The interests of places like Portland that view greater global economic integration as an opportunity, not a threat, have been almost completely eclipsed this year. Threatening tariffs and walls, Donald Trump insists that trade and immigration are undermining wages and devouring jobs (while also presenting migration from Mexico and the Middle East as a security threat). Clinton has defended immigration, but effectively surrendered to Trump on trade. Clinton has not only renounced her conditional early support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership that President Obama negotiated with 11 Asian nations, but has also refused to defend the North American Free Trade Agreement that her husband Bill Clinton signed—an agreement Trump routinely calls “the single worst trade deal ever approved in this country.”

From both a political and policy perspective, Clinton’s trade surrender makes little sense. Trade has prompted many of her worst moments across the three debates. While Trump has never appeared more confident than when he’s denouncing TPP or NAFTA, Clinton has been tongue-tied. Unwilling to make the persuasive alternative case for expanding trade, she has been reduced to limply suggesting that it doesn’t cause as many problems as Trump says. Not exactly a rallying cry.

Clinton’s suspicion of trade isn’t just a tactical maneuver: Veterans of the Bill Clinton administration say that internally she was always dubious about pursuing NAFTA. But her resistance to expanded trade reflects outdated assumptions about the Democratic coalition. As recently as 2004, Democratic and Republican voters were almost exactly as likely to view globalization as good for America overall, and international trade specifically as beneficial for the U.S. economy, consumers and their own living standards, according to annual surveys by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

But the latest Chicago Council survey, released last month, shows that Democratic partisans are now much more likely than Republicans to view globalization and trade as a positive force on all those fronts. (Over two-thirds of Democrats now say trade benefits both the overall U.S. economy and their own living standards.) That reflects the movement of blue-collar whites largely skeptical of trade into the GOP, and their replacement in the Democratic coalition by minorities, Millennials, and college-educated whites, who are all more welcoming of it. (Millennials, on pace to become the electorate’s largest generation by 2020, are also the most open to the world, expressing more support than their elders in the Chicago Council survey for both trade and immigration.)

With Trump centering his campaign on mobilizing working-class whites, Clinton may rely even more than previous Democratic nominees on these pro-trade groups—even as she further sublimates their views. Similarly, given Trump’s strength in small-town America, in all of the big swing states, Clinton will be depending on big margins in metropolitan areas where trade is generally prized; virtually all big-city Democratic mayors have backed the Asian trade deal.