What’s more, Washington may have little choice but to accept Johnson’s move for the moment — despite the fiery words of Trump allies such as Republican Sen. Ben Sasse of Nebraska, who lamented that “our special relationship is less special now.” One U.S. official told POLITICO that some in the administration see at least a partial victory in London’s decision to exclude Huawei from the “sensitive core” of British networks, limit its involvement outside that core and acknowledge that Huawei is a “high-risk vendor.”

“'We will bank it and then see what more we can get' is what I would imagine would be our posture,” the U.S. official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Not exactly fire and fury.

Why the U.S. pressure campaign fell short

Throughout the United States’ anti-Huawei crusade, even close U.S. allies complained that Washington was dictating, not making a case. Rather than presenting evidence, they said, it fell back on the sort of argument made by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, that Huawei's security risks are self-evident: It's a Chinese company, full stop.

In the past, that might have been enough, especially given the special, exceptional role that the United States has always played in the global communications network itself. The country built the internet, and many of online realm’s most defining companies — from Google to Facebook to Apple to Amazon — were born in the U.S. That gave the country a certain moral, and functional, authority when it comes to tech.

But a lot has changed in the past several years. For one thing, residual anger remains outside America over former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden's revelations that the U.S. government was willing to tap those homegrown companies for spying, even on allies such as Germany. Whether that anger is entirely real or a performance, it has still made the rest of the world less inclined to accept Washington’s advice on how the internet should work.

And even countries that might have given the U.S. the benefit of the doubt have balked in recent months at the Trump administration's often undiplomatic 5G diplomacy. On a July episode of POLITICO's Global Translations podcast, a German diplomat working on Huawei conceded that in the end, his country would likely end up close to the U.S. position — but it wasn't going to be told what to do by the United States. (Chancellor Angela Merkel's coalition government is still struggling with a decision.)

What's more, the Germanys of the world now have options when it comes to tech — cheap, reliable, Chinese options. Both the Chinese people and Chinese government are immensely proud of Huawei because of it, and they're not going to let countries get away lightly with dismissing the company.

In the U.K., the unspoken issue is Brexit

The U.K. economy is predicted to grow by just 1 percent in 2020. With an uncertain economic future thanks to Brexit, getting rid of Huawei in favor of more expensive Swedish (Ericsson) and Finnish (Nokia) suppliers is an economic headache Britain doesn’t need — on top of the fact that such a move would also delay the networks.

Given that the decision is guaranteed to anger Britain’s closest ally — the United States — the decision demonstrates the wider tensions in the country’s post-Brexit “Global Britain” policy. Expect more of those tensions if Britain pushes ahead with a 2 percent levy on big tech firms, an action that U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin warned British Chancellor Sajid Javid against implementing in a Saturday meeting.

On their own, these two transatlantic fights would be a significant nuisance for Britain, but hardly a crisis. But the problem for Britain is they can’t be separated from London’s wish for a quick trade deal with the United States.

Britain wants the U.S. trade deal for two reasons: to show the rest of the world that Britain is worth doing business with as its breaks from the EU, and to pressure the EU into settling its own trade deal with the U.K. quickly.

But Johnson’s Huawei decision threatens to set off a cascade of complications for that strategy, especially since it alarmed senior Republican lawmakers who may have to approve any trade deal. EU trade negotiators also scoff at the idea of Britain using U.S. trade negotiation as leverage in EU-U.K. talks.

“You think Trump is going to be soft in an election year?” one EU negotiator told POLITICO on Monday. “Come on, the U.S. deal isn’t leverage.”

The negotiations are fragile before they’ve even started: The U.S. wants full access for American drug and medical device-makers, which sparked outrage across the U.K. in 2019, given the cherished role Britain’s National Health Service plays in national life there. Meanwhile, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Sonny Perdue is talking tough in EU-U.S. trade negotiations, pushing back against an EU ban on hormone-treated beef and poultry washed with peracetic acid, which signals that Britain will be in line for the same treatment.

If delaying or losing a trade deal is the political price Britain has to pay for its Huawei decision, advisers to Johnson believe they’re making a calculated choice.

“In 10 years, we want to be a high-tech Silicon Valley across the whole of the U.K.," one British government official who works closely with Johnson told POLITICO. "That is more important than getting slightly cheaper meat.”

Annabelle Dickson and Eric Geller contributed to this report.

Heath is the author of Global Translations, a new POLITICO weekly newsletter. Sign up for the free newsletter.