Two months ago, Albert Edwards first suggested that investors are focusing on the wrong catalyst for the next crash, which according to the grumpy SocGen strategist would emerge out of China, contending that as Trump exerts mounting pressure on the Chinese economy via tariffs, "the worry is that a Chinese policy response will send the global markets into a tailspin, just as the August 2015 devaluation did."

Today, in his latest note, Edwards doubles down on his assertion that a China hard-landing may be "the grey rhino that investors are ignoring" even as he once again admits that "naysayers, such as I, have consistently been proved wrong about the ability of China’s policymakers to successfully navigate choppy waters without capsizing the economic ship. And it is wholly natural that investors, having been proved overly bearish about the economy in the past, have given up worrying about a Chinese hard landing – but now that ship looks to be taking on water once again."

But, as he alleged back in October, when he wondered if "China's luck is running out", Edwards doubles down, only instead of using the traditional sinking ship metaphor, this time the SocGen permabear compares China's economy to driving a motorcycle, and specifically a close personal encounter he calls the "Tank Slap", which he describes as one where the front wheel wobbles violently out of control from side to side, with the handlebars hitting both sides of the petrol tank.

Also known as a ‘death wobble’, a rider is very lucky if they are not thrown from the bike – usually at high speed. In my own case, this situation was caused by a car driver with whom I had been having an altercation, winding down his window and trying to push me off the bike as I drove past at high speed.

This vivid memory in turn prompts Edwards to ask if President Trump’s tariffs against China "amount to a similar unbalancing shove as China drives past the US to become the largest economy in the world."

Yet while a sudden collapse in China's economy like the one Edwards suggests has yet to be observed, a more granular read of Chinese economic data suggests that indeed Beijing is looking increasingly wobbly on its motorbike as it rushes to overtake the US as the world's biggest economy.

Here are some of the troubling Chinese economic indicators Edwards highlights:

November’s Chinese PMI data confirmed that the rapid slowdown in the manufacturing sector seen in the previous couple of months was not an anomaly. The reading of the official NBS PMI is now the weakest since before the August 2015 devaluation (see left-hand chart below).

Here Edwards focuses on the export PMI sub-component, which has slumped to August 2015 levels, "suggesting an export decline will soon be seen in the real economy data (see right-hand chart above)." This comes at a time when the US trade deficit with China - as we reported over the weekend - surged to a record $43bn, mostly due to temporary factors related to the imminent imposition of tariffs and as Chinese imports from the US plunged 25%.

So if as Edwards contends Chinese exports are indeed set to slump, this would come at a time when manufacturing and services sector employment is already declining at a similar pace to that which triggered the August 2015 devaluation. Meanwhile, a far bigger risk is emerging for policymakers: falling employment.

And while the US economy has itself started to slowdown rather perceptibly, the contrast between manufacturing employment in the US and China could not be more stark as Edwards shows in the chart below, and notes that "China will likely be forced to respond to any further deterioration with additional easing."

Which is not to say that the US is doing great: as we showed over the weekend, the US ISM has clearly disconnected with the S&P, and the recent market weakness is more consistent with a US ISM closer to 50 than the actual print just shy of 60, suggesting that the US market is not at all convinced the US economy is as strong as surveys indicate, largely as a result of a Fed which may have overtightened rates and pushed the economy off a recessionary cliff in the process.

Leaving no risk factor untouched, Edwards lastly looks at the Eurozone where he compares the current Eonia rate (-0.4%) to the Taylor Rule-implied rate, which is at 1.75%, or more than 2% higher than current levels, and cautions that the ECB's delay to hike rates is "dangerous", because the longer this deviation persists, the bigger the bubbles that willbuild in the Eurozone.

These excesses are in plain sight - whether economic, such as the region’s current account surplus, or asset bubbles like the German housing market.

Finally, addressing central bank errors, Edwards highlights a recent attack by John Taylor (of the Taylor Rule) of Alan Greenspan for being too slow to raise rates in the US between 2002-2006, saying that the Fed’s timidity directly caused the housing/credit bubbles and subsequent crash.

Similarly, Downunder Daily's author Gerard Minack spots a comparable risk in China, and notes that Beijing is set on yet another easing cycle in an attempt to avoid a head-on motorcycle crash, as the following chart showing China's credit impulse and the 10Yr Swap rate suggests...

... as unless Beijing manages to boost Credit creation, the entire economy is about to fall off a cliff...

... or as Edwards calls it - a "Tank Slap" - one caused by Trump’s unfriendly tariff shove.