The problem of proportional representation and unstable governments One of the most common arguments against the implementation of proportional representation as a vehicle to elect parliamentarians is that, in often creating a legislature with multiple political parties, a stable coalition representing a majority to form government cannot always be counted upon. The most often example used to support this argument is that of the turbulent history of the government of post-war Italy wherein changes of government happened on an almost annual basis. Another is that of New Zealand where after an election, then Prime Minister Helen Clark, in order to garner a majority, had to accept an offer of support from the leader of a small party on the extraordinary condition that he become what was termed ‘the Minister of Foreign Affairs outside cabinet’, that is, a minister who is not bound by the concept of cabinet collective responsibility.



‘Responsible’ Government

The potential for this government instability arises in countries with so called responsible governments, governments where the executive is both appointed and removed by, and thus responsible to, the legislature. Under this system the office of the prime minister (or the president or chancellor) is awarded to the leader of any party in the lower house which manages to control a majority of the seats either on its own or in coalition with one or more other parties.

Even though there have been many examples of responsible governments that were both elected by proportional representation and also managed a history of stability (Germany, Israel and South Africa initially come to mind. Australia can also provide examples which controvert the accepted theory. The state of Tasmania has a lower house elected by proportional representation. Despite the many parties filling its chambers the Australian Labour Party governed, without interruption for 35 years, from 1934 to 1969. Furthermore, single-member electorates can produce periods of unstable government. Victoria, with single member electorates, experienced eleven governments in the few years between 1943 and 1955.*), the criticism is valid to the degree that instability can occur. However it is not valid in that it is a condemnation of proportional representation. Separation of Powers “Separation of powers is the division of the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government among separate and independent bodies. Such a separation, it has been argued, limits the possibility of arbitrary excesses by government, since the sanction of all three branches is required for the making, executing, and administering of laws.” Encyclopaedia Britannica 2008 Ultimate Reference Suite The problems in governments like that of New Zealand or Italy are not derived from their electoral systems. Proportional representation merely acts as a catalyst to highlight the inherent flaw in the underlying set up of their governments. That is, the lack of accommodation for the classic principle of the separation of powers. In a true liberal democracy, just as there should always be a separation of executive and the judiciary, and the legislature and the judiciary, there should also be maintained a proper separation of executive and legislature. So as to prevent a conflict of interest between those who execute the law and those who make the law, both arms of government should abide by the separation of powers concept and thus be established independently of each other. “For the constitution, rather than suggesting that all behave in a godlike manner, recognises that, to the contrary, people are swine and will take any opportunity to subvert any agreement to pursue what they consider to be their proper interests.

To that end, the constitution separates the power of the state into those three branches which are for most of us Americans (I include myself) the only thing we remember from twelve years of schooling.

The constitution, written by men with some experience of actual government, assumes that the chief executive will work to be king, the parliament will scheme to sell off the silverware and the judiciary will consider itself Olympian and do everything it can to much improve (destroy) the work of the other two branches.

So the constitution pits them against each other in the attempt not to achieve stasis but to allow for the constant corrections necessary to prevent one branch from getting too much power for too long.” playwright and screenwriter David Mamet # This separation is simply accomplished in all so called presidential governments as exist in countries such as France, South Korea, Indonesia, and the United States. The people vote to elect their representative in the legislature, and they also vote, on a different ballot paper, to elect their chief executive. Neither politicians have the arbitrary power to remove the other from office, and whatever the electoral system, governments, because they are directly elected for a set term, can never become unstable. The myth of small parties winning the balance of power and “holding the government to ransom” One of the most ridiculous arguments against proportional representation is the invention that, when no party has a majority in the legislature, a small party, in having the “balance of power” by offering to support or threatening to vote against, can control the passage of all legislation. How this allegedly works is that, when one political party in the legislature becomes the largest party, albeit with still a minority of seats, it tends to develop the imprimatur of representing most of the people and the community in general. There is then supposedly a grave injustice when a small party threatens to deny it support to get what it believes to be important legislation passed. However the fact is that if and when the larger party can not get specific legislation passed, it is not because a small party denies it its (for example) five percent of the vote support, it is because all other parties deny it approximately 53% support. It is quite difficult to see why there should be any injustice when legislation can not attain passage because the majority of the people’s representatives do not support it. (see also: “Extremist Parties”) * David Mayer, ‘Democracy in Australia’ Dellasta, Melbourne, 1991 p.41

# David Mamet, ‘Why I Am No Longer a ‘Brain-Dead Liberal’ The Village Voice, March 11 2008.