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S E C R E T STATE 103511 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O PY (TEXT) E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018 TAGS: EWWT, MOPS, PREL, PHSA, XA, SO, RS, LG, BH, UP SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF AFFECTED STATES: HIJACKING OF BELIZE-FLAGGED CARGO SHIP M/V FAINA, IMO NUMBER 9419377 1. (SBU) This message is NIACT due to potential fast-breaking events, and urgent action is required from action addressees. 2. (U) Classified by Acting DAS James Knight, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 3. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 4-7. OBJECTIVES ---------- 4. (S/Rel to Ukraine) For Embassy Kyiv, please approach host-country officials to pursue the objectives set out below. In discussing these points, please emphasize that at this stage we are only gathering information, including the views of interested parties. While we believe it is extremely important to ensure the cargo of the FAINA is not offloaded in Somalia, we are eager to consult with the flag and crew states prior to taking action to prevent that scenario. Our contact is therefore meant to inform our decisions about how to proceed in this matter. -- Convey the United States' sympathy and concern for the safety and well-being of the crew member nationals on board the FAINA. -- Explain that the nature of the vessel's cargo and its potential diversion by terrorists pose a grave threat to security in the region. -- Note that among the available options for preventing this scenario would be to disable and/or board the vessel. -- Ask for Ukraine's views with respect to possible United States military action to prevent the hijackers from delivering the FAINA's cargo into Somalia. Such intervention could include disabling fire against the vessel or equipment being used to offload ("lighterage") it, or boarding the vessel. Emphasize that we would only consider such actions as a last resort to prevent the cargo from being taken ashore by the pirates or other malafides. If the pirates simply hold the vessel for ransom, as they have in the past, we would not intervene in this manner. Thus, we are consulting with Ukraine now regarding the possible range of options open to us. -- Note, however, that the United States reserves the right to take urgent action if necessary. -- We are of course aware that the opposed boarding of any vessel creates a risk to the lives of the crewmembers, so we are especially interested in Ukraine's views regarding such measures, should that situation arise. -- Request information on the ship specifications, including draft. -- Inquire into host nation's authorities, willingness, and ability to assist the U.S. in bringing the pirates aboard the FAINA to justice consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1816. Seek information on any conditions precedent or particular procedural requirements that would enable the host government to accept custody of, investigate, and prosecute any persons apprehended in conjunction with the piracy of the FAINA. 5. (S/Rel to Russia, Latvia) For Embassies Moscow and Riga, please approach host-country officials to pursue the following objectives: -- Convey the United States' sympathy and concern for the safety and well-being of the crew member nationals on board the FAINA. -- Explain that the nature of the vessel's cargo and its potential diversion by terrorists pose a grave threat to security in the region. -- Note that among the available options for preventing this scenario would be to disable and/or board the vessel. -- Ask for Russia's/Latvia's views with respect to possible United States military action to prevent the hijackers from delivering the FAINA's cargo into Somalia. Such intervention could include disabling fire against the vessel or equipment being used to offload ("lighterage") it, or boarding the vessel. Emphasize that we would only consider such actions as a last resort to prevent the cargo from being taken ashore by the pirates or other malafides. If the pirates simply hold the vessel for ransom, as they have in the past, we would not intervene in this manner. Thus, we are consulting with Russia/Latvia now regarding the possible range of options open to us. -- Note, however, that the United States reserves the right to take urgent action if necessary. -- We are of course aware that the opposed boarding of any vessel create a risk to the lives of the crewmembers, so we are especially interested in Russia's/Latvia's views regarding such measures, should that situation arise. -- Inquire into host nation's authorities, willingness, and ability to assist the U.S. in bringing the pirates aboard the FAINA to justice consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1816. Seek information on any conditions precedent or particular procedural requirements that would enable the host government to accept custody of, investigate, and prosecute any persons apprehended in conjunction with the piracy of the FAINA. -- Note that we are aware that a Russian navy vessel is en route to the area, apparently in response to these events, and inquire as to Russia's intentions with respect to this vessel. Urge Russia to coordinate any planned actions with the United States. 