Judge Richard A Jones of the Western District of Washington has confirmed the collusion between the FBI and Carnegie Mellon University in carrying out an attack on the Tor network. This disclosure occurred in Jone's denial of a motion to compel discovery put forth by attorneys representing Brian Farrell who is alleged to be DoctorClu of the Silk Road 2.0 according to prosecutors. The revelation settles the mystery surrounding the "lead" on Farrell's IP address received on July 30th of 2014 by the department of Homeland Security. This previously uncertain lead enabled by Carnegie Mellon's collaboration lead to months of surveillance of Farrell's residential address before Farrell was raided and arrested on January 2nd, 2015.

This entry into the public record confirms that the United States government is selectively treating domestic law enforcement cases as a military problem while precious few citizens of the United States are treating the defense of their liberty with comparable severity. This entry into the record would make Farrell's case promising in appellate courts maintained by righteous judges, but there is a poverty of actual justice in the United States court system. The full text of the order is presented below:

Case 2:15-cr-00029-RAJ Document 58 Filed 02/23/16 Page 1 of 4

Judge Richard A. Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

NO. CR15-029RAJ

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO COMPEL

v.

BRIAN FARRELL,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s Motion to Compel Discovery.

(Dkt. #48). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the defendant’s Motion

to Compel Discovery.

The defendant is charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine, heroin, and

methamphetamine by virtue of his alleged operation as an administrator with the online

“Silk Road 2.0” website. According to the government, the site operated on the Tor

network with the ostensible purpose of its operation being to mask Internet Protocol

(“IP”) addresses of users of the network.

The record demonstrates that the defendant’s IP address was identified by the

Software Engineering Institute (“SEI”) of Carnegie Mellon University (CMU”) when SEI

was conducting research on the Tor network which was funded by the Department of

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO COMPEL – 1

Case 2:15-cr-00029-RAJ Document 58 Filed 02/23/16 Page 2 of 4

Defense (“DOD”). The government previously produced information to the defense that

Farrell’s IP address was observed when SEI was operating its computers on the Tor

network. This information was obtained by law enforcement pursuant to a subpoena

served on SEI-CMU.

Based upon the submissions of the parties, it is clear to the court the government

has provided to the defendant basic information about the technique used by SEI to

obtain IP addresses of Tor users, including the defendant. Among other items, the

government’s disclosures included information regarding the funding and structure

relationship between SEI and DOD, as well as directing the defendant to publicly

available materials regarding the Tor network.

The defendant seeks to compel disclosure of additional material pertaining to the

relationship between SEI and federal law enforcement and the methods used by SEI to

identify the defendant’s IP address. The detailed specifics of the request are reflected in

Exhibit A to the defendant’s motion.

II. ANALYSIS

The record before the Court suggests that the only information associated with the

defendant and collected by SEI subject to a suppression motion is his IP address. Yet, the

defendant seeks additional technical details as to how SEI operated and captured the

information. From the record, it appears the only information passed on to law

enforcement about the defendant was his IP address. There is nothing presented by the

defense, other than rank speculation, that anything more was obtained by SEI and

provided to law enforcement to identify the defendant.

The Court agrees with the government that applicable Ninth Circuit authority

precludes the defendant’s success on his motion. SEI’s identification of the defendant’s

IP address because of his use of the Tor network did not constitute a search subject to

Fourth Amendment scrutiny. The Court reaches this conclusion primarily upon reliance

on United States v. Forrester, 512 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 2007). In Forrester, the court

clearly enunciated that: “Internet users have no expectation of privacy in …the IP address

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MOTION TO COMPEL – 2

Case 2:15-cr-00029-RAJ Document 58 Filed 02/23/16 Page 3 of 4

of the websites they visit because they should know that this information is provided to

and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of

information.” Id. at 510.

In the instant case, it is the Court’s understanding that in order for a prospective

user to use the Tor network they must disclose information, including their IP addresses,

to unknown individuals running Tor nodes, so that their communications can be directed

toward their destinations. Under such a system, an individual would necessarily be

disclosing his identifying information to complete strangers. Again, according to the

parties’ submissions, such a submission is made despite the understanding communicated

by the Tor Project that the Tor network has vulnerabilities and that users might not

remain anonymous. Under these circumstances Tor users clearly lack a reasonable

expectation of privacy in their IP addresses while using the Tor network. In other words,

they are taking a significant gamble on any real expectation of privacy under these

circumstances.

Equally supportive of this determination, which this Court agrees with, is Judge

Robert Bryan’s ruling in United States v. Michaud, W.D. Wa. No. 15-cr-05351,

Dkt. #140, p. 14, where the court held that the IP address was public information.

The evidence before this Court indicates that SEI obtained the defendant’s IP

address while he was using the Tor network and SEI was operating nodes on that

network, and not by any access to his computer. For these reasons, any other discovery

about the methodology or technique used to identify the defendant’s IP address is not

material to his defense.

In addition, the defendant seeks disclosures regarding contacts between SEI, the

Department of Justice, and federal law enforcement. This request includes the period

before and after SEI performed the subject research, with the thrust of the request

premised upon the substance of meetings between DOJ and SEI. The Court is satisfied

that the government has met its discovery obligations on this request. The government

provided the extent of the relationship between DOJ and SEI, and the substance of

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MOTION TO COMPEL – 3

Case 2:15-cr-00029-RAJ Document 58 Filed 02/23/16 Page 4 of 4

meetings in which representatives from DOJ and SEI were present. Nothing further is

required.

As to the remaining discovery requests, they are denied. Request No. 1 is moot in

light of the government’s observation that it is irrelevant to the defendant’s case. Request

No. 2 is overbroad and certainly not narrowly tailored, as it calls for documents related to

the entire federal government and SEI during a two-year period. Moreover, the

government (according to the attachments to the government’s response) has provided

the relevant contracts at issue between SEI, DOJ, and DOD. As to Request Nos. 3 and 4,

nothing further is required to be produced. Request Nos. 5 through 9 are the subject of

this Order and require no further explanation.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the defendant’s Motion to Compel

Discovery. (Dkt. #48).

DATED this 23rd day of February, 2016.

The Honorable Richard A. Jones

United States District Judge

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO COMPEL – 4