3/04/04 (est.) - Comey and Ashcroft agree, " We had concerns as to our ability to certify its legality, which was our obligation for the program to be renewed." Ashrcroft taken ill. (see Marty Lederman on Comey's testimony at Balkanization) 3/10/04 - Congressional briefing on domestic wiretap program 3/10/04 - Gonzales hospital visit.

Negroponte and Mueller said they didn't know. But Negroponte's deputy, Gen., who until recently was director of the NSA, said, "I'd like to answer in closed session." Asked for comment, Wyden's spokeswoman referred to his hearing statements." (via the National Journal, 2/23/04

2/11/04 - Senate Intelligence Committe hearing : "one of TIA's strongest critics questioned whether intelligence officials knew that some of its programs had been moved to other agencies. Sen. Ron Wyden , D-Ore., asked Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte and FBI Director Robert Mueller whether it was "correct that when [TIA] was closed, that several ... projects were moved to various intelligence agencies.... I and others on this panel led the effort to close [TIA]; we want to know if Mr. Poindexter's programs are going on somewhere else."

1/04 - Given the pattern established in the prior three years twenty-seven months, there should have been a briefing of Congress in January 2004, but it did not occur.

7/18/03 - Senate votes unanimously to block funding for the Total Information Awareness program. According to the Defense Department appropriations, no funding "may be obligated or expended on research and development on the Terrorism Information Awareness program." - - over Bush admin. objections. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 10887, § 8131, 117 Stat. 1054, 1102 (2003)

I am retaining a copy of this letter in a sealed envelope in the secure spaces of the Senate Intelligence Committee to ensure that I have a record of this communication.

As I reflected on the meeting today, and the future we face, John Poindexter's TIA project sprung to mind, exacerbating my concern regarding the direction the Administration is moving with regard to security, technology, and surveillance.

I am writing to reiterate my concerns regarding the sensitive intelligence issues we discussed today with the DCI, DIRNSA,Chairman Roberts and our House Intelligence counterparts.

7/17/03 - Briefing for Intelligence Committee leadership (Pat Roberts, Jay Rockefeller, Porter Goss, and Jane Harman) on domestic wiretap program. This would be the last briefing before the crisis March 10 meeting. 7/17/03 - After his SECOND briefing on the program, Jay Rockefeller writes his CYA memo to Cheney, which states (thanks to Ann for the reminder on the date):

5/20/03 - 90 days later, Pentagon changes name of TIA from Total Information Awareness to Terrorist Information Awareness and calls it new program. Problem solved!

I'd like to pull out just a few salient dates and add four (in bold italics) to what joejoejoe did. I think the time line lends support for the argument that one of the problems--a big problem--with the domestic wiretap program is that it violated clear instructions from Congress.

Commenter joejoejoe sent me a superb timeline to show the chronology of Congress' building opposition to the Total Information Awareness program as it relates to the NSA's domestic wiretap program (how cool is that? I, the chronology weenie, am getting timelines out of the blue! Better than Christmas!!), which appears at the bottom of this post.

In other words, the Administration briefed Congress on the domestic wiretap program the day before the Senate made it explicit that they would not permit any data-mining of American citizens. That July 2003 briefing occurred in the normal pattern established in the previous two years, so it may be a coincidence. Or it may be that the Administration briefed Congress when they did before they would have a legal obligation to inform them they were breaking the law prohibiting data-mining of Americans.

But that was also the briefing after which Rockefeller wrote his memo to Cheney expressing concerns about the program. I had always understood that Rockefeller sent that memo after his first briefing on the program. But that's not right--he was briefed on January 29, 2003, but presumably sent no memo after that meeting. In other words, something about the July 17 briefing raised new concerns for him, and one of those concerns was the program's apparent similarity to the TIA program, which the Senate was just about to vote to explicitly prohibit funding.

Then, as I've pointed out before, the Administration skipped the briefing they should have held in January 2004, the first briefing after the law went into effect. They don't hold a briefing until March 10, when they've hit a crisis. Significantly, this is the first (of two, the second being in January 2006, after the NYT has exposed the program) briefing that includes Congressional leadership, in addition to the Intelligence Committee leadership; plus, there's the Tom DeLay briefing the next day, on March 11. We know they asked whether it'd be possible to pass legislation to make the program legal, so it's likely they finally included Congressional leadership in the briefings because they wanted legislation passed. Were they trying to legislate a work-around of the Appropriations Act? That might explain why the Gang of 8 told them it wouldn't happen, there was no way Congress would permit the program legislatively.

And of course, they don't brief Congress (though they do brief Pete Hoekstra, when he becomes Chair of HPSCI) again until February 2005. Eleven long months when they didn't tell Congress they (may have) been breaking the law.

joejoejoe's timeline: