Jan 30, 2015; Phoenix, AZ, USA; Chicago Bulls guard Derrick Rose (1) runs up the court alongside forward Pau Gasol (16) in the second half against the Phoenix Suns at US Airways Center. The Suns won 99-93. Mandatory Credit: Jennifer Stewart-USA TODAY Sports

Since taking over the head coaching position of the Chicago Bulls in 2010, Tom Thibodeau’s teams has always exuded two distinct traits: defensive intensity and defensive discipline.

However, the 2014-15 rendition of the Bulls have been the polar opposite — consistently playing down to their competition and often looking heavy-legged/worn-down.

Equipped with perhaps the franchise’s most talented team since the Michael Jordan–Scottie Pippen era Bulls — featuring a reinvigorated Pau Gasol, a budding two-way All-Star in Jimmy Butler, the reigning Defensive Player of the Year in Joakim Noah, and the re-return of former league MVP, Derrick Rose — many had penciled Chicago in as the favorites to come out of the east, along with the Cleveland Cavaliers.

Accordingly, the Bulls came out of the gates strong, accumulating a 22-10 record going into the New Year.

As the season has gone along, though, Chicago’s level of play has incrementally dropped off. In fact, the Bulls have lost nine of their last 15 contests; and could have easily gone 5-10 if the Golden State Warriors had not experience an uncharacteristic cold streak from beyond the arc during the second half of their overtime victory in the Oracle last week.

THE SCAPEGOAT

Many are blaming Rose and his overzealous shot selection as the root of the Bulls’ on court problems. As bad as Rose has been, however, he is merely a scapegoat behind the real cause for concern.

There is not secret Rose has been playing some — to put it bluntly — terrible basketball as of late.

Looking at Rose’s season splits, one can easily identify the concurring correlation between his minutes per game (MPG) and point production as the incumbent season has progressed. Many, though, are also quick to point out his drastic spike in 3-point attempts paired with the exponential dip in his free throw rate and scoring efficiency.

Admittedly, he is taking an inconsiderate amount of pull-up long range jumpers and has committed dozens of cringe-worthy turnovers; but, Rose’s allocation of shots is not his most critical concern.

More explicitly, for the season, Rose is taking 39.1 percent of his shots from eight feet and in and 32.3 percent of his field goal attempts from behind the 3-point line. More encouragingly, over the past month, Rose has actually increased his attempts from eight feet and in to 45.1 percent and shaved his shots from beyond to arc to 28.8 percent, per NBA.com.

Comparatively, during his much-heralded 2010-11 MVP campaign, Rose took 42.1 percent of his field goal attempts from eight feet and in and 23.2 percent of his shots from behind the 3-point line.

In fact, one could argue Rose’s current distribution of shots is more analytically prudent as he has eliminated a large portion of his “long 2s” — a.k.a. attempts from 16-24 feet — in exchange for above the break 3s.

Rose’s major hindrance, at present, is his decision making on the fly. The athleticism and explosiveness is there, and he’s getting to the rim just fine. However, since returning from his two-year absence, Rose has suffered a bad case of tunnel vision, especially on his dribble drives.

Consequently, he often over-penetrates, leaving him susceptible to turnovers when he tries to initiate the drive and kick game.

In addition, his ability to correctly read pick-and-roll (PNR) situations is still a bit rusty. Take the following play for example:

Rose makes the right initial read off of the side PNR and recognizes the Warriors’ ice defense (a.k.a forcing him away from the screen). The simple play in this situation would be to hit his multi-functional big man, Noah, flaring in the elbow-extended area; thereby, allowing him to make a play, essentially playing 5-on-4.

However, Rose either ignores or simply does not see Noah, and alternatively, tries to make the home run cross-court pass to the opposite corner — which ultimately gets picked off.

To make matters worse, Rose has never been the most “fundamentally sound.” Most notably, he has always had the bad habit of jumping on his passes and initiating too close to the sideline; thus, giving him little margin for error when he draws and kicks, handles in tight spaces on the perimeter, and gathers to attack aggressive closeouts.

All things considered, Rose is still working out his kinks — after all, the man has not played organized basketball for two full years.

Yes, his reintroduction to PNR negotiation 101 has been slow and painful; and yes, he’s taking and missing a ton of shots; and yes, he should tone down his aggressiveness and acquiesce to his highly capable teammates on offense during this period of acclimation — but he is by no means the exclusive defect for a team full of blemishes.

THE PROBLEM

Most glaringly, their defense has been slowly deteriorating since the beginning of the season. Even with a full complement of bigs, the Bulls are still conceding the most points per possession of any Bulls team in the Thibodeau era.

As of Feb. 3, Chicago is now down to 12th in defensive efficiency with a defensive rating of 102.4 and an opponent effective field goal percentage (eFG%) of 47.7 percent, which ranks fourth, per NBA.com.

Over the past 15 games, however, the Bulls have dropped to 27th in defensive rating, giving up 105.5 points per 100 possessions and an opponent eFG% of 49.9 percent, ranking in the bottom third of league, at 22nd.

