First half is a list of logical evidence that God exists. Second half is refutations of atheist arguments and contentions.

First, I'm not your dictionary:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuum_fallacy

And "herp what? that's ridiculous! derp," is not a valid contention:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divine_fallacy (The name of which is ironically an example of a reduction fallacy. Its unbiased name is Argument from Incredulity.)

Note: Sufficient for a complete argument are two premises. These arguments start simple and get more complicated to satisfy possibly your yet personal requisite-number of explanations.

If everyone simply rejected everything they don't like, the world wouldn't be able to function. If you reject something, you need to explain why, if only to yourself if you're to be rational, and merely having a feeling that you reject something doesn't constitute this reason. Any honest contention spends equal effort discerning how something is true as is false.

1

1. If God does not exist, then nothing actually, objectively matters.

2. Some things actually, objectively matter.

3. Therefore, God exists.

(A contention I've heard is that nothing can objectively matter because then they couldn't matter to anyone. This presupposes 'to matter' is contingent on experience, which is conceivably false as is the presupposition that 'to matter objectively' isn't God's experience.

Another is "I don't need God for things actually to matter." This is equivocation, i.e. how you feel like things actually matter isn't 'to matter objectively'. And whether you feel like you need God is irrelevant to His existence.

Another is "I REJECT THOSE PREMISES!"

ok

These are included here because atheists like to contend with the first thing they see, exclusively, rather than continuing onward.)

2

1. Subjective morality has no bearing on objective morality, including and up to ideas like "Whatever is most advantegeous for the survival of the species is what is objectively moral," as such an idea is itself only subjective.

2. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.

3. Objective moral values and duties do exist.

4. Therefore, God exists.

3

1. Objects have properties to greater or lesser extents.

2. If an object has a property to a lesser extent, then there exists some other object that has the property to the maximum possible degree.

3. So there is an entity that has all properties to the maximum possible degree.

4. Hence God exists.

4

1. Every natural, innate desire in us corresponds to some real object that can satisfy that desire.

2. But there exists in us a desire which nothing in time, nothing on earth, nor creature can satisfy.

3. Therefore, there must exist something more than time, earth and creatures, which can satisfy this desire.

4. This something is what people call "God" and "life with God forever."

5

1. Our limited minds can discover eternal truths about being.

2. Truth properly resides in a mind.

3. But the human mind is not eternal.

4. Therefore there must exist an eternal mind in which these truths reside.

6

1. Good things exist.

2. The cause of this goodness is either one or many.

3. But it can’t be many, for then there would be no way to compare their goodness, for each would define its own goodness. But some things are better than others.

4. Therefore, one Supreme Good (God) causes the goodness in all things.

7

1. If God were not to exist, the only thing that could create consciousness would be some interaction between any or all of the four fundamental forces of the universe.

2. To assume the brain is evidence that this happens is a fallacy of the single cause, i.e. it is to assume fallaciously that because the brain causes consciousness, it is sufficient for consciousness.

3. There is no evidence, empirical, mathematical, or otherwise, that any interaction between any of the four fundamental forces of the universe could possibly create consciousness.

4. Therefore, to believe consciousness is only a product of the universe is irrational.

8

1. If God doesn't exist, nothing actually, objectively has meaning.

2. If nothing actually, objectively has meaning, neither does the proposition "Nothing actually, objectively has meaning."

3. Therefore, the proposition is self-refuting.

4. Therefore, things actually, objectively have meaning.

5. Therefore, God exists. (modus tollens from 1)

9

1. Necessary for the subjective is being mutably subject to interpretation.

2. Intentional meaning is not mutably subject to interpretation.

3. Therefore, intentional meaning is not subjective. (modus tollens from 1)

4. Everything is either subjective or objective.

5. Therefore, there is objective meaning, i.e. God. (disjunctive from 4 and 3)

10

1. If something exists, there must exist what it takes for that thing to exist.

2. The universe — the collection of beings in space and time — exists.

3. Therefore, there must exist what it takes for the universe to exist.

4. What it takes for the universe to exist cannot exist within the universe or be bounded by space and time.

5. Therefore, what it takes for the universe to exist must transcend both space and time.

11

1. Belief in some conception of God — that Being to whom reverence and worship are properly due — is common to almost all people of every era.

2. Either the vast majority of people have been wrong about this most profound element of their lives or they have not.

3. If our only reason for doubting is that people have understood materialistic causes for materialistic things — which is necessarily irrelevant to the immaterial — then it is most plausible to believe that these people have not been wrong.

4. Our only reason for doubting is that people have understood materialistic causes for materialistic things.

5. Therefore it is most plausible to believe that these people have not been wrong.

6. Therefore it is most plausible to believe that God exists.

(to any keyword-searching NPCs, this would be an appeal to tradition if the argument were to imply only that God exists because people have traditionally believed in Him, not when the argument implies there is no good reason to disbelieve in Him.)

12

1. Human beings have a natural, innate desire for God, as indicated by history.

2. Natural selection only selects for advantageous traits.

3. To desire something that doesn't exist would be ultimately disadvantageous.

4. Therefore, to desire something that doesn't exist wouldn't have evolved.

5. Therefore, what humans naturally, innately desire, exists.

6. Therefore, God exists.

13

1. Our senses reveal to us an order of efficient causes in the world.

2. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself because then it would have to exist prior to itself, which is impossible.

3. In a series of efficient causes, each member of the series is the cause of the next.

4. Because of this, if there is no first cause in the series, there will be no series at all.

5. The series of efficient causes cannot extend infinitely into the past, for then there would be no first cause and therefore no series.

6. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

14

1. An infinite number of moments cannot be traversed.

2. If an infinite number of moments had to elapse before today, then today would never have come.

3. But today has come.

4. Therefore, an infinite number of moments have not elapsed before today (i.e., the universe had a beginning).

5. But whatever has a beginning is caused by something else.

6. Hence, there must be a Cause (Creator) of the universe.

15

1. If the multiverse doesn't exist, there is sufficient scientific reason to believe life is impossible.

2. Stephen Hawking and many other science cucks are advocates for the existence of the multiverse for this reason.

3. If there are an infinite number of universes with random properties, which the multiverse entails, all possibilities exist.

4. If all possibilities exist, God exists.

5. If God exists in any universe, being God, He necessarily exists in all universes.

6. If scientists like Steven Hawking are right about the existence of the multiverse, then, ironically, God exists.

16

1. All epistemic possibilities are metaphysical possibilities unless demonstrated otherwise.

2. If reality is infinite, all metaphysical possibilities exist.

3. Reality is infinite, whether the universe is or not.

4. Therefore, all metaphysical possibilities exist. (modus ponens from 2)

5. Therefore, all epistemic possibilities exist unless demonstrated otherwise. (hypothetical syllogism from 1)

6. God is an epistemic possibility.

7. Therefore, God exists unless demonstrated otherwise. (modus ponens from 5)

(This would be shifting of burden of proof were it to question or demand proof God does not exist. There is no such question or demand here. Presented is merely a deductive conclusion on the epistemology of God's existence.)

17

1. Meaning can be necessarily subjective and yet objective only if it's subject to God.

2. Meaning is necessarily subjective, i.e. meaning doesn't exist unless it can have meaning to someone, e.g. a book would have no meaning nor potential meaning were no one ever to exist to have written or understand it; it would just be scribbles.

