PRECISELY what happened behind the barrack gates of a Georgian tank battalion near Tbilisi on May 5th is unclear. The Georgians say they quelled a mutiny and foiled a conspiracy to overthrow President Mikheil Saakashvili, probably inspired by Russian intelligence. Russia, predictably, denied involvement. Then on May 7th protesters from Georgia's opposition, who have been demanding Mr Saakashvili's resignation, clashed with police in Tbilisi in the first outbreak of violence since their demonstrations began in early April.

It is clear that Georgia remains extremely tense. Any provocation could easily become a pretext for renewed conflict. Both Russia and Georgia were quick to link the mutiny to NATO exercises that started in Georgia on May 6th. Georgia said it was a bid to derail the exercises, Russia that it was proof of NATO's folly. Holding the exercises in a psychiatric hospital would be more appropriate than holding them on the territory of the Georgian state, thundered Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's irascible NATO ambassador.

In fact NATO's small exercises were held under its Partnership for Peace programme and planned before last August's war in Georgia. Russia was even invited to participate. Dmitry Medvedev, the Russian president, still called the exercises a provocation. The Russians were also miffed by the expulsion of two Russian diplomats from NATO on suspicion of spying, especially since one of them, Vasily Chizhov, is the son of Russia's ambassador to the EU. In a tit-for-tat, Moscow kicked out two NATO envoys from Canada and pulled out of a NATO-Russia council meeting in Brussels. (Georgia also arrested its former envoy to NATO on spying charges.)

After Mr Medvedev's relatively amicable meeting with Barack Obama a month ago, NATO's actions have caused confusion in Moscow, says Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. Is America serious about improving relations with Russia? Yet this confusion betrays a conviction that any improvement must come from America, leaving Russia free to interfere in its neighbourhood. Even as it complained about NATO's exercises, Russia was deploying border guards in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In early April Georgia detected a build-up of Russian troops and equipment in the two breakaway regions. The Russians, however, said this was merely a military exercise.

Pavel Felgenhauer, an independent military analyst who accurately predicted Russia's war with Georgia in August, says that Russia's troops are still poised for action. The proponents of war, he argues, feel that the West's reaction to the 2008 war was meek. They also note that, despite being called a political corpse by Mr Medvedev, Mr Saakashvili has survived.

Fears of Russia weighed heavily on the minds of those who went to Prague this week to launch the “eastern partnership”, a project meant to improve economic and political relations between the European Union and six former Soviet republics: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. This low-budget project has no military component and may not make much of a difference, says Fyodor Lukyanov, a Russian foreign-policy pundit. Still, Russia sees the EU as a competitor in its sphere of influence and reacts fiercely to any interference, such as Belarus being told that recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia would hurt its prospects with the EU. That the summit was followed by a conference on Nabucco, a gas pipeline meant to bypass Russia in the south, was just another irritation.

Some would like the countries in the eastern partnership to choose between Russia and the EU, said Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, on the eve of the Prague meeting. “We hope…there are no attempts at creating new dividing lines,” he added. Yet drawing new lines is exactly what Russia has done in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is no surprise that Russia's idea of a second Europe centred on Moscow has little appeal to former Soviet republics. Unless the EU can offer tangible benefits to its new partners, however, its own appeal could also quickly wear out.