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Putin reacted as Soviet leaders used to do when their empire got uppity.

It seems obvious that the invasion was a contingency that had been planned for years.

What%27s needed is a long-term plan to cope with Putin%27s carefully constructed vision of a resurgent Russia.

Perhaps the most surprising thing about Russia's weekend invasion of Crimea is that the U.S. and its allies were caught so flat-footed, groping for a response that didn't look weak and ineffectual.

It's not as if Russian President Vladimir Putin's ambitions in Ukraine, or its importance to him, are a secret. He wants to be seen as the leader who restored Russia's lost power, and if Ukraine — the biggest, closest and most important non-Russian part of the Soviet Union — were to follow other former Soviet states into the Western camp, his hopes would be dashed. He wasn't about to let that happen.

So when pro-Western rebels deposed a brutal but legitimately elected leader with whom he was allied, Putin reacted as Soviet leaders used to do when their empire got uppity. He invaded, sending troops into Crimea, the most strategically important part of Ukraine, on the trumped up excuse that the pro-Russian majority in the largely autonomous province was being threatened.

Given the speed and effectiveness of the operation, with coordinated action among Crimean paramilitary units and Russian forces, it seems obvious that the invasion was a contingency that had been planned for years. It would not be at all surprising if Putin is similarly prepared to move on other parts of Ukraine, and if he doesn't, he's surely gamed out other follow-on options. Fomenting rebellion, destabilizing the new government and applying economic pressure are among his many choices.

It's also apparent that Putin's careful strategic planning was not matched in the West, where the response has been late and lame.

President Obama started by warning vaguely that there would be "costs" if Russia invaded. That must have given Putin a chuckle. He invaded hours later.

On Sunday, Secretary of State John Kerry took a few more promising steps, threatening to boot Russia out of the Group of Eight and freeze Russian assets. He also scheduled a trip to Kiev, which is useful symbolically and to persuade the fledgling leadership — still weak, divided and lacking legitimacy — not to play into Putin's hands, which is precisely what it did by deposing an elected government.

There is, in virtually everyone's view, no viable military option for the West, but there also is no mistaking the stakes.

Putin doesn't necessarily want to take over Ukraine, which would be a bloody and unmanageable enterprise. But he wants Ukraine — or as much of it as he can get — to be a client state. If he can do that by persuasion, fine. But to do so by invasion threatens the post-Cold War order generally and Western democracies in Europe particularly.

What's needed now is not just an ad hoc response to the crisis, but a long-term plan to cope with Putin's carefully constructed vision of a resurgent Russia. Not a new Cold War, but a contest that harnesses the West's most potent weapons — its thriving economies — to deter more aggression.

Putin is playing like a chess master, and for high stakes: his role in Russian history. If the West wants him to play under peaceful rules, it will need to up its game.

USA TODAY's editorial opinions are decided by its Editorial Board, separate from the news staff. Most editorials are coupled with an opposing view — a unique USA TODAY feature.