GETTING the right tone in the negotiations over Britain’s departure from the European Union is a crucial element for their chances of success. Since the formal Article 50 talks began in Brussels on June 19th between David Davis, the Brexit secretary, and Michel Barnier, the European Commission’s Brexit pointman, the mood has been businesslike, not hostile. Yet it is also evident that other EU governments will cleave closely to the maximalist positions they set out in the negotiating mandate they gave to Mr Barnier.

Consider the response to the “generous” offer for EU citizens wishing to stay in Britain post-Brexit, which Theresa May outlined to fellow European leaders at a summit on June 22nd. A new “settled status” is to be created, the procedure to apply for it is to be simplified, and EU nationals who qualify will have most of the same rights as British citizens. Yet the offer was greeted stonily. Other leaders called it inadequate and vague, especially over the cut-off date. And they insisted that EU citizens must retain their existing rights and the protection of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It is hard to see any British government accepting this, since it would give EU citizens more privileges than Britons.

There may be a case for thinking that Mrs May’s offer is not as generous as she has claimed. Yet it is a lot better than it might have been. This points to two other reasons for the carping response. One is procedural. EU leaders do not want to discuss Brexit bilaterally or at every summit meeting, insisting instead on leaving the negotiations to Mr Barnier’s formal talks in which the other 27 can present a united front. Indeed, the likes of France’s Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Angela Merkel are eager to stress that such problems as economic reforms, fixing the euro and sorting out the allocation of refugees are far more important than Brexit, which they see largely as an act of self-harm that the British are going to have to live with.

The second is the view that, after the election, Mrs May’s government is weak and unstable. Other EU leaders are not sure if she will survive as prime minister, or whether there might be yet another early election. They see cabinet ministers in open dispute over the priorities for Brexit: on June 27th Philip Hammond, the chancellor of the exchequer, suggested in a speech in Berlin that Britain might stay in the customs union at least during a transitional period, whereas in London Mr Davis said the opposite. Moreover other EU leaders do not believe that there is a parliamentary majority for the hard Brexit that Mrs May is pursuing. Indeed, some still hope that, amid the muddle of the period leading up to the Article 50 deadline of March 29th 2019, Brexit might not happen at all. Several have gone out of their way recently to say that Britain would be welcome to change its mind.

This does not, however, mean that other EU governments are minded to be particularly generous over the conditions for Brexit. They believe that, with the Article 50 clock ticking, Britain is in a weak bargaining position. That is why Mr Davis was forced to accept Mr Barnier’s sequencing: the terms of the Article 50 divorce must largely be dealt with before any discussion of the future trading relationship. EU leaders do not want there to be no deal and a cliff-edge Brexit any more than the British government does. But they also reckon that, if it were to happen, by far the biggest loser would be Britain.

Mr Macron’s arrival as French president is interesting in this context. He is widely seen as liberal and Anglophile, as well as eager to reform France and work with Mrs Merkel to rev up the Franco-German motor. His advisers are clear that he wants to continue to co-operate closely with Britain on defence, security and counter-terrorism. Yet he is also a fervent pro-European who wants to keep the EU united and strong. Yves Bertoncini of the Delors Institute in Paris suggests that, far from being soft on Britain over Brexit, Mr Macron is more likely to play bad cop to Mrs Merkel’s good cop. The French are particularly concerned over the EU budget; they have always hated the British rebate. They will thus be especially tough in negotiations over the Brexit bill that Britain must pay.

Some British officials claim that a combination of Mr Macron’s arrival, better economic news across the continent, setbacks in many countries for populist anti-European parties and an uptick in the EU’s favourability rating among voters on the continent should be helpful for the Brexit negotiations. Talk of punishing Britain so as to demonstrate to other members of the club just how terrible the consequences of leaving would be has indeed largely evaporated. A strengthening euro zone is likely to reduce migration to Britain, which could ease the domestic pressure on Mrs May to negotiate a hard Brexit.

Yet better times in the EU will not make European leaders any readier to bend the rules to accommodate the Brexiteers. They will continue to insist that full participation in the single market must include both free movement of people and ECJ jurisdiction. They will firmly oppose cherry-picking by the British. And they will want to ensure that a post-Brexit Britain is in a worse situation than full membership.

All this implies difficult choices. As Pascal Lamy, a veteran former EU official and trade commissioner, puts it, the more that Britain once outside the single market enjoys unfettered trading access to the EU, the less sovereign independence it will have; conversely, the more sovereign independence that Britain secures, the less open will be its trade with the EU market. A year on from the referendum, it is a trade-off that most members of Mrs May’s government have yet to acknowledge.