Amrita Jash is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for East Asian Studies (Chinese Studies), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-India. She is the Editor-in-Chief at IndraStra Global, New York.

Abstract

In recent years, China’s relations with Japan have worsened, causing unresolved historical issues. China retains a deep sense of humiliation and an anger from the suffering caused by Japan. The memories have constructed a ‘fear of revival of Japanese militarism’, as witnessed in the growing anti-Japanese sentiments, as well as China’s rapidly expanding economy and military strength over time. Going beyond the rational logic, China’s current behaviour towards Japan is deeply embedded in historical memories. That is, the burden of historical consciousness overshadows China’s present as well as future relations with Japan. In this view, the paper argues that China’s relations with Japan is regulated by the logic of historical consciousness and national identity, driven from past experiences.

Keywords: China, Japan, historical memories, identity

Why China Reacts to Japan?

In September 2012, thousands of Chinese in Beijing marched to the Japanese Embassy to protest against the recent decision by the Japanese government to buy the islands, known as the Diaoyu in Chinese and the Senkaku in Japanese, from their private Japanese owners. The emotional crowd chanted anti-Japanese slogans and ransacked Japanese businesses, smashed Japanese cars and pelted stones at the buildings of the embassy compound and others. The protest soon spread nation-wide, making it the first such large scale anti-Japanese demonstrations after the Tiananmen incident of 1989 and the 2005 anti-Japanese protests over the Japanese history textbook revision. With this, China-Japan relations hit the lowest point since 1972, when the two countries restored diplomatic ties.

Though these anti-Japanese sentiments do not come as a surprise given the rise of public opinion and nationalist fervour with regard to Japan in the recent years, the irony lies in the fact that China’s anti-Japanese sentiments stand in sharp contrast to the strengthening economic relations between the two countries. The China-Japan economic partnership is one of the largest in the world as the bilateral trade relationship ranks the third- largest in the world. China is now Japan’s largest trading partner, accounting for one-fifth of its trade, and Japan is China’s second-largest. In addition, Japan is the largest investor in China, with a stock of direct investment at more than US$100 billion in 2014 or US$30 billion more than the next largest source, the United States. But, these burgeoning statistics have failed to tap the full potential or reach a mature, stable relationship maturity and stability decades after the turbulence of World War II. That is, the economic relationship has not succeeded in alleviating the tensions and rivalry between China and Japan.

What is noteworthy is that in the last two decades, China’s perception of Japan has significantly worsened. Wherein, the ongoing territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea has critically plagued the bilateral relationship, furthering the nationalist quotient between the two countries. There exists a perceptual gap of positive economic and political developments to that of negative sentiments of China vis-a-vis Japan. Therefore, it is difficult to explain the state of perplexity in China’s relations with Japan. It is uncertain if this animosity can be interpreted from the optic of national interest in terms of material forces. One can ask if China’s response to Japan runs deeper, where the minds and hearts of the Chinese people play a vital role in defining the growing asymmetry and political instability in the relationship. In finding the rationale, the paper argues that it is the historical memories, wherein the Chinese mind conjures up images of Japanese atrocities during World War II – which has constructed China’s ‘self’ identity against the Japanese ‘other’. As China’s official position to any action of Japan calls for “taking history as the mirror and facing forward to the future” – reflecting the historical consciousness of the tragic past. Therefore, the paper addresses the seldom asked question of how identity affects China’s relations with Japan, causing the ‘animosity’ in the relations.

