The Socratic Catholic has recently written posts about libertarianism, culture, and the incoherence of libertarianism. You can find them here, here, here, and here. I’ll be addressing the first two posts in order.

Before I address the two posts, however, I will to make a positive case for libertarianism, i.e., the private property ethic.

The first subject I want to draw attention to is what The Socratic Catholic and I are engaging in. We are engaging in an interaction where we are following certain rules and where we are exchanging truth claims and questions for the purpose of finding truth. This interaction is generally called argumentation, dialogue, discourse, etc. To clarify, argumentation is the interaction between two or more speakers who must follow certain rules, i.e, norms, and where they are exchanging truth claims and, possibly, questions for the purpose of finding truth, i.e. justifying or denying truth claims and seeking reasons.

Furthermore, the idea of validity of any claim, including normative claims, only comes into existence with argumentation. To realize this one only needs to note that “the question [of what is valid or not] does not arise for a stone or fish because they are incapable of producing validity-claiming propositions. Yet if this is so–and one cannot deny that it is without contradicting oneself, for one cannot [consistently] argue the case that one cannot argue–then any ethical proposal, or indeed any proposition, must be assumed to claim it can be validated by propositional or argumentative means. In producing any proposition, overtly or as an internal thought, one demonstrates one’s preference for the willingness to rely on argumentative means to convince oneself or others of something…Without argumentation there would be nothing but silence or meaningless noise.” In other words, there are no activities other than argumentation where one can justify truth claims. Any person denying this would be contradicting their own claim as they would have to justify it in argumentation.

As already mentioned in the Hoppe quote, one cannot consistently argue that one cannot argue because the denial itself would be an argument. Additionally, one cannot consistently deny that one knows what it means to say a truth claim because the denial itself would be a truth claim. It is from these two facts that we can prove that the statement “humans are capable of argumentation and hence know the meaning of truth and validity” is true. The statement is called the a priori of argumentation.

It is from the a priori of argumentation that we can find certain norms and facts that are only deniable with contradiction. Rather, these certain norms and facts are implied as justified in argumentation, and since argumentation is the place where justification must happen it is the case that what is argumentatively justifiable is justifiable and what is argumentatively unjustifiable is unjustifiable.

The norm that is implied in argumentation that I will first mention is the universalization principle, i.e. “only those norms can be justified that can be formulated as general principles which are valid for everyone without exception.” This principle is implied in argumentation as valid because “argumentation implies that everyone who can understand an argument must in principle be able to be convinced of it simply because of its argumentative force.”

The second norm that follows from the a priori of argumentation is that of body-ownership, i.e. the prima facie justifiable exclusive control of one’s body. Speakers in an argument must presuppose as valid that each has a prima facie property right in their body. If they didn’t respect the other’s exclusive control over their body then the activity would no longer be about justification. It would be an activity that has some other purpose. Rather, for there to be argumentation the speakers must be able to at least, in principle, agree to disagree on everything else. This is sufficient enough to prove that the norm of body-ownership is only deniable with contradiction, but Hoppe strengthens the case more in a German publication:

The answer to the question what makes my body “mine” lies in the obvious fact that this is not merely an assertion but that, for everyone to see, this is indeed the case. Why do we say “this is my body”? For this a twofold requirement exists. On the one hand it must be the case that the body called “mine” must indeed (in an intersubjectively ascertainable way) express or “objectify” my will. Proof of this, as far as my body is concerned, is easy enough to demonstrate: When I announce that I will now lift my arm, turn my head, relax in my chair (or whatever else) and these announcements then become true (are fulfilled), then this shows that the body which does this has been indeed appropriated by my will. If, to the contrary, my announcements showed no systematic relation to my body’s actual behavior, then the proposition “this is my body” would have to be considered as an empty, objectively unfounded assertion; and likewise this proposition would be rejected as incorrect if following my announcement not my arm would rise but always that of Müller, Meier, or Schulze (in which case one would more likely be inclined to consider Müller’s, Meier’s, or Schulze’s body “mine”). On the other hand, apart from demonstrating that my will has been ‘objectified’ in the body called “mine,” it must be demonstrated that my appropriation has priority as compared to the possible appropriation of the same body by another person. As far as bodies are concerned, it is also easy to prove this. We demonstrate it by showing that it is under my direct control, while every other person can objectify (express) itself in my body only indirectly, i.e., by means of their own bodies, and direct control must obviously have logical-temporal priority (precedence) as compared to any indirect control. The latter simply follows from the fact that any indirect control of a good by a person presupposes the direct control of this person regarding his own body; thus, in order for a scarce good to become justifiably appropriated, the appropriation of one’s directly controlled “own” body must already be presupposed as justified. It thus follows: If the justice of an appropriation by means of direct control must be presupposed by any further-reaching indirect appropriation, and if only I have direct control of my body, then no one except me can ever justifiably own my body (or, put differently, then property in/of my body cannot be transferred onto another person), and every attempt of an indirect control of my body by another person must, unless I have explicitly agreed to it, be regarded as unjust(ified).

