PG&E rejected safety warning for shut-off valves

WASHINGTON  The California utility whose gas pipeline exploded last fall had rejected federal recommendations to install more automatic shut-off valves to help reduce the risks from a rupture and fire, an investigative panel was told Tuesday.

The Pacific Gas & Electric Company pipeline in San Bruno, Calif., erupted into a massive fireball on Sept. 9 that raged for 91 minutes before firefighters could get close enough to begin tamping it down. The fire killed eight people, injured scores more and destroyed or damaged 108 homes.

Department of Transportation guidelines call for the installation of automatic or remote shut-off valves to reduce the risks of a conflagration, according to documents released at a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) hearing into the accident.

However, PG&E had rejected the guidance, finding in a 2006 memo that most damage from a pipeline rupture occurred during the first 30 seconds. The memo concluded that automatic values "will not provide additional safety to people or prevent property damage."

The memo reflects a widely held belief by the gas utility industry, according to PG&E records.

"It's absolutely outrageous," said Rep. Jackie Speier, D-Calif., who represents the district where the blast occurred. She called the decision not to install the automatic safety systems "malfeasance." Speier has sponsored legislation that would require the valves across the nation.

The NTSB investigation has identified several concerns about gas pipelines and safety. They include the amount of time it took PG&E to react to the massive leak and whether the utility's safety inspections are capable of finding high-risk sections of pipe.

By Cliff Owen, AP Matt Nicholson, left, questions Sara Peralta of PG&E, shown on the video screen, during the NTSB hearing in Washington on Tuesday.

The NTSB hasn't concluded what caused the explosion, but investigators have found that the pipe that exploded wasn't properly welded and the defects weren't detected for the 54 years the pipe was underground.

About 12 minutes after the 6:11 p.m. rupture, the PG&E dispatch center sent an employee to investigate the conflicting initial reports of an explosion. However, the employee wasn't qualified to operate the valves that could have shut down the leak, said the NTSB's chief investigator into the accident, Ravindra Chhatre.

During sometimes tense questioning by NTSB investigators, a panel of PG&E officials said it was impossible to say whether the fire could have been lessened by better preparation.

"I don't know," said Chih-Hung Lee, the PG&E consulting engineer who wrote the 2006 memo.

The utility acknowledged that gas would have been shut off far faster with a remote shut-off system. Keith Slibasager, PG&E's manager of gas system operations, estimated that gas flow could have been stopped within about 20 minutes of the rupture.

Edward Salas, PG&E's senior vice president for engineering and operations, said that since the accident the utility had reversed its position on automatic shut-off valves and planned to install many on its system.

The explosion occurred while PG&E engineers were working on the system. An electrical failure had caused two valves to open wide, allowing higher than normal pressures in the line. PG&E insists that the pressures did not exceed the maximum pressure allowed for the line.