CIA agents lied to White House officials and others about the use of torture and its effectiveness in obtaining information from detainees, according to an explosive report released by the Senate Intelligence Committee on Tuesday.

The lies began during the first term of the George W. Bush administration and continued into the presidency of Barack Obama.

We've listed some of the examples—cited in the report—that show when and how the CIA misled White House officials from Bush himself to Obama's national security team.

The CIA lied to former Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell walks on stage to speak during a seminar in Tokyo, on June 18. Image: Eugene Hoshiko/Associated Press

The CIA told Powell and Rumsfeld on September 16, 2003, that torture (or "enhanced interrogation," in the report's parlance) "produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives."

To back up those claims, they cited the capture of Majid Khan, a Pakistani citizen imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Agents said they nabbed Khan after obtaining "major threat" information from a detainee identified as "KSM."

But the torture report says otherwise.

"There is no indication in CIA records that reporting from detainee KSM—or any other CIA detainee—played any role in the identification and capture of Majid Khan,” according to text on page 335 of the report.

The CIA lied to the Department of Justice

The Department of Justice was supposed to determine the legality of the CIA's torture program, but from 2002 to 2007 it relied only on information provided by the CIA to do that, according to the report.

CIA officials said that the Agency's methods were justified because they obtained information vital to protecting the United States, and the DOJ cited the "necessity defense" in a memo to the White House on August 1, 2002.

The DOJ also stated that its conclusions could change based on new information, but the CIA often kept the DOJ in the dark, especially in regard to the effectiveness of torture. That way, the "necessity defense" could remain intact.

A former CIA director lied to the Senate committee about nearly every aspect of the torture program

In this Feb. 5, 2008 photo, former CIA Director Michael Hayden testifies about world threats before a Senate Intelligence Committee on Capitol Hill in Washington. Image: Kevin Wolf/Associated Press

The report strikes a massive blow to the credibility of former CIA Director Michael Hayden. According to text on page 450, at a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on April 12, 2007, Hayden "provided extensive inaccurate information" on the background and training of CIA interrogators, the number of detainees, the intelligence gained from tortured detainees, how prisoners were tortured, injuries the detainees suffered, whether agents threatened the families of prisoners, and more.

The CIA crafted an inaccurate speech for Bush

Former President George W. Bush speaks at the Presidential Leadership Scholars Program Launch on Sept. 8, at The Newseum in Washington. Image: Jacquelyn Martin/Associated Press

After the former president was briefed on the torture program, the CIA gave Bush inaccurate information about the effectiveness of torture that he used in a speech on September 6, 2006, according to the committee's findings.

"This is intelligence that cannot be found any other place," Bush said during the speech. "And our security depends on getting this kind of information."

The CIA gave Bush the example of Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti. The Agency said intelligence gathered through torture stopped a strike against a Marine base there, but the Senate committee said that claim was baseless.

The CIA duped Obama's national security team

In January 2009, President-elect Obama's national security team had a sit-down with the CIA. The agency said it had gathered "key intelligence" from torture, according to page 342 of the report. To back up this claim, the CIA cited information gathered from detainee Janat Gul, even though other CIA agents had determined years before that Gul had no valuable information.