Anatomy of the Big Air Battle over Munich - April 24, 1944 With permission of Bill Marshall, author "Our Might Always – Volume I,

A History of the 355th FG, the 355th TFW and the 355th FW" – December 27, 2011 A narrative of the events leading to, and details of, the battle between the Luftwaffe

and the 8th AF First Task Force, the 355th Fighter Group and the 357th Fighter Group. With assistance from Dewayne "Ben Bennett"- pilot, 384th BG, Erich Brown, Mike Williams and Dr. Frank Olynyk - Historians, Joe Shea – pilot, 357th FG, Lieutenant Colonel Joerg Dietsch – German Air Force and Historian. This narrative is about one of the last battles in which the Luftwaffe was successful enough to anticipate a critical target, skillfully place a very large reaction force of German Fighters at key spots in a bomber stream and inflict a loss greater than 10% of an 8thAF attacking force. The First Task Force, comprised of five Combat Wings of the First Bomb Division, would lose 27 of 268 bombers this day to flak and fighters. The corresponding claim by the Luftwaffe fighter force was for more than 50 B-17s and that didn’t include the seven that landed later in Sweden due to battle damage. On April 24, 1944 the 8th AF directed all three Bomb Divisions to attack a.) the Munich area airfields and manufacturing targets, b.) the Friedrichshafen area airfields and, c.) the Gablingen/Leipheim airfields. The Eighth would put up 716 bomber 'effectives' with the largest force comprised of 268 B-17s in 1st TF attacking Erding, Landsberg and Oberpfaffenhofen. The Oberphaffenhofen target was the Dornier complex currently tooling up for the Do335. The Landsberg attack was not only against the Me262s reputed to be on the base but also at the manufacturing facility for the Jumo turbine blades. The Eighth Fighter Command, combined with P-47s and P-51s from 9th AF and RAF Mustangs and Spitfires, put over 800 fighter aircraft in the air to support this broad attack against German aircraft industry. The strength of the Fighter Force is somewhat misleading as the P-47s from both the 8th and the 9th were only able to provide Penetration and late Withdrawal escort. The RAF Spitfires were restricted in range. as their Mustangs did not have the fuselage tanks, so could not quite reach the targets to bolster Target Escort. The total effective fighter force which could possibly beat off Luftwaffe attacks from Stuttgart all the way to Munich and back to Frankfort was contained in the 4th, 352nd, 354th , 355th and 357th FG’s Mustangs, plus the 20th , 55th, and 364th Lightning’s. The Lightning groups had less long range capability than the Mustangs so they were assigned to the Freiderichshafen target support The 4th FG was assigned to provide a Free Lance Sweep out in front of the entire bomber stream and remained in front of General Travis through the Stuttgart area. The Order of Battle for the Luftwaffe The LuftFlotte Reich defending force this day, was comprised of JG1, JG3, JG5, JG11, JG27, JG53, JG106, I./JG301, III./ZG26 and II./ZG76 plus a temporary placement of III./JG26 from LuftFlotte 3. In total there were more than 275 single engine and 40 twin engine fighters which were directed to attack the 8th Air Force along the southern Germany/Swiss border from Stuttgart/Worms through Ulm and Augsburg and Munich. Approximately 33 Staffels of day fighters was put in the air to engage the 8th AF. The German fighter force in the Munich area was dominantly Me109G-6’s with a few 109G-6/U4’s and 109G-5’s. In addition Sturmstaffel I, a new experimental bomber attack force, comprised of heavily armed and armored FW190 A-7’s, plus approximately 25 Me110 G-2’s from III./ZG26 and 12 Me410A-1’s from II./ZG76 were directed to the Munich area. The allocation of this force was as follows. JG1 and JG11 attacked in the Worms/Mannheim area around 1220, the rest attacked in Munich area from 1315-1415 in aggressive and sustained fights. The rest were formed from Ulm to Regensburg to the Munich areas. One hundred P-51s of the 355th and 357th FGs lifted from Steeple Morden and Bodney. After early returns, eighty eight Mustangs would be all that stood between the First Bomb Division and most of the 250 plus Luftwaffe fighters fighting that day around Munich The General Order of Battle for the USAAF Fighter Escort The 4th FG was assigned to provide Free Lance Fighter Sweep ahead of the entire stream of B-17s and B-24s as they crossed Germany toward Mannheim. The 20th and 55th and 364th P-38s were covering the Second Task Force comprised of four Combat Wings of the Third Bomb Division, attacking Friedrichshafen area airfields. The 352nd and 354th FG Mustangs had the Third Task Force (Second Bomb Division) B-24s attacking Gablingen and Leipheim airfields. The 355th and 357th FGs were assigned to provide Target Escort to the leading First Task Force, comprised of five Combat Wings of First Bomb Division B-17s, attacking Munich area. Once past the Mannheim area, near Worms, the 4th FG met several squadrons of Fw190s from JG1 and JG11. They quickly claimed 12 for the loss of three Mustangs and subsequently chased them to the north. The 55th and 364th FG P-38s