Washington, D.C., September 4, 2013 – Recent press disclosures about National Security Agency (NSA) electronic surveillance activities — relying on documents provided by Edward Snowden — have sparked one of the most significant controversies in the history of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Today, the nongovernmental National Security Archive at The George Washington University posts a compilation of over 125 documents — a Web resource — to provide context and specifics about the episode.

The Snowden leaks have generated broad public debate over issues of security, privacy, and legality inherent in the NSA's surveillance of communications by American citizens. Furthermore, news coverage has explored the story on many levels, from the previously unknown scope of the NSA's programs, to public and congressional reactions, to Snowden's personal saga, including his attempts to evade U.S. authorities and avoid extradition to the United States.

Today's posting covers the full range of these topics, featuring documents from the White House, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the NSA itself, among other sources. The records include:

White House and ODNI efforts to explain, justify, and defend the programs

Correspondence between outside critics and executive branch officials

Fact sheets and white papers distributed (and sometimes later withdrawn) by the government

Key laws and court decisions (both Supreme Court and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court)

Documents on the Total Information Awareness (later Terrorist Information Awareness, or TIA) program, an earlier proposal for massive data collection

Manuals on how to exploit the Internet for intelligence

Opinion Take It To The Limit: Smith v. Maryland & NSA's Phone Metadata Collection Program By Jeffrey T. Richelson The legality of the National Security Agency's phone call metadata collection program — which preserves the time, duration, as well as originating and receiving numbers for virtually every call made within the United States — is a logical consequence of a 1979 Supreme Court decision. At least that claim has been made by individuals either defending the program and its legality, or at least its legality. But that case, and its use as a justification for NSA's accumulation of metadata needs more scrutiny. It has significant implications for how Supreme Court decisions may be co-opted by the FBI, NSA, and other intelligence and security organizations to justify domestic collection programs as well as the very standing of the Supreme Court as the court of last resort in the nation's constitutional framework. The 1979 case had its origins in a 1976 robbery in Baltimore, Maryland. After the robbery the victim began receiving threatening and obscene phone calls from a man who claimed to be the thief. Based on the victim's description of the robber and his car, the police identified Michael Lee Smith as a suspect. At police request the phone company installed a pen register at its central offices to record the numbers dialed from Smith's home — which produced evidence that he had called the victim. The police then obtained a warrant to search Smith's home — which revealed a phone book with a page turned down to the victim's number. Smith would then be picked out of a lineup as the robber. Prior to his trial, Smith's attorney moved to throw out the evidence that followed the pen register search, charging that use of the register constituted a warrantless and impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment. The case made it to the Supreme Court in 1979. That June, based on a 5-3 vote (one Justice did not participate in the hearing or decision), the Court ruled that installation of the pen register was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The majority argued that it was doubtful that telephone users had "any expectation of privacy regarding the numbers they dial," since they knew that the numbers must be conveyed to the telephone company, and the company recorded the numbers "for a variety of legitimate business purposes." In addition, the five-justice majority argued, any such expectation was not one society would consider "reasonable" and that when Smith made a call he assumed the risk that the company would reveal the information. The majority further explained that the Court "consistently has held" that individuals had no legitimate expectation of privacy in information turned over to a third party. Among the justices not convinced by that reasoning was Potter Stewart, who noted that the Court had held that the user of even a public telephone was entitled "to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." In addition, and of particular relevance to the NSA's metadata collection effort, he observed that "the numbers dialed from a private telephone ... are not without 'content.'" Stewart also wrote: "I doubt there are any [telephone subscribers] who would be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the local or long distance numbers they have called. This is not because such a list might in some sense be incriminating, but because it could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life." Thus, some of the arguments in Smith v. Maryland mirror some of the arguments concerning the NSA's collection effort. But it is also important to consider the very dramatic disparities between the case and the NSA effort. The police obtained calling records for a limited period of time, for a single individual who had already been identified as a suspect in a specific crime under investigation. Had their request been a mirror image of the NSA requests they would have asked for all the calling records from Baltimore for the purpose of combating an ongoing threat of crime. One can be reasonably certain that the police would not have had the nerve to make such a request or that it would have the remotest chance of being granted by the phone company or ordered by any court. Thus, the connection between Smith v. Maryland and the NSA program is not so straightforward. The extent to which the NSA has relied on the principal finding of Smith v. Maryland as a justification of their telephone metadata collection activities is disturbing not only for that reason. It also raises the question of how many other court findings with regard to law enforcement are being or may be employed by the FBI, NSA, or other security agencies as a justification for extensive domestic intelligence collection programs. In recent years the Supreme Court has ruled on a variety of law enforcement activities with privacy implications. These have included the use of police dogs to detect drugs (Illinois v. Caballes; Florida v. Jardines, Florida v. Harris), employment of an infrared detection system to detect heat levels inside a house indicative of marijuana cultivation (Kyllo v. United States), use of a GPS device to track a suspect (United States v. Jones), and acquisition of DNA from individuals in custody (Maryland v. King). Even in the cases decided in favor of the defendants the decisions were often close and not unequivocal in their wording. There can be little confidence that government lawyers will not seek to mine such rulings to justify expansive domestic collection operations — no matter how much stretching is required (just as NSA lawyers reportedly argued that "collection" did not take place until "gathered" data was actually examined). A complementary concern is that such justifications may be immune from review by the Supreme Court, which is supposed to be the ultimate arbiter of what governmental activities are constitutional. The NSA effort based on Smith v. Maryland was reviewed in secret, by the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court rather than by the Supreme Court — which turned aside a lawsuit (concerning alleged phone call monitoring) because the very secrecy enveloping any such program precluded individuals from establishing that they had been the targets of surveillance. With the acknowledgment of the widespread nature of the metadata collection program, hopefully future lawsuits can make their way to the Supreme Court. But what about any other secret programs derived from Supreme Court decisions and vetted only by a secret court, or even worse, government lawyers?

On August 12, 2013, President Barack Obama announced (Document 118) the impending creation of a group to review U.S. signals intelligence capabilities and communications technologies. Its mandate would be to "assess whether, in light of advancements in communications technologies, the United States employs its technical collection capabilities in a manner that optimally protects our national security and advances our foreign policy while appropriately accounting for other policy considerations, such as the risk of unauthorized disclosure and our need to maintain the public trust." That same day, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, Jr. announced (Document 119) that he would be establishing the review group and its final report would be due no later than December 15, 2013.

The catalyst for the president's announcement was an unexpected event that occurred just a little over two months previously. On June 5, a British newspaper, The Guardian, began publishing a series of articles disclosing highly classified aspects of, and documents about, certain National Security Agency (NSA) electronic surveillance operations involving not only extensive collection of foreign communications, including Internet traffic, but the collection of the metadata associated with phone calls (foreign and domestic) made by United States citizens. A few days later, The Guardian revealed its source to be Edward J. Snowden, a former CIA employee who had been working at a NSA facility in Hawaii as an employee of Booz Allen Hamilton.

On June 14, the United States filed a sealed criminal complaint against Snowden, releasing only one page (Document 74) to the public. Subsequently, Snowden departed Hong Kong, where he had been staying for the previous month (reportedly spending his final two days at the Russian consulate[1]), using a SAFEPASS (Document 83) issued by the Ecuadoran embassy in London. He arrived at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport while seeking asylum elsewhere. While in Russia, he issued several statements (Document 97). During that time, the United States sought to discourage nations offering Snowden asylum and pre-emptively requested his extradition (Document 94) from at least one nation.

Snowden's potential movements also became the subject of a letter (Document 91) from his father's lawyer to Attorney General Eric Holder asking for three guarantees to encourage his son to return home, including that he would not be detained or imprisoned prior to trial. Subsequently, in response to reported claims that Snowden feared being tortured if he returned, Holder wrote (Document 105) to the Russian Minister of Justice, assuring him that Snowden would not be tortured or face the death penalty if he returned (or was returned) to the United States.



Director of National Intelligence James Clapper (Photo: ODNI) Director of National Intelligence James Clapper (Photo: ODNI)

The controversy that has erupted over Snowden and his disclosures is not the first time NSA has been at the center of controversy. In the 1970s, through leaks, investigative reporting, and congressional inquiries, the public learned of projects SHAMROCK and MINARET. The SHAMROCK program (1945-1975) involved several U.S. companies turning over the telegraphic communications that passed over their networks. Project MINARET "was essentially the NSA's watch list" and "used existing SIGINT accesses" to search for "terms, names, and references associated with certain American citizens." While MINARET officially began in 1969, the watch list activity had started at least as early as 1960, and did not originally involve American citizens. In 1975, The Washington Post reported that the watch list had included prominent anti-Vietnam war activists such as Jane Fonda and Benjamin Spock.[2]

In the 1990s, major concern arose — more overseas than in the United States — about a program designated ECHELON. That program involved the installation of software at a select number of "COMSAT Intercept" sites operated by what are today designated the "FIVE EYES" nations — the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The sites intercepted the traffic flowing through communications satellites and the ECHELON software sorted through it (particularly printed fax transmissions), routing those containing pre-selected key words to analysts in whatever FIVE EYES nation had expressed interest. However, claims that ECHELON was a far more extensive global surveillance operation produced an international controversy and a European Parliament investigation.[3]

Perhaps the controversy around ECHELON would have had a significantly longer life had it not been for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But those events presaged the more recent controversies. In May 2006, USA Today published an article titled "NSA Has Massive Database on Americans' Phone Calls: 3 Telecoms Help Government Collect Billions of Domestic Records."[4] One lawsuit that followed was based on the claims of an AT&T employee (Document 11) concerning a special room containing surveillance equipment at an AT&T San Francisco facility.

However, there was a lack of official acknowledgment or leaked documents to support the claims. Thus, an August 2007 Congressional Research Service examination of the issue (Document 15) noted that "the factual information available in the public domain with respect to any such alleged program is limited and in some instances inconsistent, and the application, if at all, of any possible relevant statutory provisions to any such program is likely a very fact specific inquiry." The CRS study also stated that "It is possible that any information provided to the NSA from the telephone service providers was provided in response to a request for information, not founded on a statutory basis."[5]



National Security Agency headquarters (Photo: National Security Agency) National Security Agency headquarters (Photo: National Security Agency)

In contrast, the pre-August 12 disclosures in The Guardian, as well in The Washington Post and the Brazilian media, were based on a variety of document sources. Further, the online stories provided links to many of the key leaked documents, including an inspector general's report on the STELLARWIND Program (Document 23) — also known as the President's Surveillance Program (Document 24) — as well as Top Secret documents specifying procedures concerned with targeting (Document 25) and the 'minimization of data' about U.S. persons (Document 26). Also appearing on the web were selected slides from a 41-slide presentation (Document 55) on a program referred to as PRISM — involving the collection of Internet traffic from a variety of service providers — as well as a presentation on XKEYSCORE (Document 18), which sorts through intercepted traffic.

Along with the PRISM revelations, charges that the U.S. had bugged the facilities of European governments produced the greatest reaction in Europe — and the announcement (Document 95) of an investigation. However, the focus in the United States revolved around two programs, the Section 215 Bulk Collection Program and the 'PRISM' program, the latter based on Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act (Document 20).

Among the first documents The Guardian disclosed was a 4-page Top Secret 'Secondary Order' (Document 59) from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that commanded Verizon Business Network Services to provide an electronic copy of two 'tangible' things: "all call detail records or 'telephony metadata' created by Verizon for (i) communications between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States." The government subsequently released a heavily redacted version of the Primary Order (Document 58) from the surveillance court.

The leak of documents concerning the Bulk Collection program had a number of consequences leading up to the review ordered by President Obama. The leaks provided new data on the evolution of the program (Document 12, Document 17), reporting to Congress (Document 28, Document 32), challenges by Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) and others to the legal interpretations employed to justify the program (Document 10, Document 34, Document 63, Document 90a), as well as official reaction to those challenges (Document 37, Document 90b). The leaks also resulted in attempts by the government (Document 79, Document 92) to provide public reassurance — both with regard to the legality and utility of the program — including a single-spaced 22-page white paper (Document 115). Labeled "Administration White Paper" and lacking any specific agency source, the document seems to include the kind of legal language and justifications that would likely appear in the still-Secret Office of Legal Counsel opinions describing the government's legal bases for the programs. Such attempts also met with rebuttals ( Document 68) by those less convinced of the utility of the Bulk Collection effort.



Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) (Photo: www.wyden.senate.gov) Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) (Photo: www.wyden.senate.gov)

Because of the leaks, DNI James Clapper had to provide various explanations (Document 71, Document 82) for his "no" response to a question Wyden had posed to him at a public hearing in March. Wyden had inquired whether the NSA collected "any kind of data at all" on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans.

In addition, there were amendments introduced in Congress that would have terminated the program — including Sen. Rand Paul's (R-KY) "Fourth Amendment Restoration Act" (Document 67) and an amendment (Document 101) by Representatives Justin Amash (R-MI) and John Conyers (D-MI) that would have prohibited funding for execution of any FISA order that did not limit collection to data that pertained to an individual who was the subject of an investigation. Objections to the amendment, which was ultimately defeated by the unexpectedly close margin of 217-205, came from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chairman Dianne Feinstein (Document 106), the White House (Document 107), and DNI Clapper (Document 108).

The contrast between the Bulk Collection program and the Section 702 'PRISM' program was that there was little dispute that the latter had produced significant intelligence that could be employed in operations against terrorist activities. Still, disclosure of the program was accompanied by the publication of relevant, sometimes Top Secret, documents (Document 18, Document 25, Document 26, Document 55) that produced significant controversy. One element of controversy concerned the specifics of the involvement of key communications providers (e.g. Yahoo, Google, Facebook) in the program — particularly if NSA had direct access to their servers.



National Security Agency director Gen. Keith B. Alexander (Photo: National Security Agency) National Security Agency director Gen. Keith B. Alexander (Photo: National Security Agency)

A second source of controversy concerned a number of NSA claims made in a fact sheet it had posted on the Web about the 702 program (Document 78). The fact sheet sparked a letter from Senators Wyden and Udall (D-CO) (Document 85) to NSA director Keith Alexander with two objections. The senators wrote to dispute what they considered "an inaccurate statement about how section 702 authority has been interpreted by the U.S. government." In addition, they objected to the statement in the fact sheet that any inadvertently acquired communication concerning a U.S. person that was not relevant to the purpose of the intercept, or evidence of a crime, had to be promptly destroyed. They characterized the statement as "somewhat misleading in that it implies that the NSA had the ability to determine how many American communications it has collected under section 702, or that the law does not allow NSA to deliberately search for the records of particular Americans." In his response (Document 87), Alexander noted that "the fact sheet ... could have more precisely described the requirements for collection under Section 702." Shortly thereafter, the NSA removed both the Section 215 and Section 702 fact sheets from its website.

A number of disclosures and declassifications occurred subsequent to the president's August 12 announcement — primarily from The Washington Post and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Among the documents provided by Snowden to the Post was a Top Secret report (Document 44) on the Washington-based activities of the NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate, with collection limitations imposed by Executive Order 12333, the FISA, and other regulations. Over the course of a year starting April 2011, it noted 2,776 incidents (2,057 related to the executive order and 719 with regard to FISA). The report attributed the incidents mostly to "roamers" (foreign targets that entered the United States), but they also involved cases of a lack of proper FISC authority, database queries, errors in tasking or detasking, and collection at international transit switches. The Post also first disclosed a 4-page document (Document 125) titled "Targeting Rationale," which focused on what information should, and should not, be provided to FISA Amendments Act "overseers."

On August 21, 2013, the Office of the DNI declassified a collection of relevant documents with Clapper providing an overview in a release letter (Document 123). Included in the documents were a directive on minimization (Document 38) — which was a more recent version of one of the documents that first appeared in The Guardian (Document 26) — as well as testimony before closed Congressional hearings (Document 41) and a semiannual compliance report (Document 113). In addition, there were three 2011-2012 opinions (Document 35, Document 40, Document 48) from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The first of the opinions had been the subject of a lawsuit by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. It noted that "one aspect of the proposed collection — the 'upstream collection' of Internet transactions — is in some respects, deficient on statutory and constitutional grounds." The subsequent opinions (Document 40, Document 48) discussed the adequacy of the government's response to the court's criticism.

Compliance violations had been noted several days before the release in a press briefing (Document 120) by John DeLong, NSA's director of compliance. His disclosures produced reactions from Senate intelligence chairman Feinstein and committee members Wyden and Udall. Feinstein stated (Document 122) that her committee had "never identified an instance in which the NSA has intentionally abused its authority to conduct surveillance for inappropriate purposes," while Wyden and Udall wrote (Document 121) that "we believe Americans should know that this confirmation is just the tip of a larger iceberg."

THE DOCUMENTS

Document 1: U.S. Congress, Public Law 95-511, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, October 25, 1978. Unclassified.

Source: www.gpo.gov.

This initial version of the FISA law distinguishes between the circumstances that require a court order to authorize electronic surveillance from those that can be authorized by the president or attorney general without a court order, and establishes a court to hear requests for court orders approving surveillance. It also describes the information that must be provided in support of a request and that contained in an order, regulates the use of information about or from surveillance, and stipulates the mechanism for Congressional oversight.

Document 2: U.S. Supreme Court, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, June 28, 1979. Unclassified.

Source: https://laws.findlaw.com/us/442/735-html.

This case has been cited as establishing that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to calling data and that government agencies can obtain the data without a warrant. This document provides a summary of the case, the reasoning of the majority — that individuals had no legitimate expectation of privacy in information turned over to a third party — and the views of the dissenting judges.

Document 3: John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for the Attorney General, November 2, 2001. Top Secret/[Deleted]/SI/ORCON/NOFORN.

Source: Department of Justice Freedom of Information Act Release (to Matthew Aid).

