Vast numbers of current and former Goldman executives shared their stories with Ellis, a level of access that both helped and hurt. The book is rich with insider lore, as well as the closed-door dramas of partnership clashes. But outsiders’ voices are disappointingly faint. And some minor episodes, like the buildup of Goldman’s corporate bond business in the ’70s, take far too long to unfold, as each participant gets to reminisce.

Ellis writes as a Wall Street loyalist. He ran Greenwich Associates for 30 years, providing research and consulting to securities firms, including Goldman Sachs. That experience graced him with a sure hand in writing about the world of traders, analysts and deal makers. But it makes it harder for him to put Wall Street’s great moneymaking abilities into a broader context — either as a key part of American progress or just an unwelcome form of profiteering.

The book nods briefly to the ways that Goldman officials shuttle into powerful government jobs. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson used to run Goldman; so, too, did former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and former Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead. More insights on this pathway would have been welcome.

Ellis does point out a fascinating quirk in tax law: wealthy political appointees who put their assets into blind trusts needn’t pay capital gains taxes on any sales. So public service isn’t always a low-paying sacrifice; it can also help outwit the tax man. Ellis estimates Paulson could have saved as much as $200 million this way.

The financial crises of 2007-8 win only a few pages of notice at the end of the book. Goldman’s earnings and stock price have sagged, but the firm remains profitable, which is more than some of its now-­extinct rivals can say. Ellis suggests that’s no accident.

As he tells it, Goldman largely cleared its portfolios of mortgage troubles in April 2007, acting far faster than other firms, some of which keep struggling to extricate themselves from ill-advised loans. Instead of suffering helplessly as mortgage values declined, Goldman switched tack and earned as much as $1 billion in a quarter by betting on a further drop in mortgage-index values.

Nimble trading, indeed.