Alternatively: The time has come to unvote the group controlling 53% of the network and keeping most of the block rewards for personal gains. Here’s how.

The Lisk blockchain has several issues in its core infrastructure that make the DPoS system seemingly broken. While the LiskHQ is working hard to address the problems like dynamic fees or a better-balanced voting mechanism, we as delegates and voters can contribute our share to improve the system.

The time has come to unvote ELITE.

Reasonable pools

First of all, let’s point out core issues with the current deadlock in the 101 active delegates:

̶A̶c̶c̶u̶m̶u̶l̶a̶t̶i̶o̶n̶ ̶o̶f̶ ̶p̶o̶w̶e̶r̶:̶ ̶T̶h̶e̶ ̶E̶L̶I̶T̶E̶ ̶p̶o̶o̶l̶ ̶i̶s̶ ̶o̶f̶t̶e̶n̶ ̶d̶e̶s̶c̶r̶i̶b̶e̶d̶ ̶a̶s̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶ ̶c̶a̶r̶t̶e̶l̶;̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶y̶ ̶c̶o̶n̶t̶r̶o̶l̶ ̶m̶o̶r̶e̶ ̶t̶h̶a̶n̶ ̶5̶3̶%̶ ̶o̶f̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶ ̶n̶e̶t̶w̶o̶r̶k̶ ̶a̶n̶d̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶r̶e̶f̶o̶r̶e̶ ̶h̶a̶v̶e̶ ̶f̶u̶l̶l̶ ̶c̶o̶n̶t̶r̶o̶l̶ ̶o̶v̶e̶r̶ ̶c̶o̶n̶s̶e̶n̶s̶u̶s̶,̶ ̶t̶r̶a̶n̶s̶a̶c̶t̶i̶o̶n̶s̶,̶ ̶v̶o̶t̶e̶s̶,̶ ̶a̶n̶d̶ ̶d̶e̶l̶e̶g̶a̶t̶e̶s̶.̶ ̶I̶f̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶y̶ ̶w̶a̶n̶t̶,̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶y̶ ̶c̶o̶u̶l̶d̶ ̶s̶t̶o̶p̶ ̶u̶s̶ ̶f̶r̶o̶m̶ ̶u̶n̶v̶o̶t̶i̶n̶g̶ ̶t̶h̶e̶m̶ ̶b̶y̶ ̶m̶e̶r̶e̶l̶y̶ ̶n̶o̶t̶ ̶c̶o̶n̶f̶i̶r̶m̶i̶n̶g̶ ̶o̶u̶r̶ ̶d̶e̶l̶e̶g̶a̶t̶e̶ ̶v̶o̶t̶e̶ ̶t̶r̶a̶n̶s̶a̶c̶t̶i̶o̶n̶s̶. Update: I just learned, broadhash consensus prevents that and I stand corrected.

Selfish mining: Their unique position of power allows them to keep most of the block rewards for themselves. Each of the 54 delegates already forged more than 250_000 LSK and they hold 75% for private gains; doing a quick’n’dirty math with a calculator leads to the conclusion they accumulated more than 10_000_000 LSK in the last two years. Funds that neither benefit the Lisk ecosystem nor reach any of their voters.

Taken the negative example, one could now define a reasonable pool. It should not have more than 33 members, share at least 50% of the block rewards with its voters, and use another 25% of the block rewards to create funds for infrastructure projects supporting the Lisk developer ecosystem.

I hereby request ELITE to become a reasonable pool! Remove anyone from your pool who is not a real person; Reduce your pool size to less than 33 delegates; and increase your reward sharing for voters to more than 50%!

Sherwood Example

The Sherwood pool is exemplary for a reasonable pool. It contains only a small number of members (four required fellows, three optional associates) and therefore limiting its power over the protocol.

In addition to the Robinhood delegate sharing 100%, each of the Sherwood delegates commits to sharing at least 50% of the forging rewards. Furthermore, Liberspirita is maintaining the Sherwood Fund which contains almost 10_000 LSK for infrastructure projects.

Last but not least, the Sherwood pool incentivises unvoting ELITE by giving a bonus to voters that do not vote all of their 54 members.

Unvote Manager

In the case, ELITE does not care about Lisk and voters, and if voters want to increase their personal staking rewards and break the full control of ELITE over Lisk at the same time, they have to take action to unvote at least 21 members of this pool.

It’s so easy, really. Let me help you.

To ease this step, I created an unvote manager: http://uncartel.4fry.net/ — It offers three options to help investors and stakeholders to make the change.

Moderate change : It unvotes 16 ELITE pool members and replaces them with high-reward sharing standby delegates and well-known community- contributors from Lisk Builders, Sherwood Pool, and the Ascend Pool. Only one vote step is required (1 LSK).

: It unvotes 16 ELITE pool members and replaces them with high-reward sharing standby delegates and well-known community- contributors from Lisk Builders, Sherwood Pool, and the Ascend Pool. Only one vote step is required (1 LSK). Radical change : It unvotes 27 ELITE pool members and replaces them with the entirety of all Lisk Builders, Lisk Italian Group, Sherwood Pool, Dutch Pool, Ascend Pool, as well as respected independent delegates. Two vote steps are required (2 LSK, recommended option).

: It unvotes 27 ELITE pool members and replaces them with the entirety of all Lisk Builders, Lisk Italian Group, Sherwood Pool, Dutch Pool, Ascend Pool, as well as respected independent delegates. Two vote steps are required (2 LSK, recommended option). Unvote Elite: It unvotes 52 ELITE pool members and only partially replaces them with all available standby-delegates from the community. It does not unvote Carbonara as he’s an honourable member of the Lisk Builders and Loveforever who shares 50%. This requires three vote steps (3 LSK).

Once, the power of ELITE is broken, and more high-reward sharing delegates from the community are voted into forging positions, I expect voter’s rewards to at least double in proficiency.

It’s in your hands. Unvote now.

Let’s make this change happen. (Un-)Vote now. Do you support this initiative? Spread the word and use the hashtags #uncartel #lisk!

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Full disclosure: The author, 4fryn, is invested in Lisk in therefore highly incentivised to care about the future of the most accessible blockchain.

For transparency, the unvote manager is available on Github: https://github.com/4fryn/unvote-manager — Contributions, feedback, critics welcome.