3. If God doesn't exist, nothing objectively has meaning. (modus tollens from 1)

4. If a proposition is true, it objectively has meaning.

5. If nothing objectively has meaning, neither does the proposition "Nothing objectively has meaning."

6. Therefore, the proposition is self-refuting. (modus tollens from 4)

7. Therefore, things objectively have meaning. (modus tollens from 5)

8. Therefore, God exists. (modus tollens from 3)

18

1. Logical absolutes exist.

2. Logical absolutes are conceptual by nature--are not dependent on space, time, physical properties, or human nature.

3. They are not the product of the physical universe (space, time, matter) because if the physical universe were to disappear, logical absolutes would still be true.

4. Logical Absolutes are not the product of human minds because human minds are different--not absolute.

5. But, since logical absolutes are always true everywhere and not dependent upon human minds, it must be an absolute transcendent mind that is authoring them.

6. This mind is called God.

7. Furthermore, if there are only two options to account for something, i.e., God and no God, and one of them is negated, then by default the other position is validated.

8. Therefore, the atheist position cannot account for the existence of logical absolutes from its worldview.

19

1. We have ideas of many things.

2. These ideas must arise either from ourselves or from things outside us.

3. One of the ideas we have is the idea of God — an infinite, all-perfect being.

4. This idea could not have been caused by ourselves, because we know ourselves to be limited and imperfect, and, because causes necessarily assume the greatness of their effects, no effect can be greater than its cause.

5. Therefore, the idea must have been caused by something outside us which has nothing less than the qualities contained in the idea of God.

6. But only God himself has those qualities.

7. Therefore God himself must be the cause of the idea we have of him.

8. Therefore God exists.

20

1. If it's a consequence of only physical reaction, then it's physical.

2. If consciousness is a consequence of only physical reaction, then it's physical.

3. If it's physical, then it's energy.

4. If consciousness is physical, then it's energy.

5. Conservation of energy

6. If consciousness is energy, then in some form it's conserved.

7. Consciousness is either conserved or there is nothingness after death.

8. If consciousness is conserved, then there is not nothingness after death. (disjunctive syllogism from 7)

9. If consciousness is a consequence of only physical reaction, then there is not nothingness after death. (modus ponens from 2, 4, 6, and 8)

21

1. If life is a consequence only of evolution, then everything that's a consequence of us is a consequence of evolution, from our intelligence to all of our inventions to all of our thoughts to belief in God.

2. Yet atheists think they've broken free of this deterministic, consequential system and become "free thinkers" via the pure intelligence of rejection of an idea and its entailed ideas.

3. Breaking free of a consequential system with pure smug intellect is impossible.

4. Therefore, atheism can't exist in a world in which life is a consequence only of evolution.

5. Atheism can't be correct if it doesn't exist.

6. Yet if atheism is correct, it must exist in a world in which life is a consequence only of evolution.

7. Life can't be a consequence only of evolution and not be a consequence only of evolution.

8. Therefore, atheism implies a contradiction.

9. Therefore, atheism is false.

10. Therefore, God exists.

22

1. Natural evolution is contingent on advantage for function.

2. The apparent advantage of consciousness is modally-contingent, i.e. consciousness is not advantageous for function if naturalism is not presupposed, as it shouldn't be.

3. Therefore, consciousness wouldn't have naturally evolved. (modus tollens from 1)

4. Anything that isn't caused naturally, if it happens, is caused supernaturally.

5. Therefore, consciousness is caused by the supernatural. (modus ponens from 4 and 3)

6. Any supernatural cause is a consequence of objective purpose.

7. Therefore, consciousness is a consequence of objective purpose. (modus ponens from 6 and 5)

8. Any objective purpose is a consequence of God.

9. Therefore, consciousness is a consequence of God. (modus ponens from 8 and 7)

10. Everything is consequence of things that exist.

11. Therefore, God exists. (modus ponens from 10 and 9)

23

1. We notice around us things that come into being and go out of being. A tree, for example, grows from a tiny shoot, flowers brilliantly, then withers and dies.

2. Whatever comes into being or goes out of being does not have to be; non-being is a real possibility.

3. Suppose that nothing has to be; that is, that non-being is a real possibility for everything.

4. Then right now nothing would exist. For

5. If the universe began to exist, then all being must trace its origin to some past moment before which there existed — literally — nothing at all. But

6. From nothing nothing comes. So

7. The universe could not have begun.

8. But suppose the universe never began. Then, for the infinitely long duration of cosmic history, all being had the built-in possibility not to be. But

9. If in an infinite time that possibility was never realized, then it could not have been a real possibility at all. So

10. There must exist something which has to exist, which cannot not exist. This sort of being is called necessary.

11. Either this necessity belongs to the thing in itself or it is derived from another. If derived from another there must ultimately exist a being whose necessity is not derived, that is, an absolutely necessary being.

12. This absolutely necessary being is God.

24

1. Only the mind gives descriptions of the world meaning.

2. Emergent properties are descriptions of the world, i.e. in defining emergent properties, we are describing the world.

3. Therefore, only the mind gives emergent properties meaning.

4. Descriptions of the world that only the mind gives meaning don't objectively exist.

5. Therefore, emergent properties don't objectively exist. (from 2, 3, and 4)

6. Therefore, matter is never objectively more than its parts, and matter cannot produce consciousness, e.g. an electron, or any number of electrons, passing between any number of points, in any permutation, through any combination or permutation of mediums, cannot produce consciousness.

7. Therefore, our consciousness can only be a consequence of consciousness.

8. The age of the earth is limited.

9. Therefore, there is a consciousness that precedes consciousness on earth.

10. What precedes that consciousness?:

10a. It's possible an infinite consciousness could "precede" itself.

10b. An omnipotent, aspacial, atemporal being would not necessitate a logical cause, and therefore would not necessitate a precedent consciousness.

10c. Irrelevant. It can't be inferred from the necessity of a consciousness that there is no consciousness.

25

1. The fine-tuning of the fundamental physical constants of the universe is due either to physical necessity, chance, or design.

2. Proponents of the anthropic principle assume that because observations of the universe must be compatible with the conscious and sapient life that observes it, it is unremarkable that this universe has fundamental constants that happen to fall within the narrow range thought to be compatible with life -- which is a modal scope fallacy, i.e. it equivocates the necessity of the universe if conscious and sapient life that observes it exists, with modal necessity, i.e. it confuses "necessary if" and "necessary."

3. All physical things have a logical cause.

4. All logically-caused things are contingent, i.e. it is possible for them not to be caused.

5. Therefore, all physical things are contingent.

6. The fundamental physical constants are a physical thing.

7. Therefore, the fundamental physical constants are contingent.

8. Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe is not due to physical necessity, and the universe, as it is, is not the only possible world.

9. There are an infinite number of possible worlds in which the fine-tuning of the universe and all its antecedents do not exist or are in an infinite number of possible states.

10. There is a finite number of possible worlds in which the fine-tuning of the universe and all its antecedents exist or are in a state thought to be compatible with life.

11. Therefore, the probability of a possible world in which the fundamental constants exist and fall within the narrow range thought to be compatible with life is n (number of possibilities in the actual world) / n^2 (number of possible worlds), asymptotically tends to 0.

12. Therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe is not due to chance.

13. Therefore, it is due to design.

26

1. Propositions aren't necessarily true.

2. If it isn't necessarily true, it's contingent.

3. Therefore, propositions are contingent. (modus ponens from 1)

4. If propositions are abstract objects, they aren't contingent.

5. Therefore, propositions aren't abstract objects. (modus tollens from 4 and 3)

6. If it's true and doesn't have meaning, it's an abstract object.

7. Therefore, propositions aren't true or they have meaning. (modus tollens from 6 and 5, DeMorgan's Law)

8. Meaning can be necessarily subjective and yet also objective only if it's subject to God.

9. Meaning is necessarily subjective, i.e. meaning doesn't exist unless it can have meaning to someone, e.g. a book would have no meaning nor potential meaning were no one ever to exist to have written or understand it; it would just be scribbles.

10. Therefore, if God doesn't exist, objective meaning doesn't exist. (modus ponens from 8)

11. If the proposition "Objective meaning doesn't exist," is false, objective meaning exists.

12. Objectively having meaning implies objective meaning, i.e. nothing can be objectively meaningful unless it has objective meaning. (an objection is that everything can exist inside a subjective bubble not a part of the objective world)

13. If objective meaning doesn't exist, the proposition "Objective meaning doesn't exist," doesn't have objective meaning.

14. Therefore, if objective meaning doesn't exist, the proposition doesn't objectively have meaning. (modus tollens from 12)

15. If a proposition is true, it has meaning. (disjunctive syllogism from 7)

16. If it exists, it objectively exists, e.g. if an idea exists, it objectively exists, just not necessarily the subject of the idea.

17. The proposition having meaning, exists.

18. Therefore, if a proposition has meaning, it objectively has meaning. (modus ponens from 16)

19. Therefore, if a proposition is true, it objectively has meaning. (modus ponens from 15)

20. Therefore, the proposition "Objective meaning doesn't exist," is self-refuting. (modus tollens from 12)

21. Therefore, objective meaning exists. (modus ponens from 11)

22. Therefore, God exists. (modus tollens from 10)

Pascal's Wager:

It's possible the Christian God exists. It's possible that if you don't accept Jesus, then you will go to hell, an infinite consequence that outweighs any quantification of improbability you can think of, and is therefore irrational merely to dismiss.

Humans bet with their lives that God either exists or does not. A rational person should investigate seriously whether God exists and seek to do His will. If God does actually exist, such a person will have only a finite loss, whereas they stand possibly to receive infinite gains and avoid infinite losses.

It is fallacious to suppose religion has any bearing on the probability of consequences after death. The probability has nothing to do with the number of religions or what anyone believes, else one could invent any number of religions, conceptions of god, or faiths to skew the probability -- an illicit substitution of non-identicals.

Refutation of every atheist 'argument' I could find:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atheist%27s_Wager

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_God_Challenge

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fate_of_the_unlearned

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_free_will

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_of_the_gaps

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hitchens%27s_razor

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incompatible-properties_argument

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_inconsistent_revelations

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_nonbelief

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnipotence_paradox

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_poor_design

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_Hell

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_teapot

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theological_noncognitivism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimate_Boeing_747_gambit

Richard Dawkins:

>1. One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect has been to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the universe arises.

>i am very smart

>2. The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself.

>you are stupid

>3. The temptation is a false one because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer.

fallacy fallacy. The implication of question begging doesn't imply anything is false. It can't be inferred from the necessity of a designer that there is no designer.

>4. The most ingenious and powerful explanation is Darwinian evolution by natural selection.

false dichotomy and red herring by appeal to emotion. The truth value of Darwinian evolution, and how ingenious or powerful it may be, are irrelevant to God's existence. (interesting quote: "I am quite conscious that my speculations run quite beyond the bounds of true science." - Charles Darwin)

>5. We don’t have an equivalent explanation for physics.

lolwut irrelevant

>6. We should 'not give up'(appeal to emotion) the hope(appeal to emotion) of a better explanation arising in physics(false attribution, appeal to authority), something as powerful(appeal to emotion) as 'Darwinism is for biology'(association fallacy)

The appeals to emotion are implying not to give up the hope that God doesn't exist, and that science is powerful, i.e. a sufficient replacement. The false attribution is to physics, which doesn't necessarily agree. The appeal to authority is to himself, which is a fallacy when used to imply a non-probabilistic truth claim, e.g. 'It is true that [conclusion]'. The association fallacy is implying that because physics and biology are both sciences, and because Darwinism is a "powerful" and better explanation for biology, so too will a "powerful" and better explanation arise in physics.

>7. Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist

This doesn't follow from the "premises."

Christopher Hitchens:

>We calculate that the human species Homo sapiens have been around now, Carl Sagan thought perhaps 200,000 years, I would say 100,000. In order to believe the Christian message, you have to believe this. For those 100,000 years, people were born, died – usually, many of them, in childbirth, life expectancy perhaps 20 years, 25. Earthquakes would have been terrifying. Tsunamis, volcanoes, mysterious events. War, famine. That was our life for tens of thousands of years. On and on it went. Now here is what you have to believe. You have to believe that heaven watched that for 98,000 years and after 98,000 years decided it may be time to intervene. And the best way of doing that would be to have a filthy human sacrifice in a very remote part of Palestine. And the news of this has still not penetrated to the rest of the world, and I don’t think will be believed when it does, and isn’t believed by me, and can’t be believed by thinking persons. Thank you.

Israel, from where Christianity originated, being between Africa, Asia, and Europe, was ideally situated for the Gospel eventually to go out and fill the entire globe, as it has, with unprecedented growth. Christianity is the largest, most successful movement in history.

The number of people who have ever been born is approximately 105 billion. Due to exponential growth, about 2% were born in the 98,000 years before Christ came to earth. The amount of time that passed for that first 2% is irrelevant. It is possible this time was necessary for the development of the knowledge and events necessary for the calling of Abraham out of modern day Iraq into the land of Israel, the Roman peace, the system of Roman roads, the Greek language prevalent throughout the area, etc. necessary for the calling forth of Jesus. If He'd come earlier in human history, there is no reason to believe the records of His relationship with man would be as reliable, nor that it would have been profitable for God or mankind.

Atheist's Wager:

>One version of the Atheist's Wager suggests that since a kind and loving god would reward good deeds – and that if no gods exist, good deeds would still leave a positive legacy – one should live a good life without religion.

>God -> reward

>~God -> reward

>Therefore, reward, and stay away from religion

This is just a hilarious non sequitur.

>Another formulation suggests that a god may reward honest disbelief, a reward which would then be jeopardized by a dishonest belief in the divine.

Wtf is dishonest belief?

Link to explanation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atheist's_Wager#Explanation

The argument presupposes atheists are equally as likely to do good as theists, which implies they are equally likely to know what is good, and to want to do good, as theists, which implies they are as much or more likely to know what is good than God, which implies God, by definition of omniscience, doesn't exist, which implies atheism is rational -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question. If not all versions of Pascal's Wager are unsound, which is unknowable, then without knowledge of a sound Atheist's Wager (this not being one of them), as Pascal posits: Humans bet with their lives that God either exists or does not.

Alas, Michael Martin, the 'philosopher' who popularized the Atheist's Wager, and typical of atheists who don't understand what they don't believe, missed the whole point: All fall short of the glory of God. Apparently, God cares more about humble acceptance of truth, i.e. acceptance of the sacrifice and resurrection of Jesus Christ, than prideful insistence that our fee fees dictate what is good or not.

Evil God Challenge:

>The Evil God Challenge is a thought experiment. The challenge is to explain why an all-good god should be more likely than an all-evil god. Those who advance this challenge assert that, unless there is a satisfactory answer to the challenge, there is no reason to accept God is good or can provide moral guidance.

The argument presupposes evil is based on our fee fees, which implies either God doesn't exist or doesn't have the right to make evil not based on our fee fees, which implies God, by definition of omnipotence and omnibenevolence, doesn't exist, which implies there is no reason to accept God is good or can provide moral guidance -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.

Good and evil are whatever God says they are. Good and evil relative to us are only what He wants us to do and not to do. If God had said "I am evil, this is evil and this is good; only do the evil things," it would have been equivalent to saying "I am good, this is good and this is evil; only do the good things." Therefore, an evil god implies a god that wants what he doesn't want, which is self-contradictory. Therefore, the argument is self-refuting.

Fate of the unlearned:

>The fate of the unlearned, also known as the destiny of the unevangelized, is an eschatological question about the ultimate destiny of people who have not been exposed to a particular theology or doctrine and thus have no opportunity to embrace it. The question is whether those who never hear of requirements issued through divine revelations will be punished for failure to abide by those requirements.

>It is sometimes addressed in combination with the similar question of the fate of the unbeliever. Differing faith traditions have different responses to the question; in Christianity the fate of the unlearned is related to the question of original sin. As some suggest that rigid readings of religious texts require harsh punishment for those who have never heard of that religion, it is sometimes raised as an argument against the existence of God, and is generally accepted to be an extension or sub-section of the problem of evil.

The argument presupposes God couldn't have so ordered the world that those who never hear the Gospel are only people who would not have believed it, and anyone who would have believed it is born at a time and place in history where he does hear it, which implies God, by definition of omnipotence, doesn't exist, which implies God isn't omnibenevolent -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.

We are not condemned based on rejection of the gospel; we are condemned because we are naturally, necessarily -- inherently -- sinners. God is merciful in that He has provided a way of salvation via Christ for those who can and will accept Him. But God is also just in that unrepentant-sin will not go unnoticed.

Argument from free will:

>The argument from free will, also called the paradox of free will or theological fatalism, contends that omniscience and free will are incompatible and that any conception of God that incorporates both properties is therefore inherently contradictory. These arguments are deeply concerned with the implications of predestination.

The argument presupposes a definition of "free will" that is incompatible with omniscience, which implies such a definition is metaphysically possibly true, which implies God doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.

The argument presupposes a definition of "free will" that is incompatible with determinism, which implies materialism, which implies God doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.

A definition of "free will" that is incompatible with omniscience or determinism is not necessarily true, e.g. Christians, whose conceptions of God and free will are allegedly inherently contradictory, don't define free will as the ability to make choices independent of God's knowledge or cause, nor as achievable only by breaking the physical laws of the universe. Free will is only epistemic, i.e. it is contingent only on our knowledge. Will that is contingent only on subjective knowledge is independent of omnipotence. Therefore, free will is compatible with God's existence.

God of the gaps:

>"God of the gaps" is a term used to describe observations of theological perspectives in which gaps in scientific knowledge are taken to be evidence or proof of God's existence. The term was invented by Christian theologians not to discredit theism but rather to point out the fallacy of relying on teleological arguments for God's existence. Some use the phrase as a criticism of theological positions, to mean that God is used as a spurious explanation for anything not currently explained by science.

God of the gaps is a straw man. Arguments like teleological arguments for God's existence aren't taking gaps in scientific knowledge to be evidence or proof of God's existence -- they are inferring to God as the best explanation over materialism. To take a lack of evidence that God is not the cause as evidence that He is the cause would indeed be an argument from ignorance. Ironically, those who cite 'God of the gaps' commit this very fallacy: that if there is no evidence that God is the cause, then He isn't the cause -- assuming a materialistic explanation is by default true, even if undiscovered, until proven otherwise. It is assumed a materialistic explanation is sufficient and thus that there are no other jointly sufficient causes, which is a fallacy of the single cause. This is assumed because of a faulty induction, i.e. materialistic cause is all they've ever seen, and all science is able to study, thus, excluding other reasons, it is all they are willing to accept.

No one believes in God because of something like missing evidençe for evolution.

Hitchens's razor:

>Hitchens's razor is an epistemological razor asserting that the burden of proof regarding the truthfulness of a claim lies with the one who makes the claim; if this burden is not met, the claim is unfounded and its opponents need not argue further in order to dismiss it. It is named, echoing Occam's razor, for the journalist and writer Christopher Hitchens, who, in a 2003 Slate article, formulated it thus: "What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence." The dictum also appears in God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, a book by Hitchens published in 2007.

>Hitchens's razor is actually an English translation of the Latin proverb "Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur" ("what is freely asserted is freely dismissed"), which was commonly used in the 19th century.

This is true, however it can be taken fallaciously to mean, as may have been Hitchens' intention, "What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed as false or unlikely without evidence." Those who interpret the statement as such, commit an argument from ignorance: neither absence of evidence nor expectation of evidence absent are necessarily evidence of absence.

Incompatible-properties argument, Evil vs. good and omnipotence:

>The problem of evil is the argument that the existence of evil is incompatible with the concept of an omnipotent and perfectly good God.

>A variation does not depend on the existence of evil. A truly omnipotent God could create all possible worlds. A "good" God can create only "good" worlds. A God that created all possible worlds would have no moral qualities whatsoever, and could be replaced by a random generator. The standard response is to argue a distinction between "could create" and "would create." In other words, God "could" create all possible worlds but that is simply not in God's nature. This has been argued by theologians for centuries. However, the result is that a "good" God is incompatible with some possible worlds, thus incapable of creating them without losing the property of being a totally different God. Yet, it is not necessary for God to be "good". He simply is good, but is capable of evil.

If God creating some possible worlds is logically absurd, e.g. the human idea of a perfect world, and "omnipotence" doesn't imply the ability to perform the logically absurd, then God could create worlds with evil, and yet remain omnipotent and omnibenevolent. If "omnipotence" does imply the ability to perform the logically absurd, then God could still create worlds with evil even though He could have created e.g. a perfect world, and yet remain omnipotent and omnibenevolent, because the contention "But that's logically absurd," is therefore invalid if the ability to perform the logically absurd is implied by "omnipotence." Therefore, His properties remain compatible.

Purpose vs. timelessness:

>One argument based on incompatible properties rests on a definition of God that includes a will, plan or purpose and an existence outside of time. To say that a being possesses a purpose implies an inclination or tendency to steer events toward some state that does not yet exist. This, in turn, implies a privileged direction, which we may call "time". It may be one direction of causality, the direction of increasing entropy, or some other emergent property of a world. These are not identical, but one must exist in order to progress toward a goal.

Presupposes purpose is only a steering of implicitly pre-existent events, which implies God isn't omnipotent, which implies God doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.

>In general, God's time would not be related to our time.

Presupposes God has a time, which implies it's fixed, which implies it can't be changed or that God necessarily has it, which implies God isn't omnipotent... therefore, the argument begs the question.

>Thus God's time must be aligned with our time if human activities are relevant to God's purpose.

Presupposes God can't change His "time" or enter any time He wants at any time, which implies God isn't omnipotent... therefore, the argument begs the question.

>A God existing outside of any sort of time could not create anything because creation substitutes one thing for another, or for nothing.

Presupposes things must be pre-existent; God could not "substitute" outside of time; and true creation isn't possible, which implies God isn't omnipotent... therefore, the argument begs the question.

>Creation requires a creator that existed, by definition, prior to the thing created.

Supposes God can't have existed prior to things created based on unsound premises, and presupposes things have already existed, which implies God didn't create everything... therefore, the argument begs the question.

Incompatible-properties argument, Simplicity vs. omniscience:

>Another pair is divine simplicity and omniscience. An omniscient God must necessarily encompass all information in the universe. Information is not "ineffable" and cannot be reduced to something simpler.

Divine simplicity only means God is without parts -- that He is His attributes. If the information God "encompasses" is an attribute of His, its "complexity" is irrelevant. If the information God "encompasses" is not an attribute of His, its "complexity" is irrelevant. Neither contradict the definition of divine simplicity.

Argument from inconsistent revelations:

>The argument from inconsistent revelations, also known as the avoiding the wrong hell problem, is an argument against the existence of God. It asserts that it is unlikely that God exists because many theologians and faithful adherents have produced conflicting and mutually exclusive revelations.

This is just as likely if God exists. Many theologians and faithful adherents have produced revelations of a great deceiver, whom itself produces revelations. Therefore, it is as likely the great deceiver exists as it's unlikely God exists. The likelihood the great deceiver exists is equivalent to the likelihood God exists. Therefore, it is as likely God exists as it's unlikely God exists.

>The argument states that since a person not privy to revelation must either accept it or reject it based solely upon the authority of its proponent, and there is no way for a mere mortal to resolve these conflicting claims by investigation, it is prudent to reserve one's judgment.

Modal scope fallacy, false dichotomy. Not "privy" doesn't imply necessarily not privy, and those aren't the only options. The only way for a "mere mortal" to be privy to revelation is by investigation. Therefore, it is prudent to investigate, not to reserve one's judgment.

>It is also argued that it is difficult to accept the existence of any one God without personal revelation. Most arguments for the existence of God are not specific to any one religion and could be applied to many religions with near equal validity. When faced with these competing claims in the absence of a personal revelation, it is argued that it is difficult to decide amongst them, to the extent that acceptance of any one religion requires a rejection of the others. Further, were a personal revelation to be granted to a nonbeliever, the same problem of confusion would develop in each new person the believer shares the revelation with.

Deciding among them is irrelevant upon personal revelation.

Argument from nonbelief, J. L. Schellenberg:

>1. If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.

>2. If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur.

>3. Reasonable nonbelief occurs.

Presupposes reasonable nonbelief in God is possible, which implies God, by premise 2, doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question. If God exists, it is possible reasonable nonbelief does not occur.

>4. No perfectly loving God exists (from 2 and 3).

>5. Hence, there is no God (from 1 and 4).

Version for students:

>1. If no perfectly loving God exists, then God does not exist.

>2. If a perfectly loving God exists, then there is a God who is always open to personal relationship with each human person.

>3. If there is a God who is always open to personal relationship with each human person, then no human person is ever non-resistantly unaware that God exists.

>4. If a perfectly loving God exists, then no human person is ever non-resistantly unaware that God exists (from 2 and 3).

Presupposes temporary states of non-resistant unawareness imply God is not perfectly loving, which implies God, by premise 1, doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question. Only persistent states of non-resistant unawareness are relevant. Since this argument is a later presentation of the former argument, it also equivocates temporary states of non-resistant unawareness with aware nonbelief, presumably in order to manipulate the students at whom it's aimed.

>5. Some human persons are non-resistantly unaware that God exists.

>6. No perfectly loving God exists (from 4 and 5).

>7. God does not exist (from 1 and 6).

Argument from nonbelief, Theodore Drange:

>1. If God exists, God:

>1a. wants all humans to believe God exists before they die;

>1b. can bring about a situation in which all humans believe God exists before they die;

>1c. does not want anything that would conflict with and be at least as important as its desire for all humans to believe God exists before they die; and

>1d. always acts in accordance with what it most wants.

>2. If God exists, all humans would believe so before they die (from 1).

>3. But not all humans believe God exists before they die.

>4. Therefore, God does not exist (from 2 and 3).

It is possible it isn't logically possible God could create a world in which as many people that have believed in Him in the actual world freely choose to believe in Him, and in which not as many people choose not to, and that therefore, creation of the actual world is implied by omnibenevolence. If "omnipotence" implies the ability to perform the logically impossible, it's possible God has brought about a situation in which all humans believe God exists before they die. The contention "But that's logically impossible; not all humans believe God exists before they die," is invalid if the ability to perform the logically impossible is implied by "omnipotence."

Omnipotence paradox:

>The omnipotence paradox has medieval origins, dating at least to the 12th century. It was addressed by Averroës (1126–1198) and later by Thomas Aquinas. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (before 532) has a predecessor version of the paradox, asking whether it is possible for God to "deny himself".

>The most well-known version of the omnipotence paradox is the so-called paradox of the stone: "Could God create a stone so heavy that even He could not lift it?" This phrasing of the omnipotence paradox is vulnerable to objections based on the physical nature of gravity, such as how the weight of an object depends on what the local gravitational field is. Alternative statements of the paradox that do not involve such difficulties include "If given the axioms of Riemannian geometry, can an omnipotent being create a triangle whose angles do not add up to 180 degrees?" and "Can God create a prison so secure that he cannot escape from it?".

Omnipotence isn't self-contradictory. If "omnipotence" doesn't imply the ability to perform the logically absurd, then the answer to whether or not God can resolve paradoxical questions is simply "No," and He is still omnipotent. If "omnipotence" does imply the ability to perform the logically absurd, then the answer to whether or not God can resolve paradoxical questions is simply "Yes," e.g. He could do something like create a stone so heavy He is unable to lift it, and He could lift it anyway. The contention "But that's logically absurd," is not valid if the ability to perform the logically absurd is implied by "omnipotence." Therefore, omnipotence isn't self-contradictory.

Argument from poor design:

>The argument from poor design, also known as the dysteleological argument, is an argument against the existence of a creator God, based on the reasoning that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God would not create organisms with the perceived suboptimal designs that can be seen in nature.

>The argument is structured as a basic modus tollens: if "creation" contains many defects, then design is not a plausible theory for the origin of our existence. It's most commonly used in a weaker way, however: not with the aim of disproving the existence of God, but rather as a reductio ad absurdum of the well-known argument from design, which argues that living things are too well-designed to have originated by chance, so must have been deliberately created by an intelligent God.

Whether there are examples of poor design in nature is highly contested in biology. For example: it's often contested that the human eye is poorly designed because its retina is "inverted" which creates blind spots. It is then countered that the "inverted" retina allows the eye to process the higher amount of oxygen it needs in vertebrates, and that no one has been able to conceive of how it might be modified without significantly decreasing its function, to the point that engineers mimic its design. Appeals to concensus among atheistic biologists are usually then cited, but this is a fallacious appeal to authority, which is a fallacy when used to imply a truth claim.

A design is fallaciously presumed to be poor if it's conceivable there is a better design, rather than only if a better design is conceived. Only when a better design, for God's purpose, has been conceived in its entirety, can it rationally be said one exists.

It is also presupposed that evolution only progresses. While natural selection selects for advantageous mutations, disadvantageous mutations are not necessarily deselected. Therefore, nature alone could account for any perceived poor design in the world.

The problem of evil:

>The logical form of the argument tries to show a logical impossibility in the coexistence of God and evil, while the evidential form tries to show that given the evil in the world, it is improbable that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God.

