The ongoing worldwide shift towards multiculturalism and inter-cultural migration brings to the fore a critical albeit under-theorised question: what does it mean to belong to a society and how does belonging relate to and possibly surpass political inclusion? I consider the hypothesis proposed by Alain Badiou that inclusion of incompatible elements in the same category does not result in extension or augmentation of the native category but in its negation and replacement by a new, essentially larger category, characterised by a lower general degree of belonging. For example, a migrant may be socially included as a citizen but nonetheless self-alienates from the host culture, irrespective of openness of the host culture to inclusion of cultural difference. Belonging in the relevant sense occurs only when the migrant identifies with the host culture or multicultural society as his or her own. Conversely, social inclusion of radical cultural difference (a case of low cultural compatibility) creates a general loss of belonging which would not occur under social exclusion. I argue that a degree of social exclusion is favourable to universal belonging.

I adhere to the definition of compatibility suggested by Badiou, which consists in belonging to the same kind. (2009, 255) I define Belonging as being a member of a set {X}, and Inclusion as belonging to a subset of {X}. This distinction gives rise to a hypothetical inconsistency when applied to social relations: a pack of wolves may include a lamb but the lamb will never be one of the wolf-kind. Moreover, what a strange kind of wolves it would be if their pack included a lamb. Belonging to a kind – such that “a has to b the relation of identity as restricted to things that f” (Wiggins 2001, 17) – is evidently a stronger ontological condition than inclusion of an arbitrary subset in a set. Less obviously, inclusion of a new subset causes internal difference within the native set, a split between ontological kinds, which, to a degree, negates the primary relation of belonging to the native kind (‘what a strange kind of wolves!’).

For Badiou, “the pure essence of being-there, or appearing, consists not of a form of being but of forms of relation.” (2011, 31) If human identity is not intrinsic to an individual but consists in indirect reflexive relations with other individuals of the same kind, then individual identity is inseparable from identities of other subjects and from the cultural referents that those subjects have already internalised. Introduction of new, inconsistent meanings into the network of reflexive relations negates the common property (the kind) with which all members of the group identify: “the essence of generic multiplicity is a negative universality (the absence of any predicative identity)” (Badiou 2011, 126). In effect, the native group remains in place but now only as a subset in a new, essentially larger group with a lower degree of belonging. It is no longer a matter of a ‘strange kind of wolves whose pack includes a lamb’ but of a new kind of beings whose common existence consists in the relation of ontological compatibility between lambs and wolves. Ontological compatibility entails “that the ‘common’ of degrees of existence is equal to the degree of identity of the terms in question.” (Badiou 2009, 256) It follows that if lambs and wolves are ‘radically’ different, then the degree of existence as members of their common kind is also ‘radically’ diminished with respect to the same kinds under exclusion.

The excess of inclusion over belonging with respect to an ontological kind grounded in the relation of ‘likeness to kind’ presents us with two seemingly contradictory scenarios: either cultural inclusion of that which does not ontologically belong is irrational, or provisional inclusion can, in time, facilitate belonging. In the former case, the logical inconsistency is taken to arise only as a consequence of failure to discriminate on the basis of ontological inconsistency. Once the ontological difference is taken into account, different situations may warrant opposite treatments without contradiction: inclusion/exclusion is qualified on the basis of acquired cultural likeness to kind (belonging) instead of likeness to kind being assumed or demanded just on the basis of inclusion (a possibility refuted by Badiou). The alternative scenario faces an explanatory challenge in light of phenomenological ontology: if identity of the subject is relational and reflexive, which already entails a degree of belonging, then belonging precedes identity. Any subsequent inclusion of identities of different kinds is merely nominal; it presents no means of resolving their incompatibility (their un-likeness to kind) in order to facilitate common belonging. Belonging can be accomplished only if there is some universal principle via which incompatibilities between values and preferences can be consistently resolved. Commitment to minimal rational objectivity (Aristotle’s a priori laws of logic, in contrast to any form of dogmatism) is perhaps the ultimate cultural condition of belonging to a non-native culture. The degree of logical consistency in an ontologically mixed system of social relations is then directly proportional to the common of degrees of belonging, irrespective of differences in the cultural heritage of individuals.

Possibly the biggest impediment to rational conversion from one system of relations to another are religious convictions, which are essentially non-rational and typically anti-rational. A possible objection to this is that no culture is perfectly rational. Even the rationalistic West contains ample irrational elements. If no culture is perfectly rational then should we be at all concerned about logical consistency at the level of social ontology? I suggest that every culture is a reflection of its rational and irrational commitments, and even if the degree of practical rationality of a culture cannot be precisely measured, some cultures are better than others at resolving inter-cultural conflict. This may manifest in the openness of a culture to rationally accommodate ideas of other cultures. A more open, less dogmatic culture may provide better opportunities for inclusion of migrants from other cultures by recognising the inter-cultural inconsistencies as ontological, but it cannot on its own accomplish their ‘passage’ to belonging. The relation of belonging is also a function of the ideas and values professed by the migrants themselves, and is therefore conditional on an internal act of conversion, but this step can be frustrated by premature inclusion. Inclusion, insofar as it allows cohabitation and mixing of incompatible kinds, transforms cultural inconsistencies into conflict about the very process of conflict resolution and thereby alienates the included. This phenomenon was demonstrated empirically by Rutherford et al. (2014).

Returning to Badiou, “The strong difference makes the multiple into a One of opposition, without the possibility that anything combined emerges from it.” ( Theory of the Subject 2009, 69) The state of alienation signified by ‘inclusion without belonging’ entails not only a lower degree of belonging of the included but incompatible subset of a community, but a general disruption of identity of the entire community and therefore the loss of belonging in all co-localised demographics (Neal 2014). Permanent alienation can be avoided by ensuring that belonging precedes inclusion, at least in the crucial aspect of universal adherence to the rational means of conflict resolution. The final state of belonging and the ultimate attractor for cultural conversion arguably rest with the culture which possesses the most consistent means for voluntary resolution of conflicts of values and ideas.

Badiou, Alain. Logics of Worlds: Being and Event II. Continuum, 2009.

Badiou, Alain. Theory of the Subject. Continuum, 2009.

Badiou, Alain. Second Manifesto for Philosophy. Polity Press, 2011.

Neal, Zachary P., and Jennifer W. Neal. The (In)compatibility of Diversity and Sense of Community. American Journal of Community Psychology, 2014.

Rutherford, Alex, et al. Good Fences: The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful Coexistence. PLOS ONE, 2014.

Wiggins, David. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

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