The recent hard line endeavours in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) have thrown up pertinent questions on possible paradigm shift in application of conflict resolution models. Will security-centric approach be the new normal? Formation of Nagaland in 1963, literally, unleashed ‘domino effect’, resulting in splintering of Assam into seven sisters, including grant of statehood to Union Territories (UT) like Arunachal and North-East Frontier Agency. Standard prescription to address regionalism was to create states and plethora of autonomous regional councils – Bodo, Kachari, Kuki etc. Historic amendments in Articles 370 and 35-A, coupled with downgrading of J&K to UT, amounts to jettisoning, earlier trend of pandering to sub-national aspirations. While each conflict has its own set of unique challenges, precluding templated solutions, yet there are few common parameters, that need to be flagged. Conventional conflict resolution models have been characterised by steps like stabilising security environment, engagement with groups, proposing solution package, negotiations (often prolonged ones) and, finally, accord – summed up into acronym Sepna.

Naga insurgency erupted in ’50s, followed by equally violent movements in almost the entire north east (NE). Naga movement has the dubious distinction of being the perpetually festering problem. Notwithstanding many agreements – like 16-point agreement of 1960, Shillong accord in 1965 and recent framework agreement in 2014 – it is still to find closure. While violence in NE simmered down, proxy war in Kashmir emerged as the most complex challenge, having kept the nation on the edge for three decades with frequent terrorist attacks in the Valley, followed by daily court martial on TV and Twitter. Separatist elements leveraged centrifugal forces generated by alienation and ethnic/theological fault lines, drawing ready sustenance and sanctuary from external forces like Pakistan and China. Special credit must be given to current governments in Bangladesh and Myanmar for denying bases and flushing out ultras.

Simmering left-wing extremism combined with looming threat of fedayeens have kept even the hinterland in a state of uneasy calm. In this maze of multiple insurgencies, the success rate, in terms of conflict resolution, remains poor and only notable positives have been Mizoram and Punjab. An imaginative stratagem of installing Laldenga at the helm catalysed solving of Mizo problem. Punjab has been the only successful, hard power enabled solution, wherein security forces, specially Punjab Police, were given free hand. Despite success against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, use of force remains an extreme option. Its recent application in Kashmir is due to prolonged cumulative frustration built up due to Pakistan, stymieing all other options like Sadbhavana. Yet, this model is restrained and unlike heavy-handed approach prevalent in the American and Pakistan armies, where gun ships and heavy weapons are used freely.

Security agencies lead by Army, given operational freedom and synergy, invariably stabilise the situation and put insurgency in recession loop, as evidenced, repeatedly in J&K and NE. The frustrating reality is that response strategy lacks clear cut road map, especially in socio-political domain. More often than not, it is a story of missed opportunities and ‘deja vu’. Flare ups in south Kashmir and north Nagaland are recent examples. Oft repeated cliché of ‘prevention is better than cure’ needs to be adopted by creating separate specialist administrative cadre dealing with national security, also endorsed by former governor, N N Vohra. It can be contemporary version of erstwhile Indian Frontier Administrative Services. More importantly, Central Armed Police Forces have proved unequal to task, forcing Army to step in, they need to take up this challenge.

Only redeeming feature in Nagaland is that after 20-odd years of stand still, populace has got addicted to peace and this acts as restraining influence on insurgents. Drift is also relished by agencies and forces, as it gives them relevance and unaudited funds. But status quo needs to be broken by innovative initiatives. Impasse of two decades has imposed huge opportunity costs, reducing ‘Act East’ policy to mere paper exercise. National Socialist Council of Nagaland remains obdurate, insisting on separate constitution and flag. The biggest challenge is to address these aspirations and yet extend nuanced interpretation of ‘one nation, one constitution’ to NE. Financial inclusion, dismantling of extortion regime and enabling genuine economic liberation are key challenges. There is definitely strong case for replacing ‘drift and tiring out’ approach with dynamic conflict resolution initiatives. It will be interesting to see if groups in NE draw any lessons from new hard line approach in Kashmir.

Critical enablers are mediators/interlocutors and initiation of dialogue. It would be ideal to keep the mediation window open allowing moderates to come on board. Nagaland has formal monitoring mechanism also, headed by an Army General. Mechanism has the most inappropriate nomenclature of Cease Fire Monitoring Group, giving additional legitimacy to separatists as cease fire is normally between sovereign nations. Ideally, nominated mediator should operate from state concerned. Naga peace process, in earlier years, was steered by a former bureaucrat, who preferred Bangkok, rarely visiting NE. Transition from non-resident Indian to resident mediator, R N Ravi in his new role as governor, is very welcome. J&K witnessed failed experiment of group of interlocutors headed by Dileep Padgaonkar aided by Radha Kumar and M M Ansari. The current interlocutor, Dineshwar Sharma seems to have yielded ground to governor and National Security Agency. Over reliance on former intelligence operatives requires review and balancing.

Government, in all likelihood, has an action plan, which is yet to be shared as ambiguity seems to be the current flavour. Transparency and involvement of domain experts will not only result in value additions but will also inject certain amount of peer review and accountability.

The writer is former ArmyCommander, Western Command