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UNITED STATES/AMERICAS-Delhi Commentary Says India Achieving 'Neat Balancing Act' Between Russia, US

Released on 2013-02-19 00:00 GMT

Email-ID 3126532 Date 2011-06-10 12:31:08 From dialogbot@smtp.stratfor.com To translations@stratfor.com

UNITED STATES/AMERICAS-Delhi Commentary Says India Achieving 'Neat

Balancing Act' Between Russia, US





Delhi Commentary Says India Achieving 'Neat Balancing Act' Between Russia,

US

'Special Report' by Kanwal Sibal, former Indian foreign secretary and

former Indian ambassador to Russia: "Old Friend and New" -- text in

boldface and italics as formatted by source - Force Online

Thursday June 9, 2011 08:10:03 GMT

During the Cold War, when the US and Soviet Union were acknowledged as

superpowers, with monstrous nuclear arsenals at their command, vying with

each other internationally, with competing ideologies and alliances,

making a comparative analysis of India's relations with each of them had

significance that went much beyond the bilateral dimension.



BOTh the US and the Soviet Union were seeking the support and allegiance

of the third world countries, in particular, of those who rejected both

power blocks and opted for the n onaligned movement. India, as the founder

member and the largest nonaligned country, had therefore a special

importance in their larger political calculus. India had a moral weight in

addition to a political one, and the direction in which India leaned

buttressed the diplomacy of the concerned superpower. Which is why,

India's perceived leaning towards the Soviet Union was intensely resented

in the US, to the point that the memory of this and persisting reflections

of nonalignment in India's foreign policy rankles many US policy-makers

even today.



With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the US as the

only global superpower, the bipolar world no longer exists, and,

therefore, equations between India and, respectively, the US and Russia

(the state succeeding the Soviet Union) have no longer the same

international relevance. Russia, although still a major power, is a

diminished one, and is aware of this. It has withdrawn from many parts of

the world; i t is no longer challenging the US, and even if the

relationship continues to have its sharp edges and misunderstandings, the

cooperative element in it is not negligible either. Russia has now to cope

with strategic challenges to its political, military and economic

interests with the emergence of many of the erstwhile constituent states

of the Soviet Union as independent states that have carved out policy

space for themselves outside Russian control. With NATO and the EU

expanding into the former Soviet heartland, Russia's periphery has

narrowed, and demands on it for a successful neighbourhood policy have

grown greatly, detracting from the country's larger international role.



Russia has not been able to compensate for its reduced political status by

building a modern, dynamic, rapidly growing economy of the kind China has.

Its immense oil and gas resources and its huge mineral wealth provide

Russia with revenue, but its growth is not taken as a striking economic

succ ess story, despite its inclusion in the BRIC quartet. Russia has

slipped technologically compared to the West; its manufacturing sector has

declined; it is lagging in innovation.



Militarily it has been weakened too, with long neglect of its conventional

forces and absence of sufficient investments in the defence production

sector, though with its massive nuclear and missile holdings it remains

capable of warding off any security threat to it. The prodigious military

base Russia inherited from the Soviet Union has enabled it to keep a share

of the global arms market, and use military sales for foreign policy

objectives. But with a greatly contracted internal market, the

disappearance of the Warsaw Pact -- as against the survival and expansion

of NATO -- and many countries spinning out of the Russian orbit, the

competitive challenge to Russia is serious.



With the end of the Cold War the world moved from bi-polarity of sorts to

uni-polarity under US primacy. But t he US overplayed its hand,

over-extended itself militarily and, in an effort to permanently shape the

world according to its longer term strategic needs, got embroiled in

debilitating wars. With the seeming triumph of its unrestrained

capitalised ideology relying on the magic capacity of the market mechanism

and individual entrepreneurship to spread prosperity globally, its

financial sector moved from profits to greed, from dynamis m to

recklessness, from freedom from excessive regulation to license to seek

disproportionate rewards from heedless risk-taking.



By pursuing self-damaging economic and financial policies, the US has not

only weakened itself, it has opened space for China to grow at a whirlwind

pace, inundating the US market with its cheaply produced goods, its

voluminous earnings swelling China's dollar reserves to figures

unprecedented in history, which, invested in Also in this Section



US securities, has financially fused the US and the Chinese economies,

making the two countries unhealthily nterdependent. The proposition of the

G-2 managing global affairs is as much a reflection of the shift in global

power as a product of US mismanagement of its own economy, leading to an

accelerated rise of China that now threatens US power.



