Related Everything You Need to Know About Week 3 of the 2019 NFL Season

Late in the fourth quarter of Sunday’s matchup with the Chiefs, the Ravens did something odd. John Harbaugh’s team was trailing 33-28 with 2:01 left on the clock and just one timeout remaining. That situation seemed to call for an onside kick—especially since the quarterback on the other side of the field was Patrick Mahomes. But instead of having Justin Tucker bounce a kick toward the sidelines, the Ravens had him do this:

This onside kick didn't work, but it's the greatest onside kick.



[ : @thecheckdown]pic.twitter.com/OoEAXv1Li1 — The Ringer (@ringer) September 22, 2019

While that drop kick may look like a creative onside attempt, Baltimore never intended to recover it. In a league where onside kicks have become increasingly impossible to pull off, the Ravens opted instead for a high, floating ball that would force the Chiefs to call for a fair catch. That kept the game clock at 2:01, meaning the Kansas City offense had to run a play before the two-minute warning, giving Baltimore a slightly better chance of forcing a three-and-out before time expired.

Ultimately, it did not work—Mahomes and Co. picked up a first down on their ensuing drive and ran out the clock, handing Baltimore its first loss of the season. That makes this play a microcosm of the Ravens’ game plan on Sunday: aggressive, creative, smart … and doomed.

The Ravens came into Sunday knowing they would need to score often to keep up with the Chiefs, and throughout the game, they showed they had an analytically driven plan to try to get the job done. On their opening drive, the Ravens went for it on a fourth-and-3 from Kansas City’s 9-yard line, which quarterback Lamar Jackson converted on a scramble. That led to a Mark Ingram touchdown, but when the Ravens kicked the extra point, there was a flag: Kansas City had lined up in an illegal formation. Instead of declining the infraction, the Ravens took the point off the board and went for a two-point conversion from the 1-yard line.

This is incredibly rare. In all of 2018, there was only one instance of a team going for a two-point conversion in the first quarter. But with a mobile quarterback, the Ravens are well equipped for plays near the goal line and the chance to steal a point against Kansas City’s high-octane attack was too tempting to pass up.

The gamble didn’t pay off. The Ravens called a keeper for Jackson, sending him rushing toward his left with plenty of blockers, but the Chiefs defense crashed to that side and stopped him short:

Despite that failure, the Ravens continued to be aggressive. Overall, the team went for it on fourth downs four times and attempted three two-point conversions. They were successful on three of their fourth-down tries, but went 0-for-3 on the two-point conversions in a game they ultimately lost by five. Those decisions will bring up plenty of questions in Baltimore, and Harbaugh defended them in his postgame presser:

Harbaugh on 3 failed 2 pt conversions in 33-28 defeat at KC:

"All of those were clear analytic decisions to go for 2...we're going to keep playing that way....we don't play scared." — Mark Viviano (@MarkWJZ) September 22, 2019

More Harbaugh: "We had a mindset that we were going to come in and try and score as many points as we could. We’re going to keep playing that way just for the record. When you write your article, just understand that we’ll

disagree with your criticism. We’re going after it." — Jamison Hensley (@jamisonhensley) September 22, 2019

Harbaugh’s mention of analytics comes after an offseason in which Baltimore hired a number of young analytics-focused people into its front office. It’s a shift for the Ravens, who switched general managers this offseason after longtime decision-maker Ozzie Newsome retired. New GM Eric DeCosta has an interest in analytics, one that seems to have trickled down to the coaches as well.

This new approach was especially apparent in the fourth quarter, when the Ravens went for two again. After another Mark Ingram touchdown, the Ravens trailed 30-19 with 12:22 left on the clock. The straightforward decision would have been to kick the extra point, leading to a 10-point deficit for the Ravens: just a touchdown and a field goal away from tying it up.

Instead, the Ravens went for two, and again they failed: Jackson could not find an open receiver and his pass attempt fell incomplete. The logic behind this decision is more complicated, but it’s similar to why teams should go for two when they’re down eight. The idea is that if the Ravens had successfully completed the conversion, a touchdown and field goal would now win the game, rather than tie. Meanwhile, a miss isn’t the end of the world: The Ravens could still go for two again on their next touchdown to try to get that game-tying field goal back in play.

In 2017, FiveThirtyEight looked at the circumstances under which it makes sense to go for two and found that doing so when down by 11 carries a slight advantage in win probability. All of this is to say: The Ravens’ decision to go for it was analytically sound.

Analytics are about processes, not results. In this case, the Ravens did not get the result they wanted, but Harbaugh’s aggressive approach gave his squad the best chance to upset one of the best teams in the NFL. Despite the loss, Baltimore is 2-1 and has established itself as an AFC contender. After Sunday, we may need to think of them as the NFL’s smartest team, too.