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Many in media and academic circles seem to pride themselves on having advanced beyond the “Clash of Civilizations” rhetoric that defined the aftermath of September 11th (2001). However, upon analysis is clear that the primary development has been the transformation of these frameworks into euphemistic forms: consider, for instance, the supposed conflict between the liberals and the Islamists; this dichotomy is ill-formed on several levels:

First, the categories are not mutually exclusive: one can simultaneously be an Islamist and a liberal. And while there are certainly conflicts vis a vis liberalism across the Middle East and North Africa, the tension is not between liberalism and Islam—instead, it is a tensioninternal to liberalism itself, in simultaneously promoting free markets, secularism, pluralism, and democracy—ideologies which are neither intrinsically compatible norinevitable. Insofar as these values are unpopular in the MENA region, it is often because they conflict with socio-cultural norms which transcend any particular religion (or religion altogether). Of course, left out of this discussion is any suggestion that liberalism may not be the ideal social model, or that the people of the MENA region have a right, perhaps a duty, to derive alternative models from their own history, culture, values, and frames of reference.

In a similar manner, the supposed dichotomy of “moderates v. extremists” is ill-formed. Typically when this distinction is deployed it is unclear what “moderate” means. The most natural definition of a moderate would be someone who rejects extreme methodologies (such as violence) in order to advance their ideological views. But by that standard, many hardcore salafi groups would be moderates, as would the Muslim Brotherhood—while the (ever-elusive) liberal-secular components of the Free Syrian Army would be extremists, as they are attempting to instantiate their political ideal through force. However, as many news reports convey a desire to arm the “moderate” factions of the rebels, it seems as though a rejection of extreme methods cannot be what is meant by the term.

Instead, a “moderate” is typically one who espouses pro-West or liberal sentiments—regardless of how extreme they may be in terms of methodologies or ideological fervorrelative to their adversaries. Conversely, anyone who resists Western values, interests, or modes of governance is de facto an “extremist.”

The dichotomy between “Islam” and “the West” presents Islam as a monolith. Insofar as commentators now acknowledge diversity within Islam, the talk primarily circles around the supposed clash between Sunnis and Shiites. However, this portrayal is also problematic. For one, it assumes that Sunnis and Shiites are a homogenous forces, rather than extremely diverse populations with a number of conflicting ideologies, interests, and alliances. Moreover, this framing obscures Islamic sects who do not neatly fall into the “Sunni/ Shia” divide, such as Sufis and the Druze. Finally, this caricature overlooks the significant (if dwindling) populations of other MENA religions, such as Christians, Assyrians, and Zoroastrians. And then there is the large (and growing) Jewish population, most of whom reside in Israel—a significant source of tension with both Sunnis and Shiites (and also between them). However, in the Jewish case, as with others (such as the Kurds), ethnic alliances are actually more significant than religious or other identities.

While terms like “Islamist,” “Moderate,” “Sharia Law,” “Muslim,” etc. are frequently bandied about in popular discourse, their referents are typically opaque (at best), rendering the conversations which rely upon these terms more-or-less vacuous. Not only do reductive binaries (e.g. “liberals v. islamists,” “moderates v. extremists,” “West v. Islam,” “Sunnis v. Shiites”) fail to address the critical dynamics at work in the region—they actually obscure said dynamics even as they polarize discussants. While these conceptions are convenient insofar as they reinforce ethnocentric narratives and can be easily fit into the small segments of news-themed entertainment between advertisements—greater nuance is required should one wish to understand the real struggles underway across the Middle East and North Africa.

Theological Struggles

Throughout the Islamic world (which transcends the Middle East and North Africa: Islam is the world’s 2nd largest and fastest-growing religion; most the world’s Muslims are non-Arabs who live outside the MENA region), and across Islamic sectarian alignment, there are a number of debates underway about the role of religion relative to the state.

What (if any) political authority should religious authorities wield? Should the sharia be understood as a singular code of rules or a set of guiding principles from which codes are derived? Should it be instantiated uniformly in all Muslim societies or is it a living corpus which should inform and be informed by the particular historical social, and cultural contexts of believers? How much of “traditional” Islamic culture is merely reflective of Arab culture and history which need not be intrinsic to Islam? How can the two be authentically separated? What sorts of cultural and social models are most-compatible with Islamic values and mandates? How can Islamic values change or inform how political and financial institutions are (re)structured? What are the implications of these discussions for non-Muslims? How can believers engage as Muslims with pluralistic societies or societies in which they are minorities (often more feared and distrusted than other minority groups)?

As Islam serves as the cultural and historical center of gravity for the MENA region, even for non-Muslim intellectuals such as Michel Aflaq and Edward Said, the (ever-evolving) answers to these theological questions will certainly inform and be informed by the ideological and geopolitical struggles simultaneously underway.

Ideological Struggles

The people of the Middle East and North Africa are also sorting through and (re)prioritizing the identity frames of tribalism, nationalism, sectarianism, and cosmopolitanism/globalization. There is a tension on how to best translate the rich cultural heritage of the MENA region into contemporary societies, drawing from this legacy to find new solutions for contemporary problems. Accordingly, there are technical questions as to what the most effective means of ordering social and economic institutions are in particular contexts. There is an ongoing struggle to confront and transcend the legacies of violence and exploitation resulting from imperialism, colonialism, and (ongoing) foreign meddling—and the divisions, fear, and mistrust left in the wake of authoritarian regimes, indigenous civil wars and long-standing historical grievances. And although there is overwhelming agreement, from men and women alike, that Western gender norms are unappealing, there are profound questions which remain about the role of women in contemporary MENA societies.

Geopolitical Struggles

Layered on top of these ideological and theological dilemmas is a set of major geopolitical struggles—primarily between the Muslim Brotherhood, the “Club of Kings,” the Axis of Resistance, and al-Qaeda. Until recently, the energy has with the Muslim Brotherhood, who has made enormous gains throughout the region over the course of the Arab Spring, and who comprise the primary opposition blocs in the monarchic states. However, as the Brotherhood and its affiliates have generally failed to deliver on the economic and political justice they have been long-promoting, there is a widespread (if premature) belief that their momentum may soon be reversed (indicated, perhaps most strongly be recent developments in Egypt, orchestrated and funded largely by Saudi Arabia and the UAE). While it may be that a regional backlash is coming against the Brotherhood, the results of such a shift would be unpredictable. The notion (reliant on reductive binaries) that the Brothers will be replaced primarily by liberal and/or secular candidates, is as ethnocentric and condescending as it is unrealistic. Instead, the fastest-growing ideological alternative seems to be al-Qaeda’s ideological brethren Ansar al-Sharia.