India must not fall for the Israel model that calls for forced response to every attack. Just the intent to escalate should be established to daunt cross-border terror

There have been two major terror ‘strikes’ against India in the recent past, the first one being the June 4 ambush of a Dogra Regiment convoy in which 20 jawans were killed and the second one in Gurdaspur on 27 July. The two have however, drawn differing responses — the first resulted in a riposte through a Special Forces raid into Myanmar while the second has drawn only verbal opprobrium so far. One hopes that facts and strategies are being marshalled to nail the masterminds. The lessons from a poor application of ‘escalation dynamics’ in the Myanmar strikes have clearly been learnt and applied in the case of responses to Gurdaspur.

No two responses can be similar, as no two foes are alike. The Naga Khaplang group, responsible for the Army ambush, was feeling left out after being sidelined in the ‘peace talks’ with the government. It will feel more isolated now, as will other, smaller Naga groups, after the signing of the Naga accord this week with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) [NSCSN (I-M)].

If there is another attack, should the Army strike back across the international border on insurgent camps in Myanmar? What inferences can we draw while deciding on our responses on the Western front?

Israeli model

In the game of international relations, credibility plays a vital role in building ‘reputations’. Israel has a stated policy of inflicting disproportionate punishment on its opponents in case of an attack on its interests. This policy may ultimately never get the permanent peace that Tel Aviv desperately desires. However, it has paid short-term dividends, as witnessed from the reduction in major terror attacks against the country.

Is there a lesson for India here? The answer lies in escalating intelligently — sometimes, non-escalation can also be the basis for an escalation strategy.

As I have written before, Israel banks on the results of its periodic engagements to complement its deterrence tactics, buying it lengthened periods of peace. Disproportionate action against a weaker adversary showcases its intent to other opponents to ‘keep off’. Hamas in the Gaza Strip has little support and is a politically marginalised organisation in West Asian politics, hence becoming easy fodder for the Israeli policy. The Hizbollah, on the other hand, has strong backing from Iran and Syria. Hence, it cannot be messed about with easily, as it showed Israel in 2006. However, the Hizbollah keeps its peace with Israel partly due the ‘realistic perception’ of an ‘assured’ strong response in the case of any misadventure on its part. This is premised on Israel’s founder David Ben Gurion’s view that “[T]utcome of every round of violence should leave no room for interpretation. The victorious should be undisputed and the price paid by the vanquished in prestige and material should be sufficiently heavy that they lose their appetite for another round in the foreseeable future”. This seems to be partly succeeding — can anyone recollect any major terrorist attack in the past decade against Israel?

The Indian experience

Cut to India. What are the options before us? First, let us not fall into the trap that compels Israel to respond to every attack solely to maintain the credibility of its stated retribution policy. Henry Kissinger has written that “nations cooperate for long periods only when they share common political goals and that… policy must focus on these goals rather than on the mechanisms used to reach them.” Kashmir is a political red flag as far as India and Pakistan are concerned, hence the Ufa statement issued by the two Prime Ministers has wisely hinted at realistic interim goals to be attained. So far, so good, and if this goal stays, we are looking at a policy of ‘non-escalation’ on the Western frontier — not as a sign of weakness but as an indication of a reasoned approach aimed at longer periods of peace — by preventing both accidental and planned escalations.

With the Naga accord signed and Myanmar’s government apparently on the same page, as symbolised by last week’s visit of its Army chief, the time is ripe for a posture of robust response to any insurgency misdemeanour in the Northeast. Let this begin the accumulation of ‘points’ in India’s deterrence account, even as we improve our intelligence capability to forestall terrorist action elsewhere.

The message of our resolve to answer ceasefire violations on the Western border with resolute force has already indicated our intent to brook no adventurism on the border. The quick neutralisation of terrorists has shown the determination of the security forces. This attitude has been reiterated by National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval, who recently said that India should punch at the right weight, neither above nor below. The intent to cross border to hit terrorist installations should gradually become a point to be considered by the adversary as a possible Indian response — if this is achieved, controlled escalation short of kinetic action would have been attained.

Let the other side then bear the burden of guessing India’s intentions. The art of signalling and symbolism has to be practised adroitly — the earlier we realise it the better. To ruminate should be a chore thrust on the adversary so that the threat of escalation by India becomes the central issue for him to consider before launching any future misadventure.

(The author, a retired Air Vice-Marshal, is a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi; views are personal).