Trump Does Not Need To Go To War With North Korea

The People’s Party of America

“Of all the manifestations of power, restraint impresses men the most.” - Frank B. Jevons

There are five conceivable outcomes with regard to North Korea,

North Korea launches a first strike against America or one of her Allies

North Korea supplies a third party with a nuclear weapon

The US or one of her Allies launches a first strike against North Korea

The Kim regime is overthrown by domestic forces

The Kim regime voluntarily gives up its nuclear weapons capability

The first three outcomes are unacceptable for various reasons, which we will discuss. The last two outcomes are favourable to US national security, with the final outcome possessing the least risk to American and global interests.

Firstly, let us consider the likelihood of North Korea launching a first strike against America, South Korea, or Japan. The DPRK has long had the ability to deliver a first strike against our Allies, but has chosen not to do so. This is evidence that the DPRK understands the concept of deterrence and that a first strike on America or her Allies would result in an overwhelming response. In turn we can conclude that Kim wants to possess nuclear weapons in order to secure his dynasty from regime change, and in order to use the weapons as leverage for other political and economic concessions, but not to launch a first strike.

Similarly, with regards to the DPRK supplying nuclear weapons to a third party, Kim understands that the risk of his involvement being discovered, which would also lead to the end of his regime, is too great. Again, the DPRK has long had the opportunity to pursue this course of action, and has not done so, and there is no reason to believe that will change.

As for the possibility of a US first strike against the DPRK, such a course of action is obviously disastrous. Seoul would be completely destroyed, and America and her Allies would be dragged into a full scale war that has a significant risk of developing into a wider global confrontation. The cost of a first strike against the DPRK would be trillions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of lives, if not millions, and a potentially devastating imbalance in the equilibrium of the world power structure.

Moreover, on 24th August, 2016, North Korea successfully demonstrated a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability. The strategic implication of such a capability is that it further deters aggression towards North Korea. If the US or her Allies could wipe out North Korea’s nuclear capability with a first strike, they would be more inclined to do so. But since there is no guarantee that a first strike against North Korea would eliminate DPRK’s SLBM capability, there is a significant probability that such a strike would result in a massive retaliatory strike against Japan, which we would not be able to prevent. Although at the present time it does not appear as if the DPRK has a nuclear SLBM capability, they are making rapid progress in marrying warheads to ballistic missiles, and such a nuclear SLBM capability is imminent if it does not already exist unbeknownst to the world. And even though the DPRK’s SLBM capability is not yet a threat to the US, because North Korea does not have nuclear submarines or diesel-electric submarines with air-independent propulsion, which limits the range of DPRK’s SLBM capability, an attack on one of our Allies should be considered an attack on America herself.

Although nuclear weapons secure Kim from a foreign power forcing regime change through military action, it will not secure him against being toppled by domestic forces. Given enough time, Kim’s position will become untenable as his unjust domestic policies catch up with him. Eventually he will be overthrown by the North Korean people or the military. In this scenario, it would take America roughly 50 days with our current capabilities to secure DPRK’s nuclear weapons. This is an unacceptable risk and the US must develop a capacity to secure or destroy DPRK’s nukes as soon as Kim loses power, and before the weapons can fall under another’s control. This response must be dynamic and multi-pronged to be able to match the nuances of the situation. A large scale military operation is not necessary, for example, if Kim is overthrown by the military and the military stands down. Kim being overthrown by domestic forces is a base case scenario, which will occur naturally in due time if America does not initiate a first strike. Without a legitimate enemy, without a viable economy and social system, and without support from the international community, Kim will lose power sooner or later. While it may not be the most intuitive solution, the best strategy is to continue strategic patience with North Korea indefinitely unless DPRK launches a significant first strike. We recognise that the DPRK will develop the capability to arm a missile capable of reaching the US by 2020. Even so, Americans have for half a century lived with similar threats, and will survive as we have always survived. We must meet the challenge for war by suing for peace until war is forced upon us and there is no other choice. The DPRK’s development of a nuclear ICBM does not justify a preemptive war.

A fifth outcome is possible. The current nuclear States could pursue scheduled, irreversible, proportional, and multilateral disarmament, and include DPRK in the program as and when it is appropriate to do so. Such an approach would lay a pathway for DPRK to determine its own future and enter the international community as an equal amongst equals. This is the ideal solution with the least risk to national security as it eliminates the risk, inherent in any contested power transfer, of weapons falling into the wrong hands.

War with the DPRK would be devastating for national, regional, and global security. War is to be avoided on principle, and it is easily avoided when the costs are so great. Therefore our policy should be to go to war with North Korea only in the event of a large-scale attack by DPRK against America or her Allies. Diplomatic efforts should be continuously made to seek multilateral disarmament and the DPRK’s inclusion in the international community. Until the DPRK is willing to make this transmission, the international community must continue to strengthen and sustain effective pressure on Kim in order to accelerate his demise to domestic forces. During this interim, we must strengthen our currently unreliable homeland missile defence capabilities to provide further deterrence against a limited nuclear first strike so as to keep the probability of Kim pursuing such a move negligible. These defences must be arranged so that they protect the homeland, but do not undermine the strategic balance of forces, which is integral to national security.

While there will be some who favour preemptive war, we must resist such a course of action for several reasons. Firstly, by engaging in preemptive war, we ensure that a bloody and costly war will occur; peace should always be given every chance. Secondly, the decision to engage in preemptive war may be based on false intelligence, as was the case with Iraq. Thirdly, a President may seek a preemptive war not because it is right, but because it will help their domestic political position. Fourthly, history has shown that leaders have a tendency to overestimate threats to their nation, and underestimate the threat they are posing to other nations, increasing the probability that a leader will have poor judgment as to when war is truly necessary. By defining the necessity of war as necessary when and only if America or her Allies are attacked in such a way as to pose an existential or catastrophic threat to sovereignty, we remove all guesswork and significantly reduce the likelihood of an error in judgment leading to war.

In conclusion, The People’s Party of America’s policy on North Korea is defined by the following 10 principles,

1. The US and China are in agreement that war on the Korean Peninsula is unacceptable,

2. The US rules out all preemptive strikes and will not strike first,

3. The US is permanently and solely committed to a diplomatic solution,

4. A diplomatic solution will take considerable time, and the US will take steps to protect by law this policy from changes by future administrations and generations,

5. The US does not seek and will not allow other nations to seek regime change in DPRK through any means,

6. The US will pursue aggressive denuclearisation in a bilateral framework with Russia, expanding the framework to include the remaining nuclear armed States once there are a small number of viable warheads,

7. Following an aggressive proportional reduction in nuclear arms, the US will phase out nuclear weapons in lockstep with DPRK and all other nuclear armed States, as guaranteed by technical safeguards and inspections,

8. The future of the Korean Peninsula will be determined by the DPRK and South Korea,

9. The US seeks an agreement with China to ensure that China engages in trade restrictions against the DPRK commensurate with the necessity to prevent the ready financing of further nuclear developments (H-bomb, SLBM, ICBM, and warheads),

10. The US guarantees the security of its Allies in perpetuity.