Introduction

The campaign for Brexit was conducted by a network of lobbying organisations; but it was underscored by an extensive campaign, which had been pursued through Parliament and the media, over the course of many years.

This ultimately lead to the referendum on EU membership, of 23rd June 2016; and it resulted in a vote for Britain to withdraw from the European Union.

On the surface, therefore, it would appear to have triumphed. Yet, despite their claims, the aim of many Brexit-campaigners was almost certainly not for Britain to depart the European Union.

Instead, their initial ambition had been to transform the EU itself into a deregulated free-trade zone; which would suit the commercial interests of certain British and American businesses, who were funding their efforts.

When this failed, they attempted to reform the UK’s relationship with the European Union; with the aim of receiving leeway to curtail the EU’s financial, environmental, and employment regulations within Britain.

The overriding ambition was to withdraw Britain from the European social model – and transform it into a US-style society; featuring minimal taxes – and maximum profits – for transnational corporations.

They also wanted to gain the flexibility to grant the City of London’s financial sector freedom to exploit overseas markets – particularly in developing countries.

However, rather than being left in a strong position to make demands of the European Union, the referendum result has placed the British government in a weak and uncertain one.

The consequences of this are liable to prove damaging to the United Kingdom, economically; while creating a series of constitutional, political, and legislative dilemmas.

So who was conducting this campaign? Whose interests were they serving?

‘Euroscepticism’ – Business for Britain

A previous lobbying effort makes plain what the intentions behind the Brexit campaign really amounted to. It is highly revealing about the nature of corporate lobbying, and the extent to which it has corrupted British politics.

In 2013, a group called Business For Britain published a letter in several media outlets, signed by 500 professed business-leaders; which demanded a set of reforms to the European Union, in order to better serve their own interests.

The full text of the letter claimed that:

“As business leaders and entrepreneurs responsible for millions of British jobs, we believe that the Government is right to seek a new deal for the EU and for the UK’s role in Europe. We believe that, far from being a threat to our economic interests, a flexible, competitive Europe, with more powers devolved from Brussels, is essential for growth, jobs and access to markets. We therefore urge all political parties to join in committing themselves to a national drive to renegotiate the terms of Britain’s membership of the EU.”

It is significant that these people were not demanding Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union at this juncture – instead, they were pressing for the EU to be reformed, in the interests of British businesses.

What this would have amounted to was a more profitable arrangement for themselves. As noted in the BBC article which reported on this letter: “employment law was the number one area they wanted opt outs from”.

In 2016, Business for Britain reconstituted itself as Brexit Central: the working group for the individuals at the forefront of the Vote Leave campaign; many of whom had been involved in the Taxpayers’ Alliance lobby group.

Business for Britain was quite open about this lineage; noting on its website that the group was “launched in 2013 and formed the basis for Vote Leave, which won the EU referendum on the 23rd June 2016”.

There is evidently more to this matter than meets the eye, however – not least of all because one of the individuals who signed Business for Britain’s letter was Stuart Rose; who was appointed the Campaign Chair of Britain Stronger In Europe, which campaigned to remain in the European Union, on 12th October 2015.

Needless to say, it is highly incongruous that people involved in the same lobbying effort, on the same theme, would subsequently take converse sides in a referendum on the issue of EU membership.

In fact, the motivation at work here was reaffirmed by other signatories of the Business for Britain letter. For example, the group’s chairman – Alan Halsall – was quoted in a City AM piece, stating:

“Business for Britain has been formed because many would have you believe that business doesn’t want politicians to try and renegotiate a better deal from Europe”.

This is what the group were pressing for in 2013 – not Brexit, but “a better deal” [1].

The head of Business For Britain was Matthew Elliott, from the Taxpayers’ Alliance; who would also lead the Vote Leave campaign, during the referendum itself.

Elliott proposed leaving the EU on 14th August 2015 – yet only two months beforehand, on 3rd June 2015, he was pressing the case for reform of the European Union; rather than Britain’s withdrawal from it.

The reforms he was lobbying for were outlined as “ten changes” on 3rd February 2015. These included demands to “return control over social & employment laws” to Britain. To “cut the EU budget to save taxpayers’ money”, and “protect the City and financial services”; as well as “fast track international trade deals”. At this point, there was no reference to leaving the European Union.

Instead, Elliott was demanding that Britain’s government “hold a referendum on the results of any future renegotiation”; as this “offers the best prospect of securing the far-reaching change backed by a majority of voters and business leaders”. Significantly, Business for Britain published a pamphlet on the issue at this stage, entitled ‘The Change We Need‘.

Elliott reiterated the objectives he was lobbying for, in his Telegraph article of 3rd June 2015 – in particular “returning power over social and employment law to the UK and a complete British opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights”.

He also alluded to Boris Johnson, who had “called for radical reform or abolition of the Common Agricultural Policy, along with a British opt-out from the Common Fisheries Policy”.

Again, the article provides a link to Business for Britain’s ‘The Change We Need’ document; which featured additional proposals from Boris Johnson, demanding that Britain “scrap EU social and environmental legislation”.

At this point, Elliott had begun to intimate at the possibility of favouring Brexit if these reforms were not attained:

“what if we cannot secure the change we need? On this issue, the Prime Minister has been equally clear, having said that he would ‘rule nothing out’ if his renegotiation aims are not met”.

This had changed by 22nd June 2015, however; when Elliott suggested in a more straightforward manner that either the European Union reforms itself to suit Britain, or Britain should leave the EU.

Notably, by this point Business For Britain’s tract had turned from ‘The Change We Need’ into ‘Change Or Go‘. A remarkable transformation of opinion, in the space of 3 weeks.

Likewise, as reported by the BBC in November 2015, David Cameron issued his demand for ‘reforms’ to the EU. Yet these were announced to much chagrin from ‘Eurosceptic’ Conservative MPs; who were apparently underwhelmed by their scope.

It is noteworthy that this BBC article features a comment from Vote Leave’s campaign director, Dominic Cummings; already opining that:

“the public wants the end of the supremacy of EU law and to take back control of our economy, our borders, and our democracy…the only way to do this is to vote leave”.

On 3rd December 2015, Cameron’s demands remained unmet; and it was announced that no reforms were liable to occur before February 2016.

In between, on the 8th December 2015, Elliott openly called for Britain to leave the EU:

“If you want to take back control from the EU and stop sending £50million each day to Brussels and spend it instead on our priorities such as the NHS, now is the time to stand up and be counted. If you want your children to live in a more democratic and prosperous country, then join our campaign to leave the EU”.

This was two months in advance of the expected date for a reformed treaty, which he had previously encouraged his peers to await patiently.

As a testament to how false his case was, Elliott complained that:

“the leaders of all the main political parties, big business groups such as the CBI and the establishment Britain Stronger in Europe (BSiE) campaign have huge resources at their disposal”.

Furthermore, that:

“big multinational businesses do well out of the EU because they have armies of well-paid lobbyists who help them stitch up the rules in Brussels to favour them at the expense of smaller, growing companies”

This is true enough – but their counterparts are lobbyists such as Elliott himself, of course; whose interest in this issue revolved entirely around changing the “rules in Brussels” to suit the profiteering of his backers: foremost among them were executives of large companies.

In fact, this was a markedly hypocritical claim for Elliott to make, given the fact that his Brexit campaign was nothing more than a lobbying effort on behalf of “big multinational businesses”.

This was also evinced in Business For Britain’s letter from 2014, which purported to speak on behalf of “business leaders and entrepreneurs responsible for millions of British jobs”.

Moreover, Elliott had written a piece in 2014, on the Conservative Home website – bemoaning the introduction of EU regulations to the City Of London’s financial district; which is dominated by multinational banks.

It is possible that Elliott, and Business For Britain’s key personnel, had changed their minds in this short space of time – and genuinely favoured Brexit; but this is unlikely in light of spending years continuously pressing for reforms to the EU, rather than an end to UK membership.

More to the point, if they genuinely thought Britain would be better off outside the EU, why not simply make that point from the outset?

It cannot even be claimed that Business For Britain altered their position in light of David Cameron’s failure to secure the reforms they desired – as both Dominic Cummings and Matthew Elliott had begun to voice their demand for Brexit before February 2016; which was the point when Cameron’s failure had become clear.

Elliott’s demand for Britain to leave the EU, regardless of any reforms, was repeated in March 2016. So, either his views had evolved markedly in the course of half a year; or he simply changed his tune to suit the same purpose.

In reality, of course, his commitments hadn’t changed at all: for him, the referendum was the means to an end, sure enough – but for reforming the EU to Britain’s advantage, not leaving it.

He had made this plain on at least two occasions via The Spectator during 2014 – in January and September, respectively. It was in the second of these articles that Elliott made explicit what his agenda actually amounted to here:

“Only a referendum can deliver a better deal and they know it. Try telling Scotland you don’t get anything back if people think you are serious about the alternative to membership of a political union”.

The aim was a “renegotiation backed up by an EU referendum”; which would be “our best hope of securing a better deal for the UK”. The referendum, therefore, was an attempt at extorting the EU.

More indicative still of the duplicity at work here, Business For Britain had published a far lengthier version of their ‘Change Or Go’ Pamphlet, funded – significantly enough – by the Telegraph Media Group. This 1,000 page document outlined what Business For Britain actually wanted [2].

Its core aim was for the European Union to dispense with social protections and employment laws; and allow Britain to be transformed into a free-market zone.

Business For Britain complained that “the EU increased its remit beyond the narrow needs of a purely common market into “the social dimension of Europe many years ago” (p. 199); before proposing that “any satisfactory renegotiation would have to see the UK, once again, exempt from the Social Chapter” (p. 200).

This document was published in July 2015. It was accompanied by a series of articles published by Business For Britain in the Telegraph, at the same juncture.

This booklet and media campaign had evidently seen a great deal of effort and funding devoted to its creation. It will therefore have had a serious purpose in mind – one which cannot reasonably be expected to undergo a wholesale change in the space of a few weeks.

