HN comments are terrible. On any topic I’m informed about, the vast majority of comments are pretty clearly wrong. Most of the time, there are zero comments from people who know anything about the topic and the top comment is reasonable sounding but totally incorrect. Additionally, many comments are gratuitously mean. You'll often hear mean comments backed up with something like "this is better than the other possibility, where everyone just pats each other on the back with comments like 'this is great'", as if being an asshole is some sort of talisman against empty platitudes. I've seen people push back against that; when pressed, people often say that it’s either impossible or inefficient to teach someone without being mean, as if telling someone that they're stupid somehow helps them learn. It's as if people learned how to explain things by watching Simon Cowell and can't comprehend the concept of an explanation that isn't littered with personal insults. Paul Graham has said, "Oh, you should never read Hacker News comments about anything you write”. Most of the negative things you hear about HN comments are true.

And yet, I haven’t found a public internet forum with better technical commentary. On topics I'm familiar with, while it's rare that a thread will have even a single comment that's well-informed, when those comments appear, they usually float to the top. On other forums, well-informed comments are either non-existent or get buried by reasonable sounding but totally wrong comments when they appear, and they appear even more rarely than on HN.

By volume, there are probably more interesting technical “posts” in comments than in links. Well, that depends on what you find interesting, but that’s true for my interests. If I see a low-level optimization comment from nkurz, a comment on business from patio11, a comment on how companies operate by nostrademons, I almost certainly know that I’m going to read an interesting comment. There are maybe 20 to 30 people I can think of who don’t blog much, but write great comments on HN and I doubt I even know of half the people who are writing great comments on HN .

I compiled a very abbreviated list of comments I like because comments seem to get lost. If you write a blog post, people will refer it years later, but comments mostly disappear. I think that’s sad -- there’s a lot of great material on HN (and yes, even more not-so-great material).

Basically, the Word file format is a binary dump of memory. I kid you not. They just took whatever was in memory and wrote it out to disk. We can try to reason why (maybe it was faster, maybe it made the code smaller), but I think the overriding reason is that the original developers didn't know any better. Later as they tried to add features they had to try to make it backward compatible. This is where a lot of the complexity lies. There are lots of crazy workarounds for things that would be simple if you allowed yourself to redesign the file format. It's pretty clear that this was mandated by management, because no software developer would put themselves through that hell for no reason. Later they added a fast-save feature (I forget what it is actually called). This appends changes to the file without changing the original file. The way they implemented this was really ingenious, but complicates the file structure a lot. One thing I feel I must point out (I remember posting a huge thing on slashdot when this article was originally posted) is that 2 way file conversion is next to impossible for word processors. That's because the file formats do not contain enough information to format the document. The most obvious place to see this is pagination. The file format does not say where to paginate a text flow (unless it is explicitly entered by the user). It relies of the formatter to do it. Each word processor formats text completely differently. Word, for example famously paginates footnotes incorrectly. They can't change it, though, because it will break backwards compatibility. This is one of the only reasons that Word Perfect survives today -- it is the only word processor that paginates legal documents the way the US Department of Justice requires. Just considering the pagination issue, you can see what the problem is. When reading a Word document, you have to paginate it like Word -- only the file format doesn't tell you what that is. Then if someone modifies the document and you need to resave it, you need to somehow mark that it should be paginated like Word (even though it might now have features that are not in Word). If it was only pagination, you might be able to do it, but practically everything is like that. I recommend reading (a bit of) the XML Word file format for those who are interested. You will see large numbers of flags for things like "Format like Word 95". The format doesn't say what that is -- because it's pretty obvious that the authors of the file format don't know. It's lost in a hopeless mess of legacy code and nobody can figure out what it does now.

Here's another example of this fine feature:

#include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #define LENGTH 128 int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *string = NULL; int length = 0; if (argc > 1) { string = argv[1]; length = strlen(string); if (length >= LENGTH) exit(1); } char buffer[LENGTH]; memcpy(buffer, string, length); buffer[length] = 0; if (string == NULL) { printf("String is null, so cancel the launch.

"); } else { printf("String is not null, so launch the missiles!

"); } printf("string: %s

", string); // undefined for null but works in practice #if SEGFAULT_ON_NULL printf("%s

", string); // segfaults on null when bare "%s

" #endif return 0; } nate@skylake:~/src$ clang-3.8 -Wall -O3 null_check.c -o null_check nate@skylake:~/src$ null_check String is null, so cancel the launch. string: (null) nate@skylake:~/src$ icc-17 -Wall -O3 null_check.c -o null_check nate@skylake:~/src$ null_check String is null, so cancel the launch. string: (null) nate@skylake:~/src$ gcc-5 -Wall -O3 null_check.c -o null_check nate@skylake:~/src$ null_check String is not null, so launch the missiles! string: (null)

It appear that Intel's ICC and Clang still haven't caught up with GCC's optimizations. Ouch if you were depending on that optimization to get the performance you need! But before picking on GCC too much, consider that all three of those compilers segfault on printf("string: "); printf("%s

", string) when string is NULL, despite having no problem with printf("string: %s

", string) as a single statement. Can you see why using two separate statements would cause a segfault? If not, see here for a hint: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=25609

Good engineering eliminates users being able to do the wrong thing as much as possible. . . . You don't design a feature that invites misuse and then use instructions to try to prevent that misuse. There was a derailment in Australia called the Waterfall derailment [1]. It occurred because the driver had a heart attack and was responsible for 7 deaths (a miracle it was so low, honestly). The root cause was the failure of the dead-man's switch. In the case of Waterfall, the driver had 2 dead-man switches he could use - 1) the throttle handle had to be held against a spring at a small rotation, or 2) a bar on the floor could be depressed. You had to do 1 of these things, the idea being that you prevent wrist or foot cramping by allowing the driver to alternate between the two. Failure to do either triggers an emergency brake. It turns out that this driver was fat enough that when he had a heart attack, his leg was able to depress the pedal enough to hold the emergency system off. Thus, the dead-man's system never triggered with a whole lot of dead man in the driver's seat. I can't quite remember the specifics of the system at Waterfall, but one method to combat this is to require the pedal to be held halfway between released and fully depressed. The idea being that a dead leg would fully depress the pedal so that would trigger a brake, and a fully released pedal would also trigger a brake. I don't know if they had that system but certainly that's one approach used in rail. Either way, the problem is equally possible in cars. If you lose consciousness and your foot goes limp, a heavy enough leg will be able to hold the pedal down a bit depending on where it's positioned relative to the pedal and the leverage it has on the floor. The other major system I'm familiar with for ensuring drivers are alive at the helm is called 'vigilance'. The way it works is that periodically, a light starts flashing on the dash and the driver has to acknowledge that. If they do not, a buzzer alarm starts sounding. If they still don't acknowledge it, the train brakes apply and the driver is assumed incapacitated. Let me tell you some stories of my involvement in it. When we first started, we had a simple vigi system. Every 30 seconds or so (for example), the driver would press a button. Ok cool. Except that then drivers became so hard-wired to pressing the button every 30 seconds that we were having instances of drivers falling asleep/dozing off and still pressing the button right on every 30 seconds because it was so ingrained into them that it was literally a subconscious action. So we introduced random-timing vigilance, where the time varies 30-60 seconds (for example) and you could only acknowledge it within a small period of time once the light started flashing. Again, drivers started falling asleep/semi asleep and would hit it as soon as the alarm buzzed, each and every time. So we introduced random-timing, task-linked vigilance and that finally broke the back of the problem. Now, the driver has to press a button, or turn a knob, or do a number of different activities and they must do that randomly-chosen activity, at a randomly-chosen time, for them to acknowledge their consciousness. It was only at that point that we finally nailed out driver alertness.

See also.

Curious why he would need to move to a more prestigious position? Most people realize by their 30s that prestige is a sucker's game; it's a way of inducing people to do things that aren't much fun and they wouldn't really want to do on their own, by lauding them with accolades from people they don't really care about.

