Does the Divine exist ?



prolegomena to a possible religious philosophy © Wim van den Dungen Can the transcendent be conceptualized ? No. Is the world conserved & intelligently designed ? Yes. Is there gnosis beyond atheism & agnosticism ? Yes. "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen."

Wittgenstein, L. : Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , 7. Table of Contents



Abstract

Introduction



1. Windows on the traditional proofs of God.



1.1 Aristotle on the Supreme Being.

1.2 To battle over universals.

1.3 Anselm of Canterbury's ontological proof.

1.4 The "quinque viis" of Thomas Aquinas.

1.5 Ockham's first Conserver.

1.6 Cusanus and the coincidentia oppositorum.

1.7 The Cartesian proofs of God.

1.8 David Hume and the cause of order.

1.9 Kant and the architect of the world.



2. A revised ontological proof of Divine existence ?



2.1 Kant and the ontological proof.

2.2 Phenomenology and the question of Being.

2.3 The logic of the revised proof.

2.4 Process philosophy and God.

2.5 The a priori argument rejected.



3. Towards an exposure of the Divine.



3.1 The Münchhausen-trilemma in science & religion.

3.2 The genetic approach to knowledge.

3.3 The argument from design - the anthropic principle.

3.4 The "Anima Mundi" and the worship of Nature.

3.5 Memorial & wager-argument of Pascal.

3.6 Uncertain objectivity in authentic existence.

3.7 Objective chance.

3.8 The case of Raja Yoga.

3.9 The God-spot : a brain wired for the Divine.

3.10 Atheism - agnosticism - gnosis.



Bibliography Abstract



Can logical atheists, arguing against the existence of the Divine, be refuted ? Can the concept of a theist, omnipotent, omniscient & transcendent God be made meaningless ? Is a rational discourse on the Divine possible ? Answering these three questions with a yes is the aim of this essay.



Studying movement, Aristotle conjectured a Supreme Being. Rooted in fideism and Platonism, Anselm of Canterbury tried to prove God's existence a priori, from mere concepts. Thomas Aquinas offered five arguments a posteriori intended to help believers apologize Divine existence by observing the world. Like Ockham, Kant argued with success the impossibility of any possible proof of a transcendent God, but like the Franciscan, accepted a highest cause in the finite order of actual things. Although no definite concept of it is possible, its greatness, intelligence and conserving power can be admired.



What formerly was called "cognitio experimentalis Dei", although deemed possible, is limited by genetico-cognitive criteria, leading up to a "desperate leap" (Kant) or a "leap of faith" (Kierkegaard), and a reevaluation of the "psychic mechanism" (Breton) advocated by surrealism and put into practice by the Dadaists. First Patañjali's yoga is taken as a historical, non-Western, example of a common religious practice of spiritual emancipation and experience, and then the neurological structures computing this are referenced.



These considerations lead to a re-evaluation of "atheism" and "agnosticism", bringing to the fore the quest for a gnostic (Hermetical) interpretation of the existence of the Divine, in terms of an immanent metaphysics of becoming (cf. Whitehead) and a henotheist pan-en-theism. The experience of the unity of the world serves as the exclusive stepping-stone to a non-conceptual, mystical experience of outwordliness and transcendence. These exceptional experiences, so do mystics testify, may be poured in non-propositional statements of the most sublime poetic excellence, exemplaric of God. This pataphysics is suggestive, intimate, subtle, tactful and non-directive. True religion is applied poetry. Introduction



"How can cosmic religious feeling be communicated from one person to another, if it can give rise to no definite notion of a God and no theology ? In my view, it is the most important function of art and science to awaken this feeling and keep it alive in those who are receptive to it."

Einstein, A. : "Religion and Science", New York Times Magazine , 9 XI 1930.



§ 1



According to Sextus Empiricus, it was the skeptic Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 365 - 275 BCE) who taught that conflicts between two (or more) criteria of truth automatically lead to an apory or an antinomy, i.e. a contradiction posed by a group of individually plausible but collectively inconsistent propositions. The truth of a given criterion can only be argued using true propositions. But, whenever a given criterion is justified, a petitio principii or circular argument is involved. Discussions about the criterion of truth are therefore unending and without solution.



This holds true within and between the monotheist religions, based on a criterion of truth rooted in a particular "revelation" of "God", called "Adonai" by the Jews, "Father" by the Christians and "Allah" by the Muslims.



Ad intra. Catholics claim the New Testament is true because Jesus and the authors of these books were inspired by the Holy Spirit and thus expressed the "Word of God". Because of this, the New Testament is absolutely true (Ratzinger : Dominus Iesus , § 8). But why believe God is the author, and not some malin génie ? Because these books say so. Muslims claim the Koran is the last and most true revelation of God. Why ? Because God said this to His prophet Muhammad. How do we know this ? Because the Koran says so, and authors claiming the presence of Satanic verses in it should be executed.



Ad extra. As major differences between these faiths occur, no truth-bearing communication is possible between them, for none will relinquish the "sacred" set of beliefs adhered to, and this despite the conflicts with the other revelations (of the same God). For example, the ontological identity between Jesus Christ and God will never be accepted by the Jews and the Muslims, whereas the revelation of the Koran to Muhammad by God will never be accepted by the Christians, who see Christ as the fulfillment of Judaism. Neither is it likely for them to ever change their core dogma's. Because of this, in every communication, an implicate, silent and hidden a-symmetry will be maintained by both sides, each considering the other as holding a lesser truth, a lesser view on God. Hence, only strategic action is possible, but truth-bearing communicative deeds are out of the question.



This emphatically points to the pivotal importance of science in a possible religious philosophy, for ecumenism is bound to book marginal advances only, which, given the popularity of the Abrahamic "religions of the book", nevertheless may be of crucial practical significance (like peace).



§ 2



The existence of God is the propositional core of the doctrine of theology. God is not merely symbolical, but always theo-ontological, not only restricted to myth, language and mentalities, but involving nature, humanity and the future of creation. One cannot worship God if there is not something worthy to be worshipped. To not take the proposition "God exists" literally, is equal to not believing in the existence of God, which is the thesis of historical atheism. The matter of God's existence is the core dogma of all possible theologies and its "proof" the task of religious philosophy.



To facilitate the entire argument, let us avoid a relative treatment of the subject, i.e. one posited from the perspective of a single theological system of beliefs among many. Hence, in what follows, "the Divine" is divorced from the exclusive milieu of Abrahamic monotheocentrism (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). The question is not : "Does the God of Abraham exist ?", but : "Does the Divine exist ?". This intention calls into being the "fuzzy" set called "Divine", encompassing all possible supernatural entities (like the Abrahamic God, Hindu, Jain, Shinto, Taoist, Shamanist Divinities, etc.), as well as all natural entities with unequivocal supernatural capacities (like the Buddha, Guru's, Masters, etc.). Logical concerns thus invite the non-casual use of the word "God", suggestive of historical monotheocentrism and religious philosophy (cf. the "God of the Philosophers").



Hence, the words "Divine" and "Divinity" will cover monotheism, henotheism and polytheism, yes, even non-theist Buddhism. The complete fuzzy set of the Divine is targeted when we ask : "Does God exist ? Do Gods exist ? Does the Buddha exist ?", in short : "Does the Divine exist ?" Atheism then, is the denial of Divine existence, exceeding the rejection of the Abrahamic, sole God Alone, but covering the whole range of mystical, religious and spirito-communal phenomena in all religions of all times. To better identify the contents of this fuzzy set, let us distinguish between four historical theo-ontological models of the Divine : Semitic model : God is One & Alone. He, the sole God, is an unknown and unknowable Divine Person, Who Wills good & evil alike (cf. Judaism & Islam ), calling man to do what is good ; Greek model : God is a Principle of principles, the best of the best (Plato), the unmoved mover (Aristotle), the One even ecstasy does not reveal, impersonal and in no way evil or tainted by absence or privation of being (Plotinus), the First Intellect (Ibn Sina), a "God of the philosophers" (Whitehead). This abstract God figures in intellectual theologies, in humanism & in atheism. In the latter, by the "alpha privativum" of the Divine, as in a-theism, an absolute term is produced, but this time by negation instead of by affirmation ; Christian model : God is One essence in Three Persons : God the Father revealed by God's incarnated Son, Jesus Christ, because, in and with God the deifying Holy Spirit. A God of Love, never impersonal, always without evil (pure of heart) and sole cause of goodness ( Christianity ) ; Or iental model : God, The All, is One sheer Being present in every part of creation in terms of a manifold of impersonal & personal Divine Self-manifestations (theophanies), as we see in Ancient Egypt , Alexandrian Hermetism (gnosis), Paganism, Hinduism (Vedanta), Taoism & Hermeticism. § 3



Also in science, the problems posed by skepticism had to be addressed. Especially since Kant, the question "What can I know ?" has been crucial. The apory between "realism" and "idealism" (cf. Rules ) is also without final result. The foundational approach favored since the Greeks has caused a pendulum movement between two criteria of truth (consensus versus correspondence). To move beyond this, the antinomic problems of justificationism (foundational, fundamentalist thinking within science) must be clear : if, on the one hand, real "sense data" are the only building-blocks of "true" knowing, as realism maintains, then why is the definition of the word "sense datum" not a sense datum ? Also : how can a "naked" or "raw" sense datum be observed if our mental framework co-constitutes our observation ? If, on the other hand, ideal linguistic symbols and speech-situations are the exclusive arena of truth, as idealism maintains, then how can knowledge be knowledge if it is in no way knowledge of something (i.e. a "res" and not only "flatus voci") ?



