(1)

One play - Week One of the 2016 season dramatically reduced the Seahawks' chances of winning the Super Bowl. To many, this play was the culmination of years of bad planning and neglect. To others, it was an almost-eventual catastrophe, painful but not surprising. Those two narratives are not mutually exclusive, and I think we're best informed considering both.

The play, this play:

Russell Wilson, not able to completely adjust his style of play, suffered further injury as the season progressed, and endured his worst season as a pro.

He became a mediocre passer:

Year | DYAR | ANY/A+

2012 | 872 | 114

2013 | 770 | 115

2014 | 503 | 109

2015 | 1,190 | 123

2016 | 562 | 105

(context: In 2015 he was the third overall passer by total DYAR and third overall by DVOA, or value per attempt. In 2016 he ranked 14th, sandwiched between Marcus Mariota and Jameis Winston. ANY/A+ is ANY/A relative to league average, so Wilson was 5% better than league average. )

And Wilson's ability to supercharge the run game all but vanished.

Year | Rush DVOA | Offensive DVOA

2012 | 16.5% (1st) | 18.5% (4th)

2013 | 6.4% (7th) | 9.4% (7th)

2014 | 29.0% (1st) | 16.8% (5th)

2015 | 7.6% (3rd) | 18.7% (1st)

2016 | -11.4% (23rd) | -2.7 (17th)

"Hatred" of Wilson finally found its mark, he was indeed bad, and some even sought to retroactively strip him of his dominance, accrediting it to Seattle's defense or Marshawn Lynch. It may be that Wilson peaked young and is already in the midst of a protracted decline, but I think we'd be better off saying "Who can say what will come next?"

(2)

If you watched Luke Joeckel play guard against the San Diego Chargers in Week 2 of last season, how would you remember his performance?

Play-by-play announcer Tom McCarthy, after Joeckel was charged with a false start in the third quarter, had this to say "Boy, Luke Joeckel, first-round pick, has not had an easy day today." Here's why: In two of the five plays previous to McCarthy's comment Joeckel was charged with a penalty. This first penalty was especially ugly.

Melvin Ingram sprinted from just off the line of scrimmage, got under Joeckel, and bull rushed him so badly that Joeckel did this as a last resort.

That ass-bound blur stretching out Melvin Ingram's jersey is Luke Joeckel.

If I had not sat down and focused on Joeckel, I too probably would have noticed him for his two penalties and extrapolated from that that he had struggled all game.

Joeckel was effectively bull-rushed by a shorter defender. He's tall. He plays tall. Maybe he's misplaced at guard. Maybe he just can't cut it in the NFL: too tall to anchor; too slow to block the speed rush. If I were a pundit and had to wager my hot-take chips on an ez opinion, I wouldn't hesitate to accuse the Seahawks of whizzing away eight million dollars signing a bust.

But I'm tricking you through editing--not telling you the whole story.

Center Brandon Linder trips Joeckel twice but it's this second one which precipitates the topple, so that's your screen grab.

This does not free Joeckel of blame, quite. It could be that his legginess and flexibility and thus wide base could become a liability in the crowded space that is guard-center-guard. Hard to say. But at least we know what the problem was, and have freed ourselves of the fun but distorting, NFL-Blitz indebted relationships of dominance phrasing.

Ingram neither ran over nor flattened nor pancaked nor made a human plow of nor asphalted nor made an orphan out of Joeckel's children.

Ingram is very good. His particular blend of explosiveness and leverage may just be particularly effective against Joeckel. But in the other 38 snaps I studied, including four in which he was matched directly against Ingram, he was never again badly beat. So: Joeckel was tripped by his teammate and that is an extenuating circumstance, but it's not abnormal or exculpating. Mortal weaknesses of otherwise impervious champions are common. Think there's a word for that. Heracles' pinky or something. The Seahawks have to figure out how exploitable that weakness is, and if it can be overcome. Otherwise: straight up, he's not a guard.

(3)

Wilson is a scrambler. Some of his value derives from his ability to extend plays, some of his value derives from his ability to rush, and some of his ability derives from being a decoy. Once defenses stopped accounting for Wilson as a decoy, Seattle's rushing attack fell apart and with it the Seahawks offense. Seattle had company. Last season may well one day be known as the Great Scrambling Quarterback Collapse of 2016. Cam Newton, Colin Kaepernick and Russell Wilson--combining to represent the NFC Champions of the last four seasons--all cratered as if cursed.

Maybe "what comes next" is a dramatic reinvention, and Wilson becomes a Drew Brees-like pocket passer. But most likely he will simply attempt to resume his previous play style, and that's a bit scary.

Here is a chart showing the progression of several famous scrambling quarterbacks. There's no exact right way to do this. I am listing total yards, because this simple stat contains information about health, ability to keep the starting job, willingness to scramble, and effectiveness of that scrambling. I am trying to find players who were starters and whose rushing was a primary weapon. That's a judgment call.

I am listing only the years in which the player was the primary starter. Which you'll notice are often discontinuous.

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 Bortles 419 310 359 Culpepper 470 416 609 422 406 147 Cunningham 505 624 621 621 942 549 288 132 Douglass 408 284 968 525 Elway 146 237 253 257 304 234 244 258 255 94 153 235 176 249 218 94 Griffin 815 489 Kaepernick 415 524 639 256 468 Mariota 252 359 McNabb 629 482 460 355 220 55 212 236 147 140 151 McNair 674 559 337 403 414 440 138 128 139 119 Newton 706 741 585 539 636 359 Rote 158 523 313 180 301 332 398 366 351 156 62 Stewart 476 406 258 436 537 Taylor 568 580 Tarkenton 308 361 162 330 356 376 306 301 172 236 111 180 202 120 108 45 6 -6 Vick 777 902 597 1039 676 589 332 S. Young 425 415 537 407 293 250 310 199 454 V. Young 552 395 281 125

What pops out right away is just how hideous and sloppy looking this chart is. Less noticeable is how goddamn long it took to construct. If you can adjust to its nauseating appearance, you might next notice the very high rate of injury among quarterbacks in this sample, and the very poor ability to adapt their style of play to an older, slower and less durable body. Most of these players do not have a decline phase. They suffer catastrophic injuries. They're benched. They retire early.

Steve Young defied age and ran for 454 yards at 37. A concussion forced him into retirement just three games into the next season. Vick broke his leg; &c. Cunningham and Culpepper tore up their knees. Mariota has ended his first two pro seasons on injured reserve. McNair, a relative ironman, missed games throughout his career because of injuries. His legs left him age 30. He was an excellent passer that same season, missed half of the next season, and sputtered out. &c. &c.

In general: wheels fall off, bodies get busted, games and even whole seasons are missed, awkward transitions to pocket passing are attempted, and careers end.

Those players who supplemented good pocket passing with scrambling aged better. Those who were scramblers that passed enough to win failed. That doesn't mean Wilson is destined to age poorly, but it does mean he will have to change his style or blaze his own trail.

(4)

Joeckel played 66 snaps on offense, but I charted only through the third quarter, eschewing everything after the Chargers pulled ahead 35-0. This is an attempt to save myself a little time and to de-Bortlize the tape.

Bortle: 1. To thrive offensively only when victory is far out of reach.

San Diego very much throttled down after that score. No defensive player played in more than 86% of possible snaps, and so lopsided was the score, role players like Caraun Reid, Tenny Palepoi and Darius Philon out-snapped starting defensive tackle Brandon Mebane. It's hard enough to accurately assess someone playing meaningful snaps and matched against a credible opponent. The forces of garbage time, prevent defense, and fringe roster depth conspire to make it all but impossible.

Joeckel spent most of his (meaningful) snaps facing one of Mebane or Corey Liuget. Coming into 2016, Liuget was an excellent player mostly unknown outside of San Diego. A 3-4 end / under tackle who did lots of the small stuff which contributes to winning but goes unnoticed: disrupting run blocking, interior pressure pass rushing, gap integrity, handling double teams, some pass rush, some run tackling. 2016 was his first season without a sack.

Mebane is Mebane: great leverage player, great gap integrity, still damn good at pushing the pile, great hustle, great awareness, decent lateral agility; doesn't separate well at all, little burst to consummate a sack or tackle for a loss. Guy's solid. Even at 32 he's probably still producing some surplus value, but he's not the kind of matchup which tends to expose his opponent.

Like Terrell Suggs, Joeckel faced players who are good but not great, well-rounded but perhaps past their peak, and able to test Joeckel's abilities in a variety of ways, but not especially able to expose this or that weakness.

He did ... pretty well. The bull rush was not a consistent problem. Opponents did not easily shed him through arm fighting. He was mostly AWOL in the second level, his trudging gate too slow and too stiff for him to engage linebackers and defensive backs. Defenders were rarely free, Joeckel showed good read and reaction to stunts, and so his awareness seems sufficient. He combos well, pancaking Palepoi. He angle blocks pretty effectively, selling the play action when Jacksonville bootlegged and combo blocking well enough to create horizontal push. And, perhaps most importantly, he helped ensure Bortles had throwing lanes.

(5)

Wilson's success will constitute much of the expression of Joeckel's play. Will Wilson throw a pick under pressure because Joeckel blew a block? Or, more subtly, will Wilson be forced to check down? or Seattle forced to assign additional blockers? or Wilson frequently caught in third and long? or without a viable play action game? How about tipped passes? Throwing lanes?

Luke Joeckel's job is to make Russell Wilson's job as easy as possible. The offensive line populates half of the system which Wilson will play in. Simplicity and intelligibility dictate that all football players are judged on a spectrum of good to bad. But football is a game of interactions. Pete Carroll and Tom Cable did not sign Joeckel because he is good or bad, but because of how his play will interact with his teammates' play, and how this interaction of five players, the offensive line, will interact with Russell Wilson. Carroll and Cable targeted Joeckel because they believed Joeckel does certain things which make Wilson's job easier, and therefore make Wilson better. To answer how valuable Joeckel is to Seattle, we must ask what is it that Wilson needs to succeed.

So let's talk about Russell Wilson, Wisconsin Badger. He played one season. He earned a pretty damn good draft grade for his work in that season. That Badger's team was known for Montee Ball. Ball is long out of the league. The leading receivers were Nick Toon, son of Al Toon, and Jared Ryan Abbrederis, son of someone, I presume. Toon's canceled. Abbrederis is clinging to a one year contract with Detroit. Wilson's offensive line was excellent and of unusual size.

Left Tackle Rick Wagner 23 Million (total guaranteed money) 47 Starts 6'6" 308 Left Guard Travis Frederick 35 Million 64 Starts 6'4" 312 Center Peter Konz 573 Thousand 28 Starts 6'5" 314 Right Guard Kevin Zeitler 39 Million 71 Starts 6'4" 314 Right Tackle Josh Oglesby [Minimal] 0 6'7" 338

It's free agency time and so I thought I'd go with total guaranteed money as a measure of value. The equation I devised for that is simple: total earnings + money guaranteed in current contract. Three of the above are stars—top young players at their position playing at the highest level of competition.

Konz was the first center selected in the 2012 draft. He developed a rep for inadequate strength to play in the NFL, which isn't super-uncommon for young centers. Max Unger was often overpowered his first few seasons. Injury ended Konz's career in 2016. He was never good as a pro, but extracting from his first team All American honors, draft position, and the reasons he failed as a pro, Konz was likely an excellent college center.

Oglesby was said to "have no cartilage left in his knee." Whichever knee, he now coaches at Oregon State. 28 game starter and Ram Rob Havenstein was his backup. I would guess Oglesby was pretty darn good.

This was a good group. It was big group. And it was a group best known for its run blocking.

This I think is the group Pete Carroll is emulating, why?, because he believes in the interaction of Wilson and this kind of line. But, and let's be honest, Seattle has not created a dominating run blocking line, and unless Joeckel reinvents himself at guard or right tackle, signing him will not aid in that cause. The Seahawks have chased a great run blocking line, one with the kind of height and physical dominance to keep open throwing lanes, stop tipped passes, and keep Seattle in manageable down and distance. But Seattle has only achieved great rushing through the synergistic brilliance of Wilson and Lynch; Wilson and Thomas Rawls.

The Seahawks have invested pretty heavily into the offensive line, but have little to show for it. Seattle has, I think wisely, chosen not to re-sign its own mediocre free agents. J.R. Sweezy, Russell Okung, James Carpenter and Breno Giacomini have become another franchise's boondoggle. Max Unger was swapped pursuing a skill position player, and though I certainly think Jimmy Graham is the better of the two, it's difficult to argue that Seattle's offense as a whole has improved because of that trade.

Seattle hasn't neglected the line only failed to effectively evaluate talent. This may prove Wilson's undoing. Wilson creates some of his own sacks and evades others, but absent of context, he's damn sack prone, consistently among the worst quarterbacks in football. His career 8.25% sack rate ranks 120th of 156 qualified quarterbacks--all time. Few in his range had long careers.

Roger Staubach is probably his most favorable comparison. But that's somewhat misleading. Bob Griese, Terry Bradshaw, Ken Stabler and Staubach were all sacked at a pretty high rate, but also played most of their career in the 70's when quarterback sacks as a whole were more common, and offense was built around running the ball. Each was about league average. Believe it or not, last season was Wilson's best relative to the league. He performed at 91% of league average, yet led the league in yards lost by way of sacks. By rough estimate Wilson suffers six to seven more sacks a season than the league average quarterback, each potentially ruinous, each at least harming the delicate mechanics of a position that is halfway between running back and starting pitcher.

2017 will be Wilson's age 29 season. Seven of the 13 scramblers in the above list old enough to have had an age 29 season did not in fact have an age 29 season. Most pretty much stopped scrambling in their 30s. Steve Young is a notable exception, and coincidentally Young is said to have run a 4.55 40 yard dash at the 1983 Scouting Combine, identical to what Russell Wilson ran in 2012. (You might also notice that Young was listed at 6'0.5".) Maybe Wilson duplicates Young's rushing success. Hopefully he avoids the many concussions which plagued Young. If Wilson is indeed something of a black swan, precedent may prove misleading. It certainly misled me into doubting his potential.

But I think such unlikely possibilities should not be counted on. Last season was probably a preview of things to come. It stunk. One injury to a starter, Germain Ifedi, exposed Seattle's horrible depth. One missed block by Garry Gilliam resulted in an injury that robbed Wilson of his best abilities. One injury to Wilson, a high ankle sprain, soon led to a severe knee sprain which was probably still affecting his play in January. One season in the Seahawks title window was lost, an especially precious one.

No one signing marks the course of a team, but signing Joeckel to a one-year deal is essentially another step in the same direction. Having no major free agents of its own, Seattle will not lose a compensatory pick. The Seahawks excel at managing their cap and Joeckel's contract will not force a cap pinch which could cost someone like Kam Chancellor or Jimmy Graham. If Joeckel spends the season on injured reserve, Seattle will not be much worse off for the wasted cash.

But this plan may be steadily wasting opportunity--both the opportunity to maximize Seattle's chances of winning in the short term and the opportunity to assist Wilson in transitioning into the kind of quarterback who excels well into his 30's. He's gonna need a line. Every season planned around him working magic is a season planned without due deference to the probability of injury and the eventuality of age. It represents the worst qualities of Pete Carroll's optimism. As such, I get why fans are kinda pissed about this signing. It makes sense in isolation, kinda, but within context, it seems a bit oblivious.

It is damn hard to create a great offensive line. It is a feat of both coaching and recognition of talent. When Carroll first signed with Seattle, he coaxed Alex Gibbs out of retirement. Gibbs is among the greatest position coaches in NFL history, but Gibbs was exhausted and retired before the season started. It probably didn't help that Seattle was stuck with Okung after Washington drafted Trent Williams at four.

Tom Cable was supposed to be if not his equal at least a credible successor. I have supported and defended him, but six years in, the sense that Cable is spinning straw into gold no longer seems plausible. If the talent has sucked, surely he bears some of the blame for picking or at least okaying it. Joeckel is undoubtedly his guy. I do not think Joeckel is a high-upside talent, regardless of where he was drafted, but if he could be a good run blocker and a good pass blocker, that would be sufficient for next season.

Only the crafting of Russell Wilson's future should not be a season by season affair, in which the unit perhaps most responsible for his health and success is pieced together from discards and rookies. But it has been, and rather than reversing course, redoubling their effort to spend or even overspend to stabilize the line, Seattle begins 2017 with the same line coach coaching the same kind of maulers in pursuit of the same kind of run-centric offense which desperately depends on a scrambling quarterback capable of almost magical acts of improvisation. That's worrying. Many great defensive-minded head coaches struggle to evaluate offensive talent. Before Wilson, much the same could be said about Pete Carroll. Well ... you got the franchise quarterback, Pete. Now treat him like his future will determine your legacy.