The answer is 52 percent — an outcome that is barely better than that of a coin flip. This means that although the value of players declines throughout the draft, quality declines more slowly than compensation — players picked early are very highly paid. As a result, the first pick in the draft has often provided less value to his team, in performance per dollar, than the last pick in the first round (the one awarded to the Super Bowl winner). In other words, in the world of the N.F.L. draft, the rich get richer.

The league has helped to create this problem in the way it pays rookies. A special salary cap applies to rookies and, unlike the overall salary cap the league uses, it varies across teams. The teams with the first picks get more money to spend on signing their draftees. Since agents know how much a team has been allocated to sign the first-round pick, they demand that amount for their player. As a result, compensation for draft picks declines almost in lock step; the first player gets the most, then the second pick, and so on, with the last player taken in the first round getting only 25 percent of the amount awarded to the first pick.

It turns out that the N.F.L. and the players’ union are trying to renegotiate their collective bargaining agreement. One topic reported to be on the bargaining table is shifting some of the pay away from early draft picks.

The owners and players should find common ground on this issue, because it makes absolutely no sense to be giving so much money to unproven rookies, many of whom turn out to be busts. By reducing the premium paid to the highest draft choices, the league could restore the redistributive goal that the draft was created to achieve. And veteran players would probably agree with the principle that eight-figure salaries should be reserved for players who have already proved themselves on the field.

SO if teams’ ability to select players is only slightly better than flipping coins, should we expect that corporations can do any better in picking their chief executives?

After all, it’s probably easier to predict the performance of football players than of C.E.O.’s. Athletes perform the same job in a very public forum for years, and all aspects of their job are subject to wide critical evaluation. They are also given extensive physical and mental tests. (Yes, it is important for a football player to be smart — and several years of college don’t assure that.)

On the other hand, chief executives hired from outside a particular company have been performing mostly in private. And I’ve never heard of a prospective C.E.O. being given an I.Q. test — or having to run the business version of the 40-yard dash (perhaps a press conference?).

So maybe companies shouldn’t pay big bucks in the desperate hope of getting the equivalent of a Peyton Manning, who was the first overall pick in 1998 and, of course, has proved his superstar value. Instead, maybe they should dig around for a replica of Tom Brady, who was the 199th pick in the 2000 draft and has gone on to play in four Super Bowls, winning three.