U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson finally met with his NATO foreign ministry counterparts in Brussels last week. As expected, Tillerson reiterated long-standing demands that NATO members to spend more on their armed forces.

But while Tillerson flew to Belgium to deliver that message, he missed an important opportunity to reassure America’s allies that the U.S. will firmly stand by its commitment to hold Russia accountable for invading Ukraine.

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A year ago observers would not have pinned the United States as the wobbly partner in the effort to get Russia to change course, but the fact is President Donald Trump’s disparagement of NATO and rumors that the White House may be willing to forgive Russian aggression in return for counter-terrorism cooperation have undermined Western confidence in American leadership.

The context here is important: if we look at the last year and a half, there have been a few times when things have been looking up for Vladimir Putin’s government, as it looked like cracks were appearing in the wall of opposition to his foreign policy that the U.S. erected in 2014. For example:

In January 2016, Canada’s government announced it was going to resume formal relations with Moscow, in an effort to find the right balance between working with Russia while standing by its commitments to Ukraine. This lead to concerns inside Canada that Ottawa might be willing to implicitly trade sanctions relief (or hold off on further sanctions) in return for cooperation with Moscow in the Arctic. While the Canadian government ultimately did not lift any Ukraine-related sanctions, many saw the episode as evidence that the Liberal government was not as committed to holding the Kremlin to account as its predecessors were.

In June 2016 the UK voted to leave the EU. This immediately weakened Europe’s hand by effectively removing a Kremlin-sceptical voice from its foreign policy debates and by forcing Westminster and Brussels to focus their efforts on domestic and internal European matters for the foreseeable future. With the UK gone from the EU, and Europe unable to shake their economic doldrums, the possibility Brussels loosening its sanctions against Moscow increased.

Finally, last December, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe tried to woo Vladimir Putin with suggestions that Tokyo might want to prioritize economic relations and make headway on resolving the Kuril Islands issue. President Putin suggested that Prime Minister Abe revisit Japan’s sanctions on Moscow if he wanted better relations on other fronts. While Abe did not take the offer, Putin’s intent was clear.

Now, in all three cases governments held the line and despite showing signs that they might change policy, have stuck to the principle that while invading, annexing, and dismantling neighbouring countries may have been acceptable in the past, the world is far less tolerant of it today.

President Trump Donald John TrumpTrump says he doesn't think he could've done more to stop virus spread Conservative activist Lauren Witzke wins GOP Senate primary in Delaware Trump defends claim coronavirus will disappear, citing 'herd mentality' MORE’s Russia imbroglio is only the last (but not least) episode in which the sanctions coalition looks vulnerable. Add to this Europe’s inward focus — whether on the potentially combustible migrant issue, lurking risks in the continent’s financial sector, or upcoming elections in Germany and France that could further upset the continent’s politics — and some would say the Kremlin’s prospects for turning cracks into fissures — and then into glaring divides in the sanctions coalition — look good.

A substantive effort by Secretary Tillerson to reassure some of America’s oldest allies — beyond boilerplate language about NATO’s role in blocking Russian military aggression, or that the U.S. “will uphold” their commitments to the alliance — would have gone a long way towards assuaging allies’ concerns about the White House’s reliability. It would be folly if for the U.S. to dismantle — deliberately or accidentally — the coalition it put together, especially after that coalition has weathered several tough patches.

Tillerson should have gone beyond bromides not just because confidence in the U.S. is waning, but for two other reasons as well.

The first is that if we look beyond NATO, several countries from the Atlantic to the Pacific seem to be slowly coalescing around a finely balanced Russia policy: engage on issues of mutual interest, but hold the Kremlin to account for its invasion and annexation of Crimea and its involvement in Ukraine’s civil war. This means eschewing outright hostility towards the Kremlin, and working with Russia on a selective basis, but only removing sanctions when Russian troops and guns leave Ukraine.

It is neither a matter of “going soft” on Russia, nor is it Cold War-style containment. However, if diplomatic and economic measures fail, then the U.S. can be sure that calls from NATO members to further bolster the alliance will be loud, clear, and persistent.

The second reason is that American credibility on Russia will affect Washington’s ability to tackle other big foreign policy challenges. The Trump administration has made holding China accountable for a range of policy decisions, ranging from how it trades with the U.S., to Beijing’s seizure (and militarization) of islands, reefs, and shoals in the South China Sea.

If Washington wants to take a more assertive stance towards Beijing, they’ll find much more success if China believes that it is dealing with an American government that honors past promises and stands by its allies. Forgiving Russia for its invasion of Ukraine today will signal to Beijing that national security issues of supposed paramount importance can in fact be bargained away for limited cooperation on the small stuff. Despite Tillerson’s warm words for Beijing this past week, he has called China’s behavior in the South China Sea “extremely worrisome,” and suggested that the US has “got to show back up in the region with our traditional allies in Southeast Asia.”

If the U.S. wants its allies to back it in Asia, then backing its allies elsewhere is not only the right thing, but the smart thing too. Washington can’t have it both ways.

Simon Palamar is a research associate and expert on North American relations at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). He is currently leading several projects within conflict management and continues to manage CIGI’s work in the areas of emerging global security issues.

The views of contributors are their own and not the views of The Hill.