. . . we noticed that we also needed:

(1) A suitable, existing airport at the hub location.

(2) Good weather at the hub location, e.g., relatively little snow, fog, or rain.

(3) Access to good ramp space, that is, where to park and service the airplanes and sort the packages.

(4) Good labor supply, e.g., for the sort center.

(5) Relatively low cost of living to keep down prices.

(6) Friendly regulatory environment.

(7) Candidate airport not too busy, e.g., don't want arriving planes to have to circle a long time before being able to land.

(8) Airport with relatively little in cross winds and with more than one runway to pick from in case of winds.

(9) Runway altitude not too high, e.g., not high enough to restrict maximum total gross take off weight, e.g., rule out Denver.

(10) No tall obstacles, e.g., mountains, near the ends of the runways.

(11) Good supplies of jet fuel.

(12) Good access to roads for 18 wheel trucks for exchange of packages between trucks and planes, e.g., so that some parts could be trucked to the hub and stored there and shipped directly via the planes to customers that place orders, say, as late as 11 PM for delivery before 10 AM.

So, there were about three candidate locations, Memphis and, as I recall, Cincinnati and Kansas City.

The Memphis airport had some old WWII hangers next to the runway that FedEx could use for the sort center, aircraft maintenance, and HQ office space. Deal done -- it was Memphis.



The decision to sell to Google was one of the toughest decisions I and my cofounders ever had to wrestle with in our lives. We were excited by the Wave vision though we saw the flaws in the product. The Wave team told us about how they wanted our help making wave simpler and more like etherpad, and we thought we could help with that, though in the end we were unsuccessful at making wave simpler. We were scared of Google as a competitor: they had more engineers and more money behind this project, yet they were running it much more like an independent startup than a normal big-company department. The Wave office was in Australia and had almost total autonomy. And finally, after 1.5 years of being on the brink of failure with AppJet, it was tempting to be able to declare our endeavor a success and provide a decent return to all our investors who had risked their money on us. In the end, our decision to join Wave did not work out as we had hoped. The biggest lessons learned were that having more engineers and money behind a project can actually be more harmful than helpful, so we were wrong to be scared of Wave as a competitor for this reason. It seems obvious in hindsight, but at the time it wasn't. Second, I totally underestimated how hard it would be to iterate on the Wave codebase. I was used to rewriting major portions of software in a single all-nighter. Because of the software development process Wave was using, it was practically impossible to iterate on the product. I should have done more diligence on their specific software engineering processes, but instead I assumed because they seemed to be operating like a startup, that they would be able to iterate like a startup. A lot of the product problems were known to the whole Wave team, but we were crippled by a large complex codebase built on poor technical choices and a cumbersome engineering process that prevented fast iteration.

When I've had inside information about a story that later breaks in the tech press, I'm always shocked at how differently it's perceived by readers of the article vs. how I experienced it. Among startups & major feature launches I've been party to, I've seen: executives that flat-out say that they're not working on a product category when there's been a whole department devoted to it for a year; startups that were founded 1.5 years before the dates listed in Crunchbase/Wikipedia; reporters that count the number of people they meet in a visit and report that as a the "team size", because the company refuses to release that info; funding rounds that never make it to the press; acquisitions that are reported as "for an undisclosed sum" but actually are less than the founders would've made if they'd taken a salaried job at the company; project start dates that are actually when the project was staffed up to its current size and ignore the year or so that a small team spent working on the problem (or the 3-4 years that other small teams spent working on the problem); and algorithms or other technologies that are widely reported as being the core of the company's success, but actually aren't even used by the company.

As the main developer of VLC, we know about this story since a long time, and this is just Dell putting crap components on their machine and blaming others. Any discussion was impossible with them. So let me explain a bit... In this case, VLC just uses the Windows APIs (DirectSound), and sends signed integers of 16bits (s16) to the Windows Kernel. VLC allows amplification of the INPUT above the sound that was decoded. This is just like replay gain, broken codecs, badly recorded files or post-amplification and can lead to saturation. But this is exactly the same if you put your mp3 file through Audacity and increase it and play with WMP, or if you put a DirectShow filter that amplifies the volume after your codec output. For example, for a long time, VLC ac3 and mp3 codecs were too low (-6dB) compared to the reference output. At worse, this will reduce the dynamics and saturate a lot, but this is not going to break your hardware. VLC does not (and cannot) modify the OUTPUT volume to destroy the speakers. VLC is a Software using the OFFICIAL platforms APIs. The issue here is that Dell sound cards output power (that can be approached by a factor of the quadratic of the amplitude) that Dell speakers cannot handle. Simply said, the sound card outputs at max 10W, and the speakers only can take 6W in, and neither their BIOS or drivers block this. And as VLC is present on a lot of machines, it's simple to blame VLC. "Correlation does not mean causation" is something that seems too complex for cheap Dell support…

Working for someone else's startup, I learned how to quickly cobble solutions together. I learned about uncertainty and picking a direction regardless of whether you're sure it'll work. I learned that most startups fail, and that when they fail, the people who end up doing well are the ones who were looking out for their own interests all along. I learned a lot of basic technical skills, how to write code quickly and learn new APIs quickly and deploy software to multiple machines. I learned how quickly problems of scaling a development team crop up, and how early you should start investing in automation. Working for Google, I learned how to fix problems once and for all and build that culture into the organization. I learned that even in successful companies, everything is temporary, and that great products are usually built through a lot of hard work by many people rather than great ah-ha insights. I learned how to architect systems for scale, and a lot of practices used for robust, high-availability, frequently-deployed systems. I learned the value of research and of spending a lot of time on a single important problem: many startups take a scattershot approach, trying one weekend hackathon after another and finding nobody wants any of them, while oftentimes there are opportunities that nobody has solved because nobody wants to put in the work. I learned how to work in teams and try to understand what other people want. I learned what problems are really painful for big organizations. I learned how to rigorously research the market and use data to make product decisions, rather than making decisions based on what seems best to one person.

Having been in on the company's leadership meetings where departures were noted with a simple 'regret yes/no' flag it was my experience that no single departure had any effect. Mass departures did, trends did, but one person never did, even when that person was a founder. The rationalizations always put the issue back on the departing employee, "They were burned out", "They had lost their ability to be effective", "They have moved on", "They just haven't grown with the company" never was it "We failed this person, what are we going to do differently?"

Anyway, the SOA effort was in full swing when I was there. It was a pain, and it was a mess because every team did things differently and every API was different and based on different assumptions and written in a different language. But I want to correct the misperception that this lead to AWS. It didn't. S3 was written by its own team, from scratch. At the time I was at Amazon, working on the retail site, none of Amazon.com was running on AWS. I know, when AWS was announced, with great fanfare, they said "the services that power Amazon.com can now power your business!" or words to that effect. This was a flat out lie. The only thing they shared was data centers and a standard hardware configuration. Even by the time I left, when AWS was running full steam ahead (and probably running Reddit already), none of Amazon.com was running on AWS, except for a few, small, experimental and relatively new projects. I'm sure more of it has been adopted now, but AWS was always a separate team (and a better managed one, from what I could see.)

I (and others) have put a lot of effort into making the Linux Chrome build fast. Some examples are multiple new implementations of the build system (http://neugierig.org/software/chromium/notes/2011/02/ninja.h... ), experimentation with the gold linker (e.g. measuring and adjusting the still off-by-default thread flags https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/group/chromium-dev/... ) as well as digging into bugs in it, and other underdocumented things like 'thin' ar archives. But it's also true that people who are more of Windows wizards than I am a Linux apprentice have worked on Chrome's Windows build. If you asked me the original question, I'd say the underlying problem is that on Windows all you have is what Microsoft gives you and you can't typically do better than that. For example, migrating the Chrome build off of Visual Studio would be a large undertaking, large enough that it's rarely considered. (Another way of phrasing this is it's the IDE problem: you get all of the IDE or you get nothing.) When addressing the poor Windows performance people first bought SSDs, something that never even occurred to me ("your system has enough RAM that the kernel cache of the file system should be in memory anyway!"). But for whatever reason on the Linux side some Googlers saw it fit to rewrite the Linux linker to make it twice as fast (this effort predated Chrome), and all Linux developers now get to benefit from that. Perhaps the difference is that when people write awesome tools for Windows or Mac they try to sell them rather than give them away.

