7 September 2001

Source: Word-format document from http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/OM-Europarl?PROG=REPORT&L=EN&PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2001-0264+0+NOT+SGML+V0//EN

See two previous draft reports see: http://cryptome.org/echelon-ep.htm

See also meeting minutes and resolution of 5 September 2001: http://cryptome.org/echelon-090501.htm

[194 pges.]



EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1999 2004

Session document

FINAL

A5-0264/2001

Part 1

11 July 2001





REPORT on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI)) Part 1: Motion for a resolution Explanatory statement Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System Rapporteur: Gerhard Schmid

Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes.

Juvenal (ca. 60 to 130 AD), Sat. 6, 347

CONTENTS

PROCEDURAL

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

1. Introduction

1.1. The reasons for setting up the committee

1.2. The claims made in the two STOA studies on a global interception system codenamed ECHELON 1.2.1. The first STOA report of 1997

1.2.2. The 1999 STOA reports 1.3. The mandate of the committee

1.4. Why not a committee of inquiry?

1.5. Working method and schedule

1.6. Characteristics ascribed to the ECHELON system

2. The operations of foreign intelligence services

2.1. Introduction

2.2. What is espionage?

2.3. Espionage targets

2.4. Espionage methods 2.4.1. Human intelligence

2.4.2. Processing of electromagnetic signals 2.5. The operations of certain intelligence services

3. Technical conditions governing the interception of telecommunications

3.1. The interceptibility of various communication media

3.2. The scope for interception on the spot

3.3. The scope for a worldwide interception system 3.3.1. Access to communication media

3.3.2. Scope for the automatic analysis of intercepted communications: the use of filters

3.3.3. The example of the German Federal Intelligence Service

4. Satellite communications technology

4.1. The significance of telecommunications satellites

4.2. How a satellite link operates 4.2.1. Geostationary satellites

4.2.2. The route followed by signals sent via a satellite communication link

4.2.3. The most important satellite communication systems

4.2.4. The allocation of frequencies

4.2.5. Satellite footprints

4.2.6. The size of antennae required by an earth station 4.3. Satellite communications for military purposes 4.3.1. General

4.3.2. Frequencies used for military purposes

4.3.3. Size of the receiving stations

4.3.4. Examples of military communications satellites

5. Clues to the existence of at least one global interception system

5.1. Why is it necessary to work on the basis of clues? 5.1.1. Evidence of interception activity on the part of foreign intelligence services

5.1.2. Evidence for the existence of stations in the necessary geographical areas

5.1.3. Evidence of a close intelligence association 5.2. How can a satellite communications interception station be recognised? 5.2.1. Criterion 1: accessibility of the installation

5.2.2. Criterion 2: type of antenna

5.2.3. Criterion 3: size of antenna

5.2.4. Criterion 4: evidence from official sources 5.3. Publicly accessible data about known interception stations 5.3.1. Method

5.3.2. Detailed analysis

5.3.3. Summary of the findings 5.4. The UKUSA Agreement 5.4.1. The historical development of the UKUSA Agreement

5.4.2. Evidence for the existence of the agreement 5.5. Evaluation of declassified American documents 5.5.1. Nature of documents

5.5.2. Content of documents

5.5.3. Summary 5.6. Information from authors and journalists specialised in this field 5.6.1. Nicky Hager's book

5.6.2. Duncan Campbell

5.6.3. Jeff Richelson

5.6.4. James Bamford

5.6.5. Bo Elkjaer and Kenan Seeberg 5.7. Statements by former intelligence service employees 5.7.1. Margaret Newsham (former NSA employee)

5.7.2. Wayne Madsen (former NSA employee)

5.7.3. Mike Frost (former Canadian secret service employee)

5.7.4. Fred Stock (former Canadian secret service employee) 5.8. Information from government sources 5.8.1. USA

5.8.2. UK

5.8.3. Australia

5.8.4. New Zealand

5.8.5. The Netherlands

5.8.6. Italy 5.9. Questions to the Council and Commission 5.10. Parliamentary reports 5.10.1. Reports by the Comité Permanent R, Belgium's monitoring committee

5.10.2. Report by the French National Assembly's Committee on National Defence

5.10.3. Report of the Italian Parliament's Committee on Intelligence and Security Services and State Security

6. Might there be other global interception systems?

6.1. Requirements of such a system 6.1.1. Technical and geographical requirements

6.1.2. Political and economic requirements 6.2. France

6.3. Russia

6.4. The other G-8 States and China

7. Compatibility of an 'ECHELON' type communications interception system with Union law

7.1. Preliminary considerations

7.2. Compatibility of an intelligence system with Union law 7.2.1. Compatibility with EC law

7.2.2. Compatibility with other EU law 7.3. The question of compatibility in the event of misuse of the system for industrial espionage

7.4. Conclusion

8. The compatibility of communications surveillance by intelligence services with the fundamental right to privacy

8.1. Communications surveillance as a violation of the fundamental right to privacy

8.2. The protection of privacy under international agreements

8.3. The rules laid down in the ECHR 8.3.1. The importance of the ECHR in the EU

8.3.2. The geographical and personal scope of the protection provided under the ECHR

8.3.3. The admissibility of telecommunications surveillance pursuant to Article 8 of the ECHR

8.3.4. The significance of Article 8 of the ECHR for the activities of intelligence services 8.4. The requirement to monitor closely the activities of other countries' intelligence services 8.4.1. Inadmissibility of moves to circumvent Article 8 of the ECHR through the use of other countries' intelligence services

8.4.2. Implications of allowing non-European intelligence services to carry out operations on the territory of Member States which are ECHR contracting parties



9. Are EU citizens adequately protected against the activities of intelligence services?

9.1. Protection against the activities of intelligence services: a task for the national parliaments

9.2. The powers enjoyed by national authorities to carry out surveillance measures

9.3. Monitoring of intelligence services

9.4. Assessment of the situation for European citizens

10. Protection against industrial espionage

10.1. Firms as espionage targets 10.1.1. Espionage targets in detail

10.1.2. Competitive intelligence 10.2. Damage caused by industrial espionage

10.3. Who carries out espionage? 10.3.1. Company employees (insider crime)

10.3.2. Private espionage firms

10.3.3. Hackers

10.3.4. Intelligence services 10.4. How is espionage carried out?

10.5. Industrial espionage by states 10.5.1. Strategic industrial espionage by the intelligence services

10.5.2. Intelligence services as agents of competitive intelligence 10.6. Is ECHELON suitable for industrial espionage?

10.7. Published cases

10.8. Protection against industrial espion 10.8.1. Legal protection

10.8.2. Other obstacles to industrial espionage 10.9. The USA and industrial espionage 10.9.1. The challenge for the US Administration: industrial espionage against US firms

10.9.2. The attitude of the US Administration towards active industrial espionage

10.9.3. Legal situation with regard to the payment of bribes to public officials

10.9.4. The role of the Advocacy Center in promoting US exports 10.10. Security of computer networks 10.10.1. The importance of this chapter

10.10.2. The risks inherent in the use by firms of modern information technology

10.10.3. Frequency of attacks on networks

10.10.4. Perpetrators and methods

10.10.5. Attacks from outside by hackers 10.11. Under-estimation of the risks 10.11.1. Risk-awareness in firms

10.11.2. Risk-awareness among scientists

10.11.3. Risk-awareness in the European institutions

11. Cryptography as a means of self-protection

11.1. Purpose and method of encryption 11.1.1. Purpose of encryption

11.1.2. How encryption works 11.2. Security of encryption systems 11.2.1. Meaning of 'security' in encryption: general observations

11.2.2. Absolute security: the one-time pad

11.2.3. Relative security at the present state of technology

11.2.4. Standardisation and the deliberate restriction of security 11.3. The problem of the secure distribution/handover of keys 11.3.1. Asymmetric encryption: the public-key process

11.3.2. Public-key encryption for private individuals

11.3.3. Future processes 11.4. Security of encryption products

11.5. Encryption in conflict with state interests 11.5.1. Attempts to restrict encryption

11.5.2. The significance of secure encryption for e-commerce

11.5.3. Problems for business travellers 11.6. Practical issues in connection with encryption

12. The EU's external relations and intelligence gathering

12.1. Introduction

12.2. Scope for cooperation within the EU 12.2.1. Existing cooperation

12.2.2. Advantages of a joint European intelligence policy

12.2.3. Concluding remarks 12.3. Cooperation beyond EU level

12.4. Final remarks

13. Conclusions and recommendations

13.1. Conclusions

13.2. Recommendations

At the sitting of 5 July 2000 the European Parliament decided, pursuant to Rule 150(2) of its Rules of Procedure, to set up a Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System and laid down its mandate as outlined in Chapter 1, 1.3. With a view to fulfilling that mandate, at its constituent meeting of 9 July 2000 the Temporary Committee appointed Gerhard Schmid rapporteur.

At its meetings of 29 May, 20 June and 3 July 2001 the committee considered the draft report.

At the last meeting the committee adopted the motion for a resolution by 27 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Carlos Coelho, chairman; Elly Plooij-van Gorsel, Neil MacCormick and Giuseppe Di Lello Finuoli, vice-chairmen; Gerhard Schmid, rapporteur; Mary Elizabeth Banotti, Bastiaan Belder, Maria Berger, Charlotte Cederschiöld, Gérard M.J. Deprez, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, Robert J.E. Evans, Colette Flesch, Pernille Frahm, Anna Karamanou, Eva Klamt, Alain Krivine, Torben Lund, Erika Mann, Jean-Charles Marchiani, Hugues Martin, Patricia McKenna, William Francis Newton Dunn (for Jorge Salvador Hernández Mollar), Reino Paasilinna, Bernd Posselt (for Hubert Pirker), Jacques Santer (for Catherine Lalumière), Ilka Schröder, Gary Titley (for Ozan Ceyhun), Maurizio Turco, Gianni Vattimo, W.G. van Velzen, Christian Ulrik von Boetticher, Jan Marinus Wiersma and Christos Zacharakis (for Enrico Ferri).

The minority opinions and the annexes will be published separately (A5-0264/2001-Par2).

The report was tabled on 11 July 2001.

The deadline for tabling amendments will be indicated in the draft agenda for the relevant part-session.

European Parliament resolution on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098 (INI))

The European Parliament,

 having regard to its decision of 5 July 2000 to set up a Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System and the mandate issued to the Temporary Committee,



 having regard to the EC Treaty, one objective of which is the establishment of a common market with a high level of competitiveness,



 having regard to Articles 11 and 12 of the Treaty on European Union, which impose on the Member States a binding requirement to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity,



 having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 6(2) thereof, which lays down the requirement that the EU must respect fundamental rights, and Title V thereof, which sets out provisions governing the common foreign and security policy,



 having regard to Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,



 having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Article 7 of which lays down the right to respect for private and family life and explicitly enshrines the right to respect for communications, and Article 8 of which protects personal data,



 having regard to having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in particular Article 8 thereof, which governs the protection of private life and the confidentiality of correspondence, and the many other international conventions which provide for the protection of privacy,



 having regard to the work carried out by the Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System, which held a large number of hearings and meetings with experts of all kinds, and in particular with senior representatives of the public and private sectors in the sphere of telecommunications and data protection, with employees of intelligence and information services, with journalists, with lawyers with expert knowledge of this area, with members of the national parliaments of the Member States, etc.,



 having regard to Rule 150(2) of its Rules of Procedure,



 having regard to the report of the Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System (A5-0264/2001), The existence of a global system for intercepting private and commercial communications (the ECHELON interception system)

A. whereas the existence of a global system for intercepting communications, operating by means of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA Agreement, is no longer in doubt; whereas it seems likely, in view of the evidence and the consistent pattern of statements from a very wide range of individuals and organisations, including American sources, that its name is in fact ECHELON, although this is a relatively minor detail,

B. whereas there can now be no doubt that the purpose of the system is to intercept, at the very least, private and commercial communications, and not military communications, although the analysis carried out in the report has revealed that the technical capabilities of the system are probably not nearly as extensive as some sections of the media had assumed,

C. whereas, therefore, it is surprising, not to say worrying, that many senior Community figures, including European Commissioners, who gave evidence to the Temporary Committee claimed to be unaware of this phenomenon,

The limits of the interception system

D. whereas the surveillance system depends, in particular, upon worldwide interception of satellite communications, although in areas characterised by a high volume of communications only a very small proportion of those communications are transmitted by satellite; whereas this means that the majority of communications cannot be intercepted by earth stations, but only by tapping cables and intercepting radio signals, something which - as the investigations carried out in connection with the report have shown - is possible only to a limited extent; whereas the numbers of personnel required for the final analysis of intercepted communications imposes further restrictions; whereas, therefore, the UKUSA states have access to only a very limited proportion of cable and radio communications and can analyse an even more limited proportion of those communications, and whereas, further, however extensive the resources and capabilities for the interception of communications may be, the extremely high volume of traffic makes exhaustive, detailed monitoring of all communications impossible in practice,

The possible existence of other interception systems

E. whereas the interception of communications is a method of spying commonly employed by intelligence services, so that other states might also operate similar systems, provided that they have the required funds and the right locations; whereas France is the only EU Member State which is  thanks to its overseas territories  geographically and technically capable of operating autonomously a global interception system and also possesses the technical and organisational infrastructure to do so; whereas there is also ample evidence that Russia is likely to operate such a system,

Compatibility with EU law

F. whereas, as regards the question of the compatibility of a system of the ECHELON type with EU law, it is necessary to distinguish between two scenarios: if a system is used purely for intelligence purposes, there is no violation of EU law, since operations in the interests of state security are not subject to the EC Treaty, but would fall under Title V of the Treaty on European Union (CFSP), although at present that title lays down no provisions on the subject, so that no criteria are available; if, on the other hand, the system is misused for the purposes of gathering competitive intelligence, such action is at odds with the Member States duty of loyalty and with the concept of a common market based on free competition, so that a Member State participating in such a system violates EC law,

G. having regard to the statements made by the Council at the plenary sitting of 30 March 2000 to the effect that the Council cannot agree to the creation or existence of a telecommunications interception system which does not comply with the rules laid down in the law of the Member States and which breaches the fundamental principles designed to safeguard human dignity,

Compatibility with the fundamental right to respect for private life (Article 8 of the ECHR)

H. whereas any interception of communications represents serious interference with an individuals exercise of the right to privacy; whereas Article 8 of the ECHR, which guarantees respect for private life, permits interference with the exercise of that right only in the interests of national security, in so far as this is in accordance with domestic law and the provisions in question are generally accessible and lay down under what circumstances, and subject to what conditions, the state may undertake such interference; whereas interference must be proportionate, so that competing interests need to be weighed up and, under the terms of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, it is not enough that the interference should merely be useful or desirable,

I. whereas an intelligence system which intercepted communications permanently and at random would be in violation of the principle of proportionality and would not be compatible with the ECHR; whereas it would also constitute a violation of the ECHR if the rules governing the surveillance of communications lacked a legal basis, if the rules were not generally accessible or if they were so formulated that their implications for the individual were unforeseeable, or if the interference was not proportionate; whereas most of the rules governing the activities of US intelligence services abroad are classified, so that compliance with the principle of proportionality is at least doubtful and breaches of the principles of accessibility and foreseeability laid down by the European Court of Human Rights probably occur,

J. whereas the Member States cannot circumvent the requirements imposed on them by the ECHR by allowing other countries' intelligence services, which are subject to less stringent legal provisions, to work on their territory, since otherwise the principle of legality, with its twin components of accessibility and foreseeability, would become a dead letter and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights would be deprived of its substance,

K. whereas, in addition, the lawful operations of intelligence services are consistent with fundamental rights only if adequate arrangements exist for monitoring them, in order to counterbalance the risks inherent in secret activities performed by a part of the administrative apparatus; whereas the European Court of Human Rights has expressly stressed the importance of an efficient system for monitoring intelligence operations, so that there are grounds for concern in the fact that some Member States do not have parliamentary monitoring bodies of their own responsible for scrutinising the secret services,

Are EU citizens adequately protected against intelligence services?

L. whereas the protection enjoyed by EU citizens depends on the legal situation in the individual Member States, which varies very substantially, and whereas in some cases parliamentary monitoring bodies do not even exist, so that the degree of protection can hardly be said to be adequate; whereas it is in the fundamental interests of European citizens that their national parliaments should have a specific, formally structured monitoring committee responsible for supervising and scrutinising the activities of the intelligence services; whereas even where monitoring bodies do exist, there is a strong temptation for them to concentrate more on the activities of domestic intelligence services, rather than those of foreign intelligence services, since as a rule it is only the former which affect their own citizens; whereas it would be an encouragement for proportionate interference practices, if intelligence services were obliged to notify a citizen whose communications have been intercepted of this fact afterwards, for instance five years after the interception took place,

M. whereas, in view of their size, satellite receiving stations cannot be built on the territory of a state without its consent,

N. whereas, in the event of cooperation between intelligence services under the CFSP or in the areas of justice and home affairs, the institutions must introduce adequate measures to protect European citizens,

Industrial espionage

O. whereas part of the remit of foreign intelligence services is to gather economic data, such as details of developments in individual sectors of the economy, trends on commodity markets, compliance with economic embargoes, observance of rules on supplying dual-use goods, etc., and whereas, for these reasons, the firms concerned are often subject to surveillance,

P. whereas the US intelligence services do not merely investigate general economic facts but also intercept detailed communications between firms, particularly where contracts are being awarded, and they justify this on the grounds of combating attempted bribery; whereas detailed interception poses the risk that information may be used for the purpose of competitive intelligence-gathering rather than combating corruption, even though the US and the United Kingdom state that they do not do so; whereas, however, the role of the Advocacy Center of the US Department of Commerce is still not totally clear and talks arranged with the Center with a view to clarifying the matter were cancelled,

Q. whereas an agreement on combating the bribery of officials, under which bribery is criminalised at international level, was adopted by the OECD in 1997, and this provides a further reason why individual cases of bribery cannot justify the interception of communications,

R. whereas the situation becomes intolerable when intelligence services allow themselves to be used for the purposes of gathering competitive intelligence by spying on foreign firms with the aim of securing a competitive advantage for firms in the home country, and whereas it is frequently maintained that the global interception system has been used in this way, although no such case has been substantiated,

S. whereas, during the visit by the delegation from the Temporary Committee to the US, authoritative sources confirmed the US Congress Brown Report, indicating that 5% of intelligence gathered via non-open sources is used as economic intelligence; whereas it was estimated by the same sources that this intelligence surveillance could enable US industry to earn up to US$ 7 billion in contracts,

T. whereas sensitive commercial data are mostly kept inside individual firms, so that competitive intelligence-gathering in particular involves efforts to obtain information through members of staff or through people planted in the firm for this purpose or else, more and more commonly, by hacking into internal computer networks; whereas only if sensitive data are transmitted externally by cable or radio (satellite) can a communications surveillance system be used for competitive intelligence-gathering; whereas this applies systematically in the following three cases:

- in the case of firms which operate in three time zones, so that interim results are sent from Europe to America and on to Asia; - in the case of videoconferencing within multinationals using VSAT or cable; - if vital contracts are being negotiated on the spot (e.g. for the building of plants, telecommunications infrastructure, the creation of new transport systems, etc.) and it is necessary to consult the firms head office,

U. whereas risk and security awareness in small and medium-sized firms is often inadequate and the dangers of economic espionage and the interception of communications are not recognised,

V. whereas security awareness is not always well developed in the European institutions (with the exception of the European Central Bank, the Council Directorate-General for External Relations and the Commission Directorate-General for External Relations) and action is therefore necessary,

Possible self-protection measures

W. whereas firms can only make themselves secure by safeguarding their entire working environment and protecting all communications channels which are used to send sensitive information; whereas sufficiently secure encryption systems exist at affordable prices on the European market; whereas private individuals should also be urged to encrypt e-mails; whereas an unencrypted e-mail message is like a letter without an envelope; whereas relatively user-friendly systems exist on the Internet which are even made available for private use free of charge,

Cooperation among intelligence services within the EU

X. whereas the EU has reached agreement on the coordination of intelligence-gathering by intelligence services as part of the development of its own security and defence policy, although cooperation with other partners in these areas will continue,

Y. whereas in December 1999 in Helsinki the European Council decided to develop more effective European military capabilities with a view to undertaking the full range of Petersberg tasks in support of the CFSP; whereas the European Council decided furthermore that, in order to achieve this goal, by the year 2003 the Union should be able to deploy rapidly units of about 50 000  60 000 troops which should be self-sustaining, including the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities; whereas the first steps towards such an autonomous intelligence capability have already been taken in the framework of the WEU and the standing Political and Security Committee,

Z. whereas cooperation among intelligence services within the EU seems essential on the grounds that, firstly, a common security policy which did not involve the secret services would not make sense, and, secondly, it would have numerous professional, financial and political advantages; whereas it would also accord better with the idea of the EU as a partner on an equal footing with the United States and could bring together all the Member States in a system which complied fully with the ECHR; whereas the European Parliament would of course have to exercise appropriate monitoring,

AA. whereas the European Parliament is in the process of implementing the regulation on public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents by amending the provisions of its Rules of Procedure as regards access to sensitive documents,

Conclusion and amendment of international agreements on the protection of citizens and firms

1. States, on the basis of the information obtained by the Temporary Committee, that the existence of a global system for intercepting communications, operating with the participation of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand under the UKUSA Agreement, is no longer in doubt;

2. Calls on the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe to submit to the Ministerial Committee a proposal to protect private life, as guaranteed in Article 8 of the ECHR, brought into line with modern communication and interception methods by means of an additional protocol or, together with the provisions governing data protection, as part of a revision of the Convention on Data Protection, with the proviso that this should neither undermine the level of legal protection established by the European Court of Human Rights nor reduce the flexibility which is vital if future developments are to be taken into account;

3. Calls on the Member States  whose laws governing the interception capabilities of the secret services contain provisions on the protection of privacy which are discriminatory  to provide all European citizens with the same legal guarantees concerning the protection of privacy and the confidentiality of correspondence;

4. Calls on the Member States of the European Union to establish a European platform consisting of representatives of the national bodies that are responsible for monitoring Member States performance in complying with fundamental and citizens rights in order to scrutinise the consistency of national laws on the intelligence services with the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, to review the legal provisions guaranteeing postal and communications secrecy, and, in addition, to reach agreement on a recommendation to the Member States on a Code of Conduct to be drawn up which guarantees all European citizens, throughout the territory of the Member States, protection of privacy as defined in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and which, moreover, guarantees that the activities of intelligence services are carried out in a manner consistent with fundamental rights, in keeping with the conditions set out in Chapter 8 of this report, and in particular Section 8.3.4., as derived from Article 8 of the ECHR;

5. Calls on the Member States to adopt the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a legally binding and enforceable act at the next Intergovernmental Conference in order to raise the standard of protection for fundamental rights, particularly with regard to the protection of privacy;

6. Calls on the member countries of the Council of Europe to adopt an additional protocol which enables the European Communities to accede to the ECHR or to consider other measures designed to prevent disputes relating to case law arising between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Communities;

7. Urges the EU institutions in the meantime to apply the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter within the scope of their respective powers and activities;

8. Calls on the UN Secretary-General to instruct the competent committee to put forward proposals designed to bring Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the protection of privacy, into line with technical innovations;

9. Regards it as essential that an agreement should be negotiated and signed between the European Union and the United States stipulating that each of the two parties should observe, vis-à-vis the other, the provisions governing the protection of the privacy of citizens and the confidentiality of business communications applicable to its own citizens and firms;

10. Calls on the USA to sign the Additional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, so that complaints by individuals concerning breaches of the Covenant by the USA can be submitted to the Human Rights Committee set up under the Covenant; calls on the relevant American NGOs, in particular the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) and the EPIC (Electronic Privacy Information Center), to exert pressure on the US Administration to that end;

National legislative measures to protect citizens and firms

11. Urges the Member States to review and if necessary to adapt their own legislation on the operations of the intelligence services to ensure that it is consistent with fundamental rights as laid down in the ECHR and with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights;

12. Calls on the Member States to endow themselves with binding instruments which afford natural and legal persons effective protection against all forms of illegal interception of their communications;

13. Calls on the Member States to aspire to a common level of protection against intelligence operations and, to that end, to draw up a Code of Conduct (as referred to in paragraph 4) based on the highest level of protection which exists in any Member State, since as a rule it is citizens of other states, and hence also of other Member States, that are affected by the operations of foreign intelligence services;

14. Calls on the Member States to negotiate with the USA a Code of Conduct similar to that of the EU;

15. Calls on those Member States which have not yet done so to guarantee appropriate parliamentary and legal supervision of their secret services;

16. Urges the Council and the Member States to establish as a matter of priority a system for the democratic monitoring and control of the autonomous European intelligence capability and other joint and coordinated intelligence activities at European level; proposes that the European Parliament should play an important role in this monitoring and control system;

17. Calls on the Member States to pool their communications interception resources with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the CFSP in the areas of intelligence-gathering and the fight against terrorism, nuclear proliferation or international drug trafficking, in accordance with the provisions governing the protection of citizens privacy and the confidentiality of business communications, and subject to monitoring by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission;

18. Calls on the Member States to conclude an agreement with third countries aimed at providing increased protection of privacy for EU citizens, under which all contracting states give a commitment, where one contracting state intercepts communications in another contracting state, to inform the latter of the planned actions;

Specific legal measures to combat industrial espionage

19. Calls on the Member States to consider to what extent industrial espionage and the payment of bribes as a way of securing contracts can be combated by means of European and international legal provisions and, in particular, whether WTO rules could be adopted which take account of the distortions of competition brought about by such practices, for example by rendering contracts obtained in this way null and void; calls on the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada to join this initiative;

20. Calls on the Member States to undertake to incorporate in the EC Treaty a clause prohibiting industrial espionage and not to engage in industrial espionage against one another, either directly or with the assistance of a foreign power which might carry out operations on their territory, nor to allow a foreign power to conduct espionage operations from the soil of an EU Member State, thereby complying with the letter and spirit of the EC Treaty;

21. Calls on the Member States to undertake by means of a clear and binding instrument not to engage in industrial espionage, thereby signifying their compliance with the letter and spirit of the EC Treaty; calls on the Member States to transpose this binding principle into their national legislation on intelligence services;

22. Calls on the Member States and the US Administration to start an open US-EU dialogue on economic intelligence-gathering;

Measures concerning the implementation of the law and the monitoring of that implementation

23. Calls on the national parliaments which have no parliamentary monitoring body responsible for scrutinising the activities of the intelligence services to set up such a body;

24. Calls on the monitoring bodies responsible for scrutinising the activities of the secret services, when exercising their monitoring powers, to attach great importance to the protection of privacy, regardless of whether the individuals concerned are their own nationals, other EU nationals or third-country nationals;

25. Calls on the Member States to make sure that their intelligence systems are not misused for the purposes of gathering competitive intelligence, an act at odds with the Member States duty of loyalty and with concept of a common market based on free competition;

