_______________________________________________________

Memorandum of Decision

of the

Honourable Mr. Justice D.R.G. Thomas

_______________________________________________________

I. Introduction

[1] On January 15, 2019, the Clerks of the Court drew to my attention that the Court had received an Apparently Vexatious Application or Proceeding [“AVAP”], and, per Civil Practice Note No. 7, the Clerks notified the Court of this development. I am presently designated to receive and review AVAPs identified by court personnel, per paragraph 5 of Civil Practice Note No. 7.

[2] I have reviewed the identified Statement of Claim and associated documents in this matter, Jericho Labonte - Private Individual v Alberta Health Services (Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 1903 01083), and a second claim also initiated by Mr. Labonte, Jericho Labonte v Chief of Police - Edmonton Police (Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 1803 23217). The Statements of Claim in these matters exhibit indicia that these two lawsuits are potentially abusive litigation. On that basis I conclude these actions should be subject to a “show cause” document-based Rule 3.68 review of this litigation per Civil Practice Note No. 7 [“the Procedure].

II. The Procedure

[3] The Procedure is a recent step by the Court to better manage abusive litigation in a timely, proportionate, and cost-effective manner: Unrau v National Dental Examining Board, 2018 ABQB 874. The Procedure permits a document-only “show cause” mechanism where a court filing may be reviewed per Rule 3.68 to evaluate whether that filing, an AVAP, is unmeritorious and has no prospect of success, or is otherwise abusive and vexatious.

[4] If either of those criteria is apparently met by an AVAP, then the Court issues a first written decision that identifies the apparent defect(s) which may be a basis to apply Rule 3.68 and strike out the AVAP filing. The party who filed the AVAP is then given an opportunity to within 14 days provide the Court and serve on other parties a Written Submission of up to ten pages in length that responds to and demonstrates why the AVAP is a legitimate action and should be permitted to continue.

[5] The Procedure is not for “close calls”, but instead the Court intervenes by this mechanism when the defect(s) in question are “apparent on the face of the pleading”: Unrau v National Dental Examining Board, at para 22.

III. The Labonte Actions

A. Labonte v Chief of Police - Edmonton Police, Docket 1803 23217

[6] The first Statement of Claim filed by Mr. Labonte was filed on December 4, 2018. Its allegations, en toto, are:

This is a claim for damages for personal injuries caused by psychological stress caused by attempted murder by two undercover EDMONTON Police officers

An attempted murder happened on Thurs. Nov 22 2018 at the EDMONTON Public Library by two undercover EDMONTON Police officers at 5:00 pm

Severe psychological stress is being endured due to the experience(s) of persecution conducted. [Sic.]

[7] On this basis, Mr. Labonte seeks $10 million and full indemnity costs for this action.

[8] Kevin Brezinski, the Chief of the Edmonton Police Service, on December 11, 2018, filed a Statement of Defence that states he and the Edmonton Police Service did not interact with Mr. Labonte on the date indicated, or at any time, and otherwise denies liability. The Defendant seeks solicitor and own client indemnity costs as well.

[9] Mr. Labonte’s Docket 1803 23217 Statement of Claim is apparently defective on several bases. First, the $10 million damages claim is grossly in excess of any possible general damages award: Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd, 1978 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1978] 2 SCR 229, 83 DLR (3d) 452. Excessive, unwarranted, and impossible remedies are a characteristic of abusive litigation: Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 at para 92, 590 AR 288, affirmed 2014 ABCA 444, 588 AR 303.

[10] A further and more serious defect is that the allegations documented in the Statement of Claim appear in many senses to be “bald allegations”, which do not provide an adequate basis on which the Defendant may respond: GH v Alcock, 2013 ABCA 24 at para 58. While the Statement of Claim indicates a location and time of the alleged attempted murder, it otherwise does not provide an alleged foundation for this lawsuit.

[11] Courts and parties have no obligation to respond to an action or application where the facts and issues are not identified or discernable (kisikawpimootewin v Canada, 2004 FC 1426 at paras 8-9, 134 ACWS (3d) 396), or the document is simply gibberish (Arabi v Alberta, 2014 ABQB 295, at paras 85-86, 589 AR 249). An action that leaves the defendant “... both embarrassed and unable to defend itself. ...” is a basis to conclude that the proceeding is vexatious and an abuse of the court’s processes: kisikawpimootewin v Canada, at para 9.

[12] I therefore conclude that Mr. Labonte’s Labonte v Chief of Police - Edmonton Police Statement of Claim appears to be an abuse of this Court’s processes.

B. Labonte - Private Individual v Alberta Health Services, Docket 1903 01083

[13] Mr. Labonte’s second Statement of Claim is also brief.

Statement of facts relied on:

1. Illegally detained Jericho - Private Individual on Dec. 7. 18

2. Refused to adhere to law/superseding legislation - Sect 32 / Charter

3. Efforts made by staff to inhibit attempts of self represented legal - - recourse

4. Refusal to adhere to section 32 of Charter/cease & desist served

5. Continuous illegal detention and several reported attempts to force medicate Jericho against his will; without consent or contract and without legal mandate, jurisdiction or legislation giving permission to force medicate against will.

6. All staff, lawyers, Directors, in Direct violation of section 32/charter

Remedy sought

7. Immediate release of illegal detention/custody

8. $10,000,000 damages for reprehensible damage to cognitive credibility and adverse experiences/- - illegal detention

9. Expunged Records - Public & private

10. Immediate injunction on all illegal information/privacy violations

11. Adherence to fee schedule contract/cease & desist

12. Costs of this action on a full indemnity basis.

[14] In this instance, Mr. Labonte’s Statement of Claim was accompanied by two other documents. The first is titled “This letter is a matter of public record.” [emphasis in original], and is addressed to Verna Yiu, the president of Alberta Health Services. Briefly, the letter states Alberta Health Services has no jurisdiction in relation to Mr. Labonte and it must discontinue any interaction with him or else he will impose penalties.

[15] The content of this letter illustrates that Mr. Labonte subscribes to a collection of legally false concepts marketed commercially by “gurus” to abusive litigants. In Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, 543 AR 215, Rooke ACJ of this Court described and classified these legal sounding but false concepts as “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments” or “OPCA”. Some of the relevant passages in that letter are:

Immediately cease all illegal actions not adhering to the jurisdiction pertaining to section 32 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, and section 52 of the canadian constitution act which supersedes the provincial mental health legislation that is currently being used to justify illegally conducted actions against Jericho Labonte - Private Individual.

The individual in custody is a private individual as defined in black's law dictionary and outlined in section 32 of the charter of rights and freedoms.

Jericho is being illegally held and detained in Alberta Health Services custody; as Section 32 of charter over-rides and supersedes all mental health legislation, jurisdiction or mandate in which the alberta health facilities are currently illegally detaining Jericho against his consent and without contract under the Uniform Commecial Code as well as operating outside of Charter Law.

...

Failure to comply will result in further litigation as well as a fee schedule will come into effect as of Dec 17, 2018.

The said fee schedule will be provided alongside this cease and desist order and all organizations involved in detaining Jericho will be held liable for further, fees, costs and nominal compensatory and punitive damages outlined in the provided fee schedule/civil lawsuits.

Further detention/apprehension in custody of Jericho Labonte will constitute acceptance of terms and conditions laid out within the provided fee schedule.

Jericho is a Private Individual as defined in the clear definition of section 32 of the charter of rights and freedoms.

Alberta Health does NOT have legal jurisdiction or mandate to be able to; hold, detain, asses, apprehend, or confine Jericho under any mental health legislation as it is; defacto, non-applicable, and operating outside of legal mandate.

The mental health act only has jurisdiction over Legal Persons, and Jericho is not a Legal Person/has claimed to be a Private Individual numerous times to all doctors and staff.

...

[Sic.]

