Nick Mangieri (56) and Indiana's defensive linemen will be key to stopping, or at least containing, Navy's triple option.

OK, fair warning time: I’m about to get southern football nostalgic on y’all. Sort of. Both of my parents went to Georgia Southern, and my father remains to this day a fan of the Eagles, so I’m pretty familiar with Paul Johnson’s spread option. I won’t profess to be a genius or savant in its ways, but between watching his career in Statesboro and then following him at Navy and Georgia Tech, I’ve gotten pretty used to the system. So as Indiana prepares for the Midshipmen, I thought I would use what little expertise I have from watching the offense in the last 15 years to walk through some of the basics.

Talking points

There are several words and phrases you’ll hear when coaches talk about defending the option. Here’s an explanation of a few of them.

Assignment football

At some level, every offense requires playing assignments to control or defeat. That’s obvious.

But the spread option gets more detailed, because it requires total adherence to specific keys on every single play. If a defensive end or a middle linebacker lets his eyes stray from what he’s watching on any snap, the whole defense can be compromised by a well-run play.

The ability to stick to assignments and get penetration from players like defensive tackle Darius Latham (pictured) will determine in part whether Indiana can keep Navy's option from finding rhythm.

Typically, each player at the first two levels of defense will have an assignment, whether it be the fullback, who lines up behind the quarterback, the involved wing back (there’s usually just one) or the quarterback himself. If a defense has the personnel to do it, then it can assign its defensive tackles to remove the fullback, its defensive end to play contain and handle the quarterback and then let at least one linebacker and the play-side defensive backs deal with the wing back.

But in this scenario, one mistake means a gain of five yards, or perhaps even more. A defensive tackle being blocked well opens a hole. A defensive end crashing down on the fullback dive (ends are often released play side, since the option is designed to remove them from the play itself anyway) creates imbalance and gives the play a good chance of getting the corner and turning up field.

This is a simplistic scenario, but the point of the option is to remove players from the play, one by one, either with blocking or with ball movement. Because three different players can touch the ball on any snap, any defender caught trying to follow the ball or vacant of his assignment leaves a hole in the defense, and because a well-executed option play can stretch down the line of scrimmage in a matter of seconds, there’s rarely time to close unexpected gaps.

Option teams will do a lot to move defenders’ eyes, running a lot of counters and traps and fakes.

I’ve got some video linked in this story, from the 2008 Chick-Fil-A Bowl between LSU and Georgia Tech. It’s probably as thorough of a beating as I’ve ever seen a defense put on one of Johnson’s teams.

Cue the video up to 2:22, and you’ll see Tech try to execute a wide-side option play. Quarterback Josh Nesbitt actually turns 270 degrees, the idea being that he wants to give the LSU defense at least a split second’s pause before following the play.

But as it unfolds, two critical things happen. First, LSU’s defensive line blows up Tech’s blocking scheme. Second, the Tigers’ linebackers are not fooled, and they flow play side excellently. The result is that Nesbitt, seeing white shirts outnumbering his option at the edge, hands off to 2008 ACC Player of the Year Jonathan Dwyer, who runs into traffic and gains less than a yard.

LSU’s players each stick to their assignments, none are fooled by the misdirection of Nesbitt’s movement at the snap and the result is a play that’s covered at all three levels from the start.

2008 Chick-Fil-A Bowl LSU vs. Georgia Tech...

This is a long talking point, but it is the one from which basically all others will spring, so it needed fleshed out first.

Eye discipline

Went over this a little bit, but a big part of playing your assignment against the option is maintaining eye discipline on your key.

Keys aren’t always players. Sometimes they’re motion or the flow of the offensive line or something else, but sticking precisely to your job and no other starts with keeping your eyes locked on your key. The option is hard to handle in this regard because it has a lot of moving parts and tries to use some of that misdirection to throw players off, even for a half step.

Read discipline

Teams using Johnson’s system, which Navy does, aren’t afraid to pass when they feel a defense has lost focus enough to cover passing routes and bite on a run fake.

Most often, play action seems to come from a simulated fullback dive, after which the quarterback just drops to pass, but if you cue up that video to 1:58, you’ll see a fake-pitch play-action pass, one that nearly works but is underthrown and barely broken up.

The passing game can work very well for option teams. Georgia Tech was, last season, 115th in the country in passing yards per game, averaging just a hair under 130. But the Yellow Jackets were second nationally in yards per passing attempt, at 9.4. Navy was 117th in passing yards per game, but 25th in yards per attempt.

Passes out of the spread option, which flexes wide receivers out often and sometimes can even go three wide, don’t always try to stretch the field, but many are designed with a deep pass in mind.

Also, Navy is, according to IU, a threat to operate out of the pistol from time to time, an excellent formation to pass from when necessary. I doubt many pistol sets will be play-action based, rather than essentially a tip that a pass is likely coming, but since this is Navy’s first game of the season, no one can be entirely sure.

Mental fatigue

So much of what the option thrives on is mental fatigue.

It’s easy, relative to the grand scheme of a whole football game and the conditioning of the average FBS player, to remember those keys and play them for 3-6 plays per drive.

But the spread option is OK with 15-play drives. IU coaches said repeatedly this week (and they’re right) that Navy has little compunction going for it on fourth down, unless the yardage is prohibitive, and Johnson has basically said for years that he’s prepared to go for anything fourth-and-short across the 50. When run right, the option offense guarantees 3-4 yards each play, so first downs are given regularly to those who are patient.

Here, it is worth pointing out that Georgia Tech and Navy finished third and fourth nationally in rushing plays of 10-plus yards last season, respectively, per cfbstats.com. They were second and tied for 15th nationally in runs of 20-plus yards, respectively.

