For the longest time, Syed Zabiuddin Ansari was an absconding terrorist, wanted in the 2006 Aurangabad arms haul case. He was someone who had successfully hoodwinked intelligence agencies, crossed into Bangladesh and then travelled onwards to Pakistan, all with the help of Pakistani intelligence operatives. Every now and then, Indian sleuths would pick up the odd terrorist who would speak about Ansari and the fact that he had been rehabilitated and was now a loyal member of the Lashkar-e-Toiba.

So, when and how did Indian agencies figure out that Ansari was 'Abu Jundal', the man who coordinated with the 26/11 Mumbai attackers from Karachi? His use of Hindi words while giving instructions had led investigators to believe that there was an Indian in the Karachi control room throughout the operation, but the question always was, who was it? There were conjectures made but no firm answers until about two years ago.

This was the time when intelligence agencies were monitoring the phones of another Pakistani terrorist, Adil alias Ajmal. He was finally picked from Madhubani in Bihar during his second visit to India last year for allegedly planning terror attacks against foreign tourists during the Commonwealth Games in Delhi. Ajmal used to be in touch with a person in Karachi whom he constantly referred to as 'Abu Jundal'. This caught the attention of Indian agencies, who had been struggling with this kunniyat or code since 26/11 and Kasab's confession, in which he refers to Jundal as the man who taught them Hindi.

This piece of information was promptly shared with US agencies, who had better eyes and ears in Pakistan. And thus began the unravelling of Ansari's post-Aurangabad lifeone about which the Indian establishment had very little information.

But there was another important breakthrough before this by RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) in early 2009, which brought the agencies closer to making this all-important connection. They picked up a vital piece of intelligence that Ansari, who was on the most wanted list for the Aurangabad case, had been issued a Pakistani passport (QL1790941) in the name of Riyasat Ali on January 28, 2009. This too was passed on to US intelligence agencies as part of the sharing arrangement to ensure better monitoring.

As a result, it did not take much for Indian and US agencies to put together pieces of the jigsaw after Ajmal's calls to the one he referred to as 'Abu Jundal' were traced. It led operatives to Riyasat Ali, who turned out to be Zabiuddin Ansari and the dots were finally joined. Intelligence officials now claim that they had a "hunch" all along about Ansari being the handler of the 26/11 attackers because it had to be someone who knew Mumbai well.

What also worked in India's favour was the surveillance US agencies mounted on Ansari from 2009, ever since details of Riyasat Ali's passport were made available to them. They found that while recruiting and motivating Indians to carry out attacks in India was Ansari's primary task, US and Israeli interests figured prominently on his list of targets in India. In fact, it was this surveillance that led to a December 2009 terror alert, warning against attacks on the US consulate in Kolkata. Other targets included the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and the Shiv Sena headquarters in Mumbai.

By 2010, when it was established that Ansari was Jundal, US interest in the case heightened, given that he was plotting attacks against US targets. Indian and US agencies began discussing how they would corner Ansari and while they explored several options, they had decided at the start that Pakistan's help should not be sought in this case.

Finally, sources said, a call was taken that they would wait for Ansari to travel out of Pakistan and nab him there. And thus started a patient phase of wait and watch, while alerts were sounded across airports based on his prevalent red corner notice. His movements, meanwhile, showed that he had gradually won the trust of the Lashkar hierarchy, with important tasks being assigned to him.

Working with Saudi Arabia

The moment came when he was taken to meet Lashkar operations chief Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi in Adiala jail in Pakistan before being sent off to Saudi Arabia. He had been tasked to recruit and motivate Indians in Saudi Arabia to join jihad and specifically look for recruits who can also target US and Israeli interests in India. Saudi authorities had been informed even before he left Pakistan on April 26 last year.

While Saudi authorities conveyed that they may not be able to stop him at immigration if he had a valid Pakistani passport, they agreed to mount a surveillance on him. He had projected himself as a small-time businessman and had floated a small company with three or four Saudi partners. However, his activities raised doubts as he spent little time in business and more time trying to spread extreme ideology and looking for potential recruits. In about a month, sources said, Saudi authorities were convinced that Ansari was not doing what he had stated before entering Saudi Arabia.

He was picked up last May and kept in detention while details were sought from India to prove his identity. With Pakistan pointing out that deportation, if required, should be to the country of origin, a fair amount of heavylifting was required. First, Ansari's photographs were superimposed, then a DNA test was done and later, a blood sample was sent from India to help the Saudi authorities conduct their own DNA comparison. By July, sources said, the Saudi authorities were convinced that the person in their detention was Ansari, not Riyasat Ali.

Yet, the Saudi authorities waited, conveying that they had to complete some of their internal processes first. Such was the Pakistani pressure on Saudi intelligence that at one point, they offered Indian investigators access to Ansari in Saudi Arabia rather than deporting him back. India, however, refused the offer and insisted on having him back.

US authorities exerted significant pressure on Saudi Arabia in the days that followed, apart from constant reminders from India. India had made it clear that it was willing to render any help to fully satisfy Saudi queries on Ansari's identity and nationality as long as Saudi Arabia would abide by its commitment that it would repatriate Indian nationals wanted for terror activities here. This was an understanding reached while firming up intelligence cooperation between both countries.

It was in the first week of June that Saudi authorities said they were willing to deport Ansari to India without the formal extradition process. Immediately, India began preparing temporary travel permit papers under the name Zabiuddin Ansari, based on the details in the last Indian passport (E7845118) he held. He was flown in on a commercial plane on June 21, completing a long intelligence operation in which Indian and US agencies managed to get Saudi Arabia to cooperate to ensure that a 26/11 suspect does not get sent back to Pakistan just because he held a Pakistani passport.

As Ansari now reveals more details about the 26/11 attacks, the bigger challenge before Indian investigators is to prepare a foolproof case in case he retracts his statements in court. Until now, Ansari is being cooperative, giving out all that he knows about his handler Muzammil Bhat, Lakhvi and also about the "welcome" meeting he had with Saeed in Qadsia Mosque, Chauburji, Lahore, after reaching Pakistan. He had spent much of his time in Muzaffarabad and Manshera visiting Lashkar training camps.

But for the investigators, it's the connection with Adil alias Ajmal that will count even more. Reason: this will be the first case to link Lashkar, Ajmal and, therefore, by extension, the Bhatkal brothers who had been giving directions to the Madhubani group. If the dots join the way they are shaping up now, insiders say, this case could prove to be the first authoritative basis for India to level the allegation that Pakistan, through the Lashkar, has tried to create a homegrown terrorist movement in Indiaa new dimension to state-sponsored terrorism.

His story

Early life

Syed Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Jundal. Born on November 30, 1981, in village Hathi Khana mohalla in Georai area of Beed district in Maharashtra.

Education

Studied up to class 10 at Zilla Parishad High School, Georai. Did a wireman course from ITI, Beed. Completed his graduation while staying in Silk Mill colony near the railway station in Sambhaji Nagar. Was studying for his MA in Navghan College at Beed in 2006.

Family

Father Syed Zakiuddin, an insurance agent with GIC. Ansari has five sisters who are married. While he knows about four of them, he says he has no knowledge of the fifth. His mother is a housewife.

Escape from India

In 2006, Zabiuddin fled from Aurangabad to Kolkata with the help of Shahid Bilal and Abdul Khaja. Later, he moved to Bangladesh and obtained a Bangladeshi passport for Rs 15,000. Finally, moved to Pakistan.

Militancy

His senior Fayyaz Kagazi introduced him to SIMI. After SIMI was banned, he is learnt to have travelled to Pakistan where he received arms training. In October 2005, Ansari went to Kathmandu and met Lashkar operator Abu Rehan alias Abdul Aziz. There, they planned the Aurangabad arms haul of 2006. Apart from the arms haul case, Ansari is an accused in the February 2006 Ahmedabad railway station blast case.

Mumbai 26/11

The Indian face of the 26/11 Mumbai attack, Ansari taught Hindi to the 10 attackers. He was present in the control room set up in Karachi to oversee the entire operation. He is believed to have been the voice who directed the 10 attackers during the Mumbai siege for three days. He is described as the highest ranking Indian in the Lashkar and is closely associated with Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi. He has 20 aliases and is the one responsible for Lashkar India's operations.

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