CITATION: Szakacs v. Clarke, 2014 ONSC 7487

ST. CATHARINES COURT FILE NO.: 128/10

DATE: DECEMBER 30, 2014

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY COURT

BETWEEN: ) ) CLARISSA OLENKA SZAKACS ) ) ) Self-represented ) Applicant ) ) - and - ) ) ) DONOVAN WASHINGTON CLARKE ) ) ) Self-represented ) Respondent ) ) ) HEARD: November 12, 14, 17, 18, 25, ) December 23, 2014 at St. Catharines

J.W. Quinn J.: –

1. Introduction

[1] For best courtroom adaptation of a work of fiction, the award goes to the applicant, Clarissa Olenka Szakacs, who shamelessly feigned what she thought was necessary to convince the court to circumscribe access by the respondent to their almost-six-year-old daughter.

[2] One could sit in Family Court for many years and not encounter such a callously conniving and mendaciously manipulative litigant. She effortlessly put the “rage” in “outrageous,” even going so far as to arrange for the board of directors of the housing co-operative where she lives to send a letter to the respondent, advising him that he is “no longer allowed on the property” and that “the Niagara Regional Police will be notified” should he be spotted, thus thwarting all access pick-ups and drop-offs. A letter also was sent to the police. These letters were prepared and delivered while the trial was in progress and they were not justified by any change in circumstances or by any evidence that I heard. Such meanness is unusual, even in the dysfunctional world of family litigation. The no-trespass letters raise questions: What evidence did the housing co-operative possess? Was this an attempt to obstruct the work of the court? Does this court have jurisdiction to quash the letters?

[3] At several points throughout the trial, Ms. Szakacs emphasized that she was a Christian who practiced Christian values. There must be some key pages missing from her copy of the Bible.

[4] This is an application involving issues of custody, access, child support and the usual related relief. The parties are self-represented (although, at various points in the proceedings, Ms. Szakacs had four different counsel of record). Presiding over a trial with self-represented litigants is unfulfilling and of debatable utility. The parties usually do not know what they are required to prove and, if they have an inkling, they have no idea how to do it. Efforts to turn them into overnight-lawyers are not sensible.

[5] In self-represented litigation, the “pleadings” rarely reflect meaningful details of the issues to be tried. In this case, after reviewing the various orders in the trial record, I ventured further and read the notices of motion and the supporting affidavits leading to those orders for the purpose of learning the specifics of the dispute. This allowed me, when the parties were testifying, to raise certain matters that they had omitted or had wrongly concluded were unimportant. A trial judge should not be put in the position of having to find, present, argue and decide a case. Wearing that number of hats is unbecoming.

[6] I told the parties, before the evidence commenced, that, as they lacked legal representation, there was no one to advise them, as the trial progressed, how they were doing (although, frankly, when a Family Court case reaches trial, there is almost always at least one litigant who is immune to advice or direction). I said that I would provide progress reports, making it clear to them that trials often change direction and momentum. A strong case one day can be weak the next day. I began by informing the parties how I thought they stood in respect of each issue on the assumption that the case would unfold generally consistent with the material that I had read (and using the descriptors “possibility,” “strong possibility,” “probability” and “strong probability”).

2. Discussion of the evidence and the issues

(a) The applicant

[7] Ms. Szakacs (pronounced sack-itch) is 46 years of age. She has two university degrees: a Bachelor of Science from the University of Toronto (1989); and, a Bachelor of Health Sciences from McMaster University (1992). She is an occupational therapist and a psychotherapist with a lacklustre employment history.

[8] She was married in 1994, separated in 1997 and divorced three years later. In 2000, on a trip to Boston, Ms. Szakacs (then 32 years of age) met a Brazilian and soon became pregnant. A son was born in 2001. The Brazilian has never been to Canada and, I gather, he was given the choice of leaving the United States voluntarily or being deported to Brazil. He chose the former.

[9] In 2007, Ms. Szakacs entered into a common law relationship with a man that lasted for one year.

[10] In the summer of 2008, at the age of 40, Ms. Szakacs met the respondent, Donovan Washington Clarke, online. She became pregnant during their first meeting offline. A daughter was born in 2009. The parties did not cohabit.

[11] When Ms. Szakacs stepped forward to testify, she brought with her a plastic tote box containing approximately 25 labeled files. I am accustomed to seeing litigants with their case in a plastic bag and so I viewed this as an encouraging improvement and excitedly felt that I was about to be the beneficiary of a rarity in Family Court: comprehensive and organized testimony. I was disappointed; very disappointed. To all but the most mundane of questions, Ms. Szakacs professed to be too nervous to provide full answers. She was unable to offer meaningful details of her complaints. For example, she accused Mr. Clarke of twice being verbally abusive to the child. I asked her when this had occurred and to particularize the abuse. She could not answer. I gave her the opportunity to consult her portable filing cabinet and, after a minute or so, she testified that, on September 10, 2013, Mr. Clarke said to the child that she was “too old to cry.” There is no indication that this statement was made in a hostile or angry manner. I told Ms. Szakacs that I did not think that this constituted verbal abuse – unenlightened parenting, perhaps, but not verbal abuse. I asked her for the second instance. She could not remember it. Later in her testimony, after a recess, I inquired whether she had been able to recall anything further. She answered, “No.”

[12] She consistently displayed an inability to provide details or examples of her complaints and I find that her phony nervousness was a ploy to obscure the truth. The court was left with general allegations that seemed to mirror a brochure that she might have read titled, “Key Words and Phrases to Use if You Want Everyone to Think That the Father of Your Child is Unfit.”

[13] Her suggestion that she was nervous is preposterous. During her testimony, in response to my questions and those put to her by Mr. Clarke, she was argumentative, flippant, acerbic and sarcastic. She queried the relevance of some questions that put her in an unfavourable light (once, it was a question from Mr. Clarke about a matter that she herself had raised in-chief). She even challenged my authority to hear the case because I had conducted a case conference in 2010. She smirked her way through the trial. All of this is hardly indicative of anything other than a confident, assertive litigant (with the moxie that comes from 31 court appearances on her résumé).

[14] In her testimony, as a further excuse for the vague and generalized complaints about Mr. Clarke, she professed to be afraid and intimidated by him and helpfully informed me that she was displaying the typical symptoms of a woman who had suffered psychological abuse. At the conclusion of the case, I was easily satisfied otherwise. I have no doubt that, in this relationship, she, if I may be colloquial, wears the pants (and the belt).

[15] It was shocking to hear the baseless and frivolous opposition that she maintained to the access requests by Mr. Clarke. If she had her way, Mr. Clarke would be in Bolivia with the other father and relegated to monthly cheques and the occasional greeting card. It would seem that Ms. Szakacs wants children without the nuisance of fathers underfoot.

(b) The respondent

[16] Mr. Clark is 55 years of age. He was born in Jamaica and came to Canada in 1976. He completed grade 12, took a mechanical engineering course for one year at Seneca College and then completed a two-year computer electronics course at Herzing Institute. In 1987, he obtained a licence to sell real estate and he has been a sales representative ever since. He has neither married nor lived in a common-law relationship. He has been a Rotarian for more than 10 years and has coached baseball “at a very competitive level,” but gave up the latter to spend time with his daughter (a sign of parental maturation that Ms. Szakacs does not acknowledge).

[17] His mother is retired from an accounting position with a Toronto hospital and his father is a retired driver with the Toronto Transit Commission. Mr. Clarke described his mother and father as “the best parents in the world.” They have been married for more than 40 years. He has a brother who works for Canada Post and a cousin who is a non-practicing lawyer.

[18] I found Mr. Clarke, soft-spoken by nature, to be an impressive witness. He eloquently described how the years since the birth of his daughter have been the “best and worst of my life.” When he was served with the Application, the cruel and unfounded allegations made him weep. Yet, he did not respond with vitriol, testifying: “I am not here to trash her.”

[19] Mr. Clarke told of his access difficulties and how “it seemed that the happier the visit” the greater the likelihood of the next visit being cancelled by Ms. Szakacs.

[20] Mr. Clarke is indebted to Canada Revenue Agency for $300,000 due, I understand, to a failed business venture and he has $50,000 in credit card and other debts. He recognizes that he must “clear up” his finances. Ms. Szakacs was extremely critical of his debt situation.

(c) Application

[21] On February 17, 2010, the Application by Ms. Szakacs was issued. She sought a declaration of parentage, custody, child support and costs.

[22] The Application includes these allegations about Mr. Clarke:

. . . . . .

(e) He exhibits psychological behavioural and cognitive deficits that impact on his ability to parent;

(f) He would appear to lack the ability to plan ahead and exercise the judgment required to meet the needs of the child;

. . . . . .

(h) He lacks the concentration and memory to adequately care for [the child];

. . . . . .

(m) He has a pattern of being verbally abusive with [Ms. Szakacs] and [she] is concerned this will continue with [the child] . . .;

. . . . . .

(o) He has a history of financial mismanagement (found guilty of tax evasion in 2001, has a history of difficulty with creditors . . .);

(p) He has a history of cocaine abuse, has driven his car for long periods of time with a suspended licence, has driven without insurance . . . [Ms. Szakacs] suspects he may still be using cocaine . . .

[23] The only allegation for which there was even a soupçon of credible evidence is the suggestion that Mr. Clarke may be guilty of “financial mismanagement.” But I do not think it is fair to suggest that this is a permanent, persistent or recurring characteristic. He had one failed business venture for which he is still suffering the consequences. As well, he has found it understandably difficult to function in his employment under the burden of these legal proceedings and the 31 court attendances.

(d) Answer

[24] Mr. Clarke filed his Answer – Claim by Respondent on March 23, 2010. He admitted paternity and claimed, among other things, custody (alternatively, joint custody and unsupervised access). It is highly likely that Mr. Clarke, at any time during the 31 court appearances preceding the commencement of the trial, would have been grateful to settle for generous and overnight access and end this ordeal. The hard-nosed tactics of Ms. Szakacs in this litigation have backfired on her but, serendipitously, inured to the benefit of the child.

(e) Reply

[25] On May 26, 2010, Ms. Szakacs delivered a Reply. One passage is educative. It reads, at paragraph 41:

41. In my opinion, and from my professional experience, people with his history and personalities are not capable of establishing a healthy bond with his daughter . . . I am trained and have practiced as a regulated health care professional in Ontario since 1993. My training and job experience have involved performing psychological/mental status and cognitive assessments as well as assessing parenting skills. I personally believe that he has personality disorders.

[26] Reading such condescendingly presumptuous allegations left me shocked, speechless, saddened and shaking my head.

(f) Direction to Canada Revenue Agency

[27] On July 21, 2010, Mr. Clarke signed a Direction to Canada Revenue Agency, authorizing then-counsel for Ms. Szakacs to obtain copies of his “income and deduction printouts showing [his] income as assessed or re-assessed . . . for the following years: 2007, 2008 and 2009.”

(g) Temporary child support and access order

[28] On October 7, 2010, the court made a consent temporary order by which Mr. Clarke was to pay monthly child support of $367.00, on the first of every month commencing on November 1, 2010, based upon his estimated annual gross income of $40,000.

[29] Mr. Clarke was given “two hours of supervised access in a public place” each week. The child, at this point, was aged 20 months.

(h) Motion for s. 30 assessment

[30] By notice of motion dated January 7, 2011, Ms. Szakacs sought an order directing an assessment under s. 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O 1990, c. C.12, as am. (“CLRA”). The order was made on January 18, 2011 and the parties were to “bear the costs of the assessment on an equal basis . . . as a disbursement in these proceedings.”

(i) Section 30 assessor appointed

[31] In an order dated March 10, 2011, Kimberly Chapman was appointed “to assess and report to the court on the needs of the child . . . and the ability and willingness of the parties to satisfy these needs, and specifically on the questions of whether there should be sole or joint custody, what access the [father] ought to have to the child and the terms and conditions of access including the question of whether such access ought to be supervised.”

