Taim bifo (the time before)

The two main islands of Bougainville and Buka and a number of smaller island groups and atolls are all part of PNG’s Autonomous Region of Bougainville, formerly known as North Solomons Province (NSP). It lies to the east of mainland Papua New Guinea and close to the border of neighbouring Solomon Islands. Bougainville has a population approaching 300 000 people with 19 main language groups.

Bougainvilleans claim that their traditional trade links and affinities before European contact were mainly with those of the western and central islands of the Solomons chain rather than with the PNG mainland. There was also substantial contact with seafaring Polynesians who came to trade and settle in some of the outlying atolls.

The first recorded European contact with Bougainville was by the French explorer Admiral Louis Antoine de Bougainville in July 1768. De Bougainville named the main island after himself but the French never settled it. In the late 1800s Germany claimed northern New Guinea and its islands, including Bougainville. Settlers established large copra plantations, and the largest of them, the German Neuguinea-Kompagnie, informally assumed the role of administrator.[8]

The German administration of New Guinea, including Bougainville, came to an end in 1914 at the outbreak of the First World War when the Australian military took control of the island. As a result of lobbying by Prime Minister Billy Hughes after the war, the League of Nations assigned the former German territory of New Guinea to Australia to administer.

From 1918 to 1975 — interrupted by Japanese occupation during the Second World War[9] — Bougainville was administered by Australia, first as a mandated territory on behalf of the League of Nations, then as a “trust” territory on behalf of the United Nations following the war.

The emergence of Bougainvillean identity

Before colonisation, Bougainville and Buka (the island to its north) shared little in the sense of island nationalism or ethnicity. The arrival of European rule changed this, with grievances against the colonial regimes driving the island populations together towards the semblance of a pan-Bougainville identity. Perhaps the strongest factor in entrenching this Bougainvillean identity, however, was the establishment of the Panguna copper and gold mine near Arawa in the 1960s and early 1970s during the period of Australian colonial administration.[10] The mine was operated by Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), an Australian subsidiary of Rio Tinto, and sought to tap large deposits of copper, gold and silver in the Emperor mountain range.

While the arrival of the mine brought infrastructure and helped to modernise Bougainville, perceived inequities in the distribution of compensation and revenue alienated local communities. From the start, the mine had provoked protests, with local women pulling out survey markers and standing in front of bulldozers.[11]

The shift to autonomy

The grievances created by the establishment of the Panguna mine stoked emerging ethno-nationalist sentiment and generated a groundswell of opposition to both the mine and the Australian colonial administration. Throughout this period, kastom and cult movements such as the Hahalis Welfare Society and Napidokoe Navitu were agitating for rights, self-determination, and secession. James Tanis, who became the second president of Bougainville, articulated the sense of alienation: “We never felt we were Papua New Guineans.”[12]

The resentments spread beyond the kastom movements to the general community, and led to a series of confrontations with the administration in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[13] The protests culminated when local leaders, intent on pre-empting PNG rule before it gained full independence on 16 September 1975, made Bougainville’s first unilateral declaration of independence on 1 September 1975.

The declaration was ignored by both the outgoing Australian administration and the incoming PNG one, but signalled Bougainville’s desire for self-determination. Instead, a deal was done between founding fathers Michael Somare and Fr John Momis to allow Bougainville a type of autonomy in the form of a ‘provincial government’ as an inducement to stay part of the PNG nation.

panguna-mine.jpg BRA guerillas above the captured Panguna copper and gold mine, 1994 (Photo: Ben Bohane/Wakaphotos.com)

Seeds of war

By the 1980s, Bougainville was considered among the most advanced and wealthiest provinces in PNG. The Arawa area in which the Panguna mine was located had a well-equipped hospital, schools and roads, and had the second-highest per capita income of all PNG provinces. It produced 14 per cent of PNG’s national income and half of its exports. Life expectancy, infant mortality, and educational indicators were all substantially superior to the PNG average.[14]

The mine’s management spent significant amounts of money on social services and infrastructure on the island. Bougainvilleans employed at the mine learned trade skills and were offered scholarships for further education. Many Bougainvilleans used the skills learnt at the Panguna mine and other businesses in Arawa to find employment elsewhere in PNG, Australia and beyond. According to academic Donald Denoon:

“BCL (Bougainville Copper Limited) tried to become good corporate citizens. Services were devised to help small businesses and to provide agricultural extension. BCL canteens were good markets for growers and local contractors moved into transport, security and building.”[15]

Despite this material progress, discontentment on Bougainville persisted. While around a third of the mine’s employees were Bougainvilleans, Arawa locals were insufficiently skilled for most of the jobs.[16] Locals were aggrieved at PNG mainlanders (‘redskins’) taking mine jobs away from the local labour pool, and involving themselves in local politics. Prostitution, gambling and squatting on kastom land all increased over the time of the mine’s operation. The Panguna mine was a major part of PNG’s national economy,[17] but Bougainvilleans were resentful at underwriting it, and when combined with the social tensions from the growing influx of foreigners and redskins, this hardened Bougainville nationalism and sowed the seeds of future conflict.

