In the opening lines of “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” Lukács mimics Marx in defining reification as “a relation between people [that] takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity,’ an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people.” That is, reification is the process by which social or subjective qualities are mistakenly perceived as objective or independent objects. Quite literally, the German Verdinglichung and Versachlichung (Marx’s preferred terms) can be translated as “making into a thing” or “ — object,” correspondingly. Lukács sees reification as the root of a number of social maladies, from the false consciousness of commodity fetishism to reified structures in industry, politics, law, and reporting. In all of these instances, Lukács argues, objectivity has replaced subjectivity as the gold standard. Mechanization in industry seeks to eradicate individuality, government has evolved into a machine-like bureaucracy, legal theory is founded upon universality and equal (thus automated) treatment, and reporters are fired for exhibiting personal biases.

It is here that Honneth pauses, taking aim at Lukás’s definition of reification. Although agreeing with Lukács that such a process is certainly taking place, Honneth asks that we consider whether objectivity should be categorically rejected in favor of a more “organic” approach. After all, don’t we want our scientists, judges, and encyclopedias to be held accountable for factual inaccuracies? And, if so, doesn’t a rejection of all cultural manifestations of objectivity work counter to liberalism and progress? If, as Honneth insists, the answer to both of these questions is yes, reification must be redefined if it is to retain its legitimacy and relevance.

Having dealt with the concept itself, Honneth moves on to address reification’s place in capitalist society. Adopting a strictly orthodox Marxist position, Lukács maintains that it is the mode of capitalist production that is primarily (if not solely) responsible for reification. Quoting Max Weber, he writes:

The modern capitalist concern is based inwardly, above all on calculation. It is a system of justice and administration, whose workings can be rationally calculated, at least in principle, according to fixed general laws, just as the probable performance of a machine can be calculated … For these modern businesses with their fixed capital and their exact calculations are much too sensitive to legal and administrative irregularities. They could only come into being in the bureaucratic state with its rational laws … that is to say, where the judge’s behavior is on the whole predictable.

Weber points here to a need for legal and mathematical predictability within the modern (or, as Lukács puts it, radical) capitalist society. By expanding on the causes of reification — from mere predictability to the uses and abuses of technology and industry — Lukács extends the scope of reification to include not only the legal and scientific apparatuses (à la Weber), but the entirety of capitalist culture.

Responding to the claim that capitalism is responsible for a society reified through and through, Honneth complains that “nowhere does Lukács even begin to substantiate his assumption that the principles of the capitalist market have indeed ‘colonized’ family life, general public opinion, the parent-child relationship, or our leisure time” (77). Accordingly, Honneth argues that even if we take reification at face value, there is no reason to believe that a full account of its causes can be located within the capitalist apparatus.

The bulk of Honneth’s essay, however, is spent rehabilitating the concept of reification so as to preserve — for, after all, you cannot rebel against that which does not exist — its very real and arguably degenerative consequences. Throughout his work, Lukács is careful to avoid any explicitly moral terminology, and avoids basing his critique on ethical considerations. Rather, Lukács begins by vigorously defending the need to

“base ourselves on Marx’s economic analyses and to proceed from there to a discussion of the problems growing out of the fetish character of commodities … Only by understanding this can we obtain a clear insight into the ideological problems of capitalism and its downfall.”

Notice that, for Lukács, all criticism of capitalism — if it is to remain “scientific — must be based only in economic analyses, and never rely on moral or political concerns such as, say, equality or justice. Therefore, by focusing on the already inherent unsustainability of capitalism, Lukács seeks to undercut the need for any sort of ethical or political argument.

Conversely, for Honneth, reification cannot be summed up as a strictly epistemic or scientific mistake: “This is not only because reification constitutes a multilayered and stable syndrome of distorted consciousness, but also because this shift in attitude reaches far too deep into our habits and modes of behavior for it to be able to be reversed by making a corresponding cognitive correction” (25). Well, if reification is neither immoral (as Lukács points out) nor simply a factual inaccuracy (as Honneth insists), why is it so bad?