Translation of interview with Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, on his perspectives and participation in the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah.

Al-Alam – Exclusive

During this interview, General Soleimani discussed the hidden and visible goals of the 33-Day

War [i.e. Second Lebanon War], and how Hezbollah’s leadership managed [both] the military

and psychological [aspects of the] war, which [i.e. Hezbollah] alone was and remains the only

hope to defend Lebanon.

The following is the full text of the interview. The interviewer questions are in bold italic.

Interviewer Introduction

In the Name of God the Most Merciful.

From the heart of the fire

The first media interview with General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of

the Guard of the Islamic Revolution

In the Name of God the Most Merciful, from Whom we Seek Help.

We welcome you and offer you our most hearty gratitude.

We also offer you our condolences on the occasion of the days of the martyrdom of the Lord of

Martyrs [i.e. Imam Hussein] (peace be upon him).

The Office of Preservation and Dissemination of the Remnants of the Leader of the Islamic

Revolution acts to explain the opinions of Imam Khamenei on various subjects.

In order to accomplish this goal, it conducts discussions with various officials and thought

leaders in all fields.

One of the important issues that were discussed in our interview with the Secretary General of

Hezbollah [i.e. Hassan Nasrallah] in Lebanon is the matter of the 33-Day War; This war became

the starting point of changes in the region and the Resistance front.

We are honored today by your visit, in your capacity as the commander of the Quds Force and

the person who participated personally in the battlefield during the days of this war, so that we

may hear your analysis of this momentous event.

Certainly, you have not had until this time any media interviews of this sort [in your capacity] as

the commander of the Quds Force, and God willing this interview will be your first in 20 years.

We begin with the first question, to analyze the preliminary reasons for the occurrence of

the 33-Day War, especially after the presence of the United States in in the region – i.e. in

Iraq and Afghanistan – for 5 years?

The Goal of the Aggression was to Eliminate Hezbollah

There were hidden factors in the 33-Day War, which were the real factors and causes of the war.

There were also revealed and clear goals, but these were excuses for the hidden goals that the

Zionist Entity wished to push through and achieve. Of course, when I say there were hidden

causes and factors, we had information regarding the preparations of the Zionist Entity [for war],

but we did not have information that the Enemy wanted to launch a surprise attack. After that,

we arrived at two conclusions or issues regarding this result, and that is that it was decided [by

Israel] before the onset of the war that the attack would be quick and surprising. The elimination

of Hezbollah in this surprise attack was expected, and this war coincided with two important

events related to the region as a whole, and another relates to the Zionist Entity in particular.

Regarding the region, the United States had assembled its forces on a very massive scale in the

region due to the event of the 11th of September. The only comparable mobilization of forces can

be seen during the Second World War, of course from the standpoint of numbers alone.

However, from the qualitative perspective, this mobilization was unprecedented even during the

Second World War.

In 1991, and due to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, America carried out its attack. Saddam’s

defeat had its militarizing implications in our region, and led to the entrenchment of American

forces. However, after September 11th [2001], because of America’s two massive assaults,

almost 40% of US Armed Forces poured into our region in a direct way. After that, and after the

passage of time and the changes that occurred, that came to include even the reserve forces and

National Guard. So it can be said that approximately 60% of the United States’ army entered our

region, both between internal and external forces. Therefore, there was a massive military

presence from the perspective of numbers, where they had 150,000 soldiers in Iraq alone, and

more than 30,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan. This is separate from the coalition forces,

which numbered 150,000 fighters in Afghanistan.

The American Presence in Iraq Threatened Iran

Therefore, there were forces comprised of 200,000 fighters, specialists, and trainees in our region

in the vicinity of Palestine. This presence, naturally, offered many appropriate opportunities to

the Zionist Entity. For the American presence in Iraq prevented the movement of the Syrians in

Syria, and was also a threat to the government of Syria. It was also a threat to Iran. Therefore, if

you looked at Iraq’s geography during the 2006 war – i.e. the 33-Day War – you would find that

America placed a barrier of 200,000 fighters between the two main countries of the Resistance

Axis, supported by hundreds of planes and helicopters, in addition to thousands of armored

devices [vehicles]. Naturally, this reality provided the opportunity to the Zionist Entity to benefit

from these circumstances and carry out some action. Meaning, this presence and hegemony was

assumed to have an intimidating effect on Iran, and intimidating and paralyzing Syria, so these

two regimes would not be able to do anything.

The Zionist Entity’s move was based on this projection, particularly since the American

government at the time was the government of Bush the son [i.e. George W. Bush]. This was a

stern government, impetuous in its decision-making – particularly the team that governed the

White House, and which was a friend to the Zionist Entity. Therefore, they saw an opportunity to

initiate such an act.

The Zionist’s Goal Was to Create a Total Demographic Change

So, the root of the matter is that the Zionist Entity seized upon the American military presence

in the region, and seized the opportunity [created by] the downfall of Saddam [Hussein],

the initial American victory in Afghanistan, and the overwhelming atmosphere of fear that

America created in the region – whereby it was threatening a large number of political groups in

the region and the world [by accusing them of being] terrorist groups [merely] for opposing its

policies. The Zionist Entity wanted to seize upon this opportunity, and believed this was an ideal

chance to carry out a lighting war, because it had been previously defeated in 2000 AD and

withdrew from Lebanon. In reality, it [i.e. Israel] fled from Lebanon after Hezbollah imposed

defeat upon it, and now it wanted to return again – not to re-occupy [south Lebanon], but to

destroy and demographically alter south Lebanon. This is what became apparent later during the

war and with its onset, approximately. Their [i.e. Israel’s] main goal was a complete

demographic change, so that the popular forces in south Lebanon who had a religious connection

with Hezbollah would be removed from Syria – akin to what happened after 1967 with the

Palestinians in south Lebanon. A similar project was planned for the Shiites in south Lebanon.

This was the former project they implemented with the Palestinians specifically, forcing the

Palestinians to leave south Lebanon, and [to] live in several refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria,

and other countries of the Arab world. [Yasser] Arafat was even forced to relocate his

headquarters from Lebanon to Tunisia and Morocco. The reality is that they want to create a

homeless administration. This was their same intention toward Lebanon’s Shiites. I will therefore

address what happened before the war so this matter will become completely clear.

The Americans and the Israelis had two important expressions regarding this issue. Bush

expressed it in very vulgar terms at the beginning of the war when the microphone was working.

Because that word is on his [low] level, I cannot repeat it. He said it in support of this matter.

Not in support of the war [itself], but in support of the result of this war. The other more polite

and diplomatic expression was said by [Secretary of State Condoleezza] Rice when those

massacres, killing operations, and chaos in south Lebanon reached their apex, and the bombings

which resulted from being drunk on technology and their [alleged] ability to destroy any location

they wanted due to their technological precision. Massacres happened which made the horror of

the [1996] Qana Massacre pale in comparison. She [Rice] used that expression, whereby she

described all of that chaos with her silly analogy as the “birth pangs of the new Middle East.”

The clamor of the victims under the rubble, the oppressed children, and the innocent women –

she likened this to the pains of labor and childbirth. This was therefore a major event, and these

expressions contained evidence [that it was the result of] a large project.

Regarding the Zionist Entity, it had prepared a large [refugee] camp, several ships, and had

prepared a camp to absorb the largest number of people possible. They would first transfer

30,000 [people] to the camp inside Palestine [i.e. inside Israel]. Then, in this camp, they would

select out the ordinary people and then transfer them to other countries or places; they would

arrest those they considered criminals or connected to Hezbollah’s organization. They had

prepared ships for deportation. Therefore, the war at that phase was [carried out] with a high

technological precision, in contrast to all of the [previous Israeli wars] which left behind

scorched earth [lit. burned the green and the dry]. In other words, they wanted to attack a whole

sect in totality.

One of the Most Important Goals of the War was Uprooting All of Hezbollah and a Certain

Sect

At first, they tried to direct the matter at a specific party – i.e. Hezbollah – and then they

expanded the matter to the entire Shiite sect in south Lebanon in order to implement this

demographic change entirely in the south. This is what can be understood about the hidden

dimension of the roots of the war. This is what they admitted later, when they admitted that they

intended – meaning [Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert, his defense minister and afterwards been the

Chief of Staff of the Army – they said they intended to carry out this war in a surprising manner,

and had that surprise attack happened, then most of Hezbollah’s positions should have been

destroyed in the large-scale airstrikes in the first phase [of the war]. Losses and severe damage

would have been inflicted upon 30% of Hezbollah’s organization. In the subsequent phase, they

wanted to destroy [Hezbollah] completely. However, the basis was seizing upon the widescale

American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and the region, and the desire of the Arab countries

to support “Israel” in a war such as this, and their acceptance of the uprooting of Hezbollah and

the Shiite sect in south Lebanon. This is what Olmert said in one of his speeches, when he said,

“this is the first time that all Arab countries gather together [i.e. unanimously agree.]” Of course,

when he says, “all,” he means, “most.” What he meant here, of course, was the countries of the

Persian Gulf and the Gulf Cooperation Council. However, this matter also included Egypt,

naturally, and other countries were not excluded from this matter. There were some exceptions at

the time. You know that Iraq lacked sovereignty, for the ruler of Iraq at the time was [Paul] Bremer, the American military ruler, and Iraqi sovereignty was controlled by the Americans. The

Syrian government was still young and inexperienced, due to the death of Hafez al-Assad. It had

just begin to work. So when they [i.e. the Israelis] say, “all [Arab] countries,” they mean the

majority. He [i.e. Olmert thus] said: “this is the first time that all Arab countries join together to

support Israel in its war against an Arab organization.” This is what he said, and this expressed

an important and serious reality.

Therefore, we must consider that this war had three goals [likely means causes, not goals]:

– First, the opportunity [created by] the American presence and American sovereignty over

Iraq, and the terror and fear that the American presence spread throughout the region.

– Second, the readiness of the Arab countries and their clandestine expression of

cooperation with the Zionist Entity in its war to uproot Hezbollah and [create] demographic change in south Lebanon.

– Third, the aims of the Zionist Entity itself to seize this opportunity to get rid of Hezbollah

forever.

These three objectives were the hidden goals that represented the causes and roots of the war.

You have detailed the hidden reasons for this war very well. What was the excuse for the

outbreak of this war and the overt reasons for it?

Hezbollah is the Lebanese people’s main [pillar] of support

The overt pretext for the war was Hezbollah’s commitment to the Lebanese people – like its

other commitments to the Lebanese people, as there was no other force besides Hezbollah which

could accomplish this – was to rescue the young Lebanese men who were prisoners in the

clutches of the Zionist entity. The Sayyed [i.e. Hassan Nasrallah] had made this promise

In one of his speeches, saying, “we will work on liberating the Lebanese prisoners from the

cutches of the Zionist Entity, as we have in the past. The Lebanese people had no [other] hope or

help to liberate the prisoners – whether they were Druze, Christians, or Muslims – except for

Hezbollah. This is the situation today as well, whereby Hezbollah is the [only] support of the

Lebanese people in any incident, and to defend itself [i.e. the Lebanese people] in the face of the

brutal/monstrous Israeli government. This was a declared position. In previous prisoner

exchanges, “Israel” did not release some of the young growing men, who became elderly in

prison.

Imad Mughniyeh Was a General in Every Sense of the Word

Hezbollah promised this, and it was not realized in the first prisoner exchange operations. Or,

“Israel” didn’t agree to free these prisoners. Therefore, Hezbollah initiated its activity to realize

this promise which it made to the Lebanese people, so that it could be able to carry out prisoner

exchanges as a result of these operations. Therefore, on the basis of special operations, and I

don’t know what title was applied to the leader of those special operations, should I call him a

general? This word has become very commonly used, and he [i.e. Imad Mughniyeh] was above

this word in military parlance. In our countries nowadays, the words, “general” and “Emir” have

become commonly used. But, in truth, the martyr Imad Mughniyeh was a general in every sense

of the word. He was a general in the battlefield, possessing traits akin to those of Malik alAshtar.

I said when he was subsequently martyred – this is not the place to talk about this now – similar

circumstances and expressions were used by the Lord of the Faithful [Imam Ali] when Malik was

martyred. The Imam was seized by a state of grief and extraordinary concern, leading him to weep

at the pulpit and say:

“Malik, O Malik. By God, had he been a mountain, he would have been a peak; had he been a

rock, he would have been solid, and no bird could have reached his height.”

