ARCHAEOLOGY









Now, we resume the clarification of historiographical categories of method.



In archeology, one assembles the shards of available evidence, to the intermediate purpose of reconstructing a working-model conception of the society under study.



At this point, one has what might be described as the intermediate model. At this phase, the work of the archeologist suffers flaws analogous to those of the credulous historical narrative form. This phase is indispensable, but does not represent material which of itself is reliable for adducing historiographical knowledge.



To develop the "intermediate model," the work of the archeologist focuses on what was constructed, how it was constructed, and to what use it was employed. By organizing the study of this subject matter in terms of labor time and amounts' of household consumption of the population as a whole, archeological studies can be advanced to a high degree of rigor in accounting for the general features of a culture. In a more useful sort of site or group of sites, the evolution of the culture in these terms provides the most advantageous and a relatively rigorous reconstruction of the sort indicated.



The danger is that the study of the matter is concluded on that level of investigation. To put the matter crudely, but otherwise usefully, the emphasis on the "objective" evidence deprecates the decisive "subjective" side of the culture.



Human practice as a whole is not "objective." Something happens. That might be termed "objective." Yet, one such objective occurrence does not lead directly to a human action in response in an objective way. Man responds to the stimulating event "subjectively," interprets its import and character "subjectively," and selects his response (or, non-response) "subjectively." In first approximation, historiography focuses on the "subjective," determining linkage between an "objective" occurrence and responsive objective" human action. This locates the crucial, "subjective" area of investigation, but does not in itself represent yet competent historiography. The question is how that "subjective" behavior is itself determined. whence and how that manifest way of seeing and responding to the world is developed.



In the absence of literary records, or with aid of only some fragments of literary or protoliterary records, that subjective side of the archeological record must be interpolated. Unfortunately, most efforts of this sort extant are deceptively plausible, specious, and wrong. The same sort of rigor employed in determining how paleolithic man produced stone tools must be applied to the "technology" of development of ruling sets of ideas. This can not be done on the basis of archeology. We must develop epistemology for this work by working backward from history as such, by first applying archeological methods to the historical period, and thus develop a rigorous method to be applied to the archeological periods as such.



For one brief example, on the basis of knowing crucial features of the history from the eighth century BC, one can project judgments upon the subjective side of sites from the middle of the third millennium BC, and so forth. How this is to be accomplished, and how we may be certain that such methods are valid, we shall demonstrate in due course in this report. For the present instant, it is sufficient to announce that there can be no competent archeological historiography without commanding the secrets of the "inner elites."









HUMAN PALEONTOLOGY









It may be noted that we employ "human paleontology" here in an included sense which is more commonly associated with the rubric "anthropology." The compelling reasons for our preference will be qualified in due course below.



Otherwise, the reader should be forewarned that human paleontology, properly understood, is the uniquely competent premise for) all scientific knowledge, competent historiography included. Consequently, a certain intensity of focus is supplied for that aspect of our report. Not only are we concerned to communicate the secrets of the "inner elite," but also to reformulate them from the standpoint of insights and knowledge not available entirely to our predecessors.



We take up this matter now. beginning by treating the subcategory in question as we treated the other two facets of historiography, and then proceed to the deeper issues.



Human paleontology is occupied in a minor, if not insignificant way, with the varieties of hominids and other matters of physical, or biological anthropology. This feature pf the investigation gains importance as our attention focuses inclusively on those characteristic features of the human species' behavior which distinguishes our species from all other anthropoids and hominids, the power of reason. This distinction, we are obliged to assume, correlates with some specific biological distinction associated with human processes of mentation, even though the specific biological "substrate" in which that distinction is essentially located may not yet have been defined for investigation. We know that such a distinction exists, and are therefore obliged to pursue the nonbiological side of the investigation in such a way that our work will aid in isolating the biological feature of the matter. If that rigor were not observed, then the entirety of our work would suffer a correlated incompetence..



The proper, principal concern of human paleontology is the study of the development of the human species as a whole, a universality, through study of cultures over long sweeps of time.



Although human paleontology has some incidental overlaps of included techniques with animal paleontology, the evolution of human culture is a feature of the human species' existence which compares only with successful biological differentiation of more advanced varieties and species in animal paleontology. All animals but man are categorically limited, by variety and species, in their range of behavioral possibilities. This works to the effect that this range of possible variations in species-reproductive behavior is delimited as. if by genetic inheritance. Human "culture has, overall, successfully evolved to an effect approximated in the plant and animal kingdoms generally only by the emergence of biologically superior varieties and species. It is that feature of the cultural evolution of mankind which is the essential, primary subject-matter of human paleontology, and which absolutely distinguishes the subject, human paleontology, from the subject of animal paleontology.



There is a correlated difficulty arising from this distinction. Although paleontological evidence dates hominid existence to the Pleistocene according to prevailing estimates, it cannot be assumed that the present human species dates from the onset of that period. Skeletal fragments and a scattering of some artifacts do not enable us to rigorously or conclusively distinguish among hominid "relatives" or "ancestors" who lacked characteristic human qualities of reason and the modern, human species which possesses that distinguishing species-power. The fact that chimpanzees, gorillas, and baboons include the use of



"tools" within their range of behaviors in the wild state suggests, usefully, that a certain amount of tool-use may be associated with a species having a human-like skeleton but lacking the power of reason. Until the subsumed issues are resolved, we date human paleontology as an investigation to the Pleistocene, with the provision that adoption of this period has the function of defining the span within which we may locate more precisely the emergence of species-man.



The intrinsic methodological defect of "anthropology" as heretofore defined is that its adopted tion backwards to this or that notion of a "primeval horde." The fact of the matter is that the power to evolve culture, in the directed way man has secularly advanced his culture since the paleolithic, is the distinguishing quality of the human species, the quality by which we can distinguish the human species from other, inferior hominids. This distinction separates species-man from the hominids of any hypothesized "primeval horde."



Modern biological research has pointed to some helpful points in this connection. It is now determined that the notion of genetic determination of species and varieties is inherently defective. A heritable varietal change in a species can be induced "environmentally" without genetic variation. (2) The experimental evidence to this effect is conclusive, and already locates the functions of genetic material as heretofore defined within a much larger process which is actually determining. Closer study of the role of the ribosomes shows itself to be a fruitful, if not yet conclusive approach to comprehension of the actually determining processes. (3) What this current line of biological research implies is that without alteration of what is ordinarily considered genetic material, a heritable alteration in the hominid stock could be introduced to the effect of producing a new variety. If this new variety were distinguished by a suitably significant change from other varieties, we should be obliged to consider the new variation a new species on that account.



It is desirable to achieve rigorously defined answers. It is indispensable, first, to have rigorously defined questions. It is such questions which properly define science, questions to which we possess only sometimes satisfying answers.



The subject of human paleontology is the empirical investigation of the characteristic of the human species' capability for social evolution from lower into, higher forms of knowledge and social practice. This standpoint takes man of this distinction as a species, denying the existence of culture as a, development within a precultural "primeval horde." This subject , demands its own, appropriate, methods of historiography, which we define at some length below.



It is to be granted that the British and their dupes take officially a strong public stand against a principle of cultural evolution, proposing instead the dogma of "cultural relativism."



It would be nonetheless an insult to Oxford and Cambridge to assume that their inner circles actually believe their own publicized propaganda in behalf of "cultural relativism" as an anthropological-scientific thesis. Such propaganda is created for the stultification of the credulous. There is overwhelming evidence that the inner circles of the British intelligentsia are confidently convinced of the very opposite to what they teach credulous fools.



The fact of the matter is that the British colonial system has always followed the instruction of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, the policy that populations should be kept wherever possible in a backward state of economic and cultural development relative to Britain itself. This was the feature of Adam Smith against which the American Revolution was fought. It is also a fact that the British colonial office pursued a political doctrine of "cultural relativism'' with respect to colonial peoples in general, and promoted that doctrine as anthropological propaganda as a part of the effort of the London School of Economics and other institutions to recruit agents for British service and interest from among the natives of the nations they proposed to keep in cultural backwardness. This is otherwise an old propaganda trick of the cult of Apollo, the characteristic feature of its cult of Dionysus, as exemplified by the case of al-Ghazali.



The inner circles of the British intelligentsia are not so stupid as to believe their own propaganda on this issue It cannot be seriously proposed that they do not know that cultural evolution is efficient; it is certain that thev do believe that continued cultural evolution is contrary to the Utopian goals of the Black Guelph oligarchy.









PALEONTOLOGICAL METHODS









Modern historiography properly combines the results and methods appropriate to all three subcategories of historiography into a single methodology. The proper methods for human paleontology are the foundation for the elaboration of historiography — and also the axiomatics of all scientific knowledge — as a whole.



Since human paleontology's essential, primary subject matter is the qualitative difference, human reason, between man and the animal species, it is the rigorous focus upon evidence most directly and universally bearing upon that difference which is the proper kernel of all historiography.



The first approximation of the method required is obtained by focusing on the problem human ecological population-potential. This is. at first inspection. the potential number of persons humanity can sustain in a certain mode of producing the necessary means of existence. At second inspection, more accurately, it represents the rate of growth populations at various levels of population-density in a given mode of production and associated culture. The question is thus posed: What is the potential rate of expansion of the population which sustains the average individual in a condition of life equal to or better than the condition at a previous, less numerous population? Quality of condition is properly defined in the same way; quality is the equipotentiality of the culture representing individuals in such a condition to maintain at least the same rate of growth of population.



