(Credit: Inter Services Public Relations/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images)

Updated, May 6, 5:15 p.m. | Bruce Riedel, who was chairman of President Obama’s strategic review of United States policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier this year, says that, while not inevitable, a jihadist state in Pakistan is a real possibility.

Updated, May 6, 11:15 a.m. | Michael E. O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution offers his views on a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

As the Pakistani military launched a new offensive against the Taliban in the country’s North-West Frontier Province, officials and former officials in Washington continued to discuss what the American response should be to the heightened conflict. How should the United States respond? And how secure are Pakistan’s nuclear weapons?

Averting the Worst

Bruce Riedel, a former C.I.A. officer, is a senior fellow in the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. He was chairman of President Obama’s strategic review of United States policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier this year.

Just before her murder in December 2007 former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said, “I now think Al Qaeda can be marching on Islamabad in two to four years.” Today her prophecy seems all too real.

The mayor of Karachi, a mega city of 18 million, tells me the Taliban alliance is now threatening to take over his city.

Al Qaeda’s allies in Pakistan, the Taliban, Lashkar e Tayyba, and other extreme jihadists, are becoming increasingly powerful. They are no longer confined to the tribal belt along the Afghan border but have built strong bases of support in the nation’s heartland, the Punjab, and in the major cities. The mayor of Karachi, a mega city of 18 million, tells me the Taliban alliance is now threatening to take over his city, the country’s only major port and NATO’s logistical supply line for the war in Afghanistan. A jihadist state in Pakistan is neither imminent nor inevitable, it may not be likely, but it is a real possibility.

A jihadist Pakistan would be a strategic nightmare for America, south Asia and the world. It would provide al Qaeda and other terrorist groups with the ultimate sanctuary in the worlds’ second largest Muslim state, protected by nuclear weapons, with a global diplomatic presence and Pakistani Diaspora that could be used to support terror. A jihadist takeover would make the NATO mission in Afghanistan increasingly untenable. It would be a direct threat to both Hindu India and Shia Iran, encouraging both to expand and accelerate their own nuclear programs.

Thus it is critical that the United States do what it can now to strengthen the Pakistani moderate center which is resisting the jihadist Frankenstein. Congress should pass the Kerry-Lugar legislation that triples economic aid and the Pentagon’s proposals for increasing counter-insurgency assistance to Pakistan with a minimum of conditionality.

Trying to legislate changes in Pakistani behavior is a recipe for disaster — as the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations demonstrates — now is the time to support Pakistanis who are ready to resist extremism and jihadism.

Two Worrisome Cases

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, is a former director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the Department of Energy and a former senior C.I.A. intelligence officer.



Pakistani nuclear weapons fall under the control of the military, which is the most professional, disciplined and competent institution in the country. It takes nuclear security extremely seriously, and will surely adopt heightened measures to protect these weapons.

That said, authorities in every country possessing nuclear weapons worry about the possibility of insiders who are willing to assist terrorists steal a weapon or gain access to facilities containing nuclear weapons and materials. The United States, for example, has invested considerable resources in measures to prevent terrorists from recruiting people at nuclear sites.

One security risk comes from extremists collaborating with insiders to exploit a lapse in the defenses.

But the U.S. does not have to secure nuclear weapons and materials amid rising extremism and instability in the country. No matter how assuring Pakistani authorities may sound publicly, one hopes they are quietly preparing to face possible sudden and unanticipated challenges to their control over nuclear weapons and facilities.

They face two fundamental problems in this regard.

First, there is no such thing as perfect security: the loss of one weapon or takeover of one nuclear facility would precipitate a crisis. The chain of security across a dispersed line of nuclear assets is only as strong as its weakest link. The risk is that extremists collaborating with insiders are able to seize an opportunity to exploit a lapse in the defenses.

Second, the insider threat is not theoretical.

Twice since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. taken action to break up networks inside Pakistan’s nuclear establishment who were collaborating with outsiders in efforts to help them build bombs. In both cases, rogue senior officials and their cohorts in the nuclear establishment were not caught by Pakistan’s military, security and intelligence establishment.

The network run by the father of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, channeled sensitive nuclear technologies to Libya, North Korea and Iran for years under the noses of the Pakistani establishment, before it was taken down in 2003.

(Credit: Associated Press)

The second case involved the Umma-Tameer-E-Nau, which was founded by Pakistani nuclear scientists with close ties to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It was headed by Bashiruddin Mahmood, a retired senior Pakistan Atomic Energy Agency official who had headed Pakistan’s Khushab Atomic Reactor. He discussed Al Qaeda’s nuclear aspirations with Osama bin Laden.

In assuring the security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan, we should remind ourselves that the insider threat is the key wild card. The record is troubling, especially when one considers the probable outcome had the U.S. not intervened as it did to neutralize threats as they became known. The next time a nuclear threat emerges, will Pakistani authorities catch it in time? The U.S. should do everything in its power to ensure they can.

Nuclear terrorism is not just a problem for Pakistan and the region. Terrorist acquisition and movement of nuclear materials represents a real and growing global threat, because the detonation of one nuclear bomb in any city in the world would change the course of history.

Other Threats: A Coup or Chaos

Karin von Hippel is co-director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

A Taliban and Al Qaeda takeover of Pakistan, along with its nuclear arsenal, pose the worst-case scenario for Western policymakers and far too many Pakistanis. But two other, less extreme scenarios also cause serious concern.

The first would be yet another military coup, potentially led by junior officers with sympathy for the Islamist militants. Many of these junior officers are largely unknown to their counterparts in the West, unlike the senior military officers. This lack of familiarity is the result of U.S. sanctions placed on Pakistan between the end of the Cold War and Sept. 11, 2001, moves that were intended to punish the country for its nuclear program and, later, for a military coup.

The second nightmare scenario would be continued state disintegration, resulting in competing militias, terrorist groups and criminal gangs in charge of most of Pakistan’s provinces and territories, with the government exercising only nominal control over parts of the capital city and — maybe — some of the nuclear weapons.

Any of these scenarios will have enormous consequences for the South Asia region, home to nearly half the world’s population.

Any of these formulations will have direct and enormous consequences not only for the people and governments in the greater South Asia region — home to nearly half the world’s population and several nuclear-armed states — but also further afield in Europe and North America.

In contrast, the best case scenario would be a full embrace by the Pakistani security forces of counter-insurgency doctrine –- notably protection of the civilian population, improved delivery of social services and successful application of the rule of law –- along with much-needed political and economic reforms throughout the country.

What should the United States and its allies do to help move the country in the right direction? While the top levels of the U.S. government –- in both the military and civilian spheres –- are already working very closely with their counterparts in Pakistan and in the region, greater efforts also need to be made to align the Pakistani people with their own government and these external efforts.

In Pakistan (and to a degree in Afghanistan), too many citizens still think they are being asked to fight America’s war, and are not fully convinced that they are facing an internal security threat from the Taliban, Al Qaeda, narco-criminals, warlords or other militia groups. Many also view their own government as corrupt and incapable of providing even basic justice.

To enhance diplomatic, development and military efforts, the U.S. government should support an extensive countrywide campaign that personalizes the victims and the heroes, telling the stories of those who were butchered by the Taliban and those who successfully resisted. This should be paired with extensive support for the very robust civil society organizations operating throughout the country.

No Consistent U.S. Response

Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.



American South Asia policy is terminally afflicted by strategic attention deficit disorder (SADD). In the three decades since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States has trusted the Pakistanis (and allowed the ISI to run mujahedeen operations), mistrusted the Pakistanis (and sanctioned them for developing the nuclear weapons they developed five years before the sanctions), trusted the Pakistanis (and climbed into bed with Pervez Musharraf as the terror fighting hero of the post 9/11 era), dumped Musharraf, embraced Benazir Bhutto and then her widower, and now we’re about to dump the widower.

Neither Bush or Obama were interested in scrutinizing where U.S. aid goes and what it achieves, preferring to trumpet mere expenditure as policy.

In light of the fact that successive American directors of the C.I.A. have labeled South Asia the world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoint, the fact that 9/11 was plotted in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan, that Islamists affiliated with al Qaeda now dominate significant swaths of Pakistani territory, and that we have two nuclear armed nations eying each other warily, the administration’s confusion is staggering.

What’s the nightmare scenario? This is it. We have another president in Washington who believes that if he only finds the right president (of Pakistan, Afghanistan, whatever), the situation on the ground will improve. Another president who believes that more troops equals better strategy. Another president who believes that nuclear weapons and the creeping domination of territory is something that can be managed by better diplomacy. Another president that has been persuaded, as Secretary Gates said today, that Saudi Arabia can help manage our problems.

These problems aren’t going to be solved by having special envoys with better titles, or subcontracting American defense to Saudi Arabia. We need clear indications of long term American commitment to the region, training and equipping of the Pakistani military, and effectively integrated military and aid programs. And what of the billions that have already been spent?

Like soldiers, money should not be obligated without a strategy. Neither Bush or Obama were interested in scrutinizing where U.S. aid goes and what it achieves, preferring to trumpet the mere expenditure as policy. Absent these changes, we are inviting our enemies to believe again in American weakness. And we know where that led the last time.

The Risks With Bombing

Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

What could we do if Pakistan collapsed and the security of its roughly 100 nuclear weapons could no longer be vouched for? The answer, in most scenarios, is that we could only usefully do what the Pakistanis themselves (or whatever fraction of their government and military remained intact at the time) might ask us to do. Unilateral American action would probably be too little, too late.

