By Wenzel Frick

To make sense out of the situation in Eastern Ukraine, it’s worth looking back at how it started. The mixture of factors which triggered the armed conflict is still in place and is hindering attempts of serious conflict resolution.

For years, Ukraine’s foreign policy was balancing between a closer integration into the markets of the Russian Federation or the European Union. Victor Yanukovych, Ukraine’s former president tried to please both sides in order benefit from both sides. In 2013, Yanukovych negotiated with representatives of the European Union over a deeper economic integration. Parallel to this, a media campaign promoted a Western European lifestyle. This led to a high acceptance of the pro-Western values among Ukrainians.

In early 2014 Yanukovych made a radical change towards integration into the Russian market. There was some acceptance of this radical step in the eastern part of the country, most of all in Crimea and to some degree in the regions Donetsk and Lugansk (Donbas). The majority of the population rejected this shift. A broad and heterogeneous movement against Yanukovych emerged (Euromaidan), united by calls for transparent government, rule of law and a foreign policy that enables an integration into the European Union. As a result Yanukovych’s administration was replaced by a pro-European government, accompanied by violent clashes between activists of Euromaidan and government forces.

The ideological rift between Ukrainians in the east (pro Russian) and those in the west (pro European) was not new at all. Ukraine’s domestic politics is paternalistic and shaped by a ‘winner takes it all’ mentality. Governments based their political survival on a specific part of the population while excluding other parts of society. Highly generalized it could be said that Ukrainian governments preferred either the population in the east or in the west. (Yanukovych’s power base was in the east, most of all the workers in the mines.) Although this rift has led to tensions in the past, it never threatened Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The violent nature of the regime change in 2014 and the controversial media coverage increased the polarization of sentiments between the Ukrainians in the east and in the west.

The prehistory helps to identify (what seem to me) the crucial factors that created the context in which the current armed conflict takes place. First, the geopolitical tension and economic rivalry between Russia and European Union is currently transforming into a confrontation between Russia and NATO. If there would be a common understanding and coordination between Russia and NATO about their zones of interests, the conflict in Ukraine would have never escalated the way it did. Second, the differing opinions within Ukraine, the polarization along this line and the media which is farming it. The polarization gave ground to quick and broad mobilization – of a population which has mainly lost interests in politics. Third, the lack of functioning institutions (or an inclusive government) which would be able to moderate the polarization and the domestic conflict of interests.

Those tendencies (and latent lines of conflict) were well known long before the conflict turned violent. Despite this, many observers were surprised by the way and speed the following escalation took place. In times of global economic integration it was hard to believe in a revival of a Cold War 2.0. The step by step escalation on the geopolitical level gave a deceptive impression of relative stability and predictability.

During 2014, protests arose in Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk against the new pro-European government, followed by the occupation of Crimea by Russian Special Forces and the rebellion in Donetsk and Lugansk which also was heavily supported by the Russian Federation.

At the point of time when the first armed clashes took place, the Ukrainian army was in a very bad shape. As a result, ragtag militias were mobilized and equipped, mostly financed by wealthy businessmen and oligarchs. The quick and fragmented mobilization by non-state actors had the side effect that the so called volunteer battalions didn’t subordinate to the governments chain of command. Operational coordination between the battalions was missing as well as the coordination between the battalions and regular armed forces under the command of Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Internal Affairs. – ‘Coordination is not needed since we know where the enemy is.’

On the side of the separatists in the east, the military situation was a bit different. Russian trained and equipped personnel functioned as kind of a spearhead while ragtag militias (at the beginning mainly recruited from the local population) were used to hold territorial gains. Russian-friendly media focused their reporting on those militias which were recruited from locals in order to frame the conflict as an internal Ukrainian issue. The Russian participation was communicated as ‘Russians who spend their holidays in Eastern Ukraine in order to help their brothers who are marginalized by a totalitarian Nazi-regime’. Media loyal to Kiev did spin the news as well but not to the extent that Russians did, at least not back then.

It was between summer and autumn of 2014 when a full-fledged ‘information war’ on social and commercial media took place over people’s hearts and minds. In this time, still many Ukrainians explained to me that the war is a result of rivalries between oligarchs, because the rivalry between Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroshenko or simply about business. ‘Many years we lived together, it’s not good when brothers fight against brothers’. Now, one year later, sentences like this aren’t heard that often anymore. The conflict is increasingly framed as a conflict between people ‘because people in Donbas (respectively in Kiev) are different, full of propaganda and it’s not possible to get along with them’. In the course of this development, commercial and social media became an integral part of warfare since a hostile population can only be occupied under high costs. In this respect the information war has a moderating effect on the theater of war since it increases the cost of making and consolidating territorial gains for both sides.

At the end of 2014 and in the beginning of 2015, the conflict nearly got out of control of its actors. Early 2015, representatives of the Russian Federation, the European Union, Belarus and separatists met in Minsk and agreed on a road map (Minsk 2) in order to de-escalate the line of contact and lay ground for a political solution. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was appointed as multilateral body to monitor the implementation of the agreement. For this purpose the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) was created. Since then, the line of contact remained relatively stable and the numbers of ‘killed in action’ decreased to one-digits per day. In this time, the term ‘frozen conflict’ was introduced as a description of the situation. While the conflict ‘froze’ at the line of contact, polarization in media and the confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation went on – and is still going on.

