Analysis: Liverpool

Jurgen Klopp set Liverpool up in a 4-3-3 formation, with Fabinho, Georginio Wijnaldum and Naby Keita forming a midfield three behind Sadio Mane, Roberto Firmino and Mo Salah. Liverpool sought to dominate possession and play vertically into the forwards’ feet where possible.

They achieved success in the initial phases by creating overloads around the first line of United’s press – particularly through Fabinho – to ensure a clean build. Upon breaking the first line, Liverpool would look to drop Firmino from the top line to create an extra man in midfield; they often then pushed Keita into the newly created space to discourage United defenders from dropping with the Brazilian.

Once Liverpool had the ball in more advanced areas, they would look to drop Mane or Salah five yards or so. Their markers would track them on an individual basis, which pulled United’s defensive line around and opened up the opportunity for combinations – a strategy that Liverpool tried but failed to properly ex-ploit. While Liverpool managed to register 36 attempts at goal over the 90 minutes – a season high in the Premier League – very few of them were clear-cut chances.

The second-half introduction of Xherdan Shaqiri for Keita added more creative quality to the attacking midfield area, and he would regularly position himself between the lines to receive the ball. Crucially, he would hover back as the play progressed outside and ahead of him, and look to arrive late at the edge of the area. This was a tactic that proved decisive in the game, as these movements were central to both of the Swiss international’s goals, albeit both were also helped by deflections as Liverpool reclaimed top spot from Manchester City

Out of possession, the Reds would press in their 4-3-3 shape and try to show United out wide. The press would usually be led by the forwards, although Keita quite often joined the front line while Mane tucked in to midfield on the other side. Importantly, the players around and away from the ball would all be on the front foot and ready to apply the next wave of pressure should the line in front be beaten. Centre-backs Virgil van Dijk and Dejan Lovren would also be on the front foot and ready to step in front of their men if the ball was played into feet, as well as being in a position to compete for aerial balls.

The most important element of Liverpool’s out-of-possession work was their counter-press, which was immediate and intense. This pressure forced United into rushing their passes, which usually went long anyway but were now more inaccurate due to the level of pressure on the player in possession. Should the counter-press be unavailable, then the Liverpool players would recover quickly back towards their goal, but also try to crowd the man with the ball and block off any passing lanes forwards.