THE fighting in Ukraine, which Vladimir Putin further escalated this week by sending Russian forces over the border, provides a sombre backdrop to the NATO summit in Wales. But it ensures that the meeting on September 4th will not have to spend time agonising over what the 65-year-old alliance is for (see article). The timing was originally meant to coincide with the end of combat operations in Afghanistan in January. Around 14,000 American and NATO troops may remain in the country to “train, advise and assist” Afghan security forces for a few years more. But the summit’s main task, thanks to Mr Putin, is a return to NATO’s old business: ensuring that when it pledges to defend its members, it can do so. The alliance was hesitant, at first, when Russia forcibly annexed Crimea in March. It took a few modest steps to reassure the new members closest to Russia that NATO stood by its obligation under Article 5: an attack on one is an attack on all. But despite the energetic leadership of the outgoing secretary-general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, some members (notably the Germans, the Italians and the Dutch) were loth to be “provocative” towards the Russians; a subsequent Polish request for 10,000 troops, including a sizeable American contingent, to be permanently based in that country was rejected, because it was too close to Russia’s borders.

Thankfully, appeasement of Mr Putin is no longer on the cards. Russia’s orchestration of the civil war in east Ukraine and the shooting down of MH17, with 193 Dutch nationals on board, by separatists recklessly armed by the Kremlin have hardened European opinion. It is clear that the alliance must prepare to deal with an antagonistic Russia for a long time to come. Yet, even now, the risk is that NATO will do too little.

The summit is likely to back a “readiness action plan” aimed at strengthening deterrence. It is good—but not good enough. A new high-readiness brigade will be formed, deployable within hours; heavy weapons will be pre-positioned in Poland which could be used later by “follow-on” forces; and a new command-centre will be established. Yet NATO would send a stronger signal to Russia if it had followed the Polish suggestion and set up a base for 10,000 combat troops there.

One-way street

This would contravene the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which was intended to end the mutual suspicions of the cold war and pave the way for partnership between the alliance and Russia. However, Mr Putin has never treated NATO as anything but an enemy. So NATO members have no need to feel bound by a document that is not honoured by the other side.

NATO’s European members should show their serious intent in another way, too. Fiscal austerity and a false sense of security have resulted in years of defence-budget cuts, whereas Russia has doubled its military spending (in nominal terms) since 2007. The complacent assumption in European capitals has always been that America would fill any capability gaps. Mr Rasmussen says that Mr Putin’s “wake-up call” has jolted half of NATO’s members into promising not to cut further, but that is not enough. In 2006 all member countries pledged to spend 2% of their GDP on defence. In Europe only Britain, France, Greece and Estonia come even close (although Poland is getting there). What NATO needs above all is more deployable and better-equipped forces—and European leaders prepared to tell their voters why they should pay for them.