The British government continues to plod along without a Brexit strategy with the deadline for invoking article 50 fast approaching. Sir Ivan Rogers, head of the British representation in Brussels, recently conceded as much in what has become a public resignation. “We do not yet know what the government will set as negotiating objectives for the UK’s relationship with the EU after exit,” Rogers wrote to staff as he departed.

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His letter makes clear that the UK representation to the EU in Brussels is being ignored by Downing Street. With just three months to go until perhaps the most important talks in Britain’s history, the negotiating team and the parameters for the discussions are still not in place.

“Serious multilateral negotiating experience is in short supply in Whitehall, and that is not the case in the Commission or in the Council,” Rogers writes.

This is shaping up to be a one-sided affair. Brexit is a paradox, an effort to return to the past and a vision for the future at the same time. After nearly 45 years as a fully fledged member of the EU the UK wants out. And it has two years to cut a deal with the EU.

There is no mutually beneficial deal available between the UK and the EU in this time frame. Existing levels of trade and investment will not guarantee a positive outcome for the UK. The Brexiters who think they have the upper hand are wrong.

Then there are the more mundane aspects of international trade negotiations that evidently are not getting a hearing in Whitehall. I write from experience, having helped give birth to the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (Ceta).

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Ceta is a very good agreement between two willing and flexible partners that approached negotiations with a positive spirit, seeking to realise the full potential of the relationship. It will stand the test of time once implemented. However, I certainly did not think that the scoping, negotiation and the ratification of the treaty would take more than 10 years. The politicisation of the European process of ratification has been most surprising and, at times, disconcerting. Rogers’s warning to Downing Street, outlining that the EU expects a full UK trade deal to take until the early to mid-2020s, seems a realistic timeframe. Undoing nearly 45 years of integration and shared law will not be a pleasant experience and represents a clear step backwards.

Why do these agreements take so long? The last generation of trade agreements was focused mainly on removing tariffs. Multilaterally, the single biggest recent event at the increasingly ineffectual World Trade Organisation has not been the conclusion of a successful round, but, rather, China’s accession in 2001. The next generation of bilateral agreements, of which Ceta is the template, is complex. They reflect the realities of modern commerce and go beyond trade, touching upon behind-the-border issues such as standards, regulation and opening government contracts to competitive bidding. This complexity means that the deals take years to negotiate and conclude. In our amped up media environment, there are special interests making noise at each step in the process, ensuring that trade and investment deals are a marathon, not a sprint.

The EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, has stated that the ratification process alone for a UK-EU deal would take six months. Based on the experience of Ceta it will certainly be longer.

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An interim deal is surely now the target – but it seems impossible to achieve without UK flexibility on freedom of movement and the role of the European courts. This means that a reversion to WTO rules and the common tariff schedules is the most likely scenario for the UK. Estimates are that this will mean a 4% drop in UK GDP versus a 1% loss in the EU, due mainly to the relative sizes of their economies. While it would be diminished by the loss of one of its most dynamic members, the EU can take the hurt. It has no choice but to do so.

In addition to paving the way for similar deals across the Union which could lead to its fragmentation, a sweetheart deal with the UK would be a missed opportunity to extract industries back to the continent – banking, autos and aerospace to name a few. The Brexit camp seems to be divided into two groups – those who believe that an interim deal is possible and those who are not only resigned to a WTO outcome, but have actually convinced themselves that the UK will be as strong or stronger as a result. This view is held despite the higher tariffs, a loss of passporting rights for UK financial institutions and the disappearance of agricultural subsidies such an outcome will represent.

Yet a post-EU Britain would pitch itself as a country open for business – free of red tape and a great place to invest. Pay no mind the red tape represented by those customs barriers into the 450 million-person market that the UK used to be part of.

I have not formally advised the UK government but I have had a number of informal discussions with officials. While they have always been pleasant (and notably friendly towards Canada), my view is that they remain in campaign mode.

Were they willing to realistically discuss options for Brexit, as opposed to telling you what they intend to do in a very general sense while dismissing the obvious concerns, they may have a chance to minimise the damage from the potentially catastrophic decision to leave.

This seems increasingly unlikely. Let’s hope that the courts, parliament and, ultimately, the electorate do it for them.

Jason Langrish, the executive director of the Canada Europe Roundtable for Business, worked on the Canadian trade deal with the EU