Daily NK recently sat down for a

no-holds-barred conversation with Kathy Moon on nuclear politics and

provocations, strategic culture and marketization, international response and

the importance of using history to steer policy. Interview highlights include a

nuanced suggestion for sanctions, the dangerous arrogance of the Kim Jong Un

regime, and a look at how women’s roles might be changing in North Korea. Kathy

Moon is the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies and senior fellow at the

Brookings Center for East Asia Policy Studies and a professor of political

science at Wellesley College.

Daily NK [DNK]: Does Kim Jong Un lack the strategic

sense of his predecessors? What are the ramifications of that in terms of NK’s

willingness to provoke its neighbors and how the U.S. and allies should

respond?

Dr. Moon [DM]: We see these patterns of nuclear tests,

launches, provocations. We don’t have a lot of tools in the toolbox for our

response. And we shouldn’t lump them together. We need to ask ourselves what

each individual provocation means in comparison with what happened during the

1994 crisis with his father (Kim Jong Il) and further back with his

grandfather’s intentions for nuclear capability. It is better analysis to ask,

‘Are the intentions the same? Are the motivations the same? Are the

ramifications the same?’ To some extent the answer is no. For Kim Jong Il’s

regime, nuclear weapons helped rocket North Korea into the nuclear club by

leapfrogging other forms of technological, military, and economic development.

I don’t think Kim Jong Un’s regime is acting out with the sole goal of getting

the U.S.’s attention. They’ve already done that.

Kim Jong Un is less interested in using the

nuclear program as a bargaining chip to get other goodies, whereas under his

father’s rule, the nuclear program was negotiable, especially during the Bill

Clinton era. We almost got denuclearization toward the end of Clinton’s

presidency. I don’t think this regime is willing to negotiate the program away.

The best the U.S. can expect is some sort of cessation of tests and enrichment

for the near future and then serious disarmament talks. But one problem is that

disarmament talks are reserved for nuclear states. We’re in a dilemma, because

we don’t acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state, but it is a de facto

nuclear state. At the same time, Pyongyang is not interested in

denuclearization. Not only has North Korea invested a lot of money and prestige

into its nuclear program, this has become the regime’s raison d’etre. The

leaders don’t want to throw it away. It’s called the sunk cost fallacy in

economics.

[DNK] B.R. Myers responded to your recent

article in the Atlantic. He tries to point out a substantive difference between

your points of view about the Kim regime’s motivation for pursuing nuclear

weapons. He thinks that the nuclear arsenal is about preparing to complete Kim

Il Sung’s mission of unification by force. How do you feel about that?

Strategically, why does North Korea continue to pursue, develop, and

demonstrate nuclear weapons?

[DM]: I think in terms of domestic legitimacy and

maintaining power, of course, that’s a given. But what size nuclear arsenal do

they have to develop to buy domestic legitimacy and support for the regime?

North Korea does not have a full nuclear arsenal, but in a society that can’t

independently assess the government’s capabilities, you don’t need an excessive

amount of warheads to demonstrate power to your people. You just need to have

the myth of success and achievement so that the domestic audience believes that

the regime is powerful. The current amount is sufficient for that purpose. So I

don’t get why they are in “roll out mode,” with the alleged H-bomb test and the

missile launch and more in the works. Does Kim Jong Un really need all that to

beat his chest at the Party Congress in May?

There are other things at play. Both North

Korea and South Korea have their rhetoric about unification. The regime may

want to believe that provocations will lead to a unification more along their

lines, as a bargaining chip or something. If you talk to common North Koreans

in Pyongyang, many can give you a whole speech about how glorious the country

is, but over time, they are the first ones who will fess up, “We know that the

South has wealth, highly developed technology, capital, etc. We know we are

very poor and underdeveloped.” The North Koreans who have some access to outside

information and can engage in comparative thinking are not clueless.

Which means the regime is not clueless. As reckless as they act, they

know the facts on the ground. They know how powerful the South Korean economy

is. So unification to absorb the South that accords with the North’s vision is

a pipe dream. I don’t think North Korean elites are that silly.

[DNK]: You spoke about using sanctions or other

means to target the donju (new rich class) as a way to destabilize the regime.

There are some who argue that the donju’s growing power reflects the

government’s weakened grasp on the economy. If the aim is to target and

destabilize the regime, do we want a strong or weak donju class?

[DM]: I don’t seek instability in North Korea. We

don’t want to have mass chaos on the peninsula. We’ve tried focusing sanctions

on the hyper-elite, the very few who surround the Kim family and form the main

pillars of their power. We’ve tried going after luxury goods. But they’re not

going to complain about not being able to buy the Rolex they want because a)

their heads could roll and b) they’re a constituent part of the regime. They

won’t rock the boat. Besides, how many Rolex watches and Mercedes cars can one

use?

But the new rich class is not part of the

establishment in the same way. They benefit in many ways from the regime but

they also use the regime. In my view, that very small group of newly rich

people in Pyongyang choose to endure political oppression because they have

access to a better lifestyle. I call them “lifestyle elites.” So if we

make it harder for them to pursue this lifestyle, they have to question the

direction of the country. The Kim Jong Un regime is very cautious with this

group. He gives them room to make money but also keeps them politically at bay.

But if they were to realize how vulnerable they are to sanctions and the long

term maintenance of their new social position, perhaps they could start

signaling to the hyper-elite that real economic development is contingent upon

political reforms. In terms of not hurting commoners, I don’t support sanctions

that hurt those who are eking out a living and that is what I am afraid might

happen. If we squeeze the hyper elite, they’ll respond by grabbing more from

the ordinary people. Even during the great famine in the 1990s, the regime

initially refused international aid. We don’t want to create a situation in

which we prompt the regime to create even more hardship for ordinary people.

[DNK]: Prospects for the announcement of

economic reforms at the 7th Party Congress in May?

There are some commentators who argue that

North Korea’s use of the nuclear arsenal is meant to keep domestic society at

bay, conserve funds for economic development, and serve as military deterrence

to compensate for the dilapidated nature of their military equipment. There’s a

chance that the regime is doing that. The problem is that even if they are

trying to save on military spending by developing and demonstrating their

nuclear capability every once in awhile, the reality is that they still lack

the capacity, human resources, facilities, and infrastructure that allow for

economic development to take off. North Korea is not in a position to do that

on its own. And they can’t do it only with China’s help either. In order for

the North Korean economy to really be viable in the way that Kim Jong Un talks

about “Prosperity for North Korea,” they’ll need to be connected to the outside

world, get skills and technology training, foreign investment, and access to

international funding sources such as the World Bank, IMF, etc. This can’t be

delivered solely by China or by Russia and it cannot be home-grown in North

Korea.

This is another danger point that

distinguishes Kim Jong Un from Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Il had an understanding

that North Korea is an underdog. But Kim Jong Un has expressed arrogance that

extends beyond the usual pride over the nuclear push and economic growth that

the country has been able to achieve in the past few years. That makes me

particularly nervous. Because just a few piecemeal changes don’t amount to the

kind of fundamental changes that they need in order to prosper. At this point,

who’s going to help? They’ve alienated even those who are traditional engagers.

[DNK]: How do you think China will respond to

North Korea’s provocations in the long term?

[DM]: China needs to come up with a nuanced way

of using the leverage they have. They should not cut off oil, fuel, and food in

one day. But they can play with it to signal to Pyongyang, “You’re really lucky

that we’ve been putting up with you,” by reducing fuel by 10%, 20% for a

limited time, on and off, etc. A nuanced and graduated policy is better. They

don’t have to do anything dramatic. We don’t want drama on the peninsula. But

it’s no longer possible for China to just sit tight. There has to be a clear

concerted signal sent by all neighboring countries, “Here are the limits.”

China’s red line is whatever hurts Chinese interests. The people on the border

have become concerned about radiation contamination. They’ve seen cracks in school

buildings from the alleged H-Bomb test. The residents have to communicate to

their government that the situation is causing anxiety and putting the people’s

security at risk every time the North tests nuclear devices near the border.

[DNK]: How will South Korea’s policies towards

the North change as a result latest provocations? Will the national assembly to

pass the North Korean Human Rights Act? How should we interpret the closing of

the Kaesong Industrial Complex?

[DM]: You never know with South Korean politics.

Relative to the prelaunch period, they’ve run out of ways to deal with North

Korea. Closing Kaesong is a significant symbolic move. It represents a huge sea

change given the importance of Kaesong for South Korea’s policy towards the

North. It was a lynchpin. By closing Kaesong, the government is admitting that

no carrots have worked. Kaesong was the biggest carrot so far. Given that,

you’re left with sticks. So the Human Rights Act legislation would be a stick.

