The word agnosticism was first publicly coined in 1869 at a meeting of the Metaphysical Society in London by T.H. Huxley , a British biologist and champion of the Darwinian theory of evolution. He coined it as a suitable label for his own position. “It came into my head as suggestively antithetical to the ‘Gnostic’ of Church history who professed to know so much about the very things of which I was ignorant.”

Agnosticism , (from Greek agnōstos, “unknowable”), strictly speaking, the doctrine that humans cannot know of the existence of anything beyond the phenomena of their experience. The term has come to be equated in popular parlance with skepticism about religious questions in general and in particular with the rejection of traditional Christian beliefs under the impact of modern scientific thought.

Nature and kinds of agnosticism

Huxley’s statement brings out both the fact that agnosticism has something to do with not knowing, and that this not knowing refers particularly to the sphere of religious doctrine. Etymology, however, and now common usage, do permit less limited uses of the term. The Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin, for instance, in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908), distinguished the extremes of true materialism on the one hand and the bold idealism of George Berkeley, an 18th-century idealist, on the other. He recognized as attempted halfway houses between them the “agnosticisms” of the Scottish skeptic David Hume and the great German critical philosopher Immanuel Kant—agnosticisms that here consisted in their contentions about the unknowability of the nature, or even the existence, of “things-in-themselves” (realities beyond appearances).

Berkeley, George; Smibert, John George Berkeley, detail of an oil painting by John Smibert, c. 1732; in the National Portrait Gallery, London. Courtesy of The National Portrait Gallery, London

Huxley’s nonreligious agnosticism The essence of Huxley’s agnosticism—and his statement, as the inventor of the term, must be peculiarly authoritative—was not a profession of total ignorance, nor even of total ignorance within one special but very large sphere. Rather, he insisted, it was “not a creed but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single principle,” namely, to follow reason “as far as it can take you,” but then, when you have established as much as you can, frankly and honestly to recognize the limits of your knowledge. It is the same principle as that later proclaimed in an essay on “The Ethics of Belief” (1876) by the British mathematician and philosopher of science W.K. Clifford: “It is wrong always, everywhere and for everyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” Applied by Huxley to fundamental Christian claims, this principle yields characteristically skeptical conclusions: speaking, for example, of the apocrypha (ancient scriptural writings excluded from the biblical canon), he wrote: “One may suspect that a little more critical discrimination would have enlarged the Apocrypha not inconsiderably.” In the same spirit, Sir Leslie Stephen, 19th-century literary critic and historian of thought, in An Agnostic’s Apology, and Other Essays (1893), reproached those who pretended to delineate “the nature of God Almighty with an accuracy from which modest naturalists would shrink in describing the genesis of a black beetle.” Get exclusive access to content from our 1768 First Edition with your subscription. Subscribe today Agnosticism in its primary reference is commonly contrasted with atheism thus: “The Atheist asserts that there is no God, whereas the Agnostic maintains only that he does not know.” This distinction, however, is in two respects misleading: first, Huxley himself certainly rejected as outright false—rather than as not known to be true or false—many widely popular views about God, his providence, and man’s posthumous destiny; and second, if this were the crucial distinction, agnosticism would for almost all practical purposes be the same as atheism. It was indeed on this misunderstanding that Huxley and his associates were attacked both by enthusiastic Christian polemicists and by Friedrich Engels, the co-worker of Karl Marx, as “shame-faced atheists,” a description that is perfectly applicable to many of those who nowadays adopt the more comfortable label. Agnosticism, moreover, is not the same as skepticism, which, in the comprehensive and classical form epitomized by the ancient Greek skeptic Sextus Empiricus (2nd and 3rd centuries ce), confidently challenges not merely religious or metaphysical knowledge but all knowledge claims that venture beyond immediate experience. Agnosticism is, as skepticism surely could not be, compatible with the approach of positivism, which emphasizes the achievements and possibilities of natural and social science—though most agnostics, including Huxley, have nonetheless harboured reserves about the more authoritarian and eccentric features of the system of Auguste Comte, the 19th-century founder of positivism.