Fish are killed by the billions. Should humans be as confident as they are that these amazing individuals lack the ability to think and feel?

It’s a sad fact, but it’s one that animal advocates know all too well: many people do not consider fishing, and killing/eating fish in general, to be particularly morally concerning. The authors of this paper try to challenge this notion through various considerations and lines of argument.

They begin by arguing that eating animals in general is not morally defensible. Those in favor of eating animals often argue that killing animals is acceptable, whereas killing humans is not because humans are morally special. If this claim is based just on species membership alone, then the authors argue that it is speciesist and illogical. After all, a species label is meaningless if not attached to significant relevant differences.

On the other hand, if the claim is based on a specific quality thought to be found only in humans – such as a certain form of intelligence or emotional capacity – it likely fails to account for many individual humans’ deficiency in that quality. This is, of course, not to mention all the developing research pointing towards animals having capacities that we previously thought only humans could have.

The authors then consider marine life more specifically. Although fish anatomy is very different from human anatomy, many studies have nevertheless found signs of self-awareness and intelligence in a variety of fish species. For example, giant manta rays can pass the “mirror test” of recognizing themselves in their reflections. Studies have also found that fish recognize each other, make complex plans, and more. On the question of pain, the authors bring up evidence that fish exhibit complex behavioral responses when something harms them. These complex responses indicate that there is, at the very least, a central processing system that takes in information about damage to the fish’s body and prompts a response.

Next, the authors consider the idea that fishing is justified because it is more natural than killing animals raised for food in a farm or factory setting. However, they point out that acting in a way that is closer to how hunter-gatherers of the past acted, or to how predators in the wild currently act, is not in any way inherently ethically good. This is especially true when the behavior causes harm and can be avoided by eating alternative food options, and when fish populations are being depleted at alarming rates.

From there, the authors then consider whether fishing can be justified because it is a traditional way of life for many communities. Although preserving a community’s lifestyle is not morally insignificant, it does not trump all other moral concerns (such as all of the fish, marine mammals, and even humans who die as a result of the fishing industry). The authors suggest that perhaps fishing communities even have a moral obligation to start transitioning away from fishing.

Finally, the authors consider the excuse that an individual consumer’s buying choice may not make much of an impact on the fishing industry. Nevertheless, the authors argue, inefficiency does not excuse moral wrongdoings. The authors conclude that, due to the feasibility of the reality that fish are to some degree conscious, intelligent, and capable of feeling pain, we may be a making a “massive collective moral mistake” in killing “nearly a trillion individuals each year” for the sake of eating fish when other food options are available. Even if fish do not naturally provoke the same sympathies in us compared to, say, mammals, their moral worth should not be dismissed.

Advocates can use the ideas presented in this paper in their own efforts to urge people and communities away from fishing. Though getting the general public to recognize the sentience of fish can often feel like an uphill battle, encouraging signs abound. This paper can help advocates keep the momentum going.