St. Thomas Aquinas' celebrated five ways to the existence of God look to features of the cosmos as a whole that call out for explanation, which could not be explained by the formal functional principles of sublunary beings: why there is any change here below rather than none at all (the first way), why there is something rather than nothing (the second and third ways), why there is perfection in varying degrees (the fourth way), why everything is ordered to an end the best way (the fifth way). The arguments conclude to an ultimate explainer, which must have or be whatever formal functional principle or power it takes to explain the phenomena.



Feser in his article, "Existential Inertia and the Five Ways", develops and defends the suggestion that the traditional proofs represented by the Five Ways are best read as defenses of the Doctrine of Divine Conservation (DDC). The Doctrine of Divine Conservation (DDC) holds that the things that God has created could not continue in existence for an instant if he were not actively preserving them in being. This would also be arguments against the Doctrine of Existential Inertia (DEI). According to DEI, the world of contingent things, once it exists, will tend to continue in existence on its own at least until something positively acts to destroy it. It thus has no need to be conserved in being by God.



He summarizes his up-to-date Five ways in this article as follows:





The first argues that the existence, even for an instant, of composites of act and potency presupposes the simultaneous existence of that which is pure act; the second argues that the existence, even for an instant, of composites of essence and existence presupposes the simultaneous existence of that which is being or existence itself; the third argues that the existence, even for an instant, of composites of form and matter presupposes the simultaneous existence of an absolutely necessary being; the fourth argues that the existence, even for an instant, of things which are many and come in degrees of perfection presupposes the simultaneous existence of something one and absolutely perfect; and the fifth argues that the existence, even for an instant, of finality or directedness toward an end presupposes the simultaneous existence of a supreme ordering intellect.



In this post, I will argue that all of these proofs ultimately fail. Since they entail a theory of time that, given God's activity in the created universe, presupposes a theory of persistence that would contradict numerous metaphysical commitments these arguments have. Many arguments here will merely be reinforced variations of the arguments used in my refutation of Edward Feser's: Aristotelian, Thomistic, and Neo-Platonic proofs of God . These updated arguments used against the First, Second, and Third way would equally apply for these three proofs of God by Feser.



Feser's up-to-date versions of Aquinas Five Ways



First way

1. That the actualisation of potency is a real feature of the world follows from the occurrence of the events we know of via sensory experience.

2. The occurrence of any event E presupposes the operation of a substance.

3. The existence of any natural substance S at any given moment presupposes the concurrent actualisation of a potency.

4. No mere potency can actualise a potency; only something actual can do so,

5. So any actualiser A of S's current existence must itself be actual.

6. A's own existence at the moment it actualises S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualisation of a further potency or (b) A's being purely actual.

7. If A's existence at the moment it actualises S presupposes the concurrent actualisation of a further potency, then there exists a regress of concurrent actualizers that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualiser.

8. But such a regress of concurrent actualizers would constitute a causal series ordered per se, and such a series cannot regress infinitely.

9. So either A itself is purely actual or there is a purely actual actualiser which terminates the regress of concurrent actualizers.

10. So the occurrence of E and thus the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of a purely actual actualiser.

Second way

1. That efficient causation is a real feature of the world is evident from sensory experience.

2. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself.

3. The existence of any natural substance S at any given moment presupposes that its essence is concurrently being conjoined to an act of existence.

4. If S itself were somehow conjoining its own essence to an act of existence, it would be the efficient cause of itself.

5. So there must be some concurrent efficient cause C distinct from S which is conjoining S's essence to an act of existence.

6. C's own existence at the moment it conjoins S's essence to an act of existence presupposes either (a) that C's essence is concurrently being conjoined to an act of existence, or (b) that in C essence and existence are existence

7. If C’s existence at the moment it conjoins S's essence to an act of existence presupposes that C's own essence is concurrently being conjoined to an act of existence, then there exists a regress of concurrent conjoiners of essences and acts of existence that is either infinite or terminates in something whose essence and existence are identical.

8. But such a regress of concurrent conjoiners of essence and existence would constitute a causal series ordered per se, and such a series cannot regress infinitely.

9. So either C's own essence and existence are identical, or there is something else whose essence and existence are identical which terminates the regress of concurrent conjoiners of essences with acts of existence.

10. So the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of something in which essence and existence are identical.

Third way

1. That the particular substances revealed to us in sensory experience are contingent is evident from the fact that they are generated and corrupted.

2. Their generation and corruption presuppose matter and form, which are

neither generated nor corrupted and are thus necessary.

3. But matter of itself is pure potency and material forms of themselves are mere abstractions, so that neither can exist apart from the other; and even when existing together they cannot depend on each other alone on pain of vicious circularity.

4. So matter and form do not have their necessity of themselves but must derive it from something else.

5. Material substances are also composites of essence and existence, as are non-divine necessary beings like angels, and any such composite must have its essence and existence conjoined by something distinct from it.

6. So these other necessary beings too must derive their necessity from something else.

7. But a regress of necessary beings deriving their necessity from another would constitute a causal series ordered per se, which of its nature cannot regress infinitely.

8. So there must be something which is necessary in an absolute way, not deriving its necessity from another and (therefore) not a composite of form and matter or essence and existence

Fourth way

1. The things of our experience exhibit goodness, unity, and the other transcendentals only to some limited degree.

2. But they can do so only insofar as they participate in that which is good, one, etc. without limitation.

3. Moreover, the transcendentals are convertible with one another, and ultimately with Being Itself.

4. So there is some one thing which is being itself, goodness itself, unity itself, and so forth, in which the things of our experience participate to the degrees they do.

5. But that in which things participate is their efficient cause.

6. So the one thing which is being itself, goodness itself, unity itself, etc. is the efficient cause of the things of our experience.

Fifth way

1. That unintelligent natural causes regularly generate certain specific effects or ranges of effects is evident from sensory experience.

2. Such regularities are intelligible only on the assumption that these efficient causes inherently "point to" or are "directed at" their effects as to an end or final cause.

3. So there are final causes or ends immanent to the natural order.

4. But unintelligent natural causes can "point to" or be "directed at" such ends only if guided by an intelligence.

5. So there is such an intelligence.

6. But since the ends or final causes in question are inherent in things by virtue of their natures or essence, the intelligence in question must be the cause also of natural things having the natures or essences they do.

7. This entails its being that which conjoins their essences to an act of existence, and only that in which essence and existence are identical can ultimately accomplish this.

8. So the intelligence in question is something in which essence and existence are identical.

God and time

Theists typically conceive of God’s eternality in one of two ways: either God is in time (temporalism) or he is outside of time (atemporalism). These conceptions paint strikingly different portraits of the divine nature, as well as suggest an array of competing philosophical and theological implications. The God of Aquinas five ways and the one Feser has in mind is a God which is atemporal (or timeless). In which God's eternity is a whole simultaneously, not successively. As R.T Mullins discussed in his book End of the timeless God, We can understand God being atemporal to mean at least the following five propositions:

(1) God exists without beginning.

(2) God exists without end.

(3) God exists without succession, or successive moments, in His life.

(4) God exists without temporal position and extension

(5) God cannot undergo any intrinsic or extrinsic change

As seen, these up-to-date five ways argue for the simultaneous existence of that which is pure act, which is being or existence itself, an absolutely necessary being, one and absolutely perfect, and of a supreme ordering intellect, which is identified as 'God'. Following DDC, he preserves the existence of creatures which could not exist even for an instant without it. So creatures at all times depend on his conservation. This means God is "present" to all past times, present time and all future times, since whenever his creative or sustaining activity is present there, he is an immediate agent of it.

God concurs with the operations of his creatures by immediately bestowing their esse or being, regularly endowing with causal powers (actualizing there active potency) that allow them to produce effects. and by (depending on the case and circumstances) directing them to reach effects beyond the creature’s own causal order (such as in the case of instrumental causality).



By God being "present", i don't mean our present. Instead, “present” denotes what exists. Our present is ﬂeeting because it stands between the non-existent past and/or the yet-to-exist future. God’s timeless "present" does not have a before and after. It simply exists. So the predicate “present” can be applied literally to God because it can be given a non-temporal meaning that overlaps with the temporal meaning of “present.”

Metaphysics of time

There is a fundamental division in the metaphysics of time between temporal ontologies, this would be between dynamic temporal ontologies and static temporal ontologies. We can distinguish between dynamic temporal ontologies that include some notion of temporal passage or progression, which often feature an objective present, and static views of time in which there is no real progression of time.

Eternalism: Classical eternalism is a static view since the past, present and future facts are equally real and are not brought into existence as time progresses. In classical eternalism, there is no real temporal passage in the sense that new facts are brought into existence or that there is an objective present which progresses. In its most intuitive reading, eternalism is a B-theoretic view: the facts are ordered according to an earlier/simultaneous-with/later relation, but there is no fact, or instant, which is intrinsically past, present or future.

Moving spotlight: The MST combines the eternalist notion of a block of all facts, events or things with the notion of an objective present and temporal progression. In its classical guise, the MST is an A-theoretic version of eternalism: while all facts past, present and future are equally real, there is an objective and progressing present or “spotlighted area” that is the exclusive present moment, in reference to which the past, present and future can be defined. The classical MST offers a non-reducible notion of tense.

Growing block theory: The GBT is dynamic, with the distinction that the past and present facts, but not the future ones, are real. In GBT, the facts that are real or exist simpliciter are the past and present ones, while only the latter exist presently. The GBT resembles eternalism in the sense that the past and present facts form a block, which is the totality of existence, excluding the future facts. This block grows constantly as new facts are added to the block of past and present facts with the progression of time.

Shrinking Block theory: The SBT is dynamic, while being the opposite of the GBT. Where future facts and present facts, but not past ones, are real. In SBT, the facts that are real or exist simpliciter are the future and present ones, while only the latter exist presently. Presentism:

Presentism is probably the most popular dynamic and A-theoretic view of time, since it gives an account of temporal progression and of becoming: only the present is real, the past is not real anymore and the future is not real yet. The present is all there is and it progresses. The only facts that exist simpliciter are the ones that are objectively present. The future facts do not exist yet and the past ones do not exist anymore.

It is worthwhile to discuss whether the God of the five ways is compatible with the non-eternalist dynamic theories of time. Which unsurprisingly turns out not to be. The issue is that God's eternity has no beginning or end, nor experiences any succession, so his creative or sustaining activity cannot experience succession. While in non-eternalist theories, moments of time successively come into existence and/or cease to exist.

The five ways and time

So God's creative or sustaining activity means he is "present" to all past times, present time and all future times, since whenever his creative or sustaining activity is present there, he is an immediate agent of it (Braine 1994). But It is not clear, however, how an atemporal entity, isolated from the transient flow of time, could be "present" to past times, present time, and future times on most of the dynamic theories of time (presentism, SBT, and GBT) without itself becoming ‘infected’ (or at least ‘affected’) by temporality. This is because God cannot be "present" to non existent times, as moments of time successively come into existence and/or cease to exist simpliciter. This means that it applies to God as well, since in no sense do those moments of time exist. So God must act regularly in order for things to exist at all; if the states of the universe are different, God is acting differently. God cannot act once, changelessly, within a changing world if either of these 3 dynamic theories of time are true.



Attempts to avoid this like Stump and Kretzmann's ET-simultaneity model fail simply because past and/or futures events do not exist on these 3 dynamic models of time, and could therefore not be ET-simultaneous (or simultaneous under any other definition of simultaneity) with anything. Given this reasoning, a static model of time would seem to be an inevitable requirement of ET-simultaneity (Walton 2013), who was summarizing an argument by DeWeese (2004, P.164-5). One could try to avoid this by saying these moments of time only exist in eternity. But this position commits one to attributing a dual existence to created, temporal entities. But if God sustains non-existent future contingents only as they exist in eternity, God does not sustain them in their own proper existence until a certain moment of time begins to exist. If one respond that an objects own proper existence is just their existence in eternity, then, it seems to me, one has conceded that an eternalist theory of time is the case. If one insists that a contingent’s temporal and eternal (eternity) existences are distinct, then it is difficult to see why they are not two things rather then one.



Since God wills from eternity and eternity has no beginning or end. Then God's willing from eternity is eternal. God could eternally will that some thing x come to exist at time t1, but God cannot eternally act at t1 because that time does not always exist. God cannot act at non-existent times, nor is God eternally sustaining yet-to-exist future times. So one can easily grant the Thomist the claim that God’s eternal will never changes, but this does nothing to assuage the problem. God still has to wait to sustain future moments of time, and God still has to wait to perform certain actions until those future moments become present. This is not something that a timeless God can do. A timeless God cannot wait to perform actions. A timeless God cannot wait to be present to, and sustain, yet-to-exist moments of time. This would involve God changing from one moment to the next. So an eternalist theory of time, which encompasses Eternalism and MST can only be compatible with God's creative and sustaining activity.

Must God have eternal effects?

In Summa Contra Gentiles II.35. A4. Aquinas’ develops solutions to arguments for the eternity of the world from the standpoint of God. Im particulary interested in what he says in theses parts of article 3-4:



On the contrary, God's act of understanding and willing is, necessarily, His act of making. Now, an effect follows from the intellect and the will according to the determination of the intellect and the command of the will. Moreover, just as the intellect determines every other condition of the thing made, so does it prescribe the time of its making; for art determines not only that this thing is to be such and such, but that it is to be at this particular time, even as a physician determines that a dose of medicine is to be drunk at such and such a particular time, so that, if his act of will were of itself sufficient to produce the effect, the effect would follow anew from his previous decision, without any new action on his part. …..But, as we have said, just as the will wills this thing to be such and such, so does it will it to be at such and .such a time. Hence, for the will to be a sufficient cause it is not necessary that the effect should exist when the will exists, but at that time when the will has ordained its existence. But with things that proceed from a cause acting naturally, the case is different. For, as nature is, so is its action; hence, given the existence of the cause, the effect must necessarily follow. On the other hand, the will acts in keeping not with the manner of its being, but of its intention. So, then, just as the effect of a natural agent follows the being of the agent, if the latter is sufficient, so the effect of a voluntary agent follows the mode of his purpose.

The idea seems to be this. When an agent wills or decrees that such and such take place, she wills or decrees that it take place at a certain time. Her will or decree need not immediately produce the intended effect. So God wills, and so determines, the time at which that thing comes to be. But in the case of a cause acting naturally, the cause would immediately produce the effect, and thus be eternal. R.T Mullins helps us understand this by giving an example in his book end of the the timeless God (P. 103):

I get motion sickness very easily. One day I decide to go to Edinburgh. I know that I must take medicine before I get on the train in order to prevent illness. However, the medicine has clear directions that it should be taken 20 minutes before travel. About a week before my trip I will that I take the medicine 20 minutes before travel. My will never changes throughout the week, but I do not act until the right time. If I take the medicine immediately following my will it shall be of no use to me. I must wait to act until 20 minutes prior to travel. My will in this instance does not produce an immediate effect

This seems identical or at the very least, similar to William Lane Craig’s argument for the beginning of the universe being a personal cause who freely wills its effects. This is addressed in the article “Must the beginning of the Universe have a Personal Cause?” by Wes Morriston. Who takes a long hard look at premises (1) and (4) of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA), as defended by William Lane Craig.



Craig seems to be thinking along the following lines. There are just two kinds of cause — personal causes and non-personal ones. Non-personal causes are causally sufficient for their effects. A temperature below freezing is Craig's example of a non-personal cause. It cannot fail to freeze whatever water happens to be around. Personal causes, on the other hand, are individual persons who freely decide to bring about this or that state of affairs. A man freely choosing to stand up at a certain time is an example of a personal cause. If the man (rather than some state of the man) is the cause of his standing up, then obviously the cause can exist without producing its effect.



Craigs distinction between personal causes and non-personal ones leads him to postulate the conclusion that the cause of the universe must be a personal agent, since a non-personal cause from all eternity would have already produced the universe, no matter how far back in time we go. If all of the conditions for the origin of universe were in place from all of eternity, then the universe would already have sprung into existence. But the universe clearly has a beginning, therefore must have been caused by a personal agent.



Aquinas, just like Craig, for agents (personal causes), if the will is sufficient for the effect, “it is not necessary that the effect should exist when the will exist”. But for natural causes (non personal causes), it is necessary that the effect must exist coincidently with the cause. So if the natural cause is eternal, then the effect must be eternal as well.



As Morriston points out, this seems to commit Craig to an inconsistent set of propositions. As follows:

(i) The universe God intended to create has a beginning.

(ii) God’s willing-to-create the universe is eternal.

(iii) God’s willing-to-create is causally sufficient for the existence of the universe.

(iv) If a cause is eternal and sufficient for the existence of some object or event, then that object or event is also eternal. [This follows from (d) in the previous argument].

(v) If a thing is eternal then it does not have a beginning.



T he problem is that these propositions would imply:



(vi) The universe both does and does not have a beginning.



Here, Morriston points out a major problem with this supposed personal agent as the cause of the universe. By postulating a personal cause, Craig cannot escape his own conclusion that the universe must be just as eternal as its cause. Since an eternal sufﬁcient cause must have an eternal effect, the universe must be eternal. For if God is timelessly eternal then there was never a moment in time when God did not will into existence this universe. Since Craig does not deny that God’s intention to create our world is eternal, “God’s eternal intention to create a universe must surely be causally sufficient for the existence of that world. So, if, as Craig indicates, God’s will to create is eternal, why doesn’t he conclude that the universe is eternal?” Therefore, according to Morriston, if it is God’s eternal will that the universe should exist, the universe would exist for as long as God’s will has existed. \



Craig’s and Aquinas’s problem seems to stem from the conflation of two quite distinct concepts of eternity: (i) eternity as beginningless and endless temporal duration and (ii) genuine atemporality. When Craig speaks of God being causally prior to the universe, Craig is appealing to (ii). But when he speaks of God’s eternal intention, he is implicitly using (i). In Aquinas's case, when he speaks of God, he is appealing to (ii). But when he speaks of God’s eternal will, he is implicitly using (i). This is because the idea of intending to do something at a later moment in time provides both Craig and Aquinas with the crucial difference between a agent (personal cause) and a natural cause (non-personal cause). Both argue that a natural cause automatically gives rise to its effect. There is no way for it delay the exercise of its causal powers. Only a agent can do that.