>logical

Omnibenevolence only implies doing the best and most moral thing, e.g. saving people with free will. It is possible it is logically impossible to do the best and most moral thing and there not be evil. If "omnipotence" implies the ability to perform the logically impossible, it's possible God has created this world such that there is no evil. The contention "But that's logically impossible; there is evil," is invalid if the ability to perform the logically impossible is implied by "omnipotence."

>evidential

Presupposes pain of innocent people is objectively evil, which implies innocent people exist, which implies there was no fall of man upon knowledge of good and evil, and which implies God doesn't decide what evil is, which imply God, and by definition of omnipotence, doesn't exist -- implicit premises that are supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question.

>implying evil can exist objectively without God

1. If God doesn't exist, "evil" is only an idea.

2. Ideas are only subjective.

3. Therefore, if God doesn't exist, "evil" is only subjective.

>and implying we can know what it is, and it's based on our feelings

If God doesn't exist, the explanation for how our feelings could accurately dictate what is objectively evil is natural evolution, which is self-refuting: If our ability to conceive of truth exists only because it has naturally evolved to be as it is, and nature selects only for traits that help us survive, and knowledge of truth isn't necessary for our survival, then there's no reason any of our conceptions of truth would be correct and we shouldn't believe anything we think or feel, including about morality.

Animals don't believe pain is evil.

Problem of Hell:

>The problem of Hell is an ethical problem in religion in which the existence of Hell for the punishment of souls is regarded as inconsistent with the notion of a just, moral, and omnibenevolent God. It derives from four key propositions: Hell exists; it is for the punishment of people whose lives on Earth are judged to have sinned against God; some people go there; and there is no escape.

Presupposes God doesn't have the right to decide what justice is, which implies God, by definition of omnipotence, doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question. God decides what justice is.

Presupposes people who go to hell have any redeeming qualities, which implies God is wrong, which implies God, by definitions of omniscience and omnibenevolence, doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- therefore, the argument begs the question. People who go to hell choose to go there (See: fate of the unlearned); it is the consequence of not doing what we're supposed to do -- its perceived harshness only a testament to the importance of not making that choice. "People" who deny God and go to hell are truly evil, by God's objective definition.

Russell's teapot:

>Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.

False analogy. We observe that we are the only civilzation in the solar system, that teapots don't launch themselves into space, and that there have been no manned missions to Mars -- we observe that it is unlikely such a teapot exists. We make no such observations about the existence of God.

Russel would have no authority to assert there is such a teapot. The bible does have authority. The bible is 66 different narratives, letters, and writings written by 40 different people, some of whom witnessed Jesus after His resurrection, over about 1,500 years that are all theologically synchronous, with irrelevant contradictions of detail that are expected of any such collection of historical documents and add to its historicity. Its own words also give it authority, which reveal themselves as the word of God to anyone willing to read it as such.

Theological noncognitivism:

>Theological noncognitivism is the argument that religious language – specifically, words such as "God" – are not cognitively meaningful. It is sometimes considered as synonymous with ignosticism.

To assert something isn't cognitively meaningful is to imply cognition of that thing.

This argument can also be applied to anything. It can be said nothing is truly cognitively meaningful, because when enough questions are asked about anything, the answer is invariably "Just because." Thus, all cognition is ultimately contingent on a priori knowledge. If this were to mean there is no such thing as meaningful cognition, it would apply to God no more than it applies to everything. It is axiomatic that the necessity of a priori knowledge does not negate meaningful cognition. Just because it is possible God can't be fully known, doesn't mean knowledge of Him isn't possible.

Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit by Dawkins:

>The Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit is a play on the notion of a "tornado sweeping through a junkyard to assemble a Boeing 747" employed to decry abiogenesis and evolution as vastly unlikely and better explained by the existence of a creator god. According to Dawkins, this logic is self-defeating as the theist must now account for the god's existence and explain whether or how the god was created.

It can't be inferred from the necessity of a creator that there is no creator. Space-time originated with the universe. Therefore, the cause of the universe would be aspacial and atemporal. The aspacial and atemporal doesn't necessitate cause. Therefore, what caused the universe wouldn't necessitate cause. An omnipotent being is capable and is the only thing capable of being this uncaused first cause.

>In his view, if 'the existence of highly complex life on Earth is the equivalent of the implausible junkyard Boeing 747'(straw man), the existence of a 'highly complex god'(straw man, begging the question) is the "ultimate Boeing 747" that truly does 'require the seemingly impossible to explain its existence'(straw man).

The first straw man misrepresents the existence of highly complex life, in substitution of abiogenesis and evolution, as being decried as equivalent to the implausible junkyard Boeing 747. The former exists; the latter's existence is what's contested.

The second straw man misrepresents belief in God as in "a highly complex god." It begs the question because it assumes God is necessarily highly "complex." It is conceivable that God is a "simple" conception or perception -- an objectively perfect being.

The third straw man misrepresents the existence of something as being "seemingly impossible" only because it's highly "complex." Insufficient cause doesn't imply "seeming" impossibility of the highly "complex."

This isn't even really an 'argument' against God's existence. It's merely a poor attempt to cite inconsistency in a contention against evolution.

Occam's razor:

>Occam's razor (also Ockham's razor; Latin: lex parsimoniae "law of parsimony") is a problem-solving principle attributed to William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347), who was an English Franciscan friar, scholastic philosopher, and theologian. His principle can be interpreted as stating Among competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected.

>In science, Occam's razor is used as a heuristic guide in the development of theoretical models, rather than as a rigorous arbiter between candidate models. In the scientific method, Occam's razor is not considered an irrefutable principle of logic or a scientific result; the preference for simplicity in the scientific method is based on the falsifiability criterion. For each accepted explanation of a phenomenon, there may be an extremely large, perhaps even incomprehensible, number of possible and more complex alternatives, because one can always burden failing explanations with ad hoc hypotheses to prevent them from being falsified; therefore, simpler theories are preferable to more complex ones because they are more testable.

God is the simplest possible solution to everything (See: Simplicity vs. omniscience). Complexity is not a consequence of all-perfection; it is a consequence of deficient cognition. Simplicity and complexity don't objectively exist.

Occam's razor is also only a rule of thumb for abducing that a conclusion is more likely than not, when its likelihood is unquantifiable. Therefore, it can't be used to infer truth nor existence, neither of God nor of anything.

There is no representation of valid criticisms of these arguments, and arguments for God are poorly represented, not because atheism is the rational position, but because evil really does exist, as an influence on everyone.

It isn't surprising all these "smart people" can be wrong if you accept that God exists. They probably even know they're wrong, but they don't care about what's right -- only about arguing that the bible is wrong.

If it's possible God does exist, and thus that there could actually be good and evil and things actually, objectively matter, and you don't believe, consider the possibility that you are deceived.

Pleb-tier atheist arguments:

>will is a consequence of lacking therefore God is not omnipotent

presupposes God's will necessitates weakness based on a faulty induction that God's will has human necessities, which implies God isn't omnipotent precedent to the conclusion that God isn't omnipotent, therefore this begs the question. God's will does not necessitate weakness. It is possible that omnipotence includes the ability to will without weakness, e.g. God willing things simply because they are good.

also presupposes God has a human perception of knowledge and time. It could be that in God's perspective, nothing was ever 'missing' because He has always been omniscient of everything, or because everything has "already happened."

>consciousness is an illusion

circular reasoning. Consciousness is necessary for illusion. Consciousness can't be an illusion of itself because consciousness can't be the cause of itself.

>God would have shown himself to me waaaaaa

The bible says "And ye shall seek me, and find me, when ye shall search for me with all your heart." It can be inferred this is a necessary condition because there is no other reason to say it. It isn't possible to do this, and doubt or identify as a butthurt atheist.

>you can't prove a negative, therefore it is rational to take the negative position

There is no such thing as a "negative," i.e. positive and negative isn't a polarity that objectively exists. All propositions are positive and negative, i.e. when claiming one is true, you are saying all its negations are false.

>why didn't Jesus write the bible himself?

You mean like Muhammad (the quran's sole witness), or Joseph Smith?

>God's a genocidal maniac!

appeal to emotion. Genocide only applies to humans. God -- who decides what is good or evil in the first place, and who has the right to decide when they should die -- killing people, is not the same thing. Presupposing otherwise implies you think your judgment, which is based on your fee fees, is better than God's, which would be impossible and therefore implies He doesn't exist, therefore this contention begs the question.

>what happened to people before Jesus?

The gospel existed before Jesus.

>God should be more obvious

God is obvious. He also isn't interested in just getting people to believe that He exists. He wants to bring people into a loving, saving relationship with Himself. God and His Providence knows how to so order the world so as to bring the maximal or optimal number of people, freely, into relationship with Himself. People are given adequate, but not coercive, evidence for His existence. You really have to work not to believe in God. It is the natural ontology as evidenced by history.

>dinosaurs ruin your story

Young-earth Christians believe man existed at the same time as dinosaurs. "Behold now behemoth, which I made with thee; he eateth grass as an ox. Lo now, his strength is in his loins, and his force is in the navel of his belly. He moveth his tail like a cedar: the sinews of his stones are wrapped together. His bones are as strong pieces of brass; his bones are like bars of iron. He is the chief of the ways of God: he that made him can make his sword to approach unto him." - Job 40:15-19. Old-earth Christians believe dinosaurs existed before man.

>creating a [emotionally-charged word for "big"], empty universe, dinosaurs and all the now-extinct animals, and it taking a long time for us to be created is inefficient

The universe has to be big, since the heavy elements like carbon of which our bodies are made are synthesized in the interior of stars and then distributed throughout the cosmos by supernovae explosions, which takes a long time, and all the while the universe is expanding. The size of the universe is a function of its age.

The primeval forests were the basis for the oil and coal deposits that make modern civilization possible. The extinct creatures that existed during those times were part of the ecosystem that made the planet flourish.

This also presupposes God has the same conceptions of "big" and "long time" as you do, that God has limited power or time, and that God's only function is as an efficient, impersonal cause of us. Conceptions of "bigness" and "longness" imply a small mind. God is omnipotent, with unlimited time. He can create just because it's good, or because He takes delight in His creation. Everything that is created is for the glory of God.

>but those poor dinosaurs tho. letting them die was evil

It is unlikely the dinosaurs would have agreed with you, and your opinion isn't any more valid. This also presupposes a materialistic, binary existence of life, and that dinosaurs had some of the same conceptions of life as you do or that your fee fees can dictate that dinosaur-pain is evil, which isn't necessarily true.

>the bible is scientifically inaccurate, for example: it says pi = 3

The bible says "He made the Sea of cast metal, circular in shape, measuring ten cubits from rim to rim and five cubits high. It took a line of thirty cubits to measure about it." That is an observation, not a statement of mathematics. This presupposes they should have specified exactly what fraction of line was needed to measure around it, and that they couldn't notice it was more than 31 cubits around, which embarrassingly presupposes the story is made-up to arrive at the conclusion that God is made-up and therefore begs the question. The measurement was 30 or they rounded to 30 when recounting the story because there was no need to be specific. Therefore, no, the bible does not say pi = 3.

Every other objection of this kind either makes the same kind of error, or purposely interprets phenomenal language as literal.

>the bible has errors in it therefore it can't be the word of God and Jesus wasn't resurrected

The historicity of the bible is proven by contradictions of its otherwise irrelevant details, as it is 66 different narratives, letters, and writings written by 40 different people, some of whom witnessed Jesus after His resurrection, over the course of about 1,500 years in different geographic locations, that are all theologically synchronous. It was also copied and translated by men, who make errors. God's word and Jesus' resurrection are corroborated by multiple sources. Therefore, this is false.

>believing stories like the ark had millions of animals is silly

The ark's cargo was limited to land-dwelling, air-breathing vertebrate animals, of which there were fewer kinds at the time because of speciation. Stories like the ark are true or an example of the bible's use of illustration. Both are equivalently probable if God exists, therefore neither can be logically cited as a reason He doesn't.

>it's possible phenomenal language is up for interpretation therefore the bible isn't true

The truth of something isn't contingent on your knowledge of it, nor is the possibility of a misinterpretation reason not to pursue the truth.

>the old testament God had ridiculous laws like not eating shellfish, stoning people for trivial things, and generally demanded things i don't like

Shellfish is fraught with parasites. Such laws existed to keep God's people healthy.

>why not just tell them to make sure to cook them sufficiently so they could eat shrimp and stuff?

Perhaps because that's disgusting. Laws also existed, like 'no mixed fabrics,' to distinguish God's people as respectable men and women of God.

Things people were stoned for, such as adultery, were not trivial to God. The punishment was a testament to how sacred something was, such as marriage, and how important it is not to do something.

Just because you don't like something doesn't mean you can -- rationally -- insinuate your own postmodern sense of righteousness and declare it to be superior to God's and that He therefore doesn't exist.

>the bible was written by men, therefore it's not the word of God

false dichotomy

>there are diseases and stuff

Pain is only evil because you have a perception of its evil which has been passed down ever since the fall of man, which is man's fault for disobeying God. It is also pain that often forces us to humble ourselves and seek God, rather than living under the delusion that we are safe without Him.

>you only believe what you do because of where you were born and it's what you've been taught therefore your religion is probably wrong

circumstantial ad hominem. This is a confusion of epistemic probability and metaphysical actuality. From the atheist's perspective, each religion generally has an equivalent probability of being correct. However, the metaphysical actuality is contingent only on what is actually true. Therefore, the atheist can't correctly infer the probability of each one's truth or falsity without investigation. If God exists, it is not unlikely His word persists and is well-known by a 'religion.' Therefore, it is prudent to investigate and, since God revealing Himself implies it's what He wants, it is prudent to start with a more popular religion, like Christianity.

>religion is a ruse invented by people to control people

association fallacy and fallacy of the single cause. Just because this is possibly true, doesn't mean it is true of Christianity.

>believing in God is like believing in the flying spaghetti monster

Why? "because the flying spaghetti monster doesn't exist" presupposes God doesn't exist and thus begs the question. The reason you feel the flying spaghetti monster doesn't exist is because the more random properties something is posited to have, the less likely it is to exist. Our knowledge of God's properties aren't random at all, as they are properties we know to exist in living beings.

>there's like 5,000 gods; which one is it, then?

The plausibility of God's existence isn't proportional to the number of conceptions of Him. What people conceive is irrelevant to reality. Therefore, the question of God's existence isn't "Which conception is it then?" It's "Is there any kind of Godly being?" Our knowledge of God's properties is not randomly composed. Therefore, the answer to this question being "yes" is epistemically not implausible unless demonstrated otherwise. It's possible and inevitable to have limited, variant, or even wrong understandings of a singular, existent being.

>what does x word mean? durr checkmate

red herring. This contention can be made against absolutely any argument or any word, ad nauseam.