This heavily redacted from Yoo to Attorney General John Ashcroft discussed the president's authority to conduct electronic surveillance without a warrant, and argued that FISA did not prevent the president from directing such surveillance.

Document 4: Marcia S. Smith, Jeffrey W. Seiffert, Glenn J. McLoughlin, and John Dimitri Moteff, Congressional Research Service, The Internet and the USA Patriot Act: Potential Implications for Electronic Privacy, Security, Commerce, and Government, March 4, 2002. Unclassified.

Source: http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/RL31289.pdf.

This study, completed just a few months after passage of the PATRIOT Act notes the numerous ways in which the act could have an impact on commerce and government as well as examining how the act provided law enforcement with "greater authority to monitor Internet activity such as ... e-mail and Web site visits."

Document 5: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet, October 2002. Unclassified.

Source: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nato/exploit_internet.pdf.

This manual provides an overview of the Internet (including the Web, newsgroups, e-mail lists, and chat rooms), aspects of collection (planning, search strategies, and search tools), processing (including source evaluation), and dissemination.

Document 6: Robert J. Hanyok, "The First Round: NSA's Effort against International Terrorism in the 1970s," Cryptologic Almanac, November - December 2002. TOP SECRET/COMINT.

Source: NSA Freedom of Information Act Release.

This article, in a NSA journal, provides a brief account of NSA's early efforts to intercept and exploit terrorist communications.

Document 7: Gina Marie Stevens, Congressional Research Service, Privacy: Total Information Awareness Programs and Related Information Access, Collection, and Protection Laws, March 21, 2003. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org.

The main focus of this study is the variety of laws that determine federal access to information about residents of the United States, in light of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Total Information Awareness (TIA) program (Document 9), which envisioned applying data mining techniques to masses of data about individual transactions to identify and track terrorists.

Document 8: A. Denis Clift, "Intelligence in the Internet Era," Studies in Intelligence, 47, 3 (Fall 2003). Unclassified.

Source: www.cia.gov.

Clift, the former chief of staff of the Defense Intelligence Agency, notes the challenges to intelligence collection and analysis posed by the advent of the Internet. He also notes that "with new transnational adversaries — international terrorism foremost among them — the flood of new information technologies ... and global access to the Web, the National Security Agency is charting new directions in the way it identifies, gains access to and successfully exploits target communications."

Document 9: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Terrorism Information Awareness Program, December 12, 2003. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org.

One consequence of the hostile reaction to the concept of Total Information Awareness was the substitution of 'Terrorism' for 'Total.' This audit of the program by the DoD Inspector General observed that "a review of the program ... [s]howed that although the TIA technology could prove valuable in combating terrorism, DARPA could have better addressed the sensitivity of the technology to minimize the possibility of any Governmental abuse of power." Among the report's recommendations was the appointment of an ombudsman to ensure that TIA technology was examined with privacy concerns in mind.

Document 10: Larry E. Craig, Richard J. Durbin, John Sununu, Russell D. Feingold, Lisa Murkowski, Ken Salazar, Chuck Hagel, John F. Kerry, and Barack Obama, letter to Dear Colleague, December 14, 2005. Unclassified.

Source: www.washingtonpost.com

Among the senators signing this letter to their colleagues in the Senate was Barack Obama. The letter expressed disappointment with regard to the minimal nature of the revisions the conference report suggested with regard to a number of sections of the Patriot Act — including Section 215.

Document 11: Mark Klein, Declaration of Mark Klein in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, June 8, 2006. Unclassified.

Source: www.eff.org.

This declaration from a former AT&T technician reports on the establishment of a secure room for NSA at an AT&T facility in San Francisco through which interstate and foreign voice and electronic data communications flowed.

Document 12: Vito T. Potenza, Acting General Counsel, National Security Agency, letter to Mr. James A. Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Department of Justice, September 28, 2006. SECRET/COMINT/ORCON/NOFORN.

Source: www.guardian.co.uk.

This letter from NSA's acting general counsel to a Department of Justice official notifies the recipient that NSA is requesting approval, from the secretary of defense and attorney general, of an amendment to classified Defense Department procedures. That amendment would "permit NSA personnel analyzing communications metadata to analyze contacts involving U.S. telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and other identifiers." The memo also notes that while NSA has conducted such activities for several years, it has applied the procedures in a way that "precluded it from chaining 'from' or 'through' communications" when there was a reason to believe the communications were those of U.S. persons.

Document 13a, b, c, d, e, f: National Security Agency, Untangling the Web: A Guide to Internet Research, February 28, 2007. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Source: www.nsa.gov.

This 651-page internal NSA guide to Internet research provides an introduction to searching, and then focuses, inter alia, on mastering searches (with sections on Google and Yahoo searches and hacks), specialized search tools and techniques, uncovering the "invisible" internet, international searches, and going "beyond search engines." The penultimate section focuses on internet privacy and security — "'making yourself less vulnerable in a dangerous world.'."

Document 14: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of Section 215 Orders for Business Records, March 2007. Unclassified.

Source: www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0703a/final.pdf.

The USA Patriot and Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 required the Justice Department's inspector general to conduct "a comprehensive audit of the effectiveness and use, including improper or illegal use" by the FBI of Section 215 of the Patriot Act — which allows the FBI to obtain "any tangible things," including books, records, and other items, from any authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. This is the first report by the inspector general in response to the 2005 act.

Document 15: Elizabeth B. Bazan, Gina Marie Stevens and Brian T. Yeh, Congressional Research Service, Government Access to Phone Calling Activity and Related Records: Legal Authorities, August 20, 2007. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33424.pdf.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) prepared this report in response to the 2006 allegations that NSA was collecting and analyzing information on telephone calling patterns in the United States. It notes the numerous lawsuits that had been filed in response to such allegations. The report summarizes statutory authorities regarding access by the government, for either foreign intelligence or law enforcement purposes, to information related to telephone calling patterns or practices.

Document 16: Department of Justice, Responses to the Department of Justice to Questions Posed to Then-Assistant Attorney General Kenneth L. Wainstein, September 18, 2007. Unclassified.

Source: Department of Justice Freedom of Information Act Release (to Steven Aftergood).

These responses are the result of questions on warrantless surveillance and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that arose from Kenneth Wainstein's appearance before the House Judiciary Committee. The questions include those related to: minimization procedures, section 105(B) authority (Document 75a, Document 75b), the need for immunity for communications carriers, reporting in USA Today concerning NSA collection of phone call data, and FBI retention of data from National Security Letters.

Document 17: Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Subject: Proposed Amendment to Department of Defense Procedures to Permit the National Security Agency to Conduct Analysis of Communications Metadata Associated with Persons in the United States, November 20, 2007. SECRET/COMINT/ORCON/NOFORN.

Source: Edward Snowden leak: www.guardian.co.uk.

This memo to the attorney general concerns the Defense Department's request for a proposed amendment to procedures governing NSA activities concerning metadata analysis (Document 12). It informs the attorney general that "we conclude that the proposed communications metadata analysis, including contact chaining is consistent with" the Fourth Amendment, FISA, and "the electronic surveillance provisions contained in Title 18 of the United States Code." In its discussion the memo notes the implications of the Smith v. Maryland case (Document 2).

Document 18: National Security Agency, XKEYSCORE, February 25, 2008. TOP SECRET/COMINT.

Source: Edward Snowden leak: www.guardian.co.uk.

This NSA presentation focuses on a system that is described as the "widest-reaching system" for developing intelligence from the Internet. It notes that the database, collected from 150 sites and 700 servers, includes phone numbers, e-mail addresses, logins, and user activity.

Document 19: Elizabeth B. Bazan, Congressional Research Service, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of Selected Issues, July 7, 2008. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34279.pdf.

This report examines three issues related to FISA: tension between national security and civil liberties (particularly privacy and free speech), "the need for the intelligence community to be able to efficiently and effectively collect foreign intelligence information from the communications of foreign persons located outside the United States," and limitations of liability for electronic communications service providers who assisted the federal government in its foreign intelligence collection efforts.

Document 20: U.S. Congress, PL-110-261, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, July 10, 2008. Unclassified.

Source: www.intelligence.senate.gov/laws/pl110261.pdf.

This act served to extend and modify some expiring provisions of the Protect America Act of 2007 — including via Section 702. Prior to its enactment FISA only permitted sustained domestic electronic surveillance or access to domestic communications stored electronically after the issuance of a FISC order that was specific to the target. Other sections relate to acquisitions inside the United States, targeting U.S. persons outside the country, and acquisitions targeting U.S. persons outside the United States.

Document 21: United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, No. 08-01, In Re: Directives [redacted text]* Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, August 22, 2008. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org

This FISC Court of Review document conveys the court's decision in response to a suit brought by a "communications service provider" challenging the legality of an order to "assist [the United States] in acquiring foreign intelligence" that "targeted third persons (such as the service provider's customers) reasonably believed to be located outside the United States." The court writes (pp. 3-4) that "after a careful calibration of this balance and consideration of the myriad legal issues presented, we affirm the lower court's decision." The remainder of the document reviews the statutory framework and background, and provides the court's analysis.

