Continue reading this post…

It certainly doesn’t help that philosophy is rarely taught or read in schools. Despite the fact that children have an intense interest in philosophical issues, and that a training in philosophy sharpens one’s analytical abilities, with few exceptions our schools are de-philosophized zones. This has as a knock-on effect that students entering college shy away from philosophy courses. Bookstores — those that remain — boast philosophy sections cluttered with self-help guides. It is no wonder that the educated public shows no interest in, or perhaps even finds alien, the fully ripened fruits of philosophy.

While all this surely contributes to the felt remoteness of philosophy, it is also a product of it: for one reason why philosophy is not taught in schools is that it is judged irrelevant. And so we return to the questions of why philosophy appears so removed and whether this is something to lament.

This situation seems particular to philosophy. We do not find physicists reproached in the same fashion. People are not typically frustrated when their questions about the trajectory of soccer balls get answered by appeal to Newton’s Laws and differential calculus.

If one seeks illumination, then one must uncover abstract, general principles through the development of a theoretical framework.

The difference persists in part because to wonder about philosophical issues is an occupational hazard of being human in a way in which wondering about falling balls is not. Philosophical questions can present themselves to us with an immediacy, even an urgency, that can seem to demand a correspondingly accessible answer. High philosophy usually fails to deliver such accessibility — and so the dismay that borders on a sense of betrayal.

Must it be so? To some degree, yes. Philosophy may begin in wonder, as Plato suggested in the “Theaetetus,” but it doesn’t end there. Philosophers will never be content merely to catalog wonders, but will want to illuminate them — and whatever kind of work that involves will surely strike some as air treading.

Related The Stone: Philosophy App A new mobile app can connect users directly with philosophers. Go to the Post »

But how high into the air must one travel? How theoretical, or difficult, need philosophy be? Philosophers disagree about this and the history of philosophy has thrown up many competing conceptions of what philosophy should be. The dominant conception today, at least in the United States, looks to the sciences for a model of rigor and explanation. Many philosophers now conceive of themselves as more like discovery-seeking scientists than anything else, and they view the great figures in the history of philosophy as likewise “scientists in search of an organized conception of reality,” as W.V. Quine, the leading American philosopher of the 20th Century, once put it. For many, science not only provides us with information that might be pertinent to answering philosophical questions, but also with exemplars of what successful answers look like.

Because philosophers today are often trained to think of philosophy as continuous with science, they are inclined to be impatient with expectations of greater accessibility. Yes, philosophy does begin in wonder, such philosophers will agree. But if one is not content to be a wonder-monger, if one seeks illumination, then one must uncover abstract, general principles through the development of a theoretical framework.

This search for underlying, unifying principles may lead into unfamiliar, even alien, landscapes. But such philosophers will be undaunted, convinced that the correct philosophical account will often depend on an unobvious discovery visible only from a certain level of abstraction. This view is actually akin to the conception advanced by Aristophanes’ Socrates when he defends his airborne inquiries: “If I had been on the ground and from down there contemplated what’s up here, I would have made no discoveries at all.” The resounding success of modern science has strengthened the attraction of an approach to explanation that has always had a deep hold on philosophers.

But the history of philosophy offers other conceptions of illumination. Some philosophers will not accept that insight demands the discovery of unsuspected general principles. They are instead sympathetic to David Hume’s dismissal, over 250 years ago, of remote speculations in ethics: “New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters,” he said. Ludwig Wittgenstein took this approach across the board when he urged that “The problems [in philosophy] are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known.” He was interested in philosophy as an inquiry into “what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions,” and insisted that “If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.” Insight is to be achieved not by digging below the surface, but rather by organizing what is before us in an illuminatingly perspicuous manner.

The approach that involves the search for “new discoveries” of a theoretical nature is now ascendant. Since the fruits of this kind of work, even when conveyed in the clearest of terms, can well be remote and difficult, we have here another ingredient of the sense that philosophy spends too much time scrutinizing the sun.

Which is the correct conception of philosophical inquiry? Philosophy is the only activity such that to pursue questions about the nature of that activity is to engage in it. We can certainly ask what we are about when doing mathematics or biology or history — but to ask those questions is no longer to do mathematics or biology or history. One cannot, however, reflect on the nature of philosophy without doing philosophy. Indeed, the question of what we ought to be doing when engaged in this strange activity is one that has been wrestled with by many great philosophers throughout philosophy’s long history.

Questions, therefore, about philosophy’s remove cannot really be addressed without doing philosophy. In particular, the question of how difficult philosophy ought to be, or the kind of difficulty it ought to have, is itself a philosophical question. In order to answer it, we need to philosophize — even though the nature of that activity is precisely what puzzles us.

And that, of course, is another way in which philosophy can be difficult.

Alexander George is professor of philosophy at Amherst College. A new book drawn from AskPhilosophers.org, “What Should I Do?: Philosophers on the Good, the Bad, and the Puzzling,” is forthcoming from Oxford University Press.