(j) Jane Lauermeier

[32] Jane Lauermeier, a doctor of naturopathic medicine, provided a report for Ms. Szakacs on January 23, 2013. Ms. Lauermeier was called as a witness by Ms. Szakacs. I found her to be likeable, competent and, most importantly, fair-minded. She described how the child suffers from asthma and identified three primary triggers for that ailment: a head cold that descends into the chest; exposure to allergens; and, stress. She has seen the child in her clinic on many occasions in the period 2009-2014.

[33] Ms. Lauermeier testified that Ms. Szakacs is adequately informed as to the child’s health problems and that she responds to symptoms in a timely and appropriate manner. I accept her testimony.

[34] In cross-examination, Ms. Lauermeier agreed with the suggestion by Mr. Clarke that the asthma “is under control.” Mr. Clarke showed to her a letter from Dr. M. Burger, a St. Catharines pediatrician, dated March 20, 2014. It reads:

To whom it may concern:

This letter is to certify that [the child] has asthma fairly well controlled on QVAR 50 taken twice a day. She is well enough to stay overnight or for the weekend with her father, Donovan Clarke, in Toronto, as long as her prescribed medications are administered.

[35] Ms. Lauermeier agreed with the opinion of Dr. Burger. As one of my progress reports to the parties during the trial, I advised them that this was the most important piece of evidence I had heard that day. (Ms. Szakacs was opposed to Mr. Clarke having overnight access because she thinks he is incapable of managing the child’s asthma and otherwise is an inept parent.)

(k) Preliminary s. 30 assessment report

[36] On February 22, 2013, Kimberly Chapman provided a preliminary s. 30 assessment report in which one of her recommendations was that Mr. Clarke be permitted unsupervised access to the child “two full days each week.” She stated:

. . . I have reviewed two years’ worth of supervised access notes which indicate [Mr. Clarke] has attended consistently and demonstrated child-focused interactions with the child . . . [but] overnight access is not being recommended at this time.

[37] By then, the child was four years of age.

[38] Ms. Chapman referred to her recommendations as “Phase I” and that, once implemented, she “would become re-involved in approximately July 2013 to determine how things have progressed and [to] evaluate [the] next steps.”

[39] Unhappy with the recommendations of Ms. Chapman, Ms. Szakacs swore an affidavit on February 26, 2013, stating: “I have concerns regarding her [Ms. Chapman’s] standards of practice.” Ms. Szakacs went so far as to make enquires to the College of Social Workers about Ms. Chapman.

[40] Ms. Chapman was never asked to complete her assessment. Ms. Szakacs had no desire to hear any more inconvenient truths.

[41] It is at least interesting to note that, in an e-mail from Ms. Szakacs to Mr. Clarke on July 23, 2012, in response to an offer to settle from him (the contents of which I am unaware) and seven months before the preliminary s. 30 assessment report was rendered, she said:

I would like to continue with the section 30 assessment and hear the recommendations of Kim Chapman, Social Worker – I think we are very fortunate to have access to that type of expertise and trust her recommendations will help us move forward.

(l) Criminal records check

[42] Because Ms. Szakacs repeatedly alleged that Mr. Clarke had a criminal record, he obtained a Police Criminal Records Check from the York Regional Police dated March 18, 2013, which was negative for a criminal record. She does not accept the accuracy of that document.

(m) Court order May 9, 2013 (unsupervised access)

[43] On May 9, 2013, the court made a temporary order granting unsupervised access “on Tuesdays from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. to be exercised in the Niagara Region.”

[44] The “access exchange” was to be “through the Supervised Access Exchange Program, or from the daycare, if the child attends on an access day.”

[45] The order further provided, in part:

4. [Mr. Clarke] shall attend at the child’s doctor, Dr. Whitty, and the child’s naturopathic doctor, Jane Lauermeier, to obtain information directly from them as to the child’s health difficulties and treatment protocols.

5. [Ms. Szakacs] shall prepare [for Mr. Clarke] a package of information regarding the child’s health . . .

. . . . . .

7. On consent, [Mr. Clarke] shall submit to drug testing with the cost of same to be paid by [Ms. Szakacs].

8. . . . the child . . . shall remain in the custody and care of [Ms. Szakacs].

[46] Ms. Lauermeier met with Mr. Clarke, at her clinic, on May 28, 2013 and found him to be “pleasant” and “interested” in the health difficulties of the child. Mr. Clarke purchased a quantity of naturopathic remedies.

[47] Mr. Clarke also met with Dr. Whitty.

(n) Drug test

[48] Ms. Szakacs insisted that Mr. Clarke was a non-prescription drug user. He submitted to drug testing on August 22, 2013. The results were negative. A copy of the results of a controlled substance test from a Toronto laboratory was attached as an exhibit to an affidavit from Mr. Clarke. Ms. Szakacs remains unconvinced.

(o) Motion to adjourn trial

[49] On December 7, 2013, counsel then acting for Ms. Szakacs moved for an adjournment of the trial which had been set for the week of January 13, 2014.

[50] The matter was adjourned to the sittings commencing April 14, 2014.

(p) Second motion to adjourn trial

[51] By notice of motion dated April 4, 2014, Ms. Szakacs, once more self-represented, asked for, and obtained, another adjournment of her trial.

(q) Third motion to adjourn trial

[52] When the matter came before me on November 12, 2014, Ms. Szakacs again moved to adjourn the trial. One reason given was that she wanted to hire a lawyer. As Ms. Szakacs already had been represented by four different counsel of record, I dismissed her motion. The trial began.

(r) Unfairness

[53] One of the most notable features of the testimony from Ms. Szakacs was her refusal to admit anything negative about herself or to concede anything positive about Mr. Clarke. In my experience, this absence of fair-mindedness is one of the hallmarks of an untruthful witness. I will give six examples (but there are more):

(a) At the conclusion of her testimony in-chief, I asked Ms. Szakacs whether she would be happy if the child turned out to be just like her. She answered, without hesitation, “Yes.” I then reviewed the evidence of her life between the ages of 32 and 40 and inquired whether it showed good judgment. Her rambling answer ended with, “I cannot judge myself.”

