Russia’s intervention in Crimea is not justifiable by international law. To clarify Russia’s actions, other, historical explanations are more useful and give a valuable insight. The current version of international law was implemented in 1948 within the UN framework. Those laws and the organisations built around them, reflected the outcome of World War II and regulated the new balance of power. This framework of international cooperation was crafted to prevent more European wars. The Western bloc’s attitude after the Cold War did not take into account the temporary nature of the Russian downfall and in the process, deeply insulted the Russians. By its actions, the Russians are letting us know that we didn’t keep our promises.

The spheres of influence in Europe were marked and agreed on during the Yalta Conference in February 1945 in Crimea. The US, UK and the Soviet Union divided Europe in areas of exclusive influence to prevent further conflict. Military and political interventions within the boundaries of those agreed spheres of influence, did create tensions, but not hot conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs.

The interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 didn’t reflect International Laws or justice, but reflected the power of the Soviet Union and the political acknowledgement of that power by the Western bloc. The possession of nuclear weapons sealed the deal and kept any European territorial alterations from NATO or Warsaw Pact countries in check. Outside of the agreed spheres of influence, territorial disputes did create dangerous situations, hot wars and proxy wars. The Suez Crisis, the Korean War, the Cuba Crisis and the wars in Southeast Asia are some examples.

Putin made no secret of his deep resentment of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its consequences. Putin, along with a lot of his countrymen, are seeing the collapse as an injustice and the impression is that the Western bloc humiliated Russia. In the 90’s the West advocated free market principles and stressed the importance of democracy and an open society. Russia was in chaos and witnessed what the consequences of this Western recipe were. From 2000 on, Putin managed this chaotic implementation of Western values and methods to a situation of stability, without those values and methods.

In 1999 and after that in 2004 and 2009, NATO and the EU enlarged their spheres of influence to the east, by accepting former Warsaw Pact countries as members or starting accession procedures. At the time it was seen by many as a solution of a potentially dangerous power vacuum in between Russia and the Western bloc. Now NATO was at Russia’s borders, proclaiming that we needed a missile shield against Iran and North Korea, but in fact destroying a pillar under the European stability by weakening Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Almost all the former Warsaw Pact buffer states and even former Soviet states were incorporated into the Atlantic political and military bloc.

Ukraine was never allowed to apply for NATO or EU membership and Russia is exploiting that ambiguity. Before the Orange Revolution in 2004, Ukraine was clearly within the Russian sphere of influence. After this so called pro Western revolution, Ukraine was still not welcome within the security bubble of the West. Both NATO and the EU were not willing to take Ukraine in and designed partnership co-operations that weren’t giving Ukraine military protection nor a serious political road map for membership.

The 2004 revolution was not as comprehensive as many hoped. Yanukovich took Ukraine back to its big brother Russia, until he was ousted a few weeks ago, after the street battles in Kiev that began as a protest against his refusal to sign a partnership co-operation with the EU. In Russia’s eyes Ukraine and Crimea were at risk of being swallowed by the West’s never ending appetite for enlargement. But with one crucial difference: Ukraine did not have the assurance of protection under NATO’s nuclear umbrella.

During this crisis, Russia’s frustrations with the Western bloc showed and at the same time a new Russian confidence. Russia reminded us that the old post WWII framework only worked because there was a general understanding of the fragile balance it cemented. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West thought that its values won in an epic struggle against totalitarianism. Russia just showed us the weakness and the boundaries of that victory, and that the enlargement of the Western sphere of influence doesn’t hold when there are no hard promises for security.