The two Hall of Famers associated with the 1969 Mets did not attend the 50th anniversary ceremonies this weekend at Citi Field.

Tom Seaver’s family announced in March that the greatest Met was suffering from dementia and would no longer participate in public events. Nolan Ryan declined the invitation without making a public explanation.

Ryan is embedded in Mets history for two reasons: 1) his brilliant relief performances in the 1969 NLCS and World Series helped the franchise win its first title, and 2) his December 1972 swap to the Angels for a washed-up Jim Fregosi stands as the worst trade in the organization’s history.

The most despairing Mets trades — Ryan, Amos Otis for Joe Foy, Lenny Dykstra for Juan Samuel — have been on my mind because the maneuver that brought Robinson Cano and Edwin Diaz to the team in December is pushing to become a candidate.

Lots of time remains to make a full determination. Perhaps Cano will reverse to career norms, Diaz will return to the dominant force of last season and Jarred Kelenic will crater at Double-A or Triple-A without ever making a mark in the majors. But halfway through this season, Brodie Van Wagenen’s signature move of his first offseason as Mets GM could hardly be going worse.

Consider:

1. As most teams shun investments in older players, the Mets absorbed the final five years of Cano’s contract for his age 36-40 seasons. They did this despite Cano being suspended 80 games last season for violating MLB’s testing program for PEDs. At that time, Van Wagenen was still Cano’s agent and has said he had insights into the failed test that made him confident in Cano. Also, with Jay Bruce and Anthony Swarzak included and the Mariners kicking in $20 million, the Mets’ commitment fell to $63.5 million over five seasons.

But if Cano were a free agent today, what would he get at his age, with the PED suspension in his recent past, with the questions about his hustle and with an impact-free .227 batting average and .635 OPS? It certainly would not be five years at $63.5 million.

2. What happens as Cano ages further? At the time of the trade, you could have thought first base. But would you take one at-bat from Pete Alonso to play this version of Cano? The Mets made the deal believing the DH was coming soon to the NL. But that is no certainty. And even if it was, would you rather have the bats of both Alonso and Dom Smith in the lineup or Cano’s?



Jeff McNeil’s defense is better at second than the sliding Cano. Yet, now it is McNeil who has to play out of position, mostly in the outfield. If the Mets were to play someone out of position, they would be best served doing it with Smith in left and McNeil at second, at least getting two better, prime-aged bats into the lineup. One advantage in 2019 should have been a productive right side of the infield of Alonso and McNeil for just more than $1 million total, giving the team a cornerstone and financial flexibility moving forward.

To make such a high-risk trade without full awareness of the major league abilities of Alonso and McNeil, at minimum, borders on reckless.

4. You know what else is reckless — or arrogant or delusional? Giving up top prospects and taking the large and multi-year contract of an aging/dubious player all to access a closer.

On the day the Cubs gave up Gleyber Torres for Aroldis Chapman, they had the majors’ best record after 98 games and had not won a title since 1908. When the Indians surrendered Clint Frazier and Justus Sheffield for Andrew Miller, they had the AL’s best winning percentage after 102 games and had not won a title since 1948.

Translation: You only give up elite pieces for a closer if you know —you know— you are playing for a championship. Such is the limited role of the position. Such is the volatile year-to-year results of relievers. You certainly do not take on the dubious contract and yield the best prospects if you are coming off consecutive fourth-place finishes in which the team finished a combined 30 games under .500.

It is one thing to say you are the NL East team to beat. But to make this kind of trade, you better know that for sure.

5. And if you want to take the closer risk, why not just try to buy it with Craig Kimbrel or Zack Britton? That would have cost money, but not prospects and the inclusion of Cano.

6. A great closer on a bad team is a beautiful sun roof on a jalopy. Generally a waste. But Diaz has not been a great closer. His meltdown Thursday in Philadelphia gave him as many runs (17) as he had permitted last year and two more homers (seven to five). He was brilliant last season. But in 2017 he was both walk- and homer-susceptible. Again, this is a volatile position. Few relievers are metronomes. Hence, why they are dangerous to acquire — especially at substantial costs.

7. Ah, the cost. The Mets gave up arguably their two best prospects in Kelenic and Justin Dunn, who as Mariners were invited to the Futures Game. At Double-A, Dunn was pitching well (3.45 ERA, striking out 30.1 percent of hitters).

Kelenic, the sixth-overall pick in 2018, dominated Low-A this year and has flashed power in his first 15 High-A games, moving from MLB’s No. 56 prospect before the season to No. 24 now. Any prospect is tradeable. But was the Van Wagenen administration familiar enough with Kelenic and Dunn to move them in such a risky deal?

Patience would have been wise because both have more value today than they did in the offseason. Kelenic is now the kind of player who might be able to front any trade for a significant player (without having to take on a Cano-esque burden).

8. The adding salt portion of this is Bruce and Swarzak. Both were subsequently traded from the Mariners back into the NL East, where they are helping teams that are superior to the Mets. Bruce had a .918 OPS for the Phillies and delivered a walk-off hit last week against the Mets. Swarzak had a 0.52 ERA in 17 games with the Braves. Both could have, in theory, been helping the Mets, potentially been dumped in other trades or — at worst — had contracts expire after this season (Swarzak) or next (Bruce).