ALMOST seven years after the announcement of the Iraq Inquiry by Gordon Brown, then prime minister, the completed report of the committee led by Sir John Chilcot was delivered into the hands of a team of Whitehall officials and spooks this week for national-security vetting. Mr Brown’s successor, David Cameron, hopes they will complete their checks on a document the size of 15 chunky novels within two weeks.

John Penrose, the Cabinet Office minister in charge of shepherding the report through to publication, reassured MPs on April 14th that nothing would be censored to save ministers or officials from embarrassment. Its long-awaited release is likely to be soon after, rather than before, the EU referendum on June 23rd.

Sir John and his committee have been the butt of much criticism, including from Mr Cameron himself, for the time they have taken to complete their work. They are accused of failing to respect the desire of families who lost loved ones to learn what happened and put it all behind them. That was never the purpose of the report. It was intended to provide a complete record of Britain’s involvement in Iraq from mid-2001 to 2009, two years after British forces ignominiously pulled out of Basra. It is hoped that future governments will be able to draw lessons from it.

One reason why the report has taken so long is the amount of material that had to be gathered and examined. To draw defensible conclusions and make recommendations that will be heeded, an inquiry has to show that it has left no stone unturned and has weighed the evidence objectively.

Another is the need for fairness. Inquiries of this kind are set up on the assumption that some people made mistakes or behaved badly. Those whose reputations may be damaged by its conclusions must be allowed to see and respond to the case against them. Some accuse individuals including Tony Blair, the prime minister who took Britain into Iraq, of using the process both as a delaying tactic and as a way to deflect or dilute criticism. Mr Blair strongly denies such charges. The responses of some others were worth the wait as they made a positive contribution to the report.

A third reason for the almost interminable wait is the need to negotiate with other governments, particularly America’s, before making public material they regard as sensitive or confidential, such as the undertakings made by Mr Blair to President George W. Bush in private conversations. Britain’s military and intelligence relationship with America, however awkward at times, remains the cornerstone of British security. An agreed path through this diplomatic minefield had to be found.

Sir John hopes that when people see the comprehensiveness of the inquiry they will understand the time it has taken. The reality is that it can only disappoint many of those who have been demanding its publication most stridently. They will be satisfied only when Britain’s role in the war has been officially declared illegal and Mr Blair is convicted as a war criminal. Neither is imminent.