By Roman Dobrokhotov

Translated by Olga Ruda and edited by Voices of Ukraine

Source: http://uainfo.org/yandex/288705-top-7-mifov-ob-ukraine-prochno-zakrepivshiesya-v-soznanii-rossiyan.html

In the midst of the information war, it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish real news from the propaganda scares. Numerous myths about Ukraine that are firmly embedded in the Russians’ consciousness are currently being used as a justification for military intervention in Crimea. The following analysis reviews seven of the most prominent myths.

Myth No. 1. In Ukraine, they don’t like Russians and they’ve banned the Russian language

Despite all the tensions that have emerged between the two countries, thus far there have been no examples of attacks against Russians on the basis of national animosity. Moreover, there have been quite a few Russians on Maidan during the revolution, including Russian citizens with Russian flags, expressing their support for the struggle for democratic changes. Some Russian citizens have even spoken from the Maidan stage.

As far as the language in Ukraine is concerned, the 2012 law on foundations of state language policy remains in effect. Under this law, the Russian language has been given the status of a regional language in those territories where at least 10% of citizens consider it their native language. Specifically, this relates to 13 out 27 regions. It should be noted that Russia currently does not have a similar law.

Myth No. 2. The revolution in Ukraine is run by right-wing radicals

Out of all the political leaders who came to power following the revolution (Klitschko, Tymoshenko, Yatsenyuk, Turchynov, Tiahnybok, and Poroshenko), only Tiahnybok can be more or less regarded as a radical nationalist. Yet, Tiahnybok’s electoral rankings are below those of the other leaders. It does appear that the main candidates for the President’s office will include Vitali Klitschko (who speaks Russian, rather than Ukrainian, even during rallies), Yulia Tymoshenko (who is more readily identified as leftist, rather than rightist), and Petro Poroshenko (who held the Minister of Economy post in Yanukovych’s government, and has not shown any radical rightist tendencies).

Indeed, the revolutionaries’ “combat wing” did include quite a few nationalists, including, for example, the Right Sector leader, Dmytro Yarosh. Yet, first of all, Yarosh is not as radical in his views as he is said to be (e.g., the “appeal to Doc Umarov” on his behalf turned out to be a fake), and, secondly, he is currently not considered as a candidate for any government posts. [Editor’s note: Yarosh announced he was running for president 4 days after this article was written. Advanced polls show him rating at 1.6% of votes]. The only truly radical nationalist that comes to mind is Oleksandr Muzychko, but he already enjoys an image of a nutcase among Ukrainians, and even the Parliament members themselves are trying to rein him in (it appears this is going to happen soon).

Russian mass media have also actively promoted the use of certain photos that depict mask-wearing youngsters carrying firearms attacking police officers. It was reported that they have arrived from Lviv by buses (indeed, one of the buses pictured has “Lviv” written on it). However, the license plates are, for some odd reason, from Crimea. Later on, a Forbes journalist discovered that same bus in Crimea, as it was being used by the locals to transport “volunteers.”

It is worth pointing out that nationalists are more significantly represented in the Russian government. For example, nationalist Dmitry Rogozin rose through the ranks all the way to the Deputy Prime Minister level. His former comrade from the nationalist “Motherland” party, Sergey Glazyev, has become Putin’s advisor and, reportedly, one of the most active supporters of incursion into Ukraine. Both Glazyev and Rogozin are memorable for their election campaign commercials, in which visitors are compared with the “mud” from which it is necessary “to clean” Moscow.

Myth No. 3. The revolution in Ukraine has led to crisis and ruin

Propaganda can deceive laymen, but not investors. Investors are cynical and pragmatic people, they leave places where things are going bad and buy where there is expected growth.

On February 24, following the change in Ukraine’s government, the Ukrainian stock exchange was forced to suspend trading in light of a sharp rise in the index (more than 15% for the day). Apparently, business has not noticed any disaster in the aftermath of the revolution. Ukraine’s affairs deteriorated once Russia declared its desire to invade Crimea. It was Russia, which accounts for a third of Ukraine’s total trade turnover – and not the change in government – that is the cause of the current economic problems in independent Ukraine. However, the aggressive policy of the Kremlin is even more costly for Russia itself. On Monday, March 3, in response to the news of invasion into Crimea, the Moscow Stock Exchange RTS index collapsed to the lowest level since September 2009. Total capitalization losses of Russian companies totaled more than USD 62 billion in the course of a single day. This is more than the entire amount of capital outflows last year. On the same day, the Central Bank spent USD 10 billion to support the ruble’s exchange rate. While the stock market can still rebound somewhat, the USD 10 billion spent by the Central Bank cannot be recovered. And, given the introduction of sanctions by the US, it would appear that the economic crisis in Russia has just begun.

All reports about refugees purportedly fleeing Ukraine were also proven to be lies. Russian mass media have reported that hundreds of thousands (!) of Ukrainians, mad with fear, rushed to Russia for protection. In reality, not only are there no long lines on the borders – there are no lines whatsoever. So far, it has been confirmed that the only persons who received asylum in Russia are the Berkut (Ukrainian special police) officers, who fled out of fear of being criminally prosecuted for their violence against protesters on Maidan.

Myth No. 4. “Stepan Bandera fought under the banner of fascism against Russia”

These words are attributed not just to anyone, but to Russia’s envoy to the UN, Vitaliy Churkin, who declared this nowhere other than during a session of the UN Security Council. In reality, Bandera (with all his many shortcomings) not only did not fight under the Nazi flag, but he himself was sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp by the Nazis.

It remains only to recall that the USSR that Bandera fought against, just two years before his arrest by the Nazis, conducted a joint parade with them in Brest. The city of Lviv – Bandera’s hometown – belonged to Poland, which the USSR and Hitler’s Germany captured together, under the plan in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on the partition of Europe. In 1939, Lviv had to first defend itself against the Nazis, and then against the Bolsheviks.

Myth No. 5. The revolution threatens Russian interests

The revolutionary events in Ukraine, as we know, began with Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. According to a popular misconception, Putin was able to pressure Yanukovych at that time under the pretext that this Agreement would have prevented Ukraine from entering the Customs Union. In reality, there is no contradiction there. For example, Israel, which has had an Association Agreement with the EU since 2000, has recently sought membership in the Customs Union.

Similarly, there has been no threat to the Russian military bases in Crimea. Ukraine’s new authorities have committed to comply with all current international treaties (including those related to the Russian bases).

Thus, even assuming the Ukrainian revolution poses any sort of threat to the interests of Russian government, such threat is no greater than any other clear example of how society can take power into its own hands.

Myth No. 6. The Ukrainian opposition has violated its February 21 agreement with Yanukovych

As soon as Yanukovych realized he can no longer counter Maidan, he signed an agreement with the opposition, which provided for early elections and a return to the 2004 Constitution. Russia was also invited to countersign this agreement, but the Kremlin refused. Yet, it now screams right and left about its violation. But – was it really violated?

Under the agreement, after Verkhovna Rada [Parliament] adopted the law restoring the 2004 Constitution of Ukraine, Yanukovych was given a 24-hour period to sign it. Following this, protesters had to vacate a number of government buildings and take other steps to reduce tensions. However, instead of signing, Yanukovych left Kyiv and disappeared. After this, even Yanukovych’s own party voted on a law eliminating him from office and approved the new government. It should be recalled that the Party of Regions, and not the revolutionaries, have a majority in the Rada [Parliament] today. And it was this Rada, elected long before the revolution, which approved the new Ukrainian government.

Myth No. 7. In Crimea, Russia is acting in accordance with international treaties

The 1997 Friendship Accord requires Russia to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. This Accord is currently being blatantly violated, both by the very fact of introducing troops into Crimea and the intent to integrate Crimea into Russia. The Kremlin is trying to give legitimacy to annexation of the peninsula, by installing a puppet government and organizing a “referendum.” There is not anything new about this strategy. This is quite similar to the way in which the USSR integrated the Baltic States into it. Yet, according to the Ukrainian Constitution, a referendum on secession cannot be conducted. It is notable that, although Russia is a federation (unlike Ukraine), the Russian Constitution similarly prohibits putting the issue of separation up to the referendum. Moreover, under a law that was recently adopted by the Duma, even discussing the possibility of holding such a referendum could be deemed “extremism.”

The Kremlin also frequently references the fact that, according to the 1997 Agreement, the Russian federation has the right to keep its troops in Crimea. In reality, a whole host of formations (some of which include helicopter gunships or Tiger armored vehicles) are not provided for by the treaty, yet they were already introduced in Crimea. And of course, no treaties provide for the possibility of blocking Ukrainian military bases in Crimea.