Match date: 6 May 2015

A lot of the build up to this match was about Guardiola’s return to where he made his name. Pep talked about it a bit, saying how he will always love Barcelona, but that he was determined to win the match, while it also saw him manage against former teammate Luis Enrique as the Bayern boss did in the last round.

Luis Enrique was able to name his strongest XI in a 4-3-3 which included Neymar, Suarez, and Messi up top.

Guardiola and Bayern Munich were again unable to named their strongest XI with Ribery and Robben out injured. To start the match, Guardiola decided to play a 3-5-2 with Benatia, Boateng, and Rafinha as the three centre backs and Thiago in something of a right wing back role with Lahm, Alonso, and Schweinsteiger centrally. About fifteen minutes into the match, he changed to a 4-4-2, which is pictured below.

How Guardiola Tried to Contain Barcelona’s Three

With Guardiola opting to start his side with three at the back, it meant that he was taking a huge risk (and putting a huge amount of trust in Benatia, Boateng, Rafinha, and Neuer) as it was essentially setting up his back three for a 3v3 battle. Not only that, but there seemed to be clear instructions for each defender to man-mark one of the Barcelona attacks. Benatia stuck to Neymar, including one time when he followed him incredibly deep into Barcelona’s half only to commit a foul, Boateng stuck to Suarez, and Rafinha tracked Messi. This in itself is risky enough, but coupled with how Bayern were pressing and the positioning of the defensive three, it was almost suicidal. Bayern pressed Barcelona very high up the pitch and it left the 3v3 at the back very isolated, and within that 3v3, the Barcelona players spread themselves so wide that each 1v1 became very isolated. Below is a perfect example of this situation as well as the high defensive line that Bayern were playing which meant that one mistake or mistimed play by a Bayern defender or a moment of excellence from a Barcelona player allowed the Barcelona front three a huge amount of space to run into.

In the above example, Messi won the flick on from Ter Stegen’s pass which allowed Suarez to break in behind in a 1v1 with Neuer. The German goalkeeper saved very well, but it was just the first warning sign that this aggressive tactic from Guardiola could undo Bayern Munich very quickly and so the Spaniard changed his back three to a back four about a quarter hour into the match. With the change, Rafinha moved to right back, Benatia and Boateng partnered one another at centre back, and Bernat played at left back. Further up the field, Thiago move from what was something of a ‘false’ right wing back role to the left side of a midfield diamond. Lahm played on the right side with Alonso at the base in front of the back four and Schweinsteiger behind Lewandowski and Müller. Below is a good example of their shape, with the back four still very high up the pitch, showing trust in Neuer’s sweeping abilities.

Influenced by this change, Bayern Munich began to have more of the ball in the closing stages of the first half and Barcelona’s play into their forwards became less common as Bayern’s pressing allowed them to cut off the passing lanes relatively well. Bayern Munich started to control the middle third of the pitch both with and without the ball as they had a 4v3 in this area of the pitch and very importantly, but subtly, Schweinsteiger was able to eliminate Sergio Busquets from getting on the ball which disrupted Barcelona’s play. You can see Schweinsteiger’s positioning in the screen capture above as well as Lahm and Thiago’s. You can also see the freedom that Alves and Alba had, which is to be expected with a diamond midfield playing against a side with full backs.

Müller and Lewandowski, Thiago



During Bayern’s good spell in the game, at the end of the first half and for about 25 minutes of the second half, one of the most important parts of their play was the movement of Müller and Lewandowski. They linked up one time in the first half when Lewandowski should have scored after an excellent ball into the middle by Müller. There were two reasons, perhaps, for the movement of the Bayern Munich forwards’ movement. The first was that, as noted above, Alves and Alba were getting far too much space to run into in the wide areas, and Alves almost scored because of it, so to eliminate that, the Bayern forwards moved out wide a bit to stop the forward runs of the Barcelona full backs. When Bayern had the ball, it also allowed the likes of Thiago and Schweinsteiger more space to move forward around the Barcelona penalty area as the Spanish side were spread out by Müller and Lewandowski.

Guardiola did this in the second leg of the last round against Porto and in that match, just as it did in this one, it allowed Thiago, in particular, to have a greater influence on the game. Schweinsteiger’s role going forward was limited; he tracked Busquets well, but Busquets also tracked him well, so the German moved Busquets around, which allowed more space to open up for Thiago. During Bayern’s best spells of possession, Thiago was the main man in midfield, at least in a creative sense. He looked for openings and the runs of Müller and Lewandowski, but far too many times Bayern Munich were unable to really penetrate Barcelona’s back four. This led to Bayern Munich to play what were mostly hopeful balls in the box hoping that Müller and Lewandowski would get on the end of them or the second ball (with the latter being something that Guardiola talked about in ‘Pep Confidential).

Players (Messi) Win Games

For all the tactics that went into the match, it was Messi’s moments of brilliance, especially on his second goal, that saw Barcelona take a 3-0 lead in the tie. The Argentine had started to have more of an influence in the match at about half way through the second half. He started to drift inside right much more often as the game went on and found space to turn and run at the Bayern Munich back four. This, coupled with the movement of Suarez and Neymar, allowed Barcelona back into the game and there were a few half chances for the Spanish side before they won the ball high up the pitch and Messi scored his first.

Messi picked up the ball in almost the exact same position. On the first goal, Bayern Munich were without a player anywhere him and on the second, he was isolated in a 1v1 with Boateng, who shaped his body with the assumption that Messi would shift the ball to his left foot so he would have to turn inside.

Messi had the assist on the third goal as well. It was less about his brilliance (although the ball was quite good) and more about Bayern Munich pushing for what would have been an incredibly important away goal and playing with what was a high line all game.

Conclusion

Easily one of the most entertaining games of the year and that was as much for it’s tactics as it was the individual ability. Guardiola took risks in his back line and pressed Barcelona at Camp Nou, both of which made for an entertaining game. It was two teams with similar philosophies, a philosophy that was arguably brought by Guardiola to both clubs. Both clubs wanted to get on the ball, neither were looking to sit back and it was excellent.

The only way one team was really going to win was through an individual taking hold of the match and the reason Bayern Munich lost, for the most part, was because of Messi, who Guardiola said was impossible to stop.

The second leg will be interesting. Will Barcelona sit a bit deeper and defend a 3-0 lead? They are more willing to play with a defensive mentality under Luis Enrique. What does Guardiola do?