This digital edition Copyright © 2005 by Joseph H. Peterson. All rights reserved.

NOTE: For a more recent translation, see Proclus: Elements of Theology

Proclus, one of the so-called Neo-Platonic philosophers (411-485 CE), had an enormous influence on the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, Ficino, Pico, Agrippa, Bruno, and others. This work is also known as Elements of Theology.

Note: All of the page numbers have anchor tags, so can be referenced individually, for example, http://www.esotericarchives.com/proclus/metaelem.htm#p30. Likewise, the propositions can be referenced, for example, http://www.esotericarchives.com/proclus/metaelem.htm#prop30. Errata and addenda have been incorporated, and other obvious typos corrected.

Please let me know if you find any other typos, or have suggestions for improving this e-text or web site. Thanks. -JHP, November 8, 2005.



TO

WILLIAM T. HARRIS, LL. D.,

The Greatest American Thinker,

who for over fifty years has battled in de­fense

of God, Freedom and Immortality, against

sottish atheists and materialists, this book is dedi­cated

as an expression of admiration and friendship.

[i] INTRODUCTION.

Proclus, the famous philosopher, mathematician, and poet, came into the world of time and sense on the 8th day of February, A. D. 410, at Byzantium, and mi­grated from this physical life on April the 17th. 485 A.D.1 His parents, Patricius and Marcella, were Lycians and of an illustrious family. He was taken immed­iately after his birth to their native country, to the city of Xanthus, which was consecrated to Apollo. And this happened to him by a certain divine providence: for it was necessary that he who was to be the leader of all sciences should be educated under the presiding Deity of the Muses. He received his elementary edu­cation in Lycia, and then went to Alexandria, in Egypt, and became a pupil of Leonas the rhetorician, and Orion the grammarian. He likewise attended the schools of the Roman teachers, and acquired an accu­rate knowledge of the Latin language. But his tutelar Goddess exhorted him to study philosophy, and to go to the Athenian schools. In obedience to this exhorta­tion he attended the lectures of Olympiodorus, an emi­nent Peripatetic, in order to learn the doctrine of Aris­totle; and he was instructed in mathematical disciplines by Hero. On one occasion, after hearing a lecture by Olympiodorus, a man who was gifted with much eloquence, [ii] and who, by the rapidity of his speech and the depth of his subject was understood by but very few of his auditors, Proclus repeated to his companions the lecture nearly word for word, though the discourse was copious. He comprehended with great facility the writings of Aristotle pertaining to rational philosophy, though the bare reading of them is difficult to those who attempt the task. After learning all that his Alexandrian masters could teach him, he went to Athens accompanied by the Gods who preside over eloquence and philosophy, and by beneficent daemons. For that he might preserve the genuine and entire suc­cession of Plato, he was brought by the Gods to the city of the guardian (Athene) of Philosophy. Hence Proclus was called by way of preeminence the Pla­tonic Successor. At Athens he became the pupil of the first of philosophers, Syrianus,2 the son of Philoxenus, who not only taught him but made him the com­panion of his philosophic life, having found him such an auditor and successor as he had a long time sought for, and one who was capable of apprehending a multitude of disciplines and divine dogmas. In less than two years, therefore, Proclus read with Syrianus all the works of Aristotle, viz. his Logic, Ethics, Politics, Phys­ics, and Theological Science. And being sufficiently instructed in these as in certain proteleia,3 i. e., things [iii] preparatory to initiation, and lesser mysteries Syrianus led him to the sacred discipline of Plato, in an orderly progression, and not, according to the Chaldaean Oracle, with a transcendent foot. And he likewise enabled Proclus to survey with him truly divine mysteries, with [iv] the eyes of his soul free from material darkness, and with an undefiled intellectual vision. But Proclus, em­ploying sleepless exercise and attention, both by night and by day, and synoptically and judiciously recording the discourses of Syrianus, made so great a progress in his studies that by the time he was twenty-eight years of age he had composed a multitude of works, among them his Commentary on the Timæus, which is truly subtle and full of erudition. But from this course of training his manners became more adorned; and as he advanced in science he increased in virtue. The soul of Proclus, concentrating itself, and retiring into the depth of its essence, departed in a certain respect from body, while it yet appeared to be contained in its dark receptacle. For he possessed a Prudence, not like that of a civil character, which is conversant with the admin­istration of fluctuating particulars, but Prudence itself, by itself pure, which is engaged in contemplating, and converting itself to itself, in nowise agreeing with a cor­poreal nature. He likewise possessed a Temperance free from the inferior part or body, which is not even moderately influenced by perturbations, but is abstracted from all affections. And, lastly, he acquired a Forti­tude, which does not fear a departure from the body. But reason and intellect dominating in him, and the in­ferior powers of his soul no longer opposing them­selves to purifying Justice, his whole life was adorned with the divine irradiations of genuine Virtue. Proclus, having perfected himself in this form of the virtues, ad­vancing as it were by the highest and most mystical step ascended to the greatest and most consummate virtues, being conducted by a prosperous nature and scientific discipline. For being now purified, rising above generation, and despising the wand or thyrsus-bearers in it,5 he was divinely inspired about the [v] Primal Essences, and became an inspector of the truly blessed spectacles which are in the Intelligible Sphere. It was no longer necessary for him to acquire a knowl­edge of them by processes of reasoning and demon­strations, but surveying them as it were by direct vision, and beholding by simple intuitions of the thinking power the paradigms in the Divine Intellect, he ob­tained a virtue which no one would rightly call Pru­dence, but rather Wisdom, or something even more venerable than this.6 Proclus therefore energizing ac­cording to this virtue easily comprehended all the the­ology of the Greeks and Barbarians, and that which is adumbrated in mythological fictions, and revealed it to those who are willing and able to understand it. He explained likewise every thing more enthusiastically than others, and brought the different theologies into harmony with each other. At the same time, investi­gating the writings of the Ancients, whatever he found in them genuine he judiciously adopted, but every thing [vi] of a vain and fruitless character he entirely rejected as erroneous. He likewise strenuously refuted by a dili­gent examination those doctrines which were contrary to truth. In his associations, too, with others he power­fully and clearly discussed the subjects presented for consideration, and delineated them in his writings. For he was laborious beyond measure: in one day he de­livered five and sometimes more lectures, and wrote as many as seven hundred verses.... In the beginning of his forty-second year he appeared to himself to pro­nounce with a loud voice these verses:

1. The following sketch of Proclus is taken almost verbatim from Marinus' Life of his Master. This biography is an admir­able production, and gives us much curious and interesting in­formation about the philosophic life of the Successors of Plato. It is unfortunate that Taylor's English version of it is practically in­accessible. (It was printed in 1792.) The original text was edited by Fabricius, Hamburg, 1700, Lond., 1703; by Boissonade, Leip., 1814, and in the Cobet edition of Diogenes Laertius, Paris, 1850; and by Cousin, in his Procli Opera Inedita, Paris, 1864.



2. This truly great man appears to have been the first who thoroughly penetrated the profundity contained in the writings of the more ancient philosophers, contemporary with and prior to Plato, and to have demonstrated the admirable agreement of their doctrines with each other. Unfortunately but few of his works are extant. —T.



3. Aristotle's philosophy when compared with the discipline of Plato is, I think, deservedly considered in this place as bearing the relation of the proteleia to the epopteia in sacred mysteries. Now the proteleia, i.e., things previous to perfection, belong to the initiated, and the mystics; the former of whom were intro­duced into some lighter ceremonies only, but the mystics were permitted to be present with certain preliminary and lesser sacred concerns. On the other hand the epoptaa were admitted into the sanctuary of the greater sacred rites, and became specta­tors of the symbols and more interior ceremonies. Aristotle indeed appears to be every where an enemy to the doctrine of ideas, as un­derstood by Plato, though they are doubtless the leading stars of all true philosophy. However the great excellence of his works, considered as an introduction to the divine theology of Plato, de­serves the most unbounded commendation. Agreeable to this Damascius informs us that Isidorus the philosopher, "grasped only slightly the rhetorical and poetical arts, but devoted himself to the more divine philosophy of Aristotle. Discovering, however, that this was based more on necessary reasons than intuitive intellect, that the procedure by method was deemed sufficient, and that it did not entirely employ a divine or intellectual insight, he was but little solicitous about his doctrine. But when he tasted the conceptions of Plato, he did not think it worth while "to look any further," as Pindar says, [Olymp. I. 183.] but expecting to gain his desired end if he could penetrate into the adyta of Plato's thought, he there­fore directed to this purpose the whole course of his application. Of the most ancient philosophers, he deified Pythagoras and Plato, believing that they were among those winged souls which in the supercelestial place, in the plain of Truth, and in the meadow there, are nourished by divine ideas." (Photii Bibliotheca, p. 337. Vol. II. ed. Bekker.) —T.



The form of the foregoing note has been changed somewhat, and the quotation from Damascius extended. This note was written in 1792: Taylor's mature conclusion was that the opposi­tion of Aristotle to the Platonic doctrines, even to that of Ideas, was purely apparent. "He strenuously maintained that Aristotle was not only the pupil but in the strictest sense the holder of the Platonic dogmas; contrary to the ignorant and rash deduc­tions of the moderns, who had never fully comprehended either master or pupil."



5. The narthex (wand or thrysus) is a symbol of material and partible fabrication .because it has as it were a false form: for it is wood and not wood. More rightly is it so called on ac­count of its sundered continuity, whence it is likewise a Titanic plant. For they hold it before Dionysus (Bacchus) instead of his paternal sceptre, and through this they call him into a partible nature. Moreover, the Titans are wand or thyrsus-bearers; and Prometheus concealed fire in a reed, by which we may under­stand either that he draws down celestial light into generation, or leads the soul into body, or calls forth divine illumination, the whole of which is ungenerated, into generation. Hence Socrates Orphically calls the multitude thyrsus-bearers, because they live Titanically. —Olympiodorus: Commentary on the Phædo, p. 96, (ed. Finckh, Heilbron. 1847).



6. Doubtless the fashionable philosophasters of this mater­ialistic age will shake their empty heads over the intellectual training of Proclus and brand it as "mystical," but since the opinion of these sapient gentlemen arises from ignorance and in­capacity it will not disturb those whose thought ranges beyond the barriers of sense and matter.

Lo! on my soul a sacred fire descends,

Whose vivid power the intellect extends;

From whence far beaming thro' dull body's night.

It soars to aether deck'd with starry light;

And with soft murmurs thro the azure round,

The lucid regions of the Gods resound. Moreover, he clearly perceived that he belonged to the Hermetic chain; and was persuaded by a dream that he possessed the soul of Nicomachus the Pythag­orean.7 Ammonius Hermeias, a genuine Platonist and likewise [vii] one of the best of the Aristotelian commentators, says (Com. De Interpret. Aristot.): "If we are able to add any thing to the elucidation of this book from recollect­ing the interpretations of our divine teacher, Proclus the Platonic Successor, who possessed the power of un­folding the opinions of the Ancients, and a scientific judgment of the nature of things, in the highest perfec­tion possible to humanity, we shall be very grateful to the God of discourse (Hermes)." Cousin declares (Procli Opera, Præfatio Generalis): "Proclus was illustri­ous as an astronomer; he was the first among the philol­ogists of his age; he had so comprehended all religions in his mind, and regarded them with such equal reverence, [viii] that he was as it were the hierophant of the whole universe: nor was it wonderful that a man possessing such a profound knowledge of nature and science should have this initiation into all sacred mysteries.... As he was the head of the Athenian School and of all later philosophy, so I may affirm that all the earlier is found gathered up in him, and that he may be taken as the one interpreter of the whole philosophy of the Greeks.... I shall set it down as an established fact that nothing great was thought out by Iamblichus, Por­phyry, and Plotinus, either in Ethics, Metaphysics, or Physics, which is not found expressed more clearly and methodically in Proclus.... The threefold division of Greek Philosophy may be reduced ultimately to one, which being the same always, by a natural and certain progress enlarges and unfolds itself, and moves on through three stages intimately connected, the first be­ing contained in the second, the second in the third, so that the man who after the lapse of ages finds himself at the end of this gradually evolving series, on the high­est apex of that third age, as he embraces all the ac­cumulations of former times in himself, stands as the representative of each sect of Greece, emphatically the Greek philosopher — such a man I say was Proclus, in whom it seems to me are combined and from whom shine forth in no irregular or uncertain rays all the phil­osophical lights which have illuminated Greece in vari­ous times, to wit Orpheus, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus."



7. No opinion is more celebrated than that of the metem­psychosis of Pythagoras, but perhaps no doctrine is more gener­ally mistaken. By most of the present day it is exploded as ridiculous; and the few who retain some veneration for its founder endeavor to destroy the literal, and to confine it to an al­legorical meaning. By some of the ancients this mutation was limited to similar bodies; so that they conceived the human soul might transmigrate into various human bodies, but not into those of brutes. And this was the opinion of Hierocles, as may be seen in his Commentary on the Golden Verses. But why may not the human soul become connected with subordinate, as well as with superior lives, by a tendency of inclination? Do not similars love to be united; and is there not in all kinds of life something similar and common? Hence when the affec­tions of the soul verge to a baser nature, while connected with a human body, these affections, on the dissolution of such a body, become enveloped as it were in a brutal nature, and the rational eye in this case clouded with perturbations is oppressed by the irrational energies of the brute, and surveys nothing but the dark phantasms of a degraded imagination. But this doctrine is vindicated by Proclus, with his usual acuteness, 1n his admir­able Commentaries on the Timæus, Lib, 5. p. 329, [Vol. III. p. 294. ed. Diehl], as follows: "It is usual to inquire how human souls can descend into brute animals. And some indeed think that there are certain similitudes of men to brutes, which they call brutal lives: for it is not possible that a rational essence can become the soul of a brute. But others allow that it may be immedi­ately sent into irrational animals, because all souls are of a similar form; so that they may become wolves and leopards and mollusks. But true reason indeed asserts that the human soul may enter into brutes, yet in such a manner that it may retain its own proper life; the soul riding as it were on and bound by sympathy to the brutal nature. And that this is the only mode of insinua­tion we have proved by a multitude of arguments, in our Com­mentaries on the Phædrus. If however it be requisite to remind the reader that this is the opinion of Plato, we may observe that in his Republic he says that the soul of Thersites assumed the na­ture of an ape, but not the body of an ape; and in the Phædrus that the soul descends into a brutal life, but not into a brutal body. For the life is conjoined to its proper soul. And in this place he says that it 'is changed into a brutal nature.' For a brutal nature is not a brutal body, but a brutal life." —T.

These eulogies, which may seem extravagant to those who know Proclus, if at all, only through the average historian of Philosophy, are in my deliberate judgment, a judgment formed after a study of many years of the writings of Proclus, based on the truth.





Proclus was unquestionably one of the greatest phi­losophers of any age or country. His authority was [ix] dominant during his own time: in all subsequent ages, directly and indirectly, he exerted an enormous and far-reaching influence through his writings, especially the Metaphysical Elements, which were generally read, either in the original or in translation. The noted Liber de Causis, which was compiled almost textually from the Metaphysical Elements, was one of the most famous and widely-circulated books of the medieval ages, and the source of many of the conceptions of the medieval thinkers, Christian and Arabian. It was at­tributed to Aristotle, and was variously known as Liber de essentia purae bonitatis, De causis causarum, De Intelligentiis, De Esse, etc. Jourdain says that the phi­losophy of the 10th Century cannot be known well, un­less the Liber de Causis and Fons Vitae are analyzed. Renan thought that the Liber de Causis holds in germ all the scholastic philosophy. Haureau9 observes: "Such is the 'Book concerning Causes,' which has made so great an uproar; which, according to the Church, has ruined so many consciences; which has produced at least so many scandals."



9. De La Phil. Scol. 1. 389.

It would be superfluous to enumerate the names of all the thinkers who were nurtured by his philosophic conceptions, but a few may be mentioned. The writings of Pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite, which profoundly inspired and influenced Christian thought for many centuries, owe much to Proclus. Generally, and particularly in his treatise On the Divine Names, Dionysius borrowed extensively from him. The hierarchies of Dionysius are modelled on the different orders of the "gods" ( qeoi ) which are divine natures, es­sences or forces, of varying power and rank. During the Renaissance Proclus, made known to the Latin world by the translations of divers of his [x] works by William of Moerbeke10 and Marsilius Ficinus [Ficino], was one of the mighty intellectual forces which emanci­pated mankind from the shackles of prejudice, bigotry, and ignorance. Later, the writings of Giordano Bruno and Benedict Spinoza show that they drew from Proclus some of their cardinal doctrines. In Modern times the influence of Proclus has not diminished. Many distinguished scholars and thinkers, though in all cases not directly, have been stimulated or inspired by his thought. Hegel, for instance, studied Proclus deeply, and was largely indebted to him. He gave special attention to the Elements, as is evidenced by his correspondence with Creuzer on the text.11



10. William of Moerbeke, Archbishop of Corinth, who flourished in the 13th Century, translated from the Greek into Latin several books of Proclus, among which was the Metaphysical Elements. He records that he finished his translation of the Elements on the 18th. day of May, 1268, at Viterbo, Italy. This is extant in Ms., but has never been printed. A Ms. Expositio of the Elements, by Brother Berealdus of the Dominican Order, written in 1454, is pre­served in the library of Balliol College, Oxford. The Commentary of Thomas Aquinas on the Liber De Causis is published in the com­plete editions of his works. Aquinas knew that this book was an Arabic abstract of the Metaphysical Elements of Proclus.



11. Creuzer's edition was dedicated to Hegel and Van Heusde, Cousin dedicated his edition of Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenides to Boissonade, Schelling, and Hegel.

If the reader wishes to ascertain what the character of Proclus was not, and to get a travesty of his philos­ophy, he may peruse "Alexandria and Her Schools" by Charles Kingsley, one of the blind leaders of the blind in philosophical science, a gentleman who was in the habit of vilifying whatever he did not understand, and who was no more qualified to explain or criticize what he termed "Neo-Platonism" than an Esquimo [Eskimo].





I first read the Greek text of the Metaphysical El­ements, ( (StoiceiwsiV qeologikh ), in Creuzer's edition, [xi] in the Winter of 1872—73. At that time many of the Propositions were beyond my full comprehension, but the study of the whole book was to me an intellectual discipline of inestimable value, and the Propositions which I mastered amply repaid all the time and thought expended upon them. In the Spring of 1873 I read Taylor's translation, published in 1792,12 in connection with the original. His notes illuminated many of the dark places.



12. A second, revised edition appeared in 1816.

In translating the Metaphysical Elements I have spent many intensely laborious but very pleasant and extremely profitable hours. The translation is based on Taylor's, but it would be an act of injustice to him to call my version a revision of his, though my indebted­ness to him is large, and is cheerfully acknowledged. Many of the Propositions I retranslated entirely, and in the others more or less changes were made, for the sake of perspicuity or by way of correction. Taylor's notes are generally truly illuminative of the subject, and I have reprinted nearly all of them. I am also much indebted to Mr. Thomas Whittaker, whose book, "The Neo-Platonists", may be strongly commended to all students. His abstract of the Elements is excellent.





Purely philological notes have been omitted. These rightly belong to an edition of the original text, which some day I may publish. As a rule the text as edited by Creuzer, (Francof. 1822), has been followed, but I have adopted most of the emendations of Taylor, and made a few of my own. The Latin version of Franciscus Patricius, (Ferrar. 1583),13 is a valuable aid to the interpretation of the original. He undoubtedly used a [xii] much more perfect manuscript than any which is now known,



13. This is of course a very rare book. It was only in April last that I was able, after a search of many years, to find a copy.

Greek words and quotations are printed without the accents. It is difficult to get them printed correctly, but there is a better reason for dispensing with them: they are practically useless. They "seldom occur in Greek manuscripts before the seventh century" of the Chris­tian era. Accents were invented by Aristophanes of Byzantium about 200 B. C, for the purpose of preserv­ing the true pronunciation of the Hellenic language. This they failed to do: the true pronunciation is lost, beyond recovery. We should remember that accents were not devised for scholars. Probably the best preparation for the apprehen­sion of the Elements is a mastery of Plotinus' treatise On the Three Archical Hypostases of Things, viz. The Good, Intellect, and Soul. He demonstrates that the Primary Causes can be neither more nor less than these. "But these three are thus denominated, because they are not consubsistent; and they are not consubsistent, because they are essentially different from each other. For, according to Plato, The Good is superes-sential; Intellect is an impartible, immovable essence; and Soul is a self-motive essence, and subsists as a medium be­tween Intellect and the nature which is distributed about bodies." The chief aim of Proclus in the Elements is to demonstrate and develop this Platonic insight. The work "contains two hundred and eleven propositions, disposed in a scientific order, and supported by the firmest demonstrations. They begin from super-es­sential unity, and proceed gradually through all the beautiful and wonderful progressions of divine causes, ending in the self-moving energies of soul. They pos­sess all the accuracy of Euclid, and all the subtility and sublimity necessary to a knowledge of the most profound theology, and may be considered as bearing [xiii] the same relation to the Pythagoric and Platonic wisdom as Euclid's Elements to the most abstruse geometry." Mr. D. E. Wagenhals, of Nashville, Ills., has in­geniously and admirably illustrated the Propositions of the Metaphysical Elements by geometrical diagrams — a work which I heartily hope will soon be given to the public. These diagrams will much facilitate the student's apprehension of the Elements. In an Appendix, two specimens of these diagrams are pre­sented, by the kindness of Mr. Wagenhals.





At the request of friends, a few notes of personal intellectual history are here given. My introduction to the so-called Neo-Platonic philosophy was on a day in the Spring of 1870 when, roaming around the Library of the University of Notre Dame,14 Indiana, seeking any book of interest, especially of a classical nature, I found half a dozen dust covered volumes of the old Classical Journal, (published in London, 1810—1829). How these volumes ever gained entrance into the Li­brary, I have often wondered. Be that as it may, there they were, and the first article I saw when I opened one of them was the Chaldaean Oracles,15 ed­ited, translated and annotated by the famous Thomas Taylor the Platonist. (Taylor shows that the Chaldaean and Platonic teachings on important points were iden­tical). There were other translations and papers by Taylor, and through them I discovered the existence of the mighty thinkers, the genuine disciples of Plato.



14. Then and now the principal Catholic University in America.



15. The last edition of the Chaldaean Oracles is by Kroll, (Breslau, 1894). It is philologically good, but philosophically worthless.

[xiv] In the latter part of August, 1870,16 on my way to the University, I purchased in St. Louis the April No., 1869, of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, which contains the Sentences of Porphyry, translated by my friend, the late Prof. Thomas Davidson. My attention had been called to it by a press notice giving the contents of this particular number.



16. In June of this year I read Emerson's works, (2 vols., 1869), and his magnificent eulogy at the end of his essay on Intellect on the Trismegisti, among whom he ranks the "Neo-Platonists," im­pressed me greatly. It is somewhat curious that my first knowl­edge of Emerson came through a hostile review in the Catholic World of this very edition. Emerson is one of the best stimu­lants to the study of Philosophy, of which I know.

In December, 1870, I procured the original text of the writings of Plotinus, (2 vols., ed, by Adolph Kirchhoff, Lips., 1856). Later I procured the Paris edition, (1855), which has Prolegomena and the Latin version of Marsilius Ficinus [Ficino].17 In 1871 I picked up Taylor's version of the Select Works of Plotinus, (London, 1817), which is excellent, though almost as concise as the original, and is enriched with useful notes and an Introduction profoundly interesting and valuable. But I soon found that it was an Herculean task to reach the insights of Plotinus. I had a fair mastery of the lan­guage, but to apprehend his Thought was very difficult. But I persevered. The gathering of Platonic knowl­edge, if a matter of constant toil and activity, was [xv] equally a matter of perpetual delight and profit. My appetite for Wisdom was immeasurably stimulated, and it is still insatiably strong. And thus gradually I was able to recall a knowledge of the wonderful and mar­velous Philosophy, of which Plato is the chief exponent — the Philosophy whose principles will never become obsolete, for they are "the same yesterday, and to day, and forever": the Philosophy which, as Proclus truly says, "came to mankind for the benefit of terrestrial souls, in lieu of statues, temples, and the whole of sa­cred institutions; and which is the leader of intellectual salvation alike to the men that, now are and to those who shall come hereafter." True, I knew something of Plato, even before this, I had read several of his works in a wretched English version,18 and the Apology and Crito in the Greek, but my "knowledge" was [xvi] merely superficial. I had never until now found the key which would admit me into the penetralia of his Thought. But when I read Taylor and Plotinus, then indeed was the darkness of ignorance dispersed — then I could truly say, "Night's candles are burnt out, and jocund day

Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain tops." By an indefatigable study of the Platonic text, with these and others of the Golden Chain of the Platonic Succession as guides, I was enabled to find and travel the way to the divine Ideas of Plato. The way was not easy, for "The path by which to deity we climb

Is arduous, rough, ineffable, sublime," but every step taken was an encouragement to proceed, by reason of the gain of new insights and a contin­uous accession of intellectual power.



17. Several years ago I was fortunate to secure a copy of the first edition of Ficinus' translation, which appeared at Florence, Italy, in the month of May, 1492, folio. It is a magnificent speci­men of typography. The type is large and elegant, the paper is of a superior quality, the margins are wide, and the printing is fine — it will indeed compare favorably with that of the present time. The publication of this work opened to mankind a new in­tellectual world, just as the discovery of America by Columbus in the same year opened a new physical world.



18. A childish performance, translated from the French of Dacier, by "several Hands," (London, 1701). It passed through six or seven editions, however, in spite of or on account of its worthlessness. The "several Hands" apparently conspired to make this production stale, flat, and unprofitable. All the intellectual vital­ity, force, and energy of the Platonic text disappear in this ver­sion, and the thought evaporates into persiflage.



Of the three English versions of Plato's complete writings, Tay­lor's is the best, despite some verbal imperfections and infelicities. He knew more Plato, if others knew more Greek. The Bohn translation is largely a piece of hack-work, done to order: it is purely verbal. The translators criticize Taylor severely, but are under deep obligations to him, and inmost of the difficult passages adopt his renderings! Jowett's version is popular, and is highly esteemed by many. Three editions of it have appeared. In the second and third numerous changes were made. Jowett aimed to make his work better, but his efforts were confined chiefly to the improve­ment of his style. In his anxiety to turn polished Greek into polished English, he often allowed the force and thought of Plato to escape him. The Platonic style is characteristic of the Greek, and is untranslatable, either into English or any other language. Still, Jowett doubtless expresses as much of the Platonic thought as the average reader will or can assimilate.

The Platonic are the only writings to which I can return, in health or in sickness, without satiety, fatigue, or dissatisfaction. It matters not how often I open these golden books, I find thoughts and ideas which lift me above the sordid and material cares of life, and which are a perennial consolation and a refuge. These ideas are primarily in the noumenal world, and our apprehension and participation of them here, in the region of time and space, is a foretaste of a perfect participation hereafter, if we qualify ourselves for such an exalted intellectual experience. THOS. M, JOHNSON, Osceola, Mo., U. S. A. October, 1909.









[1]



Proclus' Metaphysical Elements On The One PROPOSITION I. Every multitude partakes in some respect of The One. For if it in no way or degree participates of The One, neither will the whole be one, nor each of the many things from which multitude arises, but each mul­titude will originate from certain or particular things, and this will continue ad infinitum. And of these in­finites each will be again infinite multitude. For, if multitude partakes in no respect of any one, neither as a whole nor through any of its parts, it will be in every re­spect indeterminate. Each of the many, whichever you may assume, will be one or not one; and if not one will be either many or nothing. But if each of the many is nothing, that likewise which arises from these will be nothing. If each is many, each will consist of infinites without limit. But this is impossible. For there is no being constituted of infinites without limit, since there is nothing greater than the infinite itself; and that which consists of all is greater than each particular thing. Neither is any thing composed of nothing. Every mul­titude therefore partakes in some respect of The One.1



1. Proclus understands by multitude or number everything which is mixed, compounded, or in any respect non-simple — in brief, all things other than the Supreme One. It has been shown that all things partake in some degree of oneness. By virtue of this participation every number or individual thing is at the same time one and non-one — one through participation or communion but not one essentially, because in this case it would be One it­self, and not merely a participant of it. So far as any individual or thing departs from its primal abiding with the Supreme Unity, so far it becomes multiplied or compounded: it becomes one or re­turns to its original abode exactly to the degree that it rids itself of multiplicity or everything alien to its true nature.



The orders of multitude are three: (1) Primary, consisting of unities; (2) Composite, consisting of things united; (3) Sim­ple, consisting of the last of things.



"There exist no more beautiful lines in English poetry than the following, taken from the "Adonais," lines in which the whole system of Plotinus [and Proclus] is summed up in exquisite words:



The One remains, the many change and pass,

Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly;

Life, like a dome of many-colored glass,

Stains the white radiance of Eternity." Kuhns: The Sense of the Infinite.

PROPOSITION II. Every thing which partakes of The One is alike one and not one. For though it is not The One itself — since it partic­ipates of The One and is therefore other than it is — it experiences [2] The One through participation, and is thus able to become one. If therefore it is nothing besides The One, it is one alone, and will not participate of The One but will be The One itself. But if it is something other than The One, which is not The One but a par­ticipant of it, it is alike one and non-one, — one being, indeed, since it partakes of oneness, but not oneness it­self. This therefore is neither The One itself, nor that which The One is. But, since it is one and at the same time a participant of The One, and on this account not one per se, it is alike one and not one, because it is something other than The One. And so far as it is multiplied it is not one; and so far as it experiences a privation of number or multitude it is one. Every thing, therefore, which participates of The One is alike one and not one.



[3] PROPOSITION III. Every thing which becomes one, becomes so by the partici­pation of The One, and is one so far as it experi­ences the participation of The One. For if the things which are not one become one, they doubtless become so by a harmonious alliance and association with each other, and experience the presence of The One, though they are not that which The One is. Hence they participate of The One, so far as they allow themselves to become one. But if they are already one, they will not become one: for that which is, does not become that which it already is. But if they become one from that which was previously not one, they will possess The One, since a certain one was ingenerated in their nature. [And this ingenerated one must be de­rived from The One itself. Everything, therefore, which becomes one, becomes so by the participation of The One, etc.] PROPOSITION IV. Every thing which is united is different from The One itself. For if it is united it will participate in a certain re­spect of The One, so far as it is rightly said to be united. That, however, which is a participant of The One is both one and not one. But The One itself is not both one and not one: for if this was so, again the one which is in it would have both of these, and this would take place ad infinitum, if there was no One itself at which it is possible to stop; but every thing being one and not one, there will be something united, which is different from The One. For if The One is the same as the united, it will be infinite multitude. And in a similar manner each of the things of which the united [4] consists will be infinite multitude. Every thing, there­fore, which is united is different from The One itself.

PROPOSITION V. All multitude is posterior to The One. For if multitude is prior to The One, The One in­deed will participate of multitude, but multitude which is prior will not participate of The One, since prior to the existence of The One that multitude was. For it does not participate of that which is not: because a par­ticipant of The One is one and at the same time not one — but, on the hypothesis, The One will not yet subsist, that which is first being multitude. But it is impossible that there should be a certain multitude which in no respect whatever participates of The One. Multitude, there­fore, is not prior to The One. But if multitude and The One subsist simultaneously, they will be naturally co-ordinate with each other, and intimately related. Nothing in time prohibits this, since neither is The One essentially many, nor is multitude The One, because they are directly opposite to each other by nature, if neither is prior or posterior to the other. Hence mul­titude essentially will not be one, and each of the things which are in it will not be one, and this will be the case to infinity, which is impossible. Multitude, therefore, according to its own nature participates of The One, and there is no thing of it which is not one. For if it is not one it will be an infinite, consisting of infinites, as has been demonstrated. Hence it entirely partici­pates of The One. If therefore The One, which is es­sentially one, in no possible respect participates of multitude, multitude will be wholly posterior to The One — participating indeed of The One, but not being par­ticipated by it. But if The One participates of multi­tude, subsisting indeed as one according to its essence, [5] but as not one according to participation, The One will be multitude, just as multitude is united by reason of The One. The One therefore will communicate with multitude, and multitude with The One.2 But things which coalesce and communicate with each other in a certain respect, if they are impelled together by another, that is prior to them: but if they themselves harmonize they are not antagonistic to each other. For opposites do not hasten to each other. If therefore The One and [6] multitude are oppositely divided, and multitude so far as it is multitude is not one, and The One so far as it is one is not multitude, neither will one of these sub­sisting in the other be one and at the same time two. And if there is something prior to them, which impells them to harmonize, this will be either one or not one. But if it is not one, it will be either many or nothing. But neither will it be many, lest multitude should be prior to The One, nor will it be nothing. For how could nothing impell together those things which are something or many? It is therefore one alone. For t his one is not many, lest there should be a progres­sion to infinity. It is therefore The One itself, and all multitude proceeds from The One itself.



2. It is a fundamental principle of the Platonic Philosophy that all things primarily proceed from, and depend on, One First Cause. It necessarily follows from this principle that One pre­cedes Many; or, in other words, that pure, simple being is prior to the compound or multiplied. Every being, other than the First, is to a greater or less degree a number or multitude. Every number or individual thing must in some respect participate of primal one­ness — otherwise it could not exist as a whole, nor in each of its parts. In brief, Oneness is absolutely essential to the in­dividual existence of every being or thing. "All beings are beings through The One, both such as are primarily beings, and such as in any respect whatever are said to be classed in the order of beings. What indeed would they be, if they were not one? Truly, if deprived of oneness, they are no longer that which they were said to be. Neither would an army or a choir or a herd exist, as such, unless each of them was one. But neither would a house or a ship have an existence, unless they possessed The One; since a house is one thing, and also a ship, which one if they lose the house will no longer be a house, nor the ship a ship. Contin­ued magnitudes, therefore, unless The One is present in them, will not exist. Hence when they are divided, so far as they lose The One they change their existence. The bodies, also, of plants and animals, each of which is one, if they fly from The One, thereby becoming dissipated into multitude, will lose the essence which they before possessed, no longer being that which they were, but becoming other things, and continuing to be these so long as they are one. Health, likewise, subsists when the body is congregated into one, [i. e. when it possesses symmetry], and beauty flourishes when the nature of The One confines the parts of the body. And Virtue reigns in the soul when the soul tends to unity, and is unit­ed in one concord."-Plotinus: En. VI. Lib. 9.1.

