Trends and Forces

No team operates in a vacuum. The Celtics, coming off a positive season with a disappointing end, are entering what is viewed as a critical offseason at a time when the league’s traditional team-building foundational principles are changing. This is well-trod territory, but it’s worth just looking at what the “new TV deal” cap increase looks like.

Last year’s $7M cap increase, which was barely noticed as people looked to the future, was, in raw dollars, the third largest cap increase ever. Next season the cap is projected to increase by $22M, with a further $16M (and it will end up being more than that) tacked on the following year.

This means that functionally every team in the league would be willing and able to clear enough cap space to sign a transformative player like Kevin Durant, if he chose them. We could actually see a team break the regular season wins record and then make one of the biggest free agent signings in league history.

In this environment the traditional team building tools are all seeing their values change. The Mid-level Exception (MLE), long the primary tool for good teams to add quality role players (or saddle themselves with bad contracts), now looks like it may buy a deep bench player instead of someone for the core rotation. Most teams will spend time under the salary cap meaning they won’t even have access to the full MLE and instead will get the smaller Room Mid-level Exception (RME) if they are able to get back up to the cap at all. The Bi-annual Exception (BAE) is already rarely used and the Taxpayer MLE (MMLE) may only even be a consideration for the Cavaliers as no one else has immediate tax concerns.

Trade Exceptions (TPE), which the Celtics have used well in the past, barely even exist now. Teams that do have or create them are more likely than ever to just renounce them as they go below the cap, and their value in the market is extremely low as cap space is easier to trade into than a TPE and many teams have that available to use. In the past, when cap space was precious, expiring contracts often greased the wheels of major trades. The years long decline in the value of those contracts is now bottoming out with them being functionally worthless.

Rookie deals, with their first four years of salary predefined and ending in restricted free agency with comparatively low maximum contracts, see their relative value increase as their salary-to-cap ratio quickly drops. However, future draft picks for 2017 and beyond are more difficult to value as the potential to re-write the CBA, and with it the rookie scale table, looms that summer; we’ll get to that in a second.

Pushing against all this newly available cash is the salary floor. The obligation for every team to, at least on paper, spend up to 90% of the salary cap has, to this point, only been the concern of a few teams tanking away seasons. Beginning this year we’ll have multiple teams both trying to compete and add talent, and struggling to spend up to the floor. It may be that teams simply accept the “penalty” of having to cut their players a check to make up the difference to the salary floor, but teams really don’t like to give away money for nothing, no matter how much fans like to believe the owners of their team will do it for team good will. The more likely result of the floor will be that it plays its intended role and leads teams to overspend on middling players. Getting something is better than nothing, after all.

Except when it’s not. The challenge for teams is striking a proper balance. It may be that we see the cap increase by large amounts for two seasons then shrink and level out. Teams that spend lavishly on mid-tier players may find themselves capped out in a few years, looking to dump contracts the way teams used to regret giving out bad MLE deals. The limits on contract length keeps that from being a major issue (if it were the late-1990’s we’d be seeing Evan Turner angling for a 5-6 year deal) but smart, or copy-cat, front offices who miss out on their top targets but want to spend up to the floor will look to make Amir Johnson-type deals with frontloaded money followed by team outs. The goal of the agents of mid-tier players will be sniffing out the stupid franchises willing to give their player a four-year deal to overcome a two-year salary floor concern.

I say this is a two-year concern but we really don’t know how things will play out beyond that. The expectation is that the CBA will be rewritten before the 2017-18 season. It seems like the players are the driving force behind this, which would indicate player friendly changes could be coming, including further increases in the salary cap. Teams, who have more information about how things are going than an outsider like me, have to make bets on how they see this playing out. Around the last set of CBA changes we saw two franchises, the Mavericks and Thunder, make large bets that the league’s finances would be more stagnant than they have been and so made aggressive moves that backfired.

That choice between being conservative or aggressive in pursuing a plan aligned to your projections is one all teams face. Unlike around the last CBA change, where the aggressive position was to scale back team finances, the aggressive position now is to expand them and spend. This is actually a less risky position to be in than last time, because trading away James Harden or breaking up a title core lasts forever; a free agent signing that goes south may only carry two years of real pain and even that could be cleared away if a new amnesty provision is created.

All of that leads to a position that teams have maybe never been in before. Hyper-aggressiveness, on the financial front, seems to be the correct course of action. That does not mean that teams should be willing to spend for the sake of spending; it’s that teams should not let financial concerns get in the way of what they think are good talent acquisitions. We’ll get into how that plays into the planning specifically for the Celtics, but the average team should identify their targets all the way down through the tiers of players and then pursue them very hard. A player signed to a “bad” four-year deal on an even $92M salary cap won’t matter if the cap is $125M in 2018 or your projection goes wrong and it sinks to $100M but you get an amnesty option, especially if that player helps you reach the salary floor for the next few seasons.

