Elizabeth Drew has a piece in the New York Review of Books — How Money Runs Our Politics. I’m surprised by how many mistakes there are in the short bit about my work:



Also unhelpful are the activities and proposals by Harvard Law School professor Lawrence Lessig. A prominent specialist in copyright law, Lessig took on the problem of money in politics just a few years ago

[8 years ago, but how time flies when you’re having fun!]

and has since pushed various proposals. At first he called for a Constitutional Convention,

[I do not advocate for a “constitutional convention” in the sense of the convention of 1787. I have only ever called for an Article V convention — a “convention to propose amendments” which is not what the convention of 1787 was. All an A(V) convention can do is “propose”; the 1787 convention (because a “constitutional convention”) had the power to change the rules of of ratification, which it did. But it’s clear we need better work in making this distinction clear. The Framers had a “constitutional convention” (with the constituent power to “alter or abolish” a constitution; the current Article V movement is not for a “constitutional convention.” It is only for a convention “to propose amendments” — which are not valid till ratified by 38 states.]

which would be a disaster since it could lead to all sorts of other proposals.

[If it is a “proposing convention,” not sure of the “disaster” in “other proposals” — since nothing changes unless the proposals are ratified by 38 states. If it is a “constitutional convention” then indeed, it could be a “disaster,” which again is why I am not calling for a “constitutional convention.”]

When this idea came under attack from, among others, law professors, Lessig retreated

[Huh? I have never retreated; indeed, I was just in Delaware testifying in favor of a Proposing Convention at Wolf-PAC’s request]

and encouraged people in the Occupy Wall Street movement to think they could overcome Citizens United through political pressure to amend the First Amendment.

[My efforts have almost obsessively been focused on getting Congress to enact small dollar public funding of campaigns, and I have not made friends in “the movement” by pressing so firmly on the argument that this —as opposed to “amend[ing] the first amendment” — is what we need to do first.]

After that movement fizzled out—at least in its initial form—Lessig formed his own Super PAC, called Mayday, to raise funds to fight the Super PACs.

[We were not “fighting SuperPACs”]

He selected eight candidates to back in the 2014 midterms, on the grounds that they would support campaign finance reform. All but two of his selections lost, and the candidates who won had been expected to anyway.

[Almost true — Ruben Gallego won a hotly contested primary, the data suggests, in part because of our support.]

Now Lessig has a new proposal for 2016: it involves a complicated process by which his followers would identify members of Congress who are leaders on campaign finance reform—though there’s really no mystery about who they are.

[Wrong again. Mayday.US is recruiting citizens to recruit Members to become leaders, by becoming co-sponsors of reform. We know who the current co-sponsors are of course. But we’re trying to get more, so that reform at least seems feasible.]

In addition his followers would campaign in the primaries on the side of the candidate most interested in such reforms.

[True: we want to press this fight in non-partisan contexts].

His followers also would discourage contributions to a candidate in the primary who wasn’t backing campaign finance reform.

The problems with Lessig’s proposals are several: he’s leading people, from whom he now receives contributions, to believe that their efforts will be able to transform Congress into a body that’s ready to back campaign finance reform, election by election, which means that even if his scheme worked his younger followers would be very old by the time such a transformation occurred.

[Wow. Even the most cursory review of our plan documents shows this is just wrong. We ran an experiment in 2014 to see whether we could spend big and make reform an issue. IF that worked, we would have pushed a much bigger campaign in 2016. It didn’t, so now we have shifted to (1) recruiting leaders during the off election year, and (2) targeting primary fights in election years. This isn’t a 40 year strategy; it’s up and out.]

Second, his funds will always be overwhelmed by the corporations that are raising money for their own political interests.

[Non sequitur anyone?]

There are no shortcuts.

[And yet, there are so many possible cliches.]