Abstract: The Berlin truck attack last December by Anis Amri, a Tunisian extremist suspected of communicating with Islamic State operatives in Libya, was not just the first fatal Islamic State-linked attack on German soil. It also exposed the danger posed by a radical network that Amri belonged to in northwestern Germany. The network, led by Iraqi preacher Abu Walaa, is believed to have recruited dozens to travel to join the Islamic State, communicated extensively with Islamic State operatives in Syria and Iraq, and encouraged attacks on German soil. What investigators are learning about the network could have severe implications for European security.

On December 19, 2016, Tunisian extremist Anis Amri hijacked a heavy truck after shooting and killing its driver and drove it through the Christmas market in Berlin’s Breitscheidplatz, killing 11 and wounding 55. Four days later, the Islamic State-affiliated news agency Amaq released a video of Amri in which he had pledged allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and vowed to slaughter “crusaders who are shelling the Muslims every day.”1 The Breitscheidplatz attack was the first confirmed Islamic State-related terror attack in Germany that resulted in fatalities.

Prior to the attack, German law enforcement agencies were well aware Amri was a sympathizer of the Islamic State and had talked about committing an attack.2 They were also aware that he was in contact with both Islamic State operatives outside of Germany3 and the so-called Abu Walaa network, a recruiting network for the Islamic State in Germany headed by 32-year-old Iraqi salafi preacher Ahmad Abdulaziz Abdullah Abdullah, known to his followers as Abu Walaa.4 One former militant, recruited by Abu Walaa for the Islamic State, labeled the Iraqi preacher the “Islamic State’s top representative in Germany” in his interrogation by German security officials after his defection from the group.5 Abu Walaa’s proselytization efforts created a cluster of extremists in Germany similar to those around other charismatic preachers in Europe such as Abu Hamza al-Masri6 at London’s Finsbury Park mosque; Anjem Choudary7 and Islam4UK; Fouad Belkacem and the Sharia4Belgium group in Antwerp;8 Mirsad Omerovic (aka Ebu Tejma) in Austria,9 with which the Abu Walaa network was at least loosely connected;10 and Khalid al-Zerkani’s network in Brussels.11 German investigators believe the Abu Walaa network, operating primarily out of Dortmund and Duisburg in North Rhine-Westphalia and Hildesheim in Lower Saxony, partly financed itself by “stealing from the infidels” through burglaries, much like the Zerkani network, as well as with fraudulent loans.12

This article draws on court documents, investigative files, and interviews with German counterterrorism officials and months of investigative reporting to outline Amri’s background, radical trajectory, execution of the Breitscheidplatz attack, and ties to the Abu Walaa network. It details key figures of the Abu Walaa network and how they operated, indoctrinated, recruited, and communicated. It then also examines what is known about the links between the Abu Walaa network and Islamic State operatives in Syria. Finally, this article examines the implications for the threat moving forward in Germany and Europe.

Anis Amri’s Pathway to Terror

Anis Ben Othmane Amri was born on December 22, 1992, in Tataouine, Tunisia. He grew up in Oueslatia in the Kairouan Governorate in northern Tunisia13 with three brothers and five sisters.14 Though the area where he grew up is known to be a salafi stronghold—where groups like Ansar al Sharia used to hold public recruitment drives15—there is no indication that he became radicalized while living in Tunisia. Instead, he was a troublemaker who dropped out of school when he was 15, lived off occasional jobs, and turned to drugs and alcohol. “My son Anis drank and stole, but he was radicalized in Europe,” Amri’s father said after the Berlin attack.16 In 2010, Amri stole a vehicle and was sentenced to prison by a Kairouan court.17 But amid the chaos of the Tunisian revolution, he managed to avoid prison by fleeing the country.

When Amri entered the European Union on April 4, 2011,18 via the Italian island of Lampedusa, he claimed to be 16 years old.a After his arrival, he was placed in a refugee shelter for minors in Belpasso, Sicily. The Italian authorities asked Tunisia for travel documents in order to return Amri to his home country, but the request went unanswered.19 In October 2011, Amri and four other Tunisian refugees attacked a staff member at the shelter and started a fire.20 Amri was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison. It was during his incarceration in different Italian jailsb that Amri became radicalized.21 A report for the Italian Committee for Strategic Anti-Terrorism Analysis (CASA) stated that Amri was considered a “dangerous person” and a “leader of the Islamists in prison” and that he was “transferred due to severe security concerns.” Amri had threatened and attacked staff22 and reportedly threatened to decapitate a Christian inmate.23

On June 17, 2015, Italy was legally required to release Amri from a deportation facility because Tunisian authorities had not responded to its request to send travel documents for him.24 After his release, Amri traveled to Switzerland, where he stayed for around two weeks before traveling to Germany.25 In early July 2015, German police in the city of Freiburg, near the Swiss border, registered Amri for “unlawful entry” under the name Anis Amir and took his fingerprints and photo.c

In the first six months after his arrival in Germany, between July and December 2015, Amri registered at least five times as an asylum seeker under different identities.26 d Altogether, he would use 14 identities in Germany.27

Under his different names,28 he attracted police attention several times—for example, for stealing a bicycle, hitting a security guard with a fist in the face,e and having pictures of people in black robes posing with AKs on his cell phone. In November 2015, a police informant within the Abu Walaa network, known as “VP01,” told state criminal police in North Rhine-Westphalia that an individual named “Anis” wanted to do “something here” and that he claimed he wanted to get a Kalashnikov in France or Italy.f

Amri attended classes at “Madrasa Dortmund,” a Qur’an school in the eponymous German city. He also had keys to the building and often slept there overnight.29 The school was run by Boban Simeonovic, a Serbian and German national who had converted to Islam30 and had allegedly become a top deputy to Abu Walaa.31 Simeonovic was something of a guru to Amri. He mentored him and allegedly expressed approval when he discovered Amri’s desire to launch some kind of attack in Germany, according to the informant VP01.32 At the time, police considered Amri a messenger for the Abu Walaa network.33 A police profile of Amri lists five contacts in “Madrasa Dortmund,” including Simeonovic. Also on the list is Hasan Celenk, a 51-year-old Turkish-Kurdish preacher who, alongside Simeonovic, was allegedly the other top deputy to Abu Walaa.34 Besides talking about committing an attack in Germany, Amri also aspired to join the Islamic State in Syria. According to investigative files, in December 2015 and January 2016, Simeonovic talked to others in the Abu Walaa network about organizing the logistics in order to send Amri to Syria.35 The informant VP01 reported Amri participated in a hike with heavy backpacks that Simeonovic had organized to improve the physical fitness of those who were about to leave for Syria.g

In late 2015, Amri began commuting between Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia. He was occasionally under police surveillance, and his phone calls were intercepted.36 Underscoring the interconnections between extremists in Germany, Amri’s name appeared in two other terror-related police investigations. One was an investigation into three Tunisian nationals, where Amri was flagged for being a contact person of a contact person of the three.h He was also flagged as a result of intercepted phone calls37 that were wiretapped in an investigation against Tunisian national Bilel Ben Ammar,38 i who was a close contact of Amri.39 The two men had dinner together on the night prior to the Breitscheidplatz attack, and Amri occasionally stayed in Ben Ammar’s room in a refugee shelter in Berlin.40 Both men also attended prayers at the Fussilet mosque in Berlin, which Amri visited on the day of the attack and where he used to sleep occasionally.41 The Fussilet mosque is run by an association named “Fussilet 33 e.V.,” which had already attracted police attention for suspected Islamic State recruiting.j

In January 2016, the federal interior intelligence service, BfV, noted that Amri was traveling under different identities to Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Baden-Württemberg.42 During this time, he had conversations with other members of the Abu Walaa network, urging them to carry out an attack with him. Nevertheless, in early February, federal criminal police BKA assessed the probability of an attack carried out by Amri at 7 out of 8, which, under its definition, means an attack can nearly be ruled out. 43 k On February 12, Amri was photographed at the DIK mosque in Hildesheim,44 where Abu Walaa preached.l The criminal police in North Rhine-Westphalia classified Amri as a Gefährderm (individual posing a threat) on February 17, 2016.45 The next day, Berlin police stopped Amri upon his arrival at the central bus station and confiscated his mobile phone on the grounds it had been stolen.46 Later, an analysis of the phone would reveal that Amri had searched for information about the production of pipe bombs on the internet47 and that he had two Libyan phone numbers among his contacts,48 with which he communicated via the Telegram messenger.49 German foreign intelligence service BND linked the Libyan numbers to the Islamic State.50 On January 19, 2017, four weeks after the Berlin attack, the United States struck two Islamic State camps southwest of Sirte, Libya, after intelligence reportedly indicated the possible presence of external attack plotters with suspected links to the Breitscheidplatz attack.51

When law enforcement agencies learned that Amri was planning on stealing goods from the house of a wealthy Lebanese outside Berlin in order to acquire money for the purchase of weapons, the Berlin prosecutor launched an official investigation. From April 2016, Amri was placed under surveillance in Berlin and his phone wiretapped.n The intercepted conversations made plain his Islamist ideology but also his involvement in ordinary crime like fraud and theft. From May, Amri’s conversations increasingly centered on criminal enterprises and his wish to return to Tunisia rather than being Islamist in content.o German investigators were aware he dealt drugs and that he consumed ecstasy and cocaine, which contributed to the assessment that he did not post an imminent threat.52

In July, Amri was involved in an assault on a dealer in the drug scene around Berlin’s Görlitzer Park. Then, on July 30, he was arrested in a bus when he tried to leave for Switzerland with falsified Italian identification cards. Investigators believe Amri was possibly on his way back to Tunisia. After two days in custody pending deportation, he was released because German authorities had no verification of his identity from Tunisia.53 In September and October, Moroccan intelligence warned Germany that Amri was an Islamic State sympathizer. The Moroccans told Germans that Amri hoped to join the Islamic State in Syria or Libya and was undertaking an unspecified “project.”p The Moroccan warning seems to be related to Amri’s part-time roommate54 Toufik N., a Moroccan national whose parents allegedly were Islamic State sympathizers and whose father had cousins who were Islamic State members.55

Most of what Amri did between the end of the wiretap of his phone on September 21 and the attack on December 19 is still unclear. Investigators have established Amri shot the video in which he pledges bay`a to al-Baghdadi and vows to slaughter “crusaders” on October 31 or November 1, about seven weeks prior to the attack.56

Five days before the attack, on December 14, Amri came to Berlin.q Both the phone he used at this point and the prepaid SIM card inside it originated in Switzerland,57 r as did his gun, a .22 caliber, German-made Erma.58 On December 18, one day before the attack, Amri met his friend, the suspected Tunisian extremist Bilel Ben Ammar, for dinner at a restaurant.

On the day of the attack, Amri repeatedly called a former roommate (investigators have not said which one), but it remains unclear if they actually spoke.59 In the afternoon, Amri went to the Friedrich-Krause-Ufer, where heavy trucks are regularly parked.s The area is also in the vicinity of Fussilet mosque and less than a mile from the Kieler Bridge, where Amri filmed his pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State.t Having found a truck to hijack, Amri shot its Polish driver, Lukasz U.,60 in the head and took control of the vehicle. As subsequent analysis of the truck’s GPS system has revealed, Amri practiced driving the vehicle before he left the truck and went over to the Fussilet mosque.61 He then returned at around 7:30 PM and drove in the direction of Breitscheidplatz. On his way, he sent a voice message and a picture from within the truck via the Telegram messaging app to several individuals in Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia. “My brother, everything is okay, inshallah. I am inside the vehicle now. Pray for me, my brother, pray for me.” 62



Anis Amri in the attack claim video he filmed on the Kieler Bridge (Amaq)

At around 8:00 PM, Amri drove the truck into the Christmas market at Breitscheidplatz. The truck was stopped by an automatic braking system after it was driven approximately 70 meters through the market, preventing even greater loss of life.63 Amri escaped on foot and was caught by a CCTV camera at a nearby zoo station where he displays the Tawhid index finger, obviously aware of the cameras. The next trace of Amri surfaced on the afternoon of the next day, when someone—most likely Amri himself 64—logged into one of Amri’s Facebook accounts and deleted it. It is very likely that he went to Emmerich, close to the Dutch border, where he had previously lived and where a witness has claimed to have seen him.65

On December 21, CCTV subsequently reviewed by investigators picked him up at train stations in the Dutch town of Nijmegenu and then in Amsterdam and Brussels, from where he apparently took a bus to France. On December 22, Amri’s 24th birthday, he was filmed at Lyon Part-Dieu station, where he bought a ticket to Milan via Chambéry and Turin. At 12:58 AM on December 23, Amri was caught on CCTV exiting Milan’s main station. Two hours later, he opened fire on two police officers who, in a random search, asked him for his ID at the suburb station of Sesto San Giovanni. Using the same Erma gun he had used to kill the Polish truck driver, Amri shot one officer in the shoulder before he himself was shot and killed. It remains unclear where he was heading when he left the Sesto San Giovanni station. Seventy-seven hours had elapsed since the attack at Breitscheidplatz.66

The Abu Walaa Network

Abu Walaa67 and four of his alleged accomplices were arrested in Lower Saxony and North Rhine Westphalia on November 8, 2016,68 about six weeks prior to Amri’s attack. Abu Walaa and his alleged aides Ahmed Fifen Youssouf (also known as Abu Faruq), a 27-year old Cameroonian national, and Mahmoud Omeirat (also known as Abu Samir), a 28-year-old Lebanon-born German,69 were arrested in Lower Saxony. All three men had been active in a mosque run by “Deutsch-Islamischer Kulturverein e.V.” (DIK) in Hildesheim, a town with a population of about 100,000 in Lower Saxony. After 2012 when DIK opened the mosque,70 Hildesheim emerged as one of hotspots of the salafi scene in Germany, and many extremists moved there.71

In North Rhine-Westphalia, German police simultaneously arrested two other leading figures in the network. One was Boban Simeonovic (also known as Abu Abdurahman), a 27-year-old Serbian and German national, who holds a degree in chemical engineering and ran the madrasa in Dortmund. The other was Hasan Celenk (also known as Abu Yaha al-Turki), a 51-year-old Turkish national who preached in his travel agency in nearby Duisburg. These two were the leading figures in the Abu Walaa network with whom Amri had repeated contact.72

All five individuals were arrested for supporting a foreign terrorist organization73 and are currently awaiting trial in pre-trial confinement. Investigators believe they were the central figures in a network that recruited people for the Islamic State and facilitated their travel to join the group in Syria.

While the informant “VP01” had provided police in North Rhine-Westphalia with crucial intelligence on the network (and on Amri) since the second half of 2015, German police had apparently held off making arrests for two reasons. One was insufficient evidence caused in part by Abu Walaa’s high level of operational security,v and the other was protecting the identity of “VP01.”w It was not until Anil O.—a 22-year-old Turkish-German medical student recruited by the network in Germany in 2015—fled the Islamic State’s caliphate in early 2016, voluntarily returned to Germany,74 and became a key witness against Abu Walaa and his accomplices that German police moved against the network.x

Investigators believe the Abu Walaa network had a clear hierarchy with Celenk and Simeonovic appointed as the regional leaders for North Rhine-Westphalia and Abu Walaay acting as the leader at the federal level of a “nationwide network of salafi-jihadi indoctrinators, which are closely interlinked and act in a work sharing manner.”75 The German federal public prosecutor accuses Celenk, Simeonovic, and Abdullah of teaching their “students” a common curriculum aimed at preparing them for hijra and jihad, which included an Islamic State textbook on theological doctrine published by al-Ghuraba Media.76 As well as being taught Arabic, students were theologically and ideologically indoctrinated and constantly reminded that it was their duty to join the Islamic State’s caliphate.

According to Anil O., Abu Walaa was the Islamic State’s top representative in Germany,z with the ability to approve people for the hijra and their entry into Islamic State territory.aa Abu Walaa himself had allegedly told Anil O. that he was the only one in Germany who was approved by the Islamic State to make fatwas.77 According to Anil O.’s account, Abu Walaa personally advised him to travel via Brussels and Rhodes to Turkey in order to reach Islamic State territory in Syria. Anil O. also claimed that he was told by Martin Lemke, a German convert from Saxony-Anhalt and a former student of Abu Walaa who now is a senior amniyat (Islamic State intelligence) official in Raqqa,78 that it was Abu Walaa’s advocacy that resulted in him (Anil O.) being freed from an Islamic State prison when he was arrested on charges of espionage and attempted defection.ab Lemke (whose kunya is Nihad Abu Yasir al-Almani) also told Anil O. that he had obtained the position in the amniyat through Abu Walaa, suggesting Abu Walaa had significant cloutac with senior Islamic State figures in Raqqa.79

Abu Walaa was born in al-Tamim, Iraq, in 1984.80 According to Anil O., Abu Walaa told him he was an ethnic Kurd.81 In this regard, it is noteworthy that in a police database under Abu Walaa’s real name Abdullah, there is also a reference to the Kurdish jihadi terror group Ansar al-Islam, though the exact connection remains unclear to the author.82

Abu Walaa came to Germany in 2004 and obtained permanent residency in 2008 through marriage.83 He first appeared in the salafi scene in the state of Hesse, preaching at events held by the Frankfurt-based salafi missionary association Dawa FfM.84 Another preacher who was active for Dawa Ffm, which was outlawed in 2013, was Abdellatif Rouali.85 After Abu Walaa’s arrest, Rouali replaced him as a teacher on al-manhaj.de,ad an online Qur’anic instruction website closely tied to the Hildesheim mosque and that promoted Abu Walaa’s social media channels.86



Abu Walaa, as identified to the author by a source

According to Anil O., Abu Walaa told him he had personally been to the caliphate several times in the period after June 2014.87 German authorities have so far ascertained that Abu Walaa left for Iraq on August 4, 2015—four days before Anil O. himself left Germany—and made a second trip to the country in early 2016. When prior to his arrest Abu Walaa was asked by German police for the reason for his trips, he claimed he wanted to visit relatives in Iraq.88 ae

Abu Walaa’s alleged two top deputies, Celenk and Simeonovic, worked closely together, sometimes even holding joint seminars. Simeonovic, described by Anil O. as an “extreme hardliner” and an outspoken supporter of the Islamic State, was the most hardline of the three—accusing Muslims of takfir (apostasy) “for not knowing certain things.” Celenk allegedly convinced Anil O. that he would have no future in Germany after he was visited by a special police unit.89 Celenk mainly preached at his travel agency in Duisburg, where every Monday and Friday his students had to sit on the floor and repeat Qur’anic verses. Celenk stressed the obligation of participating in jihad and made his students watch Islamic State execution and decapitation videos. According to “VP01,” Simeonovic and Celenk regarded Germany as darul harb, a land of war, and repeatedly mentioned that attacks in Germany were justified and sought to encourage them. The informant claimed that both men were supportive when Amri mentioned several times he would seek to commit an attack in Germany.90 The police informant further reported that one in Celenk’s community had talked about a plan to drive a truck filled with gasoline and loaded with a bomb into a crowd.91 Anil O. also said there was talk within the Abu Walaa community about driving trucks into crowds.92 af

The number of people the Abu Walaa network recruited for the Islamic State remains unknown. The official case file names 12 male individuals recruited by the network who successfully made the hijra and seven who attempted it.93 Some of these 19 individuals traveled with their wives and children, raising the total.94 Others who became foreign fighters for the Islamic State, like the twin brothers Kevin and Mark Knop who both died in suicide attacks,95 ag were not listed in the case files as being recruited by the network but were nevertheless radicalized by one of its key figures, Hasan Celenk.96 In the town of Wolfsburg, some 50 miles from Hildesheim, Yassin Oussaifi, a 32-year-old Tunisian citizen who went by the kunya Abu Obeida recruited 20 young men (mostly of Tunisian descent) for the Islamic State.97 Abu Walaa may have played a role in their radicalization. Not only did he hold a seminar in the town and in nearby Gifhorn but he had a “Dejavu – Jeans and more” store in Wolfsburg’s Porschestrasse 48,ah in close vicinity to where Oussaifi and his followers convened.98 Oussaifi himself joined the caliphate on May 29, 2014, and worked there as a sharia judge.99

Abu Walaa also had a wide presence in the digital sphere.ai He was active on al-manhaj.de, and he had a German and an Arabic Facebook profile and a YouTube channel. His supporters even created AbuWalaa apps for Android and iOS devices. His content also appeared on the social media channels of Islamic State members and supporters.aj Because he never showed his face in videos, Abu Walaa became known as “the preacher without a face.”

Abu Walaa was careful in other respects. He made sure there were no phones in the room when he talked about sensitive issues. Members of his network used the encryption app Telegram to communicate with each other and jihadis overseas.100 In his online messages, the Iraqi preacher did not openly express support for the Islamic State but rather used coded language—for example, when he praised “our lions” fighting for Islam. His words were well understood in the salafi scene as supportive of the Islamic State as Claudia Dantschke, who works in the field of prevention and deradicalization for the NGO Hayat has noted.101 During his “Islam seminars,” Abu Walaa used more explicit language. “Dawla is our country and the caliph is our caliph … we have to fight for our land and kill the kuffar that attack it,” he allegedly stated at one of the seminars.102

Abu Walaa’s main base for his proselytization efforts was the DIK Hildesheim mosque, where he preached regularly on Fridays and had an office. It was from here that he gave money to those who wanted to travel to Syria.ak Up to 350 people would regularly show up at Friday prayers in Hildesheim, with intelligence officials estimating that roughly 10 percent of them were so radicalized that they were willing to use violence.103 In Hildesheim, Abu Walaa was supported by his aides Fifen Youssouf and Omeirat, who, according to the investigations, were responsible for providing recruits with phone numbers of Islamic State contact persons in Turkey.104

Fifen Youssouf was considered a close contact of Simeonovic, with the two having studied together at Dortmund University.105 Later, Fifen Youssouf moved from Hildesheim to Dortmund where he led prayers and allegedly became the “right hand” of Abu Walaa. According to the informant “VP01,” Fifen Youssouf said he was involved in collecting donations for Islamic State fighters in Syria and Iraq and claimed the community at the DIK mosque in Hildesheim had sent almost €2 million ($2.1 million) to their “brothers” since the founding of the mosque in 2012.al Police in Lower Saxony believe that Fifen Youssouf was involved in burglaries, which were theologically justified by Abu Walaa as ghanima (plunder from the infidels).106 Another way the Abu Walaa network raised funds was to tell those who were about to leave for Syria to sign contracts for mobile phones and tablets. The travelers simply stopped paying the monthly fees and gave the phones to Fifen Youssouf and Omeirat so they could resell them.am Anil O. and another alleged member of the network—Yunus S.—were instructed by Abu Walaa to sign contracts for mobile phones for this purpose.107

