The Ukraine crisis turned the security of the Baltic states into a top European security priority. Although NATO member states stood squarely behind their Eastern allies at the NATO summit in Wales, this initial display of unity started to show some signs of unravelling in the run-up to the Warsaw summit. Differences between Eastern and Southern allies on how to deal with Russia and where the geographical focus of the Alliance should lie became increasingly visible. The Netherlands found themselves caught in-between this East-South divide. This article analyses how the divide shaped NATO’s approach to the security of the Baltic states and pays particular attention to the role of the Netherlands in trying to bridge the gap between NATO’s two flanks.

The Ukraine crisis raised concerns that the Baltic states might be next on Putin’s wish list, especially after Russian military and non-military provocations in the Baltic states and its continued interference in the Donbass. With defence budgets somewhere in the range of 250 to 500 million annually, the Baltic states would not stand a chance in the face of Russian armed aggression. Furthermore, Russia’s increased anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the region made it more difficult for NATO to come to the Baltic states’ defence when necessary.

For Moscow, the region therefore proved to be the ideal testing ground of Alliance solidarity. Militarily, Russia strengthened its troop presence along the Russian side of the border and beefed up its presence in the Baltic Sea and in Kaliningrad. Moscow furthermore increased the number of unannounced exercises and incursions into NATO airspace. Also outside the military realm Russia intimidated the Baltic states in various ways, for example through misinformation campaigns targeted at Russian-speaking minorities in the region. This new Russian assertiveness did not go beyond military muscle flexing, but nonetheless provoked a strong NATO response.

Within the Alliance attention shifted eastwards. Replacing a decade-long focus on crisis management, collective defence once again dominated NATO’s agenda. Immediately after the annexation of Crimea, NATO member states demonstrated their commitment to the security of their Eastern allies by imposing a series of reassurance measures. These measures included the intensification of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission, a strengthened maritime presence in the Baltic Sea and increased military exercises in the region. This shift in focus to collective defence and deterrence was institutionalised at the Wales summit (2014) with the adoption of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and the reconfirmation of collective defence as NATO’s core task.

The widening East-South divide

In the run-up to the Warsaw summit (2016), the initial display of unity at Wales showed signs of unravelling. Cleavages between member states deepened over two questions in particular: how to deal with Russia’s renewed assertiveness and where the geographical focus of the Alliance should lie. For NATO’s Eastern member states – Poland and the Baltic states in particular – the reassurance measures were a welcome first step, but not enough to deter Russian aggression. For them, the only credible deterrent would be the permanent stationing of NATO troops in Eastern Europe. Eastern allies furthermore advocated a review of NATO’s command structure.

US navy drill during the BALTOPS 2017 exercise in the Baltic Sea. Source: U.S. Navy photo/ Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Ford Williams Released

Other allies, notably the Southern member states, were hesitant about this approach. These countries did not perceive the threat of a Russian invasion to be imminent and therefore advocated a non-escalatory approach towards Russia. They believed the permanent stationing of NATO troops in Eastern Europe to be a violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997.

NATO’s shifting focus eastwards furthermore raised concerns among Southern member states – notably France, Spain, Italy and Greece – that security challenges on NATO’s southern flank would be overlooked. They argued that these challenges, ranging from instability in Libya to the rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, were as much of an existential threat to the Alliance as was Moscow’s renewed assertiveness. Their calls on NATO to step up its efforts in the South increased further after the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and the growing migratory pressures on Southern member states.

The Netherlands: bridging the divide

The Netherlands was caught in-between this East-South divide, together with other allies such as Germany, the UK and the US. On the one hand, the Netherlands strongly condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine and stated that its commitment to collective security was “beyond any doubt”.It stepped up its military presence in the region, albeit in a limited way, by participating in regional exercises and in NATO’s standing naval force SNMG-1, which was relocated from the coast of Somalia to the Baltic Sea (for an overview of Dutch contributions to the security of the Baltic states, see table 1 below).

The initial Dutch offer to increase its contribution to Baltic Air Policing was withdrawn after the Netherlands joined the coalition against IS, but the Netherlands did participate in the interim-phase of the new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). On the other hand, the Netherlands was careful not to add fuel to the fire and opposed the permanent stationing of troops in Eastern Europe. The Dutch government furthermore emphasised that in the long run a strategic partnership with Russia would remain the end goal, and that channels for communication – notably the NATO-Russia Council – should remain open to prevent unintended escalation.