CAN YOU PASS THE IRAN QUIZ?

By Jeffrey Rudolph (April 2010; last update January 2020)

Except for a period of cautious engagement during the Obama administration, what has justified relentless American political and economic aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran?

It cannot be argued that Iran is an aggressive state that is dangerous to its neighbors, as it has decent to good relations with many countries in the region: Oman, Qatar, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan. It cannot be relevant that Iran adheres to Islamic fundamentalism, has a flawed democracy and denies women full western-style civil rights, as Saudi Arabia is more fundamentalist, far less democratic and more oppressive of women, yet has long been a strategic ally of the US. It cannot be relevant that Iran has had a nuclear research program and may have pursued the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, as Pakistan, India, Israel and other states are nuclear powers yet maintain good relations with the US — in fact, Israel deceived the US while developing its nuclear program.

The answer to the above-posed question is obvious: Iran had to be punished for leaving the orbit of US control. Since its Islamic Revolution in 1979 when the Shah was removed, Iran unlike, say, Saudi Arabia, acts independently and thus compromises US power in two ways. First, Iran impedes the attainment of some US goals in the Middle East region. Second, Iran provides a “bad” example for other countries that may wish to pursue an independent course. The Shah could commit any number of abuses—widespread torture, for example—however his loyalty to the US exempted him from American condemnation, yet not from the condemnation of the bulk of Iranians who brought him down.

On 14 July 2015, in part due to the dangerous chaos the US has created in the Middle East and the threat posed by Islamic State, the US, the EU, the UN, and Iran agreed to a nuclear deal designed to remove sanctions on Tehran in exchange for long-term curbs on its nuclear program. And, on 16 January 2016, the UN nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, certified that Iran had fulfilled its obligations under the nuclear deal. Accordingly, Iran is entitled to receive relief from all US, EU and UN economic and financial sanctions related to the nuclear program. However, despite Iran’s abiding by the nuclear deal, on 8 May 2018 President Trump breached the agreement by withdrawing the US from it and announcing the coming reimposition of harsh sanctions on Iran. On 6 August 2018 Trump signed an Executive Order reimposing sanctions.

The following Quiz is an attempt to introduce more balance into the mainstream discussion of Iran.

THE IRAN QUIZ

1. Has Iran launched an aggressive war of conquest against another country since 1900?

-No. According to Juan Cole, the Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History at the University of Michigan, “Iran has not launched an aggressive war since 1775, when Karim Khan Zand sent an army against Omar Pasha in Basra in neighboring Iraq.” http://www.juancole.com/2015/02/surprising-better-israel.html

“Branded by hardliners in Washington as an ‘Islamo-fascist’ state that threatens world peace, Iran has in fact not invaded any country since the eighteenth century — in marked contrast to the United States [and Israel].” (Scott Peterson, Let The Swords Encircle Me: Iran–A Journey Behind The Headlines, Simon & Schuster, New York: 2010, 26. Hereinafter, “Peterson 2010.”)

“Iran’s major military interventions have been against ISIL and kindred groups in Iraq and Syria. Iran sent Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Shiite militias, along with a small number of its own Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as well as Afghan fighters, into Syria to fight the Sunni extremists ([and] merely conservative Sunni rebels). It also helped to organize Shiite militias in Iraq for campaigns in Tikrit and elsewhere against the terrorist group of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In this endeavor, of defeating ISIL, Tehran was a latent asset to the United States, something neither Tehran nor Washington can publicly acknowledge.”

https://www.thenation.com/article/neocon-plan-destabilize-iran-will-blow-back-united-states/ (26 July 2018)

-While the Islamic Republic of Iran has never invaded another country (nor even threatened to do so), “it has been involved in various regional conflicts ([such as the Lebanese Civil War,] the Iraq War, the Syrian Civil War [and] the Houthi insurgency in Yemen).” Iran, like other powers, tries to exert influence in its region. It is likely that the more threatened Iran feels – by, for example, harsh sanctions – the more active it will be in the region. Essentially, “like Russia, like the US, like Israel, [Iran] seeks to protect itself in its ‘near abroad’…”

http://mondoweiss.net/2015/03/annotated-benjamin-netanyahus#

“[A] critical component of Iranian foreign policy is to support…politically disenfranchised groups—whether that’s groups in Afghanistan,…in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Palestine, [in Yemen]. [Iran] work[s] to empower those groups to participate in political processes. At the end of the day, this means that Iran gains favor in those countries, because it has supported the political empowerment of previously marginalized groups, who then come to power in elections.”

http://thenewsdoctors.com/saudi-disorientation-the-yemen-war-and-americas-self-imposed-decline-in-the-middle-east-hillary-mann-leverett-on-cnn-and-rts-crosstalk/ (25 April 2015)

“To forestall an Israeli attack on its nuclear program or an attempt at regime change in Tehran, Iran has long backed regional proxies that extend its power across the region. Foremost among these is Hezbollah, the Lebanese ‘Party of God,’ which has been an integral part of what Iran calls its ‘forward defense,’ taking the place of missiles that could effectively target Israel, which Tehran still lacks. Through Hezbollah, Iran can use Lebanon as a launching pad within fifty miles of major Israeli cities. Yet [this] strategic posture is only as strong as the supply line that supports it.” http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/04/13/syria-hidden-power-of-iran/

In the mainstream media, “Iran has…‘proxies’, while the US merely has regional ‘allies’ and ‘security interests’ that encompass a military presence encircling Iran from Afghanistan to the east, Iraq to the west, and the Persian Gulf to the south.” https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/surprise-was-not-soleimanis-death-unity-it-fostered

-“Tehran and Jerusalem may be a thousand miles apart, but Iran’s so-called axis of resistance—which, by some counts [as of summer 2019], totals more than a hundred Shiite militias, with widely diverse manpower and matériel—has become entrenched across the Middle East, right up to Israel’s borders with Syria and Lebanon. Iran’s network spans half a dozen countries and has so fundamentally altered the region’s strategic balance that no nation can take on Iran and its proxies without risking multiple military challenges, major loss of life, devastating damage to infrastructure, or instability rippling through other nations. That applies even to the US, nuclear-armed Israel [as, for instance, Hezbollah can destroy parts of Tel Aviv], or Saudi Arabia, which spent fifty-five billion dollars—or roughly five times—more on defense in 2017 than Iran did.”

Consider the 14 September 2019 “attack on two Saudi sites that process more than half of the kingdom’s oil production….[S]audi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense displayed parts of the weapons used in the attacks by eighteen unmanned drones and seven cruise missiles. Iran ‘sponsored’ them, it claimed.” (In prior months six “foreign tankers [were] sabotaged outside the Strait of Hormuz [and] a sophisticated American drone [was] shot down off the Iranian coast.” As Iran witnessed the devastating effect of sanctions on Saddam’s Iraq, it’s reasonable to expect that Iran will not remain passive as the US maintains and enhances its extreme sanctions regime.)

“Iran’s oldest, most sophisticated, and best-armed proxy is Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Iraq has the largest collection of Iranian-backed militias—more than sixty. Some are decades old… Syria hosts a growing array of Iran-orchestrated warlords, gangs, and armed groups created during the chaos of its civil war. Iran also arms and trains Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who claimed the September 14th attack on Saudi oil installations, and Hamas, which rules Gaza, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Among the more recent Iranian-mobilized militias are the Fatemiyoun, from Afghanistan, and the Zainabiyoun, from Pakistan.”

“The Trump Administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, aimed at squeezing Iran economically, and Israel’s air strikes on Iranian targets in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq have had limited impact, according to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Affairs. ‘There has been an increase in the overall size and capability of foreign forces that are partnered with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,’ Seth Jones, a former adviser to the commanding general of US Special Operations Forces, wrote. ‘Iran’s economic woes have not contributed to declining activism in the region.’ What’s shifted in recent years is Iran’s ability to consolidate allies and proxies into a web or grid that can operate regionally.” Furthermore, “Iran’s allies in the axis of resistance have [also] entered politics, transforming armed movements into powerful players in governments that decide policy.” https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/iran-entrenches-its-axis-of-resistance-across-the-middle-east (19 Sept. 2019)

-The claim that General Soleimani (who was assassinated by the US in January 2020) “and the Iranian government are somehow responsible for the deaths of ‘hundreds of Americans’ in Iraq…appears to be groundless. There have not been significant US casualties in Iraq since around 2007, when charges of Iranian involvement in attacks against US forces first surfaced. Virtually all attacks against US forces since the 2003 invasion had come from Baathist, Sunni, and other anti-Iranian groups. Of the more than 10,000 suspected insurgents arrested in US counter-insurgency sweeps prior to the first US withdrawal in 2011, the relatively few foreigners among them were Arabs, not Iranians.”

“The National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, compiled by America’s sixteen intelligence agencies and issued in February 2007, downplayed Iran’s role in Iraq’s violence and instability. Yet it was at this point that the George W. Bush Administration began making the case that Iran had become the principal foreign threat to US forces in Iraq. The Bush Administration’s case was based primarily on assertions that bomb fragments, such as those displayed by US military officials in a press conference in Baghdad on February 11 of that year, were of Iranian origin. But they never showed any proof making this linkage.”

“Even the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [from 2005 to 2007], Marine General Peter Pace, admitted [in February 2007] that there was no proof that the Iranian government was supplying Iraqi insurgents with the lethal [IED] weaponry. The British government withdrew similar charges they made in 2005, and the Iraqi government has also denied US accusations of an Iranian connection.” https://www.commondreams.org/views/2020/01/07/there-zero-actual-evidence-iran-responsible-killing-hundreds-americans

-On 29 January 2019, Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats released the annual Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, which included the following. “Iran continues to pursue permanent military bases and economic deals in Syria and probably wants to maintain a network of Shia foreign fighters there despite Israeli attacks on Iranian positions in Syria. We assess that Iran seeks to avoid a major armed conflict with Israel. However, Israeli strikes that result in Iranian casualties increase the likelihood of Iranian conventional retaliation against Israel, judging from Syrian-based Iranian forces’ firing of rockets into the Golan Heights in May 2018 following an Israeli attack the previous month on Iranians at Tiyas Airbase in Syria.”

https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/jan/29/us-intelligence-community-iran

While the US relentlessly condemns Iran for its aggression, it’s worth noting that Iran (and Russia) were legally invited by the Syrian government to provide military assistance during the civil war. (However, the US was not invited to intervene in Syria, and therefore is fighting illegally there.) Likewise, Iran was invited into Iraq by its government; a government which also invited 6,000 US troops into the country. Lastly, Iran’s involvement in Yemen is quite limited, while the UAE and Saudi Arabia actually invaded Yemen (with American support).

(When the Arab spring uprisings spread to Syria, and it thus “became clear that the wave of Arab revolutionary movements now threatened to wipe out the Assad regime, Iran’s alleged solidarity with the Arab protestors showed its limits. Within a year of the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, the Islamic Republic declared its unconditional commitment to the Assad regime’s survival. It sought to discredit all Syrian opposition groups by lumping them together as Islamic extremists linked to al-Qaeda…In direct contradiction to its narrative of supporting an ‘Islamic awakening,’ it furnished political and material support for the Assad regime’s massive repression and killings of the opposition. Doing so tarnished Iran’s image, eroded its legitimacy in the eyes of the Arab revolutionary movements, and undermined its rhetorical and political strategy. Whatever earlier appeal it had achieved on the ‘Arab street’ was lost as Iran revealed itself to be as responsible as its Gulf Arab counterparts for fueling Shia-Sunni sectarian divisions and state repression in the region.” Essentially, Iran’s “leadership has not always allowed the ideals that it so actively publicizes to stand in the way of its interests. On the contrary, while it has deployed Islamic revolutionary rhetoric to justify policy actions, the latter have been influenced more by pragmatic than by ideological considerations.” (Saikal 2019, 203-4, 206))

-“Iran’s standing has benefited, more than anything else, from several recent events in the region–America’s faltering 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, its 2003 invasion of Iraq, and its decisive inaction in Syria and the rise of [ISIS]…These issues have led to a major reconfiguration of the status quo and the creation of power vacuums that Iran–along with its allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and, since late 2015, Russia–has exploited…By the same token, these developments, coupled with Iran’s nuclear program, have alarmed Israel and the Saudi-led GCC, which have come to cooperate in a broad front against Iranian regional influence…However, not all GCC states share this [concern of Iran being a geopolitical threat]; Oman, Qatar and Kuwait have consistently favored good working relations with Iran.” (Saikal 2019, 169)

-Iran’s military is designed for defense not offense. “The Islamic Republic’s leaders have designed its foreign policy and national security strategy to preserve Iran’s territorial and political integrity in the face of [threats from the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia]. The aim is not to establish Iran’s regional hegemony; it is to prevent any other regional or extra-regional power from attaining hegemony over Iran’s strategic environment. Even the US Defense Department acknowledges the defensive character of Iranian strategy; as a [January 2014] Pentagon report puts it, ‘Iran’s military doctrine is defensive. It is designed to deter an attack, survive an initial strike, retaliate against an aggressor, and force a diplomatic solution to hostilities while avoiding any concessions that challenge its core interests.’” http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article42101.htm (10 June 2015)

“Iran has a serious shortage of modern military equipment, largely due to sanctions and arms embargoes imposed after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It has been forced to rely on arms from China and Russia.” “As veteran defense analyst Anthony Cordesman concluded in 2010, ‘Iran’s conventional military is severely limited, relying heavily on obsolescent and low quality weaponry.…Its forces are not organized or trained to project significant power across the Gulf.’ By contrast, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates…possess some of the most sophisticated weapons money can buy, including Abrams battle tanks and F-15 aircraft, and Israel has nuclear weapons. In the unlikely event Iran ever attacked them, they could also count on support from the mighty United States. Given the far more powerful forces arrayed against Iran, to claim it is on the brink of regional hegemony defies reason.”

http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/jul/06/military-rivals-iran-and-saudi-arabia

https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteria-iran-middle-east-trump/

The significant limitations of Iran’s military have “been demonstrated in…Syria, where [Iran] has provided military support for Assad’s regime since the beginning of the conflict in 2011. When Iran and its allied Hezbollah could not tip the strategic balance in favor of the regime, Russia accomplished just that through massive air operations against the divided opposition forces. The same has proven to be the case with Iranian military involvement in Iraq”, where the “US and its Western allies had to provide enormous assistance to the Iraqi government, and indirectly to their Iranian supporters, to get the job done in the fight against their common enemy, IS.” (Saikal 2019, 153, 205)

“Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the region, according to former UN weapons inspector Michael Elleman. The program is controversial because Tehran possesses multiple missiles that, in theory, are capable of delivering a nuclear payload. Also, Iran’s missiles can reach targets throughout the Persian Gulf, all of the Levant, including Israel, Turkey and parts of southern Europe. The United States has argued that Iran’s missile tests are in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 [and thus] has imposed sanctions on individuals and firms for supporting Tehran’s ballistic missile program. Iranian officials, however, have consistently stressed that their missiles are for defensive purposes only.”

http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2017/aug/01/iran%E2%80%99s-missile-tests-2017

Missiles are an important part of Iran’s deterrent strategy because its air force is relatively weak. In fact, Iran’s combat aircraft is vastly outclassed by Arab, Israeli, US, and European air forces. For example, while Saudi Arabia has advanced fighters and bombers, Iran’s air force consists of “pre-revolutionary F-14s and F-5s plus a mix of Russian and Chinese aircraft based on designs dating as far back as the 1950s. But it has beefed up its air defenses with mobile surface-to-air missiles including advanced Russian S-300s and has also installed long-range radar capable of spotting Saudi aircraft not long after they get off the ground.” (Its deterrence is further enhanced by the fact that it is “less isolated than it was during the 1980–88 war with Iraq when both the United States and Soviets sided with Saddam Hussein. [In 2017,] Russia is in its court to a degree, and it can count on strong support from Syria and Hezbollah. Iraq, meanwhile, is sympathetic.”) https://jacobinmag.com/2017/11/saudi-arabia-iran-trump-war-bin-salman

“Despite repeated US estimates over the years that Tehran could soon develop ICBMs–and the persistent assumption that it would test one before 2015–Iran’s missile arsenal continues to be limited to short- and medium range.” (However, Iran has long been working on improving its missiles’ accuracy and survivability.) Essentially, “Iran’s arsenal of conventional short- and medium-range missiles [do] not constitute an imminent threat either to the United States or its allies—unless they are planning to attack Iran, to which Tehran would likely respond with missiles.” (“The deterrent function of Iran’s missiles gained further importance during the nuclear crisis, with threats of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran vowed to retaliate against a preventive strike by launching its missiles at Israeli cities and US bases throughout the region.”) It should be obvious that the “best way to change Iran’s missile policy is by mitigating its respective security concerns…”

http://lobelog.com/dont-let-misplaced-concerns-over-missiles-jeopardize-iran-deal/ (10 Nov. 2017)

Reflecting the Trump administration’s aggressive posture toward Iran, the Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy states that “In the Middle East, Iran is competing with its neighbors, asserting an arc of influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony, using state-sponsored terrorist activities, a growing network of proxies, and its missile program to achieve its objectives.”

https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

-“The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ successful [April 2020] launch of the Noor (Light) satellite into space is a significant moment at a time when many countries, including Iran, are still grappling with the deadly COVID-19 virus. It marks a military advancement, an audacious move in the diplomatic poker game with Washington, and an effort to restore domestic political legitimacy after a series of blunders.”

“While the deployment of the satellite is a significant technological breakthrough for Iran after several attempts that may have been sabotaged by the US and/or Israel, the IRGC’s move should be analyzed more in terms of Tehran’s political posturing instead of as a strategic leap toward developing ICBMs. Since the Trump administration’s decision to re-impose economic sanctions on Iran, Tehran has upped the ante by reducing its own compliance under the nuclear deal, confiscating oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, and, in the aftermath of the US assassination of Quds Force leader General Qasem Soleimani, has attacked American forces in Iraq, using indigenously developed ballistic missiles.”

“One should further not discount the fact that creating an advanced ‘indigenous’ technology is quite significant for a developing country, such as Iran. ‘[M]any countries do not have such technological capacities and have to beg world powers such as the United States to provide them with communications and, even, imagery from space, which is very expensive.’” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-satellite-launch-carries-more-political-weight-than-military-significance/

-While the Iranian regime deserves condemnation for its behavior toward domestic critics — for example, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/iran/ — US foreign policy is not determined by a country’s domestic behavior. For example, consider the US’s support of gross abuses by the Bahraini regime against domestic protesters and activists. (It’s noteworthy that a report commissioned by the Bahraini government concluded that the 2011 “disturbances” were a response to genuine grievances and that there was no evidence of an Iranian role behind the unrest.)

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/bahrains-fake-sectarian-war (June 2013)

The conflict the US and Israel has with Iran “springs from the exigencies of geopolitics rather than ideology: Iran’s age-old ambition to be recognized as a–or the–regional hegemon versus the determination of the US and Israel to foil its ambition and preserve their regional preeminence. Many informed Israelis freely acknowledge” this reality. For example, according to Eliezer Tsafrir, former head of Israeli intelligence in Iran and Iraq: “However ideological and Islamic, everything Iran was doing was nationalistic, and even similar to the Shah”. (Norman G. Finkelstein, Knowing Too Much: Why the American Jewish Romance with Israel Is Coming to an End, OR Books, New York: 2012, 49. Hereinafter, “Finkelstein 2012.”)

According to David Crist, a historian for the US federal government and an advisor on Middle East issues, “Hardliners in Iran reject the status quo of American supremacy in the region….While in this conflict the United States remains largely the good guy, it has not always been the perfect guy. Both Bush administrations dismissed Iranian goodwill gestures and refused to accept any dialogue that addressed Iran’s legitimate security concerns. The United States supported Saddam Hussein and his Arab bankrollers in a bloody war against the Islamic Republic that killed several hundred thousand Iranian soldiers. The mantra of regime change remains a frequent slogan in many quarters in Washington. Unfortunately, Iran’s response to these trespasses has invariably been to use the tools of the terrorist: an exploding car bomb on a crowded street…Iran’s quest for nuclear technology has heightened the stakes and the tension but it has not been a catalyst for the conflict.” (David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran, Penguin Press, New York: 2012, 5-6. Hereinafter, “Crist 2012.”)

(It’s clear that “Iranian foreign policy is not typically made on a religious basis. Iran supports the secular, proto-Stalinist, socialist Baath Party in Syria. It is allied with oligarchic Russia and Communist China. It supports a multicultural coalition that includes Maronite Christians in Lebanon. It sides with Christian Armenia against Azerbaijan (which, now a largely secular country, has a Shiite heritage). A Shiite clerical regime itself, Tehran has its difficulties with the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq.”)

https://www.thenation.com/article/neocon-plan-destabilize-iran-will-blow-back-united-states/ (26 July 2018)

-“[T]he United States is the only country ever to launch an actual cyberwar when the Obama administration used a cyberattack to destroy thousands of centrifuges, used for nuclear enrichment, in Iran. This was an illegal act of war, according to the Defense Department’s own definition.” (Stuxnet was the first, major cyberattack used to destroy critical infrastructure. Previous cyberattacks’ effects were limited to other computers.) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-election-intelligence-commentary-idUSKCN10F1H5 (4 Aug. 2016)

Iran responded to the cyberattack, that came to be known as Stuxnet, “by establishing the Cyber Army in 2010 to conduct computer attacks on its domestic and international enemies. Major US banks such as Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley sustained tens of millions of dollars in damages as a result of cyberattacks in late 2012 that US officials said they traced to Iran. The Department of Justice indicted seven Revolutionary Guard hackers, one for allegedly trying to break into the control system of a New York dam.” (Jay Solomon, The Iran Wars: Spy Games, Bank Battles, And The Secret Deals That Reshaped The Middle East, Random House, New York: 2016, 25. Hereinafter, “Solomon 2016.”)

“[The US] learned, from communications intercepts, that the Iranians had expressly developed and launched Shamoon [–a computer virus that wiped out nearly every workstations’ hard drive at Saudi Aramco–] as retaliation for Stuxnet and Flame”, the latter NSA virus wiped out nearly every hard drive at Iran’s oil ministry and at the Iranian National Oil Company. (Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory: The Secret History Of Cyber War, Simon & Shuster, New York: 2016, 213.)

2. Which country was responsible for starting the Iran-Iraq War?

-It is not disputed that Iraq started the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s by invading Iran on 22 September 1980. (In fact, in 1991 the UN reported that Iraq’s initiation of the war was unjustified, as was its use of chemical weapons.) “In invading Iran, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein assumed that the divided Iranians and their dilapidated armed forces would be unable to put up much of a fight. He was wrong….Iran’s leaders quickly resurrected the armed forces by halting military trials and purges and enforcing conscription….[Iranians] were driven to defend the country, the revolution, and the Islamic Republic by a potent combination of nationalism, revolutionary mission, and religious zeal that was stoked by the foreign threat.”

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21698/attacking_iran.html

“[S]addam…had long harbored ambitions of claiming regional Arab leadership…[His] aim was to overthrow Khomeini’s regime in favor of a more receptive one and to replace the fallen Shah as the regional superpower. In this, the Iraqi leader was supported by other major Arab players–Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt in particular. The US also now found it expedient to court Saddam as a counter to Khomeini’s regime, despite Washington’s past criticism of the Iraqi dictator for his repressive rule and massive human rights violations, close ties with the Soviet Union, and maverick behavior in the region.” (Saikal 2019, 82-3)

-During the war “It was Iraq’s increasingly effective use of chemical weapons that raised Iran’s death toll, using American satellite imagery that pinpointed Iranian troop locations. That deadly arsenal was made with ingredients supplied by American and European companies, its use given a green light from Washington that all methods were acceptable in the fight against [Iran].” (Peterson 2010, 60)

“[While] Iran was subjected to years of chemical attacks, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini…and his associates chose not to weaponize Iran’s stockpiles of chemical agents, a move that would have enabled it to respond in kind. And for years now the Islamic Republic’s highest political and religious authorities have rejected the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, both on strategic grounds and because, in their view, nuclear weapons violate Islamic morality.” (Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, Going To Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Metropolitan Books, New York: 2013, 17. Hereinafter, “Leverett 2013.”)

-“[President] Reagan’s support for his friend Saddam was so extreme that when Iraq attacked a US ship, the USS Stark, [in May 1987,] killing thirty-seven American sailors, it received only a light tap on the wrist in response. Reagan also sought to blame Iran for Saddam’s horrendous chemical warfare attacks on Iraqi Kurds.” (In 1989, after the war ended, President George H. W. Bush invited three Iraqi nuclear scientists to the US “for advanced training in nuclear weapons production–an extraordinary threat to Iran, quite apart from its other implications.” Apparently, the Pentagon, the Department of Energy, and the Department of State invited the Iraqi scientists to attend a detonation conference where they learned how shock waves detonate nukes.) (Noam Chomsky, Global Discontents: Conversations On The Rising Threats To Democracy, Metropolitan Books, New York: 2017, 188. Hereinafter, “Chomsky 2017.”)

“The US assisted [Saddam] in the war…primarily because it perceived its own interest in letting Iraq and Iran wear each other down in a cycle of mutual destruction, thus dramatically weakening two of the region’s strongest states. Israel played its part in this plan by channeling some arms to Iran, although indirectly, in such a way as to make sure that the two antagonists were locked in indefinite hostilities and that no united Arab or Islamic front could be formed against the Jewish state–a policy that informs Israeli behavior to date. Unsurprisingly, the war ended in stalemate. The Islamic Republic had staved off its first existential threat, largely because of Khomeini’s ability to mobilize the Iranian population against Iraqi forces by invoking a combination of Iranians’ fierce sense of Shiism and nationalism in defense of the new Islamic Republic and the old motherland, Iran.” (Saikal 2019, 6-7)

“The public’s preoccupation with the war and its human and material consequences availed Khomeini of a significant diversion that enabled him to push through forceful theocratic measures that would have faced stiff social resistance but for the exigencies of foreign invasion. Thus, he and his close entourage proceeded with the enactment of the new Islamic Constitution, which was ushered in under the marginalization or elimination of hundreds of opposition elements on the grounds of treason and subversion.” (Saikal 2019, 83)

-The war, which led to an estimated one million Iranian deaths, “was one of the most momentous events in Iran’s contemporary history and has shaped Iran’s views of itself and the outside world. Most of the country’s key decision makers and commanders took part in the war, and they now make policy with the war’s lessons in mind.” For example, vulnerability to Iraq’s daily air and missile raids against major cities, and the international community’s failure to deter and punish Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops and civilians, highlighted the need for an effective deterrent.

“[Accordingly,] Iran’s experience in the war triggered the start or resumption of many of the country’s critical defense programs—including those related to ballistic missiles, drones, and weapons of mass destruction—which pose a challenge to the United States and its allies… Tehran saw itself as isolated and unable to rely on others to meet its defense needs during the war [–Syria was the only Arab country that sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war–] and the downing of an Iranian civilian airliner by a US Navy cruiser, killing all 290 people on board, in the war’s final months seemed to indicate that the United States would go to any length to hurt Iran. This perceived isolation strengthened the Iranian leadership’s view that the country needed to stand on its own and become self-reliant in matters of defense.”

https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-iran-nuclear-deal-through-lens-iran-iraq-war (16 July 2017)

“Ever since it was forced to accept a humiliating stalemate at the end of its bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s, the Iranian leadership has refrained from meeting its adversaries head on, instead developing asymmetrical warfare and proxy management to an art. The million-plus deaths in the Iran-Iraq War and the recognition that Iran lacked the firepower and resources to fight another direct war were the constant factors in Soleimani’s grand strategy.” (Soleimani was assassinated in January 2020 by the US.)

https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/.premium-four-key-questions-after-trump-s-assassination-of-soleimani-1.8351038 (3 Jan. 2020)

-When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, “Iran’s leaders now felt vindicated for having repulsed Saddam’s aggression against their country and sustained a long war. During that military conflict, Saddam had wrapped up his war rhetoric in racist terms, describing Persians as inferior to Arabs, with his generals describing Iranians as insects deserving to be eliminated by chemical weapons. Now he showed no qualms in invading a neighboring Arab state. Among other things this brought home to GCC members the aggressiveness of Saddam…” (Dilip Hiro, Cold War in the Islamic World: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy, Oxford University Press, New York: 2018, 127. Hereinafter, “Hiro 2018.”)

Naturally, however, “Iran viewed the build-up of the US-led anti-Iraq coalition with rising anxiety and disapproval. Its government welcomed Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Tehran on 9 September [1990]… Since its founding in 1979, the Islamic Republic had opposed the military involvement of foreign powers in the Gulf, arguing that the Muslim states of the region should form an alliance similar to NATO to safeguard the area militarily. This could be achieved by expanding the existing GCC to admit Iran. Such a scenario did not appeal to Saudi Arabia which would stand to lose its leadership role in the GCC to a Shia-majority republic.” Nor did the scenario appeal to the US, as one of Iran’s goals was “to facilitate the departure of American forces from the region.” (Hiro 2018, 130, 134)

-Background: Iraq’s Signficance: “Iran has emerged as the most influential foreign player in Iraq since US-led forces toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003.” (In fall 2019, tens of thousands of Iraqis took to the streets (some violently) to protest endemic government corruption, high unemployment, poor basic services and growing Iranian influence in their country–in fact, the Iranian consulate in Najaf was firebombed.) “Iran and Iraq are Shiite-majority countries that share centuries-deep cultural and religious ties — and a 900-mile border. The Islamic Republic has used these advantages to permeate Iraq’s political, security, economic, and religious spheres. Iran’s interests in Iraq are best served if the country is stable. [1] Politics: Iran has an interest in maintaining Iraq’s current political system because it ensures that Shiites, the majority of the population, play a prominent role in the government. Under Saddam Hussein, Shiites were marginalized. [2] Security: Iran fears that unrest in Iraq could allow ISIS or other Sunni extremists to take hold and eventually threaten Iran or its Iraqi allies. [3] Regional Interests: Iran wants to maintain its so-called ‘land bridge’ extending from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, so that it can move forces, weapons and supplies throughout the region. Iran’s most important proxy, Hezbollah, is based in Lebanon. [4] Economy: Trade with Iraq, valued at some $12 billion annually, has gained importance as US sanctions have squeezed Iran’s economy since 2018. [5] Religion: Iran wants to ensure the safety of its citizens who travel to Iraq, which is home to major Shiite holy sites that draw millions of Iranian pilgrims each year.”

