ARE the British leaving the European Union? Hardly a conversation passes in Brussels without somebody asking. Britain’s friends are alarmed, some rivals gleeful. For the EU as a whole, the prospect of “Brixit” compounds the uncertainty of the euro crisis. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, says she cannot imagine the EU without Britain. But Michel Rocard, a former French prime minister, speaks for many when he says that “the United Kingdom, which has blocked all progress on European integration since 1972, has distanced itself from the euro zone. Let’s take advantage of that.”

In many ways, the British have only ever been half-in; they are not part of the euro or the Schengen passport-free travel zone. The prime minister, David Cameron, says that he wants to stay in the EU and its single market (and one day to renegotiate Britain’s membership). But some moves give the impression that Britain is on its way out. Its plan to opt out of big chunks of justice and police co-operation is one example. Another is Mr Cameron’s threat to veto the EU’s next budget unless it is frozen. Most worrying is the drumroll of Eurosceptic MPs seeking an in-or-out referendum. A parliamentary vote calling for the EU budget to be cut suggests that Mr Cameron does not control his Tory backbenchers, and that the Labour Party is ready to exploit anti-EU sentiment.

The rest of the union is in flux, not least because the euro crisis is forcing the pace of political integration. This creates a dangerous cocktail of resentment and unpredictability, and raises the prospect that Britain could find itself outside the EU by error if not by design. Two summits—one on November 22nd to decide the budget, and another on December 13th to forge a euro-zone banking union—may determine whether the EU moves towards a new kind of “variable geometry”, or Britain drifts away altogether.

A benign scenario would see EU leaders do a budget deal, clearing the air for one on banking union. This is the first real test of how to balance the integration of the 17 euro “ins” with the interests of the ten “outs”, particularly the integrity of the single market of 27. Countries want to place the euro-zone’s banks under a single supervisor (the European Central Bank) while reassuring Britain that it will not be outvoted in the European Banking Authority, which sets common rules.

Meanwhile, Mr Cameron’s “balance of competences” review will assess the distribution of power between London and Brussels, reporting in 2014. Around that time the European Commission should be setting out its vision of a new treaty, which may include some powers to be repatriated. Mr Cameron, if re-elected, could negotiate the “new settlement” that he seeks and put it to a referendum, perhaps in 2015 or 2016.

British ministers say they want a calm and “grown-up” conversation about the future of the EU. But they may not have that luxury. Much can go wrong, starting with the negotiation over the budget for 2014-20. Britain is the most hawkish country, demanding a real-terms freeze based on spending in 2011. But under pressure from MPs for a cut, Mr Cameron’s opening bid may now be his maximum concession. A prolonged stalemate could see the EU budget being rolled over yearly. This would cost Britain more than it wants, and irritate its partners: multi-year projects in eastern Europe would be disrupted, and other net contributors would lose the temporary rebates they now enjoy.

Recrimination over a failed budget could poison the banking talks. An isolated Britain might be tempted to veto the single supervisor. Eurocrats are ready then to push for “enhanced co-operation” that allows nine or more members to seek deeper integration. This could be explosive. Forget sober reflection: Mr Cameron could even be forced to concede an immediate referendum. And other bad scenarios abound. Perhaps the euro will collapse, bringing down the EU with it. Or perhaps the euro will survive, and use its combined weight to push the British around.

Hold your nerve

Still it is hard to see the British, awkward as they are, completely outside the EU. The Germans don’t want to be left alone with the protectionist French; the weakened French, on balance, want the British to counterbalance the mighty Germans; smaller countries don’t want to be crushed in a Franco-German vice. The Americans want their British ally to stay in. And what would be left of the EU’s foreign-policy ambitions without the global diplomatic network and armed forces of the British?

All this may stop events from spinning out of control. Even so, Britain may find European leaders less willing to accommodate its demands in any renegotiation than it thinks. Many see Britain as trying to protect the City, which is hardly popular. The French say repatriating social and employment laws would give Britain an unfair advantage. Even friends in northern liberal countries think Britain goes too far in trying to create an à la carte membership. “You cannot just pick the raisins out of the bun,” says one.

Several factors are reducing Britain’s bargaining power. First is the accumulated resentment of past battles. Second, Germany may feel less necessity to keep the British in, now that their troops no longer defend its borders. Third, unlike Britain, most of the outs want to stick close to the euro zone. Fourth, a looming Brixit makes even friendly countries less willing to line up with the Brits. Most important, most leaders think resolving the euro crisis must take priority over British demands—and they resent Britain’s attempts to exploit the euro crisis for its own ends.

A year ago most EU countries sidestepped Mr Cameron’s misconceived veto of the “fiscal compact”, a treaty to tighten budget discipline. They will do so again if they have to. This may not matter to those wanting Britain out of the EU, but those who still want the best deal for Britain need to keep cool heads.

Economist.com/blogs/charlemagne