In January, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson met with Major League Baseball (MLB) owners in Florida to discuss security threats and improving the security profile of Major League baseball stadiums around the country. Because of their visibility, infrastructure, economic impact, iconic status and with millions of Americans attending MLB games every year, continual risk assessments must be past of the continuing conversation to secure these attractions.

“There’s got to be more security than there is now. I don’t know what it will be. Everybody realizes that the world has changed and these people are never going to give up, so we have to give up some of our comforts.” -Chicago White Sox owner Jerry Reinsdorf

Secretary Johnson’s message to the owners: Recognize the new realities. In 2014, working with the Department of Homeland Security, MLB implemented new screening requirements for all 30 teams, mandating that by the 2015 season, they must screen all fans entering the stadium, either with hand-held metal detection or walk-through magnetometers. MLB spokesman Michael Teevan stated that, “this procedure, which resulted from MLB’s continuing work with the Department of Homeland Security to standardize security practices across the game, will be in addition to bag checks that are now uniform throughout MLB.”

During his recent discussion with owners, Johnson pointedly stated that Stadiums could be one hundred percent secure if Major League Baseball just implemented a few more security precautions. Now, Johnson is proposes that if MLB were to prohibit fans from bringing any bags into games, eliminate food and food service workers from the stadiums, and check the underside of cars in addition to their trunks, then the stadiums would be fully secure.

However, the challenge with Secretary Johnson’s recommendations are two-fold. First. they are not realistic. MLB cannot eliminate food and food service workers. To suggest such is almost an exercise in futility. MLB stadiums earn several hundred thousand dollars during each game through concession sales. The recommendation by Secretary Johnson highlights a glaring disconnect between government officials and the private sector. For the private sector, security cannot come at any cost. They must constantly evaluate the risk to revenue lost. Unlike the government that gets funded regardless of public sentiment, when customers are not happy, businesses’ feel it both financially and immediately.

The second problem with Secretary Johnson’s statement is that all the recommended security enhancements are external to the stadium, and does not address the human-factor. In doing so, a false sense of security is created for people that go through bag screening and metal detectors. Within stadiums, there are many instruments and tools that can be used to cause mass-violence. Inside concession stands alone, there are knives and other instruments to start fires, in addition to cleaning products and other toxic items that can be used nefariously once you clear security. The greatest threat from inside the stadium is mass panic, creating a stadium-wide evacuation. Simply pulling a fire-alarm, or screaming you have a bomb will incite panic and a disorderly evacuation. Stephen McKeever, vice president for research and technology transfer at Oklahoma State and executive director of UML stated when asked about stadium security, “The thing that occurs to me when I’m at a game is not so much the danger from a chemical attack or a shooter, it’s the danger from the panic that would ensue. That is what we must find a way to control.”

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If the MLB and DHS are serious about securing stadiums, DHS should consider developing and implementing comprehensive safety and security standards for stadiums like FIFA and several other foreign countries have done. DHS has the capability to bring experts and local officials to support a venue in preparing for a mass causality incident, but it does not require specific planning steps.

DHS however, does certify equipment and services as effective tools in fighting terrorism. Troubling though is that while DHS will certify equipment and services, it does not hold the manufacturers accountable if the equipment/service fails. “The federal government says, ‘We’re not going to mandate anything, but we will help protect manufacturers from liability,’” says Stacey Hall, associate director of National Center for Spectator Sports, Safety and Security (NCS4) and one of the nation’s leading experts on stadium security.

DHS ranks the truck bombing of a stadium as one of the 12 most devastating possible acts of terrorism; therefore you can understand the focus of their security recommendations. The reality is that there will always be public risks when large crowds of people come together. The Palestinian group Black September murdered 11 Israeli athletes and coaches and a German policeman at the Munich Olympics in 1972. During the 1996 Olympics, Eric Rudolph bombed Centennial Park in Atlanta, killing one person and injuring more than 100. The Tsarnaev brothers detonated two pressure cooker bombs at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. And most recently, in Paris, several attackers targeted the parking lot of a soccer match within the city.

Sports fans are patient, tolerant and resilient. For many, sports are pure escapism and the fans would like to keep it that way. Successful integration of security and fan experience requires DHS and MLB to find the right balance to keep fans safe but also keep the game enjoyable. That probably includes keeping concessions available during the game so we can enjoy a hot dog and beer.