Mark Leonard says Europe has what it takes to become a global player. Its single market is still the world’s largest. The EU has “some of the largest national aid budgets, accounts for the second-highest level of defense spending, and can deploy the largest diplomatic corps. If it can put these assets in the service of a larger strategic agenda, it can become a player in the twenty-first century, rather than the plaything of other great powers.”

In recent years, global power is increasingly focused on the Group of Two (G2) – China and the US. With G20 replacing action with empty talk, piling ever more goals on top of unmet objectives, the group is losing its relevance. Part of G7 – Britain, France, Germany and Italy – together with other European countries could make the Continent a global player that matches the strength of China and the US, making the EU the third pillar of a “G3”.

The author says, among the challenges the bloc faces is to “reassert its own sovereignty in an age of great-power politics.” Growing tensions between China and the US has put the EU in a bind. The rivalry between the two economic superpowers does not benefit Europe, which is the world’s largest trading bloc and a top trading partner of the two rivals. Europeans hate to take sides, although they share many of the grievances raised by the Trump administration in its campaign against Beijing.

Apart from right-wing populism across Europe and the emergence of illiberal democracies that pose a threat to the global rules-based order, Europe’s strategic backyard has also become a “ring of fire,” dogged by spillover effects of the wars in Ukraine, Syria and Libya. Moreover, “aspects of globalization – from trade to the Internet – are being used to divide rather than unite countries.”

With the EU’s main institutions preparing for a change of leadership this autumn, and Spain’s Foreign Minister, Josep Borrell becoming the next High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the author says, the bloc will have “an opportunity to update Europe's approach to foreign policy.” In his effort to “unite EU institutions and national foreign ministries behind a common EU-level foreign policy,” Borrell will face three challenges.

The first will be for the EU to secure its “strategic sovereignty,” which means a more integrated EU. Borrell will have to “start developing strategies for managing the bloc’s most vexing diplomatic and security issues, from the threats posed by Russia and China to the potential powder kegs in Syria, Africa, and the Balkans.”

Secondly, he has to “re-operationalize” European defense. While the EU has “made progress in launching defense-related industrial projects, its operational capacity has shrunk.” The bloc has to beef up military presence in Eastern Europe, and take over “certain military operations from the US, not least the mission in Kosovo, where Europeans already provide most of the troops.” Another conflict zone is the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). The US vetoed UN support for the region and planned a troop drawdown in some of those countries, the EU may need to increase its presence in Africa.

Finally, Borrell should “consider appointing core groups of member states to convene workshops on divisive issues, with the goal of identifying common positions and raising the lowest common denominator. At a minimum, this could give each member state some ‘skin in the game’, possibly discouraging them from abusing EU processes or pursuing unilateral action. By adopting the broad agenda outlined above, Borrell can help the EU confront the challenges of the coming years as a united bloc.”

The problem is that while charting a “new course forward,” Borell will confront “dissenting views from member states.” Nor can he settle “for the lowest common denominator of what all members say they can accept.” It is unclear whether he could achieve a higher level of integration, through greater pooling of member states’ resources and much closer policy coordination, when most important decisions in the bloc still require unanimity among member states.

Under the terms of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty, significant further integration would require either unanimous agreement on an issue, or their approval by qualified majority voting (QMV). But the use of QMV on such important decisions would itself require unanimity or treaty change, which looks impossible in the near future. Much time and goodwill are needed to break a gridlock and reach unanimity. Given the desire to reform, perhaps member states would find a way forward.