PLENTY of Londoners secretly suspect that beyond the M25 motorway that encircles the capital, nothing very much happens. Their city is the most economically important in Europe, perhaps anywhere, as well as the most fun according to the votes of reviewers on TripAdvisor. London and the south-east region have long been more prosperous than the rest of the country, where the remaining three-quarters of the population live. In July Theresa May, who likes to contrast herself with her posh, metropolitan predecessor, David Cameron, began her time as prime minister with a promise to help “every single” British city, an appeal to those who feel left behind by the country’s London-led growth.

Certainly the Britain beyond London and the south-east that Mrs May wants to conquer—call it the Mayan Empire—is less economically advanced. If it were a country it would be about as rich as Spain, with a GDP per person one-tenth below the EU average. Some parts are a lot worse off. On the Isle of Anglesey, in Wales, income per person is 57% of the EU average, lower than most of Sicily. The gap between the richest and poorest parts of Britain is greater than in any other EU country; London’s GDP per person is 186% of the European average.

By almost any measure, the Mayans’ recent GDP growth has been unimpressive. Data from the OECD, a club of rich countries, suggest that if you ignore London and the south-east, Britain’s GDP growth between 2008 and 2014 was slower than France’s. Sluggish economic activity keeps property prices down. House prices have risen by over one-fifth in London and the south-east since 2008 but fallen by more than 5% elsewhere in England.

There is little to suggest that GDP growth will soon pep up. The number of Mayan firms annually registered has risen by 10% since 2010, half the rate of London and the south-east. Investment is low, too. Its share of overall R&D spending is much lower than its share of the population.

The familiar phenomenon of a “north-south divide” is thus alive and kicking. But dig into the data and a puzzle emerges. The Mayan Empire’s GDP growth may be sluggish, but in recent years the lot of its people has been improving faster than that of people in London and the south-east.

However you measure pay—hourly, weekly or annual, mean or median—since 2009 that of the Mayans has grown faster in cash terms than the pay of those in the London region, in contrast to pre-crisis trends. After housing costs, Mayans’ median real household incomes have held steady since 2008, compared with a 6% fall in London. Indeed, after housing costs the incomes of working-age folk are now higher in Scotland and the east of England than they are in London.

The disconnect between GDP growth and how workers actually fare is best captured by a measure called the “labour share”, defined as wages and salaries as a proportion of GDP. Economists have recently noted that Britain’s overall labour share is falling. But this is driven by London and the south-east; elsewhere labour’s share is stable (see chart).

Not only that, but in recent years income inequality has grown in the capital, while falling elsewhere. Since 2009 the real annual pay of a Londoner at the tenth percentile (ie, near the poorest) has fallen by an astonishing 23%. The official figures may even understate the reality at the top. The richest folk, who disproportionately live in the capital, hide income. “There has been a huge rise since 2009 in people starting companies which have no employees. I can’t help but think that a large part of this is to avoid tax,” says Danny Dorling of Oxford University. There are many reasons for Mayans’ relatively strong wage growth. They may have experienced a lighter squeeze on pay because they tend to be older, and so have more experience and bargaining power than others, points out Stephen Clarke of the Resolution Foundation, a think-tank. About one-quarter of employees are unionised, compared with one-fifth in London and the south-east. And Mayans have been protected by their reliance on public-sector jobs. Since the crisis, public-sector pay has grown faster than private. Others argue that the high number of immigrants who settle in London and its surroundings may push down on low-end wages. But this is less convincing: in recent years the immigrant population has grown quicker outside the capital. A more plausible explanation is that more Mayans are on the minimum wage, which in recent years has risen faster than average earnings. The most intriguing explanation for relatively strong pay growth outside the capital concerns technology. In a recent speech Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England examined the effect of automation on wages. As machines have replaced men and women across a growing number of tasks, he suggested, the balance of bargaining power has swung against labour, especially low-skilled workers. Wage growth can thus be weak even as GDP rises.

That process may be most pronounced in London and the south-east. The region buzzes with innovation; investment in new technologies is high. And because of the south-east’s monstrously expensive housing, it is hard to locate low-value-added activities there. (Secretarial and administrative jobs in the region are disappearing 50% faster than elsewhere.) Londoners are also more likely to work in the “gig economy”, via platforms like Uber and PeoplePerHour, than Mayans, whose wages may thus suffer less from the disruption associated with rapid technological changes.

These trends may not continue for long. Public-sector jobs could be cut. Labour-saving technology may soon sweep across the country. Still, common misconceptions about the British economy outside London and the south-east need setting straight. Output is lower, and growing slower, beyond the capital. But the incomes of the three-quarters of Britons who live there are catching up with those of Londoners—and in a few places are already ahead.