Anthology

Copyright © 2013 by Small Wars Foundation

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CONTENTS

ABOUT SMALL WARS JOURNAL AND FOUNDATION

PREFACE: THE THREAT OF MEXICAN CARTEL INFLUENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

FOREWORD: TEXAS IN THE CROSSHAIRS–ARMED CARTELS SPREAD FEAR AT THE BORDER

INTRODUCTION: MEXICAN CARTEL ESSAYS AND NOTES

STRATEGIC ESSAYS AND NOTES

CHAPTER 1 STRATEGY FOR MEXICO?

CHAPTER 2 HOW CORRUPTION AFFECTS NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER 3 OPEN VEINS OF MEXICO: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF CARTEL RESOURCE EXTRACTION AND PETRO-TARGETING

CHAPTER 4 BOOK REVIEW: CARTEL: THE COMING INVASION OF MEXICO’S DRUG WARS

CHAPTER 5 RETHINKING REVOLUTION: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 6 FIVE PS FOR A VIOLENCE REDUCTION STRATEGY IN MEXICO

CHAPTER 7 WELL, THEY’RE NOT ABOUT TAKING OVER THE GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER 8 UNDERSTANDING INFORMATIONAL FEATURES OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS: CASES FROM MEXICO AND GUATEMALA

CHAPTER 9 THE CASE OF MEXICO: A HARD PILL TO SWALLOW

CHAPTER 10 THE MERIDA INITIATIVE AND MEXICO’S LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

CHAPTER 11 A CALL FOR CAUTION: THE (SIDE) EFFECT OF MEXICO’S ENTRY INTO THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

CHAPTER 12 THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN MEXICO: A NARCO SPRING ?

CHAPTER 13 DESCRIBING CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AMERICA: CRIMINAL INSURGENCY

CHAPTER 14 EXTREME VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN MEXICO

CHAPTER 15 GUADALAJARA: THE NEXT EPICENTER OF VIOLENCE IN MEXICO?

CHAPTER 16 MONOPOLY OF FORCE DOES NOT ALWAYS EXPLAIN PEACE: ILLICIT NETWORK EVOLUTION DOES

CHAPTER 17 WAR ON TERROR: RADICALIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE THREATS

CHAPTER 18 MEXICO MATTERS!

CHAPTER 19 POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE NEW DRUG WAR

CHAPTER 20 WHY ARRESTING EL CHAPO MIGHT BE A BAD THING

CHAPTER 21 ENHANCING NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

CHAPTER 22 IS CHICAGO ON THE ROAD TO BECOMING AN AMERICAN CIUDAD JUÁREZ?

CHAPTER 23 ENHANCING NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY THROUGH MILITARY TO MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

CHAPTER 24 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 1: MEXICAN CARTELS (TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS) NOW OPERATING IN OVER 1,000 US CITIES; UP FROM 195 US CITIES

CHAPTER 25 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 2: COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE (DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO DE SEGURIDAD—DAS) COMPROMISED BY DRUG TRAFFICKERS

CHAPTER 26 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 3: U.S. STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: DOA (DEAD ON ARRIVAL)?

CHAPTER 27 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 4: TEXAS BORDER SECURITY: A STRATEGIC MILITARY ASSESSMENT

CHAPTER 28 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 5: BORDER CORRUPTION OF US OFFICIALS BY THE MEXICAN CARTELS & CASES SHOWN

CHAPTER 29 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 6: 2011 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT: 40% INCREASE IN ACTIVE GANG MEMBERS FROM 2009 TO 1.4 MILLION

CHAPTER 30 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 7: US NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE MEXICAN CARTELS—PROCESO MAGAZINE INTERVIEW WITH DR. ROBERT J. BUNKER

CHAPTER 31 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 8: 230,000 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) IN MEXICO AND ‘NARCO-REFUGEE’ POTENTIALS FOR THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER 32 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 9: WHY DOES NAPOLITANO FOCUS ON AL QAEDA LONE WOLVES AND IGNORE THE MEXICAN CARTELS?

