One consequence of Johnson’s decision to prorogue Parliament is to make it more likely that there will be a vote of no confidence in the government. Here, too, old constitutional understandings are in doubt. Since the end of the Second World War, there has been only one instance of a government losing a vote of no confidence. That was in 1979, when Prime Minister James Callaghan lost. At that time, Callaghan effectively had a choice: He could resign immediately, or he could ask the queen to dissolve Parliament for a general election. He chose the latter. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, however, now requires a 14-day period following a vote of no confidence in which the Commons can pass a vote of confidence either in the existing government or in an alternative government led by someone whom MPs have recommended to the queen. If neither occurs, Parliament will be dissolved.

Whichever of those options happens, there is plenty of room for more constitutional crises. Senior figures in No. 10 have given clear signals, reported in the media, that Johnson would not resign in the event of a no-confidence vote. If the Commons expresses its confidence in someone else, then for Johnson to stay would be, as former Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind put it, “the gravest constitutional crisis since the actions of Charles I led to the Civil War.” The last monarch who dismissed an administration was King William IV in 1834. It would be less controversial for Queen Elizabeth II to dismiss Johnson. Arguably, it would be her constitutional duty. But it would still politicize the monarchy.

If there’s to be an election, Johnson could play fast and loose with the constitution in other ways. He might, for example, choose an election date after the October 31 deadline for Britain to leave the EU, allowing Brexit to happen by default during an election campaign. That would be reckless in the extreme—including for Johnson’s chances of securing an overall majority. Would it also be unconstitutional? During election campaigns, there are so-called caretaker conventions, according to which the government should not make any controversial decisions that would bind a future government. The government would be right to insist that a no-deal Brexit is the legal default, but that does not necessarily mean there would be no duty on the government to change it. If Johnson loses a vote of no confidence, it would be because MPs had rejected a no-deal Brexit. Whatever the conventions of the constitution require, it would be a gross violation of representative democracy to ignore MPs’ wishes.

The fact that all of this is up for debate is truly astonishing. To some scholars, such as Vernon Bogdanor, a politics professor at King’s College London, Brexit has demonstrated the need for the U.K. to adopt a codified constitution. The breakdown in parliamentary government—the triumph of populism over pluralism brought about by Brexit—strengthens the case for a codified constitution that would place more obstacles in the way of political power. But a codified constitution is not a panacea. As other countries have discovered, it would not be a guarantee against populist excess, and could even create more problems than it solves. That’s not to say there’s no need for reform. Britain’s constitution is hardly in rude health; in fact, it’s never been more vulnerable.