India’s civil services need a revamp. We should start with the IAS.

This June, around half a million youngsters across the country will attempt the preliminary test of the Civil Services Examinations, popularly known as the ‘IAS Exam,’ conducted by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). It will start a year-long process of selection, including a comprehensive main examination of multiple papers, and an interview for final recruitment of around 1000 officers in Central and All-India Civil Services. Considering the difficulty levels of the exam, and the tiny proportion of applicants who make it as final recruits, the exam is considered one of India’s toughest. The ones who clear it are hailed as India’s brightest.

While these are the men and women who will run 21st-century India, the civil services themselves are outdated. They follow a structure that the British created in the middle of the nineteenth century, and it is outdated today. In particular, we need to rethink the IAS.

History and Evolution

Most countries recruit their civil servants through some form of competition, usually written examinations. The system followed in India is a legacy of the colonial Indian Civil Service, where young men educated in Britain wrote lengthy essays on various subjects ranging from European history to Greek language and literature to work as a civil servant in India. The ICS gave way to the IAS – the Indian Administrative Service – and over the years, the exam pattern was regularly updated to make the services modern and more inclusive.

The core nature and structure of the civil service, captained by the IAS, has not changed. Despite massive administrative reforms in the United Kingdom and many other former colonies, the bureaucracy in India continues to be a relic. It is an archaic system designed for a poor colonial state now struggling to catch up in a democracy and a major economy. There have even been a few calls for the abolition of the IAS, such as by the journalist Mihir Sharma. These are no doubt revolutionary ideas, but even if abolishing it seems a drastic measure, there is no doubt that it needs urgent reform. Let’s take a look at how the system works today to understand why.

Generalist selection for specialist roles

The Civil Services in India are multiples services, some of them called ‘Central’ services (such as Foreign, Revenue and Railways which pertain to the Union Government) and others called the ‘All-India’ services – the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS) – which pertain to both State and Union governments.

Selection after the examinations is followed by allotment to a particular service based on the rank of the candidate. The exam, however, is not designed to recruit for the specific needs of various services. For example, it does not test a flair for languages for selection to the Foreign Service, physical fitness or observational skills for the Police Service, accountancy skills for the Revenue Service, and so on. What the exam does test, instead, is the ability to write long answers to questions on a wide range of general topics and on a special ‘optional’ subject chosen by the candidate from a menu card of options ranging from Physics to Psychology, and from Tamil Literature to Public Administration. This is then followed by an equally generic and one-size-fits-all interview stage.

Any graduation degree is the minimum qualification to write the civil service exams, and all candidates essentially write the same general exam, irrespective of the services they might end up in. Hard work through a long period of slogging for the exam helps, no doubt, but one cannot discount other factors like performance on the day of the examination, subjective marking and sheer luck either.

Selection and allotment to a service is completely unrelated to the subjects of one’s graduation, specialization, previous work experience, or even interests. Based on the ranks attained in this one common exam, a mechanical engineer can become a diplomat in the IFS, a chartered accountant can become a policewoman in the IPS, and a veterinarian doctor can become a tax administrator in the IRS, irrespective of whether they ever wanted to be any of these things or not. Although most end up sticking to their new professions, in most cases it was neither their first choice nor the line of career that they were best suited for. Unless of course, they scored a few marks higher and got their first choice – which, in most cases, is the IAS.

IAS – the preferred choice

What makes the IAS the top choice for most civil service aspirants? As a generalist service, the IAS offers a wider variety of work and powers than the other specialist services. Early in their careers, IAS officers are entrusted with administrative powers for the maintenance of law and order, revenue collection, implementing development works and social schemes and performing quasi-judicial functions in districts. Preserving its colonial legacy, the elite status of the IAS officer is maintained with privileges in housing, transport, facilities and a sizeably large staff and retinue to assist. Indeed, this is justified by pointing to the nature of workload and an otherwise lack of comfortable lifestyle in a remote district. It is understandable why such a career, which commands awe and respect – even demigod-like treatment in some cases – can be so attractive for an average Indian youth raised in an essentially hierarchical society.

Not accountable to the people

The District Collector – a post reserved exclusively for the IAS – is the Chief Executive of a district in India. Entrusted with immense responsibilities and commensurate powers, a District Collector supervises departments of the administration, collects revenue, controls the police, presides over elections, looks after supply of essential goods and services, handles relief during natural disasters or unnatural crises and can even shut down an entire district.

Even in most cities, it is an IAS officer who is the Municipal Commissioner, who as the Chief Executive of the city heads the city office and looks after day-to-day administration. This is unlike most developed democracies, which have elected mayors to govern their cities and counties with civil servants to aid and assist.

It may not be an exaggeration to say that their equivalents in the State and the Union are the Chief Minister and Prime Minister. But while the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister are accountable to the electorate, routinely face elections and can be kicked out of office for poor performance by the electorate, the same does not hold not true for the District Collector or Municipal Commissioner. Article 311 of the Constitution, which is meant to protect civil servants from political interference, guarantees them job security and promotions, in many cases, despite incompetence or below average performance. In short, an IAS officer, as a Collector in the district or Municipal Commissioner in the city, is an unelected administrator, not directly accountable to the citizens.

Dominance of Generalists

After spending a good decade or so in the districts, IAS officers move into Secretariats, where they run the Ministries and Departments of the State and Union governments. Senior policy-making roles in government Ministries are available for all services – State as well as Central – but it is the IAS, with its historical advantage in pay and promotions, that is able to monopolize the most senior roles. This results in a stunting of the professional growth of officers in other services, however talented, meritorious or hard-working. This means that one could have spent a lifetime as a police or intelligence officer, but can never rise to become the Home Secretary. The same goes for the post of the Revenue Secretary which has always been occupied by an IAS officer, and never someone from the IRS who has spent a lifetime understanding the ins and outs of taxation in the country. In all likelihood, a non-IAS officer would spend the sunset years of her service reporting to an IAS officer of a junior batch. And no amount of merit or hard work throughout their career can change their fate, sealed by an exam they wrote 30 years ago.

In discussions on administrative reforms, a strong case is often made for lateral entry or recruitment from the private sector at various levels to have government departments managed by domain experts. However, such proposals have always been opposed by existing bureaucracy keen to protect its turf. It is rather obvious that the IAS leadership of the bureaucracy, which opposes competition from other civil services, would scuttle any proposal of lateral entry that threatens their monopoly.

A much-needed overhaul

Abolishing the IAS would be seen as a revolutionary move, even disruptive, but you can’t make an omelette without breaking some eggs. It must not be forgotten that the colonial predecessor of the IAS – the Indian Civil Service – was established by the British Raj to rule India from a distant land through officers loyal to the Crown. The structures were made to adequately distance the elite rulers from the people while enjoying high power and maintaining status quo. The IAS perpetuates the status quo designed in its favour, and ensures that multiple responsibilities and vast powers are concentrated into the hands of a few non-specialists.

Moreover, unlike the IAS, services such as the IFS, IPS, and IRS perform the sovereign functions of the state – diplomacy, law & order and tax administration, respectively. Therefore there is justifiable cause for retaining and even strengthening these specialist services. But as we’ve seen, the current system of recruitment through written examinations tests neither the aptitude nor the inclination for working in these services. It is assumed that the common generalist exam looks for trainability so that any service-specific skills and knowledge required for the job can be imparted during training or picked while working.

The UPSC would do well to conduct separate exams for each service, drawing candidates who have some degree of desired skills or knowledge of the subject, and, most importantly, interest in the job they might end up in. This will have our youth entering, say, the Indian Police Service because they really want to become IPS officers, and not because they missed the IAS by a few marks.

A maturing democracy must show the way to further devolution of powers to districts, cities and towns, strengthening elected representatives and reducing the discretionary powers of unelected bureaucrats. There will surely be some major roadblocks for this to happen, such as obstruction by the State government which may not want to lose its control over local body governments. The bigger roadblock, however, would be erected by the IAS itself, as any attempt to curb their present power would naturally be fought tooth and nail. It is evident then, that any desirable administrative reform – at the top or bottom levels – would not be possible because of the mere existence of the IAS.

Even if abolition of a service like the IAS with established institutions and practices is impractical, there is no reason why there should be no administrative reform unless one favours the status quo. Many governments outside India have replaced their permanent tenured civil service with hiring on contract-basis. Lateral entry of specialists from the private sector, a common practice outside India, is an idea repeatedly made by policy experts. After all, if one has entered the civil service through competition, there should be no fear of competition at higher levels.

A Blueprint

So what would an overhauled or reformed system look like? Local self-government bodies, cities to begin with, would be run by popularly elected leaders calling the shots, and not a civil servant. Their performance would be measured by the citizens during elections instead of an appraisal report by a superior. Think of the successful mayors around the world – Rudy Giuliani of New York, Ken Livingstone of London or Enrique Penalosa of Bogota – who were rewarded with re-election by their electorate because of their performance. Elected governments at all levels – union, state and city – would continue to depend on civil servants, but they would have the liberty to bring in experts to aid and assist them.

Finally, what does this mean for the thousands of youngsters who will be attempting the civil services exams this year? This is surely not meant to discourage them. Until the administration and particularly the civil services are not truly reformed, they will continue to attract youngsters for the power, prestige and status they provide as a career, not to forget the tremendous potential of serving the people and the government. After all, one cannot deny the fact that a career in the IAS is one of the most enriching and exciting ones in our country. However, its relevance in a modern democracy needs to be questioned and re-examined.