Thank you for the clear exposure of this subject, I beg leave to place some objections to the two "solutions" you address in the text. First, I cannot see how they could fix the imbalance of the incentives. Something like the long term bonds that you talk about already exists and it is part of bank's capital, under some conditions. The biggest difference, as I can see it, is about who will decide of how much of this kind of debt the bank should undertake: no more the banker himself but his regulator. Would we are not be perpetuating (or making more dangerous, because relying on an expanded basis) the tug of war between banks and regulators on the decision to keep a greater or lesser amount of capital? Is not it a great reliance on rules of "command-and-control" type? About the second solution, of course a conection between the senior managers’ revenue and the banks safety would make grow the right incentive. But that conection must come as a result of market forces and not as a rule about what could (or could not) be used to pay senior managers. Yourself shows the difficulties that must arise. And this is the core of the question I think. The solution cannot assume the action of the regulator as a required. The latter must have at most a secondary role. Excuse my poor (or worse) English and thank you again for the chance