Preventing the Barbarization of Warfare: The USMC CAP Program in Vietnam

Alex Calvo[i]

Vietnam is often cited as an example of the "barbarization of warfare," that is the trend towards more horrific forms of armed struggle both among nations and non-state actors, with actions such as mass bombings or incidents such as My Lai being referred to.[ii] Although not so much discussed, Communist actions were probably even more barbaric.[iii]

The Second Indochina War was very complex, among other reasons because as noted by a number of observers, it actually consisted of two wars.[iv] One against the Vietcong, that is an insurgency, who melted into the population using a mixture of threats[v] and inducements to secure its cooperation in the form of intelligence, supplies, and all sorts of support, making it difficult for the government and the Republic of Vietnam and Free World Forces to root out its "infrastructure" or parallel local government structures[vi] (which actually ruled large swathes of the countryside for most of the war). The other a conventional army.

Leaving aside the controversy over whether it was correct to concentrate on the threat posed by the NVA (one of the main points emphasized by Westmoreland's detractors, while his defenders note that it was conventional, not irregular forces, which finally entered Saigon 1975 since no large scale revolt ever materialized and the 1968 Tet offensive resulted in the destruction of a large portion of the Vietcong forces), we can note how many of the reasons why some observers have referred to "barbarization" in connection to Vietnam stem from the basic dilemma before counterinsurgents intervening in another country.

Basically, the problem can be summarized as follows: allied troops are better trained and equipped, while local forces enjoy a much greater familiarity with the terrain, including above all the population.[vii] When allied troops are unable to clearly tell civilian from insurgent (and we should note that the two categories are not always clearly set apart, since many civilians will either sit on the fence until they see who is winning or be forced to cooperate with the enemy regardless of their ideology[viii]) the road is open to "barbarization".[ix] This can take different forms, among them:

* Overreliance on air and artillery support. This can cause excessive civilian casualties while not significantly damaging the insurgents' infrastructure[x]. Furthermore, it can be employed by the enemy for propaganda purposes.[xi] * Indiscriminate reprisals against civilians. Either when confused with insurgents, or out of frustration. If shot from a village, for example, a patrol may return fire and harm civilians.[xii]

A soldier in a foreign land, ignorant of customs and language, harassed by an enemy which seems to disappear into the landscape[xiii], be it physical or human, can easily fall prey to the temptation of seeing any local as a threat. Just like vegetation and the night[xiv] can come to be seen part of the enemy, a similar view can emerge concerning civilians. Once classified as part of “them”, instead of the “us” he is supposed to protect (this being the ultimate rationale for intervention in the first place), the door is open to an excessive or even indiscriminate use of force, descending into “barbarization”.[xv]

What is the Solution?

Some proponents of COIN have emphasized the use of local forces[xvi], leaving the allies in a supporting and training role[xvii]. Although attractive, this may sometimes not be sufficient, on account of the practical and political realities on the ground, or the time necessary to develop strong local forces may not be available. It may be necessary to otherwise gain some breathing space while local forces develop.

A compromise solution, employed by the USMC in Vietnam was to combine the deployment of a small detachment of troops in a single village with the organization there of local part-time militias. This was called the Combined Action Program.[xviii] Both the Marine platoons and the local forces served in a single village[xix], patrolling only its environs, and operating together for long periods of time. The Marines integrated into the village's social structure, developing friendships in most cases.[xx] This is usually considered to have been a success, with none of these population centres having been overrun by the enemy[xxi], and had a number of advantages from the point of view of preventing the "barbarization" of warfare, including:.

* Avoiding air and artillery strikes on populated areas. Since the Marines were living in the towns themselves, they could not call for them to be bombed.[xxii] * Good knowledge of local conditions, including the local population. Long periods living among the people meant that the Marines knew them, and were able to tell the local inhabitants from strangers, likely to be members of the Vietcong.[xxiii] * Deep cooperation with local forces, which furthermore were truly local (that is from the same village, not just from Vietnam. We must remember that one of the problems of the RV Army was the reluctance of conscripts to serve far away from their place of birth, a common problem in many other countries).[xxiv] This reinforced the previous point and meant that interaction with the local population was much easier and less likely to result in misunderstandings or abuse. * From a psychological perspective, acting in familiar environs makes it less likely for military personnel to "dehumanize" civilians, a prerequisite for many people to commit abuses against them. Unable to distinguish civilian from guerrilla[xxv], it is otherwise easy to imagine any local to be an enemy, and view him not only with suspicion but fear, thus justifying the use of force. It has been noted that most US personnel “passed through Vietnam but were really never in Vietnam”, whereas CAP Marines “associated intimately with Vietnamese for long periods of time in a Vietnamese setting”.[xxvi]

Therefore, we could perhaps conclude that the experience was positive not just from a purely military perspective, but also from a political one (keeping those villages under effective RV control) and from a humanitarian point of view, that is avoiding the "barbarization" with which the Vietnam War is often associated. Closely integrating US forces, their Vietnamese counterparts, and villagers, meant not only that no resort would be made to brute force in the shape of, among others, artillery and air strikes, but that civilians would clearly be seen as such, part of the “us” to be protected, and not as part of a hostile landscape, a hostile “them” to be fought.

End Notes