Fundamentally, nuclear arms present a security threat to the United States, its allies, and the world. And, as even Trump has made clear in his pursuit of denuclearization in North Korea, there is broad agreement that a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy must be to strive for limits on nuclear arms.

Withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty is at odds with that goal.

That, however, is exactly what the United States is doing. In a statement released Friday, President Trump explained:



Tomorrow, the United States will suspend its obligations under the INF Treaty and begin the process of withdrawing from the INF Treaty, which will be completed in 6 months unless Russia comes back into compliance by destroying all of its violating missiles, launchers, and associated equipment.



The INF treaty, originally signed in 1987 by former President Ronald Reagan and then-USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev, bans nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers — eliminating an entire class of weapons.

The limit on intermediate range missiles is especially important, as without a ban, Russia could have access to weapons that would be capable of hitting European targets without also threatening the U.S. That would de-link European and U.S. security, which could be used to split the NATO alliance — a key bulwark against Russian aggression.

The impetus for U.S. withdraw is a Russian missile that Washington alleges is out of compliance with the treaty.

Since 2014, the U.S. has made clear to Russia that its 9M729 missile, which it tested at ranges within INF restrictions, violates the provisions of the INF treaty. Those tests are clearly troubling, but they are strategically insignificant. Russia has only deployed a small number of those missiles that would do little to augment its ability to target Europe. (For comparison, the INF treaty led to the destruction of 2,692 missiles based in Europe. At most, Russia has deployed fewer than 100 of its disputed missiles, which existing NATO forces can easily counter.)

Russia's restraint is likely born out of concern for the INF treaty. By withdrawing, the U.S. is wiping out the impetus for those limits. This may result in the deployment and development of more missiles, perhaps even greater than pre-treaty levels, heightening the nuclear threat and sparking a new, costly arms race.

Worse, by simply leaving the agreement without plans for a replacement, the U.S. gives up established diplomatic channels for negotiations and its ability to impose legal and political pressure on Moscow. Meanwhile, Moscow can blame the U.S. for killing the agreement.

None of that helps cut the number of nuclear weapons, protects our European allies nor addresses other security threats such as China's development of midrange missiles. Indeed, to address those concerns the U.S. needs exactly type of arms control agreements that it is so eager to scrap — an approach that does not bode well for future deal making with, for example, increasingly aggressive Beijing.

Withdrawal from the treaty is a misguided move and a bad deal. The U.S. loses considerable influence and costs its allies key protections for negligible gains. Arms control treaties, like all diplomatic relations, require work and continued negotiations. The INF is no different. By leaving, seemingly simply to look "tough" on Russia, the U.S. is giving up on the hard work of limiting nuclear arms.

After all, the treaty itself was not the goal of U.S. policy but mitigating threats against Europe and limiting nuclear arms. Leaving furthers neither objective.