Soldiers parade on June 8, 2016 in Ayr, Scotland, following a NATO mission in Kabul | Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images Opinion NATO cannot be strong if democracy is weak It’s good news that the Alliance is finally focused on the Russian threat to the West.

I recall sitting next to Viktor Orbán at a dinner in Budapest in the early days of the war in Kosovo. It was spring 1999, and I asked Orbán why his government supported the NATO intervention despite considerable public opposition. Without pause, the prime minister — a year into his first time on the job — replied that it was important for Hungarians to experience what it's like to be on the right side of history. The humanitarian intervention lasted just 78 days and NATO won decisively.

A decade and a half later, as NATO leaders meet in Warsaw, the Alliance faces a world transformed. The new strategic landscape has been shaped to a considerable extent by George W. Bush's overreach in Iraq, and by his successor's under-reach and strategic indifference. The result is a badly frayed world order, and the rise of anti-Western forces around the globe — China in East Asia, Iran and ISIL in the Middle East, and Russia in Eastern Europe — who have rushed to fill the vacuum.

It is welcome news that NATO is finally focused on the Russian threat, and committed to strengthening the Western Alliance. But the biggest problem currently is not external aggression. The Kremlin has been working assiduously to destroy the West by other means. Central and Eastern Europe, a part of the Alliance we once saw as a source of rejuvenation, should now be our main source of concern.

Russia's bag of tricks includes bullying, blackmail, and bribery. The Kremlin wields commercial ties and energy reliance as weapons in the battle for geostrategic influence. Moscow's intelligence services are exceptionally active in former communist Europe. Russian propaganda is ubiquitous. Kremlin Monitor Watch, a project of the Prague-based European Values think tank, documents Russia's formidable disinformation efforts across the region. A steady stream of stories about Western provocation and aggression have run in pro-Moscow media outlets ahead of the Warsaw summit. The Russian Embassy in Prague's Facebook page spews conspiracy theories about American and European malfeasance. In Poland, Kremlin trolls work around the clock antagonizing Poles and Ukrainians.

Attempting to respond to these efforts quickly becomes an endless game of whack-a-mole. It also misses a more fundamental question: How did we get here? And how can we start to dig ourselves out?

The United States has pivoted away from Europe twice since 2001, first under Bush, with the war on terror; then under Obama, with the pivot toward Asia. These strategic shifts and reallocation of resources were not in themselves unreasonable. Yet they were predicated on the assumption that Russia was becoming a "normal country," and that nations of Central and Eastern Europe had "graduated" in their transition to democracy. Neither has turned out to be the case.

Moscow's relentless hybrid war, its massive cyber attacks in Estonia in 2007, military aggression against Georgia in 2008, and most recently Russia's war on Ukraine should have dispelled by now any notion that Vladimir Putin wants peace in Europe and cooperation with the West.

America's absence has been provocative. Only if the U.S. steps up its commitment to Europe again can the Continent face the threat from Russia. This will not be easy. Europeans are not exactly yearning for American leadership. And Americans have problems at home. Yet every alliance, as Bismarck once put it, has its horse and rider. Germany too must start to play a bigger role. Meanwhile, a revitalized, American-led alliance needs a robust Russian containment strategy that puts Putin back on his heels.

But there is a deeper problem. We were hasty and naive about democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. It takes time for democratic institutions to create deep roots. And it takes even longer for the values, habits, and behaviors of democracy to take hold among a majority of citizens.

Russia has understood this from the get-go, and reveled in the opportunity to undermine democratic progress. Poland's ruling Law and Justice Party has taken dangerous steps undermining an independent judiciary and the role of a free press. Czech President Miloš Zeman sides with Russia over Ukraine, wants a referendum on NATO (and EU membership), and has been accused by legislators of turning his back on democratic values.

In his second tenure as prime minister, Viktor Orbán appears to have decided that illiberal democracy is the best model for Hungary, and that a middle ground between East and West is the best way to advance his country's nationalist interests. Similar tendencies persist across the region. Countries like Romania and Bulgaria are plagued by weak party systems, corruption and kleptocracy.

Russia will continue to encourage and manipulate these problems. But it did not create them. The only way ultimately to rob the Kremlin of its opportunity to wreak havoc on Europe is for the West to get back to the patient, long-term work of promoting and assisting democracy.

Of course, NATO faces a military threat, too. But if democracy dissolves, we'll have nothing meaningful to defend.

Jeffrey Gedmin is senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, and senior director of Blue Star Strategies in Washington, D.C.