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Leaving it to caucuses to decide whether to so empower themselves was one of the compromises Conservative MP Michael Chong, the act’s sponsor, was obliged to accept as the price of party leaders’ support, without which it would not have passed. The leaders calculated their caucuses were so cowed that they would continue to obey them in all things, including an order not to assume any powers the leaders would rather they not have — especially not the power to remove them.

Photo by Fred Chartrand/The Canadian Press/File

For the most part, this judgment proved correct. Indeed, in its first test, after the 2015 election, the law was largely a bust. Not only did the Liberals and NDP not vote to give themselves the powers envisaged by the Reform Act, they did not even obey the act, either failing to hold the votes required or holding them long after that first meeting.

The exception was the Conservatives, whose caucus voted to assume three of the four powers, including a modified version of the power to elect an interim leader (the act stipulates only members of Parliament are to vote on this; the Tories broadened the definition of “caucus” to include senators). The sticking point, naturally, was the power to remove the leader.

It will be interesting to see whether the Liberals and the NDP, now joined by the Bloc, obey the law this time, and hold the votes as required. But it will be fascinating to see how the Conservatives vote.

Should a majority of MPs vote to assume the leader-removal power, it would take the signatures of just 20 per cent of them (25 out of 121) at any time to force a vote on Scheer’s leadership, by secret ballot. Were a majority in that vote to support his removal, he’d be gone as of that date. The April convention might then be devoted to selecting a new leader.