Von Clausewitz and the Indian General Elections

Von Clausewitz in his magnum opus, On War expanded on a wide variety of topics related to war, the stratagems to be used, the tactics to be avoided and advised the Prince on how best he could win any war.

His principles apply just as much to war as to life in general and definitely politics in particular as an election campaign today is played out as a total war between the key players. If Rahul Gandhi had studied Clausewitz and applied his key maxims, he might have just avoided the humiliating defeat that he was. He could still pay heed to the lessons of Clausewitz and script a slow comeback as no victory is total, and the victors eventually become the losers. Time as always is the great leveller, but it requires boldness, agency and guile to bring down an enemy as strong and clever as Mr Modi and Mr Shah.

Note — The Version of On War or Vom Kreige used here is the Howard and Paret translation.

To begin, the 3 key objectives of any war that Clausewitz lays down are,

(1) To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy;

(2) To take possession of his material and other sources of strength, and

(3) To gain public opinion.

We can translate this into electoral terms as,

(1) To conquer the opposition’s vote bank

(2) To match his resources and sources of strength, and if not match, deploy your limited resources wisely

(3) To gain public opinion — Self explanatory

According to Clausewitz, the key rules that are mandatory to achieving these goals are,

(1) Use all the forces at our disposal with utmost energy, and more than the physical benefits the effect of seeing a visible presence, the public opinion benefits are commensurately high. This Clausewitz says, has immense advantages for the morale of your troops and the importance of morale cannot be understated

(2) To concentrate said forces (from point 1) on 1 key location, even if it leaves us vulnerable in other flanks, but to consistently hammer home this one weak point till it gives. Later German theorists refined this to the “Schwerpunkt” or focus of gravity / main point.

(3) Never waste time — Speed and agility are key. We should keep the enemy second guessing about our moves at any point in time

(4) Finally, when you gain any success, even if limited, you focus on these to the exclusion of everything else

With the broad strategies laid out, let us break down the rules for Offensive and defensive and then link it to how Rahul / Congress “strategists” failed so miserably. I say both offensive and defensive because as the incumbent, Rahul Gandhi was on the offensive, but as the inheritor of a long legacy, he was also on the defensive, and esp as the Cong runs many states in India today.

The General principles of Offense –

(1) Schwerpunkt — As explained above, Clausewitz and later German theorists preferred choosing one (or maybe 2) weak points in the enemy’s line and focussing all efforts there.

Here, Rahul failed miserably. He kept opening so many different fronts, be it the Tukde Tukde protests, the Patidar protests, siding with the likes of Jignesh Mewani, the whole “intolerance rising” campaign, Rafale and its sub “Chowkidar chor hai campaign” that his messaging was not clear and rather than choose a week point in the line, he went for a mad frontal assault on the strongest part of the line (more on this in a bit). He diffused his energy and resources so much so that what should have been a Tsunami and a tidal wave of epic proportions on one aspect of the Modi regime (which it was, is not the subject here) broke as tiny wavelets on many aspects. Even the most hardcore Congress supporter was left confused on what the line of attack was.

(2) Avoiding a frontal assault (Clausewitz interestingly only recommends a frontal assault when on the defensive)- A frontal assault is when you attack the enemy in his strongest point and hope to overwhelm his line, break it up into two and destroy the now disjointed line piecemeal. This however is one of the most unsuccessful tactics in history and only the rare genius like Raja Hemu dares use this and win (Hemu used it in 10 battles and won every single time….ask me how if you are interested, but again, topic for another write up). The whole of WW1 were frontal assaults and we all know how that went.

Again, Rahul failed miserably in choosing his target. Mr Modi’s greatest assets are his personal probity and incorruptible image and by centring his campaign around “Chowkidar Chor Hai” Rahul played into Modiji’s greatest strength, thus weakening his assault even before it began. Like the armies of WW1, he repeatedly smashed head first onto the wall of Modiji’s image, using energy, resources and getting naught for it. Then came Balakot and Rahul Gandhi started assaulting Modi’s Maginot line, head on with disastrous consequences for the Congress. Or the confusing stategem of visiting temples on one day and then meeting Muslim clerics the other day and asking for the “secular” vote….where was the consistency of messaging?

Windmills have been tilted at with greater and more positive outcomes

(3) I will quote the strategist here, and his words will without an explanation even tell you how Rahul failed here.

The concerted attacks of the divisions and army corps should not be obtained by trying to direct them from a central point, so that they maintain contact and even align themselves on each other, though they may be far apart or even separated by the enemy. This is a faulty method of bringing about cooperation, open to a thousand mischances. Nothing great can be achieved with it and we are certain to be thoroughly beaten by a strong opponent. The true method consists in giving each commander of an army corps or a division the main direction of his march, and in pointing out the enemy as the objective and victory as the goal.

Prussian theorists worked on with deadly effect and which bore fruit in WW2, the principle of Auftragstaktik or mission command. You basically identify trusted subordinates, give them a general direction and the final aim and let them get along with it.

Rahul Gandhi though, given his innate distrust of any power centre aside from the Gandhi dynasty (it must be hereditary starting with Nehru as all the Nehru-Gandhis have been loath to share power) went with the centralised command route. The central command aka himself decided the issues, and the foot soldiers and generals were mustered and pointed specifically at the few areas identified as campaign issues. Local issues, state level discontent etc were all given the go by and the focus was…Mr Modi. Again, this was Mr Modi’s greatest strength, Mr Modi and in focussing all his resources on Mr Modi, Rahul just weakened his entire campaign. Now look at the states which won, Punjab, Kerala and you will see that both these states fought on their own terms, esp Punjab, which under the dynamic General Mr Amarinder Singh remains a fortress that even the BJP war machine cannot touch. However, no other regional satrap has the gravitas and dignitas that Capt Singh can muster, and hence kow-tow to the high command and the result is writ large for everyone to see. Now just compare this to the BJP strategy- Mr Himanta in the East, Mr Ram Madhav in UP, Mr Fadnavis and his own team in Maha — every state unit had a say and fought on local issues with Mr Modi providing the covering fire. Look at the depth of leadership the BJP has and compare it to the Cong (or any of the “secular” parties really) and the difference is clear for all to see.

The key defensive principles laid down by this great strategist are,

(1) To keep the bulk of our troops covered till such time the right opportunity opens up for a counter offensive

Rahul Gandhi opened with all guns blazing 4.5 years ago, and kept going so that by the time when possible opportunities opened up for a counter attack, his party and the ecosystem indeed was fatigued and most importantly the JantaJanardhan were done paying attention to these. The Public battle was lost going into 2019.

(2) Never remain completely passive and this is the only time Clausewitz recommends a frontal attack

Arguably this is the one maxim that Rahul Gandhi has followed, but he overplayed this and thus weakening his position in the end game

(3) Aim High or go home, no halfway measures here — Clausewitz recommends that the objectives, even when on the defence should be a total and complete annihilation of the enemy and that (this is very important) if our aims are limited but the enemy has a higher war aim, then we are finished.

Rahul Gandhi lost the plot here entirely when the Cong didn’t even contest on enough seats so that it would secure a majority even if it tried, and this was hammered home when Rahul Gandhi abandoned Amethi for the safe seat of Wayanad. He abandoned his forces and fled when they most needed him leading from the front. The blow to the morale of the soldiers and the optics (public opinion again) were so terrible that there was no recovering from these blows

Clausewitz also cautions the Prince, . Even under the most favorable circumstances and with greatest moral and physical superiority, the aggressor should foresee a possibility of great disaster”, and yet in every interview, speech we only got the sense that Rahul Gandhi believed his own stories, remember the famous “Modi is finished, I tell you finished” or “Modi’s image was his strength and I went after it” soundbytes? Aided by the Lutyens or sorry should I say Khan Market ecosystem, who sounded the death knell everytime the BJP even lost a single bypoll, they made it sound as though Modi’s defeat was inevitable and that Rahul himself to paraphrase Thanos, was inevitable.

Finally and this seems prophetic when applied to Modiji, Clausewitz says,

in any measure we may undertake, we always have the choice between the most audacious and the most careful solution. Some people think that the theory of war always advises the latter. That assumption is false. If the theory does advise anything, it is the nature of war to advise the most decisive, that is, the most audacious. Theory leaves it to the military leader, however, to act according to his own courage, according to his spirit of enterprise, and his self-confidence. Make your choice, therefore, according to this inner force; but never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity. Open your heart to such emotion. Be audacious and cunning in your plans, firm and persevering in their execution, determined to find a glorious end, and fate will crown your youthful brow with a shining glory, which is the ornament of princes, and engrave your image in the hearts of your last descendants.

Modiji has always been audacious, be it the DeMon gambit, or Balakot strikes, hasn’t ever shied taking the battle to the enemy, attacks them on the flanks, keeps them second guessing as to his own motives (very Napoleonic this particular trait), conserves his energy till the end game, his aim and goals have been stated clearly at a broad level — Gandhi mukth Congress and a Congress mukth Bharath — and these are audacious in themselves. Has a talented roster of subordinates and he sets the policy direction and lets them execute the policy vision as they see fit. Clearly, the student of Clausewitz or should I say Chankya (as he would prefer) is Modiji and not Rahul.

As someone who has followed Indian politics for decades like others follow sports and studied it causally, in Modi I see the perfect political animal and very few could have matched him in skill and guile (and not even talking about the massive force multiplier of Mr Shah), Gandhiji? Mrs Indira? At a regional level a M Karunanidhi in his peak form and maybe a few others am missing, but the point is simple, Rahul is outmatched, outplayed and outgunned from the get go and even Clausewitz might help him go only that much.