After a national tragedy on July 8, 2014, Brazilian football had more questions than answers. Brazil had lost 7-1 to Germany in a World Cup semifinal on their own soil, a comprehensive victory for the ages from a German perspective. For the Brazilians however, that defeat represented much more than international embarrassment. It was the day that the Brazilian way of playing, the “joga bonito” style that the world had fallen in love once upon a time, had a public funeral and was pushed aside in favor of a more tactically structured match-day approach.

The Brazilian Football Confederation recognized this need for the Brazilian team, and after the resignation of Luis Felipe Scolari, hired former captain Dunga. It would be Dunga’s second stint in charge of A Selecão, after a notable four years from 2006-2010, where they were eliminated in surprising fashion by the Netherlands in the quarterfinals. During this span, his team was more pragmatic and tactically structured than the great Brazil teams of other eras, while still showcasing a tactical fluidity that made them intriguing to watch. Having been hired after the underwhelming performances of the Magic Quartet in the 2006 World Cup (Ronaldinho, Kaka, Ronaldo, & Adriano), Dunga saw this new approach as a need if the nation wanted its national selection to be competing for top honors. 2014 brought a similar feeling of underachievement in the eyes of Brazilians, and Dunga was put in charge yet again to take Brazil back to the top.

In order to make any sort of comparison between Dunga’s first spell and his second, the characteristics of his first team have to be discussed. His group, which won the 2009 Confederations Cup and Copa America in 2007, was often criticized by the media of Brazil because they lacked the recognized star power and trickery that the nation is infamous for. Despite winning 70% of his matches, it still wasn’t enough to gain the support of the people.

The First Era

During the run-up to the 2010 World Cup, renowned journalists Jonathan Wilson and Michael Cox (owner of zonalmarking.net) commentated on this Brazil side and the tactics it deployed. In my analysis, I do not want to simply repaint the same picture, as that would be an injustice to the both of them. However, it is difficult to expand on their methodical analysis. Their interpretations and articles can be found here and here.

Something discussed in both of their works was how Dunga’s side was difficult to categorize tactically because of the fluid nature of Brazil’s play. Some categorized the side as a 4-2-3-1 with two deep holding players (Gilberto Silva and Felipe Melo), while others interpreted the selection as a 4-4-2 diamond with Robinho drifting inside from a wider position on the left flank.

One of the problems of using formations to describe a team is how formations are all relative to several factors. They can change from offense to defense, they can adapt readily between phases of play, or there can be a stereotype associated with a particular formation that could mislabel how a team plays (ex. playing 5 at the back implies a team may be “parking the bus”).

Overall, this team played in a controlled tempo in which more often than not, they had the majority of possession. Some fundamental aspects of many high level teams were prevalent, such as a build-up style out of the back line, attacking full backs, and quick combination play around the box which led to goals. While the team may have lacked the traditional star power associated with Brazil, Dunga still had some fantastic footballers at his disposal, namely Kaka, Luis Fabiano, Ramires, and Maicon.

However, there were many aspects of this team that made it so successful that could be seen as unconventional to some. Others maybe would call these parts a manager getting the best out of his teams skill sets.

The shape of this team in its own right was fascinating to many, not only because of the dichotomy of formations at hand, but also the advantage gained from the team shape. In this system, Dunga aimed to utilize the strengths of each of his midfield players to create a quantitative advantage on one side of the pitch, and a qualitative advantage on the other.

On the right side of the pitch, Brazil in 2010 always sought to create a numerical advantage with the intention of creating chances. If you look at the diagram above indicating the team shape however, you will find that more of the team’s players are concentrated towards the middle of the field. In fact, only one player (Maicon) appears to be in a position that suggests that Brazil uses the right side of the field. So how exactly did Brazil play on the right side of the pitch if the team was narrow in its build up? The answer lies in the halfspaces.

