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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 004749 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, FR SUBJECT: COUNTER-TERRORISM CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRENCH, PART 1 OF 2 REF: PARIS 3118 Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS ONS 1.4 B/D 1. (S) Summary: A USG delegation led by Counselor Philip Zelikow met with senior French officials June 27 to inaugurate strategic counter-terrorism consultations. The two delegations exchanged points of view on counter-terrorism doctrine formulation and the role of public diplomacy, threat assessments and crisis management. Other topics, including discussion of the radicalization and recruitment of extremists, geographic areas of concern, which on the French side included a discussion of the GSPC terrorist group, will be reported septel. Both delegations hailed the talks as important steps in the furthering of excellent U.S.-French counter-terrorism cooperation. The talks adjourned with the decision to meet again in Washington in October, at which point both the U.S. and France would be further advanced in their counter-terrorism doctrine formulation. End summary. 2. (C) The consultations took place June 27 at the headquarters of the Secreteriat General de la Defense Nationale (SGDN), an interagency organization that reports to the Prime Minister on defense and security issues. The SGDN is lead rapporteur for the GOF formulation of a "White Book" on security and counter-terrorism, a project that is due out by the end of 2005. The U.S. delegation, led by Counselor Zelikow, included Josiah Rosenblatt, Political Minister-Counselor at Embassy Paris; Thomas White, Economic Minister-Counselor at Embassy Paris; David Aidekman, State; Marc Norman, State; Charles Frahm, FBI; James Roberts, DOD; Randall Blake, NCTC; Mark Motley, Embassy Paris; and Peter Kujawinski (note taker), Embassy Paris. 3. (C) The French delegation was led by Francis Delon, SGDN Secretary General, and included Stanislas de Laboulaye, the SIPDIS MFA's Director General for Political and Security Affairs; Admiral Edouard Scott de Martinville, SGDN deputy Secretary General; Major General Jean-Pierre Meyer, Permanent Secretary of the SGDN's Joint Intelligence Committee; Eric Lebedel, the SGDN's director for International and Strategic Affairs; Prefect Bernard Boube, the SGDN's director for Protection, Safety and Security; Philippe Meunier, MFA DAS-equivalent for counter-terrorism and security; Jean-Francois Clair, DST (France's internal security service); and Thierry Liron, DGSE (France's external intelligence service.) COUNTER-TERRORISM DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 4. (S) Delon opened the consultations by characterizing U.S.-French counter-terrorism cooperation as "excellent," especially at the level of intelligence sharing. France and the U.S. were united, said Delon, in understanding that terrorism was a threat to be countered by all available means. Zelikow agreed that cooperation between the U.S. and France was excellent, and added that the U.S. realizes it is not enough to have a national strategy on terrorism, but that the nature of the threat demanded international coalitions and cooperation. He said the consultations were a good first step towards the goal of broadening cooperation and discussion to the level of strategy and policy. Zelikow explained that in recent weeks, the USG interagency community had been working on a counter-terrorism doctrine that downplayed the use of the word "war" in favor of a strategy against violent extremism. One key point, said Zelikow, is that terrorism is considered a tactic, while the enemy - violent extremism - is a movement. 5. (S) In response, Delon complimented this new approach, saying it was more comprehensive and nuanced. Furthermore, focusing on violent extremism instead of a global war on terrorism allowed for the use of other tools, including public diplomacy, diplomacy, intelligence, and development assistance. Delon said France was also engaged in a reflection on its counter-terrorism doctrine, and it planned to issue a "white book" on security and terrorism by the end of 2005. This interagency exercise (reftel), with Delon as overall rapporteur, would seek to lay out in detail France's approach to combating terrorism and safeguarding its territory. Although the focus would be on issuing a publicly available report, said Delon, the GOF planned on also writing a classified version. Delon said the white paper had three goals: 1) define the terrorist threat; 2) enable public buy-in for the GOF's policy; and 3) evaluate resources and methods used to combat the threat, and determine whether these are sufficient for the task. 6. (S) In formulating a counter-terrorism doctrine, Zelikow said the USG was focused on the importance of public diplomacy. Similar C/T discussions in London with HMG on June 24 included a discussion on how to combat the effective single narrative of the enemy; i.e., that Islam is under attack and the source of that threat is the West and more specifically, the U.S. The U.S. and its partners, said Zelikow, should have an equally clear-cut and effective message. He offered statements that had been discussed and debated in London, and said they might serve as building blocks to form a unified and coherent message issued by the U.S. and its allies. Zelikow said these draft messages could be tailored to individual countries' needs, but agreement upon them would serve as an important foundation for a common message. 