No question about it, the Quakes’ season thus far has been nothing short of a total disaster. When I examined the 2018 season schedule prior to the start of the season, I correctly anticipated that the start of the season would include some struggle. Eight of the first thirteen games have been away games, so it has not been an easy stretch by any means. However, what I did not expect was a Quakes team with a staggering eight losses before the summer began, quickly falling out of the playoff race, and being described by MLS analyst Matt Doyle as doing nothing right. Therefore, calls for Mikael Stahre to be sacked have been immense. While I am forced to agree with them, that is not what I want to elaborate on here. I am going to attempt to observe and dissect key tactical failures that are limiting our team’s effectiveness, particularly in the attack.

This Quakes team is to me clearly the most talented in recent memory. However, it has been poorly assembled. Disregarding the massive weakness that is the left back position, our starting eleven includes far too many centrally orientated players, being played in positions that limit their individual effectivenesses. Those players would be Vako and Eriksson. While they are very different players, both are best suited for the number 10 position, as an attacking midfielder situated behind the forward. Vako’s best quality is his ability to beat defenders and create space while in crowded areas. He is not particularly fast or athletic. Thus, he needs to be played centrally, and not on the wing, where pace is key and technical skills less valuable. Eriksson is a creative passer, who possesses minimal pace and ability to dribble with the ball, making him a poor choice for a winger, but an ideal one to feed the ball to the forward and create goal scoring opportunities. Consider him played centrally and on from being comparable to a player like Federico Higuain, albeit with less skill when on the ball and dribbling.

Not only are our two wingers’ talents being essentially wasted, but their presence in their positions is actually proving detrimental to our attack in a key way. Since both are naturally best suited to play in the middle, and in addition are being played on the sides of their weak feet (Vako, a right-footed player, plays on the left, while Eriksson, although he is left-footed, plays on the right), their natural tendency in most games is to drift into the middle. Although such an occurrence can on occasion be beneficial in aiding our attack, it often proves disastrous in limiting it. Namely, it simplifies it and makes it easier for opposing teams to defend against. When our team lacks substantial wing play, with the exception of the fullbacks, the opposition needs simply to direct most of its defensive players to the middle, resulting in severe congestion and a complete failure of the Quakes attack. How many times have we seen a Quakes player dispossessed just outside of the box, running into a wall of defenders, this season? This should not be credited to the defensive team, but to our own tactical failures.

After the Portland game, Jungwirth described the recent performances as resembling “youth soccer.” Jesse Fioranelli wrote this off in a later Q&A session with fans, claiming that Jungwirth was emotional and being overly harsh. However, after witnessing recent games, I can truly understand what Jungwirth is referring to. Not only are our attackers moving far too central repeatedly, they are frequently taking up each others space, to drastic consequences. This “clumping” effect was on frequent display during the recent home game against D.C. United. This flaw could hardly be classified as even a rookie mistake. It is, as Jungwirth says, something that one would expect in a youth soccer setting.

As evidence to underscore my point, consider the following images, both captured in the aforementioned game. In the play pictured, Jungwirth was on the ball, ready to attempt a pass forward. Unfortunately, almost all of our attacking players pinched in, occupying the same space and, which made it quite easy for D.C. to prevent a dangerous opportunity from being created. Wondolowski, Hoesen, Eriksson, and even Godoy were all far too tightly compacted. Vako, while not being positioned in as problematic of a way, was still drifting inwards, hardly taking up a position on the wing to stretch the defense. In possession, we are not stretching the opposition by working the ball around, and this spacing issue plays a major role in explaining why. Take a look at the second image. It shows what a more appropriately spaced attacking structure should look like. Notice how the players would all be occupying different regions of the pitch, making it much more difficult to defend against. Time and time again do we see the problematic first spacing example, and seldom do we see the ideal second.

(Note: this topic will be continued in a later article.)