IT WAS perhaps only appropriate that, as the culmination of 12 years’ haggling, the negotiations on global trade rules held on the island of Bali in Indonesia on December 3rd-6th ran over time. Early in the morning of December 7th delegates to the World Trade Organisation’s powwow rose to applaud the first deal among all its members to expand its scope since the WTO’s inception in 1995. But the agreement leaves the future of global trade cloudier than might have been hoped.

The deal was the first success of the “Doha round”, an effort initiated in 2001 to bring down tariffs and various other trade barriers, which has come close to collapse several times over the years. When trade officials resuscitated talks last year they opted to keep the agenda as simple and attractive as possible. They dropped intractable topics such as intellectual property and trade in services, to concentrate on humbler ones such as “trade facilitation”—an attempt to cut red tape in customs.

Even this less ambitious agenda, however, proved thorny. Cuba nearly scuppered the deal at the last minute by threatening to oppose any agreement that failed to chip away at America’s embargo. In the run-up to the meeting Roberto Azevêdo, the director-general of the WTO since September, repeatedly warned that this or that disagreement posed a mortal threat to negotiations. Yet at each turn he kept the parties at the table until a compromise could be reached.

The trade-facilitation measures agreed in Bali could cut the cost of shipping goods around the world by more than 10%, by one estimate, raising global output by over $400 billion a year, with benefits flowing disproportionately to poorer countries. They nonetheless proved contentious. Some countries raised concerns about their ability to pay for the required improvements to their customs procedures, and talks briefly stalled as arrangements for assistance were worked out.

Not all disputes were resolved so smoothly. As ever, agriculture was the sorest subject. India spearheaded an effort to allow poor countries to subsidise staple crops in the name of “food security”. In the months leading up to the meeting India had already wrung concessions from rich-world economies in this regard, including a four-year “peace clause” that would have granted developing countries temporary immunity at the WTO from challenges to such measures. Not satisfied, it later threatened to derail the talks unless the reprieve was made indefinite.

Several other disputes received a similar papering over. Indeed, although the trade-facilitation agreement should help to boost world trade, the deal is unlikely to convince sceptics that the multilateral process can produce ambitious reforms. The main problem is that those least committed to progress—in this case, India—can hold proceedings hostage until their demands are met.

Relief at having at last reached a deal will therefore turn quickly into hand-wringing over what should follow. Mr Azevêdo emerges from Bali with his stature enhanced. He must now decide what reforms to pursue and how.

Plenty remains on the Doha agenda. The most glaring item is agriculture. Not only is the WTO theoretically in search of a permanent substitute for India’s waiver on subsidies; it also pledged long ago to scrap rich countries’ farm-export subsidies. Yet ploughing back into such territory risks wasting the momentum of the Bali deal. Mr Azevêdo might instead seek to open discussions on fresher subjects. Investment is one possibility: the WTO could work to rein in subsidies and set rules protecting cross-border investment. Trade in environmental goods and services, which covers everything from air filters to green consulting, is another candidate.

Not all subjects need be negotiated among all WTO members, as the Bali deal was. Some can be passed to those countries that are eager to press forward (“plurilateral” talks, in the jargon, as opposed to multilateral ones), as long as other WTO members are free to sign up to any resulting agreement. Negotiations on services and on information technology already fall into this category. In Bali China’s trade minister endorsed the use of the plurilateral approach as a way to move liberalisation forward.

That should help the WTO provide a more inclusive alternative to the various regional trade blocks being negotiated around the world. These are often more ambitious in scope, but their smaller memberships carry the threat of a Balkanised global trading system. The most prominent such grouping, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, suffered a setback this week when its putative members abandoned the goal of completing an agreement this year. Big groups or small, sweeping deals or narrow, trade liberalisation is never easy, alas.