Every so often in politics, a perfect storm rolls in. Thunder, lightning, squalls and a career-ending moment. In 1991, the Coronation Hill mining project was just such a storm.



I made one of the strongest and bitterest attacks I ever made on my colleagues in the cabinet Bob Hawke on his opposition to the Coronation Hill mining project

Like all big issues, it echoes many of today’s debates. The fight around land use, between miners, Indigenous people and the environmental movement. But overlaid like a shroud was the leadership struggle between the then prime minister Bob Hawke who was against the mining project, and his treasurer, Paul Keating, who was in favour. The two sides were indivisible.

Unscrambling eggs would have been easier.

At issue was the Coronation Hill mining lease in an area that is now a part of Kakadu national park in the Northern Territory. Back then, the area was outside the park.

The local Indigenous Jawoyn people believed the hill they call Guratba contained the spirit Bula. Elders protested against the lease on the grounds that if mining were allowed in the “sickness country” it would destroy their ceremonial standing and “bring physical disasters which will affect everyone”.

BHP wanted to mine it for the reserves of gold, palladium and platinum. It had already spent $16m on the project.

The cabinet meeting was scheduled for 30 May 1991 and journalists expected a showdown, given Hawke was lining up against Keating and ministers Bob Collins, Peter Cook, John Kerin and John Button. Rightwing power broker Graham Richardson infamously referred to the Jawoyn stance and their spirit Bula as “Bula-shit”.

Those in favour of the lease supported resource development over “environmental appeasement” in a party that was profiting from a growing environmental movement.

Even now, aged 86, Hawke is having none of that. Speaking on the release of the 1990-91 cabinet documents by the National Archives of Australia, he says plainly that those opposing were guilty of “innate prejudice”. His greatest regret of his prime ministership was his lack of capacity to do more for Indigenous Australia.



But this is where we get back to those scrambled eggs. That night of 30 May, the news broke of the Hawke-Keating leadership pact, known now as the Kirribilli agreement. At the same time, Keating threw down his first challenge to Hawke, and the Coronation Hill resolution was deferred until after the leadership ballot.



When Keating lost, he went to the backbench. He was not in the subsequent 18 June meeting which thrashed out the issue for five hours, with a majority of cabinet ministers coming to the conclusion that the mine should go ahead. Hawke said his will prevailed only because the cabinet agreed at the beginning of their government that if there was a stalemate, the prime minister would win.

“One of the things I hope I was able to do in this period was address head on, rather brutally the innate prejudice that existed, unconsciously I think in some cases, in the minds of so many of my colleagues,” Hawke said at the release of the cabinet papers.

“I was annoyed beyond measure by the attitude of many of my colleagues and their cynical dismissal of the beliefs of the Jawoyn people and I think I made one of the strongest and bitterest attacks I ever made on my colleagues in the cabinet when I was addressing this issue.

“There is no doubt this was one element in my loss of leadership as there was a great deal of antagonism amongst my colleagues as to the intensity of the remarks I made. But this was something I felt very deeply about.”

While much of this argument has been raked over, in Hawke’s memoirs and in various Keating books, the interesting point about the cabinet release is that some of the file is still withheld. According to the reasons cited, legal advice was given confidentially and, despite the passage of time, “sensitivities” remain.

The released documents show the split not just in cabinet but right across government departments. They record the submissions, but not the arguments within cabinet.



The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet largely hedged its bets, though advised the “most crucial consideration relates to Aboriginal issues”.



The treasury was in favour of mining, with the agreement of the Jawoyn people.



“If a decision is taken not to allow mining, Treasury fears that it would be difficult for the government to persuade the investment and business community that Coronation Hill should be considered a special case. Failure to do so would heighten international perceptions of sovereign risk, to our national economic detriment,” the department advised.



The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade argued that “suggestions that the no-mining option would have a significant negative impact on investor confidence do not appear to be firmly based, other than in areas which have similar Aboriginal or national heritage complexities”.

The industry department was in favour of mining, briefing cabinet that “a decision to mine Coronation Hill will have an impact on the government’s Aboriginal and environmental credentials only in the short term”.

“The department is very concerned, however, that a decision not to mine Coronation Hill will have a major negative impact on investment in the mining and minerals processing industries in the medium to longer term – with a corresponding impact on Australia’s export earnings for many years to come.”

The fourth Hawke government after its swearing-in at Government House in April 1990. The cabient was split over proposals to mine in the Northern Territory. Photograph: NAA

In cabinet, Hawke’s memoirs recall, he told those in favour: “The monumental hypocrisy of this position is mind boggling.

“The same people who denigrate blacks in this way can easily accommodate and embrace the bundle of mysteries that make up their white Christian beliefs. The virgin birth, the holy trinity, God in his question mark heaven. Where is he?

“This supercilious supremacist discrimination is abhorrent to everything I hold most important and what in the end, this party stands for. We can argue about some things but surely in the end we are at one against discrimination.”

The pro-mining Northern Territory minister Collins revealed in the ABC documentary Labor in Power the acrimony over the decision after the marathon meeting.



“It was pretty bloody personal and very nasty and everyone started walking out. And Hawke just sat there. I was in the doorway, with about half a dozen other ministers, sort of walking through, and people were just shaking their heads, because everyone knew this decision stinks ...

“Bob [Hawke] called out after us, ‘Oh, well, everybody’s happy about this now, are they?’

“I can’t remember who now, but about six people just turned on him and actually walked back to the table, and I was one of them, and said, ‘No, we’re bloody well not. And don’t you dare, you know, walk away with that impression. We’re supporting you because a decision’s been made, but none of us are bloody happy about it.’”

Hawke had his way, but the following day senior journalists were briefed that Hawke was “losing it”. He lost the leadership some months later because Keating came back, just as Kevin Rudd did and as Malcolm Turnbull did.