Happy New Year! I’m trying to organize my thoughts and data on matters European, and I think I’ve come up with a useful way to summarize what has been happening in the euro area. In the figure below I compare the ratio of government debt to GDP (from the IMF — year-end number) with the 10-year interest rate (from the ECB) for a number of euro nations; I show two dates, the peak of the euro crisis in 2011 and a relatively recent observation:

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What you see here is that borrowing costs for the troubled euro countries have dropped a lot. But it’s not because austerity policies have brought their debt under control — debt ratios are still rising, in large part because of shrinking economies and deflation. Instead, there has been a dramatic flattening of the relationship between debt and interest rates.

Why has this happened? The timing strongly suggests that it’s mainly the Draghi effect — that the ECB’s signal that it will, in a pinch, act as sovereign lender of last resort has removed much of the fear of self-fulfilling liquidity panics. It’s possible that there has also been some reduction in the political risk premium, because European nations are proving amazingly determined to stay on the euro at almost any cost.

So is the euro crisis over? No — it’s not over until the debt dynamics sing, or perhaps until the debt dynamics sing a duet with internal devaluation. We have yet to see any of the crisis countries reach a point where falling relative wages are generating a clear export-led recovery, or in which austerity is actually paying off in falling debt burdens.

But as a europessimist, I do have to admit that it’s now possible to see how this could work. The cost — economic, human, and political — will be huge. And the whole thing could still break down. But the ECB’s willingness to step up and do its job has given Europe some breathing room.