Until the moment the Berlin Wall collapsed

on November 9th, 1989, nobody believed that East Germany would disappear and

the two German states would be unified. The reasons for this perception were

both that the USSR apparently had no desire to allow it, and that East Germany

had given the impression of being a stable socialist state, one with the most generous

welfare system in the Eastern Bloc.

East Germans themselves were even more

confident of this, not only because their state had the most advanced and

generous welfare system of all, but also because it was thought it could not

collapse for as long as the Soviet Union endured. Not one single major politician from East or

even West Germany was active in pushing for reunification.

Erich Honecker’s Stable East

German Regime

The mid 1980s were a time of unrest for the

Eastern Bloc communist states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, whose

citizens demanded ever-greater liberalization. East Germany, by contrast, seemed

exceedingly stable as leader Erich Honecker began his 19th year in

power.

There were some demonstrations; however,

they were modest and happened only occasionally. Moreover, the demands were

limited to freedom of travel and protection of human rights and the environment;

issues unconnected with regime change. May 1989 local elections produced

landslide results for the ruling party. Honecker, who had come to power in

1971, was seen as a relatively liberal leader, one who raised wages, extended

vacations, granted greater freedom of movement, and increased supplies of housing.

Nobody could even imagine that this was about to end.

False Impressions: Strong Industry and Fine Socialist

Welfare

Among the socialist states, East Germany

was known for its generous welfare and advanced technological know-how.

According to official statistics for 1989, GDP was $9703, and the average

economic growth rate over the last 5 years had been 3.02%, surpassing West

Germany’s 2.66%. Encyclopaedia Britannica recorded that East Germany had the

most developed economy in Eastern Europe, and that its manufacturing industry

was among the largest in the world.

It only became clear only after

reunification that the East German economy had actually been in dire straits.

Despite assertions that no foreign loans had been received, the country owed

more than $20bn dollars to foreign creditors, and spent 62% of annual foreign

currency earnings on servicing its debts. After 1990, East Germany required

annual transfers of $5.5 to $6.5bn dollars per annum; otherwise, standards of

living would have dropped by 30%. The value of the East German economy amounted

to just 30% that of West Germany, and its average productivity was only 25%

that of the West.

The basic cause of East Germany’s

subsequent collapse was distortions inherent to socialist economic systems the

world over, but the specific cause was failed 1980s investments in chemical and

electronics industries. The generous welfare system also stunted the economy

badly. The two German states were in competition to provide the best welfare

for their people, and in East Germany annual economic growth was dwarfed by

welfare payments growth.

In March 1990, after the fall of the

Berline Wall, the first free elections in East German history produced a

government led by Lothar de Maiziere, which pressed for swift reunification. De

Maiziere’s Alliance for Germany did this in part because the people desired it,

of course, but more importantly because East Germany’s survival could not be

guaranteed.

National Security and Security Systems

East Germany occupied a more secure

position than its neighbours. Its regular soldiers numbered 95,000, and

reserves 180,000. The Stasi (secret police) had one Stasi agent for every 62

civilians. By comparison, the Nazi equivalent, the Gestapo, had just 32,000

agents managing 80mn civilians. Moreover, because East Germany was on the front

line against Western Europe, an additional 540,000 Soviet service personnel

were stationed on its soil. It was difficult to imagine the collapse of East

German communism.

Maintaining Status on the World Stage

East Germany had a solid international presence.

Although it had diplomatic relations with 134 states, lagging behind West

Germany with 162, East Germany nonetheless had relations with important states such

as the United States, France, and the UK. Both East and West joined the UN

after signing the 1972 Grundlagenvertrag,

or Basic Treaty, which governed their relations. In addition, the two held

seven summits and signed thirteen agreements establishing cooperation in

diverse areas. Hence, efforts to establish a socialist East Germany distinct

from West Germany were clearly successful.

In order for German reunification to take

place, it needed the acquiescence of the four major powers and the persuasion

of neighbouring countries. These requirements made it seemingly impossible for

reunification to happen. Therefore, East Germans did not believe that

reunification was possible, and did not expect or particularly desire it to

take place.

Lessons from East Germany

Outwardly, East Germany appeared stable,

but reunification took place mere months after the collapse of communism. This

sudden turn of events offers several important lessons. Firstly, that it is very

hard to judge the opinions of people living under an oppressive regime. The

East German regime believed that its popular support was high; they did not

know what lay beneath the surface.

Secondly, that official statistics released

by communist states are not reliable. East Germany did try to assemble accurate

statistics, and scholars from both Germanys collaborated and exchanged

documents. Nonetheless, administrative bodies fabricated data, to the extent

that even the government did not have an accurate understanding of its economy.

Thirdly, that the awareness and aggregate

thinking of a people living under an oppressive regime can change radically

once a revolutionary spark is ignited. East Germans believed that as long as

the USSR kept hold of East Germany, political change would be difficult, and so

held back from expressing anti-regime sentiment. However, once they realized

that the USSR no longer wished to buttress the East German communists led by

Honecker, they began expressing their sentiment openly, and because West

Germany stood next door as a model, they threw off the shackles of the regime

in a surprisingly brief moment.