WikiLeaks' founder Julian Assange. Credit:Reuters When a person who knows something about their organisation takes the step to blow the whistle on wrongdoing in government, they are confronted with a plethora of reasons not to: the prospect of censure within a workplace which prefers to keep its failings hidden, and, even more seriously, the risk of prosecution for breaching one of the hundreds of laws criminalising the revelation of government secrets. The treatment of Bradley Manning and the response to the actions of Edward Snowden serve as very public demonstrations to whistleblowers as to why they shouldn't reveal their secrets. A whistleblower protection framework has to counter these realities and establish a framework that encourages whistleblowers to come forward and then, when they do, provides them with adequate protection and support. This is important for the individual involved, but also for future whistleblowers, who need to see a connection between the rhetoric of government support for whistleblowers and the reality of that support. It also operates as an effective spur to government to do the right thing when complaints are initially made and internal investigations conducted. The Commonwealth's legislation as it was originally drafted created a framework in which there was a glaring disconnect between its objectives of encouraging and protecting whistleblowers, and the level of protection and support they might actually receive. That is, it was merely symbolic. The framework required the would-be whistleblower to navigate a way through a legal maze in order to receive protection. Whistleblowers had to make their initial disclosure to the correct person within their department, and could only blow the whistle to someone outside the organisation (such as a journalist) if the internal investigation or response was ''inadequate''. More than 400 words were used to explain, in lawyer's language, when an investigation would be inadequate.

Further, an external disclosure would be protected only if it was not contrary to the public interest. Determining where the ''public interest'' lies requires a value-laden balancing exercise with which politicians and lawyers have struggled for centuries. Worse still, in determining what constituted the ''public interest'', the bill only listed factors that counted against disclosure. A would-be whistleblower who read the bill might well conclude that the government would rather they kept their mouth shut. However, acting largely on the recommendations of a senate committee, the government introduced 73 amendments to strengthen whistleblower protection. The amendments emphasise the role of these committees in good policy and law making, and how they have been able to make an impact during this era of minority government. Several of the amendments are particularly significant in making the process more accessible to would-be whistleblowers. The initial disclosure can now be made to a supervisor - the person who most whistleblowers first approach with their concerns. The detailed specifications for when an internal investigation is ''inadequate'' have gone, replaced with a simpler and more easily applied requirement that the whistleblower reasonably believe that the investigation was inadequate. Five factors favouring disclosure have been introduced into the public interest test. Other amendments reinforce the impression that this legislation supports and encourages whistleblowers. The Ombudsman has been given an increased role in overseeing internal investigations. The penalties for taking a reprisal against a whistleblower (such as sacking them or discriminating against them at work) have quadrupled. And, if a whistleblower has to go to court to seek redress against reprisals, they do not run the risk of having to pay the government's legal costs - as long as they have acted reasonably.

The framework that the bill creates is not perfect. The requirement that an external disclosure must be in the ''public interest'' still requires whistleblowers to make a risky judgment call. The exclusion of intelligence agencies and some politicians from the ambit of the legislation continues to be a matter of concern. The legislation still contains some ambiguous or unnecessarily technical language. However, compared with the alternatives - no protection at all, or this legislation prior to amendment - it is a historic and meaningful step. Gabrielle Appleby and Judith Bannister are senior lecturers in law at the University of Adelaide. Anna Olijnyk is a PhD candidate and teaching associate at the University of Adelaide.