Did NATO Intervention Make Libya’s War Bloodier?

In the latest issue of International Security, Alan Kuperman makes the case [abstract only for those without access] that NATO intervention prolonged and made much more bloody Libya’s 2011 war (for a previous post on Kuperman skepticism about the efficacy of humanitarian intervention, see here). He argues that the conventional wisdom that the intervention stopped a massacre of regime opponents is almost certainly wrong:

Although the government did respond forcefully to the rebels, it never targeted

civilians or resorted to “indiscriminate” force, as Western media reported.

Indeed, early press accounts exaggerated the death toll by a factor of

ten….From March 5 to March 15, Libyan government forces retook

all but one of the major rebel-held cities, including Ajdabiya, Bani Walid,

Brega, Ras Lanuf, Zawiya, and most of Misurata. In none of those cities did the

regime target civilians in revenge, let alone commit a bloodbath.

While Kuperman doubts that the intervention prevented a bloodbath, he finds strong evidence that NATO’s role prolonged the war, increasing the overall death toll:

NATO intervention signicantly exacerbated humanitarian suffering in Libya and Mali, as well as security threats throughout the region. The only apparent benefit is that Libyans have been able to vote in democratic elections, but the elected government has little authority in a country now controlled by dozens of tribal and Islamist militias accountable to no one. NATO intervention increased the duration of Libya’s civil war by approximately six times, and its death toll by seven to ten times.

Even more broadly, he argues, the intervention produced instability in the region, including in Mali and even Syria: