Full text of "Moral Theology A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities"

Project Gutenberg's Moral Theology, by John A. McHugh and Charles J. Callan This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net Title: Moral Theology A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities Author: John A. McHugh Charles J. Callan Release Date: February 22, 2011 [EBook #35354] Language: English Character set encoding: ASCII *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORAL THEOLOGY *** Produced by David McClamrock MORAL THEOLOGY A Complete Course Based on St. Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities BY JOHN A. MCHUGH, O.P. AND CHARLES J. CALLAN, O.P. REVISED AND ENLARGED BY EDWARD P. FARRELL, O.P. NEW YORK CITY JOSEPH F. WAGNER, INC. LONDON: B. HERDER Nihil Obstat ELWOOD FERRER SMITH, O.P., S.T.M. BENJAMIN URBAN FAY, O.P., S.T.LR. Imprimi Potest VERY REV. WILLIAM D. MARRIN, O.P., P.G., S.T.M. Provincial Nihil Obstat JOHN A. GOODWINE, J.C.D. Censor Librorum Imprimatur + FRANCIS CARDINAL SPELLMAN Archbishop of New York New York, May 24, 1958 The nihil obstat and imprimatur are official declarations that a book or pamphlet is free of doctrinal or moral error. No implication is contained therein that those who have granted the nihil obstat and imprimatur agree with the contents, opinions or statements expressed. [Transcriber's note: References to the Code of Canon Law in this work are to the 1917 version of the Code, later superseded by the 1983 version.] All Rights Reserved by Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., New York PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PREFACE The purpose of the present work is to give a complete and comprehensive treatise on Catholic Moral Theology, that is, on that branch of sacred learning which treats of the regulation of human conduct in the light of reason and revealed truth. This new work strives to deal with the subject as a systematic and orderly whole, and is based throughout on the principles, teaching and method of St. Thomas Aquinas, while supplementing that great Doctor of the Church from the best modern authorities. Needless to say, there are many questions and problems connected with modern life that did not exist when the great classic works on Moral Theology were written, and to these naturally special attention has been given in the treatment that follows. Nowadays, since the appearance of the New Code and of many special works on Canon Law, it would be a mistake to encumber the pages of a work like the present one with canonical questions of interest only to the specialist, and which are ably and abundantly treated in fine commentaries on the Code that are already available. Likewise, it would be an error to treat here matter pertinent only to Dogmatic Theology or History. All digressions, therefore, into alien fields have been avoided in this work, with the result that a greater number of useful moral questions have been herein considered. But not only is it necessary to avoid irrelevant subjects, but it is also needful not to sacrifice essentials for accidentals in any work of this kind. It is the fault of too many textbooks on Moral Theology to stress controversies, cite authors, and quote opinions, at the expense of the principles and reasons that govern and explain the teaching given. This work eschews that method, and is at pains everywhere, first of all, to lay the foundations on which the superstructure is to be built, namely, the definitions and rules that are presupposed to moral judgments and conclusions. Obviously, this is a more logical way of proceeding, and it consequently enables the student much more easily to understand and retain the matter studied, since he can thus reason questions out for himself. Moreover, such a method makes for brevity and renders it possible, as said above, to treat more subjects than could otherwise be treated; it makes it possible to condense the matter of many pages of larger and less accessible works into brief and terse paragraphs. But from this it should not be gathered that the work which follows aims to present Moral Theology in a dryly scientific fashion. On the contrary, it has been our endeavor to treat the matter in a way that is at once clear, solid, comprehensive and interesting. Since the general and the abstract do not make the same strong impression as the particular and the concrete, laws and axioms are copiously illustrated throughout with pertinent and practical examples that often amount to brief _casus conscientiae_, thus combining the theory and the practice of Moral Theology. It would be a mistake to think that, while Moral Theology is a technical and scientific treatise on human conduct, it deals exclusively or primarily with vice and sin, and that it is intended only to enable the priest rightly to administer the Sacrament of Penance, distinguishing between the various classes of sins and their consequences. Of course, it does all this, but it should do much more; for it has also a much higher purpose, which is to enable man, not only to know what is forbidden and how he may escape from moral disease and death, but also to understand what are his duties and how he may live the life of grace and virtue. The subject is indeed more positive than negative, and it should be discussed accordingly. Thus, far from being useful merely to confessors as a guide by which they may detect and distinguish mortal and venial sins and the higher and lower degrees of culpability, Moral Theology in its broader aspect should be of the greatest service likewise to the individual in forming his own habits and character, and in particular to those who have the guidance of others, whether in or out of the confessional, such as pastors, preachers, teachers, and the like. Consequently, the present work has been written with a view to the homiletic and pastoral functions of the priest, as well as those that pertain strictly to the administration of the Sacraments. Heretofore works on Moral Theology in English have been altogether too few or too fragmentary, whereas they have been abundant in the vernaculars of Continental Europe--German, French, Spanish, Italian, etc. This does not mean that the present work is intended to replace the Latin text-books used in our seminaries, but rather that it should enable students and priests to get a more thorough and ready knowledge of an all-important subject, and to adapt it more easily to the varying needs of the ministry. The section of this work on Law has been carefully read by two eminent civil lawyers. THE AUTHORS. May 10, 1929. REVISOR'S NOTE This is a revision, not a rewriting. Various deletions and additions have been made with the intent of bringing the work up to date within the scope of the original plan and methods of the authors. In this way it has been possible to preserve the features that have made this manual a standard guide for the past thirty years. EDWARD P. FARRELL, O.P., S.T.LR., S.T.D. Washington, D.C., June 8, 1958 CONTENTS [Volume I of print edition, through section 1625] PREFACE INTRODUCTION Definition of Moral Theology (1-3).--The Objects of Moral Theology (4-5).--The Sources of Moral Theology (6-12).--The Methods of Moral Theology (13-14).--The History of Moral Theology (15-16).--The Division of Moral Theology (17-18). PART I. GENERAL MORAL THEOLOGY Question I THE LAST END OF MAN AND THE MEANS TO THAT END Art. 1. THE LAST END OF MAN The Existence of the Last End (19).--The Nature of the Last End (20).--The Attainment of the Last End (21). Art. 2. ACTS AS HUMAN Introduction (22).--Definition (23).--Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act (24-33).--Consent Requisite for a Human Act (34-39).--Obstacles to Consent (40-55).--Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts (56-62). Art. 3. ACTS AS MORAL Introduction (63).---Definition (64-69).--The Sources of Morality (70-75).--Good Acts (76-78).--Bad Acts (79-81).--Indifferent Acts (82-86).--Perfect and Essential Goodness (87-88).--Morality of the External Act (89-93).--Morality of the Act Indirectly Willed (94-95).--Morality of the Consequences of an Act (96).--Imputability (97-105). Art. 4. ACTS AS MERITORIOUS Introduction (106).--Definition (107).--Divisions of Merit (108-115). Art. 5. THE PASSIONS Introduction (116).--Definition (117).--Division (118-120).--Moral Value of the Passions (121-131). Question II GOOD AND BAD HABITS INTRODUCTION (132) Art. 1. HABITS IN GENERAL Definition (133).--Division (134-136).--Strengthening and Weakening of Habits (137-139).--Habits and Morality (140-141). Art. 2. GOOD HABITS, OR VIRTUES Definition (142).--Division (143-152).--Properties of the Virtues (153-158).--Complements of the Virtues (159-166). Art. 3. BAD HABITS, OR VICES Definition (167).--Divisions (168).--Mortal Sin (169-179).--Venial Sin (180-184).--Imperfections (185).--Change in the Gravity of Moral Defects (186-196).--The Distinctions of Sins (197-219).--Comparison of Sins (220-229).--The Subjects of Sins (230-245).--The Causes of Sin (246-267).--The Motives of Sin (268-271).--The Results of Sin (272-283). Question III LAW INTRODUCTION Art. 1. LAW IN GENERAL Definition (285).--Division (286-287).--Collision of Laws (288-292).--The Basis of All Laws (293-294). Art. 2. THE NATURAL LAW Meaning (295-296).--Division (297-304).--Properties (305-327). Art. 3. THE POSITIVE DIVINE LAW Meaning (328-330).--Division (331).--The Mosaic Law (332-345).--The Law of the New Testament (346-369). Art. 4. HUMAN LAW Definition (370).--Division (371).--Qualities (372-374).--Obligation of Human Laws (375-384).--Interpretation of Law (385-386).--Those Subject to Law (387-388).--Change of Law (389-390).--The Law of Custom (391-400).--Dispensation (401-410).--Epieikeia (411-417). Art. 5. ECCLESIASTICAL LAW Introduction (418-419).--General Law of the Church (420-422).-- Lawgivers in the Church (423-424).--Subject-Matter of Church Law (425-426).--Those Bound by General Laws (427-434).--Those Bound by Particular Laws (435-446).--Promulgation (447-449).--Irritant Laws (450-458).--Laws Based on Presumption (459-461).--Fulfillment of Law (462-482).--Interpretation (433-486).--Cessation of Obligation (487-499).--Cessation of Law (500-505).--Custom (506-513).--Laws in a Wide Sense (514-541). Art. 6. CIVIL LAW Meaning (542).--Origin (543-545).--Subject-Matter (546-549).--Those Subject to Civil Law (550).--The Obligation of Civil Law (551-556).-- Special Kinds of Laws (557-572).--Other Questions (573). Question IV CONSCIENCE INTRODUCTION (574) Art. 1. THE LAW OF CONSCIENCE Definition (575).--Division (576-579).--Obligation of Conscience (580-587).--Results of Conscience (588-592). Art. 2. A GOOD CONSCIENCE Introduction (593).--Definitions (594).--Divisions (595-596).--The Lax Conscience (597-606).--The Scrupulous Conscience (607-613).-- Scrupulosity (614-635).--Practical Conclusions (636-639). Art. 3. A CERTAIN CONSCIENCE Introduction (640).--Necessity of Certitude (641-642).--Kinds of Certitude (643-653).--An Uncertain Conscience (654-655).--Doubt and Suspicion (656-661).--Opinion (662-671).--The Moral Systems (672-675).--Tutiorism (676-679).--Laxism (680-681).--The Other Systems (682).-Probabiliorism (683-687).--Equiprobabilism (688-700).-- Probabilism (701-730).--Compensationism (731-738).--Practical Conclusions (739-742). PART II. SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY INTRODUCTION (743) Question I. THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN THE INFUSED VIRTUES (744-745) Art. 1. THE VIRTUE OF FAITH Introduction (746-749).--The Meaning of Faith (750-753).--The Object of Faith (754-781).--The Acts of Faith (782-796).--The Habit of Faith (797-807).--The Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge (808-811). Art. 2. THE SINS AGAINST FAITH Introduction (812).--The Sin of Unbelief (813-825).--Heresy (826-834).--Apostasy (835-839).--The Sin of Doubt (840-846).--Credulity and Rationalism (847).--Dangers to Faith (848).--Dangerous Reading (849-866).--Dangerous Schools (867-874).--Dangerous Marriages (875-881).--Dangerous Communication (882-888).--The Sin of Blasphemy (887-903).--Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness (904-912). Art. 3. THE COMMANDMENTS OF FAITH Introduction (913).--The Commandment of Knowledge of Faith (914-924).-- The Commandment of Internal Acts of Faith (925-937).--The Negative Commandment of External Profession of Faith (938-943).--Dangers of Profession of Unbelief (944).--Forbidden Societies (945-955).