Once again I went to Sokeel Park, LiNK’s Director of Research and Strategy, to get his thoughts on the historic Kim-Trump Summit in Singapore. Here’s what he had to say.

Kim Jong-Un and President Trump shake hands at the historic summit in Singapore. Photo courtesy of Vox.

What’s your assessment of the summit?

Sokeel: First of all, it was quite amazing to see the photos and videos of Kim Jong-un meeting President Trump. Those images will stay with us for a long time. As many have pointed out though, the terms of the agreement were not very unprecedented compared to previous agreements with the North Korean government.

But this was always only going to be the starting gun for a marathon process that we will probably have to wait a year or two to judge. KJU has a different policy calculus to his father, and we can also influence that policy calculus with a more holistic strategy.

It is also a positive that President Trump said that human rights were raised with Kim Jong-un, although he also said it was discussed only “relatively briefly” compared to denuclearization, which he said was the main focus.

There’s so much attention on North Korea’s nukes. Will they be completely resolved now?

Sokeel: Unfortunately no. As we’ve discussed before it’s very unlikely that North Korea will actually completely, verifiably and irreversibly denuclearize (CVID). North Korea has a lot of nooks and crannies, and nukes are small and USB sticks containing engineering data to rebuild nukes and missiles are even smaller. But they may act reasonably enough through a process and scale back enough to a situation that the U.S. and others can live with as the least-worst possible outcome (not a 100% solution, but better than war).

Last month the North Korean regime invited international journalists to witness the destruction of their nuclear test facility. Photo courtesy of NY Post.

So is this a good thing or not?

Sokeel: These security issues need to be managed even if they aren’t fundamentally resolved, and this engagement and agreements are positive (unless they break down and lead to conflict) as it can be good for the North Korean people in the long run if NK’s economy develops, there is more interaction with the outside world, and the opening of NK is accelerated.

This broader and more fundamental progress is more likely if such engagement is tailored to not just managing the security (nuke and missile) problems, but is designed to benefit 25 million North Koreans and accelerate internal change and opening. This includes making human rights part of the engagement, and maximizing possibilities for North Koreans to interact with, and get exposure to, the outside world.

Three North Korean girls walk the streets of Pyongyang. Photo courtesy of Eric Lafforgue.

Is there a danger that KJU will walk away if human rights issues are emphasized?

Sokeel: This fear is overblown. The Pyongyang government does engage on human rights issues when it suits their interests, and KJU very clearly wants to engage now and will not throw it all away just because engagement isn’t completely on his terms.

There is great value in telling the most powerful man in the NK government that this isn’t just about nukes, it’s about a broader relationship between NK and the rest of the world, and the welfare of the North Korean people is going to influence that engagement. Sidelining it out of convenience sends the opposite signal: that we don’t actually care about human rights, we only care about these nukes, and human rights is just something we use to bash you with at the UN when we’re not getting along.

What is KJU’s game plan here?

Sokeel: As well as finding a way to muddle through to keeping enough of a nuclear deterrent just in case, KJU is still only 34 and needs a plan to maintain control and power for the rest of his life. (History has not been kind to people like him who lose power). He knows that economic development is crucial for maintaining power for the long term, and that is one of the main reasons KJU is now playing nicely with the outside world. He may not succeed in this long game, and a growing economy and opening North Korea will be hard to maintain control of. But he doesn’t have a choice.

What is the best way to secure progress and prevent backsliding?

Sokeel: If we focus narrowly on the symptomatic issues of nukes and missiles, then there is a risk of backsliding. Over the long term, internal change and empowerment of the North Korean people as a factor in KJU’s policy decisions is the only way to force KJU to play nicely with other countries, and of course secure benefits for the North Korean people. The more we can open the country and accelerate the people’s demands for a growing economy and better lives, the more KJU will have to secure a favorable environment for trade and investment from China, South Korea and the rest of the world, and the more he will be tied to a track of positive engagement.

So in the deals that we make and the approach we take with North Korea, we have to make sure that it’s a win not just for KJU but also for the North Korean people, and pushes the country in the direction of opening and normalization. In other words, we need a strategy that includes 25 million North Koreans, not just KJU. That is the only way to put us on a track of long-term sustainable progress.

A North Korean father and son. Photo courtesy of Roman Harak.

What do the North Korean people think about all of this?

Sokeel: It is difficult to have a full picture, but my sense is that a lot of ordinary and richer/elite North Koreans alike will welcome this re-engagement with China and South Korea and new high-level engagement with the U.S. After all people tend to want change, breakthroughs and better economic opportunities, especially after the embargo from the Chinese side started to bite last year. However, outside of controlled reporting in state media most North Koreans of course don’t have nearly as much information, analysis and commentary about all this, so even though they are affected more they may actually be thinking about it less.

How will this all affect LiNK’s work?

Sokeel: Except for the media attention and changed atmosphere on the issue, we don’t expect this will significantly affect our work on the ground with North Korean refugees in the short to medium term, either through significant security changes on the border or in China, or through changes to South Korean government or US government policies. However, more broadly and long term, we will of course be sensitive to new challenges and open to new opportunities in our mission to support the North Korean people.

Read more about our work with North Korean refugees at www.libertyinnorthkorea.org