While everyone agrees that the threat from al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) has grown exponentially over the past year, it is unclear what precise direction the two groups will take in the future. No one can, of course, predict with certainty what will occur over the next twelve months, but there are indications from the past that might help us to understand the range of possibilities for future developments. While everyone agrees that the threat from al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) has grown exponentially over the past year, it is unclear what precise direction the two groups will take in the future. No one can, of course, predict with certainty what will occur over the next twelve months, but there are indications from the past that might help us to understand the range of possibilities for future developments.

The Islamic State

Given the spread of IS in Syria, the recent oaths of fealty to the Caliphate from new groups around the world, and the erosion of territory controlled by the group in Iraq, there seem to be five directions and one external action that the group might take.

1) The Islamic State turns to irregular warfare—continuing to hold territory in Syria, on the border between Syria and Iraq, and around Mosul, but returning to guerrilla fighting elsewhere.

2) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his command staff are killed, causing the group to splinter into warring factions.

3) Under pressure from the U.S.; regional states; and local actors like the Iraqi government, tribal groups, and the Kurds; IS loses control over most of its territory in Iraq while slowly losing ground to AQ’s al-Nusra Front in Syria.

4) IS is able to stabilize its position in Iraq and Syria and turns to a regional offensive to expand its power.

5) IS surges—expanding on a global scale, stealing members from AQ, and setting the stage for a no-holds-barred fight between the two groups.

6) Minor, but repeated, terrorist attacks inspired by the IS occur in Europe, the U.S., Canada, and the Middle East.

While many of these potential directions are mutually contradictory, it is also possible for some of them to occur simultaneously.

Al-Qaeda

The entire AQ network, meanwhile, has been growing around the world. The recent assault by the al-Nusra Front on the Syrian opposition, seizure of territory in Idlib and near Damascus, spread of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), multiplication of AQ-linked groups (and their growing power) in Libya, as well as the creation and attacks by al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), all suggest a group that is aggressively expanding its reach and capabilities.

For AQ high command and various branches, at least four possible directions and two terrorist opportunities emerge. As with the aforementioned possibilities for IS, some of these could happen simultaneously.

1) AQ and IS merge into a new organization dominated by AQ’s High Command in Afghanistan-Pakistan.

2) Al-Nusra Front, in cooperation with other groups, takes Damascus and declares an Emirate in Syria.

3) AQAP seizes control of Aden and most of southern Yemen, then launches an assault on the capital of Sana’a and the Houthis.

4) As the U.S. draws down in Afghanistan, AQ is able to reestablish a safe haven in that country.

The two terrorist possibilities include the most dangerous courses of action in the near-term:

1) AQIS carries out a mass casualty attack on India.

2) Through the “Khorasan Group,” AQ manages to carry out a terrorist attack against the U.S. or Europe.

Islamic State Possibilities

1) IS turns to irregular warfare—continuing to hold territory in Syria, on the border between Syria and Iraq, and around Mosul, but returning to guerrilla fighting elsewhere.

Discussion: If the situation in Iraq continues to improve, and IS is slowly but surely extirpated from the territory that it has controlled since this summer, then there is always the possibility that the group will revert to guerrilla warfare. By embedding itself in the population, IS will be returning to its roots as an insurgency and ensuring that its fighters will be as difficult as possible to deal with in Iraq.

Possible results: Because Iraqi government forces have never been trained in counterinsurgency warfare, and the U.S. is committed to keeping its boots off the ground, it will be impossible for Iraq to deal effectively with a resurgent IS guerrilla campaign. Casualties could spiral, territory thought safe and under government control could become once again open to terrorist and insurgency assault, and more Sunnis might be attracted to the IS option. The country could become, once again, the terrible place that it was in 2006, and this will present the U.S. with two policy options: to abandon the country to its fate, or to put more forces into the theater and begin a counterinsurgency with additional effort to counter the sectarian civil war. The first option could have three potential bad outcomes: the regional spread of the sectarian war; the regional spread of IS; and a serious upset in oil markets. The second option would entail domestic political damage and the possibility of casualties for American troops once again.

2) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his command staff are killed, causing the group to splinter into warring factions.

Discussion: Given the position of al-Baghdadi as “Caliph,” his death—and that of his potential replacements—could set up a fight over succession that would consume the group in infighting for a very long time.

Possible results: This is, in some ways, one of the best possible outcomes for the entire world. By the time an extremist leader manages to rise to the top, the group could be seriously damaged not just in Iraq and Syria, but also around the world. Its image would certainly be marred, making it less attractive to potential recruits. At the same time, however, if al-Nusra Front is able to take advantage of such an opportunity, it might be able to scoop up IS territory and members throughout Syria, strengthening that AQ affiliate.

3) Under pressure from the U.S.; regional states; and local actors like the Iraqi government, tribal groups, and the Kurds; IS loses control over most of its territory in Iraq while slowly losing ground to AQ’s Nusra Front in Syria.

In Syria, al-Nusra Front could continue to seize wide swathes of territory, making it more attractive to recruits while overshadowing the earlier gains of IS, which might remain bogged down in Kobani.

Discussion: While less likely than other outcomes, it is possible that the current level of effort put into defeating IS will continue to show results in Iraq, especially if the group insists on fighting in a more or less conventional way. This plays into the strengths of U.S. effort at this point, as well as those of our partners. In Syria, al-Nusra Front could continue to seize wide swathes of territory, making it more attractive to recruits while overshadowing the earlier gains of IS, which might remain bogged down in Kobani.

Possible results: This is, again, a good outcome for the region and the world. It assumes, however, two things: first, that IS will never realize the weakness of its current tactics in Iraq and adapt accordingly by returning to its guerrilla roots; second, that the group will not give up on taking Kobani.

It is also very unlikely that the Iraqi fighting forces will be capable of the high intensity warfare necessary to take the city of Mosul without outside aid. This will present the U.S. again with two possibilities: to leave the city and its inhabitants in IS hands or to put boots on the ground to help with an assault.

4) IS is able to stabilize its position in Iraq and Syria and turns to regional terrorism to expand its power.

Discussion: Given the engagement of so much of the region and outside powers like the U.S., this again seems unlikely, but it is possible that IS will be able to slowly regain its position in Anbar, where it has been carrying out a serious offensive, and stabilize its borders in northern Iraq. In Syria, the group is in better condition and might be able to take the final government holdout in Dayr al-Zawr (an important military base), and continue its spread southward toward Damascus.

Possible results: If IS is able to prevent further losses in Iraq while maintaining its territorial growth in Syria, the group might be encouraged to spread through terrorism into Jordan, Lebanon, and elsewhere in the region. This course of action depends on the group being helped out by other events, such as: Iraqi forces carrying out an assault on Mosul without direct U.S. military assistance, leading to failure and thus restoring IS to the appearance of invulnerability; the U.S. failing to provide sufficient aid to Sunnis in Anbar province to fight off the spread of IS and to let Sunnis know that we care about their lives (there have been multiple reports of massacres of Sunnis who have been fighting IS in Anbar); the U.S. and its regional partners being unable to find a way to attack IS in Syria, allowing it free rein in that country. Any of these contingent events could help to resuscitate the image of IS and once again make it seem worthy of the title “Caliphate.”

5) IS surges globally, stealing members from AQ and setting the stage for a no-holds-barred fight between the two groups.

Discussion: This seems the least likely scenario, but it is still possible. If IS not only holds off losses, but is actually able to expand in both Iraq and Syria—using insurgent and conventional tactics—it might feel strong enough to take on al-Nusra Front directly while making another appeal to AQ members around the world. This could cause a global war between the groups.

Ideally, a worldwide fight between AQ and IS would lead to their mutual exhaustion and collapse without causing any collateral damage. In the real world, this is unlikely to happen and there will be many innocents killed in any fighting.

Possible results: Ideally, a worldwide fight between AQ and IS would lead to their mutual exhaustion and collapse without causing any collateral damage. In the real world, this is unlikely to happen and there will be many innocents killed in any fighting. It also seems likely that one group or the other will emerge victorious, convincing the losers to join up with the winner and fight on for the cause. If this sort of global infighting did occur, however, it could give the world a breathing space of months or even years to find ways to better combat both organizations.

6) Minor, but repeated, terrorist attacks inspired by IS occur in Europe, the U.S., Canada, and the Middle East.

Discussion: Given past history, the most likely course of action for IS terrorism is attacks by lone wolf jihadis who are inspired by the group. However, writing off entirely the potential for a larger scale attack—allowing for the number of foreign fighters the group has attracted—would be foolhardy.

Possible results: In just the past week there have been a series of lone wolf attacks in France. Even if these particular attacks have no direct connection to IS, they demonstrate the sort of terrorism that the organization attempted to provoke in a video published just one day before the first attack.

Of course, the group also hopes to inspire these sorts of attacks on a global basis against the countries fighting it in Iraq and Syria. If the group is able to persuade radicalized individuals to carry out a large and continuous number of attacks in multiple countries, it could discourage some from joining the fight while convincing others to combat the group. It therefore seems likely that only a mass casualty terrorist attack (an improbable but high impact event) would be able to force members of the coalition to quit the fight.

Al-Qaeda Possibilities

AQ insurgencies:

1) AQ and IS merge into a new organization dominated by AQ’s High Command in Afghanistan-Pakistan.

Discussion: Given the news reports of local cooperation between AQ and IS, as well as the stated desire by AQ to reconcile with the group, it seems likely that at least part of IS will end up rejoining the organization that gave birth to them. This would be even more likely if Baghdadi and his command staff are killed.

...even a partial unification [between AQ and IS] could be dangerous, since it would still add significantly to the power of the al-Nusra Front and make it far more likely that the taking of Damascus would succeed.

