In other words, by continuing with UCLASS but beefing up its tanking requirements a bit—tanker capability was part of that program as well—the Navy would have had a little less tanking capability per airframe, but they would also have ended up with an aircraft that could do so many other missions, some of which are very in demand and go completely unfulfilled within the Navy as a whole. Also, considering the Navy is now buying large lots of Super Hornets again—and with conformal fuel tanks—the need to offset the tanking mission from the Super Hornet community has decreased massively.

Then again, if the Navy just bought the best navalized unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) available from any of the four manufacturers that were bidding on UCLASS, the service would have carrier-based tactical aircraft that could shatter the range of any manned asset by a multiple of two or three, and without any tanker support at all. So an MQ-25 tanker really wouldn't even be necessary. But if the Navy still wanted an unmanned tanker, it could convert some of the 108 S-3 Vikings it already owns that are just sitting out in the desert into one.

Then again, if a stealthy carrier-based UCAV wasn't 'strangled in its crib' by the fighter-pilot dominated decision-making cadre in the Navy and the idiots in Congress, it would lead a lot of people to ask why an F-35C is needed if a drone that cost half to a quarter the price can do many of the same things but three times to four times farther away and without risking a pilot in the process.

But instead of just embracing the future and fielding the best UCAV it could, the Navy is blowing its money on a tanker drone that it no longer needs that badly and that can maybe adapt to do some limited work in the semi-contested airspace. That is if the Navy will shell out to develop and field those upgraded variants.

In the end, the decision deep six UCLASS and neuter the Navy's unmanned carrier-based aircraft potential into the form of a flying gas can was laughably near-sighted and arguably disingenuous. Above all else, the decision to give the drone a job no fighter pilot wanted, one that was only needed in part because of the cancellation of UCLASS itself, protected the service's manned fighter programs with ruthless abandon.

And sadly, none of this is surprising.

Contact the author: Tyler@thedrive.com