Six secret authorizations have been approved by Energy Secretary Rick Perry for U.S. companies to sell nuclear energy technology and support to Saudi Arabia.

Reuters, which has seen a copy of a document explaining the authorizations, reported Wednesday night that the Trump administration is stealthily pursuing “a wider deal” on sharing American nuclear technology with the Gulf Arab nation, in a bid to beat companies in Russia, China, and South Korea for the contract.

The “Part 810” authorizations approved by Perry allow U.S. companies to do the groundwork ahead of the deal, even though Saudi Arabia has yet to sign any kind of agreement that would prohibit it from using enriched materials to build weapons.

The document, produced by the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), indicates that the approvals remain secret at the behest of the companies. These authorizations are not in the FOIA Public Reading Room, ostensibly because they included some proprietary information.

“There are now indications that they weren’t approaching this entire issue the right way…”

But prior Part 810s issued for Saudi Arabia have not been given the same secret treatment, making them available to the public.


All of this is unfolding as the House Oversight and Reform Committee looks into investigating the Trump administration’s engagement with Saudi Arabia on its plans to build a nuclear reactor. Additionally, the Government Accountability Office, has agreed to start investigating the Trump administration’s nuclear negotiations with Saudi Arabia. The probe is being done at the request of Sens. Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Bob Menendez (D-NJ).

Lawmakers have an increasingly dim view of Saudi Arabia, in large part due to its role in the death of dissident Saudi journalist and U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018. (It is unclear whether the authorizations were made after Khashoggi’s killing, according to Reuters). While the kingdom continues to spend its way into an ever-closer relationship with the Trump administration, Congress has also expressed concerns over Saudi’s increasingly deadly role in Yemen’s civil war.

The Saudis want to build nuclear reactors without signing on to a 123 Agreement, as well as added protections — safeguards to ensure that materials from the power reactors would not be diverted into a weapons program. Signing the 123 Agreement is the bare minimum, under U.S. law, for a U.S. company to be able to sell or transfer nuclear technology to a foreign government or company.

Westinghouse Electric Co. is one of several companies that has bid to build the AP1000 reactors in Saudi Arabia. The company was purchased in January 2018 by Brookfield Business Partners, which bailed Jared Kushner’s family out of a bad real estate deal in August of that year.

The 123 Agreement and added protocols are supposed to be based in nonproliferation policy rather than commercial interest. The Trump administration is all about commercial interest, and the openly transactional nature of the Trump White House, coupled with an extra-close relationship with Saudi Arabia, are in part what prompted the House Oversight report in February.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman caused a stir when he told CBS last year that his country would pursue nuclear weapons if they thought Iran was doing the same. (Iran’s energy program has been subject to regular inspections. It does not have a nuclear weapons program.)


While it’s “absolutely normal” for the DOE to use the Part 810s without a 123 Agreement in place, said Richard Nephew, former director for Iran on the National Security Council, there’s an “air of inappropriateness that is hovering around the Administration’s dealings with Saudi on nuclear grounds.”

“And, I have to say, as someone who believes we ought to negotiate a 123 with Saudi and that we ought to have a civil nuclear relationship with them, this makes me really frustrated, as they’re tainting something that ought to be a commonly held strategic interest,” he added.

Nephew also said these authorizations make him feel “uneasy,” “nervous,” and “suspicious” because “there are now indications that they [the administration] weren’t approaching this entire issue the right way … it suggests an attempt to end run the 123 Agreement.”

Thomas Countryman, former assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, said that it’s unlikely that the Part 810s would allow for “any sensitive information that could potentially be useful if Saudi Arabia later chose to pursue nuclear weapons.”

But, he added, answering questions via email, that “It does seems clear that the Administration has not acted consistently with either the spirit or the letter of the Atomic Energy Act, in failing to notify the Congress of the 810 approvals, and failing to brief Congress on the course of the 123 negotiations with Saudi Arabia.”

The unusual level of secrecy surrounding these approvals, said Countryman, “will only add to Congress’ suspicion of the intentions of both the Administration and of Saudi Arabia.” Any deal with the Saudis, he said, should be achieved “through transparency and not through secrecy.”

Perry an “unwise” choice

The secret authorizations are not the only things that are somewhat unorthodox about the negotiations. One question worth asking is, why is Rick Perry negotiating this deal?


Signing a 123 Agreement falls under the auspices of the State Department (though other agencies, including the DoE, are involved).

Perry has been promoting the Westinghouse bid while also making a number of trips to Saudi Arabia in order to get the Gulf Arab Kingdom to sign on to 123 and added protections.