Since risk-limiting audits verify elections while minimizing the number of audited ballots, they are both inexpensive and speedy. They largely eliminate the need for emergency recruitment of recount workers and can be conducted before the election must be certified by law. This also means that auditing can become a routine part of every election. Regular auditing will also allow state and county electioneers to become more skilled at spotting problems, from mundane system errors to deliberate hacking, something that is difficult for them to do today.

Colorado has been working on audits since 2011, and is ready to take the next step: Risk-limiting audits will be required in Colorado’s 2017 election. More states should follow Colorado’s bold lead.

Yet too many states still have electronic voting machines with no paper trail, meaning that no audit is possible at all. And all audits are not created equal. After the 2016 election, many Wisconsin counties simply ran ballots through their tabulating machines a second time and called it an “audit.” But if the machines were broken or compromised, the same inaccuracies they registered the first time would show up again the second time.

Technology is already deeply embedded in our voting systems. The next step isn’t to pile on more technology; it’s ensuring that the technology we rely on works properly and has not been hacked or undermined. The way to do that is clear: standard election procedure should include risk-limiting audits. If the Nevada Gaming Commission can establish detailed audit requirements for Keno, we can certainly do the same for our democracy.

This article is part of a collaboration with the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University.

We want to hear what you think about this article. Submit a letter to the editor or write to letters@theatlantic.com.