Because if so, could such a thing happen again? History is never irrelevant.



Our current government seeks to hurry us into a war whose end is – by the Prime Minister’s own admission – unknown. I thought this would be a good moment to take a deeper look at Sir Edward Grey’s successful efforts to rush us into the 1914 disaster. Perhaps we could learn something from them , in this extraordinarily precarious moment of history, with potential wars smouldering in the Middle East and Ukraine.



In his speech to the Commons on the early evening of 3rd August 1914, which was followed later by a voteless debate which was not attended by much of the government Front Bench, Sir Edward made much use of the 1839 Treaty of London, under which Britain and several other powers had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium.

As Sir Edward Grey and the Cabinet well knew (see my recent blogs on 1914 revisited, and some subsequent postings in answer to my automatic critic, the Wiki Man), this Treaty did not bind Britain to go to war. They also knew that Britain’s secret military commitments to France, discussed over years between Henry Wilson and Ferdinand Foch, and above all Sir Edward Grey's very recent rushed agreement to undertake the defence of the French Channel Coast from a hypothetical German naval attack, had committed us to war before Belgium’s neutrality was violated.

The famous Belgian Treaty’s provisions (Everyone has heard of this Treaty. Almost nobody has read it) had been viewed as so weak and vague by W.E.Gladstone, during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, that he had made special extra emergency treaties (with the North German Federation, as it then was, and the French Empire, as it then was) which were specific on intervention. Those treaties (which, amazingly, simultaneously committed us to possible military alliances with France against Germany, or with Germany against France) were limited in effect and time.

They specifically ruled out British involvement in any general war, limiting it to the defence of Belgian neutrality. And they expired after a year, which meant they were long dead and buried, and we were back to the 1839 text. But anyone who did not know this rather inconvenient detail would have been much enlightened by Sir Edward’s speech.

**

Sir Edward must have known this. Yet his speech does not really explain it. He said :

‘The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords, and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville, on the 8th of August 1870, used these words. He said:

"We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that we did not think this country was bound either morally or internationally or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium, though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the country's interests." '



**

This seems to me to be mere bluster about honour, of the sort to which politicians resort when they are short of actual arguments, of little interest one way or another. Gladstone, on the other hand, is harder and clearer. But if you did not know the background, a casual listener might not have realised just how different the two were.



Sir Edward said : Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:—

"There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the *** complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that Treaty*** (my emphasis, PH); but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.”

***



What Sir Edward is actually quoting Gladstone as saying is, if you read it carefully, very damaging to his case. Gladstone is ‘not able to subscribe’ to the ‘doctrine’ of those who say that ‘existence of a guarantee is binding on every party *irrespective*of the specific conditions. In other words, this Treaty at any rate is so vague that it is inadequate for the needs of 1870 (and by implication even more inadequate for the equally unforeseen needs of 1914)



Grey went on to quote Gladstone further: ‘ The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee.’

*****

Palmerston certainly didn’t take a rigid view of treaties. His (in 1870) very recent evasion of British obligations towards Denmark in 1864, much more specific than the 1839 Treaty, would have been fresh in Gladstone’s mind and those of his listeners. But did Sir Edward Grey’s audience know of it? For them it was almost half a century ago, as obscure to them as Harold Wilson’s East of Suez foreign policy is to us now. Sir Edward, and his Foreign Office staff would have known of all of this, and would also have known of the detailed context. It was their area of knowledge and expertise. But it seems to me they were happy to give a highly misleading impression of Gladstone’s real position. For Sir Edward ends his quotation from Gladstone’s specific speech here.

**

' "The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact, and a weighty element in the case to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power whatever."'

Sir Edward then continued ‘The Treaty is an old Treaty—1839—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those Treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the Treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.’

**

Sir Edward then quoted Gladstone (from elsewhere in the same speech) on the general issue of Belgian independence. Once again the quotation tells us much less than it ought to :

‘I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," Volume 203, Page 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin."

***

Interestingly, the context does make a considerable difference, and I really don’t see why Sir Edward had no time to check it. I am sure that the necessary bound volumes of Hansard were available in the Foreign Office Library, and that Sir Edward had plenty of well-educated assistants to check them for him. I am tempted to wonder if his claim that he had ‘no time’ was an attempt to expiate some slight guilt at leaving out the previous words.

