The importance of international conferences cannot be gauged by what is said on the podium to the open mikes. At such conferences the important things are decided in the hallways and back rooms.

The Munich Security Conference held over the weekend was no exception. How did Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov come to meet Moaz al-Khatib, head of the Syrian opposition? What was the significance of Khatib’s meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi? Why did Saeed Jalili, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, rush to Damascus for a meeting with Syrian President Bashar Assad?

Is there any connection between these meetings and U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s declaration of America’s willingness to conduct nuclear talks directly with Iran? What might all this have to do with the agreement to resume the nuclear talks at the end of the month in Kazakhstan, as suggested by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who will on Tuesday become the first Iranian leader to visit Egypt since the 1979 Islamic revolution?

Speculation is rife, but several recent developments seem to point to a new strategic alignment. Russia has been conveying for two weeks now that it is no longer committed to Assad and is prepared for him to capitulate, so long as his replacement is acceptable to Moscow.

According to Western diplomatic sources, there has also been a change in the United States’ position following an intense dialogue with Moscow, with Washington reportedly prepared to accept a political dialogue in Syria that’s not conditioned on Assad’s removal, though he would not be allowed to run again for president or be part of a transitional government.

That and the Syrian opposition’s lack of any prospects of a definitive military victory on the horizon could be why Khatib said last week he was prepared to talk to representatives of the Assad regime, on condition that some 160,000 political prisoners are released. Khatib did not insist on Assad’s removal either, and garnered praise for his stance from both Moscow and Washington. This is apparently why Lavrov and Salehi agreed to meet with him. Jalili, meanwhile, went to Assad to convey what had been discussed in Munich, and to clarify that Iran also supports a national dialogue.

If indeed Iran, Russia and the United States have agreed on a framework to end the crisis in Syria, it isn’t likely to be divorced from some kind of dialogue on the nuclear issue. Washington went from hints to declarations with Biden’s remarks, which in turn got a cautious but positive response from Tehran, when Salehi said his country would also be prepared for direct talks if America proved its seriousness.

The nuclear talks with the P5+1 world powers are scheduled to open on February 25; until then Tehran and Washington will try to outline the substance of a dialogue between them. What Iran must decide is whether to make concessions on the nuclear issue to maintain influence in Syria and not lose the diplomatic foothold it now has in Syria and Lebanon, or whether to separate the two issues.

It’s also a dilemma for America, which wants to stop the bloodshed in Syria and devise a solution that won’t turn Syria into a radical Islamic state where the United States won’t have much influence. Since Iran also fears a Syrian takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood or radical Sunni groups affiliated with Al-Qaida, it may turn out to be an effective partner on this issue. Iran has proven it is willing to cooperate with secular regimes if doing so promotes its interests.