Introduction

Recently, I installed Malwarebytes on my machine. I played around with it for a little and I noticed that something was off with the scanning of files on disk. Naturally, it tempted me into digging further to identify the root cause but I had also unexpectedly discovered something else that was incredibly strange. So, a couple of issues and hours of investigation later, I would like to present to you what I’ve uncovered in this journey.

What File Scanning?

For those unaware, the EICAR test file is a file developed to test anti-malware solutions by intentionally triggering a detection based on the following ASCII string: X5O!P%@AP[4\PZX54(P^)7CC)7}$EICAR-STANDARD-ANTIVIRUS-TEST-FILE!$H+H* . For more information about this, please see here: https://www.eicar.org/.

As I completed the installation of Malwarebytes, I wanted to test it with the classic EICAR file. So I dropped it into disk and waited for a detection notification… and nothing…? Malwarebytes did not bat an eyelid. I escalated it further and explicitly requested a scan on the file… and nothing!

After Googling the issue, here is the summary in the FAQ of why Malwarebytes does not detect EICAR files:

Malwarebytes: Malwarebytes: So in summary, MB3 already incorporates world-class, next-generation anti-malware technologies. Our combination of signature-less and rules-based layered approach is far more effective than using AV signatures. Malwarebytes is able to prevent 0-minute threats and attacks without updates, even script-based, file-less, and other advanced attacks . We won’t detect EICAR because EICAR is not representative of either today’s threat environment or security needs.

Weird flex, but okay.

After this unique incident, I decided to try and see if it would detect anything that was dropped to disk so I decided to find something that should guarantee a detection: Quasar RAT. I downloaded it and unzipped it, waiting in anticipation for the detection notification… and nothing! Again!

I performed a manual scan on the Quasar.exe file to check if Malwarebytes was actually functional at all and, lo and behold, it picked it up!

Investigating the Issue

Of course, I was not impressed by what I have seen. I wanted to investigate what was causing this problem to resolve it. Having messed with a little bit of kernel driver development before, I knew where to look.

Minifilter Callback Operations

Windows has a special type of drivers called Minifilters which are used for file system operations. To register as a minifilter, the driver must use the FltRegisterFilter registration function. One of the parameters specify the registration context which is a struct that holds the relevant information to be provided to the kernel.

typedef struct _FLT_REGISTRATION { USHORT Size; USHORT Version; FLT_REGISTRATION_FLAGS Flags; const FLT_CONTEXT_REGISTRATION *ContextRegistration; const FLT_OPERATION_REGISTRATION *OperationRegistration; // <-- PFLT_FILTER_UNLOAD_CALLBACK FilterUnloadCallback; PFLT_INSTANCE_SETUP_CALLBACK InstanceSetupCallback; PFLT_INSTANCE_QUERY_TEARDOWN_CALLBACK InstanceQueryTeardownCallback; PFLT_INSTANCE_TEARDOWN_CALLBACK InstanceTeardownStartCallback; PFLT_INSTANCE_TEARDOWN_CALLBACK InstanceTeardownCompleteCallback; PFLT_GENERATE_FILE_NAME GenerateFileNameCallback; PFLT_NORMALIZE_NAME_COMPONENT NormalizeNameComponentCallback; PFLT_NORMALIZE_CONTEXT_CLEANUP NormalizeContextCleanupCallback; PFLT_TRANSACTION_NOTIFICATION_CALLBACK TransactionNotificationCallback; PFLT_NORMALIZE_NAME_COMPONENT_EX NormalizeNameComponentExCallback; PFLT_SECTION_CONFLICT_NOTIFICATION_CALLBACK SectionNotificationCallback; } FLT_REGISTRATION, *PFLT_REGISTRATION;

Within this struct, there is one member that is interesting: OperationRegistration .

typedef struct _FLT_OPERATION_REGISTRATION { UCHAR MajorFunction; FLT_OPERATION_REGISTRATION_FLAGS Flags; PFLT_PRE_OPERATION_CALLBACK PreOperation; PFLT_POST_OPERATION_CALLBACK PostOperation; PVOID Reserved1; } FLT_OPERATION_REGISTRATION, *PFLT_OPERATION_REGISTRATION;

This struct describes the type of operation that will be registered as a callback ( MajorFunction ) and the two functions that will handle the callback ( PreOperation and PostOperation ). The PreOperation handles the callback before the operation is performed and the PostOperation handles the callback after the operation is performed. This struct is used in an array that may specify multiple types of operations.

The Tip of the Iceberg

Using this knowledge, I discovered the registration structure used for FltRegisterFilter :

If we match the offsets of the above struct definition, we can deduce that the two green unk_XXX values are the ContextRegistration and OperationRegistration respectively. We are interested in the second one:

The figure above shows the OperationRegistration struct with the operations IRP_MJ_CREATE (file handle opens) and IRP_MJ_ACQUIRE_FOR_SECTION_SYNCHRONIZATION . What’s strange here is that there is no registered callback registration for IRP_MJ_WRITE (file writes) nor IRP_MJ_CLEANUP (file handle closes). This could track malicious byte patterns being written to a file as well as being able to scan a file after it has been opened and potentially modified. Perhaps this was the issue for failing to have scanned Quasar?

Anyway, the IRP_MJ_CREATE specifies both PreOperation and PostOperation . The PostOperation is only used for clean up so we are not interested in that. Let’s have a look at the PreOperation . The function is actually quite small and didn’t contain any relevant information about file scanning but I noticed the following deferred routine:

Taken By Surprise

If we jump into sub_140005AA0 , we can see this:

In the green boxes, there are calls to RtlCompareUnicodeString , with the first argument as the file extension and the second argument as hardcoded strings! Here are the three strings:

Looking back at the flow chart, RtlCompareUnicodeString is defined to return zero if the two provided strings are the same. We can follow the green branches that satisfy this return value and see that execution flows all the way to the end of the function. The red box on the right contains the function that scans the file. If we wanted to bypass the file scanning function, all we need to do is to rename the file extension to Manifest , Config , or etl (case-insensitive)!

It is actually possible to run executable files despite lacking the exe extension name. I believe that the PATHTEXT environment variable plays a role in the CreateProcess function. The (my) PATHTEXT variable is defined as:

.COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH;.MSC

From my educated guess, if the executing file has an unassociated file extension, it will iterate through these file types in order (left to right) and verify by analysing the file’s header. In the case of an exe , it will reach the .EXE value, be recognised as an executable by the MZ header signature, and then attempted to be executed as such. Correct me if I’m wrong.

Demonstration

In the following GIF, I will show that malicious files dropped to disk do not get detected. Then, by changing the file name extensions to etl and manifest , Malwarebytes will not also not see them.

Dropper PoC

I’ve also developed a PoC dropper designed to automate this process.

Conclusion

This journey started out quite strange and became even stranger. I have no idea why the implementation is missing some file system operation callbacks. It may explain why Malwarebytes is not scanning files when they are written to disk. I have even less of an idea as to why it was decided that these file extensions were whitelisted from scanning. Perhaps it was an optimisation of some sort? Maybe it was assumed that they weren’t executable? Let me know what you think.

As always, you can find the PoC here on my GitHub: https://github.com/NtRaiseHardError/Antimalware-Research/tree/master/Malwarebytes.

– dtm