Documents on Terrorism

Terrorist Threats to the United States - Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims; January 26, 2000

Page 1

64355

2000

TERRORIST THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 26, 2000

Serial No. 85

Page 2

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin

BILL McCOLLUM, Florida

GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JAMES E. ROGAN, California

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina

MARY BONO, California

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

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JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina

ZOE LOFGREN, California

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

MAXINE WATERS, California

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., General Counsel-Chief of Staff

JULIAN EPSTEIN, Minority Chief Counsel and Staff Director

Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chairman

Page 4

BILL McCOLLUM, Florida

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

ZOE LOFGREN, California

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts

GEORGE FISHMAN, Chief Counsel

JIM WILON, Counsel

LAURA BAXTER, Counsel

CINDY BLACKSTON, Professional Staff

LEON BUCK, Minority Counsel

C O N T E N T S

HEARING DATE

January 26, 2000

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OPENING STATEMENT

Smith, Hon. Lamar, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims

WITNESSES

Collacott, Martin, Ambassador, Canadian Department of External Affairs (retired)

Emerson, Steven, executive director, Terrorism Newswire

Harris, David, former chief of strategic planning, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (retired)

Sands, Christopher, fellow and director, Canada Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Stubblefield, Gary, president, GlobalOptions LLC

Thompson, John, director, the Mackenzie Institute, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Wilcox, Philip C., Ambassador, U.S. State Department (retired)

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LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

Collacott, Martin, Ambassador, Canadian Department of External Affairs (retired): Prepared statement

Emerson, Steven, executive director, Terrorism Newswire: Prepared statement

Harris, David, former chief of strategic planning, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (retired): Prepared statement

Jackson Lee, Hon. Sheila, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas: Prepared statement

Sands, Christopher, fellow and director, Canada Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies: Prepared statement

Smith, Hon. Lamar, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas: Prepared statement

Stubblefield, Gary, president, GlobalOptions LLC: Prepared statement

Thompson, John, director, the Mackenzie Institute, Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Prepared statement

Page 7

Wilcox, Philip C., Ambassador, U.S. State Department (retired): Prepared statement

TERRORIST THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, 2000

House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on Immigration

and Claims,

Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a.m., in Room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Lamar Smith, Edward A. Pease, and Sheila Jackson Lee.

Also present: Representative John J. LaFalce.

Staff present: George Fishman, Chief Counsel; Jim Wilon, Counsel; Kelly Dixon, Clerk; and Leon C. Buck, Minority Counsel.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SMITH

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Mr. SMITH. The Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims will come to order.

Before we get to opening statements, I have a couple of comments and announcements to make. The first is to thank our witnesses for staying in town an extra 24 hours to be here today. My feeling was that a lot of people had gone to a great inconvenience and a lot of effort and perhaps expenditure of funds to be here, and we needed to proceed on such an important subject.

I wasn't sure whether it was the right thing to do early this morning when we were trying to make a final decision, but clearly I think it feels good to take the initiative, when the government is closed down, and to be here and to have a hearing on such an important subject.

Also I want to mention that Sheila Jackson Lee, the ranking member, is on her way here. I talked with her earlier this morning. She has other meetings going on today as well, so she will be in and out, but I do expect her shortly to be able to make an opening statement as well.

Also I want to recognize, we have two Members of Congress with us today, Ed Pease, a member of this subcommittee from Indiana, to my right, and John LaFalce from New York, who has an interest in this subject as well.

I would like to single out Ed Pease simply because we could not have this hearing if we did not have two Members present, so Ed Pease is the indispensable individual here today. He is also, in my judgmentor maybe I should put it this way: I don't know of any other Member of Congress who is more conscientious than Congressman Pease. I don't think he has ever missed a hearing or markup of this subcommittee. He reads everything ahead of time and is well-educated on the subject of immigration and terrorism today. He is a special friend, and I appreciate his always making an effort to be at these hearings.

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With that, I think we will proceed. We are going to go straight through today. We won't take a lunch break. We only have one panel. I am sure we will have a number of questions for the members of the panel who are here. We are missing two witnesses. I understand that Mr. Sands is on his way. Mr. Thompson was in Canada as of yesterday afternoon. We have not heard from him since. So we hope that he will walk in the door at any minute as well. But in any case, I hope by the time we get to them they will be here or we will know their whereabouts.

I am going to recognize myself for an opening statement. Then I hope Ms. Jackson Lee will be here. If not, we will proceed to our witnesses.

Recent arrests on the Canada-U.S. border underscore the threats faced by both our nations from international terrorists and alien and drug smugglers.

The December arrest of Ahmed Ressam as he attempted to enter the U.S. from Canada with hundreds of pounds of sophisticated bomb-making materials was a loud wake-up call. An alleged accomplice, Lucia Garofolo, a Canadian, smuggled one or more suspected Algerian terrorists into Vermont.

Canadian media reported that Ressam came to Canada in 1994 carrying a false French passport and using an alias. He applied for refugee status, stating that the Algerian Government had accused him of terrorist and criminal activities.

The Canadian authorities released Ressam and scheduled a court date to hear his refugee claim, but he failed to appear. Ressam was taken into custody but then was released again.

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Between 1994 and 1999, Ressam repeatedly failed to appear for court hearings, but he was not detained or deported. He embarked on a career of crime that resulted in a number of criminal charges and convictions.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service identified Ressam as a potential terrorist and tracked him for a few years, but then dropped its surveillance due to a lack of resources.

In May of 1998, Canadian immigration authorities issued a warrant for Ressam's arrest but did not actively pursue or locate him. In the summer of 1998, Montreal police charged, convicted and briefly imprisoned Ressam for theft, but failed to act on the immigration warrant.

In February of 1999, when Ressam submitted fingerprints along with his application for a Canadian passport, the fingerprints were not correlated to those in his refugee application or his criminal record, so Ressam was able to receive a Canadian passport in a false name.

Numerous Canadian Government officials, terrorism experts and journalists have criticized the Canadian refugee system as prone to abuse by criminals and terrorists. Thousands of refugee claimants each yearas many as 10,000 last year, according to Leon Benoit, a member of the Canadian Parliamentdisappear into Canadian society, never to be located by law enforcement authorities.

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Even if a refugee claim is denied and the alien ordered deported, the deportation order is seldom carried out. The Canadian National Post recently reported that Immigration Canada, the Canadian immigration agency, has accumulated over 40,000 outstanding deportation orders over the past 6 years.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has warned us about terrorism. ''For a number of reasons, Canada is an attractive venue for terrorists. Long borders and coastlines offer many points of entry which can facilitate movement to and from various sites around the world, particularly to the United States,'' CSIS reported last month.

This statement echoes the Service's 1998 annual report: ''most of the world's terrorist groups have established themselves in Canada, seeking safe haven, setting up operational bases, and attempting to gain access to the USA,'' CSIS informed the Canadian public at that time.

In Montreal, where Ressam was briefly jailed then released despite pending warrants, police investigator Claude Pacquette noted that loose immigration controls and interagency fumbling have turned Canada into ''a Club Med for terrorists.'' .

In a disturbing story about organized crime and illegal drugs, The Globe and Mail quoted 19-year Royal Canadian Mounted Police veteran Constable Scott Rintoul as calling Canada ''an easy mark'' because of its porous border with the United States and weak sentences for those convicted of drug offenses.

Drugs coming to the U.S. from British Columbia, where there is a significant domestic production, have increased tenfold.

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It would be misleading to suggest that the only problems are in Canada. The U.S. has only 300 Border Patrol agents along the entire 4,000-mile U.S.-Canadian border. Although Congress has authorized and funded 1,000 new Border Patrol agents each year since 1996, the Clinton administration hired only 369 agents in fiscal year 1999. And the United States has yet to begin the implementation of an entry-exit control system at its borders to monitor cross-border traffic for law enforcement purposes.

All of the above problems have created a situation where terrorists, and also illegal aliens, alien smugglers and drug smugglers, are increasingly using Canada as a transit country en route to the United States. In fact, the fortuitous apprehension of Ressam occurred only because he panicked during his inspection, which raises the question of how many other Ressams have successfully crossed the border.

The problem is a two-way street. The U.S. also exports terrorists and drugs to Canada, so improved border security will benefit both countries.

Both Canada and the U.S. are sovereign nations and should respect each other's right to determine their own immigration laws. The goal should be to reach mutual solutions to mutual problems, acting with good faith in the interests of our respective nations. If Canadians want more liberal immigration and drug policies, that is their decision, and if Americans want to act on security concerns, that is our decision. The issue is one of sovereignty, not who is to blame.

Experts from both countries have observed that the border has become an irresistible temptation to international terrorists and smugglers. As a result, we should focus on two issues: First, terrorism and the smuggling of drugs and aliens. These crimes pose a direct and growing threat to citizens in both Canada and the U.S. Second, the legitimate flow of people and goods across the border. This should be facilitated.

Page 13

There is too much at stake in terms of bilateral trade to accept anything less than a well-secured border that also facilitates legitimate crossings. In fact, cooperation at the border between immigration, customs and investigative agencies is already good. This cooperation resulted in the largest-ever alien smuggling bust in upstate New York and in Quebec in 1998 and triggered the international law enforcement response in the Ressam case.

Ahmed Ressam proved that those in the U.S. who argue that accused terrorists don't enter at checkpoints are wrong. The United States now needs, more than ever, to develop and implement a system to track the entries and exits of foreign nationals. While it won't stop all terrorists, an entry-exit system will deter them, because they can no longer slip across the border with no trace.

