Lessons learned

Russia was not the only one who learned something from the 2008 experience. While the previous Georgian government’s initial reaction to its military’s poor performance was to restock its arsenal of Soviet vintage equipment, the current government has taken a very different approach.

After assuming office in 2012, defense minister Irakli Alasania has de-emphasized the acquisition of new weaponry in favor of improved doctrine, organization and intelligence.

Georgia is building a new kind of army—one that might actually be able to defend the tiny country.

Almost as soon as he took office, Alasania ordered a comprehensive military review of the chief failures of the 2008 war effort. As it turned out, Tbilisi’s biggest problems in 2008 had little to do with Russia’s well-known advantages in numbers and equipment. Rather, the Georgian military demonstrated poor command and control, communications, intelligence and reconnaissance.

What needed fixing first wasn’t the brawn, but the brains.

Alasania has embarked on big structural reforms. He scrapped mandatory conscription—long the mainstay of post-Soviet militaries—in favor of an all-volunteer professional force.

The defense minister also dismantled the troubled military reserve system, which was supposed to turn out tens of thousands in 2008 but in fact totally broke down. Alasania is building a new reserves call-up system—this time with NATO’s help.

Under the new minister, there’s more civilian oversight and better transparency. Doctrinally, the Georgian military is trying to shed its post-Soviet pedigree and embrace the Western model of highly trained, highly mobile units.

Alasania has reportedly fixed the widespread communications problems that were most glaring in 2008. “Georgia is much better-prepared today than we were in 2008,” Alasania told War is Boring in a recent conversation. “Without question.”

Reforms matter, but there’s no substitute for experience. In Afghanistan’s restive Helmand province, Georgia’s army has gotten that, too.

Tbilisi boosted its deployments to Afghanistan in 2009 and soon became one of the most prominent contributors to the international mission. By October 2012, Georgia had sent nearly 1,600 crack troops to fight alongside U.S. Marines in Helmand, making Georgia the top per-capita troop contributor and largest non-NATO force in the country.

Georgia has committed to sticking around alongside U.S. troops even after most NATO countries finish pulling out of Afghanistan this year.

By all accounts, the Georgians have performed well in Afghanistan. Unlike many NATO members, Tbilisi demanded no national caveats. They went wherever they were needed, no strings attached. The Georgians took some heavy casualties, but won the respect of their U.S. counterparts.

“You could always rely on the Georgians,” said one Navy corpsman who recently returned from Afghanistan with his Marine unit. “They had a reputation as guys who would get shit done.”

The Afghanistan mission has earned the Georgian army more than just plaudits from their U.S. peers. Rigorous pre-deployment training and long months in combat conditions have transformed the Georgian army into a well-prepared, battle-hardened force.

For the Georgians, Afghanistan has been a master class in combat operations in an austere environment—and they’ve paid close attention. “They’re hungry to learn,” one U.S. Marine instructor based in Georgia told me. “These guys are real professionals.”

Today, Georgia boasts some 10,000 troops whom it claims are trained to the highest NATO standards. This is reportedly a bigger trained force than even many current NATO states can field.

Tbilisi’s forces have so impressed Western officials that Georgian troops are set to join the NATO response force—the alliance’s 25,000-strong rapid reaction unit—in 2015.