Clint Watts is senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and the Homeland Security Policy Institute at the George Washington University. Clint served previously as executive officer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

In 2012, the Obama administration, engaged in a presidential race tainted by the messy security vacuum left after intervening in Libya, rejected the idea of a no-fly zone against the Assad regime in Syria. So Syrian jihadists, backed by thousands of foreign fighters, created their own: They carved out a safe haven by seizing government airbases and by pushing out more moderate rebel groups. The grim results are what we see before us today.

America’s airstrikes inside Syria against both the Islamic State, often known as ISIL, and Al Qaeda’s primary affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, come with some obvious benefits — taking on a genuine threat to U.S. interests and security — but may also expose the United States to some unintended consequences — dangers that could haunt the United States for years to come.


Some of these dangers are apparent and some less obvious. As of July, more than 12,000 foreign fighters had flocked to Syria, hundreds bearing passports that could allow them to slip in and out of Western countries unnoticed. ISIL members in the region, or ISIL supporters globally, might soon conduct reprisal attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities abroad and could launch dangerous attacks in Europe or even against the U.S. homeland. The United States might see a hurried, conventional weapons attack by an unconnected but inspired supporter or, in the worst case, a former foreign fighter with sufficient skill and experience to hit a soft target like a transportation hub or shopping center.

Whatever the scenario, in taking the lead against ISIL, the United States has painted a bull’s-eye on its citizens. A more indirect U.S. strategy to counter ISIL with proxies and supporting allies could have deflected the group’s most passionate members from hitting the U.S. homeland. But now, the United States has moved itself up in ISIL’s targeting priorities, from one of many to the very top of the list. Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, ISIL’s official spokesman, said in an official statement released this week, “O Americans, and O Europeans, the Islamic State did not initiate a war against you, as your governments and media try to make you believe. It is you who started the transgression against us, and thus you deserve blame and you will pay a great price.”

More subtly, U.S. airstrikes in Syria against ISIL confirm Al Qaeda’s narrative of more than two decades: The United States, as the “Far Enemy” propping up the “Near Enemy”— corrupt dictators and apostate regimes repressing Al Qaeda’s vision of an Islamic state. And the strikes, by attacking the biggest threat to the Assad regime’s grip on power, potentially empower a far more serious enemy of the United States than the jihadis: Iran.

There’s also the danger that the United States is uniting, rather than dividing, its terrorist adversaries. ISIL’s rejection of Al Qaeda’s senior leadership weakened the latter group’s grasp on foreign fighter flows and donor cash. By striking both ISIL and Al Qaeda’s official arm in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, the United States may be encouraging ISIL and Al Qaeda to return to coordinating rather than competing against each other. There are already hints of this happening elsewhere. Last week, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, two Al Qaeda affiliates losing manpower and momentum to the hot new kid on the block — ISIL — called for unity among jihadi groups in the fight against America. If Nusra and ISIL, rather than eroding each other’s support and competing for resources, join forces to combine ISIL’s resources and skill at insurgency in Iraq and Syria with Al Qaeda’s international terrorism knowhow, the danger to the United States and its interest around the world could multiply rapidly. In other words, the United States could win some tactical victories by hitting both groups hard in Syria, but might be committing a massive strategic blunder by uniting a jihadi landscape it desperately sought to fracture over the past decade.

The Obama administration was under tremendous pressure, both in Washington and among America’s Sunni allies, to act in Syria. But bombing ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra could create consequences beyond the president’s control. What happens when the jihadis scatter to the winds, and American jets run out of targets? The task of countering both Assad and the jihadis while rebuilding two war-shattered societies in Iraq and Syria — even if, as the president said Wednesday, Arabs themselves must be in the lead — seems overwhelming. No small challenge for a man who came into office promising to end America’s wars, not begin new ones.

Clint Watts is senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and the Homeland Security Policy Institute at the George Washington University. Clint served previously as executive officer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.