Possible results: The full unification of AQ with IS would be a disaster for the region and eventually the world, especially if IS territory comes under AQ control. Given the bad blood between the two organizations and the likelihood of infighting if al-Baghdadi is killed, a full reconciliation seems improbable, although it should not be ruled out entirely. However, even a partial unification could be dangerous, since it would still add significantly to the power of the al-Nusra Front and make it far more likely that the taking of Damascus (outlined below) would succeed. Much of the potential success for al-Nusra Front in this scenario hinges on the groups unifying without serious infighting or the collapse entirely of IS into warring factions.

2) Al-Nusra Front, in cooperation with other groups, takes Damascus and declares an Emirate in Syria dominated by AQ.

Discussion: As the Institute for the Study of War has shown, Nusra Front and its allies have made steady progress in encircling Damascus over the past few months. The leader of Nusra Front was also recorded this summer discussing the possibility of creating an “emirate” (i.e. Islamic territory) in Syria. Taking Damascus could be a milestone big enough for the declaration of this state.

Possible results: The fall of Damascus to al-Nusra Front and its allies would give the group—and AQ—an unprecedented boost, overshadowing the conquest of Mosul by IS and setting up AQ as the undisputed leader of the global jihad. While it might seem unlikely that Assad’s allies would allow this to happen, both Russia and Iran have challenges on their own borders (i.e. Ukraine and Iraq) that they might consider far more important and deterring them from coming to Assad’s rescue.

In addition to setting up al-Nusra Front and AQ for further spread into Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere in the region, such a take-over would also give the group the opportunity to compete for the ideal of the “Caliphate” by declaring an emirate run by AQ. Syria would act then as a rallying point for recruits and a safe haven in the center of the Middle East for AQ to plot and plan its next insurgent and terrorist moves.

3) AQAP seizes control of Aden and most of southern Yemen, then launches an assault on the capital of Sana’a and the Houthis.

Discussion: In September, the Hadi government in Yemen collapsed under assault from the Huthis (a rebel group made up of Zaydis—a form of Shi’ism) and the capital of Sana’a also fell to the insurgents. AQAP has taken advantage of this opportunity to spread rapidly across the south of the country and seems poised to hold territory as it did before the Yemeni government offensive in 2012. In 2015, it might be strong enough to carry out a full-on assault of the capital and to use the rallying cry of Sunni vs. Shi’a, already a part of the group’s propaganda, to win recruits around the region to its cause.

Possible results: There is a growing likelihood that the entire Middle East—and South Asia—could be consumed with a sectarian war, as Sunnis and Shi’a choose to fight for their co-religionists and ignore national affiliations and boundaries. An offensive by AQAP on Sana’a might act as an impetus for the outbreak of this regional sectarian war. In addition, if AQAP is able once again to hold territory, it could use this terrain to plan and train for attacks against the U.S. and others.

4) As the U.S. draws down in Afghanistan, AQ is able to reestablish a safe haven in that country.

Discussion: The Long War Journal has been carefully following reports of the return of AQ to Afghanistan. Given the weaknesses of the central government in that country, and the strength of the Taliban, it seems possible that, as the U.S. walks out the door, AQ will be able to return to reclaim the areas in Afghanistan that were once used as its only safe haven.

Possible results: While there are many places that could be used by AQ to plan attacks against the U.S. (this article does not even discuss Libya), the return of the organization to Afghanistan should be understood as particularly dangerous. The central command node of the group is apparently still located somewhere in South Asia, and control of territory in Afghanistan would give it more protection from U.S. interference than would be possible in other, more accessible, areas of the world.

AQ terrorism:

1) AQIS carries out a mass-casualty attack on India.

Discussion: The creation of AQIS, a new affiliate of AQ that claims to represent Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Burma, brings the potential for serious terrorism and perhaps even insurgency to the entire subcontinent. Attacks in Karachi and elsewhere have already been claimed by the group, and it seems very likely that AQIS will attempt to carry out a spectacular attack in India itself.

Possible results: There are many ways that this sort of attack could occur, but undoubtedly the most dangerous for the entire world would be if AQIS were able to find serving Pakistani officers to carry out the assault. One of the attacks in Karachi claimed by AQIS—at least according to news reports—employed serving Pakistani naval officers. If AQIS were able to find officers to carry out a mass casualty attack on India, this might set off a crisis between Pakistan and India to rival that of December 2001.

2) Through the Khorasan Group, AQ manages to carry out a terrorist attack against the U.S. or Europe.

Discussion: The revelation in September of an “imminent threat” posed by the Khorasan Group was a surprise to the entire world. News reports suggest that the group has been working with both al-Nusra Front and AQAP to plan some sort of terrorist attack on aviation, and that the air strikes carried out by the U.S. to deal with the threat have, up to this point, been ineffective.

Possible results: If the Khorasan Group survived the attempts by the U.S. to deal with this imminent threat, then AQ might be able to carry out a significant attack on the U.S., Europe, or elsewhere in 2015. This possibility is, of course, dependent on the failure of future air strikes or other actions taken by the U.S. and its allies in Syria. In addition to the horrific loss of life, there are other significant implications of a successful terrorist attack by AQ: it would burnish the group’s image, increase its recruiting potential among radicalized youth, undercut the appeal of IS, and return to AQ the undisputed leadership of the global jihad.