THE senior officers who seized power in a coup in May are stepping up their campaign to establish what they call “true democracy”. In late July the junta appointed a parliament stuffed with cronies and officers from the Queen’s Guard regiment. Now General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the coup leader and prime minister (pictured, above), has formed a cabinet made up of the junta and former officers plus a few senior bureaucrats. The election commission has been called upon to appoint a group of people to write a new constitution. It has also, of all institutions, been asked to come up with ideas for preventing populist parties from winning office in future.

The streets of Bangkok, the capital, are calm; indeed many residents were relieved when the army stepped in to end months of debilitating confrontation between the government of the then prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, and her opponents on the streets. Still, the junta refuses to lift martial law. Meanwhile, the officers who in 2006 ousted Ms Yingluck’s billionaire brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, have made their comeback.

A former army chief, Prawit Wongsuwan, is a deputy prime minister. Anupong Paochinda, who preceded General Prayuth as army chief, is interior minister. Tanasak Patimapragorn, the Thai army’s chief of defence forces, is the new foreign minister and the contact for Western governments—who remain unsure how to deal with a country now run by soldiers.

The consensus among most seasoned observers is that the latest spell of army rule will blow over like the last one, which was soon followed by civilian rule and then fresh elections (which Ms Yingluck won in a landslide). Pro-establishment newspapers report that the new government’s term is just a year. But what if, instead, the generals’ “road map to democracy” intends to put an end to electoral democracy altogether, recast Thai society, and establish a long-term rule of “moral people” who are not chosen through the ballot box? Their sense of purpose plays into fears of such a possibility.

The junta’s moral underpinning is a brand of puritanical paternalism. A clean-up is in full swing intended to purge the informal economy of unregistered labour, smuggling, prostitution, gambling and drug-dealing. There is also a sense that the generals feel the need to play Mr Thaksin’s populist game. The last government’s scheme to subsidise rice was financially disastrous. Yet the junta has insisted that the farmers should be paid off, so boosting incomes in the poor countryside. A planned rise in the consumption tax has been frozen, and fuel prices have been sharply cut. Entry to cinemas showing patriotic films (or the World Cup) has been made free of charge. And to much surprise the generals, guarantors of the monied establishment, are considering a tax on land and inherited wealth.

The junta’s many difficulties may explain all this populism. The economy has stopped growing because exports are stagnant, consumption is sluggish and investment and tourism figures have declined. Bangkok’s main international airport is the only one in Asia with falling passenger numbers. The government insists that Thailand remains one of the best places to do business, with reliable electricity, an industrial base and educated workers. Yet even it can see that some of the country’s magic has been lost.

There will now be much emphasis on investment in infrastructure. The generals love railways as much as any planners. They have earmarked $23 billion for rail links to China that are unlikely to pay for themselves. Thailand does not have much in the way of bulk goods that need to be transported by rail. Meanwhile, passengers have been shunning railways for decades because fuel is cheap and the road network good.

What lies ahead? For now, managing expectations downwards so far as the economy is concerned seems a sensible precaution. Much depends on the health of the ageing King Bhumibol Adulyadej. His demise could well entrench the junta and prolong its illiberalism. The junta has already seized on the king’s long-held notions of a “sufficiency economy”, which in essence is a call for everybody from the rural poor upwards to take their place in a social hierarchy overseen by the king’s benevolence. Arch-royalists are telling people that in a sufficiency economy the correct measure of your standard of living is happiness, not income.

Superstition is never far away. The prime minister has complained that anti-coup groups have resorted to the use of black magic against him. For all that the generals are out to smash the movement that Mr Thaksin created and runs from self-imposed exile, they are handling the task delicately. A court has delayed a ruling on whether Ms Yingluck will face charges over her messed-up rice policy. When it feels more confident, the junta may deal with the Shinawatras more harshly.

Ordinary Thais may sense a greater threat. Human-rights groups fear that military courts, last seen in the 1970s, might be set up in Thailand’s restive south, scene of a rumbling Islamist insurgency. And the generally kid-glove treatment of the political classes since the coup sits uncomfortably with reports of the disappearance and even torture of anti-coup activists. A better sense of the new direction will come with details of the constitution. Its contents are not yet openly discussed.