Yesterday, Google announced two new encrypted messaging apps called "Allo" and "Duo". There has been some talk about the security of Allo's end-to-end encryption and incognito mode. Most of it was speculation, until Thai Duong blogged about it. Well, it's time to see what he said, and see if Allo stands up to scrutiny.

"Allo offers two chat modes: normal and incognito. Normal is the default, but incognito can be activated with one touch. I want to stress that both modes encrypt chat messages when they are in transit or at rest. The Allo clients talk to Google servers using QUIC or TLS 1.2. When messages are temporarily stored on our servers waiting for delivery they are also encrypted, and will be deleted as soon as they're delivered."

There are a few things in this paragraph that need some explanation. First, "both modes encrypt chat messages when they are in transit or at rest". This is good, but the devil is in the details. In transit, Thai explains how they're encrypted: "Allo clients talk to Google servers using QUIC or TLS 1.2". This has a couple of ramifications. First, this isn't end-to-end encryption (E2E). This is client-server encryption, which means both the server and the client are encrypting and decrypting the data. As a result, any Google employee with the appropriate privileges can read the messages delivered to Google servers. That's sort of the point of why E2E encryption exists- to prevent this from happening.

Second, kudos for storing the messages encrypted on disk. But, realize that Google has the master key to decrypt these messages if needed. Also, kudos for deleting them off of Google's servers as soon as they're delivered. However, just like VPN service providers promising they don't log your connections, Google promising not to log your message sort of falls into this category. That is, although they might not be storing the messages right now, they may store them later, especially if presented with a warrant from law enforcement. So, Google promising to not store your messages really doesn't amount to much other than maybe they don't want to unnecessarily chew through disk unless forced. Just remember, Google isn't going to go to jail for you, so they will comply with law enforcement.

"In normal mode, an artificial intelligence run by Google (but no humans including the Allo team or anyone at Google) can read your messages. This AI will use machine learning to analyze your messages, understand what you want to do, and give you timely and useful suggestions. For example, if you want to have dinner, it'll recommend restaurants or book tables. If you want to watch movies, it can buy you tickets. Like it or not, this AI will be super useful. It's like having a personal assistant that can run a lot of errands for you right in your pocket. Of course, to help it help you you'll have to entrust it with your chat messages. I really think that this is fine, because your chat messages are used to help you and you only, and contrary to popular beliefs Google never sells your personal information to anyone."

Herein lies the real reason why E2E is not enabled by default- Google would like to mine your messages, on your phone, and present you with real-time ads. Ads not just on your phone, but likely when you're logged into your Google account on your desktop or laptop as well. If the data is E2E encrypted, this poses a problem for a company that has made Big Bucks off of advertising. With incognito mode, you are enabling E2E encryption, and the AI no longer has access to this data. Application and browser ads become generic, or must get their mining elsewhere. Because Google is allowing an AI to mine Allo messages for targeted ads, could it be possible that this same AI could be mining other data on your phone for the same goal? Could this AI be mining your email, Twitter, Facebook, photos, and other data? Will this AI be shipping solely with Allo, or will it be a separate service in Android N?

While Google might not be selling your data, they are making a percentage of sales that come from ads. The more targeted the ads become, the more likely you are to make a purchase, and the more likely Google will be to get a percentage of that sale. Google isn't selling your data, but they are making money off of it.

"But what if I want to stay off the grid? What if I don't want even the AI or whatever to see my messages? "That's fine. We understand your concerns. Everybody including me has something to hide. This is why we develop the incognito mode. In this mode, all messages are further encrypted using the Signal protocol, a state of the art end-to-end chat encryption protocol which ensures that only you and your recipients can read your messages."

WhatsApp, acquired by Facebook, and pushing nearly one billion active messaging accounts, recently enabled E2E encryption also with the Signal Protocol. The difference being, with WhatsApp, E2E is default for every account when they update their app. E2E is not default for Allo, and only enabled for incognito mode. So, if "everybody including me has something to hide", then why isn't E2E default with Allo?

