“In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq.” Thus says the foreward of the monograph that is available from the Strategic Studies Institute of the the U.S. Army War College.

Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, February 2003, by Dr. Conrad C. Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill.

There is an excerpt and a bit more about the authors at:

The Army Monograph that Predicted Just About Everything that’s Happened in Iraq, History News Network, March 10, 2008.

From the foreward of the monograph:

In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism. The Strategic Studies Institute organized an interdisciplinary team under the leadership of Dr. Conrad C. Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. The team’s initial findings were vetted at a joint and interagency workshop conducted in December. The final report of the project consists of three parts: a discussion of historical insights from 20th century postwar occupations and post-conflict operations; an analysis of the unique challenges Iraq will present for an occupying power; and a mission matrix that lists 135 specific tasks that must be performed to build and sustain a state. The matrix arrays those tasks across four phases of occupation and designates whether coalition military forces or civilian agencies should perform them.

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