Official media have recently featured emotional stories, many told in the first person, of doctors reuniting with their families or former patients expressing gratitude to their medics. One moving video posted by People’s Daily, a government newspaper, shows an old man in the hospital room where he was treated for Covid-19 playing the violin for the doctors who cared for him. Another animated short featured on People’s Daily online platform ends with medics triumphantly sending off patients who have recovered with the farewell, “We won’t retreat!”

Turning the stories of ordinary people into a narrative of national unity and resilience isn’t a new strategy for China. I observed it in previous propaganda campaigns, notably in the aftermath of torrential rains in 2012 that caused at least 77 deaths and 65,000 evacuations in Beijing and sparked much public anger over the authorities’ mishandling of the disaster. Back then, People’s Daily filled its pages with stories about local heroes, like restaurant employees who pulled cars from flooded roads.

Once again with the Covid-19 epidemic, showcasing individual stories of bravery or solidarity is an attempt by state media to generate what Mr. Xi has referred to as “positive energy”: Promoting this, the president has argued, should be a top priority for journalists so as to create “a sound environment for public opinion.”

Similarly, when Chinese media address global audiences, they delegate the lauding of China’s performance to Western experts. An April 2 video report from the state news agency Xinhua that characterizes China’s management of the coronavirus crisis as “timely and transparent” is told through foreign voices: the president of Cyprus, the chief scientist at the World Health Organization, the deputy minister of health of Venezuela. Chinese news outlets also routinely employ foreign journalists to communicate China’s vision to the rest of the world.

And the two tactics cross-fertilize: Stories about the resilience of Chinese citizens are directed to international audiences, and foreign leaders’ praise of China’s generosity in providing medical aid is transmitted to audiences in China.

But does all this work, especially with Chinese people?

Partly because openly expressing one’s views on political matters is a sensitive matter in China (as in any authoritarian regime), it is a persistent challenge for social scientists to gauge the public’s views there. Much research about public opinion in China has found strong support for the government, particularly the central government. Yet a recent study published in China Quarterly, a flagship journal of China studies, cautions that these findings might be exaggerated because they don’t take account of high rates of nonresponse to politically sensitive questions, especially among people from marginalized groups.

What does seem clear, though, is that by providing only partial responses to public concerns, the government has prompted some people to ask for more. Some commentary on Chinese social media exudes cynicism about the belated, official response to Dr. Li’s death. “Is that it?” read one post in reaction to the official report blaming Wuhan police officers for reprimanding Dr. Li. The comment attracted around 160 million views.