There were also unresolved issues with PNG’s oversight of the mine, including its failure to conduct regular reviews of the mine lease every seven years, as stipulated in the original mining agreement. Bougainvilleans felt the government had failed in its duty to protect their interests when dealing with the mine and its foreign owners. The mine was seen as very profitable for the company and for the PNG state, but less so for the provincial government and the Bougainvillean people.[18] BCL’s own records show that from the mine’s profits between 1972 and 1989, approximately 1 billion kina was given to the PNG Government in tax and royalties (roughly 20 per cent of total production value), while landowners and the provincial government received 5 per cent each of the total royalties — around 110 million kina.[19] Landowners and other Bougainvilleans regarded these as insufficient compensation.

As the mine operator, BCL was caught between intergovernmental rivalry — national versus provincial — and unrealistic local expectations.[20] There were other rumours as well: that BCL was planning more mines on the island, adding to locals’ fears of further disenfranchisement and dislocation.[21] A younger, second generation of landowners formed the New Panguna Landowners Association (NPLA),[22] led by Perpetua Serero and a mineworker called Francis Ona, who demanded a more equitable distribution of compensation from older landowners and the mine. When that failed, the NPLA demanded 10 billion kina in compensation from BCL as well as other concessions. BCL declined. It was at this time that the fledgling Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), led by Ona, emerged.[23]

Bougainville Revolutionary Army leader Francis Ona (third from right) with a group of BRA guerrillas at Guava village above the Panguna mine, 1994 Bougainville Revolutionary Army leader Francis Ona (third from right) with a group of BRA guerrillas at Guava village above the Panguna mine, 1994 (Photo: Ben Bohane/Wakaphotos.com)

War and peace: 1988–2018

The war began in late 1988 when Ona led a small cell of armed followers in disruptive operations against the Panguna mine and the PNG state. It lasted for ten years.

Stolen dynamite was used to blow up mine facilities, including power pylons.[24] A number of mine workers, including an Australian, were shot. The BRA escalated its attacks, and PNG police and the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) were brought in to restore order, but their heavy-handed methods aggravated the conflict.[25] After 17 years of production, the mine was closed in May 1989 and a state of emergency declared as PNG sent riot police and the PNGDF to pursue the rebel BRA.

The brutality of PNG forces turned many Bougainvilleans towards the BRA. However, BRA killings and intra-island ethnic tensions, in turn, created a Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) — locals who largely collaborated with the PNGDF, often to seek payback against the BRA, even if many of them ultimately wanted independence too. The BRF fought alongside the PNGDF for fear that a future independent Bougainville would be dominated by Nasiois (Central Bougainvilleans, who made up the bulk of the BRA’s leadership).

This led to a protracted conflict that claimed an estimated 10 000–15 000 lives, mostly through preventable disease and lack of medicine.[26] A naval blockade of Bougainville during the war prevented much-needed medicine getting in and the wounded and sick getting out through the sympathetic Solomon Islands. The number of actual combat deaths between BRA, BRF and PNGDF forces is unclear, but perhaps accounted for between 1000 and 2000 lives.[27]

Australia was placed in a difficult position. Its policy at the time, as set out by then Prime Minister Bob Hawke, was that “Bougainville must remain an integral part” of PNG.[28] While it was naturally inclined to assist its long-time partner as PNG’s security forces attempted to wrest back control, there were loyalties to the Bougainvilleans too, and Canberra sought to facilitate truce talks between the parties to the conflict.[29] Through the established Defence Cooperation Program, however, Australia continued to train and equip the PNGDF. It had also donated four Iroquois helicopters for transport and medevac purposes in response to an earlier request from PNG predating the crisis, flown by Australian and New Zealand civilian pilots.[30] There is evidence that the PNGDF used the helicopters as gunships to fire on villages and in other incidents,[31] contributing significantly to Bougainvilleans’ suspicions and mistrust of Australia.

pngdf-troops-on-patrol.jpg PNGDF troops on patrol in Bougainville, 1997 (Photo: Ben Bohane/Wakaphotos.com)

