.

It is a curious fact that by the mere force of circumstances

the Spanish Catholics were driven to an alliance with protestant England,

a power which the Spaniards were accustomed to look upon as

the incarnation of the most damnable heresy. The British in Peninsula.

The campaign in Spain "was to the Napoleonic wars

what North Africa was to the WW2, an arena of British failure,

redeemed by victory only when the enemy broke one of the great

laws of war: NEVER INVADE RUSSIA."

- 'The Economist' Oct 3rd 2002, London On picture: in 1812 the second in command of the British army, Lord Paget, was captured by French dragoons. In 1809 the first in command, Wellington, was almost captured at Combat of Casa de Salinas. It is a curious fact that by the mere force of circumstances the Spanish Catholics were driven to an alliance with protestant England, a power which the Spaniards were accustomed to look upon as the incarnation of the most damnable heresy, and little better than the Grand Turk himself became ally. Napier writes: "As early as April, General Castanos, then commanding the camp of San Roque, had entered into communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, the Governor of Gibraltar. He was resolved to seize any opportunity that offered to resist the French, and he appears to have been the first Spaniard who united patriotism with prudent calculation - readily acknowldging the authority of the Junta of Seville, and stiffling the workings of self-interest, with a virtue by no means common to his countrymen at that period." (Napier - “History of the War in Peninsula 1807-1814” p 36) Britain profited from the campaign of 1809 after Napoleon had been compelled to leave Spain hurriedly to take command in Germany. Had he been able to remain on the Peninsula, it is probable the campaign in Spain would have turned out very differently. The Emperor might well have broken Spanish resistance and driven Wellington into the sea. (Rothenberg - "The Emperor's Last Victory" p 27) Wellington's corps in Spain was viewed by Russia, Prussia and Austria as of little importance, and the Allies generals saw no British troops in the main theater of war facing the Emperor himself. The Allies asked Great Britain to send troops into central Europe, to fight the French, but the Government refused. According to some British authors, it was Wellington's army, and not the Spaniards, was the primary cause of victory in Spain. Without the British, the guerillas would do more harm to the Spanish people than to the enemy. Napier writes: "That the guerilla system could never seriously affect the progress of the French, is proved by the fact, that the constant aim of the principal chiefs was to introduce the customs of regular troops; and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than 50,000 of these irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain; and so severely did they press upon the country tha it may be assumed as a truth, that if the English army had abandoned the contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have gained the good will of the nation would have been extirpating of the partidas." (- Napier Vol II, p 128) Royal Navy.

Without the Royal Navy, Britain's campaign in Peninsula

could never have been waged and certainly not with the success

that was eventually achieved. According to David Gates without the Royal Navy, Great Britain's campaign in Spain and Portugal could never have been waged and certainly not with the success that was eventually achieved. He writes: "As well as ferrying troops to and from the war zone, the fleet transported virtually all the gold, equipment, food and munitions used by the Allied armies and guerillas. ... Moreover, whereas the lack of any naval support of their own confined the French to moving via the appalling Peninsular roads, the Allied forces could frequently transport men and material by sea; a method that was invariably safer, cheaper and quicker.

This provided them with enormous advantages in the fields of logistics and strategy. ... Eternally threatened with landings on the sea-shore, their [French] army had to detach thousands of badly needed troops to patrol beaches, garrison ports and man coastal batteries. In 1810, for example, two Allied squadrons - based on Ferrol and Corunna - tied down some 20,000 Imperial soldiers along the Biscay coast.

A further 20,000 soldiers were needed to invest the naval base at Cadiz, and several thousands more spent their time fruitlessly chasing Allied detachments that constantly embarked and disembarked along the Andalusian coast. Very few of these men ever saw an enemy ship or soldier, but they had to be deployed to counter the possible threat of attack. Furthermore, the sea-shore guards frequently became targets in themselves. Required to patrol enormous lengths of coastline, they were invariably thin on the ground and easy prey for amphibious forces composed of thousands of men. Many small detachments were annihilated before assistance could arrive ..." (Gates - "The Spanish Ulcer" p 29) During 1811 the British-Portuguese army did not share the fate of that of Massena, was almost entirely the responsibility of the Royal Navy. In sharp contrast to the Allied army, the French supply network was constantly disrupted by guerilla bands and the rebellious population.

Consequently, the operations of the French army were repeatedly undermined or delayed by shortages of such basic equipment as munitions, horses, weapons and money. Unable to rely on their forces being adequately supplied by convoy, French marhsals had to resort to extracting provisions locally - much to the annoyance of the populace. The total naval dominance lasted until 1812, when the USA interfered, albeit indirectly, on the side of the French. In 1812 the war with USA broke out and American privateers (ext.link) arrived on European and African coast. The Royal Navy was forced to devote hundreds of warships to a blockade of the American coast. "Then the American privateers, being unmolested, ran down the coast of Africa, intercepted the provision trade from the Brazils, one of the principal resources of the army, and emboldened by impunity infested the coast of Portugal, captured 14 ships loaded with flour off the Duoro, and a large vessel in the very mouth of the Tagus. These things happened when the ministers were censuring and interfering with Wellington's commercial transactions, and seeking to throw the feeding of his soldiers into the hands of British speculators; as if the supply of an army was like that of a common market !" (Napier - Vol IV, p 185) The French naval vessels, backed by a powerful force of privateers and American ships, instigated a relentless campaign againt British vessels, and by summer 1814, about 800 merchantmen had been sunk, damaged or captured, many of them in home waters. Gates writes: "With ships like USS 'Argus' rampaging up and down the English Channel (ext.link), Wellington's formerly smooth supply system was appreciably disrupted." Moore's failed campaign.

The British were defeated at Corunna

and forced to leave Spain. General Sir Moore's corps arrived at Maceira Bay on the 24 August with the following troops: Fraser's Division (4 British btns.), Murray's Division (4 German btns.), Paget's Division (2 German and 1 British btn. and German cavalry regiment), and artillery (2 German and 2 British batteries). This campaign began as follow: General Moore left a garrison in Lisbon of 10,000 men and entered Spain with 20,000 to aid the Spanish. His command was to be augmented with 16,000 more under General Baird being sent through Corunna. Moore hoped that his action will disrupt Napoleon's offensive and draw his attention away from Portugal. In the beginning of September arrived reinforcements. The British government designated another army (under Baird) to go to Peninsula and decided to assist the Spanish armies in the field. Moore arrived at Salamanca and after hearing of the defeat of Blake's Spaniards at Espinosa, the annihilation of Army of Estremadura and the destruction of Castaños at Tudela, he was having second thoughts about his own campaign. He rejected the entreaties of the Supreme Junta and ordered a withdrawal to Portugal. On Dec 5th however Moore received news that the population of Madrid offered resistance to the French army. A letter arrived from General La Romana, in which the Spaniard assured Moore that he had rallied Blake's divisions and was ready to take the field with 23,000 men. A captured dispatch revealed the isolation of Marshal Soult's scattered corps. Moore decided to strike a blow at the French communication lines at Burgos and guarding them Soult's troops and thus oblige Napoleon to relinquish his grip on Madrid. However, much of the information Moore received was incorrect. Madrid had surrendered to Napoleon on Dec 4th and on Dec 11th Moore received gloomy information about it. Napoleon already had been aware of Moore's army at Salamanca and was hurrying northwards. On Dec 19th three British deserters from the 60th Foot (actually they were Frenchmen captured at Trafalgar and enlisted in the British army) reached the French outposts with news that Moore's army had been in Salamanca as late as Dec 13th. However, the chances of catching the British were slim. "Setting the weather aside, Moore was so far to the north that it was unlikely that a force from Madrid would ever have been able to cut him off. The emperor's only chance, indeed, was that his opponent would be caught unawares, but Moore was well aware of the danger and fled westwards as soon as he got news that Napoleon was on the march, whilst he had also long since requested that his transports should be sent round from Lisbon to La Corunna. Vigorous action on the part of Soult, it is true, might just have slowed Moore down enough to allow Napoleon's forces to get behind him, but the marshal elected to wait for the first reinforcements that were being sent up to him from Burgos and then was slowed down by pouring rain ..." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War") Realising what Moore had in mind, the Emperor saw a golden opportunity to swing into his rear, while Soult contained him frontally. The British army would be encircled and destroyed. Napoleon took his army towards the Guadarrama Pass and in appalling weather led through the mountains. On December 30th, the main French army began crossing the Esla River, and Marshal Soult entered Leon. Napoleon pushed forward. Unfortunately the cares of his vast empire were plucking at his coattails. He received news of political intrigues at Paris and that Austria was again mobilising her large army. The Emperor was needed in France. On January 17th he began a breakneck ride for Paris, arriving there on the 24th. Soult was left with only 16,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry. He pressed Moore hard, but ran no unnecessary risks. The British general sent his light troops through Orense to Vigo, where they embarked on the 17th. General La Romana moved southward. At midnight, after the destruction of the remaining stores and 500 horses, Moore ordered his army back on the Corunna road. Other than for the rearguard and the Guards the discipline of many of the British regiments disintegrated. Moore finally halted in Corunna. Marshal Soult began to collect his scattered troops for battle. However, the appearance of British warships and transport fleet and the detonation of 4,000 barrels of gunpowder - convinced the Frenchman that the British's escape was imminent. Realising that he could delay no longer, re resolved to attack immediately. In the battle Moore was mortally wounded. General Hope pressed the embarkation. Benjamin Miller writes: "As we drifted down the harbour we saw hundreds of our soldiers, which had been doing duty in the garrison, sitting on the rocks by the water's side … waving their hats and calling for the boats to take them off …" The British had almost finished the embarkation by morning, when French artillery came into action from cliffs overlooking the bay. Cpt. Gordon writes: "The French … opened a cannonade upon the shipping in the harbour, which caused great confusion amongst the transports. Many were obliged to cut their cables, some suffered damage by running foul of each other, and 5 or 6 were abandoned by their crews and drifted on shore." The expedition reached England between 21 and 23 June, having lost some 8,800 men. "The people of Portsmouth looked on in horror at the spectacle that was emerging from the harbour. The British expeditionary force had returned home, but there was no grand parade through the streets, no pomp or colour, no tale of victory. What appeared seemed rather to be the mere wreckage of an army." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War" p 140) With the Spanish armies defeatd and the British driven from the country, the winter 1808 seemed full of promise for the French troops. The projected invasion of Portugal - delayed by Moore's interference - could now go ahead. However, the interminable guerilla warfare continued to occupy vast numbers of French troops and the ever resilient Spaniards were soon raising new troops to fling into the fray. Meanwhile fresh British troops were landing in Peninsula. Edward Costello of 95th Rifles writes: "... after a tolerably pleasant voyage we anchored off Lisbon [28 June 1809]. From thence, in a few days, we proceeded in open boats up the River Tagus, and landed about 4 miles from Santarem, where we encamped for the night. On the following day we marched into the city of Santarem amid the cheers of its inhabitants, who welcomed us with loud cries Viva os Ingleses valerosos !" (Costello - "The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns" p 17)

On landing at Mondego Bay, Wellington (Wellesley), heard the welcome news of the great Spanish victory at Baylen and, later, General Spencer arrived with units drawn from the Mediterranean. Wellington's long and successful campaign.

"Viva os Ingleses valerosos !"

Wellington raised the reputation of the British army

to a level unknown since Marlborough. By May 1809, the French armies were victorious almost everywhere in Spain. Victor advanced on Badajoz, defeating Cuesta at Medellin. Soult occupied northern Portugal, but halted at Oporto to refit his army before advancing on Lisbon. In April Wellesley took command of the British army in Portugal, plus a new, British-trained Portuguese army. Wellington was a skilfull tactician, and later he earned reputation for being a cautious general who only fought defensive actions from positions of overwhelming strength (named by some Fabius The Cunctator). As strategist Wellington was one of the best in Europe. Striking north, he surpised Soult and drove him into the interior. With Portugal in revolt all around him, Soult seemed doomed, but escaped by a daring march through the mountains to Orense. Wellesley then turned on Victor and advanced up the Tagus River together with Cuesta. Victor retired to Talavera, where Joseph joined him with the French reserves. Wellesley repulsed Victor in a 2-day battle, but had to retreat hurriedly when Soult, Ney, and Mortier emerged from the mountains to his left rear. In 1810 Soult rapidly cleared all of southern Spain except Cadiz, which he left Victor to blockade. Massena took Ciudad Rodrigo, and forced Wellington back through Almeida to Busaco, where Wellington offered battle. Goaded by his headstrong corps commanders, Massena made an unsuccessful frontal attack. The next day, he turned Wellington's flank, and the latter thereupon retired - devastating the countryside as he went - into a previously fortified position called the "Lines of Torres Verdes." De Rocca writes: "The French sought, in vain, to provoke Lord Wellington to come out and give them battle. That modern Fabius [Fabius The Cunctator] remained immovable in his lines, and coolly contemplated his enemies below him, from the top of his high rocks." (de Rocca, - p 177) In 1811 Massena grimly held his starving army before Lisbon for a month, then fell back to Santarem, where Wellington did not choose to attack him. In March, with supplies exhausted, Massena managed a skillful retreat on Salamanca, with Ney again displaying a savage talent for rear-guard fighting. Soult, meanwhile captured Badajoz. Victor was defeated at Barrosa by Graham, but the cowardice of La Pena made it a fruitless success, and Victor soon renewed the blockade. In April, Wellington besieged Almeida. Massena advanced to its relief, attacking Wellington at Fuentes de Onoro (ext.link). The French claimed victory, because they won the passage at Poco Velho, cleared the wood, turned the British right flank, obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced Wellington to relinquish 3 miles of ground. The British also claimed victory because the village of Fuentes was in their hands and their object (covering the blockade of Almeida) was attained. The French, without being in any manner molested, retired.

Outgeneraled, Wellington was saved only by the innate toughness of his troops and Bessieres' failure to support Massena. Bessiers led the cavalry of Imperial Guard and refused to obey orders from Massena. After this battle, the Almeida garrison escaped through the British lines by a night march. Napier writes: "In the battle of Fuentes Onoro, more errors than skill were observable on both sides ..." (Napier - Vol III, p 87) Picture: British infantry storming Badajoz, by Mark Churms. Part of Wellington's army had besieged Badajoz, until Soult forced it to retire on Albuera. There, Soult outmaneuvered Beresford, but could not quite win the battle, and so retired to Seville. Wellington joined Beresford and unskillfully renewed the siege of Badajoz. Marmont (who had replaced Massena) joined Soult, and Wellington retired - but soon appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo. In September, Marmont crowded him back and reprovisioned that fortress. During 1810-1811, the majority of the French annual conscript calls of 180.000-200.000 conscripts went to Spain and dramatically lowered the quality of the French troops. The lack of seasoned officers caused replacement battalions and squadrons returning to Spain to be led by inexperienced officers of reserve formations and second rate troops. Additionally Napoleon considered the war in Spain so insignificant that he rarely bothered to bring to it his military genius, relying instead on his marshals and simultaneously launching his disastrous Russian campaign of 1812.

The French armies were commanded by the bowlegged and grumpy Soult, the growing bald and irresponsible Ney, and the well educated Marmont who outmarched and often outmaneuvered Wellington. Between September 19 and October 21 Wellington besieged Burgos but failed to capture it and retreated to Portugal being pursued by the enemy and losing several thousands men

Napier writes: "The French gathered a good spoil of baggage ... According to muster-rolls, about 1,000 Anglo-Portuguese were killed, wounded and missing ... but this only refers to loss in action; Hill's loss between the Tagus and the Tormes was, including stragglers, 400, and the defence of Alba de Tormes cost one hundred. If the Spanish regulars and partidas marching with the two armies be reckoned to have lost a 1,000 which considering their want of discipline is not exaggerated, the whole loss previous to the French passage of the Tormes will amount perhaps to 3,000 men. But the loss between the Tormes and the Agueda was certainly greater, for nearly 300 were killed and wounded at the Huebra; many stragglers died in the woods, and Jourdan said the prisoners, Spanish, Portuguese and English, brought to Salamanca up to the 20th Nov, were 3,520. The whole loss of the double retreat cannot therefore be set down at less than 9,000, including the loss in the siege.

