Urgent update: Yemen

Recently, clashes erupted between pro Saleh/General People's Congress and Houthis/Youth believers.





Why does it matter?





The two factions representing respectively Sana'a on one side and the president of Yemen decades, who has a lot of tribe connections, and the north of Yemen (Saada) on the other with a religious group (pro tradition, zaydi, anti-Wahhabi) who is transtribal and with convinced members rather than political operatives as commanders, but with less influence. The Houthi have a giganormous war experience (uninterrupted since 2004) and have fought against Saleh before. It is only after their surge from their sanctuary to oust what is the currently recognized president of Yemen Hadi (although he was elected unopposed and fled after the Houthi takeover), and their seizing of Sana'a, that they made an alliance with Saleh. It was a logical move, he pretty much as control of the Yemeni army, and was needed to pacify the capital. However the relentless Saudi led coalition, who uses more than questionable tactics (blockade, bombings of civilian infrastructures...), made the Yemeni economy and logistic chains implode. It barely put a dent on the territory held by the rebels, who hold mostly a mountainous terrain, apart from the sea plane, retaking Mocha and the strait of Bab el Mandeb. The siege had consequences, as did the economic activity grinding to a halt from bombings of factory, farms and road, sea blockade, air blockade and the battle of Taiz who is a major commercial hub. It created a dire humanitarian crisis, with epidemics including most recently Cholera (500000 cases, the worst in history), hunger (over 70% of the population leaves on some form of aid), displacement, and abject poverty. To this should be add a continuing refugee crisis, as people keep coming in from the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, and Erythrea).

This situation created a strain on the previously cited alliance, especially since the Houthis still remember the war of extermination Saleh waged on them before. The Houthis had, through their military might, taken the control of Yemeni government, puppeteering Hadi before ousting him, this gave them the upper hand, and they kept control of it after the Saleh alliance. Nominally, the new council that was created has a GPC parity, but de facto, the previous Houthi upper hand meant that they were the ones mostly governing. This is the stage for the current rift. Saleh who wants to keep power forever, and then give it to his sons, doesn't like to be sidestepped with the GPC whereas the Houthi part of the alliance was always meant to be temporary given their history (Saleh made the founder of the movement killed). This, in a configuration where they slowly loose (or win, war of attrition is tricky to predict), put pressure on both the groups, with the absolute awful humanitarian situation putting fuel to the fire and adding discontentment among the populace (which is the base for the GPC) for the alliance work, make the whole thing very volatile. While their objective and reasonable aim is to keep calm and govern conjointly, political calculations for after the war, as well as payback seems to have won for a short time. This is, weirdly, not the result of the most armed faction (Houthi), because they need GPC, in case of a weakening of the military they would be obliterated, no peace that includes the whole of Yemen would tolerate them, and despite a rebound in diplomacy with the Saudis (without Saleh), their wrong footing with the Emiratis (they killed 47 of their army members in a missile strike) make a continuing war of annihilation likely. Which is why their goal, though mostly not stated because they would prefer to conquer all of Yemen, is to keep the "reduit" of North Yemen, which corresponds mostly to the area they currently control. Whether it would be a Korean (demilitarized unpassable border) or a Yougoslavian scenario (already happening, putting north Yemeni back to the north and vice versa) remains speculative. On the other hand, Saleh wants a peace, because he has a good hand with the UAE (his son resides there) and they currently have the upper hand in the coalition. He also wants to rule over ALL of Yemen, which makes his goal different to Houthi, and is ready to turn on his former allies, a peace involving a federalization would suit him perfectly. A collapse of the military capability that would represent GPC leaving the alliance, would leave the Houthi needing to quickly accept an unadvantageous peace, and Saleh political power might see him reinstated. With the demonstration (the clashes were a byproduct) he was testing his popular power, and whether he could pull out of the alliance without the capital turning into a bloodbath (from what we saw, it's unlikely).

This demonstration showed his force, but the clashes showed his weakness, he might not be there to tell the tale if he tries to turn on the Houthi. On the other side, the Houthi are cornered, with them unable to loosen the grip on Sana'a without risking a Saleh pull out, and their authoritarian behaviour increasing the popular support to Saleh and decreasing theirs. Nonetheless, to conclude, not all hope is lost for them. The Hirak movement is asking for Southern secession, which would suit them nicely, they currently mostly fight the Houthi/Saleh alliance, but, paradoxically, the more the alliance retreat, the more the Southern Movement gets vocal for independence and might end up making enough trouble for the Emiratis and Saudis to ask for the peace the Houthi wish. In addition, by retreating, they go from territory populated in majority by pro South Yemen, making popular resistance against them, increasing their opponents will to fight and their numbers, to population who are pro North Yemen, making their popular support higher, and punishing more the coalition troops, this while coalition troops are Hirak will likely stop to fight to try to get their independence instead. The Houthi victory is dependant on them losing more terrain, whilst the GPC, and, at least partly, the coalition victory (they intervened to counter the Houthi), will be conditioned to the conflicts stalling, on terrain pro South Yemen, to a halt and the Houthi losses being higher than the GPC and/or the coalition losses. This makes for a weird war, where the winner might very well end up losing.