Breathe… deep breaths. Grab a paper bag if it will help. We normally don’t spoil the reveal this early in an article, but I know some folks need assistance immediately. The total value of a new contract is not the most important part of the deal. Repeat, the total value of a new contract is not the most important part of the deal. OK, let’s get to the nitty gritty.

Everyone is making projections on what we’ve been discussing for almost a full year at Cowboys Wire; what will a Dak Prescott extension cost the Dallas Cowboys?

We stepped up to the plate in July 2018, and projected an annual average value (AAV) for Prescott based on two years of statistical evidence. At the time, he was coming off of a horrible end-of-season performance that coincided with the loss of backfield mate Ezekiel Elliott and the deteriorating play of his top two targets, Dez Bryant and Jason Witten. Since, there has been an additional season worth of evidence, along with changes to the QB market which inevitably lead to an adjustment.

Still, there was more than enough evidence even last offseason that a team which waded through a quarterback wasteland for nearly a decade between Troy Aikman and Tony Romo, would want to keep Prescott in the fold long-term. He had certainly shown the ability to lead the team.

Prescott’s slide continued through the first half of 2018 though, and with that brought serious doubt as to whether he deserved the moniker of Cowboys franchise quarterback.

His play was bad and his poor mechanics and sketchy decision making were front and center for the world to see, contributing to the Cowboys missing scoring opportunities and losing games. However in the second half of the season, Prescott’s play returned to the form from the first season and a half of his young career, and Dallas returned to the playoffs as NFC East champions for the second time in three seasons.

Prescott is the team’s QB for the next several years.

When talking about a long-term deal, the most common resistance response is the team still doesn’t know what they have in Prescott. Many think the club should let him play out the final year of his rookie deal in 2019, then franchise him in 2020, and possibly again in 2021.

Keep him in the fold, but give yourself the flexibility to move on if he regresses.

Just plan on using the franchise tag twice, they say. No.

Let’s break that down, as franchise tags are something many fans may not realize are the basis for how long-term deals for superstars are determined.

In 2018, when the cap was at $177 million, the franchise tag for quarterbacks was $23.2 million. The tag is expected to be around $25.6 million in 2019, with Over The Cap expecting the cap to be around $190 million once determined in March.

If the 2020 cap, in the final year of the current NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining agreement (CBA), jumps another $13 million, it is likely the franchise tag for QBs rises to around $28 million.

So play that out.

If Dallas were to franchise Prescott again in 2021, under the current rules, Dallas would then pay him 120 percent of his 2020 amount, or $33.6 million.

Over those two years, Dallas would be giving Prescott $61.6 million in salary.

Also, the Franchise Tag may look different in 2021

There is a possibility the new CBA will change how franchise tags work. This could be wide ranging. The NFLPA could demand that players can only be tagged once, making Prescott an immediate free agent. The new CBA could decide to lower the second-tag percentage (which would benefit the Cowboys) or increase it. A shift up just five more percentage points to 125 percent means Prescott would be at $63 million for 2020 and 2021.

Things could go either way, but the point is going the double-tag route is a dangerous game to play. The Jones’ aren’t averse to taking risks, and fans don’t truly care because it’s not their money, but this doesn’t seem too logical because…

Again, the franchise tag is the basis of negotiation

That $61.6 million for 2020 and 2021 is the starting point for guaranteed money negotiated by Prescott’s side.

We’ve talked about for years how the guaranteed money, and the three-year value of a deal is truly what a contract should be judged on. Teams rarely guarantee salary beyond the third year of a deal in the NFL. Everything else is closer to window dressing (but not completely) than it is paramount to evaluating the deal.

If Prescott were to play out his 2019 base salary, which after the proven performance escalator is up to $2 million, he’d be looking at $63.6 million of salary over the next three years, with the caveat that the team and Prescott’s agent could have different future cap estimates.

Anything demonstrably less than this amount of guaranteed dollars is Prescott giving Dallas a huge hometown discount.

We’ve used this strategy in predicting previous contracts.

It was the basis for our March 13, 2018 prediction that Zack Martin would see $40 million in guarantees, and then Martin got $40 million in guarantees and the exact AAV, $14 million, we had predicted. There are numerous other examples of this around the league.

Also remember, Prescott signed with big-dollar CAA as his agents last summer.

That’s the basis for guaranteed money of a long-term deal. Everything else is negotiated from that point. How Dallas wants to use signing-bonus proration is what will lead to how many years are in the deal and the total value.

Prescott’s side will deal based on saying, if we commit to more than three years, you are able to walk away at any time after the guaranteed money runs out. So you’ll need to pay us at a level that keeps us near the top of the market.

Dallas will do this because the current dollar amount at the top of the market will no longer be come 2022, 2023 and possibly 2024 and 2025.

A double-tag strategy for Dallas would be trading ultimate financial flexibility in 2022, for the complete loss of leverage and control should they want to ink Prescott long-term at that point. There will be a handful of new QB deals that will have bumped QB salaries up several notches and they will have to negotiate with every QB-needy team at that time.

In addition but just as important, Dallas’ cap space in 2020 and 2021 would be eaten up by the fact that Dallas couldn’t prorate any of the costs of those cash payments across the rest of the contract. As a long-term deal, Dallas can pay Prescott the same amount of money and defer chunks of it to future cap years where the same payment takes up a smaller percentage of the team’s cap space for a season. $10 million on the books in 2020 when there’s a $200 million cap, takes up a bigger percentage than it will in 2023, when the cap could be $240 million, for a Plain Jane example.

Textbook Definition of Statistically Consistent

Interestingly enough, Prescott’s final numbers confirm exactly what was thought of him following his first two years in the league.

It’s uncanny how the overall total product in 2018, despite his woeful start, ended up on par with what he had done in the first two years of his career.

Here’s an excerpt from our July 2018 writeup, when trying to project Prescott’s numbers after the coming third season.

We’ll assume the Cowboys go 11-5 and Prescott throws for 23 touchdowns against nine interceptions with a 95.5 passer rating and a 72.5 QBR . . .

He’ll also have 18 touchdowns on the ground if we extrapolate his career totals.

The Cowboys ended up 10-6, Prescott threw for 22 touchdowns against eight interceptions with a 96.9 passer rating. That last part, yes, he now has 18 rushing touchdowns, too.

There’s nothing to take credit for here prediction-wise. Prescott was simply right on the mark splitting the difference between his first two seasons. In other words, with all the changes he endured, from losing Bryant and Witten as targets, to his offensive line injuries and completely different (and fireable) blocking scheme, despite all of his mechanical and mental flaws, he still performed at an above average level.

His detractors focus on the micro, when the macro clearly has proven his sustainability despite his weaknesses and because of his strengths.

History of QBs who start well through 3 seasons

Now that we have a look at Prescott’s three-year stats, how does he compare to other franchise quarterbacks?

We know players whose stats and winning percentage match the early career of Prescott don’t normally regress, but do they always improve?

After all, that’s the biggest concern for those who oppose a long-term deal. They don’t believe Prescott will be better during the deal than he is right now.

Passing metrics for some of the best-paid veteran QBs are very interesting. What they did in their first three years, vs what they did in their next six seasons (a five-year extension on top of 2019 would mean six more years for Prescott), reveal support for the notion Prescott will continue to improve.

There are five recent quarterbacks who were full-time starters by their second season in the league and had similar success as Prescott in their first three years as starter: Ben Roethlisberger in Pittsburgh, Matt Ryan in Atlanta, Tom Brady in New England, Joe Flacco in Baltimore and Russell Wilson in Seattle.

The growth of these players from Starter Years 1 through 3, to Starter Years 4 through 9 is almost universal across both team record and five, key passing categories: touchdown percentage, interception percentage, adjusted net yards per attempt, completion percentage and passer rating. The only quarterback to regress from a strong start was Joe Flacco, who coincidentally was just traded this week.

Position Record TD% INT% ANY/A Completion % Passer Rating Rank Quarterback 1st 3 Next 6 1st 3 Next 6 1st 3 Next 6 1st 3 Next 6 1st 3 Next 6 1st 3 Next 6 Big Ben 29-11 58-28 5% 5% 4.2% 2.4% 6.19 6.56 62.4% 63.4% 87.9 94.5 Ryan 33-13 52-44 4.5% 4.8% 2.3% 2.2% 6.27 6.89 60.8% 66.6% 86.9 96.3 Brady 34-12 77-20 4.5% 6.1% 2.5% 2.1% 5.64 7.41 61.9% 64.5% 86 99.7 Flacco 32-16 51-39 4.2% 3.7% 2.4% 2.5% 5.96 5.66 62% 61.2% 87.9 83.1 Wilson* (4 YRS) 36-12 39-24-1 5.8% 6.2% 2.1% 1.8% 6.93 6.97 63.4% 64.8% 98.6 101.5

Hat Tip to former contributor @PercyHoward_ for reminding that the era these stats were achieved differ, and that a more fair evaluation would be to discuss passer rating based on rank.

The 6 QB w/ their rank in passer rating their 1st three years as starters (among the 32 QB w/ the most attempts in those seasons). Using rankings instead of raw ratings to eliminate cross-era confusion.

Wilson 4th

Brady 8th

Roethlisberger 9th

Prescott 10th

Ryan 12th

Flacco 14th — percyhoward (@percyhoward_) February 15, 2019

Four of the five took their teams to the Super Bowl in Starter Years 4 through 9, with Russell Wilson – who went twice in his first three years and has only had four more seasons since – the outlier.

Here’s a look at the separation in touchdown percentages to interception percentages:

Roethlisberger: +0.8% to +2.6% = 1.8% growth

Ryan: +2.2% to +2.6% = 0.6% growth

Brady: +2.0% to +4.0% = 2.0% growth

Flacco: +1.8% to +1.2% = -0.6% regression

Wilson: +3.7% to +4.4% = 0.7% growth

In other words, 80 percent of the second contracts doled out to young quarterbacks who won out the gate proved worth it.

