While speaking to KP Sharma Oli, the new Prime Minister of Nepal, Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed the hope—according to a press release by the ministry of external Affairs—that Oli will carry all sections of society along and address the remaining political issues confronting the country in a spirit of dialogue and reconciliation.

On the other side, the leaders in Kathmandu are convinced that New Delhi has imposed an undeclared blockade on Nepal. India claims its inability to transport goods across the border emanates from the law and order situation in the Terai region.

Both are partially correct. Trucks are stranded on the borders after India noted the promulgation of “a" constitution in the backdrop of protests in Madhesh. Many Madhesis are of Indian origin and share connections across the border. The new constitution deprives the naturalised citizens from holding a range of high public positions.

How did it all come down to this? After all, Narendra Modi was the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Nepal in 17 years. He ended up visiting Kathmandu twice in the span of a few months. Modi offered the political leadership of Nepal a blank slate to amend the Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between The Government of India and The Government of Nepal signed in 1950. By doing so, Modi implicitly admitted that the treaty undermined the sovereignty of Nepal. The bottlenecks that were hampering various Indian-sponsored projects in Nepal were being eliminated after a long delay.

Since the relationship was going so well, should India have rocked the boat just to address discontent of some politically inconsequential Madhesis, Tharus and Janjatis? After all, the agitation is being led by regional leaders who did not win the elections. But the question partially answers itself. New Delhi’s support means the protesters no longer remain inconsequential. The instances when New Delhi has behaved as a hegemon and bullied Kathmandu are too many to list here. Modi wanted to change the trend and hence took unilateral initiatives. On this occasion, the hill-based leaders have shown profound lack of statesmanship and democratic ethos. Unfortunately—and this may reek of the entrenched elitism typical of Delhi—the leaders in Kathmandu have failed Modi.

Some Nepal observers are now saying that the visit of S. Jaishankar, India’s foreign secretary, came a bit too late. India should have expressed its displeasure with the specific provisions of Constitution a lot earlier in explicit terms. The same people would have criticised Modi if he had indeed chosen to do so. Modi did talk to his Nepalese counterpart and gently nudged former Prime Minister Sushil Koirala towards generating “widest possible agreement." A nod or a wink more would have been tantamount to interference of the same old kind detested by Nepal and India’s other South Asian neighbours. It was sensible of India to allow Nepal the latitude to arrive at a just and fair solution by itself.

Nepal has long been called India’s protectorate, a satellite state, and so on. This was an opportunity for both India and Nepal to prove such epithets wrong. It was time for Nepal to move into the sun and a moment for India to provide its Himalayan neighbour the requisite support. The best possible way for India could have been to maintain some distance even as Nepalese leaders wrangled protractedly in arriving at a consensus. Unfortunately, the hill-based leaders in Nepal clearly proved—to India’s dismay—their immaturity to handle with dexterity the constitutional and administrative issues of a culturally diverse state.

When the protests in Madhes grew, the leaders in Kathmandu resurrected the old enemy called India. KP Sharma OIi, who is now the Prime Minister, led the charge against New Delhi. China began to be flaunted as a substitute for India. Perhaps the lessons of 1989 have been forgotten when India had imposed an economic blockade on Nepal after King Birendra purchased anti-aircraft guns in clear violation of the 1950 treaty. Nepal tried to survive on Chinese supplies. Very soon, both Beijing and Kathmandu realised the futility of expensive trade across difficult geographical contours. By 1990, domestic tumult gave rise to a pro-democracy movement which recognized India’s security concerns. A repeat of 1989-90 would deflate the ego of hill-based leaders but will sadly come at a huge cost to the citizens of Nepal. India understands the consequences of a hermetically sealed border and hence has made efforts to resuscitate the supplies in the interim.

How much of the current crisis is China’s creation? China was not very comfortable with the idea of ethnicity based federalism. It also did not want Madhesis, perceived to be a pro-India block both in Kathmandu and Beijing, to get a share of power at the centre. The Constitution that has been promulgated, some allege, has the backing of Beijing as it broadly achieves China’s objectives. Madhesis have been rendered second class citizens in their own country. China’s sensitiveness to political alignment in Nepal is not at all surprising given the latter’s position as a buffer state between the politically restive Tibet and India, which houses the Tibetan government in-exile.

China is indeed Nepal’s neighbour and both have a right to maintain independent relations. However, history and geography have conspired to make Nepal dependent on India for its essential supplies. That doesn’t grant India a license to bully Nepal but nevertheless keeps Nepal from blatantly ignoring the political rights of a section of its citizens just because they trace their origins to India.

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