Introduction

Pascal’s Wager gets its name from mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal, as the argument can be traced to his collection of writings titled Pensées. The argument’s conclusion is that it is in our best interest to wager on God. Exactly what it means to wager on God is unclear. Some people may say that to wager on God is to choose to believe in God. Those who are not doxastic voluntarists can say that to wager on God is to act as if one believes in God in the hopes of coming to actually believe in God.

In the chapter of Arguing about Gods on Pascal’s Wager, Graham Oppy writes:

I shall suppose – following standard practice – that the justification for the claim that wagering on an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god maximises expected utility is most readily conveyed by means of the following table:

An orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god exists and Pr (an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god exists) = p It is not the case that an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god exists and Pr (it is not the case that an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god exists) = 1 – p Wager for an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god Positive Infinite Value Less than Positive Infinite Value Do not wager for an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god Less than Positive Infinite Value Less than Positive Infinite Value

Following the standard prescription for the calculation of expected utilities, and performing the calculation in the standard arithmetic on Я, it is readily seen that: EU (Wager for an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god) = p × (Positive Infinite Value) + (1 − p) ×(Less than Positive Infinite Value) = Positive Infinite and that: EU (Do not wager for an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god) = p × (Less than Positive Infinite Value) + (1 − p) ×(Less than Positive Infinite Value) = Less than Positive Infinite Value So, if the decision situation is properly represented by the table, and if the calculation in Я is acceptable, then it seems that we have shown that wagering on an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god maximises expected utility. (242-243)

Oppy’s calculations demonstrate that there does not have to be negative infinite value in not wagering on an OCMG if an OCMG exists for wagering on an OCMG to maximize expected utility. There just needs to be positive infinite value in wagering on an OCMG if an OCMG exists and finite value in the other three possibilities for wagering on an OCMG to maximize expected utility.

Positive Infinite Value

The assignment of positive infinite value to wagering on an OCMG if an OCMG exists is based on the thesis that an OCMG will reward those who wagered on him with eternal happiness. Since the happiness is eternal, it can be said to have positive infinite value. Eternal happiness in heaven is a central part of many monotheistic religions, but not all theists claim that one will receive eternal life if and only if one wagers on an OCMG. Some theists believe that those who do not wager on God can still receive eternal life if they live moral lives, and Greek Orthodox philosopher David Bentley Hart has gone so far as to say that everyone will receive eternal life [3]. However, neither universal salvation nor the the more modest claim that wagering on God is not necessary to receive eternal life invalidates Pascal’s Wager. Firstly, one can say that even if wagering on an OCMG is not necessary for receiving eternal life, wagering on an OCMG still increases one’s chances of receiving eternal life. If wagering on an OCMG increases one’s chances of receiving eternal life, then one can say that wagering on an OCMG if an OCMG exists has infinite positive value.

Secondly, one could say that wagering on an OCMG does not increase one’s chances of receiving eternal life, but it does increase the amount of happiness that one will experience in any given moment in heaven. Suppose that if one does not wager on an OCMG but still receives eternal life, then one will experience 1 unit of happiness during every moment in heaven. Further suppose that if one does wager on an OCMG and receives eternal life, then one will experience 2 units of happiness during every moment in heaven. Infinity multiplied by any number is infinity, but one can say that infinity multiplied by 2 is infinitely greater than infinity multiplied by 1. Thus, one does not have to say that wagering on an OCMG is necessary for one to receive eternal life or that doing so increases one’s chances of receiving eternal life in order to say that wagering on an OCMG if an OCMG exists has positive infinite value.

My Objections

I have two main objections to Pascal’s Wager. The first is that Pascal’s Wager seems to be encouraging people to wager on God on the basis of self-interest. Even if it is in one’s self-interest to wager on God, it is unclear why God would want people to act out of self-interest. It seems to me that most theists would say God wants us to devote our lives to him out of selfless love rather than out of self-interest. I doubt many theists would be comfortable with the ethical egoism that is evoked by Pascal’s Wager.

The theist could claim that Pascal’s Wager is not encouraging one to wager on God out of self-interest. The theist could say it is because wagering on God will make one a better person that one should wager on God. This seems like a different argument to me. I think one can address this argument by defending the claim that there is no compelling evidence that believing in God makes one more likely to exhibit prosocial behavior.

My second objection has been noted countless times before. It is epistemically possible that there is a god who values intellectual integrity, especially when it comes to wagering on his existence. It seems to me that the epistemic probability that there is a god who values intellectual integrity is greater than the epistemic probability that people benefit from wagering on an OCMG.

Conclusion

Pascal’s Wager encourages people to act out of self-interest, which is contrary to the concept of selfless love that is central to most monotheistic religions. In addition, Pascal’s Wager ignores the possibility that there is a god who values intellectual integrity. Perhaps Blaise Pascal should have stuck to math rather than venturing into philosophy.

References

Pensées by Blaise Pascal Arguing about Gods by Graham Oppy That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation by David Bentley Hart