This is the first part of a series that would cover the major players in the Syria war, trying to step back from the daily news and think about broader strategy and objectives. Disclaimer: I am not an expert on this topic. Anything below is my attempt to understand what would make sense based on events so far. I’d love to consider other options I haven’t thought about in the comments!

A poster of Bashar al-Assad (Credit)

What does Assad want? Or to be more specific, what would be his best-case scenario for the Syria war? This is a seemingly simple question which eludes most discussions, as do the objectives of other sides in the war. Rather, commentators often cite the perceived objectives of actors in passim to make a point. In the Middle East statements such as “Israel wants to remove Iranian influence from Syria” or “Iran wants to open a land route to Beirut” are thrown around as truisms. They remain abstract and general, and assume that readers should and would accept them as true.

We can begin by pointing out that uncovering the true objectives of a country is impossible, partly because “a country” is in itself an abstraction. Instead of a single and clear direction, it is more helpful to see a lively debate between different public and personal interests. The idealized “greater good” for the public is often rejected in favor of narrow personal, business, and career interests. This seems to be a feature of human society. Putting such concerns aside for the purpose of this post, let us accept the abstraction and generalization, and consider what would be best for Assad and his government, from their perspective.

So what would the ideal scenario for Assad and his government include?

Personal survival, and survival of the Assad government. This is easy. Both Assad and his government would prefer survival over everything else. They’d also prefer survival in Syria, although we could assume they would leave to another country if things become too dangerous or hopeless in the country. Maintaining Syria’s geopolitical alliances. Syria is weak, its economy is ravished by seven years of war, and it depends on foreign support for survival. This foreign support is manifested through diplomacy (e.g. defending Syria from sanctions), military force (de facto defending Syria, e.g. Russian air support, Iranian military support), and economic benefits (ranging from gifts to loans to trade markets). This would probably be the second most important objective and would be necessary for Syria to stabilize. Keeping Syria’s territory intact. Syria cannot give up either of the top conditions. It might be willing, however, to negotiate giving up some of its territory if necessary — simply because it is too weak to take it back (contra this). As of mid-Feb. 2018, Turkey, rebel Syrian groups, the US, and the Kurds (with US support) are holding Syrian territory. Realistically, Syria cannot take any of that land back by itself in the near future, while it would be very difficult to convince one of its allies to support such a move. In fact, Syria is so weak that it cannot strongly protest the presence of these forces at the moment. Keeping Assad’s government autonomy. Assad will probably have to negotiate on this. He received too much support for too long with little else to pay back with. Therefore he will probably have to submit to his more powerful allies at least for some time and on certain matters. On a more positive side, from his perspective, this could be a more temporary problem, and the exact parts of his autonomy he would have to give up are probably up for discussion.

Foreign involvement in Syria (Unknown credit)

Assad would also have other objectives, although they are probably lower on his priority list.

Rehabilitate Syria’s geopolitical position. This would be a tricky objective since Syria will be dependent on its allies for years after the war’s end. Returning to the status quo ante would be exceedingly difficult. Limited aggression against Israeli and Turkish interests (accompanied with propaganda) might improve Syria’s position, but the price might be more military, diplomatic and economic pressure that could further destabilize Syria.

This would be a tricky objective since Syria will be dependent on its allies for years after the war’s end. Returning to the status quo ante would be exceedingly difficult. Limited aggression against Israeli and Turkish interests (accompanied with propaganda) might improve Syria’s position, but the price might be more military, diplomatic and economic pressure that could further destabilize Syria. Strengthen the Syrian state. This is not an obvious task. Syria lost much of its bureaucracy (necessary to sustain taxation revenue, which dropped by 94% over 2010–2015) and control over what used to be state institutions. This is most noticeable now through the warlords, militias and black markets who took over part of the state’s responsibilities. As a result, in 2016 Syria was one of the most corrupt countries in the world (173rd of 176 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index). Once the war is over, the state will undoubtedly have to re-appropriate or re-establish some of its former institutions (such as supplying peacetime police and security, but also water, electricity, mail, etc.). One way to do this would be to support the government’s cronies, enriching a few through reconstruction but ultimately widening the economic gaps that facilitated the war in the first place. Handing out resources, licenses and contracts to Syria’s foreign allies limits Assad’s government’s maneuverability and would slow down any process of rehabilitation.

Destroyed parts of Aleppo (Credit)

So overall, almost all of Syria’s objectives seem defensive. This suggests that in its current fragile state, Assad’s Syria would prefer a conservative, risk-averse approach which would allow it to consolidate its gains and re-establish its authority and its control over its resources. To have any hope of gaining these objectives, it must maintain its alliances with its more powerful allies in the region and beyond (Iran, Russia and Hizbollah), and perhaps strengthen its relationship with other groups that may become closer allies (e.g. Lebanon [the state], Iraq and further down the line, Turkey).

Did I forget anything? Do you think the emphasis of these objectives should be different? Let’s discuss this further through the comments!