I have blogged extensively about the decline in bar pass rates around the country after the July 2014 test. My original take was more inquisitive, and I later discounted the impact that ExamSoft may have had. After examining the incoming LSAT scores for the Class of 2014, I concluded that it was increasingly likely that the NCBE had some role, positing elsewhere that perhaps there was a flaw in equating the test with previous administrations.

The NCBE has come back with rather forceful data to show that it wasn't the MBE (and that my most recent speculation was, probably, incorrect)--it was, in all likelihood, the graduates who took the test.

In a December publication (PDF), the NCBE described several quality-control measures that confirmed it was the test-takers, and not the test. First, on re-takers v. first-time test-takers:

Among the things I learned was that whereas the scores of those we know to be retaking the MBE dropped by 1.7 points, the score drop for those we believe to be first-time takers dropped by 2.7 points. (19% of July 2014 test takers were repeaters, and 65% were believed to be first-time takers. The remaining 16% could not be tracked because they tested in jurisdictions that collect inadequate data on the MBE answer sheets.) The decline for retakers was not atypical; however, the decline for first-time takers was without precedent during the previous 10 years.

I had suggested from earlier data from a few states that re-takers and first-time test-takers performed similarly; but, disclosing data from a much broader dataset and using the more precise issue of MBE performance, first-time test-taker performance was much worse.

Second, on equating the test:

Also telling is the fact that performance by all July 2014 takers on the equating items drawn from previous July test administrations was 1.63 percentage points lower than performance associated with the previous use of those items, as against a 0.57 percentage point increase in July 2013.

As equating the test is probably the biggest possible flaw on the NCBE's end, it's extremely telling that the equating of specific items on previous administrations yielded such a significant decline, and such a sharp contrast with the July 2013 test.

Third, and, in my view, one of the most telling elements, the MPRE presaged this outcome:

The decline in MPRE performance supports what we saw in the July 2014 MBE numbers. In 2012, 66,499 candidates generated a mean score of 97.57 (on a 50–150 scale). In 2013, 62,674 candidates generated a mean score of 95.65. In 2014, a total of 60,546 candidates generated a mean score of 93.57. Because many MPRE test takers are still enrolled in law school when they test, these scores can be seen as presaging MBE performance in 2014 and 2015.

A steady decline in MPRE scores, then, foretold this problem. This further undermines any notion that ExamSoft or other test-specific factors impacted the outcome; the writing was on the wall years ago. But as few schools carefully track MPRE performance, it might not have been an obvious sign until after the fact.

The NCBE bulletin then points out additional factors that distort student quality: a decrease in quality at the 25th percentile of admitted students at many institutions (i.e., those at the highest risk of failing the bar), the impact of highest-LSAT score reporting rather than average-LSAT score reporting for matriculants (a change embraced by both the ABA and LSAC despite evidence that taking the highest score overstates student quality), and an increase in transfer students to higher-ranked institutions (which distorts the incoming student quality metrics at many institutions). Earlier, I blogged that a decline in LSAT scores likely could not explain all of the decline--it could explain part, but there are, perhaps, other factors at play.

The NCBE goes on to identify other possible factors, ones that may merit further investigation in the legal academy:

An increase in "experiential learning," including an increase in pass-fail course offerings, and which often means students take fewer graded, more rigorous, "black-letter" courses;

A decline in credit hours required for graduation and a decline required (i.e., often more rigorous) courses;

An increase in bar-prep companies over semester-long coursework to prepare for the bar;

A lack of academic support for at-risk students as the 25th percentile LSAT scores of matriculants worsens at many institutions.

So, after I waffled, and blamed some decrease in student quality, and then started to increasingly consider the NCBE as a culprit, this data moves me back to putting essentially all of the focus on student quality and law school decisionmaking. Law schools--through admissions decisions, curriculum decisions, academic support decisions, transfer decisions, as a reaction to non-empirical calls from the ABA or other advocacy groups, or some combination of these factors--are primarily in control of the students' bar pass rates, not some remarkable decision of the NCBE. How schools respond will be another matter.

Further, the NCBE report goes on to chart the decline in the 25th percentile LSAT scores at many institutions. The declines in many places are steep. They portend some dramatic results--the decline in bar pass rates this year is only the beginning of probably still-steep declines in the next couple of years, absent aggressive decisions within the present control of law school. (The admissions decisions, after all, are baked in for the current three classes.)

Coupled with the decline of prospective law students, law schools are now getting squeezed at both ends--their prospective student quality is increasingly limited, and their graduates are going to find it still harder to pass the bar. And we'll see how they respond to this piece of news from the NCBE--I, for one, find the data quite persuasive.