In 2014 the rapid expansion and conquests of the Islamic State brought Iraq to its knees. ISIS militants reached towns just 60 miles from Baghdad, and the overarching tale was that Iraqi soldiers had dropped their weapons and abandoned their posts, from Mosul to Kirkuk. The existence of Iraq itself was called into question by many commentators, with one writing in the Huffington Post that it was time for Iraq’s Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurds to “go their separate ways”. Another commentator described it as a Middle Eastern Yugoslavia and the BBC asked “Is this the end of Iraq?”. Former Prime Minister Nouri Maliki had been widely accused of enacting a sectarian anti-Sunni agenda, breaking promises made to Sunni tribal leaders and concentrating power in the hands of a small group. Maliki attempted to centralise control and power in Baghdad, whilst reducing regional autonomy, and with Baghdad dominated by Shi’a, this move came at the expense of Iraq’s Sunnis and Kurds. It is safe to say that Iraqi nationalism was at a low-point.

Since the beginning of the Iraqi counter-offensive however, Iraqi nationalism began to experience a revitalisation, which has largely gone unnoticed amid the turmoil in the Kurdish regions. I am by no means claiming Iraq is united now or that everyone supports the central government and the future is all bright and rosy. But there is a quiet optimism of many that despite the horrors of war, Iraq itself is stronger than it was pre-2014. I’m going to be a little bit self-indulgent here and add that I made this point in a seminar last year and was shot down by my seminar leader…

The crucial change from pre-2014 Iraq and Iraq today is that it has strong national institutions such as the Iraqi Army, institutions that are vital to “winning the peace” and creating a strong and stable state. Support for the state and the army as institutions has increased. In 2014, before the June collapse of the Iraqi Army, 59% of Iraqis viewed it in a positive light. That figure now stands at 81%, with the massive sacrifice of Iraq’s young men recognised and appreciated (1). With the rise of ISIS many Sunni leaders were forced to choose between the government or the Islamic State. The subsequent collapse of ISIS has resulted in the elimination of any mainstream Sunni political support for them, and new Sunni actors have emerged from the chaos, actors who understand the need to work with Baghdad and the central government. Under Saddam, Iraqi Sunnis were the dominant power, and the argument that ISIS arose out of Sunni frustration at losing this supremacy is convincing. That’s a matter for another article however, but the fact remains, Sunni tribal leaders are prepared to swallow their pride and cooperate with the national government, accepting that they are no longer the preferred group in a dictatorial state. Perhaps this willingness to act inside the state rather than rebel against it also comes from the understanding that Iraq, with local allies Iran and international partners will act heavily against another ISIS style revolt. Either way, both are important for a functioning state (state monopoly on violence etc).

Despite the insistence of many in the build-up the bloody liberation of Mosul and other Iraqi cities by a predominantly Shi’a army wasn’t met with fury from Sunni residents, it was instead by and large welcomed, despite substantial allegations of war crimes and extrajudicial killing by PMU militias. The People’s Mobilisation Units (PMU), comprised of some hard-line sectarian militias, is now viewed favourably in Western Iraq, increasingly so since 2016 (Western Iraq being predominantly Sunni and ISIS’s stronghold). Sunni Sheikh, Khalid al-Mulla, head of the influential Muslims Scholars Association described the PMU earlier today as the safeguard of Iraq’s future. And even if those in the West aren’t convinced, Iraqi’s themselves believe that their country is stronger. Across the country (excluding Kurdistan) the overwhelming majority believe that the fight against ISIS has unified Iraq (2).

Critics will argue that Iraq was saved by Iranian military intervention and American air support, and it is probably true that without assistance the Iraqi revival wouldn’t have happened. But for Iraqis there is now a vital narrative of young Iraqi men from across the country joining the army to save the country from aggressors. The importance of national narratives is huge in terms of bolstering national identity, especially those of “good versus bad” which this conflict can be shaped as.

Some will also argue that Iraq is beholden to Iran and this national identity is weak in the face of that. Yet neither the political or spiritual leadership of Iraq is toeing the Iranian line. Unlike his predecessor Maliki, Haider Al-Abadi, Iraqi PM, has tried to minimise Iranian influence. Many have pointed out that Iran would prefer to see Al-Abadi removed (and Maliki returned), but with his high approval ratings from both Sunni and Shi’a this is unlikely to happen. The past few days has seen the most influential Shi’a leaders within Iraq call for the PMU to be nationalised as part of the government, a move that Al-Abadi will probably support, and Tehran will definitely oppose. Both Moktada al-Sadr, a populist Shi’a cleric and Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani who holds global reverence among Shi’a have spoken against Iranian dominance, dominance which can only be achieved through Iranian exploitation of Iraq’s sympathetic Shi’a.

With Sunni leaders understanding that support for ISIS and its successors will not be tolerated, and with a strong Iraqi military, made proud by its brave successes across Iraq, there is much to be cautiously optimistic about. Iraq will face significant hurdles, with Kurdish separatism and the ISIS terrorist threat remaining. As long as Al-Abadi continues the process of involving local tribal Sunni leaders and stamping out corruption and Iraqi Shi’a resist the control of Iran the basic Iraqi state then this optimism could be realised.

As for the Kurds, I’ll probably write something on that later this week because it has the potential to get very nasty, with anti-Kurdish Regional Government protests starting yesterday and curfews being imposed tonight.

Thanks for reading, feel free to like/comment/share.

(1) https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20April%202017%20Survey%20Public%20Final%20%281%29%20%281%29.pdf

(2) Ibid

Interesting read- Fanar Hadad- https://postwarwatch.com/2017/11/20/after-sectarianism/