Despite skepticism and concerns after Singapore, US President Donald Trump and North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-un will be meeting for a second time in Hanoi this week. The two leaders have achieved what all their predecessors failed to: holding bilateral dialogues at the highest possible level. Following the first summit in Singapore, expectations are higher this time around in Hanoi. So, what exactly can be expected?



Background: Singapore Summit

Trump and Kim first met on June 12, 2018 in Singapore where they signed a joined statement agreeing to several points:

The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.

The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.

Critics considered the statement to be vague, short and lacking details regarding concrete steps towards denuclearization. If we look closely at the wording and order of the agreements, a few interesting points stand out. First, denuclearization, despite being the top priority for the US, was listed as the third point. The text also explicitly refers to denuclearization as something encompassing the entire Korean Peninsula, not just North Korea. This was a smart play by the North Koreans as it not only restricts them but South Korea and the US as well. Denuclearization of the entire Peninsula would mean no nuclear weapons in South Korea either. Pyongyang would feel less threatened knowing there will be no nuclear weapons south of the 38th parallel. Moreover, such an agreement would also cap the amount of damage the US could inflict on the North in case war breaks out.



Besides the wording, there is also no clear timeline or a list of actionable steps to be taken in the short-term to achieve denuclearization. The cause of this vagueness might be attributed to the lack of pre-summit preparation on both sides, especially the US. The decision to hold the summit was made rather spontaneously by President Trump, without prior consultation with his advisors. This threw his team off and made it difficult for adequate planning to take place.



Nevertheless, the summit should be seen as a success. Why? Because it took place. That is reason enough to celebrate. The DPRK went from testing missiles and threatening war in 2017 to holding in-person meetings with both the South Korean and US presidents. Anyone would argue that the current situation is far preferable to that of 2017. Still, much progress can, and should, be made with this upcoming summit. More clarity is needed on the details and more significant concessions must be given by both sides.

Getting to Hanoi

After the Singapore Summit, relations between the two leaders seemed to flourish. Personal letters were exchanged and, in Trump’s own words, the two leaders “fell in love.” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and US Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun took the leading roles in the talks that followed.

Unlike the Singapore Summit, the Hanoi Summit has been preceded by better preparations, including working-level talks between both sides that took place last week. The US is even considering opening a liaison office in North Korea, something the South Koreans did last year. In turn, North Korea would also be able to open an office in the US. Such a move would be a meaningful step towards normalizing diplomatic relations between the US and the DPRK.

Negotiations between US-DPRK delegations in Singapore, 2018

Hanoi 2019



Choice of Vietnam:

Just like the first summit in Singapore, the choice for the location of the second US-DPRK summit was not left to chance. The choice to hold the second summit in Vietnam is a wise one for several reasons. First of all, just like Singapore, the country is not geographically far from North Korea. This is important given that Kim is known for not traveling too far. Second, Vietnam is seen as a neutral country given its good diplomatic relations with both the US and the DPRK. This makes it much easier for officials from both sides to make the required preparations and prevent any political misunderstandings that might arise regarding the host country. Third, Vietnam is a safe choice. The single party communist state boasts high security capabilities and has a proven track-record of successfully hosting meetings involving world leaders.



Finally– and maybe most importantly– Vietnam serves as a great example which North Korea could potentially follow. If, after the brutal Vietnam War, Vietnam was able to forge a strong alliance with the US, there’s no reason why North Korea cannot do so too. Besides normalizing relations with the US, Vietnam also serves as an attractive economic model for North Korea to learn from. Even though Vietnam is ruled by one party and considers itself a socialist republic, its economy functions according to capitalist principles and the country is able to attract foreign investment and participate in global trade. This might inspire Kim Jong-un to slowly begin opening the North Korean economy up to the world while making efforts to increase cooperation with the international community.



Streets of Hanoi

What both sides seek to achieve:



What the US wants:

Verifiable shut down of Yongbyon nuclear facility

Halt of all fissile material production

Declaration and destruction of all DPRK nuclear weapons facilities

Full inventory of nuclear arsenal

What North Korea wants:

Sanctions relief

Formal end of war declaration

Restoration of humanitarian aid

Suspension of US-ROK joint military exercises

A decrease–and ultimate removal– of US troops from the Peninsula

Potential pitfalls:

More focus on ‘improving the bilateral relationship’ than denuclearization

US settling for narrow ICBM deal

Narrow focus on Yongbyon

Agreeing to withdraw US troops too soon

Trump conceding more than gaining in order to save face

We have to remember that the ultimate reason for why Trump and Kim are meeting is to achieve denuclearization. Not just the normalization of relations; that is just a necessary starting point. The Hanoi Summit will have to go further than the one in Singapore in laying out concrete commitments to begin the denuclearization process. Of course, this won’t come for free. The US will have to make some concessions as well. This might come in the form of partial sanctions relief, loosening restrictions on aid delivery, and maybe even an end of war declaration. Still, the Americans must be careful not to be left without any leverage. Kim is not dumb, and he will seek any small loophole and try to exploit it to his benefit.



For instance, Trump keeps repeating he is in “no rush” to sign a denuclearization deal with North Korea. Such posture could make the North Koreans feel as though they have more leeway to drag negotiations along while only making small concessions without ever having to agree to CVID. Trump does not seem as obsessed with the CVID idea as some of his advisors, such as John Bolton. This last point is key as we have to remember who is really in charge: Donald Trump. At the end of the day, neither John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, or any other advisors will be signing a deal with Kim Jong-un. Therefore, the North Koreans know that as long as ties between Kim and Trump remain warm and Trump’s attention remains directed towards improving the bilateral relationship–in whichever way he sees fit (letters, trips, Tweets, comments to the press, etc)–then Pyongyang knows it has room to breathe. They understand the Trump psychology and know that, above all, Trump does not want to lose face and look like an idiot. This means, he does not want negotiations to fall apart. They know he’d rather have some kind of deal instead of no deal at all. This fact is not so comforting to key American allies in the region–South Korea and Japan– whose national security depends on Trump making a complete deal that protects them too.



Trump’s obsession with not losing face might result in him signing a deal that only covers ICBMs that could reach the continental United States. Trump could hail this as a victory back home and argue that North Korea no longer poses a threat to American citizens. He could spin it to make it look like a huge, historic diplomatic achievement. He could then take the argument further and begin reassessing the need for US troops in South Korea, and maybe even Japan. The gradual, phased withdrawal of a large chunk of troops might then follow.



This might look good for Trump in the short term–especially given the 2020 elections coming up–but it would be tantamount to leaving two of America’s closest allies to fend for themselves. North Korea would still have short-range missile launching capabilities and could still potentially target both South Korea and Japan. Given their lack of military defense capacity, this might open the door for China to come in and fill the void America has left. In the long-term this would end up severely weakening America’s position in the region. This is all, of course, very hypothetical as of now, but it is not impossible and the scenario must not be ruled out.



The reality is that CVID is extremely unlikely to happen. North Korea has hinged its entire existence on its nuclear weapons program and will not give them (all) up for sanctions relief, aid, or some new allies. However, this doesn’t mean they aren’t willing to make concessions that matter. A deal concerning ICBMs would be a good place to start, but pressure must remain on North Korea until its other missile programs are dealt with. The disabling and dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear plant will take time but represents a strong first step towards long-term denuclearization efforts. However, the remaining stockpiles of fissile material have to be safely disposed of and centrifuge plants must be found and destroyed. History serves as a good mentor and, looking back at the 1994 Agreed Framework deal between the US-DPRK, we know that simply freezing activity at plants like Yongbyon is a far cry from achieving long-term denuclearization. Besides disabling, active dismantling efforts must be implemented in tandem. The existence of clandestine sites must also not be ruled out or ignored.



Besides nuclear weapons, the DPRK is also rumored to possess a number of chemical and biological weapons. Such a significant threat must also be taken into account when drafting any future deals aiming to fully denuclearize the North. Finally, the US should not agree to any kind of phased withdrawal of US troops from South Korea until later in the negotiating process when more trust has been built between US-DPRK; an end of war declaration signed; and a deal between US-ROK reached on the withdrawal of troops.



Hanoi represents a fresh opportunity for both sides to take further steps towards better bilateral relations, denuclearization, and peace on the Peninsula. In the words of Biegun: the US “has a leader who, more so than any previous president, is deeply and personally committed to once and for all bringing an end to 70 years of war and hostility on the Korean Peninsula”. Hanoi is an opportunity to do just that.