Halfspaces are areas of the pitch that are essentially in between the central and wide flanks on the field. Translated literally from the German word Halbraum, halfspaces have been a recent revelation among tacticians and the blossoming field of tactical theory. What makes halfspaces so effective in a nut shell is that they often times are located in between where defenders would usually mark, throwing off any marking scheme. In addition, a player in the halfspaces can maintain a playing angle of 360 degrees, rather than being limited by the touchline. These areas have been utilized with higher frequency in recent years, especially in the German Bundesliga, but Dunga made these zones a key aspect of his team, whether he knew about the theoretical implications of halfspaces or not.

Brazil would use the halfspaces as a key component of their attack. When a side is as gifted as Brazil, any bit of space is useful when deconstructing defenses that are determined to not be broken down. With the set-up found in a 4-4-2 diamond, creating a numerically superior situation in the right half-space was often times fairly easy due to the narrow nature of the tactic. But, it could also be easy to mark if the defensive team stayed compact and simply blocked the passing lanes to the midfield.

This is where Maicon was extraordinarily key. Maicon and his surging runs forwards would force the opposition to pivot defensively. Since Maicon was a key threat in the wide areas, the opposition’s last defensive line would have to respond accordingly. Take the example below against the United States in the 2009 Confederations Cup final. In the pictures below, you can see how Maicon forces the USA back four to adjust. His advanced position is almost like that of a winger, causing left back Carlos Bocanegra to mark him. Normally, he would’ve been the responsibility of left midfielder Landon Donovan, but his decision not to track back in this case has forced this scenario.

Once the other team’s left back was occupied, the trio of Luis Fabiano, Ramires (if not him, Elano), and Kaka would move in and out of the halfspace to see if the slightest opening could form that could be exploited. Their combination play in this part of field led to several goals for A Selecão, highlighted by their display against the Ivory Coast in the World Cup. In the example below, a goal wasn’t the end product. However, countless dangerous situations formed as a result of this tactic.

However, if a team concentrates its attacking buildup down one side exclusively, it risks being overly predictable and easy to defend against. Remember from earlier the positioning of Robinho, and how he would oftentimes start wide and drift inside. His role in the team was critical when it came for Brazil being able to maintain an advantage in the right half space. His positioning on the field made it so Brazil had maximized the width on the field, yet that wasn’t the point of his role. The main point of his role was so that the defense would have to cover as much of the space created by the width as possible, a very difficult task.

Opposing teams, regardless of their defensive structure, were then left with a choice. They could either balance the team to evenly cover the space, which would make it so Brazil had numbers in the right half space, or they could try to anticipate the overload and leave Robinho in a 1v1 situation with a lot of space available, a situation in which he would very much fancy. Robinho is known to be a tricky player, who loves to dazzle fans and defenders with his quick feet, which makes him a dangerous person to leave marked inadequately.

Let’s take a look at what happened when the opposition would balance the space evenly. Below is yet another example provided from the 2009 Confederations Cup final. Note how USA have defended in two banks of four. Here they have shown solid defensive shape when it come to covering the space evenly. However, Brazil will always find a way to adjust those defensive lines through their movement. Andre Santos and Kaka, in an effort to disrupt their opponents, make runs towards the left flank. The result of their runs and the response of the American defense is Gilberto Silva in acres of space (figuratively). From those movements, Gilberto can play into the 2 v 1 between Maicon/Ramires and Landon Donovan. However, this situation is self-destructed in the end by Gilberto Silva’s decision to dwell on the ball and allow the Americans to reorganize.

Here’s another example found in the 2010 World Cup during their Group G match against North Korea. While North Korea may not be the most formidable of sides, they were defensively solid during their match with the Brazilians. Playing a 4-1-4-1 formation (though not very well I might add in the diagram below), they have now encountered Robinho in a different situation: off the dribble. Initially from a wider area, he beats his man with ease and goes towards the middle. From that, space has opened up in the half space, in which he plays Luis Fabiano. Regardless the option Robinho would take when encountering a zonal marking scheme, space would always be created in the halfspaces thanks to the system used by Dunga.

What would happen if Brazil’s opposition packed their defense to one side, with the intention of trying to deal with all the space formed in the right halfspace? Then, Brazil could take advantage of all the space opened up on the left through Robinho. This rarely happened inherently due to all of the risk that comes with leaving large amounts of space open against a side as good as Brazil. Yet the last goal scored of the first Dunga era showed what can happen when such a risk is taken.

When pitted against the Netherlands in World Cup Quarterfinals, the Dutch attempted to nullify the threat on the right side of pitch. In the process, they neglected the left side. In the photo below, you can see four Dutch players lined up in the halfspace, clearly recognizing the value of this space for Brazil. Dani Alves, in this instance playing central midfield, shows to the ball. That action ends up creating space for Robinho to run into behind, and in a matter of seconds, Brazil take the lead.

No matter what the defense would do, Brazil would reap benefits in their build-up, either resulting in a quantitative advantage in the right half space, or Robinho being put in a 1v1 scenario, a qualitative advantage when against inferior sides. This can be credited to the unorthodox system that Dunga had put in place for his team.

The system was also extremely fluid in terms of the spots players would find themselves in. In the example below in a Round of 16 match against Chile, three members of the attack have diverted from their “original” positions. Kaka is seen on the left, Robinho down the middle, and Luis Fabiano towards the right. This fluidity made this team exciting to watch, as it had both tactical pragmatism and the attacking fluidity which define the Brazilians.

While some of the photographs used in my analysis give the appearance that this team could’ve easily have been a 4-2-3-1, I personally feel that a 4-4-2 diamond is the only really suitable categorization on paper. In a 4-4-2 diamond, the width in the side is generally provided from the full-backs going forward, rather than the shuttling central midfielders. In the case of a 4-2-3-1, the attacking midfielders can provide the width. This team had its width generated from Maicon on the right primarily, and the left side had its width created through Robinho or Kaka, depending on who was taking up that spot. It was really the best of both worlds, but due to how Maicon was the most common source of width and how Robinho would often roam from his position on the left, a 4-4-2 diamond seems a more fitting title than a 4-2-3-1.

Overall however, there was a general imbalance in the approach of this team, as possession was generally favored toward the right side to exploit any advantages the team would create in that area. The left full back (Michel Bastos, Andre Santos, among others), would often be more central and provide himself as support for Robinho/Kaka when needed. Due to the kind of positions the left back would end up in, shots from distance from this player were commonplace. No goals came as a result of this trend, however many close chances were created between the combination play of Robinho and Michel Bastos.

This Brazil side’s reputation for pragmatism and not being attractive came down to the selection of two holding midfielders by trade in the side. One of whom who played like a classic Brazilian number 5, an “anchor man” so to speak, and the other as a more conservative option on the left outside of the diamond, providing balance for when Ramires would venture forwards. I am of course referring to Gilberto Silva and Felipe Melo. Far from attractive footballers who provide moments of quality, their value in the side came from making sure that the team wasn’t in danger either on the counter attack, or when pinned in their own half. They basically just did what was asked of them. The endless energy of Ramires contributed to their defensive efforts as well, but the two of them played an effective role in the team, one very similar to how Dunga played back in his days on the pitch.

In the end, Felipe Melo was a main protagonist to the downfall of Dunga’s 2010 side. In that match against the Netherlands, a cross from Wesley Sneijder deflected off Melo’s head and into the net after him and goalkeeper Julio Cesar jumped for the same ball. Later on after the Netherlands had taken the lead from a corner, he lost his temper and earned himself a red card when he stamped on Arjen Robben’s leg. Dunga was then sacked shortly after.

The Second Era

Dunga was given a second chance by the Brazilian Confederation, and so far, the team is looking somewhat different stylistically than the team fielded in 2010. In that time span, Neymar has grown into Brazil’s star man, many of Dunga’s ex-players have retired or drifted away from top level football, and more Brazilians have found themselves in higher tempo, more physically demanding leagues in Europe.

At the time of writing, Dunga has been in charge of eight Brazil matches so far, winning all of them. All of the games except for one have been friendlies. Some notable matchups include France, Argentina, Chile, and Colombia. While it still is early days in the new World Cup cycle, it appears as if Dunga has found a cohesive group of players and a style that fits these players that can take him into 2018 as one of the favorites. This was apparent in their friendly matches against France and Chile in the past international break, as well as some of his interactions with the press.

Unlike the first time around, there is not a debate among the public as it pertains to Brazil’s formation. For the viewing eye, it is quite clear that Brazil play a 4-4-2. Modified from the ideas of a Brazilian box midfield, Oscar and Willian take up wider positions on the outside when defending, then pinch centrally in possession. Yet this 4-4-2 is far from traditional. For starters, it appears as if Brazil will play without a recognized striker for the foreseeable future. The role of Neymar in the team wasn’t really ever in doubt, as Dunga wanted to replicate a similar role to the floating role up front that Neymar played under Luis Felipe Scolari. The main question entering this cycle was who would play alongside Neymar in the attacking areas. The old partners weren’t working out, as Brazil probably could’ve found better strikers in the crowd than Fred and Jô based off of the form they displayed at the World Cup. After their nightmare, Dunga has opted to go strikerless. Due to the success of the team after selecting Roberto Firmino in an advanced role alongside Neymar, it’s hard to see any radical changes to the system due to Firmino’s ability, and the lack of a world-class Brazilian striker.

Strikerless formations are far from new, as in the past decade a variety of managers have used them such as Pep Guardiola, Luciano Spaletti, Sir Alex Ferguson, and Vicente Del Bosque. Most often times in the formations, a team plays with a singular “False 9”, or a lone striker that drops into midfield. Yet if you recall, Brazil played with 2 upfront, both emulating the False 9 tactical role. How does Brazil’s Double False 9 perform in match then?

Roberto Firmino made his international debut in November 2014 versus Turkey, then scored in a substitute appearance against Austria later that weekend. From then, he has maintained his place in the team as a starter, scoring twice in four appearances total. Consequently, there is a small sample size of how this system works, but here are some glimpses in the past matches that provide insight on what to expect in the future.

Take the two instances above in their recent match against France. Both of them drop into midfield and distance themselves from France’s defensive line. The back line of four is picking up nobody as a result of their decision to not follow both Neymar and Roberto Firmino. This in turn gives Brazil midfield superiority, making ball circulation and possession much easier higher up the field. In the case of this partnership, one or both of them often drops into a halfspace, where they can present danger to throw the French midfield off-balance.

In the defense for France, they are not in a position to defend the ball, the space, or the players in the space, so they have an important decision to make. If the line doesn’t move up, players have room to shoot or pass in dangerous positions. A large amount of shots have been taken from distance by Brazil because of these spacial openings. If the line does move up, then space is conceded in behind. Due to differences in how each player is defending the attacking threat for their position, confusion is often caused among defenses with a lack of cohesion. Any positional mishaps by the defense can be taken advantage of by midfield runners attacking the space in behind, provided there is effective passing through that last line of defense.

For Brazil’s second goal of that match against France, they finally got that effective passing that at last took advantage of runs in behind. With this system, all it takes is a slight miscommunication by the defenders and an unbalanced covering of space as a result. In this instance, Neymar put away his 43rd international goal via a Willian through ball. Due to this intentional vacating of the area the center backs typically occupy, a 4-4-2-0 would be a more suitable description of this new look side. It’s clear that a main objective of this system is to cause positional errors for the opponent’s back line.

There is another key part of the team when it comes to the attacking side of the game for this group and that takes shape in the form of left back Filipe Luis. Filipe Luis so far is just as critical to the attack for this cycle as Maicon was for the 2010 cycle. Just like how Maicon would often link up with Kaka, Ramires, and Luis Fabiano, Filipe Luis combines with Oscar and Neymar frequently. There is one key difference in the approach that these attacking full backs took positionally.

While Maicon was the key provider of width, the same cannot be said of Filipe Luis, who frequents himself within the half spaces on the attack. Luis, like the left backs of Dunga’s first era, often provides support from a narrow position as there is already a player out wide (typically Oscar). In their friendly match against Austria back in November 2014, the play leading up to Roberto Firmino’s first international goal is indicative of the type of play we can potentially expect from Luis and Brazil. With both of the false 9’s dropping deep and his run initially ignored, he becomes the highest man on the field. Rather than retreat, he adjusts his position to where he can combine with his team, eventually doing so by laying off the pass from Neymar into Firmino. He then takes advantage of the space to shoot to clinch a 3-0 win.

Overall, the same imbalance that was encountered during 2006-2010 is still a characteristic of this team. Rather than the right side receiving the majority of the attention, it is the left side. That side of the pitch is the primary focus for build-up and chance creation, and with Willian drifting inside from the right, there lacks a real threat on the right side of the pitch that can stretch defenses to a similar degree that Robinho did previously. However, perhaps teams have learned that keeping a team compact and narrow in a particular area is the best solution, as Atletico Madrid have had fantastic success with their defensive structure under the guidance of Diego Simeone. If that proposition is true, than the solution to that problem is not to spread the opposition by fielding a player in wider areas, but to outnumber the opponent in the central zones, as Willian has done so far under Dunga.

The most drastic change with this team is the counter attack. This has been spearheaded by Chelsea’s Willian and Oscar, players who have been crucial to Jose Mourinho’s squad and the counter attacking style which they play. In addition, Neymar and Roberto Firmino are solid players in transition who are in fantastic physical condition. Hoping to utilize this strength in his team, Dunga has changed his approach to the counter attack radically.

Here is a snapshot from Brazil against Chile in the 2010 World Cup. Kaka, a fantastic dribbler on the break in his day, is left frustrated as the only options for him ahead are Luis Fabiano and Robinho. They are clearly outnumbered and Chile have reorganized as a product of Brazil’s lack of urgency in transition.

Now take a look at the team after a corner kick against France. There are four forward runners in support of Neymar when he receives the ball from Firmino who can create havoc for France during a time where most of their defenders ventured forward in search of a goal. Rather than wait for the team to get into position so build up can initiate, the team opts to surge towards goal. The shape of the counter attack maximizes space, as noted by the width of the counter. The very structure and result of this sequence I potentially will discuss further as a larger theory I may publish.

Another key aspect of the counter attack is how players are moving in the counter. Rather than let 2-3 players handle it so the team isn’t caught out when the ball is lost, multiple players make the journey up to provide a lifeline when the attack appears to stagnate. This is best illustrated with Oscar, with yet another example from the France match. He goes from a complete stand still on his eighteen to a shot on goal at the other end in 15 seconds. This approach is seen throughout the attacking players, always attempting to create danger out of situations which may appear safe for the other team. When it comes to counter attacks and Dunga’s strategy, a vastly different approach has been taken in this regard.

With that in mind, it’s almost a shame that Kaka is not in his prime at this moment in time. If he was, he would be the ideal player for this team based off of both his footballing intelligence in tight spaces and his appetite for the counter attack. His dribbling abilities would complement the running of Oscar and Willian, while also changing up the pace to Neymar’s dribbling style more centered on beating defenders to score rather than creating chances for others. While Roberto Firmino is great at his role, Kaka in this lineup would make Brazil among the elite teams in the world if he at his full playing capacity as seen in his younger days. If that were to happen this team would be equipped with an attacking killer instinct that few nations on Earth could seriously boast about.

As Dunga approaches the largest job in South America for the second time around, he has made some alterations to fit to the strengths of his best players. He did this very much in his first stint, with great success up until where it mattered most. The jury is out about whether this team will put Brazil in a serious position to add a sixth star to their kit, but it cannot be doubted that Dunga takes a pragmatic, winning first, approach to the game. All of this alongside a Brazilian flair that can’t be mimicked anywhere else. It’s hard to complain for the viewpoint of a neutral, but sometimes, winning just isn’t enough for the Brazilians. Maybe these next three years will convince them otherwise.