Then he said this very important expression, that, “Malik was to me as I was to the Messenger of

God.” The same situation applied to Imad Mughniyeh, in that Imad held this kind of status with

the Resistance. And as I have said, if I wanted to not use these common appellations, then I have

to liken him to Malik, as in the assaying of the Imam [Ali], the Commander of the Faithful, when

he said of him, “let women give birth until [another] like Malik is born.”

The first, which was the basis, was the planning.

The second was crossing the Zionist Entity’s very dense, high, and widespread barbed wire and

arriving [inside Israel], because the operation was not merely striking and destroying, but there

had to be a situation of crossing [the border] and going over to the other side and bringing [back] prisoners. Therefore, it was necessary to work with utmost precision in order to prevent the

people inside the car from dying.

Third, speed was of the essence, and the operation had to be finished within mere minutes. This

couldn’t take fifteen minutes or half an hour. The matter took minutes and seconds. They had to

cross over quickly before the enemies arrived, and often the distance between the Enemy and the

location of the operation was mere minutes. This was the distance over land. By air, it would

have been much quicker, and [the Israelis] could have arrived and retaken the prisoners. The

third operations (sic) were quickly returning with the [prisoners] to a secure area, safe from the

threats of the Enemy.

The war started under this pretext, and painful strikes were carried out against

Hezbollah’s positions. What was Hezbollah’s reaction in Lebanon in the first hours and

days? Particularly since Israel had made Hezbollah taking the two prisoners a pretext for

carrying out this barbaric attack, and this naturally created psychological pressures. What

was the local opinion inside Iran about the Islamic Republic in Iran would respond and

react?

Hezbollah is Always 100% Ready, and This Readiness Has its Reasons

We have to point out two things, because Hezbollah is in a clash with an enemy with which it

can have no reconciliation. Meaning, Hezbollah – from an ideological standpoint and political

philosophy – cannot reconcile with this Enemy. That Enemy also does not want reconciliation

with Hezbollah. Therefore, this enmity between the two sides is a continuous enmity and was at

that time an ongoing enmity as well. Therefore, Hezbollah is always and continuously ready

from a defensive standpoint. This is one point. So, Hezbollah was not carefree and unprepared;

It was ready and prepared, and this readiness had nothing to do with those operations [i.e. the

kidnapping operations]. Those operations only increased its readiness and willingness in other

dimensions and increased its vigilance and anticipation. However, its readiness was already

present on the level of fighting forces, [military] equipment, and capabilities. This is also the

case now, in that Hezbollah is constantly ready to the maximum degree, and 100%. Its readiness

cannot be likened to other ones, which are described as “yellow” and then rise to a readiness and

preparation level of “red.” Or for example, a readiness of 30%, then 70%, then 100%. No.

Hezbollah is always ready 100%. On that day [i.e. July 12, 2006], Hezbollah was at 100%

readiness, and today they are 100% ready – while, admittedly, the manner of its readiness varies

from one period of time to the next for reasons of possibilities and capabilities.

The second point is that any step that Hezbollah wants to take, it first undertakes preparatory

security steps. Therefore, when Hezbollah decided to carry out the operations to seize the two

Zionist soldiers for the purpose of that important and fateful [prisoner] exchange, it decided first

to be ready and self-prepared. This readiness had two components [lit. situations]: The first was

readiness in confrontation, and the second was readiness in minimizing [its own] casualties.

Therefore – for the entire duration that the Zionist Entity carried out its attacks, particularly in

the early hours and the first day and the first days, and had a preplanned target [lit. information] bank and gave all this information to its aerial forces, which carried out bombings upon this basis

which contained precise coordinates of Hezbollah’s position – due to the prior preparations that

Hezbollah had undertaken, we find that they incurred the most minimum possible of losses,

either in personnel, equipment, or preparations. In fact, it is possible to say that it [i.e. Hezbollah] was not harmed at all in the early moments, and after 10 days the Entity [i.e. Israel] declared, per

its target [lit. information] bank, to have destroyed all of its targets, meaning all of Hezbollah’s

existing targets. However, it became apparent later that what it [i.e. Hezbollah] carried out was

contrary to what was foreseen or hoped for [by Israel], and that was due to the steps and

innovations that Hezbollah had undertaken prior to the beginning of its operations, anticipating

the enemy’s reaction.

Therefore, this is the first point. The second point is that the prior predictions of the war and the

estimations of the other party’s [i.e. Israel’s] reactions, often/most of the time such operations –

and the reactions to them – do not lead to a total, major war. There could be retaliation [lit.

reactions] for one day, whereby the [Zionist] Entity could heavily target specific areas and

points, and then stop the attack. However, this time, the [Zionist] Entity began carrying out all of

its operations for which it had previously planned. Meaning, it began implementing that project

that it had secretly planned. Of course, now we say it was a secret plan, and I will say later in the

clarifications, that we arrived at this conclusion [lit. result] after two weeks on the level of

doctrinal belief, and I will say why we reached this conclusion as a belief and not from an

informational or intelligence standpoint.

Approximately towards the end of the war we concluded that the enemy had a prior plan and

wanted to operate with total surprise. A big part of our understanding rested upon what the

enemy itself declared, and based upon that alone the operations turned into a comprehensive war

as quickly as could be possible, as if it were a large warehouse of equipment and explosives that

exploded in one fell swoop. It was as if that project and plan entered into effect all at once, and

this great explosion – which we call the 33 Day War – occurred on the first day that the incident[i.e. the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers] occurred. I returned to Lebanon – because I had

been there one day prior [i.e. on July 11, 2006] – and I returned to Syria. But because all of the

roads had been bombed and attacked, particularly the one official road to enter [Lebanon from

Syria] called Al-Masna, which is the border crossing between Lebanon and Syria, was in danger

of constant bombardment by jets, and those jets would not leave it safe for one second. We had

communication with the friends [i.e. Hezbollah] via a secure line, and Imad [Mughniyeh] arrived

and took me from Syria to Lebanon by another road, part of which we had to cross on foot and

another part via automobile. During those days, [Israel’s] focus was still mostly on Hezbollah’s

administrative buildings in the area of the south [i.e. south Lebanon], and sometimes in the

center and the north [of Lebanon]. The first week was almost over, but in Tehran they insisted

that I be present to offer clarifications on the situation.

