VLADIMIR PUTIN was never going to let the Ukrainian revolution go unanswered. All the same, the speed with which he moved to seize Crimea came as something of a shock. The immediate Western response was to find some way, through threats, diplomacy or a mixture of the two, to stop the Russians going farther into eastern Ukraine. When Russia’s military exercises close to the border ended without incident on March 4th there was a sense of something like relief in the capitals of Europe, a feeling—quite possibly a complacent one—that things were, at least, not getting worse.

On March 5th José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, announced a package of economic aid for Ukraine (see article) in advance of an emergency European Union (EU) summit set for March 6th. On the same day, in Paris, John Kerry, America’s secretary of state, met his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. The Americans and the Europeans want to persuade Moscow to open a dialogue with the new government in Kiev and also to withdraw its forces in Crimea to their bases and allow in international monitors. While Russia has not recognised the new regime in Kiev, talks that were expected to begin in Rome as The Economist went to press could lead to the establishment of a “contact group” that might include the EU, the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and both Russia and Ukraine.

While this may represent some progress, there is a difference in approach between the EU and America that could frustrate the tough diplomacy that is called for. They agree that the Russian move into Crimea was illegal, that subsequent moves into eastern Ukraine would be a disaster, and that Western military action would be folly. But while America is clear in its desire to punish Mr Putin for what has already happened, Europe seems more focused on pre-emptive diplomacy. The two approaches could, if co-ordinated, be complementary. They could equally lead to division, recrimination and a failure to achieve either goal.

Mr Obama has a freer hand than many European leaders when it comes to imposing costs and consequences on the aggressor. The relatively tiny amount of trade that America does with Russia—about $40 billion a year compared with a figure ten times that between Europe and Russia—means that America has little to fear from Russian retaliation to any sanctions. But that also cuts the other way: without Europe on board, American sanctions on Russia will hardly set Moscow quivering. Nor would a confrontation be free of other sorts of cost. Russia could close a valuable supply route into Afghanistan that keeps American troops fed and watered. On the diplomatic front, it is in Mr Putin’s power to make the West’s life harder still over Syria and Iran.

The American president has a further freedom—that which comes from the indifference of the American public, fewer than one in five of whom think that it is America’s duty to protect Ukraine or sort out the crisis. Moreover, though Mr Obama has faced rhetorical blasts from Republicans eager to blame him for Mr Putin’s aggression (see Lexington), behind closed doors Washington is unusually united, thanks to Mr Putin’s bullying.

Congress is approving $1 billion in loan guarantees for Ukraine. Various bilateral meetings to boost trade with Russia have been suspended, as have the Pentagon’s military-to-military contacts with Russia. Preparations for the June G8 summit in Sochi have been put on hold amid calls across the political spectrum for Russia’s G8 membership to be suspended for a year or more.

There is debate about how forcefully to pursue visa bans against Russian officials deemed responsible for human-rights abuses in Ukraine. Republican hawks have sounded keener than Mr Obama’s aides on sanctions against members of Mr Putin’s inner circle, business leaders and selected financial institutions, with the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman, Edward Royce, calling for “crippling sanctions on Russian high-ranking officials, state-owned banks and commercial enterprises, and key individuals behind the Russian intervention.”

Some senators have also called for America to reinstate plans to install missile-defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia disliked those plans, which were dropped in 2009, a move Mr Obama’s critics saw as evidence of weakness. Officials and ex-officials are not keen, though. Kurt Volker, a former American ambassador to NATO, notes that the system was always designed to deal with rogue missiles from Iran, though Russia purported not to believe this. To revive the scheme in order to punish Mr Putin would make it look as though it had been a plot against Russian interests all along.

Some in Europe would be happy to take the sort of line America is developing. Led by Poland, the “new”, former communist, members of the EU from central Europe would like to spell out sanctions that Russia will face if it does not vacate Crimea, and to threaten an oil embargo if it pushes into eastern Ukraine. If nothing else, argue the Poles, an explicit threat would strengthen Europe’s negotiating hand.

Telephone diplomacy

The doves, led by Germany, take the opposite view. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, has been much tougher with Mr Putin than her embarrassingly Russophile predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, but for now she has set her face against sanctions. According to her spokesman, Steffen Seibert, she is “entirely focused” on securing a “peaceful resolution of the crisis”. A telephone call between the chancellor and Mr Putin on March 2nd started discussions about the possible contact group. As one diplomat puts it: “Now is the time to lock the Russians into diplomacy. You have to make it hard for the Russians to say no. Sanctions will only drive Russia back into the bunker.”

Mrs Merkel’s approach may owe quite a lot to the importance of her country’s trade relationship with Russia—about a third of the gas and oil Germany imported last year came from Russia, while around $48 billion worth of German vehicles, machine tools and chemicals went in the other direction. But that is not the whole story (see Charlemagne)—and she has plenty of support elsewhere in the EU.

Britain, for example, has shown no great enthusiasm for sanctions that would damage the rich pickings the City of London makes from handling Russian money. Hugh Powell, the deputy national security adviser, was photographed going into 10 Downing Street on March 3rd carrying a document stating that the “UK should not support, for now, trade sanctions...or close London’s financial centre to Russians.” Another Brussels diplomat sums up the conundrum thus: “The Russians need us economically more than we need them. But their ability to take economic pain is greater that the EU’s.”

How far apart does this leave the Europeans and Americans? To some extent the differences are more rhetorical than real. Sanctions that would really hurt Russia, such as locking Russian banks and financial institutions out of the American-dominated international financial settlement system—the sort of measures that have caused Iran real pain—are likely to be held in reserve as a deterrent against further action. Most of the other sanctions being discussed are of limited effectiveness.

Not a worried man Limited visa bans would be an irritant in Moscow, but are unlikely to apply to those who really matter because the West needs to go on talking to them. The same applies to freezing the financial assets of Kremlin officials and supportive oligarchs. Some of those assets have already been moved to territories where they are less vulnerable. Slowing down trade talks that run on for years is not much of a threat. Suspending Russia from the G8 would hurt Mr Putin a bit—he enjoys the opportunity to grandstand on a world stage—but he would still have the BRICs summits to look forward to. Brazil and India have been typically silent on Russia’s Ukraine adventure. China, while saying it respects “the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine”, has avoided explicit criticism of Russia, just as it did when Georgia was invaded in 2008. Like his predecessors, President Xi Jinping regards China’s relations with Russia as a useful counterweight to American power. With both American and European officials emphasising the need to “de-escalate” the crisis, progress on any sort of sanctions will probably be stately. The priority for now is to reach some agreement with Russia over such things as a timetable for elections and a framework for moves towards devolved power in parts of the country. Jonathan Eyal of RUSI, a London think-tank, argues that the West’s inability immediately to deprive Mr Putin of his victory should be set against the substantial cost he is likely to end up paying in the end. In the first place, while stirring up discontent in parts of Ukraine that he may not be able to control, he has almost certainly turned much of the country against Russia in a way that it was not before. Future leaders of Ukraine will face even greater popular pressure to turn West.

Secondly, Russia’s aggression has breathed new life into NATO, which has been searching for a post-Afghanistan role. Poland, Romania and, most of all, the three Baltic states feel genuinely threatened. Poland, Lithuania and Latvia have invoked Article 4 of the treaty, a rarely used rule allowing any ally to consult with the others if it feels its security, territorial integrity or independence are under threat. Were it not for the more famous Article 5 that commits all members to regard an armed attack on one as an attack against all, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia all believe that they would be next in line for Moscow’s revanchism. The next NATO summit, to be held in Wales in September, will have a sense of real urgency. Mr Putin may end up with one of the things he has wanted least—a NATO with a new sense of purpose.

Out of gas

Mr Putin has also virtually ensured that Europe will accelerate the steps it is taking to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. Europe’s gas supply has become more resilient and diversified in the past decade. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is ever more available for import, and today’s interconnector pipelines already allow LNG unloaded in Britain to be sent more or less anywhere in continental Europe. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are still wholly dependent on Russian gas, as are Hungary, Bulgaria and Moldova—but the Baltics are scrambling to install LNG terminals.

Parts of Europe are likely to accelerate the exploitation of shale-gas reserves; for its part, hydrocarbon-rich America can now be expected to move quickly to end legal restrictions on exporting oil and LNG. Having lost its reputation for reliability as a gas supplier through frequent sanctions and threats, Russia must live with the consequences. As its stockmarkets demonstrated on Monday, it also needs to be aware that its economy is now vulnerable to investor sentiment, a much quicker comeback than sanctions.

In seizing Crimea and cocking a snook at the West, Mr Putin believes he has got away with an act of daring that will cement his popularity at home as a brutally effective statesman. He is right that the short-term consequences he faces for his recklessness may prove relatively trivial. But the long-term cost for a country that needs investment, trading partners and markets could still be high. Mr Putin may not suffer prompt retaliation. That does not mean, in the long run, that Russia does not face serious consequences.