When we switch over to Craig's and Aquinas’s preferred understanding of eternity, the alleged difference between a agent’s sufficient condition and a natural one disappears completely. For Craig, a timeless agent timelessly wills to create a world with a beginning, or else does not so will. For Aquinas, a timeless agent timelessly wills to create x at a specified time t, or else does not so will. In either case, there can be no temporal gap between the time at which it does the willing and the time at which the thing willed actually happens. In this respect a timeless agent is no different from a natural cause. It seems even worse considering Aquinas’s conception of God.



As R.T Mullins points out “that this in no way helps Aquinas explain how the will of an eternal God does not produce an eternal effect.” Since the “reason my will did not produce an immediate effect is because my will and act are distinct.” God’s will, intellect, act, and so on all being identical to himself means that God cannot wait to perform an action.



Perhaps a thomist could say that God's eternally-willing-to-create-a-x-at t merely makes it eternally true that there "is" x, which has a true ontological beginning at t, while denying that it makes x eternal. There may be something to this idea, but I do not see how one can make use of it in the present context since it can just as easily be deployed on behalf of an eternal natural cause. So, rejecting premise (iv) means that Aquinas would lose his rationale for saying that a natural cause must immediately produce its effect. It would also require Aquinas’s to reject the notion of conditional necessity.



We can conclude that God cannot timelessly and changelessly produce X which exists at past time F or future time E from eternity because, on the dynamic views of time, X-at-F or E does not exist. Yet if God is willing X from eternity, since eternity has no beginning or end and X-at-F or E could not fail to exist, X-at-F or E would be eternal thus leading to a static theory of time aka an eternalist theory of time. Because only an eternalist universe where the past, present And future exist can X’s existence at F or E be eternal. As in GBT or Presentism, X’s existence at the moments of time at F or E would not be eternal as they begin to exist. And for SBT, X’s existence at the moments of time at F or E would not be eternal as they would eventually cease to exist. So, Feser's up-to-date version of Aquinas Five ways could be combined with additional premises to also serve as proofs for an eternalist theory of time. So, we could formulate a portion dedicated too deducing an eternalist theory of time where the past, present and future are real.







Argument for eternalist theory of time based off the First Way

11. If this purely actual actualizer existed in time, then it would be capable of change, which it is not.

12. So, this purely actual actualizer is eternal, existing outside of time.

13. So, this purely actual actualizer is timeless.

14. If this purely actual actualizer is timeless and eternal, then its eternity has no beginning or end, no succession, and without temporal position and extension.

15. The purely actual actualizer is the concurrent cause of somethings existence, since it will have to be the direct concurrent cause of the second member of any hierarchical causal series

16.The existence of S depends on A (`here and now`) and the existence of A at any give moment requires the concurrent actualization of A’s potential for existence by the purely actual actualizer (`here and now`).

17. A exists from t1 to t4

18. The purely actual actualizer is the concurrent direct cause of A, which is wholly present from t1 to t4

19. If the purely actual actualizer is the concurrent direct cause of A, then it wills A to exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4

20. The purely actual actualizer willing that A exist at each moment that it exists from t1 to t4 brings about A’s existence at t1 to t4.

21. If the purely actual actualizer is willing the existence of A from eternity, then because eternity has no beginning or end and is simultaneously whole. It would be eternally willing A's existence at t1 to t4

22. If the purely actual actualizer's willing that A at t1 to t4 to exist brings about A’s existing at t1 to t4, then he is causally sufficient for the existence of A at t1 to t4

23. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

24. So A’s existence at t1 to t4 is eternal

25. Only an eternalist universe where the past, present And future exist can A’s existence from t1 to t4 be eternal. As in GBT or Presentism, A’s existence at the moments of time t1 to t4 would not be eternal as they begin to exist. And for SBT, A’s existence at the moments of time t1 to t4 would not be eternal as they would evantually cease to exist.

26. Therefore, a eternalist theory of time where the past, present and future exist is true.

Argument for eternalist theory of time based off the Second Way

24. If that which is subsistent existence itself (SEI) had some potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, then existence would have to be imparted to it by some cause.

25. So, SEI has no potential for existence which needs actualization, but rather exists in a purely actual way.

26. Whatever is purely actual does not exist in time and is eternal. Because if it existed in time, then it would have potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, which it is not.

27. So, SEI is eternal and exists outside of time.

28. So, SEI is timeless.

29. If SEI is timeless and eternal, then its eternity has no beginning or end, no succession, and without temporal position and extension.

31. If SEI is the concurrent cause of things which have their esse distinct from there own intrinsic nature either directly or indirectly. Then it will have to be the direct concurrent cause of the second member of any hierarchical causal series.

32. C exists from t1 to t4

33. SEI is the concurrent direct cause of C, which is wholly present from t1 to t4

34. If SEI is the concurrent direct cause of C, then it wills C to exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4

35. SEI willing that C exist at each moment that it exists from t1 to t4 brings about C’s existence at t1 to t4.

36. If SEI is willing the existence of C from eternity, then because eternity has no beginning or end and is simultaneously whole. It would be eternally willing C's existence at t1 to t4

37. If SEI's willing that C at t1 to t4 to exist brings about C’s existing at t1+y, then he is causally sufficient for the existence of C at t1 to t4

38. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

39. So C’s existence at t1 to t4 is eternal

40. Only an eternalist universe where the past, present And future exist can C’s existence from t1 to t4 be eternal. As in GBT or Presentism, C’s existence at the moments of time t1 to t4 would not be eternal as they begin to exist. And for SBT, C’s existence at the moments of time t1 to t4 would not be eternal as they would evantually cease to exist.

41. Therefore, a eternalist theory of time where the past, present and future exist is true.

Argument for eternalist theory of time based off the Third Way

8. If the non-composite necessary cause were changeable, then it would have parts which it gains or loses— which, being simple or non-composite, it does not have.

9. So, the non-composite necessary cause is changeless or immutable.

10. If the non-composite necessary cause had a beginning or an end, it would have parts which could either be combined or broken apart.

11. So, since it has no such parts, the non-composite necessary cause is beginningless and endless.

12. Whatever is immutable, beginningless, and endless is eternal.

13. So, the non-composite necessary cause is eternal, existing outside of time

14. So, the non-composite necessary cause is timeless

15. If the non-composite necessary being is the cause of the conjunction of any material substance (which are form-matter composites) and for essence-existence composites at any moment they exist either directly or indirectly. Then it will have to be the direct cause of the second member of any hierarchical causal series.

32. C exists from t1 to t4

33. The non-composite necessary being is the concurrent direct cause of C, which is wholly present from t1 to t4

34. If the non-composite necessary being is the concurrent direct cause of C, then it wills C to exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4

35. The non-composite necessary being willing that C exist at each moment that it exists from t1 to t4 brings about C’s existence at t1 to t4.

36. If SEI is willing the existence of C from eternity, then because eternity has no beginning or end and is simultaneously whole. It would be eternally willing C's existence at t1 to t4

37. If SEI's willing that C at t1 to t4 to exist brings about C’s existing at t1+y, then he is causally sufficient for the existence of C at t1 to t4

38. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

39. So C’s existence at t1 to t4 is eternal

40. Only an eternalist universe where the past, present And future exist can C’s existence from t1 to t4 be eternal. As in GBT or Presentism, C’s existence at the moments of time t1 to t4 would not be eternal as they begin to exist. And for SBT, C’s existence at the moments of time t1 to t4 would not be eternal as they would evantually cease to exist.

41. Therefore, a eternalist theory of time where the past, present and future exist is true.

Argument for eternalist theory of time based off the Fourth Way

7. Things which have being or existence only by participation will also be having goodness, truth, and so on only by participation, thus have them in a limited way.

8. If that which just is supreme goodness, unity, etc is not limited in goodness, unity, etc. It is not limited in being.

9. Something that does not have being or existence in a limited way has its essence identical to its existence.

10. Something in which essence and existence are identical is something which is subsistent existence itself (SEI)

11. So, that which just is supreme goodness, unity, etc is also subsistent existence itself (SEI)

12. If SEI had some potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, then existence would have to be imparted to it by some cause.

13. So, SEI has no potential for existence which needs actualization, but rather exists in a purely actual way.

14. Whatever is purely actual does not exist in time and is eternal. Because if it existed in time, then it would have potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, which it is not.

15. So, SEI is eternal and exists outside of time.

16. So, SEI is timeless.

17. If SEI is timeless and eternal, then its eternity has no beginning or end, no succession, and without temporal position and extension.

18. Anything that has its essence distinct from its existence only has being in a limited way and could not exist even for an instant if it were not sustained by something that is substistent existence itself (SEI)

19. If SEI is the concurrent cause of things which have their esse distinct from there own intrinsic nature either directly or indirectly. Then it will have to be the direct concurrent cause of the second member of any hierarchical causal series.

20. C exists from t1 to t4

21. SEI is the concurrent direct cause of C, which is wholly present from t1 to t4

22. If SEI is the concurrent direct cause of C, then it wills C to exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4

23. SEI willing that C exist at each moment that it exists from t1 to t4 brings about C’s existence at t1 to t4.

24. If SEI is willing the existence of C from eternity, then because eternity has no beginning or end and is simultaneously whole. It would be eternally willing C's existence at t1 to t4

25. If SEI's willing that C at t1 to t4 to exist brings about C’s existing at t1+y, then he is causally sufficient for the existence of C at t1 to t4

26. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

26. So C’s existence at t1 to t4 is eternal

27. Only an eternalist universe where the past, present And future exist can C’s existence from t1 to t4 be eternal. As in GBT or Presentism, C’s existence at the moments of time t1 to t4 would not be eternal as they begin to exist. And for SBT, C’s existence at the moments of time t1 to t4 would not be eternal as they would evantually cease to exist.

28. Therefore, a eternalist theory of time where the past, present and future exist is true.

Argument for eternalist theory of time based off the Fifth Way

23. Something in which essence and existence are identical is something which is subsistent existence itself (SEI)

24. If that which is subsistent existence itself (SEI) had some potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, then existence would have to be imparted to it by some cause.

25. So, SEI has no potential for existence which needs actualization, but rather exists in a purely actual way.

26. Whatever is purely actual does not exist in time and is eternal. Because if it existed in time, then it would have potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, which it is not.

27. So, SEI is eternal and exists outside of time.

28. So, SEI is timeless.

29. If SEI is timeless and eternal, then its eternity has no beginning or end, no succession, and without temporal position and extension.

30. Since this finality or end-directedness is immanent, “built into” things given their natures or essences, that which directs natural things to their ends must be what gives them their natures or essences, and thus what conjoins their essences to an act of existence.

31. Whatever has their essence distinct from their act of existence must have them conjoined at any instant at which they exist.

32. So SEI must concurrently conjoin their essences to an act of existence.

31. If SEI is the concurrent conjoiner cause of things which have their esse distinct from there own intrinsic nature either directly or indirectly. Then it will have to be the direct concurrent cause of the second member of any hierarchical causal series at each moment that second member exists.

32. C exists from t1 to t4

33. SEI is the concurrent direct cause of C, which is wholly present from t1 to t4

34. If SEI is the concurrent direct cause of C, then it wills C to exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4

35. SEI willing that C exist at each moment that it exists from t1 to t4 brings about C’s existence at t1 to t4.

36. If SEI is willing the existence of C from eternity, then because eternity has no beginning or end and is simultaneously whole. It would be eternally willing C's existence at t1 to t4

37. If SEI's willing that C at t1 to t4 to exist brings about C’s existing at t1+y, then he is causally sufficient for the existence of C at t1 to t4

38. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

39. So C’s existence at t1 to t4 is eternal

40. Only an eternalist universe where the past, present And future exist can C’s existence from t1 to t4 be eternal. As in GBT or Presentism, C’s existence at the moments of time t1 to t4 would not be eternal as they begin to exist. And for SBT, C’s existence at the moments of time t1 to t4 would not be eternal as they would evantually cease to exist.

41. Therefore, a eternalist theory of time where the past, present and future exist is true.





No Real relations doctrine

Perhaps a way to avoid eternalism is to invoke Aquinas No Real Relations doctrine. Which is that since God is simple and lacks all accidents, He cannot possess any relations to creatures or any real relation to the world. So one could say that while C does have the real relation of being actualized by God, God does not have a real relation of actualizing C. So he could avoid eternalism and avoid my refutation entirely. It should strike one as implausible that a relation obtains between one relatum and not the other relatum in the relation.



Typically we think that a relation is a two way street. When x stands in a relation to y, it is also the case that y stands in a relation to x. This move, however, says that x stands in a relation to y, but that y does not stand in any relation to x. This appears to be self-contradictory. This seems to be saying that a relation obtains when in fact no relation obtains. If one is forced to deny the commonsense notion of relations in order to maintain divine timelessness, simplicity, and immutability, one should reconsider one’s position (Mullins 2013).



We could even make the arguments immune to this objection, simply by reformulating the premises. For example:

SEI is the concurrent direct cause of C, which exists from t1 to t4 and is the second member of a hierarchical causal series.

Could be changed to:

C, which exists from t1 to t4 and is the second member of a hierarchical causal series, is being concurrently caused by SEI directly

This premise would say C does have the real relation of being concurrently caused by God, but it does not say that God has a real relation of concurrently causing C. Thus, it avoids the no real relations objection.





Theories of persistence:

Before we move on, just gonna define theories of persistence as they'll be important down the line.



Endurantism : According to endurantism, to say that an object persists is to say that it is “wholly present” at different times. Endurantism is sometimes referred to as three-dimensionalism because it conceives of persisting objects as three-dimensional continuants, entities that continue to exist in their entirety over a period of time. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the significance of these characterizations of endurantism is to contrast them with those of its principal competitor, worm theory or four-dimensionalism. Perdurantism/Worm theory: According to worm theory, unlike enduring objects, worms are not “wholly present” at any particular moment: rather, they are “partly present” at every moment where they have a temporal part. They persist through time in much the same way that bodies are spread out in space. At this moment, someone could accurately describe my body as resting on both a chair and an ottoman. What this means, of course, is not that my body is resting entirely on a chair and entirely on an ottoman, but rather that part of my body is resting on a chair and another part on an ottoman. The worm “Temporal Parts.” theorist holds that the proper name applies to the spacetime worm. Exdurantism/Stage Theory: From an ontological point of view, stage theory and worm theory are indistinguishable: both affirm the existence of instantaneous three-dimensional temporal parts, or “stages,” and of four-dimensional spacetime worms composed of these parts. However, while worm theorists identify persisting objects – cars, books, bodies, and so on – with worms, stage theorists identify them, as one might guess, with stages. If it exdures, it's a whole object waddling at t1 connected by an “I-relation” to a counterpart whole object flying at t2. The stage theorist says the proper name applies to each temporal counterpart or stage. Stage theory is usually included with perdurantism but as another separate version of it.

Impact of an eternalist theory of time on the five ways

To access the impact of an eternalist theory of time on the Five ways, we first must know what kind of causation is at work here. This would be Aristotle's powers theory of causation. Which is built up on the intuitive idea that when the cue ball knocks the eight ball into the pocket, the cue ball has an active power (active potency) to produce the sinking of the eight ball, and the eight ball has the passive power (passive potency) to be sunk (im aware this is a linear causal series of efficient causes and not hierarchical). So, Aristotle’s deﬁnition of a causal power would be a causal power as being the origin of change in another thing. Activity being the exercise of a power.



In the last two decades, there has been a resurgence of Aristotle's powers view of Causation. Characterized by a growing interest in the metaphysics of dispositions and their manifestations. The proponents of this approach claim that non-living and living beings are characterized by “powers” or dispositions, “actual, intrinsic states or properties,” classified as “a distinct and basic ontological category in their own right, irreducible to any other ontological category” (Stephen Mumford). A standard example would be the solubility of salt and sugar. Powers ontology provides a metaphysical framework for a theory of causation that describes each event as an effect of powers manifesting themselves in a causal process.



Powers ontology brings a retrieval of the Aristotelian language of potentiality (dispositions) and actuality (manifestations). Moreover, with the recognition of dispositions “pointing” or being “directed” toward their ends, it opens the way back to the notion of natural teleology--now defined as “physical” or “natural” intentionality. Dispositional metaphysics is rightly classified as Neo-Aristotlelianism.







First way

The power theorist Ruth Groff thinks we can distinguish causation into two accounts. On one hand, we have the anti-passivist or powers-based accounts and passivists accounts on the other. Powers-based accounts, in turn, are central to non-passivist , powers-based ontologies, ontologies that include active, productive doing of different kinds. While passivist accounts of causation fit into static pictures of the world in general -- passivist ontologies, as she calls them.



The best way she thinks to know about what’s at stake between static and non-static views of the world is by way of analogy. She gives an analogy of a children’s animated flipbook. The kind where you draw a number of images, each slightly different, on separate pieces of paper, then fan through them quickly. When you do that, it looks as though the drawings are not just moving, but doing things. Let’s imagine a bit of flipbook animation that shows a figure doing something – weaving.



We can use this imaginary flipbook to identify two different positions, corresponding to the ontologies that do and do not include real causal powers. The first position is that real-world weaving is not at all like flipbook weaving. Specifically (says the proponent of this view), real weaving, unlike simulated weaving, is not composed of a sequence of static “stills.” This position is the powers-filled, anti-Humean picture of the world. The second position is that real-world weaving and flipbook weaving are in fact exactly alike (in the relevant respect). Activity looks like something other than a sequence of static “stills,” but really it isn’t. Really, everything is static. This position is the static, passivist picture of the world.



The powers-based view of causation invites an account of causation in which causality is a kind of doing, a bringing about of change. Causes, from this perspective, really do produce effects -- literally. They do not simply precede them, or figure in theories about why they precede them. The idea that causation is productive assumes that activity, or dynamism, is an irreducible feature of the world. Mumford in his article Dispositionalism: A Dynamic Theory of Causation , defines Dynamism as follows:





Change is everywhere. It is continuous, in the sense that it does not break down into changeless parts. Causation begins as soon as certain processes are appropriately aligned, which is to say that they form a mutual manifestation partnership with respect to some effect. When they are so aligned, a new process begins and continues dynamically (always in a state of change) until it reaches its end (exhausts itself) or is interrupted, either additively or subtractively.



The passivist view of causation gives a picture of the world as static and inert, this gives an account of causation in which can’t be about anything actually doing or producing anything, if there is no such thing as active producing or doing. Passivists (also called Humeans) may analyse activity or dynamic processes reductively as a mere sequence of static events. It sees causes as “passive” rather than having any active tendency to bring about their effects. This will be the case even when the sequence is conceived as being a chain of productive causes, rather than a sequence of facts or static states of affairs. Since a sequence of steps is not dynamic, each step in itself is not productive. Since a process (the manifestation of powers) will still be conceptualized as a sequence of static things. Each step in itself is not productive. A “process,” in turn, will be conceptualized as something other than a chain of discrete productive causes.



Power theorists like Ellis, Groff, and Mumford reject this. Groff argues in “Whose Powers? Which Agency?” In Powers and Capacities in Philosophy, that it is simply impossible to reductively analyse dynamism in terms and with concepts that the passivist accepts. Hence, any characterisation of dynamism will involve dynamic language.







Eternalist theory of time and powers

Orignially, i used a shortened version of by Marius Backman to showcase the incompatibility of the powers ontology and an eternalist theory of time. But it was pointed out too me that this relies on causation being understood as diachronic as they are purported to involve a temporal asymmetry: causes occur before their effects.Yet, many power theories like Mumford and thomists like Edward Feser adheres to simultaneous causation where the cause and effect are simultaneous with each-other. But i think we can still show the incompatibility of the powers ontology with an eternalist theory of time when assuming God and his action within the created world.



It is worthwhile to discuss whether eternalist theory of times which encompasses eternalism and moving spotlight theory are compatible with the powers view, which unsurprisingly turns out not to be. The issue is that under an eternalist theory of time and God's activity within the block universe, together entail a four-dimensional account of persistence which makes it incompatible with the powers ontology.





This is against A-T metaphysics which adhere to endurantism. So, assuming eternalism and endurantism, let’s go with the possibility that the selfsame entity A is being directly concurrently actualized by the purely actual actulizer at three different times t1, t2 and t3 by “existing wholly” at each of these times (endurantism), without having temporal parts. It is being concurrently caused directly since it is the second member of a hierarchical causal series. As A is a three-dimensional, it occupies a four-dimensional region by being exactly located at several instantaneous regions making up that region.

If God concurs an entity's existence over multiple times from his beginningless and endless eternity, Then each cannot be considered the same object under eternalism. For example, if God actualized A at t1 and a similar but non-identical G also at t1. We would consider them separate objects, as God cannot actulize two distinct wholly present objects at t1 from his eternity while being considered the same object. But this could also be applied if he was actualizing A at t1 and A at t3. God would be actualizing two separate wholly present entities from eternity. So we can't consider that entity A at t1 is really the same A at t3 rather then a distinct but similar entity, so entity A at t1 does not survive other then an instant, instead of being located at several instantaneous regions, it is an instantaneous object. Thus A wholly present at t1 does not persist as it only exists for an instant. Then how we say that A persists? I see two possibilities: first, an perdurantist account where it is a whole composed of the different temporal parts), or second, an exdurantist account where it is a set of numerically distinct entities (the distinct temporal counterparts). Both of these are encompass what is called Four-dimensionalism.



Impact of four-dimensionalism on the Power's theory of causation





Considering Mumford's sugar cube: if the sugar cube is to be water-soluble at t1, and to be manifesting this power at t1, it has to have a power (potency) to change at t1, a power (to become partly dissolved) which is moreover actually manifested at t1. But if t1 is an instant (and not a long interval of time), nothing could realize this manifestation at t1. Since change requires duration; and a moment of time, under four-dimensionalism, has none. Hence, to be water-soluble at t1 in the power sense, the sugar cube must have an inherent ability that essentially involves over a temporal sequence. Merely having a power that “tends” towards a simultaneous effect is not enough. So, in order for the sugar-cube to actively dissolve in water, the sugar cube must have, at t1, a power (potency) with the aid of water to become partly dissolved over an interval of time that extends beyond t1. Since again, change requires duration, and under a four-dimensional account of persistence, an instant has none.



This would make sense, since powers are understood as giving rise to processes, In Groff’s words, processes are ‘irreducibly active displays of dispositional properties’. Mumford seems to be on board with this analysis. He also analyses powers as giving rise to dynamic processes that are not analysable in terms of sequences of static parts. In Mumford’s view, processes that are the exercise of a certain individual’s powers are ‘continuous and constant’ in the sense that every proper part of a change process undergoes change itself and can hence not be reduced to static parts. For the power theorist, processes can be understood as a prolonged event that may encompass numerous changes to its constituent particulars and have no motionless parts.



That powers may have processes as their manifestations is not itself problematic for a powers ontology under a four-dimensional account of persistence, but it quickly becomes so if we conceive of those same processes as essentially dynamic; that is, if we understand those processes as flowing continuous events that are constantly in act and undergoing seamless change. If the manifestations of powers are dynamic and continuous in this way, then they will be incompatible for the perdurantist’s and exdurantist's unchanging static temporal parts or stages. This is due to the fact that in perdurantism and exdurantism, the world consists of a mere succession of static events, so change and processes would be merely seen as the succession of these static events. This contradicts the view that processes have no motionless parts and are the continuous manifestation of change. As non-reductive dynamism sees change as continuous, in the sense that it does not break down into changeless parts.

For Groff, the issue with respect to whether or not one is a passivist or an anti-passivist centers on the ‘bringing about’: how is the phenomenon in question being conceptualized? Does ‘bringing about’ involve real, non-metaphorical activity or does it not? By ‘bringing about’, i would assume that Groff means processes. Since powers bring about effects and processes are the manifestations of these powers. If processes are reduced to sequences of events as they would in a four-dimensional world and if they are the manifestations of powers, while activity is the exercise of a power. Then activity would be reduced to a sequence of events. So, activity is merely a metaphor and not actually real activity. Just like in her flipbook analogy mentioned earlier, activity would look like something other than a sequence of static “stills,” but it really isn’t. Rather, everything is static. This is identical to the so called static, passivist picture of the world.



We do not have to fall too deep into the rabbit hole of dynamism and four-dimensionalism to see why the eternalist theory of time and the powers view aren’t the happiest of bedfellows. We have seen above how big an emphasis the defenders of the powers view place on ‘non-metaphoric’, and, crucially, non-reductive dynamism. this argument by Marius Backman to showcase the incompatibility of the powers ontology and an eternalist theory of time. But it was pointed out too me that this relies on causation being understood as diachronic as they are purported to involve a temporal asymmetry: causes occur before their effects.Yet, many power theories like Mumford and thomists like Edward Feser adheres to simultaneous causation where the cause and effect are simultaneous with each-other. But i think we can still show the incompatibility of the powers ontology with an eternalist theory of time when assuming God and his action within the created world.Traditionally, powers theorists take the power or disposition of being water-soluble to essentially involve an ability to cause (together with the properties of water) the bearer to dissolve in water (the characteristic manifestation effect). But if the manifestation type in question involves some kind of change, as dissolving arguably does, the relevant power must, if it is to be a power of the kind in question, be an ability to cause this kind of change in the subject. I am not claiming that the power of being water-soluble must involve (or “point at”) the subject being completely dissolved. For the present purpose, I only want to propound the weaker claim that water-solubility must at least involve the subject undergoing some kind of change – i.e., that the power can cause (together with water) the subject to become, roughly put, at least partly dissolved. How much change is needed (e.g. the number of broken bonds, the distance the freed molecules must have travelled) for the subject to become at least partly dissolved may be a vague matter; but whatever happens at an instant is not enough to realize or constitute the subject even partly dissolving. Since the process of partly dissolving in water is a prolonged event where the subject (sugar) is undergoing change, which requires duration, and under four dimensionalism, an instant (a moment of time) has none.Considering Mumford's sugar cube: if the sugar cube is to be water-soluble at t1, and to be manifesting this power at t1, it has to have a power (potency) to change at t1, a power (to become partly dissolved) which is moreover actually manifested at t1. But if t1 is an instant (and not a long interval of time), nothing could realize this manifestation at t1. Since change requires duration; and a moment of time, under four-dimensionalism, has none. Hence, to be water-soluble at t1 in the power sense, the sugar cube must have an inherent ability that essentially involves over a temporal sequence. Merely having a power that “tends” towards a simultaneous effect is not enough. So, in order for the sugar-cube to actively dissolve in water, the sugar cube must have, at t1, a power (potency) with the aid of water to become partly dissolved over an interval of time that extends beyond t1. Since again, change requires duration, and under a four-dimensional account of persistence, an instant has none.This would make sense, since powers are understood as giving rise to processes, In Groff’s words, processes are ‘irreducibly active displays of dispositional properties’. Mumford seems to be on board with this analysis. He also analyses powers as giving rise to dynamic processes that are not analysable in terms of sequences of static parts. In Mumford’s view, processes that are the exercise of a certain individual’s powers are ‘continuous and constant’ in the sense that every proper part of a change process undergoes change itself and can hence not be reduced to static parts. For the power theorist, processes can be understood as a prolonged event that may encompass numerous changes to its constituent particulars and have no motionless parts.‘bringing about’, i would assume that Groff means processes. Since powers bring about effects and processes are the manifestations of these powers. If processes are reduced to sequences of events as they would in a four-dimensional world and if they are the manifestations of powers, while activity is the exercise of a power. Then activity would be reduced to a sequence of events. So, activity is merely a metaphor and not actually real activity. Just like in her flipbook analogy mentioned earlier, activity would look like something other than a sequence of static “stills,” but it really isn’t. Rather, everything is static. This is identical to the so called static, passivist picture of the world.We do not have to fall too deep into the rabbit hole of dynamism and four-dimensionalism to see why the eternalist theory of time and the powers view aren’t the happiest of bedfellows. We have seen above how big an emphasis the defenders of the powers view place on ‘non-metaphoric’, and, crucially, non-reductive dynamism.

