This forceful attitude and the several taboos it broke reveal that the currency union that Germany wants is probably fundamentally incompatible with the one that the French elite can sell and the French public can subscribe to. The choice will soon be whether Germany can build the euro it wants with France or whether the common currency falls apart.

Germany could undoubtedly build a very successful monetary union with the Baltic countries, the Netherlands and a few other nations, but it must understand that it will never build an economically successful and politically stable monetary union with France and the rest of Europe on these terms.

Over the long run, France, Italy and Spain, to name just a few, would not take part in such a union, not because they can’t, but because they wouldn’t want to. The collective G.D.P. and population of these countries is twice that of Germany; eventually, a confrontation is inevitable.

This sorry state of affairs is not of Germany’s making alone. It began largely because of France’s romantic and somewhat naïve view of the monetary union; it deepened due to France’s political absence from European affairs since the beginning of the crisis; and it was compounded by the traumatic shock caused by financial stress on French banks and government bonds during the summer of 2011, which laid bare the economic enfeeblement that continues to undermine France’s self-confidence.

Meanwhile, Germany has built a politically and morally coherent narrative that obscures an economically deceptive vision based on the idea that abiding by the rules alone can create prosperity and stability for the European Union as a whole. This narrative has wide support across the German political spectrum and the clear backing of the German public.

France has still not completely overcome its inclination to put French sovereignty and decision-making first and has failed to articulate its own post-Maastricht vision of a prosperous monetary union, backed by a federal budget, governed by a real European executive power and legitimized by the European Parliament.

Despite the recent call by President François Hollande to address these issues, progress is unlikely. That’s because French elites are now unable to convince the public of the merits of the Union’s current economic policies in general — and toward Greece in particular. They are also too divided to propose a new shared vision, too disoriented to challenge the German narrative, and too afraid to start building alliances with like-minded countries such as Italy and Spain.