After 2003, Humayim maintained an anti-American view, calling for an end of the US occupation of Iraq. It is important to mention, however, that Humayim did not resort to sectarian rhetoric to incite violence against Shia or the Iraqi government, something many expat Sunni clerics did. Unlike Harith al-Dhari and other clerics, Humayim had a more moderate, nationalist outlook and kept a neutral position towards the new political process.

Humayim returned to Iraq in 2012 and created a political coalition called Nahdhat al-Iraq (the Renaissance of Iraq) hoping to enter the political process two years before the 2014 parliamentary election. The coalition, which included many Sunni clerical and tribal figures, was opposed to federalism and the idea of a Sunni region. His return to Iraq is rumored to have been facilitated by the then prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. Al-Maliki sought Humayim’s help to offset anti-government Sunni clerics who were leading a protest movement throughout Sunni majority cities particularly in Anbar. In return, al-Maliki allegedly released assets belonging to Humayim and his relatives that were frozen after 2003. Al-Humayim’s Nahdhat al-Iraq never picked up momentum and it did not enter the 2014 elections as announced.

Humayim was thrust again into the political scene in June 2015, when Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi appointed him as the chairman of the Sunni Endowment. Al-Abadi’s decision was rejected by two of the most influential Sunni blocs in Parliament, Usama al-Nujayfi’s Mutahidoun and the Islamic Party. They objected to the appointment of al-Humayim as acting chairman of the endowment without parliamentary endorsement, and the fact that he was not selected by the Fiqh Council, an institution created by the Iraqi government to act as a sort of “Marji’ya” for Sunni scholars. Interestingly, secular Sunni MP with Ba’athist background, Dhafir al-Ani, praised the appointment of Humayim as a “brave” decision by al-Abadi. Essentially, Nujayfi saw in Humayim an obvious ally of al-Abadi who would impede his regionalist ambitions, while Ani, the Ba’athist with strong centralist roots, saw the appointment of Humayim as a good precedent for former Saddam loyalists being included in the post-2003 order.

The Political Fight for Ramadi

Al-Humayim’s struggle against local officials in Anbar was almost inevitable. By authorizing Humayim to oversee the return of displaced people and reconstruction in Ramadi, al-Abadi essentially sidelined Anbar’s governor and provincial council. The Islamic party, which has dominated the local government since 2005, sees Humayim’s involvement as an encroachment on its territory. The reason behind this thinking is twofold. First, the entity that would supervise the return of IDPs would be winning people’s hearts, and that would have major political and electoral implications. If things go as Humayim planned, he, and by extension al-Abadi, would be credited with bringing home Ramadi’s displaced residents. Second, the return of IDPs is only possible if the homes and streets of Ramadi are cleared of IEDs and booby-traps, and therefore, it is the first step to reconstruction. Islamic Party leaders, who anticipate a flow of international aid (particularly from Gulf countries) to rebuild Sunni cities, do not want to lose control of the reconstruction process and the obvious financial benefits it entails.