George Soros blames the US for the rise of nationalism, which he says seems “much more powerful and disruptive than internationalism” three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The collapse of the Soviet Union two years later in 1991 was a triump of “open societies” whose liberal democracy and “international cooperation became the dominant creed” of the post-Cold War era. It also created a unipolar world, with the US being the dominant political and military power.

Soros accused the US of being “more interested in enjoying the fruits of its Cold War victory” in an era of hegemony. In fact, it “failed to extend a helping hand to former Soviet bloc countries, which were in dire straits.” In Russia there was no growth under Boris Jelzin. The economy contracted for a decade. After Putin came to power in 2000, Russia’s GDP began to grow. The value of its economy rose from $210 billion in 1999 to a peak of $1.8 trillion in 2008.

An assertive Putin maintained, since the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev willingly dismantled Russia’s political and military dominance over Eastern Europe, he believed the West should be grateful for such a magnanimous gesture. He insisted that Russia be respected and treated as an equal partner of the US, rather than as a rival, with the right to retain influence over countries in what it considered its backyard.

Putin still wishes that the Soviet Union had not collapsed, calling its breakup “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.” He has since been seeking to re-establish Russian hegemony within the space of the former Soviet Union, with Ukraine being its biggest prize. The annexation of Crimea was a step in that direction. This aggression sparked international outcry and led to Western sanctions against Russia, taking a toll on its economy.

Putin’s resentment toward the West grew, as Russian businesses complained that sanctions have hurt their economy. He had backed the cash-strapped far-right populist and Eurosceptic politicans in the past, offering loans, political cover and propaganda. In return they became his fawning admirers, seeing him as the kind of patriotic hero who prizes national traditions and realpolitik over internationalism and the openness that have long characterised Western liberalism.

The West’s adherence to “the prescriptions of the neoliberal Washington Consensus” – the embrace of lower taxes on the rich, deregulation of labour and product markets, financialisation, and globalisation - resulted into the global financial crisis in 2008. Putin doubled down his efforts to empower far-right nationalists and Eurosceptics in 2016, who hijacked the negative impact of globalisation, and suspicions of government institutions and elites ahead of the UK’s vote to exit the EU and Trump’s election.

Putin’s lackeys delved into issues of ethnic or religious or cultural identity to divide a country, putting blame on mainstream political parties for their failures, demonising immigrants, while spreading disinformation and sowing discord among various groups of a population. They all call for the resurgence of nation states, condemning multilateral institutions etc.

While China had benefited hugely from the “Washington Consensus” and the neoliberalism advocated by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, Soros also criticises China’s abuse of technology – AI and IT – to “gain total control over its citizens.”

Indirectly the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union did enable China to rise - it became the world's second largest economy in 2011 - although the author does not explicitly mention it.

So the current trade war between the US and China is just the reflection of grievances among Americans who resent free trade and globalisation. They say China’s phenomenal economic growth came at the expense of job losses, falling incomes and declining living standards etc in the US.