My Report to the Leader of the Revolution [Khamenei] Did Not Contain Any Hope [Lit.

Horizon] of Victory

I returned via a side road, and Imam Khamenei was then in Mashhad. I went to meet him in a

meeting attended by the three authorities and key officials of the National Security Council, who

are mostly specialized in security and information matters. So yes, in Mashhad, I gave a report

on the incident. It was a bitterly negative report, in that my testimony did not include any

possibility of victory, and the war was an entirely different [type of] war. It was a highly

technical war. Twelve-story buildings were leveled with one bomb, and the targets were chosen

with precision inside villages, with the distance between villages being very small – these

villages were attached to each other and differentiating between them is difficult for artillery.

Despite that, [the Israelis were able to] distinguish between one village and the next. The war at

that time had already moved on from targeting Hezbollah to targeting a whole sect. There were

Shiite villages, neighbored by Christian villages and Sunni villages. But the situation was

different for these villages, for in a specific place [i.e. the Christian or Sunni villages] a person

could sit and be calm and smoke hookah, and in another place fire and billets rained down upon

them. I submitted my report during that meeting, and then the time of prayer arrived. So they got

up to perform ritual ablution. I also got up to perform ritual ablution. [Khamenei] performed

ablution, revealing his forearms, performing ablution and then returned and gestured to me with

his hand to come to him. I went to him, and he asked me if I wanted to say anything to him

regarding my report. I said no, only that I wanted to clarify the situation.

Imam Khamenei said: I understand that, but don’t you want to say anything else? I responded:

no.

Ayatollah Khamenei: The Victory in this War will Be like the Victory in the Battle of the

Trench

We prayed and returned to the meeting. My report ended, and then [Khamenei] began speaking.

He mentioned several point and said that the points which a certain individual [i.e. Soleimani] mentioned are correct, for this is indeed a very difficult and severe war. However, I think this

war resembles the War of the Trench. The Sayyed [i.e. Khamenei] then read the suras of War of

the Confederacies, or the War of the Trench, which were one war, and he described the situation

of the Muslims and companions of the Messenger [i.e. Mohammad] and the situation that

prevailed upon their ranks. Then he said, I think the victory in this war will be like the victory in

the Battle of the Trench. My heart shook at this statement, because I could never have imagined

such a thing from a military standpoint, and I privately wished the Leader [i.e. Khamenei] had

not said this, i.e. that the result would be a victory akin to the Grand Messenger’s [i.e.

Mohammad] in the War of the Confederacies. After that, he singled out two very important

points, first he said – and my vision and belief which I relate to the friends is always based upon

my experience of over 20 years with [Khamenei], whereby the wisdom emanating from his

tongue, mouth and mind are a result and fruit of his piety, and this is precisely what I saw from[Khamenei]. Therefore, anything upon which he casts doubts now, I am sure that in the end it

will be ambiguous and indecisive; and anything of which he is assured, I am assured will be

useful and positive.

[Khamenei] said, “I believe Israel pre-planned this plan, and wanted to carry it out as a surprise

attack and wanted to surprise Hezbollah. But Hezbollah’s operation to kidnap the two prisoners

ruined Israel’s surprise.”

I did not possess this information, nor was this information available to Sayyed Nasrallah either.

Neither of us had anything like this information, including Imad Mughniyeh. None of us had this

information or data.

Hezbollah Saved Itself and Lebanon from Total Destruction by Capturing the Two

Prisoners

Ok, well, they were on the border and saw. This was very good news for me because it would

help Sayyed Nasrallah a lot, and relieve him. The matter was not so severe at first, but became

severe in the end, whereby the number of martyrs and amount of destruction and losses

increased. Sayyed Nasrallah made statements which affected many people, and I do not want to

repeat those statements, but I found that those statements were very good for him. Someone

would be critical and say, “why did Hezbollah subject all Shiites to dangers in order to capture

two prisoners,” however [the reality] was that Hezbollah saved itself and the Lebanese people

from total destruction by capturing the two prisoners, and this was very good and important

news.

We Must Learn the Lessons of Wilayah From Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah

Another thing that [Khamenei] said which had a spiritual effect and effect on morale was when

he said, “tell them [i.e. Hezbollah] to recite the Small Jawshan Prayer. The Small Jawshan Prayer

is not well-known, at least by the common Shiites. It may be different for some. [Khamenei] then

clarified that we should not be surprised by this recommendation to read the Small Jawshan

Prayer, as some might be surprised when they are told to read Surat al-Ikhlas four times or AlFatiha so a matter may be solved. [Khamenei] said that the Small Jawshan Prayer represents the

situation of a person in need, one in an extreme state of compulsion who wants to talk to God.

This is the condition of a person in need. That same day I returned to Tehran in the evening, and

then I returned again to Syria. I carried with me a very good feeling. I was probably carrying

with me something perhaps more valuable than anything else as far as Sayyed Nasrallah was

concerned. Imad [Mughniyeh] came again and we returned by that road, and I went to Sayyed

Nasrallah and told him what happened. Perhaps nothing else affected Sayyed Nasrallah’s morale

like these words. First, he has a particular sense about him that none of us have reached to the

same degree, and I think we should all go learn the lessons of Wilaya from him, [because] he has

a belief and entrenched conviction in the words of [Khamenei], and considers [Khamenei’s

words] to be divinely inspired, and therefore pays extreme attention to any word or phrase issued

from [Khamenei], and deals with it with great care.

I clarified the matter to him, and he rejoiced a lot at first. [Khamenei’s] words soon quickly

spread among the Mujahideen, that the victory in this war would be like the victory in the Battle

of the Trench – meaning that it would be trying and difficult, but will end in a great victory. This

viewpoint and good news [gospel] spread among the Mujahideen, starting with those who were

on the front lines with the enemy, and reached all of the ranks of the Mujahideen.

Second, [Khamenei’s] analysis that the Enemy had a pre-planned project [to launch a war] became the basis of Sayyed Nasrallah’s activities in clarifying public opinion and alerting people

to the intentions of the enemy. Regarding the third matter, the Small Jawshan Prayer spread like

wildfire, and it contains many concepts of mystical and spiritual value. It’s possible to say that it

is one of the best prayers in the Mafatih al-Jinan, containing many moral and worship concepts.

This prayer spread greatly, and Al-Manar would repeatedly continuously broadcast it in a

beautiful and very sad voice. It was also read among the Christians, because it is a self-helping

divine prayer that does not really belong to a single sect. Anyone who worships God, and who

believes in God or the Divine power will be affected by this prayer; and it had a great effect, and

became the start of a new beginning. It can even be said that it was like new blood pumping

through the body [lit. existence] of Hezbollah, enabling it to carry on the battle with the enemy

with greater hope and self-confidence.

I did not return [to Iran] until the end of the war, and I was there completely for the duration of

the 33 days. After the war ended, I returned from Lebanon [to Iran] and participated in a meeting

similar to the one in Mashhad – but this time in Tehran, at [Khamenei’s residence], attended by

all of the authorities and high-ranking officials. I gave a report on what had occurred, and it

happened that part of it was published. In addition, I used to send my daily reports via our secure

line to Tehran, so that they would be totally apprised of the situation and the battlefield.

What was the local opinion in Iran about how the Islamic Republic in Iran should react

and its reactions? Were there opposing opinions among the officials or were they all in

agreement on how to respond?

There Was Complete Unity in Iran on Supporting Hezbollah

No, there was no difference of opinion at the time at all. Everyone was in agreement on

supporting Hezbollah morally and materially, meaning with weapons, equipment, capabilities,

and media and whatever else the Islamic Republic was capable of. Not a single person cast doubt

upon that within the regime at least during that period. When I was there, I would hear what

would happen, and there was no concern from that regard. There was total unity in the Islamic

Republic regarding supporting Hezbollah and striving toward Hezbollah’s victory. There was

complete unity in the Islamic Republic. There was a devotion to this support, and the main pillar

of this support was his Eminence [Khamenei], therefore there was no doubt or hesitation in this

regard, because it benefited the Islamic Republic, Islam, and the Islamic world. Of course, there

could be differences of opinion regarding several matters, but regarding Hezbollah, there was

and there remains until now unanimity all levels [to support the group].

Rarely has the operational dimension of the 33-Day War Been Discussed, and most of the

statements and information have been regarding the circumstances of the Zionist Entity

during this war. We want to hear from you details about the strategies followed in

Hezbollah’s operations in Lebanon, given that you actively participated in the battlefield of

this conflict?

We Still Have Much to Reveal About the Secrets of the 33-Day War

There are still matters we cannot mention about the 33-Day War, and perhaps that’s because only

13 years have passed since that war, and we still have many long years before we can reveal a

portion of this war and what Hezbollah did, which is still enveloped in secrecy. However, there

are aspects which can be discussed, and which are beneficial, and which include several

important points. I will recount here some [of my] memories. Hezbollah had an operations room

in the heart of Dahiyeh, and the buildings surrounding it were continuously bombed and

destroyed ever night. Two or three large, tall buildings of twelve or thirteen stories, more or less,

often more than that, would be completely leveled [by the bombing]. One night when we were in

the operations room, and all of the officials in charge of conducting the war were in that room –

and that room was not underground, but a regular operations room. It contained communications

and contact equipment, so that we could maintain communication and contact with the different

actors. I felt at the time, after they bombed the surrounding buildings and destroyed them – it

was nighttime, at around 11:00 PM – I felt that serious threat was endangering Sayyed

Nasrallah’s life, and I decided that we should transfer the Sayyed to another place. Imad and I

discussed the matter, and the Sayyed only agreed after much difficulty to leave the operations

room. This was not to leave Dahiyeh, but only from the building which we imagined was subject

to danger because of [people] repeatedly entering and exiting it, and because the MK planes –

meaning the Israeli drones – were constantly hovering above our heads in Dahiyeh, three at a

time, and closely monitoring all movements, including motorcycle traffic. Thus, Dahiyeh was

totally quiet at 12:00 AM, as if no one lives in the heart of Dahiyeh, where Hezbollah has its

main center. We agreed to move from one building to the next, and we moved. The distance

between the first and second building was a short one. When we moved, we had barely entered

the second building when serious bombing began occurring, and they bombed places near this

building. We waited there, because we had a secure line and communication and contact could

not be cut off, especially the communications of Sayyed Nasrallah and Imad [Mughniyeh].

Another bombing occurred, and they destroyed a bridge near that building. We felt as if a third

bombing would follow those two bombings and that they would bomb this building as well.

There were only three people in that building – myself, Sayyed Nasrallah, and Imad[Mughniyeh]. Therefore, we decided to exit that building toward another building. The three of

us exited, and there was not a single car [driving in the street], and Dahiyeh was totally dark and

completely silent. The only sound was that of the planes of the Zionist Entity over the skies of

Dahiyeh. I was wearing a camouflaged military uniform. I took off the shirt, and remained in my

undershirt, which was a regular civilian shirt. However, my pants were military fatigues. Sayyed

Nasrallah, myself, and Imad [Mughniyeh] exited. Imad told me and the Sayyed, “sit down under

the shade of this tree.” Not [really] under its shade, because it was nighttime, and it had no shade.

But [he meant to say,”] sit under it to hide from detection [by the UAVs],” even though it

couldn’t protect us against detection, because the MK planes have infrared cameras that detect a

person’s body heat and differentiate it from other sources of heat. Therefore, you could not hide

anything, and this is what should be understood from this point. We sat in that place, and I

remember the story of Muslim [ibn Aqeel]. Not regarding myself, but regarding Sayyed

Nasrallah, because the place was the Sayyed’s country; Imad went and found a car, and returned

quickly. This probably took a few minutes. I want to commend Imad, but I am afraid it will

disrupt our session as happened yesterday. But he was unrivaled, especially in planned. When[his] car reached us, the MK planes were hovering above our heads and focusing on us. When

the car reached us, the planes began focusing on the car. As you know, when the MK sends it

signals, these images are sent to Tel Aviv, and they see the scenes and images in their operations

room. It took some time until we were able to move from a hiding place underground to another

that was underground, and after that to move from this car to something else that can’t be

mentioned now, in order to trick the Enemy, and then we returned after midnight to the

operations room again.

