China’s Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry

BANGLADESH-CHINA DEFENCE CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT'S STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS: An Analysis





* Pakistan could supplant China in terms of training, maintenance and production of latest Chinese military equipment for Bangladesh.



* Rising Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh could provide further leverages in using Bangladesh.for intensifying Pakistan’s proxy war on India’s Eastern peripheries.



China’s Strategic Interests Served by Bangladesh-China Defence Cooperation Agreement: China as the most intrusive external power in South Asia would be well served by its Defence Cooperation Agreement with Bangladesh. The scope of this agreement, not spelt out more out of design, would encompass a much wider canvas than just training and maintenance. The agreement could more aptly be termed as “ Bangladesh-China Treaty of Friendship and Strategic Cooperation”.



China’s strategic interests are served in the following manner:







* China’s strategic encirclement of India is completed with the above



* Soon one could witness Chinese plans to develop Chittagong Naval Base on the lines of Gwadur in Pakistan.



* China could get naval bases facility in Bangladesh.



India-The Strategic Implications: Despite protestations by Bangladesh, that the Defence Cooperation Agreement is not aimed at India, the symbolic value, if not anything else, would dismay India greatly.



India cannot ignore the strategic embrace of Bangladesh by China, whose strategic implications are:







* Bangladesh’s enhanced military profile will have to be factored in India's future military plans.



* India will now have to factor in a fourth strategic concern in its operational plans, namely China-Pakistan-Bangladesh military collusion in the context of any Indo-Pak or Sino–Indian conflict.



* China’s naval intrusions are facilitated by Bangladesh into the Bay of Bengal area.



* India’s North East region's strategic vulnerabilities (especially the lines of communication) become more complicated.



* India’s IRBM deployments in the North East against China will now need more securing.



All the above concerns are realistic and one cannot be dismissive about them as conclusions of an overactive imagination.



United States–The Strategic Implications: Preoccupied with its Iraq fixations, the United States does not appear to have reacted to this development. Till now it appeared that the United States had a good military hold on Bangladesh. The United States had been providing military training assistance to Bangladesh. Bangladesh Armed Forces personnel were participating in US Pacific Command’s training events and the US Marines had carried out familiarization exercises in Bangladesh. On the economic front, the United States had been more than generous towards Bangladesh.



Logically, therefore, Bangladesh, should have turned to the United States for military Insurance to offset her threat perceptions, basically focused on India. That it did not do so, and turned towards China, carries strategic implications for the United States as follows:







* China can now outflank United States strategic interests in South East Asia by reinforcing the defence cooperation with Bangladesh into a strategic nexus.



* China adds Bangladesh as an additional pressure point against United States in South Asia in addition to Pakistan.



* China’s containment by the United States at some future date becomes complex with Pakistan and Bangladesh in a strategic nexus with China.



The United States needs to re-evaluate its strategic concerns in South Asia. It should not reach to the conclusions as enshrined in a RAND report (The United States and Asia: Towards a New US Strategy and Force Posture, 2001) that: “finally given the proximity of this region (Bangladesh and Myanmar) to China, these countries would likely to be reluctant to become too closely aligned with the United States, in the event of heightened tensions”.



Conclusions: The Bangladesh-China Defence Cooperation Agreement, presently being termed as only a consolidation of different defence agreements between the two countries, carries in it an inbuilt potential of serious strategic implications, not only for India but also for the United States and for the South Asia region as a whole.



China does seem to have a grand strategic design in South Asia, basically focused on the strategic encirclement of India and imprison her within South Asia confines. The bitter strategic reality for India is that it has no friends in South Asia. India to break out of the strategic bind imposed by China, needs to lessen the conventional and nuclear weapons gap with China. India’s ICBM and SLBM development programmes need to be put into over-drive.



Coming back to the Bangladesh-China Defence Cooperation Agreement, the policy and decision-makers in Bangladesh need to ponder long and hard whether China can provide the strategic insurance it seeks against India. China’s record of support to Pakistan in the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 are an ample pointer to the efficacy of its military insurance with China. Bangladesh’s inter-dependencies with India far outweigh those with China with which Bangladesh does not even share geographical contiguity. It would be futile politically, economically and militarily for Bangladesh to follow the Pakistan model in terms of off-setting asymmetries with India by playing the China card.



(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email <drsubhashkapila **********>

​ * China had earlier outflanked United States strategic interests in the Gulf region by its strategic nexus with Pakistan.* China can now outflank United States strategic interests in South East Asia by reinforcing the defence cooperation with Bangladesh into a strategic nexus.* China adds Bangladesh as an additional pressure point against United States in South Asia in addition to Pakistan.* China’s containment by the United States at some future date becomes complex with Pakistan and Bangladesh in a strategic nexus with China.The United States needs to re-evaluate its strategic concerns in South Asia. It should not reach to the conclusions as enshrined in a RAND report (The United States and Asia: Towards a New US Strategy and Force Posture, 2001) that: “finally given the proximity of this region (Bangladesh and Myanmar) to China, these countries would likely to be reluctant to become too closely aligned with the United States, in the event of heightened tensions”.The Bangladesh-China Defence Cooperation Agreement, presently being termed as only a consolidation of different defence agreements between the two countries, carries in it an inbuilt potential of serious strategic implications, not only for India but also for the United States and for the South Asia region as a whole.China does seem to have a grand strategic design in South Asia, basically focused on the strategic encirclement of India and imprison her within South Asia confines. The bitter strategic reality for India is that it has no friends in South Asia. India to break out of the strategic bind imposed by China, needs to lessen the conventional and nuclear weapons gap with China. India’s ICBM and SLBM development programmes need to be put into over-drive.Coming back to the Bangladesh-China Defence Cooperation Agreement, the policy and decision-makers in Bangladesh need to ponder long and hard whether China can provide the strategic insurance it seeks against India. China’s record of support to Pakistan in the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 are an ample pointer to the efficacy of its military insurance with China. Bangladesh’s inter-dependencies with India far outweigh those with China with which Bangladesh does not even share geographical contiguity. It would be futile politically, economically and militarily for Bangladesh to follow the Pakistan model in terms of off-setting asymmetries with India by playing the China card. * China's strategic intrusiveness in South Asia gets further reinforced.* Bangladesh’s enhanced military profile will have to be factored in India's future military plans.* India will now have to factor in a fourth strategic concern in its operational plans, namely China-Pakistan-Bangladesh military collusion in the context of any Indo-Pak or Sino–Indian conflict.* China’s naval intrusions are facilitated by Bangladesh into the Bay of Bengal area.* India’s North East region's strategic vulnerabilities (especially the lines of communication) become more complicated.* India’s IRBM deployments in the North East against China will now need more securing.All the above concerns are realistic and one cannot be dismissive about them as conclusions of an overactive imagination.Preoccupied with its Iraq fixations, the United States does not appear to have reacted to this development. Till now it appeared that the United States had a good military hold on Bangladesh. The United States had been providing military training assistance to Bangladesh. Bangladesh Armed Forces personnel were participating in US Pacific Command’s training events and the US Marines had carried out familiarization exercises in Bangladesh. On the economic front, the United States had been more than generous towards Bangladesh.Logically, therefore, Bangladesh, should have turned to the United States for military Insurance to offset her threat perceptions, basically focused on India. That it did not do so, and turned towards China, carries strategic implications for the United States as follows: * China gets a strategic toe-hold on India’s Eastern flank in Bangladesh.* China’s strategic encirclement of India is completed with the aboveDespite protestations by Bangladesh, that the Defence Cooperation Agreement is not aimed at India, the symbolic value, if not anything else, would dismay India greatly.India cannot ignore the strategic embrace of Bangladesh by China, whose strategic implications are: * Bangladesh’s enhanced military profile with Chinese aid would divert some of India’s strategic attention from the West to the East, lowering pressure on Pakistan.* Pakistan could supplant China in terms of training, maintenance and production of latest Chinese military equipment for Bangladesh.* Rising Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh could provide further leverages in using Bangladesh.for intensifying Pakistan’s proxy war on India’s Eastern peripheries.China as the most intrusive external power in South Asia would be well served by its Defence Cooperation Agreement with Bangladesh. The scope of this agreement, not spelt out more out of design, would encompass a much wider canvas than just training and maintenance. The agreement could more aptly be termed as “ Bangladesh-China Treaty of Friendship and Strategic Cooperation”.China’s strategic interests are served in the following manner:

