Corrected judgment: A corrigendum was issued on February 22, 2017; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment.

_______________________________________________________

Memorandum of Decision

of

S.L. Schulz, Master in Chambers

_______________________________________________________

I. Introduction

[1] On November 5, 2015 Steve Pomerleau filed a Statement of Claim [“Pomerleau v CRA #1”] in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench that sued the Canada Revenue Agency [the “CRA”]. The Statement of Claim in total reads:

Statement of facts relied on

1. Canada Revenue Agency is in possession of my property & so far, after approximately 152 days and many attempts sent by registered mail to Canada Revenue Agency officials, demanding the return of my property to its rightful owner, me, Canada Revenue Agency never returned my property nor replied to any of my letters.

Remedy sought

2. Four Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Six Hundred Forty One 22/100 CAD ($475,641.22) as of November 5, 2015

+

All daily compounded interest of 25% and 10% late penalty fees that are still in effect until the full payment of my property is paid and there are no outstanding balance due.

+

The fee of Twenty Five (25) troy ounces of .999 pure gold or its equivalent in CAD at the time/date of any and every of Steve Pomerleau court appearance(s) in order to recover his property.

[2] On January 6, 2016 Mr. Pomerleau filed a second related Statement of Claim [“Pomerleau v CRA #2”] against the CRA, which reads:

Statement of facts relied on:

1. The Defendant is unlawfully in possession of the Plaintiff’s property which was fraudulently collected for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 & 2009.

2. The Plaintiff tried at multiple occasions to settle this dispute out of court but the Defendant ignored the Plaintiff’s request to have his property returned.

Remedy sought

3. One Million One Hundred Ninety Two Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Nine 14/100/CAD ($1,192,749.14).

+

All daily compounded interest of 25% and 10% late penalty fee which will be added every 90 days and until the full repayment of my property plus interest (is applicable) and late penalty fee(s) (if applicable) is paid and there are no outstanding balance due

* The 25% daily compounded interest will be recalculated on February 5, 2016

** The next late payment fee will be added (if applicable) on March 14, 2016.

+

The fee of Twenty Five (25) troy ounces of .999 pure gold or its equivalent in CAD at the time and date of any and every of Steve Pomerleau Court appearance(s) (if applicable) in order to recover his property with interest and penalties.

4. The Fee of Four Hundred Fifty CAD ($450.00) per hour for my physical and mental labors preparing this case in order to recover my property as stated in this Statement of Claim sections 1, 2 & 3. An Affidavit will be submitted as evidence of labors in order to recover these fees.

[3] In short, Mr. Pomerleau claims that the CRA has improperly received paycheque income tax deductions made by Mr. Pomerleau’s employers. His lawsuits are for the return of those funds, and various penalties.

[4] CRA applied on April 7, 2016 for summary judgment per the Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010 [the “Rules”, or individually a “Rule”], Rule 7.3, arguing Mr. Pomerleau’s litigation could not succeed because his outstanding tax assessments had not been challenged in the correct forum, the Tax Court of Canada. Alternatively, Canada’s application argues Mr. Pomerleau’s claims have no merit and instead feature characteristics that are stereotypical of Organized Pseudo legal Commercial Argument [“OPCA”] schemes (Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, 543 AR 215). As a consequence, Mr. Pomerleau’s lawsuits cannot succeed.

[5] Mr. Pomerleau rejects both these arguments, and instead identifies this Court’s inherent jurisdiction as his basis for appearing in the Albert Court of Queen’s Bench. He denies he has based his claims on pseudo law, and explained that he has via his own investigation discovered fundamental defects in Canadian government authority, including the Federal authority to collect income tax.

[6] I order Mr. Pomerleau’s action struck out. I agree that the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench can generally take jurisdiction of an action such as advanced by Mr. Pomerleau, however what Mr. Pomerleau identifies as the legal basis for his claims is incorrect in a number of different ways. Though Mr. Pomerleau has rejected the label, he is a person who advances legally incorrect OPCA concepts, and for the most part those OPCA concepts are very well known, even notorious. However, the precise manner in which Mr. Pomerleau has assembled that pseudo law is not one reported in other OPCA judgments. This is one reason why I have engaged in a somewhat detailed and arguably more expansive response than Mr. Pomerleau’s argument would strictly warrant.

[7] Second, Mr. Pomerleau was polite and responsive to my questions at the January 30, 2017 hearing. He clearly has put great effort into his court submissions, which were organized and detailed. Though Mr. Pomerleau’s action has no legal basis, I perceive his lawsuits flow from honest, though incorrect, beliefs. Mr. Pomerleau expressed great emotion about what had happened to him during his interactions with the CRA and other government officials. He obviously believes he and others have experienced unfair treatment from the courts and government actors. Mr. Pomerleau emphasized the importance of respect and courtesy during his interactions with government and court actors. Crown counsel acknowledged in his oral submissions Mr. Pomerleau conducts himself in that way. This is another reason why in this decision I have traced through Mr. Pomerleau’s argument to show where his ideas are wrong, and why. He asks a question - I attempt to provide a thorough answer.

[8] Perhaps others besides Mr. Pomerleau will benefit from that, too.

II. History of these Actions

A. Pomerleau v CRA #1

[9] Pomerleau v CRA #1 was initiated on November 5, 2016 in the Judicial District of Fort McMurray as Docket No. 1513 00485. On December 4, 2015 Canada denied this claim, requested the action be dismissed, and filed a request for particulars: the nature of the disputed property in question, how that property was improperly taken, and the basis for the sums sought and interest and penalty fees.

[10] This resulted in Mr. Pomerleau on December 11, 2015 filing a number of documents:

A) an Affidavit with 10 exhibits . These include:

• A sworn statement by Mr. Pomerleau that he never knowingly or willingly granted or pledged “... the Canadian Government, her Majesty the Queen nor the State the beneficial use of my life or my property”, he has not sworn an Oath of Allegiance to Queen Elizabeth II, and that he was a victim of fraud as a child.

• Correspondence between Mr. Pomerleau and the CRA concerning his 2011-2014 income tax. This includes several “Notices” and a “Fee Schedule” (see Appendix A). Mr. Pomerleau distinguishes between upper case letter and mixed case letter versions of his name, for example:

Notice: The Free will living man commonly called Steve Joseph Mario Pomerleau, also commonly called Steve Pomerleau the undisclosed principle, is not subject to government legislation, is not a ‘fiction/legal’ person, and thus, is not a ‘taxpayer’. The free will living man is not attached as an accessory to Crown property, and he only uses the Crown owned legal name under private necessity as his agent in commerce and trustee in trust to sustain and maintain his life. Therefore, any remuneration for mental or physical labor, or from risk, for the free will man commonly called Steve Pomerleau and collected, and/or held in trust in any form of asset value by STEVE JOSEPH MARIO POMERLEAU, the agent in commerce and trustee in trust for that principal and beneficiary, is under claim of right in equity by the undisclosed principal and beneficiary, and is contractual exchange of property, and, as such, is not income for STEVE JOSEPH MARIO POMERLEAU. It is an error in referring to STEVE JOSEPH MARIO POMERLEAU as an employee, or having an employee status with an employer or any other contracting party.

• Annotated income tax T4 forms.

• Correspondence by Mr. Pomerleau to the Ministers of National Revenue and other government officials increasing the alleged debt owed by the CRA due to Mr. Pomerleau’s “peaceful agreement” sent to the CRA.

• An October 15, 2015 “PAST DUE FINAL NOTICE” to these same parties stating:

Despite our earnest efforts to resolve this past due outstanding amount owed to Steve Pomerleau, payment as still not been made. We are informing you that this is your final notice and last opportunity to make payment. Until the full payment of $468.530.17 is receive within the next fourteen (14) days, or an acceptable proposal for payment is obtained forthwith, we shall commence legal action against Canada Revenue Agency.

If this matter goes that far, Canada Revenue Agency will also be liable for the approximate cost of $35,000.00 per court appearances as stated in section 3 B) of the Steve Pomerleau peaceful agreement sent on May 11, 2015.

• A December 6, 2015 “onetime offer” for a $350,000.00 payment “to return my property back to its rightful owner, ME. ... to save all Canadian Citizens/Taxpayers a vast amount of unnecessary extra fees/dollars ...”.

B) a Request for Particulars , that among other things sought a “Certified Copy from the Queen’s printer of the Canada Income Tax Act”, evidence of “Oaths of Allegiance”, and evidence of “the beneficial use of his life and property”.

C) a Reply to Defence referencing the December 11, 2015 Affidavit indicating Mr. Pomerleau had not been able to locate a “Certified copy” of the Income Tax Act, that he had not pledged himself and his property to the Canadian Government, or swore an Oath of Allegiance to Queen Elizabeth II.

[11] Mr. Pomerleau next on January 6, 2016 filed an “Application” and an Affidavit. The Application is made under Rule 3.61 (a request for particulars), but both documents challenge the failure of the CRA to respond to the December 11, 2015 filings. These documents elaborate further on Mr. Pomerleau’s purported relationship with the CRA and Canadian government, for example:

Throughout my childhood and when I became an adult, I was lead to believe by mean of false and fraudulent education conducted by the corporate entity of Canada, commonly called Canada, AKA: Government of Canada, AKA: Crown, that the ‘Legal identity name’, AKA: the name on my registered birth certificate, AKA: the ‘Legal fiction name’, AKA: the ‘agent in commerce’, AKA: ‘person/taxpayer’, AKA: the ‘slave name’, AKA: ‘STEVE POMERLEAU, was my name. I was unaware that this ‘Legal identity name” bear the ‘Status of slave’ which was/is owned by the slave owner, the Crown. I never knowingly, willingly & voluntary entered into a contract with the Crown therefore, never consented to be the property of the Crown nor to pledge my life and property to the beneficial use of the Crown, AKA: the corporate entity of Canada, commonly called Canada, AKA: Government of Canada therefore, I was victim of fraud since November 11, 1973. Therefore, this contract was voided/nullified on the 11th day of November, 1973, therefore, I was/am victim of this fraud conducted by the Crown, the Canadian Government, Canada Revenue Agency and their officials and everyone who by their actions and non-action(s) had enforced, and still to this day, January 6, 2015, try to enforce this fraudulent voided/nullify contract on me, the free will living man commonly call Steve Pomerleau, after I exposed their fraudulent acts and established who I was and who I wasn’t in a letter of intent/peaceful agreement which was sent to Canada Revenue Agency & to the then Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada Peter McKay on May 12, 2015 and filed with the court on December 11, 2015 as EXIBIT “C” in the Reply to Defence and all other pertinent documents filed with the Court, therefore make them all liable for that fraud. ...

[12] Mr. Pomerleau then concludes: “There is absolutely no government act, statute or law to which an free will living adult human being in Canada is subject.” [italics in original].

[13] The Crown on January 20, 2016 proposed that both the Pomerleau v CRA #1 and #2 actions be heard together in a special chambers application.

[14] The next litigation step was on March 23, 2016 when Mr. Pomerleau filed a Notice to Admit Facts, an Affidavit that attached a copy of Mr. Pomerleau’s Quebec birth certificate, and an Application in relation to the Rule 4.16 dispute resolution process. The Application, whose body is reproduced as Appendix B, is a useful restatement of Mr. Pomerleau’s position and the terminology he used at this point.

[15] The CRA on April 7, 2016 replied to Mr. Pomerleau’s Notice to Admit Facts with a simple denial of all facts and opinions as irrelevant, improper and unnecessary, and nonsensical. That same date the CRA applied to have Mr. Pomerleau’s action struck out per Rule 7.3.

[16] The parties by mutual consent adjourned this matter in April of 2016.

[17] Mr. Pomerleau on April 18, 2016 filed another Affidavit that repeats many themes in the March 23, 2016 materials, states the CRA is “in DISHONOR” on many points, and disputes the validity of many aspects of CRA submissions and affidavits. The Affidavit also attaches a “Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights” that Mr. Pomerleau says was delivered to the addressed parties on April 13-14, 2016. No response was made to the “Notice” within ten days, which resulted:

... in an automatic default judgment securing forevermore all rights and claims claimed and establishing and irrevocable estoppels by acquiescence ...

This also means the CRA has no right to be heard in these court proceedings. This document is reproduced as Appendix C, and was notarized by a John Bergman, a Notary Public located in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.

[18] On April 26, 2016 Hughes J transferred this action to the Judicial District of Edmonton, where it received its current Docket: No. 1603 11244.

B. Pomerleau v CRA #2

[19] The Pomerleau v CRA #2 action largely parallels Pomerleau v CRA #1. The CRA filed its Statement of Defence on January 29, 2016.

[20] Mr. Pomerleau on February 8, 2016 filed a “Reply to Defence” document and an Affidavit. Much of these documents parallels the Pomerleau v CRA #1 December 11, 2015 and January 6, 2016 filings. These materials also makes parallel allegations concerning the validity of Mr. Pomerleau’s 2004-2009 tax deductions.

[21] The Affidavit also includes a December 9, 2015 letter from Minister of National Revenue, Diane Lebouthillier, which responds to Mr. Pomerleau’s materials:

You received misleading information about Canada’s tax laws. The document you sent has no legal force and does not release you from your tax obligations or cancel your rights as a taxpayer. You are still responsible for your tax obligations under legislation passed by Parliament and enforced by the courts. Taxpayers who follow misleading information and accept incorrect advice expose themselves to serious financial and legal difficulties, including reassessments, penalties, and interest charges.

[22] Most of Mr. Pomerleau’s arguments are consistent with Pomerleau v CRA #1, however he also identifies certain international law treaties as relevant, as shown by this excerpt from the Reply to Defence:

I have been deceived, manipulated, coerced and I am a victim of infancy because I was unknowingly tricked into being a servant to Her Majesty when I was born and l was unknowingly tricked into being recognized as a 'legal person' AKA: a 'corporation'. Therefore, the state party and its agencies has forced me to be recognized as a 'legal person'/'corporation' and I was unknowingly and unwillingly held into servitude therefore, the state party and its agencies have infringed upon and deprived me of my inalienable Fundamental rights and freedoms and were/are in sheer violations of their International and domestic obligations as per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights & Articles; 1, 2, 3, 4, 21 . The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural rights & Articles; 1, 2, 3, 5. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights & Articles; 5, 8(2), 16, 46 & 47. The Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individual Article 10. The Canadian Bill of Rights Article 1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Articles 2 & 7. ...

I am a living Human being with intrinsic rights and with absolute natural and inalienable Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. I am not and was never an 'agent in commerce' nor an 'Artificial person' nor a 'fictional person' nor a 'legal person' nor a 'person'/'corporation' nor a 'taxpayer' nor a 'Slave' ...

Since I was manipulated, coerced and fraudulently tricked into servitude to Her Majesty and unknowingly recognized as that 'legal person' since I was born by the state party and its agencies, as a Human being, I had/have inalienable Fundamental Rights and Freedoms for which I was deprived of by the state party and the Defendant. I had/have the right to own property alone as stated in Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property and in Article 21 (I) Everyone has the RIGHT to take part in the Government of his Country (not an Obligation). I also had/have the rights of self-determination and freely determine my political status and freely pursue my economic as per the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural rights. That No one shall be held in Servitude as per their international Covenant, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms. Therefore, none of the state party Statute, Regulations and Enactments never applied to me as a free Human Being with his intrinsic rights. I was never obligated to pay income taxes on my remunerations and I only did since I was tricked into doing so and threatened with reprisals if I did not filed income tax reports each years or did not pay the state party/the Defendant after their assessment. ...

[23] The remaining filings in this action duplicate or parallel those in Pomerleau v CRA #1. This action was also transferred to the judicial district of Edmonton, where it received Docket No. 1603 11557.

C. The January 30, 2016 Hearing

[24] Both parties made oral submissions at the January 30, 2016 hearing. At this point, I explained to Mr. Pomerleau that his application per Rule 4.16 was unnecessary because operation of that Rule had been suspended due to the inability to this Court to maintain that requirement due to a critical lack of judicial resources. Mr. Pomerleau apologized for his unnecessary application; he explained he was unaware of that change in procedure.

[25] I inquired to counsel for the CRA concerning an Alberta Court of Appeal decision, 783783 Alberta Ltd. v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ABCA 226, 322 DLR (4th) 56, that might be a binding authority against the CRA’s argument that the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench had no jurisdiction to hear Mr. Pomerleau’s lawsuits.

[26] Mr. Pomerleau reviewed his written submissions, and explained that as a “human being with full legal capacity” he is not a “statutory creature”, nor an officer or employee of a corporation. He said he has been subjected to unlawful taxation by the CRA, and seeks the administration of justice, per his fundamental rights and freedoms. He had been tricked into being a designated class of person, and that violated his rights under Canadian and international law.

[27] Mr. Pomerleau also explained more about the history of this dispute. In 2014, he received a $42,534.69 CRA reassessment. The CRA classified a living allowance as income. He then received a further reassessment for about $29,000 for his 2011 tax year, a year he had not filed a tax return. The total debt claimed was $71,286.45. Mr. Pomerleau was also laid off from his employment around this period.

[28] Mr. Pomerleau explained he was not the only person affected by this CRA action, which he called bullying. About 40 other employees of the same company were also reassessed in a parallel manner. This had caused personal and marital distress. Mr. Pomerleau at this point began to research law, and then discovered “great deceptions pertinent to Statutory creatures of the state et al as of: the ‘person’, ‘legal person’, ‘fictional person’”. He advanced these ideas in correspondence to the CRA, and demanded refund of amounts his employer had deducted for 2011-2014. Mr. Pomerleau also wrote a book that explained his ideas and his litigation. That book was then distributed to government officials and legal counsel for the CRA. I note Mr. Pomerleau’s book was not entered into evidence in this matter.

[29] Mr. Pomerleau’s conflict with the CRA spilled over into his employment relationship, and Mr. Pomerleau in February, 2016 was terminated from his employment with the ClearWater Energy Services LP business. Mr. Pomerleau explained he was well paid, making about $250,000.00 per year. He filed two lawsuits against his employer (Pomerleau v Clearstream Energy Holdings, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket No 1613 00126; Pomerleau v Clearstream Energy Holdings, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket No 1613 00127), but both these actions were struck out by Master Smart on April 19, 2016.

[30] Mr. Pomerleau concluded he was deceived into being a taxpayer. That was involuntary servitude, and the CRA and other government actors should not be permitted to intimidate and bully him into the giving up his property. He wants peaceful relations with government actors, and just wants to move on with his life.

III. Law

[31] The test for summary judgment is well established. Rule 7.3 states:

7.3(1) A party may apply to the Court for summary judgment in respect of all or part of a claim on one or more of the following grounds:

(a) there is no defence to a claim or part of it;

(b) there is no merit to a claim or part of it;

(c) the only real issue is the amount to be awarded.

(2) The application must be supported by an affidavit swearing positively that one or more of the grounds described in subrule (1) have been met or by other evidence to the effect that the grounds have been met.

(3) If the application is successful the Court may, with respect to all or part of a claim, and whether or not the claim is for a single and undivided debt, do one or more of the following:

(a) dismiss one or more claims in the action or give judgment for or in respect of all or part of the claim or for a lesser amount;

(b) if the only real issue to be tried is the amount of the award, determine the amount or refer the amount for determination by a referee;

(c) if judgment is given for part of a claim, refer the balance of the claim to trial or for determination by a referee, as the circumstances require.

[32] Summary judgment can be given if a disposition that is fair and just to both parties can be made on the existing record by using that alternative method for adjudication: Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 8, [2014] 1 SCR 87. This is a question of “merit”. Pyrrha Design Inc. v Plum and Posey Inc., 2016 ABCA 12 at para 19 provides a useful restatement of the concept:

The question is whether there is in fact any issue of 'merit' that genuinely requires a trial, or conversely whether the claim or defence is so compelling that the likelihood it will succeed is very high such that it should be determined summarily.

[33] In this case both the CRA and Mr. Pomerleau have filed affidavits in support of their respective positions. Parties have the obligation to put their “best foot forward”: Pyrrha Design Inc. v Plum and Posey Inc. While I will not detail my conclusion on this point, some of Mr. Pomerleau’s affidavits are not admissible as fact, but instead is opinion and legal argument. I have generally nevertheless considered these materials but only as argument.

[34] That said, the parties do not dispute the key facts in this matter, and that permits me to conduct the summary conviction application.

