The resounding defeat suffered by Nicolás Maduro’s Socialists in Venezuela’s elections will be hailed in conservative circles as a definitive end to the so-called Bolivarian revolution by Washington’s long-time nemesis and Maduro’s predecessor, the late Hugo Chávez.

Even before the results were confirmed in Caracas, regional analysts were already pointing to what they believe is an even bigger, continental shift: the reversal of the implicitly anti-Washington “pink tide”, or the turn to the left, that swept through many Latin American countries in the opening years of the new century.

But such conclusions, in Venezuela’s case and more broadly, seem premature. Leftists argue it makes no sense to view political change in Latin America solely or even primarily through the distorting prism of relations with the US. Many factors are at work, and their impact on different countries is neither uniform nor pre-determined.

In Venezuela’s case, dismay over economic hard times, exacerbated by perceived mismanagement, appears to be the key reason for the Socialists’ defeat. Chávez used oil revenues, the state’s main source of income, to alleviate poverty and build a supportive social welfare system. This basic commitment to a more equal society meant enough voters were prepared to overlook the many, less laudable aspects of Chávista rule.

Drastic falls in oil income, caused by reduced worldwide demand, left Maduro unable to keep his side of this economic and social contract. Shortages of staple foods and everyday necessities gave real-life expression to the IMF’s jaundiced view of Venezuela as the world’s most mismanaged economy.

Maduro’s complaint that his government is the victim of a deliberate war waged by capitalist enemies in the US smacks of bluster. The Socialists were not rejected on ideological grounds, but on grounds of economic incompetence. At the same time, structural problems such as weak institutions, lack of accountability and poor infrastructure, have hindered Venezuela’s development.

These same obstacles have helped undermine other leftwing or centre-left governments. Falling world commodity prices have badly hit living standards in Brazil, for example. But recent mass protests against the ruling Workers party of Dilma Rousseff, who succeeded leftwing icon Lula da Silva as president, were also sparked by anger over corruption scandals. Rousseff’s approval ratings are down to 10% or below and moves are afoot in Congress to have her impeached.

Voter intolerance for incompetence and corruption played an important part in the recent victory of the Buenos Aires mayor, Mauricio Macri, over the Peronist candidate fielded by outgoing president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. But Kirchner’s bombastic personal style, her dirigiste policies – and her inept handling earlier this year of the suspicious death of Alberto Nisman, a prominent critic and prosecutor – also assisted the opposition’s success.

Looking at Argentina, some commentators thought they saw a common thread linking it to other countries. But it was not a negative reaction to the socialist pink tide. Rather, it was a rejection of populism of both left and rightwing varieties.

“In Latin America [populism] has been propping up the politically powerful for decades, making pawns of the urban and rural poor. Under various ‘caudillos’, both military and civilian strongmen, it has eroded democratic institutions and led to massive government intervention, concentrating political and economic power in the hands of the few,” said writer Alvaro Vargas Llosa.

“The last wave, driven by leftwing caudillos, started in 1999 with the ascent of Chávez ... followed by the Kirchners in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.”

Nor are all left-leaning governments economically incompetent, as Bolivia’s Morales has demonstrated. Initially ridiculed abroad for his radical views, Morales, elected to a third term last year, is now credited by the World Bank and IMF with implementing transformative economic and social reforms that have reduced poverty levels, boosted real wages and produced high growth rates.

Political change in Latin America is also driven by another factor: peacemaking. In Colombia, a peace process is now under way that could lead to the demobilisation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) after decades of drugs-fuelled conflict. Cuba, meanwhile, is actively pursuing a historic rapprochement with the US that will likely bring enormous economic and social change in its wake. But this shift in Havana, a high bastion of the left, does not necessarily mean the pink tide has receded forever. Rather, the new “Cuba model” may be socialism with a capitalist face.