



Oman is arguably the most stable country in the Gulf. Its ruler is loved, made some democratic inroads, and is widely credited with the recent progress the country has made. Even with oil price being low, there is no turmoil in Oman, whilst the deficit is getting enormous in places like Saudi Arabia. It is also an ally of Iran and Saudi Arabia at the same time, being in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Any fight between the two has no risk of involving Oman, who has long been known for its diplomatic tradition, and keeps being an intermediate for negotiations with Iran, as well as with Yemeni rebels. In addition, there is virtually no terrorism there, with Omanis practising a particularly peaceful branch of Islam called Ibadism. It seems, in the Gulf, with all the trouble going on, and the extremism periodically resurfacing, that Oman is indeed the only place that will have a peaceful and stable future. But there is one thing most people overlook.

Oman's progress is mostly owed to Sultan Qaboos, what risks to happen after his reign?

Oman wasn't always like this. Before this ruler, there was his father, who, like many gulf monarchs in this period and to this day, was tyrannical, and against social and economical change. He ended up deposed by its own son. The relative democratization following Sultan Qaboos access to power didn't mean general elections electing a head of state, instead the old system remained mostly in place, with the Sultan holding most of the power. There are local elections, and, the elected assembly has recently became more important, reviewing laws, following protests, but the government, and de facto the head of state, still hold a majority of the legislative power. It means that a Sultan is central to Oman's system. This is where the trouble starts. Sultan Qaboos is getting old, with recurring health problems and doesn't have children. He was unique, for his connections, being the son of the ruler, and his credibility, being willing to overthrow his father because he held the country back, made him the perfect ruler to take over, and popular with the elite as well as the people. It will be difficult for his successor to do the same. He will be at a crossroad of several problems that started emerging under Sultan Qaboos' reign, and will have to solve them all to remain in place, with others, as close in the bloodline to the Sultan, waiting around the corner to take the throne.





First, there are economical problems looming around the corner. Most of the Omanis citizens are employed by the state. There is also a strong population of immigrants from Asia, notably India, who live there thanks to the strong economic growth. In case of sustained recession, which is possible, because, despite a start of diversification not accomplished in other Gulf countries, it still remains heavily tied to oil. Its population will risk heavier unemployment if it's the case, and might even, in the most extreme case, have to stop paying immigrants who work on its soil for a while, like Saudi Arabia. It is clearly not the most gruesome risk compared to other Gulf countries, and even if it's possible for the nationals or the immigrants to riot, the fact that the country remained mostly unmoved by the Arab Spring means that it is not that likely to happen. However the Economy isn't just about employment in Oman. It has socialized several sectors, including medicine and education, and has several social programs going, with construction, as well as heritage site rehabilitation, and a host of other programs assured by the government. It greatly increased the Omanis' standard of living, but it costs money. The funding was through the oil reserves, but now, with the prices keeping low, it looks like austerity might be on the rise. For the new generations, who have been used to this, and who have great ways to organize, notably through social media, it might become a reason to protest. It is the same situation in other other Gulf countries, and it might not be triggered by Oman's succession crisis itself, but rather by neighbouring protests. It's not the only risk of instability though.





There is also a political risk. Whoever finds itself running Oman, will have to deal with several political forces that have often opposing interests. In particular there are the elites, especially in business, who will try to get the person the most friendly to them to rule. There will also be the other royal family members who will want a traditionalist to ensure they stay at the head of the country. Those groups aren't necessarily antagonist, but there is the population of Oman who frequently clashes with each wishes. The population of Oman is young, and, being accustomed to a certain standard of living, and tolerance from the government, want someone progressive, maybe even a democracy, given that they protested for more power for the people recently. This is absolutely opposite to the royal family, which is where the successor of Sultan Qaboos will be from. They are also attached to state companies, as they are mostly employed by the government, and won't easily let a privatisation go through, which is the most business friendly position. Given the current economic upheaval, the appointed head of Oman, after the current one, might be forced to please the business elite, and this will turn the people against him, leaving him to choose between a full democratization, alienating his own family and ruling a rebellious country. This risk will be only amplified because each group will likely have different foreign backers.

Oman has a great position, as an in between for Iran and Saudi Arabia, but, as middle ground, it is likely that each will try to swing it to its camp when it proves possible. A succession will just do that. Even if the popularity of the current ruler, Sultan Qaboos, continues for the next one, it won't stay this way long. Soon he will be confronted with some form of resistance, whether from elite forces opposed to him, or from the young people. At this moment, the foreign powers, that have the Gulf as a playground, will likely choose to take sides. At this moment, with its membership to the GCC, and the known Iran's role as a troublemaker in the Middle East, makes it likely that they will support the forces of change, with Saudi Arabia supporting the government. It is entirely possible though, that either Sultan Qaboos makes a posthumous democratization, or that a quick revolution by the Omanis leaves a full democracy instead of a partially constitutional monarchy. In this case, it's Saudi Arabia, who is threatened by democratic rule, who will likely try to topple the regime, and Iran who will try to defend it. The power play between the two regional powers is one of the major risk of a succession crisis but not the last one.





There is currently a disconnect between Omanis and their past. The government tries to promote its heritage, and does its best to preserve it, but big chunks of old trades, and old neighbourhood, disappear without anyone paying attention. The immigrants are the proletariat of Oman, some natives still hold the same kind of work, especially in agriculture, but, in services, it's mostly manned by immigrants. This has spread to qualified technical work like the medical field. Omanis are increasingly urban and reliant on those lower qualified jobs, or those technical jobs. It is the stage for an ugly crisis. It is not only in Oman, but Oman's reputation is for stability, it's why there was investment there that wasn't for oil. Contrary to other countries, like Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, where the companies are ready to flee at the first signs of a widespread revolution, and then come back later, any crisis might permanently damage Oman's reputation, especially if it takes a side in the regional conflicts following foreign influence. Losing its privileged position, in an economy already struggling with low oil prices, and a population that is the perfect breeding ground for revolutionaries, might set on a full economic collapse and political instability. With those arising, all the immigrants, and their knowledge, will flee. It will leave Oman with shortages in several crucial areas, with the Omani universities not able to close the gap. Most importantly, already dissatisfied youth will find themselves in unknown hardships, that had been long forgotten, and in tough jobs, with government help disappearing under their eyes. This is the exactly the kind of cocktail that could transform Oman, from a peaceful, stable, semi democracy into anything, whether a communist state or an Islamic caliphate.





It will hopefully not happen this way, but with the rest of the region already extremely unstable, and several factors in the country that point towards this direction, the succession of Sultan Qaboos might be the catalyst for a violent uprising a few years after it took place, with instability and political crisis reigning until this major event.

That said, several Omani exceptions, make the future after Sultan Qaboos even weirder, and likely less explosive. There is no political parties in Oman, and no radical/political Islam either. It means that the population is not politicized, and will only budge if it's important and likely on a single issue. The young population learns English in school and university, there won't therefore be the ability for any regime to crackdown on them without the world knowing. This guarantees that a too brutal regime, without the right connections, will be deposed.

They are close to Yemen, who has several factions fighting against each over, it is imaginable that if Oman devolves into political chaos, this fight in Yemen will spill into Oman via Salalah.

Finally Oman has a geographical configuration that makes visible differences between Omanis of different regions. It might add to the troubles, as the mountain region have the resources to wage a guerilla, but it will, more likely, limit any trouble, as the people of certain regions will be apathetic towards the struggle of the others, and any revolution, or uprising, won't spread to the whole nation, except for very unlikely circumstances.





In conclusion, the most stable country in the Gulf might not be spared by the upheaval that is the current trademark of the Gulf and more largely the middle east, with the tensions and complex alliances, coming alive in this country, after decades of neutrality and peace, during its succession from the current Sultan. It might not be too problematic, but with other problems becoming critical around the same time, it will, almost inevitably, be the start of changes for Oman within a few years or even a few months. What would be the best case scenario is either a full democratization, accepted by everyone, with no scheming behind the scenes, or another benevolent ruler, who is also accepted, with him keeping the popularity of Sultan Qaboos, and no elite group trying to upset the status quo to their advantage. It is also possible that it devolves into a mild political crisis, that becomes more severe, as the rest of the Gulf already eroded dictatorships crumbles. It might finally, in the worst case, be the theatre of a full on violent revolution or guerilla, and whether the starting point or getting it from contagion by neighbours, it will mean a Gulf in the fire of revolution, with no end in sight, and oil prices spiking, likely requiring western military involvement to calm things down, and stabilize oil production.



