This is outrageous and criminal in nature! Thanks to the whistle blower. I hope FAA is forced to act and extend investigations to other major suppliers and their supply chains.

- Gary McCartney, President and CEO AviationHubAsia Inc and Vice President of Operations of Asian Aeronautics Services Inc.

This FAA whistleblower (Charles Shi) was the founder of Moog Aircraft China Supply Chain back in 2006. I used to report directly to Kevin Walek, Director of Moog Aircraft Global Supply Chain.

I myself developed almost all of China suppliers through auditing and approval before 2012 except NHJ-the verified counterfeiting supplier.

All the rest of suppliers approved by myself remain the supply base of Moog Aircraft today.

K. Walek, middle, Charles Shi, right picture 2007

Moog Aircraft hired J. Zou, an American citizen in 2013, by then VP of Supply Chain. M.Trabert as Asian Supply Chain Director to be my supervisor.

M. Trabert, VP of Supply Chain, Moog Aircraft in 2012 Who hired J. Zou as Asian Supply Chain Director (Mr Trabert Is Now President of Moog Aircraft Group)

Photo taken 2012 by Charles Shi at Great Wall, Beijing

In early 2014, Joe brought in the verified Chinese counterfeiting supplier to Moog Aircraft supplier base, Suzhou New Hongji Precision Part Co., Ltd.(NHJ).

Before Moog, NHJ had an aerospace customer B/E Aerospace who exited from NHJ in 2013 because

NHJ falsified material certification and used excessively fake material in B/E Aerospace business resulting in product failures.

Moog quality lead "The SQE", through reckless and fraudulent practice admitted NHJ into Moog Aircraft approved supplier base. The SQE used to work as a junior quality engineer at Moog UK facility (Moog acquired from GE Aerospace in 2009) and had no supplier audit experience before she came to China in 2012.

"The SQE" did what she called desk-top auditing to approve NHJ, meaning she approved NHJ from her laptop at her living apartment instead of going to NHJ for an on-site audit. The approval process was unknown to Moog Aircraft Supply Chain Practice. It was probably unheard of in the entire aerospace industry.

At Moog, we need to go to a potential supplier facility, check their documentation system, conduct workshop tours, ask questions and use a supplier checklist to audit and approve or disapprove a potential supplier.

The first question we shall ask is how the supplier document and maintain material traceability because this is most vital in aerospace business.

Moog Supplier Audit Checklist Used in Approving Potential Suppliers

NHJ as a counterfeiter used an illicit material traceability system called MID (Material Identification Number) disconnecting with aerospace material sourced from approved vendors.

If "The SQE" was a competent quality auditor and used Moog's standard supplier audit checklist, she could have easily identified the violation of NHJ by using illicit MID "traceability" and stopped approving NHJ as Moog approved supplier.

In the late Spring of 2015, two of my supplier development engineers (SDE) reported to me that B/E story with NHJ on counterfeiting, I immediately reported to J. Zou. Mr. Zou brushed it off.

Then I learned more alarming violations from my SDEs that NHJ was not using required travelers to document the production and outsourcing Moog business from unknown & unapproved sub-tiers just because the limitation of its own capacity and shortage of machines.

Exh. Moog056 page 2

Exh. Moog056 page 3

Exh. Moog056 page 7

I requested "The SQE" to conduct a supplier audit on those unknown sub-tiers. But "The SQE" squarely refused.

Before 2012, Moog Aircraft Asian Supply Chain had SDE performing all functions of supplier development, supplier quality and engineering support. A IPT(Internal Product Team) team structure was introduced in 2012 splitting the functions into three. So supplier audit and approval was handed over to SQEs who still reported to me dot line. (SQE get what to do from me in China).

Before The SQE was a trained Moog employee, Moog Aircraft Supply Chain already had an established rule of approving sub-tiers.

It is Moog's responsibility of approving 2nd tiers recommended by 1st tier supplier's

T. Rider, Senior Supplier quality manager of Moog Authored the procedure approving sub-tier suppliers 23-05-2013

Following my 2015-8-7 Moog internal whistleblowing, The SQE finally realized the NHJ illicit sub-tier suppliers should not be allowed to do business with Moog.

Exh. Moog119

She wrote: NHJ currently do not have a process for subcontracting aerospace parts and they should not be subcontracting anything without Moog's permission.

Ex. Moog119

But when The SQE was confirming NHJ outsourcing Moog parts are a violation, Moog already sourced 11 part numbers, thounsands of pieces parts which were already assembled into flight control system hardware of Boeing planes which are not removed even today (2020-Feb)

Moog has been concealing compelling evidence of a part list of the 11 Boeing part numbers NHJ was outsourcing to unknown and unapproved sub-tiers.

Since "The SQE" lead refused to do what she should, I myself went to audit 4 of the sub-tiers

NHJ was telling Moog in making Moog parts either partially or completely. After two days of auditing with the SDE responsible for NHJ, our findings were extremely alarming. I wrote an audit report to J. Zou.

Sender: Shi, Charles

Time: 2015-7-9 18:19

To: Zou, J. ;

CC: xxx,xxx

Subject: New Hongji 2nd tier supplier visit and findings

Joe,

Shao and I spend 2 days visiting 4 NHJ recommended 2nd tier suppliers, and this afternoon we sat down with CEO Mr Li Jian and his team sharing our findings.Findings.All 4 2nd tiers are doing business with different industrial customers. Those customers may not have stringent traceability requirement like Aerospace does, This could cause their production system I'll coping with what is required by Moog, leaving easily mix up of lots...

Generally speaking the 2nd tiers don’t have an awareness of what Moog is requiring in terms of NC, lot control and traceability management. Even NHJ has blurred understanding and that is why we conducted improvement action two weeks ago trying to correct any variations of traceability management. If this fails, the result could be disastrous...

This morning we happened to hear a communication within themselves trying to buy one material from another company with a fake certificate. We felt this is something serious in violation of aerospace Raw Material controls. ...*

When visiting 4 the 2nd tier suppliers, asking each of them what Moog parts they are manufacturing. Only 2 acknowledged doing either certain ops or complete parts, but when we asked who is making CA81706 which Shao and Ron identified to have been outsourced, Nobody can tell us which 2nd tier is.This raised alarm as NHJ may take it into their own hand outsourcing Moog parts to unknown 2nd tiers, and this may raise red light right away.

Since 2nd tier supplier management process is something new to both NHJ and Moog, it may take more time to make the procedure completed. So in this afternoon summary meeting, Mr. Li agreed to hold new PO placement to NHJ for any parts they are planned to go with 2nd tier until the procedure and training and full compliance is in place.

I’d appreciate you review above and give us directions how we proceed before communication with larger groups.

Thank you

Charles Shi | Far East Asia Supply Chain Manager, Aircraft Group

* Regarding above mentioned NHJ creating fake a material certificate, it was evidenced later by "The SQE" testimony in her report 25/08/2015 to Moog quality organization.

Exh. Moog116

Joe replied agreeing with my reporting, but two weeks later, J. Zou ordered my SDEs to expedite development of NHJ by giving NHJ and its unapproved sub-tiers more business. This raised the red light so I decided to report to K. Walek, Zou's supervisor on Zou's unethical misconduct.

I asked Mr Shao, the NHJ responsible SDE to do a product audit with that SPOF blocking of B737 focused so I could have evidences in reporting to K. Walek. Mr Shao came back on 07/08/2015 with extremely alarming findings.

With his audit report, I started Moog internal whistleblowing on the same day by writing to K. Walek, Moog Aircraft Global Supply Chain Director.

Sender: Shi, Charles

Time: 2015-8-8 4:38

To: W., Kevin

Subject: concerns on Joe- confidential

Kevin, How are you!

I know this email might be very unexpected. However I need to take the step which is risky to my job security yet may do good to the company as a whole...

Please refer below email regarding NC we identified with this supplier New Hongji which was introduced by Joe since he joined Moog. Another incidence of traceability findings by Shao today is in the attached file.

We learned from multiple sources that the only aerospace customer New Hongji had prior to Moog, BE has revoked their business with New Hongji because NHJ substituted raw material that was found out at customer’s end.

I reported this to Joe and he simply brushed it off with no request for deep investigation.He requested nothing to demand NHJ take actions to correct the traceability NC (non conformance), but kept telling us it is normal for a supplier to have such issues!!!

What issues, traceability is the biggest issue that can cause immediate disaster to aerospace business.New hongji is not ready for aerospace machining because they are basically an industrial machining house, their 95 percent business does not require traceability and now Moog parts are mixed with their industrial machining and it is unavoidable operators don’t mind traceability.

They don’t have the resources to manage. I repeatedly reminded Joe about it but he seems not hearing.On the contrary, he was obsessed giving more business to NHJ and even requested NHJ use their 2nd tier supplier base which is nowhere near doing aerospace like Moog type of parts.

I visited their 2nd tier suppliers which has no training on treacebility, no awareness of aerospace requirement, and the owner of NHJ chose to outsource complete Moog parts to unknown 2nd tier sources with or without Joe’s knowledge.I don’t know why Joe picked up NHJ and very head-strong using them and their 2nd tier suppliers, it is too risky compromising the integrity of Moog parts.

However one thing I assume is that Joe must have some private dealings or kick-back arrangement with Mr. Li, the owner just because of the private ownership that allows them to do so. (J. Zou registered a shell company)

Kevin, I’d like have a call with you at your convenience to talk things over.

Thank you

Charles

J. Zou's shell company registration was in violation of Moog ethics.

Moog Employee Handbook Bans Alternative Employment

AP EE 2008

AP EE 2008 page 13/25

Well, let us focus on the felony Moog committed in covering up the extraordinary aircraft safety threat. The devil was all in the Moog SDE audit 07/08/2015.

Exh. Moog054 Page 1

Mr. Shao audited a few production lots of SPOF blocking of B737 Spoiler which I told him to focus on. He checked 4 NHJ MID lots with a total quantity of 1006pcs.

