THE idea of a European army is as old as the hope for European unity. After creating the European Coal and Steel Community, the embryo of today’s European Union, the six founding members agreed in 1952 to form a supranational European force. But the plan was voted down by the French parliament; thereafter countries focused on gradual economic integration. Now that the EU is in trouble and Britain has voted to leave, the idea of military integration is being revived (see article). Some countries talk of a “European Defence Union”. Others, evoking the “Schengen” passport-free travel area, envisage a “Schengen for defence”. Eurocrats want to show there is life in the EU after Brexit: with the British gone, they say, the biggest obstacle to defence integration will be gone, too. France, left as the unrivalled EU military power, delights in the chance to reclaim leadership from Germany. The danger is not that such big talk will threaten NATO, as some fear, but that it will come to nothing and expose Europe’s weakness. That would aggravate two big threats to its security: bullying by an emboldened Russia and abandonment by an exasperated America.

EU and whose army?

Europeans have every reason to do more. Russia is a growing menace, and the transatlantic alliance is fraying. American isolationism, were Donald Trump to be elected president, could wreck NATO; Hillary Clinton would like Europeans to do more. Why should America, with a smaller population and economy than the EU, keep underwriting Europe’s security? Only four of its 25 European allies—Britain, Estonia, Greece and Poland—meet the minimum standard of spending 2% of GDP on defence. And Europeans waste much of their money on mostly useless toy armies, navies and air forces. Any serious European policy must start from the fact that Europeans have to spend more on defence. And they should share critical equipment. Not even the biggest EU powers can do it all alone, as Britain and France discovered in Libya in 2011.

The EU can add value. Many modern-day threats—from terrorism to energy blackmail and cyber-security—are best dealt with by civilian bodies. The EU is better placed than NATO to muster these. In Afghanistan, Iraq and other places, the generals have learnt that soldiers alone cannot fix broken countries; they are the first to plead for the aid and state-building advice that the EU can offer. The EU can also provide a stepping-stone for neutral Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland, to be more involved in the defence of vulnerable Baltic states and ultimately join NATO. And the European Commission can put up money for defence research; as with its monitoring of deficits, it can scrutinise national defence budgets.

The risk is that, in their desire to show quick results, European leaders will seize only on the symbols of military integration and not the substance. One obsession is a separate headquarters for EU operations. This is a waste: NATO and EU states already have lots of headquarters. But it would be churlish for Britain, as it negotiates its new ties with the EU, to block the idea; and the EU should still aim for close defence co-operation with Britain. The EU’s military ambitions need not displace NATO: they will remain puny compared with America’s heft.

A Franco-German defence paper talks vainly of “strategic autonomy”. But there is nothing less autonomous than armies that cannot move, fight or even see the enemy without American help. The Europeans need transport planes, air-refuelling tankers, helicopters, drones, satellites, field hospitals and much else. It does not matter whether these are acquired in the name of NATO or the EU. Military forces are national: the stronger they are, the stronger will be both the EU and NATO.