Lu Chen-wei of the National Policy Foundation says studying in China helps Taiwanese students change stereotypical perceptions. But does the same apply to their own political identities?

﻿By Lu Chen-wei (盧宸緯)

This editorial was originally published in The Initium in Traditional Chinese. It is being reprinted in English with permission of the publishers.

On October 13th, 2017, on the eve of the Communist Party of China’s 19th National Congress, China’s Ministries of Finance and Education jointly released the “Measures for the Administration of Scholarships for Taiwanese Students.”

It wasn’t just the sheer scale and expansion of scholarships offered that captured Taiwan’s attention, but the specific eligibility criterion detailed in the documents — the applicants must identify with the “One China Principle” and “defend the national unity of the motherland”.

In fact, this isn’t the first time the Chinese government has shown concern about the identity of Taiwanese studying in mainland China.

On December 1st, 2016, China’s Ministry of Education (MOE) released the “People’s Republic of China’s Ordinary Post-Secondary Institutions’ Joint Recruitment Examination Syllabus for Admissions of Chinese Students Overseas in Hong Kong and Macau Regions, and from the Province of Taiwan.”

The document explicitly states that the spirit of this amendment is to “reinforce the observance of quality traditional Chinese culture and content”, and to “guide students towards strengthening their cultural and national identities as well as establish correct world views and value systems.”

Because these measures were only recently launched, we’re unable to confirm the effectiveness of such policies. But according to China’s MOE, the number of Taiwanese students pursuing higher education in China has steadily increasing since 2011. The number grew into the five-digits by 2015 and reached a total of 11,329 students in 2017.

Since said education involves the transmission and communication of particular values, one can't help but wonder whether Taiwanese youth studying in mainland China have undergone changes in their identities or political recognition. If so, in what ways have their identities changed?

These questions are discussed regularly in Taiwanese media. However, there are some Chinese scholars also studying and researching this topic. In fact, from the perspective of Beijing, the findings of such studies are quite surprising.

First, separate public opinion polls conducted by the Taiwanese media and by Chinese scholars both reflect a similar trend: The majority of Taiwanese students who visit mainland China develop more positive impressions of the country.

In other words, the experience of Taiwanese youth does indeed lead them to drop some stereotypical ideas about mainland China. Such exposure also convinces Taiwanese youth that the rise of China presents more opportunities than dangers.

However, with regards to the political identities of Taiwanese students, the research outcomes of two groups of Chinese scholars are interesting to reflect upon.

Professors Zhu Jie (祝捷) and Lai Yanjun (赖彦君) of Wuhan University studied a group of students from Central Taiwan with study experience in China to understand the political preferences and voting tendencies of Taiwanese youth during the 2014 local elections.

The study discovered that the political inclinations of Taiwanese youth differed completely from the conventional beliefs of Chinese society. The thinking goes, that upon returning to Taiwan from China, Taiwanese students will vote for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT).

Their research shows that Taiwanese students actually lean more towards a middle ground, with 59.78 percent of students expressing a lack of preference for any particular political party. The main factors impacting students is their families’ political leanings and the location of their household registration. The duration of their stay in China did not sway their vote. Rather, when Taiwanese students cast their votes, their main concerns were predominantly about issues of day-to-day livelihood, such as the Taiwan food scandals of 2013-14.

Among the students who returned to Taiwan to cast their votes, 97.6 percent believed that Taiwanese young people would have an impact on the local elections. Moreover, students believed that partisan political factors do not have a significant impact on the development of peaceful cross-strait relations.

Their opinion was that the rotation and transition of political parties in Taiwan do not lead to negative consequences for cross-strait relations, or for the kind of treatment they receive in mainland China.

At the Shanghai Academy of Educational Sciences, scholars Shang Hongjuan (尚红娟) and Zhang Yiping (张一平) surveyed 300 Taiwanese students studying in China using paper and electronic forms. Their research found that the students’ experience had no influence on their views of unification and independence.

In fact, their time in China had a “negative effect” on their opinions of Chinese identity, cross-strait relations and the development of trade relations. In other words, Taiwanese students either adhered to their original stance, or changed their stance from support for unification, to opposition to unification.

For example, when examining the dimension of “self-identification”:

52.34 percent did not identify as Chinese from a cultural or historical perspective.

21 percent changed their previous position of “self-identity as Chinese” to holding an opinion that China and Taiwan are “two different countries”.

46 percent did not change their personal identity after spending time in China.

With regards to their opinions on “cross-strait unification versus Taiwan’s political independence”:

After their experience in China, 17.59 percent changed their opinion from supporting unification to opposing unification.

41.03 percent did not have an opinion before or after their experience in China.

18.62 percent persisted in their opposition to political unification.

In the field of “cross-strait economic relations”:

10.73 percent who previously supported the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) opposed these agreements after their experience in China.

43.6 percent expressed their lack of opinion before and after their experience in China.

In comparison, Taiwan scholars Lan Pei-Chia (蓝佩嘉) and Wu Yifan (吴伊凡) at National Taiwan University’s Department of Sociology arrived at different conclusions.

Their research found that Taiwanese students who intend to stay in China for long-term career development and work in multinational corporations adopted strategies of “diluting cross-strait differences” and “developing a global identity”.

However, Taiwanese students whose only focus is to obtain diplomas at Chinese universities rather than settling in for the long-term take an approach of persisting in their Taiwanese identity and strengthening cross-strait differences.

Through this research, one can see that the self-identification and cultural identities of Taiwanese students who visited China for school or exchange are not necessarily impacted by their experience on the other side of the strait. But why is this so?