In the NFL, a coach’s past is often the best predictor of his future. However, the past can create some misgivings about a coach’s future, as the circumstances in his new environment may be different from his previous, thus leading to differences in the coach’s decision-making.

One of the cardinal sins of coaching is trying to jam a square peg into a round hole: a coach needs to meld his internal philosophies with the collective skill sets of his team, which can change drastically from one stop to the other.

Even though most of the Dallas Cowboys’ fan base appears satisfied with the Mike McCarthy hire, many have brought up valid points of concern about his future based on some of his tendencies in Green Bay.

The two biggest of which are underutilizing the running back position and the infrequent usage of play-action, both of which have been incredibly important to the previous Cowboys’ success on offense.

Nevertheless, a closer look reveals those tendencies were likely personnel-based and could change drastically with the personnel in Dallas. Let’s dive into a couple of McCarthy’s tendencies in Green Bay that he could break with the Cowboys.

Underutilizing RBs

After shelling out a $90 million contract extension to Ezekiel Elliott, many fans worry that he will be underutilized with McCarthy as head coach. The concern is justified after studying McCarthy’s final three seasons in Green Bay.

In each of those seasons, even though Green Bay finished top-7 in yards per attempt on the ground and in the bottom half in net yards per attempt through the air, they still ran the ball at a below-average rate while still throwing the ball more frequently than average. Moreover, in those three seasons, Green Bay never finished in the top half of the NFL in RB targets in the passing game, per Fantasy Pros.

2016 2017 2018 Yards per attempt (running) 7th 5th 2nd Net yards per attempt (passing) 17th 31st 21st Rushing attempts 29th 27th 32nd Passing attempts 5th 4th 13th RB targets in passing game 16th 25th 19th

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While this would normally be cause for concern for the Cowboys, it ignores the personnel the Packers had at running back those three years, as McCarthy never had a running back with Ezekiel Elliott’s talent or prominence.

In 2016, McCarthy’s No. 1 back was converted wide receiver Ty Montgomery, an overweight Eddie Lacy and a quartet of average backups (James Starks, Christine Michael, Knile Davis and Don Jackson). In 2017, Green Bay drafted two promising backs on Day 3 of the NFL draft — Jamaal Williams in the fourth round and Aaron Jones in the fifth round.

Jones has turned into an excellent running back this season but, in 2017-18, he was still a back who was trying to find his footing. Since hindsight is always 20/20, there’s reason to believe that Jones, in particular, should have been utilized more in 2018.

However, it’s much easier to justify not giving the ball to a former fifth-round pick (Jones) in lieu of putting the ball in the hands of his generational QB (Aaron Rodgers) than it is to justify not giving the ball to your $90 million former fourth overall pick in Elliott.

This is why, when asked, McCarthy revealed that Elliott will be a huge part of the Cowboys offense despite his recent history in regards to running backs, saying “I think first off with Zeke, he’s going to get the football. Let’s make no mistake about that.”

Nevertheless, actions tend to paint a more accurate picture than words, so let’s dive a little further into McCarthy’s history to the last time he led an offense that possessed an elite RB, which takes us back all the way to the early 2000s when McCarthy was the offensive coordinator for the New Orleans Saints.

From 2000-03, McCarthy was blessed with an elite running back corps that included Ricky Williams (with McCarthy from 2000-01), who was the fifth overall pick in 1999 (which is similar prominence to Elliott in Dallas), and Deuce McAllister (with McCarthy from 2001-04), who was a first-round pick in the 2001 NFL draft.

For those four seasons, McCarthy utilized his RBs a ton, even to the point of over usage, as McAllister was never the same after his 438 touch season in 2003. Compare Elliott’s touches per game in his career compared with McCarthy’s top back during that four-season stretch:

Year Zeke Total Touches Touches Per Game Year Saints No. 1 RB Total Touches Touches per game 2016 361 (322 rushes, 39 targets) 24.06 2000 Ricky Williams: 303 (248 rushes, 55 targets) 30.3 2017 280 (242 rushes, 38 targets) 28 2001 Ricky Williams: 401 (313 rushes, 88 targets) 25.06 2018 399 (304 rushes, 95 targets) 26.6 2002 Deuce McAllister: 399 (325 rushes, 74 targets) 26.6 2019 372 (301 rushes, 71 targets) 23.25 2003 Deuce McAllister: 438 (351 rushes, 87 targets) 27.37

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McCarthy designs his offenses to get the ball in the hands of his best playmakers. In Green Bay, that was Aaron Rodgers and the Packers’ passing attack. In New Orleans, that was McAllister and Williams.

From 2000-03, McCarthy’s top running back touched the ball even more frequently than Elliott has in the first four years of his career. Moreover, notice how McCarthy’s backs in New Orleans were utilized heavily in the passing game, so even if he couldn’t create advantageous opportunities for the RBs on the ground, he still looked to keep them involved through the air.

Now, don’t get it twisted, the Cowboys aren’t going to turn into the Seattle Seahawks and just incessantly pound the rock in an effort to “establish the run.” Even when McCarthy had McAllister and Williams, the Saints ranked top-10 in pass attempts in two of the four seasons, and that was with Aaron Brooks as QB, who is much less talented, accurate and effective than Dak Prescott.

While there are reasons to be skeptical of McCarthy’s fit with Dallas, his tendency to underutilize RBs in Green Bay shouldn’t be one of them. Don’t worry Cowboys fans, NFL defenses are still going to get a full serving of Ezekiel Elliott on Sundays.

Lack of play-action

While many fans became skeptical of McCarthy based on how he utilized running backs in Green Bay, the more studious fans were concerned with McCarthy’s infrequent use of play-action. Let’s take a look at how often McCarthy utilized play-action in Green Bay, per Pro Football Focus (publicly available play-action data only dates back to 2012):

Year Play-Action Rate Rank among NFL QBs 2012 18% 20th 2013 22.1% 20th 2014 24.1% 11th 2015 15.6% 33rd 2016 16.4% 30th 2017 19.2% 30th 2018 (Weeks 1-13) 21.6% 25th

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As you can see, McCarthy’s signal-callers consistently ranked near the bottom in play-action pass play percentage outside of 2014, which just so happens to be one of the two seasons where McCarthy’s team finished first in win percentage.

Now, there are many reasons to be concerned at McCarthy’s infrequent use of play-action.

First, it’s already been proven that play-action is more effective than traditional dropback passes. In 2018, teams saw a +11.3% DVOA (Defense-adjusted Value Over Average) differential between play-action and traditional passes, per Football Outsiders.

Second, the lack of an effective running game isn’t a valid excuse for the lack of play-action, as there’s convincing data that “cannot find any support for the success of play-action passing being related in any way to a team’s rushing statistics, whether measured by frequency or effectiveness,” per Football Outsiders.

Third, Dak Prescott has proven to be lethal when utilizing play-action thus far in his career. In 2019, Prescott finished 14th among QBs in play-action play percentage but saw the eighth-highest jump in terms of his completion percentage with play-action (69.8) and without it (63.5) while also seeing an 0.9 yards per attempt improvement as well. So, not only is Prescott more accurate when using play-action, but he tends to pick up more yards with each attempt.

Nevertheless, as mentioned in the prior section on utilizing running backs, it’s important to understand the context surrounding why McCarthy used play-action so infrequently.

Former NFL executive Michael Lombardi revealed last offseason that Aaron Rodgers doesn’t prefer play-action because it forces him to turn his back to the defense, which can be an uncomfortable feeling for a player.

Moreover, since 2012, the Green Bay offense finished in the bottom half of NFL teams in DVOA on play-action passes, per Football Outsiders, which just means that they were one of the least effective teams using play-action through the entirety of McCarthy’s time in GB where play-action data is publicly available. In fact, Green Bay’s best finish in DVOA on play-action passes was 18th in 2014, per Football Outsiders.

Therefore, it appears the McCarthy utilized play-action less frequently than most teams because it didn’t fit his personnel, not because he has some sort of vendetta against the play-action passing game.

This makes sense, as McCarthy utilizes a West Coast Offense (WCO), a philosophy that typically utilizes a ton of play-action passes. In 2019, four of five QBs (Jared Goff, Jimmy Garoppolo, Patrick Mahomes, Kirk Cousins) who utilized play-action passes play in different versions of the WCO. In terms of WCO’s using play-action, McCarthy’s stint in Green Bay was the exception to the rule.

Just as he has done at his previous stops, McCarthy is going to utilize the concepts that best fit his team and personnel. Unlike in Green Bay, the Cowboys have thrived when using play-action. Expect McCarthy to use play-action at a much higher rate in Dallas than he did in Green Bay.

Twitter: @JohnOwning