Poland has common interests only with the Baltic countries. But because of their weakness, as well as Lithuania’s historic distrust of Poland, such an alliance doesn’t get anyone anywhere. And Romania, the second-largest country in “New Europe” after Poland, lacks strong ties to anyone.

This explains why Poland bears such love for Ukraine. At this past Saturday’s party convention in advance of the May elections to the European Parliament, the Polish prime minister and leader of the Civic Platform party, Donald Tusk, said, “The fundamental security of Poland and Europe depends on these elections.” The campaign slogan for Mr. Tusk’s party will be “A Strong Poland Within a Secure Europe.”

The key to that strength and security is Ukraine. As Mr. Tusk told the Ukrainian protest leader Vitali Klitschko, a special guest at the convention, “Everyone who wants a secure Poland within a united Europe has to keep his fingers crossed for Ukraine.”

The foreign press is writing a lot about Poland, which, thanks to its engagement in Ukraine, has strengthened its international position, especially compared with the rest of the European Union. Nevertheless, Poland’s security depends on the strength of the union, and so seems more threatened than at any point since the fall of Communism.

Not only is there a lot to lose, but there is also more to gain than ever in our modern history. If Ukraine survives in its current shape (even without Crimea) and enters a path similar to that followed by Poland, the human and economic potential of both countries, strengthened by ad hoc alliances within the European Union, will allow the realization of Poland’s historical dream to balance Russia’s role in the region and ensure a significant position for Eastern Europe within the West.

Today, though, this scenario seems unlikely. Not counting the risks associated with Russian expansion and the West’s dilatory attitude, corrupt habits and social divisions within Ukraine are a major obstacle. Another obstacle may be the West itself, which, if it presses for too-severe economic reforms in exchange for too-paltry economic assistance, may well bring the same people out into the Maidan.

And even if this can be overcome, in the end Poland and Ukraine, rather than finding mutual love for each other, might well start a war over historical memory, for which neither lacks pretexts. We have seen the history books reopened on Crimea; there is no reason they cannot be reopened on Polish-Ukrainian tensions as well.

Slawomir Sierakowski is a sociologist and a founder of the Krytyka Polityczna movement. This article was translated by Maria Blackwood from the Polish.