This is the script for this video.

In part 1, we were discussing some of the major misconceptions of the cosmological arguments which permeate modern philosophical conversation. Just to remind you, these consisted, first, of the insertion of the premise “everything has a cause” into the argument, even though no such premise is found in the theological tradition; secondly, the claim that the argument is a god of the gaps argument, as though the theist is proposing some sort of scientific hypothesis which serves as the best explanation of some evidence in the probabilistic sense. What we seek to do instead is reason from general features of experience to that which has a nature which is uncaused in a very clear, logical fashion. This mode of deductive reasoning means that if the premises are true and the argument is formally valid, then the conclusion necessary follows. It also means that we reason to the only possible conclusion, and we’re not proposing a scientific hypothesis which can be overturned given some new scientific finding. This is very much like how a theorem in mathematics is not a scientific hypothesis which claims to be the best explanation of the empirical evidence and might be overturned when new evidence comes in. For example, when I prove that the square root of 2 isn’t a rational number, I’m not hypothesizing that it’s irrational as the best explanation of the decimal expansion empirical evidence which could be overturned fifty years from now when new decimal expansion empirical evidence comes in – I’m saying it cannot fail to be true and is certain knowledge. In the same way, when I say it’s impossible to trisect an angle with ruler and compass I’m not giving an empirical hypothesis along the lines of ‘no one has ever been able to do it but we might have to change our mind when new geometrical evidence comes in’, I’m saying it’s absolutely impossible and can never be done and this is certain knowledge. The classical arguments for God’s existence should be thought of as closer to proving a mathematical theorem than giving a scientific hypothesis. And because the classical theist isn’t giving a scientific hypothesis, new individual results from the empirical sciences have nothing to say one way or the other. They don’t make the case for classical theism and they don’t make the case for atheism. Finally, we also dealt with the classic atheist question ‘who made God?’ To add to what I said last time, the atheist actually betrays two things by asking this question: the power of the infinite regress to undermine an argument and the desire to reach the most fundamental – that which accounts for everything else. I say that this desire for the most fundamental is shared by the atheist asking such a question and the classical theist. This mentioning of the most fundamental leads me to the primary topic of this video, the distinction between uppercase-G God and ‘the lowercase-G gods’.

You’ll remember I introduced this distinction in part 0 and I think it’s an important one, for the failure to make such a distinction results in both sides talking past one another. Instead of talking about Pure Act or actus purus , that which ultimately allows for there to be any actualizations of potentials and therefore any change in the world at all, what often happens in popular discourse is that both sides end up debating whether there exists a souped-up version of a human being, or a cosmic superhero, or a distinguished character perhaps named Mr. god who represents an exceptionally well-behaved gentleman. The fault cannot be placed only on atheists for thinking along these lines, for many popular theists such as Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig do essentially have this view of God where God is supposedly the most exalted member of the class named ‘person’. Now, the classical theistic tradition would reject the very idea that God is a person (not to be confused with God being personal) and classical theists often call this flavor of theism theistic personalism. It should be noted that this theistic personalism has not been the mainstream in classical theological thought and I think there are good reasons for thinking it’s incorrect. In a way, I cannot fault atheists for failing to be convinced of this view of God as being another instantiation of the category person for it does seem excessively anthropomorphic. Atheists often claim that theists believe in an ‘invisible man in the sky’, mostly because they confuse artistic representations and metaphors with reality, much like how someone uneducated in physics may think that atoms really are like little billiard balls and they bounce around because he’s seen a few artistic representations. When it comes to theistic personalism, the only mischaracterization here seems to be the ‘in the sky’ part.

I claim there is something more being designated by the uppercase G besides swapping one symbol for another and it’s most certainly not designating a proper name, as though by talking about the Prime Mover we’re talking about some being among other beings who just so happens to have the name ‘Prime Mover’. The classical theist here is trying to get at something else, and in my opinion it has to do with the absolute dependency on everything upon this most metaphysically prior reality as opposed to pointing out an isolated, limited, local power like what one of the Greek gods lowercase-g represents. Now the natures of these two categories (to use that word in a loose sense) appropriately reflect each, in that uppercase-G God, so the classical theist argues, has no potencies, no materiality or corporeality, or any composition of parts, or anything that would cry out for a prior cause to metaphysically assemble this God, as it were. On the other hand, the lowercase-g gods are changeable, material, corporeal, natural objects, which certainly cry out for a prior cause to metaphysically assemble these lowercase-g gods together. So, the atheist is perfectly entitled, given that these lowercase-g gods have a nature that cries out for a prior cause or prior explanation ‘who made these lowercase-g gods?’ But given the divine nature of uppercase-G God, which has nothing which demands of a prior cause, asking ‘who made the First Principle?’ makes little sense as I have argued before. So uppercase-G represents absolute metaphysical primacy and properly deserves the names First Cause and First Principle, whereas the lowercase-g gods absolutely do not merit the name First Cause; the only thing they merit is being called cosmic superheroes, which many atheists are quite adamant in telling theists do not really exist; what’s odd about this whole modern conversation is that the classical theist likely agrees with the atheist on their main contention that there aren’t any of these cosmic superheroes. On the other hand, we describe uppercase-G God by saying things like: Pure Actuality, or Ground of Being, or as Aquinas says, Subsistent Act of Existence Itself or ipsum esse subsistens in Latin, meaning that whose essence or quiddity just is existence itself. Now, that’s contrasted with essence and existence being distinct in most other things, in that saying what a thing is does not of itself communicate that it is; the act of existence in a man, for example, is conjoined to what a man is, that is, his essence/quiddity, simply to exist as a man in the here and now or any other moment for that matter – to emphasize, not in the distant past, but right here and right now.

