Next, in mid-August, news reports suggested that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had warned his parliament—on live television—that Iran was prepared to “return … within hours—to conditions [in its nuclear program] more advanced than before the start of negotiations.” It took a day for a more accurate translation to indicate that Rouhani had instead argued, “new U.S. officials should know that failed experience of sanctions and coercion brought their previous governments to the negotiating table,” and that if the agreement dissolved “we will return to a much more advanced situation than at the time of the start of the talks.” In other words: Sanctions didn’t solve the nuclear issue, only negotiations did; and if the United States rips up the nuclear agreement, Iran has options too. These might reasonably be interpreted as old facts, not new threats. Indeed, the truly striking thing about the remarks was the fact that Rouhani—even to a parliament populated by plenty of hard-liners—doubled down on his commitment to compromise and diplomacy rather than to escalation and confrontation. He didn’t tell the hardliners what they wanted to hear. To an audience that at times doubts Rouhani, he made it clear that the nuclear agreement isn’t Iran’s only option, it is “Iran’s preference.”

This week nuclear deal opponents coalesced around an alleged threat by Vice President Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s nuclear sector, that “we are able to resume 20 percent enrichment in at most five days.” The Independent initially reported that this meant the Iranians could have a nuclear weapon within five days of withdrawing from the agreement. Very few reports bothered to include his contemporaneous comment that “definitely we are not interested in such a thing happening. We have not achieved the deal easily to let it go easily. We are committed to the deal, and we are loyal to it.” Lost in the surrounding firestorm was the fact that even if the nuclear agreement disintegrated, Iran could not in “five days” return to a robust nuclear program. The Iran deal ensured this, because it required the elimination of 97 percent of Iran’s uranium stockpile; the destruction of the Arak reactor’s core, blocking the production of weapons-grade plutonium; the removal of two-thirds of centrifuges; and and a halt to all uranium enrichment at the underground Fordow site. Salehi knows that—which is why it’s logical to conclude he was parroting Rouhani’s previous argument.

Does all of this mistranslation and misinterpretation matter? History tells us it certainly can. Historians still debate whether a mistranslation of the Japanese word “mokusatsu” at the Potsdam Conference as World War II put America on a road of no return to drop the atomic bomb. The Allies pressed Japan for an unconditional surrender, to which the Japanese delegation responded using the term ''mokusatsu,'' to “reserve comment.” Truman was misinformed that the word meant “ignore.” We will never know what might have happened had a translator conveyed, correctly, that Japan might not have intended to “ignore” the Allies and close the door on negotiation after all, but rather “reserved comment” to keep it cracked open for future discussion.