The debate over Brexit has so far been more about process than about substance. In 2017 that will change—and the going may get tougher

ON ONE level, much has happened since June 23rd, when Britain voted by 51.9% to 48.1% to leave the European Union. The country has a new government led by Theresa May. She has set up two new Departments, for Exiting the EU (under David Davis) and for International Trade (under Liam Fox). After years of cuts, the civil service is growing again, to tackle the challenge of disentangling Britain from Brussels. And in his Autumn Statement Philip Hammond, the chancellor, softened previous plans to cut the budget deficit by 2020.

On Brexit itself, however, Mrs May has done little beyond repeating her catchphrase that “Brexit means Brexit and we’re going to make a success of it.” She has promised a Great Repeal Bill to enshrine most existing EU rules into British law for continuity. And she has said she will invoke Article 50 of the EU treaty, the legal clause that sets a two-year time limit for Brexit, by the end of March 2017.

Indeed, most public discussion on Brexit has been procedural, not substantive. Parliamentary debates have revolved around how much information MPs will be given. The courts have become involved: in January the Supreme Court will decide whether triggering Article 50 necessitates prior authority through an act of Parliament, as the High Court has already ruled. There have been disputes over how much Mrs May should reveal of her negotiating objectives. And all this before there is internal agreement within the government over what form of Brexit to aim for when negotiations begin.

Neil Carmichael, a pro-EU Tory MP, is hoping to see a government white paper on Brexit before Article 50 is triggered. Indeed, just after the referendum such a paper was proposed by none other than Mr Davis himself. He recently said the government would not publish anything before February, but that would still leave time for a white paper and a short parliamentary act before Article 50 is invoked.

The substance of Brexit is likely to prove more difficult than the procedure, for two reasons. One is that it will involve trade-offs the government has so far avoided debating. Most obviously, maximising barrier-free access to the EU’s single market will make it hard to take back full control of migration and laws and to cease contributions to the EU’s budget. Many more dilemmas await: for instance, the desire to maintain security and intelligence co-operation with the EU may be hard to achieve if Mrs May sticks to her insistence on escaping completely from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.

The second reason is that Britain’s 27 EU partners are likely to put a premium on unity. Mrs May was excluded from an EU summit dinner in Brussels on December 15th. There was talk of an exit bill for Britain as large as 60bn ($63bn), and of making clear that negotiation of future trade relations would follow, and not run in parallel with, the two-year Article 50 divorce settlement. Other EU leaders face political pressures at home: France, Germany, the Netherlands and possibly Italy will all have elections in 2017.

Yet if the general gloom points to a harder version of Brexit, some signs point in the other direction. Mr Davis and Mr Hammond seem to be working together to minimise the shock of departure. Mr Davis has not ruled out making payments into the EU budget after Brexit. Several ministers have floated the possibility of continuing partial membership of the single market, the customs union or both. This week the Scottish government said it wanted to stay in the single market regardless of what happens to Britain.

And there is a growing recognition of the economic risks of Brexit. Brexiteers have long claimed that forecasts by Mr Hammond’s predecessor, George Osborne, were too gloomy. But the Autumn Statement made clear that Brexit has a cost. Consumption has held up but investment is being cut. Banks and others in financial services are talking of job losses as positions are transferred to continental Europe. How the economy performs matters: one recent poll for Open Britain, a pro-EU lobby group, found that half of Leave voters are not ready to be made worse off as a result of Brexit. That could prod ministers towards a softer version.

So might more realism about immigration. Thus far, this has been presented in terms of the relationship between the single market and the four freedoms of movement of capital, goods, services and people. The implication has been that to keep the first may require concessions on the second. But a number of companies in industries ranging from financial services to agriculture are making clear that migration is crucial in its own right. Indeed, some are more concerned about migration controls than they are about barrier-free access to the EU’s single market.

Lastly, more politicians see the need for a transitional deal with the EU to avert a hard landing in March 2019. A string of recent reports from the House of Lords EU committee say this matters, especially for financial services. Mr Davis and Mr Hammond have talked up the case for transition. As Nick Clegg, a former leader of the Liberal Democrats, puts it, the fact that transition was ever controversial is “symptomatic of a strategyless approach to Brexit”. That it is now widely accepted may be a sign of growing common sense.