Oman and Qatar are two Arabian Gulf states that have slowly embarked on a path of liberalization. One of the main results has been the redistribution of power within the state. Furthermore, both states have also attempted to standardize their national history and place their ruling family or its leader in the center of the state.

The formation of Qatar is on the basis of tribal unity and the leadership of the Al – Thani family. Since Sheikh Hamad came to power in 1995 there has slowly been the spread of power away from the Emir and towards the people. In 1995, the Emir amended Qatar’s constitution to separate the powers of the Prime Minister and the Emir (Lambert 2011, 90). The Premier was given to his brother Sheikh Abdullah Bin Khalifa Al-Thani. The Emir also ushered in an elected Council in 1995 (Lambert 2011, 90). The Central Municipal Council was the first albeit partially elected body in Qatar, and in 1997, the Emir declared that all seats in the Municipal Council would be decided by direct election rather than appointment by the Emir (Lambert 2011, 91). The distribution of power away from the leadership was done so by the Emir. This is important because it illustrates how the ruler is behind all legislation in the past. Moreover, there was no serious domestic threat for redistribution of power. However, the Emir did face opposition.

The main opposition of the Emir came from within the ruling family. Since Emir Qassim, all Emirs were overthrown or have abdicated. The two preceding Emirs before Sheikh Hamad were ousted by members of their inner-circle who were Al-Thani. It has been suggested that the Emir has liberalized the state in order to bypass the more conservative members of the Al- Thani family (Kamrava 2009, 403). During his reign, Sheikh Hamad faced countless rumored coup attempts mostly from unreliable sources that state either Al-Thani’s or nationals have attempted to overthrow the Emir. The most notable and credible attempted coup was in 1996 by senior members of the ruling family including the Emir’s cousin (BBC 2000).

Over the years, the number of Al-Thani’s in ministerial positions has decreased; and those that are kept within the Al-Thani family such as the Premier have moved away from the Emir’s direct family. The first Prime Minister under Sheikh Hamad was his brother then it was Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabor and now it is under Sheikh Abdullah Bin Nasser Al-Thani. The current and previous Prime Ministers were not direct relatives of the Emir. Hence, the Premier was once held by the Emir, then his brother and now to a distant relative illustrating a power shift away from the Emir. Furthermore, the proportion of Al-Thani’s in ministerial positions has also decreased overtime especially under Sheikh Hamad. In mid-1997, they were no fewer than fourteen Sheikhs holding ministerial positions and by 2007 only four Al-Thani’s were in ministerial positions (People’s Daily Online 2007). However, there has been an increase in quasi-governmental organizations in Qatar and many of them are headed by Al-Thanis.

The state has created a legislative body in Qatar; the body has the right to draw up legislation, question cabinet ministers and review the government’s budget proposals (State of Qatar 2003). In 2005, the constitution went into effect, which gave Qataris the right to elect the Parliament/Majlis al-Shura. However, the parliament has been delayed since then and has yet to occur. In 2006, the government stated that the delay was to “give more time for the people to get acquired with the democratic process” (Saif 2011, 110). In 2011, the Prime Minister stated that the delay was going to end in the near future and that special laws are being drafted for the Parliament (Al-Shibeeb 2011); however, no laws have been announced since, and the Parliamentary elections which were due to happen in 2013 has been subsequently delayed (Doha News 2013). The state has no credible domestic threat that would pressure the Government into speeding up the parliamentary elections and subsequently the Government has the ability to usher in reform in its own pace and in its own style.

The state of Qatar, similarly to Oman, did not offer all of its citizens the ability to vote at the start of the state’s liberalization policy. In Oman, over time the Majlis al-Shura’s gave more Omani’s eligibility to vote. In Qatar, around 25 percent of the current Qatari population are allowed to vote (State Department n.d.). In 2011, The Central Municipal Council was recorded to have a 43.3 percent turnout (32,622 registered voters), which referencing with the 2010 census data would mean only 9.5 percent of the national adult population voted and 3.9 percent of the total Qatari national population (Zaccara 2011, 5). This number is even further dwarfed when including all residents of Qatar most of whom are non-nationals.

In Oman, Sultan Qaboos chose the pace of democratization and he brought in the political liberalization of the State. Sultan Qaboos created the Majlis al-Shura in order to place the modern institutions of the state with Omani “democratic tradition” (Valeri 2009, 159). In 2011, Sultan Qaboos, unlike Al-Thani, faced internal pressure from protestors to liberalize the political system in which he conceded to.

In 1991, the Majlis al-Shura replaced a previous consultative council. In the beginning, the Majlis al-Shura would elect nominees from each district for the State/Sultan Qaboos to appoint (Peterson 2011, 109). However, the process slowly democratized and the council became a fully elected body. The Shura also in the past restricted its voters to around 25 percent of the Omani population; and in 2002, Sultan Qaboos extended the voting rights to all Omani citizens (Katzman 2013, 4). The council before the 2011 protests was fully in line with Omani culture of consultation.

The Majlis al-Shura compared to western parliaments could be seen as a toothless organization; however, its consultative nature was inline with Oman’s principles of Shura. The Majlis “participate fully in genuine consultation, with a view reaching a consensus” (Jones and Ridout 2012, 257). The Shura can be seen as “the center of the process of contemporary political legitimacy in Oman” (Valeri 2009, 45). Valeri argues that the Shura is a national myth created of traditional Islamic democracy (Valeri 2009, 47). However, the Shura is a highly regarded principal for Ibadis who also refer to themselves as “people of consultation” (Valeri 2009, 10).

In 2003, the first universal suffrage elections were held and Salim Al-Ghattami, a candidate, found out that he was standing unopposed for his seat in the Majlis al-Shura. He was widely seen as “hardworking” (Jones and Ridout 2012, 256). However, instead of simply taking the seat, Al-Ghattami attempted to lure candidates in running against him (Jones and Ridout 2012, 257). Jones and Ridout argue that Al-Ghattami attempted to create a competition because without competitions credible participation would not have happened (Jones and Ridout 2012, 257). Thus, it would go against the importance of Shura if there were no credible participation. The importance placed by Al-Ghattami highlights how important participation and Shura is in Oman.

The 2003 elections were also the first in which the government had allowed overt campaigning. Candidates in 2003, circulated biographies but did not issue manifestos or make campaign promises as it is against the culture of politeness and it is seen as “vulgar and undignified” (Jones and Ridout 2012, 257). Campaign promises are considered against the Shura principal of the state. Campaign promises mean that you have concluded and you are not open to consider other opinions of what should occur (Jones and Ridout 2012, 257). Moreover, there were other limitations present for candidates, in 2003 and 2007, it was forbidden to tackle any generally important or sensitive topic like the role of religion in present society (Valeri 2009, 162).

The Omani Government also expanded in 1997 when the Majlis al-Dawla (State Council) was created (Peterson 2011, 110). It is an appointed body that initially was made up of forty-one members. It subsequently was expanded to fifty-seven. The council appeared to be designed to serve as an appointed counterweight to the elected Majlis al-Shura. The two bodies together, Majlis al-Shura and Majlis al-Dawla, form the Majlis Oman (Peterson 2011, 110).

The powers of Majlis Oman were based on Omani consultation. However, after the 2011 protests the Majlis was given more power. Amendments, in 2011, gave Majlis Oman legislative and regulatory powers. The amendments also gave the Consultation Council the ability to propose laws on its own initiative (Oman Ministry of Information n.d.) Moreover, in 2011, two members of the 2011 protest were part of Majlis Oman (Al-Shaibany 2012).

Sultan Qaboos also created the Municipal Council of Oman after the 2011 protest. The first-ever 192-member Municipal Council of Oman swiftly occurred in 2012 with a 50.3 percent turnout (Times Of Oman 2012). The Municipal Council was given consultative power on improving Municipal Services (The Peninsula 2012). Omanis hailed the Council as an expansion of Oman’s Shura based state (Muscat Daily 2012).

The expansion and creation of legislative branches of Government illustrates a push from a more inclusive and participatory Oman. The liberalization of politics has occurred not only in the macro level. Omani’s now are more inclusive than they have been in the past; all Omanis of age are now eligible to vote.

The Omani state similarly to the Qatari state is evolving. The rulers of Oman and Qatar ushered in new systems of politics along with new ways of managing the ruling members. Oman unlike the other Gulf States is not a dynastic monarchy thus the ruling family with the exception of Sultan Qaboos are not pillars of legitimacy (Herb 1999, 145). Sultan Qaboos however cannot be equated to the King of Libya or Afghanistan who Herb argued their extreme exclusion of the ruling family was an integral part to their monarchy’s survival or the lack of it (Herb 1999, 145). Sultan Qaboos has given important state posts in Oman to ruling family members (Herb 1999, 145). Sultan Qaboos expanded participation of the ruling family even though Sultan Qaboos was the only member of the ruling family to have participated in the coup. Thus unlike the previous Emir of Qatar who brought himself to power through family ties, Sultan Qaboos came to power with the help of the British and non-ruling members of the Omani state (Herb 1999, 151). In 1932, Said Bin Taimur abolished the four-person government council and replaced it with departments directly underneath him, and by 1939, the British noticed that it was ‘“ doubtful if any of the Sultan’s close relations… have any influence, even in local affairs”’ (As Cited in Herb 1999, 147). However, by the time Sultan Qaboos appointed a new cabinet in 1974, things were changing and there were members of Sultan Qaboos’ relatives in state positions (Herb 1999, 152). In the late 1990s, the cabinet included a considerable number of Al Said giving a resemblance to their GCC neighbor’s cabinets (Herb 1999, 152).

