MU'TAZILA

MU'TAZILA, the name of a religious movement founded at Basra, in the first half of the

2nd/8th century by Wasil b. 'Ata' (d. 131/748 [q.v.]), subsequently becoming one of the most

important theological schools of Islam.



The origin of this term-which has the sense of 'those who separate themselves, who stand

aside'-remains enigmatic. According to a traditional explanation (sometimes acknowledged

by the Mu'tazila themselves), the word would have been applied to Wasil-or to his lieutenant,

'Amr b. 'Ubayd (d. 144/761 [q.v.])-because on the question relating to the definition applicable

to the Muslim guilty of a serious offence, the former (or the second) 'would have separated

himself' from al-Hasan al-Basri (or from qatada) (on this tradition and its variants, see W. M.

Watt, The formative period of Islamic thought, Edinburgh 1973, 209-11). An explanation, more

plainly hostile, propounded notably by Ibn al-Rawandi (according to al-Khayyat, K. al-Intisar, ed.

Nader, Beirut 1957, 118, ll. 2-9, later by al-Ash'ari, K. al-Luma', ed. McCarthy, Beirut 1953,

a 184), is that, on the same question of the name to be given to the sinful Muslim-who should,

according to Wasil, be described by the definition of fasiq, an 'in-qtermediate rank' between

tthat of mu'min and that of kafir-Wasil was opposed to the consensus of the Muslims for whom, in

any circumstances, the sinful Muslim could not be other than 'believing' or 'disbelieving'. To

this, the Mu'tazila replied that, on the contrary, Wasil's intention was in fact to retain only that

which, among Muslims, was the object of a consensus: while they differed as to whether the

sinful Muslim should be termed mu'min or kafir, all, on the other hand, were agreed in defining

him as fasiq (K. al-Intisar, 118, ll. 10-19). In other words, on this question, Wasil was as unwilling

to side with the Murji'a (q.v.; partisans of the first solution) as with the Kharijites (q.v.; partisans

of the second); he chose to 'stand aside' from this debate.



It is an explanation of this kind which today, in particular as a result of the studies undertaken

by Nallino (Sull'origine del nome dei Mu'taziliti, in RSO, vii [1916]), is generally accepted: i'tizal

would designate a position of neutrality in the face of opposing factions. Nallino drew support

for this argument from the fact that at the time of the first civil war, some of the Companions

('Abd Allah b. 'Umar, Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas, etc.), who had chosen to side neither with 'Ali nor with

his adversaries, were for this reason called mu'tazila. He even drew the conclusion that the

theological Mu'tazilism of Wasil and his successors was merely a continuation of this initial

political Mu'tazilism; in reality, there does not seem to have been the least connection between

one and the other. But, in its principle, this explanation is probably valid.



Little is known of the origins of the movement. It appears to be established that Wasil, originally

a disciple of al-Hasan al-Basri [q.v.] was indeed the sole founder, and this during the lifetime of

the latter. It was only at the end of a relatively long period, and after the death of al-Hasan

(110/728), that 'Amr b. 'Ubayd-another disciple of al-Hasan, and a particularly eminent

one-decided to join him. After the death of Wasil in 131/748, it was 'Amr who took on the

leadership of the group. It is hardly likely that at this early stage of the movement the Mu'tazili

doctrine, as it was to be formulated several decades later by Abu 'l-Hujayl, was already fully

developed. No doubt the theses defended here were essentially the same as those previously

current in the milieu of the qadariyya [q.v.], to which al-Hasan belonged: rejection of the

doctrine of predestination, affirmation of the absolute responsibility of every individual with

regard to his transgressions which could not be in any sense the work of God. It will be noted

that, on the question of the name to be applied to the sinful Muslim, al-Hasan seems to have

accepted the notion of an 'intermediate rank', although in the event he proposed munafiq

('hypocrite' [q.v.]) in place of fasiq ('malefactor' [q.v.]). Similarly, al-Hasan subscribed to the

principle that every unrepentant sinner will suffer for ever the torments of Hell, an essential

element of what was later to be called 'the promise and the threat' (al-wa'd wa 'l-wa'id).



Did the movement launched by Wasil also have political objectives? Nyberg believed so, on the

basis of a singular interpretation of the i'tizal and of the doctrine of the 'intermediate rank' (cf.

EI1, s.v. Mu'tazila, at III, 787-8). This, according to him, should in fact be interpreted as

denoting a position of a political nature, characterised simultaneously by a declared hostility

with regard to the Umayyads and a cautious attitude towards the Sji'a, at least in consideration

of its more radical elements. Now, Nyberg claimed, this position corresponded exactly to that of

the 'Abbasid movement, to the extent that the doc-qtrine of 'intermediate rank' would be

nothing other than 'the theoretical encapsulation of the political programme of the 'Abbasids

before their accession to power'. This explains why, 'for at least a century', Mu'tazili theology

'remained the official doctrine of the 'Abbasid court'. This would also account for the fact that

Wasil sent envoys to the different countries of the Muslim world; the object was to spread the

propaganda of the 'Abbasids. This interpretation, as proved now, has no validity. Not only did

tthe first Mu'tazila not support the 'Abbasid movement, but a large number of them participated

in the insurrection of Ibrahim b. 'Abd Allah [q.v.] in 145/762 against al-Mansur (cf. J. van Ess,

Une lecture a rebours de l'histoire du mu'tazilisme, 120-1). The 'propaganda' organised by Wasil was,

in all probability, of a purely religious nature (ibid., 104-8). As for the supposed amicable

relations between al-Mansur and 'Amr b. 'Ubayd, this is probably an instance of a legend

invented after the event (ibid., 118-22). It was only on the accession of al-Ma'mun that

Mu'tazilism became, for a brief period, official doctrine.



Historical evolution.



The author of the present article is not a historian, and therefore will not venture to describe

the history of Mu'tazilism (which extends over a period of approximately five centuries) in detail

and with reference to all its elements, doctrinal, political and social. On this subject, and in

particular on the earliest periods, some very detailed and informative analyses have been

compiled, in recent years, by J. van Ess. While inviting the reader to avail himself of these

sources (see Bibl.), we confine ourselves here to a few succinct references.



The great age of Mu'tazilism is not limited, as is still all too often the general view, to the first

'Abbasid century. The revocation by the caliph al-Mutawakkil, in 234/848, of the decrees

instituting the mihna [q.v.] marks only the end of one period, that during which, for a period of

some thirty years, the Mu'tazili school enjoyed the favour of the caliphs of Bagjdad. In fact, by

the time this reversal took place, the Mu'tazila were established not only in the capital but also in

numerous regions of the Islamic world, especially in Persia, where measures taken in Bagjdad

did not necessarily have an effect. Furthermore, although deprived of the patronage of the

'Abbasid caliphate, they subsequently found other princes or influential persons (under the

Buyids, in particular) to support them. Better still: this first period, which we are quite willing to

term the 'heroic' period, or that of the 'great ancestors', is not-in our view, at least-the

most important. It was only at a later stage that there appeared, from the point of view of

elaboration and systematisation of doctrine, what may be described as the 'classical' period of

Mu'tazilism, lasting approximately from the last quarter of the 3rd/9th century to the middle of

the 5th/11th century (in other words, until the arrival of the Saljuqids). It could almost be said,

mutatis mutandis, that, in relation to persons such as Abu 'Ali and Abu Hashim al-jubba'i, the

Mu'tazila of the first period correspond to the pre-Socratic philosophers in relation to Plato and

Aristotle.



This difference between two periods of Mu'tazilism is very clearly felt within the school itself: thus

Ibn Abi 'l-Hadid distinguishes systematically between al-mutaqaddimun (or al-qudama'), 'those of the

earlier period', and al-muta'akjkjirun, 'those of the later period' (cf. SjarhNahj al-balagja, ed. M.

Abu 'l-Fa·l Ibrahim, i, 7-8; iii, 288, l. 19; xi, 119, l. 17-18 and 120, l. 5). Mankdim, for his part,

readily uses, to denote the first, the term salaf: al-salaf min ashabina (Sjarh, 634, l. 10), al-mashayikj

min al-salaf (ibid., 146, l. 11). q



Furthermore, it is known that, very soon, the Mu'tazila constituted two separate schools, 'those

of al-Basra" and 'those of Bagjdad" (terms which, over the course of time, were to

become purely conventional, having no association with specific geographical location). Taking

into account the two periods mentioned above, there is thus a total of four groups of

theologians, clearly distinguished, again, by Ibn Abi 'l-Hadid: the "Basrans of the earlier

period' (qudama' al-basriyyin) and 'those of the later period', the "Bagjdadis of the earlier

period' (qudama' al-bagjdadiyyin) and 'those of the later period'.



Among the "Basrans" of the first period, the most significant figures are 4irar b.

'Amr (d. ca. 200/915 [q.v. in Suppl.]), Abu Bakr al-Asamm (d. 201/816? [q.v. in Suppl.]), Abu

'l-Hujayl (d. 227/841? [q.v.]), al-Nazzam (d. 221/836 [q.v.]), nephew and disciple of the

preceding, Mu'ammar b. 'Abbad (d. 215/830 [q.v.]), Hisham b. 'Amr al-Fuwati (d. between

227/842 and 232/847, cf. Gimaret-Monnot, Shahrastani, Livre des religions et des sectes, i, 249

[q.v.]), the eminent writer al-jahiz (d. 255/869 [q.v.]), a disciple of al-Nazzam, 'Abbad b.

Sulayman (d. ca. 250/864 [q.v.]), a disciple of Hisham al-Fuwati, Abu Ya'qub al-Sjasham (d. after

257/871, cf. Gimaret-Monnot, op. cit., 199), a disciple of Abu 'l-Hujayl. Among the

"Bagjdadis" of the same period, it is appropriate to mention in particular Bishr b.

al-Mu'tamir (d. 210/825 [q.v.]), founder of the school of Bagjdad, øjumama b. Ashras (d.

213/828? [q.v.]) and Abu Musa al-Murdar (d. 226/841 [q.v.]), disciples of Bishr, ja'far b. Harb (d.

236/850 [q.v.]) and ja'far b. Mubashshir (d. 234/848 [q.v.]), disciples of Abu Musa, Abu ja'far

al-Iskafi (d. 240/854 [q.v.]), disciple of ja'far b. Harb.



The most characteristic feature of this first period is the extreme diversity of people and of

doctrines; it is a case of a collection of distinguished individuals, of often 'colourful'

personalities, rather than continuous and homogeneous associations. On the human level,

nothing could be more dissimilar, for example, than the two disciples of Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir:

øjumama, courtier, personal friend of al-Ma'mun, hedonist, and Abu Musa, ascetic, nicknamed

the 'monk' (rahib) of the Mu'tazila, who denounced as infidels all those who sought the favour of

princes. On the doctrinal level, divergencies are no less stark. Thus 4irar b. 'Amr is distinguished

from all the rest of the school by his affirmation that voluntary human acts are created by God,

a thesis which associated him with jahm b. ‘afwan [q.v.] and as a result of which he was to be

disowned by later generations of Mu'tazila (cited as such, among others, by Ibn al-Nadim, he is

explicitly challenged, in his turn, by Abu 'l-qasim al-Balkji in his Maqalat; furthermore, he does

not appear in the Tabaqat al-Mu'tazila of the qa·i 'Abd al-jabbar). Al-Nazzam radically rejects the

atomist theory adopted by his uncle and master Abu 'l-Hujayl, and thus is likewise isolated in

relation to all the others. Al-Asamm also rejects the cosmology of Abu 'l-Hujayl, but in his case,

on a different point: he absolutely denies the existence of accidents, another fundamental

element of this cosmology. The same al-Asamm also rejected the very thing that had

characterised the i'tizal at the outset, this being the thesis of the 'intermediate rank'! Another of

the (theoretically) cardinal principles of Mu'tazilism, that which affirms the reality of the

'threat' (in other words, of Hell in perpetuity for sinners), was rejected by an entire group of

Murji'a Mu'tazila, including Abu Sjimr, Muways b. 'Imran [q.v.] (two contemporaries of Abu

'l-Hujayl), and later Muhammad b. Sjabib [q.v.] (of the followingqgeneration). The thesis

supported by Abu 'l-Hujayl and al-Nazzam, according to which God necessarily does for every

man what is the most advantageous (al-aslah) for him, including that relating to his future life,

was contradicted by Bishr al-Mu'tamir, author of a theory of lutf which he was almost alone in

supporting (with his disciple ja'far b. Harb), and which stated on the contrary that God does

not impart to all men the 'grace' which would assure their well-being; paradoxically, in view of

the fact that Bishr was the founder of the school of Bagjdad, it was specifically the

"Bagjdadis" who, later, were to be seen as partisans of the theory of al-aslah. The

doctrine of 'generation' (tawallud), also supported by Bishr, (and, to a lesser extent, by Abu

'l-Hujayl), according to which a man is capable of producing an act outside himself through

the intermediary of another whom he himself produces, was rejected on the one hand by

al-Nazzam, Mu'ammar, øjumama, al-jahiz, in the name of a concept of 'nature' (tab' or tiba'),

on the other by ‘alih known as qubba [q.v.], in the name of an absolute divine arbitrariness.



Also present in this tableau are figures who adopted more or less eccentric positions. The

asceticism preached by Abu Musa as well as by the two ja'fars, his disciples, clearly takes, in

some cases, the form of ‘ufism: these are the sufiyyat al-Mu'tazila, including such notable figures as

'Isa b. al-Haytjam al-‘ufi (d. 245/860), a disciple of ja'far b. Harb, of whom Ibn al-Nadim

relates that he ultimately 'became delirious' (kjullita), or Abu Sa'id al-Husri, likewise charged

with 'delirium' and 'innovation' by the author of the Fihrist, and whom 'Abd al-jabbar, in his

Tatjbit dala'il al-nubuwwa (ed. 'A. K. 'Utjman, Beirut 1966, i, 129), does not hesitate to place

among the zanadiqa. In the same vein attention may be drawn to two disciples of al-Nazzam,

passed over in tactful silence in the majority of Mu'tazili tabaqat, namely Ahmad b. Khabit (or

Habit [q.v.]) and al-Fa·l al-Hadatji, whose theories (including in particular the affirmation of

transmigration) evoke very directly those of certain Sji'i gjulat. Finally, also to be counted among

the Mu'tazila-although absolutely disowned by them-are the two enigmatic personalities Ibn

al-Rawandi [q.v.], a disciple of 'Isa b. al-Haytjam, and Abu 'Isa al-Warraq [q.v.].



Turning now to the second period, the landscape becomes altogether different. This time,

genuine schools are established, around a coherent body of doctrine which may truly be called a

'system'. On the "Basran" side (in fact, both the persons named below spent

almost their entire lives at 'Askar Mukram, in Khuzistan), appear the two dominant figures of

Abu 'Ali al-jubba'i (d. 303/933 [q.v.]) and of his son Abu Hashim (d. 321/933 [q.v.]), 'the two

shaykjs', whose names appear repeatedly in the works of all the authors who quote their

teaching, to such an extent that it is appropriate to speak of a "jubba'i" school.

Among the very numerous members of this school, worthy of mention are Abu 'Ali Ibn Khallad

[q.v.], a disciple of Abu Hashim; Abu 'Abd Allah al-Basri (d. 369/980 [q.v. in Suppl.]) and Abu

Ishaq b. 'Ayyash, both disciples of Ibn Khallad; the qa·i 'Abd al-jabbar (d. 415/1025 [q.v.]), a

disciple of the two preceding, friend and protege of the ‘ahib Ibn 'Abbad (himself a disciple of

Abu 'Abd Allah al-Basri); Abu Rashid al-Nisaburi [q.v.], Abu 'l-Husayn al-Basri (d. 426/1044, q.v.

in Suppl.), Abu Muhammad Ibn Mattawayh, all three disciples of 'Abd al-jabbar. The

"Bagjdadi" school, for its part, is represented principally by Abu 'l-Husayn

aal-Khayyat (d. ca. 300/913 [q.v.]), described by Ibn Abi 'l-Hadid asqshaykj al-muta'akjkjirin min

al-Bagjdadiyyin (SjarhNahj al-balagja, xi, 120, l. 5); Abu 'l-qasim al-Balkji (d. 319/913 [q.v.]), a

disciple of the preceding (although described as a "Bagjdadi" he lived most of his

life in Khurasan); Abu Bakr Ibn al-Ikjshid (d. 326/938 [q.v.]); the grammarian 'Ali b.

'Isa al-Rummani (d. 384/994 [q.v.]), a disciple of the last-named.



The opposition between the two schools is now much more decisive than in the preceding

period. A famous work by Abu Rashid al-Nisaburi, fortunately preserved, reveals, in matters of

cosmology and anthropology, 'The questions on which the Basrans and the Bagjdadis are

opposed' (al-Masa'il fi 'l-kjilaf bayn al-Basriyyin wa 'l-Bagjdadiyyin, ed. M. Ziyada and R. al-Sayyid,

Beirut 1979), where primary attention is given to the theses upheld on the one hand by Abu 'Ali

and (especially) Abu Hashim al-jubba'i, on the other by Abu 'l-qasim al-Balkji. It is in

particular the theory of 'states' (ahwal), conceived by Abu Hashim, which was violently attacked

from the "Bagjdadi" side (especially by Ibn al-Ikshid). It is true that, even among

the "Basrans", this thesis was not unanimously accepted, far from it; some opposed

it with the utmost vigour, including Muhammad b. 'Umar al-‘aymari (d. 315/927)-although it

should be said that al-‘aymari was at least as much "Bagjdadi" as

"Basran"-and in particular, Abu 'l-Husayn al-Basri. As a result, there was

constituted in the very midst of the "Basran" school a sub-group of supporters of

Abu Hashim, known as Bahshamiyya (though comprising almost all of the "jubba'is"

mentioned above).



The arrival of the Saljuqids marks, in general, the end of this second period (without there

being any genuine relation of cause to effect), and, consequently, of the 'Golden Age' of

Mu'tazilism. Nevertheless, the latter did not disappear.



On the one hand, Mu'tazilis as such continued to exist for a long time. Even in Bagjdad, the

forced recantation of Ibn 'Aqil [q.v.], under pressure from Hanbali circles, should not be invested

with undue significance. Many Hanafis were Mu'tazilis, and, as is known, the Saljuqid sultans

favoured the Hanafi majhab. Consequently, throughout the last two centuries of the 'Abbasid

caliphate, a fair number of qa·is, in Bagjdad as in Rayy, were avowed Mu'tazilis (cf. W.

Madelung, Religious schools and sects in medieval Islam, London 1985, ii, 135-7). Among these,

mention should be made of Abu Ya'qub Yusuf al-Lamgjani (d. 606/1209), who was one of the

masters of Ibn Abi 'l-Hadid (cf. SjarhNahj al-balagja, ix, 192, ll. 10-11). In Khwarazm, where it was

overtly supported by the local princes, Mu'tazilism continued throughout this period as the

dominant ideology (cf. Madelung, op. cit., 115-16), to such an extent that outside this area

kjwarazmi was understood as a synonym of mu'tazili (cf. Yaqut, Udaba', vi, 155, ll. 7-10). Khwarazm

was the birthplace of Mahmud al-Zamakjshari (d. 538/1144 [q.v.]), author of a famous qur'anic

commentary entitled al-Kashshaf; it was also in Khwarazm that the young Fakjr al-Din al-Razi

[q.v.] had such violent arguments with the local Mu'tazilis that he was forced to leave the

country. It appears that by this time the "Bagjdadi" tendency had ceased to exist;

according to al-Razi (I'tiqadat firaq al-Muslimin, ed. 'A. S. al-Nashshar, Cairo 1938, 45) the only

survivors were the supporters of Abu Hashim and those of Abu 'l-Husayn al-Basri. But it was only

after the Mongol conquest that Mu'tazilism as such finally disappeared altogether.



