Looking beyond the increasing sophistication of China’s unmanned systems, the PLA’s actual operational UAV capability will depend upon these human and organizational dimensions of its approach to these systems. It is notable that the PLA appears to have progressed substantively in its institutionalization of education and training programs, as well as a career track for UAV officer and enlisted force operators, across multiple services. There could be but are not obvious indications of cultural or organizational resistance to the PLA’s widespread adoption of UAVs, even though these uninhabited systems could, in some cases, displace conventional pilots and platforms. Frictions could be less prevalent because unmanned systems are considered among “new-type forces” (新型力量) of key strategic importance, and there have not been controversies akin to those that have arisen in the U.S. context due to the uses of unmanned systems for counterterrorism campaigns.[46]

Indeed, the PLA appears enthusiastic in its embrace of UAVs, seeking to capitalize upon the anticipated transformation of the character of conflict towards “unmanned, intangible, silent warfare” (“无人, 无形, 无声”战争) that is increasingly “intelligentized” (智能化) due to the advent of AI on the battlefield.[47] The PLA’s expanding employment of unmanned systems for multiple missions will likely result in the establishment of new dedicated UAV units, further increasing the demand for qualified UAV operators and technicians. Despite continued challenges, the PLA remains focused on enhancing its UAV forces’ operational capabilities, while engaging in more sophisticated joint training exercises with unmanned systems, including in major exercises like “Firepower” (Huoli, 火力) and Stride (Kuayue, 跨越).

What does the PLA’s approach so far to the humans behind their unmanned systems reveal about its potential engagement with the challenges associated with the highly automated and autonomous systems it is currently developing? Despite the myth that such systems tend to replace humans, requiring smaller numbers of combatants with lower levels of expertise, there is clear evidence to date that the human challenges of such systems are considerable, often requiring higher levels of specialized training.[48] In this regard, PLA’s active focus on the development of personnel to operate UAVs could constitute an early case that demonstrates that the PLA will likely confront considerable challenges in the process of learning to use such high-tech systems more effectively, given that human capital and training have remained major issues. However, it appears that the PLA does recognize the importance of the human element in the machine age of warfare.

Although the PLA seems to have less of an aversion than the U.S. military to taking humans out of the loop in operational circumstances in which doing so may be advantageous, there are indications that it is nonetheless focused on the value of human-machine collaboration and integration. For instance, it is telling that PLA theorists are starting to incorporate the distinction between humans in the loop and on the loop (i.e., exercising supervisory control) into their writings, and even into a patent for a system designed to allow a human operator to control multiple UAVs.[49,50] Lieutenant General Liu Guozhi, head of the Central Military Commission’s Science and Technology Commission, anticipates that human-machine hybrid (人机混合) intelligence will be the highest form of future intelligence.[51] As warfare progresses towards the machine age, the PLA and U.S. military alike will confront new challenges at this intersection of humans and new technologies.