On 31 March, Ukraine will elect a new president. But no clear winner has yet to emerge, as the three leading candidates, President Petro Poroshenko, ex-Premier Yulia Tymoshenko, and newcomer Volodymyr Zelensky, are neck and neck in the polls.

That the outcome remains undetermined is not trivial. Ukraine has always been unique among post-Soviet states for having a relatively open political system.

“Democratic” may be too strong a word for a state notoriously plagued by clientelism and corruption. But political competition does exist. Politicians and parties oppose each other, and power regularly changes hands.

Just compare it to the highly controlled politics of post-communist Russia, ruled by latter-day czar Vladimir Putin.

Even when power does get transferred in Russia — from President Boris Yeltsin to Putin, to Medvedev and back again — it is done in a highly controlled and orchestrated manner designed not to upset the power structure.

Ukraine is different. Since its independence, it has seen not only two revolutions but has also accomplished more than once that rarest of feats for young democracies: a peaceful, legal change of government.

Russia’s tycoons are often described as “oligarchs”. That is incorrect. There are many wealthy and powerful people in Russia, but they don’t govern. The state still calls the shots and resists any attempts to challenge its power.

In Ukraine’s weak and increasingly decentralised state, in contrast, oligarchs, economic power structures and local bosses have much more autonomy, and the political system is essentially pluralistic.

No Ukrainian head of state is able to govern without keeping together an alliance of political, regional, economic, and oligarchic interests. Even the war in Donbass has not led to a disappearance of the forces associated with the overthrown Yanukovych government.

The Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, is home to a large number of different power blocs. Despite Ukraine being a presidential republic, parliament is a much more significant body than the Russian Duma, which rubber stamps initiatives from the executive.

This severely restricts the Ukrainian government’s ability to implement reforms, since it gives political parties ample opportunity to block anything might that infringe on their interests.

But it also puts strong limits on any attempts to monopolise power. If one ruling bloc becomes too brazen in its attempts to take over the state, it will meet opposition, both popular and from competing coalitions. This was the story of both the Orange and Maidan revolutions.

So why isn’t Ukraine a functioning democracy then? According to the Economist’s Democracy Index, Ukraine ranks as a “hybrid regime” that combines democratic and autocratic elements.

The “revolution” of 2014, which was supposed to create the conditions for the Ukrainian people to take power into their own hands, did little to change that.

Various factors play a role. Political violence is not the most significant, though of course, it has become a serious problem since the bloody struggles of 2014. Today, the country is filled with radical, often battle-hardened nationalist groups and thugs — independent or for hire.

The atmosphere of war sustains a political atmosphere inductive to illiberalism. Activists, anti-corruption campaigners, supporters of separatists (real or imagined), leftists, feminists, Roma, and more than anything LGBT-people live in fear of being attacked.

Still, even though everything from backroom deals to vote-rigging and fake news is commonplace, Ukrainian elections are not fought with arms.

They are, however, cutthroat competitions, and populist to the extreme.

“Ukrainian politics are noisy, colourful and performative,” writes political analyst Leonid Bershidsky. “The current set of candidates is modern European politics incarnate: Traditional left-right divisions are hard to trace; all the candidates use populist tricks and emotions, rousing nationalist and anti-elite rhetoric.”

Bershidsky expects an election “livelier than anything Russia has seen since the 1990s”.

It seems doubtful that many Ukrainian citizens, frustrated with their dysfunctional and corrupt elite, shares the analyst’s excitement. But Bershidsky hits upon an interesting truth: how “European” Ukrainian politics increasingly seem.

Maybe this is not because Ukraine has become more like “us” although Ukrainian civil society has become more oriented towards western-style democracy.

Perhaps it is because Europe is becoming more like Ukraine. Economic crises, the decline of longstanding political parties, populism, media plagued by disinformation, a political process controlled by special interests. Sounds awfully familiar, doesn’t it?

The world of Ukrainian politics

All the more reason to step into the fray and get familiar with the chaotic, disorienting world of Ukrainian politics.

The first thing to keep in mind when looking at Ukrainian politics from a Western perspective is that nothing is as it appears. In the West, political parties are distinguished by ideology and often govern for long periods of time. In Ukraine, they’re ephemeral, malleable and volatile.

To understand what they stand for, it’s necessary to identify their backers and their power brokers, not their politics or programs.

Ukrainian elections are expensive and driven by private donors. A study by the Westminster Foundation For Democracy estimates that a major party aiming to capture a sizable share of parliamentary seats will spend “between $300 million and $500 million during an electoral campaign”.

These are incredible sums, considering that Ukraine is the poorest country in Europe. Only the wealthy can participate in politics. The state and civil society are assimilated in patronage networks. There is no dues-paying base or party membership.

In the past, it has been common practice to pay ordinary citizens to participate in rallies or protests in order to create the illusion of popular support. This year, pranksters decided to ridicule this practice.

Reportedly, offers of monetary reward via Facebook have been successful in drawing out supporters to rallies for non-existent presidential candidates in Kyiv and Odessa. In mid-February, ‘compensated’ citizens came together in Kyiv’s Podil district to stage a rally against paid rallies, brandishing slogans such as “We are not for sale” and “Against paid protesters.”

Ukrainian media are controlled by private interests as well. By directing mass media to support certain candidates and parties, or by granting airtime and advertising space for reduced prices, television is an essential instrument of the oligarchy for managing politics.

Independent, high quality and critical journalism is, therefore, one of the most important elements in Ukraine’s struggle for democracy. When powerful people intimidate, defame, or murder journalists, they are defending their control over society.

Another peculiar phenomenon of Ukrainian politics are ‘spoiler’ projects, that have no other purpose other than dividing and taking away votes from competitors. One almost painfully obvious example of a spoiler is relatively unknown politician Yuriy Timoshenko, who enlisted in early February for the presidential election.

An enraged Yulia Timoshenko accused her rival, President Petro Poroshenko of standing behind his candidacy. And understandably so, since the male Tymoshenko’s main purpose seems to be to appear as a second Y. Timoshenko on the ballot, thus confusing voters and draining votes from his rival Yulia.

Election fraud has of course also always been part of Ukrainian politics, be it through outright manipulation or by paying impoverished voters to sell their ballot. Accusations of systematic voter fraud set off the Orange Revolution, the mass protests in 2004 which prevented then- Premier Viktor Yanukovych from taking power.

However, the grand old days of Ukrainian vote rigging might be over. On 15 February, the Ukrainian Center for Social Development brought together analysts in Kyiv to discuss the potential for disruptions and manipulation of the upcoming election.

“No single political force now fully controls the administrative resources,” one expert explained. Instead, the influence of local administrations has grown, turning even the ability to manipulate votes into a competitive enterprise.

Political parties are preparing to accuse each other of fraud. In one town, police claimed to have uncovered a scheme to buy off votes for 1000 hryvnia, around 33 euros, a piece. Poroshenko and Tymoshenko’s parties both accuse each other of culpability.

A group of candidates, including Tymoshenko and Volodymyr Zelensky, recently signed a declaration committing themselves to ensure fair elections — and used the opportunity to once again accuse Poroshenko of preparing to rig the vote.

Such efforts, combined with the strong presence of election observers and an intense European Union focus on Ukrainian politics, may, in fact, serve as a deterrent to outright fraud.

2019 : The comedian who could be president

There is some ground for optimism. The 2014 elections were relatively clean. War, poverty, and stagnating political reforms have inspired a desire for political change.

But, with over 40 candidates competing in the March poll, and a concerted pushback from oligarchs and Petroshenko, few are optimistic about its outcome.

The only hope for a breakthrough lies with Volodymyr Zelesnky, a comedian who plays a naïve but good president on Ukrainian television. Currently the frontrunner, doubts are beginning to emerge about his candidacy though.

For observers of Ukrainian politics, this isn’t surprising. The country is used to it by now. At some point, it will become clear who his masters really are. The real surprise will be if Zelesnky turns out to be like this onscreen personality.

Paul Simon is a German journalist who divides his time between Kyiv and Hamburg. Photograph courtesy of FEMEN. Published under a Creative Commons license.