Administration can use a precedent of cooperation to its advantage, the author writes. | REUTERS In The Arena How Obama Can Win Over Congress on the Iran Deal

Ray Takeyh is Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The interim agreement reached between Iran and six world powers is supposed to be the first step on a long path of international diplomacy. Yet the accord, which temporarily freezes Iran’s nuclear program over the next six months, is already proving contentious with the Obama administration insisting on the deal’s merits and congressional critics highlighting its concessions. House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), for instance, urged that the agreement be met “with healthy skepticism,” while Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) said that it “does not seem proportional.”

If the White House wants talks to move toward a more comprehensive disarmament deal, it will need to make its case not just to allies in the region but also to a skeptical congressional audience — and soon. For the Iranians, a key component of a more permanent agreement is the rollback of sanctions, which fall to a U.S. Congress that has already been itching for further penalties. Diplomacy with Iran hinges not only on the Islamic Republic’s compliance then but also Congress’s buy-in.


It is ironic that U.S. policy toward Iran is becoming so divisive since beneath all the bluster and bombast, this has been one of the most bipartisan issues in a Capitol perennially divided against itself. The Obama administration would be wise to nurture this rare bipartisan unity as much as the international coalition it has assembled against Iran.

It was Condoleezza Rice’s State Department, after all, that originated the notion of a two-track policy of steadily increasing economic pressure on Iran while seeking a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear issue. Rice marshaled the United Nations Security Council to repeatedly censure Iran and demand that it suspend all of its nuclear activities. The Treasury Department, meanwhile, pursued an imaginative policy of segregating Iran from global financial institutions. The Obama administration inherited this policy, refined it and implemented it with discipline.

On the legislative side, all the Iran sanctions bills to date have passed with overwhelming bipartisan majorities. Liberals and conservatives have come together to punish the Islamic Republic for its nuclear transgressions and sponsorship of terrorism. During the past three decades, while many countries have been enticed by Iranian commerce, Congress has distinguished itself by persistently holding Tehran responsible for its human rights abuses. It is inappropriate to attribute this consensus to the prodding of pro-Israeli groups. American legislatures are perfectly capable of being offended by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s penal colony without such advocacy.

The Obama administration can use this precedent of cooperation to its advantage, but it must also acknowledge that diplomacy with Iran cannot be concealed from congressional scrutiny. It is time for the administration to breach its own walls of secrecy and fully and frankly brief congressmen and senators about what happened in Geneva. Going forward, the administration would be prudent to take into consideration congressional concerns as it plots its course of action. What’s more, future American delegation to Iran talks should include key Republican staffers from the relevant committees — not as mere ornaments but as active participants in the talks and the many planning sessions that usually precede such meetings. By firmly tethering the two branches of government together, the White House can ensure that a potential accord rests on a firm anchor.

Those who lament such an activist congressional role should pay closer attention to how two legislative giants changed the course of American foreign policy. On the left, the famed 1966 Vietnam hearings of Sen. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) awakened the nation to the tragedy of that war. Less known were Fulbright hearings on China that established the intellectual foundation for the subsequent reconciliation between Washington and Beijing. No arms control agreement negotiated during the height of détente in the 1970s escaped the critical eye of the hawkish Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), who forced Henry Kissinger to renegotiate, reconsider and even abrogate various provisions of his contemplated agreements. Two presidents, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, complained bitterly of such meddling, and yet, America is better off because of those efforts.

The White House might be tempted to fire back at its critics, but it would be a mistake to deride skeptical members of Congress as “marching to war” with Iran. The most realistic alternative to diplomatic stalemate or a bad deal is not war but a more concerted pressure strategy that may yet compel further concessions from a battered Islamic Republic. Republicans, in turn, should desist from cheap comparisons of President Barack Obama to Neville Chamberlain. This is not the 1930s, and Iran is not Nazi Germany.

It remains to be seen whether a comprehensive agreement imposing stringent and permanent curbs on Iran’s nuclear ambitions is possible. Iran has long been an unreliable negotiating partner — acceding to compromises under stress only to violate those commitments at a more convenient time. Still, the White House cannot simply negotiate an accord between Iran and the United States in secret conclaves and then spring it on an incredulous legislature. If Congress is not there on the takeoff, then it is unlikely to be there at the landing.

Ray Takeyh is senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.