VANCOUVER — The 2019 federal election focused little on Canadian policy toward China. Despite the fact that Canada-China relations have deteriorated to their worst point in recent memory, no party leaders offered more than a few lines on how to reset the bilateral relationship. Now that Trudeau has won a second term, however, he and his cabinet must change the way in which Ottawa forges its China strategy. Trudeau must articulate a coherent approach and build the political institutions necessary to support that approach.

Trudeau came into his first term preaching the virtues of engagement and pushing for warmer ties with Beijing. This was hardly surprising, given that Trudeau had previously expressed his admiration for China’s “basic dictatorship” in controversial remarks about Beijing’s ability to steer its economy in 2013. The prime minister then pushed for a free-trade agreement, considered an extradition treaty, and initially allowed Chinese firms to acquire Canadian companies involved in sensitive technologies. The government’s ambassador to China, former Liberal MP John McCallum, publicly pushed for “more trade, more investment, more tourists.”

Gradually however, Trudeau’s government also began to confront Beijing on certain issues. Trudeau’s China strategy has thus proven schizophrenic. In late 2018, for example, then-Ambassador McCallum, aided by other ambassadors in Beijing, rebuked China’s internment of Muslim Uighurs in a letter. The government has also taken a more discerning view toward Chinese investment in Canada, blocking the attempted takeover of construction firm Aecon. Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland has commented publicly on the Hong Kong protests, calling on the Chinese government to uphold “fundamental freedoms.”

Trudeau’s actions in recent weeks indicate that he will likely carry on as before and employ a mix of engagement and confrontation. On the one hand, Trudeau’s recent pick of Dominic Barton, the former managing director of McKinsey & Company management consulting firm, as ambassador indicates continued appetite for engagement. Barton, given his impressive business background in China, may, like McCallum, push for more trade, more investment, more tourists. On the other hand, the government has finally decided — in a necessary act of confrontation — to challenge China’s ban on Canadian canola exports before the World Trade Organization.

There is nothing wrong with mixing tactics. Indeed, practically every Prime Minister since Trudeau Sr., whose government recognized the People’s Republic of China, has adopted both engagement and confrontation in dealing with Beijing. The issue is that this government has failed to articulate any coherent, overarching strategy on China. The government has yet to publish a white paper on the bilateral relationship. It conducts its China policy in a secretive fashion, without meaningful consultation of opposition MPs. It makes its China strategy on an ad hoc basis, without any reference to core values or an underlying grand strategy. When it comes to the many facets of the bilateral relationship, Ottawa has not specified where it will seek co-operation, and where it will push back. The ultimate result has been that Trudeau’s policies toward China seem unpredictable, not only to Canadians, but also to allies and the international community.

If Trudeau wants to stabilize Canada-China relations, he should change the way in which the government forms its China strategy. First, it is high time that the government published a white paper on China, setting out the goals and means of Canadian diplomacy. The government’s review might come as part of a larger foreign policy white paper, but the point is that Trudeau needs to articulate his administration’s views forcefully and clearly. The paper must specify the issues on which the government will pursue engagement, confrontation, or a mix of both.

More importantly, this government should form an interparty and interagency China Working Group (CWG), composed of prominent MPs from across the political spectrum, as well as the heads of relevant agencies — the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment, for starters. Ottawa had a CWG in the 1980s, but members tended to be departmental officials, not MPs. The revived and improved CWG should meet regularly to discuss developments in the bilateral relationship and provide considered advice to cabinet. It could review and discuss classified information in camera.

Canadian allies have long benefited from such institutional reforms. In 2001, the United States created the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, composed of members of both Houses and five senior Administration officials. The British Parliament has an All Party Parliamentary China Group. Trudeau now needs to spearhead similar institutional reforms and approach the bilateral relationship in a more disciplined and consultative fashion. To simply carry on as before, making decisions on an ad hoc basis, would worsen the bilateral relationship and weaken Canada’s image in the eyes of allies and the world.

Preston Lim is a J.D. candidate at Yale Law School. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Princeton and represented Canada as a Schwarzman Scholar at Tsinghua University, where he received a master’s of Global Affairs. He has worked as a policy adviser to MP Erin O’Toole and has been recognized by China Hands magazine as a Top 25 under 25 Leader in US-China Relations.

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