Summary: The following text is an approximate translation of an 8 August 2017 op-ed written for the Russian state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta by Russian Council for Foreign Affairs president and former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998-2004) Igor Sergeevich Ivanov. Ivanov opens his editorial with a brief aside regarding additional sanctions targeting Russia passed by the US Congress in July 2017. Echoing the sentiments of previous commentators, Ivanov maintains that these sanctions “may have serious consequences that reach far beyond US-Russia relations”, and threaten especially to aggravate the “deep systematic crisis” which already confronts the European Union. Even so, he maintains that rumors of Europe’s demise may be greatly exaggerated, noting that the denunciation by some in Europe of the abovementioned sanctions regime evidences the continent’s capacity for the mobilization of its “internal strength”. Building on this point, Ivanov indicates that Europe should follow Russia’s example and chart its own path. Though he does not make clear what this would entail in practice, Ivanov’s repeated allusions to “unified spaces” and “[a] common continent”, as well as his invocation of Europe and Russia’s shared cultural and religious heritage, mesh neatly with certain of the core ideological tenets of Eurasianism. Again, Ivanov is light on details as to how this condominium with Russia would benefit Europe, apart from assurances on strengthened cooperation with Moscow against “new security challenges” such as terrorism and cyber threats. At the same time, he contends that by engaging more closely with the European Union and the West more broadly, Russia stands to strengthen its hand in “the East” (i.e. the Asia-Pacific region). Ivanov thus construes rapprochement with Europe as a prerequisite to Russia’s realizing its “unique historical calling to be the easternmost country of the West, and the westernmost country of the East”. In this way, the present debate over sanctions in Europe may indeed have far-reaching consequences in terms of US strategy not only towards Russia but also towards East Asia, however indirectly. – Allen Maggard

Washington’s introduction of anti-Russian sanctions is unprecedented, yet their inherently destructive potential may have serious consequences that reach far beyond US-Russia relations. Regardless of their economic consequences for Russia and other countries, these sanctions pose a fundamental question about what kind of relationship should take hold between Russia, Europe, and the United States in this new configuration of the world that is emerging before our eyes.

As of late, it is fashionable to once again dig Europe’s grave. There are plenty of such doomsayers in the West as well as in Russia. In fact, the events of the past year may have helped to create the impression that the end of the once-flourishing continent is not far off on the horizon. The unending streams of refugees, terrorist attacks on European cities, protracted economic problems in Greece which cast doubt on the viability of the European financial system, Great Britain’s unexpected decision to exit the European Union, Donald Trump’s threatening statements that Europe should increasingly rely on its own strength in the future, the rising tide of populism in the leading European countries – all of these factors speak to the deep systemic crisis which faces the “European Project” today.

But, as is well-known, every crisis is unique. Some emerge weakened from crisis, or succumb to it, while others, by mobilizing their own internal strength, successful attain new levels of development. There is reason to believe that Europe, however slowly and however inconsistently, will all the same move along the latter path. And the fact that the leading European countries have not kept silent regarding American sanctions, but almost immediately denounced them, says a great deal. And the issue here lies not in Russia, but in that the approach of the Trump administration has swiftly given rise to divergences in the many basic interests of the United States and its European allies.

In Russia, the reaction to events in Europe over the past few years has been emotional, rather than pragmatic. This [emotionality] was especially acute in connection to Europe’s aversion to Russia’s activities around the crisis in Ukraine. The initial affront developed into a powerful campaign directed at convincing itself and everyone else that European values and everything connected with Europe, in general, was organically alien to Russia, which, as an independent civilization, should pursue its own path. Relations between Russia and Europe withdrew into hibernation, while mutually-beneficial cooperation in a number of very important areas has been set back by many years.

As an alternative to relations with the West, a “pivot” to the East has been proposed. In the coming years and, possibly, decades, the Asia-Pacific region will remain the center of global economic development. Practically all the countries of the world are directing their attention to this region, which is one of most promising global centers. For Russia, the pivot to the East is a long overdue step, considering that a significant part of its territory is located in Asia, while broad international cooperation is required for the dynamic development of Siberia and the Far East. However, the pivot to the East does not create the essential conditions for a curtailment of relations with the West. On the contrary, active engagement between Russia and the West strengthens the former’s advantages in the East. It is Russia’s unique historical calling to be the easternmost country of the West and the westernmost country of the East.

I remember well how, in 2003, Russia joined together in solidarity with France and Germany to come out against the US military operation in Iraq. The was not a “conspiracy” against Washington, as some American politicians tried to frame it, but an attempt to take a fresh view on the world of the 21st century. That same year in St. Petersburg, there took place a Russia-EU summit, which brought together for the first time in history the leaders of Russia and all of the European member states, without exception. At that time, important decisions were made that determined a strategy for the development of relations between the West and East of our common continent. Much has been achieved within the framework of this strategy, from which both sides have benefited. Unfortunately, in recent years many of these milestones have been lost.

However, as was previously mentioned, one must draw the correct conclusions from any crisis. For various reasons, both Russia and Europe today face a historic choice. And this is not a choice of the geographic priorities of foreign policy, but rather a choice of the trajectory of its further development. Europe has to survive the stresses and cataclysms of coming years and concentrate on internal reforms aimed at strengthening and increasing the effectiveness of imperfect supranational mechanisms. It is up to Europe whether to make some sort of sacrifice and select a path of multi-speed integration. But Europeans do not have another path besides the development and improvement of multilateral institutions – an alternative in the form of a revived European nationalism will result in a historical impasse.

As far as Russia is concerned, a no less complicated task stands before it, namely: to determine its own place in the future world order, to master new instruments of international influence, to preserve for itself the role of one of the leading players in contemporary global politics.

In forming its own long-term strategy, Russia, as well as Europe, should define the contours of their relations with each other. If one starts from the national interests of both parties, then it is entirely clear that they have all the necessary historical, geographical, cultural, religious and economic prerequisites. Taken together, these factors constitute a foundation for full-fledged partnership. But what form this partnership will be dressed up in, only time can tell.

Unfortunately, due to the strained state of relations between Russian and Europe in recent years, earlier initiatives aimed at the formation of a unified humanitarian and economic space stretch from Vladivostok to Lisbon are unrealistic. But this is especially true with respect to the formation of a unified security space in the Euro-Atlantic region. These initiatives can be revived if a positive dynamic develops between the two sides. For the time being, it seems possible to actualize the concept – well-proven during the Cold War – of “coexistence”. It is especially urgent for combined efforts to strengthen stability, preventing the proliferation of weapons, the strengthening of confidence-building measures, et cetera. Without coexistence, we cannot cope with new security challenges, from terrorism to cyber-threats.

In [coexistence], possibilities for a higher form of partnership will be opened: the formation of unified spaces, the development of common regimes, et cetera – these are opportunities which should not be missed.

At one time, slogans about the construction of a common European home were moving forward. In the epoch of globalization this slogan is no longer a slogan, but a harsh reality. And this home is one that Russia and Europe can only build together.