The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates is a book about the formation of the United States government and the arguments against its foundational document by Ralph Ketcham. Ketcham wrote the introduction, but the book proper consists of materials from 1787–88 that were written and published during and immediately after the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.

The introduction explains the context in which the Constitution (printed in Appendix II, except for the 27th Amendment, which was adopted after this book’s printing) was developed, beginning with the period between the Stamp Act and the Declaration of Independence (1765–76). The rejection of almost all of the old forms of authority and tradition, already weak in the New World, required a period of synthesis of new thought, and the decade after independence provided much empirical data on what seemed to work. Ketcham describes some of these experiments in the former colonies, then explains what the Founders meant by monarchy, republicanism, and democracy, whose usages have changed somewhat since the 1780s. He then discusses the difficulties faced by the Founders in not being able to work with the checks and balances that existed in traditional feudal institutions like lords and bishops. Differences between regions of the United States are then discussed, as they would shape many of the internal conflicts during the first century of the nation. Ketcham notes that the political community of the time was restricted to landowning white men and certainly did not include slaves, which would remain a point of contention until it was resolved by war in 1865. The Articles of Confederation (printed in Appendix I) are discussed next, and it was their perceived shortcomings that led to calls for a convention to modify them.

With the stage set for the Constitutional Convention, Ketcham previews the content of the book; first the Constitutional Convention debates, then the efforts to ratify the Constitution. The Federalist Papers were written as part of this effort, and the Anti-Federalist Papers, the subject of the book, were written in response and rebuttal to them. Ketcham concludes the main part of his introduction by summarizing federalist and anti-federalist thought. A few short sections following this explain the arrangement, use, and editing of the documents, the chronology of events from when the Articles of Confederation became effective (Mar. 1, 1781) to when the Bill of Rights became effective (Nov. 3, 1791), and a table that matches each issue with the best-regarded Federalist and Anti-Federalist writings that address them.

The Constitutional Convention Debates

The first half of the book takes the reader through the Constitutional Convention debates from May to September 1787, although it begins with a letter sent from James Madison to George Washington in April. Here, one encounters a wide range of ideas and proposals for the federal government, some of which were regrettably rejected and others of which would be unthinkable today. The reader sees from the beginning that the delegation from Virginia subverted the proceedings from the beginning, choosing to go beyond their charge of amending the Articles of Confederation by forming an entirely new constitution. Indeed, there were some who sought to eliminate the state governments in favor of a strong national government, and others who would grant Congress the power to nullify state laws.

In the debates on representation, one finds a more classically republican and aristocratic attitude than may be found in contemporary politics, with open hostility to the idea of involving the masses in affairs of state expressed by many delegates. Others found it necessary to have at least the lower house of the legislature elected by the people, but more for a sense of identification with the government than for attempting to empower the masses. The enormous effort put into determining a proper number of representatives stands out. The cynicism of some of the delegates concerning what politicians will do with power and which interests will be pursued is admirable and sadly lacking today. One finds that concern that monied interests would hold sway over affairs of state was as common then as it is now. The need for good people to constitute a good government was also well-recognized, but the Founders were wearing rose-colored Enlightenment glasses on this subject.

The discussions on the executive branch led to a wide range of proposals, as the recent experiences of the Founders had given them pause about creating a strong executive and there was no clear historical precedent. Had another course been taken, there might now be three or more Presidents of the United States serving at one time. Perhaps the President(s) might receive no salary, or might have no duties other than appointing officers and enforcing laws. Term limits for the President (later codified in the 22nd Amendment) were seriously considered. Choosing the President out of the Congress, as is done in most other democratic and republican systems, was almost adopted and only changed toward the end of the Convention, which would have produced vastly different results than have occurred. Interestingly, a term limit was viewed by some as a check on the legislature if it should appoint the President. Once again, antipathy toward mass democracy among the delegates is evident, but so is support for majority rule in some less direct sense. The Electoral College system was finally devised as an attempt to reconcile the various positions on the election of the executive.

The consideration of the judiciary, which led into a broader discussion on separation of powers, is perhaps the most interesting part of the Constitutional Convention, for no one there seemed to understand how this branch might become the most powerful, as it undoubtedly has. Such concerns were frequently voiced of the legislative and executive branches. Instead, consideration was given to making judges part of the executive veto power. Though the judges were ultimately not given such power, they granted it to themselves in Marbury v. Madison (1803), and this discussion may help one understand why there was so little resistance to this. The debate over how they might be appointed is one of the most balanced in the book.

The disarray between advocates of the Virginia Plan and the less centralized New Jersey Plan illustrates another facet of politics that remains the same: chaos provides an opening for radicals, in this case Alexander Hamilton, who proposed a far more expansive federal government. Though the rest of the convention gave this little attention, our current state of affairs looks more like Hamilton’s vision than anyone else’s. That there was a near-consensus on the danger of state governments encroaching on the federal government and not vice versa seems quaint in hindsight.

On the subjects of suffrage, immigration, and citizenship, the reader will find debate over what it means to have a stake in society, but the rejection of universal suffrage could not be more clear. Unfortunately, the idea that one should pay taxes, own property, or otherwise have some attachment to a community and its government in order to have a representation in that government has since been lost as anything more than a formality. However, the skepticism of outsiders and cautiousness of their attachment to their former lands possessed by some of the Founders, especially as pertains to high-ranking government officials, remains with us to our benefit.

The contradictions inherent in an attempt to secure liberty in a land with many slaves were well-understood by the Founders. A realization that the issue must someday come to a head seemed obvious to many, but it was left unresolved at the time for the purpose of establishing the new government, as it was the final point of contention before signing. This is the origin of the clauses ending slave importation in 1808.

The first half concludes with the objections of three delegates, formalized by George Mason, many of which inform the Anti-Federalist Papers, as well as the signing of the Constitution by all except those three.

The Anti-Federalist Papers

The second half of the book covers the effort to ratify the Constitution, mostly from the anti-federalist side. The sole exception is James Wilson’s speech advocating ratification, which begins the section and presents the general case that the anti-federalists would argue against. Wilson’s naïvete as to the natural tendencies of Power in the majuscule Jouvenelian sense is astounding given the events that have transpired between his time and ours, but the ideals of the Enlightenment clouded the judgment of many, and Wilson lacked the benefit of our hindsight.

The selection of Anti-Federalist Papers begins with the first two essays by John DeWitt, whose real identity is unknown. These stand against Federalist Nos. 1–6 and 84. In the first, he urges caution against those who wish to adopt the Constitution hastily and restraint upon passions and fearmongering. The second warns that the Constitution will be difficult to amend if it should be faulty, then proceeds into the same kind of Hobbesian view of societal formation that was common among federalists.

Patrick Henry is best known for his declaration “Give me liberty, or give me death!” made during the Revolution, but he later became a prominent anti-federalist. He argued against ratification at the Virginia Ratifying Convention on June 5 and 7, 1788. In the first speech, Henry made many of the same arguments as DeWitt, but also noted how Madison played high-low versus middle to empower the federal government in the name of the people against the state governments. He then discussed at length the dangers of standing armies and letting the federal government have charge over the militia. In the second speech, Henry spoke against the fearmongering of some Federalists, then explained how one state could be oppressed by the others should it not acquiesce to their demands. After this, he warned of the dangers of tyrannical monarchy that he thought the Constitution would produce. These arguments are opposed by Federalist Nos. 1, 14, and 15.

Perhaps the best-known legacy of the Anti-Federalists is the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution, added to secure support from enough of them to avoid discord under the new system. Their proposals from various state ratifying conventions are included. A few of these became part of the Bill of Rights almost word-for-word, while others would have greatly altered the course of American history. Imagine, for instance, if the federal government had to ask the states for money if it could not fund all of its expenditures from tariffs, or if a two-thirds majority were necessary to pass laws regulating commerce or adding to the national debt.

