The juvenile justice systems of the Western world were established to embrace the doctrine of parens patriae and to emphasize the treatment and rehabilitation of wayward youth (Parsloe, 1978). Yet, as the world was swept by dramatic social change in the 1960s and 1970s, many began to question the legitimacy of social institutions like the justice system. Part of this skepticism was from a relative lack of faith in correctional programming, which was partially driven by two damning critiques—one from the United States (Martinson, 1974) and one from the United Kingdom (Brody, 1976)—of its ability to rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism. In particular, after reviewing the available evidence, Martinson (1974, p. 25) concluded, “[T]he rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.” Brody (1976, p. 37) similarly stated, “Reviewers of research … have unanimously agreed that the results have so far offered little hope that a reliable and simple remedy for recidivism can be easily found.” Sweeping changes followed both reports. For example, there were reductions in rehabilitative programming for both juvenile delinquents and adult offenders in their respective countries, which ultimately led to the “get tough” era in the United States (Cullen & Gilbert, 2013) and the implementation of the neo‐correctionalist model in the United Kingdom (Cavadino & Dignan, 2006). Motivated by fear of the “super‐predator” (Bennett, DiIulio, & Walters, 1996), these movements opened the door for the philosophies of deterrence and incapacitation to form the basis for many policy decisions.

But the pendulum seems to be swinging back toward rehabilitation in recent years as both the United States and the United Kingdom have reduced their use of punitive actions against delinquent youth (Bateman, 2017; Taylor, 2017). Such trends are at least partially the result of a movement away from conservative era policies because of an increase in the discomfort with deterrence theory and the revival of a fear that labeling effects are indeed real. These shifts in policy have shone light on one of the classic theoretical debates in criminology: Does contact with the justice system deter or promote future criminal behavior? Two long‐standing theoretical traditions—deterrence theory and labeling theory—have been focused on answering this question, but they have arrived at different conclusions. Both have shifted the primary focus away from the individual offender and have placed it on the actions and impact of the justice system where contact with the system works as a turning point that alters the life courses of individuals (Elder, 1985; Laub & Sampson, 1993; Sampson & Laub, 2003). According to deterrence theory, justice system contact is a positive turning point, implying contact reduces future offending by teaching offenders the costs of crime outweigh the benefits. According to labeling theory, justice system contact is a negative turning point, implying contact exacerbates the chances of later offending by initiating a self‐fulfilling prophecy in which the individual perceives him‐ or herself as a “bad apple.”

Although deterrence and labeling have rich theoretical histories and long empirical records (see Farrington & Murray, 2014; Nagin, Cullen, & Jonson, 2018), few studies have been designed to adjudicate between the two frameworks in a broadly generalizable way. There have been many tests of deterrence theory and labeling theory independently, but few researchers have been able to sort out which theory offers the best explanation of the impact of typical justice system contact. The ones that sought to do so have had mixed results (e.g., Klein, 1974; Nedelec & Silver, 2018; Smith & Gartin, 1989; Ward & Tittle, 1993; Wiley & Esbensen, 2016), leaving the difficult task of having to draw on an inconclusive evidence base when making policy recommendations.

One factor partially responsible for the mixed evidence base is that much of the available research has had methodological designs that may not adequately account for preexisting differences between individuals that affect variation in their risk of engaging in offending behavior (see Loughran, Paternoster, & Piquero, 2018). In particular, scholars have sought to test deterrence and labeling, but they have tended to do so with research designs that cannot disentangle causal effects from selection effects as a result of their reliance on observable variables to control for selection. Consequently, sources of unobserved selection bias may confound estimates of the causal impact of justice system contact on subsequent antisocial behavior, complicating the interpretation of prior results (Jacobs, 2010; Morris & Piquero, 2013; Morris, Barnes, Worrall, & Orrick, 2013).

In this study, we test the relationship between common forms of justice system contact in the United Kingdom and later delinquency to offer insight into the long‐standing “deterrence or labeling” question. We account for the confounding influences of selection bias by leveraging a unique sample and a powerful methodological design that has been recognized for its ability to rule out a wide range of biasing influences: a family fixed‐effects design. The family fixed‐effects design has appeared in the literature under other names such as the “co‐relative approach” (Kendler, 2017), “discordant twin design” (Moffitt & Beckley, 2015), “twin difference approach” (Nedelec & Silver, 2018), and “sibling‐comparison analysis” (Connolly & Kavish, 2018). Regardless of the name, the design is implemented with the goal of adjusting for a wide range of potential confounds at the family level, factors such as the early rearing environment, neighborhood effects, and even genetic inheritance (Becker & Tomes, 1986; Heckman & Mosso, 2014). Essentially, family confounds capture all factors that might operate to make members of the same family similar to one another. As a result, the design offers “a natural solution” to ruling out many sources of confounding in criminological research (Moffitt & Beckley, 2015, p. 123).

We draw on data from a nationally representative and longitudinal study of British twins to estimate the effect of coming into contact with the justice system on subsequent delinquency. In particular, the effect of the following three common forms of justice system contact are explored: 1) spending a night in jail/prison, 2) being labeled by the justice system through what was known as an anti‐social behaviour order (ASBO), and 3) having an official crime record. Aside from the United Kingdom having a much lower incarceration rate, its justice systems are comparable with those of the United States. The age of criminal responsibility is 10 years, and 18 years is the age that separates the juvenile system from the adult system.

Given that the ASBO is unique to the United Kingdom, and no longer in use today, it may require some explanation. Simply put, an ASBO was a civil order that could be given to any person age 10 or older—but in practice was primarily given to juveniles—who had been deemed to have acted in an antisocial manner. The ASBO was intended to deter future antisocial behavior by identifying (i.e., labeling) individuals judged to pose a risk to their community without having to resort to actual criminal sanctions. The process by which ASBOs were carried out resulted in an archetypal label—private citizens, such as neighbors in a housing development or local business owners, could file a complaint with the police that would result in another person being formally identified as someone likely to pose problems for the public. In essence, in cases where the police may not have been able to arrest or charge an individual, the community could undertake the process of public labeling of the individual as a risk to the community. The process required some evidence of community consensus to avoid application of an ASBO on the request of a sole complainant, which could have been subject to misuse. An ASBO could be used to deny services and entry to public spaces, and failure to comply with the ASBO could give rise to penalties that included criminal proceedings and sanctions (for more details on ASBOs, see Campbell, 2002).

Because the family fixed‐effects design is so robust, we can provide some of the most valid estimates of the impact of justice system contact on delinquency to date. If we find that spending a night in jail or prison, being issued an ASBO, or having an official crime record decreases later delinquency, then deterrence theory will be supported. If we find that contact with the justice system increases later delinquency, labeling theory will be supported.