The paradox of hedonism refers to a range of arguments purporting to show that the pursuit of pleasure for its own sake is either practically or logically self-defeating. “A number of philosophers have recognised this idea as describing a real and important phenomenon, and a potentially serious challenge for hedonistic versions of ethical theories such as egoism and utilitarianism.” (Dietz 2018) Here I propose a purely analytical account of the paradox which avoids practical doubts associated with the existing formulations of the problem.

The two main accounts of the paradox consider a practical rather than logical challenge. The argument from incompetence capitalises on the empirical fact that “people are systematically so inept at making happiness-promoting choices that a surer route to happiness is for people to aim, when making choices, at objectives other than the promotion of happiness.” (Eggleston 2013) The special-goods account is based on the premise that “happiness might depend on acquiring certain particular kinds of goods which hedonists are unable to have” if they focus just on their own happiness. (Dietz 2018; Stocker 1976) The only formulation of the paradox that is wholly analytical is ‘the nature of pleasure’ account, originally proposed by Butler (1726) and recently developed by Dietz, according to which the idea of happiness or pleasure (real or imagined) for its own sake is nonsensical; if happiness obtains only in virtue of satisfying a desire for something, then we need first to desire something other than happiness itself. This in turn implies that the objects of desire in virtue of which we may experience happiness are more fundamental value-commitments than happiness.

The distinction between happiness (or pleasure) and the satisfaction of desire is necessary to avoid circular reasoning about the object of desire: “I can only get pleasure in virtue of the fact that my desire [for pleasure] is satisfied, but my desire can only be satisfied in virtue of the fact that I am getting pleasure.” (Dietz 2018) This formulation, despite being neatly paradoxical, may be at odds with common experience: people seem to desire pleasure for its own sake, for example, by consuming mood-altering drugs, in which case they desire a specific mood they identify as pleasurable. It is unclear whether the mood itself is already pleasure, or whether satisfying the desire for this particular mood results in pleasure for some other reason, for example, because it temporarily neutralises pain, boredom or the sense of hopelessness. Another way, I may enjoy the warmth of the sun not because it is enjoyment in itself but because I currently desire more warmth. The desire-satisfaction account of pleasure is not self-evident but hypothetical and is therefore unlikely to convince a committed hedonist. On the other hand, if the paradox formulated in terms of ‘the nature of pleasure’ would fail just in case of pleasure (basic hedonism) a similar account in terms of ‘the nature of happiness’ may still hold just in relation to happiness (psychological hedonism). It may be argued, for example, that meaning, fulfilment and the will to live (the constitutive conditions of what we take for happiness) derive from our capacity to endure suffering rather than from its absence. I will not pursue this secondary distinction here.

I propose a purely analytical account of the paradox according to which hedonism is logically inconsistent either because its aim is provably impossible to satisfy (and so pursuing it would be absurd) or the aim can be fully satisfied by meeting a sufficiency-condition but then, I argue, hedonism collapses to nihilism (nothing more to desire and nothing more to do for a committed hedonist). On the first formulation, let as call it the argument from impossibility, the pursuit of maximum happiness can never be satisfied because there is no maximum level of happiness: a hedonist is always infinitely far from the aim of absolute or infinite bliss and so the pursuit of maximum happiness is provably hopeless. Another way, there is no such level of happiness or pleasure that cannot be hypothetically exceeded, and it makes no sense to pursue an aim that certainly cannot be achieved. But perhaps positing absolute happiness or maximum pleasure as the aim of hedonism is excessive, not representative of typical hedonic aspirations. There is no inconsistency in self-identifying as a hedonist while maintaining some yet to be achieved sufficiency-condition, a degree of happiness or pleasure (other than the case of absolute happiness or maximum pleasure which was addressed already) that would be enough to completely satisfy a particular hedonist at a particular time. This result is implied for any ‘procedural’ hedonic motivation: if I just want more pleasure for its own sake then, in order to act on that reason, I must commit to how much more to aim for at the time. Should I have one scoop of icecream, two scoops of icecream, or heroin? Whatever kind and amount of pleasure would satisfy me for now is just my contemporaneous sufficiency-condition. On this formulation, if hedonism is my reason to act, and if sufficient happiness or pleasure is achieved, then the reason no longer applies for the relevant period of time (perhaps forever after), rendering the agency of the hedonist temporarily obsolete. Existence without a reason to act is not hedonism but practical nihilism, negating the hedonic account.

The same inconsistency arises even when the sufficiency condition cannot be practically satisfied, as the relevant account of hedonism fails to provide a reason to act in general but only contingently, subject to sustained non-satisfaction of the sufficiency condition. It follows that both the sufficiency condition and its sustained non-satisfaction (insufficiency condition) are at the same time constitutive of hedonic agency, rendering this more modest account of hedonism just as inconsistent as the extreme (absolute happiness) account. Another way, hedonism does not make sense unless it can be successful at achieving its aim, but if it were successful then it would no longer make sense.

The only consistent reason to exist as an agent is to have reasons to act, which admits of no ideology that would neutralise our reasons to act. Consequently, every reason to act must allow for further reasons if one is to continue being an agent. For example, when I fix my car I do so with the implied intention to possibly drive somewhere, and I drive somewhere with the intention to possibly do something else, and so forth. I call this the openness of reasons requirement for rational agency. Hedonism cannot satisfy this requirement because it is either impossible to satisfy or ends with a successful hedonic act, and thus collapses into nihilism rather than a continuation of hedonism. “Every definition of Man based on happiness is nihilist.” (Badiou 2001, 37)

Badiou, Alain. Ethics . Verso, 2001.

. Verso, 2001. Butler, Joseph. Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel . British Moralists 1650–1800 Vol.1, ed. D.D.Raphael, Hackett, 1726 (1991).

. British Moralists 1650–1800 Vol.1, ed. D.D.Raphael, Hackett, 1726 (1991). Dietz, Alexander. Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism . Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2018.

. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2018. Eggleston, Ben. Paradox of Happiness . The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

. The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Stocker, Michael. The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories. The Journal of Philosophy, 1976.

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