Match Date: 10 December 2017

There is a fine line between the mutual respect and disdain that Jose Mourinho and Pep Guardiola seem to share; complimentary in one sentence and then dismissive in the next. The one thing that cannot be doubted is that every time the two face one another, it is a good tactical game with a visual display of the differences in the view of the game that one another have. Overall, Guardiola has gotten the better of Mourinho in their head-to-head. Including this game, Guardiola has won 10 of the 20 times they have faced one another, Mourinho has won four times, and they have drawn six times. Mourinho has lost to Guardiola more times than any other manager he has faced in his career.

For this particular match, both managers were missing significant players: Mourinho was without Pogba, who was suspended for a stomp on Bellerin the week prior, and Guardiola was without John Stones, who picked up an injury. Mourinho’s Manchester United setup in a 4-4-1-1 with Jesse Lingard playing just behind Lukaku, while Guardiola’s side looked something like a 4-1-3-2/very flexible and fluid 4-3-3.

DeBruyne, Silva

There were a few interesting things going on in Manchester City’s attack that allowed them to get a a hold of the game quickly, work the ball into the box, and create some half-chances. The first thing to look at was the positioning of Kevin DeBruyne and David Silva. From the start of the match, it was clear that Mourinho instructed Matic to man-mark DeBruyne and likewise with Herrera on Silva. Under Mourinho, Herrera was noted for an excellent man-marking performance last season against Eden Hazard when United faced Chelsea and he seems to be Mourinho’s ‘go-to’ when looking to man-mark the opposition’s creative player. With that, wherever DeBruyne and Silva went, Matic and Herrera were tight. Guardiola’s instructions to his two centre midfielders were to drag the United players wide and with the ideas behind Guardiola’s positional play, he knew that through time and build up that the two would find themselves in areas where a ball could be played into them to cause United more issues. This became evident just before the 3:00 minute mark when DeBruyne got space between him and Matic, got a ball from Kyle Walker, and was then then able to dribble at Smalling, attracting Herrera as well, which freed up Silva. In the end the Belgian’s pass to Silva was blocked by Herrera, but the movement and execution of Guardiola’s ideas were there up until the final pass.

There were also a number of times where Silva and DeBryune would rotate deeper to get on the ball, but Matic and Herrera would stay in a mid-to-low block rather than follow them out, which allowed the Manchester City players to get time on the ball and build again. Below is a good example of Matic and Herrera close to their marks and then Silva, having dropped deep to get on the ball, with more freedom on the ball.

With the Matic and Herrera man-marking and with the rotation and movement of DeBruyne and Silva being calculated and purposeful, it opened up huge spaces centrally to exploit, which will be discussed below. Essentially, Guardiola wanted to United’s back four to be occupied, but also for the centre backs to be coaxed out of their shape by having City players running into the central space that DeBruyne and Silva opened up through their movement into the half spaces and wider. Below are two screenshots of just two seconds apart that show DeBruyne and Silva moving wider to open space centrally and then Jesus darting into that space to drag Smalling out. You will also see Silva coming back in to a central position as well; notice the urgency in Herrera’s body language to track his fellow Spaniard back into the space.

Sterling, Jesus, Sane

The importance of DeBruyne and Silva’s movement came in the influence of Sterling and Jesus throughout the game, with Sterling particularly. With DeBruyne and Silva occupying Matic and Herrera, Guardiola wanted the United back four to remain occupied as well. Sane provided width throughout the game, and though he changed sides, he was always occupying either Valencia or Young. This left Sterling and Jesus to float between a wider position, occupying the other full back, and a central position. Most often in the first half, it was Sterling who found the space in front of the United centrebacks to pick up the ball as he floated in and out. Smalling and Rojos were rigid, and if they did step out, they were always late in applying pressure in front of their starting position. What continued to happen was that United’s back four of Valencia, Smalling, Rojos, and Young were occupied by two City players, usually Sane and Jesus, by staying stretched wide. This allowed Manchester City to essentially have a 4v3 in midfield with Sterling free to find the space that DeBruyne and Silva dragged Matic and Herrera out of and Fernandinho deeper, sometimes, but not always, marked by Lingard. Below you’ll see a good example of this overload just before Sterling plays a ball into the box for Jesus, who tries to play a back heel into Silva.

Other things to note in the shot above are that Sane has maintained his wide positioning on the far side, Delph has pinned back Martial as has Walker with Rashford on the other side, leaving Lukaku isolated against Kompany and Otamendi.

Sterling continually picked up space in front of Smalling and Rojos and, again, they were reluctant to step into midfield and when they did, did very little to stop Sterling (or Jesus). With all that said, Sterling and Jesus had very good chances in the first half due to their movement and how disorganised the Manchester United back four and midfield became because the City’s rotations, but despite the chances being in good positions, they never forced De Gea to make a save worth noting. In fact, it was a shot from Sane that worked De Gea’s the most and led to the corner that Silva scored from to give City their 1-0 lead. Just minutes later, Rashford equalised after Delph misjudged a long ball.

Mourinho’s Plan

It was clear by the way Mourinho setup his Manchester United side that he was looking to have United play long into Lukaku to hold the ball up and into Martial and Rashford to utilise their pace in an effort to counter attack. It was a direct game plan and it was largely ineffective because Martial and Rashford were both pushed back by the high positioning of Delph and Walker and Lukaku was left isolated against Kompany and Otamendi and didn’t offer much lateral movement for United when they got on the ball.

Above, it was noted that Matic and Herrera had specific man-marking duties on DeBruyne and Silva, respectively, and United looked very much like a 4-4-1-1/4-4-2 throughout, with Lingard staying high with Lukaku, when City had the ball in their half between the Kompany and Otamendi, trying to deny passes centrally. At times Lingard would just drop to Fernandinho, but this would then allow Otamendi (usually) to freely dribble into midfield and beyond.

It seemed Mourinho could have gone with a different approach defensively, which may have allowed for a more efficient counter-attacking option as well. Rather than have Matic and Herrera man-mark, Mourinho could have opted to play a very narrow 4-2-3-1 and should have done so especially after seeing the amount of space and freedom that Sterling had in the opening parts of the match. Had Matic and Herrera left DeBruyne and Silva to roam and just stayed in front of their back four, there would have been significantly less space for the City players to run into centrally, which would have made things a bit easier for Rojos and Smalling. Rather than the United centre back pairing having to worry about stepping out to close down a free City player in central midfield, their primary job would have likely been to cut out low crosses from wide and cover for the Valencia and Young when they were in 1v1 situations with the City wide players. By forcing City to play wider, United would have simply had to shift side to side, something that Rojos and Smalling and Matic and Herrera would have been able to do in an organised manner rather than being dragged out of shape by City’s central movement.

Going forward, Martial and Rashford would have been closer to Lukaku and with a narrow midfield, Lingard would have been allowed to mark looser and thus a bit freer to find space in transitions. The Belgian was largely ineffective in the match and some of that was down to how isolated he became, but Delph and Walker pinned Martial and Rashford back, which certainly did not help Lukaku.

Changes

The first two changes in the match game through necessity: Rojos was taken off due to a head injury, with Lindelöf replacing him and Kompany was also taken off due to injury with Fernandinho dropping to centre back and Gündoğan coming on into midfield. This had little impact on the game in fairness, but perhaps showed both more intent from Guardiola that he was going to try to win the game by bringing on another more controlling midfielder and that he was not too concerned with United’s direct play in the first half as he was trusting Fernandinho to compete with Lukaku for the mostly hopeful balls being played forward by United.

After City scored their second, Guardiola took off Jesus and brought on Mangala. This pushed Silva into the centre forward role and Fernandinho back into midfield. Silva was a nuisance as he pressed United’s centre backs and Herrera and Matic at times, at one point fouling both the United centre midfielders to pick up a yellow card.

Mourinho’s big move was to bring Ibrahimovic on for Lingard. Up until that point, United were very direct and Lingard has offered very little other than doing an ‘okay’ job fulfilling his defensive duties, but he left Lukaku isolated, never really picking up a second ball. With Ibrahimovic on, it gave United two big presences to play long to. Mourinho brought on Mata a few minutes later and it was a combination between Ibrahimovic’s good hold up play and Mata’s pass that led to United’s best chances to equalise after Martial played a ball across the area to Lukaku who (should have scored) had a shot saved by Ederson with the Brazilian goalkeeper reacting quick to save Mata’s follow up, with Mangala then playing the ball into touch. It was United’s two best chances in the match.

Conclusion

An excellent performance by Manchester City, who now have won 14 games in a row, setting a record for the most in a single season (Arsenal did it across two seasons), and with three more points, went 11 points clear at the top of the table, with United remaining in second place. Guardiola got the better of Mourinho’s rigidness (or maybe lack thereof in terms of adapting and literal structure); attempts to stifle DeBruyne and Silva were undone by the fluidity of Sterling and Jesus’ movement in and out of the space in front of United’s centre backs. Mourinho lamented the goals that his team conceded through two set pieces, but the fact remained that Manchester City were able to control both the ball and the space throughout the game and limited United from any dangerous counter attacks.

It of course would have been interesting to see what Mourinho would have done with his side had Pogba been in the game, one would assume that he would have been in for Lingard and maybe would have given Manchester United a bit more going forward. Although it is unlikely to have caused too much of a difference, perhaps we will get a look on April 7 when the two sides play the reverse fixture.