In new regulations released on Thursday, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) required that all providers of internet services of “a public opinion nature” (舆论属性) or “having the capacity for social mobilization” (社会动员能力) “must voluntarily conduct security evaluations” (安全评估). The regulations are designed to create formal mechanisms by which the government can ensure that any and all internet services with the potential to impact the news cycle, set the public agenda or support collective action have systems in place — subject to regular government oversight and participation, and properly supported in terms of personnel and technology — to prevent “security risks.”

The regulations make clear that “security risks” are understood as arising from the online population itself, and we should understand this not as an attempt to make the internet a more secure space for users (through data protection, etc.), but rather a more secure space politically for the government and for the Chinese Communist Party. The regulation is premised on the fundamental fear that communication technologies might overwhelm the government, making it impossible to achieve what has long been a central objective — the control of public opinion in order to ensure social and political stability.

Of particular interest to understanding the impetus behind these regulations are several stipulations contained in Article 3, about the need for active review and reporting on “new technologies or new applications that result in a dramatic shift in terms of the functional attributes of information services . . . . resulting in major changes to the public opinion nature [of communications] or to the capacity for social mobilization.” Right after this comes mention of circumstances “where there is a clear increase in user scale, resulting in major changes to the public opinion nature or capacity for social mobilization of the information service.”

Over the past decade, China’s leadership has repeatedly found itself in a reactive position regarding the impact of new communication technologies such as Weibo or WeChat. But cyber policy under Xi Jinping has become far more proactive. The above language takes into account the potential for shocks that might come as a result of new technologies, or even modification of existing ones. The government does not want to be caught on its back feet. It wants to prepare for and neutralize such shocks, and so incorporating this in the system of “voluntary” security evaluations makes a great deal of sense from the standpoint of this underlying fear.

Our partial translation of the new regulations through the end of Article 6, covering most of the basics, follows: