Bill Emmott is making a very interesting suggestion. If ever North Korea has to be dealt with militarily - as a last resort - Beijing may be the white knight. The author could envision a Chinese invasion of North Korea and the toppling of the Kim regime. However unsavoury the idea, it may still be "the least bad" option than a US intervention. And however unlikely the notion, alone its "very plausibility is one reason why it needs to be taken seriously, including by Chinese military planners." The author says, in "Trumpian" terms, this would be a “China First” option that could help “Make China Great Again.”

So far, the international community has realised that the "continued combination of tight containment and aggressive diplomacy" has not curbed North Korea's nuclear ambition, and may not rein in Kim Jong-un's recklessness. Nevertheless, such a military action would "sharply shift East Asia’s strategic balance in China’s favor." Despite enormous risks a Chinese military action would constitute, there are potentials for "what a successful Chinese intervention would achieve."

The biggest enticement would be to allow North Korea to return to the Chinese fold: "where the country’s post-Korean War history suggests it belongs: under a Chinese nuclear umbrella, benefiting from a credible security guarantee." Mao Zedong had once described China's relationship with North Korea under Kim Jong-un's grandfather, Kim Il-sung, as “as close as lips and teeth" and had helped avert "an American victory in the Korean War." Today China is the North's main backer.

The author points out that in the course of decades, while Japan and South Korea have forged closer relationship with the US, "hosting US bases and sheltering under US nuclear protection, China and North Korea have drifted ever further apart." Kim Il-sung, the founding leader of North Korea had very close ties with China under Mao Zedong. His son, Jong-il continued the policy with Beijing and maintained regular high-level contacts at the state, party, and military level.

In August 2010 Kim Jong-il made an unexpected visit to China with his youngest son, Jong-un, and prompted speculation that the ailing dictator might be preparing to hand over power to his son. Since Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011, Jong-un has largely ignored the Chinese and has declined to meet Xi Jinping or pay homage to his giant neighbour by visiting Beijing. He also liquidated his uncle, half-brother and others close to China, hence Beijing’s waning influence in North Korea. China fears that - given the reduced relations - "cutting trade further and blocking energy supplies" would only drive Pyonyang into the arms of Moscow.

If Kim Jong-un's nuclear ambition merely serves to secure his regime survival, China could provide him "some sort of credible security guarantee in exchange for curtailing its nuclear program." Following the removals of Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, it's obvious that Kim doesn't trust the US. The question is whether Kim can trust Beijing, because Pyongyang has a long history of resilience to Chinese pressure.

Despite good relationship with China since Kim Il-sung's days, there had been an enduring potency of Korean nationalism and antipathy toward Chinese interference. In Kim Jong-un's eyes, "a nuclear exchange with the US would mean devastation." But he may not fancy any "submission to China" either, even if it would guarantee him "survival, and presumably a degree of continued autonomy." Indeed, "for all except those closest to Kim, the choice would not be a difficult one."

The author thinks China's combination of "threats of invasion with a promise of security and nuclear protection, in exchange for cooperation and possible regime change," might have a chance to win "over large parts of the Korean People’s Army." An implosion or a coup orchestrated by China would allow Beijing to regain control of the North and "to establish military bases, but also regional gratitude for having prevented a catastrophic war." And China - apparently - shouldn't worry about the legitimacy of its invasion, which would be a much better alternative to "a reckless, poorly planned US-led war."

Indeed, the question about whether this operation could work, is rightly asked. The author points out the Chinese army's lack of "comparable battlefield experience," despite its size and modern equipment. Besides one can not rule out the possibility of a nuclear launch or the use of weapons of mass destruction from the North in defence. Surely a Chinese invasion, "rather than an American one," would not trigger Kim's "likely response" - an attack on South Korea. He would see no reason to slaughter the South Koreans "in retaliation for a Chinese invasion that came with a promise of continued security, if not autonomy."

The author says, "were a Chinese military option to be contemplated seriously, some intelligence and missile-defense collaboration with the US might be worth exploring. Given the risks, it would be hard for the US to refuse." Even if an invasion may seem far-fetched, it is "so logical that the possibility of it should be taken seriously. It is, after all, China’s best opportunity to achieve greater strategic parity with the US in the region, while removing a source of instability that threatens them both."

No doubt Beijing has envisioned such an option and North Korea also fears such a scenario. It remains to be seen, whether China will deal with the North decisively. Beijing is no friend of changes and prefers to kick the can down the road. The world expects nothing from Xi Jinping until perhaps after the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party next month, when a new generation of leaders will be chosen.