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There was a slight sense of deja vu ahead of kick off. Liverpool at the Emirates, donned in black, taking on Arsenal in August.

Granted, this season’s game took place in the summer sunshine, rather than the North London floodlights. But for the second consecutive season, the Reds faced off against the Gunners early in the season.

A similar scenario, but the scoreboard could not have been more different; untroubled last year, it flashed more than Gary Lineker this time.

There was a difference in the dugout, of course, not to mention in the away side’s line-up. Only five of those who started last August were named in the 11 by Jurgen Klopp.

What’s changed, then?

Pointing towards that change, both in personnel and in the dugout, is an obvious starting point.

In the goalless draw last August, Liverpool actually produced a solid performance and, in truth, had the better chances to win the game. But this 4-3 win was a real transition from that. After a tentative start, the Reds were emphatic.

It should be noted how Arsenal were different over the course of the two games, as well, although they did have more starters from last year – seven – than Liverpool.

Here is how the two games differed in some key areas.

PLAYER POSITIONS

Last year: The structure of the team was far more rigid, with the 4-3-3 clearly defined. Nathaniel Clyne was higher up the pitch on the right, while Joe Gomez – at left back – was far deeper, almost helping form a back three. Ahead of them, Lucas Leiva was in the holding midfield position, with James Milner and Emre Can either side; the German, having to compensate for Gomez’s defensive instructions, was slightly more advanced. Up front, the trio of Philippe Coutinho, Christian Benteke and Roberto Firmino were all spaced out, with the two Brazilians taking up positions wide.

This year: A marked change. The space between Ragnar Klavan and Dejan Lovren was far wider than last year’s partnership of Lovren and Martin Skrtel; Clyne remained out wide and Alberto Moreno, interestingly, was the deeper of the two full backs. In the front six positions, however, it was much less structured. Jordan Henderson and Gini Wijnaldum were very close to each other in the middle, with Adam Lallana also in a central role. Firmino and Sadio Mane were not far from that trio, with Mane noticably infield; only Coutinho drifted from these central positions.

PASSING COMBINATIONS

Last year: The most frequent successful pass combination was between Simon Mignolet and Christian Benteke, with 11. No surprise that all of those passes started within 20 yards of Mignolet’s goal, with the stopper finding his compatriot in the other half of the pitch. This was very much a long-ball tactic.

This year: Mignolet did not feature in any of Liverpool’s top five passing combinations – to be expected, given Firmino was the man leading the line. Joint-highest on this occasion was Henderson to Moreno, a successful combination 12 times, with the captain seeking out the Spaniard on the left. This highlights a far more progressive style, playing on the front foot.

ATTACKING DOWN THE RIGHT

Last year: Coutinho was the clear outlet for Liverpool with 38% of their attacks moving down the left-hand side. With Firmino drifting inside, almost 35% of their movements towards goal came down the centre, leaving the right-hand side fairly quiet with just 27%. Up against Nacho Monreal and Hector Bellerin – who also started on Sunday – the lesser of the two, Monreal, was given a quiet evening.

This year: Liverpool looked to move up both wings, with far fewer attacks starting down the middle. The marked difference comes on the right – again, a sign of the influence of Mane – with almost 40% of attacking play filtering down that side. Almost 34% came down the left, too; the graft came in the middle, but the invention was shared out wide.

WINNING BACK THE BALL

Last year: It should be noted that Liverpool only had 34% of the possession compared to the 50% at the Emirates on Sunday, and therefore the side’s chances of winning back the ball – or, as defined by OPTA, ‘ball recoveries’ - are greatly increased. Still, Rodgers’ side won back the ball more than Klopp’s did in the corresponding fixture.

Yet the interesting aspect comes from who actually pressed the ball. Here, it was Coutinho who was the main man, with a remarkable 12 recoveries – nine of them in the opposition half. On the other side, Firmino made six recoveries, but four of those came in his own half.

This year: Fewer ball recoveries in general, which only serves to make Mane’s efforts even more impressive. He recovered the ball eight times, four in the opposition half, which demonstrates how crucial he will be to Klopp’s pressing game. Coutinho, however, won the ball back only thrice – all in defensive positions – highlighting the potential freedom the Brazilian could be given this season, and the freedom he was allowed at the Emirates.

TERRITORY

Last year: Although Liverpool had the better chances – Benteke being denied point-blank by Petr Cech was a stand-out moment – it was a defensive line-up. Understandably, given the pressure he was under, Rodgers set his side up not to lose. That was reflected in how the Gunners won the territorial battle, with 34% of the play being played in Liverpool’s final third, and just 23% in the Arsenal final third.

This year: Klopp accused his side of showing Arsenal too much respect in the first half, but that would not happen in the second half. The battle was evenly split between the two – Liverpool 25%, Arsenal 27% - with a distinct portion of the play coming in midfield (48%). This shows just how Klopp sought to gain the advantage in the midfield, and did not regress into putting men behind the ball.