IN THE gilded, airless hall, the journalists were becoming restless. They had gathered in the Foreign Office on July 22nd for a first glimpse of a government audit of Britain’s relations with the European Union. A flustered press officer announced that the photocopier had broken down. Ranting about their looming deadlines, several flounced out. Copies finally distributed, the remaining scribblers flicked through before machine-gunning questions at the official responsible. How much did this cost to produce? Are its conclusions Europhile or Eurosceptic? Does it criticise the European Court of Human Rights? (nothing to do with the EU, the mandarin corrected, with a millimetric raise of an eyebrow). Hurried, primary-coloured and sometimes ill-informed, the questions were illustrative. The EU is a technocratic subject. But Britain’s public debate about it is emotional and simplistic. Headline-chasing journalists prefer bombast to nuance (only three newspapers have correspondents in Brussels). Apart from small cabals of diehard Europhiles and Europhobes, MPs, too, avoid the detail: the European Scrutiny Committee is often inquorate, as members fail to attend meetings. The wider British public cares little and understands less. The government knows this, and uses it to its advantage. For example, David Cameron’s inglorious withdrawal from negotiations over the EU fiscal pact in 2011 was briefed to the media as a great victory (“UP EURS: Bulldog PM sticks up for Britain” bellowed one tabloid headline). So was the news of a real-terms cut to the EU’s 2014-20 budget—in fact a product of German statecraft. Both were misreported but pleased the home crowd.

The Foreign Office review is the latest such example. In January, after months of agitation by Eurosceptic backbenchers, Mr Cameron gave a speech committing to a “new settlement” for Britain, followed by an in-out referendum before 2018. The “balance of competences” review, he explained, would inform the process. In fact, its main purpose is not evidential. The prime minister cannot hold a referendum in the current parliament for fear of tearing the coalition government and his party apart. The future shape of the union, and Britain’s role in it, remains uncertain and partly depends on the outcome of the German election in September. So the review and the delegations of Tory MPs dispatched to European capitals on fact-finding boondoggles give the useful but false impression that the prime minister has started the renegotiation process. They are illusions, not substance.

Further such examples abound. Appearances have dictated the government’s policy on opting out of EU justice and home affairs rules. Most are insubstantial or irrelevant to Britain, but the Conservatives wanted to abandon over 100 all the same—because the number sounded impressive. The Lib Dems wanted a lower figure, so they split the difference and settled at around 95. Likewise, on July 5th Tories rallied around a pointless private members bill “guaranteeing” a referendum by 2017 (no government can bind its successor). The prime minister joined his MPs, cheering the spurious endeavour from the front bench. When the time comes, the renegotiation of British EU membership will be another such Potemkin effort. British and German diplomats agree that any repatriations of powers to London from Brussels will be largely symbolic.

Threats to Mr Cameron's strategy remain. Labour may yet commit to a referendum (perhaps sooner than 2017, the likely year of the prime minister's proposed plebiscite). Moves towards fiscal union will pick up speed after the German election. UKIP will likely receive the most votes at next year's European election. For now, the prime minister's efforts seem to have calmed the mood in the Conservative Party, which goes into the summer recess more united on Europe than it has been for years. This too could yet prove illusory.