After dramatically increasing its military expenditure over the last several years, in 2010 China has raised it by only 7.5 percent, marking the first time in nearly 21 years that the rate of increase has fallen below double digits.1 While there are a number of factors behind this, the Chinese government has used this to announce its pacific intent, underlining that it has always tried to limit military spending and set defence spending at a reasonable level. China’s foreign policy thinkers and political establishment have long sought to convince the world that Beijing’s rise is meant to be a peaceful one, that China has no expansionist intentions, that it will be a different kind of great power.Of course, the very nature of power makes this largely a charade, but more surprising is that western liberals have tended to take these assertions at face value. There is an entire industry in the West that would have us believe that China is actually a different kind of a great power and that if the west could simply give China a stake in the established order, Beijing’s rise would not create any complications.Now, one of China’s most prominent policy intellectuals is advocating for the creation of overseas bases. Shen Dingli, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, asserts that “it is wrong for us [China] to believe that we have no right to set up bases abroad.” He argues that it is not terrorism or piracy that’s the real threat to China. It’s the ability of other states to block China’s trade routes that poses the greatest threat. To prevent this from happening, China, Shen asserts, needs not only a blue-water navy but also “overseas military bases to cut the supply costs.”2Of course, Shen also wraps this up in the widely accepted world peace diplomacy, asserting that the establishment of such military bases overseas would promote regional and global stability. It is a familiar diplomatic wrapping that other superpowers should easily recognize.As China emerges as a major global power, it will expand its military footprint across the globe, much like that other great power, the US, whose bases surround China. The rapid expansion of China’s naval capabilities and broader military profile is a classic manifestation of its great power status. China’s new naval strategy of “far sea defense” is aimed at giving Beijing the ability to project its power in key oceanic areas, including and most significantly the Indian Ocean.3China’s expansionist behaviour has, in fact, long been evident. China has been acquiring naval facilities along the crucial choke-points in the Indian Ocean not only to serve its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic presence in the region. China realizes that its maritime strength will give it the strategic leverage it needs to emerge as the regional hegemon and a potential superpower. China’s growing dependence on maritime space and resources is reflected in the Chinese aspiration to expand its influence and to ultimately dominate the strategic environment of the Indian Ocean region. China’s growing reliance on bases across the Indian Ocean region is a response to its perceived vulnerability, given the logistical constraints that it faces due to the distance of the Indian Ocean waters from its own territory. Yet, China is consolidating power over the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean with an eye on India, something that emerges clearly in a secret memorandum issued fifteen years ago by the Director of the General Logistic Department of the PLA: “We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians…We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.”4China’s growing naval presence in and around the Indian Ocean region, beginning in areas such as China’s Hainan Island in the South China Sea, is troubling for India. China deployed its Jin class submarines in 2008 at a submarine base near Sanya in the southern tip of Hainan, raising alarm in India as the base is merely 1200 nautical miles from the Malacca Strait and is its closest access point to the Indian Ocean. The base also has an underground facility that can hide the movement of submarines, making them difficult to detect.5 The concentration of strategic naval forces at Sanya could propel China towards a consolidation of its control over the surrounding Indian Ocean region. The presence of access tunnels on the mouth of the deep water base is particularly troubling for India as it will have strategic implications in the Indian Ocean region, allowing China to interdict shipping at the three crucial chokepoints in the Indian Ocean – Bab el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. Of particular note is what has been termed China’s “string of pearls” strategy that has significantly expanded China’s strategic depth in India’s backyard.6This “string of pearls” strategy of bases and diplomatic ties includes the Gwadar port in Pakistan, naval bases in Burma, electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal, funding construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, a military agreement with Cambodia and building up of forces in the South China Sea.7 These “pearls” are to help build strategic ties with several countries along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in order to protect China’s energy interests and security objectives. Some of the claims are exaggerated, as has been the case with the purported Chinese naval presence in Burma. The Indian government, for example, had to concede in 2005 that reports of China turning the Coco Islands in Burma into a naval base were incorrect and that there were indeed no naval bases in Burma.Still, the Chinese thrust into the Indian Ocean is gradually becoming more pronounced. The Chinese may not have a naval base in Burma but they are involved in upgrading of infrastructure in the Coco Islands and may be providing some limited technical assistance to Burma.With almost 80 percent of China’s oil passing through the Strait of Malacca, given its reluctance to rely on US naval power for unhindered access to energy, it has moved to build up its naval power at choke points along the sea routes from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea.China is courting other states in South Asia by building container ports in Bangladesh at Chittagong and in Sri Lanka at Hambantota. Consolidating its access to the Indian Ocean, China has signed an agreement with Sri Lanka to finance the development of the Hambantota Development Zone at the southern tip of Sri Lanka, which includes a container port, a bunker system and an oil refinery. China’s activities at Marao in the Maldives have also generated apprehension in New Delhi.China’s involvement in the construction of the deep-sea port of Gwadar on the Southwest coast of Pakistan has attracted a lot of attention due to its strategic location, about 70 kilometres from the Iranian border and 400 kilometers east of the Strait of Hormuz, a major oil supply route. It has been suggested that it will provide China with a “listening post” from where it can “monitor US naval activity in the Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea, and future US-Indian maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean.”8 Though Pakistan’s naval capabilities alone pose no challenge to India, the combinations of Chinese and Pakistani naval forces can indeed be formidable for India to counter.Recent suggestions emanating from Beijing that China is contemplating setting up military bases overseas to counter American influence and exert pressure on India have been interpreted in certain sections in New Delhi as a veiled reference to China’s interest in securing a permanent military presence in Pakistan. Although it might not be politically feasible for the Pakistani government to openly allow China to set up a military base, New Delhi fears that Islamabad might allow Beijing use of its military facilities without any public announcement.9It is possible to explain the construction of these ports and facilities by China on purely economic and commercial grounds, but regional and global powers like the US, Japan and India inevitably view the sum total of China’s diplomatic and military efforts in the Indian Ocean as projecting power vis-à-vis competing rivals. Moreover, most of Chinese naval facilities in the Indian Ocean are dual use in nature and no serious strategy can discount their future military use.Whatever China’s vision, together with its expansive military budget and accelerated global search for energy and other natural resources, it has built up all aspects of its maritime economy and created one of the world’s largest merchant fleets with a port, transport, and ship-building infrastructure to match.10 Certainly, the Indian Ocean could play an important role in Chinese efforts to establish a position as a leading maritime power in the region. And this is resulting in Sino-Indian competition for influence in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Despite significant improvement in Sino-Indian ties since the late 1990s, the relationship remains competitive and China has succeeded in containing India within the confines of South Asia by building close ties with India’s key neighbours, in particular with Pakistan.11The notion that China aspires to naval domination of the Indian Ocean remains a bit far-fetched. However, China certainly wishes to play a greater role in the region, to protect and advance its interests, especially Chinese commercial interests, as well as to counter India. But given the immense geographical advantages that Indian enjoys in the Indian Ocean, China will have great difficulty in rivalling India in the Indian Ocean. Even the task of sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection remains challenging for the PLA Navy as of now. Still, the steps that China is taking to protect and enhance its interests in the Indian Ocean region are generating apprehensions in Indian strategic circles, thereby engendering a classic security dilemma between the two Asian giants. And it is India’s fears and perceptions of China’s growing naval prowess in the Indian Ocean that is driving Indian naval posture. Tensions are inherent in such an evolving strategic relationship as was underlined in an incident in January 2009 when an Indian Kilo class submarine and Chinese warships, on their way to the Gulf of Aden to patrol the pirate-infested waters, reportedly engaged in rounds of manoeuvring as eacg tried to test for weaknesses in the others’ sonar system. The Chinese media reported that its warships forced the Indian submarine to the surface, which was strongly denied by the Indian Navy.12 Unless managed carefully, the potential for such incidents turning serious in the future remains high, especially as Sino-Indian naval competition is likely to intensify with the Indian and Chinese navies operating far from their shores.For its part, China is merely following in the footsteps of other major global powers, which have established military bases abroad to secure their interests. There is only one kind of great power, and one kind of great power tradition. China will not be any different; power is necessarily expansionist.The sooner the world acknowledges this, the better it will be for global stability.1 “China plans to slow expansion of defense spending in 2010,”, March 5, 2010.2 Shen Dingli, “Don’t shun the idea of setting up military bases overseas,” January 28, 2010, available here 3 Edward Wong, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power,”, April 23, 2010.4 Youssef Bodansky, “The PRC Surge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and the US,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Washington, DC, September 30, 1995, pp. 6-13.5 Manu Pubby, “China’s new n-submarine base sets off alarm bells,”, May 3, 2008.6 The term “string of pearls” was first used in a report titled “Energy Futures in Asia” that was commissioned by the US Department of Defense’s Office of net Assessment from defense contractor, Booz-Allen-Hamilton. For details, see David Walgreen, “China in the Indian Ocean Region: Lessons in PRC Grand Strategy,”, Vol. 25, No. 2 (January 2006). Also, see Jae-Hyung Lee, “China’s Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean,”, Vol. 24, No. 3 (June 2007), pp. 553-4.7 For a detailed explication of the security ramifications of the Chinese “string of pearls” strategy, see Gurpreet Khurana, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications,”, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 1-22.8 Ziad Haider, “Oil Fuels Beijing’s new Power Game,” Yale Global Online, March 11, 2005, available here 9 Saibal Dasgupta, “China mulls setting up military base in Pakistan,”, January 28, 2010.10 Geoffrey Till,(London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 102, concludes from this that the Chinese government appears “to have a very clear vision of the future importance of the sea and a sense of the strategic leadership needed to develop maritime interest.”11 Harsh V. Pant, “India in the Asia-Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China,”, Vol. 14 (1), May 2007, pp. 54-71.12 Manu Pubby, “Indian submarine, Chinese warship test each other in pirate waters,”, February 5, 2009.An old article from 2003 with same prediction.: Bangladesh was the former Eastern province of Pakistan. The Pakistan Army inflicted genocide in 1971 on its Bengali compatriots to nullify their majority win in Pakistan’s general elections and prevent Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s emergence as Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Pakistan Army could not stomach the emergence of a Bengali as Prime Minister of Pakistan.The civil war in Pakistan that commenced in March 1971 ended in December 1971 and Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation state thereafter.Bangladesh has a population of over 130 million with an area of 143,998 square kilometers. Bangladesh is bounded West and North by India, East by India and Burma and South by the Bay of Bengal. It shares a long and porous 3901 kilometers border with India. This has enabled more than 20 million Bangladeshi nationals to move into India as illegal immigrants. A predominantly Muslim state, it has about 12% Hindus, whose numbers are dwindling.The salient observations that can be made here are:* Bangladesh’s past history of being part of Pakistan and its predominantly Muslim population, draws it into the political and strategic calculus of Pakistan. Consequently it gets factored in Pakistan’s strategic calculus in the India-Pakistan confrontation.* Like Pakistan, Bangladesh’s politics get defined in the context of anti-India stances.* Like Pakistan. Bangladesh is coming under growing influence of Islamic fundamentalists. In the present government of Begum Khaleda Zia, the Jammat group is part of the ruling coalition.* Bangladesh offers Pakistan a fertile ground for basing its proxy war apparatus to strategically discomfit India ion its East and North East peripheries. This arises from common religious links and shared heritage of its intelligence and military establishments with those of Pakistan.* The influence of Pakistan-China strategic nexus in South Asia also logically comes into play in Bangladesh.