Independent Auditor’s Report

Introduction

Background

Royal Military College of Canada

6.1 National Defence, which includes the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence, operates the Royal Military College of Canada as a federally funded institution to educate and train Officer Cadets and commissioned officers for effective military service.

6.2 The Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) was founded in 1874. In 1959, the Ontario provincial legislation authorizing RMC to grant university degrees restated RMC’s original purpose: to provide “a complete education in all branches of military tactics, fortification, engineering, and general scientific knowledge in subjects connected with and necessary to a thorough knowledge of the military profession.” In 2001, National Defence regulations broadened this purpose. It now includes objectives to prepare and motivate Officer Cadets for effective service as commissioned officers and to improve the education of commissioned officers.

6.3 The Regular Officer Training Plan is the principal and largest program at RMC, providing a fully subsidized undergraduate education for Officer Cadets. When they successfully complete the Officer Cadet program, they are awarded a university degree, receive a commission, and become junior officers in the Canadian Armed Forces.

6.4 Over the years, RMC has expanded. It now offers undergraduate and graduate degrees in both official languages, and supports education programs for other members of the Canadian Armed Forces and federal government departments. As part of a National Defence effort to build bridges with Indigenous communities, RMC operates a one-year program for First Nations, Métis, and Inuit youth. This program trains them in key leadership skills while they gain accreditation toward post-secondary education. RMC also conducts specialized research, such as cyber defence, to support Canada’s defence objectives.

Focus of the audit

6.5 This audit focused on whether the Royal Military College of Canada produced the quality of officers that the Canadian Armed Forces needed at a reasonable cost.

6.6 This audit also focused on whether National Defence ensured the proper conduct of Officer Cadets and staff at the Royal Military College of Canada. Proper conduct includes the responsibility to obey the law, enforce military discipline, and uphold professional and ethical standards of duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage. It can be ensured through policies, formal instruction, and demonstrated action, including addressing instances of improper conduct in a consistent, appropriate, and timely manner.

6.7 This audit is important because an effective military requires leaders who are well educated, who are trained to meet National Defence’s standards, and who serve with integrity.

6.8 More details about the audit objectives, scope, approach, and criteria are in About the Audit at the end of this report.

Findings, Recommendations, and Responses

Role and purpose of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)

RMC emphasized academic education over military training

Overall message 6.9 Overall, we found that the Royal Military College of Canada emphasized academic education over military training and that there were weaknesses in military training. Recommendations from previous reviews of the Royal Military College of Canada to enhance military training did not result in fundamental changes. We also found that there was no clear measurable standard for leadership qualities and ethical military behaviour that graduates were required to demonstrate before receiving their commissions. 6.10 This finding matters because there are many other universities that can offer an undergraduate education to future officers. However, only the Royal Military College of Canada has the objective of providing an undergraduate education in a military environment with a focus on military leadership, ethics, and training.

6.11 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topics:

Context

6.12 Under the National Defence Act, the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) was established as both a military unit and a university that educates and trains Officer Cadets and commissioned officers for a career of effective service within the Canadian Armed Forces. Its objectives include

providing undergraduate and graduate university education in both official languages;

developing leadership qualities, including ethics;

developing high standards of physical fitness; and

developing proficiency in both official languages.

6.13 The Regular Officer Training Plan at RMC (ROTP-RMC) is a four-year university undergraduate program, with summer months spent in military training. Officer Cadets also include a small number of candidates from the Reserve Force and non-commissioned members. Each Officer Cadet must satisfy four standards upon graduation:

academics,

military training and leadership,

physical fitness, and

official languages.

Recommendation

6.14 Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at paragraph 6.25.

Analysis to support this finding

6.15 What we examined. We examined previous reviews focusing on RMC’s training and education of Officer Cadets, including the following:

Report of the Officer Development Review Board (Morton Report), 1995;

Balanced Excellence: Leading Canada’s Armed Forces in the New Millennium report (Withers Report), 1998;

Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development System Study Final Report, 2014; and

Special Staff Assistance Visit Report on the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada—Kingston, 2017.

We also interviewed personnel at RMC and National Defence headquarters, and reviewed policy documents, training records, and emails.

6.16 Previous reviews. Previous reviews recognized that RMC needed to place more emphasis on military training for Officer Cadets:

The 1995 Morton Report recommended professional development requirements for officers, starting with the need for officers to have an undergraduate degree. Based on this recommendation, all officers are now required to have a university degree.

The premise of the 1998 Withers Report was that RMC needed to graduate officers who were noticeably better prepared for their responsibilities than other officers. The study found that military training at RMC was weak, noting that RMC graduates were not readily distinguishable from other officers at any point in their careers. The report recommended strengthening military instruction at RMC. Specifically, it recommended that Officer Cadets complete 2 years of academic study, followed by at least 16 months of military training in operational units before returning to RMC to complete their degrees. These recommendations were never fully implemented.

6.17 Special Staff Assistance Visit report. In August 2016, the Chief of the Defence Staff ordered a special assessment of the climate, training environment, culture, and structure of the Regular Officer Training Plan at RMC. RMC’s Special Staff Assistance Visit (SSAV) team released its report in March 2017.