The current situation in the Ukrainian conflict is mainly driven by the tendencies described above. The line of contact is stable while both parties violate the ceasefire agreement to the same degree. Additionally to this, the fragmentation of Ukrainian military forces (loyal to Kiev) has led to a difficult dilemma for the Ukrainian government. The autonomous operating battalions are holding the line of contact but they are hard to control. The government started various attempts in order to subordinate the volunteer battalions under its chain of command. While these attempts were partially successful, other battalions, first of all the politico-military movement ‘Right Sector’ deny to subordinate under government structures and even challenge the legitimacy of the government. Over the past months this has led to serious tensions and armed clashes between units of ‘Right Sector’ and the government. The recent clashes in Kiev over the constitutional reform (decentralization) took place along this line of conflict as well.

‘Right Sector’ represents the position that there will be no peace until all territory is under Ukrainian flag again, including Crimea. As a consequence they reject the Minsk 2 agreement. They propagate a nationalistic and conservative mindset, which is hardly compatible with the values of the European Union. Moreover, their repertoire of symbols remind of Nazi-Germany. This makes it very easy for the Russian-friendly media cycle to frame them as Nazis – resulting in even more cognitive polarization.

One of the main financiers of ‘Right Sector’ is said to be Igor Kolomoyskiy, an oligarch and rival of President Petro Poroshenko. Poroshenko challenges Kolomoyskiy by removing his ‘economic privileges’ in the name of reform and as a fight against corruption. Meanwhile Poroshenko and his allies are resistant to reforms if they reduce their own privileges. The rivalry between those two men is more and more creating a second line of conflict within Ukraine – which is basically about business. (At the height of escalation between the two, Kolomoyskiy even threatened with the withdrawal of his battalions from the frontline in Donbas.) Kolomoyskiy is also said to be a driving force behind UKROP, a political party that came out of nowhere this summer, driving a course of fundamental opposition against the ruling government coalition. Due to recruitment of high profile politicians, heavy campaigning and low popularity of the current government their chances in coming regional elections in October are not bad.

There is some chance that the rivalry between Poroshenko and Kolomoyskiy will be ‘frozen’ until elections are over. Depending on the result of elections and developments in Donbas, the armed escalation of the in-fight Poroshenko vs Kolomoyskiy can lead to a new quality of destabilization. It should be noted that Kolomoyskiy is one oligarch; there are several others who are watching the scene and stay behind. The complexity of rivalries among oligarchs should not be underestimated, also their influence on events on the ground.

Many Ukrainians completely lost trust in governmental institutions and the political personnel, also the ruling coalition of Poroshenko lost a lot of its credibility. Some days ago, I was told: ‘We have two enemies. Our government and Putin.’ The high degree of frustration over the situation and the cynicism is hardly comprehensible for outsiders. An 18 year old told me once: ‘We don’t live in this country, we just survive’. Due to the lack of perspectives of the young population, they are easy to recruit by whoever is able to pay them. (The price of renting a thug ranges between USD 10 – 20 per day at the moment, renting protesters is way cheaper.)

Due to complexity and dynamic of the situation in Ukraine and its context, forecasts on further developments are pure speculation. Nevertheless, there are three points that might helpful in order to develop short-range scenarios for the future. First is the stability of the line of contact. The strategically important city Mariupol serves as a kind of red line. In case Mariupol will be taken by separatists, the Minsk 2 agreements would be considered as failed. On the other side, the city of Donetsk works as a red line. If those red lines are crossed, the probability that the conflict is going to leave its current equilibrium is very high. In such a scenario, all features of a full scale war including the brutality of a ‘last battle’ are realistic. In such a case, even the direct involvement of Russian Armed Forces, including air power is thinkable – and as a result of this new fronts in the Baltics, Poland and so on.

This leads to the second point shaping the situation in the short run: The confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation. Or let’s say between Russia and USA. The geopolitical tensions might not directly fuel the conflict in the Donbas, but due to the lack of coordination (or cooperation) attempts to stop the self-sustaining conflict dynamics have low chances of success.

It’s kind of a footnote, but worth mentioning. Fifty years ago, Herman Kahn wrote ‘On Escalation’. It provides an analysis framework to explain escalations among superpowers. Therein he introduced the terms ‘limited conflict’ or ‘agreed battle’. In its core, the concept is a powerful tool to analyze the conflict in Donbas in its wider context. There is a bitter taste if a framework of Cold War is applicable to a current situation.

The third point to observe is the Ukrainian civil society. The current government failed to deliver substantial demands of the Euromaidan movement. The ones who replaced Yanukovych might also go after Poroshenko. His popularity is rather low and contenders start challenging his regency. Nevertheless, the probability of his violent replacement seems rather low as long as separatists and Russia pose a threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and therefore give ground to a ‘rally around the flag’. But this is guessing. The fall of Yanukovych came quickly and unexpectedly; there is no reason to believe that we are able to do a better analysis of the situation today than back then. The outcome of another regime change through people from the street would be different. Today Ukraine is full of weapons and people know how to use them. The rumors of a ‘reset of power in the Ukrainian parliament in 2016’ are rumors first of all – but it’s not the case that they would be completely illusory.

About the author: Wenzel Frick is a political scientist, based in Zurich/Switzerland. He frequently writes on armedpolitics.com about developments in Ukraine under the acronym (wf). Contact for inquiries or contracts: ap@armedpolitics.com.