The rise of populist radical‐right agents (parties and politicians) in Europe and the United States has inspired a considerable amount of research. A central aim of this research is to better understand why people are willing to vote for these politicians. Scholars generally distinguish between demand‐side explanations and supply‐side explanations as different perspectives on that question. Research on supply‐side explanations is concerned with how structural features of party competition (e.g., electoral systems, political finance regulations, ballot access laws) or party communication (e.g., communication strategies) contribute to the rise of the populist right (see also Golder, 2016). Research on demand‐side explanations focuses on whether and how political attitudes and psychological motivations in voters foster proclivities for populist radical‐right agents. In the present article, we aim to contribute to the latter line of research from a social justice perspective.

Theoretically, it is reasonable to assume that social justice concerns can motivate voting for populist radical‐right parties (e.g., Pettigrew, 2017). This idea is especially plausible given a growing inequality in the distribution of wealth in postindustrial economies. Pettigrew (2017) highlighted the importance of perceived injustice as a psychological motivation for supporting Trump in the U.S. Presidential Elections. He argues that “Trump adherents feel deprived relative to what they expected to possess at this point in their lives and relative to what they erroneously perceive other ‘less deserving’ groups have acquired” (p. 111). There is some evidence that the experience of deprivation relative to other social groups can foster populist sentiments (e.g., Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; Spruyt, Keppens, & Droogenbroeck, 2016) and anti‐immigration attitudes (e.g., Ellemers, 2002; Jetten, Mols, & Postmes, 2015; Taylor, 2002). However, when it comes to understanding the psychological link between social justice concerns and preferences for populist radical‐right political agents, two questions remain unanswered: First, do dispositional justice concerns predict populist radical‐right voting preferences? There is research indicating that personality dispositions contribute to the explanation of individual differences in voting for populist radical‐right parties and politicians (e.g., Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Bakker, Rooduijn, & Schumacher, 2016; Fatke, 2019; Heiss & Matthes, 2017). We aim to complement this evidence from the perspective of social justice research by focusing on justice sensitivity—a measure of dispositional justice concerns. Research on justice sensitivity distinguishes between the sensitivity to experience injustice towards oneself (JS‐Self) and the sensitivity to experience injustice towards others (JS‐Others). To get a better understanding of how dispositional justice concerns impact populist radical‐right voting preferences, we systematically differentiate between these two dispositional notions of justice. Second, which components of a populist radical right ideology mediate the link between justice concerns and preferences for populist radical‐right political agents? Scholars have argued that nativism, populism and authoritarianism constitute a populist radical right belief system and that these three components reflect the ideological basis for voting for populist radical‐right parties and politicians (e.g., Mudde, 2007). Previous research on the relation between social justice concerns and support for populist radical‐right parties has focused on single ones of these components in isolation. To better understand the underlying psychological link, we investigate all three components in parallel. By doing so, we aim to test whether each component of this belief system accounts for independent psychological effects of justice concerns on preferences for populist radical‐right political agents.

Social Justice Concerns and Justice Sensitivity There is a fairly broad consensus in political science and psychology that justice notions reflect key elements of political attitudes and ideology and that they provide a strong motivation for political action (for an overview, see Rothmund, Becker, & Jost, 2016). Importantly, the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions to social injustice are not only predicted by boundary conditions of a given situation (e.g., the level of inequality) but also by stable individual differences (for a review, see Baumert & Schmitt, 2016). Justice sensitivity has been introduced as a multidimensional personality construct (Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005) that taps into dispositional justice notions from four social perspectives, namely a self‐oriented victim perspective (sensitivity to oneself being treated unfairly) and three other‐oriented perspectives, namely an observer perspective (sensitivity to others