The think tank closest to Whitehall the Institute for Government has published the most comprehensive report on the state of government in Northern Ireland since the breakdown of Stormont. Here is its executive summary. It deserves to be read in full. Here is the launch video.

Not before time the IfG reminds the UK government of the perils of ignorance and neglect. Rather generously, it attributes blame for failures as much to the persistent and puzzling ignorance of our affairs in London since the GFA, as to the intractability of our politics. Written very much within a civil service culture, it has nevertheless avoided pulling too many punches when addressing Westminster and Whitehall. It gives real insight into the Whitehall mentality and has given a useful voice to the hard pressed Northern Ireland Civil Service. The best outcome of the report will be signs that the government will adopt the more activist approach it recommends. Brexit makes that both more desirable and more difficult.

The report writers don’t seem to have engaged much with local politicians and have relied for evidence mainly on civil servants and academics. This was probably wise, given the stand-off and the confidentiality surrounding the fruitless series of talks.

Northern Ireland politics will soon reach a new watershed on the interlinked agenda of Brexit reaching a climax of some sort and the UK government being forced to decide on some form of direct rule, with the local parties likely to remain deadlocked at least until a Brexit outcome emerges.

NI business in the Commons will feature on or around 21 October which is the deadline for reviewing progress on restoring the institutions. In July, back bench amendments to the NI Executive Formation Act on same sex marriage and abortion were accepted as a device to prevent Parliament being prorogued for long. The Bill has since been superseded as a block on prorogation by the sensational Supreme Court ruling. But it has had the equally sensational and locally more significant result of passing these reforms into law in default of a Stormont restoration. It remains to be seen whether the government will seek to amend them with or without DUP pressure or even introduce a repeal Bill for abortion at least.

There follows an extended summary of the IfG report. The full version is pretty comprehensive although cautious about peering too far into the future. At first digest its analysis will command idespread support – although it oddly omits a discussion on a voluntary coalition in its proposed Assembly reforms.

Everyone we spoke to agreed that the current situation was unacceptable – but had differing views on what the most troubling implications of the prolonged period without ministers were. They variously highlighted: • Pressing issues are going unaddressed – even where there is local agreement. • The inability of civil servants to make policy decisions risks “stagnation and decay” of public services. • There is a lack of scrutiny and accountability. • Opportunities for cross-border working are being missed. • Northern Ireland has been left without proper representation in the Brexit process. • The long-term risk is a deterioration in community relations.

On 24 July 2019, over two years after the Hart Inquiry ( into Historical Institutional Abuse) concluded, then minister of state for Northern Ireland, John Penrose, told the House of Commons that the UK government would introduce legislation after summer recess a commitment that the new NI secretary, Julian Smith, reiterated in August.

The Domestic Abuse Bill introduced to the House of Commons on 16 July extends the offence of coercive control to Northern Ireland. The decision in September by Prime Minister Johnson to end the parliamentary session meant that the bill was expected to fall, but with the Supreme Court’s decision that prorogation was unlawful it could continue its passage unless and until parliament is prorogued again.

Despite these recent commitments, such changes will require primary legislation – unless direct rule is imposed. And with continuing parliamentary battles over Brexit and the vulnerability of Johnson’s minority government, it is unlikely that devolved Northern Ireland issues will be a priority of the UK government in the near future – so the list of outstanding issues is likely to grow the longer the executive is absent

The inability of civil servants to make policy decisions risks “stagnation and decay” of public services Most senior civil servants we spoke to told us that the biggest consequence of the absence of an executive was not an immediate ‘cliff-edge’ caused by a lack of short-term decision making, but a longer-term inability to develop new policy or change policy direction. Many interviewees told us of the major structural changes to public services that are needed in Northern Ireland to run government effect

But even where there is clear policy direction on transformation there are still important decisions that civil servants do not feel can be made in the absence of political cover. A prime example is the merging of NI hospital emergency departments, where performance has always been worse than their English comparator, but has been in further decline since 2017

In its review of education funding in Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee said that “the political deadlock at Stormont has meant that the education system has been unable to respond to the urgent challenges facing schools”, and that the UK’s approach of passing budgets for Northern Ireland on a rolling annual basis “has been an obstacle to investment and improvement in children’s education”.

Officials in the Department of Infrastructure told us that there is a public perception that the absence of ministers has meant that there is a big pile of projects waiting for sign off. In reality, however, there is no money for new projects to sign off on – and officials feel they cannot commit any capital sums for future projects that would pre-empt the decisions of incoming ministers.

There are also important decisions to be made about the long-term funding of water infrastructure. Northern Ireland is the only part of the UK that currently does not have domestic water charges, but officials and regulators have warned that the underfunding of water infrastructure is becoming increasingly unsustainable and could act as a brake on future economic development.

The Westminster institutions have done little to fill the scrutiny gap left by the absence of the NI Assembly. As a consequence of the UK government’s unwillingness to legislate until the last minute, most Northern Ireland bills have been subject to the emergency legislation procedure. In recent times, bills have usually been passed in one day in the Commons – having committee stage on the floor of the house rather than in public bill committees – and have passed through the Lords in two days. This means that legislation is often subject to little or no scrutiny, and there are few, if any, opportunities for concerned parties in Northern Ireland to feed into the process.

This absence of political representation was made even more problematic by the fact that the Northern Ireland perspective has often been missing in Whitehall, too. The Northern Ireland Office lacks the clout within government to ensure that Northern Ireland issues were given the priority they perhaps deserved. Officials told us that the culture of ‘no bad news’ among ministers translated into a reluctance to address the difficult issues raised by the Irish border and need for cross-border co-operation – for example, the operation of the Single Electricity Market.

In the absence of a plurality of Northern Ireland voices in Westminster, civil society in Northern Ireland has taken a more high-profile role than previously. Business, farming and human rights groups have publicly outlined their views on the consequences of Brexit on their respective sectors, and have been increasingly vocal in opposing no deal.25 This is unusual in Northern Ireland, where many civil society groups have been traditionally reluctant to speak out on political issues.

The absence of an executive is prompting remarkably little comment It is striking how readily accepted the prolonged absence of the executive seems to be.

The current arrangements could not survive a no-deal Brexit It is also clear that this vacuum could not survive no deal – as both UK ministers and Northern Ireland civil servants have acknowledged. Unless power-sharing is resumed, a no-deal Brexit will require UK ministers to take some sort of legislative control, as officials will not be able to take the fast-pace and wide-ranging policy decisions that will be required to manage the fallout – and cannot be held accountable for those decisions.*

Whether that constitutes full-on direct rule, or more limited Brexit-related powers, is uncertain. But no one should underestimate how controversial the imposition of direct rule in the circumstances of a no-deal Brexit would be. Such a move would attract strong criticism from nationalists, the Irish government and key figures in the US, who would likely argue that this would be an infringement of the GFA. When direct rule was last imposed, in 2002, there was an understanding that power-sharing was in its infancy and that teething problems were inevitable. Now, 20 years on, a decision to impose direct rule would be much more significant act.,

Polling from August 2019 suggests that a majority of people in Northern Ireland would also back a Northern Ireland-only backstop; although only one in six unionists would…

The UK government would undoubtedly be widely blamed for any economic fallout – north and south of the border – caused by a no-deal exit. In these circumstances, hopes of an imminent return of devolved government would be dashed. A no-deal Brexit would drive a further wedge between the parties, and the difficulties it would create would likely disincentivise any political party from re-entering government. The history of Northern Ireland shows that once imposed, direct rule often remains in place for a long time.

Many people suggest that power-sharing is near to its last chance saloon, and that any further collapses would leave big question marks over how to govern Northern Ireland in the long term. Whatever problems devolution has encountered, everyone we spoke to was clear that Northern Ireland had benefited from its return and that when the parties could act together that brought solid gains to Northern Ireland. This is perhaps best manifested in the fact that Northern Ireland has become a major tourist destination in recent years – external overnight trips increased by 34% between 2013 and 201835 – and that figure will have been further boosted in 2019 by the hosting of the Open golf tournament for the first time since 1951.

If the current attempts to restore power-sharing falter – and the government is not forced by a no-deal Brexit to change approach – the NI secretary should set out clearly the government’s long-term plan for governance in Northern Ireland, including how it intends to address the scrutiny gap.

It should also outline how it will ensure that the people of Northern Ireland do not suffer from the failure of their politicians to co-operate. Prime Minister Johnson has said restoration is a priority: he now needs to act as though it truly is.

He must also think how a power-sharing executive can be supported through the type of Brexit he is pushing for. The excuse that everything is on hold until power-sharing comes back is well past its sell-by date.

