Unlock bootloader

Generate keys

Install new key

Lock bootloader

Sign image

Install image

Unlock bootloader

Install ROM key

Lock bootloader

Install ROM

The security model on the Google Nexus devices is pretty straightforward. The OS is (nominally) secure and prevents anything from accessing the raw MTD devices. The bootloader will only allow the user to write to partitions if it's unlocked. The recovery image will only permit you to install images that are signed with a trusted key. In combination, these facts mean that it's impossible for an attacker to modify the OS image without unlocking the bootloader[1], and unlocking the bootloader wipes all your data. You'll probably notice that.The problem comes when you want to run something other than the stock Google images. Step number one for basically all of these is "Unlock your bootloader", which is fair enough. Step number two is "Install a new recovery image", which is also reasonable in that the key database is stored in the recovery image and so there's no way to update it without doing so. Except, unfortunately, basically every third party Android image is either unsigned or is signed with the (publicly available) Android test keys, so this new recovery image will flash anything. Feel free to relock your bootloader - the recovery image will still happily overwrite your OS.This is unfortunate. Even if you've encrypted your phone, anyone with physical access can simply reboot into recovery and reflash /system with something that'll stash your encryption key and mail your data to the NSA. Surely there's a better way of doing this?Thankfully, there is. Kind of. It's annoying and involves a bunch of manual processes and you'll need to re-sign every update yourself. But it is possible to configure Nexus devices in such a way that you retain the same level of security you had when you were using the Google keys without losing the freedom to run whatever you want. Here's how.Note: This is not straightforward. If you're not an experienced developer, you shouldn't attempt this. I'm documenting this so people can create more user-friendly approaches.First: Unlock your bootloader. /data will be wiped.Second: Get a copy of the stock recovery.img for your device. You can get it from the factory images available here Third: Grab mkbootimg from here and build it. Run unpackbootimg against recovery.img.Fourth: Generate some keys. Get this script and run it.Fifth: zcat recovery.img-ramdisk.gz | cpio -id to extract your recovery image ramdisk. Do this in an otherwise empty directory.Sixth: Get DumpPublicKey.java from here and run it against the .x509.pem file generated in step 4. Replace /res/keys from the recover image ramdisk with the output. Include the "v2" bit at the beginning.Seventh: Repack the ramdisk image (find . | cpio -o -H newc | gzip > ../recovery.img-ramdisk.gz) and rebuild recovery.img with mkbootimg.Eighth: Write the new recovery image to your deviceNinth: Get signapk from here and build it. Run it against the ROM you want to sign, using the keys you generated earlier. Make sure you use the -w option to sign the whole zip rather than signing individual files.Tenth: Relock your bootloaderEleventh: Boot into recovery mode and sideload your newly signed image.At this point you'll want to set a reasonable security policy on the image (eg, if it grants root access, ensure that it requires a PIN or something), but otherwise you're set - the recovery image can't be overwritten without unlocking the bootloader and wiping all your data, and the recovery image will only write images that are signed with your key. For obvious reasons, keep the key safe.This, well. It's obviously an excessively convoluted workflow. A *lot* of it could be avoided by providing a standardised mechanism for key management. One approach would be to add a new fastboot command for modifying the key database, and only permit this to be run when the bootloader is unlocked. The workflow would then be something likewhich seems more straightforward. Long term, individual projects could do the signing themselves and distribute their public keys, resulting in the install process becoming as easy aswhich is actually easier than the current requirement to install an entirely new recovery image.I'd actually previously criticised Google on the grounds that using custom keys wasn't possible on Android devices. I was wrong. It is, it's just that (as far as I can tell) nobody's actually documented it before. It's important that users not be forced into treating security and freedom as mutually exclusive, and it's great that Google have made that possible.[1] This model fails if it's possible to gain root on the device. Thankfully this would never hold on what's that over there is that a distraction?