Bill C-14, the government’s response to the Carter Supreme Court ruling on medical assistance in dying, is generating a lot of criticism from diametrically opposed perspectives — from those who think it’s too permissive and those who think it’s too restrictive.

Constitutional law scholar Errol Mendes, testifying before the Senate Committee, was right to invoke the old adage: “Perfection is the enemy of the good.” It’s especially apt where assisted dying is concerned, since there are so many different versions out there of what constitutes ‘perfect’.

The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the absolute ban on physician-assisted suicide ran counter to the Charter of Rights because it went too far in its attempt to protect the vulnerable — those who seek death in a moment of weakness. The Supreme Court suspended its declaration of invalidity until June 6 in order to give Parliament time to develop a complex regulatory regime.

The most contentious aspect of Bill C-14 is that it is limited to those who are dying, but with no time-limited cut-off. Those who think Bill C-14 is too permissive are seriously constrained by the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling. No attempt to completely prevent medical assistance in dying is possible without invoking the Charter’s notwithstanding clause — a highly unlikely option. Very restricted access to assisted dying — such as the proposal from the Conservative bench that assisted death should be allowed only for patients with less than a month to live — would almost certainly fail a Charter challenge.

Critics who think Bill C-14 is too permissive should consider the consequences of defeating or significantly delaying the bill. From their perspective, going forward with no law could only make things far worse. Without criminal legislation, courts would have to fall back on the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling invalidating the ban on physician assisted dying — which would result in much wider access to physician-assisted death than C-14 would permit.

If the Supreme Court had determined already that Parliament could not adopt an end-of-life stipulation, it would have said so. But it never weighed the pros and cons of any end-of-life stipulation. It handed over that task to Parliament. If the Supreme Court had determined already that Parliament could not adopt an end-of-life stipulation, it would have said so. But it never weighed the pros and cons of any end-of-life stipulation. It handed over that task to Parliament.

Then there are those who think wide access is constitutionally required, and that by limiting physician-assisted death to those facing a reasonably foreseeable death, Bill C-14 violates that requirement. These critics claim that since the Supreme Court of Canada’s declaration said nothing explicit about limiting assisted death, no limits should apply. If an end-of-life stipulation were permissible, the argument goes, the Supreme Court would have said so.

I find the opposite argument more compelling: If the Supreme Court had determined already that Parliament could not adopt an end-of-life stipulation, it would have said so and explained why. But it never weighed the pros and cons of any end-of-life stipulation, such as exists in American states and in Quebec’s law. It handed over the task of evaluating an end-of-life stipulation to Parliament.

Much has been made of the comment by Justice Andromache Karakatsanis on January 11, 2016, during the hearing on the application to give Parliament extra time to respond to the Carter ruling. Justice Karakatsanis, discussing Quebec’s legislation, said that “whereas in Carter we rejected terminally ill …” — the implication being that the law must not limit access to physician-assisted death to those already dying.

Much less attention has been paid to the fact that Justice Karakatsanis herself pulled back in the Court’s written reasons just four days later. She was one of five judges who said the court “should not be taken as expressing any view as to the validity” of the Quebec legislation.

If Bill C-14 is unconstitutional in being limited to those who are dying, so is Quebec’s legislation. In the second Carter decision, the Supreme Court was careful to leave the issue open. Despite that, those arguing that the first Carter decision already settled that there can be no end-of-life stipulation in an assisted dying bill are saying that this matter is not even open for debate.

The principled defence of Bill C-14 — the reason why it’s likely constitutional — is that the risk of an irreversible error (of subjecting people to a premature death who may have ended up changing their minds) is much higher for those not already close to death. To claim that all that counts is individual autonomy is to deny society’s duty to protect the vulnerable.

The Supreme Court ruling has not obliterated suicide prevention as important public policy. Bill C-14 may not be perfect, but it’s far better than the alternatives.

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