Kim’s absence triggers visions of massive regional disruption with catastrophic consequences. North Korea has possibly dozens of nuclear weapons, a substantial cache of biological and chemical weapons, a diverse array of ballistic missiles and a million-person military. State propaganda has made it clear that Kim alone controls these levers of military power. A power struggle in North Korea as a result of Kim’s death or incapacity could lead officials to jockey for control of the regime’s nuclear weapons, either to use them or sell them for cash. Such a development might invite U.S., Chinese and South Korean military intervention, setting the stage for confrontation and miscalculation that could spiral into a larger conflict.

Nuclear war or “loose nukes” isn’t the only prospect worrying Washington, Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo. Internal collapse in North Korea could spark armed clashes among competing factions for control and trigger massive refugee flows, taxing the region’s ability to respond.

The current pandemic would only amplify a humanitarian disaster in North Korea. Of its total population of 25 million people, North Korea has 10 million citizens who are malnourished and 8 million who lack access to clean water, making them more vulnerable to the coronavirus and other diseases. Internal instability could also unravel the state’s strict measures to contain the coronavirus. Last week, the state ramped up its anti-coronavirus campaign, including reinforcing existing border lockdowns and the inspection and quarantining of imported goods—an acknowledgement of the ongoing necessity of pandemic vigilance, even though Pyongyang still insists that it has zero infections. A few days earlier, the regime reportedly announced restrictions on some imports to “prevent the spread of the virus,” alarming North Koreans whose survival depends on smuggling and trading goods from China. Pyongyang residents this week are reportedly panic-buying, according to NK News, mirroring similar behavior around the world as a result of the uncertainty about the pandemic and availability of daily necessities. Adding to the North’s woes, one of China’s biggest cities in its northeast, close to North Korea, is tackling an outbreak of coronavirus.

The Trump administration is not ready to handle a post-Kim North Korea beset with problems. Trump’s unilateral decision in 2018 to engage directly with Kim, as well as the latter’s sidelining or purging of his negotiators since the failed February 2019 summit in Hanoi, shriveled bilateral diplomacy between the two countries down to shallow letters between Trump and Kim. Trump has little to show for his efforts: Kim has only built a more dangerous and powerful nuclear arsenal while providing hollow assurances that he would “work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” a pledge falling far short of previous agreements, like the Joint Statement of 2005 in which North Korea “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”

In the meantime, Trump’s desire for a grand deal with Kim undermined his own diplomats who have struggled to gain traction with their North Korean counterparts on even defining what “denuclearization” means. It’s hard to say how much success U.S. diplomats would have had in establishing substantive and sustained contacts had Trump not pursued his one-on-one détente, but Trump’s actions certainly didn’t help. Trump flattered Kim, postponed military exercises with South Korea, and blocked large-scale sanctions on North Korea, even as Kim continued with his missile tests and human rights violations—giving Kim little reason to invest in working-level talks with the U.S. Thus, U.S. diplomats never had a chance to establish contacts that might have proved critical now, as North Korea potentially heads toward chaos.

Trump’s gutting of the national security bureaucracy hasn’t helped. The current acting director of National Intelligence—a position that requires leading the intelligence community, a sprawling organization with 17 entities—is a political loyalist with no security or intelligence experience. Key positions on Asia and North Korea policy remain vacant or in limbo. These are the people who would ordinarily be able to help with information collection and analysis, diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and military planning in the event of Kim’s death.

Further, dealing successfully with North Korea will require China’s help. And yet Trump has been waging a war of words with the Chinese government over who’s more at fault in the coronavirus pandemic. There are plenty of reasons to be critical of Beijing’s suppression of information to hide the scale of the health crisis, but Trump might want to look more to the future: If Kim’s absence leads to a destabilizing power struggle or even internal collapse, China’s early cooperation will be necessary to stem a potential humanitarian crisis, secure North Korea’s nuclear weapons and avoid conditions that might spark armed conflict among the U.S., China and South Korea as the three sides move to protect their interests.

Jung H. Pak is the author of Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer's Insights Into North Korea's Enigmatic Young Dictator.

Trump has also reportedly scuttled a potential deal with South Korea on burden-sharing, undermining U.S.-South Korea military readiness and the decades-old alliance, even as he requested Covid-19 testing kits from Seoul. A long-time critic of alliances, Trump for nearly a year has ignored North Korean missile tests that threaten South Korea, calling them “very standard.” The perceived erosion of U.S. commitment to alliances increases the potential for North Korean adventurism and reduces the ability of the U.S. to exert influence in the region.

Trump has spent two years boasting that he has North Korea policy under control because of his personal rapport with Kim. And yet, he has been unable to use that relationship to push denuclearization or improve bilateral ties. All he’s done is made the United States ill-prepared for a North Korea without Kim.