1 Organizations and economists that have examined the Jones Act and found it to impose a net decrease on economic welfare include the U.S. International Trade Commission, World Economic Forum, Organisation for Economic Co‐​operation and Development, Gary C. Hufbauer and Kimberly Elliott, and Scott N. Swisher IV and Woan Foong Wong. See U.S. International Trade Commission, The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints, Third Update 2002 (Washington: U.S. International Trade Commission, June 2002); World Economic Forum, Enabling Trade: Valuing Growth Opportunities (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2013); Gary C. Hufbauer and Kimberly Elliott, Measuring the Costs of Protection in the United States and Japan (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1993); and Scott N. Swisher IV and Woan Foong Wong, “Transport Networks and Internal Trade Costs: Quantifying the Gains from Repealing the Jones Act” (unpublished manuscript, December 2, 2015).

2 Organisation for Economic Co‐​operation and Development, “Local Content Requirements and Their Economic Effect on Shipbuilding: A Quantitative Assessment,” OECD Science, Technology, and Industry Policy Papers no. 69, April 2019, beginning at p. 21.

3 Under the law, the ship’s crew is deemed to be an American crew if it consists of at least 75 percent U.S. citizens, and a ship is deemed U.S.-owned if its ownership is at least 75 percent American.

4 “Text of the Jones Act,” http://​huel​ladig​i​tal​.uni​vi​sion​noti​cias​.com/​c​r​u​c​e​r​o​s​-​v​a​c​a​c​i​o​n​e​s​-​e​n​-​a​g​u​a​s​-​d​e​-​n​a​d​i​e​/​w​p​-​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​u​p​l​o​a​d​s​/​2​0​1​6​/​0​6​/​J​o​n​e​s​_​A​c​t​_​1​9​2​0.pdf.

5 This was later made more explicit by the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, which adds “efficient shipbuilding and repair capacity” to its policy goals. “An Act to Amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936,” Pub. L. No. 91–469, § 3 (2), October 21, 1970, https://​www​.gov​in​fo​.gov/​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​p​k​g​/​S​T​A​T​U​T​E​-​8​4​/​p​d​f​/​S​T​A​T​U​T​E​-​8​4​-​P​g​1​0​1​8.pdf.

6 The U.S. Maritime Administration describes the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), which comprises nearly half the government‐​owned surge sealift capacity, as a fleet that “primarily supports transport of Army and Marine Corps unit equipment, combat support equipment, and initial resupply during the critical surge period before commercial ships can be marshaled.” See United States Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, “The Ready Reserve Force (RRF).”

7 James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast (Washington: United States Transportation Command, 1992).

8 The eight vessels were the Ponce (RO/RO); Strong Texan (heavy lift); Omi Champion (tanker); Overseas Vivian (tanker); Overseas Philadelphia (tanker); New York Sun (tanker); Solar (tanker); and St. Emilion (tanker).

9 Vice Adm. A. J. Herberger, USN [Ret.], Kenneth C. Gaulden, and Cdr. Rolf Marshall, USN [Ret.], Global Reach: Revolutionizing the Use of Commercial Vessels and Intermodal Systems for Military Sealift, 1990–2012 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015), p. 106.

10 Matthews and Holt, “So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast.”

11 Matthews and Holt, “So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast.”

12 Matthews and Holt, “So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast.”

13 Robert Little, “Merchant Marine’s Demise Endangers War Readiness,” Baltimore Sun, August 5, 2001.

14 Herberger, Gaulden, and Marshall, Global Reach, p. 323.

15 The Military Sea Transportation Service was renamed the Military Sealift Command in 1970.

16 Lawson P. Ramage, “The Military Sea Transportation Service,” Naval War College Review 22, no. 5 (1969): 4–11.

17 Herberger, Gaulden, and Marshall, Global Reach, p. 68.

18 U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, “Maritime Workforce Working Group Report,” September 29, 2017.

19 Serving aboard government sealift vessels could bring complications to the professional lives of those who volunteer. A 2015 Government Accountability Office report notes that, according to MARAD officials, volunteering for prolonged employment aboard the reserve sealift fleet would, in most cases, mean that mariners would forfeit their permanent positions aboard commercial vessels. The mariners would then have to compete for a new commercial position once they completed their service aboard government‐​owned ships. See Government Accountability Office, International Food Assistance: Cargo Preference Increases Food Aid Shipping Costs, and Benefits are Unclear, GAO-15–666 (Washington: GAO, 2015).

20 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, 113th Cong., 1st Sess., May 21, 2013, https://​www​.gov​in​fo​.gov/​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​p​k​g​/​C​H​R​G​-​1​1​3​h​h​r​g​8​1​1​4​8​/​p​d​f​/​C​H​R​G​-​1​1​3​h​h​r​g​8​1​1​4​8.pdf.

21 Herberger, Gaulden, and Marshall, Global Reach, p. 116.

22 Peter Navarro, “Buying American Can Help Keep the Philly Shipyard Afloat,” Philadelphia Inquirer, June 29, 2018.

23 These four are Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia; General Dynamics‐​NASSCO in San Diego; VT Halter in Pascagoula, Mississippi; and Keppel AmFELS in Brownsville, Texas.

24 Philly Shipyard, “Q2 2019 and Half‐​Year 2019 Results,” July 15, 2019.

25 Hearing on U.S. Maritime and Shipbuilding Industries: Strategies to Improve Regulation, Economic Opportunities, and Competitiveness, Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 116th Cong. 1st Sess. (March 6, 2019) (statement of Mark H. Buzby, Administrator, U.S. Department of Transportation). For perspective, a single shipyard in South Korea, the Geoje shipyard owned by Samsung Heavy Industries, has the capacity to build 70 ships per year. See “Samsung Heavy Industries: Sustainability Report 2016,” Samsung Heavy Industries, 2016.

26 Hearing on The State of the U.S.-Flag Maritime Industry, Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (January 17, 2018) (statement of Bill Van Loo, Secretary Treasurer, Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association).

27 Tim Johnson, “Dwindling Merchant Marine Fleet Crimps U.S. Ability to Wage War,” McClatchy, May 14, 2018.

28 Posture of the United States Transportation Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (April 10, 2018) (statement of General Darren W. McDew, United States Air Force, Commander, United States Transportation Command).

29 . National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, Shipping, Shipyards, and Sealift: Issues of National Security and Federal Support (Washington: NACOA, 985).

30 Clinton H. Whitehurst, The U.S. Shipbuilding Industry: Past, Present, and Future (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 21.

31 An Assessment of Maritime Trade and Technology (Washington: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1983).

32 U.S. International Trade Commission, Analysis of the International Competitiveness of the U.S. Commercial Shipbuilding and Repair Industries (Washington: USITC, 1985).

33 Stephen Baker, Chris Degnan, Josh Gabriel, and John Tucker, National Security Assessment of the U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair Industry (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2001).

34 Victor Barnes et al., “Final Report: Shipbuilding Industry,” Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2009.

35 Deborah Broughton et al., “Final Report: Shipbuilding Industry,” Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2006.

36 Francisco Badiola et al., “Final Report: Shipbuilding Industry,” Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, Spring 2016.

37 John Frittelli, “Shipping Under the Jones Act: Legislative and Regulatory Background,” Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2019.

38 An Assessment of Maritime Trade and Technology, p. 86.

39 Jill Boward et al., “Final Report: Shipbuilding Industry,” Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2007.

40 John Frittelli, “Shipping Under the Jones Act: Legislative and Regulatory Background.”

41 “Navy Secretary Calls for Used‐​Ship Buy to Recapitalize Sealift Fleet,” Maritime Executive, May 17, 2019.

42 U.S. House Armed Services Committee, “U.S. Transportation Command and Maritime Administration: State of the Mobility Enterprise,” YouTube video, 1:40:20, March 7, 2019, https://​youtu​.be/​-​L​0​W​6​k​H​-​s​O​Y​?​t​=6021

43 Syamsul Bachri et al., “Final Report: Shipbuilding Industry,” Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, Spring 2015.

44 The Maritime Security Program (MSP) provides an annual $5 million stipend to each of the 60 ships participating in the program. In exchange, operators of these vessels are required to make them available for charter on request by the secretary of defense during times of war or national emergency. Although the ships participating in the program are U.S.-flagged and U.S.-crewed, they operate exclusively in the foreign trades because of their foreign construction.

