What many describe as "sleeper cells" is actually a modular system, combining various types of agents who are being infiltrated into an area of interest. Whether these operatives start collecting information and intelligence in advance, or whether they are activated in the last days or hours before an attack, depends on the situation. They may remain "dormant" for longer periods, like in Baghdad for example, which could hold as many as 2 000 ISIS operatives already.

ISIS can't mobilize and built-up large ground forces prior to an offensive: any suspicious gathering of vehicles or troops outside of a major city would immediately be detected and endanger the whole operation, as the attacking force would likely be targeted by coalition airstrikes. The Caliphate doesn't have the manpower to sustain a campaign of that nature, even though the casualty rate suffered from air attacks doesn't seem to have harmed IS' overall capabilities so far.

Infiltration of potential target areas by ISIS members has proven a very powerful tool in the organization’s arsenal. In the conquest of Ramadi in particular, "sleeper cells" have been blamed by Iraqi officials for the chaos and confusion they created among government troops, through disseminating false information and spreading fear. While not entirely false, the role of so called "sleeper cells"doesn’t explain the rout of Iraqi troops by a force much smaller in numbers.

In fact, ISIS' strategy for winning over cities like Ramadi earlier this month, or Mosul last year, is based a lot on what happens in the weeks and months before the actual military attack. This "intelligence war" that ISIS has mastered much more than combined arms in the conventional sense is interesting as so far as it could give a few pointers regarding how the organization might try to react to the government’s offensive that is supposed to start soon.

Be that as it may, the purpose of this piece is not to analyze tactical scenarios for possible developments on the ground, but rather to study a few cases of ISIS operations that are not strictly military, and focus instead on another of the organization’s tactics, as a follow-up to last week's piece about the Caliphate's ground troops. The aim is to give the reader an insight into one of ISIS most potent weapons, one that has a direct bearing on the outcome of a battle, but one that remains mostly in the shadows, only to be seen by its results and effects.

The question that also needs to be asked is how the "Islamic State" is going to react to the government’s preparations. It can probably stomach a defensive fight in Ramadi, even a tactical retreat out of the city, but it can't let the Shia groups take away the initiative and drive back the Caliphate's armies into Iraq's Western desert. Basically, all bets are on as to what might happen next. First reports are already trickling in about a number of suicide attacks by ISIS "Martyrs" against the pro-government forces preparing for battle in the North and East of Ramadi. The writing is on the wall: ISIS won't probably give up Ramadi the way it did Tikrit and the Shia militias have to brace themselves for a tough fight in the days to come.

Is it a sign of desperation within the Iraqi government, an impulse reaction against harsh American criticism or the realization that of all government troops available, the Shia militias are the only ones with the will and the "guts" to take the fight to the enemy ? Time will tell, but if this is more than a PR-stunt and if there is indeed an actual military effort at taking back large areas under ISIS control, the most likely scenario is one of massive bloodshed, destruction and chaos.

Yesterday, the Iraqi government announced its coming offensive not just on Ramadi, but on the entire Anbar province. To be more precise, it was a Shia militias spokesman who made that announcement even prior to the government. One can only wonder at the ambition of such an enterprise and the disaster that would be a ground operation spearheaded by sectarian troops with a bad reputation and a number of alleged war crimes under their belt. Launching Shia militias into the heartland of Sunni Iraq, under a codename (" Labayka ya Hussein ") that can only be resented by many Sunnis in Ramadi, Fallujah and elsewhere in Anbar, doesn't bear the hallmarks of a sound strategy.

Part of these cells however carry out their mission as soon as they are in place. Once infiltrated into neighborhoods where they can easily hide, possibly among family or tribe members, in exclusively Sunni neighborhoods, they start collecting intelligence, stage suicide attacks or organize targeted assassinations.

A tough nut to crack

Members of the Caliphate's "Special Forces", lead by the now famous Abu Omar al-Shishani, may also be called upon to take-over strategic buildings and locations as part of first military action prior to a main offensive, as has been the case in Mosul last year as well as in Ramadi. These troops however are already part of the military aspect of an offensive. They don't do any intelligence work and only qualify as "sleeper cells" because they get called into action in the last hours prior to the attack.

However, with regard to Ramadi in particular, it wouldn't be surprising that either members of Shishani's troops, suicide bombers or snipers have taken up positions in the urban environment of the city, waiting for the right time to strike and inflict severe casualties to any approaching government force.

Obviously, these ISIS assets won't be able to halt a determined assault, but they can potentially delay operations and demoralize the attacking troops, while in the meantime ISIS may very well prepare for another operation in the back of the Iraqi army, launching a major suicide campaign in Baghdad, which could force the government to regroup around the capital and thus weaken its ground force in Ramadi. One might even conjecture as to the possibility of simultaneous terror attacks in major Shia cities in the South, like Karbala, which could be ISIS' way of deepening the sectarian rift, at a time when Shia groups are potentially about to enter Sunni heartland.

The Caliphate's black, white and red "lists"

However, the actual intelligence work of IS "cells" operating in areas under government control is not directly related to military operations as such. One example of the job they do is the so-called black, white and red lists that they compile in potential target areas. This was the case in particular in Mosul, in early 2014, where dozens of informants, some of them local and regional government officials, gave crucial information to IS intelligence operatives, in exchange for mercy once the city was taken.

The "know-how" the Islamic State is exhibiting in matters related to such type of intelligence work is actually much more impressive than its military prowess. No doubt, it bears the signature of Saddam Hussein's intelligence officers, who have joined ISIS in numbers since the mid-2000s. Thanks to these men, the Islamic State sometimes just had to reactivate intelligence networks that used to work for Saddam and had been lying dormant for months, sometimes even years. In Mosul, local politicians, police officers, and sometimes average citizens provided the raw material for IS agents to gather the information they needed.

The lists that were compiled are divided by colors: black, white and red. The one that calls for immediate action is the “black list”, which features names and details of individuals earmarked for "targeted assassination" by ISIS. This list might include Sunni leaders likely to oppose any take-over by the Islamic State, or a competent military commander who could be an obstacle to easy conquest.

The "white list" is being completed over a longer period of time, as it comprises people that have been won over by ISIS agents or who can provide information. Once ground operations begin, the assets from the "white list" can also be called upon to participate in certain actions, like sabotage, or – in the case of Mosul – very simply spread messages over the loudspeakers of the city's mosques, calling for the take-over of Mosul by the Islamic State's troops.

The Baathist handbook of terror

The "red list" finally is the trickiest one to manage, as it involves a good read of the situation on the ground. This list, also referred to as "chaos list", aims at triggering a cycle of sectarian violence, reprisals and counter-violence, likely to foster a climate more favorable to ISIS action. Names on the red list include individuals of all kinds. A Shia cleric for example might be killed by a car bomb in his mosque, which would then cause for the local Shia militants to avenge his death by taking lives among the Sunnis. Thus, the “red list” increases and reinforces the sectarian divide.

In cities where Sunnis are a minority, they are more likely to turn to ISIS for protection, if they appear to be targeted by a violent Shia mob. That wasn't the case in Mosul, but it may very well be the case in Baghdad, where a "red list" operation might be implemented on a large scale by the Islamic State. The "red list" is usually the last of the three lists to be implemented. It is the sign of something major in the making: assassination numbers go up, car bombs and suicide bombers hit crowded places, enemies and rivals are being killed and a climate of fear and sectarian violence is being spread.

These tactics are no invention of the Islamic State, they're more an adaptation of the intelligence "handbook" of Saddam Hussein's services, which has been fully taken onboard, as exemplified by the US raid on camp "Sheikh Osama Bin Laden", in July 2014. Information about what happened during that raid, the first one of its kind on Syrian territory, is still sketchy. However, certain information obtained on the ground, as well as the lack of clarification by US officials, make the scenario of an ISIS "intelligence" operation a very plausible possibility.

US raid on camp "Sheikh Osama Bin Laden"

If you read the few articles that have been published about the US raid that took place early in July 2014, outside of Raqqa in Eastern Syria, you get the impression that this was nothing more than a failed hostage rescue attempt. And in a sense, it was, only that it didn't fail because of "bad luck" or because the hostages involved (James Foley and Steven Sotloff) had been moved to a different location, but quite possibly because this had been an operation designed by ISIS' intelligence to lure the US into an ambush.

According to official and Western media sources, it all started in June 2014, when the FBI sent several agents to Europe, in order to interview European hostages who had been released by ISIS. The idea was to establish whether US citizens taken by ISIS were still alive, gather as much information as possible about their whereabouts and finally report back and see if a hostage rescue operation was feasible. Unknown to the FBI however, ISIS agents had anticipated that possibility and were planning to ambush any US rescue party.

What the European hostages described to the FBI was a building that was later determined to be part of an oil refinery on the outskirts of Raqqa, in Eastern Syria. It took the NSA a while to identify the building through satellite imagery, as US Intel wasn't flying any surveillance drones over that area at the time.

A Delta Force detachment was dispatched to Jordan in anticipation of a possible rescue attempt, which finally got the "go ahead" in the night of July 2nd 2014. Helicopters flew the Delta Force over to Raqqa, the building was stormed, a fire-fight ensued, but the hostages couldn't be found. About a month later, ISIS released a video showing the beheading of one of the US hostages.

ISIS' most successful intelligence operation ?



That's about everything you'll find in the media about the operation, give or take a couple of minor details. There's another side to that story however, and the fact that until recently the US hadn't staged any other raid of that sort over Syrian or ISIS controlled territory certainly gives credence to this version of events.

If you’re to believe these alternative sources, the raid on camp "Sheikh Osama Bin Laden" was a set-up from the start, an operation led by a close associate and longtime acquaintance of Abubakr al-Baghdadi. After the European hostages were released in the spring of 2014, this man and his lieutenants had no doubt Western intelligence would debrief his ex-captives, who would possibly give away the place they had been held together with Foley and Sotloff.

Soon after, ISIS decided to relocate the US hostages in another IS hideout and " camp "Sheikh Osama Bin Laden", basically an empty shell at that point, was gradually prepared for a US airborne operation. Additionally, ISIS informants in the border area to Turkey began feeding Turkish intelligence with reports about a camp near Raqqa where foreign hostages were allegedly being held.

This human intelligence was in line with the statements made by the European hostages and was later confirmed by satellite imagery, making for a picture in which the base appeared as a prime target for a US raid. As early as June 2014, i.e. one month before Delta Force attacked, ISIS started beefing up its defenses and brought in small groups of experienced fighters, who were going to wait there for a whole month, until the night of July 2nd. Several dozen fighters were dispatched over the perimeter, and a larger number did hide in small farms and villages around the camp.

Casualties and lessons to be learnt

When Delta Force arrived on site, they became quickly aware that the enemy had been waiting for them. Nonetheless, they managed to enter and search the building, or parts thereof, but couldn’t find the hostages and were taking heavy fire from ISIS' fortified positions within the compound.

Officially, according to US estimates, five ISIS fighters were killed in the exchange, while one US serviceman was wounded. Sources in the area however claim to have seen at least two bodies wearing “SOCOM” type uniforms, without it being clear whether it was Delta Force operatives or Jordanian Special Forces accompanying them.

Be that as it may, the casualties are not the main point to take away from this. However, if indeed this was an operation directed by ISIS and aimed at manipulating the US into a trap, it would certainly explain US reluctance to launch any similar raid until the "Abu Sayyaf" operation which took place a few weeks ago, and which certainly wasn’t based on information gathered from unreliable local informants.

From a purely intelligence point of view, the message to take away from the failed raid on camp "Sheikh Osama Bin Laden" is also a cause for concern, as it would prove that no HUMINT coming out of Syria or from the Turkish border areas is credible enough for Western analysts to base a reliable assessment on. In that regard, the weakness of Western – and even Turkish – human intelligence is an obvious shortcoming that has potentially long term consequences.

The problem is, all the CIA and other Western agencies have to offer their local informants is money. ISIS on the other hand can also offer money, combined with the threat of a slow and painful death in case you don't play ball. Weighing in both propositions, there's not really much of a choice for the locals.

NGO-traps: the true story of the fake “Sons of the Levant”

A last example of the tactics of spreading fear and fostering paranoia among local populations under ISIS control also took place in the border area to Turkey in the spring of 2014. In early March of that year, ISIS set up a fake Syrian opposition group in a Turkish border town. “The sons of the Levant” was an NGO allegedly sponsored by the Free Syrian Army (FSA), whose goal was to draw the international community’s and the media’s attention towards war crimes and atrocities committed by the Islamic State.

The NGO of course was nothing but a cover. Its militants, young Syrian opposition members willing to engage with Western media and any friendly local, called for the unification of the various FSA branches. For several months the activists tried to build-up networks, gathered information and identified witnesses of ISIS atrocities.

In May 2014, the “Sons of the Levant” had already about one hundred regular members. What these people didn't know, was that they had actually given away their identities to operatives of the Islamic State. After May 20th, they were arrested by ISIS border troops, together with their families. Some of them were publicly crucified, the others haven’t been seen since …

What the Islamic State is trying to achieve through operations such as this is not only to round-up possible opponents and shut them up. By publicizing its operations, it is pursuing the permanent goal of spreading fear and paranoia among the population, very much like Saddam’s security apparatus did in Baathist Iraq. Raising suspicion, even among family members and especially towards foreigners and strangers, turns out to be a very efficient way to control any attempt at passing on information potentially damaging to the Caliphate.

Foreign Intelligence Recruiters

Finally, operations such as the “Sons of the Levant” also serve yet another purpose, which is to discourage anybody willing to cooperate with Western intelligence in exchange for money, the only leverage our agencies have in that area.

To make that point clear, IS agents even posed as CIA recruiters early into their involvement in the Syrian civil war. Having "tapped" a local source, they paid the man tens of thousands of US dollars and promised a similar amount every month in return for intelligence about ISIS and the names of his informants. The operation, which was run out of Turkish Kurdistan, lasted several months, and each time the would-be CIA source cashed in his money.

When his ISIS handlers finally decided they knew enough, he was arrested – again with his family – and so were about 15 of his informants, whose identity he had given to the supposed CIA agents. None has been seen since and chances are, they ended up in a shallow grave somewhere in the border region.

What to take away from this

These few examples of successful intelligence operations led by ISIS are not intended to give the impression of an all powerful enemy that can’t be defeated. ISIS is just playing the cards it has been dealt, and it is playing them well, feeding as much on its own strengths as on the Iraqi government’s weaknesses.

As a conventional force, ISIS is rather small, considering the size of its territory and the number of inhabitants. Its means of conquest are not the one’s of a large Western army and that is a fact that the organization has understood well. To succeed, it needs to prepare its actions long in advance, divide potential adversaries and strike fear into the hearts of its enemies.

The intelligence aspect of that strategy has been perfectly mastered by the armies of the Caliphate and regardless of the outcome of the Iraqi government’s offensive on Ramadi, defeating the Islamic State will also require taking them on in the field of military and wartime intelligence.