Apr 23, 2019

On March 31, the UN special envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, met in Muscat with the chief Houthi negotiator, Mohammed Abdulsalam. They discussed ways to facilitate the implementation of the Stockholm agreement for peace in Yemen. While these negotiations were largely inconsequential, they highlighted Oman’s rising profile as a diplomatic arbiter in Yemen, as they occurred a month after British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt held a rare meeting with Abdulsalam in Muscat.

Since the start of the Saudi Arabia-led military intervention in Yemen in March 2015, Oman has attempted to position itself as a critical mediator in the conflict. Unlike its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) counterparts, Oman has consistently maintained a position of neutrality in Yemen, and questioned the feasibility of the Arab coalition’s efforts to subdue the Houthis through force alone. In order to burnish its credentials as a mediator, Oman has pursued a strategy of constructive engagement with the Houthis.

This policy has reaped fruit, as Oman has successfully negotiated the release of numerous detainees held in Houthi prisons, supported UN cease-fire efforts in Hodeidah by hosting parallel intra-Yemeni dialogue sessions, and helped the United States evacuate its embassy in Sanaa after the Houthi coup d’etat. In lieu of these successes, Oman is hoping to convince the Houthis to end their occupation of Hodeidah, as the Stockholm agreement requires, and play a central role in Griffiths’ ambitions of securing peace in Yemen. In addition, Oman has been feted as an effective mediator between warring factions in Yemen by numerous prominent analysts, including former US ambassador to Tunisia, Gordon Gray, and Hakim Almasmari, the editor-in-chief of the Yemen Post.

In spite of these optimistic assessments of Oman’s diplomatic role, Muscat’s mediation gambit has received a mixed reception in Yemen and the GCC. Among Yemeni factions, the Houthis and numerous members of Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s coalition have supported Oman’s arbitration efforts, while the Southern Transitional Council (STC) views Muscat’s involvement with less enthusiasm. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates share the STC’s reticence about Oman’s mediation efforts, as both countries view Muscat’s intentions with suspicion, due to its close relationship with Iran and alleged transfers of arms to the Houthis. These polarizations could undermine Oman’s mediation ambitions in Yemen and reduce the credibility of Muscat’s purported mission of promoting “understanding, stability and overcoming differences” in dialogue with its neighbors.

As Oman has maintained normalized relations with the Houthis since the start of the war and supported the eventual transformation of the Houthis into a legitimate political party, the Houthis are the leading advocates for the expansion of Muscat’s diplomatic role in Yemen. These positive perceptions of Oman were further entrenched in early 2018, as Muscat’s diplomatic efforts helped prevent loyal supporters of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress party from engaging in open conflict with the Houthis, after the former president’s assassination. The trust that the Houthis place in Oman is exemplified by the insistence of senior Houthi officials on using Omani planes for diplomatic purposes and Muscat’s acceptance of Houthis requiring medical treatment.