Read: Will John Bolton bring on armageddon — or stave it off?

That system evolved over seven decades, but its overarching aim remained consistent: providing a coherent policy-making process for a nuclear-armed superpower that could replace improvisation. Such policy integration did not ensure perfect order in Washington, much less that the choices it made were always right, as the minutes of National Security Council meetings about Vietnam, Iraq, and other crises make clear. But regular order, a predictable rhythm and rigor to how the government made decisions, brought some sanity to Washington—and stability to the world.

After all, the United States sat at the center of nearly every postwar global institution, including NATO, the Bretton Woods economic order, and the United Nations. Foreign nations may not have been able to pick who sat at the table in the Situation Room, but with such immense responsibility shouldered by one country, the American commitment to regularity in meetings and reasoned decision making allowed the rest of the world to sleep a little easier.

This has been especially true since the end of the Cold War, when few could doubt the United States was the most powerful nation on Earth. As the world looked toward Washington at every moment of terrorism, pandemic, financial crisis, and natural disaster, the national security adviser became a trusted intermediary, traffic cop, and triage responder, who knew whom to call, what to ask, and whether the United States could help. Some nations even emulated the American system: National security advisers now chair sessions in India, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere.

President Trump, who lacks any prior experience with government or national security, struggled from the start to find a workable rhythm in this system. Still, leaders in foreign capitals took heart that—despite his ham-handed tweets and incendiary statements—the president was forced to sit in meetings and deal with the questions from his more experienced appointees and Cabinet secretaries. The departure of Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and others aides, though, has left Trump less constrained: He has begun relying on a shadow National Security Council that includes senators, a retired general, and a television anchor, and his public and private suggestions that the national security adviser no longer speaks for the president have undermined any remaining sense of order.

Graeme Wood: How long can John Bolton take this?

Few should pity Bolton, who keeps showing up for work regardless of the latest indignity, but everyone should worry about what his downfall means. Though national security advisers have fallen out of favor before, no one’s time in the doghouse has been this public, this long, or this unlikely to change. Presidential juggling—of personalities, prerogatives, and policy initiatives—is back, but in hands far less nimble than Roosevelt’s.