Even if we admit Tab Ramos’ strategies yanked the U.S. through last week’s CONCACAF U20 qualifiers to World Cup qualification, it was through no great feat of tactical engineering. The 4-3-3 that’s served this team sporadically in this cycle quit on Ramos when Junior Flores was slow off the blocks, no true starting striker emerged and holding midfielder Kellyn Acosta was injured and lost for the tournament in the second match. Ramos’ answer was a bland switch to a 4-4-2 that harkened back to an earlier boot-and-chase era.

Ramos’s switch back to the 4-4-2 (which yielded four shutouts and a 4-0-0 record, but against four teams of sub-standard quality) looked like a guy who’d bought flashy new running shoes, became convinced the gym at large was judging him on his neon selection and switched back to the white New Balances he’s had for 10 years. Better to get it done without rocking the boat than die on an ideological sword. And credit goes to Ramos in some respects. The U.S. didn’t come close to winning its group, but it qualified.

And before we get too snippy about Ramos’ playing style, remember the venue. By the end of the tournament, the playing fields were a soppy mess, making attractive play all but impossible. So it’s tough to judge based on that alone. Understand, though, that the U.S. had reverted to over-the-top balls early in the tournament on fresher fields when its forward line featured three players under 5-foot-9.

So if we hold this team up to a higher standard (and we should), then we should also admit the 4-4-2 was an emergency measure designed merely to get this team beyond the minced Jamaican soccer fields and into the World Cup.

And it worked. But it cannot be the way forward. Not with this team. Not with the step-up in competition accompanying the World Cup.

By the end of this CONCACAF tournament, forwards Bradford Jamieson, Paul Arriola (especially Paul Arriola) and Lynden Gooch had all played notably out of position, while Flores and Hyndman were shoehorned into roles for which they were ill-suited. This was not merely a 4-4-2 problem, especially considering Arriola, a forward, looked adrift in the opener when he was deployed in the midfield. The 4-3-3 had its share of problems as well.

But the 4-4-2 exacerbated those issues. Between Ben Spencer, Gooch, Arriola and Jamieson, no American deployed up top had a particularly good string of performances. Certainly nothing to justify starting at the World Cup. Jamieson deserves special mention here, since he was deployed as a second striker in the 4-4-2 off the more immobile Spencer’s shoulder. He showed some flashes, but Jamieson is a wide player 100 percent of the way. He lacks on-ball technical ability, is absolutely hold-up averse and can easily be pushed around by center backs. He’s great on counters, poor on build-ups. And based on individual talent, I think this team is engineered for the latter.

So what to do? This team has no No. 10 operating on a World Cup level, and no striker emerged as a legitimate goal-scoring option. That’s why the U.S. should flip the switch and use a 4-3-3 system with a withdrawn forward.

You may know it more colloquially as the False Nine.

There is precedent for the false nine at this level, in fact. In 1989 and 1991, Carlos Quieroz used a false nine system to lead Portugal to back-to-back U20 World Cup titles. Traditionally, the formation was born out of random necessity rather than invention, but I can argue just as easily that coaches are generally stubborn and resistant to change that has yet to be globally adopted. Pack animals to the end, coaching cycles tend to value certain formations over another. Until everything swaps several years down the line.

That said, this team is perfectly poised to run a 4-3-3 system with a dropping forward. And that man is Tommy Thompson. Have a look at my proposed XI for the World Cup, and then we’ll talk about what this could mean. They’re in the Waldos because I’m sentimental.

The gravitational anchor of a false nine system is the false nine himself, which is the least surprising thing I’m going to say all day. But there are layers to his duties. He has to judge the game’s rising and receding tide and react accordingly. If the opposing system is a 4-2-3-1, he’ll more than likely be skipping between banks of two and four to create overlaps. If he finds himself shadowed by a central defender, he’ll drop deeper to tease out space for wide runners pinching in to backfill that space.

