Jason Noble

jnoble2@dmreg.com

A tight race between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders could heighten the importance of perhaps the least-understood aspect of Iowa’s first-in-the-nation caucuses: the mind-numbingly complex arithmetic that decides the Democratic winner.

Given the closeness of recent polling, successful maneuvering by Sanders and Clinton supporters to win over Martin O’Malley’s supporters — or even to prop up his candidacy in certain precincts — could decide who wins the caucuses Feb. 1 and who heads to New Hampshire with momentum behind them, several caucus experts said.

“It’s serious business,” said Tri-County Democrats Chairman Kurt Meyer, who has remained neutral in the 2016 caucus race. “If in every precinct, you can get one more delegate by virtue of familiarity with the rules and familiarity with some of the strategies, that’s not inconsequential in a race that many think is going to be within the margin of polling error.”

For evidence, consider 2008. According to former Iowa Democratic Party Caucus Director Norm Sterzenbach, the Barack Obama campaign’s shrewd manipulation of caucus math was instrumental in wounding Clinton, who for months was seen as that race’s front-runner but finished a disappointing third in Iowa.

“The Obama campaign really strategized on this, and I think that strategy alone was the difference between Clinton coming in second and third,” Sterzenbach said. “And that was a very big victory.”

Caucus math

Understanding caucus-night strategy requires a bit of background on the Democratic process. Here’s an abridged explanation:

Rather than simply casting ballots and counting them, Democratic caucuses calculate candidates’ support based on the delegates they’ll send to subsequent party meetings. That math-intensive process alone is enough to complicate the race, but there’s another big caveat: A candidate must secure a baseline level of support at a given caucus site to be eligible for delegates.

For the front-running Clinton and Sanders, the arcane rules add a layer of strategic complexity to the basic objective of packing the state’s 1,681 precincts with supporters. They also could make O’Malley more important than his also-ran polling numbers suggest.

Unlike the Republican caucuses, where the party takes a straw poll of attendees’ favorite candidates, the Democratic Party determines support for candidates by dividing up caucusgoers based on their presidential preference — literally by forming groups in different corners of the precinct site. Delegates are assigned based on the support each candidate has in the room, and ultimately translated into statewide results.

But there’s a catch: Candidates with support from less than 15 percent of attendees in a given precinct are declared nonviable, and their supporters must either recruit additional backers, realign with another candidate or declare themselves uncommitted.

Together, these rules not only make participants’ choices public but also make them subject to change before the night is over. And that, in turn, opens the door to all kinds of gamesmanship.

Photos: Hillary Clinton's Iowa campaign

Strategies

There are two basic tactics for maximizing delegates at a given precinct. But given the personal nature of caucuses and the near-infinite permutations of situations that can arise in 1,681 separate sites, it’s not as easy as applying a mathematical formula.

The first move is the obvious one: When a candidate is declared nonviable, the supporters from viable campaigns put on a full-court press to win over the orphaned supporters. Adding to one’s own numbers — or blocking a rival from gaining strength — can affect the ultimate delegate allocation.

Often, this process sorts itself out. Caucusgoers frequently have a second choice in mind and gravitate to a certain campaign on their own. But if someone is truly undecided, they’ll be helped along by real and contrived relationships that have been formulated months or years ahead of the caucus.

The community of Democratic caucusgoers can be a relatively small one, particularly in rural areas, Meyer said. That means there’s a good chance the attendees will know each other, and can be persuaded by their personal connections.

“There’s our friend Tom in a nonviable group,” Meyer said, spinning out a caucus night hypothetical. “C’mon, Tom. C’mon over here. Your next-door neighbor is here. Your cousin is here. Your brother-in-law is here.”

Beyond those relationships, caucus organizers for the Democratic campaigns say their precinct captains have been making intensive and personal outreach efforts to identify not only hardcore supporters but also undecideds and backers of other candidates who might be won over.

That outreach effort lasts for months, and includes not just phone calls and campaign mail but also knocks on the door and handwritten notes.

“Most of the people who are not in our group, whether they come in supporting another candidate or they come in undecided, will likely have had a conversation either on the phones or the doors with our precinct captain,” said Michelle Kleppe, the organizing director for the Clinton campaign in Iowa. “We’re going to go back to those relationships and those conversations.”

Photos: Martin O'Malley's Iowa campaign

Less common but still possible is for supporters of a leading candidate to shift their allegiance to a nonviable candidate, making that candidate viable and stealing a delegate from a third candidate.

As an example, Richard Bender, a longtime aide to former U.S. Sen. Tom Harkin who helped write the caucus rules in 1971, described a scenario that could play out in a precinct with four delegates up for grabs and 50 attendees.

Suppose Candidate A has 26 supporters, followed by Candidate B with 18 and Candidate C with six. As it stands, Candidate C does not have support from 15 percent of the attendees, and isn’t viable, so candidates A and B would each win two delegates.

But if two supporters from Candidate A switched their allegiance to Candidate C, Candidate C would become viable with eight supporters. That would shift the delegate allocations to two for Candidate A and one each for Candidates B and C. If Candidate B is the bigger rival across the state, that shift is a net gain for Candidate A.

“In reality, being in a situation where this will work and knowing the precise numbers and being able to convince some attenders to publicly switch their allegiance all within the time frame allowed is going to be relatively rare,” Bender said.

Sterzenbach agreed that such moves are tough to pull off. But they can be meaningful — especially given the dynamics of the 2016 race, where Clinton and Sanders are thought to be running neck and neck while O’Malley lags far behind.

“It doesn’t happen very often but when it does — with a smart precinct captain who understands the dynamics — it can make a huge difference. Making O’Malley viable at the expense of Sanders is a big win for Hillary,” Sterzenbach said.

Photos: Bernie Sanders' Iowa campaign

Intense training

So even as they build relationships, the campaigns are working to master the math as well.

Kleppe, the Clinton campaign organizing director, described a training regime for precinct volunteers that included mock caucuses, jeopardy games, online quizzes, role playing and in-person training.

The Sanders campaign is also training precinct captains and volunteers on the finer points of caucus process, spokeswoman Rania Batrice said. But the Sanders campaign's training is most focused on simplifying the caucus process for the many young people and first-time caucus attendees expected to turn out on his behalf.

“It’s actually quite easy,” Batrice said. “It takes more time than just walking in and casting a ballot, but what we’ve been saying is if you can stand or sit underneath a Bernie sign, you’re caucusing.”

When it comes to winning over undecideds and partisans from nonviable groups, she added, the Sanders campaign will draw on its nontraditional supporters' energy and passion to make the case in personal, relatable terms.

For O’Malley, who’s currently polling in Iowa around 5 percent according to averages compiled by Real Clear Politics, the calculation is simpler: Exceed that 15 percent viability threshold in as many places as possible

“Our approach is going to be viability by any means necessary,” said Jake Oeth, the O’Malley campaign’s state director.