CHAPTER 33 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 10: FORTIFIED TOWN (BURGWARD) STRATEGY IMPLEMENTED IN TAMAULIPAS

CHAPTER 34 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 11: MEXICO’S VIETNAM WAR? SOLDIER-TO-CRIMINAL EXCHANGE RATES AND NARCO BATTLEFIELD DEATHS IN CONTEXT

CHAPTER 35 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 12: THE SPREADING CRIMINAL INSURGENCIES IN MEXICO: STATES WITH U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT TRAVEL ADVISORIES

CHAPTER 36 MEXICAN CARTEL STRATEGIC NOTE NO. 13: CITY OF HIDALGO, TEXAS, FEARFUL OF CARTEL VIOLENCE POTENTIALS—WILL NOT RELEASE NEW POLICE CHIEF’S PHOTO

OPERATIONAL ESSAYS AND NOTES

CHAPTER 37 THE GROWING MEXICAN CARTEL AND VIGILANTE WAR IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION OFFENSIVES AND COUNTER-OFFENSIVES

CHAPTER 38 THE COIN APPROACH TO MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS: SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE

CHAPTER 39 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY PRINCIPLES AGAINST CRIMINAL INSURGENCY: THE RIGHT TOOL FOR THE JOB (ABSTRACT ONLY)

CHAPTER 40 DESIGNING LAW ENFORCEMENT

CHAPTER 41 COUNTERING CRIMINAL STREET GANGS: LESSONS FROM THE COUNTERINSURGENT BATTLESPACE

CHAPTER 42 MEXICAN CARTEL OPERATIONAL NOTE NO. 1: MEXICAN MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST LOS ZETAS COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS

TACTICAL ESSAYS AND NOTES

CHAPTER 43 NARCO-ARMOR IN MEXICO

CHAPTER 44 BORDER SCHOOL TRAINING CONFERENCE HELD IN CALIFORNIA

CHAPTER 45 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTES

CHAPTER 46 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #2: AMBUSH/TARGETED KILLING OF US LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER (SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS) [WITH UPDATED POSTS SUGGESTING LONE-WOLF/AFFINITY SHOOTER]

CHAPTER 47 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #3: NARCO ARMORED VEHICLE THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES

CHAPTER 48 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #4: CARTEL MILITARY WEAPONS CACHE DISCOVERED NEAR FRONTON, TEXAS

CHAPTER 49 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #5: INDICATIONS & WARNING (I&W): VBIED ANTI-VEHICULAR/ANTI-PERSONNEL AMBUSH CAPABILITY FOR LOS ZETAS [ASSUMED]

CHAPTER 50 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #6: CROSS BORDER INCURSION WITH SWAT TEAMS RESPONDING: 15 CARTEL/GANG GUNMEN CROSS INTO US NEAR ESCOBARES, TEXAS

CHAPTER 51 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #7: LOS ZETAS THREE VEHICLE (SUV) COMMANDO ENGAGES IN OFFENSIVE ACTION IN NORTHWEST HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS: ENSUING FIRE FIGHT WITH US LAW ENFORCEMENT

CHAPTER 52 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #8: TEEN TORTURED, DISMEMBERED, BEHEADED BY TRAFFICKING GANG IN BETHANY, OKLAHOMA

CHAPTER 53 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #9: DECAPITATED ADULT MALE WITH HANDS AND FEET REMOVED: FOUND ON SIDE OF A DIRT ROAD NEAR MARANA (PIMA COUNTY) ARIZONA

CHAPTER 54 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #10: CLAYMORE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE (AND OTHER MILITARY HARDWARE) RECOVERED IN ZACATECAS

CHAPTER 55 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #11: MG 34 MACHINE GUNS RECOVERED IN NAYARIT—HEZBOLLAH ARMS TRANSFER CONCERNS

CHAPTER 56 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #11A—MG 34 MACHINE GUNS IN MEXICO: THE GUATEMALAN CONNECTION

CHAPTER 57 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #12: FORENSICS OF RECOVERED WEAPONS FROM PIEDRAS NEGRAS TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN LOS ZETAS AND GATE (GRUPO DE ARMAS Y TÁCTICAS ESPECIALES)

CHAPTER 58 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #12A: LANZAGRANADAS Y LANZACOHETES—TRACKING THE SOURCES OF MEXICAN CARTELS’ RPG7S

CHAPTER 59 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #13: MAN CRUCIFIED IN MICHOACÁN, MEXICO

CHAPTER 60 MEXICAN CARTEL TACTICAL NOTE #14: ANTI-AIRCRAFT MOUNTED .50 CAL. MACHINE GUN AND SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM)

POSTSCRIPT: OUTLINING THE CONTOURS OF CRIMINAL INSURGENCY

ADDENDUM I URBAN LAND USE BY ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS IN MEDELLIN

NOTES

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

ABOUT SMALL WARS JOURNAL

AND FOUNDATION

Small Wars Journal facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field. We hope this, in turn, advances the practice and effectiveness of those forces prosecuting Small Wars in the interest of self-determination, freedom, and prosperity for the population in the area of operations.

