May 14, 2014

Yahya Rahim Safavi, the former commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the current military adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in May 2014, “[Iran’s] real borders are not what they appear, but extend to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea in southern Lebanon.”

His words triggered a storm of criticism and questions in Lebanon and the Arab region for a variety of reasons.

First, Safavi's stance, which he expressed during a television interview, clearly infringes on Lebanese sovereignty. No Iranian official issued any statement to counter the stance despite the torrent of criticism and an objection from Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. The president requested the Lebanese Foreign Ministry seek a clarification from the Iranian side. Making matters worse, instead of correcting or denying the statement, a few days later, another former commander of the IRGC, Hussein Hamdani, confirmed “the formation of a Syrian Hezbollah, after a Lebanese Hezbollah,” adding, “Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is fighting on behalf of Iran.”

These statements, despite being grave, are not new. They simply expressed openly what was being said about Iran’s expansionist intentions. But the statements raise several questions about their timing and their blatant, provocative tone. These statements are important because they were issued as the negotiations between Iran and the United States are in high gear. Radical parties affiliated with the supreme leader question the timing of the statements, and how they are related to the US-Iran negotiations. What are their repercussions on the Levant scenes, on elections in Iraq and Syria and on Lebanon's potential presidential vacuum?

These attitudes reveal Iran’s intentions in the negotiations and its regional project that runs from Tehran to the Mediterranean, through Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, where all are waiting for parliamentary election results. The Iraqi elections will determine the shape and parameters of Iranian influence. It is likely that Iran is showing its cards to negotiate over them as part of a grand bargain that goes beyond the nuclear issue, as Iran has sought from the beginning. If the door to bargaining outside the framework of the nuclear file is open, it is all the more likely that one file be traded for another. We could face a situation wherein Iran backs down in Syria and advances in Iraq or Lebanon or vice versa.