Historical Memories of Japan in Chinese Psyche

The anti-Japanese demonstrations in China strongly highlight the historical consciousness of China towards Japan, bringing to the forefront the inherent tensions of historical issues in China-Japan relations. For China, the brutal memories of Japan as the puppet state of Manchukuo, the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women issues, war reparations, biological warfare units, and others – create the prejudices that contribute to the present ‘trust deficit’. The antagonistic sentiments against Japan are largely witnessed in terms of revision of history textbooks, Japanese high-level visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and Dioayu/Senkaku islands dispute reflecting the ‘conditioned reflex’ of Chinese to Japanese actions. The Chinese reactions to these issues clarify that the emotional response is because the people of China connect the current events with historical grievances. That is, any act on part of Japan reactivates the Chinese memory of the wars and invasions that this country has suffered many years ago. China has strongly reacted – a “knee-jerk response”, as Allen S. Whiting once put it – to any perceived “revival” of Japanese imperialist ideology or symbols.

What seems to be true is that for China, the brutal war and this part of history in relation to Japan, have left many sensitive historical symbols, which gets reactivated deliberately or unintentionally, creating a discord in China’s attitude towards Japan. This fundamental reason helps to explain as to why the bilateral relations have always been fragile and dangerous even after decades of normalisation. It is because the historical issues and interpretations of the past pose a major barrier for China to reconcile with Japan. And what makes these memories so strong in the current context of China’s relations with Japan, can be argued in three ways.

First, the primordialist view, which argues that “centuries of accumulated hatreds” are behind much present-day violence of China-Japan relationship. In this view, from the Chinese side the problem does not just date from the Eight Year War but from 1895 (large indemnity, loss of Taiwan) . The Chinese concerns are rooted in their deep distrust of the Japanese, which is dominated by the historical legacy of Japanese imperialism and occupation. It is found in China’s anxiety over Japan’s significant military capabilities and its alliance with the United States that keeps the Chinese primordial beliefs of Japan intact, making the past relevant to the contemporary perspectives of what Japan represents today.

Second, the instrumentalist view claims that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strategically and rationally uses the history of Japanese imperialist aggression to gain political and economic concessions. This point can be validated in two ways: First, history is used to take advantage of Japan’s war guilt and draw out political concessions from Tokyo. And, secondly, it is utilized by the Chinese government to take a strong stance against Japan, thus, presenting itself as a patriotic force and enhancing its claim to legitimacy. For instance, China’s anti-Japanese protest in the post-1982 textbook controversy is argued on the grounds that the Chinese Government found the textbook controversy as a convenient lever to bring the Japanese government to heel, in which it was largely successful. What makes history dominant in China’s policies towards Japan is that the Chinese government does not just use history as a card against Japan, but largely as part of patriotic education for domestic consumption. Memories of the negative history is linked to factional politics, as the elites utilize memories of Japan’s imperialist aggression to “coalesce support and weaken opponents”. For instance, historical sites of Japanese aggression were utilized by the Chinese Communist Party leaders in their ‘patriotic education campaign’ which aimed at strengthening the regime’s claims to power. Therefore, in China it is a common wisdom that patriotism- often in the form of anti-Japanese nationalism- is intrinsically linked to the government’s legitimacy in China.

Third, the constructivist view argues that China and Japan perceive their relations in the background of their shared historical experience, wherein “the past is reconstructed with regard to the concerns and needs of the present”. In this view, the discourse of the Chinese on Japan is clearly shaped by their “shared historical experience.” This makes history an important factor in current security relations because many issues are handled against the context of historical experience, and the security relationship is especially “sensitive to perceptions of intentions and to manipulations of these perceptions.” The logic is grounded in China’s profound distrust in Japan for various reasons, but mainly due to the dissatisfaction over how Japan has handled certain historical issues. As a result, even though Japan is a weaker military power than the United States, Japan seems to be trusted less and more disliked than the United States in the eyes of China. That is, the memories of the tragic past has constructed China’s national consciousness, making Japan a threat- creating a nationalist rhetoric from past that vilifies Japan in the present.

Perception and Identity: China’s ‘Self’ versus Japanese ‘Other’

Historical analogies play a vital role in political decision making. That is, people make sense of new situations by comparing them to older situations already stored in their memories. Where, history profoundly influences the perception they have of the world around them as memories act as important information processors. In this way, historical memory influences an actor’s interpretation and understanding of the external world and specific situations, and it often leads actors to endow a group with certain motives and to interpret the world through frames defined in part by those motives. Similarly, in the case of China, the memories of the past have constructed their collective national identity. Given this, it can be argued that what lies at the core of China’s identity of the ‘Self’ is directly related to China’s encounters with the western and later Japanese ‘Others’. Therefore, for China, the historical memory of a ‘victim’ has constructed the identity of a ‘victimized state’ – which plays a crucial role in determining Chinese psyche in foreign policy. It is argued that Japan’s emergence as an ‘Other’ in China’s identity is a by-product of China’s attempts to assert its ‘victimhood’ and regain its social and moral legitimacy within an international society.

In this process of China’s identity formation, what makes Japan more significant over other foreign invaders is that, China did not adjust its image of Japan by recategorizing Japan as a waiguoren (foreigner) state, rather it perceived itself as an “un-Japanese” state”. That is, China’s historical consciousness of Japan’s aggression during 1931-1945 serve as the common link of collective post war identity among Chinese, that distinguishes them from the Japanese ‘Other’. The ‘othering’ of Japan plays a strong role as it gives a positive thrust to China’s identity against Japan. This clash of identities is the prime factor that constrains the present relations. This argument stands valid as China’s economic relations with Japan has failed to heal the wounds of its past, rather with time China has become more assertive in claiming the wounds suffered in the past. Here, the clash lies in China’s identity of self as the “victim” against the construction of Japan as the “victimizing Other”.

Given this identity clash, what dominates Chinese perception is the “potential resurgence of Japanese militarism” , as witnessed in case of Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute, Taiwan and others- which reflects that wartime history has become a leading factor in China’s Japan policy. It can be strongly argued that the present Chinese perception of Japan is strongly shaped by memories which stem from past Japanese aggression. This can be said so, as the central causal factor is the deep distrust, misunderstanding and dislike which is triggered by the historical memory creating cognitive biases in China’s behaviour towards Japan in the present times. The image of Japan as a “modern, friendly neighbour” that was formed in the 1980s quickly gave way to that of a remorseless, vexatious, and stubborn “small man” that is still defined in the early 21st century by its wartime history of aggression against China.

The distrustful image of Japan results into a ‘constructed fear’ as many Chinese fear that an unrepentant Japan is bound to repeat its past aggression, echoing the widespread historical deterministic idea of many Chinese that a country that does not acknowledge past misdeeds “correctly” is bound to repeat them. This makes the beliefs about the shared past matter for the perception of threat in the present and future foreign policy preferences, as the empirical findings suggest that “security and insecurity in Northeast Asia are not just a question of the balance of economic and military power in the region, but also hinges on the impact that beliefs about the shared past has on the perception of threat”. In this regard, Chinese perceptions and beliefs about the Japan threat, based on the events of history, impacts China’s present behaviour towards Japan.

Conclusion

In an overall assessment, it stands validated that in China’s relations with Japan, historical memories act as the key driving force that shapes and constrains China’s behaviour and policies towards Japan. For China’s memory driven perception of a distrustful and aggressive Japan make the relations more fragile, impeding the process of reconciliation. This spiraling of an inherent suspicion over Japan’s intentions and motives significantly impact China’s attitude- leaving no space for a positive perception of Japan. In this view, it can be rightly concluded that if China’s current identity is constructed from the past atrocities of Japan, then it becomes a truism, that its future interpretation of every act of Japan will be drawn from the historical prism. Therefore, in China’s relations with Japan, history is not just a matter of the past, but a key variable that defines the present and future of this relationship. That is, China’s Japan policy goes beyond the fixed contours of national interest, as it is more connected to the conscience of national memory and identity.

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Amrita Jash is a Doctoral Candidate at the Centre for East Asian Studies (Chinese Studies), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-India. She is the Editor-in-Chief at IndraStra Global, New York. She can be reached at: www.amritajash.in or ajash108@gmail.com.

Endnotes