Last year I spent a lot of time covering the Greek crisis for Newsnight. Much of what I learned then feels relevant to Brexit. So, here are a few of those lessons.

Red lines & rhetoric matter less you think. But accidents happen.

Syriza’s supposed red lines were ending austerity, reversing some of the labour and product market reforms introduced by their creditors, achieving a debt write down and ending supervision by the Troika officials in Athens. Very little of this was achieved.

On the other hand, they did not experience a total defeat. Creditor red lines were crossed to — austerity was eased, the reform agenda was amended, talks on debt relief have been left open, funding packages are now longer term.

Throughout the crisis last year I thought a compromise was achievable. That compromise would always been closer to the creditor position than the Greek one — such was the imbalance of power in the talks. And, in the end, that’s where things settled. But getting there was a messy and fraught process

That leads to a few observations:

It is notable that even as the agreed positions creep closer together, the rhetoric (on both sides) rarely softened. Much of it, of course, was aimed at a domestic audience. Expect the same this time around.

A cautionary note: just because a compromise is foreseeable, doesn’t mean it will happen. I can envisage a deal whereby the UK retains Single Market membership (or something very close to it), gets some token changes on free movement and continues to pay (a reduced) budget contribution to the EU. As in the Greek case, such a compromise would be closer to the EU starting line than the British/Greek one and would involve fewer European red lines being crossed. But there were several occasions last year when any hope of compromise almost fell apart. There was a great deal of luck involved in keeping Greece in the Euro and this time some important dynamics are different.

In the end the Greek government basically capitulated for two reasons: it became clear that they were the less powerful party by far and that the consequences of an exit would be (at least in the short term) economically devastating. The odds of an accident leading to a “hard Brexit” are much higher in this case. The UK may be in a more powerful position than Greece was and it retains much more freedom of action. Equally, whilst the loss of Single Market membership would be a blow to the British economy it is of a different order of magnitude to Greece leaving the Euro.

In other words, the two factors that prove the Greek capitulation may not be present. That said, a serious sell off in gilts could play role here in demonstrating where power lies.

Internal party politics matter

With the opposition in poor shape, internal debates within Syriza mattered far more to the outcome than what the opposition did (sound familiar?).

The analogy I’d draw here is between Syriza’s Left Platform and the Eurosceptic right of the Conservative Party. Throughout the crisis Left Platform was noisy, its rhetoric made for good news lines and its spokespeople made themselves widely available to the media. But when push came to shove it was marginalised and a deal was done.

It is tempting to see the Eurosceptic right as being a similar position — noisy enough to unsettle the markets and rile up the Europeans but not, in the final analysis, setting policy.

But I’m not so sure. First, its members hold far more important ministerial briefs than Left Platform’s ever did and that alone makes them harder to marginalise. Second though, and I make no great claims to being an expert on the Conservatives’ internal politics, they seem in a stronger position vis a vis the leadership.

One of May’s first acts as Prime Minister was to sack much of the Cameron/Osborne clique. Many of them are already proving to be critical backbenchers. It’s hard to see how she can run the Party without the backing of either the previous leadership’s followers or the Eurosceptic right. If Tspiras has been more internally reliant on Left Platform, things could have turned out very differently.

Economic hardship doesn’t have to turn public opinion

This one matters. A lot.

There is a creeping belief amongst British Single Market proponents, that as inflation picks up and real incomes are squeezed then public opinion will move towards a “softer” Brexit.

I’m not so sure. In the Greek case the economy nosed divided during the talks, capital controls were introduced and the banks were closed. Not only did Syriza’s support hold up well but they were able to win re-election.

The thing to understand about Syriza is that for all the talk of them being a radical left party, they ran for office and governed as a nationalistic, populist left party. They won and held support by “standing up for Greece” against the Europeans and indeed against an “international financial elite”. Economic pain was blamed on outsiders and the government was seen as standing with the people.

It isn’t hard to see a right, populist, nationalistic government achieving a similar feat. It’s not sure they will achieve that, but it’s certainly possible. Economic outcomes don’t feed directly into popular narratives and understanding in a smooth way.

Europe takes political contagion seriously

On the occasions when it looked like Greece might actually leave the Euro, then the creditors had to make a cynical choice; did they care most about financial or political contagion?

I.e. were they more concerned about the market spillovers of Greece leaving the Euro and the whole project being called into question, or the political risk than concessions to Syriza would lead to the election of similar governments demanding similar terms across the European periphery?

Political contagion is something that worries senior Europeans committed to the Union. There will (again) be a strong desire amongst senior politicians against providing a roadmap for other countries to follow.

Smart diplomacy matters, internal allies are more important than external ones

Syriza initially banked on getting US support for their desire for change (they even went as far as to talking up their friends in Moscow and attempted to turn an economic crisis into a geopolitical for NATO). In the end US pressure didn’t matter much directly.

Many Single Market proponents in Britain today expect the US and Japan to pressure both sides to minimise trade and supply chain disruption. No doubt outside countries will apply some pressure, but the mechanisms through which they can do so (especially with the IMF not directly involved in the talks) are indirect.

In the end, the final compromise in Greece came after France and Italy became more closely involved in providing (some) support to Greece.

Those looking for a soft exit should pay more attention to divisions between the 27 other EU members than what the Japanese government happens to be arguing for.