Feb 20, 2018

Jordanian King Abdullah visited Russia last week for the 20th time in 18 years, but this trip was far from a routine encounter with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The countries' ties have been strong for decades. If the frequency of diplomatic gestures is an indication, Jordan appears to be Moscow's strongest ally in the Middle East. Yet despite a solid record of cooperation, as well as a certain chemistry between Abdullah and Putin, Amman never really played a prominent role in Russia’s Mideast strategy, including in Syria. This approach, however, got a review last year when Russia was faced with the challenge of implementing de-escalation zones in Syria, specifically the one along Jordan's border. Along with the old challenge of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement — which recently became even more complex — the need to settle Syria's civil war took center stage at the Abdullah-Putin meeting Feb. 15.

Russia’s and Jordan’s interests in the region are uniquely aligned at the moment, allowing the two to explore opportunities for cooperation that go beyond routine interaction. Jordan essentially became a linchpin of Russian policy toward southern Syria when the kingdom played a key role in negotiating a de-escalation zone that spans across Quneitra and Daraa provinces and borders Israel and Jordan. During his visit to Moscow, Abdullah boasted about the two countries’ active dialogue on Syria — and the southern de-escalation zone is where this dialogue is most visible. Since 2015, the two countries have operated a joint center in Amman to share intelligence on the situation in southern provinces and coordinate military action. The agreement between Russia and the United States on the de-escalation zone at Jordan's border became possible thanks to the king's participation.

Russia and Jordan do not necessarily see eye to eye on the Syrian conflict, but since the de-escalation zones were announced, Amman has been gradually adjusting its position regarding the Syrian government. Jordanian officials no longer see Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a threat and even go as far as to claim their relations are back on track. The perceived improvement of ties between Damascus and Amman was arguably facilitated by a new understanding in the south, where Amman no longer saw a threat to Jordanian borders.

The Russian plan to give Jordan an active role in settling the Syrian conflict was part of the strategy to create an environment — or the illusion of one — of a Sunni Arab power normalizing relations with and accepting Assad. It is not surprising that Abdullah was susceptible to Russia’s plan: The West hasn't acknowledged Jordan's accommodation of Syrian refugees and has failed to nurture a strong resistance to Assad in the south. These omissions led Amman to look for alternative partners, and Russia was readily there. Abdullah's realignment with Russia resulted in his dwindling support for training Syrian opposition on Jordanian soil, and prevented a much-anticipated US-led push against the Islamic State (IS) from Jordanian territory in 2017.