Amid all the uncertainties of the general election, one thing is predictable. Britain’s nuclear weapons system is not only here to stay, it will be upgraded.



Michael Fallon, currently defence secretary, repeatedly declined recently to say whether the Conservatives would support a Labour government’s motion to renew Trident.

Vernon Coaker, Labour’s shadow defence secretary, accused Fallon of playing party politics with Britain’s nuclear weapons.



Both the Labour and Tory leaderships have said they would replace the fleet of four Trident ballistic missile submarines, a project that is likely to cost well over £100bn over its 30-year lifespan.

It is scarcely credible that the Conservatives would decline to back a Commons vote tabled by Labour to renew Trident.



Labour, after all, had to rely on Tory votes to support Trident renewal even in 2007 when it had a Commons majority. (As part of the 2012 coalition deal, a decision on Trident was delayed until 2016 as a result of LibDem opposition.)



A new study tracing the development of Britain’s nuclear weapons project rightly points to what the authors call “the beliefs, culture, and identity, issues which have led Britain to develop and retain a nuclear capability for nearly seventy years”.

These, say the authors of The British Nuclear Experience (Oxford University Press), “remain firmly in place”.



They conclude: “We should be sceptical of those who claim to know the ‘truth’ and who speak with great certainty, assurance, and apparent authority, about the continuing need for nuclear deterrence...The least we should expect is an open and honest debate about the utility and dangers of nuclear weapons and a willingness to listen seriously to those who hold different beliefs to our own on this vitally important subject”.



It is difficult at the best of times to have a calm debate about whether the UK should maintain its nuclear weapons arsenal. It has proved impossible during this general election campaign.

There are many, even within the UK’s military herarchy, who question the credibility of the country’s “nuclear deterrence”. There are more and more who believe that any credibility it did have is increasingly threatened by the decline in Britain’s conventional forces.



That decline is likely to be hastened as more and more of the UK defnece budget is devoted to a new Trident submarine fleet and its nuclear missiles.



John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, authors of the The British Nuclear Experience, quote Vice Admitral Sir Jeremy Blackham, deputy chief of the defence staff.



“Through conventional weakness, “ warned the admiral, “the nuclear deterrent is compromised, whether it is a rogue state or a major power that is involved. To be credible, the nuclear deterreent must be underpinned by strong conventional deterrence”.



British ministers, Labour and Tory, have argued that possession of nuclear weapons have enabled Britain to be a big player in the global nuclear disarmament debate.



There is a clear opportunity for the new UK government to put this to the test. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) review conference is taking place in New York under UN auspices and will continue for another 3 weeks.



The NPT review conferences take place every five years and are regarded by the five “officially recognised” nuclear powers - the US, Russia, the UK, France and China - as little more than an irritating talking shop.



General James Cartwright, former commander of US nuclear forces has urged Washington and Moscow to taking US and Russian nuclear missiles off high alert, arguing that a longer fuse could prevent a possible cyber attack from starting a nuclear war and would mean less risk of miscalculation in a crisis.



(At any given time 1,800 nuclear weapons are held on high alert, meaning they could be deployed with just a few minutes’ notice.)



The European Leadership Network has called for cuts in nuclear arsenals and confirmation of so-called “negative security assurances” - namely, that a nuclear weapon state would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state.



British governments have over the years cut the number of missiles and warheads on the four Trident submarines.

Fallon told MPs earlier this year that the number of warheads on board each submarine had been reduced from 48 to 40, the number of operational missiles on the submarines reduced to “no more than eight”, and the total number of British “operationally available” warheads” reduced from “fewer than 160 to no more than 120”.



The new government could do better than that.

