Through the analysis of the consultations and documents, the study team has identified 6 major areas of lessons learned containing a total of 17 lessons. The 6 major areas are presented in Figure 1, as follows:

In our view, these are lessons that are yet to be learned, not lessons that have been learned through the course of the management and implementation of the TPA .

Two of the 6 major areas were identified as foundational to the overall success of the initiative. The most critical area is the “what” of the transformation (Initiative Definition). This is the big picture of the transformation, the conceiving of all the organizations, business processes, people, and information technology systems that will be involved and will undergo change. This big picture is then broken down into manageable components (usually projects) with a roadmap of how these will all unfold over the years of the transformation. Closely related is the second foundational area, Governance and Oversight, which is the high level “who” of the transformation and ensures that leadership, accountability, decision-making, engagement and oversight are appropriate for the “what” of the transformation.

If these 2 major foundational areas are addressed effectively in the earliest stages of the initiative, the transformation has a greater probability of being successful. The lessons learned from TPA highlight challenges in both Initiative Definition, as well as in Governance and Oversight.

The additional 4 major areas of lessons learned greatly influence the probability of success of the transformation initiative. Each of these major areas is critical to success. They cannot overcome flaws in the 2 major foundational areas, but the lessons learned in these areas are each essential to get right for transformation initiatives.

The lessons within Change Management also focus on the “who,” in terms of the people involved with and impacted by the transformation initiative. Change Management must surround and underpin the whole initiative and be treated as a fundamental component, being critical for buy-in from those affected by the change, and must support staff and managers to help them adapt to their changing roles.

The lessons within Business Case and Outcomes Management address the “why” of the transformation. The reasons for undertaking the transformation initiative and the outcomes of the transformation (including more than just costs and financial benefits) form commitments that then need to be assessed, adjusted and achieved so that the initial “why” is addressed throughout the transformation and not just at the beginning.

The lessons within the Initiative and Project Management area highlight aspects of “how” the transformation initiative and the projects within it are managed day-to-day over the years of the initiative. Although this is a mature area in the literature and there are many experienced practitioners both within and external to the Government of Canada, there are specific lessons learned coming from TPA in this area.

Capacity Management is the final of the major areas and addresses the need to explicitly manage the transformation of the workforce, the “who”, but emphasizing the knowledge and how that knowledge must be stewarded and developed as a critical resource.

The lessons under each of these major areas are described below.

Even in the absence of the identification of all the various discrete projects, a more holistic and inclusive approach to project, change and risk management would have addressed many of the issues encountered throughout the TPA lifecycle. Indeed, if a roadmap had been outlined, then a better staging of the various components could have been undertaken. The study team suggests that the staging of the components could have been:

The roadmap is a tool whereby each of the discrete projects would then be considered holistically. This would include not only project management, but when and how the concepts of change management and risk management would be brought in. It is the view of the study team that if the various discrete projects had been considered as a whole, the interrelationships and interdependencies would have been identified and could have been better managed and associated risks better mitigated.

When considering implementing a complex initiative, a roadmap is a high level description (which can be a graphic, a table or narrative) of the various components of the projects, along with the schedule, deliverables and interrelationships. Footnote 39 Leading practice suggests that a roadmap should be developed that is based on the discrete components that fully account for the proposed changes to all aspects of the operating model, as well as related projects.

To further illustrate the complexity of the environment within which the Government of Canada administers its pay and the resulting impact of this environment on the performance of pay under RPS , a benchmarking analysis undertaken by IBM compared the Government of Canada pay administration performance with industry performance in the areas of cost, efficiency and quality, and cycle time. Footnote 38 This study confirmed the complexity of the environment within which pay is administered in the Government of Canada and suggests that this complexity should have been addressed (at least in part) prior to implementing a new IT solution.

Cutting across all these elements was the establishment of a new service model for the administration of pay. Where before departments and agencies had compensation advisors internal to their organizations, these positions became centralized at PSPC for 45 departments and agencies. Footnote 37 However, the design of this service model (including culture, service standards, roles and responsibilities, governance, processes) did not address the full scope of the changes end-to-end across HR to Pay that would be required within individual departments and agencies, nor did the development of the service model fully address the diversity of practices within all departments and agencies.

