Forget about the latest drama for a moment and consider this hypothesis: regardless of where you stand on the Trump presidency, Russia policy is now as politically explosive in the daily Washington grind as tax policy, healthcare policy, and social policy. And that could have a damaging effect on any president’s ability to get the bilateral relationship back on track.

If you thought stories about Russian interference in U.S. elections would taper off after Special Counsel Robert Mueller completed his two-year investigation and delivered his final report to Congress, you were sorely mistaken. We now have another controversy on our hands, this time concerning the vote this November.

Yesterday evening, news of a contentious House Intelligence Committee briefing landed on the front pages. According to reports, an intelligence briefer told lawmakers that Russia was rooting for President Donald Trump to win re-election. When Trump learned about the assessment from ranking member Devin Nunes, he erupted at acting Director of National Intelligence Joseph Maguire for letting the briefing happen and was especially upset that Adam Schiff, the chairman of the committee, was listening in. Maguire was given a stern lecture from the president and was essentially dismissed on the spot. U.S. ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell will now serve as Maguire’s replacement in an acting capacity.

There is a lot of fodder for both political parties in this story. Democrats have already used yesterday’s disclosure as a way to bolster their case that Trump is politicizing intelligence to an unprecedented degree. Republicans are citing Maguire’s dismissal as a fully justifiable decision by a president who feels under siege by his own government.

But forget about the latest drama for a moment and consider this hypothesis: regardless of where you stand on the Trump presidency, Russia policy is now as politically explosive in the daily Washington grind as tax policy, healthcare policy, and social policy. And that could have a damaging effect on any president’s ability to get the bilateral relationship back on track.

On the merits, Russia can’t compete with the United States economically, politically, or militarily. Moscow’s economy grew at an anemic 1.3% last year, down from 2.5% the year prior. With a GDP of $1.658 trillion, Russia’s economy is well below Italy’s, a country that is still sometimes referred to as the “sick man of Europe.” The Beltway is concerned about Russia’s presence in Africa, but the outreach is more about selling arms and extracting resources than building long-lasting geopolitical friendships. Vladimir Putin continues to claim progress on new weapons systems, but nobody can seriously argue that Moscow is able to go toe-to-toe with the United States in terms of defense spending.

However, this doesn’t mean Washington has the luxury of ignoring Moscow or pretending it doesn’t exist. The U.S. can’t get anything through the U.N. Security Council without Russian support or acquiescence. Russia’s status as the world’s largest nuclear power, with 48% of the globe’s entire arsenal, means that the risks of miscommunication or misunderstanding between Washington and Moscow are still quite serious. The Russians are also experts at being irritants; it’s economic and diplomatic support to Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro is the biggest external factor keeping his regime afloat. And of course, Russian interference and disinformation operations in the West are a continuing source of concern.

Despite the noise in Washington, D.C., there is very serious business with the Russians to attend to. The New START Treaty—the last pillar of the U.S.-Russia arms control regime—will expire in less than a year if Washington and Moscow don’t agree to extend it (the Trump administration is still hoping for the pipe dream of bringing China into a three-way arms control deal). Energy security is top of mind for both countries, who after all each have an interest in preventing long-term disruptions to supplies. Terrorism, while a marginal threat, isn’t going away either. The U.S. and Russia are often on opposite sides of the playing field, but there are also several domains that have brought both together in the past. The duty of U.S. policymakers is to exploit opportunities with the Russians when interests coincide.

The politicization of Russia policy, however, makes a pragmatic working relationship politically costly for those who advocate for it. Even conversations at the head-of-state level, an ordinary and necessary element of good statecraft, is frequently viewed with suspicion. On Capitol Hill, being seen as a “serious” foreign policy voice is now synonymous with writing, introducing, and voting for sanctions bills against Moscow. Some of those bills, like the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, are so generalized that it ties the president’s hands and makes any negotiations with Moscow in the future more complicated. The reflex in the Beltway is to take the most hawkish position possible, lest you be inaccurately perceived as spineless or weak.

Good politics now coalesces with short-sighted policy. And the more Russia policy is treated as a political cudgel for both parties to beat each other with, the worse U.S.-Russia relations will become.

Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy organization focused on promoting a realistic grand strategy to ensure American security and prosperity.