A focus of truth "behind the mirror" (as Kant put it) comes within reach if and only if both perspectives, experiment (correspondence, objectivity) and argumentation (consensus, intersubjectivity) are used together, and this in a regulative, non-constitutive (unfoundational) way. The criterion of truth is not justified by a sufficient ground outside knowledge, but by discovering the normative principles governing all possible knowledge. The latter are bi-polar but interactive and never exclusive, as 19th century, Newtonian scientific thinking claimed. Insofar as either realism or idealism are accepted, the logical problems of science's truth claim do not exceed the religious criterion of truth. It cannot escape the apory as long as it identifies with objectivity at the expense of subjectivity and intersubjective symbolization (as in logical positivism, materialism, scientism, instrumentalism, reductionism and epiphenomenalism) or with subjectivity and intersubjective symbolic activities with disregard for entities independent of the human sphere (as in spiritualism). Facts are not only experimental and not only argumentative. Empirico-formal object-knowledge is always the product of two vectors at work simultaneously. Not because of some ulterior reason, but because it must be so and has always been so.



The problems of foundational thinking are summarized by the Münchhausen-trilemma. It proves how every possible kind of foundational strategy is logically flawed. For every time a theory of knowledge accommodates the postulate of foundation, three equally unacceptable situations occur. A justification of proposition P is a deduction with P as conclusion. How extended must this deductive chain be in order to justify P ? regressus ad infinitum :

there is no end to the justification, and so no foundation is found ; petitio principii :

the end is implied by the beginning, for P is part of the deduction ; circularity is a valid deduction but no justification of P, hence no foundation is found ; abrogation ad hoc :

justification is ended ad hoc, the postulate of justification is abrogated, and the unjustified sufficient ground is accepted because as it is so certain, it needs no justification. Kant's epistemology is a attempt to adhere to the postulate of foundation, for synthetic judgments a priori are rooted in the cognitive, categorial apparatus of the subject of experience, without which no thinking is possible. These categories hold true for the object of experience insofar as this object is constituted in observation by our capacity of observation and knowledge. For Kant, scientific knowledge (empirico-formal propositions) does not deal with reality-as-such, but with reality-for-us. However, as relativity & quantum mechanics disagree with the principles of Newtonian physics Kant thought to be anchored in our minds, it becomes clear these categories are not absolutely certain and not a priori. Kant's attempt to anchor science failed.



It took more than a century before the antinomy between realism and idealism was critically superseded by a normative theory on the possibility and the production of knowledge. In contemporary scientific practice, scientific facts are the outcome of two simultaneous vectors, on the one hand, objective experiments and their repetition, and, on the other hand, intersubjective communication between the community of sign-interpreters. Logic provides a few a priori conditions, related to form, clarity and elegance of the symbols of the theory. Epistemology adds a few objective and intersubjective criteria and the local research-unit will foster a series of a posteriori rules of thumb. Nevertheless, despite all possible care, scientific knowledge cannot be absolutist or radical, but instead delicate, prudent & provisional.



Hence, empirico-formal knowledge, or knowledge of facts, is conditional, relative, hypothetical and historical, although a clear theory, explaining lots of phenomena will (provisionally) always be called "true", meaning "very probable", not "certain". A set of such theories will constitute a tenacious scientific paradigm, covering entities which "kick" and "kick back". But things may change ...



"It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow : and this means that we do not know whether it will rise."

Wittgenstein, L. : Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , 6.36311.



§ 4



Historical atheism, the proposition denying the existence of the Divine, has attacked its counter-thesis on several fronts : theology :

There are conflicting revelations and faiths. This makes every fundamental theology trivial ; theodicy :

If the Divine is deemed good, then the massive amount of evil history records could not exist, so the Divine is nonexistent ; irrationality :

The theologies of the world evidence triviality, lack of elegance, inefficiencies, major contradictions and apories, absence of fact and poor argumentation, in short : irrationality ; criterion of truth :

A religious criterion of truth cannot be justified, for the attempt will always entail a circular argument ; logic :

It can logically be demonstrated the existence of the Divine is either an empty set or untrue. science :

The existence of the Divine is not corroborated by contemporary science. Contra 1



In a philosophical context, fundamental theology is unnecessary. The revelations and their dogmatic theologies are not the only possible superstructures of direct spiritual experience. Conflicts between superstructures prove the point of mysticology : the phenomena of spirituality have to be put in the center, not their symbolization. Fundamental theologies are indeed trivial. Moreover, they are the origin of fanaticism, closed mindedness, reactionary reflexes and misplaced conservatism. In the context of monotheism, they have been the cause of too many bloody conflicts. Religious philosophy in tune with reason is deeply "protestant", and thus against the canonization and eternalization of spiritual symbolizations, instead promoting the idea of permanent revolution and personal experience.



Contra 2



Directed against Christianity, this argument is valid and strong. The goodness of God cannot be reconciled with the massive presence of evil and death, despite Christ. Tertullian's "Credo quia absurdum est" is the only escape for Christian philosophy, for all the rest is vanity. The just order of the good God and the NAZI death camps form an eternal conflict. Unfortunately, the latter were real.



A religious philosophy in harmony with reason will necessarily have to accept the evil, dark side of the Divine. Divine wrath cannot be avoided if we wish to understand why omnipotence allows us to suffer as we do. To acknowledge this dark side, does not negate the possibility of Divine goodness. Instead of the Platonic "agathon", a balance of Divine attributes prevails. To confess a theological impasse, no "mysterium inequitatis" needs to be invoked. The inability to escape this dead-end, causes a spiritual standstill, a dangerous deadlock in which most world religions fossilize.



Contra 3



Irrationality implies an open conflict with reason. This can be in terms of the norms of thought, affect and action, trivial complexities, multiplication of entities or operators, lack of elegance, inefficient paraconsistency, major contradictions and apories. Irrationality may also manifest as absence of fact and/or poor argumentation.



Unfortunately, in terms of the questio facti, the religions have indeed excelled in irrationality. This has many causes. A religious philosophy has to pose the questio iuris, and first investigate the possibility of a possible knowledge of the Divine. The fact most (if not all) world religions failed to ask about their proper limitations, does not imply religious philosophy has to follow their example, quite on the contrary. The challenge is this : is true religious knowledge possible ? If we limit ourselves to history, the answer will surely be negative.



Contra 4



As long as this argument is raised in the context of the foundational view on science, it may cause harm in all forms of religious knowledge, for its logic is flawless. Circular arguments cannot justify knowledge, but nothing can. If this is not understood, and reality (or ideality) is deemed the rock bottom of knowledge, i.e. a sufficient ground to stop the chain of justification ad hoc, then the circular arguments of fundamental theology are considered inferior to those of science. Then science becomes the only game leading up to true propositions, either as "real facts" or as "ideal symbols". Epistemology has made null the pretence to absolute knowledge, i.e. the complete identity between "real" and "ideal", between "experiment" and "theory".



Scientific knowledge is a system of empico-formal propositions involving "facts" produced by an experimental set-up and a chain of dialogal processes, both strategic and communicative. Besides scientific knowledge, metaphysics speculates to arrive at a global perspective on the world. Being no longer the foundation of science, metaphysics aims to understand the world and man, feeding its arguments with scientific facts, the condensation of the activity of objective and (inter)subjective principles, norms & maxims. Situated "next" to "physics" (or science), speculative philosophy is meta-physics, the inescapable background of all possible scientific knowledge. The demarcation between both is clear, for science is testable and arguable, whereas metaphysics is only subject to the laws of logic and argumentation. Metaphysics is speculative and argumentative, but never experimental and factual.



We define "rationality" as the set of cogitationes uniting three subsets : normative philosophy :

the normative disciplines delving up the principles governing thought (epistemology), affect (esthetics) & action (ethics) ; scientific knowledge :

all empirico-formal propositions which are probably true in most tests (regulated by the idea of correspondentio) and for most concerned sign-interpreters (regulated by the ideal of a consensus omnium), but never absolutely true ; metaphysics :

all speculative propositions which have been the subject of a dialogal & argumentative process (argued plausibly, i.e. backed by arguments). Religious knowledge is not necessarily anchored in a sufficient ground. If so, circularity ensues. Like scientific knowledge, it is the outcome of objective and subjective states, conditions and symbols. Just as scientific knowledge changes and evolves, so may our insights of the spiritual world grow and emancipate.



Contra 5



If the existence of the Divine is kept outside the set of facts (the "world" in scientific terms), then it is deemed exclusively apophatic, or object of un-saying only. For to those accepting the definition of rationality as the union of normative, scientific and metaphysical knowledge, this exclusive apophatism holds the thesis of the meta-rationality of religion. Then, even metaphysics would be unable to say anything sensible about the Divine, making religious philosophy impossible.



"How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world."

Wittgenstein, L. : Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , 6.632.



The thesis of the meta-rationality of religion can never be put to the test, for according to the thesis, there will never be a fact (in the world) able to objectify the Divine. Likewise, nothing can be said about the Divine, and so no argumentation is possible. The "thesis" is thus not even metaphysical. Logically, this implies the Divine and the empty set are identical. If such exclusive apophatism is maintained, the conclusion of logical atheism is indeed inevitable : the Divine does not exist, for this fuzzy set is not a normative principle (it is not clear how the denial of the Divine involves a contradictio in actu exercito), not a fact of the world, nor a possible concept in an argumentative metaphysical discourse.



Even ps-Dionysius paired apophatism with the kataphasis of the Divine in the world. For the mystics of many religions (but not so for theologians and fundamentalists), Divinity is simultaneously far and near, remote and close. This bi-polarity, the two "eyes" of the Divine, makes logical atheism impossible. Of course, the burden of proof now falls on religious philosophy to demonstrate how the presence of the Divine in the world, Divinity-as-fact, can be a valid hypothesis one may put to the test and argue about.



The theologies accept the katapathic side of the polarity, for otherwise they have nothing to reveal. They eternalize a series of propositions and negate all other possible theophanies. To succeed, they must believe to possess a superior revelation. Even if they accept other (conflicting) revelations (i.e. the Divine as experienced by other believers), they must eventually consider theirs as better and the last word to be said about the matter. This is the hallmark of fundamentalism.



If, avoiding logical atheism, we accept to give factual contents to the Divine, then religious philosophy is burdened to provide the answer to the question : How are Divine facts produced ? If no experiments are possible and/or dialogue is always power-driven, then it is clear that, for the time being, we act "as if" the proposition "The Divine does not exist." is true. For, ex hypothesi, the Divine is not only a speculative object of metaphysics, but also part of the world as a radical experience "totaliter aliter". If conflicting theological foundations may lead to the same spiritual datum, then how to (in the stage of theory formation) isolate genuine spiritual facts and define the Divine in terms remaining close to the phenomenology of its direct experience (mysticism) ? These terms are not to be derived from religious superstructures, although they can never be completely devoid of theoretical connotations. Perhaps religious philosophy may provide a minimal framework derived from the principles of participant observation and critical hermeneutics ?



Suppose the Divine is nowhere found. What does this imply ? Only that for the moment science finds it highly unlikely for the Divine to exist. Just as it is improbable for the Sun not to rise tomorrow. This is something else than certainty, which is not provided by scientific knowledge. As we do not know for certain the Sun will rise tomorrow in the same way as we know it rose yesterday, another question is : How is the Divine probable ?



In short : the factuality of the Divine negates logical atheism, placing the burden of proof on all spiritual people. If the latter are unable to back their musings, based on the fundamental proposition ("The Divine exists."), then religion is not an absolute untruth, but, insofar as our knowledge goes, relatively untrue. In the latter case, we can only confirm (for the time being), that the ideas and practices of religions are indeed insignificant and silly. As such, they should not be allowed to play their games, especially politically and education-wise.



Contra 6



So even if the hypothesis stating the disclosure of the Divine is found to be not (yet) factual, we never absolutely know Divinity not to exist, nor whether some day the Divine may indeed become factual. In the supposed case, we only take a bet on a high probability, nothing more.



"Progress in truth -truth of science and truth of religion- is mainly a progress in the framing of concepts, in discarding artificial abstractions or partial metaphors, and in evolving notions which strike more deeply into the root of reality."

Whitehead, A.D. : Religion in the Making , 1926.



The overall probabilism of science has weakened the position of historical atheists persuing the last line of attack, especially the pretentious roarings of logical positivists and materialists. If no certain foundation is given, then no certain conflict with it can be ascertained, and so the thesis of Divine existence cannot be absolutely negated, only relatively. This does not diminish the obvious fact worshipping an entity that very probably does not exist is rather silly and in conflict with scientific rationality. If so, then in no way must this fictional belief be granted constitutional powers or way of law. This does not take away the right of the most bamboozling of faiths to become a pressure group and influence the democratic process.



In short : atheism's proposition ("The Divine does not exist."), if well argued, is as likely as the rising of the Sun tomorrow. But this is not the same as to know for certain and eternalize the nonexistence of the Divine. This certain knowledge falls outside the domain of normative, scientific and metaphysical knowledge, i.e. outside reason. Hence, dogmatical atheism is impossible. But, it is to the spiritualists and a possible religious philosophy to argue why this position is meta-rational rather than irrational (speculative arguments) and how the experience of the Divine can be produced (experiments).



In what follows, the following main ideas recur : the traditional & revised proofs a priori of God are flawed ; because of the intrinsic limitations of human cognition, no absolute proof (justification) or disproof of any proposition of fact is possible, not in science, ethics or religion, and this a priori - there is no certainty, only probability ; a relative, genetico-cognitive justification of knowledge is the applied epistemological corollary of this ; it is possible to justify the existence of the conserving architect of the world by means of the argument from design and the argument from conservation ; spirituality is impossible without un choix fondamental ; the experience of the Divine is dependent of a specific, rather unique psychic mechanism ; it is possible for the experience of the Divine to be triggered by sustaining this fundamental choice over a long period of time, along with the systematic application of spiritual exercises aimed at the development of the special psychic mechanism of spirituality ; Yoga is a non-Western, historical example of a testable and arguable spiritual research-unit, operating a meditative protocol rooted in factual neurological knowledge ; the principles of the scientific study of mysticism are participant observation and the delineation of religious symbols. HISTORICAL WINDOWS 1. Windows on the traditional proofs of God.



"The proofs of God have an impressive tradition. The greatest minds of humanity have been concerned with this. Their foundations were laid with the 'pagans', Plato and Aristotle ; they became acclimatized in Christianity, particularly through Augustine ; then, in the Middle Ages, extensively systematized by Aquinas ; and freshly thought out in modern times -in connection with Anselm's 'ontological' argument- by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff ; but, after that, they were all involved together in a radical crisis and replaced by Kant with a moral 'postulate', eventually reinterpreted speculatively by Fichte and Hegel and finally restored by neo-Thomism in neo-Scholastic form."

Kung, H. : Does God exist ? , 1980, III.



§ 5



In the West, since Christianity turned imperial (in the first half of the 4th century), the truth of revelation was no longer in doubt, and fideism became the leading mode of thought, enforced de manu militari. Augustine (354 - 430), the bishop of Hippo, affirmed the continuity between rationality (identified with Platonism) and faith, in casu, Christianity. Without (the Christian) God, reason leads to the worship of idols. For him, reason and faith are not in conflict and should not be separated : "itinerarium mentis in Deum". But, the gospels have no philosophy to offer. They provide no rational system, but a proclamation of the "Kingdom of God" (in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ). If the former is a Greek ideal like "agathon" or the unmoved mover, the latter is a revelation of the Divine : a Divine datum. The tensions are obvious. Is reason equipped enough to arrive at a comprehensive explanation of what works ? If so, then no "eye of faith" needs to be postulated. For Tertullian (ca. 220 CE), Christianity abrogated reason, or "worldly wisdom". The folly of faith ?



In the course of Western philosophy, four major positions between "reason" and "faith" came to the fore : continuity : faith is the accomplishment of reason, the pyramidal capstone finishing its construction ; separation : faith and reason each belong to separate domains of human knowledge, the former revelational (meta-rational), the latter rational ; conflict : faith and reason are in conflict, for the former is empty and/or untrue ; harmonization : meta-rationality and reason are stages in the genetico-cognitive development of the cognitive apparatus, the former being a high-order texture based on stable low-order distinctions or rational categorizations. Contra 1



Cognitive architecture is not devoid of crucial "leaps", and the considerable differences between reason and meta-rationality (the factual component of "faith" explored in religious philosophy) also point to the fact meta-rationality initiates, besides affectional and volitional novelties, a new cognitive standard of measurement (comparable with the bracketing of the context in the step from pre-operative proto-rationality to operative, rational thought). To do this, the spiritual data were cause of the irreversible crisis and disequilibration of the system (to trigger an autoregulative response). The genesis of human cognition is not a continuity, but a stratified texture, completed in steps and jumps.



Contra 2



If meta-rationality is completely outside rationality, then it lacks an object. Also : the continuum of human knowledge is "broken up", with an enduring polarity between dogma and fact.



Contra 3



Accept, for the sake of argument, science evidences the non-factual nature of the Divine. This means science, by a consilience of inductions, or convergence (quasi verisimilitude) of certain propositions about the order of the world and the place of man in it, considers the existence of the Divine as very unlikely. This statement of probability is not a priori, but a posteriori. These empirico-formal propositions are not based on any sufficient ground, but solely on the product of test and argument. The way we observe the world co-determines how we observe the world, but how the world truly is, so must we think, also feeds our senses. The fact thus ascertained are never absolute or in any way eternal and definitive. It can not be excluded in an absolute way the Divine is not a fact, for scientific knowledge is not certain knowledge but probable knowledge. Moreover, suppose a Divine datum can be isolated, then surely a lower probability has to be calculated and a spiritual research-programme initiated ? Have scientist not dismissed the hypothesis because they considered non-spiritual theories to have given an exhaustive explanation of spirituality ? What if these theories have missed the point ?



Pro 4



Affective, cognitive and moral development happens in stages, as explained elsewhere . Meta-rationality, the stage of Self-actualizing spiration, is not a priori in conflict with reason, but, ex hypothesi, entertains a larger perspective. Because of this aspired openness, unconditionality and continuous possibilities, reason may continue to develop, for a new horizon is always presented and the mental attitude of the beginner is never lost. To seem to return from behind the horizon, from behind the surface of the mirror, is the inspiring and heuristic Pharos of intuition and its intellectual perception (the intellect witnessing itself). Of course, given the criterion of testability, the spiritual datum must be repeatable. This must go hand in hand with a clear and concise theory on spirituality. Otherwise spirituality is a mere fiction (like Hamlet saying : "To be or not to be ...").



De iuris, reason cannot reject high-order distinctions, although the post-rational stages of human cognition always involve un choix fondamental, i.e. the fact of freedom. There is no coercion in religious philosophy. A rational system cannot function properly without choice. But for each choice there is a price to pay, and is the price for rejecting the amor intellectualis Dei a mental handicap (the "dry bones" of the "nature morte", the horizon of the pigeonhole) ? Logics of finity function properly in imperial, Fregean calculi, but are inefficient, marginal or too static when non-linear, dissipative systems are studied.



This harmony between reason and meta-rationality implies their distinction as well as their being part of the stratification of the proposed modes of cognition (cf. mythical, pre-rational, proto-rational, formal, critical, creative and nondual).



