Craig Gilbert

Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

Ever since Gov. Scott Walker was voted out of office, some Republicans have blamed his defeat on landslide losses in the Democratic bastions of Madison and Milwaukee, suggesting the rest of Wisconsin had little to do with toppling the two-term governor.

But a close study of local election returns — how people voted in town by town and city by city — tells a different story.

Sure enough, Walker had an urban problem in this election. But it was much bigger than a Milwaukee or Madison problem.

The governor’s undoing was a serious erosion of support in the state’s most populous places.

And by “populous,” we mean not just Wisconsin’s two biggest cities — but communities of any real size at all.

Compared with his victory in 2014, Walker’s performance declined significantly in cities of all stripes, sizes and regions, according to a detailed analysis of election data from the past two races for governor.

It happened in blue cities (Eau Claire), red cities (Brookfield) and purple cities (Green Bay).

It happened in affluent cities (Mequon) and blue-collar cities (West Allis).

It happened on the south side of Milwaukee County (Oak Creek); in the Waukesha County suburbs (New Berlin); in the Fox Valley (Appleton); in southern Wisconsin (Whitewater); in central Wisconsin (Stevens Point); in eastern Wisconsin (Port Washington); and in western Wisconsin (La Crosse).

Walker did worse in 2018 than he did in 2014 in all these cities. He won some and lost others. But in every case the margin between him and his opponent worsened by at least 10 percentage points.

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Troubling signs for GOP

The governor’s performance Nov. 6 fits into a larger pattern with national overtones in the Donald Trump era: a growing gap between bigger and smaller places, reflecting GOP gains in small towns and slippage in cities and suburbs.

But those trade-offs are ominous for the party, as Walker’s 2018 defeat (after three statewide victories) illustrates.

The governor improved his numbers in this election in nearly half of Wisconsin’s more than 1,800 municipalities. But the communities where Walker gained ground had an average population of about 1,100 people. They were overwhelmingly small towns and villages with modest voting power. Together, they account for about 16 percent of the state’s population.

By contrast, Walker lost ground in 39 of the state’s 40 most populous municipalities (representing more than 40 percent of the state’s population). And in most of those places (red or blue), the shifts against Walker were sizable.

For this analysis, I measured the vote shift from 2014 to 2018 in each of Wisconsin's cities, towns and villages, based on the point margin between Walker and his Democratic opponent (Mary Burke in 2014, Tony Evers in 2018).

For example, Walker lost the very blue city of Madison by 58 points in 2014 and by 67 points in 2018 — a shift of 9 points in a Democratic direction. He won the very red city of Brookfield in Waukesha County by 46 points in 2014 but by 28 points in 2018 — a shift of 18 points in a Democratic direction. He lost the northern town of Crandon in Forest County by 3 points in 2014 but won it by 16 points in 2018, a shift of 19 points in a Republican direction.

By this measure, the state as a whole shifted almost 7 points in a Democratic direction between 2014 (when Walker won a second term by 5.7 points) and 2018 (when he lost his bid for a third term by 1.1 points).

But there were huge variations at the local level.

More than 1,000 communities moved in a Democratic direction in 2018 and more than 800 moved in a Republican direction.

Here is what the pattern looks like when you group communities by population size:

In places with at least 50,000 people (there are 12 such communities in Wisconsin), there was an average vote shift of 10.2 points against Walker.

In places with 30,000 to 50,000 people (13 communities), there was an average shift of 10.4 points against Walker.

In places with 10,000 to 30,000 people (65 communities), there was an average shift of 9.2 points against Walker.

In places with 5,000 to 10,000 people (84 communities), there was an average shift of 6.3 points against Walker.

In places with 2,000 to 5,000 people (267 communities), there was an average shift of 2.8 points against Walker.

In places with 1,000 to 2,000 people (427 communities), there was an average shift of 0.6 points against Walker.

And in places with under 1,000 people (978 communities), there was an average shift of 1.6 points toward Walker.

In short, Walker made gains in many small towns around Wisconsin despite a large decline in his statewide performance. But his declines were larger than average in larger places.

Where did Walker’s support erode the most?

Among places with more than 1,000 people, the biggest vote shift against Walker occurred in the Milwaukee County community he called home for much of his adult life — Wauwatosa.

The governor won Wauwatosa by 5 points in 2014 but lost it by 16 in 2018 — a shift of 21 points.

Wauwatosa is representative of the kind of community where Walker lost the most ground in 2018 — suburbs of Milwaukee and Madison (whether Democratic or Republican).

Losing ground

Walker’s winning margins declined by double digits in such GOP communities as the city of Waukesha (from a winning margin of 32 points to a winning margin of 15), the city of Cedarburg (from 34 to 19), the village of Menomonee Falls (from 41 to 28) and the city of Oak Creek (from 22 to 10).

Walker’s losing margins ballooned in such Madison suburbs as Verona (from 24 to 43 points) and Sun Prairie (from 21 to 38 points), and such Milwaukee suburbs as Shorewood (from 44 to 56 points), and Whitefish Bay (from 1 point to 20 points).

Other communities, like Wauwatosa, flipped. Walker won West Allis by 9 points in 2014 but lost it by 5 in 2018.

Many of the places where Walker lost the most ground were places where Trump underperformed in 2016, suburban communities like Whitefish Bay, Mequon, and Brookfield outside Milwaukee, and Middleton and Fitchburg outside Madison.

But Walker also lost ground in more blue-collar cities in regions of the state where Trump performed well in 2016. He won Green Bay by 3 in 2014 and lost it by 9 in 2018. He won Appleton by 6 in 2014 and lost it by 7 in 2018. He lost La Crosse by 23 in 2014 and by 34 in 2018. He lost Eau Claire by 10 in 2014 and by 24 in 2018. He won Sheboygan by 3 in 2014 but lost it by 6 in 2018.

We don’t know from the election results alone how much of Walker’s decline in this very diverse group of communities was caused by turnout factors (Democrats voting at higher rates than Republicans) and how much was caused by voters shifting away from Walker and his party.

We don’t know how much of Walker’s erosion in these places was purely about Walker and how much of it was driven by negative attitudes toward Trump.

We also don’t entirely know which communities are undergoing cyclical swings and which are experiencing long-term partisan transformation. Green Bay shifted in a Republican direction in the 2016 race for president but shifted in a Democratic direction in the 2018 race for governor. On the other hand, Madison just keeps getting bluer and bluer. Milwaukee’s north shore has been growing more Democratic for decades. And prosperous GOP suburbs such as Mequon and Brookfield have shown distinct signs in the past two elections of becoming less Republican.

Overall, the "density divide" (between more densely populated places and less densely populated places) is growing here and nationally.

Republicans lost ground in 2016 in the state’s most populous regions, the Madison and Milwaukee media markets, while gaining strength in much of the rest of the state.

But in the 2018 race for governor, the GOP’s problems extended to populous places all across the state.

Here is one more illustration: Walker won his race in 2014 by about 137,000 votes and lost his race in 2018 by about 29,000 votes. That’s a swing of roughly 166,000 votes. Democratic gains in the cities of Milwaukee and Madison accounted for less than a quarter of that statewide swing. The rest of it happened largely in county seats, regional hubs and red and blue suburbs both close to and far from the state’s two biggest cities.

Compared with four years ago, Walker lost ground in every community in Wisconsin of more than 30,000 people -- in most cases, a good deal of ground.

That wasn’t just an urban problem for him and his party. It was a voter problem.