In 1997 the Sandline mercenary crisis erupted and marked a final attempt by the PNG Government, led by Sir Julius Chan, to secure Bougainville by force. It hinged on a secret deal to bring in mercenaries from Africa, led by British army veteran Tim Spicer, to take Panguna first and then the island. However, the mission was aborted when the PNGDF Commander, Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok, opposed the operation. The PNGDF rounded up the mercenaries and arrested Tim Spicer. After a tense standoff at parliament house between the police and army, as well as large public demonstrations, Sir Julius Chan resigned as prime minister and the Sandline operation was called off.[32]

The crisis propelled the parties to seek a truce in a process that began in late 1997 and culminated in the Burnham Agreement shortly thereafter. New Zealand led the negotiations, supported by Australia, which then established a Peace Monitoring Group of 300 military and civilian peacekeepers on Bougainville. In April 1998 a formal ceasefire was concluded. The final stage of the peace process was the completion of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which was signed on 30 August 2001 in Arawa by all major parties to the conflict, including PNG’s then Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta, the Governor of Bougainville’s Interim Provincial Government, John Momis, and the BRA Chief of Defence, Ishmael Toroama.[33]

Peace and the referendum deal

The peace agreement was based on PNG’s commitment to constitutional amendments guaranteeing Bougainville the right to hold a referendum on independence, the formation of an Autonomous Bougainville Government, and a plan for weapons disposal. PNG signed the BPA on the basis that any referendum result would need to be ratified by the PNG parliament following consultation between both governments, giving PNG a veto power.

The BPA was a significant outcome and the ongoing peace process is rightly lauded as a major success and model for conflict resolution worldwide. The war ended, the peace has held since then and a resolution is within reach.

John Momis Bougainville President Dr John Momis played a leading role in the peace negotiations between Bougainville and Papua New Guinea that led to the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement in 2001 (Photo: Ben Bohane/Wakaphotos.com)

However, for both parties to the agreement — Bougainville and PNG — the looming referendum is causing strains. On Bougainville, there are still tensions on the ground stoked by those who remain outside the BPA process. These are primarily the two factions known as ‘Me’ekamui Panguna’ and ‘Me’ekamui U-Vistract’. The former control the area around the Panguna mine and have agreed to ‘contain’ their weapons (a process formally outlined in the BPA to securely lock away weapons for later disposal).[34] They have an agreement in place with the ABG and an organised group of former combatants (known as the ‘Core Group’) not to disrupt the peace process, and will actively participate in the upcoming referendum. They are unlikely to be a threat to the peace process but are regarded as something of an ‘insurance policy’ for the BRA and pro-independence groups in the unlikely event PNG attempts another military action against Bougainville.

The other group, Me’ekamui U-Vistract, is led by Noah Musingku, who is wanted for financial fraud over his promotion of pyramid money schemes.[35] Musingku remains a wild card. He is the only factional leader to be holding weapons and telling his followers not to vote in the upcoming referendum, claiming “we are already independent”.[36] While the group presents a risk to the peace process and upcoming referendum, they have been generally quiet and sequestered in South Bougainville.

On the PNG side, successive governments, particularly the O’Neill government, have wrestled with the referendum process. For some time, the O’Neill government withheld funding from the ABG and the referendum process as promised under the terms of the BPA. Bougainvilleans are more hopeful now, however, given the funding provided by the new Marape government and its stated commitment to honour the terms and spirit of the BPA. To allow more time to register voters and properly fund the referendum, the date of the vote was pushed back from June to October and then November. Doubts about the accuracy of the common roll — as reported following the 2017 PNG elections[37] — have eased somewhat, with a new ward system and voter registration in place.

Outside the immediate region, powers such as China and Indonesia are positioning themselves for the potential outcomes of the referendum. A Chinese delegation is rumoured to have offered substantial funds in late 2018 to help finance a transition to Bougainville independence, along with offers to invest in mining, tourism and agriculture, with a figure of US$1 billion cited.[38] A new port in the Bana district of East Bougainville was also reportedly discussed.[39]

Indonesia, on the other hand, is likely to be concerned at the prospect of a successful Bougainville referendum lest it create a regional precedent for West Papua, where significant elements of the population are also agitating for a referendum and eventual independence.[40] Jakarta was “not at all happy” that West Papua had been included on the agenda for the 2019 Pacific Islands Forum in Tuvalu.[41]

Amid these uncertainties, tensions and potential flashpoints, Australia has a responsibility — and an interest — to see that peace is maintained, a credible referendum held, and a negotiated outcome achieved to ensure a lasting peace so that Bougainville does not become a source of regional instability again.