Army

Headquartered in Baghdad, the army--of an estimated 1.7 million or more Iraqis, including reserves and paramilitary--in 1987 had seven corps, five armored divisions (each with one armored brigade and one mechanized brigade), and three mechanized divisions (each with one armored brigade and two or more mechanized brigades). An expanded Presidential Guard Force was composed of three armored brigades, one infantry brigade, and one commando brigade. There were also thirty infantry divisions, composed of the People's Army (Al Jaysh ash Shaabi--also cited as the Popular Army or People's Militia) brigades and the reserve brigades, as well as six Special Forces brigades.

In August 1990 the Iraqi Army seized and occupied Kuwait. Iraqi ground forces in the KTO included elements of up to 43 divisions, 25 of which are assessed as committed, 10 the operational reserve, and eight the strategic reserve. Some independent brigades were operating under corps control. The Iraqi defensive strategy, however, was not prepared for the Coalition's offensive strategy. The Iraqi assumption that the tactics used in the Iran-Iraq War would be applicable against the Coalition proved faulty, as did their assumption that the attack would be terrain-oriented in support of the Coalition's political goal of liberating Kuwait. Further, once the air war began, Iraqi tactical intelligence became virtually blind. Most importantly, Iraqi defensive planning was rendered ineffective due to the speed, maneuver, firepower, and technological advantages of the Coalition offensive, which surprised and overwhelmed the Iraqis, although some Iraqi regular and heavy units put up a fight. At the end of more than a mouth of bombardment, Iraqi forces remained in Kuwait; many particularly in the front line units, were in poor condition, with their ability to coordinate an effective defense along the border severely reduced.

In theory, prior to Operation Desert Storm armor divisions consisted of 12,100 men and 245 tanks and infantry divisions had 14,100 men and 78 tanks. In practice the Iraqi army's divisions were never equal to their tables of organisation and equipment. The gap between theoretical and actual strength may have contributed to over-estimates of the strength of Iraqi forces deployed during the 1990-91 Gulf War. In any event, the War itself resulted in the destruction of roughly half the tanks and other equipment of the Army.

Since the War, the army reduced the numbers of units and personnel, and focused on reconstituting armor and mechanised units with remaining equipment. The number of regular army divisions was cut from seven armored/mechanised and 20 infantry divisions to two or three armor divisions, three mechanised divisions and 15 to 17 infantry divisions. Currently, armor divisions have two armor and one mechanised brigade; mechanised divisions have one armor and two mechanised brigades; and the infantry divisions consist of three infantry brigades and a tank battalion. Armor brigades consist of three armor battalions and one mechanised battalion, while mechanised brigades consist of have three mechanised battalions and a tank battalion. Divisions generally have four supporting artillery battalions.

Sources and Resources