§ 6



Regarding the justification of its truth claim, science developed its argument in three stages : uncritical & foundational : true knowledge corresponds with real, repeatably observable objects (naive realism under the guise of materialism) or true knowledge is the object of an ideal theory (naive idealism under the guise of spiritualism or ideology). In both strategies, the error consists in the implicate use of the contra-thesis. Real objects are also co-determined by the theoretical connotations of their observers. Ideal objects are always also a "something" outside the grasp of a theoretical discourse. The foundation of science is objectified : the "real" world "out there" or the "ideal" theory of reason ; critical & foundational : asking for the limitations of human knowledge, Kant rooted cognition in the cognitive apparatus (cf. the Copernican Revolution). In this way, the foundation sought was interiorized and its a priori categorized. By making the ego cogito (the "I Think" or factum rationis) the foundation of knowledge, Kant succeeded in making reality-as-such fall outside science ! Likewise, for Kant, meta-rational knowledge (intellectual perception) was denied to science, which, divorced from any contact with "das Ding an sich", seems trivial. The foundation of science is subjectified (not in an idealism but in a transcendentalism) ; critical & normative : in the previous century, the foundational approach was relinquished and in this way, the aporia threatening justification was avoided. Science produces empirico-formal propositions treated "as if" they represent a high probability, but never a certain truth. This likelihood is posited by repeatable tests and the intersubjective dialogues and argumentations of all involved sign-interpreters. The end result is fallible knowledge, although highly probable. The existence of the Divine is (very probably) a fact or not. But even if today the Divine is not a fact, It may be one tomorrow. With the end of foundational thinking, the time of confrontation between incompatible foundations (reason versus faith) is over. Scientific knowledge is probable, historical and relative. Facts may change over time, and nobody is able to predict for certain what the future will bring. Moreover, scientific investigations are always conducted against the background of untestable information. Insofar as the latter is arguable, metaphysics is possible. But the latter is never testable. Finally, who decides who the "involved sign-interpreters" are and/or when a certain threshold is "critical" ? In order to define these and other matters, science evokes a series of a posteriori conditions representing the idiosyncrasies of the local research-unity, the "opportunistic logic" of their fact-factory and the style of their pursuit of scientific, factual knowledge.



Science has no longer a reason a priori against the existence of the Divine. It may, and does move against it a posteriori. If it finds no evidence for Divine existence, then it is entitled to dismiss the hypothesis as very unlikely, and consider Divine worship as silly insofar as it is not deemed fictional (like art). However, "worship" and "fiction" are incompatible. He who worships, truly believes to worship something more than a personal fiction, more than just sacral art. It is this "something more" which religious philosophy must isolate and make available. For it to do so, philosophy and science should remain open and postpone their final judgments. Both must be totally recuperated from the hang-over of their shameful foundational history over the last two millennia. The only role of science is to confirm or deny probable fact. Is "modern" education not meant to dictate the futility of meta-rational knowledge in the light of independent, rational thought ? Suppose it can be demonstrated such bias is precisely what hinders the emergence of the spiritual fact (just as the rejection of independent thought halted science) ?



§ 7



In the Abrahamic faiths, God as Adonai, God as Father and God as Allah is intensely personal and immanent, either in terms of His elect (Israel), of His Son Christ or of His Koran . This One God Alone is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, transcendent (supernatural), creative and personal (a "He"). He differs from the henotheist " Amun " of Ancient Egypt or the "Brahman" of Hinduism because He is singular (like the Aten of Akhenaten). He does not manifest as other Gods or Goddesses, nor are their appearances His many theophanies. There is no God, but the God.



This monotheocentrism is monolithic. Theology is a petrified entity struck with the unveilings of God. Revelation is a truth of God and hence final. Nevertheless, in order to develop an individual spiritual superstructure or a solid apology to win supporters, rational arguments are necessary and so the need to provide "proof" or "evidence" of God becomes unmistaken.



In what follows, a series of windows are described. Although as such these philosophical speculations are outdated, in each, a "nugget of gold" is isolated and added to the technical apparatus. Together, these assist the argumentation developed in the second and third section, proposing one revised a priori and three a posteriori proofs of the Divine.



1.1 Aristotle on the Supreme Being.



"We hold, then, that the God is a living being, eternal, most good ; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to the God ; for that is what the God is."

Aristotle : Metaphysica Lambda , XII.VII.9.



§ 8



In chapter 1 of his Metaphysica Lambda (or twelfth book of his Metaphysics ), shortly written after Plato (428 - 347 BCE) died, Aristotle (384 - 322 BCE) tries to demonstrate the existence of two physical beings and one unmoved being. These three beings, or meanings of the word "ousia", are : (a) physical and eternal (planets), (b) physical and moved (plants & animals) and (c) a "first" being beyond physics and eternal ("the God"). The first two beings are the objects of physics. The last is not and demands another approach coming "after" and/or next to physics, or metaphysics, a word Aristotle did not coin. "Metaphysics" appeared as a separate discipline only after the Aristotelian corpus was put together by Andronicos of Rhodos (ca. 40 BCE). He used to place the books on metaphysics "next to" those dealing with physics.



In book 6, the existence of the "first being" is discussed. Although physical considerations are also "wisdom", they are not "first". Instead of thinking this eternal being as a transcendent "idea" (as Plato had done), Aristotle tries to develop its meaning by radicalizing his ideas about the physical world. Physics, as conceived by Aristoteles, discovers an eternal movement.



"time seems to be a circle"

Aristotle : Physica , 223b 29.



In Ancient Egypt , creation was also deemed cyclic and eternal. The deities (or natural differentials), except for Osiris, were born, culminated, died and reborn after the model of the Solar cycle. This "time" was called "neheh" or eternal repetition, and contrasted with "djedet" or eternal sameness or everlastingness. This eternal repetition was the "motor" of rejuvenation, as evidenced by the Amduat . The influence of Egyptian thought on certain pre-Socratics was discussed elsewhere . It cannot be excluded the Egypt of Alexander the Great (356 - 323 BCE), influenced Aristotle, although not in the Afrocentric measure evoked by James (1992).



Indeed for Aristotle, there is no creation at all, no autogenous act in precreation , as in Heliopolitan theology. No "Atum" sui generis splitting in space, life and order (Shu and Tefnut), emerging spontaneously from the primordial matrix of endless possibilities (the Nun ). The world is eternal. There is no beginning of time. No exploding singularity (cf. the "Big Bang" theory, remaining silent about what happened at t = 0). Both the poets of the gods (like the Egyptians), who claim the world rose "from the night" (or nonexistent precreation) and the philosophers of nature, who say all things are simultaneous, are wrong.



In De Caelo , Aristotle writes :



"The actualization of the God is immortality, in other words, an eternal life. Hence, it is necessary that there is an eternal movement in the God. Because heaven is of that nature -for it is a Divine body- therefore it has a circular body, by nature always moving in a circle."

Aristotle : De Caelo , 286a 9 - 12.



His demonstration of the Divine involves the justification of this eternal movement (of the world), and this in a necessary and thus not-contingent way. In terms of the famous Peripatetic pair potency versus actuality, this means "the God" is devoid of latency, fully awake, conscious and actualized. As it is possible to think potency as nonexistent, the principle of movement must be "pure" act, or realization without potency and without matter. The principle sought is immaterial & spiritual. It is not necessarily transcendent, as the Stoic "pneuma" proves.



In book 8 of his Physica , the existence of a first mover is justified by considering an infinite, horizontal series of mediating causes cannot be accepted. If every thing moved is caused to move by something else, then the first mover moves itself. This is the concept of the unmoved mover. This mover is not a point of beginning in time, but the sufficient ground of all movement. In De Anima , we read how the "Nous poiètikos" (430a 18) or "active intellect" stands on its own, cannot be influenced, is unmingled and in essence realization (pure actuality). It is inevitable to accept this unmoved mover, not only by the necessities of our mind, i.e. in order to arrive at abstractions and "theoria", but also to provide a sufficient ground for physical reality.



Greek concept-realism is not critical. Hence, the foundational approach is cherished and the "essential tension" of the aporia of reason appears : realism versus idealism. In the Platonic system, "anamnesis" is possible and by its own efforts the mind arrives, by contemplating the world of ideas, at Divine, eternalized truth. There is a "spiritual eye" enabling us to "see" the world of prototypes ("paradigma"). By means of this "intellectual perception" avant la lettre, absolute knowledge is within reach (a similar thesis is proposed by intuitionism). For Aristotle, knowledge derives from the senses, but abstractions are impossible without a Divine active intellect.



For these most influential of Greeks, theoretical knowledge is certain, eternal and sufficient. Plato thinks the "chorismos" or separation between the "world" of ideas and the "world" of becoming, Aristotle does not divide the world in two, but the soul. The Platonic difference returns in his psychology, namely to distinguish between "passive" and "active" intellect. Grosso modo, identical problems will be at work in later, modern, pre-Kantian rationalism and empiricism, albeit in a different conceptual framework and adjacent historical situation. Like the latter, Greek conceptual rationality is entrapped by the Münchhausen-trilemma.



Greek concept-realism, discovering the antinomic logic of the sufficient ground (Plato in ontology, Aristotle in psychology), did not yet make this study the focus of its attention. In Medieval philosophy, the issue of the existence of the Christian God would become of first apologetic importance. Reason was there to serve theology and accommodate the diffusion of faith. Was the God of Christ this sufficient ground ? Could the existence of the Divine be demonstrated a priori ? The answer to these questions was linked with the status of universal concepts, or, in terms of the Medieval dialectica, the position of genera and species in the logical category of substance ("ousia"). For the Augustinian Platonists, the world of ideas, revelation and intellectual perception interlaced. For the Thomists, knowledge only derived from the senses, and so the idea of God could only be acquired a posteriori.



1.2 To battle over universals.



"This universe would never have been suitably put together into one form from such various and opposite parts, unless there were some One who joined such different parts together ; and when joined, the very variety of their natures, so discordant among themselves, would break their harmony and tear them asunder unless the One held together what it wove into one whole. Such a fixed order of nature could not continue its course, could not develop motions taking such various directions in place, time, operation, space, and attributes, unless there were One who, being immutable, had the disposal of these various changes. And this cause of their remaining fixed and their moving, I call God, according to the name familiar to all."

Boethius : The Consolation of Philosophy , Book 3, Proza XII.