26. Calls on Germany and the United Kingdom to make the authorisation of further communications interception operations by US intelligence services on their territory conditional on their compliance with the ECHR, i.e. to stipulate that they should be consistent with the principle of proportionality, that their legal basis should be accessible and that the implications for individuals should be foreseeable, and to introduce corresponding, effective monitoring measures, since they are responsible for ensuring that intelligence operations authorised or even merely tolerated on their territory respect human rights;

Measures to encourage self-protection by citizens and firms

27. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to inform their citizens and firms about the possibility that their international communications may, under certain circumstances, be intercepted; insists that this information should be accompanied by practical assistance in designing and implementing comprehensive protection measures, including the security of information technology;

28. Calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to develop and implement an effective and active policy for security in the information society; insists that as part of this policy specific attention should be given to increasing the awareness of all users of modern communication systems of the need to protect confidential information; furthermore, insists on the establishment of a Europe-wide, coordinated network of agencies capable of providing practical assistance in designing and implementing comprehensive protection strategies;

29. Urges the Commission and Member States to devise appropriate measures to promote, develop and manufacture European encryption technology and software and above all to support projects aimed at developing user-friendly open-source encryption software;

30. Calls on the Commission and Member States to promote software projects whose source text is made public (open-source software), as this is the only way of guaranteeing that no backdoors are built into programmes;

31. Calls on the Commission to lay down a standard for the level of security of e-mail software packages, placing those packages whose source code has not been made public in the least reliable category;

32. Calls on the European institutions and the public administrations of the Member States systematically to encrypt e-mails, so that ultimately encryption becomes the norm;

33. Calls on the Community institutions and the public administrations of the Member States to provide training for their staff and make their staff familiar with new encryption technologies and techniques by means of the necessary practical training and courses;

34. Calls for particular attention to be paid to the position of the applicant countries; urges that they should be given support, if their lack of technological independence prevents them from implementing the requisite protective measures;

Other measures

35. Calls on firms to cooperate more closely with counter-espionage services, and particularly to inform them of attacks from outside for the purposes of industrial espionage, in order to improve the services efficiency;

36. Instructs the Commission to have a security analysis carried out which will show what needs to be protected, and to have a protection strategy drawn up;

37. Calls on the Commission to update its encryption system in line with the latest developments, given that modernisation is urgently needed, and calls on the budgetary authorities (the Council together with Parliament) to provide the necessary funding;

38. Requests the competent committee to draw up an own-initiative report on security and the protection of secrecy in the European institutions;

39. Calls on the Commission to ensure that data is protected in its own data-processing systems and to step up the protection of secrecy in relation to documents not accessible to the public;

40. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to invest in new technologies in the field of decryption and encryption techniques as part of the Sixth Research Framework Programme;

41. Urges states which have been placed at a disadvantage by distortions of competition resulting from state aid or the economic misuse of espionage to inform the authorities and monitoring bodies of the state from which the activities were undertaken in order to put a stop to the distorting activities;

42. Calls on the Commission to put forward a proposal to establish, in close cooperation with industry and the Member States, a Europe-wide, coordinated network of advisory centres - in particular in those Member States where such centres do not yet exist - to deal with issues relating to the security of the information held by firms, with the twin task of increasing awareness of the problem and providing practical assistance;

43. Takes the view that an international congress on the protection of privacy against telecommunications surveillance should be held in order to provide NGOs from Europe, the USA and other countries with a forum for discussion of the cross-border and international aspects of the problem and coordination of areas of activity and action;

44. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Secretary-General and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and applicant countries, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

1.1. The reasons for setting up the committee

On 5 July 2000 the European Parliament decided to set up a temporary committee on the ECHELON system. This step was prompted by the debate on the study commissioned by STOA concerning the so-called ECHELON system, which the author, Duncan Campbell, had presented at a hearing of the Committee on Citizens Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs on the subject the European Union and data protection.

1.2. The claims made in the two STOA studies on a global interception system codenamed ECHELON

1.2.1. The first STOA report of 1997

A report which STOA commissioned from the Omega Foundation for the European Parliament in 1997 on An Appraisal of Technologies of Political Control described ECHELON in a chapter concerning national and international communications interception networks. The author claimed that all e-mail, telephone and fax communications in Europe were routinely intercepted by the US National Security Agency. As a result of this report, the alleged existence of a comprehensive global interception system called ECHELON was brought to the attention of people throughout Europe.

1.2.2. The 1999 STOA reports

In 1999, in order to find out more about this subject, STOA commissioned a five-part study of the development of surveillance technology and risk of abuse of economic information. Part 2/5, by Duncan Campbell, concerned the existing intelligence capacities and particularly the mode of operation of ECHELON.

Concern was aroused in particular by the assertion in the report that ECHELON had moved away from its original purpose of defence against the Eastern Bloc and was currently being used for purposes of industrial espionage. Examples of alleged industrial espionage were given in support of the claim: in particular, it was stated that Airbus and Thomson CFS had been damaged as a result. Campbell bases his claims on reports in the American press

As a result of the STOA study, ECHELON was debated in the parliaments of virtually all the Member States; in France and Belgium, reports were even drafted on it.

1.3. The mandate of the committee

At the same time as it decided to set up a temporary committee, the European Parliament drew up its mandate. It reads as follows:

'- to verify the existence of the communications interception system known as ECHELON, whose operation is described in the STOA report published under the title "Development of surveillance technology and risks of abuse of economic information"; - to assess the compatibility of such a system with Community law, in particular Article 286 of the EC Treaty and Directives 95/46/EC and 97/66/EC, and with Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty, in the light of the following questions: - are the rights of European citizens protected against activities of secret services? - is encryption an adequate and sufficient protection to guarantee citizens privacy or should additional measures be taken and if so what kind of measures? - how can the EU institutions be made better aware of the risks posed by these activities and what measures can be taken? - to ascertain whether European industry is put at risk by the global interception of communications; - possibly, to make proposals for political and legislative initiatives.

1.4. Why not a committee of inquiry?

The European Parliament decided to set up a temporary committee because a committee of inquiry can be set up only to investigate violations of Community law under the EC Treaty (Article 193 TEC), and such committees can accordingly only consider matters governed by it. Matters falling under Titles V (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and VI (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters) of the Treaty on European Union are excluded. Moreover, under the interinstitutional decision the special powers of a committee of inquiry to call people to appear and to inspect documents apply only if grounds of secrecy or public or national security do not dictate otherwise, which would certainly make it impossible to summon secret services to appear. Furthermore, a committee of inquiry cannot extend its work to third countries, because by definition the latter cannot violate EU law. Thus, setting up a committee of inquiry would only have restricted the scope of any investigations opening up any additional rights, for which reason the idea was rejected by a majority of Members of the European Parliament.

1.5. Working method and schedule

With a view to carrying out its mandate in full, the committee decided to proceed in the following way. A programme of work proposed by the rapporteur and adopted by the committee listed the following relevant topics: 1. Certain knowledge about ECHELON, 2. Debate by national parliaments and governments, 3. Intelligence services and their operations, 4. Communications systems and the scope for intercepting them, 5. Encryption, 6. Industrial espionage, 7. Aims of espionage and protective measures, 8. Legal context and protection of privacy and 9. Implications for the EU's external relations. The topics were considered consecutively at the individual meetings, the order of consideration being based on practical grounds and thus not implying anything about the value assigned to the individual topics. By way of preparation for the meetings, the rapporteur systematically scrutinised and evaluated the material available. At the meetings, in accordance with the requirements of the topic concerned, representatives of national administrations (particularly secret services) and parliaments in their capacity as bodies responsible for monitoring secret services were invited to attend, as were legal experts and experts in the fields of communications and interception technology, business security and encryption technology with both academic and practical backgrounds. Journalists who had investigated this field were also heard. The meetings were generally held in public, although some sessions were also held behind closed doors where this was felt to be advisable in the interests of obtaining information. In addition, the chairman of the committee and the rapporteur visited London and Paris together to meet people who for a wide variety of different reasons were unable to attend meetings of the committee but whose involvement in the committees work nonetheless seemed advisable. For the same reasons, the committees bureau, the coordinators and the rapporteur travelled to the USA. The rapporteur also held many one-to-one talks, in some cases in confidence.

1.6. Characteristics ascribed to the ECHELON system

The system known as ECHELON is an interception system which differs from other intelligence systems in that it possesses two features which make it quite unusual:

The first such feature attributed to it is the capacity to carry out quasi-total surveillance. Satellite receiver stations and spy satellites in particular are alleged to give it the ability to intercept any telephone, fax, Internet or e-mail message sent by any individual and thus to inspect its contents.

The second unusual feature of ECHELON is said to be that the system operates worldwide on the basis of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among several states (the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), giving it an added value in comparison to national systems: the states participating in ECHELON (UKUSA states) can place their interception systems at each others disposal, share the cost and make joint use of the resulting information. This type of international cooperation is essential in particular for the worldwide interception of satellite communications, since only in this way is it possible to ensure in international communications that both sides of a dialogue can be intercepted. It is clear that, in view of its size, a satellite receiver station cannot be established on the territory of a state without that states knowledge. Mutual agreement and proportionate cooperation among several states in different parts of the world is essential.

