For the crew of U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey number 06-0031, a lot of things went wrong on the early morning of April 9, 2010, in southern Afghanistan. A series of alleged pilot errors and possible mechanical failures sent the speedy, hybrid aircraft – which takes off and lands like a helicopter but cruises like an airplane – crashing to the ground.

Four people died.

The loss of 06-0031 was a tragedy for the victims and their families. It was also problematic for proponents of the controversial Osprey. In recent years, elements within the U.S. military have worked hard to portray the V-22 as safe, reliable and combat-ready. The Afghanistan crash threatened to undermine that effort.

Which perhaps explains why the Air Force appeared to cover up the possible real cause of 06-0031's deadly mishap. The lead investigator, Brig. Gen Donald Harvel, claimed that the V-22 suffered engine problems before its crash. Then Harvel's superior officer overruled the initial decision, chalking up the accident mostly to pilot error. That took the heat off the Osprey itself.

"There was absolutely a lot of pressure to change my report," he told Air Force Times, adding that the flying branch was focused on protecting the V-22's reputation.

A series of fatal crashes between 1992 and 2000 earned the Osprey a reputation as a widowmaker ... and nearly resulted in the aircraft's cancellation. But the V-22 survived, thanks to determined lobbying by the Marine Corps (the Osprey's main user) and manufacturers Bell and Boeing. After an 18-month redesign period, the Osprey returned to flight in 2002. Five years later, the tiltrotor entered combat.

Tentatively at first, and with growing confidence, the military crafted a narrative – one neatly summed up by Lt. Col. Jason Holden, V-22 plans officer at Marine Corps headquarters in Virginia. "The message is that the V-22 flying today in Iraq and Afghanistan ... is not the same V-22 we had years ago," Holden told Danger Room. "We had problems, acknowledged the problems and have gone on to fix them."

But as we reported on Thursday, the Marines' V-22 probably isn't nearly as safe as Holden and other officials would have us believe. Through clever bureaucratic maneuvering and massaging of mishap data, the Marines have apparently downplayed several serious Osprey accidents, masking ongoing problems with the tiltrotor's engines, in particular.

It's possible the Air Force did the same thing during the investigation of 06-0031's crash, covering up the V-22's safety risk in order to protect a prized weapon system.

Osprey Down ———–

It was just after midnight in Zabul province, southern Afghanistan. Osprey number 06-0031, assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command, was the lead aircraft in a formation of three transporting U.S. Army Rangers into battle near the village of Qalat.

Ten miles from the landing zone, the $87-million aircraft with the rotating wingtip engines encountered an unexpected tailwind. The tailwind, plus the decision by the pilot to make a non-standard approach to the LZ, might explain why 06-0031 began its descent a half-mile late. That, in turn, could help explain why the Osprey's pilot seemed to be in a hurry to reach the ground.

Osprey 06-0031 was traveling at least 88 miles per hour – several times the recommended speed – when it touched down a quarter mile from the LZ. The tiltrotor shot 200 feet across the desert floor, struck a ditch, flipped and broke apart.

The tailwind could have been a factor, but there's an equally compelling explanation: that the Osprey's engines had stopped working in mid-air. Video shot by an A-10 attack plane circling overhead showed puffs of exhaust coming from 06-0031's nacelles in its final seconds of flight, a sign that the crew was trying to restart non-working engines.

If 06-0031's engines did malfunction, it wouldn't have been the first time for the V-22. Densely packed, complex and hot, the Osprey's Rolls-Royce AE 1107C engines run dangerously close to normal safety margins – something the military knows all too well. Marine V-22s have suffered a steady chain of engine fires and power surges that have damaged no fewer than seven aircraft since 2002, some severely. And in March 2009, an Air Force CV-22 lost an engine during a training flight, incurring more than $1 million in damage.

With engines out, the pilot would have mere moments to kick-start the motors ... or land the unpowered aircraft according to emergency procedures outlined in the V-22 flight manual, as depicted above. There would be no time for the slow, deliberate landing that Osprey pilots learn in training.

When the dust settled and the rescuers arrived in Qalat, two crewmen and two passengers were dead out of the 20 people aboard. 06-0031 itself was a total loss. After a brief recovery operation, an A-10 bombed the wreckage in order to keep the Osprey's advanced technology out of enemy hands. The bombing also destroyed the tiltrotor's black box. That, plus memory loss by the only survivor from 06-0031's cockpit, ensured that the subsequent crash investigation would raise more questions than it could answer.

Air National Guard Brig. Gen. Donald Harvel, the lead accident investigator, concluded that engine failure was the likely cause. But his boss, Lt. Gen. Kurt Cichowski, vice chief of Air Force Special Operations Command, overruled Harvel. "The convening authority disagreed that engine power loss was supported by the greater weight of credible evidence," the Air Force concluded.

What explanation did Cichowski offer as an alternative? None, really. The investigative board "was unable to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of this mishap," the Air Force stated. But the flying branch did mention pilot error as a "substantially contributing factor."

Harvel, who retired a month after the release of the full, final accident report (.pdf), cried foul: "My heart and brain said it was not pilot error. I stuck with what I thought was the truth." The pressure on Harvel echoes at least two occasions when Marine officers told Osprey mechanics to falsify records in order to downplay the tiltrotor's mechanical problems.



Investigator, Overruled ———————–

"Accident investigations can be very complicated," Nick Schwellenbach, an investigator with the Washington, D.C.-based Project on Government Oversight, told Danger Room. The dispute over 06-0031's accident "could mean simply that there's a disagreement based on the facts or lack of facts."

That's the best-case scenario. "The worst-case scenario is that there is a crass and dangerous desire on the part of certain elements of the Air Force to suppress negative assessments of the V-22," Schwellenbach said.

Between the Marines and Air Force, evidence is growing that the military is deliberately obscuring the truth regarding the V-22's ongoing safety woes. "This lead investigator Harvel is no rookie," Schwellenbach said. "The fact that a professional is being vocal about being overruled and says that the Air Force overruled him to protect the V-22 program should be cause for greater concern. Perhaps the highly respected and transparent National Transportation Safety Board, which investigates civilian aviation accidents, should be brought in to review the V-22 accident record, evaluate the different conclusions and rule on this dispute."

But that would entail an admission on the military's part that that V-22 isn't, as the Marines claim, the "safest tactical rotorcraft" of the last decade – and such an admission is highly unlikely to happen. The Marines and Air Force have labored to create the impression that today's, purportedly safer V-22 is nothing like the earlier version of the tiltrotor that killed 30 people during testing. "The V-22 of 2000 is not even in our rearview mirror anymore," Marine spokesman Capt. Brian Block said.

Maybe so. But that doesn't mean the Osprey of 2011 is as safe as the military says.

Photos/art: Department of Defense, Air Force

See Also: