For these reasons, the Shiites decided to disregard the considerations of their Christian ally and instead agree with their common opponents — the Sunnis affiliated with Hariri and the Druze led by Walid Jumblatt — to extend parliament's mandate for another 20 months. This they did in a May 31 session that Aoun and his MPs alone boycotted.

The Shiites were not confident of victory if elections were held under the extant law. The Shiite camp believed that holding elections in light of mounting tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, as well the volatile security situation in many areas, would exacerbate sectarian conflict, possibly resulting in major sectarian "strife," which they believe would spell doom for their existence and be the end of Lebanon. In addition, at the time Hezbollah was preoccupied with events in Syria, with its fighters in the midst of the battle for Qusair , which eventually fell to them on June 5.

Aoun's position had been clear: A new electoral law was a priority, otherwise elections should be held under the provisions of the existing law. Postponing the elections or extending the mandate of parliament was, for him, out of the question. The general's Shiite allies, however — especially Hezbollah and the Amal movement, the latter headed by parliament Speaker Nabih Berri — took a different view of the matter.

The end of May was the constitutional deadline for Lebanese MPs to make a decision on a new electoral law . They had to pass a new one, approve holding elections based on the law still in force or extend their own mandate, which was to end on June 20. After they failed to pass legislation for holding parliamentary elections, talk began to be heard of Aoun changing his political alignment.

Rumors have been circulating in Beirut for weeks about a change in political positions and alliances, with Gen. Michel Aoun, the most prominent Christian leader, appearing to have adopted a new political stance. Speculation abounds that Aoun has been gradually moving away from his Shiite allies while making overtures toward Sunni leader and former prime minister Saad al-Hariri. What are the reasons for this situation and to what extent are the expectations of a radical repositioning in the Lebanese political scene plausible?

Aoun later appealed to the Constitutional Council, which considers the constitutionality of laws, requesting that the mandate be revoked. Due to abstentions by three members of the council, and the resulting absence of a quorum, the council could not convene to consider Aoun's appeal. Not coincidentally, the three abstaining members were two Shiites and one Druze. Aoun's appeal came to naught, while the parliamentary extension became a fait accompli.

At this point, sources close to Aoun had begun to express dissatisfaction with the positions of their Shiite allies and to question the viability of such an alliance in achieving common patriotic and national objectives, such as maintaining democracy and constitutionality, holding elections and sustaining the work of constitutional institutions.

Earlier, in April, there had been intensive consultations to select someone to form a new government following the resignation of Prime Minister Najib Mikati. At the time, it was said that Saudi Arabia had given its blessing to Tammam Salam, a Beirut MP affiliated with Hariri's parliamentary bloc. His nomination was unanimously approved by most of the MPs. Salam won the votes of the Shiite as well as Aoun MPs and was nominated as prime minister. Many believed that the Shiites' approval of a figure backed by Saudi Arabia must have been the result of or an indication of some kind of overture between Tehran and Riyadh.

Aoun’s first aide, the MP Gebran Bassil, therefore initiated a meeting with the Saudi ambassador to Lebanon, Ali Awad Asiri, to search for a way to form the government Salam was to present. Several meetings were held after a number of amicable messages back and forth between the Saudi ambassador and Bassil, and thus Aoun. Asiri returned Bassil's visit to the Saudi Embassy with a trip to his residence two weeks later. On July 2, the Saudi ambassador was invited by Aoun for lunch at his home in Rabieh.

The combination of the discontent of those close to Aoun with their Shiite allies, the multiple visits among Asiri, Aoun and Bassil, not to mention talk of a possible secret meeting between Aoun and Hariri, who has been living abroad for two years, lent the strong impression that new alliances were in the offing, and Aoun would likely change his position.

Those with knowledge of the nature of the relationship among Aoun, the Shiites and Hariri cannot provide further readings at this point. Aoun has made observations and comments about the political behavior of his allies, in public and behind the scenes, as has been claimed.

First, one should mention questions among some Christian and Aoun-affiliated circles about Hezbollah’s regional power, especially after its victory at Qusair, which turned it into a regional player whose role and influence goes beyond Lebanon. Many have been questioning the importance of a Christian ally to Hezbollah at this stage, given its new priorities in light of its enhanced position regionally.

