Mohammad Ali Shabani is a doctoral researcher at the University of London, where he focuses on Iranian foreign policy, and is a columnist for Al-Monitor.

Even as the nuclear talks dragged on and yet another deadline was broken, the mood in Vienna has grown increasingly positive since Tuesday morning. Numbness from the daily grind has given way to cautious optimism. Part of this is due to Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s return from his one-day trip to Tehran, where he held consultations and brought along Ali Akbar Salehi, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran chief who helped ensure success on the interim deal reached in Lausanne in April. Accompanying Zarif is Hossein Fereydoun, special envoy and brother of President Hassan Rouhani. Just before entering a meeting with Secretary of State John Kerry on Tuesday, Zarif told reporters he’s in Vienna “to get a final deal, and I think we can.”

Part of the shifting mood is that, according to several Iranian sources privy to the negotiations, there appears to be progress on some key issues.


It won’t be easy to find the middle ground, especially with one week’s grace only, but the extension of the November 2013 interim deal until July 7 means that negotiators believe progress can be made. On the issue of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s presence in Iran, one Iranian source close to the negotiating team told me that Tehran is willing to allow “managed access” but won’t allow interrogations of its nuclear scientists, a practice that the Iranians believe has helped to target the scientists for assassination in the past. There also appears to be some progress on the touchy issue of how to coordinate the implementation of a deal.

After twelve years of on-and-off talks, Iran and the major powers have never been this close to a comprehensive nuclear agreement. If a deal is reached by July 7, it’ll give the Obama administration just enough time to get out bound copies of the agreement—an 80-plus-page main text and multiple thick annexes—to members of Congress for the required 30-day review before implementation will begin. Under that law, which the White House agreed to, the review period is to start July 9.

It wouldn’t be a stretch to say that perhaps those most eager for the talks to conclude–beyond the negotiators–are the journalists covering them. Reporting fatigue kicked in many rounds of negotiations ago. The bigger names are getting tired of sipping overpriced lattes at the Marriott, just across from the imposing Palais Coburg where negotiations are held. The common folks reporting from the tent erected adjacent to the Marriott are beyond impatient to move on to the next story.

The main issues still on the table can be boiled down to inspections, research & development (R&D) and sanctions relief. A lot of heavy lifting has already been done; the broader parameters of a final deal were agreed in Switzerland in April. However, as always, the details will make or break the deal.

That is especially true of IAEA inspections. In a speech last week, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected anytime-anywhere access to Iranian non-nuclear military sites. However, according to Ariane Tabatabaei of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, there is middle-ground that could allow transparency without crossing Iranian red lines. “My understanding is that the IAEA got access to Parchin, and are getting one-time access again,” she says, referring to the military complex just east of Tehran. Iran is suspected of having carried out nuclear activities with a possible military dimension (PMD) in the past, including at Parchin. Questions related to the so-called PMD, which go beyond Parchin, have been hanging over the negotiations for years.

Even critics of a deal with Iran recognize that if weaponization activities have taken place in the past, there is no way for Iran to confirm it in a face-saving manner. This sort of admission is particularly difficult because of the supreme leader’s fatwa banning the development, stockpiling and use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear warheads. Cognizant of this dynamic, the United States has been clear about that it does not seek an “admission” on the part of Iran, with Kerry emphasizing that the future matters more than the past. Thus, “there is still room for maneuvering even for the PMD issue, where both sides started on a relatively hard line,” says Tabatabaei.

The Iranian source, who is privy to close details of the negotiations, said that “managed access is not a taboo…but we don’t accept interrogation,” referring to the IAEA’s request for access to Iranian scientists. Tehran says the nuclear scientists who were assassinated in recent years—possibly by Israeli covert operators—were identified through past interviews with the IAEA. The Iranian source argued that there are ways to move forward in a feasible manner. “The IAEA currently has a counterpart in Iran. Our Atomic Energy Organization is in touch with the agency. This is nothing out of the ordinary. We have safeguards, and there are regulations. If it is necessary for the sake of transparency for the agency to speak with relevant officials, this is something ordinary. But if this is going to be transformed into interrogations or requests for access to irrelevant people, we will never accept it. The supreme leader has said that this is a humiliating demand.”

Also on the table is the matter of Iranian research and development of centrifuges. According to Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association, who is in Vienna, “a number of different political decisions have already been made … there are differences, but these are resolvable.” Iran currently only operates IR-1 centrifuges, which are based on an inefficient 1970s design prone to malfunction. In addition, it has installed but not operating just over 1,000 IR-2m centrifuges, while a series of more advanced models are under development. Davenport says that “the parameters [agreed in Switzerland] left open a number of questions … including the introduction of advanced centrifuge machines later in the deal,” which is expected to last between ten and fifteen years.

Research and development is a sensitive issue in Iran, where the authorities have largely portrayed Western opposition to the Iranian nuclear program as part of a broader attempt to keep Iran technologically backward. Of note, President Hassan Rouhani, who led Iran’s failed 2003 to 2005 nuclear negotiations with Europe, has repeatedly invoked continued R&D at that time to deflect criticism of past performance. These sensitivities make the topic of R&D restrictions under a final deal a particularly difficult sell in Tehran.

Where progress has been reported—although short of a finalized solution—is in relation to the practical implementation of a deal. In his speech last week, Khamenei said that economic and financial sanctions must be lifted the day an agreement is signed, leading many observers to speculate that Iran’s red lines have been stiffened. However, a second Iranian source said to me there is now agreement on the mode of implementation of sanctions relief, dismissing reports that the Supreme Leader has hardened his stance. According to this well-placed source, “Nothing is going to be signed in Vienna, because this is not going to be an international agreement or treaty. The only thing it is, is what its name suggests: a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. A plan of action is very different from a treaty or agreement. What is meant by ‘signed’ is the so-called date of implementation.” The Iranian source further clarified that the implementation of a deal will involve three phases: adoption, operationalization and implementation.

The adoption phase will last from the time an agreement is reached until each of the seven parties to the negotiations have gone through domestic processes needed to proceed with the deal. Tehran is still pushing for the UN Security Council to endorse the agreement at this stage.

Subsequently, in the so-called “operational phase,” both sides will take measures to start implementing their commitments. On Iran’s part, the number of centrifuges will begin being reduced among other measures. The Iranian source added that the P5+1 will also have to begin taking simultaneous and reciprocal measures at this stage, to ensure its commitment to the deal—adding that the manner in which the latter is to be ensured is still under discussion.

The final phase, the implementation date, will thus be the day when both sides have lived up to their commitments. On Iran’s part, this will include finalization of the removal of the heart of the Arak heavy water, while on the part of the P5+1, all nuclear-related economic, banking and financial sanctions will be terminated. The Iranian source underscored that measures taken on the implementation date will not be a decision based on the operational phase, but the result of a previously agreed automatic mechanism.

If the July 7 deadline is also missed, multiple new obstacles will emerge: the Congressional review period will be extended to 60 days under the Corker bill, paving the way for opponents to a deal to extend their attacks. Already, negotiators on primarily the US and Iranian sides are under heavy domestic pressure.

On Sunday, EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini told reporters that ministers would return to the Austrian capital once more work has been done, and it is time for major political decisions to be made. Considering Zarif and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s return to Vienna, and other counterparts expected to trickle in the coming days, it seems that time has come. The negotiators are under heavier pressure than ever to deliver.

If not, then perhaps last major opportunity to end the Iranian nuclear crisis may be missed.