…and what conclusions can be drawn from it?

Two days ago, an interesting account of the (latest, second in total) fall of Palmyra to the Daesh (aka ‘Islamic State’, or ‘IS’) appeared on the Facebook. Initially available in Arabic and Russian only, it was meanwhile translated into English and in French.

Here few observations regarding what I find are most interesting details from that account.

) Not mentioned with a single word in this account is the fact that Russian Army troops withdrew from their base in Palmyra at least two, perhaps four days before Daesh’s assault. Despite such a ‘timely’ retreat, a video of the abandoned Russian base in Palmyra released by the ‘Amaq News Agency’ reveals that Russians de-facto run away from there, leaving behind not only plenty of small arms and ammunition, but even food plates and credit cards. ) Composition of ‘Assad-Regime’ Forces defending Palmyra.

According to the source in question, defences of Palmyra included, ‘Military Security Shield Forces, al-Badia with different units, as-Saima, Zanubiya, Heart of Syria, and units of ash-Sheikh Suleiman – in total, about 1,800 fighters; the 11th and 18th divisions, armed with six 130-mm artillery cannons, six 122-mm artillery cannons, seven Grad multiple rocket launchers, and 12 tanks; the formidable al-Faminiyun legion, consisting of 1,200 fighters and a large number of redoubtable military equipment; about 150 fighters of the Tiger Forces for defense of the weak point in the southeast of the region.’

This requires quite some sort. Specifically:

‘Military Security Shield Forces’: here I’m not sure if the source means the Dir al-Quwwat al-Jawwiya (Air Force Intelligence Shield), or the Dir al-Quwwat al-Jawwiya 223 (Military Intelligence Shield Forces 223).

‘al-Badia with different units’: probably stands for Fawj al-Maghawir al-Badiya (Desert Commandos Regiment). Because this is also known as the ‘Sheikh Suleiman ash-Shawakh Battalions’, the subsequent citation of ‘units of ash-Sheikh Suleiman’ is de-facto a repeat of this ‘entry’.

‘as-Saima’: unknown unit.

‘Zanubiya’: this is the well-known Liwa Zainabiyoun (Brigade of Zainab), an IRGC-unit staffed by IRGC officers and (about 2,000) Pakistani Shi’a.

‘Heart of Syria’: unknown unit, but almost certainly one of about a dozen of Druze militias known to be fighting for Assad-Regime (reason I think so is that the death of numerous militiamen was reported by the Suweida News Network, which is usually publishing Druze-related news).

‘Tiger Forces’: the famed Quwwat Nimr… it transpired that actually only one of its companies — the Quwwat Shahin (Panther Force) was present in Palmyra. As the most loyal elements of the garrison, and its ‘command & control element’ the Quwwat Shahin was there to ‘corset’ everybody, i.e. keep everybody under control.

Combined, these units should have provided about 1,950 combatants — none of these from the famed ‘Syrian Arab Army’. Certainly enough, the latter should have been represented by ‘11th and 18th divisions’, though the same sentence citing them concludes with citation of the ‘formidable al-Faminiyun legion’ and this having ‘about 1,200 fighters’.

My conclusion: above-mentioned units are what makes out the ‘11th and 18th Divisions’; i.e. they are under nominal control of the headquarters of these two divisions, which in turn is all that exists of the same. Means: the HQs of the 11th and 18th Divisions are controlling a hodgepodge of militias in order to maintain semblance of ‘SAA’ presence. Operations-wise, and like everybody else, they were subordianted to the Quwwat Shahin.

3. ) Daesh attack on Palmyra began on 9 December 2016 with a single SVBIED (apparently converted from a tank), ‘escorted’ by two ‘technicals’ (4WDs usually armed with machine-guns). The latter were quickly knocked out by ‘air power’. The SVBIED was knocked out by RPG-7 or something similar while quite close to its target — probably Assad-Regime’s positions near the Grain Silo, which was the main defence post on the eastern side of Palmyra. Nevertheless, its detonation caused a panic between defenders: especially ‘legionnaires’ from the Liwa Fatimioun began to flee, in turn causing most of the others to flee, too.

4.) As next, Daesh assaulted Jabal at-Tar, protected by Quwwat Shahin/Quwwat Nimr. The source is suddenly raising the number of their combatants to 500. More likely, they Loyalists of this ‘command & control militia’ simply collected whomever of those fleeing their positions they could put their hands upon, and concentrated the resulting ‘unit’ at the Jabal at-Tar. Unsurprisingly, half of these fled as soon as the attack came. The Quwwat Shahin then also lost both of its MBTs to Daesh’s ATGMs: this is probably a photo of one of them (a T-62), this is one from a series of photos showing an ATGM hitting the other (apparently a T-62, too). Nevertheless, this assault was repelled.

5.) During the night to 10 December, remaining defenders were reinforced by 100 combatants from Liwa Fatimiyoun, and 70 from the ‘18th Division’.

6.) Shortly after, Daesh launched its third assault, this time directed at as-Suhna Neighbourhood, protected by ‘11th Division’, reinforced by combatants from Quwwat Shahin. This position was hit by another SVBIED, which knocked out two MBTs and killed a number of troops, but the assault was repelled.

7.) Fourth Daesh assault followed in the morning of 10 December and aimed simultaneously for Jabalat-Tar and al-Ameria neighbourhood.