On Unity. PROPOSITION VI. Every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities. It is evident that each of things many will not be it­self multitude alone, and, again, that each part of this will not be multitude alone. But if it is not multitude alone, it is either united or unities. And if indeed it partakes of The One it is united; but if it consists of things of which that which is primarily united consists, it will be unities. For if The One itself exists, there is also that which primarily participates of it, and which is prima­rily united. But this consists of unities: for if it consists of things united, again, things united consist of certain things, and this will be the case to infinity. It is neces­sary, however, that what is primarily united should con­sist of unities. And thus we have discovered what we proposed at first, [viz. that every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.] [7] On Producing Causes and Effects. PROPOSITION VII. Every thing productive of another is better than the na­ture of that which is produced. For it is either superior, or inferior, or equal. Hence that which is produced from this has itself either a power productive of something else, or it is entirely unprolific. But if it is unprolific, by reason of this fact it will be inferior to and unequal to its producer, which is prolific, and has the power of producing. But if it is productive of other things, it either produces that which is equal to itself, and this similarly in all things, and all beings will be equal to each other, and no one thing will be better than another, that which produces always generating that which is equal to itself, in a consequent series; or it produces that which is unequal to itself, and thus that which is produced will no longer be equal to its producer. For it is the province of equal powers to pro­duce equal things: the progeny of these, however, will be unequal to each other, if that which produces indeed is equal to the cause prior to itself, but the thing posterior to it is unequal to it. Hence it is not right that the thing produced should be equal to its producing cause. Moreover, neither will that which produces ever be less than that which is produced by it. For if it imparts essence to the thing produced, it will also supply it with essential power. And if it is productive of all the power which that posterior to itself possesses, it will certainly be able to make itself such as its production is. But if this be so, it will also make itself more powerful; impotency cannot hinder, the productive power being present, nor a defect of will, — since all things naturally desire the good. Hence, if it is able to render another thing more perfect, it will also perfect itself before it perfects [8] that which is posterior to itself. The thing produced, therefore, is neither equal to nor better than its produc­ing cause: and hence the producing cause is in every respect better than the nature of the thing produced. On the First Good, Which is Called The Good Itself. PROPOSITION VIII. That which is primarily good, and which is no other than The Good itself, is superior to all things which in any way whatever participate of good. For if all beings desire good, it is evident that the Primary Good is beyond beings. If it is the same with a certain one of beings, either being and The Good are the same, and this particular being will no longer desire good, since it is The Good itself — for that which desires anything is indigent of that which it desires, and is dif­ferent from it — or, being is one thing, and the good an­other. And if some one being and The Good are the same, being indeed will participate, and that which is participated in being will be The Good. Hence, on this hypothesis, The Good is a certain good inherent in a certain participant and which the participant alone desires, but is not that which is simply good, and which all things desire: for this Good is the common object of desire to all beings. But that which is in­herent in a certain thing pertains to that alone which participates of it. Hence that which is pri­marily good is nothing else than The Good itself. The adding of any thing else to The Good is to diminish it by the addition, making it a certain or particular good instead of that which is simply good. For the addition, since it is not The Good but something less than it, will by its association diminish The Good. [9] On The Self-sufficient. PROPOSITION IX. Every thing which is self-sufficient, either according to es­sence or energy, is better than that which is not self-suffi­cient, and depends on another cause for its perfection. For if all beings naturally desire good, and one thing supplies well-being from itself, but another is in­digent of something else, the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the other separate and apart. To the degree, therefore, that the former is nearer to that which supplies the object of desire, to that extent will it be superior to that which is indigent of a separate cause, and which externally receives the perfection of its nature or its energy. For since the self-sufficient is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to The Good itself [than that which is not self-sufficient]. It is diminished indeed by participating of The Good, and because it is not primarily The Good, though it is allied to it in a certain respect so far as it is able to possess good of and from itself. But to participate good, and to participate through another, are more remote from that which is primarily good, and which is nothing else than good.

PROPOSITION X. Every thing which is self-sufficient is inferior to that which is simply good. For what else is the self-sufficient than that which from and in itself possesses good? But this is now full of good, and participates of it, but is not that which is simply good: for that is better than participation and plenitude, as has been demonstrated. If therefore the self-sufficient fills itself with good, that from which it [10] fills itself will be better than the self-sufficient, and will be superior to self-sufficiency. And that which is simply good will not be indigent of any thing: for it does not desire any thing else, since the desiring would indicate a deficiency. Nor is the simply good self-sufficient, for in that case it would be full of good, but not that which is primarily The Good.3



3. "For Intellect subsists after The First, and is indigent of nourishment and intelligence, being proximate to that nature which is indigent of nothing, not even intelligence (thought). In­tellect, however, has true plenitude and thought, because it has these primarily: but that which is prior to Intellect and these neither needs nor has, otherwise it would not be The Good itself." —Plotinus: En. III. Lib, viii. 11.

On Cause. PROPOSITION XI. All beings proceed from One First Cause. For either there is no cause of any being, or the causes of all finite things revolve in a circle, or the as­cent (progression) is to infinity, and one thing is the cause of another, and the presubsistence of essence (cause) will in no respect cease. If, however, there is no cause of beings, there will be neither an order of things second and first, of things perfecting and perfec­ted, of things adorning and adorned, of things generat­ing and generated, and of agents and patients, nor will there be any science of beings. For the knowledge of causes is the work of science, and we are then said to know scientifically when we know the causes of things. But if causes revolve in a circle, the same things will be prior and posterior, more powerful and more imbecile. For every thing which produces is better than the nature of that which is produced. Nor does it make a differ­ence to conjoin cause to effect, and through many or [11] fewer media to produce from cause. For cause will be superior to all the intermediate natures of which it is the cause; and the more numerous the media the greater is the causality of the cause. And if the addition of causes is to infinity, and there is always again a cause prior to another, there will be no science of any being: for there is not a knowledge of any thing infinite. But causes being unknown, neither will there be a science of the things consequent to the causes. If, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a cause of beings, and causes are distinct from the things caused, and there is not an ascent to infinity, there is a First Cause of beings, from which as from a root every thing proceeds,—some things indeed being nearer to but others more remote from it. The neces­sity of the existence of One Principle has been demon­strated, because all multitude is secondary to The One. PROPOSITION XII. The Principle and First Cause of all beings is The Good It­self. For if all things proceed from one cause, [as has been demonstrated], it is necessary to call that cause either The Good, or that which is better than The Good. But if it is better than The Good, is any thing imparted by it to beings, and to the nature of beings, or nothing? And if nothing is imparted by it, an absurdity will re­sult. For we would no longer rank it in the order of causes, since it is everywhere necessary that something should be present from cause to the things caused, and especially from the First Cause, on which all things de­pend, and by reason of which every being exists. But if something is imparted by it, in the same manner as there is by The Good, there will be something better than goodness in beings, emanating from the First Cause. [12] For if it is better than and above The Good it will in no way bestow on secondary natures any thing inferior to that which is imparted by the nature posterior to itself. But what can be greater than goodness? Since that which is better than other things is so called because it is a participant to a greater degree of the good. Hence if the not good cannot be said to be better than The Good, it must be entirely secondary to it. If, too, all beings desire The Good how is it possible that there should be any thing prior to this cause? For if they also desire that which is prior to The Good, how can they specially desire The Good? But if they do not de­sire it, how is it possible that they should not desire the cause of all, since they proceed from it? If therefore The Good is that on which all beings depend, The Good is the Principle and First Cause of all things.

PROPOSITION XIII. Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union is good; and The Good is the same as The One. For if The Good is preservative of all beings — by reason of which it is desirable to all things — that indeed which is preservative and connective of the essence of every thing is The One. For by The One all things are preserved, but dispersion expells every thing from its essence. If this be the case, The Good will cause those things to which it is present to be one, and will connect and contain them through union. And if The One is collective and connective of beings, it will perfect each of them by its presence. The union therefore which unites a thing with all is a good. But if union is a good per se, and Good itself has a unifying power, that which is simply good and simply one are the same, causing beings to be both good and one. Hence those things which in a certain way or respect fall off from The Good, [13] at the same time lose the participation of The One. And those things which become destitute of The One, being filled with separation, are equally deprived of The Good. Goodness therefore is union, and union is goodness, and The Good itself is one, and The One is that which is primarily Good.4



4. "The Good is that on which all depends, and which all things desire and have as a principle, and of which they are all indigent, while The Good itself lacks absolutely nothing, is wholly self-suffi­cient, and is the measure and limit of all; producing of itself in­tellect, essence, soul, life and intellectual energy." Plotinus: En. I. Lib. 8. 10.

On the Immovable and Self-motive Principle or Cause. PROPOSITION XIV. Every being is either immovable or moved. And if moved, it is either moved by itself, or by another: and if it is moved by itself it is self-motive, but if by another it is alter-motive. Every nature, therefore, is either immovable, self-motive, or alter-motive. For it is necessary, since there are alter-motive natures, that there also should be that which is immov­able, and the self-motive nature, which is a medium be­tween them. For if every alter-motive thing is moved because it is moved by another, motions will be either in a circle, or they will proceed to infinity. But neither will they be in a circle, nor proceed ad infinitum, since all beings are limited by the Principle of things, and that which moves is better than that which is moved. Hence there will be something immovable, which first moves. But if this be so, it is necessary that the self-motive exist. For if all things should stop, what will that be which is first moved? It cannot be the immovable, for this is not naturally adapted to be moved; nor the alter-motive, [14] for that is moved by another. It remains, there­fore, that the self-motive nature is that which is primari­ly moved. It is this, too, which unites alter-motive na­tures to that which is immovable, being in a certain re­spect a medium, moving and at the same time being moved: for of these, the immovable moves only, but the alter-motive is moved only. Every thing, therefore, is either immovable, or self-motive, or alter-motive. Corollary.— From the premises, therefore, it is evident, that of things which are moved, the self-motive nature is the first; but that of things which move other things the immovable is the first.5



5. Axiom 1.: "All things are either in themselves or in others." Axiom 2.: "That which cannot be conceived as through another must be conceived as through itself." —Spinoza.

On an Incorporeal Essence, and What the Characteristic of it is. PROPOSITION XV. Every thing which is able to return to itself is incorporeal. For no body is, by reason of its nature, competent to return to itself. For if that which is converted to anything is conjoined with that to which it is converted, it is evident that all the parts of the body which is con­verted to itself will be conjoined with all the parts. For a thing is converted to itself, when both that which is converted, and that to which it is converted, become one. This however is impossible in body, and, in short, in all partible things. For the whole of that which is partible is not conjoined with the whole, on account of the separation of its parts, which lie outside one another. No body, therefore, is naturally able to return to itself, so that the whole may be converted to the whole. Hence, [15] if there is anything which has the power of returning to itself, it is incorporeal and impartible.6



6. There is no more important or significant word in the Platonic vocabulary than epistrofh, epistrefein (a conversion, a turning back, a return to self). It is comprehensive more or less of self-activity, self-development, self-determination, self-knowl­edge, self-reflection, self-relation, self-consciousness. It is essen­tially self-reflection or self-relation.



"Great stress is laid on self-relation ( epistrefein ) as the form of the highest order of being; and this is what Hegel's school of philosophy lay so much stress upon, as the doctrine of "return-to-self." It is the form of consciousness, and life, and moral habit; and its image is found in the Cosmos in the shape of orbital move­ment, diurnal revolution, recurrence of seasons, etc. The external image of this return-to-self-through-other has given the forms of speech in all languages for what is divine, and hence the sun-myth and other astronomical scaffolding of mythologies." —Dr. Harris. (Memoir of A. Bronson Alcott, by F. B. Sanborn and William T. Harris. This is one of the most interesting and valuable biogra­phies in the English language.)



"The Intellect sees because it is turned back to its origin, the One; its movement is circular, i. e. reflexive, or turned back upon itself, conscious." —Plotinus: En. V. Lib. I. ch 7. "For there are two orders of knowing, (Plotinus, En. V. Lib. 6.), — self-knowing and the knowing of something different from the self. Self-know­ing is the primary or highest act of the Intellect, — that whereby it returns to its source, the One." —Dr. Harris.



Nothing really exists which is not self-determined and self-related, — which has not a self which it maintains through all its changes." —Hegel.

PROPOSITION XVI. Every thing which is able to return to itself has an essence separate from every body. For unless it was separate from every body whatso­ever, it would not have a certain activity or act apart from body: since it is impossible that, the essence being inseparable from body, an activity (act) proceeding from essence (body) should be separate. For in this case its activity would be better than its essence, because the [16] latter indeed would be indigent of bodies, but the former unindigent and self-sufficient. If therefore any thing is inseparable in essence from body, it is similarly insepar­able in activity (act), — or, rather, it is much more insep­arable. But if this be so, it will not return to itself: for that which returns to itself, being something other than body, has an activity separate from body, and which is not either through or with body, since the activity, and that to which the activity is directed, are not at all in­digent of body: hence that which returns to itself is wholly separate from bodies.

PROPOSITION XVII. Every thing which moves itself primarily,7 is able to re­turn to itself. For if it moves itself, and its motive energy is directed to itself, that which moves and that which is moved are at the same time one. For it either moves in a part or is moved in a part, or the whole moves and is moved, or the whole moves, but a part is moved, or the contrary. But if one part, indeed, is that which moves, and another part is that which is moved, it will not be essentially self-motive, since it will consist of things which are not self-motive, but which appear in­deed to be so, yet are not so essentially. If, however, the whole moves, but the part is mov­ed, or the contrary, there will be a certain part in each which in one and the same subject moves and at the same time is moved.8 And this is that which is pri­marily self-motive. If, however, one and the same thing moves and is moved, it will have the energy of moving [17] to and within itself, being motive of itself. But it returns to that toward which it energizes. Every thing, there­fore, which primarily moves itself, is able to return to itself.



7. Or, is primarily self-active.



8. For if the whole moves, the part which is moved will at the same time be motive. —T.

PROPOSITION XVIII. Every thing which imparts being to others is itself primari­ly that which it communicates to other natures. For if it gives being, and makes the impartance from its own essence, that which it gives is subordinate to its own essence,9 which is truly greater and more per­fect, since every nature which is able to constitute any thing is better than that which is constituted by it—hence the giver is essentially superior to that which is given, but is not the same with it, for the one exists primarily, but the other secondarily. For it is necessary that either each should be the same, and that there should be one reason and definition of each, or that there should be nothing common and the same in each, or that the one should subsist primarily, but the other secondarily. If, however, there is the same reason and definition of each, the one will no longer be cause, but the other effect; nor will the one subsist essentially, but the other in a partici­pant; nor will the one be the maker, but the other the thing made. But if they have nothing which is the same, the one will not constitute the other from its very being, because in that case it imparts nothing. Hence it follows that the one which gives is primary, but that the other to which existence is given is secondary; the former supplying the latter from its very being.



9. See the 7th Proposition.

[18] PROPOSITION XIX. Every thing which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings is present to all the beings which are arranged according to that nature, conformably to one reason, and in the same manner. For unless it was present to all of them in the same manner, but present to some and not to others, it is evi­dent that it would not be primarily in that nature, but in some things primarily, and in others secondarily, which sometimes participate of it. For that which at one time exists, but at another time does not, does not exist pri­marily, nor of itself: but it is adventitious, and comes from some other place to the things in which it is thus inherent. PROPOSITION XX. The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intellectual na­ture is beyond all souls, and The One is beyond, all intel­lectual hypostases. For every body is movable by another, but is not naturally competent to move itself, but by the presence of soul it is moved of itself, lives through soul, and, when soul is present is in a certain respect self-movable, but when it is absent is alter-movable, because any self-mov­able nature which it may have it receives from soul, which is allotted a self-movable essence: since, to what­ever nature soul is present, to this it imparts self-motion. Soul is, however, by a much greater priority that which it imparts by its very being. Hence it is beyond bodies, which become self-movable by participation, because it is essentially self-movable. Again, however, soul which is moved from itself has an order secondary to the im­movable nature, which subsists immovable, in activity or energy. Because of all the natures that are moved, the self-movable essence is the leader; but of all that [19] move, the immovable is the leader. If, therefore, soul, being moved from itself moves other things, it is neces­sary that prior to it there should be that which moves immovably. But intellect moves, being immovable, and energizing always in the same manner. For soul through intellect participates of perpetual thought, just as body through soul possesses the power of moving itself. For if perpetual intellection or thinking was pri­marily in soul, it would be inherent in all souls, in the same manner as the self-motive power. Hence per­petual thinking is not primarily in soul. It is necessary, therefore, that prior to it there should be that which is primarily intelligent: and hence intellect is prior to souls. Moreover, The One is prior to intellect. For intel­lect, though it is immovable, yet is not The One; for it thinks itself, and energizes about itself. And of The One indeed all beings, in whatever way they may exist, participate; but all beings do not participate of intellect. For those beings to whom intellect is present by partici­pation necessarily participate of knowledge; because intellectual knowledge is the principle and first cause of gnostic energy. The One, therefore, is beyond intel­lect, nor is there anything beyond The One: for The One and The Good are the same. But The Good, as has been demonstrated, is the principle of all things. That Intellect is not the First Cause. PROPOSITION XXI. Every order, beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multi­tude co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred to one monad.

For the monad, having the relation of a principle, generates a multitude allied to itself. Hence one causal chain and one whole order has a decrement into multitude [20] from the monad. For there would no longer be an order, or a chain, if the monad remained of itself un-prolific. But multitude is again referred to the one common cause of all coordinate natures. For that in every multitude which is the same has not its progres­sion from one of those things of which the multitude consists. For that which subsists from one alone of the many is not common to all, but eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since in every order there is a certain communion, connection, and sameness, through which some things are said to be co­ordinate, but others of a different order, it is evident that sameness comes to every order from one principle.10 In each order, therefore there is one monad prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connection to the natures arranged in it, both to each other and to the whole.



10. See Additional Notes.

For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under the same causal chain or series; but that which ranks as the cause of the one series must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things must be generated by it as coordinate, not so that each will be a certain particular thing, but that each will be­long to this order. Corollary.— From these things it is evident that both one and multitude are inherent in the nature of body; that nature has many natures co-dependent on it; and that many natures proceed from the one nature of the universe. Further, that the order of souls originates from one first soul, proceeds with diminution into the multitude of souls, and reduces multitude into one; that in the intellectual essence there is an intellectual monad, and a multitude of intellects proceeding from one intel­lect, and returning to it; that there is a multitude of [21] unities in The One which is prior to all things; and that in these unities there is a striving for The One. Hence, after the Primal One there are unities;11 after the First Intellect there are intellects; after the First Soul there are souls; and after Total Nature there are natures.



11. This will be evident by considering that The One, or the First Principle of all, must produce that which first proceeds from himself by union. And as his first production must be the most similar of all things to himself, and must be at the same time mul­titude, — or in what respect would it differ from The One — hence it is necessary that this progression be no other than self-perfect unities. In consequence thereof of this sublime doctrine, as Proclus beautifully observes, (Theol. Plat. p. 123), there is One God and many gods; one Unity and many unities prior to beings; and one Goodness and many goodnesses, after the First Good. It likewise follows that the First Principle of all is a super-essential One, and that after this One there are many super-essential unities. And we may consider every unity of beings as the flower of some certain being; and as the summit and centre about which every be­ing subsists. For a further account and confirmation of this sub­lime doctrine, study the third book of Proclus on Plato's Theol­ogy. —T.

PROPOSITION XXII. Every thing which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is wholly one alone. For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist, since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two; or let that which subsists pri­marily consist of each of these. But if, indeed, it con­sists of each it will again be one, and there will not be two things which are first. And if it be one of the two, each will not be first. Nor, if both are equally primary, will each have a principal subsistence. For if one of them is primary, but this is not the same with the other, what will it be in that order? For that subsists primarily [22] which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But each of these being different is, and at the same time is not, that which it is said to be. If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily differ so far as they are that which they are said to be, — for this primarily experiences that which is the same, — both will not be first, but will be that of which both participating are thereby said to subsist pri­marily. Corollary.— From these things it is evident that what is primarily being is one alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two; that the first intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first in­tellects; and that the first soul is one. This is also the case with every form, such as the primarily beautiful and the primarily equal. Thus, too, with respect to the form of animals, and the form of man, the first of each is one; for the demonstration is the same. On the Imparticipable. PROPOSITION XXIII. Every imparticipable produces the things which are partici­pated: and all the natures which are participated strive for imparticipable essences.

