General McChrystal is gone but the war bleeds on to no purpose. It cannot be won. But this isn't about that. This is about the politics.

In the past weeks some curious events have taken place. A theme has begun to emerge and coalesce with reports that there are a trillion dollars worth of natural resources in Afghanistan. Why did that suddenly become news? The facts had been known. And the relevance apparently is that those natural resources somehow justify the continuing quagmire. As if another nation's natural resources somehow are our business. Literally. But has anyone even asked why our tax dollars were being spent exploring the potential resource value in a foreign and sovereign nation?

Then, General David Petraeus began hinting, once again, that he's not so sure about President Obama's planned begin date for withdrawal from Afghanistan. Which, itself, always has been a bit opaque and malleable. Republicans have begun questioning the strategy. Which, very notably, few had been doing before withdrawal became part of the discussion. Which leads one to believe that it's not the strategy that makes them uncomfortable, it's the withdrawal. And then came McChrystal. And once again, it was a question of timing.

Congress soon will vote on the war supplemental. And despite there being little good news and plenty of bad, you can be sure that the war will continue to be funded. With more troops now on the ground, and Congressional elections just months away, you can be certain that the war will continue to be funded. But what about a year from now, when the drawdown is at least supposed to begin? We know what will happen. The neocon chickenhawks will squawk. The McChrystals will be enraged that their war may be taken away from them. The military contractors and their propagandists in the traditional media will question the patriotism of anyone suggesting we need to get our troops out. And the vast majority of our troops will do what they always do. Which is what General McChrystal didn't do. Which is respect the chain of command. Even if some privately disagree with what it commands.

President Obama made a terrible mistake, when he again chose to escalate the war. But this is not about the policy, it's about the politics. And he made a mistake there, too. His intentions, no doubt, were honorable. But the disaster he inherited was not fixable. According to news reports, at the time, his most senior advisors were split. Vice President Joe Biden and Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel were said to have opposed the escalation. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was said to have supported sending the number of troops General McChrystal requested. The President, as he so often does, tried to find a middle ground. His intentions, no doubt, were honorable. But the policy was a mistake.

There never was a middle ground. On the policy, it didn't matter how many troops the President sent. He could have sent twice the number General McChrystal requested, and the war still would have been unwinnable. But politically, by sending more troops but not as many as General McChrystal requested, he opened himself up to criticism from both sides. As the war continued to deteriorate, it became increasingly obvious that escalating was the wrong choice. But it left the hawks the false excuse that although he sent more troops, he didn't send enough. You will hear that argument. You can count on it.

Careers will be judged on this disaster, and no one will want to accept the blame. The hawks will say they could have won this war, if only the President has sent enough troops. Because of that, on political grounds, Clinton may have been right. If there was going to be an escalation, it might as well have been exactly as requested by the general. That way, there would have been no one else to blame, when the inevitable happened. On policy grounds, of course, the President should have listened to Biden and Emanuel. But that's now the past. The question is what happens, going forward.

The war must end, and the President must figure out a way to end it. Not by starting a tortuously slow, phased withdrawal, but by initiating a complete withdrawal, as expeditiously as is logistically possible. He needs to recognize that the war was unwinnable, and that nothing he could have done would have changed that. He needs to figure out a way to explain that to the American people. He tried, and then he realized that it already was too late. But the war must end. And he must end it. And he must prepare for the inevitable political onslaught. Because failure to do what must be done will be even worse, both as policy and politics. On politics, it could turn 2012 into a post-modern 1968.

The hawks won't let this war go. They don't want to be remembered the way the military commanders of Viet Nam are remembered. They only reluctantly accepted the withdrawal from Iraq because they thought they would save face in Afghanistan. Take away Afghanistan, and all their warrior dreams are shattered. But this isn't about saving face or fulfilling dreams. This is about doing what is right.

For now, keep a close watch for further evidence of attempts to preempt the narrative of withdrawal. There will be more. It will slowly increase in frequency and volume. You don't introduce new products in August. But the new product will be introduced. It will be a demand to stay the course. To be patient. Things will improve. Eventually. Some day. And the more the President resists those demands, the more intense they will grow. The politics could get ugly. And about a year from now, one of those hawkish generals just might end up deciding that the only way to change the chain of command is to enter civilian life and challenge the President on his own terms. Via politics. Which would make Afghanistan one of the defining issues of the 2012 election.