The current situation as seen by Col. Cassad, a Russian observer. Note this is a translation, and some constructions may seem odd to English speakers.

[I]n general, of course, it is not clear why there is so much surprise at the text of the “truce” and its results.

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1. On the political underpinnings of the replacement of the leadership of the DPR and the LPR I wrote more than once in July and August, especially in the materials related to the attempts to neutralize Strelkov. Eventually, there was an attempt to implement in early September the same plan that was devised in early July. Those who lacked negotiating capacity were pushed aside, the others were suspended on the threat of suspension of shipments. If somebody didn’t get it yet, the shipments of the humanitarian aid to some or other commanders are the indirect element of control over the political processes in Donbass. Those who receive humanitarian aid are the good guys, those who don’t receive it are on the sidelines, in the best for them case. After a certain point, the valve of shipments of the humanitarian aid is arbitrarily turned on in the interest of some field commanders and shut off for those who are stubborn. This is how the increase of controllability from Moscow actually happens.

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2. Moscow, just like in the Spring of 2014, does not have a coherent strategy in Donbass. It operates situationally. This happens because the line towards Large Novorossia, which was planned in early March and required a military intervention for its support, was abandoned. But because the rebellion actually already went full steam ahead by that moment, the Kremlin faced an unpleasant dilemma: the military intervention was ruled out due to a threat of a direct confrontation with the USA. They also had to rule out a complete dump of Novorossia, because the consequences of it for the internal stability of the Russian Federation were considered to be unacceptable. In the end, a half-and-half variant was chosen, when they fed the militia on the one hand and tried to negotiate with the Ukrainian oligarchs (bypassing the USA) about mitigating the process on the other hand.

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3. These negotiations continued over July; in the meantime there was a shallow stream of humanitarian aid for the militia. The fighting was in general low-intensity (compared to July and August), the sides swarmed, trying to feel out a compromise, but it couldn’t be achieved. During this time Mariupol was surrendered to the junta with Akhmetov’s help. In Donetsk they engaged in every possible activity (raiding businesses, fighting for power, fighting for humanitarian aid, creating constitutions of varying degrees of sanity) except war. Strelkov, who appeared in Slavyansk with the expectation of a military intervention (which didn’t happen) and sat on the crucial transport hub in the rear of the junta military group that covered the border from a possible invasion, was frankly “sad”, while the increasingly strong military of the junta continued to encircle Slavyansk, preparing a pocket for Strelkov.

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4. Later the well-known events occurred: the junta offensive started on July 1st, Slavyansk fell into an operational encirclement, the work on surrendering the city started in Donetsk, Strelkov, after consultations with Moscow, left Slavyansk and Kramatorsk and arrived into Donetsk with 2000 fighters. Immediately, Pozhidayev, Khodakovsky, Lukyanchenko were thrown out of their positions. Pushilin left a bit later. After that the war got really serious, without joking: the casualties got really massive, the destruction got really large-scale, every weapon that could be used was used. The failure of the attempts to negotiate naturally led to the attempts by the junta to win the war using only the force. They got close to this in the first half of August, when after a month of bloody fighting its detachments rolled into the streets of Shakhtyorsk and Krasnyi Luch. But as we now know, this didn’t happen and Novorossia stood its ground.

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5. Meanwhile, after Strelkov arrived in Donetsk, due to the increase in density of their battle order, the militia managed to free up the forces and set up the first major encirclement for the junta, which terminated in a massive catastrophe with thousands KIAs and MIAs and also with more than a hundred armored vehicles that were destroyed and captured by the militia. At the same time, negotiations with Akhmetov and Poroshenko were continued by the initiators of the negotiations with the junta (the immediate contacts were carried out both by Surkov in person and by his people) and their masters – the Russian oligarchs like Friedman and former members of the so-called The Family , like Voloshin. Kolomoisky, as his conflict with Poroshenko was developing, gradually fell out of the possible partners in these negotiations. Now Russia and Poroshenko hammer him together: Benya is no longer needed, Benya will absorb the responsibility for the civil war.

The main interest of the circles that are represented by Surkov is to prevent a direct confrontation with the USA, which would put their assets in the West and their ability to run business there under threat. The boundary condition was to prevent a complete dump, which would primarily damage Putin. He would have to explain why is it that despite all of the bombastic hurrah-patriotic rhetoric, Russia is getting bent over again and again in Ukraine – one time they put Yuschenko, another time they depose Yanukovich, and now Novorossia getting dumped. So while they were laying into Strelkov to the benefit of the Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs who were trying to negotiate, the valve of the “military surplus store” started to gradually open, but in strictly homeopathic doses.

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6. This was quite sufficient for the militia fighters to contain the offensive of the junta forces. The militia suffered losses and slowly retreated to the crucial positions: pretty much surrendering the Lisichansk protrusion, Debalcevo, and Saur-Mogila. All of this quite reasonably led to the August crisis, when the junta tried to achieve a decisive victory by using the bridgehead in Debalcevo, getting so close to the victory that it could almost touch it. It is quite possible that if the junta wouldn’t plan various stupid moves near Perekop and on the border with Transnistria, but would use the military that were stationed there in Donbass, then they would be sufficient to actually cut the DPR from the LPR. But it didn’t happen. In Moscow it was understood that it is no longer possible to wait any longer. A swift replacement of the leadership of the DPR and the LPR with more controllable people followed. They were replaced exactly with the focus on the negotiations with the junta. The main mechanism of the replacement was the humanitarian aid. The same Strelkov was given a clear condition: either you will go or your military won’t get the aid. It is quite clear what Strelkov chose. The private contractors were openly told not to send cargo to Strelkov a few days before his resignation. Because the decision to open the “red valve of the military surplus store” to the full was already made back then, the curators of the Ukrainian direction were absolutely not interested in Strelkov taking the credit for this. By this time he already managed to successfully defend Slavyansk for 3 months and then to defend the Donetsk agglomeration for more than a month. Therefore, right before the start of the counter-offensive, following Bolotov (in that case there were both political and a number of non-political reasons), Strelkov was forced to resign. Literally within a few days, the hot stream of water from the “red valve of the military surplus store” started to digest the junta units in rapidly emerging cauldrons. This led to the overall apocalyptic picture of burned bodies, burned tanks, and other materiel. The junta losses increased by the factor of several tens of times in a few days and the front line started to attain increasingly dangerous shape.

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7. The junta clearly missed this moment and continued to try to penetrate the defense of the army of Novorossia near Ilovaysk despite the threatening situation, with confidence worthy of a better cause. They pretty much did the same thing that the Germans did in Stalingrad. This culminated in a terrible catastrophe and in the disintegration of the whole South Front. The “red valve of the military surplus store” played its part perfectly and the junta started to openly get massacred in numerous cauldrons. In some places it was done by the forces of the army of Novorossia, in other places it was done by “merchandisers from the military surplus store”. But officially there are and there were no “merchandisers” there. The junta rolled back straight to Mariupol on the south, it surrendered the Lugansk airport and Lutugino, it effectively surrendered Debalcevo and the question of the military of Novorossia entering the operational space was put on the agenda. Meanwhile, Russia was taking advantage of the opportunity due to the unsuccessful provocation with the downed “Boeing”. “Boeing” was shot down by the junta, but it couldn’t properly dump the responsibility for this on the militia and Putin. So, while the junta yelled that the “military surplus store” is turning into an adult film studio where the Ukrainian army is having a very rough time, Russia expectedly pointed to the “Boeing” and the junta. As a result of this, a nicely shaped informational line of the West with respect to Novorossia was temporarily undermined by this unsuccessful provocation, which is now let go, albeit with difficulty.

The assault on Mariupol, a complete sweep of Debalcevo, capturing Schastye, the strikes on Lisichansk and Severodonetsk, and also the offensive on Konstantinovka were on the agenda. A threat of utter military catastrophe started to loom before the junta, on the background of a lamentable situation in the rear.

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8. By the late August – early September it became clear to everybody that it won’t be possible to destroy Novorossia militarily. The junta was clearly spewing blood and at the same time the USA and their satellites started to toughen their policy in the relations with the Russian Federation. Just like in April, the attempts to mitigate the process by going around the USA began, recording some acceptable result on the ground (they are trying to cover up these attempts with media phantoms like the “united pro-Russian Ukraine” and various rotten talks of “federalization”). If you look carefully, the USA weren’t actually represented during the Minsk talks. And the behavior of the junta depends exactly on them. By September, Akhmetov already managed to fully reinforce his positions in the structures of the DPR (he will do just fine in Novorossia, no matter what it will become) and to set up a certain dialog with Moscow. All people who lacked negotiating capacity were removed from crucial positions. Thus, the negotiations were launched in Minsk, which were supposed to not only determine the future of Novorossia but also to help Russia avoid a direct confrontation with the USA, gradually letting go of the war and also avoid sanctions that touch “our precious Gazprom”, oil, and bank sector, and also some of the oligarchs. Little depends on Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky here, both of them are suspended on the humanitarian shipments and if it is necessary, then they will be replaced with even more flexible people. The junta of course jumped at such an opportunity, because the offensive by the army of Novorossia was developing successfully and the junta had no military way of stopping it. The offensive itself didn’t run out of steam yet and could continue successfully for another 5-7 days at least, liberating significant territories and major cities in the process. In the military respect the junta certainly benefits from this respite. Currently it is urgently plugging holes in the front and sending the reserves there, performing local offensives at the same time, akin to the offensive on Telmanovo with the goal of cutting the Novoazov group of the army of Novorossia from the main forces to the north of Telmanovo. Russia also got what it wanted in the form of softening the rhetoric of the USA and their satellites and the delay of sanctions. Ordinary militia fighters and fascist punitive troops, who didn’t understand what is the truce for… of course, they weren’t asked. Within the framework of the so-called “big politics” these are just consumable pieces on the “chessboard”. Some of them may bleed in defense for a month, waiting for the valve of the “military surplus store” to be opened up for them. Others may perish by hundreds in the cauldrons, cursing Poroshenko and the AFU.

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9. Nevertheless, despite the political truce, the war as such continued, because the logic of the conflict demands its resolution by exactly military means. The inertia of war triggered new firefights, shelling, and combat. At the same time the junta openly and publicly demonstrates that it uses this “cease-fire” for accumulating forces and for preparing a new offensive. The USA look at this approvingly, because the military solution of the problem of Novorossia and the final defeat of Russia in the fight for Ukraine is among its national interests. It is absolutely irrelevant what will be state of the junta – while it remains in power, it will be used against the Russian Federation. The suffering of the population, victims among soldiers, destroying the infrastructure – from the point of view of the USA all of this is just insignificant collateral damage. So, from the military point of view, only a complete destruction of the fascist junta is a best guarantee for ending the war.

The leadership of Novorossia understands this, but cannot do anything – they are dependent on the political line of the curators of the Ukrainian policy and on the humanitarian shipments.

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From this come stupid announcements like “we thought that the junta may possibly observe the cease-fire, but it doesn’t observe it – bad, bad fascist junta”. Of course, such kindergarten talk/play/stuff seriously discredits both the military and political leadership of the DPR and the Russian policy in Novorossia. The junta figured out this moment and clearly uses it, but it has one problem: it cannot solve the problem of Novorossia by force if the star-and-striped hand of sanctions won’t be placed on the “red valve of military surplus store” and carefully shut it off, giving the necessary time for the junta. Otherwise, it is certainly possible to start another offensive, but the risk is very high of not getting the junta flags over Donetsk and Gorlovka as a result, but rather getting new thousands of corpses and hundreds of destroyed tanks and APCs with yet another temper tantrum by the patriots of Ukraine that Poroshenko and generals betrayed everybody.

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Because the parties cannot determine the parameters of resolving the crisis, the war continues on its own. The resumption of full-scale military action appears unavoidable, because the USA will push the junta towards forceful destruction of Novorossia. Russia, on the other hand, will fall into the very same fork of decisions: between a forceful scenario (military intervention or “impolite merchandisers” is not all that important – this is just a method of implementing a decision that was taken) and dumping Novorossia (stopping military support, agreeing to “united Ukraine”, and arm-twisting for those commanders of the army of Novorossia who will start to ask “unpleasant questions). The main difficulty of the negotiators is that the standard reaction of the militia to the proposal of “united pro-Russian Ukraine” is “Which fucking Ukraine?!” Only the political technologists in Moscow and Surkov’s servants, who broadcast this BS into the masses, may fight for the “united Ukraine” on the Russian side. The militia fights for other things.

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Some still cannot understand that the war of the junta against Novorossia is just one dimension of the conflict. Without resolving the tensions between the USA and the Russian Federation there won’t be a full-fledged peace there. So, the Minsk negotiations and the obscene piece of paper that was signed there is just another attempt to jump out of the same unpleasant dilemma. One of these decisions will have to be made in the end.

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Actually, this is why I am not in a hurry to join the crowd with the cries of “Novorossia was dumped” or to deliver mantras about “Putin’s Clever Plan”. The final choice is yet to be made. The current attempts to avoid this choice only make the conditions for making it worse.

Novorossia in one shape or another will definitely happen. In the nearest weeks it will be decided what exactly will it be, once the final choice of Russia in the Ukrainian question becomes clear.