What’s new? In March 2018, President Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw U.S. forces from north-eastern Syria and suspended stabilisation funding for the area. His senior foreign policy advisers provided somewhat discordant views. These confused messages from Washington have added uncertainty to an already volatile situation.

Why does it matter? A precipitous U.S. pullout from north-eastern Syria could unleash competing forces as they scramble for advantage. These include the U.S.-supported People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish group, the regime of Bashar al-Assad, backed by its allies, and Turkey. Without a prior negotiated agreement, the risk of escalating conflict could rise.

What should be done? The best chance at averting chaos in north-eastern Syria is through decentralisation negotiated among the YPG, Damascus and Ankara, backed by Washington and Moscow. Washington should neither withdraw precipitously nor wed its presence to countering Iran. It should instead provide the YPG the time, space and leverage needed for negotiations.

Executive Summary

The war in Syria’s north east is entering a new phase. Offensives against the Islamic State (ISIS) are winding down and tensions among external powers are heating up, as President Bashar al-Assad looks to restore his writ. For much of the last seven years, this region has been among the safest in the country; increasingly, however, it appears combustible, as the U.S. threatens to pull out its military personnel and competing powers prime themselves to take advantage. The best chance for avoiding new conflagration is through an agreement on decentralised governance in Syria’s north east that accounts for the security concerns of neighbouring Turkey. Washington and Moscow should help their respective allies in the Syrian war achieve such an arrangement before U.S. troops depart.

Since 2014, various campaigns against ISIS have upended the geopolitical balance in the north east. With U.S. support, a Kurdish organisation called the People’s Protection Units (YPG), along with subordinate local allies, captured all but a sliver of what was once a swathe of ISIS-controlled Syrian territory east of the Euphrates river. As a result, the YPG (linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK, which continues a decades-long insurgency against the Turkish state), now holds nearly 30 per cent of Syria, including most of its oil, much of its border with Turkey and vast Arab-majority areas. YPG gains since 2015 spurred Turkish military intervention, first against ISIS in border areas abutting YPG control, and earlier this year against the YPG itself in the north-western enclave of Afrin. Meanwhile, the Assad regime, with strong backing from Russia and Iran, seized ISIS-held areas west of the Euphrates.

Among this array of external players in and adjacent to Syria’s north east, the U.S. stands out as pivotal. It provides stability, because it helps restore essential services in areas taken from ISIS and deters further Turkish or Assad regime military action. It also introduces volatility, because Washington’s messages about its intentions are so ambiguous. Depending on the day and who is talking, the Trump administration may signal that it aims to leave Syria soon or to remain there indefinitely, unless and until Iran dramatically reduces its regional power projection. Or anything in between.

Along that spectrum of potential policies, extremes on either end appear especially risky. Directly applying the U.S. presence in Syria as a tool against Iran may encourage Tehran to support insurgent attacks as a means of pressing the U.S. to withdraw, much as it did in Iraq. On the other hand, exiting precipitously could plunge north-eastern Syria into a new war, with Ankara, Damascus, Tehran’s militia allies or some combination thereof attempting to seize territory and resources from a newly exposed YPG. The resulting chaos could prove costly for all of these players and allow ISIS or other jihadists to reassert themselves.

The YPG insists on constitutional revisions that would grant the north east considerable autonomy.

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Some U.S. officials quietly hope that recently launched discussions between Damascus and the YPG’s political umbrella, the Syrian Democratic Council, will lead to an agreement averting a violent post-withdrawal free-for-all. Yet several factors suggest this outcome is unlikely, at least at present.

First, on the central questions of how and by whom north-eastern Syria should be governed, huge gaps separate the minimum the YPG is willing to accept from the maximum Damascus is prepared to concede. The YPG insists on constitutional revisions that would grant the north east considerable autonomy, including responsibility for local security. Damascus, however, has made clear that it intends to reassert its overall control, including in the security sector. It is willing to discuss smaller-scale reforms but not the substantive local autonomy the YPG demands.

Secondly, Damascus believes time is on its side, thanks to its military gains elsewhere and the prospect of an early, unconditional U.S. withdrawal. So long as it expects a chance to impose all its demands by force, it has little reason to make big, long-term concessions. For its part, the YPG insists it would defend itself against regime attack rather than surrender as opposition forces have elsewhere in Syria. In the meantime, however, it too remains optimistic that Washington’s position will ultimately shift in its favour.

Thirdly, even were the YPG and Damascus to reach an agreement, Turkey might see reason to intervene militarily if a swift U.S. withdrawal left north-eastern Syria up for grabs. Ankara strongly dislikes the status quo but also seeks to avoid two alternative scenarios: most crucially a YPG-Damascus deal that cloaks PKK-linked forces in the flag of the Syrian state, but also a military advance by Damascus and its allies that expands the influence of Iran-linked Shiite militias along Turkey’s southern border. In theory, Russia, whose influence would increase after a U.S. departure, could deter repeats of the Afrin operation; in practice, as seen in Afrin, Moscow’s geopolitical priorities potentially may dissuade it from doing so.

In sum: tying an open-ended U.S. presence to an ambitious counter-Iran agenda is dangerous, while unconditionally withdrawing could set off a mad scramble for dominance. Either scenario presents risks and costs for all concerned.

The surest route to a better outcome is through reaching an agreement between the YPG and Damascus on decentralised governance that is also tolerable to Ankara, prior to a gradual and conditional U.S. withdrawal. It could include a restoration of the Syrian state’s control over the northern border; devolution of local security in the north east (apart from the border itself) to the YPG-linked forces currently exercising local control; the official incorporation of those forces within the Syrian state; and a return of the state’s civil administrative institutions. Some de facto guarantees from both Washington and Moscow likely would help reach an understanding and avert a new eruption of violence. Proactive U.S. engagement may also be necessary to encourage additional steps by the YPG to assuage Ankara’s concerns and thus reduce risk of Turkish military action.

Brussels/Ankara/Washington, 5 September 2018

I. Introduction

Between 2015 and 2018, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG), greatly expanded their zone of control in Syria’s north east, far beyond the majority-Kurdish areas they have governed since 2012. Harnessing air and special forces support from the U.S., the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) seized from the Islamic State (ISIS) nearly all the territory the jihadists had controlled east of the Euphrates river, including Syria’s most significant oil fields, in addition to the cities of Manbij and Tabqa on the river’s western bank.

The YPG/PYD’s competitors responded. Turkey launched two successful offensives into northern Syria, in cooperation with Syrian rebel allies: against ISIS in 2016, in order to block the YPG’s path to connecting its north-eastern holdings to the north-western enclave of Afrin; and into Afrin itself in early 2018, expelling the YPG and establishing Turkish control. For its part, the Syrian regime accelerated operations against ISIS in 2017. With air support from Russia and help from Iran-backed militias on the ground, the regime raced to seize the territory ISIS controlled west of the Euphrates.

The YPG/PYD’s zone of control in north-eastern Syria is large but vulnerable, as seen in the loss of Afrin. The presence of U.S. forces deters attacks from Ankara or Damascus. But with U.S.-backed offensives against ISIS winding down and amid conflicting signals from Washington about the objectives and duration of its role in Syria, the future appears uncertain – and potentially bloody.

This report analyses a new phase of the conflict in north-eastern Syria. It addresses the rising danger of violent escalation and concludes with recommendations for structuring negotiations to avert it. It is based primarily on research conducted in Syria and Turkey, including eight visits to north-eastern Syria between December 2015 and July 2018. It also incorporates research conducted in Washington, Moscow and Beirut, and builds on Crisis Group’s five previous reports and briefings on Syria’s north east.

II. The (De)Stabilisation Phase

A. U.S. Policy Before and After Trump’s Announced Shift

In unscripted remarks during a 30 March 2018 speech, to the effect that the U.S. would leave Syria “like, very soon”, and in subsequent meetings with his national security staff, President Donald Trump signalled a departure from the Syria policy his administration had announced just two months prior. Though its continuing applicability is uncertain, that policy’s core elements represented points of relative consensus among key officials before recent staffing changes in the U.S. administration. These points may continue to be pillars of U.S. policy if the president decides to change tack once more.

1. Balancing priorities

As outlined in a 17 January speech by then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the Syria policy rolled out in early 2018 centred on a U.S. intention to remain indefinitely in areas it helped the Kurdish-led SDF take from ISIS in northern and eastern Syria. It depicted this presence as aimed primarily at enabling operations against what remains of ISIS and at stabilising the captured areas so as to prevent the jihadists’ return. Toward those ends, the U.S. would continue to train local forces (now with a focus on holding territory and policing) and would increase other forms of “stabilisation” assistance – including removal of explosives and rubble, restoration of basic services and coordination with local governance bodies. Notably, however, the policy also called for applying the U.S. presence toward other objectives: achieving a broader political transition in Syria, including Bashar al-Assad’s departure, and containing Iranian influence.

The administration’s policy rollout was complicated by clumsy messaging and heightened anger in both Ankara and the pro-regime camp – for distinct reasons. The SDF’s core component – the People’s Protection Units (YPG) – retains deep organisational, personal and ideological links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which continues a decades-long insurgency against the Turkish state; Turkey, the U.S. and European Union (EU) designate it a terrorist organisation. Ankara had hoped Washington would wind down support for the SDF after capturing Raqqa and other towns held by ISIS. For their part, Damascus and its key backers, Iran and Russia, view an indefinite U.S. military presence as a strategic threat, given the stated aims of achieving Assad’s departure and containing Iranian influence. Just three days after Tillerson’s speech, Turkish and allied Syrian rebel forces launched an offensive against the YPG in Afrin (see below); both Turkey and Russia described the attack as a consequence of the newly announced U.S. policy. Notably, since the U.S. announcement, north-eastern Syria has also witnessed an escalation in unattributed assassination attempts against figures within and allied to the SDF; the most significant of these killed a key official responsible for building local governance bodies in Raqqa and other Arab-majority areas captured from ISIS.

A Turkish attack on Manbij would take the crisis between NATO allies to new heights.

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As Turkey gained ground against the YPG in Afrin, it ratcheted up pressure on Washington by threatening to expand its operations to Manbij, a contested SDF-held city west of the Euphrates which the U.S. helped capture from ISIS in 2016 and where it continues to maintain a military presence. A Turkish attack on Manbij would take the crisis between NATO allies to new heights and could create major humanitarian, political and security problems inside the U.S. zone of influence in Syria.

Rather than allow tensions to spiral, Washington took steps to improve its relations with Turkey, or at least mitigate damage. Its reaction to the Afrin offensive was muted: statements of concern and criticism, but no real pressure. Instead, the U.S. focused on preventing a follow-up Turkish offensive against Manbij; it emphasised its military presence in the city as a deterrent, but also launched negotiations with Ankara to address some of Turkey’s concerns in Manbij, including an unmet 2016 U.S. commitment that the YPG would withdraw from the city following ISIS’s defeat there. On 4 June 2018, the two sides announced a “roadmap” for defining and implementing agreed-upon governance and security arrangements in Manbij, though at the time of publication key details remained unresolved.

The initial reasoning behind Washington’s measured approach to Afrin and Manbij was clear: achieving the administration’s goals in Syria (as laid out in Tillerson’s speech) would require both continued support for the SDF and a rehabilitation of U.S. relations with Ankara. Washington sees partnership with the SDF as necessary for pursuing operations against ISIS remnants, guarding against jihadist resurgence in “liberated” areas, and maintaining control over resources and territory east of the Euphrates in order to prevent Iran-backed gains there and thus keep leverage in eventual negotiations with the pro-regime camp.

At the same time, Washington considers cooperation with Ankara imperative. Tensions between the two soared in August 2018, as Trump raised economic pressure on Ankara after a round of negotiations failed to win the release of a U.S. pastor imprisoned in Turkey. While the outcome of that multifaceted spat was unclear at the time of publication, both sides should have ample incentives to avoid a vicious cycle and resume efforts to repair ties. For Washington, these include the fact that Turkey’s influence in northern Syria makes its cooperation essential to containing (let alone resolving) the Syrian conflict, and to weakening the strong jihadist presence in Idlib in a manner that averts a surge of refugees, including fighters, toward Europe. Turkey also remains important to U.S. geopolitical interests; Washington seeks its cooperation in containing Iranian influence, and wants to avoid a Turkish drift toward Moscow. Addressing those U.S. interests in theory would require improved U.S.-Turkish cooperation, while further deterioration in relations present opportunities for additional Iranian and Russian gains, including by driving a stake into NATO’s internal cohesion.

2. The Trump factor

Following Trump’s repeated assertions that U.S. forces should withdraw from Syria and amid significant turnover in the administration’s national security staff, it has become difficult to determine how much of the policy approach outlined above remains relevant. Trump’s 30 March suggestion that the U.S. would quickly leave Syria raised alarm throughout his administration; key officials who have sparred on other aspects of Syria policy appear united in viewing an accelerated withdrawal as unwise, and have advised Trump to reconsider.

According to U.S. officials, in a 3 April meeting with his top national security staff Trump stopped short of ordering an explicit timeline for U.S. withdrawal. But he made clear that he wants the U.S. to leave Syria as soon as ISIS is defeated; that his primary metric for that defeat is seizure of the group’s remaining territory; that he would like to see this goal reached within the next six months; and that the Pentagon should outline plans accordingly. Trump also has repeatedly emphasised his desire to limit U.S. spending in Syria; toward that end, he froze $200 million originally earmarked for a year of stabilisation funding. The president also urged other countries (in particular Gulf allies) to foot more of the stabilisation bill, and directed his administration to explore the possibility that a multinational Arab force could substitute for the U.S. military presence in areas captured from ISIS.

There arguably are insurmountable political and logistical barriers to completely replacing U.S. forces on the ground.

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In practice, there arguably are insurmountable political and logistical barriers to completely replacing U.S. forces on the ground; the U.S. military provides the deterrent umbrella and infrastructure that enable the counter-ISIS coalition’s military and stabilisation activities, and no other country appears willing and/or able to assume those roles in the event of a full U.S. military withdrawal. Convincing allies to send more money and troops to supplement (and subsidise) the U.S. role appears achievable; some coalition members have already increased their support. But it is unclear if (or how long) these contributions will suffice to convince Trump to extend the U.S. presence.

In short, Washington’s Syria policy has lurched into the unknown, rendering the range of possible policy outcomes very broad: at one end of the spectrum, Trump may insist upon – and eventually order – a withdrawal of forces and end to U.S. stabilisation programming. Alternatively, advocacy by key national security and military officials, increased support from Gulf countries and other allies, and White House prioritisation of other objectives (in particular, countering Iran) could combine to push the policy back toward much of what Tillerson articulated in his January speech. At the time of publication, such a shift appeared underway: for the moment at least, U.S. officials are publicly linking the U.S. presence to the goal of reducing Iran’s role in Syria, though they have de-emphasised insistence on Assad’s departure. Yet plenty of ambiguity remains, as does the potential for abrupt reversals. And so long as the wrangling in Washington continues, stakeholders in north-eastern Syria will remain on tenterhooks.

B. U.S. Impact on the Ground

It is highly questionable whether the U.S. can achieve the policy objectives that Tillerson laid out. For one thing, the Trump administration is probably overestimating the influence the U.S. has gained from its presence. To be sure, the U.S.-backed SDF’s control of more than one quarter of Syria’s territory, oil fields accounting for more than 80 per cent of the country’s pre-war production and farmland growing most of its wheat is a source of leverage over Damascus, which is strapped for cash and eager to restore the state’s writ throughout Syria. But given the depth of support Damascus receives from Russia and Iran and the military gains they have achieved together since 2016, that leverage appears insufficient to accomplish Assad’s departure (indeed years of more intense military pressure from rebel forces failed to produce that), and it is unclear how it could be applied to effect any meaningful form of political transition in areas already under regime control. Trump’s expressed preference for withdrawal likely reduces Washington’s capacity to employ its presence as leverage, as it suggests a U.S. exit may occur even without concessions from Damascus or its allies.

Moreover, by explicitly linking the U.S. presence in Syria to Assad’s fate and containment of Iran’s regional influence, the policy risks encouraging the regime and its backers to use violence as a means of pressing Washington to withdraw. Tehran and Damascus supported insurgents against U.S. forces in Iraq following the 2003 invasion, and officials in both capitals have hinted at the prospect of applying similar force as a means of driving the U.S. from Syria.

And yet, as viewed from the ground in northern and eastern Syria, the U.S. role remains critical for the area’s stabilisation. Three reasons stand out, two relating to benefits accruing from the U.S. military presence, and the third to the dangers that would follow a hasty retreat.

First, there is the sheer volume of the local population’s need. The scale of destruction in some areas captured from ISIS is enormous, most notably in Raqqa. U.S. airstrikes destroyed or severely damaged many of the city’s homes, businesses and facilities. Moreover, much of the city remains inaccessible or highly dangerous due to ISIS’s extensive emplacement of concealed explosives before it withdrew in October 2017, as well as unexploded bombs dropped by the U.S.-led coalition. Even in post-ISIS areas that suffered less damage, the cumulative toll of recent battles, jihadist rule and years of drought and government neglect prior to the current conflict has left communities in dire straits. Local leaders and U.S. officials alike acknowledge that U.S. support was far too little to meet local needs even before Trump froze stabilisation funding in March 2018. Still, the support it has provided is essential. In addition to the funding itself, the security umbrella provided by the U.S. military presence (see below) and the programming infrastructure the U.S. has established make it possible to channel contributions from other donors. If stabilisation programming is reduced or halted, whether due to funding cuts or removal of U.S. protection and infrastructure (including oversight provided by U.S. staff), it could derail recovery in some areas and precipitate a dramatic worsening of conditions in others – a scenario that in turn could encourage ISIS fighters to return.

The U.S. presence on the ground deters Turkey and pro-regime forces from attacking SDF-held areas.

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Secondly, the U.S.’s presence and provision of resources in areas captured from ISIS enable Washington to encourage positive (albeit still marginal) shifts in how north-eastern Syria’s dominant authorities – the YPG and its political wing, PYD – handle local governance. While the YPG/PYD’s cadres maintain ultimate control and decision-making authority (in both recently captured Arab-majority and longer-held Kurdish areas), U.S. prodding and their own capacity to learn from mistakes have combined to gradually expand the scope and quality of local representation in the civil councils that administer day-t0-day governance in “liberated” areas. It is, to be clear, representation without empowerment; local officials still answer to the YPG/PYD power structure, and the marginal improvement in representation does not sufficiently address local complaints about Kurdish dominance (including anger at the YPG’s enforcement of compulsory conscription into forces under its command), nor Turkey’s concerns that cadres with roots in the PKK wield ultimate control. But it is a necessary step in the right direction, and one the U.S. is capable of building upon.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the U.S. presence on the ground deters Turkey and pro-regime forces from attacking SDF-held areas. Turkey’s Afrin offensive (discussed below) and the 7 February pro-regime attack on SDF-held oil fields highlighted the risk; the former was made possible by the absence of a U.S. security umbrella, while the latter failed because U.S. forces countered it with force. If the U.S. precipitously withdraws its security assurance without prior agreement on who or what will fill the void, then Turkey and the regime (perhaps with help from its allies) would each have powerful incentives to launch attacks aimed at crippling the YPG, seizing territory and resources for themselves and, in the process, gaining leverage vis-à-vis each other.

The YPG has vowed to defend itself in such a scenario. Although its lack of an air force places it at a disadvantage, the tens of thousands of fighters it commands could mount a significant resistance. And, even if it quickly lost ground, the YPG could apply its capacity for guerrilla warfare against attacking forces or, potentially, behind enemy lines. Details and specific scenarios aside, the evolving situation holds the potential for a new round of war that would wreak havoc on what is now a relatively stable part of the country and could reverberate far beyond.

C. A Pandora’s Box of Violent Conflict

For north-eastern Syria’s protagonists – including the local population, the SDF/YPG/PYD, Washington, Ankara, Damascus, Moscow and Tehran – the risks and costs of a violent struggle for territory and resources may turn out to be high. The stakes for the region’s residents are obvious, given the destruction and bloodshed military escalation would likely entail. So, too, for the SDF/YPG/PYD, which could lose most of the territory it now controls, as well as its military capacity and political weight.

There are also costs for the U.S. and its international coalition partners. The disorder resulting from escalating violence and/or an unravelling of SDF control would present opportunities for jihadist resurgence. This danger is especially apparent in Deir al-Zour, where the Euphrates separates regime-held territory (west of the river) from SDF control (east of the river). The eastern bank’s population swelled when residents west of the river fled as pro-regime forces seized their towns from ISIS in October and November 2017. In these areas, fear of pro-regime forces runs high, fuelled by perceptions (difficult to verify) of brutality during the regime’s offensive and ongoing predatory behaviour and security crackdowns by these forces west of the Euphrates; there is also wariness of Iran-backed Shiite militias that have played a significant role in some areas along the Euphrates. ISIS, which maintains pockets of territory and (by U.S. estimates) hundreds of fighters in eastern Syria, may once again find itself well-placed to exploit such fears if a U.S. withdrawal opens space for a regime advance. Such an advance could also, arguably, expand Iran’s capacity to move fighters and weapons between Iraq and Syria – a concern in Israel and among some U.S. officials.

For Ankara and Damascus, operating from opposite sides, a U.S. withdrawal would present opportunities to push back the SDF/YPG/PYD and seize valuable territory. If free to employ air power, their capacity to gain ground against the SDF is not in doubt. Indeed, the two might race to do so, with Turkey’s wariness of increased Iranian influence on its border and the regime’s fear of expanding, indefinite Turkish occupation of parts of Syria contributing to a mutually reinforcing sense of urgency.

And yet each might find that the costs of a violent free-for-all would outweigh the initial benefits. For Damascus, a fight for north-eastern Syria might become costly. The YPG is better organised and more proficient than the rebel opponents the regime has vanquished elsewhere to date (with the help of Russian air power and Iran-backed militias); through defence and counter-attack, it could cause many casualties in pro-regime ranks. And, even as it progressed, the regime would need to maintain a force presence sufficient to protect its gains in potentially hostile territory, amid significant threat of ISIS (and perhaps YPG) insurgent attacks. For a pro-regime camp that already struggles to secure its eastern holdings from ISIS and whose shortage of reliable manpower limits its capacity for simultaneous combat on multiple fronts, there is a real risk of overstretch that would leave it vulnerable elsewhere, particularly if some of its rebel opponents, recognising their own inability to hold territory, eventually regroup and stage guerrilla attacks. In the meantime, Turkey might well expand its foothold inside Syrian territory; its much more powerful military, as well as its proximity and conducive topography, give it major advantages in any race for territory along the Syria-Turkey border.

Rather than pushing the YPG back to its guerrilla roots, Turkey might benefit from allowing it to remain an important player in north-eastern Syria.

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At present Damascus seems to be waiting for a U.S. withdrawal to expand its military options. But it could calculate it would be better served by negotiating a mutually tolerable arrangement with the SDF on substantive decentralisation within the framework of the Syrian state. Section V lays out the potential outlines of such a deal.

For different reasons, Turkey might similarly come to regret eliminating the YPG’s territorial foothold in the north east. Turkish officials express confidence that military and intelligence operations have significantly weakened the PKK’s capacity in Turkey and established Turkish control in Afrin at acceptable cost. These perceived successes may burnish the appeal of further military options in the event of a U.S. withdrawal from Syria. Yet while Turkey may hold on indefinitely to whatever territory its forces seize amid a scramble, the burdens it bears to support local governance would increase. Perhaps more important, however, is the impact that a YPG defeat might have on the security situation in Turkey. Since January 2017, the PKK has refrained from conducting major bombings in Turkish cities, apparently after U.S. entreaties relayed via the YPG convinced the PKK to halt such attacks. A U.S. withdrawal (and the resulting removal of security assurances for the YPG) would diminish the PKK’s incentives for restraint, and a Turkish attack on north-east Syria could remove them entirely.

Moreover, if a combination of Turkish and regime gains ended the YPG’s control of territory in Syria, many YPG fighters (and in particular PKK-trained cadres) wishing to continue the fight would likely seek refuge in PKK camps in northern Iraq’s mountains, which have proved impregnable. From there, they could turn to renewed insurgency inside Turkey, this time without the constraints resulting from their role and alliances in Syria.

Rather than pushing the YPG back to its guerrilla roots, Turkey might benefit from allowing it to remain an important player in north-eastern Syria, within the context of an internationally backed decentralisation agreement with Damascus that entails at a minimum removal of YPG forces from the Turkish border (as discussed below). So long as the YPG has significant (yet difficult to defend) equities in north-eastern Syria, Turkey can use the threat of retaliatory attack there as a means to deter PKK escalation inside Turkey.

III. Lessons from Afrin

Four key lessons from Turkey’s early 2018 Afrin offensive shed light on the risk of military escalation in the wake of a precipitous U.S. troop withdrawal from north-eastern Syria, and the difficulty of reaching a mutually tolerable negotiated arrangement to avert a spike in violence.

A. Turkey’s Power Projection in Northern Syria

With its intervention in Afrin and its deployment of observers deep along the de-escalation line in Idlib, Turkey has greatly expanded its role inside Syria, taking on significant new costs and risks in pursuit of two core policy concerns: weakening the YPG’s political hand and military foothold, and preventing a new wave of displaced persons from surging toward – and potentially across – its border. In the process, Ankara is expanding a sphere of influence in Syria’s north and consolidating it with boots on the ground, infrastructure and governing arrangements. This sphere also helps Turkey address a secondary, undeclared objective: limiting the presence of Iran-linked pro-regime forces along the border. And, in the event of a viable political process for settling the Syrian war, Turkey may attempt to apply its leverage on the ground to secure a place for its Syrian opposition allies in a post-war order.

The Afrin offensive was a gamble for Ankara. Among YPG-controlled areas, Afrin was Turkey’s most viable target because it, unlike towns in north-eastern Syria, was not sheltered by a U.S. security umbrella. Yet in some respects it presented the tallest hurdles of any YPG-held territory: hilly, wooded terrain along the Turkish border, dense urban areas in Afrin’s centre and YPG roots within the local population. And the YPG is no easy foe: its ranks include fighters well-versed in guerrilla tactics (thanks to the organisational link with the PKK) and hardened veterans of tough battles with ISIS.

Yet these factors – and some help from pro-regime forces, as described below – ultimately proved little obstacle to a Turkish and allied Syrian rebel advance once Russia opened Syrian airspace to Turkish strikes. In Operation Olive Branch, Turkish forces took complete control of Afrin district, forcing the YPG to withdraw on 18 March.

The intervention was costly. More than 50 Turkish soldiers died, as did hundreds of allied rebel fighters. Turkish officials emphasise that the operation took care to avert civilian casualties, but the civilian toll nevertheless appears heart-wrenching: an estimated 300 killed and more than 130,000 displaced to areas outside Afrin district. Some saw their property looted as Turkey-backed Syrian rebels asserted control, and reports of property seizures, arbitrary detention and other abuses by Turkey-backed forces have persisted in subsequent months. While some Kurds have returned, such abuses and public statements about resettling refugees now living in Turkey have exposed Ankara to accusations of demographic engineering, even if the YPG also appears to be blocking some Kurdish civilians from returning. The YPG, which lost hundreds of its fighters, is waging a low-level insurgency in Afrin against Turkey and its local allies.

Turkey has greatly expanded (and physically connected) its sphere of influence in northern Syria.

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For now, at least, Turkish officials regard the political and military gains they have achieved as well worth the price. Polls conducted during the offensive suggest a strong majority of the Turkish public views the operation favourably. And, in addition to asserting control over a YPG stronghold, Turkey has greatly expanded (and physically connected) its sphere of influence in northern Syria. Afrin abuts (to its north east) the “Euphrates Shield” zone held by Turkish and allied rebel forces since late 2016, and (to its south) rebel-held territory in Idlib and the western Aleppo countryside that depend on Turkey for resources and protection (see below). Sensing momentum, Ankara has threatened to take the fight with the YPG further east, and beginning in April it escalated separate attacks on the PKK inside Iraq (as it has done on several occasions in past decades).

Meanwhile, Turkey has established twelve military “observation posts” deep within north-western Syria, along the de-escalation line that separates rebel-held Idlib and adjacent areas of Aleppo and Hama provinces from territory controlled by the Syrian regime and its allies. It has done so in close cooperation with Russia and with the acquiescence of Iran, its two partners in de-escalation efforts launched in the Kazakh capital of Astana in January 2017. It is taking on new headaches and risks in the process. But the gains, thus far at least, have been significant. First and foremost, Ankara has averted (or at least delayed) a pro-regime offensive into Syria’s most densely populated area (including with IDPs), and the massive displacement toward the Turkish border that would surely ensue. And, if it can continue to stave off such an offensive while also expanding its influence over (and introducing order within) the north west’s fractured rebel scene, its zone of hegemony in Syria could extend south from parts of Aleppo’s northern and western countrysides through Idlib to the edge of Lattakia province. At the time of publication, however, the danger of a pro-regime offensive was rising as Damascus threatens to ride its military momentum into Idlib; it is unclear whether increased Turkey-Russia diplomacy will be sufficient to avert that.

Uncertainty in Idlib notwithstanding, Turkey has found relative success in assuming the risks of proactive military engagement in northern Syria. In the event of a U.S. withdrawal, Ankara may consider a similar approach toward additional SDF-held areas.

B. The YPG’s Dilemma

The fall of Afrin underlined a reality Crisis Group has addressed in previous reports and briefings, and in conversations with YPG/PYD officials: Turkey poses an existential threat to the YPG/PYD in northern Syria. For at least as long as the YPG remains deeply tied to the PKK and the latter is in violent conflict with the Turkish state, that threat will remain.

As noted above, Afrin was the portion of YPG-held territory in which the organisation arguably was best situated to defend itself. The mostly flat, open terrain of north-eastern Syria would prove an easier target, in particular for Turkey but also, eventually, for pro-regime forces (or both simultaneously). These potential adversaries have air forces, while the YPG does not; it could resist a major offensive but probably not stop it. The main factor protecting the YPG from crippling losses has been the deterrent presence of U.S. forces in north-eastern Syria. That protection may not last much longer. And it is clear that the YPG lacks a reliable alternative to Washington’s security umbrella.

Crisis Group’s conversations with YPG/PYD officials since the Afrin offensive suggest that the organisation has become cognizant of its vulnerabilities in the aftermath of Trump’s call for a U.S. withdrawal, and is less inclined to take continuing U.S. support for granted. But the April 2018 U.S. airstrikes in Syria in retaliation for a suspected regime chemical attack; reassurances from U.S. military personnel on the ground; Washington’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and escalating tensions with Tehran; and statements from within and outside U.S. government on the risk that withdrawal will redound to Iran’s advantage together have raised hopes among YPG/PYD officials that the U.S. will eventually revert to something resembling the policy articulated by Tillerson. Still, those same officials have tended to underestimate the threat from Ankara and overestimate the willingness and capacity of Washington and Moscow to shield them. Insofar as optimism discourages them from making difficult choices, it could leave them exposed.

C. No Easy Answers from Damascus

Negotiated arrangements between the YPG/PYD and the Assad regime might provide a means of pre-empting Turkish military action.

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In theory, negotiated arrangements between the YPG/PYD and the Assad regime might provide a means of pre-empting Turkish military action. Some international analysts, Western diplomats and Syrian regime officials argue that a deal incorporating YPG/PYD structures within “the Syrian state” – though not necessarily restoring the full control of regime security and military forces – could be sufficient to placate or deter Turkey. Afrin offered an early – somewhat but not entirely dissimilar – test as to whether and how this approach might be applied in practice, as YPG/PYD leaders strived to forge a deal with Damascus that would block Turkey’s advance.

Their attempts failed, as competing interests between the YPG and Damascus slowed negotiations and narrowed grounds for coordination, resulting in a deal that shifted neither Turkish calculations nor the offensive’s trajectory. Likewise, it may prove quite difficult for the YPG and the regime to reach negotiated outcomes acceptable to them as well as to Ankara when it concerns YPG-controlled areas east of the Euphrates.

