Oct 6, 2017

Up until the last day before the Sept. 25 Kurdish independence referendum, Iran was still dealing with the event with a sense of disbelief and with the misconception that it would be called off at the last moment. The assumption was that the de facto head of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Massoud Barzani, was only maneuvering to negotiate a better deal with the central government in Baghdad with respect to the region’s autonomy — on both the political and the economic side. Iran thought that Barzani was looking for Iranian-Turkish support for future talks, while already having an American green light to escalate to the edge of the abyss, and that things would then be better.

This was the case when Iranian Chief of General Staff Mohammad Bagheri visited Ankara and met with high-level Turkish officials and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in August. And even when Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani visited Iraqi Kurdistan to convince the Kurdish leadership to “delay the vote,” Tehran was still dealing with the whole story from a perspective that could easily be described as one of denial. This policy continued until the moment the Kurds announced that the referendum returned a big "yes," with almost 93% of votes in favor of independence.

Barzani had killer timing: The whole region is apprehensive of taking any step toward a new escalation, with crises already igniting in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and the Gulf. Therefore, it was clear to the Kurdish leader that it’s either now or never. Now that the referendum has been held, what are the dynamics that are to follow this historical change? And how is Iran as a nation — and its powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — going to deal with it?

Despite the ideological crust that covers Iran’s politics, it could be said that Iranian diplomacy enjoys an amount of pragmatism that allows it to cope with changes. This was the case when the United States invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively, and the series of events that have taken place in the region since then. Even when it comes to existential battles such as the one in Syria, Iran made the decision to fight until the end while preserving a line of dialogue with other players, directly or through mediators. This was what Barzani believed would occur in the aftermath of the referendum. Therefore, he felt confident that neither Turkey nor Iran would be able to take any dramatic action. Still, this doesn’t mean the two powers aren’t going to take action at all, especially since both countries regard the Kurdish move as a threat to their national security.

To Iran, the referendum will have dire consequences on the future of neighboring Iraq. Having a Kurdish state could prompt the Sunnis to call for a referendum of their own, thus Iraq would cease to exist and would be replaced with three shaky sectarian or ethnic states. Kurdistan is a step toward “Shiitestan” and “Sunnistan” in Iraq. The border is a main concern for Tehran, especially because some Iranian Kurdish separatist groups function in border regions and have resumed their fight against the IRGC. Since 2016, several attacks have been launched by groups whose headquarters are located in Iraqi Kurdistan. Now that the Kurdish region is planning to continue moving toward independence, Iran is going to be very concerned that these groups’ activities might have an impact on the internal Iranian front.