Since the 1980s, Turkey has faced a prolonged, often brutal insurgency sustained by the refusal to allow the democratic expression of Kurdish grievances. Recognizing that the country’s “Kurdish conflict” could never be solved through arrests and military operations, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) initially tried to change this dynamic after coming to power in 2003. Now, the government is doubling down on a tactic that has already brought Turkey several decades of violence.

Turkey's powerful president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan — bolstered by popular support in the wake of a failed coup attempt in July — is working to consolidate nationalist support for a plan to increase his executive authority, perhaps via referendum in the coming year. Tough measures like this recent round of arrests will almost certainly prove popular among a constituency that is both angered by PKK terror attacks and unsympathetic toward Kurdish political aspirations. But they also make it harder to imagine how the current conflict will end.

AD

AD

Over the past year of fighting, some in the AKP envisioned that military victories would set the stage for the government to return to negotiations with the PKK on better terms. Others believed that the PKK’s violent tactics were alienating its supporters, and thus that the AKP’s religious rhetoric, combined with select concessions on Kurdish cultural rights, could help the party win the battle for Kurdish hearts and minds. Now, a return to negotiations appears all the more unlikely. The PKK will consolidate its support within the Kurdish population and possibly escalate its own campaign of violence, fueling more anger among the Turkish public and setting the stage for fighting to continue in the coming years.

Just hours after Demirtas and his allies were rounded up, a car bomb exploded in the heavily Kurdish city of Diyarbakir outside a police station, killing eight and wounding more than 100.

The consequences of these arrests will also be felt in Syria, where Washington is currently caught between its Turkish and Kurdish partners in the campaign against the Islamic State. The People's Protection Units, or YPG, a Kurdish force closely connected to the PKK, has been uniquely effective in driving back the Islamic State, but Turkey has strenuously objected to U.S. support for the group. The United States has at times tried to restrain the YPG, limiting its gains to avoid violating Turkey’s redlines. But amid hopes that the group will play a lead role in the assault on Raqqa, Washington has also been willing to turn a blind eye when it has broken promises and crossed these lines.

AD

AD

Already this has led to clashes between Turkish forces and the YPG, raising the risk of a more serious confrontation that would distract both sides from the fight against the Islamic State. Intensifying conflict in Turkey will make Ankara even more willing to confront the YPG in Syria. And Ankara’s crackdown on democratically elected Kurdish politicians will only make U.S. policymakers less likely to restrain the YPG, condemn its sometimes troubling behavior or defer to Turkish concerns over its advances.

The Turkish government has always insisted that, from its point of view, the Islamic State, the YPG and the PKK are all equally bad. Now, in one night, it has potentially succeeded in strengthening all three.