Confidential information on the crisis in France



T.me/GalliaDaily







Here are the minutes of several meetings at the head of the French State.





Summary / TL;DR

> There will be "the day before" and "the day after". The future of France is being decided during this crisis

The health crisis is going to be violent, much more than in other European countries because France has been slow to put in place the appropriate measures.

Nevertheless, the health crisis will be fairly easily contained in the long term, with a peak normally reached before June.

What worries the government and the official services much more is rather the risk of "dissolution of the Republic" in the long term : i.e. that this crisis will be a catalyst that will bring back all the political errors, an accelerator that will exacerbate tensions in a decisive way.

In other words, the risk is that the state loses control during the crisis and never manages to regain control afterwards.

As an example, the urban confinement was to have been announced on Friday 13 March but was twice postponed, using the electoral pretext, because the government does not have the means to apply this confinement throughout the country. It will be announced Monday evening (16 March).

The use of the army is foreseen in the territory through a transformation of the VIGIPIRATE plan, which is a trick of constitutional law to avoid having to activate Article 13 (state of emergency/martial law). The army should mainly be used in hospitals and logistic centres, in order to associate the army with an image of "protection" rather than repression.

Nevertheless, the army's lack of loyalty (or rather its lack of voluntarism) is a concern of the government, which is concerned that it does not have the means to implement its policy on a large scale.

The potential for slow secession of some urban and rural areas is being seriously considered. This will be a medium-term process, starting now but taking effect over about ten years.

Economically the situation is extremely critical, with a destruction of jobs and wealth that will put France in a shaky situation for at least 5 to 10 years. Maybe definitively.

In the very short term, the fear of the government is the possibility of a bank failure or "bank run".

A controlled destruction in the short or medium term of the euro zone is envisaged in a non-definitive way, in order to limit the breakage and give the State more room for manoeuvre to conduct a recovery policy after the crisis.

The EU seems impossible to save for many french officials.

On the whole, parliamentarians cynically point out that the only way for France to keep its "place" in the concert of nations would be to hope that the crisis would be even more violent elsewhere. In other words, France is no longer saveable, but it may be in a situation "less worse" than others.





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SUMMARY

> Summary

> I) The government's perception of the crisis

> II) Containment implementation

> III) The risk of "secession"

> IV) Terrorism of opportunity

> V) The role of the army

> VI) Crime

> VII) The economy

> Conclusion

> Legal note, sources and contact





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I) The government's perception of the crisis





The government is aware that it has lost valuable time, approximately 7 to 10 days, in implementing measures to combat the epidemic.

As a result of this delay, the entire government has been informed that the epidemic is going to hit France in an ultra-violent manner, visibly much harder than in Italy or China.

There is a huge uncertainty about the number of expected victims. The most optimistic are talking about 30,000 infected. The most pessimistic explain that this figure was exceeded more than a week ago, and that France should soon see between 90,000 and 300,000 cases. A marginal voice speaks of a contamination that could reach several millions, between 20% and 40% of the French population.

The government is aware that the lethality of the virus will increase as hospitals become congested. The 5% lethality rate given corresponds to an average established by taking into account adapted care. In case of complete blockage, the lethality could easily reach 30%.

The government is already questioning whether or not it is necessary to issue a governement notice (circulaire) to "orient medical teams" to help them "better identify priority cases". They referred to the "Italian criteria". The question here is whether doctors should be instructed to give priority treatment to "savable" patients while ignoring "condemned" patients (too old, too ill, whose chances of survival are low even if they are treated).

The government is aware that the latter measure, while effective in the long term, would be politically, if not legally, impossible to implement. It has therefore been decided for the time being to leave it "to the discretion of the doctors", who the government hopes will take the measures themselves without orders, without engaging the government's responsibility.

The confinement of Paris and 17 other French cities was initially to be declared as early as Friday evening. Eventually postponed until Saturday. Then now to Monday night.

By Monday night, the capital and largest cities in France should enter total containment. Information confirmed by leaks from an exchange of emails between two AP-HP doctors.

the question of whether the containment should be extended to the rest of the country directly has not been decided.

Nevertheless, the containment will be extended to the rest of the country at some point. The question is only whether this should be done in incremental steps. Or directly.





II) Implementation of the containment :

the implementation of a total containment of the French territory, has therefore been discussed. This would mainly involve the closure of towns, road and rail lines, the stopping of non-vital transport services, the stopping of non-vital logistical means.

In this respect, for example, postal services would continue to deliver mail, but not packages. Independent services such as Fed-Ex or Mondial Relay would be suspended.

A "part of the public services would be maintained". It is not clear which ones or what the term means.

Almost all economic activities would be suspended, with the exception of supermarkets, drives, veterinary clinics and a few other exceptions (e.g. DIY-Garden stores, like french equivalent to Home Depot, are allowed to remain open but only let in customers who are present to buy gas or buy food for their animals).





III) The risk of "secession" (separation)

Interesting quote "it is important that the French feel that the State is still there. And therefore it is important that the State make itself felt. Otherwise, the country will implode. We will return to tribalism, people will organize themselves based on hatred and violence. And once the health crisis will beover, let's make it clear, the country will be irreconcilable. In a way, it's the very future of the country that's at stake here." (Pronounced by a minister of state, impossible to specify which one without risking defamation trial).

the risk of having certain suburbs ("quartier" = no-go-zones) refuse health measures was explicitly mentioned. .

The risk of "secession" as such seems very low in the short term.

Nevertheless, the authorities fear urban violence and scenes of looting which would make armed police operations inevitable (implying a more ferocious repression than usual).

The main fear is that too fierce a repression would fan the flames. While the absence of repression would contribute to the isolation of the territories concerned because the health care services would no longer be able to reach them.

Alongside this risk of "separation" of "no-go-zones", there was also the risk that rural areas would de facto start operating without the State.

This is clearly the scenario most feared by the authorities. That villages and small towns would organise themselves "in competition with the legitimate state".

The case of hunters "often adept at survivalism (prepper) and of far right ideas" was mentioned.

the hypothesis of disarming some of the hunters in a preventive manner was evoked. A gendarmerie (police) officer explained that such a measure would require at least 2 months, while having very limited effectiveness (about 20% of effective seizures), and while contributing to creating a divorce between the State and the rural population.

An army general mentioned the idea of including hunters in the emergency mechanism, giving them responsibilities, citing the example of the "SAS" during the Algerian war. [The SAS were citizens who had been armed to enable them to protect their villages. So a kind militia composed of citizens with community policing missions.

The gendarmerie officer replied that "the problem was not to have armed hunters" but rather that the problem would come "when we will want to disarm them". Understandably, the functions assigned to the hunters could not be taken away from them later.

The debate was closed without really deciding the case of either "no-go-zones" or "rural areas".

Broadly speaking, the government realized that whatever its decision, there would be unrest and choices to be made. Especially in the long term.





IV) Opportunity terrorism

the hypothesis has been raised that terrorists might use the events to strike and attempt to create a chain reaction

According to the answer from representatives of the French domestic intelligence services, this is highly unlikely.

they note, however, that the WhatsApp exchanges they monitor are indeed very turbulent. Islamists rejoice in what they claim is a "divine retribution", while political extremists rejoice in a "crisis that will bring down the system".

but clearly there is no real risk of terrorism in the traditional sense, because the situation is not very favorable to cell organization as such.

the deputy director of one of the Police services notes, however, that if strict containment measures are taken, the results will lead to for the DGSI to be the first police service to be affected, thus compromising the monitoring capacities of the "Fiché S" (suspected terrorists, around 17.000).

Comment by a Member of Parliament: "Why should we monitor them if they pose no risk?".

A dry answer from the Deputy Director: "How do you know they pose no risk if you don't monitor them?"

Finally, the MPs note that the police resources must be used as a priority for public order measures. Not anti-gang or anti-terrorist measures.

