Ukraine conflict reaches the Caucasus

Broken columns, damaged balustrades, fallen statues and faded mosaics are everywhere — proof that Abkhazia was once part of a great empire. Only the empire in question is not Greek or Roman, but a Soviet one. Structures in the architectural style of socialist classicism that Stalin favoured dominate. For years Abkhazia’s ideal location on the Black Sea made it the preferred holiday destination for every combine-worker and kolkhoz-farmer from the 15 Soviet republics.

Abkhazia has been de facto independent since a devastating war with Georgia in 1992-3 — a conflict that arose from the breakup of the USSR in 1991. The scale of the fighting is clear from many houses in the capital Sukhum, where bullet-holes still cover the walls. Apart from the thousands who died, there was widespread destruction of infrastructure, buildings and equipment; and the majority of the 240,000 Kartvelians (Mingrelians, Georgians, Svans) in the territory fled. The government in Tbilisi has never — like most UN members — recognized Abkhasia’s independence and wants to have the territory back under Georgian control.

Since 1921, different constitutions had defined Abkhazian autonomy in association with the Georgian Soviet Republic. This was unilaterally cancelled by the Georgians in March 1990, in the chaotic period when the Soviet Union fell apart and Georgia became an independent country. The move ignored the interests and wishes of the Abkhazians, leaving them without their own constitutional status, and they considered it a quasi-colonial annexation (1). Two years later their worst fears came true, when the Georgian government backed its decision by sending forces to Sukhum to secure control of the area, which covers 8,600 square kilometres (roughly the size of Corsica).

Largely owing to Stalin’s settlement policy, the Abkhazians had become a minority in the territory. In 1989, 45.7% of them were considered to be ’Georgians’, most of them of Mingrelian descent, and 17.8% to be Abkhazians. Russians were 14.3%; Armenians 14.6%; Greeks 2.8%; and Ukrainians 2.2%. A small Estonian minority also lived in the territory, as shown in the 2013 award-winning Tangerines, an anti-war movie by Georgian director Zaza Urushadze about the 1992-3 fighting in Abkhazia. Mainly because of the Georgian exodus, Abkhazia has seen its post-war population shrink from 525,000 in 1989 to around 241,000 in 2011 (2): Abkhazians are now the majority, though there is still much ethnic diversity.

This corner of the Caucasus was largely forgotten until August 2008 when the Five Day War between Georgia and Russia erupted, over another territory where Tbilisi claims supremacy — South Ossetia. The conflict greatly soured relations between the West and Russia; and is seen as a run-up to the war in the Donbass six years later. Professor of Russian and European politics Richard Sakwa called it Russia’s ‘first war to Stop NATO expansion’ (3) — the fighting in Eastern Ukraine is the second — and it seriously changed the balance of power in the region by questioning the West’s ability and will to make Georgia a member of the Atlantic Pact.

A further result of the August war was that Russia recognized Abkhazia’s — and South Ossetia’s — independence. The move was condemned in western capitals as a violation of international law, although six months earlier the EU and US had themselves recognized Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. Russia unilaterally lifted international sanctions against Abkhazia that had destroyed its trade and vital tourist industry. Since then, Abkhaz relations with its large northern neighbour have been very strong and its presence in Abkhazia is felt widely, not least through a large contingent of Russian soldiers stationed there. In Sukhum and Moscow, they are viewed as peacekeepers. In Tbilis, they are considered an occupying force on Georgian territory. Moscow issues Russian passports to Abkhazians, who need them for travelling since their own documents are not recognized abroad; the elderly need Russian passports to receive pensions from Moscow. It is believed that more than half the Abkhazians now hold Russian passports; and the currency is the Russian rouble. Abkhazia has is own native language, but Russian is widely spoken. The country’s most important trade partner by far is Russia, with Turkey in second place. In the first six months of 2014, more than a million Russian tourists visited Abkhazia (4). The small republic has fertile lands and grows agricultural products, including tea, tobacco, wine and fruits.

