The F-35 Lightning II can evade radar while infiltrating enemy airspace to deliver a knockout blow. It's a sophisticated, stealthy fighter with one big vulnerability—being hacked. As the plane finally reaches full production, the Air Force is racing to plug holes that could allow hackers to exploit the jet's connected systems—with disastrous results.

The aircraft itself is pretty secure. As Air Force Times explains, there are multiple layers of security surrounding the jet, including PIN numbers for individual pilots and secure authentication in crafting mission packages for uploading into the aircraft computer. A faraway hacker could not, for example, start up the aircraft and force its engine to explode, or cause the airplane to roll off the runway and crash.

F-35 pilots are fond of saying that the plane is as much computer as fighter jet.

But whether we're talking about a home computer, phone, tablet, or a hugely expensive fighter jet, vulnerabilities add up the more you're connected with the outside world. Much of the F-35's strength lies in its ability to connect to the wider military and harness big data about the mission.

The worldwide F-35 fleet is connected to at least two secure networks designed to maximize efficiency. The first is the Autonomic Logistics Information System , or ALIS, which keeps track of individual aircraft issues and the location of spare parts and equipment worldwide. Here’s a Lockheed Martin video that describes ALIS:

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Every F-35 squadron, no matter the country, has a 13-server ALIS package that is connected to the worldwide ALIS network. Individual jets send logistical data back to their nation’s Central Point of Entry, which then passes it on to Lockheed's central server hub in Fort Worth, Texas. In fact, ALIS sends back so much data that some countries are worried it could give away too much information about their F-35 operations.

Another networking system is the Joint Reprogramming Enterprise , or JRE. The JRE maintains a shared library of potential adversary sensors and weapon systems that is distributed to the worldwide F-35 fleet. For example, the JRE will seek out and share information on enemy radar and electronic warfare signals so that individual air forces will not have to track down the information themselves. This allows countries with the F-35 to tailor the mission around anticipated threats—and fly one step ahead of them.

Although the networks have serious cybersecurity protections, they will undoubtedly be targets for hackers in times of peace, and war. Hackers might try to bring down the networks entirely, snarling the worldwide logistics system and even endangering the ability of individual aircraft to get much-needed spare parts. Alternately, it might be possible to compromise the integrity of the ALIS data—by, say, reporting a worldwide shortage of F-35 engines. Hackers could conceivably introduce bad data in the JRE that could compromise the safety of a mission, shortening the range of a weapon system so that a pilot thinks she is safely outside the engagement zone when she is most certainly not.

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Even the F-35 simulators that train pilots could conceivably leak data to an adversary. Flight simulators are programmed to mirror flying a real aircraft as much as possible, so data retrieved from a simulator will closely follow the data from a real F-35.

In an interview with Defense News, Brig. Gen. Stephen Jost, director of the Air Force F-35 Integration Office, says there are “a lot of nodes of vulnerability that we’re trying to shore up.” Not only is the worldwide networking system vulnerable, wireless systems used to support the F-35 could also be points of entry for hackers.

F-35 pilots are fond of saying that the plane is as much computer as fighter jet. While the use of computers and worldwide networking is a benefit to all of the jet’s operators, the U.S. military and F-35 customers worldwide must be sure the aircraft—and the equipment that supports it—is properly armored against cyber threats. The alternative could be the jet’s greatest advantages being quietly turned against it, the extent of the damage known only once the shooting starts.

Read more at Defense News .

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