Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>

Dear IRTF Chair, IAB, and CFRG: I'd like to request the removal of Kevin Igoe from CFRG co-chair. The Crypto Forum Research Group is chartered to provide crypto advice to IETF Working Groups. As CFRG co-chair for the last 2 years, Kevin has shaped CFRG discussion and provided CFRG opinion to WGs. Kevin's handling of the "Dragonfly" protocol raises doubts that he is performing these duties competently. Additionally, Kevin's employment with the National Security Agency raises conflict-of-interest concerns. Dragonfly Background ---- Dragonfly is a "Password-Authenticated Key Exchange" protocol (or "PAKE"). Dragonfly was proposed to CFRG 2 years ago [PROPOSAL]. Compared to better-known PAKEs, Dragonfly has no security proof, a lack of extensive security analysis, nonfunctional complications added for IPR reasons, and some security issues [REVIEW]. Dragonfly became a hot topic recently when the TLS WG disputed CFRG's alleged report that Dragonfly was "satisfactory", as well as disputing that this report reflected CFRG consensus [TLS_1]. After extensive criticism of Dragonfly, the TLS WG ceased work on a Dragonfly extension [TLS_2]. NSA Background ---- The National Security Agency ("NSA") is a U.S. Intelligence Agency which is believed to devote considerable resources to: - "Influence policies, standards and specifications for commercial public key technologies" - "Shape the worldwide cryptography marketplace to make it more tractable to advanced cryptanalytic capabilities" [BULLRUN] While much is unknown about these activities, the NSA is known to have placed a "back door" in a NIST standard for random number generation [ECDRBG]. A recent report from the President's Review Group recommends that the NSA: - "fully support and not undermine efforts to create encryption standards" - "not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available commercial software" [PRESIDENTS] This suggests the NSA is currently behaving contrary to the recommendations. Reasons for requesting Kevin's removal ---- 1) Kevin has provided the *ONLY* positive feedback for Dragonfly that can be found on the CFRG mailing list or meeting minutes. The contrast between Kevin's enthusiasm and the group's skepticism is striking [CFRG_SUMMARY]. It's unclear what this enthusiasm is based on. There's no record of Kevin making any effort to understand Dragonfly's unusual structure, compare it to alternatives, consider possible use cases, or construct a formal security analysis. 2) Twice Kevin suggested a technique for deriving the Dragonfly password-based element which would make the protocol easy to break [IGOE_1, IGOE_2]. He also endorsed an ineffective attempt to avoid timing attacks by adding extra iterations to one of the loops [IGOE_3, IGOE_4]. These are surprising mistakes from an experienced cryptographer. 3) Kevin's approval of Dragonfly to the TLS WG misrepresented CFRG consensus, which was skeptical of Dragonfly [CFRG_SUMMARY]. 4) Kevin's NSA affiliation raises unpleasant but unavoidable questions regarding these actions. It's entirely possible these are just mistakes by a novice chair who lacks experience in a particular sort of protocol and is being pressured by IETF participants to endorse something. But it's hard to escape an impression of carelessness and unseriousness in Kevin's work. One wonders whether the NSA is happy to preside over this sort of sloppy crypto design. While that's of course speculation, it remains baffling that an experienced cryptographer would champion such a shoddy protocol. The CFRG chairs have been silent for months, and haven't responded to attempts to clarify this. Conclusion ---- The position of CFRG chair (or co-chair) is a role of crucial importance to the IETF community. The IETF is in desperate need of trustworthy crypto guidance from parties who are above suspicion. I encourage the IAB and IRTF to replace Kevin Igoe with someone who can provide this. Thanks for considering this request. Trevor [PROPOSAL] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03044.html [REVIEW] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03537.html [TLS_1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10819.html [TLS_2] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10993.html [BULLRUN] http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html [ECDRBG] http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/government-announces-steps-to-restore-confidence-on-encryption-standards/ [PRESIDENTS] http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [CFRG_SUMMARY] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03545.html [IGOE_1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03047.html [IGOE_2] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03258.html [IGOE_3] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03262.html [IGOE_4] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg03264.html