The election for the 17th Lok Sabha has been the world’s largest democratic exercise with 900 million electorates, 2,293 political parties and more than 8,000 candidates contesting for 543 seats. With the elections behind us, it is time to deliberate upon the major socio-political churns in India and mainly in the Hindu society and polity. Four major churns are discernible with long-term impact on the future trajectory of India — it being the most diverse country in the world with thousands of castes, tribes and communities with different concerns and aspirations. And, the successful political party is supposed to be one which is the best ‘aggregator’ of this diversified population. The party which succeeds in bringing various sections of the society under its single umbrella normally gets maximum seat in parliament to form the government.

Depending upon the prevailing social conditions there can be several equilibriums of sharing of political power in a society.

And after Independence, it was only Congress party which successfully played the role of the aggregator. Congress evolved a system of (unequal) power sharing between different castes where token representation was given to the weaker sections. The social structure of power was simple; urban upper-castes held the bureaucratic and institutional power and ruled for long in alliance with the feudal elements of the local dominant castes in the agrarian countryside. This was complemented by the welfare schemes for the poor and token representation of the Dalit and Tribal population using the reservation policy. The votes of the Muslims were garnered under the official commitment to secularism, promising them security in the post-partition India if nothing else. This model of aggregation worked well for decades, but this doesn’t mean that it should also be socially the best possible model available. Depending upon the prevailing social conditions there can be several equilibriums of sharing of political power in a society.

There were several challenges thrown at the Congress model especially by the OBC politics under the ideological construct of ‘Samajwad’ or socialism in the Hindi heartland, Dalits assertion under the aegis of the Ambedkarite or Bahujan politics, Dravidian politics in south and the communist parties in Bengal, Kerala and few other states. But they all failed to emerge as the main aggregator at the pan-India stage. All they were capable of was carving some regional niche for themselves or were just reduced to a party of one or two castes and communities.

But the rise of the Narendra Modi led BJP heralded the new era of social engineering where BJP replaced the Congress as the main aggregator in the Indian politics. Both in 2014 and 2019, BJP succeeded in weaving together a massive alliance of various Hindu castes now famously known as the ‘United Spectrum of Hindu Votes’ (USHV). The extent to which party president Amit Shah went to form these micro caste-alliances, at a single district level, is unprecedented in India’s political history. And, while Congress operated under the overarching narrative of secularism and anti-poverty policies, BJP proved it again that elections can be fought and “won” (as predicted in exit polls) under the umbrella of Hindutva and an aspirational agenda of development. 2014 was the maiden election when India got an alternative to the Congress model of politics and governance and it seems it is going to be the new normal in India.

The rise of the Narendra Modi led BJP heralded the new era of social engineering where BJP replaced the Congress as the main aggregator in the Indian politics. Both in 2014 and 2019, BJP succeeded in weaving together a massive alliance of various Hindu castes now famously known as the ‘United Spectrum of Hindu Votes.’

Secondly, there is the intensifying conflict between the old urban class and the new. The old urban elites were the beneficiaries of the Nehruvian patronage system and exercised disproportionate influence on the public discourse and policy making. They were also drawn mostly from the socially and economically privileged sections of the society. While, the new or neo urban class is mostly the product of the economic reforms, drawn from the villages and middle class population of small towns. This class has always resented the hold of the old urban elites in academia, institutions, media and policy-making mainly due to their sharp difference with them on issues of religion, nationalism and secularism. The new class was more rooted in the local concerns and aspirations rather than aspiring to be global citizens. They belonged to ‘somewhere’ and not ‘anywhere’. The new urban class also has no concern for the international left whose approval was always sought by old urban elites. The clash on fundamental difference, in relation to future of India between the two was inevitable. But, the real game changer was the advent of social media, which provided the new urban class with a voice as well as means to connect to like-minded people and organise themselves. Riding on effectiveness of social media and new means of communication, the new urban class subverted the old narrative. The gatekeepers of the India International Centre and academia were left clueless as the ground shifted under their feet. In this war of narrative between ‘Noida and Lodhi Road,’ it looks like Noida having an edge as of now.

Thirdly, the longing of transformation within the Hindu societies of the country, the prevalence of desire for development and modernity but strictly based on Indian civilisational ethos or what we can call as “Hindu modernity.” Everywhere people are trying to break away with the old social structures, not satisfied with their present, but having no clear idea of what they are yearning for. There is a desire to be like the ‘modern world.’ However, with more and more people rejecting the superiority of the western culture, it is unclear what will be the contour of this new modernity. We don’t have any other model of modernity apart from the Western and Japanese world. And, India in itself is a classic case of ‘mistaken modernity’ suggested by Dipankar Gupta. There is an inadequate realisation that modernity is not about smartphones, Facebook or driving latest cars. Modernity is essentially about the people; social structures, gender relations and political system. ‘Hindu modernity’ remains a highly contested issue even among the Hindu nationalists who are grappling with the question as to how best can they ensure the survival of the traditions and old culture & customs facing the rapid economic transformation, which will eventually change the entire social structure as we know it.

There is a desire to be like the ‘modern world.’ However, with more and more people rejecting the superiority of the western culture, it is unclear what will be the contour of this new modernity.

And fourthly, there is the nascent but emerging backlash of the orthodoxy against the socio-economic transformation. As the old varna-jati system breaks down amidst increasing socio-economic mobility since independence, there are attempts by regressive sections of the society to revive the advocacy of feudal-caste system and unfreedom for the women. It must be noted that the trajectory of the Hindu society has been reformist for more than a century. Even, Hindutva was a radical break in the Hindu thought that advocated widow remarriage, inter-caste dining and argued against the caste system and untouchability. The pace of the reforms in Hindu society has been slow because, it was not complemented by the transformation of the economic structures. But after the economic reforms, the pace of dissolution of the old feudal-caste order has accelerated.

One of the biggest stories of the last three decades is the flight of the Dalits and lower castes from the villages and their ancestral occupations and the corresponding loss of power of the dominant castes over them. This has thrown the old social structure in a state of chaos as the dominant castes find their social and economic power being rapidly diminished. Also, the spread of education and economic opportunities for all castes and gender is leading to a silent but far-reaching reconfiguration of the social and gender relations. This has invited the ire of some sections of the society who have started championing the old laws of the Manusmriti and similar texts. According to them, varna-jati system must be re-imposed with no right to change profession that is decided by birth and women should be confined to purdah and homes. Such views are attracting even the young urban youth and are becoming visible on various social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. In the name of the ‘Indic model’ and challenging the ‘Missionary-Marxist discourse’ to fight the ‘Breaking India’ forces they have started justifying each and every social problem in the Hindu society. Much of it is delusion of a perfect society in the hoary past and inability to reconcile the notions of subjective superiority with the new socio-economic reality especially among the traditional upper/dominant caste youth from the villages and small towns.

How will they all play out in the future is something to watch out for. Can BJP sustain itself as the main aggregator, as unlike the Congress it has to deal with the new landscape where virtually every caste is mobilising for greater share in the state resources and power? The clash between the old and the new urban class will only intensify. But, will the new urban class buckle under its own weight as it’s not socially homogenous unlike the old elite. There are deep social fault lines running through it. The conflict between the desire for Hindu modernity and reassertion of orthodoxy will continue and may soon reach a tipping point as India approaches the inflection point where it must transform from a largely agrarian society to an urban-industrial society.

The author is an assistant professor at the University of Delhi.

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