It was perhaps revealing that Chris Hughton’s dismissal by Brighton was met with outrage by the wider footballing community but indifference by Brighton supporters – those who actually watched the team.

You will be hard-pressed to find anyone with a bad word to say about Hughton. He’s by all accounts a lovely man and when finally given his first long-term role in charge of a club, he took it with both hands, getting Brighton promoted to the Premier League and keeping them there.

Hughton looked like he had reached his ceiling at Brighton though. He had set up a well-organised defensive unit, but if Brighton were going to do more than scrap it out to avoid relegation and push into the top half of the table they would need more strings to their bow than sending crosses in to Glenn Murray. The funds provided to improve the squad were generally misspent and Brighton finished the 2018-19 season just two points above relegation.

Few supporters would be overjoyed to see the man who took Brighton to the top division in English football for the first time since 1983 go, yet many might privately have thought it was time to move on if they were going to stay there or climb even higher.

On paper their choice to succeed Hughton was a little strange though: if they wanted to secure a Premier League place, why did they go for Graham Potter, whose only success had come in Sweden and whose one season in English football was guiding Swansea to tenth place in the Championship?

Basic idea

Hughton had Brighton organised defensively but the team could be conservative, simply looking to push men down the wings in their 4-2-3-1 and hit crosses towards Murray. Even when Hughton switched to a 4-5-1, this only really added an extra man to defend the midfield rather than adjusting how Brighton played.

A Potter team, on the other hand, is a “tactically flexible, attacking, possession-based team,” according to the man himself. “Players that are brave, that aren’t afraid to make mistakes. That can get on the ball and show courage and really try to enjoy their football. If the players are enjoying their football, there’s a chance that the supporters will enjoy it as well. And that’s how you grow and develop as a club.”

Potter started with ten different formations in charge of Swansea last season and would regularly change them on the fly during matches, while no team in the Championship completed more passes per 90 minutes than the Welsh side.

Brighton were clearly searching for a completely different style of football when they settled on their man.

Defending

Brighton are more difficult to analyse than most other teams largely due to Potter’s constant changes of formation. Brighton have started in a 4-4-2, a 3-4-3, a 4-2-3-1, a 3-4-1-2, a 4-3-1-2, a 4-3-3, a 3-5-2, a 4-3-2-1 and a 3-5-1-1 this season, often choosing completely different shapes for defending and attacking, and regularly alter those shapes over the course of a game. Attempts to pin Brighton down into any one framework is pointless because they will change it as soon as you do.

Always adjusting Brighton’s shape to the opposition, it means that there’s rarely any massive hole in their game that the opposition can exploit and, if there is, Potter closes it up quickly. Despite fighting relegation, only once all season have Brighton been thrashed and that was early on against Manchester City. All their other losses have been by at most two goals.

While the formation and line-up constantly changes, there are consistent patterns of play across them.

When defending, the defence and midfield tend to drop off, however the forward or forwards will stay high to press. Brighton stay central through the middle, then, once the opposition pick a side to go down, they will attempt to keep the opposition on that side, blocking the passes across to the other. Once the balls starts to head wide, Brighton’s midfielders and defenders will push up, getting tight to their opponents to cut off the short passing options, while those on the opposite flank will tuck inside to cover.

Brighton stay central. Once the opposition go wide Brighton will try to block passes to the opposite flank and get tight to the short passing options.

Brighton stay central. Once the opposition go wide Brighton will try to block passes to the opposite flank and get tight to the short passing options.

The man-orientations through the middle means if the opposition attempt a short pass there’s a Brighton player close by to immediately pressure the recipient, but more often than not the opposition will simply go long. While the full-backs might push up to follow their men, the centre-backs tend to stay deep so there’s little chance of them getting caught out by a ball over the top. They are also good in the air, making them capable of winning aerial duels.

There are downsides to this approach though. The man-orientations cut off the short passing options but it can leave gaps for the opposition to slide the ball straight through to the forwards between the lines, in space to turn and run at the defence. This is how Manchester United took the lead against Brighton.

Brighton press, cutting out the short passing options, but Michael Keane passes straight through the gaps to the forwards

The opposition don’t even have to pick out a fantastic pass to work the ball into these positions though. Brighton’s midfielders can easily get dragged up the pitch to press, leaving no one in front of the defence. Hit a ball over the top and while Brighton’s centre-backs might head the ball away, there’s no one on hand to pick up the second ball. Neither Davy Pröpper nor Dale Stephens are quick enough to rush back into position once they have been pulled forward, so the opposition can pick up the ball in this area and go straight on the attack. This is how Bournemouth took the lead against Brighton.

