I titled my diary with one of the early lines in Webb's statement, where he notes the inconsistency with democratic principles to insist on a 60% majority to decide matters of policy.

Let me focus on the weaknesses Webb sees with the resolution, even as he supports it. Here is his analysis:

* The strength of this amendment is that it mandates a turn-around in our current operational policy. It would be wrong to call the "surge" a strategy. It is not a strategy in traditional terms. It is simply one more in a long line of operational experiments that have kept our military forces in the middle of a problem that, in the end, will only be resolved by the Iraqis themselves. * The concerns I have about this amendment are twofold. First, it does not explicitly state that this transition of missions is only an intermediate step toward an eventual – and necessary – American withdrawal from Iraq. As such, it could be interpreted as a ratification of the idea that we should keep long-term bases in Iraq. * Second, the amendment does not really specify the nature of this transition of missions, except in the broadest terms. As a result, this Administration could conceivably choose a very minimal withdrawal and then claim that it is within the intent of the amendment.

That is part of what surprises me in the resistance to this amendment. It is something which the administration could use to kick the ball down the road if it so chose, and argue that it was abiding by the clear language of the amendment. Of course, we know the administration does not wish to grant any iota of oversight or limitation on "principle" (as if Cheny and Bush really have any principles beyond that they should have unfettered power to do what they want).

Webb is a very astute thinker. The quote with which I began this diary is important because it points at the damage being done to both parties, to the institution of the Senate, to the polity of the nation, and to the image of the US in the world.

You will as you read begin to realize how astute a thinker Webb is. You will not always agree with what he has to say, but you will be absolutely clear on why he takes the positions and actions he does. You should respect the depth of his insight. You will begin to understand why he is increasingly visible as a leader even as a freshman Senator.

I have been involved in politics since my adolescence. I have known many elected officials. I have certainly been personally closer to people than I am to Jim Webb, whom I would describe at this point as a friendly acquaintance: we do not socialize together. But when we encounter one another he will usually take the time to chat for a few minutes, despite the business of his schedule.

I am 61. When I look back at my various political endeavors, many have been Quixotic in their attempts to make a difference - Howard Dean was not my first failed idealistic effort to change national politics: I was heavily involved in the abortive presidential campaign of Fritz Hollings, for example. And I have certainly played a larger role in other sucessful campaigns, usually on local levels - for example, our Arlington Treasurer Frank O'Leary, who will having won his primary be elected for a 7th and final term in November, won his first election by less than 90 votes out of more than 33,000, and I played a big role in that campaign.

But I can justify all of what I have done, and even the mistakes in judgment as to some on whose behalf I have labored by looking back at the past year. Whatever small role I played in the group that help persuade Jim to run (and I was not in the group that spoke directly with him, although I had offered them some analysis and argumentation), whatever role my efforts may have helped with first the primary and then the general election, seeing him in just over 6 months contribute as he has to our nation gives me the sense that I can add my names to one of Chris Kendrick's DIDS (Dman! I did Something!) postings.

And so, enough of me. Here is Jim's statement in its entirety, as distributed by his office:

Senator Jim Webb Floor Remarks, as Prepared Levin/Reed Amendment, 7/17/07 Before I speak about Iraq, I believe it is important to mention another issue at play here tonight. What does it mean to have majority rule in a democracy? Harry Reid and Dick Durbin are right. There is no justifiable reason for us to be denied an up or down majority vote on this and other issues. Why should it take more than 60 percent of the members of the Senate to decide a matter of policy? If it took 60 votes to be in the Senate, most of us wouldn’t be talking tonight. I support this amendment. I have reservations about certain parts of it, and I want to make them clear. But I do intend to vote for it and I suggest to my colleagues that they do likewise. * The strength of this amendment is that it mandates a turn-around in our current operational policy. It would be wrong to call the "surge" a strategy. It is not a strategy in traditional terms. It is simply one more in a long line of operational experiments that have kept our military forces in the middle of a problem that, in the end, will only be resolved by the Iraqis themselves. * The concerns I have about this amendment are twofold. First, it does not explicitly state that this transition of missions is only an intermediate step toward an eventual – and necessary – American withdrawal from Iraq. As such, it could be interpreted as a ratification of the idea that we should keep long-term bases in Iraq. * Second, the amendment does not really specify the nature of this transition of missions, except in the broadest terms. As a result, this Administration could conceivably choose a very minimal withdrawal and then claim that it is within the intent of the amendment. And there is another, vital point that needs to be raised tonight. For the good of the country, we in the congress need to find a way to come together, on both sides of the aisle, and work toward a solution that will end our presence in Iraq, increase the stability of that region, increase our ability to fight international terrorism around the world, and allow the United States to focus on the larger strategic issues that have been neglected in large part for more than five years. This is the political version of the World War One Battle of the Somme. Both sides of the aisle continue to pound on each other, neither side yielding, with little or no ground being gained by either side, and little good coming to the country despite all of the energy and frustration. -- In World War One, great nations lost their influence and inevitably their place in the world because neither side knew how to do anything except slog directly into each other, again and again, for years. This is hardly the blood bath of World War One, but the implications for our country are just as severe. We are spending away our national treasure, burning up good people, losing the good will of other nations, and have in many ways lost the moral high ground that has always characterized the United States in the eyes of other nations. We in the congress owe the country a better way. And that way begins with an honest, logical approach to the issues we face in Iraq. Here’s what we do know: 1. The invasion of Iraq was a strategic blunder of historic proportions. 2. Nothing that has happened since the invasion has been particularly surprising. In fact most of it was both predictable, and predicted. 3. International terrorism has increased, not decreased, as the result of our invasion and occupation of Iraq. The presence of the United States military in Iraq is now the number one recruitment tool for Al Queda. 4. It is not to the advantage of our nation or of our military to continue down the road of repetitive military operations without strong, regionally-based diplomacy that might capitalize on our military effort. This has been the major failing of this Administration from the very first days of the Iraq invasion. It is wrong – and unjust – to claim that success or failure in Iraq is largely the province of our military. 5. This is not a classic counter-insurgency effort, as many on the other side have portrayed it. A counter-insurgency requires a defined and understandable insurgency that can be countered. In Iraq we are facing a many-headed sectarian and intra-sectarian confrontation, made even more complex by the presence of outside terrorist forces who have come to Iraq purely because the United States invaded and occupied the country. How does one build a counter-insurgency doctrine to handle that – particularly when there is no real central government that would provide a safe haven toward which citizens should move? It won’t happen, any more than it happened in Lebanon in the 1980’s under similar circumstances. 6. It’s no accident that this complex situation has resulted in more than 4 million Iraqi refugees since our invasion. Half of those have left their homes and are internal refugees inside their own country. The other half are flooding adjacent countries, particularly Jordan, straining national resources in those countries and threatening their ability to maintain local order. There’s another reality, which despite all of the flag-waving rhetoric we tend to ignore when it comes to our military. We’ve watched as the finest maneuver force in the world has been put into situations again and again, in circumstances where they are on the defensive, or are sitting ducks for IEDs as they drive their convoys through territory that is easily penetrated by guerrilla forces. We’ve deployed them again and again, taking advantage of their professionalism and good will until now we have reached the absurd reality that many of our soldiers and Marines are spending more time in Iraq than they are at home. This is breaking our military force, threatening retention, and could affect our ability to act elsewhere in the world. And here’s what else we know: this vital region is in deep trouble, partly because of our invasion and occupation, and partly because this Administration has failed miserably on the diplomatic front even as our military has given us every ounce of its courage, dedication and proficiency. * Iran

* Turkey

* Saudi Arabia

* Jordan

* The American navy in the Persian Gulf

* Israel, Palestine, Hezbollah, Syria

* Al Queda – the most recent National Intelligence Estimate Only under the steady hand of strong, creative diplomacy, with our military as our safety net rather than our principal instrument of policy, can we begin to resolve these many crises. This is what history teaches us, and history has been too often ignored. It can be done – as in our recent approach to the situation in Korea. It needs to be done. And the passage of this amendment will help it get done. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Peace.