In my last piece, I analysed Ireland’s defence, in particular against the fast-paced Japanese attack, and questioned whether it would stack up against a similar All Blacks attack in the World Cup quarter final. Unfortunately, it did not. Many of the potential weaknesses I identified were exploited, as well as Ireland’s most basic of skills – things usually so natural to this side – deserting them when they needed them most.

This piece will analyse the early stages of the match, how New Zealand capitalised on every Irish mistake, how Ireland showed some variation early in the game, and had potential opportunities only for their hands to let them down, or key players making the wrong decision.

In the opening minute, Ireland managed to secure possession off a scrappy kick off, winning a scrum. Immediately they tried to test New Zealand’s defensive shape, stretching them from one wing to the other. Conor Murray went to Jacob Stockdale on the short side, who switched back behind the scrum, firing a screen pass to Sexton who was deep, and he delivered a cross field kick behind the far winger George Bridge. There were a couple of inaccuracies straight away with this play, even though the idea was well thought out. There is a gif below, and there’s also a screenshot of just as Sexton is about to kick the ball across to Earls’ wing.

The main problem is that Sexton is too deep when he kicks it, meaning Bridge is still deep enough to turn on his heel and collect the ball ahead of Earls. Second of all, as soon as Sexton gets the ball, it’s obvious he’s only ever going to kick it. Ideally, Sexton would have taken another step or two before kicking it, making the winger commit to the defensive line, which would have given Earls the head start in the kick chase. In essence, the move never deceived the defence, therefore nullifying its effectiveness.

Early crossfield kick

Sexton’s depth and distance from defence as he kicks crossfield

Shortly after this, CJ Stander carried the ball into contact carelessly, got held up and New Zealand got the resulting scrum. Another strange error so early in the match. From this scrum, Richie Mo’unga hoists a massive up and under into the Irish 22, and unbelievably, the ball was let bounce before an All Black recovered it. It’s hard to believe that Rob Kearney would let a high ball in his own 22 bounce, but if you look at New Zealand’s shape off the scrum, you can see that Kearney had been dragged out of position by the loitering Sevu Reece on the near touchline. Usually the full back would be positioned more centrally in the back field, perfectly positioned for the upcoming kick, but with that threat of a cross field kick, New Zealand manipulated Ireland’s back three into leaving that space, causing uncertainty among who would claim it, and ultimately nobody did.

Kearney pulled out of position by Sevu Reece

This kind of play is not typical of the All Blacks, kicking off a scrum inside the opponent’s 10m line, but it worked, allowing them to regain possession and apply more pressure to Ireland. What it also does is make Kearney second guess everything New Zealand do in attack from then on, forcing him at times to hang in the backfield a little longer, potentially leaving space in the wider channels to be exploited.

From here, New Zealand attack with accuracy and pace that they hadn’t shown in the tournament thus far. They had flat ball carriers taking the ball at pace, giving tip on passes just before contact, which makes it much harder to tackle on the gainline as the late runner can change his line right until the moment of contact. They did this through a pass from Kieran Read to Codie Taylor, who went through a small hole in the defence and made another 4 or 5 yards. Once they’re on the front foot, they’re so difficult to slow down. They continued at this pace, working a lot of ball in the middle of the field, and constantly switching which side of the ruck they attacked. This has been a key weakness of Ireland’s defence, and something Japan also exploited in their victory. When the direction of play is switched so often, the Irish defence invariably gets outnumbered on one side of the ruck, and the attack then has an overlap or some sort of attacking mismatch that they can go after.

Once they get to within 5 yards, Aaron Smith masterfully conducts his forward pack as they carry up time and again, until, after numerous phases of one off runners to the right of the ruck, Smith spots Iain Henderson folding around the ruck, disconnecting from his captain Rory Best, leaving no pillar on one side of the ruck, and Smith darts through, scoring a soft try under the posts.

Aaron Smith scores his first try

Minutes later, Ireland regain possession from the All Black’s exit from their 22, with Sexton carrying the ball into contact around the half way line. Ireland then work through the phases on the open side, with POM giving a tip on pass to James Ryan, but if you compare this to the tip on pass by Kieran Read a couple of minutes prior, they are like chalk and cheese. Kieran Read is much wider, getting the ball from the 10 rather than the scrum half. He takes the ball flat, right at the gainline, with Taylor on his shoulder at pace, changing direction at the last second, getting through half a gap and creating momentum. In stark contrast, POM is standing much deeper and almost static as he gets the ball from Murray. Then all he does is ship the ball outside him to James Ryan who is also static, meaning he ultimately gets nailed behind the gainline, immediately putting Ireland on the back foot.

Kieran Read’s flat carry and tip on pass

Ireland’s static tip on pass

In fairness, Ireland then do really well to create a little bit of forward momentum, before Rory Best pops the ball out the back to Sexton who has a clear overlap with Stockdale wide on his wing, but Sexton instead chooses to hit Henshaw who immediately gets wrapped up, not really gaining any ground. Perhaps Sevu Reece was blocking the pass, but it looks like he would have made it had he not hesitated. The All Blacks infringe off the ball and Ireland get the penalty that Sexton then misses touch with, and you have to assume all of this puts a huge dent in Sexton’s and the team’s confidence.

Sexton passing short instead of going wide

These mental errors from Ireland’s arguably most influential and important player of the Schmidt era really cost them, and epitomised the entire team performance in the match. 10-0 down, if Sexton finds touch in the All Black 22, the potential for a maul drive or a ‘Schmidt power play’ is huge, and suddenly the game could be 10-7, and confidence is back where it needs to be. Instead, Mo’unga keeps the ball in play, New Zealand regroup, and just a few minutes later score in the corner, once again through Aaron Smith, which culminated from a scrum awarded for an Irish handling error. The potential for the score to be 10-7 has now swung to 17-0. Just 20 minutes into the match, and New Zealand have already scored more points than Ireland managed when they beat the All Blacks in Dublin 11 months before.

The match had at that point been lost, and it carried on in a similar vein. Ireland continued to torment themselves with unforced errors, and the Kiwis persisted, twisting the knife with every beautifully fluid and lethal attack. There’s no need to analyse the last 60 minutes of Ireland’s world cup campaign, I don’t think anything new will be learned from it that cannot be learned from watching their progress over the last 2 years.

On the day, for whatever reason, the players didn’t perform the way every supporter hoped they would, for the team’s sake, and for Joe Schmidt’s sake as well as for the nation. Perhaps there had been too much of a build up and focus on getting past a quarter final, maybe a little bit of a paralysis by analysis situation where the team were so focussed on the result that they never stood back and took it for what it was at face value; another match.