To give you a taste of how someone like a Thomist would conclude that there must be Ipsum Esse Subsistens, that whose essence/quiddity just is his act of existence, instead of merely being an idea in an intellect, we begin by saying that in something like a man, in which essence is distinct from existence, an act of existence must be joined to essence; the man cannot do this on his own, for such would be logically impossible – he would have to give himself existence, something which he does not already have. To put it another way, he would have to exist before he exists to make himself exist. So the Thomist would say something else, not the essence of the man itself, must cause an act of existence to be joined to that man’s essence in the here and now. But you’ll notice that of this additional thing, we should also ask whether it too has an essence/quiddity distinct from its existence. If not, he have our conclusion, there must be that in which essence is not distinct from existence. If the two are distinct, it too just to exist at all in the here and now, or any moment at which it may exist, must also have a cause of its act of existence being joined to its essence. Now, the Thomist says this series of causes cannot proceed to infinity. Why? This sort of series of causes is another example of a series ordered essentially or per se, which we discussed last time. Remember, members in these sorts of series only possess a certain power because they receive it from the previous member, that is, they only have power to do certain things derivatively, such as actualize potentials, as we saw in the argument from motion. Here, each member in this series of things conjoining acts of existence to essence can only do such a thing because it too is being caused to exist by the previous, through its act of existence being joined to an essence, for if the previous member stopped doing such a thing, the member in question wouldn’t be able to do much of anything, for it wouldn’t even exist to get the chance. Just as we saw in the argument from change/motion, suppression of previous members would result in the failure of latter members in the series – here they would just drop out of existence. Therefore, this series must terminate with a most fundamental member. You might call it a first member if you insist, but remember first means most fundamental, not first in a temporal sense. Now this first member cannot be just like the others, in which essence is distinct from existence, thus requiring an act of existence joined to essence, for if that were true, then there would have to be a more fundamental cause, thus contradicting this being the first or most fundamental member in this series. Therefore, we conclude that in this most fundamental member, essence is, in fact, not distinct from existence, it is the same; that’s a sketch how we arrive at Ipsum Esse Subsistens argued by St. Thomas.

