Photo: Earl Gardner

Whew. Josh Yaro is on a run of bad luck.

Many players make poor decisions during a game, but Yaro has been punished extremely harshly for his errors recently.

Yaro’s red card on Saturday, however, stemmed more from issues in midfield than from the second year man’s reading of the game. The pass that sent the extremely quick Josef Martinez through could have been prevented, and cutting out direct play through midfield remains an issue for a Philadelphia side that operates without a true holding player protecting the back line.

Find the space, attack the space

A key function of dropping one of the strikers from a 4-4-2 into midfield is creating a triangle. Nothing groundbreaking there, but it’s worth considering the geometric advantages a triangle gives that any two-man combo can’t provide. Playing with two advanced midfielders and a holding player should force an attacking team to play wider before penetrating the center. The passing lines available against such a triangle are rarely vertical, but instead angled from outside to inside. Thus, to attack such shapes, teams will look to rotate the ball and penetrate through the center as defenses rotate.

Alternatively, a triangle like the Union nominally play may allow teams to advance further into the channels, but with a holding player on either side of the advanced midfielder, it should be hard to re-enter the center and end up in high percentage shooting areas. The advanced midfielder prevents immediate access to the center, forces play into channels, and can exert back- or square pressure on the ball if it moves through channels.

In both cases, the result of the extra man in midfield is not merely another body, but also a shape-based advantage in space.

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Take the above instance as an example of reasonably good spacing but without a clear sense of what its goal is.

Alberg, Bedoya, and Medunjanin are all well-connected, and Sapong has forced the ball to one side. The midfield trio, though, is unclear on how to handle the situation. Alberg initially sits in a passing lane to the near-center player, ignoring the other midfielder in the middle. This allows the ball to be switched into the right channel, and the entire midfield must slide, with Medunjanin approaching the ball and leaving a lane through the middle. Once that first pass is completed, Philly is essentially in scramble mode. Fafa Picault comes central, leaving his man to sneak behind the midfield (but, again, in front of the deep defense), and Atlanta is easily slicing through the center of Philly’s shape.

This could be solved if Alberg sat in the lane to the open player initially or rotated deeper as Medunjanin slid. This would allow Bedoya to drop and protect the center (a necessary move since the defense has left a big space behind midfield to play in).

All season, the Union have sought to maintain their midfield triangle while properly supporting their extremely active striker. This has, over and over, proven a difficult problem to solve.

Jim Curtin would like his attacking midfielder to stay close to CJ Sapong defensively in order to prevent Sapong’s high workrate from being in vain. As Sapong presses the ball, Ilsinho or Alberg should be reading his movements and preparing to press the most likely forward pass or prevent the ball from being fully rotated back across the pitch.

Doing this, however, creates separation between the attacking midfielder and Philly’s holding players, who must step quickly to players drifting through the center while also monitoring the center to ensure the center backs are protected.

From the outset, Curtin has focused on alert rotations as solution to protecting the back four that doesn’t involve deploying a more pure defensive midfielder. And, accordingly, rotations have taken the brunt of the criticism when the Union have been easily played through. The emphasis on Bedoya and Medunjanin has, however, obscured at times what the rest of the team must do to, essentially, protect the protectors. Preventing deep vertical passes requires team positioning that minimizes the amount of ground — both vertically and laterally — that the holding mids need to cover. The Union’s deep defensive line and undisciplined attacking midfielders have not minimized space but, instead, enlarged it.

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Above, the Union’s defense is stretched vertically with Sapong in Atlanta’s back line, Alberg in space, and the rest of the defense deep behind them. Ideally, Alberg would be connected by 10-12 yards from Sapong and from the holding midfield duo. The Dutchman would sit in the central lane looking to press a short pass from Michael Parkhurst before the receiver could turn upfield. Additionally, Alberg would be shadowing the vertical lane through midfield that the dangerous Miguel Almiron is hoping to find.

Instead, Alberg and Sapong are on the same vertical line of the pitch. Atlanta brings bodies into the center to occupy Bedoya and Medunjanin, then finds the deep vertical through to Almiron. This puts the center backs in a difficult spot: Yaro must follow Almiron to prevent the playmaker from picking his head up, but in doing so, Yaro can open space in the back line. This is exactly what happens (in fact, it was already the second time Almiron used an open field dummy through the center to advance play; he’s quite good). When Yaro follows Almiron, Josef Martinez slides across into the hole left behind and cues the fullbacks to move into Philly’s attacking half.

This is what happens to an unprotected back line. And while the Union have done a fairly good job recently of limiting attacks that build up the wings, they have yet to solve how to support Sapong without leaving the holding midfielders exposed.

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If Atlanta has a major weakness offensively (aside from an oddly lackadaisical response to losing possession at times), it is the passing ability of their holding midfielders. Both Jeff Larentowicz and Chris McCann are limited in range and iffy under pressure, so Atlanta’s solution is to simply play around them. Above, Larentowicz clears space by pulling wide while McCann comes deep to lure Medunjanin forward. Michael Parkhurst can then lift the ball into a huge space in midfield and pit an $8 million signing against a 4th round draft pick. That’s a matchup Atlanta will take all day.

Note, additionally, that if Almiron can turn, or if he can drop the ball back, Josef Martinez has pulled out to the right and Giliano Wijnaldum has two men to cover with no central defensive support. In other words: Good foul, Mr. Elliott. Good foul.

But how did all of this actually end up being costly to Philly?

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Above, you can see the events prior to Josh Yaro’s red card. Once again, the play will develop from a situation in which Atlanta is able to feast on the center backs because the first line of defense struggles to close down the ball.

Atlanta loads numbers on the right side, with the center back almost on the touchline to start the play. Importantly, they also provide a central option, and with the fullback on the touchline, the winger has moved into the half-space instead of staying wide.

There are many ways to defend this situation, and all of them involve ensuring that Atlanta cannot collect the ball facing forward with time and space in midfield. Yet, that is what occurs. Parkhurst’s initial ball up the wing to Walkes is closed down by Wijnaldum stepping out of the back line. This shifts Elliott into a covering role and Yaro slides over to hang near Martinez.

But look at what the first ball does to the Union’s defense: Already — after one pass — Philly’s shape begins to break down, and that is because it was never set up properly to begin with. Both Fafa Picault and Roland Alberg are providing very little defensive cover. Picault is sitting in the lane to the interior winger, but once the ball is played to Walkes, neither he nor Alberg respond. Bedoya drops because Elliott continues to cover space instead of stepping up when the ball is played to a man under pressure. Picault and Alberg watch, rapt, as the ball is shifted inside. This leaves Bedoya stranded, as he must now leave his man (who can draw away Elliott now that the ball carrier can look up and pick out deep runs) and guess at passing lanes to shadow.

He guesses wrong, and once Elliott leaves his hole, it’s a simple vertical ball to Martinez that does Philly in. Yaro is likely the fastest defender on the team, but letting him (or anyone else) engage in footraces with Josef Martinez is, let’s say, a bad idea.

Back pressure is the real pressure

The most frustrating aspect of the above play is that it hits Philly in a known weak point: The Union are not good at back pressure.

Back pressure is simply pressing from behind the player with the ball. It’s power is belied by its simplicity: If the man with the ball can’t see you, pressure — or the threat of pressure — can be extremely effective.

Using back pressure, a defense can use passes between the lines to their advantage, provided they dictate where those passes go. And, when the ball is played through lines, they can trigger pressure from behind that wins the ball or greatly enhance the effectiveness of those pressing from the front.

If either Picault or Alberg presses the ball in the buildup to Yaro’s card, there is not nearly enough time for the long pass through the lines to develop.

After the match, Jim Curtin said of Yaro, “He’ll learn from it, again, but there’s still three or four other things that could’ve happened on that play that don’t lead to the through ball that put Josh in a bad situation.”

Yep.