Due to being ill in the past few days, I couldn't get to write a tactical preview or my usual in-depth post-match tactical analysis of the Basel game.



Here are some brief notes of the tactical highlights from the game:



· The initial tactical context of Basel’s 4-1-2-3 against Liverpool’s 4-2-1-3 would have suited the visitors more. This is because the team cancelled each other out due to the formation match-up, which is bound to favour the individually better team.



· After the early injury, Basel switched to 3-1-4-2. Now, certain tactical advantages in favour of Basel were clear. Given the presence of a back three, the home team found it easier to play out quickly and purposefully from the back, as Balotelli’s closing them down was not enough to stop them. This meant the midfield three had a freedom to push up and be more proactive with their movement. Serey Die (Basel’s deepest midfielder) started to roam forward, getting past Coutinho. Due to the Brazilian’s lack of defensive work-rate, Basel now had a 3-v-2 midfield advantage.



· Apart from the 3-v-2 midfield advantage, Basel managed to pin Liverpool down the flanks. The wing-backs (who both were natural wingers and in Gonzalez’s case even a player often deployed up front) received extra freedom to play higher up due to the cover of the back three plus the 3-v-2 midfield advantage. This and the fact Embolo (now playing alongside Streller as the second centre-forward) often drifted to the right, meant Liverpool’s left flank was targeted. As a result Enrique was pinned back (by Embolo) while Gonzalez’s attacking nature forced Sterling back. Meanwhile Streller’s presence occupied both Lovren and Skrtel, leaving space for others to run from deep and out wide to join him forward.



· So, not only Basel had the upper hand in terms of possession, but positionally they had advantages down the flanks and through the middle. However, apart from a couple well-constructed passing moves (mainly thanks to the 3-v-2 advantage in midfield and the static nature of Gerrard and Henderson), Basel struggled to fully exploit their advantages. They showed great enthusiasm and determination to work hard, but lacked that extra bit passing intelligence and clever movement to fully exploit their areas of strength.



· Liverpool’s starting formation, XI and approach was confusing. With the team’s already accumulated fatigue and the need to account for the WBA game (which is to come after only two full days for travelling back, rest and preparing), it was logical to see Liverpool reactive. The way they started the game suggested they would defend in two banks of four, waiting for chances to break forward. As the situation in the third minute (for the Sterling disallowed goal) showed, this was a viable strategy. However, the selected personnel was not suitable for this, as the front four were not the type of players to suit such a style. The main clash was the presence of both a #10 type of player (Coutinho) and a striker who is bound to drop deep and drift wide (Balotelli). The presence of such a centre-forward (to play the role of a target-man with the option to receive direct passes from deep, play with his back to the goal and open up space in the final third – things Balotelli generally did very well) meant extra need for runners coming from deep. However, apart from Sterling, neither Coutinho nor Markovic were capable to offer that. Similarly, the presence of a #10 as the player granted a free role ahead of the two banks of four, meant there was a need for a more mobile striker to work the channels and get in behind (Borini). Especially as it’s clear the opposition will boss possession and will push their whole team higher up, leaving that space in behind their backline.



· That clash of the chosen reactive strategy and the natural flaws of the selected personnel became clearer once Basel switched to 3-1-4-2 and started to dominate in terms of possession and territory. With Sterling forced back, Liverpool were deprived of their single counter-attacking outlet. That’s why it may have been sensible to place Sterling through the middle (as there was the more space, due to Serey Die often vacating his deep-lying position to join forward). With Markovic on the left to help out Enrique defensively, and Coutinho narrow on the right (as it was clear Basel didn’t favour that side at all, so there was a possibility to see Liverpool’s creative player used there and take advantage of the gaps).



· Coutinho and Balotelli played their individual roles well. Balotelli worked hard out of possession and seemed keen to drop deep and drift wide to receive the ball and hold it up while support arrived. Meanwhile The Brazilian seemed keen to drop deep and collect possession off the double pivot to link-up the play (something he struggled to provide in previous games), then turned forward and sprayed some great passes. But the lack of suitable movement ahead of him (Sterling forced back, so needed more time to get forward, giving Basel time to regroup; Balotelli dropping deep and drifting wide, not getting in behind; Markovic completely missing and not offering anything in terms of penetrative movement off the ball) meant his good individual play often came to nothing.



