That’s an overly hopeful view. No administration—least of all the Trump administration, which is extorting host nations in the region for support payments—will find it easy to convince allies that they should agree to host American missiles on their soil. Take Japan, the U.S. ally likeliest to come around to the idea of hosting some American post-INF missiles. Tokyo has long had to deal with public opposition to American military activities on Japanese soil, especially in Okinawa. Asking an already troop-weary Japanese public to tolerate massive American missiles on mobile launchers, driving around their towns, will be a hard pill for Tokyo to swallow.

Even if INF opponents had a clear vision for how to deploy new missiles in Asia, those deployments might create bigger strategic headaches for the United States. For instance, the U.S., whether it likes it or not, is in a nuclear deterrence relationship with North Korea. Pyongyang has long bristled at American bomber flights from Guam, which could retaliate against a North Korean nuclear strike within several hours. But one of the American post-INF missiles reportedly under development—a ballistic missile with a range of between 1,800 and 2,500 miles—could, if deployed to Guam, prompt a serious North Korean response. The flight time of such a missile to Pyongyang would be under 20 minutes; deploying a missile that might take out Kim Jong Un in his sleep will encourage North Korea to take dangerous steps itself. Kim might choose to implement a “fail deadly” mechanism, loosening the conditions under which his nuclear arsenal might be used. Even if the United States focuses its new INF deployments in Asia on challenges to China, we’d have to consider the implications for the uneasy relationship with North Korea.

It’s not just the United States that has to deal with the range of consequences of this treaty’s collapse. One of the most-forgotten features of the INF is it was never entirely bilateral after the fall of the USSR: It also covered a handful of former Soviet states that once had their territories involved in the production or testing of intermediate-range missiles. Among these is Ukraine, a country with a particularly strong domestic industrial base for the production of rockets. Though it would take several years in practice, Kyiv has said it reserves the right to develop its own post-INF missiles “as necessary.” Given the seemingly interminable hostilities between Russia and Ukraine, Moscow might find itself with a new regional headache in a matter of years, as it stares down both American conventional intermediate missiles in Europe and similar systems in Ukraine.

America did not violate the INF Treaty, but it did choose to pull the plug. The process by which the Trump administration chose to go about withdrawal was quick, haphazard with regard to U.S. allies’ interests, and fundamentally unstrategic. While the American military-industrial complex begins to spin up for the production, testing, and deployment of missiles that had been banned for 32 years, someone needs to give serious thought to what these missiles will do, where they’ll go, and whether the benefits they might bring to bear will truly outweigh the risks. So far, though, Trump officials have spent less time addressing these issues than it takes for a Pershing II to fly from Western Europe to Moscow.