Over the past couple of years, American labs have been caught mishandling biological samples that require extreme care: things like smallpox, anthrax, and avian flu. Largely in response to this, the White House issued a memo this past October 29 that outlined its vision of our future biosecurity and safety.

But in last week's Science, a trio of academics from Stanford lamented that the memo's approach was insufficient. Their exact criticism: “It grafts recommendations onto inadequate institutional structures and fails to address underlying systemic needs.”

When those assorted labs screwed up in their own distinctive ways, each was shut down and reviewed on a narrow, individualized basis. It is definitely great that the White House recognized that a more systematic, centralized approach is necessary but, according to this critique, they have not provided it.

Within individual agencies, those in charge of managing biological risk are those with expertise in biology, not those with expertise in regulation, risk management, or governance. The NIH—the largest funding agency for biological research—is also tasked with assessing and managing biological risk. In addition to being an enormous conflict of interest, this can allow experts to dismiss the valid criticisms of outsiders.

Further Reading After biosafety lapses, US halts funding for work modifying virus targets

Yes, molecular biologists have a good history. They heeded the restrictions on recombinant DNA technology laid out at the Asilomar meeting in 1975 and have more recently sought a moratorium on using CRISPR-Cas9 technology to modify the human germline (at least until more research is done). But the authors contend that scientists are probably as unable to regulate themselves as Wall Street bankers, police forces, or any other insular group whose technical and specialized knowledge gives them a feeling of untouchability.

Other high-risk activities are regulated in a much more centralized manner. The nuclear power industry has two independent authorities that provide standards for, and monitor the safety of, nuclear plants. The transportation industry also has different government organizations that oversee railroads and aviation. Rather than being redundant, these have independent, non overlapping jurisdictions to avoid conflicts of interest and mitigate bureaucratic complexities and inefficiencies.

Likewise, the authors argue, there should be a government official overseeing a committee that will anticipate and hopefully manage the risks of biotechnologies. Of course it will need the power to enforce its recommendations and guidelines. It will also need to be independent from, but work in tandem with, relevant agencies like the NIH and the US Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Homeland Security.

Asilomar was a responsible, admirable, and successful case of self-regulation. But genetic engineering has come a long way since 1975; DIY-bio types can find genetic sequences online and cut and paste them almost with impunity at this point. In order to both avoid tragic accidents and perhaps the equivalent tragedy of halting promising avenues of research, our country needs to set up a national oversight, standard setting, and enforcement body to manage potential biological threats.

Science, 2015. DOI: 10.1126/science.aad8849 (About DOIs).

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