There are numerous other defensive problems too. Brighton concede an incredible amount of goals from set-pieces. This was also a problem last year, yet it’s arguably gotten worse. Last season, Brighton were conceding goals because the opposition were exploiting their man-marking to find space at the back post; now they are simply not marking well. Brighton’s line-up is full of big tall players who should be able to dominate in the air, but they are always losing their men, getting caught flat-footed and barely reacting.

An equally troubling problem is how often they are caught out on the counter. Their patient passing style does mean that Brighton are often in a good position to counter-press once they work the ball into attack, with plenty of players spaced across the pitch to quickly converge on the man on the ball once it’s given away.

Brighton counter-press

They also tend to get men hovering around outside the box to recover any cleared balls.

Brighton have plenty of players outside the box to pick up the loose ball

Escape that initial pressure though and there doesn’t tend to be much stopping the opposition from breaking forward quickly at Brighton’s defence, as United showed:

Manchester United evade Brighton’s counter-press and score

The greater problem is Brighton giving the ball away cheaply in their own half though. Trying to play the ball out from the back, Brighton’s defenders will spread out across the pitch, leaving large gaps between them. If Brighton are sloppy and give the ball away then, the opposition can immediately spring forward and attack these gaps before Brighton can respond. For example, Wolves claimed a point when Pröpper gifted Jonny Castro the ball and Watford took the lead when Aaron Mooy gave the ball away on the half-way line.

Brighton give the ball away on the edge of their area

While bigger clubs that pass out from the back can rely on individual defensive brilliance to rescue them when they make mistakes in the build-up, this is rarely the case for Brighton.

Potter broke up the successful partnership of Lewis Dunk and Shane Duffy, replacing the latter with new signing Adam Webster.

Dunk is still the strong and intelligent defender that excelled under Hughton, but his lack of pace can be exposed more under Potter. With the backline spreading out across the pitch to play out, large gaps open up between them so if Brighton give the ball away, Dunk’s not really the man you want having to rush across to cover. He’s not slow, but he’s not quick either.

New boy Webster’s not exactly set the world alight since his arrival from Bristol City. Like Dunk he’s tall and strong and he has nice, light springy footwork, enabling him to adjust quickly. He’s also good at sticking to the back of opponents. This can work against him though: he has a habit of pushing up to get tight to an opponent, leaving a massive gap for the ball to played in behind him. This tendency led to Brighton conceding the opener against Manchester City and the winner against rivals Crystal Palace.

This general lack of awareness of what’s behind him also proved costly when Dominic Calvert-Lewin ran in behind to score for Everton and when Jack Grealish snuck in to tap-in a cross for Aston Villa. In poor form, Webster has the simple habit of dropping a clanger, like for Sheffield United’s winning goal. He’s a solid defender but not one that can currently be relied upon all the time.

At right-back, Martin Montoya is much the same as he was last year: solid enough, albeit with a habit for standing too far from his man in one-on-ones, as he displayed when Wilfried Zaha equalised for Crystal Palace or Sofiane Boufal set up Nathan Redmond for Southampton.

Montoya stands off despite Webster telling him to close down, allowing Wolves to cross

6ft 6 Dan Burn has played as a centre-back in a back three, but has typically been chosen at left-back in the back four. Like the centre-backs, he’s big and strong, however with such a large frame he struggles defensively against the tricky wingers of the Premier League. When asked to turn quickly, he’s more likely to trip over his feet than manage an immediate 180°, and while he’s fast when he can get up to full speed, smaller wingers can accelerate away from him.

Burn falls over when asked to turn

Burn is beaten and can’t turn quickly but recovers once he can build up speed

None of them are poor defenders but they aren’t an unbreakable backline either. Brighton are always competitive, however they are also always likely to concede from a set-piece, counter-attack or gifting away a goal to turn a win into a draw or a draw into a loss.

Build-up

That Brighton regularly give away goals by losing the ball in their own half could be interpreted as a little bit of a spoiler for this section, yet they aren’t terrible at playing out from the back as that might suggest.

Brighton spread out and pass out from the back

Brighton spread out and pass out from the back

Whether a back three or four, Brighton’s centre-backs will spread wide and drop deep to receive the ball short. Mat Ryan is good with the ball at his feet, while Webster and Dunk are both willing to push forward with it if given space to do so, opening up passes into those ahead of them as the opposition are forced to adjust to stop their advances.

Dunk pushes forward and picks out a pass

Webster pushes forward and picks out a pass

Burn is better yet, hence why he’s been chosen to push into attack as a full-back as well as from centre-back, while Montoya is a good technical player at right-back and, although he lacks the delivery of Burn, Bernardo’s athleticism means he can quickly turn defence into attack.

