The NDP may be running a candidate in Peter Penashue’s district, and Joyce Murray may only have a few weeks left to promote her ideas regarding partisan cooperation in prime time. But progressives will eventually learn the hard lessons the conservative movement did in previous decades: that there’s now little to lose and much to gain by cooperating. What type of Canada progressives inherit will depend on how quickly they come to terms with this reality.

A political sphere characterized by many distinct political parties, each with clear platforms, is often seen to be a sign of democratic health. And at their best, parties are institutions that ideally give voters clear political and philosophical choice, policy predictability, and electoral accountability. But like any institution, parties also are repositories of multi-layered interests that are not always aligned with those of the citizens they represent. Strategic and tactical considerations, interests in individual careers and legacies, deep internal identification with party affiliation (or brand as they like to call it now) and historical animosity towards opposing parties all profoundly influence the behaviour of parties.

It took decades of duking it out and losing to the liberals federally before the conservative movement realized that neither ideological purity nor vested interests were served by ongoing internecine warfare. But eventually they did. The faster the representatives of today’s progressive parties recognize this, the better. To that end, here are three realities on which the happy partisan warriors of a progressive hue should seriously reflect.

First, the parties of the centre-left are less and less philosophically and politically distinct. Once, the New Democrats were social democrats – with a clear collectivist perspective and a burning desire to influence from the outside. And the Liberals were the party of individual rights, well-heeled donors, and central Canadian establishment compromises. But as in other countries, these sharp differences have become much fuzzier of late.

It is not coincidental, for example, that the outgoing interim leader of the Liberal party was once the most polarizing NDP premier in Canada, and the leader of the NDP was a Liberal member and cabinet minister for 13 years in Quebec. Neither are simply opportunistic floor-crossers. Rather, they could shift parties because the philosophical and policy divides are not particularly fundamental.

When Mulcair says that the NDP is “embracing trade, there’s no question about that” and is potentially open to an EU trade deal, and Justin Trudeau, the presumed heir to the Liberal crown, states that he won’t cooperate with other parties because that would be old-style politics with its “single-minded focus, not on governing but on winning, on taking away power from people we don’t like,” it’s as if we’re peering through Alice’s looking glass.

The dream of forming government has understandably softened the NDP’s corners. And being reduced to the underdog has meant that the Liberals are looking for an edge to regain relevance. Consequently, while policy differences remain, observers might be forgiven if they question whether these differences are more important than the commonalities. And whether they are the result of core philosophical disagreement rather than considerations of tactical positioning.

In this context, partisan attempts to argue that cooperation would be tantamount to a betrayal of philosophical and policy ideals ring increasingly hollow, even when sincerely meant. Besides, even if one believes that there are important policy differences, it still may be true that even the most extreme form of cooperation (a merger) might be preferable to the current situation. Hashing out policy differences within the confines of a single party, before an election, does have its advantages. As social conservatives have learned since 2006, minor strands in a party don’t get everything they want. But they definitely get a government with priorities and policies that are much closer to their preferences than would otherwise be the case. And with initiatives like the Office for Religious Freedom and the administrative shuttering of many government supported NGOs and programmes, they have received a variety of specific asks too. Being a winning minority partner, in other words, might be a whole lot better than a losing stand-alone.

Secondly, the partisan players in this drama should take a long hard look at what the next decade will likely bring without cooperation or a merger. It’s not very hard to predict. In many ways, the ideal scenario for the conservatives is precisely what we are seeing right now – with the NDP remaining strong, but the Liberals coming back slightly from their electoral disaster of 2011. The conservative attack ads will, of course, roll on again in the next election. The tragedy, however, is that the conservatives probably won’t have to do much to remain in power. Because the strategic context will almost certainly ensure that unless they explicitly agree to cooperate, the NDP and Liberals will do it themselves. Since the Liberals under Trudeau will not capture power by tacking hard to the right, the real dogfight will be the one between the NDP and Liberals for many of the same voters. This has, to some degree, been the case before. But this time, with the NDP looking to consolidate its new role, and the Liberals desperate and without other options, conservatives will likely be able to sit back and watch the cage match with glee, laughing all the way to the electoral bank.

Thirdly, and most importantly, progressive partisans need to acknowledge that the ideological landscape has changed dramatically – and that this has profoundly altered the stakes and costs of not cooperating.

The 1970s and early 80s saw a dramatic transformation of Canada politically. At that point, everyone knew it was happening because it was done with dramatic political and legal changes, colourful personal panache and a visible groundswell of popular enthusiasm (and backlash, of course).

In contrast, the current conservative transformation of Canada is much less flamboyant. Their method is grey, gradual, unflinching and largely boring to those outside the Queensway. Pierre Trudeau’s style was to pirouette while carving new policies with an epee. Harper’s government sternly peers over its glasses as it administers a thousand paper cuts. But make no mistake: even though it is no Tea Party North, this version of conservatism is deeply ideological, profoundly strategic and long-sighted, and more determined than in any other period. Their goal is no less ambitious than that of welfare state liberalism in the 1970s. They just don’t trumpet it in the same way.

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There will always be reasons – some valid, others less so – to argue against progressive cooperation. And what form cooperation should take is a complex question. But these concerns pale when we compare them to the larger stakes. Ours, like the 1970s, is an era of profound political transformation. And two majority terms in the right hands can go a long way to redefining a state, and a country. Narrow partisanship is now a luxury progressives can no longer afford. We will learn this eventually. It would be better if we realized it sooner.

Paul Saurette is an associate professor at the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa.