The ultimatum game is an experiment involving two players and a sum of money, say $10. The first player chooses how to divide the $10 between the two participants and the second player decides whether to accept this arrangement. If accepted, the money is divided as the first player chose and the experiment ends. If rejected, neither player gets any money. There is no negotiation; merely two decisions.

Objectively, it never makes sense for the second player to reject any split. Even if the first player chooses to keep $9 for himself and give only $1 away, both parties come out ahead.

But humans don't always act in their objective best interest and experimenters have discovered that unequal offers in the ultimatum game are often rejected. To some people, taking nothing at all is better than leaving with the feeling you got the raw end of a deal.

The human mind is plagued by this and similar cognitive biases, and it's precisely this thinking - or, rather, lack of rational thinking - that could prevent the Tennessee Titans from acting in their best interest in the upcoming NFL draft.

The Titans are in a relatively rare position for a team selecting first overall in that they have no use for a quarterback like Carson Wentz or Jared Goff, two prospects widely considered to be worthy of the top pick. The Titans filled that hole a year ago with the second overall pick, Marcus Mariota, and all indications are he's a franchise player.

The rest of the Titans' roster is stocked with poor to mediocre talents. This is a team that desperately needs upgrades at several positions. Trading back from first overall to stockpile picks is the obvious solution.

The impediment is that NFL draft trades operate on precedent and the price of the top pick has been set exorbitantly high. The Washington Redskins blew the top off the trade market in 2012, sending three first-round picks and more to the St. Louis Rams for the right to draft Robert Griffin III second overall.

Though the Redskins likely knew they were overpaying at the time (and certainly believe that now, after Griffin's much publicized failures), the deal actually fell largely within the borders of the draft trade chart, a rough and arguably obsolete accounting of the value of each draft pick crafted in the early 1990s.

The Titans have tried to coax a similar offer out of their NFL peers, with general manager Jon Robinson declaring it will take a "king's ransom" to make a deal happen. (Robinson has since softened his stance a little, but says it will take "a lot of picks.")

No RG3-level offer is likely to arrive in Robinson's inbox. The Titans' obvious desire to trade down, plus questions about Wentz's and Goff's upside, means the Titans are negotiating from what is clearly a place of weakness.

To work a deal, the Titans must come to terms with the idea of trading down at a discount. It may hurt their pride to do it, but the hurt feelings will be a necessary casualty in the path back to NFL relevancy. Until the Titans elevate the talent across their league-worst roster, they'll keep picking at the top of the draft.

Where the Rams received three first-round picks, the Titans should consider accepting a swap of first-round picks (but not too far down - the Titans still need to add at least one premier talent) and the addition of multiple mid-round picks, each of whom would likely represent an upgrade.

Accepting an offer far short of what the Rams received would surely be positioned in the media as an embarrassing loss for the Titans, but perception doesn't win games on Sundays. Staying put at No. 1 and leaving the draft with pride intact but a worse roster than was attainable via trade is the wrong move.

Circumstances are such that the Titans probably can't get a 50-50 split (or better) in their high-stakes version of the ultimatum game, but leaving with a few dollars where they previously had nothing is cause for celebration, not shame.