Gladstone’s words immediately before this quotation run :

‘Looking at a country such as that, is there any man who hears me who does not feel that if, in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandizement, coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that witnessed that absorption would hear the knell of public right and public law in Europe?’

Again, some historical knowledge is helpful here. The country Britain suspected of wishing to absorb Belgium in 1870 to ‘satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandizement’ was not Germany (which did not then exist) but France, a country with which we had nearly gone to war in the early 1860s, hence the huge ring of forts built round Portsmouth in 1865, still there as evidence of abiding Anglo-French suspicion. Indeed, Belgium had been created (under British pressure) as a modern nation largely so as to prevent France from taking over that territory, should it once again acquire a leader such as Bonaparte.

On the eve of our going to war as France’s ally, I doubt very much whether Sir Edward wanted to revive any such memories.

My own view is also that Germany meant what she said in 1914 when she pressed Belgium to let her troops through unresisted, saying that in that case Belgium would be unmolested and unoccupied (this promise was accompanied by a threat, very much fulfilled, to make war and occupy if Belgium resisted).

This is not becaue i think the Kaiser's Germany was nice, but because I think it was rational. Germany certainly wanted to defeat France, but she was mainly interested in conquering and carving up the Russian Empire, not in colonizing developed western European nations. Paradoxically, Belgium’s best guarantee of independence and neutrality would have been to let the Kaiser through.

Anyway, I turned, as anyone can do, to the necessary Historic Hansard for 10th August 1870, debate on Belgian Neutrality Sir Edward and the MPs of August 1914 would have benefited from a more thorough study of what Mr Gladstone said, and what was said to him. :

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1870/aug/10/observations

House of Commons Debate 10 August 1870 volume 203 columns 1776-92, beginning at column 1776.

Mr Gladstone is busy explaining why Britain has concluded two new and important treaties at short notice:

MR. GLADSTONE

‘As I understand, Sir, that during my absence in the discharge of other duties yesterday a desire was expressed by some hon. Gentlemen to make observations upon the recent proceedings of Her Majesty's Government with respect to affairs abroad, I think it is desirable that the House should be in possession of the facts up to the present time—that is to say, precisely as they will presently receive them in the Speech from the Throne. I therefore wish to mention that the Treaty proposed by Her Majesty's Government to the belligerent Powers has been actually signed by Count Bernstorff on the part of the North German Confederation, as well as by Earl Granville on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and also that M. de Lavalette, the Ambassador of the Emperor of the French at this Court, has, in a letter dated yesterday, stated that he is now in a position to announce to Earl Granville that he is authorized by the Government of the Emperor to adhere to the Treaty proposed by the British Government, for the more effective guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium. He adds, I shall sign the Treaty as soon as I shall receive the full powers which I expect for that purpose.

‘With regard to the instrument itself, perhaps it would be convenient for the better understanding of what has been done that I should simply read the principal articles, omitting, for the sake of clearness, the ordinary preamble. The first Article is this— His Majesty the Emperor of the French having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which France is now engaged with the North German Confederation, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as the same shall be respected by the North German Confederation; Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, on her part, declares that if during the said hostilities the armies of the North German Confederation should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Imperial Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance; and to maintain, in conjunction with His Imperial Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

(This is particularly worth noting) It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between France and the North German Confederation beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.

‘The second Article is this— His Majesty the Emperor of the French agrees, on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid, and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken separately or in common to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium. The third Article is this— This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between France and the North German Confederation, and for twelve months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those parties; and, on the expiration of that time, the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the high contracting parties respectively are concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the first Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839. Sir, such is the Treaty which we have proposed to the belligerent Powers, mutatis mutandis. There is some correspondence on the subject; but I think the reading of the principal Articles will give the House all the information that is necessary.’

