Just three years ago, the Indiana Pacers built an entire offense around an inefficient gunner that averaged 18.7 points on more than 15 shots per game. For the season, Danny Granger shot an abysmal 41.6% from the field while averaging less than two assists per game, despite using up over a quarter of the Pacers’ possessions while he was on the floor. Indiana’s “superstar” took 31% of his shots from the dreaded “midrange” area of the floor, connecting on only 37% of those low-quality shots.

And yet, the Pacers really had no other options offensively. David West was in town, but he was recovering from a massive knee injury. Roy Hibbert was just figuring out how to stay out of foul trouble and stay on the floor, and his offensive game (which hasn’t exactly blossomed since) was unpolished and balky. Paul George was in his second year, and while he had shown great promise on defense, he had also been outscored by the one and only A.J. Price in the previous season’s short playoff appearance. The rest of the roster prominently featured guys of the George Hill/Leandro Barbosa/Tyler Hansbrough ilk. A (seemingly) mediocre Danny Granger breathed life into the Indiana offense, practically becoming the engine that ran the entire vehicle.

Incredibly, that offense finished in the top half of the league in many meaningful categories. Indiana was 13th in points per game, 7th in offensive rating, 6th in 3-point percentage, and 7th in turnovers.

On paper, there was little rhyme or reason for the Pacers’ offensive success. They lacked the players, they lacked the balance, and they seemingly lacked the overall offensive identity to score with some of the best teams in the league. Yet, there they were in the playoffs, up 2-1 in the series while leading in the third quarter at home against a fantastic Miami Heat squad. Unfortunately, LeBron James turned into Superman, but the Pacers had built an effective and capable enough offense to translate into both regular and postseason success.

The next season, Zach Lowe analyzed the Indiana Pacers (and teams built in a similar fashion) at greater depth, noting that in some cases, teams actually benefit from featuring inefficient “chuckers.” In succinct fashion, he summed up what players like Granger could actually add to their team, statistics and analytics be damned.

The debate mostly centers around the search for the proper balance on each team, and whether there is value in simply having guys who can create shot attempts — even if a few of those attempts each night are blatantly bad. Math in a vacuum suggests teams would be better off shifting possessions from heavy-usage players to low-usage players who have been monstrously efficient in their rare chances; this is the “get the ball to Tyson Chandler more often!” argument. Studies of actual basketball suggest that asking Chandler to do more would result in more bad stuff from him — turnovers, offensive fouls, misses, and air-balled mid-rangers like the one he launched last week in San Antonio. Having a ball hog like Carmelo Anthony — playing less like a ball hog this season — might actually have value, as he allows teammates to find their happy medium on offense.

Granger’s ability to create his own shot, even when those shots were less than optimal, opened things up for the rest of his teammates. Paul George had room to grow. George Hill and Darren Collison could combine to spot up for 5 open 3-point attempts per game. And perhaps most importantly, Hibbert, West, and Hansbrough could crash the offensive glass on all of those misses, extending possessions and gobbling up garbage baskets. Indeed, Indiana finished 6th in the league on the offensive boards that season.

When Granger got hurt the next season, everything changed.

In the time since, Indiana’s offense has only gotten worse, dropping to 23rd in the league in 2013 and 24th last season (they also earned the dubious distinction of being the second worst offensive team in the NBA last season after the All-Star break, only beating out the 76ers who were actively not trying to be a professional basketball team). Most notably, turnovers shot up, ball movement stagnated, and they fell all the way to 23rd in the league on the offensive glass, despite being bigger and more athletic than all but a handful of NBA teams.

Enter the equation, Rodney Stuckey.

When Lance Stephenson chose Michael Jordan over Larry Bird this summer, the Pacers scrambled to find a replacement suitable for their team. Nobody who was available could come close to replicating all (both good and bad) of the things that Lance had done for the Pacers in 2014. Lance led the team in assists, rebounds, and headaches, while also providing stellar defense and flexibility on the wing. What the Indiana Pacers found in Rodney Stuckey was a player who could create his own shot and soak up possessions, albeit in an often inefficient (and most likely loss-inducing) fashion.

Frantic Pacers’ fans immediately responded by pulling up Stuckey’s 2014 shot chart to complain about his poor shooting …

… noting his lack of a perimeter game and his proclivity for the unreliable and ill-advised mid-range jumper.

When Paul George snapped his leg in half weeks later, Pacers’ fans threw in the towel on the 2014-15 season.

Of course, one would be crazy to envision (barring an unlikely, Adrian Peterson-esque comeback from Paul George) a scenario in which Indiana made any sort of deep playoff run this season. Without Paul George and Lance Stephenson, they may have to work hard just to be watchable this season. However, with nowhere to go but up, the Indiana offense could potentially be much improved over last year’s debacle, due in large part to the acquisition of Stuckey.

For comparison, let’s look at the shot chart of another player who has long been called “an inefficient chucker” throughout his career until finding the right team in 2013-14.

Other than the gross totals (Ellis played 1100 more minutes than Stuckey last season) and slightly higher ratio of 3-point attempts, the two guys have eerily similar styles. Once you factor in that Ellis had the luxury of playing with intelligent floor spacers like Dirk Nowitzki, Vince Carter, and Jose Calderon while Stuckey languished with Josh Smith and a guy that does this at the free-throw line, one is stuck wondering just how much of a poor man’s Ellis the newest Pacer really is.

Of course, the Indiana Pacers (and every other team for that matter) don’t have anyone approaching Dirk Nowitzki on their roster, but they do feature one of the best shooting big men in the game, especially from the high post, in David West. George Hill is an above average floor spacer from 3-point range and with increased playing time for long-range threats like Chris Copeland, Damjen Rudez, and C.J. Miles, the Pacers could actually trot out a lineup this year with something resembling floor spacing and balance.

Here is where Rodney Stuckey will be so important. No matter how much shooting a team may have, at some point, it needs to provide a threat going to the basket. If an offense can’t penetrate a defense vertically, no amount of horizontal stretch is really going to matter. Further, every team needs at least one guy that can create his own shot when the offense has broken down. As good as Paul George has become, even the most hardcore Indiana fan will acknowledge that he still struggles to create his own looks at times (other than, you know, when he’s in the zone). Stuckey can provide both pieces of the equation to Indiana.

Stuckey may shoot a “low percentage” for the Pacers this season, and his lack of real 3-point range will certainly cause some spacing issues on more than one occasion. Still, it wouldn’t be at all surprising to see him lead the team in field goal attempts and even scoring. Don’t be surprised if the addition of Stuckey’s offense has positive net effects on Indiana’s turnover rate, offensive rebounding, and overall production. With any luck, the Pacers’ just might turn into a watchable offensive team.