In the previous video, I argued for the existence of an unactualized actualizer or Pure Act and I claim that Ipsum Esse Subsistens is also Pure Act; they’re just two different ways of describing that most metaphysically fundamental reality, one through the lens of act-potency and the other through the essence-existence distinction. But essence and existence are very much related by potency and act as we discussed last time, in that an essence all by itself is only in potency and requires actualization to truly exist. So just like things which are in motion, which have certain potentials being actualized, essences represent a potency which must also be brought to actuality. Now, in Ipsum Esse, there cannot be any such potencies, for if there were, Ipsum Esse wouldn’t really be the Subsistent Act of Existence Itself, because it’s not really subsistent, for it, like most other things, would need some potency actualized just to exist. Therefore, Subsistent Existence Itself cannot have any potencies and therefore exists in a purely actual way or just is actuality itself. Therefore, that which is Subsistent Existence Itself is also Pure Act, two different ways of talking about the same thing, and because it’s Pure Act, it’s also going to have to inherit all those other attributes I defended in the last video, such as unity – there being only one Ipsum Esse in principle as opposed to five hundred different ones – eternality, immateriality, etc. Notice that this argument, just like the argument from motion, has nothing whatsoever to do with the distant past; it also has nothing to do with whether the universe began to exist or is eternal, for even if it were eternal, the argument would still have to be answered, since we’re talking about the here and now in this argument. It does not say that everything needs a cause, for what it says, if we actually pay attention to the premises, is that in which essence is distinct from existence needs a cause, and precisely because essence is distinct from existence, it requires a cause. As I said last time, the premise ‘everything has a cause’ is not a premise in any cosmological argument any respected theologian or philosopher has ever made. If Stephan Molyneux says not an argument, please permit me to say #NotAPremise in regards to this ghost premise ‘everything has a cause’. And no, Subsistent Existence Itself cannot be identical with the universe unless you’re prepared to concede that the universe is immaterial and immutable. Furthermore, it cannot be a mere abstraction like a law of nature, whatever that’s supposed to mean when we precisely define what a law of nature is, especially not as Newton or Descartes saw them, which were things reflecting God’s will – the Deus vult theory of laws of nature, if you will. And it makes no sense to even raise the question of what causes Subsistent Existence Itself to exist, for if there were a cause, Subsistent Existence Itself, wouldn’t really be subsistent – again, a popular question which sounds like a devastating objection just turns out to be as silly as the question ‘what changes that which is immutable and cannot even in principle be changed? We saw that the unactualized actualizer represents the singular ultimate source of all change of those things in our daily experience which are composed of act and potency; what Subsistent Existence Itself represents is the singular ultimate source for the existence and continued existence of all the things of our daily experience in the here and now. And the things of our daily experience require such a sustaining cause precisely because their essence/quiddity is distinct from their existence. In summary because what the things of our daily experience are does not entail that they are, there must be that in which what it is is the same as that it is: the great I am, if you catch my drift. And this is indeed, as Aquinas might say, et hoc dicimus Deum: this is what we call God [uppercase-G].

What I’d like to drive home here is the absolute metaphysical primacy of Subsistent Existence Itself which is not characteristic of the lowercase-g gods. There are a number of ways to see that Subsistent Existence Itself has little to do with the gods. First, the lowercase-g gods are local, discrete powers, usually natural powers, but not metaphysically fundamental, owing their existence to other conditions that must be in place. These clearly cannot be Ipsum Esse, that is, they exist insofar as they are in a Pantheon or a power within nature but do not exist of themselves in the absolutely subsistent way that Subsistent Existence Itself does. In general, that which just isn’t most metaphysically fundamental, which entails its being Pure Act and being Ipsum Esse just isn’t what the classical theist, or even the atheist who’s asking ‘who made God?’ is talking about here in our quest for the most fundamental. Secondly, we saw in part 1that Pure Act is immutable and incorporeal, both because to be otherwise would presuppose certain potencies present within something which is Pure Act, which is contradictory. On the other hand, the lowercase-g gods are corporeal beings who are ruled over by their irrational passions and therefore change over time – therefore these pagan gods just aren’t candidates for being Pure Act or Subsistent Existence Itself. They’re not even in the same ballpark; to confuse the two is a category error. Thirdly, the distinction between Subsistent Existence Itself and ‘the gods’ is also made quite clear by the numbers of such things, Pure Act being unified, the latter being multiple in principle. It could make sense to talk about fifty distinct lowercase-g gods but it makes no sense, not even in principle, to talk about more than one Subsistent Act of Existence Itself or Pure Act, for there are no ways in which more than one could be distinguished, such as a potency that one has that one does not have. On this point of number of lowercase-g gods, one often hears atheists saying they believe in one less god than you. Now, this has some air of plausibility until we clarify the issue and recall we’re talking about Pure Act or Subsistent Existence Itself here. Therefore, this witticism in the realm of classical theism really translates to saying I believe in one less Pure Act than you. Or “I just go one Subsistent Act of Existence Itself further than you.” Or “you reject all of those other Grounds of Being don’t you? Great, I just go one Ground of Being further than you.” Or “I’m an atheist with respect to all those other most fundamental realities.” None of these questions really has the same rhetorical power and in fact makes this witticism seem rather silly since if there is uppercase-G God, there’s only one such thing, not fifty different ones like the lowercase-g gods. If the atheist here is talking about lowercase-g gods, it’s totally irrelevant, since the classical theist can agree with the atheist in that there are zero lowercase-g gods. So, if this locution of ‘one less god’ makes any sense, the atheist isn’t really saying to the classical theist that he believes in one less local power or superhero than the classical theist, what he’s really saying he denies there is an absolute source of all change in the world and he denies there’s an ultimate ground for being and intelligibility. That notion concerning the most fundamental is what this whole debate is really about, not trying to figure out how many cosmic superheros or distinguished gentlemen named Mr. god there are.

So the atheist is actually saying something quite radical if he denies the very source for not only change in the world but also the ground for there being any contingent thing at all. If there is no Pure Act there is no ultimate source of motion and the question of why any potentials are actualized in the here and now is left mysterious and we’re left with the absurdity that things possess motive power derivatively but ultimately derive such a power from nothing at all. So, atheism seems to have within it the potential for total absurdity and we see this here when thinking about change, which is an undeniable aspect of the most mundane experience. We’ll see the potential for total absurdity pop up again when we discuss the contingency of those beings of our everyday existence and we’ll find an analogous problem – if you don’t acknowledge there is a most fundamental member of the hierarchy, in this case necessary being, then you implicitly say that contingent beings exist ultimately for no reason at all, which is not a reasonable answer to the question. Atheism, therefore, isn’t a benign intellectual position of the same significance as, say, putting on a different colored t-shirt; atheism, if taken seriously, blows out the metaphysical foundations for understanding key parts of reality, such as the cause of existence of the things of our daily experience existing at any moment at all or the very possibility that they could change. The atheist who denies this is simply unaware of or unwilling to draw out the metaphysical consequences of his position. When it comes to metaphysics, atheism is much more cancerous than most atheists realize.

But I should also emphasize that what the classical theist isn’t saying is that there’s indeed a Pantheon but there’s only one lowercase-g god within it. What the classical theist is saying is that there is a unified, absolutely simple Divine Nature which is much more fundamental than the Pantheon itself or any of its members and allows for the possibility of there being a Pantheon at all or for there to be any of ‘the gods’ even in possibility. So, the classical theist is not what David Bentley Hart calls a mono-polytheist, in the sense he’s asserting there are these local powers, the lowercase-g gods, but there just so happens to be one such power. He’s saying there is a most metaphysically fundamental reality upon which even the lowercase-g gods depend. Even the pagan lowercase-g gods, if they were to exist, are dependent on Pure Actuality to actualize any potentials or upon Subsistent Existence Itself to exist by joining an act of existence to an essence, just like in most things. As a side note, you can see here why the terms monotheism and polytheism are actually potentially confusing terms, since if you’re a classical theist, you’re not a monotheist in the sense you think there’s one such limited local power as opposed to twenty, rather you think there is an First Principle from which all other powers and existences are derived. The gods, qualitatively speaking, are no less ontologically impoverished than anything else in our daily experience.

The classical theist is trying to push things back as far as they possibly go and not settling for any derivative realities like Pantheons or ‘the gods’, he’s trying to get at that which is the most fundamental and see what comes out of this line of questioning, one example being Pure Actuality, as we’ve already seen in the argument from motion and Ipsum Esse Subsistens in the Thomistic argument. So, if the thing you’re talking about like ‘the gods’ is dependent on other things to be the way it is such as needing other gods to give birth to it or is changing over time, which indicates the actualization of a potential, or even needs some parcel of matter conjoined to form, or having a body, you haven’t yet reached rock-bottom and you’re not yet talking about uppercase-G God, or the Absolute. Since there is a difference in kind and not in degree between lowercase-g god and uppercase-G God, you haven’t even gotten close to talking about God, as understood in the classical tradition, as that most metaphysically fundamental reality. Now, this is the rather unfortunate state of discourse nowadays where atheists aren’t even talking about the same thing that serious theists are, even though certainly much ink has been spilled on atheism in terms of books and lectures. Instead of becoming wiser and looking to the past, to thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, Avicenna, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and others have had to say about God, 90% of the time in our modern hubris, believing that we understand whereas we’re actually lost at sea, we’re working under the pretense that we’re both discussing whether uppercase-G God exists or not, whereas what we’re really doing, both theist and atheist, is debating how many cosmic superheroes or lowercase-g gods there are. Instead of running our mouths, and I’m talking to both sides here, let’s actually take the time to read these guys, because we’ve certainly got a lot to learn from them.

As I’ve been saying, the classical theist and the atheist share a common sentiment when the atheist asks ‘who made God?’ in that that which emerges from our reasoning must be truly fundamental and be congruous with it and with it being most fundamental. In the argument from change, the Prime Mover indeed has a nature being Pure Act which is congruous with being the most fundamental. Supposing we messed up in our reasoning and added some potencies to the Prime Mover, the atheist would be entitled to ask what actualizes this alleged Prime Mover, precisely because those things which are mixtures of act and potency require actualization, whereas asking what actualizes the potentials in that which has no potentials to be actualized, even in principle, becomes not only a silly question, but the indicator that we’ve reached rock-bottom in our analysis of change in tracing it back to first principles. The same goes for the essence-existence distinction in the Thomistic argument, our line of reasoning went as back as far as it can go, and reason leads us to conclude that there exists that which just is Subsistent Existence Itself, at which point, it makes absolutely no sense to ask what caused that which is Subsistent to exist? Again, the classical theist, pushes things back as far as they can go.