And that’s where “The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy” comes in.

As anyone familiar with Douglas Adams’ masterwork knows, there are some very good reasons why the “Hitchhiker’s Guide” is so popular compared to other reference works about the galaxy:

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In many of the more relaxed civilizations on the Outer Eastern Rim of the Galaxy, the “ Hitchhiker’s Guide” has already supplanted the great “ Encyclopaedia Galactica” as the standard repository of all knowledge and wisdom, for though it has many omissions and contains much that is apocryphal, or at least wildly inaccurate, it scores over the older, more pedestrian work in two important respects. First, it is slightly cheaper; and secondly it has the words DON’T PANIC inscribed in large friendly letters on its cover.

And that’s the key piece of advice one can offer here: pay attention to Chinese diplomacy, but don’t panic about it.

The thing is, American foreign policy commentators are almost guaranteed to panic about it. As Randy Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu observed a few years ago, the very nature of a unipolar system means that even mild challenges by incipient challengers will trigger anxiety:

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[U]nipolarity is the only system in which balancing is a revisionist, rather than status quo, policy … Because balancing under unipolarity is a revisionist process, any state intent on restoring system equilibrium will be labeled an aggressor. This reality implies that balancing under unipolarity must be preceded by a delegitimation phase

In this delegitimation phase, any challenger to the unipolar status quo will attempt to discredit the pre-existing rules of the game, in order to lower the costs to a future balancing strategy. Because a delegitimation phase is likely to precede any overt balancing, observers will magnify even rhetorical or symbolic steps away from the status quo as a harbinger of future balancing.

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So, here’s a useful three-part mantra to calm down the easily excitable foreign policy community, which will no doubt be the last group to switch from the “Encyclopaedia Galactica” to the “Hitchhiker’s Guide.”

First, some of China’s moves simply don’t affect U.S. interests all that much. Take, for example, China’s $40 billion Silk Road Fund:

Mr. Xi said this past week that … the new Silk Road Fund would help to finance China’s plans to develop a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” The “Economic Belt” is a network of highways, railways and other critical infrastructure linking China to Central and South Asia, the Mideast and Europe. The maritime route entails building or expanding ports and industrial parks in Asia, the Mideast, Africa and Europe. Together, analysts have said, the plans are designed to put China at the center of Asian trade and transport and secure more opportunities for major Chinese construction and engineering firms. The goal of the Silk Road Fund is to “break the connectivity bottleneck” in Asia, Xinhua quoted Xi as telling a meeting in Beijing that included the leaders of Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan and Tajikistan.

So, if this initiative succeeds, China will … feel less vulnerable to instability in its key shipping lanes. And this is a good thing for the United States. Let a thousand pathways to Beijing bloom. There are very few downsides to this initiative to the United States — in fact, as a partial counterweight to Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union, Washington should welcome it.

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Second, some of China’s moves are too nascent and self-limiting to worry about. Take, for example, the BRICS Development Bank. As I wrote this past summer, there are some reasons for concern about this new structure — but not too many. In all likelihood, this bank will be the stepsister of China’s Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIDB). The latter has and should inspire some genuine concern, so it is not surprising that the United States has reacted to AIDB the most strongly. The former should not. Oh, and this goes double for any announced China-Russia gas deal, by the way.

The third and most important part of the mantra requires understanding exactly what China is doing and why it seems to familiar. Consider this pretty accurate summary of China’s strategy:

Policy makers in Beijing will continue to invest in Western-dominated structures and push for their reform. Yet at the same time, they will quietly expand networks in many different areas, ready to engage those who do feel today’s institution fail to satisfy their needs, or those who seek to increase autonomy from the United States. China’s strategy, the authors assert, is not aggressive. Most of the structures it sets up are complementary or parallel to existing ones, rarely challenging them head-on …. One of the main goals of establishing parallel structures is to slowly enhance strategic autonomy and reduce China’s dependence on Western-controlled structures — for example by strengthening the role of China’s currency and establishing a China-centric global payment system. Yet conscious of its limitations, China continues to actively support existing structures, making it harder for the West to accuse China of undermining current order.

This sounds about right. But hey, do you know what other great power is establishing parallel structures as a means of enhancing its autonomy? I’ll give you a hint: it’s negotiating both a Trans-Pacific Partnership and a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. As I have noted before, the United States has been doing for decades what commentators are accusing China of doing in the past few years. And the US is continuing to do it: TPP and TTIP are being negotiated because of the multiplication of veto points in the WTO. So no one should be getting terribly worked up that Beijing is copying Washington’s playbook.

China’s rise poses some challenges, but overreacting to China’s rise would pose even greater challenges. So, seriously, don’t panic.