IT SHOULD have been a happy anniversary. On March 15th 2012, KORUS, a trade deal between America and South Korea, came into effect. It slashed tariffs, tightened intellectual-property rights and opened up South Korea’s services market. When it was signed, the head of an American manufacturing lobby hailed it as meaning “jobs, jobs and jobs”. Wendy Cutler, its American negotiator, calls it “the highest standard deal we have in force”. Five years on, jubilation has given way to anxiety. On the campaign trail, Donald Trump referred to the deal as a “job-killer”. On March 1st his administration’s official trade-strategy document singled it out for criticism. America’s trade deficit in goods with South Korea has more than doubled since 2011. “This is not the outcome the American people expected,” it lamented.

Trade between America and South Korea has indeed fallen short of expectations. When the deal was signed, the United States International Trade Commission predicted that it would boost American goods exports to South Korea by around $10bn. In fact they fell by $3bn between 2011 and 2016. The deal suffered teething problems. As tariffs fell, American carmakers griped that South Korean regulators were erecting other barriers. Most incendiary for this administration, the South Korean government was accused of devaluing its currency for competitive advantage.

But weak exports cannot be blamed on KORUS. As it came into force global trade slowed sharply; total South Korean imports have fallen steeply (see chart). Without the deal, which slashed tariffs, American goods exports would have been even lower. American exports of services rose by almost 30% between 2011 and 2016. The stock of South Korean investment in America has more than doubled.

At least Philip Seng, chief executive of the United States Meat Export Federation, a trade body, remains pleased with KORUS. American exports of chilled beef to South Korea have risen by 152% over the past five years. The tariff cuts have offset the strong dollar. “We are now the number-one supplier of beef,” he says proudly. And by 2026 the duty is due to be phased out entirely.

If American export performance overall has been disappointing, then dawdling by its trade negotiators could also be to blame, says Jeff Schott, an economist and trade-deal veteran. Nine months before KORUS came into force, a deal between the EU and South Korea gave European companies a head start.

In South Korea fears of what an “America first” agenda might mean are in the air. Some potential candidates in the forthcoming South Korean presidential election have suggested pre-emptively renegotiating the deal on their own terms. Meanwhile, the South Korean government is playing down talk of a renegotiation. Since no tweak to KORUS could produce the trade balance that the Trump administration wants, this seems wise.

A sensible upgrade to the deal is possible. A revised version might include new rules on digital trade and e-commerce, and more transparency over currency intervention. But its terms would then look remarkably similar to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 12-country trade deal that the Trump administration has scrapped. (South Korea was not in TPP, though it had not ruled out joining, and took part in a trade summit on March 14th-15th in Chile devoted to Pacific integration.) For now, though, the Trump administration’s aggressive bilateralism seems more likely to promote rancour than trade.