Top Republican strategists have begun to argue that Donald Trump could win the nomination. PHOTOGRAPH BY SCOTT OLSON / GETTY

Political parties are rarely suicidal in Presidential campaigns. While it’s not uncommon for a party to nominate an unelectable candidate in a Senate or House election, the Presidential nominating systems used by both Democrats and Republicans only occasionally produce a fringe candidate. The last time that the Republican Party truly misfired was in 1964, when it nominated Barry Goldwater, who lost forty-four states in the general election. On the Democratic side, the last time the party produced a fringe candidate was in 1972, when George McGovern, who took advantage of new nominating rules that he had helped to write, lost forty-nine states.

The question that has hung over the Republican race for the past few months is whether the party is on the path to producing another historic loser by nominating an unelectable candidate, like Donald Trump or Ben Carson, or whether Republican voters, many of whom don’t make up their minds until the final days before a caucus or primary, will settle down with a more traditional—and electable—candidate, such as Marco Rubio, Jeb Bush, John Kasich, or even the voluble Ted Cruz.

Ever since June, when Trump announced his candidacy, the conventional wisdom among G.O.P. and media élites has been that Trump was a soufflé candidate who would collapse just like fringe outsiders in previous contests, such as Herman Cain, in 2012. But recently, a number of prominent observers have stepped forward to declare that, actually, Trump could win the Republican nomination.

In August, Norm Ornstein, a longtime and well-regarded political observer, made the most comprehensive argument that Trump could prevail. Ornstein pointed to several factors: a conservative media that has fostered a deeper anti-establishment sentiment among G.O.P. voters, who are less likely to get news from outside an ideological bubble; a more extreme G.O.P. electorate, especially on the issue of immigration; the absence of a consensus establishment alternative to Trump; the emergence of Super PACs, which might encourage the traditional candidates to stay in the race longer and divide up the non-Trump vote; and the fact that Trump is “a far more savvy candidate” than Cain and the like.

More recently, Alex Castellanos, who worked for Mitt Romney, echoed Ornstein’s arguments, and wrote, “Slow learner that I am, I’ve resisted the idea that Donald Trump could and would become the Republican nominee. Unhappily, I’ve changed my mind.” Steve Schmidt, a veteran of John McCain’s 2008 campaign, has repeatedly argued that Trump could win. Ron Fournier, the National Journal columnist, said in June that Trump “won’t win the G.O.P. nomination,” but this week he changed his mind and wrote, “I was wrong to rule out Trump winning the nomination or the presidency.”

Ironically, the recent burst of Trump-could-win commentary occurred just as Trump lost his lead in Iowa to Ben Carson, and, in at least one poll, nationally as well. (Trump is dealing with this development as one would expect: by questioning Carson’s religion and the validity of the polls.)

But has the Republican Party really lost its mind? Is it really going to nominate someone like Trump (or Carson), whose views are are so far outside the mainstream that either would pave the way for a historic Democratic landslide?

It’s doubtful.

The overwhelming majority of Republican voters have repeatedly told pollsters this year that, whatever their choice in any given poll, they haven’t made up their minds yet. Most won’t think hard about their decision for at least another three months. At this point in 2008, Rudy Giuliani was the polling leader. In 2012, it was Cain. Rather than tell us anything deep about voter sentiments, polls at this point generally reflect name recognition and which candidates are receiving the most media attention at any given time.

That’s why, despite Bush’s obvious troubles this year, it makes no sense for him to drop out of the race while he still has money in the bank and a very flush Super PAC financing an advertising blitz on his behalf. The most likely scenario remains that the G.O.P. will eventually coalesce around the most conservative candidate who is electable. Bush seems less and less likely to be that person, not because of Trump but because someone like Marco Rubio seems more conservative _and _more electable.

While the G.O.P.’s rightward lurch is well-documented, the influence of the most conservative voters in Republican primaries is frequently overstated. Last year Henry Olsen, writing in the National Interest, dissected the Republican electorate and explained that it is divided into four groups: “moderate or liberal voters; somewhat conservative voters; very conservative, evangelical voters; and very conservative, secular voters.” His surprising argument was that, while most of the media coverage focusses on the latter two groups, which are louder and often more interesting to cover, it is the candidate who wins over the “somewhat conservative voters” who has the best shot at the nomination:

The most important of these groups is the one most journalists don’t understand and ignore: the somewhat conservative voters. This group is the most numerous nationally and in most states, comprising 35–40 percent of the national G.O.P. electorate. While the numbers of moderates, very conservative and evangelical voters vary significantly by state, somewhat conservative voters are found in similar proportions in every state. They are not very vocal, but they form the bedrock base of the Republican Party.

They also have a significant distinction: they always back the winner. The candidate who garners their favor has won each of the last four open races. This tendency runs down to the state level as well. Look at the exit polls from virtually any state caucus or primary since 1996 and you will find that the winner received a plurality of or ran roughly even among the somewhat conservative voters.

These voters’ preferred candidate profile can be inferred from the characteristics of their favored candidates: Bob Dole in 1996, George W. Bush in 2000, John McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 2012. They like even-keeled men with substantial governing experience. They like people who express conservative values on the economy or social issues, but who do not espouse radical change.

While Trump often talks about the silent majority he is awakening, his actual supporters come from the G.O.P.’s noisy minority. The true silent majority in the Republican Party hasn’t picked its candidate yet. As Olsen makes clear, the G.O.P. Presidential electorate is little different from four years ago. Super PACs have not been able to save the candidacies of Rick Perry or Scott Walker, so the traditional process that winnows the field of unfunded candidates continues apace. It’s possible that the “somewhat conservative” kingmakers will end up backing Trump or Carson, but the safe money remains on Rubio, Bush, or even Kasich—one of those “even-keeled men with substantial governing experience.”