

University of Chicago professor Robert Pape has a provocative thesis: If you want to stop suicide terrorism, stop putting U.S. troops in other people's countries. Admiral Gary Roughead, the head of the Navy, likes where this is headed.

In a Washington speech that Pape introduced, the U.S.' top naval officer said the Navy was "fully committed" to supporting the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But after the U.S. involvement there comes to a close, he said, it'll be the Navy that takes point in defending the country once again.

The basic idea Pape promotes is called "offshore balancing," and it means that the U.S.'s long-term security interests are better served by keeping troops near unstable or failed states but not actually stationing them there, where their presence provokes local resentment – and, ultimately, violent resistance. That's the conclusion of his new book, Cutting The Fuse, which finds that keeping ground and tactical air forces in insurgent-contested countries motivated 87 percent of documented suicide attacks since 2004. (You can check his work in an online database he established.)

So if the Army – and, to some degree, the Air Force – are problematic instruments of long-term security, who does that leave? You guessed it. Roughead called the case for an offshore-balancing strategy "compelling" and dismissed the idea that it's "inherently anti-engagement [or] even isolationist," pointing to the fact that the Navy's already deployed all over the world putting a version of it into practice. Offshore balancing doesn't look timid to either Somali pirates or the Chinese navy, for instance.

"Naval forces preserve both the option and the capability to deliver decisive force in the event instability becomes disorder," Roughead said in the U.S. Capitol Visitors Center. "An offshore balancing approach can afford our forces protection in the fullest sense of the term, as they execute the security and assistance missions our nation has asked of them."

This all aligns neatly with the Navy's view of its role in national security. At the same time, Roughead doesn't seem to just be out for a bigger slice of the defense budget. He told reporters after his speech that he's already identified $28 billion in savings over the next five years as part ofDefense Secretary Robert Gates' effort to cut overhead costs. And he told Danger Room that he's still comfortable with a fleet of at least 313 ships, even though he's envisioning an expanded role for the service in the near future.

Still, the U.S. is supposed to leave Iraq next year and mayyyybe Afghanistan by 2014. And little domestic appetite for more ground wars, the U.S.s postwar security posture could look a lot like what the Navy already does: patrol the seas with allied fleets to encourage commerce and discourage aggression; move to hotspots quickly if aggression occurs; and serve as a launching pad for air, sea and ground forces when necessary. Increased reliance on naval forces will "prove critical in assuring the access we've come to expect in the pursuit of our national interests," Roughead said, thanks to classic Navy tactics like "dispersion, flexibility, and mobility."

That's a concise rationale for a naval-led grand strategy. What it leaves out is why sea-based air or cruise missile attacks on discrete targets (Yemen and Somalia, anyone?) won't also inspire resistance, or how to provide a persistent presence offshore to prevent terrorists from regrouping. The last time the U.S. tried to combat terrorists with the occasional seaborne missile strike, the 9/11 Commission cited it as an insufficient response that paved the way for a huge domestic terrorist attack. If another attack succeeds – and al-Qaeda's trying hard to inspire one – Pape's research and Roughead's advocacy may not be enough to stop a U.S. desire for revenge. On the ground.

Photo: Navy

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