Michael Doran and Michael O’Hanlon

Each side%27s goal is the complete defeat of the other%2C but neither has the means to win.

Obama is forcing opposition to join a process they see as a poison pill.

These negotiations stand no chance of success. In fact%2C they could even do harm.

This week, elements of the Syrian opposition are scheduled to begin negotiations in Geneva with representatives of President Bashar Assad. The goal of the talks is an end to a three-year civil war that has taken more than 130,000 lives, displaced 7 million Syrians, and turned the country not only into the epicenter of the Middle East's Sunni-Shia war but also the hornet's nest from which al-Qaeda-linked extremists destabilize Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan.

Absent a miracle, the talks will fail. The goal of each side is the complete defeat of the other. But neither has the means to accomplish such objectives, or even understand this profound disconnect. Complicating things further, the Syrian opposition is as fractured as ever, with considerable infighting, and the rise of al-Qaeda affiliates within its ranks makes it harder to work with than before.

Of course, sometimes peace talks make sense even when the odds are long. The gesture of a peace offering to the enemy can help hold together the coalition we favor (as in Afghanistan). Or talks can involve parties that, for all their weaknesses, at least are capable of grappling with the stakes at hand (as with Israelis and Palestinians). They can also help acquaint negotiators with each other so that once the situation becomes riper for compromise, channels of communication already exist.

Grounded reality

None of these conditions exists in Syria. Under threat of cutting all support, the Obama administration is forcing the Syrian opposition to join a political process that the rebels see as a poison pill. Worse, the talks are not based on reality.

It is worth refreshing our memories on the chronology of this conflict to see how intractable the problem has become. In 2011, a popular uprising against Assad began and quickly spread to much of the Sunni population, which represents two-thirds of the country. In the early days of the Arab Spring, it seemed possible that a relatively non-violent movement could be successful, and prompted Obama to call for Assad's ouster.

But that was then. By late 2012, with the direct aid of Iran and Hezbollah, Assad's forces regained battlefield momentum. Meanwhile, many in the West began to buy into Assad's argument that the opposition was a motley crew of terrorists, an argument buttressed by the rise of al-Qaeda affiliates. The pro-Assad forces stopped the insurgency momentum and reversed some losses.

Against this backdrop, there are only two ways the Geneva talks can influence realities on the ground. The opposition, including its Islamist component, could lower its demands, or the opposition could become militarily stronger and politically more unified. Of the two, the second option is the only realistic cornerstone for U.S. policy.

Strengthen opposition

While strengthening the opposition militarily is a first step, it must be part of a larger political strategy. When it comes to defining what that strategy should be, the two of us disagree slightly.

One of us favors a power-sharing arrangement for Syria, akin to Bosnia, with a loose federal structure overseeing autonomous regions (for Kurds, Sunni and Alawite) together with a central mixed region (that might require United Nations peacekeepers to help calm tensions and fears). Assad could have a role in the Alawite sector under this plan — not because he should, but because the opposition does not have the means to push him out.

The other of us favors a serious attempt at regime change, believing Assad to be too divisive to be part of any arrangement.

But these kinds of disagreements need not paralyze us in the present. Until the U.S. gets real about the realities in Syria and how they link to various political strategies for the talks, negotiations like those planned for Geneva stand no chance of success.

In fact, they could even do harm, because they are demoralizing our friends while emboldening the worst actors on both sides.

Michael Doran and Michael O'Hanlon are senior fellows at the Brookings Institution. See their latest research atBrookings.edu/bigbetsblackswans2014.

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