Analysis: Manchester United

Manchester United manager Ole Gunnar Solskjær sent his team out in a 3-4-3 formation, in which Brazilians Fred and Andreas Pereira featured in central midfield, against Sheffield United’s 5-3-2. They attempted to play out from the back by circulating possession between their three central defenders, to encourage a three-on-two overload against the hosts’ front two, but strikers David McGoldrick and Lys Mousset would press Harry Maguire – who played in the centre of that back three – and restrict the passing lanes to the other two.

The numerical disadvantage they were confronted with in central midfield discouraged them from using Fred and Pereira, and contributed to the numerous turnovers Chris Wilder’s team turned into counter-attacks. Wider central defenders Victor Lindelöf and Phil Jones drove into midfield in an attempt to free up either Fred or Pereira, but McGoldrick and Mousset worked to send them towards the touchlines, where they would be boxed in before they either conceded possession or played it long and into the channels.

That the movement of Daniel James, Marcus Rashford and Anthony Martial in attack offered so little in the first half contributed to the visitors’ struggles. In transitions during that period, Sheffield United resisted the temptation to counter-press if they lost possession in the attacking half, and instead sought to recover their shape.

For the second, Solskjær reorganised his team into a 4-2-3-1, through Jesse Lingard replacing Jones and operating as their number 10, and in turn encouraging James and Rashford to attack around their opposing wing-backs. Full-backs Aaron Wan-Bissaka and Brandon Williams also then advanced, to create two-on-ones out wide; Wilder responded by instructing his three-strong midfield to press their visitors’; there was also the risk of two-on-twos against Maguire on Lindelöf.

Sheffield United increasingly withdrew, presenting Manchester United with further opportunities to circulate possession. That they attacked with greater ambition and a six-on-five overload in the final 20 minutes contributed to them taking the lead. A mistake Wilder perhaps made was not instead adopting a 5-4-1, so that his team could defend the wide areas more effectively, and maintain a numerical advantage while defending.