Germany has made its choice. It voted the grand coalition out of office with a bang, consigning the Social Democrats to the political abyss. Only ruins remain of the once-proud Gerhard Schröder's SPD. Despite a clear win for the center-right, the Christian Democrats (CDU) did not escape unscathed. But while their losses were moderate, CDU's Bavarian sister-party, the CSU, experienced a debacle second only to the Social Democrats.

So it looks like SPD hit rock bottom, CSU is in freefall, and CDU the worse for wear. The clear winners are Guido Westerwelle and his Liberal party, followed by the Left, and the Greens - all three of which got their highest vote count ever.

But the reality is a bit more complicated. The clearest winner is Angela Merkel. The chancellor played for high stakes, seemingly against the odds, and hit the jackpot. Unlike her party, she is now stronger than ever. So will we see a new Merkel, a chancellor who, freed from the restraints of SPD in the governing coalition, will be more decisive, reformist, and willing to take political risks?

Don't bet on it. Merkel barely avoided political oblivion in the last general election, after the CDU had embraced market radicalism and then campaigned on it in 2005. Her savior came in the unlikely form of the then Social Democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, whose wild performance on election night handed her the chancellorship.

To be sure, fortune and success are inseparable in politics. But Merkel hasn't tried to press her luck since then. On the contrary, she has unflinchingly steered the CDU towards the left, because she learned three things from the CDU's election defeat in 2002 and its narrow victory in 2005: Germans don't want to go to war, don't think much of economic reform, and are mostly to the left of the CDU/CSU.

Merkel could attempt this strategy because she knew that her right flank was covered by the FDP, which would attract voters dissatisfied with the CDU's leftward turn, but then join in a CDU-led coalition. At the same time, by moving to the left, Merkel ousted the SPD from the political center - where elections are won and lost in Germany - while still being able to form a workable majority in the new five-party system without risking new coalition constellations and fierce internal conflict.

In other words, the secret of Merkel's election victory was to secure a majority for the center-right in order to pursue, more or less, a center-left policy agenda. A change of tack by Merkel now would merely reinvigorate the devastated SPD.

To be sure, the "black and yellow" CDU-FDP coalition will make some policy corrections - slowing the nuclear phase-out, cosmetic changes to the tax system, etc. - in order not to disappoint parts of their constituency and economic supporters. But there will be no clear-cut change in policy direction.

That said, governing will hardly be a cinch for Merkel. In the coming years, she will face the economic crisis, increasing unemployment, mounting public debt, and demographic challenges at home, as well as tough foreign-policy choices in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and the Middle East. Moreover, with the grand coalition gone, she will no longer be able to blame SDP's obstructionism for her inaction.

Indeed, Merkel's room for maneuver will be reduced. Until now, Merkel had to deal with a weak or non-existent opposition. This will change very quickly, particularly given the possibility of NATO troop increases in Afghanistan. From now on, she will require a trait that she has lacked so far: leadership and decision-making skills.

The victory of black and yellow has, moreover, defined the alternative: red, dark red, and green. The political camps of old - left and right - are back for the time being. If this situation prevails beyond 2013, the SPD will face an unenviable challenge. It will have to manage a realignment that includes a possible coalition with the Left at the federal level, but without moving too far to the left in policy terms. The SPD, together with the Greens, will have to take the fight to the political center, which precludes competing with the Left for fringe voters.

Moreover, the Left - a party that is descended from the former East Germany's ruling Communists and Social Democratic dissenters - will have to play ball by embracing political realism. The best way to achieve this is through the Left's participation in regional ( länder) governments. But it is difficult to predict whether such a division of labor with the disenchanted former Social Democrat Oskar Lafontaine will be possible.

And the Greens? Their part in such a constellation will be to represent middle-class and ecologically oriented voters. If, however, a scramble towards the left occurs within the left camp, the Greens would stand to lose, as would their most likely coalition partners.