The heads of MI5, MI6,and GCHQ, will give evidence in public for the first time under plans to beef up the intelligence and security committee (ISC), which is responsible for monitoring their activities. Also for the first time, parliament will have a say in deciding the committee's membership.

These are among proposals being drawn up in what Sir Malcolm Rifkind, chairman of the ISC, describes as a "root and branch inquiry" into the future of the committee, which has come under increasing scrutiny. Rifkind, the Conservative MP for Kensington and former defence and foreign secretary, was appointed chairman after last year's general election.

Other issues also need to be addressed, he said in an interview with the Guardian. "Should [the security and intelligence agencies] have the power to decline to give information? The agencies accept that is no longer appropriate." Further, it was for ministers to decide what information should be kept secret, not the agencies. The agencies having that power amounts to a conflict of interest. "It can't be right," Rifkind said.

The ISC at present can only request information, not require it. And it meets only in private. "There is a serious discussion, including among the agencies, whether [the ISC could have] public sessions as well", Rifkind said. "There is a reasonable prospect next year they will probably want to do that," he added, pointing to previous speeches by public intelligence chiefs, including Jonathan Evans, director general of MI5, and Sir John Sawers, head of MI6.

The ISC reports to the prime minister, who can censor its reports, rather than to parliament. And members of the ISC, a mixture of peers and MPs, are handpicked by the prime minister and indoctrinated within a "ring of secrecy".

Rifkind suggests the ISC should become a "committee of parliament". Prospective members would be chosen on the assumption they would "know how to handle top secret information" and have the confidence of the security and intelligence agencies.

In future, a list of names would emerge and be published in the parliamentary order paper. There would not be open elections but individuals could be voted down, suggests Rifkind.

Rifkind said when the ISC was set up under the 1994 Intelligence Services Act, there was "intense nervousness" among the agencies that parliament should be subject to some kind of oversight. Even ministers were concerned. Yet the act had become out of date, he observed. The ISC's remit had extended to cover the defence intelligence staff, the joint intelligence committee and the new National Security Council.

It also conducted investigations into operations – something not envisaged in the 1994 act – for example, into the government's connivance in the secret rendition by the US of terror suspects, what MI5 knew about the 7/7 London suicide bombers, and the use of intelligence in the runup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The ISC reports into Iraq shed fresh light on how the Blair government was warned by the joint intelligence committee that military action against Iraq would increase the risk of terrorist attacks in Britain. But the failure of the security agencies to provide the ISC with information about the 7/7 terror plotters and what they knew about rendering and abusing terror suspects has contributed to increasingly widespread criticism that the committee lacks muscle.

The ISC's reports will still be vetted and passages redacted before they are published and it will continue to meet mainly in private. Its members will also in effect be vetted, though MPs could object to them. Parliament's role in scrutinising the activities of the security and intelligence agencies is far behind that of the US Congress.

Rifkind makes clear he believes there is a need to reassure the public. The test will be whether his reforms go beyond appearance and take on substance.