A former senior Shin Bet official who was involved in pushing for the 2002 legislation said that the agency had not pushed for Article 11 because officials believed lawmakers would “never allow such a draconian clause to pass.” But lawmakers “didn’t understand what it was about and nobody said anything,” added the former official, who insisted on anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence issues.

The former official added that after Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency employee, leaked details about the United States government’s bulk collection of data on American citizens, igniting a furor, “we all laughed, that what the American intelligence community was trying to hide, and what caused such an uproar among the American public, is so clearly written in Israeli law.”

Under that law, it is up to the head of the Shin Bet to determine how cellphone data is used. While the law authorizes its use for only six months, the Shin Bet director may reauthorize it. The director is required to report to the attorney general every three months and to the Knesset’s Secret Services Subcommittee yearly.

Since 2002, a former senior Justice Ministry official said, prime ministers have required cellphone companies to transfer to the agency a vast range of metadata about their subscribers. The official refused to say what categories of data were being provided or withheld, but metadata includes the identity of each subscriber, recipients or initiators of each call, payments made on the account, as well as geolocation information collected when phones communicate with cellular transmission towers.

Using cellphone data to combat the coronavirus requires government approval because the Security Agency Law limits the Shin Bet’s role to protecting Israel “against threats of terror, sabotage, subversion, espionage and exposure of state secrets.” It is permitted to act in other ways “vital to national security” but only with the approval of the cabinet and the Secret Services Subcommittee.