M/S Estonia - the visor didn't cause the sinking On 28 September 2019, it is 25 years since the M/S Estonia sank in the Baltic Sea 1994 and Prime Minister Carl Bildt ordered Swedish Accident Investigation Board, SHK, to confirm that the visor had fallen off and caused the accident. Bildt knew that the M/S Estonia transported military contraband and that certain parties did not like it. The SHK Director General Olof Forssberg was eager to help Bildt and SHK shipbuilding technical expert, my old friend, navy commander Börje Stenström invented a fantasy story that media announced as TRUTH. I didn't believe it. The above three persons covered up a crime incl. kidnapping of innocent people. Media helped. The story is still going on ...

M/S Joola Det kan ju vara av intresse att veta varför lilla senegalflaggade M/S 'Joola' kapsejsade och sedan flöt upp och ned på det oskadade skrovet den 28 september 2002 utanför Gambia. Hennes deplacement var ca 2 150 ton och dödvikten 500 ton vid djupgående d=3.1 meter. Hennes metacentrum M var ca 5,9 meter över kölen K, KM=5,9 m.

Normalt var tyngdpunkten G ca 5,1 meter over kölen, KG=5,1 meter, vilket innebär att den berömda metacenterhöjden GM=0,8 m. 'Joola' kunde ta 580 passagerare, ca 40 ton levande vikt. M/S Al Salam Boccaccio 98 The M/V AL SALAM BOCCACCIO 98, was a Panama registered ropax vessel, which sank on 3 February, 2006, at approximately 01.33 hours Egypt local time (23.33 hours UTC on February 02, 2006), during a short international voyage across the Red Sea, where she departed from the Port of Duba, Saudi Arabia, with destination to Safaga, Egypt. It was suggested that (i) a fire broke out in the main RO-RO cargo space - garage - in the ship's superstructure (car deck), that (ii) water of the spray fire extinguishing system used to extinguish the fire could not escape, as (iii) the scuppers were blocked and that (iv) the weight of this water caused the vessel to capsize and sink and (v) that >1 000 persons drowned, while the Master and crew just watched and didn't contact the ship owner at Cairo. I think sabotage took place - of ship and of investgation. M/S Costa Concordia The Italian flag/registry M/S Costa Concordia was incorrectly designed, substandard, unsafe and not seaworthy at departure 13 January 2012 with ship owner's and Italian maritime authority's knowledge and the insurances were not valid. Crew, mostly underpaid foreigners, were not available aboard to muster passengers and escort them to the lifeboats and to launch all lifesaving appliances to enable safe and complete abandon ship of all passengers in an emergency. The ship had 25 illegal, watertight doors in the hull that caused the capsize the following day. Media has never reported these simple facts. By pure luck most people aboard managed to leave the ship anyway before it capsized and sank. Later the wreck was salvaged, put in drydock and ... finally towed to sea and was sunk .... again! High Safety at Sea You expect that the marine industry really wants to learn from accidents to achieve better safety. Accidents occur every day at sea. Do we learn anything from the investigations? Are the corrective measures right? Three very big accidents come to mind - the Exxon Valdez grounding in 1989 (35 000 tonnes of crude oil spilled), the Estonia sinking in 1994 (at least 852 dead) and the Erika sinking in 1999 (>10 000 tonnes of heavy fuel spilled). What do these three accidents have in common? One answer is that the casualty investigations were not done as agreed by the IMO. The IMO has adopted resolutions about how accident investigations shall be done since more than 40 years. The early resolutions were recommendations; the latest is a Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents. If the spirit of the resolutions is followed, there should be no problem. The resolutions are sometimes not followed. Independent innovators of better safety at sea like Heiwa Co have difficulties. Fast Resuce Boats are unsafe According PART A, MANDATORY STANDARDS REGARDING PROVISIONS OF THE ANNEX TO THE STCW CONVENTION , Chapter VI: Standards regarding emergency, occupational safety, security, medical care and survival