Whatever comes next, good UK–Irish relations are of great importance Co-operation between the UK and Irish governments is essential to any successful strategy in Northern Ireland. But Brexit has meant official relations between the two are at their lowest ebb since well before the 1990s. The Irish government considers itself as the co-guarantor of the GFA; the UK government has been reluctant to embrace such a characterisation, although Dublin’s central role in power-sharing talks is widely acknowledged. Officials present during the St Andrews Agreement, which paved the way for the last successful restoration of the executive, highlighted the importance of the British and Irish governments working in ‘lockstep’.

If direct rule is imposed, nationalist parties would expect a role for the Irish government. Both Sinn Féin and the SDLP have said they would favour a “joint authority” approach where Northern Ireland is co-governed by the UK and Irish governments – but the UK has ruled this out. Nonetheless, the Irish government will want to make full use of its entitlement under the GFA to involvement in Northern Ireland affairs (though without the derogation from sovereignty) through the British–Irish Intergovernmental Conference. This institution, although disliked by unionists, is an essential part of the GFA. The government must find ways to repair its relationship with the Irish government, for the sake of Northern Ireland. Those institutions will be more important than ever as the UK leaves the EU. Irish diplomats have stressed that the fact that the UK and Ireland were both EU members, and often acted in concert in the EU, provided a forum for building and normalising relations that had been strained over the previous 50 years. The UK’s exit reduces that opportunity:38 the UK will have to actively invest in maintaining good relations with Ireland.

There will be further recommendations on how to improve the functioning of NI government when the Renewable Heat Initiative (RHI) Inquiry1 report is released. Those recommendations may cover capacity in the civil service and its need to formalise internal processes, the relationships between ministers and civil servants and the role of special advisers. David Sterling, head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS) told the inquiry that 14 actions were already being put in place to address shortcomings.

We do not attempt replicate the detail of that inquiry or its likely recommendations here. Instead, we look at possible reforms that might increase the capacity of the political institutions in Northern Ireland to address the longer-term challenges people we spoke to identified. The seven areas for practical improvement are:

Develop more buttressing institutions to support Northern Ireland’s politicians and civil servants.

Reform the operation and capabilities of the NICS. • Review the wider governance landscape in Northern Ireland.

Build on the recent widening of policy engagement across Northern Ireland. • Encourage more cross-fertilisation between the UK’s nations, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.

Increase the capacity for scrutiny by the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Ensure that the Northern Ireland secretary is a respected figure and improve ‘NI literacy’ in Whitehall and Westminster.

Backbench MPs fill the gap controversially.

The government has also come under increasing pressure to address discrepancies in abortion and LGBT rights that exist between the UK and Northern Ireland. During the passage of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Bill 2017–19, amendments were added to compel the government to extend same-sex marriage to Northern Ireland and to liberalise abortion laws – both issues the government considered to be devolved matters – on which MPs were given a free vote. These provisions will come into force should the executive not be restored by 21 October 2019. Further amendments were subsequently added, including requirements for the NI secretary to report to Parliament on the progress of executive formation on specified dates, to limit the window in which the government could prorogue Parliament and to ensure that Parliament sits in the run-up to the UK’s current date for EU withdrawal on 31 October. The bill was passed into law in July 2019.

Scrutiny in the Assembly is also underdeveloped. The creation in 2016 of an official opposition is a new feature that requires further development; committees have done some great work but are often not taken seriously by ministers. To effectively hold the executive to account, the Assembly needs to develop its own identity, distinct from government, and ensure it has the appropriate resources to effectively scrutinise it.

The NICS should be applauded for how it has handled the absence of ministers, but as the Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry into the ‘cash-for-ash’ scandal is expected to outline in its report due in November 2019, there are areas – such as transparency, collaboration across departments and capability – where there is room for improvement. Reform is needed.

In Westminster and Whitehall, the NI-specific implications of policies or issues are rarely considered, the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) is marginalised, and there is a poor general understanding of local issues. Greater clarification of the role of the NIO and steps to improve Northern Ireland literacy are necessary.

The government’s no-deal planning assumptions – Operation Yellowhammer, released in September 2019 – state that in the event of no deal, the government will not impose new checks, to avoid a hard border. However, it also notes that “the model is likely to prove unsustainable due to significant economic, legal and bio-security risks and no effective mitigations to address this will be available”.