I'm a developer in Windows and contribute to the NT kernel. (Proof: the SHA1 hash of revision #102 of [Edit: filename redacted] is [Edit: hash redacted].) I'm posting through Tor for obvious reasons. Windows is indeed slower than other operating systems in many scenarios, and the gap is worsening. The cause of the problem is social. There's almost none of the improvement for its own sake, for the sake of glory, that you see in the Linux world. Granted, occasionally one sees naive people try to make things better. These people almost always fail. We can and do improve performance for specific scenarios that people with the ability to allocate resources believe impact business goals, but this work is Sisyphean. There's no formal or informal program of systemic performance improvement. We started caring about security because pre-SP3 Windows XP was an existential threat to the business. Our low performance is not an existential threat to the business. See, component owners are generally openly hostile to outside patches: if you're a dev, accepting an outside patch makes your lead angry (due to the need to maintain this patch and to justify in in shiproom the unplanned design change), makes test angry (because test is on the hook for making sure the change doesn't break anything, and you just made work for them), and PM is angry (due to the schedule implications of code churn). There's just no incentive to accept changes from outside your own team. You can always find a reason to say "no", and you have very little incentive to say "yes".

See link for giant table :-).

Broken record: startups are also probably rejecting a lot of engineering candidates that would perform as well or better than anyone on their existing team, because tech industry hiring processes are folkloric and irrational.

Too long to excerpt. See the link!

I am 42-year-old very successful programmer who has been through a lot of situations in my career so far, many of them highly demotivating. And the best advice I have for you is to get out of what you are doing. Really. Even though you state that you are not in a position to do that, you really are. It is okay. You are free. Okay, you are helping your boyfriend's startup but what is the appropriate cost for this? Would he have you do it if he knew it was crushing your soul? I don't use the phrase "crushing your soul" lightly. When it happens slowly, as it does in these cases, it is hard to see the scale of what is happening. But this is a very serious situation and if left unchecked it may damage the potential for you to do good work for the rest of your life. The commenters who are warning about burnout are right. Burnout is a very serious situation. If you burn yourself out hard, it will be difficult to be effective at any future job you go to, even if it is ostensibly a wonderful job. Treat burnout like a physical injury. I burned myself out once and it took at least 12 years to regain full productivity. Don't do it. More broadly, the best and most creative work comes from a root of joy and excitement. If you lose your ability to feel joy and excitement about programming-related things, you'll be unable to do the best work. That this issue is separate from and parallel to burnout! If you are burned out, you might still be able to feel the joy and excitement briefly at the start of a project/idea, but they will fade quickly as the reality of day-to-day work sets in. Alternatively, if you are not burned out but also do not have a sense of wonder, it is likely you will never get yourself started on the good work.

The earlier in your career it is now, the more important this time is for your development. Programmers learn by doing. If you put yourself into an environment where you are constantly challenged and are working at the top threshold of your ability, then after a few years have gone by, your skills will have increased tremendously. It is like going to intensively learn kung fu for a few years, or going into Navy SEAL training or something. But this isn't just a one-time constant increase. The faster you get things done, and the more thorough and error-free they are, the more ideas you can execute on, which means you will learn faster in the future too. Over the long term, programming skill is like compound interest. More now means a LOT more later. Less now means a LOT less later. So if you are putting yourself into a position that is not really challenging, that is a bummer day in and day out, and you get things done slowly, you aren't just having a slow time now. You are bringing down that compound interest curve for the rest of your career. It is a serious problem. If I could go back to my early career I would mercilessly cut out all the shitty jobs I did (and there were many of them).

A small anecdote. An acquaintance related a story of fixing the 'drainage' in their back yard. They were trying to grow some plants that were sensitive to excessive moisture, and the plants were dying. Not watering them, watering them a little, didn't seem to change. They died. A professional gardner suggested that their problem was drainage. So they dug down about 3' (where the soil was very very wet) and tried to build in better drainage. As they were on the side of a hill, water table issues were not considered. It turned out their "problem" was that the water main that fed their house and the houses up the hill, was so pressurized at their property (because it had maintain pressure at the top of the hill too) that the pipe seams were leaking and it was pumping gallons of water into the ground underneath their property. The problem wasn't their garden, the problem was that the city water supply was poorly designed. While I have never been asked if I was an engineer on the phone, I have experienced similar things to Rachel in meetings and with regard to suggestions. Co-workers will create an internal assessment of your value and then respond based on that assessment. If they have written you off they will ignore you, if you prove their assessment wrong in a public forum they will attack you. These are management issues, and something which was sorely lacking in the stories. If you are the "owner" of a meeting, and someone is trying to be heard and isn't. It is incumbent on you to let them be heard. By your position power as "the boss" you can naturally interrupt a discussion to collect more data from other members. Its also important to ask questions like "does anyone have any concerns?" to draw out people who have valid input but are too timid to share it. In a highly political environment there are two ways to create change, one is through overt manipulation, which is to collect political power to yourself and then exert it to enact change, and the other is covert manipulation, which is to enact change subtly enough that the political organism doesn't react. (sometimes called "triggering the antibodies"). The problem with the latter is that if you help make positive change while keeping everyone not pissed off, no one attributes it to you (which is good for the change agent because if they knew the anti-bodies would react, but bad if your manager doesn't recognize it). I asked my manager what change he wanted to be 'true' yet he (or others) had been unsuccessful making true, he gave me one, and 18 months later that change was in place. He didn't believe that I was the one who had made the change. I suggested he pick a change he wanted to happen and not tell me, then in 18 months we could see if that one happened :-). But he also didn't understand enough about organizational dynamics to know that making change without having the source of that change point back at you was even possible.

Heavily relying on Google product? ✓

Hitting a dead-end with Google's customer service? ✓

Have an existing audience you can leverage to get some random Google employee's attention? ✓

Reach front page of Hacker News? ✓

Good news! You should have your problem fixed in 2-5 business days. The rest of us suckers relying on google services get to stare at our inboxes helplessly, waiting for a response to our support ticket (which will never come). I feel like it's almost a [rite] of passage these days to rely heavily on a Google service, only to have something go wrong and be left out in the cold.

IIRC PayPal was very similar - it was sold for $1.5B, but Max Levchin's share was only about $30M, and Elon Musk's was only about $100M. By comparison, many early Web 2.0 darlings (Del.icio.us, Blogger, Flickr) sold for only $20-40M, but their founders had only taken small seed rounds, and so the vast majority of the purchase price went to the founders. 75% of a $40M acquisition = 3% of a $1B acquisition. Something for founders to think about when they're taking funding. If you look at the gigantic tech fortunes - Gates, Page/Brin, Omidyar, Bezos, Zuckerburg, Hewlett/Packard - they usually came from having a company that was already profitable or was already well down the hockey-stick user growth curve and had a clear path to monetization by the time they sought investment. Companies that fight tooth & nail for customers and need lots of outside capital to do it usually have much worse financial outcomes.

