“Thus you shall not show pity: life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.” – Deuteronomy 19:21

In a similar fashion to Ayn Rand’s ethical criticism of empathy, I may have recently challenged the long held assumption that forgiveness is, in fact, a virtue. You can see the full article here at Forgiveness is (Not) a virtue, however below I have provided a brief recap as a prerequisite to this follow up article.



Much of my previous assertion comes from what I would have deemed as moral intuition. It seems wrong to prioritize the guilty over the innocent which is what forgiveness does. Forgiveness is, in essence, the pardoning of a wrong that deserves punishment. Furthermore, forgiveness can only exist contingently within an ethical system which assumes failure from the beginning. This appears to be, on the surface, the most religiously recognized view of forgiveness. However, I recognize that some noble persons, in attempting to redeem forgiveness, argue that it is wholly something other than what I have described. Nevertheless, the commonly held view of forgiveness in both religious traditions and in philosophy has been the aforementioned definition. Morally speaking, forgiveness is the release of a debt. Moreover if one grants the following, it would appear forgiveness is, by definition, unjust and is, at best, merely instrumentally good. Thus forgiveness is not a virtue.



The Stoic philosopher Seneca, in his letter On Clemency, argues the following: “Pardon is given to a man who ought to be punished; but a wise man does nothing that he ought not to do, omits to do nothing which he ought not do; therefore he does not remit a punishment which he ought to exact.” Pardon, according to Seneca, is the issue. If one is to pardon another who is guilty of injustice then they themselves fail to act in accordance with virtue. The Stoic Sage, the ideal man or woman, would always act in a way that is in harmony with their nature, to be virtuous, and therefore would not pardon the iniquities of the wicked. However, Seneca is not advocating that there is no room for what he deems as “Clemency” or mercy.



As Seneca sees it, justice without mercy is cruelty. Seneca labors to demonstrate, to none other than the notorious Emperor Nero himself, that mercy has the capacity to restrict a ruler from falling into ruthless vengeance and tyranny. The bulk of Seneca’s argument assumes that mercy “declares that those who are let off did not deserve any different treatment.”



This is vastly different than forgiveness or pardon. Rather, mercy is more like gentleness. A gentleness befitting a person who has the right to exercise authority over another.



Of course, I do not want to mislead. Seneca did make room for both retributive and restorative justice. Mercy’s gentle touch is most emphasized in those whom she can correct by small gesture as opposed to unnecessarily heavy handed force. “Still pardon should not be general for the distinction between bad men and good is abolished, chaos will follow in an eruption of vice. We must therefore apply a moderation capable of distinguishing the curable from the hopeless.” This is because, as Seneca further elaborates: “ We have all sinned, some grievously, some less so, some of set intent and some by chance impulse or by the misleading of others’ wickedness; some have not been steadfast and good resolutions and have lost innocence reluctantly and after a struggle.” Mercy, working in harmony with justice, can make the distinction between those who are redeemable and those who are not without compromising justice, as is the case with forgiveness.



To further my point, Seneca maintains that mercy, not pardon, is the duty of the sage by arguing the following: “But the wise man will bestow upon you in a more honourable way that which you wish to obtain by pardon, for he will make allowances for you, will consult your interests, and will correct your bad habits: he will act just as though he were pardoning you, but nevertheless he will not pardon you, because he who pardons admits that in so doing he has neglected a part of his duty. He will only punish some people by reprimanding them, and will inflict no further penalty if he considers that they are of an age which admits of reformation: some people who are undeniably implicated in an odious charge he will acquit, because they were deceived into committing, or were not sober when they committed the offence with which they are charged: he will let his enemies depart unharmed, sometimes even with words of commendation, if they have taken up arms to defend their honour, their covenants with others, their freedom, or on any other honourable ground. All these doings come under the head of mercy, not of pardon.” As some have seen it, the mercy to which Seneca is defending appears to be an exercise of equity, which is an application of justice in light of the unique circumstances of individual cases. Furthermore, Seneca emphasizes: “Mercy is “a restraining of the mind from vengeance when it is in its power to avenge itself,” or it is “gentleness shown by a powerful man in fixing the punishment of a weaker one.” It is safer to have more than one definition, since one may not include the whole subject, and may, so to speak, lose its cause: mercy, therefore, may likewise be termed a tendency towards mildness in inflicting punishment. It is possible to discover certain inconsistencies in the definition which comes nearer the truth than all the rest, which is to call mercy “self-restraint”…”



Here I would like to conclude with some examples of how I see Seneca’s views in practice. The first example comes from the article The God of Disappointment, where I discuss the story of the prophet Jonah in the Hebrew Bible. In this story, we are told that Nineveh has fallen under God’s wrath due to its extreme wickedness. However, the city is spared, to Jonah’s regret, because, “there are more than a hundred and twenty thousand people who cannot tell their right hand from their left—and also many animals”. To which Cyril of Alexandria, in like mind with many other early Christians, explains: “This is something beyond infants, it is logical to accord them loving-kindness before all others, since they have not sinned; what sins could they be guilty of if still unfamiliar with their own hands?” God had every right to wipe Nineveh off the map for her injustices, yet He excised mercy by sparing Nineveh for her several innocent individuals who have not sinned…and the animals (laughs).



The second example comes from an experience I had with a friend who happened to be a Somalian Muslim. We were discussing the major differences between Christianity and Islam when he brings up the topic of justice ( a favorite subject of mine as you can no doubt tell if you follow my work). When providing his own view of justice, he stated that if a man murders his wife or child he would seek retribution by murdering the guilty party’s wife or child. I recall being appalled at the idea of harming or seeking retribution upon the innocent to further harm the wicked. This is a clear case where an “eye for an eye” has gone completely off the rails into something only mercy can correct. Now I’m not saying this is the definitive Muslim view of justice….from what I can tell of my limited study of the Quran, it is far from it, but I use it here to demonstrate my point. Recall that mercy declares that those who are let off did not deserve any different treatment. It would be unjust to punish anyone who is not directly guilty of the crime committed and therefore my Samalian friend had fallen victim to cruelty. This cruelty being something that Seneca stresses mercy eliminates.



Therefore, mercy is not forgiveness (pardon) but is necessary and, dare I say it, virtuous!