Over the summer, numerous clubs have made tactically interesting managerial appointments, with Marseille bringing in El Loco Marcelo Bielsa and Van Gaal moving to Manchester after a successful World Cup. However, a more off-the-radar move may prove to be the most, as Bayer Leverkusen made the appointment of one of Europe’s most tactically-exciting managers in Roger Schmidt.

In the 2013/2014 season, Schmidt had made Red Bull Salzburg into one of the most aggressive sides in Europe, as they dominated the Austrian Bundesliga – winning by 18 points with a +75 goal difference and proved themselves in Europe, beating Ajax 6-1 in aggregate in the round of 32 for the Europa League.

Salzburg became known for their extremely aggressive pressing and all-out-attack style which, as we can see from Leverkusen’s friendlies and opening games, is something Schmidt is bringing with him to the BayArena.

Shape

Around 2-3 years ago, the 4-4-2 system was seen as extinct, with how open it was and how easily it could be dominated by a system with 3 central midfielders (but more importantly how it was so stereotypically ‘English’). In the past season however the 4-4-2 has been successful with teams such as Atlético and Salzburg, largely down to the way it is set out. The great emphasis on the horizontal compaction means that the midfield battle is rarely lost (see the 3-0 defeat of Ajax by Salzburg last year) whilst the narrow wide players mean that the midfield can be supported by the strikers, wide players and at times full-backs. In addition Salzburg, Atlético and now Leverkusen are in possession of excellent pressers (Ilsanker, Rolfes) who can almost make up for the extra player regardless.

Although a 4-2-3-1 on paper, Leverkusen often make a 4-4-2 with 10 Calhanoglu pushing up alongside Kiessling as the front pressers on the centre-backs. Either side play the advanced narrow (half space) wingers Bellarabi and Son, who take the opposition full-backs and if needed provide support to the double 6 in midfield of Rolfes and Castro.

The 1st phase pressing is sometimes assisted by Castro who will pick up any deep-running players from midfield whilst his midfield partner Rolfes sits deeper in anticipation of a long ball and for cover if either full-back (especially Jedvaj) in the press.

Kiessling will press the ball-carrying centre-back in most situations as an individual 1st wave of pressing, although Calhanoglu comes in as a more 1 ½ presser as he delays his press of the other centre-back. His main pressing trigger is the horizontal pass between Kiessling’s CB and his own, which he anticipates excellently and will look to challenge the player just as he receives the ball, causing lots of problems. The true second phase is made by Bellarabi or Son who will press the full-back or support centrally when it’s needed (then the opposition full-back would be taken by Leverkusen’s full-back). Due to the half-space positioning, the wingers can support in 3 areas. 1 – They cover the opposition full-back (see below) and can create effective traps. 2 – They can support to press the centre-back with Kiessling or Calhanoglu if the situation requires. 3 – They can tuck inside lightly more and help cover the centre if the opposition are trying to exploit Leverkusen’s double 6 by overloading the middle. Rolfes and Castro generally man mark to make sure that the centre-backs can’t make direct vertical passes to beat the press and potentially exploit Calhanoglu’s high positioning. By doing this they can also create central pressing traps by just stepping off their man slightly also. Rolfes in particular is a very good presser and good in 1v1 situations so this plays directly to his strengths to create the individual 1v1 from the overall midfield battle. The full-backs are both strong defensively and will follow the opposition winger very closely if he looks to drop deep and support. This does open space up behind them which was quite noticeable in the Europa League game against Kobenhavn where they looked to exploit it on occasions but the centre-backs (especially Toprak) are good at covering any runners. Neither Jedvaj nor Boenisch are ever caught out directly though as they’re very good in 1v1s against the winger and will win the large majority of aerial duels, interceptions and tackles. (below)

Bellarabi tackling Durm for Leverkusen’s 2nd goal

Above is Jedvaj pressing and (successfully) tackling Durm after Castro failed his initial tackle.