https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/oct/16/iran%E2%80%99s-role-iraqi-protests

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/30/iraq-risks-breakup-blood-fued-protests-iran-influence

3. Who wrote the following in 2004? “It is in the interests of the United States to engage selectively with Iran to promote regional stability, dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, preserve reliable energy supplies, reduce the threat of terror, and address the ‘democracy deficit’ that pervades the Middle East…”

-A task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and chaired by two prominent members of the American foreign policy establishment, former CIA director Robert Gates and former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, recommended “a revised strategic approach to Iran.” Their report included the above statement. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2005/mar/24/clouds-over-iran/?pagination=false

Due to the failures of US foreign policy in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, the task force’s recommendation was finally pursued. In November 2013, the Geneva interim agreement was signed between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany). This agreement represented the first formal agreement between Iran and the US since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

-Peace between Iran and the US would allow the “two states to cooperate against their common adversary, that is, Takfiri groups (such as al-Qaeda [and the Islamic State]), primarily in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but also across the region as a whole. Intelligence, military, and logistical cooperation between Iran and the US could create unprecedented formidable force with which to confront extremism across the region. Rapprochment…would assist in the reconstruction of Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbors and encourage those Arab countries [such as Saudi Arabia] that currently support Salafist groups proxy wars against Iran to desist from doing so….Peace with Iran will address the security concern of the US with regard to Iran’s nuclear activities. By creating an atmosphere characterized by cooperation, Iran would welcome close cooperation with the IAEA, implementing maximum transparency measures and adopting appropriate limits in its nuclear program.” (Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Shahir ShahidSaless, Iran And The United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, Bloomsbury, New York: 2014, 272-3. Hereinafter, “Mousavian 2014.”)

For readers who cannot imagine Iran and the US working together, it is not disputed that Iran provided vital intelligence and logistical support before, during, and after the US-led military operations in Afghanistan that resulted in the overthrow of the Taliban.

-“An annual report delivered [in early 2015] to the US Senate by James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence [at the time], removed Iran and Hezbollah from its list of terrorism threats, after years in which they featured in similar reports. The unclassified version of the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Communities, dated February 26, 2015, noted Iran’s efforts to combat Sunni extremists, including those of the ultra-radical Islamic State group, who were perceived to constitute the preeminent terrorist threat to American interests worldwide. In describing Iran’s regional role, the report noted the Islamic Republic’s ‘intentions to dampen sectarianism, build responsive partners, and deescalate tensions with Saudi Arabia,’ but cautioned that ‘Iranian leaders—particularly within the security services—are pursuing policies with negative secondary consequences for regional stability and potentially for Iran. Iran’s actions to protect and empower Shia communities are fueling growing fears and sectarian responses,’ it said.” (“[I]ran and Hezbollah were both listed as terrorism threats in the assessment of another American body, the Defense Intelligence Agency.” And, Iran is classified by the US State Department as a leading state sponsor of terrorism.) http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-report-scraps-iran-hezbollah-from-list-of-terror-threats/ (16 March 2015)

-“[I]n the eyes of many Iranians and Iraqis, [Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, who was assassinated by the US in January 2020, is] credited with rolling back ISIS when it was at the gates of Baghdad in 2014. When the world stood by and watched ISIS march on Iraq’s cities in 2014, Soleimani rushed into the capital city and prepared the resistance to ISIS. In sum, no man led the charge against ISIS more than him, and the terror group certainly sees his demise as a victory.” (Pouya Alimagham, Facebook post, 4 Jan. 2020)

-“Saudi Arabia—not Iran—is the biggest state sponsor of terrorism in the world today and Wahhabism remains the source of most radical Islamic extremism. For years Iran has borne the unenviable title of ‘world’s biggest state sponsor of terrorism.’ However, out of the 61 groups that are designated as terrorist organizations by the US State Department, the overwhelming majority are Wahhabi-inspired and Saudi-funded groups, with a focus on the West and Iran as their primary enemy. Only two are Shi’a—Hezbollah and Kataib Hezbollah, and only four have ever claimed to receive support from Iran. Nearly all of the Sunni militant groups listed receive significant support from either the Saudi government or Saudi citizens.” (As early as 2009, the US State Department identified Saudi Arabia as a critical financial support base for al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups.)

“[In 2017] the debate in Washington is whether to designate Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as terrorist organizations. [However,] The Muslim Brotherhood has rarely engaged in terrorism and the IRGC’s main focus appears to be Iranian dissidents abroad and fighting ISIS in Syria.” (“The IRGC, Iran’s premier fighting force, has 100,000 soldiers….The IRGC has often taken the lead in confronting external threats, including during the 1980-88 war with Iraq and against Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2018….The IRGC’s elite Qods Force has operated—overtly and covertly—in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.”)

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-real-largest-state-sponsor-of-terrorism_us_58cafc26e4b00705db4da8aa?p3bjpx32kf7wah5mi (16 March 2017)

http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/jul/06/military-rivals-iran-and-saudi-arabia



In April 2019, “The Trump administration [designated] Iran’s Revolutionary Guard a ‘foreign terrorist organization,’ the first time the US has applied the label to an entire government entity in a move designed to significantly ramp up the pressure on Tehran. … The designation…comes with sanctions such as freezing any assets that might be in the US and a ban on Americans doing business with the Guard. Dozens of people and entities associated with the Guard, including its Quds Force, have previously been blacklisted…” (The designation may lead to unexpected complications. In Iraq, “Shiite militias with ties to the Guard operate in close proximity to US forces [fighting IS]. [And] in Lebanon the Guard has close ties to Hezbollah, whose political wing is part of the Lebanese government.”)

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/437820-trump-labels-irans-revolutionary-guard-a-foreign-terror-group?userid=69253 (8 April 2019)

https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/apr/08/part-3-what-will-irgc-designation-actually-do (8 April 2019)



In any event, “America’s branding of Iran as a state sponsor of terror [has been] based on Israel’s interests. ‘[I]ranian support for terrorism translates to support for Hezbollah, whose major crime is that it is the sole deterrent to yet another destructive Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and for Hamas, which won a free election in the Gaza Strip [in 2006]—a crime that instantly elicited harsh sanctions and led the US government to prepare a military coup’…”

http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/10/04/537502/Iran-US-Chomsky-JCPOA-Trump-nuclear-deal-sanctions (Note that PressTV is an English language news channel that presents Iran’s view of issues to foreign audiences. Iran also has two Arabic-language outlets: al-Alam and al-Kowthar. These are elements of Iran’s soft power.)

“All recent attempts to link Iran to terrorism have failed. Even America’s own reports on terrorism don’t list Iran as the leading state sponsor of terrorism. The State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorisms ‘rarely identifies a terrorist incident as an act by or on behalf of Iran.’ And, the most recent Global Terrorism Index from the Department of Homeland Security clearly states that, not Iran, but ‘ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qaeda’ are the biggest terrorist threats. None of these four groups is Shiite and none is aligned with Iran, but combined they are ‘responsible for 74 percent of all deaths from terrorism.’”

“As for the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex for American military personnel in Saudi Arabia, the case against Iran rests largely on information provided by their enemy, Saudi Arabia. Michael Scheuer, director of the Bin Laden unit, says that ‘a substantial body of evidence’ pointed, not to Iran, but to al-Qaeda. Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett say that by 1998, even the Saudis were admitting that the bombing ‘was executed by Saudi hands. No foreign party was involved’.” (In 2006 a US court found that Iran, through a Saudi militant group affiliated with Hezbollah, had carried out the attack. The federal judge ordered Iran to pay $254 million to the families of 17 US service personnel killed in the attack.)

https://original.antiwar.com/ted_snider/2018/05/10/trumps-ten-lies-a-response-to-the-iran-nuclear-agreement-speech/

-“The idea that Tehran was Terror Central originated in 1979 when Iranians held 52 American diplomats [and citizens] hostage for [444] days. When Iran then used covert operatives and proxy forces to wage war on Western targets after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Reagan administration depicted Iran as the biggest state sponsor of terrorism. The charge stuck, even as Iran’s revolutionary fervor cooled and factions within the government pursued better relations with Washington. … [In fact,] Read the NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center] reports of the last 20 years, and you will see Iranian/Shiite terrorism is not even a category in US counterterrorism reporting. By any objective measure, it is a much smaller threat to Americans and the world than either Sunni terrorism or white nationalist terrorism.”

The fighting that occurred between the IRGC and uniformed American soldiers in 2008 in Sadr City in Baghdad wasn’t terrorism. The Iranian soldiers were attacking (illegal) invaders of Iraq. “‘The IRGC had a role in training Hezbollah and providing logistical assistance for the US embassy bombings in Beirut in 1983 and 1984 and the US Marine barracks at Beirut International Airport also in 1983’… Bombing an embassy—even one that housed a hostile CIA station—is clearly an act of terrorism. But the 241 US Marines killed by a car bomber were sent to Lebanon in support of the brutal 1982 Israeli invasion. After the Marine barracks bombing, President Ronald Reagan quickly withdrew the US forces, knowing full well he had not sent American boys on a peacekeeping mission. He had sent them into a war zone on the side of the Israeli invaders. The Marines were victims of war, not terrorism.”