being treated unfairly), a beneficiary perspective (sensitivity to benefiting from others being treated unfairly), and a perpetrator perspective (sensitivity to treating others unfairly). All four dimensions are linked to a specific social perspective in which social injustice can be perceived. Empirical research supports the usefulness of distinguishing between these dimensions. For example, justice sensitivity from each of these perspectives is highly stable over time (Schmitt et al., 2005, 2010), and correlations between the dimensions indicate a substantial amount of unique variance (Baumert & Schmitt, 2016). Even more importantly, different dimensions of justice sensitivity predict different kinds of psychological reactions and behaviors. The most fundamental difference has been established between the psychological functioning of the self‐oriented justice sensitivity from a victim perspective compared to the other‐oriented justice sensitivities from an observer, beneficiary, or perpetrator perspective. In the present article, we argue that these differences follow from different motivational underpinnings of self‐oriented justice concerns and other‐oriented concerns that are enlightening to better understand the political psychology of populist radical‐right proclivities. Self‐oriented justice concerns reflect concerns about social justice for oneself or one's own social group and corresponding affective reactions (e.g., anger, fear of exploitation). In line with social‐exchange theories, these kinds of justice concerns should be motivated by self‐interest (for a review, see Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). In order to serve self‐interest, it is highly functional to monitor the ratio of costs and benefits in social interactions. Self‐oriented justice concerns should be triggered when people think that they deserve more than they received in terms of personal or group‐based benefits. Relative deprivation theory (e.g., Walker & Smith, 2002) is based on this assumption. It describes situations in which people or groups feel deprived because they compare themselves with groups or individuals who are better off. High levels of self‐deprivation are linked to personal or group‐based anger that can translate into political opposition (Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012). Low levels of relative deprivation allow individuals to be less concerned about their own self‐interest and to show more solidarity with others who are similarly deprived. Justice sensitivity from a victim perspective (JS‐Self) can be considered as a dispositional tendency to experience relative deprivation. It involves individual tendencies to fear of being deprived or exploited (Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005), to feel anger about personal or group‐based deprivation (e.g., Gollwitzer & Rothmund, 2011; Rothmund, Stavrova, & Schlösser, 2017), and to retaliate when disadvantaged (e.g., Baumert et al., 2014). Other‐oriented justice concerns reflect concerns about social justice for other individuals or groups and corresponding affective reactions (e.g., outrage, compassion, guilt). These concerns can be considered as moral concerns that guide people's political thinking and behavior independently of their individual or collective interests (Baumert, Rothmund, Thomas, Gollwitzer, & Schmitt, 2013). Although there is hardly a shared definition of morality, scholars generally assume that moral concerns “must bear on the interest or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” (Gewirth, 1984, p. 978). Research indicates that justice sensitivity from other‐oriented perspectives (JS‐Others) is related to empathy and social responsibility (Schmitt et al., 2005) and that it predicts prosocial reactions to unequal allocations in the context of economic games (Baumert, Schlösser, & Schmitt, 2014; Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Lotz, Baumert, Schlösser, Gresser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011; Lotz, Schlösser, Cain, & Fetchenhauer, 2013). For example, persons high on JS‐Others give a substantial share of their endowment to powerless other persons, even when they are tempted to act selfishly (Lotz et al., 2013). It is important to note that JS‐Self and JS‐Others are correlated (Baumert & Schmitt, 2016; r = .22–.52), which has been interpreted as evidence of a general justice motive that underlies both self‐oriented and other‐oriented justice concerns (for an overview, see Ellard, Harvey, & Callan, 2016). Despite this correlation, we argue that JS‐Self and JS‐Others provide opposing motivations when it comes to supporting populist radical‐right parties and politicians: JS‐Self should increase and JS‐Others should decrease people's preferences to vote for populist radical‐right parties and politicians. In the following paragraph, we hypothesize how these links are mediated by political attitudes that constitute a populist radical right ideology.

