Paulo Casaca is the Founder and Executive Director of the ‘South Asia Democratic Forum’; founder of the international co-operation association registered in Brussels ARCHumankind, ‘Alliance to Renew Co-operation among Humankind’. Founder and senior partner of the consultancy company on sustainable development registered in Brussels, Lessmeansmore, Land and Energy Sustainable Systems (2010-2020).

1. The context

In September last year, I travelled extensively through Bangladesh’s conflict area within the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the immense refugee camps on the right bank of the Naf River. In the first half of February, I stayed for some days in Yangon, Myanmar, in the wake of a conference called ‘Digital economic transformations in emerging Asia – opportunities for collaboration’, which was jointly promoted by the Community Agency for Rural Development and Relex development.

In this conference I moderated a panel on rural development animated by Dr Min Zaw Oo, executive director of the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security as well as Ms Shrabana Barua, fellow associate of the Nepal Institute of International Cooperation and Engagement. I introduced the topic of rural development as an instrument of peace; the topic here further developed.

Whereas we have witnessed numerous ethnic conflicts in the region and indeed in various parts of the world, the tragedy unfolding upon the ‘Rohingya’ people is deeply shocking for its ruthlessness and epic dimension.

Most Western public opinion has placed great hopes in Myanmar’s complex process of democratisation, which started in 2016 through a governmental opening to participation by elected politicians. Disappointment was therefore great when the world witnessed in the summer of 2017 the recrudescence of extreme forms of violence by Myanmar military forces against the civilian population, which provoked a mass exodus of circa 700,000 people across the River Naf to Bangladesh.

It is necessarily difficult to establish a dialogue where even a common lexicon is lacking. Lost-in-translation both originates in and fuels mutual spite: while Myanmar’s government repudiates the very term ‘Rohingya’ as fictional – only a false belonging to the ‘Rakhine state’ – the Rohingya people in turn repudiate being classified as in any way ‘Bengali’, and thus somehow non-native.

As was quite often the case regarding the creation of new states, independent Burma – now called Myanmar – struggled to create a new identity out of a territory with a variegated history and diverse peoples.

Arakan, now renamed the Rakhine state, covered the country’s Western shores along the Gulf of Bengal. For a period of time it comprised

Chittagong. The area has a distinct and complex history, in no short measure as a sort of commercial melting pot – a point of encounter between peoples of Tibetan (mostly Buddhist) and Bengali (mostly Muslim) ethnic origin, as well as many other peoples arriving by sea.

On the other hand, the designation of ‘Muslim inhabitants of the Rakhine state’ was also proposed to me, implying that Islamophobia is at least part of the phenomenon we are dealing with. This approach faces several obstacles.

Firstly, there is a sizable Muslim minority in places such as Yangon that face no obvious discrimination. Any tourist can visit and see open Mosques in several areas of the town and find several people dressed in modern ‘Muslim attire’. Secondly, there is a minority of Hindu Rohingya, tiny yet significant as it suffered persecution both by military forces and Jihadists. Thirdly, there has been a clear attempt of manipulation of the subliminal ethnic conflict by Islamists.

Whereas ethnic tensions and historical conflicts existed before Burma’s creation, the military rule that followed the coup of 1962 exacerbated them. The main victims in the process were ethnic Bengalis / Rohingya people who first were not recognised as one of the country’s ethnic group in 1974 and second were mostly considered either foreigners or second- (or third-) class citizens by a law of nationality that came into force in 1982.

The military regime refined the stigma upon Rohingya/Bengali ethnic citizens by misunderstanding both history and ethnicity (the term still widely used is ‘race’). This is easily understood either by reading existing literature or simply by visiting the Yangon National Museum.

The mistreatment of this population has increased ever since and, most worryingly, has survived the 2016 democratisation process. Beyond strict persecution as in 2017, the reality on the ground in today’s Rakhine State continues to be characterised by unacceptable living conditions. Sizeable sections of the local citizenry remains confined in concentration camps.

2. The case for engagement with Myanmar

Maintaining a healthy balance between engagement and containment and/or confrontation is the most delicate issue relating to any crisis or challenge.

As we all know the misplaced and unprincipled effort of engagement with the Nazi regime in the 1930s resulted in a monstrous human catastrophe; yet, unfortunately the most obvious lessons from that period still seem to escape us.

During the last 15 years I have been fighting the West’s engagement policy towards the Iranian theocracy, most notably as regards the promotion of the nuclear deal. Some of the reasons for this attitude are quite obvious: the Iranian theocracy is an aggressive, expansionist power which has partially occupied several of its neighbours (Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon) and has fuelled mayhem in several others through the consistent use of a complex set of policy instruments – including international terrorism and drug trafficking. None of this happened even in the height of Myanmar’s military rule.

The main argument for engagement with Iran is the existence of ‘conservative’ and ‘reformist’ wings – the latter of which could transform the country and should be engaged with. The existence of several factions within the Iranian theocracy (not necessarily classifiable within the simplistic conservative/reformist duality) has indeed characterised the regime since its creation 40 years ago.

A careful analysis of this inter-factional game however shows that it has fundamentally been used by the regime as a means to fool its interlocutors – not as a genuine power game wherein the international community could influence the course of events. The two years of civil-military power-sharing in Myanmar appears nothing like the sophisticated game of dissimulation and deceit played by Tehran.

As regards the global functioning of freedom and democracy, no possible parallels can be made between the two countries. This I could verify in loco by openly criticising the country’s policy regarding the Rakhine state in a public conference, something that would be unthinkable for anyone to do in Tehran.

The only possible parallel we can establish between both regimes regards the treatment of minorities. In this area we can speak of intolerant mind-sets – although the circumstances and problems at stake are considerably different and, most importantly, as these problems exist in different degrees all over the World.

Myanmar is facing a wide set of insurgencies other than the ‘Rohingya’ issue along its borders, and these insurgencies cannot always be explained by an objective set of grievances. The most recent example was the spectacular attacks in the area perpetrated by the ‘Arakan Army’- in apparent alliance with the ‘Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’ (ARSA) and showing sophisticated weaponry and tactics.

The ‘Golden triangle’ has the potential to affect political stability of Myanmar as much as similar situations affect Afghanistan and once affected Colombia. Myanmar will need international cooperation so as to tackle this and other issues, and this cooperation may only be available if the country embraces common international standards to be applied to all its inhabitants.

3. Basis for a dialogue

Although it is important to understand the history of the conflict (Oxford Research encyclopaedia available in the web seems a good start) one should refrain from engaging in a constructed historical debate as so often misused to justify the unjustifiable and waste time on the unessential.

The only historical topic I think we should see as relevant is that in 1961 the civilian government – prior to the military coup – had found a solution accepted by the Rohingya:

‘In 1961, U Nu finally decided to establish the Arakan State, but in order to receive support from the Muslims, he decided to separate the Mayu region (which consisted of Buthidaung and Maungdaw Townships and western Rathedaung) from the State of Arakan and put that region under the direct control of the central government. It was named the Mayu Frontier Administration.’ (Nemoto, op.cit. p.16). This historical fact could be the departure point for a dialogue.

The second point was already made by the Catholic ‘La Croix’ (op. cit.); one should start tackling the crisis from within Myanmar rather than from the refugee camps alone. This point deserves however a qualification: the rhythm of structural change within Myanmar will certainly be slower than the rhythm of change demanded by the persecuted population.

The third basis is that a sustained effort of sustainable development, respect of human dignity and enhanced security shall accompany any solution to the conflict, and this effort has to be sustained by the international community.

Last but not least, an intense engagement in all fronts will be necessary – starting perhaps with inter-religious dialogue enhancing tolerance and isolating fanaticism, but embracing all sectors of government and society.

4. Rural development for peace

The ‘rural development’ policy was started in the United States around the ‘Country Life Movement’ and was widely developed across the globe during the twentieth century. It can be described as an eclectic movement using an immense variety of instruments. Its ultimate goal is to support rural populations to attain levels of development comparable to those of urban areas – without however sacrificing local values and cultures.

The relation of rural development policies with farming activities has also been complex and ultimately contradictory. What started in a relation of complementarity with agricultural pursuits, later developed – namely in Europe – as an alternative to farming practices, or at the very least an alternative to intense modern farming practices. Conversely, in India, rural development played a crucial political role after independence – but was later sidestepped by the ‘Green Revolution’ which enhanced intensive farming procedures.

As I stressed during the conference, new technologies will certainly transform this reality. On the one hand, farming will likely be ever more present within new urban environments – challenging the traditional role of the rural world as supplier of agricultural raw materials; on the other hand, the dissemination of instant communication will likely allow rural communities to step into production activities previously thought to be exclusively urban.

Yet another important and revealing evolution in rural development policies is taking place and called my attention last month while travelling through north-eastern India: rural development as an instrument for peace, dialogue and understanding across borders!

The Green Generations at Bahundangi, Nepal, joined by the Association for Conservation and Tourism, Darjeeling, India developed an initiative first geared at conservation through sustainable tourism – which is now set to improve Cross-Border Relations along Mechi River between Nepal and India and ultimately geared at ‘creating an Asian model through the participation of India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar’ (Sikkim Express, Gangtok, 2019.01.13).

Joseph Win Hlaing Oo, CEO and founder of the Community Agency for Rural Development (CAD) in Myanmar and co-host of the conference, is a native from the Chin State – located in the north-eastern border of the Rakhine State and one of the most ethnically diverse in the country.

He classified his state as ‘the most peaceful in the world’ and made an impressive definition of peace, inspired by the rural reality of his native Chin State: ‘peace is to have no locks on your home door’ – as it means you are not afraid of whomever.

It might take a long time to get rid of the locks of intolerance, hate, and fear across the southern bank of the Naf River, but I came out of Myanmar convinced that the task is within the reach of perseverance and peace-loving people within the country if we are prepared to give our support.