The Origins and Impact of International Prohibition

Contents:

0.0: Abbreviations

0.1: Abstract

0.2: Introduction

0.3: Literature Review



1.0: Securitisation

1.1: The Rise of International Drug Prohibition

1.2: The Securitisation of Drug Policy

1.3: Findings



2.0: A History of Africa and Narcotics

2.1: Historical alcohol prohibition in Africa

2.2: The Rise of Africa as a Drug Entrepôt

2.3: Findings



3.0: Academic Research on Africa’s Drugs Trade

3.1: The role of Governments in Africa’s Drugs Trade

3.2: The Case of Guinea Bissau

3.3: Findings



4.0: Africa’s Drugs Trade, Data vs Narratives

4.1: Finding Africa’s Narco-Terrorists

4.2: Why Africa’s Drugs Trade has become sensationalised

4.3: Findings



5.0: The International Response to Africa’s Drugs Trade

5.1: Africa’s Response to the Drugs Trade

5.2: Dealing with Rogue State Actors

5.3: Findings



6.0: Conclusions



7.0: Bibliography

0.0: Abbreviations

AQIM — Al Qaeda in the Maghreb

AU — African Union

DEA — Drug Enforcement Administration

ECOWAS — Economic Community of West African States

FARC — Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia

SAB — South African Breweries

SOCA — Special Organised Crime Agency

t– Metric tonne, 1000kg

UN — United Nations

UNODC — United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

US — United States

0.1: Abstract

Africa and the War on Drugs: The Origins and Impact of International Prohibition takes a holistic view of the continent’s illegal drugs trade. By exploring the concept of securitisation and the history of international prohibition, it explains why Africa has now emerged as a hub for drug smuggling. Using modern academic sources, it challenges the sensationalised

narratives emerging from governments and international control agencies. It finds that issues such as rising substance abuse, and the threat of Narco-Terrorism on the continent, are being exaggerated and exploited for political purposes. Counter to this however, it also notes significant evidence of African state officials being active participants in drug smuggling activity. This document explores the global reaction to African drug trafficking,

and finds that it has been seriously flawed. While key smugglers may be targeted and removed, this does not address the structural issues on the continent that promote drug trafficking activity. It concludes that the focus and alarm about Africa’s drugs trade is a symptom of much greater challenges to global drug policy, as countries begin to push back against prohibition based ideology.

0.2: Introduction

Africa’s illegal drugs trade is a growing concern of the international community. The region emerged as a narcotics entrepôt in the 1980s, with growing imports of cocaine and heroin destined for European and North American markets. While this trade does pose a threat to affected communities, the issue has now become dominated by sensationalist narratives, originating from governments and narcotics control agencies. Ideas of rising drug use, the corruption of states, and the threats of Narco-Terrorism are all being misrepresented as justification for heavy handed policy interventions. These responses do not appear to be based on evidence, they are instead driven by a hard-line ideological commitment to

international drug prohibition. This dissertation aims to explore the origins of global drug policy, in order to understand how the modern prohibitionist approach has come to dominate. Within this framework, it will then look at the history of drugs in Africa, to explain why the region has now emerged

as a centre for cocaine and heroin trafficking. Using contemporary academic research, it aims to provide a clear picture of the drugs trade on the continent, and dispel many of the myths which have emerged. Finally, this work will examine how international narcotics control agencies are trying to apply prohibitionist policy within Africa, and what impact this is having on local networks.

0.3: Literature Review.

The academic community began to take an interest in Africa’s narcotics trade roughly two decades ago, and since then there has been a considerable amount written on the subject. The issue became popularised in the late 1990s, after the UN held its’ General Assembly Special Session on Drugs, and published its’ first major report on drugs in Africa (UNODC, 1999). In 1999, the Review of African Political Economy dedicated a special issue to

examining Africa’s growing drugs trade, and that year also saw the publication of ‘The Criminalization of the State in Africa’ (Bayart, et al., 1999). This work was one of the most influential documents on the subject, and it began investigations into the growing role of African State actors in drug smuggling activity. Stephen Ellis and Mark Shaw emerged as two

of the most prominent writers on the issue, and they have since collaborated to examine the intermingling of politics, crime, and legitimate business. (Ellis & Shaw, 2015). Since the mid-2000s, the debate surrounding Africa’s drugs trade has evolved significantly, and become increasingly dramatized and sensational. This can be seen in the media, but also in official documents such as the UNODC’s Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa, The threat to stability and development. In this, Antonio Costa of the UNODC, claimed that “Africa is under attack” from drugs and smuggling groups (UNODC, December 2007, p. 1). Sources from the United States government and other specialist institutions appear to share this pattern, but they rarely back up the claims they make with hard evidence. Within the last few years, a number of publications have come out that are increasingly critical of this

approach. The West African Commission on Drugs has distributed a range of documents that establish a comprehensive overview of the modern trade (Gberie & Kavanagh, 2014) (Kavanagh & Walker, 2013). They aim to dispel many of the myths that have emerged relating to smuggling, and they offer an alternative perspective than the War on Drugs narrative. The Work of Ambler (2014) is also significant in this regard, as it adds some much needed historical perspective to the modern debate on drug prohibition. Ambler’s work focuses on the 19th century alcohol trade in Africa, and the regulations that were enacted in order to protect ’native peoples’.

1.0: Securitisation

Before analysing the internationalised War on Drugs, it will be useful to explain the concept of securitisation. Many modern theorists, such as Nadine Voelkner (2014) argue that security threats are not objective unbiased realities, but are in fact the products of social and political practices. In this constructivist approach, security is then seen as a socially constructed concept. Existential threats, are then regarded as a subjective matter,

depending heavily on a shared understanding within a community of what constitutes a danger to security. The concept of securitisation is built upon these principles, and it is most closely associated with the Copenhagen school of security studies, and the work of Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and others. In their 1998 book, Security: a New Framework for Analysis,

Buzan et al. described securitisation as:

“A move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames [an] issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitisation can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicisation.”

(Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 23).

In order for an issue to become securitised, these writers suggest that a specific process must take place. This commences with a ‘speech act’, whereby an actor presents an issue as an ‘existential threat’ to a designated ‘referent object’, and finally ‘extraordinary measures’ are justified in order to combat this threat. (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 20–27). As Buzan et al.

argues, this approach is used by political actors to bypass public debate and democratic procedures, factors that would normally limit extremist regulation. The securitisation of an issue relies on its’ acceptance by the ‘intended audience’, if the audience does not accept this, then the process fails. When Buzan et al.’s theory emerged in 1998, it met with harsh

criticism, with writers such as Skidmore (1999, p.1011) describing it as “a framework for analysis that lacks clear direction or purpose”. It is clear that there are some weaknesses in this concept, with a lack of distinction existing between the politicisation of an issue and the securitisation of it (Emmers, 2007, p. 117). Nevertheless, the securitisation concept has had a significant impact on academia, and is now widely recognised within the fields of

international relations and security studies.

