Defendants’ assertions that it would have been far more intrusive to “attempt to secure the parcel of property while a warrant was prepared,” given that Harris’s property was surrounded on three sides by other privately owned parcels, are inapposite. The fact that it may have been more tedious to secure the property at 297 Enfield Street while a warrant was obtained does not create exigency. We further note that aside from there being no urgency created by Hemingway’s tip about the firearms in and of itself, there is no evidence that the officers sought to corroborate the tip prior to their entry. The officers did not attempt to “knock and talk” or to learn who lived at 297 Enfield Street prior to arriving on the scene with their weapons out in a “tactical approach.” Trial Tr. Vol. II at 277; Trial Tr. Vol. III at 620. These facts underscore the inappropriateness of the exigent circumstances exception to this case.

Accordingly, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence of urgency, and that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement was therefore not applicable on the evidence presented at trial. Because police officers require “either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry,” . . . the invasion of Plaintiffs’ curtilage without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.