It seems that there is an Awlaki in Yemen who runs a refrigerator shop, and that Yemenis may care more about this man and his fridges than about the New Mexico-born cleric who made it near the top of America's most wanted list.

What threat did Awlaki really pose to the U.S.? In death, as in life, probably not much. Though the Yemen-based branch of al-Qaeda (known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP) has been tied to recent attempted terrorist attacks the U.S., those attacks have all failed. And even those failures might have had little to do with Awlaki, a man with no operational experience, battlefield experience, or skillset known to extend beyond shouting into a webcam and posting to YouTube.

Whether or not those web-based pronouncements change anything is still up for debate. If they do, the impact was -- and will remain -- limited to web-surfing Westerners. "His many works will not die with him so his impact on the Western jihadi movement will not wane," Brandeis University researcher Aaron Zelin wrote in an email. "He is an enigmatic figure, which is why I believe so many struggle to fully comprehend his true stature (either influential or non-influential)."

Assuming that AQAP does pose a threat, that threat comes from experienced officers like AQAP emir Nasir al-Wihayshi, top military officer Qasim al-Raymi, and top AQAP ideological officer Ibrahim bin Sulayman al-Rubaysh. Battle-hardened or at least better known among the fields of potential Arab recruits, all three are still alive. As straight-talking Bush-era Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend confirmed this morning on CNN, Awlaki was not believed to have run either AQAP or its operations.

There is, however, an appropriate irony to the U.S. so heavily pursuing Awlaki, a man whose actual importance never appeared to come close to either his ego or his image in the U.S. Al-Qaeda these days is better at hype than at anything else; at taking credit beyond its actions and projecting its name beyond its actual reach. No one exemplified that better than Awlaki. He blustered, he threatened, he issued declarations and warnings. In the end, he convinced few fellow Arabs to listen; even his colleagues in Yemen's al-Qaeda branch never gave him a very prominent role. But he did manage to convince the U.S. government of his importance -- how we may never know, as the U.S. declared its evidence against Awlaki secret -- and it cost him his life.

We want to hear what you think about this article. Submit a letter to the editor or write to letters@theatlantic.com.