Canadian citizens will benefit from such a system through information shared with law enforcement officials about suspected criminals traveling north. Canadians share our relief that the result of the Ressam entry was an arrest, not a terrorist bombing, and understand that the U.S. must act to protect its citizens.

Congress has authorized a buildup of the Border Patrol. A similar buildup of border infrastructure that responds to both security and congestion concerns is also needed.

Congress has authorized development and implementation of a comprehensive port-of-entry security system that will allow us to know who enters and leaves our country. When we don't know who comes in, we don't know what comes in, such as bomb-making materials or illegal drugs.

Page 14

Our Border Patrol and Customs agents are dedicated professionals, but they have too few resources and have said that the Ressam arrest was an exception. ''It was pure luck, the unraveling of this in Port Angeles,'' Vincent Cannistraro, former counter-terrorism chief for the CIA, explained.

To protect United States citizens from terrorism, illegal drugs, and alien smugglers, we must know who enters and leaves our country, a legitimate and understandable goal given the security risks we face and the illegal immigration problems we confront.

As we implement this crucial policy as quickly as possible, consistent with efforts to expedite and expand legal traffic, we should also make better use of present and future technologies. For instance, programs to preclear business travelers and provide them with a variety of options for quick passage across the border should be expanded. The twin goals of increasing security while also facilitating legal traffic can be attained.

Canadians want easy access to the U.S. Americans want increased security in an increasingly unfriendly world. Neither request is unreasonable. Given our two nations' long and successful past relationship, there is no reason why we cannot accommodate both interests.

That concludes my opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Page 15

Recent arrests on the Canada-U.S. border underscore the threats faced by both our nations from international terrorists, and alien and drug smugglers.

The December arrest of Ahmed Ressam as he attempted to enter the U.S. from Canada with hundreds of pounds of sophisticated bomb-making materials was a loud wake-up call.

And an alleged accomplice, Lucia Garofolo, a Canadian, smuggled one or more suspected Algerian terrorists into Vermont.

Canadian media reported that Ressam came to Canada in 1994 carrying a false French passport and using an alias. He applied for refugee status, stating that the Algerian government had accused him of terrorist and criminal activities.

The Canadian authorities released Ressam and scheduled a court date to hear his refugee claim, but he failed to appear. Ressam was taken into custody but then released again.

Between 1994 and 1999, Ressam repeatedly failed to appear for court hearings, but he was not detained or deported. He embarked on a career of crime that resulted in a number of criminal charges and convictions. Evidence indicates that Ressam was a member of an Algerian crime gang raising funds for an Algerian terrorist organization responsible for murderous attacks on Algerian and French civilians.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service identified Ressam as a potential terrorist and tracked him for a few years, but then dropped its surveillance due to a lack of resources.

Page 16

In May of 1998, Canadian immigration authorities issued a warrant for Ressam's arrest but did not actively pursue or locate him. In the summer of 1998, Montreal police charged, convicted and briefly imprisoned Ressam for theft, but failed to act on the immigration warrant. In February of 1999, when Ressam submitted fingerprints along with his application for a Canadian passport, the fingerprints were not correlated to those in his refugee application or his criminal record, so Ressam was able to receive a Canadian passport in a false name.

Numerous Canadian government officials, terrorism experts, and journalists have criticized the Canadian refugee system as prone to abuse by criminals and terrorists. Canada does not detain refugee claimants, even those with suspicious backgrounds. Instead, thousands of refugee claimants each yearas many as 10,000 last year, according to Leon Benoit, a member of the Canadian Parliamentdisappear into Canadian society, never to be located by law enforcement authorities.

Even if a refugee claim is denied and the alien ordered deported, the deportation order is almost never carried out. The Canadian National Post recently reported that Immigration Canada, the Canadian immigration agency, has accumulated over 40,000 outstanding deportation orders over the past six years.

The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service has warned us about terrorism. ''For a number of reasons, Canada is an attractive venue for terrorists. Long borders and coastlines offer many points of entry which can facilitate movement to and from various sites around the world, particularly the United States,'' CSIS reported last month.

Page 17

This statement echoes the service's 1998 annual report: ''Most of the world's terrorist groups have established themselves in Canada, seeking safe haven, setting up operational bases, and attempting to gain access to the USA,'' CSIS informed the Canadian public at that time.

In Montreal, where Ressam was briefly jailed then released despite pending warrants, police investigator Claude Pacquette noted that loose immigration controls and interagency fumbling, have turned Canada into ''a Club Ed for terrorists.''

Last August, The Globe and Mail reported, ''Canada could soon enjoy membership in an exclusive club of nationsincluding Panama, Columbia and Mexico-blacklisted by the United States for being soft on drugs.'' The newspaper quoted British Columbia Attorney General Ujjal Dosanjh as blaming a lack of funding for the drug enforcement shortcomings in B.C.

And in another disturbing story about organized crime and illegal drugs, The Globe and Mail quoted 19-year RCMP veteran Constable Scott Rintoul as calling Canada ''an easy mark'' because of its porous border with the United States and weak sentences for those convicted of drug offenses.

Drugs coming to the U.S. from British Columbia, where there is significant domestic production, have increased tenfold.

It would be misleading to suggest that the only problems are in Canada. The U.S. has only 300 Border Patrol agents along the entire, 4000-mile U.S.-Canadian border. Although Congress authorized and funded 1,000 new Border Patrol agents per year since 1996, the Clinton Administration hired only 369 agents in FY 1999.

Page 18

And the United States has yet to begin the implementation of an entry-exit control system at its borders to monitor cross-border traffic for law enforcement purposes. All the above problems have created a situation where terrorists, and also illegal aliens, alien smugglers, and drug smugglers, are increasingly using Canada as a transit country en route to the United States.

In fact, the fortuitous apprehension of Ressam occurred only because he picked a poor crossing route and panicked during his inspection, which raises the question of how many other Ressams have successfully crossed the border.

The problem is a two-way street. The U.S. also exports terrorists and drugs to Canada. So improved border security will benefit both countries.

Both Canada and the U.S. are sovereign nations and should respect each other's right to determine their own immigration laws. The goal should be to reach mutual solutions to mutual problems, acting with good faith in the interests of our respective nations.

If Canadians want more liberal immigration and drug policies, that is their decision. And if Americans want to act on security concerns, that is our decision. The issue is one of sovereignty, not who is to blame.

Experts from both countries have observed that the border has become an irresistible temptation to international terrorists and smugglers.

Page 19

As a result, we should focus on two issues: First, terrorism and the smuggling of drugs and aliens. These crimes pose a direct and growing threat to citizens in both Canada and the U.S. Second, the legitimate flow of people and goods across the border. This should be facilitated.

There is too much at stake in terms of bilateral trade to accept anything less than a well-secured border that also facilitates legitimate crossings. In fact, cooperation at the border between immigration, customs, and investigative agencies is already good. This cooperation resulted in the largest-ever alien smuggling bust in Upstate New York and in Quebec in 1998 and triggered the international law enforcement response in the Ressam case.

Ahmed Ressam proved that those in the U.S. who argue that accused terrorists don't enter at checkpoints are wrong. The United States now needs, more than ever, to develop and implement a system to track the entries and exits of foreign nationals.

While it won't stop all terrorists, an entry-exit system will deter them because they could no longer slip across the border with no trace.

Canadian citizens will benefit from such a system through information shared with law enforcement officials about suspected criminals traveling north.

Canadians share our relief that the result of the Ressam entry was an arrest, not a terrorist bombing, and understand that the U.S. must act to protect its citizens.

Congress has authorized a buildup of the Border Patrol at a rate of 1,000 new agents per year. A similar buildup of border infrastructure that responds to both security and congestion concerns is also needed.

Page 20

Congress has authorized development and implementation of a comprehensive, computerized port-of-entry security system that will allow us to know who enters and leaves our country. When we don't know who comes in, we can't know what comes in, such as bomb-making materials or illegal drugs.

Our Border Patrol and Customs agents are dedicated professionals. But they have too few resources and have said that the Ressam arrest was an exception. ''It was pure luck, the unraveling of this in Port Angeles,'' Vincent Cannistraro, former counterterrorism chief for the CPA, explained.

To protect United States citizens from terrorism, illegal drugs, and alien smugglers, we must know who enters and leaves our country-a legitimate and understandable goal given the security risks we face and the illegal immigration problems we confront.

As we implement this crucial policy as quickly as possible, consistent with efforts to expedite and expand legal traffic, we should also make better use of present and future technologies. Programs to pre-clear business travelers and provide them with a variety of options for quick passage across the border should be expanded.

The twin goals of increasing security while also facilitating legal traffic can be attained.

Canadians want easy access to the U.S. Americans want increased security in an increasingly unfriendly world. Neither request is unreasonable. Given our two nations' long and successful past relationship, there's no reason why we cannot accommodate both interests.

Page 21

Mr. SMITH. Does the gentleman from Indiana have an opening statement or any comments at this time?

Mr. PEASE. No.

Mr. SMITH. If not, as I say, we will recognize the ranking member when she arrives, but we will now go to our panelists. Let me introduce the witnesses who are here or who are expected to come.

Mr. Thompson, I am glad you sneaked in the door. We are glad to have you here. I know you made a big effort, and we weren't sure where you were between here and Canada. So we are glad to have you.

The witnesses here today are Ambassador Martin Collacott, Canadian Department of External Affairs, retired; Mr. Steven Emerson, Executive Director of Terrorism Newswire; Mr. David Harris, former Chief of Strategic Planning, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, retired; Mr. Christopher Sands, Fellow and Director, Canada Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mr. Gary Stubblefield, President, GlobalOptions LLC; Mr. John Thompson, Director of the Mackenzie Institute, Toronto; and Ambassador Phillip C. Wilcox, U.S. State Department, retired.

Mr. SMITH.Collacott, we will start with you, if we may. Thank you again for being here.

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STATEMENT OF MARTIN COLLACOTT, AMBASSADOR, CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (RETIRED)

Mr. COLLACOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for inviting me to testify this mornings. First of all, may I say as the first Canadian to testify, I want to absolve myself and my colleagues for your weather. Usually we get blamed for that, but I think we are pretty sure it came up from the Carolinas.

Now, you have mentioned many of points that I want to mention, but as you said, Canada and the United States both face major problems in dealing with the entry of criminals, terrorists and illegal migrants in general into our countries. Some of these manage to get in through regular channels, and many of them come in surreptitiously, or try to, to sneak in from the sea or from across borders, occasionally by airplane.

What I want to focus on, though, is what we call our refugee determination system, which you have already flagged, Mr. Chairman. I think in the United States you call them asylum-seekers rather than refugee claimants, but we are talking about the same thing.

I am going to focus on some of the problems with our system, which you have already done. I will make some comments briefly about your system, because, as you have said, this is a two-way discussion and a dialogue.

Most of my comments on the Canadian system are going to be quite critical. I will try and identify the bright spots.

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I would like to look at some specifics. One of the problems we have in Canada is we have stretched the definition of refugee way beyond what it was intended in the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees. It was originally meant to include people fleeing well-founded fear of persecution on various grounds. We have extended it to include people fleeing from civil conflict, such as civil wars, which the U.N. intended to be only temporarily settled in neighboring countries, and all sorts of social problems, battered spouses, people who oppose the one China policy.

You have stretched it also to some degree, and I think the major source of this was very effective refugee lobbies in both countries who want to make the doors open, sometimes on humanitarian grounds, sometimes for vested interests. This has been well outlined in a document published in the States by the Center for Immigration Studies just how powerful this lobby is.

We don't have a similar document, but I think we face the same problems in Canada.

I will mention one problem you give us, and that is that you allow many people in as visitors who probably intend to stay here and can't get permanent status here, but they know they can get in under our refugee claim system because we allow people that you don't. So we have had tens and probably hundreds of thousands of people you have allowed in, and then they go up to the border and are able to claim refugee status.

One of the big problems with both of our systems is that once you are into a refugee claim or asylum claim, you are into a very elaborate, many-layered, and costly and long process. This is one of the things that I think encourages people to come and try and stay.

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In our case in Canada this is made possible in large measure because of an interpretation of our Charter of Rights and Freedoms which gave some of the same rights to anyone on Canadian soil, even if they are there illegally. We don't have any provision really for removing people quickly. You have an expedited removal system, but, again, once people get into your system, they are there for a long time. In our case, protesting under the Immigration and Refugee Board still takes over 11 months, and then there can be another 7 months of assessment of risk if returned to their country of origin and another 10 months before removal. That encourages people to come to stay for a long time. The government does aim to get this down to 6 months in Canada, but the Auditor General, who is our oversight agency, wants to get it down to 10 weeks.

Again, the complexity and many-layered nature is due to an effective refugee lobby.

There are a lot of measures we can take to improve the situation. One thing we have been doing is improving intercepts at airports abroad of people with bogus travel documents. We have been doing that in cooperation with the United States. We should be doing a lot more of that. That takes resources.

One thing we did drop that we were doing was to interrogate refugee claimants when they arrive, or let's say question them when they arrive, to get all the information we can on who brought them in and how they got here. We discontinued doing that in Canada I think largely for resource purposes, and we shouldn't have.

Detention can be an important tool. That is controversial, but we started doing it in Canada with some of the Chinese boat people. We are still not doing it with the much larger numbers of people who come in by air without documents, and it makes me question how determined the government is to deal with this problem. If we were detaining people who don't have a manifestly sound claim when they arrive, this would also give us a chance to start a security check, because at the present time we don't really do a security check until people are successful in their refugee claim and then apply for landed immigrant status. That can be several years sometimes, unless there is really an egregious outstanding case against some individual that surfaces.

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Perhaps the worst problem, and you mentioned it though, is our tracking and removal. The government did try to get some money to do some automated tracking a few years ago and couldn't get it on board. We have a huge number of people who haven't even had their hearings for deportation who have been refused, many who have been refused, but still haven't been deported. This is a very attractive feature, I think, of our refugee determination system for anyone who wants to come and stay for a long time.

All these measures take resources, but if we streamlined our refugee determination system, as you need to as well, I think we would have the funds for that.

Well, what is the impact in terms of things like terrorism? I would like to use the example of one group, the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka. We now have about 200,000 Tamils from Sri Lanka in Canada, most of whom have come in through the refugee system or nominated their relatives, not fleeing persecution, fleeing civil conflict. The real Tamil refugees are in refugee camps in India. The Tamil Tigers have been able to influence and infiltrate this community and I think pretty well control it, have done, I think, their fund-raising for their activities in Sri Lanka. It is the largest Sri Lankan community anywhere in the world, and it is an example of where our system has aided and abetted.

They are not the only problems. We have Middle Eastern groups, we have Sikh terrorist groups, we have IRA. But the system itself has encouraged this. I think our security and intelligence agencies are very good. They have excellent cooperation with you, but the refugee determination system does not help.

Page 26

We have had a few positive developments. We made changes to our Immigration Act to provide for not giving status in Canada to terrorists. We have had a recent court decision which said Canadian national interests took precedence over deporting people back to a risky country, and we are going to sign an international convention on suppression of financing of terrorism. I tried to push through something on that 10 years ago and failed.

We have some moves in the right direction, but overall I have to say I am not comfortable with the extent to which the Canadian system is dealing. We have had reports on the inadequacy of our refugee determination system going back in the 1980's. The government has made moves to correct these, but I don't see yet a sustained attempt to clear up the kind of problems that encourage to a considerable extent terrorist groups to function in Canada.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Collacott follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARTIN COLLACOTT, AMBASSADOR, CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (RETIRED)

Canada along with other countries is faced with an unprecedented movement of illegal migrants organized by international criminal organizations. It is estimated by the UN that four million people are smuggled across international borders each year. Criminals are now believed to make money more from people trafficking than from the smuggling of narcotics.

Page 27

Canada's refugee determination system has come under severe criticism in recent years because of the ease with which claimants can enter the system, the generous treatment they receive once in it, the high rate of acceptance of claims and the considerable likelihood that they will never be forced to leave the country if their claim is rejected. This has made Canada a favorite target not only for bogus refugee claimants seeking better economic opportunities but also for criminals and terrorists.

While Canada has had a strong tradition of accepting refugees who are genuinely fleeing persecution as defined by the United Nations Convention on Refugees, there is growing concern on the part of the Canadian public over what is regarded as widespread abuse of the system. It is not only very costly but results in many people remaining in Canada who should not be here. This is seen as unfair to migrants who have come here legally, usually after a lengthy processing period, who may also suffer from being confused by the public with large numbers of illegal migrants coming from the same source countries. It is equally unfair to genuine refugees whose processing is delayed because the system is clogged with bogus cases. Other major problems are the opportunities available to criminals and terrorists to use the system to enter Canada as well as the problems created for the United States by large numbers of people gaining entry into Canada by making refugee claims in order to be smuggled across the border.

I a well as other critics of the present system have made a number of proposals to tighten up the system. Many of these are contained in a report issued two years ago by the Auditor General of Canada, who identified so many shortcomings that it cautioned against making patchwork changes and recommended a thorough review of the refugee process. Thus far, however, the government's response has been limited. A major obstacle in the way of instituting fundamental reforms is the existence of a highly articulate and influential lobby, comprised in large part of refugee lawyers and advocacy groups whose funding is closely related to the continued arrival and settlement of significant numbers of refugee claimants in Canada. A similar situation exists in the United States.

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Specific recommendations to reform the refugee determination system include the following:

a) Given the very large numbers of persons arriving in Canada, the United States, Australia and many Western European countries without valid travel documents and without plausible grounds for seeking asylum, much wider use should be made of detention until it is determined that they have reasonable case for claiming refugee status or, alternatively, are deported. Experience to date indicates that this will substantially reduce the numbers trying to enter the country. Those who are really fleeing persecution are presumably prepared to put up with this inconvenience. While such detention will be not come without considerable expense, the long term social costs of letting in thousands of bogus refugee claimants, a large percentage of whom disappear if not kept in detention, will be much greater. Canada has shown some progress in this directionalthough very limited. After most of those released from the first boatload of Chinese who arrived last summer disappeared, our authorities detained those from the second, third and fourth boats. Relatively few of the undocumented claimants arriving by airand who, over time, enter the country in much larger numbers than the boat peopleare detained, however.

b) Claimants entering the Canadian refugee determination system can be at present be assured of staying in the country for a considerable period of time as well as receiving free legal counsel, welfare payments and full access to the health care system. This extended stay has been made possible in large measure by a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada which conclude that Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (namely, that everyone is entitled to life, liberty and security) applies to everyone who has managed to set foot on our soil, and not just to Canadian citizens. It will be difficult to make fundamental reforms of the system unless this decision is revisited in some form or other. While there is also considerable scope for improving various aspects of the refugee determination system in the United States, Canada could benefit from the introduction of something similar to the U.S. Expedited Removal System, which allows for the quick deportation of those with manifestly unfounded claims. The average processing time for a claimant in Canada is now just under one year. The government's objective is to reduce it to six months by 2002. The Auditor General recommends reducing it to ten weeks.

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c) Canada needs to review its application of the standards outlined in the U.N. Convention on Refugees. At present Canada accepts claims from many persons who are not fleeing persecution as defined by the UN Convention. Many have left their homeland because of civil wars or other conflicts and by UN standards require only temporary protection until they can return home. Still others have been granted refugee status for more personal reasons, such as having an abusive spouse. Canada, in fact, warned the UNHCR back in 1991 that stretching the definition of refugee would make so many people around the world eligible to claim status that the system would become unmanageableto the particular disadvantage of those requiring protection from persecution. The United States has also stretched the definition well beyond the original intent of the UN Convention in some areasalthough not to the same extent as Canada. The result is that many persons who visit the United States with the hope of staying permanently, but who do not meet U.S. refugee standards, simply travel to the Canadian border where they are almost automatically accepted into our determination system.

d) Substantial additional funding is required to make the Canadian system function more efficiently. As well as the resources required for increased detention more need to be applied to the interception of persons with questionable documents at airports abroad before they emplane for Canada. More resources should be used to track rejected claimants and have them removed as quickly as possible. The fact that Canada has one of poorest records for those who fail to get status is a major inducement for bogus claimants. Much if not all of the required funding can be realized from savings resulting from the speeding up of the refugee determination process.

e) Foreign-based terrorist organizations have been attracted to establishing themselves in Canada for a number of reasons. One of these is the fact that it is not only very easy to get into the refugee determination system in the first place but, unless there is very obvious adverse information available on an individual, no security check is usually made until a claim is accepted and application is made for landed immigrant status. A more stringent detention system combined with at least a preliminary security check would improve this situation. A much more effective and expeditious deportation regime, as recommended in the previous paragraph,-particularly in the case of those with connections to terrorist organizationsis also much needed.

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f) A further circumstance that has attracted foreign terrorists to Canada has been the ease with which they can raise and transfer funds abroad. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are a particularly notable example of a group adept both at bringing large numbers of supporters into Canada through the refugee determination system and at fund raising. One encouraging development is that Canada appears about to sign a United Nations convention which will require our government to pass domestic legislation making it illegal to raise funds for terrorism.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Emerson. You will need to move the microphone down as you testify.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN EMERSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TERRORISM NEWSWIRE

Mr. EMERSON. I am very impressed with your high-tech termination procedures here.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin my prepared comments, I would just like to take a moment to express my deepest appreciation to you for holding this hearing, and, equally important, for standing up to the orchestrated campaign to stop me from appearing this morning. Because of the investigative work I have carried out as a journalist and investigator in exposing the presence of militant Islamic fundamentalists and Middle Eastern terrorists in the United States, I have been the focus of a sustained campaign of defamation and even a threat to my life during the past 5 years. These threats have disrupted my life, but I continue to work in this area.

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The aim of this campaign is to prevent me, as well as others, from speaking about the threat. The very success of these types of intimidation creates a chilling climate where free speech on this issue has become somewhat suppressed. Just as significantly, the tactics of these groups do a tremendous disservice to the vast overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans who do not support violence or terrorism. Mr. Chairman, your refusal to allow these militants to suppress free speech is to be applauded and lauded.

Today the U.S. and Canada serve as the home for a wide spectrum of international terrorist groups as well as indigenous home-grown groups. Today's hearing focuses on the threat of international terrorism on American soil and the porous nature of U.S. borders.

It is important to point out that even though every single terrorist group in the world has established a presence here in the United States, the primary threat to international security stems from Middle East-based terrorist groups. The entire spectrum of Middle Eastern terrorist groups now operate on American soil, including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, the Egyptian Al Gamat Al Islamiya, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas.

In the last few years, the list of terrorists and militants allowed to enter the U.S. or granted green cards or citizenship is nothing less than staggering: Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, head of the Egyptian Al Gamat and leader of one of the plots to bomb U.S. landmarks and bridges in New York; Musa Abu Marzook, a top Hamas figure; Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who served as a professor at the University of South Florida in Tampa; Sheikh Abdel Aziz Odeh, spiritual leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and unindicted coconspirator in the World Trade Center bombing, who visited the U.S. multiple times for fund-raising and political recruitment without any knowledge of the INS; Lyman Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian Al-Gihad organization, lieutenant to Osama bin Laden, and conspirator in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

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There are no shortages of examples of the problems on American borders with Canada. Last fall, and there is some new information in what I am about to say, a stateless Mauritanian flew from Germany to Montreal. Within days before and after his visit to a group of Algerian nationals living in Montreal, several members of that group flew to Chechnya, another group traveled to Vancouver, and another headed for the Vermont border.

The Mauritanian, whose arrival in Montreal from Germany last fall appeared to trigger some of the movements of this cell, is still believed to be in Montreal. Germany had notified Canada of this man's departure and pending arrival in Montreal. U.S. authorities believe the Mauritanian was connected to the Al Qaeda organization, the terrorist group headed up by Osama bin Laden, and he had been to Pakistan and Afghanistan where he trained in camps operated by bin Laden.

At about the same time that the Mauritanian left Germany for Montreal to rendezvous with the Algerian terrorist cells, several other Islamic militants connected to bin Laden began activating another terrorist plot. Khalil Deek, a Palestinian who became a U.S. citizen in 1991, travelled from Peshawar, Pakistan, to Amman, Jordan, where he helped organize a terrorist plot to bomb tourist sites, including the Radisson hotel. In charges made public last week, the Jordanian prosecutors alleged that Deek conspired to carry out terrorist attacks in Jordan and had acquired explosives in furtherance of that conspiracy.

Deek was extradited from Pakistan to Jordan on December 17, 1999. He had served as a facilitator in the underground railroad operated by bin Laden, arranging the transport of terrorists and explosives. He had trained in a Camp near Khost, Afghanistan.

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An accomplice of Deek in the same camp, a person by the name of Idris, was arrested by Pakistani authorities at the same time that Deek had been picked up.

Another person who is still wanted in connection with that plot is a person named Hejazzi, who has been living in Boston. His whereabouts today are not known.

Long before the arrests in Montreal of Algerian terrorists last December, Canada had witnessed its soil being used by foreign-based terrorists. Ward Elock, Director of CSIS, testified in testimony on January 1998, ''With perhaps the singular exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist groups active here than in any country in the world. The Counter-Terrorism Branch is currently investigating over 50 organizational targets and 350 individual terrorist targets.''

I have other information here about the degree to which Canada has served as a site for Hezbollah, the degree to which Hezbollah has been able to penetrate Canada and provide intelligence back to Iran on potential Canadian targets, and the degree to which Canada was used as a staging branch for other terrorist organizations.

I think it is important to point out that while Canada does get criticized, and I think appropriately, for some of its policies, its openness and its intellectual candor in acknowledging the degree to which terrorists have emplaced themselves in Canada is something that we should be applauding.

Thank you very much.

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Emerson.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Emerson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN EMERSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TERRORISM NEWSWIRE

Introductory comments:

Good morning. Before I begin my prepared comments, I would like to take a moment to express my deepest appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and, equally important, for standing up to the orchestrated campaign to stop me from appearing. Because of the investigative work I have carried out as a journalist and investigator in exposing the presence of militant Islamic fundamentalists and Middle Eastern terrorists in the United States (see attached bio), I have been the subject of a sustained campaign of vilification, defamation and even a threat to my life during the past five years by militant Islamic organizations operating as self-anointed representatives of the larger Muslim population, whom they decidedly do not represent. But without access to accurate information about my real background to correct the false claims being fabricated about me, some of those who receive this information are unfortunately subject to manipulation. In the end, the aim of this campaign is to prevent me, as well as others, from speaking and writing about the threat of militant Islamic fundamentalism on American soil, and thus prevent the public from being properly informed. The very success of these organizations and their supporters, fronting under the false veneer of being ''moderate'' and ''mainstream,'' in creating a chilling climate where free speech on this issue has been suppressed, has become a factor in allowing foreign terrorists to operate in the United States below the radar screen and thus avoid the scrutiny from either the media, public officials or law enforcement. Just as significantly, the tactics of various Islamic organizations do a tremendous disservice to the vast overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans who do not support violence or terrorism. Mr. Chairman, your refusal to allow these militants to suppress free speech is to be applauded and lauded.

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Overview of international terrorist problem:

Thanks to the quick response of US Customs Agents to behavior deemed suspicious at the Canadian border in Port Angeles on December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam was caught trying to smuggle REX explosives. A wide-ranging investigation, unprecedented in its sweep and scope, succeeded in identifying and arresting other members of the hitherto unknown terrorist cell to which Ressam belonged. A plot to bomb and destroy targets in the United States, although still not publicly identified, had been narrowly averted.

Today the United States and Canada serve as the home for a wide spectrum of international terrorist groups as well as indigenous ''home-grown'' groups. Certainly, today's hearing focuses our attention on the threat of international terrorism on American soil and the porous nature of US borders. While virtually all foreign terrorist organizations from throughout the world, including Latin America and Asia, have set up infrastructures in the United States, the primary threat of international terrorism on American soil stems from Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, a fact that FBI and CIA officials have repeatedly testified to. These organizations have set up fundraising operations, political headquarters, military recruitment and sometimes even command and control centers. The entire spectrum of Middle Eastern and Islamic terrorist groups now operates on American soil, including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, the Egyptian Al Gamat Al Islamiya, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Liberation Party, the PKK and Al-Qaeda, the organization of Osama bin Laden.

There are various reasons for the emergence of these groups in the United States, which include:

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Ability to operate under our political radar screen

Ability to hide under mainstream religious identification

Loopholes in immigration procedures

Ease of penetration of borders

Limitations on FBI and other agencies performing law enforcement functions, including INS and Customs

More sophisticated compartmentalization of terrorist cells around loosely structured terrorist movements

Exploitation of freedoms of religion and speech

Absence of a vigilant media

Exploitation of non-profit fundraising prerogatives and lack of government scrutiny

Increasing cross fertilization and mutual support provided by members of different Islamic terrorist groups

Ease of availability of student visas from countries harboring or supporting terrorism

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Failures by universities to keep track of foreign students and their spouses

Protection afforded by specially-created educational programs

Ease of visa fraud and the invention of false credentials, from passports, drivers licenses, credit cards and social security numbers

Blowback from the anti-Soviet mujihadeen that the US supported in Afghanistan.

Despite passage of the anti-terrorism bill and a realization by law enforcement since the World Trade Center bombing that the threat of Middle Eastern terrorism had become part of the US and Canadian landscapes, militants and terrorists continue to use both countries as a base of operations. As water seeking its own level, terrorists will gravitate to those areas that give them the greatest freedom to maneuver. Unless choked off and stopped along the different points of entry's ranging from the visa granting process overseas to the hundreds of unmanned border crossing points between Canada and the United Statesterrorists will continue to come to the United States. The list of major international terrorists and militants allowed to enter the United States in recent years or actually granted green cards and citizenship is nothing less than staggering.

Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, head of the Egyptian Al Gamat Al Islamiya, and convicted leader of an interdicted plot to bomb US landmarks, bridges and tunnels in New York

Musa Abu Marzook, one of the top three officials of Hamas (who founded and operated a ''think tank'' in Chicago and Virginia

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Ali Mohammed, a top lieutenant to Osama bin Laden (and not insignificantly, enrolled as a Special Forces sergeant at Fort Bragg)

Wadih el Hage, secretary to Osama bin Laden

Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (who served as a professor at the University of South Florida in Tampa)

Sheikh Abdel Aziz Odeh, spiritual leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and unindicted co-conspirator in the World Trade Center bombing (who visited the United States multiple times for fundraising and political recruitment without any knowledge of the INS)

Ayman Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian Al-Gihad organization, lieutenant to Osama bin Laden and conspirator in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat

Rashhid Ghannoushi, head of the Tunisian Al-Nahdah

Anwar Haddam, a leader of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)

Leith Shbeilat, a militant Islamic leader implicated in an assassination plot against Jordan's King Hussein

Khalid Mishal, a top leader of Hamas, who, in his speeches in the United States, has called for stabbings

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Kamal Hilbawi, a spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood, who has called for attacks on American targets and who has encouraged carrying out of suicide bombings

Yusef Al Qaradawi, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and active supporter of Hamas and other violent groups, who has called for suicide bombings and taking over the United States

Qazi Hussein Ahmed, leader of Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami, a militant group that supports violent ''jihad'' or holy war

Ramzi Yousef, the top organizer of the World Trade Center bombing

Sheikh Abdulmunem Abu Zant, a militant Jordanian Islamic cleric, who has routinely called for violence

Ishaq Al-Farhan, a leader of the militant Islamic Jordan Action Front who has issued numerous exhortations to carry out violence

Wagdi Ghuniem, a militant Islamic cleric from Egypt, who has called for jihad against Jews and other ''enemies of Islam.'' (Curiously, on one of his recent visits to the United States, Ghuniem was barred from entering Canada because of his terrorist affiliations and sent back to the United States, where he continued his tour exhorting Islamic groups to carry out violence.)

Loopholes and weaknesses of immigration controls:

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Foreign nationals who are terrorist operatives routinely utilize false identity documents to illegally enter the US and/or remain here once they have entered. There are no shortages of examples in this regardthe recent Washington State and Vermont arrests clearly show this. The ability of Islamic Jihad leader Abdel Aziz Odeh to have entered the US numerous times, without leaving a record under his real name, is yet another example. Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer and Lafi Khalil were arrested on July 31, 1997 in a Brooklyn apartment by police officers from the New York City Police Department, based on a tip that people in the apartment were intending to bomb the New York subway system. The arrests narrowly averted a series of bombings that could have killed hundreds of commuters. After the arrests, police determined that Mezer and Khalil were in the United States illegally. Mezer was apprehended three times by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the thirteen months prior to the arrest in New York for attempting to illegally enter the United States from Canada. At the time of arrest, the INS had begun formal deportation proceedings against him, but he was free on bail and had filed a request for political asylum based on his fear that the Israeli government would arrest him for membership in Hamas. False documents are as important to terrorists and their organizations as their guns and bombsthey are tools that help them ply their international trade of death and destruction.

In addition to false documents, alien terrorists and their support operatives frequently engage in immigration benefit fraud. One of the most glaring examples would be asylum fraud. All one has to do is show up at a US port of entry, even without documents, utter the two magic words ''political asylum,'' have any moderately truthful sounding story and one is likely to be processed inat least temporarily. The tightening of the asylum process over the past couple of years has helpedbut, be a fraudulent asylum claimant showing up at a very busy Point of Entry such as JFK Airport or Miami International Airportand you are likely to remain in detention for only a short time before you are paroled out to (hopefully) appear at a later hearing! If a name (real or false) does not appear in any of the lookout systems and the applicant merely has an alleged ''friend'' to stay with in the US, then parole from detention is most likely. Of course, it goes without saying, terrorist aliens so released seldom show up againand the INS, because of serious manpower shortages and conflicting priorities, rarely pursues such absconders. Of course, any number of other immigration fraud schemes aboundmarriage fraud, other familial relation fraud, naturalization fraud, work visa fraud (H1 and L1 and ''E'' statusas used by Islamic Jihad officials Ramadan Abdullah Shallah and Bashir Nafi), investor fraud and religious worker fraud.

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Smuggling of alien terrorist operativesapart from the noted utilization of false documents: alien terrorists use established alien smuggling pipelines across both the USMexico and USCanada border. Maritime smuggling along the coasts, particularly via the Caribbean as well as East and West Coast seaports, occurs. How easy can it be for a terrorist operative to bribe his/her way onto a freighter destined to a busy US seaport, and simply be hidden aboard the vessel until Customs and INS have done their routine inspections, then to simply disembark the vessel?

The issue of classified evidence in immigration proceedings is now under assault by editorialists in the media and from some members of Congress. What they forget is that these proceedings are administrative in naturenot criminaland such evidence, in spite of all the recent hoopla, is only rarely and very selectively utilized. Deportation proceedings ultimately result in a person being removed from the USnot sentenced to prison (as in criminal proceedings)even though aliens may be detained while those proceedings go forward. As such, it should be remembered that aliens detained hold their own cell keys ''all they have to is simply agree to be deported and they can be freejust not in the US. Moreover, Congress itself approved of the Classified Information Procedures Act, in which classified information can be introduced in criminal trials without releasing this information to the defendant.

Unfortunately, too many senior INS managers do not recognize the critically important role INS enforcement branches, particularly the Investigations Division, can and should play in the counter-terrorism and national security arena. These are officials at both the HQ and field levels. INS has but a small contingent of agents dedicated to this workand, often those do not receive the recognition and support from higher management they should. INS should have at least a hundred field agents assigned to these missionsat least the same it has assigned to Organized Crime Drug Task Force effortsbut in fact INS has less than half that assigned to counter-terrorist efforts in the field. I have been told that it is not unusual for very senior INS officialsespecially at headquarters (who should know otherwise), when the topic of counter-terrorism arises in senior staff meetings, to state, ''that's the FBI's responsibility'' and ''what does INS have to do with that!'' Certain key, senior INS managers fail to even understand and recognize the very statutes within the Immigration and Nationality Act they are charged with enforcing!

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New information on the Algerian and Jordanian terrorist plots:

Last fall, a stateless Mauritanian flew from Germany to Montreal. Within days before and after his visit to a group of Algerian nationals living in Montreal, several members of that group flew to Chechnya; another group traveled to Vancouver and another headed for the Vermont border.

According to a superceding federal indictment released last week, Ressam and a still fugitive accomplice Abdelmajid Dahoumane plotted '' to destroy or damage structures, conveyances or other real or personal property within the United States.'' The plot, which stretches back to at least 1998, according to federal authorities, called for compartmentalized cells to be activated in the United States. No one cell would know about the others, in the event that any of the participants got arrested. Members of another cell belonging to the same group and entering the United States through Vermont border crossings were to rendezvous in a still undisclosed location in the northeast. Ressam was to be met in Seattle by a Brooklyn based Algerian Abdel Ghani Meskini. While Ressam had planned to fly to London after leaving the explosives laden car for someone else to pick up, Meskini was to fly from Seattle to Chicago to help secure additional funding for the Islamic terrorist group. Telephone toll records, released by prosecutors, show that the Seattle cell was in contact with the Vermont-based cell through third party numbers.

The Mauritanian, whose arrival in Montreal from Germany last fall appeared to trigger some of the movements of the cell, is still believed to be in Montreal. Germany had notified Canada of this man's departure from Germany and pending arrival in Montreal. US authorities believe the Mauritanian was connected to the Al Qaeda organization, the terrorist group headed by Osama bin Laden and had been to Pakistan and Afghanistan where he trained in camps operated by bin Laden.

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At about the same time that the Mauritanian left Germany for Montreal to rendezvous with the Algerian terrorist cells, several other Islamic militants connected to bin Laden began activating another terrorist plot. Khalil Deek, a Palestinian who became a US citizen in 1991, traveled from Peshawar, Pakistan to Amman, Jordan, where he helped organize a terrorist plot to bomb tourist sites, including the Radisson hotel. In charges made public last week, Jordanian prosecutors alleged that Deek conspired to carry out terrorist attacks in Jordan and had acquired explosives in furtherance of that conspiracy. A dozen Jordanians and an Iraqi and Algerian were arrested by Jordanian authorities in the first week of December as being members of that same conspiracy. Deek had been extradited from Pakistan to Jordan on December 17, 1999. Deek served as facilitator in the underground railroad operated by bin Laden, arranging the transport of terrorists and explosives.

According to intelligence sources, Deek trained in a bin Laden camp near Khost, Afghanistan. An accomplice of Deek in the same bin Laden camp, a person by the name of Idris, was arrested by Pakistani authorities at the same time that Deek had been picked up. Another terrorist colleague of Deek, a Palestinian who goes by the name Abu Zubeida, escaped arrest as did another suspected conspirator in the Jordanian plot, a man named Hejazzi. Hejazzi traveled on an American passport and had previously driven a taxi in the Boston metropolitan area. He had rented a house in Amman where he stored a vast amount of explosives. Hejazzi's whereabouts are unknown today. US authorities believe that he was connected to other members of terrorist cells still active in the United States. That he was able to acquire a US passport and use of the US as a base of operations only further illustrates the problem we face.

Hejazzi's accomplice, Deek, who had lived in Anaheim, California, is the focus of a still unraveling US investigation. US authorities acquired his computer disks and are now studying them. Although Deek's brother told a reporter last week that he (Khalil Deek) had left the United States in March 1997, federal authorities believe that he may have been in the United States as recently as September 1999although they are not certain at this moment as they try to reconstruct his movements. But authorities have determined that while he lived in the United States, he was involved in wiring transactions of sums totaling tens of thousands of dollars to overseas destinations. Interestingly, Deek made the transactions not from Anaheim, where he lived and worked, but rather from Chicago, where he flew multiple times en route to Pakistan. Deek was also associated with a Californian registered Islamic non-profit charity called Charity Without Borders, whose existence was disclosed last week. As also disclosed, Deek's brother, Tawfeeq, has been involved with the Islamic Association for Palestine, described by former FBI official Oliver Revell as a ''front group'' for Hamas, and has allowed his mosque to host fundraisers for the Holy Land Fund for Relief and Development, a non-profit fundraising organization that has been linked to Hamas, with offices in Texas, Illinois and New Jersey.

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Although the President's Executive Order of January 1995and renewed again several days agoorders the seizure of assets belonging to terrorist groups, and the 1996 anti-terrorist legislation similarly ordered the freezing of terrorist assets of some 30 groups, very little money has actually been seized. With the primary exception of funds belonging to Musa Marzook, the head of the Hamas politburo who was deported in 1997, the US Government has not designated terrorist affiliates in the United States.

The problem, of course, is that terrorists don't openly raise funds for explosives or guns but rather for ''humanitarian'' purposes, such as education or for orphans.

The use of Canada by terrorists: Details of Hezbollah's modus operandi:

Long before the arrests in Montreal of Algerian terrorists last December, Canada had witnessed its soil being used by foreign based terrorists. As stated by Ward Elock, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, on January 24, 1998, in testimony delivered to the Special Committee of the Senate on Security and Intelligence, ''With perhaps the singular exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist groups active here in than in any country in the world. The Counter-Terrorism Branch is currently investigating over 50 organizational targets and 350 individual terrorist targetsBy way of example, the following terrorist groups acting on behalf have been and are active in Canada: Hezbollah and other Shiite Islamic terrorist organizations; several Sunni Islamic Extremist groups, including Hamas, with ties to Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Lebanon and Iran; the Provisional IRA; the Tamil Tigers; the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK); and all of the world's major Sikh terrorist groups.''

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Hezbollah in Canada:

Hezbollah has been particularly active in both Canada and the United States. One of those arrested in Canada was Mohammed Hussein al-Husseini, arrested in March 1997. In seeking to deport al-Husseini, who arrived in Canada in 1991 without travel documents and who was immediately granted refugee status based on his fear of prosecution in Lebanon, Canadian authorities filed an extensive memo in 1993 detailing his involvement with Hezbollah. In interviews conducted by Canadian authorities, al-Husseini admitted that he was a member of Hezbollah and ''provided information, which revealed a great deal of knowledge of the inner workings of Hezbollah, including names and positions of Hezbollah officials.'' And when asked about the existence of Hezbollah in Montreal, he stated flatly, ''Yes Hezbollah has members in Montreal, Ottawa, Torontoin all of Canada.'' Al-Husseini provided extensive material on the modus operandi of Hezbollah, from the tasking of its missions in Iran to the support it has enlisted in specific Canadian Islamic centers. One of the most interesting pieces of information he provided was that video of potential Canadian targets was taken by Hezbollah members in Canada and sent back to Hezbollah headquarters in Lebanon for contingency planning in the event that Hezbollah would want to target Canada.

After being granted refugee status, al-Husseini flew back to Lebanon in August 1993and returned to Canada in early September 1993, this time with a new Lebanese passport, which revealed a US visa issued to him in Montreal on May 20, 1993. An entry stamp to the United States was dated September 1, 1993.

In 1997, Canada charged two Saudi-born men who had entered Canada the previous year with being members of Islamic terrorist organizations. One of them was Hani Al-Sayegh, accused of being a member of the Saudi branch of Hezbollah and being an active participant in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996 that killed 19 Americans. Al-Sayegh arrived in Canada on August 16, 1996 from Kuwait. But he first traveled to Italy and then to Boston, where according to US intelligence officials, he made contact with members of an Islamic terrorist group. From Boston, he went to Canada. According to documents filed by Canadian authorities, ''conducted surveillance at the site of the [Khobar] bombing. On the day of the bombing, he was the driver of the car which signaled the explosives-laden truck to enter the parking lot.'' After entering into a plea agreement with the US Department of Justice, Al-Sayegh agreed to be extradited to the United States, where he was to plead guilty to a charge of conspiring to kill US nationals in exchange for a ten-year sentence. But after arriving in the United States, Aal-Sayegh withdrew his plea agreement and in the absence of admissible corroborative evidence, the Department of Justice was forced to withdraw its charges. Al-Sayegh was subsequently deported to Saudi Arabia.

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Canadian authorities have been courageously open about the degree to which their country has become a base of operations for terrorists. I think this openness should be lauded for it helps provide the public with the necessary information to evaluate policy decisions. While certain components of Canadian policies, such as the ease in which terrorists have entered Canada in recent years, are glaring in their absence of proper oversight, the willingness of Canadian intelligence and law enforcement to publicly acknowledge the problem on Canadian soil should be applauded.

The most recent report, Terrorism 2000/2001, by the Canadian Intelligence Security Service on December 18, 1999, and which can be read on the Internet makes for very instructive and important reading. I have cited three sections in particular:

34. For a number of reasons, Canada is an attractive venue for terrorists. Long borders and coastlines offer many points of entry, which can facilitate movement to and from various sites around the world, particularly the United States. As a wealthy industrial society, Canada is an excellent location in which to raise money in the name of causes abroad. The nation accepts large numbers of immigrants and refugees, and consequently has significant émigré communities, which can be a source of haven and support.

35. Many of the world's terrorist groups have a presence in Canada, where they engage in a variety of activities in support of terrorism, including:

logistical support for offshore terrorism through efforts to obtain weapons and equipment to be shipped abroad, such as electrical detonators for explosives, or remote-control devices that can be adapted for use in the remote detonation of bombs. In one case, a Canadian was involved in an attempt to purchase a Stinger missile for PIRA;

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attempts to establish an operational support base in Canada, to enable groups to send in hit teams for attacks on targets of opportunity;

fundraising, advocacy, propaganda. For example, not long ago members of the Kurdish PKK tried to enter Canada illegally to carry out a leadership, propaganda and fundraising role;

intimidation and manipulation of Canadian citizens in émigré communities to support activities for homeland issues;

a safe haven for terrorists. The recent case of the Saudi Arabian, Hani al-Sayegh, implicated in the Al Khobar bombing, provides one example of this trend;

use of Canada as a base to arrange and direct terrorist activities in other countries. This is a particular problem with some members of Sikh terrorist groups whose leaders continue to endeavor to use Canada as their headquarters; and

raising money through illegal activities. Tamil Tiger supporters have been accused of raising money through intimidation and the manufacture and sale of false passports and documentation.

36. Authorities have been reasonably successful in thwarting the growth of right-wing extremism across the North American continent, but the activities of some groups continue to pose a substantial threat. The Militia Movement, for example, while not established in Canada, has endeavored to expand northwarda cache of weapons and equipment belonging to an American group was discovered in British Columbia.

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Think tanks as a conduit for visa issuance: A case study of the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE) and the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR):

The United States is full of educational institutes and think tanks that issue visas to foreign individuals in order to have them work for these institutes. This process has not evaded the sphere of those groups which pursue radical and extremist agendas and that serve as apparatuses for foreign terrorist organizations abroad. The utilization of these institutes allows radicals, terrorists and militant activists from abroad to enter the United States with little or no monitoring by the federal government. Two prime examples of this method are the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a now-defunct Islamic think tank based in Tampa, Florida with alleged ties to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist organization; and the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR), a fully operational Islamic think tank based in Springfield, Virginia, against which have been levied claims of providing a headquarters for Hamas operatives in the United States.

WISE and ICP:

''Yes for Jihad in the name of Allah, yes for Islam, yes for the Intifadah. We're going toward the future that Allah promised us. Allah is one. Mohammad is the leader. The Koran is our constitution. Jihad is our path. Victory to Islam. Death to Israel.'' (Translated from Arabic)

It would be understandable if one assumed that the statements above were taken from a rally or speech in the Middle East; however, this was the conclusion to a speech that took place in the heartland of America: Chicago, Illinois on September 29, 1991. The speaker was Dr. Sami al-Arian, a professor of computer science and engineering at the University of South Florida in Tampa. In addition to his professorial role, al-Arian was the president of a Palestinian charity organization known as the Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP), the organization that sponsored the Chicago rally, and the incorporating ''chairman of the board'' of an Islamic research organization known as the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE). Both of these organizations ceased to exist after 1995 due to the ascension of one of their leadership alumni, Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, to the role of Secretary General of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad based in Damascus, Syria.

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The Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP) and the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE) were two organizations defined by Special INS Agent William West as ''fronts for the purpose of fund-raising activities for the Islamic Jihad and the Hamas terrorist organizations andalso engage in other support-type activities, primarily to allow for the perceptually legitimate entry of foreign nationals, aliens into the United States who are leaders and/or operatives of the Islamic Jihad, Hamas and other terrorist organizations.'' WISE was incorporated in Tampa, Florida in 1991. At that time, the institute's executive director was Dr. Khalil Shikaki, the brother of then- Secretary General of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Dr. Fathi Shikaki. ICP was incorporated in 1988 and was headed by Dr. al-Arian personally.

Under the auspices of WISE, al-Arian arranged for entry visas into the United States for the primary leaders of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist organization hierarchy. Among these were Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, the current head of the Islamic Jihad in Damascus; and Dr. Bashir Nafi. In late October 1995, Shallah was appointed the new Secretary General of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to succeed Dr. Fathi Shikaki, who had been assassinated days earlier in Malta. Nafi, whose visa applications stated that he was Director of Research for WISE, appeared at a conference in Lebanon, in October 1994, of Islamic and opposition leaders opposed to the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, alongside Dr. Fathi Shikaki. Nafi was deported from the United States in 1996, following Shallah's ascension to the leadership of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and based on his violation of the stipulations of his visa which dictated that he would be working at WISE in Tampa. In 1996, Nafi was working at the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in Herndon, Virginia. As a side note, a letter written by Ramadan Abdullah Shallah to the University of South Florida indicated that this institute, IIIT, was the primary funder of WISE.

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In addition to these individuals, al-Arian's ICP played host to other radicals from around the world, gathered at conferences sponsored by the ICP in St. Louis, Missouri in 1988 and in Chicago, Illinois from 1989 until 1992. The other radicals appearing at these conferences included Sheikh Abdel Aziz Odeh, the spiritual leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for his spiritual role in a plot to blow up various landmarks and bridges in the New York City area in 1993; Sheikh Rashhid Ghannoushi, the leader of the Tunisian Al-Nahdah Movement, who was exiled from Tunisia in 1989 after being found guilty of conspiring to carry out violence against the Tunisian regime; Leith Shbeilat, a militant Islamic opposition figure in Jordan, who has been in and out of prison in Jordan for his role in incitement of riots against the Jordanian government and whose name now appears on the website for the Jordanian Association Against Zionism and Racism; Anwar Haddam, spokesperson for the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), who is currently appealing a deportation order in the United States for his ties to terrorist activities; and Sheikh Saeed Sha'aban, the leader of Lebanese Tawheed Movement, who passed away in 1999.

In 1992, in a further attempt to legitimize its activities, WISE (represented by Ramadan Abdullah Shallah) signed a cooperative agreement with the Committee for Middle East Studies at the University of South Florida in Tampa. As a joint event with the university, WISE invited Rashhid Ghannoushi, whose radical ties have been discussed earlier, to speak at a roundtable symposium at the university. When the Department of State refused to grant a visa to Ghannoushi, WISE (primarily Sami al-Arian) petitioned the State Department for Ghannoushi's admission, but was denied. It is clear through these efforts that WISE, through its legitimizing agreement with USF, attempted to, as Special Agent William West stated, ''allow for the perceptually legitimate entry of foreign nationals, aliens into the United States who are leaders and/or operatives of the Islamic Jihad, the Hamas and other terrorist organizations.''

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Since 1995, WISE and Dr. al-Arian have been the subjects of a federal investigation in Tampa to determine their role as a front for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist organization. As stated in West's November 1995 Affidavit:

Based upon the facts and information that I have set forth in the instant affidavit, I have probable cause to believe that ICP and WISE were utilized by Sami Al-Arian and Ramadan Abdullah Shallah as ''fronts'' in order to enable individuals to enter the United States, in an apparent lawful fashion, despite the fact that these individuals were international terrorists. Among the unlawful methods employed by these terrorist organizations are the apparent lawful procurement and use of visas and other documents relating to immigration which enables terrorists and other excludable aliens to gain entry into the United States through false statements, misrepresentations, and other forms of fraud.

This statement encapsulates the problems associated with current visa issuance guidelines. By providing an organizational structure to host undesirable individuals, Dr. al-Arian and others at WISE and other similar organizations are able to exploit the law to their advantage to further their illegal goals.

Musa Abu Marzook and UASR:

The United Association for Studies and Research (UASR), an Islamic think tank now based in Springfield, Virginia, was founded in 1989 in Chicago, Illinois by a number of prominent Islamic radials living in the US, primary among whom was Musa Abu Marzook.

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Musa Abu Marzook, a.k.a. Abu Omar, was the head of the Hamas Political Bureau since 1988, while he was resident in the United States. Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia fi FilastinThe Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine) is one of the most militant Islamic groups in the world and is included in the United States Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations that are outlawed pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Hamas has claimed responsibility for numerous suicide bombing attacks within Israel resulting in the deaths of scores of innocent Israelis.

On July 27, 1995, Marzook was arrested at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport because ''he played an important role in supervising the activities of the military wing to Hamas [the wing responsible for the terrorist attacks] and in appointing individuals to important leadership roles in the military wing.'' In the United States, Abu Marzook was ''responsible for the Muslim Brothers organization in the U.S. and resigned from this job in order to devote his time to activities dedicated to Palestine'' following the foundation of the Hamas. Marzook, who was born in the Gaza Strip, was a close associate of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the Islamic cleric who founded Hamas as an organization distinct from its parent group Muslim Brotherhood.

Marzook first came to the United States in the late 1970s, although immigration records show that he formally began residing in the United States starting in 1981. Marzook and his family lived in a number of locations during their 14 years in the United States, including Colorado, Louisiana and Virginia. He and his family moved to Falls Church, Virginia in 1991.

Between 1993 and 1995, Marzook resided principally in Jordan, which deported him in June 1995 for his involvement and senior position in Hamas. In July 1995, after making trips to Iran and Syria, Abu Marzook attempted to reenter the United States at which time he was arrested by customs and INS officials at the request of the Israeli government which sought to prosecute Abu Marzook for numerous crimes in connection with his leadership role in Hamas. In October 1995, acting at the request of the Israeli government, the United States initiated extradition proceedings against Abu Marzook based on pending Israeli criminal charges that included murder, attempted murder and conspiracy stemming from Hamas-sponsored terrorist acts.

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At the time of his arrest, Abu Marzook was a permanent resident alien of the United States. In 1990, he and his family received their Green Cards in an INS lottery that offered ''permanent legal residency'' to potential immigrants. In affidavits filed by Deputy United States Attorney Shirah Neiman, the role of Abu Marzook in Hamas activities was discussed as follows:

In his role as head of political bureau, Abu Marzook financed certain activities of Hamas, including terrorist activities against soldiers and civilians in the Territories and Israel. In addition, he played an important role in supervising the activities of the military wing to Hamas (the wing responsible for the terrorist attacks) and in appointing individuals to important leadership roles in the military wing. Throughout most of the relevant period, he resided in the United States.

The arrest of Mohamad Salah, Mohamad Jarad and Nasser Hidmi by the Israeli authorities marked an important turning point into the investigation of Hamas. What was revealed as a result of interrogations and confessions of these individuals (Salah and Jarad were both residents of Chicago, Illinois, and Hidmi was a student at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas) was the importance of the United States as an operational base for Hamas. Under the leadership of Musa Abu Marzook, the Hamas headquarters in the United States was able to operate virtually unimpeded from the intense scrutiny of authorities.

On January 25, 1993, Salah and Jarad, two high ranking Hamas operatives with United States citizenship, were arrested by the Israeli General Security Services (GSS) with aid of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The Israeli authorities obtained the most significant information against Musa Abu Marzook from Salah, a.k.a ''Abu Ahmad.'' In these statements, Salah exposed the pivotal role of Musa Abu Marzook in the Hamas organization. Musa Abu Marzook directed the Hamas organization's activities, the allocation of its resources and the transfer of funds: ''Abu Marzook specifically directed funds towards Hamas' 'military' (i.e. terror) activities, encouraged acts of terror, and played an important role in overseeing certain 'military' aspects of 'Hamas' operations and in making 'military.' ''

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On October 10, 1994, Abu Marzook appeared in a television interview broadcast from the ''Al Manar'' television station in Lebanon. This was only one day after the October 9, 1994 shootings in which two Hamas terrorists killed two and wounded eighteen persons in a suicide attack on pedestrian mall in downtown Jerusalem. In interview Marzook stated as follows:

''Death is the goal to every Muslim and every fighter wants to die on Palestinian land. This is not the first time that the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassem heroes carry out suicide and terrorism actions.

''The peace process, as described by Arafat more than once, is a failure. By these actions, we do not strive to foil the talks and the negotiations. We are doing them for a much higher aim and they are steps on the way for a full restitution of the rights of the Palestinian people.''

The succeeding passages of the interview put to rest any doubt and made clear that Marzook was providing endorsement for the violent attacks carried out by Hamas:

Q: what about the assessments that one of those killed is a Palestinian policeman?

A: We believe that one day the entire Palestinian police will join the ranks of its people and join the fight against the enemy..

Q: Christopher denounced the action and called to Arafat to denounce it and prevent similar actions in the future. We also saw that Faisal Al-Huseini also denounced the action. What are your expectations as regards Arafat's reaction to Christopher's instructions?

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A: Arafat promised to stop the attacks since the signing of the Cairo Agreement and he said that they were obliged to do their best to do so. Arafat has no connection with this kind of activity and he cannot prevent it. the Hamas movement has been expressing its opposition and rejection of the agreement for a long time, and explained that it will continue according to the principle of the Jihad and God's instructions and will stick to its stand.

On October 18, 1994, Abu Marzook was interviewed by the Lebanese Ad-Dyiar newspaper. At the beginning of the interview, the writer states that ''Ad-Dyiar interviewed Dr. Musa Abu Marzook, head of the Political Bureau of the Movement, who arrived in Lebanon in order to take part in the Islamic National Congress and in order to meet with Lebanese leaders.'' In the course of this interview, Abu Marzook was asked if he could speak about the operations of the Movement. This was Marzook's answer:

The operations reflect the Jihad (Holy War) policy of the Movement in confronting the Zionist enemy . . . We fulfill our hope by way of Shahadah (martyrdom) . . . We will continue this line of Jihad until we realize this right.

Marzook also stated:

The jihad brings honor to all Muslims. Until Jerusalem is freed and Palestine is returned to its owners. This is the basis for the participation of the young Egyptian in the recent East Jerusalem action.

In an interview dated October 14, 1994, in Al-Ahed, Abu Marzook referred to himself as the ''head of the Political Bureau of the Hamas Movement'' and stated in response to the question ''is it possible the Hamas Movement has decided to take steps in martyrdom missions in order to fight the occupation'':

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Martyrdom is the goal of every Muslim and death is the highest hope of that holy fighter on the land of Palestine. This was not the first martyrdom mission which the heroes of Al-Qassam have undertaken, it is rather continuing missions.

With this description of the founder of the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR), it is also instructive to describe the activities of that organization prior to exploring its usage in the visa issuance sphere. Another member of the ''inner circle'' of UASR alongside Abu Marzook, and who has served as the Executive Director of the institute since it moved to Virginia in 1991, is Ahmed Bin Yousef, aka Yousef Salah.

A popular UASR volume by Ahmed Bin Yousef is a tribute to Hamas founder and leader Ahmed Yassin entitled Ahmed Yassin: The Phenomenon, the Miracle, and the Legend of the Challenge [UASR, 1990]. It contains odes of praise and letters extolling the imminent victory of Hamas over the Jews, such as this letter from a Hamas activist in Chicago to the Hamas fighters in Palestine: ''Greetings to you from here in America, from over the seas, that you may know that we are your sons of the era, the era of Allah, the era of Islam, the era of Palestine, the era of Jihad, the era of Hamas, until complete liberation of all Palestine from the river to the sea!''

According to a February 17, 1993 New York Times article written by journalist Judith Miller, who had observed Israeli interrogation sessions, Mohammed Abdel Hamid Salah, a Hamas terrorist convicted by an Israeli court, confessed that ''the political command of Hamas in the United States is at the United Association for Studies and Research in Springfield, Virginia. He [Salah] identified the Hamas leader in the United States as the head of the institute, Ahmad Yousef [sic], a writer whose code name he said was Abu Ahmed. He [Salah] also said that Musa Abu Marzouk [sic], known as Abu Omar, 51, of Arlington, Virginia, was the political chief. . . .''

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According to Ronni Shaked, an Israeli journalist and former member of the Israeli security establishment, in his book entitled Hamas: From Belief in Allah to the Road of Terror, Ahmed Bin Yousef is named as the person ''in charge of all Hamas activities.''

In a pamphlet called Hamas: Background of Its Inception and Horizons of Its March [1989], Ahmed Bin Yousef wrote that Hamas represents a ''conflict between Islamic thought and Western thought and . . . a conflict of existence and destiny between the Jewish capitalist alliance and the Muslim people in Palestine.''

Under the auspices of this organization with clear ties to the Hamas movement in Israel and the Palestinian Authority, work visas have been issued for foreign individuals with determinable links to the Hamas movement.

According to an Affidavit by Ephraim Rabin of Israel's General Security Service, Nasser Al- Khatib returned to the United States in 1994 to work for UASR. In an Affidavit filed by FBI Special Agent Robert Wright on June 8, 1998 (pursuant to a civil forfeiture case presented in Chicago, Illinois, against the property of individuals suspected of providing financial support for the terrorist activities of Hamas within the State of Israel), Mr. Wright characterized Al-Khatib as follows:

53. FBI review of bank records also show that during the same period, Nasser Al-Khatib (''Al-Khatib''), a United States-based supporter and financial backer of HAMAS and close associate of Abu Marzook, wire transferred additional funds into Salah controlled accounts in Chicago. In an interview with the FBI in March of 1994, Al-Khatib acknowledged being a supporter of HAMAS and that he donated money to HAMAS causes. Al-Khatib further related that prior to leaving the United States in June of 1993, he was an employee of Abu Marzook, serving essentially as Abu Marzook's personal secretary. In that capacity, Al-Khatib explained, he had access to and was a signatory to some of Abu Marzook's financial accounts, and that he had made financial transactions on Abu Marzook's behalf. (The footnote to this reads: Al-Khatib had previously written a check to Salah on August 21, 1992, immediately prior to Salah's trip to Israel during which he gave money to Salah Al-Arouri for the purchase of arms for HAMAS military operations See Para. 1520. . . .)

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According to published reports, there has been an ongoing grand jury investigation in New York to explore the activities of Hamas within the United States. This grand jury investigation was apparently precipitated by the extradition trial of Musa Abu Marzook and the arrest and conviction in Israel of Mohammed Abdel Hamid Salah (who was released by Israel in 1997 after being imprisoned since 1993). Pursuant to this grand jury investigation, Mr. Abdelhalim Al-Ashkar was called before the grand jury in the spring of 1998. Al-Ashkar was held in contempt after refusing to answer the questions posed by the grand jury and was afterwards incarcerated. He was subsequently let out of prison after it became clear that he would not change his mind about testifying.

According to the April 2, 1998 edition of the Arabic-language newspaper Al-Risala (which is controlled by the Hamas movement in Gaza), Al-Ashkar was a Research Associate at UASR at the time that he was called before the grand jury to testify.

Prior to moving to the United States, Al-Ashkar had served as head of Public Relations at the Islamic University in Gaza for a period of about eight years. According to documents submitted in the Abu Marzook extradition proceedings, this University was founded by, among others, Abu Marzook and Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (about whom UASR has written extensively).

Al-Ashkar came to the United States pursuing post-graduate studies at the University of Mississippi where he founded the Al-Aqsa Educational Fund in the United States. According the April 2, 1998 Al-Risala article, this fund ''chooses, indiscriminately, several needy students from the families of martyrs or detainees and provides them with financial support in the form of tuition, registration and admission to the university.'' Intelligence sources have verified that the Al-Aqsa Educational Fund is tied to the Al-Aqsa Foundation in Germany which was deemed illegal in Israel for its connections with Hamas.

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Islamic militants on the lecture circuit in the United States:

''The Jews distort words from their meanings . . . they killed the prophets and worshipped idols . . . Allah says he who equips a warrior of Jihad is like the one who makes Jihad himself.'' In Arabic, Wagdi Ghuniem, a militant Islamic cleric from Egypt, mesmerized his audience, with his relentless tirade against the Jews, reminding them of the Jews' ''infidelity,'' ''stealth'' and ''deceit.'' Known for his folksy deliveries and exhortations to commit violence against the Jews, Ghuniem did not disappoint his crowd, several of whom had come just to hear him. The conflict with the Jews, he said, was not over land but one of religion. ''The problem of Palestine is not 