Some real things seem more real than others. A slap on the face manifests itself with greater sensory intensity than an intellectual argument, a single wild buffalo has a more definite presence than the shape of its territory. Two things can be said to exist in different ways: one may be capable of complex causal interaction with things of many kinds, another (a property or a part) may interact directly only with things of the same kind. The practical distinction of How different kinds of things appear to Exist in the same world can be explained in terms of degrees of existence. Here I evaluate what I call the Causal Entanglement thesis, according to which the degree of existence of a thing is determined by the scope and intensity of its causal relations with other things.

“Whatever has a native power, whether of affecting anything else, or of being affected in ever so slight a degree by the most insignificant agents, even on one solitary occasion, is a real being. In short, I offer it as the definition of beings that they are potency – and nothing else. – Plato, Sophist 247d–e

“The existing things are precisely those we can in principle causally interact with” (Berto 2012), so the more we can in principle interact with a thing and the greater effect it can have on us the more it exists. There is a distinctly contextual twist in the above interpretation in that a thing X can exist to a higher degree with respect to Y than with respect to Z. Assuming causal symmetry (‘every action has an equal and opposite reaction’) this entails that X and Y exist to a degree E1 with respect to one another, X and Z (and Y and Z) exist to a degree E2 with respect to one another, and E1>E2.

Another way of defining existence that admits of degrees is in terms of likeness, a thesis first proposed by Aristotle (1984, 980b25) in Metaphysics: “from memory experience is produced in men; for many memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience.” More generally, a thing exists only insofar as there is something ‘it is like’ to be that thing (Nagel 1974), where the degree of likeness to a kind determines the degree of existence as a member of that kind (What is it Like to be ‘Me’: Ontology of the Subject). That something “does not look like anything to me” (a phrase notably uttered by Dolores in the TV series Westworld) implies that some nominal ‘thing’ literally does not exist for me. If, on the other hand, somethings looks ‘vaguely’ like something else that I can already identify, it may already possess a positive degree of existence with respect to me. At the maximum, if something looks intimately familiar to me, is like me, the object of this kinship it maximally real to me: its degree of existence is absolute. This I call the phenomenological thesis. Again assuming causal symmetry, X and Y, members of the same ontological kind K1, exist to the same degree E1 with respect to one another, X and Z (Y and Z) exist to a degree E2, where E1 is an internal property of K1, E2 is a common property of different ontological kinds (K1, K2), and Z is a member of K2. If my interpretation is correct, this line of reasoning reflects Alain Badiou’s axioms of existence: “the degree of existence of a is equal to its degree of identity to b” (2009, 257) and “the common of degrees of existence is equal to the degree of identity of the terms in question” (Badiou 2009, 356).

The idea of degrees of existence ‘as an agent’ is compatible with both the causal entanglement thesis and the phenomenological thesis. In the context of causal entanglement, we can be more or less intentional in our actions, which implies a degree of consciousness of what we do and for what reason. Acting compulsively need not be intentional but may involve something merely happening with me, or I may be simply lacking a reason for acting or reacting. In either case, acting compulsively is less intentional than acting for a reason. According to the phenomenological thesis, the less we regard other agents as beings of the same kind as ourselves the less we are conscious of their agency, and therefore we have a lower capacity to act intentionally with respect to something we do not regard as existent (as members of a particular kind). On this account, the causal entanglement thesis is complemented by the phenomenological thesis just in case of agency.

If agency is matter of degree, and if we value our capacity to act, then we are rationally committed to act in a way that maximises our capacity to act intentionally. Counterintuitively, self-interest could thus form not only the basis of objective, rational ethics, but be the fundamental principle of consciousness. If consciousness and ethics are intrinsically connected, and if we were to abandon universal ethics of humanism (in the Kantian sense, limited to beings capable of rational agency) in favour of moral relativism, our degree of existence as conscious, rational agents would diminish. This has curious eschatological implications: if consciousness and agency are not strictly conditional on what we conceive of as our physical constitution but on performative, social reflexivity, then the idea of the End of the World makes sense only as a metaphysical event, as a failure of some fundamental ontological relation.

It may be objected that the idea of degrees of existence violates the law of Excluded Middle with respect to existence, which states that something must either exists or not exist. I contend that anything that exists with Any positive degree can be said to exist in the relevant sense (irrespective of its degree of existence); conversely, anything that exists with zero-degree must be said not to exist at all. I accept nonetheless that this objection is interesting, relevant and may have a deeper logical dimension that I have not yet considered.

Aristotle. The Complete Works . Princeton University Press, 1984.

. Princeton University Press, 1984. Badiou, Alain. Logics of Worlds : Being and Event II. Continuum, 2009.

: Being and Event II. Continuum, 2009. Berto, Francesco. “To Be Is To Have Causal Powers”: Existence and Nature in Analytic Metaphysics . In Favaretti M., Plebani M., editors, Existence and Nature: New Perspectives, 2012.

. In Favaretti M., Plebani M., editors, Existence and Nature: New Perspectives, 2012. Nagel, Thomas. What is it Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 1974.

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