Guillaume Durocher has an English language write-up of the disquieting conclusions reached by researchers at the nationalist French website Fdesouche.

These assertions are based on the percentage of Muslim first names granted at birth, statistics for which can be downloaded from INSEE (France) and Statbel (Belgium).

Here are the original articles:

The most obvious objection is that some Muslim names are also French names, but they tried to account for that – see the methodology section in the first article.

Incidentally, Fdesouche is also the same website that revealed that one third of newborns in France were being tested for sickle-cell disease, a procedure usually done if the infant is of African or Middle Eastern origin. Steve Sailer wrote about it in English in 2015.

Anyhow, here is a graph for France from the end of WW2 from the Fdesource writeup on France:

As we can see, the percentage of Muslim first names amongst newborns went up from essentially nothing, to 5% by the 1980s, where they stagnated until they began to soar inexorably in the late 1990s.

And here is a map of Muslim names in France as of 2017:

They speculate that they could might even have undercounted Muslim names, since INSEE does not publish “rare” names (less than three cases per department) for privacy reasons. The state that rare names are relatively more frequent amongst Muslims.

In contrast to France, the growth in the incidence of Muslim names in Belgium has actually greatly slowed down since the early 2000s.

Moreover, in the capital Brussels, it hasn’t budged since the mid-2000s, even though it has settled at a much higher rate (44%) than the Île-de-France (28%).

This is probably a function of Brussels stepping into its role as the EU’s Washington D.C. The rising cost of living is ejecting low income people into Flanders and especially Wallonia, while the city itself sucks up human capital from the entire EU.

The resulting equilibrium may well be surprisingly stable. As Durocher notes:

We ought to be cognizant of the fact that the “global cities” appear to be quite economically and socially viable for the foreseeable future. The most intelligent of our people, indeed of the entire planet’s population, are moving to Silicon Valley, New York, London, Paris, Brussels, and so on. The functionality of these cognitive elites seems to more than make up for the masses of low-quality immigrants. There is a working modus vivendi whereby the rich Whites and foreigners drive out dysfunctional minorities through rising property prices, inflicting them on the hapless White middle and working classes in the suburbs. The surveillance/welfare state is largely capable of jailing/baby-sitting minorities as necessary, as we see in Michael Bloomberg’s New York and across Western Europe. Each city becomes more or less residentially segregated quite naturally, with the metropolitan Whites generally moving beside fellow Whites despite their “anti-racist” sentiments (see the situation in New York and London). Furthermore, the foreign ethnic groups generally form no single ethnic and/or religious, but are themselves divided into innumerable ethno-religious groups: this limits political conflict insofar as no single group is large enough to have undisputed power. Where only two or three ethnic groups can credibly vie for power, this tends to be a major cause for ethnic civil war. Our “global cities,” while being forces for dysgenic reproduction and ethnic entropy, appear quite sustainable for the time being.

Possibly things may come to a head in 60 years time, when Durocher estimates that an Islamic majority in births could happen in France.

Non-Whites may become a majority of the total population of France a few years earlier.

On the other hand, the French were also the first people in the world to undergo the demographic transition; their “breeders” have been increasing their share of the population longer than any other people, which possibly explains why the French now have the highest fertility rate (even adjusting for Muslims) of any major European people. In contrast, the Arabs and Africans who have arrived in France were in the midst of and the start of their peoples’ demographic transitions, respectively. It’s plausible that the ethnic share of the French population will instead trough, and then start rising again.