But, from interviews with about two dozen security officials across the country, it is clear that of the improvements that General Nicholson said were urgently needed in several vital areas — leadership, retraining struggling units and combating corruption — little has been achieved on the ground.

Western officials said that in the first three months of the year, Afghan forces were almost entirely on the defensive. In a clear indication of concern, General Nicholson has asked the White House to send thousands of additional American troops to help the roughly 10,000-strong coalition force that remains on the ground.

In the eastern province of Nangarhar, the district governor of Bati Kot said the pressure of fighting over the winter months was such that training was impossible. In northern Sar-i-Pul Province, the commander of a police battalion said his forces had no time to regroup and prepare for the next fighting season because they had been “on standby 24/7” all winter. “This year, we did not send anyone for retraining,” said Haji Ghalib Mujahid, the district governor of Bati Kot. “We are engaged in fighting each hour, during day and night.”

Officials say President Ashraf Ghani is increasingly aware that his military commanders have been lying to him on the state of their units and on the adoption of changes charted in Kabul. But there is also skepticism among Western and Afghan officials about just how committed he is to keeping the security overhaul free from patronage politics.

After prodding by coalition leaders, a board appointed by the president was supposed to purge corrupt and incompetent security leaders during the winter and create a system of merit-based promotions. The winter is over, and that work has yet to begin.

Even though the military reform has been far from satisfactory, the support keeps coming.

According to General Kaiser, the United States has since October provided about 900 new Humvees, new weapons sufficient for about 14 battalions, fuel for a fleet of more than 100,000 vehicles, winter clothing for 25 percent of the Afghan Army and the police, and three-quarters of a year’s supply of ammunition.