If Sinn Féin is going to succeed in removing the border, it is going to have to have to go far beyond its current stance

Until Brexit, even Sinn Féin’s calls for a border poll had become perfunctory – the sort of demand which for ideological reasons has to be made every so often, rather than one which involves any genuine belief that they could win such a contest.

In the space of less than four years, the political landscape has been suddenly transformed to the extent that individuals and organisations far beyond Sinn Féin – some of whom are implacably opposed to removing the border – are now pondering what a border poll would mean, and even in some cases considering what would happen if it resulted in a vote for Irish unity.

That rapid shift is unmistakable but there is limited evidence that the leaders of unionism are willing to confront the reality of where their strategy in recent years has led.

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And yet, the increasingly serious examination of how a border poll would unfold has thus far unintentionally amplified one of the reasons that Northern Ireland has endured for almost 100 years despite the myriad threats to its existence.

Even in a settled society such as Scotland it is extraordinarily difficult to persuade a majority of the public to vote for radical constitutional upheaval. But in a divided society such as Northern Ireland, with history pointing to the clear potential for discrimination, recrimination and violence, it is more difficult still for those in favour of Irish unity to win the argument – even at a time when the old Protestant majority is vanishing.

Although polling evidence is contradictory – with Belfast firm Lucid Talk’s polls consistently suggesting higher levels of support for Irish unity than most other polls – next week polling will be released which for several reasons will make grim reading for republicans.

Even after all the turmoil of Brexit, of three years without devolved government, of the cash for ash scandal, of the distrusted Boris Johnson as prime minister, there is scant evidence of the sort of surge in support for Irish unity which would be necessary to win a border poll.

This week a group of senior academics headed by The Constitution Unit at University College London but encompassing professors in Belfast, Dublin and the US came to Belfast to take evidence about how any future border poll would work.

A separate academic team at another English university is working on another significant project examining related questions.

The very fact that more than 20 years after the Belfast Agreement basic questions around the practicalities of a border poll have not been resolved – or in many cases even asked – implicitly points to a failure of Sinn Féin.

The party which has Irish reunification as its central goal and which now accepts that the only way that can happen is by winning a border poll has put far less energy into resolving how that could happen than it has into the sort of political disputes and manoeuvring which have brought it to electoral dominance within nationalism.

Belatedly, republicans now appear to be adopting some of the tactics of Brexiteers ahead of the EU Referendum. Just as Brexiteers, realising that Ukip were toxic to many voters, set up surrogate organisations – from ‘Business for Britain’ to ‘Students for Britain’ – to carry their message to otherwise unreachable groups, so several republican groups which are not publicly linked to Sinn Féin have now sprung up.

Those groups have been more effective than the party at stimulating debate and encouraging some unionists to engage in that debate.

Nevertheless, even those groups have made limited progress in persuading those who do not instinctively want a united Ireland – or a ‘new Ireland’, as it is now branded – of the imperative for that to happen.

While the Secretary of State retains a discretionary power to call a border poll at any time the mandatory trigger for him to have to call a referendum remains opaque. The 1998 Agreement states that “if at any time it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the UK”, then he must call a referendum.

The Agreement is not prescriptive on the criteria to be taken into account when deciding on the issue.

Five weeks before the Brexit vote I hypothetically asked the then Secretary of State, Theresa Villiers, whether she would take an overall majority for nationalism at Stormont or opinion polls as an indication of support for a united Ireland. She said vaguely that the NIO would consider “all the relevant facts”.

If such a poll was called, it is unclear what roles the British and Irish governments would or could play. Some people believe both governments should be neutral.

But how could the Irish government be neutral when it is not only constitutionally obliged to support Irish unity, but would also be the only body which could make credible promises to voters as to what a vote for unity would entail?

Central to any successful Irish unity campaign would almost certainly be a clear plan – or at least a sufficiently convincing one – as to what would happen after such a vote. An agreed plan – akin to the Scottish government’s document prior to the 2014 independence referendum – would make it harder for unionism to make the argument that, as with Brexit, people would be voting to end the current constitutional clarity and enter a period of uncertainty. Some republicans believe that unionists will come on board to discuss what should be in that proposal.

While there will be exceptions who prove the rule, there is little evidence of unionists willing to assist with such a process – as distinct from taking part in discussions where they argue the unionist case.

In fact, it would be profoundly illogical for unionists to help with something which would make the end of the Union easier – unless they believed that they would inevitably lose such a plebiscite, which is not a commonly held view.

Unionists working on a plan to build a united Ireland would be the equivalent of republicans working on a plan to make the Union more attractive – it would be antithetical to their ideological interests.

Any significant body of unionists being involved in such a process only seems realistic if they have lost a border poll, meaning that until that point the onus is on nationalists to present an attractive proposition which will persuade voters.

As a Sinn Féin member this week admitted, with unusual candour, to the BBC, the sort of ‘up the Ra’ comments and other triumphalist episodes which marked Sinn Féin’s recent southern electoral success do nothing to persuade unionists that they are serious about the ‘new Ireland’ rhetoric.

Some people believe that ‘citizens’ assemblies’ – a trendy attempt to circumvent seemingly intractable political problems – could bring ordinary unionists on board even if their leaders refused.

But aside from the difficulties of such a process being infected by either conscious or unconscious bias, the legitimacy of citizens’ assemblies rests on the argument of their proponents that those selected to sit on them are chosen randomly, making them at least quasi-democratic.

If ordinary unionists refused to participate, such bodies would not be remotely representative.

Thus far there is significant reason to believe that the scale of change is less decisive that either those unionists who despair the Union is over would fear or those nationalists who believe Irish unity is inevitable now hope to be the case.