Populist Radical Right Ideology and Justice Sensitivity Towards Self Versus Others In what is now a seminal work, Mudde (2007) postulated three core elements of a populist radical‐right ideology: nativism, populism, and authoritarianism, where nativism is considered the most central feature. It reflects the individual's belief “that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation‐state” (p. 19). While the concept of nativism is essentially subjective upon who or what is (non‐)native, it includes a combination of nationalism and xenophobia and is often expressed in anti‐immigration sentiments. Authoritarianism reflects a belief in a strictly ordered society, in which conventions must be enforced and infringements of authority are to be punished severely (Mudde, 2007). The historical roots of this concept lie in the work of Adorno and colleagues (1969) who defined authoritarianism as “a general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority” (p. 228). Continuing and extending this work, the concept of right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) has been defined by Altemeyer (1981) who postulated three constituent elements, namely submission to “strong” or charismatic leaders (authoritarian submission), aggression against deviants and “weak” scapegoats (authoritarian aggression), and the holding of traditional, conventional views about politics and morality (authoritarian conventionalism). Finally, populism is considered a unique set of ideas, in which politics is seen as a Manichean struggle between the will of the people and a conspiring elite (Hawkins, 2009). It is generally defined as a “a thin‐centered ideology that considers society to be separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). As a thin‐centered ideology, populism can be combined with different host ideologies such as, for example, a radical‐right political belief system (Stanley, 2008). There is empirical evidence that each of these three attitude dimensions predicts the willingness of people to vote for populist radical‐right parties. For example, scholars have demonstrated relations with nativist attitudes (e.g., Cutts, Ford, & Goodwin, 2011; Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2012; Ivarsflaten, 2008), authoritarian attitudes (e.g., Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; Smith & Hanley, 2018), and populist attitudes (e.g., Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014; Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2012). Only few studies have been conducted to test whether these attitude dimensions complement each other's predictive validity. For example, van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) provided evidence that populist attitudes, cultural conventionalism, and anti‐immigration sentiments can serve as independent predictors of voting for populist radical‐right parties in different European countries. Following this line of research, we assume that populist attitudes, authoritarian attitudes, and nativist attitudes can serve as independent mediators between justice concerns and preferences for populist radical‐right parties and politicians. In the subsequent paragraphs, we outline research that links social justice concerns to these components of populist radical‐right ideology (see Figure 1 for an overview of our hypotheses). Figure 1 Open in figure viewer PowerPoint Theoretical model. Arrows with “+” indicate an expected positive relation, arrows with “–” indicate an expected negative relation, and arrows with no symbol indicate no expected relation. Populist Attitudes 2016 2007 2017 relative deprivation theory. He argues that globalization makes some people feel as losers in the sense that they feel deprived of what they perceive themselves to be entitled to. But how can relative deprivation foster populist attitudes? When behavioral reactions to relative deprivation (e.g., collective action) is not possible or not successful, relative deprivation can motivate cognitive coping strategies such as blaming other individuals or outgroups (see Smith et al., 2012 2016 2016 2015 2011 2015 H1: Individual differences in JS‐Self positively predict populist attitudes and, thus, preferences for populist radical‐right political agents. Globalization makes western societies change extremely fast. Many scholars have argued that these changes trigger psychological uncertainty, grievances, and frustrations, which in turn make populist thinking attractive (e.g. Golder,; Mudde,). Pettigrew () linked this line of argumentation toHe argues that globalization makes some people feel as losers in the sense that they feel deprived of what they perceive themselves to be entitled to. But how can relative deprivation foster populist attitudes? When behavioral reactions to relative deprivation (e.g., collective action) is not possible or not successful, relative deprivation can motivate cognitive coping strategies such as blaming other individuals or outgroups (see Smith et al.,). A feeling of relative deprivation due to societal change might translate into populist thinking and scapegoating of politicians. In two Belgian samples, Spruyt and colleagues showed that people who experienced group‐based (Spruyt, Keppens, & Droogenbroeck,) or personal deprivation (Elchardus & Spruyt,) were more inclined to report populist attitudes. The authors argue that blaming “the establishment” and “politics” for privileging others and for tolerating and covering up social injustice can serve as a psychological coping strategy for people who feel relatively deprived. We aim to complement and extend the work done by Spruyt and colleagues in three ways. First, we focus on the link between populist attitudes and stable individual differences in people's propensity to feel relatively deprived. By doing so, our research enhances the understanding of populist thinking from a personality perspective. We argue that JS‐Self should foster populist thinking. There is some preliminary support for this assumption (Agroskin, Jonas, & Traut‐Mattausch,; Traut‐Mattausch, Guter, Zanna, Jonas, & Frey,). For example, Agroskin et al. () demonstrated that people high on JS‐Self tended to oppose political reforms because they were more likely to distrust political elites and attribute sinister motives to political agents with opposing opinions. Second, we do not only assess populist attitudes but also party and candidate preferences. This allows us to test whether the link between justice concerns and populist attitudes translates into preferences for populist radical‐right parties and politicians. Third, we investigate different attitude components of populist radical‐right ideology in parallel. This allows us to test whether populist attitudes are a mediator of justice concerns on populist radical‐right voting preferences even when we control for the effect of the other components. Nativist Attitudes There is a compelling body of evidence linking relative deprivation and nativist attitudes, especially anti‐immigration attitudes and prejudice against ethnical outgroups (for a meta‐analysis, see Smith et al., 2012). The most well‐documented effect is that collective deprivation experiences can foster anti‐immigration sentiments (e.g., Ellemers, 2002; Jetten, Mols, & Postmes, 2015; Taylor, 2002). For example, Jetten et al. (2015) used a hypothetical society paradigm and showed that people who perceived themselves to be deprived relative to other parts of society were more opposed towards immigrants than participants in a moderate wealth group condition. Consistent with this finding, political economy researchers have argued that attitudes towards immigrants are affected by the extent to which immigrants are perceived to threaten material self‐interest (Mayda, 2006; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Similar findings have also been reported from an individual differences perspective. In the context of the German reunification and the introduction of a solidarity tax (an additional income tax aimed at alleviating the economic disparities between former East and West), JS‐Self among the residents of former West Germany was positively related to the fear of a negative future and to the anger about the residents of former East Germany (Süssenbach & Gollwitzer, 2015; Study 1). This effect extends to attitudes toward migrant groups, with Germans high on JS‐Self being more likely to experience anger at migrant groups when these groups are presented as having exploitative motives (Süssenbach & Gollwitzer, 2015; Study 2). Accordingly, we hypothesize that stable individual differences in people's sensitivity to feel personally or collectively deprived predict anti‐immigration sentiments. 2015 2017 H2: Anti‐immigration attitudes are positively predicted by JS‐Self and negatively predicted by JS‐Others. Opposing effects of JS‐Self and JS‐Others on preferences for populist radical‐right political agents are mediated by anti‐immigration attitudes. Recently, Anderson, Stuart, and Rossen () provided evidence for a negative relation between other‐oriented justice concerns and nativist attitudes. Using an Australian sample, they showed that preferences for social fairness predicted positive attitudes towards asylum seekers over and above social dominance orientation and RWA. Research on justice sensitivity also indicates that JS‐Others is a positive predictor of higher solidarity with disadvantaged outgroups (Rothmund et al.,). During the Euro Crisis, Germans high on JS‐Others were more likely to support solidarity with countries in need of financial support. These correlations were mediated by reduced resentments towards debtor countries and increased empathy towards the outgroup. An opposing pattern was found for JS‐Self, which was negatively related to solidarity with debtor countries. The latter effect was mediated by increased nationalistic concerns and increased resentments towards debtor countries. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that JS‐Self and JS‐Others have opposing effects on nativist attitudes and, thus, on preferences to vote for populist radical‐right parties and politicians. Authoritarian Attitudes Duckitt and Sibley (2010) proposed a theoretical model in which they argue that RWA reflects a way of coping with existential threat (see also Sibley, Osborne, & Duckitt, 2012). People high on JS‐Self are especially sensitive to perceive and experience threatening social cues. For example, they rated faces with neutral expressions as less trustworthy and underestimated the cooperativeness of strangers of whom they saw only short video clips (Gollwitzer, Rothmund, Alt, & Jekel, 2012). Based on these findings, we expect a positive relation between JS‐Self and RWA. 2013 2014 2013 H3: Right‐wing authoritarian attitudes are positively predicted by individual differences in JS‐Self. Positive effects of JS‐Self on preferences for populist radical‐right political agents are in part mediated by RWA. There have also been some attempts to investigate how RWA relates to fairness as a moral principle (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt,; Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi,). Both studies found substantial correlations between RWA and group‐binding moral foundations (loyalty, authority, purity). Concerning relations with fairness, results are mixed. Whereas Kugler et al. (2014) found small to medium negative correlations of fairness with RWA, Federico et al. () presented small positive correlations. Because these studies do not show a consistent pattern of relations between RWA and social justice concerns, we do not propose specific hypotheses on the relation between JS‐Others and RWA.