The space vacated by a weakened Russia has been filled increasingly by

China. The superpowers of the globalised world, freed from the Cold War

ideological confrontation, are not those with military might but those

with an economic one. Russia is seeking to compensate for its weakness vis

a vis the West by developing closer strategic ties with China. Aware no

doubt that a de facto G-2 would be at Russia's expense, Russia is building

equities with China that will enable it to remain a significant player in

the developing international scenario.



BOTh Russia and China have an interest in reducing US global primacy and

promoting multipolarity. Both oppose the aggressive world-wide propagation

of US/Western values described as universal, as well as military

intervention by the West to change unfriendly regimes that seek to limit

its political and economic penetration into their territory. Both are

subject to military and other pressures because of the active US presence

in their immediate neighbourhood. Both question the status of the dollar

as the world's reserve currency. It is not clear whether the decline of US

power will necessarily play to Russia's advantage vis a vis China in the

longer term, as the Russia-China relationship has undercurrents of

suspicion linked to Russian vulnerabilities in Siberia, the

disproportionate demographic balance between the two countries and the

inevitable erosion of Russia's Asian profile with China's continuing rise.

The end of ideological confrontation between the US and Russia after the

Soviet collapse means that if India leans in favour or against either of

the two countries, it is no longer in the context of communism versus

democracy or state control versus free enterprise in the economic field



It is in this broad background that India has to conduct its policy

towards the US and Russia. The end of ideological confrontation between

the US and Russia after the Soviet collapse means that if India leans in

favour or against either of the two countries, it is no longer in the

context of communism versus democracy or state control versus free

enterprise in the economic field. India has much more room for manoeuvre

in its relations with the two countries because US and Russia, no longer

out and out adversaries, have a constructive relationship in many areas,

even if the democratic and market economy promise of Russia post the

Soviet collapse has not lived up to US expectations. If the US and Russia

are constantly trying to place their relationship on a more productive

footing, despite difficulties, India has every reason to arrange its

relations with both countries in accorda nce with its own needs and the

potential of the individual relationship.



India itself has vastly changed in the last two decades. India's economic

rise, stemming from its economic liberalisation policies initiated in

1991, coincides with the Soviet Union's collapse. The political and

economic equations between India and Russia have changed radically since

then. Politically, on issues like J&K, India is no longer as dependent

on Russia's goodwill in the UN Security Council as in the past. With

improved relation between India and the US and Pakistan' s image as a

terrorism spawning state, Pakistan's capacity to mobilise the US/West

against India has got eroded. Pakistan is now being looked at as a

potentially failing state, a problem state, whereas India is being seen as

a rising global power. The negative hyphenation with Pakistan has been

replaced by a positive hyphenation with China.



India's candidature for a permanent membership of the Security Counc il

has now received a carefully formulated US endorsement, neutralising in

the process, the ground gained by Russia in being the first P-5 country to

do so. In the civilian nuclear field, with the Indo-US nuclear deal and

the lead taken by the US in obtaining an exception from the Nuclear

Suppliers Group for civilian nuclear cooperation with India without it

adhering to the NPT, Russia's lost its exceptional status as the only

country actually engaged in civilian nuclear cooperation with India.



In the security field, post-Soviet Russia under President Yeltsin's

westward lurch revised the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, removing its vital

defence clause. This ended the special security relationship between the

two countries. President Putin, on coming to power, and realising, the

value of a strong relationship with an independent minded country like

India, tried to recast the 'special' relationship into a new 'strategic

partnership', including in its ambit, the assured transf er of advanced

Russian defence equipment and select sensitive technologies. This also

served to secure orders for the out of work Russian defence industry,

preventing its rapid decline and preserving the Indian market for Russian

defence equipment. India, hugely dependent on Russia for its defence

needs, had its own serious anxieties about maintaining the level of

preparedness of its defence forces in the face of a real prospect of

disruption of supplies from a collapsed Soviet Union.



An off-shoot of the post-Soviet scenario for India-Russia defence

cooperation has been friction over inadequate product support for Russian

equipment procured by India. Commercial as well as erratic pricing without

professional level servicing, by the Russian suppliers, aggravated by

privatisation of sections of the Russian defence industry, delay in

supplies of spare parts because of procedural problems on both sides,

documentation and training shortfalls, non-adherence to delivery sche

dules etc have been the underside of an otherwise valued and reliable

partnership. The problems associated with the aircraft carrier Admiral

Gorshkov are symptomatic of this.