provided Target escort to the Second Task Force attacking Friedrichshafen area. Near Lake Constance the 2nd Task Force separated from the leading 1st and for 15-20 minutes there was no fighter coverage anywhere near the1st Task Force from there all the way to Augsburg . The lead five combat wings now proceeded alone due east along a track that would take them north of Leipheim, then Gablingen before turning east southeast past Augsburg toward Erding. This is where the day begins for the two Groups assigned to provide cover for the First Task Force. F.O.312 – Erding A/D, Landsberg A/D, Oberpfaffenhofen/Daimler Werke A/D. Plan for 8th Air Force attacks on Germany, 24 April 1944 (Click to enlarge) The 355th and 357th FG over Munich Lieutenant Colonel Dix led the 355th on a Ramrod at the lead of 357 Squadron to the Munich area from 1106 to 1632. The 355th provided Target and Withdrawal support to the leading Combat Wing (41-A and 41-B) of First Division B-17s bombing Landsberg. The pilots were alerted that the Order of Battle was the 41st, 40th , 1st and 94th Combat Wings. Major Dregne led the 357th FG to also provide Target and Withdrawal Support to the trailing three Combat Wings bombing Erding. Neither fighter group was briefed concerning the unusual formation placement assigned for 41-B, was led by Colonel Dale Smith of 384th BG. It was placed line abreast, on the right side/dressed left, to 41-A to improve forward firepower of the leading bomber force against Company Front head-on attacks. General Travis led 41-A to attack Landsberg and Smith’s 41-B was to break away at the IP to attack the Daimler Werke factories at Oberpfaffenhofen. It was this critical facility which was manufacturing major subassemblies of the formidable Do335 twin engine fighter and turbine blades for the new and dangerous Me262. It was probably assumed that fighter cover could be dropped back from 355th or moved forward from the 357th should the need arise. The 'need' would arise and there weren’t close to enough escorts to beat off 25-30 staffels of single engine fighters.. General Robert Travis led the First Task Force/First Division in the lead 303rd BG. By the time this bomber stream was over the Channel, Travis had over 700 B-17s and B-24s behind his Fortress The Forts took off and assembled in the 0920 timeframe and proceeded to climb above the Channel and turn south toward Paris. The 355th Rendezvous was to be made slightly northeast of Augsburg at 1322 to pick up 41A and 41B, and continue escort southeast toward Erding. Some 10 minutes behind the 355th FG, Major Erwin Dregne led the 357FG to their RV point north of Munich soMe20 miles behind the 355th. Further in trail was the 2nd Division B-24s assigned to bomb Leipheim and Gablingen 10-20 minutes after the1st AD passed the area. This force was protected by the 352nd and 354th FG’s and had cleared the Gablingen area by 1330, turning north and then west northwest for home. RAF Mustangs would pick them up northwest of Ingolstadt. An unanticipated effect of the Echelon Left formation for the First Task Force was that every time a left turn was made, the 41-B B-17s to the right of 41-A were 'slung away' to the right of, and further behind, the lead wing and forced to throttle up to 158 mph IAS to try to catch up. Despite the trailing wing commanders pleading with the First Task Force commander, General Travis, to slow down, he continued to pace them at 150+ mph IAS. Twice a left turn was made and each time the 41-B fell further behind, opening a dangerous gap between 41-A, 41-B and the boxes of B-17s behind the lead wing. Ultimately the 41-B was isolated off to the right of the bomber stream as the trailing wings closed on 41-A, leaving no 'opening' for 41-B to slide into. So, instead of the trail squadrons of 355th able to cover the two boxes of both 41-A and 41-B, and the lead squadron of 357th FG able to overlap the trailing three bomber wings, 41-B was left dangerously exposed 10+ miles behind the lead combat wing and off to the right of the trailing wings with disastrous consequences. The German controllers quickly identified the issues with formation integrity, found that 41-B was isolated, and exploited the situation at Ulm. Near Wurms JG11 and JG1 attacked from the northeast at 1150-1200 and the 4th FG destroyed 12 for the loss of three. At 1255 the P-47 Penetration escorts started breaking escort and were out of sight by 1300. The 355th FG was still some 10-15 minutes away from the planned rendezvous point near Augsburg, and the 357th FG was at least 20 minutes away. The 56th and 361st FGs were now near the Channel after breaking escort to 1st Task Force southeast of Stuttgart. The escort fighters for the Second and Third Bomb divisions were 30+ miles away. There was an escort coverage vacuum, not by flawed timing but calculated risk by planners that did not have enough Mustangs and Lightning’s to cover everybody all the time. At 1305 west of Ulm, the German controller put I./JG3 in the same space as the First Task Force. West of Gablingen, they started making persistent and effective attacks from 1305-1320 on both 41-A and the isolated 41-B boxes. These first