Wes Morriston, former professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, interacted with William Lane Craig of Reasonable Faith over the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Morriston brings up a few interesting challenges. I hope the answers will help you to appreciate the strength of the KCA.

Does Everything that Begins to Exist Have a Cause?

Morriston first focuses on the first premise of the argument regarding the need for a First Cause. He says that any discussion of God’s existing before the universe is nonsense because there could not be any “prior” to the existence of time. He writes, “What can it mean to say that ‘prior’ to the beginning of the universe God was outside of time?” [1] It is as if the theist wants to say that God created time before the Big Bang, which doesn’t make any sense. If time were a ruler, then the theist is left trying to measure to the left of zero. Since the theist can’t place God anywhere before the Big Bang, the theist can’t insist that God was the cause of the Big Bang. There simply is no time in which God could have done it.

Moving on, he says that apart from the creation of the universe, there would be nothing. The theist claims that this means there could be no “springing into existence” of the universe. The theist has failed to appreciate the concept of nothing, according to Morriston. “Nothing at all has no power at all, not even the power to prevent things from existing.” [2] In other words, if there was nothing before the Big Bang, then there was nothing to stop the Big Bang from happening. There would be no need for a First Cause because there was no barrier to entry for the universe.

It does seem like common sense that something can’t come from nothing, but Morriston points out that our common sense is based on our firsthand experiences in time. However, when we are talking about the beginning of the universe, we are talking about something very different. Time begins with the universe. Since we have never experienced anything like that before, our common sense of how things work in time can’t tell us how the beginning of time works. [3] Morriston clarifies his point elsewhere in saying that the difference is in the natural order. Our common sense draws on our experience, “…within a natural order that did not exist prior to the First Moment.” [4] In other words, no law-like regularities were governing how things worked. It is only because of our experience of nature’s laws that we would say that things do not come into existence on their own. We can’t rely on our common sense to tell us about the circumstances we have never experienced.

Even so, the theist’s position is undoubtedly no less absurd than the atheist’s, says Morriston. “After all, a house ‘popping into existence out of nowhere’ doesn’t seem any less absurd just because somebody says (or thinks), ‘Let there be a house where there was no house.'” [5] Since the theist has to claim that the universe was created out of literally nothing, he is in no position to criticize the atheist for saying that it came out of literally nothing. In this way, the theist’s argument doesn’t make theism more reasonable than atheism since both have to accept what seems absurd to us.

The conceivability of a universe from nothing is a sort of evidence for the atheist’s position. Morriston says, “Nevertheless, I believe that the ability to conceive something without apparent contradiction is evidence – albeit defeasible evidence – for its metaphysical possibility.” [6] So, the atheist is not without his own evidence for an atheistic account for the beginning. The theist can imagine God creating the universe. The atheist can imagine the universe coming into existence on its own.

In fact, Morriston brings his own common-sense principle to bear against the theist. He says that at least part of every cause has to precede its effect in time, which implies that the beginning of time cannot have had a cause. Morriston discusses a typical illustration used by theists to demonstrate that causes can be simultaneous with their effects, that of a man sitting in a cushion. The man’s backside creates a cavity in the pillow as he sits. The man sits, and the cavity forms at the same time. Morriston points out in this example that the man existed before sitting down, which serves to show, “At least part of the total cause of every event precedes it in time.” [7] A First Cause couldn’t exist since the beginning of time had no moment preceding it. Our common sense tells us that the First Cause would have to be before the beginning, which is impossible.

How would you respond? Do you think Morriston has defeated the Cosmological Argument? Hit the Follow button to receive future posts.

You can find my response to Wes Morriston’s critique Here.

[1] Wes Morriston, “Must The Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?: A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument” Faith and Philosophy 17:2 April 2000, pg 151.

[2] ibid, pg 153.

[3] ibid, pg 155.

[4] Wes Morriston, “Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument: Reply to Craig” Faith and Philosophy 119:2 April 2002, pg 235.

[5] Wes Morriston, “Must The Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?: A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument” Faith and Philosophy 17:2 April 2000, pg 155.

[6] ibid, pg 157.

[7] Wes Morriston, “Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument: Reply to Craig” Faith and Philosophy 119:2 April 2002, pg 240.