The military reforms which have underpinned President Xi’s premiership over the last five years will culminate at the upcoming meeting of the 19th Party Congress where an unprecedented reshuffle of military leadership will take place. President Xi has made the task of reforming, restructuring and modernising the People’s Liberation Army a central policy platform since 2012. Whilst military reforms and developments in this period have at times played second fiddle to the perpetual responsibility of maintaining the juggernaut that is the Chinese economy, and with it the promised economic development that gives the CCP it’s mandate, they are numerous and noticeable. The question is how much should the world outside of the Asia-Pacific region pay attention? Are Xi Jinping’s reforms a signal that Beijing is abandoning it’s long-standing foreign policy of restrained involvement in conflict? After all, in only September of this year, Foreign Policy summarised that ‘a rising China’ now had a “more forward-leaning approach to its neighbours”(1). Or is it all nothing more than an attempt at claiming a trophy of strength to display when those who would vie for Xi and his allies’ positions come forward in future? Perhaps the decision makers in Beijing are pondering whether or not great economic power brings with it great military responsibility. All of these scenarios are possible explanations, and in some ways they are all now realities.

In the hysteria that has been drummed up in the North Korea crisis, would seem like the perfect barometer by which to gauge Chinese foreign policy and military attitudes has presented itself. Simply concluding — no interest in military involvement, no critical change in the warmth of the relationship with the USA, seemingly no interest in the projection of power beyond Chinese borders. If this were the case then perhaps we would see defence spending as a percentage of GDP drop since China has already asserted itself as the world’s second largest (by almost all measures and definitions) military. But spending has continued to hold at around 2% of GDP in recent years, after dropping from much loftier heights before 2008. In fact the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has reported that for 2017, Chinese defence spending is at 1.9% of GDP resulting in a figure of $215.7bn.(2)

So if China and the CCP has no interest in ever actually using this military might beyond existential security, if it has no interest in entering the world stage when nuclear war seemingly beckons, then why spend such vast and increasing sums year after year? It seems to me that the most likely reason for China and Xi’s commitment to military reform is not the noisy and vocal neighbour in North Korea. Beijing is still committed to following the same foreign policy approach of “non-interference, respect for the sovereignty of others, non-aggression and peaceful co-existence”(3) which it has done so for 50 years or so — as Jiang Zemin once told President Bush(jr) “North Korea is [your] problem”(4) — and whilst Xi has been more willing than other recent Presidents to join US efforts against the DPRK, official Chinese policy and rhetoric has not moved on much from that of Jiang. In fact it is quite safe to say that in any international dispute, other than those surrounding the South and East China Seas of course, Jiang Zemin’s words and sentiments hold true. China just does not see itself as needing to get too involved in international conflicts, whether that be regarding the Korean peninsula or Russian expansionism or the Syrian civil war. This probably stems from the CCP’s own fears and insecurities surrounding legitimacy. After all a communist state, no matter how seemingly benevolent or ‘liberalised’, can’t feel too secure in opening itself up to potential criticism and undermining from an international order built around the sanctity of human rights and free markets.

Three years ago, just after President Xi came to power, I completed my final University dissertation on the question of how high would Sino-Japanese tensions rise in regard to their island disputes. I concluded that any substantial militaristic conflict between the two states was virtually impossible and unthinkable for economic reasons. This still holds true today in my opinion. Xi and others’ continuation of Hu Jintao’s policy of Peaceful Development has kept the PRC away from conflict. And whilst Xi has openly discussed a shift away from the ‘hide and bide’ policy of his predecessors, and whilst he has openly stated his desires for China to embrace an “increasingly assertive” foreign policy that will result in a “new type of international relations” asserting that the “growing trend toward a multipolar world will not change”,(5) there is very little to suggest that any of this is militaristic in nature. Under President Xi, ‘assertive foreign policy’ has meant more meaningful and constructive engagement with international institutions. Rather than displays of military might, Xi’s premiership has favoured embracing the rules and structures of international institutions and their processes. Notably the Chinese delegation sent to The Hague to mediate the dispute with the Philippines over parts of the South China Sea. This moment was key in understanding that both ‘peaceful development’ and an ‘assertive foreign policy’ could coexist — in years gone by the PRC may have opted to ‘hide’ over the issue and ‘bide’ their time, or if ‘peaceful development’ had been in some way abandoned then perhaps the deployment of some conventional forces would have happened instead of going to The Hague.

So if China and Xi have not abandoned their long standing commitment to restrained military activity and non-interventionism, then what is going on? As I said previously North Korea is not President Xi’s inspiration for military reform. Perhaps mind has been paid to the possible situation following any potential collapse of the Kim regime at the hands of any American led assault. But overall neither North Korean missiles, nor Japanese or Filipino claims to islands are driving motivators for what can only be described as one of Xi’s flagship policies. It would seem that their are exceptions to the rule — whilst Chinese foreign policy has held true to form in the east, perhaps we will see a shift in approaches to the west to go hand in hand with The Belt and Road Initiative(BRI).

If military reform has been a priority for Xi Jinping and his premiership, then the BRI has surely been the top priority. It is almost a personal project for President Xi, and it he has mainly been responsibly for its conception. After visiting countries on the old Silk Road in 2013, he decided it was time to rejuvenate the region economically, and further integrate it, by rebuilding the Silk Road trade routes and expanding on them with modernising infrastructure projects. The countries included in the BRI range from Germany to Malaysia. The economies included in the BRI will use, and are using, the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to finance projects related to the BRI. The Economist states that effectively China is putting “roughly $150bn a year in the 68 countries that have signed up to the scheme”(6). Xi Jinping wants to once again make the trade routes between China’s east coast and Western Europe the driving force of the world economy, bringing with it a new era in the world economy of Sino-centrism. In the same article, The Economist even asserts that the BRI is proof of “Mr Xi’s determination to break with Deng Xiaoping’s”(7) ‘hide and bide’ foreign policy. The BRI seeks to place China at the heart of a new global trading area, there will be no room in the future for China to hide it’s capabilities when the vast spaces that belong to Central Asian republics have Chinese high-speed trains coursing through them. Also, there is now no longer a need for China to ‘bide’ it’s time either. China has reached extraordinary, and well documented, economic heights in recent years. This is now spilling over to the outside world — towards the end of 2016, Chinese companies had completed around $120bn of merger and acquisition takeovers (M&As) globally (8)— as Chinese companies take advantage of this economic golden age to expand their portfolios to secure foreign assets. China’s wealth and economic strength is most probably now reaching a peak, or at least a plateau. The BRI seeks to consolidate this strength.

So perhaps, just as the BRI is an attempt at planning for the future of global economics, President Xi’s military reforms are an anticipation for the future military responsibilities China will bear. In attempting to find what problems and difficulties China will face in the future and why it might be eventually rely on it’s military, it is useful to look for a scenario in history which shares a substantial number of parallels. Perhaps the best historic parallel from modern history is the foreign policy of the USA at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Herman Melville once described Americans as the “chosen people” who “bear the ark of liberties of the world.”(9) Melville’s sentiments were echoed by American foreign policy from that point until America’s involvement in the Second World War. As Niall Ferguson states, “the defining characteristic of American foreign policy…prior to 1947 was the insistence of successive presidents that the United Stated could somehow be a great power without behaving like any previous great power.”(10) Of course the Wilsonian age was the paramount era for this American thinking. Wilson himself announced in 1917 that “every people… should be left free to determine its own polity.”(11) These words sound laudable and certainly seem comparable to Chinese foreign policy since Zhou Enlai’s principles of “non-interference, respect for the sovereignty of others, non-aggression and peaceful co-existence.”(12) were laid out in 1955. Perhaps also the words of Walter Lippmann also have some relevance when looking at China now. He asserted in 1926 that in America “we continue to think of ourselves as a kind of great, peaceful Switzerland, whereas we are in fact a great, expanding world power.”(13) Yet Ferguson is quick to assert that American foreign policy of this time was “richly hypocritical”(14) and if American military activity in this time period is anything to go by then he is mostly correct. It seemed that the reality of policy borne out of the American Renaissance was a militarily enforced exportation of these ideals which ultimately descended into the the US having to send troops into the unstable neighbour territories of Central and South America to defend American installations and economic interests. General Butler wrote in 1935 that “I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street… I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house Brown Brothers in 1909–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras “right” for American fruit companies in 1903.”(15) Whilst this is a very cynical and harsh look at the situations that unfolded in the region at the time, it is also clear that the USA was originally involved in all those countries for the ‘right’ reasons of Wilsonian thought, either to achieve peace or for the expansion of trade networks. The fact that these reasons then ultimately led to extensive military campaigns that seemingly wound up being almost entirely related to the defence of economic interests is something which perhaps President Xi and his successors will need to take on board.

Maybe this is the real reason behind the extensive military reforms and why they have been enacted simultaneously to the development of the BRI. After all, China is not neighboured by exceptionally stable or peaceful countries, especially to its west. It also doesn’t have particularly peaceful relationships with its closest neighbours — the recent border stand-offs with India should be indicative of this point — or even full and stable control of it’s expansive western regions, with unrest in its biggest province of Xinjiang consistently simmering. It is my belief that the combination of intense investment into the BRI regions, political instability in said reasons, and the immense importance of the project itself that is driving the emphasis that Xi Jinping has placed on upgrading the military. It would be unwise to have the amount of money invested in the countries involved in the BRI project that China has, $31bn last year and already $33bn this year just as a snapshot,(16) without the military prowess to defend it should the need arise. If the American example is anything to go by, then heavy investment and business interest in unstable neighbours usually requires a great, almost constant, deal of military force to back it up. The recent incident of two Chinese teachers possibly murdered in Pakistan could be seen as a sign of things to come. Beijing has so far pledged $57bn to Pakistan for the BRI,(17) and if death becomes an occupational hazard of working in places along the route of the BRI for Chinese nationals then it puts the entire project in jeopardy. The fact that China sees this project as instrumental to bringing an end to American unipolarity and creating the multipolarity that President Xi has so often discussed suggests that Chinese military involvement along the route is a more likely prospect than abruptly abandoning the initiative or pulling funding from key areas. As of 2015, the USA “maintains nearly 800 military bases in more than 70 countries”(18), perhaps it is conceivable that China will maintain bases along the silk road route to ensure stability if not at national level of BRI countries then at least in the immediate vicinity of trade routes and key infrastructure.

I am of the belief that the conditions forming to the west of China and into Central Asia and the Middle East will likely bring China to abandon its 60 year old foreign policy core more quickly than any of the dramas that may or may not unfold to its east. Ultimately the subtlety of needing to defend interests related to the BRI will more easily sway opinions in Beijing than the cacophony of potential catastrophe on the Korean peninsula or in the South China sea — these situations usually reward patience, caution, and a degree of brinkmanship.

The timing of these events is particularly noteworthy too. Xi Jinping will unveil the reshuffle of military leadership at the congress marking the halfway point of his premiership. There is a chance this has all been done for show. After all a visibly improved military is a good policy path to follow, it satisfies allies and critics alike whilst pleasing the general public too. If it ends up that the renewed Chinese military is never needed for any conflict of note, whether that be for the defence of the BRI as I’ve hypothesised or for any unfolding situation in the east, then at the very least it will be a clear demonstration of President Xi’s legacy once he leaves his post in 2022. A strong and modern army is visible and tangible whilst the extent of Chinese soft power and the robustness of a regional trading zone — the aims of the BRI — are much less visible. The ceremonialism surrounding the launch of China’s second aircraft carrier, domestically built, and pride that was found in reactions from all across China is evidence of this. Having such a bold and obvious success to show at the 19th party congress, of a new and improved military, will continue to help the President shore up the power vested in the post. This has been a central aim of Xi’s premiership, to make the positions of President and General Secretary more absolute in their power, a strong military can only help this cause.

However the level of commitment to military spending and reform, the sheer scale of building an aircraft carrier for example, suggests that China and President Xi foresee the military as having an active role to play rather than just a becoming a monument for display purposes only. The timing of these announcements, whilst of course having implications domestically, seem undeniably linked to the progress of the BRI — Beijing has this year limited the outflow of Chinese capital in order to redirect Chinese companies to invest in BRI economies — and coming at the five year mark and halfway point of President Xi’s leadership means that Xi Jinping will have the military he wants for the second half of his term to respond to issues as he sees fit, conforming to his own ideals of how Chinese foreign policy should look now in the post-‘hide and bide’ era. Ultimately though it seems almost inevitable to me that with the greater Sino-centrism that President Xi is looking to create, will come a raised necessity for military action as almost every supreme regional power has found to be the case before. The regions which China is seeking to utilise are surely still too volatile for China to leave its most prized project unattended or at least unable to defend should the need arise. It’s for these reasons that I believe that this military reshuffle is an important flashpoint that the world should pay attention too. China now has the two biggest contributors to developing front-foot foreign policy. Something to defend outside of its borders, plus the means and will to defend it. Whilst Russia has seemingly seized the initiative from the USA and European powers in the Middle East for now, it perhaps won’t be long before Chinese forces will be on their way to push rebel groups out of pivotal towns and cities along the BRI route.

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