Writing for a British online magazine such as TheArticle is a risky undertaking for an Irish person in the present climate unless you are fully against Brexit, the Conservative Party and Boris Johnson. It’s risky because in Ireland we are in full ‘green jersey’ mode again, and your patriotism is likely to be called into question if you show any sympathy at all for Brexit voters, never mind Brexit itself.

This is a bit strange when you think about it, because Ireland is, so far as I know, the only country in the EU that is obliged by our Constitution to put EU treaties that affect national sovereignty before the voters. At the first time of asking, we voted against the Nice Treaty, and then the Lisbon Treaty.

The former, dating back to the early 2000s, paved the way for the admission of some of the former communist countries of Eastern Europe into the EU.

The later, dating back to 2008, conferred yet more powers on Brussels. In neither case was our initial rejection taken for a final answer. We mortified our political leaders in front of their EU peers, and following cosmetic changes to each treaty we were asked to vote again and on the second time of asking, passed them.

But the fact that we were willing to defy Brussels at all, even if it was partly motivated by a wish to annoy our own politicians, is a sign that the Irish might not be quite as Europhile as we appear to be on the surface. On this basis, we should be a tad more understanding towards Brexit voters in the UK, even if there is absolutely no demand worth speaking about in Ireland to actually leave the EU.

You would also imagine that a country which struggled for so long to ‘take back control’ of its future from London would appreciate why its neighbour wants to take back control from Brussels. The centenary of Irish independence will be marked in three years time, and three years ago we marked the centenary of the 1916 Easter Rising. We paid a high price to win our freedom in both blood and treasure.

Of course, it will be correctly pointed out that Britain joined the EU voluntarily whereas we were conquered, and that is obviously true. Nevertheless, at its heart Brexit and the fight for Irish independence have the same motive; a desire for national sovereignty.

I was still a boy when we joined the EEC, as it was known then, in 1973 along with Denmark and the UK. I remember how pleased my father was. He was editor of The Evening Herald at the time and was a life-long supporter of Fine Gael, which has traditionally been far friendlier towards Britain than its main rival, Fianna Fail.

My father was not anti-British by any stretch, but he firmly believed that by joining the EEC we would be able to further escape Britain’s giant shadow. That feeling was widespread and now it has come back.

Britain is affecting our destiny again and not for the better from our point of view. Britain wants to go its own way without thinking for an instant about how it might affect its Irish neighbour. We feel slighted. Not for the first time.

But this time there is a difference. This time we have friends, namely the other member-states of the EU, including the French and mighty Germany.

Thus, when Boris Johnson was in Dublin last week to meet with Taoiseach Leo Varadkar, Varadkar had no need to feel intimidated and or under any real pressure to make concessions. He knows Boris cannot control his own parliament, that he leads a deeply divided country, that all of the main parties in Ireland support our strategy of insisting upon a backstop, as does Brussels. He also knows almost the entire country is united behind him. That puts Varadkar in a position of strength.

And in many ways, it’s true. Nonetheless, the Irish political establishment’s strategy is perilous. It is an all-or-nothing approach that risks poisoning Anglo-Irish relations for a long time and also relations with pro-Brexit Unionists in the North.

Talk of a possible Irish unity poll – admittedly not encouraged by our Government – isn’t helping matters either. If Remain voters in Britain are intensely annoyed at the prospect of their country leaving the EU, how are Unionists who voted against a united Ireland going to feel if they are forced to leave the UK against their will?

If the fear is that a return to a ‘hard border’ will lead to an upsurge in Republican violence, why should the disappearance of a border altogether on the island not lead to Loyalist violence?

From an Irish point of view, this is why the preservation of the status quo is the best outcome, and that might yet happen. But suppose it doesn’t and suppose Britain and Northern Ireland leave the EU without the backstop in place guaranteeing that there is no return to customs posts etc at the border? What do we do then?

Well, that depends largely on the EU. Britain has repeatedly said there will be no checks on its side, although there are doubts about the sustainability of that position. The EU, on the other hand, insists on maintaining the ‘integrity of the Single Market’, thereby placing it above the Peace Process, as though the Single Market is some kind of Revealed Truth.

But only a small fraction of Irish trade goes over the Northern Ireland border, never mind total EU trade. If the EU really believes peace in the North will be threatened by checks of some kind, even if they are away from the border itself, then why insist on them?

Given the slavishly pro-EU stance of our most of our media, this sort of question is rarely asked of either Irish or EU politicians. When it was put to Leo Varadkar it on RTE last Friday, he did not give a clear answer.

Our past history with Britain means we are tempted to enjoy its present Brexit-induced troubles far too much and it might even mean we are not seeing our interests as clearly as we should. The best possible trade deal between the UK and the EU is what would suit us best. Even if a special Northern Ireland-only backstop is arranged, we will still want a very low-friction border down the Irish Sea. We should do doing our utmost to ensure that.

David Quinn is a columnist with The Sunday Times (Ireland edition).