Possible objection

A potential objection could be what Neil. E Williams discusses in his article; Powerful persistence: Linking parts with powers. Which would be that the incompatibility between four-dimensionalism account of persistence and the powers ontology. Which arises from an alleged mismatch between the duration of temporal parts and the time it takes a power to be manifested. He rejects this because atleast in the case of Worm theory, there is no reason to think that the time it takes for a single-link manifestation to arise is any longer than the duration of any temporal part. Because in worm theory, just because temporal parts are sometimes conceived as being instantaneous does not always mean they must be instantaneous. One can be a perdurantist without instantaneous temporal parts. Thus to quote Neil:

"In other words, as long as temporal parts have a duration that is just as long as the short processes manifestations take to come about, then there is no worry here. A power is stimulated and its very quick manifestation is some new state of affairs with some change in properties. Why think that this involves anything more than two temporal parts—one for the first stimulated state and one for the latter." I see this proposal as plausible, but it raises a question: is God's constant conservation compatible with worm theory? According to Timothy Miller in his dissertation Continuous Creation, Persistence, and Secondary Causation: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Theism (P. 83-86),worm theory is inconsistent with continuous creation. Since Edward Feser thinks Aquinas Five ways can be thought as arguing for God's continuous conservation, then God is the continuous creator that conservers all contingent beings in existence.

Here, ill have a summary of Miller's argument as i understand it.Initially, Worm theory seems to comport well with the doctrine of continuous creation. Indeed, it seems to offer a quite simple and straightforward way of understanding the doctrine – to say that God is continuously creating me is simply to say that at each moment God creates the temporal part of me that exists at that moment. But worm theorists need to explain why a bunch of distinct temporal parts should be regarded as composing a further persisting individual or worm, and the most plausible accounts worm theorists have offered all require some kind of causal relation(s) between temporal parts. So the earlier temporal parts will have to causally contribute to one (or both) of the following: (a) the existence of the later temporal parts, and/or (b) at least some of the properties possessed by the later parts. Call the former version existence-causal worm theory and the latter version property-causal worm theory.

Unfortunately, existence-causal version of worm theory is flatly inconsistent with continuous creation. Since God is the total and exclusive cause of the existence of everything at every moment, then nothing else is in on the act. Thus, since continuous creationists deny that earlier stages cause the existence of later stages, it seems that the property-causal version of worm theory is their only option. Nevertheless, this approach faces a further difficulty that is not easily overcome: namely, that of explaining how causal interactions between temporal parts are possible at all. If God conserves (creates) x at t1 and x at t2, then it is paradoxical, to say the least, to insist that earlier temporal stages make causal contributions to the existence/properties of later stages when those later stages would not even exist unless they were immediately created by God. If God has to step in at later moments to create them, then it is hard to see how anything other than God can contribute to the existence or properties these later stages possess. So x’s earlier stages cannot be the cause of the properties of x’s of later stages.

This inference depends crucially upon the assumption that God cannot will that some contingent individual exist without willing that it exist with determinate properties. If God created a temporal part of a lamp at t3 with the property of being bent, God must create it with a determinate property – i.e. God must cause it to be either bent or non-bent. Moreover, in the case of creation in the narrow sense (i.e. of bringing about the existence of a new entity ex nihilo), it seems obvious that it must be God who causes the individual to possess the properties it has. After all, if t3 is the first moment of the bent lamp existence, then there was no opportunity prior to t3 for any earlier temporal part to act upon the bent lamp and cause it to possess the properties it has at t3 of being bent.

To add upon this, let's assume the plausibly of hierarchical causal series and hypothesize that y causes x which exists at t4 to possess different accidental properties. Since we are assuming exdurantism and a hierarchical causal series, y itself would be a counterpart that would only exist at the moment that the counterpart x exists at, which is at t4. Due to the fact that in exdurantism and four-dimensionalism in general, none of these individual temporal stages is changing itself. The counter part y at t4 would not be able to cause a change in the counterpart x accidental properties at t4. Also, any contribution the counterpart y at t4 could of made would only be in the accidental properties of later counterparts of x. Since in a four-dimensional account of persistence, change is a succession of temporal parts/stages with different properties, but these are not the same counterpart x at t4. Because of this, it wouldn't be the counterpart x that counterpart y would of caused to possess different accidental properties at t4. So secondary causes cannot contribute to the accidental properties that things possess.

It seems that continuous creation will be incompatible with any plausible version of worm theory – existence-causal or property causal worm theory. Then the only way one can retain the notion that anything persists is by accepting a exdurantist/stage theorist account of persistence. By saying that x persists (i.e. exist for longer than an instant) indirectly via having temporal counterparts that exist at other times. But in stage theory, exduring objects do not survive, as the different stages are different objects. At best, an exduring object “continues” in some way, but the momentary stages are no more identical than are links in a chain. Since in exdurantism, where persisting objects are composed as wholly present counterpart stages. A stage would be an instantaneous temporal part. So exdurantism entails that things persist only with instantaneous temporal parts. Thus, Williams proposal would not save processes.









What this means for the First way

Ultimately, If the the consists of a succession of static events, as it does in perdurantism/exdurantism, we can conclude that the First way would fail. Since it would deny the existence of hierarchical causal series. As an hierarchical causal series is where the non-reductive activity of A depends on B (`here and now`) and the activity of B depends on C(`here and now`). But activity in the block universe can only be reduced to sequences of facts which all exist equally simpliciter , each at their own respective times characterized by B-relations (earlier,later,simultaneous with). With activity being reduced to mere sequences, nothing depends on another in order to act or exist as production is also reduced to mere sequences. There simply is no dependence relations.



To help visualize this. Think of the world as one giant Stop motion film where all the events are present simultaneously on one giant film reel. These events are merely different but they don't exhibit dynamic change,"things" in any of those events. They don't "Cause" other things. For example, if I try to use the paradigmatic illustration of a hierarchical causal series. My hand pushing a stick which is pushing a stone, there is no sense which it could be said that it's the "thing" which is "my "hand" which is pushing the "thing" which is "stone" it's just that all these objects which are persisting through time persist through discrete temporal parts/stages which are present in these "events" which are merely different from each other but which "Don't do anything" (they just keep sitting there ).



Without a hierarchical causal series, we wouldn't even get a infinite regress, and thus cannot come to conclusion that a purely actual actualizer exists. The world consists of a succession of static events and then some of those events are ‘connected’ together by a contingent relation. That relation might be regular succession, counterfactual dependence, probability raising, or something else. There are no irreducible causal powers and change required by the proof in order to succeed.



Secondly, it relies on the premise that change is the actualization of potential. And as Edward Feser himself said in Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (page 227-228), four-dimensionalism would deny the reality of change, at least if change is defined as the actualization of a potential. Instead, change in exdurantism and perdurantism is analysed as a mere succession of discrete, self-contained objects, parts, or stages. It merely connects static parts in an attempt to manufacture change from changelessness.



Feser seems to also hint this in his article, Actuality, Potentiality, And Relativity's Block Universe.

So, even if relativity were to have the worst implications for Aristotelianism it is thought by some to have, it still would not refute the theory of actuality and potentiality. An atemporal, timeless, or eternal actualization of potentiality would still be defensible, as a kind of limit case of the actualization of potentiality more familiar to common sense as everyday change. To be sure, the applicability of the theory would be very greatly reduced. It could no longer ground a hylomorphic analysis of everyday material substances. Perhaps its only application would be within natural theology.

Second way

Feser up-to-date Second way reads it as in light of the “existential proof” in part 4 of On Being and Essence, an argument which Thomists have in any event always considered extremely important to a proper understanding of Aquinas’s conception of God, his relationship to the world, and the grounds of our knowledge of his existence.



Since we have finite hierarchical causes in relation to giving and sustaining being (creation ex- nihilo—the act of causing something to exist as a whole substance from nothing), Feser up-to-date Second way seems to suggest the First Cause, God, could use creatures as active agents to conserve creation. Even without wondering how God can use instruments to create ex nihilo —the causing of sheer existence of a substance. It wouldn't be possible because as shown earlier, an eternalist universe and four dimensionalism makes causes to be merely passive. And the Second way entails via God's divine action entails these views, so causes are passive. We can get this following a slightly modified version of the argument used earlier to get the first way to entail a four dimensionalist account of persistence:



Assuming eternalism, lets go with the possibility that the selfsame entity C is conserved by God at two different times t1 and t2 by “existing wholly” at each of these times (endurantism), without having temporal parts. As C is a three-dimensional, it occupies a four-dimensional region by being exactly located at several instantaneous regions making up that region.If God sustains the same object over multiple times, Then each cannot be considered the same object. As Gods conservation is creation ex nihilo and timeless , God would create C at t1 and C at t2 “simultaneously” in a single timeless act, so he would create two seperate objects as they are created via separate inputs of esse. So it would be Successive existence, which consists of a new, different esse conferred at each successive moment of “its” existence.



But the definition of endurantism is that a thing persists by being "wholly present" at any time that the thing exists. If the thing receives different esse conferred at each successive moment of “its” existence. Then you would have a different thing at each moment, as at each moment it is coming into being from non-existence. We can't consider that entity C at t1 is really the same C at t2 rather then a distinct but similar entity, so C at t1 does not survive other then an instant, instead of being located at several instantaneous regions, it is an instantaneous object. Again we have two possibilities to see how C persists, either perdurantism or exdurantism.



And as discussed earlier, perdurantism is not compatible with continuous creation under an eternalist theory of time. So, only exdurantism is compatible. This means that instruments are unable to be productive, thus cannot be used as instruments to produce the existence of substance. So the very notion of a chain of physical causes maintaining things in existence makes absolutely no sense. As hierarchical causal series don't exist within the universe. So this argument would not work as it concludes God via the impossibility of an infinite regress in a hierarchical causal series.





It does not seem to be the end of the argument though, we have an alternative possibility, which is that the First Cause may be external to the whole chain and in direct contact with each member, even if it turns out to be infinite in length. But we are gonna need a different way to get to God. Instead of concluding God exists using the impossibility of a infinite hierarchical causal series. Perhaps we can conclude the existence of something whose essence and existence are identical simply by the sheer fact that something which esse is distinct from its essence is merely a contingent being (it does not have to exist), thus it still needs an explanation for why it exists at all times that it exist. Another alternative is demanding an explanation for the Block universe itself because its essence and existence are still distinct. Edward Feser proposed this in his essay Actuality, Potentiality, and Relativity's Block Universe:





Now, suppose it turned out that no variation on the A-theory was ultimately defensible. Suppose it turned out that an eternalist or B-theory of time is correct, and that the universe really is a static four-dimensional block from which real temporal passage is entirely absent. Even in this case, the Aristotelian theory of actuality and potentiality would not be refuted, though the range of its applicability would be severely restricted. The reason is that the existence of such a block universe would still be contingent. There would be nothing about its nature that requires that a block universe of precisely that sort, or any block universe at all for that matter, exists. It would in that sense be of itself potential and in need of actualization. The way this idea would be spelled out in the Thomistic branch of the Aristotelian tradition is that a four-dimensional block universe, considered as one big substance, would have an essence distinct from its existence, where the essence of a thing is, considered by itself, a kind of potentiality and its existence is a kind of actuality. A natural way for the Thomist to extend this line of thought is to argue that what actualizes the potential existence of the universe is a divine First Cause the essence of which just is existence—an uncaused cause which is (as it is often put) Subsistent Being Itself.





Continuous Creation





So even with eternalism, we need an explanation for the block universe, as even without change. Actuality and Potentiality are still present because Scholastics construe existence along the lines of an activity – thus their favorite translation of the Latin verb esse is: “act of existing.” So the existence of a contingent being (anything whose essence and existence are distinct) is ultimately sustained by the causal power of the First Cause. Therefore, the First Cause, or God, is the continuous creator—the divine conserver of any contingent being’s existence creation ex nihilo. God bestows being-as-such to everything that He creates, which implies the in toto production of the creature. We can define CC using Quinn's definition of Continuous Creation (CC):





(CC) Necessarily, for all x and t, if x is contingent and x exists at t, then God’s willing that x exists at t brings about x’s existing at t.

The idea that God’s creative activity is continuous in the universe is known as “continuous creation.” However, there are different versions of this doctrine:

Mere-conservationism/weak concurrentism: God creates the world in the beginning but after this initial act His causal activity is effectively exhausted in his continual existential preservation of the world, which thus operates semi-autonomously and on the basis of the causal powers of the created agents therein, who thus produce their effects alone and unaided.

Concurrentism: God creates the world in the beginning and continually preserves it in existence, but also retains His status as the continual efficient cause of the world by actively “concurring” with the activity of created agents therein, who thus actively contribute to the production of their effects. Yet, He is capable of both withholding his concurrence, thereby rendering natural agents impotent, as well as producing their effects alone without any natural agent at all.

Occasionalism: God creates the world in the beginning and preserves it by continually recreating it ex nihilo, the upshot of which is that He is the sole efficient cause and created “agents” contribute nothing to the production of their effects.

Malebranche's Divine Concursus Argument for Occasionalism

The philosopher Malebranche is probably the most well known occasionalist. Although he offers at least four distinct arguments for occasionalism, interpreters generally regard his continuous creation argument or Divine Concursus Argument (DCA) as the most powerful. It is an argument based not upon the nature of created substances, but upon the nature of the creation of those substances.





On the face of it, the doctrine of continuous creation says nothing even close to occasionalism. It affirms that God is the total and exclusive cause of the existence of all contingent things at all times, and thus it clearly entails that secondary causes do not bring about the existence (being) of anything. But occasionalism claims that secondary causes do not bring about anything at all – that is, in addition to denying that secondary causes bring about the existence of anything, occasionalism also denies that secondary causes make any contributions to properties or states of things. This is clearly a stronger claim, and it is far from obvious that (CC) is in any way committed to it.





What Malebranche claims is that God cannot be the total and exclusive cause of the existence of all things without also being the total and exclusive cause of all their properties substantial and accidental – accepting continuous creation commits us to accepting that God is the total and exclusive cause of all their properties as well. In order to defend this claim, Malebranche needs some additional assumptions. Continuous creation entails, for example, that God’s willing that I exist brings about my existence at this moment, but it certainly does not entail (not by itself, anyway) that my being seated at this moment is brought about by God’s willing that I be seated. This inference depends crucially upon the assumption that God cannot will that some contingent individual exist without willing that it exist with determinate properties.





The intuitive connection between continuous creation and being the total and exclusive cause of all their properties is easy to see. If God created a bent lamp at t3, God must create it with a determinate property – i.e. God must cause it to be either bent or non-bent. It is a simple matter of the law of excluded middle that for any property and any given moment, either an individual has that property at that moment or it does not. Moreover, in the case of creation in the narrow sense (i.e. of bringing about the existence of a new entity ex nihilo), it seems obvious that it must be God who causes the individual to possess the properties it has. After all, if t3 is the first moment of the bent lamp existence, then there was no opportunity prior to t3 for anything else to act upon the bent lamp and cause it to possess the properties it has at t3 of being bent.





Just as in the initial act of creation, God alone completely brings the world and everything in it into existence in toto , so in every subsequent moment, Malebranche contends, God is said to do the same thing, which is to fully specify all the individual attributes and modes of the world, and in the same manner as He did before. Thus divine conservation is continued creation, and God turns out to be the only true cause of anything that occurs



Louis Mancha summaries Malebranche's DCA as follows:

1. If God creates substance x , then God must conserve x.

2. But divine conservation is just continued creation.

3. If God conserves substance x , then for every property f that x has at each subsequent moment of existence t1+y and onwards , God is the sole cause of x’s having f at t1+y.

4. God creates every substance other than Himself.

5. God is the sole cause of every state of affairs, that is to say, for every substance x, and for every property f that x has at each moment of its existence t, God is the sole cause of x ’s having f at t1+y.

6. No substance other than God (i.e., no creature) is a cause.

Problem with the DCA

But as Louis Mancha has noted in his essay concurrentism: a philosophical explanation . The DCA relies on the traditional theistic premise that conservation is just continued re-creation . And it seems Malebranche is not entitled to interpret the doctrine this way, as in scholatic talk, continuous creation is the continual inpouring of esse to the creature, and not a series of successive acts of creation. So although there may be no real distinction between creation and conservation, we do not yet get the implication that the existence of the creature is being re-created. Instead, the distinction only means God creates and conserves via the same action and not different actions. This leaves no room to interpret conservation as continuous re-creation. If this is the case, premise 2 does not follow from premise 3, for the traditional interpretation leaves open the possibility that creatures can be causally responsible for the changes that occur in later states.





Properly interpreted, continuous creation does not entail that God continually re-creates each thing at each successive moment. An additional argument for that inference is required, and it is just not there in Malebranche. In general, the Scholastics all held that there was a difference between existence as permanent and as successive, with divine conservation establishing permanent existence in a creature. If a creature has permanent existence, then its existence is the same, numerical existence at each moment that it exists: it “remains to the end” (though it does not follow that it exists without fail). Successive existence, on the other hand, consists of a new, different esse conferred at each successive moment of “its” existence. I say, “its,” for it is unclear on a continuous re-creation view as to whether you would have the same substance from one moment to the next.





One could not help, but too notice that this distinction is identical to the distinction between endurance and perdurance/exdurance. On the one hand, something perdures if and only if it persists by having different temporal parts at different times. On the other hand, something endures if and only if it persists by being wholly present at different times. We can see the parallelism between a different esse conferred at each successive moment of its existence and the contemporary notion of a temporal part, as well as between the notion that a permanent entity existence is the same, numerical existence at each moment that it exists and the contemporary notion of being wholly present.