Document 22: Office of the General Counsel, National Security Agency, FISA Amendments Act of 2008 Section 702, Summary Document, December 23, 2008. TOP SECRET/COMINT/NOFORN

Source: www.aclu.org.

The released version of this document (including its table of contents), which is almost completely redacted, contains sections on compelling electronic communications providers "to assist the government in acquiring foreign intelligence information," and on FISC orders concerning U.S. persons.

Document 23: Office of the Inspector General, National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Report on the Stellar Wind Program, March 24, 2009. Top Secret/STLW/COMINT/NOFORN

Source: Edward Snowden leak: www.washingtonpost.com.

This review of the STELLARWIND program, covers six topics: initial establishment of the authority; implementation of the authority and the resulting SIGINT product; access to legal reviews, the authorization, and information about the program; NSA-private sector relationships, NSA interactions with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the transition to court orders; and NSA oversight of the President's Surveillance Program SIGINT Activities.

Document 24: Offices of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report on the President's Surveillance Program, July 10, 2009. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org.

This report on the President's Surveillance Program, which had been referred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program subsequent to New York Times disclosures in December 2005, focuses on the inception of the program (including expansion of NSA's collection activities and threat assessment memoranda supporting the program's authorization), implementation of the program, the legal reassessment of the program, transition of some program activities to FISC orders, and the impact of the program on the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism activities.

Document 25: Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, Exhibit A: Procedures Used by the National Security Agency for Targeting Non-United States Persons Reasonably Believed to Be Located Outside the United States To Acquire Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As Amended, July 28, 2009. TOP SECRET/COMINT/NOFORN.

Source: Edward Snowden leak: www.guardian.co.uk.

This document concerns five aspects of NSA targeting of non-United States persons outside the United States — determination of whether the targets are reasonably believed to be outside the United States, post-targeting analysis by NSA, documentation, oversight and compliance, and any departures from procedures "in order to protect against an immediate threat to the national security."

Document 26: Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, Exhibit B : Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As Amended, July 28, 2009. SECRET/COMINT/NOFORN.

Source: Edward Snowden leak: www.guardian.co.uk

This secret document concerns restrictions on NSA's acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of non-publicly available information concerning nonconsenting United States persons that is acquired through the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside of the country.

Document 27: Department of Justice and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, Reporting Period: December 1, 2008 - May 31, 2009. December 2009. TOP SECRET/SI/NOFORN.

Source: www.odni.gov.

This document was produced in accord with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Document 20) and examines procedures used to ensure compliance with procedures and guidelines related to Section 702 of the Act by the NSA and FBI. It also reports on the results of the compliance audits.

Document 28: Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice to Silvestre Reyes, December 14, 2009. Top Secret/Comint/Noforn w/att: Report on the National Security Agency's Bulk Collection Programs Affected by USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization, Top Secret/COMINT/NOFORN.

Source: www.odni.org.

This letter and attachment were the result of a request that the Department of Justice prepare a document describing the bulk collection program conducted under Section 215 (Document 14). The attachment describes two bulk collection programs — one based on Section 215 and the other based on pen-trap collection (see Document 2).

Document 29: Elizabeth B. Bazan, Edward C. Liu, and Gina Stevens, Congressional Research Service, Government Access to Phone Calling Activity and Related Records: Legal Authorities, February 2, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33424_20100202.pdf.

This study updates the earlier CRS effort (Document 15) to examine the statutory authorities regarding access by the government, for either foreign intelligence or law enforcement purposes, to information related to telephone calling patterns or practices.

Document 30: Department of Justice and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, Reporting Period: June 1, 2009 - November 30, 2009. TOP SECRET/SI/NOFORN. May 2010.

Source: www.odni.gov.

Like Documents 27 and 113, this semiannual assessment was produced in accord with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Document 20) and examines procedures used to ensure compliance with procedures and guidelines related to Section 702 of the Act by the NSA and FBI. It also reports on the results of the compliance audits.

Document 31: United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Rules of Procedure, November 1, 2010. Unclassified.

Source: www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/FISC2010.pdf.

The rules specified in this document concern amendments to the rules; national security information; the structure and powers of the court; matters presented to the court; hearings, orders, and enforcement; supplemental procedures; proceedings held before the entire court ('en banc'); appeals; and administrative provisions.

Document 32: Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, letter to Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss, February 2, 2011. TOP SECRET/COMINT/NOFORN; Ronald Weich, letter to Mike Rogers, and C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, February 2, 2011 w/att: Report on the National Security Agency's Bulk Collection Programs for USA Patriot Act Reauthorization. TOP SECRET/COMINT/NOFORN .

Source: www.odni.gov.

These identical letters from Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich to the chairmen and deputy chairmen of the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees, to be made available to all members of Congress, provide an updated description (see Document 28) of the bulk collection programs conducted under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. After a discussion of key points, it contains passages on Section 215 and Pen-Trap Collection, checks and balances, and compliance issues. It notes (p.4) that in 2009, "a number of technical compliance problems and human implementation errors in these two bulk collection programs were discovered."

Document 33: Edward C. Liu, Congressional Research Service, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015. June 16, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL40138.pdf.

This report examines three amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that were extended on May 26, 2011, to June 15, 2015. The amendments had (1) increased the flexibility to the degree of specificity with the description of a location or facility subject to electronic surveillance, (2) expanded the scope of material that could be sought under Section 215 to include "any tangible thing," and (3) changed the "lone wolf" provision of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act with regard to the types of individuals who could be targets of FISA-authorized searches.

Document 34: Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, letter to Eric Holder, September 21, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: www.documentcloud.org.

This letter, from two senators to the attorney general, expressed continued concern that the U.S. government was relying on "secret interpretations of surveillance authorities" which, they believed, differed from the public's understanding of what U.S. law permitted. They also expressed their belief that U.S. officials had made misleading statements about the government's interpretation of the law and urged Holder to "correct the public record with regard to these statements."

Document 35: United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Memorandum Opinion, October 3, 2011. TOP SECRET/COMINT/ORCOM/NOFORN.

Source: www.odni.gov

This memorandum concerns the U.S. government request for approval to acquire telephone and Internet communications under Section 702 of the FISA Act. The order grants the government's request in part, but reports the court's conclusion that "one aspect of the proposed collection — the 'upstream collection' of Internet transactions — is in some respects, deficient on statutory and constitutional grounds."

Document 36: Special Source Operations, NSA, FAA Certification Renewals with Caveats, October 12, 2011. TOP SECRET/SI/NOFORN.

Source: www.aclu.org.

This one-page document notes the FISC, on October 3, 2011, (Document 35) approved continued Section 702 collection activities, except that certain "upstream" or "passive" digital network information collection would have to be halted after 30 days unless NSA corrected certain deficiencies.

Document 37: Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, letter to Ron Wyden, October 19, 2011. Unclassified.

Source: http://images.politico.com/global/2012/03/dojltrwyden.pdf.

The Justice Department responds to Wyden's September 21 letter (Document 34). It objects to Wyden and Udall's claim that the Executive Branch is operating pursuant to "secret law" and tells Wyden that while "we appreciate and share your interest in an informed debate on how the government interprets and uses its intelligence collection authorities ... the Intelligence Community has determined that public disclosure of the classified uses of Section 215 would expose sensitive sources and methods to our adversaries."

Document 38: Eric Holder, Attorney General, Exhibit B: Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As Amended, October 31, 2011. TOP SECRET/COMINT/NOFORN.

Source: www.odni.gov

This document covers the same ground as the 2009 version (Document 26), leaked to The Guardian, and concerns restrictions on NSA's acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of non-publicly available information concerning nonconsenting United States persons that is acquired through the targeting of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the country.

Document 39: National Security Agency, Lesson 4: So you got U.S. Person Information?, November 1, 2011. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Source: www.aclu.org

This one-page document describes what to do when information is obtained about a U.S. person. It consists of three columns covering how the information was obtained and what to do in each case, and providing commentary.

Document 40: United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Memorandum Opinion, November 30, 2011. TOP SECRET/COMINT/ORCOM/NOFORN.

Source: www.odni.gov

In this opinion the FISC reports that "the government has adequately corrected the deficiencies identified in the October 3 Opinion" (Document 35), and therefore approves the government's amended minimization procedures.

Document 41: Lisa O. Monaco, John C. (Chris) Inglis, and Robert S. Litt, Joint Statement before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives at a Hearing Concerning "FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization", December 8, 2011. TOP SECRET/COMINT/ORCON/NOFORN.

Source: www.odni.gov

This heavily redacted statement discusses the FISC Opinion of October 3, 2011 (Document 35), and argues that "FISC's exhaustive analysis of the Government's submission, like its other decisions, refutes any argument that the court is a 'rubber stamp'."

Document 42: James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of National Intelligence and Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, letter to John Boehner, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, and Mitch McConnell, February 8, 2012, w/enclosure: Background Paper on Title VII of FISA Prepared by the Department of Justice and the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Unclassified.

Source: www.justice.gov/ola/views-letters/112/02-08-12-fisa-reauthorization.pdf.

