In his War on the Rocks article, IS THE SPACE FORCE VIABLE? PERSONNEL PROBLEMS ON THE FINAL FRONTIER, Mark Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret.) inadvertently demonstrates why a space force is critically required within the US Department of Defense (DoD). An archetypal demonstration of the lack of space mindedness so common throughout the defense complex at large, his polemic essay discounts the efficacy of a Space Force based on the number of generals he reasons compulsory through contrived comparisons to the other military services and by discounting the extant and requisite warfighting attributes of military space professionals. His solution, create a separate, non-military, government agency for warfighting, would actually complicate post-modern battlespaces and decrease efficiency and military effectiveness in already austere decision making cycles.

Colonel Cancian’s initial argument that the force structure of a military space organization is going to look different and perhaps top heavy by comparison to other services, is without a doubt accurate. The same argument was made (and continues to be made) about the Air Force itself. However, his proposed initial requirement for 75 general officers is an obvious overstatement which serves no purpose, but dramatic effect. His argument, haphazardly derived from the DoD legislative proposal (which incidentally congress has already declared dead on arrival) specifies that a requirement for 3 four-star flag officers results in a requirement for 75 general officers in total based on a DoD average reached by adding together all the flag officers in all the services. While statistically interesting, these numbers say nothing about scope of responsibility in warfighting, only the number of subordinates supervised. They further ignore the fact, that there are already space flag officers serving in the various services and the number in no way approaches 75.

Currently there are two Space four star generals in the US military. Commander USSTRATCOM (in a billet not always filled by a space officer) and Commander Air Force Space Command. In the proposed restructure, Commander USSPACECOM will be a four star general and the Commander of the Space Force will also…that is still just 2 four star generals. (Congress has already effectively nixed the Deputy Space Force Commander being a four star.) Each will likely have a three star general deputy, with three star generals commanding the acquisition and war fighting elements within Space Force, that’s just four three star generals…with potentially one for the space reserve or national guard...so Five. Even if we now accept the average defense personnel model used by the author, we only get 10 two stars and 15 one stars for a total of 32 general officers…and that still vastly exceeds the current numbers within the military space community.

With a proposed force of around 20,000 officer and enlisted personnel, 32 Generals would present a flag officer ratio closer to the Coast Guard than traditional military services within the DoD. But none of this statistical self-indulgence is particularly meaningful without discussions of scope of responsibility and warfighting effectiveness. Unlike, say Marine Generals, who’s subordinates are conducting most of the real-time tactical decision making down at the junior officer and senior NCO level, battlefield space effects have operational and strategic consequences of a national character requiring a more senior decision maker. This decision maker must further be fulling witting of other orbital activities informed by a robust and broad range of expert information to include the political and strategic ramifications of any action taken. Such a structure would arguably look more like a headquarters element and less like rifle platoon, naturally resulting in a more senior composition.

Colonel Cancian’s conclusion in favor of a civilian space agency for orbital warfighting is also predicated on a number of false assumptions. Setting aside the leadership ratio argument already discussed, his supposition that “no one would be shooting back” and that “garrison-based duties do not require a high degree of physical fitness or medical wellness” are actually as ridiculous as they sound. First, any command and control center is a legitimate military target. So, if future space battles were like the global war on terror, were power was projected from outside the combat zone and the only areas under traditional combat conditions were the JOAs, then he might have a point. Unfortunately, the Space Force requirement is founded in the return to great power competition in a multi-polar world wherein a war involving orbital forces is, more likely than not, total war across all the domains of conflict in which all legitimate targets will be held at risk by potential adversaries.

Second, it is generally agreed that quick and rational deliberation and decision making is aided by good physical health. Understanding this renders the argument against un-physically fit garrison forces moot. But really, that isn’t the point. Tell me, would any ground pounder want his missile threat warning in the hands of some waning crewmember having a heart attack at his console or one who, after running back to the console from the snack bar, can’t catch their breath to issue the alert report? To say nothing of the individuals conducting orbital combat operations? Or, in the very near future, suborbital bombardment? Would any troop in contact with the enemy be comfortable applying the author’s same wellness standards to the remote pilots of the Reaper drones providing their close air support? By the way, this entire discussion neglects the fact that for the last twenty years there have been military space professionals from multiple services forward in the combat zone, conducting space/counter-space operations as well as providing needed expertise and support to battlefield organizations and leaders across the military spectrum.

Likewise, the author’s argument that “the CIA, a civilian agency, has long had authority to conduct offensive, lethal operations, while federal law enforcement agencies like the FBI also use lethal force” is equally disturbing in its lack of understanding about the restrictions of US Code, the role of space forces in modern combat or the potential consequences of their use. The legal basis for lethality in both highlighted agencies exists under completely different authorities from the military departments…authorities which are not resident in the DoD. Military operations of the United States are conducted by uniformed military personnel beholden to the laws of war, rules of engagement and various conventions on treatment and handling of military personnel. CIA doesn't kill enemy soldiers in the combat zone and the FBI doesn't arrest enemy soldiers on the battlefield. Those are military roles. Further, military personnel are subject to the uniform code of military justice, ensuring accountability and actions consistent with national expectations, in and out of armed conflict. Civilian agencies (outside of the Intelligence community) are unionized, bound by time clocks and subject to management-labor agreements which vary by location. There is no way, that under existing laws a Defense civilian agency could be relied upon to produce the necessary combat forces and effects needed to prevent and if necessary win a war in orbit. The changes to US code necessary to achieve a workable civilian war-fighting agency within the DoD are considerably more radical and politically controversial than the simple creation of a new military service, and if it were attained, would add a layer of inter-agency complexity assured to diminish unified action.

Colonel Cancian’s final argument, the often repeated concern that creating a space force will establish a precedent which will force the creation of a Cyber Force is the poorest kind of contention. Not, it shouldn’t be done because its not needed; or it shouldn’t be done because its not affordable … just, don’t do it, because it might make it seem reasonable to do other things…what? I don’t want to have a cyber argument here…but if the US needs a cyber force, there should be a discussion about how to organize, fund and authorize a cyber force (talk about an authorities nightmare.) In all actuality, this is a ridiculous and yet entirely appropriate choice by the author for how to end this essay.

Articles such as this demonstrate why a space force is, in fact, a necessity within the DoD. Despite his acknowledgement that space is a warfighting domain, the author argues as if orbital forces exist only for support to ground based military operations. His perspective is entirely terrestrial. The reality is that orbit is a competitive and hostile environment on which the civil, economic and military infrastructures of the US are entirely dependent, but upon which, conversely, there has been very little investment on defense. Adversaries of the US are planning to confront the US there, through the development of military counter-space systems and organizations. Space Forces are different than terrestrial forces. More different than the Army is from the Marine Corps or the Air Force is from the Navy. Space presents a unique set of physical requirements which will necessitate a unique military organization with a warfighting culture, talent management strategy and acquisition processes developed specifically to address the inherent challenges of orbital combat and defensive operations. Rather than beginning with a comparison, this discussion should have begun with requirements.









The expressed opinions are the author's own and do not reflect the official policy of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the Joint Forces Staff College or the United States Air Force.