On the other hand, Mu'tazili theses have not remained the exclusive property of the school

bearingqthis name. Other groups, within Islam and even outside Islam, have adopted and

perpetuated them, to such an extent that they could be said to be still current at the present day.



Within Islam, these are the Sji'is, Zaydis and, later, Imamis. Already implicit, to some extent, in

the teaching of al-qasim b. Ibrahim al-Rassi (d. 246/860), Mu'tazilism was decisively adopted as

much by al-Hasan b. Zayd (d. 270/884 [q.v.]), founder of the Zaydi amirate of Tabaristan (his

bbrother and successor, Muhammad, employed as secretaries Abu 'l-qasim al-Balkji and Abu

Muslim al-Isfahani, one of the Mu'tazili commentators of the qur'an), as by Yahya b. al-Husayn

al-Hadi ila 'l-Haqq (d. 298/911 [q.v.]), founder of the Zaydi principality of the Yemen. Among

the Yemenis, it is the "Bagjdadi" tendency which prevailed, while among the

Zaydis of the Caspian region, the jubba'i doctrine was followed. The Imam al-Mu'ayyad bi 'llah

(d. 411/1020 [q.v.]) had been the pupil of Abu 'Abd Allah al-Basri and of the qa·i 'Abd al-jabbar.

One of the claimants to his succession, known by the curious name of Mankdim (or Manakdim)

Sjashdiw (d. 425/1034), is the author of the well-known paraphrase of the Sjarh al-usul al-kjamsa

of 'Abd al-jabbar. (On all of the above, cf. W. Madelung, Der Imam al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim und die

Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen, Berlin 1965.) This state of affairs had a particularly fortunate

consequence, the preservation of quantities of Mu'tazili writings; it is principally in the Yemen

(the Zaydi amirate of Persia having disappeared at the beginning of the 6th/12th century) that

there have been recovered, in all or in part, the works of 'Abd al-jabbar, Abu Rashid

al-Nisaburi, Ibn Mattawayh, etc.



On the Imami side, Mu'tazilism first made an impact at the end of the 3rd/9th century, with the

Banu Nawbakjt [q.v.]: Abu Sahl al-Nawbakjti (d. 311/924) and his nephew al-Hasan b. Musa (d.

ca. 310/923), the author of the K. Firaq al-Sji'a. It was initially short-lived; the theology of Ibn

Babawayh (d. 381/991 [q.v.]) affirmed, on the contrary, that God creates the actions of men and

wills everything which comes into being (including evil). But Mu'tazili theses prevailed again,

this time definitively, with the disciple of Ibn Babawayh, al-Sjaykj al-Mufid (d. 413/1022 [q.v.]),

upholding the theses of the "Bagjdadis", as is abundantly illustrated by his Awa'il

al-maqalat (cf. M. J. McDermott, The theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufid, Beirut 1978). Then it was the

turn of al-Sjarif al-Murta·a (d. 436/1045 [q.v.]), a disciple of 'Abd al-jabbar, who, for his part,

successfully championed the theses of the "Basrans". The qur'anic commentaries of

Abu ja'far al-Tusi (d. 459/1067 [q.v.]) and of al-Tabarsi (d. ca. 548/1155 [q.v.]) are overtly

Mu'tazili commentaries, even more so than the Kashshaf of al-Zamakjshari, and not their least

interesting feature is the innumerable references made in them to the (now lost) tafsirs of

al-jubba'i and al-Balkji (the same observation applies, moreover, to the qur'anic commentary

of the Zaydi theologian al-Hakim al-jushami (d. 494/1101 [q.v.]).



Finally, outside Islam, Mu'tazili thought has exerted a decisive influence, as is shown by the

studies of G. Vajda, on the Jewish theologians living in Islamic countries: Rabbanites (like

Sa'adya al-Fayyumi, d. 330/942), and especially Karaites, notably Yusuf al-Basir (first third of the

5th/11th century), whose entire theological corpus is directly modelled on the work of 'Abd

al-jabbar (cf. G. Vajda, Le kalam dans la pensee religieuse juive du Moyen Age, in RHR [1973]). The

adoption of Mu'tazili theses by theqKaraites had, moreover, the same beneficial consequence as

that observed among the Zaydis of the Yemen: the preservation (although in rather less

significant proportions) of a quantity of Mu'tazili literature (often transcribed, in this instance, in

Hebrew characters). It is thus, for example, that the Firkovitch Collection in the Public State

Library of Leningrad contains, among others, numerous fragments-as yet unedited-of the

Mugjni and the Muhit of 'Abd al-jabbar (cf. A. úü. Borisov, Mu'tazilitskiye rukopisi Gosudarstvennoy

Publi´noy Biblioteki v Leningrade, in Bibliografi¹ü Vostoka, 8-9, 1935; cf. also H. Ben-Shammai, A note on

some Karaite copies of Mu'tazilite writings, in BSOAS [1974]).



After centuries of suppression or systematic misrepresentation in Sunni Islam, Mu'tazilism has

been 'rediscovered' at the beginning of the 14th/20th century, and since then a significant

trend towards its rehabilitation has been observed, especially in Egypt. In the first instance,

Ahmad Amin, in his 4uha al-Islam (1936), devoted to it a chapter of some two hundred pages,

where he shows that the Mu'tazilis were before all else men of religion, committed to the defence

of Islam, and concludes with this unequivocal statement: 'In my opinion, the demise of

Mu'tazilism was the greatest misfortune to have afflicted Muslims; they have committed a crime

against themselves'. Then, notably, Zuhdi Hasan jar Allah, whose book al-Mu'tazila (Cairo

1947) is an eloquent plea in favour of the school, the author considering its historical

elimination as a 'victory of obscurantism' and the cause of the decadence of the Arabs (cf. R.

Caspar, Le renouveau du mo'tazilisme, in MIDEO [1957]). Again in the present day, because it

affirms the primacy of reason and of free will, many Muslim thinkers continue to see in

Mu'tazilism (sometimes to an exaggerated extent) a symbol of intellectual liberty and modernity

(cf. inter alios, Ch. Bouamrane, Le probleme de la liberte humaine dans la pensee musulmane, solution

mu'tazilite, Paris 1978; 'Adil al-'Awa, al-Mu'tazila wa 'l-fikr al-hurr, Damascus 1987).



Theses.



This term will be understood here as applying exclusively to the theses characteristic of the

Mu'tazilis, those by which they are recognised as such, and as a result of which their

opponents-Sunni theologians in particular-combatted them. There will thus be no discussion

here of their cosmology, based (except in the case of al-Nazzam) on the principle of atomism [see

juz'] and the distinction between substance and accident; elaborated, in all probability by Abu

'l-Hujayl, this cosmology was to become, in effect, the common doctrine of all the mutakallimun,

Sunni as well as Mu'tazili. Nor will there be reference to their theses regarding the Imamate,

their views on this subject also being (almost without exception) identical to those of the Sunnis

[see imama].



In his time, Abu 'l-Hujayl had believed it possible to propound the distinctive theses of

Mu'tazilism in the form of 'five principles' (al-usul al-kjamsa), these being (cf. among others

al-Mas'udi, Muruj, ed. Pellat, aa 2254-6): 1. uniqueness of God (al-tawhid); 2. justice of God (al-'adl);

3. 'the promise and the threat' (al-wa'd wa 'l-wa'id), by which, it will be recalled, it is understood

that on account of the 'threat' uttered against him in the qur'an, every Muslim guilty of a

serious offence, who dies without repentance, will suffer for eternity the torments of Hell; 4. the

theory of an 'intermediate state' (al-manzila bayna 'l-manzilatayn) formulated by Wasil b. 'Ata',

according to which the same sinful Muslim cannot here on earth be classed either as

'believing'q(mu'min) or as 'disbelieving' (kafir), but belongs to a separate category, that of the

'malefactor' (fasiq); 5. finally, the obligation laid upon every believer (in accordance with

qur'an, iii, 104 and 110; vii, 157; ix, 71, etc.) to 'command the good and forbid the evil' (al-amr

bi-'l-ma'ruf wa 'l-nahy 'an al-munkar), in other words, to intervene in public affairs to uphold the

Law and oppose impiety.



Two centuries after the death of Abu 'l-Hujayl, this scheme was still considered pertinent, since

it constituted the basis of the best 'manual' of Mu'tazili theology currently known, the

paraphrase by Mankdim Sjashdiw (see above) of the Sjarh al-usul al-kjamsa of the qa·i 'Abd

al-jabbar. It is, however, difficult to be entirely satisfied with it. First, while the first four

principles represent, or cover, the characteristic positions of the school, the same cannot be said

of the fifth, particularly in view of the fact that in the course of their history the Mu'tazilis

showed little inclination to put it into practice (except perhaps at the very beginning); the

politico-religious activism which it implies was to a much greater extent the prerogative of the

Kharijites, later of the Hanbalis. Furthermore, there is an evident disproportion between, on

the one hand, the third and fourth principles, which refer to particular, relatively secondary

points of doctrine (the importance given to the theory of an 'intermediate state' consists only in

the fact that historically it was the first formulation) and, on the other, the first and second

principles, which genuinely represent the two major theses of the Mu'tazilis, as illustrated by the

generic term ahl al-'adl wa 'l-tawhid which they themselves gladly embraced. It could even be

considered that the third principle (the reality of the 'promise' and the 'threat') derives in fact

from the second, the justice of God implying, on the one hand, that He rewards those who obey

Him and punishes those who disobey Him, on the other and in parallel, that He accomplishes

that which He has said He will do, since otherwise He would render Himself guilty of an

untruth, which is an evil act. In the Mugjni, furthermore (according to Mankdim, Sjarh, 122, ll.