6. (S/Rel to Belize) For Embassy Belize, please approach host-country officials to pursue the following objectives: -- Convey the United States' sympathy and concern for the safety and well-being of the crew members on board the Belize-flagged roll on-roll off cargo ship FAINA, IMO number 7419377. -- Explain that the nature of the vessel's cargo and its potential diversion by terrorists pose a grave threat to security in the region. -- Note that among the available options for preventing this scenario would be to disable and/or board the vessel. -- Ask for Belize's views with respect to possible United States military action to prevent the hijackers from delivering the FAINA's cargo into Somalia. Such intervention could include disabling fire against the vessel or equipment being used to offload ("lighterage") it, or boarding the vessel. Emphasize that we would only consider such actions as a last resort to prevent the cargo from being taken ashore by pirates or other malafides. If the pirates simply hold the vessel for ransom, as they have in the past, we would not intervene in this manner. Thus, we are consulting with Belize now regarding the possible range of options open to us. -- Ask for concurrence with possible United States military action to prevent the hijackers from delivering the FAINA's cargo into Somalia. Such intervention would include disabling fire or borardingv the vessel and would only be used as a last resort to prevent the cargo from being taken ashore by the pirates or other malafides. -- Note, however, that the United States reserves the right to take urgent action if necessary. --Request information on the ship specifications, including draft. -- Inquire into host nation's authorities, willingness, and ability to assist the U.S. in bringing the pirates aboard the FAINA to justice consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1816. Seek information on any conditions precedent or particular procedural requirements that would enable the host government to accept custody of, investigate, and prosecute any persons apprehended in conjunction with the piracy of the FAINA. 7. (S/Rel to Kenya) For Embassy Nairobi, please approach host-country officials to pursue the following objectives: -- Convey the United States' sympathy and concern for the safety and well-being of the crew members on board the FAINA. -- Explain that the nature of the vessel's cargo and its potential diversion by terrorists pose a grave threat to security in the region. -- Note that among the available options for preventing this scenario would be to disable and/or board the vessel. -- Ask for Kenya's views with respect to possible United States military action to prevent the hijackers from delivering the FAINA's cargo into Somalia. Such intervention could include disabling fire against the vessel or equipment being used to offload ("lighterage") it, or boarding the vessel. Emphasize that we would only consider such actions as a last resort to prevent the cargo from being taken ashore by pirates or other malafides. If the pirates simply hold the vessel for ransom, as they have in the past, we would not intervene in this manner. Thus, we are consulting with Kenya now regarding the possible range of options open to us. -- Note, however, that the United States reserves the right to take urgent action if necessary. -- Inquire into host nation's authorities, willingness, and ability to assist the U.S. in bringing the pirates aboard the FAINA to justice consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1816. Seek information on any conditions precedent or particular procedural requirements that would enable the host government to accept custody of, investigate, and prosecute any persons apprehended in conjunction with the piracy of the FAINA. -- Indicate that we will seek--but cannot guarantee--that these weapons will be resent on their original route to Kenya for onward delivery, if recovered. BACKGROUND ---------- 8. (S) The Belize-flagged roll on-roll off cargo ship FAINA was hijacked on September 25 while en route to Mombasa, Kenya and was last reported approximately 280 NM ENE of Mogadishu. FAINA departed Nikolayev, Ukraine on September 1. One Latvian, three Russian, and 17 Ukrainian crewmembers are on board. 9. (S) As part of a contract signed between Ukraine and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army in December 2006, the vessel is believed to be carrying the following cargo intended for transshipment to southern Sudan: -- 33 T-72 tanks, with spare parts -- 42 ZPU-4 rolling anti-aircraft guns -- 36 RPG-7v -- 6 BM-27 Self propelled multiple rocket launchers -- 13,000 125mm rounds of ammunition (T-72) 10. (C) The Department is deeply concerned that the armaments may fall into al-Shabaab's hands if off-loaded from the vessel in Somalia. 11. (C) The USS Howard has been dispatched to intercept and take up a position from which to monitor the FAINA. REPORTING DEADLINE ------------------ 12. (U) The Department greatly appreciates posts' continued support and assistance. Department requests action addressees report results Of efforts via front-channel cable by September 29 to AF/RSA Jun Bando, PM/ISO CAPT Jeff Frederick, and the appropriate regional bureau. POINTS OF CONTACT ---------- 13. (U) Please contact AF/RSA Jun Bando at (202) 647-5781 or PM/ISO CAPT Jeff Frederick at at (202) 647-0886 or via email for for any necessary further background information or supporting argumentation to meet demarche objectives. RICE