Written in April 2019 for a university undergraduate course on Phenomenology.

One of the primary debates in philosophy and science is the question regarding whether consciousness exists and whether or not it exists as a separate “substance”. Before reading Heidegger, I held the view that consciousness has some functional role that ipso facto precludes itself form comprehending itself. I believed that since the function of consciousness was to collect objective and subjective information about existence, that consciousness could never collect information about itself since consciousness was not subjective or objective information itself. Consciousness seemed to precede the objective-subjective distinction. I sincerely believed that knowing whether consciousness was a separate ‘thing’ (called “qualia” by some) or merely the firing of neurons in the brain would remain elusive for the rest of time. Thomas Nagel wrote that “it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective” (Nagel 450). I will argue that what we call consciousness is neither objective neurons firing in the brain nor subjective “qualia”. Consciousness, when understood ontologically, is “worlding”.

Consciousness has been Dasein’s fallen understanding of itself. When we think of consciousness in our usual fallen state, we think of it as something belonging to life that is not present in material objects. Heidegger makes a strong case that consciousness should not be considered either neurons firing in the brain or some substance in itself; instead, both of these understandings are inauthentic as they fail to recognize the primordial worlding that is necessary for consciousness to understand itself in either manner. The scientific reductionist understanding of consciousness as simply the firing of neurons in the brain fails to recognize the significance of the fact that “human beings” have the freedom to ‘world’ in a way that “material objects” do not. The dualist idea that consciousness is a separate thing from neurons or even a separate substance entirely, fails to recognize the significance of the fact that all experience is necessarily worldly. Figuring out what consciousness is turns out to be a difficult task when the actual question is misunderstood to mean identifying a substance or a thing. Worlding does not have a substance. Substance is “characterized by not needing anything” (BT, 125). All substances, like “soul” or “matter”, are conditioned upon their being and thus the investigating of substances in ontology has been a failed attempt at investigating being. The elusiveness of the ontology of consciousness is simply a symptom of how ontology has gone wrong. Worlding is what the being of consciousness is when one lets the phenomena show itself in itself from itself without positing anything about it.

For the reductionist, who reduces consciousness to the firing of neurons in the brain, the objective “world” is everything and thus consciousness is simply another instance of an objective material object to be analyzed. The world as conceived by the reductionist is “the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world” (BT, 93). When a scientist is analyzing a brain and sees neurons firing in a certain way, the being of consciousness is said to be those neurons because they are present-at-hand; the activity of consciousness is seen to be just one of many other observable things of matter that are present around us. Proving that something is present-at-hand becomes falsely tantamount to proving that it is. Heidegger asks that we take a step back and observe what we really mean when we say that something is present to us. For Heidegger, presence-at-hand is actually the deficient mode of ready-to-hand: it is anything which “stands in the way” of our concern (BT, 103). The imagery of the “firing of the neurons” became a tool for the scientist to potentially interpret the human brain further, and thus the “firing of neurons” is actually ready-to-hand. Before scientists were able to analyze the neurons of the brain, the imagery of the firing of neurons was present-at-hand and it only became ready-to-hand – a part of our understanding – when technology was created in order to observe neurons for the sake of studying human anatomy to keep humans healthy. This is how we are and the scientist who reduces consciousness to the firing of neurons passes over the being of this relational totality (BT, 120). This relational totality is worlding, which can also be described as projecting.

No material object possesses this feature of projecting; for instance, pens do not undertake projects. Rather, a pen’s being is not that it is a material object; it’s being is ready-to-hand for a project – for us. There is no way to imagine consciousness without imagining a project being undertaken. Let us imagine someone sitting down on a chair to do nothing to show that experience does not necessarily involve a project. In this example, the chair is de-severed, and it could be de-severed because it was already ready-to-hand in that the chair was intelligible. The chair was thus used as a tool in the project of making a point. Dasein in this case was the “making a point”. If a person is actually just sitting on the chair not trying to prove anything, they are resting, and resting is also a project. This projecting is clearly evident to us all, but it is not “present to us” like a tree. Our being conscious is not the firing of neurons “present to us” to observe because consciousness is worlding/projecting which cannot be reduced to neurons “present to us”. We cannot be reduced to being neurons. We are the “I am observing the firing of neurons to study consciousness” itself as a unitary whole and reductionists pass over this phenomena.

