The introduction of user namespaces in the Linux kernel has opened the doors to running containers as default user logins via e.g. ssh or desktop. On Fedora, bwrap-oci lets you make use of this feature, as I will demonstrate.

The concept behind user namespaces is quite simple: UIDs and GIDs in a user namespace are converted to a different set in the parent namespace, so that an application thinks it’s executed as root while instead a non-privileged user is running it. User namespaces are not limited to altering an application’s UID/GID mappings, a user can keep capabilities in the new namespace and together with other namespaces perform privileged operations there that are unprivileged in the parent namespace. For example, an application with a new network namespace can create firewall rules that only affect its namespace. This offers extra security since the container is limited to the user that is running it, so even if something goes wrong the process has no more privileges than the user who runs it (unless things go very wrong!).

At the time of writing this post, the changes required into bubblewrap and bwrap-oci are not part of a stable release yet.

If you’d like to try the demo out, you’ll need to build the development version for both of them. You can get the last source from the git repos here:

You can install the needed libraries with sudo dnf build bubblewrap bwrap-oci .

After you’ve cloned the git repos, you can build bubblewrap and bwrap-oci doing the usual:

autoreconf -f ./configure sudo make install

This will be the only time you need root access through the demo.

If you are not already familiar with it, bubblewrap is the core technology used by Flatpak for running sandboxed applications and take advantage of user namespaces in the kernel. It has a simple but effective CLI interface:

$ bwrap --uid 0 --gid 0 --ro-bind / / bash -c \ 'echo "I am $(whoami) but cannot do much, see..."; touch pizza' I am root but cannot do much, see... touch: cannot touch 'pizza': Read-only file system

Bubblewrap needed a few features added to run privileged containers:

allowing configuration of namespaces from an external application

running a container without bubblewrap process reaping zombie processes

allowing Usernamespace linux capabilities to be left in the container

The OCI runtime spec describes how to run a container using a standard JSON format. The runtime spec is used by runC.

bwrap-oci is a tool that bridges the gap between an OCI container and bubblewrap. It translates the JSON description into a list of arguments that bubblewrap can understand.

One limitation with user namespaces is that a non privileged user, a user process not holding CAP_SETUID / CAP_SETGID , is only allowed to map one user in the new namespace. This is fine for most containers, but prevents running containers that require multiple different UIDS, for example systemd based containers. Systemd needs a range of uids/gids to be defined for its execution so that some system services can be run as non root user ( User= in a .service file).

We want to remove this limitation. bwrap-oci uses a set of tools that are part of the shadow-utils package: newuidmap and newgidmap to circumvent this limitation.

newuidmap and newgidmap are setuid root applications that configure a user/group mapping in a new user namespace. Since they run as root, they can allow a user to create usernamespaces with multiple user mappings.

This is, of course, risky in principle since any user could map an uid/gid in the parent namespace to the user namespace gaining full control over it. To prevent this, the system administrator limits the mappings done by these tools to what is defined in /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid . The administrator defines a range of uid/gid that each user can set for their user namespaces. Mappings are denied by default. Each line in the file /etc/subuid file specifies the user in the parent namespace, the initial uid of the range and the range length. Same thing for /etc/subgid and gids.

For example on my system, for my user I have defined this:

$ id -u 1000 $ grep ^gscrivano /etc/subgid gscrivano:110000:65536

This allows my login process to use newuidmap to setup any mapping in a new user namespace that points back to my uid 1000 and any other defined in the additional range of 110000 to 175535.

The uid/gid mapping done by bwrap-oci follows these two rules:

The uid/gid defined in the OCI config.json file (i.e. the uid/gid used to exec the sandboxed program) must be mapped to the uid/gid of the user in the parent namespace. Any other uid/gid in the range [0, AVAILABLE_UIDS] is mapped to the additional ids defined for the user in the parent namespace, as described above.

At this point we have all we need to run systemd as a non privileged user.

In the bwrap-oci repository there is a demo on how to setup a container. For simplicity, I’ll skip the steps required to build it here.

Running a container with bwrap-oci is extremely easy once you have the rootfs with all the files required by the container and the config.json :

I am not root:

$ id -u 1000

And I do not have any current capabilities:

$ grep ^Cap /proc/self/status CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: 0000003fffffffff CapAmb: 0000000000000000

In order to run a container I am required to have a json file describing the application to run and a rootfs directory structure containing the application:

$ ls -l -rw-rw-r--. 1 gscrivano gscrivano 5741 Jul 7 11:53 config.json drwxrwxr-x. 18 gscrivano gscrivano 4096 Jul 6 12:26 rootfs

Now I use bwrap-oci to run the container:

$ bwrap-oci run systemd-demo systemd 231 running in system mode. (+PAM +AUDIT +SELINUX +IMA -APPARMOR +SMACK +SYSVINIT +UTMP +LIBCRYPTSETUP +GCRYPT +GNUTLS +ACL +XZ +LZ4 +SECCOMP +BLKID +ELFUTILS +KMOD +IDN) Detected virtualization container-other. Detected architecture x86-64. Welcome to Fedora 25 (Twenty Five)! ....

Thus, systemd --system running as an unprivileged init container!

From another shell, we can get a list of the containers known by bwrap-oci:

$ bwrap-oci list NAME PID STATUS BUNDLE systemd-demo 7412 running /home/gscrivano/systemd-container

Systemd halts the machine on receiving the signal SIGRTMIN+3 . I use directly the value of SIGRTMIN+3 until bwrap-oci kill understands signal names (you can also use directly kill -SIGRTMIN+3 $PID):

$ bwrap-oci kill systemd-demo 37

In the first shell we can see that systemd container is stopped now.

Future directions:

We plan to improve the integration of bwrap-oci tool into the Atomic CLI. We’d like to get more containers that we use now with atomic install --system to work with atomic install --user . The main difference will be to use bwrap-oci instead of runC as the containers backend. User containers will use systemd --user instead of the system systemd as we do with system containers to manage their life cycle.