Both Modi and Shah have their work cut out. But they already have the building blocks of change with them. The point is to start moving to a new trajectory from 2015.

The outcome of the Delhi assembly elections – whatever it turns out to be tomorrow – points to the need for Narendra Modi to reinvent himself and his party. Once again.

We are currently on version 2.0 of Modi. We saw Version 1 in 2002; an upgrade to version 1.5 was offered in 2007, with the Gujarat development model as the backdrop; this evolved further between 2007 and 2014 into the inclusive development model of Modi 2.0 (Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas).

Version 3.0 is now due as the Aam Aadmi Party re-emerges as a political force in Delhi. Kejriwal is now into Version 2.0, more moderate, less anarchic.

To meet the challenge, Modi’s party too needs to upgrade to Version 3.0 to grow and become the natural party of government at the centre. Version 1.0 was the new BJP created after the collapse of the Janata Party in 1980. Version 2.0 was the evolution of the party under LK Advani as the mascot of muscular Hindutva. Under Vajpayee, and later under Advani till 2009, the BJP moved to Version 2.5 – more development, mild Hindutva, a tentative reaching out to minorities. Under Modi, the party promised Version 3.0, but his big victory in May 2014 brought a lot of Sangh activism out of the closet. The party is thus at a crossroads, and in danger of reverting to Version 2.5, or even slipping into Version 2.0. The huge shift of the Muslim vote in Delhi to AAP is a signal on this front.

This is why Modi 3.0 and BJP 3.0 are issues neither can avoid grappling with.

Of course, Delhi is different, and a win there does not mean Arvind Kejriwal’s party is going to grow roots everywhere and threaten the BJP.

However, there is another way of looking at AAP’s revival in Delhi: it is, in fact, an extension of the Modi win in 2014. Both revivals, of the BJP in 2014 under Modi and Kejriwal’s now, have been enabled by the emergence of the new, young aspirational voter – and the willingness of the underclass and the lower and middle classes to look beyond traditional political loyalties.

The reason why Modi won in 2014 was his ability to take the language of development beyond the confines of class and caste; the reason why his party is struggling in Delhi is because the BJP forgot this aspect.

Consider just one tell-tale sign: AAP is being driven by fresh, young faces. The BJP in Delhi is (largely) driven by older men and women, voices from the past (if you leave out Nupur Sharma, who is fighting Kejriwal in New Delhi, and may lose). Purely from the optics of it all, it is difficult to believe that the BJP in Delhi is the party of youth, change and aspiration.

While no one can change the composition of the party overnight, Modi can signal the change from the top in order to retain his political cutting edge in future elections.

Party President Amit Shah has made the right moves by launching a recruitment drive for new members: at last count, the party claimed 4.65 crore members, which would make BJP world’s largest after the Communist Party of China (17 crore members, but membership is almost a must in China for progress).

Going forward, the BJP will thus have two types of membership – a cadre-based party membership that draws on its RSS roots; and a citizen-based mass party membership that has a looser connect to the party.

This mass membership base is what needs more watering at the roots. This expansion is not reflected in the party’s leadership at any level. If this continues, this base will shift to younger parties, including AAP. The BJP’s problem is that the top is almost always represented by leaders with strong Sangh affiliations.

This is why we need Modi Version 3, followed by a BJP Version 3.0.

What would Modi V3 look like?

First, it would mean Modi taking the lead directly to empower both his current set of ministers, and elevating a younger lot to ministerial and party posts. Modi’s cabinet appears too tightly controlled by the PMO to deliver on its promises. This grip, probably needed in the early stages of government formation when coherence was important, needs to be loosened.

Second, Modi needs to take a more direct role in wooing allies and opposition parties to get his legislative agenda moving. Currently, he is using the likes of Arun Jaitley and Venkaiah Naidu to get allies and regional parties to work with the government during parliament sessions. But if AAP wins, the opposition will be emboldened to be more aggressive against the government. It will scuttle new legislation if it can, especially if it calculates that Modi has been weakened by the Delhi vote. It will thus need Modi himself to use the power and prestige of the PMO’s office to get things moving in parliament, including the sealing of deals with regional parties which may be crucial for legislation. Such deals may be needed with the AIADMK, NCP and BJP, three parties that are not unfriendly to Modi, and also with political rivals, including Congress, TMC, Samajwadi and BSP, among others. Amit Shah may be more useful in striking such deals compares to lightweight politicians.

Third, to start on the right foot in the budget session, it may make political sense for Modi to make a statement upfront on his approach to recent Sangh statements on conversions or the church vandalisation, among other things. The last time, when the entire opposition tried to corner him in the Rajya Sabha over the same issues, Modi chose to remain quiet in order to avoid giving the impression that he has succumbed to pressure. This time he could do this on his own and set the right tone for the budget session, where several ordinances have to be passed.



Fourth, Modi has to live up to his promise of “cooperative and competitive” federalism in practice. A good way would be to offer cooperation to the new Delhi government, assuming it is led by Kejriwal, all help to make the capital city a better and safer place to live in.

Fifth, Modi cannot avoid sending a clear message to minorities. This does not have to be traditional vote-bank politics, but about development visible where Muslims are able to notice sincere intent. A simple way to do this would be to, for example, open skill development centres in areas with high minority populations. Action speaks louder than words.

In short, a kinder, gentler, more inclusive Modi who carries everybody along should be key elements on Modi Ver 3.0.

But Modi 3.0 has to be complemented by BJP 3.0. What would this comprise?

#1: Bringing younger faces to the fore. This is evident in the party’s national presence on TV, but not in the state units. As in the case of BJP, without young leaders, the BJP will not benefit from changing demographic trends. In Delhi, young leaders were invisible. We saw Kiran Bedi, Amit Shah, Harsh Vardhan, Vijay Goel, Satish Upadhyay, and other top leaders from the central cabinet – all older folks. Where were the young faces that Kejriwal was able to commandeer?

#2: Ending over-reliance on old Sangh hands. This is not a hard-and-fast rule, but what worked elsewhere may not work in future elections. In Delhi, the BJP appears to have retained its core vote, and the Sangh’s last-minute volunteer push would surely have helped. But the BJP needs its core vote plus the new floating voter. Here, the difference between BJP and AAP was stark: AAP got the incremental youth and aspirational vote. The Sangh cannot help here. In Delhi the party looked like an old-fogies club. The bringing in of Kiran Bedi was an acknowledgement that the BJP needed non-RSS faces to woo the non-traditional vote, but the change came in too late to make a difference.

#3: The strategy of fighting purely under the banner of Modi has its limits. In future, the BJP needs to find state-level faces to lead the party. This may not matter so much in the next election in Bihar – where Sushil Modi is already the acknowledged leader and BJP Chief Ministerial face, and where the opponents are the traditional foes (Lalu, Nitish, etc) – but in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and, especially Uttar Pradesh, this may not work.

It is worth recalling that in Uttar Pradesh, it was not Mulayam Singh who won in 2012, but the youthful leadership of Akhilesh Yadav. After the stinging Lok Sabha defeat, Akhilesh has begun reasserting his youth leadership. In West Bengal and Tamil Nadu, the BJP badly needs a fresh, young face to give voters an additional reason to vote out Mamata Banerjee or the two Dravidian parties which have been ruling for nearly 50 years. A dynamic face will make all the difference under the overall Modi leadership.

In UP, there is a real possibility that BSP or SP may align with Congress the next time, and so without a positive local leader, the BJP cannot hope to repeat its 2014 Lok Sabha record. Young faces need to be groomed in the next few months, and a dynamic CM candidate found at least a year before polls in 2017. The BJP needs a face like Varun Gandhi or someone equally capable of building the party in the run-up to the polls. Amit Shah has till May next year to find this face.

#4: The party needs to start using its large membership base to bring in greater political dividends. These new members should be called for frequent interactions on policies and tapped for their ideas. This is the only way to convert an inert mass of members into a vibrant political force. The party’s future local level leaders need to come from this new constituency.

#5: The name of the new game is visibility and engagement. No party can grow with a cloistered leadership. Party leaders need to be accessible to the grassroots and the wider membership out there. This was decisive in Delhi for Kejriwal; it could begin to become decisive in other polls too. The BJP and Modi must engage more strongly with their own grassroot workers and the public at large to reduce the disconnect between leadership and the led.

Both Modi and Shah have their work cut out. But they already have the building blocks of change with them. The point is to start moving to a new trajectory from 2015. Delhi is the starting point for this change.

(This is the first in a series of stories looking at what parties need to do to grow in the new India. Over the next few days, this writer will look at what the Congress, AAP and major regional parties should be doing to reinvent themselves for the future).