Thai then quotes a survey explaining that users want self-destructing messages more than E2E. He explains that survey with (emphasis mine):

"So to most users what matters the most is not whether the NSA can read their messages, but the physical security of their devices, blocking unwanted people, and being able to delete messages already sent to other people. In other words, their threat model doesn't include the NSA, but their spouses, their kids, their friends, i.e., people around and near them. Of course it's very likely that users don't care because they don't know what the NSA has been up to. If people know that the NSA is collecting their dick pics, they probably want to block them too. At any rate, NSA is just one of the threat sources that can harm normal users."

Sure, my threat model is also losing my phone. I find that much more likely than either the NSA confiscating my phone, issuing a warrant to collect my data, or decrypting my traffic in real-time (which isn't practical anyway). However, while the NSA isn't in my threat model, the NSA should be in Google's threat model. In other words, Google should be worrying about the NSA for me.

This is why I created d-note is is running at https://secrets.xmission.com. As a system administrator, I don't want to turn over logs to the NSA or any other organization. As such, the messages are encrypted server-side before stored to disk, and destroyed immediately upon viewing. The goal isn't necessarily to protect the end user, but to protect the server administrator. By legitimately not being able to provide logs or data when a warrant is issued is extremely valuable.

Google should be protecting the "dick pics" of users from getting into the NSA hands. Apple recently made a strong stand here against the FBI regarding Syed Farook's iPhone. Apple technically could not help the FBI, because of the protections that Apple baked into their product. Apple's hands were tied. As such, the FBI wanted to set a precedent about enabling government backdoors into the OS for future releases, so they would no longer be blocked from access. Apple is protecting the "dick pics" of its users from the NSA, FBI, and everyone else. Why isn't Google? As we mentioned earlier, the answer to that question is data mining and advertising revenue.

"This is why I think end-to-end encryption is not an end in itself, but rather a means to a real end which is disappearing messaging. End-to-end encryption without disappearing messaging doesn't cover all the risks a normal user could face, but disappearing messaging without end-to-end encryption is an illusion. Users need both to have privacy in a way that matters to them."

Emphases mine. So, Thai recognizes that disappearing messaging without E2E encryption is an illusion. So, why isn't it default? The higher powers that be, likely. He mentions in his conclusion that he would like E2E to be default, with a single tap. Something of an option with "Always start in incognito", thus always starting with E2E and always having self-destructing messages. However, rather than opt-in, it should be opt-out. If the prior message history is more important to you than the security of E2E encryption and self-destructing messages, then it should be something that you switch. If SnapChat is so popular because of self-destructing massages, and WhatsApp has one billion users with E2E encryption be default, Google, a company larger than both combined, should be able to do the same.

Finally, one point that Thai does not mention in his post. Allo is proprietary closed-source software. From a security perspective, this is problematic. First, because you don't have access to the source, you cannot audit it to make sure it holds up to the security claims that it has. As security and software engineers, not having access to the source code should be a major block when considering the use of non-free software.

Second, without access to the source code, you cannot create reproducible builds. Even if you did have access to the source code, are you sure the binary you have installed matches the binary you can build? If not, how do you know the binary isn't spying on you? Or compromised? Or just compiled incorrectly, causing undesired behavior? Not being able to create reproducible builds of software means not being able to verify the integrity of the shipped binary. Debian is making it a high priority to ship packages with reproducible builds. It's important to Debian, because they want to be transparent with their userbase. If you don't trust Debian is doing what they claim, you can rebuild the binaries and packages yourself, and they should match what Debian has shipped.

I know this sounds very Richard Stallman and GNU, but proprietary closed-source software is scary when it comes to security. While your immediate threat model might just be those you interact with on a daily basis, the immediate threat model to Google, Apple, SnapChat, and others, are well-funded organizations that have legal weight. Ultimately, they're after your data, which in the end, puts them in your threat model. There are no safety or security guarantees with proprietary closed-source software. You are at the mercy of the software vendor to Do The Right Thing, and many companies just don't.

So, while Allo might be the new kid on the block with E2E encrypted and self-destructing messages, as I've shown, it can't be trusted for your security and privacy. You're best off ignoring it, not recommending it to family and friends, and sticking with Free Software alternatives where E2E messages are default.