14-15), 'Abd al-jabbar considered that the whole dogma depends on these two principles of

tawhid and 'adl; following him, Mankdim claims to show that in fact everything which does not

derive from the one necessarily derives from the other (ibid., 123, ll. 5-14). Finally-as is quite

clear from the foregoing-the very terms tawhid and 'adl are not entirely adequate. Under the

first heading (which may be interpreted as meaning quite simply, initially, the affirmation of the

absolute monotheism of Islam, as opposed to dualist theses or the Christian dogma of the

Trinity) there figure a number of conceptions regarding the nature of God-that He is invisible,

that the anthropomorphic expressions applied to Him by the qur'an are to be taken in a

metaphorical sense, etc.-which, in fact, depend on an affirmation of transcendence rather

than of divine uniqueness. As for 'justice', as will be seen, this is to be understood as meaning

not only that God is not 'unjust' in the narrow sense of the word, but that in all things He

necessarily does that which is (morally) good, and is exempt from any act that is (morally) bad.

For these various reasons, the analysis which follows will be partly arranged according to

headings other than the 'five principles' set out above.



I. The nature of God and the divine attributes.



I. The nature of God and the divine attributes.



1. A primary thesis characteristic in this context is what could be called the negation in God of

'substantive attributes'. Like all theologians, the Mu'tazilaqhabitually describe God by means of His

''attributes', or sifat. By this term, following the example of the grammarians, they refer

exclusively, for their part, to ajectives, such as 'powerful' (qadir), 'knowing' ('alim), 'creating'

(kjaliq), 'nourishing' (raziq), etc., the word sifa here being nothing more than a direct synonym of

wasf, or even of ism. But the question is then posed: by virtue of what does God merit such

qualifying ajectives? In the context of what may conveniently be called 'attributes of the act'

(sifat al-fi'l), i.e. ajectives which He merits on account of such-and-such an act accomplished by

Him, such as kjaliq, raziq, mutjib, muhsin, etc., it will be accepted without difficulty that such

ajectives can be applied to Him on account of something which comes into being, an existent

created by Him. But when approaching the 'attributes of the essence' (sifat al-jat or al-nafs), i.e.

ajectives which are applied to him from all eternity, by the very fact of His nature as God, such

as 'alim, qadir, hayy (since it cannot be conceived that God has ever been not knowing, not

powerful, not living), the question may be asked whether these other ajectives do not

themselves imply, according to the same rule, 'existents' which would be their reason for being,

and which, through the fact that God merits these ajectives eternally, would necessarily be

themselves eternal; in other words, God would be knowing from all eternity on account of the

presence in Him of an eternal knowledge, etc. It is known that the Sunni

theologians-following the example, in particular, of Ibn Kullab [q.v. in Suppl.]-explicitly

accepted this conclusion. The Ash'aris, for their part, affirm the existence in God of seven (or

eight) eternal 'entities' (ma'ani): knowledge, power, life, hearing, sight, will, word (and

occasionally, duration), i.e. 'substantives' by virtue of which God merits for all eternity the

corresponding 'ajectives'. It is true that such a doctrine implies the formal acceptance of a

plurality of eternals, which is apparently contrary to the principle of monotheism, of a God who

is the sole uncreated One; the Sunnis seek to avoid this difficulty by stating, following Ibn Kullab

(although this principle had previously been upheld by the Zaydi theologian Sulayman b. jarir

[q.v.]), that these 'entities' are at the same time neither identical to God nor other than Him,

just as between themselves they are neither identical nor other.



Reasoning in this fashion, it may be noted that the Sunni theologians did nothing other than to

apply without restriction two principles which the Mu'tazila also normally held to be true, and

which they had possibly been the first to formulate: on the one hand, the principle that every

ajective has a cause ('illa), a reason for being (such is the primary sense of the word ma'na) which

is nothing other than, precisely, the corresponding substantive; an object is 'mobile' on account

of the presence in it of an entity of 'movement', 'white' on account of the existence in it of an

entity of 'whiteness', etc.; on the other hand, there is the principle of the necessary 'analogy of

the invisible to the visible' (qiyas al-gja'ib 'ala 'l-shahid), by virtue of which that which is true of the

creature is likewise true of God; it is through analogy with man that we know that God is

powerful, knowing and living. Hence, if Zayd is necessarily knowing an account of a knowledge

(by virtue of the first principle), the same must inevitably apply to God (by virtue of the second

principle). Such is the reasoning explicitly invoked, for example, by al-Baqillani (Tamhid, ed.

McCarthy, Beirut 1957, a 335).



And such indeed was, apparently, the reasoning ofqAbu 'l-Hujayl who, for his part, accepted

the statement that God is 'knowing through a knowledge', 'powerful through a power', etc.

With, however, a significant difference; with the evident object of avoiding the conclusion to

which adherents of this thesis habitually find themselves drawn, i.e. the admission of a plurality

of eternals-in other words as an advocate of the principle of tawhid-he maintained that this

knowledge by virtue of which God is knowing is nothing other than God himself. 'God', he

said, 'is knowing through a knowledge identical to Himself (huwa 'alimun bi-'ilmin huwa huwa),

powerful through a power identical to Himself, living through a life identical to Himself, and

likewise he spoke of His hearing, His sight ... and of all the attributes of His essence' (al-Ash'ari,

Maqalat, 165, ll. 5-7). This is a paradoxical thesis, which has the effect of simultaneously asserting

and refuting the first of the two principles enunciated above, since, while basing each divine

qualificative on the corresponding substantive, it removes all reality from this substantive by

identifying it each time with the divine essence. This is no doubt the reason why this thesis did

not have a following and why, instead of taking this artificial detour by way of entities that do

not exist, the majority of the later Mu'tazila, equally concerned to maintain the principle of

divine uniqueness, preferred to declare directly that God is 'knowing, powerful, living through

Himself (bi-nafsihi), and not through a knowledge, a power and a life' (Maqalat, 164, ll. 13-14; cf.

also al-Sjahrastani, K. al-Milal, ed. Badran, Cairo 1947-55, 62, ll. 2-3). Such would also be the

point of view of al-jubba'i (cf. Sjarh, 182, ll. 13-14; Milal, 122, ll. 3-4).



Between Mu'tazilis and Sunnis, there are not only differing points of view, there is also a

difference in vocabulary. As has been observed, for the Mu'tazila, the word sifat, used in reference

to God, could denote nothing other than the ajectives ('powerful', 'knowing', etc.) which are

applied to Him. The Sunnis, curiously (although the Imami theologian Hisham b. al-Hakam

[q.v.] had previously used the term in this sense, cf. Maqalat, 222, ll. 1-5 and 369, ll. 1-3),

normally understand by sifat not the ajectives (for which they tend to reserve the term awsaf) but

the corresponding substantives, in other words, those eternal 'entities' from which God derives

the said ajectives. Whence, on the part of the Sunnis, the assertion, astonishing at first sight,

according to which the Mu'tazila, since they deny the existence in God of such entities, 'deny

the sifat (op. cit., 483, ll. 2-7), whereas the Sunnis, for their part 'affirm the sifat' (ibid., 170, l. 12)

and call themselves ashab al-sifat (ibid., 171, ll. 12 and 16) or sifatiyya) (cf. Milal, 145, ll. 4-12).



The truth is that the simple solution proposed, among others, by al-jubba'i did not eliminate

all the problems. If the reason that God is, for all eternity, powerful, knowing, living, is nothing

other than His very essence, then how is it to be explained that a unique, undifferentiated

essence can give rise to distinct qualificatives? It is for this reason that Abu Hashim, son of

al-jubba'i, was to propose a solution of compromise between pure and simple negation of the

substantive attributes and their affirmation: the ajectives applied to God are not simple words

applied directly to a pure and plain essence, they are each the expression of something other

than the essence itself, which is a 'state' (hal) of this essence; there is in God, for all eternity, a

'fact-of-being-powerful' (kawnuhu qadiran), a 'fact-of-being-knowing', etc., which legitimise the

corresponding ajectives. With-qout being veritable 'existents' (this with the object of

preserving the principle of divine uniqueness), these 'states' are nevertheless ontologically 'real'

(tjabita), and are thus capable of founding objectively, and independently of one another, the

ajectives which express them [see hal in Suppl.]. But this thesis, as has been observed, was far

from being a factor of unanimity among the Mu'tazila, even among those of the

"jubba'i" line; while 'Abd al-jabbar accepted it, Abu 'l-Husayn al-Basri, on the

other hand, vigorously opposed it.



2.



Among these eternal essences, linked to the divine essence, the existence of which is affirmed by

the Sunni theologians, there are also the word of God and His will. Regarding the word, the

Mu'tazila do indeed uphold the doctrine of the created qur'an [see kalam and qur'an]. For the

majority of them, the qur'an is, in the technical sense of the term, an accident ('ara·); like every

word, it is made up of 'letters serially arranged and sounds separately articulated' (huruf manzuma

wa-aswat muqatta'a), which God creates in one or other corporeal framework (mahall). Regarding

the will, the jubba'is propound a singular thesis; according to them, God wishes through wills

that He creates and which are, again, in the nature of accidents, but which He could not

create, they say, either in Himself (since God cannot be 'a receptacle of casuals') nor in any

body (since, henceforward, it is the body that would be wishing on account of these wills), and

which therefore exist-in a manner contrary to the normal rule, concerning accidents-la fi

mahall (cf. Gimaret-Monnot, 265, n. 3). It might be thought that the same conclusion would

apply to the word: once God has created a word in a certain body, it is this body that would be

speaking as a result; but the jubba'is reply to this that a 'speaker' is not 'he in whom the word

resides' (man qama bihi 'l-kalam) but 'he who produces the word' (man fa'ala 'l-kalam) (cf. ibid., 267,

and no. 13-14). As for Abu 'l-qasim al-Balkji, following al-Nazzam, he unequivocally denied the

existence of a divine will in the sense of a specific entity; when we say that God 'wills' His own

acts, this simply means that He creates them; when we say that He 'wills' the acts of men, this

means that He commands them (ibid., 262-3).



3. As much as the absolute uniqueness of God, the Mu'tazila stress His absolute transcendence.

By this it is to be understood fundamentally that, for them, God is not a body, and therefore is

not to be attributed with any of the properties of a body, such as being localised, moving about,

having a form, etc. Two principal consequences are entailed. The first is that all

anthropomorphic representations of God are to be rejected; furthermore, any qur'anic

expression of this kind-the 'hands' of God, His 'eyes', His 'face', His 'side'-is to be

understood only in a figurative sense: by the 'hand' of God, His blessing (ni'ma) is meant, by His

'eye', His knowledge (cf. Maqalat, 165, ll. 12-13; 195, ll. 13-15), by His 'side', His command

(amr) (ibid., 218, ll. 46), by His 'face', His very essence (ibid., 521, l. 16). The second consequence

is that God cannot be seen, in the literal sense of the term, either in this world or in the other,

since only a body can be seen, all vision operating through contact between a ray (shu'a') emitted

by the eye and the object that is seen (cf. 'Abd al-jabbar, al-Mugjni, iv, 57, ll. 10-11; al-juwayni,

al-Irshad, ed. Luciani, Paris 1938, 96, ll. 2-13). The qur'an, moreover, states explicitly of God that

'vision does not comprehend Him' (la tudrikuhu 'l-absaru, vi, 103). It is true that it says elsewhere,

regarding the elect on the Day of Resurrection: 'faces, that day, will be resplen-qdent, looking

at their Lord (ila rabbiha naziratun)', LXXV, 22-3); but for the Mu'tazila this second formula is to

be interpreted as previously proposed by Mujahid (cf. the commentary of al-Tabari): on the one

hand, nazara here signifies not 'to look at' but 'to wait'; on the other, the proper complement of

naziratun is not rabbiha, but a word implied, this being tjawabi, so that the true meaning of the

formula is: 'waiting for the reward of their Lord' (cf. Sjarh, 245, ll. 4-5; al-Ash'ari, Luma', a 78). As

for the haditj according to which the Prophet said to his Companions: 'On the day of

resurrection, you will see (sa-tarawna) your Lord as you see the moon, on a night of full moon', if

the haditj is authentic, which is doubtful (cf. Gimaret-Monnot, 418, n. 40) the verb 'to see' (ra'a)

is to be understood here in a figurative sense (a type of which the qur'an provides many

examples), that is, as a synonym of 'to be acquainted with' ('alima) (cf. Mugjni, iv, 231, ll. 4-17;

Sjarh 270, ll. 10-17).



It is necessary, however, to observe closely in what sense the Mu'tazila understand this divine

transcendence. Certainly, they adhere as firmly as members of any other school to the letter of

the qur'anic formula stating that 'nothing is of His likeness' (XLII, 11). But what they basically

understand by this, once more, is that God can have none of the characteristics of a body as

such; that He has neither form, nor colour, nor length, nor breadth, nor height, that He

cannot be said to be either mobile or immobile, that He has neither parts, nor members, etc. (cf.

Maqalat, 155-6). This does not mean that there is no resemblance, in any respect, between Him

and His creatures. If such were the case, we would be unable to say anything of Him and we

could only describe Him negatively. Now God, because He is just (cf. below), has made it

possible for us to know Him, with a positive knowledge which, here below, is accessible to us

only through reasoning. Consequently, it is on account of our experience of creatures, and on

account of a necessary 'analogy of the invisible to the visible' (haml al-gja'ib 'ala 'l-shahid) that we

can know, first, that God exists (because we know that here below everything which comes into

being implies that someone makes it come into being), subsequently that He merits certain

ajectives: 'powerful', because every agent (and God is known to us first as such, as creator) is

necessarily powerful; 'knowing', because He performs acts 'skilfully executed' (af'al muhkama), or

whoever is capable of producing such acts is necessarily knowing; and so forth. All the ajectives

which we apply to God, we first become aware of them in this visible world (fÌ 'l-shahid), and it is

in the same sense that we apply them to God as to man; just as what is proof for us is likewise

proof for Him (cf. Gimaret, Theories de l'acte humain en theologie musulmane, Paris 1980, 281-2).



II. Concerning the justice of God, and the doctrine that He wills and does only

that which is good.



The principle of the necessary justice of God is not only one of the characteristic dogmas of

Mu'tazila, it may be said without exaggeration to be their fundamental dogma. Even more than

ahl al-'adl wa 'l-tawhid, they are and they call themselves, in brief, ahl al-'adl (cf. Mugjni, iv, 139, l. 4;

vii, 3, l. 15; viii, 3, l. 4; xiii, 4. l. 17: Milal, 57, l. 7).



While no Muslim theologian, of whatever persuasion, has ever asserted the contrary and

described God as 'unjust', it is the manner in which the Mu'tazila conceive this necessary justice

of God that characterises them. For one such as al-Ash'ari, God is necessarily just whatever He

does; He would be soqeven if He acted in a contrary fashion. God, according to al-Ash'ari, is not

subject to any rule; rules are applied only to us, on account of the Law which God has imposed

upon us. For the Mu'tazila, on the other hand (and here again there is a form of 'analogy of the

invisible to the visible'), God is subject, in this respect, to the same laws which apply to man;

that which is just or unjust for us-i.e., that which our reason, for its part, tells us to be so-is the

same for God. This is why, from the Mu'tazili point of view, the necessary justice of God is not

only fact, it is for Him a permanent obligation; in the name of His justice, God is required to act

in such-and-such a fashion, since otherwise He would be unjust. Whence arises the question

which the Mu'tazila were constantly debating (a question which, for al-Ash'ari, would be quite

meaningless), which is whether God has the power to be unjust, or, in a broader sense, to act

badly; this is a question with no satisfactory answer, since, whether the answer be affirmative or

negative, either the justice of God, or his omnipotence, will be compromised.



The necessary justice of God first of all excludes any notion of predestination; it would be unjust

on the part of God, say the Mu'tazila, to decide in advance the fate of every man in the

Hereafter and to ordain that one will be saved and another damned, without either having

merited this by his actions. It is for humans to decide their future lot, according to whether they

choose to believe or not to believe, to obey or to disobey the Law. God would be unjust if He

Himself were to determine faith or disbelief, the fact that some are 'well guided' and others

'astray'. It is true that the qur'an states that God 'leads astray (yu·illu) whom He wills and

guides (yahdi) whom He wills' (XIV, 4; XVI, 93, etc.). But these terms can be interpreted

otherwise than envisaged by the proponents of predestination. Either, by 'to guide' it is to be

understood that God 'shows and makes clearly seen' where the truth is, in which case it will be

said that He 'guides' all men equally (otherwise He would be unjust). Or, if His 'guidance'

applies only to the believers, given that it can only intervene following the free choice which the

latter have taken to believe, this could signify either that God 'says and judges' that they are

'well guided', or indeed (the interpretation preferred by al-jubba'i) that in the other world,

God will 'guide' them on the road to Paradise, hada having, in this context, the sense of 'to

reward' (cf. Maqalat, 260 ll. 9-10). Conversely, when the qur'an says that God 'leads astray', this

can only concern those who, of their own accord, have chosen 'to go astray', and this means

either that God 'says and judges' that they are 'astray' (op. cit., 261, ll. 10-11) or (again the

preference of al-jubba'i) that in the Hereafter, he will 'lead them astray' far from the road to

Paradise in order to lead them to Hell, a·alla consequently having the sense of 'to punish' (ibid.,

262, ll. 1-4). As for those other qur'anic formulae where it is said that God has 'set a seal'

(kjatama, taba'a) on the hearts of the unbelievers, al-jubba'i, for his part, took this quite literally,

in the sense of a 'mark' (sima, 'alama) made by God on the hearts in question, so that on the Last

Day the angels will be capable of distinguishing unbelievers from believers.



Not only must God leave to men the freedom of choosing between belief and disbelief, and thus

deciding their future lot, but it is further necessary that He gives to all the same means of

believing, that He offers them all the same 'aid'. Curiously, it was a Mu'tazili, Bishr b.

al-Mu'tamir, who expressed theqcontrary notion that God, if He wished, could make all men

believe (but He does not do so); that 'He has available to Him a grace (lutf) such that, if He

produced it in one whom He knows ought not to believe, the latter would believe' (Maqalat, 246,

ll. 3-4 and 573, ll. 9-11). This thesis, which only ja'far b. Harb subsequently took seriously, was

rejected-quite logically-by all the rest of the school (ibid., 247, ll. 3-14 and 574, ll. 4-7). The

jubba'is did, indeed, retain the term, but distorted the sense. There does exist, according to

them, a divine 'grace', or rather 'graces' of all kinds, such that, through them, men are led, or

helped, to believe (thus the intelligence that God gives them, the 'clear proofs' by which He

makes Himself known to them, the prophets whom He sends to them, etc.); but there can be no

question, as implied by the thesis of Bishr, of seeing here a pure favour which God, arbitrarily,

would grant to some and withhold from others; God, in the name of His justice, is bound to

grant these 'graces' to all equally, since otherwise it would have to be admitted that He

deliberately wills the perdition (fasad) of those to whom He denies them, a notion that cannot be

conceived (cf. Mugjni, xiii, 116 ff.).



This same justice of God likewise implies that men have control over their voluntary acts, in

other words, they are themselves the producers of them; this principle contradicts the thesis of

the 'coercionists' (al-mujbira), according to which these acts are created in them by God. Only

such an autonomy of the human agent can justify the fact that in this world God imposes a law

upon him, and that in the next he will be rewarded or punished according to whether he has

observed it or not. Obligation and sanction can only be understood in reference to a responsible

being; now, according to Mu'tazili thinking, the only one authentically responsible for an act is

the one who is the author of it in the full sense of the term, who, therefore, 'makes it to be'

(yuhditjuhu, yujiduhu). To claim-as do the adherents of the theory of kasb [q.v.]-that man can be

in some way the agent, or the one responsible for an act, without causing it to be, is

meaningless.



While God does not create the voluntary human act, He does at least create in the man the

power (qudra, istita'a) corresponding to this act. But it could not be the case, as thought by these

same adherents of kasb, of a power which only comes into being when the act is put into effect,

which God would create simultaneously with this act. For the Mu'tazila, the notion of power is

linked to that of free choice (ikjtiyar), itself implied, once again, by the principle of divine justice.

One who has power is recognised by the faculty which he has of 'not choosing that for which

he has power' (Mugjni, viii, 188, l. 10). A typical formula of al-jubba'i, as of his son Abu Hashim,

was that 'whoever has the power of a thing can equally well do it or not do it' (min haqqi 'l-qadir

'ala 'l-shay' an yasihha an yaf'alahu wa-an la yaf'alahu, ibid., ix, 73, ll. 8-10). In other words, every power

is equally the power of an act and of its opposite (qudratun 'alayh wa-'ala ·iddih, Maqalat, 230, ll.

12-13). Hence, the power cannot be other than prior to the act; if it were concomitant with it,

owing to the fact that it is at the same time the power of an act and of its opposite, its coming

into being would entail the simultaneous realisation of opposites, which cannot be. On this

question of the priority (or non-priority) of the power in relation to the act, Mu'tazila and Sunnis

are opposed, the qur'an itself being invoked in support of both arguments (cf., for example,

Luma', ch. vi).



Naturally, it is the duty of God to create in us the powers necessary for the fulfilment of acts

which Hisqlaw imposes upon us. Any form of obligation to the impossible (taklif ma la yutaq) would

be contrary to His justice. The powers in question are specifically among those 'graces' which

He is required to grant to all those subject to the Law.



Finally, in the next world, God must of necessity reward those who have merited His reward,

and punish those who have merited His punishment. There is no doubt that He has the ability

to pardon; the qur'an states that He 'pardons whom He wills and punishes whom He wills (II,

284; III, 129, etc.). In fact, there is no possibility that He will pardon anyone who has not

merited His pardon; pardon is only conceivable where there has previously been repentance on

the part of the unbeliever or the sinner (inna 'l-magjfira bi-sharti 'l-tawba, says 'Abd al-jabbar,

Mutashabih al-qur'an, ed. 'A. Zarzur, Cairo 1969, 596, l. 13). Similarly, only sinners who have

already repented will be able, on the Day of Judgment, to benefit from the intercession of the

Prophet (Sjarh, 688, l. 3). Conversely, God is required to pardon the man who repents;

'accepting repentance', so long as it is sincere, is for Him an obligation (qabul al-tawba wajib; cf.

Mugjni, xiv, 377, ll. 6 ff.). It is likewise out of the question that God will punish those who have

not merited it, since 'to punish someone when there has not been an offence (on his part) is

injustice' (Sjarh, 477, ll. 15-16). This applies in particular to young children (atfal), irresponsible

beings; it is inconceivable that God would punish the children of idolaters (atfal al-mushrikin) for

the sins of their fathers (ibid., 477, l. 8). All suffering inflicted by God, in this world or in the next,

must be merited; if such is not the case (thus in particular the sufferings experienced in this

world by children and animals) God will be obliged to grant, either here below, or in the next

world, a compensation ('iwa·) commensurate with the suffering experienced (cf.

Gimaret-Monnot, 281-3).



Such are the manifold implications of the Mu'tazili principle of divine 'justice', interpreted stricto

sensu. But the Mu'tazila, as already indicated, also understand this term in a much wider sense, as

meaning that God only wills or does that which is (morally) good (hasan), and He is necessarily

exempt from any act which is (morally) bad (munazzah 'an kull qabih). These notions of good and

bad are interpreted in the same way as the notion of 'justice' in the narrow sense; it is always a

question, for the Mu'tazila, of that which we ourselves judge to be so, God, here too, being

subject to the same rules which apply to us. There exists objective good and bad, acknowledged

as such by every being endowed with reason. Thus, our reason makes us spontaneously

recognise as acts bad in themselves injustice, deceit, ingratitude; all the more so is God aware of

evil, since, by nature, He is omniscient. Moreover it cannot be imagined that He has the need

to commit such acts, since, also by nature, He is devoid of need (gjani). We are thus assured,

according to al-jubba'i, that God is incapable of doing evil, by virtue of the principle that

anyone who recognises an act as bad, and does not need to commit it (and knows that he does

not need, which is also the case), necessarily does not commit it (cf. Mugjni, vi/a, 207. ll. 1-7). It

is true that according to the same principle, it could be supposed that God does not do good

either, since He does not need to do it! Against such an objection, al-jubba'i and his successors

set out to show that a good act, even on the part of man, can be performed for the sake of its

own goodness (li-husnih faqat), without need on the part of its agent (op. cit., 223, ll. 17 ff.).



The fact that God is exempt from any evil act im-qplies in particular that He is 'wise' (hakim)

and not 'foolish' (safih). This means essentially that, of necessity, He acts for a certain motive,

towards a certain end, since otherwise His action would be a 'vain act' ('abatj); now the vain act

is, in itself, among the morally evil acts spontaneously acknowledged as such (op. cit., 61, 9).

Consequently, if God has created men and imposed a Law upon them, it is because He had a

reason to do so, and the next task is to show, as is done by, among others, 'Abd al-jabbar, how

God has been 'wise' in creating His creatures (wajh al-hikma fi 'btida'ihi 'l-kjalq), then in imposing

obligation upon them (wajh al-hikma fi 'l-taklif) (Mugjni, xi, 58, l. 16 and 134, l. 1). What then is

this end? It cannot be self-interest, since in this case too God is devoid of need. Nor could it be

conceived that God has created men and imposed a Law upon them with the sole object of

tormenting them, which would be pure injustice. Consequently, the only motive which could, in

this respect, determine divine action is the benefit, the good (salah) of creatures. 'All the

Mu'tazila", according to al-Ash'ari, 'agree in saying that God has created men for their

advantage (li-yanfa'ahum)' (Maqalat, 251, l. 4). Similarly, it is for their good that He has imposed a

Law upon them, with the object of enabling them thereby to accede to the sublime form of

happiness, which is the reward consecutive upon a pain endured (cf. Mugjni, xi, 387, l. 10 and

393, l. 2). Some Mu'tazilis even considered that, from all points of view and in all circumstances,

God does for men what is to their greatest advantage (al-aslah lahum) (otherwise, if He were to

deny them any advantage, this would imply that He is 'avaricious', and avarice is a sin); thus

Abu 'l-Hujayl, al-Nazzam, and subsequently and in particular Abu 'l-qasim al-Balkji and the

"Bagjdadis", for whom God is obliged to do for men that which is to their greatest

advantage both 'in their future life and their terrestrial life' (fi dinihim wa-dunyahum), a principle

applying to the poor as to the rich, to the sick as to the healthy (cf. al-Mufid, Awa'il al-maqalat,

Najaf 1393/1973, 64, ll. 4-5; al-juwayni, Irshad, 165, 1, ll. 12-14). The jubba'is do not go so

far, and oppose on this point the theses of the ashabal-aslah (cf. Mugjni, xiv, 56 ff.). But they agree

with them as regards life in the Hereafter: for all Mu'tazilis-with the minor exception of Bishr

b. al-Mu'tamir and his few supporters-God necessarily does (i.e. has an obligation to do) for

men al-aslah lahum fi dinihim; it cannot be conceived that He does not grant to them all that they

need in order to fulfil the obligations which He imposes on them, in other words, all the

'graces' (altaf) which He can bestow on them (cf. Maqalat, 247, ll. 5-8 and 248, ll. 1-3). God, in

any event, could not will their 'perdition'. For this same reason, al-jubba'i went so far as to

say that God is obliged to keep an unbeliever alive, if He knows that, in this case, the latter will

become a believer (cf. especially the commentary of Abu ja'far al-Tusi on qur'an, VI, 27; it was

on this last point, with regard to the notorious problem of the 'three brothers', that al-Ash'ari,

originally a disciple of al-jubba'i, broke with him; cf. Gimaret-Monnot, 313).



Finally, because He cannot will the perdition of men, it is not possible that God should will of

them that which leads them thither, i.e. their disbelief and their sins. God wills of men only

their good acts. (On the debate between Mu'tazilis and Sunnis on this issue, cf. Gimaret, in SI, xl

and xli.)



III. The definition of faith and the lot of the sinful Muslim.



The point hardly needs stressing, since the Mu'tazila are clearly distinguished from the

otherqschools only by the definition which, following Wasil b. 'Ata', they apply to the sinful

Muslim (i.e. guilty of a serious offence, sahib al-kabira). For them, as for the Hanbalis and other

ashab al-haditj, faith is not only adherence to the dogma of Islam but includes 'works'; they most

often define it as 'the totality of acts of obedience (to God)' (jami' al-ta'at), the only point of

disagreement between them being as to whether acts which are simply recommended (nawafil)

constitute a part of this or not (cf. Maqalat, 266-9). This is why, according to them, if it is

inappropriate to describe the sinful Muslim as kafir (since this can only be said of one whose

beliefs contradict the dogma of Islam, one, for example, who maintains that God is 'the third of

three'), it is likewise inappropriate to describe him as mu'min, all the more so, according to

al-jubba'i, since on account of the Revelation, mu'min has become a laudatory term (ism

al-madh), whereas the sinner, on account of his sin, deserves only censure (cf. Sjarh, 701, ll. 17ff.).

