Most Bangladeshis would welcome the Supreme Court’s confirmation of death sentence awarded to Motiur Rahman Nizami, Ameer of Bangladesh’s largest Islamic fundamentalist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) for leading the Al Badr Bahini to carry out the massacre of innocent civilians and other crimes in collusion with Pakistan army during the liberation war in 1971. Those of us who took part in the war and witnessed the gruesome tragedy would also welcome it.

On November 21, 2015, two other collaborators - Salauddin Quader Chowdhury and Ali Ahsan Mohammed Mojaheed, JI General Secretary - were executed after the Supreme Court rejected their appeal against a Chittagong special court that sentenced them to death for acts of genocide and murder in Chittagong in 1971.

It had not been an easy task for her to prosecute the collaborators of Pakistan army, particularly after Major General Ziaur Rahman seized power after the founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who started their prosecution, was assassinated on August 15, 1975.

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Zia not only stalled the prosecution of collaborators, but also lifted restrictions on collaborators like Nizami to return to Bangladesh in 1975. Though fundamentalist parties like JI commanded less than ten percent votes, they wielded a strong influence over sections of conservative Muslims. Zia’s intention was to muster their support for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to counter the huge popularity the Awami League (AL) enjoyed.

It was an anachronism that for political gains, Zia, who led his Bengal Regiment battalion to join the fight for freedom against Pakistan army, chose to ignore the crime of collaborators who carried out systematic genocide of two to three million innocent civilians and raped an estimated 2,00,000 women, mostly Hindus. We had seen at first hand the traumatic effects of the massacres when we marched into Dhaka.

I still remember the chilling sight of a grinning human skeleton hung at the entrance of the Al Badr interrogation centre in Mohammedpur, a posh suburb of Dhaka, when we went there after the battle to collect evidence of war crimes. We also met many families of intellectuals killed by the militia. A doctor from Tangail recounted his brush with death at the hands of the militia and the Pakistan army when he and over 60 other intelligentsia of the town were lined up and shot dead. Luckily, others who fell dead upon the doctor saved him from the bullets!

Scores of young Hindu women came in palkis and met us in Cox’s Bazar (in the Southeast tip of Bangladesh) when I stayed on to carry out counter insurgency operations in Chittagong. They tearfully recounted the atrocities they were subjected to, including rape, at the hands of lumpen militia elements during the war.

Begum Khaleda Zia, who came to power after Zia’s assassination, accommodated fundamentalist parties including the JI in the BNP’s ruling coalition and legitimised the role of collaborators like Nizami in mainstream politics. He used the opportunity to emerge as an influential member of the coalition cabinet from 2001 to 2006.

It was not surprising that during this phase, fundamentalist extremism was unofficially encouraged and the JMB extremists grew bolder and bigger. Initially, the Khaleda government chose to ignore their violent activities. However, when the JMB elements attacked NGOs, the government bowed to public pressure and banned the organisation in 2005.

The government action was apparently half-hearted thanks to fundamentalist elements within the coalition like Nizami. The JMB sent a strong message against the ban when it exploded 500 bombs in 300 locations across the country. Though JMB leaders have been prosecuted and executed and the organisation suppressed, there are indications the sleeper cells of JMB are still active in Bangladesh and would stage a comeback.

Similarly, the case of an extremist grenade attack on an Awami League rally on August 21, 2004 killing 21 people was investigated and seriously taken up for prosecution only when Hasina came to power. Fifty two people are facing prosecution for their involvement in the attack. They include Khaleda’s son and senior BNP vice chairman Tarique Rahman now in exile, former state minister for home Babar, former political secretary to Khaleda Zia Haris Chowdhury and JI secretary general Mojaheed. They are believed to have conspired with a leader of Harkat Ul Jihad Al Islami Bangladesh (HUJIB) - the Bangladesh affiliate of the notorious Pakistani terrorist outfit (HUJI) - to carry out the attack.

Of special interest to India is the role of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in Bangladesh during Khaleda’s rule. It became active in Bangladesh arming Indian insurgent groups like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) that had taken refuge there.

At that time Bangladesh’s intelligence agencies like the Directorate General of Federal Security Intelligence (DGFSI) and National Security Intelligence (NSI) also helped the ISI in these efforts indicating official approval of the action. This came to light when ten trucks carrying a huge cache of arms and ammunition enough to arm a brigade of troops were found at the Chittagong port in April 2004. The arms cache destined for delivery to ULFA included 4,930 assorted firearms, 840 rocket launchers, 300 rockets, 27,020, 2,000 grenade launchers and 11.4 million bullets!

However, serious investigation of the case and prosecution of the culprits was taken up only when Sheikh Hasina came to power. A Chittagong special court convicted 14 persons including Nizami (a minister in 2004), Lutfozzaman Babar of BNP (state minister for home in 2004); the then director of the DGFI and the director of NSI were sentenced to death for their role in this case.

Fortunately, both India and Bangladesh are now actively sharing information on terrorists operating on both sides of the border and coordinating their actions. This was evidenced by the return of ULFA leader Paresh Barua (also sentenced to death in the arms smuggling case) to India which augurs well to end insurgency in Northeast.

It is in India’s own national security interest that it should extend all possible aid to prime minister Sheikh Hasina to help her succeed in her relentless efforts to eliminate the patrons of jihadi extremism embedded in the body politics of Bangladesh.

Recently, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) has unearthed an extensive support network of the JMB in West Bengal while probing the October 2, 2014 accidental blast in Burdwan district. The fact that they could infiltrate and establish their foothold across the border in India speaks poorly of state’s role in tightening its set up to fight jihadi extremism. The NIA has now slapped charges against 28 persons, including a key member of JMB Nurul Hoque alias Naeem for “waging war against Bangladesh.”

The West Bengal government should do more to tighten its security apparatus. Often, local political considerations seem to be overtaking national security concerns during follow up action on reports of jihadi extremist activity. The state runs the risk of becoming a hotbed of jihadi extremism to the detriment of the national security of not only India, but also Bangladesh. And with the Islamic State increasingly taking interest in Bangladesh and the JMB extremists trying to stage a comeback, there is no time to lose.