Mr Gladstone was then challenged rather smartly by a Mr Osborne - a member for Waterford, a city then of course represented in the London House of Commons rather than in the Dublin Dail. From Mr Gladstone’s description of him as ‘honourable and gallant friend’ we know that Mr Osborne was a Liberal had served in the Army or Navy (perhaps seen active service in the Crimea?) and so knew a bit about war. But I have been unable to find out any more about him

MR. OSBORNE

‘I do not know whether it is competent to any Member to make remarks on this extraordinary document. I will only say that there never has been a more extraordinary document, or a more extraordinary manner of producing such a document on a great crisis like this in the history of the British House of Commons. Now, we have had recently so many strange revelations of diplomatic proceedings that I have myself lost all faith in diplomacy. Indeed, Sir, I am very much inclined to think that if our other weapons are not in better order we are very badly off, as the weapons of our diplomatists are not remarkable as arms of precision. For what a Treaty is this! For my own part I would sooner have no Treaty at all, because I think this Treaty involves hidden dangers, which nobody can foresee.In the first place, this Treaty is entirely superfluous if the Treaty of 1839 is worth anything at all. In the eyes of Austria and Russia that Treaty of 1839 is entirely superseded by this. You have struck a blow at that Treaty, which you can never put in the same position again. Where is the article? Now, do look as men of common sense, and not as versed in diplomacy—

MR. GLADSTONE

‘As far as I understand, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Waterford (Mr. Osborne) has complained that we have destroyed the Treaty of 1839 by this instrument. As I pay so much attention to everything that falls from him, I thought that by some mistake I must have read the instrument inaccurately; but I have read it again, and I find that by one of the Articles contained in it the Treaty of 1839 is expressly recognized. But there is one omission I made in the matter which I will take the present opportunity to supply. The House, I think, have clearly understood that this instrument expresses an arrangement between this country and France; but an instrument has been signed between this country and the North German Confederation precisely the same in its terms, except that where the name of the Emperor of the French is read in one instrument, the name of the German Confederation is read in the other, and vice versâ.

The Grand Old Man continues (at some length) before actually answering Mr Osborne's point, by simply denying its truth:

'I have listened with much interest to the conversation which has occurred, and I think we have no reason to be dissatisfied at the manner in which, speaking generally, this Treaty has been received. My hon. Friend the Member for Brighton (Mr. White) speaking, as he says, from below the Gangway, is quite right in thinking that his approval of the course the Government have taken is gratifying to us, on account of the evidently independent course of action which he always pursues in this House. The hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Colonel Barttelot) has expressed a different opinion from ours on the great question of policy, and he asks whether we should not have done well to limit ourselves to the Treaty of 1839. We differ entirely on that subject from the hon. and gallant Gentleman; but we cannot complain of the manner in which he has expressed his opinion and recognized the intentions of the Government. From Gentlemen who sit behind me we have had more positive and unequivocal expressions of approval than fell from the hon. and gallant Gentleman. The only person who strongly objects to the course taken by the Government is my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Waterford; and I do not in the least object to his frank method of stating whatever he feels in opposition to our proceedings in a matter of so much consequence, though I do think it necessary to notice some of his objections. In the first place, he denounces this Treaty as an example of the mischiefs of secret diplomacy. He thinks that if the Treaty had been submitted to the House it would not have been agreed to.

My hon. and gallant Friend is a man much, enamoured of public diplomacy. He remembers, no doubt, that three weeks ago the Duc de Gramont went to the Legislative Body of France and made an announcement as to the policy which the French Government would pursue with respect to Prussia. The result of that example of public diplomacy no doubt greatly encouraged my hon. and gallant Friend. Then we have a specimen in the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend of the kind of public diplomacy which we should have in this case if his hopes and desires were realized. He says that if Belgium were in the hands of a hostile Power the liberties of this country would not be worth 24 hours' purchase. I protest against that statement. With all my heart and soul I protest against it. A statement more exaggerated, a statement more extravagant, I never heard fall from the lips of any Member in this House. [Mr. OSBORNE: Napoleon said it.] Whatever my hon. and gallant Friend's accurate acquaintance with the correspondence of Napoleon may induce him to say, I may be permitted to observe that I am not prepared to take my impression of the character, of the strength, of the dignity, of the duty, or of the danger of this country from that correspondence. I will avail myself of this opportunity of expressing my opinion, if I may presume to give it, that too much has been said by my hon. and gallant Friend and others of the specially distinct, separate, and exclusive interest which this country has in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium. What is our interest in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium? It is the same as that of every great Power in Europe. It is contrary to the interest of Europe that there should be unmeasured aggrandizement. Our interest is no more involved in the aggrandizement supposed in this particular case than is the interest of the other Powers. That it is a real interest, a substantial interest, I do not deny; but I protest against the attempt to attach to it the exclusive character which I never know carried into the region of caricature to such a degree as it has been by my hon. and gallant Friend. What is the immediate moral effect of those exaggerated statements of the separate interest of England? The immediate moral effect of them is this—that every effort we make on behalf of Belgium on other grounds than those of interest—as well as on grounds of interest, goes forth to the world as a separate and selfish scheme of ours; and that which we believe to be entitled to the dignity and credit of an effort on behalf of the general peace, stability, and interest of Europe actually contracts a taint of selfishness in the eyes of other nations because of the manner in which the subject of Belgian neutrality is too frequently treated in this House. If I may be allowed to speak of the motives which have actuated Her Majesty's Government in the matter, I would say that while we have recognized the interest of England, we have never looked upon it as the sole motive, or even as the greatest of those considerations which have urged us forward.

