For years, Hamas, Syria and Hezbollah, all "proxies" of Iran, have been seen as Iran's vanguard in threatening Israel. But with President Bashar al-Assad fighting for survival against a Syrian popular uprising, of which Syria's majority Sunnis are an integral part, Hamas could not continue its close relationship with Syria. To Assad's intense anger, Hamas has declined to support him against his people. Reportedly, Meshal remained in Damascus only under immense Iranian pressure. Meanwhile, Hamas activists are streaming out of the city, and it is a good bet that Meshal's successor, yet to be chosen, won't be based there. The recent thaw between Jordan and Hamas leads to speculation he might be in Amman. Jordan can under no circumstances be turned into a base for attacks on Israel, but it would be an excellent venue for a change of policy as well as of leadership.

Already, Hamas has softened its image--and seemingly its political stance as well. It announced on December 29 it was ceasing attacks against Israel (but not renouncing violence). In the wake of the deal that freed Gilad Shalit and over one thousand Palestinians, it is also renewing its dormant "reconciliation" with Fatah.

If Hamas is distancing itself from Iran, its longtime patron, and Syria is not in a position to threaten anyone outside its borders for the foreseeable future, the organization needs to find a new patron--which may require an adjustment of its policies. Even if rapprochement with Jordan develops, Jordan is too small a player to be Hamas's main patron. The obvious candidate for the role is Egypt, home of Hamas's parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. But Egypt, like Jordan, is at peace with Israel, and there is little likelihood that will change, even with the Brotherhood as the dominant political party. Thus, even though Hamas will not "recognize" Israel, (a process rarely demanded of a political movement), it will have to realize that it cannot be launching missiles against a country with which its potential new patrons have peace treaties that they value highly.

And this brings us back full circle to "Hamas's brutal assaults" on the Shia in Gaza. It is little recognized in Israel and the West that Hamas has a running battle going on with the PIJ within Gaza, which gains new adherents whenever Hamas makes a move towards moderation. PIJ has been linked to al-Qaeda, whereas Hamas has been supported by Iran. It now seems that Iran and PIJ are allied, and so Hamas viewed itself as really attacking its old enemy, PIJ. Hamas clearly understands that these PIJ members are demonstrating their loyalty to Iran by proclaiming themselves Shia. Its erstwhile patron is supporting its enemy.

Thus, Hamas could now be in serious trouble. The spring that has helped Islamists elsewhere in the region has deprived Hamas of its longtime patrons and emboldened and empowered its enemy at home--PIJ. It must somehow adapt--quickly--to the new climate. This helps explain its seeming moderation, though it has given hints of this possibility for years.