Against Philadelphia, Washington allowed 9 of 18 third-down plays to be converted, a staggering 50 percent of the Eagles’ attempts. It’s been an ongoing struggle that Washington just can’t seem to overcome. Defensive coordinator Joe Barry was accused of playing too soft, usually preferring to drop into zone coverages and trusting his defenders to force a check-down underneath and make a tackle short of the first-down marker. But after that failed, Barry has started to try different looks and blitzes, but still can’t find the right formula for success.

On the first third down of the game, Washington, somewhat predictably gave up a first-down conversion:

Here, the Eagles face third and six. Washington rushes five, with inside linebacker Will Compton joining the usual four down linemen on the rush. Compton stunts to the right side of the offensive line while Ryan Kerrigan loops around him to the middle.

Behind that five-man rush, Washington plays man coverage with a single deep safety. Philadelphia combines a drive concept, involving the tight end running a dig route while the slot receiver runs an underneath crossing route, with a crossing route from the far side.

This route creates two natural screens. Cornerback Bashaud Breeland gets caught in traffic as safety Deshazor Everett trails the tight end up the field. It also creates traffic for Quinton Dunbar later in the route as he trails Jordan Matthews crossing from the left side of the formation.

Dunbar takes a false step away from Matthews, giving him plenty of separation on the underneath crossing route. Preston Smith provides a good rush off the edge, working around left tackle Jason Peters and forcing quarterback Carson Wentz to roll to his right.

Compton joins Smith in pursuit of Wentz as both break free of their blocks. But Wentz manages to elude the rush and get away his throw as Dunbar desperately attempts to catch up to Matthews. Dunbar eventually makes it back across the field, but not before Matthews makes the catch for 10 yards and converts the third down.

Just a few plays later, Washington manages to restrict the Eagles to a third-and-five situation.

The Eagles spread out all five eligible receivers, leaving Wentz in the backfield alone. They run two slant routes from the two slot receivers to the right.

Washington appears to run zone coverage. But there seems to be a bit of a mix up. Kerrigan drops into coverage on tight end Zach Ertz, even though Compton drops to a similar spot. It’s entirely possible they called for a zone coverage with Kerrigan as a spy on Ertz, but I can’t recall Kerrigan being used specifically to cover a tight end like this before.

In the end, Compton and Kerrigan run into each other, while the slot receiver runs his slant in behind them, making the catch for 10 yards and picking up a first down in the process.

In the second quarter, Barry tried to mix things up with a new look.

On third and nine, Barry calls for a disguised safety blitz, though he drops both edge rushers, Kerrigan and Smith into coverage. Compton joins safety Everett on the blitz, while fellow linebacker Mason Foster appears to read the running back, waiting to see if he runs a route or stays in to protect before blitzing. Breeland lines up in the slot against tight end Trey Burton, who runs a deep out route.

The back stays in to protect, meaning Foster joins the blitz. However, the Eagles hold up well in protection, giving Wentz a clean pocket to throw from. Breeland recovered his position somewhat after losing position initially to Burton. But Burton makes a sudden cut outside and Breeland can’t adjust.

With Breeland beaten and the rush unable to get to Wentz, the Eagles complete the pass for 16 yards and convert the third-and-nine play.

The frustration was clearly building for Barry and his Washington defense. On the next third down, he called for cover-zero.

Cover-zero is a blitz designed to give the defense one more rusher than the offense can account for. Every eligible receiver is assigned a defender, with the rest of the defense sent on the blitz, leaving no safety help. Washington attempt to disguise the blitz, lining up somewhat normally, though the safeties are closer to the line of scrimmage than they normally would be.

Breeland commits a cardinal sin in cover-zero. With no safety help in the middle of the field, every defender in coverage has to play with inside leverage and force his receiver towards the sideline. But Breeland allows slot receiver Burton to run a slant across his face.

Partially because of the efforts to disguise the blitz, the rush can’t get to Wentz in time to disrupt the throw. Burton makes the catch over the middle for an easy first down and picks up 16 yards before Breeland catches him to make the tackle.

By the fourth quarter, the defense appeared to be confused from the different blitzes Barry called.

On third and seven, Barry sends safety Donte Whitner on a blitz from the slot. The confusion comes from who replaces Whitner in coverage. Smith lines up near the tight end in the slot, while Foster also drops back into coverage.

Smith carries the tight end down the field for a few yards before strangely peeling off and working back towards the line of scrimmage. Foster works over from the middle of the field, but has a lot of ground to make up, especially as the tight end runs an out route.

Foster can’t make up the ground, while Whitner fails to get close to Wentz on the blitz. Smith is left in the middle of the field neither rushing the passer nor covering the tight end. The Eagles convert yet another third-down attempt with a 14-yard gain on third and seven.

There was one scheme that appeared to work on third down.

In the third quarter, the Eagles face third and five. Washington sends five rushers with a stunt, while dropping six into coverage.

Washington runs what I know as ‘triangle coverage’, sometimes referred to as three-over-two. The two underneath defenders read the two receivers to their side, taking the first receiver that breaks to their side of the field. The safeties over the top have to read both receivers and be prepared to stay on top of any vertical route.

Wentz looks to his left, likely hoping to find Matthews on his out route. But Dunbar peels off the outside receiver and into the path of Matthews, taking him out of the play. To compensate, safety Duke Ihenacho takes the outside receiver on his vertical route, taking away that option too. Before Wentz can look to the right side of the field, he gets sacked as the pocket collapses around him.

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This type of pattern-matching scheme often sets traps for quarterbacks. It’s a style that suits corners like Josh Norman, who read routes well and break on the ball quickly. It might be an option to use more going forward, but as far as I could tell, this was the only time Washington used it on third down against the Eagles.

Barry deserves some credit for trying different things. He drew up some creative blitzes, but they failed to bring him the results Washington needs to improve its third-down defense. The critical note I have on some of those blitzes is how long they took to develop. Take the cover-zero blitz. The point of cover-zero is to get immediate pressure and give the quarterback as little time as possible to react. But with two safeties lined up five to 10 yards off the ball in effort to disguise the look, it took longer for them to make up the ground to the line of scrimmage, giving Wentz more time to find his receiver.

But Barry isn’t the only one to blame. The players need to be held accountable too. Dunbar and Breeland both had poor plays in coverage, and they weren’t the only ones. The pass rush could also improve, with Wentz given time despite different blitzes being used. Barry and his defense will need to improve quickly if Washington hopes to sneak into the playoffs and beyond. They’re simply no way they can continue to match the winless Browns in third-down defense and expect to be successful in the playoffs.