By Andrei LankovThe last decade has seen the quiet collapse of Stalinism in North Korea. Yes, while the country's political structure still remains largely Stalinist, its economy has changed profoundly and perhaps irreversibly. This was not a result of some planned reforms: On the contrary, North Korea's 'economic Stalinism' died a natural death, being eaten away by the grass-roots capitalism which began to grow around 1990. But can we have a capitalist economy without capitalists? In the North, this process necessarily gave rise to a new class of black market capitalists.Of course, the North Korea of the 1960s or 1980s also had its rich and poor. But the affluent people were affluent either because the party-state bureaucracy chose them (officials and people who were allowed to work overseas and were paid in hard currency) or at least allowed them to be affluent (this was the case with the repatriates from Japan who received hard currency remittances). But this is not the case any more. People get rich, well, because they can get rich…The private market trade began to grow explosively around 1990, and this was when North Korean 'black capitalism' was conceived. In order to succeed, one had to have advantages since the competition was tough. In the late 1990s, the North Koreans used to say: ``There are only three types of people in [North] Korea: those who starve, those who beg, and those who trade''.Those successful early entrepreneurs usually came from a background that gave them advantages over others. Most of them were officials or managers of state-run enterprises who had manifold, if not strictly legal, ways to make an extra won.For example, in the 1990s a person who could command a truck easily made a fortune by moving merchandise around the country and using the large differences in prices between the regions. Managers of state enterprises often sold the production of their factories on the market.This was technically stealing, but in the increasingly corrupt and disorganized society there were fairly good chances of not getting caught. The retail personnel at all levels channeled the goods through the 'back doors' of their shops, away from the disintegrating public distribution system.The military and security personnel also had their advantages, since for decades they operated in what can be described as a 'state-within-a-state' beyond even the most nominal control of outsiders.Finally, the 'hard currency earning' officials made a lot of money: They had been running quasi-market operations from the 1970s and had both the necessary expertise and resources. After 1990, they began to use these resources for their own ends.Apart from officials, generals, and police officers, there were other groups of people who found themselves in advantageous positions in those early stages of the North Korean capitalist revival. These included the repatriates from Japan, whose relatives back in the 'capitalist hell' have always been encouraged to transfer money to the North. The repatriates had money, and some of them retained a vestigial experience of operating in a market economy. Other groups included local Chinese, some of whom were Chinese citizens and Koreans who had close relatives in China. For decades they had been engaged in small-time cross-border commerce, and after the collapse of state control, they greatly increased the scale of their operations.Even some humbler professions found themselves in a relatively better position. Take, say, drivers who could earn money by moving passengers and merchandise _ especially after the quiet breakdown of the travel restriction system around 1997. They also augmented this money by selling and buying goods themselves. This same activity became a major source of income for train conductors. Of course, they had to share some of their profits with their supervisors.Fortunes were made in trade, but not in manufacturing, which remained under the control of the state. Money lending also provided good profits. In the late 1990s, private lenders charged their borrowers with a monthly interest of some 30 to 40 percent. The associated risks were high, too: These lenders had virtually no protection against the state, criminals or above all, bad debtors. They had to choose their clients carefully, frequently choosing prominent officials who were engaged in private commerce.Does the future of North Korea belong to these new capitalists? I doubt it, frankly. If the North continues to exist as a separate entity, these market adventurers will eventually have to compete with the heavyweights from the state oligarchy, who will sooner or later join the capitalist game (some of them probably have done so already). If the entire state collapses, to be reunited with the South, most of them will be pushed to the margins by the capital flowing from Seoul. But we'll have to wait for a while to learn those new stories.