The appeals court rejected Mr. Salman’s argument that the Newman case required showing a tangible benefit beyond the close familial relationship. “To the extent Newman can be read to go so far, we decline to follow it,” Judge Rakoff wrote. Instead, the opinion concluded there was sufficient evidence that the information “was intended as a gift” to meet the requirements of the Supreme Court’s analysis in the Dirks case.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not specifically disagree with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, but it took a more forgiving approach to what is necessary to show a benefit in a tipping case.

Does that mean there is a conflict between the appellate courts that the Supreme Court needs to resolve?

The Justice Department pointed to the conflicting approaches as a reason for the Supreme Court to review the Newman case, asking the justices “to restore a uniform interpretation of Dirks.” But in opposing Mr. Salman’s petition for review, the government argued that “review is less warranted here than in Newman because the decision that petitioner urges this court to review is correct and wholly consistent with Dirks.”

In other words, the Justice Department essentially claimed that after refusing to review the Newman case, the Supreme Court should just let sleeping dogs lie. That did not persuade the justices, however, especially as the Salman case squarely presents the question about how much evidence is needed to prove a benefit when it is based on friendship or family, not something tangible.

Although the Justice Department might have preferred to have the Newman case reviewed, the facts underlying Mr. Salman’s conviction may give the government a better opportunity to ask the Supreme Court to uphold the conviction. As an initial matter, the jury has already found the evidence sufficient to show a benefit, so the justices may not want to substitute their judgment for that of the jurors.

Mr. Newman and Mr. Chiasson were far removed from the original sources of the inside information, who were never charged for their disclosure. That made it difficult to fathom how a tippee could be liable when the tipper did not rate being accused of violating the law. Thus, it was not difficult to see why the appeals court found that the government’s evidence “was simply too thin to warrant the inference that the corporate insiders received any personal benefit in exchange for their tips.”