AP Photo Washington And The World What Obama and Netanyahu Will Talk About With the violence in Israel, their preoccupation may no longer be Iran.

Ambassador Dennis Ross is a long-time U.S. Mideast negotiator and author of the forthcoming Doomed to Succeed: The US-Israeli relationship from Truman to Obama.

Things have grown so difficult inside Israel lately that the Iran nuclear deal, which caused such friction between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, is not likely to be their main preoccupation when they meet at the White House on Monday. We don’t yet know whether the wave of stabbings and attacks against Israeli civilians will stop; whether the security measures Israel is taking can blunt the seemingly random terror assaults that are being carried out by Palestinians and Israeli Arabs mostly between the ages of 15 and 25; or whether the violence and Israeli responses will take on a life of their own and persist until exhaustion sets in and the divide between Israelis and Palestinians deepens irreparably.

What we do know is that Obama and Netanyahu are likely to spend at least as much time on this issue than on Iran. Of course, the Iran nuclear deal will be discussed. The one unmistakable achievement of the agreement is that, if enforced, it buys fifteen years in which we can be reasonably confident that the Islamic Republic will not become a nuclear weapons state. After that, with no constraints on how large a nuclear program Iran can build, there can be no such confidence. So, at a minimum, the two leaders should agree to develop a plan for taking advantage of these fifteen years with three objectives in mind:

bolster deterrence so the Iranians understand the price for going for nuclear weapons later is simply too great;

create incentives and disincentives for others in the region like Turkey and Saudi Arabia not to seek the same nuclear threshold status that the agreement permits Iran to have;

prepare contingency options to counter increasing Iranian de-stabilizing activities in the region, a certainty given the Supreme Leader’s desire to validate his “resistance” ideology in the aftermath of the deal.


There will also surely be discussion on the Palestinians. No doubt, even while expressing sympathy for what Israel is now facing, President Obama will find it hard to resist telling Netanyahu in private that he had warned him about the consequences of standing pat and expecting the Palestinians to remain quiescent. Still, this part of the private discussion could be useful if the president comes out of the meeting emphasizing that lies about Israel changing the status quo on the Haram al Sharif (the Temple Mount) must cease—nothing has done more to incite those carrying out the attacks. In addition, the president should publicly welcome the Israeli commitment not to change the status quo and the Israeli acceptance of the Jordanian proposal to put cameras on the Temple Mount. If nothing else, the cameras will show whether the Israeli commitments are being fulfilled and who is responsible for violence if it erupts. Assuming this helps to calm the situation and stem attacks more generally, the president could ask the prime minister to take additional steps on the ground that might demonstrate his commitment to a two state outcome, particularly because we are now seeing what it might mean to have one state.

Given the obvious tension in their relationship and their different world views, is it possible for these two leaders to have such a discussion and seemingly mend fences? Yes, consider that during the debate over the Iranian nuclear deal, President Obama not only conveyed written promises to Rep. Jerrold Nadler and others on the Hill about addressing Israeli security concerns and needs, but he is also indebted to those democrats who supported him on Iran and want him to end the tension with Israel. Similarly, Netanyahu has a need particularly now in the face of daily attacks to show that Israel is not alone and that the U.S. stands with it. Moreover, having been unwilling to have a discussion on addressing Israeli concerns about the deal in the hopes that Congress would block it, he needs the dialogue now to mitigate some of the dangers the agreement poses for Israel down the line.

This does not mean I expect their private discussion to be easy or to be limited only to Iran and the Palestinians. It won’t be. There should be a discussion of the implications of the Russian military intervention in Syria and its meaning for Israel’s freedom of action against Hezbollah—and whether Israel can count on America to back it. (It would surely help if President Obama would convey a clear message to President Putin that we will support Israeli actions to prevent both the transfer of qualitatively more threatening weapons to Hezbollah and the imposition of an Iranian/Hezbollah foothold along the Golan Heights in southern Syria.)

Maybe all this is too much to expect from this encounter between this president and this prime minister. Nonetheless, even if there is no meeting of the minds in private, there will almost certainly be a public effort to say that the relationship is back on track.

President Obama is not the first U.S. president to have a rocky relationship with an Israeli prime minister. Ronald Reagan and Menachem Begin were not on good terms, particularly during the siege of Beirut in the summer of 1982, when Reagan actually warned Begin several times that he was jeopardizing the future of the US-Israeli relationship. George H. W. Bush was gracious with every foreign leader except Yitzhak Shamir. He felt Shamir misled him on settlements and he never trusted him as a result. And, even Bill Clinton who was against public distancing from Israel given his belief that it weakened Israeli deterrence, was, at one point, not prepared to see or even talk to PM Netanyahu when he was visiting the US and their planes were parked next to each other in Los Angeles.

It is noteworthy that in all of these cases, the US-Israeli relationship improved materially in the aftermath of the tensions. President Reagan following the low point in ties acted to transform the relationship fundamentally. He was the first president starting in 1984 to treat Israel as a strategic partner and to institutionalize defense cooperation, support for Israel’s defense industries, joint military planning, and counter-terror and intelligence coordination. Bush 41 notwithstanding his description of himself as “one lonely guy” resisting “thousands of lobbyists” in his opposition to loan guarantees for Israel, would press forty four countries to establish (or re-establish) diplomatic relations with Israeli at the time of the Madrid Conference and subsequently mobilize a campaign to repeal the Zionism is Racism resolution at the UN. And, Bill Clinton, despite his differences with Netanyahu would actually offer him a defense treaty to formally make us allies.

Why the pattern of improving the relationship even after periods of tension? It has far less to do with politics and far more to do with a simple reality: Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East. We share values and interests—and enemies. Even if President Obama often seems to find it easier to reach out to adversaries than traditional friends, he is unlikely to break this pattern.

Moreover, although the improvement with Obama may be only pro forma and signs of dissonance may continue, the next president will seek to reduce the appearance of distance in the relationship. In fact, with the region unraveling, Israel's basic stability will stand in stark contrast to the turmoil and uncertainty in the rest of the area. Whatever Israel's current difficulties, it is a country of laws, separation of powers, and elections where the loser accepts the outcome. It will find a way to cope. At a time when we will need partners we can rely on, Israel will remain a pillar in the Middle East. Even if differences remain on how to deal with the Palestinians, our next president is likely to recognize and act on that reality.