These contradictory positions did not come out of the blue, and they have represented a pattern in Maliki’s management style regarding the talks with the Sunnis and the Kurds throughout the past eight years. These negotiations suffered from violence and inconsistency, and lacked the oversight of a government that represents all parties.

Remarkably, in 2008, Maliki himself defended the Sahwa set up by the US military and acknowledged that it was these very forces that defeated al-Qaeda. However, Maliki reiterated in 2014 the same concerns related to the arming of tribes and the forming of the National Guard forces : that the move would set the stage for new militias .

At the time, the Iraqi government, headed by Nouri al-Maliki, refused the formation of the Sahwa forces and viewed the idea with suspicion. Back then, Maliki told Newsweek, “They make mistakes by arming tribes sometimes, and this is dangerous because this will create new militias .”

First of all, this is not the first time that the United States has managed to set the stage for dialogue between the various Iraqi parties. In 2006, it established the Sahwa forces following talks and negotiations conducted by US officials with Sunni insurgents and tribal leaders who were fighting the US presence in Iraq and caused the US forces material and human losses during the occupation of the country (2003-11).

Washington has managed to start a dialogue with Sunni parties on the future of the war on the Islamic State (IS). The Iraqi government had failed for years to open such talks in the context of the continuously deferred national reconciliation project. This raises several issues, chief among them that the Iraqi state is failing to present itself as a neutral intermediary between the political forces and instead promoting itself or allowing the conflicting parties to promote it.

The widespread conviction that the liberation of the Sunni regions from IS is only possible through the Sunnis themselves is not informing the contacts between the Iraqi government and the Sunni forces that are influential on the ground and capable of effectively leading the war. These forces are mostly former military members and tribal groups linked to them.

The Maliki government has succeeded only in turning the government into a party to the conflict with the Sunnis and Kurds, working hard to promote the image that it represents Shiites and defends their rights.

This idea is wrong, as the government does not only operate in the interests of Iraq's Shiites. The Shiites themselves organized the largest campaign to prevent Maliki from starting a new term, and they are the ones who led to the consecration of the political reform principles in the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

Even under Abadi, the Iraqi government still cannot seem to rid itself of the Shiite representation mantle to sponsor the comprehensive national dialogue. This is why it is failing to engage in frank dialogues with the extremist Sunni parties to pursue a common goal: fighting IS. This is the same issue that US forces faced in 2006 and today.

The terror threat in Iraq comes from both IS and anti-IS groups, and as a result the classification of “terrorism” varies between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.

This situation has been exacerbated by the atmosphere of mistrust in the Iraqi justice system over the past years, a system that has worsened ambiguity about terrorism and converted a lot of the anti-terror and de-Baathification battles into political rather than legal issues.

Meanwhile, international organizations such as Human Rights Watch continue to condemn the Iraqi judicial system as “terribly flawed.” It should be noted that the current Iraqi government has also recognized the existence of innocent detainees in prison.

In July, Sunni forces, classified by the government, political parties and Shiite media outlets as “terrorist” forces, held a conference in the Jordanian capital, Amman, and they were getting ready to hold another conference at the end of the year to discuss the future of the Sunni areas of Iraq.

There are no criteria for acquitting some of these forces and figures on charges of committing terrorist acts or contributing to bloodshed. On the other hand, there is no certainty (at least not on the Sunni and media levels) that these are actual terrorist forces.

Other countries are seeking to embrace these Sunni forces while the Iraqi government is unable to persuade them to engage in the war against IS. A few months ago, Washington developed serious contacts with these forces and figures close to them, according to information obtained by Al-Monitor, to try to mobilize Sunni forces against IS.

The Abadi government is not responsible for this deep rift between it and the Sunni “street” in terms of defining terror, but it has a chance to change it during the next phase.

The essential step that the new Iraqi government can start by taking is ending its image of representing a particular sect, as the current government is representative of all groups and driven by consensus.

The good news is that Abadi, according to his political reform efforts, insists on operating as the ruler of the entire country, not just of one sect. He is working to solve the political crisis with the Kurdish side and making a set of decisions to stop the persecution by the previous government of senior officials and media members. Abadi can open an official dialogue with the various Sunni parties to agree on a plan to liberate Iraq from extremists and ensure a safe future for its residents.