6.18 We found that the SSAV report was conducted in a thorough and objective manner. It included observations based on more than 400 interviews with stakeholders, including RMC Officer Cadets and staff. We have integrated the relevant SSAV observations into our report.

6.19 Many of the SSAV report’s observations were about weaknesses in military training and the lack of balance between military training and academic programs. These observations were similar to those made in previous reviews. For example, the SSAV report found that

a complex and unclear chain of authority resulted in confusion as to whether military or academic objectives should take precedence;

there was limited input from the rest of the Canadian Armed Forces on the standards and curriculum for military training;

Officer Cadets did not see professional military training as practical or connected to lessons learned in academic courses, particularly core courses in leadership and ethics; and

Officer Cadets emphasized academic studies over military training because of academic program demands.

6.20 The SSAV report made 79 recommendations on subjects ranging from governance issues to the amount of time Officer Cadets should be given to study. More than half of the recommendations called for further review and did not recommend concrete actions. As a result, it is our view that the SSAV report’s ultimate effect on the institution is likely to be limited. National Defence told us that it had started to implement the recommendations.

6.21 Balance of military training and academic programming. We found that RMC did not sufficiently balance and integrate military training and academic education. As a result, military training at RMC was secondary to the culture and demands of the academic program. During the summer, Officer Cadets at RMC and those in other officer entry plans receive leadership and occupational training elsewhere within the Canadian Armed Forces, including at operational units. Although we did not include this summer training in the audit, National Defence observed that the training was not always practical or relevant.

6.22 The SSAV report observed that Officer Cadets found that academic and military training at RMC were not aligned. Consistent with the SSAV report, we found examples where academics were emphasized over military training at RMC:

Based on our analysis, Officer Cadets spent an average of from 30 to 53 hours per week on academics, 9 hours on physical fitness, 6.5 hours on military training, and 4 hours on second language study, where required.

In an RMC survey of first-year Officer Cadets, only 7 percent of respondents felt that RMC emphasized military training, whereas 40 percent felt that RMC focused on academics.

We found that the ROTP-RMC leadership and ethics curriculum focused on academic theory instead of practical military skills. We and the SSAV report also found that RMC was falling short in providing military training. We noted that Officer Cadets consistently viewed military training as low-value, irrelevant, and a poor use of time.

In his written directives to implement all SSAV recommendations, the Chief of the Defence Staff stated that before receiving their commissions, Officer Cadets were required to successfully complete a bachelor’s degree, achieve proficiency in their second language, and successfully complete a physical fitness standard. However, the directives did not mention a clear requirement for Officer Cadets to demonstrate leadership qualities and ethical military behaviour.

6.23 The SSAV report also observed that some academic faculty believed that RMC was first and foremost a university, not a unique national institution. We found that many faculty members were civilian employees who were not required to help instill military attributes while educating Officer Cadets. In our opinion, the academic environment did not consistently support teaching military discipline and Canadian Armed Forces’ values. For example, National Defence requires that members report for duty unless absences are approved. This means that Officer Cadets are required to attend all academic classes. Failure to do so without authorization means that they are absent without leave, which is considered military misconduct. We reviewed cases in which Officer Cadets did not attend classes but asked other students to forge their signatures on the attendance record. We also noted a case of a military training staff member who was told to leave a class by the academic instructor when the military training staff member attempted to identify absent Officer Cadets.

6.24 National Defence told us that academic education was emphasized because Officer Cadets were required to meet the degree-level expectations of a modern university. In our view, strengthening military training does not necessarily take away from time spent on academics. The SSAV report recommended changes to the professional military training at RMC to make it more relevant, practical, and useful for junior officers at their first units. It is the military training that makes RMC unique when compared with other universities. RMC was established as a military training institution, and the needs of the Canadian Armed Forces should be reflected more in its operations.

6.25 Recommendation. National Defence should clearly define and strengthen its military training of Officer Cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada so that the training is relevant and practical, and provides value to operational units. The Royal Military College of Canada should then integrate the improved military training with the academic education of Officer Cadets.

National Defence’s response. Agreed. This finding is consistent with the Canadian Armed Forces Royal Military College of Canada’s Special Staff Assistance Visit report. National Defence has already begun work in this area with a view to maintain the appropriate balance between academic and military training.

The Royal Military College of Canada as a defence university

Overall message 6.26 Overall, we found that the operating cost per student to provide education at the Royal Military College of Canada was about twice as much as at other universities. We also found that the cost of educating and preparing Officer Cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada was almost twice as high as using other officer entry plans. The higher costs were partly attributed to the higher standards that the Royal Military College of Canada set for its graduates. However, National Defence could not demonstrate that these standards resulted in more effective military officers. Furthermore, the Royal Military College of Canada’s governance structure failed to integrate military and academic objectives. 6.27 This finding matters because the Royal Military College of Canada needs effective governance and clear leadership to ensure that it achieves its objectives in the most cost-effective way possible.

Context

6.28 Officers in the Canadian Armed Forces must have a university degree. National Defence can

promote officers from non-commissioned ranks,

recruit university graduates for direct entry into the Canadian Armed Forces as officers, or

use subsidized education programs to educate and train officers.

6.29 Officer Cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) or at civilian universities receive tuition and other direct education costs, salary, pension contributions, and other benefits.

RMC did not operate in a cost-effective manner

What we found

6.30 We found that although RMC offered a good-quality academic education to Officer Cadets, the operating cost per student to provide the education was twice the average cost of other small universities. Several factors increased the education cost per student, including the number of programs offered, the salaries of military staff in non-academic roles, and the very low student-to-faculty ratio.

6.31 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topics:

Why this finding matters

6.32 This finding matters because National Defence must ensure that its spending is cost-effective and focuses on National Defence’s priorities.

Recommendation

6.33 Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at paragraph 6.44.

Analysis to support this finding

6.34 What we examined. We examined RMC’s academic programs, staff levels, student-to-faculty ratios, quality of education, and operating costs for military training and academic education for the 2014–15 fiscal year. We analyzed data from RMC and compared it with data from two Statistics Canada surveys—the Financial Information of Universities and Colleges survey and the Postsecondary Student Information System survey—as well as with data on publications and citations of RMC faculty in scholarly publications. While other countries have military educational institutions, we did not compare them with RMC because of differences in educational requirements, in how the schools operate, and in military spending.

6.35 Academic programs. RMC is a small university that offers a large number of programs. There are 22 undergraduate arts, science, and engineering degree programs, and 13 graduate degree programs (Exhibit 6.1). RMC also offers a number of specialized non-degree programs. In the 2014–15 academic year, these programs were offered to 1,312 full-time students and 1,248 part-time students. Approximately 1,000 Officer Cadets who were enrolled within the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) represented the majority of full-time students.

Exhibit 6.1—Programs, students, and faculties at the Royal Military College of Canada Source: Based on unaudited data from National Defence Exhibit 6.1—text version This diagram shows the number of programs, students, professors, and faculties at the Royal Military College of Canada. The Royal Military College of Canada offers 22 undergraduate degree programs and 13 graduate degree programs in the faculties of arts, science, and engineering. There were 192 full-time professors, consisting of 156 academic professors and 36 military professors, for 1,668 full-time-equivalent students. Full-time-equivalent students are the sum of full-time students and equivalent part-time students, where 3.5 part-time students are equivalent to 1 full-time student. Forty-four percent of students were enrolled in a faculty of arts program, 12 percent of students were enrolled in a faculty of science program, and 29 percent of students were enrolled in a faculty of engineering program. Fifteen percent of students were enrolled in non-degree or interdisciplinary programs. This exhibit is based on unaudited data from National Defence.

6.36 Using the ratio of full-time-equivalent students to full-time professors is an accepted way to compare universities. Full-time-equivalent students are the sum of full-time students and equivalent part-time students, where 3.5 part-time students are equivalent to 1 full-time student. Using this calculation, RMC had 1,668 full-time-equivalent students in the 2014–15 academic year. RMC employed 156 full-time academic professors and 36 full-time military professors.

6.37 We compared RMC with eight Canadian universities of similar size and mix of degree programs based on information available for the 2014–15 academic year (Exhibit 6.2). We found that RMC had the lowest ratio of full-time-equivalent students to full-time professors across arts, science, and engineering degree programs. While this may be an indicator of program quality, it is also costly.

Exhibit 6.2—The Royal Military College of Canada had fewer students per professor than other universities in the 2014–15 academic year University Arts Science Engineering Note * The Arts and Science ratios are based on the average of comparable programs at eight universities, whereas the Engineering ratio is based on the average of comparable programs at six universities. Return to note * referrer Royal Military College of Canada 10 students to 1 professor 10 : 1 5 students to 1 professor 5 : 1 7 students to 1 professor 7 : 1 Other universitiesNote * 23 students to 1 professor 23 : 1 16 students to 1 professor 16 : 1 25 students to 1 professor 25 : 1 Note: Full-time-equivalent students are the sum of full-time students and equivalent part-time students, where 3.5 part-time students are equivalent to 1 full-time student. Source: Based on unaudited data from National Defence and Statistics Canada

6.38 We also found that some degree programs produced very few graduates. For example, the programs in chemistry, economics, English, French studies, and mathematics each graduated fewer than 10 undergraduate students on average per year, and only 1 or 2 in some years. In our opinion, there were too many degree programs for the size of the student body, and delivering programs that graduated such small numbers of students was not cost-effective.

6.39 Quality of academic programs. All degree programs are reviewed internally and externally on a cyclical basis in accordance with the requirements of the Ontario Universities Council on Quality Assurance. According to these reviews, the overall quality of RMC programs examined was good. However, reviewers noted that some programs offered a limited number of courses and had limited library and faculty resources.

6.40 Our analysis of scholarly publications showed that faculty at RMC published as much as faculty of comparable programs at other universities of a similar size. Publication in peer-reviewed and other journals is an indicator of research quality at Canadian universities. We found that, in particular, the civil engineering and history faculties had their work published and cited more often than the same faculties at similar universities used for comparison.

