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* [GIT PULL][SECURITY] Kernel lockdown patches for v5.4 @ 2019-09-10 22:01 James Morris 2019-09-25 14:54 ` Jiri Kosina 2019-09-28 15:55 ` pr-tracker-bot 0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: James Morris @ 2019-09-10 22:01 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Linus Torvalds Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, Matthew Garrett, David Howells Hi Linus, This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others. From the original description: This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature, intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel. When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted. Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand. The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer to not requiring external patches. There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline: 1. Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/ 2. Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven, rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism. A new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line: lockdown={integrity|confidentiality} Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract confidential information from the kernel are also disabled. This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and overriden by kernel configuration. New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in include/linux/security.h for details. The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way. Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing this under category (c) of the DCO. Several simple conflicts have been identified by Stephen in linux-next: vfs tree: https://www.lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/12/21 Linus' tree: https://www.lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/12/26 https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/20/1415 https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190821130513.0038df28@canb.auug.org.au/ https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190821130957.407d9c10@canb.auug.org.au/ Keys tree: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190829150609.7ae3c4ee@canb.auug.org.au/ Please consider merging for v5.4. The following changes since commit 0ecfebd2b52404ae0c54a878c872bb93363ada36: Linux 5.2 (2019-07-07 15:41:56 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next-lockdown for you to fetch changes up to 45893a0abee6b5fd52994a3a1095735aeaec472b: kexec: Fix file verification on S390 (2019-09-10 13:27:51 +0100) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Dave Young (1): lockdown: Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells (10): lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down Jiri Bohac (2): kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Josh Boyer (2): hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down Linn Crosetto (1): acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett (15): security: Support early LSMs security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM kexec: Fix file verification on S390 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 6 +- arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/configs/defconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/configs/performance_defconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c | 4 +- arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c | 4 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 4 +- arch/x86/Kconfig | 20 ++- arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c | 19 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 9 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 7 +- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 8 + arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 1 + arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c | 5 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 +- drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 6 + drivers/acpi/osl.c | 14 +- drivers/acpi/tables.c | 6 + drivers/char/mem.c | 7 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 + drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 16 ++ drivers/pci/proc.c | 14 +- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 4 +- drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c | 5 + drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 5 + fs/debugfs/file.c | 30 ++++ fs/debugfs/inode.c | 32 +++- fs/proc/kcore.c | 6 + fs/tracefs/inode.c | 42 +++++- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 8 +- include/linux/acpi.h | 6 + include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++ include/linux/kexec.h | 4 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 ++ include/linux/security.h | 59 ++++++++ init/Kconfig | 5 + init/main.c | 1 + kernel/events/core.c | 7 + kernel/kexec.c | 8 + kernel/kexec_file.c | 68 +++++++-- kernel/module.c | 37 ++++- kernel/params.c | 21 ++- kernel/power/hibernate.c | 3 +- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 10 ++ kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c | 5 + security/Kconfig | 11 +- security/Makefile | 2 + security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++ security/lockdown/Kconfig | 47 ++++++ security/lockdown/Makefile | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 191 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 56 ++++++- 61 files changed, 864 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/lockdown/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/lockdown/Makefile create mode 100644 security/lockdown/lockdown.c ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

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