These charges are only pro forma. They range from rejectionist, Alawite, Zoroastrian, or "agent of the infidel regime." This hostility to heads takes on a symbolic dimension and may reflect the collective subconscious of movements that oppose reason, criticism and thought. They even behead statues, such as that of 10th century Syrian poet Abul Ala al-Ma’arri , which was beheaded on Feb. 11, 2013.

The charge is ready and prepared in advance. They are "agents of the regime" and they are providing it with arms. The same scene is repeated in multiple regions across Syria, committed by Islamist movements that have come together on the basis of their hostility toward a man as an individual, his right to life and freedom. They only differ in name — Jabhat al-Nusra, Sham al-Ahrar, etc. — and the extent of their power.

The scene of the crime was set somewhere in the Syrian wilderness, believed more specifically to be in the countryside of Idlib , but with no date specified. Hundreds of people — Syrians, other Arabs and Chechens — surround three chained hostages, insulting the divine spirit through chants of "God is Great" as the executioner carries out his duty. The latter is a jihadist who does not seem to know Arabic, but who knows how to behead three prisoners with various dull knives. The scene is documented by those eager to film the death of humans and the revolution, amid enraged jubilation that is only witnessed in Totem rituals .

The Syrian regime has turned a deaf ear to that sound and replaced it with one of intimidation and bullets. The new sound is one of terror, hatred and nihilism. The first cries of freedom have been reduced to a mere echo of dreams to build a democratic state ruled by law, a dream that seems farther away than ever.

The law of these "men of God" is not only applied to accused adults, but children as well. On June 9, Mohammed Qatta — a 14-year-old coffee vendor known by his nickname Salmo — fell victim to the "legitimate body of the Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant" in al-Shaar, a poor neighborhood of Aleppo. Despite this group’s name, it has nothing to do with any legitimate body or the Unified Judicial Council based in Aleppo. Why was Qatta targeted? Because, in a fit of rage, he expressed his anger at the exploitation that was taking place in the absence of the rule of law and said he wanted people to pay him with cash, rather than buying on credit.

“Even if the Prophet Muhammad were to come down to earth, I wouldn’t allow anyone to buy on credit,” he said. This expression deeply reflects the personality of Syrian Muslims, whose tongues often do not reflect their hearts, and who are far from being characterized by blind intolerance. Such intolerance is linked to religion, when religious beliefs turn into an ideology that metamorphs into a killing monster similar to any other political or racist party. Syrians are fully aware that this child’s anger reflects the people’s anger and is not linked to a particular sect.

Three gunmen — professing how different they are from Syrian society with their long hair, beards, short robes and classical Arabic language — heard the child’s words. "How dare you insult the prophet?" they said. The child replied from his heart, "I am ready to sacrifice my life for the prophet!" The group, however, dragged him away. They brought him back half an hour later, his shirt was covering his face, and whip marks on his body. According to the child’s father, prior to the execution of his son, one of the killers shouted to the crowd: "Those who insult God can be forgiven, but those who insult Muhammad must be punished by death!"

The child was then shot point-blank in the face.

One small detail differentiates this scene from the previous scenes of slaughter. This was not a festive rite, but a scene of fear, attended by dozens of people in complete shock, who did not dare confront the killers. This clearly reflects that some of the "revolutionaries" have come to restore the wall of fear that was torn down by Syrians in the first year of the revolution. This fear was once that of the regime, but there is now a prominent fear among constituents of the revolution itself.

Even more worrisome, violations like these go beyond the regime's crimes, not in terms of quantity, but in terms of surpassing politics and touching upon the country’s social dimension in allegedly "liberated" areas. These crimes are carried out in a bid to impose a forced change through the power of intimidation, which is practiced by any occupying force. Its means of application range from jizya, whipping, imprisonment and field executions preceded by speeches similar to those made during the Inquisition.

The absence of self-criticism, censure and immediate accountability, as well as the Syrian intellectuals and politicians’ betrayal of their historical role, are factors that have served to symbolically decapitate the Syrian revolution before truly being decapitated by the armed jihadist battalions. This happened after having derived enough cumulative legitimacy in a way that enabled them to rebel against the people and not fear accountability. When and if the latter takes place, it is usually a sort of cosmetic operation carried out by one of the battalions at the expense of others.

Throughout two years of revolution, the pretext used by Syrian intellectuals and politicians in their rejection of the self-assessment of errors and criticism was that the regime started it, and that the one who starts it is to blame, as if the regime was a role model for revolution. As for not criticizing war crimes committed by opposition forces, its excuse was that it puts the victim and the executioner at the same level.

This intelligentsia hid behind slogans of the people to sell them illusions of rapid settlement and victory. This intelligentsia changes as its position on Jabhat al-Nusra changes. First, it denied its existence, and then it started desperately defending the need to take advantage of its presence. Then, it objected to having it labeled as a terrorist organization and moved to being shocked to see its crimes and to criticizing them in an indirect yet gentle way.

Meanwhile, one of the pillars of the Assad regime, who later joined the opposition, went so far as to emphasize that his personal follow-up finally led him to the conclusion that "Jabhat al-Nusra head Abu Mohammed Golani is just like Syrian Minister of National Security Ali Mamlouk, and Islamic State of Iraq leader Abu Bakr Baghdadi is just like Commander of the Iranian Quds Force Qasem Soleimani!"

They were the first to abandon the Syrian people, who were in dire need of the concerted efforts of the national democratic opposition. They also abandoned the revolution since they found themselves in the media spotlight. They relied on selective analysis as the only way to explain politics. They also begged for arms, which do not come free of charge. They created excuses for criminals by saying their practices were part of an "urgent" reaction to the violence of the regime, or through denying entire events or blaming the regime for everything.

If the Assad regime was the first and last party to blame for the destruction of the country, then the opposition and its armed battalions are the only ones to blame for the abortion of the revolution and its transformation into a nihilistic movement.

However, having absolute confidence and preaching that "the revolution is ongoing" and that it will "cleanse itself" is just a metaphysical expression used by cultural and political figures. They use these expressions to minimize the magnitude of the disaster that hit the country and avoid facing a counter-revolution.

What is happening in Syria is the extension of a civil war led by international powers. The situation has no victor. The revolution will not purify itself unless they first purify themselves.