by COLEMAN LARNED

Lead Analyst

A historic victory in Amsterdam did not come without tactical concerns on the defensive end for the USMNT.

Three Goals in the last 20 minutes of the game saved it for the US, but little defensive pressure applied to crosses from Dutch players who found spaces in between defenders was a consistent theme throughout the match.

Jurgen Klinsman deployed a 4-3-3 original formation, which reconstructed to 4-2-3-1 and 4-1-4-1 shapes at times. Beckerman and Johannsson were the only two geometric consistencies above the back 4 when the USMNT were in possession, as Beckerman held in the #6 pocket and Johannsson was generally isolated as a #9.

Both Shea and Chandler were tasked with progressing offensively but being aware of their Dutch winger counterparts whom frequently attempted to pin the American defenders in their own half with constant, wide pressure in possession.

If an outside back would offensively commit, Beckerman and the opposite wide defender would stay home and maintained extra defensive numbers.

Three issues emerged in the most interesting, positional spaces of the pitch throughout the match:

USMNT midfield triangle vs Dutch midfield pairing USMNT CB pair vs 2 offset Dutch strikers USMNT wing pairs vs Dutch wing pairs

1) USMNT midfield triangle vs Dutch midfield pair. Within the triangle the USMNT deployed, 3 very different roles emerged.

Beckerman, as usual, sat above the back 4 to defensively cover, providing consistent balance, and determined offensive tempo and direction. Bradley was consistently higher than Beckerman, found the ball higher up the pitch, but was also allowed freedom to affect the game deeper if he wished. Morales shuttled between the two extremities and sat flat with either – with Beckerman in defensive posture and Bradley in offensive progression – which provided a dynamic shape.

The man advantage in the middle of the park had little offensive benefit, but accomplished one purpose defensively; as Clasie and Wijnaldum were accounted for by two of the three, the extra midfielder was able to help in wide or deep defensive positions. If Johannson was able to correctly direct the Dutch offense to one half of the pitch, the extra midfielder could shift to one side and help account for a pinched Dutch winger, or a withdrawn van Persie.

2) No matter the CB pairing for the USMNT, all three players who were used looked defensively inept when forced to consistently defend crosses of any measure. As the Dutch rarely successfully att acked through the middle of the USMNT shape, most chances were created from wide crosses – either from the touchline, or as narrow as the edge of the box – and found a forward or the opposite winger in spaces in between defenders.

Brooks had trouble many times predicting the trajectory of the cross and was found too shallow. The complimentary CB or outside back allowed their opponent to make unimpeded runs in front and were consistently a step short with their reaction. The origin of the scoring chances often came from the inability of wide men (defenders or midfielders) to close down their opposition to deter the crossed ball.

3) The pairings of Zardes/Shea and Johnson/Chandler struggled with their defensive distances all match and allowed the Dutch to create many full scoring chances through crosses of all varieties. The defensive shape and willingness to vertically track opponents was not the issue, yet the inability to close horizontally to deny the space for crosses regularly was.

Both Shea and Chandler were caught in between waiting for the midfield partner to track back to mark wide and pressing the opponent themselves, which provided the Dutch enough time to cross. Does the outside defender track the opposing defender overlapping wide, and wait for his midfielder to cover the space he left? Does the outside defender stay tight to high center defender and give his opposing midfielder the wide spaces? These answers depend on two variables: the qualities and consistent intention of the opposition and the understanding between the teammates with which the decision lies.

If the opposition is consistently wanting to cross balls from wide spaces through overlapping runs by their outside defenders, then pressure on their wide possession is imperative to deny opportunities. The outside defender must apply the pressure, the other defenders must shift towards the possession to compensate, and the same sided midfielder must track back into the space left by the outside defender. The lack of playing time among wide pairings caused defensive misunderstandings in assignments and duties, but will come with time.

These were the areas of the pitch that were consistently most interesting and troubling for the USMNT throughout the entirety of the match. The USMNT did fashion chances in bunches, but the goals usually came from Dutch defensive mistakes: a missed mark on the back post, not tracking an opposing CB as he charged through 2/3 of the pitch, not clearing a cross that was the root of a deflected goal and letting Bradley eliminate five defenders by dribbling and a through ball to end up at the back post with two unmarked, USMNT runs.

The introduction of dynamic and different talent has absolutely improved the quality of the USMNT, but if Klinsmann is serious about the Gold Cup, solidity in personnel and positioning is what is needed now. An understanding in partnerships must be developed pre-tournament – specifically among wide pairs, central midfield pairs/trios and central defender pairs – to expect success.