* Bangladesh too, consequently, as a smaller nation is not averse to playing off Pakistan and China against India.With the above as background, the analysis of the strategic significance of the Bangladesh-China Defence Cooperation Agreement would become that much more apparent.China was against the liberation and emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation state during Pakistan’s civil war in 1971. No wonder, that China did not accord diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh till 1975 i.e. nearly four years after the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign state. It can be said that China’s relations with Bangladesh were being determined by Pakistan’s considerations.However, political and strategic realities soon took over and China made serious attempts to wean over Bangladesh from India’s influence. And as a recent book puts it : “But it is important to note that Bangladesh had also been a major recipient of Chinese arms and the country is on the larger game plan of China to encircle India, together with Pakistan and Myanmar”. (South Asia’s Fractured Frontiers, B Nepram, 2002).Bangladesh’s Armed Forces today are predominantly equipped with Chinese military hardware. The Bangladesh Army’s tanks and light tanks are of Chinese origin. The Bangladesh Navy’s frigates and patrol crafts are mostly Chinese. The Bangladesh Air Force's combat aircraft are all Chinese. In short China has forged Bangladesh into a military-equipment client state like Pakistan.The Defence Co-operation Agreement was signed between Bangladesh and China during the visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister, Begum Khaleda Zia ‘s visit to China from December 23 to 27, 2002.Some observations/statements emanating from Bangladesh officials and media sources explaining the Defence Cooperation Agreement are as follows:* The purpose of Defence Cooperation Agreement signed with China is to meet present day need of Bangladesh’s defence forces.* This new agreement was signed to help institutionalize the existing accords in defence sector and also to rationalize the existing piecemeal agreements to enhance cooperation in training, maintenance and some areas in production.* Bangladesh Foreign Minister, responding to questions, emphasized the following:-Bangladesh wanted time-befitting armed forces for the country. China will cooperate with Bangladesh for this purpose.- “Intention is there to cooperate in defence sector; now the two sides w ill co-operate with each other”-“This defence umbrella agreement is not directed against any country and would not affect Bangladesh’s relations with India”All said and done, what emerges from the above, analytically is:* Bangladesh has plans to expand, upgrade and modernise her armed forces.* China is willing to under-write Bangladesh’s military plans above.* The emphasis on “to enhance cooperation in training, maintenance and some areas in defence production” should normally imply ‘induction of more modern military hardware, as these activities would not be applicable to older generation of military hardware.* Deliberate secrecy and ambiguity has been maintained in terms of the scope of the agreement. This gives leeway for widening the strategic cooperation in the future.The next question needing analysis is why the sudden need of an “umbrella” Defence Cooperation Agreement”.? The major significance of the Defence Cooperation Agreement is that it is the first such agreement ever signed by Bangladesh in its history. Defence Cooperation Agreements are normally signed when: (1) Countries perceive enhanced threat perceptions;(2) Countries are amenable to be used in a region for balance of power politics; and (3) Countries fear retaliation in response to their territories being used for proxy war and terrorism by third counties against another country.The question why now, gets answered by a combination of one or all of the reasons above .Bangladesh is conscious of the fact that its territory is being used by Pakistan’s ISI, Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups for anti-India activities. India has cautioned Bangladesh on this count. The significance of Indian military escalation in 2002 against Pakistan would not have been lost on Bangladesh.Bangladesh therefore seems to have taken out an insurance policy from China to cater for increased threat perceptions in the India-specific context.Analytically, it would not be too simplistic to suggest that Pakistan has had a role in egging on Bangladesh towards a full strategic embrace with China and also facilitating it. General Musharraf’s visit to Bangladesh in October 2002, his tentative apology for the 1971 Pakistani genocide of the Bengalis and the mutual discussions centering around Pakistan’s perceptions of India’s military escalation would have helped in Musharraf’s exaggerating Bangladesh’s strategic concerns.The personal factor of shared cantonment lives between Musharraf and Begum Zia when her husband was with the Pakistan Army prior to independence of Bangladesh would have added to Musharraf’s persuasions.That Pakistan had a definite game plan was evident from the numerous Pakistan TV debates especially in their ‘ Newstime’ programme focused on giving a spin to India’s hegemonistic designs on Bangladesh.Down to bare bones, Pakistan’s strategic designs against India stand served as follows: