As war is becoming increasingly fast, changing and unpredictable, for a state to maintain future security it must consider how to best allocate its resources in combating insurgencies. On the conventional side, allocating military funds and budget may seem to be a bad idea given the poor performance of Iraqi conventional forces in the past. Iraqi military spending is likely to have exceeded at the very least 20 billion dollars just on creating conventional formations, training, wages, military infrastructures and logistics. The figure may actually well possibly double, triple or even exceed 100 billion dollars. If you take into account of the American military training and spending between 2003 to 2009 the amount is almost immeasurable. To put into comparison the counter terrorism service or CTS was established in 2006 with a far more modest expenditure of between 200 – 300 million dollars. CTS’s annual budget did not exceed over a few hundred million dollars and the force’s spending in 2017 amounted to approximately in between 600 to 700 million dollars. The counter terrorism service initially began with the conceived objective clause to bring together; coordinate and synchronize all elements of resources pertaining to Countering Terrorism and especially to such entities as the AQI. Before the fall of 2014; the CTS political indifference, interference, poor management and sectarian division increasingly deterred military efficiency of the force. However, during the Northern Iraq offensive and the Anbar campaign it was the CTS which led the vanguard to almost every major operational and strategic offensive. Given its role in the subsequent period after 2014, it is needless to say they were instrumental in not only preventing the collapse of Iraqi’s northern front but to re – organize and commit to the governments counter attack which ended in the recapture of Mosul.