A few days ago, the National Transportation Safety Board released its “preliminary information” on the episode. I did an item about its most eye-opening part: the transcript of instructions from a controller that the F-16 pilot “turn” and then “turn immediately” to avoid the other plane. Then, in installment #3, I quoted an email from a veteran Air Force pilot who was unhappy that even implicit responsibility was being placed on the F-16 pilot. That was because, according to this older pilot, military flyers were the best in the business; also, he said that because the F-16 was on a “practice instrument approach,” he couldn’t have been expected to be on the lookout for little civilian craft puttering about.

Then I explained why I thought that letter might illustrate a gap in civilian and military mindsets. Within the same little corner of the sky, civilian pilots would have assumed that all aircraft were looking out for others, on a “see and avoid” basis, while a military pilot might have assumed that everyone else should keep out of his way. So could this cultural mismatch have contributed to a tragedy?

***

Now the discussion continues with the latest crop of notes. A reader who flies for the Army says yes, there is a potentially dangerous military-civilian culture gap in the skies:

I am currently a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter pilot for the U.S. Army. Prior to my service, I went to school and received a four year degree in commercial aviation from a premier flight school at [a university well known for its aviation programs]. Having experienced both civilian and military flight training, I can say there are absolutely critical differences between civil and military aviation training. I have always felt that there were gaps in military flight training that could easily lead to accidents precisely like the F-16 and Cessna crash. Just recently, during the oral exam for my annual Instrument Flight Evaluation with the most senior instructor pilot in the company (civilian aviators would liken him to a chief pilot), we discussed at length what exactly ‘radar contact’ means and does not mean. He made repeated comments about how ‘radar contact’ meant that aircraft separation was the controller’s responsibility. As discussed in your article, this is only true during Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). Aircraft separation is still the pilot’s responsibility when flying in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). This was lost on the most senior instructor in the company. In fact, shortly after taking off on an IFR flight plan, the controller advised us of ‘radar contact,’ after which the instructor said (paraphrasing), “Good, now I don't have to worry about anything.” There was not a cloud in the sky. [JF note: That is, the flight was “IFR in VMC,” which meant that other aircraft could legally be flying in the same airspace without being in touch with air-traffic control. This is the same circumstance as in the South Carolina case.] I have seen fundamental lack of understanding of the National Airspace System among Army pilots in particular, including several of the instructors who have attended additional training schools to become “Instrument Examiners.” Army aviation is in critical need to better integrate itself with civil aviation if we are going to expect our pilots to not repeat this mistake. I have always believe that the Air Force does a significantly better job of utilizing more current industry standards of training, especially air crew coordination (crew/cockpit resource management to civilians). Although this particular accident happened to the Air Force this time, I feel that the Army Aviation community is at a far greater risk than the USAF .

Next we hear from a Navy veteran. I’ll explain context for his mention of a “standard rate turn” when that phrase comes up:

As a former Navy FA-18 pilot and now part-time commercial pilot who often operates VFR under and through SF and LA Class B airspace, I think you are spot-on regarding the gap in understanding between military and civilian aviation. We’ll see what comes out of the investigation, but the F-15 reader [the veteran Air Force pilot I quoted] who thinks it is appropriate for an F-16 pilot that is VMC to respond to ATC’s imperative with a standard rate turn is silly. [JF note: A “standard rate turn” is a maneuver whose very purpose is to be gradual. It is a turn to the right, or left, at a rate of 3 degrees per second, so that it takes one full minute to complete a 180-degree U-turn course reversal. Standard-rate turns are a normal component of instrument-flight procedures, precisely because when pilots are inside the clouds they want to minimize sudden or dramatic control changes. When the weather is clear, on the other hand, even civilian planes routinely make much sharper turns — for instance, the series of 90-degree turns to the right or the left that make up the rectangular “traffic pattern” for clear-weather landing at airports. The point of this reader’s note is to underscore the difference between a standard rate turn, when you want things to be slow and steady, and the rapid maneuver you would make to avoid imminent danger.] My survival instinct would have been to add power, roll to 70-90 deg AOB [angle of bank, a very sharp turn] and pull 3G’s to get to the assigned avoidance heading ASAP. That would not have been a problem or uncomfortable at all. Even if I had the landing gear down, there would have been 2G’s available with mil power to quickly turn…. Thanks for shedding light on this. I hope my former Navy, Marine, Army, and Air Force aviators still on active duty take note. Back to your broader theme of lack of legitimate skepticism of the military by Congress and public, I hope GA [general aviation, or civilian flyers] community doesn’t shy away from putting a spotlight on this incident.

From another airline pilot who trained as a civilian rather than in the military:

I feel compelled to respond to the letter you received from an Air Force veteran regarding the recent tragedy involving an Air Force F16 and a Cessna 152. I've flown at least 14,000 hours at three airlines and several previous experience-building jobs. In that time, I've worked with at least 3,000 other pilots from every imaginable background. It's from this perspective that I say this veteran exhibits some of the most dangerous and challenging traits any pilot can exhibit. Delusions of infallibility, arrogance, defensiveness, and blind deference to rank and regulation over common sense have all been shown, through the history of aviation tragedies, to be much more dangerous than all other factors. This is especially true now that aviation safety challenges have been whittled down to the last consistent issue ... human error. In countering this letter writers’ assertions, a very strong anecdote can be found in the safety history of the airline I currently work for. All but one incident in our [multi-decade] history has involved at least one former military pilot. In fact, most incident aircraft have had two veterans up front. Even more damning is the fact that most of them have been former fighter pilots. Having said all that, the vast majority of the veterans I fly with are fine airmen and good people. Fortunately, I don't wear a civilian versus military chip on my shoulder, apparently unlike the letter writer.

A reader who is familiar with the same small South Carolina airport from which the Cessna departed wrote with several questions about the incident. He ended with this:

I learned to fly at the airport in Moncks Corner, and did a lot of flying in the area where this collision occurred. I have also flown many times as safety pilot with people practicing instrument approaches into Charleston. I believe your analysis based on the information currently available is correct… The only time I've heard “immediately” from an air traffic controller was on a training flight. My instructor took over (“MY PLANE”), and executed a sharp turn to the requested course. After that, there was never any doubt in my mind about the meaning of “immediately”.

For what it’s worth, my experience is similar: