72 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ed. William Carey Jones, vol. II (San Francisco: Bancroft‐​Whitney Co., 1916), p. 2295.

73Federalist 65, in Carey and McClellan, eds., The Federalist, p. 339.

74 James Wilson, Collected Works of James Wilson, ed. Kermit L. Hall and Mark David Hall, vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), http://​oll​.lib​er​ty​fund​.org/​t​i​t​l​e​s​/​2​0​7​2​#​W​i​l​s​o​n​_​4​1​4​0​_3091.

75 John O. McGinnis, “Impeachment: The Structural Understanding,” George Washington University Law Review 67 (March 1999): 652.

76 “Nixon Inquiry Report,” p. 17.

77 See Frank O. Bowman III and Stephen L. Sepinuck, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Defining the Constitutional Limits of Presidential Impeachment,” California Law Review 72 (Fall 1999): 1558–63.

78 Michael J. Klarman, “Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate,” University of Virginia Law Review 85, no. 4 (1999): 646.

79 Bowman and Sepinuck, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” pp. 1522–23.

80 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 3.

81 Senate Resolution on William Blount, July 4, 1797, Founders Online: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01–29-02–0371.

82 Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801, p. 276. Under Article I, Section 5, “Each House [of Congress] may determine the Rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two‐​thirds, expel a member.”

83Hinds’ Precedents, § 2302. Other charges included attempting to foment an attack on Spanish territory by the Cherokee and Creek nations and conspiring to “alienate the tribes from the President’s [Indian] agent.”

84 Jonathan Turley, “The Executive Function Theory, the Hamilton Affair, and Other Constitutional Mythologies,” North Carolina Law Review 77 (1999): 1820.

85 Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801, p. 281. For an argument that the Blount case didn’t settle that question, see Buckner F. Melton, Jr., “Let Me Be Blunt: In Blount, the Senate Never Said that Senators Aren’t Impeachable,” Quinnipiac Law Review 33 (2014): 33–57.

86Hinds’ Precedents, § 2318.

87 Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 420.

88 “Although Jefferson complained that impeachment was ‘a bungling way’ of dealing with the problem, he was reluctantly willing to give it a try.” Wood, Empire of Liberty, p. 422.

89 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Jeffersonians, 1801–1829 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 23.

90Hinds’ Precedents, § 2328. Pickering had released the ship to its owner, a prominent Federalist, without hearing evidence that the duties had been paid, and refused to allow the government to appeal the ruling.

91Hinds’ Precedents, § 2328.

92 For a critical view of the Pickering impeachment, see Lynn W. Turner, “The Impeachment of John Pickering,” American Historical Review 54, no. 3 (April 1949): 485–507.

93 Indeed, the way the Republicans framed the vote reflected some unease about the insanity issue. Rejecting a Federalist proposal that the question take the form of whether Pickering was “guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors,” they opted for the formulation “guilty as charged” — a means of “keeping out of sight the questions of law implied” in the constitutional standard, according to John Quincy Adams. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Jeffersonians, 1801–1829, pp. 26–27.

94 Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Jeffersonians, 1801–1829, p. 28. Henry Adams, otherwise quite critical of the Republicans’ behavior in the Pickering episode, acknowledges the strength of this argument: “If insanity or any other misfortune was to bar impeachment, the absurdity followed that unless a judge committed some indictable offence the people were powerless to protect themselves.” Henry Adams, History of the United States of America under the Administration of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1909), Kindle Edition, loc. 6481 of 21677.

95 Adams, History of the United States of America under the Administration of Thomas Jefferson, Kindle Edition, loc. 6393 of 21677.

96 William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson (New York: William Morrow, 1992), pp. 104–5.

97 Thomas Jefferson, letter to Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819, http://​press​-pubs​.uchica​go​.edu/​f​o​u​n​d​e​r​s​/​d​o​c​u​m​e​n​t​s​/​a​1​_​8​_​1​8​s​1​6​.html.

98 Wood, Empire of Liberty, p. 424.

99 See William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests, p. 125: “Supreme Court justices sitting on circuit stopped including political harangues in their charges to grand juries.”

100 Andrew Johnson, “Proclamation 134 — Granting Amnesty to Participants in the Rebellion, with Certain Exceptions,” May 29, 1865, American Presidency Project, http://​www​.pres​i​den​cy​.ucsb​.edu/​w​s​/​i​n​d​e​x​.​p​h​p​?​p​i​d​=​72392; and Andrew Johnson, “Proclamation 135 — Reorganizing a Constitutional Government in North Carolina,” May 29, 1865, American Presidency Project, http://​www​.pres​i​den​cy​.ucsb​.edu/​w​s​/​i​n​d​e​x​.​p​h​p​?​p​i​d​=​72403.

101 “In North Carolina all of those able to vote before the Civil War and who fell within the scope of Johnson’s pardons could vote. This formulation denied freedmen the franchise while granting it to men who had rebelled against the United States.” Richard White, The Republic for Which It Stands: The United States During Reconstruction and the Gilded Age, 1865–1896 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 38.

102 David O. Stewart, Impeached: the Trial of President Andrew Johnson and the Fight for Lincoln’s Legacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), Kindle Edition, p. 23.

103 Keith E. Whittington, “Bill Clinton Was No Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two Impeachments,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 2 (March 2000): 426.

104 Michael Les Benedict, “From Our Archives: A New Look at the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson,” Political Science Quarterly 113 (Autumn 1998): 495.

105 See Rehnquist, Grand Inquests, pp. 208–15.

106 Disagreements between the House and the Senate over whether Cabinet officers should be covered led to the adoption of compromise language that clouded the Act’s application to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. The act stipulated that cabinet members “shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Stanton had been appointed by Lincoln; if, as Johnson’s defense counsel would argue, “death is a limit,” then Lincoln’s term ended in April 1865 and the act’s protections no longer applied to Stanton. See Stewart, Impeached: the Trial of President Andrew Johnson and the Fight for Lincoln’s Legacy, p. 208.

107 14 Stat. 432, § 9.

108 Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, pp. 259–60.

109 Stewart, Impeached: the Trial of President Andrew Johnson and the Fight for Lincoln’s Legacy, p. 156.

110 The articles of impeachment are available at United States Senate, “The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United States: Articles of Impeachment,” https://​www​.sen​ate​.gov/​a​r​t​a​n​d​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​/​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​/​c​o​m​m​o​n​/​b​r​i​e​f​i​n​g​/​I​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​_​J​o​h​n​s​o​n​.​htm#7.

111 United States Senate, “The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson.”

112 Rehnquist, Grand Inquests, p. 247.

113 Stewart concludes that “it is more likely than not” that some senators were paid off to acquit the president. Stewart, Impeached: the Trial of President Andrew Johnson and the Fight for Lincoln’s Legacy, p. 295.

114 See Rehnquist, Grand Inquests, pp. 240–46; and Stewart, Impeached: the Trial of President Andrew Johnson and the Fight for Lincoln’s Legacy, p. 317.

115 “‘I Have Impeached Myself’: Edited Transcript of David Frost’s Interview with Richard Nixon Broadcast in May 1977,” Guardian, September 7, 2007, https://​www​.the​guardian​.com/​t​h​e​g​u​a​r​d​i​a​n​/​2​0​0​7​/​s​e​p​/​0​7​/​g​r​e​a​t​i​n​t​e​r​v​iews1.

116 Michael E. Miller, “Like Trump, Nixon Was Obsessed with Leaks. It Led to Watergate — and Ruin,” Washington Post, July 22, 2017, https://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​n​e​w​s​/​r​e​t​r​o​p​o​l​i​s​/​w​p​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​6​/​2​2​/​l​i​k​e​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​n​i​x​o​n​-​w​a​s​-​o​b​s​e​s​s​e​d​-​w​i​t​h​-​l​e​a​k​s​-​i​t​-​l​e​d​-​t​o​-​w​a​t​e​r​g​a​t​e​-​a​n​d​-​r​u​i​n​/​?​u​t​m​_​t​e​r​m​=​.​1​e​e​7​0​9​1​a09cc.

117 Andrew Kohut, “How the Watergate Crisis Eroded Public Support for Richard Nixon,” PewRe​search​.org, August 8, 2014, http://​www​.pewre​search​.org/​f​a​c​t​-​t​a​n​k​/​2​0​1​4​/​0​8​/​0​8​/​h​o​w​-​t​h​e​-​w​a​t​e​r​g​a​t​e​-​c​r​i​s​i​s​-​e​r​o​d​e​d​-​p​u​b​l​i​c​-​s​u​p​p​o​r​t​-​f​o​r​-​r​i​c​h​a​r​d​-​n​ixon/.

118US v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

119 U.S. Congress, “Articles of Impeachment Adopted by the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary,” July 27, 1974, American Presidency Project, http://​www​.pres​i​den​cy​.ucsb​.edu/​w​s​/​?​p​i​d​=​76082.

120Deschler’s Precedents of the House of Representatives (Washington: Government Printing Office), § 15.13.

121 U.S. Congress, “Articles of Impeachment,” July 27, 1974.

122 U.S. Congress, “Articles of Impeachment,” July 27, 1974.

123 House Judiciary Committee, “Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States,” 93rd Cong., 2d sess., August 20, 1974, Report No. 93–1305, pp. 220–23. (Hereinafter referred to as “Nixon Judiciary Committee Report.”)

124 “Nixon Judiciary Committee Report,” pp. 217–19.

125 University of Virginia Miller Center, “The Smoking Gun,” audio recording and transcript of Richard Nixon and Bob Haldeman, June 23, 1972, https://​miller​center​.org/​t​h​e​-​p​r​e​s​i​d​e​n​c​y​/​e​d​u​c​a​t​i​o​n​a​l​-​r​e​s​o​u​r​c​e​s​/​t​h​e​-​s​m​o​k​i​n​g-gun.

126 Albin Krebs, “Notes on People,” New York Times, June 5, 1973, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​1​9​7​3​/​0​6​/​0​5​/​a​r​c​h​i​v​e​s​/​t​a​n​g​o​-​s​t​a​r​s​-​f​i​n​e​d​-​n​o​t​e​s​-​o​n​-​p​e​o​p​l​e​.​h​t​m​l​?_r=0.

127 For background on the Independent Counsel Statute, see Benjamin J. Priester, Paul G. Roselle, and Mirah A. Horowitz, “The Independent Counsel Statute: A Legal History,” Law & Contemporary Problems 62: (Winter 1999): 5–109.

128 Leuchtenburg, The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton, pp. 725, 768.

129 For a summary of the events leading to Clinton’s impeachment, and the factual basis of the charges, see Posner, An Affair of State, pp. 16–58.

130 28 U.S.C. § 595(c).

131 James E. Rogan, Catching Our Flag: Behind the Scenes of a Presidential Impeachment (Washington: WND Books, 2011), Kindle Edition, loc. 1648–1651 of 7042.

132 Rogan, Catching Our Flag, loc. 1364–65 of 7042.

133 “Impeaching William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” H. Res. 611, 105th Cong., December 16, 1998, https://​www​.con​gress​.gov/​b​i​l​l​/​1​0​5​t​h​-​c​o​n​g​r​e​s​s​/​h​o​u​s​e​-​r​e​s​o​l​u​t​i​o​n/611.

134 “Impeaching William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors.”

135 House Judiciary Committee, “Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States,” 105th Cong., 2d sess., December 16, 1998, Report 105–830, pp. 118, 121–23. The vote margins were 205–229 on “Perjury in the Civil Case” and 148–205 on “Abuse of Power.”

136 Richard Morin, “Approval of Congress Drops in Poll,” Washington Post, October 12, 1998, http://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​w​p​-​s​r​v​/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​s​p​e​c​i​a​l​/​c​l​i​n​t​o​n​/​s​t​o​r​i​e​s​/​p​o​l​l​1​0​1​2​9​8.htm.

137 Alison Mitchell and Eric Schmitt, “The 1998 Elections: Congress — the Overview; GOP in Scramble over Blame for Poor Showing at the Polls,” New York Times, November 5, 1998, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​1​9​9​8​/​1​1​/​0​5​/​u​s​/​1​9​9​8​-​e​l​e​c​t​i​o​n​s​-​c​o​n​g​r​e​s​s​-​o​v​e​r​v​i​e​w​-​g​o​p​-​s​c​r​a​m​b​l​e​-​o​v​e​r​-​b​l​a​m​e​-​f​o​r​-​p​o​o​r​-​s​h​o​w​i​n​g​-​p​o​l​l​s​.html.

138 Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey, Impeachment and Removal, CRS Report no. R44260 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2015), p. 1, https://​fas​.org/​s​g​p​/​c​r​s​/​m​i​s​c​/​R​4​4​2​6​0.pdf.

139 “Nixon Inquiry Report,” p. 50.

140 Cole and Garvey, Impeachment and Removal, p. 1; “List of Individuals Impeached by the House of Representatives,” United States House of Representatives, http://​his​to​ry​.house​.gov/​I​n​s​t​i​t​u​t​i​o​n​/​I​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​/​I​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​-​List/; and Sunstein, Impeachment: A Citizen’s Guide, pp. 108–13.

141 Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, p. 1.

142 “Nixon Inquiry Report,” p. 17.

143 “Nixon Inquiry Report,” p. 20.

144Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224 (1993); House Judiciary Committee, “Impeachment of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,” 111th Cong., 2d sess., March 4, 2010, H. Rept. no. 111–427.

145Hinds’ Precedents, § 2470.

146Hinds’ Precedents, § 2346.

147Hinds’ Precedents, § 2505. (Delahay resigned after impeachment and no trial was held in the Senate.)

148 Kent “engaged in conduct with respect to employees … incompatible with the trust and confidence placed in him as a judge,” according to Articles I and II. House Judiciary Committee, “Impeachment of Judge Samuel B. Kent,” 111th Congress, 1st sess., June 17, 2009, H. Rept., pp. 111–59. For more on the Kent case, see Skip Hollandsworth, “Perversion of Justice,” Texas Monthly, December 2009, https://​www​.tex​as​month​ly​.com/​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/​p​e​r​v​e​r​s​i​o​n​-​o​f​-​j​u​s​tice/.

149 “Impeachment Trials by the Senate,” CQ Researcher, http://​library​.cqpress​.com/​c​q​r​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​e​r​/​d​o​c​u​m​e​n​t​.​p​h​p​?​i​d​=​c​q​r​e​s​r​r​e​1​9​2​6​0​4​1​7​0​0​#H2_6.

150 “Impeachment of Judge Ritter,” Deschler’s Precedents of the House of Representatives (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1994, § 18.7, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-HPREC-DESCHLERS-V3/pdf/GPO-HPREC-DESCHLERS-V3-5–5-5.pdf.

151 See, for example, Bowman and Sepinuck, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” p. 1535.

152 Statement of Cass Sunstein, “Background and History of Impeachment,” Hearing before House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, November 9, 1998, in “Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton: The Evidentiary Record Pursuant to S. Res. 16,” 106th Cong., 1st sess., January 8, 1999, p. 89.

153 Akhil Amar, “Foreword,” in Black, Impeachment: A Handbook (1998 ed.), p. xi.

154 Cass R. Sunstein, “Impeaching the President,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 147 (December 1998): 304. See also Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process, pp. 83–85.

155 Mike Lillis, “Pelosi: No Grounds for Impeaching Trump,” The Hill, February 6, 2017, http://​the​hill​.com/​h​o​m​e​n​e​w​s​/​h​o​u​s​e​/​3​1​8​0​7​5​-​p​e​l​o​s​i​-​n​o​-​g​r​o​u​n​d​s​-​f​o​r​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​i​n​g​-​trump.

156 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, p. 580.

157 Sara Sun Beale, “Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 543 (January 1996): 40, https://​schol​ar​ship​.law​.duke​.edu/​c​g​i​/​v​i​e​w​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​.​c​g​i​?​r​e​f​e​r​e​r​=​&​h​t​t​p​s​r​e​d​i​r​=​1​&​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​=​2​0​4​5​&​c​o​n​t​e​x​t​=​f​a​c​u​l​t​y​_​s​c​h​o​l​a​rship.

158 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, p. 583.

159 Cole and Garvey, Impeachment and Removal, p. 9.

160 Cass R. Sunstein, “Impeaching the President,” p. 291.

161 Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process, p. 103.

162 See Bowman and Sepinuck, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” p. 1559: “In the case of impeachment, two of the four conventionally articulated rationales for criminal prosecution and punishment — retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation — are absent. The goal of impeachment is neither retribution against, nor rehabilitation of, the official who commits an offense.” See also Greg Weiner, “Impeachment’s Political Heart,” New York Times, May 18, 2017: “The purpose of impeachment is not punitive. It is prophylactic.”

163 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 3, clause 7.

164 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, pp. 586–87.

165 Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, p. 85.

166Johnson’s English Dictionary (Boston: Cottons and Barnard, 1834), p. 693.

167 “Nixon Inquiry Report,” pp. 26–27.

168 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, p. 49. See also Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process, p. 177: “Constitutional law explicates what is permissible, but politics dictates what should be done … simply because some course of action is constitutional does not necessarily mean that such an undertaking is either prudent or mandatory.”

169 “Congressman Sherman Introduces Article of Impeachment: Obstruction of Justice.”

170 McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 49.

171 eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 317.

172 McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 317.

173 McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 320.

174 Hoffer and Hull, Impeachment in America: 1635–1805, p. 219.

175 As noted above, Delahay, like Pickering, lost his post by being habitually “intoxicated off the bench as well as on the bench.” Judge English demonstrated mental instability by dragging local officials into court in a nonexistent case, ranting at them, and threatening to remove them from office.

176 In practice, Section 3 has served as the Constitution’s “Colonoscopy Clause,” having been formally invoked three times for the procedure. See John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, “List of Vice‐​Presidents Who Served as ‘Acting’ President Under the 25th Amendment,” American Presidency Project, http://​www​.pres​i​den​cy​.ucsb​.edu/​a​c​t​i​n​g​_​p​r​e​s​i​d​e​n​t​s.php.

177 U.S. Constitution, Twenty‐​fifth Amendment, Section 4.

178 Laurence Tribe, Twitter, January 21, 2017, 8:52 p.m., https://​twit​ter​.com/​t​r​i​b​e​l​a​w​/​s​t​a​t​u​s​/​8​2​2​9​8​5​2​8​0​1​8​9​7​92256; and Laurence Tribe, Twitter, February 18, 2017, 3:40 p.m., https://​twit​ter​.com/​t​r​i​b​e​l​a​w​/​s​t​a​t​u​s​/​8​3​3​0​5​3​5​7​0​5​0​5​2​73345. More recently, however, Tribe seems to have concluded it’s an “impractical” solution. Laurence Tribe, Twitter, August 13, 2017, 9:03 a.m., https://​twit​ter​.com/​t​r​i​b​e​l​a​w​/​s​t​a​t​u​s​/​8​9​6​7​3​4​0​1​8​3​3​4​4​90624.

179 Ross Douthat, “The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump,” New York Times, May 16, 2017, https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2​0​1​7​/​0​5​/​1​6​/​o​p​i​n​i​o​n​/​2​5​t​h​-​a​m​e​n​d​m​e​n​t​-​t​r​u​m​p​.html.

