This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The SMM facilitated a local ceasefire that enabled workers to repair water pipelines in Donetsk region. A meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group working group on security ended without agreement on weapons withdrawal plans.

The overall security situation at and around “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk airport (11km north-west of Donetsk) was relatively calm, with less ceasefire violations observed by the SMM than during the previous day[1]. The SMM, from its position at the JCCC observation point at Donetsk railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), heard a total of 11 explosions and three or four bursts of small-arms and light-weapons (SALW) fire during the morning. The JCCC representatives at the observation point jointly told the SMM that there had been no ceasefire violations between 18:00 on 3 August and 08:30hrs on 4 August.

At a meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group working group on security in Minsk, chaired by the SMM Chief Monitor, the sides were unable to reach an agreement on a common draft of the plan to withdraw tanks, artillery systems below 100mm calibre, and mortars up to and including 120mm calibre. After a total of 24 hours of negotiations, the sides failed to reach an agreement as to the way weaponry is to be pulled back within the draft plan.

The SMM continued to facilitate a local ceasefire between the sides in order to enable workers from Voda Donbassa to repair the water pipeline between government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 10 July 2015). After arrival at the site with representatives of Voda Donbassa, “DPR” “emergency services” and JCCC officers from the Russian Federation, the SMM was informed by the Ukrainian side that ceasefire assurances had been withdrawn. Following this, all parties withdrew from the area temporarily. After SMM facilitation of intensive negotiations on both sides, the ceasefire arrangement was re-established and repair work resumed. At 13:40hrs, the SMM heard a burst of SALW from approximately 700m north-west of its position, for which no side claimed responsibility. Repairs continued despite the incident.

In “DPR”-controlled Spartak (10km north of Donetsk), the SMM facilitated a local ceasefire so that Voda Donbassa workers could continue repair of the water pipeline (see SMM Daily Report 4 August 2015). Despite sporadic explosions during the day at distances of between 1 and 3km north-east (and one to the south-west) of the pipeline between 10:40 and 10:55hrs, the repair work was completed.

According to the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander at the JCCC observation point in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (55km north-east of Donetsk), the government-controlled areas of Luhanske (57km north-east of Donetsk), Myronovskyi (56km north-east of Donetsk) and Svitlodarsk (55km north-east of Donetsk) had been shelled on 2 August, as a result of which two soldiers had died and 12 had been wounded. In Luhanske (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed shrapnel damage to three houses and saw a crater near a gas line. Crater analysis was impossible as repair work had begun.

A resident in Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) told the SMM that civilians can now pass through a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol). The Ukrainian Armed Forces later confirmed this to the SMM. Previous restrictions on movement through that checkpoint meant that residents faced at least three hours of travel to reach Mariupol (see SMM Daily Report 15 June 2015).

In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard two outgoing rounds from mortars or grenade launchers, 500m north of its position. At the same time, the SMM also heard two bursts of automatic machine-gun fire. Immediately following that, the SMM was approached by a vehicle carrying two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, who said that they had fired the machine-gun rounds as they had come under sniper fire.

At a “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) checkpoint near the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east from Luhansk), the SMM saw two unexploded mortars protruding from the ground, 39 new craters caused by 82mm calibre mortar, grenade launcher ammunition, and one crater caused by a 120mm calibre mortar. Analysis of craters showed the direction of fire to have been from the north. At 09:58hrs, the SMM heard a single grenade explode on the government-controlled side of the bridge. At 10:39hrs, the SMM heard 35-40 small-arms rounds outgoing from “LPR”- to government-controlled areas. The SMM left the area.

The SMM spoke with four women (aged between 40 and 60 years) in government-controlled Markivka (108km north of Luhansk), who said that Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had stopped ten male civilians, brought them to the Markivka district recruitment centre and registered them for mobilisation. According to them, the process had taken place without the presence of police or representatives of the local administration. The SMM went to Markivka hospital and spoke with four men (ranging in age from twenties to forties) awaiting pre-mobilisation medical examination. All said they had been stopped in the street or located at their work place by armed soldiers. Later, the head of recruitment centre told the SMM that he had instructed the Ukrainian Armed Forces to bring in the men for mobilisation, without the presence of police or local authorities, upon direction from recruitment headquarters in Sievierodonetsk.

The SMM revisited one Ukrainian Armed Forces and five “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas whose locations comply with the respective withdrawal lines. Although weapons held at the Ukrainian Armed Forces site carried no serial numbers, the SMM noted that the number and type of weapons matched what had been previously recorded. The SMM noted all weapons previously recorded at two “DPR” sites were in situ. At a third site “DPR” members prevented the SMM from close observation of serial numbers*. At a fourth site, “DPR” guards allowed only two SMM members to enter* and see weapons from a distance of 10-15m.* At a fifth “DPR” site, the serial number of one weapon did not match the number the SMM had previously recorded.

Near Velyki Mosty (50km north of Lviv) the SMM observed 100 employees (mostly women) of the JSC Lviv coal company blocking a road. According to trade union representatives, on 3 August workers received 10% of their salary from January and 30% of February’s salary. The protest ended at 13:00hrs when the head of the district administration and the company manager invited protestors for talks.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Most areas along the Ukraine-Russian Federation international border, particularly those controlled by the “LPR”, have ordinarily been placed off limits to the SMM.

Denied access:

At a heavy weapons holding area, “DPR” guards allowed only two SMM members to enter. In addition, the two SMM members were allowed to see weapons only from a distance.

Delay:

At a “DPR” checkpoint in Donetsk city the SMM was stopped by a “DPR” member who delayed the patrol for ten minutes.

The SMM was stopped at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) and informed that it could not continue. Following a 15 minute delay the SMM was allowed to proceed.

At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near government-controlled Marinka (23km west of Donetsk) the SMM was asked for the nationality of the patrol leader. The SMM was then allowed to proceed after five minutes delay.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.