Mr. Powell was said by aides to be eager to turn the French around, possibly by reaching a compromise that might allow a couple weeks of delay in the inspections so that -- if Mr. Hussein refuses to disclose his weapons -- a war might begin in March rather than mid-February.

Today Mr. Powell acknowledged that ''there are sharp differences'' with France and Germany, but ''there were sharp differences when we also started'' with the Security Council resolution.

But swirling around Mr. Powell's position, according to diplomats who deal with him, is an uncertainty about just how he feels about going to war. Some diplomats, who insist on anonymity, say he gives them the impression that he shares their deep misgivings about it.

Some cite the secretary's public and private statements back in 1991, during the Persian Gulf war, when, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he opposed sending American forces to Baghdad.

According to Mr. Powell's own memoir, he did so not simply because of the potential casualties, but also because he feared that an invasion and occupation of Baghdad would throw the Middle East into turmoil and in the end not be acceptable to Americans.

Some say Mr. Powell continues to feel that way. Others say he accepts the need for using force to overthrow Mr. Hussein but that doing so without international support would inflame the Arab world. French envoys indicate that they think Mr. Powell agrees with them on their reservations about a war.

On the other hand, Mr. Powell is said by aides to regard the French criticism of a war as hypocritical. In this view, the French are more interested in exercising power on the Security Council, where they sit as a permanent member, and perhaps in being guaranteed access to Iraq's oil resources.