180 Marcos, “House Democrat Introduces Bill to Amend Presidential Removal Procedures.”

181 “Strengthening and Clarifying the 25th Amendment Act of 2017,” H.R. 2093, 115th Cong., April 14, 2017, https://​www​.con​gress​.gov/​b​i​l​l​/​1​1​5​t​h​-​c​o​n​g​r​e​s​s​/​h​o​u​s​e​-​b​i​l​l​/​2​0​9​3​/text.

182 “Oversight Commission on Presidential Capacity Act,” H.R. 1987, 115th Cong., April 6, 2017, https://​www​.con​gress​.gov/​b​i​l​l​/​1​1​5​t​h​-​c​o​n​g​r​e​s​s​/​h​o​u​s​e​-​b​i​l​l​/​1​9​8​7​/​c​o​s​p​o​n​s​o​r​s​?r=48.

183 Oversight Commission on Presidential Capacity Act, § § 3(b); 5(d).

184 Oversight Commission on Presidential Capacity Act, § 6(b).

185 See Maria A. Oquendo, “The Goldwater Rule: Why Breaking It Is Unethical and Irresponsible,” American Psychiatric Association, August 3, 2016, https://​www​.psy​chi​a​try​.org/​n​e​w​s​-​r​o​o​m​/​a​p​a​-​b​l​o​g​s​/​a​p​a​-​b​l​o​g​/​2​0​1​6​/​0​8​/​t​h​e​-​g​o​l​d​w​a​t​e​r​-rule.

186 111 Cong. Rec. S15586 (daily ed., July 6, 1965) (statement of Sen. McCarthy).

187 Brian Kalt, Constitutional Cliffhangers: A Legal Guide for Presidents and Their Enemies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), Kindle Edition, p. 1.

188 U.S. Constitution, Twenty‐​fifth Amendment, Section 4.

189Constitutional Cliffhangers, p. 61.

190 Kalt, Constitutional Cliffhangers, pp. 64–66.

191 Eric Posner, “Trump Could be Removed for Political Incompetence — Using the 25th Amendment,” Washington Post, September 12, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-could-be-removed-for-political-incompetence–using-the-25th-amendment/2017/09/12/b6c62380-9718–11e7-82e4-f1076f6d6152_story.html?utm_term=.8d1cb5645446.

192 James Reston, “Why America Weeps,” New York Times, November 23, 1963, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​1​9​6​3​/​1​1​/​2​3​/​w​h​y​-​a​m​e​r​i​c​a​-​w​e​e​p​s​-​k​e​n​n​e​d​y​-​v​i​c​t​i​m​-​o​f​-​v​i​o​l​e​n​t​-​s​t​r​e​a​k​-​h​e​-​s​o​u​g​h​t​-​t​o​-​c​u​r​b​-​i​n​-​t​h​e​-​n​a​t​i​o​n​.​h​t​m​l​?​p​a​g​e​w​a​n​t​e​d=all.

193 John D. Feerick, The Twenty‐​Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History and Applications, 3rd ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), pp. 115–16.

194 Quoted in Eric M. Freedman, “The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a President Immune from Criminal Prosecution Before Impeachment?,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 20 (1992): 56.

195 Feerick, Twenty‐​Fifth Amendment, p. 117. Rep. Richard H. Poff (R-VA), a key figure in the House debates, described the circumstances under which resort to Section 4 would be appropriate: “one is the case when the President by reason of some physical ailment or some sudden accident is unconscious or paralyzed.… The other is the case when the President, by reason of mental debility, is unable or unwilling to make any rational decision, including particularly the decision to stand aside.” Feerick, Twenty‐​Fifth Amendment, p. 97.

196 Douthat, “The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump.”

197 Quoted in Turley, “Executive Function Theory,” p. 1804. See also Sunstein, “Impeaching the President,” pp. 288–89, arguing that the rejection of “maladministration” suggests “the Framers were thinking, exclusively or principally, of large‐​scale abuses of distinctly public authority.”

198 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, p. 29.

199 Turley, “Executive Function Theory,” p. 1805.

200 McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 572.

201 As Joseph M. Bessette and Gary J. Schmitt noted, “the secrecy of the Convention’s proceedings meant that [this exchange] was not known to the delegates in the state ratifying conventions [and] at least some of them seemed to have believed that ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’ was equivalent to Mason’s rejected formulation.” Joseph M. Bessette and Gary J. Schmitt, What Does ‘High Crimes and Misdemeanors’ Mean? (Claremont, CA: Henry Salvatori Center, Claremont McKenna College, 1998), https://​www​.cmc​.edu/​s​a​l​v​a​t​o​r​i​/​p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​-​essay.

202 “Nixon Inquiry Report,” p. 6.

203 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol. 3 (Virginia) [1827], Liberty Fund, http://​oll​.lib​er​ty​fund​.org/​t​i​t​l​e​s​/​1​9​0​7​#​E​l​l​i​o​t​_​1​3​1​4​-​0​3​_1060.

204 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, p. 559.

205 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, p. 33.

206 Cass Sunstein, who takes a narrow, abuse‐​of‐​power approach to impeachment’s constitutional scope, acknowledges that “neglecting constitutional duties” egregiously can be an impeachable offense. See Sunstein, Impeachment: A Citizen’s Guide, p. 121.

207 Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801, pp. 36–40.

208 James Madison, “Removal Power of the President,” June 17, 1789, Founders Online, National Archives, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01–12-02–0143. (Original source: The Papers of James Madison, ed. Charles F. Hobson and Robert A. Rutland, vol. 12 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1979), pp. 232–239.

209 Although, as David Currie points out, “there was no consensus as to whether [the president] got that authority from Congress or the Constitution itself.” Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801, p. 41.

210 Philip Carter, “Articles of Impeachment for Donald J. Trump,” Slate, May 16, 2017, http://​www​.slate​.com/​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/​n​e​w​s​_​a​n​d​_​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​j​u​r​i​s​p​r​u​d​e​n​c​e​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​5​/​h​e​r​e​_​i​s​_​a​_​d​r​a​f​t​_​o​f​_​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​_​o​f​_​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​_​f​o​r​_​d​o​n​a​l​d​_​j​_​t​r​u​m​p​.html.

211 See, for example, Christopher Fonzone and Joshua A. Geltzer, “Can President Trump Just Leave Key Executive Branch Offices Unfilled?,” Law​fare​.com, July 5, 2017, https://​www​.law​fare​blog​.com/​c​a​n​-​p​r​e​s​i​d​e​n​t​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​j​u​s​t​-​l​e​a​v​e​-​k​e​y​-​e​x​e​c​u​t​i​v​e​-​b​r​a​n​c​h​-​o​f​f​i​c​e​s​-​u​n​f​illed.

212 Carter, “Articles of Impeachment for Donald J. Trump.”

213 “Partnership for Public Service Addresses Management Challenges and Opportunities for President Donald Trump at the 200 Day Mark,” Partnership for Public Service, August 7, 2017, https://​our​public​ser​vice​.org/​p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/​v​i​e​w​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​d​e​t​a​i​l​s​.​p​h​p​?​i​d​=1953.

214 Philip Bump, “Trump Is Blaming Democrats for His Own Failure on Nominations,” Washington Post, June 5, 2017, https://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​n​e​w​s​/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​w​p​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​6​/​0​5​/​t​r​u​m​p​s​-​b​l​a​m​i​n​g​-​d​e​m​o​c​r​a​t​s​-​f​o​r​-​h​i​s​-​o​w​n​-​f​a​i​l​u​r​e​-​o​n​-​n​o​m​i​n​a​t​i​o​n​s​/​?​t​i​d​=​a​_​i​n​l​&​u​t​m​_​t​e​r​m​=​.​c​4​6​9​8​5​0​387e8.

215 Cody Derespina, “Trump: No Plans to Fill ‘Unnecessary’ Appointed Positions,” FoxNews​.com, February 28, 2017, http://​www​.foxnews​.com/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​2​/​2​8​/​t​r​u​m​p​-​n​o​-​p​l​a​n​s​-​t​o​-​f​i​l​l​-​u​n​n​e​c​e​s​s​a​r​y​-​a​p​p​o​i​n​t​e​d​-​p​o​s​i​t​i​o​n​s​.html.

216 Eric Lipton and Danielle Ivory, “Trump Says His Regulatory Rollback Already Is the ‘Most Far‐​Reaching,’” New York Times, December 14, 2017, https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2​0​1​7​/​1​2​/​1​4​/​u​s​/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​t​r​u​m​p​-​f​e​d​e​r​a​l​-​r​e​g​u​l​a​t​i​o​n​s​.html.

217 See Alan Levin and Jesse Hamilton, “Trump Takes Credit for Killing Hundreds of Regulations That Were Already Dead,” Bloomberg Businessweek, December 11, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017–12-11/trump-takes-credit-for-killing-hundreds-of-regulations-that-were-already-dead.

218 See “10 Executives Reshaping Government,” Government Executive, January 23, 2018, https://​www​.gov​ex​ec​.com/​c​a​r​d​s​/​1​0​-​e​x​e​c​u​t​i​v​e​s​-​r​e​s​h​a​p​i​n​g​-​g​o​v​e​r​n​ment/.

219 Ashley Parker, “‘Ready, Shoot, Aim’: President Trump’s Loyalty Tests Cause Hiring Headaches,” Washington Post, April 29, 2018, https://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​r​e​a​d​y​-​s​h​o​o​t​-​a​i​m​-​p​r​e​s​i​d​e​n​t​-​t​r​u​m​p​s​-​l​o​y​a​l​t​y​-​t​e​s​t​s​-​c​a​u​s​e​-​h​i​r​i​n​g​-​h​e​a​d​a​c​h​e​s​/​2​0​1​8​/​0​4​/​2​9​/​7​7​5​6​e​c​9​c​-​4​a​3​3​-​1​1​e​8​-​8​2​7​e​-​1​9​0​e​f​a​f​1​f​1​e​e​_​s​t​o​r​y​.html.

220 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, p. 30.

221 Kevin O’ Brien, “A Bureaucracy So Big that It Gets to Run Itself Is Dangerous,” Cleveland Plain‐​Dealer, June 13, 2013, http://​www​.cleve​land​.com/​o​b​r​i​e​n​/​i​n​d​e​x​.​s​s​f​/​2​0​1​3​/​0​6​/​a​_​b​u​r​e​a​u​c​r​a​c​y​_​s​o​_​b​i​g​_​t​h​a​t​_​i​t​_​h​.html.

222 See, for example, Charles C.W. Cooke, “Obama: I’m Not Incompetent, Government Is,” National Review, December 6, 2013, http://​www​.nation​al​re​view​.com/​c​o​r​n​e​r​/​3​65667.

223 Cynthia R. Farina, “False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 12 (February 2010): 360, 410.

224 In the BP case, for example, some pointed to remote‐​controlled blowout preventers, mandated in Norway and Brazil, though not in the United States. Russell Gold, Ben Casselman, and Guy Chazan, “Leaking Oil Well Lacked Safeguard Device,” Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2010, https://​www​.wsj​.com/​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/​S​B​1​0​0​0​1​4​2​4​0​5​2​7​4​8​7​0​4​4​2​3​5​0​4​5​7​5​2​1​2​0​3​1​4​1​7​9​36798.

225 A Lexis search of major newspapers during the period of the spill (April 20, 2010 to September 19, 2010) turns up one reference to impeachment in the same paragraph as “Obama” and “BP,” in a Newark Star‐​Ledger “Reader Forum”: “Can you imagine had this event occurred in the prior administration just how ferocious would be calls for President George Bush’s impeachment … ?” “Reader Forum,” Newark Star‐​Ledger, May 28, 2010.

226 “Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, of High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” H. Res. 1258, https://​www​.con​gress​.gov/​b​i​l​l​/​1​1​0​t​h​-​c​o​n​g​r​e​s​s​/​h​o​u​s​e​-​r​e​s​o​l​u​t​i​o​n​/1258.

227 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, p. 46.

228 See American Law Institute, “Model Penal Code,” § 2.02(2), “Kinds of Culpability Defined”: 2(c) “Recklessly” and 2(d) “Negligently.”

229 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, p. 47.

230 Senator Bob Corker, Twitter, October 8, 2017, 10:13 a.m., https://​twit​ter​.com/​S​e​n​B​o​b​C​o​r​k​e​r​/​s​t​a​t​u​s​/​9​1​7​0​4​5​3​4​8​8​2​0​0​49920.

231 Jonathan Martin and Mark Landler, “Bob Corker Says Trump’s Recklessness Threatens ‘World War III,’” New York Times, October 8, 2017, https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2​0​1​7​/​1​0​/​0​8​/​u​s​/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​t​r​u​m​p​-​c​o​r​k​e​r​.​h​t​m​l​?_r=0.

232 Daniel W. Drezner, “White House Aides Can’t Stop Talking about President Trump Like He’s a Toddler [UPDATED],” Wash​ing​ton​Post​.com, August 21, 2017, https://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​n​e​w​s​/​p​o​s​t​e​v​e​r​y​t​h​i​n​g​/​w​p​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​8​/​2​1​/​t​h​e​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​a​s​-​t​o​d​d​l​e​r​-​t​h​r​e​a​d​-​e​x​p​l​a​i​n​e​d​-​a​n​d​-​c​u​r​a​t​e​d​/​?​u​t​m​_​t​e​r​m​=​.​b​b​0​1​6​2​7​9f658.

233 Carol E. Lee, Kristen Welker, Stefanie Ruhle, and Dafna Linzer, “Tillerson’s Fury at Trump Required an Intervention from Pence,” NBC News, October 4, 2017, https://​www​.nbc​news​.com/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​w​h​i​t​e​-​h​o​u​s​e​/​t​i​l​l​e​r​s​o​n​-​s​-​f​u​r​y​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​r​e​q​u​i​r​e​d​-​i​n​t​e​r​v​e​n​t​i​o​n​-​p​e​n​c​e​-​n​8​06451.

234 Greg Miller and Greg Jaffe, “Trump Revealed Highly Classified Information to Russian Foreign Minister and Ambassador,” Washington Post, May 15, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-revealed-highly-classified-information-to-russian-foreign-minister-and-ambassador/2017/05/15/530c172a-3960–11e7-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html?utm_term=.c89c732a7cfc.

235 Keith Whittington, “Possibly Impeachable Offenses: The Need for Congressional Investigation,” August 2, 2017, https://​niska​nen​cen​ter​.org/​b​l​o​g​/​p​o​s​s​i​b​l​y​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​a​b​l​e​-​o​f​f​e​nses/.

236 McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 317.

237 Peter Baker and John F. Harris, “Clinton Admits to Lewinsky Relationship, Challenges Starr to End Personal ‘Prying,’” Washington Post, August 18, 1998, https://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​w​p​-​s​r​v​/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​s​p​e​c​i​a​l​/​c​l​i​n​t​o​n​/​s​t​o​r​i​e​s​/​c​l​i​n​t​o​n​0​8​1​8​9​8.htm.

238 Jonathan Turley has dubbed this the “executive function theory” of impeachment. Turley, “Executive Function Theory,” p. 1796.

239 Bernard J. Hibbitts, “More Than 430 Law Professors Send Letter to Congress Opposing Impeachment,” Jurist​.org, http://​www​.law​.jurist​.org/​w​a​y​b​a​c​k​/​p​e​t​i​t​1.htm.

240 Sunstein, “Impeaching the President,” pp. 313–14. Recently, Sunstein seems to have backed away from this claim somewhat, acknowledging that it seems “a bit nuts” to say that you couldn’t impeach a president for a private murder. Ryan Goodman, “Q&A with Cass Sunstein on ‘Impeachment: A Citizen’s Guide,’” Just​Se​cu​ri​ty​.org, October 23, 2017, https://​www​.just​se​cu​ri​ty​.org/​4​6​2​0​5​/​q​a​-​c​a​s​s​-​s​u​n​s​t​e​i​n​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​-​c​i​t​i​z​e​n​s​-​g​uide/.

241 Statement of Laurence H. Tribe, “Background and History of Impeachment.”

242 Bernard J. Hibbitts, “More Than 430 Law Professors Send Letter to Congress Opposing Impeachment.”

243 “Historians’ Statement on Impeachment,” Washington Post, October 28, 1998, http://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​w​p​-​s​r​v​/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​s​p​e​c​i​a​l​/​c​l​i​n​t​o​n​/​s​t​o​r​i​e​s​/​p​e​t​i​t​i​o​n​1​0​2​8​9​8.htm; and John F. Harris, “400 Historians Denounce Impeachment,” Washington Post, October 29, 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/10/29/400-historians-denounce-impeachment/b2c18409-e033-44ee-9258–6215c12e22d3/?utm_term=.bbdcfab90f78.

244 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, pp. 3–4.

245 Hoffer and Hull, Impeachment in America: 1635–1805, p. 157.

246 Judge Halsted Ritter (1936) was removed on the grounds that he’d brought his court “into scandal and disrepute” through income tax evasion and accepting “substantial gifts from wealthy residents of his district, notwithstanding they had no cases pending before him.” Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, p. 93.

247 Turley, “Executive Function Theory,” p. 1831. Other judicial impeachments for nonofficial conduct include Judge Harry E. Claiborne (1986) (income tax fraud) and Judge Walter Nixon (1989) (perjury).

248 Posner, Affair of State, p. 109.

249 Posner, Affair of State, pp. 105, 172.

250 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, p. 39.

251 Allan J. Lichtman, The Case for Impeachment (New York: Harper Collins, 2017), p. 60.

252 “U Researcher: Trump University Lawsuits Present Potential Impeachment Case,” UNEWS (University of Utah), September 20, 2016, https://​unews​.utah​.edu/​u​n​i​v​e​r​s​i​t​y​-​o​f​-​u​t​a​h​-​r​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​e​r​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​u​n​i​v​e​r​s​i​t​y​-​l​a​w​s​u​i​t​s​-​l​a​y​-​g​r​o​u​n​d​w​o​r​k​-​f​o​r​-​p​o​t​e​n​t​i​a​l​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​-​o​f​-​d​o​n​a​l​d​-​t​rump/.

253 Christopher L. Peterson, “Trump University and Presidential Impeachment,” Oregon Law Review 96 (2017): 57–121, Social Science Research Network, September 21, 2016, https://​papers​.ssrn​.com/​s​o​l​3​/​p​a​p​e​r​s​.​c​f​m​?​a​b​s​t​r​a​c​t​_​i​d​=​2​8​41306.

254 Written Statement of Michael J. Gerhardt, Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, UNC–Chapel Hill School of Law, Committee on the Judiciary Task Force on the Possible Impeachment of Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., December 15, 2009, p. 4, https://​judi​cia​ry​.house​.gov/​_​f​i​l​e​s​/​h​e​a​r​i​n​g​s​/​p​d​f​/​G​e​r​h​a​r​d​t​0​9​1​2​1​5.pdf.

255 Another case arguably resting on prior conduct was that of Judge Archbald (1913). Five of the 13 articles of impeachment focused on improprieties committed in his previous position as a district court judge. See “Nixon Inquiry Report,” p. 52. He escaped conviction on those charges, but the Senate found him guilty on the “catch‐​all” Article 13, which incorporated them. See Patrick J. McGinnis, “A Case of Judicial Misconduct: The Impeachment and Trial of Robert W. Archbald,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 101, no. 4 (October 1977): 506–20.

