Feat of the falcon In a daring and audacious mission three years ago, a Mirage 2000 flew almost 4000 km across the Indian Ocean. This was perhaps the first time that a single-engined fighter aircraft accomplished such a feat. Vijay Mohan reports on one of the Indian Air Forces most complex peacetime operations

A file photo of an IL-78 tanker with a Mirage 2000 fighter. Photo by Roopinder Singh

T hree years ago, on October 26, an IAF Mirage 2000 flew 4,000 km non-stop across the Indian Ocean from Mauritius to Trivandrum. The five-hour sortie by a single-engined aircraft, which marked the culmination of a unique salvage operation, was one of the most challenging peacetime operations undertaken by the IAF. It all began thus: a Mirage 2000 aircraft was severely damaged when it made a belly-landing in Mauritius during an air display while on its way back from South Africa after joint exercises. The under surface of the aircraft suffered extensive damage and a large amount of water and foam got into the cockpit due to the actions of the crash crew. The IAF had two choices  dismantle the aircraft and ship it back or repair it on the site and fly it back. A decision was taken to fly it back.

The flight path of the Mirage 2000 The task of repairing the aircraft in such a situation was unprecedented and a team headed by a group captain carrying the necessary spares and equipment arrived from India to carry out the task. Inputs were also taken from the manufacturer, Dassault, and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. Ten days after the incident, the aircraft was ready for flight tests. During the first flight, multiple failures of the fly-by-wire system occurred and the flight was aborted, requiring a priority landing. Problems also cropped up in the rudder, head-up display, throttle and fuel indication. The second test flight also revealed problems in the undercarriage, tail chute deployment, and fuel indication. The third test was carried out with an air-to-air refuelling tanker to check the fuel transfer systems. The 4,000 km from Mauritius to Trivandrum covers one of the most desolate stretches of deep waters. After take-off from Mauritius, the first stretch of land is after 2,900 km, entailing a flying time of about four hours. The nearest diversion, Diego Garcia, is 2,350 km from Mauritius and was 550 km east of the intended flight track. Ferry across the route by a fully serviceable single engine fighter itself is highly challenging. For a rectified aircraft with almost no diversions available, the risks were increased manifold. Weather was a major factor while planning the ferry. In fact, one of the aircrew involved revealed that they were held up in Mauritius for almost eight days waiting for the weather to clear up. The alternate route was to fly west to Nairobi and traverse along the eastern coast of the African continent. The logistics for this route in terms of fuel, oil, oxygen, accommodation, visas and other international clearances were enormous. This would also have entailed flying the aircraft for 12 hours, which was not considered prudent given its condition. While wait for favourable weather continued, ground runs were carried out each day to check all systems. Each ground run led to detection of some snag or system failure. This highlighted that though the aircraft was serviceable, its reliability was questionable. At 7 am on October 26, an IL-76, codenamed Sparrow and acting as the pathfinder, took off from Mauritius. The task of the IL-76 was to assess the weather prevailing along the intended flight path and advise changes in the ferry route of the other aircraft coming about an hour later. Low clouds had already started drifting in and a few minutes after the aircraft had taken off, it started raining. At 7.55 am, with Wg Cdr Jaspreet Singh strapped into the cockpit, the Mirage 2000, code-named Falcon2 roared down the runway and was soon lost to view as it entered clouds. Five minutes later the tanker, Falcon1, with Wg Cdr T Shanker and Wg Cdr N.V.M. Unnithan at the controls, got airborne. About 70 nautical miles out over the sea, the Mirage made its first rendezvous with the tanker. With a window of just 11 minutes for the first air-to-air refuelling racket, the fuel transfer was successfully completed. "Mid-air refuelling," according to an officer who was part of the exercise, "can be done only in clear visibility. It cannot be attempted in bad weather." Fuel calculations for the flight, the officer said, had to be very accurate. "Refuelling has to be done within particular and pre-decided brackets of time, else the fighter aircraft becomes totally tanker dependent or the pilot is left with no option but to eject," he said. Refuelling brackets last only for a few minutes. At 25,000 feet above the Indian Ocean, the Mirage carried out refuelling twice. A decision was taken to start the third refuelling bracket a little earlier than scheduled due to weather considerations. At this point the aircraft had been airborne for about three hours and was still 1100 nautical miles (about 2,000 km) from Trivandrum. The mirage left the tanker immediately after the last refuelling, increased speed to 0.9 Mack and climbed to an altitude of 43,000 feet, for which clearance had already been taken from Male air traffic control. Here two things happened that caused concern and cast a doubt on fuel calculations. Having just topped-up, the weight of the Mirage was very high and it became difficult to maintain the altitude and speed at dry power. Afterburner had to be used to maintain a speed of 0.9 Mach, which resulted in higher fuel consumption than anticipated and the fuel situation became critical. This condition persisted till some fuel was used up and the weight was reduced. Secondly, the winds forecast for the route were beam winds of 1520 knots. However, the winds encountered had a headwind component of 2530 knots. This reduced the aircrafts ground speed from 520 knots to 490 knots and had an adverse impact on fuel consumption. A decision was made to alter the flight course to save fuel. Fresh fuel calculations were made by the tankers navigator, who reckoned that the aircraft could make it to Trivandrum with at least 1,400 kg of fuel. This went a long way in reducing the tension in the cockpit and the remaining part of the flight was executed with only a few minor problems. A leak in the oxygen system reduced the oxygen supply and just about a litre was left by the time the aircraft landed. Besides, just 300 nautical miles short of Trivandrum, one of the radio sets conked out. A second tanker had taken off from Agra about an hour after the falcons had left Mauritius in case a fourth refuelling was required in the last leg over South India. Additional fuel, however, was not required. Falcon2 landed at Trivandrum after flying for five hours and ten minutes, during which it took in over 7,000 kg fuel over the high seas. The pathfinder IL76 had already landed about an hour earlier while the tanker touched down 40 minutes later. The Mirage was ferried to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in Bangalore the next day. Documenting the event, an IAF official journal stated that the successful recovery of the Mirage 2000 would go down as one of the most complex, challenging and risky peacetime operations ever undertaken by the IAF. "The plan was audacious and fraught with many uncertainties and the decision to go ahead and attempt it was extremely bold," the journal said. THE CHALLENGES T here were several critical areas which made the flight challenging and called for accurate planning and calculated risks, such as: There was no margin for error. The fighter had to take off with its auxiliary fuel tanks empty so as not to overstress the damaged airframe. This meant that only an 11-minute window was available for the first refuelling bracket. The Mirage could carry only two drop-tanks because the integrity of the underbelly was still in doubt. This reduced the fuel load and increased the number of air-to-air refuelling brackets. The fighter was to go "tanker-free" during the last leg and could only be in radio contact with ground agencies through the tanker. In case of radio failure, the aircraft would have no means of communication and any emergency would have made the situation critical. The fighter would have to navigate on its own for the last 1100 nautical miles over the ocean with no ground-based navigation aids or radar cover for most of the part. The aircrafts inertial navigation system was the only aid and any failure on its part would have been critical. The risk of a possible ejection and slim changes of a subsequent search and rescue operation had to be accepted. And, inclement weather would have hampered rescue operations.