Duffy’s lack of comfort on the ball is presumably why he’s seen less game time this season despite his excellent partnership with Dunk. In Potter’s system, the defenders have to be able to help in the attack as well as in defence.

Regardless of formation, Brighton keep two midfielders in front of the defence. Both men move around to maintain passing angles from the defenders into them, which is easier with two of there – one can move away to open up passes into the other.

Yves Bissouma picks up the ball but draws the attention of Christian Benteke, so he passes to Pröpper to pass forward

Pröpper makes a run to receive the ball but Webster passes into Mooy

Our previous assessment of Pröpper and Stephens as “lacking mobility” was perhaps a little harsh. Although neither can cover ground quickly, Pröpper is always checking his shoulder and has proven himself capable of twisting away from danger quickly, showing a slickness to his play that suggests he’s probably enjoying his new life under Potter.

Pröpper turns out under pressure

Pröpper neat play

Stephens is less comfortable than the Dutchman, although he too has shown an ability to turn out under pressure.

Stephens evades pressure

When given time, both men have shown an eye for picking out passes into the forwards too.

Stephens picks out a nice pass into attack

Yves Bissouma has only occasionally been given the opportunity to show it, but he’s better than both of them under pressure. He can easily evade the pressing of an opponent and is willing to dribble forward into attack, opening up dangerous passes into his teammates.

Bissouma evades pressure

Bissouma dribbles forward with the ball, opening up a pass into attack

Brighton’s defenders and midfielders are all good, technically sound players, however they probably couldn’t be classed as very good, technically great players. Brighton are often capable of neat passing moves to pass around the opposition and into attack, however many opponents have found that if they press with intensity they can force Brighton into errors.

Brighton can’t pass out when Bournemouth press high

Villa win the ball back in Brighton’s half by pressing high

Getting tight to the two holding midfielders really helps to slow Brighton down. Without the easy pass into midfield open, the defenders will often get caught in the headlights, unsure of where to move the ball onto, and panic.

Brighton struggle to play out as West Ham stick close to Pröpper and Stephens

Attack

Like those behind them, Brighton’s attackers tend to be good technical players but not great. This is a massive problem for Brighton because their patient style means that when they do get into attack, they are often having to break down well-covered defences.

Sometimes used as a wing-back Solly March is an excellent dribbler but frequently lacks an end product, Leandro Trossard pulls off some good runs when given space to attack yet struggles to beat a man in tight spaces, and Aaron Mooy can pick out some great passes and is solid technically but will only ever really use his right foot when dribbling, making him a little predictable.

March beats his man but wastes the chance

Trossard pushes forward into space but once this space is limited he loses the ball

Mooy avoids using his left foot when dribbling, making it harder for him to turn in certain directions or protect the ball

Pascal Gross was of course the star man under Hughton, but his lack of pace has left him a much quieter figure under Potter.

It doesn’t help Brighton that they essentially have to attack through neat passes. Neither Neal Maupay or Aaron Connolly are tall enough to compete for crosses and, while Glenn Murray is, the club legend is too old and slow to be included without throwing the pressing system into disarray.

Maupay is great for Brighton’s passing, constantly coming short to receive the ball into feet and lay it off for a teammate, however his finishing is poor, usually shooting straight at the goalkeeper.

Maupay comes short to receive passes and lays it off for a teammate

Likewise, Connolly’s dynamism can threaten but his shots seem more likely to cannon off defenders than trouble the goalkeeper.

Conclusion

With a constantly changing set-up, Brighton are always tailored to best compete against their opposition and must be a nightmare to prepare for. Maintaining certain principles across these many formations mean the Brighton players never seem to look confused as to what they are meant to be doing despite all the constant adaptations.

Even though it’s not more successful, the football must also be nicer to watch for Brighton fans than the end of Hughton’s reign.

While they are pretty much always competitive in games, it’s not hard to see why they are battling against relegation though. Brighton’s players are all technically sound enough to fit into Potter’s system, but few are talented enough to truly excel. Coming up against strong opposition in the Premier League, Brighton aren’t quite good enough to consistently protect their goal or score in the opposition’s. Both Maupay and Webster are decent but Brighton spending big money on Championship players is reflective of the gap in quality between what they have and what they need to push on.

Brighton brought in Potter presumably because they liked his style, however if they are going to succeed with that style the squad probably needs reworking. Are Brighton willing to do that or would they have been better off choosing a manager who could have built a system to get the most of this collection of players?

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