Meanwhile, the most basic civilian services are already underfunded, with the economy growing at a slower pace than the rate of population growth . More than half of the population is considered below poverty line. That has become a national security concern, as support for the central government is tightly tied to the delivery of services — and that would be even more so immediately after a peace deal, with more people expecting an improvement in their lives when the war ends.

“A sudden and substantial reduction in civilian grants would risk a reversal of the gains that have been achieved, driving increased hardship and poverty,” said Henry Kerali, the World Bank country director for Afghanistan. “While Afghanistan is not expected to be reliant on grants forever, the pace of decline in grant support needs to reflect current realities.”

When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, there was little government infrastructure left after decades of conflict. The capacity to absorb the large amounts of money that came in — about $130 billion so far from the United States alone — was simply not there. Government corruption and a wasteful system of contracting and subcontracting, both inside Afghanistan and in Washington, created an inflated economy simply unrealistic for the means of the country.

Even 18 years later, nearly half of the international aid is still spent not through the Afghan government, which donors say is still marred by corruption, but rather through contracts where a major slice is simply lost on layers of handoffs and the costs of expensive international consultants brought in on projects. Often, the Afghan government has little idea of how much money is being spent at a particular time around the country in its name, struggling to keep tally of all the contracts.