Rational Societies

Rational Societies

Before one joins an association it is important to investigate the association to make sure that it is really one that one would like to belong to, especially after considering the

rules and selfrepresentation of the association. In this article, I will philosophize

about association rules and self-

representation and show what to look out for when considering joining an association. A good place to start is the rules of the association. Rules form a foundation for an association, so if the rules are impaired, then generally so too is the association. Furthermore, if the association is misrepresenting what it is to potential members, that is also problematic.

According to Merriam-Webster, one definition of the word “association” is “an organized group of people who have the same interest, job, etc.” As such, any group from a homeowner’s association to a political party to a school group may be considered an association. In order to maintain order in an association, certainly rules are necessary if not extremely helpful. To guide an association with its rule making, I am suggesting that we look to the term “should.” For this article, we will be looking at the “shoulds” of practicality and morality within the contexts of making association rules.



To begin with the should of practicality, one must simply start with the fairly innocent assumption that a group has goals related to the formative purpose of the group (the purpose of the group that causes people to gather within the group). For example, a homeowner’s association’s formative purpose is the fact that a common living space is shared, or that homeowners share a common interest in some property or living condition. Logically then, to keep the group on-task there must be rules of this association that spring forth from the formative purpose. The rules springing forth from the formative purpose simply exist to meet the needs as to why the group was formed. Having rules related to the formative purpose helps keep the group on-task to things relevant to the reason why the group exists in the first place.

To continue about the should of practicality guiding rule making, let’s assume a hypothetical group exists in which the association has formed around elephants and issues related to elephants. It would be justifiable from a standpoint of practicality for the group to restrict topics of discussions to elephant related points because when members stray from this path, they are using the group for reasons other than for which the group was created. When members stray from this path, they are defeating the purpose of the group: to confer about elephants and related issues. So, a group created around elephants and elephant issues would be vindicating an issue of practicality when making rules forbidding members from using the group for issues unrelated to the formative purpose of the group (elephants and elephant issues). By having rules based on the should of practicality, the group ensures that the group is meeting its purpose when the group meets.



Boiling this down to a proposition yields the following rule about association rules, “If rules of the group limit actions within the group to those which support the purpose of the group, then those group rules are rational.”

Inversely, a new proposition about association rules can be formed, “If the rules of the group limit actions within the group such that the purpose of the group is subverted, then those group rules are irrational.” Just as there must be rules to keep the group on-task relative to the formative purpose of the group, so also must there not be rules which go against the foundation of the group. When this does happen, then the rules should not exist because they contradict the foundation of the group (they are irrational on a pragmatic level).



To continue with the previous example and this new proposition, a group formed around elephants and elephant issues would make an impractical rule if they made it against rules of the group to talk about deforestation. As deforestation clearly impact elephants, making a rule against talking about deforestation at group meetings would clearly go against the formative principle of the group: the discussion of elephants and elephant issues. Making a rule against the discussion of deforestation at group meetings clearly goes against the practicality of the very existence of the group. As such, we can say that the group “should” not make such a rule (the should of practicality).



When all of the above points are taken into consideration, a unique niche argument occurs. In the context of a philosophy association, almost nothing can be rationally excluded from discussion. Of course this excludes empty content or the ravings of a lunatic as both are senseless and thus lack philosophical content. However, when we talk about the philosophy of philosophy association rules, something occurs that does not occur in other associations; there is no such thing as rational exclusion of discussion of association rules in philosophy groups, unlike other groups (because to discuss the rules of a philosophy association is engaging in philosophy, the formative purpose of the group). A philosophy association brings with it a unique set of circumstances in the larger context of the philosophy of association rules.

As an example, let’s apply this rationale to two groups, one, an association formed around cats, and the second formed around philosophy. It would be rational for the group about cats to exclude discussion about the rules of the group because the rules of the group are not about cats, they are about the running of the cat group. To allow discussion of the group rules (whether or not the rules should exist, be modified, etc.) in a group about cats would be to allow in content that distracts from the formative purpose of the group: to talk/act/etc. about cats. So without any other information other than that the group is about cats, this would be an example of rational exclusion of the discussion of topics within the group.

Obviously, this argument takes no position as to whether or not democracy or other group organization is superior to other forms of group management, so there would be a way for rational discussion of group rules in a group centered around cats, provided that the group also had a commitment to democratic organization of their group. My argument applies to all groups, and does not include an association’s further commitment to any kind of structural organization. If a group was committed to both cats and a certain form of organization, my argument would obviously have to adjust to include both the formative purpose of the group and the chosen organizational mode.

However, coming back to the philosophy association in my example, a very different conclusion results as compared to the cat group due to my definition of rational inclusion/exclusion of certain topics. While the discussion of the rules of an association formed around cats is not about cats, discussion of the rules of an association about philosophy is about philosophy. Because discussion of the rules of a philosophy group is on-task to the formative purpose of the group (philosophy), to exclude such discussion is irrational exclusion of a topic. Excluding this topic subverts the foundational purpose of the group. Again, this assumes that the philosophy group is not committed to any particular political-style organization method.

Furthermore, if this irrational exclusion is brought to the attention of those managing the philosophy group, and if those who manage the association fail to address the issue or fail to give a reason as to why this topic has been irrationally excluded, one can properly conclude that the group is run in an authoritarian manner. In this context, irrational exclusion and one definition of authoritarianism are one in the same. According to Merriam-Webster, two definitions of “authoritarian” are “of, relating to, or favoring a concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people” and “of, relating to, or favoring blind submission to authority.” When managers of this hypothetical philosophy group do not answer objections that the group is being managed irrationally or when they fail to give a reason as to the state of the association’s policies, they are running the group in an authoritarian manner because without giving a reason or answering claims, they are “favoring blind submission to authority.” This type of being authoritarian also ignores the more simple claim that the group is authoritarian because the managers of the association are not “responsible to the people” (association members).

To clarify this position against a potential objection, I will mention those who may think that the running of something as “small” or “inconsequential” as one philosophy association (of which there are presumably many) could not be meaningfully authoritarian because other authoritarian associations killed, raped, maimed, etc. people/members in order to maintain their control over their association (eg Nazis). Not only is this a flavor of the logical fallacy reductio ad absurdum, but it also ignores the definition of the word “authoritarian.” Some group managers may go to more extreme methods of ensuring their authoritarian hold over an association, but to say that one philosophy group is not authoritarian because it is not as intensely so as other associations is to conflate the category of being authoritarian and the intensity to which one is authoritarian. Being authoritarian is about meeting the definition of the word; it is not about what one is willing to do to ensure that the association continues to meet that definition. Also, it makes no difference that there are many philosophy groups. Just because there are many philosophy groups, that doesn’t mean that the one in question is not run by authoritarians.

Even though the cat association may meet the first definition of authoritarian in that they may not allow members to run the group instead of managers having complete control (because the group may not have a mechanism by which managers of the association are answerable to members), the philosophy group is doubly authoritarian in comparison. While the cat group has at least one rational leg to stand on (that of rational exclusion of topics as they do not pertain directly to the formative purpose of the group, cats), the philosophy group has none. Not only are the managers of the philosophy group not answerable to the association members, they also have no rational reason to exclude discussion of the the group’s rules as discussion of the philosophy group’s rules is pertinent to the formative purpose of the group (to discuss philosophy and philosophical issues). So, not only does the philosophy group meet the first criteria of authoritarianism, it also meets the second. In this way, the lack of rational exclusion criteria being met in this instance in this hypothetical philosophy group presents a niche in which philosophy associations are subject to scrutiny which other groups are not, according to the should of practicality within the context of associations allowing the discussion of association rules.

Finally, we still need to consider the “should” of morality in the contexts of association rules. It is uncontroversial to say that lying is generally immoral especially without some intervening reason to lie. Accordingly, if one puts a label on something, one would expect that that label to be accurate. It would be a misrepresentation to have a group labeled “cats” when the group really only discusses dogs and forbids members to talk about cats. This is so because the label and the formative purpose of the group must go together or else the group is misrepresenting itself to those who may be interested in joining the association. While this argument based on the should of morality does rest on some of the previous work explained under the should of practicality, it contains some separate content. Not only should the rules of the association be made in relation to the formative purpose, but so too should the label of the group. Rule-making being related to the formative purpose is an issue of practicality, while the label of a group being related to the formative purpose of the group is an issue of morality (“false advertising”). When these criteria are not met, one ends up with an association that has irrational rules and falsely represents itself to those who are not familiar with the group. Falsely representing a group (by having the label of the group and the formative purpose of the group in disagreement) goes against the should of morality as it is essentially lying (misrepresenting the true nature of the group). This applies equally to the group labeled only “cats,” which forbids members to talk about anything but dogs, as it does to a group labeled only “philosophy” and prevents members from talking about philosophical issues.

So, the next time you’re investigating an association, think of these “shoulds.” If it is a philosophy group, consider the arguments that specifically apply to philosophy groups. Before joining an association, ask yourself “Do the rules of the association meet the formative purpose of the group?” “Is the association representing the formative purpose of the group accurately?” After investigating an association in these ways, one is better informed and prepared to make the decision to join an association or stand against it. While in authoritarian groups the weight of these arguments comes down mostly on the authoritarian managers as they are most directly responsible for the running and rule-making of the group, there is also some fault on the part of the members. When members of a group fail to address systemic group issues, they are somewhat culpable themselves. While members’ culpability does not follow rationally (as there is nothing according to group rules that they can do about it), many people illogically think that the more members a group has, the more respectable the organization is. While people may believe this illogically, supporting this belief in virtue of being a member of a group with serious flaws is followed by at least some culpability for the group’s state of affairs.