Turkey and ISIS (Defense Policy Board)

From:seizenstat@gmail.com To: jake.sullivan@gmail.com CC: John.Podesta@gmail.com, seizenstat@cov.com Date: 2016-01-17 16:54 Subject: Turkey and ISIS (Defense Policy Board)

Dear Jake, I know the last thing in the world you are focusing on is Turkey and ISIS, with the debate tonight (where I hope she will hit on his non-electability and that his nomination will guarantee a Republican victory, since socialism is not acceptable to the broad electorate), and the upcoming Iowa caucus. But hopefully, this may be useful in the future. This is a summary (without any classified information) from our Defense Policy Board meeting this week, the last part of which was with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. He had asked us to look at Turkey and its role in dealing with ISIS. In our two days of meetings, we were briefed by a number of intelligence services, by four former U.S. Ambassadors to Turkey, and by three academic experts. Here is a brief summary. I will be pleased to fill-in more details when you come up for breath, but I wanted to get this to you before I leave this afternoon for the World Economic Forum in Davos. 1. Turkey is a very difficult ally. Prime Minister Erdogan has taken Turkey in a more Islamic direction, and has cracked down hard on independent journalists, opposition politicians, and anyone he views as challenging him, including the military (15% of their flag officers are under arrest.. After an initial election setback, he feels embolden by his most recent electoral success, where he played the national security and populist card and won over many conservatives outside his ruling party. Since the election, he has ended promising peace talks with the PKK, and has gone after not only them, but Kurds more generally. Some of the experts and former Ambassadors felt Erdogan was driving the country to the brink of civil conflict. 2. Erdogan's prime goal is to have a referendum that will change the Constitution and create an Executive President, a strong presidential system. But he knows that even with his electoral success, it is not a given he would win. He also knows that with the economy slowing down, he must produce on this end to strengthen his chances in a referendum. But whether he wins or not, the U.S. must face the fact that he will be the prime interlocutor for many years to come. 3. His Cabinet is weak and he is the sole decision-maker on anything consequential. 4. His top priority and ours are different. Ours is fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq. His is combating the PKK and the threat of a Kurdish independent state either in Turkey or in northern Syria and Iraq. He does not believe the U.S. has been sufficiently attentive to Turkey's security concerns including the PKK, even though we have them on our terrorist list. He sees the US support of the YPG (Syrian Kurdish party) in Syria, which is the most effective fighting force on our side against ISIS, as a threat to Turkey. He has decent relations with other Kurdish leaders, like Barzani and the Iraqi Kurds that he does not see as a threat. 5. His foreign policy has been based on having no enemies and calm on his borders. But he is now faced with chaos and conflict on his borders. He fears, with good reason an Iranian/Russian/Syrian/Kurdish axis. This, together with Turkey's slowing economic growth and large debt overhang, and his membership in NATO, gives us leverage. Indeed, one of the reasons he is warming-up to possible resumption of relations with Israel is his fear that he is isolated. He openly said he wants to restore relations with Israel. Likewise, he is taking a more conciliatory approach toward Cyprus, reciprocated by the new government there. This concern opens opportunities for the U.S. to get Erdogan to lean more to the West. Likewise, the burden of dealing with well over a million Syrian refugees, and the EU funds that will be provided to help keep them from coming to Europe, provides some leverage for the West. 6. He has acted provocatively in recent weeks. The downing of the Russian plane (which had been over Turkish airspace for only 17 seconds), and sending tanks briefly into Syria, are examples. Because Turkey is a NATO member, these types of actions have the risk of drawing in the U.S. 7. Around 50% of the Kurds in Turkey do not live in the Kurdish northern area, but are fully integrated into Turkish society, speak Turkish as their first language. But as Erdogan strikes at the Kurds in the north, they feel threatened. 8. The issue of doing more to get Turkey to close its border with Syria is tricky, since not only pro-ISIS foreign fighters come through, but also anti-Assad and anti-ISIS fighters. 9. Erdogan believes the U.S. needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the U.S. There was a division in the Board of how to deal with this problem. A few felt we should adopt a tougher tone to disabuse him of this belief, but a majority felt we should be exploring ways to take advantage of Turkey's economic problems and security threats to draw him closer to the U.S. 10. Several of the academic experts felt the turning point of Erdogan shifting from a pro-western to a more authoritarian, Islamic direction, was the ending of EU accession talks. We all realized this was a difficult time for Europe to resume talks, but there are some discussions on a few chapters and this could be elevated. But Kissinger felt it was a "fantasy" to think Erdogan could become pro-Western, since he is very pro-Islamic, but that there are still areas to cooperate based on shared security concerns. 11. While we should encourage Erdogan to resume talks with the PKK, this can only be done by the U.S. taking a more hard-line position on their violence. 12. Even with the sharp turn toward Islam, Turkey remains more democratic and pro-western than other Muslim states in the region. The business community and parts of the military, and the secular population (around 45% are pro-western). 13. We should be seeking a "transactional" relationship with Turkey, since a strategic partnership would be difficult. There are a number of specific steps we could take along this line. However, there was support for my idea of commencing a strategic dialogue (like we have with China), if only to better understand their concerns, and where our interests overlap. We also should do more to activate the Turkey-NATO relationship. Again, because he feels more vulnerable than ever before, given the situation in the region, we have some leverage. 14. Turkey wants a No-Fly Zone in northern Syria to protect refugees and staunch the flow into Turkey .But this can only happen if they and others put boots on the ground. 15. One unifying theme could be Iran, if we take a harder line to their misconduct. Moreover, we do have common security concerns, e.g. Iran and Russia and Assad. 16. Turkey is upset by not being in the TTIP negotiations, fearing they will lose markets in Europe and the U.S. We cannot add them, but should make clear that after an agreement, they can accede. We can also stress the importance of Turkey as an energy hub in the region. We can do more to help (e.g. through the IMF) with their economy. I hope this is helpful, at some point down the road. Good luck tonight and in the upcoming weeks. Best wishes, Stu Eizenstat