Though not a certainty, I feel that this one probably falls on ownership, as there's not a general manager in baseball that would try to compete with fewer resources than budgeted. The White Sox went into March with Avisail Garcia, he of the -2.0 career fWAR through over 1,000 career plate appearances, as the starter in right field. Adam LaRoche, a platoon bat with no obvious platoon partner, was coming off of a -1.4 fWAR season and was first on the depth chart at DH.

Earlier in the winter, the White Sox had built themselves into a roughly .500 team with no obvious juggernaut in the division. The free agency class for players at their problem positions was ridiculously deep. This was a perfect intersection of need, player availability, and spot on the win curve to take a big risk and make an unprecedented splash.

The White Sox responded to that situation by signing Austin Jackson, a sub-par starter at best and 4th outfielder at worst, for $5 million on March 6, after all of the numerous superior options had flown off the board.

Jackson was essentially lost for the season after putting up replacement-level numbers for a couple months. This subjected the White Sox to way too much J.B. Shuck, who was the fourth outfielder despite no discernible major league skill and zero ability to competently play center. During his overexposure, Shuck performed 1.6 wins below replacement level.

There were several players available that would have represented dramatic upgrades. The obvious one is Yoenis Cespedes, though choosing a risky play on a premium free agent would have also necessitated dodging the Justin Upton and Alex Gordon bullets (admittedly, I had a slight preference for Gordon over Cespedes). Even if these targets were considered far out of the White Sox' league, they had two cheaper alternatives that practically fell into their lap. Ian Desmond and Dexter Fowler lingered on the market until late February and received relatively small contracts due to the attachment of draft pick compensation. These guys were the low-cost, relatively disappointing fallback options in the eyes of the fans. The White Sox shattered those modest dreams and found a way to skimp even further on their biggest need.

It's thought that the compensatory pick was the reason the White Sox didn't make a major push to ink either player, and it's confusing why they let that be an obstacle. The Todd Frazier trade announced an intent to win immediately. If a compensatory pick really held the White Sox back from pulling the trigger on the best player possible, that's hedging. Teams making a serious push don't hedge; they accept that near-term aggression may adversely affect their future.

Here's how the five primary options shook out in 2016:

Dexter Fowler: 4.2 wins

Yoenis Cespedes: 3.8 wins

Ian Desmond: 2.6 wins

Justin Upton: 1.6 wins

Alex Gordon: 0.5 wins

Assuming something close to the median outcome and taking into account the reduction in everyday playing time for JB Shuck, I'm comfortable estimating that the decision to not sign one of these players cost the White Sox about three and a half wins.





3. The James Shields blunder