Illustration by KAL

THE most effective calls to arms are unambiguous. John Kennedy, rallying America to confront the menace of global communism, said: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” Winston Churchill, in his first speech as prime minister, said he had “nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat”. He described his aim in four words (“Victory at all costs”) and his strategy in monosyllables (“to wage war by land, sea and air”). It worked.

Barack Obama's speech at West Point on December 1st was more equivocal. At its heart were two sentences: “[A]s commander-in-chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home.” His critics seized on the apparent contradiction. If winning the war in Afghanistan is in America's vital national interest, how can the president promise to start pulling out on a fixed date, when he has no idea whether America will have won by then?

The White House insists that this is not a problem. A quick surge of extra boots and rifles will allow America to “seize the initiative”. General Stanley McChrystal's brave men and women will disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda and its “ruthless, repressive and radical” Taliban allies. The new, larger force (which, with NATO allies, will amount to more than 140,000) will crush the insurgents and secure population centres. America will train and equip the local army and police. As soon as possible, the Afghan government will assume greater responsibility for its own security. By the summer of 2011, the country will be calm enough for American forces to start to pull out. They will not do so irresponsibly, however; the pace of withdrawal will “tak[e] into account conditions on the ground”.

It may be that Mr Obama's strategy will work. After a long period of painful trial and error, American forces became quite adept at counter-insurgency in Iraq. Given enough men and money, they can probably do the same in Afghanistan. And Mr Obama's plan to “support Afghan ministries, governors and local leaders who combat corruption and deliver for the people” may produce an Afghan state that is slightly less dysfunctional than the current one. But Mr Obama's speech this week will not persuade many people that he has the unwavering resolve to win this war, for he wore his doubts on his sleeve.

He listed all the strongest reasons for fighting. He reminded Americans of the attacks of September 11th 2001, which were plotted from Afghanistan, and raised the prospect of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into terrorists' hands. But he also dwelt on the limits of American power and patience. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will soon have cost more than a trillion dollars. Because of the recession, many Americans are “out of work and struggl[ing] to pay the bills”. America “has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan,” stressed Mr Obama; it will only do “what can be achieved at a reasonable cost”.

It is good that he understands these constraints, of course. It is also good that he has doubts—what intelligent person does not? Al-Qaeda may be vile, but it does not pose the threat that the Soviet Union and the Nazis did. Nonetheless, a televised address to the world is not a college lecture. As he put it himself, the soldiers he is sending into battle need “a mission that is clearly defined, and worthy of [their] service.” Mr Obama has yet to convince both enemies and allies that he has the fortitude for a fight.

Afghan villagers, however much they may dislike the Taliban, will not tell American soldiers where they are hiding if they think the Americans will soon be gone and the Taliban will soon be back in charge. The Taliban will find it easier to recruit new warriors if people think Mr Obama is a quitter, and the Pakistani government will continue to hedge its bets. Mr Obama insisted that “America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent.” Many Pakistanis are understandably sceptical.

A war leader can't please everyone

The speech revealed how hard Mr Obama is finding it to shift from campaigning—which involves promising people lots of good things—to governing. He tried to stroke anti-war Democrats, some of whom think that American soldiers will fare no better in Afghanistan than the Soviets did, and all of whom would rather the money was spent on health care. Hence his insistence that: “the nation that I am most interested in building is our own.” But he was never going to please the anti-war crowd with a speech announcing the war's escalation. (“Have you drunk Bush's Kool-Aid?” asked Michael Moore.) And in trying to please everyone, he has pleased hardly anyone. “Never before has a speech by President Barack Obama felt as false,” complained Gabor Steingart of Der Spiegel. “[His] magic no longer works. The allure of his words has grown weaker.”

This matters. Congress will give Mr Obama the funds he needs. Republicans, though they berate him for dithering, will vote for the war because they believe it necessary. Democrats will gripe and mope, but they will not destroy Mr Obama's presidency over it. Public opinion, though, is less predictable. The latest YouGov poll for The Economist finds Americans evenly split over whether to send more troops to Afghanistan and deeply pessimistic about the outcome: only 35% think America will eventually prevail. According to Gallup, 55% disapprove of the president's handling of the war, and only 35% approve. Perhaps Mr Obama can rally the nation behind him and strike fear into America's foes. But the evidence is not encouraging.





Economist.com/blogs/lexington