Not only did it feature an editorial board, but a secretariat; and a panel of “outside experts”. It even provides a page of acknowledgements, thanking more than a score of individuals and groups for their input.

This included the Politics and Economics Research Trust (an affiliate of Mathew Elliott’s group, the Taxpayers’ Alliance); whose funding of this very document was subsequently investigated by the Charity Commission, and adjudged to have breached grant-application rules.

It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that far from wanting Britain to leave the EU, Elliott and his peers had instead desired the prospect of Brexit to result in the EU granting Britain concessions on employment laws, business regulations, and social protections.

In fact, Change Or Go made this explicit, when it evaluates the prospects of attaining a more favorable arrangement for Britain, via a “‘blackmail’ threat to leave should only inadequate terms be offered by the other EU members” (p. 221-22).

Moreover, Elliott’s predecessor at Business for Britain, was Dylan Sharpe – a former affiliate of the Taxpayers’ Alliance, and Boris Johnson; who had published an article in the Huffington Post, on 17th January 2014.

Sharpe stated plainly that “Business for Britain doesn’t want to leave the EU, but we do want some simple and achievable changes made that would help businesses to compete” [3].

Open Europe And ‘Euroscepticism’

This same agenda can be seen in the lobbying campaigns of Open Europe; as can the level of access that lobbyists of this persuasion have to Parliament, and to high-placed politicians.

Like Business For Britain’s initial output, Open Europe did not call for Britain to leave the EU. Instead, they wanted the European Union to be transformed into a deregulated free-trade zone.

They lobbied specifically for “radical reform based on economic liberalisation, a looser and more flexible structure, and greater transparency and accountability”. This was announced in a press release published on 20th October 2005 [4].

However, in November 2011, the Research Director of Open Europe – Stephen Booth – published a piece on Conservative Home; which indicates that the organisation’s priority had changed slightly, into a demand for Britain to be granted these reforms – seemingly with a view to it precipitating change throughout the European Union.

As with Business For Britain, Open Europe demanded that the UK’s government begin: “repatriating EU powers over areas such as social policy or financial services”, along with “an EU Treaty change and negotiation”.

However, they also called for “a comprehensive plan to get powers back from the EU as part of the long-term political settlement to reshape Europe”. The same month, Stephen Booth had published a longer treatise on this issue; which even considered what the UK could do in the absence of an EU agreement to these demands.

Booth’s answer was not for Britain to leave the EU, but for its Parliament to simply ignore EU rulings – on the fairly ill-defined basis that there would be a measure of political conflict with other EU countries; but that this would eventually be resolved in Britain’s favour.

Also in 2011, Open Europe published another briefing document entitled ‘The Case For European Localism‘ – written by Anthony Browne, and Mats Perrson; outlining their overall objective: “the end game is likely to be that the UK should lead the formation of a ‘localism bloc’ of EU countries dedicated to pushing localism”.

They were not advocating Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, however – as they stated:

“while pursuing a European localism strategy, Britain should make clear that it has no desire to leave the EU in the short-term”.

What they wanted instead was a reformation of the EU itself, in Britain’s favour. “Localism” evidently amounted to deregulation of the European Union; with Britain being able to opt-out of social policy.

This goal remained in place, as recently as October 2015. Open Europe were not as upfront about intending to use the referendum to coerce favourable reforms from the EU, the way Business for Britain had been.

Nonetheless, it could not be clearer that this was their aim; as they expressly called for “change in Europe – a substantially better deal both for the UK and EU”; and viewed the referendum itself as “an absolutely unique and massively important opportunity to reform the EU”.

That they saw the referendum as the means to this end was reaffirmed when they noted:

“the biggest risk is that an early vote would leave too little time for sweeping EU reform to be negotiated, potentially wasting a huge opportunity”.

This point had been made less emphatically in an earlier piece published by Open Europe, during February 2015; which contended that an early referendum would “limit the time the Government has to push for EU reform”.

It is therefore clear that Open Europe were not lobbying for Brexit – at least, not at this juncture. As with Business For Britain, they wanted the EU referendum to result in a transformation of the European Union; and for UK businesses to gain even greater advantages than they already enjoyed, as a consequence.

In fact, during this time-frame, Open Europe opposed leaving the EU – on the grounds that it would impede trade. This was outlined in a briefing published during 2012. While evaluating “existing alternatives to EU membership”, Open Europe noted that:

“from purely a trade perspective, these options all come with major drawbacks and EU membership remains the best option for the UK”.

What Open Europe wanted at this point was for the UK to:

“remain a full member of the single market in goods and services and of the EU’s customs union, but take a ‘pick and mix’ approach in other areas of EU policy.”

By 2017, however, Open Europe had drastically altered their position; and suggested that the UK should not only leave the EU, but the customs union as well – to ensure it is free to “strike the best global trade deals”.

That is, Britain should pursue what Open Europe had called “the ‘WTO option’”. They reaffirmed their demand a month later. Yet in their report from 2012, they had advised against this; as it would “see some exports facing relatively high tariffs (i.e. 10% on car exports) and market access for services would be limited” – thereby proving economically damaging.

Needless to say, the fundamental reality of EU membership and trade had not changed during these five years. So why had Open Europe lurched from expressing reservations about the merits of leaving the EU – to demanding the most extreme version of Brexit? The answer lies in the interests it was intended to serve.

Fresh Start and the All-Party Parliamentary Group for European Reform

Open Europe’s reports became the basis of policy for a coterie of Conservative Members of Parliament, called the Fresh Start Project.

This had been co-founded by the Tory MP, Andrea Leadsom. Leadsom also helped to set up the All-Party Parliamentary Group for European Reform, to which Fresh Start was conjoined.

The All-Party group was established in 2011; and it dissolved after the General Election of 2015. Despite its brevity, however, it indicates how lobbying efforts of this kind function.

Leadsom was directly involved with Open Europe; and would later become one of the foremost campaigners for leaving the European Union. This was despite the fact that in 2013, she had suggested that withdrawing from the EU “would be a disaster for our economy and it would lead to a decade of economic and political uncertainty”.

After the EU referendum – and following David Cameron’s resignation – Leadsom contested the Leadership of the Conservative Party; before withdrawing, and being appointed to Theresa May’s cabinet as Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

This indicates plainly the high level of Parliamentary access which lobbying groups can enjoy through their affiliations with MPs.

While the nexus at work here was convoluted, its purpose can be identified easily enough. In September 2014, Leadsom was among the speakers at an Open Europe event entitled ‘How to Achieve Sweeping Reform in Europe’. Fresh Start and Open Europe had also hosted a conference together, in January that same year – again, devoted to the subject of EU reform [5].

Leadsom was campaigning for the same objectives as Open Europe, and Business For Britain. This was made plain in a piece she had published on Conservative Home, in February 2013; which stated that:

“The Fresh Start Project, of which I am a co-founder, outlined in its ‘Manifesto for Change’ the powers that we would like to see repatriated to Member States. These include Social and Employment Law, Regional Policy, Fisheries Policy and Energy Policy”.

Furthermore: “the Manifesto also calls for the EU to go further in terms of trade liberalisation, both within and outside of the EU”.

Fresh Start also made their intended audience plain. Their briefing documents were expressly aimed at “Conservative MPs, Peers and MEPs”.

This was outlined in a lengthy report, which they submitted to Parliament in the form of a Green Paper – that is, a preliminary set of proposals; which are published precisely in order to generate discussion at a high level of government.

Some of its content was even included in an official Parliamentary research briefing, created by the House of Commons Library. These are purposely made available to all MPs, and their staff.

Like Open Europe and Business For Britain, Fresh Start wanted the EU to grant Britain liberty to curb:

“the regulation of working hours or the financial markets, centralised environmental policies, the development of common laws in areas such as crime and policing, or spending policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy and regional development funds that are financed via the EU budget” (p. 8).

As with their peers, they saw a referendum on EU membership as a means to achieving this outcome:

“Once the plan for reform is complete, then begins a significant renegotiation and this must be followed by a Referendum. The British people must be given their say on whether to remain in the EU with a reformed relationship that gives powers back to the UK, or whether to withdraw from the EU to make our own way in the world” (p. 7)

Evidently, Fresh Start were at least considering the possibility of Brexit at this stage; yet they followed Open Europe in warning against Brexit itself.

As their report noted: “the UK could withdraw from the EU by invoking Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union” (p. 21); but they noted that this would create severe economic problems for Britain, as “around half of manufactured exports to the EU would face an average tariff of over 5%, with some sectors particularly hard hit” (p. 21).

Fresh Start also adduced that this would have a “significant effect on UK business”, and “make the UK a less attractive location” for foreign direct investment (p. 22). Moreover, “the UK would also lose its influence on framing EU regulation, and it is unlikely to be an option that any UK government would seek” (p. 22).

Perhaps predictably, once the EU referendum was announced, Leadsom began to advocate the exact opposite of what she had spent several years saying. Yet the agenda at work had not altered.

In May 2016, she published an article on Conservative Home. This outlined her rationale for supporting Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union – namely that David Cameron’s efforts at securing reforms on behalf of British businesses had failed; therefore the EU was beyond reform, and must be departed – for the sake of British businesses.

As with Open Europe, in their Green Paper, Fresh Start even considered the merits of Britain’s government engaging in unlawful behaviour as a means of securing favourable concessions from the European Union. That is, to “unilaterally disapply EU social and employment law in the UK, through an Act of Parliament” (p. 122).

As they noted:

“This would be a clear breach of the UK’s EU treaty obligations in international law. Under general international law, the other Member States might be able to suspend obligations they owe to the UK internationally, including but not limited to EU treaty obligations” (p. 122).

They also saw it as a potential means of exaction:

“It could, though, create the conditions to force a meaningful negotiation if other Member States had previously refused to take the UK seriously” (p. 122).

