Catalonia in Spain: Europe's key struggle for democracy

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Resources: For English-language news and information sources on Catalonia, click here. For solidarity information click here. For an administrative map of Catalonia click here. For an explanatory note on this blog click here.

Translation: Unless otherwise specified, translations are by the European Bureau of Green Left Weekly and Links, International Journal of Socialist Renewal

Week ending February 10

Note: This blog has ended. Our new blog, covering the trial of the Catalan political prisoners and other movement leaders can be found here.

February 5

Background (Ara)

The chasm with Catalonia grows wider

The drive to seize back devolved regional powers is strongest in Castile, Aragon and the Madrid region

1. A single central state or less autonomy?

2. A state of autonomous regions, as at present?

3. More self-government or independence?

Do many in Spain wish to return to the centralised administration system that was pervasive, for instance, during General Franco’s regime? Well, it would appear that way, even after nearly forty years of devolved regional powers. If we are to believe the latest report published by CIS, the Spanish government’s polling body, in Spain as a whole only 16 per cent would like the central government to scrap the system currently in place. But when you also consider that 12.1 per cent of respondents say they would like to see some powers taken back from Spain’s autonomous governments, you get a more significant 28.1 per cent. If we zero in on certain regions, we soon discover that some parts of Spain openly oppose the current system of autonomous regions. Specifically, nearly 50 per cent of respondents in Madrid, Cantabria, Castile and Aragon favour some form of regression. In Madrid’s case, for example, supporters of a recentralised administration outnumber those who prefer the current system or might even like regions to be granted additional powers.

Paradoxically, in the upcoming regional elections many Spaniards who oppose the current system will go to the polls and, for the first time, they will elect MPs (i.e. Vox) who propose scrapping the regional parliaments. It is not unlike the situation you get in the European parliament with eurosceptic groups, such as France’s National Front and Britain’s UKIP. We will see whether Spain’s political system can withstand the surge of Vox, the far-right party that longs for the mythical Spain from a time now long gone, with one single parliament, one central government and fifty provincial prefects.

The CIS poll paints a picture of a country split into three. We have already discussed the first group: those who favour recentralisation can be found mainly in Castile and Aragon, a region that claims to be a historic nation in its Statute, but now wants to relinquish self-rule. In the second group we have the regions that are content with the current state of affairs: the southern regions (Andalusia, Extremadura and Murcia), the Canary Islands and some regions where a language other than Spanish is also spoken (Galicia, Valencia and the Balearic Islands). In the last of the three groups we have Catalonia and the Basque Country, followed at a distance by Navarre, where the general feeling is quite the opposite: most respondents would like to be granted either greater powers or full independence.

Spain’s future politics will also need to be explained in terms of the public’s preferences on this matter. Any debate about a constitutional reform will also have to take into consideration that, according to the CIS poll, Spaniards who would like to amend the Constitution to limit regional powers outnumber those on the opposite camp. The figures show that the current system of uniform autonomous regions is seen as a failure in many parts of Spain, particularly in those regions where demands for self-rule were unheard of before 1978.

In this context, Catalonia and the Basque Country increasingly find themselves drifting further from the Spanish average, with starkly contrasting views on how territorial coexistence ought to be organised. Any political system that aims to live on must be able to adapt to reality and not the other way round. That is the reason why the “coffee for all” system, which was meant to cohere Spain into a whole, has had the exact opposite effect (1).

Translator’s note:

(1) In contemporary Spanish politics, the decision to divide Spain up into 17 regions (1978) is often referred to as “coffee for all” meaning that they were all given (mostly) similar devolved powers … whether they liked it or not.

Translation: Ara, slightly amended by Green Left Weekly European Bureau

Week ending February 3

February 3

February 2

Hi, Podemos comrades:

A year ago I left my position as Secretary General of Podemos in Catalonia[i] but, regardless of whether I share party membership with you, I’m still aware that it is critical in times like those we’re going through for Catalan democrats and those in the rest of the State to keep looking for ways to come together and to share struggles. That’s why I’m writing to you on the threshhold of the trials of the Catalan independence leaders. Please give me a few moments of attention because the future of all of you is also at stake in these trials.

The beginning of the trials will provoke something which for Podemos has always been a problem: instead of our message being about how the banks rob us, about the PP, about the IBEX 35[ii] and the rest of the gang, it will be about "the Catalonia business". I understand perfectly the feeling of powerlessness that this situation creates. And I also know how hard it is for you to defend the position of Podemos on Catalonia (plurinationality of Spain and a Catalan right to a referendum) in places like Extremadura, the two Castiles[iii] and Andalusia. I know it is hard to explain that although Podemos is not pro-independence, it is committed to a referendum. I know how hard it is to explain to our co-workers, family and neighbours that we can want a united Spain but at the same time strongly condemn the violence of October 1 and the jailing of the independence leaders. It has always been hard. The bad news is that from now on, with the trial under way, it’s going to get a lot harder.

During the months that the trial lasts all the television coverage, the newspaper articles and the declarations of the politicians will revolve around Catalonia. There will be a competition to see who is the most Spanish-patriotic and it will be very, very hard to talk about anything else. The mass media run by the banks will repeat the word "coup" ad nauseam, the talk shows will rave about "CDR violence"[iv] and Casado, Rivera and Abascal[v] will have all the hours of television in the world to create a narrative that will be almost impossible to counter. Everyone will be talking about "the Catalonia business" while inequality and social injustice just keep on growing.

I know that many of you are asking what the best response is that you can give to this scenario that is bearing down on you at full speed. Speaking with many of you, I have seen that a fairly widespread strategy will be to resist the media tsunami, stand your ground on what is Podemos's raison d'être--social rights and exposing the issues that are buried in silence--while not getting too much into the Catalan question.

It's not up to me to make your decision for you or to give you advice. But I think that looking the other way and not actively engaging in the debate that will dominate the political landscape in the coming months would be a mistake of historical proportions. I sincerely believe that if all Podemos members do not take a clear and proactive position on the issue of these trials, Podemos will have been dealt its death blow. Put it another way: what is at stake in these trials against the Catalan independence leaders is our very existence. Effectively, this trial can ruin the lives of a handful of people whose political objectives we do not share. But if that happens, let no one doubt that Podemos will be finished forever. Let me explain.

In the early 1950s a trial against Ethel and Julius Rosenberg took place in the United States. The couple was accused of espionage and of revealing to the Soviet Union secrets about the manufacture of the atomic bomb. The Rosenberg were innocent, the trial was a set-up and they were both sentenced to death. There were demonstrations around the world, from Buenos Aires to Tokyo, from London to Moscow. World leaders of all kinds (including Pope Pius XII) asked for clemency. However, in spite of everything, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg died on June 19, 1953, electrocuted in the electric chair.

The trial has been studied for decades and for decades an explanation has been sought as to why the State did not back down on a sentence that was clearly unjust.

The answer was to be found not so much inside the courtroom as outside, in North American society at the beginning of the Cold War. The Rosenberg sentence was the starting point for manufactuting a political position that would dominate the United States during the following decades: the creation of "red terror", «the enemy within", "anti-American activities" and "the MacCarthyite witch hunt». Above all, this operation was carried out by pervading the population with a deep and unquestioning fear of any movement that might challenge the established order. A fear manufactured by politicians, judges, prosecutors, the media and politicians. A profound, uncontrollable and extremely effective fear, which in the years following allowed all kinds of political abuses and human rights violations to be committed against those who did not submit to "the official version". The Rosenberg case laid much of the foundation for this disaster.

And what does this have to do with Podemos and the trials of the independence leaders? In his book I Accuse[vi], lawyer Benet Salellas explains that the North American left was largely not enough involved in the defense of the Rosenbergs. Some of its leaders considered that if in any way they were linked to "nuclear espionage" the movement could be very much affected. And that they could therefore protect the popular movements by staying on the sidelines. And so the progressive movement in its passivity lost a golden opportunity to fight the carefully constructed notion that being a dissident, a radical or a communist was the same thing as being a traitor or spy. This strategy of distancing not only didn’t produce results but it would open the door in the following years to the progressive movement paying a huge price, one that would bring it very close to total annihilation at the hands of the North American extreme right.

Podemos comrades:

The trial that is about to start began its journey thanks to a complaint made by Vox[vii].

The judge who started everything[viii] already had in his curriculum vitae cases of legal repression against anarchists, pro-independence activists and the indignado movement (15M).

The head of the General Council of the Judicial Power congratulated the judge for being a "patriot"[ix].

The first evidence against the independence leaders was collected through irregular summonses and inquiries done by the Civil Guard.

While investigating the case, Daniel Baena, the Civil Guard officer who was in charge, dedicated himself to insulting people, parties and organisations, exploding the principle of impartiality required for any fair trial.[x]

The legal guarantees of impartiality and independence have been exploded in the passage of the case to the Supreme Court.[xi]

The evidence presented by the prosecution has the same credibility as a program by Ana Rosa Quintana.[xii] For example, to incriminate [Òmnium Cultural president Jordi] Cuixart, images of sites and places he never visited are offered in evidence.

Do you remember the whatsapp of PP senator Ignacio Cosidó saying "we will control the Second Chamber from behind"[xiii]. Cosidó meant that control was assured thanks to the presence of judge Manuel Marchena. Well, the Second Chamber is the one that is trying the independence leaders and Manuel Marchena is its chief judge.

I could go on spelling out in detail the farce that this trial entails, but that is not the aim of this letter. The objective of this letter is to convey the conviction that if the Spanish left does not involve itself openly and decisively in this trial, its die is cast. After crushing the independence leaders, Vox will move on to you. In fact, they are already chasing journalists. «Patriotic» judges will not hesitate to get you in the sights of their "justice", controlled "from behind". The blowing up of the right to a fair, independent trial with legal guarantees that has been done in the case of the independence supporters will be used to wipe out any challenge posed by the left in any part of the State. That is what is at stake.

Given all this, it's time to be courageous. I am aware that, in the midst of the vast mystification that will come with the trials, you will have a very hard time. It will be uncomfortable, they will accuse you of lack of patriotism, of treachery, of being enemies of Spain, coup plotters, terrorists and whatever else is needed. But we either block their path together or we all lose.

There are 500,000 of you. You are a huge social force and you have an enormous responsibility. That is why I ask you, in all humility, to get involved in the battle that is now starting. To inform yourself above and beyond the lies of the IBEX-controlled media, to really study the case, to look for reliable sources of information and, once all that is done, to pass on to others that part of reality that will be concealed under tons of lies orchestrated by those who have been ruling and robbing our country for 40 years. I know it’s hard, I know it can mean losing some votes and that you will not always be understood. But the alternative, as I say, is to disappear. And to do it by surrendering to the very powers that we came to fight.

A hug,

Albano

Footnotes

[i] In the run-up to the December 21, 2017 Catalan elections, called by then prime minister Mariano Rajoy, Podemos Catalonia (Podem), with Fachin as its general secretary, declared that it was open to building a broad left ticket of candidates in favour of the Catalan right to self-determination, including the ERC, CUP and the Constituent Process. In reaction, the State leadership of Podemos imposed a binding consultation of the Catalonia membership, asking it to answer Yes or No to the question: «Do you support Podem standing in the December 21 elections in coalition with Catalunya en Comú and our sister political forces that support neither the [October 27] declaration of independence nor the application of article 155 [of the Spanish constitution, suspending Catalan self-rule], with the word Podem in the name of the coalition on the ballot paper?» The result of the consultation, in which 17,379 members took part (about 60% of the «active membership»--people who had registered an internet vote at least once in the previous year) was 72% in favour, 28% against. Fachin then resigned as general secretary of Podem.

[ii] The Madrid stock market index.

[iii] The two Castiles are Castilla y León and Castilla-La Mancha

[iv] The reference is to the Committes for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), which have a program of non-violent civil disobedience in support of the Catalan right to decide and Catalan independence.

[v] Pablo Casado, Albert Rivera and Santiago Abiscal, respectively leaders of the People’s Party, Citizens and Vox.

[vi] Former CUP MP and lawyer Benet Salellas’s book I Accuse—Defence in Political Trials is a valuable study of political defence in state trials where the verdict has already been decided by the powers-that-be, with examples drawn from the Dreyfus case down to Salellas’s own involvement in the defence of Montse Venturós, the CUP mayoress of Bergà (see here for some coverage of her case).

[vii] The extreme right, neo-Francoist, ultra-unionist party Vox is the «popular prosecution» in the case of the Catalan political prisoners and has used this position to give itself profile as the most patriotic, most reliable defender of Spanish state unity.

[viii] The reference is to Juan Antonio Ramírez Sunyer, who before his death on November 4 was presiding judge in Barcelona’s Court 13. Ramírez Sunyer issued numerous search warrants that allowed the Civil Guard to raid government and company premises in search of material related to the October 1 referendum. This material forms the bulk of the prosecution’s grounds for charging the pro-independence leaders with «rebellion» and «sedition».

[ix] The reference is to Carlos Lesmes, chief judge of the Supreme Court and head of the General Council of the Legal Power. Lesmes’s letter to Ramŕez Sunyer is here.

[x] See here for some detail on Baena’s activity as a social network troll under the pseudonym of «Tácito».

[xi] See the comments on this issue of Javier Pérez Royo, University of Sevilla professor of constitutional law, here.

[xii] The presenter of the Program of Ana Rosa on Telecinco, a mixture of gossip and «investigative journalism», often directed at finding «dirt» on the Catalan independence movement.

[xiii] See here for more detail on this scandal. Cosidó is the leader of the PP group in the Senate.

January 28

January 27

International observers? They can watch it on the telly!

Spain’s Prosecutor General has suggested that international observers should follow the trial of the Catalan political prisoners on TV

Sebastià Alzamora.jpg Mallorcan writer, Sebastià Alzamora

Ara, January 29

Spain’s Prosecutor General, María José Segarra, is adamant that she sees no need for international observers to be present at the trial against the Catalan leaders because, I quote, “it will be broadcast live on TV, so I doubt if we could be any more transparent”. And she added that “you could try to give international observers a higher profile, but there you are: live on TV”. And, like the Eurovision song contest, it’ll be free for everyone to watch, she might have quipped.

María José Segarra embodies one of the biggest disappointments of PM Sánchez’s administration. Not only for the Catalan leaders who will sit in the dock and are at the receiving end of her actions (or, rather, the lack thereof), but for anyone who welcomed her appointment —someone with a progressive profile— with a glimmer of hope that Spain’s justice system might find its way back to separation of powers. Following a string of predecessors whose sole purpose was to dance to the tune of the Spanish government at the time (the late José Manuel Maza springs to mind: he was the AG who fabricated the charges upon which Justice Llarena has feverishly built the case that will be tried soon), at first it seemed as if Segarra might work to bring Spain’s judiciary back to the straight and narrow, after becoming completely entangled in Spanish politics, drifting towards extreme nationalism and taking on an authoritarian mindset epitomised by the Partido Popular’s so-called “gag law”, a bill that hasn’t been repealed yet. Segarra’s appointment came when the all-out judicial onslaught against Catalan separatism —in particular, the case examined by Justice Llarena— had been heavily censured by courts of law in Belgium and Germany, so much so that Llarena had no choice but to withdraw the European arrest warrants he had issued himself, thus becoming the laughingstock of the international community. But that’s not the end of it. Cases such as the “wolf pack” gang rape and Valtònyc, the exiled rap singer, made the front pages of the top international newspapers, plunging Spain’s justice and, therefore, the reputation of the rule of law, to a level of international disrepute unprecedented in this period of so-called democratic rule.

Far from doing anything to amend the situation, Segarra has given in to the powerful nationalist and far right elements among the judiciary’s top brass, becoming a foot soldier at their command and that of Foreign Minister Josep Borrell. The latter has been pouring public funds into an international PR campaign to improve Spain’s image abroad, badly tarnished by Madrid’s appalling handling of the conflict with Catalonia (and not, as he claims, by Catalonia’s independence supporters). Nevertheless, Segarra’s outlandish suggestion that the international observers should follow the trial on TV, as if it were a football match, insults the intelligence of International Trial Watch (the platform that brings together and coordinates observers from Spain and elsewhere) and, once again, the intelligence of the general public at large.

Translation: Ara (slightly amended by Green Left Weekly European Bureau)

Week ending January 27

20190126lacrida0101-26194918-768x512.jpg President Quim Torra at founding congress of the Crida Nacional ("National Call for the Republic")

January 25

Spain’s Supreme Court before October 1 referendum trial: 'The right to vote in an unlawful consultation does not exist'

Court issues ruling that reduces sentence for Mas, Ortega and Rigau over November 9, 2014 consultation

9N defendents with Quim Torra and Pere Aragonès President Quim Torra and vice president Pere Aragonès with Irene Rigau, Joana Ortega, Artur Mas and Francesc Homs. ANDREU DALMAU / EFE

Ara, January 24

Mariona Ferrer Fornells/Ruth Pérez Castro

Just a few days before the trial against Catalonia’s independence leaders kicks off, Spain’s Supreme Court on Wednesday released the details of ruling against Artur Mas, Joana Ortega and Irene Rigau over the November 9, 2014 consultation of Catalan public opinion on Catalan statehood. The court, which had previously found Francesc Homs guilty, took the opportunity to lay out the guidelines that could set the tone for the upcoming trial of the independence process, where two of the judges who tried the former Catalan president and his ministers will also be sitting on the bench.

In a 76-page long ruling, the court states that "the right to participate in a voting process does not exist when its illegality has been proclaimed by whose who interpret and guarantee fundamental rights." Of the November 9, 2014 consultation, it also states that "the exercise of fundamental rights has limits." "The right to vote in an unlawful consultation does not exist," it argues, pointing out that neither does "the right to participate in events of a public interest authorize an official vote to be held so that citizens can give their opinion as to whether a defendant is guilty or not, even if justice emanates from the people." The ruling was penned by Justice Antonio del Moral, who, along with Luciano Varela, is a member of the seven-judge court that will try the pro-independence leaders in the coming weeks.

The judges have thus addressed one of the aspects that will affect the defense, that of fundamental rights. The text also mentions another: the fact that calling a referendum or a consultation ceased to be a crime in 2005. The Supreme Court, which in this case was ruling on disobedience, affirms that it has the authority do so, even if the specific fact of convening a referendum is not a crime: "If the corresponding authority [in this case the Constitutional Court] bans such a vote, as it should, failure to with this instruction by its recipients will constitute disobedience." And it adds that "despite the fact that it prevents the public from participating in matters of public interest."

In addition, the judges describe as “almost bizarre" the notion that the verdict against Mas, Ortega and Rigau could contribute to making "some citizens feel inhibited" when it comes to participating in further consultations, or even "participating in public affairs." Therefore, the court considers "unfounded" the argument regarding citizen disenfranchisement alleged by Artur Mas and and his ministers, accentuated by the "fear that their legitimate representatives may be convicted."

The court justified the reduction of the disqualification penalty arguing that Mas, Ortega and Rigau have already endured the effects of the penalty without, officially, it having yet been applied. The fact that none of them could run in the elections, even though the ruling had not yet been confirmed, means that "the defendants are suffering an extra-judicial measure of similar content." Therefore, concluded the Supreme, the "de facto" period of disqualification began as of the first ruling. "We cannot ignore this," it states.

Translation: Ara

January 24

January 23

False dichotomy

The way in which the October 1 case has proceeded so far inevitably points to a guilty verdict

perez-royo.png Javier Pérez Royo, professor of constotutional law, University of Seville

Javier Pérez Royo (Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Seville)

Ara, January 23

Last Sunday [Barcelona daily] La Vanguardia published a very lengthy piece about the defence strategies of the Catalan leaders who are to stand trial following the October 1 referendum on independence. The story underscored the alleged split between those who wish to foreground the “political” angle and the defence teams that will emphasise the “technical” aspects. On Monday, Madrid-based El País ran a shorter story insisting on this point: “Differences in defence strategies to set tone of October 1 trial”.

In my opinion, this is a false dichotomy. Needless to say, every defence will be “technical”. The opposite would be impossible. But not all of them will share the same reference framework —inevitably, of a political nature— without which nothing can be understood. There won’t be —there can’t be— “technical” versus “political” defences, only “technical” defences that will necessarily be “political”, too. And that is owing to strictly judicial reasons: without adding the “political” element, lodging an appeal on the grounds of unconstitutionality —which must precede an eventual appeal before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)— would become a nearly impossible uphill struggle.

In the process that led to the referendum of October 1 2017 —and during the weeks following the vote— it seems clear to me that some Catalan leaders engaged in unlawful actions. My impression is that we can all agree on that. The point of contention is what offence these actions constituted, specifically. Did the Public Prosecutor press charges in accordance with the law or was he, in fact, merely concealing political motives under the guise judicial proceedings? This is the crux of the matter. And the answer to this question will determine everything else.

In my view, it was the latter of the two. The decision by Spain’s Public Prosecutor, José Manuel Maza, to bring charges of rebellion [against the Catalan leaders] before Madrid’s National High Court [Audiencia Nacional] had no legal base, neither from a substantive nor from a procedural point of view. The defendants’ actions did not constitute a crime of rebellion —as confirmed by over one hundred criminal law professors from universities across Spain— and the National High Court, following a decision taken by all its members in an earlier case, could not be the default court to hear the matter, as established by law. Here lies the original sin, which has not been righted by bringing the entire case before the Supreme Court: it is not the ordinary, default court of law and there is no higher ranking court in Spain to which an appeal may be made after the verdict, thus preventing the defendants from exercising their right to do so. Not just one, but two basic rights have been infringed upon.

The erratic trajectory followed by the examining magistrate, Pablo Llarena, before European courts of law, is evidence that there were no legal grounds for pressing rebellion charges. Although the Higher Court of Schleswig-Holstein is the only one to have handed down a resolution on the European arrest warrant issued by the Spanish judge, Llarena’s eventual decision to withdraw the arrest warrant across Europe has granted the German court’s ruling general scope. It has proven, beyond all doubt, Justice Llarena’s inability to persuade any European judge that the defendants had committed a crime of rebellion.

This judicial category has allowed the adoption of the most extreme of all cautionary measures: pre-trial detention, which is difficult to argue convincingly from a legal standpoint. At the time of writing, Spain’s Constitutional Court is considering an appeal [against pre-trial detention] by Oriol Junqueras, based on the ECHR’s jurisprudence.

Is a “technical” defence at all possible, if it disregards these precedents? Can we reasonably expect the Supreme Court to review the characterisation of the defendants’ actions as a crime of rebellion on appeal, bearing in mind that this court has confirmed every single decision by the examining magistrate, which has led to the defendants spending a significant length of time in prison and has prevented some of them from being voted in as president of Catalonia in a manner which —to my mind— is openly unconstitutional and at odds with Catalonia’s Statute?

I would like to be wrong, but the way in which the October 1 case has proceeded so far inevitably points to a guilty verdict. The trial will be a farce, even though they will abide by all the legal proceedings while it is being held. But the verdict has already been written.

There is no river Jordan that can wash away the original sin. The legal counsels must point this out throughout the trial, as this will provide the best basis for appeal on the grounds of unconstitutionality and, if dismissed by the Constitutional Court, a further appeal to the ECHR.

Politics and law have gone hand in hand in the actions by the Prosecutor and the Supreme Court. They must do likewise in the defence of the indicted.

Translation: Ara (slightly amended by Green Left Weekly European Bureau)

Occasional posts about the dirty deeds of Spanish foreign minister Josep Borrell

Ferreres juliol 2018 Borrell-Primer ministre belga. Ara-Premium_2054204562_55437834_766x385.jpg Belgian PM Charles Michel to Borrell: 'I'm sorry, the Belgian government can't influence judges. The legal system has been independent here since we threw out the Duke of Alba.'

Episode 1 (January 21-22)

The Borrell view...

(El Nacional, January 21)

Spanish foreign minister Josep Borrell is continuing his international campaign to sell the Spanish government's narrative about the police repression of the 2017 Catalan independence referendum. This Monday, he brought up the vote as an example of "disinformation" in an EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting. "We've given examples of cases like the famous thousand injured during the illegal referendum in Catalonia", the minister said in Brussels, saying that "only two were admitted to hospital".

One of the topics for debate today was an action plan to fight false information in the European election. Borrell told his counterparts that "the images spread those days on the police's violent attitude" were "false" and that "there was an enormous quantity of information" those days which came from servers "situated in Russian or Venezuelan territory".

The minister said that foreign interference and fake news is "of special importance" for Spain in its "internal problem" of Catalonia. "In the Catalonia conflict, disinformation has played a very important role", he told a press conference after the meeting.

According to Borrell, all the European states agree on the need to develop measures to protect this year's European election from outside interference and false information. He warned that "it's ever easier to hack human brains".

...and reality

Tweets by former Catalan health minister Toni Comín (January 22)

1. In this report it explains in all detail (all the detail allowed by data protection rules) how many people were attended to [on October 1], where, what the diagnosis was and how serious the injuries were.

2. If I were a doctor in the Catalan health system, I would want to know whether when minister Josep Borrell talks about "fake news" he's questioning the rigour of the professionals who diagnose the patients who arrive in their surgeries, which this report is based on.

3. If I were one of the more than 1000 people attended to by the health services during those days (1st to 4th October 2017), I would find it to be a grave lack of respect that a minister of the government of the state I belong to should put into doubt the injuries I suffered.

4. Finally, if I were a PSOE voter, I would ask myself why minister Josep Borrell is acting, as regards those injured and attended to on 1st October, in exactly the same way the senior PP officials have done from the start, October 2017. Is the PP his point of reference?

Translation: El Nacional

January 22:

Eighty years later: the fall of Barcelona began a dark night of pillage and sadistic repression

Tropes franquistes entren Barcelona.jpg January 26, 1939: Francoist troops enter Barcelona

Ester Vera (editor, Ara)

The shamelessness and insolence of the far right in Spain coincides with a broad wave of populism in the West that in some parts of Europe takes its inspiration directly from fascism. Certain commentators speak of a pendulum swing characterized by a return to exclusionary nationalism and reactionary values, but the situation in Spain is more akin to the zombie apocalypse of the Franco regime. This week will mark the eighth decade since Franco’s troops entered Barcelona, a prelude to the entire nation subsequently falling into the hands of the junta. Some of the ideas imposed by the victors were adopted by the collective consciousness and, unfortunately, they have survived to this day, like when people accuse the Catalan independence movement of having awoken the beast instead of wondering why it is still alive and kicking.

Sílvia Marimon has written a piece which appears in today’s edition of ARA on how the Franco regime systematically went about confiscating the assets of thousands of individuals who had either died, were imprisoned or had fled from the terror instigated by the winning side in 1939. Franco’s troops, who didn’t have the least intention of acting with magnanimity, carried out a bloodthirsty repression that included pillage, humiliation, torture, rape and the silencing and terrorizing of millions of individuals.

Marimon has obtained a folder containing documents entitled Account of Apartments Referred to the Housing Review Commission (1), which consists of a list of unoccupied houses drawn up with the help of pro-Franco residents in Barcelona. The document had been written before the city surrendered. The list, together with the Law of Political Responsibilities of February 9, 1939, allowed for the systematic plunder of property and assets belonging to Republicans, an occurrence which is still unfinished business for Spain, where so many families escaped with their lives in exchange for being forced into a life of humiliation and misery, terror and exile.

When Franco’s troops took Barcelona, it did not bring peace; instead, it led to a long, dark night which Spain has yet to fully illuminate with a modern, democratic political consensus. No restitution has occurred, whether material or ideological in nature, as shown by the resistance to changing the dictator’s final resting place.

In an interview with Manuel Aznar on December 31, 1938, Franco announced his plans for the defeated, whom he divided into "hardened criminals" who could never be reformed and those who had been deceived by their leaders and who had a chance to repent.

The prison and the labour camps would be for those responsible for minor crimes while the rest would face prison or exile. Repression was a drawn out affair, as Paul Preston reminds us in The Spanish Holocaust. Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth Century Spain (Harper Press). Preston quotes words spoken by Franco on May 19, 1939, the day on which he presided over a spectacular Victory Parade in Barcelona: "Let us not fool ourselves: the Jewish spirit that allowed the alliance of the great capital with Marxism, which knows all about pacts with the anti-Spanish revolution, cannot be excised in one day, and it lurks deep in many consciences". Thus, Franco approved of Germany’s anti-Semitic laws. Likewise, some months later, on December 31, 1939, he claimed that the expulsions [of Jews] ordered by the Catholic monarchs had shown the Nazis the way. In his speech he stated: "Now you will understand the reasons which have led different nations to fight and separate from their activities those races which are tainted by greed and self-interest, since their predominance in society leads to disturbance and jeopardizes the achievement of their historical destiny. Thanks to the grace of God and the insight of the Catholic monarchs, we freed ourselves from such a heavy burden many centuries ago, yet we must not remain indifferent to this new flowering of greedy, selfish spirits, so attached to their material possessions that they are more willing to sacrifice their own children than renounce their sordid interests".

On January 26, the arrival of Franco’s troops in Barcelona was preceded by a mass exodus. Only two days earlier, on January 24, the Republican government had fled to Girona. Eighty years later, Spain is a democratic country and a prosperous member of the European Union. Nevertheless, political discourse continues to pour out anger, hate and imagined grievances against cultural diversity. Incredibly, the frequent references to the Reconquista, together with accusations of "stealing money from Extremadura to give to Catalonia" are not due to ignorance of our past, but instead thanks to deep hatred and sectarianism.

It appears as if Spain experienced the Counter-Reformation without having ever been reformed, and only the Spanish people themselves can put an end to this state of affairs by opposing the return of the reactionaries that we are witnessing. By standing up for democracy and progress.

Translator’s note: (1) The original title in Spanish is: Relaciones de pisos remitido a la Comisión Revisora de Viviendas

Translation: Ara

The data are clear: there is a broad consensus among Catalans

Statistical analysis done by Joe Brew for VilaWeb

January 11

All sides in the Catalonia crisis agree that Spain is facing a constitutional crisis. And though the proximal cause of that crisis is the collective disobedience of the Spanish government by Catalonia's citizenry in regards to the October 2017 self-determination referendum, the distal cause (ie, "the cause of the cause") of that disobedience is the perceived illegitimacy of the Constitution in Catalonia, and the broad desire for self-determination.

In other words, the "illegal" referendum organized by the Catalan government last October came about because the rulebook which prohibited that referendum (the Spanish Constitution) does not receive sufficient support to guarantee broad compliance in Catalonia. Support for the Spanish Constitution is low among Catalans, and support for Catalan self-determination is high.

How low? And how high? Let's see.

The questions

How much support is there for the 1978 Consitution in Spain and Catalonia?

How much support is there among Catalans and Spaniards for self-determination?

The data

We'll use the most recent data from the Barometer of Public Opinion from the Center of Opinion Studies (CEO, Catalonia) and the Center for Sociological Research (CIS, Spain).

The results

1. Satisfaction with the Constitution in Spain

Outside of Catalonia, the overall percentage of Spaniards who are "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the Spanish Constitution is an absolute majority (51.8%). The unsatisfied minority (the sum of both "not satisfied" and "not at all satisfied") is only 23.4%. In other words, in Spain, the "satisfied" outnumber the "unsatisfied" by a margin of greater than 2 to 1.

Given this high degree of satisfaction, serious reforms are unlikely in the near future.

2. Dissatisfaction with the Constitution in Catalonia

If we look just at Catalonia, the opposite pattern emerges. Only 1.75% are "very satisfied" with the Constitution, less than one fourth the rate of high satisfaction in the rest of Spain. And the sum of the "very satisfied" and "satisfied" group rises to only 22.55%.

The percentage of Catalans who are not satisified with the Constitution is over twice that: 52.1%. 24.3% of Catalans are "not satisfied", and 27.8% are not at all satisfied.

3. Variation in satisfaction with the Constitution in other Autonomous Communities

Of the 17 CCAAs, Catalonia has the highest dissatisfaction rate, exceeding 50%. But there are two other CCAAs where dissatisfaction is greater than satisfaction: in the Basque Country, 41.6% are dissatisfied with the Constitution whereas only 32.9% are satisfied; and in Navarra, 39% are dissatisfied with the Constitution whereas 31.7% are satisfied.

4. Broad opposition to self-determination in Spain

In a national survey in October 2018, Spaniards were given 5 choices about their preferences for territorial organization: (i) a centralized state with no autonomy for the regions, (ii) a state with less autonomy than the current status quo, (iii) status quo, (iv) greater autonomy for the regions, (v) the possibility for regions to become independent.

A majority of non-Catalan Spaniards (76.4%) want to either keep the status quo (41.6%) or decrease the amount of autonomy given to the regions (34.8). A full 22.5% want a centralized state with no autonomy for the regions. Only 5% are in favor of granting self-determination to regions.

5. The consensus for self-determination in Catalonia

Only 19.1% of Catalans believe that Catalonia does not have a right to a self-determination referendum, whereas 68.4% believe that it does. Removing those who do not answer the question, 78.2% of Catalans believe that Catalonia has a right to a self-determination referendum.

Qualitative reflection

6. "Social fracture" and its causes

A common accusation of the political right in Catalonia is that the drive for self-determination has caused unprecedented "social fracture". But the supposed cause of this social fracture - self-determination - is supported by a large majority of Catalans, including many who are opposed to independence. Only 19% of Catalans believe that Catalonia does not have a right to self-determination. Even in the staunchly Spanish nationalist parties (C's and PPC) have sizable minorities who believe that Catalonia has a right to self-determination (35.4% and 20.8%, respectively).

On the other hand, in a hypothetical referendum on the Spanish Constitution, only 17.4% of Catalans say that they would vote "yes". Even if we remove the 25.6% which don't know or don't answer, the percentage who would vote "yes" would be only 23.4% ("no" would be 76.6%).

Conclusion: the broad consensus

Pedro Sánchez recently said that the Catalan crisis "is going to last for years" since a solution will require a "broad social majority which does not exist right now in Catalonia".

But the data are clear. Catalans already share a broad consensus: more than 3/4 are in favor of exercising the right to self-determination, and more than 3/4 are opposed to the Spanish Constitution which prevents them from exercising that right.

It is a strange that in many political sectors, the 78% consensus in favor of a self-determination referendum is considered "not enough", but the 23% consensus in favor of the Constitution is considered sufficient for the continued governance of Catalonia. It is also strange that mainstream Spanish political parties and politicians continue to treat the broad desire among Catalans for self-determination as a question of criminal law, rather than politics. As long as a broad majority of Catalans favor self-determination, they will continue to elect politicians who pursue it (within or outside of Spanish law). And as long as a broad majority of Catalans are opposed to the Spanish Constitution, they will continue to elect politicians who create laws outside of it.

A political solution to the Catalan crisis requires recognition of the following three truths:

A broad consensus in favor of self-determination already exists among Catalans. The root cause of the current crisis is not a disagreement among Catalans, but rather the prohibition by Spain of Catalonia acting on that broad consensus. Governing a territory in which fewer than one quarter of the inhabitants approve of the "rules of the game" (the Constitution) is simply unsustainable, and will likely lead to further "illegal" policies voted and approved by Catalan leaders.

Mr. Sánchez is correct that the crisis will "last for years" if Spain is politically incapable of accepting an independence referendum in Catalonia. But a prolonged crisis is neither necessary nor inevitable. The consensus for the solution already exists among Catalans. Pretending that this consensus does not exist, or describing the political crisis as a "conflict between Catalans" reflects ignorance of reality... or a desire to twist it.

Acknowledgement: Thanks go to Joe Brew for making the English original of his analysis available to this blog.

21-01-19 Toni Comín.jpeg Toni Comín, former Catalan health minister, exiled in Belgium

Andreu Barnils (VilaWeb)

January 15

Toni Comín, former Catalan health minister and MP for the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) in the Catalan Parliament, is in exile in Leuven (Belgium), where he lives with his partner and daughter who has already begun speaking Flemish. He is involved in the Council for the Republic, and follows Catalan politics in detail, including the negotiations over the budget, the disputes among the pro-independence parties and the forthcoming municipal elections. VilaWeb spoke with Mr Comín over the phone and found him, as always, forceful, open-minded and very focussed on the present.

Would Toni Comín support the PSOE government budget?

I believe that you can’t vote in favor of the budget for the clear and obvious reason that Pedro Sánchez has not shown any change of attitude. The question is: does the PSOE government stand outside the Francoist mental framework or not? Does it stand outside the framework into which the parties of the right and the Supreme Court are locked? Does the PSOE grasp that legal persecution has to be stopped and does it understand that the solution for Catalonia is the same as for Scotland? We want the Spanish socialists to behave like David Cameron. Will they? If it turns out that we have before us a government that is unable—out of fear, electoral calculation, laziness or inertia—to break out of this Francoist mental framework it makes no sense for us to support its budget.

I don’t know if they have room to move. According to the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS), and as [poll analyst] Joe Brew recalled, in Spain a spectacular 20% of people want a state without regional autonomy, 12% want less autonomy and only 5% accept the right of the autonomous regions [states, in Australia and US, provinces in Canada] to independence. 40% want the status quo. This is data that does not include Catalonia. What margin does the PSOE government have?

The drama of Spanish politics is cultural. Since the Franco regime, and in the name of the anti-terrorist struggle [against Basque Homeland and Freedom], a pre-democratic idea of the unity of Spain has been upheld. And this is the deepest foundation of Spanish political culture: the unity of Spain is sacred, above and beyond civil and political rights. I hold the 1982 PSOE government of Felipe González responsible for what is happening today. There was an historical opportunity then and it was not grasped. They showed great irresponsibility. They missed the opportunity in the eighties to purge Francoism not only from the institutions but also from the political culture of the citizens of Spain.

And how do you see Catalan politics now from Leuven?

Within the independence movement there are people who still get too conditioned by the struggle for hegemony. That is a problem. My position on this has been very clear right from the start: now is not the time for the fight over hegemony. From October 27, 2017 [day of the declaration of independence by the Catalan parliament] this struggle should have been put on hold until further notice. What is needed now is strategic unity. But there are those who think that the little obstructions are still important because they weaken the rival team. Well, for me, the rest of the pro-independence supporters are not rivals. They are allies. I am on the list of ERC in the Parliament of Catalonia and my allies are called the People’s Unity List (CUP) and Together for Catalonia (JxCat). Having them as allies does not make me less of a supporter of the ERC. And working for the alliance with these sectors does not make me any less of an ERC MP. It does not make me a betrayer of anything.

What do you mean?

