This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared with the day before but an increase in Luhansk region, where most of the violations were assessed as training related. The SMM confirmed reports of civilian deaths and injuries. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The Mission monitored in the proposed disengagement area near Zolote. The Mission monitors observed the presence of mines and mine warning signs in areas close to the contact line. It monitored border areas not under government control. The SMM continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. None of the SMM’s interlocutors could confirm media reports of security incidents involving shooting or military activities in the vicinity of the administrative boundary line.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared with the day before [1].

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre during the night of 9-10 August, the SMM heard 31 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west of its position.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 9 August, the SMM heard 23 outgoing explosions of artillery rounds (undetermined calibre), bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-5km east and south-east of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded four mortar muzzle flashes from the north to the east, followed by bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire from east to north and 22 undetermined explosions in the north.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions and five explosions assessed as outgoing explosions 2-5km south-south-west of its position. Positioned at a different location in Avdiivka a short time later the SMM heard four undetermined explosions south-south-east, bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, five undetermined explosions 2-5km south-south-east, one explosion assessed as a mortar (82mm) impact, four explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 4-6km south-south-east and small-arms fire 1-2km south-south-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted an increase in the number of recorded ceasefire violations compared with the day before. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Bile (22km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard approximately 50 explosions (40 assessed as outgoing tank rounds, 10 as outgoing artillery) 5-10km south-west of its position, in a known training area near “LPR”-controlled Shymshynivka (28km south-west of Luhansk). Positioned in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions (possibly from artillery) 6km south of its position.

The SMM confirmed reports of civilian deaths and injuries. The deputy head of the Kalinina morgue in Donetsk city told the SMM that bodies of two civilians (men aged 55 and 60) were brought there by “DPR” members from Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district on the afternoon of 9 August. The SMM saw the bodies of two men with numerous wounds. Both wore civilian clothes. According to the deputy head, autopsies revealed the cause of death was severe blood loss caused by multiple shrapnel wounds. At hospital number 14 in Petrovskyi district medical personnel told the SMM that at around 03:30 on 10 August a resident of Petrovskyi district - a man in his mid-fifties – had received treatment for a leg wound. Later the man told the SMM that he had heard around seven explosions at around 03:00 on 10 August, one of which had damaged his home and injured him. The SMM analyzed a crater next to the building where the man lives in Petrovskyi district and assessed that it was caused by a mortar (calibre not determined) fired from a southerly direction. Medical personnel at the trauma department in the central municipal hospital in government-controlled Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that a seven-year-old girl had been admitted with bruises on her left side, caused by falling masonry when a shell struck her house in the town.

An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was shot at by Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in an area near government-controlled Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk). The SMM immediately landed the UAV. A short time later, the soldiers approached the SMM and apologized for the incident, stating they had not been informed that the UAV belonged to the SMM. The UAV was not damaged.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 18 tanks (T-64) stationary at a known training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 12 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm), four of which had been moved from another site, which now sits abandoned. The following weapons were missing: 26 howitzers (eight towed D-20, 152mm, and 18 self-propelled 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and six anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm), all missing since 14 March 2016; three towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) missing since 2 February 2016 and six anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm) missing since 2 October 2015.

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed: 16 howitzers (eight self-propelled 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm; and eight towed of which six were 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, and two D-30, 122mm).

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At an “LPR”-controlled area the SMM observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The Mission monitors observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) in the security zone: two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-80) travelling south towards government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 26 armoured vehicles in areas around government-controlled Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk) and one armoured vehicle in an “LPR”-controlled area just south of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) on 9 August.

The SMM monitored in the proposed disengagement area near Zolote. The SMM met with the Ukrainian Armed Forces Major-General from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) on the government-controlled side, and with the Russian Federation Major-General from the JCCC and “LPR” members on the “LPR”-controlled side. Mr. Deynego, a senior “LPR” member, told the SMM that he is not yet willing to demine the south of Zolote which is under “LPR” control.

The SMM observed the presence of mines and mine warning signs in areas close to the contact line. At the southern end of the bridge at government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM observed three lines of anti-tank mines that had not been removed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The presence of these mines meant the SMM had to go on foot to meet an SMM mirror patrol to the south that had travelled there unimpeded due to mine clearance by “LPR” members. The SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces demining team remove a booby trap in the proposed disengagement area between government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk). Such efforts demonstrate the sides can clear mines if they wish but that the lack of co-ordination by the JCCC hinders the process.

In an area to the north-east of government-controlled Zolote, the SMM observed as a Ukrainian Armed Forces demining team removed 26 anti-tank mines, ahead of planned repairs to the electrical power line facilitated by the SMM. Between “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed a number of mine hazard signs (red background with white Cyrillic letters) that had been provided by an intergovernmental organization. The SMM observed over 200 signs which were spaced at different intervals. Some signs were difficult to see as they were covered by dense vegetation.

The SMM continued to insist on responsibility for violations related to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification. Mr. Zakharchenko again did not respond to a request to meet the SMM in order to indicate effective steps taken in response to the incident on 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 29 July 2016).*

The SMM monitored border areas not controlled by the Government. During 33 minutes of observation at the “DPR”-controlled Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk) the SMM counted 44 cars (nine carried Russian Federation number plates, one Belarus plates, one Ukrainian plate covered with a “DPR” sticker, while the rest had Ukrainian number plates) queuing to leave Ukraine. Three coaches (two carrying passengers) with Ukrainian number plates were stationary in a car park nearby. Over 18 minutes of observation at the “DPR”-controlled Uspenka border crossing point (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 14 cars queuing to leave Ukraine, of which four had Russian number plates, the rest, Ukrainian. Four cargo trucks with closed containers (two with Ukrainian plates, and two with Russian Federation plates) and one bus were queuing to leave Ukraine.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation at three crossing points at the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. The SMM observed that all three crossing points at Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (67km, 72km and 167km south-east of Kherson, respectively) were open on 10 August. At Kalanchak, at 12:15hrs on 10 August the SMM observed slow moving traffic crossing in both directions. The driver of one car told the SMM that he had been waiting about 13 hours to cross to Crimea. The border guard commander at Kalanchak told the SMM that the Crimean side was opened for traffic at 04:30 closed at 08:00 and was reopened at 11:20 on 10 August. The SMM observed minimal traffic at Chaplynka, where the border guard commander said that the Crimean side had opened at 07:00 on 10 August. Travellers that had crossed from Crimea told the SMM that their vehicles had been checked thoroughly on the Crimean side of the Kalanchak and Chaplynka crossing points. At Chonhar on the afternoon of 10 August the SMM observed ­­– in the space of an hour ­­­– eleven vehicles crossing to Crimea and seven in the opposite direction. The SMM visited the Ukrainian border guard position close to the administrative boundary line at Cape Kutara (125km south-east of Kherson) and found the situation calm without indications of increased alert. None of the SMM’s interlocutors could confirm media reports of security incidents involving shooting or military activities in the vicinity of the administrative boundary line.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

An obstacle blocking the road in an area under “LPR”-control prevented the SMM from travelling south from Zolote to Pervomaisk.

An armed “DPR” member stopped the SMM near Markyne (94km south-east of Donetsk) and told it to find another route to its destination of Novoazovsk, as according to him there was a shooting range in the area. The SMM took an alternative route and reached its destination. The JCCC was informed. Other impediments:

The Russian Federation Armed Forces representative at the JCCC in “LPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Luhansk) refused to share information from the JCCC ceasefire log book with the SMM on 9 August.

The “deputy chief” of “police” in Horlivka informed the SMM that a new instruction received from “superiors” in Donetsk forbade “police” from communicating with the SMM without receiving prior approval.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

Contacts

Alexandra Taylor

Head of Press and Public Information Unit

OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

26 Turhenievska Street

01054 Kyiv

Ukraine

Mobile: +380 67 650 31 57

alexandra.taylor@osce.org

smm-media@osce.org

Tetiana Tesliuchenko

Senior Social Media Assistant

OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

26 Turhenievska Street

01054 Kyiv

Ukraine

Office: +380 44 382 0832

Mobile: +380 67 466 2563

Tetiana.Tesliuchenko@osce.org