Questions Answered

In a comment to a below post, Seth asks these questions:

Ok Jon, so what's the explanation? Why is the UN Sec-Gen soft on Israel? Does the Israel lobby of the US dominate the UN too? Is he too scared of the US reaction? Seriously, he has nothing to lose by condemning Israeli aggression in the strongest terms he desires. So why is he holding back?

Here are some answers:

This is from a New York Times story from November 26, 1996. (Note that, according to Nexis, the Times didn't even bother to run a story on November 19, when the actual veto was cast.)

The Clinton Administration, which vows to prevent [Boutros] Boutros-Ghali from winning a second term [as Secretary-General], vetoed his candidacy in the Security Council last Tuesday and asked Africans to come up with other names, which they were expected to do by this week. If they do not, American diplomats say, Africa may lose the Secretary General's position to another continent. The United States has refused to name its own candidate, knowing that in the current mood here, that person would be rejected. American diplomats believe that Africans are less united behind their candidate than divided among themselves over an alternate. A number of Africans are known to be waiting in the wings for a call. Until Africa or another region makes a move, the 14 other Security Council members, all of whom voted against the United States and for Mr. Boutros-Ghali last week, are not in a position to change their preferences, diplomats say.

Here's more detail in a quote from Richard Clarke's book Against All Enemies:

Albright and I and a handful of others (Michael Sheehan, Jamie Rubin) had entered into a pact together in 1996 to oust Boutros-Ghali as Secretary-General of the United Nations, a secret plan we had called Operation Oriental Express, reflecting our hope that many nations would join us in doing in the UN head. In the end, the US had to do it alone (with its UN veto) and Sheehan and I had to prevent the president from giving in to pressure from world leaders and extending Boutros-Ghali's tenure, often by our racing to the Oval Office when we were alerted that a head of state was telephoning the president. In the end Clinton was impressed that we had managed not only to oust Boutros-Ghali but to have Kofi Annan selected to replace him.

And here's a great deal of detail, in an extremely informative column by Phyllis Bennis:

By the middle of 1996, as President Clinton's second election campaign was in full partisan swing, the administration known for its domestic priorities suddenly turned on the United Nations. Its target, on the 38th floor, was UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the pro-Western Egyptian whom even the staunchly reactionary Washington Times admitted "has done nearly all the US wanted - even if he squawked about it". Madeleine Albright, then ambassador to the UN, announced that she intended to veto Boutros-Ghali's expected second term in office. And Israel would play a key role. The campaign wasn't really about Boutros-Ghali, of course. Washington did not suddenly begin condemning the UN and halting UN dues payments in 1996 because they didn't like Boutros-Ghali. (It was during the Reagan administration, back in 1985, that Washington first refused to pay up.) Boutros-Ghali was merely a convenient scapegoat for an anti-UN crusade... The main parameters of the administration’s campaign were set quietly by State Department officials in early 1996...The State Department team quietly offered Boutros-Ghali a "deal", a one-year extension of a single term; he turned it down, but counter-offered that he would accept a two-and-a-half year "half term". Washington refused, and the battle was joined. Washington's support for Israel further shored up US determination to get rid of the secretary-general. Israel's August 1996 air assault in south Lebanon had targeted, among other things, a UN peacekeeping center at Qana, a small Lebanese village. Hundreds of refugees had taken shelter there from the bombardment. The Israeli attack killed more than 100 Lebanese civilians, and wounded several Fijian peacekeepers serving with the UN peacekeeping contingent in south Lebanon. The UN's report, issued some months later, documented the presence of an Israeli drone surveillance plane in the immediate area during the air strikes, rebutting Israel's claim that the Qana attack was an unfortunate accident because they never knew about the civilians sheltering in Qana. US diplomats worked hard to prevent the information from being released, but eventually Boutros-Ghali allowed the report to be made public. It was carefully edited, but unmistakably damning to Israeli claims. US officials were furious, and their anger at the secretary-general consolidated Albright's already intense anti-Boutros-Ghali campaign. Albright had also correctly recognized that no one ever lost points inside the Washington beltway by being too antagonistic towards the UN As ambassador to the institution Washington loved to hate she was best positioned to blame Boutros-Ghali for everything in the UN that Washington hated. She could orchestrate his downfall, claim credit for it, and reap her just reward –- appointment by a victorious Bill Clinton as secretary of state in his second administration. Her campaign was successful: Boutros-Ghali was forced out, Albright moved up the State Department ladder, and Kofi Annan was anointed UN secretary-general with Washington's blessing.

P.S.: This is not just a blug post. It is also a sophisticated psychological experiment.

—Jonathan Schwarz

Posted at December 29, 2008 11:18 PM

