jorge: jorge: Similar to the blacklist, I think the meta-governance process for deciding who gets a token and whose token gets burned wouldn’t scale.

Considering the work that is funded is open source, I think it will be quite easy for a self-regulatory body to form and perform analysis on Github (or Pando) twice a year. Additionally, aren’t Nest teams funded on a milestone basis? Is there a plan to phase out Nest because it won’t scale?

I think it will be quite easy to track who is active or who isn’t. An alternative to one person, one token can be that a full-time contributor gets 4 tokens, half-time 2 tokens, quarter-time 1 token. This same methodology can also be applied to Aragon DAC which has part-time contributors, compared to Aragon One who seems to be all full-time (and would get 4 tokens each person).

Also, since Nest grants are budgeted and planned quite specifically, the project manager of the grant can decide the “weight” per team member. If the other worry is that it will be difficult to track who remains active after the grant period, is that the teams need to publish quarterly updates of their progress to be able to hold onto their ACT token. This also provides a valuable data point for the ACT SRO to create proposals to burn ACT tokens for team members who don’t share transparency reports. Also another option is that the ACT tokens for non-Flock members all automatically burn after 6 months and that the Giveth platform has to be used to request ACT tokens again. (So for example Nest team starts January 2019, they get their first ACT tokens in June 2019, these ACT tokens burn in December 2019. In January 2020 they have to request the ACT tokens again and share proof for what they did from June-December 2019)

This provides the transparency paper trail and makes the user have to go through a hoop to retain voting power, which they should make the effort to report their contributions for the past 6 months. I think once you are putting stuff up in Giveth, one will feel a lot of guilt if they are lying and it will be hard to do that as they need to share proof of work etc.

jorge: jorge: Just to put some rough numbers, let’s say there are 60 ACT holders right now (actual figure should be close counting core team members, Nest grantees, advisors, etc.), a newly accepted Nest team with 4 full-time members would control ~6.25% ( 100 * 4 / (60 + 4) ) of the voting power, immediately upon receiving the grant. In order to have that voting power with ANT weighted voting, someone would need to have ~2,475,595 ANT. In regards to the ANT bonus Nest teams get upon successful delivery of the entire project, the governance power gotten with the proposed ACT is 2 orders of magnitude greater.

And if the worry is that they shouldn’t be granted it right away, perhaps it happens after 6 months of activity or after the completion of the work in the grant. As mentioned above, they would be able to maintain these ACT tokens assuming they continue the work post-Grant and publish transparency reports.

jorge: jorge: Also I personally disagree that a newly Aragon Nest grantee team member should get the same decision making power over the project than an individual who has been putting 50h work weeks for a year on the DAC or A1

But a very wealthy person who has only purchased ANT for speculative purposes, and it took them 5 minutes of time, should have the same decision making power as an individual who has been putting 50h work weeks and acquired the same amount of ANT via 2 years of work? This means more trust is placed in large bag holders than active community members. Also, aren’t the Aragon Network assets belonging to an Association, with a nonprofit nature, where voting is actually closer to one person, one vote traditionally? I know that is a bit opposite of DAOs, but I guess I don’t really know how one intends to classify ANT. Is it more equivalent to a “security” token or is it something so different that there is no way to classify, as it is a governance token of a DAO and regulation just hasn’t caught up?

How does one new Nest team with 6.25% voting power tip the dial in such a way, that you think it would be worse than a whale who may be trying to perform votes that can maybe result in the value of ANT going down because they have some short position on some exchange and access to journalists who will spread ANT FUD? For example, they acquire ANT and mess with all of the votes in the next cycle.Then they sell the ANT and hit up their dishonest journalist friends or FUDsters to spread stuff on reddit that “Aragon is broken”. I think some potential adversaries can be other DAO platforms, whether they exist today, or they are future ones… The competition exists both for user acquisition and for providing value in the token (as they both go hand in hand). I don’t think it’s going to be all kumbaya toward the DAO heavens.

The ACT proposal I have is actually somewhat similar to Z Cash’s Community Governance Panel, where people who weren’t even that active contributors of the community participated in voting in a one person, one vote manner. Maybe @light can share his experience.

I am personally fine with this starting off as a non-binding vote exercise. Once everyone else has the data, it will become more apparent if it can be a “trusted” model. If one starts now with attempting the system, it can be fine tuned, it can be made more lean. And it can be a weapon ready to deploy if plutocracy fails

jorge: jorge: Also I don’t think that active community members working on the project at one point in time are the stakeholders most incentivized on the long term project success in becoming self-sustaining (i.e. let’s triple everyone’s salary! ).

Well just like AGP-1 outlines different types of voting privileges per class, perhaps there can be certain things ACT members have the privilege of voting on. Yeah if Nest team members outnumber non-Nest team members, they probably shouldn’t be able to just increase the budget of the Nest program for example. One will want to do what they can to design the governance in such a way to mitigate conflicts of interest across the entire spectrum.

jorge: jorge: I think ACT voting could potentially make proposals (as the AA multisig currently can) that get voted on by ANT holders. Adding the ability for holders to delegate their vote, either to a liquid delegate or to a council member will also increase economic support of proposals and will solve some of the issues pointed out here.

I think any movement in the way in experimenting with ACT can be interesting to see! I think it should be pretty easy to just get it going and see what the voting results or proposals are like.