Supreme self-confidence and an utter lack of doubt helped make Jurgen Klinsmann one of the best strikers in the world. But these same traits do not serve him well in his role as U.S. men's national team coach.

BY John D. Halloran Posted

September 13, 2015

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TWO DECADES AGO Jurgen Klinsmann’s confidence made him one of the world’s elite strikers. Now, as head coach of a United States men’s national team heading into an all-important playoff with arch-rival Mexico, that same confidence has the American team on the verge of a momentous failure.

During his time as one of the world’s best goal scorers, Klinsmann accomplished more than any American player before or since. With Germany, he won the World Cup in 1990 and the European Championship in 1996.

On the club level, Klinsmann was the top scorer in the Bundesliga with Stuttgart in 1988; England’s FWA Footballer of the Year with Tottenham in 1995; and he won a league title with Bayern Munich in 1997. He was runner-up for the Ballon d’Or, given to the world’s best soccer player, in 1995.

A prolific goal scorer, Klinsmann found the back of the net 47 times in 108 caps for the German national team and scored 277 times for seven different clubs in a 17-year professional career.

In that environment, playing for some of the best teams in the world on the international stage and in Europe’s top leagues, Klinsmann couldn’t afford a moment of doubt. As all great players learn early on, especially goal scorers, they must have supreme belief in themselves and their abilities while quickly dismissing doubt and immediately forgetting mistakes.

But that same confidence that once made Klinsmann a great player is now seriously hampering his effectiveness as coach of the U.S.

Every coach, almost on a daily basis, has to balance a difficult conundrum. On one hand, they have to trust their instincts—sometimes stubbornly so—holding onto their beliefs about players and tactics in the face of doubt, lost games, and conflicting evidence. On the other hand, to be truly effective, coaches must be willing to accept their culpability for their team’s failures in order to make needed changes.

Klinsmann, in his tenure as head coach for the U.S. national team, has proved to be more than adept at the first part of that equation—and a total failure at the second.

In four years as manager of the U.S., Klinsmann’s stubbornness has paid dividends in a number of ways. The team has won a number of high-profile friendlies against Germany (twice), the Netherlands, Italy, and Mexico at the Azteca. The U.S. finished at the top of the hexagonal in World Cup qualifying and made a memorable run against some of the world’s best teams at the 2014 World Cup.

Along the way, Klinsmann found important, game-changing contributions from some of the player pool’s most maligned players, including Brek Shea, John Brooks, DeAndre Yedlin, Brad Evans, Julian Green, DaMarcus Beasley, Eddie Johnson, Graham Zusi, Bobby Wood and, yes, even Alan Gordon.

Despite this, Klinsmann ran into trouble this summer when he failed to lead the team to success at the Gold Cup. The U.S. squad, missing nearly a dozen key players and starting a defense anchored by a young center back combination, struggled.

Many pointed to the defense, and Klinsmann’s reliance on young center backs Ventura Alvarado and John Brooks, as the key to the team’s failures. Those pundits weren’t wrong, but they forgot that Klinsmann had little choice with Geoff Cameron held back by Stoke and World Cup veterans Matt Besler and Omar Gonzalez both struggling for form. They also conveniently forgot that it wasn’t the defense’s fault that the U.S. midfield—relying on Kyle Beckerman and missing Jermaine Jones—was overrun nearly the entire tournament.

Klinsmann talked about positives at the Gold Cup but he overlooks why #usmnt was outshot 85-47 at GC (minus Cuba) playing at home — Brian Sciaretta (@BrianSciaretta) September 4, 2015



But against Peru and Brazil this month, Klinsmann had a mostly full complement of players and the team still struggled to equal the sum of its parts. While the U.S. did beat Peru before being annihilated by five-time World Cup champions Brazil, it was once again obvious that Klinsmann’s mistakes in the midfield, and his stubbornness to make adjustments there, is the real issue with the U.S.’s recent performances.

Against Brazil, Klinsmann decided to start Jermaine Jones and Alejandro Bedoya as the U.S.’s deep-lying midfielders with Michael Bradley in the No. 10 role. Bedoya, who has always looked best for the U.S. on the flank, said “I’ve never really played that position as a professional” after the defeat.

Tactical blunder of the highest order by Klinsmann putting Bedoya in a spot where he wasn't going to succeed. Ridiculous. #usmnt — Jeff Carlisle (@JeffreyCarlisle) September 9, 2015

It's really uncomfortable watching Bedoya in this role. Looks so lost. #USAvBRA — Ben Jata (@Ben_Jata) September 9, 2015

Alejandro Bedoya pays the price for Jurgen Klinsmann screwing up — Stars and Stripes FC (@StarsStripesFC) September 9, 2015

Bedoya played completely out of position and then gets subbed before halftime. Pretty harsh on him unless he's injured. #USAvBRA — Landon Donovan (@landondonovan) September 9, 2015

Not only did Bedoya get torched multiple times in the center, including on El Selecao’s first goal, but his replacement on the right side of the U.S. midfield, DeAndre Yedlin, also struggled. Yedlin, for all his potential, is clearly not ready to be a starter at this level and is the one who gave away possession on the play leading to Brazil’s first goal.



Bedoya’s central midfield partner, Jones—who has always looked best when given the freedom to roam forward—also struggled. And like Bedoya, Jones said that the holding midfield position is not where he is best, telling ESPN’s Jeff Carlisle prior to the game, “Anyone who knows me, knows I prefer to have someone who covers me, so I can go all over the place.”

The last piece of the midfield puzzle against Brazil was Bradley, who has been cemented by Klinsmann into the No. 10 role for more than a year. In the match, Bradley was largely ineffective, as he has often been as the U.S.’s attacking midfielder—so much so that many forget he was often the U.S.’s best player in a foregone era when he played as the team’s No. 6.

But despite all evidence to the contrary, and seemingly unanimous agreement that Bedoya and the team had been set up to fail, Klinsmann refused to acknowledge his tactical blunder.

“Ale had a little bit of a problem getting into his rhythm, into his game," Klinsmann said during a halftime interview, "and there’s not much time you can give him. If you see that clearly…you’ve got to make a sub.”

So much for the theory Klinsmann "owned his mistake" by removing Bedoya. That halftime interview brought to you by Greyhound bus over Bedoya — Neil W. Blackmon (@nwblackmon) September 9, 2015

Speaking to reporters after the match, Klinsmann remained defiant: “Obviously playing Ale in the center there with Jermaine and with Michael in front of him was a very good option.”



This stubbornness isn’t a new phenomenon with Klinsmann, or simply that of an embattled coach struggling for results. In the past, Klinsmann has repeatedly proved unwilling to admit his own mistakes and repeatedly thrown his players under the proverbial bus.

After the World Cup he blamed the U.S.’s lack of offense on his players and during this year’s January camp, Klinsmann refused to take any responsibility for the team’s failures, instead attributing it to his players’ lack of “fitness” and MLS’ short season.

Prior to the match against Brazil, he even called out American fans and pundits, telling the Washington Post's venerable Steven Goff in an interview, “We have a long way to go to educate people on the game of soccer still in this country.”

Whether or not the coach actually believes what he is saying or not, on a public relations and practical level, his comments are just plain stupid. They alienate fans and the media (who like it or not often shape the narrative of the team), and increase resentment toward U.S. Soccer president Sunil Gulati—who clearly stood in Klinsmann’s corner when he extended the coach’s contract into 2018 before the team even stepped on the field at last summer’s World Cup.

They also damage Klinsmann’s relationship with his players and undermine his credibility as a coach. His players now know that Klinsmann will not stand up for them when they face adversity—often caused by Klinsmann himself—and his absurd statements after the Brazil game make him appear to players and fans alike as the emperor who wore no clothes.

As the U.S. approaches its all-important game with Mexico next month, Klinsmann needs to take a long hard look in the mirror. He must realize that if the U.S. is to have any chance against El Tri, it will start with him admitting his mistakes, re-organizing his midfield, and putting his team and players in a position to win.

John D. Halloran is an American Soccer Now columnist. Follow him on Twitter.