It is from this norm of body-ownership that we can derive the “non-aggression principle.” The non-aggression principle simply says that it is unjustifiable to aggress upon another person’s property rights. Aggression as it is concerned with bodies is “the unconsented to (or uninvited) change in the physical integrity (or use, control or possession) of another person’s body…”

It also needs to be brought to the attention of the reader that a body is simply a scarce resource, and a scarce resource is a resource that there can be physical conflict over.

Another insight we can discover from the body-ownership principle is that the function of property rights is physical conflict avoidance. If everybody respects the property rights that others have in their own body then there would be no (physical) conflict with regard to bodies.

I must address two more points. (1) Why body-ownership is a prima facie right and (2) why Hoppe is wrong in the quote that nobody ever could justifiably own some other person’s body. The reason for both is a person can forfeit property rights in their body as a result of an act of aggression.

Any other norms concerning property rights must be compatible with the principle of body-ownership.

The third norm that follows from the a priori of argumentation is that of private property rights in external scarce resources. For there to be argumentation the speakers must have used external scarce resources to survive and have the ability to argue, and as such it must presupposed as valid in argumentation that there can be property rights in external scarce resources. If a person’s argument is that property rights in external scarce resources cannot be justified then their argument is self-defeating and self-refuting.

It is self-defeating in that if the person denying property rights in external scarce resources didn’t exclusively use external scarce resources in the past then they would not even be able to argue their position. The norm of property rights in external scarce resources must be presupposed as valid in argumentation because if the norm is not presupposed as valid then argumentation would not occur but since one would be engaged in argumentation it is occurring. It is in this way their claim is self-refuting. It is also self-refuting in another way. The claim that it is justifiable to be alive must be presupposed as valid in argumentation as well. Anybody denying this would be alive and arguing and would be contradicting oneself. If one denied property rights in external scarce resources then one would die, and since one must presuppose that it is justifiable to be alive the claim that denies property rights in external scarce resources must be unjustifiable as it leads to death.

There are more norms concerning property rights in external scarce resources that are implied in argumentation. External scarce resources are different from bodies in that they are initially unowned. As such there must be ways to acquire property rights in external scarce resources, as we have seen that having property rights in external scarce resources is justifiable, and these norms must be compatible with the body-ownership principle.

The first norm concerning the acquisition of property rights in external scarce resources that is implied in argumentation is the homesteading principle, or rather the first-use-first-own rule. The homesteading principle states that the first person to appropriate an external scarce resource is its owner. Appropriation is “the transformation or embordering of a previously unowned resource…the first use or possession of the thing.”

It should be noted that Locke’s idea of homesteading, i.e. the labor theory of property, is invalid. Locke said that one owns one’s labor and that one owns the fruits of one’s labor. There are two ways in which this idea breaks down. The first being that labor is just an action and thus cannot be owned. A person can own their body which they can perform actions with, but one cannot own one’s labor because one can only own scarce, contestable resources. Owning labor makes as much sense as owning a snapping of the fingers. Second, labor is not some metaphysical substance that can be imbued in a scarce resource. Labor is simply action.

An alternative to the homesteading principle is the norm that whoever declares an external scarce resource as theirs is the owner of the scarce resource. There are many issues with this norm.

First, it is not compatible with the body-ownership principle. A person could just declare that another’s body is theirs, but as we have seen every person has a prima facie property right in their body.

Second, this norm does not fulfill property rights’ function of physical conflict avoidance. Two people might declare some scarce resource as theirs, maybe even at the same time, and there would be no way to say that one owns it and the other doesn’t.

Third, this norm is in conflict with another norm presupposed in property rights. This other norm is the “objective link” principle. In the case of bodies one’s objective, intersubjectively ascertainable link to their body is the direct use of it. The norm that supposes as valid that one can simply declare a scarce resource as theirs only provides an arbitrary link.

The homesteading principle is in accordance with the body-ownership principle and thus the “objective link” principle as well. It avoids physical conflict and it requires an objective link between a specific person and a specific external scarce resource for a person to own the external scarce resource, i.e. the person must be the first to appropriate the external scarce resource.