However, up until this point, Fresh Start evidently had not viewed Brexit with any enthusiasm. Instead, their main concern was dismantling the various social protections which EU membership affords to the UK; on behalf of the business concerns whose interests Fresh Start represented.

In fact, Fresh Start were relatively upfront about the type of groups whose behalf they were serving. The list of acknowledgments which appears at the end of their Green Paper extends gratitude towards a number of organisations for their input; and thanks several members of Open Europe for their “work in drafting this paper” (p. 279).

While the groups who contributed to Fresh Start’s report included several trade unions, a preponderance of their affiliates were corporate lobbying organisations and think-tanks; such as the Tax Payers’ Alliance, the Centre for Policy Studies, the Institute of Economic Affairs, Global Vision, and the Adam Smith Institute.

Also featured were the City Of London Corporation – along with various banking groups, such as Barclays, and JP Morgan. Additionally, there was an anti-environmental group called Global Warming Policy Foundation, which had been co-founded by the Conservative peer – Nigel Lawson, in 2009.

A network of lobbying organisations

There was an even greater level of co-operation between lobbying organisations than this, however: one which is highly revealing about the network of groups behind the campaign for Brexit – both in terms of the techniques they deployed, and the interests which they were serving.

Open Europe’s various briefings were the underpinning for Fresh Start’s lobbying efforts; while Fresh Start’s proposals would in turn be cited extensively in Business For Britain’s Change or Go booklet (pp. 192-197).

Open Europe were also funded by another lobbying group, called the Institute for Policy Research; which has donated significant sums of money to a number of similar organisations.

These include the Centre for Policy Studies, along with the European Policy Forum; and Eurofacts – a seemingly defunct publisher of fortnightly ‘Eurosceptic’ news briefings. Its editor – Ian Milne – had also been the director of another anti-EU think-tank, called Global Britain. This has received funding from Patrick Barbour, who is a trustee of the think-tank Civitas.

Barbour is also a long-standing financial backer of Ukip, as well as the Taxpayers’ Alliance; and supports another anti-EU think-tank: the aforementioned Global Vision. During the EU referendum campaign, he would donate £500,000 to the Vote Leave campaign.

To return to the starting point here, the Institute for Policy Research has also funded a group called Politeia: a think-tank comprised primarily of Conservative MPs, which lobbies for free-market policies in all areas of public life. Its Westminster Advisory Council includes Michael Gove – who would subsequently be at the forefront of the official Vote Leave campaign.

If this array of think-tanks and donors sounds convoluted, it pales beside the extensive umbrella organisation for ‘Eurosceptic’ lobbying outfits, called the Stockholm Network. At its height, the Stockholm Network represented over 120 groups – including many of the aforementioned ones.

So what were these elaborate efforts geared towards? What was their agenda?

The Stockholm Network and ‘Euroscepticism’: corporate lobbying in Britain, America, and Europe

The Stockholm Network was created by Helen Disney and Roderick Nye; who had both been involved in the Social Market Foundation – a think-tank, which lobbies for privatisation and deregulation.

Disney was a journalist – whose articles in numerous publications invariably pressed the case for public institutions to be privatised. Nye had formerly been a director of research for the Conservative Party.

The Stockholm Network was itself derived from the public relations firm, Market House International; and drew upon the resources of multiple ‘Eurosceptic’ organisations, to lobby for a “market-orientated reform” of the European Union [6].

As with their peers, the Stockholm Network did not want Britain to leave the European Union. On the contrary, they had actively lobbied Parliament for the European Union to be expanded; as they outlined in a memorandum submitted to a House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, in 2006.

It was in this document, however, that the Stockholm Network outlined their priorities – namely that “if the EU is serious about reaching Europe’s maximum economic potential, it should seek to deregulate individual and business activity”.

They also suggested that the European Union should promote “consumer-driven healthcare” – that is, a healthcare system modeled around free-market profiteering; and deliver “a more flexible labour market”. Or in more honest terms, the EU should dissipate employment rights.

More oblique still was the Stockholm Network’s call for “reforming European energy markets to ensure the most beneficial balance between economic growth and environmental quality”. Needless to say, perhaps, this was not as benign as it sounds.

It was a euphemistic means of calling for EU environmental protections to be discarded in favour of energy companies’ business-interests. It cannot be proven that the Stockholm Network advanced this position after receiving money from the petroleum company, Exxon; which is why suggestions to the contrary will not be made herein.

However, the tangible possibility that the Stockholm Network was lobbying on behalf of such clients is what makes the various groups and donors which supported it particularly significant; especially with regard to the agenda underscoring their campaign for reforming the European Union.

As Helen Disney had herself adduced during an exchange with the Corporate Europe Observatory, financial supporters of the Stockholm Network comprised:

“major funders across a variety of sectors including public affairs firms, venture capitalists, pharmaceutical companies, healthcare providers, trade associations, software companies and the energy sector”.

These were not named, publicly. The various companies Disney lobbied for can be discerned from the Stockholm Network’s annual reports, however, which provide a list of their sponsors.

They include the Cato Institute, Exxon Mobil Corporation, the private healthcare firms Bupa and Nuffield Hospitals – along with the aforementioned Patrick Barbour; and two magazines: the Spectator, and the Economist.

It also included a number of pharmaceutical companies – such as Eli Lilly, Novartis, Pfizer, Phrma, and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (Ifpma). However, the most notable of these was the company Merck Sharp & Dohme [7].

The Stockholm Network’s campaigning on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry is especially indicative of the business interests they were serving. This was not limited to Britain, however; nor even to the European Union.

US-UK Lobbying: The Centre For Medicine In The Public Interest

Numerous members of the Stockholm Network actively collaborated with an array of American lobbying groups to promote the same purpose. One of these groups was the Centre For Medicine In The Public Interest.

According to her own biography on the Talk Standards website, Helen Disney “sits on the advisory board of the Centre for Medicine in the Public Interest (CMPI)”. This was written in 2010; and the group’s advisory board is now seemingly defunct.

However, the Centre for Medicine in the Public Interest’s own archived webpage indicates that Disney was among their advisers as far back as 2006.

The Centre for Medicine in the Public Interest was as misleadingly-named as such organisations invariably are. It campaigns on behalf of pharmaceutical companies; often against the public interest.

It is also a subsidiary of the Pacific Research Institute – which is in turn affiliated with the UK-based Institute of Economic Affairs: the two groups having been created by the same person, Antony Fisher [8].

Both the Pacific Research Institute and the Centre For Medicine In The Public Interest lobby on behalf of business concerns. In the case of the Pacific Research Institute, this includes anti-environmental activism and pro-tobacco campaigning on behalf of their clientele – such as Exxon and Phillip Morris [9].

The Center for Medicine In The Public Interest performs a much more specialized function, however. Its president and co-founder is Peter Pitts; and the group campaigns solely in the commercial interests of major pharmaceutical companies.

What makes it particularly significant herein is the fact that this purpose coincides with the Stockholm Network’s priorities and donors – as noted previously, this included the Pharmaceutical company, Merck [10].

Merck had been a client of Peter Pitt’s employers – the public relations firm Manning, Selvage & Lee; and it was responsible for manufacturing a drug called Vioxx.

Vioxx had been approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1999; and received worldwide distribution. It was used to treat acute pain – primarily when caused by arthritis [11].

However, Merck withdrew Vioxx from sale in 2004, after it had become clear that the drug increased the likelihood of patients suffering heart-attacks and strokes.

The US Food and Drug Administration calculated that Vioxx-usage had led to approximately 28,000 heart-attacks or deaths among American citizens, between the years 1999-2003. Vioxx is also estimated to have caused between 88,000 to 140,000 excess cases of serious coronary heart disease [12].

The Vioxx scandal had become public knowledge in 2004. It did not stop Peter Pitts speaking in defence of its sale, across a variety of media outlets; deflecting responsibility from Merck – and placing the onus onto consumers.

In 2007, Pitts would opine that:

“The more I think about Vioxx, the more I’m convinced that it should not have been pulled from the market. Vioxx was a tremendous opportunity to put forth a responsible argument that drugs have risks as well as benefits and that the public needs to be better aware of that. But it turned into good versus evil—the public health was served in no way. And when you withdraw drugs that actually helped lots of people from the market because of political pressure, then you know we’re heading in the wrong direction”.

In 2013, the Stockholm Network’s erstwhile Director of research, Meir Pugatch, would co-author a paper “commissioned by the trade associations of the research-based biopharmaceutical industry, PhRMA and EFPIA”, which offered a distinctly similar viewpoint:

“With regard to medicines such as Vioxx (rofecoxib) and Avandia (rosiglitazone) there are also fundamental doubts as to whether or not it was in the public’s interest for either of these potentially safe and effective treatments to have been withdrawn, as opposed to their usage indications being better defined” (p. 29) [13].

Furthermore, both the Stockholm Network and the Center For Medicine In The Public Interest would campaign for wider distribution of a cholesterol medication, called Lipitor. This has distinct implications for the interests being served by ‘Eurosceptic’ lobbying.

‘Euroscepticism’ and private healthcare

In 2006, the Stockholm Network published a pamphlet aiming to secure support for the promotion of anti-cholesterol drugs within the European Union. This was written by Stephen Pollard, Mike Sedgeley, and Tony Hockley – and entitled ‘Cholesterol: The Public Policy Implications of Not Doing Enough‘.

Its three authors proposed the “wider use of statins, a class of medication that lowers cholesterol” as a remedy to the supposedly burgeoning “health and welfare crisis in Europe” (p. 7).

While the drugs listed included Lipitor, it is noteworthy that the final page of the pamphlet acknowledges “this report is made possible by an educational grant from Merck Sharpe & Dohme (MSD) and Schering-Plough corporation”.

Merck were the manufacturers of Mevacor and Zocor – two of the other statins which the pamphlet’s authors allude to, as viable means of treating obesity throughout Europe [14].

However, the three authors of the pamphlet are conspicuous in their own right. None were qualified medical experts. Instead, they were involved in various free-market think-tanks – which have played a long-standing role in campaigning for business-friendly reforms throughout the European Union.

