Report raps military propaganda efforts as ineffective

Tom Vanden Brook | USA TODAY

WASHINGTON — Pentagon propaganda programs are inadequately tracked, their impact is unclear, and the military doesn't know if it is targeting the right foreign audiences, according to a government report obtained by USA TODAY.

Since 2005, the Pentagon has spent hundreds of million of dollars on Military Information Support Operations (MISO). These propaganda efforts include websites, leaflets and broadcasts intended to change foreigners' "attitudes and behaviors in support of U.S. Government" objectives, according to the report by the Government Accountability Office. Some of them disclose the U.S. military as the source; others don't.

The Pentagon's response noted that it partly concurred with the GAO criticism. Lt. Col. James Gregory, a Pentagon spokesman, said Thursday the military is revising its tracking requirements for propaganda programs, has a pilot program to assess their effectiveness and will soon publish revised guidelines that emphasize better planning of its operations.

The report offers a rare glimpse inside the cloaked world of military propaganda, much of which is held secret by the Pentagon. It shows the effort extends from Southeast Asia to South America, with special operations troops deployed to embassies to "erode support for violent extremist ideologies."

The stakes are high. Used effectively, the programs can dampen extremism and increase support for U.S. military operations. However, "if used ineffectively, MISO activities have the potential to undermine the credibility of the United States and threaten (Pentagon) and other agencies' efforts to accomplish key foreign policy goals," the report says.

While the report says some of the military's propaganda teams have succeeded in the 22 countries, "it is unclear whether MISO activities are effective overall."

"Once again we are seeing a misguided spending approach by the government," said Scott Amey, general counsel of the non-partisan watchdog the Project on Government Oversight. "It is horrifying to think that millions are spent on propaganda with little administration of those funds and without some metric of the campaigns' success."

Military propaganda and marketing efforts have been the focus of a series of USA TODAY stories. In 2012, the paper found that the Pentagon had spent as much as $580 million per year on propaganda programs at the height of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan but had trouble gauging their effectiveness. It spent $54 million last year, according to the GAO. The GAO refused USA TODAY's request for the report, which was obtained from another government source.

The GAO found three "weaknesses" in the Pentagon's tracking of its propaganda programs:

• The Pentagon and Congress "do not have a complete picture" of the efforts and the funding used to pay for the programs.

• The Pentagon can't measure the effects of propaganda programs well enough to know where to allocate funding.

• Lacking goals, the Pentagon does not have "reasonable assurance" that it is putting resources into countries that need it.

Gregory noted that the Pentagon already provides Congress with substantial data on its MISO programs every three months.

The Pentagon "submits an exhaustive report of all MISO activities to key Congressional staffers," Gregory said. "This report, often well in excess of 100 pages, provides comprehensive tracking of all MISO activities and the resources used to support them."

The report also outlines how propaganda works. In war zones such as Afghanistan, the military deploys three- and four-soldier MISO teams to drop leaflets telling insurgents how to surrender, air radio broadcasts "to explain U.S. military operations in a favorable light," collect local propaganda and devise counterpropaganda, according to the report.

It also relies heavily on contractors to produce advertising, leaflets and radio broadcasts, many of them unattributed to the U.S. government because locals do not trust western influence, senior military officerstold USA TODAY last year.

In safer countries, teams of two to 10 special forces soldiers are deployed at the request of combatant commanders and ambassadors. They lead programs that include helping "instill confidence by local populations in their law enforcement" and offering rewards for information.

Senior State Department officials told GAO that the efforts were valued at embassies. In Bangladesh, for example, the team worked with the U.S. Agency for International Development and "another (Pentagon) organization" to incorporate counter-radicalization messages into disaster response exercises." In Peru, a top-level Drug Enforcement Administration official praised a military team for its effort in the battle against "Shining Path" terrorists.

Less successful: regional websites set up by the military. U.S. Special Operations Command provided $22 million for combatant commands, such as Central Command in the Middle East, to operate regional websites "that offer readers an alternative to extremist ideology." They're "an important tool," according to the Pentagon, but GAO found "instances where the websites are not well-coordinated" with local embassies or even MISO teams in those countries.

In Nepal, for example, the embassy's public affairs office was "unaware of U.S. Pacific Command's website." State Department officials have expressed concern about U.S. Africa Command's website "about the Maghreb region of northern Africa, saying that a program marketed as a (Pentagon) operation may not be well received by countries traditionally sensitive to foreign military presence." Islamic extremists have waged insurgencies against countries such as Mali in northern Africa and are suspected in the attack that killed the U.S. ambassador to Libya in Benghazi last fall and three other Americans.

While the Pentagon has taken some steps to coordinate the websites with State Department, senior embassy officials told the GAO the "websites have the potential to unintentionally skew U.S. policy positions or be out of step with other government efforts in a particular country."

The report also pointed out that its reserve forces may not be adequately trained or equipped. In 2006, the Pentagon separated the MISO force into 2,800 special forces soldiers and 4,200 reservists but funded only the active-duty component. The Army's reserve command does not provide funding for language and cultural understanding courses its soldiers are required to have. There is also no dedicated fund to pay for reservists' equipment.

One result, according to the report, is that one reserve company reported asking "local businesses in Iraq and Afghanistan to print MISO products because they did not have working printers, and that these scenarios were not ideal because due to the sensitive nature of the products."