Much has been said about the unprecedented’ nature of the Pulwama suicide bombing, which some have chosen to describe as the worst terrorist attack in decades’, but this reflects evident and selective amnesia. Tragic and shocking though it was, it was far from the worst that India has seen, nor was it unique in its tactic. This was the seventh vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) suicide attack in Jammu and Kashmir, the first dating back to April 19, 2000, at the army’s Badamibagh headquarters. As for the worst’, it is astonishing that the 257 killed in the Mumbai 1993 serial bombings could be overlooked; or the 201 killed in the serial train bombings, again in Mumbai, in 2006; or the 175 killed in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks of 2008; or, moving away, the 148 killed in the Jnaneswari Express derailment engineered by Maoists in 2010; or the 2008 serial blasts in Guwahati, which killed 87; or the 76 security force personnel slaughtered by Maoists at Chintalnad in Dantewada in 2010.

The list goes on, but the point is that we appear to have no historical memory, and that is why the entire strident discourse after each major incident is quite meaningless. If one trawls the record, the same words of condemnation, threats and imprecations, often verbatim, will be found to have been repeated after each terrorist outrage. So, if we are to examine our current options’, it is useful to look back at the earlier and exceptional terrorist attacks, and discover what was done then.

In most cases, the answer is, little or nothing. Some rushing around to drum up diplomatic support’; a few symbolic gestures; the suspension of talks (if ongoing); and impotent promises to never again allow this affront.

An exception was the response to the attack on India’s Parliament on December 13, 2001, which resulted in Operation Parakram, the massive military mobilisation along the border, among a number of other, largely symbolic, measures. The mobilisation raised temperatures and unfounded fears of nuclear war, but eventually achieved nothingexcept the death of some 800 (more, according to some estimates) Indian soldiers in a range of accidents, including explosions during mining and demining operations.

A second apparent exception was the surgical strikes’ of 2016, in the wake of the Uri attack. Though there are disputes over scale, depth and damage, such strikes had been executed before. However, the present regime chose to politicise and internationalise the strikes. The impact, if any, has only been adverse, with terrorism and cross-border exchanges of fire escalating dramatically. Some variation of these actions may again be attempted, but the impact would be no greater.

A strategic response, as against knee-jerk tactical reactions, is based on the enduring capacities of the State, and require preparation over extended periods of time. We have hollowed out our defence apparatus over decades of underinvestment and neglect, and the present regime has only reinforced this trend. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, in a report last year, stated, inter alia, that 68 per cent of equipment with our defence forces was in the vintage category’; and that the forces did not have ammunition reserves to sustain a 10-day war with Pakistan. We may have a military doctrine’ that requires us to be ready for a two-front war’, but it has not gone beyond the paper it was written on. Moreover, our capacities for covert action have also been systematically dismantled, particularly under Morarji Desai and Inder Kumar Gujralbut none of the intervening or succeeding regimes have done much to rebuild these. The kind of granular intelligence and covert capabilities required for a deep strike within Pakistan simply do not exist. So talk of taking out’ Masood Azhar or replicating America’s Abbottabad strike are just frustrated fantasies. India simply lacks the conventional and sub-conventional strengths necessary to effectively punish Pakistan’s support to terrorism, and to deter future adventurism.

The writer is the executive director of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal and editor of South Asia Intelligence Review.