One of the most important stories in the ongoing confrontation between the West and Russia has been that of Western unity. Despite a wide array of different histories, interests and geography, the U.S. and the European Union have held together in a common response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s violation of Ukrainian territorial integrity and the larger threat it poses to the European security order. At the heart of this unity has been the German-American partnership. Berlin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have taken the lead in both shaping that response and negotiating with Putin. This solidarity has clearly surprised Putin, who has regarded the West as weak, decadent and divided.

One of Putin’s major goals is to divide Europeans from each other and Europe from the United States. He has attempted to do this in a number of ways, waging information warfare and disinformation campaigns on social media and through the purchase of major newspapers and the financing and cultivation of anti-European political parties, most notably the National Front in France, Jobbik in Hungary and Syriza in Greece. His recent visit to Hungary, where he was warmly received by Prime Minister Viktor Orban, is another indication of fault lines opening in Europe.

However, his most important target will be the German-American relationship. Putin has tried to capitalize on the Snowden effect in German public opinion, hoping to feed a sense among Germans that both the U.S. and Russia are equivalent in their behavior and that Washington is trying to drag Germany and Europe into a confrontation. He has used his extensive business and criminal network, including a number of former members of the East German secret police who worked for him when he was a KGB agent in East Germany, to foster corruption and to buy favor among German decision-makers. This effort has largely failed.



But it is important for Washington, as I describe in my new book “Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geo-Economics,“ to keep in mind that Germany and the U.S. have very different stakeholders and interests in Russia which, if not carefully managed, could split these two partners to Putin’s advantage. Danger signals were perceptible at the recent Munich Security Conference, where leading American senators such as John McCain, R-Ariz, and Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., were openly critical of Merkel’s rejection of military options for dealing with the Ukraine situation, with McCain labeling her ideas as “foolishness.”

The key U.S. stakeholders in Russia policy are in the defense and intelligence community, and they perceive Russia as a threat which needs to be confronted not only by sanctions but also by military means. German stakeholders are largely in the private sector, and they see Russia as an opportunity which requires engagement rather than confrontation. This dovetails with a long-standing German diplomatic tradition of engaging adversaries as a means of transforming them. The contrast is clear when you ask Americans and Germans who won the Cold War. Americans are likely to name Ronald Reagan and the importance of NATO while Germans will cite Mikhail Gorbachev and the German version of détente as the main reason for the peaceful end of the Cold War.



This also reflects the deeper social and geographic connections between Germany and Russia. The American business stake in Russia is significantly lower than that of Germany, and while Germany gets about 39 percent of its oil and gas from Russia, the U.S. has no real energy dependence on that country.

While the U.S. and Germany are united in their assessment that Russia now poses a significant and long-term threat to the European order, the potential for divergence over the long run is real. How can a split be avoided? First, leaders and analysts in both countries need to be sensitive to these contrasts and put themselves in the shoes of the other. This means that Americans have to understand the German aversion to the use of military force and the economic and social constraints working on any German leader. They have to think of Russia as Germany’s Mexico, an unavoidable neighbor. Germans should understand that Americans have a concern for anything which smacks of appeasement of an aggressive dictatorship and that the polarization of American politics is producing outsized rhetoric more directed internally than to foreign audiences. They should also appreciate that many in Washington consider Germans free riders on defense who let the U.S. carry the military burden while remaining free of the costs. Given the exceedingly low levels of German defense spending, this is a particular vulnerability. Both sides have to be extremely careful about their public rhetoric. Putin must have been especially pleased with McCain and Graham’s outbursts, made in Merkel’s own country, and their effect on splitting the two partners.