Because NHJ production documentation only contain the MID lots, Mr. Shao demanded what material heat lots NHJ sourced to match these four MID lots. NHJ searched "very hard" and finally told Mr. Shao that these four MID lots were traced to three Heat lots sourced from Taiwan Gloria Material Technology (GMT) which was a Moog/Boeing approved raw material vendor.

However these four MID lots did not match the three heat lots of GMT by 10 pc difference. The traceability was lost.

Exh. Moog054 Page 2

When the finding alarmed Mr. Shao, he did a deep dive on the mismatch of MID by NHJ vs GMT Heat lots. He found two GMT lots had ISSUE and marked in red.

Exh. Moog054 page 4

Throughout my whistleblowing process to Moog management and FAA, I repeatedly requested Moog and FAA to verify material facts with this SPOF P/N665A0039-02 focused.

Both Moog and FAA refused and did not do any material verification.

I myself verified these three GMT lot in mid August,2016 and was confirmed by GMT sales person that they only sold NHJ 314pcs, not 1016pcs that NHJ was telling Moog but unfortunately Moog quality and FAA accepted without any verification.

Regarding GMT Heat lot SD1850B2-10G, NHJ falsified the quantity from 112pcs to 612pcs.

Transcript of GMT Confirmation of Sales, Admitted into Court Record by DOL ALJ Judge

Exh. RF39-1T

FAA reached a no violation substantiated verdict on 1st June,2016 by accepting outrageous Moog forgery that Moog checked all lots delivered to Moog since October 2014, including all the raw material certificates for P/NP665A-0039-02(That SPOF of B737 spoiler)...material providers confirmed they shipped the material type, specification, and quantity indicated on the material Certificate of Conformance.

FAA Investigation Report 01/06/2016

Exh E.page 15

When Moog forgery of having verified material facts by January 2016, was destroyed by above-mentioned A-One bombshell compelling evidence submitted to FAA investigation in August, 2016. Moog forged another deceit to cover the old ones.

Moog was asked by FAA to verify and Moog did "verifying" in September 2016 by making new forgeries which were unfortunately accepted again by FAA in its abusive report.

In FAA report 04/11/2016, the MIDO investigator stated "that (7th Sept, 2016) Moog discovered an accounting error...during a 2015 (before May 27,2015) audit....first, a single billet...was large enough to produce two finished parts, second, multiple raw material certifications were reported under a single material certification number."

Exh. E. FAA investigation report 04/11/2016

However, the quantities of the 3 GMT lots of 314pcs did not make up 1016pcs NHJ falsified that in turn had nothing to do with the four MID lots of fake material NHJ used in making SPOF of B737 planes.

Therefore NHJ/Moog/FAA made another forgery by adding a "4th GMT lot" which was not even on the only authentic audit report 07/08/2015.

But Moog did a very bad job forging this time. The dire fact is: GMT Heat Lot SC282A5-10G was non existent!!!

Exh. E. FAA report 04/11/2016 Page 11

A US senior investigative journalist contacted GMT to verify the 4th lot Moog/FAA attempted to make up the quantities NHJ falsified. GMT Aerospace Sales Director J. Chiu responded 09/11/2017.

"SC282A5-10G April 20, 2015 (This is not an existing No. in our production. We produced SC0282-..but do not produce SC0282A5-.. There is no SC1282A5-..either. And SC0282- is material 440C instead of 15-5PH.)"

From testimony by B/E Aerospace insider on 02/02/2017, NHJ used copies of certificate by shipping material not meant by those certificates. NHJ used same criminal scheme in faking Moog business.

Exh. RF75

Exh. RF75

NHJ Own Employees Admitting They Were "Counterfeiting Brigade," If Caught, They Would Be Arrested and Ended up in Jail...

Exh. RF75

I filed a criminal complaint on NHJ 2018-6-3 to Chinese law enforcement. Suzhou police interrogated Moog witness Mr S. Shao 2019-4-29.

 Ex 25,page 3，Shawn’s interrogatory4-29（ex 7 related lots information）is collected based on data of material delivery note and traveler privately, my collection did not go through NHJ official channel. The audit and the data collection method was ordered by Charles Shi

Ex 25,page 3, When asked if the 112pc is correct for SD1850B2-10G, Shao said: I just verified paper from both NHJ and GMT the quantity for SD1850B2-10G is both 112pcs.

NHJ was the exclusive supplier for the part P665A0039-02, the single point of failure (SPOF) blocking of B737 spoiler since 2015. It is believed some 500 B737 have been compromised due to installing this safety critical counterfeit SPOFs.

More fatal accidents are just looming in.

SPOF Blocking of B737 Was Sourced and Installed by Moog from a Verified Chinese Counterfeiting Supplier-NHJ

P665A0039-02 Blocking or mounting lug of B737 spoiler

To be continued....Part 2 shall present Moog deep fraud and felony covering up the scam by top management... stay tuned!

For more information.

JDA

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