Russia’s 2012 election will likely prove decisive in the Putin-Medvedev relationship, though the election itself will probably be much less significant than the period immediately before it, when the real decision — which of them runs for president and wins — will be made. Most believe the choice is still Putin’s, but Medvedev’s supporters hope that Putin won’t fight back if they mount a real challenge. The closer the election comes, the greater the pressure on Russia’s elite to choose sides.

Ironically, the competition between Medvedev and Putin creates more political space in Russia, but in some ways limits its media space. Those within the elite have the freedom to choose sides and to discuss the reasons for their choices online and in newspapers, but cannot broach the topic on television, which is controlled most tightly because of its national impact. Television channels are in the unhappy position of receiving conflicting guidance from the Kremlin (the president’s office) and Russia’s White House (the prime minister’s office) and trying to avoid offending either.

The competition can also produce curious results in Russia’s foreign policy. For example, while Medvedev sounds more like a liberal on domestic issues, he generally sounds tough on foreign policy — despite some forthcoming comments on Iran sanctions. It would be risky for Medvedev to allow Putin to outflank him on national security, where the president has limited background and his toughness has been questioned.

Medvedev’s reluctance to challenge Putin on foreign policy could prove to be an advantage if it lowers the profile of international issues as a topic of heated political combat. Putin is sufficiently popular in Russia that he does not need “foreign enemies” to bolster his position; even on the economy, he has fared better than Medvedev in opinion polls.

For the United States and Europe, however, Russia’s new political uncertainty and the resulting ambiguous lines of authority only add to the difficulty of working with a corrupt, autocratic and often inept bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, the fact that Moscow is a frustrating interlocutor — and might become even more frustrating — does not mean that it is an impossible one. And in view of the crucial international security issues at stake — including Iran, Afghanistan and energy security — Russia’s many complexities and failings should not be an excuse to avoid seriously engaging with Moscow.

One thing is certain: Neither Barack Obama’s charm nor appeals to common interests will persuade Russia’s unsentimental leaders. Only the combination of real leverage and real inducements can move the uneasy Putin-Medvedev partnership to accommodate American and broader Western priorities.