After losing the John Tavares sweepstakes, the Tampa Bay Lightning were right back in the news again looking to obtain defenseman Erik Karlsson from the Ottawa Senators. The Lightning passed on a deal at the trade deadline to bring Ottawa’s star defenseman to Tampa and instead acquired Ryan McDonagh from the New York Rangers. While Karlsson would’ve been a sexier pickup, McDonagh was a better fit to fill the shutdown role Tampa Bay was desperate to improve.

Last week, Tyler Dellow of The Athletic wrote an article pondering how Karlsson would improve the Lightning. He brought up Karlsson’s career powerplay production, Tampa Bay’s acquisition cost and injury concerns as well as the resulting salary cap implications an extension for the 2019 UFA would bring as potential red flags to consider as they get deeper into trade negotiations. While Dellow does have legitimate concerns, I do think the Karlsson’s fit into Tampa Bay’s powerplay and the resulting salary cap implications are greatly overvalued and Tampa should make the necessary moves in order to acquire Karlsson and sign him to a long-term deal.

Tampa Bay’s defense isn’t necessarily a weakness as they finished in the upper third of the league in even strength shots against, shot attempts against and right outside the upper third in goals against, but is an obvious area for improvement as the team looks to move from great to elite and contend for the Stanley Cup for the next half decade.

Dan Girardi saw increasing time with Victor Hedman on Tampa Bay’s top pairing in the final quarter of the season (42.7% CF%, 61.5% GF% in 221 TOI) which carried into the postseason (49.7% CF%, 50.0% GF% in 194 TOI). Shockingly, their 108.0 PDO in the regular season didn’t continue into the postseason and their goal-based results cratered. To win the Stanley Cup, Tampa needs the ice to be tilted in their favor when Hedman is on the ice and that did not happen when he was anchored down by Girardi.

After easing into the lineup after recovering from an injury, McDonagh coupled with Anton Stralman as Tampa’s shutdown pairing in the playoffs allowing Hedman more favorable matchups at even strength. This was very successful in the first two series when the opponents were top heavy, facing the Taylor Hall line vs. New Jersey and the Patrice Bergeron line vs. Boston. In the third round, Tampa faced a much more evenly balanced Washington Capitals. Tampa Bay Head Coach Jon Cooper abandoned his go-to pairing for much of the first two games of the series, instead going with top two pairings of Hedman-Stralman and McDonagh-Girardi. Tampa lost both those games and quickly united their shutdown pair against the Kuznetsov line as they clawed their way back into the series. Let’s look at how Tampa’s shutdown pair did in keeping the opponent’s top line off the scoresheet.

McDonagh had a very successful postseason for Tampa. Facing the opposition’s top line for much of 17 games, he was only on the ice for seven goals against at even strength, including a single goal against on the road where line matching is more difficult. It was Braydon Coburn who bared a brunt of the opposition’s goals with a minus five goal differential (2 GF, 7 GA) in less than 100 TOI when paired with any of Tampa’s top three defensemen.

The internal answer to improving Tampa Bay’s defensive structure is simple: healthy scratching or sheltering both of Girardi and Coburn. They are the two obvious drags on Tampa’s backend and limiting their minutes/usage will go a long way in improving the team’s performance at even-strength. Alongside Tampa’s high-powered offense, this move may be enough to transition Tampa from great to elite.

Star power is a major driver of postseason success and when a team’s championship window is wide open, they should look to add as much talent as possible. Adding Karlsson to the mix would even out Tampa’s top four and likely pair Hedman with Stralman and McDonagh with Karlsson. Per Dellow’s calculations, Karlsson would improve Tampa’s second pairing by around 12.4 goals for while allowing 1.5 fewer. Factoring in the impact to Hedman’s top pairing, the bottom line impact would be around three additional wins for Tampa Bay in the regular season.

Despite the impact at even-strength, Dellow detailed Karlsson’s struggles to produce a high rate of goals for over the course of his career on the powerplay and warned a team like Tampa not to put a ton of value in his powerplay skills, namely because of how lethal their powerplay already is. This is a fair argument to make and for similar logic, I have argued Nashville trading for Karlsson would be a step sideways rather than a step forward as their defense is already exceptional at even strength and the percent improvement may not be worth the acquisition cost.

I’ve also been on record for a long time saying the return for Karlsson won’t be as high as many people around the game expect it to be. Senators GM Pierre Dorion does not have a strong track record when it comes to trades and he doesn’t have the upper hand in this deal. I do think it is possible for Lightning GM Steve Yzerman to acquire Karlsson without parting with Mikhail Sergachev/Brayden Point/Cal Foote, but for our sakes, let’s assume that a trade package would center around Sergachev (I’d much rather this scenario than Foote as I believe his ceiling is higher).

My counter argument to Dellow: Tampa Bay’s long-term plan isn’t to give Karlsson regular powerplay minutes. This past season, Tampa Bay consistently ran a 4F1D powerplay at 5V4 on both of their units. Hedman (6.4 Pts/60 and 9.1 GF/60 in 245 minutes) was the lone defenseman on the first unit and rookie Sergachev (6.7 Pts/60 and 9.6 GF/60 in 143 minutes) on the second. The void Sergachev would leave on the second powerplay unit may put them back a step or two but would remain a legitimate scoring threat with Point and Yanni Gourde. I believe the long-term plan is to groom Foote into running the second man advantage unit from the backend. Foote’s scouting report includes moving the puck well, can be trusted to create chances from the back end on special teams and the vision to quarterback things from the point on the powerplay. The numbers back this up where almost half of Foote’s junior production came from the man advantage, scoring 74 power play points in 202 career WHL games. As Sergachev did, Foote should be able to step into the lineup and impact Tampa’s powerplay.

This lack of powerplay time may be a tough sell for Karlsson who has averaged over four PP TOI per game over the past eights seasons and over one third of his total point production comes from the man advantage. This comes despite his PP TOI having dropped a total of 31% over the past three seasons to a career low 3.32 minutes per game this past season. Players usually complain that losing powerplay time could cost them money on future contracts but with a trade likely dependent on a long-term contract extension, there would be nothing to worry about. Karlsson’s largest impact comes at even-strength where he’s averaged 21-23 TOI over the past several seasons and eliminating a powerplay role would allow Karlsson to take a few extra 5V5 shifts every game. He’s also been infrequently used on the penalty kill (usage varies between 0.6-2.2 TOI/GP over the past several seasons with on-ice results greatly differing season to season) so a larger role here could be viable if Tampa’s coaching staff sees an opportunity.

It isn’t easy trying to project what a contract extension for Karlsson would look like. Drew Doughty recently re-signed with Los Angeles for an $11.0M AAV, a significant upgrade from his current contract paying an average of $7.0M per season. This appears to be the baseline for which Karlsson, who is currently making an average of $6.5M per season, would expect an extension to pay, but is it? Karlsson has to ask him an important question: does he want to appear to make more money than Doughty or does he want to make more money than him and play for a strong contender? State tax has been a hot topic for the past few offseasons and with good reason: the large state-to-state variances heavily affect the bottom line of which a player brings home. California has the largest state tax rate at 13.09% and an overall higher cost of living where Florida has no state tax and the overall cost of living is much lower. Using Capfriendly’s Post Tax Calculator, Doughty will bring home $5.25M after federal and state taxes eat away at his $11.0M average salary. Keeping this equation simple and ignoring that athletes pay tax dependent on the state in which games are played, a deal with a $8.63M AAV would net the same post-tax earnings in Florida and allow Karlsson a legitimate chance to win the Stanley Cup for the duration of the contract. With Tampa Bay recently re-signing Nikita Kucherov to an 8-year, $9.5M AAV contract, it is not out of the picture to assume a Karlsson extension would land between $9.0-10.0M annually.

Dellow later comments on the salary cap implications of Tampa extending Karlsson, specifically in 2019-2020, and beyond that could affect the make-up and depth of the organization. One salary cap principle I’m willing to die for is I’d rather overpay a core of elite talent and fill out the rest of the roster with players on cheap entry level contracts than overpay mediocre players in the middle of the roster that don’t have a ton of upside. Dellow failed to acknowledge the amount of money coming off the books after the next two seasons. Stralman ($4.5M), Coburn ($3.7M), and Girardi ($2.5M) are among the contracts expiring after this upcoming season (side note: if Tampa doesn’t land Karlsson, I wouldn’t be surprised to see Stralman back on a 3 year contract). Ryan Callahan’s contract ($5.8M with a modified NTC) is set to expire after the 2019-2020 season as well as the $1.8M owed to Matt Carle for his 2016 buyout. Callahan’s contract is very tradeable, especially after a strong postseason from the perspective of 200 Hockey Men, but offseason shoulder surgery that will cost him the first month of the season is likely holding up any potential deal. The salary cap increased $4.5M this past season and it is fair to assume a conservative $3.0-4.0M bump for the next handful of years. I do not see the team trading Ondrej Palat ($5.3M until 2022), Tyler Johnson ($5.0M until 2024) or Alex Killorn ($4.45M until 2023). They are all still below 30 years old and are serviceable players that fill a role within the organization (besides would you waive your full NTC so your old team could acquire Erik Karlsson?).

The one contract I have an issue with is the JT Miller 5 year extension at $5.25M AAV handed out earlier this offseason. Miller is a good player but let’s be honest: he’s a complimentary top-6 forward. He wasn’t driving Tampa’s top line alongside Stamkos and Kucherov but rather rode shotgun to one of the league’s most dynamic forward pairs. Miller’s production in this role could easily be reproduced by a handful of young forwards in the system on a rookie contract. Ideally, the top line wing spot alongside Stamkos and Kucherov should be a “pump and dump” role where Tampa inflates a player’s counting statistics and sells him high for a return to tighten up another part of the lineup or draft picks. I had assumed at the Trade Deadline Miller would be a rental acquisition and the restricted free agent would be dealt at the draft for a 2nd or 3rd round pick. There is still a chance Tampa can trade Miller this offseason but the team’s trade leverage wasn’t increased by signing him to that extension.

Acquiring Karlsson would require Tampa to move at least one contract and it has been rumored that the New York Rangers or New Jersey Devils were in the mix to take on a contract and receive an asset in return. With all the money coming off the books, Tampa will have the money to pay most of their key free agents in the coming years. Brayden Point is the biggest name to come to mind and I wouldn’t be surprised to see Tampa go the bridge contract route with him like they did Kucherov. Point would demand more leverage than Kucherov due to a more productive entry level contract and my best estimate would be a 3 year, $6.0-6.25M AAV contract (same term, slightly higher cap hit % as Kucherov’s 2016 deal), a $5.0M increase from his rookie contract. Next would be Andrei Vasilevskiy who will be a RFA after the 2019-2020 season after his 3 year, $3.5M AAV contract expires. My best guess for a follow up contract is 5-6 years, $6.0-6.25M ($2.5M increase from his bridge contract), similar to the contract Connor Hellebuyck just signed with Winnipeg. Finally, the last key piece Tampa doesn’t have signed long-term is Yanni Gourde who is a UFA after this season. I do not see Tampa re-signing him as much as they would like to keep him around. He will likely demand $5.0M+ on the open market if he’s able to put together another 25 goal, 60+ point season. While Gourde’s counting and underlying numbers are great, I worry about him having completed his first full NHL season at age 26. Similar to Miller’s contract, I believe there are prospects that can provide most of Gourde’s production for a fraction of the cost and he will be Tampa’s largest salary cap casualty. Luckily, Tampa’s cabinet is stock full of forwards that have the potential to make an impact at the NHL level including Mathieu Joseph, Anthony Cirelli, Alex Volkov, Taylor Raddysh, Mitchell Stephens and Alex Barre-Boulet. If I’m Tampa Bay, I’d be willing to bet at least two of these players will be able to contribute on their rookie contracts.

Tampa’s is in the middle of their Stanley Cup window and acquiring Karlsson would make them legitimate contenders for the next five seasons. Karlsson would have a huge impact to Tampa’s shot and goal metrics at even-strength and any concerns to his powerplay production or salary cap implications are greatly overvalued.

Follow Steve Ness on Twitter: @QuickkNess

All data is from Corsica, NaturalStatTrick, HockeyViz, Capfriendly, the WHL’s website and the NHL’s website.