Country has shaped an ‘axis of resistance’ with proxy forces and influence in Middle East



There has been a calibrated de-escalation of tensions between the US and Iran, after a drone strike killed General Qassem Suleimani, the second most powerful man in Iran and most influential military commander in the region. Missile strikes on US bases allowed Iran to claim it had responded in kind, without causing any American casualties that could have prompted a further US attack.

But there is little expectation that this will be the end of Iran’s response to such a significant loss. The country has spent years honing its assets and expertise in asymmetric warfare, to strike against better armed, better funded opponents.

Iran – and particularly Suleimani himself – have over decades shaped an “axis of resistance”, a web of proxy forces, patronage and influence networks across the region, from Syria to Afghanistan, that are highly flexible.

Some have fought insurgent wars against an established army, others have bolstered an army against rebels. Terror attacks and targeted assassination are also in their arsenal, and pragmatism has sometimes led Iran to make common cause with ideological enemies – such as the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The axis of resistance could now be used to attack or undermine American interests in coming weeks or months, although not all damage will be claimed by Tehran.

LEBANON

Lebanon is a base for perhaps Iran’s oldest and most powerful proxy organisation, Hezbollah, or party of God. A political party and militant organisation, it emerged as a fighting force in the early 1980s, during the country’s civil war, but now operates on an international stage.

Iran supplied the group with weapons during its 2006 war against Israel; more recently it has been mobilised as one of the most effective groups fighting for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. It gets up to $700m (£535m) in annual support from Iran, the US government has estimated.

IRAQ

Iraq is perhaps the regional power most directly under Tehran’s influence. Suleimani shaped governments for years and last year the scale of Iranian political and military control helped spur a broad protest movement for reform.

It is the base for a range of proxy groups and militias. Perhaps the oldest is the Badr corps (later Badr organisation), originally formed as a force of Iraqi exiles fighting for Tehran in the Iran-Iraq war nearly 40 years ago.

They moved back into Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein and were joined by other Iran-linked groups such as the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army, which targeted the US using roadside bombs, rockets and other attacks.

The rise of Islamic State shifted the dynamic in Iraq again, even prompting some unofficial cooperation with the US on the battlefield against a shared enemy.

But it also spawned the rise of the PMF (Popular Mobilisation Force) militias, recruited to fight Isis but more recently involved in anti-US action. They include Kata’ib Hezbollah, which led attacks on the US embassy in Baghdad over the New Year festivities, and whose leader was killed with Suleimani.

SYRIA

Iran has been involved in Syria’s civil war almost since its start; in 2012 opposition forces captured 48 Iranian “military pilgrims” claiming to visit a shrine, although they were important enough to be swapped for thousands of captives.

When Iran first admitted it had “volunteers” on the ground, it claimed they were there to protect holy sites. But as Assad’s hold on his country crumbled, they became more visible. Hezbollah joined the fight, and dozens of small Shia militias were formed to fight for Assad around the country.

Some drew recruits from abroad, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Others were made up of Syrian fighters, but received funding and weapons from Tehran. Together with Russian airpower and other military support, they turned the tide of the war in Assad’s favour and helped maintain control over newly recaptured areas.

YEMEN

Tehran is backing rebel Houthi forces in the country’s civil war, which began in 2015, providing them with advisers, cash and hi-tech weaponry, including drones that can operate in the air and water.

Born out of the Arab Spring, the conflict has effectively become a brutal proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, fighting on broad sectarian lines, although the Houthis mostly follow a different branch of Shia Islam.

Last September, Houthi rebels claimed an attack on Saudi Arabian oil installations, which caused a dramatic cut in output. Western powers later blamed Iran, either for managing the operation or carrying it out using Houthis as cover. The US said there was no evidence the assault originated in Yemen.

Peace talks late last year have raised questions about the durability of Iranian influence there however, should the conflict end.

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

Iran has an alliance of convenience with the extremist Palestinian group Hamas, a Sunni organisation which is happy to take Iran’s money and arms while their interests are aligned in challenging Israel.

“Hamas does not expect direct and sustained Iranian assistance during a conflict, nor does it assume that Tehran would subordinate its interests to Hamas’s as part of regional brinkmanship or dealmaking,” according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

AFGHANISTAN

Last year, the Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, acknowledged that Iran had some cooperation with the Taliban and added it was impossible to imagine Afghanistan’s future “without any role for the Taliban”.

There is little ideological or religious affinity with the Taliban, who are Sunni extremists, but Iran has always been pragmatic about its alliances. The two countries share a border, and Tehran and the militants share an enemy in the US.

Afghanistan, and neighbouring Pakistan, have also proved a fertile recruiting ground for young men to fight in militias backing Assad in Syria.

BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA

Iran has sought influence among Shia communities in these countries, but because they are all wealthy with strong security forces, its efforts have faced far more obstacles than in other parts of the Middle East.

They have offered support for militant grounds, including reportedly training for Bahraini fighters with pro-Iran groups in Iraq, the IISS says. But this is “primarily meant to irritate and pressure their governments, and impose a political cost for their partnership with the US”, rather than have military impact.

IRAN’S OWN MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Iran has an active military over half a million strong, and another 350,000 reservists. Its military spending was estimated at $13bn in 2018 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), a figure dwarfed by the US military budget for that year of $648.8bn.

It has developed drone and missile capacity, with an arsenal that the US describes as the largest in the Middle East. It is thought to have thousands of missiles of over a dozen different types, the most powerful with ranges towards over 2,000 km.



It is also thought to have its own cyber-command, and after Suleimani’s death, the US warned of possible retaliation online.