Earthquakes cannot be predicted. The best that scientists can do at the moment is to calculate the probability of an earthquake occurring – and that calculated probability may be subject to change, as more accurate data is acquired. But in Italy, six geoscientists and one government official have been charged with manslaughter for failing to provide adequate warning of a coming earthquake. The L'Aquila earthquake in April 2009 killed 309 people.

The country is located along active tectonic plate boundaries. In Italy, as well as in many other earthquake-prone areas such as Chile and Japan, constant rumblings of the earth remind citizens of the threat. In contrast, here where I live, on the west coast of Canada, the Pacific oceanic plate and the North American continental plate are locked. Our region is seismically silent, save for the giant megathrust quake that hits every few centuries or so.

In late 2008 and early 2009, a series of small quakes that shook Italy's Abruzzo region had locals worried. The concern was high enough that, on 31 March 2009, a meeting of the major risks committee was convened. The six scientists and the one government official who have been charged were all present. The scientists concluded that, in spite of the recent increase in tremors, there was no scientific basis for determining that a major earthquake was (or was not) imminent. At a press conference immediately following that meeting, the government official Bernardo di Bernardinis is quoted as having said "the scientific community tells me there is no danger, because there is an ongoing discharge of energy. The situation looks favourable."

While to a layperson, those statements may appear identical, to a scientist they are not. The scientists concluded that they had no evidence indicating an increased risk. But the message given to the public was that there was no increased risk. So who, if anyone, is to blame?

I look at this situation not only as an earth scientist, but as an earth scientist whose home is perched above the Cascadia subduction zone, in a region woefully under-prepared for the scale of disaster that will come. The science is, right now, imperfect. I know the probability of the giant Cascadia quake going off in my lifetime is about one in three. It could happen tonight, as I write this article. Or it could happen in 50 years, or in 200. Scientists are working hard to move from calculating probability to being able to predict – but it is not yet certain that earthquake prediction will ever be possible.

The fundamental issue here is communication. It is rare that scientists communicate directly with the public. In the Italian case, it was a government official who attempted to communicate the scientists' message to the press, and who seems to have twisted it along the way. In many instances, science is reported in the press by journalists who are not themselves scientists – and I have seen countless instances where the "science" being reported was clearly wrong, misunderstood by the reporter.

However, the blame does not rest entirely upon the scientists and journalists. A substantial portion of the public does not have sufficient grounding in basic sciences to understand the scientific information that is presented. This only widens the void between scientists and the public, forcing scientists to use intermediaries such as journalists or public relations personnel. And it also forces those media personnel to simplify concepts or ideas, often to the point where they are no longer strictly accurate. Somehow, whether intentionally or accidentally, this seems to be what happened in Italy.

However, I see a similar scenario developing here, on the west coast of North America: the understanding that scientists have of the risk is not being clearly communicated to the public. And, since our earth does not issue rumbling reminders of the risk, the public is not demanding information.

The parties who work in emergency services, from the scientists to the emergency planners to the government officials, must strike a difficult balance. They must inform the public both of risks and of the actions they can undertake to minimise those risks. But they do not want to cause needless fear, and they most certainly do not want to issue false warnings – both for the financial cost of needless evacuations and for the subsequent lack of trust following any history of "crying wolf".

The challenges of conveying accurate scientific information, along with the uncertainties that accompany it, are substantial. However, shooting the messenger is not the solution. Scientists need to be proactive, and to communicate clearly to the public when health or safety is at stake. In Italy, it was not a scientist who relayed the scientists' conclusions to the press. It appears that the scientists did not make any specific effort to correct misconceptions that their group's spokesperson may have given to the press, and there is probably a lesson to be learned from that.

But indicting these scientists on charges of manslaughter can serve only one purpose: that of discouraging scientists everywhere from speaking to the public at all.