Some French writers have spoken of 10,000 being taken between the Tormes and the Agueda, and Souham estimated the previous loss, incl. the siege of Burgos, at 7,000. But the King in his dispatches called the whole loss 12,000, including therein the garrison of Chinchilla, and he observed that if the cavalry generals, Soult [not the marshal] and Tilley, had followed the allies vigorously from Salamancathe loss would have been much greater. ... On the other hand English authors have most unaccountably reduced the British loss to as many hundreds." (Napier - "History of the War in the Peninsula 1807-1814" Vol IV, p 155) Despite the heavy losses suffered during retreat, the year of 1812 was a good year for Wellington, his troops captured Cuidad Rodrigo and Badajoz and defeated Marmont at Salamanca.

The effect of Salamanca was to convince the British Government finally that the war in Spain should be continued. This battle partially dispelled Wellington’s reputation for being a cautious general who only fought defensive actions from positions of overwhelming strength. For Napoleon however, losing in Spain in 1812 or 1813 would have meant little if there was a decisive victory in Germany or Russia. In August Wellington entered Madrid. By the way, one of several acts that soured relations between the British and the Spanish during the Peninsula War was the destruction of the famous ceramic factory in Madrid, wool factory, and Roman Bridge at Alcantara by Wellington's troops. In 1813 Wellington's army advanced against Joseph and Jourdan. In June Wellington (75,000-90,000) he routed the French (50,000-60,000) at Vittoria. After Vittoria Wellington failed to pursue effectively and the French recovered. He now shortened his communications by shifting his base of operations to the northern Spain coast, and began operations against san Sebastian and Pampeluna, at first unsuccessfully. Soult was given command of all French troops in Spain and advanced through western Pyrenees, but was finally repulsed. Wellington captured San Sebastian, later invading southern France as far as Bayonne. Soult fought and almost won at Toulouse, the last battle of the war. Suchet evacuated Valencia, but defeated two British expeditions from Sicily. Enjoying many advantages over the French, Wellington achieved a record of victory perhaps unmatched in the history of the British army. The British infantry performed gallantly especially when placed on a strong defensive position. Wellington's Portuguese and German troops were steady and respected by British and French alike. In the English speaking world, Wellington's campaign in Peninsula became the most popular napoleonic campaign among wargamers. However, despite the advantages and victories in pitched battles, Wellington's campaign in Peninsula was "the most protracted campaign of the period". Claims were made that "the Peninsular War had been pursued with insufficient vigour." Battles alone don't win this type of wars. British military historian Hart writes: "... the presence of the British Expeditionary Corps was an essential foundation... Wellington's battles were materially the least effective part of the operations. By them he [Wellington] inflicted a total loss of some 45,000 men only - counting killed, wounded and prisoners - on the French during the 5 years' campaign... whereas Marbot reckoned that the number of French deaths alone during this period averaged 100 a day. Hence it is a clear deduction that the overwhelming majority of the losses which drained the French strength, and their morale still more, was due to the operations of the guerillas..." (Hart - "Strategy" 1991, pp 110-111)

"... the Spanish 'nation in arms' ... may have lacked the polished professionalism of the British Light Division but, in the long run, they probably inflicted considerably more damage on the French forces than all of Wellington's pitched battles combined. The sieges of Gerona alone cost the Imperial armies over 20,000 casualties and, exclusively from sickness and guerilla raids, the French forces in the Peninsula lost approx. 100 men per day for over 4 years, a total of some 164,000 casualties. It is, therefore, easy to see how the war in Spain bled the French army white ..." (- Gates)

