Too many Australians seem to believe that we have been there before – that the row with Indonesia does not really matter, that it will go away. Those who fall on this side of the argument tend to adopt the “we all spy” mantra. That simplicity covers a multitude of sins.

The nature of spying has changed dramatically with the communications revolution. Over 40 years ago, I was advised that the United States listened to all phone conversations in and out of Canberra, providing they went over the airways. Landlines were secure, at least in those days. Now, nobody and nothing is. Since 9/11, we have been part of the global war on terror. The US government now believes that if it is in its perceived interest, it has the right to take out a target in virtually any country of the world. That is the new concept for war.

But we have in part forgotten that terrorism is not new. In the 1960s and 1970s in particular, the European world was beset by terrorist acts. The Red Army and Red Brigades in Italy and Germany. The Lockerbie aircraft disaster sponsored by Libya. Both Italy and Germany spent enormous amounts on policing, intelligence and security for senior personnel – not just for political leaders, but for senior businessmen also. The number of aircraft hijackings also grew significantly. Between 1968-1977, the annual number was around 41. In 1969, there were 82 hijackings. This was real time terrorism attacking innocent civilians, just as much and just as dangerously as suicide bombers do today. Such assaults on our basic freedoms were overcome by persistence and good policy but they were very serious terrorist attacks, which we seem to have forgotten.

When the Hilton Hotel in Sydney was bombed in 1978, I asked our security services whether they needed more powers. I was told by my department that they didn't. They did need more intelligence, but they had the resources necessary for the task. When we look at the new $630m ASIO building, close to the defence buildings and not far from the parliamentary triangle, we get a slightly different view. Since 9/11, the number of ASIO personnel has grown from under 600 to over 1,700. The cost of running the organisation has grown from under $65m to nearly $340m.

Chief spies can now say to governments that they are not going to be able to provide sufficient security unless they have more resources. If an incident later occurs, and the security service has not been given the increased personnel that it required, the government will be held culpable. This is not to say that security services have been wrong to ask for additional staff; the communications revolution has made their task more complex and more difficult. But with the growth of surveillance services, it is highly desirable that governments and people know they are getting value for money. How much useful intelligence is indeed being gathered? Are the security services' activities paying dividends? Or have their activities spread out too far and too wide in the name of national security, with little or no benefit? We need an impartial third eye, so the government and people can be reassured that security services are in fact giving value to the vast resources they consume.

Two things rankled with the Indonesian government in recent times. The first was the allegations that we are collection information for and on behalf of the US. The second was the targeting of the president’s phone and of his wife’s phone, which is regarded as a serious and personal insult. There has been much public advice for the government. Hang tough, it will go away. Others have advised the government to follow the Obama model as he dealt with his own country spying on Germany. Obama said it would not happen again, and called for a review of how US intelligence operates internationally. This is the course Australia should take.

It will not only fulfil the essential task of re-establishing a working relationship with Indonesia, but would give Australians the added benefit of knowing that our security services have not run amok. Who authorised the targeting of the president and his wife’s mobile phones? What was the basis for that? There is always the risk of being found out, as we have learnt to our cost. The risk of being found out undertaking such surveillance must always be balanced against the possibility of gaining some useful information. In this case, the security services got it terribly wrong. The charter of the inspector-general of intelligence and security does not fulfil this role. Occasional judgemental reviews are necessary.

Australia has had a varied relationship with Indonesia. It began on a good footing when H V Evatt was more helpful than other senior political figures when Indonesia was seeking independence from the Dutch. As a leading figure in the UN, and as foreign minister of Australia, Evatt’s role was constructive. Move on a few years, and ambassador Mick Shann maintained access at the highest levels of the Indonesian government during the Confrontation; we had the neat diplomatic task of maintaining the relationship with the country when our troops were fighting Indonesian troops in Borneo during the conflict. The British embassy on the other hand was trashed and destroyed, and Britain could not maintain a relationship with Indonesia.

We would do well to seek to re-establish the kind of relationship we had with Indonesia when Shann was ambassador for Australia. The government is correct in saying that it is one of our most important relationships.

If there is to be a peaceful world, a level of trust between leaders has to be established. It is not worth putting it at risk by snooping on the people whose trust one wants to win.