In 2002, the Pentagon ran a free-form exercise code-named Millennium Challenge.



The exercise was designed to test U.S. tactics against a modern foe based on Iran.

The “Red Team,” led by a retired Marine Corps general, repeatedly beat U.S. forces by using unorthodox tactics.

As the world reacts to the U.S. military’s killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani, many experts are predicting Iran will treat the incident as an act of war. In 2002 the Pentagon ran an expensive wargame designed to simulate what a war with Iran would be like—and the U.S. lost heavily.

The exercise was a reminder that opponents like Iran will eke out any possible advantage they can against larger, more heavily armed U.S. forces, and that assuming enemy forces will do what U.S. forces think they will—and not what will give them the best advantage—is a serious mistake.

Millennium Challenge was a congressionally-mandated exercise designed to test new experimental concepts in warfare. The scenario was that the Blue Force, the U.S. military, was invading a smaller, yet scrappy Middle Eastern country (Iran), in a time frame set five years in the future, or 2007. A rogue commander within the Red force country initiated hostilities against his neighbors, leading to his invasion of disputed islands in the region. Blue Force’s goal was to reopen shipping lanes, neutralize Red’s weapons of mass destruction, and liberate the territory conquered by Red.

U.S. Marines with 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, charge onto an MV-22 Osprey during an aerial assault exercise on Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Dec. 5, 2019. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Jacob Wilson

The Pentagon asked retired Marine Corps general Paul Van Riper to return to command Red forces, as Van Riper was known as a maverick with a reputation for unorthodox thinking. He was seen as a good fit for Red/Iran, which would seek to maximize every bit of capability it had to repel the American attack.

Faced with imminent attack, Van Riper decided to go on the offensive as soon as U.S. forces were in range. The Bush Administration had recently announced its doctrine of “pre-emption,” meaning the U.S. would strike first before threats grew too serious. Van Riper was reasonably sure then as two aircraft carriers, six amphibious ships, and their combined escorts bore down on him that war was likely. Van Riper decided to attack first, to “pre-empt the pre-empters.” As War on the Rocks explained:

Once U.S. forces were within range, Van Riper’s forces unleashed a barrage of missiles from ground-based launchers, commercial ships, and planes flying low and without radio communications to reduce their radar signature. Simultaneously, swarms of speedboats loaded with explosives launched kamikaze attacks. The carrier battle group’s Aegis radar system—which tracks and attempts to intercept incoming missiles—was quickly overwhelmed, and 19 U.S. ships were sunk, including the carrier, several cruisers, and five amphibious ships. “The whole thing was over in five, maybe ten minutes,” Van Riper said.

The problem? U.S. forces had expected Van Riper to sit back and come under attack, and then to launch a counterattack with his surviving forces, which could be easily brushed aside. Van Riper, who actually wanted to win the exercise, refused to sit on his hands and let the Americans attack first.

Members of the 82nd Airborne Division conduct an airdrop over Drop Zone Sicily, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 2016. Photo by Senior Airman Ericka Engblom

Van Riper’s success led to a problem. With the U.S. fleet sunk, including the Marine landing force, the exercise was effectively over in the first inning. Red team had won. In order to continue the exercise, the exercise controllers “refloated” the U.S. fleet and allowed the exercise to continue as though Red’s victory had never happened.

Red team also used unorthodox means to communicate, frustrating U.S. intelligence that expected it to use modern communications techniques. Van Riper had kicked off his attack on the U.S. fleet, as The Guardian describes, “gave a signal—not in a radio transmission that might have been intercepted, but in a coded message broadcast from the minarets of mosques at the call to prayer. The seemingly harmless pleasure craft and propeller planes suddenly turned deadly, ramming into Blue boats and airfields along the Gulf in scores of al-Qaida-style suicide attacks.”

He also used motorcycle runners to pass orders to subordinates, whose messages could not be intercepted by U.S. aircraft designed to eavesdrop on enemy communications.

An Iranian Revolutionary Guard Naval Forces speedboat armed with a heavy machine gun. AFP Getty Images

Meanwhile, the exercise controllers imposed unrealistic limitations on Van Riper’s Red Team. As U.S. forces gathered to launch an air assault, it became clear the controllers were determined to let them succeed.

“The red team was ready to begin shooting down the V-22s when Van Riper’s chief of staff received a message from the white cell. Hostile fire against the V-22s or blue’s C-130 troop transport planes was forbidden. The white cell also directed the chief of staff that the red team had to position its air defense assets out in the open so the blue forces could easily destroy them. Even after some were not destroyed, the red team was forbidden to fire upon blue forces as they conducted a live airborne drop.”

The search for Red Team weapons of mass destruction was also compromised. According to The New York Times “the enemy figured out how to move its chemical weapons around so that the Americans could not find them, that caused problems for the simulation—so control of the chemical weapons was handed over to the Americans, who then managed to destroy them.”

At one point in the exercise, Van Riper was so disgusted with how controllers were running it, tying the hands of Red to ensure a Blue victory, that he sat the rest of it out, reserving his scorn for a report published afterward.

Japan’s super-battleship Yamato burning and under attack in the last weeks of World War II. Japanese hubris during prewar exercises created a false sense of superiority over potential adversaries--particularly the U.S. Navy. Historical Getty Images

In the years leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Imperial Japanese Navy ran and re-ran several simulated battles with U.S. forces in case war broke out between the two countries. Many of these exercises ended with heavy losses for Japan’s carrier fleet. The solution? Simply re-float the ships and declare victory. It was this sort of hubris that arguably contributed to Japan’s overconfidence entering the war and eventual defeat.

There are two sides to the meddling that took place during Millennium Challenge. On one hand, if the U.S. Navy is beaten on the field, it’s beaten. That having been said, if the fleet isn’t re-floated to continue the exercise nothing else happens and all of the preparation is for nothing. Lessons that could be learned farther along the exercise never happen at all.

At the same time, it also seems clear that the U.S. side and their controllers were determined to ram through their vision of warfare, and that an opposing side that was equally determined to win was simply kneecapped to ensure Blue team victory.

Millennium Challenge wasn’t controversial because U.S. forces won, it was controversial because the other side was prohibited from having an actual shot at winning. The lesson of Millennium Challenge is that the enemy will do what it needs to do to win, not what the U.S. military needs it to do.

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