The purpose of this letter from Clapper and Holder was to urge Congress to reauthorize Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was enacted by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Document 20). An attached background paper contains a section concerning their view as to the value of section 702 (permitting the FISC to approve surveillance of terrorist suspects and other targets who are non-U.S. persons outside the United States) and other provisions of Title VII.

Document 43: James R. Clapper, Jr. Director of National Intelligence, to John Boehner, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, and Mitch McConnell, March 26, 2012, w/att: FISA Amendments Act of 2008 Extension Act of 2012. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov.

This letter from the DNI to key congressional leaders concerns a proposed extension of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Document 20), which would extend its provisions to June 1, 2017.

Document 44: [Deleted], Chief, SID Oversight & Compliance, Subject: NSAW SID Intelligence Oversight (IO) Quarterly Report - First Quarter Calendar Year 2012 (1 January - 31 March 2012) - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, May 3, 2012. TOP SECRET/COMINT/NOFORN.

Source: Edward Snowden leak: www.washingtonpost.com

This document examines compliance by NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate with collection limitations imposed by Executive Order 12333 on U.S. intelligence activities and the FISA. It notes 2,776 incidents (2,057 related to EO 12333 and 719 related to FISA). It also provides data on the activities or programs related to the incidents — including, but not limited to, roamers, lack of FISC authority, and collection at international transit switches.

Document 45a: Kathleen Turner, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Ronald Weich, Department of Justice, Letter to Mike Rogers and CA. Dutch Ruppesberger, May 4, 2012. TOP SECRET/SI/ORCON/NOFORN.

Document 45b: Kathleen Turner, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Ronald Weich, Department of Justice, Letter to Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss, May 4, 2012. TOP SECRET/SI/ORCON/NOFORN.

Document 45c: The Intelligence Community's Collection Programs under Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. TOP SECRET/SI/ORCON/NOFORN.

Source: www.odni.gov.

These two identical letters from the ODNI and Department of Justice to the chair and vice-chair of the House and Senate intelligence committees are cover letters to the attachment, an 11-page discussion of the collection activities conducted under Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Document 1), particularly under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Document 20).

Document 46: National Security Agency, BOUNDLESS INFORMANT - Frequently Asked Questions, September 6, 2012. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Source: Edward Snowden leak: https://s3.amazonaws.com

These briefing materials, probably leaked by Edward Snowden, focus on the BOUNDLESS INFORMANT program - described as a GAO [Global Access Operations] "prototype tool for a self-documenting SIGINT system" which requires no human intervention. It is intended to describe collection capabilities via map, bar chart or simple table.

Document 47: Inspector General, Department of Justice, DOJ OIG Issues Report on Activities Under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, September 25, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: www.justice.gov/oig/press/2012/2012_09_25.pdf.

This very brief item announces that the Department's inspector general has recently "issued a report examining the activities of the FBI under Section 702 of the FISA and had delivered the report to the relevant Congressional oversight and intelligence committees," but "because the report is classified, its contents cannot be disclosed to the public."

Document 48: United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Memorandum Opinion, September 25, 2012. TOP SECRET/SI/ORCON/NOFORN.

Source: www.odni.gov.

This is an extract of a FISC opinion that responds to the government's request for reauthorization of its Section 702 collection activities. It notes that "last year ... the government [disclosed] that it had materially represented the scope of NSA's 'upstream collection' under Section 702" and discusses measures taken by NSA to bring it into compliance with legal restrictions. It also states that "it appears to the Court that the outstanding issues raised by NSA's upstream collection of Internet transactions have been resolved."

Document 49: Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, U.S. Senate, letter to General Keith Alexander, Director, National Security Agency, October 10, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: www.wyden.senate.gov.

This letter, from Senators Wyden and Udall, to NSA director Alexander objects to comments he made at a technology convention in Nevada, stating that they "portrayed privacy protections for American's communications as being stronger than they actually are;" they urge him "to correct this statement." They also request that he answer two questions, including "Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on 'millions or hundreds of millions of Americans'?"

Document 50: United States Supreme Court, James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of National Intelligence, et. al., Petitioners v. Amnesty International USA, et. al., October 29, 2012. Unclassified.

Source: www.supremecourt.gov.

This hearing before the Supreme Court resulted from a lawsuit in which Amnesty International and others challenged the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. The key question addressed in the remarks of each side's lawyers and the Justices is whether Amnesty and others had 'standing' for its suit.

Document 51: Dianne Feinstein, Jeff Merkley, Ron Wyden, Mark Udall, U.S. Senate, letter to John D. Bates, Presiding Judge, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, February 13, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc_021313.pdf.

This letter from four senators, including Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chief Diane Feinstein, to the presiding judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, conveys their belief that declassification of Court decisions would help "inform public debate over FISA, including provisions of the law that are subject to sunset in 2015 and 2017." (See Document 30).

Document 52: U.S. Supreme Court, Syllabus: Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, et. al. v. Amnesty International USA et. al., February 26, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.surpremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1025_ihdj.pdf.

This document reports and explains the Supreme Court's decision in the case argued on October 29, 2012 (Document 50). The Court found that the "respondents do not have standing" and notes several earlier rulings in support of their conclusion.

Document 53: Remarks of Rajesh De, General Counsel, National Security Agency, Georgetown Law School, February 27, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.nsa.gov

Rajesh De states that he would like to bridge "the gap between public discourse about NSA and the reality of legal rules, oversight, and accountability." He goes on to claim that there are three "pervasive" false myths about NSA: "NSA is a vacuum that indiscriminately sweeps up and stores global communications," "NSA is spying on Americans at home and abroad with questionable or no legal basis," and "NSA operates in the shadows free from external scrutiny or any true accountability."

Document 54: Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, letter to Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senate, March 27, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc/_032713.pdf.

This letter from the new presiding judge of the FISC responds to the February 13 letter (Document 51) from Senators Feinstein, Wyden, Udall, and Merkley, requesting declassification of FISC opinions. In it Judge Walton suggests a number of problems with issuing declassified opinions.

Document 55: National Security Agency, PRISM-984XN Overview, April 2013. TOP SECRET/SI/NOFORN/ORCON.

Source: Edward Snowden leak: www.guardian.co.uk

These slides are part of a much larger presentation (consisting of 41 slides) leaked by Edward Snowden that explain the PRISM program for collection of Internet data. It notes the providers that are part of the program, when PRISM collection began for each, and the variety of data that is gathered.

Document 56: Edward C. Liu, Congressional Research Service, Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act, April 8, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R42725.pdf.

Following the recommendation of DNI James Clapper and Attorney General Eric Holder (Document 42), Congress approved and President Obama signed (on December 30, 2012) a bill that extended Title VII of FISA, a result of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Document 20). This report focuses on the provisions that allow targeting of non-U.S. persons abroad with individualized court orders (Section 702) and the Sections (703 and 704) that concern procedures for targeting U.S. persons abroad employing court orders.

Document 57: Department of Homeland Security/Federal Bureau of Investigation, Use of the Internet for Attack Planning, April 24, 2013. Unclassified/For Official Use Only.

Source: www.publicintelligence.net

This one-page joint memo focuses on use of the Internet by "malicious actors" to obtain information that can be used to support pre-operational planning against a potential target. It notes varieties of online presence that can facilitate attack planning.

Document 58: Roger Vinson, Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Primary Order, April 25, 2013. TOP SECRET/SI/NOFORN.

Source: www.odni.gov

This order, declassified by the Director of National Intelligence, was the primary order from which the leaked secondary order (Document 59) was derived. It required the deleted entity to provide "on an ongoing daily basis" for the duration of the order all "telephony metadata" created by the entity for communications between the United States and abroad or wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.

Document 59: Roger Vinson, Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Secondary Order, April 25, 2013. TOP SECRET/SI/NOFORN.

Source: Edward Snowden leak: www.guardian.co.uk

This unredacted, leaked order, identifies the target of the primary order (Document 45) as Verizon and commands it to provide the identified telephony metadata. It also specifies that "no person shall disclose to any other person [other than those authorized by the Order] that the FBI or NSA has sought or obtained tangible things under this Order."

Document 60: John J. O'Sullivan, United States Magistrate Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. RAEES ALAM QAZI, a/k/a "Shan," and SHEHERYAR ALAM QAZI, Defendants. May 6, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.justice.gov.

The defendants in this case had been charged with conspiring to blow up a New York City landmark. In his ruling, Judge John J. O'Sullivan orders the federal government to disclose whether the electronic surveillance it described in its FISA notices related to the case was conducted pursuant to the pre-2008 provisions of the FISA or the under the authority of the FISA Amendments Act. (Document 20).

