John Ferak

USA TODAY NETWORK-Wisconsin

A federal magistrate's 91-page ruling overturning Brendan Dassey's murder conviction raises questions about the Wisconsin appeals court's handling of the case.

In January 2013, Wisconsin's Court of Appeals District II upheld Dassey's March 2006 confession to Calumet County Sheriff's Detective Mark Wiegert and Wisconsin Division of Criminal Investigation special agent Tom Fassbender in connection with the November 2005 death of Teresa Halbach. Dassey was 16 at the time.

The confession was instrumental in a jury's decision in 2007 to find Dassey, then 17, guilty of first-degree intentional homicide, second-degree sexual assault and mutilation of a corpse. Manitowoc County Circuit Judge Jerome Fox, who presided over Dassey's trial, sentenced Dassey to life in prison.

In 2013, Dassey's conviction was upheld by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' District II, which consisted of:

Lisa S. Neubauer, a lawyer with Foley & Lardner from 1989 until 2007, when she joined the appeals court.

Paul F. Reilly, who had been the city attorney in New Berlin from 1997 until 2002. He was a circuit court judge in Waukesha County from 2003 to 2010 before joining the court of appeals.

Chief Judge Richard Brown, who retired last summer after 37 years on the appeals courts bench.

The Court of Appeals District II consists of Calumet, Fond du Lac, Green Lake, Kenosha, Manitowoc, Ozaukee, Racine, Sheboygan, Walworth, Washington, Waukesha and Winnebago counties.

Here are some key distinctions in the Wisconsin appeals court's ruling and last Friday's decision by U.S. District Court Magistrate Judge William Duffin that overturned Dassey's conviction:

On the question of ineffective legal assistance by Dassey's first lawyer, public defender Len Kachinsky:

Court of Appeals, Jan. 30, 2013:

"Dassey contends that Kachinsky rendered ineffective assistance due to an 'actual conflict of interest' that so breached the fundamental duty of loyalty owed him that under Cuyler v. Sullivan and its progeny, prejudice can be presumed. We disagree."

"Dassey draws no viable link between Kachinsky's actions and any demonstrable detriment to him."

"Kachinsky was long gone before Dassey's trial or sentencing. Dassey has not convinced us that Kachinsky's actions amounted to an actual conflict and that Kachinsky's advocacy was adversely affected, such as it was detrimental to Dassey's interests."

Duffin, Aug. 12, 2016:

"Although it probably does not need to be stated, it will be: Kachinsky’s conduct was inexcusable both tactically and ethically. It is one thing for an attorney to point out to a client how deep of a hole the client is in. But to assist the prosecution in digging that hole deeper is an affront to the principles of justice that underlie a defense attorney’s vital role in the adversarial system. That said, Dassey’s attempt to characterize Kachinsky’s misconduct as a conflict of interest under Sullivan is misplaced."

"Although Kachinsky's misconduct was indefensible, the United States Supreme Court has never accepted arguments such as those Dassey makes here as a basis for relief under (Cuyler v. Sullivan. Therefore, federal law prohibits the court from granting Dassey habeas relief on the first claim he presented to this court."

On the key legal question of the admissibility of Dassey's confession:

Court of Appeals, Jan. 30, 2013:

"Dassey contends that his March 1 (2006) confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed ... A prerequisite for a finding of involuntariness is coercive or improper police conduct.

"(Judge Fox) also found that the investigators used normal speaking tones, with no hectoring, threats or promises of leniency; prodded him to be honest as a reminder of his moral duty to tell the truth..."

"(Judge Fox) concluded that Dassey's confession was voluntary and admissible. The court's findings are not clearly erroneous. Based on those findings, we also conclude that Dassey has not shown coercion. As long as Dassey's statements merely encourage honesty and do not promise leniency, telling a defendant that cooperating would be to his or her benefit is not coercive conduct."

Duffin, Aug. 12, 2016:

"For starters, Dassey was a juvenile — only 16 years old — at the time of his confession. Also significant is the fact that investigators questioned Dassey without the presence of a parent or other adult looking out for his interests."

"Not only did Dassey not have the benefit of an adult present to look out for his interests, the investigators exploited the absence of such an adult by repeatedly suggesting that they were looking out for his interests ..."

"The investigators' assertions that they already knew what happened and assurances that Dassey did not have anything to worry about were not confined to an isolated instance at the beginning but rather persisted throughout the interrogation."

"Dassey's conduct during the interrogation and his reaction to being told he was under arrest clearly indicate that he really did believe that, if he told the investigators what they professed to already know, he would not be arrested for what he said."

"Rather, the investigators' collective statements throughout the interrogation clearly led Dassey to believe that he would not be punished for telling them the incriminating details they professed to already know."

"Consequently, the court finds that the confession Dassey gave to the police on March 1, 2006 was so clearly involuntary in a constitutional sense that the court of appeals' decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law."

John Ferak of USA TODAY NETWORK-Wisconsin: 920-993-7115 or jferak@gannett.com; on Twitter @johnferak