Ankara looks beyond Raqqa offensive for fate of northern Syria The Turkish government is worried about how the Democratic Union Party will transform northern Syria once the Islamic State is defeated in Raqqa. REUTERS/Stringer.

By Metin Gurcan

Jun 2, 2017

Prior to the May 16 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Washington, Turkey had sought for a year to pressure Washington to make a final decision on whether it would cooperate with Turkey in northern Syria or whether it would opt to ally with the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Of course, Turkey had hoped the United States would prefer to cooperate with its NATO ally rather than the YPG — a sub-state actor and the military wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The United States, however, adamantly maintained over the past year that it did not have to make such a choice, and Ankara could not devise a new road map that would persuade the United States to ally with Turkey east of the Euphrates. Now, the United States feels it can preserve its relations with the YPG — even elevating such relations with the upcoming Raqqa offensive — while keeping Ankara at bay. This may not be as easy as Washington seems to think.

Last week, I had a series of meetings in Ankara with government and security officials on behalf of Al-Monitor, and I was able to gather the following impressions. Both the government and the security bureaucracy in Ankara see the Islamic State (IS) as an internal and border security issue, yet they consider the PYD a political structure that could rapidly transform into a state. They see its military wing, the YPG, to be on the verge of becoming a standing army with conventional capabilities, thus making it an existential and imminent security threat to Turkey. In short, when it comes to northern Syria, Ankara is preoccupied with the YPG threat, not the IS threat. This may explain the statement issued by the National Security Council following their May 31 meeting: “The meeting emphasized that the policy of support of the US for PKK/PYD/YPG terror organizations that operate under the guise of Syrian Democratic Forces in contravention of Turkey’s expectations is not compatible with friendship and being allies.”

That same day, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu issued what sounded like a last-minute warning and called on the United States to refrain from arming the YPG. By saying that such a move would be tantamount to threatening Syrian territorial integrity, Cavusoglu insinuated that the YPG and PKK are seeking to establish a Kurdish zone in Syria. Another important impression Al-Monitor obtained from its Ankara contacts was Turkey's shift in geographical focus in Syria. It is understood that Ankara — with the anticipated Raqqa offensive — has shifted its attention to the Kobani canton. A result of this shift is a renewed intensity of Turkish military moves on the Suruc-Akcakale front line that faces the Kobani canton. The Turkish military continues to intensify its moves opposite the Kobani canton, indicating that Ankara sees the PYD’s presence — not its actions on the ground — as an existential threat.

Ankara is debating three different approaches to combating the YPG:

To prevent the creation of a Kurdish (or PKK) corridor, Turkey would, without delay, launch an operation east of the Euphrates (in the same vein as the concluded Operation Euphrates Shield) to control the Akcakale-Raqqa road, despite US objections. This means that the Turkish army would take over the Kobani canton, thus ensuring the collapse of the Raqqa offensive that the United States has tried to develop for two years. This approach has many supporters in Ankara. In this approach, Turkey would remain, for the time being, on strategic silence mode regarding an intervention in Syria and would await the outcome of the Raqqa offensive. This approach takes into consideration the losses the Iraqi army sustained in its Mosul operation against IS . The idea is to wait for the 50,000-strong YPG to sustain losses at Raqqa so Turkey can then launch a second Operation Euphrates Shield. In this approach, it is important to accurately predict how long and how strongly IS will defend Raqqa. Should IS mount a serious defense in Raqqa for 10-12 months — as it has in Mosul — this would increase YPG casualties and serve Ankara’s interests. The Raqqa offensive continues to shape strategies in the field and in politics. The political strategy should be to instigate a bottom-up insurgency within the PYD to divide it and thus compel it to cooperate with the Kurdish National Council (ENKS) in Syria, which operates in northern Syria under Massoud Barzani’s tutelage. On the ground, the strategy would be to dilute the pro-PKK sentiments in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). One way to dilute pro-PKK sentiment would be to insert Barzani peshmerga who are close to Turkey — as was done during the 2014 IS-Kurdish clashes — and also to increase the Sunni Arab footprint in the SDF. Most likely, Turkey will opt for a combination of the second and third approaches.