Even if the product support problems with Russia have eased, the changes

in the international situation favour a diversification of India's defence

acquisitions. The most notable change being the transformation of overall

ties with the US. The Indo-US nuclear deal, with all its restrictions and

political caveats, represents a change in US strategic thinking towards

India. If the underlying purpose was to put the India-US relationship on a

new footing, remove mutual distrust of the Cold War period, lift the

obstacles to India's greater integration with the international system,

recognise the value of the long term relationship with the next rising

Asian power, exploit the market opportunities in a growing India, tie up

India within evolving global structures superintended by the West, create

a be tter strategic balance in Asia in the face of China's threatening

rise, make India part of a hedging strategy against China etc, new

breakthroughs in the India-US defence relationship had to be part of the

equation.



The India-US defence relationship has progressed slowly in view of the

weight of the past marred by sanctions, technology denials, targeting of

India's strategic programmes, arming of Pakistan etc. Fitful efforts have

been made since the mid-Nineties to establish defence cooperation. The

Indian Navy has been ahead of the political establishment in organising

regular exercises with the US Navy, extended later to the Air force and

the Army. These exercises did not create any m utual dependency, did not

tie down India in any long term engagement, and therefore had low

political cost, even as they had the advantage of signalling an opening

towards the US. Even here, the political reticence has not disappeared

when it comes to durable engagement, which is why t he Logistics Supply

Agreement has not been signed as yet.



Significant progress has been made in sourcing defence procurement from

the US, mainly in those areas where comparable Russian equipment is either

not available or is inferior. In the last couple of years the US has

bagged major multi-billion dollar contracts such as the supply of six

C-130J transport aircraft, eight P-8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft and

a number of VVIP planes equipped with advanced EW suites. Negotiations for

acquiring 10 C-17 heavy lift transport aircraft are likely to be concluded

soon. The US should also bag the sizable order for supply of attack

helicopters and of light howitzers as well.



India is steadily overcoming its inhibitions in acquiring US equipment

because of fears of interruption of supplies in case of a conflict in the

region or emergence of strategic differences. These are not irrational

fears as India has had experience of sanctions in the past. Even the

Indo-US n uclear deal envisages sanctions if India tests again. Sanctions

are integral part of US law and practice. Whatever assurances against

interruption of supplies are given at a particular point of time are in

the nature of political comfort; so long as US laws exist the potential

for sanctions remains. In this light India is displaying unprecedented

confidence in its developing defence relationship with the US.



Concerns about the relationship, however, remain at political and

practical levels. It is easier for India to describe itself as a 'natural

ally' of the US on the basis of shared values of democracy, pluralism,

human The India-US defence relationship has progressed slowly in view of

the weight of the past marred by sanctions, technology denials, targeting

of India's strategic programmes, arming of Pakistan etc. Fitful efforts

have been made since the mid-Nineties to establish defence cooperation

freedoms etc, but this natural alliance does not extend to the stra tegic

domain because there India wants to distance itself from any impression

that it is getting politically aligned to the US, or entering into any

binding defence arrangements with it. India and the US differ on several

security issues in our own region, be it US policy towards Pakistan or

Iran, or the China-Pakistan relationship. India is resisting signing some

basic framework agreements with the US which the latter considers

essential for raising the level of defence cooperation in terms of access

to advanced advance US defence technologies, such as CISMOA, the

interoperability agreement, and BASIC, the agreement on heightened

technology protection. India signed the End-Use Monitoring Agreement with

some resistance because of elements in it that encroached on the country's

sovereignty.



The exclusion of US aircraft-the F-16 and the F-18 from the 126 combat

aircraft mega-deal has caused severe disappointment in the US government

and aircraft industry, as they expect ed to secure the deal as a 'reward'

for the Indo-US nuclear deal and for imparting concrete substance to the

strategic partnership between the two countries. After the initial public

expression of dismay the US side has adopted a more mature position,

declaring that the relationship with India does not hinge on the results

of a single deal and that US defence companies will continue to actively

seek to expand their presence in the Indian market etc. In any case, some

big defence contracts are in the offing for the US under the FMS route,

without international competition and the kind of price negotiation that

goes on with other suppliers. The FMS route gives the US a distinct

advantage over procurements from other countries as it insulates the

acquisitions from the corruption scandals that ha ve plagued purchases

from other countries.



Concerns about reliability of supplies and imposition of sanctions are

absent from the defence relationship with Russia. That relations hip is

time tested and based on trust built up over the years. The technical

assistance Russia has provided for India's indigenous nuclear powered

submarine, or the leasing of a Russian nuclear powered submarine to India

to enable it to acquire experience of handling such platforms, is a vital

contribution Russia has made to the development of India's strategic

programmes. The agreement on joint designing and production of fifth

generation fighter aircraft should give India access to design

technologies, an area in which India lacks experience. The agreement to

give access to military signals from Glonass, the Russian version of GPS,

is significant. The BrahMos missile is another example of Russia beefing

up India's missile know-how and capability.