(b) In her tote box of files were some handwritten notes that she made of something the child said on one occasion. Ms. Szakacs had her 13-year-old son sign the notes as a witness. When I expressed surprise that she would involve her son in this litigation, she would not concede that it was wrong to have done so.

(c) In explaining why she was not employed, Ms. Szakacs referred to the time-consuming and stressful nature of this almost-five-year application. When I reminded her that Mr. Clarke had described his difficulty in “holding it together” and selling real estate with those same burdens, she refused to acknowledge that they were acceptable excuses for his drop in income in the years 2009-2013.

(d) When questioned about her life between the ages of 32 and 40, she testified that she had changed and is now a better person. I said to her: “So, people can change. For example, over time, some people become better fathers?” She refused to concede that this applied to Mr. Clarke.

(e) Mr. Clarke and his parents were late arriving from Toronto for the christening of the child. Ms. Szakacs holds a grudge about that to this day (and is oblivious to how badly Mr. Clarke and his parents may feel).

(f) Early in their relationship, Mr. Clarke borrowed some money from Ms. Szakacs (for which she had him sign formal promissory notes). She complained about this from the date that her Application was issued to her last words in the witness box, even though the money was fully repaid, with interest, within one year. Why was she upset? Because the money to repay her had come from Mr. Clarke’s mother.

(s) The witnesses

[54] In addition to Jane Lauermeier, whom I have mentioned, Ms. Szakacs called two further witnesses: Heather Ranger and Lindsay Morton.

[55] Heather Ranger, who has a Masters in Social Work, runs a marvellous youth diversion program. She has known Ms. Szakacs for five years. Lindsay Morton met Ms. Szakacs approximately three years ago at a church group. I found that both of these witnesses fairly answered the questions put to them, but did not shed light on the key issues in the case. They do not know Mr. Clarke.

[56] Mr. Clarke called Christine Stark as a witness. She is the manager of a valuable facility that provides supervised access services. She was a very good witness. Before Ms. Stark was brought into the courtroom, I told the parties that if they did not challenge the statement by Kimberly Chapman (in her preliminary s. 30 assessment report of February 22, 2013) that she had “reviewed two years’ worth of supervised access notes which indicate [Mr. Clarke] has attended consistently and demonstrated child-focused interactions with the child,” I did not see what Ms. Stark could add to the proceedings. Ms. Szakacs objected and so Ms. Stark testified. Her evidence was as expected. She did, however, helpfully add that during the supervised access regime there were “a lot of last-minute cancelations by mother,” thereby corroborating the testimony of Mr. Clarke.

(t) The income of the parties

[57] Ms. Szakacs has not made an effort to obtain employment, even though the child is in all-day kindergarten. She gave her potential income range as $30,000-$50,000, yet she has earned more than that amount in other years. She did not give credible evidence to justify her current absence from the workforce. Consequently, commencing in 2015, I shall impute an annual income to her of $40,000 for the purposes of calculating her contribution toward special or extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg 391/97, as amended (“Guidelines”).

[58] The evidence of Mr. Clarke’s income is entirely unsatisfactory. I accept his testimony that he has found the court proceedings to be time-consuming and stressful (as I have mentioned, the parties had 31 court attendances prior to the start of the trial) such that his ability to work has been affected. However, it is the lack of proper income tax returns and related documentation with which I find fault, not his level of earnings. He estimates his current annual income to be $75,000 and Ms. Szakacs (in her only conciliatory act during the trial) is prepared to accept the accuracy of that figure for now until Mr. Clarke is able to provide proper proof. Consequently, the child support order that I intend to make will be temporary, with the matter to come before me if it turns out that, once Mr. Clarke has produced his full income tax returns and notices of assessment or re-assessment, either side wishes to seek a different award or a different commencement date. I have, with more arbitrariness than reason, selected January 1, 2013 as the commencement date for my temporary child support order, thereby replacing, as of that date, the order of October 7, 2010.

[59] It is important that Mr. Clarke provide full particulars of the employment-related expenses and deductions that he has claimed on his income tax returns, in order for his adjusted income to be determined for Guidelines purposes.

[60] There must be some sanction imposed for Mr. Clarke’s failure to meet his income disclosure obligations in this case. If he were seeking relief in respect of property or assets I would dismiss his claims in that regard. However, as his claims relate to the child, their dismissal would not be in her best interests. The only sanction remaining, apart from judicial finger wagging, is to deprive him of the award of costs to which he otherwise would be entitled in having succeeded with his claim for joint custody and overnight access (claims which Ms. Szakacs bitterly contested throughout). As there were periods of time when Mr. Clarke was represented by a lawyer (and bearing in mind his expenses in travelling from Toronto to the courthouse in St. Catharines on 31 occasions), those costs would have been thousands of dollars.

(u) Life insurance

[61] The financial statement (Form 13) filed by Mr. Clarke shows two policies of life insurance (AIG Life and Toronto Real Estate Board). Currently, the beneficiary of both is his mother, Verna Clarke. In his evidence he stated that he was agreeable to having the policies changed to show the beneficiary as his mother, in trust for the child. That was not enough for Ms. Szakacs, who indelicately grilled Mr. Clarke on the health of his mother, and suggested that her life expectancy was not sufficiently long to merit her role as a beneficiary. While convinced that his mother is in good health, Mr. Clarke, nevertheless, has agreed to name someone else as an alternate beneficiary to his mother, but still in trust for the child.

(v) Custody

[62] In determining custody and access, I have considered the various factors in s. 24(2) of the CLRA (most of which are not terribly applicable in the circumstances of this case). I have been particularly influenced by the evidence of Mr. Clarke’s character, his bond with the child and the likely positive influence to be provided by his parents and other relatives.