IV. Jurisdiction of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench to Address Legal Disputes that Involve Assessed Taxes

[35] CRA takes the position that this Court has no jurisdiction in this matter. Mr. Pomerleau claims his paycheque deductions were incorrect. The Tax Court of Canada has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear appeals under the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) (Tax Court of Canada Act, RSC 1985, c T-2, s 12(1)). Income Tax Act, s 152(8) deems any assessment is “...valid and binding notwithstanding any error, defect or omission in the assessment or in any proceeding under this act relating thereto ...”. The Crown submits that these provisions combine to close any inquiry by this Court into the legality of the legislation that led to those deductions.

[36] CRA argues further that Mr. Pomerleau never had possession of the funds that were deducted from his employment paycheques. Those funds were first held in trust by the employers and then delivered to the CRA. That was never Mr. Pomerleau’s property.

[37] Mr. Pomerleau in his response argument questions why the Income Tax Act and Tax Court of Canada Act prohibit him from challenging the underlying basis for the taxation regime in this court. Mr. Pomerleau does not dispute the calculation of income tax assessments and reassessments, but instead attacks the CRA’s actions on a more basic level, and says that the inherent jurisdiction of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench must provide a remedy where government has acted in an unauthorized, unconstitutional manner.

[38] I reject the CRA’s argument that the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench has no jurisdiction to address Mr. Pomerleau’s claims because his only recourse was to go to the Tax Court of Canada and challenge his income tax assessments there. During the January 30, 2017 hearing I asked counsel for the CRA to comment on 783783 Alberta Ltd. v Canada (Attorney General), which reports on a very unusual tort lawsuit. At the time Edmonton had two rival weekly entertainment newspapers, Vue Weekly and SEE Magazine. SEE Magazine ceased to be a Canadian newspaper per the Income Tax Act when Conrad Black renounced his Canadian citizenship to become the UK “Lord Black of Crossharbour”. Vue Weekly sued the CRA, alleging that the CRA owed Vue Weekly a duty of care to ensure that advertisers in its competitor, SEE Magazine, had their tax assessments made correctly, so that Vue Weekly received a competitive advantage as a Canadian newspaper.

[39] Canada in this action argued that the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench has no jurisdiction to hear Vue Weekly’s lawsuit because the Tax Court of Canada has exclusive jurisdiction, per Income Tax Act, s 152(8): 783783 Alberta Ltd. v Canada (Attorney General), para 21. The Alberta Court of Appeal at paras 22-30 rejects this proposition:

Just because the Tax Court of Canada has exclusive jurisdiction over tax liability and assessments does not mean that no other court can interpret the provisions of the Income Tax Act, if that is necessary to decide an issue properly before the court. The provincial superior courts have general jurisdiction to interpret statutes, including federal statutes ... The provincial superior courts routinely have to inquire into the tax status of parties, or the tax consequences of particular transactions. This can arise in many business or commercial disputes, in matrimonial proceedings, in the calculation of personal injury damages, and otherwise.

...

Viewed from the other perspective, the Tax Court of Canada has no jurisdiction to decide the tort liability of Canada or the SEE Magazine defendants. That is part of the jurisdiction of the Court of Queen’s Bench. In engaging that issue, the Court of Queen’s Bench is entitled to make any factual and legal decisions that are required to come to its ultimate conclusion on liability.

[40] Mr. Pomerleau’s lawsuits can be framed in a number of ways. They could be called a tort lawsuit, an equitable claim that Canada is unjustly enriched by operation of an unlawful scheme, a lawsuit for conversion of stolen property, or an application for reimbursement of moneys collected under ultra vires legislation. But in each of these cases, Mr. Pomerleau is not challenging his tax assessments themselves, but rather an ‘upstream’ basis for the operation of income tax legislation.

[41] An argument could be made that Mr. Pomerleau’s actions are a collateral attack on a tax liability, analogous to Roitman v Canada, 2006 FCA 266, 353 NR 75, leave to appeal refused [2006] SCCA No 353, however that is not the legal basis identified for Canada’s application to strike out Mr. Pomerleau’s action.

[42] Other Canadian courts other than the Tax Court of Canada have entertained lawsuits that have parallel bases to Mr. Pomerleau’s actions, for example: Bursey v Canada, 2015 FC 1126, affirmed Bursey v Canada, 2015 FC 1307, affirmed Dove v Canada, 2016 FCA 231; Claeys v Her Majesty et al, 2013 MBQB 313, 300 Man R (2d) 257; Holmes v Canada, 2016 FC 918. Further, persons accused of tax evasion have unsuccessfully made essentially the same argument, that they cannot be found guilty of evading income tax because provincial courts have no jurisdiction to calculate tax and evaluate the quantum, if any, of the amounts evaded: R v Anderson, 2014 BCSC 2002 at paras 34-37, [2015] GSTC 85; R v McCartie, 2012 BCSC 928 at paras 6-13, [2012] 6 CTC 230; R v Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356 at para 20, 2012 DTC 5069.

[43] The Tax Court of Canada has clearly evaluated the constitutional validity of the Income Tax Act (e.g. Davis v The Queen, 2015 TCC 79, 2015 DTC 1105; Freeman v Canada, [2001] TCJ No 349 (QL) (TCC); Randall v The Queen, 2008 TCC 621, [2009] 4 CTC 2108; St-Laurent v Canada, [1995] TCJ No 809 (QL) (TCC); Pappas v Canada, 2006 TCC 692, [2006] GSTC 161), but so have provincial courts (e.g. R v Gerlitz, 2014 ABQB 247 at para 29, 589 AR 43; Hoffman v HMTQ, 2003 MBQB 238 at para 9, [2004] 1 CTC 383, affirmed 2004 MBQB 164 at para 8, [2004] 5 CTC 1; R v Gauvreau, (19 June 1995), Grande Prairie 9404-0009S20101 (Alta QB); R v McGrath (2001), 2001 CanLII 37641 (NL SC), 204 Nfld & PEIR 334 (NL SCTD); R v Strang (1997), 207 AR 72 at paras 4-6, 53 Alta LR (3d) 100 (Alta QB); Coulbeck v University of Toronto, [2005] OJ No 4003 (QL), 142 ACWS (3d) 889 (Ont Sup Ct J); Bruno v Canada, 2000 BCSC 190, [2000] 2 CTC 16, affirmed 2002 BCCA 47, 162 BCAC 293) and the Federal Courts (Hoffman v Canada (1996), 112 FTR 185, [1996] GSTC 34 (FCTD); Mueller v Canada, [1993] 1 CTC 143, 1 GTC 6064 (FC (TD)); Kasvand v Canada (1995), 189 NR 222, [1996] 1 CTC 204 (FCA); Sarraf v Canada (1994), 82 FTR 78, 94 DTC 6553 (FC(TD)).

[44] I therefore conclude the rule advanced by Canada is not as clear cut as what was proposed by counsel in argument. Courts other than the Tax Court of Canada clearly do have a jurisdiction to evaluate the quantum of tax due from a taxpayer, as well as the constitutional validity of tax legislation.

[45] I therefore move to the second basis on which the CRA argues Mr. Pomerleau’s lawsuits are fatally flawed: his claim that he is outside the income tax apparatus as a whole is wrong in law, without merit, and an OPCA scheme.

V. Mr. Pomerleau’s Lawsuits are OPCA Litigation

[46] The basis on which I strike out Mr. Pomerleau’s litigation is that his arguments are legally false. He has no legal basis to seek return of amounts collected by his employers per the Income Tax Act and other related legislation. I will therefore trace through Mr. Pomerleau’s argument, as I understand it, and indicate where that scheme encounters issues.

[47] I subsequently also identify other problematic aspects to his litigation conduct to date. This has less to do with whether Mr. Pomerleau’s lawsuits have a legal basis but instead relates to him being potentially subject to other court responses, such as increased costs, and court access restrictions. Some of these supplementary findings are also intended to assist Mr. Pomerleau in understanding how certain points he has raised are false.

A. Preliminary Issue - Status of Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571

[48] Mr. Pomerleau in his written filings at various points criticizes the Meads v Meads decision of Associate Chief Justice Rooke of this Court. For example, in his April 18, 2016 filings Mr. Pomerleau says this decision is irrelevant to his litigation. He “object and REBUT” the Meads v Meads judgment. Mr. Pomerleau’s arguments and evidence are valid. He states that relying on Meads v Meads is “frivolous, improper, irrelevant and would constitute an abuse of process”, and is “PRIMA FACIE evidence that there is NO MERIT” to the CRA’s defence.

[49] More drastically, Mr. Pomerleau’s March 23, 2016 Application in Pomerleau v CRA #1 states that the Meads v Meads judgment is invalid. It is a fraud designed to deceive and injure humanity:

The FACT that a court Judgment (i.e Meads v. Meads) and/or Court cases (i.e. Meads v. Meads) and/or any/every documents/CONTRACTS (i.e Meads v. Meads) which are/is/was/were INTENTIONALLY made with the INTENT to DECEIVE/ AID and ABET humanity into FRAUD via ignorance of these CONTRACT FACTS are NULL and VOID, ab initio, nunc pro tune, ad infinitum. Any/all FRAUDS by virtue of its INTENT and CREATION remain as such, any/all FRAUDS exposed, all CONTRACTS are NULL and VOID upon its discovery where a FRAUD revealed is, in FACT, NULL and VOID, ab initio, nunc pro tune, ad infinitum.

[50] As a decision of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, the Meads v Meads judgment is a binding authority for a Master of this Court. I inquired during the hearing on Mr. Pomerleau’s position concerning that decision. He confirmed he had read it. Mr. Pomerleau was at this point more circumspect. He restated his respect for the Court and its decisions, but nevertheless indicated he believed the Meads v Meads judgment was engineered with the intent of concealing from Canadians their true rights, particularly when they did not use the exact correct terminology and/or language.

[51] Meads v Meads is binding case law on a Master and relates to many elements of Mr. Pomerleau’s litigation. In Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier, 2015 ABQB 703 at paras 32-46 I reviewed how the Meads v Meads decision is not merely a binding authority in this Court, but has been broadly endorsed by courts in Canada and the Commonwealth. I therefore reject Mr. Pomerleau’s argument that I cannot rely on this decision, or that it is “in FACT, NULL and VOID, ab initio, nunc pro tunc, ad infinitum.” Meads v Meads is instead a correct statement of Canadian law on this subject.

B. The Tax Immunity Argument

[52] I interpret Mr. Pomerleau’s argument to have the following steps:

1. The Income Tax Act, s 248(1) definitions of “person” and “taxpayer” means that only corporations may be subject to income tax.

2. Human beings in Canada are misled into acting in concert with a government-owned artificial entity or corporation, a “fictional person”, “legal person”, “person/corporation”, “death fictional entity” [a.k.a. the “Strawman”], and/or being an employee thereof;

3. This makes human beings officers of the “Strawman”, and subject to income tax.

4. International human rights treaties are binding authorities that govern how the Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be interpreted, particularly Charter, s 7.

5. International treaties recognize that human beings have certain innate rights that they possess as a consequence of being human beings.

6. These inherent rights are also a reflection of common law and/or natural law principles.

7. The Charter, s 7 right to “life, liberty, and security of the person” must be interpreted so that it captures the rights enumerated in international human rights treaties.

8. One of the protected rights under Charter, s 7 is that a human being can be “a person before the law”.

9. A right is a privilege. A human being can reject any right, including being “a person before the law”. That is a right to refuse or reject being linked to the “Strawman”.

10. A second protected right is a right to property. A human being has an absolute right to their property.

11. A third protected right is the right to work, and to engage in economic activities without restriction.

12. Any restriction on rights identified in international treaties makes a human being a slave.

13. A human being who has rejected being “a person before the law” cannot be taxed because that human being is not a taxpayer, per Income Tax Act, s 248(1). The human being’s right to their property is absolute, therefore any employment contract payment deductions made by an employer are theft on behalf of the CRA, which receives those funds.

[53] At this point I need to make two observations. The first is that Mr. Pomerleau’s materials do not use consistent language and terminology. To better document Mr. Pomerleau’s argument I have attached as Appendices B and C parts of two of his documents from Pomerleau v CRA #1:

• March 23, 2016 Application, and

• April 18, 2016 Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Right.

[54] I believe these documents were intended to explain his argument in a single cohesive whole. Mr. Pomerleau explained that he sent these documents to the CRA and other government actors, they were not rebutted or rejected, and therefore these documents are accepted, binding, and true.

[55] My other preliminary observation before going further is that I have used a term, the “Strawman”, that is nowhere in Mr. Pomerleau’s materials. I have used this term, which in Meads v Meads is more formally described as the “double/split person”, because I conclude Mr. Pomerleau’s argument concerning human beings, artificial persons, and the interlinking of these entities as simply a variation on the well-debunked “Strawman” concept that was invented by the Sovereign Citizen movement, and then introduced into Canada. The “Strawman” is a myth, in any form. However, I will review that in more detail as I move through this analysis.

1. Error #1: Misinterpreting “Includes”

[56] The first critical error in Mr. Pomerleau’s scheme is that he is incorrect when he concludes that human beings are not taxpayers per the Income Tax Act. In his written argument at pp 7-9 Mr. Pomerleau reproduces many legislative definitions and concludes:

In order for this Corporate State party and, the Corporation of Canada Revenue Agency to unlawfully enforce upon me the obligations of such designated class of ‘person’,

i. Supporting Affidavits were filed with the Court in this action in which I specifically stated at multiple occasions that I was Not a ‘person’, ‘legal person’, fictional person’ et al. and/or, ‘an employee’ or having an ‘employee’ status with an ‘employer’. ...

[57] As I understand Mr. Pomerleau’s argument, he interprets the Income Tax Act definition of a “person” to mean only a corporation. The definition actually reads:

"person", or any word or expression descriptive of a person, includes any corporation , and any entity exempt, because of subsection 149(1), from tax under Part I on all or part of the entity's taxable income and the heirs, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of such a person, according to the law of that part of Canada to which the context extends; [Emphasis added.]

[58] “Person” then defines “taxpayer”:

"taxpayer" includes any person whether or not liable to pay tax;

[59] Mr. Pomerleau is emphatic: he is not a “person”. On that he is wrong. First, he is wrong in a grammatical sense. The word “includes” does not define an exclusive list.

[60] Second, Mr. Pomerleau is wrong according to the legal meaning of the word “includes”. Canada’s leading authority on statutory interpretation, Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, (5th ed) (Markham: LexisNexis, 2008) at 239 defines “includes” as a mechanism by which those who write legislation identify examples of a category. “Includes” does not set out an exhaustive list of defined items. Sullivan cites Nat Bank of Greece (Canada) v Katsikonouris, 1990 CanLII 92 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 1029 at 1041, 74 DLR (4th) 197:

... In legal drafting … “including” is normally used as a term of extension, “designed to enlarge the meaning of preceding words, and not to limit them.” …

[61] Third, Mr. Pomerleau is wrong because the meaning of the “person” definition in the Income Tax Act has been repeatedly evaluated in Canadian case law, with a single consistent result. This is because the idea that a “person” is only a corporation and not a human being is one of the oldest Detaxer OPCA motifs. In every case, Canadian courts have said the same thing. Human beings are persons according to the Income Tax Act, s 248(1) definition. Here are a few examples.

Kennedy v Canada (Customs & Revenue Agency), 2000 CanLII 22837 (ON SC), [2000] 4 CTC 186 at paras 9-21, 54 DTC 6524 (Ont Sup Ct J):

I find that a “person” as defined in s. 248(1) of the Income Tax Act includes both a natural person and an artificial person. It follows that the applicant is a “person” and a “taxpayer”. I also find that he is a person “resident” in Canada. Either a corporation or a person may be “resident” or, indeed, for other legal purposes “domiciled”, in Canada or elsewhere. As a “person”, the applicant has the same rights and obligations as any other “person” under the Income Tax Act. His obligations include the filing of annual income tax returns and the payment of any income tax owing under his returns.

R v Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 at para 19, 93 OR (3d) 81, leave denied [2008] SCCA No 522:

Unfortunately for the respondent, the Act does not distinguish between persons and natural persons. The definition of "person" in the Act includes human beings of which specie the respondent belongs.

R v David Lindsay (David-Kevin: Lindsay), 2006 BCCA 150 at para 3, 265 DLR (4th) 193, leave denied [2006] SCCA No 273:

As far as not being “a” person, Mr. Lindsay relies on the definition of “person” at s. 248 of the Income Tax Act ... Notwithstanding the word “includes”, Mr. Lindsay takes the position that only artificial persons such as corporations come within the definition, so that he is not subject to the requirement to file a return under the Income Tax Act. This position ignores the fact that the ordinary meaning of “person” is a natural person (including, I would have thought, a “free will, full liability flesh and blood living man”) and that the purpose of the statutory definition is to extend the meaning to include other specified legal entities as well. Mr. Lindsay’s position that he is not a “person” for purposes of the Income Tax Act is simply not tenable.

R v Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at paras 24-27, 302 BCAC 76, leave denied [2011] SCCA No 265:

Mr. Lindsay contends the word “person” has a distinct meaning in law that should be distinguished from the word’s meaning in ordinary parlance. In his submission, the word “person” under the Income Tax Act refers to a legal entity or status. He notes that the word “person” in the legal context includes corporations, and, at one point in time, excluded women, in contrast to the word’s ordinary use. ... Mr. Lindsay distinguishes between artificial persons, like corporations, who are subjected to rights and duties by the state and natural persons who, although possessing the capacity for rights and duties, may voluntarily accept or reject them. In Mr. Lindsay’s submission, Verhoeven J. erred in failing to appreciate this distinction and to appreciate that the Income Tax Act applies mandatorily only to artificial persons and that he, a natural person, had not accepted any obligation to comply with the Act.

...

With all due respect to Mr. Lindsay’s submissions, I think there is no possibility that he will be able to persuade a division of this Court to accept his arguments or his contention that he is not a “person” within the meaning of that term in the statute. ...

[62] I will cite one more example: Canada (National Revenue) v Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99, 2009 DTC 5050. This is a case that Mr. Pomerleau in fact relies upon in his arguments at p 21, where he cites para 21. However, if he read a few paragraphs further he would find this statement of law:

... Cory Stanchfield’s attempt to argue before this Court that his body comprises two persons which act in different capacities is of one of two things: (1) an inadmissible division of his indivisible entity, or (2) an attempted creation of a second entity in a fashion which is not recognized by law, the result of which amounts to nothing in the eyes of the law. It is an attempt at the impossible and the respondent cannot do the impossible. Therefore, “Cory Stanchfield (the Respondent)” and “Cory Stanchfield, in his capacity as a natural person (the Witness)” is but one person, with one single capacity, whom is directly included in the definition of “person” contained at subsection 248(1) of the Act.

[63] Mr. Pomerleau’s legal error on the scope of the Income Tax Act, s 248(1) definition of “person” collapses his entire argument. He says he is a human being. He is therefore also a “person” and a “taxpayer” according to the Income Tax Act. The parts of his argument that follow, alleging a fraudulent linkage to a “legal person” or a “fictional person” or a “death fictional entity” (i.e., the “Strawman”) via various mechanisms, are therefore irrelevant. I could end my analysis here and order summary judgment on this basis, but I will continue onward, because, as I indicated, I wish to respond in full to Mr. Pomerleau’s arguments.

[64] I also pause at this point to stress to Mr. Pomerleau that courts will interpret his litigation activities based on whether he advances a lawsuit that is plausible, or is supported by facts, or a potentially valid legal argument. The cases I cited above are readily identified. Mr. Pomerleau says he has read the Meads v Meads decision. The judgments I quoted above are all identified in Meads v Meads. Mr. Pomerleau cited Canada (National Revenue) v Stanchfield, and I presume he has read that decision.

[65] There is a principle of law - and common sense - that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts: Starr v Houlden, 1990 CanLII 112 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 1366, 68 DLR (4th) 641. If a litigant ignores established law, let alone the analysis and result in a case that is cited by that litigant, that leads to the common sense conclusion that someone is not litigating in good faith. Now, to be explicit, I am not saying Mr. Pomerleau is litigating in bad faith - I will discuss that later - but I am stressing to him that he will be judged by what he writes and says. Mr. Pomerleau spoke at the January 30, 2017 hearing about his intentions, and how he meant no disrespect or insult to the Court by his arguments, or any missteps he had taken. This is the kind of misstep that could lead a judge or a Master to come to the opposite conclusion.

[66] That takes me to the second critical defect in Mr. Pomerleau’s argument.

2. Error #2: The “Strawman” is a Lie

a. Mr. Pomerleau’s Argument(s) Rely on the “Strawman” Concept

[67] Mr. Pomerleau’s various submissions return to a single theme. He has been improperly, incorrectly, or fraudulently linked to another entity or name, which uses all upper case letters. A birth certificate is involved in that:

Pomerleau v CRA #1 - December 11, 2015 Affidavit

... any remuneration for mental or physical labor, or from risk, for the free will man commonly called Steve Pomerleau and collected, and/or held in trust in any form of asset value by STEVE JOSEPH MARIO POMERLEAU ...

Pomerleau v CRA #1 - January 6, 2016 Affidavit

... Throughout my childhood and when I became an adult, I was lead to believe by mean of false and fraudulent education conducted by the corporate entity of Canada, commonly called Canada, AKA: Government of Canada, AKA: Crown, that the ‘Legal identity name’, AKA: the name on my registered birth certificate, AKA: the ‘Legal fiction name’, AKA: the ‘agent in commerce’, AKA: ‘person/taxpayer’, AKA: the ‘slave name’, AKA: ‘STEVE POMERLEAU, was my name. ...

Pomerleau v CRA #2 - February 8, 2016 Reply to Defence

I have been deceived, manipulated, coerced and I am a victim of infancy because I was unknowingly tricked into being a servant to Her Majesty when I was born and l was unknowingly tricked into being recognized as a 'legal person' AKA: a 'corporation'. Therefore, the state party and its agencies has forced me to be recognized as a 'legal person'/'corporation' and I was unknowingly and unwillingly held into servitude

Pomerleau v CRA #1 - March 23, 2016 Application

The FACT that I, commonly called 'Steve Pomerleau', the 'Plaintiff', am a LIVING WITNESS with a SOUL, mind, body, spirit and NOT a DEATH Fictional entity, am NOT the LEGAL NAME on the REGISTERED birth certificate OWNED by the CROWN.

Pomerleau v CRA #1 - Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Right

... the REGISTERED birth Certificate OWNED and COPYRIGHTED by the CROWN Corporation was FRAUDULENTLY and intentionally created to DECEIVE and enslave humanity/mankind and, the CROWN CORPORATION is guilty of misleading by means of non-disclosure of the ramifications of all licenses, birth certificates, negotiable instrument ... the CROWN OWNED REGISTERED birth Certificate existence is all the proof/physical evidence of the INTENT to COMMIT FRAUD and to DECEIVE and enslave humanity/mankind ...

Pomerleau v CRA #1 - Brief of Argument

... after many hours of researches in regards to Taxations and, other related subjects, I started to realize the magnitude of the great deceptions pertinent to Statutory creatures of the state et al. as of: the ‘person’, ‘legal person’, ‘fictional person’ et al. for which I was oblivious prior to the spring of 2015 and, for which I had been subjected to all my life by this state party and its agencies. ...

... I was manipulated, coerced and tricked by this state party and its Officials, Canada Revenue Agency and its Officials and, to be recognized as a ‘legal person’, ‘person’, and servant/slave of her Majesty. ...

The simple fact that they forced me into recognition as a class of person is a violation of article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 7. Of the Constitution Act of 1982 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 6.

My inalienable Fundamental Rights and Freedoms were not created by this state party. I was born with these intrinsic rights contrary to the ‘legal person’, the designated class of persons et al. which are Statutory creatures of the state.

I have the right to recognition as a person, a legal person, a designated class of persons before the law and, my right does not obligate me to take recognition as of such designated class of person regardless of their designations through the Enactments, through its Statutory powers. I have the right to not be subjected to the rules that govern the private corporation of this state party and/or its agencies.

By forcing me to play the role of a class of person is a violation of my fundamental rights and freedoms . There is absolutely no justification for these deceitful actions and, as a whole, fraudulent actions . The fact that the Corporate Body designated Canada and its Executive powers have deliberately forced me and/or tried to force me into being recognized as a class of person is a sheer violation of International laws, Constitutional laws and the rule of law itself.

[68] These are all variations on a common single theme: the double/split person “Strawman”.

b. Canadian Courts Universally Reject “Strawman” Schemes

[69] The “Strawman” has many variations. That, if nothing else, is illustrated by this action. Mr. Pomerleau at various times indicated he refuses to be affiliated with ‘a something’ that carries a variety of names, including: a “fictional person”, a “legal person”, a “person/corporation”, a “death fictional entity”, a “Crown owned copyrighted legal name”, a “Crown owned registered birth certificate”, and a “person before the law”.

[70] Rooke ACJ in Meads v Meads explains that the “Double/Split Person” concept is at its core based on the idea that an individual has two aspects. One is the physical human being. The other is a “non-corporeal aspect”. Associate Chief Justice Rooke observes this other half of the duality has many names (para 417) but those labels do not matter. Canadian law only recognizes one “you” (para 445):

‘Double/split person’ schemes have no legal effect. These schemes have no basis in law. There is only one legal identity that attaches to a person. ...

[71] The version Mr. Pomerleau describes in his March 23, 2016 Application (Appendix B) is a conventional variation. Mr. Pomerleau was fraudulently tricked into being associated with a “DEATH Fictional Entity” (i.e. the “Strawman”) by a birth certificate, and that is how the government has exercised control over him.

[72] Many, many Canadian judgments have rejected the “Strawman” in its various permutations and forms. I will focus on one particularly important decision for Mr. Pomerleau: Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31, 368 Nfld & PEIR 80. While this is a decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal, it has been endorsed by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213, 86 CPC (7th) 348; R v Eddy, 2016 ABQB 42, 2016 DTC 5032; Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629, 29 Alta LR (6th) 334) and therefore is a binding authority on me.

[73] Fiander v Mills denounces the “Strawman” as legally false, and notoriously so: paras 20-21, 40. Arguments that are based on the idea the birth certificates create estates or other entities are “fanciful”, “have no rational support”, and “no basis in the law”: paras 21, 40. These ideas are so bad that a court should presume that anyone who advances these ideas does so for a “vexatious and abusive” purpose: para 40. A court that encounters the “Strawman” may act pre-emptively to terminate or restrict litigation abuse based on this notoriously false idea.

[74] That is the state of affairs in Canada when it comes to the “Strawman”. This idea in its various forms is entirely wrong in law. Mr. Pomerleau has presumptively acted in bad faith when he sued the CRA on the basis of these ideas, which as I have illustrated are a consistent thread that runs through his litigation.

c. The “Person Before the Law” “Strawman” Variation

[75] Mr. Pomerleau’s approach clearly has evolved from what was initially a classic “Strawman” with two parts, one physical, the other non-corporeal, linked by a birth certificate, and where the non-physical aspect of the doppelganger provides the basis for state authority. As I have indicated, this concept has been globally rejected by Canadian courts.

[76] However, Mr. Pomerleau’s written submissions for the January 30, 2017 hearing display a somewhat different approach. Like the classic “Strawman”, he objects to being a “person”, or a “legal person”, or an “employee of a corporation”, or an “officer of a corporation”, because those are different and less than his ‘physical’ half, which he in his written argument calls “a Human Being in Full Legal Capacity”. Mr. Pomerleau says he does not have to be “any class of person”.

[77] Mr. Pomerleau in his written argument explains that he initially used the wrong terminology to refer to himself, specifically “free will living man”, “the Sole beneficiary of my life and property”, and “a living witness with a soul”. He should have used “Human Being in Full Legal Capacity”.

[78] None of these phrases, including “Human Being in Full Legal Capacity”, is found in any reported Canadian case. Frankly, they are just magic spell language. It does not matter how Mr. Pomerleau describes his human-ness. In law, he is a person. This “Human Being in Full Legal Capacity” is called a “natural person”. And a natural person is a taxpayer, as I have previously explained.

[79] But there another, deeper problem with Mr. Pomerleau’s scheme. His mechanism for getting rid of the “Strawman” takes a somewhat different path. The traditional version attacks a contract between the human and the “Strawman”, or the effect of a birth certificate.

[80] Mr. Pomerleau’s version works this way. He cites two international treaties:

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 16:

Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law .

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 6:

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law .

[Emphasis added.]

[81] Then Mr. Pomerleau says something unexpected. “A right does not produce an obligation.” “[R]ecognition everywhere as a person before the law” is a “right”. Ergo, Mr. Pomerleau can reject being “a person before the law”:

I have a right to recognition as a person, a legal person, a designated class of persons before the law and, my right does not obligated me to take recognition as of such designated class of persons ...

[82] And that is what Mr. Pomerleau says he has done. He has repeatedly told the CRA and other government actors that he is not “a person”, under a wide variety of labels.

[83] This is nothing but the “Strawman” tarted up in a new dress. In Canada a human being is also a legal person, “a person before the law”. You cannot reject that, or opt out of it. To try to do so is simply nonsense. To use the language of Mr. Pomerleau, a “Human Being in Full Legal Capacity” is also and always “a person”. They are one and the same. They have exactly the same rights. They have exactly the same obligations under Canadian law.

[84] This is not the first time this concept has appeared and been rejected. In Claeys v Her Majesty et al at para 4 the plaintiff made this claim:

The Plaintiff, at all material times, is a human being, and is to be so recognized, having waived her human right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law, pursuant to Article 6, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 16, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

[85] At para 27 Master Harrison rejected that as a basis for an exemption from income tax obligations.

[86] Similarly, in O’Brien v Murchland, 2013 ONSC 4576 the plaintiff sued for damages, saying he was not subject to motor vehicle legislation, because:

I, Edward O’Brien was born free and have waived any/all “benefits and privileges” of any/all corporations et al., known or unknown, compelled or not. I DO NOT give consent or give my permission to be recognized as a person and strongly object to any party identifying me as operating under or though the designation of a “person” or anything other than a “man”. I, Edward O’Brien acknowledge that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights make it clear how Canada, the Province of Ontario, and Her Majesty must view and interact with him.

...

Under the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR), article 16 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights states that, “everyone has the right to be recognized as a person before the law”. I also have the right to waive that right as Canada is a signatory to the IBHR, therefore all court officers and government employees are bound by this “International Law” which trumps other laws which are only corporate statutes.

[87] Unsurprisingly, O’Brien’s action was struck out as futile and without merit.

[88] This is a second fundamental defect in Mr. Pomerleau’s scheme. A human being is a person, and therefore subject to valid Canadian legislation, including the Income Tax Act. He cannot ‘opt out’ of his income tax obligations by saying he is a particular kind of person, or he does not want to be a person.

d. What Would Happen if the “Strawman” Worked?

[89] The preceding review of how Canadian law has uniformly and consistently rejected the “Strawman” concept is, frankly, a little frustrating. I do not understand why this fabrication exerts the appeal it apparently holds for so many people who endorse OPCA ideas. So, I am going to take a different approach on this issue, and talk about what it would mean if the “Strawman” scheme worked. This is in most ways a thought experiment. Human status and status as “a person before the law” is one and the same. They are inextricably fused. But what would happen if you could somehow tease those two pieces apart?

[90] There is an answer, and that involves going back into the history of English common law. A human with legal person status is an individual who can stand in front of a court and seek to have the court enforce his or her rights under the law. They are therefore “a person before the law”. They are also equally subject to that law.

[91] English common law does, in fact, include a category of humans who are not legal persons, and who have no such rights. They are called slaves. They are humans, but are property. Slavery, humans as chattel property, was legal in the British Empire until that institution was abolished by The Slavery Abolition Act 1833, 3 & 4 Will 4, c-73. In England itself, the Magna Carta meant no human being could be a chattel slave (see Colin Bobb-Semple, “English Common Law, Slavery, and Human Rights”, (2007) 13 Tex Wensleyan L Rev 659 at 663-664, 668-672), but that would not apply here in Canada, at least until 1833.

[92] This is not the only way that the English common law has recognized humans who were not persons before the law. English common law considered children to be property of their father: William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, in Four Books, Volume 1, 12th ed (London: A Strahan and W Woodfall, 1793) at 452-453. In fact, children in Victorian New York held the same legal rights and privileges as livestock and pets, and were therefore protected by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals: Judith Areen, “Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State’s Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases”, (1975) 63 GEO L J 887 at 903, see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, ““Who Owns the Child?” Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property”, (1992) 33 Wm & Mary L Rev 4:995 and Kevin Noble Maillard, “Rethinking Children as Property: The Transitive Family”, (2010-2011) 32 Cardozo L Rev 225.

[93] Women too were not “persons”. In Canada this principle was overruled in the famous “Persons Case”, where Emily Murphy was initially denied any right to serve as a Canadian senator. However, the high court of Canada at that time, the Privy Council of England, decided in Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada, 1929 CanLII 438 (UK JCPC), [1930] AC 124 at 134 (PC) that women were persons, despite that “several centuries ago” it would have been understood that “persons” should refer only to men. The English common law also included the concept of “coverture”, where a wife’s legal status is subsumed by that of her husband: see Tim Stetton & Krista J Kesselring, Married Women and the Law: Coverture in England and the Common Law World, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013).

[94] Nor would the Magna Carta offer total protection, because the English common law still recognized an unusual kind of person without a right to access courts: a “villein”. These were feudal indentured servants who were controlled via ownership of land. Villeins were owned by whomever owned the land, and subject to physical discipline and their property being seized by their lord: John Hamilton Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, (London: Buttersworth, 1971) at 171-172; John Hatcher, “English Serfdom and Villeinage: Towards a Reassessment”, (1981) 90 Past and Present 3; Bobb-Semple, at 660-661.

[95] If Mr. Pomerleau were to somehow find a way to cease being “a person before the law” then he would experience an awful fate. He would not be a human being with rights. He would instead be a human being without rights. I can only guess who would own him. Perhaps his parents, like the Blackstonian child. Perhaps he would become the property of the state. If he rents his residence then he might be a villein of his landlord. The good news is that neither I nor any Canadian judge will ever have to untangle that knot, because Mr. Pomerleau’s quest to be a not-person will never succeed. And he’s lucky for that.

e. Conclusion

[96] This is a second basis on which I dismiss Mr. Pomerleau’s litigation as wrong in law and futile. No matter how parsed, framed, or styled, the “Strawman” is a fiction. Litigation based on this concept is always invalid, futile, and those who invoke the “Strawman” do so in bad faith.

3. Error #3: International Treaties are Not Binding Authorities

[97] The third critical defect in Mr. Pomerleau’s argument relates to the legal implications of international treaties for a person in Canada. This element of Mr. Pomerleau’s litigation is chiefly developed in his argument filed for the January 30, 2017 hearing. In brief, he says that if Canada has signed an international treaty then the terms in that treaty become binding on Canadian governments, either through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, via common law, or because international treaties operate as a kind of ‘superconstitution’ that trumps any Canadian constitutional principles, legislation, or common law.

[98] Again, I approach this misconception in a number of different ways.

a. International Treaties are Not Binding Supra-Constitutional Authorities

[99] Mr. Pomerleau’s first fundamental error is that he claims international treaties are binding on Canada. This is wrong. International treaties, themselves, have no legal effect on governments or persons in Canada. A treaty is an agreement between states that is political in nature: A.G. for Ontario v Scott, 1955 CanLII 16 (SCC), [1956] SCR 137 at 142, 1 DLR (2d) 433. The only way in which an international treaty has any force and effect inside this country is by government order or if the treaty’s provisions are enacted as Canadian legislation: Capital Cities Communications Inc. v Canadian Radio-Television Commission, 1977 CanLII 12 (SCC), [1978] 2 SCR 141 at 188, 81 DLR (3d) 609. Canadian governments may ignore international treaty and law, and even legislate in conflict and default on their international obligations, provided that is done in an explicit manner: R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at paras 53-54, [2007] 2 SCR 292.

[100] Mr. Pomerleau has cited a number of Supreme Court of Canada judgments that discuss the role international treaties play in the interpretation of Canadian legislation. For example, he quotes R v Hape, at para 53:

It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that legislation will be presumed to conform to international law. The presumption of conformity is based on the rule of judicial policy that, as a matter of law, courts will strive to avoid constructions of domestic law pursuant to which the state would be in violation of its international obligations, unless the wording of the statute clearly compels that result. ... the legislature is presumed to act in compliance with Canada’s obligations as a signatory of international treaties and as a member of the international community. In deciding between possible interpretations, courts will avoid a construction that would place Canada in breach of those obligations ...

[101] It is important to note that this quote from paragraph 53 omits an important concluding sentence: “Parliamentary sovereignty requires courts to give effect to a statute that demonstrates an unequivocal legislative intent to default on an international obligation.” Canadian law trumps anything in international treaties . What the passage quoted by Mr. Pomerleau means is that where there are alternative ways to interpret legislation, and one form is consistent with an international treaty, then that is the correct alternative interpretation.

[102] Mr. Pomerleau also cites Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 47 at para 22, [2013] 3 SCR 157:

Canada’s international obligations and relevant principles of international law are also instructive in defining the right:

The content of Canada’s international human rights obligations is, in my view, an important indicia of the meaning of “the full benefit of the Charter’s protection”. I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.

I have reproduced the quote as it is found in Pomerleau’s written brief, which omits citations. I also note that the quoted passage is from a dissent by Dickson CJC in Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), 1987 CanLII 88 (SCC), [1987] 1 SCR 313.

[103] Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) does not support Mr. Pomerleau’s proposition that international treaties are binding authorities. In that decision a Canadian imprisoned in the US argued that Canada had breached his Charter, s 6(1) right to enter into Canada when Canada refused to accept an application that the prisoner serve his sentence in Canada. The prisoner claimed he had an absolute right to enter Canada, whenever he wants. The prisoner argued that since Canada is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 12(4) of that treaty says: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”, that means that Canada can never deny a prisoner transfer of this kind. Abella J rejected that argument, and conclude that Charter, s 6(1) is “... construed generously, not literally ...”: para 48. This illustrates the limited purpose and relevance of international treaties when evaluating a Canadian’s rights. Treaties dictate nothing. Treaties may assist in interpreting and understanding a right, where that identified right is unclear or ambiguous.

[104] Another passage cited by Pomerleau states this principle in a clear and explicit manner. In Németh v Canada (Justice), 2010 SCC 56 at paras 34-35, [2010] 3 SCR 281 Cromwell J explains how international treaties serve as an interpretative tool, but do not dictate Canadian law:

[34] I also accept, of course, that, where possible, statutes should be interpreted in a way which makes their provisions consistent with Canada’s international treaty obligations and principles of international law. As LeBel J. noted in R. v. Hape ... it is presumed that the legislature acts in compliance with Canada’s obligations as a signatory of international treaties and as a member of the international community as well as in conformity with the values and principles of customary and conventional international law ...

[35] The presumption that legislation implements Canada’s international obligations is rebuttable. If the provisions are unambiguous, they must be given effect ... [Citations omitted.]

[105] Justice Cromwell here is very clear. R v Hape stands for the principle that when one is unsure how to interpret a statute, one presumes that statute is consistent with the international treaties to which Canada is a party. However, if legislation does not implement a treaty, then that ends the matter. The treaty is irrelevant.

b. International Treaties are Do Not Invalidate Canadian Income Tax Legislation

[106] The misconception that treaties are supra-constitutional or otherwise superior authorities is common in OPCA litigation: Bouchard v Canada, 2016 FC 983; Claeys v Her Majesty et al; Doell v Canada, 2016 FCA 235; Holmes v Canada; O’Brien v Murchland; R v Barens, 2016 BCCA 389; Bursey v Canada, 2015 FC 1126, Bursey v Canada, 2015 FC 1307, affirmed Dove v Canada, 2016 FCA 231. Some of these decisions clearly implement what are variations on Mr. Pomerleau’s arguments.

[107] In Claeys v Her Majesty et al, “Theresa-Marie Katherine Claeys, a human being”, demanded many penalties, and the refunding of her income tax for the previous decade. As previously described, she unsuccessfully used the same treaty-based “Strawman” concept used by Mr. Pomerleau. The same occurred in O’Brien v Murchland when the plaintiff relied on international treaty provisions to invalidate Canadian law.

