The security consequences associated with refugee flows are among the most widely studied aspects of forced migration. While the majority of this research program has focused on how refugee movements affect the risk of political violence, scant scholarly attention has been paid to violence perpetrated against refugees. Building upon the state repression literature, we argue that refugees are particularly vulnerable to the violation of their physical integrity rights in the wake of terrorist attacks in host states. Governments are pressured to respond to security crises but prefer to take actions without jeopardizing public support. In this context, refugee groups can be strategically attractive targets of repression because they lack electoral power and citizens are often supportive of government crackdown against foreigners in times of security crises. Given that leaders have stronger incentives to respond to voters’ demands quickly in democracies, we expect the effect of terror attacks on violence against refugees to be stronger in democratic host states. Using a novel global dataset on anti-refugee violence between 1996 and 2015, we show that refugees are more likely to be exposed to violence by the coercive agents of the state in the wake of security crises. We provide suggestive evidence that the repression of refugees is more consistent with a scapegoating mechanism than the actual ties and involvement of refugees in terrorism. The findings reveal that the well-being of uprooted populations is particularly at risk when host countries face a security threat.

Introduction The security consequences associated with refugee flows are among the most widely studied aspects of forced migration. There is a large body of literature suggesting that refugee groups are associated with an increased risk of interstate war, civil war, terrorism, and communal violence (Choi & Salehyan, 2013; Fisk, 2014, 2018; Lischer, 2003, 2005; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Salehyan, 2008, 2009; Whitaker, 2003; Zolberg, Suhrke & Aguayo, 1989). However, while this research program by and large implies that refugee flows create conditions that increase the risk of political violence, it does not pay sufficient attention to the dynamics of violence against refugees.1 This is unfortunate because violence ‘against’ refugees is as much if not more widespread than violence ‘by’ refugees (Onoma, 2013). Our study is an attempt to address this lacuna by identifying when host states are likely to violate the physical integrity of refugees within their borders. We argue that the security environment in which host states operate is a major determinant of their treatment of refugees. Specifically, we expect host states to violate the physical integrity of their refugee populations in the wake of terror attacks. Our argument is based on the widely supported empirical observation that states usually respond to security threats with repression (Davenport, 1995, 2007a,b). However, indiscriminate repression may lead to backlash and criticism by citizens. We contend that refugee groups can be strategically attractive and convenient targets of repression given their lack of political power to punish leaders and the public’s overall negative attitudes towards refugees in times of security crises. Pressured to look politically competent and responsive, leaders are likely to target refugees with coercion in times of security crises, even though such measures may not do much to improve security. We expect this hypothesized relationship to be more pronounced in democracies where the leaders’ incentives to respond quickly to terrorism are stronger. We evaluate the empirical validity of our theoretical expectations using a novel global dataset on anti-refugee violence by host states’ agents between 1996 and 2015. The findings of our models provide support for our central argument that terror attacks increase anti-refugee violence by states. The data also offer suggestive evidence that a scapegoating mechanism may be at work. We find that the propensity of states to repress refugees when they are reportedly tied to terrorism is not significantly higher than when there are no reported ties between refugees and terrorist attacks. The article proceeds in four sections. In the next section, building on the state repression literature, we develop our argument about the centrality of change in the security environment in shaping a government’s treatment of refugees. The third section discusses our research design, introducing an original, global dataset of acts of anti-refugee violence perpetrated by states, presents the results of our models, and provides suggestive evidence for the plausibility of a scapegoating mechanism. The last section concludes and discusses policy implications and future extensions of this study.

Conclusion: Implications and directions for future research The portrayal of refugees as ‘propagators of violence’ is increasingly common in public debates and policy circles.39 There is a corresponding scholarly emphasis on the role of refugees in the diffusion of political violence. This is unfortunate because refugees are often the targets of violence in their host states. In this article, we seek to reorient the literature by focusing on violence against refugees and shed light on the broader policy debates on forced migration. We show that terrorist attacks in host states lead to an increase in the prevalence of violence against refugees by state agents. Leaders often respond to security threats with repression and refugee groups can be strategically attractive targets. Refugees do not have electoral power and citizens’ attitudes towards refugees in times of security crises tend to be negative, creating a permissive environment for leaders to repress refugees. We conjecture that repression of refugees may not be a security-maximizing strategy as long as leaders perceive it as politically rewarding, at least in the short run. We provide suggestive evidence for scapegoating of refugees as a plausible mechanism explaining the robust positive relationship between terrorist attacks and subsequent violations of the physical integrity rights of refugees. The results of our article set the groundwork for several avenues of research. First, future work should investigate whether repression of refugees may result in violent backlash. Our argument hinges on the assumption that refugees are safer targets of state repression because citizens have more capacity to punish their leaders for repressive behavior. However, not having political voice does not necessarily prevent refugees from engaging in violent backlash against their host states. While institutional channels of discontent are only available for citizens, unsanctioned channels (protest, riots) can be utilized irrespective of residency status. While scapegoating may help leaders to look competent in the short term, such measures may be prove to be costly in the long term. While this is an empirical possibility and needs to be explored further, it is important to remember that unlike citizens of a state who enjoy permanent residency status, the stay of refugees in host states is considered to be temporary with the expectation of voluntary return to the country of origin. Even though refugees are protected by international law, host states have significant de facto discretion with respect to the admission and treatment of refugees in their territory.40 Being in such a precarious situation, the cost of collective violence against the host state is usually higher for refugees compared to citizens. Second, there are perpetrators of violence against refugees other than host states, such as civilians and other refugees, that require systematic analyses. Focusing on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea, and Uganda, Onoma (2013) shows that involvement of refugees with opposition groups against the host state and whether refugees are settled in areas that privilege residence or indigeneity determine civilian attacks on refugees. While Onoma’s study has made important strides in our understanding of civilian violence against refugees, it is important that quantitative scholars of forced migration evaluate the scope conditions and generalizability of these findings. For example, civilian violence against refugees in developed states may be governed by a different set of mechanisms than refugees’ choice of residence. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that there are certain time periods, that is, post-terrorist attacks, when the safety of refugees is particularly at high risk. It is imperative that states, international organizations, and human rights advocacy groups are cognizant of this trend.

Replication data The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, along with the Online appendix, can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. All analyses were conducted using Stata 15.1.

Acknowledgment We would like to thank Tobias Böhmelt, Alex Braithwaite, Jessica Maves Braithwaite, Jori Breslawski, Mike Colaresi, David Cunningham, Faten Ghosn, Jude Hays, Paul Huth, Benjamin Laughlin, Dong Ju Lee, Amanda Licht, Will Moore, Brian J Phillips, Pat Regan, Idean Salehyan, Yang-Yang Zhou, and the editor, Gudrun Østby, for valuable feedback and comments.

ORCID iD

Burcu Savun https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5932-0592