Gilsinan: And you also see this, years later, in discussions about the current peace talks—that basically Assad has been trying to maneuver the international community into a position where it has to choose between him and ISIS. Does that mean that his plan working? Or is this worse than he foresaw?

Lister: Well again, this necessitates a rough assessment of how smart or not the Assad regime is. But I think any insurgency expert knows that in any area of the world where religion plays a part in forming one’s sort of social views, the longer a brutal conflict goes on, the more religion will come to shape many people’s view of their specific political cause. I think it was clear that although Syria had been a very cosmopolitan and largely secular country, the roots were there—that if the Assad regime used enough brutality, and the conflict lasted long enough, and enough people were killed, and enough suffering and chaos was created, that the actors on a more conservative and extreme end of the spectrum would become more prominent over time. And moreover, we cannot forget that later on through the uprising, for a significant period of time, the Assad regime refused, basically, to target ISIS in any form, precisely because it was seen as a useful anti-opposition actor, and an effective one at that.

Gilsinan: Has the regime’s approach differed according to different groups? So it hasn’t targeted ISIS, but what about groups like [the al-Qaeda affiliate] Jabhat al-Nusra?

Lister: Groups that have demonstrated themselves to be specifically dedicated to the fight against the regime have been consistently targeted, consistently labeled as terrorists, and [have] consistently taken up the focus of regime operations. The ultimate objective of Jabhat al-Nusra is basically no different than that of ISIS. But [Jabhat al-Nusra’s] strategy for getting there is that much longer, that much more patient. They have dedicated themselves solely to fighting the regime and its allies on the ground for the last five years, and for precisely that reason, they are seen as a genuinely existential threat to the regime itself.

Gilsinan: Are there any “moderate” groups any more?

Lister: Yes, absolutely. This is the Middle East, and not the United States, so the frame of reference for assessing someone’s moderation is necessarily different, but with that being said, [up to] 80,000 people still belong to that more conventional, genuinely representative opposition. They want representative government; many of them say they want some kind of democracy. The want equal rights for all, no matter what ethnic or religious minority you might come from, etc. And all of those things are exactly the kinds of expectations that we as the West have sort of placed upon them. The most unfortunate reality for them is that they have not been provided with sufficient support by the international community, [enough so] they don’t feel like they need to use a group like Jabhat al-Nusra as an ally on the ground.