In the past few days, VCIOM released the results of a large opinion poll about Russian attitudes towards the Revolution, the Civil War, and various historical figures.

The results largely speak for themselves, but to identify the most important elements:

1. Soviet attitudes are dying out. While older generations are still highly “pro-Soviet” historically, attitudes amongst the young are essentially mixed (as proxied by opinions on Nicholas II vs. Lenin/Stalin, or sympathy for the Reds vs. the Whites).

This confirms my frequent observations that Russia is not an outlier insofar as younger cohorts in Eastern Europe are trending towards nationalism, and away from socialism.

2. On a related note, there’s nest of sovok trolls who infest the comments hat insist that I am a marginal loser, have an Americanized mindset, etc. In reality my views are not atypical of my generation.

They would know this if they tracked opinion polls, or for that matter, lived in Russia (in reality, of course, almost none of them do, having fled “their” country as soon as if not before it collapsed).

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1. What was the main cause of the Civil War?

All polled 18-32 years 33-42 years 43+ years Foreign intervention 35% 27% 36% 38% Bolshevik policies 34% 41% 38% 29% White resistance 9% 12% 4% 10% (Incorrect) Tsarist policies 2% 1% 3% 3% Impoverishment, despair 2% 1% 1% 3% All the above 1% 1% 2% 1% Large wealth gap 1% 1% 0% 1% Other 2% 1% 2% 2% Hard to say 14% 15% 14% 13%

These are all correct, to a greater or less extent. Even so, foreign intervention as a cause of the Civil War is the dominant trope of Soviet and neo-Soviet discourse on this question. The real tragedy, of course, was that the scope of said intervention was far too limited to present any danger to Bolshevik power, and was in any case rapidly withdrawn when the Whites suffered military reverses; but just sufficient for the Reds to effectively use it is a propaganda point.

This narrative is now declining. While the pseudo-patriotic option of “foreign intervention” is cited by 38% of 43+ year olds, this falls to 27% amongst the 18-32 year olds, of whom a plurality blame Bolshevik policies. Virtually nobody these days talks about classically leftist factors such as “impoverishment” or wealth gaps even amongst the boomers, which confirms Kholmogorov’s point that classical Communism is completely dead in Russia.

4. Which side do you sympathize more with in the Civil War?

All polled 18-32 years 33-42 years 43+ years Sooner the Reds 16% 10% 11% 21% Sooner the Whites 7% 11% 8% 5% All had legitimate points 31% 29% 23% 34% No relevance to today 36% 43% 44% 31% Hard to say 10% 7% 14% 9%

The vast majority of Russians remain ambivalent or disinterested on this question – much as in 1917.

Even so, amongst the “activists”, the preponderance of the Reds over the Whites decreases from 4:1 amongst the boomers to parity amongst youth.

7. What feelings do the following actors of the first half of the 20th century evoke in you?

Blue – sympathy; red – antipathy. From left to right: Nicholas II; Stalin; Lenin; Kolchak; Denikin. Via Tsargrad.

Table:

Year Sooner sympathy Sooner antipathy Hard to say Nicholas II 2018 54% 23% 23% Nicholas II 2017 60% 20% 20% Nicholas II 2008 44% 22% 34% Nicholas II 2005 42% 28% 30% Stalin 2018 51% 28% 21% Stalin 2017 52% 30% 18% Stalin 2008 28% 48% 24% Stalin 2005 37% 47% 16% Lenin 2018 49% 29% 22% Lenin 2017 53% 30% 17% Lenin 2008 42% 30% 28% Lenin 2005 50% 32% 18% Kolchak 2018 36% 29% 35% Kolchak 2017 35% 37% 28% Kolchak 2008 32% 30% 38% Kolchak 2005 20% 41% 39% Denikin 2018 23% 30% 47% Denikin 2017 25% 38% 37% Denikin 2008 23% 32% 45% Denikin 2005 26% 39% 35% Trotsky 2018 20% 46% 34% Trotsky 2017 21% 52% 27% Trotsky 2008 18% 39% 43% Trotsky 2005 16% 45% 39% Bukharin 2018 18% 26% 56% Bukharin 2017 20% 30% 50% Bukharin 2008 21% 22% 57% Bukharin 2005 21% 22% 57% Kerensky 2018 11% 46% 43% Kerensky 2017 16% 47% 37% Kerensky 2008 16% 36% 48% Kerensky 2005 14% 44% 42% Makhno 2018 12% 58% 30% Makhno 2017 13% 63% 24% Makhno 2008 18% 45% 37% Makhno 2005 13% 55% 32% Milyukov 2018 7% 23% 70% Milyukov 2017 7% 28% 65% Milyukov 2008 10% 29% 61% Milyukov 2005 7% 32% 61%

Essentially, we see three distinct trends over the past thirteen years:

1. Stagnation in the ratings of the Communist figures (Lenin, Bukharin, Trotsky), with Lenin’s reputation remaining positive, and Trotsky’s negative. Both are, of course, a product of the Soviet religious narrative – Lenin as the founding God of the Soviet state, Trotsky as the great betrayer and universal scapegoat (even though in all fairness Lenin was consistently more extremist and maximalist than Trotsky).

2. Rehabilitation of the Whites, in particular Nicholas II (who is now viewed more sympathetically than either Lenin or Stalin), and of Kolchak though not so much Denikin (perhaps thanks to this film about The Admiral).

3. Unfortunately, also a rehabilitation of Stalin. I discussed the reasons for that here. TL;DR: Stalin “loads” on the patriotic/vatnik component (if undeservedly), not the leftist one, of the modern Russian psyche. Still, even if a bad thing, at least it happens for the right reasons.

Moreover, this is how the figures look if only the 18-32 year olds are considered in 2018 (which I extracted via the attached .sav file with all the variables).

Sympathy Antipathy Hard to say Net Sympathy Bukharin 13% 24% 63% -12% Kerensky 14% 25% 61% -11% Kolchak 42% 17% 41% 25% Lenin 47% 32% 21% 15% Makhno 20% 33% 47% -13% Milyukov 13% 24% 64% -11% Denikin 19% 19% 62% 0% Nicholas II 61% 18% 21% 43% Stalin 55% 27% 18% 28% Trotsky 31% 36% 34% -5%

Net favorability of Nicholas II climbs from 31% (vs. Stalin’s 23% and Lenin’s 20%) amongst the general population, to 43% (vs. Stalin’s 28% and Lenin’s 15%).

For comparison, here is the data for 65+ year olds:

Sympathy Antipathy Hard to say Net Sympathy Bukharin 21% 31% 48% -10% Kerensky 7% 61% 31% -54% Kolchak 24% 42% 33% -18% Lenin 58% 20% 21% 38% Makhno 3% 80% 17% -77% Milyukov 2% 27% 71% -25% Denikin 20% 40% 40% -20% Nicholas II 46% 26% 27% 20% Stalin 53% 21% 26% 31% Trotsky 14% 49% 36% -35%

Here is the net favorability of these figures across youth, the boomers, and the general population.

18-32 years 33-64 years 65+ years All polled* Bukharin -12% -8% -10% -9% Kerensky -11% -39% -54% -36% Kolchak 25% 9% -18% 7% Lenin 15% 13% 38% 18% Makhno -13% -54% -77% -50% Milyukov -11% -17% -25% -18% Denikin 0% -5% -20% -7% Nicholas II 43% 28% 20% 29% Stalin 28% 16% 31% 21% Trotsky -5% -34% -35% -28%

1. Increase in net positive sentiments towards “nationalist”-associated figures (Nicholas II, Kolchak, Denikin).The pattern here more clearly confirms what was already evident above:

2. Decrease in antipathy towards liberal figures (Kerensky, Milyukov) and especially towards the Ukrainian anarchist Makhno. This should be interpreted as just the consequences of the end of Soviet propaganda against them; people simply no longer take an interest in them, one way or the other.

3. Curiously, Stalinist sentiments are slightly stronger amongst youth *and* the boomers, versus the middle-aged, who are far more skeptical. This is probably because those two groups have more of a patriotic-vatnik tilt to them than the middle-aged, whose formative experiences were in the 1990s. Recall that so far as political tribalism in Russia is concerned, Stalin is more of a patriot than a Communist.

* Figures for the general population differ slightly from public poll results because I didn’t apply the demographic weightings.