Senin, 21 November 2016 | 15.04 WIB |

West Java is more that a mere government administrative unit. It was build over complex elements and experiences that are different for the groups that compose it, ethnically, religiously, socially, politically and historically. Relations between groups within these elements are continuously changing following the changes in power configuration. In the context of a post-Suharto Indonesia, this power configuration is even more complex and rapidly changing.

One of the issues that arose in the post Suharto Indonesia is the rise of identity politics at a previously unimaginable scale so that in many cases, it often leads to confusing conflicts. In West Java, the issue of politics of identity are mostly triggered by mounting religious sentiments. Among Muslims, groups that want to fight for their aspirations through a number of local public policies are rising. In several cases, their aspirations were successfully reached, judging by the issuance of a number of regional regulations that some are labelling as “regional sharia regulations (perda syari’ah.)”

However, outside of this formal channel, a number of mass groupings based on religion, especially Islam, are actively fighting for their aspiration through street actions that often cause tension. These groups, such as the FPI, MMI and FUI for examples, often take to the streets to voice their aspiration and even often do not hesitate to attack other groupings that they deem are in opposition. In the context of a pluralistic Indonesian society, proponents of pluralism are seeing what these groups are showing through their actions are seen as a threat.

In relations to this phenomenon, West Java often comes under the spotlight. Historically, hardline Islamic groups have a long existed in the dynamics of the society. Bandung, the capital of West Java, has long been known as a city that has given birth to hardline Islamic thinkers and organizations. One best known case is that of A. Hasan and his Persatuan Islam (Persis/Islamic Union). In the early decades of the 20th century, Persis became known as an Islamic organisation that harshly attacked various traditions of Muslim societies which it deems as not being in line with the koran and the hadiths.

Even in comparison to Muhammadiyah, Persis was much more harder on these matters. However, instead of leading to destructive conflicts, the existence of Persis in Bandung did on the contrary give birth to constructive controversies. A Hassan for example, was often involved in long debates with a number of Kiais or leaders of traditional Islam groups.

The existence of “traditional Islam” in West Java follows a rather different history compared to similar groups elsewhere in Java. In the rest of Java, proponents of traditional Islam are usually members of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) while in West Java they are split into several organizations. Besides NU which in West Java is mostly concentrated in Tasikmalaya and Cirebon according to the results of the 1955 general elections, there are other groups such as the Islamic Ummah Association (PUI) that was established by KH Abdul Halim. There is now of course, need to review the facts regarding the spread of these Islamic groups in West Java.

In the case of Bandung, this city has a number of interesting paradoxes. When linked to pluralism, especially concerning the presence of hardline Islamic groups, Bandung shows two contradicting faces. On one hand, Bandung has long been known as a leisure city and its society likes what is known in the present context as “pop culture.” But on the other hand, Bandung also provides a conducive environment for the growth of hardline Islamic groups.

Up to a certain level, this paradox remains on the surface, This, according to opinions developing within the society in Bandung, is due to the existence of another structure that has an important influence on the formation of the identity of the city of Bandung. This said structure is the presence of military centers and barracks that can be found across the city. The interest of the military is of course, oriented towards stability. Ideological background does not occupy a priority position in the hierarchy of military interests, While other cities were kept busy by the communal conflicts that accompanied the fall of the New Order, Bandung had remained relatively safe and without any serious unrest.

The notion that West Java is seen as a fertile ground for hardline Islamic groups does indeed have a strong historical precedence. One of the main historical incidents in the pre-New Order era, is the DI/TII rebellion in the 1950s. For the supporters of what is often called the “regional sharia regulations” this rebellion is seen as the precedent that showed that the idea and aspiration for an Islamic State have long roots in the West Java society. The supporters of region al sharia regulations in Tasikmalaya, for example, often use this argument to base their political struggle.

If one is to detail it more, the encounter between “Sunda” and “Islam” is a historical discourse that showed that Islamization was almost a total success in West Java. At the very least, there have been no instance of physical conflict during the Islamization process. Sociological facts showed that what is known as “syncretism” in the Javanese context, did not take root in Sunda land. This arguments, up to a certain level, is indeed essential, as if Islam and “Sunda” are two entities that have merged into one. But from another perspective, the sociological facts that point to the absence of syncretism in the Sundanese tradition, may well be read as a form of “unclarity in ideology”in the Sundanese discourse. It can be said later, that Islam was the most important factor that formed the Sundanese identity before it later had to face another discourse, that of Western modernization.

That argument can be used to understand the cosmopolitan nature of social life in cities in West Java, especially in Bandung. Another explanation came from eco-political analysts. Since colonial times, cities in West Java were where industrialization grew. This was further supported by its geographical proximity to Batavia and later to Jakarta. In the post-colonial context, life in West Javanese cities were dominated by the image of an urban middle class that is really influenced by modern culture. From this point of view, the affiliation of Sundanese people to Islam is in reality related to the “opportunity structure” provided by Islamic networks for the growth of the middle class economy.

The cosmopolitan character of the middle class still leaves room for ambiguity, such as can be found in the cultural discourse that dominates the public space in Bandung. Therefore, especially among youth, the existence of hardline Islamic groups unbending does not give rise to excessive concerns. For them, Bandung is too much a cosmopolitan city to be won over by a single identity, especially on that is inward looking. They do not seem so concerned with the issues related to primordial identities. Their identity are mostly built on a foundation of popular culture which is hybrid by nature.

Meanwhile, Cirebon is an urban center on the northern coast of West Java and in reality does not belong to the Sundanese cultural sphere. Besides that, the historical experience of the people of Cirebon also went though a rather different path than that taken by most of the rest of the West Javanese people. Culturally, Cirebon is clearly part of the Javanese cultural sphere -- Jawa Cirebonan (Cirebon type of Javanese)— but seen from the centre of Javanese culture in Jogja and Solo, Cirebon is marginal. This cultural fact, up to a certain level, goes in parallel with the political orientation and the configuration of religious groups in Cirebon.

Specifically in the context of the Islamic society, Cirebon is part of the Javanese Islamic cultural map that is based on the spread of pesantren networks. The connection between pesantrens in Cirebon with their counterparts in the rest of Java is clearly much more intensive that those between pesantrens in Sunda land with those in the rest of the island. Therefore, the orientation of Islamic groups in Carbon are mostly influenced by the leadership model of Kiais ,the leaders of the pesantrens. However, the changes that took place in the post New Order era is a factor that can often bring surprises and thus, the old mapping as described earlier may not necessarily hold anymore.

In the context of pluralism, Bandung and Cirebon are two entities with different characters. Besides the long term arguments as have been state earlier, there are also short term factors — borrowing the term from Gerry van Klinken — influencing the communalism discourse in post-New Order Indonesia. If the threats against pluralism are assumed to come from the escalation in identity politics that is based on communalism (especially religious and ethnic), then it is imperative that an answer be quickly found to the questions of what are these short term factors and how do they work.

By: Amin Mudzakkir, Researcher at LIPI.

Bahasa Indonesia version of this article has been published in NU Online as a part of Wahid Foundation's Media Syndication Program.