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In neither case is it clear what the United States would get in exchange for these major concessions. One version says Putin would promise to withdraw the Russian troops whose presence he denies from eastern Ukraine. Another says Putin would promise, somehow, to contain Iran, a country with which, in Syria, he is allied. Talk of this latter deal dates to the earliest days of the administration, back when Jared Kushner, all those months ago, sought a secret channel of communication with the Russian government.

But all these deals, just like the original Yalta agreement, have at their heart a fatal flaw: They rely on promises from a Russian leader who has never, in Syria, Ukraine or anywhere else, kept his word. In Ukraine he has continued to bankroll the “rebels” who continue to prosecute an illegal war in the east. In Syria he has repeatedly reneged on commitments to lift sieges, allow the delivery of humanitarian aid and deescalate conflict, yet he has paid no price. Even if he wanted to, the idea that he can somehow control Iran is peculiar: The Russian foreign minister has already said that it is “absolutely unrealistic” to expect Iran to remove itself from the conflict. The Russian military doesn’t have the troops for that anyway.

In both Ukraine and Syria, the situation is extremely odd: The United States – still, in theory, the stronger power – appears to be negotiating to give up quite a lot in exchange for very little. The only explanation for U.S. determination to make a lopsided deal is Trump himself. Perhaps he has learned from his experience negotiating with North Korea: In Singapore he endorsed a dictator, got nothing except unenforceable promises and then came home to a hero’s welcome from Fox News. Or perhaps he still feels he owes something, after all, to the man who helped him win the presidency.