Of course, you’re going to have some progressives criticizing and opposing it.

But even if the Human Rights Act passes,* I don’t foresee any substantive change

in South Korea’s policy towards the human rights of North Koreans. I don’t

think there will be much flesh to the skeletal change. In terms of the general

population’s support for these kinds of activities, I don’t think that the

recent test and launch has changed the cautiousness of South Koreans. They

don’t want to invite significant change that would have negative consequences

for South Korea. I think that general cautiousness will continue – Don’t rock

the boat too much, but don’t make it easy for the regime either.

[DNK]: Do you see women’s increased

participation in the markets and bringing in the family income causing larger

changes in the direction of gender equality?

[DM]: Because of the difficulty of doing field

research, it is really hard to know. We don’t know how the money that’s earned

is actually used at home. How much goes to food? How much goes to women’s

healthcare versus the drinking habits of their husband? This happens in

developing countries as well, even those with micro credit access. If the money

is spent in an unproductive way, that’s not useful. I don’t see North Korean

gender roles as being significantly different from those in other hardship

settings. I think if we look deeply and study women’s roles in other hardship

settings and then compare with the North, we’ll see that it’s variations on a

theme, rather than a totally different theme.

The real power issue is that when women

start making money, they hope that they will play a larger role in the

decisions making and have more access to other resources. The general tendency

is for the men, especially the husbands and the fathers, to crack down on it,

to resist it, because their power is being challenged. So it’s possible that

women’s increased economic status could lead to increased incidents of domestic

violence. That’s very possible. If gender roles and expectations don’t change

generationally, there can be frustration. I visited North Korea three years ago

and met a young woman, about 25 years old, who graduated from a university and

was working at a highly desirable job. She was from an elite family in

Pyongyang. She told me that she wants to marry her boyfriend but unenthusiastic

about having to live with in-laws and be a “servant” in their home of her

husband’s parents, a prospect that did not sound appealing to her at all. On

this issue, I thought how easily North Korean and South Korean women would be

able to understand each other. I told her it’s the same in the South.

[DNK]: Is there something that we should be

paying attention to in North Korea but aren’t?

[DM]: In the media, academia, and policy circles,

I think we all have to will ourselves to be more curious about North Korea as a

place with history and culture. I don’t mean Communist, Kim Il Sung,

revolutionary history, I mean hundreds of years of history. We don’t have

knowledge about what culture is in North Korea. My mom is writing a memoir

about being born in the North pre-division, and I am helping her out with that.

The people who came out of North Korea before or during the war to settle in

the South were very different from the Southerners they encountered. These are

strong-willed, tough people, and they pushed and pushed to develop South Korea.

The stories of northern Korea that I grew up with—memories of my mother’s

childhood in Kanggye were healthy and wholesome.

They focused on nature, the mountains, the special foods they ate, the games

they played.

When I talk about history and culture, the

point is to humanize the place. It is very difficult for foreigners to

understand the current situation when we regard them as a history-less,

culture-less people. We too often see it as a rootless place. [She points to a

movie poster of the controversial film ‘The Interview’ that is hung up in her

office as a humorous jibe at the American tendency to caricature North Korea]

This is what we think. We only see them as a people with an overbearing state,

and a history that the state made up. But North Korea is more than that. I’d

like to see scholars and journalists try to dig out the real history, not the

one that the Kim family manufactured. We need to find that history again so

that the Northerners can reclaim it. We can’t have a successful, healthy

unified Korea in the future if half of its population doesn’t have access to

their own history. It’s necessary for political reasons as well.

[DNK]: So the strategic culture isn’t just an

offshoot of the Cold War context?

[DM]: No, why would it be? Why wouldn’t northern

Korea’s long threads of history come to bear on the DPRK’s economic culture,

strategic culture, and their psychological culture? It wasn’t just created in a

vacuum by Kim Il Sung and it’s not a matter of brainwashing. If we look at

North Korea as a culture-less place, that’s a mistake. We can’t understand

North Korea without looking deeper. Kim Jong Un may seem obnoxiously tough and

brazen from the point of view of a foreigner, but it fits into northern Korea’s

culture of endurance and resilience. If we think that sanctions will bring them

to their knees, we’re mistaken.