Russian air defense systems are ineffective and fail technically, jeopardizing civilian aircraft.

On January 8, Russian Tor-M1 operated by Iran brought down UAI civil Boeing 737-800 flying from Tehran to Kyiv by two shots. The defeat took place 5 minutes after departure from Imam Khomeini International Airport. The air defense system was located at a military base northwest of the settlement of Parand.

PS752 down. Source: Guardian.

Data analysis indicates that the Tor-M1 was probably in stand-alone mode, into which it was placed shortly before the PS752 took off. At the same time, the Tor-M1 air defense system video released by Russian Zvezda TV channel suggests that the system features the ability to cancel the launch by the operator. Thus, the air defense system operator was able to cancel the shot.

Red button to cancel the shot. Zvezda TV channel.

Tor’s radar screen. Zvezda TV channel.

Russian air defense systems fail technologically in target recognition. MH17 aircraft case shot down by a Russian Buk air defense system and PS752 shot down by a Russian-made Tor-M1 air defense system speak for their inability to distinguish a civil aircraft from a fighter or a cruise missile. Russian air defense systems do not define the target dimension, which is sensitive data in decision making.

In August 2010, an Iranian Air Force F-4 Phantom fighter mistakenly entered a 20-kilometer no-fly zone around the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, which was being guarded by the Iranian armed forces on high alert. Reportedly due to miscommunication, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Tor-M1 units misinterpreted the friendly jet as hostile. The Iranian pilots managed to eject and survive.

Therefore, this case demonstrates problems of “friend or foe” recognition system at least in SAM export models.

On October 4, 2001, the Siberia Airlines Tu-154 aircraft, Tel Aviv-Novosibirsk C flight, was unintentionally shot down by a Russian-made S-200 complex anti-aircraft missile over the Black Sea.

In September 2015, IL-20 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down by Syrian air defense systems by Russian-made S-200 SAM, the Russian Ministry of Defense claims. Russia blamed the incident for Israel, its fighters were allegedly hiding behind the Russian plane. IL-20 was at an altitude of 5000 meters, much higher than Israeli aircraft, that entered at a low altitude from the seaward, and its speed was much lower than that of F-16 fighters. Consequently, it is yet more proof that Russian air defense systems fail in identifying targets by flight altitude, speed and dimension.

Russia continues to spread conspiracy theories as for the third forces implicated, in particular the United States, in a civil aircraft destruction in Iran and criticize Tehran for taking responsibility for the downed aircraft. Such actions of Moscow are due to several factors:

– the desire to avoid responsibility for the downed MH17;

– avoid disclosing the facts of critical technological errors in Russian air defense systems’ design.

The Tor-M1 operated by Iran was probably upgraded between 2008 and 2019.

The Tor-M1 air defense system was shown with an element of the radar system, located next to the missile guidance and tracking station antenna, at 2013 military parade in Tehran. It is most likely a three-coordinate target detection station featuring systems to identify their nationality and stabilize the antenna base.

Tor M1 in Iran, 2013.

Tor M1 in Iran, 2013.

Thus, this air defense system must position the target vertically as well, allowing to determine PS752 climbing.

In 2015, the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol was in talks with Iran to modernize Tor-M1, Russian RIA Novosti reported. Iranian specialists “exploited the equipment professionally”, Vyacheslav Kartashov, the general director assistant who developed the enterprise complex said.

Kartashov also emphasized that the Tor-M1’s main feature was that it had been designed to provide the greatest probability of hitting modern high-precision weapons, today primarily including anti-radar missiles, cruise missiles and guided aerial bombs.

Therefore, the fact that a civil aircraft was hit speaks for serious shortcomings of this SAM. Operating both autonomously or manually, the complex and its crew were unable to determine the nature of the target, its origin (the target appeared within Tehran, it was impossible for other countries to launch from there).

The incident rate involving the civilian aircraft damage by Russian air defense systems indicates that even an in-depth modernization does not assist in technical characteristics’ improvement and the ability to identify targets.According to David Deptula, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant general who was principal attack planner for Operation Desert Storm, surface-to-air missile battery operator typically tries to get positive identification of a suspicious aircraft before firing. Since all commercial airliners have a transponder that sends out unique information about that particular aircraft — known as a squawk — the missile operator should check for this info. If a plane is not transmitting a squawk, the surface-to-air missile operator should check the local flight timetable. If there’s nothing on the flight schedule, he or she should next analyze the flight characteristics of the plane.

Flight plans and transponder codes of all scheduled civilian flights would be shared with military units stationed near an airport.

David Deptula underlines, that SAM crew have an ability to decide Is this airplane coming in at low altitude and high speed while heading toward a sensitive operating area, or is it climbing out on a profile, going through medium altitude at a speed typical of an airliner…and what’s its vector.

The incident occurred five hours after the Iranians launched ballistic missiles against the sites in Iraq, so the [surface-to-air missile] battery operators are at a high-level of alert and sensitivity. So it’s impossible to hypothesize a situation where this target is viewed as an inbound target.

Militaries usually follow specialized checklists to identify objects appearing on a radar screen. There are established procedures to achieve positive verification and positive identification. But Russian SAM systems do not have options to identify targets.

Consequently, Russia is indirectly responsible for PS752 death, since it sold a batch of air defense systems to Iran, unable to identify the targets, not providing the possibility to cancel the launch automatically if the transponder is fixed. In addition, when selling the air defense system, Russia should have foreseen a ban on any structural changes in the air defense system, as well as ensure proper training for the SAM crew, including that of target identification.

Sophisticated air defense systems are getting cheaper and more powerful, and smaller countries purchasing them from manufacturers like Russia may not have the level of training needed to operate them effectively. Air defense analysts wonder if automated systems in the Iranian air defense systems may have triggered the missile that brought down Flight PS752.