ACLEI's main operations consist of investigating instances of corruption arising from its own inquiries or referred to it either by agencies under its jurisdiction or by individuals. When an issue is referred to it, the commission assesses it to decide whether to investigate it and, if so, whether to investigate on its own or jointly with another agency (more than half of the investigations are conducted jointly). In 2016-17, according to its annual report, the commission worked on more than 100 investigations and was instrumental in five successful prosecutions. ACLEI is a small agency with a budget in 2016-17 of $10.8 million and about 47 full-time-equivalent staff. Though its budget grew steadily over the past decade, including significant increases to meet periodic extensions of its jurisdiction, its capacity is still constrained considering the extent of its jurisdiction. Setting priorities about what cases to pursue and what to turn down is therefore essential. On this point, the ANAO is particularly critical. It notes that, over the last five years, ACLEI accepted for investigation a growing proportion of issues referred to it, up from about 10 per cent in 2012-13 to over 50 per cent in 2016-17. Over the same time, the proportion of investigations begun but not concluded grew correspondingly (in 2016-17, the commission began investigations of 107 corruption issues but concluded only 14). Loading The obvious result, as the commission recognises, is that fewer resources are available for each investigation. The problem is compounded by a steady increase in the complexity of investigations and the sophistication of corrupt officers, factors that call for more, not fewer, resources per investigation. The commission is well aware of these problems of stretched resources and, as the ANAO acknowledges, has taken steps towards managing its caseload better. But, in the ANAO's view, more must be done to impose a more rational allocation of resources, which will bring its activities under better control. It suggests a "more structured" review process for individual investigations, including more formal assessments of potential risk and value in each case. It also proposes regular assessment of ongoing investigations to be triggered by pre-set times or milestones.

The commission, while generally accepting the report's tenor, baulked at some of the recommendations. One relates to performance information. The ANAO, consistent with its drive to make all agencies fully adopt the performance framework set out in the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act, deplores what it sees as ACLEI's lack of adequate performance measures to indicate whether it is operating efficiently in terms of outputs produced. ACLEI, in turn, is unrepentant, arguing there are no generally accepted measures of efficiency for policing and anti-corruption agencies. It even obtained an opinion to that effect from international consulting firm McKinsey & Company. (This tactic, incidentally, is a depressing indication of the spurious authority attributed to the big consulting firms, which charge large fees for opinions to order. Why should a small, beleaguered agency spend scarce funds on questionable support for an argument that could easily stand on its own merits?) Another issue of disagreement concerned the ANAO's view that ACLEI should benchmark its performance against that of other anti-corruption agencies. To demonstrate the value of such an approach, the ANAO itself conducted a brief comparison of ACLEI with four other Australian state-based agencies, including three public sector-wide anti-corruption agencies, in Victoria, NSW and Western Australia, and NSW's Law Enforcement Conduct Commission. Comparison over the last three years for which data are available indicate that ACLEI generally took longer over initial assessments (determining whether to proceed with an investigation), though it improved significantly in the last year. In terms of actual investigations, ACLEI has a much lower ratio of concluded investigations to commenced investigations, which suggests less efficiency. Law-enforcement and border agencies prefer ACLEI's light touch to that of an independent anti-corruption agency. In response, the commissioner, Michael Griffin, cast doubt on the comparisons' validity, pointing out that different anti-corruption agencies operate in different jurisdictions in different ways. "Complete isomorphism" between agencies that would allow unambiguous comparison was unlikely. The rebuttal was a straw-man knock-down, given the ANAO never suggested the comparisons were perfect nor that context was unimportant. One detects a whiff of the usual Canberra disdain for learning anything from analogous state and territory institutions. Making due allowance for the ANAO's zealotry over performance information, the overall impression is that ACLEI has been struggling unsuccessfully to keep abreast of the demands put upon it. Though this failure may be partly due to inefficiency in imposing priorities, some blame must also fall on successive governments for under-resourcing the agency while steadily increasing its jurisdiction. It is all very well to insist that ACLEI focus only on serious and systemic corruption, as its legislation requires. But without sufficient staff, even that goal becomes elusive. Though the ANAO explicitly avoids comment on the level of ACLEI's funding, it is hard not to draw the conclusion that resources are inadequate.