Since as shown earlier while objecting to the first way, exdurantism is the only account of persistence comptaible with continuous creation in a eternalist theory of time. Then, Malebranche would be entitled to view continuous creation as continuous re-creation. As in exdurantism, things at different stages are different objects, so God would have to pour a separate esse to conserve it. So he would continually re-create x at each moment that it existed. So God would be conserving "its" successive existence. I say, “its,” for it is unclear on a continuous re-creation view as to whether you would have the same substance from one moment to the next. It seems incoherent to affirm that God repeatedly causes multiple separate entities to exist at multiple instants in the same timeless act and affirm they all make up a single persistent entity.

How all of this leads to occasionalism

According to (CC), God is the sole and total cause of the existence of every contingent being at every moment. Thus, the fact that I exist right now and am typing on my computer has no direct bearing upon whether I or my computer will exist a moment from now. What exists at any given moment is entirely up to God, so I will exist a moment from now if, and only if, God causes me to exist then – same goes for my computer and every other contingent thing. So where do secondary causes enter the picture? For example, I would like to believe that the actions I am performing right now will cause certain words and sentences to be recorded on my laptop’s hard drive at later times. But if God must repeatedly cause my computer to exist at every subsequent moment, then it is hard to see how anything other than God can determine the state of its hard drive at those moments.





A objection that could be made is that Hierarchical causal chains are immediate, regardless of prior or subsequent moments. So, Secondary causes can still make contributions to properties or states of things. Since the argument above only showed the non existence of linear causal series. So, creatures can still be the true causes of whatever comes to be either through motion or generation while God is the cause of the being of all things.





But remember earlier where i argued that in a eternalist + exdurantist universe, any kind of motion (change) or generation (production) could only be reduced to a sequence of static events. Which according to power theorists like Mumford and Groff, seems too renders causes within the block universe to be merely passive with no active tendency to bring about an effect since activity (the exercise of a power) even in a hierarchical causal series could only be reduced to a sequence. Both denying that secondary causes bring about the existence of anything and that secondary causes make any contributions to properties or states of things. If causes are merely passive, then they cannot really make a contribution to anything at all.



So let's reinforce Malebranche's DCA with additional and modified premises, it can be formulated as follows:

1. If God creates substance x , then God must conserve x.

2. Eternalist theory of time is true

3. Exdurantist theory of persistence is true.

4. Under an eternalist theory of time and exdurantism, all substances within the block universe are merely passive with no active tendency to bring about an effect.

5. If exdurantism is true, then divine conservation is just continued re-creation .

6. If God conserves substance x , then for every property f that x has at each subsequent moment of existence t1+y and onwards , God is the sole cause of x’s having f at t1+y.

7. God creates every substance other than Himself.

8. God is the sole cause of every state of affairs, that is to say, for every substance x, and for every property f that x has at each moment of its existence t, God is the sole cause of x ’s having f at t1+y.

9. No substance other than God (i.e., no creature) is a cause.









From Occasionalism to Pantheism via the Eleatic Principle

All that needs to be shown now is that occasionalism entails pantheism. This argument requires a crucial additional premise called the Eleatic Principle. Mark Colyvan summarises the principle as follows: “This principle justifies belief in only those entities to which causal power can be attributed, that is, to those entities which can bring about changes in the world.”





Given the Eleatic Principle, pantheism (or panentheism) follows from occasionalism straightforwardly. Occasionalism states that only God’s will is causally efficacious; therefore, by the Eleatic Principle, God is the only substance, and only God exists. Without irreducible causal powers, everything else is a mere modification of him.





One could object and say The Eleatic principle is perfectly consistent with the stance that we have no grounds for rejecting the existence of causally impotent objects; it just says something along the lines of, "we're only justified in believing in causally potent things." And i would agree, but to posit the existence of a substance that had no causal influence upon anything whatsoever would render the idea of substance rather meaningless. Edward Feser himself says in Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction , that to have substantial form rather than an accidental form and thus of its being a true substance, with an independent existence, rather than being a mere modification of something else, is having its own irreducible causal powers. For example, water has an intrinsic tendency to act as a solvent and to freeze at 32 degrees Fahrenheit.





For something to have irreducible causal powers is for it to be irreducibly directed toward the production of a certain outcome or range of outcomes as to an end; it is for it to exhibit irreducible teleology. And a substance is that reality to whose essence or nature it is proper to be by itself (esse per se , or to be in itself [esse in se]) and not in another subject . But as causes in eternalism are merely passive without active tendency to produce any effects, then things would not have irreducible causal powers. So, it would not be a substance, thus have no essence or nature.





Without creatures within universe irreducible causal powers, pantheism (or panentheism) follows from occasionalism straightforwardly. Occasionalism states that only God’s will is causally efficacious. Since to have substantial form rather then be a mere modification of something else is too have irreducible causal powers, and since causes in a eternalist + exdurantist universe are merely passive without active tendency to produce any effects, then creatures within the universe would not have irreducible causal powers; therefore, God is the only substance, and only God exists. Without irreducible causal powers, everything else within the universe is a mere modification of him.

Edward Feser himself seems to have come to the same conclusion while discussion Occasionalism in his Five Proofs Of The Existence Of God





Consider first why occasionalism cannot be correct. Since agere sequitur esse— what a thing does necessarily reflects what it is— if something could not truly do anything, if it had no causal efficacy at all, then it would not truly exist. Occasionalism would thus entail that God alone truly exists, since only he truly does anything. (p. 235)

What this means for the Second way

This would leave Feser's up-to-date Second way as incoherent. For he arrived at the idea of God as First Cause only because he reasoned from the existence of things other than God which require him as a cause. He started with the idea that things have their essence distinct from their existence, inferred that they must be caused by something external, and deduced in turn that there must be a cause which sustains them in existence and which is subsequent existence itself. If Feser's up-to-date Second way now says that God alone exists, he would be abandoning the very grounds that led him to affirm the existence of God as a being which is substistent existence itself in the first place.



In his book Five proofs for the exsitence of God (page 234), Feser states that his arguments rule out a pantheist conception of God. Since his Thomistic proof is essentially an extended version of his up-to-date Second way, it would equally apply to the up-to-date Second way.



Now, though material things are at every moment dependent for their existence on God, they are distinct from God. This follows from the fact that they are composite whereas God is simple, are mixtures of actuality and potentiality whereas God is pure actuality, have essences distinct from their existence whereas God just is subsistent existence, and are contingent whereas God is necessary. The arguments of this book thus rule out a pantheist conception of God, which would identify him with the world. (They also rule out a panentheist conception of God, on which God is not identical with the world but is still present in the world in such a way that he is changed by it. As I argued above, given that God is pure actuality and absolutely simple, he must be immutable or unchanging.) In his bookFeser states that his arguments rule out a pantheist conception of God. Since his Thomistic proof is essentially an extended version of his up-to-date Second way, it would equally apply to the up-to-date Second way.



Third way



In Feser's up-to-date Third way, he argues that since particular substances revealed to us in sensory experience are contingent because they are generated and corrupted, so there must be a necessary being. But even if one says that matter and form themselves are not susceptible of generation and corruption so are necessary. Proving the existence of a necessary being is only one component of the overall argumentative strategy of the Third Way. Since even necessary beings either has its necessity caused by another, or from its own nature. Matter is just prime matter or pure potentiality, which by itself and apart from the forms it takes on has no actuality nor indeed any reality at all, necessary or otherwise. And the forms in question have (apart from the postmortem souls of human beings) no existence apart from matter, so that they cannot be said to have their necessity of themselves either, so must be caused by another necessary being.



A causal series of necessary beings cannot go on to infinity since it would constitute a causal series ordered per se, which of its nature cannot regress infinitely. So there must be something which is necessary in an absolute way, not deriving its necessity from another and (therefore) not a composite of form and matter or essence and existence. Thus, Feser concludes that there is a non-composite necessary being who is the cause of the conjunction of any material substance (which are form-matter composites) and for essence-existence composites at any moment they exist. Knowing this, i concluded earlier in this post that it also entailed eternalism.



Feser's up-to-date Third way is rather similar to his Neo-Platonic proof, which he shows in his book Five proofs for the existence of God published 6 years after this article. Both make use of numerous ways things are composites like having material parts and metaphysical parts like form and matter or being essence-existence composites.



The notion of world history as a tenseless four-dimensionalism block could potentially cause problems for the Third way. In an eternalist universe, things do not really come into existence, neither do they pass out of existence. An object which no longer exists has simply ‘passed out of our view’. Because we happen to be located ‘elsewhere’ on the world’s timeline, we are not able to ‘see’ it any more, but it is every bit as existent as we are. If, on the other hand, an object does not yet exist, it is simply because we cannot ‘see’ it yet. It exists ‘out there somewhere’; it just happens to exist ‘elsewhere’, in much the same way as a far-off star exists out there somewhere. So things really do not objectively generate or be corrupted, and thus are not contingent.



And only because these things experience generation and corruption, coming into being and passing away, do we conclude that they are composites of form and matter. Their coming to be is just the acquisition by a certain parcel of matter of a certain form, and their passing away is just the loss by a certain parcel of matter of a certain form. Hence it is ultimately this composite. But i think it is very easy to salvage. Since prime matter still cannot at any moment exist without form and a material form cannot at any moment exist without prime matter; they depend on each other at every moment in which they are conjoined together in a material substance.



Hence the circularity inherent in explaining the existence of a material substance's