§ 9



Medieval philosophy is defined by the tension between Christian "revelation" and Pagan "philosophy". It may be divided in three stages : fideist (IVth - XIth) : before the XIth century, science and philosophy serve theology (cf. Gerard of Czanad's "ancilla theologiae"), and "knowledge" is a gift of the Holy Spirit. Thanks to the Carolingian Renaissance (IXth century), the seven "artes liberales" (or pillars of wisdom) emerged : logic, grammar, rhetoric (trivium), and geometry, arithmetics, astronomy and music (quatrivium). These are contrasted with the "artes serviles", being directed to the satisfaction of a need. Because of political disintegration, the decay of monastic and ecclesiastical life, the degradation of the Papacy, and the attacks of the Norsemen in the ninth and tenth century, the fruit of this renaissance did not come to maturity. Of Greek philosophy, little was known. Part of one dialogue of Plato and only Aristotle's logic were attested. Neo-Platonism was studied through Augustine. Besides the Bible , an intellectual read the works of the fathers of the church. Philosophy was reduced to logic (dialectica). Education was meant to confirm the futility of independent, rational thought and to give a teaching rooted in fundamental theology. Dialectici as Anselm of Canterbury (1033 - 1109) tried to understand the contents of the revealed truths of scripture and to defend it against heretics ; philosophical (XIth - XIIIth) : in the West, about 1150, Latin translations of unknown Greek philosophical texts become available. Among them, the complete works of Aristotle, as well as the extensive writings of his influential Arab commentators, Avicenna (980 - 1037) & Averroes (1126 - 1198). Aristotelism caused a major crisis. These teachings formed a coherent whole, explained nature and articulated a vision of the world and of man contradicting the tenets of fundamental Christian theology (creationism contradicted the concept of an eternal world). From Padua to Paris, intellectuals debated, and although philosophical knowledge was deemed "according to reason" and not the absolute knowledge of revelation, radical thought slowly emerged. Perhaps reason could provide a comprehensive explanation ? Perhaps revelation could be set aside ! It would take three more centuries before intellectuals dared to openly reject fundamental theology. Meanwhile, Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274) was first to address these new sources and harmonize them with Christianity. via moderna (XIVth - XVth) : with the assimilation of Aristotle, a new vision on reality and knowledge emerged. Strict nominalism, with William of Ockham (1290 - 1350) as its protagonist, broke away from Classical Greek and Scholastic thought. Only particulars exist, and universals are not rooted in a sufficient ground, neither inside (Platonism) nor outside (Aristotle) the mind. Universal concepts are nothing but a common name ("nomen") given to different particulars sharing a certain similarity. In this way, thought is more and more considered an empirical phenomenon, and the possibility of transcending a particular physical reality to intuit (or abstact) its essence is questioned. Statements are terministic, not necessary. After three centuries, the "spirit" of the European Renaissance broke down the dogma of a revealed God known by faith alone. From within (Reformation and Contra-Reformation) as well as from without (natural science, in particular physics & astronomy) the Feudal model of Christianity came under severe attack. Modern science emerged in the XVIIth century, and in philosophy, the fideist context was eliminated by René Descartes (1596 - 1650) and his clear and distinct intuition "cogito ergo sum" (cf. infra).



§ 10



In Late Hellenism, and particularly in Stoicism, language became an independent area of study. Logic was not longer embedded in metaphysics, but a science of language, or linguistics. Physics studies things ("pragmata" or "res"'), whereas dialectica and grammatica study words ("phonai" or "voces"). This is the approach of "the first scholastic and the last Roman", Boethius (480 - 524 or 525). He created the term "universalia" (the translation of Aristotle's "ta katholou") to denote the logical concepts genus and species. The original metaphysical apory between Plato's Ideas and Aristotle's immanent forms is no longer part of the Stoic context. A reduction took place which brought logic and linguistics to the fore.



In his Isagoge , translated by Boethius, Porphyry (232/3 - ca. 305) wrote :



" I shall not say anything about whether genera and species exist as substances, or are confined to mere conceptions ; and if they are substances, whether they are material or immaterial ; and whether they exist separately from sensible objects, or in them immanently."

Porphyry : Isagoge , 1, introduction.



For Boethius, the answer is Aristotelian : the universals have an objective existence in particular physical things, but the mind is able to conceive genera and species independent of these bodies.



For Isidore of Sevilla (died in 636), etymology was the crucial science, for to know the name ("nomen") of an object gave insight into its essential nature. There exists an implicate adualism between the name (or word) and its reality or "res". This symbolic adualism does not differentiate between an "inner" subjective state of consciousness and an "outer" objective reality, which is a typical characteristic of ante-rationality (cf. psychomorphism).



Thanks to the Carolingian Renaissance, and the organization of the Palatine School, a remote ancestor of the Renaissance "university" ("turned towards unity") was created. Europe, under the political will of Charlemagne, was awakened to its "rational" inheritance and embraced the importance of education and learning (for the upper classes). Although short-lived, its influence would not completely vanish.



Clearly the problem of universals touched the foundation of thought, in particular fideism, which tried to identify general names (like "God") in the mind with universal objects in reality. On the one hand, there is the ultra-realistic position, or "exaggerated realism", found in the De Divisione Naturae of John Scotus Eriugena (ca. 810 - 877) and the work of Remigius of Auxerre (ca. 841 - 908), who taught that the species is a "partitio substantialis" of the genus. The species is also the substantial unity of many individuals. Thus, individuals only differ accidentally from one another. All beings are thus modifications of one Being. A new child is not a new substance, but a new property of the already existing substance called "humanity".



On the other hand, and very early, heretics in dialectic rose. For Eric (Heiricus) of Auxerre (841 - 876), general names had no universal objects corresponding to them. Universals concepts arise because the mind gathers together ("coarctatio") the multitude of individuals and forms the idea of species. This variety is again gathered together to form the genus. Only individual exist. By the process of "coarctatio", many genera form the extensive concept of "ousia" ("substantia"). In the same line, Roscelin (ca. 1050 - 1120) held that a universal is only a word ("flatus vocis") and so "nihil esse praeter individua" ...



§ 11



This apory between exaggerated realists ("reales") and their opponents ("nominales") is best illustrated by the confrontation between St.William of Champeaux (1070 - 1120), and Abelard (1079 - 1142) a rigorist dialectic arguing against the "antiqua doctrina", and, according to St.Bernard of Clairvaux (1090 - 1153), an agent of Satan. In his early days, William taught, against his teacher Roscelin, that the individual members of a species only differ accidentally from one another. This identity-theory came under severe attack and later he changed it. Abelard argued, that according to William, only ten different substances or "essences" exist (namely the 10 categories of Aristotle). Hence, all living beings, subsumed under "substance", are substantially identical, and so Socrates and the donkey Brunellus are the same. Some say as a subterfuge, William replied with his indifference thesis, according to which two members of the same species are the same thing, not "essentialiter" but "indifferenter". Peter and Paul are "indifferently" men (possess humanity "secundum indifferentiam"), because as Peter is rational, so is Paul, whereas their humanity is not the same, i.e. their nature is not numerically the same, but like ("similis"). In fact, he is saying that the universal substances of both are alike, applying indifferently to both or any other man. This position was also part of Abelard's polemical interpretations.



Abelard's "nominalism" is a denial of ultra-realism in epistemology, i.e. against the adualism between "vox" and "res". He does not refute Platonic "ideae" preexisting in the mind of God, but understands these as the metaphysical foundation of the real similarities in status between objects of the same species, and not of the objects (as Platonism insists).



Abelard's analysis states the distinction between the logical and the real orders, but without the denial of the objective foundation of the universals. This early nominalism is a moderate realism. He demonstrated how one could deny exaggerated realism without being obliged to reject the objectivity of genera and species. For Abelard, universals were by nature inclined to be ascribed to several objects. They are only words, not things (against the "reales"). When identified with words, universals are not reduced to mere "sound" (which is also a "res"), but to the signifying power of words (against the "nominales"). This "significatio" of words is not a concept accompanying the word (a mere contents of mind, i.e. exclusively subjective), but gives expression or meaning to the objective status of the word (semantics). This status is a human convention based on real similarities between the particulars, but these real "convenientia" are not a "res", not "nihil" but a "quasi res" : it is not the substance "homo" that makes human beings similar, but the "esse hominem".



Summarize these positions with the distinctions introduced by Avicenna : universale ante rem : the universals exist before the realities they subsume : Platonism ; universale in re : the universals only exist in the realities ("quidditas rei") of which they are abstractions : Aristotelism ; universale post rem : universals are words, abstact universal concepts with a meaning attributed to them by human convention, giving expression to real similarities between particulars. The latter are not "essentia" and not "nihil", but "quasi res". This dialectic juggling may conceal the larger issue at hand : if extramental objects are particular and mental concepts universal, then how think their relationship ? Does an extramental foundation of universals exist ? The Greeks as well as the Scholastics answered affirmatively.



For the Scholastics, given their preoccupation with God, the problem was to know whether an objective, extramental reality corresponded to the universals in the mind ? If so, then the mere concept of "God" might entail Divine existence, as the a priori proof tries to argue. If not, rational knowledge resulted in scepticism and Divine existence might be argued a posteriori only. Greek rationalism was conceptual and ontological, whereas the Medieval dialects were foundational and logico-linguistic (psychological).



Abelard's solution is a crucial distinction : universals are not real, but they are words (real sounds) with a significance referring to real similarities between real particulars. Because of their meaning, they are more than "nothing". The foundation of his nominalism is "the real" as evidenced by similarities between objects, whereas the "reales" supposed an ante-rational symbiosis between "verbum" and "res", between Platonic ideas and material objects ("methexis"). A similar Abelardian line of argumentation is found in David Hume (1711 - 1776), ending in a skepticism preventing Kant (1724 - 1804) from sleeping (indeed, Hume rejected the world of ideas and so could not back the observed similarity between objects with the mind of God). When Aristotle was finally translated into Latin, Abelard could and was recuperated by High Scholasticism.



His pivotal contribution to the historical process of reason becoming conscious of itself is not limited to logic, epistemology and semantics. In his Ethica seu Scito Teipsum or "Ethics of Know Yourself", he stressed the importance of intent ("intentio"). Good and evil are not situated in the action itself (cf. Aristotle's Ethics Nicomachea ), but in the intention of the acting subject. Conscience ("conscientia") is therefore crucial, for "non est peccatum nisi contra conscientiam". So also in his ethics, Abelard puts emphasis on the subject of experience, moving far away from the shores of the objective morality of his age (focusing on the virtue of the deed and not on the doer and his motifs).



1.3 Anselm of Canterbury's ontological proof.



"But if through your eternity You have been, and are, and will be ; and to have been is not to be destined to be ; and to be is not to have been, or to be destined to be ; (then) how does your eternity exist as a whole forever ? Or is it true that nothing of your eternity passes away, so that it is not now ; and that nothing of it is destined to be, as if it were not yet ? You was not, then, yesterday, nor will You be tomorrow ; but yesterday and today and tomorrow You are ; or, rather, neither yesterday nor today nor tomorrow You are ; but simply, You are, outside all time. For yesterday and today and tomorrow have no existence, except in time ; but You, although nothing exists without You, nevertheless do not exist in space or time, but all things exist in You. For nothing contains You, but You contain all."

Anselm : Proslogion , XIX.



§ 12



Usually depicted as a transitional figure between monastic and scholastic theology, the Benedictine Anselm of Canterbury (1033 - 1109) was a protagonist of the Augustinian tradition. Philosophy is dialectica and part of theology. Nevertheless, his position within this movement is rationalistic, for he seeks the "rationes necessariae" of the existence of God, but also for revealed data as the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation of Christ. However, his rationalism is provisional, for Anselm believes so he may understand ("credo ut intelligam"), but does not seek to understand in order to believe. The context in which he operates, does not allow him to make the distinction between philosophy and theology, and so, even if he was unable to find the necessary reasons for Divine existence, he would not reject the existence of God. Perhaps is it fair to say Anselm is the most dialectical pole within the Augustinian movement and its fideism.



Anselm's Platonic theory of truth contains four pillars : un iversale ante rem : universals are the "essentiae" of the particular individuals ; the universals are real : universals exist independently of the particulars participating in them ; independence of truth : truth is independent of statements and of things, for every being comes after its truth or "rectitudo", each being "has its truth" ; summa veritas : truth exists in the ideas of God. These are what they are "per se", i.e. by themselves. They are the causes of the essences and their truth. In the Monologium , Anselm develops two a posteriori arguments of the existence of God, defined as the best, the greatest and the highest being, namely the argument from goodness and the argument from greatness. argument from goodness : The fact good things, despite their differences, are identical in goodness, implies they are good "per aliquid", i.e. not of themselves, but by a cause exterior to them. To avoid an infinite regression of causes, we have to posit a best "per se", a good possessing goodness by itself. This highest and greatest good is the best. And God is the best. Summarized : as there are good things and better things, there must be a best thing and this is God ; argument from greatness : beings exist not of themselves, but because of a self-dependent, uncaused, sufficient ground "per se". Because what exists by itself is greater than what exists by something else, it is "maxime omnium", the highest being outside all possible hierarchical series, being-of-itself in which all participate, or God. Here, the common feature is the argument from perfection, for both arguments apply only to perfections which do not of themselves involve limitation and finiteness, like quantity. Two "outer" sets of arguments have to be introduced, depending on (a) the study of the order of creation and (b) the Platonic context, dictating that when various beings have one feature in common (receive the same predicate), an exterior cause must be present for that "truth" and self-possess this feature "per se", i.e. by itself and without any other. The autarky & autonomy of this exterior cause is deemed self-evident and ideal. Hence, the argument from perfection is complex, and composed of chains of various arguments a posteriori. In accord with his Platonic streak, Anselmus sought for a more simple proof, one necessitating no empirical study, but only logic.



§ 13



In the Proslogium , the ontological argument a priori is developed. After long, obsessive concentration on the issue, one evening, during night service, Anselm's faith in God's existence suddenly found the "insight" ("fides quaerens intellectum", the original title of the Proslogium ).



Anselms defines "God" as "something than, which no greater can be conceived", or "aliquid Quo Majus Nihil Cogitari potest", "QMNC", Anselm's concept of God. This is not an analytical, self-evident proposition, but a description which may also have meaning to non-believers. The proposition "God exists" is not self-evident, as later Thomists will say ("per se notum").



Moreover, faith is not a necessary condition to understand the meaning of this concept of God. The argument is directed against those who deny Divine existence, but affirm to know God's nature if God would exist (like the atheist claiming God is good and denying His existence because of the evils of creation). Anselm adds even a fool understands QMNC, proving its existence "in intellectu" and making this concept of God a psychological reality. How to demonstrate QMNC necessarily also exists "in res" ? The proposition "God does not exist." is a contradictio in terminis if (a) "God" is defined as QMNC and (b) it is "greater" to exist "in res" than "in intellectu" only. The steps of the argument are as follows : Major Premiss : God is QMNC ; Minor Premiss : It is greater to exist in reality than only to exist in ideality ; Conclusion : QMNC exists in reality and in ideality, so God exist in reality and in ideality. Lemma : If QMNC only exists in ideality, then something than which no greater can be conceived is something than which some greater can be conceived (namely that which exists in both orders), which is a contradiction, hence QMNC not only exists in ideality but also in reality, ergo God exists in reality and in ideality. Plantinga (1974) gave another, more sophisticated version, namely a reductio ad absurdum, based on the acceptance of QMNC : God exists in the understanding, but not in reality. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. God's existence in reality is conceivable. If God did exist in reality, the He would be greater than He is (from (1) and (2)). It is conceivable that there is a being greater than God (from (3) and (4)). It is conceivable there is a being greater than the being than which nothing greater can be conceived (from (5) and QMNC). It is false it is conceivable there is a being greater than the being than which nothing greater can be conceived. ERGO : It is false God exists in the understanding but not in reality ((6) and (7) contradict). ERGO : God exists in the understanding and in reality. In this reductive form, the argument proves that either (1), (2), (3) or (7) are untrue. For Anselm (1) was untrue because (2), (3) and (7) belong to the structure of the argument. Historically, only (2) and (7) prove good candidates for refutation, although Duns Scotus (ca. 1266 - 1308) objected against (3).



(2) What is "existence" ? Either existence "in thought" and existence "as such" are differentiated (cf. Thomas Aquinas), or "existence" is not considered to be a predicate (cf. Kant).

(7) Has QMNC meaning ? If QMNC has no meaning, then how can this meaninglessness be made clear ?



§ 14



Historically the argument has attracted two major problems : QMNC : What is the meaning of "greater" ? Clearly qualitative greatness is intended, i.e. "more perfect" in the Platonic sense, i.e. something with a higher degree of being. The truth of the argument thus depends on the ability to compare realities in an absolute sense (implying an absolute being transcending the order of the world). In the world, a being can never be that "great" that no "greater" can be found. Like the concept "greatest number", QMNC has no concrete value in the order of reality. It is a limit-concept, and so the meaning of the word "existence" is not the same for QMNC as it is for other objects. For Anselm, QMNC had a "special" status. His critic, the Benedictan monk Gaunilo of Marmoutiers (1033 - 1109), in his On Behalf of the Fool , constructed an ontological argument for the existence of the perfect island. He argued as follows : it is enough to conceive the most perfect island for it to exist, for it would not be the most perfect if it would only exist "in intellectu".



Anselm replied such a most perfect island only exists in the world and so its "perfection" is relative, not absolute. QMNC is the concept of something absolutely the greatest, outside or beyond the world. But this answer means Anselm already presupposed the existence of God before he proves it (a fact he accepts), and QMNC is the projection of this. Hence, the statement "QMNC exists" has no meaning. Neither has "QMNC does not exist". Indeed, if the same kind of "existence" of God needs to be demonstrated as the "existence" of objects of the world, then absolute greatness should not be introduced. But if this is not the case, then the argument fails ; "existence" is not a predicate : for Kant, inconsiderate of the specific background of Anselm's thought, "existence" is not a predicate as "great, beautiful or good". The fact something exists "in res" is not an additional quality next to what it is "in intellectu", for otherwise the concept would be incomplete. Anselm may answer that only in the unique case of QMNC "existence" is analytically contained in the concept of God. If we define the logic of "existence" as positing a subject-for-predication, then a proposition as "Dragons do not exist." means the subject "dragon" does not function as a subject of predication in reality. But QMNC could then be reformulated : "to function as a subject of predication in a proposition about reality is 'greater' than to function in propositions referring to fiction, imagination or concepts". Apparently, Anselm's argument is not easy to undermine, and several authors have reformulated QMNC in order to counter the attacks by Thomas Aquinas, Kant and others. It "works" against semantic atheists who accept the concept of God having meaning but refuse God any existence. For logical (positivist) atheism, the proposition "God exists." is not equivalent with "Dragons do not exist." (for "in intellectu" the subject is meaningful like all shared fictional objects), but rather with "Square circles do not exist." Logical atheism asserts "God" and "QMNC" are meaningless, i.e. just a series of nonsensical sounds or dots on paper, equal to the empty set. However, if Anselm is bound to show the "meaning" of QMNC, then his opponents must prove QMNC meaningless. Hence, the logical atheist is compelled to demonstrate how the things within our empirical experience are necessarily the only things (a logic of finitude). But if only non-foundational a posteriori arguments are available, then such a feat may prove to be impossible. At best, it may be probable QMNC is meaningless but not certain. QMNC may be semantically richer (and less complex) than the supposed proof of the "greatness" of empirical knowledge at the exclusion of all other types of knowledge : revelation, faith, the Platonic eye, intellectual perception, intuition, gnosis, meta-rational knowledge, mystical experience etc. Is a logic of finitude possible without infinity ?



Anselm's ontological argument makes one crucial point clear : one cannot at the same time state "God exists." has meaning and is untrue. The possibility excluded by the semantic atheist realizes itself precisely when the latter denies God's existence ! This atheism is auto-destructive. Logical atheism is impossible without a terministic proof of the fact empirical experience is the only possible reality. Certainty can hardly be given, except by the entrapment of knowledge by the Münchhausen-trilemma, stopping the series of final justifications ad hoc, presumably in some form of materialistic and reductionist realism.



1.4 The "quinque viis" of Thomas Aquinas.



"For from the greatness and beauty of created things comes a corresponding perception of their Creator."