1.1: The Rise of International Drug Prohibition

To understand the significance of the drugs trade to the international community, it is essential to look at the historical background and securitisation of this issue. At the start of the 20th century, there was very little international regulation controlling the trade and use of narcotics. As Reinarman (1994) argues, the key driver of change in this regard was the

United Sates’ domestic and international policy. In the early 1900s, a xenophobic alarm emerged about the effect that drugs were having on local ethnic minorities. The use of substances like cocaine and heroin was shifting, from wealthy or middle-class women, to working class men; and this led President Theodore Roosevelt to limiting the sale and distribution of recreational drugs (Reinarman, 1994, p. 95). Included in this raft of measures was the banning of opioid imports into the US colony of the Philippines, and this led the US into alignment with the Chinese government’s own anti-opium policies. Together, these two countries convened the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909, the world’s first attempt at a global agreement to control the use of narcotics. The commission called for the entire international community to accept restrictions on opiate drugs, and to limit their use to

medical and scientific purposes (Sinha, 2001). While the 1909 commission was ground breaking, it was extremely limited in its effectiveness. The agreements reached during the convention were non-binding, and they were only recognised by the 12 countries in attendance. The general consensus was that further efforts would be required for anti-drug policies to become effective. (Jelsma, 2011, p. 2). Between the early and mid-20th century, there was some further international consolidation on drug policy, with many of the developed nations agreeing to curtail their sale and distribution. Key differences remained however in how the great powers approached this

issue. While Europe was in general far more tolerant of the medical and recreational use of narcotics, the US was heavily focused on prohibition, driven by a Christian fundamentalist agenda within its’ public (Jelsma, 2011, p. 3). The efforts of the United States to outlaw the production and nonmedical use of narcotics (including alcohol) were viewed sceptically by

the European powers, particularly France, Portugal and Britain. Among other motives, these countries were unwilling to give up the tax incomes that they received from drug monopolies in their own colonial territories (Sinha, 2001).

This situation persisted until the 1940s and the post-war emergence of the US as the world’s dominant economic, military and political power. American lawmakers were then in a position to shape the international control regime, and in 1948 efforts began to work the existing drug treaties into one formally recognised approach (Senate Special Committee on

Illigal Drugs, 2002). The result of this was a major international agreement, The UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which was signed in 1961. While it is now viewed as a document that united the international community, at the time it was highly controversial, and was only passed after significant compromises and eight weeks of negotiations. The key

differences of opinion lay between the developing states, where natural narcotics were primarily produced, and the richer developed states, where these products were primarily consumed. Producer states such as Burma and Indonesia had already been the focus of previous drug control efforts. These countries pushed for weaker controls, as the existing restrictions on production and export had already affected large segments of their domestic

economies (Senate Special Committee on Illigal Drugs, 2002). Although they were effectively powerless to fight the prohibition philosophy being advocated, these states were able to force compromises by working together and diluting the treaty’s language. They also sought development aid to compensate for the economic losses that prohibition would cause. The

developed states, including the US and Western European powers, took a different stance. Facing internal pressure about the misuse of drugs by their citizens, they advocated stringent controls on the production and illicit trafficking of recreational narcotics. According to William McAllister, their goal in these negotiations was, to “shift as much of the regulatory burden as possible to the raw-material-producing states” (Senate Special Committee on Illigal Drugs, 2002).

Despite the compromises, when the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was ratified in 1961, it represented a significant break with the regulatory approach of the previous multilateral treaties. The document explicitly condemned drug addiction, stating in its’ preamble that “addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind” (United Nations, 1961, p. 1). Taking a

prohibitionist approach towards the problem of addiction, it established that punitive measures should be taken against individuals involved in the production, transport, trade and purchase of illicit substances. As Kushlick (2011, p.4) argues, the convention established a globalised framework for dealing with illicit substances, and was crucial in setting the normative tone; creating the basis for the international drug criminalisation that we are familiar with today.

1.2: The Securitisation of Drug Policy

There is a broad consensus within the academic community, that the ratification of the 1961 convention demonstrates the successful securitisation of international drug policy (Marshall, 2014, p. 2) (Crick, 2012, p. 407). However, Kushlick (2011, p.3) argues that there are in fact two separate securitisations that have occurred; the first is that of drug use, and the second is that of the criminal syndicates that supply recreational drugs. While the 1961 Single Convention was intended to stand as a document that ended all conventions, it was established at a time when drug use was comparatively low. Usage rates in Europe and the US rose sharply over the next decade, and this undermined the convention and the prevailing concept of prohibition (Kushlick, 2011, p. 5). In order to shore up the 1961 document, two further international conventions were drawn up, one in 1971 and the other in 1988. These two documents reflected a changing culture, but they also represent a

significant shift in the international community’s approach to drugs and drug crime. A major factor in this change was again the US influence, with President Nixon’s 1971 “War on Drugs” speech, in which he declared illegal narcotics to be “public enemy number one” (Richard Nixon Foundation, 1971). This declaration was certainly an escalation in rhetoric, and proved to be highly influential in the international setting. Nixon’s announcement

coincided with what his administration called the ‘GI heroin epidemic’, and the high rates of drug use in soldiers returning from Vietnam (Kuzmarov, 2009). Nixon argued that GI heroin users, domestic addicts and foreign traffickers were grave sources of danger, and that they threatened not only to spread crime and societal decay within the US, but also to damage the national identity. By the 1980s, there was a growing focus on the multibillion dollar trade in illicit drugs, which was controlled by a vast and growing network of organised criminal groups. During this period, a supposedly new threat emerged to international drugs prohibition, that of the Narco-Terrorist. This concept was adopted by the Reagan and Bush (senior) administrations, who used it in reference to groups that utilised drug trafficking in order to fund terrorist activities. Despite its’ common usage, the exact meaning of this term has been rarely, if ever, strictly defined, and this has resulted in some legal ambiguity. In 1986, Reagan signed the National Security Directive №221, which explicitly identified drug trafficking and organised crime as threats to the state (Crick, 2012, p. 411). The criminal code (Title 1 U.S. C. § 960a) was also modified to allow US agencies to pursue and prosecute drug offenses outside of the United States, if a link to terrorism was established. Two years later, Reagan’s argument was expressed at a global level, with the 1988 UN Convention on Drug Trafficking. The differences between the 1961 document and the 1988 convention are striking, with the new text reflecting a major shift in the perceived threat of narcotics. The Preamble describes illicit trafficking as “an international criminal activity”, and it highlights the “links between illicit traffic and other related organized criminal activities which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States.” (United Nations, 1988, p. 1). The threat posed by drug use was now shifted; from the individual, to society as a whole and more specifically, to the state. Within this document, the terms “crime” or “criminality” receive twenty-five mentions, “health” only four (United Nations, 1988). Reflecting this, the new directives it included were focused on police and military action, while drug-treatment programs and medical solutions were side-lined. Kushlick (2011) argues that, like the 1961 Convention, this new agreement signified another securitisation of the drug issue, with drugs now being seen as representing an existential threat to the state itself. Its’ ratification by the international community, demonstrates the

success of this process. Again the primary driver of this convention was the United States, and following its’ adoption at the UN, various extraordinary measures emerged in US policy. The federal government became increasingly more interventionist in Latin America, using its’ own military personnel to train law enforcement officers in Mexico and Columbia (Woodiwiss, 2005). The US also developed a certification programme, whereby trade deals and foreign aid were tied to action on counter-narcotics measures.

1.3: Findings

With over a century of development and the passing of three separate UN conventions, the global approach to drug policy is now well entrenched. These efforts were spearheaded by the United States, and it has been US ideology and normative ideas that have dominated the global narrative. Despite international opposition, the UN has agreed and implemented a prohibitionist approach to drug policy, which criminalises the use and transportation of narcotics. This actively damaged the economies of weaker states, as their populations relied on the cultivation of narcotics for sale on the world market. Academics are now broadly in agreement that the issue of narcotics has become securitised in the international community. Countries around the world now perceive drug use, not only as a threat to their citizens, but as a fundamental challenge to state authority and the rule of law. This approach is being constantly reinforced by the US federal government, which is now using its’ considerable resources and influence to police and enforce prohibitionist policies around the world.

2.0: A History of Africa and Narcotics

In 2009, Antonio Costa, the executive director of the UNODC, gave a speech at the annual ECOWAS summit in Praia, Cape Verde:

“Let’s be frank: Africa in general, never faced a drug problem — whether we speak about production, trafficking or consumption. Now the threat is there, on all these fronts.”

Antonio Costa. Quoted from Carrier & Klantschnig (2012, p88).

Costa’s statements mirror a sense of alarm in the international community, on the impact of the drugs trade within Africa, and Africans themselves appear to share these concerns. Many local news reports are infused with the War on Drugs discourse, and a moral panic is evident in how they are presented. From Nigeria — “Rising Drug Abuse” (Ifijeh, et al., 2017), and South Africa — “Drug Abuse is killing our Youth” (Kistnasamy, 2017) serve as just a few

examples. Despite Antonio Costa’s seniority and experience, his assertions about the drugs trade were in fact quite wrong. His statements not only obscure the truth about Africa’s drug networks, but they also dramatize its’ most recent developments, and contribute to a growing sense of panic about the issue. It is true that narcotics in Africa pose a threat, but many of these substances have been used and traded on the continent for hundreds, if not

thousands of years, and have even become ingrained in the local culture.

Archaeological evidence shows the presence of a localised trade in narcotics stretching as far back to the 13th century (Carrier & Klantschnig, 2012, pp. 17–18). Substances like the kola nut, a natural stimulant, were traded in the West African region, and in East Africa the use of Cannabis and Khat were relatively common. These substances were not used in simply a recreational manner, but they had specific roles in society; serving a function in ceremonies, or being prescribed as medicines by traditional healers (Duvall, 2017). Through contact with Portuguese expeditions in the 16th and 17th century, tobacco use and cultivation spread continent wide. The 19th century even saw attempts at opium cultivation along the Zambezi River and coca in West Africa, however these experiments were short lived (The New Your Times, 1882).

2.1: Historical alcohol prohibition in Africa

In May 1995, South Africa’s political and corporate leaders, including Nelson Mandela, gathered in Johannesburg to mark the centenary of the South African Breweries Company (SAB) Ltd. In a speech he gave at the event, Mandela ignored alcohol’s role in many of the country’s social and public health problems, describing it as an “innocent pleasure…if used in moderation” (SAHO, 2017). His perspective was a far cry from the alarmist claims that surrounded alcohol consumption in Africa when the SAB was originally founded. Mandela’s remarks hide the historical struggle to control alcohol production and distribution on the continent, and they draw a sharp line between alcoholic drinks and other narcotics. This longstanding division can be highly misleading, as in the late 19th century, when international efforts to restrict Africa’s alcohol trade began, they were seen as part of a

much larger anti-drug campaign. Musto (1999, p.40) argues that the 1909 Shanghai Opium Commission, was in fact modelled on the 1890 Brussels Convention, which was the first to impose international restrictions on the African liquor trade. Linking the regulation of alcohol and other drugs also illuminates the important ways in which the global racial discourse has continued to define the ideological premise of drug control. The campaign to

protect ‘native people’ from the damaging effects of hard sprits emerged amid an international temperance movement, and as a response to the industrial production of low cost gin in Germany and the Netherlands (Ambler, 2014, p. 27). The sudden emergence of vast quantities of this spirit being shipped to Africa, created an alliance of temperance and missionary interests in the US, Britain, West Africa, and to a lesser extent, continental Europe. At a time when cheap liquor was being demonised as a distinctly addictive and

dangerous substance, German and Dutch gins were represented as carrying poisons with dangerous impurities (Heap, 1997, p. 30). Building a case for its’ prohibition, the anti-liquor groups painted an ominous picture of Africa’s future. They argued that the native population would suffer the same fate as aboriginal people in North America or Australia, who (in their narrative) had been effectively destroyed by alcohol abuse. In the backdrop of rapid imperial expansion, the prohibitionist movement made limiting the spirits trade an

element of colonial obligation. Colonial administrations were unwilling to concede to this, as they owed a considerable portion of their revenue stream to taxing alcohol imports. However, by 1870 the British government and major commercial interests were at least paying ‘lip service’ to the temperance cause (Ambler, 2014, p. 27).

The 1890 Brussels anti-slavery conference was when international prohibition regulations were first produced. They were justified by concerns about the “moral and material consequences to which the abuse of spirituous liquors subjects the native population” (Miers, 1975, pp. 361–2). The legislation was based on two elements and was primarily focused on West Africa, as this was the key market for European and American spirits. The first was to establish tariffs at a high enough level in order to reduce legal imports in areas

where alcohol consumption was common, and the second was protecting areas with no traditional existing trade by applying full prohibition. The Brussels agreement also provided for the establishment of offices to monitor the effectiveness of these international agreements (Ambler, 2014, p. 28). This amounted to little more than the sporadic collection of information, but it created a precedent for the institutionalised approach to narcotics that can be seen today with agencies such as the UNODC. While prohibitionist campaigners saw this move as a great success, this legislation had an inconclusive impact on the African liquor trade. Imports declined significantly in the early 20th century, but as Carrier & Klantschnig (2012, p.85) argue, this was primarily due to external factors, such as WWI and the 1930s depression. The 20th century also saw the growth of industrial alcohol production in Africa, which may have caused European spirits to lose market share.

