Willard Van Orman Quine, in his famous paper “On What There Is” (1948), considers whether talking about things that do not exist may amount to granting such things a degree of existence. When we conceive of something as inexistent in the absolute (unconditional) sense we nonetheless commit to an aspect of reality that could be regarded as existent in a relative (conditional) sense. ‘Something that does not exist’ exists as an abstract reference to a hypothetical entity, a name without an unconditional object-referent, marking a distinction in the concept of reality: meta-level vs. object-level reality. Quine is not explicit as to whether the meta-level (the realm of possibilities and ideas) ought to be considered as properly ontological, but he is clear that our meta-level ontological commitments do not entail existence of object-level entities. Here I argue that existence cannot be reduced just to the dichotomy of meta- and object- levels but is more consistently characterised in terms of kinds and degrees of relational existence without giving up on the possibility of absolute existence.

Peter Thomas Geach (1967) has argued that existence (insofar as we can identify it) is intrinsically relational: whenever we identify two things as being ‘the same’ (a=b) we are making an incomplete logical step. In order to complete it we must also answer the question ‘the same what?’, what reduces identity to a description in terms of kinds. In other words, if we are able to identify two things (a, b) or two occurrences of a thing, there must be some differences between them (Leibniz’s Law), otherwise it would make no sense to say that there are two things or two occurrences of a thing. It is then possible to say that a and b (two dogs, for example) are the same f (colour) but a different g (breed) and at a different h (location), so that “a has to b the relation of identity as restricted to things that f” (Wiggins 2001, p17).

In this sense, individuals as well as kinds are just relational constructs, wholly determined by an unbounded multiplicity of kinds intersecting in unique ways, what in turn allows us to formulate unique, individual descriptions of objects (Sortal Dependency of Identity Thesis). For example, to say that Willard Van Orman Quine exists, commits us to an individual identity constructed by means of existential qualifiers (kinds) which may include: object, man, philosopher, date, birth, nationality, race, theory, language, word, letter, name. The same schema of identification can be applied to kinds: ‘dog’ is a kind of four-legged mammal, omnivore, animal… ‘animal’ is a kind of living being, member of the biological kingdom Animalia, lacking the capacity for photosynthesis…

“The goal of all ontology is the theory of categories.” (Heidegger)

What counts in favour of relational ontology is the common sense understanding of ‘being in a world’: everything that exists is in a causal relation with everything else that exists in the same world. Causality, which is the classical criterion of existence (Plato, Sophist 247d–e), and presence-in-context for a witness (phenomenology) are obviously relational conditions. If something did not in some way relate as a condition or the conditional of something else, it would then be unclear in what sense it could still count as being in the same world. It would not do to assert that everything exists just in-itself; that would amount either to infinite regress or to trivially declaring that something just is something. Existence is thus unavoidably construed as an intrinsic relation characterised by plurality of differential referents.

Geach’s thesis of relational identity was criticised and ultimately rejected by many (Perry 1970; Wiggins 2001), but the rejection was perhaps uncharitable since the notion of identity can be interpreted, depending on context, as either relational (a and b are two identical copies of X) or non-relational (a and b are literally the same X under two different names). The relational interpretation is also perfectly compatible with the widely accepted phenomenological thesis that to be able to identify some object X there must be something that X is like for the one who makes the identification: “one cannot simply introspect a conscious mental particular unless (…) there is something one’s introspective experience of it is like.” (Pitt 2004) My ability to identify a tree, for example, presupposes an idea of what trees are like, at the very least ‘for me’ (but possibly for others also).

A curious logical consequence of defining identity in terms of likeness is that all claims about existence would amount to solipsism unless likeness could be established in relation to things or properties that, either individually or in combination, actually are like X (but are not X). Phenomenological ontology is relational ontology, even if some things possess non-relational content as well. Similarly, in order to be able to identify as myself (what amounts just to being myself, a Subject) there must be something it is like to be me, what would amount to solipsism unless my likeness were grounded by means of a kind of beings that actually are like me (but are not me). We are thus left with consciousness, or perhaps some absolute condition of consciousness, as the only non-relational, non-constructed kind of being; a genuinely unconditional dimension manifested in necessarily plural instances of self-realisation. We need to relate to other Subjects as Subjects in order to reflexively relate to ourselves as something real, and thus exist for ourselves. Our degree of existence as conscious, reflexive beings is then plausibly determined by How we relate to others. Normative consequences of this ontological dependency will be analysed in a full length paper (forthcoming).

“There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other’s experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar (…) The more different from oneself the other experiencer is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise.” (Nagel)

Every constructed kind of being is, by implication of the term, subject to stages of structural development. Some kinds of objects, like trees, are constructed to such a high degree, they cohere with other ‘natural’ constructs so intricately, that to displace this one element would amount to creating incoherence in all of the constructed reality. Construction in this context amounts to progressive conceptual integration of a thing-idea into our world’s causal totality. Some existents are debatable as to their ontological status, but a tree is simply there for everyone to touch and see. Trees, gravity and dangerous ravines are obviously existents of the highest relational degree; we performatively affirm these existents by acting directly on them and by being explicitly affected by them. Some things, like subatomic particles or the real value of Bitcoin, may affect us in some ways, or may be rejected as just a fanciful ideology. The entire field of technological development has an intermediate degree of existence. The materials and their composition (if any) may be maximally real, but the meaning of the technological function (which is technology per se) is relatively vague and often rapidly evolving. Some other things, like Plato’s beard or prime numbers have a distinctly lower degree of existence than that of a tree or of the value of Bitcoin. They are identifiable as meaningful, even useful, relational facts, but they exist as facts only in narrow and contingent theoretic contexts.

Geach, Peter Thomas. Identity . The Review of Metaphysics, 1967.

. The Review of Metaphysics, 1967. Heidegger, Martin. Introduction to Metaphysics . Yale University Press, 2000.

. Yale University Press, 2000. Nagel, Thomas. What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 1974.

The Philosophical Review, 1974. Perry, John. The Same F. The Philosophical Review, 1970.

The Philosophical Review, 1970. Pitt, David. The Phenomenology of Cognition or ‘What Is It like to Think That P?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004. Quine, Willard Van Orman. On What There Is. Review of Metaphysics, 1948.

Review of Metaphysics, 1948. Wiggins, David. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

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