Created by: Created by: 創建 Daniel C. Howe, Helen Nissenbaum Developed by: Developed by: 開發 Vincent Toubiana



How It Works Comment ça marche? 運作方式

TrackMeNot runs as a low-priority background process that periodically issues randomized search-queries to popular search engines, e.g., AOL, Yahoo!, Google, and Bing. It hides users' actual search trails in a cloud of 'ghost' queries, significantly increasing the difficulty of aggregating such data into accurate or identifying user profiles. TrackMeNot serves as a means of amplifying users' discontent with advertising networks that not only disregard privacy, but also facilitate the bulk surveillance agendas of corporate and government agencies, as documented recently in disclosures by Edward Snowden and others. To better simulate user behavior TrackMeNot uses a dynamic query mechanism to 'evolve' each client (uniquely) over time, parsing the results of its searches for 'logical' future query terms with which to replace those already used. TrackMeNot tourne en tache de fond de votre navigateur pour lancer fréquemment des recherches sur les moteurs que vous choisissez (par exemple Yahoo!, Google ou Bing). TrackMeNot cache vos recherches dans un nuage de recherche "fantômes" afin de complexifier le profilage des utilisateurs et de le rendre inefficace. TMN sert aussi à signaler aux moteurs de recherche qui impact notre vie privée à des fins publicitaires mais aussi facilitent la surveillance de masse par les agences gouvernementales comme cela a été révélé récemment par Edward Snowden. Afin de simuler un comportement réaliste, TrackMeNot effectue des recherches dynamiques qui 'évoluent' indépendamment pour chaque client. en tache de fond de votre navigateur pour lancer fréquement des recherches sur les moteurs que vous choisissez ( par exemple Yahoo!, Google ou Bing). TrackMeNot cache vos recherches dans un nuage de recherche "phantomes" afin de complexifier le profilage des utilistaeurs et de le rendre inefficace. TMN sert aussi à signaler aux moteurs de recherche qui impact notre vie privée à des fins publicitaires mais aussi facilitent la surveillance de masse par les agences gouvernementales comme cela a été révélé récemment par Edward Snowden. Afin de simuler un comportement réaliste, TrackMeNot effectue des recherches dynamiques qui 'evoluent' indépendamment pour chaque client. TrackMeNot 在火狐(Firefox)和谷歌瀏覽器(Chrome)運行時，會以低優的後台進程向熱門的搜尋引擎，例如美國在線(AOL)、雅虎(Yahoo)、谷歌(Google)、和必應(Bing) 定期發出多個隨機的搜尋指令，以隱藏使用者真實的搜尋路徑。有了幻影指令的保護，對方要將搜集到的數據準確地轉化或組合成為用戶檔案的難度將會大大提升。TMN要道出用戶對廣告網絡的不滿，不但因它們無視私隱，廣告網絡更為企業和政府等機構的大規模監控行動提供了的便利；這些都記錄在斯諾登(Edward Snowden)和其他人近期揭露的資料中。為了提高模擬搜尋指令的像真度，TrackMeNot使用動態指令機制，每個客戶都會配備不斷演進的搜尋指令，同時按邏輯推斷合適的搜尋指令，來取代已用過的搜尋指令。







TrackMeNot is user-installed and user-managed, residing wholly on users' system and functions without the need for 3rd-party servers or services. Placing users in full control is an essential feature of TrackMeNot, whose purpose is to protect against the unilateral policies set by search companies in their handling of our personal information. TrackMeNot est complétement paramétrable par l'utilisateur (intégré à l'interface de Firefox en cliquant sur l'icône TMN). Une fois installé TMN s'exécute uniquement depuis votre navigateur sans nécessiter l'intervention de services tiers ou d'autres serveurs. Donner tous les contrôles à l'utilisateur est une des fonctionnalités primordiales de TMN. 備註：TrackMeNot 是由用戶安裝和管理（融合到Firefox的“工具”菜單中，當中包括各種簡易選項）。完成下載後，毋須經第三方的伺服器或服務支援，則可在用戶系統中運行。在搜尋引擎公司設立單方面條款情況下，由用戶完全掌控以保護個人資訊是TMN其中一大優點。



Why We Created TMN Pourquoi nous avons développé TMN 我們為甚麼要創建TMN





We are disturbed by the idea that search inquiries are systematically monitored and stored by corporations like AOL, Yahoo!, Google, etc. and may even be available to third parties. Because the Web has grown into such a crucial repository of information and our search behaviors profoundly reflect who we are, what we care about, and how we live our lives, there is reason to feel they should be off-limits to arbitrary surveillance. But what can be done?



Legal approaches -- urging legislators to support limits on access, or courts to extend Fourth Amendment protection -- might be effective, but would require orchestrated efforts by many parties. Appeals to search companies themselves seem even less hopeful as their interests, at least on the surface, are in direct conflict with such limits. Both, at best, are long term prospects.



