Lockheed Martin's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has been having a terrible time of late. In June, War is Boring journalist David Axe obtained a report detailing the F-35's performance—or lack thereof—as a dogfighter. The F-35 went up against an F-16 in January of this year and, with the exception of a single 'Hail Mary' move, was soundly outclassed by the older plane.

Over at Aviation Week, Bill Sweetman has joined the merge with a considered take on where we stand with the F-35. Sweetman—probably the leading journalist in the field—argues that one's view on the new fighter depends on whether you fall into one of two schools of thought: traditionalists and those who think stealth rules everything.

First, a quick recap of January's F-35/F-16 showdown. At altitudes between 10,000' and 30,000' (3,000-9,000m), the two airplanes carried out a series of basic fighter maneuvers, with the test pilot specifically focused on how the F-35 performed at high angles of attack (i.e. its nose was pointing further up than the direction it was flying). The newer jet did not distinguish itself, beyond being able to perform a defensive move that "required a commitment to lose energy" and which "meant losing the fight unless the bandit made an error," according to the leaked report.

Aerial combat maneuvers are all to do with energy—how much you have, how much you can afford to lose—and in this regard the F-35 was at a distinct disadvantage, with an underpowered engine. To make matters worse, the test pilot found it almost impossible to turn his head to see behind the plane, something you'd want to do in a dogfight.

The F-35A in question was one of the earliest airframes off the production line, As such, it wasn't equipped with much of the fused sensor suite that F-35 supporters point to as one of the jet's big leaps forward (this combines data from radar and infrared sensors to give the pilot increased situational awareness). The F-35A was up against an F-16D (a two-seat version of that plane) that should have been at a disadvantage, encumbered as it was with two external fuel tanks hanging off its wings. Even if we accept Lockheed Martin's explanations for the F-35's poor performance, the fact that it couldn't best the much older plane should be worrying.

Lockheed Martin photo/Tom Reynolds

stefano benedetto @ Flickr

US Marine Corps

USAF



Bryan Jones @ Flickr

Northrop Grumman

Yes, the F-16 is a highly maneuverable fighter, but it's also long in the tooth. The F-35's peers are newer planes like the Eurofighter Typhoon, which doesn't have the F-35's stealth but is at the leading edge of sensor fusion. And as Sweetman points out, Lockheed Martin claimed that the F-35 would outperform the Typhoon as well as the F/A-18 Super Hornet, yet both of these planes are at least equal to or better than the older F-16 in air combat maneuvering.

As Sweetman explains, the F-35 belongs to a school of thought that says air combat within visual range (WVR) is a thing of the past, rendered obsolete by the F-35's stealth, sensors, and networking ability. The opposing school of thought believes that stealth and long-range air-to-air missiles are well and good but that one ought to be prepared for a sneaky (or lucky) adversary that gets past your scanners and taps you on the shoulder.

Stealth isn't a magic invisibility cloak. Yes, it can significantly reduce the range at which a plane is detected by a radar, but that's one of the reasons why everyone else has been pursuing sensor fusion, augmenting radar with infrared and so on. Lockheed Martin's foreign competitors have also been investing heavily in electronic countermeasure technology, an area in which the US has lagged as it went down the stealthy road. It's a foregone conclusion that the F-35 will be in service long after its stealth advantage has been negated.

Perhaps the greatest irony to emerge from January's test involves the F-16's origin story. Like the F-35, the F-16 is a multi-role aircraft, designed to carry out air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. A product of the 1970s, it was a response to the US Air Force's dismal showing during the early years of the Vietnam war. Just like today, the US Air Force of the 1950s and 1960s believed that dogfighting was a thing of the past and that air combat would take place beyond visual range with radar guided missiles. The Vietnam War demonstrated the folly of that belief at the cost of almost 1,000 planes and far too many American pilots.

Still, the F-35 program has time to remedy this; after all, that's the purpose of tests like this. Unfortunately, one of the best chances to do so went away when Congress killed the alternate engine that was under development, despite work being almost complete.

STOVL problems

The bad news for the F-35 program doesn't end there. Lockheed Martin is actually developing three different versions of the aircraft. There's the F-35A, which will be used by the US Air Force, a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B for the US Marine Corps and the UK, and the F-35C for the US Navy.

The F-35C has had its share of troubles, but the real problem child is the F-35B. This plane is meant to replace the aging (and tricky-to-fly) Harrier, and it is capable of using improvised runways or aircraft carriers without catapult launchers to take off and land vertically. The UK needs the F-35B for the carriers it's building, since the government made the decision not to equip them with catapults. The US Marine Corps wants a STOVL jet because of institutional memories from World War II, when it had to fight without naval support, despite the fact that the F-35's special stealth coatings (and enormous price tag) almost certainly negate any chance of the aircraft being deployed to unsecured forward areas in a time of war.

Although Lockheed Martin and its technical partners have made headway in taming the F-35B's STOVL problems, this variant remains heavier and less maneuverable than the F-35A and to many observers is a millstone around the project's neck.

The Australian government probably agrees with that assessment, as it has this week decided to cancel plans to buy between 18 and 35 F-35Bs. The decision was made due to the enormous cost ($4.4 billion) required to upgrade Australia's ships, HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide, for F-35B operations.