Date : 28/02/2016

Venue : Juventus Stadium

Competition : Serie A 2015/2016, Matchday 27

The starting line ups:

Roberto Mancini changed his team’s shape once again in this match, choosing a 5-3-2 formation. Samir Handanovic was under the goal posts behind a defense that consisted of Alex Telles, Danilo D’Ambrosio, Juan Jesus, Miranda and Murillo. Gary Medel was protecting the defense as a DM, with Felipe Melo and Kondogbia slightly in front of him. Rodrigo Palacio and Mauro Icardi were the two forwards.

Massimiliano Allegri on the other side, chose to field his team too in a 5-3-2/3-5-2 shape. Gianluigi Buffon was the GK, with Barzagli, Chiellini and Bonucci as the three CBs in front of him and Alex Sandro and Lichtsteiner on the wings. Ex-Inter midfielder, Hernanes started as the regista in front of the defense (replacing Marchisio) and had Pogba and Khedira playing in front of him as CMs. Paulo Dybala and Mandzukic were the two forwards.

Juventus

The bianconeri did not make any drastic tactical changes just for this particular match.

They tried to build up the game from the back with their three CBs, which had a 3vs2 man advantage against Inter’s two forwards, thus moving the ball more easy up front.

Lichtsteiner and Alex Sandro were the players that were higher up on the pitch(in line with the two forwards), stretching the opposition defense by providing width and also pinning back the two nerazzurri WBs, who had to create a five man defensive line and also start the transition from defense to offense from much lower on the pitch, thus decreasing their chances of a dangerous counterattack.

Up front, Dybala and Mandzukic were combining their movements in a very harmonious manner. Dybala was making fake runs, such as dropping deep to receive the ball, in order to drag an Inter defender out of his defensive line and enable Mandzukic to run in that space behind where his teammates were targeting him.

You can see on the above image, Juan Jesus being out of position after following Dybala, with Mandzukic running behind him, in the space he evacuated.

On defense there was no need to press with high intensity through long periods as it was very easy to take advantage of Inter’s usual poor build-up and force them into long balls immediately after the start of the pressing.

When Inter reached their half in an organized manner, through short build up play, Juventus were in a 5-3-2 shape, with the two forwards in front of the 3 midfielders cutting any passing lanes towards the centre of the field, hence forcing their opponents to play solely from the wings.



Mancini’s wrong approach

Mancini’s decision to use three CBs seemed obvious from the start. With a numerical advantage of 3vs2, against Juventu’s two forwards, one CB could always follow Dybala’s dropping movements, without a lot of hesitation as he still had a 2vs1 advantage for his team, behind him.

What proved to be a totally wrong decision, though, for Mancini, were his instructions to his three midfielders (Kondogbia, Melo and Medel) to be man oriented towards the tree Juventus midfielders, at the centre of the field and while their opponents were building up their game. That meant that their movements and their pressing runs were in relation of the runs and positions of their three opponents.

Even after the ball has moved to the wing you can see the Inter midfielders being in relation to Juventus’. You can also clearly see the two Juve wingbacks providing width.

(This seemed to be the biggest part of his defensive plan with Palacio and Icardi leaving the passing lanes to Heranes free in order to invite a pass there, where their teammates would press.(just as in the picture below))

This is where the problems started.

The first problem was the execution, with the three Inter midfielders arriving sometimes very late to press, thus giving enough time to their opponents to turn, see and find a pass.

After Medel failed to press on time, Khedira has received the ball between the lines from Hernanes and is ready to pass to Dybala.

The second problem was that with Medel leaving his DM position in order to press Hernanes and Melo and Kondogbia close to Khedira and Pogba, there was no one to cover behind the Chilean. This way a pressing mistake from him was becoming much more serious, as a pass in behind him, and Juve’s forwards were in front of the defense.

The third problem and most serious of the three, was that not letting Juventus’ midfielders touch the ball a lot and create was just part of what they were confronting, as the bianconeri have three CBs (with one of them being one of the best CBs in terms of creating and building up the game in the whole Italian peninsula, Leonardo Bonucci), that can play very accurate long balls or penetrate opponent’s lines with their passes.

Hence, the only thing Juventus had to do was to completely bypass the midfield line, have Dybala drag an Inter CB out of line in order to create a space for Mandzukic to run into and pass the ball to the Croatian.

Above we can see another good example, of Inter’s strategic inefficiencies. With a 3vs3 in the middle of the pitch and a 3vs2 advantage for Juventus’ defenders against Inter’s forwards, Chiellini becomes the free man and progresses the ball forwards.

When deep into their own half and in their own defensive third, Inter were positioned in a 5-3-1-1/5-3-2 shape.

On offense, once again there was lack of movement in order to create shots. However, that was something that Inter knew they would face during the match especially against an incredibly disciplined and compact defense. This way, counterattacking had become much more important.

With the wingbacks though starting from a very low position (due to the Juventus WBs pinning them back, as mentioned before), a long ball towards Icardi, for him to act as a target man seemed like a good solution. But only on paper, as the Argentinian was unable to compete aerially with any of the three black and white CBs. Moving Melo next to Icardi in cases when Inter wanted to avoid pressing or just play a long ball did not improve the situation either, as the Brasilian was not able to win a lot of aerial battles and was also, that way, out of position when transition phases started.



Second half changes

After the second half start, which was disastrous for the Milanese, as D’Ambrosio gave a present to Bonucci, letting him score, Mancini decided to make some tactical changes.

Ljajic came in on the 56th minute, replacing the injured Gary Medel.

The Serbian was now playing in front of Melo and Kondogbia, being close at all times to Hernanes, when on defense and cutting him as a passing option.

The Brazilian’s and Frenchman’s defensive attitude also changed, as they were much less oriented towards their opponents now, protecting the centre of the field and applying pressure only after Pogba or Khedira had touched the ball.

It was tactical move that stabilized Inter defensively in a certain (although minimum) way, until they decided to press high up the pitch and once again make mistakes that allowed Juve to easily break their pressing.

With Ljajic moving in very restricted central spaces on offense, Mancini decided to give more width higher up the pitch.

Perisic was in, replacing Telles and the nerazzurri moved into a 4-4-2 shape, with Perisic and Ljajicon the two wings, the Serbian being more free to move centrally.

It was a shape that also had its problems, as there was no one in a position to press or mark Hernanes, allowing this way Juventus to build their game from the back.

On offense there were huge distances between the CMs and the front four, making combination play either very predictable or simply impossible.

Did this formation work defensively though? Considering the two best chances were created by using it, yes, although at a time when everything had ended as Morata had already formed the final 2-0.

Conclusion



Juventus won yet another Derby d’Italia this year, against an Inter side, however, in a very bad state from every point of view (tactical, execution, etc.)

You can follow me on Twitter, @ThanosChelas.