Iran had only itself to blame, the Council seemed to say. The country was seen as a renegade state that could not be trusted. It violated international law when it seized the American Embassy in 1979 and held diplomats hostage. It continued the war against Iraq for years after Mr. Hussein brought his soldiers home.

But beginning in 2003, a few months after Iran's clandestine nuclear sites were uncovered, Tehran began to take whatever small conciliatory measures were necessary to keep its nuclear program off the Security Council's agenda.

Avoiding action in that forum was at the heart of Iran's decision to open negotiations with France, Britain and Germany in 2003 and to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency access to its nuclear sites, according to Hassan Rowhani, who was replaced as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator after Mr. Ahmadinejad took office last year.

"At that time, the United States was at the height of its arrogance, and our country was not yet ready to go to the U.N. Security Council," Mr. Rowhani said at a closed-door session of Iran's ideological policy makers in September, as he was leaving his post.

Consideration of Iran's case by the Council would give the United States more power over Iran's fate, reduce the influence of the Europeans and expose Iran's missile program to new scrutiny, Mr. Rowhani said.

"The most important promise" the Europeans gave Iran, he said, "was that they would stand firm against attempts to take this case to the U.N. Security Council."

The speech was published late last year in a Persian-language journal, Rahbord.

Iran's nuclear strategy had been based on keeping the program secret, Mr. Rowhani said, and once that secrecy was shattered, the country became vulnerable to pressure. Iran, he said, had "no choice" except to enter into negotiations with the Europeans and to open its nuclear facilities to inspectors.