Herr Vogt VIII

Dâ-Dâ Vogt and his Studies

"Sine Studio" [119]



About a month before the outbreak of the Italian war, Vogt published his so-called Studien zur gegenwärtigen Lage Europas, Geneva, 1859. Cui bono? [a] Vogt knew that "in the approaching war England would remain neutral" (Studien, p. 4). He knew that Russia, "in agreement with France, would do everything in its power to injure Austria, short of actual hostilities" (Studien, p. 13). [b] He knew that Prussia—but let him say for himself what he knows about Prussia. "Even the most short-sighted will have realised by now that there is an understanding between the Prussian Government and the Imperial Government of France; that Prussia will not take up arms to defend Austria's non-German provinces: that it will give its approval to all measures necessitated by the defence of the territory of the Confederation; but apart from this it will prevent any attempt by the Confederation or any of its members to intervene in support of Austria, and in the subsequent peace negotiations it will expect to be rewarded in the northern plains of Germany for these pains" (loc. cit., pp. [18-]19). To sum up: In Bonaparte's imminent crusade against Austria, England will remain neutral, Russia will adopt a hostile stance towards Austria, Prussia will restrain the bellicose members of the Confederation, and Europe will localise the war. As with the Russian war earlier on, Louis Bonaparte. will now conduct the Italian war with the permission of the supreme authorities, he will act, as it were, as the secret general of a European coalition. What then is the purpose of Vogt's pamphlet? Since Vogt knows that England, Russia and Prussia are acting against Austria, what compels him to write for Bonaparte? But it appears that, quite apart from the old Francophobes with "the now childish Father Arndt and the ghost of the wretched Jahn at their head" (loc. cit., p. 121), a sort of national movement was convulsing "the German people" and was echoed in all kinds of "Chambers and newspapers" "while the governments only joined the dominant current hesitatingly and with reluctance" (loc. cit., p. 114). It appears that the "belief in an imminent threat" moved the German "people" to issue a "call for common measures" (loc. cit.). The French Moniteur (see inter alia the issue of March 15, 1859) looked on at this German movement with "astonishment and regret". [c] "A sort of crusade against France," it declares, "is preached in the Chambers and in the press of some of the states of the German Confederation. They accuse France of entertaining ambitious plans, which it has disavowed, and of preparing for conquests of which it does not stand in need", etc. In rebuttal of these "slanders" the Moniteur argues that "the Emperor's" attitude towards the Italian question should "rather inspire the greatest sense of security in Germany", that German unity and nationhood are, so to speak, the hobby-horses of Decembrist France, etc. The Moniteur concedes, however (see April 10, 1859), that certain German anxieties may appear to have been "provoked" by certain Parisian pamphlets—pamphlets in which Louis Bonaparte urgently exhorts himself to provide his people with the "long-desired opportunity" "pour s'étendre majestueusement des Alpes au Rhin" (to extend its frontiers majestically from the Alps to the Rhine). "But," the Moniteur asserts, "Germany forgets that France stands under the protection of a legislation which does not authorise any preventive control on the part of the government." [d] This and similar declarations by the Moniteur produced the very opposite effect to the one intended, or so it was reported to the Earl of Malmesbury (see the Blue Book On the Affairs of Italy. January to May 1859 [e] ). But where the Moniteur failed, Karl Vogt might perhaps succeed. His Studien are nothing but a compilation: in German of Moniteur articles, Dentu pamphlets [120] and Decem brist maps of the future. Vogt's tub-thumping about England has only one point of interest—as an illustration of the general style of his Studien. Following his French sources he transforms the English Admiral, Sir Charles Napier, into "Lord" Napier (Studien, p. 4). The literary Zouaves attached to the Decembrists have learnt from the theatre of Porte St. Martin [121] that every distinguished Englishman is a Lord at the very least. "England has never been able," Vogt declares, "to harmonise with Austria for long. Even though a momentary community of interests may have united them for a while, political necessity always separated them again immediately. On the other hand, England constantly formed close alliances with Prussia", etc. (loc. cit., p. 2.) [f] Indeed! The common struggle of England and Austria against Louis XIV lasted with brief interruptions from 1689 to 1713, i.e. almost a quarter of a century. In the war of the Austrian Succession England fought for about six years together with Austria against Prussia and France. It was not until the Seven Years' War [122] that England became the ally of Prussia against Austria and France, but as early as 1762 Lord Bute left Frederick the Great in the lurch and put forward .proposals for the "partition of Prussia" first to the Russian minister Golitsin and then to the Austrian minister Kaunitz. In 1790 England concluded a treaty with Prussia against Russia and Austria, but it faded away before the year was out. During the Anti-Jacobin War Prussia withdrew from the European Coalition with the Treaty of Basle [123] , despite Pitt's subsidies. Austria, on the other hand, urged on by England, fought on with brief interruptions from 1793 to 1809. As soon as Napoleon was eliminated and even before the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna, England concluded a secret treaty (of January 3, 1815) with Austria and France against Russia and Prussia [124] . In 1821, in Hanover, Metternich and Castlereagh made a new agreement against Russia [125] . Thus whereas the British themselves, both historians and parliamentarians, mostly refer to Austria as their "ancient ally" [g] , Vogt has discovered from his original source, French pamphlets published by Dentu, that Austria and England were always at loggerheads apart from cases of a "momentary community of interests", while England and Prussia were constant allies, which probably explains why Lord Lyndhurst warned the House of Lords during the Russian war with Prussia in mind: "Quem tu, Romane, caveto!" [h] Protestant England has antipathies towards Catholic Austria, liberal England towards conservative Austria, free-trade England towards protectionist Austria, solvent England towards bankrupt Austria. But emotional factors have always been alien to English history. It is true that Lord Palmerston, during his thirty years' rule of England, occasionally glossed over his vassalage to Russia by parading his Austrian antipathies. From "antipathy" to Austria, for example, he rejected in 1848 Austria's proposal, approved by Piedmont and France, for England to mediate in Italy, a proposal according to which Austria would have withdrawn to Verona and the line of the Adige, Lombardy would have become part of Piedmont, if it so decided, Parma and Modena would have fallen to Lombardy, while Venice would have formed an independent Italian state under an Austrian Archduke and given itself a constitution. (See Blue Book on the Affairs of Italy, Part II, July 1849, Nos. 377, 478.) These conditions were at any rate better than those of the Treaty of Villafranca [126] . After Radetzky had defeated the Italians at all points, Palmerston put forward the same terms that he himself had earlier rejected. As soon as Russia's interests required the opposite approach, however, such as during the Hungarian war of independence, he refused the assistance for which the Hungarians asked on the basis of the treaty of 1711 [127] —despite his "antipathy" to Austria—and even refused to make any protest against Russian intervention on the grounds that "the political independence and liberties of Europe are bound up with the maintenance and integrity of Austria as a great European Power" (sitting of the House of Commons, July 21, 1849). [i] Vogt's story continues: "The interests of the United Kingdom ... are everywhere in opposition to them" (to the interests of Austria) (loc. cit., p. 2). "Everywhere" is at once transformed into the Mediterranean. "England wishes at all costs to preserve its influence in the Mediterranean and the countries along its coastline. Naples and Sicily, Malta and the Ionian Islands, Syria and Egypt are points of support of its policy oriented towards the East Indies. At all these points, Austria has set up the greatest obstacles to it" (loc. cit.). It is amazing to see how much Vogt takes on trust from the original Decembrist pamphlets published by Dentu in Paris! The English had imagined hitherto that they had been fighting the Russians and the French in turn for Malta and the Ionian Islands, but never the Austrians. They imagined that France, not Austria, had earlier sent an expedition to Egypt and was establishing itself at this very moment in the isthmus of Suez; that France, not Austria, had made conquests on the North coast of Africa and, allied with Spain, had striven to snatch Gibraltar from Britain; that England had concluded the treaty of July 1840 referring to Egypt and Syria against France and with Austria [128] ; that in "the policy oriented towards the East Indies" England had everywhere encountered the "greatest obstacles" set up by Russia, not Austria. They imagined that in the only serious dispute between England and Naples—the sulphur question of 1840—it was a French, not an Austrian, company whose monopoly of the Sicilian sulphur trade triggered off the conflict [129] . And lastly, that on the other side of the Channel, there was occasional talk of transforming the Mediterranean into a "lac français", but never into a lac autrichien". However, an important particular has to be considered in this context. In the course of 1858 a map of Europe appeared in London entitled L'Europe en 1860 (Europe in 1860) [j] . This map, which was put out by the French Embassy and for 1858 contained several prophetic hints—Lombardy-Venice, for example, were annexed by Piedmont, and Morocco by Spain—redrew the political geography of the whole of Europe with one exception, that of France, which apparently remained within its old frontiers. The territories designed for it were, with sly irony, donated to impossible owners. Thus Egypt fell to Austria and the note in the margin of the map read: "Francois Joseph I, l'Empereur d'Autriche et d'Egypte" (Francis Joseph I, Emperor of Austria and Egypt). Vogt had the map of L'Europe en 1860 before him as a sort of Decembrist compass. Hence his dispute between England and Austria on account of Egypt and Syria. Vogt prophesies that this conflict would "end in the destruction of one of the disputants", if, as he remembers just in time, "if Austria possessed a navy" (loc. cit., p. 2). However, the historical scholarship peculiar to the Studien reaches its climax in the following passage: "When Napoleon I once attempted to break the English Bank, the latter one day [k] resorted to counting the sums, instead of weighing them out, as it had always done previously; the Austrian Treasury finds itself in the same position, or even in a much worse one, for 365 days every year" (loc. cit., p. 43). It is well known that the Bank of England ("the English Bank" is another figment of Vogt's imagination) suspended payments in cash from February 1797 until 1821 [130] , during which 24 years English banknotes could not be exchanged for metal at all, whether weighed or counted. When the suspension first began there was as yet no Napoleon I in France (although a General Bonaparte was engaged on his first Italian campaign), and when cash payments were resumed in Threadneedle Street, Napoleon I had ceased to exist in Europe. Such "studies" even surpass La Guéronnière's account of the conquest of Tyrol by the "Emperor" of Austria. Frau von Krüdener, the mother of the Holy Alliance, used to distinguish between the . good principle, the "white angel of the North" (Alexander I), and the evil principle, the "black angel of the South" (Napoleon I) [l] . Vogt, the adoptive father of the new Holy Alliance, transforms both, Tsar and Caesar, Alexander II and Napoleon III, into "white angels". Both are the predestined liberators of Europe. Piedmont, Vogt claims, "has even gained the respect of Russia" (loc. cit., p. 71). [m] What more can be said of a state than that it has even gained the respect of Russia. Especially after Piedmont had ceded the naval port of Villafranca to Russia, and as the selfsame Vogt points out in regard to the purchase of the Jade Bay by Prussia [131] : "A naval port on alien territory, without organic connections to the land to which it belongs, is such ridiculous nonsense that its existence can only acquire meaning if it is, as it were, regarded as a target of future aspirations, as a raised pennant on which to train one's sights" (Studien, p. 15). It is common knowledge that Catherine II had already striven to obtain naval ports on the Mediterranean