Nathalie Tocci is director of Istituto Affari Internazionali, a former special adviser to former European High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini, and the author of POLITICO's World View column.

Since the assassination by the United States of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, Europeans have been busy talking.

European Council President Charles Michel promptly stated that further escalation must be avoided at all costs, while Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and High Representative Josep Borrell urged restraint, advocated a regional political solution and reaffirmed the EU's as coordinator on the Iran nuclear deal.

The prime ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom jointly called for restraint and the easing of tensions, and reiterated their commitment to the fight against the Islamic State. After U.S. President Donald Trump issued then retracted threats to target cultural heritage sites and Iran launched ballistic missiles on U.S. bases in Iraq on Wednesday, Europe’s sounds like a lonely voice of reason.

But Europeans have a bad habit of talking too much and acting too little — only to cry over spilled milk when events tip beyond the point of no return. As the Middle East descends into chaos, the consequences of which would be devastating not just for the region but for Europeans too, what, if anything, can Europe do?

Inevitably, if one side of a contract is violated, the other is unlikely to hold indefinitely.

Three possibilities stand out.

The first regards the Iran nuclear deal. While many media outlets have prematurely announced the death of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the agreement, rather miraculously, remains on life support.

Following the U.S. violation of the JCPOA in 2018 through the re-imposition of all nuclear-related sanctions, as well as the threat of applying these extra-territorially to all (read: European) companies wishing to engage in lawful trade with Iran, the Islamic Republic has been progressively stepping back on its commitments under the deal.

Inevitably, if one side of a contract is violated, the other is unlikely to hold indefinitely. As the months went by and Europe’s rhetorical commitment to the JCPOA failed to translate into concrete action, Tehran’s position hardened.

With Iran heading toward a parliamentary election in February, the concern internationally was that Tehran would respond to Soleimani’s assassination by announcing a return to 20 percent uranium enrichment or by placing restrictions on inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Indeed, there were fears that Iran could go even further, by exiting the Non-Proliferation Treaty altogether.

Against all odds, none of this has happened. Yes, Iran has announced that it will no longer be bound by the JCPOA limit to the number of centrifuges, which are necessary to enrich uranium. But it neither announced an uptick in its levels of enrichment nor a restriction of international inspections. Were Iran to start enriching uranium at the levels necessary to build a nuclear bomb, the international community would find out straight away.

This decision, alongside Iran's decision to launch missiles on U.S. bases in Iraq, signals that Iran's retaliation is directed exclusively at the country responsible for Soleimani’s assassination: the U.S. Iran may yet exit the JCPOA, but for reasons intrinsic to the agreement and non-compliance by other signatories: the EU, the U.S., Russia, China and the “E3” — France, Germany and the U.K.

Significantly for the last three, Iran’s restraint can also be read as a last-ditch hope that Europeans will live up to their side of the bargain.

For almost two years now, Europeans have incessantly talked up their commitment to the JCPOA, but they have done very little that would raise eyebrows in Washington.

Yes, Europeans have been busy establishing INSTEX — a parallel barter system that would allow for lawful trade in humanitarian goods between Europe and Iran — but to date no concrete transaction has actually taken place under the program.

Europe, notably the EU, is perceived as a neutral actor in Iraq.

Europeans are sincere when they highlight the technical difficulties in establishing such a mechanism, but that’s a poor reason for inaction. If Europe doesn’t act fast and in a meaningful way on INSTEX, Europeans will instead find themselves in the coming weeks or months ringing their hands over nuclear proliferation or other deadly blows to multilateral diplomacy.

The second opportunity for action concerns Iraq. Aghast by the U.S.’s blatant breach of trust and sovereignty, the Iraqi parliament voted in favor of a withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country.

Meanwhile, the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State has announced a temporary halt of its operations and it remains unclear whether U.S. troops have been ordered to leave Iraq altogether. Taken together, all this could represent a tragic boon for the terrorist group.

Europeans are currently present in Iraq through a civilian mission advising Iraqi security sector reform. Given Baghdad’s dire need for support to prevent the rebirth of the Islamic State, this could open a space for a European military mission as well.

Europe, notably the EU, is perceived as a neutral actor in Iraq. And given its commitment — at both national and EU levels — to the fight against the Islamic State, it would be in a privileged position to fill what otherwise risks becoming a dangerous void.

The third possibility for action is diplomatic. Iran’s clear yet measured retaliation on Wednesday — which reportedly avoided casualties — alongside the cautious silence of other countries in the region, including Iran’s rivals Israel and Saudi Arabia, suggest there is appetite for de-escalation. This is precisely what European leaders have called for. Given their open channels of communication with all parties, Europeans could play a role in promoting dialogue — to encourage movement toward what Borrell has described as a “regional political solution.”Europeans could play a role in promoting dialogue — to encourage movement toward what Borrell has described as a “regional political solution.”

Of these three candidates for action, Europeans are instinctively turning to the third. Europe has a natural inclination for action that does not step on U.S. toes — and diplomacy, while hard work, is a good candidate.

However, the third option becomes credible only if the previous two are also pursued. Without greater willingness to “get wet” as we “swim” — as the Iranians would put it — Europeans are simply not taken seriously by anyone in the region or elsewhere.

How likely is this to happen? If the past is precedent, the odds are stacked against it. The tone of the E3 declaration was hardly encouraging, turning reality on its head by focusing single-mindedly on the need for Iranian restraint while making no explicit mention of the recklessness of U.S. action.

In this atmosphere, one can hardly expect courageous moves on INSTEX. As for the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq, EU countries are likely to be less — rather than more — willing to boost their presence as tensions rise or the U.S. is forced to leave, thus eliminating their ultimate security guarantee.

Given the stakes, it’s worth reflecting on the causes of this sorry state of affairs. When it comes to explaining European weakness, observers are quick to point their fingers at the preeminence of EU national governments over the bloc’s institutions, and the divergence of interest between individual countries.

On the simplest level, this just states the obvious. The EU is not a state and it does not act as one. On a deeper level, however, the critique simply misses the point. Europeans are far more divided on other foreign policy matters than the Middle East. Yet their differences do not necessarily act as brakes on meaningful action. Given the complexity of what’s happening in the Middle East, the difference that exist amount to little more than nuance.

The Continent’s emancipation is necessary also — and above all — because U.S. power in the Middle East is in structural decline.

The real problem is what Europeans do agree on: their resistance to painful emancipation from the U.S., to which European foreign policy in the Middle East has been subservient to for more than 60 years. This is one area where the pain is felt equally in Paris, Berlin, London, Rome, Madrid and Brussels — not to mention Warsaw, Vilnius or Bucharest.

But it’s also a necessary process, as Europe is faced with the most reckless U.S. administration in decades. The Continent’s emancipation is necessary also — and above all — because U.S. power in the Middle East is in structural decline.

If the U.S. wrecks the region, it can simply pack up and go. But Europe will remain on the other side of a narrow strip of water. If Europeans are at all serious about their autonomy, there isn’t a more existential place to start.