Following the publication of my recent article, “The Great White Hope?” a number of commentators have expressed the view that while it would obviously be wonderful to have at our disposal the six prerequisites that I listed, we simply do not have the “luxury” of the time that it would take to acquire them.

This is a misconception and I will explain why.

The people who raise such an objection are usually from among those nationalists who have since the decline of the BNP, either joined one of the existing nationalist micro-parties or who are currently actively engaged in the launching of such a party.

These people make the mistake of assuming that the BNP was the ‘dream vehicle’ for the advancement of nationalism and that it was only mismanagement or alleged corruption on the part of Nick Griffin that caused the BNP’s fortunes to wane.

These people believe that if a ‘BNP Mk II’ can be created, without the involvement of Nick Griffin, that such a political party will succeed where the BNP has failed. However, they couldn’t be more wrong.

Nick Griffin was instrumental in causing the decline of the BNP and he did play a central role in this, but he was not ultimately the cause of the failure of the BNP. This lies in the political party structure, which is totally unsuited for a movement such as ours at our present stage of development and which was the primary cause of the failure of all of the preceding thirty-odd nationalist political parties that have attempted to advance our cause since the 1890s.

When a political party exists within a cultural/political/social milieu that is favourable or at least neutral towards it, then such a party can if it’s members work hard, grow to play a progressively more prominent role in national politics. However, truly nationalist political parties do not at present enjoy such a favourable or even neutral environment within which to grow, far from it!

As I stated in “The Great White Hope?“:

“Nationalist politics is currently blighted by the fact that at every level and in every sphere of life in Britain and throughout the Western World today, the social, cultural and political environment is poisoned against the values underpinning nationalism.”

“… a totalitarian regime exists which has effectively marginalized anyone harbouring notions of nationalism or White racial solidarity, and which has effectively outlawed any public expression of the sentiments we hold dear.”

“Furthermore, … almost the entire mass media throughout Britain and the Western World is owned or controlled by organised Jewry who have a vested interest in suppressing the nationalisms of we European peoples and in suppressing all manifestations of White racial solidarity, …”

Within such an environment, anyone publicly aligning themself with racial nationalism (or anything that the establishment and/or media suspect is really racial nationalism in disguise) automatically becomes a social pariah.

The problem for nationalist organisations that take the form of a political party is that electioneering, the primary activity of a political party, requires the party to seek the ‘oxygen’ of publicity, and to make public the true identities of its officers, organisers, election candidates, election agents and many of its key activists, and this has meant that the BNP has been starved of the kind of people that could in other circumstances have accelerated its development.

For any able person from the professions, a managerial position or working in the public sector – the kind of person who would normally gravitate to leadership and administrative positions in any of the establishment parties, public association with the BNP has with few notable exceptions, been tantamount to career suicide.

Most importantly, this situation has not only deterred many fine people from assuming prominent roles within the BNP, it deterred anyone of truly exceptional leadership ability from pushing themselves forward to challenge John Tyndall for the leadership of the BNP at the critical time, during the late 1990s, when his powers were beginning to wane.

It was left to Nick Griffin, a clever and able man with considerable ability as a leader to challenge John Tyndall in 1999, and although the BNP initially benefited from Griffin’s relatively youthful dynamism, Griffin has his limitations and in 2009 the BNP had achieved a size such that Griffin was at the limit of his organisational competence. While Griffin is in many respects a good leader, in my opinion he did not have the truly exceptional ability that was required for the BNP to grow further, beyond 2009.

During the period 2005-2009 Griffin often spoke of the probability that he would have to stand down at some future date in favour of a new leader, often referring to what he called his ‘political baggage’ as the rational for this, but in my opinion it was because he knew in his heart that he was at his organisational limit.

The hostile political environment in which we nationalists find ourselves, has meant that historically, the BNP never developed a sufficiently strong cadre of subordinate leaders of the quality that the party leader would have needed in order to perpetuate the party’s expansion. Consequently, at his organisational limit in 2009, Griffin had too few people that were competent enough for him to delegate responsibility to and he lacked the ability to start, let alone keep any more ‘plates spinning’ himself.

As we have seen, during the Euro elections of 2009, Nick Griffin’s problems were compounded when he and Andrew Brons were elected as MEPs and Griffin’s ability to cope began to visibly crumble; Griffin fluffed his performance on Question Time; he became distracted by the European Parliament; and he chose unwisely when it came to delegating domestic party matters to his largely second rate, incompetent and in some cases notably avaricious subordinates.

I repeat, Nick Griffin was instrumental in causing the decline of the BNP and he did play a central role in this, but he was not the root cause of that decline, he was merely a ‘symptom’ of a deeper malaise and if Griffin had never existed, someone else just like him would have come along, would have faced the same problems and pressures that he faced and would have done much the same as him. One only has to look at the continual saga of internal wranglings, controversies and bungling that have accompanied nationalism since the days of A K Chesterton and John O’Brien and beyond, to see that the malaise that I describe has dogged nationalist political parties for almost a century.

In its early stages, our movement must be structured in such a way that it does not make it’s key people targets for attack by the establishment, the left and organised immigrant groups and so that it does not require people of the highest quality in terms of leadership and administrative ability to commit career suicide upon joining and playing leading roles within it. This means that our movement must not be structured as a political party and should initially at least, and for possibly a matter of years, eschew electoral politics, until we are strong enough and have sufficient assets and influence to protect our key people. Only by proceeding through stealth during the early stages, can we hope to succeed in the long term and avoid the otherwise inevitable cycle of growth, decay and collapse, which as we can see has got us absolutely nowhere over the last one-hundred years.

The people who claim that we do not have the luxury of the time necessary to satisfy my six prerequisites fail to realise that while they may with a political party be able to begin electoral campaigning immediately, they will not suddenly experience a dramatic upturn in the fortunes of British nationalism. If this were so, then we would have witnessed such an upturn with the British Freedom Party, or the English People’s Party, or any one or more of the other nationalist micro-parties that already exist.

Even when we look at an establishment approved quasi-nationalist party like UKIP, we can see that even with the widespread toleration and sporadic support of certain sections of the media and with several sizeable donations from maverick millionaires, UKIP have taken twenty years to reach a point where they have just twelve MEPs and a mere thirty-nine local councillors. They are still a long way from political power and currently have little influence over government policy.

We must ask ourselves, is there any reason to assume that a sanitised BNP clone, not unlike UKIP, will achieve more in the next twenty years than UKIP have achieved so far, especially when the new party will have to compete against the original UKIP, the original BNP and all of the other BNP clones that already exist?

Furthermore, we must ask ourselves, will the voting public be more likely to vote for a UKIP-come-BNP clone than for the original UKIP or the original BNP?

No, and therefore with the best will in the world, any new nationalist political party will almost certainly take several decades at the very least before making any significant political impact, if it manages to last that long.

The ‘new political party’ route to power will therefore take much longer to succeed than the plans that we at Western Spring advocate and will be too slow to save the British people before mass immigration and current demographic trends will have made us a minority in our own land. I’m sure I don’t need to point out that once people of our race and ethnicity become a minority in Britain, it will be impossible for us to gain a majority in support of racial nationalist policies through the democratic process.

However, if nationalists were to throw their support behind the plans we advocate at Western Spring there is a genuine and realistic prospect of us being able to satisfy the six prerequisites that I have outlined and to seriously challenge for political power within just ten years. Furthermore during that ten-year period, we will be able to lay the foundations of an ethnic/national homeland within the British Isles that will secure the existence of our people in perpetuity, even if we do temporarily become a minority within the British Isles as a whole.

Therefore, far from not having the ‘luxury’ of the time required to fulfil our plans, the converse is true. The British people cannot afford the luxury of the fatuous waste of the time, money and physical effort involved in launching yet another nationalist micro-party that will be doomed to suffer the same fate as all of the others that have gone before it.

Finally, the six prerequisites that I have listed are not ‘nice-to-haves’, that we can do without. The term ‘prerequisite’ means that these things are ‘essential‘ for success, and that success cannot be achieved without them. Therefore, whichever route we choose to pursue, it must involve the acquisition of those pre-requisites, otherwise we will fail.

Therefore it is not a matter of whether we have the ‘luxury’ of the time required, because if we are to win we must make the time, and we must make the task of acquiring these prerequisites our highest priority.

We must build a movement that fulfils the six prerequisites and then, and only then, as the final phase of our quest for power, should we launch a political party.

By Max Musson © 2013

If you wish to become involved in building the Movement of National Salvation, then please email me: max.musson@hotmail.co.uk

# # # #

For further reading, please read:

The Great White Hope?

The Great White Hope – Encore!

# # # #