Stephen Pollard is a columnist/newspaper editor – but he has also been a Senior Fellow at the Centre For The New Europe; and was listed as an adviser to the Center for Medicine in the Public Interest, in 2006.

The Centre For The New Europe is typical of these lobby groups – advocating free-market policies, usually via the pages of tabloid newspapers. As with many of its peers, the group is opaquely funded by corporations, such as Exxon, the tobacco company Phillip Morris; and the pharmaceutical company, Pfizer [15].

Perhaps more indicative still of the lobbying effort at work herein, are the two fellow authors – Tony Hockley, and Mike Sedgley; who were members of a group called the Policy Analysis Centre.

In 2005, the Policy Analysis Centre bemoaned the EU Working Time Directive, as it meant healthcare companies had to recruit increased numbers of staff; rather than being able to force employees to work longer hours (pp. 9-10).

However, during 2006, both Hockley and Sedgley were involved in an Institute of Economic Affairs campaign for healthcare reform. This was announced in a pamphlet entitled ‘The British One Size Fits All Healthcare Model should be abandoned‘.

This appears to no longer be publicly available – at least not in its entirety. Nonetheless, the announcement itself makes sufficiently plain what was being advocated herein; as does the foreword – written by Tony Hockley – which remains online.

The Institute of Economic Affairs proposed that “consumers should take more responsibility in the fields of healthcare and drugs”; and that this “will lead to more productivity and innovation”.

However, they add that a consumer-led model of healthcare “may cost more money”, meaning that “co-payment by patients may be necessary”. The announcement then adds: “if consumers had control of their own spending on drugs, they would be willing to pay much more to obtain new innovative treatments”.

It seems fairly clear that this was a call for fees to be applied to healthcare, within the UK; on the grounds that this could form a personal budget for consumers – that is, patients – to spend on new pharmaceutical medicines, sold at high-cost. It is pretty obvious that the pharmaceutical industry’s commercial interests were the fulcrum of this scenario.

Significantly, the Institute of Economic Affairs’ announcement also “applauds the practice of direct-to-consumer advertising by pharmaceutical companies which is currently banned in the EU”.

This is a form of advert, whereby pharmaceuticals provide “information directly to consumers coming from entrenched healthcare interest groups”. Or in more straightforward terms, it allows companies to advertise healthcare products directly to patients with particular ailments.

As a final note, the announcement calls for reform to “the provision of drugs”. More specifically:

“In the UK the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) has an increasing role in determining which treatments are offered to all patients nationwide. This approach is diametrically opposed to the consumer-led drugs policy that we should be following”.

In sum, what the Institute for Economic Affairs were lobbying for herein was a deregulated free-market system of healthcare; which facilitates profiteering among major pharmaceuticals.

It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Tony Hockley had previously been employed by one of these – namely, GlaxoSmithKline; or that his organisation, the Policy Analysis Centre, has received funding from the pharmaceutical companies Merck Sharp & Dohme, and Schering-Plough.

Helen Disney of the Stockholm Network would echo these same sentiments, in 2007; calling on the European Union to put them into effect. The European Parliament had processed a Motion for a Resolution on “action to tackle cardiovascular disease”, in July 2007.

The Stockholm Network responded to this, with Disney opining that:

“although the motion for resolution rightly identifies the threat posed by cardiovascular disease, it does not fully address the impact of heavy government regulation and involvement in health systems in Europe, nor does it fully recognise the need to ensure access to medicines and the latest treatments.”

This was a more oblique way of demanding commercial healthcare than had been advanced by Tony Hockley. Nonetheless, the shared agenda is made plain as Disney continued; contending that the crisis of cardiovascular disease:

“will remain unsolved while health care technology assessment bodies continue to ration health care technologies, and access to consumer information is restricted which limits patient awareness of treatment options.”

It could not be clearer, therefore, that this collection of British and American groups were seeking to reform public policy to serve the business-interests of their backers. It was this priority which underlay ‘Eurosceptic’ efforts to deregulate and remodel the European Union.

It was not merely in terms of healthcare, of course; but this was an area where a lack of effective regulations in America had resulted in members of the public suffering harm, as a direct consequence of unsafe medicines being prescribed to people. This eventuality was evidently treated with indifference by the Stockholm Network, and its affiliates.

The business interests behind ‘Euroscepticism’: Nurses For Reform

No less revealing are the efforts undertaken by one of the Stockholm Network’s members – a group called Nurses For Reform.

Nurses For Reform had been created in 2007, and posed as:

“a growing pan-European network of nurses dedicated to consumer-oriented reform of European healthcare systems”.

That is, a group of nurses demanding increased involvement of private companies within the NHS. Needless to say, this was not the upshot of genuine grassroots agitation.

In reality, Nurses For Reform was set up by Helen and Tim Evans. Both had been involved with the Stockholm Network, and the Centre for the New Europe; but Tim Evans had also been a public relations representative for the Independent Healthcare Association – a trade body for private hospitals, and private social-care providers [17].

As is the case with many lobbying organisations, the official website and publications of Nurses For Reform are no longer available online.

However, the organisation – or, at least, Helen Evans – would maintain a wordpress blog for several years beforehand, under the name Nurses For Reform.

This records precisely what the group were campaigning for – namely,”the complete privatisation and deregulation of all aspects of healthcare and medicine”.

Nurses For Reform’s blogposts were marked by invective – to the point of histrionics, in places. What underscored this was a campaign for ‘market-based’ healthcare; and a promotion of the pharmaceutical industry’s commercial interests.

Their stated objectives included “private top ups for NHS patients who want to access innovative medicines denied to them by the state”. What this meant in practice was increased public funds for businesses working within the NHS; via public-private partnerships.

The ultimate aim behind this was revealed by Evans in a previous blogpost, when noting that once the government allows “private top-ups the NHS will be over”; adding that Nurses For Reform “welcomes this”. The rationale being that “the NHS is an essentially Stalinist, nationalised abhorrence”; and that “Britain can do musch better without its so called ‘principals’” [18].

Nurses For Reform also called for deregulation of Direct-To-Consumer advertising, on behalf of pharmaceutical companies:

“the next government must end health censorship. In today’s internet age it is absurd that advertising by doctors and pharmaceutical companies are still largely restricted or subject to outright bans”.

Moreover, despite claiming to represent “a growing number of nurses”, Helen Evans would also bemoan the prospect of nursing staff having influence over healthcare – complaining that “for far too long politicians have allowed the General Medial Council and Nursing and Midwifery Council to be market monopolists”.

Furthermore, she complained that the British Medical Council and the Royal College of Nursing “should lose their monopoly status in law” – because they inhibited “genuine consumer empowerment and choice”.

It is therefore evident that the people behind Nurses For Reform were not ordinary nurses, but decidedly crude individuals; lobbying for ‘market-based’ healthcare, in order to serve the profiteering of private sector concerns.

In Helen Evans’ case, this would involve giving speeches at a conference organised by the Galen Institute and the International Policy Network.

While the International Policy Network was another lobbying organisation created by Anthony Fisher – with a fairly predictable array of corporate sponsors – the Galen Institute was devoted exclusively to the privatization of healthcare: namely, “to inject consumer-power and market competition into public programs”.

In 2006, Helen Disney and Stephen Pollard of the Stockholm Network would also collaborate with the Galen Institute – along with the International Policy Network – and a further group, called the Institute for Policy Innovation.

They contributed to a pamphlet, whose various authors cited the supposed shortcomings of health-services in several European countries, including Britain – in order to counter calls for a similar system being adopted in the United States [19].

However, despite their shared commitments, Nurses for Reform would leave the Stockholm Network in 2009 – supposedly having their membership withdrawn by Helen Disney, for reasons which are not entirely clear.

Yet, this is not the end of matters. In fact, despite the relatively brief existence of Nurses For Reform, the organisation would provide a key link between these corporate lobbying efforts, and the Vote Leave campaign [20].

Global Vision

Two other people involved with Nurses For Reform as advisers were Ruth Lea and Shane Frith. Suffice to say, neither Frith nor Lea had any expertise or background in nursing.

Instead, they were two lobbyists – who would both campaign elsewhere for reform to Britain’s relationship with the European Union; and subsequently for Brexit.

Frith had been involved in a variety of think-tanks, including the Institute of Economic Affairs, and Open Europe; as well as Reform – which is dedicated to privatizing the NHS – and Progressive Vision, which was the short-lived successor to Nurses For Reform.

Frith was also a managing director for the Stockholm Network. However, of particular significance among this plethora of organisations was his involvement in Global Vision – as Ruth Lea was the director of this group [21].

In 2012, Global Vision published a lengthy document, outlining their aims for a reformed relationship between Britain and the European Union.

Global Vision differed from many of their peers, however, by virtue of being relatively upfront about their intentions to leave the EU – though they were more reticent about the material consequences which were liable to follow; and the position they advocated was ultimately contradictory [22].

What Global Vision’s case amounted to was a suggestion that Britain could simply select whichever aspects of the EU it pleased, and disregard any which the authors considered inexpedient.

This prefigured the Vote Leave campaign’s misleading message; but it is also in this respect that the itinerary motivating their calls for Brexit were made clear.

As with Business For Britain et al, Global Vision made a series of complaints about environmental legislation, employment protections, and tax regulations. It is evident that their aim was for Britain to withdraw from the European Union, in order to terminate these.

For instance, after lamenting that the European Single Market “is not intended to be a straightforward free trade market, as many in the UK would like it to be, it is intended to be a regulated market” (p. 16), Global Vision complained that it is:

“underpinned by and influenced by the Continental Social Market Model, which is characterised by heavy employment regulations (social protection) and trade protectionism (especially in France)” (p. 16)

In fact, this was the focus of Global Vision’s animus; as they clarified, bemoaning “extensive employment regulation”, such as the Agency Workers Directive; along with harmonised tax-rates (p. 16).

They also complained about “draconian cuts to manmade greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions” and “a series of demanding climate change and energy targets to be met by 2020” (p. 24); as well as “a very heavy price of costly regulations, not least of all on the City of London” (p. 21).

However, Global Vision’s position was paradoxical. For instance, they contended that “Britain needs a new relationship with the EU, one which means withdrawing from the Customs Union, from the Single Market and de facto and de jure from the EU itself” (p. 27).

Yet they went on to say that “going it alone”, where “Britain simply trades with the EU under the WTO umbrella, with no free trade agreement and/or bilateral agreements”, seemed “unnecessarily ‘isolationist'”; and therefore “it is not our preferred option”. (p. 27). It can not really be had both ways, of course.

So what did they want? Their proposal was a “Swiss-style option”, whereby:

“Britain negotiates a free trade agreement with the EU and mutually beneficial bilateral agreements…this is our preferred option for a new relationship with the EU” (p. 27).

In other words, Global Vision wanted Britain to leave the European union; then make a series of demands for a new trade arrangement, entirely on the terms which Global Vision, their peers – and their respective sponsors – considered favorable.

At no point did Global Vision outline any prospective time-frame or cost to these scenarios, however. Instead, potential liabilities were treated dismissively; and there was no consideration given to the possibility that other EU countries might simply reject these demands.

Of particular significance therein is Global Vision’s cursory reference to Article 50 – that is, the official mechanism required to initiate the process of withdrawing from the European Union; and therefore of optimal importance.

In fact, Global Vision devoted only one paragraph to this issue:

“Article 50, Treaty on European Union (TEU), which says “…any Member-State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.” Article 50 also says “…the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State…taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.” (p. 28)

Suffice to say, the ellipses removed certain information.

Article 50 itself explains how complex this scenario would actually prove for any country withdrawing from the European Union; and indicates plainly that the terms of any future trade-arrangement would depend upon the agreement of other EU countries.

It also states that withdrawal would take a minimum of two years to process – a somewhat salient fact; which Global Vision neglected to mention. Despite being frank about their intentions, therefore, Global Vision were not making an honest case.

Moreover, there is a question of who the intended audience for their briefing was. It was published in 2012, two years into the tenure of the Coalition government; of which its co-author, Brian Binley, was an MP.

Global Vision made no reference to any referendum within Britain, in order to secure their aims – and their pamphlet is unlikely to have been intended for a general audience, given its length (51 pages); and the amount of technical data contained in its various appendices.

Instead, it was almost certainly aimed at policy-makers – or perhaps written for them as a resource; as signified by the high number of Conservative MPs and Peers affiliated with Global Vision. This is equally true of its progenitor – the Centre for Policy Studies; of which Ruth Lea was also a director.

It is consequently plausible that Global Vision were seeking to obtain Britain’s withdrawal from the EU via an act of government, irrespective of any public vote; and regardless of popular approval.

The involvement of Lea, in particular, denotes an additional agenda behind these lobbying efforts – namely, advancing the monetary concerns of Britain’s financial sector; concentrated in the City of London.

It was in this regard that Global Vision had made their demand for Britain to withdraw from the European Union:

“Whilst the UK is in the Single Market, there are major and potentially devastating limitations on what any UK Government can do to resist the Commission’s increasing regulatory and supervisory control over the City of London. In order to maintain the pre-eminence of the City, the UK really has no choice but to leave the Single Market. ” (p. 23)

In fact, evidence indicates that this was the primary motivation for several of the foremost organisations which campaigned for Brexit. It would also seem to have proven self-defeating – or at least, to have been rooted in divergent interests; several of which have proven unattainable in the aftermath of the EU referendum.

The City Of London

Ruth Lea is an economic adviser to Arbuthnot Banking Group – a City of London investment bank, run by Henry Angest. Angest is a significant financial supporter of several anti-EU organisations.

However, he has also donated considerable sums of money to the Conservative Party over the course of many years, under various guises; and is a member of its premier supporters’ group – the Leaders’ Group.

This grants Angest and his peers access to leading figures within the Conservative Party; including the Prime Minister. It thereby facilitates high-level lobbying.

The convergence of Global Vision, a City of London bank, and the Conservative Party, is indicative of what was arguably the most substantive element underscoring the campaign which eventually lead to Brexit.

In April 2016, Lea had been asked by a local newspaper in Exeter why she intended to vote for Britain to leave the EU; and had answered: “I’m a democrat. I wish to live in a self-governing democracy that makes its own laws. It’s about political freedom”.

Needless to say, this motive did not feature in the Global Vision pamphlet Lea had co-authored. Her actual motivations were markedly different; and had been outlined in detail on several occasions prior to the EU referendum – reaching at least as far back as 2005. They revolved almost entirely around the interests of the UK’s financial district.

Lea had been unabashed about this concern. For instance, in February 2016, European Union leaders agreed on a new settlement for the UK, at the behest of David Cameron – who consequently announced a date for the EU referendum.

According to Cameron, this arrangement would protect the City of London from any unwanted EU regulations. Lea complained, however, that “the political reality is that on serious financial regulation the UK will be impotent. People who think otherwise are delusional”.

Furthermore, Lea had written several commentaries advocating Brexit, with the City of London’s interests at the forefront of her justification.

What they amounted to was as paradoxical as the case made by Global Vision: namely that Britain had no leeway over EU policy while it remained a member of the European Union, and should therefore withdraw from it. Yet once outside its confines, the UK could expect to have its demands acceded to by even the most powerful EU countries, without opposition.

For example, in contrast to her claim in February 2016 that Britain would be “impotent” on financial regulation, Lea opined several months later that following Brexit, the UK would not be a “a supplicant with regard to negotiations over financial services”; as many EU financial institutions benefit from the City of London, and therefore “it would not be in their interests” to inhibit any future arrangement.

In fact, Lea’s stated reasons for leaving the EU contradict her forecast for the aftermath of Brexit. Global Vision’s pamphlet complained that “the power to ‘influence’ Single Market legislation within the EU is very limited for any member state” (p. 16).

Moreover, that “the UK, as a frequent outlier, finds it almost impossible to form political alliances to form blocking majorities to stop legislation it does not wish to be implemented” (p. 16).

Yet, once Britain has left the EU – and thereafter become an outlier in the most extreme sense possible – “sheer commercial pragmatism” would mean that trade deals are “done quite expeditiously”; because “money will talk”.

This would also supposedly ensure that Britain “could repeal regulations”, and “it could have its own trade deals and decide exactly what its immigration policy should be”. This clearly fails to add up.

So, what explains this self-contradictory rationale? It is possible that Lea was genuinely unclear on the reality; but it seems more plausible that the case being presented was insincere – and was driven by an ulterior concern. It is not difficult to discern what this was.

In reality, Brexit was not merely intended to prevent the imposition of EU regulations on Britain’s financial district. Instead, once Britain was no longer constrained by EU trade requirements, UK financial companies would be able to expand their commercial interests into developing nations; and exploit them.

During May 2016, Lea had written in the Financial Times that “non-EU markets will probably be the major growth markets for financial services in the future”; and had noted that “London’s recent toppling of Singapore as the second-largest renminbi clearing hub is a significant development”. Renminbi is an alternative name for China’s currency.

There is a further element to the matter, however; which clarifies how self-serving this motivation really was. Lea continued:

“the government may decide that the restrictions imposed by regulatory equivalence are too restricting, and instead pursue a more liberal regulatory path”.

What Lea omits to mention here is the fact that “regulatory equivalence” had been applied throughout the Eurozone in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis; in order to prevent a re-occurrence.

This omission was not simply a matter of oversight for Lea’s part – on the contrary, the Global Vision pamphlet had been quite specific in complaining about “the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive” (p. 16); which had been instituted in 2011, in order to regulate hedge-funds, and similar forms of high-risk investment funding.

Global Vision were therefore lobbying to repeal the protective regulations imposed upon Britain’s financial sector, regardless of the potential consequences.

There was another dimension underscoring Lea’s reference to “a more liberal regulatory path”, however; which was arguably more egregious still. Global Vision’s complaints about EU regulations had not been limited to the concerns of British banks; but had encompassed employment rights too.

As they contended:

“The latest major piece of EU social legislation to be implemented (October 2011) was the Agency Workers Regulations, which will cost British business £1.9bn a year. The imposition on businesses of this absurdly expensive piece of legislation makes a mockery of the Government’s war on red tape. Suffice to say the net regulatory impositions are increasing, and the net costs on business are increasing, damaging British competitiveness” (p. 23).

The UK Agency Workers Regulations act of 2010 was derived from the EU’s Temporary Agency Work Directive of 2008.

It had been intended to guarantee that people working through employment agencies would receive the same pay and conditions as employees at the same company, who perform identical work.

In other words, it would prevent businesses discriminating against agency workers; or exploiting them. Global Vision evidently wanted to reverse this; and saw Britain’s withdrawal from the EU as a means to that end. They were not alone [23].

The Heritage Foundation

In fact, Lea had been more explicit on this theme a decade earlier – during a conference held by the American lobbying group, the Heritage Foundation. This had been entitled “Is the European Union in the Interests of the United States?“; and was conducted on the 28th June 2005.

Alongside Lea were several other figures who would later be at the forefront of campaigning for Brexit. This included the Conservative MEP, Daniel Hannan, along with the Ukip peer, Malcolm Pearson; and Ian Milne, the director of Global Britain.

The transcript featured a discursive preface written by Margaret Thatcher – which bemoaned the possible “consequences of a more bureaucratic, more centralised Europe” in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty; and stressed “the need to strengthen our Atlantic ties”.

Lea had been much more specific with her objections to the European Union, however – deploring “environmental regulations”; along with regulations affecting “industry groups”, “the labor market”, and employment (p. 35).

In fact, Lea’s series of complaints about the EU continued; including regulations that “covered equal opportunities”; while bemoaning “employment protection”, and requirements to ensure safe working-conditions (p. 35).

