Under Vanetsyan’s tenure an extensive number of investigations were initiated dealing with corruption and abuse of power by members of the previous regime, ranging from public officials to powerful businessmen. The question that arises is quite simple: What has been the end result of these high-profile arrests and investigations? Was the anti-corruption program, as implemented under Vanetsyan’s stewardship, a mirage, or has there been substantive results? This is the illusion of Vanetsyan. A more pertinent question also presents itself: Why have certain oligarchs or public officials been targeted, while others have not? Between concerns of investigative stagnation and selective justice, the popularity and illusion of Vanetsyan can only go so far. While there are a wide-range of case studies—from Ruben Hayrapetyan (“Nemetz Rubo”) to Aghvan Hovsepian’s “Aparan clan” to Khachatur Sukiasian (“Grzo”) to numerous other individuals—that may be presented addressing concerns of investigative stagnation and selective justice, for the sake of parsimony, four will be assessed.

One of the most notorious members of the previous regime, a former member of parliament that illegally and through extortion dominated the Yerevan district of Erebuni, one who blurred the line between businessman, politician, and gangster, and one who happens to have the moniker “Toghmaghi Mher” has, astonishingly, not been touched by the NSS during Vanetsyan’s tenure. The person of reference here is, of course, Mher Sedrakyan, whose prolific vulgarity towards journalists was perhaps his better side, a consummate “heghinakutyun” who controlled both criminals and the police in his fiefdom of Erebuni. That the NSS has not targeted Sedrakyan’s past crimes, his network of acolytes, and his economic empire attained through illegal enrichment remains a mystery. This mystery, of course, must be unraveled by the NSS, but the fact that such a mystery exists creates concerns of trust and selective justice. Why has someone like Sedrakyan not been touched, while others, who have come nowhere close to the things that he has done, been subjected (rightly so) to justice? That Vanetsyan is very close friends with Sedrakyan’s son, for example, may perhaps create more questions than answers. While we are not here to speculate, we can, however, express our concern at the unequal distribution of justice.

A similarly fascinating case of investigative stagnation, and one that has been speculated upon extensively, has been the case of Mikayel Minasyan, son-in-law of former President Serzh Sargsyan, as well as Sargsyan’s former chief-of-staff and Armenia’s ambassador to the Holy See at the Vatican. Minasyan’s immense wealth, his dominance of Armenia’s media, and his expansive abuse of his authority to illegally enrich himself is not only an open secret, but rather, has been verified by various Armenian investigative journalists. This, again, poses the question: Why has someone like Minasyan not been touched, while others, who have come nowhere close to the activities that he has undertaken, been subjected (rightly so) to justice? Again, we refrain from speculating, but there are undeniable patterns that indicate lack of investigative rigor and enforcement of the law by Vanetsyan’s NSS. The fact that charges were brought against Minasyan, immediately upon Vanetsyan’s dismissal, is an astonishing coincidence. But again, one should not speculate…

If the corruption of Sedrakyan was not very sophisticated, or if the corruption of Minasyan was overly-sophisticated, the astounding corruption of former Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan was simply blatant. He is considered one of the more prolific organizers of corruption from the previous regime. Possessing the moniker “Mook” (Mouse), he is a peasant-turned-lord of Ararat, who not only monopolized most of the industry and agriculture of the region, but expanded his wealth by embezzling the country’s institutions. The NSS’ comical investigation of Abrahamyan has also astonished most observers: a simple investigation of illegal gun ownership that Abrahamyan’s brother assumed responsibility for. Years of illegal enrichment, abuse of power, and transparent embezzlement did not seem sufficient for Vanetsyan to direct the NSS into properly investigating and bringing charges.

One of the more powerful individuals in the city of Yerevan, assuming the moniker of “Chorny” (meaning “black” in Russian), Gagik Beglarian professionalized the art of corruption and embezzlement in his capacity as both Mayor of Yerevan and then Minister of Transportation. Beglarian’s abuse of authority as Mayor of Yerevan was so profound that he was actually forced to resign by Serzh Sargsyan (regardless of the fact that two were allies). Exercising extensive control over the city’s construction and jewelry industries, Beglarian utilized his position as Mayor to both plunder and amass a huge economic empire through sophisticated kickbacks. Furthermore, when later appointed Minister of Transportation, he played an important role in orchestrating the embezzlement of funds from the North-South Highway construction project, one of the more extravagant embezzlement cases in recent memory. Taxi driver-turned-oligarch, Beglarian is the perfect archetype of the criminal-politicians that made up the ruling elite of the previous regime: contemptible individuals who preyed on their own society. Trying to cogently comprehend why Vanetsyan’s NSS did not pursue a criminal of this magnitude defies all understandings of equal application of the law.

Conclusion

Can the popularity of the NSS be sustained after Vanetsyan’s dismissal and the broad set of questions and concerns that have been addressed above? Armenian society has been quite patient with the NSS’ selective application of justice; but this patience is conditioned upon the assumption that a broader process is at work and that equal justice will soon be applied to all who had propped up the corruption and repressiveness of Armenia’s previous regimes. Simply put, considering that Armenian society has placed its trust in the NSS, this trust has been qualified by a hope that all, and not simply a few, perpetrators will be held accountable. Whether Vanetsyan has or has not violated this trust cannot be speculated upon at this point. However, considering that 16 months have passed since the Velvet Revolution, and many of these formerly-powerful figures have not been touched by the scales of justice, a great deal of concern has arisen. Whether or not this is largely Vanetsyan’s fault also cannot be substantively answered at this point.

So, can the popularity of the NSS be sustained? Indeed, the popularity of the NSS can be sustained, but only through one mechanism: rigid institutionalization and the complete alleviation of the personalization of politics in Armenia. The head of an institution cannot and should not become bigger or more celebrated than the institution itself. That Vanetsyan became bigger and more celebrated than the institution he ran is quite evident. That Armenia’s political system and political culture is just as much at fault for such a development is also quite evident. And finally, what has also become quite evident is the illusion: that Vanetsyan was a great anti-corruption crusader.