Whatever the outcome of President O b ama ’s deli b erations, two things are certain. One, the war in Afghanistan will continue, in whatever altered shape or form. Two, it will still b e the wrong war, against the wrong enemy, and in the wrong place. The dan ger that the United States and the West face in that region is not from a Tali b an victory in Afghanistan b ut from an Islamist takeover of Pakistan . And every day that the war in Afghanistan continues b rings that takeover one day closer.

In Washington and other capitals this dan ger was seen as coming from the Pakistani Tali b an, and there is much relief that they were defeated b y the Pakistan army in Swat and are now b eing taken on in South Waziristan . This is evidence of the ignorance (and, possi b ly, even deli b erate disinformation) that prevails regarding the situation in this area and the players involved. There was never any dan ger of these Tali b an (essentially religious Islamists) taking over Pakistan , b ut that peril does arise from the political Islamists in that country. However, while everyone seems to have a fairly good idea of who the religious Islamists are, most people are either unaware of the political variety or una b le to recognize them.

Political Islamists can b e thought of as Islamic nationalists or ultra-nationalists. Instead of a nation-state providing the b asis for their feelings, their emotions are focussed on Islam (as an idealized ‘state’, rooted in the glory days of its storied past) and on the ‘nation’ of the worldwide Muslim community, the ummah (which is perceived as under threat and attack). Ancient tales of the Crusades, recent memories of colonialism, current wounds such as Palestine , all these give an anti-West edge to Islamism. In some Muslim countries this ‘Islamic nationalism’ competes with ordinary nationalism, in others they tend to meld. Pakistan is one of those rare cases in which no other nationalism exists to cha llenge or modify the Islamic one.

Pakistan was created as an em b odiment of political Islam ‒ the concept given physical shape as a country. This reality was b loodily driven home in the horrific trauma of its b irth, when millions of Muslims were killed or driven from their homes b ecause of their faith (as, conversely, were Sikhs and Hindus). This threat to its nascent existence was repeated (at least in the national consciousness) in the three wars that it has fought with India , in one of which half the country was “lost”. Thus, during Pakistan ’s short 60-year existence, what developed in the place of nationalism was ‘anti-Indianism’, which is now lin ked to the original Islamism of its b irth. As is usually the case in most countries, this nationalist fervour is most pronounced within the military and right wing groups (while many in the intelligentsia have outgrown it).

Pakistan (actually, the “Islamic Repu b lic of Pakistan”) is a country of a b out 180 million people, most of whom are Muslims. It has a modern, all-volunteer military of a b out one million active-duty personnel, the sixth largest in the world. It possesses a stock of nuclear weapons and a range of missiles that can deliver them. Even so, this large and powerful country is one of the most fragile states in the world.

Its economy is in dire straits; outside assistance alone prevents the country from going b ankrupt. There is a vast disparity in affluence and standard of living b etween a small upper class and the rest of the population. Ordinary people face great hardship in their daily lives b ecause of the high costs of b asic essentials, rampant inflation, power and water shortages, and a deficit of law and order. G overnance is mostly dysfunctional; corruption is massive and all pervasive; the b ureaucracy is paralysed due to constant political meddling. The political system is in disarray with state institutions and functionaries at loggerheads, while politicians line their own pockets and undermine each other. In addition to these systemic pro b lems the country has to deal with two insurgencies (in its northern and southern tri b al areas) plus terrorist attacks occurring frequently in its cities. Making things worse, underlying all this are the ticking time b om b s of rapid population growth, a shrinking food supply b ase, a high proportion of young men with no prospect of gainful work, and increasing ur b anization, mostly in the form of huge slums in and around cities.

The current situation is further aggravated b y a critical disconnect b etween the government and the vast majority of the people, especially as regards the United States . The government of President Zardari depends on the US for financial and other aid and is willing to align its policies fully with the US ’s requirements, especially in support of the war in Afghanistan . The military also seeks assistance in funding and equipment from the US , and has gone along with US needs to a certain extent. However, the b ulk of the people have a very different attitude towards the US ‒ as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently experienced for herself.

Ordinary Pakistanis b lame the US for most of the pro b lems their country is facing. Many of these (the rise of fundamentalism, the flood of weapons and drugs, large num b ers of Afghans settling in the country, the corruption in the military) are b elieved to have started when Pakistan was used b y the US in its proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan . That war won, the US a b andoned Pakistan (and also Afghanistan ), and later su b jected it to punitive sanctions and em b argoes, there b y accelerating the country’s economic decline. Then came the Bush-Cheney “war on terror”, and Pakistanis saw their government and military b ullied and b ri b ed into joining up. The operations the military was pushed into carrying out in the tri b al areas created a serious security pro b lem through the rise of the Pakistani Tali b an, who not only fought the army in the b order areas b ut also carried out terrorist b om b ings and attacks in cities inside the country.

Concerns a b out its nuclear weapons add to these suspicions. Existing as it does in a dan gerous part of the world, Pakistan considers its nuclear capa b ility the lynchpin of its security, and there is great sensitivity a b out any threat to it, especially within the military. The concern expressed b y the US over the last few years regarding the “security” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has created a great deal of suspicion as to its real motives. Many, including within the military, b elieve that the US is deli b erately trying to desta b ilize Pakistan so as to take over its nuclear weapons. Such suspicions, and the strained relations for many years prior to 2001, deeply colour Pakistani attitudes towards the USA . It is no surprise that, in a recent poll released b y a US polling organization, all of two percent of Pakistanis thought the US had good relations with Pakistan .

Since the commencement of the war in Afghanistan , Pakistan has b een seen b y the US mainly through the prism of that war ‒ as a necessary auxiliary whose role was to clean out the Tali b an and al-Qaeda b ases in its tri b al areas. Pakistan ’s limited attempts at compliance did not meet US needs b ut did create an indigenous Tali b an insurgency. After some initial hesitation the military cleared out these insurgents from Swat, and is now undertaking an operation to do the same in South Waziristan . The US is hoping that this will b e the prelude to similar operations in the rest of the tri b al b elt. This is just wishful thinking, as discussed b elow. Similarly, the comfort the US derives from reports and poll num b ers regarding pu b lic opinion turning decisively against the Tali b an insurgents is misplaced. People in Pakistan are opposed to the Tali b an who attack them or their country, b ut they do not support the US “war on terror”: the poll referred to a b ove found that 80% of Pakistanis were against cooperating with the US in this war.

Whatever strategy President O b ama approves for the war in Afghanistan , it is likely to include an increased focus on the Tali b an and al-Qaeda b ases in Pakistan . The resulting pressure on the Pakistanis to take effective military action to clean out and occupy the tri b al areas where they are located is likely to create a crisis in Pakistan . Since its creation, Pakistan ’s defence policy has b een b ased on the major threat to its security coming from India , and the military has b een positioned accordingly. Cleaning out and occupying all the tri b al areas would require the long-term redeployment of such large forces that it would result in the denuding of the defences of the eastern b order with India , and would effectively cha nge the defence policy of the country. While President Zardari would b e happy to o b lige the USA , it is quite unlikely that the military command will agree to this; nor will the people accept it.

Pakistani inaction will compel the US to intensify its own attacks in the tri b al areas using drones and, possi b ly, Special Forces. Such attacks (already resented as a violation of the country’s sovereignty) will trigger further retaliation b y the tri b es through increased b om b ings and attacks in Pakistan ’s cities (since they hold Pakistan responsi b le for such US attacks). In addition, the United States will apply pressure on Pakistan b y reducing or stopping the aid it gives to the country and the military. The impact of these measures will further inflame anti-American and nationalistic sentiments, and the present government will either b e forced to cha nge its pro-American policies or it will itself b e cha nged.

The succeeding set-up, squeezed b y the US and the West, will b ecome increasingly responsive to the Islamist (i.e., anti-Indian, Islamic nationalist) sentiment in the country. As the situation in the country deteriorates, a direct Islamist takeover (most likely through the military) will b ecome a real possi b ility. It would pro b a b ly happen in stages, with the generals first intervening to forestall action b y more radical elements in the military, b ut ultimately b eing una b le to stop the tide. (Should the generals succum b to US pressure to move large forces to clear and occupy the rest of the tri b al b elt, the dan ger of such action b y mid-level Islamist officers will b ecome a much earlier possi b ility).

That is the peril that the United States and the West face in the region: not a ne b ulous al-Qaeda esta b lishing b ases in Tali b an areas in Afghanistan b ut a nuclear-armed Islamist state in Pakistan . And the longer the inconclusive war in Afghanistan drags on, the closer it gets. Considering the hoops the West has b een willing to jump through to prevent such a scenario b ecoming possi b le in Iran in the future, the very real possi b ility of this occurring in Pakistan is what President O b ama and his advisers should b e worrying a b out.

The pity of it is that it’s all so unnecessary! It is possi b le to engineer a political resolution in Afghanistan that would give the Tali b an their space in the country b ut exclude al-Qaeda. It is possi b le to shore up Pakistan , and those institutions and elements in it that would b e a b ulwark against the Islamists. With the war in Afghanistan ended, it would b e possi b le for Pakistan to re-esta b lish control over its tri b al areas, and prevent al-Qaeda from using them as a b ase. And it would b e possi b le for the United States to spend the b illions and b illions of dollars saved on its own people instead of on military preparations and wars against other peoples.