Introduction

We consider the model of national parties which form flimsy alliances at the level of the European Parliament to be obsolete. While the fight for democracy-from below (at the local, regional or national levels) is necessary, it is nevertheless insufficient if it is conducted without an internationalist strategy toward a pan-European coalition for democratising Europe. European democrats must come together first, forge a common agenda, and then find ways of connecting it with local communities and at the regional and national level.

From the day DiEM25 was inaugurated in Berlin, in February 2016, we have been saying that we have no urge to contest elections, in the daily hustle of what passes for “politics”. We would rather continue in our chosen areas of activism, while supporting existing progressive political parties./big>

Alas, Europe’s crisis and slow descent into a quagmire of incompetent authoritarianism does not give us the right to do so. The window for us to effect change is closing and this has become even more pressing after the recent German election, which killed off the last remaining hope for a federalist democratic push by Macron and Merkel. Time is running short. If DiEM25 is to make any impact on the 2019 pan-European (EP) elections; if our movement really wants to act before Europe disintegrates; if we want to redress climate change or the dominance of xenophobia before it is too late… we must decide soon.

In our first year, DiEM25 worked hard to generate a Progressive Policy Agenda for Europe. One that would confront head-on “Euro-TINA”, the toxic belief that there can be no alternative in the EU. At our Rome event on March 25, 2017, we introduced our European New Deal (END) a strong answer to the question: “What should be done?” On that occasion, we promised to turn immediately on the next question: “Who should do it?”

We need to seize every opportunity available to us. This is especially important for our ‘European New Deal’ economic agenda – our proposals to (a) stabilise the Eurozone by measures that can be implemented without treaty changes or new institutions, and (b) forge closer integration with other European countries either in the EU (but not in the Eurozone) or in the periphery of the EU (or moving out of the EU, e.g. the UK).