Last August, the Mets began to play Matt den Dekker and Wilmer Flores on a regular basis. den Dekker had the larger part of a platoon in left while Flores essentially played every day, seeing time at shortstop and second base. The duo was more productive than anyone else the club trotted out during the 2014 campaign at the trouble spots of LF and SS. Here were their numbers once they started getting consistent playing time:

MDD – .290/.392/.374 for a .766 OPS in 125 PA

WF – .258/.295/.411 for a .706 OPS in 174 PA

A .392 OBP like den Dekker’s would be the sixth-best mark in the majors while Flores’ .153 ISO would be the fourth-best mark among full-time shortstops. In other words, both players put up impressive numbers in their extended tryouts, even if you could go, “yeah but…” and tear apart both guys if you so desired.

Following the early offseason news, it appears the Mets are willing to live with Flores at shortstop but consider getting a corner outfielder the top priority. Part of this is because it’s generally easier to find a big bat to play the outfield than it is to find one to play shortstop. But it seems to me that a larger part is the belief that what Flores produced is more valuable or perhaps more repeatable than what den Dekker did.

The latter belief is true as den Dekker posted a .360 BABIP in his extended tryout while Flores had just a .253 mark in the category. But for a second, let’s ignore the BABIP aspect – don’t worry, we’ll come back to it – and examine the actual production of what they delivered between the white lines.

We’ll look at WPA, which stands for Win Probability Added. Up front, let it be known that WPA is descriptive and not predictive. WPA tells you what happened, not what’s likely to happen in the future. A player can have a great (or terrible) WPA one season and turn around and deliver the exact opposite the following season. Here’s part of the definition from FanGraphs:

“While wOBA rates all home runs as equal, we know intuitively that a home run in the third inning of a blowout is less important to that win than a home run in the bottom of the ninth inning of a close game. Win Probability Added (WPA) captures this difference by measuring how individual players affect their team’s win expectancy on a per-play basis.

For example, say the Rays have a 45% chance of winning before Ben Zobrist comes to the plate. During his at-bat, Zobrist hits a home run, pushing the Rays’ win expectancy jumps to 75%. That difference in win expectancy (in decimal form, +.30) from the beginning of the play to the end is Ben Zobrist’s WPA for that play. If Zobrist strikes out during his next at bat and lowers his team’s win expectancy by 5%, his overall WPA for the game so far would be +.30 – .05 = +.25, as WPA is a counting statistic and is additive.”

In judging the value of what two players delivered in a certain past time period, WPA is the perfect stat to use. We’re looking for a statistic to describe what happened in the past, not one to project what will happen in the future.

From August 10th to the end of the season, den Dekker delivered a 1.36 WPA while Flores recorded a 0.19 WPA from August 7th forward. Most advanced stats are denoted in terms of runs. But as you probably already figured out, WPA is recorded in wins. So, despite having 49 fewer plate appearances in this counting statistic, den dekker’s production was over a full win better.

In other words den Dekker’s actual offensive output in contributing to wins was better and it wasn’t close.

A baseball season is six months long. These numbers were over a two-month span, so if we were to extrapolate these to a full season, den Dekker would have a 4.08 WPA if he maintained this level of production for an entire year. Curtis Granderson led the Mets with a 2.49 WPA last year and Lucas Duda was right on his heels with a 2.46 mark.

Now, it’s obvious that a bigger number here is preferable. What’s not so obvious is what makes for a good WPA number. If you clicked on the link to the WPA definition above, you would see a chart putting season long WPA numbers in context. A 1.0 WPA is considered average with a 3.0 WPA being considered great.

What den Dekker did when given a chance late last year was extremely valuable. And this doesn’t even take into account that he was batting in a sub-optimal spot in the order for most of this stretch. In the six games he started and hit first, den Dekker notched a 0.51 WPA. In his last 15 games as a leadoff hitter, Juan Lagares had a 0.26 WPA.

Okay, perhaps you are convinced that what den Dekker produced last year was great. But you’re still not sold on him because you know that WPA is not predictive and you’re alarmed by his .360 BABIP. That’s certainly a valid position to take.

A .360 BABIP is definitely elevated and you should not predict a .360 BABIP for anyone. But one thing to keep in mind is that den Dekker fits the profile of a player who should have a high BABIP. He hits a lot of line drives, runs fast and gets more than his share of infield hits. Using an xBABIP calculator on FanGraphs, we see that den Dekker’s batted ball profile indicates a BABIP of .348, which means his extended tryout number was elevated but not ridiculously so when we consider how he hits the ball.

The same calculator produces a .309 xBABIP for Flores.

Obviously we are dealing with small samples, and in that sample one player exceeded expectations (as calculated by xBABIP) and the other underperformed. The offensive difference between them is not as great as the numbers would indicate. Having said that, let’s examine the difference:

den Dekker Flores OPS .766 .706 wOBA .349 .314 wRAA 3.7 0.5 wRC+ 127 103 WPA 1.36 0.19

The wOBA number for den Dekker is considered above average while the mark for Flores is below average. The wRC+ number is a hair beneath what is considered great for den Dekker and average for Flores. And we know OPS overvalues slugging, the component that Flores holds a decided advantage, and undervalues on-base percentage.

The Book estimates you should multiply OBP * 1.7 and then add to slugging for a truer value. Phil Birnbaum has done research that suggests it’s even higher than that. Using the 1.7 factor, we get den Dekker holding a 127-point edge.

Just look at the wording used to describe den Dekker’s play during his extended tryout. It ranges from above average to great. And this isn’t me picking words out of the air but rather rules of thumb benchmarks that den Dekker reached once he reworked his swing and was given a chance to play regularly.

The doubters will answer everything with the cry of small sample. And they’re right. But it’s curious how the small sample argument is applied differently to Flores and den Dekker. Somehow, despite a history of performing better in his second crack at a level, when den Dekker does just that in the majors, it’s dismissed as a small sample. But Flores looks okay defensively in a small sample and that’s enough to grant him a starting job at the most important defensive position in fair territory.

UZR really liked what it saw defensively from Flores at shortstop last year. DRS saw him as below average. The two systems had a significant difference in what they thought of his range. This is not so unusual. Generally, you need more innings for defensive numbers to stabilize and Flores only played about one-third of a season at shortstop.

There’s a reasonable chance that Flores is an average defensive shortstop. However, if asked to wager, my money would be on den Dekker repeating his .360 BABIP over a full season than Flores duplicating his 12.5 UZR/150 at shortstop over an entire year.

We know Sandy Alderson tried to acquire a shortstop last year and found the price, either in dollars or trade assets, too high. Perhaps this experience is influencing the decision to make acquiring a corner outfield a bigger priority than getting a shortstop. And that’s certainly something to consider.

If the rationale for making an outfield acquisition the top offseason priority is the cost/scarcity factor, then that’s a legitimate reason. But saying that Flores’ small samples are acceptable and den Dekker’s are not is not a valid position. When you take their entire professional career into account, there’s more reason to think den Dekker can be an asset offensively than to think that Flores can be one defensively at shortstop.

And while Flores’ numbers took off offensively once he received regular playing time, they were inferior to the ones den Dekker put up when he got his chance. It’s nothing special for an OF to be better offensively than a SS. Yet people are thinking that what Flores produced was better and it simply was not.

For me, the bottom line is if that Flores can produce a .700 OPS, he’s likely an asset at short unless his defense is horrible. And if den Dekker can produce an OBP of .370 or above, he would be right up there with the best leadoff hitters in team history, along with the sublime first half of 2011 by Jose Reyes and Rickey Henderson‘s magical 1999 season.

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