Flight IR451 arrived at Bandar Abbas (BND) from Tehran (THR) at 08:40. The Airbus A300 was to continue to Dubai (DXB) as flight IR655. Prior to departure the crew received an enroute clearance to Dubai via the flight planned route A59 and A59W at FL140. The flight took off from runway 21 at 10:17 hours and climbed straight ahead.

Two minutes later, the crew reported leaving 3500 feet for FL140 on Airway A59, estimating MOBET at 06:53 UTC (10:23 Iran time). At 10:24:00 the aircraft passed MOBET out of FL120. At 10:24:43 two Airbus was hit by surface-to-air missiles. The tail and one wing broke off as a result of the explosions. Control was lost and the aircraft crashed into the sea.

The missiles were fired by the US Navy cruiser USS Vincennes. It was operating in the area together with the frigates USS Elmer Montgommery and USS John H. Sides. They were to protect other ships in the area.

At about the time the Airbus took off, the radar aboard the USS Vincennes picked up a brief IFF mode 2 response, which led to the mistaken identification of the Airbus as a hostile F-14 aircraft. The USS Vincennes issued 7 challenges on the Military Air Distress (MAD) frequency 243 MHz, addressed to 'Iranian aircraft', 'Iranian fighter' or 'Iranian F-14'. These messages were followed by three challenges on the IAD (International Air Defence) radio frequency.

Due to increasing tension in the area - on May 17, 1987 an Iraqi Mirage had attacked USS Stark - all aircraft in the area had to monitor 121.5 Mhz: the International Air Defence - IAD radio frequency. There was no response.

Meanwhile radar operators were monitoring the Aegis screens. They reported that the incoming plane was descending with an increasing speed. In fact, the Airbus was climbing. Considering itself and USS Montgomery under aggression, USS Vincennes took the ultimate decision to launch missiles against the perceived hostile target at 10:24:22.

It remains uncertain whether the IR655 flight crew (only able to monitor the IAD, not the MAD frequencies) would have been able to rapidly identify their flight as the subject of the challenges made by the USS Vincennes.

Probable Cause:

CAUSES: "The aircraft was perceived as a military aircraft with hostile intentions and was destroyed by two surface-to-air missiles ."

Accident investigation:

Investigating agency: ICAO Status: Investigation completed Download report: Final report

Classification:

Sources:

» ICAO Adrep Summary 3/88 (#1)» ICAO Circular 260-AN/154 (27-51)

Follow-up / safety actions

ICAO issued 8 Safety Recommendations

Issued: -- To: EP-IBU (1) a) Military forces should, initially through their appropriate State authorities, liaise with States and ATS units in the area concerned. Issued: -- To: EP-IBU (2) b) Military forces should be fully informed on the extent of all promulgated routes, types of airspace, and relevant regulations and restrictions. Issued: -- To: EP-IBU (3) c) Advance information on scheduled civil flights should be made available to military units including the allocated SSR mode A codes when available. Issued: -- To: EP-IBU (4) d) Direct comunicstions between military units and the appropriate ATS units, not using regular ATC or the emergency frequencies, should be established for the exchange of real time flight progress information, delays and information on non-scheduled flights. Issued: -- To: EP-IBU (5) e) Military units should be equipped to monitor appropriate ATC frequencies to enable them to identify radar contacts without comunication. Issued: -- To: EP-IBU (6) f) If challenges by military units on the emergency frequency 121,5 Mhz become inevitable, these should follow an agreed message format with content operationally meaningful to civil pilots. Issued: -- To: EP-IBU (7) g) In areas where such military activities occur, infomation necessary for the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation should be promulgated in a suitable form. The information should contain the type of challenges that might be transmitted, and should include instructions to pilots of civil aircraft to monitor the emergency frequency 121.5 MHz. Issued: -- To: EP-IBU (8) h) To assist identification by electronic emissions, pilots of civil aircraft should ensure continuous operation of airborne weather radars and radio altimeters. Show all... ICAO issued 8 Safety Recommendations

Photos



accident date:

type: Airbus A300B2-203

registration: EP-IBU accident date:type: Airbus A300B2-203registration: EP-IBU

Books

Map

not display the exact flight path.

Distance from Bandar Abbas Airport to Dubai Airport as the crow flies is 239 km (149 miles).

Accident location: Exact; as reported in the official accident report. This map shows the airport of departure and the intended destination of the flight. The line between the airports doesdisplay the exact flight path.Distance from Bandar Abbas Airport to Dubai Airport as the crow flies is 239 km (149 miles).Accident location: Exact; as reported in the official accident report.

This information is not presented as the Flight Safety Foundation or the Aviation Safety Networks opinion as to the cause of the accident. It is preliminary and is based on the facts as they are known at this time.