One week and two series into the season, the Rockies have only played seven games. But the games already matter, as a glance at the fluctuating playoff odds at FanGraphs and Baseball Prospectus bear out. As things stand right now, the Rockies are neither in great shape nor terrible shape. They’ve dominated the opposition, but have also been handily beaten. The Rockies are, in a sense, still shapeless—waiting for more information and game results to mold the 2014 season. But that doesn’t mean that there aren’t any take-aways from the first week of games. Specifically, we’ve learned a bit about the team’s lineup and daily strategy. We can also glean some very early conclusions about pitching performances. And finally, as fans, we have relearned that watching a Rockies broadcast from Coors Field is different than watching them play on the road.

Wither Platoon?

Before the Rockies played their first Spring Training game, I tweeted this:

The #Rockies should construct a cage to house either Morneau or Stubbs, depending on whether the opposing starter is left or right handed — Eric Garcia McKinley (@garcia_mckinley) February 25, 2014

I felt that I had enough information about how Drew Stubbs fared historically against right handers, and Justin Morneau against left-handers since 2011, to advocate for deploying both in platoons. I still do. The change in my thinking from writing that to the beginning of the season was that I had internalized the platoon strategy as self-evident. I had not only convinced myself of the merits of the strategy, but reading and writing in an internet-based Rockies echo chamber furthered my conviction. This despite not much indication from the team that they prefer platoons.

So, on April 1, I was not very happy to see Stubbs starting in center field and leading off against right-hander Henderson Alvarez in Miami, especially with both Charlie Blackmon and Corey Dickerson available. Stubbs’s career slash line against right handers is .226/.295/.355, good for .650 OPS, which is 11 percent worse relative to his career OPS. In other words, it’s a poor split. My initial, admittedly knee-jerk, reaction was that this was terrible use of a line-up spot. But after glancing through the Rockies opening schedule, I noted that the team wouldn’t face a left-handed starter until yesterday (April 6), the seventh game of the season. Temporarily mollified, I accepted that the team wanted to give Stubbs playing time and put his above average defense to good use. Run prevention is just as important as run production, so I wholeheartedly embrace the value Stubbs contributes to the Rockies.

But then I remembered that he was also used in the leadoff spot. In the end, Stubbs made the final out—the only Rockies hitter to get five plate appearances—in a one run game, to top off a not unexpected 0-5 day. I’ve written before that discarding lineup orthodoxies (“the fastest player shall bat leadoff”) in favor of a statistically optimized lineup won’t do enough in itself to make a non-playoff team a contender. These small things, however, tend to be components of broader team philosophies, and those can make a difference.

In the same game, we witnessed a second instance where the Rockies withheld a possible platoon advantage. It was a different situation though. In the eighth inning, with the Rockies down 4-2, Michael Cuddyer and Carlos Gonzalez led off the inning with back-to-back doubles off of left-hander Mike Dunn. Dunn is an effective reliever against both left and right-handers, but more-so against lefties; right handed hitters have a career .763 OPS against Dunn, while it is .638 for left-handers. Dunn stayed in to face Troy Tulowitzki, who flied out to center field, and Justin Morneau, who grounded out to first base. Right-hander A.J. Ramos then came into the game and walked Wilin Rosario before striking Nolan Arenado out, thus extinguishing the Rockies eighth inning rally. Tulowitzki, Morneau, and Arenado made the outs, so each one is partially responsible for leaving Gonzalez on the base paths. Take a look at the win probability chart for the game:

After Gonzalez’s double, the Rockies had a 38 percent chance of winning, but the outs dropped their chances by 10, 8, and 8 percentage points, respectively. The outs were equally injurious, but it is important to remember that the calculations are context neutral, as they don’t consider the personnel on the field. The real questionable move of the inning was the choice to leave Morneau in to face the left-handed Mike Dunn. According to ESPN Stats & Info, since 2011 (after he lost the second half of 2010 to a concussion), Morneau has hit .204/.244/.271 against left-handers, “good” for a weighted On Base Average (wOBA) of .232. If we want to be generous and include only 2012 and 2013, discounting his shortened 2011, his line is .218/.258/.286, and a wOBA of .243. They should have pinch hit for him. On the bench, the Rockies had Corey Dickerson,, andavailable. Dickerson is also left-handed and only has 40 big league plate appearances against left-handed pitching, but in those PAs, he hasn’t hit very well. Either Barnes or Culberson would have been the better move, neither of whom are very good hitters, but still would have been better options (if such a move were made, Cuddyer would have shifted to first base). The best pinch hitter in this situation would have been Stubbs, but because he started he was obviously unavailable. Additionally, the Marlins probably would have just went to A.J. Ramos a batter earlier, but in that case Ramos would have been tasked with getting two outs rather than one.

