North Korea’s stated goal is an ICBM armed with a nuclear warhead that can reach the United States—a development most experts say is only a matter of time. Indeed, its missile test Tuesday was its most successful ever, and experts say the Hwasong-14 missile could reach Alaska. Speaking last week at the Aspen Ideas Festival, which is co-hosted by The Aspen Institute and The Atlantic, General David Petraeus, the former CIA director, said North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “could have a nuclear device that could actually strike Los Angeles or San Francisco” during President Trump’s first term.

“This is the potential problem that could confront the president of the United States with that most awesome and awful of problems: which is to use a really significant amount of force knowing that there really is no good option,” Petraeus said.

Indeed, the U.S. has few options in dealing with North Korea: most of them expected to result in a North Korean military response that could wreak havoc on South Korea, Japan, and U.S. military assets in the region. As Mark Bowden wrote in last month’s Atlantic, the choices facing the U.S. aren’t good. They range from a U.S. first strike against the North to more limited military action; from the decapitation of the Kim regime to acceptance of the North’s nuclear ambitions.

The first option, Bowden wrote, “would likely trigger one of the worst mass killings in human history” as the North responds to a U.S. strike; the second, a limited strike, could prompt a counterattack, resulting in “another, perhaps more devastating, American blow” that would persuade Pyongyang that the U.S. is serious about not allowing it to develop nuclear weapons that can reach the U.S. mainland. But as Bowden points out:

The problem with trying to turn the screws on Pyongyang is that once the shooting starts, containing it may be extremely difficult. Any limited strike would almost certainly start an escalating cycle of attack/counterattack. Owing to miscalculation or misunderstanding, it could readily devolve into the full-scale peninsular war described earlier. For the strategy to work, Pyongyang would have to recognize America’s intent from the outset—and that is not a given. The country has a hair-trigger sensitivity to threat, and has been anticipating a big American invasion for more than half a century.

The third option, decapitation, would not only have to rely on someone inside Kim’s inner circle cooperating with the U.S., but also on China’s willingness to permit the geopolitical chaos that would follow such an event. Also, as Bowden points out: “Given the reverence accorded Kim, his sudden death might trigger an automatic military response. And what guarantees are there that his replacement wouldn’t be worse?” Which brings us to the final option: acceptance of a North Korea that possesses nuclear weapons that can reach the U.S.—a situation that, despite President Trump tweeting it “will not happen,” could be the policy the U.S. adopts. Kim’s use of such weapons would almost certainly lead to his country’s annihilation, a threat that would be a powerful deterrent to his regime.