Philosopher Edward Feser has argued on his blog that the prior probability of a miracle occurring has to do with our background knowledge of the world; therefore, there isn’t an absurdly low prior probability of a miracle occurring if: God exists, supernaturalism is true, God wants to perform miracles, God wants to raise Jesus from the dead, etc.

I don’t know what to label this objection, and I constantly see it trotted out in apologetic circles. And (at this point) I’m unaware of whether this objection is based on a strawman, ignorance, lies, all of the above, etc.

For one, atheist Michael Martin has argued that miracles are improbable even given the truth of theism and other assumptions. One of Michael Martin’s argument has to deal with God’s power. God has many ways to redeem mankind because God is all-powerful. Another argument that Martin gives has to do with the fact that even if miracles are possible, they are still extremely rare (frequency is actually an objective measure of probability). So, even if that doesn’t mean miracles are absurdly improbable, with respect to prior probability, that doesn’t mean miracles still aren’t really improbable (or just improbable). Also, it’s certainly not clear how God existing is even close to being sufficient to make the resurrection likely (with respect to prior probability). One could argue that an all-good and all-powerful Being would not raise Jesus, given many of the teachings of Jesus. Finally, one could also argue that it would be immoral of God to perform miracles. There are also other arguments as well, and they also do not reject supernaturalism/theism.

Secondly, there is no burden of proof for the skeptic when it comes to miracles. It’s up to the Christian theist to demonstrate that all the relevant background assumptions are in fact true. Thus, the skeptic isn’t engaging in circular reasoning (or ‘begging the question’) and any suggestions to the contrary are sophistry (i.e. an attempt to shift the burden of proof). If I want to demonstrate the truth of Y to you and the truth of Y requires the truth of X, then I also have to demonstrate the truth of X to you (if you don’t already accept the truth of X).

More Probable vs. Probable

When it comes to the story of the resurrection of Jesus, it’s not enough to point to the Gospels and claim that our supposed ‘evidence’ makes the resurrection hypothesis (i.e. God raised Jesus from the dead) more likely than it would have been otherwise (i.e. not having that evidence or ‘facts’). Instead, at a minimum, the Christian needs to establish that the resurrection hypothesis is probably true, and the resurrection hypothesis can’t be probable unless God exists. That’s because the resurrection hypothesis entails that God exists, because the resurrection hypothesis says, “God raised Jesus from the dead”; God can’t raise Jesus from the dead if God doesn’t exist. God raising Jesus is what has religious significance, and it is not very religiously significant if, for instance, aliens raised Jesus; it’s also not what Christians believe!

Why is it not enough to make the resurrection hypothesis just more probable? Because that’s not enough for a Christian to have outright belief in the resurrection, a fortiori, it won’t even be close to sufficient for convincing a skeptic. Hume was right that one needs to establish that a miracle probably happened. What that means is that the probability of a miracle occurring needs to be greater than 50%. Nevertheless, Hume likely was a little too lenient. Because, for example, it seems implausible that 51% confidence in a claim is enough for me to just believe in said claim [1].

Richard Swinburne is one of the only philosophers of religion that has even attempted to meet Hume’s challenge. Craig, Moreland, McGrew, and others have largely ignored trying to show that the resurrection of Jesus probably happened.

Notes

[1] This is according to contemporary epistemology. Suppose I think there is a 51% chance that there will be a tornado in my state tomorrow. Does that mean I believe this proposition? That doesn’t seem right. For one, 51% is barely above 50%; it’s basically a coin toss. Secondly, since confidence levels constantly fluctuate, 51% can easily change to 50% or 45% confidence (for instance).