Interestingly, the Kansas City Royals faced a similar situation on the same day against the Detroit Tigers. Down one run in the eighth inning and with a runner on second base, Royals manager Ned Yost left light-hitting shortstop Alcides Escobar (.559 OPS in 2013) in to face Max Scherzer, while the superior hitter against right handers, Justin Maxwell, was left on the bench. Escobar flied out, and the Royals went on to lose by a run. Yost later said that pinch hitting for players gets in their “dome,” something he didn’t want to do so early in the season. I think a similar reservation might have been at work in the Rockies case. I recognize that there is a rationale behind the moves (or non-moves, as it were), but the presence of reasoning doesn’t make it a good idea. Broadcasters like celebrating “unselfish” plays, such as a hitter purposefully grounding out to move a runner from second to third. Ostensibly, these things elevate a player’s rapport with teammates and respect in the clubhouse. If that’s the case, then why should being replaced in the middle of a game for sound reasons that can help the team win be perceived any differently? This is also a small matter, but one that if repeated can add up over the course of the season. In fact, both of these small things might have contributed to the Rockies loss on April 1.

With a few more games of hindsight, it’s starting to look like Stubbs will be deployed how he should: as a late inning defensive upgrade in center field and a spot starter against left-handed pitching. With two out of the next four games coming up against left handed starters, it will be interesting to see what the Rockies do with Morneau and Stubbs. My guess is that Morneau will play in games (and be left in games) that don’t favor his splits more frequently than Stubbs.

Hope in Pitching

Jorge de la Rosa and Juan Nicasio have combined for mixed results thus far, but their performances have showed us what to look for in their upcoming starts. Let’s start with Jorge de la Rosa’s debut. In the opener in Miami, de la Rosa cruised through four innings before melting down in the fifth. In the first fifteen batters he faced in the first four innings, de la Rosa gave up one hit and one walk. In the fifth, he faced five batters, and the results were double, single, sacrifice bunt, single, and hit by pitch. By the time de la Rosa beaned Christian Yelich, it was clear to everyone that he needed to be pulled from the game. The argument on the mound with Rosario was just the climax of de la Rosa’s total loss of focus. It hasn’t been emphasized enough, however, that de la Rosa pitched a fine game. The heat map below shows where the pitches that went for hits were located.

Note that two out of the four were down, in, and barely in the strike zone. In other words, they were good pitches. However, big league hitters sometimes get hits off of good pitches, and that is exactly what happened. Marcell Ozuna knocked a fastball down and in for a home run, which you can see here.

The second of Ozuna’s two extra base hits, a double, off of de la Rosa came on a changeup in the same location. The bullpen proceeded to allow eight more runs (three credited to de la Rosa) in the 10-1 Opening Day loss. The result should give us some pause regarding the bullpen, but not de la Rosa. Additionally, I would argue that de la Rosa’s second lackluster start can be read the same way. On Saturday, April 5, he once again pitched just four and one third innings. The problem in his second start was location, as he was overthrowing both his fastball and his slider. However, de la Rosa’s zeal also resulted in increased velocity. His fastball averaged 93.7 miles per hour on Saturday. In 2013, his highest mark was 91.9 in an April game against Arizona. In a sense, de la Rosa is still coming back from Frank Jobe surgery, as his fastball velocity is back, but he’s lacking command. Look for whether or not he reins in his fastball in his upcoming starts. It will be very good for the Rockies if he can.

The best pitching performance of the year thus far was Juan Nicasio’s gem on Friday in the home opener. Nicasio’s line: 7 innings pitched, 4 hits, 1 run allowed, 1 walk and 6 strikeouts. The real story was how effective Nicasio’s slider was. According to ESPN Stats & Info, he threw the pitch 29 times. Forty five percent of his sliders resulted in a swing and miss; seventy one percent of his total whiffs were from his slider. That translates to an excellent strikeout pitch, as five of Nicasio’s six strikeouts culminated with the Diamondback in question missing the slider. His use of the pitch was not new, but the frequency with which he threw it was. Nicasio had only used the slider more than 30 percent of the time in four previous outings. Of those four, we’d have to go back to May 6, 2012, to find a comparable game in terms of how often Nicasio got the opposition to whiff on the slider. But in that contest the Braves scored six runs off of eight hits, and Nicasio walked three. In that 2012 game, the slider was ineffective despite the whiffs, as Nicasio was throwing enough hittable pitches that it was a bad idea not to swing. Of course, Nicasio’s biggest mistake of the game this past April 4 was a hanging slider to Mark Trumbo, who proceeded to mash it over the fence in left-center field. That blunder notwithstanding, Nicasio showed how good of a pitcher he can be if he locates his fastball and couples it with a strong secondary pitch.

There’s still more to learn about Jorge de la Rosa and Juan Nicasio. Keep an eye on de la Rosa’s fastball velocity. If he can keep it at around 93 and command it, the Rockies will be tough to beat when he is on the mound. We’ll know more about how effective Nicasio can be in the long-run by paying attention to his slider usage and whether or not he can continue to get batters to whiff on it.

Watching the Game

Baseball is much more than individual numbers; it’s also more than team wins and losses. Baseball is fun to watch. Nobody impatiently waited for the start of the season to look at spreadsheets with renewed vigor. There are distinct experiences of watching baseball television broadcasts—indeed, there are 30 different experiences for 30 different teams. After watching the Rockies home opener, I’m reminded that I sometimes enjoy watching the Rockies play on the road more than I do at home. Most if that has to do with the center field camera at Coors Field.

If I had to choose between a World Series win for the Rockies and a new center field camera for Coors Field, I would have to deliberate. Of course, I would choose the World Series win, but it would be close. Flags may fly forever, but the Rockies also play 81 games a year at home. The Rockies center field camera is situated in such a way that observers see pitches at about a 70 to 75 degree angle. Whereas the pitcher, catcher, and umpire face one another in a straight line, viewers of games at Coors Field are forced to see every pitch from an unnatural position. The center field cameras that are elevated and straight behind the pitcher highlight what’s missing from the broadcasts at Coors Field. Pay attention to the movement of Jose Fernandez’s pitches in the video below from Marlins Park.

Compare the center field view from Marlins Park to that of Coors Field. This is a video recap of Juan Nicasio’s excellent first start this year.

Notice how the angle from Coors Field flattens the trajectory of the pitches. You can see sliders slide and curveballs curve a bit, but from this angle fastball movement is completely absent. It’s especially difficult to see the ball move horizontally. As far as I know, Coors Field is home to the only center field camera where the viewer can see both batter’s boxes and a diagonal of home plate while the pitcher lingers to the far left of the screen. It makes the broadcasts less enjoyable. I have no idea whether the current placement of the camera is a result of technical or logistical issues on the field. If it’s an aesthetic choice though, it’s a poor one. Of course, I’ll continue to watch, but maybe my comments will be the start of a grassroots movement to introduce a new center field camera that more accurately shows how the baseball travels from pitcher to catcher. To be successful, it obviously would need a hashtag. I’m currently accepting ideas.

So we’ve learned a few things in this first week of Rockies baseball. Those that anticipate the team to take advantage of platoon situations whenever possible should recalibrate expectations, but should not be overly concerned. We’ve also learned, again, that Jorge de la Rosa is capable of standing in the way of Jorge de la Rosa’s success. I don’t think his rattled performance from Opening Day is a sign of things to come though. Conversely, let’s hope that Juan Nicasio’s first start ends up being representative of his season. In his upcoming starts, his slider will be telling. If those starts take place at Coors Field, however, you might have rely on sources other than your eyes to identify sliders.

What did you learn about the Rockies in the first week of play? Let’s start a conversation in the comments.