In other words, did one F-35 die per 15 enemy aircraft killed strictly by the F-35’s own hand, or did those enemy aircraft die while the F-35 was merely involved in the battle? The F-22As from the 27th FS were integrated into this Red Flag, as were APG-63V3 AESA radar toting F-15Cs from the 159th FS. The UK brought their highly capable Typhoon FGR4 to the exercise as well, and these are just the high-end air superiority players; other fighters, including F-16s, were also present. That’s a lot of counter-air capability in the air at one time, all with various advantages and disadvantages, feeding their data into one common fused data-link picture. In addition, they were assisted by an armada of support aircraft, including the most capable jamming and information, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms in the world.

The problem is that the limited amount of information we have from an air exercise that produces hoards of data really does not give an accurate picture of what the F-35 contributed, or how their performance compared to that of other platforms. The 15:1 kill ratio in particular is nebulous, because it seems this may be skewed in terms of what data it actually includes. Kill ratios attributed to a platform naturally make us think of direct engagements with enemy aircraft, but Red Flag is a highly integrated air battle, one that always uses the latest data-link fusing gateways and other force-multipliers . It remains unclear whether the stated kill ratio is strictly attributable to the F-35, or if it includes the actions of other coalition aircraft, particularly F-22s, while the F-35 is merely present.

This version of Red Flag , which only includes aircraft from the US, UK and Australia, has supposedly been tailored with more challenging surface-to-air missile and adversary aircraft threat profiles. Layered enemy air defense systems and a higher degree of electronic warfare are said to have been present. Reports state that F-35s have done well taking on these air defenses as part of a massive strike package that included many types of US and coalition aircraft, including F-22s.

The media has run wild with reports that 13 F-35As from Hill AFB have made an impressive showing at the USAF’s largest air warfare exercise, Red Flag. Most notably, a kill ratio of 15:1 has been touted, which traditionally means the F-35 has suffered one loss for every 15 enemy aircraft it has killed.

Here is a full list of the players for Red Flag 17-1: B-1 37BS EC-130H 41ECS EA-18G VAQ-132 EA-18G VAQ-134 E-8 GA 12/16ACCS F-15C 159FS F-16C 77FS F-16C 176FS F-22A 27FS F-35A 34FS HH-60 55RQS KC-135 92ARW RC-135 343RS C-130J RAAF 37Sq E-7 RAAF 2Sq KC-30 RAAF 33Sq C-130J RAF 47Sq E-3 RAF VIIISq FGR4 RAF 6Sq KC-3 RAF 10Sq R-1 RAF V(AC)Sq RC-135 RAF 51Sq Even if the kill ratio strictly depicts what F-16Cs of the 64th Aggressor Squadron were shot down by F-35As and a visa-versa (at this time we know of no other disclosed red air players), without more information as to the rules of engagement, what weapons were available, what threat profiles the adversary aircraft were flying, what missions were the F-35As partaking in when the kills occurred, and what third party support both sides had at the time of each kill, these kill ratios can only be seen as anecdotal. This is just the nature of a large combined forces exercise: nothing happens in a vacuum.

Also, the 64th AGRS flies Block 32 F-16Cs, the least capable in the USAF inventory. Some pack Israeli-built Elta ELL8222 self-escort jamming pods, which can play havoc on the opposition’s ability to target the host aircraft. But these F-16s have radars that are relatively old and they do not sport any sort of infra-red search and track system, which is the biggest air-to-air sensor threat to the F-35A, one that is often found on modern enemy aircraft. Not just that, but unless things have changed for this Red Flag, the aggressors rely entirely on Ground Control Interception (GCI) radar controllers to guide them to their targets. Meanwhile the “blue force” uses much more capable airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms that often use radars that are more capable at detecting low-observable targets than their smaller X-band fighter-borne fire control radar counterparts.

How can we really judge F-35A’s supposed kill ratio without knowing those of other platforms used in the exercise, or even historical numbers from other exercises? For instance, what was the F-15C’s kill ratio? Or the F-22’s? What about the Royal Air Force’s Typhoons? How about red air’s corresponding kill ratio? 15:1 sounds great, but it really is about the same as what the US Navy experienced with their Topgun graduates in Vietnam, a time when F-4s were taking on MiG-17s and MiG-21s. In the end we have nothing to compare this number to, and “lesser” platforms could have gotten as high a ratio or even higher, we just don’t know. None of this is really a mark against the F-35A. It could have performed even better than we know at this time. It certainly seemed by most accounts that it did well regardless of what kill ratio has been reported, but keep in mind that any major issues with the type that surfaced during Red Flag is very unlikely to get a public comment by those involved directly with the program. I have been to Red Flag multiple times, sat in the media briefs and aircrew panels, and asked some tough questions. But if you think a F-35 pilot is going to come out and say “well we did ok, but we kept having data-exchange issues between jets and the S-300 SAM guys were using some unorthodox tactics to detect us farther away than we would have liked” than I have an airworthy F-32 to sell you.

So once again, this readiness figure should be taken anecdotally—as a good sign, but not as conclusive evidence that the jet will perform anywhere near that level during normal fleet operations. Another issue when it comes to these reports on how the F-35 performed during Red Flag is that the exercise was just starting its second week when they were published. Over the course of Red Flag—which usually runs two weeks—things get tougher during not easier. So once again, the notion that these are the final results of the exercise is far from accurate. So what we end up with here is grab bag of hyperbole mixed with some truth, and a whole lot of unknowns sprinkled on top. In the end, the F-35 seems to have done well for its second Red Flag showing, the Marines having made it to the last Red Flag with their F-35Bs. Considering that the aircraft has been in development for twenty years and has been flying for over a decade, this at the very least should be expected. Setting the bar so low as to tout that a 5th generation fighter that has cost monumental piles of cash to develop and still runs $100 million a copy, can trounce 30 year old 4th generation fighters, not even particularly advanced or highly equipped ones at that, is just foolish. Not just that, but the F-22 had proved that 4th generation fighters are no match for 5th generation ones over a decade ago, and has done so time and time again since. Contact the author: Tyler@thedrive.com