The case for a European Army

The crisis in Ukraine reveals disagreement and tensions between the European Union and the United States. European-Atlantic disputes are not new: France wasn’t a NATO member for decades and Germany designed its own Ostpolitik during the 1970’s. More recently opposition against the Iraq War and reluctance to join the Afghanistan War soured EU-US relations. A new dimension is that continental European NATO members and its more Atlantic orientated members seem not to be able to agree on measures against its old enemy. NATO looks powerless and is weakened by wars that were essentially not its business. Since NATO’s eastern enlargement, the key interests and dependencies of the Alliance within Europe have changed. European strategic interests maybe better served by the creation of a European Army.

The dispute during the Iraq and Afghan Wars

NATO states the following on the original goals of the Alliance when it was founded in 1949:

“…the Alliance’s creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration.”

NATO has abandoned this course radically: It began a military-political enterprise by expanding towards to old Cold War enemy Russia. The US state of mind after 9-11 approaches the definition of nationalist militarism. In a way the US did what they tried to avoid from happening in Europe and in the process the US pulled NATO into this military response. The US Armed Forces retreated almost completely from Europe to be able to support these wars and did not come back after. That marked the end of a strong North American presence in Europe.

Germany and France, as the biggest and most influential EU continental powers, openly disagreed with the US in the build up towards the Iraq War. By leaving Europe as abruptly as the Americans did, in the midst of political disagreement, they left the Europeans to their own device. The Europeans did not replace the military capacity: to the contrary, they reduced their defensive capabilities even more.

The disagreements with Germany continued during the Afghan War. The Germans were responsible for the training of the Afghan National Police. Germany refused to deploy its troops and trainers in the violent southern regions of Afghanistan, also after NATO was made responsible for the occupation of the south in late 2005. The UK, Canada, the US and the Netherlands all committed troops there and pressured Germany to do the same. Germany refused categorically. During a counterinsurgency war that is an impossible situation: reliable police forces are essential. So the Americans and others started to train the Afghan National Police themselves, applying a totally different approach, impossible to integrate with the German method.

Angela Merkel bargained a deal between the EU and the US: all the training efforts for the Afghan National Police were to be organized by the EU and placed under its responsibility. The EU was not able to keep its promises due to a lack of political support from its member states and a lack of structures and experience in fighting a war. The EU didn’t deliver enough trainers and also did not pair the mission with much needed military support. The US was very frustrated by the inaction of EU member states and Turkey was equally frustrated by the EU’s refusal to provide a realistic road map towards EU membership. As important NATO partners, Turkey and the US categorically refused to protect the few trainers that the EU was able to provide in their areas of responsibility. By doing that, they endangered the lives of EU trainers. The attitude on both sides showed a strong undercurrent of political disagreement on NATO’s role in the Afghan War.

NATO commitments

While these political-military conflicts boiled under the surface, both the EU and NATO expanded further towards the east. Eastern European states were eager to join both. They anticipated that the EU would become the political-economic pillar and NATO the military pillar, bringing long term stability and prosperity. Countries like Slovakia, Poland and Lithuania send contingents towards Afghanistan to cement this new military friendship. Whether the war against the Pashtun in southern Afghanistan was a just cause for NATO is questionable: the Taliban and Opposing Militant Forces were not directly responsible for the 9-11 attacks and Al-Qaeda left the country long before NATO entered. But the new eastern NATO members knew that American support for their own territorial integrity would only come when they showed commitment to the policies of their mighty new protector.

Now the Alliance is put to the test, but in Ukraine the Russians caught NATO by surprise. The new NATO members feel threatened by the aggressiveness of their former communist master. Naturally they are looking at the US and NATO for assurances: they loyally delivered troops to the latest American wars, that were advertised as a NATO responsibility, and are expecting protection for this commitment. The question is whether the Americans and Europeans are able to deliver that together: the conventional deterrent from both the US and European powers is at an all-time low after the US strategic replacement of forces, the defence budget cuts following the Great Recession and the overstretching of resources caused by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Different interests creates US-European tensions

Economic pressure by sanctions can’t be employed as easy as it may sound: The economic situation for the new NATO members is very vulnerable compared to the American economic position. The new NATO members are dependent on Russian energy and trade. In case they are cut off from this natural, geographically close trading partner, the EU is the first party that must step in for support. Germany is the economic power that kept the EU from a total collapse during the Great Recession. It means that no sanctions, that influence the financial position of the EU, can be imposed without German consent. Sanctions would weaken the already fragile eastern economies and by doing so pressure on Germany’s finances increases even further. Imposing sanctions would deeply disturb the EU, its social cohesion, financial position and as a consequence: the defensive capabilities. In this circumstances the EU has no other choice than to oppose sanctions.

Russia is dependent on European payments for energy supplies, but is expanding the supply network towards East Asia. That would give Russia even more opportunities to blackmail the eastern NATO members. To counter this dependency, the Europeans are discussing possibilities for a new gas pipeline from Azerbaijan, south of the Russian border, through Turkey and into the EU. This week the Russian Armed Forces announced military exercises in the Caspian Sea, posing a direct threat to the EU effort to create an independent energy supply from Azerbaijan.

American diplomats, like Victoria Nuland and James Jeffrey seem to be frustrated by what they appear to see as European weakness and the obstruction of American policies. Here we arrive at a key issue: the European strategic position and interests are very different compared to the American key interests. The US is not dependent on Russia for their trade or energy supply and has a lot more leverage than the EU. It is therefore questionable whether NATO is able to pose a credible deterrence for the future, when the political and military course is dominated by the Pentagon and key American interests. It is perfectly clear that Europe has to take responsibility for its own safety and that EU members need to increase defence budgets. These defensive capabilities should be designed around common political, economic and social interests. The recent events in Ukraine show that the US has a different set of interests and that these differences create tensions over and over again.

The European Army

NATO has become a pool of auxiliary forces for a Coalition of the Willing serving American interests, instead of a defensive North Atlantic military organisation to protect American and European lives from outside aggression. Europeans leaned too much on the American military power. They lack the capability to protect their key interests and ultimately themselves. The only long term solution would be the creation of a strong and independent European Army and become independent from Russia’s gas supplies. Germany and France, as the driving force within the EU, are capable of taking the lead. Closer European military co-operation is obvious because of the shared political and economic structures, cultural understanding and financial inter-dependency. There is no reason why they should not do that in harmony and co-operation with Anglo-Saxon friends and European neighbours. The non-allied European countries Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Austria are trying for years to co-operate more closely with European partners and are eager to join a new initiative.

So far NATO has only reached the first two of its originals three goals. The Soviet imperial threat is overcome and nationalist militarism is not the key issue in Europe right now. The US decided on its own that the North American military presence was not essential anymore. These new Russian threats could cause the third original goal to be reached, but with an extra dimension: by deepening the political integration of Europe, it is logical to pair this with military integration in a structure that serves European interests. By differing from its original tasks after defeating the old enemy and by the eastern enlargement, NATO changed the dependencies within the Alliance. It made NATO vulnerable and opened the door for a European Army that would create a more sovereign Europe.