The fact that Russo-western relations are now deteriorating even further over Ukraine, and the EU and US have effectively turned their backs on Abkhazia (adopting a pro-Georgia stance) has made Abkhazia and Russia become even closer. Recently the two sides put their intentions for closer cooperation on paper. President Vladimir Putin and his Abkhazian counterpart Raul Khajimba signed a far-reaching agreement on alliance and strategic partnership in Sochi in November 2014, which came into effect in March 2015. Putin has promised subsidies to Abkhazia amounting to €247 million over the next three years (5), modernization of the Abkhazian military and a common defence and security space; and the deal aims to coordinate foreign policy and strengthen cultural and economic cooperation. Abkhazia will adapt its customs’ legislation to the standards in the Eurasian Economic Union. Healthcare, education and social policy are to be harmonized. Border-control and combating international crime are to be carried out through a Joint Information and Coordination Centre (6).

The agreement was condemned in the West; organizations like the EU and NATO see it as a violation of Georgia’s ‘territorial integrity’ (7).

The ever-warmer feelings between Sukhum and Moscow coincide with the August 2014 election of the pro-Russian Raul Khajimba as Abkhazia’s president. Critics warn that increasing Russian influence might jeopardize the independence that Abkhazia fought for in the 1992-93 war (8). But the Abkhazian foreign minister, Viacheslav Chirikba, doesn’t share their concerns: ‘Abkhazia has been an independent country for more than twenty years. We will not become a part of any other country. We have defended our independence and shown that we are ready to sacrifice our lives for it. We reached a victory and managed to build up a functioning democracy — one of the few democracies on the former Soviet space. We have elections, which are very competitive by all standards. We have freedom of the press. We have freedom of religion and ethnic expressions. Abkhazia is a very relaxed, democratic country almost with a Mediterranean feel to it. We have shown the world that we can function as an independent state with all state institutions. At the same time we want to develop closer ties with Russia on the levels of security, economy and culture. Our strategic partner is Russia. She is the sole guarantee of our security against attempts by Georgia to invade Abkhazia again. Furthermore, Moscow is by far the largest donor to Abkhazia. Without Russian assistance we would be in very bad shape.’

The parliament and government building is close to Sukhum Bay, full of Russian holidaymakers. The hall of the foreign minister’s office is decorated with photos: in one of them Chirikba shakes hands with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov; another shows the Abkhazian leader and national hero Nestor Lakoba, who was murdered by Beria under Stalin in 1936. The country’s large red, white and green flag with a hand and stars is in place. So are the flags of those nations who recognize Abkhazia’s independence — Venezuela, Transniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nauru, Nicaragua, South Ossetia and Tuvalu.

It is unlikely that the ‘frozen’ conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia will be solved any time soon or that Abkhazia will obtain recognition from the West. Quite the contrary, according to expert on Georgian-Abkhazian relations George Hewitt: ‘Given the pro-Georgian position adopted by the West as soon as former Foreign Minister of the USSR and Georgian national Eduard Shevardnadze returned to post-Soviet Georgia in March 1992 and the consequent negative attitude towards both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, worsening relations with Russia following events in the Ukraine can hardly help improve the situation. Neither Abkhazians nor South Ossetians can expect any changes in their favour in the near future. Also, the West’s sanctions on Russia cannot but have an impact on the regions, which depend so much on Russian financial support.’ Hewitt holds that the initial response by the West to the break-up of the USSR and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, based on ignorance of the internal dynamics of Georgia’s problems, was a bad mistake.

Chirikba regrets the way Abkhazian-Georgian relations are portrayed in the western media: in Abkhazia, the US and the EU are sees as biased in favour of Georgia. Meanwhile out in the streets of Sukhum, people are frank about Abkhazia’s marginalized position on the global scene and its narrow room for manoeuvre. ‘On one side, there is Georgia, the US and NATO; on the other are Abkhazia and Russia. It is a fact. It is politics.’