Anil O. said Fifen Youssouf and Omeirat gave him advice on encrypted communication, inconspicuous behavior, and discretion before he left.108 According to Anil O., the two men also gave him a Turkish cell phone number of an Islamic State trafficker in Turkey, who went by the kunya Abu Osman al-Almani and spoke German. They instructed him to contact them from Turkey once he had established contact with al-Almani.an

Anil O. also said that Omeirat and Fifen Youssouf could obtain passports. They had the means to forge (or arrange for others to forge—Anil O. did not clarify) passports.ao In another ploy, they used stolen passports or borrowed passports from family members of the person willing to make the hijra that would later be sent back to them.109

Abu Walaa was also active in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, for instance at Simeonovic’s Madrasa Dortmund.110 The Iraqi preacher was officially registered as living in the state with his first wife and their three children, specifically in the town of Tönisvorst close to Duisburg, where Hasan Celenk resided. While it remains unclear for how long Celenk and Abu Walaa have known each other, it seems possible that their acquaintance dates back prior to the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014 since both men allegedly had already been in contact with the Islamic State’s predecessor organization. According to Anil O., Abu Walaa mentioned to him (Anil O.) that he maintained direct and close relations to the Islamic State’s “predecessor organisation”ap and that he had been previously appointed to his current position as the group’s representative in Germany by the predecessor organization. “VP01” reported that Celenk had also himself maintained relations to the Islamic State “predecessor organisation.”111

The Abu Walaa network was also linked to another attack in Germany. On April 16, 2016, a bomb detonated outside a Sikh temple in the city of Essen, injuring three.112 The main suspects in the attack, Yusuf T., Mohamed B., and Tolga I., who were all 16 at the time, are currently on trial. Investigators believe that they were part of a group of teenagers 113 who were radicalized by Celenk.114 At least some of the teenagers had also been to Abu Walaa’s mosque in Hildesheim.115 Anil O.116 is among the witnesses against the suspected bombers and claimed Yusuf T. had told him as early as November 2014 that he knew Islamic State members.117

Links Between the Network and the Islamic State

The Abu Walaa network in Germany was closely connected to Islamic State operatives inside Syria and Iraq, especially with prominent figures from Germany. As already noted, among these is Lemke, the 26-year-old German national from Zeitz in the state of Saxony-Anhalt, who converted to Islam and later moved to Hildesheim and then left Germany for Syria with at least one wife and one child in November 2014.aq

The fact that Anis Amri was able to upload a video pledging allegiance to the Islamic State before the Berlin attack, which was subsequently broadcasted by the Islamic State, also showed that members of the Abu Walaa network had ways to transmit information to the group.

During a raid in August 2016 at Simeonovic’s apartment, police found handwritten notes indicating that he was in direct contact with four German-speaking Islamic State members while they were inside the caliphate in Iraq or Syria. One of them was 32-year-old Ahmad Siala from Hildesheim (also known as Abu Nuh(r)). Siala was the former chairman of the DIK e.V.118 and a confidant of Abu Walaa.119

Another individual apparently in contact with Simeonovic was Silvio Koblitz120 (also known as Abu Azzam al-Almani and Abu Soumaya al-Almani), who appeared in an Islamic State video in 2014 and threatened to attack Germany. 121 The 29-year-old Koblitz, who is from East Germany and later moved to Essen, was also part of the Millatu Ibrahim movement, a German extremist network supportive of global jihad with a main base in Solingen.ar Simeonovic’s notes also hinted at direct contact with another prominent figure of Millatu Ibrahim: Austrian national Mohamed Mahmoud122 (also known as Abu Usama al-Gharib). Mahmoud is one of the most prominent German-speaking figures in the Islamic State, has run a mosque for German speakers in Raqqa,123 and has allegedly led a German-dominated Islamic State brigade.124

The fourth individual Simeonovic was allegedly in touch with was only identified by his kunya Abu Qatada,125 an Islamic State operative who apparently functioned as a warrantor for seven Germans who were about to leave to the caliphate at the time Simeonovic wrote the notes. State criminal police in North Rhine-Westphalia believe (or at least did so in October 2016) that Abu Qatada is Christian Emde, a leading figure in the German-speaking Islamic State propaganda branch and a former member of the Millatu Ibrahim movement. Emde, born in Solingen in 1984, converted to Islam and joined the Islamic State in 2013.as

It should be noted that Abu Qatada is also the kunya of an ethnic Albanian from Hamburg who was a close friend of Lemke, and research by the author suggests that this may actually have been the individual with whom Simeonovic was in contact.126 This Albanian is married to Anil O.’s former wife. The Albanian Abu Qatada was a prayer leader in Raqqa who also fought in the brigade of Mohamed Mahmoud and had, according to Anil O., modestly criticized the Islamic State. He was, as a result, confronted by Lemke who told him and Anil O. they would both get executed if they committed any other offense.127

In the conversation recalled by Anil O., Lemke allegedly claimed he had talked with then Islamic State propaganda and amniyat chief Abu Mohammad al-Adnani128 about the case of Abu Qatada.129 Abu Qatada confirmed to Anil O. that Lemke was the amniyat operative in charge of all Germans within the caliphate. Lemke also told Anil O. that he was appointed to this position thanks to his close ties to Abu Walaa.130 According to Anil O., Lemke told him that Abu Walaa knew about everything Lemke was doing in the caliphate.131

Anil O. also claimed132 that when he was in Raqqa, he met other Germans, who came from Solingen (the base of the Millatu Ibrahim association) and from Dinslaken, a city in North Rhine-Westphalia from where more than a dozen members of a group known as the Lohberg group,133 or brigade,at (named after a district of Solingen) had traveled to Syria. A member of the group was 43- or 44-year-old Hüseyin Diler, also known as Abu Hanifa, who was close to Paris attacker Abdelhamid Abbaoud and is wanted in connection with the Paris attack.134 When Anil O. met the Germans, he was asked by one of them what acquaintances he had in militant circles in Germany. When he named Hasan Celenk, the individual contacted Celenk via Telegram and Celenk confirmed that he knew and trusted Anil O.135 According to the official file, Celenk was also aware that Anil O. had left Mosul and suspected he had even left the caliphate, which also indicates that he was in close contact with people inside the caliphate. Celenk had also organized at least one bus trip from Dinslaken to the Hildesheim mosque.136

These were not the only links between Abu Walaa network and the Islamic State. In traveling to join the group, Anil O. claimed that he was picked up in the vicinity of al-Ra’i on the Syrian side of the Turkey-Syria border by Bali Ilhami (also known as Ebu Bekir al-Turki), a Turkish national of Kurdish ethnicity who allegedly fought with the Taliban before entering Syria. Ilhami told Anil O. that the brothers in Germany had informed him that Anil O. would come and that he personally knew Celenk and Abu Walaa. Ilhami also said that Abu Walaa was a longtime supporter of the Islamic State and had been to Islamic State territory several times.137

Islamic State operatives in Syria were aware of the aspirations of at least one member of the Abu Walaa network to carry out an attack. Omeirat had in 2015, according to Anil O., talked about committing attacks on police officers with silenced handguns in Germany and had claimed he had weapons and a silencer. It seems clear that Abu Walaa knew of the alleged attack plans since Anil O. testified he was told by Lemke that he (Lemke) was informed about this plan by Abu Walaa.138

What triggered Omeirat’s desire to attack was a run-in between members of the network and German security services. When Anil O. was approached by a special police unit on July 7, 2015, and served an official document prohibiting him from leaving Germany, he resisted and was injured, while his friend Yunus S. surrendered. Yunus S.’s pregnant wife and Anil O.’s wife were also at the scene. Shortly after the incident, when Anil O. was in Hildesheim, Omeirat told him in the cellar of the mosque that he would take revenge for the police action, according to Anil O.’s account.au

In yet another connection between the Abu Walaa network and the Islamic State, when Anil O. was imprisoned in the caliphate on charges of espionage and attempted defection, a Syrian qadi (Islamic State judge) known as Sheikh Hassan who spoke a little German, asked him who sent him to Syria. When Anil O. replied his recruiter was Abu Walaa, Sheikh Hassan said he knew him. Sheikh Hassan also told Anil O. that he had been to Aachen, where Anil had studied medicine prior to his departure.139

The Future Threat

The case of Anis Amri and the Abu Walaa network has grave implications for the security of Germany and Europe. It shows an interconnectedness between Islamist extremists inside Germany and individuals within the Islamic State who are, in some cases like Lemke, closely connected to the group’s leadership. They were sharing information in real time, coordinating on security-related issues and the logistics for hijra, and in at least one instance communicating on attack plans.

The remaining parts of the Abu Walaa network could still pose a threat. In the Hildesheim mosque community, there are individuals still proselytizing who were very close to Abu Walaa and were possibly involved in the activities of the network. Investigators believe there were more people involved in the recruitment of individuals and the logistics of sending them to Syria than the five arrested.140 With groups like the Abu Walaa network, there appears to be organizational memory that persists even after leading figures are arrested. History shows that banned organizations like Millatu Ibrahim or Dawa FfM were replaced by similar associations with other figures rising up to fill leadership gaps.av The Abu Walaa network itself was at least loosely connected to similar networks in Austria and Turkey141 and possibly elsewhere, which had created a logistical and recruitment pipeline over thousands of miles between Germany and Syria. This interconnectedness provided and likely continues to provide what would otherwise be only groups aligned with the Islamic State and acting independently the ability to pool know-how and resources, making them significantly more effective and dangerous.

The interconnectedness between the Abu Walaa network, other extremist networks in Germany, and the Islamic State provides the latter with a support network in Germany that is familiar with the country and its culture, law, and language. This could provide assistance to any attack cells the Islamic State has dispatched or might dispatch to the country. Online encryption messaging platforms such as Telegram have allowed Islamic State operatives in caliphate territory to keep in touch with recruiters and guide plotters in Europe. Celenk and Simeonovic used Telegram to communicate with Islamic State members in Syria,aw and Amri used Telegram to communicate with Islamic State operatives in Libya, as well as other membersax of the network in Germany.

The presence in Europe of die-hard supporters of the Islamic State like Simeonovic with significant influence over young men, ongoing communication with Raqqa, and a deep commitment to launch attacks on European soil only makes the threat more severe.

While the attack on the Sikh temple in Essen was committed by teenagers linked to and inspired by the Abu Walaa network, almost every other Islamic State-linked terror attack in Germany in 2016—the knife attack on a police officer in Hannover by a then 15-year-old girl in February, the knife and axe attack inside a train close to Würzburg in July by a refugee, the bomb attack in Ansbach in July by a refugee, and the foiled bomb attack by Syrian refugee Jaber al-Bakr142—were remotely guided from outside Germany.143 Such remote control guidance was also possibly a feature of Amri’s attack, given his suspected communications with Islamic State operatives inside Libya.144

The case of Amri shows how difficult it is to predict which individuals will switch from radical rhetoric to radical action and how difficult it is to judge when individuals have shed their radical views. Amri dealt drugs and consumed them, a fact that appears to have led German police to mistakenly conclude that he no longer posed a threat. Amri’s case also shows how difficult it is for German authorities to verify identities of asylum seekers.

The information that has emerged on the Abu Walaa network’s activities in and around a few towns in northwestern Germany, just like the Khalid al-Zerkani network in Brussels and similar networks elsewhere, shows the pernicious and outsize influence of just a few radical preachers and the networks that surround them can have in recruitment for the Islamic State. It seems unclear how similar networks will act now that the hijra to Syria becomes more and more difficult, but it seems that the threat for Germany and Europe will not grow smaller because of this reality. Amri’s contact to Libya shows that there is no necessity to communicate with Syria since Islamic State operatives are spread around many countries.

The case also underlined the high level of operational security maintained by radical networks in Europe, with the Abu Walaa network using encrypted communications and other security protocols.

It took a long time for the leaders of the Abu Walaa network to be arrested as police had to rely on an Islamic State defector to get the necessary proof for arrest warrants. The Berlin attack demonstrated time is not on their side. CTC

Georg Heil is a Berlin-based investigative journalist who focuses on national security and Islamist terrorism. He has worked for public German broadcaster WDR and was part of a team that investigated the Abu Walaa network for more than a year for a documentary, which aired on ARD on November 8, 2016—the day Abu Walaa was arrested. As part of his reporting, he spoke to one of those recruited by the group—Islamic State defector Anil O.—in Turkey. Follow @Georg_Heil

Substantive Notes

[a] Later, Tunisian authorities would inform the Italians that Amri was in fact 18 years old and therefore an adult according to Italian law. Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry, January 17, 2017, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/01/veroeffentlichung-chronologie-anis-amri.html

[b] This article names prisons in Enna, Sciacca, Agrigento, Palermo, and Caltanissetta. Elisa Sguaitamatti and Chris Delis, “New Information Surfaces on Killed Terrorist Anis Amri, as Italian Investigation Continues, “ Balkananalysis blog, December 24, 2016.

[c] It appears that the misspelling of his name was not by mistake but that Amri intentionally provided false information; the date of birth was noted as 12/23/1993 instead of the correct date of 12/22/1992. “Unlawful entry” is a violation of German law (§14 AufenthaltG). Amri was not allowed to enter Germany because he did not have a visa and passport. Under the Dublin regulation, Germany was not responsible for examining any application under the Geneva Convention because Amri must have entered through another European Union country in which he could have applied for asylum. However, he could not be deported because he had no documents. Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry, January 17, 2017.

[d] According to a profile of Anis Amri in a police file, he registered in Berlin, Dortmund, Münster, and Hamburg and used the aliases Mohamed Hassa, Ahmed Almasri, Ahmad Zaghoul, Mohammad Hassan, Anis Amir, and Ahmad Zarzour.

[e] A police investigation against Ahmad Zaghoul (i.e. Amri) was later halted because “Zaghoul” had disappeared. Author interview, German intelligence official, January 2016. The basic fact, without the exact date, was also reported by Der Spiegel and quoted in “Staatsanwaltschaft Duisburg ermittelte gegen Amri wegen Betrugs,” Die Zeit, December 29, 2016.

[f] VP stands for Vertrauensperson, which translates to trusted person. German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[g] The police informant, “VP01,” stated he thought Amri was among the hikers. VP01 did not participate in the hike. German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[h] The investigation was named “Eisbär,” which means polar bear. Author interview, German police official, February 2017.

[i] Germany’s Public Prosecutor General investigated whether Ben Ammar had helped Amri in carrying out the attack but did not find sufficient evidence. Ben Ammar, who used 18 different identities in Germany, denied those accusations. He claimed he did not know anything about the attack and that he had bought cocaine and hashish from Amri. Ben Ammar was deported to Tunisia on February 1, 2017. Lena Kampf and Georg Mascolo, “Amris Freund soll abgeschoben werden,” ARD, January 27, 2017.

[j] The association also ran “Dagestan Mosque” in Berlin, which was closed after Imam Ghazimurad Khanov (also known as Murad Atajev) was arrested on suspicion of recruiting for the Islamic State. “Berliner Imam kommt vor Gericht,“ RBB, March 22, 2016.

[k] The BKA levels range from 1 (assume attack will happen) to 8 (can be ruled out). For more information, see “Anschlagsrisiko galt als eher unwahrscheinlich,” Ostsee Zeitung, January 5, 2017.

[l] According to a German intelligence official the author spoke to in February 2017, there is only proof that Amri visited Hildesheim on this one occasion. The official said a second suspected visit has not yet been proven. Police informant “VP01” named six individuals, among them “Anis,” who had traveled to Hildesheim regularly (according to the case file). While this does not prove Amri had met with Abu Walaa, he would have also had plenty of opportunity to meet him in Dortmund, where Abu Walaa would often visit the “Madrasa Dortmund.”

[m] On February 18, 2016, one day after he was officially labeled a Gefährder, the BKA switched the risk level of Amri from 7 to 5, a higher risk but still meaning it is “rather unlikely that an attack will occur.” There are currently approximately 550 individuals labeled as Gefährder. A significant number of them are German foreign fighters in Syria, and an estimated 150 of them are foreigners within Germany. For more on this designation, see Florian Flade, “Zahlen, Fakten & Gedanken zum Gefährder,” Ojihad Blog, December 23, 2016.

[n] In June, the surveillance of Amri was stopped because it did not bring any evidence of the supposed burglary plan. The wiretap on his phone was terminated on September 21, 2016. Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry, January 17, 2017.

[o] Amri first spoke about his wish to return to Tunisia in mid-May 2016. According to the chronology of the Federal Interior Ministry, German Federal Criminal Police BKA informed police in Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia on May 6 that they had sent an officer to Tunisia, who handed out photos and fingerprints to Tunisian authorities. Then, in August, German authorities asked the Tunisian General Consulate in Bonn for travel documents for Amri and provided the General Consulate with Amri’s fingerprints. But the request was declined because the General Consulate claimed the person was unknown. It was not until two days after the attack that German authorities received the travel documents from Tunisia that were needed to deport him. Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry, January 17, 2017. See also interview with Tunisian PM Youssef Chaed, “Tunisian authorities have made no mistake,” Bild, February 13, 2017.

[p] German officials do not know what this project referred to. Author interview, German counterterrorism expert and intelligence official, February 2017.

[q] The information was reconstructed by the analysis of his mobile phone, which was found at the scene in Breitscheidplatz. Christoph Sydow and Thies Schnack, “77 Stunden quer durch Europa,” Der Spiegel, January 5, 2017.

[r] The Switzerland angles to Amri’s story remain unclear.

[s] According to Die Welt, police are investigating a witness’ claim that a person who looked similar to Amri had tried to steal a truck days before the attack. Florian Flade, “Machte sich Amri Tage vor dem Anschlag an LKW zu schaffen?” Die Welt, February 8, 2017.

[t] Amri did not reveal what or where his target was going to be in the video.“IS veröffentlicht angebliches Video von Amri,“ RBB, December 23, 2016.

[u] Nijmegen is around 40km from Emmerich, where Amri lived in a refugee shelter for a time.

[v] The claim that there was insufficient evidence was made several times to the author by police and intelligence officials during the summer of 2016.

[w] The written testimony of the anonymous informant ”VP01,“ who authorities sometimes refer to by the fake name “Murat Yilmaz,” would have had less sway in court as compared to the testimony of a person whose identity could be revealed.

[x] Anil O. grew up in the town of Gelsenkirchen where he achieved outstanding grades in high school. While living there, he came into contact with salafis in 2012. He later distributed Qur’ans as part of the salafi dawa project “Lies!” in his hometown of Gelsenkirchen, Anil O. had close contact with Hasan Celenk, had attended Simeonovic’s teachings several times, and had also met Abu Walaa, with whom he talked about his hijra plans. Anil O. is currently in pre-trial confinement. He was in Syria between August 2015 and January 15, 2016, according to the warrant. After he entered Turkey, he was detained and later released from prison but had to stay in Turkey until his case was resolved. The author, together with his colleague Volkmar Kabisch, first met Anil O. in Turkey after the author was tipped off that “a German doctor” had defected from the Islamic State. This first meeting with Anil O. happened in early March 2016 when the journalists picked him up after he was released from Turkish prison. Excerpts from a (hidden) camera interview with Anil O., which was filmed in July 2016 in Turkey, can be seen at Britta von der Heide, Georg Heil, and Volkmar Kabisch, “Die Terrorschmiede,” ARD, November 8, 2016, http://www.daserste.de/information/reportage-dokumentation/dokus/die-terrorschmiede-100.html.

[y] Celenk was based in Duisburg and Simeonovic in Dortmund, North Rhine-Westphalia, whereas Abdullah, also known as Abu Walaa, had his main base in a mosque in Hildesheim, Lower Saxony. Abu Walaa had an apartment in North Rhine-Westphalia and one in Lower Saxony. He held Islam seminars in different German cities and was also present several times at al-Madina mosque in the city of Kassel in the state of Hesse, close to Hildesheim.

[z] In an interview in July 2016 for ARD, Anil O. stated Abu Walaa was the Islamic State’s top representative in Germany. He said he was “the representative” without mentioning “the top” when he spoke to German officials. Von der Heide, Heil, and Kabisch; German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[aa] Islamic State registration documents often included details on recommenders. See Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trail (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2016).

[ab] Anil O. claimed he was tortured and interrogated while he was detained by the Islamic State. Author interview, Anil O., 2016.

[ac] It is not clear how much of Abu Walaa’s clout in the Islamic State was linked to his pre-existing ties to the group and how much was linked to his acolytes joining the group and moving up its hierarchy.

[ad] The website is registered in the name Rabih Omeirat in Hildesheim, a relative of Mahmoud Omeirat.

[ae] German police had also labeled Abu Walaa a Gefährder. Author interview, German police official, October 2016.

[af] According to Anil O.’s testimony, among Simeonovic’s students were Arabic-speaking refugees, including some who had relatives in Islamic State-held territory. Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[ag] The brothers were also featured in the Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine, issue 9.

[ah] Abu Walaa also ran a shop in the town of Braunschweig, close to Wolfsburg, which was registered as a Kleingewerbe, or small business, and closed sometime before June 2016. His shops were also listed in these company databases: http://www.registrat.de/wolfsburg/herrn-ahmad-abdulaziz-abdullah-handel-mit-textilien-16565488.html; http://www.nahklick.de/firmeneintrag/tag/ahmad-abdullah-abdulaziz-dejavue-jeans-more.

[ai] As part of his investigative reporting on the Abu Walaa network, the author identified Abu Walaa’s social media accounts. Abu Walaa‘s main Facebook account (25,000+ likes) was https://www.facebook.com/sheikh.abu.walaa/. He was also connected to the following Facebook accounts: https://www.facebook.com/Al-manhaj-858491320887671/; www.FaceBook.de/AlManhajMedia; www.FaceBook.de/SheikhAbuWalaa. His YouTube accounts were https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC3CfRAh1obhp7gglIhUlv6w; https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCs9d7S7-fPgT6KmmqbfukOA; and https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC8Qz8UQ3-zP6Yluk6kZv1jw (Arabic). His Telegram accounts were https://telegram.me/abuwalaa3 and https://telegram.me/al_Manhaj.

[aj] These were the NIWELT, BAQIYYA, NASHIR channels for Islamic State members DAWAPICS for supporters. Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[ak] According to Anil O., Abu Walaa gave the German aspiring Islamic State recruit Yunus S., among others, 500 Euro to facilitate his travel. Yunus S., from the town of Gelsenkirchen, was part of the so-called “sharia police” that patrolled the streets of Wuppertal for a short time in 2014. Yunus S., a friend of Anil O., was supposed to travel at the same time as Anil O. to Syria through Turkey, but Yunus S. chose to stay in Turkey. Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[al] The context makes clear he was referring to “brothers” inside Syria and Iraq.

[am] Anil O. testified that Omeirat and Fifen Youssouf paid him and Yunus S. several hundred Euro for several mobile phones they obtained through the described mobile contracts, thus providing them funds for travel. Anil O. and Yunus S. gave Omeirat and others five iPhones and one MacBook worth €5,000 ($5,300) prior to their departure, some of which were likely obtained fraudulently. German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[an] After Anil O. had reached Antalya in Turkey on a ferry from Rhodes, he traveled to Sanliurfa where he stayed in a safehouse for a week or more, after which he was brought to Gaziantep. He later crossed the border with others close to the Turkish village of Elbeyli. When he saw a Turkish military vehicle, Anil O. thought they would be caught. But then the vehicle’s lights were turned off, and they could pass. Anil O. claims he was told by one of the traffickers that the Islamic State had a mole inside the Turkish border guards who would make sure they could cross the border. Author interview, Anil O., March 2016.

[ao] A source told the author that there was a connection to someone in the Ebu Tejma network in Austria who forged passports.

[ap] It says predecessor organization, therefore it has to be assumed that it refers to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. This indicates Abu Walaa had connections to the group before June 2014 when the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, renamed itself the Islamic State and declared the creation of a caliphate. German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[aq] A witness informed police he/she had heard that Abu Walaa had given Martin Lemke €2000 for the hijra to Syria. German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah. The biographical detail on Lemke is from an author interview with a German counterterrorism official in the summer of 2016.

[ar] In examining the links between Millatu Ibrahim and the Abu Walaa network, it is noteworthy that the same year the German Federal Interior Ministry prohibited the Millatu Ibrahim organization in Solingen in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, the DIK mosque opened in Hildesheim, the neighboring state of Lower Saxony. And when Millatu Ibrahim was banned in May 2012, police also raided a store run by Abu Walaa. Author interview, German intelligence official, fall 2016. For more information on Millatu Ibrahim, see Daniel Heinke and Jan Raudszus, “German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 8:1 (2015).

[as] Emde is known to a broader audience for the Interview he gave to Jürgen Todenhöfer inside the caliphate in Mosul. See https://vimeo.com/152235972. The biographical details on Emde are from an author interview with Claudia Dantschke, an Arabist and expert on deradicalization at the NGO Hayat, in February 2017.

[at] A member of the Lohberg group, Nils D., who returned to Germany and was convicted, was a member of a special unit in the caliphate that hunted defectors. See Lena Kampf and Georg Mascolo, “Deutsche foltern für den Geheimdienst des IS,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 20, 2015.

[au] Part of the approach by the special police unit was filmed and was viewed by the author at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_vTNIbpMROk. German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah. Yunus S. is now believed to be in Turkey and part of the salafi scene there. Author interview, source, February 2017.

[av] The DIK association seems to have learned from the ban of similar groups. According to the registry, it has sold the mosque to a member of the mosque’s community on the condition that the DIK could use it. As the mosque is now owned by a private individual, it cannot be seized by the state.

[aw] Anil O. claimed that German foreign fighters contacted Celenk via Telegram, according to the case file. Simeonovic used Telegram, according to an intelligence official. Author interview, German intelligence official, February 2017; German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[ax] The informant VP01 said he communicated with Amri by Telegram messenger. German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

Citations

[1] Laura Smith-Spark, “Berlin Attack: Amri’s ISIS allegiance video called authentic,” CNN, December 29, 2016.

[2] German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[3] Georg Mascolo, “Wie die Behörden Amri beobachteten – und doch die falschen Schlüsse zogen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 4, 2017; “US-Luftangriff in Libyen Bombardierung soll Kontaktmann von Amri gegolten haben,” Der Spiegel, January 24, 2017.

[4] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[5] Georg Heil, Volkmar Kabisch, and Georg Mascolo, “Das ist der Schlimmste,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 8, 2016.

[6] “Abu Hamza Profile,” BBC, January 9, 2015.

[7] Jamie Grierson, Vikram Dodd, and Jason Rodrigues, “Anjem Choudary convicted of supporting Islamic State,” Guardian, August 16, 2016.

[8] Robert-Jan Bartunek, “Belgian terror group sentenced: Sharia4Belgium’s ‘charismatic leader’ Fouad Belkacem imprisoned for 12 years,” Independent, February 11, 2015.

[9] Andreas Wetz, “Die duestere Welt des Ebu Tejma,“ Die Presse, December 3, 2014; “Urteil im Grazer Jihadistenprozess: 20 Jahre Haft für Mirsad O.,” Der Standard, July 14, 2016.

[10] Author interview, German counterterrorism official, February 2017.

[11] Pieter Van Oystaeyen, “Belgian Radical Networks and the Road to the Brussels Attacks,” CTC Sentinel 9:6 (2016).

[12] Paul Cruickshank, “A look inside the Abu Walaa ISIS recruiting network,” CNN, December 29, 2016.

[13] Constanze Reuscher, Beat Stauffer, and Moez Jema, “Bereits 2010 stahl Anis Amri einen Lastwagen,” Die Welt, December 22, 2016.

[14] Christel Haas, “Die Heimat des Berlin-Attentäters – Spurensuche in Tunesien,” ZDF, January 11, 2016.

[15] Bel Trew, ”‘My son Anis drank and stole but he was radicalised in Europe,’” Times, December 22, 2016.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Reuscher, Stauffer, and Jema.

[18] Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry, January 17, 2017, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/01/veroeffentlichung-chronologie-anis-amri.html.

[19] Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry.

[20] “Funktionstyp Akteur,” Der Spiegel, December 30, 2016.

[21] Francesco Viviano, “‘Amri pericoloso e radicalizzato,’ l’Italia lo aveva segnalato alla polizia europea,” La Repubblica, December 22, 2016.

[22] Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry.

[23] “‘Ich schlage dir den Kopf ab:‘ Anis Amri drohte christlichem Mithäftling,‘” Focus Online, December 23, 2016.

[24] Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry.

[25] “Anis Amri lebte zwei Wochen in der Schweiz,“ Berner Oberländer, December 25, 2016.

[26] “Funktionstyp Akteur,” Der Spiegel, December 30, 2016.

[27] “Attentäter von Berlin benutzte 14 Identitäten,“ Die Zeit, January 5, 2017.

[28] For more on his identities, see Hans Leyendecker, Georg Mascolo, and Nicolas Richter, “Das Terror-Abwehrzentrum hatte Amri bereits auf dem Schirm,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 29, 2016.

[29] “Anis Amri soll noch im November in Dortmund gewesen sein,“ WDR, December 23, 2016.

[30] Author interview, German counterterrorism official, September 2016.

[31] Press release, German Federal Public Prosecutor, November 8, 2016, https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?newsid=638.

[32] Paul Cruickshank, “A look inside the Abu Walaa ISIS recruiting network.”

[33] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[34] Police profile of Anis Amri obtained by the author. The last update on the document obtained by the author was made on December 14, 2016.

[35] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[36] Susanne Opalka, Jo Goll, Norbert Siegmund, and Sascha Adamek, “Massive Fehleinschätzungen der Berliner Behörden,“ RBB, January 26, 2017.

[37] Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry.

[38] “Neue Hinweise Zum Weihnachtsmarkt Anschlag Die Spuren der Berliner Terror-Zelle,“ Bild, December 30, 2016.

[39] Police profile of Amri.

[40] Georg Heil and Georg Mascolo, “Was wusste Bilel A.?” ARD, January 4, 2017.

[41] Police profile of Amri.

[42] Georg Heil, Georg Mascolo, and Lena Kampf, “Fall Anis Amri: Verpasste Chancen,“ ARD, January 3, 2017; author interview, German counterterrorism official, February 2017.

[43] Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry.

[44] Michael B. Berger, “Was hat Anis Amri in Hildesheim gemacht?,” Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, January 11, 2017.

[45] Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Georg Mascolo and Georg Heil, “Behörden schätzten Amri falsch ein,“ ARD, December 29, 2016; Hans Leyendecker and Georg Mascolo, “Die Fehler der Terror – Fahnder im Fall Amri,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 3, 2017.

[48] Chronology on Amri released by German Federal Interior Ministry.

[49] “Warum ließ man den Terroristen immer wieder laufen?“ Bild, January 5, 2017; author interview, German counterrorism official, February 2017.

[50] Author interview, German counterterrorism official, February 2017.

[51] Paul Cruickshank and Nic Robertson, “US bombing in Libya was linked to Berlin truck attack,” CNN, January 24, 2016.

[52] Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry; “Warum wurde die Überwachung von Anis Amri abgebrochen?” B.Z., February 2, 2017.

[53] Chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry.

[54] Jo Goll, Oliver Soos, David Donschen, and Holger Hansen, “JZwei Terrorverdächtige hatten Kontakt zu Anis Amri,“ RBB, February 1, 2017.

[55] Author interview, German counterterrorism official, February 2017; chronology on Amri released by the German Federal Interior Ministry.

[56] This is according to a report to the interior committee in the German Bundestag on February 13, 2017.

[57] Daniel Glaus, “Berlin-Attentäter benutzte Schweizer Handy,” SRF, January 27, 2017.

[58] “Anis Amri könnte Tatwaffe aus der Schweiz haben,” zeit.de, January 6, 2017.

[59] Christoph Sydow and Thies Schnack, “77 Stunden quer durch Europa,” Der Spiegel, January 5, 2017.

[60] Press release, Public Prosecutor General, January 4, 2017, https://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?themenid=19&newsid=664.

[61] Sydow and Schnack.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Laura Smith-Spark, “Berlin attack: Amri’s ISIS allegiance video called ‘authentic,’” CNN, December 29, 2016.

[64] Author interview, German police investigator, early January 2017.

[65] “Zeuge will Anis Amri offenbar in Emmerich gesehen haben,” RP Online, January 19, 2017.

[66] Sydow and Schnack.

[67] Britta von der Heide, Georg Heil, and Volkmar Kabisch, ”Die Terrorschmiede,” ARD, November 8, 2016.

[68] Georg Heil, Volkmar Kabisch, and Georg Mascolo, “Das ist der Schlimmste,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 8, 2016.

[69] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[70] Christian Wolters, “Grossrazzia gegen Salafisten in Hildesheim,” Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, July 30, 2016.

[71] Author interview, German intelligence official, summer 2015.

[72] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[73] Press release, Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, November 8, 2016.

[74] “Mutmaßliches IS-Mitglied in Düsseldorf festgenommen,“ WDR, September 25, 2016.

[75] Press release, Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, November 8, 2016.

[76] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid; author interview, Anil O., March 2016.

[80] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[81] Author interview, German police official, September 2016.

[82] Author interview, German police officer, summer 2016.

[83] Author interview, German intelligence officer, October 2016.

[84] Annual report of the Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz of the state of Hesse, 2012.

[85] Annual report of the Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz of the state of Hesse; his Facebook account is at https://www.facebook.com/sheikh.abdellatif.18.

[86] See https://www.facebook.com/Al-manhaj-858491320887671/.

[87] Author interview, Anil O., March 2016.

[88] Author interview, German police official, October 2016.

[89] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[90] Ibid. See also Paul Cruickshank, “A look inside the Abu Walaa ISIS recruiting network.”

[91] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[92] Author interview, German intelligence official, February 2017.

[93] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[94] Author interview, German counterterrorism official, February 2017.

[95] Florian Flade, “Zwillinge aus dem Ruhrgebiet sterben für den IS,” Die Welt, May 27, 2015.

[96] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[97] Britta von der Heide and Christian Baars, “Ein Sommer im Dschihad,” ARD, July 16, 2015; Justin Huggler, “Germany police investigate 50-person ‘Isil jihadist cell’ in Wolfsburg,” Telegraph, January 15, 2015.

[98] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[99] This is according to the Islamic State entry documents obtained by the author. Regarding the position of sharia judge, see “Du bist entweder tot oder tot,” Die Zeit, July 15, 2015.

[100] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[101] Von der Heide, Heil, and Kabisch.

[102] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[103] Author interview, German intelligence official, winter 2016.

[104] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Author interview, Anil O., March 2016.

[110] Author interview, German intelligence official, winter 2016.

[111] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[112] Reiner Burger, “Anschlag auf Sikh-Tempel: Jetzt stehen die Dschihadisten vor Gericht,” FAZ, December 7, 2016.

[113] Lena Kampf, “Explosion in Essener Sikh-Tempel: Polizei hatte Hinweise auf Anschlagspläne,” ARD, May 24, 2016.

[114] Sebastian Auer, “Radikalisierung im Reisebüro?” WDR, May 2, 2016.

[115] Author interview, German intelligence official, fall 2016.

[116] Stefan Wette, “Ein Syrien-Rückkehrer belastet die Essener Tempelbomber,” waz.de, January 31, 2017.

[117] Ibid.

[118] This is according to the Vereinsregister, the association registry.

[119] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[120] Klaus Brand, “Wie Silvio K. aus Essen vom Mitläufer zum Isis-Terroristen wurde,“ waz.de, July 21, 2014.

[121] Klaus Brand, “Silvio K. droht mit Anschlag auf Atombombenlager,“ waz.de, August 7, 2014.

[122] Susanne Klaiber, “Wie ein Österreicher und ein Deutscher den IS erfolgreich machten,” huffingtonpost.de, April 11, 2016.

[123] Author interview, German intelligence official, summer 2016.

[124] Author interview, German intelligence official, February 2017.

[125] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Paul Cruickshank, “Who was ISIS leader Muhammad al-Adnani?” CNN, August 30, 2016.

[129] Author interview, German intelligence official, February 2017.

[130] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[131] Author interview, German intelligence official, February 2017.

[132] Author interview, Anil O., March 2016.

[133] Christoph Erhardt, “Drei Dschihadisten aus Dinslaken ums Leben gekommen,” FAZ, January 11, 2015.

[134] “Terror in Paris: Dinslakener Islamist auf der Fahndungsliste,” RP Online, December 11, 2015.

[135] Author interview, Anil O. in Turkey, March 2016. The incident is also mentioned in the official file without a reference to where the Germans were from. German Public Prosecutor General of the Federal Court of Justice, case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[136] Author interview, German intelligence official, summer 2016.

[137] Author interview, Anil O., March 2016; author interview, German intelligence official, February 2017.

[138] Case file in the investigation against Hasan Celenk, Boban Simeonovic, and A. Abdulaziz Abdullah.

[139] Von der Heide, Heil, and Kabisch; author interview, Anil O., 2016.

[140] Author interview, German counterterrorism official, February 2017.

[141] Author interview, German intelligence official, February 2017.

[142] Kai Biermann and Michael Stürzenhofecker, “Was wir über Jaber al Bakr wissen,” Die Zeit, October 10, 2016.

[143] Lena Kampf and Andreas Spinrath, “Mach, was Dich glücklich macht,” ARD, February 1, 2017.

[144] For more on plots enabled by the Islamic State in such a way, see Josh Meyer, “ISIS Has Help Desk for Terrorists Staffed Around the Clock,” NBC, November 16, 2015, and Rukmini Callimachi, “Not ‘Lone Wolves’ After All: How ISIS Guides World’s Terror Plots From Afar,” New York Times, February 4, 2017.