The strategy — which administration officials said was drawn from speeches that Mr. Trump had delivered during the 2016 campaign and as president while at the United Nations and on trips in Europe and Asia — ranges widely and includes jihadi extremism, space exploration, nuclear proliferation and pandemics. But it is animated by a single idea: that the world has been on a three-decade holiday from superpower rivalry; and it suggests that that holiday is now over.

“After being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned,” the document says. China and Russia, it says, “are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”

The document’s call to push back against China on trade is familiar from the campaign, but its description of the challenge posed by Russia seems at odds with Mr. Trump’s own refusal to criticize Mr. Putin for his seizure of Crimea, his efforts to destabilize Ukraine and his violations of a key nuclear treaty with the United States.

While Mr. Obama’s two national security strategies emphasized cooperation with allies and economic partners, Mr. Trump’s strategy attempts to walk the line between his campaign slogan of “America First” and an insistence that he is not rejecting working with American partners — as long as they do so on terms advantageous to the United States.

Mr. Trump’s strategy contains more than a few hints of a return to a Cold War view of the world. Mr. Obama used his strategies to de-emphasize nuclear weapons as a key to American defense, but Mr. Trump calls those weapons “the foundation of our strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression against the United States.”

The national security strategies of past administrations were sometimes strong predictors of future action: It was Mr. Bush’s 2002 strategy that revived a national debate about the justifications for pre-emptive military action. And it helped frame the rationale for the invasion of Iraq six months later, arguing that the risks of inaction in the face of a major threat made “a compelling case for taking anticipatory actions to defend ourselves.”