The Times of India has accused Chinese hackers, allegedly backed by the Chinese government, of systematically attacking Indian online assets over the past 18 months. The goal of these assaults, at least according to the paper, is to map and discover weak points within India's IT infrastructure. Such information could give China an advantage in any potential conflict, and the article implies that India has been slow to develop a retalitory system in the event of a Chinese attack.

The degree to which the Chinese government is actually involved in these attacks is still an open question, The Times' rhetoric notwithstanding. A continuing series of sophisticated and methodical assaults is no longer proof of another nation's malevolent intent, even if such attacks appear to be originating in the country in question. The same market forces responsible for the commercialization of the malware industry across the globe promote sophisticated attack vectors and a methodical approach to security probes. So the hackers behind the intrusion attempts that Indian IT workers are detecting are essentially cyber-casing the country's digital joint, and while they may be working for the Chinese government they could also just be out to make a buck.

The problem with accusing other countries of attacking one's own cybersecurity systems is that, at least to date, such accusations haven't proven particularly accurate. As we covered in January, a series of cyber attacks that the Estonian government initially blamed on the Russian government actually turned out to be the work of a disgruntled student hacker. The incident did no permanent damage to Russian-Estonian relations, but it did cause a temporary diplomatic cooling between the two countries over a set of allegations that the Russians vehemently—and apparently truthfully—denied.

Sino-Indian relations are probably better, on the whole, than Estonian-Russian relations, but the two burgeoning powers have had their share of conflicts, including a brief war in 1962. Since the 1980s, however, the relationship between China and India has generally grown stronger. China recognized Indian sovereignty over the disputed state of Sikkim in 2003, and the two country's jointly reopened the Nathula Pass in 2006, which had been closed since the aforementioned Sino-Indian War of 1962.

India's relatively friendly relationship with China may have grown a bit more tense of late thanks to the recent Chinese crackdown in Tibet. India is home to the largest group of Tibetan refugees in the world, including the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile. The cybersecurity attacks India detected aren't directly related to the Tibetan riots—evidence indicates that they've been occurring for at least a year—but the government's decision to release such information at a time when China is under enormous scrutiny is hardly accidental.

The Times notes that "cyber warfare is yet to become a big component of India’s security doctrine." Even in the US the military's role in cybersecurity is still in its relative infancy; India is but one of many countries in the process of evaluating how cybersecurity (and cyber warfare) impact its safety.