Former Defense Minister Ehud Barak did the right thing when he publicly disclosed details from the deliberations in the previous government over attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. The Israeli public should know that its leaders, headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, seriously considering going to war against a regional power, and that their plan was blocked thanks to the determination of politicians and public servants who refused to say “Yes” and who stood up against the military adventure.

Barak told his biographers, Danny Dor and Ilan Kfir, that the attack was considered and rejected three times: once because the army was unprepared, once due to the absence of a majority in the forum of eight senior cabinet members and once on account of a U.S. military exercise in Israel. He belittled Moshe Ya’alon, his successor as defense minister, and then-Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz, who were outwardly militant but who, at the moment of truth, joined their cabinet colleagues Dan Meridor and Benny Begin in opposing the operation.

Barak’s remarks suggest that the Israeli public is deeply indebted to Steinitz and Ya’alon, who usually come off as as the prime minister’s yes-men but who opposed him precisely on the most sensitive and important issue of all. Also deserving of appreciation are the known opponents of a preemptive strike against Iran: Meridor, Begin and the former army Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, Mossad chief Meir Dagan and Shin Bet security service chief Yuval Diskin. In the end, Netanyahu and Barak did not bring all their political weight to bear in order to overcome or push aside the opponents, and perhaps they were secretly relieved.

The nuclear deal with Iran makes it clear that the idea of an Israeli military operation that would put an end to the Iranian nuclear program was unrealistic and dangerous. In the agreement, Iran promises to dismantle or suspend much of its uranium enrichment and plutonium manufacturing infrastructure, as well as reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium. It is doubtful that an Israeli strike could have achieved even that much; in any case, Iran could have rebuilt the damaged infrastructure and enjoyed international legitimacy to renew and expand its nuclear capabilities. The agreement that was reached is not perfect, but it postpones the Iranian bomb more than any Israeli attack would have done.

A war with Iran would have spilled over into confrontation with other forces in the region, starting with Hezbollah and its tens of thousands of missiles. Even Barak judged at the time that the cost of the attack against Iran would be “only 500 dead” Israeli civilians. The opponents and the hesitators, who saved the lives of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Israelis and prevented large-scale attacks and destruction, therefore deserve an Israeli security prize — and not the scorn of the former defense minister, who described how Ya’alon and Steinitz “melted” during the deliberations.