Like the Keating government before it, the Howard government of 1996 and 1997 was deeply resistant to taking any action on climate change that could harm the Australian economy.

But by 1996, John Howard was facing intense international pressure to step up Australia’s commitments as his government prepared for the meeting to discuss the protocol to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change to be adopted at a meeting in Kyoto in December 1997.

Australia had adopted a “no regrets” policy towards tackling climate change under Keating. This meant it would consider only measures that involved cutting emissions without any adverse impact on the economy or trade competitiveness, leaving it largely reliant on on tree-planting and limiting clearing for its response.

The Howard government clung to that negotiating position, despite growing evidence that Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions were rising quickly.

By 1996 Australia was facing a new dynamic: the European Union and the US had both proposed legally binding targets as part of the Kyoto discussions.

The cabinet papers of 1996 and 1997, released by the National Archives of Australia on Tuesday, reveal Australia’s increasing isolation on the international stage.

In June 1996, cabinet agreed that “Australia’s overall objective in climate change negotiations should be to safeguard our national trade and economic interests while advancing compatible outcomes that are environmentally and economically effective”.

While Australia recognised “the need for effective global action on climate change”, it vowed to pursue an international agreement that “does not contain targets which are legally binding” and argued for differentiated, rather than uniform, reduction targets.

The then environment minister, Robert Hill, reported to cabinet that for the first time the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change scientific report had said that the balance of scientific evidence supported the view that the changes in climate and greenhouse gas concentrations were due to human activity.

Small island states were proposing a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from 1990 levels by 2005. While other time frames were being discussed, all were potentially problematic for Australia because of its carbon-intensive economy.

Hill told the cabinet that modelling showed Australia’s emissions from the energy sector – accounting for half of national emissions – were projected to be 30% above 1990 levels by 2010.

The Geneva conference of parties, held in June 1996 in the lead-up to Kyoto, intensified government anxiety.

Hill, who led the Australian delegation at Geneva, told the cabinet it had “proved a difficult and complex meeting for Australia” and that Australia had been singled out for criticism by environmental organisations and by the UK environment minister in an “ill-considered attack”.

There was a perception that Australia was isolated in its position, he said.

“The emergence of a US-EU alliance on legally binding targets was one of the most significant developments and served to shift the debate beyond the position held by Australia,” he said.

Australia found few allies for its proposal for variable emission reduction targets and it had attracted criticism for being one of “very few “ to publicly articulate its concerns about defining a dangerous greenhouse gas concentration level in the atmosphere.

Cabinet agreed it had to beef up its domestic greenhouse gas response policy before the Kyoto meeting if was to have any chance of convincing the international community that it should have differentiated targets.

The consternation grew further by mid-1997. A joint submission to cabinet warned of the prospect of an “EU–US bilateral understanding for progressing climate change” at a forthcoming G7 summit.

Australia worried a deal at G7 could provide the basis for the UN special session adopting a position “which narrows down our [negotiating] options” in the lead-up to Kyoto.

The cabinet actively considered walking away from Kyoto altogether.

It was facing publishing its future emissions as part of the Kyoto process but modelling was now showing that emissions from the energy sector would be 40% to 50% above 1990 levels by 2010.

Options included arguing it was premature to agree to targets, or for a longer time frame.

“Australia’s strategy should be to ensure that we are seen to be excluded from an agreement by the international community rather than having Australia reject agreement … we should be seen to be ‘pushed off the cliff’ rather than ‘walking away’,” the submission advised.

But by July 1997, Hill and other ministers reported the G7 meeting had not produced a deal between the EU and US, and had instead exposed differences.

The memorandum particularly highlighted Howard’s international advocacy with “Australia’s opposition to legally binding uniform targets” having “figured prominently in the prime minister’s [recent] discussions in Washington and London”.

The cabinet also agreed in July to establish a climate change taskforce to advance Australia’s domestic greenhouse gas strategies, to strengthen its bargaining stance. One option to be explored was “domestic and international emissions trading”.

In the following months, Treasury modelled various measures for reducing domestic emissions.

The memorandum warned that none of its scenarios would cap carbon emissions at 1990 levels but would achieve potential cuts of 22%.

And so began Australia’s long and tortured debate over carbon trading schemes.

A proposal was put forward by the Australian Greenhouse Office in 2000, but was scuttled in cabinet; another came forward in 2003, but was vetoed by Howard.

Finally, in the dying days of his government in December 2006, Howard announced an emissions trading scheme, after bureaucrats convinced him it was the most efficient way to meet Australia’s commitments.

Both parties went to the 2007 election promising to implement such a scheme. It would prove no easier for Kevin Rudd, or Julia Gillard.

Or for Malcolm Turnbull.