Will Pakistan’s elected representatives now pressure the Supreme Court to hold Generals to account?

Perhaps, the most important observation regarding the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s dismissal of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his disqualification from all future public office — on grounds which seem to be based on him holding an iqama (work permit) from a Dubai-based company — is that a former President of Pakistan, former Chief of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf (retd), who has been accused of treason against the state of Pakistan and is under trial, was allowed to leave the country through a deal cut by the military, and has been declared by the courts to be an “absconder” and lives in ostentatious comfort in his apartments in London and Dubai.

The verdict was based on the fact that Mr. Sharif did not disclose asset details of the UAE-based Capital FZE company, from which he received some income, while filing nomination papers for the elections and hence filed false declarations.

Lawyers and jurists have already started discussing the nature of the Supreme Court judgment and the implications for other Members of Parliament, including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) chief Imran Khan, a prime ministerial aspirant who also supposedly has offshore investments. With Mr. Sharif’s resignation, while Parliament still stands, the Federal Cabinet no longer exists and Pakistan has no Prime Minister, and even has no government.

What’s different?

Of course, this is not the first time such events have taken place in Pakistan. Since 1971, except for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who himself called early elections, no elected Prime Minister has had a full five-year term. In the past, when the Prime Minister was dismissed, Parliament was also dissolved. Not so this time, much like the disqualification of former Pakistan Peoples Party Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, the Prime Minister following the 2008 elections after Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. Yet, things are different today compared with the more distant or even recent past.

Three things are evident now, which are different from the past. One, that democracy — despite this disqualification of the Prime Minister — is much stronger in Pakistan than it has ever been.

The disqualification of Mr. Sharif was instigated by elected representatives, particularly Mr. Khan. It was the PTI leader’s efforts which brought constant pressure upon the Election Commission of Pakistan and the Supreme Court to examine allegations — now proven, it seems — against the Prime Minister.

If the transition to replace Mr. Sharif goes smoothly and Parliament still functions, albeit differently, democratisation will gather stronger roots in Pakistan.

The second major change has been the proactive role of the Supreme Court following the lawyers’ movement of 2007. Perhaps, finally, the superior judges have undone their past record and become far more independent than ever before, and taken decisions which they believe are based on fact, on the law, and in the public interest. Finally, and most importantly, perhaps for the first time since 1977, the military may not have been involved in the dismissal of a Prime Minister.

Mr. Sharif’s party won the most seats and the most votes in the 2013 elections and is still very popular, in fact more than people anticipate. His brother is still the Chief Minister of Punjab province, and whoever rules Punjab rules Pakistan. The many politicians who hope to replace Mr. Sharif in the immediate present, or whenever elections take place, might still have a long wait. In fact, the court’s decision, which they celebrate at this juncture, might just come back to bite them instead. Mr. Sharif might have been removed as Prime Minister, but his popularity and public presence will still endure. Victimhood and martyrdom dominate Pakistan’s politics.

It works both ways

One final point worth emphasising is that given this dismissal of an elected Prime Minister who was held accountable for not declaring his assets and income by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, perhaps elected civilian representatives can gain the confidence to pressure the same court to hold accountable the numerous military generals and officials who have done the same, and much more. That might be the true indication of Pakistan’s real democratic transition.

S. Akbar Zaidi is a political economist based in Karachi. He teaches at Columbia University in New York, and at the Institute of Business Administration in Karachi