In Part 1 of our interpretation of NFL Writer Cian Fahey’s post on on older quarterbacks and their alleged lack of production manifested in sub-par accuracy, we examined recent efforts by New England’s Tom Brady (see below appendix for link to our work and Fahey’s). Our eagerness to follow up on last week’s effort from New England is only seconded by our breakdown of the play of New Orleans’ Drew Brees. Recently turned 39 years young, Brees was selected for his 11th Pro Bowl where he posted his highest seasonal completion percentage of his career (72%), while only throwing 8 interceptions, the second lowest total of his career. In Part 1 there was a real need to focus on and then question the validity of recent statistics of Brady’s; for Brees that is simply not the case. In Games 1–2 he threw for 71.5 completion percentage, 17 TDs, 5 picks, and a 104.2 QB rating. In games 13–16 he went for 73.6% completion rate, 1036 yards, 6 TDs, and 3 picks. In the playoffs his completion rate did drop to 65.7%, and although roughly 600 basis points is significant the film showed many more positive examples than negative against two very talented defenses. But, as always, we must dive deeper.

Taking a step back, Head Coach Sean Payton’s offense this year really showed an evolution in running the football, with frankly dominant results. In previous seasons running has seemed more of an an after thought, but 2017 brought a good mix of zone and man concepts resulting in top tier statistics. They finished 5th in yards, 1st in touchdowns and 2nd in yards per attempt. Some may say that was was by design and supportive of Fahey’s point; that an aged Brees would force their offense to be successful through a balanced attack. Others would say that both running backs Kamara and Ingram had somewhat unexpected career years. We must note that Brees’ pass attempts (536) was his lowest since 2009 (514), and that was the year they won the Super Bowl. We will show that although the success of their running game was certainly by design (Payton’s offense and many are most deadly when balanced well between run and pass), but the need for balance did not come from a lack of arm strength or fading accuracy, particularly during key stretches of games in the playoffs.

As we dive into film examination, context must be given to establish proper background of this offense within the sixteen game season and two playoff games . As great offenses do, the Saints attack had shifted slightly as the season wore on, mostly because of the various weekly match ups in the hyper competitive league. To sum up the shifts, Payton and Brees had excelled at the quick passing game to compliment their powerful rush attack for the first half of the season. We tracked Brees time in the pocket (and noted this in our Weekly piece back in week 14), and found that in weeks 1–10 65% of the time his throws came from<2.5 seconds in the pocket. This statistic dropped off for a three week span (weeks 11–13) down to 46% and then reverted again in the last 4 games back above 60%. We wrote in Week 14 that this reversion needed to happen, not because of correlation to Brees’ accuracy or wins and losses, but because conceptually it does many things two of which are as follows. It slows the pass rush by frustrating particularly edge rushers who have little chance of impacting the throw. Secondly it allows for easier distribution to multiple targets in the passing game putting pressure on a defense to make tackles. Whether or not coaching perspectives would agree on this tactic is always debatable, but the point was defenses by the end of the season were expecting mostly the quick rhythmic passing to start the game. Pulling an example from week 16 against the Falcons, this second play from scrimmage for the Saints’ offense featured 21 personnel and an empty set backfield (a Payton favorite) vs. base defense Cover 1 man. See below: