A major complication when it comes to Liberal Democrats thinking about cooperation with Labour, of course, is Europe. As Tom Brake forcefully argued when defending the Liberal Democrat decision to stand in Copeland, the Labour Party’s continued dalliance with Brexit and unwillingness to oppose strongly Theresa May over Article 50 is a major obstacle to cooperation between the parties. Moreover, the most pro-European Labour MPs are also often those with the the strongest record of support for New Labour, authoritarian streak on civil liberties and all. Finding common ground is much harder than it was for Labour rebels when first the SDP was formed and then the Alliance struck with the Liberals in the early 1980s. Yet Europe, both the issue itself and the wider set of values behind Brexit and Remain viewpoints, is the most likely fulcrum we have had for a very long time around which British politics could be restructured. The Liberal Democrats are not quite united on Europe, with both Greg Mulholland and Norman Lamb deciding to buck the party’s official hard line against Hard Brexit. It is notable, though, how few Lib Dems members outside their two constituencies were supportive of their decisions in the widespread online discussions that followed. Party members rightly understand the important of the party have a simple, clear position on what will be the defining issue of this political generation and one which may yet, for all the complications already mentioned, trigger a significant political realignment. In reacting to, or even helping trigger, such a realignment, it’s worth remembering the key lesson from the past. Deals over candidates take the most effort and attract the most attention. But the evidence is that more informal methods of cross-party cooperation are usually more effective as Duncan Brack set out in his excellent recent chapter for The Alternative: What lessons can we draw for the future from the experience of the Project? There are (at least) six. First, don’t talk about coalition, even if that’s what you have in mind. The target seat polling from 1997 showed that those who had voted Tory in 1992 would be frightened back to their original party if they thought Labour and the Liberal Democrats were ganging up in advance of the election. This is strongly reinforced by the experience of the 2015 election, when the prospect of a Labour government in coalition with, or supported by, the SNP proved deeply unpopular (though not quite as unpopular as the Liberal Democrats’ apparent willingness to join a coalition with almost anyone). Second, it is nevertheless worth exploring the potential for pre-election cooperation over specific areas of policy. The most obvious is constitutional reform, along the lines of the Cook–Maclennan agreement or, more ambitiously, the Scottish Constitutional Convention of 1989–95. The gross distortions of the 2015 election result, where it took 34,000 votes to elect a Conservative MP, 302,000 to elect a Liberal Democrat and 3.9 million to elect a Ukip MP, makes a strong case for electoral reform in particular. Voters do not tend to get excited about these kind of issues, however, so the state of public services, particularly the NHS, could be another possible topic – the evidence suggests that voters like the idea of politicians setting aside party differences to work together (though the fact that that’s what coalitions do seems to have eluded them). Third, do everything you can to maximise tactical voting, which is a rational response to the distortions of the first-past-the-post electoral system. This will probably be more effective if it is promoted from outside the parties, as in the Mirror piece in 1997. In 2020 there should be extensive potential for arranging vote swapping via social media. Parties’ campaigning resources – which, with the much greater use of telephone canvassing, are now more centralised than in 1997 – can also be deployed to avoid attacking each other, at least up to a point. Fourth, either keep it all as quiet as you can – or be as open as you can. Some party activists are open to cooperation – and it is of course widespread in local government – but many are not. Journalists often like to look down on party members as ‘tribal’, but another way to put this is that they are loyal, to their beliefs and their colleagues. Most party activists will spend their entire political careers delivering leaflets, raising money and knocking on doors without ever being elected to anything, and without realising any personal financial benefit. Belief in the cause is what keeps them going, and naturally they will not be well disposed to giving up their efforts to see another party’s candidate elected. So, either don’t tell them, or as be as open as you can, explaining what’s going on and what the benefits are. The Blair–Ashdown Project is an example of the former approach; in retrospect it is remarkable how little of what was going on leaked to the outside world. The overwhelming vote at the Liberal Democrat special conference in May 2010 to enter coalition with the Conservatives is an example of the latter, showing that reasoned argument can convince activists to work with other parties in the national interest. Fifth, none of this will work unless the personal relationships between the key individuals involved are very good – they have to trust each other to work together and stick to their side of the deal. The Project would never have happened without the rapport that Ashdown and Blair built up over several years of dinners and discussions. Finally, be clear what you want the outcome to be: a coalition, a confidence and supply arrangement, an agreement to reform the voting system and then call another election, or something else. And despite all the difficulties, never forget the reason: to avoid the 21st century seeing another succession of Tory victories on ever-diminishing shares of the vote.