“Iranian forces and the IRGC will engage in violent attacks on American uniformed personnel when US (or Israeli) troops invade its neighbors. When threatened with American or Zionist attacks, the Iranians are likely to target US military and intelligence personnel and not to care about the inevitable civilian casualties. If Iran is not provoked by invasion of neighboring lands, the IRGC does not attack Americans. At least, that is the record of the last twenty years. And that is likely part of the reason why CIA and Pentagon officials reportedly opposed Trump’s decision [to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization in April 2019]…”

https://newrepublic.com/article/153537/growing-obsession-linking-iran-terrorism (10 April 2019)

-The American “obsession with Iran makes no sense given [its] government’s limited influence and negligible military and economic power. Iran poses no threat to the United States, it is outspent and outgunned by its regional rivals, and it has very little ability to project power beyond a handful of countries in the region. The fact that the US treats a medium-sized regional power with no ability to harm [it] as one of its chief adversaries is an unintentional acknowledgment of how incredibly secure the US is, and it reflects the extent to which our foreign policy has become divorced from the security of our country and our allies.”

https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-irrational-iran-obsession/ (6 Feb. 2019)

-“In the last hundred years, for Iranians, the United States has gone from friend to puppet master to enemy and scapegoat. In Iranians’ century-long struggle for dignity and independence, Americans were originally on the right side. Americans supported Iran’s constitutional movement [1905-1911], and, after World War II, helped Iran preserve its independence against a serious threat of partition backed by the Soviet Union. A few years later, however, they let the Cold War, blind anti-Communist ideology and willful ignorance create an unhealthy patron-client relationship with the repressive Pahlavi monarchy. [And] Since the revolution of 1979, grievances on both sides, fed by third countries that fear any US-Iran engagement, have continued to fester. Like a couple trapped in a bad marriage, interaction has mostly consisted of reciting complaints with no goal beyond venting.”

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-iron-and-depressing-laws-of-us-iran-relations (6 Feb. 2019)



4. True or False: Israel opposed the implementation of US sanctions on Iran during the 1980s.

-True. During the 1980s, Israel was “not at all concerned about Iran’s nuclear program [nor] about many of Iran’s other activities that [Israel] now profess[es] concern about. In fact, in the 1980s, the United States wanted to impose [sanctions] on Iran for…[its] connection to the [1983] bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. [T]he then Israeli government, in a live interview by the then Minister Ariel Sharon, said that Israel would oppose sanctions being…imposed on Iran. [Nevertheless, the US did impose sanctions in 1984. However, Israel reversed its position] not because of any change in Iranian behavior, but because the Iraqi military was [routed by the US after Iraq’s 1990-1991] invasion [and occupation] of Kuwait…[Hence,] in early 1992, you have the first visit to Washington by then Prime Minister Rabin [who] started to raise concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and the prospect of sanctions. And…in 1995…the United States first imposes its comprehensive economic embargo on Iran. So [Israel has long been concerned] about the rise of Iran in the region, [as Iran can potentially] check Israel’s…reckless impulses vis-à-vis its neighbors.” Israel, in short, wants the current balance of power in the Middle East maintained, yet with an even more “isolated and crippled” Iran. http://www.democracynow.org/2015/3/12/ex_us_official_with_iran_letter

-“In its clash with Iran, the US has always had a very close partner, Israel. The partnership started in 1979, but it took different routes. Up until the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the first US invasion of Iraq, Israel’s attention was primarily focused on Iraq, which was viewed by Israel as the most immediate obstacle to achieving its goal of annexing ‘Judea and Samaria’ [the West Bank]. Thereafter, Israel turned its attention to Iran, the other main obstacle in fulfilling the Zionist dream of Eretz Yisrael. Starting in the early 1990s Israel not only joined the US in its massive campaign against Iran, but it actually took over the sanctions policy of the US. With the help of its lobby groups, Israel pushed through the US Congress one set of sanctions after another, hoping that ultimately the US would attack Iran, as it had done in the case of Iraq [in 2003].” http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/11/21/is-israel-losing-the-battle-to-wage-war-on-iran/

-According to Tel Aviv University Professor David Menashri, Israel’s foremost expert on Iran, “Throughout the 1980s, no one in Israel said anything about an Iranian threat — the word wasn’t even uttered”. In fact, Israel sold weapons to Iran during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War.

http://mondoweiss.net/2015/03/netanyahu-democracy-matthews

5. How many Iranian suicide-bombers have there been since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988?

-According to Robert Baer, a former CIA field officer assigned to the Middle East, “There’s not a single known instance of an Iranian suicide-bomber since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988.” During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran used suicide-bombers as the ultimate “smart bomb.” In fact, there is little difference between such an Iranian suicide-bomber and a US marine who rushes a machine-gun nest to meet his certain death. In contrast to Iran which used suicide-bombers for tactical military purposes, Sunni extremists use suicide bombing for vague objectives such as to “purify the state.” (Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower, Crown Publishers, New York: 2008, 205.)

-“[The] most comprehensive, data-based study of suicide terrorism carried out to date determined that there has never been an Iranian suicide bomber. Iranian support for paramilitary groups that the United States considers terrorist organizations or threats to American forces–Hezbollah, Hamas, Shi’a militias in Iraq–has been focused in theaters where the United States, Israel, or Sunni states allied to Washington are seeking to undermine important Iranian interests.” (Leverett 2013, 17-18)

-In July 2016, Ali David Sonboly, who was born in Germany to Iranian Muslim parents, “murdered nine people in a mass shooting in Munich” before killing himself. Sonboly should not be considered Iranian or Muslim as he was raised in Germany, held far-Right racist attitudes, and rejected his Muslim heritage. That all of his victims were of immigrant backgrounds and that he idolized the Norwegian far-Right terrorist Anders Breivik who massacred 77 people in 2011, provides evidence that his “killings were racially motivated.” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/28/munich-gunman-had-far-right-sympathies-and-killings-were-raciall/ (28 July 2016)

-“[I]t is wildly inaccurate to describe [Iran] as the source of jihadi terror. According to an analysis of the Global Terrorism Database by Leif Wenar of King’s College, more than 94 percent of deaths caused by Islamic terrorism since 2001 were perpetrated by ISIS, al-Qaeda and other Sunni jihadists. Iran is fighting those groups, not fueling them. Almost every terror attack in the West has had some connection to Saudi Arabia. Virtually none have been linked to Iran.”

http://www.sunjournal.com/news/columns-analysis/2017/05/28/america-has-now-signed-saudi-arabia-foreign-policy/2137452 (28 May 2017)

-“[Westerners] think of images of demonstrations and chanting crowds and assume (encouraged by our news media) that Iranian Shi’ism is a dangerous, uncontrollable, fanatical force. But in truth the religious hierarchy that Iranian Shi’ism has developed means that religious Iranians are more controlled, more subject to religious discipline and the guidance of senior clerics (most of whom are pragmatic and moderate, and many of whom are out of sympathy with the Islamic regime) than Sunni Muslims, who since the dissolution of the Caliphate in the 1920s have lacked that kind of structure. Some experts have pointed to that lack as a factor in the rise of radical, theologically incoherent groups like Al-Qaeda….An important strand of Iranian Shi’ism is a traditional quietist principle that commends decent, honest conduct and the patient endurance of adversity.” (Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic, Penguin Books, New York: 2013, xxi. Hereinafter, “Axworthy 2013.”)

6. What was Iran’s defense spending in 2011?

-Approximately $13 billion. “Iran spends only about 20 percent of the amount allocated by the six sheikhdoms in the Gulf Cooperation Council – a consistent trend since the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988.” http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/conventional-military

In 2016, “Iran accounts for only 7 percent of the total defense expenditure in the MENA region, compared to 41.8 percent in Saudi Arabia, 7.4 percent in the UAE, and 5.1 percent in Oman.” (Saikal 2019, 148)

-“The sheer size of Iran’s military does not translate into a strategic advantage when its soldiers are bereft of state-of-the-art weapons and support technologies. In fact, with the notable exception of the delivery of the Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems in late 2016, ‘Iran has not imported major combat systems since the early 1990s.’” (Saikal 2019, 154)

-As of 2019, “Iran continues to develop, improve, and field a range of military capabilities that enable it to target US and allied military assets in the region and disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz[, through which 20 percent of the world’s total oil exports travel]. These systems include ballistic missiles, unmanned explosive boats, naval mines, submarines and advanced torpedoes, armed and attack UAVs, antiship and land-attack cruise missiles, antiship ballistic missiles, and air defenses. Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the Middle East and can strike targets as far as 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders. Russia’s delivery of the SA-20c SAM system in 2016 provided Iran with its most advanced long-range air defense system. Iran is also domestically producing medium-range SAM systems and developing a long-range SAM.” (“In September 2018, Iran struck Kurdish groups in Iraq and ISIS in Syria with ballistic missiles in response to attacks inside Iran, demonstrating the increasing precision of Iran’s missiles, as well as Iran’s ability to use UAVs in conjunction with ballistic missiles.”)

https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/jan/29/us-intelligence-community-iran

-The First Gulf War (Aug. 1990 – Feb. 1991) “demonstrated to the Iranian authorities the futility of trying to defeat US forces in conventional battle. By the same token, the difficulties experienced by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan–and the problems they had in fighting insurgencies–have largely underpinned Tehran’s strategic shift toward asymmetric warfare. The logic is that although Iran cannot defeat the US or, for that matter, Israel, in conventional combat, it can make use of its geographical positioning, guerrilla tactics, proxy forces, and committed manpower to inflict costs significant enough to deter its adversaries from attacking it.” (“One of Iran’s greatest assets is…the sheer size of [its] army–the largest in the MENA region…”) (Saikal 2019, 146)

-Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) has divisions that parallel those of the regular (marginalized) army (Artesh): “ground forces (100,000), naval forces (20,000…), and an air force (which controls strategic and ballistic missile forces…). It also has two additional branches–the Quds Force and the Basij Resistance Force… The Quds Force…undertakes covert military activities outside the country. It builds and maintains networks with subnational ethnic, religious, and political groups, establishing relationships that can further Iran’s strategic interests. Furthermore, it provides Iran with ‘boots on the ground,’ delivering material assistance–weapons (especially rockets), supplies, expertise, and sometimes even soldiers–to its regional allies and proxies in areas of strategic interest outside Iran’s borders. Notable examples of this include…Iran’s close military relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as its assistance to the…Assad regime in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Palestinian groups, especially in Gaza. The Quds Force has also been heavily involved in Iraq.” (Saikal 2019, 149)

“The Basij Resistance Force is a paramilitary militia initially set up to protect the revolution from internal challenges…Its volunteer militia played an important role during the Iran-Iraq War, conducting raids and compensating for the incapacitated army, which was crippled by purges. It has 90,000 soldiers, with reserves of up to 300,000 and a total mobilization capacity of one million.” (Saikal 2019, 150)

7. What was the US’s defense spending in 2019?

-“In 2019 the US spent $732 billion on ‘defense,’ accounting for 38 percent of global military spending, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. If the US cut its current defense budget in half, it would still exceed the combined budgets of China ($261 billion) and Russia ($65 billion). … The Pentagon spent $55.9 billion on research and development…Compare that figure to spending on research on health ($38.9 billion), energy ($4.4 billion) and the environment ($2.8 billion).”

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lets-defund-the-pentagon-too/

-In 2011, the US’s defense spending was approximately $700 billion. US defense spending “is bigger than that of the next 17 countries combined.”

http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending#USMilitarySpending

http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/06/military-spending

-There is little doubt that Israel could defeat Iran in a conventional war in mere hours. “Israel’s defense budget easily exceeds those of its four immediate neighbors combined; it is the world’s fifth-largest exporter of arms…” (Juan Cole, Engaging the Muslim World, Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2009, 206-7. Hereinafter, “Cole 2009.”) (Peter Beinart, The Crisis of Zionism, Times Books, New York: 2012, 4. Hereinafter, “Beinart 2012.”)

-It is disturbing to note that, despite having spent “nearly eight trillion” dollars on nuclear weapons “in the last half of the twentieth century,” the US “admits to having lost track of eleven nuclear bombs over the years.” (Nearly all were later accounted for.) (Rachel Maddow, Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power, Crown Publishers, New York: 2012, 219, 231.)

-According to the 2019 Global Firepower Military Strength ranking, the US has the world’s strongest military and Iran’s is ranked 14th. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp

8. What is the Jewish population of Iran?

-Estimates of the Jewish population of Iran range from 15,000 to 25,000. “It is one of the many paradoxes of the Islamic Republic of Iran that this anti-Israeli country supports by far the largest Jewish population of any Muslim-majority country [after Turkey].” Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, thousands of Jews left for Israel, Western Europe or the US fearing persecution. But Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran’s supreme leader, issued a fatwa upon his return from exile in Paris decreeing that Jews and other religious minorities were to be protected thus reducing the outflow of Iran’s Jews to a trickle.

http://www.sephardicstudies.org/iran.html

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/despite-tension-between-iran-and-israel-irans-jewish-minority-feels-at-home



“In a 1979 meeting with five of the Iranian Jewish community leaders, Khomeini summarized his position on the local Jews in one of his quintessentially coarse one-liners: ‘We recognize our Jews as separate from those godless Zionists.’ The line has served as the regime’s position on the Jewish minority ever since. So important were these words that they were painted on the walls of nearly every synagogue and Jewish establishment the day after the ayatollah spoke them.” https://forward.com/opinion/13602/then-they-came-for-the-bahai-02039/

“[In 2015], the government of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani recognized Saturday as the Jewish Sabbath and a religious holiday. Parents have permission to stay home from work, and children stay home from school.”

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/despite-tension-between-iran-and-israel-irans-jewish-minority-feels-at-home

Iran’s Constitution recognizes Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians as “People of the Book” who “are thus entitled to protection and some autonomy in religious practices. But Baha’is [who were seen as a threat historically] are not protected under the law, are not allowed to practice their faith, and have faced persistent persecution.” http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/feb/12/rival-islamic-states-isis-v-iran



-The Jewish community in Iran dates back over 2000 years, continues to run kosher shops, Hebrew schools and synagogues, and has guaranteed representation in parliament. (Tehran is a city with 13 synagogues.)

http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/09/05/us-and-israeli-tensions-over-iran-strike-bared/

Many Jews have left Iran due to discrimination and economic difficulties. “Some of the Jews who have stayed in Iran are elderly and unable to tolerate travel or establishing a new home in a foreign country. Some Jews are determined to protect their sacred places and synagogues, or family homes.”

http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/238471/why-some-iranian-jews-stay (29 June 2017)

-The Islamic Republic, while anti-Zionist, is not anti-Semitic as manifested in its treatment of Iran’s Jewish community. (Being opposed to the policies of the state of Israel is not the same as being anti-Jewish.) “In 2006, the head of the [Jewish] community criticized–with impunity–Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric about the Holocaust in an open letter distributed to Iranian and international media.” “Although a sizable portion of Iran’s Jewish community left the country immediately after the revolution, Iranian Jews have in recent years overwhelmingly rejected financial incentives–almost $10,000 per person, just over $30,000 per family, offered by diaspora groups on top of Israeli government incentives–to emigrate to Israel.” (Leverett 2013, 93, 94)

In September 2013, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif made clear to the world that the Ahmadinejad era—marked by Holocaust denial and threats to Israel—was over. Zarif tweeted that “Iran never denied [the Holocaust]. The man [i.e., former President Ahmadinejad] who was perceived to be denying it is now gone.” And in an interview to the US media, he “condemned the Holocaust as a ‘heinous crime’ and a ‘genocide,’ dismissing as a poor translation the appearance of the word ‘myth’ about the Holocaust on the Iranian Supreme Leader’s English website.”

https://twitter.com/jzarif/status/375617854214660097

http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/iranian-foreign-minister-javad-zarif-holocaust-a-heinous-crime-and-a-genocide/

On 15 December 2014, Iranian “officials in Tehran unveiled a monument honoring Iranian-Jewish soldiers who died in action during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s….Photos of the ceremony [showed] Iranian officials and members of the Jewish community praying together and placing wreaths on the graves of the soldiers, who were hailed as ‘martyrs.’ [The regime wants] ‘to show that Iran is multireligious.’” (In fact, Iran’s 2013 and 2017 elections demonstrated that Iran, despite being a theocratic state, has one of the most open political systems in the Middle East.)

http://www.juancole.com/2014/12/honors-fallen-soldiers.html#comment-305830

-“A perhaps surprising result emerged from a [2014] opinion poll by an international organisation that fights anti-Semitism — that Iranians are the least anti-Semitic people in the Middle East and North Africa (with the exclusion of Israel).”

“Perhaps the most significant aspect of the…opinion poll is the very low percentage of respondents in Iran who agree with the statement that ‘Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.’ In the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the ruling conservatives have been denying the Holocaust for a long time, only 18% of the respondents believe that the above statement is ‘probably true’. This figure is particularly noteworthy when compared to 22% who agreed with the same statement in the United States.” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27438044

-“After centuries of abject poverty and religious persecution, the Jews of Iran got their big break under the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-1979). Iran was one of the fastest modernization projects in the world, and experienced 20% annual increases to its gross national product.” https://forward.com/opinion/454190/why-iranian-american-jews-love-trump/

Iranian Jews were deeply involved “across all shades of Iranian politics…During the Pahlavi dynasty, Iranian Jews had a leading role in Tudeh [Communist party] politics; in Muhammad Mosaddeq’s National Front and in the anti-colonialism-inspired struggle for nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1950-1953); in pro-monarchy politics; in Zionist activities; and in anti-Zionist activities. Under the second Pahlavi Shah (r. 1941-1979), Iranian Jews were high-ranking bureaucrats, industrialists, merchants, physicians and journalists in the Jewish and national press. They climbed the social ladder and amassed wealth, flooding the ranks of universities and professional organizations.”

“This unprecedented integration of Jews into larger Iranian society was, among other things, an achievement brought about by the White Revolution. This was an ambitious reform program undertaken by the second Pahlavi Shah in the 1960s and 1970s, with the objective, among other things, of creating a unified and homogeneous nation—what the late renown historian Eric Hobsbawm described as making ‘state frontiers coincide with the frontiers of nationality and language.’ But this was a pyrrhic victory by the Shah. [I]t was this very assimilation of Jews into Iranian society―and their consequent identification and empathy with the plight and grievances of their largely disenfranchised and/or indigent compatriots―that prompted not a few of them to participate in activities to topple the monarchy and to cooperate with high-ranking revolutionary figures of the likes of Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani. True, in the course and after the 1979 revolution the population of Jews in Iran sharply declined from one hundred thousand to about twenty-five thousand—with most of the Jews choosing to emigrate to Europe and North America. However, those Jews who remained in their country of birth have done so by choice: they enjoy relative prosperity, and are free to come and go as they please. [T]his particular story will shock…Jewish Israeli[s], for whom the notion of Jewish participation in the Islamic Revolution and their loyalty to their country of birth is inconceivable.” http://www.tarb.co.il/the-jews-of-iran/ (2019)

9. Which Iranian leader said the following? “This [Israel’s] Occupation regime over Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time.”

-Ruhollah Khomeini. This wasn’t a surprising statement to come from the leader of the 1979 Revolution as Israel had been a firm ally of both the US and the Shah. In fact, Khomeini labeled “Israel as a colonialist-imperialist and Zionist occupier that needed to be removed in order to liberate Jerusalem and to restore the Palestinians to their rightful homeland. He declared an annual Jerusalem, or Quds, Day of public rage against Israel and all other imperialist aggressors…” (Cole 2009, 201) (Saikal 2019, 78)

-According to Juan Cole, Ahmadinejad quoted this statement in 2005 yet wire service translators rendered Khomeini’s statement into English as “Israel must be wiped off the face of the map.” Yet, Khomeini had referred to the occupation regime not Israel, and while he expressed “a wish for the regime to go away” he didn’t threaten to go after Israel. In fact, a “regime can vanish without” any outside attacks, as happened to the Shah’s regime in Iran and to the USSR. It is notable that when Khomeini “made the statement in the 1980s, there was no international outcry”. In fact, in “the early 1980s, Khomeini supplied Israel with petroleum in return for American spare parts for the American-supplied Iranian arsenal. [As both Israel and Iran considered Saddam’s Iraq a serious enemy, they] had a tacit alliance against the Saddam regime during the first phase of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988.” It should also be noted that Ahmadinejad subsequently stated he didn’t want to kill any Jews but rather he wants a one-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. While Ahmadinejad’s preferred solution is a non-starter, Israel’s refusal to pursue a comprehensive peace creates space for Arab hardliners whose agendas do not include a realistic peace with Israel. (Cole 2009, 201, 202, 218)