Document 61a: David L. Sobel and Mark Rumold, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records or, in the Alternative a Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules on Statutory Access Rights , May 21, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 61b: Stuart F. Delery, John R. Tyler, and Jacqueline Coleman Snead, Department of Justice, Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of the Department of Justice's Motion for Summary Judgment, Civil Action No. 12-1441-ABJ, April 1, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 61c: Mark A. Bradley, Declaration of Mark A. Bradley, Civil Action No. 12-1441-ABJ, April 1, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 61d: Reggie B. Walton, Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, In Re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records, or in the Alternative, a Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules on Statutory Access Rights, Docket No. 13-01 , May 24, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 61e: John P. Carlin, J. Bradford Wiegmann, Tashina Gauhar, Jeffrey M. Smith and Nicholas J. Patterson, The United States' Opposition to the Motion of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 7, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 61f: Reggie B. Walton, Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, In Re Motion for Consent to Disclosure of Court Records, or in the Alternative, a Determination of the Effect of the Court's Rules on Statutory Access Rights, Docket No. 13-01, June 12, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.cryptome.org.

These court documents concern a suit filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation requesting that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court order release of a 86-page FISC opinion of October 2, 2011, which found that certain surveillance activities conducted under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Document 20) "were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."

Document 62: Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, The Government Sentencing Memorandum for Sabirhan Hasanoff, May 31, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2013/06/bombplot.pdf

This sentencing memorandum contains evidence obtained from a variety of sources, including the defendant's electronic communications. Among the contents of the latter are discussions about where to travel for jihad (p. 22) and efforts to make new contacts with Al-Qaeda (p. 24).

Document 63: F. James Sensenbrenner, U.S. Congress, letter to Eric H. Holder, Jr., June 6, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.sensenbrenner.house.gov.

This letter to the attorney general from an author of the PATRIOT Act expresses Sensenbrenner's concern about "what appears to be an overbroad interpretation of the act."

He goes on to review the provisions of Section 215 of the act, notes the impression of sparing use created by Administration testimony, and poses a number of questions that he requests be answered by June 12.

Document 64: James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, DNI Statement of Activities Authorized Under 702 of FISA, June 6, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov

In response to articles in The Guardian and The Washington Post, DNI Clapper issued this short statement which claimed the articles contained "numerous inaccuracies." He further stated that activities authorized under Section 702 "cannot be used to intentionally target any U.S. citizen, or any other U.S. person, or anyone located in the United States."

Document 65: James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, DNI Statement of Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, June 6, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov

In this two-and-a-half page statement, Clapper writes that the unauthorized disclosure of the secondary order (Document 59) threatened "long-lasting and irreversible harm" and omitted key information regarding "the numerous safeguards that protect privacy and civil liberties." Almost the entire remainder of the statement consists of information Clapper directed be declassified "to explain the purposes and limitations of the program."

Document 66: Ron Wyden, U.S. Senate, "Wyden Statement on Alleged Large-Scale Collection of Phone Records," June 6, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.wyden.senate.gov

In this short statement, Senator Wyden, in the aftermath of the leak of the Verizon order (Document 59), confirmed that the program referred to by the chairman and vice-chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, was the one "that I have been concerned about for years."

Document 67: Rand Paul, U.S. Senate, Fourth Amendment Restoration Act of 2013, June 7, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.paul.senate.gov/files/documents/EAS13699.pdf.

This bill, submitted by Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) quotes the Fourth Amendment, refers to media reports of the NSA metadata collection program, and specifies that "The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution shall not be construed to allow any agency of the United States Government to search the phone records of Americans without a warrant based on probable cause."

Document 68: Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, U.S. Senate, "Wyden, Udall Question the Value and Efficacy of Phone Records Collection in Stopping Attacks," June 7, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.wyden.senate.gov

In this joint statement, the two Senators dispute a number of claims made by unidentified administration officials concerning the utility and value of the NSA telephony metadata collection program, and object to the claim that the program strikes the 'right balance' between security and privacy. They also note their long concern about "the degree to which this collection has relied on 'secret law'."

Document 69: James R. Clapper, Jr., DNI Statement on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, June 8, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov.

Asserting that "there are significant misimpressions that have resulted from the recent articles" in The Guardian and The Washington Post , the DNI announces that he has "declassified for release the attached details about the recent unauthorized disclosures in hope that it will help dispel some of the myths and add necessary context to what has been published."

Document 70: James R. Clapper., Jr., Director of National Intelligence, Facts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, June 8, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov

As the title suggests, this 3-page fact sheet is the result of the declassification announced the same day (Document 69). It contains a list of statements concerning activities authorized (or not) by Section 702. Among the topics addressed are the meaning of the term PRISM, the role of the FISA court in obtaining information, the requirements for targeting, the prohibition on targeting U.S. citizens under Section 702, the existence of internal and external oversight, and the role of the courts, Congress, and the executive in Section 702 activities.

Document 71: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Director James R. Clapper Interview with Andrea Mitchell, June 8, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov.

This transcript of NBC Foreign Affairs Correspondent Andrea Mitchell's interview with the DNI contains Clapper's answers to a variety of questions related to the disclosures in The Guardian and The Washington Post. Among the topics he addresses are the requirement for collecting every telephone number, whether there are examples where the program has prevented a terrorist plot, and his statement to Senator Wyden that there was no data collection on millions of Americans. With respect to the latter, he stated that he responded in the "least untruthful manner" he could, and explained that data was not 'collected' until it was actually examined.

Document 72: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Statement from the ODNI Spokesperson on the Latest Report from the Guardian, June 9, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov.

The ODNI issued this statement in response to the revelation from The Guardian that the source of the latter's information concerning NSA collection programs was Edward Snowden, an employee of Booz Allen Hamilton assigned to an NSA facility in Hawaii. It notes that the matter had been referred to the Department of Justice and that further inquiries should be directed to that department.

Document 73a: David A. Schulz, Alex Abdo, and Arthur B. Spitzer, Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and The Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for the Release of Court Records, June 10, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 73b: Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, In Re Orders Issued by this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, June 14, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 73c: Gregory L. Diskant, Benjamin S. Litman, and Richard I. Kim, Brief of Amici Curiae U.S. Representatives Amash, Broun, Gabbard, Griffith, Holt, Jones, Lee, Lofgren, Massie, McClintock, Norton, O'Rourke, Pearce, Salmon, Sanford, and Yoho for Leave to File a Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation's Capital, and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic for the Release of Court Records, June 28, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 73d: John P. Carlin, J. Bradford Wiegmann, Tashina Gauhar, Jeffrey M. Smith, and Nicholas J. Patterson, Department of Justice, The United States' Opposition to the Motion of the American Civil Liberties Union, et. al., for the Release of Court Records, July 5, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.cryptome.org.

These court documents concern a proceeding initiated by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic. In the wake of the disclosures in The Guardian, the two organizations request that the FISC publish its opinions "evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of Section 215 of the Patriot Act."

Document 74: John A. Kralik, Jr., Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States v. Edward J. Snowden, Criminal Complaint, Case No. 1:13 CR 265 (CMH), United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , June 14, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://apps.washingtonpost.com

Five days after The Guardian's identification of Snowden, the United States filed a criminal complaint against Snowden. The complaint was filed under seal and only the basic claims are stated on this single page released to the public.

Document 75a: Marc J. Zwillinger and Jacob A. Somner, ZwillGen PLLC, Provider's Unclassified Motion Under FISC Rule 62 for Publication of This Court's Decision and Other Decisions, June 14, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 75b: Reggie B. Walton, Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, In Re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, June 17, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 75c: John P. Carlin, J. Bradford Wiegmann, Tashina Gauhar, Jeffrey M. Smith, and Nicholas J. Patterson, Department of Justice, The United States' Response to Provider's Motion Under FISC Rule 62 for Publication of this Court's Decision and Other Records, June 25, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 75d: Reggie B. Walton, Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, In Re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, June 26, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 75e: Marc J. Zwillinger and Jacob A. Somner, ZwillGen PLLC, Reply in Support of Yahoo! Inc.'s Motion Under FISC Rule 62, July 9, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.cryptome.org.

These documents concern a motion by Yahoo!, made following the DNI's declassification decisions (e.g. Document 70), requesting the declassification of FISC decisions upholding the constitutionality of directives issued under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.

Document 76: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI Statement on the Limits of Surveillance Activities, June 16, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov.

This brief, one-paragraph, statement asserts that a single analyst cannot eavesdrop on domestic communications without proper legal authorization, and that Congress was not told otherwise.

Document 77a: Albert Gidari, Perkins Coie LLP, Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders, June 18, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 77b: Reggie B. Walton, Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, In Re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders, June 20, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 77c: John P. Carlin, J. Bradford Wiegmann, Tashina Gauhar, Jeffrey M. Smith, and Nicholas J. Patterson, Department of Justice, Response of the United States to The Court's Order Dated June 20, 2013, June 25, 2013.Unclassified.

Document 77d: John P. Carlin, J. Bradford Wiegmann, Tashina Gauhar, Jeffrey M. Smith, and Nicholas J. Patterson, Department of Justice, Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Google, Inc.'s Motion, July 2, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 77e: Reggie B. Walton, Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, In Re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of a First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Information About FISA Orders, July 3, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 77f: Floyd Abrams, Dean Ringle, Philip V. Tisne, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Brief of First Amendment Coalition, American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Democracy and Technology, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and TechFreedom for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Motions for Declaratory Judgment , July 8, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.cryptome.org.

These documents stem from Google's motion to the FISC to permit it to disclose "limited, aggregate statistics regarding Google's receipt of orders issued by this Court, if any, without violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ... or the FISC Rules of Procedure."

Document 78: National Security Agency, "Section 702," June 18, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.nsa.gov.

This collection of statements concerning Section 702 authorities and activities was subsequently withdrawn in response to criticism that some of the claims were inaccurate (See Document 85).

Document 79: National Security Agency, "Section 215," June 18 , 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.nsa.gov.

The NSA also withdrew this collection of statements concerning Section 215 along with the fact sheet on Section 702 (Document 78).

Document 80a: James M. Garland, David N. Fagan, and Alexander A. Berngaut, Covington & Burling LLP, Microsoft Corporation's Motion for Declaratory Judgment or Other Appropriate Relief Authorizing Disclosure of Aggregate Data Regarding Any FISA Orders It Has Received , June 19, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 80b: Reggie B. Walton, Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court , In Re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, Docket No. Misc 13-04 , June 20, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 80c: John P. Carlin, Tashina Gauhar, Jeffrey M. Smith, and Nicholas J. Patterson, Department of Justice, Response of the United States to The Court's Order Dated June 20, 2013, June 25, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 80d: John P. Carlin, Tashina Gauhar, Jeffrey M. Smith, and Nicholas J. Patterson, Department of Justice, Consent Motion for Extension of Time To Respond to Microsoft's Corporation's Motion, July 2, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 80e: Reggie B. Walton, Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, In Re Motion to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders, Docket No. Misc 13-04, July 3, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.cryptome.org

As did Google (Document 77a), Microsoft filed a motion before the FISC asking the court to declare that Microsoft "may lawfully disclose aggregate statistics concerning any orders and/or directives that Microsoft may have received under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ... and/or FISA Amendments Act."

Document 81: Pamela Phillips, Chief, FOIA/PA Office, National Security Agency, letter to [Deleted], June 21, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.cryptome.org.

This letter is NSA's response to a Freedom of Information Act request for telephony metadata about the requester. It states that "we cannot acknowledge the existence or non-existence of such metadata or call details pertaining to the telephone numbers you provided or based on your name."

Document 82: James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, to Dianne Feinstein, June 21, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov.

In this letter, the DNI tries to explain to Senator Feinstein his response to Senator Wyden's question in March concerning whether NSA collected any type of data on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans" — as he did in his interview with Andrea Mitchell (Document 71). Clapper asserts that in light of Wyden's reference earlier in the hearing to "dossiers" he "simply didn't think of Section 215 of the Patriot Act" and his answer "addressed collection of the content of communications."

Document 83: Fidel Narvaez Narvaez, Consul of Ecuador in London, SAFEPASS No. RE038804, June 22, 2013. Not classified.

Source: http://s0:uvnimg.com/files/2013/06/13298/xc560-5b4f588.pdf.

This is the SAFEPASS the Ecuadorian embassy in London issued to Edward Snowden, which would allow Snowden to travel to Ecuador, in the absence of a passport, "for the purpose of political asylum."

Document 84: Jennifer K. Elsea, Congressional Research Service, Criminal Prohibitions on the Publication of Classified Defense Information, June 24, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41404.pdf.

This study, prepared subsequent to the disclosures earlier in the month of NSA collection programs, discusses the background to the disclosures (including the Wikileaks releases and other leak prosecutions), statutes protecting classified information, the jurisdictional reach of relevant statutes, extradition issues, constitutional issues, and prior legislative efforts (including the Classified Information Protection Act of 2001).

Document 85: Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, U.S. Senate, letter to General Keith Alexander, June 24, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.empytwheel.net.

In this letter to the NSA director, Senators Wyden and Udall note their disappointment that the fact sheet on Section 702 (Document 78) "contains an inaccurate statement about how the section 702 authority has been interpreted by the U.S. government," and characterizes the inaccuracy as "significant." Wyden and Udall also characterize as "somewhat misleading" the statement that any inadvertently collected communication of or concerning a U.S. person must be promptly destroyed if it is not relevant to the authorized purpose or evidence of a crime.

Document 86: General Keith B. Alexander, "Statement to the NSA/CSS Workforce, "June 25, 2013. Unclassified .

Source: www.nsa.gov.

In this statement to agency employees, Alexander states that on June 21 NSA provided the House and Senate intelligence committees with information on over 50 cases that demonstrated the value of "these programs" to U.S. understanding and, in some cases, disruption of terrorist plots. Later, he remarks that "the challenge of these leaks is exacerbated by a lack of public understanding of the safeguards and little awareness of the outcomes that our authorities yield."

Document 87: General Keith B. Alexander, letter to Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, U.S. Senate, June 25, 2013, Unclassified.

Source: NSA Freedom of Information Act Release.

In this letter, Alexander responds to Wyden and Udall's letter (Document 72) of the previous day, which challenged some of the claims in the NSA fact sheet on Section 702 authorities and activities. He notes his agreement that "the fact sheet ... could have more precisely described the requirements for collection under Section 702." He also notes five limitations on collection activities under the section. He asserts that the fact sheet did not intend to imply, as the senators suggested it did, "that NSA has the ability to determine how many American communications it has collected under Section 702, or that the law does not allow the NSA to deliberately search for the records of particular Americans."

Document 88: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Transcript: Newseum Special Program - NSA Surveillance Leaks: Facts and Fiction, June 25, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov.

This transcript reports the views of current and former intelligence officials as well as representatives of civil liberties organizations on the leaks concerning NSA surveillance programs. Among the participants was Robert Litt, general counsel of the Office of Director of National Intelligence, who discusses both the Section 215 and Section 702 collection efforts.

Document 89a: H. Morgan Griffith to Ashley Lowrey, June 25, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 89b: H. Morgan Griffith to Ashley Lowrey, July 12, 2013. Unclassified

Document 89c: H. Morgan Griffith to Ashley Lowrey, July 22, 2013. Unclassified

Document 89d: H. Morgan Griffith to Ashley Lowrey, July 23, 2013. Unclassified

Source: http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/747919/griffith-letter-1.pdf.

These letters concern the repeated attempts of a Member of Congress to gain access to classified FISA orders and the semi-annual FISA "reviews and critiques."

Document 90a: Ron Wyden, Mark Udall and others Senators, letter to James R. Clapper, June 27, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: ww.wyden.senate.gov.

Document 90b: James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence letter to Ron Wyden, no date.

Source: www.fas.org/irp/news/2013/07/dni-wyden.pdf.

This exchange between a number of senators and DNI Clapper began with the letter he received which expressed the senators' concerns about the application of the Smith v. Maryland case (Document 2) to the bulk collection program, and the possibility of bulk collection authority being applied to other categories of records (such as credit card purchases, pharmacy records, and records of book and movie purchases). They also express concern about dependence on secret interpretations of the PATRIOT Act "that differed from an intuitive reading of the statute." In addition, they request unclassified answers to seven different questions, including how long NSA used PATRIOT Act authorities for bulk collection. Clapper's undated response provides answers to the seven questions. He also notes that "the Supreme Court has squarely held that this type of information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment."

Document 91: Bruce Fein, Counsel for Lonnie G. Snowden, letter to Eric H. Holder, June 27, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.cnn.com/interactive/2013/06/us/snowden-holder-letter

This letter from the counsel for Edward Snowden's father to Attorney General Holder requests that Holder agree to three conditions — including that Snowden would not be detained or imprisoned prior to trial — to encourage his voluntary return to the United States.

Document 92: National Security Agency: General Keith Alexander Speaks at AFCEA's Conference , Baltimore, Maryland, June 28, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.nsa.gov.

Alexander's remarks at the Armed Forces Communications-Electronics Association concern both Section 702 and 215 collection activities. He reports that "last week ... we provided 54 cases to several congressional committees in which these programs have contributed to our understanding, and in many cases, helped enable the disruption of terrorist plots in the U.S. and in over 20 countries throughout the world." He notes the existence of NSA, DNI, and DoD whistle-blower programs and "investigator generals" - and that "an individual acting nobly would have chosen one of those as a course of action to reveal his concerns."

Document 93: Marshall Curtis Erwin and Edward C. Liu, Congressional Research Service, NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background and Issues for Congress, July 2, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43134.pdf.

This study examine four issues concerning the Section 215 and Section 702 collection programs — the nature of the information being collected, the legal bases for the collection, the oversight mechanisms, and arguments for and against the programs.

Document 94: United States Embassy, Caracas, Diplomatic Note No. 487, July 3, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://cryptome.org/2013/07/US-VE-Snowden-Extradition.pdf.

This diplomatic note was transmitted to Venezuela's Ministry of Popular Power for External Relations, and requested "provisional arrest for the purpose of extradition of United States citizen Edward J. SNOWDEN ... should SNOWDEN seek to travel to or transit through VENEZUELA."

Document 95: Press Service, European Parliament, "Parliament to launch in-depth inquiry into US surveillance programs," July 4, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.europarl.europa.eu

This release from the European Parliament's press service announces, in the wake of the reports in The Guardian and The Washington Post, the parliament's plans to conduct an inquiry into U.S. electronic surveillance activities.

Document 96: Carolyn Jewel, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. National Security Agency, et. al., Defendants, Virginia Shubert et. al., Plaintiffs v. Barack Obama, et. al., Defendants, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, July 8, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.eff.org/node/74895

This document announces and explains the court's decision in two related cases challenging NSA's surveillance programs — with the judge rejecting the federal government's attempt to have the suit dismissed under the State Secrets Privilege.

Document 97: Statement by Edward Snowden to Human Rights Groups at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport, July 12, 2013. Not classified.

Source: www.wikileaks.org.

This statement, issued by Snowden during his time in the Moscow airport transit lounge, states "I did what I believed was right," and announces his "formal acceptance of all offers of support and asylum that I have been extended and all others that may be offered in the future."

Document 98a: Stewart A. Baker, Oversight Hearing on the Administration's use of FISA Authorities, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, Statement of Steward A. Baker , July 17, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 98b: Kate Martin, "Oversight of the Administration's use of FISA Authorities," Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies, before the Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives, July 17, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 98c: Jameel Jaffer and Laura W. Murphy, American Civil Liberties Union, Testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary Oversight Hearing on the Administration's Use of FISA Authorities, July 17, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 98d: Steven G. Bradbury, Testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary Oversight Hearing into the Administration's Use of FISA Authorities, July 17, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 98e: Robert S. Litt, Opening Statement of Mr. Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, ODNI, July 17, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/hear_07172013.html.

These statements of witnesses before the House Judiciary Committee represent the views of current government officials (Litt), former officials (Bradbury and Baker), and civil liberties advocates (Martin, Jaffer and Murphy) on the issues involved in the NSA surveillance activities rvealed by The Guardian and The Washington Post. The representatives of the FBI, NSA, and Justice Department who appeared before the committee did not provide written statements.

Document 99: AOL, Apple, and others, letter to President Barack Obama, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper and others, July 18, 2013. Not classified.

Source: www.cdt.org/files/pds/weneedtoknow-transparency-letter.pdf.

This letter, from a large number of companies (including AOL, Apple, Microsoft, and Yahoo!) as well as nonprofit organizations and trade associations (including the ACLU, Competitive Enterprise Institute, and Project on Government Oversight), urges "greater transparency about national-security related requests" to "Internet, telephone, and web-based service providers for information about their users and subscribers." It also makes a number of recommendations concerning measures that could be taken to increase transparency.

Document 100: Preet Bharara, United States Attorney, to William H. Pauley, United States District Judge, Re: ACLU et. al. V. Clapper et. al., 13 Civ 03994 (WHP), July 18, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2013/07/nsaacluresponse.pdf.

This letter, from the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, largely attempts to rebut claims made by plaintiffs concerning the constitutionality of the Section 215 metadata collection effort.

Document 101: Justin Amash, Amendment to H.R. 2397, as Reported, Offered by Mr. Amash of Michigan, July 18, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.amendments-rules.house.gov.

This amendment, offered by Congressman Justin Amash (R-MI), would have limited collection of telephone metadata by prohibiting funds from being expended for executing a FISA order that did not limit collection to data pertaining to an individual who is the subject of an investigation.

Document 102: Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Privacy, Technology and National Security: An Overview of Intelligence Collection, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery, Brookings Institution, July 19, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov.

In this address to the Brookings Institution, Litt discussed the legal framework for intelligence activities, the impact of changing societal norms, and FISA collection.

Document 103: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Renews Authority to Collect Telephony Metadata," July 19, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov

This press release announces that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has renewed the U.S. government's authority to collect telephony metadata in bulk.

Document 104: Sen. Ron Wyden, Remarks As Prepared for Delivery for the Center for American Progress Event for NSA Surveillance, July 23, 2013. Not classified.

Source: www.americanprogress.org

In these remarks, Wyden recounts his earlier warnings about how the government was interpreting the PATRIOT Act, and warns that if "we do not seize this moment ... to reform our surveillance laws and practices, we will all live to regret it." He notes the impact of 9/11 on surveillance activities and procedures, including those of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. He also raises the specter of government accumulation of bulk data with regard to cell phone location data, credit card purchases, and medical records. Wyden also criticizes key government officials for making misleading public statements with regard to collection activities.

Document 105: Eric H. Holder, Jr. Attorney General, letter to Alexander Vladimirovich Konovalov, Minister of Justice, Russian Federation, July 23, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: http://m.theatlanticwire.com

This letter from Attorney General Holder to the Russian Minister of Justice focuses on reported remarks by Edward Snowden that he would be tortured and face the death penalty if he were returned to the United States. Holder informs Konovalov "the charges [Snowden] faces do not carry the death penalty," and the United States would not seek it even if he were charged with "death-penalty eligible crimes." He also offers assurance that Snowden would not be tortured.

Document 106: Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein Statement on House Amendment on Phone Records Program, July 23, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.feinstein.senate.gov.

In response to the Amash amendment (Document 101), Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chairman Feinstein issued this brief statement claiming that the FISA business records (Section 215) program had contributed to disrupting numerous terrorist plots and "any amendments to defund the program ... would be unwise."

Document 107: Jay Carney, White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Amash Amendment, July 23, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.whitehouse.gov.

This statement from the White House press secretary, like Feinstein's (Document 106), announces opposition to the Amash amendment ( Document 101), stating that "we oppose the current effort in the House to hastily dismantle one of our Intelligence Community's counterterrorism tools.

Document 108: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, DNI Clapper: Defunding FISA Business Records program risks dismantling important intelligence tool, July 24, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.odni.gov.

In this statement, DNI James Clapper echoes the remarks of Feinstein (Document 106) and Carney (Document 107), stating that "I join others who caution that acting in haste to defund the FISA Business Records program risks dismantling an important intelligence tool." He also expresses his support for "an open and candid discussion about foreign surveillance authorities."

Document 109: Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, letter to Patrick J. Leahy, July 29, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.leahy.senate.gov/download/honorable-patrick-j-leahy

In this letter to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the presiding judge of the FISC provides answers to several questions Leahy had posed in a letter of July 18.

Document 110: John P. Carlin, J. Bradford Weismann, Tashina Gauhar, Jeffrey M. Smith, and Nicholas J. Patterson, Department of Justice, The United States' Response to this Court's July 15, 2013 Order, July 29, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.uscourts.gov

This memorandum is the government's response to a FISC order of July 15, 2013, directing the government to "conduct a declassification review" of the Court's April 25, 2008, memorandum opinion.

Document 111a: Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearing on "Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA Surveillance Programs," July 31, 2013.

Document 111b: James M. Cole, Opening Statement of Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, July 31, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 111c: John Inglis, NSA Opening Statement, Senate Judiciary Committee Open Hearing on Media Leaks, July 31, 2013. Unclassified.

Document 111d: James G. Carr, "Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA Surveillance Programs," Prepared Remarks, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, July 31, 2013. Not classified.

Document 111e : Jameel Jaffer and Laura W. Murphy, American Civil Liberties Union, Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee: Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA Surveillance Programs, July 31, 2013.

Document 111f: Stewart A. Baker, Statement, Oversight Hearing on FISA Surveillance Programs, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, July 31, 2013. Not classified.

Source: www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings.

These are the prepared statements of witnesses before the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing on the NSA's telephony metadata and Section 702 collection activities. In addition to the chairman, written testimony was submitted by key government officials (Cole, Department of Justice; Inglis, NSA), a former NSA official (Baker) and outside experts on privacy issues.

Document 112: General Keith Alexander, Director, National Security Agency, Keynote Address, Black Hat USA 2013, Las Vegas, July 31, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.nsa.gov.

This document contains the text of Alexander's remarks to a convention of hackers and focuses on the Section 215 (metadata) and Section 702 (Internet) collection programs as well as counterterrorist successes. It also contains the transcript of the subsequent question and answer session.

Document 113: Department of Justice and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, Reporting Period: June 1, 2012 - November 30, 2012 . August 2013, TOP SECRET/SI/NOFORN.

Source: www.odni.gov

Like Documents 27 and 30, this semiannual assessment was produced in accord with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Document 20) and examines procedures used to ensure compliance with procedures and guidelines related to Section 702 of the Act by the NSA and FBI. It also reports on the results of the compliance audits.

Document 114: National Security Agency, The National Security Agency: Missions, Authorities, Oversight, and Partnerships, August 9, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.nsa.gov.

This 7-page document discusses NSA's mission, its collection authorities, FISA collection, FISA Section 702, FISA Title I, Collection of U.S. Person Data (via FISA Section 215, Sections 704 and 705 (b)), the role of corporate communications partners, the role of foreign partners, and the oversight and compliance framework.

Document 115: The White House, Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, August 9, 2013. Unclassified.

Source: www.publicintelligence.net

This white paper lays out the administration's description and justification of the bulk collection activities conducted under Section 215. It describes the telephony metadata col