For Britain, European integration was not about escaping past horrors, but rather a response to a sudden fear of a declining future. In the 1950s and 60s its political elites were assailed by a tide of pessimism about the country and about themselves. Loss of empire seemed to threaten marginalization. The economy seemed in decline. National institutions and those who ran them were mocked. Britain, said a prime ministerial adviser, was “the sinking Titanic”, and Europe its lifeboat.

The simplest explanation for Brexit would be that by 2016 these perceptions had changed. Britain no longer needed a lifeboat, and even if it had, an economically and politically floundering EU was not it.

There is a longer history at work. From the 18th century onwards, the new United Kingdom turned outwards to become a dynamic global trader and power. This is of course a vast story, during which profound economic, demographic, cultural and political changes took place which still operate centuries later. For example, the commercial pattern in which Britain runs a deficit with Europe and a surplus with the rest of the world already existed in the 19th century. Britain never became as economically integrated with the EU as its other members.

More broadly, we can only guess at the psychological difference caused by having most of the world speaking our language, and having old-established non-European relationships such as with the Commonwealth and the United States. The idea of “global Britain” is simply more feasible and meaningful than would be “global Poland” or even “global Germany”. It may also prove a more realistic strategy for the future than integration into a troubled EU.

Does even older history contribute to Brexit too? At the very least we have a national story that has nourished it. This we might call the “Magna Carta myth”: the idea that when fundamental choices have to be made, it is the people who decide, and the rulers who must obey. Some of our European neighbours have very different national stories. France was the creation of monarchs, emperors and revolutionary minorities. Germany and Italy were established in the 19th century by a combination of visionary ideologists and autocratic politicians.

The people, if consulted at all, were merely summoned to accept and approve what their enlightened elites had done: active authority, passive democracy. This still colours the political practices of the EU. But that is not how we instinctively think of our own politics, and events since 2016 have proved the dogged determination of British voters to be obeyed. How much European anger at Brexit is embarrassment at the contrast?