We’re still in danger

These incidents also continued well past the end of the Cold War.

During the failed Soviet hardliner coup against Pres. Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, Gorbachev was temporarily cut off from his own nuclear forces. It’s unlikely the Soviet missile forces would have taken orders from the hardliners, but it was still worrying.

As nuclear weapons proliferated, the dangers of inadvertent use proliferated with them. During the Kargil crisis of 1999—set off by a series of military exercises by India and Pakistan—the Pakistani generals moved nuclear weapons out of storage into a position where they could be fired.

Had the crisis continued further, or had Indian forces launched an offensive into Pakistan, there could have very well likely been a nuclear attack on India.

Chatham House also brings in the U.S. Air Force’s recent nuclear force scandals for criticism. While not risking the accidental release of nuclear weapons, the U.S. experienced two major incidents in the past eight years that are still quite concering.

In 2007, the Air Force lost contact with six nuclear cruise missiles for 36 hours after the missiles were placed unguarded under the wings of a B-52 bomber. “Had the plane experienced any problem in flight, the crew would not have known to follow the proper emergency procedures with nuclear weapons on board,” the report states.

A big shake-up also occurred last year. After a major investigation by the Air Force and Navy, several officers with responsibility over U.S. nuclear forces were dismissed or demoted after numerous security lapses at missile bases.

It might seem like these accidents and near-misses are an exception to more than a half-century of nuclear peace. But the report argues that accidents are likely, given human frailty and the peculiar nature of nuclear weapons. During times of political crisis, the risk of inadvertent use is at its highest.

In a modern flash-point like the Korean peninsula, “it is a reasonable assumption that an exercise similar to Able Archer-83, which simulated command and control, in the region could be confused with an actual attack and provoke a nuclear response,” the report warns.

Nukes are also complex weapons—and their capabilities are kept as secret as possible. According to the report, this makes it difficult to learn from past mistakes. Each event is treated as a singular event, and the fault is put onto individuals rather than seeing these incidents are a systemic problem.

To make matters more risky, few people are—by necessity—responsible for making the decisions regarding whether nukes should be used. The flip side is that fewer people are there to check for a potential miscalculation.

“A shared belief in nuclear deterrence is not the only plausible explanation for our escape from nuclear war; rather individual decision-making, often in disobedience to protocol and political guidance, has on several occasions saved the day,” the report states.

So thank your luck—and thank those individuals who disobeyed.

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