[108] A group of litigants apparently led by a Wally Dove have made related claims in the Federal Courts. Bursey v Canada, 2015 FC 1126 and Bursey v Canada, 2015 FC 1307 provide some detail on Dove’s scheme. The plaintiffs in these actions sued to enforce state obligations to them under international treaties, including freedom from income tax: 2015 FC 1126, at paras 7-8; 2015 FC 1307, at Appendix para 59. Similarly, in Holmes v Canada, an OPCA litigant who was declared a vexatious litigant had sued alleging (para 2):

... that the Federal Crown has failed to meet its obligations under various international covenants and is in violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

[109] Much of the language used by this group of litigants resembles that used by Mr. Pomerleau, and I do not think that is a coincidence. For example, the Holmes v Canada decision at para 25 quotes parts of a statement of claim made by that litigant, who calls himself “a human being with intrinsic rights”. That is the same magic language found in some of Mr. Pomerleau’s documentation. It has never been used in any ‘conventional’ Canadian jurisprudence.

[110] The brief R v Barens decision is directly on point. Saunders JA affirms a motor vehicle offence conviction, and concludes at para 3:

... In a nutshell, Mr. Barens says he is not required to have a drivers licence because he is a human being, and not a person as referred to in the licensing requirement of the Motor Vehicle Act. He relies upon the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as allowing him free movement as a driver without being licenced. His proposition is, I must say, what is described in law as a frivolous argument.

[111] Mr. Pomerleau is not the first to argue that various international treaties affect Canada’s right to collect income tax. Canadian courts have consistently rejected this proposition:

• R v Blerot, 2015 SKCA 69 at paras 5-6, 2015 DTC 5074: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not create an “absolute and inalienable rights in relation to life, liberty and property” that invalidates income tax legislation.

• R v Gerlitz, at paras 35, 41: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not permit a person to choose to not be subject to income tax legislation.

• Girard v The Queen, 2014 TCC 107 at paras 10-11, 20, 2014 DTC 1112: the Income Tax Act does not put a person in a state of slavery and servitude, contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

• Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v MacIver, 2002 FCT 877, 224 FTR 289: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Articles 1-4, 17.2, 22, and 25 do not override or strike out Income Tax Act provisions.

c. International Treaties Do Not Dictate the Scope of Charter, s 7

[112] Beyond this simple general rule that international treaties have no binding effect on Canadian law and courts, it is useful to look at a few examples of where Canadian courts have rejected arguments that an international treaty right can be enforced in Canada. Mr. Pomerleau’s argument, as I understand it, is that one must ‘read in’ international treaty rights into the scope of the Charter, s 7 meaning of “life, liberty, and security of the person”.

[113] His written submissions emphasize how international treaties make statements about economic rights, rights relating to property, a right to work, and so on. For example, he cites:

Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

23(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culture Rights:

1.2 All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

3 The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.

5.1 Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.

5.2 No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.

6.1 The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.

25 Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.

[114] Mr. Pomerleau also cites the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Articles 1.2, 3, 5.1-5.2, 47, which have the same text as the same numbered Articles in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Culture Rights, except for Article 47 which corresponds to Article 25.

[115] But are these values and principles incorporated into the Charter of Rights and Freedoms s 7 protection of life, liberty and security of the person?

[116] In Godbout v Longueuil (City), 1997 CanLII 335 (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 844 at para 66, 152 DLR (4th) 577 Justice La Forest emphasized that Charter, s 7 does not protect all choices or interests. For example, the right to liberty means:

... only those matters that can properly be characterized as fundamentally or inherently personal such that, by their very nature, they implicate basic choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence.

[117] One thing that Charter, s 7 does not protect is a right to property and economic rights: Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 87 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 927, 58 DLR (4th) 577. For example, in A and L Investments Ltd. v Ontario (1997), 1997 CanLII 3115 (ON CA), 152 DLR (4th) 692, 104 OAC 92 (Ont CA), leave denied [1997] SCCA No 657; [1997] SCCA No 658, a group of landlords sued arguing their Charter, s 7 rights had been infringed by rent control legislation. Goudge JA rejected this argument, and concluded:

... the jurisprudence that has developed under the Charter has made clear that economic rights as generally encompassed by the term "property" and the economic right to carry on a business, to earn a particular livelihood, or to engage in a particular professional activity all fall outside the s. 7 guarantee ...

[118] This was intentional. If the drafters of the Charter had intended it to include property rights, then that would have been indicated explicitly: Bassett v Canada (Government) (1987), 1987 CanLII 4873 (SK CA), 35 DLR (4th) 537 at para 61, 53 Sask R 81 (Sask CA). For example, in Alberta this principle was applied to reject a claim that Charter, s 7 was infringed by a Calgary bylaw that require taxi licenses: United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (City of), 2002 ABCA 131, 303 AR 249, outcome reversed on other grounds 2004 SCC 19, [2004] 1 SCR 485. In Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(C) of the Criminal Code (Man.), 1990 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 1123, 56 CCC (3d) 65 Lamer J concluded Charter, s 7 does not create an economic right “... to exercise their chosen profession ...”, which in this case was prostitution. No one has a Charter, s 7 right to use a motor vehicle: R v Werhun (1991), 1991 CanLII 11718 (MB CA), 70 Man R (2d) 63, 62 CCC (3d) 440 (Man CA).

[119] Justice Major in Siemens v Manitoba (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 3 at paras 45-46, [2003] 1 SCR 6 rejected an argument that legislation which prohibited video lottery terminal games in a Manitoba town breached Charter, s 7 because that impeded the appellants choice of profession and location of work. Justice Major responded:

However, as a brief review of this Court’s Charter jurisprudence makes clear, the rights asserted by the appellants do not fall within the meaning of s. 7. The right to life, liberty and security of the person encompasses fundamental life choices, not pure economic interests. ...

... The ability to generate business revenue by one’s chosen means is not a right that is protected under s. 7 of the Charter.

[120] Another example of how the Charter, s 7 does not protect a right to property is reported in Tourki v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FCA 186 at para 46, [2008] 1 FCR 331. The appellant complained that a customs seizure and forfeiture of undeclared $102,642.33 was a breach of his Charter, s 7 rights. Justice Desjardins rejected this claim:

The duty to report imposed by the Act and the seizure and forfeiture mechanism it establishes do not engage the right to life, liberty and security of the person. The right to life, liberty and security of the person encompass a person’s fundamental life choices, and not purely economic interests or property rights ...

[121] The money smuggler had a legal obligation to declare the funds. That ended the question.

[122] I will conclude this analysis with one more example, which I think is very telling: Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 SCR 429. This judgment does not only involve the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but also the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Gosselin argued the Charters created a government obligation to provide a universal social assistance regime. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote the majority decision. Unsurprisingly, she confirmed that Charter, s 7 does not create “... a positive state obligation to guarantee adequate living standards.”: paras 82-84. That is consistent with the principle that the Charter does not protect economic interests.

[123] What is more relevant to Mr. Pomerleau’s argument is the Quebec Charter analysis. Section 45 of that document reads:

Every person in need has a right, for himself and his family, to measures of financial assistance and to social measures provided for by law, susceptible of ensuring such person an acceptable standard of living.

[124] Obviously, this seems to indicate a right to social assistance. However, Chief Justice McLachlin rejected that, and importantly compared the Quebec Charter, s 45 to Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”) and the Articles 22 and 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognize “the right to social security”, “realization ... of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality”, and “a standard of living adequate for the health and well‑being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services”.

[125] If Mr. Pomerleau’s theory of how international law works is correct, the Supreme Court of Canada should have ‘read in’ the international treaties standards into the Quebec Charter, s 45. Instead, McLachlin CJC did the opposite, and at paragraph 93 concluded the international treaty provisions were “unambiguous and direct”, “though they may not be actionable”, unlike the Quebec Charter provision which was “symbolic” (at paragraph 96). The Court therefore rejected Gosselin’s appeal.

d. Conclusion

[126] This shows how international treaties simply do not work the way Mr. Pomerleau says they do. Treaties are not ‘superior law’. Instead, a treaty is a political statement, and has no direct relevance or binding effect on Canadians and Canadian governments, unless the government takes the positive step of creating a domestic law that matches an international treaty. Even then the international treaties do not control the operation of that domestic law. Treaties are, at most, an interpretive tool.

[127] This is a third separate basis on which I reject Mr. Pomerleau’s lawsuit and its underlying rationale.

VI. Other OPCA-Related Issues

[128] Though I have disposed of Mr. Pomerleau’s lawsuit on multiple bases as an attempt to implement legally incorrect OPCAs, there are other issues that arise in his materials that I wish to deal with, again as much for his benefit as for those litigants who follow this line of argument.

A. “Tacit Assent”, Fee Schedules, and the Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Right

[129] Mr. Pomerleau in his written argument indicates on many occasions that he had sent documents to the CRA and other government officials. They did not reply or rebut the contents of those documents. That creates “tacit assent”. I asked Mr. Pomerleau in court what he meant by that, and he explained that silence means agreement. When I asked him whether he had Canadian court cases which indicate that is a rule of law, he said he had found that concept via “Google”, and on the Internet there are many mentions of this rule. He therefore accepted the principle must be correct.

[130] I pause at this point to note that the “Google” search engine is an unwise choice for legal research. In Canada the law is defined by legislation and the common law, which are the judgments given by Canadian courts. These can be accessed using the CanLII database, which is free and an extremely well designed and powerful legal research tool.

[131] In any case, Mr. Pomerleau’s belief that silence can mean agreement is wrong, and again this is a subject which is addressed in detail in the Meads v Meads decision at paras 447-528. Mr. Pomerleau says he has read this decision, which is binding on me. He should have understood that “tacit assent” does not apply here, and that the government actors had no obligation to reply to any of his documents, except two.

[132] Mr. Pomerleau on March 23, 2016 filed two “Notice to Admit Facts” documents. Rule 6.37 makes it a legal rule that a party to a lawsuit who receives a “Notice to Admit” is presumed to agree with an alleged fact in that “Notice”, unless it denies the fact, or objects to that fact. Here, silence does mean agreement, but this is a law put in place by the Alberta Legislature, and not a principle of common law. The CRA disputed Mr. Pomerleau’s Notices, and I agree with its position that the proposed admissions were irrelevant, improper and unnecessary, and nonsensical.

[133] Mr. Pomerleau has filed a Fee Schedule that he sent to the CRA (see Appendix A). This document purports to set penalties or amounts due to Mr. Pomerleau for certain steps or events, including:

• if he is required to reply to government correspondence (10 ounces of gold)

• if he has to appear in court (25 ounces of gold)

• if he is injured, which includes discrimination, threats, intimidation, and loss of sleep (15 ounces of gold)

• if he is detained he receives 100 ounces of gold, and an additional 5 ounces per hour after the first hour

• 100,000 ounces of gold if he is killed.

[134] Mr. Pomerleau at the January 30, 2017 hearing asked why government actors can impose fines, like he did via his fee schedule. The answer to that is simple. Those fines and penalties ultimately flow from legislation authorized by democratically elected governments. They are law, and may be enforced without an individual’s agreement or consent. Mr. Pomerleau has no equivalent authority to impose analogous penalties.

[135] Canadian courts refuse to enforced fee schedule based claims such as the ones advanced by Mr. Pomerleau (note: Pomerleau v CRA #1 Statement of Claim, para 2; Pomerleau v CRA #2 Statement of Claim, para 3). Instead, Canadian courts reject these documents. Their only purpose is intimidation and harassment: Meads v Meads at para 527; Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114 at para 199, 94 Alta LR (5th) 318; Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, 2014 ABQB 771 at para 78, 18 Alta LR (6th) 1; Gidda v Hirsch, 2014 BCSC 1286 at para 84; R v Sands, 2013 SKQB 115 at para 18; R v Boxrud, 2014 SKQB 221 at para 46, 450 Sask R 147; Re Boisjoli, at paras 58-69; Gauthier v Starr, at para 39; Allen Boisjoli Holdings v Papadoptu, 2016 FC 1260.

[136] I strongly recommend Mr. Pomerleau read the Re Boisjoli decision with care. In that decision Rooke ACJ concluded that Allen Nelson Boisjoli had prima facie committed the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 423.1 offence of intimidation of a justice system participant when Boisjoli attempted to enforce a fee schedule claim via the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. Boisjoli was subsequently charged with that offence and is facing trial.

[137] Mr. Pomerleau has also attempted to unilaterally define his relationship with other Canadians, his former employer, and Canadian government and government actors using a document entitled a “Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Right (Appendix C). This document purports to become a binding default judgment if it is not refuted or rebutted. I will not detail this document’s contents, but confirm it has no (beneficial) legal effect for Mr. Pomerleau: R v Petrie, 2012 BCSC 2110, 107 WCB (2d) 29; R v Sands; Szoo’ v RCMP, 2011 BCSC 696, 202 ACWS (3d) 450; ANB v Hancock, 2013 ABQB 97, 557 AR 364; Jabez Financial Services Inc. v Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112, 264 NSR (2d) 224; Viglione c Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec, 2012 QCCS 2742; Gauthier v Starr; R v ANB, 2012 ABQB 556, 570 AR 146; R v McCormick, 2012 NSCA 58, 316 NSR (2d) 273; Holmes v Canada.

[138] Saskatchewan notary John Bergman who certified this document was in breach of his professional duties when he formalized Mr. Pomerleau’s fraudulent and vexatious “Notice”: Meads v Meads, at paras 643-645; Re Boisjoli, at para 113-124. Counsel for CRA may wish to consider reporting Mr. Bergman’s involvement in this matter to the relevant Saskatchewan authorities.

B. Criminal Interest Rates

[139] Mr. Pomerleau in his Statements of Claim demands “daily compounded interest of 25%” for the amounts he alleges are owed by the CRA. Criminal Code, s 347 makes excessive interest charges a criminal offence:

347(1) Despite any other Act of Parliament, everyone who enters into an agreement or arrangement to receive interest at a criminal rate, or receives a payment or partial payment of interest at a criminal rate, is

(a) guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or

(b) guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to a fine not exceeding $25,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both.

[140] “Criminal rate” is defined in s 347(2) as:

...an effective annual rate of interest calculated in accordance with generally accepted actuarial practices and principles that exceeds sixty per cent on the credit advanced under an agreement or arrangement;

[141] Mr. Pomerleau via this lawsuit is obviously attempting to charge and enforce a criminal rate of interest.

[142] While Mr. Pomerleau’s attempts to foist these interest obligations on the CRA are legally ineffective, Criminal Code, ss 24(1), 463 also make an attempt to commit an offence such as charging a criminal interest rate a basis for criminal prosecution and sanction.

[143] I will not belabour this point, other than to note to Mr. Pomerleau that he puts himself at risk when he advances claims of this kind. Further, attempts to co-opt the Court to enforce this kind of illegal activity is a basis to restrict future court access (Re Boisjoli, at paras 98-103), as well as other sanctions such as unfavorable and/or elevated costs.

C. Other OPCA Motifs

[144] There are a number of other OPCA motifs that appear in Mr. Pomerleau’s written argument that warrant commentary.

[145] Mr. Pomerleau concludes that Canada is a corporation, and not a geographic space with an associated nation-state government. This is false, and the misconception that Canada is somehow a corporation has been rejected by Canadian courts on numerous occasions: Meads v Meads, at para 384; Fearn v Canada Customs, at paras 65-69; Harms v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2015 BCSC 1309 at para 27, affirmed 2016 BCCA 247; Butterfield v LeBlanc, 2007 BCSC 235, 155 ACWS (3d) 1075; Royer c Québec (Procureure générale), 2016 QCCS 2500 at paras 19-20, affirmed 2016 QCCA 1612, . Canada is a nation-state with sovereign authority within its geographic territory: R v Hape.

[146] Mr. Pomerleau cites Thomson v Minister of National Revenue, 1946 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1946] SCR 209, [1946] 1 DLR 689 as proof that “the person who operates as an officer of Canada must pay a tax”. If Mr. Pomerleau read that case he would discover that the word “officer” is not used in the judgment, and instead this case asks whether a man who rented a house in Bermuda and pretended to visit that island could claim to be a non-resident of Canada and as a result avoid being liable to pay income tax. In short, the case Mr. Pomerleau has cited stands for the exact opposite proposition than he claims. It says if you are resident in Canada, geographically, you are a taxpayer.

[147] Mr. Pomerleau cites the Canadian Bill of Rights as having constitutional effects, for example creating a right to property. Instead, it is only legislation, and has no such special authority: Attorney General of Canada v Lavell, 1973 CanLII 175 (SCC), [1974] SCR 1349, 38 DLR (3d) 481. The Canadian Bill of Rights does not invalidate the Income Tax Act.

[148] Mr. Pomerleau complains that the requirement to have a Social Insurance Number illegally denies him his economic rights and forces him to associate with others, impeding pursuit of his “economic development et al”. This concept too has been rejected before by Canadian courts: Bydeley v The Queen, 2012 TCC 142, 2012 DTC 1153.

[149] In parallel to Mr. Pomerleau’s argument that he can opt out of being a “person before the law”, he also says citizenship is a privilege, so he should be able to reject being associated with the Crown, and therefore become free of Canadian authority, citing Dowhopoluk v Martin et al, 1971 CanLII 557 (ON SC), [1972] 1 OR 311, 23 DLR (3d) 42 (Ont HCJ). However, this decision stands for the proposition that the Crown gets to choose in its “absolute discretion” who is or who is not a citizen of Canada. Even the Courts cannot interfere in that decision. At the present whether one is a citizen of Canada is determined by the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29. This continues the principle that the Crown determines who is or is not a Canadian. In any case, I am bound by a higher Alberta decision that rejects that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a basis for an individual to ‘opt out’ of being a Canadian citizen and therefore become immune to its laws: R v Gerlitz, 2014 ABQB 247 at paras 35, 41, 589 AR 43.

VII. Costs

[150] The Rules state that an unsuccessful litigant is presumptively required to pay court costs to the successful party: Rule 10.29(1). That would be the CRA. OPCA litigation is by its nature false, vexatious, frivolous, and an abuse of process. As such, Rooke ACJ instructs in Meads v Meads at para 631 that because of the obnoxious and abusive nature of OPCA litigation, innocent targets of OPCA litigation should be indemnified to the extent possible.

[151] I have grounds to order a very stiff or punitive cost award against Mr. Pomerleau in this litigation. As illustrated, his lawsuits had several independent fatal flaws, and his litigation includes other problematic aspects. However, I am not going to order elevated or indemnity costs, but instead order that the CRA receive its party and party litigation costs taxed on Rules, Schedule C, tariff chart:

• Pomerleau v CRA #1 - Column 3

• Pomerleau v CRA #2 - Column 4

This will have significant cost implications for Mr. Pomerleau, which I hope will deter further meritless litigation.

[152] I have taken this unusual step because Mr. Pomerleau has attempted to conduct himself in a cooperative and constructive manner in his two lawsuits. Some OPCA litigants are ‘a handful’. Though Mr. Pomerleau’s litigation builds from a foundation of sand, he has asked a question, and I have now given him the most thorough answer I can.

[153] Mr. Pomerleau should be aware it is very unlikely he will be granted this kind of indulgence in the future if he continues to engage in OPCA litigation.

VIII. Conclusion

[154] Mr. Pomerleau’s two lawsuits are struck out. Costs are ordered against him as indicated above.

[155] Mr. Pomerleau’s argument that he has a valid action against the CRA is clearly composed of old OPCA motifs, somewhat rearranged and rejiggered in what I perceive is an attempt to work around Canadian jurisprudence, such as that reviewed in Meads v Meads. It won’t work. Mr. Pomerleau in his oral submissions insinuated in a very polite manner that Canadian judges, government officials, and lawyers are attempting to conceal a way to the golden prize - life in Canada with all the benefits but none of the obligations. There simply is no way to do that.

[156] This does not, however, mean that Mr. Pomerleau has no choices. If he does not want to be subject to Canadian law, including a potential obligation to pay income tax, then he has an alternative. Leave. As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in R v Hape, Canada is sovereign and has the same independent and separate authority within its territorial boundaries as that of any nation-state. The corollary is that, with limited exceptions, Canada cannot reach out and impose its laws on those outside its land and controlled waters. There is nothing to stop Mr. Pomerleau from leaving Canada. Charter, s 6(1) gives him that right. However, if Mr. Pomerleau chooses to remain in Canada, and chooses to engage in activities such as working at a job that generates income, then Mr. Pomerleau is potentially subject to an obligation to pay income tax per Canadian legislation, including the Income Tax Act.

[157] It is as simple as that.

[158] I have gone into some detail as why Mr. Pomerleau’s arguments are wrong. One reason why I did that is because Mr. Pomerleau faces very serious potential consequences if he maintains his current litigation trajectory, including unfavorable and elevated cost awards, vexatious litigant status and restricted access to Alberta courts, and the possibil