That Russia is intervening in Syria is a sign of weakness, and not of strength. If Russia had any soft power, it would not have needed to intervene. There are even similarities between Yanukovich and Assad: much as Yanukovich was the hugely-detested guarantor that Russia could extend the lease contract for a naval base in Sevastopol, Assad is the hugely-detested guarantor that Russia can retain a naval base in Tartus. And just as Yanukovich was swept from power, Assad can, and most probably will, be swept from power.

But there is a difference between the situations of Ukraine and Syria, and the difference has a name: Iran. It is Iran, not Russia, that has kept Assad's regime going all these past years, but the prospect of a US-led no-fly-zone over Syria meant that Iran had to turn to Russia, and Russia had no real option but to visibly support Iran on Assad's side. Russia has short-term interests in retaining its Tartus naval base, mid-term interests in seeing Isis destroyed, to stop returning Russian jihadists from posing threats in Russia itself, and long-term interests in being involved in any trans-Syrian gas pipelines, be those from Iran through Iraq to the Mediterranean, or from Qatar.

Contrary to what Lévy thinks, what Russia craves is less another Cold War, but membership of Nato. No one in Russia craves the old times where an enemy was just an enemy and nothing but an enemy. Russia, like the US, is permanently trying to develop common interests with nations with which it also has significant differences. Does anyone seriously believe that Russia and China are close friends? Or that Russia and Iran are close friends? The members of Nato are close friends, but beyond Nato, there are only interests and no friendships. Russia craves being an important power: not as powerful as the US and China, but equal with the EU. Russia wants to sit in the "salotto buono". This Russia crave for recognition is nothing new.

China, Russia and Iran are three nations trying to recover from the traumas of multiple humiliations imposed on them by various Western powers over the last few centuries. And as long as the Western powers allow Saudi Arabia to do whatever it wants (executions, beheadings and stonings; bombing of Yemen), the West will have little or no soft power over the likes of China, Russia and Iran. That Lévy has to pen the kind of article that he does, or that the EU releases statements calling on Russia to do this or that, is merely the sign that the West's soft power has also dissipated.

When both sides are short of soft power, hard power is exercised. What else could one expect?

