An Exclusive Wikileaks GI File leak : A serious provision contained within the National Defence Authorization Act allows the US Governement to lock up someone forever without trial. Intelligence Agency Stratfor finds its friends (CIA, military, etc…) are too inexperienced, turning this precaution into a threat.

It’s a scary thought when the US Global Intelligence agency Stratfor tells us that the same groups of people (military, CIA, etc) who have the ability to lock a person up forever are inexperienced and cannot even interrogate prisoners properly. One stratfor employee said there have been over 350 military/intelligence deaths in Iraq, not because of surprise attacks or unavoidable scenarios, but because they don’t have the training or knowledge to do basic things like check suspected terrorists for bombs (something they make every law abiding American do at Airports).

These CIA operatives/analysts are failing to protect their own lives, which is a basic human instinct, so how can we trust they are going to follow proper procedure in actually finding terrorists and being able to competently find evidence to be used against them? Of course, without a trial, it doesn’t matter how the evidence was obtained or how valid it may be. With NDAA the accused has no ability to defend themselves. Even if a lawyer was able to represent an accused client, this information would have been held from them.

It may be noted this email exchange is talking about analysts versus operations agents, analysts are usually people who sit behind desks, and operations people are usually your “James Bond” people (to romanticize it a bit), however, it should not take away from the general message of this exchange which is: The United States intelligence community is understaffed by people who don’t have enough experience. These are the same people who can make the call to have someone locked away forever, without a trial. That’s scary.

The Email Exchange

Date 2010-01-05 03:48:06

From [email protected]

To [email protected]

[email protected] leaving the middle and upper management in the hands of people trained in

the 1990s–a very different world and very different training missions. That really seems to me as an intrinsic problem… not just for the

intelligence community, but also for the State, the military, etc. —– Original Message —–

From: “George Friedman”

To: “Analyst List”

Cc: [email protected]

Sent: Monday, January 4, 2010 8:45:44 PM GMT -06:00 US/Canada Central

Subject: Re: Insight – CIA Killings ** pls do not forward ** There is a good and a bad reason for doing this. The bad reason is that

you either don’t understand the difference or you don’t have enough

trained staff. That’s DIA’s problem–both of them. But there is no inherent reason why an analyst can’t learn the operators

craft and vice versa. Granted there are profound issues of personality

type, but there are those who can bridge that. However, to bridge that

requires time, training, mentoring and maturing. It also requires time in

both roles for the person to learn where analysis stops and operations.

And it requires training by people who understand and accept both sides. This is very hard to do in a war where many of the senior people have

left. Over the past ten years a stunning number of people in the IC have

retired, leaving the middle and upper management in the hands of people

trained in the 1990s–a very different world and very different training

missions. Their numbers and skill are missing and limits their mentoring

ability. People are happy if they get baseline capable analysts and

operators, let alone cross-breeding them. Reva Bhalla wrote: i had heard a while back how in Iraq especially they would allow a lot

more analysts in DIA and other agencies to interact more directly with

sources… sounds like a trend that grew out of limited resources

On Jan 4, 2010, at 8:34 PM, Fred Burton wrote: The spooks told me tonight that DOD have lost 350 soldiers in similar

events but it has never made the press. ———————————————————————- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On

Behalf Of George Friedman

Sent: Monday, January 04, 2010 8:31 PM

To: Analysts

Subject: Re: Insight – CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **

At the age of 25 or so an analyst or an ops officer are about equally

skilled in the field. The training prepares you to start learning. The

problem is that they haven’t got enough experience out there. Twenty

years in do as opposed to di makes a big difference. In my view

getting trained at the farm and spending a year in camaroon prepares

you for squat. The problem isn’t the directorate but that both

directirates have kids playing way abobe their pay grade.

Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T ———————————————————————- From: “Fred Burton”

Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2010 20:28:29 -0600

To: ‘Analyst List’

Subject: RE: Insight – CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **

An OPS officer is in the field from the DO, the clandestine service.

He/she is specifically trained in HUMINT collection, asset

development and asset operation. They run the assets and work out the

commo bwt the source and OPS officer. Ops officers are also called

case officers. An analyst (the DI) reads the reports collected by the OPS officer and

very rarely meets w/a HUMINT source, unless its an intelligence

liaison source. Training and skillset are apples and oranges. ———————————————————————- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On

Behalf Of Sean Noonan

Sent: Monday, January 04, 2010 8:18 PM

To: Analyst List

Subject: Re: Insight – CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **

Fred, can you clarify what exactly a “analyst vice clandestine

operational officer” position is? Fred Burton wrote: Fiasco When balls are dropped in this business, they are usually fatal. The call from an operational asset for an emergency meeting should

have sent off the alarm bells. The only rational explanation is the call went to the Jordanian GID

handler first, than the Jordanian spook caused the CIA meeting.

Very Arab like. (lesson learned: Never, ever let an operational

asset control the meeting site, especially in Injun Country.) Obviously, the double agent told his terrorist handlers that he

would not be checked for bombs or weapons. This operation has been

in the works for a long time. My hats off to aQ. Job well done. ———————————————————————- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On

Behalf Of Reva Bhalla

Sent: Monday, January 04, 2010 8:04 PM

To: Analyst List

Subject: Re: Insight – CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **

wow, there are all kinds of lessons built into this

On Jan 4, 2010, at 8:02 PM, Fred Burton wrote: Politics and CIA political correctness. Since 9-11, analysts (like John Brennan, who was COS Riyadh w/zero

ops training) are placed in operational management jobs. This analyst believed their source. First mistake in agent

handling. Source was running the analyst. Lesson learned. Inexperience field personnel pushed out due to the scope of duties

that surpass CIA’s bandwidth. ———————————————————————- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On

Behalf Of Reva Bhalla

Sent: Monday, January 04, 2010 7:58 PM

To: Analyst List

Subject: Re: Insight – CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **

why was an analyst handling the source?

On Jan 4, 2010, at 7:56 PM, Fred Burton wrote: ** Note — This cannot be sourced to the CIA. Pls do not

forward ** According to a CIA source, there are several factors that caused

the catastrophic incident. Preliminary assessment follows: 1) Inexperienced analyst vice clandestine operational officer

brought the asset into the secure setting. 2) The gathering of approx. 13 CIA staff should never have

occurred. 3) Failure to screen the source for weapons or bombs. Asset

handling 101. 4) COS Amman and COS Afghanistan have been recalled for

“consultations.” 5) Jordanian spooks arrived Langley today. —

Sean Noonan

Research Intern

Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

www.stratfor.com — George Friedman

Founder and CEO

Stratfor

700 Lavaca Street

Suite 900

Austin, Texas 78701

Phone 512-744-4319

Fax 512-744-4334



DocumentID: 1094236

Document Link: From The Wikileaks GI Files courtesy of WikileaksDocumentID: 1094236Document Link: //wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1094236_re-insight-cia-killings-pls-do-not-forward-.html

Section of NDAA