We believe that Small Wars are an enduring feature of modern politics. We do not believe that true effectiveness in Small Wars is a ‘lesser included capability’ of a force tailored for major theater war. And we never believed that ‘bypass built-up areas’ was a tenable position warranting the doctrinal primacy it has held for too long—this site is an evolution of the MOUT Homepage, Urban Operations Journal, and urbanoperations.com, all formerly run by the Small Wars Journal’s Editor-in-Chief.

The characteristics of Small Wars have evolved since the Banana Wars and Gunboat Diplomacy. War is never purely military, but today’s Small Wars are even less pure with the greater inter-connectedness of the 21st century. Their conduct typically involves the projection and employment of the full spectrum of national and coalition power by a broad community of practitioners. The military is still generally the biggest part of the pack, but there a lot of other wolves. The strength of the pack is the wolf, and the strength of the wolf is the pack.

The Small Wars Journal’s founders come from the Marine Corps. Like Marines deserve to be, we are very proud of this; we are also conscious and cautious of it. This site seeks to transcend any viewpoint that is single service, and any that is purely military or naively U.S.-centric. We pursue a comprehensive approach to Small Wars, integrating the full joint, allied, and coalition military with their governments’ federal or national agencies, non-governmental agencies, and private organizations. Small Wars are big undertakings, demanding a coordinated effort from a huge community of interest.

We thank our contributors for sharing their knowledge and experience, and hope you will continue to join us as we build a resource for our community of interest to engage in a professional dialog on this painfully relevant topic. Share your thoughts, ideas, successes, and mistakes; make us all stronger.

". . . I know it when I see it."

Small Wars is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and global thermonuclear war. The Small Wars Journal embraces that imperfection.

Just as friendly fire isn’t, there isn’t necessarily anything small about a Small War.

The term Small War either encompasses or overlaps with a number of familiar terms such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, support and stability operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and many flavors of intervention. Operations such as noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance will often either be a part of a Small War, or have a Small Wars feel to them. Small Wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from their practitioners. The Small Wars Manual (a wonderful resource, unfortunately more often referred to than read) notes that:

Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.

The three block war construct employed by General Krulak is exceptionally useful in describing the tactical and operational challenges of a Small War and of many urban operations. Its only shortcoming is that is so useful that it is often mistaken as a definition or as a type of operation.

* * *

Small Wars Journal is NOT a government, official, or big corporate site. It is run by Small Wars Foundation, a 501 (c)(3) non-profit corporation, for the benefit of the Small Wars community of interest. The site principals are Dave Dilegge (Editor-in-Chief), Bill Nagle (Publisher), Robert Haddick (Managing Editor) and Peter Munson (Editor). Dilegge, Nagle and Haeddick, along with Daniel Kelly, serve as the Small Wars Foundation Board of Directors.

The views expressed in this anthology are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Armed Services, Law Enforcement, Intelligence Agencies or U.S. Local, State, or Federal Government.

PREFACE:

THE THREAT OF MEXICAN CARTEL INFLUENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Robert H. Scales

December 2012

Just about a year ago, Mr. Todd Staples, Texas Commissioner of Agriculture, General Barry McCaffrey, and I started a dialog about the threat of Mexican cartel influence in the United States. In Washington, we were for the most part either vilified or ignored by virtually every Federal agency as well as Congress and the Administration. We had a few allies among Texas border sheriffs as well as affected ranchers and farmers but that was about all.

What a difference a year makes. Since our report and testimony, the threat to our country due to the expanding influence of the Mexican cartels (and the diminished ability of the U.S. and Mexico to deal with this threat) has created a tectonic shift in the ability of the Cartels to cause us harm. The presence of the Cartels in our midst has gone from a peripheral condition to a serious national and trans-national threat that can no longer be ignored.

There are several reasons for a new awareness and concern about this phenomenon. First, the Cartels have established a home here. What a year ago was a firm foothold of about four hundred cities and towns with a cartel presence has grown almost exponentially to over two thousand cities. Associations between gangs and Cartels in these communities are making our cities far less safe. Murder rates that had been in decline for decades in American cities are now radically increasing in cities such as Chicago and Los Angeles where there is a notable cartel presence.

