Movement patterns in Roma’s buildup

In high pressing Genoa mostly covered pass options passively in a 532 shape. Roma started the game in a 4231 formation. When they built up up from the goalkeeper their staggering looked more of an asymmetric 2422. Veretout and Diawarra dropped back, always narrow and close to each other in the central lanes. Spinazzola and Kluivert occupied the halfspaces, dropping back if the ball was coming to their side. Under stayed on the touchline as long as possible, while Dzeko kept the team long by staying on the ballfar side of Romero — the middle defender in the back three.

In full pressing moments Cassata — the right side number 8 — attacked Smalling. Sometimes Sanabria — nearside striker — attacked Smalling, and hunted even the pass back to the goalkeeper. In this moment Sanabria marked Veretout from behind. Therefore Roma could easily play out of this ,,false pressing” moment with finding Smalling as the third man option through Veretout.

It is not a coincidence that after one or two attempts Genoa didn’t press Roma anymore. Asking the 8 to press the central defender, move back to midfield to take the other six again requires 20/30 meter sprints cut in half by high intensity running. This is why such passive approaches don’t work in high pressing. After one pressure moment, the team must prevent the opponent from circulating the ball again. Otherwise the possession team will simply make their opponents tired and the moment to break through the press will inevitably come.

The key against this type of passive approach to pressing is to always offer an option under the ball in the first line. Sideways passes are always possible since the opponents very rarely step out to attack the receiver in a coordinated manner. Even if they offer to press, it is based on the decision on one player, without the necessary backup from his teammates to restrict options around the ball.

Smalling and Mancini open, Diawarra and Santon occupy the central lanes. On the left side Kluivert moves back.

The two central defenders opened wider than the box. The moment of the pass back to Pau Lopez, Santon dropped even more back than Veretout or Diawarra to offer a long ball option for changing the sides. The 8 of Genoa was so much inside — covering Pellegrini — that Santon could have easily gotten the ball.

8 moving back to close the double six movement. With an even more ambitious pass Santon could have changed instantly to Veretout.

When Santon had the ball the ballnear six — Diawarra — stayed under the ball in the halfspace. If the ball went back to Lopez the striker who followed him had to press from the side, keeping the central pass lane open. To reduce this option the farside striker stayed inside, creating more space for Smalling.

This situation was the moment of breakthrough for Roma from the sideways passes in front of the Genoa press. On the left side Pellegrini moved back almost to the line of the Genoa 8 to double him. The moment Pellegrini was about to receive, suddenly four options offered around the ball. Under initially kept next to the sideline, cutting inside the moment of the pass. Veretout pushed higher, out of the striker’s cover shadow. Dzeko dropped from the shoulder of the farside central defender.

Roma have been using Dzeko a lot as tool to receive, pull the opponent together, and open space in depth or width. He is excellent at breaking away from the central defenders in the right moment when dropping to the ball, and finding the free man with two touches maximum. It is clear that Fonseca and his staff always prepare opponent-specific variations for this play. Against every team the free man will be different, but the principle of playing to the striker and finding the free man remains constant from game to game.

In the second pressing line, a common pressing trigger of Genoa was a pass from Mancini to Smalling. In this moment Cassata pressed Smalling at a diagonal angle. Spinazzola dropped back next to the sideline. Genoa were very man to man oriented on the ball side. More importantly Schone stepped up too early to Veretout, leaving a large gap in the halfspace. Therefore Kluivert was marked by the sideback, completely exposing the space to the right of Romero. Pulling back the fullback is a common tactical weapon against a back five. The wingback has to cover at least 25–30 meters to press the fullback, therefore it is extremely hard to make pressure in the right moment. With a pass to the right foot of Spinazzola, he could play a one- touch direct pass to Dzeko. It was crucial that the pass to Spinazzola was not hard, but a soft one so he could just lob it for Dzeko into space. Then Dzeko could use his hip to close out the defender attempting to intercept the pass and his arm to keep the defender from the ball. The backline of Genoa was incredibly wide in this moment. This would have made it easy to run behind Dzeko with 3rd man runs, however one thing Genoa did well was covering the layoff options of Dzeko.