The second and far more controversial imperative for the president was resisting being dragged into another war in the Middle East, a region where he believes American interests should be downgraded. In his view, the current oil glut and achievement of American energy independence render the protection of Middle Eastern oil reserves, and the maintenance of the free flow of Gulf oil at reasonable prices, important but no longer vital U.S. interests. Prolonged military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost the United States a vast amount of blood and treasure, with little to show for it. As Obama tells Goldberg, Libya proved to be a “shit show” in part because of the obduracy of tribalism, which U.S. power can do little to overcome. The Cold War is over, significantly reducing the strategic need to counter Russian intervention in support of the Assad regime, which, in any case, has always been a Russian client. In his interviews with Goldberg, Obama argues that Vladimir Putin’s military operation in Syria has come “at enormous cost to the well-being of his own country.” In short, he thinks Russia may have reaped some short-term gain, but will pay with long-term pain.

As for America’s Middle Eastern allies, despite their constant bellyaching, they should be able to withstand the mounting chaos with the support Obama is still willing to provide, but without the more robust military action they demand. If Egypt and Saudi Arabia are destabilized, it will be because of their own policies of suppression or headstrong interventionism, not because of Obama’s failure to enforce red lines or send in American troops. Indeed, he even tells Goldberg that Saudi Arabia should “share the neighborhood” with Iran.

Obama’s jaundiced view of American involvement in the Middle East reinforces and justifies a third imperative: the “pivot” away from the Middle East toward Asia. This stems from his recognition that the rise of China and India as the two most consequential powers of the 21st century requires the United States to shift its focus. Bolstered by the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement (assuming it passes Congress), and the deployment of forces and strengthening of alliances to counter Chinese assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, Obama’s rebalancing of America’s foreign-policy priorities will likely prove to be the most important change in strategy since Richard Nixon’s opening to China.

But the true test of the Obama doctrine is how it performs at moments when its goals come into conflict. Obama’s decision not to enforce his red line and strike Syrian regime targets was a clear choice in favor of avoiding involvement in the Syrian Civil War over deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction. But it came at a cost, and not just to American credibility: Some 1,500 Syrian civilians died as a result of Bashar al-Assad’s sarin attack in August 2013, but they represent a tiny fraction of the 470,000 Syrians that have been killed since the civil war started. And that shocking death toll is compounded by the suffering of 9 million displaced Syrians and 5 million refugees, some 2 million of whom are knocking on Europe’s doors and threatening to split the EU apart.