Sadly, the next shoe to drop in this tragic drama will be revelations about the internal corruption inside our state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies caused by the lethal cocktail of too much money and too little attention by those who know the truth about the extent of Cartel crime in the U.S.

The evil of the Cartels has expanded throughout the Americas, threatening vulnerable states such as Nicaragua, Panama, and Honduras. It even seems that the newly elected President of Mexico, Enrique Pena Nieto, is losing control and passion for protecting his country from the greatest enemy that Mexico has faced since independence.

Scholars like Robert Killebrew and others are beginning to sense that the evil of the Cartels is spawning and feeding on a global increase in crime and drug smuggling that might soon engulf much of the poorer parts of the globe, from the Middle East to South Asia to all of the Southern Cone.

Most distressing is the chronically dysfunctional approach of this Administration to the growing threat of cartel intrusion. So far, at least, we have seen no serious effort to improve our defenses to meet the clear offensive by cartels and their American gang allies. Too often the cartel offensive is linked to illegal immigration. The border protection agencies point to a drop in immigration as a reduction in crime. To be sure, the cartels profit from illegal immigration but they don’t depend on the flow of immigrants to feed their hunger for profit and influence.

No one of consequence has yet to admit to the growing involvement of Venezuela and its corrupt leaders in efforts to gain an underground railroad for terrorists across our vulnerable border.

In this era of diminished market viability, we still see a continuing reduction in the economic strength of Texas ranchers and farmers caused by a violent and intrusive system of crime, the perpetrators of which want to control and dominate our border so that they can continue to thrive.

Resources are not the problem. Recognition and commitment are. Now that the election is over, the Administration no longer has a motive for low-balling the problem and humiliating those who know the facts. Now that our foreign wars are winding down, it’s time for us to pay attention to wars closer to home. Just a small fraction of the money spent in Iraq and Afghanistan could go a long way to stopping cartel and gang intrusion inside our cities. The Armed Services have learned at great pain how to build coalitions, tutor military and political leaders, train and advise alien armies in the Middle East and South Asia. Now it’s time to redirect these talents to missions closer to home.

We have bought—at great expense—technologies capable of detecting border intrusions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Now it’s time to adapt these technologies to detect intrusions across our own borders. We have built a generation of warriors who know how to fight at the small unit level. Sadly, too often drug criminals are better trained and equipped to move, communicate, and fight than our own front line law enforcement.

Let’s defend our borders. Let’s do a better job of protecting citizens now besieged by the evils of the cartel-gang coalitions. Let’s take what we have learned in foreign wars and apply those resources and skills to winning at home.

And, most importantly, let’s lobby to those in charge to take this fight to the enemy with the aggressiveness and commitment that is necessary.

FOREWORD:

TEXAS IN THE CROSSHAIRS–ARMED CARTELS SPREAD FEAR AT THE BORDER

Todd Staples

January 2013

Bullets spray and glass shatters. A rancher is injured as his pickup truck is riddled with bullets.

The routine task of clearing a sugarcane field is interrupted as armed, uniformed men storm the premises demanding the workers evacuate . . . or else.

Gunfights, brutal intimidation and surprise attacks sound like scenes from the Wild West or an old Hollywood gangster movie, but unfortunately, they are the reality of many Americans who live and work along the United States—Mexico border. These Texans and Americans are under attack as drug cartels secure their trade routes in Texas and the United States through methods of violence and corruption that have proven successful in Mexico and Latin America.

With a shared 1,254-mile border, Texas and Mexico have tremendous potential for a strong future. However, the surging violence of Mexican drug cartels and the shadow of illicit trade are threatening our mutual prosperity.

While hardworking Texas farmers and ranchers stand in the crosshairs, many of our fellow Americans refuse to acknowledge these dangers and provide the aid and protection guaranteed by Article IV, Section IV of the United States Constitution:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

In January 2011, I was sworn in to serve a second term as the Texas Commissioner of Agriculture. As Commissioner, I pledged to uphold the laws of my state and nation, but I never anticipated the Texas Department of Agriculture would play a role in border security until the number of calls I was receiving from farmers and ranchers who live and work in the South Texas border region began to accelerate. Their stories of fear, trespassing, violence and property destruction at the hands of cartel members were both powerful and disturbing.

Most compelling was the sense of hopelessness expressed by these self-reliant, accomplished agricultural producers and business people. While local law enforcement works hard to address the cartels, it is the federal government that has the needed resources and authority to fully resolve the problems. Unfortunately, Washington’s response to farmers, ranchers and others who live in the border states, is to downplay or deny the violence and illegal activity perpetrated by the cartels.