6.41 Operating costs. Our calculation of RMC’s operating costs included military salaries, which do not appear in RMC’s budget, and the cost to operate RMC buildings. Some of the costs for building operations are partially absorbed by the local Canadian Armed Forces base. We included all aspects of RMC, such as academic programs, language training, and athletic programs. Where actual expenditures were not available, we applied National Defence’s Cost Factors Manual. This provides a common basis to estimate staff, equipment, and facility costs. Recognizing that each university offers different programs and areas of expertise, we divided the operating costs of each university by the number of its full-time-equivalent students to provide a common measure across universities in Canada. We excluded capital costs for all universities, as well as salaries and benefits paid to Officer Cadets.

6.42 We found that RMC’s operating expenditures were approximately $91.9 million in the 2014–15 fiscal year (Exhibit 6.3). This is about $55,000 per full-time-equivalent student and is the highest per-student cost in the country. This cost was two times the average cost per student at other small universities that had fewer than 2,500 full-time-equivalent students. In our opinion, the number of degree programs offered and the low student-to-faculty ratio are major factors that contributed to this high cost.

Exhibit 6.3—At the Royal Military College of Canada, the cost per student was double the average cost at other small universities Source: Based on unaudited data from National Defence for the 2014–15 fiscal year and from Statistics Canada’s Financial Information of Universities and Colleges survey and Postsecondary Student Information System survey for 2014–2015 Exhibit 6.2—text version This diagram shows that at the Royal Military College of Canada, the cost per student was double the average cost at other small universities. The diagram includes expenditures for 2014–15 by category as follows: Academic salaries (such as all military and civilian faculty, academic support staff, and other lecturers) totalled $33.9 million.

Other salaries (such as administrative staff, maintenance staff, and military staff in a non-academic role) totalled $20.8 million.

Benefits totalled $10.9 million.

Academic and administrative materials and supplies (such as office supplies, equipment, and library) totalled $3.3 million.

Operational expenditures (such as travel, communications, utilities, and payment in lieu of tax) totalled $4.4 million.

Contracted services (technical and administrative) totalled $4.1 million.

Other payments (scholarships and food) totalled $2.4 million.

Furniture, equipment, and maintenance totalled $12.1 million. Total expenditures for the 2014–15 fiscal year were $91.9 million, or $55,000 per full-time-equivalent student. Full-time-equivalent students are the sum of full-time students and equivalent part-time students, where 3.5 part-time students are equivalent to 1 full-time student. This $55,000 amount represents the highest cost per student in Canada and double the average cost per student at other small universities. This exhibit is based on unaudited data from National Defence for the 2014–15 fiscal year and from Statistics Canada’s Financial Information of Universities and Colleges survey and Postsecondary Student Information System survey for 2014–2015.

6.43 According to National Defence, RMC has expenditures that are unique as it is a military unit and a federally funded university. They include military training costs and second language instruction costs. We calculated these costs to be approximately $5.5 million for military training and approximately $1.8 million for second language instruction. Also, at the time of our audit, RMC offered 20 of its undergraduate programs in both official languages. In our opinion, while these factors may be considered unique, they cannot be separated from the cost of operating RMC.

6.44 Recommendation. National Defence should explore ways to reduce the Royal Military College of Canada’s operating cost per student and consider reducing the number of programs offered.

National Defence’s response. Agreed. National Defence recognizes and accepts that there is a premium associated with producing a Royal Military College of Canada graduate. Our preliminary initial comparison with other allied military institutions indicates that the costs per student are similar to, or less than, those of allied military educational institutions. We agree that additional review and analysis is required.

The Special Staff Assistance Visit report recommended targeted investment in key areas. Through further analysis, we will assess the cost structure at the Royal Military College of Canada to ensure it is appropriate given its mandate as a military academic institution.

The cost of educating Officer Cadets at RMC was higher than other officer entry plans

What we found

6.45 We found that the cost of educating and preparing Officer Cadets at RMC was the most costly method—almost twice as expensive as any other officer entry plan. These higher costs could be partially attributed to RMC’s higher standards. However, National Defence could not demonstrate that RMC’s higher costs and standards resulted in more effective military officers.

6.46 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topics:

Why this finding matters

6.47 This finding matters because National Defence needs to obtain value for money from the investment it has made to educate Officer Cadets and needs to be able to clearly explain how the extra costs it incurred to prepare officers through RMC produced better results.

Recommendation

6.48 Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at paragraph 6.59.

Analysis to support this finding

6.49 What we examined. We examined the following entry plans used to recruit civilians into the Canadian Armed Forces to become officers:

the Regular Officer Training Plan at civilian universities (ROTP-civilian plan),

the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan—Air Environmental Affiliated Degree, and

the Direct Entry Officer Plan.

We compared the costs of educating Officer Cadets through each of these plans with the cost of the Regular Officer Training Plan at RMC (ROTP-RMC). We also examined ROTP-RMC standards and the career performance of these RMC graduates.

6.50 Cost of officer entry plans. In addition to the ROTP-RMC plan, National Defence funds and operates other officer entry plans. These include the ROTP-civilian plan and the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan—Air Environmental Affiliated Degree at Seneca College, which graduates pilots for the Royal Canadian Air Force. Civilian candidates with a suitable degree from a Canadian or foreign university may also enrol as an officer through the Direct Entry Officer Plan.

6.51 We found that annual costs to subsidize education for officers varied depending on the entry plan (Exhibit 6.4). Costs to National Defence to educate an Officer Cadet at RMC included the annual operating cost per full-time-equivalent student ($55,000, as shown in paragraph 6.42) plus the salary and benefits of Officer Cadets, less student fees for room and board. The cost to National Defence for the ROTP-civilian plan and the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan—Air Environmental Affiliated Degree included tuition, books, and other expenses, as well as Officer Cadet salaries and benefits. Almost half of new officers enter the Canadian Armed Forces through the Direct Entry Officer Plan. Since these officers obtained a university degree before enrolling in the Canadian Armed Forces, National Defence did not incur any costs for their education.

Exhibit 6.4—In the 2014–15 fiscal year, it cost National Defence more to educate a civilian recruit through the Royal Military College of Canada’s officer entry plan than through other entry plans Officer entry plan Cost to National Defence Note * Since Direct Entry Officer Plan recruits obtained a university degree before enrolling, National Defence did not incur any costs for their education. Return to note * referrer Regular Officer Training Plan at the Royal Military College of Canada $100,822 x 4 years = $403,288 Regular Officer Training Plan at civilian universities $59,732 x 4 years (maximum) = $238,928 Continuing Education Officer Training Plan—Air Environmental Affiliated Degree at Seneca College $100,144 x 2.5 years = $250,360 Direct Entry Officer Plan $0 x 0 years = $0 Note * Source: Based on unaudited data from National Defence

6.52 We found that RMC was the most costly way to educate future military officers—about $40,000 more per year than sending an Officer Cadet to a civilian university through the ROTP-civilian plan. Given the shortage of officers in the Canadian Armed Forces, as noted in our 2016 audit report on recruitment and retention, it is our opinion that National Defence has an opportunity to increase the overall number of officers at a lower cost by increasing enrolment in the ROTP-civilian plan or recruitment through the Direct Entry Officer Plan.

6.53 The ability to communicate in both official languages is a key skill for all officers, and learning this skill early is beneficial. The higher costs of educating an Officer Cadet at RMC may be partially offset by reducing official languages training that could be required later in some officers’ careers. However, a significant number of RMC graduates still require second language training after graduation, either to attain minimum standards or to refresh their language levels.

6.54 We also found that RMC’s academic curriculum, language training, and physical fitness performance standards at graduation exceeded the Canadian Armed Forces’ requirements for Officer Cadets graduating from other entry plans. In our opinion, this contributed to the higher education costs for Officer Cadets at RMC. The Special Staff Assistance Visit report recognized that these higher standards were not tied to clear policy requirements.

6.55 Military performance after graduation. Despite higher standards and higher costs, National Defence could not demonstrate that RMC produced more effective officers than other officer entry plans. The Canadian Armed Forces has a professional development system to progressively develop officers throughout their careers. After graduation, or enrolment through direct entry, all junior officers attend training for their occupations. At the end of this training, all are equally qualified to be effective officers. A 2014 Canadian Armed Forces professional development system study observed that there was “no discernible difference” in officers produced from the various entry plans at the end of this occupational training. The study also observed that there was no evidence to show that RMC graduates had a stronger grasp of military leadership or proper conduct.

6.56 National Defence told us that a measure of the RMC program’s success was that 62 percent of current senior leaders in the Canadian Armed Forces earned undergraduate degrees at Canadian military colleges. These military colleges included RMC and two other military colleges. One has since closed, and the other no longer grants degrees. While this shows that military college graduates are well represented at senior leadership levels, many other factors can influence the career outcomes of all officers in the years after they graduate. These factors include the officer’s occupation, experience gained from opportunities and deployments, professional networks, and family support.

6.57 National Defence’s analysis of career progression among officers found that there was no significant difference between Officer Cadets who graduated from RMC and officers who entered the Canadian Armed Forces through other plans. On average, ROTP-RMC graduates were not promoted faster. The analysis also found a less than 10 percent difference among retention rates for RMC graduates compared with officers from other entry plans.

6.58 In our opinion, it is difficult to make a direct link between graduation from RMC and military career success. It is our view that National Defence needs to be able to demonstrate that the higher costs and standards of the ROTP-RMC plan are required, reasonable, and produce better officers.

6.59 Recommendation. National Defence should demonstrate and ensure that the higher standards of the Regular Officer Training Plan at the Royal Military College of Canada are required, that they result in better qualified officers, and that the cost is reasonable.

National Defence’s response. Agreed. Our goal will be to demonstrate that through the value of the Royal Military College of Canada program, there is greater certainty that the commissioned officers of the program are fully ready for their final officer training and for the demands of their future employment as Canadian Armed Forces leaders.

RMC’s governance was not effective

What we found

6.60 We found that RMC’s governance structure was ineffective, and that the institution did not integrate military and academic objectives.

6.61 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topic:

Why this finding matters

6.62 This finding matters because without an effective governance structure, RMC will not clearly understand its purpose and will not have the direction it needs.

Recommendation

6.63 Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at paragraph 6.72.

Analysis to support this finding

6.64 What we examined. We examined National Defence documents, including policies and directives, the RMC Board of Governors’ terms of reference, and meeting minutes. We also conducted interviews with members of the Board of Governors and senior leadership at RMC.

6.65 Governance and leadership. RMC’s governance structure is different from a typical university because it operates as a military unit and as a federally funded university (Exhibit 6.5). The Queen’s Regulations and Orders designate the Minister of National Defence as both the Chancellor and President of RMC.

Exhibit 6.5—The governance structure at the Royal Military College of Canada is different than that at a typical university Source: Based on National Defence documentation Exhibit 6.5—text version This organizational chart shows that the governance structure at the Royal Military College of Canada is different than that at a typical university. The Minister of National Defence is the Chancellor and President of the Royal Military College of Canada. The Canadian Armed Forces operates the Royal Military College of Canada according to regulations set out by the Minister. The Board of Governors of the Royal Military College of Canada makes recommendations to the Minister. The Board of Governors is also briefed by the Commandant of the Royal Military College of Canada, who reports to the Canadian Armed Forces chain of command, and by the Principal of the Royal Military College of Canada, who reports to the Commandant. The military training staff of the Royal Military College of Canada also reports to the Commandant. The Principal is the link between the academic faculty and the Commandant. The Canadian Military Colleges Programme Review Board includes personnel from the Canadian Armed Forces chain of command, the Commandant, and the Principal. This exhibit is based on National Defence documentation.

6.66 The Commandant is the commanding military officer at RMC. As its executive head, the Commandant is responsible for the efficient operation and administration of RMC, including military leadership training and proper conduct of Officer Cadets. Under the Commandant, the Principal leads academic instruction, coordinates research activities, and serves as the link between academic studies and military culture.

6.67 The Queen’s Regulations and Orders also require an advisory board, now the Board of Governors, to make recommendations to the Minister on all RMC matters. We found that the Commandant and the Principal regularly briefed RMC’s Board of Governors. The Chair of the Board of Governors is required to meet annually with the Minister or as needed. However, National Defence provided no evidence to show that the Chair met with the Minister during the period covered by the audit.

6.68 The Special Staff Assistance Visit (SSAV) report observed that RMC’s governance structure is more complex than that of other military units. The Commandant and military staff operate within the Canadian Armed Forces chain of command. Although the Principal reports to the Commandant, the academic program is governed by a framework of committees, departments, and faculty appointments outside of the chain of command with the purpose of ensuring academic excellence. The SSAV report also noted that the governance structure at RMC is characterized by conflict and confusion between academic and military visions. In our opinion, integrating these two environments is necessary but problematic because members of the academic and military communities come from different cultures and may understand RMC’s purpose differently.

6.69 A contributing factor to this confusion is that academic staff are appointed to permanent positions, whereas military training staff, including the Commandant, normally rotate into and out of RMC every two to three years. This rotation among military staff does not support long-term development of a consistent military training program. It also makes it difficult to coordinate planning to achieve both military and academic program objectives.

6.70 We did not find a clear mechanism to integrate and then approve both military and academic programming. National Defence established a Canadian Military Colleges Programme Review Board to oversee military programming, but at the time of this audit, it had no authority to approve academic programs. In 1997, RMC’s Board of Governors was assigned responsibilities to review and approve military and academic programs. However, because the Board of Governors is outside of the military chain of command, its authority was later restricted to academic programs. We and the SSAV report found that although the Board of Governors had the authority to review and approve academic programs on behalf of the Minister, it was not performing these functions.

6.71 The SSAV report recommended creating a deputy commandant position to synchronize and manage the four standards that Officer Cadets are expected to achieve—academics, military training and leadership, physical fitness, and official languages. In our opinion, this position would not have sufficient authority to integrate military and academic objectives without additional changes to RMC’s reporting and governance structure.

6.72 Recommendation. National Defence should clearly define the role of the Commandant as the executive authority for day-to-day operations and long-term planning of all aspects of the Royal Military College of Canada’s operations, particularly the ability to oversee and integrate military training and academic programs.

National Defence’s response. Agreed. This finding is consistent with the Canadian Armed Forces Royal Military College of Canada’s Special Staff Assistance Visit report, and National Defence intends to review the governance of the Royal Military College of Canada.

Military leadership and proper conduct

Overall message 6.73 Overall, we found that the Royal Military College of Canada did not provide Officer Cadets with adequate training in leadership and in the proper conduct expected of future officers. While the Royal Military College of Canada took action when incidents were reported, we found that the number of misconduct incidents that involved senior Officer Cadets showed that the Royal Military College of Canada had not prepared them to serve as role models for their peers. 6.74 This finding matters because National Defence needs the Royal Military College of Canada to produce future leaders who embody the highest standards of military leadership and proper conduct.

Context

6.75 The conduct of Officer Cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) is governed by the Cadet Wing Instructions as well as National Defence legislation, regulations, and orders, and the military’s Code of Service Discipline. Leadership training in the Canadian Armed Forces is expected to instill proper conduct, including responsibilities to obey the law, enforce military discipline, and uphold professional and ethical standards of duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage.

6.76 For example, absence without leave is considered military misconduct in the Code of Service Discipline. The Cadet Wing Instructions clearly state that classes are considered places of duty, so attendance is mandatory. Officer Cadets who are absent from classes without authorization may receive corrective training and sanctions.

6.77 RMC is considered a training environment, so minor incidents of improper military conduct, such as deficiencies in dress and deportment, are addressed by military training staff and third- and fourth-year Officer Cadets in leadership positions. They may provide counselling, mentoring, or corrective training, and administer sanctions, such as dress requirements and leave restrictions, to other Officer Cadets.

6.78 Incidents of military misconduct, such as drunkenness and insubordination, may be investigated by RMC commanders. More serious incidents, such as assault, are referred to the Military Police. The Military Police may refer cases back to RMC for further action, such as administering sanctions or disciplinary proceedings. Cases of sexual assault or sudden death are referred to the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service, a specialized crime unit. Civilian law enforcement agencies may also respond to and investigate incidents involving Officer Cadets.

RMC failed to provide effective instruction on military leadership

What we found

6.79 We found that RMC did not provide effective military leadership training, guidance, and mentoring to Officer Cadets. In our opinion, this may have contributed to the large percentage of incidents of improper conduct among senior Officer Cadets.

6.80 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topics:

Why this finding matters

6.81 This finding matters because the RMC Officer Cadet training model depends on its military training staff, academic faculty, and senior Officer Cadets working together to enforce rules, teach leadership, and instill proper military ethics. Discipline is an essential quality for Officer Cadets when they graduate and become leaders in the Canadian Armed Forces.

Recommendations

6.82 Our recommendations in this area of examination appear at paragraphs 6.92 and 6.95.

Analysis to support this finding

6.83 What we examined. We examined Canadian Armed Forces and RMC policies, procedures, and orders governing proper conduct. We also looked at the military leadership training and mentorship development provided to both Officer Cadets and training staff. For the period from September 2013 to December 2016, we reviewed all RMC unit disciplinary investigations and sanctions involving Officer Cadets.

6.84 Military leadership training. In the summers between academic years, all Officer Cadets attend Basic Military Officer Qualification training and may train with military units. RMC delivers further military training, primarily through lectures, briefs, and presentations, as well as activities such as parades.

6.85 As part of their training, Officer Cadets at RMC must follow orders designed to reinforce proper conduct and address poor performance. The Special Staff Assistance Visit (SSAV) report found that Officer Cadets and some military staff felt that there were too many rules, and that they were unevenly applied. The SSAV report also noted that some Officer Cadets were cynical about RMC rules and practices. This resulted in chronic rule-breaking and banding together to protect their colleagues when someone was caught breaking the rules. In our opinion, this shows that Officer Cadets did not consistently take RMC orders about proper conduct seriously.

6.86 We and the SSAV report found that Officer Cadets spent most of their time engaged in academic studies with academic instructors, and that many Officer Cadets saw these instructors as role models. However, faculty members were mostly civilian employees, who were not expected to instill military attributes.

6.87 Reliance on senior Officer Cadets as leaders. We found that RMC expected third- and fourth-year Officer Cadets to instill military leadership and ethics in first- and second-year Officer Cadets. RMC also appointed most third- and fourth-year Officer Cadets to leadership positions. This provided senior Officer Cadets with practical leadership experience as part of their training. In those roles, they had the authority to administer sanctions to other Officer Cadets to correct deficient behaviours.

6.88 Officer Cadets in leadership positions were expected to exercise their authority under the supervision and mentorship of Training Wing staff. However, the SSAV report found that except for some key positions, there was no process to ensure that RMC’s military training staff had the skills or experience needed to instruct and guide Officer Cadets. The SSAV report also found that some military training staff were not providing sufficient guidance and instruction to Officer Cadets.

6.89 We found that the expectation that third- and fourth-year Officer Cadets would consistently demonstrate proper conduct, enforce military discipline, and instill Canadian military values in first- and second-year Officer Cadets was not well founded. For the period from September 2013 to December 2016, we reviewed 76 completed military police services investigations and unit disciplinary investigations of serious military misconduct. We found that approximately half of these military police services investigations and unit disciplinary investigations involved third- and fourth-year Officer Cadets. We also reviewed 87 incidents of academic misconduct, such as plagiarism and cheating on academic assignments, which occurred between September 2014 and December 2016. We found that third- and fourth-year Officer Cadets committed about 60 percent of these academic misconducts.

6.90 The SSAV report found that some Officer Cadets in leadership positions abused their authority by selectively enforcing rules, causing stress among other Officer Cadets. We were told of two cases not included in the SSAV report where Officer Cadets in leadership positions caused training injuries to other Officer Cadets.

6.91 In our opinion, the number of investigations and incidents involving senior Officer Cadets showed that RMC had not prepared them to be role models for other Officer Cadets.

6.92 Recommendation. The Royal Military College of Canada should ensure that before senior Officer Cadets are appointed to leadership positions, they demonstrate high standards of conduct and ethical behaviour.

National Defence’s response. Agreed. It is important to note that the appointments to leadership positions are developmental opportunities. Consistent with the Canadian Armed Forces Royal Military College of Canada’s Special Staff Assistance Visit report recommendations, National Defence has invested in leaders and mentors to guide the Officer Cadets through their leadership development, with the goal that they adhere to the highest standards of conduct and ethical behaviour.

6.93 Mentoring of Officer Cadets. Military training staff and senior Officer Cadets are expected to act as mentors to others. Mentoring is a skill used to develop judgment and leadership traits in others. It involves exercising guidance and sharing wisdom so that the less experienced person develops professionally.

6.94 We and the SSAV report noted that military training staff required a specific set of skills and leadership qualities to effectively mentor Officer Cadets. We found that there were no formal requirements for military training staff to receive training in mentoring Officer Cadets.

6.95 Recommendation. The Royal Military College of Canada should ensure that military training staff have the proper skills and training they need to develop leadership skills among Officer Cadets.

National Defence’s response. Agreed. Consistent with the Canadian Armed Forces Royal Military College of Canada’s Special Staff Assistance Visit report recommendations, National Defence has and will continue to implement measures to ensure that military training staff have the proper skills and training they need to develop leadership skills among Officer Cadets. It has already increased the ranks for supervising military staff to ensure the required level of competency and experience. It has also revitalized their staff orientation and training program.

RMC took action when serious incidents were reported

What we found

6.96 We found that RMC provided support and took disciplinary action when serious incidents were reported.

6.97 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topics:

Why this finding matters

6.98 This finding matters because taking action in response to serious incidents helps to ensure proper conduct and reinforces a culture of leadership and discipline among Officer Cadets.

Recommendations

6.99 We made no recommendations in this area of examination.

Analysis to support this finding

6.100 What we examined. For the period from September 2013 to December 2016, we conducted detailed file reviews of training and medical files for 24 RMC Officer Cadets involved in 54 incidents. We also conducted structured interviews with a sample of other Officer Cadets. Finally, we reviewed all completed Military Police investigations involving RMC Officer Cadets. We did not examine whether RMC provided an appropriate environment to ensure that all incidents that involved a victim were reported.

6.101 Policies and procedures. National Defence and RMC had policies and procedures to deal with serious incidents, such as mental distress and self-harm, sexual misconduct, harassment, and alcohol and drug misuse. These policies and procedures were designed to educate and deter, detect and report, investigate and discipline, and rehabilitate and support both the victim and the accused. We found that these types of incidents occurred at RMC during the period covered by the audit. Our sample included only incidents that were reported to military authorities.

6.102 Support to Officer Cadets. We found that RMC provided support when serious incidents were reported. This included referrals to victim support services, mental health services, or addiction counselling.

6.103 We reviewed 54 incidents involving 24 Officer Cadets. Not all of these incidents were investigated by military police services. Almost half of the incidents involved either alcohol or drug misuse. In these cases, we found that the Officer Cadet was referred to addiction counselling or mental health services. Approximately one third of the incidents involved mental distress. In these cases, the Officer Cadet was referred to mental health services. For the remaining incidents, Officer Cadets were referred to support services, or no support services were required. We also interviewed other Officer Cadets, who told us that they knew what support systems were in place and who to contact. This is consistent with the Special Staff Assistance Visit’s report findings.

6.104 National Defence convened two Boards of Inquiry to make findings and recommendations on the suspected suicides of four Officer Cadets in 2015 and 2016. At the time of our audit, one Board of Inquiry, completed in December 2015, had recommended that RMC review its standard operating procedure on suicide prevention. We found that RMC had updated the procedure in April 2017, but it had not yet been fully implemented. This meant that at the time of our audit, some designated first responders were not fully trained to take action to prevent and respond to suicides.

6.105 Military police services investigations. Military police services completed 138 investigations involving Officer Cadets between September 2013 and December 2016 in response to incidents that occurred in this time period. We examined a targeted sample of 90 of these completed investigations that included a wide variety of military misconduct. We found that military police services conducted these investigations according to generally accepted police standards. We did not audit the adequacy of police standards.

6.106 We found that 35 of these completed investigations involved serious military misconduct as the principal incident. These serious military misconducts included sexual or physical assault, alcohol and drug misuse, break and enter, harassment, theft, absence without leave, and conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. We found that RMC took disciplinary action when the military police services referred findings of their investigations back to the RMC leadership.

Conclusion

6.107 We concluded that the Royal Military College of Canada could not demonstrate that it produced officers at a reasonable cost, and we concluded that there were weaknesses in military training. In addition, for most of their careers, there was no significant difference in career progression between graduates of the Royal Military College of Canada and officers who entered the Canadian Armed Forces through other entry plans. The Royal Military College of Canada emphasized academic education over military training, and the academic environment did not consistently support military training objectives. While the quality of its academic programs was good, the cost per student was significantly higher than other universities and other officer entry plans.

6.108 We also concluded that, while the Royal Military College of Canada took action when serious incidents were reported, the number of investigations and incidents of misconduct involving senior Officer Cadets showed that it needed to improve military training.

6.109 The primary role of the Royal Military College of Canada is to be a military institution. Unless National Defence can resolve the issues identified in this report and the Special Staff Assistance Visit report, the Royal Military College of Canada risks becoming just another university and not providing the Canadian Armed Forces with the leaders it requires.