She also lamented the European union’s attempts to regulate financial services via “the Market Abuses Directive”, and “the Financial Services Action Plan”; along with the prospect of harmonized tax-rates being introduced throughout the Europe – which would prevent reductions of corporation tax within Britain (p. 36).

In sum, as she stated: “we’d like the free trade, but not very much else” (p. 37).

Yet was the agenda of the Heritage Foundation really that limited? It seems unlikely. This conference, after all, was not concerned with the impact of EU membership on Britain; but questioned whether the European Union served the interests of the United States. It thereby had an additional significance.

This was alluded to in the closing remarks of the symposium – made by a Heritage Foundation official, Ed Meese; who had spoken of the need for a “cross-Atlantic alliance” between British, European and American lobbyists.

Their shared priority would be “to limit the power of the European Union to the extent we can”; and “to exploit its own internal seeds of its own destruction” (pp. 62-63). The overarching aim was evidently to make the European Union a more profitable market for American businesses; one which could be exploited with impunity.

This was made plain by another participant called Mark Ryland, from the Discovery Institute; who referred to an anti-trust case between Microsoft, and the EU’s Commission of the European Communities, resolved in 2007.

To cut a prolix anecdote short, according to Ryland, the European Union unfairly inhibited Microsoft’s profits via “competition regulation” (p. 40) [24].

In reality, Microsoft was fined €497 million in 2004 by the European Commission, for abusing its dominant market position. It would subsequently face an additional fine of €561 million for failing to abide by the EU’s anti-trust ruling.

Suffice to say, what the likes of Ryland wanted was a scenario whereby US companies – such as Microsoft – would not find themselves beholden to regulatory frameworks, while remaining free to trade in the European Union.

These excerpts indicate that the Heritage Foundation’s objective was not really a free-market, with liberal economic competition – as the conference organisers had claimed; but one in which major American corporations are free to behave as they please.

This corresponds directly to the lobbying efforts of the aforementioned ‘Eurosceptic’ groups; who repeatedly cited free-enterprise, while campaigning for repeals of any EU legislation that inhibited the profiteering of the American and British transnational companies who had sponsored their efforts.

These respective lobbying groups shared donors, as well such as priorities, of course. The likes of Exxon, pharmaceutical companies, and Microsoft had provided money to the Stockholm Network. The same applies to the Heritage Foundation; which had also received funding from these same sources, amongst others [25].

US and UK corporate lobbying for Brexit – a shared agenda

While this conference had made plain what type of entity its participants wanted to turn the European Union into – and indicated what they had in mind for Britain – these ambitions were revealed to be far more expansive in an essay published by the Heritage Foundation on 26th September 2014.

It was written by Nile Gardiner and Theodore Bromund – who were both involved in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom.

This organisation had been established in September 2005, following a donation from the Margaret Thatcher Foundation to the Heritage Foundation. So, this clearly revolves around a joint effort, conducted by US and UK conservative groups.

However, Gardiner and Bromund’s essay expressly advocated Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union; in order to create a Free-Trade Arrangement with America. That is, “a modern, bilateral agreement directly with the United States”; which Britain’s membership of the European Union precluded.

It was not made entirely clear what precisely the two authors envisioned; but the nature of the agreement they had in mind can be discerned to a fair extent, when they suggested that:

“the most important facet of a U.S.–U.K. free trade area is not what it would do now, but what it would do in the future. Simply put, it would significantly insulate the U.K. from the damaging effects of further EU interference by aligning it clearly with the U.S. as a nation outside the EU’s regulatory reach”.

Moreover:

“This would not just benefit the U.K. It would also help the U.S. by improving the ability of the most important foreign investor in the United States to continue to serve as both a source of investment and a recipient of it”.

This was evidently intended to facilitate American trade with the UK; and prevent any EU safeguards being applied within Britain. What did these two facets really concern, though?

It would seem to revolve around financial services, and the export of American agricultural goods to Britain:

“a U.S.–U.K. agreement would focus on sectors in which agreement is likely to be easy (including the promotion of investment) and on the major gains that are to be had (for example, in the agricultural sector).”

As will become clear, there is a considerable significance to the issue of agriculture.

However, ending the imposition of EU regulatory safeguards on the City of London is consistently among the foremost priorities of the organisations which lobbied for Brexit.

In fact, the Heritage Foundation piece had quoted the former Mayor of London, Boris Johnson; declaiming that “we cannot allow jobs, growth and livelihoods to be jeopardized by those in the EU who mistakenly view financial services as an easy target”, with regard to the European Union’s financial transaction tax.

However, as noted, the Heritage Foundation were not merely concerned with the present, but were looking to the future.

In that respect, their essay echoed Global Vision’s pamphlet; which had opined that Britain should leave the EU, and thereafter establish “closer trade links with the Commonwealth, the USA and other favoured nations” (p. 4).

Global Vision had gone a step further than the Heritage Foundation, however; and outlined the purpose behind this aim:

“by negotiating these closer relationships, Britain would be in a much better position to realign its trade patterns towards fast growing economies, thus stimulating economic growth, than it is now” (p. 4).

So the aim of this cross-Atlantic effort was not merely to protect UK financial services from EU regulations, but to establish a trading bloc with the United States; and thereafter form a series of arrangements with “fast growing economies” – which bypassed any regulatory framework that the EU might impose.

It is an obvious question to ask, perhaps, but why? Who stood to gain from this outcome of an unregulated financial sector; and a series of bilateral free-trade arrangements? This can be answered partly, by the lobbying efforts of Open Europe.

Open Europe and Brexit

On 5th December 2011, Open Europe issued a press release; entitled “UK Government should use EU Treaty negotiations to secure ’emergency brake’ on financial laws”. This was evidently of a piece with one of the key priorities advanced by the Heritage Foundation and Global Vision.

Open Europe contended that “the Government must seek to safeguard the economic benefits to Europe and the UK offered by the financial services sector”; and that Britain’s government should seek “a UK ’emergency brake’, giving London the right to block disproportionate or protectionist EU financial regulation”.

Furthermore, they complained that:

“The EU market is likely to offer limited new growth opportunities for UK financial sector firms, at a time when opportunities elsewhere in the world are on the rise. Between 2005 and 2050, the BRIC countries’ share of global banking assets is estimated to increase from 8% to 33%, while the EU will see its corresponding share drop radically”.

Global Vision had said much the same thing – that once outside the EU, Britain “would actually be better internationally networked, especially with the world’s growing economies” (p. 4).

The Heritage Foundation, likewise, had opined that:

“The U.K. relies heavily on the export of financial services, in which it had a surplus in 2013 of £61 billion. As major investors abroad, as leading recipients of foreign investment, and as the homes (London and New York) of the world’s most important financial centers, both the U.S. and the U.K. have much to gain from promoting investment freedom” (p. 7).

It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that the agenda herein was shared by these respective groups: their priority was not what would benefit Britain as a country; but how best to serve its financial sector – specifically, it would seem, investment banks.

What they wanted was not merely to prevent EU regulations being imposed on the City of London – but leeway for Britain’s financial sector to pursue opportunities in developing countries.

In 2012, Open Europe claimed that “over the next decade, growth opportunities for financial services within the EU are likely to be more limited than elsewhere in the world”. Therefore “the benefits to London of acting as the gateway to Europe are becoming less convincing”.

Consequently, they suggested that the need “to keep the door open to emerging markets elsewhere across the globe” has become “far more important”.

In fact, at this juncture, Open Europe did not endorse withdrawal from the EU; but instead, advocated two measures, intended to be profitable for the United Kingdom’s financial sector.

The first of these was for Britain’s government to “work with likeminded countries to seek assurances” that the UK’s influence over EU financial services law “will be safeguarded”.

This, Open Europe suggested, “could commit the EU to a pro-growth, outward looking and proportionate regulatory regime while safeguarding the UK from decisions taken solely by the Eurozone for all 27 member states”.

Secondly, they recommended that Britain’s government should seek:

“UK-specific, legally watertight safeguards that will ensure that the UK is not overruled on a vital financial measure and cement London’s ability to do business and compete in global markets”.

In other words, financial services throughout the EU should be deregulated; while Britain’s financial district should be free to profiteer outside its confines.

This was seemingly Open Europe’s key lobbying concern – given their conclusion that, as “financial services account for at least 10% of UK GDP”, it is “therefore clear where the UK should concentrate its political capital”.

While Open Europe changed their position after the EU referendum – and began to press for the most drastic form of withdrawal from the European Union – their core aim remained in place.

On 27th July 2016, they suggested that Britain should “maintain good links with the EU and strike a free trade agreement with the US (two regions which do demand services)”.

However, they added that the UK should also be “preparing the ground for future expansion” into the “growth markets” of “Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa”; who “are likely to demand more of what the UK provides – in particular business and financial services”. This would ensure that “the UK is ready to take advantage of any opportunities”.

They clarified this further, the following day; contending that “there is little doubt” if Britain “is going to leave the EU, it should leave the customs union”. The rationale for this was that “the alternative approach of staying in the customs union but trying to leave the EU” will mean “the UK would not be able to strike its own trade deals”.

However, it is clear from Open Europe’s piece that this was not intended to benefit Britain as a whole. As they noted, it would cause the economy to contract: “in the long run (up to 2030), there will be a permanent cost to leaving the customs union. This cost is around 1% to 1.2% GDP”.

In fact, despite boasting that they had published “one of the few Brexit reports to actually pay attention to the issue”, several other organisations had done much the same. Only they had estimated that the cost of leaving the Customs Union would be significantly higher; at c. 4.5% of Gross Domestic Product being lost.

Even so, in March 2017, Open Europe again called for Britain to withdraw from the Customs Union. Yet the report which accompanied this announcement detailed the complexity involved in departing the Customs Union; and indicated that a range of British industries would suffer economic damage as a consequence: due to tariffs being applied, and supply-chains being disrupted (pp. 21-24).

