Let me begin this blog with a caveat that seems obvious but is easily forgotten. There are very few easy answers regarding the Syria crisis. That is a cliché, but the more someone claims the objective truth and uses a simple sentence to explain their thoughts, the less they probably know.

One thing that nearly everyone can agree on is the fact that Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe: over 100,000 dead, 2,000,000 refugees who have crossed international borders (currently at a current rate of 5,000 per day), and another 4.3 million internally displaced persons—over 25% of the Syrian population forced from their homes. This is not going to stop for the foreseeable future.

Having begun in March 2011, escalating to a full civil war in Summer 2012, the Syrian conflict has drawn in Lebanon, Iran, Gulf countries (by proxy and aid), with an occasional shot fired Israel’s way. The refugee crisis has created the fourth largest city in Jordan (the Zataari Camp with 120,000 refugees), taken the war into Lebanon, and challenged even a relatively rich country like Turkey.

The conflict did not begin as a sectarian one; it began because the Syrian government, as it normally does, overreacted to a local dispute. The Assad dynasty is a thuggish and brutal regime. It responds with force against those who oppose it, while favoring those who support it. Unfortunately, the bulk of the former are primarily Sunni, while the latter are Alawite (accepted for political reasons as Shia) and the Christians, with the Kurds caught in the middle. The longer the conflict went on, however, the more sectarian it became, and the more opportunity for radicalizing the Sunnis. The longer this conflict has gone on, the greater the infiltration by Sunni extremists. When the conflict began, there was not the “pure” sectarian divisions that are increasingly apparent now. There were, and are, still some “good guys” in the opposition. But the longer the conflict lasts, the more they will be sideline, the more their followers will be radicalized, and the greater the influence of the extremists in what is becoming a nihilistic battle for supremacy.

By summer 2012, any analyst and advisor in Washington worth their salt should have been able to explain that this is exactly where the Syrian conflict would arrive. By summer 2012, the US and international community needed to have a plan. By fall 2012, if military action was to eventually be an option, that was the time. The Obama administration and the international community simply waited too long. In the meantime, the humanitarian catastrophe blossomed, al-Qaeda became involved, and Syria has been destroyed.

Bucking conventional wisdom, I would maintain a political solution was never available. The Assad regime was never going to negotiate in good faith, was never going to share power, and was never going to eschew force. The Assad regime would, however, continue to escalate and to kill unabashedly. The use of chemical weapons, while shocking, was never surprising. This is the son of the man who leveled an entire city, killing at least 20,000, in a single event. The apple didn’t fall far from the tree; in fact, it apparently hit the trunk on the way down. And it dispels the myth that someone who was educated in the west and intimated that some “liberalization” was possible would necessarily be easier to deal with.

So where are we now? The Obama Administration has few, if any, good options. While there is some irony that 1,400 deaths as a result of chemical weapons is somewhat more unacceptable than 100,000 deaths from old-fashioned conventional arms, the use of CW is probably a harbinger of things to come. While some intelligence would show that the regime, who almost beyond doubt was responsible, did not expect that high of a death toll, there should be no doubt that the Syrian government will feel empowered to continue using chemical weapons in larger amounts, over larger areas, killing larger numbers of people. The difference between the chemical weapons and the conventional sort is the indiscriminate nature of the former and the inability to truly limit their reach through effective targeting, especially in the type of conflict with fluid frontlines that we see in Syria.

I have studied chemical weapons a great deal, and trained to respond to their use, especially during my time in Germany. They are insidious. But that does not necessarily answer the question of whether the most recent event warrants an American, or international, response.

Under international law, parties to the chemical weapons treaty are prohibited from using chemical weapons. Syria is not a party to that treaty. However, a strong argument could be made that non-use of chemical weapons is now a peremptory legal norm; therefore all countries (and non-state actors) are prohibited form using them. The problem with the treaty is that there was no real enforcement mechanism. Enter the Security Council.

There is not only room, but responsibility, for the United Nations Security Council to respond to the Syrian crisis. Much has been said about the rather recent idea of “Responsibility to Protect”, where if a country is unable to protect their population from a natural or manmade catastrophe, e.g. brutal regime, the international community may have the authority to respond under the aegis of the UNSC. But what if the Security Council is unwilling to act, as is the case here? It may be possible for the General Assembly or a regional organization to step in. The GA will not get involved here, and the only likely regional body to take note is NATO. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has spoken quite forcefully about the need for NATO to get involved, but that will require the leadership of at least a couple of large NATO powers: enter the US and France, but apparently not the UK. The UN Secretary General has spoken just as adamantly is opposition to action, probably proving the adage that where you sit often determines where you stand.

Much has been written (and spouted) about the role of the US and the leadership of the Obama Administration. For a President who was elected to get us out of public and overt wars like Iraq and Afghanistan, becoming enmeshed in Syria will be a difficult step to take. That being said, and returning to what I mentioned before, Obama’s advisors should have known a couple of years ago that this is where we would be now if the US and international community failed to act.