This admittedly involves a conceptual difficulty for the person of merely an ordinary university or even a more advanced education. The British doctrine of the inductive sciences." which has become relatively hegemonic in one guise or another, starts with countable objects, and derives notions of ordering and other kinds of relationship through formulations in which the quality of the counted objects is external to the process. Only the quality of the so-called dependent variable is ordinarily assumed to be subject, to constructive valuation by formulation. “Self-reflexive functions” are, considered outlawed by the dogma of "the inductive sciences" (4) Yet. we have admittedly introduced a “self-reflexive function" here. It is the inductive-science dogma which is in error, not our definition given just above.



Beginning with that rough definition of ecological; population-potential, we can refine this notion effectively only by considering the conceptual problem which arise as we study the processes through which the mode of production is bettered, and as we at the same time more rigorously define the criteria which determine what is a betterment of the mode of existence.



The first such conceptual difficulty which might pop into view is this. As the mode of culture changes, the requirements of consumption by individuals are altered. Consequently, we cannot compare successive states of cultural development with the included assumption that the normative spectrum of consumption required for the first case is appropriate for the second. Also, we cannot assume that a linear function can account for the transformation involved. Related conceptual problems will be faced as we proceed.



Changes in ecological population-potential are effected to human advantage through advances in mode of culture, in which advances in mode of production are,, decisive. These changes originate modally as discoveries mediated through individuals, which become more or less universalized for that culture's practice through, typically, the transmission of such an individuals discovery to numerous others.



This peculiarity of the individual defines the powers of reason (creative discovery) of the individual person as a singularity which characterizes the human species as a species. We shall develop the significance of, that in due.



Historically (paleontologically), the cumulative effect of such successful discoveries is a secular trend of increase in the number of calories of useful energy commanded by the average individual engaged in production. This secular increase in per capita energy-density of production has in fact risen secularly. Empirically, the cultural progress of the human species correlates with an exponential rate of increase of per capita energy-density for production (cf. Figure 1).



Not all cultures have maintained such advance. In general, those strains of cultural progress which are most rapid determine a superior rate of population-potential for the branches of culture involved. Stagnating cultures collapse, retrogress, and so forth. In this way the branches of culture which maintain progress determine the largest portion of the human population.



This is not contrary to the fact of population-expansion in the developing sector today. The recent tendencies for expansion of those populations are the consequence of European culture. However, because of the City of London's domination of the world financial markets, and because of related malignant influences, the growth of population in developing nations, itself caused by more advanced European cultural influences, appears to represent a problem. This is not a problem because of the numbers of persons existing, or population growth rates. Using presently available nuclear-energy technology and imminently available fusion technologies, the world would have already the technology to maintain a population of tens of millions of persons at current European standards. The problem is that the social productivity of populations kept at "labor-intensive" levels at or near barbarism is inadequate to sustain those persons.



There is a recurring "resources problem," of course; however, this problem has no resemblance to the hoaxes circulated under that rubric by Ralph Nader, the Club of Rome, or Barry Commoner.



From early in the existence of the human species, man has been perpetually, or with frequent recurrence, confronted at each such point with what a contemporary "Club of Rome" could have argued to be an "insuperable limit to growth" with as much finality as the actual Club of Rome argues presently. This problem existed when the human population of the earth could be counted in mere millions, and repeatedly so thereafter. Yet, in all those branches of cultural evolution which have led into modern civilization, man has repeatedly overcome what "environmentalist" maniacs of those times might have' decreed to be "insuperable limits to growth."



The British oligarchy's inner circle of intelligentsia knows this to be a fact. Privately, as some examples attest in fact, they should consider themselves insulted (privately) in respect of their intelligence if one accused them of actually believing the rubbish published by the Club of Rome. Similarly, since the British have developed and operated nuclear power plants, the British elite knows that nuclear energy production by established standards is the safest sort of energy production yet in existence.



They know, and sometimes concede privately, that the Club of Rome thesis and "environmentalism" generally are hoaxes, fit only for the consumption of very foolish, very credulous dupes. After all, it was they who ordered that those hoaxes be concocted.



As in the instance of "cultural revolution," their point is that they do not wish to maintain technological progress; they are only wicked, not stupid; they are not such abysmal idiots that they do not believe technological progress could not solve all the present ecological problems. It was to aid them in mobilizing adequate political support from masses of fools, to block technological progress, that they promoted the Club of Rome's hoax. They generated a myth to persuade the hysterical donkeys of plebeia that technological progress was undesirable — because they are determined to bring on the "new dark age" out of which they aim to establish enduring rule for their "feudalist" Utopia.



At first glance, the pseudo-limits to growth have been successively overcome by our species through increased per capita energy for production. The use of tools, the development of the simplest forms of agriculture, the simplest forms of livestock raising, increase the usable energy commanded by a calorie of human biological effort. The application of fire and its cultural derivatives have the same effect. The "reducing power" of the species relative to existing forms of man-altered nature is increased. The increase in calories of "artificial labor" commanded by a calorie of human biological effort tends toward a qualitative decline in costs of "primary materials" per calorie of human biological effort, such that marginal or out-of-reach primary resources of a lower state of culture become the abundant, cheap resources of a new stage of progress of culture.



It is man's movement away from labor-intensive forms of production into what are presently capital-intensive forms of increasing emphasis upon "artificial labor," which define the world-line of human survival and progress. Conversely! the shift from capital-intensive forms of production can have only one consequence: large-scale genocide against the populations so murderously oppressed.



The British who propose labor-intensive methods know this. They propose labor-intensive "full employment" methods precisely because they intend to reduce the earth's population to the order of between one and two billion persons by the end of the century.



They create movements for labor-intensive full employment measures, such as the U.S. draft Humphrey-Hawkins legislation, because they wish to induce populations to willfully mass-murder themselves in this emulation of the lemming.



Increased energy-density is indispensable for maintaining as well as advancing human culture. Yet, it is not undifferentiated, scalar increases in energy per capita which enable man to survive. It is inventions. It is inventions which make possible increases in the energy-density of production. It is inventions which make possible the effective conversion of that augmented energy-density into useful forms of production.



The effort to reconcile two interconnected causes, energy and reason, into something equivalent to a single "equation" points us immediately in the direction of the most fundamental issues of scientific knowledge. Energy is ordinarily measured in calories, watts, and so forth. These are all scalar measures. In what units is human reason to be measured? The concern of Thales and other lonians for the combined action of mind, fire (energy), and continuous primary substance cannot seem so unimportant a conception as Aristotle and his admirers have purported to make the issue — it is indeed so fundamental that the import of Thales' work is to this day concealed with aid of British frauds.



We shall turn attention to the subsumed physics of that problem subsequently. It is indispensable to note the existence of such a problem at this state of the report, so that it can be temporarily set to one side, and that we may proceed to examine one crucial facet of this matter seemingly independently of the physics problem as such. We shall show, subsequently, why energy cannot be fundamentally a scalar magnitude, and under what circumstances it might nonetheless appear to be a scalar.









THE MEANING OF SCIENCE









So far, we have outlined the premises for the following judgments concerning historiography. History, in both its narrowest and broadest meanings, is the history of the human species. Consequently, it is the history of the distinguishing characteristics of the human species, the history of reason, and of the consequences of actions taken according to or contrary to reason by individuals and societies. The advances in ecological population-potential, which determine whether or not the species shall continue to exist, determine successive advances (secularly, for the species as a whole)

successive forms of culture.



Reason is not applied ex novo to raw, precultural conditions, but is always reason informed by an existing culture acting to change (advance) that culture. Hence, history and the internal history of science are inseparable facets of the same inquiry. It is the ordering 'of the evolution of human culture according to the principles internal to scientific progress which is the primary feature of competent historiography, the standard of reference with whose governance we comprehend inclusively the failures of human history.



Conversely, history so studied is the unique premise for competent scientific knowledge.



The key to scientific method, and thus to the mastery of both science and history, is the method of the Platonic dialogue. This is also properly termed the dialectical method, as such a method is associated with Thales, Heraclitus and Plato. It is not, however, the "dialectical method" represented in most of the available literary productions of the Moscow Institute of Marxism-Leninism — even though the kernel of Karl Mark's method was a distillate from the Ionian dialectical method.



This Platonic method has two inseparable facets. As a consequence of its findings, the Platonic method early correctly classified all forms of human knowledge into three primary categories, showing, as we have noted earlier, how the method of the Platonic dialogue ordered the progress of the mental development of the individual from the lowest to the highest of these three levels.



The lowest level is the level of simple belief, the level of individual judgment defectively based on narrow experience and informed chiefly by prejudices and mythologies. That is the level of "common sense," or "horse sense," the donkey-like state of the human intellect. The second level is the level of the understanding, as defined by Immanuel Kant, for example. It is on this level that underdeveloped and miseducated persons mislocate their definitions of "scientific knowledge." Those misdefinitions of scientific knowledge are what we must expose as fraudulent here. The third, highest level is the level Plato associated with Socratic reason, or, for our purposes here, simply reason, the Vemunft of whose existence Kant was certain, but whose efficiency he pronounced incomprehensible to the understanding. It is at this level that science properly defined is found.



That is the understanding, and application of science we must outline here.



The Platonic dialogue's method, the dialectical method, is essentially as follows.



It begins with the certainty that all knowledge presumably believed by the individual on the basis of his culture and narrow sense-experience is inherently false because of that very narrowness of its empirical basis. In the way this was defined by Spinoza, "such knowledge is inadequate or fictitious. In the Platonic dialogue, the individual examines his own consciousness in terms of the way this consciousness is consciously mirrored in the thinking of another person(s). The point of this is not to compare different views if one attributes such a trivial significance to the Platonic dialogue, one condemns oneself to benighted ignorance forever. The object of "mirroring" is to make one's own consciousness an object for, a subject of one's willful consciousness, to make consciousness an object of willful consciousness for itself.



The subject of such willful consciousness of one's own mirrored consciousness is not primarily the "what?" of the consciousness brought under willful scrutiny. The primary subject matter is the "how?" and "why?" of that consciousness. My concern is not simply to discover on what points I may have believed in error; my concern is to discover in my consciousness how previously prevailing criteria have led me into error, and why I have thought foolishly. The subject of willful consciousness of consciousness is willful mastery of the method of conscious thought. The object of the Platonic method is to develop in oneself an effective method of thinking, of judgment, to reduce consciousness itself to a subject of scientific inquiry concerning method.



The first goal of the Platonic method is negation, is to break out of the narrowness of fictitious, false knowledge ("common sense," "practical experience"), I must. in first approximation, determine what methods of conscious judgment will actually solve problems without significant error over entire ranges of experience.



These method-specific ranges of experience are termed categories of knowledge. In turn, what is termed a category is determined by the differences in specific methods of judgment required for various aspects of knowledge (understanding). Another term for category is a relative universality. For example, physics, chemistry, botany, internal medicine, economics, and so forth have been subcategories of knowledge on these grounds, even though they may otherwise overlap.



To arrive at methods of thought by which one has mastered such a universality of knowledge methodologically from the standpoint of relatively best contemporary levels of practice, is to have arrived at a condition of understanding for that category. However, this does not remove the case in which a person has an understanding of physics and yet is a donkey in matters of, for example, internal medicine and economics. To characterize persons as persons of understanding in general has a special meaning. It means that the philosophical outlook of the person toward categories of knowledge which he has not yet mastered in particular ,is methodologically in correspondence with the principles of understanding — although he may not yet have achieved yet the competence of particular understanding in that category. It means that his philosophical outlook, his governing sense of personal social identity, is governed by the methodological principles of understanding.



Consequently, derived from or subsumed under this level of mental development, we have given to us the usual misdefinition of scientific knowledge among educated persons. In the case of the mathematical sciences, science is usually associated with the range of conceptual apparatus currently developed by the culture in the indicated categories. There is another, worse meaning, we merely identify at this instant, the meaning given to "science" by the dogma of "the inductive sciences."



In reason, we advance a qualitative step beyond the mere understanding. In understanding, we seek to extend present elementary knowledge and special methods "horizontally," so to speak, to fill out the extent of knowledge in each category, to establish coherent connections among categories, and to correct included errors in the body coexisting knowledge in an ordinary fashion. Although creative-mental activity is essential to this work, it is largely unconscious mental activity, and so appears only as a tool of the effort; it is generally regarded as something outside the domain to which it is applied transiently in acts of creativity. In progressing from mere understanding to reason,. we apply the same Platonic method to the inadequacies of understanding that was applied, to achieve understanding, to donkey-like states of "common sense"



There is nothing properly mystical in this, no mumbo jumbo, yoga-like meditative gimmickry, or any "black magic" of that sort. Geniuses are grown, cultivated, not produced miraculously out of donkeys sucking on some, fortuitously acquired philosopher's stone.



The inadequacy of existing scientific knowledge generally is that it must be superseded, to arrive at a higher level of scientific knowledge. This is not solved, by the effort to leap abruptly into the next qualitative development of scientific knowledge



The process of progressive evolution of scientific knowledge must be made itself an object for willful consciousness. It is the internal history of progress of scientific and related knowledge, approached in this way which enables consciousness to willfully abstract the element of progress from the consciousness of scientific knowledge in particular. In other words, the subject of consciousness is transformed from the conscious contemplation of an existing body of scientific knowledge, into comprehension of the process which characterizes the historical progress of scientific knowledge. It is this element of science, the motion of scientific progress, from which we abstract for consciousness the method for willfully effecting scientific progress. The mastery of that indicated method, developed for knowledge in that way. is reason.



In that way, the kinds of unconscious process of thought by which the creative person otherwise on the level of mere understanding produces the exceptional insights turning up seemingly so abruptly in his conscious understanding, are brought into willful consciousness by the Platonic method, and thus made the ruling criteria of what then becomes ordinary, willful consciousness of reason for that person.



The way in which the contemporary nonsense-version of the "dialectical method" came into circulation, e.g., the case of the Moscow Institute, was that certain persons encumbered with the duty of professing that method, and yet without the slightest acquaintance with it, applied, at best, the mere understanding to the task of composing glosses on what seemed appropriate passages from Hegel, Marx, Engels and so forth, often with reference to Lenin's Materialism and Empiric-Criticism and "Philosophical Notebooks" added.



This method — in its actuality — is not only a method tor developing geniuses, or, more modestly and realistically, lor developing people's mental powers in directions converging upon genius. It is the indispensable point of reference for competently defining the lawful ordering of the universe. We shall turn to develop that facet of the point now, and return, later, to complete the notion of science on the basis of such grounding development.









THE PROOF OF SCIENCE









The proof of scientific knowledge is essentially that through the improved social practice with which its application is associated, man advances the power of his society in terms of ecological population-potential. Although the individual invention is expressed in this, the individual invention, defined only as an individual invention, does not define such a proof of the knowledge embodied in itself. It is the generality, or relative universality of invention, a generality which is at least implicitly expressible as a quality of prevailing scientific practice, which a society tests, tests by the I success of its existence through progress.



In a limited sense, therefore, the efficacy of existing scientific knowledge, as demonstrated in the indicated way, does prove that the laws attributable to scientific knowledge are in some form of correlation with the lawful ordering of the universe. However, the paradoxes of existing scientific knowledge, in particular, conclusively indicate that the existing body of scientific knowledge is not competently representative of comprehensive knowledge of universal laws. indeed that the flaws of existing mathematical-scientific knowledge are axiomatic on this account.



This apparently insuperable problem begins to evaporate once we shift the focus from an existing body of scientific knowledge to the history of progress of human scientific and related knowledge. At no point has the prevailing body of knowledge according to understanding been adequately in correspondence with reality. Yet, in respect of all those advances in understanding which are rankable as advances by the criterion of ecological population-potential, the progress in understanding determining such advances is progress in correspondence with the lawful ordering of the universe.



In other words, no form of understanding, mathematical physic as presently defined included, could possibly be in actual correspondence with the lawful ordering of the universe, but reason is. One could avoid the point, out of fear no doubt; and say merely that the successive, qualitative advances in physics appear to converge, as if asymptotically, upon some "true physics" which is in correspondence with fundamental laws. That view would be more credible to the taste of prevailing mythologies, but is false for that very reason. It is also a useless compromise, since such a fearful, conservative observation contributes nothing which points our attention in direction of fruitful scientific progress.



The problem which such fearful evasions of the point most explicitly incur is that the level of understanding, exemplified by mathematical physic's, involves axiomatic assumptions like those associated with mathematics as such. Once we shift our focus away from the standpoint of mere scientific knowledge to the process of historical progress of scientific knowledge, such axiomatic difficulties begin to vanish.



The formal solution to this problem for mathematical physics began to emerge for direct, conscious comprehension through the combined efforts of Riemann and Cantor. We sum up here the point to be extracted from those sources.



Throw away the mistaken notion of a universe which can be represented by the heurisms of a fixed, n-dimensional geometry. Imagine instead, a universe whose characteristic, defining feature as a whole is a constant self-elaboration from the equivalent of any given n-geometry into an (n+1)-geometry. Now, rather than considering the symbols of "n," "n+1," "n+2," as counting the numbers of geometric-like dimensions of such a universe, let "n," "n+1," "n+2," and so forth denote different qualities of universe, in the sense of transfinites as developed by Cantor.



Now. to illustrate the implications of this, we note the following applicable case, without, we trust, implying that this illustration offered is exclusive.



We have at hand a case which corresponds to such an "n," "n+1." "n+2" ordering. If the world of prevailing physics and chemistry knowledge is taken as such, this can be termed the "n-dimensional" continuum. Mathematically interpreted in presently prevailing ways, that continuum is presumed to be characterized by entropy. It is not entropic in fact, but the prevailing analysis of such an "n-dimensional" continuum might be and is usually construed to suggest that, on condition such a continuum were the universe. The phenomena of living processes correspond then to an "n+1" ""continuum, which is characteristically negentropic. The phenomena of creative reason in living beings, human cultural evolution, represents an "n+2" continuum, which is of a higher order of negentropy than the "n+1."



Moreover, "n+2" is efficient with respect to both "n" and "n+1", and "n+1" is efficient with respect to "n." Furthermore, "n+1" "historically" developed out of "n," and "n+2" "historically" out of "n+1."



That is, incidentally, the basis in conception on which Riemann explicitly developed all his principal contributions, and is also the basis on which Cantor, with explicit reference to relevant aspects of the work of Leibniz and Nicholas of Cusa, developed his complementary notion of transfinites.



The conception of reason employed by Riemann and Cantor was not original to them. This conception of the fundamental ordering of the universe was first documented, to our present knowledge, by ibn Sina, in his Metaphysics — as the conception of the "necessary existent," and also by Cusa, as his conception of the "Non-Other." This is also the guiding conception of Gottfried Leibniz, the "secret" of his Monadology, and of his development of the notion of "inertia" with aid of a methodological criticism of Descartes derived directly from this order of conception of universal law.



Two principal observations have to be made immediately on the points just developed. First, a matter of some importance, "n," "n+1," and "n+2" correspond significantly to the three qualities of the human intellect in the Platonic method. This not merely because they represent three levels, but because the characteristics of mental life at each level correspond to the epistemology of experience as seen from each of these levels. Second, the characteristics of neither an "n," "n+1" nor "n+2" continuum can correspond to the real universe. Only the principle which characterizes the going over from an "n" to "n+1" to "n+2," and so forth, can be the higher, relative transfinite in correspondence with the actual lawful ordering of the universe, (cf. Figure 2)



Again, the only aspect of human consciousness which is in correspondence with such a transfinite — or transinvariant— principle of the universe, is the quality of progress in human scientific knowledge, rather than any specific, subsumed scientific knowledge as such. The adducing of that principle, in turn, provides the methodological principle for ordering thought to the effect of willfully "energizing" the progress of scientific knowledge. That is the method of rigorous hypothesis. That is the meaning of the dialectical method, the method of rigorously developing valid hypotheses.



The method employed is the Platonic method of negation, as applied from the standpoint of the level of reason. The method of negation means to isolate those axiomatic fallacies of existing knowledge (understanding) which bear upon crucial-experimental problems confronting us. The qualitative elimination of the axiomatic fallacy permits the defining of experiments which can be represented in terms of quantitative relationships. The essential, underlying test of the validity of an hypothesis (as an hypothesis) posed in this way, is the test of whether the hypothesis, if successfully demonstrated, implies a means for increasing the negentropy of human practice.



Such hypotheses are defined by Riemann as "unique hypotheses." Their distinction in effect is that they test the laws of the universe for a category of knowledge, rather than merely testing the applicability of extension of established principles to a problem without involving a testing of general laws. Such hypotheses are more commonly, less rigorously, termed "crucial-experimental hypotheses."



In the case such an hypothesis fails experimentally, no loss. The failure of the hypothesis narrows qualitatively our approach to the axiomatic fallacy it attacked, and thus acts as positive progress in knowledge for attacking that axiomatic fallacy in a more effective way.









THE CASES OF ARISTOTLE AND NEWTON









On the basis of surviving writings of Plato and of fragments of the work of his predecessors of the Ionian current, it is shown beyond admissible ambiguity that those Ionians and their collaborators were attacking precisely the problems we have so far defined, and also attacking them in a most rigorous and fruitful fashion. It is clear from the writings attributed to Aristotle, that he not only had direct access to numbers of these Ionian works — some of which he cites — but that he set out deliberately to obfuscate those writings, not only by falsifying his commentaries in a sweeping fashion, but by focusing his frauds upon the most crucial features of such writings. That most crucial feature was, in broadest terms, the Platonic — or dialectical— method, and. emphatically, the method of rigorous scientific hypothesis derived from it.



The same method was employed, with no advance in sophistication of mental exertions, by Francis Bacon and later, by the associates of John Locke in developing the program of the British Royal Society.



Notable is the comparison between Francis Bacon and William Gilbert. Gilbert, a Neoplatonic, competes with Avicennean Roger Bacon as the greatest scientific thinker England ever produced. Francis Bacon, by contrast, was a bungling, unproductive incompetent. It was Gilbert whose De Magneto provided Kepler with the indispensable final link for solving the problem of the solar orbits. Both were in the networks linked to Giordano Bruno, linked to the great center of Padua, the accomplishments of the Florentine Academy, and to the rigorous formulation of the method of crucial scientific hypothesis by Nicholas of Cusa. Bacon's obsessive attacks on Gilbert are a degraded scandal, and Bacon's Novum Organum a malignant "neo-Aristotelian" hoax.



The point is made clearer by comparing Bacon's attacks on Gilbert with his attacks on the English composer John Bull. (6)



Contrary to the mythology taught by the confused to the credulous in the music departments of our universities Johann Sebastian Bach did not develop the well-tempered system as such. That system was fully developed by the tenth century Ismaili al-Farabi, whose writings introduced the system to medieval Europe through such influences as Guido Aretino, centuries before Bach. Al-Farabi, writing in the tenth century, reports the well-tempered system to have been very ancient by his own time. and the surviving writings of a contemporary and adversary of Aristotle's corroborate this. Bach's accomplishment was not to develop the well-tempered system. Bach, previously thoroughly schooled in the well-tempered system, accomplished something quite different. Bach resolved the contributions of European vocal polyphony into a lawful, contrapuntal system of musical composition, to the effect that every note of a composition has a well-defined lawful significance, including those which represent dissonances. Later, Beethoven, himself intensely schooled in Bach during childhood, carried Bach's accomplishment a major, qualitative step forward, beyond Bach's formal system of reference, into the principle of self-developing systems of counterpoint — as exemplified by Beethoven's own late major works.



Bach's work on methods of composition was not original to him. Exemplary, John Bull taught the well-tempered system to bodies of students as a method of composition. Together with his contemporary Sweelinck, Bull was one of the leading masters of the well-tempered system of composition in his time, and part of the heritage directly transmitted to Bach's own teachers.



Bacon drove Bull out of England and caused Bull's writings on music to be destroyed.



Bacon's book-burning orgy is no isolated matter. The British intelligence services hounded Bach into isolation and attempted to suppress all knowledge of his work throughout Europe, to the point that even Bach's virtuoso son was intimidated against performing his father's compositions. A similar operation was deployed against the influence of Beethoven — through Mendelssohn, Richard Wagner, and others.(7) Although the factional issue so expressed was much older, there is a direct, unbroken factional tradition concerning music by the Black Guelph faction from Bacon to the present day. The British-promoted "rock" and the Frankfurt School's promotion of the school of Schoenberg, Webern, et al., are consistent continuations of that issue.



The British neo-Aristotelian music-doctrine was early associated — into the nineteenth century — with the irrationalist doctrine that musical thematic material was properly only an arbitrary selection of tunes, which were agreeable for one or another reason peculiar to the composer or to the relationship among the composer, performer and audiences. Harmony for the British was merely a matter of an agreeable form of embellishment of the performance of the arbitrary tune; the other forms of embellishment of the melodic line, for which rococo performances are notorious, were argued to be a matter of idiosyncratic taste by the performer. The promotion of, first, Schoenberg's school, and later "rock" by the British intelligence services, has the special significance of introducing the principles of the Phrygian cult of Dionysus into the neo-Aristotelian doctrine's general application.



From the ancient times, the well-tempered system was intrinsically associated with an opposite view of both musical composition and the function of music.



The prevailing mythology of the present-day music department bears on this issue directly. According to the neo-Aristotelian doctrine, the musical doctrine of Pythagoras defines a system of "natural" intervals. On this premise, with the aid of reference to the mechanics of vibrating strings, the ignorant edify the dupe with the doctrine that the Pythagorean scale is a "natural scale," and that. therefore, the well-tempered system is an "artificial system" adopted for this or that plausible reason. Al-Farabi's argument shows correctly that this view is nothing but absurd. The human requirement of the fifth, the derivation of the octave from this approach, and the fact of modulation from one mode (or, key) or other within a composition, illustrates the point that human beings are not "vibrating strings," and that human music has nothing to do with the purported amusement of inorganic substances.



Music is a sensuous medium of mental creative activity, in which the composer lawfully arrives at relative dissonances in various ingenious ways within terms of the lawful order of an initial mode. These relative dissonances are resolved as transitions to another lawful mode, and so on and so forth, such that the resolution of such developed relative dissonances in a composition defines a coherent totality, subsuming several modes and their made-necessary transitional connections. Thus, a good such musical composition resolves this process in the enunciation of a summarizing stretto or the equivalent, which, at the completion of the composition, resounds in the hearer's mind as an affirmation that the development which has occurred within the composition is now demonstrated to be lawful in its own right. In other choice of terms, a successful musical composition is a demonstration of the coherence of freedom (creative expansion of what is lawful) with necessity (that everything must satisfy some form of lawful ordering).



In consequence, music which satisfies the principles of the well-tempered system of composition (and its evolutionary derivatives) is both an abstract form of and also a sensuous exercise of the creative potentialities of the minds of composer, performers, and audiences.



The greatest possibilities for such musical development originate as polyphony is ordered in a well-tempered system. Thus, where the confused, miseducated dupe says "harmony," the musician says "voices." Each voice, elaborating its material according to the lawful ordering, is in active, lawful relationship to the concurrent voices, also proceeding lawfully. By shifts in accents and intonations, cross-voice "voices" are created, including relative dissonances. In this ordering, there are no "chords" being struck (or strummed) "in harmony" with a vocal melodic line. Every note is the ongoing activity of a voice, every note an activity of a voice which is in polyphonic (contrapuntal) relationship to everything else in the composition. Every voice, every note of each voice, must have a necessary role for the development of the composition, or it should not be sounded. . The folly taught as musical theory in most schools today is most directly derived from the nonsense produced by Rameau, the doctrine of harmony as arbitrary, neo-Aristotelian rules (fixed categories) enslaved to the irrationalist selection of a melodic element. It was this doctrine of Rameau's which the British intelligence services promoted against Bach during the early eighteenth century, and which nonsense has left its embedded influence in the axiomatics of nineteenth century musicological theoretics and their various twentieth century derivatives.



Notable is the nineteenth century "romantic" school, which in its most banalizing aspects substitutes an unhinged and arbitrary obsession with sheer chromaticism as what was deemed an adequate alternative to the rigorously defined dissonance of the contrapuntal development processes of composition.



In consequence of the destructive influence of British intelligence services on music, we have reached the circumstance today at which good .musical performers (and a vestige of a sane musical audience) exist almost entirely because of the influence of Bach, the late Mo/art, and Beethoven upon their childhood instrumental (and) other training. In this way they have arrived at an "instinctive" insight into music. Yet, because the musical theory taught is the wretched myths and nonsense of the British influence's effects, virtually no good performer is able to articulate his or her valid insights in the form of musical-theoretical statements — and there are no significant composers. There are those who possess valid "insight" into great music, but virtually none sufficiently familiar with the laws of music to be able to create a musical composition even by standards prevailing during the early nineteenth century, or the modern proper equivalent of such standards.



This indicated attempt to destroy music by Bacon and others was not original to the British neo-Aristotelians, or even their earlier, medieval predecessors. Aristotle himself was the ostensible author of the British neo-Aristotelian doctrine.



In the matter of music as in scientific knowledge generally, Aristotle and his imitators of the British Royal Society followed the same policy, and the same motive. Aristotle's objective, as in his fraudulent commentaries on Plato's and other writings, was to eliminate all evidence of and credit for scientific method, for the method of reason; Just as the principles of musical composition can be formally described only from the Riemannian standpoint we have identified earlier here, so the conceptions of Riemann are nothing but a derivative of the principles of reason in the Platonic-Neoplatonic sense of reason.



The same principle was applied by the British to Germany of the late nineteenth century. Most visibly, from approximately the time of Bismarck's accession to the Prussian Chancellory, but beginning, more modestly, earlier. British influence in Germany focused on promoting two philosophical methods. The first was the so-called neo-Kantian fad; the second was the convergent phenomenology and existentialism leading into the existentialism of the Nazi Martin Heidegger. and more immediately agreeable to post-Bentham varieties of British "philosophical radicalism." The nominal targets of this campaign were G.W.F. Hegel, and actually Immanual Kant himself — the neo-Kantians were in fact predominantly anti-Kantians.



Insofar as Kant defined the problem of Vernunft (pure reason), the British hated him. The premises on which Kant argued that the "thing-in-itself must be incomprehensible to the mere understanding, the British hostilely rejected. They used Kant because he was a famous (and. conveniently, dead) German philosopher, and because the by-products of his critiques could be perverted to the form of the British doctrine.



The point is crucial; we summarize it here.



The basis of Kant's notion of the incomprehensible "thing in itself was this.



Kant proceeded from the Platonic definition of the three categories — simple belief, understanding and reason. He also defined the progress from simple belief to understanding in the mode of the Platonic dialectic. The point to be considered is made, most succinctly in the second portion of his Critique of Practical Reason, "The Dialectic of Practical Reason." He recognized the existence of reason in the Platonic sense, adding the stipulation that reason must be efficient for practice, that knowledge created by reason was the basis for efficient practice in the world otherwise known to the understanding.



He stumbled at the problem of pure practical reason in the following way. Reason, standing "above" the deterministic ordering of the mere understanding, must affect the world in a way {freedom) not in conformity with the fixed deterministic rules of the understanding. However — and here is the crux of Kant's problem — since human knowledge of the determination of categories of knowledge is limited to the forms of the understanding, the efficient consequences of reason are unknowable, indeterminate, for the understanding. Hence/the real world, which must embody the efficiency of practical reason, must define 'existence (the. thing-in-itself) in a way which is not comprehensible to the understanding; hence, the thing-in-itself is incomprehensible.



The neo-Kantians (at least, in the main) ignored Kant's argument, and substituted the principle of irrationalist indeterminacy within the nominal form of Kant's formulation of the problem. Instead of Kant's judgment that the efficiency of reason was beyond human comprehension, the neo-Kantians proposed that the thing-in-itself was indeterminate because it was, intrinsically, arbitrarily anarchic. Thus, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were smuggled into the neo-Kantian's commentaries on Kant.



This was the same result offered by Aristotle. On the one side, Aristotle adopted the appearance of a pure determinist. He proposed fixed, lawful orderings of categories, and so forth. However, embedded within that schema, the elementarily of the irrational takes the place of the problem of the comprehension of the specific lawfulness of reason. So, the Phrygian cult of Dionysus was embedded within the cult of Apollo. Roman stoicism was developed to the same effect by the cult of Apollo as the secularized version of the Apollonian mysticism.



Phenomenology and existentialism are simply such neo-Kantianism or Aristotelianism viewed through the microscope.



The complementary expression of this in contemporary Maoist cults is the secularized theological doctrine of "God is dead." The doctrine's source-rationale is as follows. If God created the universe with fixed universal laws, then by so doing, God precluded his own subsequent willful intervention into the universe. Hence, God may be omniscient, but is certainly impotent. Hence, to take the point a step further, God, because entirely impotent with respect to the universe, is dead with respect to the universe. Furthermore, although the individual will is entirely irrational (arbitrarily anarchistic), the laws of the universe are so fashioned that they succeed despite the anarchy of individuals. The contemporary Maoist doctrine follows: do whatever you please, what is going to occur will occur anyway. On this ground Maoists are secularized strict Lutherans. "The ordering of the world is governed by principles beyond your power to comprehend or change. What is of concern to you is merely your private exercise of your anarchistic impulses." This is also the doctrine of Bernard of Clairvaux. "You are only efficiently concerned with such matters, the matters of your personal, Hobbesian sub-universe. The fundamental error would be to follow Abelard, to attempt to be the helper of God in the ongoing work of creation. Abelardian elites, such elitists, are the only problem with which you have to deal."



The British purpose behind the neo-Kantian campaign in Germany was the destruction of science. The case of Georg Cantor is exemplary, as is. in a different form. the campaign of Ernst Mach and his allies against Max Planck, and the Copenhagen-centered assault on the leading scientific thinkers of the 1920s.



Cantor, the student of Weierstrass, inherited Weierstrass's conflict with the wretched, but influential, British-favored Kronecker. Cantor, sensible of the importance of his discoveries, was perplexed by the way — it seemed to him — that Kronecker was orchestrating a Europe-wide, successful effort to slander and isolate him. All Europe generally, was turned into' what was effectively a "controlled environment." such that even Cantor's supposed friends induced him to capitulate to Kronecker. Cantor broke under this orchestrated pressure, capitulated to Kronecker, and, as a result of this capitulation, went insane. A British operation.



From the foundation of the British Royal Society, its principal dedication was to the destruction of what it termed "continental science." This began — in that form — with Locke's coordination of attacks against Descartes (echoing Bacon's campaign against Bull and Gilbert), continued with Leibniz — next regarded as the chief danger — and continued through the nineteenth century. During the nineteenth century, Faraday was obsessed by this impulse. Maxwell was governed by it; (5) Pasteur was hated, harassed by British influences in France. Riemann's reputation as well as Cantor's was victimized by the British tools on the continent, just as British agent Niels Bohr played a prominent role in that filthy business during the present century...as a shocked Werner Heisenberg notes in respect to Bohr's atrocious antics toward Schroedinger.



Einstein, although predominantly a protege and prisoner of the British, had enough independence of character both to be shocked and to plainly discredit one of the architects of this evil, Bertrand Russell, in print, echoing similar views by the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer.



Yet, although the British inner circles have known that they have been perpetrating knowingly monstrous frauds and crimes, in general they have also mystified themselves with respect to reason and scientific method. Newton's preoccupation with the most infantile sort of black magic, and his involvement in one of the nasty black religious cults developed within Royal Society circles, his insanity during the 1690s, involve the desperation of the members of the Royal Society on account of their inability to command the sort of creative powers manifest in those from whom they plagiarized and whom they defamed. It was the same with the wretched Aristotle.



The ruling British elite are like animals — not only in their morality, but in their outlook on knowledge. They are clever animals, who are masters of the wicked nature of their own species, and recognize ferally the distinctions of the hated human species. Nonetheless, obsessively dedicated to being such animals, they can not assimilate those qualities unique to true human beings.









THE PHYSICS OF THE MATTER









The "n" and "n+1" orderings of continua arise not only in the comparison of entropic doctrines of physics and chemistry with respect to living processes. They occur in the experimental domain of physics itself. They arise there in a twofold way: through the crucial fallacies intrinsic to accredited physics doctrines, and in certain key aspects of the experimental realm. Not accidentally, the two aspects often intersect: an "anomalous" experimental phenomenon often corresponds to the problem of an intrinsic fallacy of accredited physics.



The general problem has been outlined by Uwe Parpart (9) and matters of detail have been covered by a number of articles reported either in the journals of the Fusion Energy Foundation or by the science staff of U.S. Labor Party intelligence. (10) The problem of the electron (11) and the related problem of negentropic types of anomalous phenomena in plasma regimes locate the problem.



In certain types of phenomena occurring in plasma regimes, the process initially determined ostensibly according to ordinary, accredited physics doctrines, is transformed to produce self-sustaining or even reproductive phenomena, such as the vortices occurring in plasma-focus experiments or solitons. The latter phenomena "violate" the basic laws of physics as ordinarily defined, to the effect that the causal features of the process are subject to accountability, but the consequences of this causal connection are not determinable in terms of the initial conditions from which starting-point they are produced.



This intersects the fact that an electron-particle could not exist, according to prevailing doctrines of existing physics, if it were a particle, and yet in,many respects it behaves as if it were a particle. The crux of the difficulty is that the available gravitational forces to hold the particle together as a particle are miniscule with respect to the electromagnetic forces driving it apart. (12)



However, it has been shown that so-called elementary particles and negentropic sorts of plasma anomalies, such as vortices and solitons, are distinguished inclusively by the same Schroedinger-De Broglie properties. This indicates that the electron may be likened, at least conceptually, to the vortices in a plasma-focus experiment. In that case, the existence of the particle-form involves none of the paradoxes cited.



