A senior State Department official who was involved in the White House deliberations on the Libyan bombing insists that he and his colleagues were satisfied with the handling of the intercepts.

''There was nothing to suggest that it was not handled in good faith,'' he says. ''The intercepts did not say La Belle disco was bombed. They never identified the site. But there was a history that the Libyans were going to mount an operation in Europe.''

THERE WAS AN ATMOSPHERE of cynicism and disarray within the National Security Council as it prepared to bomb Libya while supplying arms to Iran. Poindexter was being hailed in Newsweek as ''a cool warrior'' who ''steadies the N.S.C.'' But privately, some security council officials say, he was feeling overwhelmed, and would soon be telling close associates that he wanted a transfer to the National Security Agency. By April, some N.S.C. insiders, and reportedly the President, knew that William Casey had started undergoing radiation treatment for prostate cancer; his illness was not made public until December. Donald Fortier also was extremely ill. He would die of liver cancer in August. In the weeks preceding April 14, Oliver North has told associates, he became extremely active in the Libyan planning. The Joint Chiefs had decided on a two-pronged aerial attack, involving Navy units in the Mediterranean and the F-111's from England. But none of the military planners wanted to see American airmen shot down and paraded around Libya; and there was concern that the Navy's A-6 bombers would be vulnerable to antiaircraft fire. The F-111's not only flew much faster - they would hit the target going 9 miles a minute - but also had far superior electronic defense mechanisms to ward off enemy missiles.

The round-trip from England to Libya, over France, would be about seven hours, well within the F-111's limits. Admiral Crowe and the Joint Chiefs agreed that the F-111's would play the lead role in the attack, buttressed by 12 Navy A-6's, which were assigned to bomb an airfield and military barracks 400 miles east of Tripoli.

But North has told colleagues that he had doubts about the Air Force's mission, and they were heightened when the French refused to permit the F-111 overflight. The Air Force was now confronted with a difficult assignment against the strong headwinds of the Bay of Biscay.

According to an account given to colleagues, North, just prior to the bombing, made a series of suggestions at a high-level meeting attended by the President, Poindexter, Crowe and Gen. Charles A. Gabriel, the Air Force Chief of Staff. With the approval of Casey, North had already interceded with the Israelis to increase the intelligence available before the mission. Now he argued for using a covert Navy SEAL team, which would surface on the beach near Qaddafi's tent and residence and set up a laser beam that could guide the American bombs directly to the main targets. The attacking planes could then launch their bombs offshore - out of range of Libyan antiaircraft missiles - and be just as effective. The SEAL team, apparently at North's direction, had already been deployed to the Middle East.

But, North told colleagues, Crowe said no - that no one wanted to put Americans at risk.

North reportedly then raised the issue of using the Air Force's most-advanced fighter-bomber, the supersecret Stealth, said to be capable of avoiding enemy radar. The aircraft would be perfect to attack Qaddafi's personal quarters and tent; it could be ferried to the huge American naval base at Rota, Spain, and attack from there. Admiral Crowe again said no, explaining that the Stealth technology was too valuable to risk.