Defendant

2

argues that the motion should be denied without prejudice or held in abeyance pending resolution of the appeal on the merits currently before the Sixth Cir cuit. He also objects to certain expenses, including (1) fees related to media and public relations, (2) fees related to the intervening plaintiffs, (3) unnecessary fees, and (4) redundant fees from overstaffing. Finally, he argues that any award of fees and costs should be stayed pending appeal. This was a difficult, novel

case in which Plaintiffs’ counsel showed considerable skill and determination. Counsel’s hourly rate of a pproximately $250

, and their total hours of 275.54, was most certai nly reasonable. In fac t, the total seems quite modest. Because Plaintiffs undertook a difficult, unpopular case and achieved remarkable success, the Court concludes that counsel is entitled to a small bonus to account for this risk.

The Court will now consider Defendant’s

specific objections. First, the Court agrees that media and public relations expenses are not properly included

in the calculation of Plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.

See Halderman by Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.

,

49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir. 1995)

(“[t]

he legitimate goals of litigation are almost always attained in a

courtroom, not in the media.” (quoting

Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton

, 31 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 1994)));

Hopwood v. Texas

, 999 F. Supp.

872, 912−

13 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (denying requests for fees related to public and media relations),

aff’d

in part,

rev’d in part sub nom.

236 F.3d 256, 280−

81 (5th Cir. 2000).

3

Second, the Court agrees that fees

2

Former Defendant Attorney General Jack Conway also filed a response to Plaintiff’s mo

tion but was previously dismissed as a Defendant in this case by th

e Court’s March 24, 2014 Order.

The Court therefore cannot consider

Defendant Conway’s response.

3

Even if the Court were to consider allowing media-related expenses, the interactions with the media in this case

were not “reasonably necessary for the proper prosecution of the lawsuit.”

Gratz v. Bollinger

, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (quoting

Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado

, 439 F. Supp. 393, 408 (D. Colo. 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs’ counsel contend that their efforts were aimed to “educate the

public.

”

Counsel have not shown that these efforts assisted in the litigation.

Compare Davis v. City & County of San Francisco

, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992) (

finding attorney’s fees for

lobbying the San Francisco Board of