Proponents of social justice in the 21st century seem to have taken on a very different mission statement than their predecessors. Whereas the movements of Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, and the Suffragettes sought equality before the law, more recent social justice movements appear to be focused on recalibrating society in a different, more far-reaching sense. For these groups, legal equality, while a step in the right direction, is not sufficient in and of itself to achieve genuine relational equality and substantive social justice. In addition to equality in the eyes of the law, modern social justice movements maintain that there must also be a comprehensive readjustment of “toxic” attitudes, thoughts, and perceptions within society itself; without changing social attitudes, the legal rights vulnerable groups have fought for will remain impotent.

As a consequence, the key drivers of oppression in modern society picked out by these groups are trans-legal: patriarchy, the legacy of colonialism, market forces, hetero-normativity, Judeo-Christian supremacy, and more. Although members of marginalized communities may formally possess the legal rights of suffrage, association, speech, and conscience, the effectiveness of these rights, their “on-the-ground” reality, is far less liberating for vulnerable groups due to the oppressive social structures that persist.

Take the example of women in the workplace.

It is illegal to pay women and men different salaries for the same work (legal equality), yet there remains a pay gap between how much the average man earns and how much the average woman does. Why is this the case? Liberation groups would argue that, although there are no formal legal barriers to women earning the same as men, there are unique social barriers that present disincentives for women in the labor market: male-dominated work environments, gender socialization, domestic division of labor induced by capitalist market-forces, institutional bias in candidate selection, and so forth. As a result, even though women have formal legal equality with men in the sense that they are free to put in an application and be paid the same if given the job, the odds are stacked against them from the start.

So, how do these groups propose we take action against these structures?

If trans-legal structures (for example, patriarchy) undermine the objectives of social justice, then it makes sense to assume that trans-legal means are required to combat those structures. This explains the rise in popularity for trans-legal methods such as public shaming, social media campaigns, demonstrations and protests, and “no-platforming.” By shaming people into silence, showing solidarity online or in person, or refusing to allow people with certain opinions to speak, liberation groups of all kinds are trying to stem the tide of toxic ideology, and raise up those who have been left “voiceless” by oppressive social hierarchies.

The problem is that while the objectives of these methods seem noble, the moral justifiability of using such methods is a cause for concern.

Take “no-platforming” in particular. This is the act of either a) refusing to debate with someone who holds a particular opinion, b) refusing to allow them a platform to broadcast their opinion, or c) forcibly stopping them from taking use of particular platforms. An example of (a) comes to us from a number of authors—including Caroline Lucas, a member of British Parliament—who wrote a letter stating their intention to “no-platform” climate change deniers; an example of (b) is the National Union of Students (NUS) “no-platforming” certain groups when discussing policy; and an example of (c) could be seen in the protests and demonstrations arranged by Antifa.

While they differ slightly in their means, each of the three sub-methods share the same goal: to suppress publicity and exposure for views deemed inimical to justice. By refusing to fan the flames, these groups believe that they can quell, and begin to heal from, the trans-legal oppression that permeates throughout our societies in the form of patriarchy, alienation, neo-colonialism, or any other social ill they believe is holding back the demands of justice.

When we inspect the matter more closely, however, we might find that “no-platforming” is not as attractive a way to achieve social justice as we previously imagined it to be.

First, an issue might arise based on the value we place on legal egalitarianism. Everyone in society today has the formal, equal right to free speech, association, conscience, and religion. The problem identified by modern emancipation groups is that the legal rights of some — particularly straight, white, cis-gendered, rich men — are worth more than others. There is also a reasonable case to be made in saying that this is to some extent true, for example, the women in the workplace example mentioned above. However, can we justifiably use the claim that “some people do not have effective use of their legal rights” to justify the nullification of another group’s rights?

For instance, we may argue that social conservatives have more of an effective right to free speech when compared to others. Maybe we are convinced that social conservatives are more likely to be given platforms to lobby for their views, whereas those who are more progressive are not given similar opportunities. We may think that this is not just, and that something must be done in rectification. However, can we then legitimately use this as a foundation to suggest that “no-platforming” social conservatives — stripping them of their effective right to speech and making more effective our own cause — is a morally required act? It seems utterly inconsistent to, on the one hand, deem that it is unfair and unjust that some particular group has more effective liberty than another, and, on the other, conclude that the effective liberty of some other group needs to be extinguished in the name of justice. Surely, the just outcome is one in which all have an equally effective right, not just some particular group: “no-platforming” is therefore not morally permissible on the foundations it sets itself.

Second, there is an issue of legitimacy in assuming that one’s own opinion is the unquestionably “correct” one. We must bear in mind that political debates are not scientific in the same sense as debates on physics and chemistry; nor are they conclusive, as debates in mathematics tend to be. There are not any empirically testable hypotheses that can once and for all end moral argument by appealing to observation. This is usually why political disagreement, especially when heated, is so intractable and long-lasting.

Take the abortion debate, for example. The debate around whether or not a woman should have the moral right to terminate a pregnancy has been fought so hard and so long on both sides because there is no observational, testable metric for what constitutes a “person” and the rights that emanate from that fact. All we have are two opposing sides that disagree on the definition of “personhood,” and thereby have different moral preferences in regards to ending a pregnancy early, due to differences in their fundamental interpretation of particular facts, with those interpretations often being a function of their pre-theoretical value systems.

Now, one may believe that the views of the pro-life lobby are “harmful” to women based on their “illegitimate” definition of “personhood.” Similarly, one may believe that the pro-choice lobby is “harmful” to unborn “people” based on similar shortcomings. There may even be an equality of feeling and conviction on both sides. However, one side cannot justify the taking away of the effective right of the other side on the grounds that they themselves are absolutely “correct.” As is clear, the nature of political disagreement cannot be centred around objective conclusions on the “correct” and “incorrect” view in this way: political disagreement is not only about the facts, but is also about the subjective interpretations of those facts.

That means that when someone claims they are justified in silencing the voice of another, what they are really claiming is that the debate is over and that their world-view and particular interpretation of the facts is definitively the right one. Yet due to the fact that moral interpretation is fundamentally subjective, it is not consistent or persuasive to justify the stifling of another person’s rights this way. Therefore, justifying “no-platforming” on the grounds that a particular view is objectively “incorrect” or “harmful” fundamentally misunderstands the subjective and unscientific nature of moral preferences.

In light of this, it is clear that a more tolerant approach is preferable when dealing with complex issues of this sort. It seems that “equal-platforming” within a context of an equal effectiveness of rights seems to be more just — and philosophically consistent — than silencing a particular opinion on the grounds of one’s assumed infallibility on the matter.

Third, there is possibly another inconsistency in these thoughts: that of outcome. It seems clear that if all individuals are to have equal legal rights to pursue the life they wish to lead, then it is also preferable that each person is able to enjoy these rights equally. Furthermore, it also seems clear that it is better to live in a society where individuals are respected equally, and where political disagreement never breaches the bounds of civility and undoes the fraternal bonds of citizenship. In short, living in an equal, tolerant, and fraternal society is preferable to living in an unequal, intolerant, and divisive one. This is the core justification for trans-legal acts of this kind: to make society a more just, tolerant, equal place. However, can we really consider “no-platforming” — or any other action of this kind — the best way to achieve this end? By refusing to engage constructively, a person essentially confines oneself to engaging with only those who can offer agreement.

This has all manner of consequences, very few of them positive for society. One effect is increasing partisanship in political processes. As one becomes increasingly partisan, one begins to see members of the opposing side not as fellow citizens with different opinions, but as political opponents obstructing progress.

Taking away another person’s effective rights on this ground erodes the bonds of citizenship, tolerance, and civility, rather than achieving or enhancing them in any substantive way. To paraphrase John Stuart Mill, so long as there is no real debate, there can never be a thriving democracy; better ideas can never flourish, and bad ideas are left to fester. By engaging with the other side, and keeping an open mind, we begin to see our political opponents as fellow citizens, and we can formulate more agreeable and just institutions than with our own tribe alone.

So, in terms of outcome, open and transparent debate leads to bad ideas being checked, good ideas flourishing, and more robust bonds of civic friendship.

The logic of social justice in the 21st century is a complex topic from a moral point of view. Whereas social justice in preceding decades involved securing equal legal rights for vulnerable groups, today’s movements are more concerned with how effective the legal rights that vulnerable groups now possess are in comparison to others. Though this certainly seems like a noble aim, we must remain cautious with how such groups attempt to achieve it. Trans-legal methods of challenging oppression such as public shaming and “no-platforming,” while popular, rest on shaky philosophical and practical foundations that may in fact cause more harm than good.

If we want to move towards a more just society — one in which all can share in in its rights and opportunities equally — we may have to remain tolerant and open to debate with those who disagree with us. This may mean that we have to look our opponent in the eye when we disagree with them, and share platforms with those who we may not think deserve the exposure. However, at the end of it all, we may find that this leads to a society characterized by openness, tolerance, and — above all — justice, as opposed to the often divisive partisan trenches that currently characterize modern society.