functions, Knowledge, understanding and proficiency, all seamen should know and be trained about, e.g.: (i) Safety precautions during launch and recovery of a fast rescue boat, FRB, (ii) Launching and recovery of fast rescue boat, FRB, in prevailing and adverse weather and sea conditions. I explain here all about a SOLAS Fast Rescue Boat, FRB, and why it is useless, unsafe, no means of rescue and kill seamen in spite of IMO recommending not to train with an FRB or that Port State Control, PSC, should not penalize ships not training with an FRB, etc. And why the IMO is doing nothing. Why do new passenger ships suddenly lose stability and roll over? Recently (2006) a newly built passenger ship suddenly - in a few seconds without warning - rolled over >20° in fine weather and many passengers were hurt losing balance and being thrown into walls and on decks. All water in the deck swimming pool flowed out. There was panic. Then the vessel stabilized itself at abt 15° angle of list and slowly the vessel became upright again. Why did this happen? It has of course happened before! A couple of years ago (1999) it happened to another newly built passenger ship at breakfast time. The ship suddenly rolled over, the whole breakfast buffet was thrown into the wall and on the deck and passengers lost balance and were thrown around. The ship owners quickly blamed the sudden loll on the rudders (sic)! They had turned too quickly and the vessel listed. Do you believe that? In the latter case the vessel remained at >15° list even after the rudders were put back straight. And slowly the vessel became upright. What actually happened? Vinnova (Swedish agency) Vinnova - Verket för innovationssystem - fick i april 2001 uppdrag att hantera regeringens beslutade program för utvecklings- och forskningsarbete inom sjösäkerhetsområdet. Bakgrund - Estonia hade en rad sjösäkerhetsbrister Vinnova säger själv på sin webbsida att bakgrunden för detta beslut var bl.a. Estoniakommissionens lämnade slutrapport (5) om M/S 'Estonia's förlisning: "I rapporten (5) konstaterade kommissionen att fartyget hade en rad sjösäkerhetsbrister. Dessa avsåg bl.a. fartygets konstruktion, utrymningsmöjligheter och rutiner, räddningsutrustning och räddningssystem. Enligt kommissionen var det huvudsakligen dessa brister som låg bakom olyckan och dess allvarliga konsekvenser. Kommissionen rekommenderade även andra åtgärder för att förbättra sjösäkerheten, bl.a. framtagande av system för kvalitetssäkring vid konstruktions och tillverkning av fartyg, säkerhetsanalyser, system för utrymning och räddning efter ett fartygshaveri och ny livräddningsutrustning". Learning from Marine Accidents This paper should have been read at the 'Learning from Marine Incidents II' conference in London 14 March 2002. The Royal Institution of Naval Architects howevere decided to stop the presentation, so you have to read it here. Marine accidents occur every day. Most accidents are minor and are investigated by professional hull or P&I underwriters surveyors to everyone's satisfaction. Some accidents are bigger and may be investigated by persons from the flag states accident investigation board. The results of such investigations and subsequent reports may contribute to safety at sea. Unfortunately where extremely serious incidents occur, such as large oil spills or ferry sinkings with a large death toll, there is a danger that the subsequent investigation becomes entangled with vested interests and the cause of the incident attributed may vary from the actual causes. Regrettably this can mean a deterioration in safety at sea. The author looks at some recent marine accidents and the resulting investigations. Fast Rescue Boats and Piracy If you Google on Fast Rescue Boats, you'll find the Heiwa Co web page on first Google page. That page explains why a Fast Rescue Boat, FRB, is useless as a life saving appliance, LSA on ships at sea in spite of being a SOLAS requirement. Reason is that an FRB is difficult to launch from a seagoing ship and impossible to retrieve at sea and that seamen may be killed in the process. FRBs are not really supposed to be retrieved at sea! They are best used from shore!