The Deputy Director explains that the real threat is indeed a long-term one, with the risk of religious or political extremists seizing important assets during the crisis, assets that they can use later to strike the country.





V) The place of the army.





The IIIrd Division High Command had to work on a report aimed at preparing a possible use of the army in an amended copy of the Vigipirate plan.

No information on the Ist Division but they probably have similar instructions.

The Division is the higher echelon of the French armies. A division comprises several brigades, each brigade comprises several regiments. And each regiment comprises several autonomous companies. A division thus represents tens of thousands of soldiers.

Except in times of war, a division is only supposed to be an administrative unit and not a really organized military unit. The MPs questioned the senior officers present on the viability of the PROTERRE system (which normally allows joint manoeuvres between specialised brigades).

The general officer questioned wanted to reassure them, explaining that as long as it was a matter of elementary non-combatant missions, the units would be able to work together, the challenge being mainly logistical. He mentioned the possibility of placing some of the volunteer reservists in the GSBdDs (the logistic branches of the french army).

A member of parliament asked about the French armed forces' CBRN resources. Answer: "We are not prepared for a case like the one we are experiencing. The recruits are given brief training during their initial training in emergency measures and the use of T3P, mainly in the face of the nuclear threat. The same goes for our specialist regiment, the 2nd RD, which focused almost exclusively on gas threats."

a parliamentarian is questioning whether the army is capable of anything other than surveillance, distribution and law enforcement missions. Specifically, he asks whether the army could be used for decontamination or medical measures.

Answer: "With the exception of the SSA, in the present state it is very difficult to imagine mobilising units for anything other than law enforcement, no". Translation: Army medical branches can be mobilized, but the majority of regiments can only be effective for basic policing.

The Vigipirate plan is being called up again as an example. The debate is linked to legal and constitutional criteria as to whether it is possible to use the army without recourse to Article 13. The question is not settled, but the purpose is to avoid triggering panic by prematurely activating an article that "risks 'upsetting the population'.

the use of the military would be phased in. Firstly around hospitals to protect "stocks" (no precision, allusion to stocks of masks and drugs?), and also to associate the military's mission with that of the doctors, and thus with missions of "protection" rather than "repression".

A question is asked about the "morale of the troops". The answer comes from a lieutenant colonel, who draws a parallel with a civil war situation to explain that it is very difficult to mobilise when the threat is on national territory, because soldiers think above all of protecting their families, who are directly threatened.

He concludes by explaining that "until the State can guarantee the privileged protection of 140,000 military families, the State cannot hope to obtain the voluntarism of these 140,000 soldiers".

The subject is not discussed in any further detail, but this suggests that the army is not at all ready to be mobilized, as the military are "not willing to go and watch over roads 800 km away from their families, which are just as badly affected as the others".

The army's loyalty and obedience is therefore not directly questioned. Its legalism does not seem to be affected. But its technical and moral capacity to mobilise seems limited.





VI) Crime.

The question is discussed whether crime will increase in case of confinement.

A Police commissioner who was heard explains that the opposite is likely to happen. General crime will decrease.

On the other hand, he explains that the violence of "residual crime" will increase. In other words, fewer but much more violent crimes.

he mentions for example the almost deserted points of drug dealing in the parisian region. But at the same time the number of searches on the internet for weapons is increasing. Especially on the Deep web. He does not specify the public concerned (real criminals willing to act, or simply worried people?).

he ends by explaining that calm will depend a lot on the state's ability to maintain the water supply, but especially the electricity supply. He talks about catharsis, explaining that it's through violence "on the screen" that France will avoid violence "in the street". Quite obscure remarks that can be interpreted as a call to put the population to sleep through television and/or computer entertainment.

The subject of sexual violence is tackled in a few seconds, with a lapidary answer "it's obvious" to the question "will it increase?".