· Liverpool’s XI looked more suitable to be used with a proactive style of play. However, for this to happen the visitors needed to ensure they had the required pressing capabilities to win the ball back and ensure sustained possession. This, especially against a team expected to focus to make the game a fight, rather than a technical contest. But, due to their accumulated tiredness it was clear Liverpool would not be able to offer that particular aspect, meaning going with a reactive style was their only option. The problem was, as mentioned above, their personnel didn’t fit in with such a style.



· Once again the opposition took extra care to nullify Sterling. As in the Everton game, there were two players assigned to pay close attention to him. Once Basel moved to 3-1-4-2, Xhaka (now moved as the right-sided centre-back) and Gonzalez (the right wing-back) looked under instruction to double up on him. What helped the Basel duo to do so was Gonzalez’s sheer pace to keep up with Sterling, while Xhaka’s experience as full-back meant he was comfortable to move wide and engage with Sterling in case Gonzalez failed to track him back properly. In addition, Embolo looked keen to get goal-side of Enrique, meaning Liverpool’s left flank was often completely nullified.



· Still, for all their defensive and offensive advantages, Basel didn’t play well and were often lacking spark in attack, while they defence was often easily opened up. This is nothing new, as Basel struggled to convince with their domestic performances. Although the team is winning more often than not, the games are often full of defensive mistakes and poor attacking play. The team has 14 conceded goals from 10 games with only one clean sheet. The constant chopping and changing Paulo Sousa is doing in terms of formations (3-1-4-2, 3-4-2-1, 4-1-2-3, 4-2-3-1 all being used without any conviction) and personnel (the players used in several positions without any real continuity) led to huge critics from fans and media. Recently there was even a petition across the fan base pledging for Sousa to be sacked based on all these concerns.



· Liverpool didn’t need to play particularly well to create good attacking moves. But poor final passes and even poorer ball control often completely ruined these situations. The way Sterling wasted no less than four good attacks due to his poor first touch was the single clear sign he feels completely jaded and this finally starts to negatively impact his form and on-pitch skills.



· As the second half the game continued in the same manner – Basel dominating without threatening at all (bar the good passing move in the 51st minute which could have led to a penalty after Sterling’s challenge on Gonzalez – which illustrated how deep he was forced to play). Once Basel got ahead, they focused on ball-retention. The back three unit and the 3-v-2 midfield advantage meant they were comfortable to pass the ball around unchallenged (Liverpool couldn’t really press them) while also retaining a counter-attacking threat down the flanks (wing-backs surging forward) and up front (due to the 2-v-2 play of Embolo and Streller vs Lovren and Skrtel).



· Although Liverpool struggled to fight back and look for ways to be more proactive after conceding, Basel’s poor overall defensive play meant the visitors still had chances to create dangerous attacking moments. Sterling (three times) and Markovic both had good chances, but wasted them due to poor first touches.



· With Liverpool so lacking in attack – bar the situations Basel allowed them – it was strange to see Rodgers waiting so long to freshen up his team. When he finally did (in the 70th minute with Lallana), it was also strange to see him sub off his main creative spark Coutinho. Interestingly that sub also brought a change in the shape – from the previous 4-2-1-3 Liverpool went for a 4-1-2-3 with Lallana and Henderson now ahead of Gerrard. However, with Lallana being played deeper, arguably this was Rodgers’ way to try to free up Henderson to play higher.



· Lallana offered the missing energy, which rejuvenated Liverpool as a whole. He also played a key role in one of the better attacks Liverpool managed to create in the second half, sending Sterling through on goal – only for the winger to once again waste the situation due to a poor first touch.



· The move to a 4-diamond-2 formation seemed suitable, but once again Rodgers could be criticised for waiting too long to introduce it. With Basel defending in a 5-1-2-1 shape after the goal, it was clear Liverpool was too lightweight in attack, especially with Balotelli often vacating the centre-forward spot and the others not being able to compensate with a constant stream of reverse movement. Therefore, there was a need for more attacking bodies. The change to a 4-diamond-2 would have offered all of this as the front pair and three midfield runners through the middle, on paper, are capable to penetrate Basel through the middle while Enrique and Manquillo pushed up to stretch the play.



· The problem with the diamond formation though was two-fold. First, theoretically bringing in Lambert seemed unsuitable as he and Balotelli offered the same kind of off-the-ball movement. Borini would have offered more variety on that front, stretching Basel’s back three better. Second, although Lallana, Henderson and Sterling were all capable to offer the required surging runs off the ball (especially the latter two); they (apart from Lallana) lacked the energy to do that. Given their recent physical efforts, this was logical though. On top of this, giving this system less than ten minutes seemed simply not enough time.

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