In response to Washington’s inaction and denial, the Texas Department of Agriculture (TDA) created ProtectYourTexasBorder.com and also worked with General Barry McCaffrey and Major General Robert Scales to author Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment in an effort to clearly define the threat, identify solutions and increase awareness of both. More recently, TDA worked with the Texas Department of Public Safety to increase surveillance capacity and the presence of law enforcement along the border by facilitating and expanding a partnership with private landowners. Local, state and federal law enforcement officers have increased coordination and have sought to maximize their limited resources in a valiant attempt to curb the cross-border violence.

While these efforts are important and help fill some gaps, true reform is needed from our leaders in Washington.

Mexican Cartel Essays and Notes: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical adds to the dialogue about the threat posed by Mexican drug cartels. Dr. Bunker’s team provides valuable insight as they document and explore the reality of cartel activity.

A better understanding of the dominance of cartels and the way they interact with sanctioned and legitimate governments in Latin America and Mexico helps decision makers and thought leaders identify the resources and policies that must be put into place to counter and combat international criminal organizations. Essays and Notes also paints a disturbing picture of the effects of cartel-dominated governments and societies. The saturation of corruption, lawlessness and failure to protect innocent Americans from unbridled violence is not my vision or hope for the United States of America. The situation in Mexico should be a wake-up call for President Barack Obama and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano who, as Dr. Bunker points out, continue to deny cartel violence on American soil.

Dr. Bunker’s research focuses squarely on the issues driving and enabling the cartels. His essays challenge Washington’s denials and drive home the fact that we need a new approach to U.S.—Mexico relations and new approaches to identifying, defining and responding to threats against our nation. Put simply, the cartels are terrorists that have infiltrated and taken over cities and states, as well as many aspects of the Mexican government. They have expanded their reach into the U.S. border states and will continue their advance. To deny the violence and dismiss the cartels as being strictly Mexico’s problem is absolutely wrong.

Texans know the insecure border can be fixed, but it will require a comprehensive and sustained effort. To do so, Washington must help:

Secure our border; Enforce existing law; Document all immigrants; Mandate country of origin application for U.S. citizenship; Reform failed visa system for guest workers and international day laborers; and Modernize legal ports of entry for the efficient flow of legitimate goods and services.

Lines on a map do not stop the penetration of cartel influence at the southern border. America’s insatiable demand for illegal drugs and the underground economies filling jobs and producing products have permeated our economy and have become the norm. Parasites cannot live without a host. For too long the United States has played host to cartel activities. Americans must take actions now before the parasites take control.

INTRODUCTION:

MEXICAN CARTEL ESSAYS AND NOTES

Robert J. Bunker

December 2012

This second Small Wars Journal—El Centro anthology, Mexican Cartel Essays and Notes, represents a follow-on to the initial anthology, Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency, published in May 2012. It contains articles and notes from the El Centro section of the online professional journal SWJ (smallwarsjournal.com/elcentro) originally published between 27 May 2011 and 30 November 2012, which represents the last day in office for outgoing Mexican president Felipe Calderón Hinojosa from the PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) party. This new work also includes the addition of new specially written introductory essays by Major General Robert Scales (U.S. Army, Retired) and Commissioner Todd Staples (Texas Department of Agriculture) and a postscript by Lieutenant John Sullivan (Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department), who is also a contributing author to this anthology and a senior founding fellow of SWJ El Centro.

This new work would not exist were it not for the participation of its thirty-two contributing authors who originally wrote the various essays, and in some instances notes, that it contains for that professional journal. Compared to the initial work—which only contained nine contributors due to it showcasing essays written prior to, and right after, the initial founding of the El Centro subsite at SWJ—this much larger work represents both a growing interest and maturing of scholarship in this topical area.

The intent of this anthology is to highlight both theoretical pieces—generally in the areas of high intensity crime, low intensity conflict, insurgency, and Western hemispheric security—and more professionally focused works—that is, applied policy, law enforcement, and military related writings—on the conflicts taking place in Mexico between the various cartels and gangs and also with the governmental institutions of that country. While most of the contributors hail from the United States, other countries of origin are increasingly represented. The anthology also greatly benefits from a multi-disciplinary approach with the authors having diverse backgrounds stemming from their unique educational, training, and other professional experiences. Some of the contributors typically wear body armor and side arms on their hips, others wear suits and conduct seminars with graduate students, while still others have backgrounds in intelligence analysis, governmental agencies, investigative reporting, and gang suppression units. For more on the varied and exceptional backgrounds of the contributing authors, please refer to their biographies found at the end of this anthology.

What all of these contributors do share is a dedication and duty to the SWJ El Centro focus of analysis on what we term ‘criminal insurgencies’.¹ Such insurgencies are taking place in Mexico and other regions of the Western Hemisphere, most evidentially now in various countries in Central America, but with brushfires also already breaking out in the Caribbean, and in such Latin American states as Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and others. Even the United States is not immune to this new form of conflict with Arizona, Texas, and now even Illinois—with ground zero represented by Chicago—being negatively impacted by Mexican cartel and gang affiliate activity:

Gun violence is out of control in Chicago. Just last night, there were eight shootings, two of them deadly.

That pushes the total so far in 2012 to 351 shooting deaths—up 30 percent from last year. Drug gangs are a big reason.

In an afternoon drive on Chicago’s southwest side, Jack Riley sees signs of what he calls the toxic drug war laying waste to this city.

Riley is special agent in charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration Office in Chicago and in four neighboring states.

Daily turf battles over drugs and distribution, he said, are turning parts of this Midwest city into a Mexican border town.

One of the hardest jobs I’ve had in the past couple of years is to convince our law enforcement partners that we need an enforcement mentality as if we’re on the border, Riley said.

Miles away, Riley says, Mexican cartels have a significant influence in Chicago’s gang violence problem.

Let’s take the gloves off on that, he said. We know that the majority of the drugs here in Chicago, cartels are responsible for. We know that the majority of the murders are gang related. So it is very clear to see the connection and the role.

As it stands now, at least three major Mexican cartels are battling over control of billions of dollars of marijuana, cocaine and—increasingly—heroin in this city. That includes the ultra-violent Zetas and the powerful Sinaloa cartel, run by its shadowy leader Joaquin El Chapo Guzman… ²

That we should care about the criminal insurgencies taking place in Mexico is further reinforced by the fact that the official death toll is just over 50,000 individuals.³ This figure does not even take into consideration the tens-of-thousands more who have been killed in various Mexican states for which death statistics are not being updated and the 20,000 plus individuals who have simply disappeared and are considered ‘off the books’ for homicide counting purposes—which places the estimated number around 100,000 according to Molly Molloy, a long time Mexican drug war researcher at New Mexico State University.⁴ If this were not enough, it has now been estimated by El Universal that over 1,300 gang and cartel linked beheadings have taken place in Mexico since 2007 and approximately 55,000 people have been enslaved according to an Insight Crime investigative project.⁵ Further, about 230,000 drug war refugees are estimated to exist with parts of some cities such as Ciudad Juarez abandoned and other small villages in Northern Mexico, and even now in the state of Sinaloa, burned to the ground as part of a cartel scorched earth policy.⁶

The levels of barbarism and brutality currently evident in a number of regions of Mexico are thus off the scale and at times makes the violence that has taken place in Iraq and Afghanistan—where U.S. troops were deployed in combat operations—simply pale in comparison. Even worse conditions can be said to be taking place in some of the countries of Central America where the gangs from below and the cartels, both Mexican and occasionally Colombian, from above have resulted in conflict environments that are now witnessing some of the highest homicide rates on the face of the globe.⁷ Further afield this is occurring both in Colombia, where peripheral violence is escalating with the indigenous paramilitaries, street gangs, and new urban criminal groups (bandas criminales or BACRIMS ) fighting over drug trafficking and other illicit spoils, and in Sao Paulo, Brazil, where over ninety police officers, most of them killed while off duty, have been targeted by the PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital) prison gang this year as a reprisal for a crackdown on the drug trade.⁸

With these sobering thoughts in mind, this new anthology, unlike the prior one, is not initially organized chronologically by the writings that it showcases. Rather, it is divided into three levels of abstraction based on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of conflict. Each level of conflict is organized into its own section that then highlights first the essays that were published in SWJ El Centro, and then the notes, in a chronological manner. The Mexican Cartel Notes represent another innovation found in this new anthology. They were developed by this author to provide more focused information and analysis of significant events that have taken place at the various levels of conflict as they pertain, or are viewed as linked, to the activities of the Mexican cartels. They have proven to be immensely popular—especially those tactical notes focusing on weapons forensics and benefiting from David Kuhn’s detailed analysis—as witnessed by their reposting on various ‘narco war’ related blog sites such as Borderland Beat and the many reader comments that they have subsequently generated.

