In its report ‘On thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic’, the Defence Select Committee identified the Arctic and the High North as an area of concern.

They say this is largely due to the increasingly clear evidence of Russian military expansion. The Committee also resolved to undertake a closer examination of the region in a dedicated inquiry.

One of the reports conclusions follows:

“The historical importance of the maritime space stretching from the Arctic to the North Atlantic is well established, but we can see that many of the strategic considerations which were present in the recent past are now re-emerging. The marked increase in Russian naval activity in the waters around the British Isles and the entrances to the Atlantic is clearly a matter of concern to the Government. We are equally concerned about the United Kingdom’s ability to match this threat adequately.

The reduction of the UK’s anti-submarine warfare capability, which has been a core task of the Royal Navy for decades, has been noted in recent Committee reports and we repeat those concerns here. While the capability of the surface and sub-surface vessels the Royal Navy operates is world class, there are not enough platforms available for the task in hand, and vessels that are in service are often committed to standing tasks elsewhere.

We have received substantial evidence that nine Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft are not enough for the UK to provide sufficient anti-submarine warfare coverage in the North Atlantic. The extent of the current threat is openly acknowledged by Ministers and airborne anti-submarine warfare capability is a crucial part of the response.

The Department should provide the Committee with a detailed justification of the planned maritime patrol aircraft establishment.”

Earlier in the year, evidence submitted to the Defence Select Committee argues that seven additional P-8 Poseidon aircraft should be acquired, bringing the total fleet to 16 aircraft.

Written evidence submitted by Air Vice-Marshal Andrew L Roberts (Retd) states that:

“SDSR 15 proposed that nine P-8 Poseidon MPA be acquired. At the time, the P-8 was the only MPA on the market capable of meeting the UK’s needs in a reasonable timescale. Given the urgency of filling this acknowledged gap in the Defence Programme, the Government was undoubtedly justified in selecting that aircraft without going out to competition.

However, capable though the P-8 may be, the number of aircraft planned is undoubtedly inadequate to fulfil even the highest priority tasks likely to be assigned to the force in tension and hostilities.”

The ten primary tasks for which MPA are likely to be required in peacetime, tension and hostilities are, according to the submission:

Protection of the UK’s national strategic deterrent.

Protection of naval forces – in particular, the new aircraft carriers.

Protection against threats to commercial and other shipping, including counter-piracy.

Surveillance of, and action against, threats to trans-continental under-sea communications cables.

Protection of the UK EEZ (including oil rigs and shore facilities) against potential threats, assistance in counter-terrorism operations and, possibly, fishery protection post BREXIT.

Protection of overseas territories, including the Falklands.

Operations in such areas as the Caribbean in support of counter drug-running operations.

Support to Special Forces.

Gathering electronic, acoustic and photographic intelligence.

Fulfilling the UK’s international obligations for Search and Rescue in aid of shipping and aircraft in distress out to longitude 30 degrees west, in accordance with the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979.

Table 1 below shows the operational coverage which was possible with the original Nimrod MR2 force of 21 aircraft and compares this with that possible with nine P-8 Poseidon MPA. The table also shows what established fleets of 12 or 15 P-8s could achieve.

21 Nimrod MR2 No of sustained ASW patrols 9 P-8 No of sustained ASW patrols 12 P-8 No of sustained ASW patrols 15 P-8 No of sustained ASW patrols 400 8 4 [2] 6 [3] 7 [4] 600 7 4 [2] 5 [2] 6 [3] 800 6 3 [1] 4 [2] 5 [3] 900 5 3 [1] 4 [2] 5 [3] 1,000 4 3 [1] 4 [2] 4 [2] 1,100 4 2 [1] 3 [1] 4 [2] 1,200 3* 2 [1] 3 [1] 4 [2] 1,300 2* 2 [1] 3 [1] 3 [2] 1,400 2* 1 [1] 2 [0] 3 [2] 1,500 1* 1* 2*[0] 2*[1] 1,600 0 1* 1*[0] 2*[1] 1,800 0 1* 1*[0] 1*[0] 2,000 0 0 0 0

The submission also argues that in terms of sensors and weapons, the overall capability of the P-8, as an MPA, is not dissimilar to that of the Nimrod MRA4, both representing a very considerable increase in ASW capability over the Nimrod MR2.

However, the maximum flight time of the P-8 is only about 10 hours, allowing it to remain on station for slightly less than five hours at 1,000 nm from base. Although the P-8 is fitted with an air-to-air refuelling system, this is incompatible with the probe-and-drogue system used in the UK’s A330 Voyager tankers.

The conclusions made are;