Samuel Bryan, a Pennsylvania anti-federalist better known by his pen name Centinel, wrote eighteen papers, but only the first, on the subject of free and responsible government, is included in this book. He argues that the liberties and rights guaranteed under the Pennsylvania Constitution would not be secure under the new federal government. He then contends that the proposed system of checks and balances would fail, if for no other reason than that natural human inequality would result in one branch eventually being in the hands of more capable people than the others. Much like Henry, he argues that the federal government would trample the state governments, but shows more concern about the power of the judiciary than any of the aforementioned anti-federalists. Bryan concludes by sharing many of the concerns expressed in DeWitt III, though he primarily opposes Federalist Nos. 10 and 51.

The Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention voted to ratify on December 12, 1787 by a 46–23 margin. Most of the dissenters signed onto a widely-published address that explained their anti-federalism, which is the most verbose single anti-federalist document in the book, offering rebuttal to Federalist Nos. 10, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 45, and 84. The address, the authorship of which was claimed by Bryan of the Centinel papers, contains his description of events leading up to the Constitutional Convention. He then offers the Pennsylvania Minority’s proposed constitutional amendments, which were rejected, motivating them to vote against ratification. The three general reasons for dissent given by Bryan are common to most anti-federalist writers: that a large territory cannot have unified government and liberty except by localizing government as much as possible, that the federal government will tend to swallow up the state governments, and that the design of the Constitution would necessarily produce despotism. He criticizes the proposed representation, then spends more time addressing the right of trial by jury than most anti-federalist writers. The danger of allowing the Senate so much power, especially with regard to treaties, is discussed next. Bryan concludes by warning of the dangers of the powers of taxation and of standing armies.

The Federal Farmer, whose real identity is thought to be Melancton Smith, wrote the next two essays in the book, though he authored eighteen in total. His first essay sets the stage for his examination of the Constitution. Unlike some other anti-federalists, Farmer believed that a stronger government was necessary; just not the one proposed by the Constitution. In the second, Farmer argues that the benefits of government will collect around Washington, D.C. to the detriment of the rest of the country, much as they have. Like other anti-federalists, he believed that the federal government would either annihilate the state governments or hollow out their powers, primarily by its ability to collect taxes. The Farmer essays presented here are light on substance compared to the other authors, but offer some counterargument to Federalist Nos. 8, 10, 14, 35, and 36.

Ketcham includes more papers from Brutus, whose real identity was thought to be New York judge Robert Yates at the time of publishing but is now thought to be either Melancton Smith or John Williams, in this book than from any other Anti-Federalist author, as it is he who most directly responded to the Federalist Papers. His first essay rebuts Federalist No. 10, arguing that the powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution would eventually render the state governments ineffective, then makes the case that this will be destructive to liberty. The content is similar to that of Patrick Henry on the militia and standing armies, and resembles the Pennsylvania Minority on most other subjects. He takes particular aim at Article I, Sections 6 and 8 as granting Congress arbitrary power. These themes are continued in the sixth Brutus essay, which counters Federalist Nos. 23 and 30–36. Here, he contends that the federal government’s taxing powers will override the ability of the several states to gain revenue for their operations. Interestingly, he refers to the chief tax collector as the “farmer general,” and notes the conflict of interest inherent in letting the federal judiciary decide whether the federal government is behaving appropriately. The probing nature of tax policies into the private economic affairs of the people is discussed briefly. Brutus then foresees how those who wish to grow the state would twist the words of the Constitution to suit their purposes. The tenth Brutus essay, responding to Federalist Nos. 24–29, speaks to the dangers of standing armies, using the historical cases of Julius Caesar and Oliver Cromwell. Little else is said here that has not appeared earlier in the book. Brutus XI, XII, and XV, set against Federalist Nos. 78–83, are perhaps the most important part of this book, given how American history has unfolded. These argue that the federal judiciary holds the real power in the United States government, for their decisions are the most difficult to overturn, their members are less accountable to the people or anyone else than the legislature or the executive, and their rulings will shape the development of powers in the other two branches. A comparison is made to the British system, in which the House of Lords may set aside an errant judgment from the high court. Again, Brutus notes how those in power will interpret any limitations upon them as to give them legitimacy to carry out their purposes. These three essays seem prophetic in hindsight, except for the failure of Brutus to see the role of the imperial presidency, focusing instead on the legislature and judiciary as means of expansive tyranny.

DeWitt’s third essay, a counter to Federalist Nos. 23 and 49, defends freedom of the press, then warns of the seeds of imperialism sown in the Constitution. He also argues that the proposed checks and balances will be ineffective, instead resulting in a House incapable of contending with the Senate and the President. He concludes by critiquing the proposed method of representation of the people in the House.

The fifth and seventh essays by Cato, whose real identity is unknown but believed by some to be New York governor George Clinton, are rather weak, and their positioning between two groups of strong Brutus essays does them no favors. The fifth letter argues against the executive power defended in Federalist No. 67, making the case that the Senate has too much executive function and that the construction of the executive will tend toward monarchy or aristocracy. The seventh, opposed to Federalist No. 59, argues that a conflict of interest exists in that the Senate tries impeachments of the executive who acts in concert with them, thus making them judges of their own advice and consent. Cato shares Brutus’s concern with federal interference in elections.

The fourth and sixteenth Brutus essays deal with representation and accountability, opposing Federalist Nos. 52–57, 62, and 63. He argues that the representation is insufficient and unequal due to the small number of representatives, which will harm public confidence in government. But the concern that Congress might separate itself from the people by altering the manner of elections so as to destroy them has proven ill-founded. In the final essay, he argues for accountability to a superior power for every powerful office, then endeavors to show that the proposed Senate and judiciary are deficient in this manner. The efficacy of his proposed remedy of term limits is debatable at best.

The final entry is a selection of speeches delivered by Melancton Smith to the New York Ratifying Convention from June 20–27, 1788. By this time, the Constitution had been ratified by enough states to take effect, so this may be seen as the final statement of the anti-federalist position in the debate over ratification. After this, the anti-federalists would evolve into other forms within American politics. Smith argued on June 20 that the representation offered by the Constitution was unjust and inadequate, but maintained that slaves should have no representation. On the 21st, he expressed the standard that the legislature should resemble those it is supposed to represent, then made the case that the House would never meet that standard. He predicted that the government would be filled with the natural aristocracy unless a great man or unprincipled demagogue would unite the people, which some people may now find prophetic. Smith sought a government that allowed a mixture of elites and middle-class people into positions of power so as to have elite wisdom and motivation while checking their worst impulses. He spoke briefly on June 23 in response to mischaracterizations of his argument. Smith’s speech on the 25th supported a proposed constitutional amendment to keep senators from serving consecutive terms and subject them to recall by their state legislatures. He then echoed the concerns of other anti-federalists about federal encroachment into local affairs and finished by predicting well the bribery and corruption common in Washington. Finally, on June 27, Smith warned of the ignorance that senators from one state would have of local issues in faraway parts of the nation.

Unfortunately, the book contains only some of the Anti-Federalist Papers; the reader who seeks a fuller experience must look elsewhere, such as The Complete Anti-Federalist compiled by Herbert J. Storing and Murray Dry. The content can become repetitive, as some concerns were shared and written about by many anti-federalists. A reactionary will be given pause by some of the Enlightenment idealism, and there are some problems with the American political system that no one on either side of the ratification debate predicted, such as the two-party stranglehold. Even so, the essays presented here offer a strong rebuke to the Constitution that occasionally borders on prescience with regard to issues that have plagued American politics from then until now.

Rating: 4/5

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