There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that Treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen—such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston—never, to my knowledge, took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of a guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is the common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power whatever. But there is one other motive, which I shall place at the head of all, that attaches peculiarly to the preservation of the independence of Belgium. What is that country? It is a country containing 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 of people, with much of an historic past, and imbued with a sentiment of nationality and a spirit of independence as warm and as genuine as that which beats in the hearts of the proudest and most powerful nations. By the regulation of its internal concerns, amid the shocks of revolution, Belgium, through all the crises of the age, has set to Europe an example of a good and stable government gracefully associated with the widest possible extension of the liberty of the people.

Looking at a country such as that, is there any man who hears me who does not feel that if, in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandizement, coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that witnessed that absorption would hear the knell of public right and public law in Europe? But we have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that—which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin? And now let me deal with the observations of the hon. Member for Waterford. The hon. Member asks—What if both these Powers with whom we are making this Treaty should combine against the independence of Belgium? Well, all I can say is that we rely on the faith of these parties. But if there be danger of their combining against that independence now, unquestionably there was much more danger in the position of affairs that was revealed to our astonished eyes a fortnight ago, and before these later engagements were contracted.

I do not undertake to define the character of that position which, as I have said, was more dangerous a fortnight ago. I feel confident that it would be hasty to suppose that those great States would, under any circumstances, have become parties to the actual contemplation and execution of a proposal such as that which was made the subject of communication between persons of great importance on behalf of their respective States. That was the state of facts with which we had to deal. It was the combination, and not the opposition, of the two Powers which we had to fear, and I contend—and we shall be ready on every proper occasion to argue—that there is no measure so well adapted to meet the peculiar character of such an occasion as that which we have proposed. It is said that the Treaty of 1839 would have sufficed, and that we ought to have announced our determination to abide by it. But if we were disposed at once to act upon the guarantee contained in that Treaty, what state of circumstances does it contemplate? It contemplates the invasion of the frontiers of Belgium and the violation of the neutrality of that country by some other Power. That is the only case in which we could have been called upon to act under the Treaty of 1839, and that is the only case in which we can be called upon to act under the Treaty now before the House. But in what, then, lies the difference between the two Treaties? It is in this—that, in accordance with our obligations, we should have had to act under the Treaty of 1839 without any stipulated assurance of being supported from any quarter whatever against any combination, however formidable; whereas by the Treaty now formally before Parliament, under the conditions laid down in it, we secure powerful support in the event of our having to act—a support with respect to which we may well say that if brings the object in view within the sphere of the practicable and attainable, instead of leaving it within the sphere of what might have been desirable, but which might have been most difficult, under all the circumstances, to have realized. The hon. Member says that by entering into this engagement we have destroyed the Treaty of 1839. But if he will carefully consider the terms of this instrument he will see that there is nothing in them calculated to bear out that statement.

It is perfectly true that this is a cumulative Treaty, added to the Treaty of 1839, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli), with perfect precision, described it. Upon that ground I very much agree with the general opinion he expressed; but, at the same time, peculiar circumstances call for a departure from general rules, and the circumstances are most peculiar under which we have thought it right to adopt the method of proceeding which we have actually done.

Then Mr Gladstone at last says: ‘The Treaty of 1839 loses nothing of its force even during the existence of this present Treaty. There is no derogation from it whatever. The Treaty of 1839 includes terms which are expressly included in the present instrument, lest by any chance it should be said that, in consequence of the existence of this instrument, the Treaty of 1839 had been injured or impaired. That would have been a mere opinion; but it is an opinion which we thought fit to provide against.’

But does he, by saying this, make it true? I personally think not. In fact I think he rather contradicts some of his earlier words. The Prime Minister went on:



‘The hon. Member has said that this is a most peculiar method of bringing a Treaty before the House I admit it. There is no doubt at all that it is so. But it is not easy to say what circumstances there are that will justify the breaking up of general rules in a matter so delicate and important as the making of communications to Parliament upon political negotiations of great interest. The rule which has been uniformly followed in this country is this—that no Treaty is communicated to Parliament unless it becomes binding; and it does not become absolutely binding upon the signatories until it has been ratified; and, by the law and usage of all civilized countries, ratification requires certain forms to be gone through which cannot be concluded in a moment. Under these circumstances, we had only this choice—whether we should be contented to present a Treaty to Parliament without the usual forms having been gone through, or whether we should break down the rule which we think it is, on the whole, most desirable to observe, and we thought it best to adopt the course we have followed in the matter.

The hon. Member for Wakefield (Mr. Somerset Beaumont) has asked whether this Treaty has been concluded with the sanction of Belgium. My answer is that I do not doubt the relevancy of that inquiry, but that the Treaty has not been concluded with the sanction of Belgium, for we have advisedly refrained from any attempt to make Belgium a party to the engagement. In the first place, Belgium was not a party to the Treaty of 1839. But that is a matter of secondary importance. What we had to consider was, what was the most prudent, the best, and the safest course for us to pursue in the interest of Belgium. Independently of Belgium, we had no right to assume that either of the parties would agree to it, and we had also to contemplate the case in which one party might agree to it and the other might not. If we had attempted to make Belgium a party we should have run the risk of putting her in a very false position in the event of one of the parties not agreeing to the proposal. It was, therefore, from no want of respect or friendly feeling towards Belgium, but simply from prudential considerations, that we abstained from bringing that country within the circle of these negotiations.

The hon. Member has also asked whether Austria and Russia have been consulted upon the subject of the Treaty, but upon that point I have nothing to add to what I communicated to the House the other day. Both those parties have been invited—as Her Majesty has been advised to announce from the Throne—to accede to the Treaty, and I said on Monday that the reception of the Treaty as far as those Powers were concerned had been generally favourable. I have no reason to alter that statement; but, on the part of Russia, a question has arisen with regard to which I cannot quite say how it may eventually close, especially from the circumstance that the Emperor and his chief advisers upon foreign affairs do not happen to be in the same place. That question, so raised, is whether it might be wise to give a wider scope to any engagements of this kind; but if there is any hesitation on this point, it is not of a kind which indicates an objection of principle, but, on the contrary, one which shows a disposition to make every possible effort in favour of the Treaty. We are in full communication with friendly and neutral Powers on the subject of maintaining neutrality, and upon every side the very best dispositions prevail. There is the greatest inclination to abstain from all officious intermeddling between two Powers who, from their vast means and resources, are perfectly competent for the conduct of their own affairs; and there is not a less strong and decided desire on the part of every Power to take every step at the present moment that can contribute to restrict and circumscribe the area of the war, and to be ready, without having lost or forfeited the confidence of either belligerent, to avail itself of the first opportunity that may present itself to contribute towards establishing a peace which shall be honourable, and which shall present the promise of being permanent.

That is the general state of the case, with regard to which I do not, in the least degree, question the right of any hon. Member behind me to form his own judgment. I cannot help expressing the opinion that, allowing for all the difficulties of the case, and the rapidity with which it was necessary to conduct these operations, we have done all that appeared to be essential in the matter; and the country may feel assured that the conduct which we have pursued in relation to this matter has not been unworthy of the high responsibility with which we are entrusted. '