Proponents of Russia’s Nord Stream II pipeline rely on at least seven arguments to explain their support for the politically motivated project. The trouble is, these justifications are based on incorrect assumptions or outright disinformation. We identified the seven myths and then used publicly available facts to set the record straight.

Myth 3. Nord Stream II will not deepen Europe’s dependence on Russia. Both Ukraine’s gas transit system and Nord Stream II can coexist.



Reality: Fully controlled by Russia, Nord Stream II will eliminate Ukraine’s independent gas transit system. Both systems cannot coexist. Europe will become even more dependent on Russia.



If built, Nord Stream II will strip Ukraine of 55 bcm of transit flows, and Russia’s Turkstream pipeline under the Black Sea will divert another 30-40 bcm. Gazprom will prioritize its own pipelines, filling them as much as possible. Whatever peak demand remains uncovered occasionally, it will hardly be enough to financially justify preserving the necessary capacity in the Ukrainian system. If the system is not used on a regular basis, it will have to be severely downsized.



Gazprom’s recent record-high gas supplies to the European Union would not have been possible without the flexibility of the Ukrainian system. These pipelines are loaded near their maximum capacities, with stable and predictable flows. The chart below shows that the Nord Stream and Yamal pipelines are loaded near their maximum capacities, with stable and predictable flows. The Ukrainian gas transit system provides a more advanced service and flexibly covers all the residual demand from Europe, even when Gazprom has to shut down Nord Stream completely for maintenance and repairs.

If Nord Stream II is launched, Gazprom and its European clients will lose the exceptional flexibility and spare capacity of the Ukrainian system and will likely have to invest more in storing gas to cover emergency supplies and peak demand, which means increased consumer costs.



Myth 4. Nord Stream II will provide superior interrupted service and is a reasonable replacement for Ukraine’s system.



Reality: Ukraine’s gas transmission system is a sophisticated network of interconnected pipelines with excess capacity and dozens of compressor stations to ensure reliability and flexibility of transit. The Nord Stream II infrastructure—two unlinked offshore pipelines with just two compressor stations—is not a reasonable replacement.



To strip the issue down to its core, advocates of Nord Stream II assume the European Union would be better off sacrificing 146 billion cubic meters (bcm) of capacity in Ukraine’s network in exchange for two fragile, not interconnected offshore pipelines able to carry only 55 bcm.



Ukraine’s system is a highly flexible and robust mesh of pipelines and compressors, backed by Europe’s largest gas storage, which serves to balance swings in European gas demand.

Read the original text at Atlantic Council.