Unlikely Odds

It is difficult for us to imagine a situation in which an army of a hundred thousand, outnumbered 8 to 1, could defeat their opponents (if one considers only that simple fact). During the American Civil War, for comparison, the Union outnumbered the Confederacy (at the highest estimates) 4 to 1. Facing these odds the Confederacy fought considerably well, they were better trained and better led. Confederate general Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson spoke of how a smaller force could defeat a larger one:

Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never let up in the pursuit so long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be destroyed by half their number. The other rule is, never fight against heavy odds, if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl your own force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics will win every time, and a small army may thus destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible.

(‘Stonewall’ Jackson’s advice on the conduct of battle was as true then as it is now. And is a perfectly fitting description of the events for the following battle to be analyzed, the Battle of Tannenberg)

But as the war continued general Grant realized that his superior Union numbers could simply overwhelm the Confederacy, and even the more adept Confederate forces could not sustain such a conflict. For a time, though, President Lincoln thought he was going to lose the war. How is it that the smaller and less resourceful Confederates did so well against the wealthier and more populous Union? The German military in WWI was also far outnumbered, against multiple world powers. But somehow won in many battles against incredible odds, and did well enough to convince the Allies that a conditional armistice was in order (although a heavy one), as opposed to a continuation of fighting.

The French-Russian War Plans

With the unification of greater Germany (Großdeutsche) in 1871 by Prussia came an uneasy France and Russia. This new German country had the highest population growth in Europe (which would exceed France’s population by over 20 million in 1914), had the largest industry in Europe (second globally only to the USA in steel production and railway building), and had the accomplished military of the time. France and Prussia had just finished a war in which Prussia was the victor and annexed a large portion of France’s territory, known as Alsace-Lorraine. After a defeat by Prussia, and now their unification with greater Germany, France was nervous.

The unified German-Empire’s Territory

France and Russia saw themselves as natural allies against the fast-growing German Empire. And as natural as their common interests were, so were their geographic positions naturally advantageous for a war against Germany. Surrounding Germany on it’s eastern and western borders, the two countries could take advantage of this fact in a two-front war. This would force Germany to divide its resources and attempt to defend itself against two attackers from opposing directions.

This natural advantage France and Russia had led them to sign a military convention in 1892 (which may be studied here). This convention was an agreement between the two countries to come to each other’s aid in the case of an attack by Germany or its allies. The agreement took advantage of this two-front circumstance by obligating France to immediately commit 1.3 million soldiers to the western border, and Russia 800 thousand soldiers to the eastern border of Germany.

This was the French and Russian war plan: Wage a two-front war and engage as quickly as possible. Divide the German forces between east and west and overwhelm them with superior numbers.

The German War Plan

When the French and Russians had signed their military convention in 1892, it was obvious what their general strategy was. Therefore, Germany had to come up with a plan to counter a two-front attack. In 1905, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen designed a strategy that has been called masterful by some and devastatingly miscalculated by others.

The Schlieffen Plan, it became to be known, committed nearly all of Germany’s military to the western front against France, leaving a single field army in the East. Germany would invade through Luxembourg and Belgium (violating its neutrality ensured by Britain, which is why Britain joined the fight), and would swing around from the North of France attempting to flank the French forces from the side and rear which were engaged by other German forces on their mutual border. This plan, Schlieffen hoped, would have France knocked out of the fight within six weeks. At which time, the German calculations had shown, the slow and sluggish Russian military would just be arriving on their Eastern border. By then the German military would have been victorious in the West and could focus on the Russian military to the East.

The Schlieffen Plan

This was the German war plan: Out-flank and out-maneuver French forces by invading through neutral Belgium as quickly as possible. Capture Paris and force a French surrender. Then utilize the extensive German rail system to transfer the military back to the Eastern front in time to fight the Russians.

This plan had the, arguably fatal, miscalculation that the Russians would take six weeks to arrive. In fact, the Russians arrived within two weeks. The Germans on the Eastern front were facing overwhelming odds of 8 to 1.

The Battlefield

In order to fully understand why the Germans had such a devastating victory over the Russians, the battlefield must be familiarized. The opening fights on the eastern front took place in an area called the Masurian Lakes