The Written Description “possession” test has as much textual support as 101.

The simple fact is this: What is necessary is that the statutory scheme needs to have a mechanism that places the burden on the applicant to prevent them from describing one or even zero means of achieving a result, but then immediately describing it in broad or vague terms to achieve a claim to the result, and no mechanisms outside of 101 allow for that.

Again, the simple analogy is someone who invents the bow. The first thing that will happen is they will go to an attorney and the bow will become “an embodiment” of the “true” invention which is “a machine that fires projectiles.” That scope obviously covers and discourages the future invention of the gun, despite the gun not being posited or disclosed by the bow specification. That situation is the big no-no.

Can you use 112b? Well you used to, because “a machine that fires projectiles” does not “point out and particularly claim” the bow. But post-52 the construction of that phrase was that the invention was “a machine that fires projectiles” and “a machine that fires projectiles” points out and particularly claims “a machine that fires projectiles.” (i.e. Rather than looking at the spec and asking if the claims track the spec, the post-52 question is whether the claims track the claims, which always happens)

Can you use enablement? No, because the bow is enabled, and there is no mechanism to prove that the bow disclosure does not enable the scope of “a machine that fires projectiles” until you counter-invent another machine, and even then, enablement is measured at the time of filing, which just makes no sense.

Can you use written description? No, for the same reason. In order for someone to conclude that the applicant didn’t possess the full scope at the time of filing, they’d have to have pre-known about the gun, in which case you’d have a 102 rejection anyway.

Written description *could* be sufficient if the test was re-jiggered to place the burden on the applicant rather than the office/defendant – i.e. In order to describe the genus the specification must provide logic as to why the particularly disclosed embodiments (i.e. the bow) fills the scope of the genus (i.e. *all* machines that fire projectiles). But if you did that, the WD test would essentially become the same test as an abstraction test anyway.

The WD test has no textual basis (which is why it didn’t show up until 2000 in an act passed in 1952) and its insufficient anyway. But regardless, if you think that a statutory scheme *can* exist that allows for the bow manufacturer to claim the gun, you simply misunderstand and overestimate the power that congress was granted by the constitution. It doesn’t matter whether you want to call it 101 or 112a or whatever, the thing that the court isn’t going to allow to happen is for a statutory scheme to exist which would bless the bow inventor claiming the gun.

I’ve easily made this example a dozen times and I have yet to see someone challenge that a non-alice statutory scheme can consistently (or even ever, for that matter) solve this problem.