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(By Robert Mason)

The current foreign policy tensions between Iran

and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) pivot around Iran’s

nuclear programme, ideology (the relative balance between

revolutionary/resistance ideology and pragmatism), sectarianism, territorial

disputes (such as over the islands of Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb) and

alliances with state and non-state actors. Iranian foreign policy is premised

on negative historical events that have highlighted its insecurity, from the

British and Soviet invasion in 1941 to uneven international support during the

Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, and US containment policies imposed by the Clinton

administration in the 1990s and extended by the UN Security Council.

To narrow the broad range of foreign policy

challenges being faced by the Gulf states, it is necessary to focus on the most

contentious issues: Syria, the nuclear tensions which heighten fears of

unbridled Iranian support for an active “Shia Crescent” from the

Levant through the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia to Bahrain, and the impact

of President Obama’s support for more normalised relations with Iran on Saudi

foreign policy calculations.

On Syria, Gulf states including Saudi Arabia and

Qatar have been engaged in competing for influence over Syrian opposition

groups. Saudi Arabia has been supporting the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – in stark

contrast to Iran’s support for the Assad regime – but is also attempting to

buttress the Lebanese military with a $3 billion grant. By doing so, it reduces

the likelihood of provoking another retaliation by the Israel Defence Force

(IDF), like the invasion of southern Lebanon in 2006. It also provides some

form of constraint to Hezbollah’s actions in Syria, and more broadly constrains

Iran’s second-strike capability.

Only recently has King Abdullah attempted to rein

in Saudi influence in Syria by preventing Saudi jihadists from fighting with

groups such as the Al-Nusra Front (al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria) and the

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). However, this proscription simply

reflects increasing concern that fighters return and destabilise the Kingdom,

rather than any strategic concern over the form of interaction with Syrian

opposition forces. Weapons and training are still flowing into Syria from Saudi

Arabia and Qatar, soon to be joined by more support from western allies. However,

more needs to be done to resolve the sectarian dimension of the conflict. Diplomats

such as Ryan

Crocker warn about supporting an exclusive Sunni opposition against

al-Assad, pointing to concerns about extremists gaining power, and preferring

containment instead.

The Iranian nuclear programme is a particularly

important point of tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Riyadh seeks to

ratchet up the pressure on Iran in an attempt to resolve the impasse one way or

another. The Kingdom has used a range of rhetoric to highlight its position on

this challenge and the Syrian conflict, ranging from Prince Turki Al Faisal

outlining alternative options such as negotiating a Weapons of Mass Destruction

Free Zone in the Middle East (WMDFZME) – a plan which would also pressurize

Israel to declare its nuclear programme and commit to arms control and

reductions – to foregoing an offer for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security

Council. In May 2014, Saudi Arabia moved to illustrate its dissatisfaction in

this area by carrying out its largest-ever military

exercises, with the participation of Pakistan, a close ally and potential

nuclear guarantor.

Some degree of triangulation is necessary to

accurately contextualise GCC-Iranian relations, and to a great extent this is

the USA. Not only is the US a local power in the Gulf region and largely

depended on for Gulf security, but it is also the global actor that has

impinged most on Iranian foreign policy. Should the Obama administration allow

more normalised relations with Tehran to occur, through a broadened agenda for

the nuclear negotiations currently led by the P5+1, the US-Iran relationship

will be perceived by Riyadh not only to threaten its special relationship with

the US government, but also to come at the cost of Saudi regional influence.

By addressing these points, a

re-conceptualisation of Gulf interests could contribute to efforts at conflict

resolution, a reduction of anxiety over the rebalancing of regional power, and

therefore the normalisation of regional policies beyond containment. It could

also find ways to address sectarian issues in a period of turbulence and

uncertainty. In summary, there are ways to reconcile apparently disparate and

zero-sum GCC and Iranian foreign policy rationales in order to engage more

constructively on regional and international issues. Some states such as Oman

and the UAE are already making efforts in this regard, and with face-to-face

meetings scheduled to take place between President Rouhani and King Abdullah,

further progress in this area could soon be made.

About the author

Dr Robert Mason is Lecturer in International Relations at the British University in Egypt. His forthcoming book is entitled Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East (I B Tauris).

This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 licence.

Mirrored from Open Democracy

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