Analysis: Real Betis

Real Betis set up in a 4-3-3 shape in possession, with William Carvalho, Andres Guardado and Giovani Lo Celso as the midfield trio behind a front three of Sergio Canales, Antonio Sanabria and Joaquin. Quique Setien’s men looked to dominate the ball in a possession-based style, but the story of the game can be summed up with two simple statistics: 68 per cent possession, two shots on target.

Betis almost trebled the amount of passes that Real Madrid completed, but the hosts found penetrating their opponents’ defensive unit a real struggle throughout. They tried to create opportunities by playing through Madrid’s initial high press, creating free men between the lines by overloading Madrid’s central pairing of Casemiro and Fede Valverde with William, Lo Celso and Guardado. When Madrid matched the Betis midfield, usually by dropping Luka Modric or Vinicius in to track the third midfielder, Betis would themselves drop Canales or Sanabria into midfield, where the Madrid central defenders were reluctant to follow.

The hosts had a significant amount of possession in the Madrid half, but the majority was circulated in front of the extremely compact low block Madrid formed whenever Betis had good possession. Betis tended to push the front three inside more and use their full-backs to provide the width, essentially pulling Madrid into a 5-3-2 formation with Dani Carvajal and Sergio Reguilon tracking the full-backs all the way back. As a result, the hosts used switches of play to try to unbalance the Madrid block and take advantage on the weak side. They overloaded these areas with full-back, wide attacker and one of the midfield three – usually Guardado, and never William – but the switches were mostly too slow, enabling Madrid to shuffle across and deal with the threat comfortably.

Out of possession, Betis looked to press in a 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1, depending on the positioning of Valverde and Casemiro, and thus how Lo Celso and Guardado chose to track them. The home side looked to press Madrid aggressively and high up the pitch, but with Madrid having so little time on the ball – and playing direct and early when they did – their pressing structure was rarely required.

Instead, the majority of Betis’ defending came through recovery runs as Madrid looked to hit them on the counter. These recoveries would show the ball-carrier away from the centre of the pitch, looking to delay the next action as long as possible so more players could recover. They also looked to initiate an immediate counter-press upon losing possession, positioning players near the ball when in possession so they could exert heavy and immediate pressure as soon as possession was lost.