In Afrin as elsewhere, the most important gap between the YPG and regime negotiating positions was about physical control: whose armed forces, security and intelligence services would dominate the area, and thus guarantee hegemony over governance. During the build-up to the offensive, Russia relayed a clear message to YPG leaders: the only way to avert an attack was to hand Afrin over to the regime, including the army and security services. The YPG rejected that proposal, preferring to take its chances fighting Ankara rather than surrender pre-emptively to Damascus.

The YPG also made a counter-offer: for Damascus to send a small force, such as “border guards”, to take up positions along Afrin’s border with Turkey, under the official authority and flag of the Syrian state, but without restoring the regime’s security control within Afrin (including its urban areas). YPG officials described this approach as an assertion of the Syrian state’s sovereignty over the border and territory Turkey was attacking, and expressed hope that this limited, largely symbolic government deployment would raise the international stakes sufficiently to halt Turkish attacks, without threatening the YPG’s local dominance.

Damascus initially rebuffed the YPG’s offer. While it repeatedly condemned the Turkish offensive as an assault on Syrian sovereignty, it was reluctant to deploy its own forces in defence of that sovereignty so long as the YPG stood as the primary beneficiary. As an adviser to Assad put it, speaking two weeks into the offensive:

It cannot work the way they [the YPG] want it. We cannot cover an unlawful situation with our forces. The return of the state would have to be a complete return, with all its institutions, security and full army. There’s nothing [possible] such as a state return [that includes only] border police [and] the continuation of an insurgency within the area, under the cover of the state.

Damascus’s calculations on this issue were complex. Regime decision-makers needed to balance their objective of reasserting full control (and thus the temptation to hold out for YPG capitulation) with concerns that a YPG defeat in Afrin would lead to an indefinite, and potentially long-term, Turkish occupation.

This choice bore much in common with one Damascus faced in 2012, when the regime’s fear of then-expanding control by Turkey-backed rebels in northern Syria drove it to hand large chunks of majority-Kurdish territory to the YPG. Despite the weakening of Turkey’s opposition allies in the years since, Damascus continues to view Ankara as a threat. It is determined not to pursue rapprochement with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and has signalled its objection to Russia’s facilitating Turkish influence in northern Syria. Notably, Iran appears to share the regime’s concerns about Turkey’s expanding role on the ground, and its clear opposition to the Afrin offensive stands in contrast to Russia’s enabling of it.

As a result, and despite Damascus’s initial rejection of the YPG’s border guard offer, the regime and Iranian positions steadily shifted in the YPG’s favour as the Turkish offensive continued inside Afrin. Regime and Iran-backed militia forces allowed passage through territory they control in and around Aleppo to YPG personnel from the north east into Afrin. And following weeks of negotiation, they reached an agreement with the YPG to deploy forces: beginning on 20 February, hundreds of pro-regime fighters entered Afrin, bedecked in Syrian flags and shouting pro-government slogans.

In announcing the deployment, official Syrian state media referred to these fighters as “popular forces” (al-quwat al-shaabiya). In practice, the fighters consisted primarily of militiamen from Aleppo and the Shiite-majority towns of Nubl and Zahraa (adjacent to Afrin), who have been fighting on the government’s behalf with backing from pro-regime businessmen and Iran (in addition to whatever support they receive from official Syrian military and security structures). In a series of videos posted online and covered extensively by pro-regime and local media, they documented their presence in Afrin city and deployment to key fronts along Afrin’s border with Turkey.

The assertion of Syrian government sovereignty and deployment of pro-regime forces may not deter Turkey from striking the YPG.

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In other words, the arrangement occurred much along the lines of what the YPG had originally sought: forces affiliated with the Syrian government and bearing its flag entered Afrin in an effort to deter Turkish attack, but without sufficient force to threaten the YPG’s overall dominance in the canton. For its part, by deploying militiamen rather than the army, Damascus attempted to balance between its desire to stop the Turkish offensive and its reluctance to risk overstretched army forces or provide cover for the YPG.

The result failed to deter or even slow the Turkish offensive. Unable to stop the deployment of pro-regime forces, Turkey decided to treat them as “legitimate targets”, ie, it continued to strike and advance without regard for their presence, targeting them just as it did YPG fighters. Turkey and allied rebels quickly captured territory in which pro-regime forces deployed, and ultimately seized the entire district by 18 March. In the process, they reportedly killed dozens of pro-government fighters.

This episode suggests that the assertion of Syrian government sovereignty and deployment of pro-regime forces may not, in and of themselves, deter Turkey from striking an organisation it views as part and parcel of the PKK. Moreover, Ankara’s response would not necessarily have differed if these fighters had entered under the official banner of the Syrian army rather than as “popular forces”. As a Turkish official explained, Ankara’s treatment of pro-government forces in this case was influenced by its perception of the regime’s weakness, and by its wariness of growing influence for its regional rival, Iran, in northern Syria. Turkish officials doubt Damascus’s willingness and ability to control the YPG on its own; they view Iran-backed militias as essential to the regime’s military capacity in the north, and do not want to see an expansion of their role along the Syria-Turkey border.

Events in the north east could play out differently. The defeat it suffered in Afrin may render the YPG more open to pre-emptive compromise with the regime in hope of forestalling a Turkish offensive in the future; the regime’s military gains elsewhere may increase its bargaining leverage over the YPG as well as its credibility in Turkish eyes as a force willing and able to police the YPG along Syria’s northern border; most importantly, Russia may take steps to deter Turkish action, after refraining from doing so in Afrin.

At a minimum, however, the events of Afrin suggest that deals over the north east between the YPG/PYD and Damascus may be difficult to attain, and not necessarily sufficient to avert or halt Turkish attack.

D. A Russian Question Mark

One actor within the pro-regime camp that clearly could have taken steps to halt (or severely hamper) Turkey’s offensive is Russia, which dominates north-west Syria’s airspace. A red light from Moscow at any point would have made it very risky for Turkey to launch or continue its attack. Yet none came, leaving Ankara free to push on as it pleased. In the event of a U.S. withdrawal, Russia’s role would be essential for deterring further Turkish offensives in north-eastern Syria. Yet Moscow’s geopolitical priorities may discourage it from doing so.

It was Moscow’s decision not to block Ankara from attacking Afrin that allowed the offensive to commence in the first place, over Damascus’s strenuous objections. Following a visit to Moscow by Turkey’s military and intelligence heads, Russia removed the de facto security umbrella its small military presence in Afrin and control of the north-western skies provided. And it was Moscow’s decision to leave the skies open for Turkish airstrikes – despite the subsequent deal deploying pro-regime militiamen – that enabled the offensive to continue until the complete capture of Afrin district.

While details of Kremlin decision-making on Afrin remain unclear, several likely factors stand out:

First, Moscow was unhappy with Washington’s announcement that it would extend its military presence and apply it toward achieving Assad’s departure. It may therefore have been partly motivated by a desire to punish the YPG for its alliance with Washington, and to demonstrate the limits thereof. Second, Turkey’s gains in Afrin, achieved at great price to the YPG and the local population, may in the future encourage the YPG to accept elsewhere a Russian offer it refused prior to the offensive: to surrender areas it controls to the regime as a means of averting a Turkish attack.

Third, Turkish officials believe that Russia may view an expansion of Turkish influence in the north west as conducive to its approach to managing the Syrian conflict, which relies heavily on cooperation with both Tehran and Ankara (via the Astana process).

Moscow’s relations with Ankara, Tehran and Damascus will probably always take precedence over those with the YPG.

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Fourth, and perhaps most important: Russia appears keen to sow divisions within NATO. Enabling Turkey to pound the YPG serves the dual purpose of currying favour with Ankara while further complicating Washington’s efforts to balance its relations with antagonistic allies.

Whatever the precise combination (and prioritisation) of motivations, in Afrin they convinced Russia to allow Turkey to deal the YPG/PYD the most damaging blow it has suffered to date – one all the more staggering because the YPG has worked strenuously over the last few years to maintain constructive (and generally friendly) relations with Russia.

There are lessons here, potentially applicable to north-eastern Syria. First, Moscow’s relations with Ankara, Tehran and Damascus will probably always take precedence over those with the YPG. Combined with Russia’s propensity for dramatic tactical shifts, this limits the extent to which YPG leadership can ever trust Moscow to protect it from Turkey or the Syrian regime; in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, Russia might potentially green-light offensives by either, or both. Second, in some cases Moscow may – as it did in Afrin – place broader strategic objectives above immediate concerns about Syrian sovereignty and above the preferences of its allies in Damascus and Tehran.

Indeed, a closer look at incentives illustrates why Moscow arguably may eventually see reason to tolerate additional Turkish offensives against the YPG, if and when the U.S. removes its own deterrent umbrella from the north east. Given Turkey’s geopolitical weight and position, improved relations with it offer Russia potential benefits extending far beyond (and more strategically important than) the Syrian battlefield. If and when Moscow believes it can elicit significant Turkish steps in its favour by acquiescing to additional offensives against the YPG, it may be very tempted to do so. And it can probably continue to provide Ankara green or yellow lights without fear of serious damage to its relations with the Assad regime and Tehran; the former depends on Moscow for its survival, while Iran remains far more reliant on Russia to address its core strategic concerns than vice versa. Indeed, further demonstrating its willingness to grant Turkey concessions could improve Moscow’s leverage over Damascus (and perhaps Tehran).

This outcome is not pre-determined, of course. Russia would weigh all of these factors against other ramifications of ceding Turkey additional border territory, including a potential increase in Ankara’s influence over any eventual political process and the further undermining of Syria’s sovereignty.

IV. Between Damascus and Qamishli: A Security Dilemma

On Afrin, the YPG/PYD and Damascus failed to reach a deal that was both acceptable to each of them and sufficient to dissuade Ankara from attacking. If discussions in coming months fail to produce an arrangement fulfilling both of those conditions for north-east Syria, military escalation – by Turkey, the regime or both – is likely to follow a U.S. withdrawal. Russia’s support will be essential to the success of any negotiated arrangement, given its capacity to deter (or enable) attack; yet YPG understandings with Moscow may prove insufficient in the absence of buy-in from Ankara and Damascus. Given current levels of hostility between Ankara and the YPG/PYD, talks between the YPG/PYD and Damascus present the logical starting point for pursuing a negotiated arrangement for the north east.

A. Decentralisation and the Security Sector

Relations between the YPG/PYD and the Syrian regime have been defined since 2012 by an uneasy mix of competition and cooperation. While the former has intensified over the past year, incentives for coordination remain, as seen in Afrin. Communication between the two is limited but continues; Russia has at times attempted to facilitate engagement. Room also exists, in principle, for negotiating a compromise arrangement between the YPG/PYD’s call for a highly decentralised system of governance (which it sometimes describes as “federalism”) and the Syrian regime’s expressed willingness to pursue administrative decentralisation. In practice – as seen in Afrin – high-stakes, largely zero-sum questions of security dominance constrain areas of potential agreement, as a review of YPG/PYD and regime positions illustrates.

1. The YPG/PYD’s vision for a post-war Syria

The YPG/PYD’s political objectives are centred around Abdullah Öcalan’s notion of “democratic confederalism”, a concept the PKK leader developed during his imprisonment in Turkey. It is best understood as a form of deep decentralisation, in which a high degree of local self-rule, including the right and capacity for self-defence, provides the means through which Kurds (and other religious and ethnic communities) can secure their rights within the state borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.

The concept serves as the central organising principle of the YPG/PYD’s governance in northern Syria and its strategy for consolidating its military achievements politically. YPG/PYD officials say the organisation does not seek Bashar al-Assad’s removal, despite its opposition to his authoritarian rule; instead, it aims to secure a degree of autonomy sufficient to block whomever rules in Damascus from imposing security dominance and political agendas. The YPG/PYD has largely achieved this objective on a temporary basis in the north east, through the strength of its armed forces and the deterrent umbrella provided by the U.S. military presence. Now it is looking for ways to cement this local autonomy beyond a potential U.S. withdrawal, and within Syria’s eventual post-war order.

YPG/PYD officials understand that successful negotiations would require compromise.

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To achieve that end, the YPG/PYD advocates a transition to a decentralised system that would guarantee for the north east – and, ideally, all of Syria – a high degree of local autonomy consistent with Öcalan’s ideology. Since March 2016, the YPG/PYD has primarily referred to the system it envisions as “federalism”, but in 2018 it has de-emphasised that word in favour of the more general (and less inflammatory) “decentralisation”. The YPG/PYD has treated its military gains and consolidation of governance structures as a means of strengthening its hand, with an eye to eventual negotiations. And in July 2018 it officially opened talks with Damascus, to test the waters with regard to service provision and other tangential areas of potential agreement, in the hope of building toward substantive negotiations on the future of Syrian governance.

YPG/PYD officials understand that successful negotiations would require compromise, and they may ultimately treat some of their territory, resources, governance structures and political demands as cards worth trading for reciprocal concessions from the war’s other protagonists. They make clear, however, that maintaining a high degree of local autonomy in their core areas of control is a bottom-line demand they will not willingly concede, and they view the security sector as the most important component of that autonomy.

Thus, as seen in Afrin, the YPG/PYD signals willingness to place its military and security forces under the Syrian state’s official auspices. But it rejects a return of the regime’s security apparatus (which it and other regime opponents recognise as the primary tool of Assad’s autocratic rule), and may choose to fight rather than allow Damascus to restore its security writ in SDF-held areas.

Moreover, the YPG/PYD’s expressed openness to incorporating its forces within the framework of the Syrian state does not mean it is prepared to cede operational control thereof. YPG/PYD-affiliated military, security, political and governance bodies are dominated by a superstructure of PKK-trained cadres. Their power often far exceeds that suggested by their official titles, and in some cases they exercise real authority superseding that of nominally more senior non-cadre officials. Thus, as both Damascus and Ankara recognise, placing these structures under the Syrian state’s de jure command will not necessarily end the YPG’s de facto control over them.

2. Damascus: central rule, beyond the law

The Syrian leadership has repeatedly declared its intention to reassert control over “every inch” of Syrian territory, including areas currently held by the SDF. It holds out the possibility of accomplishing this goal via negotiations, while emphasising that, as elsewhere in Syria, it will resort to military force if necessary.

The leadership in Damascus has also repeatedly dismissed the prospect of federalism. Assad describes federalism as “an introduction to partition”; citing Iraq as an example, he suggests that those advocating it aim “to produce a weak state, a weak government, a weak people and a weak homeland”. From Damascus’s perspective, the fact that YPG control has enabled one foreign “occupation” (the U.S. presence in the north east) and precipitated another (Turkish intervention in Afrin) serves as case in point. Regime officials also express frustration at what they describe as the YPG’s repeated refusal to acknowledge support it has received from Damascus.

Though its rejection of federalism is clear, the regime’s position on lighter forms of decentralisation is more ambiguous. In September 2017, Syria’s foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem, publicly suggested that the Kurdish desire for “some form of autonomous administration within the borders of the Syrian Arab Republic is a subject open to negotiation and discussion”. That statement remains something of an outlier, however; Buthaina Shaaban, an adviser to Assad, walked it back in a subsequent interview, adding: “There cannot be any dialogue on, God forbid, partitioning or cutting off part of the country, or on what they call federalism”.

Those statements leave space for a middle ground, at least in theory: between the highly centralised system of pre-2011 Assad rule and the YPG’s preference for a system so decentralised that it would arguably enable the regions to act as autonomous entities with de facto independence from the capital. The regime itself has trod tentatively – and noncommittally – on the margins of that middle ground: in August 2011, it issued a new local administration law, Legislative Decree 107, as part of a package of ostensible reforms introduced before the uprising gave way to war. Though much of its meaningful content was never implemented, Decree 107 is notable for its rhetorical emphasis on decentralisation and its devolution of some administrative responsibilities to local bodies, albeit only on paper and even then under the authority of centrally appointed governors.

The Syrian regime’s structure and modus operandi pose major obstacles to exploration of a middle-ground solution.

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Yet in practice, the regime’s structure and modus operandi pose major obstacles to exploration of a middle-ground solution. Syria under Hafez and Bashar al-Assad has been ruled via the internal intelligence services, which have the authority and capacity to interfere in matters big and small, including in seemingly mundane aspects of day-to-day local governance. The intelligence services not only wield power superseding that of other state institutions (including the judiciary and police), but indeed exercise authority over and through them, working both within the state’s civil and military institutions and parallel to them. They can use the law as a tool, but have the prerogative to operate above and outside it. Within the Syrian system, their authority is constrained only by the presidential palace itself, the lone body to which they all answer, and which uses their overlapping jurisdictions as a means of checking and balancing among them. The course of the war has complicated this system in ways that further limit the writ of the state’s other institutions: Iran and Russia now play direct roles as additional power centres; an array of local and foreign militias have become key players on the ground; and the presidency’s supervision of and capacity to rein in these bodies is not clear.

The absence of rule of law, a political reality that predates and was exacerbated by the conflict, further limits the utility of legal or even constitutional reform. It highlights to regime opponents the unreliability of Damascus’s commitments and assurances, and the importance of maintaining military capacity and external alliances to protect themselves. The regime’s handling of local truces during the war has underlined that point: while it agreed to deals in some places enabling opposition forces to maintain varying degrees of local control, it then often refrained from implementing key aspects of those agreements, and in some cases renewed threats and attacks in order to improve terms (pushing toward surrender and the reassertion of full regime control) once it was in a position to do so.

3. Narrow ground for negotiation

The most significant gap between the YPG and regime positions can be boiled down to the fundamental question of the security sector: whose forces would exercise local control. Other issues, while important and tricky to address, are secondary. The YPG, for example, seeks to limit the regime’s display of its symbols (including the Syrian flag), influence over service provision and the civil bureaucracy, and the use of its education curriculum in areas under SDF control; but the YPG has nonetheless accepted each of these in some locations and to certain degrees. By the same token, Damascus seeks to restore these where it can, but does not view that as sufficient to fulfil its demand for a return of state sovereignty.

While security is the key issue, both sides largely treat it as zero-sum due to low trust and its centrality to governance. For the most part, areas of north east Syria are controlled either by the regime or by the YPG and its SDF allies, divided by a de facto internal border. Where there are exceptions – most notably in Qamishli – power is not so much shared as it is divided into geographic spheres of influence. For example, the regime’s security presence in downtown Qamishli is largely symbolic, with both sides (and local residents) recognising that the YPG’s overall dominance in the area essentially precludes regime forces from independent action. In contrast, the regime exercises real control over the Qamishli airport; those who fear its writ avoid the area.

The importance of (and zero-sum approaches to) the security sector poses one major barrier to fruitful YPG-regime talks. Another, related, challenge concerns the content and timing of negotiations. Having seized most of Syria’s oil and benefiting from significant yet likely temporary U.S. support, the YPG wants talks with Damascus to build toward serious negotiations on a political settlement’s core components; seeks a combination of constitutional and external, in particular U.S., guarantees to protect against the regime reneging on its commitments; and wants to avoid squandering any of its leverage on temporary agreements or cooperation.

Damascus’s preferences are the opposite: it has an interest in temporary deals and immediate cooperation, for example in resisting Turkish intervention and sharing benefits from SDF-held oil. But the regime wishes to delay negotiations on core, final-status issues, because it believes that its position relative to the YPG’s will improve over time – due both to its own advances and the prospect of diminishing U.S. support and protection for the YPG. Trump’s expressed desire for a quick U.S. withdrawal – and apparent disregard for the military and political ramifications thereof – reinforces this regime preference and weakens the YPG’s negotiating leverage.

Initial talks between the YPG/PYD/SDF and the regime have yielded only modest results. On 27 July 2018, a delegation representing the SDF’s political umbrella, the Syrian Democratic Council, travelled to Damascus for discussions with government officials. While this visit represented increased direct contact between the sides, discussion focused on the service sector rather than on political and security portfolios. A subsequent meeting in August delved into politics but revealed the breadth of the divide, with Damascus floating minor adjustments to local civil administration within the regime’s current structure (including via holding the government’s planned September local elections in SDF-held areas), while the YPG/PYD continued to insist on negotiations on Syria’s constitution and more substantive decentralisation.

Negotiating an arrangement meeting the bottom-line demands of the YPG (on local autonomy) and Damascus (on restoring state sovereignty and regime authority) will likely founder on the crucial issue of security control. Without heavy involvement of external actors, in particular Russia and the U.S., it appears unlikely that the two parties will be able to strike a viable deal addressing core issues of control and governance.

B. As in Afrin, Turkey Might Still Attack

Turkey might take military action against the YPG without regard for the presence of pro-regime forces

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Even if some accommodation is reached between the YPG/PYD and Damascus that averts a pro-regime offensive in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal from north-eastern Syria, it may be insufficient to convince Turkey to refrain from attacking. As suggested by events in Afrin, Turkey might not accept the return of the “Syrian state” as a sufficient outcome so long as the YPG’s PKK-trained cadres maintain their strength on the ground; Turkey might take military action against the YPG without regard for the presence of pro-regime forces, so long as neither the U.S. nor Russia takes steps to deter it.

To Ankara, the YPG/PYD’s subordination to the PKK leadership’s command-and-control implicates it in attacks inside Turkey, and renders it a legitimate target of ongoing Turkish “counter-terrorism” operations. In conversations with Crisis Group, officials in Ankara have outlined two ways for the YPG/PYD to exit Turkey’s crosshairs: sever ties and communications with the PKK, or persuade the PKK to cease its armed insurgency in (and withdraw its forces from) Turkey.

A deal between Damascus and the YPG could provide a third option if it entailed a return of regime forces sufficient to suppress the YPG’s capacity to operate along Turkey’s border. But even in that scenario, lack of trust could still throw a spanner in the wheel. Hafez al-Assad provided shelter and support to Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK during the 1980s and 1990s, employing the organisation as a lever against Turkey in their disputes over territory and water; this practice continued until Turkey threatened the regime with military action in 1998. Given the continued enmity between Damascus and Ankara, the latter would have reason to be wary that a new YPG-Damascus deal may once more turn PKK-aligned forces into a tool that the Syrian regime could wield against its neighbour. Russian backing for a YPG-Damascus deal might assuage Ankara, or at least deter it; but, as addressed in Section III, Moscow’s competing priorities on this issue render its decision-making difficult to predict.

In declaring victory in Afrin, Erdoğan referred to a series of YPG-controlled cities along the border as potential targets: “After this, we will continue now to Manbij, Ayn al-Arab [Kobane], Tel Abyadh, Ras al-Ain and Qamishli, until this corridor is fully removed”. These words may have been a boast rather than a vow, but today’s hyperbole may become tomorrow’s credible threat if the U.S. withdraws its forces from north-east Syria in the absence of a viable negotiated arrangement. In that scenario, the YPG-held, Arab-majority cities of Manbij and Tel Abyadh appear especially vulnerable to Turkish attack, given their political and strategic value and Ankara’s rhetorical emphasis on ending YPG control of non-Kurdish areas.

V. Averting New War

A precipitous U.S. withdrawal could ignite a violent struggle over Syria’s north east. That fighting would likely be a boon for remaining jihadists seeking a comeback but a danger for all other stakeholders – because of the jihadist threat but also because of the perils inherent in escalating conflict among competing forces. The best chance to avoid such an outcome is through negotiated arrangements mutually tolerable to Damascus, the YPG/PYD and Ankara prior to a U.S. exit, with Washington and Moscow serving as co-guarantors.

A. Charting a Way Forward

The U.S. can and should take the first step. The Trump administration should apply the president’s March 2018 comments (and the resulting uncertainty) constructively, by resetting its policy in north-eastern Syria based on a set of clearly communicated pillars. The U.S. should signal that:

It is committed to Syria’s territorial integrity, and its military presence in the country’s north east is a temporary measure aiming only to achieve stability and prevent a jihadist resurgence. U.S. forces in Syria will not be used against Iran or Russia, and will direct fire at pro-regime forces only in instances of self-defence (of U.S. and partner forces). The U.S. does not want to see north-eastern Syria turned into a theatre of confrontation with Iran.



The U.S. is committed to ending its military presence in Syria, and will begin doing so as conditions stabilise. It is prepared to initiate a troop withdrawal upon attainment of a negotiated arrangement mutually tolerable to the SDF, Damascus, Moscow and Ankara that addresses key questions of control and governance following its withdrawal. A U.S. troop withdrawal and removal of security guarantees would then be gradual and conditional, subject to that agreement’s implementation.



Through its engagement in north east Syria, the U.S. will enable and encourage local governance that is sufficiently capable and representative to win broad local buy-in (and thus better positioned to withstand destabilisation campaigns). Toward that end, the U.S. will work with the YPG/PYD, SDF, civil governance councils and local communities to define a clear process for shifting decision-making authority in local governance from the YPG/PYD’s cadre power structure to civil councils led and staffed by capable residents reflecting the diversity of their locales. The U.S. (and allies channelling assistance through U.S.-backed programming) will condition a significant portion of its stabilisation support on the implementation of this local empowerment process.

Russia’s role will also be essential, as its military power in Syria and alliance with Damascus position it to serve alongside the U.S. as a co-guarantor capable of both influencing the Syrian leadership and addressing its concerns. By helping negotiate and guarantee such a settlement, Moscow could avoid a potentially costly, destabilising free-for-all in the north east, while enhancing its international stature and establishing a vehicle (and momentum) toward improved relations with the U.S.

For their part, Damascus and Tehran should resist the temptation to use military force or insurgent proxies to press the U.S. toward withdrawal. Such attacks would likely backfire by strengthening hawkish voices in Washington and/or eliciting U.S. counter-escalation. Negotiations along the lines outlined here offer better prospects for achieving an eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces at lower risk and cost.

Members of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition, in particular Gulf and European countries, should continue to increase support for the stabilisation mission. Stepping up their investment in demining, health, education and the restoration of critical services in areas the SDF has captured from ISIS will save lives and improve countless others. It may also prove crucial in convincing Trump that Washington’s allies will share in the burdens of ensuring that north-eastern Syria’s future is not hijacked by renewed warfare or jihadists now lying low. These donor states should also coordinate with Washington and among themselves to define and implement the conditionality described above.

A U.S. decision to condition withdrawal on the achievement and implementation of a mutually tolerable arrangement might tempt the YPG/PYD to stall in arriving at one, in an effort to extend U.S. protection without making the concessions such an arrangement would entail. That would be a mistake: the YPG/PYD should recognise the White House’s limited patience and avoid providing cause for Washington to revert to an unconditional, precipitous withdrawal.

In the meantime, the SDF (and its YPG command) should end compulsory conscription that, particularly in Arab-majority areas, fuels local grievances and could ultimately prove destabilising.

B. B. Potential Pillars of a Mutually Tolerable Arrangement for North-east Syria

Achieving a negotiated arrangement that would minimise risks of a violent eruption in north-east Syria may ultimately require progress on two distinct tracks: between the YPG/PYD (along with allied components of the SDF) and Damascus, and between the Öcalanists (YPG/PYD and/or PKK) and Ankara.

A YPG/PYD deal with Damascus should focus on decentralisation within the framework of the Syrian state. Prospects for sustaining it would improve significantly if the U.S. and Russia serve as formal or informal guarantors. It could include:

Restoration of the state’s flag and civil institutions to SDF-held areas, and delineation of authorities between Damascus and local governments. Decree 107 could serve as a starting point, but would require adjustments (such as shifting authority from centrally appointed governors to local elected institutions).



Restoration of state control over international borders, via the deployment of border guards and crossing personnel under Damascus’s command.



Official incorporation of SDF military structures and allied local security bodies within the framework of the Syrian state, perhaps under the title of national guard or internal security forces. These would fall under Damascus’s sovereignty, but retain their existing command-and-control structures within north-eastern Syria. In return for incorporation of these structures within the state, Damascus would commit to refraining from deploying the regime’s internal intelligence bodies, other army units and militias to these areas.



Sharing of revenue from oil and gas extraction. Ideally, revenue would be distributed among Syria’s provinces proportionate to population (and as part of a whole-of-Syria political resolution). At a minimum, revenue should be shared between local governing authorities (in areas currently held by the SDF) and Damascus, reflecting the balance between the former’s local control (in accordance with the decentralised security arrangement described above) and Damascus’s capacity to refine fuel and access external markets.



Russia and the U.S. should serve as the agreement’s de facto co-guarantors, enabling both Syrian sides to overcome low trust. The prospect that Moscow or Washington might react to a violation of the deal could provide some reassurance to the parties.

Separately, the U.S. and Russia should encourage a gradual accommodation between the Öcalanists (YPG/PYD and PKK) and Ankara. Prospects for a breakthrough currently appear dim, but Washington could help improve them by encouraging its YPG/PYD ally to proactively consider a key decision point looming in its future.

As Crisis Group has previously argued, it will be difficult for the YPG/PYD to retain its dominant role in north-east Syria and deeply intertwined linkage with the PKK while the latter continues its insurgency against the Turkish state. U.S. protection of the YPG has enabled this for the time being, but the realities of Turkey’s military power and Washington’s strategic imperative to maintain its alliance with Ankara suggest the situation could be difficult to sustain.

To reduce risk of a costly fight that could endanger all it has built in Syria, the YPG/PYD should consider how its prioritises those three current aspects of Öcalanist activity (its foothold in north-east Syria; ties to the PKK; and the current confrontation with the Turkish state). In the event of a U.S. withdrawal in particular, attempting to maintain all three carries high risk.

The U.S. could have an important role to play in mediating with Ankara and in helping both sides overcome mutual lack of trust.

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But pursuing two may be feasible. If the YPG/PYD is willing to submit to Damascus’s control in north-eastern Syria, the risk of Turkish attack would drop even if PKK attacks and the YPG-PKK linkage continue. Alternatively, the YPG/PYD could attempt to maintain a lead role in the north east while reducing risk of Turkish attack by either severing its ties to the PKK (including an end to the movement of cadres between Syria and Qandil) or convincing the PKK itself to halt attacks in Turkey.

None of these steps would be easy or fool-proof. Allowing Damascus to assert control could ultimately cost the YPG/PYD/SDF the autonomy it has achieved, and might conceivably still prove insufficient to deter Turkish attack if Moscow withheld or removed its backing. That said, if successful, it might allow the YPG to preserve some gains, albeit subject to the approval of Damascus and its backers. Likewise, for the YPG/PYD to cut its ties with the PKK would be very tricky, given the depth of organisational, personal and ideological links, and the difficulty of demonstrating that these have been severed. And a PKK decision to halt armed insurgency in Turkey appears unpalatable to PKK leaders and cadres unless matched by reciprocal steps from Ankara demonstrating that broadly held priorities among Turkey’s Kurdish population (including official recognition of cultural rights) and the PKK’s demand for decentralisation can and will be addressed at the negotiating table and via the Turkish political process. That is difficult to imagine under current political conditions in Turkey, though the Turkish leadership could encourage mutually beneficial steps by clarifying that it is prepared to respond favourably to a cut of YPG/PKK ties or a halt in PKK attacks, and by quickly following through once the YPG/PYD and/or PKK begin to implement either of them.

The U.S. has gained significant influence over YPG/PYD leaders from its presence and security guarantees, and from the trust and relationships built through close cooperation in the fight against ISIS. Washington should employ that influence to push the YPG/PYD to confront this difficult decision. Depending on the path the YPG/PYD chooses, the U.S. could have an important role to play in mediating with Ankara and in helping both sides overcome mutual lack of trust.

VI. Conclusion

The recommendations outlined here will not be easy to put into practice. They ask north-eastern Syria’s protagonists to jolt themselves out of their current political (and, in some cases, military) inertia, in a violent, highly complex and competitive environment. But if they fail to do so, the alternatives could be bleak. The Syrian war – and the U.S.-backed SDF campaign in the north east in particular – has dramatically altered the region’s social fabric and political geography, while stoking trans-border and local tensions along old and new fault lines. No one should entertain the illusion that the disputes described above will simply sort themselves out, or that the costs of attempting to resolve them by force can be safely predicted, much less contained or absorbed.

There is real potential for an explosion of violence in north-eastern Syria. The best chance to defuse it lies in negotiating mutually tolerable arrangements prior to a U.S. withdrawal.

Brussels/Ankara/Washington, 5 September 2018