By Harem Karem and Kamal Chomani:

President Barzani’s two terms in office ended in 2013, although he has managed to cling on for two more years after striking a shady deal, exploiting a loophole in the system, with his so-called strategic partner, the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan). Barzani’s presidency was revived by Hero Ibrahim Ahmed – in the absence of her severely ill husband, and PUK secretary general, Jalal Talabani – in an act that can only be defined as a ‘desperate measure’ to protect Talabani’s interests. In recent months, however, Barzani’s post has again sparked controversy, as his tenure fast approaches its expiration date (19 August 2015).

To make sense of all this, we shall briefly explain the foundations on which the presidential system stands:

Historical Aspect

In 1992, the Kurdistan Region’s first election was held, during which none of the political parties could achieve the necessary 50%+1 to appoint one of the two rivals, Barzani or Talabani, as national leader. Neither would compromise or work together and so they agreed to disagree and divided the region into two, green and yellow, zones on a 50/50 basis. However, their continued disagreements soon sparked a disastrous civil war which claimed some 30,000 lives; both leaders are equally responsible for this.

When Talabani became the Iraqi President in 2005, the Kurdistan Regional Presidency was established, with more powers than the Parliament and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), to counterbalance him. There followed a questionable election that formally positioned the former warlord Massoud Barzani as KRG President.

The Failure of Institutionalisation

The presidency, as a new institution in the Kurdistan Region (KR) with unlimited powers, was never institutionalised, despite scores of intellectuals calling for this. Barzani deliberately prevented the presidency from becoming a national institution, and he kept using the Presidential Palace as his KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) office too. The Vice President has been unable to exercise any powers, and the public has no real idea how the presidency is run, what the structure is and who the decision-makers are on both micro and macro levels. Barzani’s foreign relations, for example, have been both dubious and unregulated; during his official visits abroad, he is regularly accompanied by his immediate family members, including grandchildren, although he has often failed to include diplomats or members of the press in his team. His foreign relations agenda is managed by the KDP’s head of foreign relations, while the KRG’s foreign relations minister acts as an interpreter to the president. Barzani has misused his presidential powers, while working diligently in the interests of his political party.

Since Barzani’s 2005 inauguration, corruption has grown on an unprecedented scale, national resources have been squandered, private militias and intelligence services are increasingly loyal to their parties as opposed to the country, and there is ever-growing social inequality. The country is bankrupt and most people are struggling to make ends meet, while 10,000 millionaires and 15 billionaires have emerged in a short space of time. Society is polarized between lackeys who live on political parties’ handouts and good honest citizens who have to wait for wages that are three months behind. During Barzani’s term, four journalists and dozens of protesters were murdered while hundreds were subjected to torture by his KDP militiamen: not only has he failed to bring the murderers and torturers to justice, but he has even harboured them. The latest example of Barzani’s tribal system is the plight of Judge Hawzhen who has fled the Kurdistan Region in fear of his life after finding treacherous tribal gangsters – who had collaborated in Saddam’s crimes of Anfal before switching their support to the KDP and PUK in the hope of becoming untouchable – guilty last week.

Whenever there has been public outrage against some aspect of his rotten system, Barzani’s answer has been to set up a committee to investigate it, although no substantive conclusions were reached by any of the committees he has formed over the past decades. To list a few, there was the committee to investigate traitors who assisted the Anfal Campaign, the committee to bring justice to those who have invaded public lands between Erbil and Pirmam, the committee to investigate the murdered journalists, the committee to investigate corruption, and so on …

Presidential or Parliamentary System?

It is a well-established Middle-Eastern-Fact that the presidential system only breeds dictators and corrupt leaders; there are numerous examples. Even though KDP representatives in parliament have been tirelessly trying to convince the public that KR’s political system is semi-presidential, according to article 60 of KR’s draft Constitution, the Presidency is “the highest executive power and chief of general staff”. According to legistlation on the presidency, including the law hastily passed when Barzani’s term was extended in 2013, the political system has become an absolute presidency, since the president’s powers are greater than those of any other president in the region.

Here are a few of the KR President’s powers which, along with many others, have concerned the public (except KDP loyalists):

Highest executive power in KR

Chief of General Staff

Power to dissolve Parliament

Can announce a State of Emergency [without parliament’s consent]

Power to appoint KR’s Constitutional Court members and members of the Judges Assembly

Power to control KR’s Security Council and KR’s Intelligence services

Most importantly, as this has caused much misery over the past decade, the power to approve or reject legislation passed by parliament

Over the past few years, opposition parties have called for a parliamentary system where the president is elected by parliament, and presidential powers are limited by and accountable to parliament. There is currently a consensus between Gorran, KIU, KIG and potentially also the PUK which can become enshrined in the draft constitution. These four parties combined hold 58 of the 111 parliamentary seats and they are working together to ratify a revised draft constitution. Additionally, the PUK and Gorran have been working to form an alliance recently and this could mean the PUK will abandon its KDP strategic partner. This would likely spark a conflict between the former allies, because the KDP supported the PUK to secure Iraq’s presidential seat and, in return, they will expect the PUK to uphold their end of the deal and support the KDP in retaining the KR presidency. Should the Gorran-PUK alliance materialise, the parliamentary system will prevail – and will the KR presidential seat be claimed too?

Why Should Barzani Leave the Presidency?

Barzani has clearly failed to uphold the rule of law and basic democratic principles; he has failed to demonstrate leadership other than to his party supporters; he has failed to protect national interests; he has failed to build the national infrastructure and a decent economy. Like other despots, he has built the system around himself, making it near impossible to remove him peacefully unless he goes willingly; his background is bloody and treacherous. Worse still, he is intending to rule forever; Dr Farhad Pirbal, a pro-KDP university lecturer, claims that, during his recent meeting with Barzani, he proposed a monarchical system and putting Barzani on the throne, to which Barzani replied: “I fully agree with your proposal”. This account has not been rejected by Barzani’s office

The president’s record in KR’s current existential crisis is not distinguished. When the war began, initially it was PUK forces that took the fight to IS from the green zone, when IS was still relatively weak, while Barzani was refusing to engage in the conflict. His KDP forces were standing by doing nothing until IS attacked Shingal and captured 1000 women and children and then posed a direct threat to his yellow zone: only then did he act. To date, he hasn’t offered an explanation as to why he failed the Yazidis. Even the war hasn’t motivated Barzani to get his act together and unite the Peshmerga into a strong, national army.

There can only be two explanations for the multidimensional crisis Barzani has dragged the nation into: either he is too weak to accept responsibility and tackle these matters head on or else he is directly involved in the wrongdoing and exploitation of national resources. Either way, he hasn’t got what it takes to run the region and it’s time we saw the back of him.

Who is the Alternative to Barzani?

For the KDP, the question of who could replace Barzani is frightening because they lack an influential leader who can be accepted by both of the main wings of their party. The PUK seems to have given up on the position since they already have Iraq’s presidency. Gorran also hasn’t declared any interest in the presidency; their focus is mainly on strengthening the parliamentary system. However, currently two strong candidates are enjoying widespread public support: either Gorran leader Nawshirwan Mustafa or PUK deputy secretary Barham Salih could get combined PUK and Gorran backing, although neither has publicly declared his intentions.

As it stands, it seems that the PUK, Gorran, KIU and KIG might be willing to accept another KDP candidate, or maybe even tolerate another term for Barzani, if the KDP accepts constitutional amendments to establish a full parliamentary system and limit the powers of the president. If the parties do not reach a consensus in the next few months, KR will face a political crisis which could potentially lead to civil unrest. The future then will be unclear.