Top decision makers in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) appear to have taken a firm decision to finally hold a referendum on independence before the end of the year. Resisting heavy pressure from Iran, key leaders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran Movement also look (at least in public) like they have warmed to the idea and expressed their support for such a referendum. As opposed to past instances when the issue arose, this time the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) seems to be undertaking real preparations for holding such a plebiscite.Writing from Erbil this week, this columnist also feels that the popular mood in South Kurdistan has improved significantly from when he lived here from September to December of 2016. Despite the continuing budget freeze from Baghdad, the economy has picked up somewhat, Kurdish debts and salaries are starting to be paid more frequently, and the war against ISIS is slowly but inexorably moving forward.If the referendum occurs in 2017, few analysts doubt that it will result in a ‘yes’ vote from more than 80% of Kurdistan’s people – and perhaps even more than 90%. If, or when, that happens, a number of questions will immediately arise. Most crucially, what will the KRG do with its new popular mandate? Will the pressure to declare independence immediately outweigh other considerations?An astute strategy from KRG leaders might look like this: First, they would meet with leaders in Baghdad behind closed doors. The Kurds would tell the Shiite Arab leadership in Baghdad that things can go two ways – amicably or terribly for everyone. The amicable route would center on various “carrots” Erbil could offer Baghdad in order to secure its acquiescence to Kurdish independence.First would be a proposal to combine a declaration of independence with an immediate announcement of confederation with Iraq, wherein Kurdistan would become a sovereign state but still maintain a host of key and official linkages with Iraq. These linkages could include a shared defense and hydrocarbons production and export strategy, provided that Kurdistan retains control of its own fields, contracts and pipelines and receives its portion of the revenues directly rather than at the whim of Baghdad.Another concession to Baghdad would include territorial adjustments, so that Kurdistan does not secede with all the territory it currently controls. Although Erbil would no doubt insist on retaining all districts where a majority voted in favour of independence in the referendum, other areas would be left under Baghdad’s writ. This would allow leaders in Baghdad to save some face as well.Concessions to Iran would include offers to build more pipelines for oil or gas (like the one recently agreed to last year) that would connect directly into Iran’s hydrocarbon grid. Iran would get as much reassurance as possible that an independent Kurdistan will not serve as a platform for Iranian Kurdish, American or Israeli machinations against the regime in Tehran. Promises of a decentralized independent Kurdistan would not only help assure the Iranians that they will retain influence in at least some provinces (mainly Suleimani and Kirkuk), but would also reassure the PUK and Gorran that an independent future holds much promise for them as well.Turkey would retain its already considerable investments and influence (especially in Erbil and Dohuk provinces), its growing energy corridor from South Kurdistan to the port of Ceyhan, containment of PKK aspirations in South Kurdistan, and a reliable partner from the KRG’s lead party (the KDP).The less pleasant alternative to all this would come from a unilateral declaration of Kurdish independence following a referendum. The Kurds would leave with all the territory they presently control, and any cooperative arrangements with Baghdad (on oil and fighting ISIS, for example) would become null and void. Given the Iraqi Army’s fatigue and continuing relative weakness, and given other problems in neighbouring states, neither Baghdad nor Iran or Turkey would have the stomach for a military invasion of the newly independent Kurdistan.The most any might do would involve an embargo of South Kurdistan. Baghdad could do this, although it would forfeit any revenues from Kirkuk’s oil fields and the Kurds could even shut off water flow towards the south. If Turkey embargoed South Kurdistan, it would immediately forfeit all its heavy investments in the region as well as its influence there – including influence that pushes KRG authorities to help contain the PKK. If Iran embargoed the region, it would likewise lose significant investments and see every province of South Kurdistan fall completely into Turkey’s orbit. In addition to increasing its support for Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, Erbil could also conceivably open up its territory for every American or Israeli agent that wanted to launch operations against Tehran.It thus seems unlikely that all three key neighbors – Baghdad, Turkey and Iran – would embargo a newly independent Kurdistan, in which case the new state could continue to get along in the world. This seems especially probable given the significant relationships Kurdistan has built abroad – with America, with Europe, and with many others. Recognition of the new state would thus probably come sooner rather than later.

David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.





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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.