Human intelligence is still Russia's forte. It is darkly obvious that they know the real balance of power. They know who's strong, who's weak. Their understanding of American politics is very fine-tuned. The Russians have been studying America to death for over 30 years, and the outcome of the Cold War has enhanced that, not reduced it. Whereas, in the West, our knowledge of Russia has been gravely reduced because we think we won. So there is an asymmetry here. When Putin makes decisions about what to do abroad, Ukraine or wherever, it looks like folly. But actually if you take into account their reading of what we're likely to do, they're not wrong, are they? He's got it right. And unfortunately, the more he gets it right, the more he's convinced of his own better judgment, so the higher the risks he's willing to take. He's willing to risk overflying Turkey, which is a member of NATO, in order to bomb Syria. He knows the Americans won't shoot down his forces. He knows exactly how far he can go.

In Ukraine, Russia is relying on asymmetrical warfare – special ops. Are there historical parallels for its use of this type of warfare?

Special operations were used by the Soviet Union against prewar Poland. So special operations, or war by other means, was very much a feature of the 1920s, which was also a time of relative Soviet military weakness. Asymmetrical activities with covert operations was a substitute for not having the use of direct military power.

How likely is it that Putin is also using these tactics to give a false impression of having a military that's stronger than it really is?

They are revamping their military in terms of divisions and equipment, but this will cost a fortune and Russia's economy is suffering. Covert operations are cheaper than major operations. You're going to see the same in Syria. They're about to send in hundreds [more] little green men to go around and do things in a more efficient way than the Assad regime can manage. And the Russians do this without a great deal of concern about casualties. These operations will take place, come what may. And if people disappear, from Putin's point of view, it will be justified if he can sustain Assad's regime

Sounds risky.

From the Russian point of view, America has a president who is not decisive and who is reluctant to commit forces. So when the Russians look at Washington, they feel that these people make verbal commitments to do things, like getting rid of [the Islamic State group], sending in air strikes, blah, blah, blah, but actually there aren't really results. Whereas Putin, what does he see? He doesn't see a best option here.

