Polling is only one issue, but the elephant in the room of the last decade of Georgian politics, is the seemingly willful failure of many in the west to understand the UNM and its leader, former President Saakashvili, for what it, and he, is. A fundamental fact of political life in Georgia is that this organization, and its leader, is discredited and remains massively unpopular. Moreover, the UNM record during their last five years or so in power included significant backsliding on democracy and human rights abuses. This is absolutely axiomatic, but somehow eludes many in western capitals. The reasons for this are baffling. To suggest, as I have in the past, that it is still simply because of Saakashvili, and some of his associates, relentless charm and lobbying offensive, fluency in English and strong anti-Russian rhetoric, is almost an insult of the intelligence of many who work in foreign policy in the US and Europe. A more plausible, if depressing, explanation might be that after years of support for the UNM, accepting a different reality about who they are and what they did is simply something that powerful foreign policy elites do not want to do. Regardless of the reason, this election should be another reminder that the UNM is viewed very differently inside of Georgia than in the west.

Part of the collateral damage of the west’s collective misreading of the UNM was their corresponding inability to understand the GD. The GD government has ample faults. Bidzina Ivanishvili continues to wield significant power even after leaving office. The government was not able to turn Georgia’s economy around in four years Georgia’ s struggle to build strong democratic institutions remains a work in progress. However, Georgia is considerably more free than it was when the GD came to power. It is also closer to the EU and NATO, is drawing significant tourism and western investment and is no longer lurching from mini-crisis to mini-crisis as it did from 2007-2012. Western governments seemed to understand that, but this was largely lost on many in the think tank, NGO and related parts of the foreign policy establishments in Europe and North America.

Beyond Bidzina v. Misha

For several years, Georgia politics have been described by many as a political battle between two larger than life figures, Saakashvili and Ivanishvili. In addition to being Georgia’s richest man, former Prime Minister and the founder of the GD, Ivanishvili is also widely regarded as the informal power behind the GD government. The Saakashvili v. Ivanishvili paradigm is appealing because it reduces Georgian politics to something very simple, suggests an equivalency between the two men and allows many to continue to avoid confronting the UNM record. Additionally, this conventional wisdom is almost cinematic. On one side, according to this frame, the former Prime Minister sits in his ultra-modern headquarters above Tbilisi sinisterly giving orders to the entire Georgian government, while the former President in exile a few stops on the L train into Brooklyn and later from his post as governor of Odessa, still continues to assert control over the UNM and, presumably, the affections and loyalty of many in Georgia.

In this election, however, Georgian politics moved beyond Saakashvili v. Ivanishvili. Naturally, these two figures remained involved in the election, but their rivalry was not the major force behind the election. Moreover, as the election approached it became clear that Saakashvili had become a drag on the UNM. A post-Saakashvili UNM would have been able to more easily break with their damaging legacy and present themselves as pro-west reformers. This would not have been enough for them to win a majority, but it would have allowed them to build beyond their base, something they proved unable to do in this election.

The loser in that scenario would have been Saakashvili as if that UNM had done well, it would have demonstrated that Saakashvili was definitively a figure from Georgia’s past. Given that Saakashvili’s Ukrainian adventure does not appear to be working out, he could not afford that perception to take root. Months ago, Saakashvili was faced with a choice, either try to bring meaningful reform, rather than just talk, to Odessa, or commit himself to rebuilding the UNM in Georgia. Saakashvili ended up trying, and failing, to do both, demonstrating the wisdom of the old Yiddish saying, “Mit eyn tokhes ken men nit tantsn af tsvey khasenes. (You can't dance at two weddings with one behind.)”

Ivanishvili continues to play a role in the GD and played a significant role in this campaign, but it is also apparent that Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirkishvili is an increasingly independent political actor who is well liked and respected both internationally and domestically. Counterintuitively, Kvirkishvili may have less leverage over Ivanishvili now that the election has come and gone. In the months leading up to the election, replacing Kvirkishvili would have been very damaging for Ivanishvili and the UNM as it would have made Ivanishvili look impetuous and unable to bring stability to Georgia, thus damaging the GD’s electoral chances. Now that the GD has won a big victory, that threat no longer exists. Therefore, there would be no electoral consequences for Ivanishvili if he were to outs Kvirikshvili.

Changing Prime Ministers, however, would be a big mistake. Moreover, following an election victory that in significant part belongs to Kvirkishvili, Ivanishvili may not even be able to replace the current Prime Minister. More significantly, there is little reason to think Ivanishvili wants to do that. The evidence from the last few months suggests that while he still wields significant power, Ivanishvili is becoming less, not more, involved with the governance of Georgia. That would be good for Georgia’s political development, but also further evidence that the battle between Misha and Bidzina is receding in Georgia’ s political life.

Where Does Georgia Go From Here

It is way too early to discern the greater longer term impact of this election, but it is possible to identify some of the questions and challenges raised by Saturday’s voting. First, this election demonstrates, pardon the mixed metaphor, that even in Georgia time moves on and political pages need to be turned. The Saakashvili v. Ivanishvili dynamic is receding into the past, and with it the UNM supported fiction that it was a somehow a fight over whether or not Georgia was pro-west. Given that, it is time for everybody, across the Georgian and western political spectrum, to retire the twin political fictions that the GD is aligned with Russia and that the UNM is a uniquely pro-western force in Georgia.

Similarly, the Rose Revolution is now almost thirteen full years in the past. That may seem like a relatively short time in the scope of Georgian history, but in this era it is a long time. That perspective should allow us to understand those events more as part of a cycle, or cycles, rather than sui generis democratic breakthrough in Georgia. This approach makes it possible to more fully understand modern Georgian political history and to place recent events in a more appropriate context.

With this in mind, two challenges that are raised by the outcome of this election should be very familiar to those who have been watching Georgian politics for a few years. First, the resounding GD victory may give them a constitutional majority in the new parliament. Even though this election was generally viewed as democratic and competitive, the result could well move Georgia closer to one party governance. Georgia has been in a cycle of one party government followed by regime collapse since the last days of Soviet Communism. It is not yet clear whether this election moves Georgia closer to or further away from that possibility.

The GD been more liberal than its predecessor and has allowed more freedom for opposition political parties and civil society than the UNM did when it was in power. Nonetheless, the temptation to consolidate one party rule will be strong following this election. Doing that would be a mistake because it would accelerate the inevitable defeat of the GD, but more importantly it would further hamstring the development of Georgian democracy.

A second, and related, point is that this election, while competitive, did not deepen pluralism in Georgia. Pluralism is a good hedge against one party dominance because if parties represent competing interests, rather than just competing claims on power, voters are less likely to move towards the winning party to gain influence or power. Rather, they will remain supportive of the party that reflects their interests.

Georgian democracy is stronger and deeper than it was five years ago. That was reflected in this election. However, obstacles to the consolidation of Georgian democracy continue. Some of these, such as the hostile presence and intervening by Russia, may be difficult to address from Tbilisi, or even Washington, but others are not. Building meaningful multi-party, pluralist democracy in Georgia requires deepening of interest based politics, the continued development of the Georgian economy and still greater freedom of media and assembly. Western democracies can, and should, play a role in this development, but to do so it is imperative to have a sound understanding of what has happened in Georgia’s recent past, and to be honest with ourselves about our own missteps.

The Georgia Analysis is a twice monthly analysis of political and other major developments in Georgia. Lincoln Mitchell is a political development, research and strategic consultant who has worked extensively in the post-Soviet space. If you would like to be on the Georgia analysis mailing list or are interested in more research, analysis or consulting for your business, government, campaign or other organization, please email lincoln@lincolnmitchell.com.