[63] The evidence does not reveal anything in the past conduct of the parties that is relevant to the issues of custody and access (s. 24(3)).

[64] There is no evidence of physical violence and abuse and no credible evidence of psychological violence and abuse (s. 24(4)).

[65] In the eyes of friends, family, school officials and the community in general, an access parent is viewed as inferior to a custodial parent. It is never in the best interests of a child to have one of his or her parents considered as inferior to the other. Therefore, I begin with the presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of the child of these parties and then I look for evidence to the contrary, such as disqualifying conduct by, or characteristics of, Mr. Clarke. Here, there is no such contrary evidence.

[66] This trial does not contain the typical evidence of a complete inability to communicate and neither side credibly professed such a failing. There is no evidence that the parties speak derogatorily of the other in the presence of the child.

[67] It cannot be said that the parties lack the ability to co-operate, because co-operation has hardly been tried. Ms. Szakacs, to use a vernacularism, has called the shots from the beginning and Mr. Clarke has complied. Ms. Szakacs should not be rewarded for her arrogant and one-sided treatment of Mr. Clarke. Once Mr. Clarke is given a voice (as I intend to do) an acceptable level of co-operation is more than feasible. Indeed, I think that Mr. Clarke will be an effective stabilizing force in what is now a non-benevolent dictatorship.

[68] Of some importance is the fact that a joint custody order will prevent the efforts of Ms. Szakacs to limit and marginalize Mr. Clarke’s relationship with the child. Mr. Clarke has much to offer as a parent.

[69] The fact that an order for joint custody will ensure that the child experiences her full cultural inheritance is a bonus (not a determining factor).

[70] Fortunately, Mr. Clarke has a bond with his daughter (despite the efforts of Ms. Szakacs) and it will grow stronger. She enjoys being with him and benefits from that relationship. Although Ms. Szakacs has shamefully manipulated the access regime to this point, no permanent harm to the father-daughter relationship has resulted. Had this litigation not occurred for a few more years (which seems to have been the agenda of Ms. Szakacs), I expect that there would be permanent harm and her goal achieved: fatherless parenting.

[71] It is in the best interests of this child to be in the joint custody of her parents.

(w) The no-trespass letters

[72] I mentioned the no-trespass letters earlier. After the completion of their closing submissions, and while I was telling the parties of the access orders that I would be making pending the release of these Reasons, and the fact that the access pick-ups and drop-offs would be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs, she advised that, if they occurred there, Mr. Clarke would be arrested. She provided copies of two letters. The first was from Carilyn Jessome, the treasurer of Greenvale Co-operative Homes, addressed to Mr. Clarke. It is dated November 18, 2014 (the fourth day of trial) and reads:

By order of the board of directors of Greenvale Co-operative Homes Inc. upon receipt of this letter you are no longer allowed on the property known as 61 Francis Creek Blvd., St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada L2W 1B8, or of that known as Greenvale Co-operative Homes.

From this date forward should you be witnessed on Greenvale’s property, at any time, the Niagara Regional Police will be notified and will act as Greenvale’s agent in enforcing this order under the Trespass to Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21.

You will be arrested and removed from Greenvale’s property.

[73] The second letter, also dated November 18, 2014, was from Douglas G. Sider, housing manager of Greenvale Co-operative Homes, addressed to “Staff Sergeant, Niagara Regional Police, Church Street Headquarters, St. Catharines”:

Please accept this request to act on behalf of Greenvale Co-operative Homes with respect to the Trespass to Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21 in regards to a Mr. Donovan Washington Clarke, residing at 3308-16 Brookers Lane, Toronto, M8V 0A5.

Mr. Clarke has been served with a notice at his home address by regular mail. Should Mr. Clarke be found on our property at 61 Francis Creek Blvd., in St. Catharines, L2W 1B8, we will inform you immediately and request that he be removed.

[74] I was greatly concerned with the timing of, and basis for, this correspondence. Did Greenvale Co-operative Homes (“Greenvale”) possess evidence that was relevant to my custody and access disposition? Why was Mr. Clarke being treated as if he were a criminal? Is it in the best interests of the child that her father be so treated and that she be forced to endure access pick-ups and drop-offs in donut shops and retail parking lots as if a drug transaction were in progress? Is a housing co-operative entitled to interfere with what a court considers to be in the best interests of a child? Were Ms. Szakacs and Greenvale obstructing the work of the court? In its dealings with Mr. Clarke, was Greenvale required to observe the principles of natural justice, such as procedural fairness?

[75] I directed that the following letter be sent to Greenvale on December 5, 2014, ordering Ms. Jessome and Mr. Sider to attend before me on December 23rd:

By order of The Honourable Mr. Justice J.W. Quinn, Carilyn Jessome (Treasurer) and Douglas G. Sider (House Manager), are required to attend court Tuesday, December 23, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., and bring with them all notes, letters, documents, memoranda and minutes relating to the issuance of a No Trespass Notice (“Notice”) to Donovan Washington Clarke on November 18, 2014. If Greenvale has a lawyer, it is recommended that he or she also be in attendance.

It is expected that the following points will be addressed:

▪ The ability of the court to call its own witnesses in a custody/access case pursuant to its parens patriae jurisdiction: see Stefureak v. Chambers, 2005 CanLII 16092 (ON SC), [2005] O.J. No. 1962 (Ont. S.C.J.).

▪ What evidence did Greenvale rely upon when issuing the Notice?

▪ Was Greenvale aware that the Notice was issued in the midst of an ongoing trial?

▪ What occurred or was learned that prompted the Notice on November 18, 2014 that had not occurred or was not known earlier?

▪ Was the purpose of the Notice to thwart the ability of the court to make an order permitting access pick-ups and drop-offs?

▪ Was Greenvale aware that the Notice would have the effect of thwarting an anticipated order by the court?

▪ Is Greenvale, by its creation and nature, an entity that is required to adhere to the rules of natural justice (e.g., to hear both sides)?

▪ Does the court have jurisdiction to strike the Notice?

[76] On December 23rd, Brent Harasym, a Niagara Falls lawyer, attended court as counsel for Greenvale. Also present were Ms. Jessome, Mr. Sider and Mr. Clarke. Absent was Ms. Szakacs, who, no doubt, could not face her unmasking. Greenvale would soon learn that it had been manipulated by her into issuing the no-trespass letters.

[77] In a family trial involving custody and access, I am not at the mercy of the parties, but may call, as witnesses, anyone who might have information relevant to the best interests of the child. Greenvale is such a witness.

[78] I outlined, for everyone in attendance, my three primary concerns.

(1) In issuing the no-trespass letters, did Greenvale rely upon anything other than information provided by Ms. Szakacs? If it did, I wanted to know the particulars.

[79] After hearing from Mr. Sider and receiving the submissions of Mr. Harasym, I was satisfied that Greenvale relied only upon information from Ms. Szakacs and, at the time, had no reason to doubt its accuracy.

(2) Did Greenvale and Ms. Szakacs obstruct justice in violation of s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code? The relevant facts are these:

(a) Ms. Szakacs has resided at Greenvale since 2009. No-trespass letters had never previously been issued.

(b) The trial began on November 12, 2014 and continued on November 14th, 17th, 18thand 25th. The no-trespass letters were issued on November 18th, at a time when Ms. Szakacs was well aware that the trial was not unfolding in her favour. She knew that Mr. Clarke would be awarded joint custody and that he would be given generous and overnight access (all of which Ms. Szakacs had bitterly contested for almost five years).

(c) Nothing had occurred to warrant the no-trespass letters.

(d) The no-trespass letters had the effect of obstructing justice, as they thwarted the access orders of this court.

[80] Because Ms. Jessome, Mr. Sider and Greenvale were unaware of the full circumstances surrounding the request by Ms. Szakacs for the no-trespass letters, they had no ulterior motive and lacked any intent to obstruct. However, the same cannot be said of Ms. Szakacs. She was fully cognizant of the surrounding circumstances and intended for the no-trespass letters to obstruct the anticipated orders of this court. I shall give thought as to whether a copy of these Reasons should be sent to the Crown Attorney at St. Catharines for whatever investigation or prosecution he considers appropriate in respect of Ms. Szakacs.

(3) My third concern involves a co-mingling of property rights and parens patriae considerations. Does this court have jurisdiction to quash the no-trespass letters issued by Greenvale? And, was Ms. Szakacs required to seek leave of the court before instructing Greenvale to issue the no-trespass letters, as those letters would interfere with and thwart access orders about to be made in the best interests of the child?

[81] Greenvale is created pursuant to the Co-operative Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.35. There is a public component to Greenvale. It relies upon government funding. In my opinion, it does not have the same unfettered freedoms and protections enjoyed by a non-public, private property owner. The parens patriae jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Justice allows the court to go behind the no-trespass letters to obtain a full evidentiary record and, if deemed to be in the best interests of the child, to quash the letters. Furthermore, Ms. Szakacs should not be allowed to accomplish deceitfully what she could not obtain openly in this court.

[82] I was relieved when counsel advised that Greenvale, now aware of the full facts, wished to rescind the no-trespass letters. Mr. Sider said that he expected the board of directors to pass the necessary resolution later that day. (I subsequently learned that, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Greenvale representatives, Ms. Jessome and Mr. Sider, in a clearly classy gesture, crossed the courtroom floor and shook the hand of Mr. Clarke).

[83] In the event of a change in circumstances, Greenvale shall not be entitled to issue new no-trespass letters based solely on the word of Ms. Szakacs. She must obtain leave of the court allowing her to request such letters.

[84] It is unfortunate that Greenvale, a reputable housing co-operative, was drawn into these proceedings. Greenvale was manipulated by Ms. Szakacs. Although the issue was not raised before me, I volunteer the opinion that Ms. Szakacs should be required to reimburse Greenvale for any legal expenses it has incurred.

3. Conclusion and orders

[85] By way of conclusion, I make the declaration and orders found in Schedule “A” to these Reasons, all of which are final except as to the amount and commencement date for child support (see paragraphs 4.4 and 4.5 of Schedule “A”).

_______________________________

The Honourable Mr. Justice J.W. Quinn

RELEASED: December 30, 2014





Schedule “A”

Parentage

1.0 THIS COURT DECLARES, on consent, and pursuant to Part III of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O 1990, c. C.12, as am., that Mr. Clarke is the biological father of the child, Madelyn Hazel Marucia Clarke, born, February 6, 2009.

Custody and related matters

THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:

2.0 The parties shall have joint custody.

2.1 The child shall reside primarily with Ms. Szakacs (sometimes referred to herein as the “mother”).

2.2 Both parties shall be listed as emergency contacts with the child’s school or other organizations involved with the child.

2.3 The parties shall notify each other immediately if the child experiences a medical emergency.

2.4 Both parties have the right to make emergency medical decisions respecting the child while she is in their care, but shall attempt to reach the other party before doing so.

2.5 The child’s health card shall travel with her between the residences of the parties.

2.6 Mr. Clarke has the right to consult with, and obtain information, records, and report cards directly from, the child’s teachers, doctors and any other professionals involved with the child concerning her health, education and general welfare.

2.7 In the event that any professional involved with the child requires the consent of the other party before providing information, the other party shall provide and execute all necessary consents when requested to do so.

2.8 Neither party shall schedule activities for the child during the other party’s time with the child unless the other party has agreed in advance, and such agreement shall not be unreasonably withheld.

2.9 Should either party be unable to care for the child for one or more days of their time with the child, they shall give the other party the option of caring for the child before arranging babysitting or childcare.

2.10 The parties shall keep each other informed about their residential address, telephone number and e-mail address and shall notify the other party within 24 hours of any changes.

2.11 The parties shall convey any necessary information about the child by e-mail and they shall maintain functioning e-mail addresses.

2.12 Ms. Szakacs shall immediately notify the child’s school that Mr. Clarke has joint custody and is entitled to pick up the child at school.

Financial disclosure

THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:

3.0 By July 1, 2015, Ms. Szakacs shall provide to Mr. Clarke a copy of her résumé, a list of all places or persons to whom she applied for employment in the preceding six months, with dates and contact information, and a copy of all responses received and she shall do likewise on January 1, 2016 and every six months thereafter until such time as she obtains full-time employment.

3.1 If Ms. Szakacs obtains employment, she shall, within thirty (30) days thereof, advise Mr. Clarke in writing of the name and address of the employer, the salary or rate of pay earned on a monthly basis or, if self-employed, monthly statements showing receipts and expenses.

3.2 Mr. Clarke shall, by July 1, 2015, provide copies of his income tax returns for 2010-2014, inclusive, along with copies of all schedules, attachments and slips and notices of assessment or re-assessment provided by Canada Revenue Agency for 2010-2014, inclusive, and particulars of all expenses and deductions claimed in his income tax returns for those same years.

3.3 Commencing in 2016, and for as long as Mr. Clarke is obligated to pay child support, both parties shall, by July 1st of each year, provide copies of their income tax returns, along with copies of all schedules, attachments and slips and notices of assessment or re-assessment provided by Canada Revenue Agency for the preceding taxation year along with any other income information required by s. 21-s. 24, inclusive, and Schedule III of the Guidelines.

Child support

THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:

4.0 Commencing January 1, 2013, and on the first day of each month thereafter, Mr. Clarke shall, pursuant to the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, pay to Ms. Szakacs support for the child in the amount of $682.00, in accordance with the Guidelines based upon an annual Guidelines income for Mr. Clarke of $75,000.

4.1 The obligation of Mr. Clarke to pay child support as set out above shall continue until:

(a) further order of the Court;

(b) the parties file with the court a Form 15D: Consent Motion to Change Child Support;

(c) the child is no longer a minor or enrolled in full-time education;

(d) the child is no longer entitled to support pursuant to provincial or federal legislation.

4.2 Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed.

4.3 A support deduction order shall issue.

4.4 Because the income disclosure by Mr. Clarke is incomplete, this child support order is temporary. If, following full disclosure, either party feels that the $75,000 income of Mr. Clarke, the amount of child support or the commencement date for the child support, is incorrect or otherwise unfair, the matter may be returned before me for completion of the trial and the making of a final child support order. The party wishing to do so shall write to the trial co-ordinator at St. Catharines and ask for a hearing date.

4.5 This temporary child support order shall continue in full force and effect until such time as it is replaced or changed by another court order.

Special or extraordinary expenses

THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:

5.0 Based upon an annual Guidelines income imputed to Ms. Szakacs of $40,000, she shall be responsible for 35% of all special or extraordinary expenses associated with the child and Mr. Clarke shall be responsible for 65%, based upon his annual Guidelines income of $75,000.

5.1 Such expenses shall include:

(a) childcare expenses incurred as a result of the employment of Ms. Szakacs, net of any subsidies, benefits or income tax deductions or credits (s. 7(1)(a) and s. 7(3) of the Guidelines);

(b) reasonable and medically justified health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement (s. 7(1)(c) of the Guidelines);

(c) expenses for post-secondary education, after considering the contribution of the child (s. 7(1)(e) and s. 7(2) of the Guidelines);

(d) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities of the child (s. 7(1)(f) of the Guidelines).

5.2 Ms. Szakacs shall provide Mr. Clarke with full particulars of any childcare expenses and health-related expenses for the child, including invoices and receipts.

5.3 Ms. Szakacs shall inform Mr. Clarke, in advance, of any extracurricular activities for which the child is enrolled and provide, in advance, full particulars of the actual or anticipated associated expenses.

Benefits and Life Insurance

THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:

6.0 Mr. Clarke shall maintain coverage for the child under any health benefits plan available to him through his employment.

6.1 Mr. Clarke shall, by March 1, 2015, provide to Ms. Szakacs a copy of any benefits booklet or brochure from his employer or, if such a publication does not exist, with full particulars in writing of all benefits available for the child.

6.2 Mr. Clarke shall change the beneficiary of all existing policies insuring his life to his mother, Verna Clarke, and another relative, in trust for the child, with such policies to stand as security for his child support obligation and he shall provide Ms. Szakacs with documentary proof thereof by July 1, 2015 and at any time thereafter, upon reasonable request.

Access for 2015

THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:

7.0 Mr. Clarke shall have access to the child in 2015 as follows:

Date Mr. Clarke to pick up child Mr. Clarke to return child 2015 Friday January 2 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. on Saturday January 3 Wednesday January 7 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday January 16 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. on Saturday January 17 Wednesday January 21 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday January 30 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. on Saturday January 31 Wednesday February 4 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m.

7.1 Commencing on February 13, 2015, mid-week access shall continue and week-end access shall be extended to Sunday:

Date Mr. Clarke to pick up child Mr. Clarke to return child Friday February 13 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday February 15 Wednesday February 18 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday February 27 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday March 1 Wednesday March 4 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday March 13 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday March 15 Wednesday March 18 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday March 27 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday March 29 Wednesday April 1 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Good Friday April 3 at mother’s residence at 10:00 a.m. to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. on Easter Sunday April 5

7.2 Commencing on April 10, 2015, mid-week access shall continue and week-end access shall be extended to Monday:

Date Mr. Clarke to pick up child Mr. Clarke to return child Friday April 10 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning April 13 Wednesday April 15 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday April 24 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning April 27 Wednesday April 29 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Wednesday May 6 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. (Mother’s Day being May 10) Friday May 15 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. on Monday May 18 (Victoria Day) Wednesday May 20 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday May 29 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning June 1 Wednesday June 3 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday June 12 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning June 15 Wednesday June 17 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Sunday June 21 (Father’s Day) at the mother’s residence at 10:00 a.m. to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday June 26 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning June 29

7.3 For the months of July and August, 2015, Mr. Clarke shall have access during alternate weeks as follows, with all pick-ups and drop-offs to be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs:

Date Mr. Clarke to pick up child Mr. Clarke to return child July 6-13 Monday July 6 at 10:00 a.m. Monday July 13 at 10:00 a.m. July 20-27 Monday July 20 at 10:00 a.m. Monday July 27 at 10:00 a.m. August 3-10 Monday August 3 at 10:00 a.m. Monday August 10 at 10:00 a.m. August 17-24 Monday August 17 at 10:00 a.m. Monday August 24 at 10:00 a.m.

