This attack sustainability serves as a defensive tool as well. With Aberdeen able to trap their opponent in a cycle of defending crosses, set pieces, long shots and wing play, combined with their aggressive counterpressing after losing the ball, the Dons can quickly stifle attempts at forming organised attacks against them. What follows is a series of unorganised phases where Aberdeen can generally emerge favourably due to the intensity of their play and the pressure under which they put their opponent. These phases typically continue until they can wrestle control through individual skill, or an opponent makes a mistake.

Man-marking and pressing

The rigid variant of man-marking that Aberdeen employ is one of the most striking aspects of their game. From their base defensive shape, almost every player will man-mark their closest opponent tightly, looking to prevent them from getting on the ball. For the central midfielders this is quite flexible, as they will follow their man away from the middle of the pitch, but will only do so until someone else is available to switch with them before returning to the centre.

As for the fullbacks, however, despite having a similar role in the marking scheme, they are forced at times to implement it far more radically. With the defensive system designed to eliminate overloads, and to prevent opponents from receiving the ball and turning to attack the goal, Aberdeen’s success in this area depends on picking up free players and marking them tightly. Should a wide player move back or infield to try get on the ball, the fullback would typically look to pass them on to one of the midfielders, allowing him to stay in touch with the rest of his back four. However, since Aberdeen’s midfielders actively look to man-mark in the centre, there is often no one for the fullback to pass his man on to. This leads to peculiar-looking scenes where Shay Logan will end up far from his right back berth, as far as the opposite flank or at the left side of central midfield.

Central defenders can also be expected to mark out of their position. Strikers dropping into midfield are almost always tracked to a certain degree, though rarely do the centrebacks allow themselves to be pulled far out of position. In these cases, one of the central midfielders will typically work back and press the receiving striker from the other side, temporarily leaving his man.

This pressing action is one of the few exceptions to an otherwise rigid scheme. The Dons’ pressing can be characterised as a series of 1v1 duels, with very few instances of help for the pressing player or doubling up on the ball-carrier. Each player is expected to perform adequately against their direct opponent to prevent the opponent from finding a free man.

High pressing is not hugely prevalent in the Aberdeen defensive system, but it can follow quite naturally from the basic scheme in certain situations. With the wingers maintaining pressing access to the opposing fullbacks, they can apply pressure on their deep build-up easily, while the central midfielders can sometimes ‘jump’ through their man and onto a centre back – blocking the pass to the man they left behind on their way. Since Derek McInnes’ men will man-mark the immediate passing options, a defender on the ball under pressure won’t see any free options to pass to, and fearing a turnover in his own third will likely look to play longer or clear his lines. In these situations, the dominance of Aberdeen’s central defenders enables them to generally win back possession easily against typically isolated forwards.

This approach is very effective against most teams domestically. Few teams in Scotland have a particularly strongly coordinated positional possession game that can take advantage of spaces left open by the man-marking on a collective level, while the intensity and strength Aberdeen have in 1v1 duels make it difficult to overcome the tight marking individually.

These aspects of Aberdeen’s game combine week in week out to make them a formidable opponent. Their low-risk strategy in possession makes it difficult to press them high up the pitch, while their individual quality mixed with good organisation allows them to unleash wave after wave of attacks on goal. Add in a hard-working defensive system and there’s little wonder that Derek McInnes has led this team to four consecutive second place finishes in the league.

The next step

Despite this season’s achievements, there undoubtedly remains room for improvement, on both the domestic and European fronts. Critics of McInnes have pointed to his record against Brendan Rodgers’ Celtic, a two-season losing streak halted only on the last day of a season Celtic had wrapped up weeks earlier. Indeed, Aberdeen’s record against the Old Firm this season makes for grim reading, with only 4 points gained from a possible 24, and a goal difference of -13. Meanwhile an early exit in the Europa League at the hands of Cypriot team Apollon Limassol did little to soften the blow dealt to Scotland’s UEFA coefficient by Rangers and St Johnstone. While the Dons’ tactical approach is clearly successful domestically, there is growing evidence to suggest that it might hinder them in these ‘big’ games.

Stability, sustainability

As outlined already, Aberdeen’s methods of bringing the ball into the opponent’s half are straightforward. Against lesser opposition or teams with poor organisation, the Reds can gain space up the pitch with their direct play and second-ball game easily. Their forward players can enjoy aerial superiority against weaker defenders, while the midfielders are better able to stay in touch with the forward line to pick up loose balls. Furthermore, the individual quality of their forward players can allow them to break out of the unorganised phases that follow a sequence of high balls and challenges.

This type of game, however, has proven to be somewhat less effective against the stronger teams. Better opposition will be able to disrupt this approach by pressing and forcing Aberdeen to play the long ball before they can get bodies around the target to prepare for second balls, with individually dominant defenders, or through strong organisation and compactness.

Celtic are a good example of this. Not only are their central defenders among the best in the league in challenging for aerial duels, but their defensive organisation and compactness makes it difficult to capitalise at all on the odd occasions where they might lose the first header. With Scott Brown and/or Olivier Ntcham staying close to the back line at the base of the midfield, they can both be perfectly positioned to pick up second-balls, and both can evade the first moments of pressure and play away, keeping their team on the ball. With this in mind, teams like Aberdeen have to think of tactics to make these situations more favourable for them.

To this end, Aberdeen already use a couple of other methods to help them in their direct play. In Scott McKenna they have unearthed not only a dominant defender, but someone who can play accurate, long diagonal passes to the opposite flank. These big switches of play can not only get a favourable aerial duel against an opposition fullback, but can create opportunities for simple overloads on the wing, dynamic advantages as the back line is stretched apart, all whilst being relatively low risk.

However, while the technical execution of McKenna’s long passing is usually very good, his timing and the preparatory movements on the receiving side are often poor. In many cases, the pass is played before the opposing fullback can be dragged centrally by an infield-moving winger, with these movements sometimes not being performed at all. Without the proper timing or preparation, the fullback has no threats to his positioning and can challenge effectively for the aerial ball, giving Aberdeen no advantage and making a successful breakthrough unlikely.

Another method the Dons have used, albeit sparingly, to make their direct play more effective has been to reduce their opponent’s ability to pick up second balls. With the ball in their own back line, the central midfield players will move towards the man in possession. If these players are marked, then the opposition midfielders will also move forwards towards the ball, taking them away from their own defensive line. This increases the space into which a direct ball can go, and gives the likes of McLean and Shinnie a better chance of picking up and loose balls and establishing themselves in the attacking half.

While this is a theoretically viable tactic which plays into the hands of Aberdeen’s athletic midfielders, in practice it is often poorly executed. The coordination in the movements from the midfield players, the positioning of the immediate support, and the timing of the pass up are almost always sub-optimal, and could even suggest that such moves are simply an organic byproduct of central midfielders looking to get on the ball and risk-averse defenders.

Indeed, Aberdeen’s reluctance to take any sort of risks in back line possession makes it very difficult for them to build sequences of possession. With even a low-risk, stability-focused possession game, they would be able to work the ball up the pitch in better condition. This would make it easier for them to get the ball to their wing areas more often and in more favourable situations.

Currently, however, Derek McInnes’ side’s risk-averse nature largely prevents this from being possible. Basic pressing forces the Dons to play long very easily, in situations where they are not prepared to regain the ball higher up the pitch. Goalkeeper Joe Lewis’ ‘always long’ distribution contributes significantly to this. Even in situations when one of his central defenders is completely free ahead of him, in a position to start another attack from just inside his own half, he will kick long – more often than not turning over possession, albeit in the opponent’s half.

Furthermore, Aberdeen’s central defenders are themselves guilty of cheaply conceding possession in exchange for territory, even when in relatively pressure-free circulation. When passing across the back, they often receive the ball facing the passing player, making it exceedingly difficult to control the ball the other way to continue the switch of play. Against any sort of pressing this results in a considerably tighter playing area, and usually a long ball to avoid a dangerous loss of possession.

When facing more aggressive pressing, the overly risk-averse possession plays straight into the opposition’s hands. Aberdeen will rarely look to escape pressing in a controlled manner, instead forcing long balls to an expectant opposing back line. The central defenders will hardly ever drop to get the ball from under pressure teammates, forcing them to play forwards to try and win the second ball. By moving backwards and facing forwards, they would have the option to receive the ball at a safe distance from pressing forwards, and pass the ball around the pressure to take those players out of the game, thus making it easier to reach the wings in a controlled way.

Perhaps the most extreme example of this is when the ball goes out to the fullbacks in build-up phases. With the central defenders not dropping off to give a backwards option, Logan and Considine are almost always forced forwards with their passing. As a result, instead of recirculating the ball around the back to the other side if there is not a clear route for the fullback to progress play, they have to either play straight balls along the touch line for the winger to receive in a horrible situation, or clip the ball in behind with little control.

It is in theses types of situations that Aberdeen’s struggles against stronger and better-organised opposition are again visible. Against weaker opposition they are often able to burst through the flank on their first attempt, with their creative dribblers, athletic depth runners, and simple wing combinations. The top teams, however, are able to prevent the Dons from progressing immediately. As such, with the wing route to the opposition half so prominent in Aberdeen’s game, being able to maintain possession to launch another attack if their first attempt fails is not only an integral part of a ‘sustained attack’ philosophy, but of almost any approach against strong opposition.

On many occasions this season, particularly against teams in the top six, this has been lacking. The sight of GMS on the flank, his teammates unable to get the ball to his feet, or isolated in hugely unfavourable situations, with no route to keep the ball and expected to drive the attack on his own has been a not wholly uncommon one at certain points this season.

Just as Aberdeen’s lack of stable possession in deep build-up resulted from their risk-averse central defenders, it is similar such behaviour from their central midfielders which presents difficulties in keeping the ball on the flank. In moments when the Dons do manage to bring the ball out of defence under control it is usually through McLean and/or Shinnie dropping deep to take possession and dictate play from deep. In doing so, they take themselves away from the centre of the pitch, towards the flanks or into the back line, where they are less likely to receive pressure. These movements though, as much as they make it difficult for the opponent to win the ball in high pressing, creates a disconnect in Aberdeen’s positional structure. With no central options the left side becomes disconnected from the right side, with the front and back ends of the structure becoming dependent on fullbacks shuttling from one end to the other.