45 John Frittelli, “Shipping Under the Jones Act: Legislative and Regulatory Background.”

46 “Hull Crack Leads to Fuel Leak Aboard U.S. Con/​Ro Matsonia,” Maritime Executive, February 22, 2019.

47 U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, “United States Flag Privately‐​Owned Merchant Fleet Report,” August 19, 2019.

48 House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, “Hearing: U.S. Maritime and Shipping Industry,” YouTube video, 39:35, March 6, 2019, https://​youtu​.be/​x​Q​u​4​g​d​xoE1Y.

49 National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, Shipping, Shipyards, and Sealift.

50 International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, “World Motor Vehicle Production, World Ranking of Manufacturers,” Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles (OICA) Correspondents Survey, 2016–2017, http://​www​.oica​.net/​w​p​-​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​u​p​l​o​a​d​s​/​W​o​r​l​d​-​R​a​n​k​i​n​g​-​o​f​-​M​a​n​u​f​a​c​t​u​r​e​r​s​-​1.pdf.

51 International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, “World Motor Vehicle Production by Country and Type,” Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles (OICA) Correspondents Survey, 2016–2017, http://​www​.oica​.net/​w​p​-​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​u​p​l​o​a​d​s​/​B​y​-​c​o​u​n​t​r​y​-​2​0​1​7.pdf.

52 Julie Johnsson, “Boeing Retains Crown as World’s Largest Planemaker,” Bloomberg, January 8, 2019.

53 Elwood Brehmer, “Rare Cargo Options Offered at Stevens Airport,” Alaska Journal of Commerce, November 19, 2014.

54 Mary E. Chenoweth, The Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Operation Desert Shield/​Desert Storm: Issues for the Future (Santa Barbara: RAND Corporation, 1993).

55 Micheline Maynard, “Pentagon Gives Airlines a Lifeline With Payments for Moving Troops,” New York Times, December 26, 2003.

56 Stephen Baker et al., National Security Assessment of the U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair Industry.

57 Ana Cristina Paixão Casaca and Dimitrios V. Lyridis, “Protec­tionist vs Liberalised Maritime Cabotage Policies: A Review,” Maritime Business Review 3, no. 3 (2018): 210–44.

58 Norway’s shipbuilding sector was estimated to have 10,400 people working in its shipbuilding sector in 2014, while Finland had 2,800 shipyard workers as of 2015. Meanwhile, U.S. shipyard employment was estimated at 94,004 as of 2018. However, unlike Norway and Denmark, the United States has a large military shipbuilding sector, which accounted for 70 percent of shipbuilding and repairing revenue in 2014–2015. Thus, if the comparison is limited to employment in commercial shipbuilding, the gap between the United States and these two Scandinavian countries no doubt further narrows. See Organisation for Economic Co‐​operation and Development, Peer Review of the Norwegian Shipbuilding Industry (Paris: OECD, 2017); Organisation for Economic Co‐​operation and Development, Peer Review of the Finnish Shipbuilding Industry (Paris: OECD, 2018); Navarro, “Buying American Can Help Keep the Philly Shipyard Afloat”; and United States Maritime Administration, “The Economic Importance of the U.S. Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry,” November 2015.

59 OECD, Peer Review of the Norwegian Shipbuilding Industry.

60 OECD, Peer Review of the Finnish Shipbuilding Industry.

61 European Commission, “Shipbuilding Sector,” https://​ec​.europa​.eu/​g​r​o​w​t​h​/​s​e​c​t​o​r​s​/​m​a​r​i​t​i​m​e​/​s​h​i​p​b​u​i​l​d​i​ng_en.

62 John Frittelli, “Shipping Under the Jones Act: Legislative and Regulatory Background.”

63 Said Al‐​Rahbi et al., “Shipbuilding: All Hands on Deck! Headwinds and Heavy Seas Ahead to Achieve the 355‐​Ship Navy,” Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, Spring 2017.

