A game built around the factors of goals, Hernandez and Lewandowski were always going to be mentioned for their deadly conversation rate this season; that’s not how it executed. The biggest factor on the table was the Alonso red card, which adds another player to Bayern Munich’s ever-growing pot.

Bayern Munich were injury hit at the back meaning Bayern were going to have to alternate, especially building from deep. Guardiola’s biggest case today was the lack of first-choice centre-backs in Benetia, Boateng and Javi Martinez. How would he fill those reputed players and what would that mean for others’ positions? Juventus, which are battering everything that comes in their way right now is building towards a very scrumptious fixture between them and Bayern.

This week’s big news was that Guardiola has set his eyes on the Barclays Premier League, Manchester City, replacing Manuel Pellegrini. Some speculation has arisen around the players’ desires for Pep and how they would fare with the news?

Bayer Leverkusen are currently clawing their way towards a Champions League spot while riding into the game in good form and a steady defence, conceding 1 goal in 4 games (against Monchengladbach, Ingolstadt, Hoffenheim and Hannover).

Statistics (with the final third opening)

Expected Goals: A total of 1.3 expected goals were the outcome of the game, mostly coming from Lewandowski’s open opportunity in the second-half, regardless, the xG map illustrates that both teams struggled to open up a free man in the final third. If Robert Lewandowski was to get a shot off in the dying minute, this would have been a totally higher xG ratio, but misleading.

The final third opening:

(1) Robert Lewandowski (red) drops off to receive an inside pass by Phillip Lahm, therefore, pulling the young Jonathon Tah forward, progressing to David Alaba (light blue) who has noticed Leverkusen’s shape is far too shifted towards the right-side. Meanwhile, Muller already has Leverkusen players starting to isolate him. Leverkusen’s shape has jaded away, two of which have gone man-to-man (at the back) the central is highly zonal to stop Muller approaching the space for the meantime until Tah fills the gap, while the right-hand side is massively contrasting to the left side. (2) Alaba (light blue) progresses his run into the 18-yard box, Jonathon Tah fearing a pass to the byline loses the angle on Lewandowski (red). Muller has players occupied, readying for the Polish striker’s deep run. (3) Munich finally opens up a free man in the final third, for the first time and last time in the match, in the 92nd minute. (And yes the green circle on the advertising board is the ball coming into Robert Lewandowski).

Average formation/positons:

Leverkusen’s average shape illustrates their pressing and how they supported their first pushers. Tah (4) and Toprak (21) distance between midfielders shows they are very much acting as sweepers and looking to attack/press any balls that are lofted to the wings and/or central areas. Which worked a treat.

Bayern’s shape was very slotted, to be exact. Douglas Costa, Arjen Robben, and Kingsley Coman were very much exchanging often between due to their central areas. I expected Alonso to have taken up more of a centre-back splitting position during the game, very rarely did it happen.

Leverkusen’s pr essing shape stutters Munich – however – Bayern offer too many pressing triggers

Pressing normally gets praised for the number of times *team a* wins the ball off *team b* rather than isolating an opponent to swap outlets and making *team b* clear the ball at the wrong time. Leverkusen’s constant high shape with maturity made Munich stutter. Pep Guardiola will be highly disappointed with how many occasions his side volunteered a pressing trigger, this time, the byline favoured Roger Schmidt’s side.

Exhibit A:

(1) Pressing trap out wide has started cohesion. Stefan Kiessling (light blue) with Hakan Calhanoglu (light blue) press Xabi Alonso and Phillip Lahm (orange), forcing Lahm to pass backwards to Manuel Neuer. (2) Neuer (pink) takes one touch, and that one touch is a poor-poor pass that is bouncing, which indicates a pressing trigger for Leverkusen. (3) Holger Badstuber (orange) has no other option. Karim Bellarabi (dark red) is alert of Badstuber’s awkward situation. (4) Badstuber takes a touch backwards and pushes the ball wide or out for a throw-in, whatever he was attempting. (5) David Alaba receives the ball from Badstuber, also founding himself some room. Christoph Kramer (peach) is angling out a pass to Arturo Vidal (mauve) encouraging Alaba to push upfield. (6) Vidal runs down the line to be stopped by Tin Jedvaj – Bayer Leverkusen ends up winning a corner from this situation. This strictly indicates the quality of passing to switch play, effectively.

