He said, "Syria is a major obstacle, but what the Syrian issue has come to should push everyone to meet and search for a solution, and not vice versa. What is happening in Syria currently is a war of attrition for all; a furnace whose flames are devouring all parties to the conflict."

While Hamas' leadership left Damascus following the profound dispute with the Syrian regime over its dealings with the demands of the people, Shalah kept lines open with various parties to the dispute in Syria and in the region. He believes that Hamas agreeing to the reconciliation was one of the results of the movement's departure from Syria. But he urged Iran to "take the lead" and hold dialogue with the Arab Gulf countries.

Thus, Islamic Jihad will not participate in the elections, but they are ready to enter the PLO "on new political and organizational bases." He warned that Fatah and Hamas entering into the elections with their own political programs would ignite the Palestinian situation.

In his interview with Al-Hayat, Shalah relied on the Palestinian reality and the gap between Fatah and Hamas to confirm the need to not exaggerate expectations about the Palestinian reconciliation . This is because, according to him, the reconciliation did not resolve the many obstacles and complexities, but rather "circumvented or avoided" them to announce the completion of the agreement.

The leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, Ramadan Abdullah Shalah, has not frequently specified his positions throughout recent years. He has maintained "principled pragmatism" to preserve the movement's alliances in the Palestinian arena and regionally. This is despite the storms that swept the region, beginning with the signing of the Oslo Accords and leading up to the "Arab Spring."

Here is the text of the interview:

Al-Hayat: What is Islamic Jihad's position on the reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas?

Shalah: We are not a party to the division, and thus we are not a party to the reconciliation agreement. Nevertheless, in principle, we welcome the reconciliation and any step that serves our people and their cause, on the condition that it doesn't violate any of the national constants.

Al-Hayat: What are these constants?

Shalah: Unfortunately there is no consensus on constants in the Palestinian arena. Every faction and every party has its own constants. But there are red lines that everyone should respect. For us, our constants are known: All of Palestine is our land and working to liberate it via resistance is a legitimate right. As for the PLO, its program is [achieving] a state according to the 1967 borders through negotiations. The common denominator in this case is that [we all agree] that any step should not lead to legitimizing the reality of the occupation, opening the door to more concessions, canceling the resistance or withdrawing its weapons, which is a red line for us.

Al-Hayat: Does this mean that you are worried about the resistance's weapons and the future of these weapons in Gaza?

Shalah: Yes, we are worried, although we have heard assurances from both sides that [the reconciliation] will not affect the resistance. But addressing this matter requires ongoing communication and coordination with all factions, particularly Hamas.

Al-Hayat: Why did the reconciliation come now?

Shalah: Because the two parties are in crisis — the crisis of governing Gaza for Hamas, and the crisis of negotiations and the lack of horizons regarding a settlement for [Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas]. This is in addition to the popular stance rejecting the division.

Al-Hayat: Do you think there is a chance for this reconciliation to succeed, or will it have the same fate as the previous agreements in Mecca, Cairo and Doha?

Shalah: There are hopes and expectations that the reconciliation will succeed. But we must not exaggerate the size of these expectations, because there are many obstacles and complexities.

Al-Hayat: What are they?

Shalah: They are the same obstacles that have prevented reaching a reconciliation deal in the past. I don't think they have been overcome, rather they have been circumvented or avoided in order to announce the agreement. If you look at the details, there are obstacles related to [each side's] program, as well as to the government, the elections, the security services, the PLO, the resistance and other issues of the agreement. The devil is in the details, as they say, and any small detail can transform into a problem that torpedoes the agreement.

Al-Hayat: Hamas agrees to a state within the 1967 borders, and says the political program is not an obstacle, and that the proposed government is a government of technocrats and has no political program.

Shalah: What Hamas says is not important. What is important is what Abu Mazen (Abbas) does, because he received the keys. Abu Mazen is the head of the proposed government and speaks in its name, and he openly declared that the government to be formed will recognize Israel and the agreements signed with it, and will renounce violence, i.e. the resistance. Furthermore, Hamas' rhetoric has said that the reason for the division is not a conflict over power, but rather it is due to the presence of two programs in the Palestinian arena. And, in my opinion, this is true.

But have they bridged the gap between the two programs? Has the dilemma related to programs been solved? This has not happened. What happened was they circumvented [the dilemma] or avoided it. The ink on the agreement had barely dried when Abu Mazen raised this issue as a red card in the face of Hamas. What will be the impact of this issue within Hamas? This is the risk and this is the threat to the agreement.

Al-Hayat: Why did Abu Mazen do this? Is it a message to the Americans and the Israelis?

Shalah: There are those who have said this, but in my opinion it's not about the Israelis or the Americans. Despite their stated position rejecting the reconciliation, I think the Israelis are lying. If they were really against the reconciliation they would not have facilitated the arrival of delegations and concerned figures from Egypt and the West Bank to Gaza. The issue relates to the fact that Abu Mazen wants to say, to Hamas and everyone, that he didn't give up his program and that the reconciliation occurred the way he wanted it to.

Al-Hayat: Why does Israel reject the reconciliation in public and support it in secret?

Shalah: The public rejection is meant to pander to a particular audience domestically and internationally. It relates to [Israel's] position on Hamas and its classification of the movement as a "terrorist" movement. As for why it supports it in private, this is due to the failure of negotiations and the option of Abu Mazen. Israel won't give up anything, and is determined to continue its settlement program in the West Bank and the Judaization of Jerusalem, which make a two-state solution impossible. This weakens the [Palestinian Authority (PA)] and threatens its existence.

On the other hand, the PA is indispensable to [Israel], and the latter was a partner in the PA's establishment under the Oslo Accords. Thus, in order to keep the PA alive, it has to make some achievement, or give it something. Israel, for its part, is not ready to give the PA anything in negotiations, so it opened the path for it and Abu Mazen to make this achievement on the front with Hamas. In other words, [Israel let the PA] take something from Hamas, and not from Israel. This is how I understand the reality of Israel's stance and actions on the subject of the reconciliation.

Al-Hayat: It seems you are confident that the negotiations will produce nothing. What is the source of this confidence?

Shalah: Its source is our understanding of Israel and the settlement and negotiations process. Here we must clarify that the settlement was carried out on a mistaken basis: The settlement between Israel and some Arab states, such as Egypt, was aimed at closing the issue on the 1967 war. But we, as Palestinians, have two issues with Israel: the issue of the 1948 Nakba and the issue of the "second Nakba," or the "setback" of June 1967, as the Arabs call it. The 1948 issue is the origin of the conflict and the basis of the Palestinian cause, and its ramifications include issues such as the refugees, the right of return and the Palestinians within the 1948 areas.

The "genius" of the design of the Oslo [Accords] was that they limited the issue between us and Israel to the 1967 issue. Oslo restricted the conflict within these limits and the PLO recognized what was occupied in 1948 as Israel and [that the latter] had the right to exist. Today, Israelis are fighting with the Palestinians for the West Bank and Jerusalem; the page has been closed on 1948 and its ramifications. While the battle raged on the 1967 issue, we were informed by the Israelis of the demand to recognize the Jewishness of the state. They want to get this recognition to completely finish with the 1948 issue, i.e., to cancel the right of return and pave the wave for expelling our people in the 1948 territories. [They want to] eliminate the entire Palestinian narrative on the history of the conflict. Thus, it's a big game and the process is very complicated. In light of the current balance of power, Israel will not make any concessions because it has [the view] that all of Palestine is for it. For this reason we cannot lapse into the 1967 game, because it is the millstone for all of the current Zionist game.

Al-Hayat: There is an agreement to hold elections for the PA under the reconciliation deal. Will you participate in them?

Shalah: I explained the basis according to which we view the settlement process, so we cannot be part of the political framework of the Oslo Accords. Our position in this regard is well known and remains unchanged.

