Clarissa Ward from CBS spoke to Abu Ibrahim who was trafficked to Syria to join a jihad. This clip is a snippet from the interview. Courtesy: CBC News

ISLAMIC State defectors have revealed why they jumped ship in an eye-opening report that lists boredom and a lack of luxury cars among the factors.

The paper based on the testimonies of 58 former militants describes how uncomfortable conditions, in-fighting, corruption, brutality and being handed a suicide mission were all among the deal-breakers.

Identifying why the jihadi dream turned sour for these individuals could be key to dissuading others from joining the extremist group and encouraging them to leave.

Unfortunately, leaving IS is not as easy as simply deciding to walk, with many defectors executed as “spies” and “traitors” when they try to escape.

IN-FIGHTING

The report, Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors, came about after a disillusioned British IS fighter contacted the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) at Kings College London in August 2014. He explained why he and others had joined: “We saw the videos. They hyped us up.”

The reality was different. “Muslims are fighting Muslims,” he said. “Assad’s forgotten about.”

He objected to militants fighting other Sunni rebels rather than Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, one of the most common reasons for defection identified in the report.

While IS leaders see the Free Syrian Army, Ahrar al-Sham, and al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra as enemies, grassroots members are often less hostile. Many defectors said vicious battles with other Sunni groups were “wrong, counterproductive and religiously illegitimate,” the report observed.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Another common influence in the decision to defect was that life under IS was “harsh and disappointing”. Many had heard tales that being a jihadist was lucrative and offered rich rewards. They “quickly realised that none of the luxury goods and cars that they had been promised would materialise”, said the report.

In fact, the opposite was true, and Westerners found it particularly hard to cope with shortages of electricity and basic items. They also found their experiences of combat “failed to meet their expectations of action and heroism”, with one calling his duties ‘dull’ and complaining of a lack of deployments.

Others objected to foreign fighters being “exploited” and used as cannon-fodder — as was the case with Melbourne teenager and wannabe suicide bomber Jake Bilardi, who was considered a great prize by the IS propaganda machine.

Two defectors who had been hoping to enjoy the spoils of war said they decided to make their escape upon learning that their commanders were planning to deploy them as suicide bombers.

BRUTALITY (AGAINST SUNNIS)

Disillusionment with IS’s brutality and atrocities also pushed soldiers to defect, with many complaining about the killing of innocent civilians, including women and children.

They criticised military operations that had no regard for “collateral damage”, the random killing of hostages, the systematic mistreatment of villagers, and the execution of fighters by their own commanders.

Interestingly, they didn’t voice objections to violence against anyone who could be deemed an infidel, only to brutality against fellow Sunnis, whose rights they believed should have been protected.

FAVOURITISM

Evidently, even terrorists argue about right and wrong. Defectors frequently spoke of behaviour they considered “unjust, selfish, and contrary to the group’s ideals and standards of conduct”.

One described the leadership as a “band of mercenaries” whose principal aim was to make oil and business deals with the supposed enemy. More often, the extremists’ ethical concerns centred on individual commanders and “emirs” who had mistreated their subordinates and favoured some over others.

Others said foreigners received special treatment or privileges. The defectors agreed that elevating some over others was un-Islamic.

They could not tolerate this inequality and ‘racism’, which they believed went against IS’s central promise to create a perfect Islamic society.

GETTING OUT

IS soldiers face the same challenge as any prisoner in making their escape. They first have to reach non-IS held territory and then avoid retribution.

Defections are considered “acts of apostasy”, so it can also take tremendous psychological willpower to risk leaving, after having been brainwashed by the organisation. The report suggests there may be many IS members in Syria and Iraq who no longer believe in the cause but are too afraid to leave.

Syrian IS fighters typically start a new life in Turkish border towns, with little money and in constant fear of detection. Their old comrades may now threaten, assault or even try to kill them. Concern for their safety and that of their families is thought to be the reason more have not spoken out about their defection.

Foreign fighters face the suspicion of their home countries, who often don’t want them back and may have cancelled their passports or withdrawn their citizenships. Governments typically view them as “sleepers” or “dangerous returnees”, and some have brought charges against former IS members, so any admission of involvement increases the risk of a lengthy prison sentence.

Going public can mean moving to a new part of the country, going into hiding, making sure relatives are protected and building an entirely new social circle. There is a constant risk of reprisal from both active IS supporters and civilians who don’t believe their claims to have reformed.

Defectors understandably see it as better to remain silent. The report advises governments to make it easier for them to talk, removing legal barriers, helping with resettlement and even protecting them.

They may be former terrorists, but their stories could be vital in the propaganda war, shattering IS’s image of unity and exposing its hypocrisies and lies.