Glass-Steagall was like 35 pages long; the parts that pertain to separating commercial banking from investment banking were three pages long. Dodd-Frank is 848 pages long and the regulations related to them are 20,000-plus pages long and are still being written, or they were until the temporary head of the Securities and Exchange Commission said no more. So now you’ve got one person at each bank watching what the other four are doing all day long. We went from a period when there were no rules, no speed limits, no speed belts, and we saw what happened, to a time when they’re basically throwing sand into the beautiful machine that is Wall Street. And my view is that is too far the other way and we’ve got to reform that.

You talked about Clinton’s speech at Goldman Sachs (the text of which was leaked by WikiLeaks), where it was revealed that, shockingly, she understands Wall Street and its importance. Do you think she would have reformed Dodd-Frank? What do you think she would have done about regulation if she had won?

I think that, unfortunately, Hillary would not have done what Donald Trump is proposing. And believe me, I don’t think I agree with Donald Trump on anything but in this one particular area, I do think he’s onto something. Hillary Clinton would have been so beholden to the Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren wing of the Democratic Party, had she won. With Elizabeth Warren, if you even have Wall Street on your résumé then you can’t work in Washington, as we saw with Antonio Weiss. So, no, there’s no way that Hillary would have done what Donald Trump is doing.

My concern now is that Donald is going to go too far the other way. And that’s why I think there should be this sort of grand bargain between Donald Trump and Wall Street—it’ll never happen but—where in exchange for Donald cutting back on these regulations, these so-called onerous regulations that hinder loan growth and our productivity, that there should be a reformation of the incentives system on Wall Street, which has been completely mismatching incentives with rewards for basically the last 50 years.

You argue in your book that “the remaining big Wall Street firms need to designate the top 500 or so top executives at their respective firms and . . . create a way for the bank’s creditors and shareholders to be able to go after their full net worth—everything—in the case of a meltdown.” Do you think any would ever work on Wall Street again if that were the case?

Is that too much pie in the sky? Is that too much wishful thinking? Of course it’s too much wishful thinking. I wish it wasn’t true. But my view is, it’s such an obvious fix, it’s in the D.N.A. of these firms because it’s the way they operated for the first 150 years of their existence. So this to me is something they’re familiar with. They seemed to make a lot of money when they were private partnerships and they took prudent risks. It‘s not something that’s unfamiliar to them, that they can claim, “Oh my god, you’re springing something outrageous on us.” But guess what? It does require leadership. It does require Lloyd Blankfein standing up and saying, “Look, no one is asking us to do this, no one is demanding that we do this, no one is telling us to do this. We’re going to do this because it’s the right thing and we want to do the right thing.”