The genesis to their defensive struggles definitely stems from Noah’s laundry list of injuries — from his ailing knee to his bummed ankle. To compound his physical limitations, Thibodeau has asked Noah to play primarily at the power forward position this year, alongside the 7-foot Gasol.

While we have all seen the highlights of Noah, bringing back the spirit fingers, as he switches on to an opposing perimeter player — stifling their hopes of scoring with a type of exuberance and fervor very few players in the association can match — asking Joakim to venture out to guard stretch 4s is not only asking a lot from your semi-debilitated big, but it also effectively strips Noah from doing what he does best; particularly, his ability to zone up PNRs while protecting the paint, his omnipresence as an interior helper, the short spurts of lock down perimeter defense he provides to effectively blow up PNRs, as well as his propensity to cause deflections and blocks as the back-line of the defense.

Conversely, in his current role, Noah just does not have the mobility with his gimped leg to cover the amount of ground he’s asked to, especially when paired with Gasol.

To escalate their dire defensive state — in light of his All-Star caliber season, averaging 18.2 points, 12.0 rebounds, 2.8 assists, and 2.2 blocks per game, his highest anecdotal output in four years — Pau is simply not the defender he was during the late 2000s.

Most notably, he’s often too upright and sinks too far back when defending PNRs, allowing opposing ballhandlers free reign in the lane, armed with a live dribble. Additionally, his rotations are often slow and his closeouts are painfully lethargic.

Even though Pau averages an impressive number of blocks, it is mainly driven by the absurd amount of blown coverages where he is bailed out by his neverending arms.

For this reason, Chicago has allowed the most field goals from 10-14 feet — not quite the long 2 the Bulls’ defensive scheme is strategically devised to concede — in the league, per NBA.com.

More alarmingly — while the Bulls still do an exemplary job of defending the 3-point shot — over the past 15 contests, Chicago has ranked in the bottom third in field goals allowed concerning all sub-areas within the 3-point line, including dead last from 10-14 feet and 15-19 feet — which a team could theoretically live with if they were not so incompetent in every other area of the floor, save the 3.

THE SOLUTION

To effectively ameliorate their current woes, the Bulls have to look internally. With the amount of talent the Bulls’ frontcourt house, it is hard to justify why Gasol is still averaging over 35 minutes per game — especially when their highly efficient rookie forward, Nikola Mirotic, has been receiving just a hair over 16 minutes a game over the past 15 contests.

The solution could be as rudimentary as switching Gasol to power forward and Noah back to center. After all, Noah was able to anchor a defense that allowed only 98.5 points per 100 possessions with Carlos Boozer at power forward last season, per NBA.com. It is hard to fathom Gasol being any worse for the wear than Boozer under such a role.

Another countermeasure would be to stagger the Bulls’ frontcourt rotation. Namely, increase Mirotic’s and Taj Gibson‘s minutes, and decrease Pau’s.

In addition, aim to pair Gibson with Gasol and Mirotic with Noah, with this in mind — the pairing of Noah and Mirotic has yielded the best Net Rating of any two-man tandem on the Bulls this season, which makes sense, as their set of skills, offensively and defensively, seem to complement.

And while the duo of Taj and Pau hasn’t exactly lit the world on fire, putting Gibson, a mobile 4 and an elite rim protector alongside Gasol, should improve their mobility and ability to defend shots from the 10-14 feet areas of the floor.

Another cause for concern has been the continued absence of Mike Dunleavy Jr., which has immensely hurt the Bulls’ depth on the wings.

Moreover, with his added responsibilities as a scorer, Butler’s defensive prowess has predictably taken a step back this season.

In fact, he has been a net negative on the defensive end, according to ESPN, sporting a Defensive Plus-Minus (DRPM) of -0.37 — which essential means Butler personally relents an additional 0.37 points per 100 possessions through the context of his defensive contributions — ranking him 43rd among shooting guards. In comparison, Butler ranked 7th last season with a DRPM of 1.23.

With that being said, no one on the Bulls roster, thus far, has stepped up and taken the perimeter defensive mantle. Kirk Hinrich tries hard, but he has mostly been an abomination, on both ends of the floor, this season.

And I have yet to Snell what Tony is cooking. Billed as your quintessential modern day 3-and-D wing coming out of college, Tony Snell has yet to consistently showcase any of the two said traits; shooting an uninspiring 30.3 percent from beyond the arc and accumulating a DRPM of -0.62.

THE CONCLUSION

Thibodeau’s best bet may be pairing the team’s two point guards, in Rose and Aaron Brooks, together in the backcourt for prolonged stretches, and leave Butler out there as the lone wing.

One thing is for sure, though, the remedy lies within Chicago’s roster. And while Thibodeau, like most coaches, resists change and yearns continuity, a tweak in the rotation or shift in defensive philosophy must be made.

By all accounts, the ongoing feud between the Bulls’ front office and Thibodeau is growing; and the only plausible antidote to repair the mistrust between both parties is winning.

Feelings may get hurt and egos may get bruised, but in order to fulfill their preseason championship aspirations, the Bulls must make a change and recapture their hallmark defensive identity.