TYLER COWEN has written a column on inequality, in which he notes that while inequality is rising within many economies it is falling globally. That is true, though it is worth pointing out that among the economies within which inequality is rising are large emerging markets like China and India. Still, the world's poor countries have become much less poor relative to the world's rich countries over the last few decades (though perhaps not relative to the rich in the world's rich countries) and that is unequivocally good news.

Mr Cowen wishes to use these trends to argue that concerns about inequality within countries, and calls for more egalitarian policies, are overblown. Some key passages:

International trade has drastically reduced poverty within developing nations, as evidenced by the export-led growth of China and other countries. Yet contrary to what many economists had promised, there is now good evidence that the rise of Chinese exports has held down the wages of some parts of the American middle class... At the same time, Chinese economic growth has probably raised incomes of the top 1 percent in the United States, through exports that have increased the value of companies whose shares are often held by wealthy Americans. So while Chinese growth has added to income inequality in the United States, it has also increased prosperity and income equality globally... From a narrowly nationalist point of view, these developments may not be auspicious for the United States. But that narrow viewpoint is the main problem. We have evolved a political debate where essentially nationalistic concerns have been hiding behind the gentler cloak of egalitarianism. To clear up this confusion, one recommendation would be to preface all discussions of inequality with a reminder that global inequality has been falling and that, in this regard, the world is headed in a fundamentally better direction... In other words, the true egalitarian should follow the economist’s inclination to seek wealth-maximizing policies, and that means worrying less about inequality within the nation. Yes, we might consider some useful revisions to current debates on inequality. But globally minded egalitarians should be more optimistic about recent history, realizing that capitalism and economic growth are continuing their historical roles as the greatest and most effective equalizers the world has ever known.

I think globally minded egalitarians can reflect on and appreciate global poverty trends and nonetheless find some pretty serious problems with Mr Cowen's argument.

Mr Cowen is attempting to reframe concern about inequality within rich economies to something essentially nationalistic rather than fundamentally egalitarian. But this is a rhetorical tactic, not something that emerges automatically from analysis of the global income indistribution—or, for that matter, of the actual political beliefs of many of those worried about rising inequality. Mr Cowen draws attention to Occupy Wall Street; its adherents declare themselves to be "the 99%", not "the Americans who have been harmed by trade". It was Wall Street they were occupying, not World Trade Organisation headquarters in Geneva (or, as was once common, the streets around the World Bank and IMF in Washington).

Much of the dissatisfaction with national income inequality actually seems to have very little to do with globalisation. It is more focused on shady financial practices, implicit or explicit subsidies to big banks, tax systems that enable the very rich to pay shockingly low effective rates, and the perception—not entirely inaccurate—that the very rich are using their resources to rig the political system in their favour. The goal does not appear to be soaring tariffs or closed borders; instead it's tougher financial regulation, higher taxes on the rich, and more money for the safety net and for public investment. The "eleven commandments for progressives" from arch-progressive Elizabeth Warren is not remotely nationalistic; on the contrary, Ms Warren cheers immigration as a source of economic vibrancy.

Mr Cowen's piece therefore rests on something of a straw argument: the idea that egalitarianism as a political force in America is fundamentally opposed to globalisation. He tries to bolster his case by arguing that intranational redistribution itself threatens broader global prosperity.

Many egalitarians push for policies to redistribute some income within nations, including the United States. That’s worth considering, but with a cautionary note. Such initiatives will prove more beneficial on the global level if there is more wealth to redistribute. In the United States, greater wealth would maintain the nation’s ability to invest abroad, buy foreign products, absorb immigrants and generate innovation, with significant benefit for global income and equality.

This rests on unstated and tenuous assumptions: first, that America best serves the world's poor by maximising its own wealth, and second, that redistribution must necessarily make the economy poorer than it otherwise would be. Neither of these are obviously right, and both deserve more attention. There is also the odd circularity that if you want to redistribute as much as possible you need to not redistribute at all, in order to boost the total resources available for redistribution.

There is an alternative hypothesis, however, which Mr Cowen mostly disregards: that redistribution provides insurance against economic dislocation and therefore softens resistance to globalisation. It's worth pointing out that the world has experienced two great eras of globalisation. The first combined minimal redistribution with minimal political power for non-elites. The second combined universal suffrage with substantial redistribution. I don't think it's unreasonable to conclude that redistribution is the price democracies pay for globalisation.

And that makes perfect sense! Reducing barriers to trade generates net gains, but those gains will occasionally be distributed in highly unequal fashion. If gains are concentrated and no provision is made for redistribution, then a voting majority might well conclude that openness is a losing proposition. Mr Cowen seems to want voters to recognise that whether or not they personally are made better off by globalisation it is a good thing to support, because it enables the enrichment of poor areas of the globe. But few voters are content to have their economies run as charities (and a good thing for economists that they aren't, as that would make a baseline assumption of rational self-interest look pretty absurd).

A generation of global integration has been very good for the world's developing economies. In light of that, the most important question, to me, is how best to maintain broad public support for openness and integration. I tend to think the best hope lies in governments which ensure that the gains from openness are broadly shared and which are responsive to the economic discomfort of typical workers. One could label that a nationalistic view, but one is then left arguing for global economic governance (which strikes me as neither achievable nor obviously welfare enhancing) or the suspension of personal self-interest (ditto) or the replacement of democracy with rule by cosmopolitan elites (and again). If you define political realism as nationalism and want people to abandon nationalism, what, exactly, are you asking for?

The more pleased globally minded egalitarians are with emerging-market trends over the past generation, the more concerned they ought to be with national income inequality. Mr Cowen's piece looks like an effort to guilt elites into abandoning a realistic view of the political economy of globalisation by charging them with nationalism. Either that, or he is expressing what are essentially plutocratic concerns, hiding behind the gentler cloak of egalitarianism.