Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov attempted to fan those flames, saying, “If the Americans continue to act as crudely … and unilaterally withdraw from all sorts of agreement and mechanisms, from the Iran deal to the international postal treaty, then we’ll be reduced to taking action in response, including of a military nature. But we don’t want to go that far.”

Read: U.S. accuses Russia of violating landmark arms treaty

Yet even if the administration’s motives are not honorable, and the likelihood is low that it can adroitly exit the treaty while sustaining allied unity, there is a reasonable case to be made for withdrawal.

First, Russia is in violation of the treaty. It has been since at least 2014, when the Obama administration originally brought the violation to light. And last year the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that the Russians had deployed prohibited missiles at the Kapustin Yar test site and another location in Russia.

Second, the White House’s decision will not come as a surprise to American allies. The Department of Defense has warned for months that the U.S. would deploy sea-based nuclear missiles unless Russia returned to INF compliance. Russia’s violations were also a topic at meetings of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group earlier in October. On Sunday, Britain’s defense minister said he supported U.S. withdrawal. And on Monday, NATO’s spokesman affirmed that all 29 allies believe Russia is in violation of the treaty. While allies would certainly prefer that the U.S. remain in the treaty, Trump’s decision may not prove as fractious as imagined.

Third, there is a strong operational argument for deploying now-prohibited ground-based conventional missiles in Asia. Commanders of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command have for some time drawn attention to the Chinese missile advantage. As Eric Sayers of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has argued, “The growing conventional military imbalance could well mean that the United States will not be able to uphold its security commitments to allies or reassure partners in the Indo-Pacific.” If the U.S. were to build a stockpile of conventional intermediate-range ground missiles, that would reduce strain on air and naval platforms, and produce greater penetration capability to the interior of Chinese territory (which would work as a deterrent).

Fourth, advocates of remaining in the treaty (and I am one) struggle to propose actionable ways to bring Russia back into compliance. Neither exposure nor the threat of new treaty-compliant nuclear deployments did the trick. Sestanovich recommends a buildup of allowable (air-delivered) nuclear weapons in Europe, which would incur many of the drawbacks of just withdrawing from the treaty. Pifer, too, recommends a non-prohibited arms buildup and intelligence-community briefings to raise public awareness of Russian violations.