So strong is the connection between tariffs and the Origination Clause that early treaties involving tariffs were implemented with legislation that began in the House — even though Article II of the Constitution gives the president the power to make treaties (with advice and consent of the Senate).

True, tariffs are no longer used to raise money, but to protect domestic industries, and to punish foreign ones. But they unquestionably still produce revenue. And while tariffs on imports are aimed at foreigners, they affect domestic industries that use or compete with imports; they can also have an enormous impact on the overall economy by raising consumer prices. Allowing the executive to circumvent the House to enact otherwise unfavorable tax policies that affect Americans is what the clause is designed to avoid — that those furthest removed from the people have the ability to tax them.

While there isn’t an enormous body of Supreme Court case law on the Origination Clause, what little there is supports the understanding that the clause would cover tariffs. The court’s test seems to set a pretty low bar: While paying lip service to an inquiry of the law’s purpose, the court has instead looked at whether a measure funds the general treasury rather than a specific program — a hurdle that tariffs, the money from which almost always goes into the general coffers, would easily clear. Whether the tariff exists to raise money or punish bad trade practices is likely irrelevant.

Indeed, in cases where the court has analyzed the Senate’s power to amend tariff legislation originating in the House, the court has never questioned that the bills at issue fell within the scope of the clause, thereby implicitly accepting tariffs as “bills for raising revenue.”