On 23 Dec 2019, UK Ambassador to Yemen shared his concern over attacks on humanitarian aid organizations working in southern Yemen, specifically sharing an article about attacks in al-Dhale province. Without identifying the attackers, the article reported launch of “rocket-propelled grenades against five offices of international humanitarian aid groups in Dhalea city”, and local sources have since identified Oxfam, IRC, Acted, Mercy corps and a number of local CSOs among the organizations targeted.

This particular attack on aid organizations reminds the international community of the assassination of ICRC staff member in April 2018, but it signals a much wider threat. Sources report calls to target international organizations are coming from both Houthi and Salafi elements throughout al-Dhale province. Similar demonization of international organizations was heard from preachers in Sadah and areas of Sana’a this year. Another incident on 27 December reported by contacts in the area involved masked men on a motorcycle threatening staff working on a project funded by an international organization in the city of al-Dhale.

While serving as Armed Groups expert (2017) and Regional Expert (2018 ) on the UN Panel of Experts, I investigated a number of incidents of incitement by preachers, including those in the city of Taiz. Sources often provided recordings of sermons where Zaydi (Houthi ) shaykhs spoke against the role played by international organizations, accusing staff of espionage. I was first alerted to Sunni preachers days following the assassination of Hanna Lahoud in April 2018. Due to a lack of direct access and limited resources, it was not possible to confirm the origins of the recordings or the author, and although I was given the names of the shaykhs I was unable to publish them as the standard of proof required more information.

While access and resources are further limited now that I am not on the Panel, I don’t have the institutional constraints that prevent me from mentioning names given by highly trusted sources on the ground. A day after the incident in al-Dhale, a trusted friend sent a recording allegedly of a lecture by Imam Rashad ‘al-Salafi al-Dhalei’ al-Sha’rabi provided by a local contact very familiar with sermons by this shaykh. Similar sermons were heard in Taiz days before Lahoud was assassinated.

Imam Rashad ‘al-Salafi al-Dhalei’ al-Sha’rabi is yet another transplant from Dar al-Hadith in Dammaj. A former student of the institute founded by shaykh Moqbil al-Wada’i in Sadah, al-Sha’rabi is said to have led a group of fierce fighters against Houthis years back. He is regarded as a controversial personality by the local PDRY-era elite in al-Dhale. As highlighted in previous publications, al-Sha’rabi is not the only Dammaj graduate playing a role in the south, but he is not as prominent as other figures. As part of my investigations during my time on the Panel I wrote extensively on the various prominent Salafi actors playing a role in this conflict, including Abu al- Abbas (see entries on Taiz here) and STC Vice President Hani Bin Breik. For more details you can read the annex in the January 2019 report for a description I wrote of the various Salafi factions found in Yemen today, see p70-72 here )

An extension of the war

Even though pro- Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces claimed an absolute victory over Houthi forces in Qatabah in early May, Houthis took advantage of the chaos during armed clashes between Security Belt/Elite Forces and the National Army in August and September to regroup and launch new operations in al-Dhale.

Intense fighting has returned to central al-Dhale province, clashes are intensifying along al-Fakhr area and closer to Qatabah. On 28 December a military parade of pro-STC forces was hit by a missile claimed by Houthis. The Sana’a-based forces retain a significant presence in north and northeastern al-Dhale to protect vital roads into Ibb province (see map below), access to western al-Baydha province and north Lahj. Areas of northeast al-Dhale were previously part of Ibb province, with a significant Zaydi population, including a number of prominent Hashimi families. Houthi presence in this area of al-Dhale is also meant to pressure the coalition, the government of Yemen and southern secessionists along with threats from the Taiz/Lahj border and southern al-Baydha province close to Abyan. Southern secessionists see al-Dhale as the de facto border between the north and the south, and a top priority to protect against Houthis since it is the place of origin for the president of the STC, Aydarous al-Zubaydi, and Aden’s Director of Security, Shalal Ali Shaye.

Renewed clashes are exacerbating the conditions of ordinary people, creating increase demand for help from humanitarian organizations. While threats to international organizations may seem a continuation of the narrative by religious extremists targeting the West, the intent behind the threats and attacks is often far more practical. As we’ve seen with Houthis in Sana’a and Hodeida, this tends to be a tactic used to extort international organizations, not actually to expel the organizations working to help ordinary people affected by the deteriorating economy and the armed conflict. A number of contacts working for iNGOs reported increasing costs around May 2019 in areas under the control of Houthi militia leaders.

Threats to organizations lead to demands for increased security, which certain elements are ready to provide, at a cost. Many organizations end up hiring ‘liaisons’ that facilitate protection of staff or routes used by the organizations to transport aid. Some prominent organizations are known to have affiliates of Ansar al-Sharia or AQAP, for example, acting as interlocutors to ensure protection in areas where the particular organization operates. This relationship also helps shift projects to areas controlled by those antagonizing the organizations, one area becomes too dangerous while their areas appear safe and open to organizations providing humanitarian relief.

Back in October I wrote about how the departure of UAE military forces and aid organizations would open space throughout the south for new international organizations as substitutes. Al-Dhale was one of those areas I highlighted for having a number of organizations moving in, including state-run organizations from Qatar, for example. Houthis or Salafi elements do not aim at expelling humanitarian organizations, they merely aim at extracting as much benefits as possible to strengthen their own hand, and financial gains to complement their patronage networks.

FC.