“The measure of U.S. policy should not be graded against the success or the stability of the Yemeni government,” Josh Earnest, the White House press secretary said during a round table discussion in late March, continuing, “the goal of U.S. policy toward Yemen has never been to try to build a Jeffersonian democracy there. The goal of U.S. policy toward Yemen is to make sure Yemen cannot be a safe haven that extremists can use to attack the West to attack the United States.”

In spite of Saudi Arabia’s rhetoric focusing on re-establishing the “legitimate government,” Saudi Brigadier General Ahmed Asiri saying the decision to intervene militarily came about due to the failure of the Houthi “to succumb to the world will and respect the efforts of peace-loving countries and opted and use military force on the ground,” the logic behind the current intervention is focused on the same goals as Earnest expressed, preventing Yemen from, again, becoming a launch pad for attacks. This fear is not without precedence Yemen being used by AQAP since 2009 and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf, later to become the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, from the late 1960s until it was dissolved in 1992.

“There is no doubt that we would prefer a situation where there is a stable government,” Earnest said but continued to make clear that this was a secondary concern, not related to any political ideals, but rather to furthering America’s counter-terrorism, describing that hypothetical situation as one where “U.S. personnel could operate inside of Yemen, could coordinate directly with Yemeni security forces to take the fight to these extremists.”

This idea of Yemen as a stable state is a purely hypothetical situation that most have little hope of achieving, hence why in Earnest scenario a substantial terrorist threat would still exist where a stable government flourishes. This is due to two factors: the first is Yemen’s geography, mountainous, sparse and ideal for groups wishing to stay below the radar and second is the countries poverty, the state lacking the resources to build strong counter-terrorism operations and maintain a monopoly on violence across the states territory.

The United States have relied on a recognized government that will allow them to carry out counter-terrorism operations in the country and contain, if not eliminate, AQAP operations. With the Houthi’s in power, not only is there a risk they will deny the US and their allies the ability to undertake these operations, but that they will also leverage an alliance with Iran as a source of diplomatic, financial, and (if necessary) military support, diminishing the US and Gulf’s ability to control the threat.

In this instance it is unlikely that Iran will take over the role of counter-terrorism operations in Yemen (both because they don’t have the resources nor the desire to do so against groups which pose little threat to themselves) and a Houhthi led government will lack the ability to do so, both due to a lack of resources and the more pressing issue of fighting internal resistance. In this case, AQAP will likely flourish and, unchecked, commit to attacks against the Gulf and US interests.