When thinking about the initial international response to the India-Pakistan crisis, it is worth considering the dog that didn’t bark: what was not said.Missing after the terrorist attack in Pulwama was any public American call for dialogue or restraint. Absent from most countries’ statements after the Indian Air Force strike was condemnation of it. The absence of these elements, which a decade or two ago would have been par for the course, offers us clues about the geopolitical landscape, and the changing nature of India and Pakistan’s relationships with various countries.The US was quick to condemn the Pulwama attack and repeatedly called for Pakistan to take action against terrorists operating from its territory. It has reportedly also worked with France on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) statement, at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to keep Pakistan grey-listed, and in the 1267 committee to get Masood Azhar designated as a terrorist. It also pressed Pakistan to release Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman. The US response has been shaped by its strategic and economic interests with India, particularly in the context of its competition with China. But it also reflects the capital that India had earned with years of restraint after provocations, and Washington’s own frustration with Pakistan on the issue of terrorism.For China and Saudi Arabia, as well as the United Arab Emirates, the crisis has put them in a fix. It’s pitted their traditional ties with Pakistan against their India imperatives.The latter is why China, too, did not initially condemn the IAF strike. For Beijing, this is yet another time that its ally Pakistan has complicated its larger interests.It has wanted to reset the temperature with India because of its uncertainty about the Trump Administration. China’s broader strategic competition with the US means it wants to stabilise the relationship with India and keep it from moving even closer to the US. But this crisis has highlighted the limits of the reset and that fundamental problems between China and India remain, including the Sino-Pakistani alliance. Almost as bad from Beijing’s perspective would be that the crisis has given the US — and its allies like Australia and France — a chance to show support in contrast with China’s obstructionism.China will know, however, that its leverage with Pakistan and position in the UNSC and the FATF give Delhi reasons to continue to engage with Beijing.Delhi’s sense of Beijing’s utility will likely be shaped by what role China has played — and will play — in urging Pakistan toward de-escalation and counterterrorism actions. In some past crises, Beijing has privately pressured Pakistan, partly by indicating the limits of its support.But, if Beijing has been unhelpful or inactive in this regard, Delhi will keep that in mind.Indian policymakers will also likely remember the Russian response. Moscow’s public statements have been minimal.Here, too, what’s been missing is striking: unlike after the Uri attack, no mention or condemnation of the Pakistan angle —despite greater Indians efforts to woo Russia with energy and defence deals over the last two years. Moscow will be aware, however, that any negative consequences will likely be limited by Delhi’s sense that Moscow is best kept onside. Because, even if Russia is not helpful, it could be harmful in settings like the UNSC or the Russia-India-China trilateral, or vis-à-vis other Indian interests.Delhi will be more pleased with the Saudi and Emirati reaction. They reportedly played a role in the captured pilot’s release, and refused Islamabad’s request to disinvite External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation meeting. India is now useful to these two countries. It is the fastest growing oil consumer at a time their other customers are looking to other energy sources. It is a relatively attractive investment destination at a time they are looking for alternative sources of revenue. It is unlikely to criticise Riyadh or Abu Dhabi for their behaviour at home or abroad. And it is not a country they want to see get closer to their rivals Qatar and Iran.It is crucial to remember that it is India’s strategic and economic clout — and utility — that has led to a more supportive environment.Anything that reduces this could adversely affect the backing Delhi enjoys.Moreover, this support is not unlimited.With escalation, we already saw more calls for Indian restraint. These countries’ broader interests would be at stake in the event of greater instability or war in the subcontinent.Moreover, it is worth remembering that Pakistan remains useful to them too — strategically for China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and tactically for Russia and the US in the context of the American draw down from Afghanistan.The writer is director of the India Project at The Brookings Institution