Hezbollah’s Actions Had a Very Important Psychological, in Addition to Military, Aspect

The important point was that there was a rapid acceleration in wars normally. After forty years of

military and security work, I can understand this matter. There is a rapid acceleration of wars,

and everything is possible in the first moments. Hezbollah, in this war and in every stage of it,

was surprising the enemy with new implements and new steps, leaving them dumbfounded.[Hezbollah] couldn’t reveal all its methods at once. Therefore, Sayyed Nasrallah had a saying

that left the enemy terrified and in great fear. He would progress step by step. First there was the

step of Haifa, then he said, “there will be a phase of after Haifa, and after after Haifa.” These

phases were successive, so the enemy would understand, and they would reveal at every stage a

new weapon and prove their abilities in every phase, so they could attack the enemy deep within[its territory, lit. within its depths] as was appropriate for each phase. Therefore, it was proven to

the enemy that Hezbollah at that time in 2006 had the ability in the next phase to take the war to

a place of danger, to a red stage of danger beyond danger, meaning taking the war into Tel Aviv.

Hezbollah possessed this ability, therefore Hezbollah’s steps, in addition to their military

importance, had a great psychological impact as well. Meaning, [Hezbollah] would carry out its

military activities and create challenges and difficulties for the enemy at each stage [of the war] in a specific geographical area of the occupied Palestinian lands [i.e. Israel, not the West

Bank/Gaza], and would also psychologically impact the enemy with confusion and severe

disturbance.

The second point, regarding the implements and equipment, is that the Enemy thought it reduced

Hezbollah’s capabilities to the pint of zero with the large-scale operations it carried out, or that it

reduced them to the lowest point possible at every stage in which the enemy would declare that

Hezbollah was no longer capable of firing its rockets and no longer possessed any of its rocket

capabilities. Hezbollah on that day and the day after would fire even larger amounts of rockets

than the prior day, and firing rockets isn’t a simple matter. In a territory being bombarded by

heavy artillery, this side [i.e. Hezbollah] has to exit its hiding place, and organize its targets, then

fire these rockets without incurring harm or losses [itself], and then return to a place of safety.

This is a very difficult thing to carry out, but because of the experience and expertise of the

Mujahuideen, this matter was carried out with absolute precision due to the precise and intensive

training for this matter between the years 2000 and 2006. Meaning from when the Zionist Entity

fled [south Lebanon], or its defeat in south Lebanon, these training began in an intensive manner,

and carried on non-stop until 2006 as a project launched by Hezbollah, which it called, “Project

Sayyed al-Shuhada.” Imad [Mughniyeh] oversaw this project, and Imad also planned it. Imad

arranged the precise arrangements and distributions regarding how to act and behave if a

confrontation occurred with the Enemy.

Hezbollah Changed the Basis of Traditional Warfare by Transforming Each Point Into a

Forward Fortification/Trench

The third point was Hezbollah’s tactic, which was contrary to that of traditional warfare. In

traditional warfare, there is a forward fortification, and in this war there was none. Instead, each

point had a forward fortification – from the frontline on the border between Occupied Palestine

and Lebanon, up to the Litani River at least. Every point there, every hill, every village, every

house, and every area was a frontline and a fortification. This was not a tangible or known

fortification as is common in wars, and as was in our war [i.e. the Iran-Iraq War]. No, this was a

special tactic. If I wanted to liken it to something, I would liken all of this tactic that Hezbollah

adopted to a wide, smart minefield which contained no free or safe spaces. Therefore, notice the

manner in which the enemy moved, and you will see that the enemy failed to enter some of the

villages adjected to the border, like Aita al-Shaab. [Israel] failed to enter these billages, and was

not able to enter it, and failed to enter the cities. In the end, [Israel] decided to go from the

eastern wadi to enter and advance toward the Litani. In fact, this was a weak point and breaking

for the Enemy. The important point here in this war is the blow that Hezbollah directed directed[at Israel], which resembled the blow that our Sayyed the Commander of the Faithful [i.e. Imam

Ali] in the Battle of the Trench, whereby he slayed Amro bin Abed Wad, and the Messenger said

that Ali’s blow on the day of the Trench equaled the worship of the two realms of mankind and

Jinn. Why? Because it saved Islam.

Some Hezbollah Strikes Would Entirely Paralyze Entire Structures of the Zionist Entity

The strikes for which Hezbollah would plan would paralyze entire structures of the Zionist Entity

in a surprising manner. One of these structures was the Zionist Entity’s naval power. You know

that access to the south [Lebanon] had a transportation route. This route went from the banks of

the Mediterranean to Sidon, [southward] toward Tyre, and then to the frontlines in the south. In

all wars, the Zionist Entity would position its ships in the sea to block this route with precise

artillery. This is what they did in this war as well, during the first week. What the Enemy did not

envision, and with which Hezbollah succeeded in surprising it, was the matter of naval missiles[i.e. land-based anti-ship missiles]. On that day, [Hezbollah] wanted to use naval missiles for the

first time, and it had not used them before that day. All these missiles were secret and hidden in a

secret place. The operation was a difficult one. [Hezbollah] had to take the missiles out of their

hiding place on a vehicle, which would carry it and take it to the launching point, which was

exposed. Opposite this point there were three or four Israeli ships in the sea. Thus, Sayyed

Nasrallah and Imad [Mughniyeh] agreed, for it was rumored at the time that the Sayyed had been

wounded, and a state of general concern spread among the people in Lebanon. Nasrallah was

expected to speak. Up until that day, the Enemy had achieved superiority during that week, and

we had failed to carry out a single important action aside from the reaction with rocket fire. This

operation had to occur. This [anti-ship] missile had been taken out to its launch-point several

times, and they wanted to launch it. But a problem would occur in the launching. Sayyed

Nasrallah wanted in his speech to declare this accomplishment [i.e. striking an Israeli Navy ship

with an anti-ship missile] as a surprise, according to the Arabic expression. This operation was a

surprise attack. We reached the end of Sayyed Nasrallah’s speech. The Sayyed’s speech was

supposed to have been recorded and then broadcast, as if you were now sitting in this room and

recording my works, and then deleting a part of it and broadcasting a part of it, or showing it to

me later and I myself would delete a part of it. Sayyed Nasrallah’s speech was supposed to have

been organized in the [operations] room. There was a side room, and we would sit together with

Imad [Mughniyeh] or another brother. The clashes were continuous, and this [anti-ship] missile

had yet to be fired, and Sayyed Nasrallah’s speech reached its end, and he wanted to say, “peace

and the mercy of God be upon you.” When he got to this point, and before the Sayyed said this

expression, the rocket was fired. It is hypersonic, so it struck its target quickly. Therefore,

Sayyed Nasrallah said at the end of his speech, as if he were metaphysically seeing the scene,

“you see in front of you now the Israeli ship as it burns.” The Sayyed’s words coincided with the

moment that the missile struck its target. A philosophy underpins this matter, which might not be

accepted in the public sphere, but it was by the grace/will [lit. door] of God that the Sayyed’s

words and this strike coincided. For this strike hit the [Israeli] ship with complete precision. The

fact is that these ships have electronic warfare capabilities which can distort the path of the

missile, and they have anti-missile defenses which can strike the missile before it hits. But the

missile struck and cleaved the ship in two, and that led to end of the Zionist naval power until the

end of the war, where none of its naval units were seen, and it was witnessed that the Zionist

Entity’s entire naval force could be removed from the battlefield with one missile. Of course, this

is something that can be subject to analysis and discussion, and can be discussed at length, with

the very capabilities of the Zionist entity being one aspect. For the Entity whose entire naval

forces can be removed from the battlefield with one missile, it becomes apparent that no matter

how many ships it possesses, if one missile can remove its naval forces from the battlefield this

time, so the next time they can be removed with two or three missiles. If last time these forces

were forced to exit the battlefield by a missile with a 100km range, it will definitely be forced to

exit next time by a 300km range missile. This was a miracle and a very great victory. The people

who at that time were displaced or subject to bombardment shouted, even while under

bombardment, with calls of takbir [i.e. they shouted “Allahu Akbar!”] and fired in the air with

great joy. This was another surprise and shock that Hezbollah carried out and changed the

calculus [of the war]. The Zionist Entity could not compensate and reverse this calculus, until it

arrived toward Plain of Khiam and toward the Litani [River] on the 28th and 27th day [of the

war]. They were two very difficult days. I had become separated from Imad after we had been in

one place, and Sayyed Nasrallah was in another place. We had our meetings at night. We would

get ourselves to the Sayyed through a specific way and meet with him. Imad [Mughniyeh] would

give a complete report on the battlefield, and would receive the orders given by Sayyed

Nasrallah. Day 20 until Day 28 were extremely heavy and difficult days. It can be said that they

were the hardest days of these 33 days, and the time has not yet come to discuss some of the

matters yet.

Regarding the conditions of the Sayyed and the Mujahideen, Imad [Mughniyeh] carried out an

initiative that had an important impact. If we wanted to measure its impact, it could be compared

to the message and the promise given by [Khamenei]. It was that important, and the initiative is

the message delivered by the besieged Mujahideen on the frontlines of confronting the enemy,

while under fire, addressing Sayyed Nasrallah. It was an extraordinary message. When it was

read on that day, Imad was crying bitterly and loudly, and he was the one who planned this

initiative. I could not find anyone who listened to this voice that was reading the message and not

crying. What’s most important, however, is the response of Sayyed Nasrallah. If we want to

compare it, it can probably be compared to the poems that were declared by companions of Imad

Hussein in Karbala when they were facing the army of the enemy while defending Imam

Hussein. The words of the Sayyed, in steadfastness and in appreciation and sanctifications of the

actions of his companions and the Mujahideen, resemble the words of Imam Hussein on the

night of Ashoura.

These statements, which each had a great impact and were indeed divine speech, these

statements and writings by the fighters and Mujahideen from the battlefield and the Sayyed’s

response to them had a great impact and gave everyone a lot of strength. But matters turned on

the 28th day. Here, I have to point out a point that if it is broadcast, I request that everyone who

hears it pays close attention. We had many such scenes and incidents in the slaughter of the

Sacred Defense and the Imposed War, and I would always say they were signs of our

righteousness in the war [i.e. the righteousness of our cause]. The morale of the fighters and their

spirits were very high. They would say things behind closed doors. [This is during the Iran-Iraq

War] Once, we were in Shalamcheh, and wanted to carry out operations prior to the Karbala 5

Operations. Maybe a year and a half prior. So the enemy wouldn’t discover us, we assigned

intelligence units for our operations. The water was ahead of us, and on that day two of our

young men – Sadeghi and Mousaipour – went to conduct reconnaissance and did not return. We

had a brother with a very knowledgeable character. He was young and a student, but was

exceptionally knowledgeable, and it could be said that he was virtually unrivaled in his

operational knowledge. He reached a level that even great men of knowledge do not reach even

after 70 or 80 years, but he reached it. He called me and told me to come [to him], so I did. At

the time, our communications were done via RACAL wireless radios. I was in Ahvaz when he

called. I went there, and he told me, “Akbar Mousaipour and Sadeghi went, and I returned.” I

was greatly disturbed, for I thought the enemy had taken prisoners from us before we even

began, our operations have been exposed. I said this all in anger. I remained there that night, then

I returned. We had many [fighting] fronts. He called me again after two days, and told me to

come, so I went [to him]. He said, “Akbar Mousaipour will return.” And his name [this very

knowledgeable person] was Hussein, so I said, “Hussein,” and I used a word which I should not

repeat now. Hussein smiled a slight smile at the edge of his lips which remains burned in my

mind [lit. implanted in my vision]. Hussein Ibn Gholam Hussein said – he’s the one who said

this, his father’s name was Gholam Hussein, and was a capable high school teacher, as was his

mother. He was the son of teachers and educators from both his father’s and mother’s side, and

he was also a teacher even though he was young. When they would say, “sayyed Hussein,” there

was but one sayyed Hussein, even though there were many whose name was Hussein – but him

alone they’d call “sayyed Hussein.” I said, “what’s the matter?” He said, “tomorrow Akbar

Mousaipour will return, and Sadeghi will return after him.” I asked him, “where did you find this

out?” He said, “you just have to wait here.” So remained, and at approximately 1:00 PM – we

had a camera we’d call “the rabbit,” and we’d wrap it in bags and place it on the tower of the

fortification, and the brothers in the intelligence and information [units] were behind the camera.

They said, “we see something black on the water,” so I went up to them and I saw the matter was

as they mentioned. There was something black and stretched out on the water. The young men

went into the water and found that it was Akbar, Akbar Mousaipour. The next day Hussein

Sadeghi returned. This was a very strange matter. The water, with all its hustle and bustle,

returned them to their launch point from the trench and to the same point. Both of them had been

martyred. They were martyred in the water, and the water returned them to that same point. It

was a very strange matter.

