By Dr. D.K. Giri

Following the Chinese veto for the fourth time on listing Masood Azhar as an international terrorist, India woke up to the historic blunder made by Nehru on refusing UNSC permanent membership. The debate has revived and rages on as Parliament election unfolds. The admirers of Nehru seek to shroud it in the smoke of history; argue that the offer was never made to India, and yet others contend that Nehru was right in refusing it; the critics scream that Nehru almost sinned by depriving India of the most powerful position in world politics.

Admittedly, the historic slip committed or not by Nehru is seven decades ago. So why dig it up now? But as the aphorism goes, those who do not learn from their mistakes are doomed to repeat them. Hence, unless we are cautious, we may be repeating the starry-eyed approach of Nehru to China in particular and internationalism in general.

Let me preface my critique of Nehruvian foreign policy, as I limit my argument to UNSC membership, by acknowledging that Nehru was a democrat, an integral part of freedom movement, a favourite protégé of Mahatma Gandhi and so on. But indubitably, Nehru erred on our foreign policy, prompted by his visceral approach to idealism, far from real-politik, a euphemism for national interest. Even observers like Shashi Tharoor, MP, a former Minister in Congress government has said on more than one occasion, that Nehru’s foreign policy was like a “running moral commentary”.

Having said that, let us substantiate our change vis-à-vis the UNSC membership, offered to India in 1950, and again in 1955. The Nehru apologists’ defensive arguments are: the membership was not offered to India at all, in 1950 by the US and not even by Nikolai Bulganin in 1955. They quote Nehru’s answer to a Parliament question raised on 27th September 1950, by Member of Parliament, J.N. Parekh, “There have been no offer, formal or informal of this kind (membership), the composition of the Security Council is prescribed by the UN Charter according to which certain specified nations have permanent seats. No change or addition can be made to this without an amendment of the charter”.

But this is contradicted in Nehru’s own notes on his tour of the USSR and the other countries, “Informally, suggestions have been made by the US that China should be taken to UN, not as a Security Council member though, India should be in the Security Council.” Vijay Laxmi Pandit, our ambassador in Washington wrote to Nehru the Prime Minister, that India was being offered the SC membership. So, it was offered to India. No ambiguity on that.

Secondly, in 1955, Bulganin, the Soviet Prime Minister, on the 10th anniversary of the UN, offered the membership to Nehru. He rejected the Soviet offer and insisted “that priority must be given to China’s admission to the United Nations”. The minutes of the meeting between Nehru and Bulganin are now circulating in the media, which shows crystal clear the offer and Nehru’s declining it.

The sidebar to the offer is that India was not fully Independent in 1945 when the membership of UNSC was firmed up. The offer was made in mid-1950 after India became fully independent. So those denying Nehru’s error of judgement are chronologically off the mark.

Second issue that calls for discussion is, if Nehru was not aware of any offer in 1950 or 1955, how he made such statements on the membership, write letters to Vijay Laxmi Pandit, and mentioned in his notes. He wrote in his answer to Vijay Laxmi Pandit, “We will not countenance the US offer to us to replace China in UNSC…we shall go on pressing for China’s admissions in the UN and the Security Council.” In his notes on the Soviet visit, he mentioned, “We cannot accept the US offer to take the seat in UNSC in place of China as it means falling out with China and it would be very unfair for a great country like China not to be in the Security Council”.

Nehru said to Bulganin, “I feel that we should first concentrate on getting China admitted.” He expressed similar views in his letter to Vijay Laxmi Pandit, “India is not anxious to enter the Security Council at this stage, even though as a great county, she ought to be there. The first step to be taken is for China to take her rightful place and then the question of India might be considered separately.”

Arguably, some commentators suggest than Nehru did the right thing by twice rejecting the offer. But, clearly Nehru, in his self-proclaimed idealism failed to secure India’s interest. Now China is blocking every proposal that aims to put India in the word leadership, or seeks to promote India’s interests. Our memberships in the UNSC would have given us the veto on Kashmir and related issues. Admittedly Nehru’s policy towards China was full of foibles.

Remember Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s criticism of Nehru’s China’s policy from 25th October 1951 to 8th February 1952. Nehru admirers dismiss it as a part of election rivalry. But foreign policy was not a major issue in Indian elections, it was a genuine concern by an informed and highly educated man like Ambedkar about Nehru’s missteps on China.

Nehru’s reading of history and international political perceptions drove him to seek accommodation with China. He was wary of growing US hegemony. According to him, a post-partition India did not want a new imperial master in the US. He was perturbed about being drawn into a defence network the US was apparently building to contain the presumed communist expansionism. He was anxious about the consequences of the invasion by North Korea of the South which became a theatre of a big power rivalry, the South Korea supported by Allied powers led by the US and North by USSR and China. He was worried that the Korean crisis would spiral out of control leading to another world war, use of atom bombs etc. Nehru was obsessed with international politics but denied India a historic opportunity of being a part of the table with six-powers running the world.

Nehru in the cold war era, followed a policy of non-alignment, but tilted towards Soviet Union. India was insisting on recognising China, a communist, authoritarian state, remained in angst of USA, a democratic country. US President Truman regretted that India was holding aloof from the democratic nations.

So evidently, the US did make offer to befriend India. But Nehru dithered and even rebuffed them. Only after Nehru’s rejection of US overtures, the latter made a military pact with Pakistan. This initiative towards India challenges the assumption that the US was committed to a strategy of equidistance between India and Pakistan. Further, Pakistan would have felt alienated from the US if India became a permanent member of the UNSC, assisted by the US, giving India an upper hand on the Kashmir issue.

Nehru’s China policy including Tibet which could be discussed on another occasion has cost India dear. Anybody arguing that India did not give away its UNSC membership to China or Nehru was right in doing so is oblivious of history and China’s invidious attitude to India. It is high time to correct the fault lines drawn by Nehru on the shifting sands of international politics and of India’s foreign policy in particular. —INFA

(The writer is Prof. International Politics, JMI)