CHANTS of “Russia without Putin!” echoed through Moscow four years ago. Vladimir Putin’s choreographed return to the presidency and vote tampering in parliamentary elections brought thousands to the streets; his approval ratings fell to 63%. But after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, those ratings soared to nearly 90% and have not come back to earth since. Mr Putin became “a charismatic leader of the Promethean type: a demigod, a Titan, who brought the people fire,” says Valery Fedorov, head of the state-financed Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VCIOM). Even a recession, falling real wages and rampant inflation have barely dented Mr Putin’s numbers.

For Mr Putin’s fans, his untouchable ratings serve as proof of his righteousness. To some Russian liberals and Western observers, they are evidence that something is wrong with the polling. The practices of state-backed sociologists have been questioned. A fear of sharing political opinions, a legacy of Russia’s totalitarian past, may taint results. But the independent Levada Centre records approval levels for Mr Putin similar to those of state pollsters; so does the in-house sociological service of Alexei Navalny, an opposition leader.

In fact, the issue is more complicated. In today’s Russia, where the Kremlin controls most media and politics offers no alternative, polls are more ambiguous than in countries where they measure the support of competing politicians. Instead of offering an assessment of Mr Putin’s actions, ratings reflect “the condition of a complex of collective expectations, hopes, and illusions connected with him”, as the late sociologist Yuri Levada said in 2005.