Is that really the case?

Foreign policy was hardly the critical concern for the majority of Bulgarians who cast ballots. And truth be told, Moscow’s influence isn’t creeping into Bulgaria — it’s long been here. A vast majority of Bulgarians value their membership in NATO and, even more, the European Union. But for historical and cultural reasons, most prefer not to see Russia as an enemy. So, unsurprisingly, both General Radev and his center-right opponent advocated lifting sanctions on Russia and improving relations with Moscow.

I share this Bulgarian story because the debate over the Kremlin’s alleged interference in the United States’ presidential election has revived a Cold War framework for understanding the world. Political outcomes in small countries tend to be explained as a zero-sum game between Russia and the West. There are three major problems with this approach.

First, it confuses more than it clarifies. In the 1970s and ‘80s a number of third-world nationalists were caricatured by the West as Communists, despite the fact that they were focused on fighting for independence, not Soviet Communism. The United States and its allies wasted energy warring with them. But misrecognizing nationalists as Communists sometimes became a self-fulfilling prophecy: After being labeled Communist, many of the third-world revolutionary governments indeed became pro-Soviet. The moral is that we should not be surprised if the constant labeling of populist parties and leaders in Europe as “pro-Russian” turns them into the Kremlin’s friends.

Second, the return of the Cold War narrative is becoming a factor in Russia’s growing international influence. The West’s current obsession with Mr. Putin is at the heart of the Russian president’s newly discovered soft power. If Moscow, as so much of the news media suggest, can really rig the American elections, how could a small Bulgaria, or for that matter even France, trust that anybody but the Kremlin would decide who the next president would be? Russia’s power of attraction today is rooted not in its ideology but in its powerful image. If you believe Mr. Putin’s most zealous opponents, he is winning all the time.

Finally, in a globalized world, foreign interference in elections is unavoidable. Private citizens — and not only governments — hack email accounts, spread fake news and conspiracy theories, and try to destroy the reputation of foreign leaders. Lone hackers and tiny rogue political groups can easily crash the servers of electoral commissions around the world. We are entering a period in which disruption is becoming an international contest, and many seek money and glory by demonstrating their ability to sow chaos beyond their borders. The Cold War narrative ignores this new reality because it tends to see any subversive activity as the work of states. A result is a growing risk of overreaction and conflict. In the world of mutually assured disruption, more than ever before what matters is the capacity to distinguish between state-inspired and state-run subversion.