Some might say, aren’t Pakistani nuclear weapons in easily identified sites that we could target with air power or special forces, and destroy, if necessary? Such an option might be worth considering if the alternative were to allow nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of extremists.

A lot could be done if a joint U.S.-Pakistan mission were created to secure perimeters around nuclear sites.

But the timing and the logistics would be challenging. We would not want to bomb sites that remained in government hands, even if Pakistani forces seemed to be gradually losing control of the situation. Yet if we waited even an hour or two after the sites were seized, the weapons could already have been removed.

The flight time for American bombers operating from the military base Diego Garcia might be too long, even if the aircraft had been predeployed and authorized to strike the sites. There is also the danger that our weapons would not penetrate the hardened facilities, mostly likely underground. (In theory, U.S. special forces could in theory penetrate almost any site if they could be deployed in adequate numbers to fend off insurgents, and fast enough to beat the insurgents to the bombs. But those assumptions might be dubious.)

Moreover, there could be weapons in sites we don’t know about, since the Pakistanis don’t trust us entirely and the locations of all their weapons are unlikely to be fully known. As American officials have noted, some weapons could be in transit at a given moment, especially if the Pakistanis came to believe that the security of their nuclear bunkers was in jeopardy.

On the other hand, if Pakistan and its leaders were willing to ask for help to create secure perimeters around nuclear sites, the United States could do a lot. Such a joint mission would also be a useful deterrent against possible Indian actions against such sites. I doubt things will get this bad, but if they do, let’s hope Islamabad has the good sense to request our collaboration on the ground.

Needed: Patience and Restraint

Ellen Laipson is president of the Stimson Center, a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution dedicated to international security issues. She was vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 1997 to 2002.

After years of the much touted cooperation on “terrorism,” it is not clear if the United States and Pakistan have a sufficient convergence of interests. In the last several weeks, confidence in Pakistan’s ability to manage its many challenges has eroded. Violence from the western provinces intrudes into the urban centers, the civilian elected government has made some regrettable choices that have damaged consensus about democracy and the rule of law, and the true intentions of the military and its subordinate intelligence units toward the radical Islamists including the Taliban are enduring concerns.

But a security breakdown at the nuclear facilities and total takeover of the state by the Taliban are exceedingly low probability scenarios, and should not be the main focus of American attention and concern. Rather, we still need to devote time and effort to building trust in our long-term intentions, and avoid antagonizing Pakistan’s tense leadership.

For example, the Obama-Biden plan to expand funding for education and basic human needs may help counter some of the acute anti-Americanism that sees Washington, even under Obama, pursuing a military strategy that has harmed Pakistani civilians. We are a supporting cast player in Pakistan’s strategy for economic development and political reform; we should have no illusions that we will be able to determine the pace or outcomes of change. But such engagement may be critical to putting the immediate security cooperation into a context that is more palatable for Pakistan’s people and its leaders.

The Civilian-Driven Solution

Parag Khanna, senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, is the author of “The Second World: How Emerging Powers are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-First Century.”

Gen. David Petraeus, head of the United States Central Command, has stated that the next two weeks are crucial to Pakistan’s survival, while David Kilcullen, the counterinsurgency expert, has said that the country could collapse within six months. General Kiyani, Pakistan’s Army chief, could declare martial law imminently if his counter-offensives in the Swat region prove ineffective in stemming Taliban infiltration into the Punjab.

For counterinsurgency, boost police recruitment and training and corral civilian forces to build roads, schools, hospitals and government offices.

But that action will mean little unless the Pakistani government can regain control of the restive Pashtun-dominated provinces, or risk losing its nominal authority over those areas forever. On the political level, the National Assembly must pass a constitutional amendment to integrate the Federally Administered Tribal Areas into the Northwest Frontier Province and mandate a fresh round of provincial elections.

This would give the government some way to replace gradually the Frontier Crimes Regulation, the British-era laws that were imposed to control the Pashtun tribal areas and which have abetted the Taliban’s rise in those regions. President Zardari must also allow the sign the Political Parties Act to allow the formation of political groups in those areas. These steps would allow the government to assert sovereignty and justify a strengthened presence of the Frontier Corps and police to monitor elections, while forcing the Taliban to consider secular options.

A smarter balance between military and police efforts is also needed. Pakistan needs to launch its own indigenous version of the NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which have had some success in maintaining local order, building relationships with district-level authorities, and stimulating small-scale economic activity. Yet while the focus to date has been almost exclusively on military-driven counterinsurgency, this requires boosting police recruitment and training while corralling civilian forces to oversee the construction of roads, schools, hospitals, and government offices. For its part, the military must now focus on internal defense, disrupting militant networks which have gained strength even in the Punjabi heartland.

If the recent protests against Talibanization rippling across continent are any indication, the secular elites are becoming quite vocal. This sliver of the population together with Pakistan’s wealthy diaspora could play an influential role in restoring unity among Pakistan’s many factions.