I will leave the economic implications to others — the Cato Institute’s Scott Lincicome has an excellent Twitter thread breaking that down. Rather, the hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts is more interested in the political economy of these negotiations. And there are three large questions that will need some answering by, oh, say, the fall of 2020:

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1. What is Donald Trump’s theory of victory? On Sunday, Trump tried to do his best impression of someone who is sure of their savvy negotiating strategy:

I have gotten pretty good at deciphering the meaning behind Trump’s gibberish, but to be honest this is too much gobbledygook even for me. More importantly, Trump’s claim that China is paying for the tariffs has been refuted by every respectable economist — and even a few disreputable ones, such as Trump adviser Larry Kudlow:

Even Kudlow admits that this latest move is a lose-lose gambit. Obviously, the hope is that economic pain now will pressure China into greater concessions in the future.

Here is what I want to know: what does victory in the trade wars look like to the Trump administration? It is clear that the Trump administration desires a complete rethink of China’s role in the global economy. The problem is that it is not at all clear if the administration possesses the negotiating savvy and resources to execute this kind of move.

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As the New York Times’s Keith Bradsher and Ana Swanson reported over the weekend, “the administration has struggled to address the immensity of the problems in the text of a trade deal. People close to the talks say that the negotiators appear powerless to force any changes that aren’t in China’s interest.”

This is of a piece with the larger problem with Trump’s negotiating style. This administration is very fond of “maximum pressure” campaigns, but has largely failed to coerce much weaker states into compliance. Indeed, the very fact that China has not acquiesced to date suggests that Trump’s threats have either been not credible or not potent. Trump has made the economic pressure more potent now, but it is far from clear that China will buckle.

Trump seems to think that even if the trade wars get worse, the United States will be just fine. At some point, however, it might dawn on this administration that other countries are continuing to sign trade deals with each other and getting along just fine, disadvantaging U.S. consumers and producers. Which leads me to the next question . . .

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2. Will Trump’s agricultural base hold firm? Trump won in 2016 in no small part because farmers liked him. Even during the midterms last fall, there were press reports about how they were willing to stick by the president. As the costs of the trade wars mount, however, farmers are starting to feel squeezed. The New York Times’s Mitch Smith reports that their patience is starting to wear thin:

Though Mr. Trump pledged Friday to help farmers — part of the coalition that put him in office — there were signs of frustration. They raised questions about his negotiating tactics. They said they were worried about what would come next given an already-struggling agricultural economy. “Many people are just torn because people want to support the president of the United States,” said Nancy Johnson, the executive director of the North Dakota Soybean Growers Association. “But it’s very stressful to be in the middle of these very challenging negotiations. Because you’re the person who can’t take hope to the banker to get his loans for operating.” . . . Lance Atwater, 29, who farms corn and soybeans near Ayr, Neb., escaped the worst of the flooding but said that he has seen prices for some of his crops plunge. Mr. Atwater, a Republican who voted for Mr. Trump, said he was eager for a trade deal but taking a wait-and-see approach on the president’s policies. “He’s claimed that he’ll get these trade deals worked out and that it will be a better deal,” Mr. Atwater said on Friday as he hauled grain. “That’s what we’re wanting to see — see those results.”

It would seem that Trump needs to cut a deal at some point in the next 18 months. The question is the extent to which China believes it can exploit that need. Press reports suggest that China’s trade negotiating position hardened when it saw Trump browbeating the Fed. President Xi Jinping might be willing to bide his time. Which leads to the last question . . .

3. How long-lasting are the effects? Analysts like Paul Krugman believe that while the trade wars are not good policy, “the short-run costs of trade war tend to be overstated.” Krugman knows more about trade than I do, but I wonder if he is underestimating the effects of continued uncertainty on both short-term and long-term investment decisions. Much like economic sanctions more generally, trade sanctions are likely to kill investment, which in turn slows the economy down and affects long-term economic trajectories.

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The Wall Street Journal’s long story on how the trade talks went south is worth reading in its entirety, but this part stood out: “At stake are the rules for global trade in a world order upended by China’s rapid rise, and both sides are keen to project an image of strength. The longer the dispute lingers, though, the greater the risk of economic fallout for both countries, along with prolonged uncertainty for global stock markets, which have whipsawed as expectations for a deal ebb and flow.”

China’s hand is stronger than Trump seems to realize. The Post’s David J. Lynch notes that according to recent IMF data, “China accounted for more than one-third of global economic growth — roughly equal to the combined contributions of the United States, Europe and Japan.” If Trump wants the rest of the world to make a binary choice between the United States and China, he is about to be sorely disappointed in the outcome.