



By Oh Young-jin







The United States is applying a full court press to force Korea to increase its share of the cost of maintaining U.S. forces here.







Reportedly, U.S. President Donald Trump asked President Moon Jae-in to raise Korea's annual payment to $1.2 billion during their "pull-aside" meeting at the G20 gathering last year.







The two sides have since conducted 10 meetings and the result: Seoul is holding on to an annual 1 trillion won, or 4.1 percent, rise from last year as its Maginot Line, while Washington is demanding $1 billion, or 1.13 trillion won.







Now there are signs of anti-American sentiment rising through protests and demonstrations condemning the U.S. for its pressure tactic.







Conspicuous by its absence is the leadership of the government, which obviously is falling back on the "candlelight mentality" to follow the masses' power and wisdom, as it did during the popular protests to topple the Park Geun-hye government.







This time, that populist approach is wrong and the government should take a cool-headed approach, even at the risk of alienating its support base.







Above all, Korea can ill afford to give the transactional Trump leeway to talk about pulling U.S. troops out of Korea. Already there have been rumors that he will, depending on how willing Korea is to pay more for America's military presence.







True, I like to believe that there are more rational people in Washington who would collectively trump Trump's reckless approach that would strategically be detrimental to U.S. interests.







It could be tempting to resort to the brinkmanship of our own brand ― believing that if the Americans are told out, they won't dare because Korea is too strategically important for America's China containment policy.







But I am quite sure few want to find out the answer to that question.







Although it may not be a perfect answer, there is a precedent for the American pullout from Korea. After the U.S. excluded the Korean Peninsula from the U.S. defense parameter under the Acheson Line, North Korea, backed by the Chinese and the Soviets, invaded the South in the 1950-1953 Korean War.







Then, when Manila told the Americans to go in the early 1990s, they departed, leaving key air force and naval bases behind. So it would be more correct to interpret "Let's go together," the motto American officials often use in Korea, not as a firm commitment but a conditional one that is valid as long as the two parties consent.







The chaos from talk of a U.S. pullout or implementation of it could be devastating to the point of shaking the foundation of the nation's stability. Paying the Americans an additional $100 million would comparably be taxpayer money well spent on an insurance policy, or protection money, whatever one may call it.







Also meriting our attention is the China factor. The country that has grown big enough to challenge the U.S. has proved to be too immature and parochial to be trusted as an upholder of regional order, not to mention replacing the U.S. as an ally or partner.







The reaction from the Chinese public and government over the installation of a U.S. anti-missile battery, or THAAD, in Korea is an example. Beijing became so hysterical that it was out of the question to have rational communication with it at government level, while its people were whipped into a nationalistic fervor, reminding one of the Cultural Revolution.







Finally, North Korea is an issue that should sober us, if we have skepticism about our alliance as a junior partner with the U.S. or feel our lost brotherhood with it restored.







The North is at the negotiation table over its nuclear weapons program because of U.S. pressure. If left to its own devices, the chance is that North Koreans would blackmail us and Japan with their nuclear arsenal, triggering an arms race and turning the region into a nuclear powder keg.







Or the Americans could go after the North's long-range missiles that are capable of striking the U.S.







A lesson from dealing with the North is that our leverage grows proportionally to our closeness to the U.S. This is true in the case of our relationship with China, at least for now.







Besides, it is hard to predict what deal Trump will strike with Kim Jong-un, the North's young master, during their second meeting. Remember, he unilaterally promised Kim that he would cancel Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, one of the pressure points for Pyongyang, without consultation with Seoul.







After all, we are a middle power that can't but be influenced by superpower politics, so the importance of choosing the right partner and applying the right policy mix to promote bilateral relations can't be overstated.







This international rule of diplomacy would be applicable to the Korean unification that may not be possible without the consent of the big powers in one form or another.







So we may feel ashamed to be at the U.S.'s beck and call or submit to the whims of China. But it is time to swallow our pride, plan and wait for our chance to lead. For that, we need a cool head most of all, and a fitting leadership by the Moon government.









Oh Young-jin (foolsdie5@Koreatimes.co.kr and

) is the digital managing editor of The Korea Times.

