The Case for an Alternative Tactical Nuclear Deployment

Early in 2017, I wrote about the tactical nuclear imbalance between Russia and NATO regarding both quantity and deliverance capability. There are reportedly 150 deployed U.S. controlled, tactical nuclear weapons based in five European countries including Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Turkey in contrast to the estimated 1850 Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. I illustrated that Russia possesses the superior tactical nuclear force and likened the imbalance to NATO playing a game of chess without a queen. I will make the case that tactical nuclear weapons controlled by the U.S. should be moved out of Turkey and into Poland. There are four points I will address that make a strong case for this strategic decision.

First is the current security and political situation in Turkey. President Recep Erdogan’s government has become increasingly authoritarian, increasingly Islamist, increasingly critical of NATO members and has recently signed a deal with Russia to purchase the S-400 Surface to Air Missile system. These factors in combination with the 2016 coup attempt are ample reason to seriously question the continued security and validity of housing B-61 tactical thermonuclear weapons at the U.S. airbase at Incirlik in the South of Turkey. The strategic positioning of these gravity bombs is sound as the combat range of their deployment encompasses NATO’s South-Eastern approach, parts of Russia’s South and parts of the Middle East. However, the growing uncertainty of the Erdogan government’s allegiance, stability, and standing regarding human rights poses issues that may impact the tactical nuclear weapons based there. A viable option to basing in Turkey might be to permanently base strategic nuclear bombers such as the B-2 in Western Europe to reduce flight times to this region.

Second is Poland’s strategic location, where the combat range of aircraft armed with the B-61 would encompass Kaliningrad and the Baltic States. Although able to be carried on a range of aircraft, the B-61 is commonly fitted to the F-16 which has a combat range of 1370 km. In their current bases across Europe, the tactical nuclear arsenal is unable to reach the entire Baltic region unless they are fitted to strategic bombers. Basing the weapons in Poland will enable NATO to employ its tactical nuclear weapons if required in the event of an invasion of the Baltic States and counter the recent Russian deployment of nuclear capable Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.

The third is the message of strength and solidarity that a strategic deployment of tactical nuclear weapons will send to NATO and U.S. allies across the globe. Poland has considered requesting access to nuclear weapons and has also expressed its concern over Russia’s posturing to the East. Basing the B-61s in Poland will help alleviate some of the fears held by NATO members who doubt that the U.S. will come to their aid in the case of war. Actions speak louder than words, and member states may be compelled to increase defense spending if they see a clear, unmistakable example that the U.S. is committed to their defense with a strategic repositioning of tactical nuclear weapons.

Fourth is also a message of strength but a message of strength to Russia. The invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, subsequent war in the Donbass region of Ukraine and the deployment of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad are examples that Russia is pushing the envelope time and time again. Sanctions have been imposed and troops deployed to the Baltic states, but the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Poland will demonstrate to Putin that the U.S. is committed to its allies and will consider the tactical nuclear option if the sovereignty of NATO members is compromised. This may also act to compel Russia to suspend its Hybrid Warfare campaign which has been apparent in its strategic thinking and actions.

The U.S. is currently committed to modernizing its nuclear arsenal. The B61-12 gravity bomb with its bunker busting and guidance capability is an example of this modernisation and forward thinking regarding the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons, however unthinkable. It is crucial that the modernisation of technology runs parallel with the modernization of strategic thought. Re-deploying the B61 from Turkey to Poland in the face of an increasingly aggressive authoritarian regime is the right decision strategically and diplomatically. The military utility of this decision in combination with its message to allies and potential enemies as well as its security benefits are all factors that make this course of action strategically sound.

Adam Cabot has a Masters in International Relations and is currently researching Russian nuclear strategy.