Some of that is just based on sheer averages — both teams run the ball an inordinate amount of the time, so they’re bound to have more explosive plays. But it’s also because the option is designed to wear teams down and exploit massively one or two mistakes born of the mental and physical fatigue that sets in over the course of a long game.

Cut blocking

Offensive lines in the spread option cut block like crazy. Their splits are actually noticeably wider than a normal line’s splits between players, which allows them more room to be mobile, seek out their assignments via pulls and traps when necessary and, in using those cut blocks, open up larger holes for the fullback dive. The cut blocks can also force second-level defenders to fill those holes, creating space at the edge for quarterbacks and wing backs.

Wide receiver blocking is also crucial, because so many plays are designed to reach the edge of the defense, so cornerbacks and safeties need to be ready to shed a lot of blocks, while always maintaining a healthy respect for passing plays.

Base plays

This is a tricky one to navigate, because part of the difficulty of the spread option is that it can be very multiple and diverse. But there are a few basic plays from which the option grows.

Triple option: This one is the most common and straightforward: Fullback lines up behind the quarterback, wing back comes into motion, quarterback snaps the ball, reads the fullback dive and then has the option to hand off or carry the ball down the line, there to either keep it and turn up field or pitch it to the wing back.

This can be run from all sorts of formations (most of these plays can), and it can involve all sorts of false motion. Typically, a wing back will come into motion toward the play side, but this system calls for plenty of misdirection counter, where the quarterback and even sometimes the fullback will fake in that direction before spinning the play around. Again, the idea is just to get defensive players mentally turned around, even for a moment.

Fullback option: This is more of a straight option, with the fullback and quarterback just running a two-man play and everyone play side blocking in front of them. Keep in mind that, in this offense, the fullback is just a bigger halfback, not a blocking, plodding back in the more traditional sense of the word.

Wing back sweep: This might be my favorite play in all of football. When it’s blocked right, it’s a guaranteed 5-7 yards, if not more.

The wing back comes into motion like a normal option play, but instead of faking or selling anything, the quarterback just tosses him the ball at the snap. If run right, the wing back is already rolling up field when he gets the ball. The play-side wing back and, sometimes, the fullback, go out and block ahead of the play, and because the wing back is catching the ball running downhill, offensive linemen can quickly release to the second level. Blocked right, it’s a good gain most of the time, and an explosive play now and again.

Play-action pass: We went over this earlier, but it can be run off of the fullback dive or a wing back toss, or even in an option setting. That last wrinkle is, in my experience, pretty rare.

Again, these are pretty basic plays, and Navy will have their own wrinkles. IU’s coaches talked about Navy quarterback Keenan Reynolds as a true dual-threat player, so the Midshipmen could mix in more passing plays, perhaps some play action rollouts and designed scrambles.

But a lot of the spread option comes from a few base plays, like the ones mentioned above, with wrinkles added in by personnel grouping and positioning, and by subtle attempts at misdirection.

So how do you beat it?

Paul Johnson took the Georgia Tech job in 2008, so his direct influence at Navy is gone, but Ken Niumatalolo kept his offense alive in Annapolis. What’s important to remember about that offense is that Johnson essentially drew it up himself, incorporating some early spread concepts into the old Wing-T, veer and wishbone schemes that were once popular in college football.

I included that particular video, the 2008 Chick-Fil-A Bowl (in civilized conversation, it’s still just the Peach Bowl), because I don’t believe I’ve ever seen anyone so thoroughly dismantle and defeat this offense as LSU did that night. The Tigers won 38-3, and though some of that was the beating Tech took in a 28-point LSU second quarter, some of it was the way Les Miles’ time so completely corralled Johnson’s offense, allowing just 164 rushing yards on the night to a team that had averaged more than 273 yards per game on the ground that season. Tech was held at almost a full yard and a half under its season average per carry.

It began with LSU’s defensive line, which handled the Yellow Jackets’ cut-blocking approach with aplomb. Without the lanes to read and cue from, quarterback Josh Nesbitt to often found himself retreating before he even reached the edge of his offensive line, which blew plays apart.

Penetration in particular is key (which means dealing with cut blocks), because it closes up those initial lanes and, in essence, turns the offense on its head, taking away its options before the play can start eliminating defenders. Quarterbacks can’t move so freely from one read to the next, because defenders are already on top of them.

Linebackers played their keys well almost all night, flowing to the play well and holding Tech’s rushing attack down. Dwyer, who led the ACC in rushing yards per game that season, finished with 10 carries for 67 yards, 39 of which came on one run.

Some of that was personnel — LSU had quarterback issues that year and lost a couple of close games en route to a 7-5 regular season, but we know now the talent that team possessed, with players like Patrick Peterson, Ricky-Jean Francois, Darry Beckwith and others.

And there was, too, that second quarter, a lesson Indiana should learn well: The option is not built to play from behind and often struggles to do so. Indiana’s offense can be a very, very good friend to its defense this weekend, if it can get points up early.

But there are some basic defensive keys as well — line penetration, assignment discipline, the ability to handle cut and open-field blocks — that will all come into play.

Indiana has to limit the long drives and the big plays that often follow them, or else Navy will control the clock, stay in the game and put itself into a position similar to the one it occupied last season. Indiana led by nine with 12:18 left in Annapolis a year ago, but it then ceded 9:34 of the remaining time to the Midshipmen, who constructed drives of 16 and nine plays to eventually win the game 31-30.

Indiana by now knows Navy’s methods, and last season’s loss was, in many ways, instructive as to how and why an option offense is dangerous, not just drive to drive, but over the course of four quarters. Now, the challenge is simply to beat it.