Washington’s Acquiescence

Egypt

Another similarity between the crises of 1956 and 2015 is Washington’s response. The United States has shifted between engagement and indifference to the Middle East’s squabbles depending on the designs of its international rivals — the Soviet Union during the Cold War and Russia, China and, tangentially, the EU today — rather than the concerns of the region’s denizens. This parallels Britain’s posture toward continental Europe for centuries — personified by Castlereagh’s support for Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna to keep post-Napoleonic France whole as a counterweight to Prussia and Austria and, earlier, King William of Orange’s central role in forging alliances against Louis XIV. Whereas in 1956 the pendulum had decidedly swung in favor of sustained involvement and, at times, micromanagement of local Middle East conflicts, the growing consensus in Washington today, and certainly that of the Obama White House, is for regional exit. This is not only because global realities have changed, but because of America’s profound structural weaknesses and steadily declining ability, contrary to the media narrative, to shape regional events over the long-term.

Winthrop W. Aldrich, U.S. Ambassador to Britain in the mid-1950s, described Washington’s reaction to the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal in line with the Sèvres Protocol in an article for Foreign Affairs: “the effect on [the U.S. government] of this sudden and unexpected British and French move and of the actual opening of hostilities against Egypt ... was catastrophic. The British Government had been told over and over again at the highest levels that we wished to do everything possible to avoid the use of force, and for force to be used without any warning came as a profound shock ... Prime Minister Eden and the British Government were immediately subjected to terrific pressure. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles would have no further direct communication with Eden, and the Canal was at once blocked by Nasser.”

Not only did Eisenhower take the Anglo-French-Israeli action as a personal affront, but from the first day, Washington was committed to bringing about a cessation of hostilities and reigning in its allies. This had as much to do with the complicated personal relationship between the U.S. president and Egypt’s dictator as anti-Soviet geopolitics — some have speculated that Nasser opted for nationalization partly as an act of retribution to Eisenhower and U.S. Secretary of State Dulles for pulling financing for the Aswan Dam.

In any event, Washington moved decisively, threatening to block loans to Britain and cut off economic and military assistance to Israel. (The French forces were under British command and, as went London, so went Paris.) Through adept maneuvering, Eisenhower circumvented possible French and British vetoes of a UN-brokered ceasefire and got the Soviets on board to send peacekeepers to Sinai. Eden, paralyzed, ordered a unilateral halt on November 7th with Anglo-French forces a day away from seizing the length of the Canal Zone. In exchange for a complete allied pullout, Nasser’s only real price was to allow the UN in and open the Canal to Israeli shipping. In short, Washington put its global interests (i.e., limiting Soviet influence and maintaining the Middle East status quo) ahead of its allies’ parochial interests and “saved” Nasser’s regime from certain defeat.

As far as Eisenhower and Dulles were concerned, Britain and France acted as petulant, post-imperial has-beens in a world with bigger problems and new centers of power. Israel’s concerns were treated with something between indifference and contempt (i.e., Washington was not about to allow a fledgling upstart to set conditions in motion which would place the Arab world in Moscow’s orbit). For Eisenhower, keeping Nasser happy and, by extension, the Soviets out of Egypt was far more important than standing by America’s allies.

Iran

Washington’s approach to the Iranian crisis mirrors its conduct during the Suez crisis — ignoring the parochial interests of (and reigning in) regional allies and opting for rapprochement in order to attain more global objectives. Whereas in 1956 the primary aim was to limit Soviet influence, what the U.S. establishment really wants in 2015 is regional exit. The end of the Cold War, the rise of China and structural problems which plague the American economy have conspired to sap Washington’s ability to independently control events in the Middle East. Moreover, the necessity for America to be so engaged in the region’s problems has declined — more resembling the mood after World War I and keeping the Peace of Versailles than after World War II and the Peace of Potsdam. The howls of the commentariat and image-obsessed politicians notwithstanding, the United States has few reasons to be as responsible for Middle East affairs over the long-term as it was before 1989 — energy independence is becoming a reality, demographic indicators for Iran and the Gulf Arab states may paint a picture of countries having their final hurrahs and more powers are willing and able to relieve America’s heretofore seldom-challenged position.

Regardless of the circumstances of Washington’s disengagement, there appears to be clear consensus that such disengagement is impossible without some sort of lasting rapprochement with Iran. In search of the exit door, the U.S. has ignored the narrow concerns of its Gulf Arab and Israeli allies and given tacit assurances through acquiescence of Iran’s nuclear program that Tehran is safe from desires for regime change or actions, which would fundamentally alter its ability to impact regional events.

Washington, perhaps realizing that India, China, Russia and others view an Iranian bomb as inevitable, wants this to occur on its terms and on a timeline which gives the U.S. more options to wash its hands of what is emerging in the Middle East. In this context, it makes little sense to examine every provision or the different versions of the Lausanne understandings, Washington’s lackluster response to the Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen or tensions with Israel over unilateral military action (these tensions also existed during the Bush Administration).

The U.S. is not leading negotiations with Iran with an aim to curb its nuclear program, but to influence Iran’s behavior such that the U.S. could ideally help shape a balance of regional power and withdraw. Just as triangular diplomacy allowed Nixon and Kissinger to disengage the U.S. from a South Vietnam both considered irrelevant and reorient the Cold War on more favorable terms, so a deal with Iran lets Washington focus on more fundamental issues impacting American security. Although the terms of that deal are subject to debate (in the opinion of this author, the current framework does not achieve any of Washington’s actual aims and leaves it more entangled), a view toward having one is where America finds itself as of this writing.

Conclusion

Far from U.S. negotiations with Iran and acquiescence toward its nuclear program (and regional expansionism) being a radical departure from the norm, it is consistent with past American practice stretching over decades. The uncanny similarities to the 1956 Suez Crisis illustrate that, then as now, Washington places global interests ahead of parochial ones — particularly those of its regional allies — in managing the Middle East. When the U.S. wanted more influence to prevent Soviet intervention, it almost single-handedly slapped three of its allies down and saved a bombastic, secular dictator in Cairo. There is little to suggest that, today, with America’s real economy hanging by a thread, its ability to act alone diminished and no concrete threat (ala the Soviet Union) to keep out, America will not do the same to reach a lasting understanding with equally bombastic, Islamic dictators in Tehran.