American Journalism, Foreign Propaganda and Fake News

Solutions exist in the fight against misinformation. We need to learn from Russian Americans’ reactions to the U.S. election

Photo by Glenn Fawcet / United States Department of Defense

If there was one thing we learned from the recent election, it was the power of misinformation. For liberals and conservatives alike, fake news has taken a prominent role in our politics, spreading conspiracies as far as the eye can see. This has raised considerable panic among Americans, many of whom might be wondering how we got here and what we can do to sanctify facts and protect the press’s legitimacy.

While the answers to these questions are undoubtedly complicated, there is a hard underlying truth that most people are unwilling to admit — namely that U.S. journalism itself empowered fake news in the first place. While misinformation certainly exacerbated media distrust, the reality is that the media’s support of particular narratives also helped strengthen not only fake news, but foreign propaganda as well.

When exposed, these narratives inflamed public opposition towards a seemingly biased media, provoking an anti-establishment backlash that made alternative news platforms more appealing. As many Trump and Sanders supporters can testify, this process has a uniquely bipartisan dimension, one that affects people of all walks of life. In fact, this phenomenon has never been more apparent than in my own Russian American community.

For more than 15 years I have lived in Northeast Philadelphia’s diverse Bustleton and Somerton community, home to hundreds of hardworking Soviet immigrants. An immigrant of Armenian and Russian ancestry myself, I spoke to dozens of Russian Americans throughout the election cycle, often curious about their political beliefs. What I quickly found, which most readers would find unsurprising, was that the majority of Russian-Americans voted for Trump on November 8.

As for explanations of Trump’s appeal, however, I realized the true culprit was uniquely distinct from mere anti-leftism, his authoritative demeanor, a desire for peaceful U.S.-Russian relations or even misogynistic conservative attitudes. While these explanations may apply to some individuals, they did not explain the passion I saw against Hillary Clinton. In my search for answers, I looked to my own family for clues.

Like as many as 400,000 Russian-Americans — most of whom make up my own community — my family receives its news and entertainment from Russian television. Largely the byproduct of language barriers and cultural preferences, this reliance on foreign broadcasting is common for immigrants across many ethnicities. In my case, my family’s viewing of Russian news was coupled by my own indulgence for American journalism. This allowed me to see the interplay of the Russian and American press firsthand and how it influenced Americans at home. More importantly, this exposure made me realize that my community’s support of Trump actually stemmed from an unusual source: the U.S. media’s one-sided portrayal of American foreign policy.

How does this make any sense?

Contrary to initial suspicions, families like mine are not particularly susceptible to Russian propaganda. The Ukrainian conflict remains divisive for many immigrant families while the vitriol of Russian figures like television host Dmitry Kiselev and party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who both spew conspiracies and fears of nuclear war, is dismissed as utter nonsense. Much like Russian Americans in general, many of us are wary of Vladimir Putin. As for the misinformation and one-sided portrayals of the Russian press, our interactions with other Americans dispel many of its lies, but also introduce us to prominent U.S. media narratives.

What were some of these trending themes in the American press?

Since the beginning of this election, the consensus in the U.S. was loud and clear: Americans view Russia as a threat (even prior to its electoral hacking) and our foreign policy establishment believes that our interventions abroad in places like Syria are beneficial, purposeful and fundamentally just.

For many of us Russian-Americans, these foreign policy positions are controversial and for good reason. Yet the U.S. media treats them infallibly, rarely criticizing U.S. military action with the exception of a few op-ed, think tank or academic articles. By contrast, amidst the hyperbole that litters much of state-sponsored Russian news, reasonable criticisms of American foreign policy often do take root along the trenches.

Take popular Russian talk and debate shows like Evening with Vladimir Solovyov and 60 Minuta where journalists and political pundits debate international news. Absent the occasional rabble-rouser, speakers often rant against the U.S.’s bossy nature towards other countries and the double standards of its international politics. In fact, shows like 60 Minuta, which are well acquainted with U.S. news, often cite popular articles and clips from outlets like CNN, the New York Times and the Washington Post to reinforce these positions, reflecting the general news themes of the American press. This is also a common practice across most Russian news networks.

An archetypal example of the Russian argument against U.S. foreign policy. Video is from a September 16, 2016 recording of 60 Minuta. Use subtitles for a rough translation.

To list a few examples, consider Russia’s support of Bashar Al-Assad’s Syria. Russian anchors often question why there has been so little coverage, save for a few conservative outlets, of the U.S.’s support of Saudi Arabia and Qatar who both provide clandestine support to ISIS, as confirmed by an unretracted WikiLeaks e-mail of Hillary Clinton’s campaign chairman, John Podesta. The U.S. has strategic interests that compel it to support these controversial partners, not unlike the Russian and Syrian governments, though Russia is the one demonized in this exchange. For more appropriate parallels, one needs but look back at the U.S.’s questionable support of leaders like Saddam Hussein, the Shahs of Iran or Chile’s Augusto Pinochet.

Similarly, Russian shows criticize the U.S.’s assertiveness in liberating Syria from Assad’s grasp. With the U.S.’s largely unsuccessful track record in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, what assurance could there be of success in Syria? American experts claim an overthrow of Assad would debilitate Iran and Hezbollah, but what ensures that a power vacuum would not ensue, that Alawites would not face an ethnic cleansing, or that radicals do not take charge in Syria — drawing the U.S. further into the region like it did during Iraqi reconstruction? With Assad’s recent victory over war-torn Aleppo, these questions have never echoed louder. But because U.S. de-escalation in the region would embolden Russia, these criticisms are tossed on the back burner while the U.S. desperately seeks to maintain its leadership status in the Middle East.

For many of us, geopolitical power and objective journalism are not mutually exclusive. Yet the American media peddled Assad’s overthrow as a seemingly riskless endeavor, often without justifying that sense of confidence. This emboldened anti-establishment feelings among my friends and neighbors who all agreed that the U.S. appeared hypocritical — with its active history of interventionism, its ouster of over 11 governments since the Cold War and its nearly 800 international military bases compared to Russia’s approximate 20 — to take the moral high ground of criticizing Russian aggression while opposition to its own activities are illegitimate grounds for debate.

To understand this sentiment, recall former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, and her December remarks on the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo. In her questioning of Assad, Iran and Russia’s roles in the death of civilians, she was unambiguously blunt, demanding to know whether they were truly “incapable of shame.” For many viewers, this comment had a familiar tone of irony. After all, the U.S. had its own share of collateral damage in Syria, not to mention its destabilizing role in neighboring Iraq and its imperfect Syrian rebel vetting process which accidentally armed local terrorist groups.

Powers’s comments thus sang the familiar tune of a faultless America standing tall in the face of belligerent adversaries. While an inspiring and noble image, the facts unfortunately do not conform to that ideal. For Russian American viewers in particular, instances like these, which the Russian press was quick to highlight, reinforced existing doubts over American foreign policy. This has led an increasing number of Russian immigrants, just like the majority of Americans in general, to oppose U.S. involvement in other countries’ internal affairs.

It is thus unsurprising that Trump’s insistent anti-war calls in his rallies and his defense of irredeemable but relatively stable regimes like Saddam Hussein’s resonated so much with my Philadelphia community. In my conversations with contractors, barbers, cooks and other hardworking immigrants, legitimate concerns over America’s actions overseas quickly polarized into a distrust of a “one-sided U.S. press.”

Instead of a community backlash against Democrats, leftists or a potential female president, I saw an assault against a hawkish and “corrupt” bipartisan establishment, for which Hillary Clinton was its indomitable flag bearer. And though I noticed this often did not translate to passionate affection for Trump himself, his representation as a force against this status quo was enough to sway many Russian Americans toward the Republican’s cause.

Now to be clear, by highlighting an element of one-sidedness in U.S. news, Russian Americans like me are not defending Russia or its appalling interference in our recent election. Nor do I suggest that Russia did not promulgate fake news onto the American public. I am not qualified to speak on that topic, though I would argue, much like The Intercept’s Glenn Greenwald did in a recent January 4 article, that the perceived electoral impact of Russian interference is significantly overblown.

Additionally, it is important to point out that the Russian press, like ours, defends Russia’s activities in equally myopic fashion. Every country’s media promotes a narrative that serve their national interest; we are not unique in this regard. Nevertheless, if we are to draw a lesson from this election, it is that the holier-than-thou narrative of American power, without balanced reporting, has supplied foreign news outlets the means necessary to undermine its very existence.

Consider the recently released declassified report on Russian hacking and its discussion of RT America, a “Kremlin-financed channel.” As the report indicates, its success was spurred by its fight to disclose every hypocrisy, however slight, in American politics. This is the modus operandi of Russian news and debate channels — one that succeeded in convincing those of my community to oppose Hillary Clinton (not blatant conspiracies and falsehoods). This tactic even swayed many non-Russian-speaking Americans, propelling Putin’s and Trump’s popularity forward among groups like the Alt-Right.

We need to remember that the most effective propaganda operates under the veneer of truth. If Putin seeks to delegitimize Western institutions by emphasizing our hypocrisies, then it is our responsibility to acknowledge our own biases and to report fairly on America’s actions overseas. Going tit-for-tat is simply not enough.

But by failing to provide balanced reporting on foreign policy, the U.S. press has given life and meaning to this propaganda, leaving media distrust and political polarization to fester while fake news platforms rack up momentum. Today, more than 70 percent of Americans believe that the media is biased, all while fake news posts on Facebook have already outperformed leading mainstream news articles in exposure, according to a recent BuzzFeed report. These trends have to be stopped.

As Robert Kagan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute puts it, “ [w]ith the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have signaled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order.” If, as Kagan argues, we need to maintain America’s international prominence to ensure great power peace, then our efforts towards journalistic balance must not falter. If Americans largely oppose an assertive foreign policy, then it is the responsibility of journalists, pundits and politicians alike to argue on its merits — not silence reasonable opposition. The preservation of NATO and other key Western institutions demands it.

This is only one of many steps we will need to take to combat misinformation and to preserve a free press. In our hyperpartisan society, these solutions cannot come from institutional change. Only by removing value judgments, sensationalism and narratives in journalists’ —not opinion writers’ — content can impartiality and the healing of public-press relations be achieved. Only then can fake news and propaganda truly lose their grandeur.

But until that happens, they are not going to disappear. Misinformation will continue to plague us, and regardless of whether Americans rely on foreign or domestic broadcasting for their news and entertainment, we are all going to be listening to what our journalists have to say.

Let us hope that they are ready to make a change in the right direction.