Mujtaba Rahman is the head of Eurasia Group’s Europe practice and the author of POLITICO's Beyond the Bubble column.

LONDON — Criticism is raging against the European Union’s economic response to the coronavirus pandemic. For example, the supposed lack of action by eurozone finance ministers after their teleconference Monday has been used by critics to argue that the EU is once again “behind the curve” and acting — or reacting — “incrementally.” Some voices believe the Eurogroup should now even be dismantled as a result.

The criticism is probably unfair. In the space of little more than a week, the European Central Bank has signaled a willingness to deviate from its capital key, the rules that govern how many bonds it can buy from any given country, while eurozone finance ministers have in practice suspended the EU’s 3 percent deficit limit.

In Italy, the government has earmarked expenditures worth €25 billion, close to 1.3 percent of GDP, that will take Rome’s deficit well above the Stability and Growth Pact’s talismanic limit (and probably much higher once the country’s inevitable recession has been factored in). Ditto in France, where President Emmanuel Macron’s €45 billion of measures announced Tuesday is likely to take the deficit to at least 3.7 percent of GDP this year. German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz has even signaled that the two unmovable pillars of German fiscal policy — the black zero (balanced budgets) and the constitutional debt brake (deficits no greater than 0.35 percent of GDP) — are no longer sacrosanct.

That these moves have been supported — indeed cheerled — by the EU’s most hawkish principals, such as the European Commissioner for Financial Stability Valdis Dombrovskis and Dutch Finance Minister Wopke Hoekstra, shows the degree of the buy-in they enjoy. That they came as part of the first wave of the EU’s response shows how much further leaders will be willing to and are likely to go.

Certainly, more will be needed, but as a first hit, the ECB’s substantive response was a good start.

Of course, there have been missteps. ECB President Christine Lagarde’s poor verbal execution at her press conference last Thursday stood in sharp contrast to the masterclass the day before from former Bank of England Governor Mark Carney and his successor Andrew Bailey, and created unnecessary panic in the markets. This should never be repeated — and likely won’t be.

After all, central banking is a learned skill. Federal Reserve President Jay Powell’s first press conferences weren’t great either — and he had been on the Fed’s board; he is doing much better now. Lagarde is still one of the few experienced economic leaders left from the last crisis. She will have to do better next time.

The package she unveiled was also quite smart and strong. The “all of the above” approach — bond purchases, term loans at a new low rate, a new bank lending program and regulatory and capital forbearance — gets at the credit and liquidity issues more directly than rate cuts could have. It would have required real skill to bring the ECB’s Governing Council around to this set of measures. Certainly, more will be needed, but as a first hit, the ECB’s substantive response was a good start.

Most of the other criticism aimed at European economic policymakers is focused on the lack of coordinated action at the EU level. If this is not remedied, it will mean that only countries with greater fiscal space will be able to safely spend more than those with high deficits and high debts. So far however, it is the latter, including Italy, France, Spain and Belgium, that have been hardest hit by the coronavirus outbreak.

But even here, more is likely — and soon.

In the first instance, coordinated action is likely to involve the use of the European Financial Stability Mechanism. This instrument, housed in Article 122 of the EU’s treaties, was first used in the 2008 Greek debt crisis. It allows the European Commission to offer support to national governments by issuing debt to capital markets, backed by the EU’s budget, which it then lends to member countries.

However, the EFSM’s firepower — €60 billion — would be nowhere near what is needed. That is why it is being considered as part of a broader package with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).

The French in particular favor the use of the ESM, as Macron believes that anything that resembles large, common EU action is important in response to the large-scale market meltdown seen so far (Macron is rightly frustrated with the EU’s piecemeal and clumsy initial actions, but accepts that this is the nature of a 27-headed organization).

The ESM would give eurozone members access to €410 billion (the Fund’s lending capacity is €500 billion, with approximately €90 billion of loans outstanding), so sizeable compared to the amounts available under the EFSM, or indeed, the EU budget. The biggest benefit, however, is that an ESM credit line would unlock the unlimited firepower of the ECB (the “enhanced” credit line certainly would; possibly the “precautionary” one too).

Criticism of Monday’s Eurogroup meeting centered on the fact that no “match ready” ESM plan emerged. But this was never the right expectation, as several issues — how best the ESM could be repurposed; what conditions would be attached to any financial support to make it more acceptable to Rome and elsewhere; and whether this would require changes to the ESM’s treaty — still need to be worked out.

Whatever one thinks of the way European governments have handled the immediate epidemiological threat, there’s reason to be slightly more hopeful about the economic response so far.

But compared with the signals sent so far — in essence a suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact; flexibility over the capital key; the black zero and the debt brake — these are likely to prove details that won’t prevent bolder ESM and ECB action to help vulnerable eurozone members manage and mitigate the economic fallout of coronavirus.

The fact that the pandemic is an external shock, not the result of populist fiscal policies or financial mismanagement, will help limit fears of moral hazard in Northern Europe — and facilitate any changes that need to be made.

There is some discussion in Brussels and among the investment community as to whether an ESM program would make sense for Italy alone, or all vulnerable, high-debt, high-deficit member countries. While there is no consensus at the moment, even the French don’t exclude some form of participation — “dipping in,” in the words of senior French sources — if this was framed as broad help for all, “not a cure for the weak.”

Given how quickly the crisis is unfolding, I suspect substantial movement and even greater policy coordination at a later stage — especially as the epidemic moves to its exponential phase.

Whatever one thinks of the way European governments have handled the immediate epidemiological threat, there’s reason to be slightly more hopeful about the economic response so far.