The 5-Part Case against Net Neutrality Regulation (Debate vs. Ben Scott of Free Press)

Yesterday I engaged in a lively luncheon debate about Net neutrality regulation with Ben Scott of Free Press at a Catholic University Law School event on “Implementing the National Broadband Plan.” To open the debate, I made a very quick 5-Part Case against Net Neutrality Regulation. I argued that the the objections to a Net neutrality regulatory regime can be grouped into 5 major categories: (1) Legal; (2) Economic; (3) Engineering; (4) Practical; and (5) Philosophical / Principled. Down below you will find my working notes to see how I then elaborated on each objection in a bit more detail. And then Ben and I engaged in some spirited banter for the next 45 minutes.

Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear that the video of our debate is online just yet, but once it is I will post it here. However, the folks from NextGenWeb asked me to shoot a short 2 1/2 min video clip after the debate summarizing my remarks. If you can stand the sight of my big fat head in your browser for that long, here ya go:

The 5-Part Case against Net Neutrality Regulation

The objections to a Net neutrality regulatory regime can be grouped into 5 major categories: (1) Legal; (2) Economic; (3) Engineering; (4) Practical; and (5) Philosophical / Principled. Each objection will be briefly summarized below:

(1) The Legal Case

The FCC utterly lacks the authority to regulate in this way : The Commission’s current effort, which is tantamount to throwing stuff at wall to see what sticks, is troubling. They should go to Congress for authority.

: The Commission’s current effort, which is tantamount to throwing stuff at wall to see what sticks, is troubling. They should go to Congress for authority. Importantly, Sec. 230 & 706 of the Telecom Act cannot be the hook : They were deregulatory in nature & aimed at keeping govt’s hands off the Net.

: They were deregulatory in nature & aimed at keeping govt’s hands off the Net. Litigation nightmare: Regardless of how the FCC or Congress plows forward, we’re going to get tied up in the courts for years if we continue down the regulatory path. It will become “full employment” for telecom lawyers.

(2) The Economic Case

NN will likely create substantial disincentives to invest and innovate : At a time when we’re trying to build out broadband infrastructure the last thing we should be doing is disincentivizing network investment.

: At a time when we’re trying to build out broadband infrastructure the last thing we should be doing is disincentivizing network investment. NN could regress into old fashion rate or return / price control regime . In the history of network regulation, price and rate controls have always accompanied service regulations.

. In the history of network regulation, price and rate controls have always accompanied service regulations. Sharing is not competing : If this is all just greasing the skids for a new line-sharing or forced access regime, well, we’ve been there before and it didn’t end well. Creating networks built on paper is a worthless endeavor.

: If this is all just greasing the skids for a new line-sharing or forced access regime, well, we’ve been there before and it didn’t end well. Creating networks built on paper is a worthless endeavor. Facilities-based competition, not infrastructure sharing is the path forward if we want truly robust & competitive networks and markets.

is the path forward if we want truly robust & competitive networks and markets. Contestability counts: This is a contestable market. Threats of new entry at margins keep incumbents on their toes.

(3) The Engineering Case

We shouldn’t be freezing networks in stone : (Can you imagine if we would have frozen 1999 walled garden model in place?) The Net was “designed for change” (Richard Bennett) and it should be allowed to adapt to changing circumstances.

: (Can you imagine if we would have frozen 1999 walled garden model in place?) The Net was “designed for change” (Richard Bennett) and it should be allowed to adapt to changing circumstances. Flexibility is crucial for fast-moving technologies & networks : In particular, we need to grant network managers the flexibility to deal with congestion, latency, malware & other unforeseen problems.

: In particular, we need to grant network managers the flexibility to deal with congestion, latency, malware & other unforeseen problems. Innovation at the core of networks is every bit as important as innovation at the edge: We don’t want stagnation at the core or networks, and the applications that ride on them, will suffer.

(4) The Practical Case

The FCC just isn’t very good at regulating fast-moving industries & technologies : And its track record is poor when it comes to incentivizing new things (remember Video Dialtone? Open Video System rules?)

: And its track record is poor when it comes to incentivizing new things (remember Video Dialtone? Open Video System rules?) No such thing as a “simple rule” when it comes to Net neutrality or network regulation in general: Consider the paperwork burden generated by just three major “competition” rules the FCC issued in an attempt to implement the Telecom Act and define the “cost” of unbundled network elements (“UNEs”):

o Local Competition Order (1996): 737 pages, 3,283 footnotes

o UNE Remand Order (1999): 262 pages, 1,040 footnotes

o UNE Triennial Review (2003): 576 pages; 2,447 footnotes

o That’s 1,575 pages and 6,770 footnotes worth of regulation in just three orders!

o This was all implemented following the passage of a bill (The Telecom Act) that was supposed to be deregulatory in character! And this doesn’t even begin to cover the tens of thousands of pages of legal filings, economic studies, consultant reports and other filings submitted to the FCC and state agencies by groups and individuals looking to have a say in the matter. That’s an enormous deadweight loss.

The potential for industry capture grows in proportion to size of the regulatory regime : Alfred Kahn, author of the seminal Economics of Regulation said it best long ago: “Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.”

: Alfred Kahn, author of the seminal Economics of Regulation said it best long ago: “Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.” Markets need not be perfect to be preferable to government regulation: That’s especially true in light of the inefficiencies associated with bureaucratic regulation.

That’s especially true in light of the inefficiencies associated with bureaucratic regulation. Community policing can help: Any deviations from “neutrality” will be policed by the watchful eyes of the digital world (and the press) and the white hot spotlight of public attention will scrutinize every carrier move (and already is). Plus, experts and technical bodies (ex: Net Neutrality squad) will be watching.

(5) The Philosophical/Principled Case