64 “Local Content Requirements and their Economic Effect on Shipbuilding: A Quantitative Assessment,” Organisation for Economic Co‐​operation and Development, April 12, 2019, beginning at p. 21.

65 Government Accountability Office, Puerto Rico: Characteristics of the Island’s Maritime Trade and Potential Effects of Modifying the Jones Act, GAO-13–260 (Washington: GAO, 2013).

66 Steven Mufson, “Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas from Russia’s Arctic Arrives in Boston,” Washington Post, January 28, 2018.

67 Duane H. Cassidy, “A Call to Action … Again,” Defense Transportation Journal 45, no. 5 (1993): 50–52.

68 Whitehurst, The U.S. Shipbuilding Industry, p. 26.

69 John Frittelli, “Shipping Under the Jones Act: Legislative and Regulatory Background.”

70 John Frittelli, “Shipping Under the Jones Act: Legislative and Regulatory Background.”

71 Comptroller General of the United States, “Maritime Subsidy Requirements Hinder U.S.-Flag Operators’ Competitive Position,” November 30, 1981, https://​www​.gao​.gov/​a​s​s​e​t​s​/​1​4​0​/​1​3​5​8​3​3.pdf.

72 U.S. International Trade Commission, Analysis of the International Competitiveness of the U.S. Commercial Shipbuilding and Repair Industries.

73 The four Jones Act ships are the Daniel K. Inouye (keel laid November 24, 2015; build date October 31, 2018); El Coquí (keel laid January 21, 2015; build date July 18, 2018); Taíno (keel laid August 24, 2015; build date December 19, 2018); and Kaimana Hila (keel laid November 18, 2015; build date February 28, 2019). The OOCL Hong Kong had its keel laid on December 24, 2015, and was delivered on May 18, 2017.

74 “Securing Maritime Commerce: The U.S. Strategic Outlook,” Brookings Institution, March 25, 2019.

75 Bryan Clark, Timothy A. Walton, Adam Lemon, Budd Bergloff, and Bryan McGrath, “National Security Contributions of the U.S. Maritime Industry,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), March 1, 2019.

76 Philly Shipyard, “2018 Annual Report,” March 2018, http://​files​.zetta​.no/​w​w​w​-​p​h​i​l​l​y​s​h​i​p​y​a​r​d​-​c​o​m​/​u​p​l​o​a​d​/​2​0​1​8​_​a​n​n​u​a​l​_​r​e​p​o​r​t​2.pdf.

77 Philip Hoxie and Vincent H. Smith, “The Jones Act Does Not Add to Our Nation’s Defenses,” American Enterprise Institute, May 2019.

78 Government Accountability Office, Puerto Rico: Characteristics of the Island’s Maritime Trade.

79 Stephen Baker et al., National Security Assessment of the U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair Industry.

80 Charlie Papavizas, “U.S. Coast Guard Issues Jones Act Build and Rebuilt Guidance,” Winston & Strawn LLP, August 1, 2017, https://​www​.win​ston​.com/​e​n​/​m​a​r​i​t​i​m​e​-​f​e​d​w​a​t​c​h​/​u​-​s​-​c​o​a​s​t​-​g​u​a​r​d​-​i​s​s​u​e​s​-​j​o​n​e​s​-​a​c​t​-​b​u​i​l​d​-​a​n​d​-​r​e​b​u​i​l​t​-​g​u​i​d​a​n​c​e​.html.

81 Papavizas, “U.S. Coast Guard Issues New Jones Act Build Guidance.”

82 Det Norske Veritas Group, Daniel K. Inouye, vessel register, IMO no. 9719056, “Machinery,” https://​ves​sel​reg​is​ter​.dnvgl​.com/​v​e​s​s​e​l​r​e​g​i​s​t​e​r​/​v​e​s​s​e​l​d​e​t​a​i​l​s​.​h​t​m​l​?​v​e​s​s​e​l​i​d​=​34847.

83 American Shipper, “U.S., Korean Shipyards Team Up to Build Jones Act Ships,” American Shipper, April 4, 2006; and General Dynamics NASSCO, “Ship Design,” https://​nass​co​.com/​p​r​o​d​u​c​t​s​/​d​e​sign/.

84 General Dynamics NASSCO, “Matson Kanaloa Class (ConRo),” https://​nass​co​.com/​w​p​-​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​u​p​l​o​a​d​s​/​M​a​t​s​o​n​-​K​a​n​a​l​o​a​-​C​l​a​s​s​-​C​o​n​R​o​_​F​a​c​t​-​S​h​e​e​t​-​2​0​1​6.pdf.

85 Philly Shipyard, “2018 Annual Report.”

86 In the early 1970s, the government encouraged U.S. shipyards to build liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers through the provision of loan guarantees, which resulted in the construction of 16 such ships. Three of the vessels built at the Avondale shipyard, however, were declared total constructive losses after the cargo tank insulation failed during builder’s trials and they were later converted to other ship types. See Peter G. Noble, “A Short History of LNG Shipping, 1959–2009,” Society of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineers (SNAME), Texas Section, February 10, 2009.

87 Government Accountability Office, Maritime Transportation: Implications of Using U.S. Liquefied‐​Natural‐​Gas Carriers for Exports, GAO-16–104 (Washington: GAO, 2015).

88 Claudiu Nichita, Tomaž Nabergoj, and Dmitriy Sonechko, “The Ultimate Jones Act Dry Cargo Carrier: An Innovative LNG Fueled Container RO-RO Vessel,” Wärtsilä Ship Design, May 2014.

89 In the 2008 court case Philadelphia Metal Trades Council v. Allen et al., both the Aker Philadelphia Shipyard and General Dynamics NASSCO argued that a more‐​limited ability to use foreign components in Jones Act shipbuilding would raise their price of these ships, thus leading to fewer such vessels operating in coastwise trades.

90 Deborah Broughton et al., “Final Report: Shipbuilding Industry.”

91 “National Security Strategy of the United States of Amer­ica,” White House, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12–18-2017–0905.pdf.

92 Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Shipping and Shipbuilding: Trends and Policy Choices (Washington: CBO, 1984).

93 Francisco Badiola et al., “Final Report: Shipbuilding Industry.”

94 John Frittelli, “Cargo Preferences for U.S.-Flag Shipping,” Congressional Research Service, October 29, 2015.

95 Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Shipping and Shipbuilding: Trends and Policy Choices.

96 Ronald O’Rourke, “DOD Leases of Foreign‐​Built Ships: Background for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, May 28, 2010.

97 Frittelli, “Cargo Preferences for U.S.-Flag Shipping.”

98 Loren Thompson, “Aging Sealift Fleet Is Achilles Heel of Pentagon War Plans,” Forbes, April 25, 2019.

99 Graduates of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy are a notable exception here because they are on Navy reserve status and are obligated to mobilize.

100 “Veterans’ Benefits: Eligibility of Merchant Mariners,” Congressional Research Service, January 27, 2017.

101 John Konrad, “Admiral, I Am NOT Ready for War,” gCaptain, May 8, 2019.

102 Government Accountability Office, Ready Reserve Force: Ship Readiness Has Improved, but Other Concerns Remain, GAO/NSIAD-95–24 (Washington: GAO, 1994).

103 Government Accountability Office, Ready Reserve Force: Ship Readiness Has Improved, but Other Concerns Remain.

104 Sarah Stillman, “The Invisible Army,” New Yorker, May 30, 2011.

105 Government Accountability Office, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports, GAO-03–15 (Washington: GAO, 2002).

106 Most of these ships hesitated but ultimately delivered their cargo to its intended destination. A total of four ships did not deliver their cargo: two feeder vessels and the Qatari‐​flagged Trident Dusk, which ended its journey in Oman. A fourth ship, the Banglar Mamata, saw its crew jump ship in Oakland before its voyage began and the Military Sealift Command canceled its contract with the ship’s operator. See Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast.

107 In March 1970, a U.S.-flagged and U.S.-crewed cargo ship transporting munitions in support of U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia, the Columbia Eagle, experienced a mutiny when two crew members used guns to seize control of the ship and force its master to set sail for Cambodia. See Henry Kamm, “Arms Ship’s Castaways Said to Blame 2 ‘Hippies’ for Seizure,” New York Times, March 17, 1970.