In a discussion with a reductionist, a dualist might respond to the reductionist’s claim by saying something along the lines of: “We know and feel. The firing of neurons does not capture this! You are ignoring the qualitative experience, the qualia.” They contend that there is another thing that is there: the particular taste of an apple or the sound of your favourite music, along with the actual apple and music. Someone sceptical of reductionism would argue that the actual tasting of the water is a thing in itself separate from the fact that water is H20. I would argue that this is more authentic than the reductionist’s understanding of consciousness; it appears to be a pre-ontological understanding of worlding. The tasting, listening, hearing and seeing that is being highlighted implicitly point to the underlying references of worlding. There cannot be such a “thing” as “the taste of a sandwich” without the primordial phenomena of “using a sandwich in order to fill my stomach for the sake of my well being.”

The stronger argument for subjective experience as it is understood ontically, however, comes from Thomas Nagel. In his famous paper “What is it like to be a bat?” Nagel showed that we cannot access the actual experience of a bat, and accordingly, there is something that we are evidently missing in our knowledge about bats when we say that bats use sonar and detect reflections. Of course, he uses this particular example of a bat to show that there is a certain inner life to consciousness that is not accessible through science. I personally do not know what it is like to play the violin because I have never played it, and so even if I hear someone playing it or research instructions on how play it, I have not yet accessed that particular “what is it like to be” of playing a violin. Further, even if I would learn how to play the violin, I would not be able to access the mineness of another person’s playing of the violin. Heidegger would have considered Nagel to be much more authentic than his reductionist or qualia counterparts.

The referential totality of worlding can be configured in numerous different ways, and every single Being-In-The-World can configure it as he or she wishes. The particular mineness of worlding is the Being-In component of Being-In-The-World. Heidegger says that Dasein is its disclosedness (BT, 171). As humans, we have a particular freedom to undertake any project we wish. I could have chosen to pursue violin lessons but I never took an interest in it. It is this particular freedom to configure our understanding – to choose what projects we become– which Heidegger eventually calls “potentiality-for-Being,” that is the mineness that Nagel was alluding to that cannot be explained by the scientific method. If I decide to pursue violin lessons in the future, I will be interpreting my own understanding – that is, what is already ready-at-hand for me – to learn how to play the violin.

For instance, I understand that the violin is an instrument and I understand that the violin makes sound, and both of these concepts of instrument and sound are ready-to-hand. By learning the violin I would be interpreting this prior understanding to make the playing of the violin ready-to-hand instead of present-at-hand as it is now. The playing of the violin would subsequently become a part of my understanding: what is disclosed to me. This dynamic is what Heidegger was alluding to when he wrote: “the understanding lets itself make assignments both in these relationships themselves and of them” (BT, 121). Learning the violin is an example of understanding in the references of my worlding. My projecting can also be of itself and in such a case my understanding would be assigned to making the project itself ready-to-hand. The project to grasp projecting is undertaken in Being and Time.

I had previously disclosed to myself that my consciousness was primordial to the objective-subjective distinction, but Heidegger has helped disclose that the activity of being conscious is actually the activity of worlding. Importantly, Heidegger has solved the mind-body problem by showing that the confusion of objective and subjective is a result of inauthentic mineness. I am neither the objective firing of neurons, nor am I a “qualitative” thing in itself. I am my projecting which I am free to shape in any way I desire. “Objective” and “subjective” are simply fallen ways of interpreting the unitary phenomena of Being-In-The-World. I have made the case that worlding should be an integral concept in the philosophy of mind and have argued for the salience of Being and Time in any discussion about consciousness.

*References to “BT” are references to MacQuarrie and Robinson’s translation of Heidegger’s Being and Time.