YOU would hunt hard for a better illustration of the maxim that the European Union is capable of reforming itself only in times of crisis. The euro summit on June 29th was supposed to be the first proper chance in years for leaders to take tough decisions on boosting the resilience of their common currency. Instead, it turned out to be a stale dessert after the meaty migration debate that had occupied the previous night. The statement issued by the leaders after the summit contained just 220 words.

It was a disappointment for Emmanuel Macron, France's president, who has argued passionately for deep reforms to put the currency on to a more stable footing. Last week he and Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, had issued a joint initiative on euro-zone reform that was more ambitious than some French observers had dared hope. Crucially for Mr Macron, the agreement did call for the establishment of a euro-zone investment budget. If the proposal fell well short of the full macroeconomic stabilisation tool (worth several percentage points of euro-zone GDP) that Mr Macron thinks the euro zone needs to protect itself when crisis hits, it nevertheless marked an important shift from Germany. In private, French officials argued that once the principles of a common budget had been established, its size could be scaled up later.

But the summit statement made no direct reference at all to a euro-zone budget. In part that is because Mr Macron faces opposition from countries other than Germany. The so-called "new Hanseatic league", a coalition of ten or so mostly northern European countries, has pushed back against some of the French president's plans. Many disagree that the euro zone needs a budget at all. “I hate things done for symbolism. This is about real money from real taxpayers," said Mark Rutte, the Dutch prime minister, after the summit. A frisson of irritation is detectable from some governments that the French and Germans have tried to stitch things up between themselves.

Still, it was not an entirely fruitless discussion. The leaders agreed that the European Stability Mechanism, a bail-out fund cobbled together in 2012, in the heat of the euro crisis, can be deployed as a "backstop" to add to the firepower of the existing euro-zone bank-resolution fund. The ESM may also take on a stronger supervisory role in monitoring any future bail-outs. All this ought to help reduce the dangers of market panic when crisis hits, although plenty of details remain to be ironed out and argued over.

And for the first time the leaders agreed to work on a "road map" towards a euro-zone-wide insurance scheme for bank depositors. This is the final leg—and, for some, the most important—of the banking union project started in 2012. The share of bad loans in Italian banks, the largest source of concern, is falling, which should make guaranteeing their deposits a less risky proposition. But creditor nations remain highly sceptical. In Germany, perhaps the biggest stumbling-block, Mrs Merkel's weaker domestic position will make it harder for her to stare down her critics. A road map represents progress, but not much.

Mr Macron put a brave face on his setback. He noted that the leaders had agreed to discuss the euro again in December, which may be the occasion for a more substantial discussion (although other issues, such as a full-blown Brexit crisis, may dominate leaders’ attention by then). Mr Macron had reportedly sought another euro summit in October, but the idea was shot down. In the months before that, euro-zone finance ministers will discuss a range of issues, including the budget, banking reform and debt-restructuring mechanisms. But talk is just that, and elections to the European Parliament in May 2019 mean further reform plans will soon slip into the deep freeze. Meanwhile, the spread between France’s impatience on one side, and the caution of Germany and a dauntingly large number of its allies on the other, remains as wide as ever.