In the 2017 General Election, 407 of the 650 seats were safe with the winner’s margin exceeding the 95% confidence interval of their predicted vote total.

But there’s a simple fix: Petition for Score Voting.

With Score voting, only 3.5% of seats would be safe by the same standard. That’s only 23 seats.

Here’s a breakdown;

As you can see the largest Margin under a Score Voting simulation of GE17 would have been less than the average Margin in the 2017 General Election.

However it’s not quite perfect, as can be seen in the difference column, Score Voting increases the margin by up to 14% in some seats. So let’s look at the seats that are still safe even under Score Voting;

The Margin increases under Score Voting creates two new safes seats, but most safes seats are FPTP safe seats so safe that in one case even a -58% reduction in margin isn’t sufficient.

In analysing the safety of seats I’ve used the predictability of the lead candidate’s vote total compared to their lead as my main metric, but the safety of a seat also depends on the predictability of the vote totals for competing candidates. However, the vote totals for weaker candidates are more predictable than the leader in absolute terms and due to vote-splitting only one weaker candidate needs factoring in nearly all cases, this produced an indication of even greater certainty in FPTP results.

Score Voting, on the other hand, lets voters express support for multiple candidates and ensures there are no wasted votes, it doesn’t just narrow the margin between the top two candidates. The average number of competitive candidates under FPTP is 1.44 vs. Score’s 3.15, it more than doubles the potential winners in the average seat.

Juxtaposed to the result with FPTP, without vote-splitting, including the predictability of weaker candidates produced an indication of even greater Uncertainty in Score results as the median case required the inclusion of two competitively viable non-leading candidates.

Score Voting simulations even predict a 5-way race in Clacton with all Lab, Con, Lib, Grn, & UKIP candidates expected to finish within a 95% confidence interval of the predicted winning total.

Be aware that this doesn’t by necessity result in Proportional Representation. PR systems guarantee a specific amount of representation, safe seats are a part of their design.

3rd parties seats aren’t a given under Score voting. It gives them new competitive positions they need to leverage their own to win each constituency.

Indeed Score Voting is expected to return a one-party majority in the first election it’s implemented even if FPTP wouldn’t have returned one. Simulations indicate this would’ve been the case for the 2017 General Election.

In the long run, it’s possible that shifts in public opinion would result in a majority passing from party to party, or results that are split and representative, or if the benefits of partisanship are weak enough under Score Voting: results would resemble that of the Isle of Man.

From the perspective of Government objections to voting reform;

Score Voting preserves existing single-member constituency and grants the win to the candidate with the greatest vote total preserving the quality that gives First Past the Post its name.

There are no grounds for objections about the loss of Strong Governance, or broken Links with Constituents, or absence of support per the 2011 AV Referendum.

Score Voting does everything FPTP does better, and more. And it does it all using an approach that Government hasn’t considered.

If that sounds appealing to you sign the petition.

Petitions may not be able to change a decision the Government has already made, but Score Voting is a novel approach to voting reform that the Government has yet to assess the benefits of.