Wisdom of Solomon , 13:5.



§ 15



In accord with Aristotelian thought, the provisions of the proof of God made by the Dominican Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274) differ from those of Anselm of Canterbury. Although the latter does not consider QMNC (God is "aliquid Quo Majus Nihil Cogitari potest") to be an analytical statement of a self-evident, intuitive idea, the existence of God is proven to be self-evident if (a) QMNC is accepted and (b) existence "in res" is considered "greater" than existence "in intellectu" (cf. supra). In his Monologium , the Platonic "methexis" or essential connection between the order of existence and the order of ideas is presupposed. This is precisely what Aristotle rejected, as does Aquinas. Also epistemologically this fundamental difference ensues. For Aquinas, truth is "adaequatio rei et intellectus" (ontological realism), for Anselm truth is "rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis" (ontological idealism).



Thomas Aquinas rejected the ontological argument a priori. Firstly, he took Anselm to be arguing the self-evident existence of God, which was not the case, and denies everyone understands QMNC. Secondly, he distinguished between "existence" in thought and existence as such. The jump from existence "in intellectu" and existence "in res" is illicit. At best, Anselm proves only we must think God, defined as QMNC, as existing. But this does not prove God exists "in res", outside the mind. The argument may be structured as follows : Proposition 1 : Circles must be thought as round.

Proposition 2 : God must be thought as existing (Anselm).

Conclusion 1 : Round circle do not therefore necessarily exist.

Conclusion 2 : God does not therefore necessarily exist. Did Aquinas grasp QMNC ? Apparently he did not. For Anselm, this definition of God is a description, not an immediate intuition, per se notum, as Thomas thought. Moreover, this description and the conclusion a priori drawn from it, fit only one Being, namely God as QMNC. Although valid for all other objects, Thomas' counter-argument does not work for "God" defined as "QMNC", for God is the only Being (Э!x) that is its own existence, and so if it is possible for such a Being to exist "in intellectu", then it must also exist "in res". In other words, the Being than which no greater can be thought is the Being existing necessarily "in intellectu" and "in res". It would indeed be absurd to speak of a possible necessary Being, i.e. a Being who's essence is existence but somehow only "in intellectu". Of course, only God is a Being that must exist, round circles and other analytical (tautological) statements do not.



In Thomas' view, we cannot come to know God as He is in essence ("quid sit"), but only that He is or exists ("quod sit"). The idea of God's existence is not, as such, an innate idea, nor is "God exists." a statement with no conceivable opposition (analytical or a priori). John Damascene (676 - 749) had asserted the knowledge of God is innate in man. Bonaventure (1221 - 1274) recognized an initial, implicit awareness of God to be made explicit by interior reflection alone.



Aquinas accepts man's natural desire of happiness (beatitudo), to be found in God alone. But between this "natural" desire of happiness and the realization of God's existence (as happiness), stand powerful side-tracking sensual and imaginal forces (pleasure, wealth, power), making the innate idea of happiness too vague to sufficiently lead to God. To be made explicit, the existence of God has to be elucidated. The proofs given by Thomas will therefore proceed by way of the (outer, exterior) world. This means they are all a posteriori. Can reason, by radicalizing his ideas about the physical world, come to the proposition "God exists." ?



This position is in accord with his Peripatetic premiss : Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu (there is nothing in the intellect which was not before in the senses). The human intellect is confined to knowing corporeal entities and can thus not, while on Earth, transcend the world of sense-experience. However, this orientation does not stop the intellect from producing general statements, and if physical objects bear a discernible relationship with a transcending cause, then the intellect can know such a cause exists. Nevertheless, corporeal objects are and remain the natural object of the intellect.



The way to proceed then, is to study God's effects in the world. But because God is infinite and material causes finite, there is an absence of proportion between cause and effect making every a posteriori argumentation indeed imperfect. So although we cannot reach a perfect knowledge of the cause, we nevertheless can come to know its existence, and this is the issue at hand. If we move from effect to a cause in such a way the effect can only proceed from a certain kind of cause, we argue to the existence of a cause of that kind.



§ 16



Aquinas argues in favour of five "paths" to God. In fact, these are not logical deductions leading to certain conclusions, but statements every believer would accept, for they correspond with what is said about God ("et hoc dicimus Deum"). Thomas' arguments intend to proof the "praeambula fidei" (steps before faith) or "motiva credibilitatis", but not to convince atheists.



(1) argument from motion :



Found in Aristotle (cf. supra), Maimonides (1135 - 1204) and Albertus Magnus (1206 - 1280), the patron saint of scientists, the argument, called by Thomas "manifestior via", the more manifest way, points to the fact all things are on the move, or, in Aristotelian terms, they evidence a reduction of potency to act. This reduction is always caused by something already in act, for every moving thing is moved by another thing. Since an infinite series cannot exist in a finite world, in the end, an unmoved mover is arrived at.



With "infinite series" is meant an endless succession in the horizontal (sequential) order of actually depending causes. But, the series as a whole is finite. To be able to give an ultimate and adequate ontological explanation of this experienced world of causal chains, the series must depend on something outside the series. This would be lacking if one would never come to a full stop, and envisage an infinite, historical series. But, in this case, a comprehensive ontology could not be arrived at. Science and philosophy are then impossible.



(2) argument from efficient causes :



Used by Avicenna (980 - 1037) and Albertus Magnus, it focuses on the series of efficient causes. As nothing can be the cause of itself (if not, it would exist before itself), every thing is caused by another thing. Ergo, rejecting an infinite series of efficient causes in a finite world order, a first cause must exist, which all men call "God".



(3) argument from necessity :



This argument, found in Avicenna and developed by Maimonides, brings the contingent nature of all things to the fore. They come into being and perish, they rise and fall. Every thing can be or not and hence no thing is necessary. If it would be otherwise, it would never stop being or pass away. But it does. To understand why such unnecessary beings come into existence, there must be a necessary being, for otherwise nothing at all would exist, nothing could ever have been reduced from potency to act, and actuality would never have been. There would only be nonexistent potency. Ergo, a being, not itself dependent, exists. A necessary being exist, whom we call "God".



(4) argument from perfections :



This argument was favored by Platonists like Augustine and Anselm. It starts from the degrees of perfection, implied by making comparative statements about various actualities, like beauty, truth, goodness etc. If we assume the difference between beautiful and more beautiful has objective foundation, then the most beautiful, the best, the most truthful, etc. must exist and this is the supreme being ("maxime esse"). This a relative best, for there must be one being or several beings which are comparatively supreme. But, what is supreme in beauty, for example, is supreme in all things. Ergo, there must be a supreme Being, which is the cause of all perfections in every other being, "et hoc decimus Deum".



(5) argument from design or finality :



The observed order of inorganic objects cannot come into being by chance, but is the result of intent. Objects without knowledge can not tend towards an end unless directed like "the arrow is directed by the archer". Ergo, there exists an intelligent Being directing all natural objects to an end. The natural world is composed of different objects with conflicting qualities. Nevertheless, these work together towards the realization of the one order. Ergo, this must proceed from an intelligent cause or Providence, and this is what we call "God".



§ 17



A first point. The outstanding logical factor in these a posteriori arguments is the presence of an "infinite series" in the finite ontological order of dependence. Thomas is convinced the world can be explained in an adequate ontological way. For him, this implies the transition from cause to effect refers to a sufficient ground outside the subject of experience (cf. his metaphysical realism), to wit : the reality of the existence of God (taken for granted). For Kant, this refers to the subject of experience (cf. Copernican Revolution), for all rules regarding this transition refer to possible experience only and are categorial. They are valid nowhere except as referring to the object of the world of sense. Hence, there is no "bridge" available for reason to move from a finite "chain" or series of conditions to the existence of a purely, infinite intelligible Being, as Aquinas claims. Hence for Kant, the existence of a transcendent God cannot be inferred, because all the rules involving the argument are meant to work with sense objects and with nothing else. They certainly are not meant to move from the immanent order of causes to the transcendent order of Divinity. The safe route supposed by Thomas is just not there. Instead, there is an unbridgeable gap, necessitating a leap. Hence, the a posteriori arguments are invalid to demonstrate God as QMNC.



Secondly, a necessary supreme Being, intelligently directing the world, unmoved mover & first cause, is not yet the God of Jesus Christ, but this is less a problem for religious philosophy than it was for Thomism and its audience. Indeed, for if the last proof of Thomas Aquinas is valid (in this or another form), then the atheist thesis stating the impossibility of the Divine fact (as effect) is refuted, as will become clear when studying Kant's objection.



"... I say that the properties of the infinite being which refer to creatures are either of causality or of pre-eminence. Those of causality in turn are twofold, the properties of efficient and final causality. What is added about the exemplar does not involve another cause different in kind from the efficient, for then there would be five kinds of causes. Wherefore, the examplar cause is a certain kind of efficient cause, namely an intelligent agent in contradistinction to a natural agent ..."

Duns Scotus : De Esse Dei , Articulus Primus.



Thirdly, for Thomas, the first proof was the "via manifestior". But, in his Oxford Commentary , the Franciscan monk John Duns Scotus (1265/6 - 1308), argued that it is a more perfect and immediate knowledge of the first being to know it as a necessary being than as the first mover. The argument from motion cannot transcend the physical world. As the cause of all motion, the first mover cannot be conceived as the cause of all beings, but only as a necessary hypothesis to explain physical motion. In his De primo principio , he reworks the argument from necessity (contingency), and considers it as more comprehensive than the arguments from motion or causal production, both dealing with specific cases. The argument from necessity asks : Why is there something rather than nothing ? In Aristotelian terms : Why has potency ever been reduced to act ?



If A is the cause of a contingent object, it must either be caused or uncaused. As contingent objects cannot be uncaused (for if so they would not exist), A must be caused. If contingent being is caused, it is caused by nothing or by itself or by another thing. As it cannot be cause by nothing or by itself, it is caused by another thing. Eventually, we arrive at the first cause, and we find what we are seeking. The Doctor Subtilis is right : we cannot proceed for ever in the ascending, vertical order of dependence (as we can in the horizontal), or in the words of Scotus : "Infinitas autem est impossibilis in ascendendo."



Suppose otherwise. Granted the possibility of an infinite horizontal series of successive causes, then the whole chain needs to be reasoned. This reason must be outside the chain, for every object in the chain is caused and so contingent, making the whole series contingent. Therefore, only by postulating a vertical, transcendent cause, can the totality of ordered effects ("causatorum") be understood. This final cause is no longer directed to any more ultimate causes. To postulate an eternal world is of no avail either, for the eternal series of contingent beings is itself in need of a cause. This is a necessary cause, outside the eternal world.



1.5 Ockham's first Conserver.



"All the conserving causes simultaneously concur for the conservation of an effect ; if, therefore, in the order of conserving causes we go on ad infinitum, then an infinite number of things would be actually existing at the same time. This, however, is impossible ..."

Ockham : Questionis in lib. I Physicorum , Q.cxxxvi.



§ 18



With the Franciscan monk William of Ockham (1290 - 1350), theologian & philosopher, the "via moderna" received its most logical of defenders. Thomists, Scotists and Augustinians formed the "via antiqua". It is their realism, Platonic (the essence is transcendent) as well as Aristotelic (the essence is immanent), which was firmly rejected. Instead, nominalism was promoted, but one without objective universals. It was hence more radical than Abelard's. No reality ("quid rei") is ever attained, but only a nominal representation ("quid nominis").



For Ockham, the metaphysics of essences was introduced into Christian theology and philosophy from Greek sources. So, contrary to Abelard's moderate nominalism, his strict nominalism did not incorporate them. There are no universal subsistent forms, for otherwise God would be limited in His creative act by these eternal ideas. This non-Christian invention has no place in Christian thought. Universals are only "termini concepti", terms signifying individual things which stand for them in propositions.



It was Peter of Spain (thirteenth century), who's exact identity is unknown, who had distinguished between probable reasoning (dialectic), demonstrative science & sophistical reasoning. Ockham was influenced by this emphasis placed on syllogistic reasoning leading to probable conclusions. Hence, arguments in philosophy (as distinct from logic) are probable (terministic) rather than demonstrative.



For Ockham, who took the equipment to develop his terminist logic from his predecessors, empirical data were primordial and exclusive to establish the existence of a thing. The validity of inferring from the existence of one thing to the existence of another things was questioned. He distinguished between the spoken word ("terminus prolatus"), the written word ("terminus scriptus") and the concept ("terminus conceptus" or "intentio animæ"). The latter is a natural sign, the natural reaction to the stimuli of a direct empirical apprehension. Only individual things exist. By the fact a thing exists, it is individual. There cannot be existent universals, for if a universal exists, it must be an individual, which is a contradictio in terminis (for universals are supposed to subsume individuals).



This focus on the objects which are immediately known, goes hand in hand with the principle of economy to get rid of the abstracting "species intelligibiles". What is known as "Ockham's Razor" was a common principle in Medieval philosophy. Because of his frequent usage of the principle (cf. the Franciscan vow of poverty), his name has become indelibly attached to it. In Ockham's version it reads : "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate." (plurality should not be posited without necessity). In general terms, this principle of simplicity or parsimony is to always prefer the least complicated explanation for an observation.



Radical nominalists, like Nicolas of Autrecourt (ca. 1300 - ca. 1350), who belonged to the faculty of arts, would say no inference from the existence of one thing to the existence of another thing could be demonstrative or cogent, but only probable. Hence, necessity and certainty, idolized by the foregoing metaphysical systems, were gone. No demonstration of God's existence was possible. Such matters have to be relegated to the order of adherence to revealed knowledge or faith. At this point, theology and philosophy separate and the latter becomes a "lay" activity. This is not yet apparent in Ockham, who remains a theologian seeking to find a way to rethink the "proof" of God's existence in merely a posteriori terms.



§ 19



Against his predecessors, Ockham accepts "being" as one concept common to creatures and God, meaning "being" is predicable in a univocal sense of all existent things. Without such a concept of being, the existence of God could not be conceived. But, this does not mean this concept acts as a bridge between empirical observation of creatures and sense data about God (cf. supra : positing the series and then transcending it). Nor can we form an abstract concept of being and then deduce the existence of God, as Anselm thought. The concept of being is univocal in the sense this concept is common to a plurality of things, neither accidentally or substantially alike (thus avoiding pantheism). The proofs of God's existence given by his predecessors are all rejected. Not to feed skepticism, but because they are not logically conclusive.



Embodied nature is the primary mental object. No direct, natural apprehension of God's essence is given. "God exists." is not a self-evident proposition. God's existence can therefore never be proved with certainty. God is not an object of demonstrative science. Is the existence of God probable ?



Against the first mover, Ockham shows how the basic premiss of the argument is neither self-evident or demonstrable. Angels and the human soul also move themselves. Such exceptions show the alleged principle is not necessary, and so not a sufficient basis for a certain proof. It cannot be proved an infinite regress in the series of movers is impossible. Perhaps infinite objects exist. Perhaps the world is not finite but infinite, not temporal but everlasting. As it is more probable there is a first unmoved mover than no first unmoved mover, the argument from movement is only probable. A first mover probably exists.



Against finality, Ockham argues as follows. In the case of things acting without knowledge and will, they act because of a natural necessity, with is not the same as to say they act "for an end". In the case of intelligent agents of will, voluntary actions are rooted in their own will. Only if one presupposes God's existence, can one speak of things acting for ends, but God's existence is not a given.



The only way to prove God's existence would be as efficient cause of all things, remaining within the finite order. Indeed, Ockham stops at the first efficient cause. The reasons for this move also explain his rejection of the arguments of necessity and perfections. Infinite transcendence is thus avoided. But to identify this cause with God is not possible, for this cause could be a heavenly body ( Quodlibet ). It cannot be proved this supposed heavenly body is caused by God, for we have only immediate and mediate sense data of corruptible things, not of any transcending concept.



Against the semantic pattern of previous arguments, Ockham argues the difference between Divine attributes like omnipotence, infinity, eternity, absolutely supreme, perfect, unique, the power to create out of nothing, which cannot be demonstrated, and "God" as the first conserving cause of this world. Although we have no certain knowledge about its nature, one can prove its existence as probable. This is Ockham's argument from conservation, a subtle form of the argument from efficient causes (and developed in the commentary on the Sentences ). The existence of God as the unique and absolute supreme being cannot be demonstrated, but the existence of the first conserving cause can, and this existence is probable and wholly immanent.



§ 20



The core of the argument favors the move from (vertical) conservation to Conserver, rather than from (horizontal) product to Producer. In this way, the infinite regress is avoided, for this infinite series is conceivable in the case of efficient causes (existing one after the other and so forming an infinite world), but impossible in the actual order of conservation "hic et nunc". If not, actual reality would be inflated to an actual infinity, which is it is evidently not, as everybody agrees.



In the traditional argument from efficient causes, it is assumed an infinite regress in causes of the same kind is not possible. The world was deemed finite and the world of ideas infinite. In Christianity, the former was associated with "fallen nature" and the latter with the Dionysian angelic choirs. To say the world was infinite was sheer blasphemy, for it ruined the strict line drawn by the theists between a finite creation and an infinite Creator. In such a context, free natural inquiry was repressed. The "via moderna" is no longer devoted to apology. For Ockham, the finitude of the world cannot be strictly demonstrated. Maybe an infinite series exists, maybe not. All previous proofs presupposed the truth of the proposition "The world is not infinite.", but this is not necessarily so. Nevertheless, probabilities may be assessed and calculated.



To avoid the question of the infinite ingress in time, i.e. as a sequence of interacting and interdependent efficient causes, Ockham jumps to the actual, vertical order of events "here and now", i.e. as they are happening in every moment. By doing so, he avoids an infinite regress, for it is a solid premiss to affirm the world is not infinite in each actual moment.



As a contingent thing coming into being, is conserved in being as long as it exists, its conserver is dependent, for its own conservation, on another conserver or not. As only necessary beings conserve themselves and the world contains contingent things only, every conserver depends on another conserver, etc. As there is no infinite number of actual conservers "hic et nunc", there must be a first Conserver. An infinite regress in the case of things existing one after the other (like horizontal causes of the same kind) is conceivable. But an infinite regress in the actual, empirical world here and now would give an actual infinity, which is absurd. Indeed, to avoid the first Conserver, actual reality would become infinite ! Ergo, the first Conserver probably exists.



This elegant proof of the first Conserver is completely a posteriori. It avoids the order of infinity, and considers the world finite. No limit-concept is invoked, no transcendent being deduced. The "essence" of God cannot be known, lies outside reason. The existence of God cannot be demonstrated by necessity, but argued by probability, for the finite order of contingent beings cannot be conserved without a first Conserver. So, according to Ockham, in the order of rational, empirical knowledge, natural necessity and a first Conserver is all philosophy can infer as proven, probable knowledge. Nothing which is really God can be known by us without something other than God being involved as object. There is no simple concept proper to God mirroring the essence of God adequately. We are left with the first Conserver, and can advance no further (cf. infra, Kant and the architect of the world).



In Late Medieval thought, the ultimate reduction introduced by Ockham was the final organ point closing the process of (1) the assimilation of the new sources in the dialectica, in particular Aristotelian thought, Arabic science and the "Orientale Lumen", and (2) their subsequent rejection. With radical nominalism, a conceptual framework was set in place describing the logical and epistemological conditions for the study of nature that was to follow. Platonism and hylemorphism were rejected. Knowledge derived from direct, actual experience is deemed valid. All other knowledge is constructed. Propositions in which universals operate, may be certain or probable. Logic deals with certaintly, but scientific knowledge is probable. The world is a contingent, corporeal whole. The existence of God lies outside reason, as an object of faith. Natural necessity and a first Conserver of the world are the two pillars of natural th