Exhibit B:

(1) Neuer (red) passes out to Kimmich (orange). Calhanoglu, Kiessling and Hernandez (light blue) begin their shape. (2) Kimmich passes out to Phillip Lahm (purple) who is already felt by the presence of Calhanoglu. (3) The pass is too weak to let it run across his body and understands he doesn’t have enough time to cushion the ball down the line or take a touch then proceed. The pressing trigger is given. (4) The ball is played back to Kimmich, space has opened up for Alonso now, but Kiessling (pink) was marking between Alonso (yellow) and Kimmich giving himself a fair press at whoever the ball was played towards. (5) Kiessling has pressed Kimmich into a poor first-touch, therefore finding himself panicking, then clearing upfield. Calhanoglu and Kampl (lime) are taking up extremely steady positions for Leverkusen – Lahm’s position is thoughtful for an inside pass into Alonso, chances are he would get angled out. The cutting midfield ball into Douglas Costa (black) is well and truly a risk take; the odds of the one pass into Alonso is dependent on Kiessling as well. An example of how some top teams like to go out and try to isolate holding midfielders man-to-man rather than the spaces in-between. Busquets is a fine example, plenty of sides believe they can take him away from the game by simply man-marking – wrong.

Exhibit C:

(1) Bayern Munich have beaten Bayer Leverkusen’s press now breaking via Kingsley Coman (red). Hakan Calhanoglu (light blue) has lost Arjen Robben (purple) by five yards (2) Coman is currently isolated and heavily guarded. (3) Somehow Coman unravels the ball centrally towards Arturo Vidal (pink), Vidal takes a glimpse as to what is coming and his outlets, Robert Lewandowski and Robben (purple). Calhanoglu instead of chasing shadows behind Robben he reads Vidal’s intentions, pressing trigger is situated. (4) Vidal attempts to let the ball run across him to find Calhanoglu slide in aggressively. (5) Calhanoglu retains possession back for Leverkusen and looks to go forward right away. (6) Calhanoglu illustrates a ball between full-back and centre-back for Hernandez (green), Neuer (yellow) steps up and sweeps the situation.

This pressing situation is far different to pressing towards defenders but how a wide player can come inside to stop a player’s thought process while a team breaks. Showing how a whole side presses all over the field, rather than just inside Bayern’s defensive third.

Exhibit D (Zonal):

(1) Xabi Alonso (red) distributes the ball wide as Leverkusen’s narrow midfield are closing off options. (2) Kingsley Coman (purple) clusters the ball as Tin Jedvaj (yellow) begins to press. Karim Bellarabi (pink) is cutting off any inside ball into Arturo Vidal (orange). (3) David Alaba (blue) receives possession from Coman and is faced by Bellarabi who is cutting off any sort of angles forward for him. (4) David Alaba plays back, achieving a full circle, back to Xabi Alonso. (5) Xabi Alonso plays into Phillip Lahm (green). (6) Lahm has no other option but to go back to Alonso or pace the ball further into Holger Badstuber. (7) Lahm opts with Alonso who jogs back with the ball to then deliver the ball to Manuel Neuer.

Leverkusen’s transition is drastic considering this entire play was a total of 17 seconds worth. Picture (1) shows a midfield line of four. Picture (2) presents the same midfield but a defensive three while the Jedvaj is between the lines. Picture (3), the formation is slightly messy at this point with two of the nine(outfield) players in view out wide, it’s a tad unbalanced centrally. Picture (4) displays a conversion into 3-4-2-1 with a midfield that has stretched more due to having three men in front of them. Picture (5), the bank of two become joint and press Xabi Alonso. Picture (6), Leverkusen convert into a 4-2-2-2 shape which ends up putting Bayern back to the beginning. No-one during this play presses with aggression due to there not being a pressing trigger established for Bayer Leverkusen, therefore, they zonally prepare for Bayern’s procedures.

