Re: Iran Nuclear Agreement

From:jake.sullivan@gmail.com To: seizenstat@cov.com CC: huma@clintonemail.com, huma@clintonfoundation.org, pverveer@aol.com, John.Podesta@gmail.com, tom.nides@morganstanley.com Date: 2015-03-17 21:24 Subject: Re: Iran Nuclear Agreement

Stu - can we talk Thursday afternoon? > On Mar 17, 2015, at 7:02 PM, Eizenstat, Stuart <seizenstat@cov.com> wrote: > > Dear Jake, > > As I have mentioned, for over three years I have chaired the Iran Task Force of the Atlantic Council, the first year as co-chair with Chuck Hagel. We have done extensive work of the Iran nuclear issue, Iranian internal politics and their foreign policy goals, publishing more than a dozen papers. > > Along the lines of the previous notes to you about the emerging Iran Nuclear Agreement, it appears increasingly clear there will be a framework agreement by or before March 24, which will set the parameters in some detail of the obligations of Iran and the phase-out of sanctions. The sanctions relief will entail not only the exercise of presidential waiver authority in congressionally imposed sanctions, but the U.S. going to the UN and seeking sanctions relief there, as well. The latter would have the force of international law. > > Obviously, with the 47 Republican Senator letter, Bibi’s congressional speech, the distinct possibility Bibi will be the prime minister again (exit polls as of this moment are 27-27 between Likud and Labor, and Bibi can more easily get to 61 seats than Herzog), and that the Saudis, Egyptians, Gulf States, as well as Israel and most of the organized Jewish community, will have great problems with the Agreement, this presents a very difficult issue for Secretary Clinton. > > I start with the premise that having been Secretary of State and being involved in earlier phases of the negotiations, and being a Democrat, she has to endorse the outcome. But permit me to suggest that she should take a harder line on a number of issues. > > She could say something along these lines, subject to modification when the details are published: > > “Given the development of Iran’s nuclear program, this Agreement, while far from perfect, offers the best way to constrain Iran from getting a bomb. It reduces the number of active centrifuges enriching uranium, and places limits on the number and quality of centrifuges for the next 10 (or 15 years). It would send most of the enriched uranium out of Iran for reprocessing in ways that makes it highly unlikely it could be used to make a bomb. It would limit enriched uranium to low levels (around 5%). It also places strict limits on the heavy-water plutonium plant at Arak, which would potentially be another way for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. It would limit the underground facility at Fordow to research and development. It provides for intrusive 24/7 inspections by the respected International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under the additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And sanctions would be only gradually withdrawn, based upon Iranian performance (check on details). It creates a one year (check) breakout period, in which the U.S. and our allies would have notice if Iran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. Moreover, 10 (or 15) years is a long time and Iran’s conduct may moderate. > > Without this Agreement, Iran would be free to develop its plutonium facility at Arak; would continue to increase the number and sophistication of its centrifuges (indeed has another 10,000 waiting on line); would not be subject to intrusive inspections; and could make more progress toward a nuclear weapon. It has added more centrifuges during the course of the severe sanctions already imposed. > > Because we already have the most comprehensive sanctions ever exacted in peacetime against Iran (its private banks out of the SWIFT clearance system; the Central Bank of Iran on the sanctions list; the EU taking no Iranian oil exports; etc.), it is difficult to see any set of additional sanctions which would lead to a better result. While we must keep the military option on the table if Iran moves forward with a weapons system, this Agreement is the best opportunity to avoid the need for military action. > > We also have to recognize that one of the reasons sanctions helped bring Iran to the negotiating table is that we were able to forge a partnership with the European Union. If we fail to endorse this Agreement, there is a real possibility the EU would remove its sanctions, and the U.S. would be left alone, with sanctions that would be less effective. > > At the same time, there are important gaps in the Agreement. It does not cover Iran’s ballistic missile program, which would not exist if Iran simply wanted a civilian nuclear program. It does not require Iran to answer the IAEA’s questions about its potential military-related testing of equipment, which was one of the reasons for the UN sanctions (check on final product). It does not permit full inspection at military facilities, like Parchin. It leaves Iran with an industrial-size nuclear facility. And at the end of the 10 (or 15) year period, Iran would be unconstrained. > > Therefore, while this Agreement is an important step forward to limit Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, we must take additional steps to assure that Iran does not pursue a breakout strategy either during or after the expiration of the Agreement. The U.S. strategy should include the following: > > 1. The toughest sanctions possible should be given to the next President to employ if Iran cheats during the course of the Agreement. > > 2. Even after the expiration of the Agreement, Iran should know that if it pursues a nuclear weapons strategy, the U.S. would consider this unacceptable, and would take all actions necessary to prevent it. > > 3. The U.S. should insist that Iran “come clean” and answer all of the IAEA’s questions to their satisfaction. > > 4. The U.S. should do everything possible to limit Iran’s development of long-range missiles. > > 5. The U.S. should assure our friends and allies in the region, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Jordan, and others that this Agreement will not lead to across-the-board cooperation with Iran on issues like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Afghanistan, where directly or through surrogates Iran is acting in ways contrary to U.S. national security interests and those of our friends and allies. Iran has provided the equipment and training of IEDs and other weapons which have killed American soldiers. Their interests and ours diverge in important ways. We will never forsake our friends, and should begin immediate consultations to provide defense arrangements to reassure them of our continued support and constancy. We will do everything possible to limit Iran’s efforts at regional hegemony at the expense of our friends and allies. We will build up our forces in the Persian Gulf to demonstrate this.” > > Jake, these are some preliminary thoughts. But I do believe Secretary Clinton cannot afford to take a pass on this Agreement, or simply endorse it without these caveats. > > Best wishes, > > Stu Eizenstat > > > > > Stuart Eizenstat > > Covington & Burling LLP > One CityCenter, 850 Tenth Street, NW > Washington, DC 20001 > (202) 662 5519 (tel) | (202) 778-5519 (fax) > seizenstat@cov.com > www.cov.com > > <image003.png> >