Let it not be said that Anonymous is afraid of establishing a foothold in Asia. Following in line with #OccupyPhilippines and Anonymous China, the group has lately taken to attacks on the Japanese government’s websites in retaliation for new and stringent copyright legislation passed on June 22. I don’t intend to dwell on anonymous for any extended period, I risk becoming one of those anti-Anon doomsayers should I do so. What is interesting in Japan’s case is the catalyzing effect Anonymous has had in pushing Japan towards institutionalizing cybersecurity. The timing cannot be ignored as the announcement of the new agency followed mere days behind the June 26 attacks on Finance Ministry, the Supreme Court and the Intellectual Property High Court.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura reported the establishment of the Cyber Incident Mobile Assistant Team (CYMAT) in a press conference on June 29. While only casually accepting Anonymous as a potential target, Fujimura identified the purpose of the organization, operating under the authority of the National Information Security Center (NISC), to be the rapid response and mobile assistance designated for the defense of government agencies. The organization is to be comprised of “personnel from all ministries and agencies,” with interagency cooperation being the hallmark of the Noda administration’s ambition. The Asahi Shimbun reports that wherein NISC has monitored computer services within government agencies since 2005, CYMAT is specifically tailored towards genuine information security threats, not just your average hometown hacker trying to make a name for himself. One way to think of the difference might be to think of NISC as the principal agent of network security, whereas the CYMAT is to be the champion of data security.

One should not overstate the significance of this new organ. While it may be the elite, dynamic Ghostbusters of cyber response, the organization will still only comprise 26 individuals, eventually rising to 40. This may be in line with the 30-strong preexisting cyberwarfare unit that China admitted to having last year, but it could hardly compete with the 180,000 Chinese cyber spies reported by a classified FBI report. Even North Korea, with its 3000-member strong cyber warfare unit, could easily challenge Japan’s 40 noble defenders. With such a numerical bias it would seem that what the CYMAT will be able to do is to diagnose, counteract and service the government in Phase 0 – Phase 1 of cyber conflict, which is to say before the onset of open hostilities.

In a small bout of irony here, Anonymous may be creating an impetus for national information security as applied to international security, not simply domestic politics. I’ve often made the case that domestic hackers may be integral to national security in a variety of ways. First, they contribute in the sense that hacking ability can only be cultivated through field experience, not academic training. Wherein the knowledge of computers may be obtained through training, the necessary creativity, vision, and illicit knowledge necessary to dissemble security systems can only be gained through firsthand, necessarily illegal experience. As cyber conflict seems more of a “when?” than a “will it?” the need for brilliant, experienced security minds will rise and such a talent pool is not to be neglected. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the vision of most domestic hackers varies from the pseudo-anarchistic to the highly principled, whatever the case, resources and ambition limit such individuals to smaller scale attacks which rarely impact national security in any critical fashion. What these attacks do accomplish, as in Anonymous Japan’s case, is to initiate the necessary reform to bring about effective national cybersecurity measures.

But it Japan up to something more than counteracting politically-charged cyber activists?

At a meeting with NISC on April 26, Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba suggested that international law should apply to cyberspace – therein making an end run around Japan’s constitution to allow for defensive action under the right of self-defense. With the Fujitsu antivirus virus’ release on the horizon, one can’t help but see Japan’s scaling up of cyber defense as an allegory for its increased presence on the non-digital security front. The Noda administration decided on December 27 of last year to make concrete efforts towards the relaxation of Japan’s 1967 “Three Principles” on Arms Exports – allowing for joint development of next generation technology and the reduction of draconian oversight of dual-use technology.

Japan is preparing for something, and they haven’t ignored the cyber equation as they progress towards being a major security player.