National security, narrowly defined, is not an issue here. However, if the security of our friends, such as Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and the stability of the region including the Eastern Mediterranean, are important, then we need to pay attention. The chances for a larger regional conflict are low, very low, but the spillover effects on countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and even Iraq, are growing.

And, again, chemical weapons: do we want countries or other actors to be able to use chemical weapons with impunity? The evidence is fairly clear that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons on at least four occasions during this conflict. “They” appear, however, to have been surprised by the scope of the effects on this occasion. It can be argued, though, that a failure to respond to the use this time will eliminate all reticence on the part of the Assad regime to escalate the use of such weapons in the future.

I tend to be skeptical about our intelligence and even more so by that provided by opposition forces. But MSF (Doctors without Borders), and to a lesser extent UN Inspectors, I trust. It is difficult to overstate the damage the Bush Administration’s fabricated intelligence and shoddy presentations did to our credibility in matters such as these. The residue of international skepticism, as a result of that and the British complicity, has slowed an international response to weapons use in Syria by months.

Limited strikes such as those seemingly being proposed by President Obama are legally and politically questionable. Reprisals are not permitted under international law, short of SC action. Politically, what effect do we expect? President Assad is not going to change his behavior as a result of limited strikes. Call it the “Saddam Hussein” effect. He didn’t have to win the 1990/1991 Gulf War, he just had to survive. That’s all Assad has to do—stand up to the Americans, and still be standing when the cruise missiles stop.

A “limited” strike then, to probably be effective, will need to destroy a critical mass of Assad’s governing abilities and loyal/elite military forces. The first errant missile that lands in a bomb shelter killing civilians will cause an outcry and change the equation. And have no doubt; that will happen.

The elephant in the room may be Israel. But Prime Minister Netanyahu, much to his credit, has given very explicit instructions to his Cabinet that they should keep their mouths shut for the time being. No discussions, no public statements, no speculation while the Obama Administration is considering what steps to take. He does not want this to become about Israel. Netanyahu was present during the 90/91 Gulf War when PM Shamir refrained from responding to Iraqi provocations. Shamir’s astute decisions helped President George H.W. Bush maintain the coalition that he had built to confront the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Netanyahu does not want to undermine President Obama, which is remarkable in and of itself.

The discussion about whether the President needed to seek the assent of Congress has been insightful at times and absurd at times. To hear members of Congress say that it was unnecessary is somewhat surreal. To hear a former NATO Supreme Commander applaud the President for the action is even more telling. The President apparently made the decision on his own, but rather belatedly. It is difficult to tell whether he was influenced by events in London. President Obama should have his desired votes in both Houses, thanks to the leadership of both parties and the support of other major members. That being said, if Congress authorizes the use of force, it is clearly going against public opinion. I expect that the President will ignore public opinion at this point, and so will the majority of Congress. Congress will want this wrapped up by Christmas so as not to have the 2014 campaigns infected by military action in Syria.

Public opinion in the UK is also squarely against military action. The British have paid a high price in lives and prestige in Iraq and Afghanistan. The House of Commons vote should probably have been able to overcome those concerns. That PM Cameron lost the vote in the British House of Commons shows at least some level of incompetence at a couple of levels. He and his whips should have been better prepared, even on this free vote—free from party instructions. His authority was undermined by this loss in the Commons, and for a short period, British standing has probably been undermined. Paddy Ashdown, a former centrist politician and member of the British Army, was quite scathing in his comments about the Commons. Former Defense Minister Liam Fox believes that an additional vote may be possible if new evidence comes to the fore. Don’t count out British involvement yet.

Unsurprisingly, given their former “overlordship” of Syria and Lebanon, the most vocal European is France. President Hollande is quite adamant about French participation in military action. Welcome back to French Fries, goodbye to English Muffins.

Watch for Russia to backtrack during the G20 summit in Saint Petersburg. They have already been opening the door a bit. The report from the UN, probably coming out next week, will possibly sway the Russians. There is a hint of Cold War in all of this. Syria hosts the only Russian base outside of the former Soviet Union, purchases many Russian weapons, and probably owes Russia money. The Russians also feel the need to limit the freedom of movement of the US. But they are not constrained by ideology anymore, and there is still room for some pragmatism, and potentially a change in their approach.

For anyone hoping to have me say that military action is either a great idea or a horrible idea is probably disappointed. There are legal, political, and moral arguments on all sides. What there is not is an easy answer. And anyone who provides an easy answer is wearing blinders. I will continue to update this, but I wanted to get these thoughts down. There is much more to be said about the Syrian opposition, the Kurds, Lebanon, Turkey, and a potential coalition. I will hope to flesh out those points over the next few days.