Therefore, we have a case of the "n continuum" being transformed into an "n+1 continuum." Moreover, the "n+1 continuum" for this case coincides on crucial points with the relevant biochemical evidence concerning the physics of living processes. If one discards the notion of chemical bonds associated with the paradoxical definition of the electron as a particle, and so forth, then chemical bonds must be reconceptualized accordingly. The altered conceptions indicated as appropriate are much improved in the sense of being more agreeable to the crucial biological evidence. Whether living processes are in the same "n+1 continuum" as the negentropic singularities of experimental physics is an open issue; perhaps we must go from an "n+1" to "n+2" to arrive at living processes.



What is conclusively illustrated by that sort of evidence (it is also demonstrated in other ways) is that the scalar notion of energy and of the characteristics of "n" continua traditional to modern physics, are useful but ultimately false. Insofar as we can treat the "n continuum" experimentally as if it were a continuum in those terms of conceptual reference — keeping away. in particular, from the singularities of the "very small" and the paradoxes of the "very large." the scalar notion of energy and the constant speed of .light are ostensibly adequate, experimental conceptions of physics. However, breaking outside those limiting circumstances for experimental invesigation, or attempting to complete the conceptual apparatus of physics for the universe in terms of the mathematical physics of the “n continuum,” science falls into contradictions and absurdities. This should cause no panic. Quite the contrary. All this we should have suspected. Science does not thus become less accessible to reason; it warns us that we must proceed now in accordance with what reason should have informed us beforehand.



The ostensible characteristic of a sub-continuum is a characteristic of that continuum in a conditional sense, but also merely a simplified aspect of the actual characteristic. The actual characteristic must be at the same time the characteristic of the universe described by the going over from an "n" into "n+1" into "n+2" and so forth continua, each continuum of which process is necessarily efficient with respect to its "predecessors." This characteristic is the transfinite for which the ostensible characteristics of each sub-continuum are enumerable predicates. Furthermore, this transinvariant cannot be linearizable, is not a constant, but is a constant principle of self-development. of true negentropy.



Abelard might, were he alive, put it this way. God, the prime existence, is a creative principle which creates Universes as the instruments for mediating the process of continued creation to ever higher states. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) has already defined this principle as the "necessary existent." Nicholas of Cusa defined it rigorously to the same effect as the "Non-Other."



Werner Heisenberg, among others, could not have erred as he did (in his adoption of the Copenhagen doctrine and postulating his notion of "indeterminacy") if he had grasped the epistemological significance of Max Planck's quantum-of-action. What Planck demonstrated, in effect, was that in the "very small" one encountered not some ultimate irreducible particle, but a singularity. The work of Schroedinger and De Broglie precisely intersected and advanced upon that feature of Planck's contribution. The cited paradox of the electron's existence as a supposed particle intersects Planck, Schroedinger, De Broglie et al. to the same effect. Indeed, during the middle 1950s De Broglie anticipated the existence of such phenomena as solitons and plasma vortices on related grounds. (13} If Heisenberg had been qualified in epistemology, rather than conditioned to the sort of neo-Kantian outlook he has reported and outlined, he "should have recognized that Riemann had already fully anticipated the necessary nature of physics to such purposes, and should have recognized, further that this entire problem was already posed by Leibniz's criticism of Descartes on "inertia," and otherwise anticipated in the broadest sense by Plato's Ionian and allied predecessors.



We focus on this point in two ways. First, we summarize the significance of the electron. Second, the connection between philosophy and physics.



The electron (and other "elementary" particles), being an existence determined in the "n+1 continuum," is efficient with respect to the "n continuum," but is not determinable as an existence within the latter. It is, therefore, a singularity within the latter. This state of affairs becomes paradoxical only if one clings to the mistaken notion that the scalar determination of energy in an "n continuum" characterized by a constant speed of light is an adequate representation of the universe. As long as that delusion is gripped, then the existence of the electron becomes a fact which threatens to demoralize science. Then. the doctrine of Heisenberg, or the more chaotic, despairing view of a von Weizacker tends to follow as a reflection of that demoralisation. If the evidence of the electron's existence as a singularity is accepted, the, opposite vantage-point, then the result is a mobilization of joyful efforts to discover the new, larger reality of the universe which has been proven available to us in this manner.



The problem of the well-tempered system is identical. Human beings are not vibrating rods, or anything else determinable according to the physics of an "n continuum." They are singularities of the "n+2" (for purposes of reference). They are efficient with respect to the n continuum. Their relations, insofar as they are mediated within the realm of the n continuum, have aspects which are partially determinable in terms of the physics of vibrating rods. However, music as human music, as the communication between the human singularities mediated in that way, is not determinable within the n continuum but only in the "n+2" continuum.



Physics can only progress as physics. It is the worst sort of absurdity to judge the fragments of Thales, Heraclitus, et al., from the standpoint of attempting to show how close or remote those minds were from the conceptions of modern physics. The issue of mind, fire (energy) and continuous substance (matter-field continuity) in Thales is not a matter of physics sub-categories as such. It is a matter of method. It is a question of how the categorical questions concerning the lawful ordering of the universe shall be posed to consciousness at the level of reason, for the purpose of rigorously ordering the production of hypotheses bearing upon the principles of universal lawfulness.



This knowledge concerning categorical questions of that sort is not physics in the sense we use the term "physics" ordinarily. It is a distinction between those directions of hypothesis-making which are useful, and those other directions which are methodologically manifestly absurd.



One cannot spin out concrete physics from a philosopher's chair. The relationship of philosophy to physics is, more narrowly, to discern which philosophical statements by physicists are' intrinsically, methodologically absurd. On the positive side, given adequate knowledge of physics to date, philosophy shows us how to select the experimental conception which will be most fruitful in gaining the next step of progress in mastery of the principles appropriate to physics. That, in general, is all that philosophy can accomplish with respect to positive sciences. That is all. but that is indispensable to the progress of science. That is the means by which the approach selected by the creative scientist is properly determined — just the approach, just the indispensable matter of approach.



The case of the electron paradox is appropriately illustrative. Confronted with a problem involving "elementary particle" experimentation, knowing that the electron doctrine of accredited physics is intrinsically absurd is representative of that kind of philosophical knowledge which guides the experimenter to the most fruitful experimental hypotheses. Thai illustrates the method to be applied in a more generalized way to order the progress of science in general.



Reason, which is definable in a consistent way in principle over the ages, is thus a kind of "constant." However, reason is not otherwise constant, not linearizable. As it assimilates to itself the fruits of its own accomplishments in mastering the lawful ordering of the universe, reason develops itself in its particular powers. In this process of self-development of reason, mediated through the practical scientific progress effected by efficient action of reason, reason parallels and intersects the fundamental, also self-developing lawful ordering of the universe.









THE HIERARCHY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE









The discoveries in the domain of the physical sciences accomplished by the U.S. Labor Party and its collaborators, and reflected in part in this report, were accomplished in the manner indicated. Through assimilation of this method, as embodied for reference in the subject of political economy, recruits to the Labor Party and associated organizations were originally drawn from young persons representing the most promising minds of the late 1960s and early 1970s — and through their own individual and collaborative efforts in mastering physics, biology and so forth, some of these persons were able to produce original contributions to scientific progress in those fields. This represented, in some instances, important new discoveries by individuals or teams of individuals. In other instances, it represented the kind of discovery involved in appreciating the broader implications of the discoveries reported by others. Method, informed by existing scientific knowledge, acted, as the power of informed reason, to advance the body of knowledge by which it was informed.



Although those persons probably would have tended to succeed in their professions with distinction in any case, the overall quality of distinctions associated with the U.S. Labor Party's work has been added to their powers, directly or indirectly as a benefit contributed by this writer's work of the 1950s.



The kernel of this writer's distinctive, original contributions to human knowledge is the successful application, beginning in the early 1950s, of the cited Riemann and Cantor conceptions to solving the basic errors in Karl Marx's three-volume Capital. This effort was "energized" by a youthful adoption of the methodological outlook of Gottfried Leibniz — in which connection Leibniz's Monadology was outstanding. Any body of knowledge which erred from the standpoint of that methodological outlook was viewed as intrinsically in error, and the existence of such error became then a source of intellectual "tension," impelling the writer to reject the indicated doctrines as given, and, if the matter involved were important, to seek a remedy agreeable to appropriate method.



The fundamental error of Marx's Capital, for purposes of reference, is this. Although Marx's own Neoplatonic outlook led him to correct systematic conclusions concerning the essential "internal contradiction" of capitalist accumulation as a whole, in all Marx's efforts to develop a set of linear equations for "extended reproduction" from the set of linear equations for "simple reproduction," he failed — and necessarily so. "Simple reproduction" is an arbitrary, heuristic construct, an effort to imagine the simplest case in which a capitalist economy perpetuates itself on the same level of technology in the same extent. Marx attempted to move to the case of "extended reproduction," in first approximation, without considering the effects of technological progress, but only extension in scale (through investment of portions of surplus value in additional plant, equipment, materials, employment of productive labor, and so forth). Consequently, on this side of his efforts, Marx's work ends up in the wretched confusion typified by the material which Marx's editor, Friedrich Engels, assembled as the concluding chapter of Capital, Volume II. For related reasons, all efforts of Marxologists to explicate the "internal contradictions" of capitalist accumulation in terms of systems of equations for "extended reproduction" become increasingly absurd as the profession of convergence upon a solution within Marx's terms is more energetically advanced.



This is not the only political-economic error in Marx's work. As we have noted elsewhere, although the kernel of Marx's method was essentially a reconstitution of the Neoplatonic dialectical method of Leibniz et al., somewhat better informed in aspects than Leibniz, the elaboration of Marx's work was contained within his credulous acceptance of a prevailing historical mythology, essentially an acceptance of the British falsification of history. This infectious blunder affects many aspects of Marx's work. It affects his political-economic work in the respect that in his elaboration of the internal order of capitalist accumulation processes, he adopted the fictitious, British model of "industrial capitalist development" as the empirical case for which competent theory must account. This effort to adapt his elaboration of political-economic theory to the fictitious British model is the chief determinant of the major errors in Marx's work on that subject.



The results of this writer's work of the 1950s, which included an emphasis on the actuality of American industrial reality, a quality almost entirely lacking in Marx's work, led to a new, • independent political-economic theory, which in no way depended upon the presumed authority of elements of Marx's own work, although it benefited most substantially from knowledge of the work of Marx. This new economic-theoretical method was crucially proven by testing of hypotheses against emerging developments of the 1950s and 1960s, establishing the newly developed theoretical economics as uniquely competent in contrast to all extant competing theories, Marx's included. (14)



The essential feature of this economic doctrine was that the principle of technological progress was the primary determinant of economic processes, rather than an "added-in" feature, as Marx's approach had attempted erroneously to deal with the matter.



This effort not only circumscribed the problems of method generally, but was associated with an intensive study of history, both history as such and archeological history, to the purpose of discovering empirical indicators of the characteristics of precapitalist economies, and the characteristic philosophical outlooks of precapitalist societies. The results of this were coherently embodied in the instructional program on which the predecessor organization of the U.S. Labor Party was established as an organization ex novo (as opposed to an organization assembled from indoctrinated elements of previously existing organizations, etc.).



Over the years, the question often arose, what is the basis in authority for imposing certain criteria of hypothesis upon work in the physical sciences. To this question, the consistent answer given was, and rightly so. the proof of that method in political economy. The fact that the order of the universe appropriate to the above-indicated features of the physics of Riemann has been crucially proven once in the domain of political economy proves also that the entire universe is ordered according to such principles. Political economy, viewed and developed in that way, is the highest form of science, the crucial source of authority for scientific knowledge in all domains.



The crucial experiment upon which human knowledge is essentially dependent is human existence itself.{15) Since all particular knowledge is ultimately and necessarily superseded, no form of knowledge as such (understanding) can embody proof of the validity of scientific knowledge in a lasting way. What is proven by human existence is the efficiency of creative reason in ordering the progress of knowledge to the effect of maintaining and advancing the human specie’s ecological population-potential. It is as political economy situates the direct connection between progress of knowledge and changes in the ecological population-potential of human practice based on advancing knowledge, that the essential connection is made, and uniquely so. It could not be otherwise It is to Karl Marx's credit that he attempted to found his efforts on realizing that perception. His "Theses on Feuerbach" and the first section, "Feuerbach," of The German Ideology, are most notable to this effect. Also notable is the recurrence of that Neoplatonic notion as the conception of "Freedom-Necessity" in Capital III, Sec. 7. Marx's failure was broadly his effort to elaborate his work within British historical mythologies, and to close himself off from the "inner secrets" of the elite by his foolish "materialist" emphasis respecting the determination of ideas. Both these principal errors were necessarily interdependent.









HISTORIOGRAPHICAL METHOD









History is to be understood as the subjective connection between "objective" events and conditions perceived, as they are "subjectively" perceived, and the "objective" consequences of the human actions (or acts of omission) taken in consequence of such perception. The crucial subject-matter is not merely that "subjective" element itself, but the processes which determine the character and development of that "subjective" element.



The accomplished historian must be both a person who has mastered that approach in essentials, and also a person who has progressed further, to the competence to adduce the "subjective" element of history from the patterns of "objective" behavior which the "subjective" clement has left as its spoor.



The case of the militia illustrates the problems of the latter work.



Putting the case of the Roman republic to one side for a moment, the most effective form of warfare is the mobilization of the resources of a state in the form of a well-trained militia. This depends, in turn, upon the constitution of the state in such forms that the general population can be "trusted" by the rulers as the armed population — trained in arms, with arms in hand when called. An oppressing ruler dare not persist in this practice, but prefers either special armed bodies of volunteer professionals or mercenary forces. His military policy centers as much on subjugating the population as contending against foreign adversaries;



The case is not cut and dried. There are exceptions of importance, and of some frequency of recurrence. Even so, the uses of the militia versus more limited or mercenary armed forces have clear, if partial implications concerning the political character of the state and the mentality of the state. The case of the mercenary force is virtually conclusive.



Rome has a double implication.



The fact that the affairs of the Roman republic were ordered from an early time, according to available knowledge, by the cult of Apollo, is of utmost importance in showing that accredited historiography on this subject is grossly flawed. The character of evolving Roman law, also consistent with the antihumanist doctrines of politics and law of the Peripatetics, is also relevant. Rome's successes, including its conquests of its Italian and Etruscan neighbors, have a different moral quality than Roman writers and their admirers would have us believe.



Nonetheless, the Roman policy of the militia was an integral feature of Roman successes overall. At the point that Roman moral and economic decay progressed to the point the militia basis evaporated, beginning the point that Rome could no Songer teed itself except by looting foreign nations, the Roman Empire was doomed.



Let there be no foolish assumption that perhaps this report exaggerates the folly of most existing appreciations of the history of the Roman republic. According to Livy and other sources, it was the cult of Apollo which governed Roman policy with the same sorts of tricks the cult employed during other regions at that period. Moreover, it is repeatedly noted that the ' loot taken in war was shared generously with the cult of Apollo. The role of the cult of Apollo in bringing the Roman legions to Greece, the cult's sponsorship of Julius Caesar of the Marian faction, using the methods of the Phrygian cult of Dionysus, and the Stoic cult, are also indicative. Rome was not some out-of-the-way development of the republican period, but during much of that period, at least, was a part of the relatively global apparatus being deployed by the cult at Delphi and by way of Ptolemaic Egypt.



The evidence of technological and scientific progress is another crucial objective fact of archeology. The existence of a flourishing city-state of large population is already an indication of the city-builders' faction and outlook. The rate of progress, and the quality of existence of various strata of the population, as well as their occupations, is similarly indicative.



The primary distinction to be made is whether the state was dominated by city-builders' forces, the oligarchical faction, or by a struggle between the two forces. Objective features of the archeological evidence, especially those bearing on rates and directions of developments, are crucial. These indications inform us, to a corresponding degree of accuracy, of the mentality of the leading forces of that state. We can presently correlate literary and archeological records adequately back to the eighth century BC to be able to go back at least two millennia earlier with principally archeological evidence in hand, to "reconstruct" essential features of the "subjective" element — the element decisive to historiography.



We know, both from history and modern experience, how the two, primary opposing policies are determined. The Hobbesian view and its correlatives are associated with the rule of heteronomic impulses, which tend to be strengthened by "entropic" developments in culture and political-economy. The humanist outlook is always originated through great intellects, an influential political and scientific intelligentsia, in whole sweeps of cultural progress usually associated with the most prominent influence of a single creative mind. These humanist influences become hegemonic through successful technological progress, which creates the conditions under which the ordinary individual of urban-centered culture values others and himself or herself in terms of the practical importance society attributes to the increased power of individuals for discovery, transmission and applications of technological and related advances in knowledge.



What defeats the human race repeatedly is "practical politics." The adaptation of policies of factions to prevailing mythologies and prejudices creates advantages for the enemies of humanity, because human progress occurs only through the hubristic intellectual leadership and action of a political intelligentsia — an elite! — to effects which are feasible but nonetheless contrary to traditional practice and prevailing prejudices concerning "practicality."



The history of man and of ideas is not determined by objective circumstances as such, but subjectively, by the action of creative powers of reason, informed by existing knowledge and with means available, to transform the objective domain according to directions specified by creative reason. Objective circumstances determine the potentialities of specific actions (and associated kinds of ideas) which reason may employ.



The history of mankind, those circumstantial aspects understood, is the history of reason's struggle against the oligarchical principle of unreason. Not to be a Neoplatonic humanist today is to be morally not a member of the human species.







NOTES







FOREWORD



1. Cf. Christopher White on the significance of the families, “The Noble Family," Campaigner Special Report No. 11, New York, 1978.



2. The majority of the following concerning Greek history is based upon or corroborated by the work of a task force coordinated by Criton Zoakos, plus work coordinated on behalf of the Wiesbaden Academy by George Gregory III.







3. Cf. Paul Arnest, "From Babylon to Jerusalem: The Genesis of the Old Testament," Campaigner, Vol. X, No. 4, Fall 1977, pp. 31-64.







4. Criton Zoakos.









THE LEGACY OF ARISTOTLE





1.Criton Zoakos, "Aristotle and the Craft of Intelligence." New Solidarity, Vol. VIII, Nos. 99. 100 (Feb. 24 and 28, 1978). See the policy statement authored by Persian-Macedonian agent Isocrates, of the Athenian school of rhetoric. The record of the "check stubs" of payments to agent Demosthenes by the Persian-Macedonian forces still exists.







2. Criton Zoakos, "Aristotle and the Craft of Intelligence."







3. Criton Zoakos et al. Also (cf. Gregory, "Aristotle and the Cult of Dionysus," [Unpublished: Wiesbaden, 1978]) the role of Alcibiades in pushing the Magna Grecia campaign in the form and at the time most expedient for the troubled Persians.







4. Gregory, "Aristotle and the Cult of Dionysus."







5. Cf. Paul Arnest, "From Babylon to Jerusalem," p. 64.







6. Livy is the standard source on this. See the commentaries on Livy by Machiavelli. On the role of the Ptolemies in the Romans' campaign against Greece, see Gregory.







7. Cf. Linda Frommer, "How Pitt's Jacobinism Wrecked the French Revolution," New Solidarity, Vol. VIII, No. 28 (June 3, 1977) and Vol. VIII, No. 29 (June 7, 1977) and David Goldman,"How the City of London Got Through the Revolutionary War Crisis," New Solidarity, Vol. VIII, No. 78 (Dec. 2, 1977) and Vol. VIII, No. 79 (Dec. 6, 1977) on the French Revolution. Lord Shelburne, allied to the Barings, and the British East India Company, used the circumstances of the 1783 Treaty of Paris to bring his circles into a dominant position within the British monarchy, putting William Pitt the Younger forward as the most visible accomplice of his circles. Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, the Mills, Thomas Malthus, (later) David Ricardo, and others were tools of this Shelburne-centered reorganization of British intelligence. This was the predecessor phase for the later reorganization toward the close of the nineteenth century, in which the emergence of the Fabian Society and Lord Milner's networks were the most prominent feature — including the Rhodes Scholarship project for aiding the subverting of the United States by the British intelligence services. Necker, who wrecked the French credit from within — much like W. Michael Blumenthal and James R. Schlesinger wrecked the dollar for the British during 1977-78. was a part of the Geneva-centered circles of British intelligence. The Duke of Orleans was a British agent to the end. Danton and Marat were British-trained and British-coordinated agents-provocateurs, deployed from London to organize the Jacobin Terror. Robespierre was a protege and dupe of Necker's circles. And, so on and so forth.







8. Criton Zoakos, "Aristotle and the Craft of Intelligence."







9. On the Royal Society and Newton, cf. Carol White, "The Royal Society," Fusion, Vol. I, Nos. 3-4, Dec.-Jan. 1977-1978, pp. 44-53.







10. Criton Zoakos, "Aristotle and the Craft of Intelligence."







11. Criton Zoakos and Erini Levedi, "The Paleologue Dynasty as Instruments of the Hohenstaufen Grand Design" (Unpublished: New York, 1978). The Paleologues developed a humanist faction in Russia, reflecting the conceptions of statecraft associated with Georgios Gemistos Plethon. Ivan Ill's policies were derived from this work, as was the later campaign against the Aristotelian-oligarchical faction (e.g., the Boyars) by Ivan IV ("The Awesome").







12. Konstantin George, "The U.S.-Russian Entente That Saved the Union," to be published in The Campaigner, Vol. XI, No. 6 (July 1978).







13. Cf. Alien Salisbury, The Civil War and the American System (New York: Campaigner Publications, Inc., 1978).







14. Ibid. See also. The Political Economy of the American Revolution (New York: Campaigner Publications, Inc., (1977), passim.







15. Criton Zoakos, "Aristotle and the Craft of Intelligence."







16. Helga Zepp, Unpublished paper: Wiesbaden, 1978.







17. The characterization of the Roman Empire as economically fascist is no hyperbole. The fascism associated with Mussolini and Nazism are only varieties of states based upon Aristotelian policies of genocidal fiscal austerity in behalf of monetarist debt pyramids and in opposition to technologically vectored solutions to "depressions." It is significant that the fascist movements of Italy and Weimar Germany were products of the work of British intelligence networks, and that both Mussolini and Hitler were put in power on directives from London. Turning attention from the monetarist policies which essentially characterized Mussolini's and Hitler's policies, and focusing on the kind of social base created to support such a state machine, the "leftism" of Mussolini's followers and of most of the Nazis' SA base not accidentally compares in essentials with the Maoism and "environmentalism" of present-day North America and Western Europe. The sociology of those base forces is the elaboration of the doctrines of the Phrygian cult of Dionysus. To see Julius Caesar as a fascist, and to see his relationship to his lumpen social base in Rome in those terms, is not only admissible, but is the only efficient conceptual approach to understanding Caesar and the policies and unfolding history of the Roman Empire.







18. Information based on unpublished studies by Costas Kalimtgis, Steven Douglas, and others.







19. Humanist Perspective on Medieval Islam" (Unpublished: New York, 1978).







20. Kalimtgis, Douglas, et al.







21. Criton Zoakos, "The Order of the Assassins," Lecture: Chicago. April 17, 1978.







22. Ibid.







23. Criton Zoakos, "Ibn Sina and the Dawn of the Humanist Heritage," The Campaigner, Vol. X, No. 3 (July-August, 1977) pp. 10-43.







24. Zoakos and Levedi, "The Paleologue Dynasty."







25. Ibid.







26. Ibid. Zoakos secured much of this on the Byzantine phase of the matter through the works of Greek historians of the 1920s. These sources documented facts contrary to the mistaken views of the usual secondary sources concerning the role of Plethon in connection with the fifteenth century ecumenical negotiations.







27. This summary of the events surrounding Bruno is based in large part on the coordinated efforts of a number of researchers in Europe and North America. Work on the Ismailis by Criton Zoakos, Helga Zepp, Judith Wyer and others. Work on the Tudor period coordinated by Christopher White. Work on Bruno by specialists on both continents, work on Nicholas of Cusa by Helga Zapp and others. Work on Leibniz by Uwe Parpart, Carol White, and others. A short biography of Bruno is given by Nora Hammerman in her preface to the first English translation of Bruno's dialogue, "The Cabala of the Winged Horse, with the Addition of the Cyllenian Ass," in The Campaigner, Vol. XI, No. 2 (March 1978).







28. Bruno's short dramatic works provide a key .to the work of Christopher Marlowe and others. Christopher White has been able to demonstrate the secrets of Elizabethan drama by a closely analyzed treatment of the immediate references embodied in Shakespeare's Hamlet. See Christopher White, "Shakespeare's Revenge,1J New Solidarity, Vol. IX, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, March 10, 14, 17, 31 and April 7, 1978.







29.Christopher White, et al.







II. THE KEY TO HISTORY



1. Alien Salisbury.







2. Cf. Dr. Richard Pollak, "Evolution — Beyond Darwin and Mendel." Fusion Energy Foundation Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 4 (May 1977), pp. 42-53.







3. Cf. Dr. Ned Rosinsky, "Drosophila Embryology — The Dynamics of Evolution," Fusion Energy Foundation Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 4 (May 1977), pp. 54-59.







4. Bertrand Russell, notably, threw himself into a sort of psychedelic literary fit on this point.







5. Criton Zoakos has employed Greek-language sources to the effect of more than corroborating this writer's established judgment concerning the lonians.







6. The research and related work on this matter has been developed in part by Anno Hellenbroich and others, and by a New York-centered group of collaborators including Dr. Peter Wyer, Vivian Freyre, Katharine Burdman. On Bacon and Bull, see P. Wyer and M. Stahlman, "Rock Music and the Mass Marketing of Terrorism," New Solidarity, Vol. VIII, No. 85 (Dec. 30, 1977). See also, Anno Hellenbroich, "Think Like Beethoven," The Campaigner, Vol. XI, No. 1 (February 1978), pp. 46-61; and K. Burdman, "The Case ofJ.S. Bach," New Solidarity, Vol. VIII, No. 75 (Nov. 18, 1977).







7. Felix Mendelssohn is usually credited, wrongly, with "resurrecting" Bach's music. Rather, the British elected to abandon their near-century efforts to suppress Bach through Mendelssohn's resurrecting the "simpler" Bach as part of his effort to direct music toward romanticism, away from the "complicated" music of Beethoven. Wagner's contribution to this wickedness was his effort to edit features of Beethoven's works and to poison the musicological doctrine respecting their performance. Both were working for the antihumanist Black Guelph networks, and doing so as a matter of political consciousness.







8. Cf. Carol White, Energy Potential (New York: Campaigner Publications, Inc., 1978), passim.







9. Uwe Parpart, "The Concept of the Transfinite," The Campaigner, Vol. IX, Nos. 1-2, (January-February 1976), pp. 6-66.







10. Cf. Dr. Steven Bardwell's series on the implications of nonlinear processes in controlled plasmas: "Fusion Plasma, An Overview of the Research," Fusion Energy Foundation Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 1 (July-August 1976), pp. 21-23; "The History of the Theory and Observation of Ordered Phenomena in Magnetized Plasmas," FEF Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 2 (September 1976), pp. 19-31; "The Implications of Nonlinearity," FEF Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 3 (March 1977), pp. 4-16; "Geometry and Causality," Fusion, Vol. I, No. 7 (June 1978). See also Dr. Morris Levitt, "Linearity and Entropy: Ludwig Boltzmann and the Second Law of Thermodynamics," FEF Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 2 (September 1976), pp. 3-18.







11. The problem was developed primarily by Dr. W. Bostick, in the form it was attacked by him and also by members of the U.S. Labor Party's science staff. Cf. Dr. Winston H. Bostick, "The Pinch Effect Revisited," International Journal of Fusion Energy, Vol. I, No. 1 (March 1977).







12. Bostick et al. proposed the effort to apply the lessons of plasma-vortex physics to the electron, etc.







13. Louis De Broglie, Une tentative d'interpretation causale et non lineaire de la mecanique ondulatoire, (Paris: Gauthier Villars, 1956), chapter 18. This information was communicated to Uwe Parpart by Georges Lochak, director of La Fondati