Abstract Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement. (JEL Q54, Q58, K32, K33)

Citation Nordhaus, William. 2015. "Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy." American Economic Review , 105 (4): 1339-70 . DOI: 10.1257/aer.15000001 Choose Format: BibTeX EndNote Refer/BibIX RIS Tab-Delimited