I didn’t believe it when I learned that in Catalonia there are people who believe that Comín has betrayed the ERC because he has a good relationship with other players, particularly with JxCat, particularly with Carles Puigdemont. At first I thought it was a joke. As far as I know, Puigdemont is not my enemy, he's my ally. On the other hand, there’s the issue of strategic unity. And when you analyse the political documents of the organisations and parties, they are closer than might seem.

For example?

No-one renounces unilateralism; everyone understands that the more of us there are, the better; everyone understands that we cannot stand still and must move forward; everyone understands that after the sentences [in the upcoming trial of the Catalan political prioners], something must be done. That is, the different strategies are closer than might seem. However, strategic unity requires concrete objectives. For example, to have the referendum on October 1 we were all on the same page: CUP, Catalan National Assembly (ANC), Òmnium Cultural, European Catalan Democratic Party (PDECat), ERC. So, if a proposal existed that was very, very, very obvious, we would already have strategic unity and things would be as plain as the nose on your face. This time around, however, there are quite a few ideas but none so unquestionable as to prevail by itself.

Let's talk about the Torra government. What score would you give it?

What I very much thank Presdent Torra for is being the person who most clearly and openly states that independence cannot be won through the institutions alone. And that it can only be won through the mobilisation of the citizens. And that citizen mobilisation has a very high cost for the people. And that the people should know that. And that the people then have to decide. Our obligation is not to tell people what to do, but, yes, explain the price of independence. The real price. Clearly and bluntly. And we haven’t had the courage to say that. President Torra is one of the clearest because he speaks of sacrifices. We have to tell people that if we want independence, there will be sacrifices. And if you do not want to make them, that’s your right, but there will be no independence. If people don’t want to make sacrifices, there won’t be any independence.

Unfortunately, in Spain independence won’t be won at the ballot box. Not in Spain. From what I was saying earlier. I want to thank President Torra very much for his courage in saying so. That’s the word, courage. Which is precisely why he gets criticism. That he’s a radical and is calling for God knows what. No. He says clearly what the price really is of the goal that people say they have. And then, let people consider that. We will not say what has to be done. But we have to be clear. Do you want independence? Well, this has a cost.



And as far as the Catalan government goes?

As regards the management of the Torra government, what I said would happen is happening. We have an effective government, yes. But let’s not generate expectations that can’t be fulfilled later. I put this in writing: once invested, the Government of the Generalitat would have a fundamentally defensive function. That is to say, to stop the other side from controlling it and dismantling the little autonomy that we have. But the government cannot meet the expectations of December 21 [the last Catalan elections]. By itself, the government, does not have enough strength.



Let’s move on to the Council for the Republic...

The Council for the Republic is an idea that, despite all the doubts, has ended up coming to fruition. The sceptics are sceptical in private, the enthusiasts, publically enthusiastic. This is because the Council maintains the mandate of October 1. The legitimacy and the political energy that were released on that day, if not institutionalised, would dissipate. If I might say so, the Council is three things in one. On the one hand, government-in-exile in waiting; then high command in waiting; and finally Diplocat [Catalan ministry of foreign affairs] in waiting. It's the three things at once.



What do you mean by «in waiting»?

I mean that if this country rises up after the sentence [against the political prisoners], it can’t be ruled out that the Spanish state will again react with an article 155 intervention [suspending Catalan self rule]. What will then be the place of residence of the will of the majority of citizens of Catalonia, its representative? The government imposed by Madrid or the Council for the Republic? The Council’s the high command, pardon the term, insofar as it’s the space that now best expresses the unity of independentism. The ERC is there, JxCat, Free People [CUP affiliate Poble Lliure], the ANC, Democrats, and we want to add more players. And it is the Diplocat-in-waiting because the foreign policy reach of the Government of the Generalitat is limited by Madrid. And by the Statute [of Catalan autonomy] itself. The Generalitat cannot go around the world doing high diplomacy in an open way. But the Council can. Now, however, we must do things as prosaic as preparing the Council’s regulations. Prepare an electoral system, because by next autumn at the latest we have to hold elections for the assembly of representatives. We also have to develop a technical infrastructure. We need staff and we need to create the Council administration. We are working on that. And we need to carry out some specific projects. Flagship projects, some of them important.



For example?

One that’s dull, but for me it's basic. We have to set up a think tank, because we lack a scientific basis on which to elaborate political strategy. That is, we need the observatory that tells us how support for the Catalan cause is evolving in the countries of Europe. We don’t have the data. In Italy, do 3% or 13% know of us? And how many support us? That means working with demographic institutes from different countries. And the other side is to speak with experts in international public law and political philosophy that have a consolidated position on the Catalan issue. And to make it clear that our claim is legitimate. And lawful. Here we have a battle. Because the problem that we have in the international arena is that they see October 1 clearly (they bashed you) but not so much October 27 (you took an unconstitutional path). We have to turn around the narrative of the unconstitutionality of October 27. And here we need political philosophy and experts in law, international and constitutional.



Would you like to stand in the May European elections?

What I would like to see for the European elections is a single list headed by [jailed ERC president] Oriol Junqueras. I’ve been saying it for many months. And so has [former ERC president] Josep Carod-Rovira and very many other people. And I think it makes sense that in this list you would have, first of all, the prisoners and those in exile. But keep in mind that we would probably not be able to collect the official confirmation of our candidacies. The central electoral board has already said that we would have to go to Madrid to pick that up.

Your friendship with [Barcelona fourth deputy mayor] Jaume Asens and your work at the health ministry make you one of the independence supporters with the closest relationship with the Commons [generic name given to the left force in Catalonia that supports a Catalan right to self-detemination but not necessarily indpendence]. How do you see them in Barcelona [where Barcelona en Comú runs the council]?

I would you ask them this question: Would Barcelona as the capital of a Catalan Republic help make a more or less egalitarian society? More! I don’t in the least underestimate the solidarity the Commons have shown towards the prisoners. Nor their condemnation of the repression. Nor that they broke with the Party of Catalan Socialists [former partners in the municipal government] over article 155. I don’t disregard any of that. But I see that sometimes they still discuss about the national axis--unionism, independence and those of us who want to be in between. That’s all legitimate. But since October 1 it’s no longer the game. Now it’s violence versus peace. On the axis of Francoism versus democracy, the peace versus violence axis, the Commons must be unambiguous, as the heirs of the United Socialist Party of Catalonia [PSUC, the former Catalan communist party] that they are. And maybe they are not entirely so. When they look out of the corner of their eye at the electoral frontier they share with Citizens, for example, in [working-class, mainly Castilian-speaking Barcelona neighbouhood] Nou Barris, I think they don’t realise that--perhaps without wanting to--they are putting the robbers and their victims on the same level. Haven’t we said that with Vox we can’t even walk to the corner? Well, neither with those who backed article 155.

Week ending January 20

This week's useful reading in English

VilaWeb

El Nacional

Ara

The dark side of Spain’s Supreme Court

Lluís Mestres, a lawyer with Associació Atenes, explains why this court is not appropriate to judge Catalonia's pro-independence leaders

Josep Casurellas (Vilaweb)

‘It’s a clear violation of civil rights and something must be done. They can’t just sit back and do nothing in the face of such injustice’. These were Lluís Mestres’ thoughts in autumn 2017, leading him and a group of colleagues to take action following the imprisonment of political prisoners and the exile of a part of the Catalan government.

They decided to set up Associació Atenes [Athens Association] as a conscious decision to make a contribution to the legal fight against Spain’s crackdown. They paid particular attention to Spain’s judicial leadership, to the corrupt practices which had been going on for many years, culminating in the vindictive measures taken against independence supporters. The entity has acted discreetly in coordination with the individuals concerned and their defence teams, in order to help without getting in the way.

As a result of their efforts, they have lodged two legal complaints. The first was in reference to the report issued by GRECCO, the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption monitoring body, which criticised Spain for the lack of judicial independence in the appointment of judges. The complaint was against all twenty members of Spain’s General Council of the Judiciary (GCJ) for having broken the rules concerning the appointment of judges, thus committing an ongoing administrative violation. They listed seven instances of the appointment of judges with ties to the Partido Popular (PP). The Associació subsequently added to the complaint following the appointment of Carmen Lamela to the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court (SC) and, an even more blatant case, the preferential treatment given to Sofía Marchena, the daughter of the president of the court which is to hear the case against the political prisoners.

The second complaint was made against the Constitutional Court and members of the Rajoy government for having violated Carles Puigdemont’s political rights and for preventing him from being voted president a year ago.

Having painstakingly combed through the actions and decisions of the Supreme Court judges throughout this eventful year of legal action against the independence movement, the Associació Atenes is clear as to the key points which discredit the prosecution’s case and some of the scandals which prove the Spanish judicial system does not operate in a normal manner. Lluís Mestres explains the situation in ten points.

1. A trial full of irregularities and lacking a legal basis

This is a trial that has no legal basis. Of course, they made an attempt to try to respect the proper legal safeguards as soon as the case reached the Supreme Court. However, right from the start it was a disaster. They violated the most basic rights due to any defence. You can’t inform someone who lives in Barcelona that the next day they have to be in Madrid and appear before the National Court when it’s a bank holiday, ​​giving them less than twenty-four hours to study the charges brought against them. This is a serious breach of protocol. But once the process was underway, although there were certain instances in which they didn’t follow the correct procedures to the letter, one can see that the Supreme made an attempt to adhere to the procedural guarantees so that no one could accuse them of ignoring them. But ultimately it’s window-dressing. The whole case is totally illegal, since they’re presiding over a case in the full knowledge that no crime has been committed. It’s that serious. I can’t believe a Supreme Court judge can say there’s evidence that a crime has been committed. No lawyer with a modicum of dignity would say that the case is based on actual crimes.

2. The Supreme’s strategy is to hear the case even though it does not fall within its jurisdiction

It appears as if the court feels there’s a national interest in them doing so. And they’ve invented a legal excuse by arguing that, since the events in question affect Spain as a whole, they will hear the case as they are highest-ranking court in the land: the Supreme Court. This is an argument seriously lacking a legal basis. Some of the defendants in this unique trial have only been charged with disobedience. And obviously the highest court in the land can’t hear a case of disobedience. So in order to ensure the outcome isn’t challenged, these defendants are being sent to the High Court of Justice of Catalonia (HCJC). But it’s basically a tactical move; the Supreme’s decision isn’t grounded on legal criteria, it’s due to strategic reasons and self-interest. They’re interested in being able to get the case over as quickly as possible and making the actual trial as short as possible. Sending a few of the defendants to the HCJC with the excuse of disobedience, the Supreme Court saves itself from putting them on trial, thus only needing to sit twelve individuals in the dock. It’s an opportunistic decision rather than a legal one. It’s a decision taken by someone who is making a political calculation. They are dealing with the case based on political criteria. Which is why the defendants and their defence teams feel justified in saying that it’s a political trial and that they must defend themselves politically. Legally speaking there is no case to answer since no crime has been committed. And to all this we have to add the fact that there’s a huge disadvantage in the Supreme’s rulings, in that there isn’t a higher judicial authority to whom one can appeal.

3. A speedy, no holds barred attempt to punish the independence movement

Even if the authority of the Supreme Court judges were completely isolated from the executive branch, they would still act in the exact same way. They don’t need to be influenced by anybody; they already act on their own initiative. There is no need for a phone call from Soraya [Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, the former Deputy PM of Spain] (who did in fact call several times). They already act autonomously with the intention of defending the State. This is their function. The composition of the court and its instructions are suited to what it does. And I’m convinced that at times there have been moments of strong disagreements between the government and the Spanish Supreme Court, especially now that the PSOE is in power. I think that the PSOE doesn’t want anything to do with this trial, or at least wants to prolong it as long as possible so it doesn’t take place before the upcoming local elections. However, the Supreme has chosen a path and it’s going to stick to it. Right now I don’t think the current administration has the same connection with the SC as Rajoy’s government, and there’s even certain disagreements. But the Supreme has its own way of working, and presently they’re convinced that they’re the guardians of the state.

4. The unorthodox appointment of Llarena as the investigating magistrate

When Llarena was appointed to the criminal chamber of the Supreme Court, there were twelve judges. When a judge is appointed to preside over a special case such as the 1-O trial, it is important to realise that certain judges can’t hear the case because they were part of the chamber which initially admitted the case; Likewise, those who are already involved in special trials or are members of another chamber are ruled out. In total, seven judges were unable to preside over the trial. This left five judges who were eligible. Trials are always assigned based on seniority; Llarena was the most junior member of the court, the last on the list. But, for a reason unknown to us, none of the four judges before Llarena took the case. And there’s no shadow of a doubt that Llarena was specifically chosen to hear the trial. But that doesn’t mean that we have definitive proof, because we’ve tried to gain access to the Supreme’s internal documents to find out how it was decided that Llarena was to hear the case rather than the other four, but they wouldn’t let us see it. They kept on referring us to the rules regarding the access to information, which we’re already well aware of. We don’t have access to the decision itself. We believe that Carlos Lesmes found him the easiest to control. If other judges like Colmenero or Del Moral were in charge, with their many years’ experience and with their own criteria and thanks to being more senior than Marchena or Lesmes, they wouldn’t be so easy to control. With Llarena, on the other hand, there’s a friendly relationship there, but also he’s easier to control. The idea behind having Llarena take the case was for everyone else to be in the background controlling the trial.

5. Marchena’s hand controlling everything

According to judges who know the inner workings of the Supreme, many decisions are made over a coffee. It’s hard to imagine an investigating judge of a special trial such as this one not discussing their decisions with their colleagues. I’m almost certain that Llarena talked about a lot of his decisions with his colleagues and that many decisions were taken over coffee, drinks or a cigar. And I understand that Llarena wanted to make sure that, in the event of any appeals, he could be sure that it would be handled with his typical firmness. Since everything happens in the same chamber, it’s easy to discuss everything with one’s colleagues. There are only twelve of them. Marchena couldn’t interfere, but I’m sure that Llarena didn’t take his decisions alone. Meanwhile, Marchena’s resignation to preside over the GCJ was a manoeuvre designed to keep him in control of the 1-O trial. The PP’s political strategy, revealed in the scandal over Cosidó’s [the PP’s spokesman in the Senate] leaked WhatsApp message, was clearly carefully thought out in order not to remove Marchena from the chamber. And this is one of the problems with the Supreme Court: if everything takes place in the same chamber, if everything is concentrated in the Second Chamber, it’s very difficult to separate the investigation from the actual trial, and I’m certain that Marchena and the other members of the court knew all about Llarena’s investigation and they’ve discussed it.

6. Ultra-conservative judges

Marchena has a tarnished reputation and his impartiality has been called into question. He’s had problems in the Supreme and his professional life that prove he’s directly affected by this case. Quite frankly, he ought to step aside. But, honestly, the chamber as a whole should say it’s unable to try this case and they ought to send it back to Catalonia. In fact, there shouldn’t have been a trial in the first place. And all the judges have a very similar profile in terms of their way of thinking and the attitude they will have during the trial. They’ll try to scrupulously respect the procedural norms, but the decision has already been taken. And it’s a collective decision. I can only imagine that the decision to do things in a particular way was taken by a small group of individuals. Every time the defence teams have lodged an appeal against the investigation which has been dealt with by the appeals court within the same chamber in the Supreme, it’s ended up taking a tougher line than the investigating judge. When we were convinced that the investigating judge, Pablo Llarena, had committed a series of irregularities or made statements that were out of line, the appeals court backed him up and defended him. The judges are all hard-line conservatives, some are ultra-conservative, highly influenced by the Opus Dei. As far as I can see, these people aren’t in the Supreme because they are the best jurists in the country, but because they have the closest affinity to those in power and they can be trusted to uphold the unity of the state.

7. A structure created and designed by Federico Trillo

The way to approach the judicial process, when it began in the fall of 2017, was shared by the whole of the Supreme Court, the public prosecutor and the Spanish government headed by Rajoy and Sáenz de Santamaría. They were all in agreement, following the manual written by Federico Trillo, the mastermind of the current judicial structure. The system for deciding judicial appointments and placing sympathetic individuals in the various chambers to hear special corruption cases or those involving politicians, as in the current case, is Trillo’s brainchild. When the PP decides there is a need to defend the state and put the judicial machinery in motion, the system runs as smooth as silk, everything is perfectly coordinated, having been prepared to act in situations exactly like this one. It’s obvious that politically the PP and the Supreme are in complete harmony. The whole thing went like clockwork. Thanks to the structure designed by minister Trillo, individuals with the conservative profile which they were looking for could be appointed to the highest positions within the Spanish justice system. The centre of power is located at the GCJ. Whoever controls it also controls the justice system. As a result, the key aspect was to change the way judges are appointed, replacing what, in principle, according to law, ought to be based on merit and experience. However, an analysis of those who have been appointed shows that it was less to do with merit and experience and more to do with their close ties to the PP.

The GCJ appoints everyone from the president of the Supreme Court to the presidents of the provincial courts across Spain. The GCJ controls the whole system. If there’s a short-list for a specific position, it’s the GCJ who decides who will fill it by examining their merits and qualifications. But of course, seeing how the Second Chamber has had three vacancies, how they fill them, and who they appoint…

8. The Concepción Espejel scandal

Concepción Espejel’s is a classic case of political meddling in the appointment of senior officials to the Spanish judiciary. She was a member of the criminal chamber of the Spanish Court and when the first trial as part of the Gürtel case [one of the largest corruption scandals in recent Spanish history, involving senior members of the PP] came up, her colleagues informed her that she would be unable to take the case since she’s a close friend of María Dolores de Cospedal. As a result, she turned down the case before they could recuse her. But it occurred to the PP at that precise moment that the criminal chamber needed a president. They created the position and Concepción Espejel was duly appointed to fill it. As a result, she went from being a peer of judges who had informed her she was unfit to hear the case, to being their president and, therefore, to having control over the chamber. The PP sought this particular solution as a means of not losing control of the situation.

9. The Sofia Marchena scandal

Marchena studied to become a judge and she’s ended up being a prosecutor, when this isn’t possible, since they’re two distinct career paths and separation is essential. Her career began at a school where Gema Espinosa, Llarena’s wife, was the director. Marchena became ill and dropped out halfway through. When she came back she wasn’t able to apply for the position she wanted, so instead of starting all over, she was aided by someone in obtaining another position: quite simply, Gema Espinosa wrote a letter saying that Sofía Marchena had the skills and abilities required to sit the exam to become a prosecutor, a position which was still open. However, there were vacancies for thirty-five positions which had already been filled. Marchena wasn’t eligible based on her exam results. So they created a thirty-sixth position, changing the requirements so that Sofia Marchena’s results were good enough. In addition, we had to lodge a third complaint against the prosecutor, Luis Navajas, who is the one who challenges all our activities and does everything he’s supposed to do as a prosecutor in the Second Chamber.

10. The prosecutor Navajas scandal

In the case of Sofía Marchena, he responded that there was no reason to investigate it and finally stated that they had contacted the individual who was offered the thirty-sixth post as prosecutor and that they had turned it down. We have this in writing. It turns out that five hundred people had been preparing for years and they were more suited to the post than Sofía Marchena. And it just so happens that the person initially selected turned it down after receiving a phone call from the chief prosecutor. The prosecutor has the cheek to put this all in writing. It’s not his job to make any phone calls. Obviously, we filed a complaint against this prosecutor with anti-corruption. There are two possibilities: that whoever was assigned to the thirty-sixth post was tired, they didn’t want to be a prosecutor, they were a friend of Marchena and politely declined the post or they were paid to do so. Either way, corruption was involved.

Translation: Vilaweb

Background information on the upcoming trial of the Catalan political prisoners (contribution 1)

Ara: Editorial, January 16

In Spain holding an unauthorised referendum ceased to be an offence in 2005

PM Zapatero repealed Aznar’s 2003 criminal code amendment aimed at thwarting Ibarretxe’s referendum plans in the Basque Country

Faced with the challenge posed by the Basque president’s referendum plans, in 2003 PM José María Aznar’s government added a new offence to Spain’s criminal code: anyone calling an unauthorised referendum would risk a prison sentence of 3 to 5 years. At the time the PP enjoyed an outright majority in the Spanish parliament and the opposition’s protestations were to no avail, even though they all refused to lend the government their support. Only two years later, once José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero had come to power, a fresh majority of lawmakers revoked the three articles from the criminal code. Back then the Partido Popular found itself all alone decrying the move and arguing that it only left the State a single defence strategy against a unilateral referendum: invoking Article 155 of the Constitution to impose direct rule.

So from a legal standpoint, holding a referendum outside the existing laws —as happened in Catalonia on November 9 2014 and again on October 1 2017— does not constitute a crime. At the very least, no charges can be pressed because —as we have seen— the State has other means to prevent the secession of a region. Therefore, if holding a referendum isn’t an offence, how come nine Catalan pro-independence leaders are being held in pre-trial detention? There is an easy explanation: since the Prosecutor and the examining magistrate could not invoke a specific article of the criminal code, they had to fabricate a narrative of violence to bring charges of rebellion and sedition against the Catalan leaders.

Had those articles not been repealed, today there would be no doubt that at least the Catalan ministers could be charged with holding an illegal referendum. But Spain’s lawmakers specifically decided not to characterise that as a crime in order not to criminalise an action that could be understood as a political statement that required precisely a political response. That is why they have had to build a farcical case, one where a peaceful demonstration is presented as a violent uprising, the Catalan police’s impeccable performance is a conspiracy and a political statement by the Catalan parliament —an inviolable institution— is construed as a criminal offence.

This will be one of the cornerstones of the defendants’ legal counsel in the trial against the October 1 vote which, undoubtedly, the European Court of Human Rights will very much bear in mind when the time comes to see the case. In the courtroom, political discourse —this will be essentially a political trial— will have to alternate with a solid legal defence that exposes the falsehoods on which the case has been built. It is at this crossroads where we expect to see the statements by the defence that will be made public next week.

The legal teams have been working for months to strike a balance between tearing the case apart and exposing Spain’s judicial shambles for all the world to see, as well as presenting Catalonia’s arguments. Specifically, they aim to expose the lack of judicial guarantees and the conditions which the defendants will endure throughout the trial: driven daily to court from their prison cell and with no time to confer with their lawyers. That is why the Supreme Court is now resorting to gestures, such as allowing the defendants to speak Catalan in court: what is at stake in this case is not just the prestige of Spain’s justice system, but of the State as a whole.

Translation: Ara

January 16: Spanish National Police information brigade on the rampage against Catalan independence supporters

The news:

Celrà mayor leaves Girona pòlice HQ.jpg Celrà mayor Dani Cornellà leaves Girona police headquarters on January 16

Analysis: (Roger Palà, Crític) The Information Brigade acts against the independence movement

rogerpala.jpg Crític journalist Roger Palà

January 16

The information brigade (BI) of the Spanish National Police (PNE) is behind the police operation that has culminated - for the moment - with the arrest of sixteen Catalan independence supporters accused of public disorder in blocking the tracks at the High Speed Train (AVE) station in Girona during the first anniversary of the October 1 referendum. Among the detainees, two mayors of the CUP and a photo-journalist. It is no anecdote that the BI has driven the operation: the BI's Barcelona province branch is a unit in the eye of the storm of many polemics for its actions, and it seems that it has now decided to go on the counterattack after being in the shadows for a while.

What is the BI and how does it work? On paper, this unit is responsible for collecting information of police interest in any field, and this also includes underground and infiltration work. In Spain, each police headquarters has an information unit (in the case of Barcelona it is in charge of all of Catalonia). Historically, the BI has specialised in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, but also against all kinds of social and political movements (in police jargon, "radical groups") from the squatters (okupa) movement to the movement for independence. At bottom, in its DNA the present BI is largely the heir of the former Franco-era political and social brigade. It is part of what we could call the deep state: governments come and go, political colours change, but they are always there.

The BI has recently been recently updated. As Crític revealed [in a November 28 article by Palà], it was this police unit that provided the on-the-ground coordination for the operation to stop voting at polling stations during the referendum on October 1, 2017. This is what is explained in a police report incorporated into the legal case that is investigating possible police abuses in Barcelona on October 1. A BI agent was also responsible for the aggression [last July 16] against photo-journalist Jordi Borràs, an action that has not been worth any kind of internal sanction (he has not even been shifted from his duties). The brigade, then, is in the eye of the storm.

The BI is a particularly hermetic unit and little is known about its operation. The Barcelona BI was well-known during the Nineties under the name of "VI group"--of infamous memory for many social movement activists. All this is portrayed in the book Chronicles of the VI and Other Samples from the Police Sewer, published 2006 by a journalist from [Barcelona neighbourhood] Gràcia then unknown to the general public, David Fernàndez [later a well-known CUP MP]. We will have to review all that is explained there: cases such as those of the Gràcia three, the arrests of Torá, the constant raids on the okupa movement during the nineties ... [web-based journal] Directe has informed about them in great depth.

The scope of yesterday's police operation, with journalists, mayors and activists detained, shows the time we are living in: a time of degradation of rights and freedoms and consolidation of a low-intensity democracy. A social context in which the police, in this case without protecting themselves with any arrest warrant, feel they can legitimately arrest elected office-holders early in the morning, or even set up an operation in the full light of day with agents all with faces covered taking away a photo-journalist in a camouflaged car.

It cannot be allowed to become normal for police to arrest mayors, activists and critical journalists for no motive in the middle of the night. Because, as lawyer Benet Salellas, who has assumed the defense of the accused said: the arrests are completely out of proportion. Even if the detainees were responsible for the offenses they are alleged to have committed--which they deny--they are people with a known address, people entrenched in their social environment and people who at no time have had any intention of evading the operation of the legal system. They could simply have been cited to appear in court at a specific time and date to make a statement, as on so many other occasions. That the facts for which they were arrested were not serious is shown by the fact that they were released without even having to declare before the judge.



We need, then, to analyse yesterday's police operation in a political key: we are dealing with a scare tactic. And not only a scare tactic against independence supporters: deep down this was a warning to all those who want to exercise the right to demonstate. It is clear that the operation yesterday does not favor the interests of the PSOE government, which is looking to lower tension so as to encourage independent parties to vote for its budget and guarantee stability. The following question should then be asked: Does central government representative Teresa Cunillera exercise any kind of practical control over the BI agents operating out of her Barcelona "headquarters"? What account do these agents render to their police and political masters? The BI is a body of public servants that survives governments of all colours and ideologies and which is very difficult to control. To whom is it responsible? Who gives the orders? What is their agenda?

Statement by the People's Unity List (CUP)

Week ending January 13

This fortnight's useful reading in English

VilaWeb

El Nacional

Ara

The New Yorker

Week ending December 31

Although its leader Santiago Abascal rejects the label, his ideology is based on populism, nationalism and an identity-based narrative

Week ending December 23

This week's useful reading in English

VilaWeb

El Nacional

Ara

Former Spanish PM Rajoy speaking through mask of present PM Sánchez: "We've come here to talk about what the people are interested in." (Ferreres, Ara, December 21)

The videos of December 21 protests in Barcelona

Images of today's actions against the Spanish cabinet meeting in Barcelona

1. Left pro-independence rally, Passeig de Gràcia 2. Demonstators outside cabinet meeting 3. Committee for the Defence of the Republic cuts roadway at Glòries (downtown Barcelona) 4. CDR roadblock cuts freeway near Girona 5. Police and CDR-led demonstration clash in Via Laietana (near building hosting the cabinet meeting)

Protests in Catalonia against Spanish cabinet visit: here’s what happened

At least 11 people were arrested and 46 injured despite heavy security measures

Catalan News

ACN | Barcelona

The Spanish cabinet's unprecedented meeting this Friday in Barcelona sparked protests across Catalonia amid heavy security measures. Pro-independence groups saw the meeting as a provocation and called on supporters to take to the streets. Some demonstrators clashed with police and at least 11 people have been arrested and 46 have been injured.

Barcelona on partial lockdown

Several parts of the city center were on lockdown this Friday morning due to the cabinet meeting and the pro-independence protests. The Palau Llotja de Mar building, close to the Barcelona seafront, was the focal point for a large deployment of police officers.

Protesters did not make it to the venue due to the cordons deployed from 5:30am onwards, but demonstrations were active nearby. The Committees for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) pro-independence group gathered in central places like Via Laietana and cut key roads, such as the Diagonal avenue and the Passeig de Gràcia boulevard.

At least 11 arrested and 27 people injured

Clashes between the Catalan police and demonstrators were reported after, according to law enforcement, as the cordon in Avinguda Paral·lel was charged.

Overall 11 people were arrested during the demonstrations in Barcelona and L’Ampolla, a town in south Catalonia.

The Medical Emergency System (SEM) has attended to 51 people in relation to the protest, and 46 of them suffered contusions. Meanwhile, at least 28 police officers needed medical attention, according to official sources.

Furthermore, a journalist was attacked while reporting a protest by the CDR. A masked man punched the reporter from the TV channel Intereconomia. The journalist defended that he was only “trying to do his job”.

Road cuts

the main highway in the country, the AP-7, in l'Ampolla, southern Catalonia. Other roads were also cut, including both Barcelona's ring roads. Hundreds of people already started protesting on Friday early morning by cutting several roads . In a very much expected move, CDR pro-independence activists cut roads at around 6am such as, the AP-7, in l'Ampolla, southern Catalonia. Other roads were also cut, including both Barcelona's ring roads.

As road cuts were announced earlier in the week, many people decided to steer clear of Barcelona on Friday morning, with 53% fewer vehicles than normal entering the city's metro area between 6am and 8am.

Cabinet’s meeting

The Spanish government described its controversial cabinet meeting in Barcelona as a "show of affection" towards Catalonia . Among the decisions adopted today by President Pedro Sánchez's Cabinet, there were several intended to send a positive message to Catalonia.

For example, they approved a €112 million funding plan for major highways and roads in Catalonia, which Madrid says will help boost economic growth. The Spanish government also condemned the trial and execution of former Catalan President Lluís Companys and proclaimed “its recognition and the restitution of its dignity”.

However, another decision turn out to be a controversial one. The Spanish government will change the name of Barcelona-El Prat airport to Josep Tarradellas , Catalonia’s first president after the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. This move was criticized by the Catalan government who claims they were not asked about the change.

Colau-Sanchez’s meeting

Before the cabinet gathering, President Sánchez held a meeting with Barcelona's mayor Ada Colau. A former anti-eviction activist, Colau requested for Sánchez to make it so that municipalities can limit “abusive rents” to facilitate rental housing access. According to her, his government pledged, after their meeting, to include the measure in upcoming legislation.

December 20

Let's take over the streets, win democracy, and build the Republic!

Statement by People's Unity Lists (CUP) affiliate Poble Lliure on the occasion of the December 21 Spanish government cabinet meeting in Barcelona

On Friday 21, the Catalan people are called to stand up against repression, violations of democratic rights, fascism, insults and harassment by the Spanish right, and the apparatus of a corrupt, demophobic State with deep Francoist roots.

December 21 is the anniversary of the great victory of the Catalan independence movement in an election organised by the Spanish government, in the framework of the coup d’état that was the application of article 155, with suspension of Catalan autonomy, and police and

military occupation of our territory. After months of repression, the imprisonment and exile of our legitimate government and leaders of civil society, of persecutions of mayors and public employees, of threats and aggressions, on December 21, 2017 the Catalan people showed its will in favour of self-determination, as it had done in the referendum of October 1.

The defeat at the ballot box of the forces aligned to the Spanish regime a year ago, even with conditions favourable to their interest, led to the deep state and to the Francoist nomenclature that still controls much of the state apparatus to opt definitively for a scorched earth policy.

And so, a year later, the situation has only worsened, with a state that has kept a scale of repression, imprisonment and legal actions worthy of the Erdogan regime. Likewise, the sewers of this post-Franco state and the large Spanish media groups have intensified the campaign of insults, lies and criminalisation of the Catalan republican movement, in a clear drift that aims for our annihilation as a people.

This Friday 21, the Government of Spain is comes to plant its flag in an occupied land, and to humiliate an oppressed people that they want submissive and obedient ... It will not be like that!

On Friday, the Catalan people will decisively again resume the march to their freedom along the road that has brought it within reach: through mass popular mobilisation, civil resistance and active non-violence.

Neither the threats and siren songs regarding a false dialogue under the threat of imprisonment by the Spanish state, nor the opportunist and short-sighted attitude of some Catalan independence leaders will stop our firm decision to tear down the walls of this prison of peoples that the Bourbon monarchy and the regime of 1978 means.

On Friday begins a cycle of civil mobilisations and resistance in the perspective of denouncing the great farce of the trials that Spain wants to carry out against the Catalan people, violating the most basic democratic political rights. We will expose, once again and in the eyes of the whole world, the intrinsically fascist character of the Spanish regime inherited from Francoism and its state apparatus. Demonstrating, once again and definitively, that the only way to democracy for the Catalan people is self-determination and a free, independent and sovereign Republic.

Barcelona, December 20, 2018

December 19

Hunger strikers' letter to Theresa May

carta-mrs-theresa-may.pdf



Backgrounder: TV3 journalist receives messages from Extremadura: 'Are you alright? Do you live in danger?'

El Nacional, Saturday, December 15, 2018

David Gorman

Nicolás Valle has been working for TV3 for nearly 30 years. Born in the province of Cáceres, the journalist developed his entire career in Catalonia. Viewers of ‘Telenotícies’ know him from his war chronicles from Bosnia, Kosovo, Algeria, the Sahara, Afghanistan or Ukraine

It is as a war correspondent that he made a name for himself in the world of journalism. And precisely this could be the reason why he is being asked about a hypothetical situation of civil confrontation in Catalonia. It seems like a bad joke, but it is not.

The journalist Arturo Puente also warns on his Twitter account of a media campaign organized by El País to convince the Spanish public opinion that a pre-war climate is emerging in Catalonia. They speak of “paramilitary bands” who want to “defend a republic that does not exist”. Puente himself explains that relatives and friends from all over the State are contacting him, afraid that Catalonia is on the brink of war.

“And since there are no paramilitary or Kale borroka commandos (urban guerilla groups made up of Basque nationalist youth) or persecuting you for being Spanish or anything like that, I flip when I talk to relatives and friends from outside, because they believe it as if they had seen it. In fact, they have “seen” it on TV and have read it in various newspapers.”

“My grandmother called me after seeing protests on TV believing that Cat(alonia) was literally on fire and that something could happen to me. I am panicked and in despair of the climate of antebellum opinion that is being generated in normal people. Doing it through the media is crazy. We are already paying for it.”

A criticism shared by Nicolás Valle: “Yesterday I received a whatsapp from Plasencia. If we are okay, if we are in danger.” As he explains it, it seems that there are sectors of society that truly believe that there is a civil confrontation in Catalonia.

“Yesterday I received a what’s app from Plasencia [in Extremadura]. Were we well, were we in danger. I told him that we are collecting food and fuel and that the “paramilitary militias” described by El País are creating safe-conduits to cross the city. I had to clarify that this was a joke.”

The reality is that there has been not been any type of violence in the streets of Catalonia, even if there are some sectors waiting in eager anticipation of this possibility. But in some media outlets it seems that the imposed motto is “a lie repeated a thousand times becomes a truth.”

Translation: Catalan News Monitor

Week ending December 16

Banner at Camp Nou match between Tottenham and Barcelona, December 11

Support for a negotiated referendum and rejection of 155 enjoy very broad support

Jordi Muñoz, Political Commentator

Ines Arrimades, Citizens' leader in the Catalan parliament, demands the reintroduction of article 155 to end Catalan self-rule (Photo: TV3)

Ara, December 15

For a long time now Spanish centralism’s main strategy for curbing Catalan sovereignty has been to divide Catalan society. They have been trying it, are trying it and will continue to try it in all possible ways. And they have created a supporting narrative that talks of a Catalonia divided into two irreconcilable halves. Yet the «Ulsterisation» of Catalonia has never been an analysis of reality but a political program. In fact, Spanish nationalism’s main political program.

Unable to formulate an attractive and coherent proposal, Spanish centralism entrusts everything to its seige of Catalonia, which is what causes Catalan society’s division into two. That’s why [Spanish PSOE prime minister] Pedro Sánchez now thinks that all he has to do to shake off the problem is shift it into Catalonia. That’s also why Citizens has been adopting an increasingly extreme message and behaviour in the Parliament of Catalonia, in a downward spiral that so far shows no signs of ending. And it's what expains the regression in the positions of the Party of Socialists of Catalonia (PSC), which not so long ago defended a legal and agreed referendum and is now flirting again with article 155.



Nonetheless, the independence movement has often had the bad idea of ​​collaborating with this strategy. For example, when it has exhibited some of the tics of the old identity-based nationalism that, once properly exaggerated and manipulated, Spanish nationalism took no time in converting into a throwing spear of its own. Or when it has tried to get the job done without sufficient support, or without being sufficiently sensitive to the experience of an important part of the country. In doing so, it has unduly increased social tension without this having helped it get closer to its goal. Quite the opposite. Fortunately, the majority of the movement for sovereignty today seems to have understood that getting out of the impasse means avoiding a repeat of these mistakes. The fact of the matter is that despite everything Catalan society resists being divided in half.

For a democratic solution



True, positions on independence are frozen and balanced evenly between supporters and opponents. But beyond that there is a broad and all-inclusive area of consensus that has not disappeared. It is the consensus on the right to decide and for a democratic solution. It is the negotiated referendum and rejection of 155 and recentralisation. It is, despite dissent about the best alternative, agreement that the status quo of the monarchy and the Constitution of 1978 does not offer Catalan society a satisfactory institutional framework. It is the area that rejects repression and the violation of civil and political rights.



It is, to a large extent, the sociopolitical area of We Are The 80%, the platform initiated by Òmnium Cultural. And it is what Ara’s opinion survey reflects, confirming previous data that were along the same lines. Now, the existence of this consensus in Catalan public opinion will not by itself be enough to unravel the situation, especially since as matters stand now it is very hard to give it political expression. The centrifugal dynamics of parliamentary competition and the influence of Spanish politics and media pose many difficulties. That’s because the common sense that prevails in Catalonia—that a political and democratic solution is needed, that the status quo is unsustainable and that repression is not a solution--is a minority, eccentric position in Spain. And parties at the Spanish state level always make politicies towards Catalonia with an eye on the rest of Spain, where the radicalisation of the right and the PSOE’s fear of carving out a separate position have been increasingly shrinking the space for finding solutions.

The big challenge now, then, is to make this social consensus operational politically. And that will not be easy.

Su