When we characterise someone as a ‘conservative’ we usually mean a person who is averse to change and holds to traditional values and attitudes. A ‘progressive’ on the other hand, may be a person advocating or implementing social reform or new, liberal ideas. The distinction seems to focus just on the attitudes towards change, but change is never rationally exercised for its own sake: we change things (or resist change) for a reason, and reasons are in turn grounded in what we value the most. I argue that despite different value-commitments, conservatism and progressivism are equally inconsistent.

Once the popular definitions of progressivism and conservatism are rationally unpacked, progressives may be more accurately characterised as committed to structural change for the better, while conservatives may committed to preserving the structures believed to be already optimised (or are on the path to be optimised) for the best. Self-identifying as a progressive may further imply that one is not only ideologically committed to improvement on the basis of what one regards as valuable (which is trivially true) but that one actually knows what improvement entails and manages to advance some universal, objective good through requisite change. This additional characterisation (which can be adapted to conservatism as well) nevertheless amounts to circular reasoning: I am a progressive (or a conservative) because I cause improvement (or preserve what is best) and therefore what I do is ‘progress’ (or is ‘for the best’). In order to avoid such circular reasoning one would have to accept uncertainly about what progress entails: I want improvement (or to preserve the best) but I cannot consistently claim to know what progress (or the best state) objectively is, therefore my progressivism (or conservatism) is based only on ungrounded, subjective value-commitments and therefore not at all normative. It may explain my actions as motivated by personal preferences but cannot justify them as objectively right. In the words of Kieran Setiya: “When an agent acts on a reason, he takes it as a reason, but that means he takes it as his reason, not that he takes it to be a good reason on which to act.”

Alternatively, a progressive may be committed just to the idea that change is in itself more valuable than preservation of the existing structures and values, and ought to be pursued irrespective of consequences, while a conservative may be committed to the idea that preservation of the established structures and values is in its own right more valuable than change. On this account, both progressivism and conservatism are still ungrounded, committed to a principle without aim or reason, respectively. It is simply the case that change or preservation are taken to be ultimate values that must be blindly pursued. A progressive may object that he is committed only to the idea that change is ‘instrumentally’ more valuable that preservation of the existing structures and values, and ought to be pursued because, on average, it is bound to result in general improvement. A conservative may in turn be committed to the idea that preservation of the established structures and values is instrumentally more valuable than change and ought to be pursued because, on average, it is bound to result in general improvement. This definition is certainly more robust, but it still lacks grounding; it is arbitrarily committed to change and preservation, respectively, and simply assumes that the relevant principle is bound to result in general improvement. Another way, the definition implies that the relevant principle is taken to be equivalent to general improvement but, by enacting the principle rather than critically responding to the consequences of its application entails that the principle itself functions as the ultimate value. This ‘weaker’, more robust definition amounts to the same practical result as the ‘stronger’ definition.

There is another way that conservatives and progressives may characterise their convictions. A conservative may simply believe that the way things are now, or have been recently, should be preserved at least in the short-term, while a progressive may believe that the way things are now is unacceptable and must be changed. To rationally justify their respective judgements, conservatives and progressives must then appeal to some normative structure, which generally can be reduced to universal ethics or values. On this account, the conflict between conservatism and progressivism is not about change vs. preservation per se, but about value-preferences that still lack grounding.

The least problematic definition of the progressive/conservative binary is relativistic and somewhat vague: a progressive is someone who is willing to risk structural change in the pursuit of common good more than a conservative, who is in turn more inclined to err on the side of preservation of norms, principles and structures that appear to sufficiently satisfy our common needs. Conservatism and progressivism of this kind are just the opposite sides of the bell curve tracing our attitudes to social change as a utility-optimisation tool. This definition is not as glaringly fallacious as those already described, but it is still far from being consistent. The idea that change is of itself and without any further qualification generally conducive (or detrimental) to consistent optimisation of some utility is completely arbitrary. There is no logical, let alone causal relationship between structural change and value (apart from the hypothetical value of change for its own sake). Even on the most liberal interpretation, the conservative/progressive binary amounts to an implicit category error.

The disagreement between conservatives and progressives may well run deeper than the commitment to change vs. preservation as a utility-optimisation tool. As I have already suggested, it is probably the case that conservatives and progressives disagree about the underlying hierarchy of values, and disagreement about values is far more difficult to resolve than disagreement about methodology. For a normative compromise about values to be at all possible, the opposing sides must first flesh out a common ground, the values that they already share, and only then consistently relate and prioritise all the contingent value-commitments in light of those values they in principe agree on. Given that real agents are rarely sufficiently informed or perfectly rational, the ultimate arbiter of practical consistency is bound to be, like always, adaptation and survival, which may be linked to sustained economic prosperity and political power (although this is disputable). Whichever value-commitments would best serve self-preservation are bound to prevail, whether we like it or not.

311 views