A lot of the people who were involved in some way in Experts-Exchange don't understand Stack Overflow. The basic value flow of EE is that "experts" provide valuable "answers" for novices with questions. In that equation there's one person asking a question and one person writing an answer. Stack Overflow recognizes that for every person who asks a question, 100 - 10,000 people will type that same question into Google and find an answer that has already been written. In our equation, we are a community of people writing answers that will be read by hundreds or thousands of people. Ours is a project more like wikipedia -- collaboratively creating a resource for the Internet at large. Because that resource is provided by the community, it belongs to the community. That's why our data is freely available and licensed under creative commons. We did this specifically because of the negative experience we had with EE taking a community-generated resource and deciding to slap a paywall around it. The attitude of many EE contributors, like Greg Young who calculates that he "worked" for half a year for free, is not shared by the 60,000 people who write answers on SO every month. When you talk to them you realize that on Stack Overflow, answering questions is about learning. It's about creating a permanent artifact to make the Internet better. It's about helping someone solve a problem in five minutes that would have taken them hours to solve on their own. It's not about working for free. As soon as EE introduced the concept of money they forced everybody to think of their work on EE as just that -- work.

I saw that one of my old textbooks was selling for a nice price, so I listed it along with two other used copies. I priced it $1 cheaper than the lowest price offered, but within an hour both sellers had changed their prices to $.01 and $.02 cheaper than mine. I reduced it two times more by $1, and each time they beat my price by a cent or two. So what I did was reduce my price by a few dollars every hour for one day until everybody was priced under $5. Then I bought their books and changed my price back.

While I like the sentiment here, I think the danger is that engineers might come to the mistaken conclusion that making pizzas is the primary limiting reagent to running a successful pizzeria. Running a successful pizzeria is more about schlepping to local hotels and leaving them 50 copies of your menu to put at the front desk, hiring drivers who will both deliver pizzas in a timely fashion and not embezzle your (razor-thin) profits while also costing next-to-nothing to employ, maintaining a kitchen in sufficient order to pass your local health inspector's annual visit (and dealing with 47 different pieces of paper related to that), being able to juggle priorities like "Do I take out a bank loan to build a new brick-oven, which will make the pizza taste better, in the knowledge that this will commit $3,000 of my cash flow every month for the next 3 years, or do I hire an extra cook?", sourcing ingredients such that they're available in quantity and quality every day for a fairly consistent price, setting prices such that they're locally competitive for your chosen clientele but generate a healthy gross margin for the business, understanding why a healthy gross margin really doesn't imply a healthy net margin and that the rent still needs to get paid, keeping good-enough records such that you know whether your business is dying before you can't make payroll and such that you can provide a reasonably accurate picture of accounts for the taxation authorities every year, balancing 50% off medium pizza promotions with the desire to not cannibalize the business of your regulars, etc etc, and by the way tomato sauce should be tangy but not sour and cheese should melt with just the faintest whisp of a crust on it. Do you want to write software for a living? Google is hiring. Do you want to run a software business? Godspeed. Software is now 10% of your working life.

The way I prefer to think of it is: it is not your job to protect people (particularly senior management) from the consequences of their decisions. Make your decisions in your own best interest; it is up to the organization to make sure that your interest aligns with theirs. Google used to have a severe problem where code refactoring & maintenance was not rewarded in performance reviews while launches were highly regarded, which led to the effect of everybody trying to launch things as fast as possible and nobody cleaning up the messes left behind. Eventually launches started getting slowed down, Larry started asking "Why can't we have nice things?", and everybody responded "Because you've been paying us to rack up technical debt." As a result, teams were formed with the express purpose of code health & maintenance, those teams that were already working on those goals got more visibility, and refactoring contributions started counting for something in perf. Moreover, many ex-Googlers who were fed up with the situation went to Facebook and, I've heard, instituted a culture there where grungy engineering maintenance is valued by your peers. None of this would've happened if people had just heroically fallen on their own sword and burnt out doing work nobody cared about. Sometimes it takes highly visible consequences before people with decision-making power realize there's a problem and start correcting it. If those consequences never happen, they'll keep believing it's not a problem and won't pay much attention to it.

It took me too long to figure this out. There are some people to truly, and passionately, believe something they say to you, and realistically they personally can't make it happen so you can't really bank on that 'promise.' I used to think those people were lying to take advantage, but as I've gotten older I have come to recognize that these 'yes' people get promoted a lot. And for some of them, they really do believe what they are saying. As an engineer I've found that once I can 'calibrate' someone's 'yes-ness' I can then work with them, understanding that they only make 'wishful' commitments rather than 'reasoned' commitments. So when someone, like Steve Jobs, says "we're going to make it an open standard!", my first question then is "Great, I've got your support in making this an open standard so I can count on you to wield your position influence to aid me when folks line up against that effort, right?" If the answer that that question is no, then they were lying. The difference is subtle of course but important. Steve clearly doesn't go to standards meetings and vote etc, but if Manager Bob gets push back from accounting that he's going to exceed his travel budget by sending 5 guys to the Open Video Chat Working Group which is championing the Facetime protocol as an open standard, then Manager Bob goes to Steve and says "I need your help here, these 5 guys are needed to argue this standard and keep it from being turned into a turd by the 5 guys from Google who are going to attend." and then Steve whips off a one liner to accounting that says "Get off this guy's back we need this." Then its all good. If on the other hand he says "We gotta save money, send one guy." well in that case I'm more sympathetic to the accusation of prevarication.

For those who work inside Google, it's well worth it to look at Jeff & Sanjay's commit history and code review dashboard. They aren't actually all that much more productive in terms of code written than a decent SWE3 who knows his codebase. The reason they have a reputation as rockstars is that they can apply this productivity to things that really matter; they're able to pick out the really important parts of the problem and then focus their efforts there, so that the end result ends up being much more impactful than what the SWE3 wrote. The SWE3 may spend his time writing a bunch of unit tests that catch bugs that wouldn't really have happened anyway, or migrating from one system to another that isn't really a large improvement, or going down an architectural dead end that'll just have to be rewritten later. Jeff or Sanjay (or any of the other folks operating at that level) will spend their time running a proposed API by clients to ensure it meets their needs, or measuring the performance of subsystems so they fully understand their building blocks, or mentally simulating the operation of the system before building it so they rapidly test out alternatives. They don't actually write more code than a junior developer (oftentimes, they write less), but the code they do write gives them more information, which makes them ensure that they write the rightcode. I feel like this point needs to be stressed a whole lot more than it is, as there's a whole mythology that's grown up around 10x developers that's not all that helpful. In particular, people need to realize that these developers rapidly become 1x developers (or worse) if you don't let them make their own architectural choices - the reason they're excellent in the first place is because they know how to determine if certain work is going to be useless and avoid doing it in the first place. If you dictate that they do it anyway, they're going to be just as slow as any other developer

I got the hero speech too, once. If anyone ever mentions the word "heroic" again and there isn't a burning building involved, I will start looking for new employment immediately. It seems that in our industry it is universally a code word for "We're about to exploit you because the project is understaffed and under budgeted for time and that is exactly as we planned it so you'd better cowboy up." Maybe it is different if you're writing Quake, but I guarantee you the 43rd best selling game that year also had programmers "encouraged onwards" by tales of the glory that awaited after the death march.

I was once speaking to a good friend of mine here, in English.

"Do you want to go out for yakitori?"

"Go fuck yourself!"

"... switches to Japanese Have I recently done anything very major to offend you?"

"No, of course not."

"Oh, OK, I was worried. So that phrase, that's something you would only say under extreme distress when you had maximal desire to offend me, or I suppose you could use it jokingly between friends, but neither you nor I generally talk that way."

"I learned it from a movie. I thought it meant ‘No.’"



