Turkey’s Nov. 24 downing of a Russian warplane, and the ensuing tensions between Moscow and Ankara, have fueled the worsening of the negative atmosphere surrounding Iran-Turkey relations. Some Iranian officials, elites and media outlets have begun to sympathize with Moscow by reiterating Russian accusations against Turkey over the Nov. 24 incident. For instance, Iranian member of parliament Laleh Eftekhari mistook a photo of Erdogan’s son, Bilal, along with the owners of a Turkish restaurant for Bilal meeting with IS leaders. Eftekhari even wrote a letter to Turkey’s first lady to voice regret over her silence on Bilal’s supposed close ties with IS. Subsequently, Mohsen Rezaei, a senior military adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and also secretary of the Expediency Council, expressed support for Russia’s stance against Turkey. Conservative news agencies such as Fars News have echoed Rezaei’s stance in support of Russia, publishing photos insinuating Turkish ties with IS and other material with questionable credibility.

After seeing their relations strained over Syria, Turkey and Iran also engaged in a verbal disagreement over the crisis in Yemen. The two countries lined up on opposing fronts, with Tehran backing Yemen’s Houthi fighters and Ankara backing Saudi Arabia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Iran of trying to dominate the Middle East and said Iran’s efforts had begun to annoy both Turkey and its Arab allies. Following these events, a group of 65 Iranian parliamentarians called on Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani to demand an end to Erdogan’s accusations.

At first, both countries tried to not let the situation in Syria influence their bilateral relations — but unfortunately, it did. Indeed, the worsening of the situations in Syria and Iraq amid the rise of the Islamic State (IS) all appear to have fertilized the growth of tension. The question now is where the verbal disputes between Iran and Turkey may lead.

Every now and then, and especially when Turkey’s secular parties have been in power, the two nations have had differing views on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) or the Islamist groups in Turkey. However, these tensions have always subsided quickly. When the Islamists came into power, there appeared to be a warming of political ties. For instance, the $23 billion gas pipeline deal between Tehran and Ankara is the legacy of former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (1996-97), who was an Islamist. Indeed, with the coming to power of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party in 2002, bilateral relations soared to an unprecedented level. However, once the crisis in Syria emerged in March 2011, things took a turn for the worse.

Furthermore, in a telephone conversation with Rouhani in August, Erdogan criticized Iranian officials and media for their approach toward Turkey, asking, “How can a Muslim ruin the name of another Muslim?” Erdogan also made damning comments in an interview with Al Jazeera, in which he criticized both Iran and Iraq’s regional policies, arguing that they have fueled sectarianism in Syria and Iraq. Yet the peak of Turkish criticism came when Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu warned Tehran that bilateral ties would be severely damaged if Iran continues its current policies toward Turkey.

Regardless of some Iranian officials and elites’ baseless accusations against Turkey and Erdogan’s family, the reality is that Ankara and Tehran are experiencing some misunderstandings as well as geopolitical rivalries in Iraq, Syria and, to a lesser degree, Yemen. Turkey believes that by aiding the Iraqi government and emphasizing its Shiite identity, or by supporting the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and emphasizing its Alawite identity, Iran is seeking to spread Shiite Islam in the Fertile Crescent. Ankara thus seemingly believes that Iran is trying to fuel the Shiite-Sunni divide and change the regional political balance to the disadvantage of Sunnis and Ankara. However, Iran’s goal is in essence to create strategic depth against Israel. This misunderstanding about Iran’s action is a major reason why the Turks are not interested in having the geopolitical balance tilted in favor of Russia or Iran. Hence, Turkey’s attempt to maintain a military presence in Iraq’s Bashiqa district — which it partially withdrew under US pressure — as well as its political flirtations with the Iraqi Kurds, and the downing of the Russian plane, should all be viewed in the context of the latter. For this reason, Davutoglu sees Turkey’s move to station forces along the outskirts of Mosul as a way to disrupt the regional strategic balance and prevent IS from sharing a border with Turkey.

The current level of rivalry between Iran and Turkey may appear like that between the Safavids and Ottomans in the 17th century. However, this analogy does not fit with the current structure and realities of either country. For several reasons, the current verbal disputes between Tehran and Ankara will not spiral to a military standoff or any other acts of violence, and the two states are bound to eventually tone down their verbal tensions.

First, Iran needs the dollars it makes through exporting oil and natural gas to Turkey. Ankara, in return, wants Iranian energy. Given the recent escalation of tensions between Moscow and Ankara, the latter is especially important since it will be almost impossible for Turkey to replace Iranian natural gas. Although Turkey has signed an agreement to import liquefied natural gas from Qatar, it will take some time for this deal to be implemented — and energy is not something that can wait. It should also be noted that 90-95% of Iran’s natural gas exports go to Turkey. Indeed, Iran is the second-largest gas exporter to Turkey, after Russia. Hence, without Ankara, Tehran would have no market for its natural gas. Consequently, neither Iran nor Turkey are able to overlook the exchange of dollars and gas.

Second, Iran and Turkey both consider each other as important trade partners. Bilateral trade volume reached some $14.8 billion in 2014, and there are hopes that it will reach $30 billion by 2020 — although the latter appears unlikely given the current situation.

The third reason why Iran and Turkey’s tensions will not escalate to violence or war is the 2 million Iranian tourists who visit Turkey every year. Iranians carry out many of their interactions with the Western world through Turkey, including applying for visas to visit North America. Turkey is indeed an entry point for many Iranians who want to seek refugee status or gain residence permits in the West. Therefore, even if the Iranian government, or the Turkish side, decides to sever relations, public pressure will not allow them to do so.

The fourth and last point relates to the crises in Syria and Iraq. It should be borne in mind that Turkey and Iran are not the sole players seeking to steer developments in these countries, and thus have no choice but to coordinate with other major players such as Russia and the United States. For instance, in Iran’s 4-point plan for Syria, any decision regarding whether Assad should remain in power is left to the Syrian people. The current general perception is that Assad should remain at the helm during the transition period, a position that even countries such as France overtly and the United States tacitly agree on. Therefore, the insistence of countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia on having Assad immediately removed from the political equation will fail sooner or later.

In conclusion, it appears very unlikely that Iran and Turkey, which have lived side by side in peace and tranquility for nearly 400 years, would escalate their tensions to involve violence.