October 8, 1953



Washington Report



U.S. Involvement in Iran

Revolt Now Believed Sure



[The Premier made no mention of Communism]

[It began on the 16th]

By FULTON LEWIS JR.WASHINGTON, Oct. 8 There now appears to be no doubt that representatives of the United States were directly involved in the recent Iranian revolution which brought the Shah of Iran back to his hereditary throne.The full and true story of events leading up to the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh and of the actual revolt, still are known only to a comparatively few persons. But fragmentary reports seeping back from the oil-rich but money-poor Middle Eastern empire make it clear that it involved all the cloak-and-dagger elements of the best of E. Phillips Oppenheim.The key public figure, of course, was the Shah himself . But grapevine tales make it evident that behind the scenes, equally important roles were played by a small group of Americans and by the Shahs twin sister, the colorful, competent and strong-willed Princess Ashraf.AMONG THE AMERICANS who appear to have been involved to a greater or lesser degree are Loy Henderson, our ambassador to Tehran; Allen W. Dulles , director of the Central Intelligence agency; and Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf , whose name means nothing to most persons today but 21 years ago was an accepted dinner-table conversation piece.All of this is not to be deemed in any way critical of our diplomatic or intelligence operations. On the contrary, the stories about the revolt would make it appear that we have learned a lot, that we have gone far toward eradicating the do-nothing wishy-washiness of the Truman-Acheson regime. Iran today, under the Shah, is much more friendly to us and our cause in the world struggle against Communism than it was under the extreme nationalist Mossadegh.Briefly, the story leading up to the revolution might begin back in late May, when Mossadegh wrote President Eisenhower asking financial help for his country and hinting broadly that if it was not forthcoming immediately, he would be forced into closer cooperation with the Communists.MR. EISENHOWER let that one cool for a month-before he replied with a flat no, thanks. From the hindsight vantage point of the Monday morning quarterback, it now appears that when the President said no, he knew that it was most unlikely Mossadegh would ever be able to carry out his threat of moving in with the CommiesIn July, Henderson bade a temporary adieu to Tehran and flew to Switzerland for a vacation. In early August, Allen Dulles packed up his bags and left Washingtonalso for a vacation in Switzerland. Not to be outdone, Princess Ashraf turned up in the same country following a visit to her homeland where she had spent some time with her brother. And Gen. Schwarzkopf, winding up a leisurely summer vacation trip through Syria, Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries, blandly turned up in Tehran.This is an intriguing character. In 1932, as the hard headed superintendent of the New Jersey State Police, he was in charge of the Lindbergh baby kidnapping case. Rightly or wrongly, he was widely accused of mishandling the case, of being stubborn, inept and publicity-seeking. Friends say that after the furor over that episode, the ensuing years brought a change in hima mellowing, a realization that some of the criticism might have been justified, a greater willingness to work with others. In any event, back on active Army duty, Schwarzkopf was lent to the Iranian government in 1942 to reorganize the national police, and stayed there for six years, so he knows the country and many of its leaders intimately.ALL OF THESE comings and goings, as well as those of several other persons who over the years have become versed in Iranian lore, along with the concentration in Switzerland, may have been sheer coincidence.It seems fair to note, however, that the revolution that finally occurred on August 13 appears to have been well planned.. Military operations went off with no hitches. Arms, men and supplies happened to be where they were needed. There was no lack of finances. Somebody had a good idea of what troops would be loyal to the Shah, which ones would stick to Mossadegh.Conceivably it could all have been sheer coincidence. That seems highly unlikely.