Summary of Argument:



Because Daniels believed that the immediate events of the October revolution have been understudied, he set out to show how, exactly, the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917. He was able to use some archival documents, but his access was very limited, and the narrative, therefore, relies mostly on published works by Western historians, memoirs by participants in the Revolution published both in the Soviet Union and the West, and works and document collections published in

Summary of Argument:



Because Daniels believed that the immediate events of the October revolution have been understudied, he set out to show how, exactly, the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917. He was able to use some archival documents, but his access was very limited, and the narrative, therefore, relies mostly on published works by Western historians, memoirs by participants in the Revolution published both in the Soviet Union and the West, and works and document collections published in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and after 1956.



The February Revolution came as a surprise both to the monarchy and its opposition, even though it has been in the making since 1825 and increasingly likely due to the state's accelerating industrial development in late 19th century. The Russian monarchy, according to Daniels, "perished for lack of takers." Even though in the summer and fall of 1917 soldiers and workers pushed for a Bolsheviks uprising, the Bolsheviks themselves believed that such a revolution will happen on its own in due time and if forced would only jeopardize the accomplishments of the February Revolution through a counter-revolutionary reaction. Lenin was the only Bolshevik who argued for an uprising because this is the only way he would be able to rule Russia alone without needing to compromise (his ultimate goal is personal power, second even to any political aims). On October 10, Lenin manages to convince reluctant Bolsheviks (except for Kamenev and Zinov’ev) of the need of an uprising, but no date for it is set. By now, everyone except for the Bolsheviks themselves are ready for the Bolsheviks to rise - the Provisional Government, supported by Mensheviks and SRs, takes defensive measures and pro-Bolshevik soldiers acquire weapons on their own initiative. Despite Lenin's exhortations, Bolsheviks decide to wait until the Congress of all Soviets on October 25th to take over the government peacefully - this is the mood that lasts until Lenin arrives in Smolny on the night of the insurrection. "Insurrection" was actually originally seen as "defense" against Kerensky's proposed attack of the Congress of Soviets, and the general crackdown on the Bolsheviks (Kerensky's seizure and destruction of the Bolshevik newspaper) on the morning of the 25th confirms the fears and causes retaliation, but until very late in the game this retaliation is solely defensive. Having overestimated the strength of the Kerensky government from which they were defending themselves, Bolsheviks "stumbled into power" and then pretended that the insurrection was intended to happen all along.



A major theme in Daniels’s book is that of the disagreements within the Bolshevik party (something Rabinowitch also emphasizes in his work) and the resulting lack of coordination between the Bolsheviks and the revolutionary forces in general. The actual offensive insurrection on October 25th began "in a fit of enthusiastic insubordination" when a regiment took initiative and started arresting members of the Provisional Government against the orders of the Military Revolutionary Committee. St. Petersburg as a location for the October Revolution was crucial - it contained the largest support groups of the Bolsheviks - soldiers and workers, as opposed to peasants in the rural areas which were a majority and supported the SRs (although I think Daniels does not stress this point enough). Daniels emphasizes the importance of chance - had Lenin been arrested on his way to Smolny, the revolution would have taken another course, since Lenin was the one who had changed the mood from offense to defense. In general, both the offense and the defense of the Winter Palace were very poorly organized. Mensheviks, Bundists, and the right SRs resigned from Congress in protest against the Bolshevik’s unilateral action (this is when Trotsky condemns them to the “dustbin of history”).



After the Kerensky government fell, the Bolsheviks proposed their program: peace “without annexations and indemnities” and land (a point they borrowed from the SRs). The revolution only eliminated Kerensky’s government – the weakest link in Bolshevik opposition, so clashes between socialist parties continued until the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly (with an elected majority of SR delegates /according to Radkey this is not true because Ukrainian and Russian SRs were very different/) was dissolved by Bolshevik soldiers.



The main goal of The Red October is to debunk Soviet myths of the October Revolution – that the insurrection proceeded according to a plan, that it was a movement of all Russia’s workers and peasants, and that it could not have taken place without Lenin (Daniels points out the contradiction between the latter two points). In reality, Bolsheviks succeeded against all odds and in defiance of any rational calculation. Lenin’s role in their victory was paramount - his desire for personal power makes him take the gamble and not wait to take power peacefully, as a result of evolution in which he would have to compromise. And yet, had the Kerensky government not began suppressing the socialists in anticipation of their still unlikely revolt, revolution might not have happened because Lenin was completely inactive during the days prior to it. Had Kerensky not acted, a peaceful evolution would have been possible. With the revolution happening as it did, a strong cleavage between Bolsheviks and their opponents was created that necessitated the formation of a military dictatorship and formed the foundations of the Soviet regime for a decade until they were altered in Stalin's "revolution from above." Stalin soon became "the gravedigger of October Revolution": he re-wrote history to erase his opponents and increase his own role. Bolshevik program that helped them achieve power was violated by themselves and their heirs ("all power to the soviets" became "all power to the Bolsheviks," workers were not given any power, world revolution did not happen, there was no national self-determination, peasants got no land. Achievements claimed by the Soviet leadership such as industrialization would have happened even without the revolution. The revolutionary myth, however, remains the principal source of the Soviet regime's legitimacy.



Comments/Criticism:



In his review of this book, Rabinowitch notes that Daniels’s research implies that historians can no longer explain the Bolshevik victory as a factor of the monolithic character of their party and supreme organization. Neither Daniels nor Rabinowitch, however, propose a plausible answer to the question of why the Bolsheviks were able to take power. Daniels’s argument is that it was a matter of chance, but Rabinowitch critiques this notion, stating that the disillusionment of the workers, peasants and soldiers with both the Kerensky government and the moderate socialists played an important role in bringing the Bolsheviks to power and cannot be attributed to chance (and Avrich agrees with him here, pointing out also the general breakdown of authority that occurred throughout Russia). Avrich also agrees with Rabinowitch in pointing out that the Bolsheviks’ organization and determination, even if deficient overall, were still vastly superior to those of the members of the Provisional Government. Finally, as Avrich points out, even if Bolsheviks’ coming to power in Petrograd was accidental, their taking over the entire Russia certainly was not. Radical solutions to mounting hardships were what the Russian people wanted and that was what the Bolsheviks claimed to be able to provide. Radkey also points out that Daniels does not pay enough attention to the war as a crucial factor that brought Bolsheviks to power, but perhaps Radkey overemphasizes the war’s role here.



Rabinowitch also critiques Daniels’s view that Trotsky without Lenin could only defend but not attack – instead, Rabinowitch argues that Trotsky used the pretext of defense in order to attack (Wade is also not convinced by Daniels’s claims on this point). Daniels’s attribution to the change of mood to Lenin’s arrival in Smolny might also be flawed because if he used sources from the time of Lenin’s cult of personality they would be likely to attribute all and everything to Lenin’s magical presence. Personally, I found Daniels’s note of Lenin's "un-Russian rigor and discipline" a bit disturbing. In general, however, it is impressive that he was able to write this book in 1967 and surprising that the sources to do so were available to him. Perhaps this book can debunk the archival revolution theory – I doubt that much more can be said about the way Bolsheviks took power than Daniels’s book does. However, this might also point to the fact that the opening of archives did little for political historians but much for historians of society, since Daniels tells us very little about popular orientations of the Russian people during the Revolution (and I think this is due to his personal preferences but also source limitations). I also question Daniels's view that Lenin's main motivation was a quest for personal power - I think he might be underestimating the power of ideology here, but this is something to compare to other works about Lenin.