Global democracy has neither advanced nor retreated substantially in the past year, according to The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2012 democracy index, which was published on March 20th. Among the findings of our latest index, now in its fifth edition, are that democratisation prospects in the Arab world remain highly uncertain; that democracy has regressed in much of eastern Europe; and that there is a crisis in popular confidence in politics in the West. In short: it is not easy to build a sturdy democracy, and even long-established democracies are vulnerable to corrosion if not nurtured and protected.

The index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories. As the index only excludes micro states, this covers the vast majority of the world's population. In 2012 the picture was broadly one of stabilisation after a tumultuous couple of years that in different ways both improved prospects for democracy and renewed threats to it. The political upheavals in the Arab world generated optimism that has only partly—and imperfectly—been fulfilled. At the same time the fallout from the global financial crisis that began in 2008, and from the subsequent debt crisis in the euro zone, continues to have a negative impact on politics in supposedly stable democracies in the rich world.

Slightly less than one-half of the world's population lives in a democracy of some sort, although only 11% reside in what we consider "full" democracies. Moreover, some 2.6bn people, more than one-third of the world, still live under authoritarian rule (with a large share being in China). The index uses a scoring system as the basis for its definitions of relative degrees of democracy. Our analysts assign each country scores in five categories: political process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. We then combine these scores to generate an overall score, which places each country within one of four types of regime. Those with the highest scores (8 and above on a scale of 0 to 10) constitute "full democracies". Next are "flawed democracies" (6 to 7.99), followed by "hybrid regimes" (4 to 5.99) with elements of both democracy and authoritarianism, and finally "authoritarian regimes" (below 4).

Several steps forward…

Encouragingly, the global average score improved slightly in 2012, to 5.52 from 5.49 the previous year. Individual scores improved in 54 countries, and in six of these there was a change in regime type. Perhaps most notable were developments in the Arab world. Although hopes for widespread and durable democratisation in the region still look premature, democracy scores in the Middle East and North Africa have improved on average. Tunisia, which saw its score leap in 2011 after the ousting of its autocratic president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, enjoyed a further slight increase in its score last year. Egypt's score rose sharply, allowing it to cross the threshold from authoritarian state to hybrid regime. However, the story of the year was Libya, which made dramatic progress for a second year in a row and in 2012 saw the biggest rise in its score of any country. Like Egypt, Libya moved out of the authoritarian category to become classified as a hybrid regime. One of the reasons for the improvement in the country's score was the successful holding of its first free and fair elections for an interim parliament in July 2012.

Notable improvements in democracy scores also occurred in Georgia, Senegal, Myanmar, Yemen and Hong Kong, among others, in 2012. In Georgia, the general election in October marked an important step on the path towards democracy. This was the first time since independence in 1991 that a handover of power had occurred that was accepted by all major players—even if the resulting realignment has stoked political tensions by imposing uneasy cohabitation on the president and parliament. Elsewhere, Senegal's move from hybrid regime to flawed democracy reflects the country's smooth transfer of power in 2012, following a presidential election in which the loser (unusually for Sub-Saharan Africa) accepted the result. The rise in Myanmar's democracy score is testament to significant progress on political liberalisation, which included the election to parliament last year of the pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi—a development that would have been unthinkable until recently. That said, Myanmar's improvement has occurred from a low base and the country has much more to do to move out of the authoritarian category. In particular, political pluralism continues to be compromised by the fact that one-quarter of parliamentary seats are reserved for the military.

… and backward

For all the progress on some fronts, 2012 was by no means an unqualified success for democracy. Scores declined in 40 countries, and in four of these (Burundi, Mali, Haiti and Sri Lanka) there was a regression to a less democratic regime type. Mali recorded the biggest decline in score of any country, following a coup and the takeover by Tuareg and jihadi Islamist rebels of the northern half of the country. This ultimately necessitated French-led military intervention in January 2013. For Sri Lanka, we have downgraded the country's democracy score to reflect the concentration of power around the president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, and continued threats to free speech and political dissent. We now classify Sri Lanka as a hybrid regime.

Beyond the changes in individual country scores, a number of themes give cause for concern about the state of democracy. One is that of regression in response to popular protests in the Middle East—most notably in Syria, where the civil war has intensified, causing further massive loss of life, but also for example in Bahrain. In retrospect, it can be said that many of the hopes for democratic transformation as a result of the Arab revolutions were overambitious. It is also worth noting that even in countries where there has been positive progress—such as Libya, Egypt and Tunisia—the transition to more democratic rule has been fraught with difficulty. This underlines our broader view that the transition to fully-fledged consolidated democracies depends on more than just holding elections; it also requires the development of a range of supportive institutions and attitudes. Such a transformation takes a very long time.

Another area of concern is the fall in democracy scores in eastern Europe. No fewer than ten countries in the region recorded lower scores in the 2012 index compared with 2011. Had it not been for the significant improvement in Georgia's score, the average score for the region would have declined. Democracy remains weakest among members of the Commonwealth of Independent States such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. However, in recent years we have also seen democracy being eroded in east-central Europe—even among EU members such as Hungary. Although democratic forms are superficially in place in much of east-central Europe, the substance of a democracy is often absent. People have little trust in the political system, and a large number of voters feel disenfranchised. Again, this underscores the importance of conceiving of democracy in a more than minimalist sense, and allowing for the fact that democracy depends on a wide range of factors that include the presence of a vibrant political culture, the rule of law and robust public institutions.

Nor is the phenomenon of declining confidence in democracy confined to young democracies in emerging markets. One of the most worrying trends in the past few years has been the decline in the status of politics in the established democracies of the West. Political participation has fallen, and voters have become disillusioned with public institutions. In the UK, trust in government, parliament and politics is at an all-time low, and the country's political participation score is among the worst in the developed world. In Europe more broadly, the effects of the Great Recession of 2008-09 and the ongoing debt crisis in the euro zone have been significant. The temporary installation in Greece and Italy of unelected technocratic leaders, by definition, eroded democracy in those countries while also damaging public confidence in the political system. The centralisation of policy—with the response to the euro crisis being directed by the troika of the EU, the European Central Bank and the IMF—also implies a loss of sovereignty for individual countries.

Democracy as a value retains strong universal appeal worldwide, nonetheless. Globalisation, the rise of the Internet and the brave examples of the Arab protests of the past two years will continue to inspire people to wish for democracy. But challenges remain. If there is one lesson from the 2012 democracy index, it is that democracy can be fragile and that establishing and sustaining it require persistence and vigilance.