Preparing shape for the second half:

(1) Leverkusen dash (red) to start off their second-half shape to follow proceedings from the first-half. (2) Kick-off is then followed to Toprak (light blue) who throws the ball forward never minding what happens with it. He ignores the options to direct play to the full-backs, they’re stretching the game nicely, though. (3) The ball flows through to Manuel Neuer who collects. (4) Leverkusen are already prepared for any short outlet in numbers – in the end, Neuer diverts to going direct. 20 seconds in and Leverkusen’s plan is setting, impressive.

Exhibit E:

(1) Holger Badstuber (red) prepares to take the free kick. Phillip Lahm (yellow) slots between the centre-backs instead of Xabi Alonso, pushing Joshua Kimmich (blue) wide. (2) As Kimmich obtains the ball, he’s closed down and cut off at all angles for any outlets by Stefan Kiessling (pink), Hakan Calhanoglu (purple) and Kevin Kampl (green) who is zonally marking the space between them. (3) Neuer takes charge and opts to go forward directly. (4) Jonathon Utah (black) claims possession. The pressing trigger is practically offered to Leverkusen, they take advantage.

The Hernandez and Lewandowski show?

With a low total of 52 touches (Lewandowski 34 – Hernandez 18) shared between them and the two superstars of the Bundesliga this season only managing 3 shots as well (Lewandowski 2 – Hernandez 1). It’s a little odd for non-Bundesliga viewers to tune in expecting this massive goal rush between two megastars this season to find that isn’t the factor, the fact they found was the game wasn’t coming towards the two, only a few occasions for Chicharito, who found himself in a strong, but non-playing position on 3 occasions:

(1) Javier Hernandez is in a great position to drive Bayern back with plenty of (deep) runners which could have created awesome variety for the final third. (2) Battling Badstuber for possession from an offside position. (3) Coming back from an unplayable position.

Along with Robert Lewandowski’s tendency of the ball getting snapped of him, on 5 different occurrences (one below), joint most with Kramer:

(1) Kimmich clears forward towards Lewandowski, Alaba (purple) is already in a steady position. (2) Lewandowski (red) brings the game to him, he’s insured with support from Douglas Costa (light blue) and David Alaba (purple). (3) Lewandowski binds his time with releasing the play where Munich are in a strong position to exploit Munich as Tah has stepped forward. Jedvaj’s (pink) and Toprak (orange) body positioning isn’t prepared for a counter. (4) The play turns over.

Build-ups in formations with progression/regression and neutral formation(s)

Bayern Munich’s set-up under Guardiola is always interesting, especially their transition from the defensive third to the final third. Leverkusen’s desire to not play around the back made their conversion more neglecting. Bayer Leverkusen only completed 24 passes that were aimed towards the defensive third.

Leverkusen’s beginning-to-end product

Starting (goal kicks):

As you can see the starting position from this goal kick is a far different scenario to Bayern’s, illustrating the quality difference, no disrespect to Leverkusen. The formation right here is practically identical to the average formation, shown earlier. For the majority of the time, I use goal kicks to find out a side’s neutral formation, rather than, believing formations on paper, which is mostly wrong due to transitions. Hernandez’s position (red) is waiting for Bayern Munich to drop and let the game towards him (and hopefully be forgotten about).

Defensive third:

Jonathan Tah (red) notices Kingsley Coman’s slip (yellow) and pushes the ball out wide towards Karim Bellarabi (blue). This was one of the few occasions Bayer Leverkusen’s played out from the back or around the back, normally reverting backwards (towards the goalkeeper) and going long. The thought of a ball like this is because of the threat of Bayern Munich off the ball and pressing Leverkusen, which is a no-no, meaning Bayer Leverkusen can push forward from Jonathan Tah’s pass.

Midfield third:

Rare occasion as Leverkusen construct their attack from this situation and being extremely direct, direct on the floor, that is. Each pass being forward from these positions followed by a turn. When Leverkusen did play backwards it would either, (1) end up being given away or a poor pass, example, to the wrong foot or an unsuitable weight for the receiver. (2) The play following all the way back towards the goalkeeper. It was extremely hard to solve a possible formation for Leverkusen in building up due to their direct play and their passes midfield passes mostly forming after goal kicks.

Final third:

Kevin Kampl (red) finds himself in a strong central position in the final third, but then again, he lacks options due to Bayern’s central structure. The only real option to break down Bayern is Wendell (yellow) – which is overhit. Leverkusen ends up getting their best chance all game turned down by a block. This was a rare occasion in the game as Leverkusen gained this position from build-up play rather than their other opportunities, which were pressing. Hakan Calhanoglu (blue) finds himself coming inside forming as a third striker to support Kiessling and Hernandez (orange). Similar to the average formation graphic showed earlier, it’s a 2-5-3 shape.

Throw-in set-up (defensively):

Leverkusen’s shape is a lot more complicated compared to Bayern. Overdoing Bayern in the wide area, (you’ll see soon). It’s a more aggressive style – Bayern being more composed zonally. Bellarabi (red) directing that he has Rafinha and Douglas Costa if the ball is played into them, prepared for pressing Bayern in a rough manner.

Bayern’s beginning-to-end product

Starting (goal kicks):

Badstuber (red) and Kimmich (red) have very much dropped extremely deep and wide, encouraging Leverkusen to step higher even more. Alonso has dropped more to bring more players narrower/deeper giving an effective direct ball out for Neuer/Kimmich/Badstuber. The line containing Alaba, Lahm and Vidal is an intriguing one (light blue) – Alaba/Lahm have enough space in their respected areas to find an inside option (Vidal/Alonso, so forth), but this depends too much on their comforting touch, Leverkusen’s presence and their teammates’ movement, definitely isn’t the correct pass to pick right away, though. From what we see, it’s a 2-1-3 starting position and the rest, well we can’t fucking see. (When on earth will they start using bird’s eye view cameras regularly).

Defensive third:

Xabi Alonso (red) splits apart Badstuber and Kimmich (orange) to receive possession from Neuer (pink) converting their on paper formation, four-one-four-one, to a, three-four-three. Also pushing Alaba & Douglas Costa (blue) forward instead of a backwards outlet for midfielders. At this time, Phillip Lahm (purple) is acting as the extra man in the banks of three, and understanding when to come inside as a full-back. Douglas Costa (blue) has now drifted behind Robben, taking up more of a right-back role. Leverkusen’s narrow midfield closes off inside passes to Vidal/Lahm, therefore, contriving Alonso to use Alaba as a direct ball – meaning Leverkusen can reshape with the time it takes the ball to travel.

Midfield third (build-up):

Phillip Lahm (red) has come inside as a holding midfield, forming a double-pivot with Xabi Alonso (yellow). Alonso has permission now to push into further space located around Lahm’s pressers, but Bayern’s overall shape ahead of them has barely moved, only Douglas Costa has come narrower as a number 10 and Muller dropping back. Sideways passes are on but nothing defensively cutting considering the room Alonso has ahead of him.

Final Third:

(1) Douglas Costa (red) passes the ball inside to David Alaba (blue) who has come inside as number ten showing Munich’s brilliant versatility and variety. Meanwhile, Thiago (purple) offers an outlet for Costa instead of Alonso offering a deeper/harder opening. (2) Alaba receives the ball (3) and flicks it through to Thomas Muller (pink) who has done his usual space investigation and found space between Leverkusen’s centre-backs thanks to David Alaba’s awareness. This happened in the 71st minute as Leverkusen’s press died off.

Throw-in set-up (defensively):

(1) Lewandowski as the lone striker – Coman and Douglas Costa create a line within themselves to angle Kampl & Kramer rather than man marking (goal side). Flat line of three containing Vidal, Alonso and Robben. (2) Before Alaba steps in and performs the interception, we have a strict pyramid shape; something that is nowhere near as common nowadays, especially in flat lines.

On The Side

As of late, you may or may not know that I have jumped ships – I’ve moved over to the Bundesliga side of life. I have found myself losing love for the Premier League, it isn’t anywhere near as good as it once was, sorry.

Therefore, I’ll be watching the Bundesliga regularly, unless Arsenal is playing. I will be looking to do analysis’ frequently to gain a faster knowledge on the league, overall. There’s no faster way to gather information on teams than exploring yourself. Expect these often, if not, hassle me.

Thanks for reading.

Bless, Jack.