When Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar arrived on February 22 at the snow-covered Diaoyutai state guesthouse, a massive complex that was once Mao Zedong's residence in the heart of Beijing, his Chinese counterpart, Zhang Yesui, thanked him for, of all things, the weather. "Thank you for bringing our first snowfall of the year," the executive vice-foreign minister said, adding hastily lest his remark be misconstrued, that this was "a positive sign" in Chinese culture. With the rest of the world in flux, officials in Delhi and Beijing say, both countries are this year hoping for a thaw in ties, strained in 2016 by frictions on several issues. From its continued shielding of Pakistani terrorist Masood Azhar at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to its stalling of India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), China appeared to be blatantly batting for its "all-weather" ally Pakistan, at the cost of its ties with India.

It was to arrest this perceived downward spiral that Jaishankar headed to Beijing, for what was the first expanded strategic dialogue between both countries at the foreign secretary level. Jaishankar arrived in Beijing at a time of great anxiety in the Chinese capital. On March 5, the Communist Party will preside over its last parliament session to approve policies before a once-in-five-years leadership congress, scheduled for September/October. Moreover, Chinese officials have been unnerved by the first month of Donald Trump's presidency, steeling themselves for what many expect will be a bruising trade war and a more robust US response to Chinese muscle-flexing in the South China Sea.

The two-day talks marked the most extensive engagement between the two countries in years: besides his engaging with the Chinese for seven hours, the FS also deputed four joint secretaries to engage with their Chinese counterparts in parallel dialogues on terrorism, nuclear issues, multilateral diplomacy, Afghanistan and other bilateral matters. The first of these two dialogues underlined that last year's tensions were certainly on the agenda, with some differences narrowed. The UNSC will revisit Azhar's listing in June, when a "technical hold" placed by China on a fresh application filed by the US in January expires. The Chinese are more than aware they are completely isolated on the matter, so how much the Trump administration may push them on it before June may decide the final outcome. Where there may be headway is the NSG, with the sense that it's more a question of when, not if, India joins the grouping with overwhelming global support, barring China. "What they kept telling us," Jaishankar said, "is that 'we are open, open to the possibility of you joining'. There were some areas where our view was closer, some where we were not."

The foreign secretary stressed that the dialogue, however, was about much more than these two friction points. "This was not an exercise where we discuss 2-3 issues and those necessarily become the standard of judgement," he said. What did come through, as Jaishankar put it, was that "given the fluidity in the international situation, it was in our mutual interest that the India-China relationship remain stable and forward-looking... that we add to the sense of certainty in international politics today".

"The feeling was the international situation is in flux and both India and China have been beneficiaries of a stable international system," he said. "In the last 25 years, China grew in a very stable and open international system. This has on the whole benefitted India as well, [even if] we haven't taken as much advantage with it as they have."

The stress that this system is facing today is certainly becoming a common cause for anxiety. "The fear is globalisation is going to decline irreversibly," says leading Chinese strategist Zhao Gancheng, who heads the Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. "Because of Trump, Brexit, the upcoming elections in a few European countries, the whole situation is not optimistic. Few countries will be more affected than China and India, so it's clear we both need to talk long term on how to defend these ideas."

The India-China bilateral relationship has always had a mix of agreement and discord but, increasingly, the latter has outweighed the former. From India's neighbourhood to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, interests are increasingly colliding, not converging. At the strategic dialogue, Afghanistan was discussed in great depth as one possible area of convergence, as were potential collaborations in Africa and Iran. "I don't agree we are on fundamentally different sides there at all, if you wish to take a balanced view," Jaishankar said, while also pointing to the G20, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank where China and India are the two biggest shareholders, and the BRICS New Development Bank as some areas of converging interests. On Afghanistan, especially, there is strong congruence on development projects, even if on the reconciliation process there are points of difference, with the Chinese view that while some Taliban elements were extreme, others could be brought onboard. On the bilateral front, India's easing of rules for Chinese investment has been much appreciated in Beijing, with investment last year crossing $1 billion in a calendar year for the first time.

On the face of it, Beijing appears to want to keep its western frontiers calm at a time when it is being challenged on other core interests, namely Taiwan, where the Trump administration has made overtures, and the South China Sea. In the past, a party academic who preferred to stay anonymous suggest, this would have worked in India's favour, and meant a greater desire on Beijing's part to compromise. Yet, he adds, these are unusual times in China. As Xi Jinping, China's strongest leader in decades, put it in a February national security meeting, it was China's time to "proactively shape" its external environment and "to guide the international order"-language, the academic says, that no leader has used since Deng Xiaoping's famous dictum of "hiding your strength, biding your time". Many in Beijing see the current moment of global uncertainty not as a time for compromise with its neighbours, but as an opportunity for China to assert itself even more strongly. An uncertain year awaits.