>i never said God doesn't exist; i'm an "agnostic atheist"

This is redundant. "Agnostic" implies "atheist," not to be equivocated with classical atheist, which is the only purpose of your redundancy. An agnostic atheist, if not actually a classical atheist, is also without belief that God does not exist, but you don't specify that, do you?

Mentioning one's own epistemology at all is just a big red herring; it has no place in debate; and it should only if ever be shared as nothing more than a cool factoid about one's self -- because there is no such thing as an agnostic or gnostic position. Whether one believes they can tell the difference between knowledge and belief is irrelevant. Neither, is anything more than a statement of feeling. If someone says "I believe but I don't know this thing to be true," or "I know this thing to be true," either way the only proper response in debate would be "Prove it."

>Matthew 10:23 "When they persecute you in this city, flee to another. For assuredly, I say to you, you will not have gone through the cities of Israel before the Son of Man comes," and Matthew 16:28 "Assuredly, I say to you, there are some standing here who shall not taste death till they see the Son of Man coming in His kingdom," prove Jesus was a false prophet

Jesus said multiple times not even He knows when He will return. This face value interpretation can't be applied to the other gospels whose, like the bible's, narrative is consonant. Therefore, you are more likely to be missing context than for this offhand understanding of Matthew alone to be correct. It is prudent to try to understand how one possibly doesn't understand rather than simply cherry-picking whatever suits a narrative.

>even if you prove God exists, you haven't proved which god. checkmate.

irrelevant. This is a sad attempt at moving the goal posts. Proving any "god" exists invalidates atheism.

>Christianity is just a copy of similar stuff before it

association fallacy and post hoc ergo propter hoc, i.e. similarities don't imply other similarities nor equivalence, and something happening before another doesn't imply a causal relationship. Function necessitates form, thus homology can't be assumed until either it's proven or analogy is negated.

>but they STOLE a part of the name of something

It's possible to use a name without "stealing" a concept as concepts are abstract objects that can't be possessed.

>can you measure God's effects? then He doesn't exist. checkmate

false dichotomy and fallacy of the single cause. The plausibility of God's existence isn't contingent on your inability or unwillingness to measure His effect, nor does a materialistic understanding of effects exclude God as a cause, e.g. of everything.

>why doesn't God just kill lucifer?

The simple answer is that He doesn't want to. What you would do with your limited knowledge of the 'circumstance' is irrelevant. Lucifer is a consequence of our existence, which isn't to say we made him; his existence is necessary for us to have freely chosen to be saved.

>God is just ridiculous. you can't expect me to consider the possibility of every fanciful notion

This is circular reasoning, i.e. dismissal by claiming something should be dismissed.

>God is just a way to explain stuff without science

circumstantial ad hominem and fallacy of the single cause. Why people believe in God is irrelevant to His existence, and the existence of materialistic explanation doesn't imply it's the only cause, i.e. that it's implausible it isn't only a jointly sufficient cause.

Atheists seem to think they're the first people to look at a natural phenomenon and think "There's got to be a natural explanation". Obviously there is a natural explanation. That isn't even a novel idea. "Natural" just means "things that can happen;" there is no such thing as a natural phenomenon that can't happen. This doesn't even lessen the probability that God is the ultimate cause.

>consciousness is physical and the cause of the universe wasn't conscious, because it was physical

self-refuting, i.e. p can't be q and not q at the same time.

>God's a baby-killer

This either presupposes people who aren't saved have any potentially redeeming qualities, which implies God is morally wrong, which implies God isn't omnibenevolent, which implies God doesn't exist -- an implicit premise that is supposed to be the conclusion of the argument -- and therefore begs the question, or admits God exists and is therefore self-refuting.

>some gospels weren't written by the apostles

If this didn't presuppose its own implicit conclusion that the gospels are somehow therefore inauthentic, the relevance to the gospels' historicity would still necessitate deduction, i.e. explanation of how this is relevant. There is no such deduction. Therefore this is irrelevant.

>God is like [made-up thing]

Why?

>because He too is made-up

"God doesn't exist because He's like things that don't exist," as entailed by the phrase "made-up," is circular reasoning and thus invalid.

>our significance is measured by our size n compared to the size of universe m. the size of our body is n/m. therefore we are insignificant.

fallacy of the undistributed middle by equivocation of significance and (in)significant. A quantification, e.g. n/m, doesn't alone imply a generalization, e.g. "insignificant."

>if there were a God we would expect to see Him

What you expect of God, and acknowledge seeing, are irrelevant.

>hurr God is indefinable and therefore He doesn't exist

Plenty of indefinable things exist. Reality isn't contingent on your understanding.

>durr there are so many religions, therefore all of them are probably wrong

This is equivocation, purposeful or not, with something like "There are so many religions, therefore any of them is probably wrong." The latter is epistemically true; the former is not.

>it would only take 1 piece of verifiable evidence to destroy atheism

The first picture presupposes atheists are smart or aware enough, and not too compelled by emotion like the actual want for God not to exist, to recognize or acknowledge said evidence.

>you don't need the bible for morality; just don't be an asshole

What you feel you need is irrelevant. The implicit argument is Christians only believe because... which aside from being a circumstantial ad hominem, presupposes God doesn't exist and thus choice of moral guidelines is arbitrary -- premised to the same conclusion -- therefore, the argument begs the question.

>my mind is sophisticated enough to be a good person without a rule book

What you think you need or don't need is irrelevant. Christians don't heed their rule book as a consequence of simply needing a rule book. Christians heed the bible as a consequence of believing in God.

These aren't straw men because these aren't inaccurate. They're atheistic contentions actually made explicit.

etc. etc. etc. An inability to think properly about God because of satan can lead to an infinite number of similar contentions.

People who think of the existence of God as a ridiculous notion, presumably by choice, imagine Him as some limited being who's unlikely to exist by definition. God is generally defined as being omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, transcendent, and ultimately incomprehensible. Imposing purposely silly definitions on Him (or any definition), aside from being an appeal to ridicule, does not function as a valid reduction to absurdity because any and all imposed definitions conflict with His actual definition. For example, a "flying spaghetti monster," or a "sky wizard," is either not omnipotent by definition, or its form isn't necessary and therefore arbitrary and non-definitive, and it isn't transcendent, because it is impossible to have a form outside of space-time. If or when the intention is merely to show God is "as ridiculous" as any fantastical thing using false analogies, it is only a redundantly-fallacious appeal to the stone. It's also akin to saying "Look, I can make things up. Therefore your God is made up," and yet these are the kind of unsophisticated arguments atheists use, presumably all because they refuse to conceive of possibility outside our comprehension, lest they have to admit we may be held accountable to something outside ourselves.

If God exists, His having created us implies He cares, which implies it's not unlikely God's word would persist and be well-known. Christianity is one of the first to teach of one rational, all-perfect God, and is the only theological understanding in which we're not expected to work our way to heaven, nor are we saved by the merit of our actions, but only by the grace of Jesus Christ. "Faith without works is dead," in that he who has faith in Jesus will simply bear the works, i.e. repentance. It is through this that we are able to know Jesus, but faith in Him and humility that men are not their own god must come first.

Jesus' resurrection was witnessed by more than 500 people. The historicity of the bible is proven by contradictions of its otherwise irrelevant details, as it is 66 different narratives, letters, and writings (i.e. historical documents) written by 40 different people, five of whom witnessed Jesus after His resurrection, over about 1,500 years that are all theologically synchronous. This is as opposed to having been written by one person like some guy in a cave who says he had a revelation.