Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s president from 1989-97, was at the top of the Iranian political establishment for three decades, his uncanny ability to manipulate politics to his own advantage undiminished. But over the past year, as Iran went through its most serious political crisis since the 1979 revolution, his empire has declined, and now his enemies have been emboldened to strike a fatal political blow. Rafsanjani has signalled his willingness to step aside from politics, thus avoiding public dismissal; the language has been carefully worded to minimise his loss of face.

Rafsanjani’s downfall was his inability to avoid a confrontation with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and supporters, after his disputed victory in last year’s presidential election. The purge of Rafsanjani has less to do with a clash of personalities and factional interests; it signals a major re-alignment in Iranian politics, in which the role of factions is much diminished and the power of the state ascendant.

Rafsanjani has been among the most influential forces in Iranian politics, devoting his life to the revolution. Before the expulsion of the shah in 1979, he was a committed disciple of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and took extraordinary steps towards the fall of the monarchy. He even participated in political violence, notably the assassination of the former prime minister, Hassan Ali Mansour, in 1965.

After the revolution Rafsanjani was catapulted to the commanding heights of the Iranian government, serving as the speaker of the Majlis or National Assembly throughout the 1980s. This gave him a vantage point to survey the complex political faultlines of post-revolutionary Iran, with its many shifting factions.

Besides his Machiavellian instincts, Rafsanjani’s extraordinary political success came from his understanding of the Islamic Republic’s lively political scene and his ability to intervene successfully in major political disputes. By placing himself in the middle of warring political factions he was able to play mediator, taking the heat out of disputes – all the while strengthening his own position and that of his family.

The biggest dispute in the 1980s centred on a left-leaning government led by the then prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi (a leftwing nationalist) and its rightwing detractors. These were conservatives allied to the Bazaar, and more ideological conservatives belonging to such associations as the Hezbe Moetalefeyeh Eslami (Islamic Coalition Party) which, contrary to its name, was a loose political grouping that brought together some of the most influential, shadowy political players and kingmakers in the Islamic Republic.

A divided regime

As a stubbornly independent politician, Mousavi was also in a political fight with Seyed Ali Khamenei, Iran’s president in the 1980s. Although this dispute is now seen in the wider context of the left-right dichotomy, it was a personal dispute over constitutional powers; both tried to invest more authority in the institutions which they represented. This dispute was finally resolved in July 1989, when an amendment to the constitution abolished the post of prime minister.

By acting as a peacemaker, Rafsanjani was able to emerge as the second most powerful man in the country, all the while appearing ever faithful to Ayatollah Khomeini. But Rafsanjani’s success was not limited to politics, for by the late 1980s critics and neutral observers alike agreed that the wily cleric had abused his position and privilege to amass a huge family fortune. While the figures may have been exaggerated, Rafsanjani’s extensive business empire before the revolution (he dealt in pistachios and property) gave credence to the accusations.

After Khomeini’s death in June 1989, Rafsanjani was elected president. Meanwhile, Khamenei had been elected as the new Supreme Leader, the highest office in the land (1). This new arrangement has influenced all the major political developments that have taken place in Iran ever since.

The two men had much in common; their political and ideological relationship stretched back to the early 1950s. They were the most committed and competent disciples of Ayatollah Khomeini, so it made perfect sense that they were at the pinnacle of the post-revolutionary system.

But they were increasingly divided by political and ideological outlook, and by different leadership styles. While Rafsanjani was happy to ride the tiger of clerical supremacy, he was careful to reach out to all the key constituents of society; he appeared to hold the middle ground in politics, yet he was content to see the battles between left and right worsen. Khamenei appealed to the grassroots of the revolution, embodying the hezbollahi spirit of the regime.

Khamenei to the fore

It was this difference in leadership styles that defined the dialectic of power in the Islamic Republic until the mid-1990s. Even though Khamenei – in his capacity as the Supreme Leader – was the more powerful, he and his supporters appeared to be in opposition to a dominant Rafsanjani. This perception of dominance – reinforced by greater cultural liberalisation following the austerity and piety of the 1980s – was resented and challenged by veterans of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war and by newly demobilised units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its paramilitary wing, the Basij, most of whom gravitated towards Khamenei.

They looked like an opposition under pressure, but Khamenei and his inner circle were consolidating power behind the scenes, through the IRGC and other grassroots revolutionary institutions. This covert political battle was suffused with personal symbolism, with Khamenei representing the ideology of the regime while Rafsanjani represented expediency. All the while the bond between them was judged to be of unique importance to the future direction – indeed the survival – of the revolution.

Though sidelined from the 1990s on, Rafsanjani continued in a major role in politics, as a grandee of the establishment. In hindsight, his fall began when he lost in the second round of the June 2005 presidential election to Ahmadinejad, a new force in Iranian politics.

The rise of Ahmadinejad represents the triumph of ideology over expediency. But at a deeper level it signifies the collapse of factional politics – the way politics were managed for 30 years – and the formalisation of rifts within the revolutionary establishment. Major political personalities – such as former prime minister Mousavi, ex-president Mohammad Khatami and ex-speaker of parliament Mehdi Karrubi – are new leaders of the opposition.

With the acute phase of the post-election crisis effectively over, Iranian politics is now moving towards more institutionalisation and the eventual formation of disciplined political parties. This may seem fanciful considering the political repression. But the maturation of the divisions long latent in the revolutionary body politic – and the aspirations of Iran’s politically aware young – point to this trend.

The end of factional politics signals the end of Hashemi Rafsanjani, who accumulated political capital from unregulated rifts and disputes. As the Iranian revolution moves toward its fifth decade, there seems to be no more room for the man who excelled in the art of being everything to everyone.