For that which is imparticipable, having the rela­tion of a monad, as subsisting from itself and not from another, and being exempt from participants, produces those things which may be participated. For either it is of itself barren, remaining within itself, and possessing nothing worthy of honor, or it will impart something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it will participate it; but that which was given will subsist. But everything participating of another by which it is gen­erated, is secondary to that which is similarly present to [23] all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which is in one only is not in others. But that which is similarly present to all things, in order that it may illuminate all, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or is prior to all. But that indeed which is in all things, being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one and that of another, the one being divid­ed. But if it is in one alone of all things it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence, if it is common to all things able to participate, and is com­mon to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable, [because it neither is nor can be participated by anything.]12



12. The imparticipable is that which is not consubsistent with a subordinate nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is the intellect which is not consubsistent with soul, but is exempt from it. And imparticipable soul is the soul which is not consubsistent with body. And so in other things. —T.

PROPOSITION XXIV. Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is participated by it; and that which is participated is in­ferior to that which is imparticipable. For that which participates, since it is imperfect prior to participation, but becomes perfect through par­ticipation, is entirely secondary to that which is par­ticipated so far as it is perfect by participating. For so far as it was imperfect it is inferior to that which it par­ticipates, which causes it to become perfect. But that which is participated by a certain one and not by all, is on this account allotted an hyparxis or essence subordi­nate to that which is common to all things, and not to a certain one thing: for the latter is more allied but the [24] former less to the cause of all. The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things which are participated; but the latter are the leaders of participants. For, in short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many; but that which is participated in the many is one and at the same time not one; and every­thing which participates is not one and at the same time one. On the Perfect. PROPOSITION XXV. Everything perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the One Principle of all. For as the one Principle by reason of its own good­ness is unically constitutive of all beings, — for The Good and The One are the same, so that the boniform is the same with the unical, — thus, also, those things which are posterior to the First Principle, on account of their perfection, hasten to generate beings inferior to their own essence: for perfection is a certain part or quality of The Good, and the perfect so far as it is perfect imi­tates The Good. But The Good is constitutive of all things: so that the perfect is likewise productive accord­ing to its nature of those things which it is able to pro­duce. And that indeed which is more perfect, the more perfect it is the more numerous are the progeny of which it is the cause. For that which is more perfect partici­pates in a greater degree of The Good. It is therefore nearer to The Good, is more allied to the cause of all, and is the cause of a greater number of effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, the more imperfect it is the less numerous are the effects of which it is the cause; for, being more remote from the producer of [25] everything, it is the cause of fewer effects. For to that which constitutes, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or fabricates all things, that nature is most allied which produces a greater number of each of these; but that is more remote which produces a less number of each. Corollary.— From the premises it is evident that the nature which is most remote from the Principle of all is unprolific and is not the cause of anything. For if it generated a certain thing, and had something posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be the most remote, but that which it produced would be more re­mote than itself from the Principle of all things; it would therefore be nearer to productive power, and, in addition, would imitate the cause which is productive of all beings. On that Which Produces. PROPOSITION XXVI. Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abid­ing in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and those which are successive. For if it imitates The One, but that immovably constitutes the things posterior to itself, everything which produces will possess in a similar manner the cause of productive energy. But The One constitutes things im­movably. For if through motion, the motion will be in it; and, being moved, it will no longer be The One, be­cause it will be changed from The One. But if motion subsists together with or after it, it will also be from The One, and either there will be a progression to in­finity, or The One will produce immovably, and every thing which produces will imitate the producing cause [26] of all things. For everywhere from that which is primari­ly that which is not primarily derives its subsistence; so that the nature which is productive of certain things orig­inates from that which is productive of all things. Hence every producing cause produces subsequent natures from itself. And while productive natures abide in themselves undiminished, secondary natures are produced by them. For that which is in any respect diminished cannot abide such as it is. PROPOSITION XXVII. Every producing cause, by reason of its perfection and abun­dance of power, is productive of secondary natures. For if it produced not on account of the perfect, but through a defect of power, it would not be able to pre­serve its own order immovable. For that which imparts being to another thing through defect and imbecility imparts subsistence to it through its own mutation and change in quality. But every thing which produces re­mains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remain­ing that which is posterior to it proceeds into existence. Hence, being full and perfect, it constitutes secondary natures immovably and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being changed into them nor diminished. For that which is produced is not a distri­bution into parts of the producing cause; since this is neither appropriate to generation, nor to generating causes. Nor is it a transition of one nature into another: for it does not become the matter of that which pro­ceeds; since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced is different from it. Hence that which gener­ates abides without alteration and undiminished; through prolific power multiplies itself, and from itself imparts secondary hypostases or natures. [27] PROPOSITION XXVIII. Every producing cause constitutes things similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar. For since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than the thing produced, they can never be simply the same with each other and equal in power. But if they are not the same and equal, but different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each other, or they are both united and separated. If, how­ever, they are entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and nowhere will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence, neither will one of these participate of the other, since they are en­tirely different from it. For that which is participated gives communion to its participant with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover, it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause, as from thence deriving its essence. But if that which is produced is partly separated from and partly united to its producing cause, — if, indeed, it experiences each of these equally, — it will equally par­ticipate and not participate: so that in the same manner it will have essence and not have it from the producing cause. And if it is more separated from than united to it, the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and be more deprived of than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things which pro­ceed from causes are allied to them according to their very being, have sympathy with them, are naturally de­pendent on them, and aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object of their desire through the cause of their existence—if this be the case, it is evident that things produced are in a greater degree Med to their producing causes than separated from [28] them. Things, however, which are more united are more similar than dissimilar to the natures to which they are especially united. Every producing cause, therefore, constitutes things similar to itself prior to such as are dissimilar. PROPOSITION XXIX. Every progression is effected through a similitude of second­ary to primary natures. For if that which produces constitutes similars prior to dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will constitute the things produced. For similars are rendered similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If, therefore, progression in its diminu­tion preserves a certain sameness of that which is gen­erated with that which generates, and shows that such as the generator is primarily so is that posterior to it secondarily, it will have its nature through similitude. PROPOSITION XXX. Everything which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it. For if every progression is effected while primary natures remain permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being constituted prior to dissimilars — if this be the case, that which is produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For that which entirely proceeds will have nothing which is the same with the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separ­ated from it. But if it has anything in common with and united to it, it will abide in its cause in the same manner as that abides in itself. If, however, it abides only but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ from its cause, nor will it while that abides be generated something different from it. For if it is something different [29] it is separated and apart from its cause. If, how­ever, it is apart, but the cause abides, it will proceed from the cause in order that while it abides it may be separated from it. So far, therefore, as that which is produced has something which is the same with the pro­ducing cause, it abides in it; but so far as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being, however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and different. Hence it abides and at the same time proceeds, and does neither of these without the other. PROPOSITION XXXI. Every thing which proceeds from, another essentially, returns to that from which it proceeds. For if it should proceed, indeed, but should not re­turn to the cause of this progression, it would not desire its cause. For everything which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover, every thing desires good, and to each thing the attainment of it is through the proximate cause. Every thing, therefore, desires its cause: and the cause of being to any particular thing is likewise the cause of well-being (good) to it. But desire is primarily directed to the cause of well-being: and con­version or return is to that to which desire primarily tends. PROPOSITION XXXII. Every conversion or return is effected through the similitude of the things converted to that to which they are converted. For every thing which is converted hastens to be conjoined with its cause, and desires communion and colligation with it. But similitude binds all things to­gether, just as dissimilitude separates and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion or return is a certain communion and contact, but all communion and all contact [30] are through similitude — if this be the case, every conversion will be effected through similitude.

PROPOSITION XXXIII. Every thing which proceeds from another and returns to it has a circular energy (activity). For if it returns to that from which it proceeds, it con­joins the end to the beginning, and the motion is one and continuous — emanating from the abiding cause and re­turning to it. Hence all things proceed in a circle from causes to causes: but there are greater and less circles of conversions (returns), some of which are to the na­tures immediately above the things which are converted, but others are to still higher natures, and so on to the Principle of all things. For all things proceed from this Principle, and return to it.13



13. In order to understand this Proposition the reader must observe that the hypothesis requires that both the progression and regression subsist together. And this hypothesis is no less proper than true: for unless effects were continually converted to their causes they could not exist, since they depend on these for their subsistence, and this can only be procured by conversion. —T.

