Uninspiring, pragmatic, Dutch. These three words have dominated the initial response to Bert van Marwijk’s hire as Socceroos coach for this year’s World Cup. The 65-year-old is all three of those things, granted. Fundamentally, he will be an ideological departure from what Ange Postecoglou sought to implement.

Examining Van Marwijk’s recent coaching history has worth in this discussion, but it’s also missing the point to a degree – this doesn’t relate to the fatuous narrative of Football Federation Australia’s Dutch crutch in times of uncertainty and the conspicuously early timing of official statement.

What has been lost in the reactionary noise: why did Australian football get here? Why is the Socceroos coach again a philosophical opposite to his predecessor?

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We must remember, before Postecoglou came Holger Osieck, who was widely criticised by the Australian football media for a prosaic approach by the end of his tenure. Then Postecoglou, initially lauded for his “never take a backwards step” ethos, has ultimately been viewed as too cavalier in the search for attacking balance.

Where Postecoglou found trouble on a tactical basis was the nature of Australia’s possession, not possession itself. Tactical discussion descended into counter-productive and scared ideas; reverting to a four-man defence was the most notable among them. The reality remains, despite aesthetic differences between Postecoglou and Osieck, they were both chased out of the door at the first point of wider discomfort.

Though potentially short, Van Marwijk’s hire alarmingly reflects the Australian game’s state of perpetual chaos. This impulsive lack of continuity from an ideological standpoint also hints at a misunderstanding of the game itself, because at its core lies risk. In football, attack or defence cannot eliminate the threat of the other, but only attempt to minimise it.

Although Van Marwijk might also fit FFA’s financial criteria, with Australia’s group at this year’s showpiece in context, this reversal in ideology becomes all the more perplexing.

Speculating on the composition of Australia’s squad in June is futile but what is likely, given the coach’s track record, they will revert to a 4-2-3-1 formation and absorb pressure. This tactical tenet was the basis upon which the Netherlands built a path to the World Cup final in 2010, with battering rams in Mark van Bommel and Nigel de Jong at the base of midfield, bullying both the opposition and Dutch football history.

It was little different for Saudi Arabia’s qualification for this year’s edition, despite benefitting from the Socceroos’ blips against Thailand and Iraq earlier in the second group stage.

No group is easy at the World Cup and progression to the knockout stages is never a guarantee, but Australia’s group is still a relatively favourable one. Despite Fifa rankings, none of the Socceroos’ opponents could be called the strongest from their respective pots.

France have an abundance of attacking talent in Paul Pogba, Ousmane Dembélé and the relentlessly vertical Kylian Mbappé but in Uefa’s qualification phase, they scored the second-lowest amount of goals (18) out of group winners, just ahead of Iceland (16).

Les Bleus’ struggles with fluidity have been at times offset by Antoine Griezmann’s movement centrally, but coach Didier Deschamps’ tactical apprehension has benefitted the rigid likes of N’Golo Kanté, Blaise Matuidi and Moussa Sissoko in midfield – at the expense of Corentin Tolisso. Meanwhile, robust striking options in Olivier Giroud and Kevin Gameiro have been favoured as the more dynamic Alexandre Lacazette remains on the outer.

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Outside of Pione Sisto on the left flank, Denmark are physical and very much reliant on the majestic Christian Eriksen, with Thomas Delaney merely industrious on his best day. Åge Hareide’s switch to Andreas Cornelius and Nicolai Jørgensen as attacking pivots late in the qualification phase – as Yussuf Poulsen shifted wide – has only reinforced this.

Although Peru’s return from a 36-year absence at the World Cup is no doubt a welcome one, they’re realistically not a better side than Australia’s most recent incarnation, irrespective of whether Paolo Guerrero plays or not.

Overall, the Socceroos have no logical reason to fear their opponents in Russia, but risk could be unnecessarily heightened through Van Marwijk’s fundamentally reactive strategy.

The overwhelming pressure that aided Postecoglou’s departure from the Australian national team was rooted in risk-aversion. Consequently, how can risk-aversion be alleviated by shifting to Van Marwijk’s tactical principles, bowing to innately flawed opposition in Russia? If at all?

It will suit the Dutchman just fine, but he will eventually be judged on his results over what could potentially be a short reign. There’s not much wrong with that in isolation, but it’s a disproportionately small sample that can impact the future direction of Australian football on a greater scale. With the latter in mind, it is hard to ignore why Van Marwijk was hired to begin with, as opposed to how.