The book is a good starting point for anyone wanting to learn about Southeast Asia in general and the ASEAN in particular. The short chapters on the four waves of cultural influence and pen sketches of each of the 10 member states are helpful in situating the context in which ASEAN operates.

Mahbubani and Sng make three major claims in support of the ASEAN ‘miracle’. One, no two ASEAN states have gone to war with each other since the organisation’s founding in 1967. Hence, ASEAN has successfully delivered peace. Two, what was once a impoverished region has undergone an economic transformation. So, ASEAN has delivered economic prosperity. And three, ASEAN has defied the ‘clash of civilisations’ logic by demonstrating that different worldviews can cooperate peacefully within a single regional framework.

The chapter on ASEAN and the Great Powers is the most interesting part of the book. The authors trace the trajectory of relations between ASEAN and the US, China, India, Japan, and EU. They acknowledge the pivotal role played by the US in guiding ASEAN, especially during the Cold War. At the same time, they argue that the US often takes a myopic view of ASEAN as merely a ‘valuable geopolitical asset’. India’s engagement with ASEAN is welcomed. One line summarises the urgency in involving India — “If the China-US rivalry intensifies, the only power that can provide ASEAN with a geopolitical buffer is India”.

The section on China is overly generous, perhaps intentionally so. The authors surprisingly concede that ASEAN is China’s ‘geopolitical backyard’ and insist on referring to China’s economic story as that of ‘peaceful re-emergence’. In the process, they downplay China’s hostile actions in the South China Sea towards individual nation-states, choosing to use these words: ‘it would be a mistake for any of the ASEAN countries to allow bilateral interests to determine the future of the ASEAN-China relationship. Instead, that should be based on an enlightened calculation of ASEAN’s long-term interests as a group via-a-vis China.’ Why all ASEAN members, especially the ones most threatened by China will heed to this sanctimonious advice is not very clear though.

The success of most Southeast Asian nations in delivering prosperity to their citizens is indeed laudable and needs to be celebrated. But in their enthusiasm to project ASEAN as a contender for Nobel Peace Prize, the authors commit two mistakes.

One, they overestimate the contribution of ASEAN as an organisation for successes while they pin the blame on individual members for failures. For example, while ASEAN is credited for its role in getting Myanmar to accept foreign aid following Cyclone Nargis, no justification is provided for ASEAN’s rather unspectacular role in the Rohingya genocide perpetrated by the government forces of an ASEAN member state.

Two, the authors’ claim that ‘ASEAN’s strength can be found in its weakness’ ignores the logic of international relations where power is the only currency. Even if the assumption that ‘many great powers have a vested interest in keeping the ASEAN going’ is assumed to be true, it doesn’t hide the fact that ASEAN remains a permanent hostage to the prevailing great power framework of the day. As the authors themselves acknowledge, if US and China relations worsen, ASEAN would find it extremely difficult to remain as one unit. This structural weakness where the existence of a regional organisation depends most not on its constituents but on external actors constraints ASEAN’s options severely.

Over the next two decades, this structural weakness means that ASEAN is disproportionately dependent on China’s attitude towards it. For India, this implies that ASEAN as a whole is unlikely to be a steady partner in countering China’s arrogant power play. For this purpose, India will have to rely on bilateral partnerships with specific ASEAN members. However, the prospect of collaboration between ASEAN and India is much brighter on the economic front. With US backing off and China’s credibility run down, ASEAN and India have the opportunity to jointly champion the cause of globalisation. All in all, the upcoming visit of the ASEAN heads of state to India is a welcome move.

In the last chapter, the authors highlight that the ASEAN project currently receive focus only at the level of governments. And this project to survive, they contend that an ASEAN identity needs to be imbibed by the people of ASEAN. This book is one such attempt to create this ASEAN identity and should be treated as such. To take the authors’ own analogy forward, the regional organisation is might well remain a ‘catalyst’ for peace but is unlikely to become an active ‘reactant’ that will shape the major world ordering decisions.