Nov 17, 2017

The latest Saudi ultimatum to Lebanon, after the baffling resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, is reminiscent of a similar development half a century ago. In February 1967, Riyadh warned Beirut to remain neutral in the kingdom's tug of war with Cairo over Yemen and threatened to evict Lebanese expatriates and withdraw Saudi cash deposits from Lebanese banks. The Saudis' pressure united Lebanese politicians, and Riyadh never followed through on its threats. Looking back at 65 years of engagement, Saudi Arabia has never had a Lebanon strategy. Several factors — most notably the geographical distance from Lebanon, the lack of a powerful or armed Lebanese ally and the lack of coerciveness and purpose —have hindered its ability to develop an effective policy.

To the Lebanese, Saudi Arabia always came second to Egypt, Israel, Syria and now Iran. In the 1970s, Riyadh pursued two contradictory goals in Lebanon: endorsing Palestinian resistance against Israel and supporting a strong Lebanese state. In the 1990s, Riyadh reached its maximum influence by empowering the Syrian regime's control over Lebanon in return for expanding the powers of the Sunni prime minister and containing Hezbollah. This influence, however, was restricted to economic affairs, while Damascus handled politics and security, which left Lebanon's economy increasingly dependent on Saudi Arabia.

Indeed, the emergence of Saudi-backed Rafik Hariri to lead post-war Lebanon gave Riyadh a seat at the table, but the Syrian regime kept Hariri in check as he began to develop an extensive network of contacts with world leaders. Riyadh helped Hariri consolidate power at the expense of all other Sunni leaders in Lebanon, as demonstrated in the 2000 parliamentary elections. His assassination in February 2005 ended Syrian-Saudi cooperation in Lebanon and forced Syrian troops out of the country. Iran gradually filled the void, and Hezbollah became directly involved in Lebanese politics.

Pressuring Saad Hariri to resign and confront Hezbollah marks a landmark shift in Saudi policy. Riyadh's policy tradition in Lebanon had long been to mediate between rivals, maintaining the same distance from all Lebanese groups and supporting the central government. Riyadh has been most effective in Lebanese politics when acting in the shadow of the United States or Syria, rather than in the forefront. Saudi policy has traditionally viewed Lebanon through the lens of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Riyadh has been known to pull back from Lebanese politics when confronted with adversity and re-engage when rival parties appear ready to talk. In 1979, after gunfire hit the helicopter of the Saudi ambassador to Lebanon, Riyadh withdrew nearly 700 soldiers from the Arab Deterrent Force deployed to preserve Lebanon's stability. That move allowed the Syrian army to gradually gain control of Lebanon and paved the way for the Israeli invasion in 1982. In May 2008, when Hezbollah clashed with and disarmed the Future Movement, led by Saad Hariri, Saudi Arabia backed away and endorsed the Doha Agreement, which ended Lebanon's political crisis in 2008. The guiding principles of Saudi policy have now completely changed.