(Eric) Let us get one thing out of the way: yes, we know that many of you just want all of this J.T. Realmuto business to be over and done with. Yes, we are as sick (if not moreso) of hearing all of the rumors and non-rumors surrounding the Braves and Realmuto as you all likely are. We aren’t here to adjudicate whether Craig Mish, the Marlins beat writer, is right when he said this:

Sources : Braves appear to be a slight favorite to land Realmuto. Austin Riley is on the table. Lots of moving parts. Mets & Yanks are still in & probably need to outdo ATL to get J.T. Reds have fallen back. TB/SD def in but longshots. Not imminent. — Craig Mish (@CraigMish) December 15, 2018

Nor are we going out to assume that the slew of Braves’ beat writers that are seemingly doing damage control and responding to these rumors are any more right or wrong either. The most consistent voice from the Braves side has been Mark Bowman and he had this to say on the subject.

The Braves checked in on Realmuto during the early part of the Winter Meetings. But the discussion led them to believe it was time to move on https://t.co/c9WL4bAsrs — Mark Bowman (@mlbbowman) December 16, 2018

In reality, it is probably true that both sides of this weird media back-and-forth have truly heard what is being reported and both can be true. The Braves very likely have made an offer that remains on the table, but they have moved on from discussing that proposal with the Marlins. The Marlins, meanwhile, may like that proposal but are currently trying to drum up some more interest to see if someone can beat it and are not in a hurry to accept anything this early in the offseason. Both things can be true and given the reporters in question, it is likely that some version of the above reflects the reality of the situation.

However, that is not why we are here. The one question that we have gotten a lot (other than “why haven’t the Braves done anything yet?”) has been what would a package for Realmuto from the Braves look like. To start with, a lot of that comes down to the idea of surplus value.

What the hell is surplus value?

Surplus value is basically the idea of measuring how much value a given player has in terms of dollars over how much they are actually compensated for. For prospects, this essentially accounts for all of their value because they are not paid anything of note (until arbitration). The calculation is based on how much WAR a given prospect is expected to accumulate over his years of team control and the value is roughly estimated from there. For more on how surplus value works for prospects, this article is a great reference.

As for surplus value for players already in the major leagues, it is about the same thing except that one has to account for how much money that player is going to be making. If we take a fictional player, lets just call him T.J. Mealruto, and try to see what his surplus value, we would just take what his expected production over the years left on his contract and calculate the value just like we would for prospects, but then we subtract out what he is expected to make over the years he is under contract (some guesstimating is required for guys who are still arbitration eligible as we don’t know EXACTLY how much they will end up making).

You lost yet? Me too. Fortunately, we have a guy for that here at Talking Chop. I reached out to Ivan to help with getting a sense of just how much value Realmuto SHOULD have on the trade market as well as giving some general ideas of what trade packages SHOULD work or not work. Here is what we came up with

(Ivan) First, a bit more on surplus value: The general idea of surplus value, instead of just talking about how much a player produces, is that you can always buy production at some kind of generic rate. Surplus value, then, represents a discount on production that you can’t freely buy. In other words, if you had a player that produced 2 WAR and was paid $16 million-$18 million to do so, there wouldn’t be any real excitement from a third party about trading for that player, because they could pay the same price to get the same deal on the free agent market. What said third party couldn’t do on the free agent market is pay, say, $9 million to get 2 WAR, so that gap between what it and isn’t possible represents the “surplus” value of a player earning less for his production than a market rate.

But for the fact that he’s a catcher, valuing J.T. Realmuto isn’t all too difficult. This is in large part because: (1) he’s only controlled for two more years, so there’s not that much potential for variation in his future production (i.e., even if you miss, you’ve only missed for two years, and not for six or whatever); and (2) he’s already been through arbitration once and just has a couple of years of that left. That second point helps with certainty because arbitration salaries are highly determined by what a player has already made. (In Matt Swartz’ documentation of his model for MLB Trade Rumors, he notes that player production predicts arbitration salary way worse than a model that takes prior arbitration-season earnings into account.)