This doesn’t even count the four starting QBs of this era who either didn’t start immediately or have a great record to begin their careers: Drew Brees and Philip Rivers for the Chargers, Aaron Rodgers and Cam Newton. Of these four, the only player who didn’t grow by leaps statistically was Newton, but his team record went from 25-23 to 43-30-1 in the next five years, including a Super Bowl appearance and with him winning league MVP.

Why should these bumps, consistent across almost every quarterback, not be expected for Prescott? Especially after looking at how he fared in his first three years against his peers.

Quarterback Record TD% INT% ANY/A Completion % Passer Rating Roethlisberger 29-11 5% 4.2% 6.19 62.4% 87.9 Ryan 33-13 4.5% 2.3% 6.27 60.8% 86.9 Brady 34-12 4.5% 2.5% 5.64 61.9% 86 Flacco 32-16 4.2% 2.4% 5.96 62% 87.9 Wilson 36-12 5.8% 2.1% 6.93 63.4% 98.6 Prescott 32-16 4.5% (t3) 1.7% (1) 6.56 (2) 67.7% (1) 96.0 (2)

Were Prescott to experience similar growth of the others in his group, he appears to be on the trajectory of one of the league’s top quarterbacks.

We get it now, pay Prescott. So what’s the contract look like?

We’ve established where we think Prescott’s guaranteed money floor will land if the deal is worked out before another eligible QB signs a blockbuster; $63.6 million. The second question is how much will he average per season, and the final question is how many years will the Cowboys tack on to allow ultimate flexibility.

$63.6 million guaranteed puts Prescott fourth behind Matt Ryan and Aaron Rodgers (deservedly so) and Kirk Cousins, who was in a unique situation to take advantage of the Vikings absolute stupidity and got a fully-guaranteed three-year contract for $84 million.

Prescott’s projection rightfully puts him above nice-stats-but-can’t-win Matt Stafford in Detroit, aging Alex Smith and unproven Jimmy Garappolo.

We can probably expect for the effective guarantee, new money associated with the years that contain full guarantee (think third year when part of the salary is guaranteed, which basically means the full year’s salary is all but guaranteed) to rival Cousins’ $84 million.

Question 2: Total AAV

This one ends up pretty easy in our eyes as well. Of all of the quarterbacks who have recently signed deals, does Prescott have better and more proven efficiency and leadership skills than them? All except for Rodgers and Ryan.

Who in their right mind could argue Stafford, Garappolo or Cousins is a better investment than Prescott is?

So without accounting for positional inflation, less than Ryan’s $30 million a year and more than Cousins $28 million a year. Look at that nice, neat number of $29 million a season.

Question 3: How many years

With the uncertainty of a CBA expiration and a labor strike and not knowing what could emerge from the other side, expect Dallas to give them as much rope as possible to spread cap hits around and keep Prescott in the fold should he ascend the way they expect. Again, if they release him prior to the end of the deal, the dead money is simply pushed-off expenses they reaped rewards for by having greater cap space to win with in the early years of the deal.

It’s not an issue.

We figure Dallas may choose to stick six years on top of Prescott’s one remaining, for a seven-year total where they can spread cap space out and keep his costs down in 2019, 2020 and 2021 if they want.

A seven-year deal, averaging $29 million brings the total value of the contract to $203 million. Dallas could sign him for less years, and he could in fact give them a hometown discount as mentioned above. All of those are real factors here.

Remember though, the guaranteed money of $63.6 million is based off two franchise tags. Dallas could escape the deal after the guaranteed money expires following the third season. The extra years just allow them the option to keep Prescott in house should he continue to progress at the rate of others who have started their careers the way he has.

Late adjustments to the projection

One caveat that I struggled with when defining the parameters of this deal was with the percentage of guaranteed money. When twitter user @Tjb_73 brought it up as well, I knew I had to circle back around to it.

As this projection is structured over seven seasons, the percentage of his contract which is guaranteed is far below the percentage of other quarterbacks atop the totem.

Prescott’s deal, as suggested, would have just 31.3 percent of it guaranteed. Keeping the AAV constant at $29 million, a five-year deal would’ve had a 43.9 percent guarantee.

Shorter Option: 5-year, $145 million, $63.6 million guaranteed.

Cousins 100 percent guarantee deal is going to be an outlier, but Rodgers (58.7 percent), Ryan (63 percent) and a litany of the other QBs are all above 40 percent.

CAA could demand that even though there is an effective guarantee in place, they want the real thing in order to commit their client for the next seven seasons. With the AAV being $29 million for the year, it would not shock to see the first three years of the deal approach $87 million, all guaranteed. That would move Prescott’s guaranteed percentage above 40 percent.

Longer More Likely Option: 7-year, $203 million total with $87 million guaranteed.

With a little wiggle room, of course.