Introduction

Network-attached storage devices allow multiple users and heterogeneous client devices to retrieve data from centralized disk capacity. These NAS stations are a must for secured file sharing and thus becoming a popular target for hacking attempts. Read below on how a fellow researcher working with our team demonstrated getting access via Authenticated Remote Command into a Synology’s DiskStation Manager.

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Vulnerability Summary

The following advisory describes an Authenticated Remote Command Injection in Synology’s DiskStation Manager.

Credit

An independent Security Researcher has reported this vulnerability to SSD Secure Disclosure program.

Affected Systems

Synology DSM version 6.2.2 before update 24922

Vendor Response

Synology has fixed the vulnerability in DSM version 6.2.2-24922. For more information see Synology-SA-19:37 DSM.

Vulnerability Details

This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2017-12075, which was fixed in DSM 6.2-23739.

When setting PPPoE network in EZ-Internet, a username and password pair is required for authentication and is saved in /etc/ppp/pppoe.conf.

The following code snippet exists in Synology’s DSM 6.2-23739:

// PPPoEConfigSet() in /usr/lib/libsynonetsdk.so.6 __int64 __fastcall PPPoEConfigSet(...) { // ... v46 = SLIBCFileSetKeyValue("/etc/ppp/pppoe.conf", "ETH", &a7, "%s=%s

"); v47 = "/etc/ppp/pppoe.conf"; v48 = 257LL; if ( v46 < 0 ) goto LABEL_17; v49 = "no"; if ( a46 ) v49 = "yes"; v50 = SLIBCFileSetKeyValue("/etc/ppp/pppoe.conf", "DEFAULTROUTE", v49, "%s=%s

"); v47 = "/etc/ppp/pppoe.conf"; v48 = 262LL; if ( v50 < 0 ) goto LABEL_17; v51 = &a7; v73[0] = '\''; v52 = 1; while ( 1 ) // fix for CVE-2017-12075: wrap username with '' { v53 = *((_BYTE *)v51 + 16); v54 = v52 + 1; if ( !v53 ) break; if ( v53 == '\'' ) { if ( v52 > 505 ) break; v73[v52] = '\''; v73[v54] = '"'; v73[v52 + 2] = '\''; v55 = v52 + 3; v52 += 4; v73[v55] = '"'; v73[v52] = '\''; } else { if ( v52 > 509 ) break; v73[v52] = v53; } ++v52; v51 = (int *)((char *)v51 + 1); } v73[v52] = '\''; v73[v54] = 0; if ( SLIBCFileSetKeyValue("/etc/ppp/pppoe.conf", "USER", v73, "%s=%s

") < 0 ) { // ... } // !!! MTU parameter still suffers from the same issue if ( SLIBCFileSetKeyValue("/etc/ppp/pppoe.conf", "MTU", &a45, "%s=%s

") < 0 ) { // ... } //... }

As we can see, the username is wrapped with single quotes to fix CVE-2017-12075. In addition, there are some other parameters which will be saved in /etc/ppp/pppoe.conf such as the MTU.

In the function syno::network::PPPoEInterface::SetData(), there exists a check against the parameters before the call to syno::network::PPPoEInterface::Apply(). These parameters are obtained directly from the HTTP request which is controlled by the user, including the username and mtu_config. It should be noted that the length of mtu_config is limited to less than 8 characters.

// syno::network::PPPoEInterface::Check() in /usr/lib/libwebapi-Network-Share.so signed __int64 __fastcall syno::network::PPPoEInterface::Check(__int64 a1, Json::Value *a2) { // ... v2 = a1; if ( (unsigned __int8)Json::Value::isMember(a2, "ifname") ) { Json::Value::operator[](a2, "ifname"); Json::Value::asString((Json::Value *)&v20); v3 = std::string::compare((std::string *)&v20, "pppoe"); // ... if ( v3 ) { v17 = (Json::Value *)Json::Value::operator[](a2, "ifname"); v18 = Json::Value::asCString(v17); syslog(3, "%s:%d Incorrect ifname [%s]", "pppoe_interface.cpp", 412LL, v18); result = 0xFFFFFFFFLL; } else { if ( (unsigned __int8)Json::Value::isMember(a2, "real_ifname") ) { v12 = (Json::Value *)Json::Value::operator[](a2, "real_ifname"); v13 = Json::Value::asCString(v12); snprintf((char *)(v2 + 396), 0x10uLL, "%s", v13); } else { snprintf((char *)(v2 + 396), 0x10uLL, "%s", v2 + 64); } if ( (unsigned __int8)Json::Value::isMember(a2, "username") ) { v5 = (Json::Value *)Json::Value::operator[](a2, "username"); v6 = Json::Value::asCString(v5); snprintf((char *)(v2 + 412), 0x100uLL, "%s", v6); } else { snprintf((char *)(v2 + 412), 0x100uLL, "%s", v2 + 80); } if ( (unsigned __int8)Json::Value::isMember(a2, "password") ) { v7 = (Json::Value *)Json::Value::operator[](a2, "password"); v8 = Json::Value::asCString(v7); snprintf((char *)(v2 + 668), 0x20uLL, "%s", v8); } else { snprintf((char *)(v2 + 668), 0x20uLL, "%s", v2 + 336); } if ( (unsigned __int8)Json::Value::isMember(a2, "mtu_config") ) { v9 = (Json::Value *)Json::Value::operator[](a2, "mtu_config"); v10 = Json::Value::asCString(v9); snprintf((char *)(v2 + 700), 8uLL, "%s", v10); // !!! length is limited } else { snprintf((char *)(v2 + 700), 8uLL, "%s", v2 + 368); } if ( (unsigned __int8)Json::Value::isMember(a2, "is_default_gateway") ) { v14 = (Json::Value *)Json::Value::operator[](a2, "is_default_gateway"); *(_DWORD *)(v2 + 708) = (unsigned __int8)Json::Value::asBool(v14); result = 0LL; } else { *(_DWORD *)(v2 + 708) = *(_DWORD *)(v2 + 376); result = 0LL; } } } else { syslog(3, aSDNo, "pppoe_interface.cpp", 407LL); result = 0xFFFFFFFFLL; } return result; }

Then in the shell script /usr/sbin/pppoe-start the file /etc/ppp/pppoe.conf will be executed in the shell environment.

# content from /etc/ppp/pppoe.conf # Ethernet card connected to DSL modem ETH=eth0 # PPPoE user name. USER='test' # ... MTU=`id>aa` # corresponding to the poc.py

# content from the /usr/sbin/pppoe-start script CONFIG=/etc/ppp/pppoe.conf USER="" ETH="" ME=`basename $0` # ... export CONFIG . $CONFIG # execute here

As we can see, the injected command through the MTU parameter will be executed thus causing the vulnerability, but it is still limited by the length of the parameter.

Note: To exploit this vulnerability the user has to be authenticated and in order to access the EZ-Internet functionality he has to be in the administration group