Realmuto is projected to earn $6.1 million in arbitration this coming year by MLB Trade Rumors; this is likely going to be pretty close given how accurate that model has been through the years. Using that figure as a starting point and the general rule of thumb that players in their third year of arbitration (Arb3) earn about 50 percent more than their second year (Arb2), we get 6.1 x 1.5 = about $9.2 million for his next salary. Adding these together, and we have a player that’s likely going to earn around $15 to $16 million for the next two years combined. So, when thinking about his surplus value, all we need to do is figure out his production, value it, and subtract the salary.

The production part is where things get a little tricky, and mostly just because Realmuto is a catcher. As noted here, fWAR and bWAR don’t currently take framing into account (though WARP, from Baseball Prospectus, does). So, when thinking about projections of Realmuto’s future production, it’s important to not forget that framing matters. (If you think that framing doesn’t matter, it’s helpful to review the recently-signed contracts of Jeff Mathis and Kurt Suzuki, who arrived at similar prices per expected contribution when you take framing into account, but look like grossly-different deals if framing is ignored. On the other hand, though, framing is still somewhat tricky; Robinson Chirinos probably got a substantially bigger deal than you’d expect given his lack of framing aptitude.)

Value: Everything but framing

Over the past three seasons, Realmuto has managed the following fWAR and playing time estimates:

2016: 3.7 fWAR, 545 PAs

2017: 3.8 fWAR, 579 PAs

2018: 4.8 fWAR, 531 PAs

There are some interesting things underlying his hitting metrics in those years, namely that he outperformed xwOBA a ton in 2016 but then improved in 2017 to actually shrink his gap in the opposite way from how it usually happens (usually wOBA regresses to xwOBA; Realmuto’s wOBA caught up with his xwOBA instead), and that Baseball Prospectus’ DRC+ statistic doesn’t think all that highly of him, giving him 2016-2018 marks of 93, 99, and 113, respectively (compare to 111, 107, and 126 for wRC+).

But, in the end, these are all curiosities around the broader context of his hitting, which is probably somewhere around above average. If we take the big picture view and rely on projection systems as our guide, we have the following for 2019:

Steamer: 3.7 fWAR, 548 PAs

IWAG: 4.2 fWAR, 550 PAs

Given that Realmuto has two years left, theoretically, there’s a need for 2020 projections as well. I’m not aware of any publicly-available beyond 2019 projections, but IWAG’s rudimentary out-year forecast just has Realmuto at essentially the exact same (4.3 fWAR) in 2019, so there’s probably not much harm to just assuming his 2019 forecast applies to 2020 as well.

The half-win deviation isn’t a big deal, but it’s still notable. If we ignore framing altogether, we can think of his value as a range, using the standard number of $9 million per WAR:

Low end (Steamer): 3.7 x 9 + 3.7 x 9 = $66.6 million in production

High end (IWAG): 4.2 x 9 + 4.2 x 9 = $75.6 million in production

Subtracting his estimated salary ($15.3 million) from these yields a range of $51.3 million to $60.3 million in production. I generally think of trades having something like a 10 percent buffer of uncertainty just as a default, especially as a needed markup when prospects are being sent the other way. That makes me think that Realmuto, if you set framing aside, could command a package of $56 million to $66 million or so in surplus value. On the one hand, that’s pretty high. On the other hand, that’s not that high; lots of players have lots of surplus. Realmuto is somewhat unique in that he’s an available young player controlled for only a short time longer that’s likely to be well above average, but he’s not unique in his ability to provide a lot of value in excess of his salary over the span of time that he’s controlled.

Value: Framing included

Ah, but of course, framing is a thing. And, unfortunately for J.T. Realmuto, he’s not so good at it. But, on the other hand, at least it’s not unanimous that he’s not-so-great at it. To the extent of my knowledge, there are three available sources for pitch-framing information. One is Statcorner. From my review of Statcorner’s methodology, it uses a simple in/out basis, i.e., you get value for stealing strikes, you lose value for giving up strikes in the zone. That’s it. By this metric, Realmuto was among the worst framers in baseball last year, giving up 15 runs (that’s about a win and a half!) with his bad framing. A lot of that, though, was just the result of accruing some negative value over a boatload of playing time. On a rate basis, among the 32 catchers with the most pitches caught in 2018, Realmuto was 10th-worst -- bad, not not tremendously awful. Among the past three years, the results have been more or less the same per Statcorner: among the worst framers in baseball on an aggregate basis, and around the bottom third (but not in the cellar) on a rate basis.

But, there’s more than just Statcorner. Baseball Prospectus has a very complex framing runs model, that takes into account umpires and pitchers being caught. This model is much less pessimistic about Realmuto’s framing, though the model’s complexity does lead to some somewhat-difficult-to-parse results. In 2018, the Framing Runs metric saw Realmuto as very marginally below average .3at -0.4 runs. Over his massive quantity of PAs, that’s essentially neutral. In 2017, though, his framing was positive by Framing Runs, at +5.3 runs. But then in 2016, it was very negative, at -8.5 runs. It’s hard to make much of this in terms of a story or an explanation; we know from Statcorner that he was consistently not-so-good at the raw task of turning balls into strikes and not letting strikes become balls, but if the Framing Runs data are to be directly believed, he was actually erratic at framing when you factor out other potentially explanatory factors.

There’s also a third data point that we can use: Baseball Info Solutions (BIS) now provides catcher framing data as part of its rSZ metric, which is available on the Fangraphs player pages. This metric has also seen Realmuto be consistently negative in this regard (-5, -3, -2 for 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively), albeit nowhere near the extent indicated by Statcorner.

I threw all three of these into the same calculus that IWAG uses for non-framing metrics. I don’t know if that’s directly accurate, because I don’t know how well framing ages or “sticks” relative to itself, but it gives us at least some touchstone for framing to work with. The results:

Per Statcorner: -1.7 framing wins in 2019, i.e., 2.5 fWAR in 550 PAs, down from IWAG’s 4.2 fWAR

Per BP/Framing Runs: +/- 0 framing wins in 2019, i.e., unchanged 4.2 fWAR in 550 PAs

Per BIS/rSZ: -0.3 framing wins in 2019, i.e., 3.9 fWAR in 550 PAs

Realmuto’s Surplus Value

An easy way to look at all these bulleted items is just to throw them into a table. This table is really just a matrix -- the rows are the two projection systems for non-framing-related WAR; the columns are the various ways to encapsulate framing value. Just for the sake of interest, I’ve added one more column that uses my (partial, non-definitive) findings from an examination of value in framing full counts only, where Realmuto gained a bit of value as opposed to losing it. This is really just for comprehensiveness in building the matrix and Realmuto’s range of values.

In addition to that first matrix, I’ve gone ahead and slapped on dollar signs for surplus value (i.e., the numbers in the first table, multiplied by $9M per WAR, multiplied by two for Realmuto’s two seasons of team control, and subtracting the estimated $15.3 million in salary) in the second table, and slapped on another 10 percent for markup in the third table. You can attribute this markup to anything -- intradivision fees for the Braves, the prospect-only package markup, the Marlins trying to save face after all the drama that’s been swirling around the Realmuto negotiations, whatever. Or you can ignore the markup, period.

The end result is that you get a range of $21 million to $70 million in surplus. The average of the various estimates is around $53 million, the median is around $58 million. If you exclude the harsh Statcorner penalties, you’re at $60 million to $61 million instead. Based on the above, I’d expect a reasonable Realmuto return to be somewhere along these lines.

