Introduction

In a neorealist perspective, the international system is characterized by anarchy where there is no central authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states. This very architecture of the international system forces the states to pursue power which is the currency in achieving their ultimate end — that is, survival. In an anarchic world, there is security dilemma where the step of one state to improve its prospects for survival diminishes the security of the other. Following the assumption that they all possess a certain level of offensive military capability, neorealism posits that states operate in a self-help system where each of them has the power to inflict harm on its neighbor/s. This often leads to perpetual security competition. By focusing on competition against a backdrop of security dilemma in a self-help system, neorealism overlooks the risks of competition per se and fails to examine the benefits of cooperation for survival. This essay aims to argue that cooperation under anarchy is a good type of self-help and can be a state’s best option.

Neorealism has been the baseline for most IR theory, thanks to its parsimony. Nevertheless, with the passing of time, its influence has become a point of contention for emerging IR analysts (e.g. from neoliberals, constructivists). This paper suggests that the standard neorealist argument that overlooks the risks of competition sidelines the opportunity for a nuanced understanding of cooperation in a state of anarchy. It is with this argument that this essay is built upon. Particularly, this essay attempts to address the following questions: 1) Does cooperation indeed have merit in an anarchic world? And 2) How does the dynamics of state intention strengthen/weaken the prospects for cooperation? Accounting the proposition that power is the core of (neo)realism, this essay narrows the focus from the general notion of power into military capabilities as the determining factor in international cooperation.

Cooperation Under Anarchy

Neorealists intimated that security dilemma reinforces a vicious cycle of competition wherein states are driven by fear of getting attacked. Thereby it makes proper sense for each state to maximize power necessary for retaliation (Mearsheimer, 2013: p. 78). It is worth noting, however, that the pursuit of power is contingent on the security dilemma (Glaser, 1994: p. 63). The question of how much power is enough has received a variegated response from the different strands of neorealism. Security-seeking states subscribe to Waltz’s “appropriate amount of power” (1979) whereas greedy states pursue hegemony through the acquisition of “overwhelming power” (Mearsheimer, 2013).

In response to the first essay question, and for the purpose of this essay, I borrow Glaser’s (1994) definition of cooperation as “coordinated policies designed to avoid arms races” (p. 51). The maximization of relative power in an anarchy, an argument posed by neorealists, only exacerbates the security dilemma by which states tend to reach an impasse that could lead to an outbreak of war. States’ preference in cooperation is predicated on their military capabilities and their absolute gains — increase in security— resulting from such cooperation. Cognizant of an adversary’s relative military assets, a security-seeking state will refuse losing in an arms race by entering into cooperation via arms control (Glaser, 1994) and military alliance (Walt, 1987). Since the ultimate goal is survival, security dilemma can only be ameliorated by security agreements. Many find this argument faulty due to the high possibility of “cheating” which is very likely to occur under any circumstances. Yet, the benefits of cooperation can balance, and even outweigh, the risks of cheating. Using the games theory, cooperation is best explained more in a Stag Hunt, where it is rational for all actors to cooperate, than in a game of Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Moreover, Jervis (1978) elaborated on the gains a state can get from cooperation. Threats of war result directly from arms race. States, being rational actors, understand the risks and costs of war. Domestic mobilization of men and ideas undermines states’ motive to enter into conflict thus leveraging economic gains as a beneficial effect of mutual cooperation (Jervis, 1978; p. 177).

Importance of State Intention

In relation to the second question, the answer revolves around an intangible force that sets the motion either for continued cooperation or competition: that is to say, state intention. Neorealists argue about the obscurity of the intention of states which are especially difficult to discern (Mearsheimer, 2013; p. 79). Consequently, they assume the worst of other states, or their adversaries in that matter.

Glaser (1994), albeit giving credence to the argument, reconciled the drawback of a changing state intention with salient approaches to one’s military capabilities. As in Prisoner’s Dilemma, states who remain suspicious of other states’ interest/s will less likely involve in any sort of international cooperation. Competition will ensue; and security dilemma will continue to serve the interest of the strong at the expense of the weak. It is in this premise that Glaser (1994) proposed for an active communication of intentions through military policy.

Policymakers hold the cards in state maneuvers. Getting a grip on military policy, they can communicate their benign intentions through cooperation via arms control, unilateral defense and unilateral restraint (Glaser, 1994; p. 68). Openness and commitment are among the tactics used to reach a certain level of confidence among states primarily motivated by security. This indicates their willingness to reduce — if not altogether remove — their offensive capability and invest in security cooperation for the enhancement of their defensive assets.

Conclusion

To a great extent, it is uncontestable that neorealism remains relevant as a research paradigm in international relations. Students and actors alike of international politics adhere to the principles of neorealism, making the theory a dominant paradigm in IR. However, as with other theories, it has its own strengths and weaknesses.

This essay is an attempt to capture the inadequacy of neorealism’s assumptions about international cooperation and therefore pose arguments against its competition bias. While some neorealists, in the likes of Waltz, did not totally dismiss the idea of cooperation, they nevertheless discount its importance in the security dilemma. This limited view of cooperation underscores its pessimism in an anarchic world, marked by arms race and unilateral military buildup. Such an assumption warrants a more rigorous examination of the dynamics of international politics in order to insert a more nuanced understanding of international cooperation amidst differences in military capabilities. This job is filled in by the likes of Jervis (1978), Walt (1985 & 1987) and Glaser (1994). Particularly, conditions for cooperation are manifested in contemporary times. Atomic scientists have moved the doomsday clock near midnight, which means nuclear war is just around the corner. States being rational actors prefer to enter into bilateral/multilateral security agreements so as to prevent unnecessary conflicts. Extant literature and succeeding IR theories corroborate this point.

To this effect, it has been established that international cooperation is not only attractive but necessary. Future students and analysts of IR will only need to elaborate on the conditions for cooperation as time progresses.

References

Glaser, Charles. 1994. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help.” International Security, 19(3): 50-90.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics30, 167-214

Mearsheimer, John. 2013. “Structural Realism.” In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd ed., eds. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 77-93.

Walt, Stephen. 1985. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International Security, 9(4): 1-43.

Walt, Stephen. 1987. The Origins of Alliances.USA: Cornwell University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics.Reading: Addison-Wesley.

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