The article “Putin targets the Scandinavians” written by Andrew A. Michta for “The American Interest” does exactly what the medium’s name promises. It does not even mention the European Union as a partner in the Scandinavian, Baltic and Central European spheres and describes the European northern flank as a pawn in a Russia vs NATO game of military chess. All is focused on NATO’s credibility and deterrence is mentioned as the way to deal with Russia. The solution for the vulnerability of Swedish and Finnish neutral status is sought in NATO membership, without considering the consequences of such a move. Russian threats are described without mentioning the perception of threats from NATO aimed at the Russians. I wonder whether Europe would be better off taking primal responsibility for its collective defense.

The Theater of War versus Home.

In his article Andrew Michta pictures Europe as a Theater of War. As if Europe is a stage, where the Rommels and Montgomeries of our time take on each other in a chivalrous fight, neatly lighted in an American stage design. But Europe isn’t empty and it is not a stage nor a theater. It is rather the place where 70 years ago millions died in a grotesque meat grinder of barbarity. War changes its face continuously and civilians have become part of it. Unfortunately not as an audience in a theater, but as real targets, real victims and real participators. 500 million EU citizens live in peace and preferably we Europeans see our cities and countryside as places to live, work, trade and farm, instead of a distant battlefield to be managed from another continent.

Over decades war has changed into something that could hit us all. Air power made civilians targets, while being at home. This century old application of technology has proven devastating, while relatively new applications like robots and drones haven’t been utilized in a large conflict yet. As a consequence civilians are likely to have become more vulnerable and not less. Therefore EU citizens need to have a voice in their own security environment and take responsibility for their own collective security. To exclude the EU totally from a security analysis dealing with its members is equal to giving Putin new arguments and wedges to split standing partnerships and co-operations. And there is plenty opportunity to ruin friendships if security policies for Europe are formulated across the Atlantic. Or if small elites are given the mandate to decide over the security environment of millions as was mentioned in the article:

As a Finnish official told me, the position of the government has always played an important role in how the public frames key national security issues. Like so much in Finnish politics in particular, a strong statement by the elite in favor of membership would go a long way toward convincing the public to change its mind.

A unified EU defense policy and a European Army should be included as a serious option to fend of Russian bullying, as a counterweight to American dominance and to put the responsibility for collective security were it should be: the citizens of Europe. Continuing NATO enlargement is seen as an existential threat by the Russians and might exactly cause the war Europeans do not want to fight in their own home. Russian Hybrid Warfare tactics further stresses the need to widen the spectrum of conflict analysis to the civilian realm and its law making institutions: the European Union. Although the EU had troublesome years and mistakes were made, Europeans still rely on it for balancing the interests of most European nations. We would be worse off without it and chances would be bigger our home once again becomes this dreaded Theater of War.

Collective European security

There are plenty reasons to include the EU in a strategic assessment of northern Europe in the face of Russian intimidation. Next to the option of neutrality, a European Army within a EU frame, represents the local values and culture better than an American dominated NATO context. The Swedish and Finnish population could be more susceptible to join a new European defensive initiative rather than NATO, because the political aims of a military alliance are formed in a familiar cultural context on the European continent. A European Army would assure democratic control within a standing political representation model.

At the moment the EU’s Collective Security and Defense Policy is a result of a consensus based decision making process of its 28 members, all with the power to veto decisions. Other policy instruments and safeguards must be introduced to be able to effectively govern. The financial and economic collective policies are already a result of qualified majority decisions. To be able to have a meaningful CSDP, this final domain where EU members still have veto power, should also be ruled by qualified majority decisions. In that way financial, social and economic interests would be aligned with collective safety policies.

A European military alliance would inevitably include NATO members. As a consequence American military power will play a role in a European initiative. But with a crucial difference: The Americans are being forced to consult with a European political layer. The political primate is safeguarded in a European context, instead of the standing practice of political aims being formulated in Washington, leaving 500 million EU citizens in the dark. This would restore the balance within the since 1989 much grown western democratic alliance and at the same time put the prime responsibility of Europe’s safety in European hands, as it should be.

The EU as a military force

Maybe it does not look like it, but the EU is a political organisation with military ambitions. After the dissolution of the WEU, an alternative military structure for NATO disappeared. But renewed structures for coordination of military engagements are in place since 2007, when the EU Battlegroups were organized. The EU Operations Center coordinates counter piracy efforts and aligns civilian initiatives with military deployment since 2012, although the modest staff is not prepared for large scale military encounters. The EU’s own, but modest democratic Hybrid Warfare Center.

It should be noted that the Operations Center was a result of political bickering between France and the UK. France wanted a far bigger compliment than the British desired, so they met halfway. The non-allied Finland and Sweden (as well as Austria and Ireland) all cooperate on a European level and are eager to widen these military partnership. Sweden and Finland already train and co-operate extensively with European partners on defense projects like the CV90, Saab Gripen and the German Leopard 2. Both contributed to the EU naval force Atalanta. Apart from these specific existing co-operations, a whole range of European military and police co-operations are in place that would be open for membership.

A mismatch of economic, financial interests and military dependencies.

Political-military decisions in the Ukrainian Crisis that were initiated in Washington were not always in line with European interests and were subsequently explained as European weakness. That is an easy statement to make when a nation’s economy is not dependent on Russian trade and energy and on EU support in times of economic hardships. Eastern, Central and Southern Europe is dependent on this support, with Germany as its most powerful sponsor. Objections to economic sanctions were logical in the light of the financial situation of most European nations.

Russia is exploiting this mismatch of economic, financial interests and military dependencies. Part of the answer is an alignment of interests and defense co-operation independent from Pentagon decision making, by organizing a European Army. It is unfair to expect the Swedes, Austrians and Fins as neutral countries and the first, seventh and ninth biggest EU contributors, to pay for sanctions designed in the US and UK, in an act of economic warfare. But that is exactly how the game to subdue Russia was played.

So if the eleven EU gross contributors (three out of eleven are neutral, Germany and France are the fourth and eighth per capita contributors) are forced to carry the financial risks for policies designed in a non EU foreign capital, over time the EU might as well decide to deal with defensive measures themselves. France has made no secret of its ambition to form an independent European military force. France’s ambitions coalesces with a strong French-German friendship, a growing German confidence and German uneasiness with both Russian and American policies in Europe and elsewhere.

This combination of factors could create a decent political base for an alternative military force in Europe. The objective for this must be an independent, sufficient military capability in a sustainable partnership with the EU’s most powerful democratic friend, the US. To accomplish that, Europe might be forced to loosen the post 1945 ties a bit and make NATO the secondary military pillar, instead of the first.

Conclusion

In the current situation, neutral EU countries are effectively financing American policies in regard to sanctions aimed at the Russian economy. That doesn’t land well in Brussels and is causing uneasiness in more than one European capital, including Moscow. European neutral countries are dragged into a position they do not want to be in. Now that Europeans have woken up from the silly dream of post Cold War peace dividends, higher defense budgets are being crafted. Changing dependencies ask for security reforms.

In the context of Andrew A. Michta’s analysis a European Army should be included as an option for the Scandinavian region, next to the current neutrality and NATO membership. It would be received as less threatening than NATO membership and at the same time align economic and military interests and dependencies. Because of the EU membership status of the four neutral European nations, this could be an organic process, rather than a threatening expansion effort. It would turn over European security responsibilities from US to EU ownership for the first time since WW2. In the end both the US and the EU might be better of than holding on to a military alliance that has become so large that military policies do not represent the interests of its members anymore.

(Edit: in a previous version of this article the information provided about EU contributors was based on older reports and found to be outdated. Information is updated and corrected, PK.)