[16] Mr. Labonte’s letter to Dr. Yiu exhibit several well-known OPCA motifs. First, he incorrectly claims that section 32 of the Charter means that he, as a “Private Individual”, is not subject to Canadian laws, since those laws only apply to government actors: Meads v Meads, at para 308; R v Petrie, 2012 BCSC 2109 at paras 68-84, 107 WCB (2d) 469; R v Zombori, 2013 BCSC 2461 at paras 21-28, 111 WCB (2d) 917.

[17] Second, he invokes the Uniform Commercial Code, which is US model legislation that not only has no legal effect in Canada (Meads v Meads, at para 150), but also is not binding in the US.

[18] Third, Mr. Labonte is indicating he subscribes to “Strawman Theory”, the idea that there are two of him. One, the “Private Individual”, is a flesh and blood human, and outside government authority. The other is a “Legal Person”, which is an noncorporeal legal doppelganger that is subject to state and legislative authority. Strawman Theory claims that the only way governments may act on humans is through the Legal Person doppelganger, which is linked to both the state and the “Private Individual” via contracts. Mr. Labonte is clear in which capacity he writes: “Jericho is not a Legal Person”.

[19] The problem with Strawman Theory is it is nothing but a persistent lie. Strawman concepts, in all their various forms, are universally rejected by Canadian courts, see Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 83-85, 110-120, Meads v Meads, at paras 417-446; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123 at paras 67-88, [2017] DTC 5024; d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298 at paras 57-70; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 134 at paras 10-17, confirmed 2018 ABQB 399 at paras 25-33.

[20] In fact, the Strawman scheme is so notoriously bad (“fanciful”, “no rational support”, and “no basis in the law”) that, in Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA at paras 20-21, 40, 2015 NLCA 31 (CanLII), 368 Nfld & PEIR 80 the Newfoundland Court of Appeal concluded that anyone who uses the Strawman in court is presumed to act in bad faith, and for a “vexatious and abusive” ulterior purpose. A court that encounters the Strawman may act pre-emptively to terminate or restrict litigation abuse based on this notoriously false idea. This rule from Fiander v Mills has been subsequently adopted in many Alberta cases, including Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629, 29 Alta LR (6th) 334; Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213, 86 CPC (7th) 348; Alberta v Greter, 2016 ABQB 293; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency); Re Gauthier, 2017 ABQB 555, 87 CPC (7th) 348, aff’d 2018 ABCA 14, Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 134, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 288, decision confirmed 2018 ABQB 399; d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 438; Toronto-Dominion Bank v Leadbetter, 2018 ABQB 472, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 611; Alberta Treasury Branches v Hawrysh, 2018 ABQB 475, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 618; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652; litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 834; Knutson (Re), 2018 ABQB 858, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 1050.

[21] The Labonte - Private Individual v Alberta Health Services Statement of Claim’s reliance on well-known and rejected OPCA concepts is a first basis on which I conclude that Mr. Labonte’s action appears to be an abuse of the Court’s processes. Per Fiander v Mills, his use of Strawman Theory motifs puts the onus on Mr. Labonte to prove his action has merit.

[22] The other document which accompanied Mr. Labonte’s Statement of Claim is titled “Jericho Labonte - Private Individual Fee Schedule”. In brief, it states that Mr. Labonte is imposing a set of penalties on Alberta Health Services. Any medication or treatments will result in “... an initial penalty of $10, 000, 000 and another $2, 000, 000 per week ...”. All diagnoses and records that relate to Mr. Labonte must immediately cease, and be redacted. Again, failure to do so will result in penalties: “... $10, 000, 000 and further $10, 000, 000 if applied or conducted again after the cease and desist order has been served.”

[23] This document says it takes effect on December 19, 2018, and concludes:

This fee schedule constitutes a legal contract, and any organizations entering into interactions with Jericho Labonte are fully doing so on the understanding that they are entering into the fee schedule provided and held liable for costs incurred.

