The relationships granted protection by the Fourteenth Amendment “are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family” and similar “highly personal relationships.” “The individuals are deeply attached and committed to each other as a result of their having shared each other’s thoughts, beliefs, and experiences. By the very nature of such relationships, one is involved in a relatively few intimate associations during his or her lifetime.” The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution protects “those relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose ‘deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.’” Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. In the context of intimate relations, “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.” Lawrence v. Texas.

The Ninth Circuit has determined [in a pre-Lawrence case] that a couple comprised of an escort and a client

Similarly, here, the Court finds precedent dictates that the intimate association between a prostitute and client, while it may be consensual and cordial, has not merited the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Lawrence (distinguishing its holding from application in the context of public conduct or prostitution); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 818 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that, pursuant to Lawrence, there is no cognizable fundamental right to private consensual sexual conduct). Having defined the asserted right to constitutional protection within a particular relationship, and having found that the

relationship has not historically been granted recognition as fundamental, the Court finds that

Section 647(b) does not challenge a fundamental right requiring the application of strict scrutiny in assessing its constitutionality….

This Court finds that, following the holding in Lawrence, moral disapproval is not an adequate or rational basis for criminalizing conduct. However, there are “justifications for criminalizing prostitution other than public morality, including promoting public safety and preventing injury and coercion.” Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has proffered sufficient legitimate government interests that provide a rational basis to justify the criminalization of prostitution in California.