First, our nation must seek an honorable and enduring outcome worthy of the tremendous sacrifices that have been made, especially the sacrifices of lives. The men and women who serve our nation in combat deserve a plan for victory. . . . Second, the consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable. 9/11, the worst terrorist attack in our history, was planned and directed from Afghanistan because that country by a government that gave comfort and shelter to terrorists. A hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum that terrorists, including ISIS and al Qaeda, would instantly fill, just as happened before September 11. . . . Third and finally, I concluded that the security threats we face in Afghanistan and the broader region are immense. Today, 20 U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations are active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The highest concentration in any region anywhere in the world. For its part, Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror. The threat is worse because Pakistan and India are two nuclear-armed states, whose tense relations threat to spiral into conflict, and that could happen.

Unfortunately, the means to achieve victory seemed both vague and insufficient. “We will not talk about numbers of troops or our plans for further military activities. Conditions on the ground, not arbitrary timetables, will guide our strategy from now on,” he said. (That’s fine, but could we get a ballpark figure to assess whether the commitment is sufficient to obtain the desired result?) One platitude followed another. “Another fundamental pillar of our new strategy is the integration of all instruments of American power, diplomatic, economic, and military, toward a successful outcome.” But have we not been doing that for almost 16 years? The result hardly sounded like a definitive victory. (“Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban and Afghanistan, but nobody knows if or when that will ever happen. America will continue its support for the Afghan government and the Afghan military as they confront the Taliban in the field.”)

Trump also promised to get tough with Pakistan but did not say how he would do that. (“No partnership can survive a country’s harboring of militants and terrorists who target U.S. service members and officials. It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to civilization, order, and to peace.”)

Looking on the positive side, Trump confessed to changing his mind and did lay out the stakes in the region. Restating that it will be up to Afghans ultimately to secure their country and that the United States would commit to helping them arrive at that goal while putting pressure on Pakistan was reassuring. Former ambassador Eric Edelman recapped the positive elements:

He didn’t pull out or heed the blandishments of [Stephen K.] Bannon and [Erik] Prince to build a mercenary army to fight the war. Making our policy conditions-based rather than subject to artificial deadlines is certainly an improvement over the previous Administration’s approach, but truth be told [Barack] Obama himself had abandoned the timelines he had originally set by the end of his Administration. Less micromanagement from Washington is clearly better than young, inexperienced staffers pestering commanders in the field with endless, politically based intrusions into the war fighter’s work. Recognizing, as Trump did, that Pakistan is an immensely important part of the problem is hardly a new insight — [George W.] Bush and Obama both realized it but how to deal with it is the $64,000 dollar question and on that the President was silent. Recognition of India as an important part of the regional equation and the danger of the delicate balance of nuclear terror on the South Asian subcontinent is welcome, but again the President had little to say about what the U.S. will do about it.

Nevertheless, in refusing to be pinned down — or to confess that complete victory is impossible — Trump left us uncertain as to whether there is a definitive plan to achieve a specific outcome. (“Our troops will fight to win. We will fight to win. From now on, victory will have a clear definition — attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al-Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan and stopping mass terror attacks against America before they emerge.”) Victory isn’t, of course, determined by “attacking our enemies”; attacking enemies is the means to an end. Moreover, preventing the Taliban from “taking over Afghanistan” tells us very little about our endpoint. In short, Trump never told us how his plan is different from the plans we’ve seen over the past 16 years.

Edelman observed: “It is hard to call it an approach, it is really more of an attitude. The speech was in keeping with Trump’s approach to everything, which is to say it was more about him than anything else.” Edelman pointed out that from the effort to recover from the Charlottesville debacle to his ” ‘I wanted to pull out’ instincts to his pathetic whining about the crappy hand he was dealt — it read less like a carefully thought-out strategy and policy and more like an internal monologue.” He added, “It was not a compelling argument to the public for continued involvement and sacrifice.”

Others tried to look for the silver lining. “If the numbers being discussed in public are correct (4,000 or so), then it is not likely to be rapidly decisive,” cautioned Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute. “But the most important thing is to articulate the importance of this theater, which he did very well and accurately, commit to the fight, which he also did, manage expectations, which he did, and promise to act according to conditions in pursuit of victory.” Kagan offered that at least this was better than some of the rejected options (e.g. a complete pullout).

Supporters of continued engagement in Afghanistan will need to press for more details and hold the president to his commitment, however unsatisfying. Frankly, Trump did not give supporters of his policy much to work with, and he did not do much to persuade skeptics. Was this a rhetorical failure, or is the policy still a work in progress? Unfortunately, our current commander in chief leaves us with little assurance that he won’t change his mind in a week, or a month, or a year. It therefore remains far from clear that we are on a trajectory that is different from that which led us to where we are — a good deal short of victory.