Andrew: but there was a way for NBs to vote that there was not enough time for them, etc. It is the normal vote.



A more-than-absolute majority of NBs participating decided that there *was* enough time, and so on. They voted yes.



At the end of the day, a lot of the objections come down to some NBs having a different opinion on the standard (and the particular process) than other NBs. *That happens all the time* though usually without the publicity machine and end-of-the-world grandiosity. People are playing this as ISO Secretariat against the world, but the world voted, in the glare of publicity: now it may be that SA, China, India and Ven did not have enough time to figure out what was going on and what to vote (and they insiste that therefore no other NB could have either) or they think their arguments are so compelling that any lack of agreement by other NBs shows that the NBs were somehow duped or shielded from the opposing view, but that is simply not their call to make. NBs decide, and the Secretariat has no right to overturn the NBs clear vote: they have to server the NBs. Remember that ISO voting rules are some of the strongest on any standards body: not simple majority, not absolute majority, but stronger than that with accept and reject quotas.



If you don't like the idea of there being a forum where each National Body has the same vote and there should be more consideration enfranchising based on economic size, or non-NB stakeholders, then JTC1 is not the body for you. (In fact, the person who has most seriously argued that smaller economies should have less votes and that primary stakeholders should have more involvement is Jan van der Belt, who is actually a lovely man: I disagree with him quite strongly on this.) Actually, ISO has being trying to position itself in recent years as more like a Senate: a house of review which looks at standards from angles different from the stakeholder-driven consortia and committees who originate the standards.



For example, you might decide to have population-based voting, for example an extra vote for every 100 million population. Or GDP-based voting. That would then encourage the formation of voting blocks and proxies. It sounds like a step sideways, at best, and probably a step backwards. I believe it is really important for there to be an international standards body where ultimate voting does not allow direct voting by stakeholders: all the systems where there is direct voting by stakeholders are suspect and deficient w.r.t. susceptibility to collusion and domination just on procedural grounds.



I don't know if you know the term "Pilgerism". It was coined about a journalist John Pilger, a fellow Australian, and it is defined as "presenting information in the most sensational way in support of a pre-dedetermined position". That is what I see a lot of. People start off with the position "Oh, of course it is impossible for OOXML to become a standard". And "It is impossible for any changes to be made". And it is impossible for MS to do anything without it therefore being bad. And so with many other impossibilities. Then when the impossible happens, rather than saying "oh. we were wrong by a mile" and "gosh the echo chamber was so strong we only heard our own voice repeated", we get "Oh, there must be corruption and folly, it is the only explanation."



But the simpler explanation is that there was a vigorous exchange of views, changes were made, and enough NBs were convinced. (However, as I have said before, I do think there should have been more NBs abstaining on both sides, based on their reasons. For example, if a NB loses confidence with its technical committee for having biased views, or if an NB considers it did not have enough time to satisfactorily review, both those should have resulted in abstentions IMHO.)



Cheers

Rick Jelliffe