1. Trump's Victory. Without a doubt, Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential elections was the most significant defense-related event for the Middle East in the past year – at least as far as Israel is concerned.

The commitment of the USA to Israel stems, first and foremost, from the massive support of the American public (according to the latest surveys initiated by the Israeli embassy in Washington, not less than 60% of the American public support Israel's positions), and it was demonstrated even during the reign of the outgoing president, Barack Obama. Fact: Obama made a crucial contribution to Israel's massive acquisition of Iron Dome missile defense systems, and during the last month of Obama's tenure in the White House, Israel became the first country in the world to receive the first two aircraft out of two future squadrons of F-35 future fighters.

At the same time, what is currently conceived as the warm feelings of the new administration toward Israel, as opposed to the hostility (or at least correctness) of President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry will have a significant effect on Israel's strategic situation. The region's important power factors will now reckon that the US commitment to Israel is unreserved, and that the way to reach the heart of the administration in Washington once again passes through Jerusalem – as it did in the past.

But there are risks, too: Trump is true to a line according to which the American interests override anything else. He is unpredictable and may even decide that the Middle East is of no interest whatsoever to the USA.

On the face of it, it appears that the pros of Trump's election, as far as the Israeli defense establishment is concerned, outweigh the cons. Here is an example: last July, Israel and the USA signed a new defense aid agreement for a period of 10 years, in the amount of US$ 3.7 billion per year. The agreement prescribes that Israel cannot approach the US Congress with any future requests for additional/special aid, and that as of the fifth year it would not be able to exchange even a single dollar into ILS for procurement in Israel (at present, 20% of the US aid funds are exchanged to ILS and Israel is allowed to use 80% of the funds exclusively for procurement in the USA). This clause of the aid agreement is a cause for deep concern among the Israeli defense industries, as it will reduce the scope of procurement from them – but now it seems likely that the new administration will improve the terms of the agreement.

More importantly, the Obama administration was conceived in the Middle East as unfaithful to its allies (for example, the Egyptian President, Mubarak, who was abandoned to face his fate in 2011). President Trump may demonstrate a higher level of commitment to his allies, just as the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, did not hesitate to fight on behalf of the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, in the context of the civil war in Syria.

Above all, Trump's election will have a decisive effect on the issue of the Iranian nuclear program. Evidently, Israel had objected mightily to the agreement between the superpowers and Iran. The prevailing estimate maintains that it is only a matter of time before Iran once again strives to acquire nuclear weapons, as North Korea did before it, despite the agreement it had signed with the USA.

Evidently, Trump had strongly opposed the agreement with Iran. Once he becomes President, the very least that can be expected is that the Iranians will be apprehensive about cheating the superpowers and pressing on with their nuclear program, and that if it turns out that they continue to strive for the bomb – the new government will not respond by drafting another agreement with them, but would make a decisive military or diplomatic move.

2. Vladimir Putin. The Russian President made the most of the vacuum left by the Obama administration in the Middle East. This year, Putin sat for hours at an evening commemorating the 25th anniversary of the renewal of diplomatic relations between Russia and Israel at the Bolshoi theater in Moscow, and Israeli parties who were there with him, at this and at other opportunities (including meetings attended by the Israeli Prime Minister, the IDF Chief of Staff and the Head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate earlier this year), are convinced that Putin has warm feelings toward Israel (in a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in the previous decade, Putin even said, half-jokingly, that he was committed to the security of the many Russians who had immigrated to Israel).

But, sentiments are one thing and interests are quite another. Russia's interests begin by exerting pressure on the West to lift the economic sanctions imposed on Russia pursuant to the invasion of the Crimean Peninsula, and end in joint military maneuvers with China – a message to the USA.

In the Middle East, the Russians' topmost interest was the establishment of an aerial base in Syria, in addition to the naval base they already had in Lattakia – and they accomplished that objective in 2016. This is the background for Putin's unreserved support for Assad, which seems to lead to a decisive outcome in the civil war in Syria. The disturbing images coming out of the defeated city of Aleppo in December 2016 have drawn world attention to the horrors of the Syrian civil war.

The time has come to say it: the civil war in Syria is one of the most vicious in the history of the world's wars, with hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries and millions of refugees. Relative to the destruction and the severity of the war crimes (including the use of chlorine as a chemical warfare agent and air strikes against civilian objectives in the style of World War II) – the global indifference is shocking. The war in Syria concerns the Europeans mainly in the context of the refugees flooding the continent. The USA lost interest almost completely, leaving the scene, as stated, for Putin.

The war is about to end with Russia holding permanent naval and aerial bases in Syria, including cutting-edge air-defense systems that cover the entire territory of Israel and challenge the freedom of operation IAF had enjoyed for decades. Hezbollah had sustained thousands of deaths and injuries in Syria – but gained extensive combat experience. The Golan Heights remain a territory where the members of al-Qaeda and ISIS operate, with only a minor presence of the Syrian regime on the Syrian part of Mount Hermon.

The implications of the war in Syria are particularly dramatic for Turkey, which is determined to prevent the establishment of a de-facto Kurdish state along the border between Turkey and what was once the great Syrian state.

3. President al-Sisi of Egypt, King Abdullah II of Jordan & the Leaders of the Third Circuit. Against the background of instability along the border between Israel and Syria, it is disconcerting to imagine a situation where the IDF had to allocate substantial forces to defend Israel's longest border lines – those with Jordan and Egypt.

The fact that both of these countries, which have peace agreements with Israel, are currently governed by fairly stable regimes, makes a decisive contribution to Israel's national security. Both Jordan and Egypt maintain close defense/security relations with Israel. All three countries share common interests.

In Jordan, King Abdullah II managed to maintain the stability of his regime for this past year, despite the presence of more than a million refugees from Syria, the threats by ISIS and the internal agitation the erupts around the kingdom every once in a while. The bottom line, as far as Israel is concerned, is this: the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan constitutes an important buffer that keeps the chaos of Iraq and south-eastern Syria away from our borders.

In Egypt, President al-Sisi fights the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the forces of ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Sinai. Despite the heavy losses sustained by the Egyptian security forces, the past year has consolidated the domination of the Egyptian regime along the border with Israel in the Sinai Peninsula.

The Egyptian regime is also engaged in a bitter war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip – the ally of the Muslim Brotherhood. After many years, the Egyptian authorities finally managed to destroy most of the underground tunnels linking the Egyptian part of the city of Rafah and the part of the city dominated by Hamas inside the Gaza Strip. Through these measures, Egypt makes it hard for Hamas to gain power, as they can no longer smuggle arms into the Gaza Strip from Libya and Iran as they did in the past.

Looking at the wider circles, 2016 was an excellent year for Israel's defense/security relations with countries with similar interests. Even with Turkey, governed by the Muslim Brotherhood party, Israel managed to sign a reconciliation agreement with positive regional implications in 2016.

4. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). The importance of countries near and far notwithstanding, Israeli national security begins with the relations with the Palestinian neighbors. By late 2016, the knife attack terrorism has diminished. From a long-term perspective, the Fatah congress held in late November 2016 was extremely important as it marked the beginning of the fierce internal struggle over the future successor of Mahmoud Abbas, the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority.

The 81-year-old Palestinian leader was elected for an additional five-year term, but the chances of him remaining in office until the end of this term are regarded as very slim. The war of succession, whose champions are Mohammed Dahlan, hated by both Abu Mazen and Hamas, and Marwan Barghouti, who's serving a succession of consecutive life imprisonment sentences in an Israeli prison, will be highly influential with regard to Israeli national security unless another surge of terrorism using old-new tactics has erupted even earlier.

Incidentally, Hamas is also facing the process of electing a successor to the head of their political arm, Khaled Mashal, who resides in Qatar and is about to complete his term in office. Until Mahmoud Abbas has vacated the stage, he demonstrates that he continues to be an effective leader who says what he means and means what he says: he does not believe in terrorism as the way to accomplish the Palestinian national goals – but does whatever he can to entangle Israel on the international political arena.