Another alternative to the homesteading principle would the the norm of the late-comer. This norm allows for a person to claim ownership to an external scarce resource after another person already homesteaded it. The first owner, however, has a better objective claim to the external scarce resources than the late comer by virtue of appropriating the external scarce resources first. This norm also fails because it would result in death. If the first owner had to wait for a late comer then they could do nothing with the external scarce resources until the late comer came; however, the late comer too would have to wait until another potential late comer arrived. Then that late comer would also have to wait to use the external scarce resources until another late comer came and so on and so forth. This norm is self-defeating because it would stop argumentation from happening. It is self-refuting because a norm that prevents argumentation from existing cannot be accepted as valid in argumentation, and it is self-refuting because it is contradictory to the norm that being alive is justifiable.

The last norm I will discuss that is implied in argumentation is contractual exchange. Since a person can acquire property rights in external scarce resources and can permit non-owners to use their scarce resources a person can also abandon an external scarce resource “in favor” of another specific individual(s).

We can see aggression in fuller view now. Aggression is “the unconsented to (or uninvited) change in the physical integrity (or use, control or possession) of another person’s body or [external scarce resources].” Furthermore, for an act to be an act of aggression it must either be an act of negligence or of intention

This approach to a libertarian, rationalist ethics is called Argumentation Ethics. It was thought of by Hans-Hermann Hoppe. Argumentation Ethics only gives facts, i.e. is-statements, and not prescriptions, i.e. ought-statements, so it does not fall to the is-ought gap like “natural law” theory does. However, it is similar to natural law in many obvious ways.

There are two other methods of building the case for the private property ethic via the a priori of argumentation. They are the Estoppel theory of rights thought of by Stephan Kinsella and the “Ethics of Dialogue” thought of by Frank van Dun. The major difference between Argumentation Ethics and Estoppel vs. Dialogue Ethics is that the first two are “value-free,” rather they only state facts, i.e. is-statements. Dialogue Ethics finds ought-statements from argumentation that are only deniable with contradiction, and as such it does not fall prey to the is-ought gap either.

With this in mind I will now address the first post.

Additionally, when I argue for a virtue based jurisprudence rather than a purely rights based jurisprudence, libertarians will often reply by saying that if you are not free to practice a vice or sin then you are not truly free. For example, libertarians tend to be against the war on drugs because they think a right exists to put into your body whatever you want to, and no government – local, state, federal – can say otherwise because such legislation violates this supposed right to self-destruction.

As it has been shown, it is unjustifiable for people to aggress against one’s property rights. So, it is unjustifiable to aggress upon and stop somebody from practicing a vice or sin insofar as they are not violating another’s property rights, and it is unjustifiable for somebody to practice a vice or sin when it aggresses against another person’s property rights. It could be the case that it is also unjustifiable for one to practice a vice or sin even when one is not aggressing upon another’s property rights, but nobody else can consistently claim to have ownership of the person to stop them.

To reiterate, it is my view that the new-libertarians are in fact arguing on behalf of a libertine political philosophy. The new libertarian political philosophy reduces the social order (nominally construed) to contractual consent, rights based jurisprudence, and economic self-interest. The rights based jurisprudence is grounded in a Mill-styled non-interference moral framework, which basically states that you should be free to do whatever it is you like just so long as you are not infringing on the rights of another to do likewise. What is often believed to follow from this is the idea that a person should be able to do drugs, practice prostitution, produce pornography, promote the practice of abortion, redefine the definition of marriage to a union predicated upon strong emotional sentiment etc. If it were the case that these acts are voluntary actions of consenting individuals, then it would be a violation of rights (read immoral) to enact legislation from any level of government to prohibit such actions. This is the new-libertarian position on these matters.

Libertarianism does not “reduce” the social order to “contractual consent, rights based jurisprudence, and economic self-interest.” Libertarianism simply deals with the political side of society; it deals with the use of physical force in a society. It does not deny that there are other features to the social order. The simplified libertarian view is that “you should be free to do whatever it is you like just so long as you are not infringing on the rights of another to do likewise.” It is also true that it would be unjustifiable to physically interfere with somebody engaging in all those vices and sins so long as they do not commit an act of aggression.

To argue that it is immoral for a community to prohibit drug use, for example, and that a person’s right is being violated if such prohibition took place, is in fact to endorse a libertine political philosophy. It is to say that a society is not free unless they can consume drugs and become addicts. It is to argue that a society is not free unless it protects and endorses the right to be libertine.

The Socratic Catholic needs to define libertinism here, but I do have a ballpark idea of what he is specifically talking about. Moreover, as I have demonstrated it is unjustifiable to aggress upon other’s property rights even if that includes letting them consume drugs, etc. so long as they do not aggress upon another. If they aggress upon another by consuming drugs, then that consumption of drugs is unjustifiable. Yes, a society is not a truly just unless it protects a person’s exclusive use of their body and scarce resources to act in a libertine manner as long as they don’t commit an aggressive act, but this is not to say that this is an endorsement of libertinism. People can still be against the lifestyle of libertinism in that they speak against it and use other non-aggressive means to show their disagreement with such a lifestyle. For example, it is conceivable that in a private law society, i.e. a society following the private property ethic, there would pop up Christian communities that would make it against the rules to live a libertine lifestyle. This could be done by contract, e.g. a home-owners association. The HOA could be set up so that the buyer of a house must sign a contract with fellow home owners and/or somebody else stating that if one engages in a libertine lifestyle then the person must forfeit property rights in the house, land, etc. to another person or persons.

Slogans such as “you cannot legislate morality,” “you can’t force your morality on another person”, “morality is subjective” does not thing to change the fact that new libertarians openly endorse libertinism while denying they do so at the same time.

Legislation implies the existence of a state, and since the state is unjustifiable, as it is an inherently aggressive institution, so is its legislation and statutes. It is unjustifiable to enforce your morality on another person insofar as they haven’t committed an aggression against you and that the enforcement is proportional.

Some libertarians might believe morality is subjective, but many do not. See Stephan Kinsella, Hans Hoppe, Frank van Dun, Tom Woods, and me. There are definitely a ton more that also believe moral relativism is a sham. Ethics is simply a subset of morality. While I disagree with how van Dun formulates his Dialogue Ethics, I personally believe that it does establish ought-statements, i.e. prescriptive statements, which establish an impenetrable case for libertarianism that can only be denied with contradiction.

Again, believing it is unjustifiable to aggress upon somebody simply because they live a libertine life is not the same as openly endorsing libertinism.

Moreover, to say, “I thin those actions are immoral but it isn’t my place to force morality on another person” is as ridiculous as saying, “I would never have an abortion because it is immoral, but I wouldn’t dare think to force my morality on a person that thinks abortion is moral.” This is where the claim of libertine moral anarchy is derived.

Insofar as the person is not aggressing upon another’s property rights and when aggression occurs proportionality is kept in mind, it is unjustifiable to physically force one’s moral code on to another person. I have already demonstrated that this is only deniable with a performative contradiction, thus proving the denial as unjustifiable.

However, not all libertarians believe abortion is justifiable; in fact, tons believe it is unjustifiable, i.e. murder. As such this criticism The Socratic Catholic makes is not applicable to pro-life libertarians.

These views endorsed by the new libertarians are inconsistent, incoherent, and dishonest. Own your political philosophy and follow its premises to their conclusion instead of watering it down with clichés and catch phrases.

1) I have proven that the libertarian view is consistent and coherent. In fact, any denial of the justifiability of the private property ethic is inconsistent and incoherent. While I am not sure what he really means by “new libertarians,” I would call Argumentation Ethics part of this new libertarianism since it has only been around since 1988.

2) I know exactly 0 libertarians that are dishonest about their views. Surely, there are a few, but to say all “new libertarians” are dishonest is extremely incorrect. Many, if not most, libertarians sincerely believe in libertarianism and are not being dishonest.

Having replied to the first post, I shall move on to the second post.

Walter Block argues, as is common among his tribe, that libertarianism is a political philosophy that deals with the legality of force, and when or when not to use force. This is it. That is all libertarianism deals with according to Block. Force should never be initiated against person or property and only used to protect these two pillars.

Block is not wrong here.

As far as Block is concerned, libertarianism has nothing to do with or say about morality and culture. In fact, there is no such thing as a libertarian position on morality or culture on this view.

Block might believe that, but not all libertarians believe it. I have already discussed that ethics is simply a subset of morality and that Frank van Dun’s Dialogue Ethics successfully shows ought-statements that build the case for libertarianism that are only deniable with contradiction.

On the subject of culture, insofar that it excludes ethics and the ought-statements van Dun discovered, libertarianism has nothing to say about it. Libertarians do comment and show disdain for anti-private property ethic mentalities and for certain parts of culture, but that does not mean there is a libertarian view on these non-force related issues. Libertarians see how aggression, in particular the state, and the support of aggression affects culture and then comment on how it is different from what would likely happen in a private law society. That is simply it.

