In December 2017, Vladimir Putin triumphantly declared Russia’s victory in Syria. Addressing troops during a surprise visit to the Khmeimim airbase, he also announced a partial withdrawal of forces. “The homeland is waiting for you, friends. Godspeed!” he said. Although Russia’s intervention on the side of Bashar Assad did meet with marked success, Putin’s declaration was little more than political theater timed for the upcoming presidential campaign in March — Russia has already announced troop reductions in Syria three times. Not only is the military actually unlikely to withdraw from Syria, it will probably continue operations there. The Kremlin next year will also continue to fuel its other major conflict, Ukraine, by supporting proxy forces in breakaway republics in the country’s east.

But even as Russia’s global conflicts look set to roll into 2018 unhindered, its Armed Forces are at a crossroads. Divergent spending priorities, resource constraints and myriad dilemmas loom over the horizon. Russia’s Aerospace Forces have shown dramatic progress compared to their performance in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Military reforms launched that same year and a large modernization program in 2011 have left their mark. They also, however, displayed their limitations. Lacking precision-guided munitions, targeting pods to make good use of them and smaller munitions, the Russian air wing’s combat performance is still arcane compared to its Western counterparts. It is effective, but brutish. Cognizant of these limitations, Russia is now pursuing a new arsenal for non-contact warfare, one based on long-range precision weapons and other guided munitions. But moving forward will be no easy feat in the face of its confrontation with the United States. Western sanctions, which now seem destined to stay in place for many years, are hampering Russia’s access to key technologies. Sanctions have also made the international cooperation necessary for these technological developments more difficult. What’s more, Russia is having to balance its demand for more advanced weapons with a slew of other priorities. The war in Syria may have been a testing ground for new generations of weaponry, such as Kalibr sea-launched, Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles, or KAB-500S satellite-guided bombs. But where Russia has capability it often lacks capacity. As the old adage goes, “Quantity has a quality all its own.” Here, the Armed Forces lack significant quantities of precision-guided munitions. The purchase of precision-guided weapons en masse will run headlong into a takeaway from Russia’s war in Ukraine: the need for a larger ground force. Since 2014, Russia has been repositioning forces around Ukraine’s borders, setting up three new divisions and a combined arms army, along with additional brigades. This force has been a drain on men and matériel and shifted spending priorities.