We have developed TrackMeNot as an immediate solution, implemented and controlled by users themselves. It fits within the class of strategies, described by Gary T. Marx, whereby individuals resist surveillance by taking advantage of blind spots inherent in large-scale systems 1 . TrackMeNot may not radically alter the privacy landscape but helps to place a particularly sensitive arena of contemporary life back in the hands of individuals, where it belongs in any free society. The practice of logging user search activities and creating individual search profiles - sometimes identifiable - has received attention in mainstream press, e.g. the recent front-page New York Times article on AOL 's release of collected data on individual searchers; also this front-page New York Times Business Section article describing the User-Profiling Practices of Yahoo!, AOL, Bing & Google. We are disturbed by the idea that search inquiries are systematically monitored and stored by corporations like AOL, Yahoo!, Google, etc. and may even be available to third parties. Because the Web has grown into such a crucial repository of information and our search behaviors profoundly reflect who we are, what we care about, and how we live our lives, there is reason to feel they should be off-limits to arbitrary surveillance. But what can be done?Legal approaches -- urging legislators to support limits on access, or courts to extend Fourth Amendment protection -- might be effective, but would require orchestrated efforts by many parties. Appeals to search companies themselves seem even less hopeful as their interests, at least on the surface, are in direct conflict with such limits. Both, at best, are long term prospects.We have developed TrackMeNot as an immediate solution, implemented and controlled by users themselves. It fits within the class of strategies, described by Gary T. Marx, whereby individuals resist surveillance by taking advantage of blind spots inherent in large-scale systems. TrackMeNot may not radically alter the privacy landscape but helps to place a particularly sensitive arena of contemporary life back in the hands of individuals, where it belongs in any free society.



Les approches légales -- faire intervenir le législateur -- pourrait être efficace mais nécessiterait un effort conjoints de plusieurs parties.



Nous avons développé TrackMeNot comme une solution immédiate, configuré et contrôlé par les utilisateurs eux même. Cela correspond à une classe de stratégie définit par Gary T. Marx, comme un mécanisme de résistance des individus tirant partie des vulnérabilités des systèmes 1 . La conservation des historiques de recherches et la création de profiles a commencé à soulever un problème de vie privée lorsque AOL a diffusé les historiques de recherches de 650.000 de ses utilisateurs en Aout 2006 comme l'a révélé le New York Times Nous sommes préoccupé par les possibilité qu'offrent ces historiques de recherche qui demeurent disponibles aux moteurs de recherche tels que AOL, Yahoo!, Google, etc. et éventuellement à des tierces parties . Le Web a évolué en une énorme source d'information à laquelle nous accédons par l'intermédiaires de moteurs de recherches qui sont donc en mesure d'avoir une idée très précise de ceux qui nous intéresse. Que pouvons-nous faireLes approches légales -- faire intervenir le législateur -- pourrait être efficace mais nécessiterait un effort conjoints de plusieurs parties.Nous avons développé TrackMeNot comme une solution immédiate, configuré et contrôlé par les utilisateurs eux même. Cela correspond à une classe de stratégie définit par Gary T. Marx, comme un mécanisme de résistance des individus tirant partie des vulnérabilités des systèmes



對於美國在線、雅虎、谷歌等企業可系統地監測和存儲搜尋指令，甚至有可能提供給第三方使用，我們感到很不安。網絡已經發展成如此關鍵的訊息庫，當我們的搜尋習慣很大程度地反映了我們的身份、我們關心甚麼以及我們的生活方式，我們就有理由阻止肆意的監控。但是，我們可以怎麼辦呢？



法律途徑 –促請立法者支持限制取用，或要求法院擴大＜第四修訂案＞的保護，這可能有效，但要通過各方精心籌劃。訴諸搜尋服務供應商的成功機會似乎相當渺茫，因為這些限制影響著他們的利益。這些只能是長遠的期望。



所以我們開發了 TrackMeNot 以作即時的問題解決，由用戶自己安裝、自己管控。就如加里.馬克斯(Gary T.Marx)所主張，在階級策略下，個人可以善用大規模系統下有盲點的優勢，來抵禦監控 1 。 TrackMeNot未必可以從根本改變私隱保護的情景，但有助將一些現代生活敏感的範疇交回個人手中，這應該是屬於任何一個自由社會的。 記錄用戶的搜尋活動和儲存搜尋資料，再組建成有時可被識別的個人檔案的做法，被受主流媒體關注。近期紐約時報(New York Times)就在頭版報道 美國在線(AOL)公布搜集到的個人用戶數據 ；紐約時報亦在商業版(New York Times Business Section)頭版報道 雅虎(Yahoo)、美國在線(AOL)、必應(Bing)、和谷歌(Google)如何組建網絡用戶檔案 對於美國在線、雅虎、谷歌等企業可系統地監測和存儲搜尋指令，甚至有可能提供給第三方使用，我們感到很不安。網絡已經發展成如此關鍵的訊息庫，當我們的搜尋習慣很大程度地反映了我們的身份、我們關心甚麼以及我們的生活方式，我們就有理由阻止肆意的監控。但是，我們可以怎麼辦呢？法律途徑 –促請立法者支持限制取用，或要求法院擴大＜第四修訂案＞的保護，這可能有效，但要通過各方精心籌劃。訴諸搜尋服務供應商的成功機會似乎相當渺茫，因為這些限制影響著他們的利益。這些只能是長遠的期望。所以我們開發了 TrackMeNot 以作即時的問題解決，由用戶自己安裝、自己管控。就如加里.馬克斯(Gary T.Marx)所主張，在階級策略下，個人可以善用大規模系統下有盲點的優勢，來抵禦監控。 TrackMeNot未必可以從根本改變私隱保護的情景，但有助將一些現代生活敏感的範疇交回個人手中，這應該是屬於任何一個自由社會的。

Background Background 背景 Public awareness of the vulnerability of searches to systematic surveillance and logging by search engine companies, was initially raised in the wake of a case, initiated August 2005, in which the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a subpoena to Google for one week's worth of search query records (absent identifying information) and a random list of one million URLs from its Web index. This was cited as part of its defense of the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). When Google refused, the DOJ filed a motion in a Federal District Court to force compliance. Google argued that the request imposed a burden, would compromise trade secrets, undermine customers' trust in Google, and have a chilling effect on search activities. In March 2006, the Court granted a reduced version of the first motion, ordering Google to provide a random listing of 50,000 URLs, but denied the second motion, namely, the request for search queries.



While viewed from the perspective of user privacy this seems a good outcome, yet it does bring to light several disquieting points. First, from court documents we learn that AOL, Yahoo!, and Microsoft have complied with the government's request, though details are not given. Second, we must face the reality that logs of our online searches are in the hands of search companies and can be quite easily linked to our identities. Thirdly, it is clear we have little idea of, or say in, what can be done with these logs. While, in this instance, Google withheld such records from the Government, it would be foolish to count on this outcome in the future. Public awareness of the vulnerability of searches to systematic surveillance and logging by search engine companies, was initially raised in the wake of a case, initiated August 2005, in which the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a subpoena to Google for one week's worth of search query records (absent identifying information) and a random list of one million URLs from its Web index. This was cited as part of its defense of the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). When Google refused, the DOJ filed a motion in a Federal District Court to force compliance. Google argued that the request imposed a burden, would compromise trade secrets, undermine customers' trust in Google, and have a chilling effect on search activities. In March 2006, the Court granted a reduced version of the first motion, ordering Google to provide a random listing of 50,000 URLs, but denied the second motion, namely, the request for search queries.



While viewed from the perspective of user privacy this seems a good outcome, yet it does bring to light several disquieting points. First, from court documents we learn that AOL, Yahoo!, and Microsoft have complied with the government's request, though details are not given. Second, we must face the reality that logs of our online searches are in the hands of search companies and can be quite easily linked to our identities. Thirdly, it is clear we have little idea of, or say in, what can be done with these logs. While, in this instance, Google withheld such records from the Government, it would be foolish to count on this outcome in the future. 2005年8月的一宗事件，讓公眾意識開始醒覺到用戶因搜尋服務供應商系統性地監控和記錄搜尋者的資料而處於弱勢：美國司法部（DOJ）向谷歌發出傳票，要求遞交一個星期的搜尋指令紀錄(不包含用戶識別資料)，和隨機列出網頁索引上一百萬個網址。這原被用作證明兒童在線保護法案（COPA）的合憲性。當谷歌公司拒絕有關要求，司法部在聯邦地區法院提交動議，要求強制執行。谷歌抗辯指，司法部的做法是增加負擔，提交資料會涉及商業秘密，並降低客戶對谷歌的信任，同時對搜尋活動形成寒蟬效應。 於2006年3月，法院批准經修訂的第一項動議，谷歌只需提供五萬個網址的列表，但第二項要求遞交搜尋指令紀錄的動議則被否決。



從用戶隱私的角度來看，這似乎是一個不錯的結果，但它亦點出幾項令人不安之處。首先，從法庭文件中我們知悉到，雖然細節欠奉，但美國在線、雅虎和微軟都答應了政府的要求。其次，我們必須面對的實情是，搜尋服務供應商完全掌控我們在線搜尋的紀錄，並且可輕易地鏈接到我們的身份。再者，明顯地我們並不知道如何應對。當谷歌面對政府的要求，仍然可以秘而不宣，若指望將來會有改變，可說是相當天真。

TrackMeNot is a work in progress -- we welcome feedback from the community! TrackMeNot 是一個試用版軟件 -- 歡迎各界給予意見！！





Special thanks to the NYU Dept of Computer Science, the Media Research Lab, the Mozilla Foundation, Missing Pixel, the Portia Project, Babelzilla, Ernest Davis, Michael Zimmer, John Fanning, and Robb Bifano. licensed under