Business processes, people/skills (including compensation advisors, others working in HR and managers with HR responsibilities), all users of the new IT solution (that is, all public servants), organizational culture, services and functions (for example, the transforming of the roles of managers and HR professionals in departments and agencies), quality and timely provision of HR data and related HR systems were also very significant areas of change in this initiative. While some of these other aspects were mentioned in the early documentation ( PWGSC ’s Report on Plans and Priorities for the 2010 to 2011 fiscal year that briefly discussed business processes), it was only in passing and no comprehensive plan for transformation was implemented.

However, the initiative implicated much more than these 2 aspects. The TPA Initiative was complex, broad, and highly dependent on the ability of a wide range of users to prepare for the transition, and adapt and change the way they carried out their HR and pay activities. While TPA documentation frequently referred to the complexity associated with the processes and business rules for pay, most of those consulted for the study admitted that very few people (other than compensation advisors) understood the degree of complexity associated with the day-to-day requirements to ensure accurate pay. The complexity of the HR to Pay process and how it would be transformed may have been understood in segments or silos but the overall management of the end-to-end process transformation from, for example entering HR data for an initial hiring offer, to the regular entry of overtime or other compensation actions, to paying employees and benefit providers (through an overall process owner Footnote 36 ) did not appear to be in place.

While each of the areas in this model was actually undergoing change as part of the TPA , the focus was almost wholly confined to the management of technology (the Pay Modernization project pertaining to development a new IT solution) and of organization (the Pay Consolidation project pertaining to the downsizing of the compensation advisors and establishment of the Pay Centre).

The hexagon in the centre contains the text “Federal Pay Operating Model.” Centred above it, the first smaller hexagon contains the text “Services, Functions and Processes.” Moving in a clockwise direction, the next five hexagons each contain text that describes another aspect. They are “Technology,” “Organization and Governance,” “Clients,” “Performance Management” and “People and Skills.”

This figure consists of a series of hexagons that is based on a model for the finance function developed by KPMG. There is one large hexagon in the background. Centred on each of the six sides of the large hexagon’s perimeter is a smaller hexagon. There is one small hexagon in the centre that contains text. Each hexagon on the large hexagon’s perimeter contains text that describes the six aspects of a model for the finance function.

3.2 Governance and oversight

Accountability: Assign accountability and authority to a single office Accountability is a relationship based on obligations to demonstrate, review, and take responsibility for performance, both the results achieved in light of agreed expectations and the means used. The principles of effective accountability are outlined below.Footnote 41 Clear roles and responsibilities The roles and responsibilities of the parties in the accountability relationship should be well understood and agreed upon. Clear performance expectations The objectives pursued, the accomplishments expected, and the operating constraints to be respected (including means used) should be explicit, understood, and agreed upon. Balanced expectations and capacities Performance expectations should be clearly linked to and balanced with each party’s capacity (authorities, skills, and resources) to deliver. Credible reporting Credible and timely information should be reported to demonstrate what has been achieved, whether the means used were appropriate, and what has been learned. Reasonable review and adjustment Fair and informed review and feedback on performance should be carried out by the parties, achievements and difficulties recognized, appropriate corrections made, and appropriate consequences for individuals carried out. Lesson 3 Assign accountability and authority for a multi-department/agency or government-wide transformation initiative to a single minister and deputy head, with the accountabilities, authorities, roles and responsibilities of other implicated organizations being designed, documented and implemented as part of an overall accountability framework. From the perspective of roles and responsibilities, as noted previously in Lesson 1, the overall undertaking within the Government of Canada to transform the compensation environment was shaped by reducing of the scope of the transformation to be simply the 2 projects under the TPA . Accountability for both projects under the TPA (that is, Pay Modernization and Pay Consolidation) was assigned to PSPC . As noted previously, its roles and responsibilities as the overall lead were sought by the Minister of Public Works and Government Services in 2009, and granted, following the normal challenge process of the TBS . However, as noted in Lesson 1, the actual scope of the undertaking to transform the compensation environment, which involved much more than these 2 projects, was not well understood. One result of the too-narrow scope was an incomplete accountability framework for the transformation. The roles and responsibilities of additional parties with accountabilities for the broader areas (namely TBS along with departments and agencies) were not effectively designed, documented nor implemented as part of an overall accountability framework. An important party in the transformation of the compensation environment was the deputy head community responsible for leading affected departments and agencies. Deputy heads are accountable for their own organizations and therefore, for the implementation of TPA within their organizations. However, the study team learned that most deputy heads were not aware of most of their responsibilities with respect to the TPA , particularly ensuring new business processes introduced by the CHRBP initiative were fully understood and implemented, and also implementing change management more broadly. Moreover, most deputy heads did not realize the extent of the changes being introduced by the initiative and the corresponding risks to their organization and to their employees’ pay. Reasons for this varied but the most commonly mentioned factor was that there were many change initiatives underway at the time and TPA was not identified to deputy heads as being more important than any other. Also, briefings provided by PSPC throughout the initiative were generally positive and, other than raising concerns on the need to ensure HR data was accurate, did not raise any red flags or other reasons to warrant more deputy head attention. Another principle of effective accountability is that of balanced expectations and capabilities; that is that performance expectations should be clearly linked to and balanced with each party’s capacity (authorities, skills, knowledge and resources) to deliver. PSPC sought and was granted the accountability to carry out both projects on behalf of the Government of Canada. However, it did not appear that the authority to ensure that the full scope of changes to occur throughout the whole of the Government of Canada was either recognized as being needed nor was it given to or assumed by any one organization. So although PSPC had the accountability to deliver on TPA , neither PSPC nor any other organization was able to exercise the necessary authority to make this happen. With PSPC not being able to exercise the overall authority (neither at the deputy minister nor ministerial level) over the full scope of the transformation of the compensation environment, the senior coordinating body for the transformation success appeared to fall to the Public Service Management Advisory Committee ( PSMAC ).Footnote 42 PSMAC regularly received updates on TPA and even served as a sounding board for deputy head concerns about the project; however, the committee could not be accountable for the initiative. No one individual or governance body was assigned the authority to ensure the necessary steps were being taken to ensure the overall success of the initiative. In a government-wide initiative such as the transformation of compensation, it is clear that an effective and comprehensive accountability framework should explicitly include the authorities and roles of TBS , departments and agencies, as well as of any organizations leading specific projects within the initiative. The accountability framework should also clearly state where the overall accountability rests for the full scope of the transformation initiative. This overall accountability should be specified at both the ministerial and deputy head level. The actual selection of the appropriate minister, deputy head and organization for overall accountability is complex and would likely depend on the particular transformation initiative. At the moment, it does not appear that any one organization has the necessary accountability, authority and capabilities to carry out such a role in future transformations. Given that these could be adjusted, one possibility to consider would be TBS , given its “general manager” role.Footnote 43 It could assume the overall accountability for such government-wide transformation initiatives. Other possibilities could be a lead client department/agency or the department/agency leading the major project(s) within the initiative. In each case, accountabilities, authorities and capabilities would need to be addressed.

Governance: Establish broad and inclusive governance Governance refers to how an organization makes and implements decisions.Footnote 44 Governance is complex and fluid and complicated by the fact that it involves multiple actors who are the organization’s stakeholders. They articulate their interests, influence how decisions are made, who the decision-makers are and what decisions are made. Decision-makers must consider this input and are then accountable to those same stakeholders for the organization’s output and the process of producing it.Footnote 45 Lesson 4 Establish governance that fully reflects the broad range of stakeholders affected by the entire initiative. For example, a committee with membership from the end-to-end process owner, the organization(s) leading projects, and different types of stakeholders (such as departments/agencies, representatives of affected functional communities and policy centres) should oversee the initiative. According to documentation received from PSPC during the lessons learned study, the Pay Modernization project included the following governance mechanisms: Senior Project Advisory Committee ( SPAC )

) Risk Management Oversight Committee ( RMOC )

) Executive Management Team

Change Agent Network

External Advisory Committee

TPA Union Management Committee ( TPAUMC ) The initiative’s governance (and decision-making) was led by PSPC but did not reflect the full scope of the areas undergoing change in the initiative. In particular, most governance was focused on the Pay Modernization project rather than the Pay Consolidation project. Documentation from PSPC indicates that the Pay Modernization governance bodies ( SPAC and RMOC ) received Pay Consolidation updates starting in fall of 2013. Thus, there was really no overall governance body for the TPA as a whole. Such an overall governance body, established at the outset of the initiative, should have had participation from PSPC , various players at TBS (such as OCG and OCHRO ) and departments and agencies. One of the key gaps in the governance structure was the lack of decision-making involvement of an HR to Pay process owner. Leading practice would suggest that there should be a defined accountability for the end-to-end process, in this case the HR to Pay compensation process and that this process owner should be part of governance. The SPAC and RMOC , being only advisory bodies and being focused almost exclusively on the Pay Modernization project did not fully consider the HR to Pay process. While all those consulted for the study agreed that PSPC was not the HR to Pay process owner, there was little consensus regarding who the process owner was, whether OCHRO or OCG . Regardless, while being members of the SPAC , OCHRO and OCG rarely attended meetings. Leading practice would see external service providers (that is, firms) included as observers/members in governance bodies. According to documentation received, an External Advisory Committee was struck to provide strategic advice and guidance to the Minister and Pay Modernization project executives. It met 8 times and included 2 to 3 external members representing private sector companies. This committee received project updates at their meetings and provided advice to the project team. The Change Agent Network was the product of combining the Empowering Change Network (established for the Pay Modernization project) and the Change Agent Network (established for the Pay Consolidation project). The purpose was to share information with departments/agencies, which could then be used to brief up and throughout the organization. It was composed of representatives of all departments and agencies affected by Pay Modernization. While organizations were encouraged to appoint individuals at a manager level or above, this was not the case for many organizations. In fact, some organizations appointed people at a much more junior (for example, AS-02) level. Additionally, attendance by many departments and agencies was uneven with some organizations hardly attending at all and other attending frequently. Generally, attendance by departments and agencies was good until October 2015 when attendance dropped to less than 50%. However, the change agents consulted as part of the study (at all levels) felt that they did not completely understand their role (as the primary point of contact between PSPC and their organization) and that information provided at meetings was not clear or adequate to allow organizations to fully understand the status of the projects or their role, particularly pertaining to change management. The TPAUMC was established in early 2011 based on a request from the Public Service Alliance of Canada ( PSAC ) for meaningful consultation on the TPA with a view to minimizing the adverse effects on employees. The committee met at least quarterly from 2011 to the end of 2015. While no one consulted from PSPC or TBS mentioned this committee during the consultations for this study, PSAC spoke about the committee at length. While the union felt the committee was a very useful forum for discussing the workforce adjustment impact of the TPA on existing compensation advisors, the union did not feel the Government of Canada representatives were responsive to the concerns raised by the union at the committee about the rollout of TPA . According to PSAC , PSPC did not share key documents with the committee that would have likely led to red flags early on in the process. Additionally, according to PSAC , PSPC never wavered from its plan that the Pay Centre could be run by 550 employees, despite numerous concerns raised by the union at meetings of the committee. While not a formal part of TPA governance, over the timeframe of the initiative, the project executives presented to PSMAC 7 times. According to many of those consulted for the study, PSMAC was often used as a senior governance body for the initiative. That is, PSMAC was asked to determine departmental readiness for go-live and to provide advice about key project milestones. However, members of PSMAC , having only received a limited number of briefings and not being completely attuned to the various initiative (and project) nuances, were not well-placed to provide this kind of advice. It is the opinion of the study team that the use of existing enterprise-wide advisory or information sharing bodies (such as PSMAC ) should not be regarded as a substitute for governance of such significant transformation initiatives.