May 2, 2013

The recent clashes between Iraqi forces and Sunni Arabs in Hawija reinforce Iraq’s growing sectarianism while creating new opportunities for a Kurdish-Sunni Arab alliance. Alongside shared anti-Maliki sentiments, Sunni Arabs are seeking their own autonomous region and are looking to the Kurdistan region as a model of security and economic development. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) also needs Sunni Arab support from the disputed province of Ninevah, where it has claimed territory and oil fields, as part of its larger ambition to develop and independently export Kurdish crude oil.

Still, the growing conflict between Sunni and Shiite Arabs could create greater complications for the KRG by refocusing the disputed land issues on the Kurds and Sunni Arabs — who largely populate the territories — and not the KRG and Baghdad. The emergence of a Sunni Arab region or a strengthened Sunni Arab community could also pose greater challenges to the KRG’s nationalist agenda, particularly in delineating internal boundaries (Article 140). This territorial challenge, as well as competing nationalist agendas and the radicalization and spillover of Syrian politics, will ultimately check a KRG-Sunni Arab alliance. It will also require the KRG to maintain its Shiite ties to balance power and better assure Kurdish interests in Iraq.

In many ways, Iraqi Kurds and Sunni Arabs are trying to minimize their historical divide and potentially work together. Immediately after the Hawija tensions, for instance, Sunni Arab tribal leaders publicly thanked Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, for allowing injured residents to be treated in Kurdish hospitals. Commercial ties between the communities are also expanding. Building on exchanges that existed during the Saddam Hussein era, particularly in Dohuk and Ninevah provinces, the KRG is providing electricity to some Ninevah populations and is negotiating energy deals with Ninevah Gov. Atheel al-Nujaifi. Turkey is using these issues and its contacts with Sunnis in Anbar and Ninevah to encourage an alliance with the Kurds.

Yet, there are important limitations to how far the Kurdish-Sunni Arab relationship can go politically. Kurdish populations, in particular the older generation, are still deeply suspect of Sunni Arabs in Ninevah, most of whom were high-ranking Baathist officers during Saddam’s rule. They regard Sunni Arab gestures toward the KRG as part of a larger strategy to manipulate the Kurds and consolidate power and ownership of the disputed territories.

Both groups also have little in common on key nationalist issues. While the KRG remains committed to implementing Article 140, de-Baathification laws and the 2005 Constitution, most Sunni Arab groups are opposed. These distinctions are evident among the Anbar demonstrators who are also displaying the Iraqi flag used by the Saddam regime as a symbol of their resistance — a symbol that is anathema to Kurdish communities. In fact, many Kurds think that their bigger problems remain with the Sunni Arabs and that their more natural allies in Iraq are the Shiites, who also suffered under Saddam and Sunni Baathist leaders and are not populous in the disputed territories.