8 March 2013. Adrian Lamo informed on Manning to Army Counterintelligence officer Timothy Douglas Webster who reported to the FBI and Army. Webster, like Manning and Lamo, engaged in surveilling online forums posing as a hacker: http://cryptome.org/0002/lamo-webster.htm Lamo, Webster and Manning, with innumerable others, allegedly share personal behaviors and foster online relations through that. Utilization of personal behavior to develop sources is a conventional spy means and method to entrap, enlist, threaten, smear and extort -- and to conceal, excuse, protect, conquer, conspire, monetize and undermine competition -- in the manner of any other warfare. What remains to be examined and revealed is the extent of military spying online, using young hackers as witting and more importantly, unwitting, tools to gather disparate material for assembly and analysis well above their pay grades and secrecy clearances. 4 March 2013 Bradley Manning Military Spying Analyzed This comments on Alexa O'Brien's Narration of Bradley Manning's court statement, February 28, 2013: http://www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wikileaks/bradley_manning/pfc_bradley_e_manning_

providence_hearing_statement.html Manning's statement provides useful information to understand military spying seldom revealed to the public. His statement was not only advised by his defense attorney but vetted by military intelligence as mandated for court proceedings. 1. Manning cites his advanced training as a military spy at Fort Huachaca, AZ, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 35F; this MOS requires Top Secret/SCI clearance.* 1.1 He does not describe specific skills he obtained and their application during training. Presumably much of this is classified. 2. Manning cites his military spying duty at Fort Drum, NY. 2.1 He does not describe specifics of what this spying involved. Presumably much of this is classified, particular that associated with spying inside the United States or on US persons. 2.2 Nor if this spying inside the United States and against US persons was legal. Military uses, and perhaps personal use, is likely classified. 3. Manning describes surveilling websites, chat rooms, and other fora as part of his military spying duites, including targets located in the United States and against US persons. 3.1. He does not describe if this surveillance was recorded and applied for military spying purposes by him and/or others in addition to his personal use. 3.2 Nor if this spying inside the United States and against US persons was legal. Military uses, and perhaps personal use, is likely classified. 4. Manning describes chats and communications allegedly with representatives of WikiLeaks. 4.1 He does not describe if these were recorded and/or used for military spying purposes. Presumbly military uses are classified. 5. Manning describes his back-ups of data and analysis of military spying. 5.1 He does not describe military systems back-ups which are conventional in most systems and in particular on systems handling classiifed information. 5.2 Presumably these back-ups will contain data about his and all others' back-ups and downloads. 6. Manning describes archiving and sharing of spying data and analysis for general use. 6.1 He does not describe multi-level security measures customarily applied to archiving and sharing systems. 6.2 Presumbably these security systems recorded all uploads, downloads and accesses to archiving and sharing systems. 7. Manning describes lax monitoring of computer and network usage, outages, work-arounds and contingencies of systems he used in military spying as justification for his personal initiatives. 7.1 He does not describe counter-intelligence measures to track usage, outage, work-arounds and contingencies long associated with computer and networks, especially those handling classified information. 8. Manning admits to disclosing lightly classified information in his statement. 8.1 He does not disclose any lightly or other classified information in his statement. Presumably advised to not do so. 9. Manning does not describe military spy training in deception, undercover, ruse, lying, impersonation, dupery, false innocence, attacks, counter-attacks, guile, sabotage, planting false information, spread of disinformation, ploys and other spy tradecraft, in particular those associated with the cyber-spy curriculum at Fort Huachuca, AZ. 9.1 Presumbably much of this is classified. 10. Manning describes use of Tor for anonymizing. 10.1 He does not describe faults in Tor: 10.2 Its principal funding by the US Government; 10.3 Its tax-exempt status by the US Government; 10.4 Its principal place of operation in the US; 10.5 Its principal staffing by US persons; 10.6 Its principal board members by US persons; 10.7 Its vulnerability of tracking users through sniffing of nodes and instantaneous access to node activity by planted-ware (including the nodes which claim to not log). _________ Corollaries: 11. The USG will call 140 or more witnesses for the Manning trial. 11.1 Presumably no prosecution classified testimony will be public, as before. 12. Manning defense will call its witnesses. 12.1 Presumably no defense classified testimony will be public, as before. 13. Military court may withhold information from the public more than civilian courts. 13.1 Information, evidence and testimonry can be classified to avoid disclosure by using military courts to cloak illegal operations. 14. MOS 35F has been revised in response to Manning disclosures, imprisonment and prosecution. 14.1 MOS 35F revisions will not be made public, especially spying inside the United States and against US persons, as before. 15. There will no disclosure of using young service members to spy inside and outside the United States, as long practiced and more recently online. 16. There will be no disclosure of manipulating young service members to believe they know more than they do or getting away with more than they are -- standard means and methods of spy operations. 17. There will be no disclosure of manipulating the public by encouraging ostensibly opposition media coverage. 18. There will be no disclosure of manipulating friendly and hostile participants to inform on each other. More later when the official transcript is released -- with the likelihood it may be redacted, doctored or revised for security clearance. * Top Secret clearance is for life; even it is withdrawn there is no escape from the obligation to never reveal what was learned under the clearance (Daniel Ellsberg readily admits he never revealed all he knew for that reason; nor has the other famous US disclosers not in jail or buried).