Al-Hayat: What about the PLO? You and Hamas expressed willingness to participate in it. Isn't the PLO the one who singed the Oslo Accords and responsible for the negotiating file?

Shalah: This is true, but we in Islamic Jihad expressed willingness to enter the the PLO on new political and organizational bases. All of the meetings that were held to discuss the issue of the PLO evaded the political title, and this evasion — in our opinion — will ignite a problem greater than that which occurred between Hamas and Fatah over power. The division occurred because everyone entered the elections while retaining their own program.

Al-Hayat: Do you think that the Hamas leadership's exit from Syria, their strained relations with Iran and what happened in Egypt were part of the reasons that led Hamas to accept the reconciliation?

Shalah: It is certain that losing an ally, whether we're talking about Hamas or anyone else, weakens one's ability to remain steadfast. Hamas withstood the siege for years, but the changes that have occurred in the region, including the so-called "Arab Spring" first, then what happened in Egypt with the end of the Muslim Brotherhood rule, and the situation Syria has reached today, brought about a sort of shuffling of papers. This caused a disruption in regional relations, and Hamas was affected by this. Everyone was affected by this, and everyone paid a high price.

Al-Hayat: Has Hamas lost Iran as an ally?

Shalah: This is what Hamas itself is asking. But I believe that the relationship remains, although not to the same extent as it was in the past.

Al-Hayat: There are those who say that the support Iran was providing to Hamas is being given to Islamic Jihad today. Is this true? Is Iran's bet in Palestine now only on Islamic Jihad?

Shalah: Regarding support, this is Israeli propaganda and incitement carried out by intelligence services in the region. We are suffering from financial hardship, as is Hamas and all of our people.

As for our relationship with Iran, according to our principles and our ideological and political pillars, we base our relations with any party on their stance on the Palestinian cause, their support for our just rights and for the resistance and their position on Israel. In the past two decades, Iran has had an outstanding stance on Palestine, Israel and the resistance. Some question Iran's intentions and motives regarding its support to the resistance. Our job is not to examine intentions; we are concerned with actions. Can I turn my back on those who accept and support Islamic Jihad and join those who have turned their back on me and on Palestine, for the sake of certifying my "Islamism," "Arabism" or "nationalism"? This is unreasonable and not possible. Moreover, Iran is open to relations with all Palestinians forces, including the PA and Fatah, not just Islamic Jihad or Hamas.

Al-Hayat: At a recent conference in Tehran, you called on Iran to reassure its neighbors and hold a dialogue with the Gulf states. Why did you make this call? Is it related to the victory of President Hassan Rouhani?

Shalah: No, it has nothing to do with the internal situation in Iran. Rather, it relates to Iran's policies in the region. We appreciate Iran's outstanding position on the Palestinian cause, but there are other sensitive files and issues in the region that have made others say that Iran constitutes a threat to them. They even see Iran as a new enemy in the region, instead of Israel. In our opinion, this is a dangerous slippery slope. We believe that the goal, or one of the main goals, of the hostile forces in the ummah [Islamic nation] — in light of the brutal wars taking place between components of the ummah and between our societies — is for the sectarian conflict, or the Sunni-Shiite conflict, to replace the Israeli-Arab conflict.

And even though some of the Arab [states] have recognized Israel and made peace with it, Iran is the first to coexist with [these states]. Iran is an Islamic country and we are linked by religious ties, proximity and history, regardless of the differences that exist between [Iran] and some Arab countries. This is why I invited Iran to "take the lead" and call for a meeting or dialogue with everyone, especially the Gulf states.

Al-Hayat: Do you think that this is possible in light of Iran's interference in Syria?

Shalah: I know that Syria is a major obstacle, but what the Syrian issue has come to should push everyone to meet and search for a solution, and not vice versa. What is happening in Syria currently is a war of attrition for all, a furnace whose flames are devouring all parties to the conflict. This is what Israel and its allies want, for all of its enemies from all parties in Syria and the region to fight [each other]. What could be better [for them]?