Second, Hezbollah has been stressing unity among Shiites during these critical times and thus clinging to its alliance with Berri and his Amal movement at the expense of its relationship with its Christian ally, Aoun. The relationship between Berri and Aoun has historically been unstable. Many Christians accuse Berri of having covered up state-level corruption, while some circles close to Berri accuse Aoun of seeking to take over the presidency and keep the Ministry of Energy and Water for his son-in-law, the current minister, and the leadership of the army for his other son-in-law, the head of the Lebanese Commando Regiment (Maghaweer), the first special forces regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Third, there has been a growing sense among the Christian community, including Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, that the balance between Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon has tipped in favor of the latter, with the conviction that it is in the best interest of Christians, and Lebanese in general, to preserve a delicate balance among the various Lebanese groups and prevent the tyranny of one over the other. Thus, many Christian groups believe that Aoun should address this imbalance, as he did in favor of Shiites when the Sunni leadership of Hariri sought to alienate them in 2006.

Aoun had been keen to underscore his understanding with his Shiite allies when he was interviewed on a Hezbollah-affiliated television station during the 2006 Lebanon War. He has been anxious to stress their understanding for two reasons. First, Aoun believes that his political investment — which he made by weaving a network of political agreements seven years ago with Hezbollah, Damascus, Tehran and Moscow — is still of value. Currently, this investment even seems to be heading toward victory in its battles in the region, starting with Syria. Therefore, it would not be wise to abandon it with the moment of victory in the offing.

Second, Aoun believes that the rapprochement with the Sunni-Hariri group and its Saudi Arabian sponsor cannot bear the requisite political fruit or achieve his declared national goals. For instance, this most prominent Christian leader calls for the Taif Agreement, the basis of the current Lebanese constitution, to be reconsidered. Yet the agreement, sponsored by the Saudis and adopted at a gathering in Saudi Arabia in 1989, gives primacy to the Sunni community in the Lebanese system. The Sunni and Hariri allies of Riyadh in Beirut continue to affirm their commitment to the agreement and to reject any reconsideration of it.

Moreover, Aoun had previously called for conducting audits of the Lebanese state’s public accounts from 1992 to 2005. The Hariri faction was in power at the time, during which the country experienced exorbitant growth in the public debt and scandalous accusations of corruption and squandering of public monies. This demand is strongly rejected by the Sunnis, just as Saudi Arabia is not expected to support it.

Aoun is also demanding that the pluralistic composition of the Lebanese system be respected so that Christians might restore their right to nominate their representatives. This is particularly the case at the top of the pyramid and with the most important Christian-held positions, that is, the presidency — elections are supposed to be held in March or April 2014 to replace the current president, Michel Sulieman, whose term expires on May 25, 2014 — and commander in chief of the army, who will retire on Sep. 23. This is in addition to various ministerial and administrative positions. Aoun also wants the adoption of a parliamentary election law that allows Christians to bring their own representatives to parliament without input from Muslim voters [and vice versa].

All Aoun's demands have been rejected by the Sunnis in general, and the Hariri [group] in particular. Therefore, his wishes face similar reservations among the Saudis. This raises the question of whether there is even a chance for a potential or actual agreement between Aoun and Hariri.

In light of this interpretation of the situation, the main positions of the political parties should be expected to remain unchanged, with the possibility of only slight changes. This means that there will not be any real shifts in balances of power and alliances as parties wait to see what will happen with the Syrian situation and assess the prospects for its development.

If it is true that Syria is heading toward a compromise that falls within the scope of a Russian-American consensus, and subsequently a Saudi-Iranian consensus, then one could also speak of a possible solution for the Lebanese crisis. If, however, the Syrian situation includes a longer, internal bloody war of attrition as a prelude to a solution, it is unlikely that the Lebanese scene will witness any changes. It is most likely to remain the same, with a series of maneuvers to kill time and fill the void with political discourses, whether appropriate or not.

Jean Aziz is a contributing writer for Al-Monitor’s Lebanon Pulse. He is a columnist at the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar and the host of a weekly political talk show on OTV, a Lebanese TV station. He also teaches communications at the American University of Technology and the Université Saint-Esprit De Kaslik in Lebanon.