True story: I went to a talk given by one of the 'engineering elders' (these were low Emp# engineers who were considered quite successful and were to be emulated by the workers :-) This person stated when they came to work at Google they were given the XYZ system to work on (sadly I'm prevented from disclosing the actual system). They remarked how they spent a couple of days looking over the system which was complicated and creaky, they couldn't figure it out so they wrote a new system. Yup, and they committed that. This person is a coding God are they not? (sarcasm) I asked what happened to the old system (I knew but was interested on their perspective) and they said it was still around because a few things still used it, but (quite proudly) nearly everything else had moved to their new system. So if you were reading carefully, this person created a new system to 'replace' an existing system which they didn't understand and got nearly everyone to move to the new system. That made them uber because they got something big to put on their internal resume, and a whole crapload of folks had to write new code to adapt from the old system to this new system, which imperfectly recreated the old system (remember they didn't understand the original), such that those parts of the system that relied on the more obscure bits had yet to be converted (because nobody undersood either the dependent code or the old system apparently). Was this person smart? Blindingly brilliant according to some of their peers. Did they get things done? Hell yes, they wrote the replacement for the XYZ system from scratch! One person? Can you imagine? Would I hire them? Not unless they were the last qualified person in my pool and I was out of time. That anecdote encapsulates the dangerous side of smart people who get things done.

Some kids grow up on football. I grew up on public speaking (as behavioral therapy for a speech impediment, actually). If you want to get radically better in a hurry:

Too long to excerpt. See the link.

I can relate to this, but I can also relate to the other side of the question. Sometimes it isn't me, its you. Take someone who gets things done and suddenly in your organization they aren't delivering. Could be them, but it could also be you. I had this experience working at Google. I had a horrible time getting anything done there. Now I spent a bit of time evaluating that since it had never been the case in my career, up to that point, where I was unable to move the ball forward and I really wanted to understand that. The short answer was that Google had developed a number of people who spent much, if not all, of their time preventing change. It took me a while to figure out what motivated someone to be anti-change. The fear was risk and safety. Folks moved around a lot and so you had people in charge of systems they didn't build, didn't understand all the moving parts of, and were apt to get a poor rating if they broke. When dealing with people in that situation one could either educate them and bring them along, or steam roll over them. Education takes time, and during that time the 'teacher' doesn't get anything done. This favors steamrolling evolutionarily :-) So you can hire someone who gets stuff done, but if getting stuff done in your organization requires them to be an asshole, and they aren't up for that, well they aren't going to be nearly as successful as you would like them to be.

I can tell that this was written by an outsider, because it focuses on the perks and rehashes several cliches that have made their way into the popular media but aren't all that accurate. Most Googlers will tell you that the best thing about working there is having the ability to work on really hard problems, with really smart coworkers, and lots of resources at your disposal. I remember asking my interviewer whether I could use things like Google's index if I had a cool 20% idea, and he was like "Sure. That's encouraged. Oftentimes I'll just grab 4000 or so machines and run a MapReduce to test out some hypothesis." My phone screener, when I asked him what it was like to work there, said "It's a place where really smart people go to be average," which has turned out to be both true and honestly one of the best things that I've gained from working there.

This entire event was a staged press op. Keith Alexander is a ~30 year veteran of SIGINT, electronic warfare, and intelligence, and a Four-Star US Army General --- which is a bigger deal than you probably think it is. He's a spy chief in the truest sense and a master politician. Anyone who thinks he walked into that conference hall in Caesars without a near perfect forecast of the outcome of the speech is kidding themselves. Heckling Alexander played right into the strategy. It gave him an opportunity to look reasonable compared to his detractors, and, more generally (and alarmingly), to have the NSA look more reasonable compared to opponents of NSA surveillance. It allowed him to "split the vote" with audience reactions, getting people who probably have serious misgivings about NSA programs to applaud his calm and graceful handling of shouted insults; many of those people probably applauded simply to protest the hecklers, who after all were making it harder for them to follow what Alexander was trying to say. There was no serious Q&A on offer at the keynote. The questions were pre-screened; all attendees could do was vote on them. There was no possibility that anything would come of this speech other than an effectively unchallenged full-throated defense of the NSA's programs.

Interestingly one of the things that I found most amazing when I was working for Google was a nearly total inability to grasp the concept of 'deadline.' For so many years the company just shipped it by committing it to the release branch and having the code deploy over the course of a small number of weeks to the 'fleet'. Sure there were 'processes', like "Canary it in some cluster and watch the results for a few weeks before turning it loose on the world." but being completely vertically integrated is a unique sort of situation.

Being a very experienced game developer who tried to switch to Linux, I have posted about this before (and gotten flamed heavily by reactionary Linux people). The main reason is that debugging is terrible on Linux. gdb is just bad to use, and all these IDEs that try to interface with gdb to "improve" it do it badly (mainly because gdb itself is not good at being interfaced with). Someone needs to nuke this site from orbit and build a new debugger from scratch, and provide a library-style API that IDEs can use to inspect executables in rich and subtle ways. Productivity is crucial. If the lack of a reasonable debugging environment costs me even 5% of my productivity, that is too much, because games take so much work to make. At the end of a project, I just don't have 5% effort left any more. It requires everything. (But the current Linux situation is way more than a 5% productivity drain. I don't know exactly what it is, but if I were to guess, I would say it is something like 20%.)

What is interesting is that people don't even know they have a complex about money until they get "rich." I've watched many people, perhaps a hundred, go from "working to pay the bills" to "holy crap I can pay all my current and possibly my future bills with the money I now have." That doesn't include the guy who lived in our neighborhood and won the CA lottery one year. It affects people in ways they don't expect. If its sudden (like lottery winning or sudden IPO surge) it can be difficult to process. But it is an important thing to realize that one is processing an exceptional event. Like having a loved one die or a spouse suddenly divorcing you. Not everyone feels "guilty", not everyone feels "smug." A lot of millionaires and billionaires in the Bay Area are outwardly unchanged. But the bottom line is that the emotion comes from the cognitive dissonance between values and reality. What do you value? What is reality? One woman I knew at Google was massively conflicted when she started work at Google. She always felt that she would help the homeless folks she saw, if she had more money than she needed. Upon becoming rich (on Google stock value), now she found that she wanted to save the money she had for her future kids education and needs. Was she a bad person? Before? After? Do your kids hate you if you give away their college education to the local foodbank? Do your peers hate you because you could close the current food gap at the foodbank and you don't?

This is Microsoft's ICQ moment. Overpaying for a company at the moment when its core competency is becoming a commodity. Does anyone have the slightest bit of loyalty to Skype? Of course not. They're going to use whichever video chat comes built into their SmartPhone, tablet, computer, etc. They're going to use FaceBook's eventual video chat service or something Google offers. No one is going to actively seek out Skype when so many alternatives exist and are deeply integrated into the products/services they already use. Certainly no one is going to buy a Microsoft product simply because it has Skype integration. Who cares if it's FaceTime, FaceBook Video Chat, Google Video Chat? It's all the same to the user. With $7B they should have just given away about 15 million Windows Mobile phones in the form of an epic PR stunt. It's not a bad product -- they just need to make people realize it exists. If they want to flush money down the toilet they might as well engage users in the process right?

I worked briefly on the Fiber team when it was very young (basically from 2 weeks before to 2 weeks after launch - I was on loan from Search specifically so that they could hit their launch goals). The bottleneck when I was there were local government regulations, and in fact Kansas City was chosen because it had a unified city/county/utility regulatory authority that was very favorable to Google. To lay fiber to the home, you either need right-of-ways on the utility poles (which are owned by Google's competitors) or you need permission to dig up streets (which requires a mess of permitting from the city government). In either case, the cable & phone companies were in very tight with local regulators, and so you had hostile gatekeepers whose approval you absolutely needed. The technology was awesome (1G Internet and HDTV!), the software all worked great, and the economics of hiring contractors to lay the fiber itself actually worked out. The big problem was regulatory capture. With Uber & AirBnB's success in hindsight, I'd say that the way to crack the ISP business is to provide your customers with the tools to break the law en masse. For example, you could imagine an ISP startup that basically says "Here's a box, a wire, and a map of other customers' locations. Plug into their jack, and if you can convince others to plug into yours, we'll give you a discount on your monthly bill based on how many you sign up." But Google in general is not willing to break laws - they'll go right up to the boundary of what the law allows, but if a regulatory agency says "No, you can't do that", they won't do it rather than fight the agency. Indeed, Fiber is being phased out in favor of Google's acquisition of WebPass, which does basically exactly that but with wireless instead of fiber. WebPass only requires the building owner's consent, and leaves the city out of it.

I've spoken at TechEds in the US and Europe, and been in the top 10 for attendee feedback twice. I'd never speak at TechEd again, and I told Microsoft the same thing, same reasons. The event staff is overly demanding and inconsiderate of speaker time. They repeatedly dragged me into mandatory virtual and in-person meetings to cover inane details that should have been covered via email. They mandated the color of pants speakers wore. Just ridiculously micromanaged.

Hertz laid off nearly the entirety of their rank and file IT staff earlier this year. In order to receive our severance, we were forced to train our IBM replacements, who were in India. Hertz's strategy of IBM and Austerity is the new SMT's solution for a balance sheet that's in shambles, yet they have rewarded themselves by increasing executive compensation 35% over the prior year, including a $6 million bonus to the CIO. I personally landed in an Alphabet company, received a giant raise, and now I get to work on really amazing stuff, so I'm doing fine. But to this day I'm sad to think how our once-amazing Hertz team, staffed with really smart people, led by the best boss I ever had, and were really driving the innovation at Hertz, was just thrown away like yesterday's garbage.

Don't count on definitely being able to sell the stock to finance the taxes. I left after seven years in very good standing (I believed) but when I went to sell the deal was shut down [1]. Luckily I had a backup plan and I was ok [2]. [1] Had a handshake deal with an investor in the company, then the investor went silent on me. When I followed up he said the deal was "just much too small." I reached out to the company for help, and they said they'd actually told him not to buy from me. I never would have known if they hadn't decided to tell me for some reason. The takeaway is that the markets for private company stock tend to be small, and the buyers care more about their relationships with the company than they do about having your shares. Even if the stock terms allow them to buy, and they might not.

I took the first test just like the OP, the logical reasoning part seemed kind of irrelevant and a waste of time for me. That was nothing compared to the second online test. The environment of the second test was like a scenario out of Black Mirror. Not only did they want to have the webcam and microphone on the entire time, I also had to install their custom software so the proctors could monitor my screen and control my computer. They opened up the macOS system preferences so they could disable all shortcuts to take screenshots, and they also manually closed all the background services I had running (even f.lux!). Then they asked me to pick up my laptop and show them around my room with the webcam. They specifically asked to see the contents of my desk and the walls and ceiling of my room. I had some pencil and paper on my desk to use as scratch paper for the obvious reasons and they told me that wasn't allowed. Obviously that made me a little upset because I use it to sketch out examples and concepts. They also saw my phone on the desk and asked me to put it out of arm's reach. After that they told me I couldn't leave the room until the 5 minute bathroom break allowed half-way through the test. I had forgotten to tell my roommate I was taking this test and he was making a bit of a ruckus playing L4D2 online (obviously a bit distracting). I asked the proctor if I could briefly leave the room to ask him to quiet down. They said I couldn't leave until the bathroom break so there was nothing I could do. Later on, I was busy thinking about a problem and had adjusted how I was sitting in my chair and moved my face slightly out of the camera's view. The proctor messaged me again telling me to move so they could see my entire face.

The first part of the interview was exactly like the linked experience. No coding questions just reasoning. The second part I had to use ProctorU instead of Proctorio. Personally I thought the experience was super weird but understandable, I'll get to that later, somebody watched me through my webcam the entire time with my microphone on. They needed to check my ID before the test. They needed me to show them the entire room I was in (which was my bedroom). My desktop computer was on behind my laptop so I turned off my computer (I don't remember if I offered to or if they asked me to) but they also asked me to cover my monitors up with something which I thought was silly after I turned them off so I covered them with a towel. They then used LogMeIn to remote into my machine so they could check running programs. I quit all my personal chat programs and pretty much only had the Chrome window running. ... I didn't talk a real person who actually worked at Amazon (by email or through webcam) until I received an offer.

[M]y company got acquired by Oracle. We thought things would be OK. Nothing changed immediately. Slowly but surely they turned the screws. 5 year laptop replacement policy. You get the corporate standard laptop and you'll like it. Sales? Oh those guys can buy new Macs every two years, they get whatever they want. Then you understand where Software Engineers rank in the company hierarchy. Oracle took the average price of our product from $100k to $5 million for the same size deals. Our sales went from $5-7m to more than $40m with no increasing in engineering headcount (team of 15). Didn't matter when bonus time came, we all got stack-ranked and some people got nothing. As a top performer I got a few options, worth maybe $5k. Oracle exists to extract the maximum amount of money possible from the Fortune 1000. Everyone else can fuck off. Your impotent internet rage is meaningless. If it doesn't piss off the CTO of $X then it doesn't matter. If it gets that CTO to cut a bigger check then it will be embraced with extreme enthusiasm. The culture wears down a lot (but not all) of the good people, who then leave. What's left is a lot of mediocrity and architecture astronauts. The more complex the product the better - it means extra consulting dollars! My relative works at a business dependent on Micros. When Oracle announced the acquisition I told them to start on the backup plan immediately because Oracle was going to screw them sooner or later. A few years on and that is proving true: Oracle is slowly excising the Micros dealers and ISVs out of the picture, gobbling up all the revenue while hiking prices.

In practice, we have to face that all that our quest for more stringent hiring standards is not really selecting the best, but just selecting fewer people, in ways that might, or might not, have anything to do with being good at a job. Let's go through a few examples in my career: A guy that was the most prolific developer I have ever seen: He'd rewrite entire subsystems over a weekend. The problem is that said susbsytems were not necessarily better than they started, trading bugs for bugs, and anyone that wanted to work on them would have to relearn that programmer's idiosyncrasies of the week. He easily cost his project 12 man/months of work in 4 months, the length of time it took for management to realize that he had to be let go. A company's big UI framework was quite broken, and a new developer came in and fixed it. Great, right? Well, he was handed code review veto to changes into the framework, and his standards and his demeanor made people stop contributing after two or three attempts. In practice, the framework died as people found it antiquated, and they decided to build a new one: Well, the same developer was tasked with building new framwork, which was made mandatory for 200+ developers to use. Total contribution was clearly negative. A developer that was very fast, and wrote working code, had been managing a rather large 500K line codebase, and received some developers as help. He didn't believe in internal documentation or on keeping interfaces stable. He also didn't believe in writing code that wasn't brittle, or in unit tests: Code changes from the new developers often broke things, the veteran would come in, fix everything in the middle of the emergency, and look absolutely great, while all the other developers looked to management as if they were incompetent. They were not, however: they were quite successful when moved to other teams. It just happens that the original developer made sure nobody else could touch anything. Eventually, the experiment was retried after the original developer was sent to do other things. It took a few months, but the new replacement team managed to modularize the code, and new people could actually modify the codebase productively. All of those negative value developers could probably be very valuable in very specific conditions, and they'd look just fine in a tough job interview. They were still terrible hires. In my experience, if anything, a harder process that demands people to appear smarter or work faster in an interview have the opposite effect of what I'd want: They end up selecting for people that think less and do more quickly, building debt faster. My favorite developers ever all do badly in your typical stringent Silicon Valley intervew. They work slower, do more thinking, and consider every line of code they write technical debt. They won't have a million algorithms memorized: They'll go look at sources more often than not, and will spend a lot of time on tests that might as well be documentation. Very few of those traits are positive in an interview, but I think they are vital in creating good teams, but few select for them at all.

I worked on Solaris for over a decade, and for a while it was usually a better choice than Linux, especially due to price/performance (which includes how many instances it takes to run a given workload). It was worth fighting for, and I fought hard. But Linux has now become technically better in just about every way. Out-of-box performance, tuned performance, observability tools, reliability (on patched LTS), scheduling, networking (including TCP feature support), driver support, application support, processor support, debuggers, syscall features, etc. Last I checked, ZFS worked better on Solaris than Linux, but it's an area where Linux has been catching up. I have little hope that Solaris will ever catch up to Linux, and I have even less hope for illumos: Linux now has around 1,000 monthly contributors, whereas illumos has about 15. In addition to technology advantages, Linux has a community and workforce that's orders of magnitude larger, staff with invested skills (re-education is part of a TCO calculation), companies with invested infrastructure (rewriting automation scripts is also part of TCO), and also much better future employment prospects (a factor than can influence people wanting to work at your company on that OS). Even with my considerable and well-known Solaris expertise, the employment prospects with Solaris are bleak and getting worse every year. With my Linux skills, I can work at awesome companies like Netflix (which I highly recommend), Facebook, Google, SpaceX, etc. Large technology-focused companies, like Netflix, Facebook, and Google, have the expertise and appetite to make a technology-based OS decision. We have dedicated teams for the OS and kernel with deep expertise. On Netflix's OS team, there are three staff who previously worked at Sun Microsystems and have more Solaris expertise than they do Linux expertise, and I believe you'll find similar people at Facebook and Google as well. And we are choosing Linux. The choice of an OS includes many factors. If an OS came along that was better, we'd start with a thorough internal investigation, involving microbenchmarks (including an automated suite I wrote), macrobenchmarks (depending on the expected gains), and production testing using canaries. We'd be able to come up with a rough estimate of the cost savings based on price/performance. Most microservices we have run hot in user-level applications (think 99% user time), not the kernel, so it's difficult to find large gains from the OS or kernel. Gains are more likely to come from off-CPU activities, like task scheduling and TCP congestion, and indirect, like NUMA memory placement: all areas where Linux is leading. It would be very difficult to find a large gain by changing the kernel from Linux to something else. Just based on CPU cycles, the target that should have the most attention is Java, not the OS. But let's say that somehow we did find an OS with a significant enough gain: we'd then look at the cost to switch, including retraining staff, rewriting automation software, and how quickly we could find help to resolve issues as they came up. Linux is so widely used that there's a good chance someone else has found an issue, had it fixed in a certain version or documented a workaround. What's left where Solaris/SmartOS/illumos is better? 1. There's more marketing of the features and people. Linux develops great technologies and has some highly skilled kernel engineers, but I haven't seen any serious effort to market these. Why does Linux need to? And 2. Enterprise support. Large enterprise companies where technology is not their focus (eg, a breakfast cereal company) and who want to outsource these decisions to companies like Oracle and IBM. Oracle still has Solaris enterprise support that I believe is very competitive compared to Linux offerings.~

I'd argue that where RethinkDB fell down is on a step you don't list, "Understand the context of the problem", which you'd ideally do before figuring out how many people it's a problem for. Their initial idea was a MySQL storage engine for SSDs - the environmental change was that SSD prices were falling rapidly, SSDs have wildly different performance characteristics from disk, and so they figured there was an opportunity to catch the next wave. Only problem is that the biggest corporate buyers of SSDs are gigantic tech companies (eg. Google, Amazon) with large amounts of proprietary software, and so a generic MySQL storage engine isn't going to be useful to them anyway. Unfortunately they'd already taken funding, built a team, and written a lot of code by the time they found that out, and there's only so far you can pivot when you have an ecosystem like that.

This unfortunately follows the conventions of the genre called "Falsehood programmers believe about X": ... I honestly think this genre is horrible and counterproductive, even though the writer's intentions are good. It gives no examples, no explanations, no guidelines for proper implementations - just a list of condescending gotchas, showing off the superior intellect and perception of the author.

It happens sometimes. Usually it's because of one of two situations: 1) The company was on the fence about wanting you anyway, and negotiating takes you from the "maybe kinda sorta want to work with" to the "don't want to work with" pile. 2) The company is looking for people who don't question authority and don't stick up for their own interests. Both of these are red flags. It's not really a matter of ethics - they're completely within their rights to withdraw an offer for any reason - but it's a matter of "Would you really want to work there anyway?" For both corporations and individuals, it usually leads to a smoother life if you only surround yourself with people who really value you.

I feel like this is every HN discussion about "rates---comma---raising them": a mean-spirited attempt to convince the audience on the site that high rates aren't really possible, because if they were, the person telling you they're possible would be wealthy beyond the dreams of avarice. Once again: Patrick is just offering a more refined and savvy version of advice me and my Matasano friends gave him, and our outcomes are part of the record of a reasonable large public company. This, by the way, is why I'll never write this kind of end-of-year wrap-up post (and, for the same reasons, why I'll never open source code unless I absolutely have to). It's also a big part of what I'm trying to get my hands around for the Starfighter wrap-up post. When we started Starfighter, everyone said "you're going to have such an amazing time because of all the HN credibility you have". But pretty much every time Starfighter actually came up on HN, I just wanted to hide under a rock. Even when the site is civil, it's still committed to grind away any joy you take either in accomplishing something near or even in just sharing something interesting you learned . You could sort of understand an atavistic urge to shit all over someone sharing an interesting experience that was pleasant or impressive. There's a bad Morrissey song about that. But look what happens when you share an interesting story that obviously involved significant unpleasantness and an honest accounting of one's limitations: a giant thread full of people piling on to question your motives and life choices. You can't win.

I was the first person to be interviewed by this journalist (Michael Thomas @curious_founder). He approached me on Twitter to ask questions about digital nomad and remote work life (as I founded Nomad List and have been doing it for years). I told him it'd be great to see more honest depictions as most articles are heavily idealized making it sound all great, when it's not necessarily. It's ups and downs (just like regular life really). What happened next may surprise you. He wrote a hit piece on me changing my entire story that I told him over Skype into a clickbait article of how digital nomadism doesn't work and one of the main people doing it for awhile (en public) even settled down and gave up altogether. I didn't settle down. I spent the summer in Amsterdam. Cause you know, it's a nice place! But he needed to say this to make a polarized hit piece with an angle. And that piece became viral. Resulting in me having to tell people daily that I didn't and getting lots of flack. You may understand it doesn't help if your entire startup is about something and a journalist writes a viral piece how you yourself don't even believe in that anymore. I contacted the journalist and Quartz but they didn't change a thing. It's great this meant his journalistic breakthrough but it hurt me in the process. I'd argue journalists like this are the whole problem we have these days. The articles they write can't be balanced because they need to get pageviews. Every potential to write something interesting quickly turns into clickbait. It turned me off from being interviewed ever again. Doing my own PR by posting comment sections of Hacker News or Reddit seems like a better idea (also see how Elon Musk does exactly this, seems smarter).

Hope this doesn't ruin it for you, but I knew someone who had a problem presented on the show. She called in and reached an answering machine. Someone called her and qualified the problem. Then one of the brothers called and talked to her for a while. Then a few weeks later (there might have been some more calls, I don't know) both brothers called her and talked to her for a while. Her parts of that last call was edited into the radio show so it sounded like she had called and they just figured out the answer on the spot.

