Saudi leaders’ faith in a military approach to Iran is also linked to their lack of faith that Iran will keep any nuclear deal. But if the Lausanne framework does not produce a final agreement, the United States and its allies will have little choice but to intensify economic sanctions on Iran. And that would sharpen the threat to the Arab states by stiffening Iran’s resolve to hasten its nuclear development and resist monitoring. In other words, the Arab strategy would shorten the time Iran needed for breakout — not just to a bomb, but to an arsenal.

Contrary to some fears, nuclear war would not be the most likely outcome of an Iranian breakout, even if it pushed Saudi Arabia or Egypt to pursue bomb capacity themselves. Israeli and Arab rulers understand that the Middle East is more likely to settle into a “nuclear peace” like the Cold War — rivalry pursued through asymmetric warfare by or against proxy armies. In that game, Iran already has the advantage of experience and a long reach.

Indeed, Iran spends far less on its military than Israel, Turkey or the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies, and a vast technological gap separates its conventional weapons from those of its rivals. But Iran makes up for that with a network of irregular fighters and armed militias trained, financed and managed by its Revolutionary Guards. That is what lets Iran menace Israel on its borders, keep the Assad regime afloat in Syria, help Iraq fight the Islamic State and sustain rebellion in Yemen. And Iran would, indeed, be even freer to do so if it had a nuclear bomb.

The logical conclusion, then, is to use whatever time can be mustered now to shore up the economic vitality and political unity of the Arab countries while Iran is seeking readmission to the global economy. In that way, the Middle East countries could reduce drastically Iran’s opportunities to meddle in their internal politics. This is not just theory. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union, despite its huge conventional military, was held at bay in Western Europe not only by American nuclear weapons, but also by the strength of Western Europe’s economy and political systems.

The deal that the United States and its partners have outlined with Iran would not eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. But it would allow the rest of the Middle East an opportunity to fortify itself with a new political order. And that goal is what the Arab states, allied with America, must devote themselves to, once a near-term breakout by Iran has been taken off the table in a final nuclear deal.

Vali R. Nasr, the dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is the author of “The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat.”