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Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 20): TrueCrypt's installers allow arbitrary (remote) code execution and escalation of privilege

Hi @ll, the executable installers "TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe" and TrueCrypt-7.2.exe load and execute USP10.dll, RichEd20.dll, NTMarta.dll and SRClient.dll from their "application directory". For software downloaded with a web browser the application directory is typically the user's "Downloads" directory: see <https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2008/09/carpet-bombing-and-directory-poisoning.html>, <http://blog.acrossecurity.com/2012/02/downloads-folder-binary-planting.html> and <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Aug/134> for "prior art" about this well-known and well-documented vulnerability. If an attacker places the above named DLLs in the users "Downloads" directory (for example per drive-by download or social engineering) this vulnerability becomes a remote code execution. Due to the application manifest embedded in the executables which specifies "requireAdministrator" the executable installers are run with administrative privileges ("protected" administrators are prompted for consent, unprivileged standard users are prompted for an administrator password); execution of the DLLs therefore results in an escalation of privilege! Proof of concept/demonstration: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (verified on Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 [R2]; should work on newer versions too) 1. visit <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html>, download <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.DLL> and store it as USP10.dll in your "Downloads" directory, then copy it as NTMarta.dll, RichEd20.dll and SRClient.dll; 2. download TrueCrypt-7.2.exe and "TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe" and store them in your "Downloads" directory; 3. run TrueCrypt-7.2.exe and "TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe" from your "Downloads" directory; 4. notice the message boxes displayed from the DLLs placed in step 1. PWNED! 5. on Windows XP copy the downloaded USP10.dll as SetupAPI.dll (or create an empty file SetupAPI.dll), then rerun TrueCrypt*.exe from your "Downloads" directory. DOSSED! The denial of service from step 5. can easily be turned into an arbitrary code execution with elevation of privilege too: add the exports SetupDiOpenClassRegKey, SetupInstallFromInfSectionA, SetupOpenInfFileA and SetupCloseInfFile to the SetupAPI.dll copied to the "Downloads" directory. For this well-known (trivial, easy to avoid, easy to detect and easy to fix) beginner's error see <https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html>, <https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/2269637.aspx>, <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff919712.aspx> and <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682586.aspx> plus <http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/load-library-safely.aspx> See <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Nov/101>, <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/86> and <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/121> plus <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html> and the still unfinished <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/!execute.html> for more details and why executable installers (and self-extractors too) are bad and should be dumped. stay tuned Stefan Kanthak PS: I really LOVE (security) software with such trivial beginner's errors. It's a tell-tale sign to stay away from this crapware! Timeline: ~~~~~~~~~ 2015-12-23 report sent to vendor NO ANSWER, not even an acknowledgement of receipt 2016-01-01 reports resent to vendor NO ANSWER, not even an acknowledgement of receipt 2016-01-08 report published _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/

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