Show caption Protesters call for a second Brexit referendum, during a rally on 23 March. Photograph: UPI/Barcroft Images Brexit Brexit: how do voters feel about the EU now? The polls show a shift in favour of Remain, but this advantage is narrow and fragile Robert Ford Sat 30 Mar 2019 17.23 GMT Share on Facebook

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The wind seems to be in the sails of campaigners looking to keep Britain in the EU as, for the first time in the Brexit crisis, they see signs of the public mood shifting in their favour.

Hundreds of thousands marched in support of EU membership last weekend, and a petition calling for article 50 to be revoked, reversing Brexit, secured almost 6m signatures in 10 days. Meanwhile, Theresa May’s withdrawal agreement was voted down for a third time in the House of Commons on Friday, and a second-referendum proposal was one of the most popular options in the “indicative vote” process developed by MPs to gauge support for ways to break the deadlock. A second referendum has never looked nearer and, polling suggests, Remainers would enter the contest narrowly ahead.

A range of polling suggests the public have moved in a pro-EU direction since 2016. The polling average compiled by Sir John Curtice and the body What UK Thinks puts Remain ahead, by 54 to 46, with practically every poll conducted in the past year or so recording a small Remain lead.

The share of the public who think the Leave vote was “in hindsight the wrong decision” has slowly crept up, and is now consistently above the share who still believe Britain made the right choice. Public approval of May’s deal is also exceptionally low, and the share of voters who think it will deliver a good outcome for Britain has fallen steadily. Time, perhaps, to go back to the people?

There are certainly good reasons to believe this shift in public opinion is real. The rise in support for Remain is mainly driven by those who did not vote in 2016, either because they abstained or were too young. Abstainers and new voters now heavily back Remain, and their numbers are growing steadily, with about three-quarters of a million new voters joining the electorate each year.

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Meanwhile, the concentration of Leave support among older voters puts Brexit campaigners on the wrong side of demographic change. There are other headwinds for Brexiters, too. Concern about immigration, a key driver of voting for Leave in 2016, has declined sharply since the referendum. And voters who were enthusiastic about Brexit in 2016 have become more negative about the deal the government has managed to negotiate.

The Remain advantage is, however, narrow and fragile. There has been very little change in sentiment among those who voted in the referendum, and little evidence that Leave voters have changed their minds. Instead, Brexit partisanship has consolidated and intensified, with Leave and Remain voters increasingly seeing their choice as a core part of their political identity. This makes their views very hard to shift – and those who voted last time are more certain to turn out again than the former abstainers and new voters driving Remain’s current polling leads.

Even among Remain voters, enthusiasm for a re-run of the 2016 vote is not overwhelming

There are also risks that the opinion polls could again be off, perhaps overstating the shift to Remain because they are unable to reach or get truthful responses from more politically disengaged sections of the electorate, who heavily backed Leave last time, or by overestimating the enthusiasm of pro-EU demographic groups such as young voters, who may be overstating their willingness to turn out in a new referendum.

A second referendum would also be divisive. While majorities back the idea when it is presented as an undefined “people’s vote”, support drops sharply if voters are told that Remain would be one of the options on the ballot paper. A large majority of Leave voters oppose the idea once this is made clear, and even among Remain voters enthusiasm for a re-run of the 2016 vote is not overwhelming.

While the public mood has shifted, the change is modest, and the electorate remains closely divided. A heated and polarising second Brexit campaign would be sure to further deepen these divides, but it is unlikely either side would win the kind of decisive victory necessary to settle the argument. Nor is the current narrow lead for Remain certain to hold up in an intense and unpredictable campaign.

Currently disengaged Leave voters could mobilise in large numbers, antagonised by what will doubtless be portrayed as an elite campaign to betray Brexit. Symbols, slogans and slip-ups could all prove important in shifting the electorate against the EU once again. Those seeing the shifts in the polls as a harbinger of a victorious “people’s vote” campaign should remember what happened in 2017 when May called a snap election based on an apparently insurmountable polling lead. It did not end as expected.