Even if the decades old defence relationship with Russia has not

adequately contributed to the development of India's indigenous defence

industry, with actual transfers of technologies less than what should have

been the ca se, the general thinking is that the US will be even less

forthcoming than Russia in transferring technologies. The US conditions

for such transfers are much more stringent, with its complex and

restrictive export control processes. In the fulfilment of off-set

obligations, a comparative evaluation of Russian and US performance cannot

be substantially made for the present, as such programmes have not been

implemented on the ground yet, but the US companies, with greater

commercial flair and more enterprise, have shown greater dynamism in tying

up with the Indian private sector than the Russian ones.



US arms transfers to Pakistan increase the threat to India's security. The

US minimises the problem, claiming that India is much stronger militarily

and that such supplies do not change the military balance in the

subcontinent. Our defence minister occasionally refers critically to these

supplies, but in general, the government plays down the problem. Buying

big ticket US defence equipment even when the US arms our adversary, gives

arguments to those lobbies in Russia that want arms to be sold to

Pakistan, undeterred by Indian sensitivities. They see no reason to shun

the Pakistani market when the US can sell arms both to India and Pakistan,

without much protest from India. It can be argued that Russia too has

helped arm both our adversaries -- China and Pakistan. For some years

Russia was China's biggest arms supplier, and it is the Russian RD-93

engine that powers the jointly developed Sino-Pakistan JF-10 fighter.

Despite our demarches, the Russian government cleared the supply to China

notwithstanding the diversion of these engines to Pakistan. India cannot

take objection to Russian arms transfers to China as, unlike US arms

supplies to Pakistan, the purpose and intention of the recipient country

is not to build up capacity against India specifically. By its arms

transfers, Russia strengthens the Chinese capacity against the US, Taiwan,

Ja pan etc, and incidentally India too. The case of the RD-93 engines is

more ambiguous, linked to the Russia-China relationship, with negative

consequences for us.



To conclude, India's defence relationship with Russia is a developed one

whereas with the US -- it is a developing one. The Indo-Russian

relationship is marked by trust whereas the one with US is still overlaid

with mistrust -- the onus being our historical experiences with the two

countries. India's dependence on Russia for defence supplies is

overwhelming, whereas with the US, it is minimalistic at present. If the

US had won the MMRCA contract, the US footprint in our defence sector

would have become much heavier, but that will not happen, though with new

acquisitions in the offing, the US profile will become higher, opening

India to pressures in the future linked to US's regional policies or

differences that may emerge over strategic issues.



Rus sia is more willing to transfer sensitive technologies to India

without onerous conditions like end-use monitoring that are sovereignty

infringing. Russia, less involved in our region, does not have the same

concern about a strategic balance in South Asia as the US has. After the

Indo-US nuclear deal and removal of some Indian space and defence research

organisations from its Entities List, the US has become more tolerant of

India's strategic programmes, whereas Russia selectively assists us in

improving them technically. Russia too lost out on the MMRCA contract, but

it has obtained other major contracts, as for example, the multi-role

transport aircraft and the fifth generation fighter aircraft.



Oddly, while the defence procurement relationship with the US is weak, the

military to military relationship is strong. In the case of Russia -- the

opposite holds. We have had over 50 military exercises with the US in the

last seven years but only three with Russia. This is bound to weigh on the

two relationships in the long r un, especially as India-US relationship,

which is much more broad-based, becomes deeper in different domains.



With India's expanding defence budgets and security needs, the Russian

share of our defence acquisitions is bound to decrease relatively, and

that of the US, with which a forward relationship is being built, should

increase. But the Russian weight in our defence acquisitions will endure

for a few decades because of the high levels of existing dependence. This

calls for a realistic appreciation of the solidity and reliability of our

relations with Russia even as we diversify. If strategic wisdom dictates

the preservation of our defence ties with Russia, it also dictates

building new partnerships, including with the US, the foremost military

power in the world. (The writer retired as foreign secretary of India. He

was also India's ambassador to Russia)



(Description of Source: New Delhi Force Online in English --

Internet-based version of an independent mo nthly national security and

defense magazine focusing on issues impacting the Indian defense forces;

weapon and equipment procurement; missiles and delivery systems; and

counterterrorism; URL:

http://www.forceindia.net)Attachments:image001.gifimage002.gif



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