RAM on EOS

Currently, BP’s are responsible for adding RAM to the EOS ecosystem. Additionally, the EOS community lacks any formal procedures by which additional RAM is implemented. BP’s are not required to make any announcements when adding RAM nor are they obligated to have a public position on the matter. As it stands now, the RAM market is essentially dictated by “shadow decisions” and ultimately confidential. This is in direct conflict with the notion of “radical transparency”. Without transparency there is plenty of room for “bad actors” to take advantage of the system and potentially corrode communal trust. We believe the current arrangement is in direct contradiction with a “trustless” platform.

A case can be made that keeping information confidential may deter speculators from artificially inflating the price of RAM in the marketplace. After all, speculators can only make money when they are able to time the market accurately — if Block Producers’ endeavor to work against them behind closed doors, the risk-return profile of speculation would shift drastically against speculators.

Issues with the Current Model

That said, the issue with this approach is that RAM supply increases can, to a degree, face technical constraints, have the potential to become a heavy and wasteful financial burden for BPs, and bestow upon BPs a sort of financial regulatory power which they might not be best suited for. Perhaps most concerning, the status quo would lead to material information asymmetry in the market that if unchecked, would enable unfair inside trading of RAM.

Under this scenario, EOS token holders would be forced to either place their trust on BP’s not taking unfair advantage of any information asymmetry to their benefit, or institute a mechanism or regulatory body to oversee that no such wrongdoing is taking place and raise any issues to ECAF (or an appointed arbitration forum if the constitution 2.0 is ratified).

While most BPs have proven to be owned and run by honorable and trustworthy individuals, operating under a system that requires trust in third parties within the scope of a trustless ecosystem goes against the key tenets of Blockchain and EOS. On the other hand, instituting a mechanism or qualified regulatory body to oversee the RAM market is easier said than done, and as is the case with the SEC in the U.S., would most likely result in a prohibitively expensive and incredibly inefficient system.

Closing Remarks

We at EOS BlockSmith are strong proponents of radical transparency in every aspect of EOS governance, in order to foster a healthy and secure EOS blockchain environment. We hold our ground in the case of the EOS network RAM marketplace, and maintain that it is in the best interest of token holders and the broader EOS community that Block Producers remain as open and transparent as possible with respect to any changes to RAM supply or to the RAM allocation mechanism, minimizing any information asymmetry and the potential for any wrongdoing.

Our Commitment to the EOS Community

Until the community comes to a consensus on this matter and eliminates the issues we’ve cited above, Blocksmith is committed to the following:

Keeping the community informed about all potential RAM increases Our position on issues related to RAM will be public at all times

What can be done about this issue?

We think RAM should be added on a transparent, fixed schedule (2–4 gigs week). We believe a “slow and steady” approach that is publicly transparent will help create a stabilized and predictable market in which the room for exploitation is virtually eliminated. Under this scenario, it’s likely that we would witness long-term downward pressure on the price of RAM, rather than large increases which invite speculation and insatiability in RAM price.

We are hoping other BP’s will join us in our commitment to develop policy that is in favor of protecting majority interests in order to secure life, liberty and property.

EOS Blocksmith

We are fully independent and 100% self-funded. Internally Incentivized to Advocate the Interests of the Majority