for Russia. Tender consideration towards the "white angel" of the North leads Vogt into crude exaggerations which violate "the modesty of nature", insofar as this was still respected by his original source in Dentu. In La vraie question. France-Italie-Autriche, Paris, 1859 (published by Dentu) he read on p. 20: "And besides, with what right could the Austrian Government invoke the inviolability of the treaties of 1815, when it has itself broken them with the confiscation of Cracow whose independence the treaties guaranteed?" {*27} He translates his French original in this way: "It is strange to hear such language from the mouth of the only government [n] which up to now has insolently violated the treaties [...] by raising its sacrilegious hand, without cause, in the midst of peace, against the Republic of Cracow, which had been guaranteed by the treaties, and incorporating it without more ado into the Empire" (loc. cit., p. 58). It was of course out of "respect" for the treaties of 1815 that Nicholas destroyed the Constitution and autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland, which were guaranteed by the treaties of 1815. Russia had no less respect for the integrity of Cracow when it occupied the free city with Muscovite troops in 1831. In 1836 Cracow was again occupied by the Russians, Austrians and Prussians; it was treated like a conquered nation in every respect and as late as 1840 it vainly appealed to England and France, invoking the treaties of 1815. Finally, on February 22, 1846, Russians, Austrians and Prussians again occupied Cracow, to incorporate it into Austria [132] . Thus all three Northern powers violated the treaties and the Austrian confiscation of 1846 was only the sequel to the Russian invasion of 1831. Out of courtesy towards the "white angel of the North" Vogt forgets the confiscation of Poland and falsifies the history of the confiscation of Cracow. {*28} The circumstance that Russia is "consistently hostile to Austria and sympathetic to France" leaves Vogt in no doubt about Louis Bonaparte's inclination to liberate all nations, just as the fact that "his" (Louis Bonaparte's) "policies are today in the closest agreement with those of Russia" (p. 30) raises no doubts in his mind about Alexander II's inclination to liberate all nations. Hence in the East Holy Russia must be regarded as the "friend of aspirations to freedom" and of "popular and national development", just like Decembrist France in the West. This slogan was given out for all the agents of December 2. "Russia," Vogt found in La foi des traités, les puissances signataires et l'empereur Napoléon III, Paris, 1859, a work published by Dentu, "Russia belongs to the family of the Slays, a chosen race.... Astonishment has been expressed at the chivalrous concord that has suddenly sprung up between France and Russia. Nothing could be more natural: agreement on principles, unanimity of purpose, submission to the law of the holy alliance of the governments and peoples, not to set traps and constrain others, but to guide and support the divine movements of the nations. From this perfect concord" (between Louis Philippe and England there was only an entente cordiale, but between Louis Bonaparte and Russia there is la cordialité la plus parfaite) "the most happy things have resulted: railways, emancipation of the serfs, trading posts in the Mediterranean, etc." {*29} Vogt immediately latches on to the "emancipation of the serfs" and suggests that "the present impulse ... may well make Russia the ally of aspirations to freedom, rather than their enemy" (loc. cit., p. 10). Like his Dentu original, he attributes the impulse for the so-called emancipation of the serfs in Russia to Louis Bonaparte and for this purpose he transforms the Anglo-Turkish-French-Russian war, which provided the impulse, into a "French war" (loc. cit., p. 9). It is well known that the call to emancipate the serfs first rang out, loud and persistently, under Alexander I. Tsar Nicholas was occupied with emancipation of the serfs throughout his life; in 1838 he created a Ministry of Domains for this very purpose; in 1843 he instructed this Ministry to make the necessary preparations and in 1847 he even issued decrees favourable to the peasantry about the disposal of land belonging to the nobility [133] which he only reversed in 1848 from fear of the revolution. Hence, if the emancipation of the serfs has assumed more substantial dimensions under the "benevolent Tsar", as Vogt genially calls Alexander II, this would appear to be the result of economic developments which even a Tsar cannot subdue. Besides, the emancipation of the serfs as the Russian Government sees it, would increase the aggressive power of Russia a hundredfold. It is simply intended to perfect autocratic rule by tearing down the barriers which the big autocrat has hitherto encountered in the shape of the many lesser autocrats of the Russian nobility, whose might is based on serfdom, as well as in the shape of the self-administrating peasant communes, whose material foundation, common ownership of land, is to be destroyed by the so-called emancipation. The Russian serfs happen to interpret the emancipation differently from the government, and the Russian nobility understands it in yet a third sense. Hence the "benevolent Tsar" discovered that a genuine emancipation of the serfs is incompatible with his own autocratic rule, just as the benevolent Pope Pius IX discovered in his day that the emancipation of Italy was incompatible with the existence of the Papacy. The "benevolent Tsar", therefore, regards wars of conquest and the traditional foreign policy of Russia, which, as the Russian historian Karamzin remarks, is "immutable" [o] , as the only way to postpone the revolution within. In his work La vérité sur la Russie, 1860, Prince Dolgorukov has subjected to devastating criticism the tissue of lies about the millennium that is supposed to have dawned under Alexander II, myths zealously disseminated throughout Europe since 1856 by writers in the pay of Russia, loudly proclaimed in 1859 by the Decembrists and blindly repeated by Vogt in his Studien. According to Vogt, even before the outbreak of the Italian war the alliance forged between the "white Tsar" and the "Man of December" for the express purpose of liberating the subject nationalities, had shown its worth in the Danubian principalities, where the unity and independence of the Romanian nation were confirmed by the election of Colonel Cuza as ruler of Moldavia and Wallachia. [134] "Austria protested with might and main, France and Russia applauded" (loc. cit., p. 65). In a memorandum [135] (printed in the Preussisches Wochenblatt, 1855) drawn up in 1837 for the Tsar of the time [p] by the Russian Cabinet, we can read: "Russia prefers not to annex immediately states with alien elements.... In any event it seems more fitting to allow countries whose acquisition has been resolved upon to exist for a time under separate, but entirely dependent leaders, as we have done in Moldavia and Wallachia, etc." [q] Before Russia annexed the Crimea it proclaimed its independence. In a Russian proclamation of December 11, 1814, it is stated inter alia: "The Emperor Alexander, your protector, appeals to you, Poles: Arm yourselves for the defence of your country and the maintenance of your political independence." [r] And above all the Danubian principalities! Ever since Peter the Great's invasion of the Danubian principalities, Russia has laboured in the cause of their "independence". At the Congress of Niemirov (1737) the Empress Anne demanded that the Sultan should concede the independence of the Danubian principalities under Russian protection. At the Congress of Focşani (1772) Catherine II insisted on the independence of the principalities under European protection [136] . Alexander I continued these efforts and put the seal on them by transforming Bessarabia into a Russian province (by the Peace of Bucharest, 1812 [137] ). Nicholas even gladdened the hearts of the Romanians through Kiselev by bestowing on them the Règlement organique, which established the most hideous form of serfdom while the whole of Europe applauded him for this code of liberty, which is still in force [138] . By his quasi-unification of the Danubian principalities under Cuza, Alexander II only went one step further in the century-and-a-half's policy of his forbears. Vogt now discovers that this unification under a Russian vassal means that "the principalities will constitute a dam blocking the advance of Russia towards the South" (loc. cit., p. 64). Since Russia has been applauding the election of Cuza (loc. cit., p. 65) it is as clear as daylight that the benevolent Tsar must be doing all he can to block his own "path to the South" even though "Constantinople remains an eternal goal of Russian policy" (loc. cit., p. 9). There is nothing new in proclaiming Russia the protector of liberalism and of national aspirations. Catherine II was celebrated as the standard-bearer of progress by a whole host of French and German Enlighteners. The "noble" Alexander I (Le Grec du Bas Empire [s] as Napoleon meanly described him) in his day played the hero of liberalism throughout Europe. Did he not make Finland happy by bestowing on it the blessings of Russian civilisation? Did he not in his magnanimity give France not only a Constitution, but even a Russian Prime Minister, the Duc de Richelieu? Was he not the secret head of the "Hetairia" [139] , while simultaneously at the Congress of Verona, he urged Louis XVIII through his hired agent Chateaubriand to campaign against the Spanish rebels? [140] Did he not use Ferdinand VII's confessor to incite Ferdinand to send an expedition to quell the rebellious Spanish-American colonies, while at the same time he promised the President of the United States of North America [t] his assistance against the intervention of any European power on the American continent? Did he not send Ypsilanti to Wallachia as the "leader of the Holy Hellenic Host", and use the same Ypsilanti to betray the host and arrange for the assassination of Vladimirescu, the Wallachian rebel leader? Before 1830 Nicholas, too, was eulogised in every language, in verse and in prose, as the hero who would liberate the subject nationalities. In 1828-29, when he undertook a war against Mahmood II, for the liberation of the Greeks, after Mahmood had refused to allow a Russian army to move in to suppress the Greek uprising, Palmerston speaking in the British Parliament declared that the enemies of Russia, the liberator, were necessarily the "friends" of the greatest monsters in the world: Dom Miguel, Austria and the Sultan. Did not Nicholas in paternal solicitude give the Greeks a president, namely Count Capo d'Istria, a Russian general? But the Greeks were not Frenchmen and they murdered the noble Capo d'Istria. And although Nicholas had mainly appeared in his role as guardian of legitimacy ever since the July 1830 revolution, he did not cease for a moment to work for the "liberation of the subject nationalities". A few illustrations will suffice. The constitutional revolution in Greece in September 1843 was led by Katakasi, the Russian minister in Athens and formerly the responsible supervisor over Admiral Heiden at the time of the disaster at Navarino [141] . The centre of the Bulgarian rebellion in 1842 was the Russian consulate in Bucharest. There in the spring of 1842, the Russian general Duhamel received a Bulgarian deputation whom he presented with a plan for a general insurrection. Serbia was to act as reserve for the revolt and the Russian general Kiselev was to become Hospodar of Wallachia. During the Serbian uprising (1843) Russia used its Embassy in Constantinople to drive the Turks to resort to violence against the Serbs, and then made use of this pretext to appeal to the sympathy and fanaticism of Europe against the Turks. Italy, too, was by no means excluded from the liberation plans of Tsar Nicholas. La Jeune Italie, which was for a time the Paris organ of the Mazzini party, recounts in an issue in November 1843: "The recent disturbances in the Romagna and the movements in Greece were more or less connected with each other.... The Italian movement failed because the real democratic party refused to join it. The Republicans would not aid in a movement instigated by Russia. Everything was prepared for a general insurrection in Italy. The movement was to commence in Naples, where it was expected that a section of the army would take the lead or make common cause with the patriots. After the outbreak of the revolution, Lombardy, Piedmont and the Romagna would rise and an Italian Empire was to be established under the Duke of Leuchtenberg, the son of Eugène Beauharnais and the son-in-law of the Tsar. 'Young Italy' [142] frustrated this plan." [u] The Times of November 20, 1843 commented as follows on this information from La Jeune Italie: "If that great end—the establishment of a new Italian Empire the head of which would be a Russian Prince—could be attained, so much the better; but there was another—an immediate, though perhaps not quite so important advantage to be gained by any outbreak in Italy—the causing of alarm to Austria and the withdrawal of her attention from the fearful [v] projects of Russia on the Danube." After Nicholas had made an unsuccessful approach to "Young Italy" in 1843, he sent Mr. von Butenev to Rome in March 1844. Butenev proposed to the Pope [w] in the name of the Tsar that Russian Poland should be ceded to Austria in exchange for Lombardy, which was to become a North Italian kingdom under Leuchtenberg. The Tablet of April 1844, which was at that time the English organ of the Roman Curia, commented as follows: "The bait for the Roman Curia contained in this beautiful plan lay in the fact that Poland would fall into Catholic hands, while Lombardy would remain in the possession of a Catholic dynasty as before. But the diplomatic veterans of Rome perceived that while Austria can barely maintain its hold on its own possessions and in all human probability will be forced sooner or later to relinquish its Slav provinces, the cession of Poland to Austria, even if this part of the proposal were seriously intended, would be nothing more than a loan to be repaid at a later date. Whereas North Italy with the Duke of Leuchtenberg would in fact fall under Russian protection and before long would infallibly come beneath the Russian sceptre. The warmly recommended plan was consequently put aside for the present." [x] Thus far The Tablet of 1844. The only factor that has served as a justification for the existence of Austria as a political entity since the middle of the eighteenth century has been its resistance to the advance of Russia in Eastern Europe, a resistance conducted in a helpless, inconsistent and cowardly, but obstinate manner. This resistance leads Vogt to the discovery that "Austria is the source of all discord in the East" (loc. cit., p. 56). With "a certain childlike innocence" so becoming to his tubbiness, he explains the alliance of Russia and-France against Austria as the result of the latter's ingratitude for the services rendered it by Nicholas during the Hungarian revolution, to say nothing of the liberating predilections of the "benevolent Tsar". "In the Crimean war Austria went to the very edge of hostile, armed neutrality. It is self-evident that such an attitude, which moreover bore all the marks of falsity and scheming, was bound to be bitterly resented by the Russian Government and impel it to draw closer to France" (loc. cit., pp. 10, 11). According to Vogt, Russia pursues a sentimental policy. The gratitude Austria expressed to the Tsar at Germany's expense during the Warsaw Congress in 1850 and in the march on Schleswig-Holstein [143] does not satisfy the grateful Vogt. The Russian diplomat Pozzo di Borgo in his celebrated dispatch from Paris in October 1825 [144] , having listed Austria's intrigues to frustrate Russia's plans for intervention in the East, goes on to say: "Our policy obliges us, therefore, to present our most terrifying face towards this state" (Austria) "to convince it by our preparations that if it ventures any movement against us we shall unleash upon it the greatest storm it has ever experienced. He goes on to threaten war from without and revolution from within, and having hinted at a possible peaceful solution in the suggestion that Austria should annex any Turkish "provinces that appealed to it" and having described Prussia as a subordinate ally of Russia, he continues: "If the Viennese court had yielded to our good purposes and intentions, the plan of the Imperial Cabinet would long since have achieved fulfilment—a plan which embraces not only the annexation of the Danubian principalities and Constantinople, but even provides for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe." It is well known that in 1830 a secret treaty was concluded between Nicholas and Charles X. Its terms laid down that France would permit Russia to take possession of Constantinople and would receive the Rhine provinces and Belgium in return. Prussia would be given Hanover and Saxony, and Austria would receive a part of the Turkish provinces on the Danube. Under Louis Philippe, at Russia's suggestion, this plan was again laid before the Russian Cabinet by Molé. A little while after, Brunnow went to London with the document where it was shown to the English Government as proof of France's treachery and helped to set up the anti-French coalition of 1840. Let us now see how, according to the ideas of Vogt, who obtained his inspirations from his original Paris sources, Russia was supposed to exploit the Italian war in agreement with France. It might be thought that the "national" composition of Russia and especially the "Polish nationality" might well create certain difficulties for a man for whom "the principle of nationality was the Lodestar" [y] . However: "The principle of nationality stands high in our estimation, but the principle of free self-determination stands even higher" (loc. cit., p. 121). When Russia annexed by far the largest portion of Poland proper by virtue of the treaties of 1815, it gained a position which extended so far westward, and drove as it were a wedge not only between Austria and Prussia, but also between. East Prussia and Silesia, that even at the time Prussian officers (such as Gneisenau) pointed out that such frontiers could not be tolerated in relation to so powerful a neighbour. However, it was not until 1831, when the defeat of Poland put the whole territory at the mercy of Russia, that the true significance of the wedge became clear. The subjugation of Poland was no more than a pretext for constructing the grandiose chain of fortresses at Warsaw, Modlin and Ivangorod. Its real purpose was complete strategic control of the basin of the Vistula, and the establishment of a base from which to launch attacks to the North, South and West. Even Haxthausen, who enthused about the orthodox Tsar and all things Russian, regards this as a very definite danger and a threat to Germany. The Russian fortifications on the Vistula pose a .greater threat to Germany than all the French fortresses put together, especially if and when Polish national resistance were to cease completely and Russia were able to use Poland's war potential as its own force of aggression. Hence Vogt comforts Germany with the thought that Poland has become Russian from an act of free self-determination. "There can, be no doubt," he says, "that thanks to the great efforts of the Russian people's party, the gulf that yawned between Poland and Russia has been narrowed significantly and it perhaps requires only a small impulse to close it completely" (loc. cit., p. 12). This small impulse was to be provided by the Italian war. (However, in the course of this war Alexander II became convinced that Poland had not yet reached such Vogtian heights.) The idea was that owing to the law of gravity Poland, which had been absorbed into Russia by an act of "free self-determination", would as a central body attract the detached limbs of the former Kingdom of Poland, which were now wasting away under foreign rule. To facilitate this process of attraction Vogt counsels Prussia to seize the opportunity and rid itself of its "Slav appendage" (loc. cit., p. 17), that is Posen (loc. cit., p. 97) and probably also West Prussia since only East Prussia is recognised to be a "genuine German land". The limbs detached from Prussia would, of course, at once revert to the central body absorbed by Russia and the "genuine German land" of East Prussia would be transformed into a Russian enclave. On the other hand, as far as Galicia is concerned, which is also shown as a part of Russia on the map of L'Europe en 1860, its separation from Austria lay directly in line with the war to free Germany from the non-German possessions of Austria. Vogt recollects that "before 1848 the picture of the Russian Tsar could be seen more frequently in [...] Galicia than that of the Austrian Emperor" (loc. cit., p. 12) and "in view of the uncommon skill displayed by Russia in weaving its intrigues, Austria would have serious cause for anxiety here" (loc. cit.). It is perfectly self-evident, however, that in order to rid itself of the "internal enemy" Germany should simply allow the Russians "to advance troops to the frontier" (p. 13) to lend their support to these intrigues. While Prussia is detaching itself from its Polish provinces, Russia using the Italian war should separate Galicia from Austria, just as in 1809 Alexander I had received a piece of Galicia in payment for his purely theatrical support of Napoleon I. It is well known that Russia successfully reclaimed parts of Poland that had originally gone to Austria and Prussia, partly from Napoleon I and partly from the Congress of Vienna. According to Vogt, in 1859 the time had come for the whole of Poland to be united with Russia. Vogt demands not the emancipation of the Polish nationality from Russians, Austrians and Prussians, but the absorption by Russia and the annihilation of the entire former Kingdom of Poland. Finis Poloniae! [145] This "Russian" conception of the "reconstruction of Poland", which was rife throughout Europe immediately after the death of Tsar Nicholas, was denounced as early as March 1855 by David Urquhart in his pamphlet The New Hope of Poland. [z] But Vogt had not yet done enough for Russia. "The extraordinary civility," says our agreeable companion, "indeed the almost brotherly feelings with which the Russians treated the Hungarian revolutionaries formed too great a contrast with the behaviour of the Austrians for it not to have had repercussions. Russia did indeed crush the party" (N.B.: according to Vogt the Russians crushed not Hungary but the party), "but treated it with forbearance and courteousness, and thereby laid the foundations for an attitude which may be characterised by saying that when faced with two evils one must choose the lesser of the two, and that in the present case, Russia is not the greater" (loc. cit., pp. 12, 13). With what "extraordinary civility, forbearance, courteousness", and indeed almost "brotherly feelings" does Plon-Plon's Falstaff conduct the Russians to Hungary, making himself into the "channel" for the illusion which destroyed the Hungarian revolution of 1849. It was Görgey's party which disseminated the belief in a Russian prince as the future King of Hungary, a belief which broke the will of the Hungarian revolution to resist. {*30} Without having particular support in any one race the Habsburgs naturally based their dominion over Hungary before 1848 on the dominant nationality—the Magyars. We may remark in passing that Metternich was the great protector of the nationalities. He misused them by playing them off against each other, but he needed them in order to misuse them. He therefore preserved them. We may compare the situation in Posen and Galicia. After the revolution of 1848-49 the Habsburg dynasty, having used the Slays to subdue the Germans and Magyars, tried to follow in the footsteps of Joseph II and to impose the rule of the German element in Hungary by force. The fear of Russia prevented the Habsburgs from embracing their rescuers, the Slays. Their overall reactionary policy in Hungary was aimed more against their saviours, the Slays, than against their defeated enemies, the Magyars. Hence, as Szemere has shown in his pamphlet Hungary, 1848-1860, London, 1860, fighting against its own saviours, the Austrian reaction therefore drove the Slays back under the wing of the Magyars. Austrian rule over Hungary and the rule of the Magyars in Hungary coincided, therefore, both before and after 1848. Russia is in a quite different position, whether it rules Hungary directly or indirectly. Taking the racial and religious affinities together, Russia would immediately have the non-Magyar majority of the population at its disposal. The Magyar race would instantly succumb to the union of the Slays, who are akin to the Russians ethnically, and the Wallachians, who are akin to them religiously. Russian domination in Hungary, therefore, is synonymous with the destruction of Hungarian nationality, i.e. of a Hungary historically bound up with Magyar rule. {*31} Vogt, who proposes that the Poles by an act of "free self-determination" should be absorbed by Russia, also wants to drown the Hungarians in a sea of Slays by subjecting them to Russian rule. {*32} But Vogt has still not done enough for Russia. Among the "non-German provinces" of Austria on behalf of whom the German Confederation should not "take up its sword" against France and Russia, which "stands whole-heartedly on .the side of France", are not only Galicia, Hungary and Italy, but in particular Bohemia and Moravia, as well. "Russia," Vogt says, "provides the firm centre around which the Slav nationalities increasingly strive to congregate" (loc. cit., pp. 9-10). Bohemia and Moravia belong to the "Slav nationalities". As Muscovy developed into Russia, so must Russia develop into Pan-Slavonia. "With the Czechs ... at our side we shall succumb to every enemy" (loc. cit., p. 134). We, i.e. Germany, must attempt to rid ourselves of the Czechs, i.e. of Bohemia and Moravia. "No guarantee for non-German possessions of the rulers" (loc. cit., p. 133). "No non-German provinces in the Confederation any longer" (loc. cit.) but only German provinces in France! Hence we must not only "give the present French Empire a free hand [...] as long as it does not violate the territory of the German Confederation" (Preface, p. 9), but we must also allow Russia "a free hand" as long as it only violates "non-German provinces in the Confederation". Russia will help Germany develop its "unity" and "nationhood" by advancing troops to the "Slav appendages of Austria exposed to Russia's "intrigues". While Austria is kept busy in Italy by Louis Bonaparte and Prussia forces the sword of the German Confederation back into its sheath, the "benevolent Tsar" will "be able secretly to support" revolutions in Bohemia and Moravia "with money, arms and munitions" (loc. cit., p. 13). And "with the Czechs at our side we must succumb to every enemy"! How magnanimous of the "benevolent Tsar", then, to relieve us of Bohemia and Moravia with all their Czechs which as "Slav nationalities must" naturally "congregate around Russia". Let us examine how our Vogt of the Empire protects the Eastern German frontier by incorporating Bohemia and Moravia in Russia. Bohemia Russian! But Bohemia lies in the middle of Germany, separated from Russian Poland by Silesia, and from the Galicia and Hungary Russified by Vogt, by a Moravia also Russified by Vogt. Thus Russia acquires an expanse of German federal territory 50 German miles long and 25-35 miles broad [ac] . Its Western frontier will advance westwards by a full 65 German miles. Since the distance between Eger [ad] and Lauterburg in Alsace is no more than 45 German miles as the crow flies, North Germany will be totally separated from South Germany by the French wedge in the West and even more by the Russian wedge in the East, and the partition of Germany would be complete! The direct route from Vienna to Berlin would, pass through Russia, and the same would apply even to the direct route from Munich to Berlin. Dresden, Nuremberg, Regensburg and Linz would be our frontier towns bordering on Russia; our position vis-à-vis the Slays would, at least in the South, be the same as it was before Charlemagne (while in the West Vogt does not allow us to go back as far as Louis XV), and we could simply erase 1,000 years of our history. What could be accomplished with the aid of Poland, could be accomplished even better with the aid of Bohemia. If Prague were transformed into a fortified encampment, with secondary for-tresses at the confluence of the Moldau and the Eger [ae] with the Elbe, the Russian army in Bohemia could calmly stand and wait for the German army which, divided from the outset, would approach from Bavaria, Austria and Brandenburg. Falling upon the smaller German units it would be able to destroy them while allowing the larger ones to run up against the fortresses. . Let us look at a linguistic map of Central Europe, taking, for example, a Slav authority, the "slovanský zemĕvid" of Šafařík [146] , According to this the Slav-language frontier runs from the Pomeranian coast near Stolp via Zastrow south of Chodziehen [af] on the Netze, and advances westwards to Meseritz. However, from there it suddenly curves south-east. Here the massive German territory of Silesia drives a deep wedge between Poland and Bohemia. In Moravia and Bohemia the Slavonic language again protrudes far to the west, although it is greatly eroded by the advance of German from all directions and the whole area is interspersed with German towns and linguistic islands, just as in the north, the whole Lower Vistula and the best part of East and West Prussia are German and push forward uncomfortably towards Poland. Between the most westerly point of the Polish tongue and the most northerly point of Bohemian, the Lusatian or Wendish linguistic enclave lies in the middle of German-speaking territory, but in such a way that it almost cuts off Silesia. For the Russian Pan-Slavist Vogt, who has Bohemia to play with, there is no doubt where the natural frontier of the Slav Empire lies. It goes from Meseritz directly to Lieberose and Lübben, then south of where the Elbe passes through the mountains on the Bohemian frontier, after which it follows the Western and Southern frontier of Bohemia and Moravia. Everything to the east of this is Slav: the few German enclaves and other interlopers on Slav soil can no longer withstand the development of the great Slav nation. And anyway they have no right to be where they are. Once this "Pan-Slavist state of affairs" has been brought about, a similar rectification of the frontiers will become inevitable in the south. Here too a German wedge has of its own accord thrust itself between the North and South Slays and occupied the valley of the Danube and the Styrian Alps. Vogt cannot tolerate this wedge and, being consistent, he therefore has Russia annex Austria, Salzburg, Styria and the German parts of Carinthia. In this construction of the Slav-Russian Empire, Vogt has already demonstrated, Austria notwithstanding, that according to the well-tested axioms of the "principle of nationality" small numbers of Magyars and Romanians as well as various groups of Turks must fall to Russia (for the "benevolent Tsar" also contributes to the "principle of nationality" by his subjugation of Circassia and the extermination of the Crimean Tartars!)—as a punishment for being wedged between the North and South Slays. In this operation, we Germans lose—nothing more than East and West Prussia, Silesia, parts of Brandenburg and Saxony, the whole of Bohemia, Moravia and the rest of Austria apart from Tyrol (part of which falls to the Italian "principle of nationality")—and our national existence to boot! But let us just consider the first stage, according to which Galicia, Bohemia and Moravia become Russian! In such circumstances German Austria, Southwest Germany and North Germany can never act in concert, except—and this would inevitably come about—under Russian leadership. Vogt makes us Germans sing what his Parisians sang in 1815: "Vive Alexandre,

Vive le roi des rois,

Sans rien prétendre,

Il nous donne des lois." [ag] Vogt's "principle of nationality", which he desired to realise in 1859 through the alliance between the "white angel of the North" and the "white angel of the South", should according to his views prove its worth by the absorption of Polish nationality, the disappearance of Magyar nationality and vanishing of German nationality in—Russia. I have not mentioned his original source in Dentu's pamphlets on this occasion because I was reserving a single conclusive quotation as proof that everything that he either hints at or blurts out stems from slogans issued by the Tuileries. In the Pensiero ed Azione's issue of May 2-16, 1859, in which Mazzini forecasts events that later took place, he remarks inter alia that the first condition of the alliance agreed between Alexander II and Louis Bonaparte was: "abbandono assoluto delta Polonia" (absolute abandonment of Poland by France, which Vogt translates as "completely closing the gulf yawning between Poland and Russia"). "Che la guerra si prolunghi e assuma ... proporzioni europee, l'insurrezione delle provincie oggi turche preparata di lunga mano e quelle dell'Ungheria, daranno campo all'Allianza di rivelarsi... Principi russi governerebbo le provincie che surgerebbo sulle rovine dell'Impero Turco e dell'Austria... Constantino di Russia è già proposto ai malcontenti ungheresi." (See Pensiero ed Azione, May 2-16, 1859.) ("If the war be prolonged so as to assume ... European proportions, the insurrection of the Turkish provinces, prepared a long time since, and that of Hungary, would enable the alliance to assume palpable forms.... Russian princes would govern the states established on the ruins of the Turkish Empire and Austria.... Constantine of Russia is already proposed to the Hungarian malcontents.") [ah] But Vogt's Russophile posture is only secondary. He is merely repeating one of the catch-phrases issued by the Tuileries and his aim is merely to prepare Germany for manoeuvres agreed between Louis Bonaparte and Alexander II if certain contingencies of the war against Austria should eventuate. In fact, he merely echoes slavishly the Pan-Slavist phraseology of his original Paris pamphlets. His true task is to sing the Lay of Ludwig [147] : "Einan kùning wèiz ih, hèizit hêr Hlùdowîg

ther gêrno Gôde" (i.e. the nationalities) "dionôt. [ai] We saw earlier how Vogt praised Sardinia by pointing out that "it had even gained the respect of Russia". We now have the parallel assertion. "There is no mention of Austria," he says, "in" (Prussia's) "declarations ... in the event of an imminent war between North America and Cochin China the wording would be the same. But the German mission of Prussia, its German obligations, the old Prussia—that is where the emphasis is put for preference. France" (in accordance with his statement on p. 27 that "France is now summed up [...] exclusively in the person of its ruler") "therefore bestows praise through the 'Moniteur' and the rest of the press.—Austria fumes" (Studien, p. 18). "The fact that Prussia correctly interprets' its 'German mission' follows from the praise bestowed on it by Louis Bonaparte in the Moniteur and the rest of the Decembrist press." What brazen impudence! We remember how from a feeling of tenderness towards the "white angel of the North" Vogt made Austria the sole offender against the treaties of 1815 and the sole state to confiscate Cracow. He now performs the same labour of love for the benefit of the "white angel of the South". "This ecclesiastical state against whose republic" (republic of an ecclesiastical state!) "Cavaignac, the representative of the doctrinaire republican party [...] and the military counterpart of Gagern" (a fine parallel!),"perpetrated the abominable act of massacre" (to commit massacre against the republic of a state!), "a crime which, however, did not help him to reach the presidential chair" (loc. cit., p. 69). So it was Cavaignac and not Louis Bonaparte who perpetrated "the abominable act of massacre" against the Roman Republic! Cavaignac did indeed send a navy to Civitavecchia in November 1848 for the personal protection of the Pope. But it was only in the following year, on February 9, 1849, several months after Cavaignac had failed to get the - presidential chair, that the temporal rule of the Pope was abolished and the republic proclaimed in Rome. So Cavaignac could not possibly murder a republic that did not yet exist while he was in power. On April 22, 1849 Louis Bonaparte sent General Oudinot with 14,000 men to Civitavecchia after he had tricked the National Assembly into giving him the funds necessary for the expedition against Rome by solemnly declaring several times over that his intention was merely to resist an invasion of the Roman states planned by Austria. It is well known that the Paris catastrophe of June 13, 1849 [148] arose from the resolution moved by Ledru-Rollin and the Montagne to exact vengeance for the "abominable act of massacre against the Roman Republic" which was also an "abominable breach of the French Constitution" and an "abominable violation of the resolution of the National Assembly", from Louis Bonaparte, who was responsible for all these abominations, by instituting proceedings for impeachment against him. We see how "abominably" the base sycophant of the coup d'état, how brazenly Karl Vogt falsifies history in order to elevate the mission of Lord "Hlùdowîg" to liberate the subject nationalities in general and Italy in particular-beyond all doubt. Vogt remembers from the Neue Rheinische Zeitung that alongside the class of the lumpenproletariat it is the class of peasant smallholders that in France constitutes the sole social basis of the bas empire. He now adjusts this as follows: "The present Empire has no party among the educated, no party [...] in the French bourgeoisie—only two masses belong to it, the army and the rural proletariat [aj] , which cannot read or write. But this constitutes 9/10 of the population and embraces the mighty organised instrument with whose aid resistance can be smashed, and the herd of mortgage helots who own nothing but their vote" (p. 25). The non-urban population of France, including the army, amounts to scarcely 2/3 of the total population. Vogt transforms less than 2/3 into 9/l0. Moreover, he transforms the whole non-urban population of France, of which around 1/5 consists of well-to-do landowners and another 1/5 of people with neither land nor other possessions, lock, stock and barrel into smallholders, "mortgage helots". Finally, he abolishes all reading and writing in France outside the cities. Just as he earlier distorted history, so now he falsifies statistics in order to enlarge the pedestal of his hero. Having done this he installs his hero on this pedestal. "Thus France is now indeed summed up exclusively in the person of its ruler, of whom Masson" (also an authority) "said 'he possesses great qualities as a statesman and a sovereign, an unshakable will, sure sense of tact, vigorous resolution, a stout heart, a bold, noble spirit and utter ruthlessness"' (loc. cit., p. 27). "wie saeleclîche stât im an

allez daz, daz êr begât!

wie gâr sîn lîp ze wunsche stât!

wie gênt îm so gelîche inein

die fînen keiserlîchen bein."

(Tristan) [ak] Vogt snatches the censer from Masson's hands in order to swing it himself. To Masson's catalogue of virtues he adds "cold calculation", "bold planning", "serpentine cunning", "tenacious patience" (p. 28) and then, as the Tacitus of the antechamber, he stammers: "The origins of this reign are monstrous", which is certainly—nonsense. Above all he has to melodramatise the grotesque figure of his hero into a great man and so "Napoléon le Petit" [149] becomes a "man of destiny" (loc. cit., p. 36). "Even if present circumstances," Vogt exclaims, "lead to a change" (what a modest word: a change!) "in the government" (of this man of destiny), "we shall not be behindhand with our warmest congratulations, even though we can see no prospect of this for the time being!" (loc. cit., p. 29.) How serious the warm fellow is with his congratulations in petto [al] can be seen from the following: "Hence with a lasting peace the internal situation becomes more and more untenable day by day, because the French army is much more closely involved with the parties of the educated than is the case, for example, in the German states, in Prussia and Austria; because these parties find an echo, above all among the officers, so that one fine day the only active pillar of the power that the Emperor holds in his hands might slip away" (loc. cit., pp. [26-]27). [am] So the "internal situation" became "more and more untenable day by day" with a "lasting peace". This is why Vogt had to assist Louis Bonaparte to violate the peace. The army, the "only active pillar" of his "power", threatened to "slip away". This is why Vogt had to prove that it was Europe's task to bind the French "army" to Louis Bonaparte once again by means of a "localised" war in Italy. And indeed at the end of 1858 it looked as though things were going to end dreadfully [150] with Badinguet, as the Parisians unrespectfully call the "nephew of his uncle". The general trade crisis of 1857-58 had paralysed French industry {*33} . The government manoeuvres to prevent the crisis from becoming acute made the malady chronic, so that the stagnation in French trade dragged on until the outbreak of the Italian war. On the other hand, grain prices fell so low between 1857 and 1859 that a loud cry went up at various congrès agricoles to the effect that French agriculture was being ruined by low prices and the heavy burdens imposed on it. Louis Bonaparte's absurd attempt to raise grain prices artificially by a fiat designed to force the bakers throughout France to set up granaries only reveals the helpless confusion of his government. The foreign policy of the coup d'état exhibited nothing but a series of unsuccessful attempts to play Napoleon—mere trials, invariably crowned by official withdrawals. For example, his intrigue against the United States of America, his manoeuvres to revive the slave trade [151] , the melodramatic threats directed against England. The insolence with which Louis Bonaparte at that time ventured to treat Switzerland, Sardinia, Portugal and Belgium—even though in Belgium he could not even prevent the fortification of Antwerp—only throws the fiasco of his policy vis-à-vis the great powers into even starker relief. In the British Parliament "Napoléon le Petit" became a standard expression and The Times heaped ridicule on the "Man of Iron" in its articles at the end of 1858, by describing him as the "Man of Gutta-Percha". In the meantime, Orsini's hand-grenades [152] had burst like a thunderbolt, illuminating the internal situation in France. It turned out that Louis Bonaparte's regime was just as insecure as it had been in the first days after the coup d'état. The Lois de sûreté publique [153] revealed his total isolation. He had to abdicate to his own generals. In an unprecedented development, France was divided into 5 General Captaincies, in the Spanish manner. With the introduction of the Regency Pélissier was in fact recognised as the highest authority in France [154] . Moreover, the renewed terreur intimidated no one. Instead of presenting a terrible appearance, the Dutch nephew of the battle of Austerlitz only looked grotesque [155] . Montalembert was able to play Hampden in Paris, Berryer and Dufaure to disclose the hopes of the bourgeoisie in their summings-up and in Brussels Proudhon to proclaim Louis-Philippism with an acte additionnel [156] , while Louis Bonaparte himself disclosed the growing power of Marianne to the whole of Europe. In the course of the uprising in Chalon [157] the officers, on hearing that a republic had been proclaimed in Paris, cautiously inquired at the Prefecture whether a republic had actually been proclaimed, instead of just falling upon the insurgents, an event which demonstrated in a striking manner that even the army regarded the restored Empire as a pantomime, whose closing scene was drawing near. Scandalous duels of the arrogant officers in Paris coincided with scandalous deals on the Stock Exchange in which the top leaders of the Gang of December 10 were involved. The Palmerston Government in England fell because of its alliance with Louis Bonaparte! [158] And lastly, a treasury that could only be replenished by resorting to exceptional subterfuges! Such was the situation of the bas empire at the end of 1858. The Brummagem [an] Empire would collapse, or else the absurd farce of a Napoleonic empire within the frontiers of the treaties of 1815 would have to cease. But for this a localised war was essential. The mere prospect of a war with Europe would then have sufficed to produce an explosion in France. A child could understand what Horsman said in the British Parliament: "We know that France will support the Emperor as long as our vacillation allows him success in his foreign policy, but we have grounds to believe that it will abandon him as soon as we show resolute opposition." All depended on localising the war, i.e. on conducting it with the supreme sanction of Europe. To begin with, France itself had to be prepared gradually for the war with the aid of a series of hypocritical peace negotiations and their repeated failure. Louis Bonaparte came to grief even here. Lord Cowley, the English Ambassador in Paris, had gone to Vienna with proposals drawn up by Louis Bonaparte and approved by the (Derby) Cabinet in London. In Vienna (see the Blue Book quoted above [ao] ), under English pressure, the proposals were unexpectedly accepted. Cowley had just returned to London with the tidings of a "peaceful solution" when suddenly the news came that Louis Bonaparte had abandoned his own proposals and had supported the convocation of a congress suggested by Russia to discipline Austria. The war became possible only through the intervention of Russia. If Russia had no longer needed Louis Bonaparte in order to carry out its own plans—either to enforce them with French assistance or to use the French to beat Austria and Prussia into passive instruments of Russia Louis Bonaparte would have fallen then. But despite Russia's covert support, despite the promises of Palmerston, who had given his blessing at Compiègne to the conspiracy of Plombières [159] , everything depended on the attitude of Germany, since on the one hand the Tory Cabinet was still at the helm in England, and on the other hand the silent rebellion of France against the Bonapartist regime would have been driven out into the open by the prospect of a European war. Vogt himself lets slip that he sang his Lay of Ludwig neither from a lively sympathy for Italy, nor from fear of the timid, conservative despotism of Austria, which was as clumsy as it was brutal. On the contrary, he believed that if Austria, which, it should be noted, was forced to start the war, should gain the advantage in Italy at first, "the revolution would certainly be unleashed in France, the Empire would be overthrown and the future would be different" (loc. cit., p. 131). He believed that "the Austrian armies would in the last resort be unable to withstand the liberated forces of the French people" (loc. cit.) and that "the victorious armies of Austria, by provoking revolutions in France, Italy and Hungary, would themselves create the enemy who would crush them". [ap] But the issue for him was not the liberation of Italy from Austria, but the enslavement of France by Louis Bonaparte. What further proof is required that Vogt was merely one of the countless mouthpieces through whom the grotesque ventriloquist in the Tuileries spoke in foreign tongues? It will be remembered that at the time when Louis Bonaparte first discovered his mission to liberate the subject nationalities in general and Italy in particular, France presented a spectacle, unprecedented in its history. The whole of Europe marvelled at the stubborn obstinacy with which it rejected the "idées napoléoniennes" [aq] . People still remember very well the enthusiasm with which even the "chiens savants" [ar] of the Corps législatif welcomed Morny's assurances of peace [as] ; the irritated tone in which the Moniteur lectured the nation, now for its immersion in material interests, now for its lack of patriotic vigour and its doubts about Badinguet's talents as a general and his wisdom as a politician [at] ; the soothing official messages to all the chambers of commerce throughout France and the imperial assurance that "étudier une question n'est pas la créer" [au] . At the time, the English press, astonished at the extraordinary spectacle, was crammed full of well-meaning nonsense about the transformation of the French into a peace-loving people, the Stock Exchange treated the issue of "war" or "not war" as a "duel" between Louis Bonaparte, who wanted war, and the nation, which did not, and bets were placed as to who would prevail, the nation or "his uncle's nephew". To give an idea of the situation as it was at the time I shall simply quote a few passages from the London Economist, which, as the organ of the City, as the spokesman of the Italian war and as the property of Wilson (the recently deceased Secretary of the Treasury for India and a tool of Palmerston), was highly influential: "Alarmed at the colossal uproar which has been created, the French Government is now trying the soothing system" (The Economist, January 15, 1859). In its issue of January 22, 1859, in an article entitled "The Practical Limits of the Imperial Power in France", The Economist says: "Whether the Emperor's designs for a war in Italy are or are not carried out to their completion, one fact at least has become conspicuous enough,—that his plans have received a very severe and probably unexpected check in the chilling attitude assumed by popular feeling in France and the complete absence of any sympathy with the Emperor's scheme.... He proposes a war [...] and the French people show nothing but alarm and discontent;—the Government securities are depreciated, the fear of the tax-gatherer subdues every gleam of political or martial enthusiasm, the commercial portion of the nation is simply panic-struck, the rural districts are dumb and dissatisfied, fearing fresh conscriptions and fresh imposts;—the political circles which have supported the Imperial régime most strongly, as a pis aller against anarchy [av] , discourage war for exactly the same reason for which they support that régime [...] it is certain that Louis Napoleon has found an extent and depth of opposition throughout all classes in France to a war, even in Italy, which he did not anticipate." {*34} Faced with this mood of the French people that section of the original Dentu pamphlets was launched which "in the name of the people" peremptorily called on the "Emperor" "at last to assist France in the majestic extension of its frontiers from the Alps to the Rhine" and no longer to resist the "nation's pugnacious spirit and desire to bring about the liberation of the subject nationalities". Vogt plays the same tune as the prostitutes of December. At the very moment when Europe stood amazed at France's obstinate longing for peace, Vogt made the discovery that "today, the fickle nation" (the French) "appears to be filled with a warlike passion" (loc. cit., pp. 29, 30), and Lord Hlùdowîg was only following the "dominant trend of the age" which was intent on the "independence of the nationalities" (loc. cit., p. 31). Naturally, he did not believe a single syllable of what he was writing. In the Programme in which he called upon democrats to co-operate in his Bonapartist propaganda he makes it crystal clear that the Italian war was unpopular in France. "I cannot foresee any immediate threat to the Rhine; but one could arise in the future. A war there or against England would make Louis Napoleon almost popular; the Italian war does not possess this popular aspect" ("Magnum Opus", Documents, p. 34). {*35} If now one portion of the original Dentu pamphlets sought to rouse the French nation from its "peace lethargy" with the aid of the traditional visions of conquest and to put the private wishes of Louis Bonaparte into the mouth of the nation, the other portion, with the Moniteur in the vanguard, had the task of convincing Germany in particular of the Emperor's repugnance to foreign conquests and of his ideal mission as the Messiah who would bring freedom to the subject nationalities. The proofs of the disinterestedness of his policy on the one hand and of his desire to free the subject nationalities on the other are easy to remember because they are constantly repeated and revolve round only two axes. Proof of the disinterestedness of Decembrist policies—the Crimean war. Proof of his desire to free the subject nationalities—Colonel Cuza and the Romanian nationality. The tone was set by the Moniteur. See the Moniteur of March 15, 1859 on the Crimean war. The Moniteur of April 10, 1859 writes about the Romanian nationality: "In Germany as in Italy it" (France) "desires that the nationalities recognised by the treaties should continue to exist and become even stronger. In the Danubian principalities he" (the Emperor) "has endeavoured to help the legitimate wishes of these provinces to triumph so that an order based on national interests might be established in this part of Europe too." See also the pamphlet published by Dentu at the beginning of 1859 with the title Napoléon III et la question roumaine. With regard to the Crimean war: "Lastly, what compensation has France requested for the blood it has shed and the millions it has expended in the East in the service of an exclusively European cause?" (La vraie question, Dentu, Paris, 1859, p. 13.) This theme, played with endless variations in Paris, was translated so well into German by Vogt that E. About, that gossipy magpie of Bonapartism, appears to have translated Vogt's German translation back into French. See La Prusse en 1860. Here too we are again pursued by the Crimean war and Romanian nationality under Colonel Cuza. "But this much at least is clear," Vogt announces, echoing the Moniteur and Dentu's original pamphlets, "that France did not conquer a single square foot of land" (in the Crimea) "and that after such a victorious campaign the uncle would not have rested content with the meagre gain of having proved his superiority in the art of warfare" (Studien, p. 33). "Here we can see an essential difference between the present and the old Napoleonic policies" {*36} (loc. cit.). As if Vogt had to prove to us that "Napoléon le Petit" is not the real Napoleon! With just as much justification Vogt could have prophesied in 1851 that the nephew, who had nothing to set against the first Italian campaign and the expedition to Egypt but the Strasbourg adventure, the expedition to Boulogne and the sausage review of Satory [160] , could never emulate the 18 Brumaire, to say nothing of acquiring the Imperial Crown. There was after all "an essential difference between the present and the old Napoleonic policies". Yet another difference was between waging a war against a European coalition and waging one with the permission of a European coalition. The "glorious campaign in the Crimea" in which England, France, Turkey and Sardinia in concert "captured" half a Russian fortress after two years, and in exchange lost a whole Turkish fortress (Kars) to the Russians, and at the conclusion of peace were forced humbly to "request" the enemy at the Paris Congress [161] for "permission" to evacuate their troops without interference and ship them home—that was indeed anything but "Napoleonic". It was glorious only in Bazancourt's novel [az] . But the Crimean war proved all sorts of things. Louis Bonaparte betrayed his ostensible allies (the Turks) in order to gain the alliance of the ostensible enemy. The first success of the Paris peace was the sacrifice of the "Circassian nationality" and the extermination of the Crimean Tartars by the Russians, and likewise the destruction of the national hopes that the Poles and Swedes had pinned to a West European crusade against Russia. A further moral of the Crimean war was: Louis Bonaparte could not afford a second Crimean war, could not afford to lose an old army and gain new national debts in exchange for the knowledge that France was rich enough "de payer sa propre gloire" [ba] , that the name of Louis Napoleon figured in a European treaty, that "the conservative and dynastic press of Europe" unanimously acknowledged "the ruling virtues, the wisdom and the moderation of the Emperor"—a fact which Vogt counts to Louis Bonaparte's credit (loc. cit., p. 32)—and that at the time the whole of Europe paid him all the honour due to a genuine Napoleon, on the express condition that Louis Bonaparte, following the example of Louis Philippe, should quietly stay within "the limits of practical reason", i.e. of the treaties of 1815, and not forget for a single moment the fine line that distinguishes a buffoon [bb] from the hero he represents. The political combinations, the ruling powers and the social conditions that provided the leader of the December Gang with the opportunity to play at being Napoleon, first in France and then even beyond French territory, do in fact belong to his epoch, and not to the annals of the Great French Revolution. "This fact at any rate is established, that present French policy in the East has fulfilled the aspirations of one nationality" (the Romanian) "for unification" (Studien, pp. 34-35). Cuza, as we have mentioned, is keeping the place open for either a Russian governor or a Russian vassal. On the map of L'Europe en 1860 a Grand Duke of Mecklenburg figures as that vassal. Russia naturally allowed Louis Bonaparte all the honour for this Romanian emancipation, reserving all its advantages for itself. Austria stood in the way of further benevolent intentions. Hence the Italian war had the function of remodelling Austria, changing it from an obstacle into an instrument. The ventriloquist in the Tuileries was already playing the tune of "Romanian nationality" on his innumerable mouthpieces as early as 1858. One of Vogt's authorities, Mr. Kossuth, was thus in a position to give an answer as early as November 20, 1858 in a lecture in Glasgow [bc] : "Wallachia and Moldavia receive a Constitution, hatched in the caverns of secret diplomacy.... It is in reality no more nor less than a charter granted to Russia for the purpose of disposing of the Principalities." [bd] Thus the "principle of nationality" was abused by Louis Bonaparte in the Danubian principalities so as to mask the fact that they were being handed over to Russia, just as in 1848-49 the Austrian Government had abused the "principle of nationality" to strangle the Magyar and German revolution with the aid of the Serbs, Slovenes, Croats, Wallachians, etc. Good care is taken both by the Russian consul in Bucharest and by the rabble of Moldavian and Wallachian Boyars, most of whom are not even Romanian but a motley mosaic of adventurers from God-knows-where—a sort of oriental December Gang—that the Romanian people should still groan beneath the burdens of a villeinage so monstrous that it could only have been set up by Russians with their règlement organique and could only be sustained by an oriental demi-monde. Vogt, in the attempt to deck out the wisdom quarried from his original Dentu sources with his own eloquence, says: "Austria already had enough on her hands with one Piedmont in the South; it had no need of another in the East" (loc. cit., p. 64). Piedmont annexes Italian lands. So are the Danubian principalities, the least warlike of the Turkish lands, to annex Romanian territory, that is, conquer Bessarabia from Russia, and Transylvania, the Banat of Temesvár and the Bukovina from Austria? Vogt not only forgets the "benevolent Tsar", he also forgets that in 1848-49 Hungary did not seem in the least inclined to part with these more or less Romanian provinces, that it answered their "cry of distress" with a drawn sword, and that on the contrary it was Austria which used "propaganda about the principle of nationality" as a weapon against Hungary. But the historical scholarship of his Studien shows itself in its full splendour when Vogt, relying on half-remembered bits from an ephemeral pamphlet, which he had skimmed through, with perfect calm "deduces the wretched condition of the principalities ... from the destructive poison of the Greeks and Fanariots" (loc. cit., p. 63). He had no idea that the Fanariots (so called after a district in Constantinople) are these very same Greeks who have lorded it in the Danubian principalities under Russian protection since the beginning of the eighteenth century. They are, in part, the descendants of the limondji (lemonade-sellers) of Constantinople that are now once again playing at "Romanian nationality" by order of the Russians. While the white angel of the North advances from the East, destroying the various nationalities for the benefit of the Slav race, the white angel of the South advances from the opposite direction as the standard-bearer of the principle of nationality, and "we must wait until the liberation of the subject nationalities has been brought about by this man of destiny" (Studien, p. 36). Now while these combined operations of the two angels and the "two greatest external enemies of Germany's unity" (Studien, 2nd edition, Afterword, p. 154) are being conducted "in close concert"—what role is assigned to Germany by our Imperial Vogt, who is, however, no "Augmentor of the Realm" [be] ? "The most short-sighted persons," Vogt remarks, "must have realised by now that there is an understanding between the Government of Prussia and the Imperial Government of France, that Prussia will not unsheath its sword to defend the non-German provinces of Austria" (including Bohemia and Moravia, of course), "that it will give its approval to all measures affecting the defence of the territory of the Confederation" (excluding its "non-German" provinces), "but will otherwise prevent any intervention of the Confederation or its individual members on Austria's behalf, so that in the subsequent peace negotiations it will receive its reward for these efforts in the North German plains" (Studien, 1st edition, pp. 18-19). By proclaiming from the housetops, even before the outbreak of the war against Austria, the secret entrusted to him by the Tuileries that Prussia was acting in "secret understanding" with the "external enemy of Germany", who would reward it with territory "in the North German plains", Vogt was of course giving Prussia the best possible assistance in achieving its alleged ends. He roused the suspicions of the other German governments both towards Prussia's initial attempts to neutralise them and towards its military preparations and its claim to the supreme command during the war. "Whatever path Germany has to choose in the present crisis," Vogt says, "one thing is certain: that as a whole it must pursue one definite path with energy, whereas as things are the unhappy Federal Diet, etc." (loc. cit., p. 96). By spreading the view that Prussia goes arm in arm with "the external enemy" and that this will lead to its devouring the Northern plains, Vogt presumably intends to restore the unity in the Federal Diet which is so badly lacking. Saxony, in particular, is reminded explicitly that Prussia has already once occasioned "the loss of some of its finest provinces" (loc. cit., p. 93). The "purchase of the Jade Bay" is denounced (loc. cit., p. 15). "Holstein was to have been the reward for Prussia's participation" (in the Turkish War) "when the notorious theft of the dispatch gave the negotiations a different turn" (loc. cit., p. 15). "Mecklenburg, Hanover, Oldenburg, Holstein and other miscellaneous appendages ... these fraternal German states are the bait at which Prussia greedily snatches"—and does so moreover "at every possible opportunity" (loc. cit., pp. 14, 15). And as Vogt reveals, on this occasion it has been firmly hooked by Louis Bonaparte. On the one side, as the result of its secret "understanding" with Louis Bonaparte Prussia must and will "reach the coasts of the North Sea and the Baltic at the expense of its German brothers" (loc. cit., p. 14). On the other side, "Prussia will have obtained a natural frontier only when the watershed of the Erzgebirge and the Fichtelgebirge is extended through the white Main and along the Main up to Mainz" (loc. cit., p. 93). Natural frontiers in the depth of Germany! Formed, moreover, by a watershed which passes through a river! It is this sort of discovery in the realm of physical geography—to which we may add the channel that rose to the surface (see "Magnum Opus")—that puts "the well-rounded character" on a par with Alexander von Humboldt. At the same time as he was preaching to the German Confederation on the confidence it must have in the leadership of Prussia, Vogt, not satisfied with the "ancient rivalry between Prussia and Austria on German, etc., territory", invented another rivalry between these two states which "has so frequently broken out on non-European soil" (loc. cit., p. 20). This non-European soil is probably on the moon. In fact Vogt simply translates into words the map of L'Europe en 1860 published by the French Government in 1858. The map shows Hanover, Mecklenburg, Brunswick, Holstein, the Electorate of Hesse together with sundry territories such as Waldeck, Anhalt, Lippe, etc., as having been annexed to Prussia, while "l'Empereur des Français conserve ses (!) limites actuelles", the Emperor of the French preserves his (!) existing frontiers. "Prussia down to the Main" is also a slogan of Russian diplomacy. (See, for example, the memorandum of 1837 mentioned above. ) A Prussian North Germany would counterbalance an Austrian South, Germany, separated by natural frontiers, tradition, denomination, dialect and tribal differences. The division of Germany into two parts would be completed by simplifying the contradictions within it and the Thirty Years' War [162] would be declared in permanence. According to the first edition of the Studien, Prussia was supposed to receive such a "reward" for its "efforts" in forcing the sword of the German Confederation back into its sheath during the war. In Vogt's Studien, as on the French map L'Europe en 1860, it is not Louis Bonaparte, but Prussia that seeks and achieves the enlargement of its territory and attains natural frontiers as a result of the French war against Austria. Vogt only reveals Prussia's true task in the Afterword to the second edition of his Studien [bg] , which appeared while the Franco-Austrian war was still in progress. Prussia was to initiate a "civil war" (see the 2nd edition, p. 152) so as to establish a "unified central power" (loc. cit., p. 153), to incorporate Germany in the Prussian monarchy. While Russia advances from the East and Austria is held down by Louis Bonaparte in Italy, Prussia is to embark on a dynastic "civil war" in Germany. Vogt guarantees the Prince Regent [bh] that "the war that has broken out" in Italy "will last, out the year 1859 at the very least, whereas the unification of Germany, if prosecuted resolutely, will not take as many weeks as the Italian campaign months" (loc. cit., p. 155). The civil war in Germany will only be a matter of weeks! Apart from the Austrian troops which would immediately march on Prussia, Italian war or no Italian war, Prussia would meet resistance, as Vogt himself explains, from "Bavaria [bi] ... which is entirely under Austrian influence" (Studien, 1st edition, p. 90), from Saxony, which would be the first to be threatened and which would no longer have any reason to do violence to its "sympathies for Austria" (loc. cit., p. 93), from "Württemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt and Hanover" (loc. cit., p. 94), in short from "nine-tenths" (loc. cit., p. 16) of the "German governments". And these governments, as Vogt further demonstrates, would not lack support in the event of such a dynastic "civil war", especially if initiated by Prussia at a time when Germany was threatened by its "two greatest external enemies". "The court" (in Baden), says Vogt, "goes along with Prussia, but the people, and there is no doubt about that, certainly does not share the predilections of the ruling family. The Breisgau, no less than Upper Swabia, is bound much more closely to the Emperor and the Imperial state by ties of sympathy, religious confession and old memories of the Austrian Forelands, to which it formerly belonged, than one would have supposed after such a long separation" (loc. cit., pp. 93-94). "With the exception of Mecklenburg" and "perhaps" the Electorate of Hesse, "in North Germany the attitude to the theory of incorporation is one of mistrust and Prussia's policy is accepted only with reluctance. The instinctive feeling of dislike, indeed of hatred, aroused by Prussia in South Germany ... has not been eliminated or talked out of existence by the full-throated cry of the Imperial party [bj] . It lives on in the people, and no government, not even that of Baden, can resist it for long. Thus Prussia has no real support either among the German people, or in the governments of the German Confederation" (loc. cit., p. 21). Thus speaks Vogt. And for that very reason, according to that same Vogt, a dynastic "civil war" initiated by Prussia in "secret understanding" with the "two greatest external enemies of Germany", would only be a matter of "weeks". But there is more to come. "The Old Prussian provinces go along with the government—the Rhineland and Westphalia with Catholic Austria. If the popular movement there does not succeed in pushing the government over to Austria's side, the immediate consequence would be to reopen the gulf between the two parts of the monarchy" (loc. cit., p. 20). Thus, according to Vogt, if the simple non-intervention of Prussia on Austria's behalf was enough to reopen the gulf between Rhineland-Westphalia and the Old Prussian provinces, then clearly, in the eyes of the same Vogt, a "civil war", undertaken by Prussia with the aim of expelling Austria from Germany, was bound to wrench Rhineland-Westphalia from Prussia for good and all. But "what does Germany matter to these papists?" (loc. cit., p. 119), or as he really thinks, what do these papists matter to Germany? The Rhineland and Westphalia are ultramontane "Roman-Catholic" and not "true German" provinces. Hence they must be expelled from the territory of the Confederation just like Bohemia and Moravia. And this process of expulsion is to be accelerated by the dynastic "civil war" recommended to Prussia by Vogt. And in fact in its map published in 1858 of L'Europe en 1860, which served Vogt as a compass throughout his Studien, the French Government, which had annexed Egypt to Austria, also showed the Rhine provinces as countries of "Catholic nationality" and annexed by Belgium—an ironic formula for the annexation of Belgium and the Rhine provinces by France. The fact that Vogt goes even further than the map of the French Government and throws in Catholic Westphalia as an extra, can be explained by the "scientific relations" between the fugitive Regent of the Empire and Plon-Plon, the son of the ex-King of Westphalia. [bk] To sum up: On the one hand, Louis Bonaparte will give Russia leave to extend its rule from Posen to Bohemia and from Hungary right down to Turkey. On the other hand, he himself will establish a united and independent Italy on France's frontier by force of arms, and all that—pour le roi de Prusse [bl] ; all that to give Prussia an opportunity to bring Germany under its wing by means of a civil war and to "secure" the "Rhine provinces for ever" against France (loc. cit., p. 121). "But, it will be said, the territory of the Confederation is in danger, the hereditary foe threatens, his real goal is the Rhine. Then, defend the Rhine and defend the territory of the Confederation" (loc. cit., p. 105), and in fact defend the territory of the Confederation by ceding Bohemia and Moravia to Russia, and defend the Rhine by starting a German "civil war" with the aim, among others, of tearing Rhineland and Westphalia from Prussia. "But, it will be said, Louis Napoleon ... desires to satisfy his Napoleonic thirst for conquest by some means or other! We do not think so, we have the example of the Crimean campaign before our eyes!" (loc. cit., p. 129.) Apart from his scepticism about the Napoleonic thirst for conquest and his faith in the Crimean campaign, Vogt has yet another argument in petto. The Austrians and the French will follow the example of the Kilkenny cats [163] and keep on biting each other in Italy until there is nothing left of them but their tails. "It will be a terribly bloody, stubborn and perhaps indecisive war" (loc. cit., pp. 127, 128). "Only by exerting its strength to the very utmost will France, together with Piedmont, be able to triumph, and it will not recover from these efforts for decades" (loc. cit., p. 129). This prospect of a long-lasting Italian war silences his critics. And the method by which Vogt manages to prolong Austria's resistance to French arms in Italy and to cripple France's aggressive power, is indeed original enough. On the one hand, the French are given carte blanche in Italy; On the other hand, the "benevolent Tsar" is given leave by manoeuvres in Galicia, Hungary, Moravia and Bohemia and by revolutionary machinations within the country and military demonstrations on its frontiers "to hold down a significant part of the Austrian forces in those parts of the monarchy which are exposed to Russian attack or vulnerable to Russian intrigue" (loc. cit., p. 11). And lastly, by means of a dynastic "civil war" simultaneously unleashed in Germany by Prussia, Austria will be compelled to withdraw its main forces from Italy to protect its German possessions. It is obvious that in such circumstances Francis Joseph and Louis Bonaparte will not conclude a Treaty of Campoformio [164] but "will