It had been incredibly hard to speak to someone from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs — one reason the Russia position is often absent from Western media. But after months of chasing diplomats, I had a chance to sit down with Denis Mikerin, the Russian press attaché in Berlin, in March 2018. (He has since returned to work with the ministry in Moscow, and when we spoke in mid-June, he confirmed that the Russian position remained unchanged.) The Russian Embassy was a beautiful complex protected by an imposing white stone wall and wrought-iron double gates. Inside, we walked past a stained-glass wall depicting a rainbow over the Kremlin. Interviews with diplomats are often boring recitations of the country’s talking points, but in the case of Russia, even this is novel. Our two-hour conversation ambled among Crimea, Europe, Russia and the Middle East. It went on so long that we had to move from what looked like an ornate tearoom to one resembling a hunting lodge, with wood-paneled walls decked with trophy heads with antlers.

I asked him if Russia was willing to take on a greater global role and all the unwanted criticism that would entail. (In a Pew 2018 poll of 25 countries, many saw Russia playing a more important international role compared with 10 years ago, but views of Putin had grown more unfavorable.)

He suggested Russia was ready. Moscow would do things differently, he said. He pointed to Syria: “Russia has all the legal basis to be there — in response to official request from the government of Syria. With Geneva negotiations completely stalled, the Astana format with Turkey and Iran appears to be an efficient platform. We did not come in alone and say now we are deciding. On the contrary, we are trying to join the efforts of all those committed to preserving Syria’s territorial integrity.” He seemed to be drawing a distinction between the Astana format and the American-proposed way forward in Iraq, but the two versions — countries spearheading a “coalition of the willing” to work outside the United Nations — did not feel dissimilar to me. Still, the strain of trying to spearhead constructive policy was becoming evident. He claimed that the Americans had sent low-level officials to the first peace conference in Sochi in an attempt to undercut their efforts. “They were sending the signals to those whom they had in fact wanted, not to sabotage, but to avoid taking part.” The Russians were falling into the same trap the United States had for so long — looking for others to blame for the difficulties of constructing policy.

In contrast to Western condescension, he explained, when Russia works with other countries it’s about finding common ground and pragmatic interests. “It’s ridiculous to presume that some countries are lobbying Russian interests,” he said. “They are lobbying their own interests in the first place.” He said the Russians were tired of the United States and the European Union “mentoring” them. “We kept trying to find this very high road in relations between Russia and the Western world in general. We treat everyone equally and want to be treated the same way. But it came to nothing at all. The West said: ‘All right, guys, you have certain limits you can come to, but those are your limits and you may not exceed them.’ This is arrogant, to say the least. We know exactly what’s good and bad for us. We totally comply with the international law. That is solid and indisputable. The rest of it is subject for negotiations.” Our interview was polite, friendly even, like two people genuinely attempting to communicate. The issue of whether Russia had broken international law in Crimea was one of the few topics where we were completely stuck, as if we were discussing two different realities.

Over all, the diplomat seemed earnestly baffled when I told him Americans believed Putin had a master plan he was slyly executing. And on this point, I didn’t disagree. It didn’t seem to me that Russia was pushing a grand strategy so much as responding to opportunities in order to do exactly what Baykov said the country would: “to be an autonomous player, to uphold its identity of a great power which is strategically independent.” If we look at the world through Russian eyes, the plan is working, but it isn’t the plan we thought it was. Russia did not break the back of the international world order, as much as it recognized the opportunities created by American withdrawal and the new era of global bardak.