BERLIN — Europe is in GroKo fever.

European politicians, intellectuals, think tankers and business leaders have all hailed the hoped-for rebirth of Germany’s “grand coalition” as a game-changer for the EU in recent days.

“La GroKo allemande,” a headline in France’s Libération declared, is “the chance for Macron’s Europe.”

If all goes according to plan, the thinking goes, Germany’s two biggest parties will have agreed to remarry by the end of the weekend, bringing Europe a big step closer to a new dawn, as Berlin seizes the initiative on European reform to lead the Continent forward.

With austerity king Wolfgang Schäuble out of the way, German Chancellor Angela Merkel eyeing her legacy and über-Europhile Martin Schulz trying to leave his own mark, what could go wrong?

A lot.

“I don’t understand where the hype comes from,” said Ulrike Guérot, founder of the European Democracy Lab think tank and a professor of European politics at Austria’s Donau Universität. “It’s wishful thinking to expect a coalition that so far has been at one another’s throats will come together suddenly on a substantial European agenda.”

Indeed, Europe’s GroKo expectations appear to be based on little more than vague hope.

When Merkel, a Christian Democrat, and Social Democrat leader Schulz declared last month that they had inked a framework for a “grand coalition” (GroKo in Berlin-speak), Europe looked like the big winner.

The German duo even devoted the first chapter of their preliminary agreement to the EU, under the headine: “A new beginning for Europe.”

In Brussels, the document was greeted with excitement. After months of nervous waiting, it finally looked like Berlin was on track to pick up the baton of European reform.

Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker sounded positively Trumpian after reading the German blueprint. “This is a very significant, positive, constructive, future-oriented, results-oriented contribution to Europe’s policy debate,” he said.

German observers were more circumspect.

“I don’t think the paper reflects the sentiment amongst the German population,” said Guntram Wolff, director of Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank. He cautioned that the paper was “so vague that one can read whatever one wants into it.”

On close inspection, the GroKo’s big plans for Europe look to be little more than warmed-over boilerplate cut and pasted from ceremonial addresses past — long on earnest pathos but short on specifics.

“For Germany, a strong united Europe is the best guarantor for a bright future in peace, freedom and prosperity,” reads a typical passage.

Far from being a sign of common purpose, the GroKo partners’ platitudes about Europe may hint at something else: division.

Merkel might be convinced that Europe requires a major overhaul, but backbenchers in her conservative bloc, especially the Bavarian Christian Social Union, are more skeptical. They are particularly wary of any steps that could bolster the far-right Alternative for Germany, a party that was born out of frustration over the German government’s willingness to bail out Greece.

That might explain why Merkel’s conservatives and the Social Democrats have largely avoided the subject of Europe as they enter the final phase of their coalition talks. Issues such as migration, workers’ rights and health care have dominated the discussions.

The underlying message was clear: Europe doesn’t win votes.

Party leaders on both sides seem to have little appetite to open a debate on a eurozone budget, finance minister or any of the other reform proposals that have been floating around the EU in recent months.

The dirty little secret of German politics is that the population doesn’t really care that much. Europe has become a rhetorical prop — everyone is for it, at least in the abstract.

In a survey last month of Germans’ views of the most pressing political issues, the question of fixing Europe didn’t even register.

That may be because many Germans don’t think the EU is broken. Germany, with its strong economy and perpetual export surpluses, is the prime beneficiary of European integration.

While most in the country welcome measures to strengthen the EU’s external borders and other efforts aimed at keeping migrants at bay, they have less time for proposals such as one for a Europe-wide bank deposit insurance. Reforms that could put German treasure at risk remain politically difficult, even outside conservative circles.

The repercussions of the euro crisis may have convinced Europe’s elites that closer integration in the eurozone is the only way forward, but the bailouts in Greece and periphery countries have only deepened the German public’s skepticism.

That, critics say, is because Germany’s political leadership has dodged the debate.

During last fall’s general election campaign, the subject of Europe’s future was hardly mentioned. Even the SPD’s Schulz, who spent most of his career in Brussels, paid only lip service to the issue.

When asked why Europe was not more of a factor in the campaign, a senior adviser to Merkel told POLITICO, “This isn’t a European Parliament election.” The underlying message was clear: Europe doesn’t win votes.

A reminder of that reality came during the SPD’s special convention in Bonn last month. Schulz, in an effort win over delegates to support a new grand coalition, told his audience that “Europe was waiting for Germany.”

“If we don’t put Europe on a new course now, Europe is going to lose support,” he said, adding that it was imperative for Germany to lock arms now with France to take the EU forward.

The speech was a dud. When Schulz told delegates that French President Emmanuel Macron had called him the day before to express his support for the GroKo, many in the audience snickered.

The reason for such skepticism, even among pro-European Social Democrats, might be that it’s too little, too late. If Germany’s political leaders were serious about European reform, they would have had to engage in a broad public debate during the campaign about the options on the table, political analysts say.

Instead, they focused on picayune domestic issues. As a consequence, some observers argue another GroKo would lack the mandate to pursue an ambitious reform course. “They’ve been lying to the public about the reality in Europe for the past five years,” Guérot said. “As a result, when it comes to these big questions, Germany is in no position to make decisions.”

“The expectation of some in Brussels that it could start raining money is a bit unrealistic” — Guntram Wolff

If another GroKo is formed, the most Europe can probably hope for is incremental progress in reforming the eurozone, Bruegel’s Wolff said.

Berlin has signaled it would be willing to embrace deposit insurance as part of the broader banking union over the long term. Germany also favors transforming the eurozone’s bailout fund into a proper European institution that could play a role in monitoring members’ economies.

Those may not be the kind of blockbuster changes some are calling for, but they are not insignificant and would in the long run likely have popular German support because the economic arguments are compelling.

The GroKo parties have also signaled that they would be willing to invest more in Europe and contribute larger sums to the EU budget, a necessity once the U.K. exits. The question is how much.

“The expectation of some in Brussels that it could start raining money is a bit unrealistic,” Wolff said.

So when will Berlin address the grander visions of a more tightly integrated Europe with common budgets, an empowered parliament and executive?

If the Germans have a say, maybe never.

“It’s waiting for Godot,” Guérot said.