To fund its research, the centre approaches research centres, universities and UN agencies with partnership proposals and relies on academics around the world to make voluntary contributions. Syria's war is now defined in many people's minds as a fight to the death between a secular - if tyrannical - Assad regime and a motley array of jihadist factions. But this picture strikes Mehchy as inadequate on many levels. "I would say that there are 5 per cent of extremists on each side who cannot compromise - the majority of Syrians are flexible. We are involved informally with many governmental institutions, and most of the people we encounter do not want to shoot us." Loading He dismisses the portrayal of the Syrian state before the war as "stable" and "secular", pointing to declining prospects and economic development for the country's people in the years from 1980 to 2010, when Syria was caught in a "low equilibrium model" - health, education and basic goods were subsidised on the understanding that the population would abandon any claims to a political voice. As was the case in Egypt, Tunisia and more recently Jordan, when those subsidies began to disappear, the prevalent tensions in the society soon emerged.

"A regime that destroyed all secular parties ... and put their leaders in jail, that supports many religious activities to replace civil ones, that sent 'jihadists' to Iraq ... cannot be the guardian of secularism," he says. "For the regime, sheikhs and religious scholars are 'secular' as long as they are loyal, and leftists and liberals are 'extremists' and 'terrorists' as long as they are opposing the regime." Mehchy says that the brutality of the regime has been compounded - and the nature of the conflict distorted - by external influences, in particular those of the Gulf monarchies and Turkey: "They have funded the armed Islamist factions because they fear that the alternative is that one day they will face broad-based civil movements in their own countries. "Instead of seeking to unify they have invested in identity politics, in difference - Sunni versus Alawite [sects], Arabs versus Kurds, even regional differences between the coast and the north-east." Loading Replay Replay video Play video Play video The result has been the collapse of the country's economy. "There is no general economy in Syria," Mehchy says. "Instead there is a violence economy. We estimate that 50 per cent of those Syrians who are working are in jobs that are violence-related, and this has its own effects on the economic, social and cultural spheres.

"How do you convince someone who is making $US300 a month - and that is a minimum figure, the warlords at the top of this chain are making millions - from violence-related employment to go back to their old job, when real wages have collapsed and that old civilian job may only be earning them $US50 a month?" SCPR has charted the rise of this identity-related violence and a resulting "flight to traditional institutions ... family, village, region", which it warns could "settle as viable inevitable institutions" - a patchwork of micro-states each with its own policy and regional allies. Has the idea of a Syrian republic become redundant? Syria peace talks at the European headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva in February 2016. Credit:AP "People still believe in Syria," Mehchy tells me. "But there needs to be a protected space for dialogue about Syria, to produce an agreed vision for the future. This dialogue cannot be led by politicians - it must be led by the grassroots, and include experts and activists."

A major obstacle to dialogues of this sort in the Middle East has been who is allowed to take part, with members of certain parties and movements often being declared beyond the pale. "The key to an organically inclusive dialogue is to articulate a set of shared values at the beginning," Mehchy says. "Justice, equality of men and women, non-discrimination ... these will filter out certain actors, of course." And the regime? It, after all, has insisted on "dialogue or war", but its vision of dialogue has been circumscribed by a zero-sum attitude to its opponents. December 2017: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin during a visit to the Hmaymim air base in Syria. Credit:AP "One of the reasons we do not talk much in our work about [Syrian President] Bashar al-Assad is that we are not focused on him but on the function of his office. If Assad were to commit to a dialogue with such values, it would be possible to include him."

But Mehchy rejects the idea of a return to the Syria of the immediate past. "You will probably remember international reporting about Assad's reforms, and the golden era of 2001 to 2010," he remarks wearily. "From inside Syria things looked very different. The 'liberation' of staple goods - ending subsidies, which increased their price - came at a time of drought. One of the items that was 'liberated' in this way was fertiliser. "It made the World Bank very happy, but the growth it talked about was either illusory or mainly benefited a class of crony capitalists. The World Bank measures prosperity through indicators around growth, but it doesn't ask about inclusivity or about the strength of institutions." This January 2018 photo shows the destruction of the Ramouseh neighbourhood in eastern Aleppo, Syria. Credit:AP He says the reconstruction touted by the regime as it regains control of key cities is following the same flawed model. "It is reconstruction for the rich, and it also has an element of retribution, with those who opposed the regime seeing their land confiscated ... unless regeneration is inclusive, it cannot be effective."

Discussing visions of the future is an important part of SCPR's work, but as we talk I find myself returning to where we are now. I admit to Mehchy that I find it hard to summon hope. "There always has to be hope," he says. "But it is true that we Arabs need to confront our need for abawiyya [paternalism], for the dhakar [big man]. "These days it seems that you are a hero if you can get money, it doesn't matter how you get it. Even a film like Ocean's Eleven glorifies the work of thieves." Is there evidence on which to base his hope? "I think of the situation of our IDPs [internally displaced persons, of whom there are now more than 6 million]. We have certainly seen some violence between IDPs and their host populations, due to economic stress, but in so many places we have also seen host populations reach out with a welcome across the supposed boundaries of sect and ethnicity - Alawite hosts to Sunni refugees, Sunnis to Alawites and so on.

"Exhaustion and hopelessness is what the regime wants." Zaki Mehchy's visit to Australia has been funded by the Council for Australian-Arab Relations.