In the age where Sam Hinkie died for our tanking sins, NBA purgatory, a.k.a being mediocre, is considered the worst place for a franchise to exist. A team is neither good enough to be a competitive playoff team nor bad enough to have good odds of winning the top pick in the NBA draft. Fans and media personnel come to this conclusion because “all the best players are at the top of the draft.” However, there are some individuals on the other side of this argument who are against the concept of “tanking” due to a number of reasons such as, “it creates a losing culture” and “it’s difficult for young players to develop good habits on a bad team.”

I’m not here to discuss which side of the argument is correct, per se (more on this in the second part of this article), but rather provide the numbers of where different types of players are selected in the NBA Draft. Below, I collected draft data from the 1993 NBA Draft to the 2013 Draft and broke down where All-NBA, All-Star, and “quality rotation players” (more on this definition in a bit) are selected. This first chart details where players who have made at least 1 All-NBA appearance were selected over the 21 draft sample.

Chart 1

This is how Chart 1 and the ensuing two charts are organized: each draft is broken down essentially into “early,” “mid,” and “late” 1st round picks, and “first half” and “second half” of the 2nd round; for example, there were 4 players selected between picks 1–10 in the 1995 draft that made at least 1 All-NBA team (Chris Webber, Penny Hardaway, Jamal Mashburn, and Vin Baker). It does not matter if the player, like Mashburn, only made the All-NBA 3rd Team once in his career; if a player made one of the three All-NBA Teams once, he is in this chart. The Totals row is the total amount of players for the corresponding column. The Percentages row is the percentages related to the Totals row values and the total number of players drafted for all of the drafts (1226); for example, between the 1993 and 2013 NBA Drafts, 9 players were selected between picks 11–20 made at least 1 All-NBA team, which is 0.73% of all the players drafted. The Pick Range Percentages row is the percentages related to the specific pick range column. Using the values for the previous example again, only 4.29% of the players selected 11–20 in the draft, related to this sample, made at least 1 All-NBA.

As you can obviously tell, if a team is looking to select one of the best fifteen players in the league in any given year, they can increase their odds significantly by selecting in the top 10 of the draft. 53 players selected in that range made at least 1 All-NBA team versus 22 players selected between picks 11–60. This is why Hinkie and the 76ers ownership deliberately tanked; if you’re looking for a franchise player, then the top of the draft is where you need to be selecting in order to maximize your odds.

Below, Chart 2 essentially says the same thing as Chart 1. The chart details where players who have made at least 1 All-Star appearance were selected.

Chart 2

Let’s not get into the minutia of whether or not the All-Star appearance is a valid assessment of a player’s ability because the All-Star Game is essentially a collection of the most popular players. Despite some exceptions and notable snubs throughout the years, the players who play in the All-Star Game are essentially the top 20–25 players in the league. Again, I’m aware it is a flawed measurement, but it is not like the players who play in the game are “bad” — for the most part, they are still all really good NBA players.

Just as the All-NBA results, the top All-Star talent is concentrated in the top 10 of the NBA draft. When we lessen the qualification from the elite players in the league to the “really good” players, the totals do increase for the specific ranges outside the top 10. However, the ratio between top 10 players and non-top 10 players is still significant — 73 All-Star players selected in the top 10 versus 41 selected between picks 11–60.

But what about “quality players” and not the best of the best? What about the players who are key contributors in a team’s rotation? You can find those players anywhere in the draft, right? First, we need a way to define a “quality player.” This process was a bit tricky since not all comprehensive metrics like RPM go back to the 1990s. I decided to use WS/48 with a certain set of criteria to counter some of the stat’s flaws. WS/48 is a standardized metric that tends to overvalue bench players that play limited minutes, especially on good teams. Is JaVale McGee really the 4th best or most important player on the Golden State Warrior? Because according to his WS/48, McGee is, despite averaging less than 10 minutes per game.

(For more on WS/48, check out the Basketball-Reference Glossary)

To help prevent having the JaVale McGee’s of the world from getting into the data, the qualifications of Chart 3 are as follows: the player must have a career average WS/48 ≥ 0.08, averaged at least 20 minutes per game for his career, and have played at least 4 years in the NBA (i.e. played through the current length of a 1st round selected rookie contract). According to Basketball Reference, league average players should have a WS/48 value of approximately 0.100. However, some notable players such as Jalen Rose, Jason Richardson, and Nick Van Exel would not have made the cut if the cutoff was at 0.100; therefore, I lowered it to 0.08 to include some overlooked players.

Despite this attempt to correct the flaws of this metric, the qualifications have in turn disqualified a number of notable players who anyone following the league would consider a “quality player,” while including players that we may not consider “quality.” For example, Juan Howard, Jamal Crawford, and Jrue Holiday missed the cutoff, while Jamie Feick, Rudy Fernandez, and Boobie Gibson made the list. This isn’t a perfect measure by any stretch, but there is essentially a 1:1 ratio of players who technically qualify versus players who do not technically qualify. It slightly skews the data a bit to favor later picks, but that’s one of the trade-offs of trying to define a “quality” player by isolating a flawed comprehensive metric.

Below are the results.

Chart 3

Once again, even if a team is looking to find a quality rotation player, selecting in the top 10 is the best range to find that sort of player. Almost 60% of the players selected in the top 10 became good players who in some fashion contribute for an NBA franchise. However, teams can find these rotation players like Channing Frye, Courtney Lee, and Tony Allen throughout the entire 1st round, and even in the early 2nd round (if the team has a good scouting department).

In sum, what these numbers are telling us is that “tanking” truly does maximize a team’s odds of selecting at worst a good rotation player that plays at least 20 minutes per game. If a team wants to improve and have sustained success over the course of a decade-plus, drafting in the top 10, while also getting lucky selecting a player or two outside that range, may very well be the best course of action.

With that being said, teams still need to make the correct selections when drafting, which is the actual difficult part in a rebuilding process. On average, a team has a 60% chance of selecting at least a rotation player in the top 10, meaning there is a 40% chance of screwing up the draft pick. For every Golden State Warriors and Oklahoma City Thunder getting multiple draft picks correct in that range, there are the Sacramento Kings and the David Kahn managed Minnesota Timberwolves who just couldn’t get it right.

DO NOT equate simply selecting in the top 10 as guaranteed future success. Tanking to get into this range simply allows a franchise the opportunity to select a good player with increased odds, not that a franchise is selecting a good player with 100% certainty. If a team consistently selects the wrong player or even misses out on the top pick with a bonafide prospect going number 1 (think the Bobcats selecting 2nd in the Anthony Davis draft), it can set back a franchise for years. If Joel Embiid and Ben Simmons do not return healthy and have careers that many expect, the 76ers can spend another five years or so before they ever begin to consider a playoff push.

Not only does a team have to be in the position to make the right draft selection, there also is some luck at play. Just imagine if the Timberwolves didn’t pass on Steph Curry twice, and if the Warriors passed on him resulting in the New York Knicks selecting Curry. So much of the NBA landscape is changed just by one team making the smart choice and another making the dumb choice.