The debt crisis in Europe is the fault of bankers, yet the people are the ones who pay.

The current mess is simply yet another earth-shaking collision between those who reap the returns from banking (shareholders and management) and those who bear the risks (everyone else).

Greek PM George Papandreou's apparently impulsive decision to put the bailout and austerity plan to a referendum merely highlights that tension between the public and bankers, and brings it to a head.

The bankers, horrified at the thought of facing the wrath of those whom they have plundered, will make sure it never gets to that by exerting the power of financial markets to head it off. And if we have learned one thing over the past three years it is that financial markets are more powerful than governments.

So after Papandreou announced his referendum plan, share prices slumped, bond yields soared and Eurozone politicians rushed into emergency meetings to try to save the rescue plan and continue to appease the financial markets.

But underlying this frantic activity is the unbalanced risks and rewards inherent in modern banking. But it wasn't always like that.

Andrew Haldane, the executive director of the Bank of England in charge of financial stability, gave a speech recently in which he showed as clearly as I have ever seen how the changes to banking over 200 years have contributed to the crises we have endured since 2007.

His last paragraph sums it up:

The risks from banking have been widely spread socially. But the returns to bankers have been narrowly kept privately. That risk/return imbalance has grown over the past century. Shareholder incentives lie at its heart. It is the ultimate irony that an asset calling itself equity could have contributed to such inequity. Righting that wrong needs investors, bankers and regulators to act on wonky risk-taking incentives at source.

Haldane explains that in the first half of the 19th century, when banking still existed in its original form, the capital put in by the owners of banks usually matched the amount of deposits - that is, bank gearing was 50/50.

Not only that, there was no such thing as limited liability as we have today: liability was unlimited and directors had the power to vet share transfers to ensure that the new owners had sufficiently deep pockets. As Andrew Haldane said:

This put shareholders firmly on the hook, a hook they then used to hold in check managers.

But during the industrial revolution, countries became hungry for more capital. The supply of credit was restricted by unlimited liability on bank shareholders, so it was progressively removed by governments, starting with Connecticut and Massachusetts in the United States in 1817 and concluding with the Companies Act of 1879 in Britain.

Shareholder vetting remained at first, and although liability was limited, a pool of uncalled capital was created that could be called on in an emergency, a sort of hybrid unlimited liability. That seemed like a good idea, but of course managers found that the act of calling on that capital merely worsened a crisis.

It was the first example of what Haldane calls the 'time-inconsistency problem'. That is, bankers do not exercise their available capital insurance because they fear - rightly - it would make a bad liquidity situation worse. The issue becomes even more acute when an institution is 'too big to fail'.

Eventually the vetting of bank shareholders was dropped as well and 'ownership and control were amicably divorced', as Haldane puts it.

The controllers (managers) soon learnt that taking bigger and bigger risks increased their returns without increasing the risks either to them or their shareholders. As a result the ratio of bank assets to GDP all over the world has risen exponentially.

There was another incentive to increase bank gearing - tax. Interest on debt is tax-deductible but dividends paid to the providers of equity are not.

Moreover, managers are paid bonuses according to returns on equity, not on the returns they make on the total assets they manage.

Andrew Haldane suggests switching banker remuneration from ROE to ROA (return on assets):

Imagine if the CEOs of the seven largest US banks had in 1989 agreed to index their salaries not to ROE, but to ROA. By 2007, their compensation would not have grown tenfold. Instead it would have risen from $2.8 million to $3.4 million. Rather than rising to 500 times median US household income, it would have fallen to around 68 times.

He also suggests that voting rights be extended to a wider set of stakeholders in the bank. For example depositors could be given a vote, albeit a smaller one than shareholders.

The advantage is that governance and control would then be distributed across the whole balance sheet. Some of the rent-seeking incentives of the equity-dictatorship model would be curbed.

At the very least, although Haldane does not mention this, banks should be forced to return to their basic function of taking deposits and making loans.

This is the core recommendation of Sir John Vickers' Independent Commission on Banking. He said that basic banking should be structurally 'ring-fenced' from the other activities, specifically proprietary trading. Naturally bankers are howling about this.

It is time for governments to listen to Haldane and Vickers and get on with radically reforming the way banks operate and bankers are rewarded, and they should not waste time discussing it with banks.

Alan Kohler is the Editor in Chief of Business Spectator and Eureka Report, as well as host of Inside Business and finance presenter on the ABC News.