The 12th instalment of the Melbourne Derby brought goals, a red card and plenty of drama, with almost everything going the way of Heart. The 40th minute red card to Victory’s Nick Ansell did little to alter the outcome of the match, with Heart already having a 2-0 buffer and looking the more dangerous side, but both team’s response to the send-off was an interesting point of discussion.

To begin, Victory lined up in their customary 4-2-2-2 formation with no recognised striker. Heart continued with a 4-3-3 formation with a dynamic midfield of Jonatan Germano, Orlando Engelaar and Massimo Murdocca.

Defensive issues have long been the problem for Victory and in recent weeks manager Kevin Muscat has tweaked his system defensively in an attempt to stop them from leaking goals. Instead of pressing high up the pitch in a 4-2-4, Victory’s two wide players dropped back into the midfield line to add stability and to form a 4-4-2 – no longer were they able to ‘cheat’ defensively and remain high up the park.

This meant when in possession, Heart’s two centre backs Robert Wielaert and Patrick Kisnorbo were pressured by Victory’s front two of Tom Rogic and Gui Finkler. In order to facilitate playing out from the back, Germano, the deepest of Heart’s midfield, dropped back to form a back three. This helped Heart create a 3 vs 2 in deep areas and allowed them to retain possession more comfortably.

After the red card, both sides were forced to adjust – first Victory and then Heart in response.

Victory defended as a 4-4-1, leaving Rogic up front alone when reduced to 10-men. Photograph: /Guardian Photograph: Victory changes

Victory’s change was immediate, with Leigh Broxham moving to centre back in place of Ansell and Finkler dropping back to form a 4-4-1 without the ball. When in possession, Finkler would move forward to support Rogic but with Heart seeing 65% of possession after the send-off Victory were forced to defend more often than not.

This meant there was no longer two Victory forwards to pressure the two Heart centre backs, with Rogic instead conserving his energy and rarely pressing. Early in the second half, Germano continued to drop back and form a back three when Heart had possession in deep areas. His role for the first 15 minutes of the second half allowed Heart to retain possession comfortably and kill off any Victory hope of grabbing an early goal back.

However his role soon became redundant against a 10-man Victory side and John van’t Schip duly responded. The decision to introduce Nick Kalmar in place of Germano helped Heart to twist the knife in the wound inflicted in the first half.

Instead of dropping deeper to receive possession, Kalmar looked to receive the ball in midfield. Photograph: Guardian

Instead of dropping back, Kalmar instead looked to receive possession behind Victory’s first line of defence (Rogic). This meant Heart were now able to create a 3 vs 2 in the centre of midfield.

Kalmar’s presence in midfield caused confusion for Victory, as Finkler and Mark Milligan were unsure of whether to pressure him or to remain in shape.

If one of Victory’s centre midfielders pressured Kalmar, a space would then appear behind them for Murdocca or Engelaar to receive possession. If they allowed Kalmar to receive possession, he was able to face forward and pick out shorter passes in between the lines of Victory’s defence or longer passes in behind them. One such example was in the 70th minute when he received the ball in the centre circle and clipped an inch perfect long-range pass to Mate Dugandzic which left him 1-on-1 with the goalkeeper.

With the numerical advantage, Heart players were able to flood forward and to get into the box when the ball was in wide areas. Heart looked to cross the ball regularly and aerially to exploit Victory’s lack of height in defence (an average of only 172cm after the red card). The third goal came during the second phase after a dangerous cross. The fourth and final goal was a spectacular effort from Harry Kewell but came after Kalmar’s presence in midfield caused confusion for an outnumbered Milligan.

Heart always had the ascendancy, even before the controversial sending off of Ansell, but the second half responses to the red card allowed Heart to dominate and humiliate their rivals.