In the fourth round of European Action, Ulster travelled to Harlequins knowing that whilst they had been a strong team in the pool they had missed out on opportunities. The game against Clermont in the Second Rounds had left them without a winning bonus point and it was the same at home against Harlequins in Round 3. For Harlequins, it had been a disappointing European campaign reflected, in the appearance of Marcus Smith in the coaches box rather than on the wet turf below. This had not to say, that Quins had left all their first choice team out with Sinckler returning for his first appearance at home since an almost perfect World Cup campaign. This set the scene for a scratchy, tense and tactical affair in front of the Harlequins crowds and under London clouds.



As you can probably tell from the introduction above, the weather played a large part in the game. It was the rain which led to a largely tactical affair. This was reflected in the stats as you can expect. Ulster kicked the most, managing to pin Harlequins back with a kicking rate of 84.6% while Harlequins kicked at an average of 60.7%. These high numbers set the background. However it was the still the grind of long general phases of play which set the background.



The breakdown of styles. Ulster (black) kicked a lot more, while Quins attempted more runs in a game dominated by the weather.

Ulster, basing their game around economy really aimed to stretch Harlequins, when they did have the ball, take this example in the 29th minute. For context, the play has started from a Landajo box kick gathered on the Harlequins 10m by Ulster’s John Cooney.



Ulster immediately, play 2 phases down the middle setting a solid platform before, stretching Quins and playing the full width reaching Faddes in the outside channel. This has the benefit of pulling Harlequins and forcing some extra effort as some over pull and have to reassemble. This causes a contraction in the Quins lineup close to the break down.



Following this Ulster then play 2 balls yet again reaching into the centre of the field.

From the second breakdown they play wide, Burns pulling the ball deep and exposing the outside of Ismaiel. Interestingly Harlequins were deploying Dombrandt deeper to cover the kicks meaning they had once less forward in the line. However, once the break is made Ulster aim to reset and deliberately tighten the play.



This allows them to keep the ball, even despite a slight break from the pattern with the offload. By slowing down the attack following the break Ulster were able to retain possession. While on this occasion it didn’t lead to a try it shows the deliberate nature of Ulster, which whilst boring was effective in exerting pressure.



This is in comparison with Quins, who often struggle to continue the opportunities they created.



Take this example from a minute or so after the above period of Ulster pressure. Harlequins have gotten into Ulster territory and strart from a Lineout. The crash ball however, is aimed at Marcell Coeteze who sits back the runner and kills momentum. James Lang, then does make ground on the following carry. But Quins are then drawn into playing in front of the gain line.



Cavubati in the exmaple above runs a strong line forcing two defenders in, with a nice flick inside allowing Elia to carry late at Herring. However, the ball comes early and Cavubati is shaping to pass before he has interested Ulster. This means Elia gets caught. While Ulster were no by means perfect at breaching the gainline on every carry, Cavubati’s carry kills momentum completely after Lang had given it a boost.



This leads to the example above, where Chisholm and Goneva look to challenge the central defenders. However, Chisholm receives the ball to deep. Not only does this limit the possible ground gained, it also means the forwards on the tip can be cut off completely naturally. Chisholm sees, not only a white wall, but a river of defenders. This is a simple effect of Rugby defense. With fringe defense watching the pick and go they can’t accelerate immediately and instead the outside comes up faster.



As a result, Chisholm can see that there is more speed on his outside ready to smash the tip on option. Therefore he naturally uses his inside option looking to regain some partial territory. This movement entirely stems from three of the four carries from the lineout being unable to break the wall.



Had Cavubati been able to carry strongly and carry on Lang’s momentum it would have enabled Chisholm to have more options instead of Goneva, who became partially isolated and again the ball was slowed.



However, once Quins made momentum they could easily spurn it. This is best shown in the amount of Errors, they made. They lost the ball to handling error on 14 occasions compared to Ulster’s 6.



This is a continuation from the attack before, Quins making a line break following 2 carries before which had made yards beyond the wall. With one of the best ball playing front rows flipping the ball inside, and Lewies making a break. Where Ulster made 3 breaks in the example above (minutes before) and held the ball lewies is unable to hold on.

Breakdown of where Harlequins played the game. Pinned in their Own 50 and Own 22 for 43 of their attacks.

This caused some real problems for Quins who were unable to take advantage of their breaks. The mistakes also came for the majority in their own 50. This fed a seemingly inescapable cycle. Ulster able to pin back Quins in their Own 50, who would escape before losing the ball and being forced back.



Overall, Ulster were able to strike effectively from set pieces, the majority of tries coming from immediate strikes. However, the grinding nature of the game meant the precision of Ulster to keep Quins pinned back and turn the screw before Quins finally broke and made an exit from Europe.