-“[T]he aggressive policies of the George W. Bush administration were arguably the decisive factor in the rise of [radicals like Ahmadinejad] after 16 years of the moderates’ rule.” “The straw that broke the camel’s back, was the failure of the West [primarily the US] to accept [President] Khatami’s moderate team’s attempt to secure Iran’s nuclear program.” (One key factor that made the 2013 Geneva talks possible was “the change of the US position toward Iran’s nuclear program from ‘no enrichment of uranium’ to ‘no nuclear bomb.’”) (Mousavian 2014, 9, 12, 13)

Although Ahmadinejad was hated in the West, “Wikileaks revealed that he has often been the official most inclined to compromise with and negotiate with the West, being blocked by the Revolutionary Guards Corps and other hardliners to his right.” http://www.juancole.com/2012/10/iran-bazaar-strikes-signal-misery-not-sanctions-victory.html

-In 2012, then Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor acknowledged that then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad never said that Iran seeks to “wipe Israel off the face of the map.” This falsely translated statement has been exploited by the US and Israel to demonize Iran and gain support for sanctions and possible military action. The following is from an interview of Dan Meridor (DM) by Teymoor Nabili (TN) of Al Jazeera:

TN: “As we know, Ahmadinejad didn’t say that he plans to exterminate Israel, nor did he say that Iran policy is to exterminate Israel. Ahmadinejad’s position and Iran’s position always has been…that he has no plans to attack Israel. He simply said that if you hold a referendum in this part of the world with everybody who lives here, he will accept the outcome of that referendum.”

DM: “Well, I have to disagree, with all due respect. You speak of Ahmadinejad. I speak of Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, Rafsanjani, Shamkhani….They all come, basically ideologically, religiously, with the statement that Israel is an unnatural creature, it will not survive. They didn’t say, ‘We’ll wipe it out,’ you’re right. But ‘It will not survive, it is a cancerous tumor that should be removed,’ was said just two weeks ago again.”

TN: “Well, I’m glad you’ve acknowledged that they didn’t say they will wipe it out.”

https://www.democracynow.org/2012/4/19/headlines/israeli_minister_admits_ahmadinejad_never_said_israel_should_be_wiped_off_the_map



10. True or False: During President Ahmadinejad’s first term, Iranian television presented a serial sympathetic to Jews during the Holocaust.

-True. Iranian television ran a widely watched serial on the Holocaust, Zero Degree Turn, based on true accounts of the role Iranian diplomats in Europe played in rescuing thousands of Jews during World War II.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJljqWQAqCI&feature=related

“In the middle of World War II, Tehran [also] became a haven for both Jewish and Catholic Polish refugees who were welcomed as they arrived from Soviet Central Asia. … The refugees were Polish citizens who three years prior, with the outbreak of World War II, had fled into the Soviet Union and now, having journeyed nearly 5,000 miles, sailed from Soviet Turkmenistan to northern Iran. More than 43,000 refugees arrived in Bandar Pahlavi in March 1942. A second wave of almost 70,000 came with the August transports, and a third group of nearly 2,700 was transferred by land from Turkmenistan to Mashhad in eastern Iran. Of these, roughly 75,000 were soldiers, cadets, and officers of what was known as Anders’ Army, a Polish army in exile that had assembled in the Soviet Union under the command of Gen. Wladyslaw Anders. The rest were mothers and babies, elderly men and women, and unaccompanied children. Three thousand, perhaps more, were Jewish, including four rabbis and nearly 1,000 unaccompanied children who were taken from Polish orphanages in the Soviet Union.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/19/when-iran-welcomed-jewish-refugees/

-While Likudniks maintain that modern-day Iran is following its ancestors in seeking to destroy Israel, Iran has in fact come to the rescue of Jews three times in history. (1) Cyrus the Great, the King of Persia during the 6th century BCE, is praised in the Hebrew Bible for saving the Jews from captivity in Babylon and allowing their return to the Holy Land (where he even helped them rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem). (2) When Xerxus I, the King of Persia during the 5th century BCE, was informed by his Jewish Queen Esther that viceroy Haman—who was an Agagite, not a Persian—wanted to destroy Persia’s Jewish community he saved the Jews, had Haman killed, and permitted the Jews to take revenge on those who sought their destruction. (3) Iranian diplomats saved Jews during the Holocaust.

Rather than demonizing the people of Iran, Likudniks should recognize that “Israel’s problem is with the Iranian regime which hosts Holocaust cartoon competitions and repeatedly calls for Israel’s destruction and not with ‘Persians’. ‘Persians’ don’t want to kill Jews. [The] Majority of Persians and other Iranians just want to feed their families and to improve relations with the outside world, in direct contrast to the regime in Tehran…” https://iran-israel-observer.com/2017/03/12/purim-netanyahu-iran/

-It is worth noting that “In his 1983 doctoral dissertation, [Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud] Abbas wrote of ‘the Zionist fantasy, the fantastic lie that six million Jews were killed [in the Holocaust]’ …” Abbas, who is respected by the US and Israeli governments, has since come to correctly recognize “the Holocaust [as] the most heinous crime in modern human history…” http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/27/world/meast/mideast-abbas-holocaust/

On 4 May 2018, Abbas rightly apologized for his 30 April 2018 comments that the 3,000-year-old Jewish connection to the Land of Israel was a myth and that Jews in Europe brought centuries of persecution–culminating in the Holocaust–upon themselves through unsavoury financial practices. In his apology, Abbas denounced antisemitism and called the Holocaust the most heinous crime in history. (It should be noted that Palestinians are still waiting for apologies for the many racist anti-Arab remarks made by Israeli politicians like Avigdor Lieberman.)

11. What percentage of university students in Iran is female?

-Approximately 60 percent of university students in Iran is female. (The New York Times, 7 June 2020, 15) (Michael Axworthy, A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind, Basic Books, New York: 2008.)

-“In many ways, women in Iran are better off than those in many other Middle Eastern countries.” Iranian women “have opportunities in higher education, most professions and high-ranking political positions. They hold seats in parliament [and cabinet], run their own businesses,…participate in (segregated) sports”, and “work as lawyers, doctors, pilots, film directors and truck drivers.”

“But there are restrictions. Women must cover their hair, arms and curves in public…” “They are mandated to wear modest Islamic dress, although styles are not [too] restrictive…[W]omen face serious discrimination in areas such as divorce, inheritance, and child custody. A woman, regardless of her age, needs her male guardian’s consent for marriage. Women also require permission to obtain a passport and travel abroad.” (However, women do not need a male escort to leave their homes.) (The New York Times, 7 June 2020, 15) http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/feb/12/rival-islamic-states-isis-v-iran

“Compared to developed countries and compared to Iran itself before [its 1979] revolution, when there were many female judges, ministers, police and military officers and ambassadors, [most women in the upper classes have likely seen their employment opportunities diminish under the Islamic Republic]. In the Islamic Republic…some hardliners go so far as to compare women in search of further personal freedom to prostitutes, which makes even minimal progress [difficult].”

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iraninsight/women-make-slow-but-steady-progress-in-iran (20 July 2017)



-According to UN data, Iran experienced the fastest decrease in babies per woman ever, “from more than six babies per woman in 1984 down to fewer than three babies per woman just 15 years later.” This decrease was “a reflection of improvements in health and education”, and due to most young Iranians adopting “modern values about family size” and contraception use. (In the 1990s, Iran had “the biggest condom factory in the world and…a compulsory pre-marriage sex education course for both brides and grooms…”)

“Almost every religious tradition has rules about sex, so it is easy to understand why so many people assume that women in some religions give birth to more children. But the link between religion and the number of babies per woman is often overstated. There is, though, a strong link between income and number of babies per woman.” (Hans Rosling with Ola Rosling and Anna Rosling Rönnlund, Factfulness: Ten Reasons We’re Wrong About the World–and Why Things Are Better Than You Think, Flatiron Books, New York: 2018, 173-5.)

-According to the 2018 Thomson Reuters Foundation poll of the top ten most dangerous countries for women, Saudi Arabia ranks fifth, and Iran is absent from the list.

https://poll2018.trust.org

-“According to the 2015 World Economic Forum’s Human Capital Report, Iran had…about three-quarters of a million more [university graduates] than Turkey,…a prominent global talent pool….But this potential is vastly underutilized. Iran has [low] overall labor force participation rates, only 45 percent of the work force are economically active, and [high] unemployment rates, particularly so among the educated youth.”

“A deciding factor in the low overall participation rate is women. At 17 percent female labor force participation rate, Iran is among the lowest in the world, despite the fact that women constitute over 60 percent of the university graduates and over 70 percent of students in STEM fields. If women were economically active ‘under similar assumptions [as elsewhere], [the IMF] estimates the GDP boost in Iran would be around 40 percent.’ The low labor force participation is due to a myriad of gender-discriminatory laws and regulations.” (Women “constitute 50 percent of the work force” in Iran.)

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-s-economic-performance-since-the-1979-revolution (1 Feb. 2019) (The New York Times, 7 June 2020, 15)

-Overall, the United Nations Development Programme “reports that Iran’s Human Development Index value — ‘a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living’ — rose from 0.437 in 1980 to 0.707 in 2011, placing the Islamic Republic in the ‘high human development category.’ One facet of this progress remains especially unappreciated in the West: the way that access to higher education is altering the status of Iranian women. While the Islamic Republic places restrictions on women (in matters of dress, for example, and access to some public events and services) that many Westerners would consider unacceptable, the majority of university students in Iran are now female, the majority of students at Iran’s best universities are now female, and women’s presence is increasingly being felt across an array of academic and professional disciplines–for example, the majority of Iran’s medical students are now female….Under the shah, women were technically free from the veil and other formal restrictions on their behavior…[however,] powerful social forces kept most women in prerevolutionary Iran from pursuing educational and career opportunities.” (Leverett 2013, 192-3)

In 2017, Iran continued to rank in the “high human development category” of the Human Development Index. Iran ranks better than Brazil and Turkey, two states often lauded by the mainstream media. http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/

In 2019, Iran’s human development ranking at 65th remained above Brazil’s but was below Turkey’s 59th rank. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-development-index-ranking

“In classifying countries according to their human development attainment, UNDP [United Nations Development Program] uses four categories: very high, high, medium, and low. Iran’s HDI value – for the year 2014 – is 0.766. This puts Iran in the ‘high human development’ category. It also positions the country at 69th out of 188 countries and territories. Iran’s HDI value for 2013…was 0.749. This positioned the country at 75th out of 187 countries and territories….Thus Iran…moved up 6 ranks in HDI in a single year. This represents one of the highest increases for any country in the past 8 years….[B]etween 1990 and 2014 Iran’s HDI value increased from 0.567 to 0.766 – a significant increase of 35%.” (Iran’s achievement is all the more impressive when it is appreciated that “the impact of sanctions has been severe”. In fact, Iranians blame domestic mismanagement, corruption, and US sanctions for their economic woes.)

http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/mar/04/un-iran-improves-human-development

-“Iran ranks 118 out of 153 countries on the UN’s 2020 World Happiness Index (WHI), thus slightly above the lowest quintile—the least happy. The index is largely based on representative random samples of the Gallop World Poll—around 1,000 observations per country—that reflect the respondents’ subjective answers to a set of questions. While the economic dimension is part of the overall individual self-assessed wellbeing, other factors seem to have a disproportionately greater negative impact on the Iranians’ sense of happiness at any point in time. Though undoubtedly, better economic times infuse optimism, an explanation for the malaise can be found in other dimensions of wellbeing, such as perceptions of widespread public and private corruption, dearth of social support in times of need, and a crowding out of negative effects of worry, anger and fear over the positive effects of laughter and enjoyment. Above all, the high negative response to ‘freedom to make life choices’ implies people’s sense of powerlessness to improve their lives.” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/just-how-happy-are-iranians-with-their-lives/ (26 June 2020)

-Iran vs. Turkey: “In 1950, Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP) was 22 percent higher than Iran’s… In 1977, the last ‘normal’ year before the revolution—1978 saw the start of unrest and strikes that ultimately brought down the monarchy—Iran’s economy was 26 percent larger than Turkey’s… In 2017, Turkey’s nominal GDP was 2.4…times larger than Iran’s…”

“Using GDP ranking as another metric of economic importance, in 1960, Iran was the world’s 29th largest economy. Turkey ranked 13th… By 1977, Iran had climbed to 18th place, Turkey was 20th… In 2017, Iran was 27th, Turkey hovered around 18th… Oil producers such as Mexico and Saudi Arabia rank today among the top twenty economies, a group which Iran could have easily been part of given its vast oil and gas endowments. Still, Iran remains the second largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa. It is still considerably larger than Egypt, Norway, South Africa, or Israel…”

“Mirroring GDP trends, Iran’s per capita income has also grown far slower since the revolution. In real terms, the three decades before the revolution saw Iran’s per capita income jump by a factor of 3.2 times; in the four decades since the revolution, it has only doubled. In 1980, Iran’s nominal GDP per capita [$2,374] was higher than [Turkey’s $2,169]. In 2018 [the comparable figures are]: Iran = $4,838; Turkey = $11,125…”

One factor inhibiting Iran’s economic growth were the “massive post-revolutionary nationalization and expropriations [which] essentially removed Iran’s emerging entrepreneurial and industrial class that had risen in the 1960-70s. Contrary to some belief that they benefited from the shah’s crony capitalism, most early industrialists came from humble beginnings and were self-made businessmen. Among the many examples are the Khayyami brothers of Mashhad, who rose from middle-class origins to start Iran’s car industry, which is today Iran’s third leading employer (after oil and gas), and still places Iran as the world’s 16th largest car producer. Nearly all industrialists emigrated and built successful businesses abroad while grooming their next generation into leaders in cutting-edge global corporations. To grow a robust private sector necessitates an industrial class—such as the Kocs and Sabancis of Turkey…The expropriated companies were handed over to be managed by trusted and ideological insiders. In its forty years, the Islamic Republic has not been able to foment a genuine and independent entrepreneurial class.”

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-s-economic-performance-since-the-1979-revolution (1 Feb. 2019)

“Privatization has failed to change the nature of the state’s involvement and control over the economy because it has largely advantaged political insiders, resulting in the transfer of state enterprises to parastatal organizations and individuals linked to the ruling elite, who are, after all, the only actors with the capital available to buy privatized enterprises. In this regard, privatization has simply reinforced existing distorted economic conditions and strengthened oligarchical interests.” (Saikal 2019, 138)

-Iran enjoys several strengths: “a large, well educated, young labor force; a relatively diverse economy; and a strong endowment of natural resources.” “In particular, Iran’s automobile industry is well developed and supports a wider manufacturing industry around it. In 2011, before enhanced sanctions took effect, Iran was the thirteenth-largest global producer of automobiles… [The country also] has the fourth-largest oil reserves and the second-largest gas reserves in the world. However, 90 percent of the gas produced in Iran is currently consumed domestically as a replacement for oil….However, if the development of the South Pars offshore gas field…comes to fruition, Iran is set to become a major gas exporter.” (Saikal 2019, 143, 144)

The relative diversity of Iran’s economy is reflected in the fact that “oil and gas accounted for around 15 percent of GDP in 2016. By comparison, in the same year, oil in Saudi Arabia accounted for 87 percent of government revenues, 42 percent of GDP, and 90 percent of export earnings. This diversification means a wider range of opportunities for investors… Iran’s reintegration into the world economy could offer the US access to a highly lucrative new market…” (Saikal 2019, 214-5)

-Iran’s achievements in science have been impressive and reflect the country’s rational leadership. Consider: “Which country’s scientific output rose 18-fold between 1996 and 2008, from 736 published papers to 13,238? The answer – Iran – might surprise many people, especially in the western nations used to leading science. Iran [over those years had] the fastest rate of increase in scientific publication in the world. And if political relations between Iran and the US [have been] strained, it seems that the two countries’ scientists [were] getting on fine: the number of collaborative papers between them rose almost fivefold from 388 to 1831 over the same period.”

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20291-iran-is-top-of-the-world-in-science-growth.html (28 March 2011)

http://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php?area=2200&category=0®ion=all&year=2010&order=it&min=0&min_type=i

“The Islamic Republic of Iran is ranked at the 8th place among the leading countries in terms of publishing top papers in the field of artificial intelligence (AI)…Based on the information gained from 1997 until 2017, Iran submitted 34,028 articles about AI and its usage, ranking it at the 14th place in the world in the area of artificial intelligence. Iran is the 8th country in the world based on high impact and high citation articles and the only country from the Middle East in the top ten countries in this field.” https://iranian.com/2020/02/03/iran-ranks-8th-in-world-for-top-papers-in-field-of-artificial-intelligence-ai/

-“Since the revolution, the Islamic Republic has followed a state-led, oil dependent, or rentier, model of economic development, as had been pursued by the Shah…” (In 2013, “oil and gas exports [made] up 80 percent of the country’s total export earnings and 60 to 70 percent of the government’s revenues…”) “It has achieved what can be described as an upper-middle-income economy. By 2016, it had a GDP of $412.2 billion and a population of just over eighty million, making it the second-largest economy with the second-largest population in the Middle East and North Africa region.” (Saikal 2019, 130, 134)

In 2012, Iran “has the twenty-fifth-largest economy in the world according to the CIA and the IMF. With a per capita income [based on purchasing power parity] of roughly $11,000–comparable to that of Brazil, South Africa, and several former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe–its status as a middle-income developing country is well established.” To fulfill the revolution’s commitment to improve the social and economic conditions of the lower classes, Iran “has made large and sustained investments to extend modern infrastructure (roads, electricity, piped water, and…Internet) into rural and low-income urban areas…The result has been a sharp and well-documented reduction in poverty. Today the percentage of Iranians living in poverty–less than 2 percent by the World Bank’s $1.25-per-day standard–is lower than that in virtually any other large-population middle-income country (including Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela).” (Leverett 2013, 190-1)

(“[I]nternational poverty benchmarks may not be [a] meaningful measure for most countries, and national poverty lines are more widely used indicators. On this basis, one in every five Iranians lives below the national poverty line and nearly 40 percent are considered to be near poverty as measured by $10 per day per person. This suggests a large share of the population’s high vulnerability to slip into poverty or remain chronically poor….Therefore, while absolute poverty has been largely eradicated, relative poverty continues to be a real problem.”

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-s-economic-performance-since-the-1979-revolution (1 Feb. 2019))

As in past years, the World Bank in its 2016 report classifies Iran as an upper-middle-income country. This is impressive considering the negative economic effects of the strict US and EU sanctions during the last decade. Nevertheless, poverty, unemployment, corruption, and inequality are serious problems for the country; problems which social media effectively communicates to tens of millions of Iranians.

http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups

https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview



“[I]ran’s income inequality, as measured by the Gini index, shows a slow downward trend and has improved in comparison to pre-revolutionary Iran….[T]he upper income quintile still controls close to half the nation’s wealth, but its share has gradually declined slightly since 1990 benefiting minor gains in the lower three quintiles.”

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-s-economic-performance-since-the-1979-revolution (1 Feb. 2019)

The fact that “rural inhabitants (26 percent of [Iran’s] population in 2016) enjoy better living conditions than under the monarchy” helps explain an important source of support for the Islamic Republic. (Saikal 2019, 244)

“The Islamic Republic is one of only a few countries to provide comprehensive medical insurance for refugees on the same basis as its own citizens….Close to one million Afghan and Iraqi refugees…have been living in Iran for as long as 40 years…”

https://reliefweb.int/report/iran-islamic-republic/sick-refugees-iran-healthcare-programme-lifesaver (18 June 2019)

-According to the 2017 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Iran ranks 130 out of 180 countries in the world on perceived corruption. While it ranks higher than Mexico, Kenya and Lebanon, and is only a little lower than close US ally Egypt, this is still a poor ranking. (Nevertheless, it is clearly disingenuous when the Trump administration singles out Iran’s corruption to justify sanctions.)

https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017#table

“Corruption in Iran stems from several major sources–international sanctions, which encourage black market and illicit activity; state control and involvement in the economy, particularly among conservative elites and the IRGC; oil rentierism and property specul