The current projections, which will likely change again after the league finish their audit, look like this:

Assets and Options

The timing of this temporary bonanza is actually somewhat unfortunate for the Celtics. Throughout almost all of the salary cap era, cap space was a precious commodity available to only a handful of teams each year. The Celtics spent 18 consecutive years over the salary cap, a feat that would not be possible if cap spikes like we’re about to see were a regular occurrence. For salary matching purposes, the Nets trade had to send back some multi-year contracts, including Gerald Wallace’s. From that moment you could see that, unless the Celtics got anxious and traded away picks to dump contracts, last summer would be an opportunity to go below the cap with this season the chance to get all the way to max space.

If the cap continued to grow at historic rates, the Celtics would have hit this offseason as one of a few teams with that type of flexibility. Instead, they face a market flush with potential suitors for their target players. Where they do have an advantage is in the ability to create enough cap space to sign two max players without gutting their core.

If the Celtics were to win one of the top two picks in the lottery they would no longer have enough starting cap space to sign two 7-9 year player max contracts, but they could get back there by using one of their picks on a draft-and-stash or by giving away one of their young players (probably James Young).

The below table shows how combinations of the four remaining non-guaranteed players and restricted free agents would impact the team’s starting cap space.

A Brief Aside About Evan Turner Evan Turner’s situation is complicated. A player establishes different levels of Bird Rights based on how many years it has been since they voluntarily changed teams. Full Bird Rights, the kind that allow a team to re-sign a player for all the way up to their maximum salary even if it bring them over the cap, are established after three seasons. The Logo signed in Boston two years ago, so he carries a lesser type of right known as Early Bird Rights. Early Bird Rights allow a team to sign their free agent for up to 175% of their previous salary even if that brings them over the salary cap. To sign the player for more than that, they must use cap space. In the coming hyper-aggressive seller’s market, Evan is going to get paid quite a lot. His Early Bird Rights only cover a $6M first season salary, which will not be enough to re-sign him, so whatever you think Turner’s whole 2016-17 salary will be is taken out of cap space. In effect, if you want to bring back Evan Turner at his market price, you do not think the Celtics can/will have a transformative offseason with multiple major acquisitions. That may very well be the case regardless of what happens with Turner. The question then becomes: Is Evan worth the price not so much in dollars (we’re in an aggressive market, after all) but in minutes. Is it a good idea to close off avenues to a massive offseason while also blocking the development of younger, cheaper alternatives like Terry Rozier and RJ Hunter? In my opinion, no; it’s not a good idea to re-sign Turner regardless of if he’s leaving because the team needs the cap space to acquire two major players, or the team is taking a longer path where internal development is a better choice. It seems like the clearest path for Evan to return is some sort of middle way. If the team were to acquire one star player, possibly via a trade that moves some of the other options for his role, but then were not able to close on a second one they could then go back to Turner as a veteran fallback. Picture a scenario where the Nets pick and Smart are traded for DeMarcus Cousins, but then Kevin Durant goes back to OKC leaving the Celtics with vacant cap space and a need for another playmaker, for example. Back to the Topic at Hand…

All of that is the set-up for the next chapter in this building cycle for the Celtics. The team was one of the youngest in the league so it’s not correct to call this a make-or-break offseason. It’s more like a fork in the road. The team is set up, more so than last summer or at the last trade deadline, to execute a franchise altering series of moves. The issue continues to be that the opportunity to do that may not present itself, and if it does there will be other teams looking to grab it at the same time.

An unfortunate reality is that the likable core of this past season’s team may not stay together if what I think everyone believes is the best case scenario happens. It’s possible that all of the non-guaranteed players and free agents are simply allowed to leave and they are replaced with two major free agents and a set of draft picks. More likely, an ideal rebuild involves a combination of expensive signings and trades where an established player and/or a set of young ones have to be let go.

Goals and Aspirations

Before we map out some fantasy offseasons, let’s set goals:

First, this team needs shooting. They really badly need shooting. Ideally from someone who looks like a traditional small forward.

Second, we need more athleticism. Terry Rozier stood out so much because there’s no one else on the roster like him. A dunker on the front line would be a welcome addition, especially if they’re able to block some shots on the other end.