I said to Hussein: Hussein, how did you know this? He said: I saw Akbar Mousaipour in a dream

last night, and he told me, “Hussein, we were not captured, but we were martyred. I will return

tomorrow at such and such hour, and Sadeghi will return the next day.” Then he told me, and this

is a very important sentence, he said, “Do you know why Mousaipour spoke to me? He was from

the youth of Sirjan. And [do you know why] Sadeghi did not speak [to me?].” I responded, “No.”

He said, “because Akbar Mousaipour had two virtues. The first was that he was married, and the

second was that he would not skip the nighttime prayer even while he was in the water. These

were his two virtues. So he came and told me.” Hussein [Ibn Gholam] was later martyred.

I want to return to this point, which is that during that very difficult situation, one of the brothers

from Hezbollah – who was very religious and observant – who was an official in south Lebanon,

said, “I was in a state that was not a state of sleep. I saw a woman come to me, and nearby her

were two women. I felt in that state of vision that [this woman] was Sayyedeh Zahra, peace be

upon her, so I rushed to her blessed feet.” He said, “I told her in Arabic, ‘do you see our situation

and circumstances?’ She responded, ‘it will be fixed.’ I said to her, ‘No,’ as if insisting to reach

her feet, and insisting to take something from her. After my insistence, she said that the matter

would be fixed, and she took out a handkerchief that was covering her face and shook it like so,

and said, ‘the matter is finished.’”

A moment later an Israeli helicopter was struck with a missile, and after that the countdown to

the Zionist Entity and its defeat began. Its tanks were struck. From that moment, the calculus

changed and a new calculus emerged, and for the first time during this war Kornet missiles were

revealed, and the first Abrams (sic) tank was struck…sorry, Israeli Merkava tanks…which had

not been struck in such a manner until then, and approximately seven tanks were destroyed in

one day.

If The War Doesn’t Stop, Then Israel’s Army Will Be Destroyed and Scattered

At that time, Mr. Hamad bin Khalifa Aal Thani was prime minister, he was the prime minister of

the government of Qatar and a foreign minister. He would act as intermediary and come to

Lebanon and go. He told a story later and said that in those days they wouldn’t permit at all any

discussion or talk regarding stopping the war. He was in the United Nations. He said: “I

despaired and went to my home to relax. Suddenly, I found the despicable John Bolton looking

for me, disturbed, unsteady, and anxious. He said, ‘where are you?’ I responded, ‘Is there

anything new?’ He said, ‘let’s go to the United Nations,’ so I went. I found the ambassador of

Israel to the United Nations [Dan Gillerman] walking around disturbed and very anxious. He

said his words to me, ‘now we must stop this war.’ I said, ‘Why?’ They said, ‘if this war is not

stopped, then the army of Israel will be destroyed and scattered.’ Because of that, they backed

down from all of their prior conditions, and bypassed them, and were forced to agree to

Hezbollah’s conditions, and accept a ceasefire. And this grand victory for Hezbollah was

accomplished.

The 33-Day War Was an Inflection Point and Not Just a Victory

This wasn’t a mere victory, but it was also an inflection/turning point, which ended the

possibilities and imagination of the Zionist Entity to again attack Lebanon. This equation is still

standing to this day, and I think it can’t be easily reversed. Hezbollah left this impact on the

Zionist Entity, whereby it doesn’t even think of attack Lebanon, but made it not even think of

any attack. I tell you that after the 33-Day War, Ben Gurion’s preemptive and offensive war

strategy was changed – rather, the offensive strategy of the Zionist Entity – bit by bit into merely

a defensive strategy. And you saw in the event that happened mere weeks ago, where Hezbollah

threatened to strike the Zionist Entity and to avenge its two martyrs, how the Zionist Entity fled

three to five kilometers from the zero-point of the borderline to inside its territory [lit. to the

depth], to a point where Al-Mayadeen’s correspondent went to the vicinity of the barbed wire

and said: “I am speaking to you from Occupied Palestine.” This is the effect of the 33-Day War.

Prayers be Upon Mohammad and the family of Mohammad.

Today, we relive the memory of the Imposed War on Iran [Iran-Iraq War]. How has the

culture and thinking of the Imposed War tied to the Resistance Front in the region and

maintained its continuity?

Regarding the Sacred Defense war, if we return to the events during the birth of Islam, we would

find that the Imam [Ali], the Commander of the Faithful, would follow the example of the

Messenger of God [i.e. Mohammad] when he would give advice, write messages, or preach. His

primary example was the days of the Messenger, the actions of the Messenger, and the story of

the Messenger. When the Lord of the Martyrs [Hussein] wanted an example to rely upon, his

example was the Commander of the Faithful [Ali], as an eyewitness and the person who was

closes to the story of the Messenger of God, and who expressed this story through example and

applied it and made it the basis of his actions. The same applies to our Sacred Defense. This is

the relationship between the Sacred Defense war and the other wars of sacred defense. For those

serve as a mother, and the axis, and the sacred foundation. I cannot say that if there was no

Sacred Defense that there would not have been anything else. But what happened during the

Sacred Defense – the circumstances and moral manifestations – was at the loftiest levels. The

religious media shone at the time at the highest levels, and the ideological and spiritual situations

were at their highest form, without an ounce of perversion. Altruism, jihad, and martyrdom were

in their purest form. Even the management and the relationship between the commander and his

subordinates, if we were to liken them to anything they could be likened to the rarest scenes from

the birth of Islam. The Sacred Defense was the loftiest peak in all field and situations. Others

were a series of mountains, and this is the peak. The Zagros mountains extend more thank 1,000

km, but its known peak is Mt. Damavand. Mt. Damavand is the main highpoint in the Alborz

mountain range. It is the highest peak in the Alborz mountain range. Pardon me, I said Zagros.

The correct [thing to say] was Alborz. The length of this mountain range is 1000km, but the

known peak is Mt. Damavand. Our Sacred Defense, compared to other instances of defense,

resembles Damavand in the Alborz Mountain range. It is the highest peak of all the rest, which

appear as foothills by comparison. This is what can be said if we want to compare.