-- Communication in Worship (956-975).-Cooperation in Religious Activities (976-986).--The Affirmative Commandment of External Profession of Faith (987-1008). Art. 4. THE VIRTUE OF HOPE Definition (1009-1017).--The Object of Hope (1018-1026).--The Excellence of Hope (1027-1035).--The Subject of Hope (1030-1040).--The Gift of Fear of the Lord (1041-1058).--The Sins against Hope (1059-1091).--The Commandments of Hope and of Fear (1092-1104). Art. 5. THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY Definition (1105-1114).--The Excellence of Charity (1115-1120).-- Production of Charity (1121-1132).--The Object of Charity (1133-1157).--The Order of Charity (1158-1182).--The Acts of Charity (1183-1192). Art. 6. THE EFFECTS OF CHARITY Internal Effects of Charity (1193).--Joy (1194).--Peace (1195-1197).-- Reconciliation (1198-1204).--Mercy (1205-1209).--External Effects of Charity (1210).--Beneficence (1211-1215).--Almsgiving (1216-1257).-- Fraternal Correction (1258-1294). Art. 7. THE SINS AGAINST LOVE AND JOY Introduction (1295).--Hate (1296).--Hatred of God (1297-1303).--Hatred of Creatures (1304-1311).--Gravity of the Sin of Hatred (1312-1316). --Species of the Sin of Hatred (1317-1319).--The Sin of Sloth (1320-1325).--Laziness (1326).--Lukewarmness (1327).--The Sin of Envy (1328-1331).--Emulation (1332).--Jealousy (1333).--Fear (1334).-- Indignation (1335-1336).--Gravity of the Sin of Envy (1337-1344).-- Means of Overcoming Envy (1345-1346). Art. 8. THE SINS AGAINST PEACE Introduction (1347).--Discord (1348-1354).--Contention (1355-1362).-- Acts of Sin against Peace (1363).--Schism (1364-1375).--War (1376-1427).--Fighting (1428-1434).--Duelling (1435-1439).--Sedition (1440-1443). Art. 9. THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE Introduction (1444).--Scandal (1445-1446).--Definition of Scandal (1447).--Causes of Scandal (1448-1458).--Results of Scandal (1459-1464).--Sinfulness of Scandal (1465-1474).--Persons Scandalized (1475-1476).--Duty of Avoiding Scandal (1477-1487).--Duty of Repairing Scandal (1488-1492).--Denial of Sacraments in Case of Scandal (1493-1494).--Seduction (1495-1505).--Cooperation in Sin (1506-1508).-- Kinds of Cooperation (1508-1512).--Sinfulness of Cooperation (1513-1514).--Lawfulness of Material Cooperation (1515-1525).-- Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation (1526-1527).--Special Cases of Cooperation (1528).-Cooperation in Reading Matter (1529-1530).--In Dances and Plays (1531-1532).--In Selling (1533-1536).--In Providing Food and Drink (1537-1539).--In Renting (1540-1541).--In Service (1542-1544).--Duties of the Confessor as Regards Cooperation (1545-1546). Art 10. THE COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY Introduction (1547-1552).--The Commandment of Love of God (1553-1560).--The Commandment of Love of Self (1561-1578).--The Commandment of Love of Neighbor (1579-1584).--Fulfillment of the Commandments of Charity (1585-1608). Art 11. THE GIFT OF WISDOM Introduction (1609).--The Nature of the Gift of Wisdom (1610-1614).-- The Persons who Possess Wisdom (1615-1618).--The Beatitude and the Fruits that Correspond to Wisdom (1619-1620).--The Sins Opposed to Wisdom (1621-1625). [Volume II of print edition, section 1626 to end] Question II. THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN (The Moral Virtues) Art. 1. THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE Definition (1627).--Objects (1628, 1629).--Certainty of Prudence (1630).--Excellence (1631, 1632).--Acts (1633).--Qualities (1634).-- Parts (1635, 1636).--Integral Parts (1637, 1638).--Subjective Parts (1639-1645).--Potential Parts (1646, 1647).--Persons Who Possess Prudence (1648-1656).--Growth and Decay of Prudence (1657).--The Beatitude and the Fruits that Correspond to Counsel (1662).--The Sins Against Prudence (1663).--Imprudence (1664-1666).--Haste (1667).-- Thoughtlessness.--Inconstancy (1669).--Causes of These Sins (1670).-- Negligence (1671-1673).--False Prudence (1674).--The Prudence of the Flesh (1675, 1676).--Astuteness, Trickery, Fraud (1677-1680).-- Solicitude (1681-1685).--Avarice, a Cause of Sins Against Prudence (1686).--The Commandments of Prudence (1687). Art. 2. THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE Introduction (1688).--The Nature of Justice (1689-1700).--Division (1701-1708).--The Object of Justice (1709-1713).--Comparison of Justice and Other Virtues (1714-1718).--Injustice (1719-1726).--Judgment (1727-1744). Art. 3. THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF JUSTICE: DISTRIBUTIVE AND COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE Subjective Parts of a Virtue (1745).--Distributive and Commutative Justice Compared (1746, 1747).--The Objects of Commutative Justice (1748-1750).--Restitution (1751-1761).-The Roots of Restitution (1762-1777).--Restitution for Cooperation in Injustice (1778-1785).-- The Circumstances of Restitution (1786-1796).--Causes Excusing from Restitution (1797-1801).--Some Special Cases of Restitution (1802, 1803). Art. 4. THE VICES OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE The Vice against Distributive Justice (1804-1814).-The Vices against Commutative Justice (1815).--Homicide (1816-1851).-Suicide (1852-1861).--Accidental Homicide (1862-1865).--Bodily Injury (1866-1871).--Titles to Property (1872-1876).--Contracts (1877-1889).--Theft and Robbery (1890-1919).--Lawful Occupation (1920-1926).--Occult Compensation (1927-1938).-Judicial Injustice (1939).--In Judges (1940-1963).--In Accusers (1964-1974).--In Defendants (1975-1983).--In Witnesses (1984-1994).--In Lawyers (1995-2008).--Unjust Words (2009).--Contumely (2010-2027).--Defamation (2028-2075).-Cooperation in Defamation (2076-2084).--Restitution for Defamation (2085-2102).--Whispering (2103-2105).--Derision (2106-2110).--Cursing (2111-2119).--Murmuring (2120).--Fraud in Contracts (2121, 2122).--In Sales (2123-2133).--Trading (2134, 2135).--Usury (2136).--Other Frauds (2137, 2138). Art. 5. THE QUASI-INTEGRAL AND POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE OF RELIGION AND THE OPPOSITE VICES The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice (2139, 2140).--The Potential Parts of Justice (2141-2144).--The Virtue of Religion (2145-2148).--The Internal Acts of Religion (2149).--Devotion (2150-2152).--Prayer (2153-2169).--Distractions (2170-2174).--The External Acts of Religion (2175).--Adoration (2176, 2177).--Sacrifice (2178-2182).--Offerings (2183, 2184).--Contributions (2185-2190).--Vows (2191-2225).--Cessation of Vows (2226-2243).--Other External Acts of Religion (2244).--Oaths (2245-2262).--Adjuration (2263-2268).--Divine Praises (2269-2272).--The Sins against Religion (2273).--Superstition (2274-2276).--Idolatry (2277-2281).--Divination (2282-2289).--Vain Observance (2290-2298).-- Irreligiousness (2299).--Temptation of God (2300-2307).--Sacrilege (2308-2316).--Simony (2317-2334).--Sinfulness of Simony (2335-2343). Art. 6. THE REMAINING POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE GIFT OF PIETY; THE COMMANDMENTS Piety (2344-2350).--Reverence (2351-2354).--Obedience (2355-2372).-- Gratitude (2373-2380).--Vengeance (2381-2384).--Truthfulness (2385-2388).--Lying (2389-2397).--Mental Reservation (2398-2402).-- Simulation (2403, 2404).--Hypocrisy (2405).--Braggadocio and Irony (2406).--Breach of Promise (2407).--Violation of Secret (2408-2420).-- Affability (2421-2423).--Liberality (2424-2429).--Equity (2430-2432).-- The Gift of Piety (2433).--The Commandments of Justice (2434-2436). Art. 7. THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE Nature (2437-2441).--Martyrdom (2442-2445).--The Opposite Vices (2446).--The Parts of Fortitude (2447).--Greatness of Soul (2448, 2449).--Presumption, Ambition and Vanity (2450).--Pusillanimity (2451).--Greatness of Deed, Meanness and Vulgarity (2452).--Patience (2453, 2454).--Stolidity and Impatience (2455).--Steadfastness, Effeminacy and Pertinacity (2456).--The Complements of Fortitude (2457).--The Commandments of Fortitude (2458-2460). Art. 8. THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE Nature (2461-2463).--The Opposite Vices (2464).--The Parts of Temperance (2465).--Abstemiousness (2466, 2467).--Fasting and Abstinence (2468, 2469).--The Sins Opposed to Abstemiousness (2470).--Gluttony (2471-2473).--Sobriety (2474, 2475).--The Sins against Sobriety (2476).--Drunkenness (2477-2485).--Purity (2486, 2487).--Virginity (2488-2491).--Impurity (2492-2496).--Temptations to Impurity (2497-2503).--Non-Consummated Sins of Impurity (2504).--Impure Thoughts (2505, 2506).--Impure Rejoicing (2507).--Impure Desire (2508, 2509).--Lewdness (2510-2514).--Sinfulness of Lewdness (2515-2518).-- Moral Species of Lewdness (2519).--The Consummated Sins of Impurity (2520-2522).--Fornication (2523-2528).--Defloration and Rape (2529).--Adultery (2530).--Incest (2531, 2532).--Carnal Sacrilege (2533).--Sins against Nature (2534).--Pollution (2535-2538).--The Sinfulness of Pollution (2539-2541).--Penalties (2542).--The Potential Parts of Temperance (2543).--Continence (2544).--Meekness (2545).-- Anger (2546-2549).--Sinful Indulgence (2550).--Clemency (2551, 2552).--Humility (2553-2556).--Pride (2557-2560).--Abjectness (2561).--Studiousness (2562).--Curiosity and Negligence (2563, 2564).--Modesty (2565).--Decorum (2566).--Modest Relaxation (2567, 2568).--Modesty in Style and Dress (2569, 2570).--Complements of Temperance (2571).--Commandments of Temperance (2572). Question III THE DUTIES OF PARTICULAR CLASSES OF MEN INTRODUCTION (2573) Art. 1. THE DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE CHURCH General Duties of the Faithful (2574).--First Precept of the Church: Sanctification of the Lord's Day (2575).--Hearing Mass (2576-2578).-- Servile Works (2579-2582).--Gravity of the First Precept (2583).-- Excuses (2584, 2585).--Second Precept: Abstinence (2586, 2587).-- Fasting (2588, 2589).--Third Precept: Yearly Confession (2590, 2591).--Fourth Precept: Easter Duty (2592, 2593).--Fifth and Sixth Precepts (2594).--Laws on the Index and Cremation (2595).--The Special Duties of Clerics (2596).--Vocation (2597, 2598).--Positive Duties of Clerics (2599).--The Divine Office (2600, 2601).--Celibacy (2602).-- Negative Duties of Clerics (2603).--Trading (2604).--Stocks and Bonds (2605).--Duties of Clerical Superiors (2606).--Duties of Pastors (2607).--Charity to the Poor (2608-2610).--Special Duties of Religious (2611).--The Vows (2612). Art. 2. DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF DOMESTIC AND CIVIL SOCIETY Husband and Wife (2613).--The conjugal Debt (2614-2617).--Morality in Marriage (2618, 2619).--Contraception and Onanism (2620).-- Birth-Control (2621, 2622).--Cooperation with Contraception (2623).-- Recapitulation (2624).--Regulae pro Confessariis (2625).--The Duty of Conjugal Companionship and Assistance (2626).--The Obligation of Marrying (2627).--The Duties of Engaged Persons (2628, 2629).--The Duties of Parents (2630, 2631).--Sex Education (2632).--The Duties of Children (2633).--The Duties of Other Relatives (2634).--The Duties of Superiors (2635).--The Duties of Subjects (2636).--Taxes (2637-2642).-- Voting (2643-2645).--The Duties of Employers (2646, 2647).--The Duties of Employees (2648).--Labor Disputes (2649).--Employment (2650).--The Duties of Certain Professions (2651). Question IV THE DUTIES OF MEN IN THE USE OF THE SACRAMENTS INTRODUCTION (2652, 2653) Art. 1. THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL: THE SACRAMENTALS Nature of a Sacrament (2654).--Matter and Form (2655-2660).--Necessity of the Sacraments (2661-2663).--The Minister of the Sacraments (2664).--Requisites for Valid Ministration (2665-2668).--For Lawful Ministration (2669, 2670).--The Recipient of the Sacraments; Requisites for Valid Reception (2671-2674).--Requirements for Lawful Reception (2675).--Obligations of the Minister in Reference to the Recipient (2676-2682).--Obligations of the Recipient in Reference to the Minister (2683).--The Sacramentals (2684). Art. 2. BAPTISM; CONFIRMATION; THE EUCHARIST; THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS Introduction (2685).--The Sacrament of Baptism (2686).--Solemn and Private Baptism (2687).--Duties of Pastors (2685).--Duties of Parents and Guardians (2689).--Duties of Sponsors (2690, 2691).--Duties of Adult Recipients (2692).--Duties of the Minister (2693).--The Sacrament of Confirmation (2694).--The Minister (2695).--The Recipient (2696).-- The Sponsors (2697).--The Pastor (2698).--The Sacrament of the Eucharist (2699).