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Most of us believe that lying is wrong. We teach our children that it is wrong, and hope or expect that value judgment is shared by our friends and family. In public, we decry politicians and public officials when they lie, which we have frequent occasion to do these days. But the truth about lying is more complicated.

We tell lies to one another every day. But when we commit other acts that are generally believed to be immoral, like cruelty and theft, we do not seek to justify them. We either deny that the acts we committed are appropriately described by these terms, or we feel guilt or remorse. But many of us are prepared to defend our lies: indeed, to advocate their general use. Of course the Nazi at the door inquiring about Jews within ought to be lied to.

But perhaps this example only shows that there is not an absolute prohibition on lying. Such cases are rare, the harm to the innocent clear, the wickedness of the aggressor obvious. I want to argue that the number and types of permissible lies are much wider than one might have thought.

I am not arguing for the view that lying is morally neutral. I accept the fact that there ought to be a strong presumption in favor of honesty. But it is a presumption that not only can be, but ought to be, overridden in many more cases than we assume.

Let me begin by defining what a lie is. If I defined lying so as to include failure to reveal the truth I would be making my case too easy. We all agree that there are many cases where the latter is permissible.

Related More From The Stone Read previous contributions to this series.

John lies to Mary if he says X, believes X to be false, and intends that Mary believe X.

It should come as no surprise that philosophers have denied, or sought to clarify, each part of this definition. But I think this definition captures most of what people have in mind when they say lying is always, or almost always, wrong. It also captures the morally important feature that explains people’s aversion to lying — saying what you believe to be false in order to make other people believe something false. It is usually a bad thing for people to come to believe false things. Even when it is not a betrayal of trust.

Nevertheless, it is my claim that we could not lead our lives if we never told lies — or that if we could it would be a much worse life. But I would like to invite your own views on this to begin a dialog.

Here is a list of lies that I believe to be either permissible, or, in some cases, obligatory. Readers will certainly disagree with me about some, perhaps many, of these cases. But such disagreement should not be the end of the discussion. I invite your reflection on why you disagree. It may be that I am making some implicit assumption about the case that you are challenging. It might be that you think that there are bad consequences of the lie in question, but I do not, either because I do not think the consequences are likely, or because I do not think they are bad.

In other cases, you might be prepared to accept the verdict as justified lying, but argue it has a special feature that is not present generally. That raises the question of whether there are other such contexts, and how widespread they are.

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Some cases may simply involve fundamental differences in judgment. “I can’t say why, but it’s just wrong.” These are much rarer than one might think and I doubt that any of my cases are like that. But we will see.

To participate:

— Read each lie scenario below.

— Beneath each one you may indicate whether you think it is permissible (click on yes) or impermissible (no) to lie in that case.

— At the bottom of the list, choose one or more lies you disapprove of (remember, I approve of all of them), and explain why you disagree as succinctly as you can, then submit your response.

I also welcome additions to my list; particularly if they have justifying features that seem different from those present in my examples.

Thank you for your responses. Submissions to the author via the form have been closed. You can still read the list of scenarios below and discuss them in the comments section of this post.

1. A man lies to his wife about where they are going in order to get her to a place where a surprise birthday party has been organized.

2. A young child is rescued from a plane crash in a very weakened state. His parents have been killed in the crash but he is unaware of this. He asks about his parents and the attending physician says they are O.K. He intends to tell the truth once the child is stronger.

3. Your father suffers from severe dementia and is in a nursing home. When it is time for you to leave he becomes extremely agitated and often has to be restrained. On the occasions when you have said you would be back tomorrow he was quite peaceful about your leaving. You tell him now every time you leave that you will be back tomorrow knowing that in a very short time after you leave he will have forgotten what you said.

4. A woman’s husband drowned in a car accident when the car plunged off a bridge into a body of water. It was clear from the physical evidence that he desperately tried to get out of the car and died a dreadful death. At the hospital where his body was brought his wife asked the physician in attendance what kind of death her husband suffered. He replied, “He died immediately from the impact of the crash. He did not suffer.”

5. In an effort to enforce rules against racial discrimination “testers” were sent out to rent a house. First, an African-American couple claiming to be married with two children and an income that was sufficient to pay the rent would try to rent a house. If they were told that the house was not available, a white tester couple with the same family and economic profile would be sent. If they were offered the rental there would be persuasive evidence of racial discrimination.

6. In November of 1962, during the Cuban Missile crisis, President Kennedy gave a conference. When asked whether he had discussed any matters other than Cuban missiles with the Soviets he absolutely denied it. In fact, he had promised that the United States would remove missiles from Turkey.

7. A woman interviewing for a job in a small philosophy department is asked if she intends to have children. Believing that if she says (politely) it’s none of their business she will not get the job, she lies and says she does not intend to have a family.

8. In order to test whether arthroscopic surgery improved the conditions of patients’ knees a study was done in which half the patients were told the procedure was being done but it was not. Little cuts were made in the knees, the doctors talked as if it were being done, sounds were produced as if the operation were being done. The patients were under light anesthesia. It turned out that the same percentage of patients reported pain relief and increased mobility in the real and sham operations. The patients were informed in advance that they either would receive a real or a sham operation.

9. I am negotiating for a car with a salesperson. He asks me what the maximum I am prepared to pay is. I say $15,000. It is actually $20,000.

10. We heap exaggerated praise on our children all the time about their earliest attempts to sing or dance or paint or write poems. For some children this encouragement leads to future practice, which in turn promotes the development–in some — of genuine achievement.

In the coming week or two, I will read the responses, and then choose some to respond to in a later post.

Gerald Dworkin is distinguished professor of philosophy, emeritus at University of California, Davis.