attacks resulted in three B-17s going down in 41-B plus another one from 41-A. The bombers were on 'C' channel pleading for help. Both the 355th and 357th FG bent their throttles to get to the rendezvous point faster than planned. At 1320 Gruppenkommandeur III./JG26, Hauptmann Staiger, led 30 pilots equipped with Me109G-6/U4’s, toward the B-17s. Mk 108 30mm cannon firing through the nose and the two 20mm cannon slung on under wing gondolas were very effective. He was joined by III./JG3. He noticed that the 355th had arrived and decided to stalk the bombers awaiting the opportunity to attack. He made one head on pass just before the 355th arrived and then retreated to cloud cover to await further opportunity. JG26 claimed five B-17s from Augsburg to Dachau during that one head on pass, along with 12 more claims by JG3 in the same area from 1305 to 1335. Post strike de-briefings place six B-17s downed in that area and time frame, although several were damaged and later went to Switzerland on the way home. Between Erding and Oberpfaffenhofen JG26 would exploit a lack of fighter escorts near the IP. Captain Dewayne "Ben" Bennett, pilot in the low squadron of the 384th BG, in 41-B, estimated 50-60 German single engine fighters plus another 20 Me109s flying top cover, made the first of many head on attacks. For approximately 15 minutes the unescorted B-17s were in serious trouble. In addition to the four of the 384th B-17s shot down in the Leipheim to Augsburg area, there were also about 20 more B-17s with varying degrees of damage, some of which would fall later. As the beleaguered Forts struggled toward the planned 355th Fighter Group R/V point, the Group arrived early north of Augsburg at 1319, heading southeast toward Munich. Trailing the lead 357FS was next the 354FS and then the 358FS, which arrived at 1322. Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Dix saw the second box of B-17s under attack, as was their own assigned first combat box of B-17s further ahead. Dix led the 357FS to attack and directed Captain Henry Kucheman, leading the 354FS and Captain Emil Sluga, leading the 358FS, to catch up to the 41A now heading southeast, due north of Munich, toward the Erding airfields. At this time, a second force of German fighters came in from the northeast. Approximately fifty more Me109s and Fw190s, with approximately 20 of those Me109s flying top cover, made a diving right turn for the first head on pass. The fighters split into formations of 4-6 each and made what were later described as "persistent and skilled" attacks, boring through the B-17 formations and returning for more head on attacks. These attacks started at approximately 1335 to 1340 and continued over Erding and thence to the south. The 357FS quickly engaged the Fw190s from Sturmstaffel 1 and their Me109G-6 escorts from Stab.III./JG3. Then more Me109s from II. and III./JG3 piled on. The sky due north of Munich was filled with B-17s, P-51s, Me109s and Fw190s. The 357FS Red and Yellow flights quickly shot down four plus damaged several more. Lt. Col. Gerald Dix shot down a Fw190 whose pilot bailed out and saluted him as Dix flew by, returning the salute. Dix then tacked on to a very skilled pilot leading the109 escorts and the fight ranged from 23,000 feet in rolling dive to the deck, then hard skids, zooming climbing turns and snap rolls near the deck until the German pilot finally straightened out in a valley hugging trees. The pilot was probably ace Ltn. Franz Schwaiger, 1./JG3 StaffelKaptain . Dix hit him hard from canopy to nose, but then his own canopy fogged up and he lost him on the deck. Dix only claimed the 109 as a 'Damaged' but Schwaiger apparently belly landed just ahead, southwest of Regensburg. According to a witness Schwaiger crash landed and then was strafed by a Mustang before he could escape - but no encounter report for either 355th or 357th Fighter Group contains an account of a strafing during this mission. 357FS Yellow flight leader Captain Henry Bille also scored in this fight on a Fw190 northwest of Munich. His destroyed claim was later reduced to 'probable'. Lieutenant Les Minchew, flying wingman to Dix, engaged and damaged a Me109 which was chasing Dix and then was separated from Dix in the fight. Shortly afterwards he shot down a Me109 northwest of Munich. At approximately 1322 the 354th FS arrived to take stock of the situation. Yellow flight’s Lieutenant Bill Boulet, flying wing to Captain Robert Woody, received a call for help from 41A. Element leader Lieutenant Bud Fortier simultaneously spotted the isolated bomb wing to the south under attack with more German fighters heading toward them. Five 109s in string formation then crossed high and in front of Yellow flight in a shallow dive. Capt. Henry Kucheman, ordered Blue and Green flights to remain with the bombers and then led Red flight in a climb to intercept 20-25 more 109s inbound from the northeast, just north of Munich. Captain Woody took Yellow flight and sped after the five 109s boring in on the B-17s of 41B. At 1330 only the 358FS and two flights of the 354th were left intact to cover the lead boxes and 41B was isolated to the south.