MI6 has been ridiculed for relying on a 'key' Iraqi source who described unrealistic scenes from Hollywood Blockbuster The Rock.

The Chilcot inquiry highlighted the ludicrous episode as it slammed flawed intelligence assessments that repeatedly suggested Saddam Hussein had significant WMD capabilities - even though no weapons were found.

It also accused chiefs of failing to stand up to Tony Blair as he drove the country towards war.

The long-awaited report said that in September 2002, six months before the invasion, the intelligence agency believed it was on the edge of a 'significant breakthrough'.

A new source in Iraq was thought to have 'phenomenal access' to information about Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapon programme.

The individual had suggested the regime was accelerating its production of such WMD.

The head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, ensured the material was shown directly to Mr Blair - who subsequently wrote a foreword to the so-called 'dodgy dossier' saying that Hussein's threat was beyond doubt.

A 'key' MI6 source apparently described unrealistic chemical weapons equipment they are thought to have seen in Hollywood blockbuster The Rock

The report highlighted the ludicrous episode as it slammed flawed intelligence assessments that repeatedly suggested Saddam Hussein had significant WMD capabilities

Sir Richard Dearlove is said to have shown the dubious source material directly to Tony Blair

A report in April 2003 included material from the source suggesting that they had seen spherical glass containers filled with chemical weapons agents.

However, the report did not include the caveat from officials who pointed out that 'the source’s description of the device and its spherical glass contents was “remarkably similar to the fictional chemical weapon portrayed in the film The Rock”.'

The chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), John Scarlett, was apparently not told about the potential problems with the source.

In June 2003, when MI6 finally met the agent face to face, it turned out he had been involved in Iraq's chemical weapons programme before 1991.

Officers concluded he was 'a fabricator who had lied from the outset' and the following month the reports were official withdrawn.

'The withdrawal of the reporting was done in a very low key manner compared with the way in which the original intelligence was issued,' the report noted.

The Chilcot report said Sir John Scarlett, who was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the run-up to the Iraq war, should have done more to protect its 'integrity'

The Chilcot report also criticised Sir John Scarlett for not doing more to protect the integrity of the JIC.

Delivering a damning verdict, Sir John Chilcot said it was 'clear that policy on Iraq was being made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments'.

'The government's strategy reflected its confidence in the Joint Intelligence Committee's assessments,' the inquiry chairman said.

BLAIR WAS WARNED THAT INVASION WOULD BOOST TERROR THREAT Tony Blair was warned that invading Iraq would increase the terror threat to the UK but went ahead anyway, the Chilcot report said. The former Prime Minister has been blamed by some for causing the rise of Isis by getting rid of Saddam Hussein and sparking chaos in the country. He has argued that the rise of such extremism was inevitable whether or not we had intervened militarily. Launching his long-awaited report today, Sir John Chilcot pointed out that in the House of Commons on March 18, 2003, Mr Blair said the possibility of terrorist groups in possession of WMD was 'a real and present danger to Britain and its national security' But Sir John said: 'Mr Blair had been warned, however, that military action would increase the threat from Al Qaida to the UK and to UK interests. 'He had also been warned that an invasion might lead to Iraq’s weapons and capabilities being transferred into the hands of terrorists.' Advertisement

'Those assessments provided the benchmark against which Iraq's conduct and denials, and the reports of the inspectors, were judged.

'As late as March 17 (2003), Mr Blair was being advised by the Chairman of the JIC that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them and the capacity to produce them.

'He was also told that the evidence pointed to Saddam Hussein's view that the capability was militarily significant and to his determination - left to his own devices - to build it up further.

'It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments.

'They were not challenged and they should have been.'

The 2.6 million word report, which took around seven years to complete, gives a detailed account of the process by which intelligence assessments were made public.

Downing Street ordered a paper in February 2002 relating to 'countries of concern' such as Iraq, North Korea and Libya.

However, when Foreign Secretary Jack Straw saw the text he suggested it should put more emphasis on Iraq.

'Good, but should not Iraq be first and also have more text? The paper has to show why there is an exceptional threat from Iraq. It does not quite do this yet.'

The publication was later postponed after Mr Straw was advised the evidence would not convince the public.

A 'public dossier' was then ordered with Mr Blair's spin doctor, Alastair Campbell, given the 'lead role on the timing/form of its release'.

Messages which passed between Tony Blair and George W Bush in the build-up to the Iraq war have been published today

A British soldier dives from a burning tank which was set ablaze in the southern Iraqi city of Basra in 2005. Critics have slated Mr Blair for starting a war, pictured, which killed 179 UK soldiers, claiming it contributed to the rise of ISIS

The Chilcot report raised concerns about the tendency of ministers 'to refer in public statements only to Iraq's WMD without addressing their nature', such as what kind of warhead and how they could be deployed.

The statements were 'likely to have created the impression that Iraq posed a greater threat than the detailed JIC assessments would have supported.

THE CHILCOT REPORT IN NUMBERS 7 - Years since the Chilcot Inquiry was launched. 2,579 - Days between June 15, 2009, when the inquiry was announced on by then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and July 6, 2016, when the report is expected to be ready for private inspection and security check. 3 - Foreign secretaries to have been in the post since the inquiry was launched - David Miliband under Mr Brown, and William Hague and Philip Hammond under David Cameron. 2.3 million - Words estimated to be included in the report, making it almost four times longer than Leo Tolstoy's epic War and Peace. 10 million - Estimated cost, in pounds, of the inquiry as of January this year. 179 - UK military personnel that died during the Iraq war. Advertisement

In September Mr Blair announced that an intelligence dossier would be published. The inquiry found the intention was to 'make the case' for disarming Iraq.

Sir John Scarlett was given responsibility for producing the document.

Some senior intelligence figures voiced concerns about the 'certainty' with which some of the judgements were expressed.

But the report stated: 'The JIC accepted ownership of the dossier and agreed its content. There is no evidence that intelligence was improperly included in the dossier or that No10 improperly influenced the text.'

But the inquiry suggested that the way the dossier was finally presented - with a foreword from Mr Blair in which he claimed intelligence had 'established beyond doubt' that Iraq had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.

In fact, the assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce such weapons, according to the inquiry.

'The JIC itself should have made that position clear because its ownership of the dossier, which was intended to inform a highly controversial policy debate, carried with it the responsibility to ensure that the JIC's integrity was protected.

'The process of seeking the JIC's views, through (Sir John) Scarlett, on the text of the foreword shows that No10 expected the JIC to raise any concerns it had.'

Chilcot found that the 'capabilities and intent' described in the dossier remained in place until the invasion in March 2003 and were 'not challenged'.

REVEALED: WHAT SECRET MESSAGES BETWEEN BLAIR AND BUSH TELL US ABOUT THE BUILD UP TO WAR IN IRAQ September 12th, 2001 Hours after the 9/11 terror attacks, Blair called for tough action which ‘some will baulk at’. ‘There will be many who ask: what is the next stage of this evil?’ ‘What of (the terrorists') capacity to get hold of WMD? We know there are countries and individuals trading in WMD. We need a range of sanctions and pressures to stop this. ‘Some of this will require action that some will baulk at. ‘But we are better to act now... than let the day be put off until some further, perhaps even worse catastrophe occurs. I believe this is a real possibility.’ October 11th, 2001 One month after 9/11 and four days after air strikes against Afghanistan have begun, Blair urges Bush to focus on the Taliban and ‘deal with’ Iraq later. He added: ‘No doubt we need to deal with Saddam’. ‘But if we hit Iraq now, we could lose the Arab world, Russia, probably half the EU... I am sure we can devise a strategy for Saddam deliverable at a later date.’ Bush and Blair in the White House in July 2003. Blair both supported and exerted influence over the US President in the build-up to war, the emails reveal December 3rd, 2001 In a phone conversation Blair on ‘how the next phase might proceed’. ‘It would be excellent to get rid of Saddam.' But, he added: ‘There needed to be a clever strategy for doing this... An extremely clever plan would be required.’ December 4th, 2001 Blair sends Bush a paper setting entitled 'The War on Terrorism: The Second Phase'. Iraq is a threat because ‘it has WMD capability’ but most countries will be ‘reluctant’ to back an invasion. Blair wants to ‘soften up’ public opinion which requires a ‘strategy for regime change that builds over time... until we get to a point where military action could be taken if necessary.’ ‘We need to be clear that if an uprising occurs, we are willing to act militarily in support,’ he wrote. July 28th, 2002 Blair tells Bush, 'I will be with you, whatever.' 'The planning on this and the strategy are the toughest yet. This is not Kosovo. This is not Afghanistan. This is not even the Gulf War. The military part of this is hazardous.' 'We would support in any way we can... On timing, we could start building up after the break. A strike date could be Jan/Feb next year. But the crucial issue is not when but how.' The former PM says getting rid of Saddam is 'the right thing to do' because 'his departure would free up the region'. He 'couldn't be sure of support from Parliament, Party, public or even some of the Cabinet'. On Saddam being issued tough deadlines: 'It would be 'take it or leave it'. If he did say yes, we continue the build-up and we send teams over and the moment he obstructs, we say 'he's back to his games. That's it'. 'In any event he probably would screw it up and not meet the deadline. And if he came forward after the deadline we could just refuse to deal.' To win over the public they must 'recapitulate all the WMD evidence, add his attempts to secure nuclear capability and - as seems possible - add on the al-Qaida link.' January 24th, 2003 'In the US/UK view the failure fully to co-operate is enough now (to invade) and technically we are right. But we won't carry other people. However if Blix carries on reporting non co-operation, makes increasing demands, and hardens his findings with each stage, I think we will carry people – even without the smoking gun – shortly'. On casualties in an invasion 'doing this in the context of international opposition would be very tough'. On the prospect of civil war: 'They are perfectly capable, on previous form, of killing each other in large numbers.' Then Britain and US 'would need the backing of the international community and preferably the UN to handle it' or we would 'get the blame for any fighting'. January 30th, 2003 Letter sets out 'military questions' and 'aftermath questions such as a new Iraqi Government or US-run?' February 19th, 2003 People 'are not against conflict in all circumstances. What they fear is that we are hell bent on war, come what may - that we don't really want the UN to succeed.' 'No-one is suggesting Saddam is co-operating fully. My faith in Blix is somewhat shaken, but he is key.' 'We have to find a way of re-focusing the issue on the absence of full co-operation – and do so in a way that pulls public opinion and the UN Security Council waverers with us.' Advertisement

