James Stavridis, former NATO supreme commander and commander of U.S. military forces in Europe, warned in 2016 that an era of maritime hybrid warfare is emerging. Stavridis highlighted Chinese activities in the South China Sea and Iran’s actions around the Gulf, arguing that the maritime domain provides four large advantages for actors: It allows them to carry out activities without official attribution, it strongly enables the use of surprise, it allows them to control the timing and tempo of events, and it is far less expensive than traditional military buildups and operations. Recent attacks against oil tankers near the United Arab Emirates and airborne drone strikes against Saudi oil pumping stations highlight the escalation of asymmetric operations, which are familiar to much of the Middle East. Though maritime-borne improvised explosive devices and long-range drone attacks into Saudi Arabia appear new, they rather reflect new technologies applied toward traditional efforts while showcasing the intensity and antagonism of cross-Gulf rivalries.

The Means of Waging Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare (often blended with and debated as irregular, asymmetric, or unconventional warfare by security professionals) differs from conventional warfare in multiple aspects. Hybrid warfare activities employ a larger variety of techniques (such as information operations) than conventional warfare. Its strength lies in ambiguity and deniably, aiming to conduct activities that are difficult to characterize as war in order to minimize public and international opposition. For a regional reference, the Iran-Iraq War was the longest conventional war of the 20th century while Russian activities in Syria demonstrate contemporary hybrid warfare operations.

The use of proxy forces and unattributable actors is a standard characteristic of hybrid warfare. Unidentified Russian agents, or “Little Green Men,” have been deployed across Syria and Ukraine. Iran, through the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, supports allied or proxy forces in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Iran’s success with Lebanese Hezbollah has turned it into a “strategic asset,” which the IRGC attempts to replicate around the region.

U.S. officials and Norwegian shipping insurers say Iran and the IRGC are likely behind the attacks on the four tankers near the UAE. Iranian-supported Houthi rebels claimed credit for the drone attack against two Saudi oil pumping stations. Whether the oil tanker attacks were the result of sabotage, mines, or waterborne IEDs, the use of explosives against economic assets is a standard method of violence outside of conventional war. Airborne drone strikes achieve similar ends with a high level of precision and deniability. Both are cheap, repeatable, and target economic and civilian entities instead of military objectives.

Historical Continuations in the Gulf

Asymmetric fighting has occurred in the Gulf since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Despite its conventional title, the maritime conflict of the Iran-Iraq War had a distinctly unconventional flavor. Both sides targeted commercial tankers, the majority of which were neutral vessels. Both sides employed mines, airstrikes, and anti-cruise ship missiles with loose degrees of precision. The first attacks of the “tanker war” began with airstrikes from fighter planes against oil tankers and facilities at Iran’s Kharg Island. U.S. forces seized an Iranian naval vessel, the Iran Ajr, as it laid mines in the Gulf, but still the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts was struck and almost sank. Late in the war, Tehran acquired Chinese-made Silkworm missiles and used them to attack a U.S.-owned tanker in Kuwaiti waters. Iran also leveraged its connections to Hezbollah against the United States with suicide attacks and kidnappings in Lebanon.

Though only 1 percent of Gulf shipping was disrupted by attacks, the United States responded with a dedicated military effort – Operation Earnest Will – and became an unofficial participant in the war. U.S. forces destroyed Iranian oil platforms and sank multiple ships in 1987 and 1988.

Low-scale attacks, terrorism, and competition has continued since. The IRGC detained six British sailors and two British Marines in 2004 between Iran and Iraq. Three years later, the IRGC captured 15 British sailors after boarding a merchant vessel. Over the past decade Iranian small boats have harassed U.S. and allied vessels around the Strait of Hormuz. The greater Saudi-Iranian rivalry over recent years in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere shares the same hybrid warfare characteristics of information operations, proxy forces, deniability, a heavy involvement by economic and civilian entities, and escalations to kinetic violence.

Ghosts of Years to Come?

The capabilities of proxies around the Gulf are likely to grow. With longer-range Iranian “UAV-X” drones, the Houthis could reach most of the UAE and Saudi Arabia with further strikes. Iran’s support for Hezbollah has made it “the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor,” and as new weapons become cheaper and easier to build they will continue to reach the hands of nonstate actors around the Gulf. Hezbollah also allows Iran to reach international actors outside the Gulf in the Mediterranean, Europe, and Western Hemisphere.

Current events in the Gulf reflect the region’s past, but they also illuminate current security trends around the world applied in a regional context. Drone proliferation will enable both state and nonstate actors increased access to advanced reconnaissance and strike capabilities. In a dense, competitive environment like the Gulf, even surveillance flights could be easily misinterpreted. Ballistic missile capabilities have also spread throughout the region. Groups like the Houthis already field a range of ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles, some allegedly used to attack Riyadh, U.S. warships, and other vessels in the Red Sea. Both Riyadh and Tehran pursue additional and new missile and anti-missile technology to maintain their positions vis-à-vis each other and their allies. Unmanned IED boats represent the spread of advanced capabilities to asymmetric groups, a trend that is unlikely to reverse. Worries about cyber vulnerabilities and previous cyberattacks indicate another domain in which competition will occur, especially against energy companies.

The Gulf is not immune from the trends toward “future warfare.” The large wealth, small size, powerful rivalries, and apparent unwillingness to engage in full-scale war of the Gulf Arab states indicate that the future of conflict in the region will be hybrid. Nonstate actors with advanced technologies, state and nonstate actors working in sync, challenges to economic and civilian infrastructure, and deniable violence below the level of conventional war are all present in recent attacks and may be present for the coming years. As rivals and proxies probe, escalate, and de-escalate in this emerging security environment, the challenge for regional actors and the United States will be to ensure that such activities remain below the threshold of conventional war.

These remarks do not reflect the views of the U.S. Marine Corps, Department of Defense, or U.S. government.