For example, copyright legislation and statues, which are unjustifiable by libertarian standards, affect a society’s culture. It creates incentives that otherwise would not have been there and as such the creator and consumers act in different ways than they likely would in a private law society. In a society with copyright legislation and statutes, the creators are much, much more likely to sue somebody for using the songs they “own” as a result of the copyright system when that somebody plays or uses bits of the song in a way the creator does not approve of, and consumers are more likely to pitch the song up so that when they upload them to video sites they do not have their videos taken down by copyright programs. This is not a libertarian position, but rather an observation of how society is affected by legislation and statutes.

To be blunt, this is ridiculous. To even postulate the basic tenets of libertarianism there needs to be an understanding of what a “right” is, what “property” is, what “force” is, what it would mean to “initiate” force; not to mention the notion of what a human person is and how to organize society around this understanding; which adds to the mixture of the ontological make up of reality that man finds himself as well as the metaphysical foundations supporting the specific ontology under consideration along side the concept of the human person so construed; finally a moral philosophy is a necessary requirement to even begin to understand what a “right” is.

We do not need to go outside the realm of politics, i.e. the use of force, to understand those terms he puts in quotation marks. I have already discussed what a right is earlier in this post. When he refers to property I am sure that he refers to scarce resources, but using the word property to refer to scarce resources is imprecise. A property is referring to a quality. That’s why it is more correct to say “X has property rights in scarce resource Y” rather than “X owns property Y.” Force is simply the “the consented to or unconsented to (invited or uninvited) change in the physical integrity (or use, control or possession) of another person’s body or [external scarce resources].” I’ve already dealt with what the “initiation of force,” i.e., aggression, means. The important thing about what a human person is, when concerned with the use of force, is that the person’s body is tangible and scarce and they can enter into argumentation. I have already shown this.

It gets worse for Block because all of these philosophical positions are properly understood within a culture that can articulate and comprehend any of these concepts.

Yes, all these philosophical positions, and any for that matter, can only be properly understood within a culture that can articulate and comprehend any of these concepts. This has no bearing on whether or not there is a libertarian view on culture.

Culture drives political institutions, the political economy, and the morality of a citizenry.

Again, yes, this is true, but, again, this has no bearing on whether or not there is a libertarian view on culture.

It is easy enough to expose the highly problematic claim that libertarianism has nothing to say about morality by simply disagreeing with any libertarian on what it means to “initiate force.”

Again, I am of the opinion that libertarianism has something to say about morality, and so do many other libertarians. It has something to say about is-statements and interpersonal conflict and it has something to say about ought-statements and interpersonal conflict. Even some libertarians that do not believe libertarianism has something to say about ought-statements believe it has something to say about ethics, which is a part of morality.

If you find yourself in such an occasion be prepared to interact with a shrieking eel.

No shrieking eel here, just meaningful propositions.

To violate a “right” is to commit an immoral act, which means that libertarianism has something to say about the morality of rights and the violation of said rights.

Some libertarians do not believe that is necessarily immoral to violate property rights. They might say that it would in fact be immoral to not violate property rights in some cases. Such a case might be where one’s family is starving and to survive one must steal somebody’s pie. I use immoral in this paragraph in the sense that it only deals with ought-statements and not the is-statements because that’s what I think The Socratic Catholic means.

On the other hand, you do have some libertarians that do believe that libertarianism has something to say about ought-statements, e.g. Frank van Dun and me.

Libertarianism also has a lot to say about culture. All the evidence you need to discover this truism is to visit any nominally libertarian web page and you will find the pervasive lament of the progressive socialist culture we find ourselves swimming. You will find a mountain of articles discussing how our culture does not respect property rights, the effects of the welfare/warfare state, the worship of militarism etc. These are criticisms of a culture to which libertarianism would like to replace with their own, let’s say an anarcho-capitalist culture/society.

Libertarianism has *nothing* to say about culture, insofar as it excludes ethics and the ought-statements that can be derived from Dialogue Ethics. Yes, you will see libertarian pages and sites complaining about the parts of culture that are affected by aggression, in particular the state, and the support of aggression, but I have already explained why these opinions do not mean that there is a libertarian view on culture.

I could go on and on, but the Neo-libertarian political philosophy is an absolute philosophical mess.

If Argumentation Ethics, Estoppel Theory of rights, and Dialogue Ethics are a “philosophical mess” then there is no philosophy that is even remotely “clean.”