In a recent Washington Post op-ed, Yoav Fromer argues that the Middle East does not have too little democracy, but too much. His argument is that illiberal democrats like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Benjamin Netanyahu are the consequence of unbridled democracy.

With regard to this particular region, the Middle East, this has become a popular position among both (western) conservatives and liberals. The former are disappointed by the failures of neoconservative invasions – which not just failed to bring a domino effect in the region but didn’t even democratize the invaded countries (eg Iraq and Libya). The latter, meanwhile, have lost hope after the Arab spring, which turned out to be more winter than spring, with the possible exception of Tunisia.

The open defense of undemocratic liberalism, particularly for non-western countries, was most eloquently and forcefully expressed by Fareed Zakaria, in his New York Times bestseller The Future of Democracy: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, which is now mainly referred to as the origin of the controversial term “illiberal democracy.” It became widespread after the failed Iraq war, often in combination with an orientalist interpretation of non-western countries and regions.

But at least since 2016, the defense of undemocratic liberalism is no longer restricted to “less developed” cultures in the western periphery. Nor is it limited to the right. In the wake of Brexit and Trump, many liberals have been arguing that, in the words of Fromer: “Instead of moderating extremism, the will of the majorities in these countries has been driving it.” Turns out that if the choice is between democracy and liberalism, for a growing group of self-declared liberal democrats their prime allegiance is to the latter.

Some remainers have argued that Brexit proves that referendums are dangerous for “democracy” because certain issues are “too important” or “too complex” for people to understand and therefore to vote on. The irony, of course, is that issues like EU membership are among many other complex issues that voters have to decide upon in national elections.

In the US, liberals are trying to come to terms with the Trump administration by obsessing over alleged Russian interference and “fake news” distributed by manipulated social media in a new, so-called “post-truth” world. Whatever the particular danger of choice, the response is almost always a demand for less choice, less freedom, less democracy.

The rise of illiberal democracy, and in certain cases illiberal autocracies, is indeed one of the big challenges of the 21st century. Attacks on critical and independent NGOs in Hungary and Israel, for instance, must be criticized and sanctioned without any compromise – but they are not, neither by the EU, nor by the US. Similarly, outcomes of elections that are fundamentally unfair and unfree, such as in Russia and Venezuela, should not be treated as democratic or as as a basis of legitimate government.

Undemocratic liberalism is therefore not the solution to illiberal democracy; it is its main cause

But to successfully fight illiberal democracy, you have to understand its main causes. Each country has its own particularly national circumstances that are often unique (at least in their national configurations). But in the western world, the creeping undemocratic liberalism of our age plays a major role in the rise of illiberal democracy in general, and populism in particular.

What is undemocratic about liberalism today? Consider that, over decades, democratically elected national governments have overseen an unprecedented exodus of democratic power at the national, but also the international, level. Crucial economic and financial powers were externalized to independent institutions, like central banks, governed by technocrats and without significant democratic oversight. Similarly, many controversial issues were legalized out of politics, such as abortion or the death penalty, never to be campaigned on again.

While these decisions were democratic in purely procedural terms – ie democratically elected politicians decided upon them – they were often taken without open and sustained political and public discussions. In fact, some of these positions were not even openly advocated in the programs of the parties that implemented them in government. Hence, they were democratic in form, not in spirit.

Undemocratic liberalism is therefore not the solution to illiberal democracy; it is its main cause. If we are really serious about liberal democracy, and indeed want it all, we have to fight both illiberal democracy and undemocratic liberalism. We have to politicize (and repolitize) every major issue, even if we sometimes, perhaps temporarily, decide to have them administered by technocrats.

This means that we go beyond Tina (there is no alternative) politics and reintroduce ideology into politics. There are always alternatives, but within certain ideological parameters, these are less attractive. That should be the message in defense of the banning of abortion or the death penalty, for EU membership and free speech, not Tina or “this is a too complex issue”.

Before we throw away the baby with the bathwater, we should honestly and openly reevaluate the past and reassess the strengths and weaknesses of our policies, ie both the goals and the means. And we must accept that undemocratic liberalism is not the solution to illiberal democracy – it is its main cause and an equally serious threat to liberal democracy. In short, we need more rather than less democracy.