PROPOSITION XXXIV. Every thing which is converted according to nature makes its return to that from which it received the progression of its characteristic essence. For if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential desire for that to which it is converted. But if this be the case, the whole being of it depends on that to which it makes an essential conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also it has a natural sympathy with it because it is cognate to the essence of it. If this be so, either the being of each is the same, or the one is derived from the other, or both are allotted similitude from a certain other one. But if the being of [31] each is the same, how is the one naturally converted to the other? And if both are from a certain one, it will be according to nature for each to be converted to that one. It remains, therefore, that the one must derive its being from the other. But if this be the case, the pro­gression will be from that to which the conversion or return is according to nature. Corollary.— From these things, therefore, it is evi­dent that intellect is the object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect, and that the whole world, though it is eternal, possesses its essence from intellect. For the world is not prevented from proceed­ing from intellect because it is eternal: neither because it is always arranged is it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially eternal, always convert­ed, and is indissoluble because it always remains in the same order. PROPOSITION XXXV. Every thing caused abides in, proceeds from, and returns to, its cause.

For if it alone abided, it would in no respect differ from its cause, since it would be without separation and distinction from it. For progression is accompanied with separation. But if it alone proceeded, it would be unconjoined and deprived of sympathy with its cause, having no communication with it whatever. And if it were alone converted, how can that which has not its essence from the cause be essentially converted to that which is foreign to its nature? But if it should abide and proceed, but should not return, how will there be a natural desire to everything of well-being and of good, and an excitation to its generating cause? And if it should proceed and return, but should not abide, how, being separated from its cause, will it hasten to be con­joined with it? For it was unconjoined prior to its departure; [32] since, if it had been conjoined, it would entirely have abided in it. But if it should abide and return, but should not proceed, how can that which is not separated be able to revert to its cause? For every thing which is converted resembles that which is resolved into the nature from which it is essentially divided. It is necessary, therefore, either that it should abide alone, or return alone, or alone proceed, or that the extremes should be bound to each other, or that the medium should be con­joined with each of the extremes, or that all should be conjoined. Hence it follows that every thing must abide in its cause, proceed from, and return to it.14



14. The return or conversion { epistrofh ) is a rectifying of the way of life ( enstasewV epanorqwsiV ). As all things proceed from The One, so all yearn for their Principle and return to it, to the extent of their power. There are three primary forms of return, viz, through essence, through life, through knowledge. And in every Principle there are abiding, progression and return ( monh, proodoV, epistrofh )

PROPOSITION XXXVI. Of all things which are multiplied in progression the first are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to them, arid after the same manner succes­sively. For if progressions separate productions from their causes, and there are diminutions of things secondary with respect to those which are first, it follows that first natures in proceeding are more conjoined with their causes, being as it were germinations from them. But secondary natures are more remote from their causes, and in a similar manner those which are successive. Things, however, which are nearer and more allied to their causes are more perfect. For causes are more perfect than things caused. But things which are more remote are more imperfect, because they are dissimilar to their causes. [33] PROPOSITION XXXVII. Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more imperfect than the second, and the second, than those that follow; but the last are the most perfect. For if conversions are effected in a circle, and con­version or return is to that from which progression is derived, but progression is from that which is most per­fect, hence conversion tends to the most perfect. And if conversion first begins from that in which progression terminates, but progression terminates in that which is most imperfect, conversion will begin from the most im­perfect. Hence in things which subsist according to conversion, the most imperfect are the first, but the most perfect are the last. PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

Every thing which proceeds from many causes returns through as many, and every conversion is through the same causes which produced the progression.15 For since both progression and return become through similitude, that indeed which passes immediate­ly from a certain thing likewise immediately returns to it. For the similitude here is without a medium. But [34] that which requires a medium in proceeding requires also a medium in returning. For it is necessary that each should be effected with reference to the same thing. Hence the return will be first to the medium, and then to that which is better than the medium. Therefore the causes of being to each thing are equal in number to the causes of well-being, and vice versa.



15. "The principal momenta in the dialectical process by which, according to Proclus, the formation of the world was accomplished, are the issuing of a thing from the cause and its return to the same. That which is brought forth is at the same time like and unlike its cause: in virtue of its likeness it is contained and remains in its cause; in virtue of its unlikeness it is separated from it; it must return to its cause by becoming like it, and in this return the same stadia are involved as in the previous forward or out-coming movement. All reality is subject to this law of triadic development. But the oftener the process is repeated the less per­fect is the result. What is first is highest, the last is the lowest in rank and worth. The development is a descending one, and may be symbolized by the descending course of a spiral line." —Ueberweg.

PROPOSITION XXXIX. Every being either alone essentially returns, or vitally, or gnostically. For either it alone possesses being from its cause, or life with being, or it receives from thence a gnostic power. So far, therefore, as every being alone is, it makes an essential conversion, but so far as it lives, a vital, and so far as it knows, agnostic conversion. For as it proceed­ed from its cause, so does it return to it, and the measures of its conversion are limited by the measures according to its progression. The desire to return therefore is to some according to being alone, this desire being an aptitude for the participation of causes; but to others it is accord­ing to life, being a motion to more excellent natures; and to others it is according to knowledge, being a conscious perception of the goodness of their causes. PROPOSITION XL. The natures which exist from and of themselves, and have a self-subsistent essence, precede those which proceed from, another cause. For if every nature which is self-sufficient, either by reason of its essence or energy, is more excellent than that which depends on another cause; and that which produces itself, since it produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to essence; and that which is alone produced by another is not sufficient to itself; [35] and the self-sufficient is more allied to The Good; and things more allied and similar to their causes subsist from cause prior to such as are dissimilar; — this being the case, the natures which are produced by themselves, and are self-subsistent, are more ancient than those which proceed into existence from another cause alone. For either there will be nothing self-subsistent, or The Good is a thing of this kind, or the first things which subsist from The Good. But if there is nothing self-subsistent, truly there will not be in anything self-suffici­ency. It will not be in The Good, since that being The One is better than self-sufficiency: it is also The Good it­self, and not that which possesses The Good. Nor will self-sufficiency be in things posterior to The Good: for all things will be indigent of that which is prior to their nature. But if The Good is self-subsistent, because it produces itself, it will not be The One. For that which proceeds from The One is not The One. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; so that The One would at the same time be one and not one. Hence it is necessary that the self-subsistent should be posterior to the First. And it is evident that it will be prior to things which alone proceed from another cause: for it has a more principal subsistence than these, and is more allied to The Good, as has been demonstrated. PROPOSITION XLI. Every thing which is in another is alone produced, by another; but every thing which is in itself is self-subsistent. For that which is in another and is indigent of a subject can never be generative of itself. For that which is naturally competent to generate itself does not require another base, because it is contained by itself, and is preserved in itself apart from a subject. But that which abides, and is able to be established in itself, is produc­tive of itself, itself proceeding into itself, and being connective [36] of itself: and thus it is in itself, as the thing caused is in its cause. For it is not in itself, as in place or as in a subject: since place is different from that which is in place, and that which is in a subject is different from the subject. But this which is in itself is the same with that in which it is inherent. It is therefore self-subsistent, and abides in itself as that which is from a cause is in the cause. PROPOSITION XLII. Every thing self-subsistent is able to return to itself. For if it proceeds from itself, it will likewise return to itself. For to that which is the source of a progres­sion there is a return coordinate to the progression. For if it alone proceeded from itself, and did not return to it­self, it would never strive for its characteristic good, and that which it is able to impart to itself. Every cause, how­ever, is able to impart to that which proceeds from it both essence and well-being conjoined with this essence. Hence that which is self-subsistent will impart this to itself. This therefore is the proper good to that which is self-subsistent. And hence this will not be the object of desire to that which does not return to itself. But not desiring this good, it will not obtain it, and not ob­taining it, it will be imperfect and not self-sufficient. If, however, self-sufficiency and perfection belong to any­thing, it must be to that which is self-subsistent. Hence it will desire and obtain its characteristic good, and will return to itself. PROPOSITION XLIII. Every thing which is able to return to itself is self-subsistent. For if it returns to itself according to nature, it is perfect in the conversion to itself, and will possess essence from itself. For from every thing to which there is a return according to nature, there is equally a progression [37] according to essence. If, therefore, it imparts well-being to itself, it will likewise undoubtedly impart being to itself, and will be the lord of its own hypostasis or nature. Hence that which is able to revert to itself is self-subsistent. PROPOSITION XLIV. Every thing which is able to return to itself through energy or activity, is likewise able to return to itself through essence. For if it is capable of reverting to itself through its activity but not through its essence, it will be more ex­cellent in activity than in essence, the former being revertive, but the latter not. For that which depends on itself is better than that which alone depends on another. And that which has a power of preserving itself is more perfect than that which is alone preserved by another. If, therefore, it is revertible to itself through the activity emanating from essence, it will also be allotted a re­vertible essence, so that it will not alone energize within itself but will depend on itself, and will be contained, connected, and perfected by itself. PROPOSITION XLV. Every thing self-subsistent is unbegotten. For if it be generated, because of its generation it will be imperfect of itself, and will be indigent of per­fection emanating from another. Because, however, it produces itself, it is perfect and self-sufficient. For every thing generated is perfected by another, which imparts generation to it not yet existing. For genera­tion is a path from the imperfect to its contrary, the per­fect. But if anything produces itself it is always per­fect, since it is always present with the cause of itself, or rather is inherent in that which is perfective of its es­sence.



[38] PROPOSITION XLVI. Every thing self-subsistent is incorruptible. For if it should be corrupted, it would depart from itself and would be without itself. This, however, is im­possible. For, since it is one, it is at the same time cause and the thing caused. But every thing which is cor­rupted, is corrupted departing from its c