But now, faced with a formal offer to exit at a profit from one of the thorniest crisis-era holdings on its balance sheet, the Fed has remained silent and seemingly without a strategy.

AIG has come forward and offered $15.7 billionfor the residential mortgage-backed securities in the Maiden Lane II portfolio. These assets were taken by the Fed in the darkest days of the AIG bailout to secure a $22 billion loan that was part of the broader bailout.

The assets, mostly subprime residential mortgage-backed securities, have paid off and kicked off interest income while the loan has been paid down to the point where just about $14 billion is outstanding. So the $15.7 billion offer from AIG would mean the Fed would clear about $1.5 billion in profit on the assets.

The Fed could be excused if the offer had only just been made. But, in fact, the idea of AIG taking back these assets has been out there, in one form or another, since at least September. AIG has been busy raising money for what would be one of the biggest RMBS transactions since the financial crisis.

And yet, the Fed acts like it’s the first time it’s heard of the offer.

AIG CEO Robert Benmosche, in an interview on Squawk Box this morning, said he had still not heard from the Fedon its 10-day-old formal public offer to buy the Maiden Lane II portfolio. AIG had also not heard from the Fed on its behind-the-scenes offer to buy the assets in December.

Both the NY Fed and the Board of Governors in Washington declined numerous interview requests from CNBC to explain its thinking behind the AIG assets.

Fed watchers said they thought it made sense for the Fed to get these non-conventional assets off its book at the earliest opportunity. One source said he found Fed ownership of AIG subprime so troubling that he believed the central bank should unload them at almost any price, let alone at a profit.

Lou Crandall of Wrightson ICAP, said: “If I were the Fed, I would cash out and close the books.” He added that he would be happy to hear anything from the Fed explaining itself and, in an email, provided reasons that he thought could explain the Fed’s actions. He added that he barely believed his own reasons.