NFL teams are missing out. When it comes to extra points and two point conversions, NFL teams default to conventional wisdom without giving it a second thought. There have been plenty of cases made by smart, non-NFL employees for teams to go for two more than they do. But maybe it’s time teams take action, and listen to the wishful thinking of analytics pioneers.

Analytics is in hot water in the NFL right now with the recent firing of Sashi Brown, and his replacement by “football guy” John Dorsey. NFL teams don’t appear to be interested in unorthodox methodology, so this is all probably a pipe dream. But it makes sense to lay out the case anyways, because it’s genuinely the right thing to do. Analytics is a scary word for brick-headed traditional football minds, but all it means is counting. Asking, “What wins more games?” is an appropriate question whether you look at it analytically or with the nebulous subjectivity of traditional “football guys.”

At predictivefootball.com, Kevin Cole made a great argument for teams taking more chances after touchdowns. For simplicity’s sake, we can assume that extra points are made 100% of the time, and two point conversions are made 50% of the time. In Kevin’s example, you’re down 14 with only enough time for two more drives. You score a touchdown, cutting the lead to eight. Teams almost always take the point after and cut the lead to seven, resigning to aspire to a tie. But taking the two-point conversion gives you a chance to win outright, and if you miss, you still get a chance to make it up later. Only missing twice (25%) loses you the game from this decision, while getting the first one (50%) gives you a game-winning advantage. The other 25% is overtime, where you have a 50-50 shot of winning. Split that up and you have a 62.5% chance of winning the game and a 37.5% chance of losing. Better than skipping straight to overtime and leaving it at 50-50.

But I want to take you all a little further. The Vikings should go for two no matter what the situation and in every game. until they’ve gotten a lead off of it. Say the Vikings, over the course of the game, will score four touchdowns. If they go for two every single one of those, their results will map out like this:

TD 1 TD 2 TD 3 TD 4 Total Points Get Get Get Get 32 Get Get Get Miss 30 Get Get Miss Get 30 Get Get Miss Miss 28 Get Miss Get Get 30 Get Miss Get Miss 28 Get Miss Miss Get 28 Get Miss Miss Miss 26 Miss Get Get Get 30 Miss Get Get Miss 28 Miss Get Miss Get 28 Miss Get Miss Miss 26 Miss Miss Get Get 28 Miss Miss Get Miss 26 Miss Miss Miss Get 26 Miss Miss Miss Miss 24

If you’re a smart cookie, you’ll notice that there are 5 of 16 scenarios where this hurts you (you get less than the 28 points you’d have if you took 1 every time). But there are 5 of 16 scenarios where you get more, so it’s even. But we’re not robots that need to adhere to strict rules. We can adjust when the game situation changes. Similar to Kevin Cole’s example, once we’ve generated an advantage, we can ride that out, assuming game situation doesn’t require us to stay aggressive. If we miss, we can get aggressive, and hopefully make it up some of the time. So that changes each scenario, and we can swap back to extra points as soon as we’re ahead. That looks like this:

TD 1 TD 2 TD 3 TD 4 Points Get XP XP XP 29 Get XP XP XP 29 Get XP XP XP 29 Get XP XP XP 29 Get XP XP XP 29 Get XP XP XP 29 Get XP XP XP 29 Get XP XP XP 29 Miss Get Get XP 29 Miss Get Get XP 29 Miss Get Miss Get 28 Miss Get Miss Miss 26 Miss Miss Get Get 28 Miss Miss Get Miss 26 Miss Miss Miss Get 26 Miss Miss Miss Miss 24

In half of all scenarios, you can get an advantage right away and just coast, forcing the opponent into a difficult decision. In only a quarter of the scenarios do you suffer a disadvantage doing this.

While this may be compelling evidence for any team to constantly go for two (and I’m hardly the first person to lay it out this way), why the Vikings specifically? Well, in most of the math, it’s assumed that you convert two-pointers about half as much as you convert extra points. The math bears out on that overall, but the Vikings may be different.

In the red zone, or the “infrared” zone as Joe Oberle likes to call it on the Purple Journal, the Vikings have been sublime. On 37 plays inside the 5 yard line, the Vikings have been able to score a touchdown or get two yards on 17 of them, a top ten mark in the league. That’s not the best proxy for success, as sometimes 1st and goal plays are used to set up 2nd and goal plays. On 3rd down and two or less, where it’s convert or die, the Vikings convert 77% of the time, 3rd in the league behind Dallas and Kansas City and 15% over the league average. Intuitively, it’s not controversial to assert that the Vikings could convert two-pointers more than half the time with the success they’ve had in short yardage situations. If it were a practiced, deliberate part of the gameplan, most teams probably could beat that goal, but especially the Vikings.

If the Vikings were to take my advice, one of the first narratives in response would be about Kai Forbath. Headlines would fly about Mike Priefer losing trust in his kicker, and with pretty good reason. Kai Forbath (and to a degree the unit around him) have only made 26 of 31 extra points, the worst mark in the NFL. So from an expected points perspective, a two-point conversion is worth 1.54 expected points, and an extra point is worth 0.84. That is to say, over 100 two-point conversion attempts and 100 extra point attempts, they’d have 154 and 84 points, respectively. League average is about 95 points either way.

So let’s update Kevin Cole’s example, but change the percentages to the Vikings’.

Result (Chances) Make 2nd Miss 2nd Make 1st Win! (59%) You’d never Miss 1st Overtime (31%) Lose (10%)

Split the 31% into 15.5% apiece and you win 74.5% of the time and lose 25.5%. Taking two Forbath extra points gives you a 70% chance to hit overtime, and only a 35% chance of winning. Taking 2 is a solid proposition, assuming Pat Shurmur doesn’t run out of good goal line ideas. If they truly committed to this strategy, they would probably practice goal line concepts more, leading to an even greater advantage. It’s both a factor of trusting the goal line offense, and simply being smarter on the scoreboard.

There’s not much necessity for Mike Zimmer to make a drastic chance in the offense. Despite the fresh sting of a 31-24 loss in Carolina, the offense is 6th in offensive DVOA and the team is sitting pretty for an NFC playoff bye at 10-3. But that’s no argument for stagnation. There’s no bad time to consider innovation for the sake of generating more advantages, and with the Vikings’ relevant success in short yardage, the only thing standing in the way is traditional wisdom. Unfortunately, traditional wisdom was strong enough to keep Hue Jackson employed over Sashi Brown. But someday, NFL teams will wake up. Hopefully, the Vikings don’t hit snooze.

Thanks for reading!