Serious fire safety breaches at Grenfell Tower included over 100 non-compliant fire doors, a fire fighting lift that didn’t work and a “stay put” policy that totally failed, the inquiry into the disaster has been told.



There was “a culture of non-compliance” at the tower which contained more combustible material than previously thought, fire safety experts revealed. This included flammable parts to the window frames that spread the fire to the external cladding within 15 minutes of the first 999 call, at just before 12.54am from a householder whose fridge freezer appeared to be alight.

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On the first day of evidence, following eight days of commemorations for most of the 71 people who died on the night, the inquiry hall was packed with survivors and lawyers from more than 550 individuals and organisations involved. They heard a recording of the panicked call from Bahailu Kebede, who lived in flat 16, when he told the 999 operator: “Quick, quick, quick. It’s burning.”

Play Video 2:33 Video timeline shows how the Grenfell Tower fire unfolded

They also saw a video montage of the fire spreading across the building’s face and into dozens of flats based on clips recorded by members of the public, which the inquiry chairman, Sir Martin Moore-Bick, described as “truly shocking”.

Flaming liquids and burning debris were shown showering down from Kebede’s flat shortly after the fire began as flames spread rapidly up and across the face of the high-rise building.

“I told you, I told you, get out,” one man could be heard shouting.

By 01.29am, the flames had climbed up to the top of the tower and burning panels could be seen spiralling to the ground.

In what became a litany of serious flaws, the inquiry also heard how risers intended to channel water to the upper floors of the building where most people died, failed to work properly and that a system for extracting smoke from lobby areas on each floor did not work either and did not meet building regulations.

“Thick black smoke” prevented firefighters from being able to use lobbies as a bridgehead or search base and would have prevented residents from leaving their flats.

In an opening statement that lasted most of the day, Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry, warned the companies and organisations called to give evidence not to “indulge in a merry-go-round of buck passing”.

He gave them a deadline to provide detailed written statements and said they must “identify exactly their role on the chain of events leading to Grenfell Tower becoming ... a major hazard”.

He also indicated that the response of the fire services would be placed under severe scrutiny in the coming weeks with more than 50 firefighters be called to give oral evidence.

He read out a statement to the inquiry by the commissioner of the London fire brigade, Dany Cotton, who was on the scene at Grenfell before 3.00am.

Facebook Twitter Pinterest The burnt-out shell of Grenfell Tower is seen behind terraced houses. Photograph: Niklas Halle'N/AFP/Getty Images

She said: “I have never seen a building where the whole of it was on fire, nobody has ever seen that, it was incredible, it was so alien to anything I had ever seen.”

But Millett asked whether “such a building envelope fire was foreseeable and what contingency plans might have been made for it by the LFB”.

He said the fire fighters faced questions about what policy they have, if any, for assessing materials used on buildings, whether this was applied and what they do if the compartmentation restricting fire spread fails, as happened so rapidly at Grenfell, partly as a result of over 100 fire doors not meeting building regulations.

Referring to the “stay put” advice, he said: “It may be that the formal maintenance of that advice until 2.47am made all the difference between life and death”.

One survivors’ group has claimed in evidence to the inquiry that many more people would have survived if the advice had been revoked earlier. But Millett insisted that was “very far from beyond argument” and that the timing of that advice and its consequences would have to be explored in evidence.

Five expert reports into the fire, its spread and the regulatory environment, were published alongside Millett’s opening remarks. Jose Torero, academic and fire safety expert, came to a damning conclusion about the building regulation system, stating that “systems that introduce obvious dangers can be incorporated by designers in a routine manner.”

Prof Lane was equally damning about the cladding that was fitted to Grenfell as part of the refurbishment, which she said was “non-compliant with the functional requirement of the building regulations”.

“I have found no evidence yet that any member of the design team or the construction ascertained the fire performance of the rainscreen cladding system materials, nor understood how the assembly performed in fire,” she said. “I have found no evidence that building control were either informed or understood how the assembly would perform in a fire.”

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“Further, I have found no evidence that the [tenant management organisation] risk assessment recorded the fire performance of the rainscreen cladding system, nor have I found evidence that the LFB risk assessment recorded the fire performance of the rainscreen cladding.”

Facebook Twitter Pinterest The kitchen from flat 16. Photograph: Reuters

Another expert fire engineer, Colin Todd, said that it appeared the aluminium composite cladding material used on Grenfell and over 300 other residential towers in England had never been subject to a full scale British Standard fire test.

Prof Lane also found that all of the fire doors between the fourth and 24th floors were “not compliant with fire test evidence relied upon at the time of installation”, and that this would have contributed to the spread of smoke and fire into the lobbies. Many of them failed in 20 minutes instead of the 60 minutes required by regulations.

Millett showed detailed plans of the building that revealed how on the top floor was a metal gate, which prevented entry onto the roof. Fifteen people living on the 18th to 22nd floors went up to the 23rd floor and 47 of those who died were found on level 18 and above, the inquiry heard. No one died from any of the flats on level 10 or below. He also said that the design of the “crown” of the building in the 2016 refurbishment appeared to have helped spread the fire around the facades. It allowed the fire to jump laterally and then molten cladding fell onto the cladding below starting new fires.

The Independent Office for Police Conduct is carrying out an inquiry into the role of police helicopters on the night of the fire, the inquiry was told. It is looking at whether their presence may have encouraged residents to flee to the upper floors in hope of rescue from the roof. The IOPC investigation is also looking at whether police helicopters could have worsened the fire, Millett said.