Below is how I think Hayat Tahrir al-Sham may now be fighting the Syrian regime’s forces, as the latter push deeper into rebel-held Idlib. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham seems not to be mounting a valiant, heels-dug-in last stand, but rather a fighting, attritive retreat paired with asymmetric insurgent tactics.

The text I’ve translated is a set of posts from a Telegram account called “Sina’at al-Fikr” (Producing Thought), which, per one description, is a channel for “programmatic guidance in order to produce right-minded consciousness.” In practice, it seems to function as a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham-aligned outlet that offers short pieces of ideological and strategic advice and instruction, like a sort of jihadist think tank publishing in bite-sized installments. (There are several Sina’at al-Fikr accounts currently on Telegram. The one that is currently active and being referred to by other accounts describes itself as a reserve account.)

These posts were originally from May 2017, but they’ve recently been published again, both by the current Sina’at al-Fikr account on 17 January 2018 and by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham media official Muhammad Nazzal (Abu Khattab al-Maqdisi) on 17 and 23 January 2018. They come in the wake of Tahrir al-Sham’s loss of the eastern Idlib countryside – including the Abu al-Dhuhour airbase – and amid complaints from other opposition constituencies about Tahrir al-Sham’s successive retreats ahead of the regime’s ongoing offensive.

If the thinking outlined below is what’s behind Tahrir al-Sham’s repeated withdrawals and its judicious use of manpower and resources in defense of insurgent-held territory, I think it’s probably the smart move for the group. As Tahrir al-Sham itself apparently recognizes, it can’t prevail in open battle with the regime and its allies, particularly against Russian airpower.

But the smart strategic move for Tahrir al-Sham – which is probably better equipped than other factions to resort to a rural insurgency – is not good for Idlib’s other, locally grounded rebel factions, or for civilians.

When Sina’at al-Fikr tells “the mujahideen” they shouldn’t aim “to prevent the enemy from reaching the areas he wants” – those “areas he wants” are cities like Saraqib and the provincial capital Idlib, where civilian Idlibis live. Realistically, there’s probably no way to defend these areas. But Tahrir al-Sham’s strategic shift means these cities and towns’ civilian residents will need to run, or otherwise fend for themselves.

Translation follows. (Note: The repeated ellipses are in the original Arabic.)

Sina’at al-Fikr, 17 May 2017:

“The most important tactics the mujahideen need to adopt at this stage of the Syrian jihad:

“In the event the regime launches military campaigns, then generally any defense ought not be meant to prevent the enemy from reaching the areas he wants… But, instead, to make his arrival there extremely costly… And attritive in the full meaning of the word.

“That is because the enemy still enjoys a military strength that enables him to reach any point he wants… So, the mujahideen at this stage shouldn’t defend according to the principle, ‘Until the last man, and the last bullet,’ rather according to the principle, ‘The greatest loss for the enemy.’ Let [the mujahideen] raise, to the maximum extent, the price the enemy pays… In terms of the lives of his soldiers and his military material… In order to reach the point he wants.

“That’s in the first defensive stage… Then let [the mujahideen] raise, to the maximum extent, the price the enemy pays to remain in that area he sought after…

“This is the tactic to which we need to be attentive:

– Booby-trapping and rigging before retreating, which makes the enemy lose dearly before taking any military point.

– Sniping and flanking maneuvers, which mean heavy losses for the enemy when he’s charging in.

– Inghimasi [suicide commando] groups that assault the enemy continuously while he mans his positions.

“Offensive tactics at this stage:

“They need to be premised on implementation with precision, speed, and discipline to avoid aerial efforts… Which may, when they’re present, result in serious losses in the ranks of the mujahideen.”