Benchmarking a Realmuto return

(Eric) This is where things get a bit tricky because we are dealing with prospects and subjective assessments. Adjusting a player a half an overall grade up or down can, according how surplus value is calculated, drastic effect how much value they can generate on the trade market because it CAN shift where they would be ranked significantly.

Moreover, the rankings and grades that are publicly accessible (Fangraphs, MLB Pipeline, Baseball America, etc.) do not always agree with each other and they very seldomly completely agree with each team’s own assessment of given players. We have seen plenty of situations where an organization values or doesn’t value a player anywhere close to what is seen as the consensus among lowly prospect evaluators is. We are dealing with imperfect and subjective information and aiming for perfection in prospect evaluation is a good way to line oneself up for failure. In theory, we could account for that a bit by averaging all the rankings/tool grades from all the lists to come up with more of a consensus-type reading. However, not all of the rankings are fully updated for the offseason, so Ivan went ahead and used information we know to be up to date and recent to get a sense of what the Marlins should realistically expect to get in return for Realmuto. Take it away, Ivan.

(Ivan) Prospect valuation is always somewhere between a more-art-than-science activity and a touch-and-go exercise. Just for benchmarking, let’s think about the recent Craig Edwards/Fangraphs values (link 1, link 2), along with the Kiley McDaniel/Eric Longenhagen prospect re-rankings from last week (link). A table summarizing these potential values, plus their averages, is below.

In my mind, I really only have two thoughts about prospect packages for major leaguers. First, and this seems really obvious, they should add up to the surplus value coming the other way. I’m not going to do math for you, you can do it yourself. Just add up values in either the third, fifth, or sixth columns until you get to whichever valuation you think is being placed on Realmuto from the tables above. Blam. You’re done. Well, except for the second thought: the headliner should probably be at least half of the value of the major leaguer coming the other way. At Realmuto’s higher-end-of-the-range $70 million valuation, that means a prospect worth about $35 million or so, i.e., someone like Ian Anderson or more valuable. Note that these are just my thoughts, they’re not set in stone. The Marlins could accept a quantity over quality return, I suppose -- there’s nothing in the rules saying they’re not allowed to do so.

One thing that stands out to me: whatever package kept making the Twitter rounds earlier, with Soroka and Riley, seems like a pretty notable overpay. Soroka or Riley could headline the trade; there doesn’t seem to be much need to send both (unless more than Realmuto is coming back, I suppose). Another thing: what if the Marlins want not-a-prospect? Well, here’s the thing: team control of decent players is valuable. Team control with pre-arbitration, league-minimum years, of those players is also valuable. The below is a quick scratch paper calculation of Sean Newcomb’s surplus value.

Basically: if the Braves trade Newcomb for Realmuto, they shouldn’t have to add much of anything else, and certainly not a premier prospect. The reality is that Newcomb’s five years of team control are about as valuable as Realmuto’s two. In the words of a man far more wise than myself, [you] don’t think it be like it is, but it do.

In short, the rumors are hopefully just that....rumors

(Eric) There are plenty of names swirling around as potential options on the table for the Braves-Marlins trade for Realmuto. As Ivan points out above, if the package is still something along the lines of Mike Soroka and Austin Riley or includes a player that is already an established major league player like Sean Newcomb, one could make the argument that that would potentially be leading to the Braves overpaying for Realmuto.

However, that may just be what it takes to get Realmuto. While the above trade packages can somewhat objectively be called overpays, they also represent a big step down from the Marlins original “shoot for the stars” asks like Ozzie Albies, Cody Bellinger, Vlad Guerrero Jr, etc. The above analysis assumes everything else being equal involving two rational actors. We don’t know the internal evaluations that the Braves and Marlins have on Realmuto and the Braves farm system and it is clear that the Marlins have their own way of thinking about and running an organization in the middle of a rebuild. For the moment at least, we now have a better sense of what such a scenario should look like based on the information we do have.