Reportedly a smaller derivative on the RS-24 Yars ICBM , the RS-26 has been in development since before 2011. It is a controversial design that some have suggested could actually violate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, commonly known as INF. Though Russia has insisted it is an ICBM, and has demonstrated that it can reach the appropriate range, experts believe this was only because the missile involved in the launch in question was carrying a light payload or no payload at all.

“The Avangard was included in the [state armament plan] program’s final version as more essential to ensure the country’s defense capability,” the source said, according to TASS. “All the work on the Rubezh and the Barguzin [rail-mobile ICBM] was put on hold until the end of 2027. A decision on the work’s resumption will be made after the current armament program is fulfilled.”

On March 22, 2018, Russian state-run news outlet TASS reported that development of the RS-26 was no longer a feature of the state armament plan for 2018 to 2027. In an annual state of the union address on March 1, 2018, Putin had said that the road-mobile Rubezh would be the primary launch vehicle for Avangard . The country had previously used the latter name to refer to the entire development program , including the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) component.

Just weeks after Russian President Vladimir Putin mentioned it in a provocative speech , Russia has reportedly decided shelve development of its RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile system and focus on fielding the nuclear-armed Avangard hypersonic boost glide vehicle using other designs. The decision suggests the Kremlin may feel the hypersonic weapon is more valuable than the missile carrying it, but also raises questions about whether the country has the necessary funds to support its broader strategic plans .

Without the Rubezh, the primary launch vehicle for Avangard will likely be the still-in-development silo-launched RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, also known as the “Satan 2.” This missile is set to replace the older R-36M , also called the SS-18 Satan, by 2020. Some reports suggest it may be able to carry as many two dozen of the hypersonic boost glide vehicles, but this remains unconfirmed.

Subsequent tests have strongly indicated the missile can’t fly beyond intermediate ranges with an actual warhead, making it a design that the INF would prohibit Russia from fielding operationally. The United States accuses Russia of having already put a treaty-breaking ground-launched cruise missile, the SSC-8 , into service and the RS-26 appeared to be another means of skirting the agreement’s restrictions.

However, separate TASS reports say that the hypersonic boost glide vehicle will be operational by 2019 and that it could enter service first aboard older UR-100N UTTKh IBCMs, also known as the SS-19 Stiletto. Russia reportedly acquired approximately 30 more of these Soviet-era weapons, in a deactivated state, from Ukraine in the early 2000s, and would refurbish and modify them in order to carry Avangard. Since these weapons remain in Russian service already, it would be relatively easy for the country to swap out the existing weapons with upgraded versions carrying hypersonic vehicles. Per the terms of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that Russia is party to with the United States, both countries can only have so many “launchers,” which includes land-based silos, mobile launch vehicles, or individual launch tubes on submarines, as well as nuclear-capable bombers. However, the deal sets higher limits on the total number of warheads either side can retain in total and places no restrictions on how many missiles without warheads a country can have in storage.

Sergey Kazak/TASS A UR-100N sits in a silo.

This plan makes a lot of practical sense. As we at The War Zone have written in detail before, the benefit of a hypersonic boost glide vehicle is that it eliminates many of the existing vulnerabilities of traditional ICBMs, which follow largely predictable signatures and flight paths after launch. While existing U.S. space-based early warning sensors should be able to detect the launch of any one of the Russian ICBMs, especially from the thermal plume of the missile blasting off, they wouldn’t be unable to monitor the subsequent flight of Avangard, which will reportedly be able to make rapid and frequent course changes at extremely high speed. By the Pentagon's own admission, the no component of the U.S. military’s ballistic missile shield would be able to shoot down such a weapon, either. “Our defense is our deterrent capability,” U.S. Air Force General John Hyten, head of U.S. Strategic Command, told members of congress during a public hearing on March 21, 2018. “We don't have any defense that could deny the employment of such a [hypersonic] weapon against us, so our response would be our deterrent force which would be the triad and the nuclear capabilities that we have to respond to such a threat.” In February 2018, Hyten detailed the need for faster development of new space-based sensors that would be able to pick up hypersonic threats, but that capability is still likely some years away. Russia, which routinely criticizes any and all American ballistic missile defense efforts, is undoubtedly aware of this, which helps explain the focus on Avangard.

Matthew Staver/Bloomberg via Getty Images US Air Force General John Hyten.

As it stands now, there is no realistic means of destroying a ballistic missile the Russians would launch from within their own territory during its vulnerable boost phase. Coupled with the sensor- and countermeasure-dodging capabilities of the hypersonic vehicle itself, the launch platform’s job is largely reduced to just getting that system to the right altitude and speed. The decision to abandon to the RS-26 in favor of putting Avangard on other platforms could also point to the hypersonic boost glide vehicle being further ahead in development than we might have previously understood. If that's true, it's also possible the Russians might also be inclined to look into retrofitting other existing ICBMs, such as the road mobile RT-2PM2 Topol-M and RS-24 Yars, with the new warhead. It’s worth noting, of course, that the U.S. ballistic missile defense shield as it exists today is in no way capable of defeating the Kremlin’s existing nuclear deterrent capabilities, either. This then brings up the possibility that the Russians simply can’t afford RS-26, whether they want it or not, along with the slew of other advanced strategic capabilities they claim to be pursuing. “It was initially planned to include both the Avangard and the Rubezh in the state armament plan,” the anonymous defense industry source told TASS. “It became clear later that funds would not suffice to finance both systems at a time.” There’s evidence that this may have been increasingly apparent for some time. Prior to Putin’s remarks in March 2018, there had been scant official mention of the RS-26 at all for years. The Kremlin was supposed to demonstrate the system to arms control inspectors from the United States first in 2015 and then in 2016, an event that still has not come to pass.

Vitaly Kuzmin A road-mobile RS-24 Yars ICBM, from which the Russians reportedly developed the RS-26.