Adm. Dennis Blair (ret.) is chairman of Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, an American non-profit focused on U.S.- Japan relations. He served previously as commander, U.S. Pacific Command and as director of national intelligence.

Japan’s historic move to reinterpret the country’s postwar “peace constitution” this week and adopt a more active role in Asia-Pacific security comes none too soon for the United States. Right now, more than ever, Washington needs robust allies.

In East Asia, the broader Middle East, the Sahel and Eastern Europe, extremists, sub-national groups and even hostile countries seek to take over territory and change borders and governments through coercion, intimidation and terrorism.


Although these events might seem disparate and limited in scope, their number and frequency amount to a global challenge to the international order the United States has led since World War II.

The United States depends on some basic building blocks of power to maintain this global order: our economic and military might, diplomatic skill and strong and cooperative allies. But at a time when we need all the friends we can muster, most are becoming less reliable as they deal with internal political and economic issues and reduced defense budgets. Even within NATO, member countries make individual decisions on each separate crisis—often struggling to act in concert, as the tepid response to Russia’s incursion into Ukraine showed. In the future, the United States will have to work hard to convince some traditional allies and partners to mount effective international responses when our common interests are threatened.

Japan, however, is bucking this trend of tepid responses. For the last 60 years, the country’s Constitution has prevented Japan from fully participating in international peacekeeping operations and constrained the alliance with Washington. But this week, the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided for the first time to allow the Japanese Armed Forces to do more than defend their homeland from a direct attack. Japan will now be able to join the United States—its alliance partner—in the event of aggression by adversaries. Japan’s self-defense forces could, for instance, be authorized to shoot down missiles heading for the United States and defend American warships on the high seas.

The threat of greatest immediate concern is North Korea. In the event of large-scale North Korean aggression, Japan can now not only provide bases and logistic support for U.S. forces, but its ships and planes can also join with the U.S. military to conduct combined defensive patrols in the Sea of Japan and the airspace over it. Although there is little likelihood that the disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea will lead to conflict, this Japanese decision, along with American assurances that our treaty with Japan applies to the Senkakus—an island chain claimed by both China and Japan—make that likelihood even lower.

Additional legislation is expected to follow, as will a renegotiation of the bilateral defense guidelines between Japan and the United States. The Japanese cabinet’s decision alone, however, itself reinforces deterrence and should give pause to potential aggressors. It also provides tangible support for the U.S. pivot to Asia.

With Japan’s cabinet decision, for example, the United States and Japan can revise the current outdated Bilateral Defense Guidelines that govern each country’s responsibilities and limitations in crisis and combat. These revised guidelines should not be rigid and legalistic. They must authorize military commanders to form combined task forces for conducting flexible operations to turn back aggression in the potentially volatile areas around Japan.

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Japan’s shift away from pacisim comes amid a period of great change: The country has adopted a new national security strategy, reformed its national security institutions and bolstered its defense budget. These reforms actually stretch back years, under different leaders, beginning with the upgrading of the Japan Defense Agency to a ministry in 2007, and including the establishment of a National Security Council last year.

The moves are a reflection that the current security environment requires more flexibility in Japan’s use of its armed forces—not a sign of coming Japanese aggression. The public Chinese and Korean rhetoric accusing Japan of returning to World War II-era militarism is in large part propaganda and politics, and for Beijing an effort to hamper trilateral cooperation among America and its two treaty allies in Northeast Asia—Japan and Korea. In reality, Japan has a long record of peaceful and responsible postwar security policies and actions, and antiwar sentiment is widely and deeply held among its citizens. Of course, the often brutal history of the years before and during the Second World War should be understood and acknowledged, but this process is entirely separate from Japan’s decision to shape its military policies to today’s security environment.

Japan’s vision, objectives and democratic values are in near complete agreement with those of the United States. What Japan is doing on security will make it a stronger and better ally and partner. So, although the decision to change the constitution is clearly Japan’s to make, and it has sparked some controversy in Japan, the United States needs to offer its ongoing support as Japan develops legislation to operationalize its new stance.

At the same time, Americans should understand that the leaders advocating change in Tokyo are all staunch supporters of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but they also believe that the alliance should be more equal. That means allowing Japan to play a more independent role in making decisions and setting policies than it has in the past. American leaders and officials will also have to confer in advance with their Japanese counterparts to fashion common policies on security issues. If Abe and his allies are successful, Japan will be a stronger partner, but it will also have its own opinions on what its interests are and how they should be pursued. This more equal alliance is a vital component of the rebalancing of American security policy to Asia.

The changes in Japan’s security policy are long overdue, and they will strengthen a steadfast ally—one that America badly needs.and, in turn, support our common interest in ensuring a more peaceful world.