VI) Economy

a heated discussion is taking place between parliamentarians and CESE members. [CESE is a kind of Constitutional court, a mix between a Upper House/Senate and a Constitutional Court].

two visions clash: should we lighten containment to save the economy? Should we, on the contrary, focus everything on the population, even if it means sacrificing businesses? Should we find an in-between by promising a blank year to companies applying total containment? Endless debate. [Blank Year (année blanche) means allowing a year without taxes to be payed to the governement by citizens]

A member of the CESE asks what is the reality of the virus, about its effects, whether it will present a risk for a long time, whether we will soon see "the end of the tunnel"? Another replies curtly that "we haven't even entered the tunnel yet". Big lull in the conversation.

A MP launches the subject of the Euro money, someone asks if it is true that MEPs would discuss a "controlled destruction plan" of the Euro zone. The subject is evaded. But it is quite clear that most of the participants are unable to find any way of reconciling the Euro with an effective national policy to combat the virus without sacrificing either the population, the state or businesses. It is either the Euro or one of the other three. The State cannot envisage a recovery policy by keeping the euro as the single currency.

the possibility of a recession is addressed. One MP explains that "it is not coming, it is already there".

a CESE member explains that the economic crisis triggered by the health crisis will require "rethinking our economic model" and in particular "the gargantuan and irrational place left to the tertiary sector, an unproductive and parasitic sector whose resilience is almost nil".

A parliamentarian interrupted him to make him understand that this is not the time to deal with the subject. The CESE member replied that the real issues at stake were long-term issues. And that it is the very future of France that is at stake.

The hypothesis of a bank run is addressed in a serious but unspecified manner. It seems likely. The question is raised of partially blocking access to accounts via the Internet to limit banking movements and reinforce the withdrawal limits for ATMs to avoid panic among savers.

Unemployment is mentioned by an CESE member who estimates that the current crisis will destroy nearly 800,000 jobs in five years, well after the end of the epidemic. He does not cite his method of calculation, but nobody contradicts him or seems surprised.

The French economy seems impossible to revive without state intervention and therefore without an exit from the Euro, which is again denounced by some. The subject is again evaded.

a question is asked about the strength and resilience of the "digital economy". One CESE member mocked the fact that "digital is built on sand", while another said that "digital only works relying on physical flows, today these flows are stopped, Amazon or Rakuten may receive orders, but they will no longer be able to deliver to the country is confined". Summary: e-commerce sites outperformed at the beginning of the crisis, but will quickly find themselves without outlets to sell their consumer goods.





CONCLUSION

The French State is aware that the health crisis will be difficult. Hence the forthcoming announcement of the confinement of part of the country, and then the use of the army, first of all to carry out protection missions.

However, the State fears mainly the political, economic and social consequences of the epidemic. In the long term.

The idea that comes up most often is that "the state must hold firm"; because the government is aware that the control it will lose during this crisis will be lost in the long term, if not permanently. Even long after the epidemic. In a way, it is the credibility and authority of the state that is at stake for the future.

This crisis is referred to by some as a "black swan", a "zero point", a "beginning" or as "the epilogue of the short 21st century, which began in 2001 and ended less than 20 years later". It all depends on political visions and affinities.

But overall, there is a real awareness on the part of the State of the historical episode that is being played out for the country, with polarization and long-term dynamics emerging in the coming weeks.





NOTE

The information presented here has been gathered from sources close to Gallia Daily who hold official positions. Almost all of the information is based on notes taken by two parliamentary assistants at several official and unofficial meetings.

The veracity of this information has been verified by us. The verification of the plausibility of this information was also submitted to professionals in the relevant fields. For example: several doctors from the AP-HP; a Swiss epidemiologist working in partnership with an American hospital with priority information on the situation; two senior officers from the French Army, a general-officer and a SOCMUE non-commissioned officer from the 2ndRD; police officers and peacekeepers; an executive from the Prefecture [state governor] and a former prefect; a senator from the PACA region; a judge from the Bordeaux Metropolitan TGI (Court), a consular judge, six people who sit or have sat on the EESC.

Unverifiable or non-credible information has not been listed here.





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T.me/GalliaDaily