Propaganda or strategic communication? Psychological operations or public diplomacy? What can we infer from these lexical choices?

The words used to describe organised persuasive communication in public discourse shape our perceptions on the purpose and intentions of the actors involved. As publics navigate their way through this discourse, they are confronted by two conflicting interpretations of organised persuasive communication.

In the West, the pejorative term ‘propaganda’ is primarily used to describe the output of adversaries such as Russia, China, Al-Qaeda or ISIS. Western organised persuasive communication, however, is recast neutrally as ‘strategic communication’ or ‘public diplomacy’. While both sets of terms refer to organised persuasive communication, the terminology applied to this process shapes public perceptions.

Prof Piers Robinson has outlined how this manifests itself in the media. However, the lexical choices of political elites also conceal the existence of Western propaganda.

A telling example of this can be found in a European Parliament briefing from October 2016. The document, US strategic communication to counter foreign propaganda, discusses developments in US counter-propaganda activities during the post-Cold War period.

The briefing title itself sets up the dichotomy between the neutral (read: positive) strategic communications of the United States and the apparently nefarious foreign propaganda of American adversaries. Throughout the document, these contrasts are raised to avoid the reality that the US and its allies also plan, produce and disseminate propaganda to influence global audiences.

In addition, the briefing also addresses the US Department of Defense’s definition of ‘propaganda’, updated in 2010, which reduces the term’s meaning to refer only to “adversary communication… especially of a biased or misleading nature”.

This focus on identifying propaganda exclusively with adversarial communication can also be seen in the language used by the British government to describe Iraq’s organised persuasive communication in the build up to the US-led 2003 invasion. In Western government publications, this distinction between allied and adversarial communication is clearly demarcated.

In the private communication of these political elites, however, the distinction becomes muddied. A declassified letter from Blair to Bush released during the Iraq Inquiry reveals that Blair was comfortable using ‘propaganda’ to refer to Anglo-American strategic communications.

This contrasting usage of the term ‘propaganda’ indicates that Western elites recognise the use of organised persuasive communication is a contentious issue. Moreover, it suggests an attempt to conceal their own use of propaganda, while also highlighting an active recognition on the part of Western elites that they routinely deploy propaganda campaigns to influence domestic and foreign audiences.

What is needed, therefore, when analysing Western political discourse, is an awareness of the effect that these propaganda campaigns play in shaping public perceptions. To adequately participate in political debate, Western publics need to learn how to evaluate and respond to information presented to them by political elites. As a starting point to this, an awareness of the differing terms (ie. strategic communication, public diplomacy) used to describe propaganda must be developed by the public.

Only then will it be possible for Western publics to engage in transparent, critical-rational political debate.