Possible threats to privacy and to businesses posed by a system of the ECHELON type arise not only from the fact that is a particularly powerful monitoring system, but also that it operates in a largely legislation-free area. Systems for the interception of international communications are not usually targeted at residents of the home country. The person whose messages were intercepted would have no domestic legal protection, not being resident in the country concerned. Such a person would be completely at the mercy of the system. Parliamentary supervision would also be inadequate in this area, since the voters, who assume that interception only affects people abroad, would not be particularly interested in it, and elected representatives chiefly follow the interests of their voters. That being so, it is hardly surprising that the hearings held in the US Congress concerning the activities of the NSA were confined to the question of whether US citizens were affected by it, with no real concern expressed regarding the existence of such a system in itself. It thus seems all the more important to investigate this issue at European level.



2.1. Introduction

In addition to police forces, most governments run intelligence services to protect their countrys security. As their operations are generally secret, they are also referred to as secret services. These services have the following tasks:

- gathering information to avert dangers to state security - counter-espionage in general - averting possible dangers to the armed forces - gathering information about situations abroad.

2.2. What is espionage?

Governments have a need for systematic collection and evaluation of information about certain situations in other states. This serves as a basis for decisions concerning the armed forces, foreign policy and so on. They therefore maintain foreign intelligence services, part of whose task is to systematically assess information available from public sources. The rapporteur has been informed that on average this accounts for at least 80% of the work of the intelligence services. However, particularly significant information in the fields concerned is kept secret from governments or businesses and is therefore not publicly accessible. Anyone who nonetheless wishes to obtain it has to steal it. Espionage is simply the organised theft of information.

2.3. Espionage targets

The classic targets of espionage are military secrets, other government secrets or information concerning the stability of or dangers to governments. These may for example comprise new weapons systems, military strategies or information about the stationing of troops. No less important is information about forthcoming decisions in the fields of foreign policy, monetary decisions or inside information about tensions within a government. In addition there is also interest in economically significant information. This may include not only information about sectors of the economy but also details of new technologies or foreign transactions.

2.4. Espionage methods

Espionage involves gaining access to information which the holder would rather protect from being accessed by outsiders. This means that the protection needs to be overcome and penetrated. This is the case with both political and industrial espionage. Thus the same problems arise with espionage in both fields, and the same techniques are accordingly used in both of them. Logically speaking there is no difference, only the level of protection is generally lower in the economic sphere, which sometimes makes it easier to carry out industrial espionage. In particular, businessmen tend to be less aware of risks when using interceptible communication media than does the state when employing them in fields where security is a concern.

2.4.1. Human intelligence

Protection of secret information is always organised in the same way:



only a small number of people, who have been vetted, have access to secret information



there are established rules for dealing with such information



normally the information does not leave the protected area, and if it does so, it leaves only in a secure manner or encrypted form. The prime method of carrying out organised espionage is therefore by gaining access to the desired information directly through people (human intelligence). These may be:



plants (agents) acting on behalf of the service/business engaging in espionage



people recruited from the target area.

Recruits generally work for an outside service or business for the following reasons:



sexual seduction



bribery in cash or in kind



blackmail



ideological grounds



attachment of special significance or honour to a given action (playing on dissatisfaction or feelings of inferiority).

A borderline case is unintentional cooperation by means of which information is creamed off. This involves persuading employees of authorities or businesses to disclose information in casual conversation, for example by exploiting their vanity, under apparently harmless circumstances (through informal contact at conferences or trade fairs or in hotel bars).

The use of people has the advantage of affording direct access to the desired information. However, there are also disadvantages:



counter-espionage always concentrates on people or controlling agents



where an organisations staff are recruited, the weaknesses which laid them open to recruitment may rebound on the recruiting body



people always make mistakes, which means that sooner or later they will be detected through counter-espionage operations.

Where possible, therefore, organisations try to replace the use of agents or recruits with non-human espionage. This is easiest in the case of the analysis of radio signals from military establishments or vehicles.

2.4.2. Processing of electromagnetic signals

The form of espionage by technical means with which the public are most familiar is that which uses satellite photography. In addition, however, electromagnetic signals of any kind are intercepted and analysed (signals intelligence, SIGINT).

2.4.2.1. Electromagnetic signals used for non-communication purposes

In the military field, certain electromagnetic signals, e.g. those from radar stations, may provide valuable information about the organisation of enemy air defences (electronic intelligence, ELINT). In addition, electromagnetic radiation which could reveal details of the position of troops, aircraft, ships or submarines is a valuable source of information for an intelligence service. Monitoring other states spy satellites which take photographs, and recording and decoding signals from such satellites, is also useful.

The signals are recorded by ground stations, from low-orbit satellites or from quasi-geostationary SIGINT satellites. This aspect of intelligence operations using electromagnetic means consumes a large part of services interception capacity. However, this is not the only use made of technology.

2.4.2.2. Processing of intercepted communications

The foreign intelligence services of many states intercept the military and diplomatic communications of other states. Many of these services also monitor the civil communications of other states if they have access to them. In some states, services are also authorised to monitor incoming or outgoing communications in their own country. In democracies, intelligence services monitoring of the communications of the countrys own citizens is subject to certain triggering conditions and controls. However, domestic law in general only protects nationals within the territory of their own country and other residents of the country concerned (see Chapter 8).

2.5. The operations of certain intelligence services

Public debate has been sparked primarily by the interception operations of the US and British intelligence services. They have been criticised for recording and analysing communications (voice, fax, e-mail). A political assessment requires a yardstick for judging such operations. The interception operations of foreign intelligence services in the EU may be taken as a basis for comparison. Table 1 provides an overview. This shows that interception of private communications by foreign intelligence services is by no means confined to the US or British foreign intelligence services.

Country Communications in foreign countries State communications Civilian communications Belgium + + - Denmark + + + Finland + + + France + + + Germany + + + Greece + + - Ireland - - - Italy + + + Luxembourg - - - Netherlands + + + Austria + + - Portugal + + - Sweden + + + Spain + + + UK + + + USA + + + Canada + + + Australia + + + New Zealand + + +

Table 1: Interception operations by intelligence services in the EU and in the UKUSA states

The columns refer to:

Column 1: The country concerned

Column 2: Foreign Communications; all incoming and outgoing civilian, military or diplomatic communications

Column 3: State communications (military, embassies, etc.)

Column 4: Civilian communications

+ signifies that communications are intercepted

- signifies that communications are not intercepted



3.1. The interceptibility of various communication media

If people wish to communicate with one another over a given distance, they need a medium. This medium may be:



air (sound waves)



light (Morse lamp, fibreoptic cable)



electric current (telegraph, telephone)



an electromagnetic wave (all forms of radio).

Any third party who succeeds in accessing the medium can intercept the communications. This process may be easy or difficult, feasible anywhere or only from certain locations. Two extreme cases are discussed below: the technical possibilities available to a spy working on the spot, on the one hand, and the scope for a worldwide interception system, on the other.

3.2. The scope for interception on the spot

On the spot, any form of communication can be intercepted if the eavesdropper is prepared to break the law and the target does not take protective measures.



Conversations in rooms can be intercepted by means of planted microphones (bugs) or laser equipment which picks up vibrations in window panes.



Screens emit radiation which can be picked up at a distance of up to 30 metres, revealing the information on the screen.



Telephone, fax, and e-mail messages can be intercepted if the eavesdropper taps into a cable leaving the relevant building.



Although the infrastructure required is costly and complex, communications from a mobile phone can be intercepted if the interception station is situated in the same radio cell (diameter 300 m in urban areas, 30 km in the countryside).



can be intercepted if the interception station is situated in the same radio cell (diameter 300 m in urban areas, 30 km in the countryside). Closed-circuit communications can be intercepted within the USW-radio range.

Conditions for the use of espionage equipment are ideal on the spot, since the interception measures can be focused on one person or one target and almost every communication can be intercepted. The only disadvantage may be the risk of detection in connection with the planting of bugs or the tapping of cables.

3.3. The scope for a worldwide interception system

Today, various media are available for all forms of intercontinental communication (voice, fax and data). The scope for a worldwide interception system is restricted by two factors:



restricted access to the communication medium



the need to filter out the relevant communication from a huge mass of communications taking place at the same time.

3.3.1. Access to communication media

3.3.1.1. Cable communications

All forms of communication (voice, fax, e-mail, data) are transmitted by cable. Access to the cable is a prerequisite for the interception of communications of this kind. Access is certainly possible if the terminal of a cable connection is situated on the territory of a state which allows interception. In technical terms, therefore, within an individual state all communications carried by cable can be intercepted, provided this is permissible under the law. However, foreign intelligence services generally have no legal access to cables situated on the territory of other states. At best, they can gain illegal access to a specific cable, although the risk of detection is high.

From the telegraph age onwards, intercontinental cable connections have been achieved by means of underwater cables. Access to these cables is always possible at those points where they emerge from the water. If several states join forces to intercept communications, access is possible to all the terminals of the cable connections situated in those states. This was historically significant, since both the underwater telegraph cables and the first underwater coaxial telephone cables linking Europe and America landed in Newfoundland and the connections to Asia ran via Australia, because regenerators were required. Today, fibreoptic cables follow the direct route, regardless of the mountainous nature of the ocean bed and the need for regenerators, and do not pass via Australia or New Zealand.

Electric cables may also be tapped between the terminals of a connection, by means of induction (i.e. electromagnetically, by attaching a coil to the cable), without creating a direct, conductive connection. Underwater electric cables can also be tapped in this way from submarines, albeit at very high cost. This technique was employed by the USA in order to tap into a particular underwater cable laid by the USSR to transmit unencrypted commands to Soviet atomic submarines. The high costs alone rule out the comprehensive use of this technique.

In the case of the older-generation fibreoptic cables used today, inductive tapping is only possible at the regenerators. These regenerators transform the optical signal into an electrical signal, strengthen it and then transform it back into an optical signal. However, this raises the issue of how the enormous volumes of data carried on a cable of this kind can be transmitted from the point of interception to the point of evaluation without the laying of a separate fibreoptic cable. On cost grounds, the use of a submarine fitted with processing equipment is conceivable only in very rare cases, for example in wartime, with a view to intercepting the enemys strategic military communications. In your rapporteurs view, the use of submarines for the routine surveillance of international telephone traffic can be ruled out. The new-generation fibreoptic cables use erbium lasers as regenerators  interception by means of electromagnetic coupling is thus no longer possible! Communications transmitted using fibreoptic cables of this kind can thus only be intercepted at the terminals of the connection.

The practical implication for the UKUSA states (the alliance formed for the purposes of interception) is that communications can be intercepted at acceptable cost only at the terminals of the underwater cables which land on their territory. Essentially, therefore, they can only tap incoming or outgoing cable communications! In other words, their access to cable communications in Europe is restricted to the territory of the United Kingdom, since hitherto internal communications have mostly been transmitted via the domestic cable network. The privatisation of telecommunications may give rise to exceptions, but these are specific and unpredictable!

This is valid at least for telephone and fax communications. Other conditions apply to communications transmitted over the Internet via cable. The situation can be summarised as follows:



Internet communications are carried out using data packets and different packets addressed to the same recipient may take different routes through the network.

At the start of the Internet age, spare capacity in the public network was used for the transmission of e-mail communications. For that reason, the routes followed by individual data packets were completely unpredictable and arbitrary. At that time, the most important international connection was the science backbone between Europe and America.

The commercialisation of the Internet and the establishment of Internet providers also resulted in a commercialisation of the network. Internet providers operated or rented their own networks. They therefore made increasing efforts to keep communications within their own network in order to avoid paying user fees to other operators. Today, the route taken through the network by a data packet is therefore not solely determined by the capacity available on the network, but also hinges on costs considerations.

An e-mail sent from a client of one provider to a client of another provider is generally routed through the firms network, even if this is not the quickest route. Routers, computers situated at network junctions and which determine the route by which data packets will be transmitted, organise the transition to other networks at points known as switches.

At the time of the science backbone, the switches for the routing of global Internet communications were situated in the USA. For that reason, at that time intelligence services could intercept a substantial proportion of European Internet communications. Today, only a small proportion of intra-European Internet communications are routed via the USA.

A small proportion of intra-European communications are routed via a switch in London to which, since foreign communications are involved, the British monitoring station GCHQ has access. The majority of communications do not leave the continent: for example, more than 95% of intra-German Internet communications are routed via a switch in Frankfurt.

In practical terms, this means that the UKUSA states have access only to a very limited proportion of Internet communications transmitted by cable.

3.3.1.2. Radio communications

The interceptibility of radio communications depends on the range of the electromagnetic waves employed. If the radio waves run along the surface of the earth (so-called ground waves), their range is restricted and is determined by the topography of the earths surface, the degree to which it is built up and the amount of vegetation. If the radio waves are transmitted towards space (so-called space waves), two points a substantial distance apart can be linked by means of the reflection of the sky wave from layers of the ionosphere. Multiple reflections substantially increase the range.

The range is determined by the wavelength:



Very long and long waves (3 kHz  300 kHz) propagate only via ground waves, because space waves are not reflected. They have very short ranges.

Medium waves (300 kHz  3 MHz) propagate via ground waves and at night also via space waves. They are medium-range radio waves.

Short waves (3 MHz  30 MHz) propagate primarily via ground waves; multiple reflections make worldwide reception possible.

Ultra-short waves (30 MHz  300 MHz) propagate only via ground waves, because space waves are not reflected. They propagate in a relatively straight line, like light, with the result that, because of the curvature of the earth, their range is determined by the height of the transmitting and receiving antennae. Depending on power, they have ranges of up to 100 km (roughly 30 km in the case of mobile phones).

Decimetre and centimetre waves (30 MHz  30 GHz) propagate in a manner even more akin to light than ultra-short waves. They are easy to focus, clearing the way for low-power, unidirectional transmissions (ground-based microwave radio links). They can only be received by antennae situated almost or exactly in line-of-sight.

Long and medium waves are used only for radio transmitters, radio beacons, etc. Short wave and above all, USW and decimetre/centimetre waves are used for military and civil radio communications.

The details outlined above show that a global communications interception system can only intercept short-wave radio transmissions. In the case of all other types of radio transmission, the interception station must be situated within a 100 km radius (e.g. on a ship, in an embassy).

The practical implication for the UKUSA states with terrestrial listening stations is that they can intercept only a very limited proportion of radio communications.

3.1.2.3. Communications transmitted by geostationary telecommunications satellites

As already referred to above, decimetre and centimetre waves can very easily be focused to form microwave radio links. If a microwave radio link is set up transmitting to a telecommunications satellite in a high, geostationary orbit and the satellite receives the microwave signals, converts them and transmits them back to earth, large distances can be covered without the use of cables. The range of such a link is essentially restricted only by the fact that the satellite can receive and transmit only in a straight line. For that reason, several satellites are employed to provide worldwide coverage (for more details, see Chapter 4). If UKUSA States operate listening stations in the relevant regions of the earth, in principle they can intercept all telephone, fax and data traffic transmitted via such satellites.

3.1.2.4. Scope for interception from aircraft and ships

It has long been known that special AWACS aircraft are used for the purpose of locating other aircraft over long distances. The radar equipment in these aircraft works in conjunction with a detection system, designed to identify specific objectives, which can locate forms of electronic radiation, classify them and correlate them with radar sightings .They have no separate SIGINT capability. In contrast, the slow-flying EP-3 spy plane used by the US Navy has the capability to intercept microwave, USW and short-wave transmissions. The signals are analysed directly on board and the aircraft is used solely for military purposes.

In addition, surface ships, and in coastal regions, submarines are used to intercept military radio transmissions.

3.1.2.5. The scope for interception by spy satellites

Provided they are not focused through the use of appropriate antennae, radio waves radiate in all directions, i.e. also into space. Low-orbit Signals Intelligence Satellites can only lock on to the target transmitter for a few minutes in each orbit. In densely populated, highly industrialised areas interception is hampered to such a degree by the high density of transmitters using similar frequencies that it is virtually impossible to filter out individual signals. The satellites cannot be used for the continuous monitoring of civilian radio communications.

Alongside these satellites, the USA operates so-called quasi-geostationary SIGINT satellites stationed in a high earth orbit (42 000 km). Unlike the geostationary telecommunications satellites, these satellites have an inclination of between 3 and 10o, an apogee of between

39 000 and 42 000 km, and a perigee of between 30 000 and 33 000 km. The satellites are thus not motionless in orbit, but move in a complex elliptical orbit, which enables them to cover a larger area of the earth in the course of one day and to locate sources of radio transmissions. This fact, and the other non-classified characteristics of the satellites, point to their use for purely military purposes.

The signals received are transmitted to the receiving station by means of a strongly-focused, 24 GHz downlink.

3.3.2. Scope for the automatic analysis of intercepted communications: the use of filters

When foreign communications are intercepted, no single telephone connection is monitored on a targeted basis. Instead, some or all of the communications transmitted via the satellite or cable in question are tapped and filtered by computers employing keywords  analysis of every single communication would be completely impossible.

It is easy to filter communications transmitted along a given connection. Specific faxes and e-mails can also be singled out through the use of keywords. If the system has been trained to recognise a particular voice, communications involving that voice can be singled out. However, according to the information available to the rapporteur the automatic recognition to a sufficient degree of accuracy of words spoken by any voice is not yet possible. Moreover, the scope for filtering out is restricted by other factors: the ultimate capacity of the computers, the language problem and, above all, the limited number of analysts who can read and assess filtered messages.

When assessing the capabilities of filter systems, consideration must also be given to the fact that in the case of an interception system working on the basis of the vacuum-cleaner principle those technical capabilities are spread across a range of topics. Some of the keywords relate to military security, some to drug trafficking and other forms of international crime, some to the trade in dual-use goods and some to compliance with embargoes. Some of the keywords also relate to economic activities. Any move to narrow down the range of keywords to economically interesting areas would simply run counter to the demands made on intelligence services by governments; what is more, even the end of the Cold War was not enough to prompt such a step.

3.3.3. The example of the German Federal Intelligence Service

Department 2 of the German Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) obtains information through the interception of foreign communications. This activity was the subject of a review by the German Federal Constitutional Court. The details made public during the court proceedings, combined with the evidence given to the Temporary Committee on 21 November 2000 by Mr Ernst Uhrlau, the coordinator for the secret services in the Federal Chancellors Office, give an insight into the scope for obtaining intelligence by intercepting satellite communications (until May 2001 the FIS was not authorised to intercept foreign cable communications in Germany).

On the basis of differing legal provisions or the availability of a greater number of analysts, the capabilities of other intelligence services may be greater in detail terms in given areas. In particular, the monitoring of cable traffic increases the statistical likelihood of success, but not necessarily the number of communications which can be analysed. In fundamental terms, in your rapporteurs view the example of the FIS demonstrates the capabilities and strategies employed by foreign intelligence services in connection with the monitoring of foreign communications, even if those services do not disclose such matters to the public.

The FIS endeavours, by means of strategic telecommunications monitoring, to secure information from foreign countries about foreign countries. With that aim in view, satellite transmissions are intercepted using a series of search terms (which in Germany must be authorised in advance by the so-called G10 Committee). The relevant figures break down as follows (year 2000): of the roughly 10 million international communications routed to and from Germany every day, some 800 000 are transmitted via satellite. Just under 10% of these (75 000) are filtered through a search engine. In your rapporteurs view, this limitation is not imposed by the law (in theoretical terms, and at least prior to the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court, a figure of 100% would have been allowable), but derives from technical restrictions, e.g. the limited capacity for analysis.

The number of usable search terms is likewise restricted on technical grounds and by the need to secure authorisation. The grounds for the judgment handed down by the Federal Constitutional Court refer, alongside the purely formal search terms (connections used by foreign nationals or foreign firms abroad), to 2 000 search terms in the sphere of nuclear proliferation, 1 000 in the sphere of the arms trade, 500 in the sphere of terrorism and 400 in the sphere of drug trafficking. However, the procedure has proved relatively unsuccessful in connection with terrorism and drug trafficking.

The search engine checks whether authorised search terms are used in fax and telex communications. Automatic word recognition in voice connections is not yet possible. If the search terms are not found, in technical terms the communications automatically end up in the waste bin; they cannot be analysed, owing to the lack of a legal basis. Every day, five or so communications are logged which are covered by the provisions governing the protection of the German constitution. The monitoring strategy of the FIS is geared to finding clues on which to base further monitoring activities. The monitoring of all foreign communications is not an objective. On the basis of the information available to your rapporteur, this also applies to the SIGINT activities of other foreign intelligence services.



4.1. The significance of telecommunications satellites

Today, telecommunications satellites form an essential part of the global telecommunications network and have a vital role to play in the provision of television and radio programmes and multimedia services. Nevertheless, the proportion of international communications accounted for by satellite links has decreased substantially over the past few years in Central Europe; it lies between 0.4 and 5%. This can be explained by the advantages offered by fibreoptic cables, which can carry a much greater volume of traffic at a higher connection quality.

Today, voice communications are also carried by digital systems. The capacity of digital connections routed via satellites is restricted to 1 890 ISDN-standard (64 kbits/sec) voice channels per transponder on the satellite in question. In contrast, 241 920 voice channels with the same standard can be carried on a single optical fibre. This corresponds to a ratio of 1:128!

In addition, the quality of connections routed via satellite is lower than those routed via underwater fibreoptic cables. In the case of normal voice transmissions, the loss of quality resulting from the long delay times of several hundred milliseconds is hardly noticeable  although it is perceptible. In the case of data and fax connections, which involve a complicated handshaking procedure, cable offers clear advantages in terms of connection security. At the same time, however, only 15% of the worlds population is connected to the global cable network.

For certain applications, therefore, satellite systems will continue to offer advantages over cable in the long term. Here are some examples from the civilian sphere:



National, regional and international telephone and data traffic in areas with a low volume of communications, i.e. in those places where the low rate of use would make a cable connection unprofitable;

Temporary communications systems used in the context of rescue operations following natural disasters, major events, large-scale building sites, etc.;



UN missions in regions with an underdeveloped communications infrastructure.



Flexible/mobile business communications using very small earth stations (VSATs, see below).

This wide range of uses to which satellites are put in the communications sphere can be explained by the following characteristics: the footprint of a single geostationary satellite can cover almost 50% of the earths surface; impassable regions no longer pose a barrier to communication. In the area concerned, 100% of users are covered, whether on land, at sea or in the air. Satellites can be made operational within a few months, irrespective of the infrastructure available on the spot, they are more reliable than cable and can be replaced more easily.

The following characteristics of satellite communications must be regarded as drawbacks: the relatively long delay times, the path attenuation, the shorter useful life, by comparison with cable, of 12 to 15 years, the greater vulnerability to damage and the ease of interception.

4.2. How a satellite link operates

As already mentioned (see Chapter 3), by using appropriate antennae microwaves can be very effectively focused, allowing cables to be replaced by microwave radio links. If the transmitting and the receiving antenna are not in line of sight, but rather, as they are on the earth, on the surface of a sphere, then from a given distance onwards the receiving antenna disappears below the horizon owing to the curvature of the earth. The two antennae are thus no longer in line of sight. This would apply, for example, to an intercontinental microwave radio link between Europe and the USA. The antennae would have to be fitted to masts 1.8 km high in order for a link to be established. For this reason, an intercontinental microwave radio link of this kind is simply not feasible, setting aside the issue of the attenuation of the signal by air and water vapour. However, if a kind of mirror for the microwave radio link can be set up in a fixed position high above the earth in space, large distances can be overcome, despite the curvature of the earth, just as a person can see round corners using a traffic mirror. The principle described above is made workable through the use of geostationary satellites.

4.2.1. Geostationary satellites

If a satellite is placed into a circular orbit parallel to the equator in which it circles the earth once every 24 hours, it will follow the rotation of the earth exactly. Looking up from the earths surface, it seems to stand still at a height of roughly 36 000 km  it has a geostationary position. Most communications and television satellites are satellites of this type.

4.2.2. The route followed by signals sent via a satellite communication link

The transmission of signals via satellite can be described as follows:

The signal coming from a cable is transmitted by an earth station equipped with a parabolic antenna to the satellite via an upward microwave radio link, the uplink. The satellite receives the signal, regenerates it and transmits it back to another Earth station via a downwards microwave radio link, the downlink. From there, the signal is transferred back to a cable network.

In the case of mobile communications satellite telephones the signal is transmitted directly from the mobile communications unit to the satellite, from where it can be fed into a cable link, via an Earth station, or directly transmitted to a different mobile unit.

4.2.3. The most important satellite communication systems

If necessary, communications coming from public cable networks (not necessarily state networks) are transmitted between fixed earth stations, via satellite systems of differing scope, and then fed back into cable networks. A distinction is drawn between the following forms of satellite systems:

- global systems (e.g. INTELSAT) - regional (continental) systems (e.g. EUTELSAT) - national systems (e.g. ITALSAT).

Most of these satellites are in a geostationary orbit; 120 private companies throughout the world operate some 1 000 satellites.

In addition, the far northern areas of the earth are covered by satellites in a highly elliptical orbit (Russian molnyia orbits) in which the satellites are visible to users in the far north for half their orbit. In principle, two satellites can provide full regional coverage, which is not feasible from a geostationary position above the equator. In the case of the Russian Molnyia satellites, which have been in service as communications satellites since 1974 (prototype launched in 1964), three equidistant satellites orbit the earth once every 12 hours and thus guarantee continuous transmission of communications.

Alongside this, the global INMARSAT system  originally established for use at sea  provides a mobile communications system by means of which satellite links can be established anywhere in the world. This system also uses geostationary satellites.

The worldwide satellite-based mobile telephone system IRIDIUM, which employed a number of satellites placed at time intervals in low orbits, recently ceased operating on economic grounds (overcapacity).

There is also a rapidly expanding market for so-called VSAT links (VSAT = very small aperture terminal). This involves the use of very small earth stations with antennae with a diameter of between 0.9 and 3.7 metres, which are operated either by firms to meet their own needs (e.g. videoconferences) or by mobile service providers to meet short-term communications requirements (e.g. in connection with meetings). In 1996, 200 000 very small earth stations were in operation around the world. Volkswagen AG operates 3 000 VSAT units, Renault 4 000, General Motors 100 000 and the largest European oil company 12 000. If the client does not arrange for encryption, communication is entirely open.

4.2.3.1. Global satellite systems

Through the positioning of satellites above the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific regions, these satellite systems cover the entire globe.

INTELSAT

INTELSAT (International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation) was founded as an authority in 1964 with an organisational structure similar to that of the UN and with the commercial purpose of providing international communications. The members of the organisation were state-owned telecommunications companies. Today, 144 governments are INTELSAT members. In 2001, INTELSAT will be privatised.

INTELSAT now operates a fleet of 20 geostationary satellites, which provide links between more than 200 countries and whose services are rented out to the members of INTELSAT. The members operate their own ground stations. Following the establishment of INTELSAT Business Service (IBS) in 1984, non-members (e.g. telephone companies, large firms, international concerns) can also use the satellites. INTELSAT offers global services such as communications, television, etc. Telecommunications are transmitted via the C-band and the Ku-band (see below).

INTELSAT satellites are the most important international telecommunications satellites, accounting for a very large proportion of the world market in such communications.

The satellites cover the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific regions (see table, Chapter 5.3).

Ten satellites are positioned above the Atlantic between 304°E and 359°E, the Indian region is covered by six satellites situated between 62°E and 110m.5°E and the Pacific region by three satellites situated between 174°E and 180°E. The high volume of traffic in the Atlantic region is covered by a number of individual satellites positioned at the relevant longitudes.

INTERSPUTNIK

In 1971 the international communications organisation INTERSPUTNIK was founded by nine countries as an agency of the former Soviet Union with a task similar to that of INTELSAT. Today, INTERSPUTNIK is an international organisation which the government of any country can join. It now has 24 member countries (including Germany) and some 40 users (including France and the UK), which are represented by their post offices or national telecommunications companies. Its headquarters are in Moscow.

Telecommunications are transmitted via the C-band and the Ku-band (see below).

Its satellites (Gorizont, Express and Express A, owned by the Russian Federation, and LMI-1, the product of the Lockheed-Martin joint venture) also cover the entire globe: one satellite is positioned above the Atlantic region, with a second planned, three are positioned above the Indian region and two are positioned above the Pacific region (see table, Chapter 5.3).

INMARSAT

Since 1979 INMARSAT (Interim International Maritime Satellite) has provided, by means of its satellite system, worldwide mobile communications at sea, in the air and on land and an emergency radio system. INMARSAT was set up as an international organisation at the instigation of the International Maritime Organisation. INMARSAT has since been privatised and has its headquarters in London.

The INMARSAT system consists of nine satellites in geostationary orbits. Four of these satellites  the INMARSAT-III generation  cover the entire globe with the exception of the high polar areas. Each individual satellite covers roughly one-third of the earths surface. Through their positioning above the four ocean regions (West and East Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean), global coverage is provided. At the same time, each INMARSAT has a number of spot beams which make it possible to focus energy in areas with heavier communications traffic.

Telecommunications are transmitted via the L-band and the Ku-band (see below; 4.2.4).

PANAMSAT

PanAmSat was founded in 1988 as a commercial provider of a global satellite system and has its headquarters in the USA. PanAmSat now has a fleet of 21 satellites which provide services such as television, Internet and telecommunications on a worldwide basis, albeit chiefly in the USA.

Telecommunications are transmitted via the C-band and the Ku-band. Of the 21 satellites, seven cover the Atlantic region, two the Pacific region and two the Indian Ocean region. The footprints of the remaining satellites cover North and South America. The PanAmSat satellites play only a secondary role in communications in Europe.

4.2.3.2. Regional satellite systems

Individual regions/continents are covered by the footprints of regional satellite systems. As a result, the communications transmitted via them can be received only in those regions.

EUTELSAT

EUTELSAT was founded in 1977 by 17 European postal administrations with the aim of meeting Europes specific satellite communication requirements and supporting the European space industry. It has its headquarters in Paris and some 40 member countries. EUTELSAT is to be privatised in 2001.

EUTELSAT operates 18 geostationary satellites which cover Europe, Africa and large parts of Asia and establish a link with America. The satellites are positioned between 12.5°W and 48°E. EUTELSAT mainly offers television (850 digital and analog channels) and radio (520 channels) services, but also provides communication links  primarily within Europe, including Russia, e.g. for videoconferences, for the private networks run by large undertakings (including General Motors and Fiat), for press agencies (Reuters, AFP), for providers of financial information and for mobile data transmission services.

Telecommunications are transmitted via the Ku-band.

ARABSAT

ARABSAT is the counterpart to EUTELSAT in the Arab region and was founded in 1976. Membership is made up of 21 Arab countries. ARABSAT satellites are used both for the transmission of television services and for communications.

Telecommunications are transmitted mainly via the C-band.

PALAPA

The Indonesian PALAPA system has been in operation since 1995 and is the south-Asian counterpart to EUTELSAT. Its footprint covers Malaysia, China, Japan, India, Pakistan and other countries in the region.

Telecommunications are transmitted via the C-band and the Ku-band.

4.2.3.3. National satellite systems

Many states meet their own requirements by operating satellite systems with restricted footprints.

One purpose of the French telecommunications satellite TELECOM is to link the French departments in Africa and South America with mainland France. Telecommunications are transmitted via the C-band and the Ku-band.

ITALSAT operates telecommunications satellites which cover the whole of Italy by means of a series of restricted footprints. Reception is therefore possible only in Italy. Telecommunications are transmitted via the Ku-band.

AMOS is an Israeli satellite whose footprint covers the Middle East. Telecommunications are transmitted via the Ku-band.

The Spanish HISPASAT satellites cover Spain and Portugal (KU-spots) and transmit Spanish television programmes to North and South America.

4.2.4. The allocation of frequencies

The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is responsible for the allocation of frequencies. For ease of organisation, for radio communication purposes the world has been divided into three regions:

1. Europe, Africa, former Soviet Union, Mongolia 2. North and South America and Greenland 3. Asia, with the exception of countries in region 1, Australia and the South Pacific.

This division, which has become established over the years, was taken over for the purposes of satellite communications and has led to the positioning of large numbers of satellites in certain geostationary areas. The most important frequency bands for satellite communications are:

- the L-band (0.4  1.6 GHz) for mobile satellite communications, e.g. via IMMARSAT; - the C-band (3.6  6.6 GHz) for earth stations, e.g. via INTELSAT; - the Ku-band (10  20 GHz) for earth stations, e.g. INTELSAT Ku-spot and EUTELSAT; - the Ka-band (20  46 GHz) for earth stations, e.g. military communications satellites (see Chapter 4.4.3); - the V-band (46  56 GHz) for very small earth stations (VSATs).

4.2.5. Satellite footprints

The footprint is the area on the earth covered by a satellite antenna. It may embrace up to 50% of the earths surface, or, by means of signal focusing, be restricted to small, regional spots.

The higher the frequency of the signal emitted, the more it can be focused and the smaller the footprint becomes. The focusing of the satellite signal on smaller footprints can increase the energy of the signal. The smaller the footprint, the stronger the signal, and thus the smaller the receiving antennae may be.

This can briefly be illustrated in greater detail, taking the example of the INTELSAT satellites.

The global, hemispheric and zone beams use C-band frequencies. The spot beams use Ku-band frequencies.



4.2.6. The size of antennae required by an earth station

Parabolic antennae with a diameter of between 0.5 and 30m are used as receiving antennae on the earth. The parabolic mirror reflects all incoming waves and focuses them. The actual receiving system is situated in the focal point of the parabolic mirror. The greater the energy of the signal at the receiving point is, the smaller the diameter of the parabolic antenna need be.

The key factor in connection with the investigations conducted for this report is that a proportion of intercontinental communications are transmitted via the C-band in the global beams of the INTELSAT satellites and other satellites (e.g. INTERSPUTNIK) and that satellite antennae with a diameter of roughly 30 m are needed to receive some of these communications (see Chapter 5). Antennae of that size were also needed for the first stations set up to intercept satellite communications, since the first generation of INTELSAT satellites had only global beams and signal transmission technology was much less sophisticated than it is today. These antennae, some of which have a diameter of more than 30 m, are still used at the stations in question, even though they are no longer required on purely technical grounds (see also Chapter 5, 5.2.3.).

Today, the typical antennae required for INTELSAT communications in the C-band have a diameter of between 13 and 20 m.

Antennae with a diameter of between 2 and 5 m are required for the Ku-spots of the INTELSAT satellites and other satellites (EUTELSAT Ku-band, AMOS Ku-band, etc.).

In the case of very small earth stations, which operate in the V-band and whose signal, by virtue of the high frequency, can be focused even more strongly than those in the Ku-band, antennae with a diameter of between 0.5 and 3.7 m are adequate (e.g. VSATs from EUTELSAT or INMARSAT).

4.3. Satellite communications for military purposes

4.3.1. General

Communications satellites play an important role in the military sphere as well. Many countries, including the USA, the United Kingdom, France and Russia, operate their own geostationary military communications satellites, with the aid of which independent global communication is possible The USA has stationed one satellite roughly every 10° around the earth in some 32 orbital positions. However, some use is also made of commercial geostationary satellites for the purposes of providing military communications.

4.3.2 Frequencies used for military purposes

The frequency bands used for military communications lie in the range between 4 Ghz and 81 Ghz. The bands typically used by military communications satellites are X-band (SHF - 3-30 Ghz) and the Ka-band (EHF - 20-46 Ghz).

4.3.3. Size of the receiving stations

A distinction must be drawn between mobile stations, which may have a diameter of only a few decimetres, and fixed stations, which generally have a diameter not exceeding 11m. There are, however, two types of antenna (to receive signals from DSCS satellites) with a diameter of 18m.

4.3.4. Examples of military communications satellites

The US MILSTAR program (Military Strategy, Tactical and Relay Satellite System), which operates six geostationary satellites worldwide, enables US armed forces to communicate with each other and with command centres using small earth stations, aircraft, ships and man-packs. Through the link among the satellites themselves worldwide communications availability is guaranteed even if all the US earth stations cease operating.

The DSCS (Defense Satellite Communications System) also provides global communications by means of five geostationary satellites. The system is used by the