In this undated photo released by Xinhua News Agency, a Chinese H-6K bomber patrols the islands and reefs in the South China Sea. Credit:AP But it's ultimately something much bigger than a slap in the face of the nations of South East Asia. "These are things that, a decade ago, the US would have been prepared to take military action to stop," suggests Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at ANU and former head of strategy at the Defence Department. Today, they produce nothing more than standard talking points from the public relations desk at the Pentagon. "The US remains committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific," said a spokesman. Barack Obama wasn't any more effective. Beijing simply ignored Obama's warnings it had to stop seizing disputed marine territories. There were no consequences. And Beijing brushed aside The Hague's ruling that there was "no legal basis" to its claim on the Spratley island group. Again, there were no consequences. Illustration: Dionne Gain "The art of Chinese strategy," says Hugh White, "is to slice the salami pretty thinly" taking small, incremental steps in gradual accumulation of territory and power. "But every few months they do something to show there's nothing the US can do or will do to stop them."

"China is demonstrating to its own people, to its neighbours, to the world that the US can no longer dictate what goes on," he tells me. "As they do, they demonstrate that the US is no longer the power it once was." Loading White prophesied in 2010 that, if sustained, China's rise "may mark the passing of the epoch of Western dominance of Asia that began five centuries ago, in 1498, when Vasco da Gama brought Portuguese naval power to India". And today? "We are not there yet, but we are clearly heading in that direction and we will keep heading in that direction unless the US does something decisive to change the state of play. I certainly don't see that from Donald Trump, or from any credible successor he might have." Apart from anything else, the US President is busy trying to cut a trade deal with China. And he's also relying on Chinese help as he tries to negotiate a nuclear arms deal with North Korea.

The Lowy Institute's Graham says that Beijing is "rolling out the capability while it has the political window". And what does this mean for Australia? Most political and media discussion of China in recent weeks has been devoted to discerning whether Australia has a problem in its relations with China. Peak hysteria was a newspaper column demanding that Malcolm Turnbull sack Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop because China relations were "now in the freezer". The author, Geoff Raby, a former Australian ambassador to Beijing, is now on the board of a Chinese state-controlled coal company and runs his own China-based consultancy. There are some signs of Beijing's displeasure with Australia - a go-slow on holding some high-level meetings, a go-slow in customs processing of Australian wine imports, some cranky lines in a hyper-nationalist Chinese newspaper - but it's hardly a crisis. Why might the Chinese be cross? Because the government criticised the Chinese Communist Party's covert foreign influence operations in Australia. Two points here. First, if the Chinese regime were seriously trying to punish Australia, we wouldn't have to guess. They'd impose real economic pain, as they did in boycotting South Korean music and movies, as they did in cutting off a key Philippines export, bananas.

Second, if the party were "punishing" Australia for standing up for itself, is it really the right reaction to self-flagellate? Is Australia that craven? White puts it this way: "The Chinese have only cleared their throat, and they've got us running around like chooks with our heads cut off."

Would China sack its foreign affairs minister for defending its national interests? While Raby and friends indulge in a cringing myopia, the Chinese Communist Party is using what White calls "brute power politics" to restructure the regional order. By landing its H-6K heavy bombers on Woody Island in the Paracel group, by putting anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles on three of the islands of the Spratly group, China's regime was asserting its intention to dominate the sea and air across the South China Sea, the world's most valuable commercial artery and Australia's chief trade lifeline. Former Australian ambassador to China Geoff Raby. Credit:Louie Douvis "There's no conceivable defensive rationale for putting these things on these islands," says Lowy's Graham. "It speaks very powerfully to power projection. They are literally putting markers down." And he says the touchdown of a heavy bomber in the Paracel group is likely "a prequel to combat aircraft deployments to the Spratlys", where Beijing has already built runways and hangars capable of taking large military craft.