7. (S) Delon replied saying that the idea of a few, simple messages was a good one, and that he personally did not disagree with any of them. He agreed that violent extremists had a simple, weighty message and that it was up to the West to counter this. Delon said the GOF would examine the messages and respond with any French suggestions. Laboulaye added that he thought the messages were "good," although some would be harder to convince Muslims to accept than others. Zelikow said the issue of detainees was extremely difficult, given that neither the civilian nor military justice system applies in a clean way. The U.S. was open to French suggestions on how to move forward regarding the detainee issue, said Zelikow. Delon promised to reflect on this and to respond, and underlined the difficulty of the subject. Laboulaye agreed that the issue of detainees was difficult, and added that there were practical, political and moral issues to consider. He said France knew how difficult this was, especially given the lingering pain of its role in Algeria. THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 8. (S) Meyer gave a presentation on the GOF terrorism threat assessment. He said the GOF believed there was an increase in the number of individuals and groups ideologically linked with al-Qaida but not trained or advised by al-Qaida or its affiliates. Examples of this in Europe are the Madrid bombers and the assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh. France considered the main terrorist threat to come from autonomous cells, even individuals, said Meyer. Of those groups suspected of having links with al-Qaida, Meyer cited the GSPC (Salafist Group for Call and Combat) and the GICM (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group). The GOF believed that the Iraqi-based extremist Zarqawi had recently been in contact with the GSPC; the GOF feared that the GSPC was transitioning from a nationalist group intent on fomenting insurrection in Algeria to a transnational group focused on international jihad. 9. (S) In listing a number of GOF preoccupations on terrorism, Meyer began by saying the GOF had determined that the use of suicide bombers had become an almost systematically considered option in the planning of attacks by violent extremists. For this and other reasons, the GOF worried that French citizen fighters in Iraq would return with new capabilities, coupled with their willingness to commit suicide. According to the latest GOF figures, the GOF has arrested 21 people on French soil for suspicion of assisting potential jihadists to Iraq; at least six French citizens have died in Iraq which includes two suicides; nine French citizens have entered Iraq, three are in Iraqi prisons, and 30 on French soil are being investigated for links to the jihadists in Iraq. This makes approximately 70 people in France or in Iraq currently linked to the "jihadists to Iraq" investigation (which is being led by investigating judges Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard). 10. (S) Meyer added that France had growing worries about the potential use of MANPADS by terrorists, which he said was a real non-conventional threat in the medium-term. Terrorists could buy any type of arms in the Balkans, said Meyer, and discussion of how to attack civilian airliners during takeoff using Stinger missiles was available online. France also had discovered recent plots regarding the use of chemicals either as weapons or as products to make artisanal bombs. In one case, that of the so-called "Chechen network" first discovered in 2000 and 2001, French police discovered cyanide products, still in development, that could have been processed into explosives. Most recently, a Moroccan arrested June 21 in Montpellier in connection with the "jihadists to Iraq" investigation was found in possession of a number of chemical products that could have been transformed into explosives. The Moroccan reportedly attempted to enter Iraq in 2004 via Syria, failed in that attempt, and returned to Montpellier to prepare a terrorist attack in Europe. 11. (SBU) Following these threat assessments, Boube presented the GOF crisis management plan. He said the preliminary focus in devising these plans was three-fold: analyses of potential threats, vulnerabilities and impacts. The key plan, called "Vigipirate," included four graduated threat levels, each adaptable according to the crisis. Specialized plans included Piratome (for nuclear and radiological attacks), Biotox (for bioterrorism), Piratox (for chemical terrorism), Piratair, (airborne threats), Pirate-Mer (sea/water threats), Piranet (cyberthreats) and Pirate-Ext (threats against French citizens living outside of France). Although Vigipirate and the specialized plans focused on terrorism and affiliated threats, Boube said all the plans could be tailored to civil disaster uses; for example, flooding or avian flu. 12. (U) This cable was cleared by Counselor Zelikow's staff. STAPLETON