When New York Giants general manager Dave Gettleman mimicked someone typing on a computer screen and dismissed analytics when it came to passing over Saquon Barkley at No. 2 overall in the 2018 NFL Draft because he played the running back position, it started a narrative. In addition to spawning a slew of memes, this narrative suggests the Giants do not use analytics when making the decisions that ultimately shape the roster. However, it's possible Gettleman's actions speak louder than this all but accepted narrative.

How analytics have impacted the Giants' roster-building process

A recent deep data study by Pro Football Focus suggests pass coverage is more important to a team's overall pass defense than pass rush. PFF used data and analytics to make this assertion and it potentially flips a common accepted NFL roster-building process of finding pass rushers first. Within the study, PFF cites their overall value board and uses Giants' first-round pick (No. 30 overall) Deandre Baker as an example. PFF had a higher overall value grade on Baker than Clelin Ferrell -- a defensive end selected by the Oakland Raiders at No. 4 overall.

The entire PFF data dive above is a must-read for any analytical NFL fan and here is a snippet from the conclusion of the piece, via Eric Eager and George Chahrouri:

"During the PFF era, teams with elite coverage (67th percentile or better) and a poor pass rush (33rd percentile or worse) win, on average, about a game and a half more than teams with the reverse construction."

In the first two offseason of the Dave Gettleman-Pat Shurmur era, the Giants have made the shift in assets away from the defensive line and toward the secondary. Perhaps this shift was influenced by analytical studies like the one above -- created by Tyseer Siam -- the Giants' head of Football Operations/Data Analytics -- and his team. The shift was also largely due to a shift in the Giants' defensive scheme that was also at least somewhat influenced by analytics, but we'll touch on more of that below.

During the last two offseasons, the Giants have acquired five defensive backs who entered the NFL from 2017-2019. This group includes two first-round draft picks (Jabrill Peppers, Deandre Baker), an early third-rounder (Sam Beal, Supplemental Draft, 2018), an early fourth-rounder (Julian Love), and an early sixth-rounder (Corey Ballentine). The Giants also held on to veteran cornerback Janoris Jenkins -- the only defensive player from the 2016 free agent spending spree who wasn't traded at or prior to the 2018 trade deadline.

If all goes according to plan, the Giants will enter the 2020 regular season having allocated next to nothing to their secondary from a salary cap standpoint. This will allow them to continue moving in the same direction they've been shifting on the offensive side of the ball. In simpler terms, this will allow the Giants to follow their own blueprint. The Giants are set to have more than $60 million in 2020 salary cap space and we expect a large chunk of it to be allocated toward completing their philosophical change on offense. We wouldn't be surprised to see the Giants get very aggressive in 2020 free agency at the right tackle, in-line tight end, and/or center positions.

In the process, the Giants have also shifted resources from a salary cap standpoint away from their defensive front. Since Gettleman has arrived, he has traded away three of the team's biggest contracts and all of them were defensive linemen -- Jason Pierre-Paul, Olivier Vernon, and Damon Harrison. The Giants used some of the salary cap they recouped to add a rangy linebacker who makes more sideline to sideline saving tackles than he's given credit for in Alec Ogletree. They used the majority of the salary cap space created to improve the offensive line by signing Nate Solder and trading for Kevin Zeitler.

How analytics have impacted the Giants' in-game strategy

There is also evidence to suggest the Giants have and continue to use analytics during their in-game process and not only in their roster-building strategy.

An analytical study pinpointed by Ben Baldwin on Twitter suggests the Giants were one of the most forward-thinking franchises in the NFL when it came to going for it on fourth down under head coach Pat Shurmur. The analytics dictate certain situations where the Giants and any other NFL offense should opt to go for it on fourth down. The Giants adhered to these analytics more than almost any NFL team in 2018.

Shurmur and the Giants have carried over this logic beyond just fourth-down conversion attempts. During the Giants' 2018 regular season against the Atlanta Falcons, Shurmur opted to go for a two-point conversion with five minutes left in the fourth quarter. Conventional wisdom suggested the Giants should kick a PAT (point after attempt) to cut Atlanta's lead to seven points. However, the analytics suggested otherwise.

"We discuss internally the math on it -- you increase your chances (of winning the game) by 50 percent if you go for it and make it there," Shurmur told reporters after the Falcons game. "I try to be aggressive for my guys."

Shurmur went a little deeper into why he made that decision.

"Whether you go for two or not, that's part of it. Whether you go for it on fourth down or not," Shurmur added. "There's some really smart people that express the percentage of doing things and how it relates to winning. That's why you make educated decisions.

"Sometimes you do things on a hunch. But, in that case, the numbers support going for it there."

Although that decision to not work out as planned after the Giants failed to convert the two-point conversion, Shurmur defended his decision anyway. Shurmur and the Giants will continue to use analytics to shape their in-game decisions.

"At one point, we all thought the world was flat, and then you learn," Shurmur said after the Falcons game. "At one point, nobody would allow the players to drink water. In the old days, hydration wasn't an issue, or it wasn't a concern. Same thing. As we go forward, there's new things added to our game. Analytics is certainly part of that, intuition is the other."

How analytics have impacted the Giants' defensive scheme

For starters, the Giants spent their vast majority of defensive snaps in the nickel subpackage with five defensive backs on the field during the first season under defensive coordinator James Bettcher in 2018. While it's true that every NFL team spent the majority of their defensive snaps with at least five defensive backs, the Giants were in their "nickel" subpackage on 64 percent of their defensive snaps and they used a subpackage other than their 3-4 base defense on 84 percent of their defensive snaps.

With more defensive backs on the field at once, it makes sense for teams to invest more draft, trade, and free agent capital on the defensive backs positions (safety, cornerback) on their roster. The Giants have done just that, as noted above.

The Giants' defensive scheme under Bettcher also follows a shift we've seen from other NFL and collegiate defensive schemes (most notably two of the NCAA's most consistently dominant defenses at LSU with Dave Aranda and Georgia with Kirby Smart). Bettcher's defensive scheme is not predicated in having one or two elite pass rushers. Instead, his scheme is predicated on creating confusion in pass protection. By crowding the line of scrimmage with up to eight defenders at once but only sending four (or sometimes more) of them as pass rushers, Bettcher's goal is for the Giants defense to create disruption with simulated pressure and uncertainty for opposing quarterback and offensive linemen.

At the NFL level, the New England Patriots have followed a similar path. They are also most often in subpackage defenses and they use them in a variety of down-and-distance situations with success against both the pass and run.

Defensive schemes like the one the Giants run under Bettcher have countered the spread concepts and heavy wide receiver personnel packages thrown at them by using more subpackages. Within these subpackages that feature more defensive backs on the field, the Giants aim to create unpredictability by crowding the line of scrimmage with a slew of defenders, most often only sending four as pass rushers, and using the rest to drop into coverage. Of course, the goal of this scheme is to force the opposing offense to guess who will drop in coverage and who will rush the passer.

The Giants' personnel restricted them from finding sustainable success within this scheme in 2018, but they have moved further in that direction during the 2019 offseason via their additions in the secondary.

Conclusion

In several ways, the Giants have already embraced and factored analytics into their roster construction, defensive play calling, and the in-game decisions made by their head ball coach. The Giants are also ahead of the curve in some ways by hiring Siam to run their analytics department. Believe it or not, several teams don't employ someone to run their analytics and those same teams don't have a department dedicated to analytics. As the team moves forward into the Daniel Jones era, you can at least be clear the lazy narrative (with no substantial evidence) that suggests the Giants are "dead last" when it comes to embracing analytics is not correct.