At issue here is only § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition on possession by persons previously committed to a mental institution. Not all previously institutionalized persons are mentally ill at a later time, so the law is, at least somewhat, overbroad. But is it impermissibly so? Congress, in its efforts to keep firearms away from the mentally ill, may cast a wider net than is necessary to perfectly remove the harm. A “prophylactic approach thus obviate[s] the necessity for large numbers of individualized determinations.” But is § 922(g)(4)’s net too wide? Are previously institutionalized persons sufficiently dangerous, as a class, that it is permissible to deprive permanently all such persons of the Second Amendment right to bear arms?

It is a difficult question but one that we need not answer in the first instance. Congress has already determined that the class of individuals previously committed to a mental institution is not so dangerous that all members must be permanently deprived of firearms. Congress created a relief-from-disabilities program in which individuals subject to a § 922 prohibition can regain their firearm rights by showing that they are unlikely to present a threat. Because this program extends eligibility to all persons subject to any § 922 prohibition, it alone might be insufficient evidence of Congress’s determination that the previously institutionalized are not per se dangerous ….

Congress has chosen not to fund the program since 1992…. Congress’s failure to fund the federal program precludes the judicial review under § 925(c) that would otherwise be available if the government denied his application on the merits. Tyler could apply for relief from a federally-certified state program, but he cannot obtain relief from his state program because Michigan has not created one. If Michigan had a program, Tyler could potentially obtain relief and regain his Second Amendment right because he is not dangerous.

Under this scheme, whether Tyler may exercise his right to bear arms depends on whether his state of residence has chosen to accept the carrot of federal grant money and has implemented a relief program. His right thus would turn on whether his state has taken Congress’s inducement to cooperate with federal authorities in order to avoid losing anti-crime funding. An individual’s ability to exercise a “fundamental righ[t] necessary to our system of ordered liberty” cannot turn on such a distinction. Thus, § 922(g)(4) lacks narrow tailoring as the law is applied to Tyler….

[T]here is a non-zero chance that a previously institutionalized person will commit gun violence in the future, but that is true of all classes of persons. Although the government presents two examples of persons adjudicated as mentally ill who committed gun violence and cites one study in support of the claim that a prior suicide attempt is a “risk facto[r]” for suicide, it has offered not an iota of evidence that prohibiting the previously institutionalized from possessing guns serves its compelling interests. In addition to recognizing that many previously institutionalized persons now are not dangerous and thus that a total ban was not justified, Congress went further. For an entire class of persons, Congress effectively conditioned the ability to exercise a right “necessary to our system of ordered liberty” on whether they reside in a state that has chosen to participate in a joint federal-state administrative scheme….

Tyler alleges that he will not present a danger, and he presents evidence to support that claim. If he lived in a state with a government-certified program, he could potentially regain his Second Amendment right. Because he resides in Michigan, he can never possess a gun, unless Michigan chooses to join the federal program. What is at stake is more than just “influencing a State’s policy choices.” It is the protection of the Second Amendment. For these reasons, § 922(g)(4)’s mental-commitment prohibition’s application to Tyler does not satisfy narrow tailoring….

Tyler’s complaint validly states a claim for a violation of the Second Amendment. The government’s interest in keeping firearms out of the hands of the mentally ill is not sufficiently related to depriving the mentally healthy, who had a distant episode of commitment, of their constitutional rights.

The government at oral argument stated that it currently has no reason to dispute that Tyler is a non-dangerous individual. On remand, the government may, if it chooses, file an answer to Tyler’s complaint to contest his factual allegations. If it declines to do so, the district court should enter a declaration of unconstitutionality as to § 922(g)(4)’s application to Tyler.