There is a mistaken belief that differences between Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners on one hand and the United States on the other are deep and growing. Critics, whose numbers increased in the aftermath of unsettling post-2011 Arab Uprisings, honed on Riyadh as a source of profound instability allegedly because ultra-conservative interpretations of Islam promoted intolerance and militancy. While such unbecoming pronouncements reflected ignorance and, even worse, an unprecedented streak of spitefulness, because they mixed politics with theology — a deadly combination among every imaginable faith — few denied that Washington and Riyadh confronted serious dilemmas. Still, what mattered were core interests, which almost always determined policies.

Starting with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, American presidents weighed the Arab World’s importance, and though current US President Barack Obama recently told Jeffrey Goldberg that several allies in the Gulf — as well as in Europe — were “free riders” eager to drag Washington into grinding sectarian conflicts that did not promote American interests, the declaration reflected confusion. Of course, Obama chastised Saudi Arabia for not “sharing” the region with Iran and emphasised that both countries — that is both the Kingdom as well as the Islamic Revolutionary State — were guilty of fuelling proxy wars throughout the region, he nevertheless used convoluted prose that left the impression that Washington no longer perceived GCC states as allies.

Beyond the “free riders” insult, which cannot possibly pass for policy, what Obama conveyed in his carefully tailored Atlantic interview was the level of frustration he encountered with Arabs because the latter failed to play ball with his preferred options. Simply stated, Obama thought that Saudi Arabia and the GCC states as a whole ought to accept the American policy to bring Iran back from the cold and create a balance of power in the Muslim world between Sunnis and Shiites. His unassuming aim wished to exploit the Sunni-Shiite schism essentially to weaken, perhaps even destroy, Sunni power.

Why could GCC States not understand that popular revolts that intended to overthrow Arab Gulf monarchies were in US interests? How could reliable GCC allies not accept US support for the Muslim Brotherhood that toppled Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak who stood as an American ally for more than three decades? What was the GCC’s problem when Obama backtracked in 2013 on his infamous “red line” to act in Syria after it was conclusively determined that President Bashar Al Assad used chemical weapons to kill civilians?

Cynicism aside, Obama was flabbergasted that Riyadh raised doubts about the 2015 nuclear accord between Tehran and the five permanent United Nations Security Council members, which merely postponed by a decade the rise of a nuclear Iran. Under the circumstances, no one should be surprised when Saudi Arabia matches Iran in every step of the way, because it perceives the Islamic Revolutionary State as a threat to the stability of the entire Arabian Peninsula and well beyond it throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. The Obama team may not approve but such an outcome was tied to his recent policy preferences.

Moreover, and while an Iranian return to the international fold as a peaceful country was certainly a positive development, GCC states refused to bend in front of a regime that loathed them and, far more important, fomented internal dissent to usher in regime change. Of course, Obama does not see it that way and shows little sympathy for GCC states when he dismisses extremist threats orchestrated by Iran. He scorns those who demur to his nuclear deal with Iran, unwilling to concede that the moratorium will eventually necessitate robust follow-ups, long after his counsel would no longer be required.

A few days ago, the White House revealed that three specific sessions would be held between Obama and his GCC counterparts, to discuss (1) regional stability, (2) how to defeat Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and (3) what to do about Iran.

His team, which includes Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter, plans to deliberate with GCC defence leaders on the best ways to “enhance GCC capability, interoperability and how to confront asymmetrical threats”, all of which mean that a GCC-wide missile defence system is in the pipeline. Ironically, such improved military packages highlight how important GCC states were and why it was absolutely critical to protect them from regional hegemons. In short, the Obama Administration has realised that GCC states are valuable allies, even if the president is inclined to accept a blurred vision of their diminished significance to American national security.

In as much as Washington has entrusted its GCC allies — led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia — to shoulder their responsibilities to ensure regional stability, it cannot possibly impose its own interests on GCC states and demand that Saudi Arabia give in to its arch-enemy, Iran. Even if puzzling, Riyadh perceives Tehran as a source of peril and believes that the Sunni-Shiite theological schism is not ground for political surrender — something its leaders shunned.

Dr Joseph Kechichian is the author of the forthcoming From Alliance To Union: Challenges Facing Gulf Cooperation Council States In The Twenty-First Century (Sussex, July 2016).