North Korea has just launched two new short range missiles into the Sea of Japan.

Also on Thursday, the Justice Department asked a federal court to authorize U.S. appropriation of a North Korean cargo vessel that was seized last summer.

In short, tensions are rising. We should expect a new North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile test by August's end.

The first indicator here is Kim Jong Un's behavior. The young dictator is rejecting a grand bargain that would end his nuclear weapon and ICBM program in return for an easing or end to economic sanctions. Instead, Kim has followed the lead of his hardliner-in-chief adviser Kim Yong Chol, and sought to extract concessions without meaningful reciprocity. Kim's deepening relationship with Russia reflects his diplomatic off-ramp in face of new U.S. pressure.

But while the U.S. has engaged in some appeasement of Kim, Trump is now escalating. Bringing North Korea's seized cargo ship into U.S. waters, the Trump administration aims to send a very public rebuke to Kim in a manner that attracts global media attention. It's a test to see whether Trump's outreach remains viable: will Kim return to more conciliatory behavior, or will he escalate further?

The broader context here is North Korea's crop crisis. If Kim hasn't got sanctions relief by August's end, a painful winter is coming. The United Nations World Food Program noted this week that North Korea's "aggregate 2018/19 food crop production is estimated at 4.9 million metric tons, which is the lowest since the 2008/09 season. In addition to unfavorable climatic conditions, limited supplies of agricultural inputs, such as fuel, fertilizer and spare parts have had significant adverse impact." China and Russia are doing what they can to undercut U.N. sanctions, but they cannot give Kim enough to adequately placate his oligarch class, consolidate the small but increasingly powerful urban middle class, and provide basic services to everyone else. Kim is a calculating but inexperienced leader tempted by emotional irrationality. He rightly fears how the crop crisis affects his domestic position.

The absence of fuel and spare parts must be considered a direct consequence of the U.N. sanctions regime. But while the Kim dynasty has little concern for the welfare of its people, it must at least have enough food to ensure its slave workforce does not perish in a massive famine. That would invite questions of regime survival. Military supplies can be prioritized, but that's no good if you're literally running out of food.

So, what should be done?

Well, absent Kim's commitment to suspend all ballistic missile tests, the U.S. should not support the provision of food supplies to the North Korean people. A North Korean long-range nuclear strike capability poses an existential threat to American society (if even one American city is ever hit, the others may empty). Trump must not allow North Korea's coming suffering to dictate his decisions. Supporting North Korea with food will both prolong North Koreans' suffering under Kim and directly undercut U.S. interests.

We must hope that Kim sees new U.S. pressure as a reason to change course. But I doubt he will. A cold winter is coming, and with it, new ICBM tests evincing improved capabilities. If that occurs, then new pressure on Pyongyang must follow.