If there are few iron-clad laws of international politics, surely one is that what happens in the powerful countries has major impacts upon their smaller, weaker neighbours. The election due to take place in the United Kingdom on Thursday will have almost as much impact upon Ireland as any election we have here. What is at stake, first and foremost, is the type of Brexit the United Kingdom commits to. A complete break with Europe, for example, could lead to tens of thousands of job losses in Ireland and could reinstate a border on the island where none has existed for decades. Also at stake is the peace process in Northern Ireland, where the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein have become deadlocked in talks to resume the power sharing Stormont Executive and where nationalist parties (Sinn Fein, SDLP) have renewed their calls for a referendum on Irish unity (a vote that could simultaneously unite Ireland and kick off a violent Unionist insurgency). The electorate in Britain will, of course, consider none of this. However, the make-up of the government they elect will significantly impact upon the course of events here in Ireland.

Despite a handful of polls indicating Labour are only a few percentage points behind the Conservatives, most polls indicate a strong Conservative majority. As such, a Corbyn government looks incredibly unlikely. That being said, there is a small (okay, very small) chance of a hung parliament where the combined seat totals for Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, the Green party and any other tiny party that might add a couple of seats into the mix (SDLP for instance?) could form a majority in parliament. This would be the “coalition of chaos” that Theresa May has been scaremongering about. Unlikely as it is, what impacts would such a government have on Ireland?

The “coalition of chaos” government would very probably result in a much softer Brexit. True, Labour has committed to following through on Brexit and extricating the UK from the EU. Corbyn himself, though he campaigned against Brexit, is probably opposed to the EU for his own ideological reasons. Nonetheless, Labour has set out a softer Brexit negotiating stance, for example guaranteeing the rights of EU nationals to stay in UK – something which Irish people would benefit from immensely. They have promised to prioritise access to the single market and the customs union. Labour, apparently less stringent on immigration, might be willing to accept some level of free movement of people to achieve this. Free movement of people and British access to the EU markets would remove the two single biggest hurdles to an open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic.

If Labour would somewhat soften the British position on Brexit, its coalition partners would do so even more. For the Lib Dems to join a coalition with Labour, their key pledge of a second referendum may have to be acceded to. Accordingly, once negotiations with the EU are finished, Britain under a Corbyn government may well be facing another referendum on EU membership. In this scenario, Brexit could yet be rolled back and Ireland might be spared the economic disasters we are facing into.

If Brexit does go ahead under Corbyn as PM than we are almost certain to see a second referendum on Scottish independence as it is likely that this would be an essential prerequisite for SNP participation in any coalition. This could have huge implications for Northern Ireland. A successful Scottish exit from the UK combined with the growing realisation of the practicalities of a Northern Ireland exit from the EU would only increase calls for a border poll on Irish unification. Would Prime Minister Jeremy Corbyn, a man who had previously expressed support for a united Ireland, stand in the way of such a vote?

Of course, all of this is speculation. Indeed, it’s speculation about a turn of events that seems very unlikely to come to pass. Probably the best Labour can hope to achieve is to get enough support to deprive Theresa May of the majority she seeks. If the Conservatives fall short of a majority, say by about 5 or 6 seats, to whom does Theresa May turn?

After the 2010 election, David Cameron’s conservatives fell short of an overall majority and turned to the Liberal Democrats to form a government. In the event of a hung parliament this time around, Theresa May will not have this avenue open to her. The pro-Europe Lib Dems will surely not form a coalition with the Hard Brexit Conservatives, and with most other parties explicitly campaigning on an anti-Tory platform, May will have few choices of coalition partners. The obvious (perhaps only) option is the Democratic Unionist Party. There are many ways such a coalition would impact on Ireland. Firstly, it would make a power-sharing agreement with Sinn Fein very unlikely in Northern Ireland. The DUP would be emboldened by being in power and their desire to compromise would be even less than it is today. Furthermore, they could pursue policy at a national (i.e. Westminster) government level rather than locally and (with a Conservative party held hostage to their whims) they could implement more of their agenda under a direct rule government than they could as part of a power sharing agreement with Sinn Fein. There would be absolutely zero chance of a border poll on Irish unification under this scenario.

What such a coalition would mean for the type of Brexit Ireland would face is a little less clear. On the one hand, the DUP campaigned for Brexit and at face value are of the hard Brexit persuasion. Furthermore, as staunch Unionists they may see Brexit as a chance to roll back on some of the North-South integration that European membership has afforded to Ireland. On the other hand, these people must face their own electorates and if there is one area of the UK where Brexit will hit the worst it is Northern Ireland. As a result, there exists an electoral motivation to lessen the impact of a hard Brexit on Northern Ireland (i.e. they could press for a soft border, a common travel area, a special status for Northern Ireland in the EU and UK). What is certain about such a coalition is that even with the votes of the DUP, Theresa May’s majority would be thin enough to ensure that she still relies on the hard Brexiteers of her party, making the type of soft Brexit that would lessen the economic harm on Ireland less likely.

This would be the same effect as an overall Conservative majority but one which is similar in size to the current government. At present, Theresa May’s small majority in Parliament means that she is reliant on those in her party who favour a complete break with the EU. With the current rhetoric that May is espousing it is easy to forget that she comes from the wing of the party that was in favour of remaining in the EU. With a Tory press dominated by calls for a hard Brexit, an electorate that has in recent years shifted significantly to the right (giving substantial support to UKIP) and a Conservative party that, in the wake of the referendum, has come to be dominated by hard Brexiteers, it is understandable that she now campaigns along “Brexit means Brexit” lines. With a similarly slim Conservative majority after this election, her freedom to pursue a more conciliatory negotiation policy with Europe will be limited. Brexit will continue to mean Brexit and the likelihood of severe consequences for Irelands economic future are increased.

Conversely, a massive Conservative victory leading to a majority of 50 plus seats would potentially give her much more manoeuvrability in terms of seeking a deal with the EU. It is in this scenario that we would get to see the real Theresa May. Will we get Theresa May the remainer, a woman who, with her new-found freedom, is able to negotiate a deal that leaves the UK still significantly integrated with the EU, albeit less formally. Or will she use her new mandate to drive home the cold reality of a United Kingdom decisively placed outside of the EU? Under the first option, Ireland faces significantly less economic turmoil with the possibility of a soft border remaining strong and questions of Irish unity less pertinent. Under the second option, Ireland faces major economic turmoil, a hard border and the eventual possibility of a vote on unification that could turn out to be transformative yet destructive.