Note: This article isn't about securing the Python interpreter against crashes/segfaults or exhaustion of resources attacks. For help with that, take a look at the excellent sandboxing features of PyPy. Those of you wanting to just know about the practical applications of this, scroll down to the bottom of the article =)

There have been many attempts to secure the Python interpreter so that untrusted code can be safely executed alongside trusted code. Working attempts like RestrictedPython and zope.proxy unfortunately come at a high cost in terms of performance.

Old-school Python hackers would probably remember the deprecated rexec module which used to be enabled in the standard library. This module, along with it's Bastion sibling, provided a framework for “restricted execution” of Python code.

The rexec module encouraged a certain design pattern which depended on class attributes being kept “private” from untrusted code. Unfortunately, Python's introspection powers are heavily geared against this and there are many many dark corners from which one can peer deep into the heart of classes.

So it was no surprise that, soon after the introduction of new-style classes in Python, rexec was dumped. And all hopes of securing the Python interpreter in an efficient way went the way of Plan 9.

Now, those in the security world are probably aware of the Object Capability model of security as pioneered by the likes of the Actors model and the E language. Entire Operating Systems have been implemented free of viruses thanks to this model.

For a long while I have felt that there exists a major subset of Python that is suited for use through the object capability model. After all capabilities are just non-forgeable references. We already have this in Python.

The next step is to simply ensure that there is no global shared state. And whilst a lot of existing code uses global shared state, there is nothing in the Python language that imposes this limitation. Thus it should be possible to isolate a capability-secure subset of Python and build up from there.

Since I've had this insight, the Google Caja project have done the exact same for Javascript. They identified a capability-secure subset of Javascript and have built up from there…

So how can we Python hackers get beyond shared state? After all, there is no “private” in Python. Right?

Well, not quite. We can use closures as an easy way of emulating a private scope in Python. After all this is how it's done in other capability-based languages. This is nothing new. Ka-Ping Yee had this insight on Python-Dev years ago!

But what about Python's various introspective powers you ask? Unlike the deep plumbing of classes, Python's functions are relatively isolated and makes our life much easier. This makes sense when you realise that Python classes are actually syntactic sugar and sets of protocols on top of functions.

But functions aren't opaque beasts by default. There are a number of variables which “leak” information. The ones I identified were:

FunctionType.func_closure/__closure__

FunctionType.func_code/__code__

FunctionType.func_globals/__globals__

GeneratorType.gi_code

GeneratorType.gi_frame

type.__subclasses__

And thanks to the Python security challenge using safelite.py we've been able to identify attributes of FrameType as additional ones, e.g.

FrameType.f_locals

As you can see this is a pretty small list. (Especial thanks to Paul Cannon for being the first with his hardcore hack to show that frame objects are accessible.)

Now this list is in no way the definitive final list. The Python challenge is still ongoing — try safelite.py yourself and see if you can find more! But the fact that there have been no new exploits in the last 24 hours despite over a 1,000 unique downloads of safelite.py in the same time gives me some confidence that we are getting towards a comprehensive list.

If we can ensure that untrusted code will never be able to access the final list of these variables, then we can ensure that “private” data using closures stays private. And from that basis, we can start building an object capability framework in Python!!

In safelite.py, I use ctypes to completely remove these variables from the Python interpreter. This is a neat approach which Phillip J. Eby showed me and means that we can start building an object capability framework in Python today!

The flip-side of removing these variables however is that the code which uses these variables won't work. Boo! So I made getter functions like sys.get_func_code and patched the handful of functions in the standard library like inspect.getargspec to use these instead.

The idea being that trusted code would have a reference to the sys module and be able to use them whilst untrusted code would not. But Guido van Rossum — in the conversation that started here — convinced me that Python already has the support for doing this!

And this is where our old friend rexec deserves some thanking. It turns out that rexec is only one half of Python's restricted execution support. The other half has been living inside the Python Interpreter for well over a decade. For the sake of simplicity let's call this PIRE — Python Interpreter's Restricted Execution.

