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By Date By Thread Cyanogenmod MITM: proven, despite cyanogenmod's public denail From: Lord Tuskington <l.tuskington () gmail com>

Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 10:03:30 +1000

After reading el reg's article regarding a cyanogenmod MITM flaw, I started looking through the code to see if I could find it. It didn't take long. This finding was not what users are led to believe by cyanogenmod's blog post: http://www.cyanogenmod.org/blog/in-response-to-the-register-mitm-article I reported the issue to cyanogenmod, but got a rather unsatisfactory reply. They didn't seem willing to modify the blog post to more accurately reflect the problem. Below is my email exchange with cyanogenmod's security address: Lord Tuskington, Thank your for your response. Truth is we assumed as much, but the lack of meaningful information in the Register's sensational article didn't leave us much room to interpret it besides what it presented at face value. As you noted, this has already been addressed in our shipping code branch (cm-11), prior to the article's publishing. This was the net result of the messaging provided in the blog post, with CM 11 being 'safe' from this issue. We normally do not patch non-shipping code (in this case 10.2 and prior), though we may in this case. We do not expect to make a advisory on the 10.2 item at this time. Thank you, Abhisek Devkota On Oct 17, 2014 8:50 PM, "Lord Tuskington" <l.tuskington () gmail com> wrote: Hello from Greenland! I think you may be confused about the issue discussed here: http://www.cyanogenmod.org/blog/in-response-to-the-register-mitm-article If I understand correctly, the original reporter may have been referring to a vulnerability fixed by this commit, which was merged 20 days ago: https://github.com/CyanogenMod/android_external_apache-http/commit/f925f10b1feba92868fd4e8966592ec1bf755d67 The vulnerable code is still present in the cm-10.2 branch: https://github.com/CyanogenMod/android_external_apache-http/blob/cm-10.2/src/org/apache/http/conn/ssl/AbstractVerifier.java#L228-244 If you release an advisory, please credit "Lord Tuskington of TuskCorp" for reporting this vulnerability responsibly. Regards Lord Tuskington Chief Financial Pinniped TuskCorp _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ By Date By Thread Current thread: Cyanogenmod MITM: proven, despite cyanogenmod's public denail Lord Tuskington (Oct 18)