So was Brexit inevitable? A popular understanding suggests that Britain joined what it thought was a trading bloc, but instead found itself part of a political undertaking, with a common currency, supreme court, and civil service. Brits, the argument goes, suddenly realized they were on the path to “ever closer union” and a “United States of Europe.” This view is a simplification, but nonetheless it has some truth.

It’s possible to argue that different moments were turning points in our European relations. Perhaps it was British Prime Minister John Major’s support for the Maastricht Treaty, which set a path toward the creation of the eurozone, creating a de facto inner tier of the EU with Britain on the outside. Or was it Tony Blair’s decision to not impose transitional controls on immigration from the eight eastern European countries that acceded to the union in 2004, resulting in an unexpectedly large wave of migration? Maybe it was Labour’s broken promise to hold a referendum on the treaty that was meant to be the EU’s constitution. Others cite David Cameron pulling his colleagues out of the European People’s Party, a continental center-right grouping, isolating Conservatives from their sister parties.

Read: Britain’s distrust of Europe helped cause Brexit. Now it could stop it.

Whichever you choose, one fact is clear: Britain has long been on a different trajectory from other EU member states. Stephen Wall’s memoir, A Stranger in Europe, recounting his time advising three decades of British prime ministers—Margaret Thatcher, John Major, and Tony Blair—on Europe is remarkable for the continuity it presents. British governments of all flavors have sought exemptions from every major EU treaty for 25 years. London secured a “rebate” from the EU budget, and opt-outs (or opt-ins) on an array of issues, including monetary union, the Schengen zone for travel without ID checks, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and legislation relating to justice and home affairs. Even left-of-center pro-Europeans have expressed skepticism. Nick Clegg, then the leader of the Liberal Democrats who would later go on to become deputy prime minister, called in 2008 for a “real referendum” on membership, while Caroline Lucas, the former leader of the Green Party, in 2011 endorsed such a vote as a “vital opportunity.”

In fact, the roots of our European ambivalence go even deeper. We often hear now how the European Union is the guarantor of peace on the Continent, a necessary construct to prevent a descent into barbarity. Yet the postwar generation of British political leaders didn’t quite see things like that. Winston Churchill supported a United States of Europe, albeit with Britain an ally outside it. Clement Attlee opposed the Treaty of Rome, saying it was “not our way.” Anthony Eden, a distinguished peacemaker as foreign secretary (although rather less successful in the top job) argued that joining a federation of Europe was “something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do.” It was Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson who offered Britain’s first referendum on the European question, arguably to resolve his own party-management issues, yet he failed to persuade his own wife to vote in favor. That referendum, which Wilson won, didn’t settle the question either, and less than a decade later Blair was first elected as a member of Parliament on a Labour manifesto promising “withdrawal from the Community.”