Deterrence and the Use of Military Force

The JCPOA can help prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, but it must be bolstered by strong U.S. deterrence policy. We must be prepared to take military action — today, tomorrow, 15 years from now — should Iran violate its specific commitment in the JCPOA that “under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” In personal conversations and letters, I have repeatedly pressed the President and his Administration on this issue.

I believe the best, most effective strategy to fortify the JCPOA over time is to have in place a strong deterrent. For years, the U.S. policy has been to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and therefore, “all options are on the table.” I believe that the U.S. should restate this policy and convey to the Iranian regime that there are certain activities that are inconsistent with a strictly civilian nuclear program that would trigger the use of U.S. military force. The Iranian regime should not doubt our capability and willingness to respond swiftly should they attempt to break out and develop a nuclear weapon.

Several experts who have expressed varying opinions on the JCPOA have been consistent in their calls for a more robust deterrence policy. Former Ambassador Dennis Ross is counselor and the William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He previously served two years as special assistant to President Obama and National Security Council senior director for the Central Region, and a year as special advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. He expressed his views in an article published in Time on July 15, stating that “deterrence is what will matter.” He continues by further stating:

Iran must have no doubts that if we see it moving toward a weapon that would trigger the use of force. Declaring that is a must even now. Proving that every transgression will produce a price will demonstrate that we mean what we say.

New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman wrote the following regarding how to bolster the JCPOA:

Congress should pass a resolution authorizing this and future presidents to use force to prevent Iran from ever becoming a nuclear weapons state. Iran must know that the U.S. president is now authorized to destroy — without warning or negotiation — any attempt by Tehran to build a bomb.

Ambassador Ross and retired General David Petraeus stated in an August 25 piece in the Washington Post:

Now is the time to make it clear that there will be a firewall between Iran’s threshold status and its having a nuclear weapon. Now is the time for the Iranians and the world to know that if Iran dashes toward a weapon, especially after year 15, that it will trigger the use of force. At that point, it would be too late for sanctions to pre-empt an Iranian nuclear fait accompli…

Indeed, were [President] Obama to be unequivocal about the use of force should Iran violate its commitment not to seek nuclear weapons, the international community would accept the legitimacy of military strikes in response.

In his recent letter to Congressman Nadler, President Obama clearly outlined U.S. policy in this arena stating:

The JCPOA, moreover, does not remove any of our options when it comes to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. As I have repeatedly emphasized, my Administration will take whatever means are necessary to achieve that goal, including military means. Should Iran seek to dash toward a nuclear weapon, all of the options available to the United States — including the military option — will remain available through the life of the deal and beyond.

The President’s language in this letter is strong, but the Administration should consider using more direct, specific language. The language of deterrence must be emphasized repeatedly in the months and years ahead, especially by the next Administration, which will have the responsibility for overseeing the majority of the implementation of this agreement.

The use of military force was an issue that I considered carefully in my analysis of the JCPOA. Since the U.S. is currently the only nation with the capability to “take out” Iran’s nuclear infrastructure by use of the mountain-busting bomb called the Massive Ordinance Penetrator (MOP), a review of relevant military issues was an essential part of my assessment of the JCPOA. I recently received a classified briefing from Department of Defense officials on U.S. and partner military capabilities to strike against Iran if necessary — essentially the “war plans” we would use if a strike was warranted. In July, at the Council on Foreign Relations, Secretary Kerry said the following:

[We have] developed something called the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the MOP, which has been written about publicly. And not only has [the President] asked it to be designed, he’s deployed it.

If the U.S. must, at some future date, use the MOP, air strikes or other military force, we must do so from a positon of strength, with the same kind of unanimity among the international community that made the economic sanctions so effective in forcing Iran to the negotiation table. Jane Harman, a former 18- year member of the U.S. House of Representatives who served on all the major national security committees, including Armed Services, Intelligence and Homeland Security, wrote the following:

This agreement doesn’t just preserve our ability to halt Iran’s “breakout” capacity with a bunker buster bomb; it strengthens our case for action if Tehran sneaks and cheats. This deal doesn’t assume that we live in the best of all possible worlds. Instead, it keeps one eye fixed on the doomsday scenario. And in that case, effective diplomacy will have laid the groundwork for effective use of force. …Iran has every reason to feel threatened on its home turf because of our decisive military advantage. But beyond that, the nuclear agreement sets up an international case for action if Tehran rushes for a bomb. Critics have questioned whether the deal’s “snapback” mechanism has enough oomph. I believe it does, but it’s also — in a worst-case scenario — mostly beside the point. What matters is that we gave diplomacy every chance in full view of the international community; we offered Iran a way to avoid conflict. Now, if restored sanctions fail to block an Iranian breakout attempt, the world would understand — and some would even applaud — a mega military response.