The video is at the ABC news page link below; the DKos won't let me embed it in this diary. Ignore the link header language about how the video is about "extending unemployment benefits"--that's only part of it, most of the video is Stephanopoulos trying to catch her out on her contradictory positions and tea party crap, including the Obama's a Nazi/Communist billboard:

http://abcnews.go.com/...

Next:

This next part of the post is written for posterity. You can skip it, if you're not interested in posterity.

I'm setting it down here as a purely "cover my own ass" memo, so no one can ever accuse me of having failed to tell an important part of the story. It will explain the "game theory in action" part of the Bachmann phenomenon that is absent from professional political journalism and most of the coverage of Bachmann on the blogs. Okay:

You live in a country where there are only two viable national political brands. Because there are only two viable brands--one or the other will be charged with national leadership/national policymaking/national direction/appointments to national policymaking positions (eg, the courts.)

Remember: all you get are two national political brands, because the branding is burned in the public mind for more than a hundred and fifty years and there isn't enough money or sustained interest to create a viable third brand.

One party is called "A," the other party is called "B." When A gets in, B and its agenda are marginalized; when B gets in, A is marginalized so long as B is in power.

There are various people all over the nation who are extremely unhappy with the two brands and view them as different sides of the same coin. These groups of voters and political activists have different and often mutually exclusive goals, but they share a frustration that "real change" is never going to take place until A and B are replaced with leaders drawn from their own groups.

These unsatisfied centers of power are called C, D, and E. Pretend you're the leader of C, D, or E. What strategy do you adopt to get your agenda made into public policy--given the fact that the winner of the contest for power must always be a member of either A or B?

Remember that the goal of the game is to direct/make national policy.

Here's group C's strategy. Group C rejects the "it's either A or B" paradigm. Group C forms a third party in the hope that the voters will rally to it as a real alternative to the same-old special interest parties of A and B. The leaders and supporters of C hope that the public will turn to them in sufficient numbers to constitute a real threat to the A and B brands; they believe that it is capable to establish a C brand capable of competing with the A and B brands.

Now is that good game theory? Game theory is about possible outcomes, so I don't think Group C has a good strategy. Group C may triumph in some local elections in states or communities open to change (eg, places where the tea party or the left progressives might pick up seats.) But remember the rule: the rule that "the party that will make national policy after election day is over is either A or B." That's set out by our historical experience, which is the most reliable guide to predicting our future. And as I pointed out above, the money, media and sustained and widespread support necessary to put C at the policy making table simply isn't there.

The fact that A or B will dominate is also an empirical likelihood because the non-elected centers of power (the business community, the voter organizers and organizations, identity voters, etc.) gravitate toward A and B in the expectation that one of them will win. And those centers of power have transgenerational and interdependent relationships with A or B (or both!) and they perpetuate the "it must be either A or B" rule.

People who pursue C are unlikely to obtain the outcomes they say they are seeking.

Here's group D's strategy. Group D accepts the fact that it will not triumph at the polls in national elections; it accepts the fact that it must be either A or B, dominating policy making after election day.

But group D still hopes to influence national policy making. How? It turns out that group A cannot win national power without the support of group D. If group D splits, A loses and B wins. So group D threatens a split, a very real split, if group A does not accommodate D by following through on at least some of group D's agenda.

The threat of a split is real: A is petrified at the prospect. B is overjoyed by the prospect. The D group has power to wield against A, but no power to threaten B's prospects unless D acts in concert with A.

So B is highly motivated to support D's split with A. In theory, B and D's agendas couldn't be farther apart. In practice, B will send D candidates and activists money to facilitate the split with A. It's very cynical for B to send that money and for D to accept it--but it's great game theory on B's part; it leads to a B outcome.

Is D's strategy good game theory? Well, that depends. If you're sincerely convinced that there is really no difference between A and B in power, it's not bad. For example, if in 2000 you believed that there really was no difference between a White House run by Al Gore and a White House run by George W. Bush--as a member of group D, you would opt for such a strategy. And risk the prospect of an America led by GWB; that would be an acceptable outcome for you if you really believed that there really wasn't any difference between A and B.

Similarly: if you really believe that there is no significant difference between an America led by Barack Obama and the Democrats and an America led by this generation of conservative Republicans--then there is no reason that you shouldn't embrace this strategy (in the hope of squeezing out concessions prior to the round of elections that follows this upcoming elections.)

However: if there are real and significant differences in how the leaders of A and B would run the country--this is a terrible strategy. Because if B comes into power without any obligations to D's agenda, the country will move further towards B's goals. B and its agenda will triumph, despite the fact that it can be beaten by the combined power of A and D.

If D actually splits, A loses--the only winners in this group D strategy are the B players. A is out (but not permanently out; it has branding), D is out (and there are no concessions to D's agenda under the B regime.) D lives with the consequences of disaster fostered by its strategy, and its only hope of reversing the damage wrought by B is to stagger back to a coalition with A in some future election cycle, with no guarantee of victory or progress on its core agenda.

And stagger back they will, not because the D supporters believe in A's agend, but because they find that life under B is a deteriorating nightmare.

So--no, since I don't believe that A and B are merely different sides of the same coin...I don't believe that D's strategy is good gaming. It may make the D people "feel good" momentarily to cost A power and election; it may further the political careers of particular D activists to exercise spoiler power...but if the goal is to get to the policy making table (and it is, that's what this is all about for all the groups)--then this is a terrible strategy for this game.

Finally: the group that I write about here, all the time: group E. What is their strategy?

It's very sophisticated, compared to the strategies of groups C and D. Because its goal is not to openly compete with A and B. Like group D, it accepts the reality of the branding and the political consequences: that the group that ends up directing national policy after election day will be either A or B.

Like groups C and D, they have a different and transforming agenda for America. They know that if they present this agenda to voters under the brand "E," the voters will reject it as the marginal agenda of a third party.

So what does this politically sophisticated group E do? Understanding that "it must be either A or B,"--they take over one of the two brands that are guaranteed to win. They focus their efforts on taking over group B in order to benefit from its national branding.

Bear in mind that group E is not the same as group B. They are not mere politics-as-usual cynics; like C and D they want to make fundamental changes to the political system and society. In some areas the agendas of groups B and E coincide, but the changes that group E wants to make are not historically a part of group B's agenda.

Like D, group E has the power to cost one of the two major brands the election (if E splits, it costs B the ability to direct national policy.)

But E is not content with the power to split. E has the means (its own media, its own money, and its own national and local political organizations) to put its people into the B hierarchy and maneuver them into positions of influence. At this writing, it regularly does so.

D has to be content to limit itself to "the power to split." D has no significant media, money--no national and local political organizations capable of electing candidates to national policy making positions. Its national political brand is dwarfed by A, B and E. But E has the necessary national machine--it's been built over three decades. It doesn't have to be content to limit itself to "the power to split"--it can groom, mentor, sponsor candidacies...give them free airtime and promotion in E's very own media, trounce any competitors in E's very own media, use E's get-out-the-vote organizations to elect E candidates under the B label.

And E runs them under the B label. Because (unlike C) E accepts the "it must be A or B, after election day" rule, and seeks the benefits of the existing branding. And because (unlike D) they have the means to put their own people into one of the two major brands.

Now: what do you think of that strategy, as game theory? I think E's strategy is a real winner, if the goal is to maximize its policy making power. In fact, I think it's fuckin' brilliant. Instead trying to build a mandate for a third party devoted to radical change from the ground up--a minority interest devoted to radical change can simply co-opt one of the existing "winner brands," and co-opt that brand's market. The voters won't be any the wiser until the E people are actually making policy. The big special interests (for example, the business community) will come on board simply because the E people get into power--and those special unofficial interests needs access to the party making policy, laws, and regulations.

And the beauty part is: because E operates under the aegis/branding of B--no one in traditional media will really question or even report its radical agenda. The traditional media will continue to report the agenda as "the B brand's agenda," even after the E party has penetrated the B party. And most people won't even know that E is an organized political party with its own radical agenda--as centrally organized and dedicated to fighting to win political power on a daily basis as the famous A or B brands.

E, as an organized political party representing a tiny minority devoted to radical transformation of the US, succeeds via stealth--by proceeding under B's brand.

And now the outcome of the game:

If the rule is that "only A or B will be designated to direct national policy after election day..."

...and A fails at the polls in any race where E has captured B (it could be the presidential race, a local municipal race, whatever)...

...then E gets to make policy, which is the object of the game. E wins, and A,C, and D are screwed because E's making policy that governs all of them. B remains as a brand, but is an empty shell--because "the people to see to get things done": are the people who run E.

So the letters stand for:

A (the Dems)

B (the GOP)

C (true believers in a third party)

D (the splitters)

E (the evangelical conservative political machine.)

Bachmann is presented to the public as a member of "B," but actually she's a longterm protege of "E." And she continues to rise. She's raised more money than any other congressional candidate, the GOP is employing her services as a national fund raiser for other candidates. And this week she was designated "queen of the American right" by a British paper--which doesn't mention the fact of E, or its sponsorship of Bachmann, or the fact of its wonderful decades-old game strategy. All consistent with the failure of media to recognize E's game strategy, all consistent with E's strategy of proceeding under the B brand.

That British paper has nothing to be ashamed of, if you accept the very low bar set by other journalists reporting on national and local politics... The other political journalists don't record "the fact of E and its political strategy," either. The stealth strategy continues to succeed, and Bachmann can be crowned "queen of the right" without anyone learning how the evangelical conservative machine promoted her to that national status.

There have been a few books touching the game theory of the evangelical conservatives in recent years (Max Blumenthal's "Republican Armageddon" and Michele Goldberg's "Kingdom Coming" and Kevin Phillips' book on the American religious right.) But the political reality does not register in the traditional media's reporting on evangelical protege candidates. Indeed, people here are reluctant to recognize the reality of this political dynamic--to realize how widespread and effective the strategy is. Bachmann is not the only protege of the national evangelical conservative strategy. Mike Huckabee and others around the country are also in their stable, and other "mainstream" Republicans continue to court the movement's favor.

If you did bother to read this: please remember my annoying nonsense about all these different letters and what they stand for. Even if you never come back here because you think I'm talking unnecessarily obscurantist nonsense.

The evangelicals have a wonderful strategy for this game that succeeds in co-opting the GOP brand even when the GOP is in remission. Proceeding under the GOP brand, plus the fact that the GOP is bound to win somewhere and sometimes--is a guarantee that evangelical conservative proteges will enter government to promote the movements agenda and make policy for you and me. That is how a radical agenda supported by only 25% of the nation's voters--can be turned into decisions on health care, war, our tax burden, social justice, civil rights, etc--affecting all of the rest of us.

ACTION LINK: to Tarry Clark, Bachmann's Dem opponent. Please help!

http://tarrylclark.com/