And since there is seemingly no comprehensive documentation of PIRE, I'll provide a summary here.

Whenever you read/write an attribute on one of Python's builtin objects, it will raise a RuntimeError stating that the attributed is restricted if both of the following conditions are true:

The attribute has a READ_RESTRICTED and/or WRITE_RESTRICTED flag set.

and/or flag set. PyEval_GetRestricted() returns True.

The flags are set when members of an object are defined. For example, in funcobject.c we find:

static PyMemberDef func_memberlist [] = {

{ "func_closure" , T_OBJECT , OFF ( func_closure ), RESTRICTED | READONLY },

{ "func_doc" , T_OBJECT , OFF ( func_doc ), WRITE_RESTRICTED },

{ "__doc__" , T_OBJECT , OFF ( func_doc ), WRITE_RESTRICTED },

{ "func_globals" , T_OBJECT , OFF ( func_globals ), RESTRICTED | READONLY },

{ "__module__" , T_OBJECT , OFF ( func_module ), WRITE_RESTRICTED },

{ NULL } /* Sentinel */

};



where RESTRICTED is just a shorthand for READ_RESTRICTED|WRITE_RESTRICTED .

As for PyEval_GetRestricted , a pure Python equivalent would look like:

import __builtin__



def PyEval_GetRestricted ():

"""Return if the we are in restricted execution."""



current_frame = PyEval_GetFrame ()

if current_frame . __builtins__ != __builtin__ :

return True

else :

return False



In other words, it checks to see if the __builtins__ variable in the current execution frame is the exact same as the default __builtin__ module [Note the difference in spelling of the two variables]. If they differ, restricted execution is assumed.

Let's see how this works out in practice:

>>> import md5 , inspect



>>> def dummy ( secret ):

... """A dummy function which creates a closure."""

...

... def get_secret_hash ( hexdigest = True ):

... if hexdigest :

... return md5 . new ( secret ) . hexdigest ()

... return md5 . new ( secret ) . digest ()

...

... return get_secret_hash



>>> get_secret_hash = dummy ( 'My Secret.' )



In normal execution, we can access the func_closure attribute:

>>> get_secret_hash . func_closure

(<cell at 0x23da10: str object at 0x23ef98>,)



And use that to get at the secret:

>>> get_secret_hash . func_closure [ 0 ] . cell_contents

'My Secret.'



But if we set the __builtins__ variable, restricted execution mode kicks in:

>>> __builtins__ = {}



>>> get_secret_hash . func_closure

Traceback (most recent call last):

...

RuntimeError : restricted attribute



Tada!!

Now the eagle-eyed amongst you would have noticed the import of the inspect module above. We will use this to show how trusted code can still access restricted attributes whilst within restricted execution. The inspect module has a useful getargspec function which accesses restricted attributes to find a function's signature. And, as we can see, it works even in restricted execution mode:

>>> inspect . getargspec ( get_secret_hash )

(['hexdigest'], None, None, (True,))



Why does this work? Because the scope in which getargspec was defined didn't have a custom __builtins__ and this was captured in the getargspec.func_globals . This is just genius! And it provides us with a framework on top of which we can build the object capability secure Python.

All we need to do is add the identified set of leak variables to the existing set of restricted attributes. For those who are not familiar with the internals of PIRE, I present a summary here of the current (in Python's SVN trunk) set of restricted attributes.

The bitwise-OR-able flag contants are defined in structmember.h:

READ_RESTRICTED Not readable in restricted mode. WRITE_RESTRICTED Not writable in restricted mode. RESTRICTED Not readable or writable in restricted mode.

In classobject.c, instance method objects:

im_class RESTRICTED im_func RESTRICTED __func__ RESTRICTED im_self RESTRICTED __self__ RESTRICTED

In classobject.c, class objects:

__dict__ RESTRICTED __class__ WRITE_RESTRICTED

In classobject.c, instance objects:

__dict__ RESTRICTED __class__ RESTRICTED

In cPickle.c:

A private copy of the Pickler registry tables is used when PyEval_GetRestricted().

