Founded by Peter Toombs in 1991, DME was closing in on about 700 projects in 67 countries by the time it was acquired by private equity firm Clearspring Capital Partners in 2015 for an unspecified amount. The purchase came after the private equity company had secured $260 million for a third round of investments, which reportedly range from $20-$50 million each. NSI was brought into the fold to combine with DME a year later, also for an unknown sum.

From the perspective of outsiders, the decades of service from both companies, as well as what was assumed to be significant capital investment, made DME and NSI even stronger. That was obviously not the case.

“This suggests to me that something profoundly shitty has been going on behind the scenes at DME for some time now and surely there will be more to this story in the days that follow,” Johnson speculated in his coverage.

In its affidavit to the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island, the Royal Bank of Canada wrote that DME had "significant liquidity constraints with a large portion of its accounts payable 90 days overdue, and limited supplies to complete purchase orders, and with most major suppliers providing supply on a C.O.D. basis, if at all." The complaint also said that Clearspring "has expressed an unwillingness to support their investment any longer on terms acceptable" and that, based on projections by the bank, DME would have needed an immediate influx of at least $3.74 million to continue operations.

Because DME and NSI were bundled together two years ago, as goes one, so goes the other. They reportedly operated as combined—but at times separate—businesses. At the end of November, DME/NSI had built more than 1,600 brewery systems and employed about 250 employees. Both construction and paychecks have at least temporarily halted.

Attempts to reach Toombs were unsuccessful, and he’s remained out of the media in the time since receivership of the companies was announced. In interviews with GBH, some brewing industry professionals wondered aloud—the same way Johnson did—what could have happened to have put DME and NSI in the hole for so much money.

Kevin Murphy, president and CEO of the Murphy Hospitality Group, which owns P.E.I. Brewing and Gahan House breweries, speculated to Charlottetown’s The Guardian that DME’s sale to Clearspring, followed by its purchase of NSI, caused the company to get “caught up in some of the stuff that can happen when you expand and lose sight of the bottom line.” What he meant wasn’t made clear, precisely, but he added that a slowing North American craft beer market may have contributed. With more breweries going out of business in the U.S. and Canada, used equipment is more readily available.

Eric Portelance, a co-founder of Toronto's Halo Brewery and currently working on a new brewery project, says there may be some credence from worries over a slowing market, noting that there were rumors that sales numbers “tanked” for DME in 2017 due to slowing volume growth and increased manufacturing competition from China, which has been making a hard push into the U.S. for a few years. There may have also been instances where DME and NSI were competing against each other for bids, despite being under one umbrella.

“They were just trying to sell equipment at cost,” says Portelance, noting the topic had come up in conversation among Canadian brewers.

There was at least one known warning sign leading up to the closure: DME was asking for a high percentage of deposits from buyers that may have been mismanaged along the way. Joel Iverson, co-founder of Atlanta’s Monday Night Brewing, said he paid 50% of the total cost up front for a pair of 120-barrel tanks, which drove off the lot to Georgia 30 minutes before the company announced its receivership. Chris Conway, co-owner and general manager of Newfoundland’s Landwash Brewery, put 25% down and another 25% at six weeks for a 15-barrel, three-vessel system, along with additional tanks that were delivered in September. Jason Fisher, the owner of Indie Alehouse, said that after spending about $600,000 over three payments, DME hadn’t even started building his equipment, which was a condition of his contract.

One assumption from industry pros, based on the need for deposits, but not completing work, is that cash coming in was being used for older projects. Essentially, it’s a claim that DME/NSI was forever trying to play catch-up, shifting money around to appear more solvent than things actually were.

Which all leads to a bigger issue from the fallout: if one of the most successful equipment manufacturers can’t make it, who can you trust?