Disunion follows the Civil War as it unfolded.

In late December 1861 Abraham Lincoln issued a directive that, had it been vigorously pursued, might have brought the Civil War to a rapid end: An order, via Gen. James Ripley, the Army’s ordnance chief, for 10,000 Spencer repeating rifles. Because Ripley resisted the order for months and did nothing to help put the rifles into volume production, initial deliveries didn’t start until about a year and a half after Lincoln first tested the rifle. Consequently, Union soldiers had to fight with less efficient weapons, handicapping them and greatly lengthening the bloody conflict.

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Even though Civil War era muzzleloaders had rifled barrels that much improved their range and accuracy, the Army’s standard issue muzzleloaders would have looked familiar to soldiers who fought under George Washington: they were loaded by a ramrod, through the end of the barrel, one bullet at a time. After firing, the entire sequence had to be repeated before taking another shot. Under the best circumstances, muzzleloaders could discharge no more than three bullets a minute, more likely only two in the heat of combat.

In contrast, Spencer repeaters, which had been patented almost two years earlier by a 28-year-old inventor named Christopher Spencer, contained a seven-shot magazine loaded with prepackaged shells and could fire eight rounds in a mere 20 seconds. Gen. James Wilson, whose Union cavalry won victories against the legendary Confederate leader Nathan Bedford Forrest late in the war, said: “There is no doubt that the Spencer carbine is the best fire-arm yet put into the hands of the soldier … Our best officers estimate one man armed with” a Spencer is “equivalent to three with any other arm.”

At least two repeating rifles were patented before the war. One was the Spencer, which, in the form of a shorter, cavalry carbine, would become the more popular during the war. The other, invented by Benjamin Tyler Henry, enjoyed less use during the war but, after evolving into the Winchester ’73, became the iconic weapon of the Western frontier. Both weapons were produced in New England, thereby rendering the technology unavailable to Confederates.

Even before Spencer and Henry repeaters were developed, breech-loading carbines and rifles, like the Sharps and the Burnside, were commercially available for years prior to the war. Though they were loaded one shell at a time, they could fire three times faster than muzzleloaders.

Many, including President Lincoln, immediately saw the importance of upgrading to repeaters and breechloaders. A small order for 700 Spencers was placed by the Navy only two months after Sumter. Lincoln personally tested the Spencer and Henry in the summer of 1861, possibly as early as June, and he was responsible for prompting all breechloader orders placed by the Ordnance Department that year. He wasn’t alone: a three-man military board that included the soon-to-be general in chief, George McClellan, recommended quick adoption of the Spencer.

The problem was General Ripley, the Army’s ordnance chief. By then 67 years old, Ripley was hostile to all breechloaders, which he considered “newfangled gimcracks.” But he had a special complaint about repeaters. Astoundingly, he concluded that the weapons would encourage soldiers to waste ammunition.

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Because Ripley reported to the secretary of war, not a general, he was immune from the board’s orders. Even after Spencer persuaded Lincoln to intervene, Ripley dragged his feet: despite having autocratic control over the Springfield Armory in Massachusetts and other weapons-making facilities, he refused to help Spencer develop a process for volume production of the rifle.

Spencer was an inventor, not a production engineer, and deliveries quickly fell behind schedule. The first shipment did not arrive until the end of 1862, and they weren’t supplied for general use until early 1863. Ripley’s unwillingness to lend production assistance also led to delays in shipments for single-shot breechloaders like the Sharps. By the end of the war Spencer had delivered fewer than 60,000 repeaters, and Henry fewer than 13,000. In contrast, the number of muzzleloaders, like the Springfield and Enfield, used by Union troops alone totaled more than two million.

Nevertheless, where new rifles were employed, they played a decisive role: Gen. John Buford’s Sharps-equipped cavalry was able to hold off a larger number of Confederate infantry during the opening phase of Gettysburg in July 1863. The most impressive example of repeaters’ effectiveness came two months after Gettysburg, at the Battle of Chickamauga.

During the first day of the two-day fight, a gap opened in the eastward-facing Union line. Confederate Gen. John Bell Hood soon began pouring through it, gradually turning, and then threatening to unravel, the northern flank of the Union Army’s southern branch. Panicked Yankees rallied briefly in a shallow ditch on the Viniard farm with a single reserve brigade behind them.

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But it was no ordinary brigade. Its commander, Col. John T. Wilder, had equipped his soldiers with 1,400 Spencer repeating rifles, purchased at their own expense. Nearly everyone else had muzzleloaders. Before the Confederates could get across the farm, Wilder’s concealed brigade opened fire. Almost immediately, the Confederates became the ones desperately crowding for cover.

Such concentrated and rapid rifle fire was unprecedented; as Wilder himself later commented, “it seemed a pity to kill men so.” The Confederates “fell in heaps; and I had it in my heart to order the firing to cease, to end the awful sight.” Hood’s troops were being slaughtered and had to withdraw. By sundown it was evident that Wilder’s single brigade had prevented a split in the Union lines that might otherwise have resulted in the destruction of the Union army’s entire southern wing.

Lincoln eventually became fed up with Ripley’s foot dragging; the old general was put out to pasture shortly before Wilder’s Chickamauga experience. Unfortunately, Ripley was replaced by Col. George Ramsay, who had long been at odds with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. Although Ramsay was more approving of repeaters and breech-loaders, he proved an ineffective manager and was replaced a year later.

Could widespread adoption of repeating rifles have shortened the war? Leaders on both sides seemed to think so. One Confederate general who faced enemy breech-loaders reckoned the war would have been lost in the first year had Union troops been so equipped at the start. The engineer turned Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Robert Bruce concluded: “If a large part of the Union Army had been given breech-loaders by the end of 1862, Gettysburg would certainly have ended the war. More likely, Chancellorsville, or even Fredericksburg would have done it.”

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Sources: Glenn Tucker, “Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West”; Steven E. Woodworth, “Six Armies in Tennessee”; Robert V. Bruce, “Lincoln and the Tools of War.”

Phil Leigh is an armchair Civil War enthusiast and president of a market research company.