MEASURED BY THEIR share of the world’s population (one-half) and of the global economy (more than one-third), it would have been the largest regional trade agreement ever finalised. So there was a sense of disappointment in Bangkok on November 4th when the would-be signatories of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) missed the deadline they had set themselves.

It was also a blow for the East Asia Summit, which is still struggling to establish itself as an unmissable gathering in the world’s diplomatic calendar. An annual institution set up in 2005, it suffered its third consecutive no-show from America’s president this year.

That said, it came close to making an impact. The RCEP would have brought together the ten members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and six of their neighbours: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The ambition, first formally announced in 2011, was to unite in one deal all those Asian countries with which ASEAN has free-trade agreements. The biggest obstacle has always been that one of them, India, feared opening its markets further to another, China. That was still what scuppered this year’s plans.

The other 15 countries have apparently reached agreement on a text, and plan to complete the deal next year—with or without India. Le Yucheng, a senior Chinese trade official at the talks, said the 15 were taking an “open attitude”. “Whenever India is ready,” he said, “it’s welcome to get on board.” India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, seems in no hurry to embark. Referring to the leader of India’s freedom struggle, Mohandas Gandhi, who preached self-reliance, he said in Bangkok: “Neither the Talisman of Gandhiji nor my own conscience permit me to join.”

The RCEP has been called the “stapler”. Aptly. Stuff too many sheaves of paper into a staple gun and it will struggle to fasten them together, however thin each page may be. Adding India to the pile was always likely to prove one sheet too many. China, fighting trade battles on so many fronts, was keen to make progress on this one. But in the end the political obstacles in India seemed too big.

Although India and China already have free-trade deals with ASEAN, they do not yet have an agreement with each other. India fears that lowering its tariffs on Chinese goods will worsen its yawning trade deficit with the country. It also fears that its dairy farmers will fail to compete with Australia’s and New Zealand’s highly mechanised industries. In its nightmares China will eat its lunch and New Zealand will provide its milk. Mr Modi is also wary of criticism at home. On November 4th Rahul Gandhi, of the opposition Congress party, tweeted: “RCEP will flood India with cheap goods, resulting in millions of job losses & crippling the [Indian] economy.”

A member of the government’s own think-tank, NITI Aayog, argued in a research note that India should “rejig” its existing trade agreements before entering new ones. It pointed out that India’s exports to its free-trade partners had not outpaced its exports to the rest of the world and that at best only 25% of the trade that could benefit from preferential treatment actually benefited from the lower tariffs. Many firms find that proving eligibility is too much of a hassle.

Quite how much difference RCEP will make, with or without India, is open to question. In Bangkok America’s commerce secretary, Wilbur Ross, called it “not much of an agreement”. This reflects his country’s long-held disdain for the deal. That said, under the administration of Barack Obama American officials contrasted RCEP disparagingly with the Trans-Pacific Partnership that America had negotiated with 11 other countries in Asia and the Americas. The TPP was far more ambitious—covering not just tariffs, but issues such as labour standards, state-owned industries and environmental protection. In comparison, RCEP was rubbished as a low-grade treaty, with big carve-outs limiting its coverage and offering only a gradual reduction or elimination of import tariffs.

The rival trade agreements also reflected strategic competition between America and China for leadership in Asia and the Pacific. But President Donald Trump pulled America out of the TPP as soon as he took office in January 2017 (the 11 other signatories went ahead anyway). Much as his officials insist on their country’s commitment to what they call the “Indo-Pacific”, they struggle to convince Asian leaders that America is fully engaged. It does not help that Mr Trump has never attended the East Asia Summit, something Mr Obama made a point of doing. This year’s American delegation was the lowest-ranking yet, led by Mr Ross and the national security adviser, Robert O’Brien. Hinting at their disgruntlement, seven of the ten ASEAN leaders skipped their “summit” with Mr O’Brien.

Mr O’Brien did make a point of criticising Chinese “intimidation” in the South China Sea, where, ignoring rival territorial claims from smaller South-East Asian countries, China has for years been building its military presence, partly by fortifying artificial islands. But Mr Trump’s absence and the volatility of his foreign policy make America seem a flighty ally.

The East Asia Summit was envisaged as a forum where such disputes could be at least managed—if not resolved. But progress on the South China Sea question has been so slow as to make the trade talks look like a headlong dash. In 2002 China and ASEAN issued a “Declaration on Conduct” in the much-contested waters. The idea was that it would soon be turned into a legally binding code, and so minimise the risk of conflict. In a breakthrough in 2011, the two sides agreed on “guidelines” for implementing the code. All they could manage this year was to point to what Mr Le called “progress”. The current target for finalising the code is 2021.