It is the question hovering on the lips of every Qantas shareholder and employee - what new atrocity would it take for Qantas chief executive Alan Joyce to be shown the door?

In his five disastrous years at the helm of the national carrier, almost every decision taken by Mr Joyce could be preceded by the rider "ill-fated".

There is no denying the difficulties of running a global airline in a market flooded with capacity, much of it sponsored by foreign governments with bottomless pits of cash.

But a $2.8 billion loss — almost three times worse than the most pessimistic forecasts — is the crowning glory of an ignominious career that has seen Mr Joyce not once take responsibility for the airline's appalling financial performance and its steady decline in the eyes of the travelling public.

While most of the loss is the result of an accounting treatment due to restructuring costs, the underlying $646 million loss is a savage indictment on Mr Joyce and the board, led by chairman Leigh Clifford.

Once again, fuel prices have featured prominently as a culprit, even though they have barely budged for years. The dollar rates a mention yet again, despite it too being relatively steady for most of the past year.

But the overriding reason for the latest disaster is an incomprehensible decision last year to slug it out with rival Virgin Australia for domestic market share which has seen record numbers of seats thrown into Australian skies.

Rather than focus on running a profitable business, Mr Joyce and the Qantas board set their sights on market domination.

Muscling up to a rejuvenated Virgin, Mr Joyce vowed that for every extra seat his rival threw into the air, Qantas would put up two.

The result? Fantastic deals for travellers, but a Flying Kangaroo that was swallowing cash faster than a pokie on steroids.

Joyce began by trash-talking his own company

From almost the day he assumed the top job in 2008, Mr Joyce began an industrial relations war under the watchful and approving eye of his chairman.

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He complained long and loud about the lousy financial performance of Qantas International, essentially trash-talking his own company, an unprecedented step for any chief executive.

Presumably, it was a strategy designed to undermine the power of the pilots in upcoming industrial relations agreements. But the side-effects were toxic. Loyal customers went elsewhere. Longstanding staff felt disillusioned.

It culminated in a debacle. On the weekend before the 2011 Melbourne Cup, Mr Joyce and Mr Clifford grounded the entire fleet, leaving stranded customers around the world bewildered and angry, in a move that undermined investor confidence and eliminated whatever allegiance staff had for their employer.

Further fiascos followed. Who could forget Mr Joyce's plan, in the midst of all this, to establish a new "premium" airline in Asia?

It was a plan that left most experts scratching their heads. Wasn't Qantas supposed to be a premium airline? And where was this new airline to be based? Mr Joyce blurted out the plan even before he had negotiated a deal. It could be Singapore. But maybe it would be Kuala Lumpur.

Unsurprisingly, the whole fanciful dream was canned before it went anywhere, although there were negotiations around a merger with Malaysian Airlines. Given recent events, the failure to pull that one off would have to count as perhaps Mr Joyce's standout achievement.

Asian strategy bled company of cash

While he was busy trashing Qantas International, Mr Joyce's great international expansion plan centred on establishing Jetstar operations in Asia.

It is a strategy that not only has bled the company of cash but has managed to infuriate rival and partner airlines alike.

The Singapore-based Jetstar Asia steeled the resolve of Singapore Airlines to cripple Qantas, partly explaining its decision to take a key stake in Virgin Australia. On Thursday, Mr Joyce confessed the airline lost $40 million last year.

Then there is Jetstar Japan. It too has been a disaster. But that hasn't stopped Mr Joyce pouring ever more cash in. It lost $70 million last year.

Both of those pale into insignificance, however, when compared with Jetstar Hong Kong. A joint venture with China Eastern Airlines, the operation literally has never got off the ground. An enraged Cathay Pacific — Qantas's code-share partner — has effectively blocked the move.

Announced with huge fanfare in 2012, the joint venture has yet to receive approval from Hong Kong regulators, has required further capital injections and its nine aircraft have been idle with six now sold off.

Mr Joyce's attempts to resuscitate the company have come too late. His alliance with Emirates was negotiated from a position of defeat after Qantas had abandoned many of its European destinations. It was a great deal for Emirates.

Meanwhile, the hugely remunerated Mr Joyce continues to hack away at staff numbers, with more than half the 5,000 planned redundancies now out the door. So far, that has cost $428 million in termination payments.

The immediate reaction from financial markets to the $2.84 billion loss was positive. Qantas stock rose 5 per cent, mostly because it has decided to split its international and domestic arms as a prelude to attracting greater foreign investment.

Mr Clifford and Mr Joyce now seek salvation from a plan that aims to attract foreign investors into Qantas International, the very division they have been trash-talking for years.

Foreign investors will not save Qantas because the company's woes are not the result of its capital structure, or the Qantas Sale Act.

The problems are down to poor performance, strategic errors and appalling execution in a hugely distorted global aviation market that requires sheer brilliance just to survive.