The first prong of this attack included 4 MBTs and 3 technicals, which eventually overrun the defenders. The latter prong of this attack overrun the defences of al-Ameria. Ultimatelly, the Daesh was now in control of the dominating elevation over the town, and inside Palmyra (i.e. Tadmor, its modern day part). With this, remaining defenders were forced to retreat, except for 200 from Quwwat Shahin, left behind as a rearguard. Daesh was left free to collect a total of 21 intact tanks (MBTs), 6 intact BMP-1s, 1 ZSU-23–4 and a number of other vehicles (including some used by Russian military only).

Obviously, reported re-deployment of reinforcements — including the Liwa Imam Ali (Iraqi Shi’a militia), and Hezbollah/Lebanon — either did not take place, or these arrived much too late but to bolster defences. Over the last few days, at least two groups of survivors from the rearguard — one of 16, another of 20 — are known to have reached the T.4/Tiyas Air Base.

8.) The fall of Palmyra during the afternoon of 10 December is where this account stops. What it is not describing is what happened afterwards.

Already during the afternoon and evening, reports emerged about ‘violent air strikes’ on Palmyra. Supposedly citing the Russian Ministry of Defence, various of these mentioned no less but ’64 air strikes’, ‘100 air strikes’ by helicopters, destruction of ’11 tanks and other vehicles’, and death of ‘300’ extremists.

While there is no doubt that the defenders of Palmyra have received some close air support — apparntly in form of two Mi-24/35s, and two Mi-28s - alone a cross-examination of available reports in the social media (like by Sentry Syria) — not to talk about similar process with help of 1st-hand sources in Syria — has shown no aerial activity of claimed intensity.

9.) On the contrary: very little aerial activity was reported for Palmyra area on 9 December. The morning of 10 December saw Russians and Assad-Regime launching about 30 air strikes against Idlib, Aleppo, northern Hama, Eastern Ghouta and Dera’a Governorates, but next to none in direction of Palmyra. Specifically: Binnish was bombed; a market in Sarqib was bombed and five killed; Latamina in northern Hama was bombed, as was Eastern Aleppo, and Nawa in Dera’a Governorate (hit by Russian aircraft).

It was only at 12.12hrs PM local time — apparently when the scope of drama inside Palmyra became known — that the SyAAF scrambled a MiG-23 from Shayrat AB in that direction. Depending on the source, this was either shot down (according to Daesh) or crashed due to malfunction, about 20 minutes later — apparently half-way between Palmyra and Shayrat, while attempting to return to he latter.

Starting around 13.00hrs, an increasing number of take-offs of aircraft and helicopters was reported that could be described as ‘going in direction of Palmyra’. For example, several Su-22s from Shayrat AB went in ‘NE direction’, instead ‘N direction’ (towards RTP and Eastern Aleppo, as usually). Nevertheless, helicopters from as-Safira continued pounding Eastern Aleppo, as did some of Su-22s from Shayrat.

In the case of Russians, an assessment is much harder, because practically all of their aircraft turn east after launching from Hmemmem AB. Furthermore, some of their aircraft were still bombing places like Ma’arat an-Nauman during the afternoon. Only one thing was kind of ‘certain’: contrary to what might be expected in an emergency of this kind, flying activity from Tiyas AB remained very limited through the day: only some 4–5 take-offs were registered (including two by Su-24s, launched late in the afternoon). About 20 fighter-bombers and 7–8 helicopters that got airborne by 14.00hrs, and another dozen by 18.00hrs, primarily targeted Eastern Aleppo or Sarqib in Idlib and Kfar Zita in northern Hama. Unsurprisingly, and before soon, complaints about lack of Russian support emerged.

10.) Situation remained very much the same on 11 December.

Assad-Regime and Russians continued the day in precisely the same fashion like they began the day before: by ignoring Daesh in Palmyra area. Instead, Russians concentrated on bombing places like Binnish, Ma’arat an-Nauman, Kfar Zita etc. while Assadists continued bombing Eastern Aleppo.

The pike of activity was reached between 13.00 and 15.00hrs, when up to 20 fighter-bombers were airborne anywhere between Khan Sheykoun, Khan Touman and — especially — Eastern Aleppo. Mere 5–6 sorties were flown by Su-22s against Daesh in Palmyra area before all the flying stopped for an hour.

Why? Because the IRGC was assaulting Sheikh Saeed District there with everything it has got — and eventually claimed it as captured, together with at least some of Fardous District. Latest news indicate they have captured all areas east of Quweiq River — which, yes, means ‘the final battle began’.

Around 16.00hrs, L-39s appeared: curiously, the example launched from Shayrat AB bombed something in Kfar Zita area — not the Daesh near Palymra. Similarly, while one might expect to hear plenty of reports about helicopters from Shayrat taking off — there was absolutely no news in this regards the entire evening: after 6 sorties by various Russian helicopters flown over W Idlib and N Hama earlier during the day, not one was launched against Daesh during the afternoon and evening. Sure, some rumours appeared that a Russian helicopter was shot down and both crewmembers killed, but this was never confirmed (not even by the Daesh).

11.) Something similar can be said about much-reported evacuation of aircraft from Tiyas. If at all, some 5–6 aircraft took off from there during the afternoon and evening — and nearly all went in northern direction, some bombing Kfar Zita, others Eastern Aleppo, and at least one apparently deploying chemical weapons against the place called Uqayribat, near Salamiyah (Hama). Sadly, there are no reports on where are they returning, but it is possible that they subsequently landed at Shayrat instead. And then, after a series of helicopter strikes on Eastern Aleppo, all the flying activity de-facto ceased at 23.35hrs: as ‘another obvious sign of emergency’ in Palmyra area, merely two air strikes were launched by Russians around 01.10hrs…

Conclusions: