China stands to gain far more economic and strategic benefit from the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement than does Australia, yet it appears this consideration has been largely overlooked, writes Geoff Wade, in part two of his analysis of the deal.

Alongside the celebratory backslapping that came with the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, further consideration should be given to how the deal constitutes a key plank in China's global strategic aspirations.

In his Motion on the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement, former PM Tony Abbott noted: "This is by far the best agreement that China has done with any significant developed economy."

Few stopped to wonder why this might be the case. Looking at the FTA in a global context provides some answers, as the agreement actually constitutes a major step in the "Chinese Dream" of national renaissance.

The "Chinese Dream" that modern China is pursuing under Xi Jinping involves the reassertion of the economic and political primacy which China claims to have enjoyed among neighbours for millennia. Given that today the neighbourhood is global, it is increasingly obvious that this dream is heading towards contention for global dominance with the United States.

If China is to successfully contend with the United States in this respect, it will need to first become the prime economic and strategic force across Eurasia. Current efforts in this direction are in the economic sphere and are concentrated at the two ends of the continent, and in the trade routes connecting these spheres.

In the East, policies are aimed at economically dominating South-East Asia and Oceania, while in the West it is Britain and Europe which are being targeted. Between the two, alliances are being built with Russia and the Central Asian states, which also involve increasing economic dependence upon, and strategic alliance with, China.

Right across the Eurasian land mass, China is attempting to establish economic connectors through the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route and the Silk Road Economic Belt; the $100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; the $40 billion Silk Road fund; the internationalisation of the Renminbi; the shifting of its industrial production offshore; and the various FTAs it has entered into.

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Hundreds of billions of dollars in Chinese funds are being invested abroad as the PRC's economy and power globalise. Even the normally guarded Straits Times in Singapore noted: "There is no altruism in China's grand plan to revive the ancient trade routes between China and the West ... Economic self-interest and big power projection are clearly at play."

Those who observed the blandishments offered by president Xi Jinping to the United Kingdom during his recent visit to the UK will also have noted the US reaction to Britain's new affection for China and the suggestions of growing difference. This is very important for China, particularly given Britain's long-standing alliance with the United States. Then it was the turns of Germany and France. At the same time, to further increase its European influence, China has applied to become a member of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, while Deutsche Börse, Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the China Financial Futures Exchange have joined forces to create the China Europe International Exchange, the first dedicated platform for yuan-denominated securities outside of China.

China also urged Britain to stay in the EU, and the UK has readily agreed to help China in its push for a China-EU FTA.

Most of the FTAs that China has pursued - the China-ASEAN, China-New Zealand, China-Singapore, China-Korea and China-Australia agreements, as well as the proposed China-EU FTA - involve US allies as partners. They are clearly aimed at allowing greater Chinese access to these economies, with the intent to achieve further economic dependence on China by the FTA partners and increased economic leverage by the PRC.

This economic domination will subsequently translate into strategic influence over these regions. These efforts have, as their ultimate goal, the severing of the Atlantic Alliance and of the US-Australia/NZ alliance in the Southwest Pacific, an end long pursued by China. The ChAFTA is a key element in this PRC strategy.

Those persons - government members and commentators - who have repeatedly accused critics of the ChAFTA of being inspired by xenophobic and racist sentiments have failed to consider another possibility: that is, that opposition to aspects of the agreement is based on concerns about the aggressive expansion of the PRC, an autocratic state with massive financial power. The concerns include that China stands to gain far more economic and strategic benefit from the agreement than does Australia, and that China will likely try to use its advantages to dominate Australia economically, which could result in both the hollowing out of domestic industry and increased Australian economic dependency on China, as part of the PRC's longer-term global strategic aims.

Australia is itself promoting this future economic domination by giving China a choice in the infrastructure projects it would like to bankroll and subsequently control. And to further facilitate Chinese knowledge of the Australian economy, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has recently signed an MOU with the PRC's National Development and Reform Commission which will see some of the most in-depth confidential information available on the competitiveness of Australian firms and industries being made available to China.

ChAFTA will inevitably enter into force within the next few months. At that time, as the uncritical proponents of the agreement congratulate each other over the additional sales to the China market of Australian wine, beef, cheese and cherries, it is hoped that some deeper thinkers in the administration will spare time to ponder the shadows which the agreement is surely casting over the future of Australia. And if we are to recognise, work against and reduce these shadows, Australia must build a much larger and better-informed contingent of China-literate citizens than we have at present.

Geoff Wade is a Visiting Fellow at the Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU.