Organised conspiracy theorist networks have launched an all-out information war across Europe. At the heart of this is the QAnon movement. It expanded from the US to Europe and the UK at rapid speed, hijacking political debates on social media as well as mass protests in the streets in recent months. Our new analysis at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue shows that European conspiracy theorists run increasingly sophisticated campaigns around critical junctions in national, regional and global politics. They even carried out social media operations to influence voters in German state elections, including the 2018 election in Bavaria.

The QAnon community, which began on the message-board site 4chan, strongly overlaps with the support networks of far-right movements such as the EDL and Pegida. Most recently, it co-opted yellow vest demonstrations and boosted hardline Brexit campaigns and Tommy Robinson protests. By injecting conspiratorial narratives into these movements, its members can leverage existing networks and alter their political direction. A commonly used tactic is to combine conspiricist hashtags with those of viral campaigns and trending topics. The scale this generates is disproportional enough to distort public perception: In 2018, ISD identified close to 30m uses of the word “QAnon” across Twitter, YouTube and forums such as Reddit and 4chan.

Ahead of the European parliamentary elections this May, the virality of conspiracy theories about the EU and the political establishment provides a fertile playground for populist parties. Groups such as Q Europe, Q Britannia and Q Deutschland are already gearing up to influence voting behaviour in a crucial election that will determine the future of the European project.

QAnon adherents organise themselves on encrypted apps such as Discord and Telegram, linking the American-centred conspiracy theory to local contexts. Emotionally manipulative and tightly organised campaigns have allowed them to gather tens of thousands of supporters across Europe. They produce videos, disinformation databases and run trainings on meme creation and psychological warfare. QAnon has even adopted its own currency, called “Initiative Q”, which its founders want to turn into “the next bitcoin”.

Across Europe, conspiracy theories that mix old antisemitic tropes with new ones that demonise migrants and Muslims have gained huge traction since the refugee crisis in 2015. A recent study showed that a stunning 60% of Brits believe in at least one conspiracy theory. The ideas that a cabal of global elites run the world, that there is a plot to replace white English natives with Muslim migrants and that the authorities are covering up immigration numbers are among the most commonly held.

In QAnon forums, it is hard to overlook the holy mess of logical fallacies and contradictions. Its adherents link the MI6, Facebook and the Rothschilds to the Vatican, Hollywood, the Nazis, the Illuminati and aliens in order to explain that climate change is a hoax, the Holocaust never happened, the world is run by paedophiles, Satanists and cannibals and that the Queen is a direct descendent of prophet Mohammed. And yet this virtual cosmos of absurd stories can inspire real-world incidents: just last month, a QAnon supporter killed his brother, whom he thought was a lizard. “Can me and my pals Raid MI6 DVD & GO2 Offices in London ourselves please”, another QAnon believer suggested in a private messaging app.

Beyond inspiring attacks on perceived enemies, the spread of conspiracy theories can, in the long-term, sow societal divisions and undermine confidence in democratic processes, institutions and representatives. At a time when distrust in the political establishment runs exceptionally high, it is easy to tap into existing suspicions and fill information gaps with fabricated news and distorted statistics.

The architecture of social media platforms plays into the hands of extreme fringe groups by pushing users towards sensationalist content. The tech firms’ business models and algorithms are geared to maximise the time users spend on their platforms. Governments and big tech firms are slowly starting to push back against the systematic diffusion of disinformation. Last month, YouTube announced that it would change its algorithms to stop recommending so many conspiracy theory videos. Meanwhile, the NGO OpenAI decided that it would not release its “deepfakes for text” tool because its researchers feared misuse. And the release on Monday of the UK parliament’s DCMS select committee report demonstrates just how seriously the problems are being taken.

But solutions to these problems need to be identified. Policies should require greater algorithmic transparency and accountability from tech firms in order to protect future elections. Instead of focusing exclusively on the removal of extreme content and accounts, it will be necessary to regulate against harmful infrastructures and malicious behaviours. As early adopters of new technologies, extremists will otherwise continue to exploit the latest innovations of cyberspace.

• Julia Ebner, an Austrian journalist, is a researcher at the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue