One of the things I’ve done for fun the last few years is attend the SABR Analytics conference that takes place in Arizona during Spring Training. Though this year’s conference was sponsored by the Rockies, unlike the prior two years, the Rockies didn’t have representatives on any of the panels. However, the Rockies players were often mentioned during the conference. Carlos Gonzalez‘s name popped up quite a few times on the subject of hardest hit balls. There was also news that Charlie Blackmon was trying to get more information about spin rate and other Statcast data, which he had mentioned is something he was interested in at Rockies FanFest. Then, of course, there were quite a few references to Coors Field in addition to the effect, if any (Sorry, Trevor Story!), the new fences would have at Coors Field. So, overall, the conference was far from starved on Rockies content.

While there, I had the chance to meet and talk quite a bit with Voros McCracken. He originated the concept of Defense Independent Pitching Statistics (DIPS). His basic theory was that pitchers have little effect over hit balls once they are in play. To better evaluate pitching performance, he suggested, it was best to focus on areas the pitcher had direct control of, such as walks, strikeouts and home runs. Many metrics and concepts today such as BABIP (Batting Average on Balls in Play) and FIP (Fielding Independent Pitching), evolved from his work. Since its inception, the theory has been refined as other researchers have investigated his findings. One presentation that he and I were looking forward to was Brian Cartwright’s presentation on “Solving DIPS by Deconstructing BABIP“. I’ve known Brian online for years, back since his Baseball Prospectus Idol days. For the real stat-savvy of our readers, Brian created the Oliver Database, a projection system used by FanGraphs as well as other projection systems that predict the performance of what college and foreign-league players would do in Major League Baseball. He knows his numbers, and Voros and I were both eager to see what he had to say about DIPS.

The focus of Cartwright’s presentation was that BABIP is a noisy stat because it’s made up of a lot of different things, such as how hard a ball is hit and where a ball is hit. He believes that there are some elements that pitchers actually have some control of, such as the vertical angle of a hit ball. Other aspects, he believed the hitter has more control of, such as exit velocity. This is a fascinating, very deep presentation with a lot of concepts being discussed. The math is pretty advanced, but Brian methodically steps through each part of the process he uses. Feel free to click the audio, flip through the slides and listen in.

Here is the slideshow of Cartwright’s Presentation (PowerPoint Required).

http://www.rockieszingers.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/RP08-Cartwright-2016-SABR-Analytics.mp3

By the way, don’t get frustrated. I didn’t get every piece of it the first time I saw and heard it either. That’s how much neat stuff there is in it.

The part that got my mind churning was his comment on how groundball pitchers give up shorter flyballs than flyball pitchers. Here’s a screenshot of that slide.

Notice how the Pittsburgh Pirates’ Andrew McCutchen gave up the highest hit rate on flyballs and line drives in the league? Is that due to a lack of range for one of the fastest guys in the league? Nope, Cartwright didn’t think so. He felt it had to do with the depth the Pirates outfield played at. He cited that since the Pittsburgh Pirates have the highest groundball rate in the league, they announced that they’ll be playing their outfield at a shorter depth so that they can convert more of those short flyballs and line drives into outs. As current Pirates manager (and ex-Rockies manager) Clint Hurdle said, “When we were reviewing the numbers last year, there was so much collateral damage done in front of us last year. Balls that fell in, extra bases that were taken [as outfielders were] trying to get to balls, that it was glaringly apparent that we could make an adjustment on our end.” Apparently, the Pirates think that positioning matters too.

Third on Cartwright’s slide of hits allowed was Charlie Blackmon. And no, that’s not a dig at Blackmon. Many Rockies outfielders have rated poorly on defensive metrics, in part, because of how many hits Coors Field allows. In recent years, the problem may be even more exaggerated as the Rockies have focused on acquiring groundball pitchers to try to counteract the altitude at Coors Field. Part of it has worked. Coors Field still gives up home runs, but nowhere near as extreme as it used to. However, the tradeoff is that Coors Field is the park that gives up the most base hits and the second most extra-base hits. Could the Rockies, by working on their home run problem, created an additional problem by acquiring pitchers that give up so many hits? Also in my mind was a question, “Do the Rockies outfielders adjust their positioning not just based on the batter, but on the Rockies pitcher? And if so, what adjustments do they make?”

My initial hunch was that they did. We already know that they are using shift data in the positioning of their infield. In order to do so, they must have spray charts. So I assume they had spray charts for what opposing hitters do in the outfield. Wouldn’t they then also have charts on where Rockies pitchers tend to allow flyballs and line drives?

That also led to another, kind of simple question. “How do major league outfielders know how deep to play?” After all, it’s a big outfield out there. Unlike the infield, where you have nearby visual markers such as the foul lines, the individual bases and the grass/dirt creases, how does the centerfielder, left fielder and right fielder judge how deep or shallow to play? All they have to look at is grass. If a spray chart says that Pitcher X gives up often gives up flyballs to left field that land from 250 to 280 feet from home plate, how does the left fielder know where 250 to 280 feet is? Apparently, to help outfielders locate where to position themselves, the Pirates painted dots in the grass during Spring Training.

Since I happened to be in Arizona for the conference and Salt River Fields was just a cab ride away, I was able to get the opportunity to ask some of the Rockies outfielders about how they position themselves.

Charlie Blackmon takes the Rockies pitchers into account, “If a guy throws real hard and no one’s catching up, I’ll play on the opposite field size and vice versa. Some guys like to throw different things in different counts and I’ll take that into account. There’s a lot of factors that go into every situation. I don’t move that much, I’m not moving 40-50 feet. It might be one step, it might be eight or nine steps.”

Brandon Barnes also based his positioning on both the pitcher and the hitter’s responses. He said, “It depends on the hitter. You’ve got to look at our pitcher. Is he a guy that throws harder, versus a guy that’s a little more crafty? I like to go off swings and tendencies. I wouldn’t go out there and play DJ LeMahieu pull. DJ’s really good at hitting the ball the other way so I would shade that way. I like to look at the tendencies and what the pitcher likes to pitch. So if the pitcher likes to pitch in, I’m probably not going to play it the other way. If he’s a power guy I take a couple steps back or a leadoff guy, maybe a couple steps in. It’s mainly reading swings, reading the approach of the hitter, and off of our pitcher.”

Carlos Gonzales tries to follow the centerfielder’s lead. He said, “I play with my centerfielder. When you’re a corner guy, you want to be in a good spot, comfortable with your centerfielder. It depends on who is hitting of course, but you don’t want to be so far away from the guy right next to you. That’s my mentality because it’s the centerfielder who has the most information, he can see whether the pitch will be in or out. He knows more so I try to follow him as much as possible. Of course when you get together with the coaches, we may have more information on some hitter and if he wants to move me a little bit, I’m always open to that.”

Most of the conversation about depth was based more on what type of hitter was at the plate than who the Rockies pitcher was. That pitcher was more important in determining which direction the outfielders would shade while the batter’s power was a bigger factor in outfield depth. As Barnes responded, “Not very much. It more dictates on if he’s a power hitter or contact type of hitter. That’s where I’ll play.”

Yet, depth was still a factor that goes through each outfielder’s mind. Gonzalez stated, “Every pitch I want to know where the fence is, how far away is the line and how far away is the center fielder. If it’s a power guy who can drive the ball to the opposite field, I’m a right fielder. You want to make sure you get over as much as possible. Same thing with a slap hitter, a leadoff hitter who just flips the ball.” Sometimes, he’ll adjust “A few steps unless it’s a guy who is really wearing me out a certain way, then you take more than a few steps. You kind of exaggerate a little more because he’s always worn you out that way. That’s the only situation when you step out of the box. Otherwise we’re pretty comfortable and we trust the coach’s information, the front office’s information. It makes it easier for us as a player. Not a lot of times you’ll be in the wrong spot but if it happens, you have to tip your cap because the guy did something he normally doesn’t do.”

Barnes also added, “I peek back to see how far back the fence is or how close the fence is. How much grass I have to cover in front of me. Usually I want to take away an extra base hit over a single so I play right in the middle. I don’t play shallow.”

Blackmon also adjusts his positioning based on other factors, “Do they look aggressive swinging the bat, how much power do they have? What’s the score of the game? How many outs are there?” And, echoing what Barnes had said, Blackmon considers “Can we afford to give up an extra base hit right now?”

And, in part, that’s a big factor in what it comes down to. How many singles turned into outs would be worth trading for a double or *gasp* a triple?

We can thoughtcraft it a bit. Let’s assume that more flyballs and line drives land in front of an outfielder than go over their head. This makes sense since there are more singles to the outfield than doubles and triples to the outfield.

Let’s also assume that Rockies outfielders played about ten feet shallower than they normally do. By moving in that ten feet, at worst, they may be able to catch one ball that previously would’ve landed for a single. In exchange, they give up a chance that a ball that would’ve been an out now lands for a double. There’s also the chance that a ball that lands between outfielders that would have been a single now would become a double as it scoots through the gap. However, since there are more balls that fall in front of outfielders than ones that go over an outfielder’s head, the chance of a former out falling in for a double is much less than the chance of a single now becoming an out.

Any doubles or triples that would’ve occurred when the Rockies played their outfielders at standard depth would’ve still been doubles or triples if the Rockies outfielders played a bit shallower.

Two batters into an inning, it makes sense that a double and an out is better than two singles, especially because two singles has a chance of being a first and third situation with zero outs. By that line of thinking, even a triple and an out is better than two singles and no outs.

If we want to skip the thoughtcraft and go just on the math, with no outs and no runners on base, multiple different systems suggest a double is worth about 60% more than a single and a triple is worth slightly more than two singles. That doesn’t count, though, the value for converting one of those now-caught singles into an out.

Now, John Dewan from Baseball Info Solutions (who literally write The Fielding Bible), believes that playing shallow actually costs center fielders more runs than it saves. However, when his study was done in 2013, it looked at all types of pitchers and not just groundball pitchers. If we know that certain pitchers tend to give up shorter flyballs, then perhaps it does make sense to play shallow only when certain pitchers are on the mound.

So, just on theory, it seems playing shallower has some risk, but it can be outweighed by the rewards. Yet, back to the original topic of this post, if we know that certain pitchers tend to give up shorter flyballs, then the risk is mitigated. If the pitcher is a groundball pitcher, playing shallow would increase the chance of an outfielder getting an out and decrease the chance that the shallow outfielder allows an extra base hit over his head.

Let’s see what that theory might look like in practice. Let’s take a look at the types of hit balls that Jorge De La Rosa allowed in 2015. This ignores home runs (which positioning would not help with) and groundballs. It looks merely at what line drives and flyballs were turned into outs versus what landed in play for a hit (with the caveat that some line drives also look like groundballs).

While not an extreme groundball pitcher in the Aaron Cook mold, De La Rosa gives up groundballs more often than he gives up line drives and flyballs. There’s a pretty consistent band from 230-270 feet from the plate where balls are landing in for hits. Charlie sets up in about the 330 foot range. Also, in terms of pull versus away, note how many doubles De La Rosa gives up down the left field line.

Let’s draw a bubble around the outs that Charlie Blackmon made on Jorge De La Rosa’s flyballs and line drives.

Now let’s move that bubble closer to the plate by about fifty feet (Sorry, Charlie!).

You can see that Charlie would end up in range of a heck of a lot of those light yellow singles, though he ends up out of range of two balls two deep right and one to center field that he previously caught. Perhaps he still gets to that area on future balls if they’re towering flyballs. Perhaps not. But look at how many potential outs that he is now in range of. Granted, some of those line drives were so low liners that even the new positioning would help with, but quite a few of those would become catchable. Charlie might not even need to move in 50 feet, but even 20 feet might make a huge amount of difference.

Furthermore, Buster Olney wrote about whether the Rockies should consider using a fourth outfielder in some situations. The Rockies could go softball style and use a short leftfielder-type of player when Jorge De La Rosa pitches, setting him up at around 250 feet from home plate in left center. According to ESPN Stats and Info, among Rockies pitchers, Jorge De La Rosa gave up the highest percentage of hit balls down the left field line. A short left fielder would allow the actual Rockies left fielder to play closer to the line to guard against those doubles.

We can even dip into this a bit more. If we look at Jorge De La Rosa’s batted balls at Coors Field… well… you almost don’t need the center fielder or left fielder to play any deeper than 270 feet. Take a look below.

This doesn’t translate quite as cleanly onto the road, where Jorge De La Rosa has admitted he has less feel for his pitches.

The hit balls allowed get distributed more evenly… and some hitters even take advantage. Look how brutally he gets pulled down the left field line. Still, some argument can still be made for playing a bit more shallow in center field.

Perhaps all this spray chart stuff this is just particular to Jorge De La Rosa. Let’s take a look at another pitcher who has a similar groundball rate to De La Rosa. That guy is Chris Rusin.

He also tends to give up a lot of hits, though unlike Jorge De La Rosa, they tend to go directly to center field or left field instead of right down the line. You see doubles in the left center field gap and quite a lot of short singles hit in front of the left and center fielders. Yet very little goes directly over the left fielder’s head. Almost no doubles go in the gap in right field, but there are a lot of flares dropping in for hits. Here, playing shallow in left field and right field makes sense to scoop up some extra outs. As mentioned previously, any doubles in the gap or over the right fielder’s head based on the current positioning would most likely remain doubles but the chance for extra outs may make all the difference.

Now let’s look at the most extreme flyball pitcher on the Rockies staff (now that Kyle Kendrick‘s gone) who racked up significant innings in 2015. That’s Christian Bergman.

Judging by this distribution, playing shallower does not make as much sense, especially with runners on base. Virtually every single would be traded for a double one for one. This would be in line with Dewan’s study on the perils of playing shallow. As indicated earlier, trading a two singles for a double and an out makes sense, but flyballs off Bergman go deep enough where the benefit might not just outweigh the cost. If anything, perhaps the right fielder could play a bit shallower since not many balls hit off Bergman go deep in right field but nits do pick and the argument isn’t overly compelling.

While we’re here, let’s also dabble with another Rockies pitcher who has gotten some innings, but is basically neutral in terms of groundball versus flyball ratio.

With Chad Bettis, relatively speaking, keeps the left fielder less busy. This is one example of a power pitcher who wears Carlos Gonzalez out. Meanwhile, note the cluster of doubles over Charlie’s head that, frankly, he probably can’t do much about. That might be Bad Chettis’s unhappy place. Again, playing shallow here does not make much sense.

Now, a disclaimer. This is all merely information I’ve gleaned from the internets. I’d think the Rockies, having more access (and experience) to data such as Statcast might have more accurate ideas of where balls land, not just based on the hitter, but on the pitcher. I also wouldn’t be surprised if it was already relayed to the coaches. It would be quite interesting if the Rockies coaches factored in the pitcher more than the hitter when determining positioning in terms of outfield depth.

Though I primarily focused on starters, the basic concept that groundball pitchers, at least for the Rockies, tend to give up shorter flyballs and line drives still applies to relievers. You could take concepts used for positioning for Chris Rusin or Jorge De La Rosa and apply them to Rockies relievers with higher groundball rates such as Chad Qualls or Adam Ottavino (assuming he has similar stuff when he returns). Also, if the Rockies call up a young groundball pitcher from the minors, the Rockies could apply that game plan to give the Rockies outfielders an idea of what to expect. You would also want to adjust the positioning based on how groundbal-y the pitcher’s stuff plays at home versus on the road.

There’s also some additional benefit to playing shallower. If more singles are converted into outs, that’ll help the pitch count for the Rockies pitchers and allow starters to go deeper into games. Also, any plays at the plate would be at a shorter distance so there’s an additional chance to throw runners out at the plate or prevent them from advancing all together.

An additional takeaway to consider, as mentioned earlier by Barnes and Gonzalez, is that the Rockies left and right fielders get their clues on how deep to play in part from Charlie Blackmon. It’s possible that the center fielder of any team might be the most important fielder on the team (with the possible exception of catcher) because so much of each outfielder’s positioning depends on the center fielder’s positioning and that player’s awareness of how the pitcher will be attacking the hitter. This is not to suggest Blackmon is doing anything wrong but it does suggest that center fielders may be more important than previously thought. The Rockies give up a lot of hits and perhaps because of that, Rockies outfielders traditionally have poor fielding metrics. Dexter Fowler is the most recent example of having poor metrics and even the “best” Rockies center fielder in terms of the metrics, Juan Pierre, was a net neutral according to the DRS and UZR fielding metrics. That being said, Blackmon has rated quite a bit better than Fowler. Now that Fowler’s with the Cubs, who have had a proactive role in adjusting his positioning, his defense as evaluated by the fielding metrics has increased so far in 2016.

Fun with #statcast data: There's a 28 foot difference in raw avg positioning from deepest CF (Kiermaier) to shallowest (Jones/Fowler). — Mike Petriello (@mike_petriello) March 23, 2016

It’s easy for me in my armchair to take a bubble and move it around. Many other factors aren’t being considered… what’s the score of the game… what’s the number of outs… Perhaps, like the infield shift, outfielders might be uncomfortable with having to make so many over the shoulder catches. Perhaps the pitcher would be real uncomfortable if they saw the entire outfield playing that shallow. Just as a pitcher might get upset when an easy groundball rolls through where an unshifted shortstop usually is, the first medium range flyball that lands for a hit would discard this idea quicker than it took me to type this post up. And yeah, I realize it would be extremely radical if for any pitcher, even the groundball pitchers, if the outfield adjusted their depth by 50+ feet inwards. I don’t think even the Pirates are doing that… but perhaps an extra step or eight or nine… heck even an extra outfielder might make enough of a difference.