In fileobject.c:

The file() constructor will raise an error when PyEval_GetRestricted().

In funcobject.c, function objects:

func_closure RESTRICTED __closure__ RESTRICTED func_code RESTRICTED __code__ RESTRICTED func_defaults RESTRICTED __defaults__ RESTRICTED func_dict RESTRICTED __dict__ RESTRICTED func_doc WRITE_RESTRICTED __doc__ WRITE_RESTRICTED func_globals RESTRICTED __globals__ RESTRICTED func_name WRITE_RESTRICTED __name__ WRITE_RESTRICTED __module__ WRITE_RESTRICTED

In marshal.c:

Unmarshalling code objects will raise an error when PyEval_GetRestricted().

In methodobject.c, bultin functions:

__self__ RESTRICTED __module__ WRITE_RESTRICTED

As you can see some of the “leak” attributes that I want to restrict are already restricted in Python! All we need to do is add the following changes:

In codeobject.c:

Creating new code objects directly will raise an error when PyEval_GetRestricted().

In frameobject.c:

All attributes of Frame objects are restricted except for f_restricted .

In genobject.c:

gi_code RESTRICTED gi_frame RESTRICTED

In typeobject.c:

__subclasses__ RESTRICTED

The nice thing about this is that we can then use it in environments like Google App Engine, where we cannot use the ctypes-based approach.

Here's my patch for Python's SVN trunk: pytrunk.secure.patch

You can review the patch for acceptance into Python core here:

With this patch in place (and assuming that there aren't more “leak” attributes lying around), we can start building up a true, secure, object-capability framework in Python.

We'd need to add things like import mechanisms and start whitelisting builtin functions for use. This is a big undertaking and is one that I am committed to — and will appreciate fellow collaborators who want to make this happen. That includes you hopefully =)

Now, some of you may be wondering what the fuss is? Why bother creating such an object capability framework in Python? For that let me give you a few use cases. All on App Engine.

Custom Templates by Users

Web applications like Blogger don't allow users to customise their blogs using a rich language. Instead they have a proprietary templating system which for the most part is just variable substitution.

Imagine instead if you could let your users use a templating language like Genshi. Users could have the full expresivity of the Python language to generate the output they want.

The problem with letting users do that today is that they would be able to use it to get at the rest of your application and start doing evil things to your database.

But with an object capability based framework in place, you could give users the capability to execute Genshi templates without worrying about them somehow getting access to your database.

And the nice thing about App Engine is that they already have something similar to PyPy's sandbox running — so your users won't be able to segfault your processes.

UserScripts: Python Services in Apps

Web applications like Twitter and Facebook provide APIs which let developers write services which run on their own servers. Imagine instead a ‘Plex’ application on App Engine which allowed users to create and run arbitrary Python services on their data.

Not only would this save resources — how many copies of Twitter's database are there?? — but it could allow for interesting and composable services. Perhaps even a command line for the internet?

Services could be provided with a minimal __builtins__ which allowed them to access the current user's data and not anyone else's.

Here's a minimal example to get you thinking:

def create_safe_get ( user_id , db = db ):

def _safe_get ( key_name ):

return db . get ( user_id + key_name )

return _safe_get



safe_builtins [ 'db_get' ] = create_safe_get ( 'tav' )



exec ( service , { '__builtins__' : safe_builtins })



There are lots and lots of possibilities — imagine a GreaseMonkey-like system but running on the server-side and with Python… the possibilities are only limited by our imagination.

But in order for any of this to be possible, the patch has to be accepted first. Guido has already promised to accept the patch (for both Core Python and App Engine!) if it gets reviewed.

So, if you are a Python-Dev-er, can you please review it:

If not, can you at least let Python-Dev know that you'd like to see this patch through? Thanks!

Let me know what you think in the comments below.

— With love, @tav