I want to make four points with this essay: 1. Every single team in baseball follows a specific strategy. 2. That strategy can be easily demonstrated as ineffective. 3. There is a simple solution to fix the inefficiencies of that strategy, a solution that has the potential to dramatically improve any team, and, 4. As radical as the solution might appear, baseball is already, gradually, moving towards it. 1. Every Single Team in Baseball Follows a Specific Strategy On October 16th, 2003, Pedro Martinez was Cinderella. Everyone in Boston knew it. Prettiest girl at the ball, sure: the best damned pitcher any of us had ever seen. But when the clock struck midnight, all hell promised to break loose. We all knew it, and we prayed like crazy for the fairy godmother to save the day. I remembered his 100th pitch. It was a swinging strike to Alfonso Soriano, a pitch that ended the 7th inning of the 7th Game of the ALCS. By the time Pedro returned to the mound to throw his 101st pitch, the score was 5-2 and Boston was winning. It was risky to bring Pedro back for the 8th inning. Anyone who had watched Pedro in 2003 knew he struggled in late innings. During the year he had been his typically brilliant self, but it was well-known that he was coming off shoulder troubles the year before, and that he struggled late in games. Besides, the heart of the Yankee order was coming up, a group that had already faced Pedro three times that night, and in five other games that season. Nick Johnson was the first batter. He waited on the first five pitches, working the count full before popping out to the shortstop on pitch 107. And then all hell broke lose: Derek Jeter doubled on pitch 110. Bernie Williams singled on pitch 115. Hideki Matsui doubled on pitch 118. Jorge Posada doubled on pitch 123. The clock struck midnight. The carriage turned into a pumpkin. And Pedro Martinez, the greatest pitcher ever, was getting hit hard. Posada’s double, the fourth consecutive hit against Martinez, tied the game. Three innings later Aaron Boone finished the work, landing the Yankees in the World Series. 2. The Strategy Can Be Easily Demonstrated As Ineffective Why did Grady Little let Pedro Martinez continue to pitch? I don’t know. And frankly, I don’t really care to speculate. What is obvious to me, what was obvious to every fan in Boston who was watching that game, was that there were two very compelling reasons why Pedro shouldn’t have been pitching. 1. Each of the Yankee hitters had already batted against him three times that night, and 2. Pedro had reached 100 pitches, a strong indicator of performance decline. Letting him pitch was a bad decision. It reflected poor strategy. And what I’d like to know is: -Why does any pitcher face a batter three times in one game? For that matter, why does any pitcher face a batter twice in one game? -Why does any pitcher throw more than 100 pitches in an outing? For that matter, why does any pitcher throw more than 50 pitches in an outing? A few numbers from 2008: PA BA OBP SLG OPS 1st PA in G 108606 .255 .328 .398 .727 2nd PA in G 44505 .270 .334 .431 .765 3rd+ PA in G 34520 .282 .346 .453 .800

Last year, hitters posted a .727 OPS the first time they faced a pitcher. Their OPS went up thirty-eight points the second time the hitter faced the pitcher. It went up another thirty-five points the third plate appearance.

The same holds true in 2007. And in 1957. And every year in between. The more times a pitcher faces a hitter, the better the hitter will do.

This is a blindingly obvious truth, applicable in every facet of life. The more you do something, the better you get at it. If you take the same math test over and over again, you’re bound to get better at it. The same thing for hitting: if you see a pitcher over and over again, eventually you get better at hitting that pitcher.

A similar pattern is echoed in pitch-counts:

PA BA OBP SLG OPS Pitch 1-25 87685 .261 .333 .410 .743 Pitch 26-50 39383 .257 .326 .400 .726 Pitch 51-75 31791 .270 .333 .429 .763 Pitch 76-100 24261 .277 .344 .450 .795

Starting pitchers are less effective after pitch 50 than they are before pitch 50 (though it should be said that, at least in 2008, there was a slight decline in offense at pitches 26-50, perhaps attributable to lineup construction).

Still not convinced that pitchers are less effective the second time through a lineup? Or that a pitcher is more effective before pitch 50 than after pitch 50? I have another table.

We can all, I think, agree that starting pitchers are better than relief pitchers. There is a long list of lousy starting pitchers who became effective bullpen pitchers. In contrast, there have been very few bad relief pitchers who went on to become effective starters. Starters are better pitchers.

Yet major league hitters had a harder time hitting against relief pitchers last year:

IP BA OBP SLG OPS As Starters 28198 .269 .333 .426 .759 As Relievers 15159 .254 .333 .397 .731

This is a crucial concept to grasp for the next step: relief pitchers are less skilled than starting pitchers. Yet they are more effective against hitters? Why?

The only obvious variable is the usage pattern. Relief pitchers are used more effectively than starting pitchers.

3. There is a Simple Solution to Fix the Inefficiencies of That Strategy, a Solution That Would Dramatically Improve Any Team

The solution is simple: do away with starting pitchers.

Change the way starting pitchers are used. Instead of asking starting pitchers to pitch to 25-33 hitters every fifth or sixth day, have them throw to 8-14 hitters every third day.

For an eleven-man staff, this would require some juggling. I would suggest regrouping the pitchers as follows: take the nine best pitchers and put them into three 3-pitcher sub-rotations. These sub-rotations would be scheduled to pitch every third game, and would take turns rotating within the group as to who starts, who pitches in the middle, and who closes.

During the games, allow each pitcher of the sub-rotation one turn through the batting order. The pitcher can then pitch to the batting order a second time, so long as a) there is a platoon advantage (for instance: of the first four batters in the lineup, three are left-handed, and your pitcher is left-handed), and b) the pitcher’s pitch count is under 75. Obviously, one would be more likely to give good pitchers more additional batters than mediocre pitchers. But keep the good pitchers on a tight pitch-count.

The first nine pitchers would be one these rotating sub-rotations. The last two pitchers would be reserved for special occasions: when the game went into extra innings, or when the score was particularly one-sided score. These guys are the ‘scapegoat’ pitchers.

Let’s call it this system the 3-3-3 Rotation: three pitchers pitch three innings each, every third game. 3-3-3.

In such a system, each pitcher on the sub-teams would make about fifty-four appearances a year. If they averaged 3 innings of work during each appearance, they would throw 162 innings, a reasonable amount. This could be adjusted to give the better pitchers more innings: if the best pitchers were granted one extra innings every other start, their inning pitched count would go up to 189 innings.

As to whether or not a pitcher can endure pitching 2-4 innings every third day: I think the answer is yes: they could. Relief pitchers today do this all the time. And there is no great difference between a reliever throwing on two-, three-, or four-days rest:

2008 PA BA OBP SLG OPS Reliever, 2 Days Rest 13772 .255 .338 .393 .731 Reliever, 3 Days Rest 8049 .263 .344 .414 .759 Reliever, 4 Days Rest 4502 .255 .336 .388 .724

Relief pitchers pitching on two-days rest are just as effective as relief pitchers on three- and four-days rest.

I’m not smart enough to know exactly how well this would work, but I am confident that it would be a better allocation of pitching resources than the one being used today. Forced to estimate, I think a team could shave off 30-80 points in their opponents OPS by adopting this strategy.

A change of 50 points in OPS won’t make the worst rotation in baseball (816 OPS), comparable to the best (.683 OPS). But I do such a strategy, if applied carefully, could mean the difference between finishing .500 and playing in the postseason.

4. As radical as the solution might appear, baseball is already, gradually, moving towards it.

In one hundred years, the 3-3-3 rotation, or some variation on it, will be the norm in professional baseball. Pitchers will be trained to make shorter appearances every third day. The concept of the pitching staff will undergo a dramatic change. Statistics such as ‘wins’ and ‘saves’ will become antiquated, replaced by other statistics that can better measure this new strategy.

The reason is this: baseball is a dynamic, ever-changing entity. As such, it is subject to the same evolutionary principles that all dynamic entities are subject to: evolution. In baseball, strategies that work; strategies that aid teams in winning baseball games, those strategies endure. They thrive. The strategies that don’t help teams win baseball games die out.

In baseball, teams have been reducing the strain on pitchers for one hundred and fifty years. This has been, if not constant, at least consistent. We have fewer complete games now. We have larger rotations. Starters pitch less innings and complete fewer games. Relievers make more appearances. Everyone is making shorter appearances.

Why?

Evolutionary theory. Successful strategies endure: they are tried and then adopted and then embraced. Baseball is always moving towards increasingly successful strategies. If strategies don’t work, they aren’t used. If strategies do work, they are incorporated more and more into the game.

A strategy that doesn’t work is a three- or four-man starting rotation. A strategy that doesn’t work is letting one pitcher pitch an entire game. Those strategies have been in a steep decline for a long time.

A strategy that does work is short, frequent appearances. And the implementation of this strategy is, as one would expect, increasing. This strategy is being used more today than it was twenty years ago. It was being used more twenty years ago than forty years ago. And it will be used with even greater frequency in the future.

What Does This Mean?

I doubt that any team is going to read this article and decide to overhaul their pitching staff this year. I doubt it, but I strongly suggest that they do.

Here’s the thing: in ten years this idea won’t seem groundbreaking at all. In ten years, some teams will be tinkering with this. I daresay that some teams will have already attempted a similar structure. I say this because this is, logically, the next step in pitching strategy. Nowadays most starters don’t go past the sixth inning. How far of a jump is it to pull your starter after four innings? After three innings?

The concept of the 3-3-3 Rotation, as outlandish as it may appear, is exactly where major league baseball is heading. It is the logical conclusion to the trends of the last one hundred and fifty years.

There is a chance, right now, for a team to get ahead of the game. The door is open. The opportunity to improvement is there for whatever team is bold enough or desperate enough to defy conventional wisdom and take a chance.

(Dave Fleming is a writer living in Iowa City. He is certain that no one will ever capture the humble beauty of watching baseball in Fenway Park better than John Updike did in 1960.)