Another major distinction between Qatar and Oman is the ruling family’s central power within the historical narrative. In Oman, it is much more revolved around one man, the Sultan. In Qatar, the state narrative is revolved around the extended Al-Thani family. This could be attributed to the politics of the state: In Oman, Sultan Qaboos is not only the head of State but also the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs; In Qatar, the Emir is only the head of State and typically (not currently) most of these key offices are held by members of the ruling family. Furthermore, in Oman, Sultan Qaboos did not come into power with the help of the ruling family. In Qatar, Sheikh Hamad and the Emir preceding him, Sheikh Khalifa, had key members of the ruling family assist them in coming to power.

Regardless of the distinction between Oman and Qatar, both states are attempting to solidify their prominence and historical/cultural significance through a standardized history based on unity.

It recent history both Oman and Qatar have changed their National Day. December 18th of each year signifies the day Sheikh Qassim Bin Mohammed united the tribes of Qatar (Mitchell 2013, 183). The state glances over important aspects of contemporary Qatari history including the tensions between Bahrain and Qatar that continued till the early 2000s and is still arguably continues. In addition, the problematic Al-Naim tribe continued to pose a problem after the unification, however that is not highlighted in the state’s narrative (Mitchell 2013, 183). Furthermore, AL Naim tribe is even embraced in the Qatar National Museum (Mitchell 2013, 208), which demonstrates the importance the state places in unity, integration and highlighting other Qataris contribution to the state. Thus, National Day is a day of togetherness not only between the ruling factions of the ruling family but also in the broader state. Furthermore, the Qatari state has highlighted unity within its population through the national museum and Qatar’s historical narrative. Likewise, Oman has focused on unifying their people around National Day.

Sultan Qaboos changed National Day to his birthday to signify the Omani miracle that “was necessarily the unified state under” Sultan Qaboos (Valeri 2009, 127). Furthermore, the Omani state has attempted to naturalize not only the meaning of National day but also in promoting a generic Islam (Valeri 2009, 127) and a standardized Arabic language (Valeri 2009, 120).

Furthermore, both states omit crucial parts of their history including the rise to power of Sheikh Hamad, Sheikh Khalifa and Sultan Qaboos (Valeri 2009, 130). In Qatar, Sheikh Ahmed Bin Ali’s reign tends to be ignored even though it is an important one. Coincidently, the cancelation of Independence Day meant that he no longer was a central figure on a national holiday. Comparably, Oman has also ignored central themes in its history and focuses on pre-oil Oman or Oman under Qaboos in order to bolster the perception that Sultan Qaboos is modern Oman and there was little before him (Valeri 2009, 130).

Oil and gas has played an important role in both states. It should be noted that both states during the Arab Spring increased political liberalization but also increased jobs and spending (Al Jazeera 2012). Moreover, there actions to increase economic spending could be seen through the lens of classic rentierism policy of buying off decent. Though in doing so it somewhat discredits the political liberalization policies especially Oman’s during the Arab Spring, also it undermines the long-term calculated risks of Sultan Qaboos and Sheikh Hamad to create a unified, strong and arguably happy citizenry. However, the increased spending did play a role in calming protests in Oman since their main demands were economic.

Oman and Qatar have been undergoing a process of political liberalization and cultural standardization in order to create a unified and strong population that is increasingly empowered. Both Qatar and Oman’s rulers are in control of the state and the pace of democratization. Furthermore, both rulers have formed a state that is based on their right to rule whether as an individual, for Sultan Qaboos, or as a family in the case of the Emir of Qatar. Both Qatar and Oman’s democratization has had a positive trajectory of inclusion. Even though the liberalization from the rulers moved power away from their hands, both rulers have attempted to create a unified nation behind them in which the Al-Thani family and Qaboos are pillars of the state and its unity.

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