Jul 26, 2017

On July 13, Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi appointed Yemen’s first ambassador to Russia since former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s fall from power in 2011. After the appointment was announced, Yemen’s official Saba news agency reported that Hadi had urged his new ambassador to Russia, Ahmed Salem al-Wahishi, to strengthen Yemen’s bilateral relationship with Russia on numerous levels.

Russia’s decision to accept Hadi’s pick for ambassador to Moscow contrasts markedly with its disapproval of Hadi’s ambassadorial appointments in late 2016. As Russia has deepened its relationships with Hadi’s pro-Saudi government and pro-Iran factions in Yemen in recent months, Wahishi’s appointment is a compelling indicator of the transformation of Moscow’s Yemen strategy from passive rhetorical criticism of the ongoing conflict to the active pursuit of a cease-fire through diplomatic means. This policy shift was codified by a February 2017 Russian Foreign Ministry statement, which called for the re-establishment of dialogue between warring parties and an end to the two-year conflict in Yemen.

Russia’s deepened commitment to ensuring a cease-fire in Yemen can be explained by a mixture of strategic considerations and broader geopolitical aspirations. From a strategic standpoint, a cessation of hostilities could allow Russia to construct a naval base on Yemeni soil. Even though the Russian February statement on Yemen did not include a reference to the construction of a potential base, a Russian military official told ITAR-TASS in 2009 that establishing a naval base presence in Yemen was a medium-term strategic objective. A Yemeni base would have significant strategic value for Russia, as it would increase Moscow’s access to the Red Sea’s shipping lanes and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

As Yemen’s Houthi-aligned ex-President Saleh has publicly expressed his willingness to grant Russia military basing rights, a peace settlement in Yemen would have allowed Moscow to construct a naval base without risk of backlash from Sanaa. If Russia ultimately decides to revive its base construction, Hadi’s forces are also likely to acquiesce, as one of their most important allies, the United Arab Emirates, believes that Moscow’s base presence in the Red Sea is a valuable bulwark against Iranian influence in Yemen.

Even though the United States has historically competed with Russia for access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Moscow’s strategy of diplomatically engaging with both sides of the Yemen conflict has made it appear more impartial than the United States, which has staked out an overtly pro-Saudi stance. In their basing negotiations, Russian diplomats have emphasized this impartiality to the leaders of both sides of the Yemen conflict to demonstrate that Moscow is a more reliable security partner than Washington. As Russia has garnered significant political capital from its diplomatic initiatives in Yemen, and the Houthis retain control over the vast majority of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, it is an opportune time for Kremlin policymakers to forcefully advocate a cease-fire in Yemen.