Sometimes, in my more conspiratorially-minded moments, I look back on all the awful moves Donald Rumsfeld made as Defense Secretary – and wonder whether the guy wasn't actually an Iranian mole, sent to sabotage

America's military from within. Chill out, neocons, chill: I'm only joking. I think.

I'm reading In the Graveyard of Empires, Seth Jones' forthcoming book about Afghanistan. And every few pages, there's another story of Rummy undermining the American effort there. Some of the tales are, by now, well-known – like shifting CIA and U.S. military assets from Afghanistan to Iraq as early as November, 2001. Others are new, at least to me.

In June 2006, for instance, Major General Robert Durbin was trying to get the funds to expand the training of Afghan police – to make sure a growing insurgency didn't get any bigger. He succeeded eventually, despite resistance from Secretary Rumsfeld.

Seven months earlier, when the Afghans wanted to expand their army, "Rumsfeld read us the riot act," one participant tells Jones. Rummy rejected requests for an Afghan Army of 70,000. Instead, he thought an army with about 50,000 troops was "more reasonable." If Afghans wanted any more soldiers, they'd have to find someone else to pay for it.

Today, Afghanistan's insurgents are in a much stronger position. Now the plan is to grow the 134,000-strong Afghan National Army to 260,000 – and expand a force of 80,000 cops to 140,000. Thanks again, Rummy.

UPDATE: Leave Rummy alone! Keith Urbahn, former Pentagon speechwriter and current Rumsfeld spokesman, disagrees with this post – rather strongly. His comments, after the jump.

*I don't know who gets it wrong, you reporting on the views of Seth Jones, Seth Jones reporting on the views of a two-star general, or a two-star general reporting on the views of someone else, but somewhere in your three- or four-man game of telephone, the transmission – and the facts – get lost. * The reality was that there was no one pushing harder for improving the capabilities and expanding the numbers in of the Afghan National Army and Afghan Police in the leadership of the Defense Department and probably the Bush administration than Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld wanted the burdens of maintaining security and executing a counterinsurgency shifted from U.S. troops to Afghans in Afghanistan and Iraqis in Iraq, and made expanding the security forces of both nations militaries and police forces among the highest of priorities. In mid-2006, Rumsfeld supported expanding the ANA to 70,000 and a step up in the size of the police force, though there were concerns about the sustainability of a large force in a relatively poor nation over the long-term – concerns that remain to this day. He continues to believe that increasing the size and capability of the Afghan security forces is one the keys to mounting a successful counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban. *

Urbahn says he has " no specific knowledge" of the earlier meeting Jones describes in his book. But, anyway, "I do know that what you're suggesting was Rumsfeld's view in 2006 - and stretching back to 2005 and well before - is 180

degrees from what was actually his view."

Other reports at the time say that the Defense Department pushed back over the expansion of the Afghan army. "Against Kabul's objections, the U.S. military hopes to cut the planned end-strength of the Afghan defense sector by more than 25 percent;

rather than building the 70,000-man force previously agreed upon, the goal is now 50,000," wrote the American Enterprise Institute's Vance

Serchuk. He didn't name Rumsfeld specifically as the force behind the reduced goal. It very well could have been someone else.

Also, it's interesting to note that two weeks after Rumsfeld's departure from the Pentagon was announced, the commander on the ground in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, proposed an acceleration of the plan to expand the Afghan army. Instead of getting to 70,000 men by 2011, he and Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak called for fielding a 70,000-member Afghan army by October 2008. Again, this may or may not have had anything to do with Rumsfeld.

Anyway, my favorite moment in my e-mail exchange with Urbahn came this morning, when I was in the middle of interviews for another piece.

"Are you going to append my comments?" he wrote. "I think if you're going to accuse

Rumsfeld of 'blowing the war in Afghanistan' and do it on spurious grounds, that's your prerogative, but if you're a professional journalist and not a two-bit blogger, I think you at least owe the reader the other side."

"Two-bit blogger" – I kinda like the sound of that, actually.

UPDATE 2: Former Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense Joseph Collins also takes issue with this post. "Eyewitness account: this single anecdote gives a very limited picture," he e-mails Danger Room. "Yes, DR [Donald Rumsfeld] was manic about saving money, and he would often tell you why: it is YOUR money, he would say. I find that attitude increasingly refreshing. When we look at the waste in what we have done in Iraq and Afghanistan, his concerns seem justified to me."

*Although a cheapskate, he also was the godfather of the ANA [Afghan National Army] and the architect too of the military "rescuing" the ANP [Afghan National Police] training program.

When the Germans and the DoS [Department of State] were "doing" Afghan police, it was terrible, and the US military has done the program much good, though it is still far from satisfactory. ** **DR was and I am still very concerned about giving the Afghans a military that they could not afford and that would hurt us financially. The Afghans started out in Feb 2001 asking for an army up to 200K ... because that is how many armed militia that they thought they had. ** Yes, saving money with the ANA and ANP is yesterday's newspaper now, but it wasn't so far out when DR was pushing it. (If we win in

Afghanistan, and I pray that we do, the greatest danger to the Afghan polity will be praetorianism.) **Poor Rummy also believed that NATO could take over Afghanistan and run it ... boy was he mistaken about that too. ** **I have not read Seth's book or any part of the manuscript. He will do a good job of giving both sides... I hope. What we must avoid is judging single anecdotes as whole stories. We also have to look at the record, and judge actions in 2004 and '05 in light of what we knew then

AND in light of what our decision makers were thinking about Iraq etc.

** **As someone privileged to have been in 100 meetings with the great man, I can tell you that the Hon. Donald Rumsfeld was much better than his press clippings in 2009... but of course he would have to be. ** The problem with blogs is that like paper, electronic screens will put up with anything printed on them. The checks and balances of editing could have helped this story. **Oh... PS: the story that we denuded Afghanistan to prepare for

Iraq is horseshit, to use the scientific term. CENTCOM fenced A'stan's nut before the war started. Indeed, during the early years of Iraq, US

troop strength in A'stan was increased. On my last trip there in the summer of 2004, the command was noticeably fatter in every category than it was in 2003. If you don't believe aging ex-bureaucrats, ask

[former NATO-in-Afghanistan commander] Gen. [Dan] McNeill or [former CENTCOM chief] Gen. [John] Abizaid.*UPDATE 3: Strategy-blogger John Donovan isn't all that impressed with Collins' defense.

I would say that this is couched in blame-shifting (to CENTCOM) and comparative terms ("noticeably fatter in every category"). None of which mitigates against the assertion that it was an economy of force operation, under-resourced for the extent of it's mission. Because the answer is, if in context the mission wasn't under-resourced, then the deterioration of conditions means the mission was badly defined. Which still leaves the onus for the current situation sitting squarely on Secretary Rumsfeld's desk.

[Photo: U.S. Northern Command]