Undisclosed Debt Sustainability Laura Alfaro Fabio Kanczuk NBER Working Paper No. 26347

Issued in October 2019

NBER Program(s):International Finance and Macroeconomics

Over the past decade, non–Paris Club creditors, notably China, have become an important source of financing for low- and middle-income countries. In contrast with typical sovereign debt, these lending arrangements are not public, and other creditors have no information about their magnitude. We transform the traditional sovereign debt and default model to quantitatively study incomplete information arrangements and find they greatly reduce traditional/Paris Club creditors’ debt sustainability. Disclosure of nontraditional debt would imply significant welfare gains for the recipient countries but would reduce its sustainability. We discuss the implications of nontraditional lending on standard assumptions of sovereign debt models in particular defaulting costs. You may purchase this paper on-line in .pdf format from SSRN.com ($5) for electronic delivery. Access to NBER Papers You are eligible for a free download if you are a subscriber, a corporate associate of the NBER, a journalist, an employee of the U.S. federal government with a ".GOV" domain name, or a resident of nearly any developing country or transition economy. If you usually get free papers at work/university but do not at home, you can either connect to your work VPN or proxy (if any) or elect to have a link to the paper emailed to your work email address below. The email address must be connected to a subscribing college, university, or other subscribing institution. Gmail and other free email addresses will not have access. E-mail:

Acknowledgments Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w26347