[24] Fee schedules such as this one are another commonly encountered OPCA strategy, where what is at best a contract offer is allegedly a binding legal contract - a “foisted unilateral agreement”. Fee schedules and other foisted unilateral agreements have no legally binding effect: Meads v Meads, at paras 447-528.

[25] OPCA fee schedules are a form of intimidation: Meads v Meads, at para 527; Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 233 at para 199, 586 AR 182; Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, 2014 ABQB 771 at para 78, 603 AR 261; Gidda v Hirsch, 2014 BCSC 1286 at para 84; R v Sands, 2013 SKQB 115 at para 18, 416 Sask R 279; R v Boxrud, 2014 SKQB 221 at para 46, 450 Sask R 147; Re Boisjoli, at paras 58-69; Allen Boisjoli Holdings v Papadoptu, 2016 FC 1260; Pomerleau v Canada Revenue Agency, at para 135; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, 2017 ABQB 124 at para 28, 276 ACWS (3d) 847; Gauthier v Starr, at para 39; Re Gauthier, at paras 65-66; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 79-80. In Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at para 80, Rooke ACJ explains:

In law (and simple common sense) a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts ... Intimidation is the natural consequence of Mr. Potvin’s illegal and unreasonable fee schedule demands. I therefore presume Mr. Potvin intended exactly that by using these strategies and issuing bills and a counterclaim on that basis. [Citation omitted.]

[26] Mr. Labonte’s attempt to impose a fee schedule penalty on Alberta Health Services therefore appears to indicate that he is conducting litigation for an illegal purpose.

[27] Beyond that, Mr. Labonte’s Labonte - Private Individual v Alberta Health Services Statement of Claim also exhibits the same issue as his other action in that it pleads bald allegations, and, in this case, I would classify its contents as so incoherent that the restatement of the Rule in kisikawpimootewin by Gill J in Arabi v Alberta would apply: “... this Court has no obligation to respond to gibberish.”

IV. Conclusion

[28] Since I have concluded that Mr. Labonte’s Labonte v Chief of Police - Edmonton Police and Labonte - Private Individual v Alberta Health Services Statements of Claim appear to be an abuse of court processes, these actions are stayed until further notice. The Procedure now advances to its second step.

1. Mr. Labonte has until 14 days after this decision is filed and served to prepare a Written Submission of no more than 10 pages, to be filed and served, per Civil Practice Note No. 7, para 3(b).

2. If no Written Submission is received by the Court by that deadline the Court will proceed to render its final decision on whether the Statements of Claim should be struck out in whole or in part, per Rule 3.68 (Civil Practice Note No. 7, para 3(c)).

3. If Mr. Labonte provides and serves a Written Submission, then the Defendants in the Labonte v Chief of Police - Edmonton Police and Labonte - Private Individual v Alberta Health Services actions have seven days to make a Written Reply of up to 10 pages in length (Civil Practice Note No. 7, para 3(d)).

4. After receipt of Mr. Labonte’s Written Submission and the Defendants’ Written Replies, if any, the Court will render its final decision on whether the Labonte v Chief of Police - Edmonton Police and Labonte - Private Individual v Alberta Health Services Statements of Claim should be struck out in whole or in part, per Rule 3.68 (Civil Practice Note No. 7, para 3(e)).

[29] In light of Mr. Labonte deploying OPCA strategies that create a presumption that he litigates in bad faith and for ulterior purposes, I conclude this is an appropriate instance where Mr. Labonte should be made prima facie subject to interim court access restrictions, per Civil Practice Note No. 7, para 7(a). The Court will prepare and serve the interim court access restriction order. Mr. Labonte’s approval of the form of that order is dispensed with, per Rule 9.4(2)(c).

[30] I also order service of this decision, the interim court access restriction order, and any further submissions in this matter on Mr. Labonte may be effected by email to the email address, theoazure@protonmail.com, indicated in Mr. Labonte’s Statements of Claim.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 22nd day of January, 2019.

D.R.G. Thomas J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances:

None