It should be mentioned, however, that, of the three levels of conflict, focus upon the middle, or operational level, has proven the most problematic when producing the Mexican Cartel Notes series. While strategic and tactical level analysis is a rather cut-and-dried affair, the operational level is far more dynamic and secretive in nature. Active cartel-on-cartel, cartel-on-government, and government-on-cartel operations are continually taking place in Mexico. All parties do not wish to reveal their operations—which in essence link broader strategies to tactical level engagements—to retain the element of surprise and to mask their intent as much as possible. Such OPSEC (operational security) concerns translate into limited information, even disinformation, being provided about such operations. As a result, only five operational level focused essays and one operational level Mexican Cartel Note are contained in this collection of writings.

With that stated, this new work contains numerous strategic and tactical level essays and notes that should prove themselves highly useful to the reader. They help to chronicle a broadening criminal based conflict that has been slowly escalating for decades, and since about the 2004-2006 period, has seen open and blatant warfare break out between the various Mexican cartels and gangs and between those cartels and gangs and the Mexican government. Many strategies, policies, and even artifacts of that war—improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and Claymore anti-personnel mines—are chronicled in this anthology. It is hoped that the writings on these and other activities and artifacts related to the Mexican cartels and gangs will help the reader gain a better perspective concerning the criminal insurgencies now taking place in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, and possibly even more importantly, it is our intent for the reader to be enabled by this work, and others like it, to make better informed decisions and critiques concerning the various security and counter-drug proposals and policies being discussed and/or implemented by the Mexican government, and other governments whose citizens are being negatively impacted by the ongoing scourge of cartel and gang violence and corruption that is now endemic to so many regions of the Americas.

STRATEGIC ESSAYS

AND NOTES

CHAPTER 1

STRATEGY FOR MEXICO?

Johnny M. Lairsey, Jr.

Initially Published June 10, 2011

For over a century, United States foreign policy was guided by the Monroe doctrine. Then, around 1890, a nascent concept of American Imperialism was popularized and served to shift foreign policy away from the Monroe Doctrine.¹ Since then the United States has exercised many different forms of foreign policy. The current United States foreign policy as evinced by the United States Secretary of State proclaims that United States freedom and prosperity is linked to the freedom and prosperity of the rest of the world.² The approach the United States Department of State uses to preserve our freedoms and prosperity includes building and maintaining international relations and protecting ourselves and our allies against transnational threats.³ Given the existing conditions in Mexico and the United States current approach to foreign policy the United States should assert its national powers to defeat transnational criminal organizations and help to improve the conditions in Mexico. However, before taking action the United States must clearly articulate the purpose of why it is taking action in a foreign country.

In 2010 there were more than 15,000 people killed in Mexico.⁴ Complicating this statistic was the belief that Mexico is on the brink of becoming a failed state. Several articles were published substantiating this belief.⁵ Additionally, several other articles suggested the existing conditions in Mexico pose a significant strategic risk to the United States without elaborating on the nature of those risks. Why do the existing conditions in Mexico pose a significant risk to the United States? Answering this question is necessary in order to formulate a rational strategic response. Given its looming debt crisis, it is imperative that the United States develop a clear strategic end state prior to committing additional resources to defeat transnational criminal organizations in the United States and Mexico.

Should the United States employ its elements of national powers to defeat transnational criminal organizations in Mexico? What is the objective? Do the existing conditions in Mexico coupled with their proximity equate to a strategic threat to the United States? How does Mexico’s current war on transnational criminal organizations impact the United States? The existing conditions in Mexico should be of concern to the United States for four reasons: spill over violence from Mexico to the United States, spread of corruption within the United States, economic impact on both countries Gross National Product and bad actors launching attacks on the United States from ungoverned areas in Mexico. Within each of the aforementioned areas is the latent possibility they will develop and threaten the United States of America’s sovereignty.

