However you feel about Jurgen Klinsmann as a Great Pontificator of the Lofty, he’s continually chased formational trends since he took over as USMNT’s head man. When he took over in 2011, he espoused the 4-3-3 that Barcelona had made so popular through its roughshod trampling of Europe’s best teams. In fact, he was so interested in using it that his first foray into the Hex in 2013, a disastrous 2-1 loss to Honduras, featured a 4-3-3 with three holding midfielders.

Klinsmann was plenty happy to transition from any notional 4-3-3 to the 4-2-3-1, but well late of the 2010 World Cup, where the formation won its place as a prominent constellation in the game’s firmament. He’d experimented with it earlier, but it wasn’t until later in the Hex that he began going to it exclusively.

Now, this report from Camp Cupcake.

Following up on @GrantWahl ‘s tweet. Jermaine Jones said he’s playing as the middle defender when #usmnt has experimented w/3 in the back. — Jeff Carlisle (@JeffreyCarlisle) January 21, 2015

The shock in those words has dulled significantly over the past few months. Jones was pushed into center back in several friendlies toward the tail end of 2014 after the World Cup, which lays the brickwork for something like this. But it also follows Klinsmann’s wider tactical nous. The U.S. going to “three” at the back with split wingbacks and a central destroyer dropping between the center backs follows the popularized trend that gained stream in global qualifying circles in the run-up to the Brazil World Cup. Klinsmann’s about two years late.

Not that being late precludes you from being successful, mind you. Good coaches aren’t exclusively parked in places of cutting edge innovation. But it’s something to note.

So about this three-man back line. What might it look like with this camp pool? The U.S. has friendlies against Chile (Jan. 28) and Panama (Feb. 8), and ironically Chile under Marcelo Bielsa but especially under Jorge Sampaoli was among the teams to popularize the three-man defense with roving wingbacks. Go figure.

Some notes.

— Since we build from the back, we start with the back. Alex Bono was a surprise addition to the camp, considering he only just wrapped his college career at Syracuse two months ago. The sixth overall draft pick to TFC will join his first MLS camp later this winter, but why not take advantage of his position here to see what he has? Rimando is the safer choice, but trust me when I say that while his selection may have puzzled some, he’s deserving. Even if it’s only 45, he needs to play.

As for Hedges, I think he’s a no-brainer for the XI. He’s probably the best player in the entire pool, regardless of position, to not yet be capped. How he was left off the initial call-up list, I have no idea. Besler, I can slash. You know Besler, what you’re extracting from him over 90 minutes. There’s nothing vital about him starting other than simply shepherding his center back counterpoint. I think Birnbaum deserves a start in one of these games, and Christian Dean, who’s a clear third in the pecking order between the Birnbaum-Hedges-Dean triumvirate, should probably come off the bench at some point too.

— Judging by the observations of those on the ground, Jermaine Jones will have a level of autonomy in this setup that better suits his style of play. Jones’ issue at center back was his unwillingness to commit to the position. Anyone who’s watched him play even a scant few minutes at center mid saw that coming from the international space station. And it’s accelerated on the club level. Jones is a bit like a molecule. You can drop him into an ordered system, but his movement will be invariably random.

So in a way, this formation makes sense. If you help Jones with a solid midfield infrastructure, he’ll have the freedom to judge attacks and build-ups by his position on the field. This formation is hardly novel in a modern sense — Roma was doing this with Daniele De Rossi five years ago. But it’s worth noting that this is innovation on the U.S. Soccer level. Both Bob Gansler in 1990 and Steve Sampson in 1995 tinkered with three-man setups, but each utilized three out-and-out center backs. Folding a defensive midfielder willing to make strafing runs into the pie crust has never been part of the equation.

In this setup, Jones is the most interesting piece. In the sense that the genesis of nearly all build-ups will flow through Jones in this formation, there is reason to be heartened. Jones’ movement and vision can be prescient when he’s switched on. The issue, if we’re looking at potential weak points, is that the midfielder splitting the center backs in this set-up has to be switched on at all times. He’s too close to the priming pan to slip up. Does Jones have that kind of mental discipline? We’ll see.

— One of the benefits of a 3-5-2 is that the midfield and wingbacks have the green light to be fluid and react to on-field situations as they flare. In my setup, I’ve allocated midfielders Wil Trapp and Michael Bradley to fold in as support beams for the build-up. This is a defensive midfield, yes, but it’s also a good way to tease the formation into shape in its early stages. Might as well start with firm footing and then add in more attack-minded options as it gets more advanced.

Further, with Jones, Bradley and Trapp on the field at once, this team immediately assumes the best fast-break offense in USMNT history. There’s an argument to be made that there are no three better long-distance passers than these in all of America right now. Though Jones’ ability on this front has waned over the past few years, Bradley and Trapp can more or less drop a 30-45-yard pass on the head of a pin.

The interaction of my wingbacks in this setup is critical. Dillon Serna is not an out-and-out fullback, but he can make hay as a wingback in this setup with license to push forward. I prefer Serna as a dedicated midfielder, but in possession in this formation that’s exactly what he’ll be. He may not have the same green light to bull as far forward, but he’ll certainly be able to interact with the midfield in a way that highlights his passing attributes. On the other side, Sorto is a bit more defensively inclined, meaning the entire back line can shift over to collapse attacks in a pinch.

I’d perhaps be most curious to see how Clint Dempsey and Lee Nguyen interact in a setup like this. As he’s aged, Dempsey’s tactical positioning has gradually become less and less reliable. Over any given 90 minutes I genuinely have no idea what he’s going to do. With Seattle, some games he’ll make an effort to tag onto Oba Martins’ shoulder, and in others he’ll frequently release himself to wander into the defensive midfield during build-ups. Whether that’s coaching or Dempsey’s simple resistance to it, that makes life hard on dedicated attacking midfielders like Nguyen who need to know.

On currently form, Nguyen is the best American No. 10. His brief stint in the Colombia friendly proved that to me. If we admit that Diskerud is more fit to be a late sub for Trapp or Bradley in situations where the U.S. needs a goal, Nguyen is more vital as someone who can actually pick out Dempsey and Jozy Altidore in lieu of simply forcing them to step back into the buildup. That’s the difference between the two, in my book. But how will Dempsey interact with a real No. 10, something he’s rarely had to do over the breadth of his entire career as a second striker? Even though they have different skill sets, will the two make each other positionally redundant?

I think that question deserves an on-field answer. Release those two into the system and see if the U.S. has finally found a No. 10 to bridge the gap to 2018.