Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Reuters photo: Ints Kalnins)

Men who could implicate the Turkish president in a lucrative, sanctions-busting scheme to trade gold for Iranian oil are awaiting trial in Manhattan.

President Trump’s May 16 meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, could be definitive for the careers of both leaders. Trump still needs to prove his foreign-policy bona fides. The controversial Erdogan, meanwhile, badly wants a deal to avoid the embarrassing revelations (or, worse yet, charges) that could emerge from an ongoing American criminal case.


Key to understanding Erdogan’s predicament is that case, the pending trial of one Mr. Rezza Zarrab, a Turkish-Iranian trader with close ties to the Erdogan family. Zarrab was arrested by American authorities on March 19, 2016, and has been held in a New York jail ever since, charged with running a massive scheme through which Iran exchanged oil for Turkish gold in violation of international sanctions. He is joined by Mr. Mehmet Hakan Atilla, the deputy CEO of Turkey’s largest bank, Halkbank, who is suspected of serving as his accomplice.

The scheme unquestionably helped Iran in its efforts to finance regional terrorist groups and prop up Bashar al-Assad. It almost certainly couldn’t have been carried out without Erdogan’s blessing, either: It involved bribes paid to several senior members of Erdogan’s cabinet and, audio recordings suggested, to members of Erdogan’s family. When it was revealed two years ago, it nearly brought down the Turkish government. Erdogan successfully held on back then by purging the judiciary and the police of political opponents and spinning the scandal as a coup attempt masterminded by exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen, his ally-turned-bitter-enemy. But now, he faces the very real danger that Zarrab and Atilla could implicate him to U.S. authorities in exchange for leniency.

Not surprisingly, Zarrab’s attorneys have been trying to slow the case down, successfully convincing the judge to push their next court date back to August 21, 2017. Zarrab and Atilla are expected to testify after the hearings start in August, meaning Erdogan has three months to neutralize the threat posed by the case.


Apparently to that end, Zarrab recently hired former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani, a major Trump ally, and former attorney general Michael Mukasey as his lawyers, in a move that had Erdogan’s fingerprints all over it. Mr. Giuliani, who also lobbies on behalf of the Turkish regime — in October he registered with the U.S. government as an agent of the Republic of Turkey — is dutifully pressuring the administration to achieve Erdogan’s preferred outcome. His strategy seems to be proposing Zarrab as a bargaining chip in a forthcoming “grand deal” between President Trump and the man who plans to be Turkey’s president-for-life.


There may be a legal loophole whereby U.S. authorities could justify dropping the charges against Zarrab and Atilla, and Erdogan will doubtless offer Trump enticements — extending the U.S. lease on the NATO Incirlik airbase, offering further Turkish assistance in the fight against the Islamic State — in an effort to win their release. But Trump would be wise not to listen.


Instead, Trump should let the case proceed, sending a clear message that the U.S. will not sacrifice the rule of law on the altar of diplomatic convenience.

Cooperation with Turkey is in America’s interests. But if Zarrab is convicted and ends up implicating Erdogan in the oil-for-gold scheme, it could set up proceedings against the Turkish president at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. That, in turn, would give the U.S. leverage to demand more substantive concessions from Ankara, including the release of political prisoners, a renewed commitment to free speech, the rule of law, and freedom of the press, and a serious effort to eradicate Salafist jihadist cells in Anatolia. Trump was one of the few world leaders to congratulate Mr. Erdogan for winning yet more constitutional power in a democratically dubious referendum a few weeks ago. But on May 16, he should drop the other shoe.


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