But this isn't only Russia's problem. Globalisation and the powerful economic forces it has unleashed have awarded unparalleled wealth and power to a tiny new elite. Call them what you will: the superclass, plutocrats, ''global meritocracy''. What they exemplify is the nexus of wealth and political power. And the situation is increasingly vexing voters in places from London to Kuala Lumpur.

It's a challenge that takes different forms. In China, membership in the ruling Communist Party is often the easy road to wealth. Many of today's political scandals centre on the antics of well-connected ''princelings'', the descendants of senior party officials who embody the country's peculiarly potent blend of Marxist-Leninist crony capitalism. Thanks to enterprising journalists, we've learnt some astonishing things about the scale of privilege enjoyed by the extended families of notables such as President Xi Jinping and ex-prime minister Wen Jiabao. But this hardly comes as a surprise. When you consider the People's Republic is governed by the seven members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party, you're talking about a tiny number of families who exercise unchecked control over one of the world's largest economies. In such a setting, it's only natural political and economic power are mutually reinforcing.

The situation in China is, of course, the outcome of an economic liberalisation program steered by an autocratic elite. In the countries of the developed West the situation is different. The number of players is larger; wealth and political influence are more widely distributed. But that is small comfort to, say, the Americans who have emerged as losers from the country's latest Gilded Age. Economic equality in the US grew steadily during the first three decades of the period following World War II, but ground to a halt amid the stagflation and increasing global competition of the 1970s. As economist Joseph Stiglitz noted recently: ''Last year, the top 1 per cent of Americans took home 22 per cent of the nation's income; the top 0.1 per cent, 11 per cent. Ninety-five per cent of all income gains since 2009 has gone to the top 1 per cent. Median income hasn't budged in almost a quarter-century.''

At the same time, the extraordinary permissiveness of US laws on lobbying and campaign financing has allowed wealthy elites to gain immense sway over the political process. Witness the stories about the vast sums of cash spent by conservative business magnates like the Koch brothers; less often discussed, perhaps, are the rich Democrats, such as George Soros, who leverage their wealth to shape policy. Even less visible are the corporations and industrial associations who can purchase politicians and fix legislation to boost their bottom lines.

One recent academic study calculates that 40 per cent of political campaign contributions in 2012 came from one hundredth of 1 per cent of US households. That figure probably reflects the new economic elite's growing awareness of its own political power - not to mention the apathy among other segments of the population who feel increasingly divorced from meaningful participation. The erosion of alternative power centres, such as labour unions, undoubtedly contributes to a sense of rising cynicism and disengagement. It all serves to undermine the promise of America's democratic system.