Third, unless the team goes through a major overhaul with new top-end talent, we need to clear opportunity. There’s no point in drafting a pack of youngsters if the only minutes available to them are in Maine. Even if it costs a few wins in the short-term, we need to see what we have in the youth movement so informed decisions can be made about them in the future.

Fourth, it would be nice to have a star player over 6′ who the rest of the league fears at least a little bit on offense.

Lastly, we don’t want to do anything stupid. The goal is not to be a 52 win team for the next five seasons. We want to reach 52 as part of a sustainable progression, or jump all the way up to 60 and challenge for a banner.

Pretenders and Contenders

So, what would it really take to elevate the Celtics to the upper echelon of the league in a single offseason? It starts with an acceptance of risk. Much of that risk is related to the timing of steps in the offseason.

The draft, which will present an opportunity to move, especially with the Amir Johnson and Jonas Jerebko contracts, also carries the risk of future mediocrity. If the Celtics win the lottery would they be willing to move that pick for a player like Jimmy Butler, who on his own does not make the team a contender, because it increases the chances of a follow-up move? If they don’t win the lottery, is it worth moving a pick in the 3-5 range with Marcus Smart and Jae Crowder for that trade that shows intent, but also may limit long-term upside if the rest of the plan does not come to fruition?

That question may be key in this whole process because if a Butler or Cousins level player is for sale the draft would be the most likely moment for it to happen and the Celtics will not have spoken to any prospective free agents at that time. If Boston is hesitant to take the leap, a collection of teams (76ers, Lakers, Magic, etc.) will be there with similar goals and tradable assets to jump in.

We at least have history to look to on this. In 2007, Ainge did take that leap moving for Ray Allen at the draft. The difference there was that Garnett was definitely available in trade so the Celtics had a full portfolio of information to work off of. A trade at this draft, if the goal is to sell a change to Kevin Durant, is done largely blind.

A complete, league altering rebuild probably looks something like this:

Boston opens with an offer at the draft of just draft assets and players who spent time in Maine, using Amir Johnson’s contract for matching purposes. If the Celtics have a top-2 pick and are willing to move future Brooklyn picks in the process that may be enough. If it is, the trade is executed at the draft.

If it’s not, and the team agrees to include an established player like Avery Bradley or Jae Crowder, it would ultimately suit the Celtics to not formally execute the trade until much later in the offseason. This is a fine line to walk and they may not bother with it, but if all of the moving parts could be managed the team could then take the necessary steps to clear as much cap space as possible. They could then sell two free agents with the promise of a third player, like Butler, unofficial but in the bag. If the cap goes up from $92M and the outgoing players make a little more money (like maybe Bradley and Smart together) it might not even be necessary to wait.

After the draft, it will be time to tender qualifying offers to Jared Sullinger and Tyler Zeller. I see no reason not to make the offer to Sully. He won’t accept it and it could always be rescinded later if the cap space is needed. Tyler Zeller is less clear-cut. I don’t think he would take the qualifying offer but you never know, and there are limits on how you can trade a player who takes the QO so if he did it couldn’t be immediately cleared off the books. If the team has no interest in retaining Tyler, it would also just be nice to give him the freedom of unrestricted free agency.

Regardless of earlier steps, the team then has to make their decisions on Amir Johnson and Jonas Jerebko early in the moratorium. I don’t see a scenario where Jonas Jerebko needs to be waived before his $5M becomes guaranteed on July 3. There are plenty of teams who would be happy to take him off Boston’s hands and into their cap space if they need the room for major moves later. Amir should also get more than $12M in his next contract but it would not be as simple to move him quickly if needed. It could still certainly be done so I don’t think he would be waived (if he weren’t traded at the draft) but I also wouldn’t be shocked if it happened. If it does, it’s a GREAT sign for pending moves.

Our ideal rebuild now has to consider some fine details. Depending on the exact salary cap, and how the lottery and draft played out, the team may choose to ship out some of the younger players like James Young or RJ Hunter to clear all required space. Neither would bring much in return, but there would also be multiple teams happy to take a risk on them for no cost.

At this stage we’re now looking to add one or two premier free agents. The primary target is, of course, Kevin Durant. We know we’ll have space for him. If we haven’t consummated a draft day trade, we’ll be looking for a second primary free agent acquisition to sell as a combo deal to KD. The name most commonly brought up is Al Horford, but Hassan Whiteside could also be in play. Most of the other top free agents play Durant’s position, or aren’t as good as the Celtics’ current options.

A less ideal but similar looking offseason would have Horford as the main acquisition and a player like Nic Batum as the paired signing.

Some people prefer a future where the Celtics sign Durant and Horford after drafting and keeping Ben Simmons (or Brandon Ingram) instead of making a major draft trade, which works and would also be great and leaves the team with more depth, but here is the maximalist “ideal build” in sequential order:

1. The Celtics agree to trade the Nets pick, Avery Bradley, Marcus Smart, RJ Hunter, and James Young for Jimmy Butler

2. One of the remaining 1st round picks is used on a draft-and-stash while the other is used on a player for next season

3. A qualifying offer is extended to Jared Sullinger but not Tyler Zeller

4. Amir Johnson is waived before July 3

5. Evan Turner’s rights are renounced (they don’t help anyway)

6. The team approaches Durant and Horford on the first day they can, pitching a super team built around them with Isaiah Thomas, Jimmy Butler, and Jae Crowder

7. Both players agree to sign for their max contracts, Durant taking a 2+1 deal meaning he can move back into free agency in 2018

8. Jonas Jerebko is traded into another team’s cap space for a future 2nd round pick

9. John Holland is waived

10. Jared Sullinger’s qualifying offer is rescinded

11. Durant and Horford officially sign

The roster is filled out with some ring chasing veterans using the RME and minimum contracts

Slow and Steady

A build like that requires so many things to happen that are out of the team’s control that, while fun to talk about, if very unlikely. The most likely, and least immediately gratifying, path involves no major acquisitions and a commitment to building through the draft. Even in this path the team isn’t going to have all players under 24 years old so all the picks down through round 2 won’t be used in this season.

This path potentially leaves the team below the salary floor by some amount so there’s no reason to lose players like Amir Johnson and Jonas Jerebko unless you think younger players are ready to push them out. Jared Sullinger, for all that he looked terrible to end the season, is still young and performed well by advanced metrics this season. If you’re building for the future, you want to keep a player like that. Evan Turner could be brought back in this scenario but let’s say you add Jamal Murray or Buddy Hield on top of Smart, Rozier, and Hunter. Do you want to commit multiple years to Evan Turner in that scenario?

If this does play out it’s important to remember that this is the mid-point of the haul from the Nets trade, not the end. The team can be ok for a few years while building a young contender beneath the surface if the patience is there. It’s more likely that the next great Celtics team will be Harry Giles, Jamal Murray, and Marcus Smart in 2021, than Kevin Durant and Al Horford in 2017.

Hot and Cold

The last option is, of course, somewhere between these two extremes. That could take any number of appearances. It could be that the team trades the Nets pick for a star but then cannot follow that up with the rest of the moves needed to become a legitimate contender. The only free agent (LeBron excluded) who makes a team a contender is Durant so, similarly, the team could make the Nets pick and then sign one good free agent (Horford, Batum, Barnes) or a few ok ones (Bazemore, Fournier, Ezeli) and advance to being an over-50 wins team.

If this is done through free agency there’s no real downside. Those players aren’t going to hamstring your franchise with the length of deals and the way the cap is moving. If Durant decides to return to OKC but only for one season, this might actually be the best course of action. You can be a 52 win team and show further progress while building a larger asset base of veteran player who could be moved later. Worst case you’re still building through the draft; best case you’re doing that while turning excess cap space into current wins and future assets.

The bigger risk, and a definite possibility given the timing of the offseason, is trading away the Nets pick for that Butler or Cousins level player but then not having the other shoe drop. If you, for example, make the Butler trade for the Nets pick, Bradley, and Smart and then, failing to entice Durant, bring back Sullinger and add some other mid-tier veteran you’re pushing up your age and cost profile but not getting to the realm of title contenders. It’s much harder to get “trapped in the middle” in the current climate than in a flat cap one, but you start edging into that world with that type of offseason.

Facts and Figures

The fact is that it’s really hard to figure how this offseason will play out. It’s undoubtedly an important one for the Celtics, but it’s an important one for a lot of teams, and the league as a whole. Having multiple positive options is always good, but it’s especially so when you’re in an environment where no one is exactly sure how the underlying landscape is shifting.

The reason a team even builds flexibility is not so they can execute one specific plan. They may have a Plan A, but too many teams get themselves in a position where Plan A is a possibility but out of their complete control, and Plan B isn’t that good. Plan A for the Celtics returns them to immediate contention, but Plans B, C, and D are still better than what most teams have going. To be able to say that about a team that is already pretty good is a testament to good management and luck. As fans, we can only really hope for those two things to continue.

(But let’s also hope for Kevin Durant)

You can follow me @dangercart. I also maintain a cap calculator workbook at roster-builder.com that is now out-of-date. A Celtics-only copy of the model in Excel can be downloaded via dropbox here.