So who would benefit from this scenario? Evidently not Britain itself, given the long-term economic decline which will ensue; and many business-sectors would also suffer losses.

Open Europe’s report reveals more than its authors perhaps intended it to, however. The source of its data was an article published by the business consultancy firm, Bain; in February 2017.

As it notes:

“net exporters in industries with low WTO tariffs, such as aerospace, or industries characterized by zero tariffs and a global production footprint and sales mix, such as pharma, could potentially beneﬁt from a hard Brexit due to pound depreciation and lower UK tax rates. In this scenario, aerospace companies may see proﬁts increase by 4% to 8%, and pharma, by 2% to 3%. Indeed, large industrial and pharma companies, including Rolls-Royce, Boeing, GSK and AstraZeneca, have conﬁrmed their commitment to continue investing in the UK”.

While this appraisal stands in conflict with the fact that these self-same industries nearly all opposed Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, it is nonetheless significant that a number of representatives from these industries have supported Open Europe – either in the past; or currently.

It is likely to have been this factor which underscored Open Europe’s self-contradicting change of stance, after the EU referendum: it was acting on behalf of its backers [26].

Open Europe and the Conservative Party

In fact, a number of Open Europe’s financial-sector supporters had campaigned for Brexit – such as the investment banker, Rupert Hambro; who had served on the advisory board of Open Europe, and was a signatory to letters calling for Britain to leave the EU, during the referendum campaign.

Hambro had also been involved in the group, Business For Sterling; which was a forerunner of Open Europe. Alex Hickman and Rodney Leach were among the figureheads of Business For Sterling, too – and co-founded Open Europe in 2005; thereafter serving on its advisory board.

There is a further significance to this lineage, however, and to Open Europe as a whole: namely, their links to the Conservative party. Leach was a Conservative Peer (he died two weeks before the EU referendum took place). Business For Sterling had been set up by Nick Herbert who is currently a Conservative Party MP.

Rupert Hambro had served as an adviser to David Cameron. Furthermore, in 2015, Open Europe’s director – Mats Persson – was appointed a special adviser to David Cameron.

Of a piece is Dominic Cummings – while he was not affiliated with Open Europe, he had been involved in Business For Sterling; and would become the Campaign Director for Vote Leave. He also served as an adviser to the Conservative government minister, Michael Gove, between 2007-12.

Likewise, Neil O’Brien had been involved in a campaign to prevent the UK government ratifying the Lisbon treaty (2004), which was another precursor to Open Europe – of which O’Brien would become the director. He was subsequently appointed as an adviser to George Osborne in 2012, until July 2016; and became a Conservative MP in June 2017.

This patronage is equally true of another Open Europe supporter – the aforementioned Henry Angest; who is also a long-standing and substantial financial donor to the Conservative Party.

Moreover, several of Open Europe’s personnel have been appointed to advisory roles within the Conservative Party. As with Mats Persson, one of Open Europe’s co-founders – Alex Hickman – worked as an adviser to David Cameron, between 2006-07.

In October 2016, Open Europe’s Co-Director – Raoul Ruparel – became a special adviser to David Davis; who is Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union.

Alex Greer – a Research and Communications Officer for Open Europe – was a Communications Officer for the Conservative Party between January 2015 – December 2015.

Victoria Borwick worked as a fundraiser for Open Europe; before becoming the Conservative MP for Kensington between 2015-17.

Henry Newman has served as an adviser to Simone Finn, and to Michael Gove; while “Lord Salisbury” – i.e. Robert Gascoyne-Cecil – has been both a peer and an adviser to Open Europe. This network extends even further afield, however [27].

The Conservative Party and Corporate Lobbying

The activities of corporate lobbyists and Members of Parliament have been intertwined within all major political parties; but this has been especially pronounced among the Conservatives.

Conservative government ministers were at the forefront of the Vote Leave campaign; yet many Tory MPs who opposed Brexit had been involved in lobbying organisations whose campaigns would pave the way for both the EU referendum, and its outcome.

Boris Johnson was the foremost campaigner for Vote Leave; and simultaneously a Conservative Member of Parliament. He had also been the Mayor of London between 2008-16, however; and as noted, during that tenure he had campaigned against EU regulations, being imposed on the City of London’s financial district [28].

Another Conservative MP, Michael Gove was named one of the joint heads of Vote Leave (along with the former Labour MP, Gisela Stuart). He had also been involved in a lobbying organisation – Policy Exchange; as was the aforementioned Simon Wolfson, who is a Conservative Party donor.

Policy Exchange had itself been a part of the Stockholm Network; and was created by Conservative Party peers and donors.

Policy Exchange seem not to have taken a position on the EU referendum; yet would advocate the most extreme form of withdrawal from the EU, in 2017 – publishing a pamphlet, which urged Britain to withdraw from the Single Market and the Customs Union.

One of its authors was Gerard Lyons; who had served as the Chief economic adviser to Boris Johnson, while he was the Mayor of London.

The counterpart to Johnson and Gove, was David Cameron – who had been the de facto head of the Stronger In campaign. Yet, as with the official leader of Stronger In – Stuart Rose – Cameron had previously supported ‘Eurosceptic’ lobbying efforts; and was affiliated with many of the organisations who would campaign for Brexit [29].

As with Boris Johnson, Cameron opposed the EU, when it attempted to apply a tax on financial transactions to the City of London, in 2013.

Two years beforehand, he had blocked an EU-wide treaty – designed to mitigate the Eurozone’s financial crisis; ultimately weakening Britain’s position within the EU, in the process. This, likewise, had been undertaken on behalf of Britain’s financial district.

Cameron had also objected to EU social policies – particularly employment rights; announcing in 2007 that:

“I do not believe it is appropriate for social and employment legislation to be dealt with at the European level. It will be a top priority for the next Conservative government to restore social and employment legislation to national control”.

Cameron repeated this complaint in a speech about the EU, during 2009; claiming that “too much EU legislation” in the areas of “social and employment legislation” were “damaging both our economy and our public services”. This included “the aspects of the Working Time Directive which are causing real problems in the NHS and the Fire Service”.

However, Cameron also proclaimed that:

“we will pay particular attention to the area of financial regulation, where we will be vigilant and tenacious in defending the competitiveness of the City of London”.

These were the fundamental precepts underscoring ‘Euroscepticism’, of course; and would in turn form the pretext for Brexit.

Moreover, it was an effort that Cameron would reanimate in July 2015, as a precursor to the referendum campaign itself. As the Telegraph noted:

“Prominent business leaders and economists have argued that Mr Cameron should lead Britain out of the EU if he is unable to secure a veto for the UK over European laws and win back control over employment rules”.

The “prominent business leaders” would seem to be those involved in Business for Britain; as indicated by another Telegraph article, published the previous month.

It referred to Business For Britain’s Change Or Go report; and noted that the editorial board which produced it:

“was chaired by Jon Moynihan, the former executive chairman at PA Consulting Group. Other members include Andrew Allum of LEK Consulting, Luke Johnson, a leading venture capitalist, and Helena Morrissey, one of the City’s most prominent fund managers”.

These individuals have all been prominently involved with the Conservative Party. Jon Moynihan is a both a substantial donor to the Conservatives; and the executive of a venture capital firm, called Ipex [30].

Andrew Allum was one of the co-founders of the Taxpayers’ Alliance; and a Conservative Party Councillor between 1998-2003.

Luke Johnson is a supporter of Open Europe, and was an advocate of the Conservative Party in 2015.

Helena Morrissey was the executive of the hedge fund bank, Newton Investment Management – based in the City of London financial district; and had been advocating Brexit since at least 2013. She was also appointed as an external adviser to the Treasury in July 2015, by George Osborne.

In fact, David Cameron would spend 2015-16 making a series of demands for reforms to Britain’s relationship with the EU, which aligned with the interests of Business For Britain – pledging not to rule out leaving the EU, if his conditions were unmet.

Both facets resulted in failure; and this inability to secure favourable concession from the European Union would be exploited by Business For Britain/Vote Leave campaigners, in order to augment their case for Brexit [31].

The links between David Cameron and ‘Eurosceptic’ lobbying had run even deeper than this, however. It was not merely a case of a shared alignment, and the same set of priorities; but identical personnel, too.

The Conservative MP, George Eustice, served as Cameron’s press secretary from 2005-07; and supported his campaign to become leader of the Conservative Party. However, Eustice had been the director of the anti-Euro ‘No Campaign’ between 1993-2003 [32].

Likewise, Susie Squire had been head of press for the Conservative Party, from July 2012 to October 2012; before becoming Press Secretary to David Cameron. However, Squire had previously been the head of communications at the Stockholm Network; as well as a former Campaign Manager of the Taxpayers’ Alliance.

In fact, this was alluded to by the Taxpayers’ Alliance themselves, in their published review of the organisation’s lobbying efforts, during 2008-09. Of all the think-tanks involved in ‘Eurosceptic’ lobbying, it was the Taxpayers’ Alliance whose activities during this epoch arguably served as the antecedent for Brexit [33].

The Taxpayers’ Alliance

Although Vote Leave had been a multifaceted organisation, the Taxpayers’ Alliance had been the principle body behind it. Matthew Elliott was the chief executive officer of both groups; and they shared a significant number of financial backers.

The Taxpayers’ Alliance was also registered within the Stockholm Network; and was among the Conservative Movement of lobbying organisations affiliated with the Tory Party [34].

They had published an annual review of their campaigning throughout 2008-09; and the affiliations mentioned therein – including the political issues they were concerned with – would become cornerstones of Vote Leave, in 2016.

It is also plausible that these endeavors helped to establish the climate of opinion which proved operative during the referendum campaign itself.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, caused by the collapse of US-UK banks during 2007-08, the Taxpayers’ Alliance exploited the cost of the publicly-funded bailout of the banking system – along with the MPs’ expenses scandal of 2009 – to campaign for reductions of government expenditure; and thereby, reduced taxes for their wealthy supporters.

Their rhetoric on this theme informed the Conservative Party’s electioneering during the General Election of 2010; while their aims were reflected by a number of the policies enacted by the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government, once in office.

It is also clear that David Cameron was incorporating material produced by the Taxpayers’ Alliance at this juncture; as their review states: “David Cameron’s speech on quangos in July 2008 prominently quoted TPA research”.

This lobbying was evidently having a more significant import within the Conservative Party as a whole, however; as the Taxpayers’ Alliance boasted that “our research was submitted to the House of Commons Business and Enterprise Committee, and it is now Conservative Party policy”.

This concerned Regional Development Agencies; which would be abolished by the Conservative-led government in 2010. Moreover, in 2008, the Conservative Party renounced their previous commitment to matching the Labour government’s public expenditure levels – which was something that the Taxpayers’ Alliance had demanded [35].

However, in 2007 the Taxpayers’ Alliance also campaigned against the supposed “costs of the EU”; and during 2009, they began promoting The Great EU Debate – creating a series of videos, featuring several people who would later become prominent in the campaign for Brexit.

This included Daniel Hannan, who advocated Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union during his interview. Far more significant, though, was an interview with Lee Rotherham – who outlined a case for leaving the EU, which would later form the basis of Vote Leave’s argument for Brexit.

Rotherham had authored a book of fiction – aptly enough – called Ten Years On; which depicted Britain prospering ten years after leaving the European Union. This novel was accompanied by a cinema advert.

However, Rotherham had served as a policy analyst for the Taxpayers’ Alliance since 2009, and would become “director of special projects” for Vote Leave. He was also an adviser to Business For Britain, and had been a research assistant to the ‘Eurosceptic’ Conservative MP, John Hayes [36].

The Taxpayers’ Alliance evidently worked directly with Conservative MPs during this period. Their 2008-09 review alludes to a number of sympathetic Tory politicians, who were active in ‘Eurosceptic’ campaigning; many of whom would later campaign for Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union.

These include Michael Gove, Liam Fox, David Davis, and Daniel Hannan – along with Eric Pickles; though he was among the ‘Eurosceptic’ Conservative MPs to oppose Brexit.

Furthermore, the Taxpayers’ Alliance worked with several of the lobbyists and media professionals who would play a similar role during the EU referendum campaign.

Particularly notable among them were Dominic Cummings, “Guido Fawkes” (i.e. Paul Staines) Tim Montgomerie, Fraser Nelson, James Frayne, and Ruth Lea – whose lobbying group, Global Vision, had formed a partnership with the Taxpayers’ Alliance at this juncture.

The Taxpayers’ Alliance’s methodology was equally noteworthy – not least of all, through conducting opinion polls in order to bolster their pressure campaigns.

For instance, their review notes that “Portland PR carries out focus groups and polling for Global Vision and the TPA, showing overwhelming demand for radical change of our relationship with the EU”.

This method of lobbying would be repeated by Business for Britain in September 2013, when pressing the case for a referendum on EU membership; by citing an opinion poll they had conducted among UK businesses.

As an equally distinct forerunner, the Taxpayers’ Alliance proclaimed that a “TPA-ComRes poll” had been conducted, “showing that voters blame overspending” for the recession of 2008; and “see tax cuts as the way out”. This theme would become a cornerstone of their anti-EU campaign, entitled “Stop the EU Rip-Off“.

Moreover, their annual review indicates that to some extent the Telegraph was working in conjunction with the Taxpayers’ Alliance – just as they would with Business For Britain; when it notes that “The Daily Telegraph breaks the MPs’ expenses story, with the TPA leading reaction”.

Further afield, the Taxpayers’ Alliance’s review notes that their personnel were collaborating with American lobbying organisations: Matthew Sinclair had given a speech at the Heritage Foundation; while Matthew Elliot had spoken at the Koch foundation.

These two groups played a key role in funding US-UK corporate lobbying ventures; while Brexit had been openly advocated by the Heritage Foundation, since at least 2005 – and was welcomed by the Koch subsidiary, the Cato Institute [37].

Likewise, under the heading “The TPA believes that radical reform of the public sector is necessary to achieve better services and lower taxes”, the Taxpayers’ Alliance refer to “an authoritative pamphlet on Better Government by Patrick Barbour and Corin Taylor”. This supposedly “launched a campaign which now plays an important part in the public policy debate”.

Corin Taylor was a research director for the Taxpayers’ Alliance; and would subsequently become a lobbyist for the fracking industry. He is also a member of the steering group for Iain Duncan Smith’s think-tank, the Centre for Social Justice – which would itself collaborate with the Taxpayers’ Alliance, while drafting policy recommendations.

Patrick Barbour, however, was a financial backer of the Taxpayers’ Alliance, along with the Stockholm Network – and had been a donor to the Conservative Party, and Ukip; as well as the Vote Leave campaign, in 2016.

Also mentioned in the Taxpayers’ Alliance’s review was Mark Wallace – who had been a campaign director for the Taxpayers’ Alliance; and would become executive editor of Conservative Home.

Wallace would also help to found the Better Off Out campaign for Brexit. This had been initiated by the Conservative MP, Philip Davies, in 2006; and was comprised primarily of Conservative Party politicians [38].

It was during this period that the Taxpayers’ Alliance, and a similar lobbying organisation called the Bruges Group – which shared many of the same financial backers – began to promote the idea that membership of the European Union was needlessly expensive for Britain.

As the Taxpayers’ Alliance claimed in their review:

“In the past year the TPA has turned its sights on the huge cost of the European Union to ordinary taxpayers. Our ‘Stop the EU Rip-Off’ campaign, launched in partnership with Global Vision”.

This was reinforced when the Taxpayers’ Alliance published an analysis of The Galvin Report, in 2008.

As with the MPs’ expenses-scandal in Britain, this saw the Taxpayers’ Alliance exploit the issue of European Parliamentary expenses, to support their ulterior agenda of reducing public expenditure on social institutions – in order to cut taxes for their backers [39].

Moreover, the Taxpayers’ Alliance alluded to their campaign for preventing EU regulations being imposed on the financial district, in the City of London:

“the EU campaign continues apace. We are already rallying support in the City against the EU’s proposed financial directives, which seriously endanger the hedge fund industry. “

It is therefore clear how extensive and formative a role the Taxpayer’s Alliance played in paving the way for the Brexit campaign, throughout this era.

The Common Agricultural Policy: Agribusiness Lobbying

However, the primary focus of the Taxpayer’s Alliance at this point was the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy [40].

In fact, the Taxpayers’ Alliance proclaimed that their lobbying on this issue met with approval from a Labour MP, Caroline Flint; who had been the Minister for Europe at the time.

As they noted in their annual review of 2008-09:

“After releasing our CAP report, then Europe Minister Caroline Flint agreed that ‘the CAP does not serve the best interests of farmers or consumers across Europe. We will use the opportunity of the EU budget review, starting later in the year, to argue for the long-term reform that is needed’”.

Moreover, on 31st March 2009, the Telegraph published an article, which quoted the Taxpayers’ Alliance’s claim that “British families are paying nearly £400 a year in higher food prices and taxes because of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy”. This theme would of course become a tenet of the Vote Leave campaign, in 2016 [41].

The Taxpayers’ Alliance were not alone among ‘Eurosceptic’ groups, in their hostility towards the Common Agricultural Policy. In fact, a number of their peers have lobbied against it – with particular intensity during 2012-13; which was when key reforms were being negotiated [42].

However, these organisations were not particularly upfront about the real cause of their animus.

For instance, Open Europe published several reports on the issue between 2005-12. In 2005, they lobbied for the Common Agricultural Policy to be ended. In 2007, they contended that developing countries were disadvantaged by it.

In 2012, however, this putative concern was no longer mentioned; and instead of demanding an end to the Common Agricultural Policy, Open Europe called for it to be deregulated. Their pretext for this being that Britain contributes more funding to the Common Agricultural Policy, than it receives in return.

Moreover, while Open Europe were correct to suggest that EU agricultural practices have undermined poorer farmers, especially in developing countries, this is hardly likely to be an an area they genuinely care about.

On the contrary, their overall lobbying efforts are geared towards policies with exacerbate global inequality; and Open Europe have advocated domestic policies which would increase poverty among foreign workers within Britain. Taken together, therefore, their complaints do not really add up.

Likewise, in 2015, the Taxpayers’ Alliance demanded an end to the Common Agricultural Policy – yet they wanted a continuation of the subsidies it grants to British farms; as they called for Britain’s government to “withdraw funding from the CAP and continue subsidies directly for British farmers”.

So, why had these groups been lobbying against the Common Agricultural Policy? It would seem to be due to the system of subsidies it provides to small farms throughout EU countries; along with the environmental measures it applies.

There are several core aspects to the Common Agricultural Policy, as outlined by Corporate Europe Observatory in 2012. These include production-subsidies for farmers – along with a range of “environmental protection incentives to limit the environmental damage caused by industrial farming practices”; which, paradoxically, are often the result of subsidised farming.

These protections are fairly weak, however; and riven with loopholes. The shortcomings of the Common Agricultural Policy in this regard have long been criticized by environmentalist organisations – such as Friends of the Earth, or Greenpeace.

Given that the Taxpayers’ Alliance had wanted to retain the system of subsidies – and Vote Leave campaigners would pledge to maintain them, in 2016 – it seems reasonable to conclude that their hostility was directed at the environmental protections; limited as they are [43].

However, there is another plausible reason, which is consistent with the priorities of these organisations – namely, agricultural-industry lobbying.

A number of US and UK lobbying organisations have called for an to end the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy; and evidently regard this as an opportunity for profiteering among multinational agri-businesses.

For example, as far back as 1990, the Heritage Foundation opined that America wanted “all barriers to agricultural trade removed, all export subsidies eliminated, and all production subsidies substantially reduced”.

As they complained: “opposition to this is led by the twelve-nation European Community”; which “strongly