The power structure of the Iranian government contains checks and balances, but also concentrates power in a few hands. It is not a dictatorship; I would describe it as a competitive oligarchy with unequal and shifting shares of power. Ayatollah Khamenei is the Supreme Leader, and he does exercise a great deal of influence, but his authority is not absolute. He is appointed by the Assembly of Experts, and they are an elected body. Hashemi Rafsanjani is the most influential, or powerful among the Assembly of Experts and he has resigned his post on the Expediency Council in protest on Saturday, but remains on the Assembly of Experts. He is reported to be in Qom (the Religious Center of Iran just south of Tehran), and there is speculation that he may be trying to undermine Khamenei's position among more moderate clerics. Here's a historical reference for these two men: think of Khamenei as Robespierre and Rafsanjani as Danton from the French Revolution. Khamenei is more of an ideologue and a purist who does not hesitate to exercise brutal authority, while Rafsanjani is an indulgent who has enriched himself and his family through his access to power. Unlike the French Revolution, this is 30 years later, and Rafsanjani has managed to keep his head, so far. To many Iranians, this election is also about these two men. Much of Ahmadinejad's support comes from revulsion to Rafsanjani. It was Rafsanjani who lost to Ahmadinejad in the runoff election of '05, and he lost resoundingly. This is why in much of Ahmadinjad's debate with Mousavi, he attacked Rafsanjani; he was trying to make this election about Rafsanjani and not Mousavi. We don't really know the results, this might have worked. Moreover, Rafsanjani's support for Mousavi may not be a good thing. He has power, but he is corrupt--so where does it go from there? What will Mousavi owe Rafsanjani if he successfully gets Khamenei voted out? (I am not saying that I think that is likely, I am just working through a hypothetical.) I am a strong Mousavi supporter, as my previous diaries clearly show. I watch for what he says and does in the next few days. He is no fool and he can take care of himself.

Another figure I am watching is Mohsen Makhmalbaf. He is an internationally acclaimed film director, whose film Kandahar was even viewed by W in the White House. He is a man who has worked tirelessly in Afghanistan on behalf of Afghani children. He has put his money where he mouth is and arranged to bring thousands of Afghani children to Iran to be able to go to school. His work reflects the complexity of Iran as a culture and society. He reveals a proud non-Western nation capable of charting their own course. I would also recommend Gabbeh to anyone not familiar with his work. He reported on behalf of Mousavi the story that Mousavi was contacted by an election official and told he had won, but that they should avoid saying anything until Saturday. Mousavi smelled a rat and announced immediately he had won. That was the point on Friday (Around 3:15 EDT), where I was happy, but worried. The polls were not even closed, and yet Mousavi made this announcement. Again, Mousavi is a serious and calm man--I believed he must have had his reasons. The unfolding events seemed to indicate that something was very wrong. SO, as I wrote on Saturday night, until I hear Mousavi's public and unrestrained statements on the subject, I wait to make final judgments.

At this point there is no way to know for certain what happened on Friday. Moreover, Khamenei's "Probe" will be a "Blue-Ribbon" Committee that will be "shocked, shocked to find gambling going on" as they are presented with their winnings. (I watched Casablanca late Friday night to escape.) Any action taken by Rafsanjani, however, will be suspect and come with strings attached. It is vital to keep in mind, that we view Ahmadinejad through the lens of foreign policy, and that distorts our vision. He has done a great deal for the poor and the remote villages of Iran, and much of the underclasses. Those people do not like Rafsanjani or what he represents, and they are correct in their assessment of him. If nothing else, this election indicates deep divisions in a country with a young government(30 years)--the situation is explosive. Tehran is around 12% of the country, but just as we are pretty ticked off at Wall Street right now and subsequently New York, many Iranians feel similarly about elites in Tehran. This is the reason that rioting in Tehran, North Tehran in particular, brutal as the suppression may be, does not necessarily reflect the mood of the country as a whole. The truth is, we are not really in a position to accurately gauge the meaning of much of what we are seeing.

If the United States had re-established diplomatic relations, we would have an embassy in Tehran and consulates in major cities around the country. I am not taking about spying here. I am talking about the regular activities and reports written by the diplomatic corps about what is going on. Many native speakers recording the attitudes of people and groups, and the political orientation of classes and other enclaves throughout the country. We don't have any of that, so our State Department is virtually flying blind in this incredibly important and volatile situation. Here are just a few of the questions we need accurate information on: 1) How many clerics appear to support Khamenei? 2) Is there division within the Revolutionary Guard on how to proceed? 3) Where do the regular Armed Forces stand? 4) What about the Basijis? Are they mostly unemployed kids, or do they really reflect the ideology of the Revolutionary Guard? and on on on... We need information and we need it to be accurate, and we need it now. One of my favorite Generals, Joseph Stilwell, who served in China during WW II, used to say, "Good news does not hurt me; I need to know the bad news yesterday." Sure we can find speculation about the answers to those questions on the Internet, but we need careful, thoughtful and informed analysis--not knee-jerk reactions.

No matter how things turn out--Iran is going to be a divided country in the near future. If Ahmadinejad and Khamenei prevail, they will have little choice but to become more dictatorial than ever. The suppression will not be pretty. If Rafsanjani prevails and gets Khamenei reversed or unseated, Mousavi ruling over a diverse nation with corrupt officials like Rafsanjani has major liabilities as well. The US needs to consider options carefully going forward. Regardless of the results, I think sanctions should be dropped. We need to stop talking about "Carrots and Sticks" as if our international adversaries are donkeys for us to ride. We need to stop punitive policies period. Sanctions tend to re-enforce the governments we do not like and punish the poorest in those countries. The people of Iraq suffered throughout the 90s; Saddam Hussein and his friends did not. Now at the same time we need to make our positions clear, and those positions need to be reasonable. We can stick to reasonable positions and if we can couple that with policies that don't put down entire nations we might find we make a bit of progress instead. I don't think anyone around here would say that our foreign policy of the last 30 years has been a raging success. (Before you start, don't give me any of that "We won the Cold War" stuff, The Soviet Union mostly collapsed on its own.) It's time to really try something new.