We argue that the UK government and the British political establishment has not treated Northern Ireland and the Irish dimension of Brexit with the seriousness it deserves since the 2016 referendum, and even following the collapse of the power-sharing executive.

Finally, we look at whether it might be possible after any future return of power-sharing to bolster NI political institutions to make it easier for local politicians to address longer-term issues.

Governing without ministers

More generally, departments have taken different approaches to working without ministers depending on the nature of the departmental work, the level of ministerial intervention when the executive was running, the level of clear policy direction pre-collapse and, in some cases, the individual personalities of senior officials and their willingness to take possibly risky decisions, for example, the Department of Health (DoH) benefits from a 10-year plan Health and Wellbeing 2026: Delivering Together, approved by the executive before its collapse and published in May 2016. In an interview with Civil Service World, DoH Permanent Secretary Richard Pengelly, said that “the first couple of years are largely getting your sleeves rolled up and starting to do the hard graft”6 so civil servants have been able to get on with delivering this. By contrast, there had been little new policy direction from ministers in the Department of Education prior to the collapse. As such, the focus of the department has been on maintaining the current system, not reforming it.

Officials have had to manage preparations for Brexit without local political input

Intergovernmental working at an official level has generally been good, but there have been concerns that Northern Ireland-specific issues are not being adequately considered in UK preparations. This is in part because UK officials have been reluctant to force their ministers to confront the issues associated with managing the land border and north–south relations after Brexit.

There is a general wariness in Whitehall to share information on Brexit preparation with the devolved administrations – a consequence of the UK government’s distrust of Holyrood – hampering the ability of civil servants in the devolved administrations to plan accordingly. A lack of knowledge, and a failure to think through the implications of UK-wide initiatives for Northern Ireland, have also meant the NICS has repeatedly had to draw issues – such as unintentionally inflammatory communications* – to the attention of Whitehall colleagues.

Although the officials from Belfast can speak, the ministers from Scotland and Wales take precedence and the NICS officials do not raise the same sort of political objections as the Scottish and Welsh governments (although we have heard anecdotal evidence that Scottish and Welsh ministers often feel obliged to highlight issues that affect Northern Ireland in such fora).

Also in the absence of ministerial direction, Northern Ireland has not been able to develop clear thinking on its post-Brexit approach in key areas such as agriculture, fisheries and environmental protection. This has hampered its ability to feed into the discussions on the UK-wide commons frameworks necessary to ensure co-ordination and consistency across the UK in certain devolved policy areas that are to be repatriated from the EU.

The lack of ministerial voice from Northern Ireland places an additional responsibility on the Northern Ireland secretary to make sure that Northern Ireland’s concerns are properly addressed in all UK government Brexit discussions – and to make sure that they fully reflect the whole range of local concerns. While Theresa May’s Northern Ireland secretary, Karen Bradley, was on her key EU exit committee, her successor, Julian Smith, does not sit on the XS Committee, the Johnson administration’s key EU exit strategy committee.

This report highlights some of the consequences of such a prolonged period of governing without ministers:

With the NI Assembly unable, and the UK Parliament unwilling, to legislate in devolved areas, progress on certain issues – such as domestic violence, judicial reform and compensation for victims of historical abuse – has stalled, even where there is political agreement.

As civil servants are unable to develop new policy and change policy direction, no progress can be made on the long-term public service reforms necessary to run Northern Ireland efficiently. David Sterling, head of the NICS, warned of the risk of “stagnation and decay”.

The North South Ministerial Council is not able to meet, meaning that opportunities for cross-border working, particularly on Brexit, have been missed.

In the absence of ministers and a sitting Assembly, there are few mechanisms in place to hold civil servants to account and scrutinise decision making. The UK’s Parliament in Westminster is not well-placed to fill this accountability gap.

Northern Ireland lacks proper political representation in the Brexit process, despite being more acutely affected by the outcome than any other part of the UK. There are no NI ministers to sit alongside their Scottish and Welsh counterparts in ministerial discussions. The unbalanced representation at Westminster, where Sinn Féin pursues its policy of ‘abstentionism’ (the party refuses to take its seats) means the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is in effect the voice of Northern Ireland, even though it represents only one perspective.

Power-sharing was designed to foster co-operation in a divided society; without it there is a long-term risk of deterioration of community relations.