The president of Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani, created a stir during a recent interview, slated to be aired April 13, in which he said that an independent Kurdish state was coming and that Iraq was moving toward a confederation. So far, he has not denied those claims.

More than five years ago, Barzani made similarly explosive rhetoric on a fairly regular basis. At that time, Iraqi Kurdistan was huddled under a fraying U.S. security umbrella in Iraq, Baghdad was still engrossed in civil war and Turkey was bombing Kurdistan Workers' Party hideouts in northern Iraq. Turkish officials publicly and privately disparaged Barzani for calling for Kurdish independence and for raising the Kurdish flag in defiance of Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran and Damascus, all of which shared a need to keep a tight lid on Kurdish aspirations for autonomy.

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But then things changed. Turkey was preparing itself to fill a vacuum in Iraqi Kurdistan once the United States withdrew. As part of that preparation, an increasingly confident Justice and Development Party government in Ankara struck up a dialogue with Barzani's nephew, Nechirvan, and started laying out the pieces of a long-term strategy that would not only neutralize the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey but provide Turkey with an alternative source of energy and Kurdish votes at home.

In return for helping negotiate a truce with the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey and for prioritizing Turkey in economic development and energy sales, the Kurdistan Regional Government expected Turkey to play the ironic role of its security guarantor, providing a vital market and supply line for Kurdish energy exports. The deal came with an understanding that the Kurdistan Regional Government would enjoy greater energy autonomy from Baghdad but would have to respect Turkish demands to drop a campaign for independence. Adjusting to the new strategic environment, the elder Barzani toned down his nationalist rhetoric, started appearing in news conferences with Turkish officials and was hailed as a strategic partner by Ankara.

For a while, the strategy appeared to be making headway. In 2013, the Turkish government launched its most ambitious peace track with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and Kurdish voters were starting to line up behind the Justice and Development Party in hopes of a settlement. By early 2014, a Turkish-backed pipeline designed to transport Kurdish energy to Turkey independently of Baghdad came online.

This is also where things were bound to get complicated. As we expected, Baghdad has been able to strong-arm the Kurds with its budgetary authority, and a desperate Kurdistan Regional Government is now looking to Ankara for help.

But Ankara is not quite prepared to be that lifeline. Turkey could certainly use Kurdish energy, especially when events in Ukraine serve as a daily reminder of Turkey's immense energy dependency on Russia. But Turkey is not about to subsidize the Kurdistan Regional Government when it has its own economic issues to deal with (including paying off that hefty energy bill to Russia). A stable oil flow out of Iraqi Kurdistan simply won't be possible so long as Baghdad retains the ability to turn the economic screws on the Kurdistan Regional Government.

This leaves Barzani, as de facto patriarch of the regional government, in a very difficult position. Without funds coming from Baghdad any time soon, the Kurdish leader is looking for more creative options to break the deadlock. He understands that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan just came off a comfortable victory in local elections and is now betting on enough Kurdish votes to fulfill his desire of becoming president come August. To get those votes, Erdogan will have to count on the Kurdistan Regional Government's continued cooperation on the peace track with the Kurdistan Workers' Party. If any hint of a resurgence of attacks arises in the coming weeks and months, Barzani will have Ankara asking him for the big favor of helping calm the situation down. Barzani is also looking ahead to Iraqi elections at the end of the month, which will lead to a lengthy, fractious period of political haggling in which the Kurds could provide the crucial make-or-break vote for the coalition. In other words, the Kurdish leadership, while desperate, is looking for any and every way to boost its leverage and climb out of its current rut.

Threatening Kurdish independence may be a component to that strategy, albeit a weak one. While such rhetoric will certainly aggravate Ankara, whose cooperation the Kurdistan Regional Government needs, it also needs to show that there could be more serious consequences if the Kurds are pushed over the edge by Baghdad. This is a message Barzani wants to send to Turkey, the United States and Baghdad, all of which are in talks currently to negotiate some sort of compromise.

The question is, will it even work? A unilateral move toward independence would ensure clashes between Peshmerga and Iraqi army units at a time when the Kurdistan Regional Government is already deeply focused on insulating itself from jihadist spillover and can't afford more distractions. Such a move would push Ankara, Baghdad, Damascus and Tehran to coordinate in undermining an independent Kurdish state for fear that it would spawn similar calls within their own borders. And then there is the issue of money: An independent Kurdish state still needs money to pay the bills. If Iraqi Kurdistan lacks a reliable export route and the funds to pay foreign oil firms, a forthcoming call for independence will remain another piece of fiery rhetoric that falls flat in Kurdistan's troubled history.