For a long while, I have considered a striking analogy between the modern-day street fight and war; considering street fights to be a micro-level conflict in comparison to the macro-level concept that is war. Using this analogy, I attempt to show how this comparison may lead one towards a realist approach to just war theory. First, I will highlight a few key concepts in just war theory, and then construct the analogy between war and street fights. Following this, using examples from street fights, I will attempt to show how this gives rise to the realist view regarding just war theory – namely that jus in bello, or just conduct in war is a fraudulent concept.

War theorists are largely separated into three camps: realists, pacifists, and just war theorists. Realists argue that once war begins, there are no rules. Pacifists take the stance that no plausible theory of morality could justify war and the atrocities it entails. Just war theorists occupy a middle ground – they believe that there is some set of principles that outline that how war ought to be conducted that makes it morally permissible, but with certain actions being morally prohibited.

To construct the street fight-war analogy, consider first what is typically called something like a “code of honour” in street fights, this code usually includes some set similar to the following: no weapons, no “ganging up” on one party, and stop when the man is down – the goal of the fight is to win, not to kill or maim.

Next, consider the UN sanctioned list of war crimes, perhaps the easiest picture we have of commonly considered violations of “codes of war”:

Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict; Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated; Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; Employing poison or poisoned weapons; Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices; Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions; Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment

The first seems to be analogous to attacking an individual trying to break up a fight, the second the equivalent of pulling out a gun and firing when non-combatants are present, the third and fourth to the phenomenon of curb stomping (or something similar), the fifth to eighth to employing any type of weapon in a fist fight, and the ninth as any number of humiliating acts that occur post or intra-fight such as spitting, defecating, and urinating to name a few.

Assuming that jus ad bellum is satisfied in both cases – both the fight and the war have just causes on both sides – is there any reason to follow these codes of conduct? If both sides do indeed have a just cause for being in the conflict in the first place, is there any reason to restrict the methods they may take to victory? Further, is there sufficient coercive or persuasive measures in place to dissuade sides from breaking the codes of conduct?

The first question can be considered through the lens of the street fight – if the reason I engage in fisticuffs is to vindicate some just cause, why ought I be limited in my pursuit of this? The obvious answer is if the methods are more unjust than the cause it seeks to vindicate is just. This is subject to further analysis though, despite the perceived injustice of say, my using of brass knuckles in a fight, are there sufficient measures in place that assure me that my opposing combatant will not engage in the safe code-violating actions I seek to avoid? I perceive the answer to this to be no in both the street fight and war.

Consider a street fight between two gentlemen surrounded by a large crowd of onlookers. The fight starts out as what is perhaps the platonic ideal of fisticuffs, virtuous conduct on the part of both sides. However, at some point when an upper hand is gained by one side, the other side, in an attempt to even the odds, pulls out a shank. The odds are now clearly unfairly stacked in the favour of the violator of the code of conduct and being that these odds are similarly stacked between him and any onlooker who may seek to intervene, the incentive to interfere to restore justice is infinitesimally low. Thus, a predicament seems to follow – he who deserved to win the fight (in terms of ability according with the code of conduct, as well as acting in accordance with the code) is in a position to lose. As well, it does not seem as though any proactive action – perhaps pulling out his own shank – solves the issue, as he would likely be attacked before he could successfully do so. As such, it seems that the only possible solution would have been to not act in accordance with the code in the first place, with adherence to the code not being seen as a praiseworthy act, but rather a damning act on his fate.

Consider a contemporary case in war, Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War. Use of chemical weapons violates the aforementioned UN-sanctioned code of conduct in war, but has been met with relative lack of repercussions. At most the fallout from the act amounts to virtue-signalling on behalf of everyone else, as they condemn Assad’s actions but take no strong retaliatory action against it.

So, it seems as though the analogy holds – while it may be true that acts of war ought to be prohibited if they are most unjust than the presumably just cause the seek to vindicate, there exists a lack of prohibitionary measures to stop this and as such the refusal to engage in such conduct-violating warfare merely serves as a detriment to those who abide by the rules of war. Rather than ensure just combat on both sides, by adhering to jus in bello, the parties who are perhaps deserving of winning the engagement are unfairly disadvantaged. Since there appears no solution to solving the issue of coercion away from conduct-violation, the only solution is to abandon jus in bello in general. Wars are fought in order to vindicate a cause, and if one cannot be assured of mutual adherence to a pre-arranged standard of conduct, it is only a detriment to attempt to adhere unilaterally to such an agreement.