Data and Measures We tested our hypotheses in two national samples, one in the United States and one in Germany. Both samples were recruited using quota sampling to represent the adult population of each country in regard to age, gender, and level of education. The U.S. data was collected during the 2016 presidential election campaign by a professional survey firm (SSI; www.surveysampling.com) between August 16 and September 9, 2016, yielding a total number of N = 1500 participants with valid cases. The German sample was recruited between October 21 and October 28, 2016 by the professional survey firm Respondi (https://www.respondi.com). The total number of valid cases was N = 848. Both samples show an adequate fit with the distribution of the quoted variables in the general public of the respective country (for an overview on the sampling procedure and the sample characteristics, see the online supporting information). The data of both studies, scripts and detailed information on the surveys can be freely accessed (https://osf.io/e2cmb/). Measures The exact wording of all items, descriptive analyses, and the estimates of reliability and intercorrelation of all scales in the United States and in Germany are reported in the online supporting information. Preference for populist radical‐right political agents was measured differently in the United States and in Germany. In the United States, participants were asked which candidate of the 2016 presidential election best represented their views. Participants could choose from a list of eight candidates: Jeb Bush, Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz, Gary Johnson, Rand Paul, Austin Petersen, Bernie Sanders, and Donald Trump.1 In Germany's multiparty system, we asked participants which political party they were most likely to vote for if federal elections were held at that point in time. Eight options were proposed, namely CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Linke, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, FDP, AfD, Piratenpartei, and NPD. We considered Donald Trump (the choice of 29.6% of the sample) and AfD (17.5%) as the populist radical‐right vote choices. Despite these agents' different contexts and characteristics, both Trump and AfD share a political view characterized by the amalgamation of nativism, populism, and authoritarianism (Golder, 2016). Most prominently, Trump and AfD explore cultural cleavages to defend “the nation” from invading foreigners threatening the homogeneity of its people as well as its culture and traditions. As for the populist component, both agents frame their set of political ideas by juxtaposing a moralized version of “the people” and “the elite,” with a marked preference for the former all the while invoking an interpretation of democratic processes that argues political decisions should be taken according to the will of the people. In addition, in terms of modus operandi, both agents are guided by anti‐establishment, anti‐muslim, anti‐media, and anti‐immigration rhetoric. Justice sensitivity was assessed with an eight‐item short scale by Baumert et al. (2014). In both samples, the two items indicating victim sensitivity were combined to measure justice sensitivity towards the self (e.g., “It makes me angry when others are undeservingly better off than me”). The other six item (indicating observer sensitivity, beneficiary sensitivity, and perpetrator sensitivity) were combined to measure justice sensitivity towards others (e.g., “I am upset when someone is undeservingly worse off than others”; “I feel guilty when I am better off than others for no reason”; “I feel guilty when I enrich myself at the cost of others”). Validity of the German versions of the short scales has been reported by Baumert et al. (2014) and by Beierlein, Baumert, Schmitt, Kemper, and Rammstedt (2013). Validity of the English versions has been provided using the 10‐item original versions of the scales (e.g., Decety & Yoder, 2016; Yoder & Decety, 2014). We assessed populist attitudes with the same six‐item populist attitudes short scale (PASS‐6) in both samples. The scale consisted of two items for each of three facets of populist thinking, namely antiestablishment sentiments, belief in the will of the people, and a Manichean worldview. Our scale provides strict measurement equivalence between both national samples. Information on the items, the item selection process, construct validity, and measurement invariance across the two countries are provided in the online supporting information. In the United States, we measured RWA with the 12‐item scale by Funke (2005). In Germany, we used the nine‐item KSA‐3 scale by Beierlein, Asbrock, Kauff, and Schmidt (2014). In both countries, we used the same two items to measure anti‐immigration attitudes (“Borders should be closed for asylum seekers”; “Immigrants increase crime rates”).

Results We started our analyses by investigating the mean levels of attitude measures and justice sensitivity in participants with preferences for populist radical‐right political agents compared to the rest of the sample. All variables were z‐standardized. Mean levels are displayed in Figure 2. The results indicate that participants with a preference for Trump (United States) or AfD (Germany) reported higher means on populist attitudes, RWA, and anti‐immigration attitudes compared to the rest of the sample. This pattern is in line with the general assumption that all three attitude dimensions provide a demand for populist radical‐right parties and politicians. Focusing on the mean levels of justice sensitivity, the findings are not totally in line with our theoretical predictions. As expected, we do find that participants with a preference for Trump (United States) or AfD (Germany) reported lower means on JS‐Others. The findings on JS‐Self are mixed. Participants with a preference for AfD reported higher means on JS‐Self compared to the rest of the German sample. However, participants with a preference for Trump reported lower means on JS‐Self compared to the rest of the U.S. sample. Figure 2 Open in figure viewer PowerPoint z‐transformed group means. Error bars indicate standard error of means. As noted before, we should keep in mind that JS‐Self and JS‐Others are substantially correlated (r = .30 in Germany, r = .49 in the United States; bivariate correlations between all variables are displayed in Table 1). Due to this correlation, opposing effects of JS‐Others and JS‐Self on populist radical‐right voting preferences might be suppressed when we look at the mean differences only (see Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004, for a detailed analysis on how correlated personality predictors can create suppressor situations). We calculated logistic regression analyses to test this assumption directly. Table 1. Intercorrelations Between Sociodemographic Variables and Scales 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 1. Age – .02 .01 .21** −.24** −.03 .08 −.11* .11* −.06 2. Sex .20** – −.04 .12* .02 −.21** .02 .00 −.03 .04 3. Education .21** .09** – .27** −.13** −.07 −.28** −.28** −.19** −.15** 4. Income .23** .09** .48** – −.18** −.11* −.12* −.10 .03 −.03 5. Justice sensitivity (Self) −.31** −.17** −.13** −.18** – .30** .20** .29** .22** .09 6. Justice sensitivity (Others) −.22** −.22** −.11** −.14** .49** – .05 −.04 −.02 −.12* 7. Populist attitudes .19** .07* −.10** −.02 .06* −.03 – .52** .34** .26** 8. Anti‐immigration attitudes .17** .09** −.15** −.01 .02 −.24** .34** – .43** .42** 9. Right‐wing authoritarianism .24** .08** −.10** .00 −.13** −.23** .27** .62** – .08 10. Preference for Trump/AfD .23** .13** −.07* .02 −.09** −.20** .27** .47** .41** – Effects of JS‐Self and JS‐Others on Voting Preferences We regressed preference for Trump (and AfD, respectively) on JS‐Self and JS‐Others in two logistic regression models, including age, sex, income, and level of formal education as control variables. Justice sensitivity predicted preferences for populist radical‐right political agents independent of the controls in the United States and in Germany. Focusing on the specific relations, we found the same pattern in both countries: JS‐Self was a positive predictor of preferences for Trump in the United States (b = 0.10; p = .039; odds ratio [OR] = 1.11) and for AfD in Germany (b = 0.20; p = .004; OR = 1.22). In other words, for each unit increase in JS‐Self, the odds of supporting Trump (AfD) compared to the other candidates (parties) increased by 11% (22%), holding all other variables constant. At the same time, JS‐Others decreased the odds to vote for Trump (b = −0.37; p < .001; OR = 0.69) and AfD (b = −0.45; p < .001; OR = 0.64). In other words, for each unit increase in JS‐Others, the odds of supporting Trump (AfD) compared to the other candidates (parties) decreased by 31% (36%), holding all other variables constant. In a second model, we added the interaction term of JS‐Self and JS‐Others as an additional predictor. Interaction effects were nonsignificant in both countries (see the online supporting information). Effects of Populist Radical‐Right Attitude Dimensions on Political Preferences To test the indirect effects of justice sensitivity via attitude dimensions on political preferences, we specified and analyzed the same path model using the German and the U.S. dataset (see Figure 1). In line with previous research indicating that populist attitudes, anti‐immigration attitudes, and RWA are correlated substantially (Rooduijn, 2014), we allowed for correlations between these variables in the statistical model. Control variables (age, sex, income, and level of formal education) were included as predictors in all paths leading to populist attitudes, anti‐immigration attitudes, RWA, and preference for populist radical‐right agents. We restricted direct effects of JS‐Self and JS‐Others on political preferences to zero. Models with direct effects can be found in the online supporting information. There are no meaningful differences in the parameters between the models with and without direct effects. We interpret this as evidence for the robustness of our model. Since our dependent variable is dichotomous, we used WLSMV estimation (cf. Beauducel & Herzberg, 2006). Both models showed a good fit (United States: χ2(2) = 3.98, p = .14; RMSEA = .026; SRMR = .004; CFI = .998; Germany: χ2(2) = 10.00, p = .007; RMSEA = .069; SRMR = .013; CFI = .980; cf. Hu & Bentler, 1999). The path coefficients for both models are depicted in Figure 3 (U.S. model) and Figure 4 (German model). A complete report of parameter estimates can be found in the online supporting information. Figure 3 Open in figure viewer PowerPoint Path model in the U.S. sample explaining preference for Donald Trump as presidential candidate. Coefficients are standardized estimates. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Figure 4 Open in figure viewer PowerPoint Path model in the German sample explaining voting preference for the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland). Coefficients are standardized estimates. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. In the U.S. model, all three attitude dimensions of a populist radical‐right ideology predicted preferences for Trump (see Figure 3). In other words, populist attitudes (OR = 1.09), anti‐immigration attitudes (OR = 1.20), and RWA (OR = 1.21) increased the likelihood of preferring Trump over the other candidates independent of each other. In the German model, we found a slightly different pattern. Again, all three attitude dimensions predicted the likelihood to prefer AfD over other political parties (see Figure 4). As expected, populist attitudes (OR = 1.07) and anti‐immigration attitudes (OR = 1.31) increased the likelihood of a preference for AfD. Contrary to our expectations, RWA was a negative predictor of preferences for the AfD in the German dataset (OR = 0.74). Keeping all other variables constant, increasing RWA reduced the likelihood that the participants in our sample preferred AfD over other political parties. We calculated tests for multicollinearity in order to rule out statistical explanations for this contra‐intuitive effect. Since all variance inflation factors (VIF) are relatively low (all VIFs < 2, see the online supporting information) in comparison to the cutoffs that are discussed in the literature (cf. O'Brien, 2007), we do not assume multicollinearity to be problematic for the interpretation of our findings. Indirect Effects of JS‐Self on Voting Preferences The path model indicates positive relations of JS‐Self with populist attitudes and anti‐immigration attitudes in the United States and in Germany (see Figures 3 and 4). We calculated indirect effects in order to assess whether and how JS‐Self can translate into political preferences by means of enhancing these attitude dimensions. In the United States, we found indirect effects of JS‐Self on preferences for Trump via anti‐immigration attitudes (OR = 1.07) and populist attitudes (OR = 1.01). There was no significant indirect effect via RWA. Interpreting the odds ratio, we can say that—all other predictors held constant—increasing the JS‐Self scale by one unit enhances the odds of preferring Trump over the other candidates by 1% via increased populist attitudes and by 7% via increased anti‐immigration attitudes. In Germany, we found the same indirect effects of JS‐Self on preferences for AfD via populist attitudes (OR = 1.01) and anti‐immigration attitudes (OR = 1.16). Increasing the JS‐Self scale by one unit enhances the odds of preferring AfD over the other candidates by 1% via increased populist attitudes and by 16% via increased anti‐immigration attitudes. In Germany, RWA operated as an additional mediator, with higher values in JS‐Self leading to higher RWA, which in turn inhibited preference for the AfD (OR = 0.96). Summing up, we found support for our first and second hypotheses (H1, H2): Effects of JS‐Self on preferences for Trump and the AfD were mediated by populist attitudes and anti‐immigration sentiments. Our findings are not in line with the third hypothesis (H3): We find no evidence that self‐oriented justice concerns foster preferences for populist radical‐right parties or politicians via RWA. Indirect Effects of JS‐Others on Voting Preferences We found negative relations of JS‐Others with anti‐immigration attitudes and RWA in Germany and the United States (see Figures 3 and 4). Indirect effect analyses revealed that JS‐Others reduced the odds of preferring Trump over other candidates in the United States via lower anti‐immigration attitudes (OR = 0.89) and lower RWA (OR = 0.95). Interpreting the odds ratio, we can say that—all other predictors held constant—increasing the JS‐Others scale by one unit reduces the odds of preferring Trump over the other candidates by 11% via reduced anti‐immigration attitudes and by 5% via lower RWA. In the German model, we found a negative indirect effect of JS‐Others via anti‐immigration attitudes (OR = 0.87) and a small positive effect via RWA (OR = 1.03). Increasing the JS‐Others scale by one unit reduces the odds of preferring Trump over the other candidates by 13% via reduced anti‐immigration attitudes and enhances the odds of preferring Trump over the other candidates by 3% via lower RWA. On a general level, we gathered support for our second hypothesis in regard to JS‐Others (H2): Negative relations between JS‐Others and preferences for Trump and the AfD were mediated by anti‐immigration sentiments in both samples.