MI5 warned Blair of UK terror risk

MI5 explicitly warned Tony Blair that invading Iraq would put Britons at greater risk of a deadly terrorist attack, but he carried on regardless.

The then Prime Minister insisted Saddam Hussein posed a threat to British interests and had to be stopped.

But the Joint Intelligence Committee, which collates intelligence gathered by MI5 and MI6, had secretly assessed that Iraq was likely to mount a terrorist attack only in response to military action and if the existence of the regime was threatened.

Even this threat was ‘limited and containable’, spy chiefs said.

By contrast, a JIC assessment dated February 10 2003 warned that Al Qaeda and associated networks would remain the greatest terrorist threat to the UK, and their activity would increase at the onset of any military action against Iraq.

Mr Blair read the intelligence but, a month later, committed the UK to the invasion. Barely two years later, on July 7 2005, terrorists killed 52 with bombs on London’s transport network.

Baroness Manningham‑Buller, the director general of MI5 from 2002 to 2007, was asked by the Chilcot inquiry if ‘a war in Iraq would aggravate the threat from whatever source to the United Kingdom’. She said that was the view communicated by the JIC assessments to Mr Blair.

She added that if ministers had read the intelligence assessments, they could ‘have had no doubt’ about the risk.

MI5 explicitly warned Tony Blair that invading Iraq would put Britons at greater risk of a deadly terrorist attack

Straw told officials to play up threat

By Jason Groves, Deputy Political Editor for The Daily Mail

Jack Straw ordered officials to play up the threat of Iraq in a Government dossier on weapons of mass destruction, the Chilcot report revealed.

The then-foreign secretary has long insisted he had sought a peaceful resolution over alleged stockpiling of chemical weapons.

But yesterday’s report showed he had asked why a dossier emphasised risk from Iran, Libya and North Korea, rather than Iraq.

Jack Straw ordered officials to play up the threat of Iraq in a dossier on weapons of mass destruction

In a note on the initial draft, Mr Straw wrote: ‘Good, but should not Iraq be FIRST and also have more text? The paper has to show why there is an EXCEPTIONAL threat from Iraq. It does not quite do this yet.’

The dossier – planned for release in March 2002 – was not published after ‘Mr Straw was advised that the evidence would not convince public opinion that there was an imminent threat from Iraq’.

The report also found Mr Straw should have done far more to plan for the aftermath of the war.

However, it shows he argued for a clear UN mandate for military action and urged the US to postpone military action on the basis that sanctions were working.