A recent post on FiveThirtyEight asks “where is Ukraine’s next Crimea?” The piece states that “Donetsk and Luhansk are more aligned with Russia than Crimea in almost every measurable way”, and hints that under similar conditions to Crimea, both regions would likely vote for an exit from Ukraine.

A more thorough look at polling data though shows a far more complicated picture.

A Kiev International Institute of Sociology poll carried out between 8-16 April in south-eastern Ukraine (specifically in Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Donetsk) is worth having a look at.

Here are the poll’s key findings:

1. 30.3% believe acting President Turchynov is the legitimate head of state, 50.8% say he isn’t. Opinion between the regions is rather split - 39.4% vs 36.6% in Dnipropetrovsk, 55.1% vs 23.8% in Mykolaiv, 14.3% vs 74% in Donetsk

The figures for PM Yatsenyuk are relatively similar - across all the regions, 33.6% believe his government is legitimate, 49.6% don’t. The divide by regions also shows similar patterns.

While reflecting an opposite overall picture, the perception of parliament’s legitimacy is also divided. 42.3% support its legitimacy, 36.8% believe its authority is not legitimate. 50% in Donetsk say parliament is illegitimate vs one in three that believe its authority is legitimate. Figures for Luhansk show a similar split (46.7% vs 35.3% respectively).



2. An overwhelming majority (69.8%) believe ousted president Viktor Yanukovych isn’t the legitimate head of state. 19.6% believe Yanukovych is the legitimate president. 67.6% overall, and 60-70% across each region, believe the former president should answer to the law for his “corrupt practices”. Opinion on the ouster is though more divided - 41.7% see events as a protest overthrowing a corrupt dictator, 46% as an armed coup. Opinion is quite diverse when looked at by region: majorities in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Odessa and Kherson see Yanukovych’s departure as a consequence of the protests. In Donetsk and Luhansk the events are seen as a coup by 70% and 60% respectively. The same divides are shown when respondents are asked who was responsible for the casualties occurred during the protests (multiple answers were allowed for this question) - 45% blame Yanukovych (28.7% in Donetsk), 17.2% his party, 37.5% the opposition (57.2% in Donetsk). 18.4% blame the west, 4.8% Russia. 68.5% claim the use of force by special forces wasn’t justified vs 21.5% who believe it was, and the same goes for protestors’ use of weapons (84.2% vs 7.5%).



In short, there is consensus in terms of Yanukovych being corrupt, less so in terms of the events that led to the former president’s ouster and what followed.



3. A majority believe Right Sector is a threat and should be disarmed, only 10.4% say the far-right party is acting on behalf of Russia’s interests.



4. 46% say there is a risk of a civil war in Ukraine, 32.7% believe such a risk doesn’t exist. In Donetsk and Luhansk the figures are 55.9% vs 26.5% and 51.9% vs 24.1% respectively. Overall, a higher number though believes that the biggest threats to Ukraine are the risk of widespread banditry and the collapse of its economy. About 15% see separatism as a major threat.



5. In terms of what steps respondents expect from government in order to preserve the unity of the country:



Disbandment of illegal radical groups 37.8%

Economic measures to support the regions 22.4%

Dialogue with Russia 23%

Become a federal state 11.8% (20% in Donetsk and Luhansk, where 17% also see the introduction of a second state language as critical).

Early presidential elections 17.6%, parliamentary elections 14.5%



6. Only 11.7% support the recent capture of administrative buildings in their region by pro-Russian groups (a minority even in Donetsk - 18.1% - and Luhansk - 24.2%). With the exception of Luhansk, across all surveyed regions these types of actions are seen as not, and never, justifiable by a majority of respondents.



7. 36.8% believe Ukraine is at war with Russia, 48.9% disagree. 55-60% in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv believe there is a conflict between the two countries. 54.1% believe Russia is interfering illegally in Ukraine, 32% doesn’t. Only in Donetsk (48.8% vs 32.9%) and in Luhansk (40.9% vs 33.5%) do more people not believe this than the ones that do. Yet, 41.4% vs 38.3% believe that Russia isn’t behind recent events in the regions. This figure is though primarily driven by numbers in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv. In the other surveyed regions, a majority say Russia is directly orchestrating the separatist rallies and actions. And, 40.7% vs 35% believe Russia is aiming for the accession of Ukraine.



8. Only 11.7% support the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, 74.3% doesn’t. This opinion is supported across all surveyed regions. 74.5% say Ukraine and Russia should be two independent states with open borders and without visas, 15.9% in Luhansk and 12.4% in Donetsk believe the two countries should unite into one state vs 8.4% overall.

None of the surveyed regions wants to secede from Ukraine to join Russia. In Donetsk 27.5% (vs 52.2%), and 30.3% (vs 51.9%) in Luhansk, are for for joining Russia. 64.6% and 60.8% in the two regions respectively, say they would not join the pro-Russian rallies in their region, 25% would.

23.1% believe the rights of the Russian-speaking population are being violated, 71.5% doesn’t. 39.9% vs 57.2% and 29.5% vs 60.8% in Donetsk and Luhansk respectively. For context, according to the 2001 census the native Russian—speaking population is 75% in Donetsk and 69% in Luhansk.



9. In terms of Crimea, opinion is once again split - 44.3% see the annexation as illegal, 43% as legitimate, and only a strong majority of respondents in Donetsk (62.9% vs 25.7%) and Luhansk 58.1% vs 26.8%), and by 44.1% (to 42.8%) in Kharkiv, support the annexation.

Opinion is also divided when it comes to the Ukrainian government’s position on the crisis in Crimea - about 40% believe the government acted correctly in avoiding a conflict, just above 30% disagree. More than 60% though say the region was lost due to incompetence and indecision. 61.6% point the figure of blame on the government, about 20% blame separatists and Russia, 6.8% the US and the EU.



10. In terms of the future governance of Ukraine, 45% want more power handed over to the regions, 20% support the status quo (10% in Donestk and Luhansk), 25% a federal structure (40% in Donetsk and Luhansk). More than 80% across all the regions want directly elected governors. Just under 90% in all the regions say Ukraine alone should determine its future, only 6% say Russia should be involved (8% in Donetsk and Luhansk), less than 1% want the EU and the US involved in this process.



11. If a referendum were held, 24.7% would vote to join the EU (9% in Donetsk, 11% in Luhansk), 46.8% a Customs Union with Russia (72% in Donetsk, 64% in Luhansk). By diverging margins, the EU option is preferred in Kherson (37.4-31.4%), Dnipropetrovsk (38.1-29.2%) and Mykolaiv (40.4-22.1%).



12. Presidential voting intention:

Poroshenko 18.6%

Tihipko 9.1%

Tymoshenko 3.7%

Symonenko 3.3%

The race would be slightly closer in Donetsk and Luhansk, where Tihipko is just ahead of Poroshenko (12-10% and 9-7% respectively), and in several regions communist leader Symonenko beats Tymoshenko to third place.

More than 30% are undecided, and 11-15% say they will not vote.



The tables (in Ukrainian) for the poll can be found here.



When looked at together, in context, what do these numbers mean?

It’s complicated, but there are several important conclusions that can be drawn:



1. Opinion between these regions and the west of the country, and within the regions themselves, is clearly divided, but to reduce the divide to being pro-Russian, or not, is an excessive simplification.

2. While with diverging margins, there is quite a strong consensus in terms of both negative views towards ousted president Yanukovych and his administration, and in terms of scepticism towards the current administration.

3. Negative views towards the current president and PM do not though directly correlate to support for pro-Russian rallies taking place in the regions, nor do they equate to a willingness to leave Ukraine to join Russia. In fact the numbers show high condemnation towards these rallies, and a significant majority opposed to a Russian intervention.

4. The 15% in Donetsk and Luhansk wanting to see Ukraine and Russia merge, and the about 30% in the two regions wanting to join Russia - while not a majority, are relatively high numbers. Support for independence is much higher in Scotland, Catalonia or Veneto, yet given the volatile context in east Ukraine, as the FiveThirtyEight analysis points out, it may well grow as it did in Crimea (where 31% of the population between 2008-2014 said Ukraine and Russia should merge).

5. The key to understanding these numbers is context - far more people, even in Donetsk and Luhansk, are more concerned about the economic situation, security and stability, and the rights of minorities (for example language) in their region, and see greater autonomy or a federation as a more favourable outcome than joining Russia. Only 6% believe Russia should be involved in determining Ukraine’s future. Furthermore the question of having to choose between the EU and a Customs Union with Russia, and views towards wanting to have open borders and strong ties with Russia, shouldn’t be confused with wanting to be annexed with Russia.

6. FiveThirtyEight hints that Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk would likely vote for independence today if the conditions of a referendum were similar to those in Crimea. Maybe. But, there isn’t sufficient evidence to so thinly support a comparison based on the polling data available. Opinion on events in Crimea is also divided, and the only point of consensus seems to be an agreement that the current government mishandled the situation. FiveThirtyEight, rightly so, claims that past polling in Crimea didn’t point to the region wanting to join Russia, and if a referendum were held these eastern regions may well vote to be annexed. Yet, this would have more to do with concerns over the government and institutional balance, and the economic and security situation on the day, than a strong pro-Russia sentiment. Because of this, and due to the complexity of a constantly changing situation, it’s near impossible to predict what may happen tomorrow. Any prediction becomes a guess.

7. Concerns about the current government are a far stronger sentiment than an eagerness to join Russia.

8. This poll confirms that Poroshenko is the favourite to win the presidential vote even in these regions. FiveThirtyEight’s point that the Party of Regions would suffer without support in the east is definitely true, but the same argument could be made for almost any country in the world when strongholds are excluded. What is less certain is that Fatherland would be the primary party to benefit from further splits - support for Tymoshenko today is quite different to the 2012 (parliamentary) and 2010 (presidential) elections - however, and if, the country is split up, Poroshenko is likely to win May’s presidential election, and looking at multiple parliamentary election results prior to 2012 shows a volatile picture, making it quite adventurous to predict future hypothetical election outcomes based on one previous vote alone.



In conclusion, scepticism towards the current government has more to do with concerns over the regions’ future than support for the ousted administration and pro-Russian sentiment. Being “pro-Russia” in this context fundamentally reflects wanting Ukraine to maintain and strengthen ties with Russia; these regions feeling closer to Russia than to the EU if they have to choose between the two; and significant concerns among what is a large Russian-speaking population. There isn’t much evidence to say that this all implies wanting Russia to intervene in Ukraine’s affairs or a majority wanting to leave Ukraine to join Russia today. Although given the size of the Russian-speaking population and the high number that wants to currently join Russia, if the already fragile conditions shift, this may change.

Ukraine is a divided country where balancing the diverse strands of opinion will be extremely complicated, but understanding this diversity, and not simplifying it into two camps is an important first step.