7.4 After Labour Day, September 7th, and for the balance of 2015, access shall be as follows:

Date Mr. Clarke to pick up child Mr. Clarke to return child Friday September 11 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning September 14 Wednesday September 23 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday September 25 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning September 28 Wednesday October 7 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday October 9 after school at the school at the mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday October 11 (October 12 being Thanksgiving) Wednesday October 21 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday October 23 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning October 26 Wednesday November 4 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday November 6 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning November 9 Wednesday November 11 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday November 20 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning November 23 Wednesday November 25 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday December 4 after school at the school at the school on Monday morning December 7 Wednesday December 9 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Friday December 18 after school at the school to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Sunday December 20 Friday December 25 at mother’s residence at 1:00 p.m. to mother’s residence at 7:00 p.m. Saturday December 26

Access for 2016 and thereafter

THIS COURT ORDERS:

Mid-week access

8.0 Commencing on Wednesday, January 6, 2016, and on alternate Wednesdays thereafter, Mr. Clarke shall have access from after school (with pick-ups at the school) until 7:00 p.m. (with drop-offs at the residence of Ms. Szakacs).

Weekend access (January-March, April-June, September-December)

9.0 Commencing on Friday, January 8, 2016, and on alternate Fridays thereafter, Mr. Clarke shall have access from after school on Friday (with pick-ups at the school):

(a) until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday (with drop-offs at the residence of Ms. Szakacs) for the months January-March, inclusive.

(b) until school Monday morning (with drop-offs at the school) for the months April-June and September-December, inclusive,.

The child’s birthday

10.0 The child shall spend her birthday with the parent she is scheduled to be with on that day.

March break

11.0 Commencing in 2016, and in even-numbered years thereafter, Mr. Clarke shall have access during March Break from Monday at 10:00 a.m. until Friday at 7:00 p.m., with pick-ups and drop-offs to be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs.

11.1 Commencing in 2017, and in odd-numbered years, the child shall be with the mother during March Break from Monday at 10:00 a.m. until Friday at 7:00 p.m.

11.2 March Break access shall supersede all other access that would otherwise take place during those days of the week.

Easter

12.0 In even-numbered years, commencing in 2016, Mr. Clarke shall have access from Easter Sunday at 7:00 p.m. until Easter Monday at 6:00 p.m.

12.1 In odd-numbered years, commencing in 2017, Mr. Clarke shall have access from Good Friday at 10:00 a.m. until Easter Sunday at 7:00 p.m.

12.2 All pick-ups and drop-offs shall be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs.

12.3 Easter access shall supersede all other access that would otherwise take place on those days of the week.

Mother’s Day and Father’s Day

13.0 Commencing in 2016, regardless of the regularly scheduled access, the child shall spend Mother’s Day with Ms. Szakacs, from 10:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., and Father’s Day with Mr. Clarke, from 10:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.

July and August

14.0 Commencing in 2016 and thereafter, during the months of July and August of each year, Mr. Clarke shall be entitled to alternate weeks of Monday to Monday access, with pick-ups to be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs on Monday at 10:00 a.m. and drop-offs to be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs on the following Monday at 10:00 a.m..

Thanksgiving

15.0 Commencing in 2016, and in even numbered years thereafter, Mr. Clarke shall have access on Thanksgiving from 10:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., with pick-ups and drop-offs to be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs.

15.1 In odd-numbered years, commencing in 2017, if Thanksgiving falls on a Monday for which Mr. Clarke has regularly scheduled week-end access, he shall return the child to the residence of the mother at 10:00 a.m. on Thanksgiving.

Christmas

16.0 In even-numbered years, commencing in 2016, Mr. Clarke shall have access from December 24th at 10:00 a.m. until December 25th at 1:00 p.m.

16.1 In odd-numbered years, commencing in 2017, his access shall be from December 25th at 1:00 p.m. until December 27th at 10:00 a.m.

16.2 All pick-ups and drop-offs shall be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs.

16.3 Christmas access shall supersede all other access that would otherwise take place on those days of the week.

General access provisions for 2015, 2016 and thereafter

Non-school days

17.0 If the child is not required to attend school on any access Wednesday, the pickup shall be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs at 10:00 a.m. on that Wednesday.

17.1 If the child is not required to attend school on any access Friday, the pickup shall be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs at 10:00 a.m. on that Friday.

17.2 If the child is not required to attend school on any access Monday, the drop-off shall be at the residence of Ms. Szakacs at 7:00 p.m. on that Monday.

Other access

18.0 Mr. Clarke shall be entitled to any other access as agreed by the parties in writing or as confirmed by e-mail.

18.1 The child shall have reasonable e-mail, internet and telephone contact with the parent with whom she is not staying.

Make-up access

19.0 If Ms. Szakacs cancels any access, Mr. Clarke shall be entitled to double make-up access unless Ms. Szakacs establishes that the child was ill, in which case Mr. Clarke shall be entitled to straight one-for-one make-up access.

Time with Mr. Clarke’s relatives

20.0 When the child is with Mr. Clarke, his parents and relatives are entitled to reasonable access with the child.





CITATION: Szakacs v. Clarke, 2014 ONSC 7487

COURT FILE NO.: 128/10

DATE: 2014/12/30

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: CLARISSA OLENKA SZAKACS Self-represented - and - DONOVAN WASHINGTON CLARKE Self-represented REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Quinn J.

Released: December 30, 2014