256 Michael A. Memoli, “Senate Convicts Louisiana Federal Judge in Impeachment Trial,” Los Angeles Times, December 9, 2010, http://​arti​cles​.latimes​.com/​2​0​1​0​/​d​e​c​/​0​9​/​n​e​w​s​/​l​a​-​p​n​-​s​e​n​a​t​e​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​-​2​0​1​01209.

257 Noah Feldman and Jacob Weisberg, “What Are Impeachable Offenses?,” New York Review of Books, September 28, 2017, http://​www​.nybooks​.com/​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​9​/​2​8​/​d​o​n​a​l​d​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​a​b​l​e​-​o​f​f​e​nses/.

258 McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 317. Gouverneur Morris offered “corrupting his electors” as a sound basis for a president’s impeachment. McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 320.

259 House Judiciary Committee, “Impeachment of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.”

260 John A. Farrell, “When a Candidate Conspired With a Foreign Power to Win an Election,” Politico Magazine, August 6, 2017, http://​www​.politi​co​.com/​m​a​g​a​z​i​n​e​/​s​t​o​r​y​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​8​/​0​6​/​n​i​x​o​n​-​v​i​e​t​n​a​m​-​c​a​n​d​i​d​a​t​e​-​c​o​n​s​p​i​r​e​d​-​w​i​t​h​-​f​o​r​e​i​g​n​-​p​o​w​e​r​-​w​i​n​-​e​l​e​c​t​i​o​n​-​2​15461.

261 Peter Baker, “Nixon Tried to Spoil Johnson’s Vietnam Peace Talks in ’68, Notes Show,” New York Times, January 2, 2017; and John A. Farrell, “Nixon’s Vietnam Treachery,” New York Times, December 31, 2016.

262 Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process, p. 109.

263 Hansi Lo Wang, “Lawsuit Could Put Trump’s Sexual Misconduct Accusers Back in Spotlight,” NPR​.org, December 5, 2017, https://​www​.npr​.org/​2​0​1​7​/​1​2​/​0​5​/​5​6​8​6​1​8​8​8​9​/​l​a​w​s​u​i​t​-​c​o​u​l​d​-​p​u​t​-​t​r​u​m​p​s​-​s​e​x​u​a​l​-​m​i​s​c​o​n​d​u​c​t​-​a​c​c​u​s​e​r​s​-​b​a​c​k​-​i​n​-​s​p​o​t​light.

264 Norman L. Eisen and Richard Painter, “Trump Could Be in Violation of the Constitution His First Day in Office,” Atlantic, December 7, 2016, https://​www​.the​at​lantic​.com/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​a​r​c​h​i​v​e​/​2​0​1​6​/​1​2​/​t​r​u​m​p​-​c​o​u​l​d​-​b​e​-​i​n​-​v​i​o​l​a​t​i​o​n​-​o​f​-​t​h​e​-​c​o​n​s​t​i​t​u​t​i​o​n​-​h​i​s​-​f​i​r​s​t​-​d​a​y​-​i​n​-​o​f​f​i​c​e​/​5​0​9810/. See also Mark Joseph Stern, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Donald Trump Appears Determined to Violate the Constitution on Day One of His Presidency,” Slate, January 4, 2017, http://​www​.slate​.com/​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/​n​e​w​s​_​a​n​d​_​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​j​u​r​i​s​p​r​u​d​e​n​c​e​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​1​/​d​o​n​a​l​d​_​t​r​u​m​p​_​a​p​p​e​a​r​s​_​d​e​t​e​r​m​i​n​e​d​_​t​o​_​v​i​o​l​a​t​e​_​t​h​e​_​c​o​n​s​t​i​t​u​t​i​o​n​_​o​n​_​d​a​y​_​o​n​e​.html.

265 Norman L. Eisen, Richard Painter, and Laurence H. Tribe, “The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and Application to Donald J. Trump,” Brookings Institution, December 16, 2016, pp. 21–22, https://​www​.brook​ings​.edu/​w​p​-​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​u​p​l​o​a​d​s​/​2​0​1​6​/​1​2​/​g​s​_​1​2​1​6​1​6​_​e​m​o​l​u​m​e​n​t​s​-​c​l​a​u​s​e​1.pdf. Actually, Eisen et al. maintain that Trump’s children would also have to relinquish all ownership in Trump properties to cure the alleged violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.

266 James Cleith Phillips and Sara White, “The Meaning of the Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of American English, 1760–1799,” South Texas Law Review 59 (2018): 37; Amandeep S. Grewal, “The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive,” Minnesota Law Review 102 (2017): 641–42; John Mikhail, “The Definition of ‘Emolument’ in English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806,” July 13, 2017, p. 15, http://​dx​.doi​.org/​1​0​.​2​1​3​9​/​s​s​r​n​.​2​9​95693; and Robert G. Natelson, “The Original Meaning of ‘Emoluments’ in the Constitution,” Georgia Law Review 52 (Fall 2017): 53. “During the founding era, there were at least four different meanings of ‘emolument’ current in official government discourse.”

267 Eisen et al., “The Emoluments Clause,” p.11; Eisen and Painter, “Trump Could Be in Violation of the Constitution His First Day in Office.”

268 Eisen et al., “Emoluments Clause,” pp. 11, 18.

269 There is also a credible argument, advanced by Seth Barrett Tillman, that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply to the president on the grounds that the language “Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States]” applies only to “holders of appointed federal statutory offices, not elected or constitutionally created positions” such as the presidency. Seth Barrett Tillman, “The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout,” Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy 107 (2013): 181–82.

270 Article II, Section I, clause 7. An alternative taxonomy designates this as the “Presidential Emoluments Clause.” See Phillips and White, “The Meaning of the Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution,” pp. 44–45.

271 Andy Grewal, “Should Congress Impeach Obama for His Emoluments Clause Violations?” Notice & Comment (blog), December 13, 2016, http://​yale​jreg​.com/​n​c​/​s​h​o​u​l​d​-​c​o​n​g​r​e​s​s​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​-​o​b​a​m​a​-​f​o​r​-​h​i​s​-​e​m​o​l​u​m​e​n​t​s​-​c​l​a​u​s​e​-​v​i​o​l​a​t​ions/.

272 Natelson, “The Original Meaning of ‘Emoluments,’” pp. 48–49.

273 Gideon M. Hart, “The ‘Original’ Thirteenth Amendment: The Misunderstood Titles of Nobility Amendment,” Marquette Law Review 94 (2010): 313.

274 Trevor Burrus, “Sleep Well, President Trump — There Are no Emoluments under the Bed,” The Hill, January 16, 2017, http://​the​hill​.com/​b​l​o​g​s​/​p​u​n​d​i​t​s​-​b​l​o​g​/​t​h​e​-​a​d​m​i​n​i​s​t​r​a​t​i​o​n​/​3​3​8​1​5​3​-​s​l​e​e​p​-​w​e​l​l​-​p​r​e​s​i​d​e​n​t​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​t​h​e​r​e​-​a​r​e​-​n​o​-​e​m​o​l​u​ments.

275 Natelson, “The Original Meaning of ‘Emoluments,’” p. 55.

276 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol. 3 (Virginia) [1827], Liberty Fund, http://​oll​.lib​er​ty​fund​.org/​t​i​t​l​e​s​/​1​9​0​7​#​E​l​l​i​o​t​_​1​3​1​4​-​0​3​_1019.

277 “Impeaching Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, of High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” H. Res. 621, 115th Cong., November 15, 2017.

278 “Impeaching Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, of High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” H. Res. 621, 115th Cong., November 15, 2017.

279 See, for example, David Frum, Trumpocracy: The Corruption of the American Republic (New York: Harper, 2018), ch. 4. These conflicts are unlikely to represent Foreign Emoluments Clause violations under the interpretation of that clause favored by professors Grewal and Natelson. Even so, they still raise issues of undue influence and potential corruption of the sort that concerned the Framers.

280 26 U.S.C. § 6103(f). The committees so empowered are the House Ways and Means, the Senate Committee on Finance, and the Joint Committee on Taxation. See George K. Yin, “Congressional Authority to Obtain and Release Tax Returns,” Tax Notes, February 20, 2017.

281 Darren Samuelsohn, “House Dems Press for Subpoenas on Trump Organization Operations,” Politico, January 11, 2018.

282 Liz Stark, “Ben Sasse Blasts Trump’s Twitter Behavior: ‘This Isn’t Normal,’” CNN​.com, June 29, 2017, http://​www​.cnn​.com/​2​0​1​7​/​0​6​/​2​9​/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​s​a​s​s​e​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​t​w​i​t​t​e​r​/​i​n​d​e​x​.html.

283 See Jasmine C. Lee and Kevin Quealy, “The 394 People, Places and Things Donald Trump Has Insulted on Twitter: A Complete List,” https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​i​n​t​e​r​a​c​t​i​v​e​/​2​0​1​6​/​0​1​/​2​8​/​u​p​s​h​o​t​/​d​o​n​a​l​d​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​t​w​i​t​t​e​r​-​i​n​s​u​l​t​s​.​h​t​m​l​?_r=0.

284 Carla Herreria, “Naval Ceremony Turns Political after Donald Trump Asks Crowd to Call Congress,” Yahoo​.com, July 22, 2017, https://​www​.yahoo​.com/​n​e​w​s​/​n​a​v​a​l​-​c​e​r​e​m​o​n​y​-​t​u​r​n​s​-​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​a​l​-​d​o​n​a​l​d​-​0​3​3​7​3​8​7​2​3​.html; and Sophie Tatum, “Trump after ‘Lock Her Up’ Chant: Talk to Jeff Sessions,” CNN​.com, September 23, 2017, http://​www​.cnn​.com/​2​0​1​7​/​0​9​/​2​2​/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​d​o​n​a​l​d​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​a​l​a​b​a​m​a​-​h​i​l​l​a​r​y​-​c​l​i​n​t​o​n​/​i​n​d​e​x​.html.

285 Ramesh Ponnuru, “Trump’s Tweets and Republicans,” Nation​al​Re​view​.com, June 29, 2017, http://​www​.nation​al​re​view​.com/​c​o​r​n​e​r​/​4​4​9​1​3​0​/​t​r​u​m​p​s​-​t​w​e​e​t​s​-​a​n​d​-​r​e​p​u​b​l​icans.

286 Megan McArdle, “Trump Disgusts Republicans. What Are They Going to Do?” Bloomberg​.com, August 17, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017–08-17/trump-disgusts-republicans-what-are-they-going-to-do-about-it.

287 “Ranking Member Cohen to Introduce Articles of Impeachment against President Donald Trump after Comments on Charlottesville.” The five articles Representative Cohen eventually introduced in November 2017 do not reference the Charlottesville incident, but include charges based on presidential speech “undermining the independence of the federal judiciary” and “undermining freedom of the press.” “Impeaching Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, of High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” H. Res. 621, 115th Cong., November 15, 2017.

288 Cristina Marcos, “House Democrat Unveils Articles of Impeachment against Trump, but Misses Chance to Force Vote,” The Hill, October 11, 2017, http://​the​hill​.com/​h​o​m​e​n​e​w​s​/​h​o​u​s​e​/​3​5​4​9​3​5​-​h​o​u​s​e​-​d​e​m​o​c​r​a​t​-​u​n​v​e​i​l​s​-​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​-​o​f​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​-​a​g​a​i​n​s​t​-​trump. Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, of High Misdemeanors, H. Res. 646,115th Cong., December 6, 2017.

289 Mike DeBonis, “House Votes to Kill Texas Lawmaker’s Trump Impeachment Effort,” Washington Post, December 6, 2017, https://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​n​e​w​s​/​p​o​w​e​r​p​o​s​t​/​w​p​/​2​0​1​7​/​1​2​/​0​6​/​h​o​u​s​e​-​d​e​m​o​c​r​a​t​i​c​-​l​e​a​d​e​r​s​-​o​p​p​o​s​e​-​t​e​x​a​s​-​l​a​w​m​a​k​e​r​s​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​-​e​f​f​o​r​t​/​?​u​t​m​_​t​e​r​m​=​.​5​d​2​d​7​9​2​b6017. A second attempt, brought by Representative Green in January 2018, garnered 66 votes. Cristina Marcos, “House Rejects Democratic Effort to Impeach Trump as Shutdown Looms,” The Hill, January 19, 2018, http://​the​hill​.com/​b​l​o​g​s​/​f​l​o​o​r​-​a​c​t​i​o​n​/​h​o​u​s​e​/​3​6​9​7​3​0​-​h​o​u​s​e​-​r​e​j​e​c​t​s​-​d​e​m​o​c​r​a​t​i​c​-​e​f​f​o​r​t​-​t​o​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​a​s​-​s​h​u​t​d​o​w​n​-​looms.

290 “Nixon Inquiry Report,” p. 18.

291 “Nixon Inquiry Report,” p. 21.

292Hinds’ Precedents, § 2346.

293 House Judiciary Committee, “Impeachment of G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.,” p. 17.

294 United States Senate, “The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson (1868) President of the United States: Articles of Impeachment.”

295 Stewart, Impeached: the Trial of President Andrew Johnson and the Fight for Lincoln’s Legacy, p. 69.

296 Senator William Pitt Fessenden, a Republican “recusant,” suggested it would deny the president “a right secured to every other citizen of the republic.” Although Johnson’s speeches were “a matter of deep regret and highly censurable,” they could “receive no other punishment than public sentiment alone can inflict.” Quoted in Rehnquist, Grand Inquests, pp. 241–42.

297 Benjamin F. Butler, Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major‐​General Benjamin F. Butler (Boston: A. M. Thayer & Co., 1892), p. 926.

298 Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 87–88.

299 “There must come a point” was Black’s repeated refrain on questions of “substantiality.” See, generally, Black, Impeachment: A Handbook; and Jane Chong, “To Impeach a President: Applying the Authoritative Guide from Charles Black,” Lawfare, July 20, 2017, https://​www​.law​fare​blog​.com/​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​-​p​r​e​s​i​d​e​n​t​-​a​p​p​l​y​i​n​g​-​a​u​t​h​o​r​i​t​a​t​i​v​e​-​g​u​i​d​e​-​c​h​a​r​l​e​s​-​black.

300 “Ranking Member Cohen to Introduce Articles of Impeachment against President Donald Trump After Comments on Charlottesville,” press release, August 17, 2017, https://​cohen​.house​.gov/​m​e​d​i​a​-​c​e​n​t​e​r​/​p​r​e​s​s​-​r​e​l​e​a​s​e​s​/​r​a​n​k​i​n​g​-​m​e​m​b​e​r​-​c​o​h​e​n​-​i​n​t​r​o​d​u​c​e​-​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​-​a​g​a​i​n​s​t​-​p​r​e​s​ident.

301 Sanford Levinson, “Our Constitution Wasn’t Built for Trump,” Democracy, August 28, 2017, https://​democ​ra​cyjour​nal​.org/​a​r​g​u​m​e​n​t​s​/​o​u​r​-​c​o​n​s​t​i​t​u​t​i​o​n​-​w​a​s​n​t​-​b​u​i​l​t​-​f​o​r​-​t​rump/.

302Federalist 69, in Carey and McClellan, eds., The Federalist, p. 361.

303 Representative Brad Sherman, “Re: Article of Impeachment Attached,” June 20, 2017, https://sherman.house.gov/sites/sherman.house.gov/files/Rep%2C%20Sherman%20-%20Impeachment%20Dear%20Colleague%20-%20June%202017.pdf.

304 Daniel J. Hemel and Eric A. Posner, “Presidential Obstruction of Justice,” July 22, 2017, p. 23, https://​papers​.ssrn​.com/​s​o​l​3​/​p​a​p​e​r​s​.​c​f​m​?​a​b​s​t​r​a​c​t​_​i​d​=​3​0​04876.

305 Hemel and Posner, “Presidential Obstruction of Justice,” p. 25.

306 Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, “Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States,” 105th Congress, December 16, 1998, Report 105–830, pp. 244–57.

307 See, for example, Statement of Senator Biden, 145 Cong. Rec. § 1480: “impeachment has no place in our system of constitutional democracy except as an extreme measure — reserved for breaches of the public trust by a President who so violates his official duties, misuses his official powers or places our system of government at such risk that our constitutional government is put in immediate danger by his continuing to serve out the term to which the people of the United States elected him.”

308 Articles of Impeachment introduced in November 2017 by Representative Cohen also included obstruction of justice charges. See “Impeaching Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, of High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” H. Res. 621, 115th Cong., November 15, 2017, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-resolution/621?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22impeachment%22%5D%7D&r=3.

309 Representative Brad Sherman, “Re: Article of Impeachment Attached.”

310 See, for example, Alan Dershowitz, “History, Precedent and James Comey’s Opening Statement Show that Trump Did Not Obstruct Justice,” Washington Examiner, June 8, 2017, http://​www​.wash​ing​tonex​am​in​er​.com/​a​l​a​n​-​d​e​r​s​h​o​w​i​t​z​-​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​-​p​r​e​c​e​d​e​n​t​-​a​n​d​-​j​a​m​e​s​-​c​o​m​e​y​s​-​o​p​e​n​i​n​g​-​s​t​a​t​e​m​e​n​t​-​s​h​o​w​-​t​h​a​t​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​d​i​d​-​n​o​t​-​o​b​s​t​r​u​c​t​-​j​u​s​t​i​c​e​/​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​/​2​6​25318; and John Yoo and David Marston, “No Case for Obstruction from Hyper‐​hyped Comey Hearing,” Philadelphia Inquirer, June 11, 2017, http://​www​.philly​.com/​p​h​i​l​l​y​/​o​p​i​n​i​o​n​/​c​o​m​m​e​n​t​a​r​y​/​n​o​-​c​a​s​e​-​f​o​r​-​o​b​s​t​r​u​c​t​i​o​n​-​f​r​o​m​-​h​y​p​e​r​-​h​y​p​e​d​-​c​o​m​e​y​-​h​e​a​r​i​n​g​-​2​0​1​7​0​6​0​9​.​h​t​m​l​?​m​o​b​i​=true.

311 Greg Weiner, Twitter, June 8, 2017, 11:03 a.m., https://​twit​ter​.com/​g​r​e​g​w​e​i​n​e​r​1​/​s​t​a​t​u​s​/​8​7​2​8​3​1​3​7​4​5​9​9​8​76608.

312 House Judiciary Committee, “Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States,” 93rd Cong., 2d sess., August 20, 1974, Report No. 93–1305, p. 136. The House Judiciary Committee report in the Clinton impeachment also emphasized this point: “the actions of President Clinton do not have to rise to the level of violating the federal statute regarding obstruction of justice in order to justify impeachment.” Clinton Report, p. 64.

313 “The Trump Lawyers’ Confidential Memo to Mueller, Explained,” New York Times, June 2, 2018, https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​i​n​t​e​r​a​c​t​i​v​e​/​2​0​1​8​/​0​6​/​0​2​/​u​s​/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​t​r​u​m​p​-​l​e​g​a​l​-​d​o​c​u​m​e​n​t​s​.html.

314 See, for example, Barry H. Burke, Noah Bookbinder, and Norman L. Eisen, “Presidential Obstruction of Justice: the Case of Donald J. Trump,” Brookings Institution, October 10, 2017, pp. 76–77 (citing case law showing lawful conduct ruled to be obstruction of justice), https://​www​.brook​ings​.edu/​w​p​-​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​u​p​l​o​a​d​s​/​2​0​1​7​/​1​0​/​p​r​e​s​i​d​e​n​t​i​a​l​-​o​b​s​t​r​u​c​t​i​o​n​-​o​f​-​j​u​s​t​i​c​e​-​t​h​e​-​c​a​s​e​-​o​f​-​d​o​n​a​l​d​-​j​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​f​i​n​a​l.pdf.

315 For a contrary view, see Josh Blackman, “Obstruction of Justice and the Presidency: Part III,” Lawfare, December 18, 2017, https://​www​.law​fare​blog​.com/​o​b​s​t​r​u​c​t​i​o​n​-​j​u​s​t​i​c​e​-​a​n​d​-​p​r​e​s​i​d​e​n​c​y​-​p​a​r​t-iii.

316 See Judiciary Committee Report, “Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon,” p. 135, listing “the firing of Cox” among the “pattern of undisputed acts” supporting impeachment for obstruction of justice.

317 Carol D. Leonnig, Ashley Parker, Rosalind S. Helderman, and Tom Hamburger, “Trump Team Seeks to Control, Block Mueller’s Russia Investigation,” Washington Post, July 21, 2017, https://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​t​r​u​m​p​s​-​l​a​w​y​e​r​s​-​s​e​e​k​-​t​o​-​u​n​d​e​r​c​u​t​-​m​u​e​l​l​e​r​s​-​r​u​s​s​i​a​-​i​n​v​e​s​t​i​g​a​t​i​o​n​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​7​/​2​0​/​2​3​2​e​b​f​2​c​-​6​d​7​1​-​1​1​e​7​-​b​9​e​2​-​2​0​5​6​e​7​6​8​a​7​e​5​_​s​t​o​r​y​.​h​t​m​l​?​u​t​m​_​t​e​r​m​=​.​6​1​9​f​3​c​4​a60af.

318 Donald J. Trump, Twitter, July 22, 2017, 6:35 a.m., https://​twit​ter​.com/​r​e​a​l​d​o​n​a​l​d​t​r​u​m​p​/​s​t​a​t​u​s​/​8​8​8​7​2​4​1​9​4​8​2​0​8​57857.

319 “Unlimited, with the exception stated.” Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).

320 Sanford Levinson, An Argument Open to All (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), p. 281.

321 McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 612.

322 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol. 2 (Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland) [1827], Liberty Fund, http://​oll​.lib​er​ty​fund​.org/​t​i​t​l​e​s​/​1​9​0​6​#​E​l​l​i​o​t​_​1​3​1​4​-​0​2​_1579.

323 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol. 3 (Virginia) [1827], Liberty Fund, http://​oll​.lib​er​ty​fund​.org/​t​i​t​l​e​s​/​e​l​l​i​o​t​-​t​h​e​-​d​e​b​a​t​e​s​-​i​n​-​t​h​e​-​s​e​v​e​r​a​l​-​s​t​a​t​e​-​c​o​n​v​e​n​t​i​o​n​s​-​v​o​l​-​3​#​E​l​l​i​o​t​_​1​3​1​4​-​0​3​_1047.

324 Jeffrey Crouch, The Presidential Pardon Power (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2009), pp. 101–7, 112–17.

325 Frank O. Bowman, “Comparing Apples (Gala) with Apples (Fuji): The Arpaio & Marc Rich Pardons,” Impeach​able​Of​fens​es​.net, August 28, 2017, https://​impeach​able​of​fens​es​.net/​2​0​1​7​/​0​8​/​2​8​/​c​o​m​p​a​r​i​n​g​-​a​p​p​l​e​s​-​g​a​l​a​-​w​i​t​h​-​a​p​p​l​e​s​-​f​u​j​i​-​t​h​e​-​a​r​p​a​i​o​-​m​a​r​c​-​r​i​c​h​-​p​a​r​dons/.

326 Federal officials can be — and have been — impeached even after leaving office. In 1876, the House impeached Secretary of War William W. Belknap despite his having resigned two hours before the vote. The Senate held the trial despite the objection of Belknap’s counsel that Belknap was no longer a federal officer. Cole and Garvey, Impeachment and Removal, CRS Report no. R44260, p. 16. See also Brian C. Kalt, “The Constitutional Case for the Impeachability of Former Federal Officials,” Texas Review of Law and Politics 6 (2001–2002): 13–135.

327 Andrew Rudalevige, “Why Trump’s Pardon of Joe Arpaio Isn’t Like Most Presidential Pardons,” Washington Post, August 26, 2017, https://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​n​e​w​s​/​m​o​n​k​e​y​-​c​a​g​e​/​w​p​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​8​/​2​6​/​w​h​y​-​t​r​u​m​p​s​-​p​a​r​d​o​n​-​o​f​-​j​o​e​-​a​r​p​a​i​o​-​i​s​n​t​-​l​i​k​e​-​m​o​s​t​-​p​r​e​s​i​d​e​n​t​i​a​l​-​p​a​r​d​o​n​s​/​?​u​t​m​_​t​e​r​m​=​.​4​b​b​f​c​c​e​d8781. For a look at Arpaio’s record, see Nathan J. Robinson, “Wait, Do People Actually Know Just How Evil This Man Is?” Current Affairs, August 26, 2017, https://​sta​t​ic​.cur​rentaffairs​.org/​2​0​1​7​/​0​8​/​w​a​i​t​-​d​o​-​p​e​o​p​l​e​-​a​c​t​u​a​l​l​y​-​k​n​o​w​-​j​u​s​t​-​h​o​w​-​e​v​i​l​-​t​h​i​s​-​m​an-is.

328Federalist 74, in Carey and McClellan, eds., The Federalist, p. 385.

329 “Impeaching Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, of High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” H. Res. 621, 115th Cong., November 15, 2017.

330 Frank Bowman, “Trump’s Pardon of Joe Arpaio Is an Impeachable Offense,” Slate​.com, August 26, 2017, http://​www​.slate​.com/​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/​n​e​w​s​_​a​n​d​_​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​j​u​r​i​s​p​r​u​d​e​n​c​e​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​8​/​t​r​u​m​p​_​s​_​p​a​r​d​o​n​_​o​f​_​j​o​e​_​a​r​p​a​i​o​_​i​s​_​a​n​_​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​a​b​l​e​_​o​f​f​e​n​s​e​.html.

331 James Warren, “Nixon’s Hoffa Pardon Has an Odor,” Chicago Tribune, April 8, 2001.

332 Robert Pear, “President Reagan Pardons 2 Ex-F.B.I. Officials in 1970’s Break‐​Ins,” New York Times, April 16, 1981. One of the officials Reagan pardoned was Mark Felt, who, it was later revealed, had been Watergate’s “Deep Throat.”

333 Robert Costa, “Trump Fixates on Pardons, Could Soon Give Reprieve to 63‐​year‐​old Woman after Meeting with Kim Kardashian,” Washington Post, June 5, 2018, https://​www​.wash​ing​ton​post​.com/​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/​t​r​u​m​p​-​f​i​x​a​t​e​s​-​o​n​-​p​a​r​d​o​n​s​-​c​o​u​l​d​-​s​o​o​n​-​g​i​v​e​-​r​e​p​r​i​e​v​e​-​t​o​-​6​3​-​y​e​a​r​-​o​l​d​-​w​o​m​a​n​-​a​f​t​e​r​-​m​e​e​t​i​n​g​-​w​i​t​h​-​k​i​m​-​k​a​r​d​a​s​h​i​a​n​/​2​0​1​8​/​0​6​/​0​5​/​3​7​a​c​6​c​b​6​-​6​8​3​d​-​1​1​e​8​-​b​b​c​5​-​d​c​9​f​3​6​3​4​f​a​0​a​_​s​t​o​r​y​.html.

334 “Nixon Inquiry Report,” p. 24.

335 Mason, quoted in McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 572.

336 Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, The Pacificus‐​Helvidius Debates of 1793–1794: Toward the Completion of the American Founding, ed. and introduction by Morton J. Frisch (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007) p. 87.

337 Evan Osnos, “The Risk of Nuclear War with North Korea,” New Yorker, September 18, 2017, https://​www​.newyork​er​.com/​m​a​g​a​z​i​n​e​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​9​/​1​8​/​t​h​e​-​r​i​s​k​-​o​f​-​n​u​c​l​e​a​r​-​w​a​r​-​w​i​t​h​-​n​o​r​t​h​-​korea.

338 Jennifer Daskal, “Trump on North Korea: The Dangerous Impulse to Go It Alone,” Just​Se​cu​ri​ty​.org, April 18, 2017, https://​www​.just​se​cu​ri​ty​.org/​4​0​0​5​1​/​t​r​u​m​p​-​n​o​r​t​h​-​k​o​r​e​a​-​d​a​n​g​e​r​o​u​s​-​i​m​p​ulse/.

339 Julia Manchester, “Trump on Attacking North Korea: ‘We’ll See,’” The Hill, September 3, 2017, http://​the​hill​.com/​h​o​m​e​n​e​w​s​/​a​d​m​i​n​i​s​t​r​a​t​i​o​n​/​3​4​9​0​5​6​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​w​e​l​l​-​s​e​e​-​i​f​-​t​h​e​-​u​s​-​a​t​t​a​c​k​s​-​n​o​r​t​h​-​korea.

340 Ken Klippenstein, “Leading Progressive Dem. Congressman: War with North Korea Is Grounds for Impeachment,” Alter​net​.org, August 10, 2017, https://​img​.alter​net​.org/​w​o​r​l​d​/​w​a​r​-​n​o​r​t​h​-​k​o​r​e​a​-​g​r​o​u​n​d​s​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​hment.

341 McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, pp. 318–19.

342 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton‐​Mifflin Co., 1973), p. ix.

343 “Nixon Judiciary Committee Report,” p. 219.

344 See, generally, John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), ch. 5, pp. 98–105.

345 Seymour M. Hersh, “US Confirms Pre‐​1970s Raids on Cambodia,” New York Times, July 17, 1973; and William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1980), p. 287.

346 “Nixon Judiciary Committee Report,” p. 218. After the widely publicized ground incursion into Cambodia in 1970, Nixon announced his intention to continue bombing after U.S. troops were withdrawn. “However, the fact that we had been bombing Cambodia from March 1969 through April 1970 remained secret until 1973.” Ely, War and Responsibility, p. 98.

347 Richard L. Madden, “Nixon Accepts a Cutoff,” New York Times, July 1, 1973, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​1​9​7​3​/​0​7​/​0​1​/​a​r​c​h​i​v​e​s​/​t​h​e​-​w​o​r​l​d​-​c​a​m​b​o​d​i​a​-​b​o​m​b​i​n​g​.html.

348 “Nixon Judiciary Committee Report,” p. 217.

349 John Hart Ely, “The American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn’t Tell Us About,” Stanford Law Review 42 (May 1990): 1146.

350 “Nixon Judiciary Committee Report,” p. 219.

351 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, p. 35.

352Federalist 66, in Carey and McClellan, eds., The Federalist, p. 346.

353 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol. 3 (Virginia) [1827], Liberty Fund, http://​oll​.lib​er​ty​fund​.org/​t​i​t​l​e​s​/​1​9​0​7​#​E​l​l​i​o​t​_​1​3​1​4​-​0​3​_1092.

354Federalist 66, in Carey and McClellan, eds., The Federalist, p. 347.

355 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, p. 44.

356 Expressing the sense of Congress that the use of offensive military force by a president without prior and clear authorization of an act of Congress constitutes an impeachable high crime and misdemeanor under Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, see H. Con. Res. 107, 112th Cong., 2d sess., March 7, 2012, https://​www​.con​gress​.gov/​b​i​l​l​/​1​1​2​t​h​-​c​o​n​g​r​e​s​s​/​h​o​u​s​e​-​c​o​n​c​u​r​r​e​n​t​-​r​e​s​o​l​u​t​i​o​n​/​1​0​7​/text.

357 “Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017,” H.R. 669, 115th Cong., 1st sess., January 24, 2017; and “Preventing Preemptive War in North Korea Act of 2017,” S. 2407, 115th Cong., 2d sess., October 31, 2017.

358 McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 573.

359 George Mason: “Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen.” James Madison: “thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the Community agst. the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate.” Quoted in McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, pp. 55, 317.

360 F. H. Buckley, The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America (New York: Encounter Books, 2014), p. 290.

361 See, for example, Robert J. Samuelson, “Are We on the Road to Impeachment?,” Washington Post, May 28, 2017 (describing impeachment as “reversing elections,” “overturn[ing] the results of an election,” and “damaging the integrity of the ballot”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-path-to-impeachment-is-an-uneasy-one/2017/05/28/79718632–4222-11e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html?utm_term=.af7c97626769; and “The I Word: Let’s All Take a Breath,” Manchester Union‐​Leader (Manchester, NH), May 22, 2017 (“hysterical critics of President Donald Trump are leaping to impeachment as a way to reverse an election”), http://​www​.union​leader​.com/​e​d​i​t​o​r​i​a​l​/​T​h​e​-​I​-​W​o​r​d​-​L​e​t​s​-​a​l​l​-​t​a​k​e​-​a​-​b​r​e​a​t​h​-​0​5​2​32017.

362 “On Impeaching Trump,” Los Angeles Times, June 10, 2017, http://​www​.latimes​.com/​o​p​i​n​i​o​n​/​e​d​i​t​o​r​i​a​l​s​/​l​a​-​e​d​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​-​t​r​u​m​p​-​2​0​1​7​0​6​1​0​-​s​t​o​r​y​.html.

363 Patrick J. Buchanan, “The Impeach‐​Trump Conspiracy,” RealClearPolitics, June 9, 2017, https://​www​.real​clear​pol​i​tics​.com/​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/​2​0​1​7​/​0​6​/​0​9​/​t​h​e​_​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​-​t​r​u​m​p​_​c​o​n​s​p​i​r​a​c​y​_​1​3​4​1​4​6​.html. For other examples, see Gene Healy, “Crying ‘Coup,’ Red and Blue,” Cato@Liberty, June 15, 2017, https://​www​.cato​.org/​b​l​o​g​/​c​r​y​i​n​g​-​c​o​u​p​-​r​e​d​-blue.

364 See, for example, “Impeachment; Excerpts from the House’s Final Debate on Impeaching President Clinton,” New York Times, December 20, 1998; and Ronald Dworkin, “A Kind of Coup,” New York Review of Books, January 14, 1999.

365 Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, p. 2.

366 Statement of Laurence H. Tribe, “Background and History of Impeachment.”

367 Dworkin, “A Kind of Coup.” See also Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, p. 91 (“Removal of the President must generate shock waves that can rock the very foundations of government”); and Sunstein, “Impeaching the President,” p. 312 (“destabilizing in a way that threatens to punish the Nation as much as, or perhaps far more than, the President himself”).

368 Before the Twelfth Amendment, removing the president would replace him with his principal electoral opponent; before the Twenty‐​fifth Amendment, the Constitution lacked a means for filling midterm vacancies in the vice presidency. Had Richard Nixon not been able to nominate Gerald Ford under Section 2 of the Twenty‐​fifth Amendment, his replacement would have been Speaker of the House Carl Albert, a Democrat. Thanks to that provision, “Congress was able to conduct the impeachment in the months that followed with the knowledge that it could not be charged with attempting to turn over control of the executive to the Democrats by installing the House Speaker as President.” John D. Feerick, “Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the Twenty‐​Fifth Amendment,” Fordham Law Review 79 (2010): 933.

369 Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “coup d’état” as “a sudden decisive exercise of force in politics; especially: the violent overthrow or alteration of an existing government by a small group,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup%20d’%C3%A9tat.

370 Richard A. Posner, “Dworkin, Polemics, and the Clinton Impeachment Controversy,” Northwestern University Law Review 94 (2000): 1030.

371 Posner, Affair of State, p. 263.

372Federalist 65, in Carey and McClellan, eds., The Federalist, p. 339.

373Federalist 66, in Carey and McClellan, eds., The Federalist, p. 343.

374 McClellan and Bradford, eds., Elliot’s Debates, p. 318.

375 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol. 4 (North and South Carolina, Resolutions, Tariffs, Banks, Debt)[1827], Liberty Fund, http://​oll​.lib​er​ty​fund​.org/​t​i​t​l​e​s​/​1​9​0​8​#​E​l​l​i​o​t​_​1​3​1​4​-​0​4_156.

376 The better‐​known of these episodes was the Senate’s 1834 censure of Andrew Jackson for “assum[ing] upon himself authority and power not conferred by the Constitution” during the fight over the Second Bank of the United States, expunged from the Senate records in 1837. Others include James Buchanan, censured by the House in 1860 for issuing military contracts on a partisan basis. See Jane A. Hudiburg and Christopher M. Davis, Resolutions to Censure the President: Procedure and History, CRS Report no. R45087 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2018).

377 See also Hoffer and Hull, Impeachment in America: 1635–1805, p. 4. (In 17th‐​century England, the House of Lords “tried very few of the cases brought to them and convicted only one in twenty of those impeached. On many occasions the Commons did not even prosecute — the impeachment itself was sufficient warning or inconvenience to the accused.”)

378One such case, Keith Whittington suggests, was the impeachment of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. “The willingness of the House to impeach was sufficient to signal to the judiciary, still largely controlled by Federalist appointees, that partisanship in the conduct of their official duties would not be tolerated, and federal judges rapidly and obviously moved to a more neutral position relative to ‘political’ conflicts.” Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1999), p. 41.

379 Keith Whittington, “What Is the Impeachment Power For?,” Law and Liberty, May 22, 2017, http://​www​.lib​erty​lawsite​.org/​2​0​1​7​/​0​5​/​2​2​/​w​h​a​t​-​i​s​-​t​h​e​-​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​-​p​o​w​e​r​-for/.

380 See Ezra Klein, “The Case for Normalizing Impeachment,” Vox, December 6, 2017, https://​www​.vox​.com/​2​0​1​7​/​1​1​/​3​0​/​1​6​5​1​7​0​2​2​/​i​m​p​e​a​c​h​m​e​n​t​-​d​o​n​a​l​d​-​trump. (“We have created a political culture in which firing our national executive is viewed as a crisis rather than as a difficult but occasionally necessary act.”)

381 A 2006 study surveying some 375 employment contracts for CEOs at large public companies found that the overwhelming majority of such contracts included “moral turpitude” or “gross misconduct” clauses. Stewart J. Schwartz and Randall S. Thomas, “An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?” Washington & Lee Law Review 63 (2006): 248–49. A similar survey of college football‐​coach employment contracts finds that more than 65 percent contain a termination clause for “unprofessional conduct.” Randall S. Thomas and R. Lawrence Van Horn, “Are College Presidents Like Football Coaches? Evidence from Their Employment Contracts,” Arizona Law Review 58 (2016): 946.