In-game adjustments are often subtle. Dwane Casey’s halftime adjustments in Tuesday’s game against the Minnesota Timberwolves were anything but that. Minnesota had repeatedly beaten the Raptors in pick-and-roll, with Jimmy Butler in particular being very effective in these actions. In ten first-half pick-and-rolls involving Butler as the ball handler, Minnesota scored 16 points on 8-for-10 shooting from the field.

Butler had his way with the Raptors’ defense, making their big men look silly as their guards desperately tried to get back in front of him to slow him down. He scored when he was open and found teammates when Toronto double-teamed him and was generally dominant in the first two quarters.

In the second half, however, the Raptors changed things up completely, blitzing Butler in the pick-and-roll in order to get the ball out of his hands and force the Wolves’ big men to beat them with quick decisions and accurate passes. It worked—Minnesota scored just seven points on ten second-half Butler pick-and-rolls. The Timberwolves shot just 1-for-7 from the field on those possessions and they didn’t go back to a Butler pick-and-roll in the final 5:53 of the game after it was clear Toronto had found the antidote.

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Generally, the Raptors like to push their big men back in the paint on the pick-and-roll as a way to offset their slow foot speed on the perimeter. Neither Jonas Valanciunas nor Jakob Poeltl are particularly fleet of foot but both possess plus wingspans (as compared to their heights), making them prime candidates to execute traditional over-drop coverage, where the guard gets over the ball screen and the big man drops into the paint to contain. Throughout the first half, Butler showed his prowess against this defense, bludgeoning the Raptors with mid-range jumpers, strong drives to the rim, and deft passes to his teammates.

In each of the above plays, the Raptors executed the over-drop coverage and Butler beat them in a myriad of ways. He took what Toronto’s defense gave him and made plays for himself and his teammates out of it, finding Teague on a backdoor cut or Gorgui Dieng for an open jumper. This coverage is most often employed against point guards, who are far too quick and handle the ball too well on the perimeter to trap and who are usually defended by guards capable of getting back into the play quickly after being hit by the screen.

When Butler ran these pick-and-rolls against the Raptors, he wasn’t killing them with speed and ball handling; it was strength, patience, and intelligence that put Butler and the Timberwolves in positions to score. And whether it was Norman Powell, Delon Wright, or DeMar DeRozan defending Butler, they were all caught trailing the play and unable to affect the outcome from behind.

After halftime, the Raptors came out like an entirely new team defensively, turning up the pressure on Butler and forcing the ball out of his hands quickly. Butler responded well with some beautiful passes in traffic, but once the passes reached their destinations, things fell apart for the Timberwolves. For the most part, it was Taj Gibson and Dieng in these spots — far less threatening players than Butler. Watch how the Raptors’ big men jumped all the way out toward Butler and made him give up the ball:

In both instances, Toronto committed two guys to Butler immediately in order to wall him off from turning the corner into the paint. Unlike a majority of point guards, Butler doesn’t have the speed and ball-handling required to beat those traps with his dribble, so he picked it up and found Gibson on the roll, which is exactly what the Raptors wanted. Gibson made one or two plays on these rolls in the second half but was mostly ineffective at punishing Toronto in 4-on-3 situations. Even when it wasn’t a big man setting the screen, the Raptors went ahead with their trapping philosophy:

Jeff Teague entered the ball to Butler, then immediately set a ball screen for him. Kyle Lowry, who was guarding Teague, jumped at Butler the same way the Raptors’ big men did. This allowed the pass over the top to the rolling Teague, who couldn’t finish. This small adjustment from Minnesota to have Teague set the screen instead of Gibson or Dieng was a good one, but they didn’t go back to it later on in the game.

One key adjustment the Timberwolves made once it was clear the Raptors were going to trap was to have their big man cut off before getting to the screen at all:

In the above clips, Dieng comes to set the ball screen but once the Raptors committed to the trap, he slipped out into a quick passing lane and was able to either make a play or draw his defender closer to him, opening up the lane for Butler. In the second play, watch again how Dieng slipping out changes Poeltl’s positioning, but since he’s already called the screen to Powell at the top of the key, Powell’s moved to his left, allowing Butler to drive to where the trapping big man was supposed to be.

Toronto didn’t get it right every time, but they did enough to put Butler off his game slightly and change how the Timberwolves attacked in the second half. Casey did a great job adjusting at halftime to Butler’s success in the pick-and-roll and getting his big guys out on the perimeter to take the ball away from him. That sort of defensive versatility bodes well for the Raptors in the playoffs, when teams face off over and over throughout a series and throwing out different pick-and-roll coverages successfully can put some hesitation in the opposing offense. Even if trapping isn’t what comes naturally to this Toronto team, being able to do so adequately will serve them well as they get deeper into a playoff series and need to make these adjustments in order to stifle their opponents.