The cladding system on Grenfell Tower was reportedly passed by a building control officer from the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea on 15 May 2015, despite a nationwide warning that the combustible insulation it featured should only be used in conjunction with cladding that does not burn.



The expert from the council, owner of the 24-storey block, approved the system when less than half of the building had been reclad, according to a newsletter distributed to Grenfell residents by the contractor, Rydon, and the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO).

Other newsletters seen by the Guardian reveal that KCTMO also appointed two clerks of works whose job it was to “evaluate the quality of work being done to the building” and that RBKC building control officers made regular visits “to ensure that all technical aspects of the work met the requisite regulations”.

One states confidently: “Grenfell was designed according to rigorous fire safety standards.”

The council has already said its building control officers went on site 16 times during construction, and its building control manager certified the Grenfell works as being in line with building regulations on completion in 2016.

Some observers have questioned how the cladding system, which burned so ferociously in a blaze that claimed at least 80 lives, could have complied with regulations.

The government confirmed on Friday that it is now considering a review of building regulations to find out “how and why non-compliant cladding has been used” on Grenfell and 233 other residential towers that have since failed government tests.

The Guardian revealed on Thursday that in 2014 the national body for building control departments, Local Authority Building Control (LABC), issued a certificate for the Celotex insulation installed at Grenfell that stated it could be used on tall buildings – but only with fibre cement panels that do not burn.

Grenfell was fitted with cheaper combustible polyethylene-filled aluminium panels.

Police are investigating possible manslaughter charges as well as any potential breaches of legislation and regulations. Detectives are examining the speed of the fire’s spread, looking in particular at the cladding and insulation.

Residents’ newsletters sent out from April 2014 to May 2016 suggest that the cladding and fire measures were high-profile issues.

In June 2014, KCTMO and Rydon reported: “We have been busy working with the council’s planning department on the type of cladding which will be used.”

The next month, samples of the cladding were erected “for the council’s planners to look at and approve”. But also in July, according to separate leaked internal emails, the council was looking for “good costs” and cheaper cladding panels were substituted, saving almost £300,000.

In February 2015, the client and contractor reported “regular visits from RBKC building control officers … working closely with us to ensure that all technical aspects of the work meet the requisite regulations”.

One newsletter passage, focusing on what to do in the event of fire, said: “Unless there is a fire in your flat or in the hallway outside your flat, you should stay inside your flat.

“This is because Grenfell was designed according to rigorous fire safety standards.

“Also, the new front doors for each flat can withstand a fire for up to 30 minutes, which gives plenty of time for the fire brigade to arrive.”

Additional research: Russell Scott