London - 6 July 2016 // SOUNDBITE (English) Sir John Chilcot, head of Iraq War inquiry and retired civil servant: “The committee has also judged that as long as sanctions remained effective, Iraq could not develop a nuclear weapon and that it would take several years to develop and deploy long-range missiles. In the House of Commons on March the 18th, 2003 Mr Blair stated that he judged the possibility of terrorist groups in possession of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) was a ‘real and present danger to Britain and its national security’ and that the ‘threat from Saddam Hussein’s arsenal could not be contained and posed a clear danger to British citizens.’ Mr Blair had been warned however that military action would increase the threat from Al-Qaeda to the UK and UK interests. He had also been warned that an invasion might lead to Iraq’s weapons capabilities being transferred into the hands of terrorists.” // SOUNDBITE (English) Sir John Chilcot, head of Iraq War inquiry and retired civil servant: “It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments. They were not challenged and they should have been. The findings on Iraq’s WMD capabilities set out in the report of the Iraq Survey Group in October 2004 were significant but they did not support pre- invasion statements by the UK government which had focused on Iraq’s current capabilities which Mr Blair and Mr Straw (Jack Straw, then-British Foreign Secretary) had described as ‘vast stocks and an urgent and growing threat’. In response to those findings, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that although Iraq might not have had stockpiles of actually deployable weapons, Saddam Hussein retained the intent and the capability and was in breach of United Nations obligations. That was not however the explanation for military action he had given before the conflict.” // SOUNDBITE (English) Sir John Chilcot, head of Iraq War inquiry and retired civil servant: “There was little time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properly identified nor fully exposed to ministers. The resulting equipment shortfalls are addressed in the report. Despite promises that cabinet would discuss the military contribution, it did not discuss the military options or their implications. In early January 2003, when the government published its objectives for post conflict Iraq, it intended that the interim post conflict administration should be UN-led. By March 2003, having failed the US of the advantages of the UN led administration, the government had set the less ambitious goal of persuading the US to accept UN authorisation of a coalition-led interim administration.” // SOUNDBITE (English) Sir John Chilcot, head of Iraq War inquiry and retired civil servant: “When the invasion began, UK policy rested on an assumption that there would be a well-executed, US-led and UN-authorised operation in the relatively benign security environment. Mr Blair told the Inquiry the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the invasion could not have been known in advance. We do not agree that hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability and Al-Qaeda activity in Iraq were each explicitly identified before the invasion.”