Date : 20/04/2016

Venue : Stadio Luigi Ferraris

Competition : Serie A 2015/2016, Matchday 34

Roberto Mancini and Inter continued with the choice of the 4-2-3-1 once again, as Handanovic could be found under the posts, behind a defensive line that included Telles, D’Ambrosio, Miranda and Murillo. In front of them there was the double pivot of Gary Medel and Felipe Melo that protected the defense but also kept the stability in a team that included four attacking minded players, Brozovic (who was also moving centrally to help with the circulation of the ball) and Perisic on the wings and Icardi up top with Palacio behind him.

Gian Piero Gasperini on the other side, started with his beloved 3-4-3/3-4-2-1 that becomes 5-4-1 on defense. Lamana started as the GK, replacing the injured Mattia Perin and was positioned behind the three CBs, De Maio, Munoz and Marchese. Dzemaili and Rigoni were the two CMs with Ansaldi and Silva on their sides as wingbacks, while Laxalt (on a more attacking role than usual) and Suso played behind the striker Pavoletti, moving primarily on the wings but also centrally.

As with every Genoa game with Gasperini as a coach, the questions that had to be answered were the same. Will the rossoblu be able to execute their heavy intensity and man marking defensive plan and the quick offensive transitions generated by quick lateral passes, to perfection? Will Inter find a way to take advantage of the opposition man marking, destroying Genoa’s shape and moving in the open spaces created to score?

Both teams started the match with the intention to stop their opponent to play from the back or primarily through the centre by using different defensive schemes.

For example, Inter pressed high up the pitch in 4-4-2 shape like in the picture below.

Icardi and Palacio were responsible for pressing the CBs, that received the ball, with a direction towards the wings forcing them to pass to their teammates near the sidelines (an area much less dangerous in comparison with the centre of the field).

Genoa on the other side, with their man to man marking all over the pitch during the Goal Kicks, tried to force Handanovic to play the ball long.

And this is when the first “tactical” change of the game came. Although we are not able to know if this was a direct order from Mancini or if Miranda, Medel and Murillo reacted appropriately, Inter were now building up from the back with this different organization in front of Handanovic.

Miranda moved from the side of the penalty area more centrally and Inter now were trying to build more towards the wing than towards the side. This move, forced Suso to mark Felipe Melo centrally, thus leaving D’Ambrosio on the other side of the pitch all alone that was now the target of his teammates.

Through the obvious 3vs2 near the ball, Inter could evade the pressure and find the Italian FB on the wing, creating two possible situations : 1)either Suso was going to stay with Melo and leave him the whole wing to move upwards or 2) Suso was going to try and apply pressure to the Italian, leaving the Melo’s marking to Rincon, who by moving there was leaving the whole central area of the field empty for Palacio to run into and receive a cross(see below).

Unfortunately for them, though, it wasn’t something they tried to do often and a big chance to take advantage of the opposition marking was lost.

How Inter tried to take advantage of Genoa’s marking

Mancini and Inter tried to take advantage of Genoa’s man-marking primarily with two different ways.

The first one and more successful, saw Rodrigo Palacio moving towards the right wing when the ball was on that side with Perisic moving towards the space the Argentinian evaded, dragging with him Genoa’s right wing back Ansaldi. That meant that in the rossoblu right wing there was a huge space, for either Telles to run into (considering also that he had to move towards that space faster than his marker Laxalt) or Icardi who was making last second moves towards the second post.

In fact, this is how Icardi lost one of the biggest chances of the game. As you can see in the above screenshot, Perisic dragged Ansaldi centrally, freeing the second post for Icardi who took the header all alone.

The second way with which the nerazzurri tried to take advantage Genoa’s marking was through dropping movements from Palacio or Icardi. However to no avail, as they had no support near them, with both Melo and Medel staying deep and almost never making a run towards them to support them.

This last problem, together with the fact that the sometimes huge spaces between the defensive and midfield lines that were created, could have given the opportunity to Inter to use Icardi (or Palacio even) as a target man, make him a long ball and then after a run towards the penalty area receive the ball again and shoot, before Dzemaili and Rigoni had even returned (like in the image below), creates a lot of questions about Mancini’s first eleven selection for this match.

It would have seemed, much more logical (at least in theory) for the Italian tactician to put a player like Brozovic next to Medel or Melo in front of defense, who is much like a “box to box” player, solving this way the striker support problem, who took a lot of opportunities away from the nerazzurri.



Final fifteen minutes of the game

Mancini was seeming content with the way his team was playing, as Genoa had big chances only via transitions or dead balls, and Inter’s attack although unimpressive at times, seemed able to pull off a goal.

Until, Genoa scored with De Maio from a corner kick in which the whole Inter defense was frozen.

Mancini, changed immediately his team’s shape, bringing Jovetic in Telles’ place.

Now Inter, had a 3 man defense, that was becoming a two man defense when D’Ambrosio was moving upwards to provide offensive width near the sideline. Medel and Melo were sitting in front of them providing once again stability to a front three that consisted of Icardi, Palacio and Eder, as well as the free moving Brozovic and Jovetic behind them.

However, it was too late. Genoa had no problem sitting back and leaving Inter in search of breaking their defense and the nerazzurri on the other side proved incapable of scoring, either because they were not making enough movements to drag defenders and create spaces (preferring instead to be positioned for crosses) or because players such as Melo and Medel who were recycling the ball during those last moments proved unable to make a difference (with a good example shown below).

Conclusion

The Champions League target is over now for Inter and Mancini, who has to be blamed for his squad selection, although it has to be mentioned that his players disappointed, first by losing a lot of big chances that they usually take advantage of and also by losing their concentration completely during the corner kick that led to the goal.

For more Inter and non-Inter related Tactical Analysis, you can find me on Twitter,@ThanosChelas.