Over the holiday weekend, China released a draft of its proposed foreign investment law. On paper, it looks like a good start to reaching a trade agreement with Beijing but, in reality, it would change little about China’s practices. More broadly, it offers a model of the kind of proposal that Beijing would likely make to Trump in an effort to end the ongoing trade dispute.

Although China denies that forced technology transfers occur at all, theft of foreign technology amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars in loss and has undercut U.S. companies. China also has repeatedly claimed that it protects intellectual property. Although it had made progress, theft of intellectual property, including trademark violations and failures to crack down on fake goods, remains a problem.

The bill would take steps to address these issues. “Forced technology transfer” — the practice of requiring foreign companies to provide significant technology to Chinese companies in order to gain access to the Chinese market — would be illegal. The bill would also strengthen intellectual property protections.

A law mandating that agreements on technology be voluntary, however, would do little to stem the flow of transfers. The practice has less to do with the law than the leverage afforded to Chinese local governments and firms through their control of foreign access to lucrative Chinese markets. As long as China remains a closed and tightly controlled economy, foreign enterprise will be dependent on Chinese partners eager for technology. Far from signaling a willingness to change that, Chinese President Xi Jinping has instead emphasized the need for state owned enterprises and state economic power.

Moreover, even if the law was enacted. The government is unlikely to prioritize enforcement against Chinese firms and the Chinese state which are often the same thing. In fact, China has long had intellectual property laws on the books but has not done enough to enforce them. The laws have been mangled by courts beholden to the Chinese Communist Party.

Worse, the proposed rule ignores the need for foreign firms to obtain regulatory approval through a process rife with political pressure and with little transparency. That omission leaves firms vulnerable to pressure to hand over technology in order to smooth approvals for projects and partnerships they're already invested in.

So, what does this sort of legislation mean for the Trump administration?

After the tariff “truce” expires on March 1, Trump will likely face two unenviable choices: a nice-sounding, but largely symbolic, deal, or following through on tariff hikes costly to the U.S. economy and painful for his voter base.

If he picks whatever package of legislation China eventually settles on, he should have no illusions that it will actually stem Beijing's offenses.

But he should still end the trade war, even if agreeing to meaningless concessions is more of a “save” than a victory. But to make that work, of course, Trump would need to remain wary of overpromising what a deal with China would look like.