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"No one should imagine that sound heads are common in armies.

Offensive generals are rare among us; I know only few, and,

nevertheless, it is only to these that ... a detachment can be

entrusted." - Frederick the Great Napoleon's Strategy.

"There are in Europe many good generals,

but they see too many things at once."

- Napoleon In the 16th and 17th century and for much of 18th as well the conduct of war was rather formal and stylized. Limited war for limited objectives was the rule. It was the sport of the kings, carefully calculated undertaking designed to secure relatively modest gains at minimal cost. Armies acquired lengthy and clumsy logistical trains. The art of fortifications rose to remarkable level, resulting in the proliferation of fortified places for defense and for the protection of the vulnerable lines of supply, and in the necessity of dragging heavy siege guns about. Armies themselves became more skilled, necessitating long years of meticulous and expensive training and maintenance. The net result was the tempo at which was conducted slowed. Bold strategic strokes were unusual. Sieges became the norm. "Washington, Marlborough, Prince Eugene, Prussia's Frederick the Great, and Marshal Saxe all knew how to fight a battle when necessary. But even these unusually able commanders did so relatively rarely." (- Loraine Petre) "At the level of strategy Napoleon had no contemporary peer. To make the utmost use of the superior mobility and inspiration of his armies, he developed two major strategic systems. When facing a foe superior in numbers, the strategy of the central position was employed to split the enemy into separate parts, each of which could then be eliminated in turn by adroit maneuvering to gain the French a local superiority of force in successive actions by bringing the reserve into action at the critical time and place. ... Conversely, when the enemy was inferior to the French, Napoleon would often employ a maneuver of envelopment - pinning the foe's attention with a detachment while the bulk of the army swept against the hostile lines of communications to sever the enemy's links with his bases. ... On occasion, Napoleon would merge features of these two classic strategies." (Chandler - "Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars" p 19) Before every campaign Napoleon considered all possible options. The Emperor wrote: "There is no man more pusillanimous than I when I am planning a campaign. I purposely exaggerate all the dangers and all the calamities that the circumstances make possible. I am in a thoroughly painful state of agitation. This does not keep me from looking quite serene in front of my entourage; I am like an unmarried girl laboring with child." In the months and weeks before operations actually commenced he would begin to collect information. In addition to reading an enormous number and variety of books bearing on the enemy and the theater of war, he studied the copious volumes of intelligence reports forwarded by the agents that he had scattered throughout Europe. He would pursue works of polirical history, accounts of the state of roads and bridges, reportss on the politicians and generals, and even studied local patterns of food stockpiling and distribution. Napoleon used 5 simple principles to guide the development of his operational plans designed to hasten the attainment of victory:

the primary objective is the destruction of the enemy's armies (or main army) That done, any remaining problems could be easily solved. If the enemy did not want to risk a battle, they might be forced to do so by a threat to their capital city.

all forces must concentrate on the task of attaining the objective.

operations must be designed to surprise and confuse the enemy. Always, he sought to seize and keep the initiative, to impose his will on the enemy.

every effort must be made to render the enemy helpless through the severance of his lines of supply, communications, and retreat. His favorite movement was to envelop one of the enemy's army's flanks and threaten its rear and communications, forcing it either to retire hurriedly or to turn and fight at a disadvantage.

the security of French forces must be carefully guarded to prevent surprise. Napoleon's favorite strategies.

- Strategy of Indirect Approach

- Strategy of the Central Position Napoleon had two favorites strategies:

Strategy of Indirect Approach

Strategy of the Central Position

The Strategy of Indirect Approach was Napoleon's strategy of superiority , and used when he had plenty of manpower and maneuvering room. It was more sophisticated and more dangerous than Strategy of the Central Position. Essentially it entailed a vast turning movement in the face of the enemy. One of two army corps would be detached to pin the attention of the enemy to his front. Meanwhile, Napoleon would take the bulk of his army on a swift, wide march around one of the enemy's strategic flanks, behind a thick screen of cavalry, optimally with some sunstantial geographic feature providing a "curtain of maneuver." As he advanced toward the enemy's rear, he would trust a corps or two and some cavalry forward to prevent reinforcements from coming up, and then fall upon the enemy from the rear, having severed his lines of communication and retreat. It was this strategy which brought about the smashing victories of Ulm in 1805, Jena in 1806, and Friedland in 1807. There was a great risk in this strategy. Only bold execution, swift movement, and aggressive use of the pinning forces and the cavalry could make it work. If the enemy gained any notion of what was afoot, as in 1807 when the Russians intercepted an order revealing Napoleon's intentions before Eylau, he might slip away, or even attack the relatively vulnerable and separated marching columns.

The Strategy of the Central Position is termed as Napoleon's strategy of inferiority , used in situations where his armies were weaker than its enemy, but the latter was dispersed in two widely separated concentrations, such as during the opening phases of the campaign of 1809 in Austria and in 1815 in Belgium, and with remarkable brilliance in the face of overwhelming odds in 1814, culminating in the tripple victories of Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps. This strategy necessitated bold leadership, careful timing, and aggressive movement, for it required the army to get BETWEEN the enemey concentrations, thereby preventing them from uniting. By movong swiftly into the central position, Napoleon could concentrate the bulk of his forces against the more threatening enemy contingent and seek a decisive battle, while a corps or two undertook to hold off the other enemy contingent as long as possible. Things could go wrong, of course. The enemy could discern his intentions and withdrew, as occured in April 1809 in the war with Austria, or the pursuit after battle might be poorly handled (for example after the Battle of Ligny 1815), allowing a defeated contingent to march to support of its comrades, both of which occured in 1815 . According to Loraine Petre Napoleon often used the two strategies interchangeably. In 1805, for example, he used the indirect approach to place himself in the central position between the Austrian and Russian armies. In 1806 he did it again. In 1813 he took advantage of his central position in Germany to undertake a series of indirect approaches, though his victories at Lutzen and Bautzen were by no means as decisive as he had hoped.

To be truly decisive, a victory had to result not merely in the defeat of the enemy, but also in pusruing him a outrance to total destruction. This desirable goal was but rarely achieved operationally. In Italy in March and April of 1797 he managed to chase the Austrians almost all the way back to Vienna, and in 1806, in the 23 days following his victory at Jena, the French army totally overran Prussia against triffling resistance. A few weeks more and the French were knocking at the gates of Warsaw !

The opportunities for such a stupendous pursuit came but rarely, for the foe had to be smashed with minimal damage to one's own army, which would have to lose no time in undertaking a renewed advance.

Allied strategy in the long wars pales beside that of Napoleon. The bulk of his adversaries were able, but unspectacular. Wellington of britain and Archduke Charles of Austria were the exceptions. The best strategy most of Napoleon's enemies could come up was to shove armies in his direction. Indeed, given endless manpower, this strategy of the concentric advance - advancing armies from all directions - ultimately led to napoleon's defeat in 1813 and again in 1814. His enemies grew wary. The more often he defeated them, the more they learned how to avoid these defeats. The Allies had confidence in the concentric advance, for Napoleon might win some battles, but he could not be everywhere at once, and they would surely win the last battle. Napoleon had devised a strategy of the central position. It was designed to place the French army in such a position that it could defeat detachments of the enemy in turn. Napoleon could use a mere part of his force to tie down and occupy the attention of one enemy, then rapidly move his remaining forces to build up a local superiority against the other. This brilliant strategy brought him fantastic victories against stronger enemies. Even in 1815 "the Emperor came within a hairsbreadth of bringing off a major success by using this system." (Chandler - "Waterloo ..." p 76)

According to Chandler only Napoleon's computer-like mind and his fast marching army were suited to accepting this type of challenge. The Ulm-Austerlitz Campaign 1805

Napoleon's decision to hurl upon the enemy his army was taken at once.

It was executed with unparalleled rapidity and exactness. In 1805, Great Britain, Austria, Sweden, and Russia formed the Third Coalition to overthrow the French. When Bavaria sided with France, the Austrians, 80,000 strong under General Mack, prematurely invaded while the Russians under Kutuzov were still marching through Poland. Bavarian force, 21,500 men under General Deroi, barely escaped. Napoleon's decision to hurl upon the enemy his army was taken at once. It was executed with unparalleled rapidity and exactness and in no time Napoleon had 180,000 men facing the Austrians. On October 7, the Austrian commander, General Mack, learned that Napoleon planned to march round his right flank so as to threathen his supply lines and cut him off from the Russian army under Kutuzov.

(See map.) Napoleonic cavalry under Murat conducted reconnaissance, drew up detailed road surveys, and screened the advance of the army. The cavalry screen also made demonstrations across the Black Forest Mountains. Meanwhile the main French forces invaded the German heartland and then swung towards the southeast, a move that was supposed to isolate Mack and interrupt the Austrian lines of supplies. The Austrian commander changed front, placing his left at Ulm and his right at Rain, but the French went on and crossed the Danube at Neuburg. On the 20th October the unhappy Austrian general Mack, surrounded in Ulm by the French, capitulated with 30,000 men, all that remained under his command of the 80,000-90,000 with whom he had invaded Bavaria few weeks before. A few days later, the Austrian troops in Italy under Archduke Charles, were compelled to retreat in the hope of covering Vienna, now threatened by Napoleon's advance. Negotiations for armistice failed. Napoleon had entered Vienna, and on the anniversary of his coronation inflicted on the Austrians and Russians the decisive defeat at Austerlitz. Austria agreed to the terms of the treaty of Pressburg. Through feverish marching, Napoleon conducted a large wheeling maneuver that captured the enemy army. The campaign is generally regarded as a strategic masterpiece. The Jena Campaign 1806

Napoleon's plan of this campaign

was simple and beautiful. For a perfect campaign, we need look no further than that of 1806 against Prussia. The French army, honed to a fine edge by the brilliantly conducted previous campaign in Bavaria and Austria, secured the total annihilation of the Prussian army and state in precisely one month, from October 6 to November 6. It was a remarkable demonstration of what the French military system could accomplish under Napoleon's guidance. Prussia was broken and dismembered by the war. Her army was ruined, she had no money, and she had lost half of her former possessions. Of particular interest in this campaign is Napoleon's use of the bataillon carre (battalion square) advancing behind an inpenetrable cavalry screen to execute nearly perfect manoeuvre sur les derries, in order to bring the enemy to battle under circumstances particularly favorable to himself.

The light cavalry rode ahead, probed and located the enemy, then reported back to headquarters (to Napoleon and his chief of staff) the positions of enemy's troops. As soon as the Emperor plotted them on the map, he would order one or both of his wing commanders to engage the nearest enemy force. The reserve was made of heavy cavalry and the Imperial Guard. All troops marched within supporting distance of one another. The wings consisted of one or two army corps each. (Although the French corps varied in size, they all shared one thing: each was a balanced, all-arm force of infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers and staff. It was in fact a self-reliant miniature army able to take on much stronger enemy for a limited time.) Napoleon's plan of this campaign was beautiful. To base himself on the Rhine River and Upper Danube and simply advance north - eastwards on Berlin would, perhaps, be the easiest for Napoleon, but it would offer no strategical advantages; for if he met and defeated the Prussians on this west-east line, he would simply drive them backwards on their supports, and then on Russians, whose advance from Poland was expected. To turn the Thuringian Forest Mountains by an advance from his right, was a less safe movement; but, it offered great advantages. First of all Napoleon would threaten the Prussian supply lines, line of retreat, and line of communications with Berlin.

Secondly, Napoleon would separate the Prussians and the advancing strong Russian Army. The danger with this maneuver was this that the Prussians by a rapid advance through the Thuringian Forest Mountains against his communication line, might sever him from France ! In the last days of September the Prussian army was spread over a front of 190 miles. The Saxons had not yet completed their mobilisation. Within few days the Prussians shortened their front to 85 miles in a direct line. At the same time Napoleon had huge army already assembled on a front of 38 miles. At last Napoleon's real plan had dawned on the Prussian headquarters. Advance guards were sent in the direction of the Thuringian Forest. The Prussians also detached small corps from Ruchel's force against Napoleon's supply lines. By doing this they weakened their own main army. Heavy fighting began when elements of Napoleon's main force encountered Prussian troops near Jena. The Battle of Jena cost Napoleon approx. 5,000 men, but the Prussians had a staggering 25,000 casualties. At Auerstadt Marshal Davout's also crushed the enemy. Napoleon initially did not believe that Davout's single corps had defeated the Prussian main body unaided, and responded to the first report by saying "Tell your Marshal he is seeing double". As matters became clearer, however, the Emperor was unstinting in his praise. . Rapidity of Movements and Concentration of Troops.

When badly outnumbered he managed, by swift maneuvering,

to throw the mass of his army against portion of the enemy's,

thus being stronger at the decisive point. "In the 17th and 18th centuries the military had evolved a supply system based on the amassing of supplies in magazines and fortifications augmented by purchases from civilian contractors who followed in the wake of every army. These supply systems were rudimentary at best, and it was not possible for any army to sustain itself at any distance from its magazines. This restriction led to a system of military operations that were carefully planned, long in advance, and supported by the accumulation of military supplies for months prior to the actual inception of the campaign. Once a war had begun, it was heavily influenced by supply considerations. There were no lightning maneuvers, troops marching hundreds of miles as was seen in the 1805 campaign. The wars of this period were like the jousting of turtles and seldom penetrated far into the country of either nation involved. These wars were primarily wars of maneuver where one army attempted to establish itself in the enemy's territory in a strong position. ... These wars resulted in a continual squabbling over border provinces that exchanged hands every few years.

When the French Revolution erupted, the French military establishment found itself undergoing a major revolution itself. The logistical administration and its supply system rapidly decayed, proving incapable of providing the logistical support required by the newly raised French armies. As a result, the French armies wee frequently on the verge of starvation. ... By necessity they found themselves forced to fend for themselves, as their government had proven incapable of providing for them. What began initially as the simple pillaging of the countryside by starving soldiers rapidly evolved into a systematic requisitioning and amassing of supplies in a given area. A relatively sophisticated system evolved, where individual companies would detach 8 to 10 men under the direction of a corporal or a sergeant on a periodic basis. These squads operated independent of the main body for periods of a week or a day, collecting supplies and material necessary for sustaining their parent company. They would then return and distribute this material amongst their fellows. ... In the case of the French moving through conquered territory, there was seldom any remuneration. However, only rarely were provisions forcefully taken. ...

Through during the previous centuries armies had depended on magazines, starving armies had often moved through provinces, stripping them bare and wasting much of what they found. In contrast, the highly organized French system wasted little.

The French quickly became expert at estimating the ability of an area to support an army and developed skills in locating supplies in areas where other armies would have quickly starved if forced to live off the land. These skills had permitted the French to execute the massive maneuvers that gave them smashing victories in 1800, 1805, 1806, and 1809. It also led to the mystique that the French army could outmarch every other army in Europe. The ablity to maneuver strategically had been seriously handicapped for years by the necessity to provide a wagon train for supplies. ... The French, lacking this military train and having the ability to live off the land they were traversing, were able to march as fast as their soldiers' legs could carry them, instead of at the pace of the oxen pulling the wagons." (Nafziger - "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia." pp 83-85, 1998) The system of living off the land worked remarkably well, but it had its limitations. It could only work efficiently where the local resources were extensive. In populous and prosperous countries large armies could be supported. But in inpoverished regions of Europe, a large army would starve. When foraging using Napoleon's well organized techniques, an amry of 100,000 men with 250 guns and 40,000 horses could be sustained in an area of about:

- 65 miles across in France, Germany, Netherlands and (northern) Italy

- 105 miles in Spain and Poland The French troops were unable to live off the land in 1812 during the campaign in Russia. Russia was described by many westerners as a "wasteland" with poor roads, few cities, and long distances. There was also the retreating Russian army and scorched earth tactic. Napoleon was forced to reorganize and expand his military train and supply system. Supplies were stockpiled all along the Vistula and Odra rivers. The munitions Napoleon gathered together for his 1812 campaign compare favorably with the efforts of the heavily industralized nations during the First World War. Napoleon used to say: "Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the later than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never." March or die was the napoleonic formula - and it did not appeal to the young soldiers. No one was allowed to lag behind and in 1813 special NCO detachments knew how to make the "lame" walk. Most often Napoleon pushed on with the attack, maintaining a constant element of surprise. He used to say: "I have destroyed the enemy merely by marches." Napoleon never encamped or entrenched, it was the general maxim of the war - where is the enemy ? Let us go and fight him ! It gave him the advantage of selecting one or another part of enemy line and forcing the enemy to time consuming regrouping and sometimes causing temporary disorder in his ranks. Napoleon believed always in the attack, speed, maneuver and surprise. Napoleon: "When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement ..." In 1813 despite the fact that the Allies had been fighting Napoleon, and knew of his talent for maneuvering, they chose to back themselves into a corner, dig in, and wait for several days while Napoleon, almost in his leisure, maneuvered against them." (Nafziger - "Lutzen and Bautzen" p 248) Napoleons troops travelled light, marching 15-50 km a day without any cumbersome baggage trains as they lived off the land. Napoleon: "The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the morale of an army, and increases its means of victory, Press on !" Such light travelling was possible in rich Western and Central Europe but not in Russia. On the vast and poorly inhabited lands of Eastern Europe Napoleon was forced to use the baggage trains to feed his troops. Napoleon wrote to Murat "The best marchers should be able to do 25-30 miles a day." In 1812 Roguet's division had covered a distance of 465 miles by wagon and over 700 on foot !

Paul Britten Austin described how the French marched during the invasion of Russia: "Each division sets out after the one ahead of it at 2-day intervals. With a distance of 100 paces (70 m) between battalions, its regiments march "in two files sharing the road whose crown they leave free.' Halting for '5 minutes in every hour and at three-quarters of the day's march for half an hour' and with a day's rest every fifth, they tramp on northwards at an everage speed of 25 miles a day. Every second day they pick up rations, provided along the route by Count Daru's administration." (Austin - "1812: The March on Moscow" pp 27-28) Not only on strategical level the French were fast, but also in battles. Tsar Alexander of Russia made this comment in 1805: "... the rapidity of Napoleon's manoeuvres never allowed time to succour any of the points which he successively attacked: his troops everywhere were twice as numerous as we were." One of Napoleon's generals replied: "We manoeuvered, indeed, a great deal: the same division fought successively in different directions - this is what multiplied us during the whole day." Austrian General Stutterheim praised the French too: "... the French generals manoeuvered their troops with that ability which is the result of the military eye, and of experience ..." One account has it that Napoleon allowed a subordinate to draw up a plan for the disposition of his troops. Not knowing what the Emperor wanted, the subordinate distributed the forces equally in neat little groups along the border. On seeing it Napolean remarked "Very pretty, but what do you expect them to do? Collect customs duties?". :-)

Napoleon expertly concentrated troops before battle. He wrote: "Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar, have all acted upon the same principles. These have been - to keep their forces united ..." It was Napoleon's method that when several corps begin an aggressive action they should concentrate at a place away from the enemy to prevent the opposing army from destroying the approaching armies piecemeal. Speed of maneuver and speed of concentration were crucial components of victory. Napoleon wrote: "Fire must be concentrated on one point, and as soon as the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing." There is however misunderstanding of this theory. Lidell Hart explained "Subsequent military theory has put the accent on the first clause instead of on the last: in particular, on the words 'one point' instead of on the 'equilibrium'. The former is but a physical metaphor, whereas the latter expressess the actual psychological result which ensures 'that the rest is nothing.' His own emphasis can be traced in the strategic course of his campaigns. The word 'point' even, has been the source of much confusion, and more controversy. One school has argued that Napoleon meant that the concentrated blow must be aimed at the enemy's strongest point, on the ground that this, and this only, ensures decisive results. For if the enemy's main resistance be broken, its rupture will involve that of any lesser opposition. This argument ignores the factor of cost, and the fact that the victor may be too exhausted to exploit his success - so that even a weaker opponent may acquire a relatively higher resisting power than the original. The other school - better imbued with the idea of economy of force, but only in the limited sense of first costs - has contended that the offensive should be aimed at the enemy's weakest point. But where a point is obviously weak this is usually because it is remote from any vital artery or nerve centre, or because it is deliberately left weak to draw the assailant into a trap. Here, again, illumination comes from the actual campaign in which Bonaparte put his maxim into execution. It clearly suggests that what he really meant was no 'point', but 'joint' - and that at this stage of his career he was too firmly imbued with the economy of force to waste his limited strength in battering at the enemy's strong point. A joint, however, is both vital and vulnerable." (Hart - "Strategy" 1991 pp 98-99) Napoleon used as little force as possible against non-critical objectives.

"There are in Europe many good generals," he declared in 1797, "but they see too many things at once. I see only one thing, namely the enemy’s main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves." According to David Chandler here lies the central theme, of Napoleon’s concept of warfare.

In order to concentrate superior combat strength in one place, economy of force must be exercised in other places. Economy of force requires the acceptance of prudent risks in selected areas to achieve superiority at the point of decision.