According to the Congressional Research Service there is no evidence to confirm the existence of significant spillover violence from Mexico into the United States.⁶ The official definition of spillover violence is the intentional targeting of innocent civilians in the United States or official United States government interests in Mexico or the United States. ⁷ The key word is significant as it is clear from the government’s narrow definition of spillover violence it has in fact occurred. In December 2010, a United States Border Patrol Agent was shot and killed by suspected members of transnational criminal organizations in Nogales, Arizona.⁸ Prior to this incident there were several other occasions in which gun fire was exchanged between Border Patrol Agents and members of transnational criminal organizations.⁹ In August 2010 the University of Texas at El Paso was struck by bullets that originated in Juarez, Mexico.¹⁰ Spillover violence from Mexico is occurring but by using a narrowly defined term the United States remains ambivalent as to what actions to pursue to address the issue. Given the presence of transnational criminal organizations in over 230 cities in the United States it is logical to conclude that violence is increasing.¹¹ The issue is the narrow definition and lack of specified data. The United States government is dependent on local and state law enforcement agencies to accurately report not only crimes but who is committing the crimes. Unfortunately, the data is only as good as what is entered into the system leading to the potential of creating a false image. Regardless, it is a reasonable conclusion, if the transnational criminal organizations in Mexico continue to grow they will continue spreading throughout the United States and violence will increase as a by-product of that growth. The violence may not meet the United States definition of significant but how many innocent people need to perish before the violence is considered significant? What level of violence is unacceptable? Spillover violence has existed since the border between the United States and Mexico was established. It is time to recognize that spillover violence exists and has already reached the threshold of significant.

Corruption is nothing new to the country of Mexico. In fact it is quite ubiquitous throughout society. A study completed by Global Integrity, a nongovernmental agency, gave Mexico an overall weak rating, versus a moderate or strong rating in terms of its susceptibility to corruption.¹² In 1995, the Central Intelligence Agency released a report that cast a shadow upon Carlos Salinas de Gortari the former President of Mexico.¹³ The report suggests that as President, Mr. Salinas had possibly participated in the corrupt activities of his relatives who had direct ties to transnational criminal organizations in Mexico.¹⁴ Though no charges were ever filed, the former President agreed to a self imposed exile to Ireland at the conclusion of his Presidency.¹⁵ In 1997, General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo the head of Mexico’s version of the Drug Enforcement Administration was fired after an investigation revealed he had received substantial bribes from the different transnational criminal organizations.¹⁶ He was later charged and sentenced to serve approximately forty years in prison.¹⁷ Corruption continues to permeate all levels of Mexican governments and has crossed the border into the United States as evidenced in the arrest and conviction of Martha Garnica a former U.S. Border Patrol agent who pled guilty to six counts of drug smuggling, human trafficking and bribery.¹⁸ Transnational criminal organizations are so adaptive and influential that they now employ cold war era spy tactics to corrupt United States officials.¹⁹ These were the same state sponsored tactics used to corrupt the likes of Aldrich Ames, one of the most notorious spies in the history of the United States. With a 300 percent increase in the number of corruption investigations initiated in the United States it is likely that the transnational criminal organizations will continue to target and corrupt United States government officials.²⁰ However, it is doubtful the transnational criminal organizations will enjoy the same level of corruption in the United States as in Mexico, but what level is deemed acceptable by United States authorities?

The United States economy is inextricably linked to Mexico in terms of imports, exports and direct foreign investment. The United States consumes approximately eighty percent of Mexico’s exports which represents approximately ten percent of total United States imports.²¹ Simultaneously, about 14 percent of total United States exports are sent to Mexico.²² A disruption to Mexican imports or United States exports would likely result in higher prices being passed to consumers, negatively affecting both countries gross domestic product. Of significant concern is Mexico’s ability to continue supplying the United States demand for crude oil.²³ In 2010, approximately 10 percent of the United States crude oil imports originated from Mexico.²⁴ Disrupting supply would have a traumatic effect on the price of gasoline causing the prices of other commodities to rise and have a negative effect on the consumer price index. Studies show that the gross domestic product contracts when energy prices rise unexpectedly and history shows there is a direct correlation between the rise of energy prices and economic recessions.²⁵ If the existing conditions in Mexico are allowed to persist, Mexico will become a net importer of oil in the next ten years which would affect the United States but in reality would destroy the Mexican economy as oil exports represent approximately forty percent of its gross national product.²⁶ Currently, the Mexican Constitution places limitations on foreign companies investing in the Mexican oil industry, but if recent efforts by the Calderon administration is attempting to change this dynamic. If the Calderon administration is successful, Mexico will relax the limitations and invite foreign investors to share their technology and the cost of deep water exploration.²⁷ It is likely that United States oil companies will assist the Mexican oil industry in exploiting its reserves. Doing so increases the amount of money invested in Mexico by the United States. The United States is Mexico’s largest foreign direct investment partner, equating to over 11 billion dollars. The risk to the investors is real as