Jun 10, 2014

Sources close to Hezbollah told Al-Monitor that there were indications among the Syrian authorities and their allies that a huge development was underway in Aleppo. The same sources noted that military and political decision-makers did not rule out the possibility of waking up to surprising news. A deal over the lines of control of the Syrian army and its allies in the second-biggest Syrian city and their entry into all its neighborhoods could happen without significant battles.

The sources explained that this idea was not a theoretical one or an astrological analysis. It rather relied on a long series of on-the-ground military developments, on the one hand, and on the back-channel diplomatic negotiations and international talks on the other. The sources said the issue started weeks ago. In mid-May, several attempts at mediation to end the fighting in Homs were suddenly declared successful. It later appeared that secret negotiations had been underway between the Syrian authorities and the camp of their opponents. They wanted to conclude a deal that saw to the withdrawal of around 1,600 opposition militants from the old Homs neighborhoods, where fighting with the Syrian army was continuing.

The sources said the aforementioned Homs agreement wouldn’t have been concluded if it weren’t for the following negotiation methods: The regime forces’ slow and efficient advance toward the rebellious neighborhoods coupled with a secret diplomatic communication network, mainly along the Tehran-Ankara axis, and military pressure culminated in an agreement and in persuading the militants to withdraw. In other words, Iran persuaded Damascus while Turkey persuaded the military groups to accept the available offer proposed to them.

The sources noted that the negotiations that had started weeks earlier between Iran and Turkey aimed at achieving a settlement in Aleppo simultaneously with a settlement in Homs. However, the double offer that was presented by the Iranians was met with reservations from Turks, who preferred to limit the negotiations to Homs.

It did not take the Iranians and their allies in Damascus long to realize that Ankara thought that the Syrian authorities were trying to normalize the situation in Aleppo before June 3, which was the scheduled date for the presidential elections that would re-elect Bashar al-Assad as Syrian president. Ankara thought that Damascus was trying, through its Iranian allies, to offer the Turks the deal to make Aleppo safe before June 3. This way, the elections would gain credibility and would be conducted in all the big Syrian cities without exception. For these reasons, the Turks refused the suggestion to complicate matters for Damascus and make the June 3 presidential elections even tougher and less credible. The Iranians and Syrians understood that, but also expected it.