Uzbekistan is embarking on the post-Islam Karimov era after the death of the man who led the nation for 27 years, as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, then President of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, and then first President of the independent Republic of Uzbekistan. The transition to a new era of leaders has been smooth so far, with Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the long-serving Prime Minister becoming President, after extra-constitutional wrangling in which the designated successor, the Chairman of the Senate, declared himself unfit for the presidency.

Assuming Mirziyoyev wins election in December, a very safe assumption, what direction might the country take and how should the U.S. engage the new government? Russia was quick to make its interest known when Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the memorial service for Karimov. Mirziyoyev told Putin his presence "says a lot" and declared an interest in solidifying the relationship between their countries. The U.S., by contrast, sent a mid-level official who met the Foreign Minister.

The U.S. and Uzbekistan have had a checkered relationship. Immediately after the 9-11 attacks on the U.S., Uzbekistan made its bases available to the U.S. for military and intelligence operations in Afghanistan, and in March 2002 the countries signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership. Relations cooled when Uzbekistan was publicly accused in 2004 and 2005 of killing prisoners, but in both cases, the Uzbek government was vindicated as impartial investigations established the prisoners committed suicide; in neither case was the retraction given as much airplay as the initial allegations. The break came in May 2005 when Uzbekistan was accused of killing large numbers of peaceful protestors in the city of Andijan after attacks on police and military facilities and the murder of hostages by an armed Islamist group. Piling on by the media, NGOs, and the U.S. government sent mixed signals, with the Uzbeks responding by expelling U.S. forces from the country. In a replay of previous crises, the only credible on-the-ground investigations undertaken by experienced investigators in 2005, 2007, and 2015 concluded the death toll announced by the Uzbek government of 189 was largely accurate.

Aspects of Uzbekistan are, as the English say, “no oil painting.” But Uzbekistan is a secular state in a troubled neighborhood with no shortage of territorial, religious, or ethnic disputes. Recent U.S. attempts to remove secular authoritarians in Iraq, Libya and Egypt failed (though in Egypt the army saved the day), so the U.S. should tread lightly as it cannot predict what will happen if the current regime is destabilized. Prime Minister Mirziyoyev has already reached out to neighboring countries to discuss trade and water rights, the latter a critical issue for Uzbekistan’s cotton crop, in an attempt to become a responsible and stable regional influence.

This presents a unique opportunity for the U.S. to engage Uzbekistan and their new leader, instead of critiquing incomplete action items from the 2002 strategic partnership agreement. Uzbekistan is a relatively friendly country neighboring a still unstable Afghanistan that can positively affect events through its large ethnic Uzbek community in northern Afghanistan. There is also an opportunity for the U.S. to counter current influence by Russia and China, which would be glad to see the U.S. sit this one out. Also, the newly-created Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank gives Uzbekistan funding options should the U.S.-controlled World Bank balk at Uzbekistan’s lack of progress on issues near and dear to the U.S. and Europe.

Most vexing to the U.S. is Uzbekistan’s record of religious freedom: religious groups must register with the government, proselytizing is prohibited as is the involvement of minors in religious activities without parental permission. Religious teachings are prohibited in public and private schools. The Uzbek government, however, is concerned by regional religious militancy, such as attacks by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, and indiscriminate attacks against civilians in Afghanistan. The U.S. must address concerns of religious freedom with Uzbekistan to assuage fears of future American retaliation, though they must marvel at Saudi Arabia’s ability to avoid a similar accounting. If the U.S. fails, Uzbekistan may tilt more to Russia which will take a hands-off attitude to what it considers a matter of state sovereignty. This is an issue the Americans cannot afford to get wrong.”

Uzbekistan’s view of the U.S. is skeptical but not antagonistic. When it played by the rules by helping in the fight against terror in 2001, or opening the prison system to international review in 2004 and 2005, Uzbeks felt betrayed. To constructively engage Uzbekistan, the U.S. should put aside its penchant for social engineering and stick to the basics: coordinated action against Islamists, and improving transparency in contracting and business. The former will address long-standing Uzbek concerns with regional militancy, and the latter will achieve many U.S. goals, such as transparent financial accounting, respect for contracts, and honest courts. There won’t be any “Mission Accomplished” moments, but Uzbekistan and the U.S. can go from quiet success to quiet success and build a deep and respectful relationship.