Blockchain is the world's worst database, created entirely to maintain the reputations of venture capital firms who injected hundreds of millions of dollars into a technology whose core defining insight was "You can improve on a Ponzi scam by making it self-organizing and distributed; that gets vastly more distribution, reduces the single point of failure, and makes it censorship-resistant." That's more robust than I usually phrase things on HN, but you did ask. In slightly more detail: Databases are wonderful things. We have a number which are actually employed in production, at a variety of institutions. They run the world. Meaningful applications run on top of Postgres, MySQL, Oracle, etc etc. No meaningful applications run on top of "blockchain", because it is a marketing term. You cannot install blockchain just like you cannot install database. (Database sounds much cooler without the definitive article, too.) If you pick a particular instantiation of a blockchain-style database, it is a horrible, horrible database. Can I pick on Bitcoin? Let me pick on Bitcoin. Bitcoin is claimed to be a global financial network and ready for production right now. Bitcoin cannot sustain 5 transactions per second, worldwide. You might be sensibly interested in Bitcoin governance if, for some reason, you wanted to use Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a software artifact; it matters to users who makes changes to it and by what process. (Bitcoin is a software artifact, not a protocol, even though the Bitcoin community will tell you differently. There is a single C++ codebase which matters. It is essentially impossible to interoperate with Bitcoin without bugs-and-all replicating that codebase.) Bitcoin governance is captured by approximately ~5 people. This is a robust claim and requires extraordinary evidence. Ordinary evidence would be pointing you, in a handwavy fashion, about the depth of acrimony with regards to raising the block size, which would let Bitcoin scale to the commanding heights of 10 or, nay, 100 transactions per second worldwide. Extraordinary evidence might be pointing you to the time where the entire Bitcoin network was de-facto shut down based on the consensus of N people in an IRC channel. c.f. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9320989 This was back in 2013. Long story short: a software update went awry so they rolled back global state by a few hours by getting the right two people to agree to it on a Skype call. But let's get back to discussing that sole technical artifact. Bitcoin has a higher cost-to-value ratio than almost any technology conceivable; the cost to date is the market capitalization of Bitcoin. Because Bitcoin enters through a seigniorage mechanism, every Bitcoin existing was minted as compensation for "security the integrity of the blockchain" (by doing computationally expensive makework). This cost is high. Today, routine maintenance of the Bitcoin network will cost the network approximately $1.5 million. That's on the order of $3 per write on a maximum committed capacity basis. It will cost another $1.5 million tomorrow, exchange rate depending. (Bitcoin has successfully shifted much of the cost of operating its database to speculators rather than people who actually use Bitcoin for transaction processing. That game of musical chairs has gone on for a while.) Bitcoin has some properties which one does not associate with many databases. One is that write acknowledgments average 5 minutes. Another is that they can stop, non-deterministically, for more than an hour at a time, worldwide, for all users simultaneously. This behavior is by design.

The database market is NOT closed. In fact, we are in a database boom. Since 2009 (the year RethinkDB was founded), there have been over 100 production grade databases released in the market. These span document stores, Key/Value, time series, MPP, relational, in-memory, and the ever increasing "multi model databases." Since 2009, over $600 MILLION dollars (publicly announced) has been invested in these database companies (RethinkDB represents 12.2M or about 2%). That's aside from money invested in the bigger established databases. Almost all of the companies that have raised funding in this period generate revenue from one of more of the following areas: a) exclusive hosting (meaning AWS et al. do not offer this product) b) multi-node/cluster support c) product enhancements c) enterprise support Looking at each of the above revenue paths as executed by RethinkDB: a) RethinkDB never offered a hosted solution. Compose offered a hosted solution in October of 2014. b) RethinkDB didn't support true high availability until the 2.1 release in August 2015. It was released as open source and to my knowledge was not monetized. c/d) I've heard that an enterprise version of RethinkDB was offered near the end. Enterprise Support is, empirically, a bad approach for a venture backed company. I don't know that RethinkDB ever took this avenue seriously. Correct me if I am wrong. A model that is not popular among RECENT databases but is popular among traditional databases is a standard licensing model (e.g. Oracle, Microsoft SQL Server). Even these are becoming more rare with the advent of A, but never underestimate the licensing market. Again, this is complete conjecture, but I believe RethinkDB failed for a few reasons: 1) not pursuing one of the above revenue models early enough. This has serious affects on the order of the feature enhancements (for instance, the HA released in 2015 could have been released earlier at a premium or to help facilitate a hosted solution). 2) incorrect priority of enhancements: 2a) general database performance never reached the point it needed to. RethinkDB struggled with both write and read performance well into 2015. There was no clear value add in this area compared to many write or read focused databases released around this time. 2b) lack of (proper) High Availability for too long. 2c) ReQL was not necessary - most developers use ORMs when interacting with SQL. When you venture into analytical queries, we actually seem to make great effort to provide SQL: look at the number of projects or companies that exist to bring SQL to databases and filesystems that don't support it (Hive, Pig, Slam Data, etc). 2d) push notifications. This has not been demonstrated to be a clear market need yet. There are a small handful of companies that promoting development stacks around this, but no database company is doing the same. 2e) lack of focus. What was RethinkDB REALLY good at? It push ReQL and joins at first, but it lacked HA until 2015, struggled with high write or read loads into 2015. It then started to focus on real time notifications. Again, there just aren't many databases focusing on these areas. My final thought is that RethinkDB didn't raise enough capital. Perhaps this is because of previous points, but without capital, the above can't be corrected. RethinkDB actually raised far less money than basically any other venture backed company in this space during this time. Again, I've never run a database company so my thoughts are just from an outsider. However, I am the founder of a company that provides database integration products so I monitor this industry like I hawk. I simply don't agree that the database market has been "captured." I expect to see even bigger growth in databases in the future. I'm happy to share my thoughts about what types of databases are working and where the market needs solutions. Additionally, companies are increasingly relying on third part cloud services for data they previously captured themselves. Anything from payment processes, order fulfillment, traffic analytics etc is now being handled by someone else.

???

How did HN get get the commenter base that it has? If you read HN, on any given week, there are at least as many good, substantial, comments as there are posts. This is different from every other modern public news aggregator I can find out there, and I don’t really know what the ingredients are that make HN successful.

For the last couple years (ish?), the moderation regime has been really active in trying to get a good mix of stories on the front page and in tamping down on gratuitously mean comments. But there was a period of years where the moderation could be described as sparse, arbitrary, and capricious, and while there are fewer “bad” comments now, it doesn’t seem like good moderation actually generates more “good” comments.

The ranking scheme seems to penalize posts that have a lot of comments on the theory that flamebait topics will draw a lot of comments. That sometimes prematurely buries stories with good discussion, but much more often, it buries stories that draw pointless flamewars. If you just read HN, it’s hard to see the effect, but if you look at forums that use comments as a positive factor in ranking, the difference is dramatic -- those other forums that boost topics with many comments (presumably on theory that vigorous discussion should be highlighted) often have content-free flame wars pinned at the top for long periods of time.

Something else that HN does that’s different from most forums is that user flags are weighted very heavily. On reddit, a downvote only cancels out an upvote, which means that flamebait topics that draw a lot of upvotes like “platform X is cancer” “Y is doing some horrible thing” often get pinned to the top of r/programming for a an entire day, since the number of people who don’t want to see that is drowned out by the number of people who upvote outrageous stories. If you read the comments for one of the "X is cancer" posts on r/programming, the top comment will almost inevitably that the post has no content, that the author of the post is a troll who never posts anything with content, and that we'd be better off with less flamebait by the author at the top of r/programming. But the people who will upvote outrage porn outnumber the people who will downvote it, so that kind of stuff dominates aggregators that use raw votes for ranking. Having flamebait drop off the front page quickly is significant, but it doesn’t seem sufficient to explain why there are so many more well-informed comments on HN than on other forums with roughly similar traffic.

Maybe the answer is that people come to HN for the same reason people come to Silicon Valley -- despite all the downsides, there’s a relatively large concentration of experts there across a wide variety of CS-related disciplines. If that’s true, and it’s a combination of path dependence on network effects, that’s pretty depressing since that’s not replicable.

If you liked this curated list of comments, you'll probably also like this list of books and this list of blogs.

This is part of an experiment where I write up thoughts quickly, without proofing or editing. Apologies if this is less clear than a normal post. This is probably going to be the last post like this, for now, since, by quickly writing up a post whenever I have something that can be written up quickly, I'm building up a backlog of post ideas that require re-reading the literature in an area or running experiments.

P.S. Please suggest other good comments! By their nature, HN comments are much less discoverable than stories, so there are a lot of great coments that I haven't seen.