First among the lessons that Viet Nam teaches concerns the composition of liberation-war guerrilla movements.... After Dien Bien Phu (1954), non-Communist revolutionaries were still employed in the government to continue attracting popular support, even while all anti-Communist factions were being eliminated. It was only when Ho Chi Minh had sufficiently consolidated power that the turn of the nationalists and non-Party militants came. Exactly the same tactic was re-employed in the 1960s when the National Liberation Front was founded to rally all those who sympathized in any way with Communist goals....



There are two points to be made here, both obvious but often overlooked. One is that Communist “liberation war” strategy calls for the creation of guerrilla fronts representing many shades of political feeling, within which the Communists themselves are likely to be a minority. Antagonists are thus faced with an enemy which attracts diversified support and whose leadership is difficult to identify.



The foreign propaganda effect alone of such an organization is more than worth the minor risk to the Communist nucleus that it will be outmaneuvered by some temporarily allied faction. Foreign journalists, for example, can be counted on to make a cogent case for the moderate, the liberal, and the nationalist struggle for a homeland rather than for the Communist flavor of the guerrilla movement. They will note that apparently leading figures are intellectuals or religious leaders whose standpoints may be distinctly non-Communist. And over time their reportage will convey to their democratically and pluralistically inclined readers the impression of a movement that is itself “pluralistic,” and to that extent representative and even democratic....



There is also no doubt (and this is the second point) that the non-Communist elements in the guerrilla front will be destroyed as soon as feasible. Ton Due Thang, president of North Viet Nam’s Fatherland Front, succinctly characterized Communist strategy in this regard: “Rally all forces that can be rallied, neutralize all forces that can be neutralized, eliminate all forces that can be eliminated.”



Ton was referring here to the standard Communist device of shifting coalitions in order to make use of opposition forces and eventually eliminate them piecemeal. For example, to deal with three enemies, alliances are formed with two while the primary enemy is attacked. The process is then repeated until Communist power stands unopposed.

In reading "LEARNING FROM VIETNAM: THE PATTERNS OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" by Doan Van Toai and David Chanoff, I couldn't help but notice that the pattern of SJW entryism in television, SF/F, and games appears to be rather similar to the successful Communist strategy in VietnamWe're already seeing the hard core SJWs turn on their less-committed allies. This also demonstrates the absolute importance of driving home to the moderates that they need to resist their urge to train their guns on their own side rather than the opposition. Moderates are always trying to curry favor with the opposition by criticizing their own "extremists", but this is not only futile, it actually plays into the enemy's strategy of shifting coalitions.Notice in particular the importance that an ignorant media and controlling the public narrative plays in both strategies.

Labels: history, SJW