WASHINGTON, Sept. 7 (UPI) -- UPI Editor-at-Large Arnaud de Borchgrave has interviewed Iraq's Saddam Hussein three times in the past. The last time was in his capacity as Newsweek's Chief Foreign Correspondent on July 17, 1978 -- two years before the Iraqi leader went to war against Iran, and three years before the Israeli Air Force destroyed Iraq's French-built nuclear reactor. The wide-ranging 1978 interview, which includes references to Iraq's support of Somalia in its conflict with Ethiopia for control of the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, is still interesting as a means of understanding the Iraqi dictator's thought processes.

DE BORCHGRAVE: Many heads of state and government, including some Marxist ones, can see a more aggressive Soviet policy in areas of vital interest to Western Europe and the U.S. Isn't that cause for concern?


SADDAM HUSSEIN: You can add our warning to that, too. The Soviet Union sees its security in spreading Communism while the U.S. believes its own security lies in having the world with a bourgeois system. In reality, they are both moving in their own directions. Americans and West Europeans were in the Middle East and Africa long before the Soviets. So when the Soviets move in somewhere, it appears as if it's only the Soviets who are acting. I'm not saying that the Soviets are blameless. In fact, they won't be satisfied until the whole world becomes Communist. By allowing ourselves to be drawn into spheres of influence, we Arabs are ensuring that we will become an East-West battlefield.


Q. You recently executed 21 Iraqi Communists three years after their arrest for plotting inside the Iraqi Army and just after the Soviet ambassador and other East European envoys had asked you to spare their lives. Was that intended as a warning shot to stay out of your internal affairs?

A. Yes, it was. Incidentally, they were shot by firing squad, which is the military tradition, not hung as reported in the Western media -- and not because they were Communists but because they had tried to subvert the state.

Q. You insist that you are completely independent, but don't you still have to pay a geopolitical price for your close relations with the Soviet Union? During the Ethiopian airlift, didn't you allow Soviet military-cargo planes to use Iraqi bases on their way to Ethiopia?

A. No, we didn't allow Soviet planes to go to Ethiopia via Iraq. We objected and got a formal understanding from the Soviets that these planes would go to South Yemen instead. We deduced, of course, that some of these shipments were going on to Ethiopia by other transport, but there was nothing we could do about that.

Q. Somalia's Muhammad Siad Barre told me Iraq had continued to support him with arms even though Russia backed Ethiopia. So you were, in effect, helping both sides by helping Russia help the regime of Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam?

A. That's like saying we are helping Israel because some of our oil, unbeknownst to us, may find its way to Israel via the U.S. The important thing to bear in mind is our official policy, which was not to support Mengistu. Said Barre was and is our friend.


Q. European counter-terrorist agencies say they have irrefutable evidence that Iraq has given aid and comfort to terrorists. I can understand your helping Palestinian commandos, but why are their European terrorist friends allowed to use your facilities?

A. Regarding the Palestinians, it's no secret. Iraq is open to them and they are free to train and plan here. On foreigners, however, we have a clear stand. We are not concerned with what happens to European countries, whether its the Italian Red Brigades or others. But we do not allow our country to be a training area for these activities. We know that certain Palestinians have trained some of these Europeans outside Iraq under mutual assistance agreements. Perhaps some may have entered Iraq disguised as Palestinians. We don't know but I assure you it's not something done by any branch of the Iraqi government.

Q. If the U.S. and Iraq had normal diplomatic relations and ambassadors in each other's capitals, couldn't many misperceptions about U.S. policies be avoided?

A. That is correct. But as you know there are other major issues -- such as your complete support for the Zionist entity [Israel] and your deliberate strategy of dividing the Arab world -- that stand in the way of normal relations.

Q. The Soviet Union endorses U.N. Resolution 242, as the U.S. does, and supports Israel's right to exist in its 1967 frontiers. Since you disagree with Moscow on this score, why haven't you severed relations with them, too?

A. We have told the Soviets very clearly why we think they're wrong. But don't forget that the Soviets supply the Arabs with arms while the U.S. rewards the Zionist aggressors. We do not wish to throw the Jews into the sea as our enemies charge, and would not even if we had the means to do so, which we will have in the future. But the Zionist entity must and will be replaced by a greater Palestinian state. Would normal relations with the U.S. change America's hostile policy?


Q. President Carter has done more to change U.S. policy in the Mideast than any president since Dwight Eisenhower. Doesn't this justify a resumption of normal relations?

A. His words have been noted with interest. But we are still waiting for deeds and that can only mean withdrawal from occupied territories. If you tell the Zionist aggressor that it must change its position to non-aggression, then we will begin to see change all around.

Q. Iraq says it will always reject the "Zionist entity." So if you refuse peace with Israel, even if it withdraws to its 1967 borders, is it correct to assume then that you believe war is the only solution?

A. Correct.

Q. Even if Egypt, Syria and Jordan could agree to act jointly, they have little military credibility against Israel. Is war then possible?

A. Not today, not tomorrow. But the Arabs won't always be weak. Their strength is growing daily. Nor will they always be ruled by capitulationist regimes. In 10 years you will see a completely different equation.

Q. After settling your differences with Iran in 1975, you began speaking about the need for Persian Gulf security arrangements. What did you have in mind?

A. First, all Gulf states should reject the status quo on freedom of navigation. Second, they should refrain from creating circumstances that might furnish a pretext for foreign intervention. Third, all problems should be solved among Gulf states without any outside interference.

Q. In a recent interview, Lybian leader Muammar Qadhafi said he now planned to dedicate himself to promoting popular revolutions in the Gulf against the sheikhdoms, emirates and the Saudi monarchy. Isn't this in conflict with the principles you have outlined?


A. Qadhafi is free to express his opinion. In any event, we do not see any contradiction between the internal will of the people inside Gulf states and freedom of navigation and non-interference in internal affairs.

Q. It was recently reported that Iraq had been discussing new security arrangements for the Gulf with Iran and Saudi Arabia, but a few days later the Iranian Prime Minister announced that Iran was giving up talks with its Gulf neighbors because no one was interested. So what's the real story?

A. We are pleased with the Iranian statement because it's the truth. The press report was pure fiction. We had discussions with the Shah in 1975 and made clear then as we have since that we are not at all interested in mutual or multilateral defense security arrangements, only in normal, bilateral, state-to-state relations, and in the three principles I have already outlined.

Q. Iraq has been diversifying its arms supplies to lessen its dependency on Soviet power. What is the ultimate objective?

A. When Iraq criticizes policies of a friendly country, it should not be judged that this is the beginning of a change in relations. By the same token, when we deal with an enemy, it does not mean the beginning of comprehensive changes in our stand. Our attitudes have absolutely nothing in common with Egypt when it changed arms suppliers from the Soviet Union to the U.S. And when we buy arms from France, it does not mean that our attitude springs from the same source as certain other Third World countries that buy from France. We do what we do of our own free will and as we perceive our real national interest, the interest of the Arab nation. We simply want a strong army capable of defending our sovereignty and guaranteeing our independence, and of participating in the Arab nation's battles.


(Two years after this interview, Iraq went to war against Iran. That conflict lasted eight years as these two Gulf powers fought themselves to a bloody standstill with about one million casualties on both sides. Two years later, in August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.)