Last week this column concluded with the following questions: “Whether or not Mr. Abadi proves magnanimous in his victory will say a lot about what kind of man Rex Tillerson and Brett McGurk have sided with…. Will Mr. Abadi and others in Baghdad feel sufficiently appeased by the surrender of the disputed territories, or will they decide to try and forcefully assert Baghdad’s authority in pre-2003 Kurdistan as well?”With numerous attacks now being reported on territory that the Iraqi constitution recognizes as indisputably part of the autonomous Kurdistan region, it seems that Baghdad and Iran chose the latter course of action. Iraq’s constitution forbids the entry of Iraqi military forces into Kurdistan without the approval of Kurdistani regional authorities, yet those forces now claim to be engaged in an offensive “to impose the law” in Kurdistan and “to reclaim Fishabur.”Fishabur and Ibrahim Khalil are the border crossings to Syria and Turkey, respectively, in a small strip of land where the borders of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey meet. The problem for Baghdad is that this small strip of land happens to be squarely within the recognized territory of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region of Iraq, preventing Baghdad from accessing the Turkish border without going through Iraqi Kurdistan. Baghdad wants to export oil to Turkey without going through Kurdistan. Baghdad would also like to prevent Iraqi Kurdistan from enjoying access to Syria – or more accurately, Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) on the other side.To send military forces and artillery to attack the Kurds and attempt to conquer their recognized autonomous areas flies in the face of Iraq’s constitution and every law currently on the books there, yet in Orwellian newspeak the Shiites describe this as “imposing the law.”After the peaceful retreat of Kurdish forces from the disputed territories last week, the Shiite authorities in Baghdad and Iran probably thought they could simply coerce the Kurds more and ignore the law, protests from Washington and Europe, and all semblance of decorum. The factions within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that apparently cut a side deal with Baghdad and Tehran last week and began the Kurdish retreat should have known that appeasement to such forces most often only whets their appetites for more.Now the Kurds in Iraq will have to choose between total subjugation – the loss of their autonomy, dignity and whatever rights they secured in post-Saddam Iraq – or a painful military campaign. Their retreat from disputed territories last week looked like an effort to avoid the painful armed conflict – an effort apparently conducted in vain given the triumphant and aggressive mood in Baghdad.Luckily, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) at least finally appears ready to pay whatever price is necessary to defend Kurdistan’s land and autonomy. The Shiite militias and Iraqi army units’ advance has at the time of this writing been blocked by the KDP’s Peshmerga, which inflicted substantial casualties north of Kirkuk and Mosul. The Shiites lost at least 2 M1A Abrams tanks, a dozen Humvees and other equipment the Americans so kindly and blindly provided them to ostensibly fight ISIS.This columnist also suspects that American acquiescence to Baghdad’s offensive last week only applied to disputed territories such as Kirkuk. If there remain any sane policymakers in Washington, the Americans will seek to intervene now before the situation escalates completely out of control. They can start by immediately ending arms transfers to Baghdad and its Iranian-controlled militias, while simultaneously providing the Kurds with better means to defend themselves. If necessary they can even, behind closed doors, threaten air strikes on the Shiite militias attacking Kurdistan proper. That should get Baghdad’s attention.Whatever the Americans do, the Kurds must also immediately consider counter-offensives to disrupt vulnerable Iraqi-Shiite supply lines and capture some of the American equipment the Shiite forces have turned against Iraqi Kurds. Historically, the greatest source of armaments for any insurgency has been the military forces of the opposing government. ISIS certainly knew this when it captured Mosul in June 2014. A robust defense and a few successful counter-offensives would likely do more to bring Prime Minister Abadi to the negotiating table than any plaintive requests or reminders about the constitution or Iraq. Such successes might even restore the morale of Kurdistanis after last week’s ignominious retreats.David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.

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