During their resting organisation, Leverkusen’s forwards (Kiessling and Calhanoglu) will simply block off any pass into the opposition 6s whilst waiting for the opposition defence to make a mistake, to then start pressing fully again. The staggered central midfield is on show as Simon Rolfes plays a deeper role for any long balls and general insurance, whilst Castro plays a more aggressive role and will press higher up and attack the opposition 6 space more. One of the key aspects in Leverkusen’s excellent space coverage is the positioning of the wingers. Both Son and Bellarabi are more half-space oriented, in a similar way to that of Atlético’s wide players. As a result, they can help to press the 6 space whilst also take a position from which they can cover the wings

In this shape, they can easily set pressing traps both wide and central.

In both the wide and central pressing traps, we can see how the 4-4-2 shape can ‘collapse’ into space very easily, with great compaction which helps stop the opposition from playing.

Pressing Traps

Pressing traps take a great significance in Leverkusen’s new system, as they let the opposition make the mistake.

With defensively strong full-backs and pressing from wingers, Leverkusen are very good at defending the flanks and frequently look to set traps, especially down their right side where the young Tin Jedvaj is excellent at pressing and 1v1 situations meaning it’s rarely played out of.

Whilst covering any vertical passes into the midfield by Sokratis, Calhanoglu and Kiessling adopt a perfect position to counter into if they regain possession early. This is mainly due to the lack of a BVB pivot, as the CBs still split leaving a large space on the edge of the penalty area. In addition they can quickly move inside to intercept any inside pass by BVB’s right-back. Son stayed quite deep off of the BVB RB, giving him space to receive the pass but is very fast to press and denies him any time on the ball, whilst covering the inside pass to Jojic, the same can be said for Calhanoglu who is also in a position to threaten the return pass.

The RB attempts an inside pass but is met by Rolfes and Boenisch moving out to help, the move is stopped and Leverkusen’s pressing trap is successful as they regain the ball.

With good support from the elevated Boenisch and Rolfes moving wide, Leverkusen have created a numerical advantage (5v3) on the flank and intercept an attempted inside pass. On the opposite side, Bellarabi and Castro man mark to ensure no stray Dortmund players can make a break to counter the heavy press and horizontal compaction by Leverkusen. In addition to covering the switch, Bellarabi is in a good position to make an attack in anticipation of his teammates’ regaining position alongside Kiessling and Calhanoglu. We can clearly see from Calhanoglu’s turned body shape the intention to break against Dortmund’s split CBs

The 4-3-3 shape they use to force the opposition wide is very similar to that of Red Bull Salzburg under Schmidt (and Dortmund) as it seems there will be a replication at Leverkusen.

Leverkusen also use more hidden central traps to their advantage which allows them to stop the opposition in the middle and provide opportunities for the counter against a disorganised defence.

In this situation, Leverkusen have setup with 2 potential traps. Sokratis has 2 main passing options with Durm on the touchline and Jojic in the centre. Either way, Leverkusen are able to trap both with Son threatening to intercept the 1st pass or press the backwards pass, whilst Jedvaj’s intelligent positioning gives him freedom to attack Castro whilst still being able to cover Durm. Castro is with Jedvaj and Son and can press Jojic from 3 directions, however the pass still seems possible to Sokratis. This is the option he takes and Jedvaj presses excellently to intercept the ball before it reaches Jojic. Again similarly to the wide pressing traps, the front 3 are all in position to attack BVB’s split 2 should the ball be regained (a poor pass from Jedvaj stopped that from formulating).

Physical Demands

It is clear that Leverkusen are just getting used to the system currently, as the extreme demands of 90 minutes of full pressing is too tasking so far, against Dortmund their shape dropped significantly throughout the second half. Because of this they may look to win games within the first half, however obviously that is not always possible.

A man key in the implementation of the system at Salzburg was Oliver Bartlett, an English fitness coach who Schmidt took from Dortmund to Austria – he follows the previously unknown manager to the BayArena where he will again be vital for getting the players to the condition required to play such a high-octane system.

This image shows the decreasing ability to cover the space as the game goes on, with the shape horizontally open especially across Dortmund’s 6-line.

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