A quarter of a century ago, the Barcelona Process was launched with great fanfare. Promoting human rights and democracy was one of its three pillars; the other two were cultural exchanges and, last but not least, economic cooperation. European policy towards southern shore Mediterranean countries suddenly seemed more ambitious. The ambitions of the first pillar were, from the very start, more honoured in the breach than in the observance. As for the third, its ambitions were more modest than the often extravagant claims made by its promoters, as the economist Alfred Tovias was quick to point out. Stripped of its glitz, the European Union offered the south the same kind of mercantilist policy its members had done unilaterally for decades.

The brave words of Barcelona did, however, carry some political weight. The Israeli Palestinian peace negotiations were still alive and the collapse of the Soviet Union had imbued western leaders with a sense of optimism. That soon turned into hubris as some US intellectuals gambled on the End of History and the final triumph of western liberal capitalism and democratic norms.

In the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East, initial optimism quickly evaporated. A peaceful outcome to the Israeli Palestinian crisis was buried at the same time as the murdered Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The second intifada soon followed and then 9/11. The End of History turned into the Conflict of Civilisations as the prism of radical Islamism, much used by policy makers in the West, soon reduced the southern shore of the Mediterranean to a bed of nails. That required a hammer: stability and combating Islamism, not just in its terrorist expression, became of paramount importance. The US and European states took to praising Arab dictators for their stated democratic credentials, which were usually thin veils disguising repression. The West closed its eyes to torture, capital evasion and repression.

The Arab revolts further complicated the situation after 2010. The rise of political Islam in Egypt and Tunisia hardly heralded democracy. In the European Union, some feared Islamism would pave the way for terrorism; others wanted to believe the narrative, promoted notably by the Tunisian Islamist Ennahda party that their creed was no more than a local variant of Christian Democracy as practised by parties in Italy and Germany. Islam, however, had not yet gone through the confrontation with secular ideas, which the Catholic Church had, since the 16th century in Europe, and Islamists were quick to parade their democratic credentials in western capitals. On the ground, in Tunisia notably, another story was unfolding. Complacency with radical Salafists and sheer ineptitude led to a flow of jihadists to Middle East conflict zones.

Europe and America funded any number of NGOs which promoted democracy. Some provided helpful advice on how to run free elections but many proved very naive and unwilling to grasp the sheer complexity of the anthropology and socio-political systems they confronted. People in North Africa were struggling to achieve their own form of democratisation, which were often unexpected as Tunisia since 2011 and Algeria since 2019, amply demonstrate. The last thing they need was prescriptions written out in London, Paris or Berlin, let alone Washington.

In North Africa, where links with France and Europe are centuries old, western intervention in Iraq and Libya explains why nobody believes a single word western leaders utter when they speak to them. They resent what they see as western contempt for people deemed incapable of modern thought. They note also that EU leaders have long abandoned any pretence of helping the Palestinians, paying more attention to lucrative arms deals with Middle East and North African countries.

After 2011, Tunisia saw its security and military costs soar from 5% to 20% of its budget, following president Sarkozy’s ill-advised military campaign in Libya. The West offered Tunisia military training but not the weapons it needed to contain the threat of terrorism born in no mean way by the NATO-backed western intervention in Libya. Algeria has helped Tunisia as much as the West since 2011 where security is concerned. Meanwhile in Europe, back-seat drivers raised concerns about neo-authoritarianism in Tunisia when the real problem was a state getting weaker by the day. For most Tunisians and not a few seasoned observers of Tunisia, western and EU officials often seemed more interested in fulfilling their own blueprint for democracy than in helping Tunisia achieve growth and stability.

A pre-condition to that is a country more at peace with itself, where the private sector is not demonised and there is less score settling between different factions. The World Bank acknowledged it had misread Tunisia’s economic achievements before 2011. In a landmark report in 2013, the EU never did own up to the extravagant praise it heaped on the economic achievements of the Ben Ali regime. Maybe the EU simply lacks geopolitical ambition and imagination.

If it wants to show real commitment to its long-term strategic interests, the EU could do worse than to offer the three leading Maghreb countries a much more substantial economic partnership than it has to date. That would encourage their southern neighbours to reform and strengthen their educational, healthcare and broader economic systems. North Africans watch with disbelief, particularly Tunisians, northern Europe’s lack of support for Italy. Surely, argue many Tunisians, we are closer to Italy, France and Spain than to Hungary’s current leader. France, in particular, but also the UK and Germany trumpet their credentials on human rights and democracy but their hypocrisy fuels a broader distrust in Europe and offers ammunition to radicals in North Africa.

Europe’s economic policy is hardly more generous. It has remained deeply driven by mercantilism. France in particular has always refused to consider de-localising certain industries as Germany did, massively, to eastern Europe after 1992. Granted there are differences but an ambitious offer might well have encouraged Morocco and Tunisia — and maybe Algeria if a low price for oil forces it to reform one day — to enact bold reforms in economic management and judicial affairs. The European Union regularly publishes lists of countries where money laundering is deemed to be a problem as if Luxembourg and the City of London were squeaky clean. Denouncing such grey money is easier than helping North African countries escape the pitfalls of youth unemployment and the informal economy.

The COVID-19 pandemic has reminded Europe just how dependent it is on China, where 80% of the active ingredients in the medicines it manufactures are made. Why not relocate some of this activity to the Maghreb, in particular Tunisia which boasts some remarkable privately owned modern pharmaceutical companies? Why manufacture all masks in Germany and France when Tunisia has the know-how? Other parts of the value chain could be based in Tunisia which has a well-educated workforce and lies an hour’s flight from southern Europe. That would also reduce the carbon footprint.

Tunisia is a key piece on the regional chessboard. Nine years after Messrs Sarkozy and Cameron’s grotesque proclamation of victory in Libya, turmoil in that country not only holds back Tunisia’s economy but is a constant security threat. Tunisia’s industrial policy has, since its inception in the early 1970s, been based on cooperating with France. As the dean of Tunisian economists, Hachemi Alaya points out, in sectors such as textiles, automotive and aircraft spare parts, not to mention pharmaceuticals “Tunisian entrepreneurs should be associated much more closely with the fast changes occurring in northern shore Mediterranean countries than hitherto.”

A strong political signal to Maghreb countries is needed at a time when more weapons are flowing into Libya, thus further destabilising the country. To the threat of terrorism spilling over into Tunisia from Libya has been added that of refugees infected by COVID-19 should the fighting around Tripoli get worse and force large numbers of civilians to flee. Libya’s crisis has deeply destabilised the Sahel countries to Tunisia’s south while the flow of refugees and illegal immigrants from Africa have caused acute political pain in Italy and elsewhere in Europe. Africa is, to a greater degree than most observers in Europe care to acknowledge, lost to Europe. Do France and its European partners wish to lose Tunisia and its neighbours to an expanded Silk Road?