This does not mean that, in the Hereafter, the sinful Muslim will not deserve just as much as the

unbeliever to dwell for eternity in Hell (except that his punishment there will be less severe). As a

result of this, it is said, al-Ash'ari regarded the Mu'tazila as 'effeminate Kharijites"

(makjanitj al-kjawarij), because, like the Kharijites, they consign the sinful Muslim to eternal

Hell, without daring however, like them, to describe him explicitly as 'unbelieving'. (In fact, as

has been observed, not all were of this opinion; there were also, even during the 'second

period', Murji'a Mu'tazila for whom the possibility existed that the punishment of sinners might

not be permanent.)



IV. Mu'tazili rationalism.





It is quite legitimate to consider the Mu'tazila as 'rationalists'. It is, however, necessary to show

precisely what is to be understood by this term, and in what respect their rationalism is specific.



They are clearly not rationalists in the sense of those who claim to formulate a system solely by

the exercise of reason, independent of all revelation. As has been well underlined by A. Amin,

the Mu'tazila are not philosophers (even though, in many regards, their speculations touch on

philosophy), but theologians. Intimately involved in the internal debates of Islam, they reckon

(just as their adversaries do!) to represent the true orthodoxy, in other words, what they

consider, as Muslims, to be the correct interpretation of the qur'anic revelation.



But the Mu'tazila are incontestably rationalists, in the true sense of the term, in that they

consider that certain awarenesses are accessible to man by means of his intelligence alone, in

the absence of, or prior to, any revelation. First, in the strictly theological domain, they say that

God can be known to us through reasoning; it is, furthermore, only in this fashion that here

below we can know Him (and this is why, according to them, the first of the obligations laid

upon man is specifically reasoning to know God). Not only does reason enable us to establish

that God exists, in the capacity of a creator (since this world has begun to exist, and everything

which begins to exist implies that someone has brought it into being), it also informs us

concerning His nature: that He is powerful (because every agent is necessarily powerful), wise (in

that He is the author of acts 'skilfully executed'), living (because one who is powerful and wise is

necessarily so), endowed with hearing and sight (because every living being free of disabilities is

capable of perceiving); that He is not a body; that He is self-sufficient (gjani); that He is just and

cannot do or will anything other than what is good; etc. It is onlyqonce it has been shown-by

reasoning, again-that Muhammad is authentically the Messenger of God (in that his

credentials are proved by miracles), that the qur'anic revelation can be taken into account. This

revelation can, in fact, only confirm that which reason has established; there can be no

contradictions between one and the other. Such contradictions as there are are only apparent,

and can be resolved by an appropriate interpretation (ta'wil) of the revealed text: this applies, as

has been observed, to all the qur'anic formulae which could give the impression that God has a

body similar to ours, that He is situated in a certain direction, that He can move from place to

place, or that He can be seen, and to anything which apparently challenges the principle of

divine justice. It is not, of course, the case that the revelation teaches us nothing that our reason

has not already discovered: it is through the revelation that we know that God has imposed a

Law upon men, that He will resurrect them, that He will reward and punish others. It remains

true that all these facts, not demonstrable initially, must themselves correspond, according to

their modalities, to the exigencies of reason, especially where the principle of 'adl is involved.



But the truth is that, on this point, the Mu'tazila do not differ fundamentally from the rival

theological schools. All, essentially, proceed in the same fashion, and it is in fact the entirety of

kalam (i.e. the theology of the mutakallimun) which should, by this reckoning, be termed

'rationalist'. The Mu'tazila simply gave the example, opened the way (whether theology as a

science was really born with them, as they claim, is a point which remains open to discussion).

The Sunni theologians also considered that the existence of God is known to us through

reasoning, and by no other means. Thus the well-known argument first devised, it is said, by

Abu 'l-Hujayl (according to Sjarh, 95, ll. 9-12), demonstrating the existence of God by means of

the principle of the 'adventitiousness' of substances (hudutj al-jawahir), itself demonstrated by the

adventitiousness of accidents, was adopted with alacrity by all Ash'ari and Maturidi theologians.

Just like the Mu'tazila, the Sunni theologians are at pains to interpret the qur'an in their own

fashion, such that it accords with their doctrinal positions. It may certainly be reckoned that in

a number of cases the Mu'tazila do greater violence to the letter of the qur'anic text (for example

in the interpretation of huda and i·lal), but this is simply because the qur'an, in its literality, is in

general supportive of Sunni theses.



Something else which may legitimately be seen as an element of 'rationalism' is the

formulation by the Mu'tazila of a substantial system for explaining the world and mankind

which, essentially, owes nothing to the qur'an, but much-initially-to fragments of Greek

philosophy, and later, and more significantly, to their own speculations: the conception of

bodies as agglomerates of atoms, the distinction between substance and accident, the

explanation of all phenomena belonging to the physical world through the inherence of

accidents in the atoms of which bodies are constituted; then, in this context, the genuinely

'philosophical' project seeking to define, for example, location and movement; to establish the

cause of the immobility of the earth, the nature of fire, or whether such a thing as a void exists

in the universe; to understand the modalities of perception through the eye and through the

ear; to consider how to define man (insan); what is to be understood by ruh and nafs; what are the

different forms of will, and whether desire and hope should be included amongqthem; etc. For

modern tastes, it is here, without doubt, that Mu'tazili literature appears at its most interesting

and most original. But in this case also, such considerations have not remained exclusively

characteristic of this school; the Sunni theologians, as already mentioned, adopted them as a

wwhole for their own purposes, and this may furthermore be seen as a characteristic of kalam in

general. Possibly such matters simply hold, for the Mu'tazila, a more important status; there

seems little likelihood in finding, in all Sunni theological literature, a work exclusively devoted to

the 'rules of substances and accidents', as is the case with the Tajkira fi ahkam al-jawahir wa

'l-a'ra· of Ibn Mattawayh (partial, and seriously flawed edition by S. N. Lutf and F. B. 'Awn,

Cairo 1975). But it is sufficient to glance, for example, at what remains of the Sjamil of

al-juwayni to gain an impression of the interest taken by the latter in these issues.



On this point, as on the preceding, the rift is not between Mu'tazila and Sunnis taken as

homogeneous wholes, but between those who accept the methods, problems and vocabulary of

the 'ilm al-kalam and those who reject them, such as the Hanbalis in the first instance (which is

not however true for the qa·i Abu Ya'la' Ibn al-Farra' [q.v.], as consummate a mutakallim as

al-juwayni) or those who, in the very midst of the Ash'ari school (including for example Abu

Bakr al-Bayhaqi [q.v.]), maintain loyalty to the inspiration of the ashab al-haditj.



Where there is a rationalism exclusive to the Mu'tazila, it is in the sphere of ethics. For them, as

has been observed, man is also capable of knowing by his reason alone that which is morally

good or evil. Spontaneously, they say, he recognises as evil acts injustice, deceit, ingratitude; and

recognises as obligatory the deed of repaying a debt, keeping himself clear of harm (daf' al-·arar

'an nafsihi), or showing thankfulness towards a benefactor (whereby all are obliged to adore God,

the supreme Benefactor, adoration representing the highest form of thankfulness). In this

context also, the revelation can only confirm that which our reason tells us. Of course, the latter

is not sufficient to make us aware of everything that is evil (i.e. forbidden), nor everything that is

obligatory; only the revealed Law can inform us that it is obligatory, for example, to perform a

prayer to God, according to a certain ritual, five times a day, or that it is forbidden to eat and

drink during the days of Rama·an. It could even be supposed that there is a contradiction here

between revelation and reason, bearing in mind that, spontaneously, reason makes us recognise

as evil (because arduous, therefore harmful) the exercise of the rituals of prayer, and conversely

obligatory (because it removes harm) the act of eating and drinking when one is hungry or

thirsty. But, in fact, reason understands without difficulty the necessity to undergo a minor

harm, as a means of avoiding the major harm which is the punishment promised by God to

those who disobey Him. In this manner, even the prescriptions of the Law have a rational basis;

if our reason were capable of knowing by itself that the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of a certain

act would earn the torments of Hell for all eternity, it would necessarily know, by itself, that the

act in question is either evil or obligatory (cf. Gimaret-Monnot, 270-1).



On this last point, the Mu'tazila are, for once, very clearly in disagreement with the Ash'ari

theologians. For al-Ash'ari, the sole foundation of good and evil, in all respects, is the revealed

Law; that which God commands is obligatory, that which He permits good, that which He

forbids evil. If deceit is morally evil, itqis because God has declared it so; if He had declared it

good, it would be good (cf. Luma', a 171). However, not all Sunnis shared this opinion; in this

respect, al-Maturidi and a large number of his supporters maintained a position comparable to

that of the Mu'tazila (see al-Maturidi, K. al-Tawhid, ed. F. Kholeif, Beirut 1970, 178, l. 16;

al-Pazdawi, K. Usul al-din, ed. H. Linss, Cairo 1383/1963, 207, ll. 9-13).

(D. Gimaret)



Bilbiography:

Over the past thirty years, with a quantity of new sources becoming available, studies relating

to Mu'tazilism have progressed considerably, and given rise to a large number of publications,

which cannot possibly be listed here in an exhaustive manner. A number of important

references have already been indicated in the course of the article.

There does not yet exist a comprehensive study, taking account of recent gains in knowledge,

of the history and doctrines of Mu'tazilism, with the exception of the substantial article by J.

van Ess in The Encyclopedia of Religion, New York 1987, x, 220-9. The works of Z. jar Allah

(al-Mu'tazila, Cairo 1947) and A.N. Nader (Le systeme philosophique des mu'tazila, Beirut 1956) are

out of date. The books by J. van Ess, Une lecture a rebours de l'histoire du mu'tazilisme, Paris 1984,

and Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, Berlin-New York 1991, relate

only to the 'first period' (as far as Ibn al-Rawandi), and is in the form of a simple outline of

what the author expects to develop, and eventually correct, in his Geschichte der frühen

islamischen Theologie.

The most important sources concerning the history of Mu'tazilism are the works of

tabaqat' devoted to this school. The Tabaqat al-Mu'tazila' drawn from the K. al-Munya wa 'l-amal

of the Zaydi Imam Ahmad b. Yahya b. al-Murta·a (d. 840/1437) and published by S.

Diwald-Wilzer (Beirut-Wiesbaden 1961) are a recasting (sometimes flawed) of those which

figure in the K. Sjarh al-'uyun of al-Hakim al-jushami, themselves derived from a work of

'Abd al-jabbar entitled Fa·l al-i'tizal wa-tabaqat al-mu'tazila. F. Sayyid published

(posthumously) in Tunis in 1393/1974, under the same title, a volume comprising: 1. the

chapter of the Maqalat al-Islamiyyin of Abu 'l-qasim al-Balkji which concerns the Mu'tazila



2. the entire text of the book of 'Abd al-jabbar (or the first ten tabaqat)



and 3. the section of the Sjarh al-'uyun of al-jushami dealing with the later period (or tabaqat

11 and 12).

The very valuable chapter of the Fihrist of Ibn al-Nadim on the Mu'tazila is almost entirely

missing in the Flügel edition



it is to be found in the more recent edition of R. Tajaddud, Tehran 1971.

Regarding the study of doctrines, a fundamental source (for the 'first period') remains the

Maqalat al-Islamiyyin of al-Ash'ari (2nd ed. Ritter, Wiesbaden 1963). The chapter of the

Maqalat of al-Balkji, mentioned above, is remarkably succinct in this respect. The information

given in the K. al-Milal wa 'l-nihal of al-Sjahrastani is the object of substantial critical

annotation in D. Gimaret and G. Monnot, Shahrastani, Livre des religions et des sectes, i,

Louvain-Paris 1986 (see especially pp. 177-289).

On jubba'i's theses, the most accessible source is the compendium already mentioned (and to

which the present article refers under the abbreviation Sjarh) by the Zaydi Imam Mankdim

Sjashdiw, which is a collection of lecture notes (ta'liq) on the Sjarh al-usul al-kjamsa of the qa·i

'Abd al-jabbar



this work, published under the same title of Sjarh al-qusul al-kjamsa by 'A. K. 'Utjman, Cairo

1965, was erroneously attributed by the latter to 'Abd al-jabbar himself (on this faulty

attribution, see Gimaret, in Annales Islamologiques, xv [1979]). Of the enormous theological

corpus of 'Abd al-jabbar, al-Mughni fi abwab al-tawhid wa 'l-'adl, not all has been preserved



of the twenty volumes which it comprised, only fourteen figure in the Cairo edition (1960-5).

For the missing sections, a substitute may be found in al-Majmu' fË 'l-Muhit bi 'l-taklif by Ibn

Mattawayh, a paraphrase of the Muhit of 'Abd al-jabbar (two volumes published, Beirut

1965 and 1981).

Among the works concerning 'Abd al-jabbar or the jubba'i school in general, three

deserve particular attention: G.F. Hourani, Islamic rationalism, the ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar, Oxford

1971



J.R.T.M. Peters, God's created speech, a study in the speculative theology of the Mu'tazili Qa·i l-Qu·at

Abu l-Hasan 'Abd al-Jabbar bn Ahmad al-Hamadani, Leiden 1976



R.M. Frank, Beings and their attributes, the teaching of the Basrian school of the Mu'tazila in the classical

period, Albany 1978.

It may be noted in conclusion that, as a result of the progress of studies since the inception of

the new Encyclopaedia of Islam, some of the articles published in the earliest instalments are no

longer up to date, and therefore it is recommended that, for the authors concerned, the more

recent Encyclopedia Iranica (London 1985-) should also be consulted. This applies in particular

to 'Abd al-jabbar and Abu 'l-Kasim al-Balkji.







--------------------------------------------------------------



al-MANZILA BAYN al-MANZILATAYN, a theological term used by Wasil b. 'Ata' [q.v.]

and the later Mu'tazila [q.v.] for designating the salvational status of the mortal sinner (fasiq

[q.v.]). The word manzila alone is attested, in the technical sense of 'salvational status', in Haditj

(cf. Muttaqi al-Hindi, Kanz al-'ummal, i, 28, no. 519) and, later than Wasil, in the K. al-'Alim wa

'l-muta'allim which was probably composed by Abu Hanifa's pupil Abu Muqatil Hafs b. Salm

al-Samarqandi in the second half of the 2nd century (cf. ed. Hyderabad 1349, 20, 11. 4 ff. and

Schacht, in Oriens, xvii [1964], 111). It was used together with, and perhaps derived from the

corresponding verb anzala (cf. a story told in Murji'i circles at Kufa where Nafi' b. al-Azraq asks

somebody: 'Where do you locate [ayna tunzilu] the unbelievers in the Hereafter?' and gets the

answer: 'In Hell'; Abu Hanifa, Risala ila 'Utjman al-Batti, ed. Kawtjari, Cairo 1368/1949, 38 n.).

The dual al-manzilatani is used, with respect to Paradise and Hell, in a haditj preserved by Ibn

Hanbal (Musnad, iv, 438, 1. 7 from bottom; for the context, cf. Van Ess, Zwischen Hadit und

Theologie, 47 ff.). The idea of a manzila bayn al-manzilatayn is prepared in a saying attributed to the

Basran ascetic Yazid al-Raqashi (d. between 110/729 and 120/738): laysa bayn al-janna wa 'l-nar

manzila (in the presence of 'Umar II; cf. Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Sirat 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz, ed. Ahmad

'Ubayd, Damascus 1374/1953, 90, 1. 9). The Mu'tazili phrase appears for the first time in the

title of one of Wasil's books (cf. Ibn al-Nadim, Fihrist, ed. R. Tajaddud, Tehran2 1393/1973,

203, 1. 5). But whether he coined it for the purpose of his own theology must remain doubtful,

for all the reports which we possess agree that, in reality, he did not dissociate from two

positions only, namely those who regarded the fasiq as a 'believer' and those who called him an

'unbeliever', but from three, he equally rejecting Hasan al-Basri's definition of the fasiq as a

'hypocrite' (munafiq) which was taken over by numerous Basran ascetics and especially by the

so-called Bakriyya, the adherents of Bakr b. Ukjt 'Abd al-Wahid b. Zayd (fl. probably in the

second third of the 2nd century). It is possible that this third standpoint did not become

relevant, and also vexing, through explicit opposition, for the early Mu'tazila, until the Bakriyya

entered the scene, for even they-and a fortiori Hasan al-Basri-ultimately considered the munafiq

as a 'believer', though as a believer who will be eternally punished in Hell (cf. al-Ash'ari, Maqalat

al-Islamiyyin, 286, 11. 2 ff.).



The discussion about the different manzils had always been connected with an attempt to specify

the juridical or theological consequences attached to them. This is how the Mu'tazili position is

proven in most of our testimonies (which are all much later than Wasil: cf. al-jahiz, Risala fi

'l-hakamayn, in Mashriq, lii (1958), 460, 11. 5 ff.; al-Khayyat, Intisar, ed.qNader, 118, 11. 2 ff.;

Pseudo-qasim b. Ibrahim, K. al-'Adl wa 'l-tawhid, in Rasa'il al-'Adl wa 'l-tawhid, ed. Muhammad

'Imara, i, Cairo 1971, 125, 11. 4 ff.): the unbeliever must be fought and cannot be inherited

from, the believer is loved by God, the munafiq should be summoned to do penance or otherwise

be executed; all this cannot be said about the fasiq. Therefore, since these juridical regulations

(ahkam) cannot be applied to him, the corresponding designations (asma') are not valid in his case

either. In this presentation of the problem which became common in the future, the term

manzila was replaced by ism; thus it slowly lost its significance for the theological vocabulary.

4irar b. 'Amr (2nd century [q.v.]) and Bishr. b. al-Mu'tamir (d. 210/825 [q.v.]) still wrote treatises

about the manzila bayn al-manzilatayn (cf. Fihrist, 215, 1. 13 and 205, 11. 23 f.). Abu 'l-Hujayl

included it among the usul al-kjamsa; Ibn al-R¿wandi [q.v.] refuted the Mu'tazila in this point (cf.

Fihrist, 217, 1. 10). The terms ism and hukm are already found, though perhaps not yet

systematically linked with each other, in Abu Hanifa's Risala ila 'Utjman al-Batti (ed. Kawtjari, 35,

1. 16 and 36, 11. 12 f.). The disputation between Wasil and 'Amr b. 'Ubayd preserved by al-Sjarif

al-Murta·a (Amali, ed. Muhammad Abu 'l-Fa·l Ibrahim, Cairo 1373/1954, i, 165, 11. 8 ff.) where

Wasil uses ism but not hukm, is apparently a retrojection or a recast possibly taken from the K.

Ma jara baynahu [sc. bayna Wasil] wa-bayna 'Amr b. 'Ubayd (cf. Fihrist, 203, n. 1) which may have

been composed in the second half of the 2nd century; nevertheless, it remains our oldest

testimony for the Mu'tazili position and shows archaic features in part of its argumentation.



Similarities with Christian speculations about penitence have been pointed out by E. Graef (in

OLZ, iv [1960], 397; cf. also R. Strothmann, in Isl., xiv [1931], 215). There is, however, to date

no proof for any influence.

(J. van Ess)







Given in the article. Cf. also W. Madelung, Der Imam al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim und die Glaubenslehre

der Zaiditen, Berlin 1965, 10 ff.



W. M. Watt, The formative period of Islamic thought, Edinburgh 1973, 213



J. van Ess, in REI, xlvii (1979), 51 ff.



M. Cook, Early Muslim dogma, Cambridge 1981, 94. See also fasiq and mu'tazila.





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