2.2: The Rise of Africa as a Drug Entrepôt

The emergence of Africa as a transit point for the modern drugs trade took many in the international community by surprise (Bybee, 2012). Ultimately however, this development was built on earlier trading networks, and records show that Lebanese smugglers used West Africa to transport heroin to the US as early as 1952 (Ellis, 2009, p. 172). It was during the 1970s that this smuggling trade began to rapidly expand, from a small handful of actors, to

hundreds in the late 1980s. Africa’s emergence as a transit point for these drugs is linked to shifts in the global heroin and cocaine markets, as well as changing domestic circumstances that made it more attractive for entrepreneurs. The 1970s saw a growing volume of drugs being traded internationally, and this caused more stringent enforcement responses in key

producer and consumer states. Reagan’s extension of the War on Drugs policy in the 1980s applied further pressure to the trade, and as a result, new, comparatively safe transit hubs emerged far away from the traditional smuggling routes (Carrier & Klantschnig, 2012). Official figures from the UNODC also point to a significant shift in global cocaine consumption, which promoted trafficking links in Africa. Since the mid-1980s, cocaine usage

rates in the US have dropped significantly, reducing by 50% between 1985 and 2007 (UNODC, December 2007, p. 17). Faced with declining demand, traffickers focused on alternative markets, and significant imports began entering Western Europe. Higher availability has translated into higher usage rates, with the British Crime Survey seeing a four-fold increase between 1996 and 20084. Spain, Italy, and France all experienced similar changes. Africa became an obvious transit point, as it lay between the areas of production

(Cocaine from South America and heroin from Southwest Asia) and consumer markets (North America and Western Europe). Economic factors were also key to Africa’s growth as a transit hub, and a report by the UNODC addresses these issues directly:

“Perhaps most importantly, the fact that governments are under-resourced and that some are unable to control properly their institutions, seriously limits the ability of many states to

regulate their own territory. Uncertainties about long-term stability may encourage citizens, including public servants, to take whatever they can, even if it is not legal. The fact that key security personnel are underpaid, and often irregularly paid, contributes greatly to their vulnerability to corruption. Once a critical mass of law enforcement is taking bribes, it may become difficult, or even dangerous to remain honest. In a vicious cycle, citizen cooperation

declines with each police failure, further undermining the ability of officials to do their jobs”. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (December 2007, p.11).

Other writers agree on the importance of economic factors (Bayart, et al., 1999, p. 3) (Shaw, 2015, p. 344), but they link this point explicitly to the structural adjustment policies that were imposed on Africa in the 1980s. With the exception of oil, Africa became marginalised in almost every legal market sector during this period. The resulting loss of diplomatic importance, combined with an economic and financial crisis, resulted in a stark erosion of

sovereignty in almost all the states in the region. Bayart, et al. (1999, pp.14–15) argues that Africa also has particular cultural pressures that would encourage entrepreneurs to enter the drugs trade. The rise of activities in Africa normally classed as ‘criminal’, is aided by the existence of moral and political codes of behaviour. Social links of ethnicity, kinship and

religion may have higher value then concepts of fairness or meritocracy. Prestigious life styles are seen to justify the use of trickery and ‘hustling’ by the individuals involved, and it is also notable that many Africans would not attach social stigma to the practice of drug trafficking. Indeed, much of what is deemed criminal is not perceived as illegitimate, even if it is illegal (Bayart, et al., 1999, pp. 14–15) (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, p. 53).

2.3: Findings

Despite the assertions of Antonio Costa, drugs are not a new phenomenon in Africa, and have in fact been there for centuries. African societies have long been exposed to both native and foreign narcotic substances, with some coming to serve important roles in ceremonies, or even as traditional medicines. The Historical prohibition of alcohol in the African context is significant, as it bears many similarities to the modern approach to drugs.

The anti-drug campaigners of the late 19th century considered alcohol to be a dangerous and addictive substance, in the same class as other narcotics. The Arguments for prohibition in Africa were based on an infantilised conception of the native people, and they played on ideas of colonial responsibility and ‘white man’s burden’. While the eventual application of prohibitionist legislation was popular with campaigners, its’ impact was ultimately

inconclusive. Alcohol imports were significantly diminished, but the local demand for alcohol appeared unaffected, and Africans came to rely more heavily on local suppliers. The rise of Africa as a drug Entrepôt in the 1980s was seen as surprising by some observers, but it was ultimately built upon much older networks of trade. This rise was caused by changes in global drug networks, as smugglers sought to avoid law enforcement efforts in the Americas, and supply a growing market for their product in Western Europe. The 1980s structural adjustment policies also had a significant impact, as they left Africa further exposed to corruption and exploitation. Academics have also asserted that cultural pressures can make Africans more susceptible to becoming involved in the drugs trade.

3.0: Academic Research on Africa’s Drugs Trade

Government sources, as well as the media typically depict African drug traffickers as members of major criminal organisations, based roughly on the model of Pablo Escobar’s Medellin cartel in Columbia. The problem with this conceptualisation is that it is extremely outdated, and the global drugs trade has evolved significantly since the 1970s and 80s. African smugglers are difficult to compare to South America’s, as they are considerably less

violent by comparison (Gberie & Kavanagh, 2014, pp. 20–24). There does appear to be some division in the academic community around the exact nature of Africa’s trafficking groups, with well-respected writers and official commentators contradicting each other’s findings. For this reason, it is very difficult to build a cohesive picture of the continent’s trade, and further research may be required.

What many different researchers have noticed is the dominance of Nigerians, or more specifically Igbos, in Africa’s narcotics trade (Bayart, et al., 1999, pp. 11–12) (Bybee, 2012, p. 71) (Ellis, 2009, p. 188). This is not only in West Africa, but over the entire continent. The reason for this may be related to the discrimination and economic exclusion of Igbos within Nigeria, as well as significant networks of expatriates throughout the western world. Carrier & Klantsching (2012, p90) also argue that the reason for this may be the 1990s Nigerian economic crisis, which caused many students studying abroad to become stranded when their state scholarships were cancelled. This forced many of them to turn to illicit activities in order to sustain themselves, including drug dealing, trafficking and the infamous 419 feescams. Today, Nigerians make up the lion’s share of arrested couriers, and this has attracted a great deal of attention from the media and law enforcement agencies.

Through interviews with traffickers from West and Southern Africa, Carrier & Klantsching (2012, p.95) claim to have established a model for the typical African trafficking group. These networks are described as diverse, adaptable, project based and comparatively small scale. The nature of their operations means that smuggling groups only form to deal with specific operations, and they soon disband after the profits are split. The trafficking routes they use are diverse and likely to change depending on intelligence on police activity. The use of drug mules to fly small amounts of narcotics to consumer markets is also a common tactic by African trafficking groups, and this appears to be linked to the comparatively small scale of these operations. While some groups may involve 30 or more people, most are significantly smaller; and for this reason, they are fundamentally different to South American Cartels. Carrier & Klantsching (2012, p.95) assert that the importance of small

independent groups in the African context is due to the competitive advantage they hold over their larger counterparts. This shift is said to reflect a broader change that has occurred in the global drugs trade since the 1980s, as the large cartels were targeted by law Enforcement.

Rousseau (2017, p.22) argues that there are two parallel streams that run drugs through Africa, the local networks, and large organized crime syndicates that originate in other countries. While at times competing with each other, these two groups are also seen to work hand in hand, and they rely on each other for different stages of the logistical challenge. The foreign cartels produce the narcotics and then ship them to major trading hubs on the African continent. From there, it is repackaged and sent to destination markets, or it is sold to local networks. African smugglers will then either buy the product outright, or they will act as couriers for the major cartels. The UNODC official, Antonio Mazitelli, has provided his own study of the region’s drug smuggling networks, based on his own law enforcement experience in West Africa8. His work distinguishes three distinct types of trafficking organisation: ‘freelancers’, locally based smuggling networks and the foreign-led bulk trade (Mazzitelli, 2007, pp. 1075–1076). Again, like Rousseau (2017), Massitelli talks of these different types of network working together and complementing one another. The foreign cartels operate their own import and export structures, as well as supplying local groups. The addition to this is the action of freelancers, who may be Europeans or West Africans with valid resident permits in the West. These people work independently and will invest their savings in the purchase of a couple of kilos of cocaine, with the objective of smuggling it to Europe.

3.1: The role of Governments in Africa’s Drugs Trade

In 1996, Stanley Cohen published an article inspired by events in the Balkans titled ‘Crime and Politics: Spot the Difference’. Cohen argued that new patterns of wealth seeking, allied to political power, were making it more difficult to apply conventional definitions of crime, and the two were becoming inextricably mixed. When state institutions were deeply implicated in crime, it created a serious problem for analysts, as the rules of the international system require that crime and the state be officially regarded as distinct and opposed entities. “Governments and their agencies do not commit crimes,” he noted, “but only because the criminal law does not take cognisance of them as criminal actors” (Friedrichs, 1998, p. 51).

Cohen’s arguments have significant implications in the African context, where corruption is often an endemic feature of national governments. Ellis & Shaw (2015, p511) found that organised crime in Africa is associated with a set of relationships generally involving senior figures within the state or important local power brokers, as well as professional criminals. These researchers see the alliance of criminals with government figures as yet another impact of structural adjustment policies (Ellis & Shaw, 2015, p. 520). Incumbent elites who were struggling to preserve their grip on power, were desperate for new sources of income to replace their lost rents. By the mid-80s, a number of states came to rely on criminal networks in this way, and a nexus of crime and politics has existed ever since. Strong evidence of this process has emerged from Sierra Leone, where the diamond trade became a vital source of political ﬁnance, but perhaps the most notorious case is that of Guinea Bissau (Reno, 1995, pp. 57–58).

3.2: The Case of Guinea Bissau

Evidence suggests that in the late 1990s, key members of Bissau’s elite were seeking illicit sources of funding, as old forms of accumulation were becoming eroded (Ellis & Shaw, 2015, p. 520). This was in the years when the country’s former president ‘Nino’ Vieira had gone into exile, after losing the 1998–1999 civil war. Vieira was planning a comeback with a run for the presidency in the 2005 elections, and was in need of funding for his campaign. There

is evidence to suggest that during this period, a series of ‘entrepreneurs’ approached Vieira and introduced him to Latin American cartel members (Shaw, 2015, p. 348). After Vieira was re-elected president, observers noticed an influx of Latin Americans, as well as a number of new high range vehicles, being driven by prominent military and civilian officials. The region

then saw major increases in the volume of cocaine being trafficked through it, with a seizure of 674 kilos occurring in 2006 (Shaw, 2015, p. 349). Events came to a head after the assassination of General Batista Tagme Na Waie on the 1st of March 2009, and the retaliatory killing of President Vieira the next day, in an apparent military coup (Shaw, 2015, p. 352). Na Waie was killed by an explosive charge placed under the stairs of the military headquarters. Observers claim that this tactic indicated a degree of sophistication that had

not previously been used, and one that the Guinea-Bissau’s military lacked. Shaw (2015, p.351) argues that this violence was related to individuals positioning themselves to access the protection money originating from the country’s narcotics trade. The killing of Guinea Bissau’s president and one of its’ leading generals attracted the attention of the international community, and eventually interventions were made.

While the case of Guinea Bissau is extreme, it is by no means unique. Gberie and Kavanagh (2014, p. 24) list cases from 10 countries in West Africa which have shown high level government involvement in drug trafficking. This behaviour is similar to what Reno (2009) describes in the cold war context as the action of ‘fusion regimes’. These were administrations that combined the façade of formal state institutions and international sovereignty, with the control of resources in illicit markets. Some foreign governments and media sources have labelled Guinea-Bissau as a ‘narco-state’, i.e. a state “where all legitimate institutions become penetrated by the power and wealth of [drug] traffickers” (IMF, 2003). Shaw (2015) has however disputed this characterisation, and in his research, he describes Guinea Bissau as being an example of an ‘elite protection network’. This is described as when a country’s leadership enters into a set of agreements, to ensure the facilitation, sustainability and safety of illicit activities (Shaw, 2015, p. 341). He argues that drug related corruption was confined to the top hierarchy of the military, police, as well as a

section of the political elite. It is important to note that after the 2005 elections, Guinea Bissau’s Judicial Police continued to arrest and detain individuals suspected of drug trafficking. The head of the police force, Orlando da Silva, received death threats for his work, and in June 2007 he was abruptly dismissed (UNODC, October 2007).

3.3: Findings

While the depiction of African drug smugglers by government and media sources appears to be flawed, there is no academic consensus on the exact nature of these groups. Researchers seem to agree on the importance of Nigerian smugglers to Africa’s drugs trade, but otherwise, their findings have been somewhat contradictory. There appear to be a range of different organisations involved in drug smuggling on the continent. This varies from the major South American cartels, to small groups, and even freelancers acting independently. These different organisations appear to share a symbiotic relationship with one another, with the major cartels focusing on the import of narcotics and the smaller groups focusing on exports.

The most significant development which has been recognised by academics, is the rise of African state involvement in drug trafficking activity. This is clear in the case of Guinea Bissau, where former president Vieira allegedly formed an alliance with Latin American smugglers, in order to fund his 2005 presidential campaign. Guinea Bissau was labelled a ‘narco-state’ by some observers, implying that the entire state apparatus had been infiltrated by drug smugglers. Shaw (2015) disputes this characterisation however, and

argues that a more accurate description would be an ‘elite protection network’. This is because state elements continued to resist drug smuggling, and it was only the highest echelons of the military and political elite which became compromised.

4.0: Africa’s Drugs Trade, Data vs Narratives

The proliferation of drug trafficking routes in Africa has received considerable attention from the international community. Ideas about Africa being “Under Attack” from powerful drug traffickers, and increases in domestic consumption are common in government and media rhetoric (UNODC, December 2007, p. 1). The problem with these assertions is that there is a serious lack of evidence to support them. The UNODC, the world’s leading

authority on the subject, still has no reliable data10 on drug usage rates within sub-Saharan Africa (UNODC , 2017, p. 47). This has not stopped the UN, or other major control organisations, asserting that consumption rates are increasing, but the evidence for this is woefully thin. The US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs did just that in a report released in 2013. It claimed that consumption rates of all illicit drugs were

growing in Ghana, and in Nigeria “cocaine and heroin use increased”, without actually citing any evidence. (US Department of State, 2013, pp. 171, 252).

The nature of illegal markets mean that accurate observations on Africa’s drug networks are inherently difficult to produce. In order to estimate the scale of the local trade, the UNODC and other official bodies rely on compiling records of local drug seizures. Their findings indicate that there has been an increase in Africa’s drugs trade over the last two decades, but this data is limited and is at least partially inconclusive. Between 1998 and 2003, the

continent as a whole averaged annual cocaine seizures of about 0.6 metric tonnes (UNODC, October 2007, p. 6). Between 2004 and 2007 however, this was seen to increase to 2.5t and peaked in 2010 at 3.4t, before then dropping off to only 1.5t in 2015 (UNODC, 2017, p. 33). Heroin seizures are similarly inconsistent. 2009 to 2010 did see increases in Egypt (from 159 kg to 234 kg), Kenya (from 8.5 kg to 35 kg), Nigeria (from 104 kg to 202 kg), and Tanzania

(from 7.9 kg to 191 kg) (UNODC, 2012, p. 34). However, between 2014 and 2015, continental seizures fell from 7.1t, to only 0.7t (UNODC, 2017, p. 20). Taking these figures at face value, they indicate that Africa accounts for only 1% of global drugs seizures, and therefore has a negligible role in the international trade. To its’ credit, the UNODC cautions about the weak data in its’ own reports, and recognises that these findings reflect the effectiveness of local policing. Other researchers have added further criticism to the UNODC’s reports, including Obot (2003), who examined this methodology within the

Nigerian context between 1994 and 2000. Obot found that national figures for drug seizures were unduly influenced by the country’s leadership, possibly due to extensive criticism from the US over the apparent laxity of Nigerian drug control. There appears then, to be fundamental flaws in the way that the international community measures drug smuggling, so why is this methodology still so popular? Csete & Sánchez (2013, p.7) argue that one

advantage of seizure data for prohibition orientated policy makers, is that it allows for ‘tip of the iceberg’ kinds of improvisations. Thus, while the UNODC may release reports that show a clear drop in cocaine seizures, prohibitionists can still plausibly claim that trafficking rates are increasing. US officials and INTERPOL have said that there is up to 300 tonnes of cocaine transiting through West Africa annually. With concreate evidence consistently hard to come by, it is hard to dispute this figure either way (Wyler, 2010, p. 13).

Officials will also habitually use seizure data to calculate the market value for trafficked drugs, but this methodology is also fraught with problems. In 2012, US Senator Charles Grassley stated that the value of cocaine smuggled through West Africa annually was estimated to be between $3billion and $14billion (Grassley, 2012). The UNODC’s 2013 report stated that just 18 tonnes of cocaine transitioning West Africa would be worth an estimated $1.25billion, and represent “immense resources to traffickers to sow corruption and support violent groups” (UNODC, 2013, pp. 17–18). As Reuter & Greenfield (2001) argue, calculating the value of cocaine in transit based on its value in destination markets is misleading, as the purchase price depends greatly on local market forces. These assertions do little to inform the public, and only serve to bolster the calamitous nature of Africa’s drug narrative.

4.1: Finding Africa’s Narco-Terrorists

“The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”

Speech by President George Bush. Quoted from (Rice, 2003).

It is notable that the Regan administration’s claims of links between terrorist activity and drug smuggling have now re-emerged in the West African context. This was first seen in the 1990s, when US officials were convinced that Nigerian drug syndicates were transforming into ‘poly-crime organisations’ (Klantschnig, et al., 2016, p. 169). The evidence for this was

decidedly thin, but these ideas are now being applied to other groups within West Africa. Since the destabilisation of Mali and the rise of the Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), mass media and government officials have repeatedly claimed that the proceedings of regional drugs smuggling are funding terrorism. A report by the West African Commission on Drugs and Crime, did find substantial links between AQIM and trafficking groups operating in

northern Mali (Lacher, 2012). However, it also found that an overemphasis on drug smuggling was overshadowing the fact that the AQIM relied far more heavily on profits from other activities, including ransoms paid for kidnapping victims. The report concluded that it would be more useful to consider trafficking as the action of ‘criminal entrepreneurs’, acting independently of the group’s leadership. The researchers were highly critical of the

mainstream reporting around this issue, arguing that, upon investigation, “many observers have relied on faulty evidence and, in some cases, on deliberate disinformation” (Lacher, 2012, p. 5). Virginia Comolli, a research associate with the Institute of Strategic Studies, gives several reasons as to why this misleading narrative became so widespread (Csete &

Sánchez, 2013, pp. 11–12). She argues that sensationalist reporting by the media was a key element, as this built up a public perception of Narco-Terrorism. Local governments were also aware that by emphasising connections to terrorist organisations (especially al-Qaeda)

it became easier for them to attract additional funding from external donors. The global emphasis on Narco-Terrorism also serves to obscure the role of state actors and corruption, in allowing organized crime to grow.

4.2: Why Africa’s Drugs Trade has become sensationalised

In light of the unreliable data and misleading information being produced by international actors, it is important to ask whether there are ulterior motives to sensationalising the issue of drugs in Africa. It is certainly true that US authorities have in the past used the War on Drugs narrative to serve unrelated foreign policy objectives. Bayart et al. (1999, p.10) has

argued this in relation to drug trafficking accusations levelled against Iran during the Clintonand Bush Eras. When questioned on the issue, the US Department of State admitted that it had no evidence to support these accusations, however it refused to clarify Iran as a non offender. The US state could also be using the War on Drugs issue as a cover to extend its’

own reach and authority. US criminal code (Title 1 U.S. C. § 959) gives the DEA ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ over drug offences with a link to the United States, even if there is no entry of US borders (Leagal Information Institute, 2017). This gives the DEA a clear motivation for highlighting apparent drug issues, even when they do not pose a realistic threat to the United States. In 2013, the US Air Force finalised an agreement with the government of Niger to build and operate a $100million drone base in their territory (Turse,

2018). This project is justified on the basis of interdicting local narcotics trafficking, as well as terrorist activity, but it may simply be used as a pretext for an increased military presence.

Csete & Sánchez (2013, pp.8–9) suggest that the US’s approach to Africa’s narcotics trade has less to do with a deliberate power grab, and instead, reflects wider changes in the global War on Drugs. Over the past decade, the United States has pumped huge amounts of funding into Latin America, in support of prohibition based drug control. One of the biggest projects has been the Mérida Initiative, in which $2billion of funds was used to supplement Mexico’s own $47million budget of military based anti-drug efforts (Seelke & Finklea, 2017). The Mérida Initiative has helped underwrite what most observers consider to be the disastrous miscalculation of former president Calderón, and his all-out assault on drug trafficking. The project has only served to splinter drug smuggling organisations, which have since thrived in new and more violent forms (Csete & Sánchez, 2013, pp. 8–10). The extraordinary levels of violence in Mexico and elsewhere in the Latin states, have led to unprecedented public challenges from South American leadership against global prohibition. A major drug policy review by the Organisation of American States, resulted in calls from Latin governments for a new drug control paradigm. This demanded alternatives to the hyper-criminalisation of narcotics to be explored, including state regulation of

cannabis and other drug markets (OAS, 2013). As Csete & Sánchez (2013, pp. 8–10) point out, US officials are at pains to draw links between what they see as ‘successes’ in Latin America, and the new challenges emerging in Africa. As South America becomes less friendly to the drug control apparatus, the US can transfer the same rationale, as well as military and surveillance hardware to Africa. In this sense, Csete & Sánchez (2013, pp.8–9) see the alarmist tone encompassing African drug smuggling, as a symptom of the failure of prohibition and the War on Drugs doctrine.

4.3: Findings

Governments and International actors have constructed a narrative of drugs as posing a serious threat to Africa, but this is not supported by empirical evidence. Claims of rising drug use and increased smuggling activity, rely on faulty methodology and incomplete data sets. The value of smuggled narcotics is also misrepresented, in order to make Africa’s trafficking

problem seem much more serous then it is. While research has found some evidence of Narco-Terrorism in West Africa, it appears that this issue is being acutely politicised in order to serve the interests of stakeholders. Taking into consideration the prevalence of misleading and inaccurate material, it is important to ask whether there are ulterior motives to the dramatization of Africa’s drug trade. In the past, the United States has used the War

on Drugs as a pretext for foreign interventions, and this argument could be made in the case of Niger and West Africa. Csete & Sánchez (2013) make a much more subtle argument however, suggesting that the hyperbole surrounding the issue of African Narcotics is due to global developments in drug policy. The international prohibition of drugs is coming under

serious threat, as South American states begin to oppose US policy interventions. The new focus on Africa is a symptom of this, as anti-narcotics organisations look for new markets to deploy their considerable resources.

5.0: The International Response to Africa’s Drugs Trade

Since the mid-2000s, there have been a broad range of policy and operational responses aiming to halt drug trafficking in Africa. The majority of these have stemmed from action through international bodies such as the UN11, or other multinational groups such as the EU or G8+ (Kavanagh & Walker, 2013, pp. 8–12). Other specialised agencies such as INTERPOL, EUROPOL, the United States DEA, and the UK’s Special Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) have

all played a part. The focus of these agencies has primarily been on controlling narcotics flows and strengthening law enforcement, and less on public health or governance issues (Kavanagh & Walker, 2013, pp. 8–12). While independent observers have noted positive results in the detention and sentencing of high-level drug traffickers, international actors still need to overcome a range of issues on the coordination and integration of their efforts. As Gberie (2013) notes, there is serious overlap between traditional donor support in the areas of governance and the rule of law, and the anti-narcotics and terrorism support being implemented by specialized agencies. An additional challenge is a lack of communication between these different institutions, as there is no centralised entity recording and publishing information about who is doing what on the continent (Kavanagh & Walker,

2013, p. 11). This is making it significantly harder for observers to assess the results of such efforts, and gauge whether it is having a positive effect. As Kavanagh & Walker (2013, pp.11) note, most of the anti-narcotics efforts being undertaken by international bodies, are working to build institutional capacity through technical assistance in Africa’s law enforcement. A key issue is that, with this focus on institutions, there is little regard for the norms, values, and objectives that underlie the concept of rule of law in African societies (North, et al., 2009). Donors pay scant attention to local behaviour, attitudes, history and power relations in this process; and this is significant in light of Bayart’s, et al. (1999, pp.14-15) argument, relating to cultural pressures in Africa that encourage drug smuggling.

5.1: Africa’s Response to the Drugs Trade

Through international pressure, a number of African institutions have also taken steps to counter drug smuggling on the continent. The African Union first approached the issue in 2002, with the AU Declaration Control of Illicit Drug Trafficking and Abuse in Africa, as well as the Revised Plan of Action for Drug Control in Africa (2002–2006). Subsequently, in 2007, the AU drafted a Revised AU Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention, which

focused on issues similar to international control efforts (Kavanagh & Walker, 2013, p. 38). This included, but was not limited to: policy formulation, capacity building and an increased collaboration of member states to combat the trade (African Union, 2007, pp. 2–3). In December 2012, the AU Conference of Ministers assessed the implementation of earlier efforts, and approved a revised Plan of Action for 2013–2017. Unlike previous documents, this differed greatly from the institution centred methods of international bodies, and took a far more holistic approach to the issue of drug smuggling. This included: enhancing continental oversight, reporting and evaluation of control strategies, as well as the scaling up of evidence-based services to address the health and social impact of drug use in member states. The reason for this difference in approach between international and regional actors, is that the AU and its’ member states are far more concerned with the

impact that drugs are having within their societies. The EU, DEA and SOCA by contrast, are more concerned with the external impacts of drug trafficking, and are not prioritising the health of African communities. Overall, the new AU Plan of Action has been well received by academics and independent observers. The Independent Drug Policy Consortium described

the document as:

“A welcome, progressive and balanced menu of activities designed to reduce drug harm, supply and demand in the region. It contains refreshing commitments to the protection of public health, the upholding of international human rights law, and the diversion of people who use drugs away from the criminal justice system. Crucially, it also allows for the setting

of clear objectives and targets by which progress and success can be measured — an element that is often overlooked (or purposefully avoided) by drug strategies in other parts of the world.”

The IDPC (2012, p.3).

5.2: Dealing with Rogue State Actors

For their part, African rulers appear to understand very well the importance of being seen to uphold the rule of law, as it is essential to continuing international recognition of their sovereignty. This was well articulated by a Nigerian Inspector-General of Police in 2004, who stated that:

“Nigeria is a distinguished member of the international community and as such we must, at all times, conform and be seen to conform with all norms, conventions and rules that are sine qua non to peaceful living and respectable human co-existence.”

Nigerian police Chief Tafa Balogun, Quoted from Ellis & Shaw (2015, p.512).

The active involvement of African leaders in combating the drugs trade, is however, another matter entirely, and they may only pay ‘lip-service’ to concerns about smuggling. This could be because of negligence, or that they simply see other national issues as more pressing, but a far more serious problem is when they are in fact actively involved in the trade. States are, in theory, solely responsible for promulgating and implementing law

within their own territory, so taking active measures against a country’s leadership will often break international agreements (Ellis & Shaw, 2015, p. 512). The United States has in the past taken action against what it sees as ‘drug kingpins’ in Africa, but this is usually done in accordance with international law, and with the backing of other major actors.

On the 2nd of April 2013, the United States DEA arrested Vice Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, the former head of Guinea-Bissau’s navy (Campbell, 2013). Tchuto along with two of his aids had been caught in a sting operation, when they were lured into international waters in order to complete a drugs exchange. According to the official indictment, Tchuto had agreed to import some four tonnes of cocaine, of which 500 kg would be shipped to the US (District Court of New York, 2015). He had allegedly demanded $1million for each tonne

brought into Guinea Bissau, and had offered to use a company he owned as a front to ship the narcotics. As part of the plan, Tchuto had also agreed to sell arms to members of the FARC Colombian rebel group, which is designated a terrorist organisation by the United States. Tchuto also stated that his country’s discredited and largely unrecognised transitional president, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, was also in on the plan (Gberie, 2013, p. 10). Action such as this certainly sends a strong message to African heads of state, but the long term impacts of this behaviour are unclear. In the case of Guinea Bissau, even if drug trafficking is stemmed through the arrest of key individuals, there is no indication that the country’s structural challenges will be resolved. The country’s governance structures are still vulnerable to corruption, so it is likely that another figure will simply replace Na Tchuto in running the smuggling network.

The US has accused other African leaders of being ‘drug kingpins’, however it does not always take action against these targets, and this may be more of a rhetorical exercise than anything else. The Case of Ali Hassan Joho, the current governor for Mombasa County in Kenya, demonstrates this inconsistency. In 2010 the US ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, held a press conference in Nairobi. Ranneberger used this event to announce

that an indefinite travel ban to the US had been placed on four Kenyan MPs and one prominent businessman, for their alleged role in drug trafficking activity. While the ambassador never revealed the individuals involved, a leaked document known as the ‘Ranneberger dossier’ identified the apparent suspects, including the Mombasa county governor. Against these accusations, Ali Joho publically argued that he was a law-abiding citizen, who had never cut corners to earn his wealth. He dismissed the allegations as propaganda, and stated that “those behind the dirty politics aimed at mudslinging my name will never succeed”. (Oduor, 2017). While he has never been officially charged, Ali Joho’s involvement in the narcotics trade appears beyond question. The Ranneberger Dossier states that his brother, Abubakar Joho, is personally implicated with a 1tonne cocaine shipment discovered in 2004, and Ali uses the power of his public office to protect him (US Embassy in Kenya, 2010). Despite his apparent guilt and the sanctions placed on him by the United States’ government, it is important to note that Joho visited Donald Trump in Washington in February 2017 (Mayoyo, 2017). Many of Joho’s critics believed it to be a sting operation, but the governor landed in Washington DC and met leaders from other parts of the world to discuss rising violent extremism in coastal regions. Joho used the visit to discredit the drug smuggling accusations against him, although it is notable that few media sources bought this narrative. Mayoyo (2017) explains this behaviour as the Trump administration viewing Joho as a key stakeholder in fighting extremism and radicalisation in Kenya, and Africa in general. It would appear then, to be another case of the US prioritising other concerns over combating the illicit drugs trade.

5.3: Findings

Many states and international institutions have taken steps in order to curtail Africa’s drug trade. This includes transnational organisations such as the UN, as well as country specific agencies such as the United States’ DEA. These institutions have invested considerable funds and resources in anti-narcotics efforts, but there appear to be significant problems with their approach. Without a central guiding body, these agencies suffer from poor communication, and have unclear roles and areas of jurisdiction. This makes it significantly harder for observers to assess the success of such efforts, but there is a more fundamental problem with their methodology. International agencies have often focused on institution building within African states, but this tactic often ignores local cultural issues relating to the concept of rule of law. African institutions, such as the AU, have also made significant efforts

to combat the drugs trade, but their approach is noticeably different to that of the external agencies. As African states are more concerned with the local impact of drugs, they have a much greater focus on the health and social issues that narcotics cause, and are less interested in criminalisation. They are also far more interested in recording and evaluating anti-drug strategies, in order to properly assess their effectiveness.

The active participation of African elites in drug smuggling activities has presented a serious challenge to the international community. Officeholders can often employ the power of the state in order to protect them, but this has not stopped US agencies from taking action. The case of Na Tchuto is an example of the lengths that the DEA is prepared to go in order to enforce global drug policy, but while it makes dramatic headlines, the impact of this action is debatable. The arrest and trial of Na Tchuto does not address the key structural issues that have turned Guinea Bissau into a haven for drug smugglers, and its’ institutions are still vulnerable to corruption. While the US has accused other African leaders of being drug kingpins, it has not always taken action against them, and the case of Ali Hassan Joho is a telling example of this. Joho’s involvement in drug smuggling appears unquestionable, but when given the chance, the United States did not arrest him. In this case, it appears that other foreign policy concerns eclipsed the threat of drug smuggling.

6.0: Conclusions

Through US ideology and lobbying, the drugs trade has now become a securitised issue within the international community. Drug use poses a health risk to users, but more importantly, it is now seen as a fundamental threat to state authority and power. This has led to a globally enforced prohibition of narcotics, and the criminalisation of drug use within society. Despite the narrative from some sources, the depiction of drugs as a new threat to

Africa is misleading, and this shows a lack of awareness of the continent’s history. The trade and use of narcotics was common in the region for hundreds of years, and some drugs came to serve important cultural roles, as well as acting as traditional medicines. The modern prohibition of drugs shares many similarities with the historical prohibition of alcohol in

Africa, with outside forces claiming to act in the best interests of the native population. The rise of Africa as a drug Entrepôt in the 1980s is related to many factors, both internal and external to the region. Global shifts in the drugs trade made Africa a more attractive destination for smugglers, while the impact of structural adjustment policies left its’ institutions open to exploitation.

In the face of sensationalist narratives, the academic community has so far failed to build a cohesive picture of Africa’s drugs trade. Prominent researchers have often contradicted each other’s findings, but some broad assumptions can now be made. Many academics agree on the prominent role that Nigerians play in drug smuggling operations. This may be down to the economic exclusion of certain ethnic groups, as well as the established diaspora communities in many western countries. Another element that researchers seem to agree on, is the diversity of organisations involved in Africa’s drug smuggling; including major cartels, small groups and freelancers. These organisations appear to work in synergy, with foreign cartels dominating the import trade, and the smaller groups focusing on exports. The most significant development in this context is the role that African heads of state are playing in drug trafficking operations. Guinee Bissau appears to be the most extreme case of this behaviour, with former president Vieira receiving election funding from South American

cartels. In this case, the corruption appeared to be restricted to only the highest levels of government, so it is more accurate to consider this an ‘elite protection network’, then a ‘Narco-State’ as some had suggested.

A great amount of effort has been made by international agencies in order to control and reduce Africa’s drugs trade, however these have suffered from a number of structural issues. Agencies have failed to coordinate effectively, and they have focused on institution building exercises, without addressing underlying cultural issues that exist within African societies.

African states themselves have taken a far more holistic approach to such problems, with a greater emphasis on protecting the health and wellbeing of their citizens. They have put a much greater focus on recording and evaluating anti-drug strategies, which is an element strangely lacking in the international approach. Foreign Governments and international actors have consistently worked to ‘talk up’ the threat of Africa’s drugs trade, but these assertions are rarely supported by empirical evidence. Claims of rising drug use and increased drug smuggling on the continent are often based on inadequate and incomplete data sets. It appears that the dangers of Narco-Terrorism in Africa are being weaponised by international agencies to heighten and dramatize the global drugs discourse.

The motivations for this behaviour seem unclear, but it is true that the United States has previously used the War on Drugs narrative to serve other foreign policy objectives. Csete & Sánchez (2013) argue that the international focus on Africa’s drug trade, is symptomatic of a

much greater shift in the global War on Drugs. As governments around the world begin to challenge international prohibition, the securitisation of this issue is now coming under threat. Specialist agencies such as the UNODC or the DEA are now experiencing strong resistance to their policy prescriptions, and this is a fundamental threat to their existence. The renewed focus on Africa’s drugs trade is now being used to justify these organisations

and reinforce prohibitionist ideology within the international community. As Gberie & Kavanagh (2014, p.13) describe it, Africa may be one of the final developments, in what many observers consider to be the failure of the global war on drugs.

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