Updated 2 p.m.

Ten years of war. Two years of an accelerated effort to train Afghans to take over that fight, at an annual cost of $6 billion. And not a single Afghan army battalion can operate without assistance from U.S. or allied units.

That was the assessment made by the officer responsible for training those Afghan soldiers, Lt. Gen. William Caldwell. Out of approximately 180 Afghan National Army battalions, only two operate "independently." Except that "independently," in Caldwell's National Training Mission-Afghanistan command, means something different than "independently" does in the States.

Those two "independent" battalions still require U.S. support for their maintenance, logistics and medical systems," Caldwell admitted when Pentagon reporters pressed him on Monday morning.

"Today, we haven't developed their systems to enable them to do that yet," Caldwell said.

Building up foreign armies isn't easy. During 2008's battle for Basra, Iraqi forces relied heavily on U.S. and British support – and still saw more than a thousand desertions. That was four years after then Maj. Gen. David Petraeus took over the training of the Iraqi military.

For the past two years, Caldwell's overseen a big push to expand, professionalize and train Afghan soldiers and cops. Caldwell has gotten bodies into uniforms: the Afghan army and police total 305,516 today, up from 196,508 last December, and they're "on track," Caldwell says, to reach 352,000 by November 2012.

Caldwell praised Afghan police officers during the Taliban’s audacious attack on Kabul earlier this month. Two separate cops “literally did a bear hug” on separate suicide bombers in different places around the city, sacrificing themselves in the process. "Policemen were doing heroic deeds," Caldwell said.

But most of Afghanistan's men in uniform can't read at a kindergarten level, much less understand the instrument panels on a helicopter or the serial numbers on their rifles.

That's one reason why it'll be years before the U.S. takes its training wheels off the Afghan soldiers' bikes. Although the Obama administration plans to turn the war over to forces Caldwell trains by 2014, Caldwell told Danger Room in June that the Afghans will need U.S. training until as late as 2017.

That is, if attrition doesn't get in the way. Caldwell expressed alarm that 1.4 percent of Afghan cops and 2.3 percent of Afghan soldiers walk off the job every month, saying that if "left unchecked [attrition] could undo much of the progress made to date." Yet last week, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta testified that attrition rates are "as much as three percent per month.

Asked by Danger Room about the increase, Caldwell simply said that the "goal we've set" is a 1.4 monthly attrition level across both forces. In the Afghan National Army, attrition "has been steady over the last year. We have not seen the decline," Caldwell said.

Then there's the nagging issue of human rights. "U.S. officials have for years been aware of credible allegations that newly-installed Kandahar police chief [Brigadier General Abdul] Raziq and his men participated in a cold-blooded massacre of civilians," writes Matthieu Aikins, in a gut-wrenching new expose for The Atlantic. Yet Raziq has been showered with cash and official praises from the highest level of the American-led coalition in Afghanistan.

Caldwell has instituted an additional 18 hours of training on respecting Afghans' rights into the eight-week course that the typical would-be Afghan cop takes. But Caldwell doesn't train every Afghan cop. Members of a program called the Afghan Local Police – founded in 2010 by Petraeus to recruit auxiliaries against the Taliban – has been implicated in "killings, rape, arbitrary detention, abductions, forcible land grabs, and illegal raids by irregular armed groups," according to a Human Rights Watch report issued this month.

Special Operations Forces are responsible for turning these groups into respectable units. When Danger Room asked if it was time for Caldwell to take over that training, Caldwell said, "We've not been asked to at this point... If there is a request for us to help and become engaged in that, we obviously would. But at this point, I think the special forces element that has the responsibility for that clearly sees and understands what that report says. We all take that very seriously."

With insurgents assassinating the man in charge of negotiating a peace deal, the Afghan security forces are the backbone of the U.S.' long-term plan for Afghan security. During his Senate testimony on Thursday, Panetta called their development "one of the most notable successes" of the war.

Yet not only can no Afghan army battalion operate without U.S. aid, the U.S. has been purchasing them a lot of creature comforts. Caldwell said that his command recently stopped buying air conditioning units for Afghan barracks, replacing them with fans instead – part of an effort to pare down the $6 billion that it costs to keep the Afghan security forces going. Caldwell said he expects that number to drop – in part because someday Afghanistan won't be ravaged by insurgency (maybe, hopefully) – but he doesn't know how much it'll drop by, or by when.

"I'm still very realistic about the challenges out there," Caldwell said.

Update: I misheard Caldwell during today's Pentagon briefing when he discussed the goal he's set for monthly attrition rates. Thanks to his public-affairs officer, Lt. Col. Shawn Stroud, for alerting me to my mistake.

Photo: Flickr/DVIDSHUB

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