both bleed to death in Italy". Austria will not make any concessions to the "benevolent Tsar" in the East and accept the long-standing offer of indemnification in Serbia and Bosnia. Nor will it guarantee the Rhine provinces to France and fall on Prussia in league with Russia and France. Not on your life! It will insist on "bleeding to death in Italy". In any event, however, Vogt's "man of destiny" would indignantly reject such a compensation on the Rhine. Vogt knows that "the foreign policy of the present Empire has only one principle, that of self-preservation" (loc. cit., p. 31). He knows that Louis Bonaparte "is intent on pursuing a single idea [...] that of preserving his power" (over France) (loc. cit., p. 29). He knows that the "Italian war does not increase his popularity in France" whereas the acquisition of the Rhine provinces would make him and his dynasty "popular". He says: "The Rhine provinces are indeed a pet ambition of the French chauvinist and perhaps, if one were to go into it, one would discover only a very small minority of the nation which did not bear this wish deep in its heart" (loc. cit., p. 121). On the other hand, "perceptive Frenchmen", and therefore presumably also Vogt's "man of destiny who is as wise as a serpent", know that "they can only hope to see this realised" (namely France's acquisition of the natural frontier of the Rhine) "as long as Germany possesses 34 different governments. [...] Let a real Germany come into existence, with unified interests and a firm organisation—and the Rhine frontier will be secure for all time" (loc. cit., p. 121). For this very reason, Louis Bonaparte, who at Villafranca offered the Emperor of Austria Lombardy in exchange for a guarantee of the Rhine provinces (see the statement by Kinglake in the House of Commons, July 12, 1860 [bm] ), would have indignantly rejected Austria's offer of the Rhine provinces in exchange for French aid against Prussia. Vogt's original Dentu sources likewise not only indulged in lyrical effusions on the subject of German unity under the aegis of Prussia {*37} : they also spurned every suggestion of ambitions in the Rhine provinces with virtuous indignation. "The Rhine!... What is the Rhine?—A frontier. Frontiers will soon be anachronisms" (La foi des traités, etc., Paris, 1859, p. 36). {*38} In the millennium that is to be established by Badinguet on the foundations of the principle of nationality, who will be concerned about the Rhine frontier, or indeed any frontiers at all! "Does France insist on compensation for the sacrifices it is prepared to make in the cause of equity, of legitimate influence and in the interest of European equilibrium? Does it demand the left bank of the Rhine? Does it so much as lay claim to Savoy and the County of Nice?" (La vraie question, etc., Paris, 1859, p. 13.) {*39} France's renunciation of Savoy and Nice as proof of France's renunciation of the Rhine! Vogt did not translate that into German. Before the start of the war it was of crucial importance for Louis Bonaparte, if he was unable to lure Prussia into an understanding, at least to make the German Confederation believe that he had done so. Vogt attempts to disseminate this belief in the first edition of his Studien. During the war it became even more important for Louis Bonaparte to induce Prussia to take steps that would provide Austria with proof or apparent proof of such an understanding. In the second edition of the Studien, which appeared while the war was in progress, Vogt therefore calls on Prussia in an Afterword to conquer Germany and initiate a dynastic "civil war" which, as the text of his book makes clear, would be "bloody, stubborn and perhaps indecisive" and would cost Prussia Rhineland and Westphalia at the very least. And in the Afterword to the same book he solemnly assures his readers that it will "only cost a matter of weeks". Vogt's voice is in truth not that of the siren. Hence Louis Bonaparte, seconded in his knavish plot by bottle-holder [bn] Palmerston, was forced to present Prussian proposals he himself had drawn up to Francis Joseph in Villafranca; Austria had to use Prussia's modest claims to the military leadership of Germany as an excuse for concluding a peace {*40} which Louis Bonaparte had to excuse in France by saying that the Italian war was threatening to become a general war which "would bring about German unity and thus accomplish a work which ever since Francis I it had been the object of French policy to prevent". {*41} After France had acquired Savoy and Nice as a result of the Italian war, and with them a position worth more than an army in the event of a war on the Rhine, "German unity under Prussian hegemony" and "cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France" became interchangeable factors in the probability calculations of the 2nd December. The map of L'Europe en 1860 published in 1858 was interpreted by the map L'Europe pacifiée (Europe pacified?) which appeared in 1860. According to this map Egypt was no longer given to Austria and the Rhine provinces together with Belgium were annexed by France in return for the "Northern plains" that were now assigned to Prussia. {*42} Finally, Persigny made an official pronouncement in Etienne that, if only in the "interest of European equilibrium", any further centralisation on the part of Germany would entail the advance of France to the Rhine {*43} . But neither before nor after the Italian war had the grotesque ventriloquist of the Tuileries expressed himself with such insolence as through the mouthpiece of the fugitive Imperial Regent. Vogt "the New Swiss, citizen of the Canton of Berne and member of the Council of States [165] for Geneva" (loc. cit., Preface), opens the Swiss section of his Studien with a prologue (loc. cit., pp. 37-39) in which he calls upon Switzerland to utter a paean of joy at the replacement of Louis Philippe by Louis Bonaparte. It is true that Louis Bonaparte was demanding that the Federal Council should "put controls on the press", but "the Napoleonides seem in this respect to have extremely sensitive skins" (loc. cit., p. 36). A mere skin disease, so engrained in the family that it is transmitted not only "in the family blood, but even—teste Louis Bonaparte—by the mere family name. However, "The persecution of innocent men in Geneva which has been carried out by the Federal Council on instructions from the Emperor against poor devils whose only crime was that they were Italians; the establishment of consulates; the harassment of the press; the senseless police regulations of every conceivable kind and, finally, the negotiations about the cession of the Vallee des Dappes [166] , have all played an essential part in obliterating in the minds of the Swiss the 16 memories of those services which the Emperor really rendered in the Neuchâtel affair [167] , and in particular for the very party which has now turned most violently against him" (loc. cit., pp. 37, 38). Magnanimous Emperor, ungrateful party! The Emperor's aim in the Neuchâtel affair was by no means the creation of a precedent for the violation of . the treaties of 1815, the humiliation of Prussia and the establishment of a protectorate over Switzerland. What he was really concerned with was "to render" Switzerland "a real service", in his capacity as "New Swiss, citizen of the Canton of Thurgau and artillery captain of Oberstrass". The accusation of ingratitude levelled by Vogt against the anti-Bonapartist party in Switzerland in March 1859, was extended to the whole of Switzerland in June 1860 by another servant of the Emperor, M. de Thouvenel. The Times of June 30, 1860 writes that "A few days ago a meeting took place between Dr. Kern and M. de Thouvenel in the Foreign Ministry in Paris in the presence of Lord Cowley. Thouvenel informed the honourable representative of Switzerland that the doubts and protestations of the Federal Government were insulting inasmuch as they seemed to imply a want of faith in the government of His Imperial Majesty. Such treatment was base ingratitude in view of the services which the Emperor Napoleon had rendered [bp] the Confederation on many occasions, and in particular in the Neuchâtel affair. However that may be, since Switzerland had been so blind as to mistrust her benefactor, she must herself bear the consequences." Nevertheless Vogt tried to open the eyes of the blind anti-Bonapartist party in Switzerland as early as March 1859. On the one hand, he points to "the real services" which "the Emperor has rendered". On the other hand, "the Imperial harassments shrink to vanishing point" beside the royal harassments under Louis Philippe (loc. cit., p. 39). For example, in 1858 the Federal Council "on instructions from the Emperor" expelled some "poor devils whose only crime was that they were Italians" [bq] (p. 37); in 1838, notwithstanding Louis Philippe's threats, it refused to expel Louis Bonaparte, whose only crime was to have used Switzerland as a base from which to conspire against Louis Philippe. In 1846, despite Louis Philippe's "warlike gestures", Switzerland ventured upon the Sonderbund war [168] , for it refused to let itself be bullied by the peaceful King; in 1858 it was hardly prudish in its reaction to Louis Bonaparte's groping in the Vallée des Dappes. "Louis Philippe," Vogt says himself, "had dragged out a miserable existence in Europe, snubbed by everybody, even by the lesser legitimate rulers, because he had not dared to conduct a strong foreign policy" (loc. cit., p. 31). However, "Imperial policy vis-à-vis Switzerland is without any doubt that of a powerful neighbour who knows that in the end he can enforce whatever he likes" (loc. cit., p. 37). Therefore, Vogt concludes, with a logic worthy of Grandguillot, "from a purely Swiss point of view one can only rejoice heartily" (p. 39) because instead of "Louis Philippe who was snubbed by every-body" Switzerland has received a "powerful neighbour who knows that with respect to Switzerland he can do whatever he likes". This prologue, which establishes the necessary mood, is followed by a German translation of the note of the Federal Council of March 14, 1859 [br] , and curiously enough Vogt is full of praise for this note in which the Federal Council referred to the treaties of 1815 [169] , though the same Vogt declares that it is "hypocrisy" to refer to these treaties. "Get along with your hypocrisy!" (loc. cit., p. 112.) {*44} Vogt now goes on to consider "from which side the first attack on Swiss neutrality will come" (loc. cit., p. 84) and proves, quite unnecessarily, that the French army, which had no need to conquer Piedmont this time, would march through neither the Simplon nor the Great St. Bernard. At the same time he discovers a non-existent land route "over the Mont Cenis, via Fenestrelle and through the Stura valley" (loc. cit., p. 84). He means the Dora valley. From France, then, there is no threat to Switzerland. "But respect for Swiss neutrality on the part of Austria cannot be looked for with similar confidence, and various factors even suggest that in certain eventualities Austria is indeed prepared to violate it" (loc. cit., p. 85). "Of significance in this respect is the concentration of a military force in Bregenz and Feldkirch" (loc. cit., p. 86). Here the thread which runs through the Studien and leads straight from Geneva to Paris becomes visible. The Blue Book on The Affairs of Italy. January to May 1859 published by the Derby Cabinet says that "the concentration of an Austrian military force near Bregenz and Feldkirch" was a rumour assiduously cultivated by Bonapartist agents in Switzerland without a jot of fa