"We're seeing 68 percent improvement in quality from core stage one to core stage two," she said. "That's your learning curves and your innovations."

Boland-Masterson, who began overseeing construction of the SLS in June 2018 after working on Boeing's problem-plagued 787 Dreamliner aircraft, also insists that the program's challenges should have been expected given the technological complexities.

"If it was easy, anybody would do it," she said. "You'd have lots of people building this rocket, but you don't for a reason."

Boland-Masterson, who joined Boeing in 2011, also spoke to POLITICO about why she moved so many employees from their offices to the floor of the factory — and why she thinks critics of SLS still don't get it.

"We don't brag enough about the changes that we have made," she said, "and we need to do a better job of that because we've made some significant improvements."

This transcript has been edited for length and clarity.

How have you changed the culture to get SLS back on track?

It's really about knowing your people. I'm not saying that the team didn't know their people, but I'm a people person and I spend a lot of time out on the shop floor. It's those relationships ... and feeling comfortable raising your hand when [there's] something you don't feel is right or you have a concern about. We're going through a cultural transformation. ... Everybody is part of that team to build this rocket whether you're physically touching it or not. After one of my team meetings, I had one of our badging ladies come up and say, "Well, I'm not really part of the team because I'm not really building the rocket."

And I said, "I disagree with you. ... We have folks that come in from other sites for their expertise to help us. If you don't badge them in and get all the necessary things, then how are we building this? You might not physically touch it, but your part of building this rocket is crucial for all of us." Once I put it in perspective, the ownership was there for everybody. You have to have your finance team, you have to have your scheduling team. They physically don't touch it, but without them, we wouldn't be where we're at.

The One Boeing production system [lays] a foundation of this is how we do things, and I think that's helped the team. ... We made sure we streamlined our cadences and we didn't put meetings in just to have meetings. ... [Things like] do we really have to have hourlong meetings? Can they be 30 minutes? Just thinking outside that box, but everyone having a voice and feeling empowered. We are taking Dennis Muilenburg's Boeing behaviors — and we're not just talking it, we're acting on it, and I think that helps drive that culture transformation. When I got here, we talked about the One Boeing behaviors and it was kinda new, and I'd say some knew it, some didn't know it. We really ingrained that into leadership first.

Communication was another big thing that we were very deliberate on. [We hold] all team meetings every month. You will go to other sustaining sites and they'll ... only do it quarterly. We do it on a monthly basis because we're so dynamic and changing a lot. People need to know where we're going. As soon as we made a decision about [building the rocket] horizontally, ... we called the whole team together and said, "Do you know what you need to know? We're making a change in our plan and here's why."

How do you convince stakeholders that the program is fixed?

Data is key. [Looking] at core stage one versus core stage two and those improvements, I think, is really important. ... We don't brag enough about the changes that we have made, and we need to do a better job of that because we've made some significant improvements. We still have more improvements to go, but we've made significant improvements. What we do is say, "Yeah, we improved it. What's the next thing?" We're not shouting that to the world saying, "Hey, these are the changes we've made and this is what saved us." ... We have not done a good job of that and we're working on that. We're kind of those leaders that pat ourselves on the back for a second, said, OK, what's the next challenge? ... We just have to say it louder and share more often.

Our safety right now — knock on wood — we've seen a 50 percent reduction in safety incidents so far for this year. That's a culture of transformation. We're seeing 68 percent improvement in quality from core stage one to core stage two. That's your learning curves and your innovations.

So, I think that's what we've got to do, to let [lawmakers] know that it's going to get better. What we're seeing in core stage two, we're going to see better in core stage three. The mindset here is continuous improvement.

How has your commercial background helped you?

I don't know how to build a rocket. I'm learning that. ... I [oversaw] the development of the 787, so I got to take those lessons learned from there. I'm in the same boat here as a development program. It's the very first one. ... [In] Charleston, [where 787 was built,] it was the same thing, the very first airplane. ... I was able to take those lessons that I learned there to apply here. We have several leaders that were in Charleston that are here. So [we could say,] "Hey, remember when we did this and we had this problem? Well, we're having the same problem. What did we do?"

So, we've been able to take that synergy and keep expanding upon it. ... Early in my career, I was in automotive, and I was on a lot of the first launches of the PT Cruiser, for example, or the Lincoln LS and the Jaguar S-Type. So, I'm used to development programs.

Why have you moved so many people's workspaces onto the production floor, right next to the production area?

We probably have moved about 40 percent [of the SLS workforce] onto the shop floor. All those guys have offices, too, but you will never find them in their offices. ... They're just down there all the time. ... What I would tell you is this team has passion for what they're doing. We just got done with our employee survey and we asked them, what's the No. 1 thing you love about being here at Boeing?

The No. 1 thing was we love the product we're working on. We have huge pride in what we're doing. ... No one really wants to be in their offices. They want to be out there.

How much time do you spend in your office versus out on the floor?

I'd say 50-50, depending on what we've got going on. I spent more [time on the floor] early on when I first started. Now I've got to really start thinking from a strategic standpoint, ... because I've got to work with our local community colleges. We've got to build the pipeline as we're going to get ready [to build] two a year. ... So, I've got to start working on the strategic development [and] develop our teammates. Some technicians don't want to stay technicians, they want to go into engineering. So, we've got to give them that path for that development because we want them to stay on SLS. ... People leave if you're not developing them, and that is something that is extremely important to us.

Do you think the criticism of the SLS is unfounded?

I think people need to look back in history of all developments. Because ... the 787 didn't roll out on time. It was ... a new way of doing things, and there was lots of criticism on the 787. But look at the 787 today. It's a flagship.

When ... you go do something brand new that no one's ever done before, ... everyone's hard on whoever's doing that because they don't realize the complexities. If it was easy, anybody would do it. You'd have lots of people building this rocket, but you don't for a reason.

People don't understand you're building a system of rockets, you're not building one rocket. You also have this factory. It was rusted out hardware and the floors had to be dug up and reinforced. People look at [the program cost] and say, "You're building one rocket out of that." It's like, no, we're an entire factory, we've designed and built tooling from scratch, we tested the hardware while we were rolling on the first rocket and, while we're building the first rocket, we got started on the second rocket.