The narrative now cemented in the public imagination that Greece could be the "next Lehman Brothers" is, for the most part, largely overblown. There's no doubt that a Greek default would be incredibly painful. But while on the surface the analogy may seem apt – two bankrupt, systemically important players in search of bailouts – dig a little deeper and it becomes clear that the comparison is misguided and even misleading.

Over the last few days, bankers, politicians and journalists have competed for the prize of most dramatic-sounding Lehman-style analogy. A Greek bankruptcy, said European Central Bank executive board member Jürgen Stark, could "overshadow the effects of the Lehman bankruptcy"; Gary Jenkins, head of fixed-income research at Evolution Securities, has warned that "Greece could become the next Lehman's as investors move from one target to the next, just like they did in the banking crises of 2008"; while the head of the Eurogroup, Jean-Claude Juncker, suggested that offering Athens debt relief is akin to "playing with fire".

But, beyond the headline-grabbing rhetoric, the comparisons simply don't stack up. Firstly, the majority of those peddling this myth have a significant vested interest in avoiding a Greek default or restructuring. It was the European Central Bank that first floated the Lehman analogy. Why? Sheer self-interest. By propping up Greek banks and the Greek state, the ECB has taken on €190bn worth of Greek assets, which would face radical write-downs should Greece default.

Many commercial banks across Europe have joined the chorus of scaremongers ("liquidity will dry up", "contagion will spread", "savings will be wiped out", etc) for much the same reason. The banks' passion for more bailouts is not altruistic, but stems from the desire to ensure that profits remain private, while losses continue to be socialised.

But here lies the crucial difference. Unlike with Lehman, both governments and the financial markets have had over a year to prepare for a potential Greek default, with plenty of warnings leading up to last year's (first) breaking point. Even as late as February this year, investors could have walked away from Greek bonds with only 20% losses (as they continued to trade at 80% of their nominal value) – a good deal considering the mess Greece is in.

Lehman was an opaque institution riddled with complex inconsistencies and, combined with its misleading accounting practices, there was no clear picture of who was truly exposed to a bankruptcy (everyone, as it turned out). Admittedly, Greece fudged its numbers in order to join the euro, and continued to massage them, but exposures to and holdings of Greek debt are reasonably well documented and understood by comparison.

On top of this, the Lehman crisis was the tip of a huge iceberg. It revealed banks' huge exposures to the US mortgage market – large parts of which turned out to be bust. Again, note the contrast to Greece. The problems with the eurozone periphery are well documented but are also country specific. A Greek default would not reveal a new hidden world of risk. Neither are the connections to Greek debt within Europe's banking sector as substantial, despite remaining opaque. But rather than finding new ways to safeguard banks' exposure to Greece, shouldn't we really be asking why these banks haven't reduced their exposure to Greece and deleveraged?

Let's not kid ourselves – contagion remains a real risk. But let's consider some further points here. Firstly, Ireland and Portugal's funding for the next two years has been secured by their bailout packages, which are already in place, so they're already out of the market. Although there will be impacts on secondary markets, the impact would be felt less directly by the countries' government finances.

Secondly, the EU's sickest banks are already heavily reliant on ECB support to stay afloat, which is itself a problem, but their situation can hardly worsen. In contrast to the Lehman situation, where credit and liquidity dried up immediately, the ECB has existing mechanisms in place to deal with this, which should help absorb the impact.

In addition, there has been contagion, even with the original bailouts, as most people see a Greek default as inevitable. Therefore, contagion is still a significant risk even with a second bailout, particularly if Greece fails to meet the tough austerity measures imposed on it (not unlikely given the domestic outrage and the continuing failure to meet the original bailout conditions). Under that scenario we could be stuck with a second failed €100bn-plus bailout and massive contagion, with taxpayers left to foot the bill.

Ultimately, if a country with a GDP of only 2.5% of the European economy can bring down the entire system, that's probably a sign that the system is fundamentally flawed. Regrettably, politicians are using the misguided comparisons with Lehman Brothers as an excuse to ignore and perpetuate Europe's real problem: an unhealthy, undercapitalised banking system and a monetary union based on the premise that political leaders' commitment alone could make economic and democratic realities disappear.

Now that's what you call playing with fire.