--Matter and Form of the Eucharist (2700).--The Minister of Consecration (2701, 2702).--The Minister of Communion (2703).--The Communicant (2704).--Worthy Communion (2705).--Frequent Communion (2706).--Duties of Parents, Pastors, Confessors (2707).--The Custody and Worship of the Eucharist (2708).--The Sacrifice of the Mass; the Celebrant (2709).--The Obligation of Saying Mass (2710).-- Dispositions for Celebration of Mass (2711).--The Circumstances of Mass (2712).--Interruption of Mass (2713).--Application of Mass (2714, 2715).--Stipends (2716). Art. 3. REPENTANCE; PENANCE; EXTREME UNCTION Introduction (2717).--The Virtue of Repentance (2718-2726).--The Sacrament of Penance (2727, 2728).--Contrition (2729-2735).--Resolution of Amendment (2736).--Confession (2737-2744).--Satisfaction (2745-2749).--The Minister (2750).--Jurisdiction (2751, 2752).-- Reserved Cases (2753, 2754).--Absolution without Jurisdiction (2755).-- Duties of the Confessor before Confession (2756).--Duties of the Confessor as Judge (2757-2761).--Duties of the Confessor as Physician (2762).--Duties of the Confessor as Teacher and Guide (2763).--Duties of the Confessor after Confession (2764).--Reparation of Defects (2765, 2766).--The Seal of Confession (2767, 2768).--Abuses of Confession (2769-2773).--The Sacrament of Extreme Unction (2774).--Duties of the Recipient and the Minister of Extreme Unction (2775). Art. 4. HOLY ORDERS; MATRIMONY Introduction (2776).--The Sacrament of Orders (2777).--Distinctions of Orders (2778).--The Hierarchy (2779).--The Matter and Form of Orders (2780).--The Minister of Ordination (2781, 2782).--The Recipient of Orders (2783-2785).--Registration of Ordinations (2786).--The Sacrament of Matrimony (2787, 2788).--The Elements of Matrimony as a Contract (2789-2793).--The Elements of the Sacrament (2794).--Duties in Reference to Marriage (2795).--Engagement (2796-2798).--Duties to Parents and to Children (2799, 2800).--Pre-Nuptial Investigations (2801).--Examination of the Parties by the Pastor (2802, 2803).-- Matrimonial Impediments (2804, 2805).--Impedient Impediments (2806-2809).--Diriment Impediments (2810-2819).--Dispensations and Banns (2820).--After the Examination (2821).--Instruction of the Couple (2822-2824).--Religious Preparation for Marriage (2825).--The Celebration of Marriage (2826-2829).--Validation (2830).--Divorce and Separation (2831). APPENDICES [placed at end of Volume I in print edition] I. SUMMARY OF COMMON LAW ON PROHIBITION OF BOOKS II. THE "ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT" INDEX TO VOLUMES I AND II MORAL THEOLOGY A Complete Course INTRODUCTION 1. Definition.--Moral Theology is defined: (a) etymologically, as the study of God, considered as the beginning and the end of man's moral life, i.e., of those acts that proceed from reason and will; (b) scientifically, as that part of Sacred Theology which treats of God as our Last End, and of the means by which we may tend to Him. 2. Hence, Moral Theology differs from various related sciences or habits. Thus: (a) it differs from Ethics, which is the science of human conduct as directed by reason to man's natural end, for Moral Theology uses faith as well as reason, and is concerned with man's supernatural end; (b) it differs from faith, since it includes not only principles revealed by God, but also conclusions derived from them; (c) it differs from synderesis, or the habit that perceives the natural principles of morality that are self-evident to the mind, for Moral Theology deals also with supernatural truths and with truths that are not self-evident; (d) it differs from conscience, which draws conclusions for individual cases, since Moral Theology is concerned with general conclusions. 3. Relation of Moral Theology to Dogmatic Theology.--(a) They do not differ as two distinct sciences, for the main object, in the light of which all else is studied, is the same in both--viz., God. (b) They do differ as two quasi-integral parts or branches of the same science, Dogma being concerned more with the speculative, and Moral with the practical aspects of theology. Dogmatic Theology is the more important of the two, as treating more directly on divine things and as being the basis of Moral Theology. In Dogma, God Himself is considered in His own nature and creatures as they proceed from Him as from an exemplary and efficient cause, or Creator. Moral Theology continues the pursuit of knowledge of God, concentrating upon Him as He is the Final Cause of things. Creatures emanate from God by way of creation, and this is part of the subject-matter of Dogma; but creatures return to Him, each in its own proper way by virtue of its nature created by God and directed by His Providence and Government, and this return of creatures to God constitutes the general subject-matter of Moral Theology. As Divine Providence and Government are continuations of His Creation, Moral Theology continues to study and to unfold the implications of Dogma's consideration of God as Creator. God is known to have created as an Intelligent Being ordering His handiwork to Himself as end. His special masterpiece, man, special because he is made to the Image of God, returns to God in a special way proper to him as an Image, i.e., by way of acts of his intellect and will guided and moved by Divine Providence and Predestination. It is of this special way of returning to God by man, His image, that Moral Theology treats. Thus it adds to and perfects Dogmatic Theology, enriching our knowledge of God by way of making explicit the implications of Divine Creation and Providence to His image, man. 4. The Objects of Moral Theology.--(a) The central theme or object of Moral Theology, which is considered for its own sake and to which all else is secondary (_objectum formale quod_), is God as the supernatural End or Destiny of man. (b) The secondary object (_objectum materiale_) is the means by which one is advanced towards one's Last End (such as human acts, virtue, grace, the Sacraments), or the obstacles which hinder one from attaining that End (such as vice, temptation, etc.). (c) The medium through which the above objects are known (_objectum formale quo_) is the light of natural reason illuminated by faith studying the sources of divine revelation and deducing conclusions from doctrines revealed by God. 5. Hence Moral Theology includes: (a) the revealed doctrines concerning man's destiny and duty that are contained in the written and oral Word of God and as interpreted by their custodian, the Catholic Church; (b) the conclusions that are contained in revelation; (c) the duties of man to human laws that are based on the divine natural or positive law; (d) the opinions of theologians on matters that are disputed, as in the controversy about the systems of conscience. 6. The Sources of Moral Theology, therefore, are: (a) Holy scripture; (b) tradition; (c) the decisions of Popes, Councils, and Congregations, Laws, etc.; (d) the authority of Doctors and theologians; (e) natural reason. 7. Holy scripture.--"All scripture, inspired by God, is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice" (II Tim., iii. 16). (a) Thus, the deeds narrated in scripture contain lessons for our instruction; but not all of them, even though they be concerned with holy men, are offered for our imitation. (b) The laws of the Old Testament known as ceremonial (such as the rite of circumcision), and those called judicial (such as the prohibition against the taking of interest), are no longer obligatory; but the moral precepts, such as those found in the Decalogue, always remain in force. (c) The ordinances of the New Testament are of three kinds: the Gospel counsels, which are not laws, but invitations to a higher practice of virtue than is necessary for salvation (e.g., the advice of our Lord that one sell all and give to the poor); the laws of the New Testament, which are the commands that it imposes for all times (such as the precepts that one believe the Gospel message, receive Baptism, hear the Church, etc.); temporary regulations, which are those dispositions that were made only for passing circumstances (such as the prohibition issued by the Apostles against the eating of animals that had been suffocated). 8. Tradition.--Tradition contains those doctrines concerning faith and morals, not found in scripture, that were given orally by Christ or inspired by the Holy Spirit, and that have been handed down from one generation to another in the Catholic Church. Tradition becomes known to us: (a) through the teaching of the Church expressed by her solemn or ordinary magisterium; (b) through the writings of the Fathers of the Church; (c) through the practice of the Church expressed in her universal customs and laws; (d) through the worship of the Church expressed in her universal forms of prayer and liturgical observance. 9. Decisions.--In addition to divine tradition just spoken of, Moral Theology uses: (a) Apostolic tradition, which comes down from the Apostles, but whose subject-matter is not a teaching revealed to them, but an ordinance which they themselves made as rulers of the Church (e.g., the law that Sunday be sanctified as the Lord's day); (b) ecclesiastical tradition, which contains regulations made by the authorities in the Church and handed down to succeeding times (e.g., the introduction of certain days of feast or fast). 10. Authority of Doctors and Theologians.--(a) St. Thomas Aquinas has been recognized by the Church as her highest theological authority, and the Code of Canon Law (Canons 589, Sec. 1, and 1366, Sec. 2) orders that in all seminaries and religious houses of study the courses of theology shall be made according to his method, teaching and principles. (b) When the theologians agree with unanimity that a certain doctrine pertaining to faith or morals is divinely revealed, it would be next to heresy to hold the opposite; if they agree only that it is certain, it would be rash to contradict them, unless new and serious objections unknown to them can be offered; if they are divided between schools and systems (even though great claims for opinions are made by their partisans), it is lawful for competent theologians to use their own judgment and decide for the side that seems to have the better arguments in its favor. 11. Reason.--The uses of natural reason in Moral Theology are: (a) it demonstrates certain preambles to the teachings of Moral Theology, such as the existence of God, His omniscience and veracity; (b) it corroborates from philosophy many of the revealed teachings, viz., that man's end is not in things finite, that he has duties to God, to society, to himself, etc.; (e) it affords analogies in the natural order by which we may illustrate the end and duties of man in the supernatural order; (d) it supplies the means by which the teachings on morals may be developed into the conclusions that are contained in them, by which those teachings may be defended against the fallacious objections of adversaries, and by which the whole may be arranged scientifically into a body of doctrine. 12. Moral Theology is served not only by the various branches of philosophy (such as Ethics, Theodicy, Psychology, Logic), but also by many of the natural sciences. Thus: (a) Medicine and Physiology are useful for understanding the morality and imputability of acts; (b) Sociology and Economics may throw light on problems concerning justice; (c) Jurisprudence is, of course, closely related to questions concerning duties that arise from human laws; (d) History confirms the teachings of Christian morality by the lessons of experience. 13. The Method to Be Followed in Moral Theology.-(a) The positive method is a simple statement of moral principles and doctrines, with little attention to argument, except such as is found in the positive sources (e.g., scripture, tradition, the decisions of the Church). (b) The Scholastic method is a scientific statement of moral teaching through accurate definition of terms, systematic coordination of parts, strict argumentation and defense, attention to controversies, and recourse to philosophy and other natural knowledge. (c) The casuistic method, or case-system, is the application of moral principles to the solution of concrete problems of lawfulness or unlawfulness. 14. The Scholastic method is the one best suited for the study of Moral Theology, because it is more scientific, and fits one better to understand, retain, and apply what one learns. But it is not exclusive of the other methods, since it perfects the positive method, and is the groundwork for the case method. Each method has a special suitability for certain ends. Thus: (a) the positive method is well adapted to preaching, and hence was much in favor with the Fathers of the Church, as can be seen from their moral homilies and treatises; (b) the Scholastic method is the best for study, teaching, apologetic, and was followed by the great classical works of theology in the Middle Ages and later; (c) the case method is very helpful to the seminarian and the priest in the exercise of the ministry of the confessional. 15. The History of Moral Theology.--There are three periods in the history of Moral Theology: the Patristic, the Medieval, and the Modern. (a) The Patristic Period (1st to 12th century).--The moral writings of the-Fathers are popular, exhortatory, and occasional; and it is not till the Middle Ages that we meet with works of systematic Moral Theology. The following are among the most notable moral works of the Fathers: the _Paedagoga_ of Clement of Alexandria (d. about 217), which explains what the everyday life of the Christian should be; the _Catecheses_ of St. Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386); the _De Officiis Ministrorum_ of St. Ambrose (d. 397), a Christian counterpart of Cicero's work _De Officiis_; the _De Civitate Dei_ of St. Augustine (d. 430), which contrasts love of God and love of self; the _Expositio in Job seu Moralium libri XXV_ of St. Gregory the Great (d. 604), which consists of moral instructions based on the Book of Job. Celebrated among the ascetical and mystical writings are: the _Ladder of Paradise_ of St. John Climacus (6th century), the Conferences of Cassian (about 416), the _Libri V de Consideratione_ of St. Bernard (d. 1153). St. Gregory the Great's _De Cura Pastorali_ is a systematic work of pastoral theology, and is regarded as a classic. (b) The Medieval Period (12th to 16th century).--The method of the moralists of this period differs from that of the Fathers in that the former is systematic and philosophical, and more proximately adapted to the use of confessors. The masterpiece of scientific Moral Theology is of course found in the _Summa Theologica_ of St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). Works of casuistry were composed by St. Raymond of Pennafort (about 1235), by John of Freiburg (d. 1314), by John of Asti (about 1317), by Angelus of Chiavasso (about 1476), by Sylvester Prierias (d. 1523). The _Summa Theologica_ of St. Antoninus of Florence (d. 1459) has been called an inexhaustible storehouse for manuals of casuistry. Among the ascetical writers are: St. Bonaventure, the Seraphic Doctor (d. 1274), John Gerson (d. 1429), John Tauler (d. 1361), Bl. Henry Suso (d. 1366), and Denis the Carthusian (d. 1471). (c) The Modern Period (16th century to the present).--Characteristic of this period are the commentaries written on St. Thomas, the controversies over the systems of conscience, the appearance of numerous manuals and special treatises, and the attention given to changed conditions of society and ecclesiastical discipline. Noteworthy among modern works are: the Commentary on St. Thomas by Cajetan (d. 1534); the writings of Bartholomew de Medina (d. 1581), called the father of moderate Probabilism; the _De Paenitentia_ of Lugo (d. 1660), a handbook that combines speculative and casuistical theology; the _Roman Catechism_, which was issued by the authority of the Council of Trent in 1566; the _Theologia Moralis_ of St. Alphonsus Liguori (d. 1787), a work whose authority is universally recognized; the celebrated treatise on the virtues by Lessius (d. 1623); the classic work of Suarez (d. 1617), _De Religione_; the _Summa Casuum Conscientiae_ of Toletus (d. 1596); the commentaries of Francis de Victoria (d. 1546), which are writings of extraordinary merit. More recent works are so numerous that it is impossible to mention them here. 18. Among the many modern works on Moral Theology which have been published abroad, not a few are in the vernacular--in German, French, Italian, Spanish, etc. While they are not intended to replace the Latin text-books used in seminaries, these are nevertheless a very great help to a fuller knowledge of the matter treated and to a more ready use of it in the work of the ministry. So far there has been a dearth of works on Moral Theology in English; and it is this want that has occasioned the present work, which aims at presenting Moral Theology, not only in its essentials, but even more in detail and with greater fullness than is done by most of the text-books commonly in use. And yet, while pursuing this larger and more comprehensive plan, the authors of this new work have tried to be as brief and compact as possible. It has been their endeavor especially to avoid digressions into other fields and to sum up pertinent matter in as clear and simple a manner as the subjects treated will permit. 17. The Division and Order of Parts in Moral Theology.--The arrangement of his matter made by St. Thomas Aquinas in the _Summa Theologica_ is admittedly unsurpassed and unsurpassable in the qualities that good distribution should have, viz., clearness, connection between parts, completeness. Hence, we cannot do better than follow the order he has used in his treatment of moral subjects. His general division is as follows: (1) The Last End of Man.--From the Last End acts derive their morality, those being good that advance man towards its attainment, and those evil that turn him away from its possession. The Last End is considered; (a) as to its existence; (b) as to its nature (i.e., the constituents of supreme beatitude). (2) The General Means Tending to the Last End.--God is approached, not by the steps of the body, but by the operations of the soul, and thus it is human acts that lead one to one's Last End. These acts are considered: (a) as they are in themselves or absolutely, and according to the twofold division of acts proper to man (human acts) and acts common to man and beast (passions); (b) as to the internal principles from which they proceed, i.e., habits, whether good (virtues) or bad (vices); (c) as to the external principles by which they are influenced. The external principle of evil is the demon, who tempts man to sin. The external principle of good is God, who instructs us by His law and the voice of conscience, and assists us by His grace. (3) The Special Means Tending to the Last End.--These are our own good works; hence, here are considered the virtues incumbent on all classes of men, i.e., the theological and moral virtues. 18. Some of the topics just mentioned (e.g., divine grace) are discussed fully in works on Dogmatic Theology, and hence may be omitted here. Again, since the Last End of man is considered at great length in dogmatic works on Eschatology, little need be said about it here. Hence, it will be convenient to divide this work into two parts as follows: General Moral Theology, in which are treated the more remote principles on duty, such as the Last End, human acts, good and bad habits, laws and conscience, grace; (b) Special Moral Theology, in which are treated the more immediate rules concerning duty, i.e., man's obligations as regards the virtues and the Commandments. PART I GENERAL MORAL THEOLOGY Question I THE LAST END OF MAN AND THE MEANS TO THAT END Art. 1: THE LAST END OF MAN (_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 1-5; _Contra Gentes_, IV, cc. 1-63.) 19. Existence of the Last End.--Every deliberate act proceeds from the will, and, since the will pursues good as its goal, it follows that every deliberate act is done for some good or end. But, if this end is an imperfect good, it is desired not for itself but as leading up to a perfect good, that is, to one which will leave nothing beyond it to be desired; in other words, the intermediate end is willed on account of a last end. Hence, all that a man wills, he wills directly or indirectly on account of a last end. All men desire their own happiness and perfection; but not all understand in what beatitude consists, since some aim ultimately at finite goods. 20. Nature of the Last End.--As man's Last End is that object which will make him perfectly happy, it cannot consist: (a) in external goods, such as wealth, honors, fame, glory and power, since one might have all these and yet be very unhappy; (b) in goods of the body, such as health, beauty, pleasure and strength, since all these things are passing, and moreover satisfy only a part, and that the lower part, of man; (c) in goods of the soul, such as wisdom or virtue, since man's intellect is never content with particular truth, nor his will with particular good, the former always reaching out for the highest truth, the latter for the highest good. Hence, the Last End of man is the Infinite Good, or God "who satisfieth thy desire" (Psalm cii. 5). 21. Attainment of the Last End.--God being supersensible, the act by which He is attained cannot be any operation of the senses, but must be an act of the higher powers. Man possesses his Last End through the vision of God, from which result beatific love and every good that is compatible with the glorified state. For "we see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face" (I Cor., xiii. 12); and there shall be "glory and honor and peace to everyone that worketh good" (Rom, ii. 10). Art. 2: ACTS AS HUMAN (_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 6-17.) 22. Human acts are a means to man's Last End, inasmuch as they are meritorious--i.e., labors that deserve a recompense (I Cor., iii. 8), struggles that deserve a crown (II Tim., ii. 5). But works are not meritorious unless they are one's own (human) and good (moral); and, since the reward is supernatural, they must also be the fruit of grace. Hence, we shall speak of acts in the following order: (a) acts as human and free (Art. 2); (b) acts as morally good (Art. 3); (c) acts as supernaturally meritorious (Art. 4). 23. Definition.--Those acts are called human of which a man is the master, and he is master of his actions in virtue of his reason and his will, which faculties make him superior to non-human agents that act without reason and freedom. Hence, the following kinds of acts done by a human being are not called human: (a) those that are not under the control of the mind, because one is permanently or temporarily without the use of reason or without knowledge (e.g., the acts done by the insane; by those who are unconscious or delirious, under the influence of hypnotism or drugs, distracted or carried away by vehement fear, anger, etc.; by infants and uninstructed persons); (b) those that are not under the control of the will, even though they are known (e.g., automatic acts, such as the acts of the vegetative powers, growth, circulation of the blood; pathological acts, such as convulsions; acts done under external violence). 24. Knowledge Requisite for a Human Act.--An act is human, or voluntary, when it is deliberately desired; and, since nothing can be deliberately desired unless it is known, an act done without knowledge is not human or voluntary. Thus, a delirious patient does not will the language he uses, for his mind is confused and he does not understand what he is saying. 25. The condition of a person without knowledge is ignorance, which is defined as the absence of knowledge in one who is capable of knowing. Ignorance is of various kinds. From the viewpoint of that which is not known (i.e., of the object of the ignorance), there is ignorance of the substance of an act and ignorance of the quality of an act. For example, Titus driving rapidly in the dark runs over and kills a pet animal of his neighbor, but knows nothing of this happening (ignorance of the substance of the act); Balbus, a child, fires a pistol at his playmate, not knowing that this causes death (ignorance of the physical quality of an act), and that it is the sin of murder (ignorance of the moral quality of an act). 26. With reference to the will of the person who is ignorant, three kinds of ignorance may be distinguished. (a) Ignorance is concomitant (simultaneous with the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and yet is not therefore the reason of the act that follows it, since that act would have been done, even had there been knowledge. This may be illustrated by the example of a hunter who intended to kill an enemy, and killed him only accidentally while shooting at an animal. (b) Ignorance is consequent (after the act of the will), when it is voluntary, which may happen in different ways: first, when ignorance is affected, as when a person expressly desires to remain ignorant about his duties, so that he may have an excuse for his sins, or that he may not be disturbed in his evil life; secondly, when he neglects to acquire the knowledge he ought to possess, as when a hunter kills a man, thinking him an animal, because he took no pains to be sure before firing. (c) Ignorance is antecedent (before the act of the will), when it is not voluntary, and is the cause of the act that follows since the act would not have been done, if there had been knowledge. For example, a hunter who has used reasonable diligence to avoid accidents, kills a man whom he mistook for a deer. 27. With reference to the responsibility of the person who is ignorant, there are two kinds of ignorance. (a) Ignorance is invincible when it cannot be removed, even by the use of all the care that ordinarily prudent and conscientious persons would use in the circumstances. Thus, a person who has no suspicions of his ignorance, or who has tried in vain to acquire instruction about his duties, is invincibly ignorant. (b) Ignorance is vincible when it can be removed by the exercise of ordinary care. There are various degrees of this species of ignorance: first, it is merely vincible, when some diligence has been exercised, but not enough; secondly, it is crass or supine, when hardly any diligence has been used; thirdly, it is affected, when a person deliberately aims to continue in ignorance. 28. Influence of the Various Kinds of Ignorance on the Voluntariness of Acts.--(a) Ignorance of an act, whether as to its substance or quality, makes an act involuntary, when the ignorance itself is involuntary, as will be explained in paragraph 29. Hence, if we refer to ignorance that is not blameworthy and to the guilt of violating the law of God, we may say: "Ignorance excuses." (b) Ignorance does not make an act involuntary before human law, unless the law itself presumes the ignorance or the ignorance is proved, as will be explained in the Question on Law (see 489 sqq.). For, when law is sufficiently promulgated or a fact pertains to one's own self, the presumption is that ignorance does not exist, or that it is culpable. Hence, the general rule of law common to all forms of jurisprudence: "Ignorance does not excuse" (cfr. Canon 16 of the Code of Canon Law). 29. Effects of Concomitant, Consequent, and Antecedent Ignorance.--(a) Concomitant ignorance does not make an act involuntary, because it does not cause anything that is contrary to the will; but it does make the act that is performed non-voluntary, since what is unknown cannot be actually desired. (b) Consequent ignorance cannot make an act entirely involuntary, since such ignorance is itself voluntary; but it does in a certain respect make an act involuntary, i.e., inasmuch as the act would not have been done save for the ignorance. (c) Antecedent ignorance makes an act entirely involuntary. 30. Effects of Invincible and Vincible Ignorance.--(a) Invincible ignorance, even of what pertains to the natural law, makes an act involuntary, since nothing is willed except what is understood. Hence, no matter how wrong an act is in itself, the agent is not guilty of formal sin (see 249), if he is invincibly ignorant of the malice involved. (b) Vincible ignorance does not make an act involuntary, since the ignorance itself is voluntary; hence, it does not excuse from sin. It does not even make an act less voluntary and less sinful, if the ignorance is affected in order that one may have an excuse; for such a state of mind shows that the person would act the same way, even though he had knowledge. 31. Vincible ignorance makes an act less voluntary and less sinful: (a) when the ignorance is not affected, for the voluntariness is measured by the knowledge, and knowledge here is lacking; (b) when the ignorance, though affected, was fostered only through fear that knowledge might compel a stricter way of life; for such a state of mind seems to show that one would not act the same way if one had knowledge. 32. Like to ignorance are the following: (a) error, which is a judgment not in agreement with the facts (e.g., Balbus, a young child, thinks stealing is lawful, because older persons are represented as stealing in the moving pictures); (b) forgetfulness, which is ignorance of what was once known (e.g., Titus made a study of his duties as a Catholic when he was young, but at present what he does not know about those duties is not inconsiderable); (c) inadvertence, which is a lack of attention to what is being done (e.g., Caius, who is absent-minded, sometimes gets his hair cut and goes away without paying, or takes money that does not belong to him). 33. The principles and conclusions given above with regard to ignorance will apply also to error, forgetfulness and inadvertence; for in all these cases the lack of actual knowledge at the moment an act is done, is either willed or not willed, and accordingly the act itself is either voluntary or not voluntary. In the examples mentioned above, Balbus does not will the guilt of theft, since he does not know it; but his elders do will that guilt, because they should know it. Titus is responsible for neglecting his duties, if he has forgotten them through his own neglect of them or other fault; otherwise, he is not responsible. Caius' inattention is involuntary, if due to mental concentration or distraction, and if it is not desired by him; it is voluntary, if he is aware of it and cultivates it, or if he does not try to be more attentive to his duties. 34. Consent Requisite for a Human Act.--To be human, an act must proceed not only from knowledge, but also from inclination; that is, it must be voluntary. Three things are necessary in order that an act be voluntary: (a) it must be agreeable to an internal principle, i.e., in most moral matters to the will. Hence, an act that is done against one's will on account of external violence is not voluntary; (b) it must be caused by the will. Hence, a shower of rain is said to be agreeable to the gardener, but not voluntary since his will is not its cause; (c) it must be performed with a conscious purpose. Hence, natural acts (such as sleeping) and spontaneous acts (such as stroking one's beard absent-mindedly) are not voluntary acts. 35. Kinds of Voluntary Acts.-(a) A voluntary act is free or necessary, according as one can or cannot abstain from it. The vision of God in heaven is voluntary to the blessed, since they look at Him knowingly and gladly; but it is not free, since they cannot avert their gaze from that which makes them blessed. The love of God on earth is voluntary, since chosen; but it is also free, since man is able to turn away from God. (b) An act is perfectly or imperfectly voluntary, according as the deliberation and consent that precede it are full or only partial. (c) An act is said to be simply--that is, absolutely--voluntary, when it is wished under circumstances that exist here and now, although in itself, apart from those circumstances, it is not wished. It is said to be voluntary under a certain aspect, when it is desired for itself, but not under existing conditions. Thus, if an arm needs to be amputated to save life, the amputation is absolutely voluntary, while the preservation of the arm is voluntary only in a certain respect. Hence, an act is voluntary simply or absolutely when one chooses it, all things considered; it remains involuntary under a certain respect, inasmuch as the choice is made with reluctance. (d) An act is voluntary in itself or directly, when it is desired in itself for its own sake (i.e., as an end), or for the sake of something else (i.e., as a means). It is voluntary in its cause or indirectly, when it is not desired in itself, either as a means or an end, but is foreseen as the result of something else that is intended. Examples: Titus quarrels with his neighbors, at times because he likes to quarrel, and at other times because he wishes to make them fear him; hence, his quarrels are directly voluntary. Caius is a peaceful man who dislikes quarreling; but he likes to drink too much occasionally, although he knows that he always quarrels when he is under the influence of liquor. Thus, his quarrels are indirectly voluntary. 36. An act is voluntary in its cause in two ways: (a) approvingly (physically and morally voluntary in cause), when one is able and obliged not to perform the act that is its cause (e.g., the quarrels of Caius mentioned above are approved implicitly by him, since he could and should prevent the intoxication which is their cause); (b) permissively (physically voluntary in cause), when one is not able or not obliged to omit the act that is its cause (see 94 sqq.). Examples: Balbus, in order to make a living, has to associate with persons of quarrelsome character, and as a result often hears shocking disputes. Titus, a military commander, orders an enemy fortification to be bombarded, although he knows that this will involve the destruction of other property and the unavoidable killing of some non-combatants or neutrals. Caius writes a book whose purpose and natural result is edification, but he foresees that evil-minded persons will misunderstand it and take scandal. 37. Omissions, as well as acts, may be voluntary. (a) Thus, they are directly voluntary, when they are willed as an end or as a means to an end. Example: Titus fails to reprove the disorders of those in his charge because he likes disorder, or because it illustrates his theory that everyone should go through an evolution from roughness to refinement. (b) They are indirectly voluntary, when their cause is willed with approval or permitted with disapproval. Example: Balbus does not like to miss Mass, but he fails to rise from bed when he hears the church bell ringing, and as a result does not get to church. If his failure to get up was due to laziness, the omission of Mass was approved by Balbus; if it was due to illness, the omission was only permitted. 38. The effect that follows upon an omission may also be voluntary. (a) Thus, it is directly voluntary, if the omission is chosen as a means to the effect. Example: Caius hears Titus say that he is going to make a certain business deal, and he knows that Titus will suffer a great loss thereby; but he wishes Titus to lose his money, and therefore says nothing about the danger. (b) It is indirectly voluntary, if one foresees the effect, and approves or permits it. Examples: Balbus sees Titus attacked by a hoodlum and realizes that, unless assisted, Titus will be badly beaten up; but he is such an admirer of pugilism that, in spite of his sorrow for Titus, he decides not to stop the fight. Caius sees his friend Sempronius drowning, and fails to go to his assistance, because to his regret he is not an expert swimmer. 39. The effect of an omission is indirectly voluntary and approved by the will when one is able and bound to do what one omits. Example: Balbus receives some confidential documents with the understanding that he will guard them sacredly; but fearing to lose the good graces of Titus, who is curious and loquacious, he omits to put the papers away as promised, with the result that Titus finds them and reads them. 40. Obstacles to Consent.--The obstacles to consent are all those factors that take away or lessen the voluntariness of an act. (a) Thus, the actual obstacles that affect the intellect are reduced to ignorance, spoken of above; those that affect the will are passion and fear, and that which affects the external powers is coercion. (b) The habitual obstacles are habits and abnormal mental states. 41. Fear is a disturbance of mind caused by the thought that a future danger is impending. It is an obstacle to consent in various ways: (a) it lessens or takes away freedom of judgment, inasmuch as it hinders or suspends the reasoning processes; (b) it lessens the voluntariness of choice, inasmuch as it makes one decide for what is not of itself agreeable. 42. An act done under fear that impeded the use of judgment is: (a) involuntary, if the fear was so great that one was temporarily out of one's mind. Example: Titus is so panic-stricken at the thought that a wild animal is pursuing him that he fires a revolver in every direction; (b) less voluntary, if the fear prevents one from thinking with calmness and deliberation. Example: Caius is being questioned by a stern examiner who demands an immediate reply. Fearing to hesitate, Caius gives what he knows is a "bluffing" answer. 43. The acts of one who is under fear are of various kinds. (a) Acts are done with fear, when the fear is concomitant--i.e., when it is not willed and does not cause the act, but is merely its occasion or would rather prevent it. Examples: Julius is ordered under pain of death to drink a glass of wine, a thing he was intending to do and which he would have done even without any threats. Balbus walks along a lonely road, because he must get home, but he trembles at the thought of robbers. Caius, a highwayman, at the point of the revolver, forces Balbus to hand over his purse, but he fears that the police may arrive before he has secured the money. Titus, a business man, makes a trip by air, because he must reach another city without delay, but he has some apprehensions about his safety. All these men act, not because of, but apart from or in spite of their fears. (b) Acts are done through fear, when fear causes an act that would not otherwise be performed. The fear may be antecedent (i.e., unwilled) or consequent (i.e., willed). Examples: Balbus, in the case mentioned above, surrendered his purse because of involuntary fear which was caused by the revolver of the robber. Claudius makes an act of sorrow for sin because of voluntary fear which he produces by thinking of the punishment of hell. 44. The effects of fear, which do not take away the use of reason, on the voluntariness of acts are as follows. (a) Acts done with fear are not made really involuntary on account of the fear that accompanies them, for they are done for their own sake, not out of fear or as a consequence of fear. They may be called relatively involuntary in the sense that, by reason of fear, they are comparatively unpleasant, unless one enjoys the thrill of danger. Examples: Balbus, Caius and Titus, in the cases mentioned above, acted with perfect willingness. Whether they enjoyed their experiences or not, depends on their attitudes towards adventure and excitement. (b) Acts done through fear are voluntary simply and absolutely, for the act done under the impulse of fear is what the agent considers here and now as most desirable. Examples: Balbus' surrender of his purse and Claudius' act of contrition are just what these two men wish to do as best suited to the circumstances. (c) Acts done through fear are involuntary in a certain respect, if the agent can retain his inclination towards the opposite of the act and still avoid what he fears; otherwise, they are in no way involuntary. Examples: Balbus retains his liking for the money taken from him by force, and hence the surrender of it to the highwayman, although voluntary, if all things are considered, is not voluntary, if only the money itself is considered. Claudius, on the contrary, retains no liking for his sins, for he knows that, if he does, he will defeat the purpose of his act of sorrow, which is to escape the pains of hell; hence, his contrition, although the result of fear, is in no respect involuntary. 45. Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite towards its object through love, desire, hope, or its repose therein through delight. It tends towards good, as fear tends away from evil (see 117 sqq.). Passion is an obstacle to consent in the following ways: (a) it takes away voluntariness (i.e., the quality of proceeding from an internal principle with knowledge of the end of the act), whenever it is so intense as to prevent knowledge; (b) it diminishes liberty (i.e., the quality of being perfectly voluntary, or indifferent as between many acts), even when it does not prevent knowledge. 46. Spiritual appetites fortify the reason, but the opposite is true of sensible appetites; for these latter draw all the attention to things that are lower and away from those that are higher, and impede the exercise of imagination and other senses that serve the reason. In extreme and rare cases passion may be so intense as to distract from or prevent altogether the exercise of reason, or to produce insanity. Thus, we sometimes hear of persons losing their minds through affection for money, or of performing irrational deeds under the excitement of joy. 47. With reference to the will, passion is twofold. (a) It is antecedent, when it precedes the act of the will and causes it. In this case the passion arises not from the will, but from some other cause (e.g., the bodily state, as when a sick man longs for food that is forbidden). (b) Passion is consequent when it follows the act of the will and results from it. This may happen either without the will choosing the passion (as when the very vehemence with which the will desires some object causes a corresponding sensitive emotion to awaken), or because the will has deliberately aroused the emotion in order to be able the better to act through its cooperation. 48. Antecedent passion makes an act more voluntary, since it makes the will tend with greater inclination to its object; but it likewise makes an act less free, since it impedes deliberation and disturbs the power of choice. Example: A man who takes extreme delight in sports, plays voluntarily, but is less free than if he were not so immoderately inclined that way. 49. Consequent passion which results naturally from an intense act of the will does not increase the voluntariness of the act, since it is not its cause; but it does show that the act of the will is intense, for it is only that which is willed vehemently that overflows from the will and affects the emotions. 50. Consequent passion which results from the deliberate choice of the will increases the voluntariness of the act that follows, since the act is performed with greater intensity on account of the passion that has been deliberately excited. 51. What has been said about the passions that tend to sensible good can be applied also to the passions that are concerned with sensible evils, such as hatred, sadness, aversion, boldness, anger. If they are antecedent, they increase the voluntariness of an act, but diminish its freedom; and, if they cause a passing frenzy or insanity, they take away all responsibility. If they are consequent, they either increase the willingness of the act, or indicate that it is willed with great intensity. 52. Violence, or coercion, is the use of force by an external agent to compel one to do what one does not want to do. Its effects on voluntariness are: (a) it cannot affect the internal act of the will, else we should have the contradiction that the act of the will was both voluntary, as proceeding from the will, and involuntary, as proceeding from external coercion; (b) it can affect external acts, such as walking, and so make them involuntary. If a boy is driven to school, the violence makes his going involuntary, but it does not make his will not to go to school involuntary. 53. Habits.--Characteristic of habits is a constant inclination, resulting from repeated acts, to perform similar acts (see 133 for definition of habit). Its effect[s] on the voluntariness of acts are: (a) if the habit is in a sense involuntary, i.e., caused by free acts but retracted by a sincere act of contrition, it diminishes or even takes away voluntariness. If the actual advertence to the act is imperfect, the voluntariety is diminished; if advertence is totally absent, all voluntariety is taken away. Thus a drunkard who retracts his habit and makes an act of true contrition may again fall into sin because of the acquired dispositions to drink. Then the sins are less voluntary or at times, owing to total lack of advertence, may be regarded solely as material sins. (b) if the habit is voluntary, i.e., acquired by free acts and not retracted, it increases the voluntariness in respect to the inclination to act. Should all advertence and deliberation be taken away, a rare occurrence, it diminishes the liberty of the act and consequently its morality as good or bad. Voluntariety, however, is not taken away entirely, since the habit itself was freely willed and hence acts flowing from it are voluntary in cause (see 35.). If sufficient advertence remains, the habit diminishes the freedom of the act owing to the impeding of reason; but this diminution of liberty is in accord with the will of the individual who freely contracted and conserves the habit to have facility in acting. Accordingly, absolutely speaking, a voluntary habit increases the voluntariety of acts caused by that habit and consequently increases their goodness or evil. Thus St. Thomas asserts that one who sins from habit sins from certain malice, i.e., not from ignorance or passion, but from the will's own choice. 54. Natural propensities are inclinations that arise from bodily constitution or physical condition (e.g., a strong native attraction to temperance or to intemperance not acquired by frequent acts). Natural propensities have the same kind of influence on the willingness of an act as involuntary habits (see 53.). 55. Pathological states are diseases of the brain or nerves that react upon the intellect and the will, such as various kinds of neuroses and psychoses, hysteria and epilepsy. The influence of pathological states on the voluntariness of acts seems similar in kind to that ascribed to antecedent passion (see 48.). Caution must be observed in applying these principles to particular kinds of mental diseases.[1] [1] In doubt whether an act associated with a pathological state is free or not, the rule of moralists is lenient. When the act is sinful, it is not imputed as gravely sinful, for man is innocent until proven guilty. If the act is good, it is presumed voluntary and free and, consequently, meritorious. See Prummer, D.M., O.P., _Manuale Theologiae Moralis_ (Barcelona: Herder, 1946), I. n.93. 56. Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts.--Having discussed human or voluntary acts in general, we shall now indicate in particular the acts that are of this kind. There are two classes of voluntary acts: (a) those elicited by the will; (b) those commanded by the will. 57. Acts Elicited by the Will.--The first class of acts under the control of the will are those that are performed by the will itself--i.e., that are begun and completed in that power of the soul. 58. There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the will has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love or inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the means by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will. Intention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end through certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it has been gained: this is the last act of the will. 59. There are three acts of the will that are directed to the means and that follow after intention, viz., consent, election, and use. Consent follows upon the counsel of the intellect, and is an act of the will agreeing to several means as suitable for the intended end. Election follows after a practical judgment of the intellect about the means consented to, and is an act of the will which chooses one of the means in preference to the others, as being most suitable for gaining the intended end. Use is the act by which the will directs and moves the other powers to employ the particular means that has been chosen. 60. Acts Commanded by the Will.--The second class of acts that are under the control of the will are those that proceed, not from the will itself, but from the other powers under the direction of the will. 61. Acts commanded by the will are of various kinds: (a) intellectual acts, such as judgment, reasoning, etc., performed under the direction of the will, (b) sensible acts such as sight, hearing, imagination, the passions of love, hate, etc.; (c) external corporal acts, such as walking, writing, etc. None of the foregoing acts need be commanded by the will, as they may be indeliberate (see 23). 62. The following kinds of acts are not subject to the control of the will: (a) intellectual acts, such as the assent of the reason to self-evident truths, as regards the specification of the act; (b) sensible acts, such as the passions considered as arising from bodily dispositions before they are adverted to; (c) acts of the vegetative life, such as digestion and growth; (d) bodily movements, such as the circulation of the blood and the beating of the heart. Art. 3: ACTS AS MORAL (_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 18-20.) 63. In order that an act be a means by which man may tend to his Last End, it is not sufficient that it be human (proceeding from knowledge and will); it must also be morally good. 64. Definition.--Morality is the agreement or disagreement, of a human act with the norms that regulate human conduct with reference to man's Last End. The act which is in agreement with those norms is morally good; the act which is in disagreement with them is morally bad. An act that neither agrees nor disagrees with the norms of morality, is called morally indifferent. 65. The constitutive norm of morality is that which gives an act its moral quality. (a) Proximately, this is the relation of agreement or disagreement of the act to the rational nature of man considered in its entirety and with reference to its true happiness; (b) remotely, this norm is the relation of the act to God, the Last End of man. 66. Hence, that which makes an act morally good is its agreement with the nature of man as a rational being destined for heaven, and its promotion of the glory of God, which is the purpose of all creation. 67. The manifestative norm of morality is that through which the moral quality of acts is known. (a) Proximately, this is right reason, which is the superior faculty and guide of the will; (b) remotely, it is the divine intellect, from which reason receives its light. 68. The preceptive norm of morality is that which points out duty with respect to good and evil. (a) Proximately, it is conscience; (b) remotely, it is the law of God. 69. The species of morality are three: (a) an act is morally good when it is in harmony with the norms of morality mentioned above (e.g., prayer, works of charity); (b) an act is morally bad when it is out of harmony with those norms (e.g., blasphemy, injustice); (c) an act is morally indifferent when, if considered in the abstract, it neither agrees nor disagrees with moral norms (e.g., walking, riding, etc.). 70. The Sources of Morality.--The sources from which the morality of an act is derived are its own tendencies and modes, in so far as they have a relation of agreement or disagreement to the standards of morals. These sources are: (a) the object of the act, from which it derives its essence (e.g., God is the object of charity); (b) the circumstances of the act, by which it is modified accidentally (e.g., fervor is a circumstance of the act of charity); (c) the purpose or end of the agent, which is the chief circumstance (e.g., to please God, as the purpose of a work of charity). 71. The object of an action is that to which it primarily and naturally tends as to its term and end, and from which it is named. Thus, an alms is directed immediately and of its own nature to the relief of the poor (end of the act); it is only secondarily and from the direction given it by the agent that it tends to generosity and edification, since the agent may give stingily, or from a bad motive (end of the agent). 72. The circumstances are all those conditions, different from the object, that affect the morality of the act. The chief moral circumstances are: (a) the time (i.e., the duration, the character of the day, as a holyday, fast-day, etc.); (b) the place (i.e., in public or in private, in church or elsewhere, etc.); (c) the manner (i.e., the advertence or inadvertence, the cruelty, etc.); (d) the quantity or quality of the thing done (e.g., that an alms is large or small, that the person who is helped is more or less deserving, etc.); (e) the purpose of the agent (e.g., that an alms is given to honor God); (f) the quality or condition of the agent (e.g., that the giver of an alms is poor himself); (g) the means used (e.g., that a benefactor's own money is used against himself). 73. With reference to their influence on the moral character of acts, circumstances are divided as follows: (a) circumstances that change the kind of morality, by making what was good to be bad, what was indifferent to be good or bad, what was venial to be mortal, what belonged to one class of mortal sins to take on another character, etc.; (b) circumstances that change the degree of morality, by making a good act more or less good, or by making a bad act more or less bad. 74. The purpose or end of an action is the reason which induces the agent to act. It is the chief circumstance of an act, and hence is treated as a separate source of morality. 75. The end or purpose is twofold. (a) It is the total end when it alone is intended, so that the action is done with no other aim in mind. Thus, if one helps the poor only to practise charity, the total motive is charity. (b) The end is partial when it is intended along with another motive of equal or unequal force. Thus, if a person helps the poor in order to relieve them and also to benefit temporarily by his charity, the assistance of others is only a partial motive of his act; and if he would not give alms except in view of the personal advantage he expects, charity becomes the secondary motive. 76. Good Acts.-An act is said to be entirely good when all its elements--its object, circumstances and purpose--are in conformity with the standards of morality. Thus, an alms given to one in need, in a considerate manner, and purely out of love for God, is good in every respect. Furthermore, the fact that the circumstances and purpose of the act are good increases the goodness derived from the object of the act. 77. An act is likewise entirely good when at least one of its elements is good, the others being indifferent, and none evil; for it is the good alone that is intended (see 85), and this gives the moral color to the whole act. This happens as follows: (a) when the object is indifferent and the purpose good, as when one takes a walk for the purpose of performing a work of mercy; (b) when the object is indifferent and a circumstance good, as when one eats a meal with intentional moderation; (c) when the object is good and a circumstance indifferent, as when one prays with unintentional stammering. 78. An act is partly good when, while its object is good, there is some evil in the circumstances that does not neutralize or transform the object. This happens in the following cases: (a) when the object is good and some minor circumstance, not intended as affecting the substance of the act, is evil, as when a person prays with distractions; (b) when the object is good and a partial, but not predominant motive is slightly evil, as when a person prays in public in order to give edification and also incidentally to help his reputation. In both these cases the good--i.e., the worship of God--is desired for itself as good, and the evil that is simultaneously desired does not change this good object. 79. Bad Acts.-An act is called entirely evil when all its elements--its object, circumstances and purpose-are contrary to the moral norms. Thus, to steal, on a large scale, in order to drive the victim to desperation is an act that is entirely wrong. The wickedness of the circumstance and of the motive increases the wickedness of the object of the act. 80. An act is likewise called entirely bad, when one or more of its elements are of themselves good or indifferent, but when there is an element which is evil and which neutralizes or transforms the good. This happens in various ways: (a) when the object is evil, and the purpose is good, as when one steals in order to pay one's debts. The good end is wished only as obtainable through a wicked means, and thus ceases to be good; (b) when the object is good or indifferent, and the total purpose is evil, as when one talks or prays with no other motive than to annoy another person. The good is willed, not as good, but only as a means to evil; (c) when the object is good or indifferent, and a partial but ulterior purpose is evil. For example, if a person extinguishes a fire in order to save a neighbor's house and thus be enabled to rob him; if a person takes physical exercises to develop his strength so as to be enabled to bully a neighbor. The good act and the immediate end in these cases are intended not for the sake of their goodness, but as instruments to the accomplishment of the evil ulterior end; (d) when the object is good or indifferent, and an evil circumstance is intended, not as a circumstance, but as forming a unit with the object and as affecting the substance of the act--for example, when a person intends prayer precisely as distracted, thus converting prayer into a sin. The good object is willed in such cases, not as good, but as vitiated by an evil circumstance. 81. Although an act is totally evil when the good in it is absorbed by the evil, the presence of what is good in itself can diminish, though it cannot take away, the evil. Thus, to lie in order to help a neighbor is totally evil; yet, it is not as great an evil as to lie to hurt that neighbor. 82. Indifferent Acts.--An act is entirely indifferent if all the elements in it--its object, circumstances and purpose--are neither harmonious nor discordant with the standards of morality. Such an act would be walking home rapidly in order to eat a meal, if besides these factors, which bear no relation to good morals, there was nothing else in the act that did bear such a relation. 83. As to the actual existence of a human or voluntary act that is morally indifferent, we conclude: (a) Considered in the abstract and universally, some human acts are morally indifferent; for if acts be considered with reference to their objects alone and apart from the circumstances that accompany them, and as they are classified in the mind, it is clear that many of them have no determinate relations to moral norms--e.g., reading, writing, walking, etc. (one can read either good or bad literature); (b) considered in the concrete, and as they happen in individual cases, no human acts are morally indifferent, since the purpose of the agent is either according to right reason or against it, so that, in spite of the indifferent object, the act becomes either good or bad by reason of the presence or absence of the good purpose. 84. Considered even in the concrete and in individual cases, all acts that are not human, but indeliberate or involuntary (see 23 sqq.), are morally indifferent--or, more correctly, unmoral, as being outside the genus of moral acts on account of the absence in them of will, which is the prerequisite of morality. Thus, absent-minded acts are neither good nor bad morally. 85. As to the kind of intention required to make an indifferent act morally good, or which should be had when the act is objectively good, we conclude: (a) The good intended must not be solely a sensible good (i.e., the pleasure that the act gives), but also and chiefly a rational good (i.e., its conformity to moral standards), since man, unlike the animals, was made, not for sensible, but for rational good. Hence, to eat deliberately with no other end than that of gratifying the palate, is to eat without a moral purpose worthy of a human being, and is a bad act. (b) The moral good of virtue which is intended in acts must not be regarded as the supreme good, but should be referred to God, since He alone is the Last End (see 20). Hence, to eat and drink with moderation solely because that is reasonable and suitable to human nature, if one excludes the Last End, is to slight the necessary purpose and is morally bad. (c) The intention of moral good or virtue in human acts need not be actual or reflex. Thus, a person who has a previously formed intention of living reasonably, or who at the time of eating intends to eat moderately for the sake of health, sufficiently intends a moral end. Likewise, it is not necessary that the reference of an act to the Last End be made actually or explicitly. Hence, every person in the friendship of God, in all his deliberate acts that are not evil, has a sufficient reference of them to God contained in the fact that he has chosen God for his Last End, or in that here and now he intends some motive that becomes a rational being. 86. An actual and explicit intention of the moral goodness of an act, and an actual and explicit reference of the act to the Last End, though not necessary, increase the moral value of what is done. 87. Axiom of Pseudo-Dionysius: "That act is good whose causes are complete; that act is evil in which a single cause is lacking." (a) This axiom can be understood as referring to perfect good, and the meaning then is that an act is not perfectly good in the moral sense unless all its elements--its object, purpose and circumstances--are good; just as an oration is not called perfect, unless all its elements--the speaker, the matter, the style and the delivery--are what they should be. Hence, a single defect is enough to make an act fall short of perfection. (b) The axiom can be understood of essential goodness, and the meaning then is that an act is not essentially good unless all the causes that contribute to essential goodness--the object of the act and any circumstances that may through the intention of the agent take on the character of object--are good; just as a man is not said to be healthy, unless his heart, lungs, and all the other chief parts of the body are sound. Hence, an act is substantially bad, if either its own end (the object of the act) or the special purpose had in mind by the agent (the end of the agent) is bad, as explained above in 79-81. 88. The axiom of Dionysius does not mean: (a) that an act cannot be essentially or substantially good and at the same time accidentally bad (see 78), for, if even one circumstance not properly attended to could change an act from good into bad, how few good acts would be done even by the most saintly persons! Example: Caius who sacrifices himself for the service of God and his neighbor, now and then feels some slight vanity over his work. His acts remain substantially good. (b) The axiom does not mean that an act cannot be substantially bad and yet have good circumstances that diminish its badness (see 81). 89. Morality of the External Act.--Having considered the morality of the internal act, we shall now turn to the external act (such as giving an alms, stealing, and the like), and inquire whether it has a morality of its own distinct from that of the internal act (see 56 Sqq.). 90. If the external act be considered precisely as it is the object, or effect, of the internal act of the will, it does not add any essential morality to the internal act, since, having no freedom of its own, it is moral only in so far as it proceeds from the will. In this sense, then, he who gives an alms to the poor, and he who would give it if he could, are equal in goodness of will; and he who wishes to defraud, and he who actually defrauds, are equal in malice of will. 91. If the external act be considered precisely as it is the term towards which the internal act tends, it completes the essential morality of the internal act by extending and communicating it without. For, though this external act cannot add a distinct morality of its own, it does carry the internal morality to its natural conclusion and diffuses its good or evil. In this sense, he who actually gives an alms is more deserving than he who really desires to give but is unable; and he who really defrauds is more reprehensible than he who wishes to defraud but cannot. 92. If the external act be considered precisely as something added to the internal act, it can increase the accidental morality of the internal act by the reaction of the external circumstances on the will. This can happen in such ways as the following: (a) the performance of the external act, being pleasurable or difficult, increases or decreases the intensity of the will to act; (b) the performance of the external act, since it requires more time than the internal act, prolongs the latter; (c) the external act by reason of repetition may also increase the strength of the internal act. 93. Furthermore, it is through the external act that edification or scandal is given, that penalties or rewards for overt action are deserved, etc. Examples: Titus bears murderous hatred towards Balbus, but keeps it concealed. Caius also hates Balbus, and first calumniates him, thus giving scandal, and then kills him, thus making himself liable before the law. 94. The Morality of the Act That Is Indirectly Willed.--An act is said to be willed indirectly, or in its cause, when it is foreseen as the result of another act which alone is directly intended (see 35 sqq.). According to the different moral character of the acts, there are four cases in which the act is willed indirectly: (a) when both the act directly willed and the resultant act are bad. Examples: Titus is heartily opposed to quarreling and blasphemy; but he makes himself drunk to forget his troubles, foreseeing that he will quarrel and blaspheme while in that state. Balbus has a real dislike for uncharitable thoughts; but he chooses the company of a notorious scandalmonger in order to be amused, knowing that thoughts against charity will be caused by listening to him; (b) when the act directly willed is bad and the resultant act is good. Example: Caius is very miserly when sober, but liberal when intoxicated; to vary the monotony of his life, he decides to become intoxicated, but grieves at the thought of the money he may give away to some deserving charity before he returns to his senses. Sempronius decides on an act of injustice with sorrow over the unbidden thoughts of remorse or repentance that will follow his act; (c) when both acts are good. Example: Out of charity Titus makes up his mind to visit a pious relative who is ill; and he foresees that thoughts of improving his own conduct--a thing not pleasing to him--will be occasioned by this visit; (d) when the act directly willed is good and the resultant act is bad. Examples: Balbus takes a drug prescribed for his health, although he foresees it will make him unable to go to church. Caius gives alms to the poor, intending only an act of charity, but he knows that thoughts of vainglory will arise. 95. The act indirectly willed sometimes gives, sometimes does not give, a new morality. (a) Thus, if it is good, it adds no internal goodness, since the will only permits, without intending the good act. Example: Caius, who does not intend, but regretfully permits his act of charity which he foresees, does not desire the act of charity. (b) If it is bad, the act indirectly willed adds a bad act of the will, if the will desires evil by permitting what it has no right to permit. Example: Titus who does not prevent, when he should, what will lead to blasphemy on his part, implicitly desires the act of blasphemy. 96. The Morality of the Consequences of an Act.--Man's life receives its moral character, not only from his internal and external acts which are done in the present and from those which he knows will result from them in the future, but also from the influence his acts exercise now and afterwards upon his fellowman. It is this influence upon others that we now speak of as the consequences of an act. According to the case, the consequences sometimes add, sometimes do not add, to the morality of an act. The good men do lives after them, and also the evil. There are various kinds of consequences: (a) foreseen consequences, which, if intended, add to the morality of an act, since it is clear that one who wishes the many good or evil results of his act is better or worse in intention than another who has no such wish. Thus, one who knows that many will be edified or scandalized by his conduct, and wills the result, is better or worse than if he had no such will about those consequences; (b) unforeseen consequences, which, if they follow naturally and usually from an act, make the act in itself better or Worse according to their character. Thus, the teaching of Christian doctrine is good as conveying a knowledge of truth, but it is made better on account of the spiritual benefit of others that naturally results from it. Similarly, the teaching of evil is made worse on account of the evil consequences it usually produces; (c) unforeseen consequences, which, if they follow only accidentally and rarely from an act, do not affect its morality, since an act must be judged by what belongs to its nature, not by what is merely occasioned by it. Thus, the fact that an alms is used by the recipient as a means to intemperance does not detract from the goodness of the almsgiving done for the sake of charity. Likewise, the fact that an injury is used by the sufferer as an occasion for spiritual profit does not lessen the wickedness of the injurious act. 97. Imputability.--Just as an act may be an act done by man (i.e., higher than the operations of brutes) and yet not be human (i.e., not performed in the manner that is proper to man as man; e.g., an act of reasoning or of decision during a dream, see 23 sqq.), so an act may be moral (i.e., in conformity or disagreement with the standards of right) and yet not imputable as good or bad to the agent (e.g., a prayer or imprecation said by an infant, or the drunkenness of one who did not realize the power of a liquor). 98. Imputability is that property of an act by which it belongs to its agent, not only in its physical nature as something of himself or as an effect produced by him or in its human quality of subjection to his will, but in its moral character of goodness or badness. From contact with the moral object, the agent takes as his own something of the brightness or defilement of that object, and so becomes chargeable himself with goodness or badness. 99. The conditions for the imputability of an act are: (a) the act must be human--i.e., it must be performed knowingly and willingly (see 23 sqq.). One is not chargeable with the quality of the act, if not responsible for its very substance. Example: Titus suffers such intense pain that he does not know what he is saying, and he blasphemes. The morality of blasphemy is not unknown to him, but his present act is not voluntary, and hence is not imputable; (b) the morality of the act must be known, or be something that should be known, at least in a general way, to the agent; for no one is responsible for what he is wholly ignorant of through no fault of his own. Example: Titus, Caius, Balbus and Sempronius rob the orchard of their neighbor. Titus in good faith thinks he is doing an act of virtue, because the owner owes money to his companions. Caius thinks that some kind of sin is being committed, but he does not know whether it is theft, or gluttony, or what. Balbus thinks that only a venial sin of stealing is being perpetrated. Sempronius, the youngest of the crowd, looks on the whole affair as a part of the day's sport. All committed theft, and the act is wrong; but Titus and Sempronius were not guilty of sin, since they were in good faith. Caius and Balbus committed sin, the species and degree depending on the knowledge they had or should have had (see 588 sqq.); (c) the morality of the act must be willed. If the act is good, the goodness must be intended, since a person should not get credit for what he does not wish. Example: Titus does not believe in virtue, and Caius is opposed to helping the poor; but both give an alms to a beggar, the former in order to get rid of the beggar, the latter in order to get rid of some old clothes. Hence, neither wishes or receives credit for the charity done. If the act is bad, the badness is sufficiently intended by the performance of what one knows is forbidden and wrong. The will chooses contact with the evil object, and thus implicitly with the evil of the object. Example: Balbus protests that he does not wish to harm anyone, and then proceeds to calumniate his neighbors. His disavowal of sinful intent does not make him any the less responsible for his calumny. 100. Imputability may be conceived as making one responsible for the moral quality of an act in three ways: (a) generically, if one should get the credit or diseredit of goodness or badness only; (b) specifically as to kind, if one gets the credit or discredit of a particular category of goodness or badness; (c) specifically as to degree, if one gets the credit or discredit of higher or lower grades of the same virtue or vice, or if one is made guilty of mortal or venial sin. These points will be discussed in the articles on the virtues and vices (see 186 sqq.). 101. Goodness is imputable as follows: (a) As regards internal acts, a person is credited with all the goodness of the object, end, and circumstances, in so far as it is known and willed by him. Example: Titus purposes to pray in a penitential posture, in order to obtain the virtue of humility. Hence, he has the credit of worship, mortification and humility through his holy desire. If he thought of the penitential posture, not as a moral circumstance, or if he regretted it, he would have the act, but not the credit of mortification; (b) As regards external acts, a person is credited with the greater readiness or intensity or duration which, through it, his will gives to what is good. Example: If 