Thompson was unarguably the U.S.’s most dynamic attacking player in Jamaica. Deployed wide right, Thompson danced through challenges, created opportunities and looked terrifyingly effective on ball. If there was one criticism during his down moments, it’s that he was marooned wide and lost the pulse of the game (which really only happened in the final match against El Salvador). Thompson is a fine winger. But service was at a premium in Jamaica.

By pulling Thompson toward the middle as a lone withdrawn forward, the U.S. solves three of its deployment problems immediately. First, it creates space on the flank for Rubio Rubin, who will presumably join this team late after missing CONCACAF qualifying thanks to his club situation at Utrecht. Rubin adds a speed dynamic to this side that was missing in Jamaica, and he’s a no-brainer for the XI in New Zealand assuming he’s fit. Second, it addresses the lack of a true striker. Spencer is the only viable No. 9 in the discussion for the World Cup, and aside from a solid put-back goal in the final match, he didn’t look great in Jamaica. Finally, it acknowledges the shaky nature of the team’s No. 10 situation. Flores hardly looked ready for prime time as the creator carrying the load, and nearly all of his best moments on field came as a crackling live wire substitute. By allowing Flores, who can also play wide, to spring off the bench as a late game injection, you’ve acknowledged something Jamaica already told us.

The idea that Thompson can play this role is written in his movement. Every withdrawn forward has elements of the classic trequartista in his game, but generally with added mobility and close-quarters dribbling added to the inherent creativity the role demands. The false nine is often asked to airdrop directly into a thicket of defenders and midfielders without an immediate outlet. Thompson has the skill set to make that work. He’s the best dribbler on this team by miles, and his creative ideas are second to none. He’s not a classic No. 10, but neither is the false nine. He’s an amalgamation of several positions mashed into a singularity. If we’re honest about Thompson’s strengths, that drills to his core anyway.

We can compare any productive formation like this to a solar system with the false nine as its sun. As a constant force in the middle, his planets orbit around the space he’s created to both play off him and fill channels with timely runs. If you watched any of Romain Gall in Jamaica, he was crying out for interchanges and one-twos off the left. With no No. 10 and Hyndman filling a bizarre hybrid 6/8/10 role, it just wasn’t there. Rubin operates similarly. Those three pinging passes off one another like three submarines at close range making radar calls could well be a tremendous thing.

Perhaps the most exciting prospect about this formation is seeing Hyndman turned back into a proper box-to-box midfielder cut free of any one role.

(Excuse a brief side note: Note that I’m assuming Gedion Zelalem plays. This is hardly a certainty, but I’d say chances are trending upward. According to Ramos, he can’t even talk to Zelalem about it until March. But with the senior World Cup still four years away, I can hardly assume Jurgen Klinsmann is in a hurry to matriculate Zelalem to the senior level right now. Some time with the U20s at a proving group like the World Cup would make a lot of sense).

So with Zelalem (this could easily be Acosta) parked deep and knitting together the base of the attack, Hyndman is cut free to either buttress Zelalem’s efforts or step up to play ping-pong with the guys at the front. He has the quality to do both. It’s just about giving him options. His counterpart on the other side is the 11th man. I’ve slotted Gooch into that role because he’s a tricky dribbler, has a running motor and doesn’t make many mistakes. But that can change, so long as Gooch doesn’t see the center forward role again as a U20.

Finally, I’ve left the back line entirely intact from Jamaica. The U.S. finished the tournament with four consecutive shutouts, or 372 straight minutes without conceding. Given, the competition wasn’t incredible, but you don’t shuffle a defense with that much cohesiveness.

This formation is a risk. It’s not a traditional 4-3-3, and it’s certainly not the 4-4-2. But what are comfort zones if not a convenient excuse to deny risk? If you don’t assume some level of hazard, you run less chance of being The Nail That Sticks Out. But in this case, I think this is a highly calculated, extremely positive risk to take. It’s high time to shake the tree.