the term positive freedom (though an umbrella term) will be used synonymously with Marx’s conception of freedom.

Thesis:

Positive liberty such as that espoused by socialists (Berlin 1969) is not undermined by its totalitarian implications, instead it is a necessary condition in dismantling the socio-economic, and class-based oppression perpetuated by the capitalist mode of production essential to the freedom of the largest section of society: the proletariat (Marx 1995 p.34). Exploitation and alienation of wage-labour (Lenin 1999; Marx 2008) is a force against freedom and It is in fact negative freedom (Fromm 2011) that facilitates the totalitarian implications as it preserves the class system by upholding property rights, and private control of the means of production (Marx 1995) which catalyse inequality and therefore alienation (Wilkinson 2010) – the antithesis to freedom (Meszaros 1970). On the other hand, Positive freedom is the only means to dismantling these obstacles, and necessary in creating a truly classless society which will be free of oppression. (Marx 2008; Engels 2003).

Two aspects of Freedom

Twentieth century discourse within politics and philosophy were heavily grounded within the dichotomy between two opposing ideologies, Liberalism and Communism. Within philosophy, the question of freedom also polarised into two separate entities: Positive and Negative Freedom. Of the first to discuss these concepts were Berlin (1969), and Fromm (2011). Positive Freedom as defined by Berlin (1969 p.8) could boil down to “freedom to” – this in summation referred to the active emancipation from oppression created and perpetuated by societal conventions, people, and Fromm (2011) would argue an oppressive class structure in the opportunities available for people to determine their best course of action. However, Fromm (2011) offers just one specific left wing rendition (Christman 1991 p.344) of positive liberty, Christman (1991) instead argues positive liberty happens within the sphere of “individuality”, suggesting the core tenet of positive liberty is “self-mastery” however, such self-mastery must occur “in a manner or by process that one had (or could have had) something to say about it” (Christman 1991 p.346) therefore positive freedom must enable ones “true-self” separated from “desires and values that have been oppressively imposed” (Christman 1991 p.345).

On the other hand, Berlin (1969 p.26) defined Negative freedom as “a maximum degree of non-interference compatible with the minimum demands of social life”, this could be boiled down to “Freedom From”, unlike positive freedom that seeks to enable opportunities for people to realise their full potential or “self-mastery” (Christman 1991 p.346), negative liberty seeks to preserve the freedom of everyone by allowing them to act without interference “there ought to exist a minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated” (Berlin 1969 p.4).

Berlin’s Critique of Positive Freedom

Berlin (1969) never dismissed either form of freedom as wrong versus right, instead engaged in a dialectic between the two concepts (Gray 2003; Collignon 2018 p.37). However, Berlin – much like his Liberal predecessors is more critical of positive liberty, more distinctly its tendency to be conflated with totalitarianism through rhetoric. Berlin (1969 p.8-9) argues positive liberty breeds totalitarianism due to the organic metaphor of self-mastery being implied in society. Self-mastery is a struggle between “higher nature” vs “lower nature”, to master one’s self, the higher nature must dominate one’s lower nature, an example of which is chocolate cake – the lower-self driven by its empirical desires seeks to eat the whole cake however, it is disciplined by the rationality of the higher-self as an unhealthy decision. In effect, society will consist of more informed, educated, and higher classed individuals “coercing” lower classed individuals in the “name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue” (Berlin 1969 p.9). This facilitates totalitarianism.

It was no illusion that Berlin wrote on the implications of positive liberty and totalitarianism as a reaction to the nature of the Soviet Union and its stranglehold on Russian society. Conquest (2008) confirmed Berlin’s theory of totalitarianism in positive liberty as material reality. Within his assessment of the Soviet Union found the socialist state was not guided by proletarian democracy (implying representative of the major section of society), but by a very specific section of society – the vanguards. Djilas (1983 p.66) argued that this “New Class” dominated policy influence (therefore, citizens) under the guise of knowing what is best for Russian society. In this case it is not difficult to see the parallel between Berlin’s concept of domination between higher/lower nature in the Soviet system as Vanguard/Proletariat.

Marxist Critique

However, Materialists and more specifically Marxists (Lenin 2008 p.1-2; Marx 2008a p.42) find liberal ideas of freedom are based purely upon ideological, and dogmatic views of society. In this sense Liberal dogma, and therefore their perception of freedom has no practical application in contemporary material conditions, Marx (1995 p.54) finds that liberal freedom within the contemporary mode of production in its negative sense only offered freedom for those who owned the means of production, as they are exempt from the oppression of wage-labour and alienation (Marx 1995 p.74) while guaranteeing oppression to those who do not own any means of production through coerced wage slavery. Negative freedom preserves the property rights of the bourgeoisie, and therefore constitute the exploitation of labour of those who do not, Marx argues preserving property rights only benefits those who inherited the private property “that of his forefathers” or obtained it through “the virtue of his primitive labour” (Marx 1995 p.410-411). In this sense negative liberty is perpetuating a class-based totalitarian system to which by birth right and primitive accumulation retain a person’s position as either being dominated (proletariat) or the dominator (bourgeoisie).

Engels (Marx 2008b p.22) suggests in building a truly free society, we must first dismantle the class system – due to its inherent oppressive nature, “communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property… does wage-labour create any property for the labourer? Not a bit, it creates capital, i.e, that kind of property which exploits wage-labour” (Marx 2008b p.22). Engels (2003 p.1) argues unless we apply positive liberty as an “antithesis” to the “thesis” that is the class system (much like the serfs did to the kings) in the form of a democratic workers struggle for education, rights, wealth redistribution, and ultimately democratising the means of production, the most major section of society: the proletariat, will remain slaves under a system of tyranny perpetuated by the bourgeois class system, much like we would still be in the days of feudal lords as a serf.

Hayek on Marxist “freedom”

Of the most profound criticisms of Marx’s concept of freedom comes from sphere of neoliberal philosophy. Hayek (2001 p.92) famously suggested positive freedom can be characterised by “the suggestion that by giving up freedom in what are, or ought to be, the less important aspects of our lives, we shall obtain greater freedom in the pursuit of higher values. On this ground people who abhor the idea of a political dictatorship often clamour for a dictator in the economic field” here Hayek echoes Berlin’s criticism of positive freedom and the dangers of the metaphor of self-mastery. However, the distinction Hayek (2001) makes is that positive freedom and its totalitarian implications are only totalitarian on the basis that it translates into individual market freedoms, Hayek (2001 p.91-93) argues socialists (Marxists by extension) guided by their “greater freedom” and the application of positive liberty has lead them to control, and plan the economy through the expansion of the state power, the effect of this facilitates totalitarianism by the state to the individual. Hayek (2001) argues collective market freedom (as promoted by positive liberty) assure equality through “restraint and servitude” (Hayek 2001 p.47) enforced by state enforced “propaganda” assuring people to believe the state’s goals are their own (Hayek 2001 p.54). Hayek (2001 p.39) goes further arguing this oppressive relationship as promoted by positive liberty are the roots of Nazi totalitarianism in WWII Germany “The increasing veneration for the state, the admiration of power, and of bigness for bigness’ sake, the enthusiasm for “organisation” of everything (we now call it “planning”) and that inability to leave anything to the simple power of organic growth” (Hayek 2001 p.39) going on to suggest it is this force against “organic growth” infects “private life”, and builds “the prototype of the totalitarian party”, “by the time Hitler came to power, liberalism was dead in Germany, And it was socialism that had killed it” (Hayek 2001 p.44)

Increasingly, Hayek (2001) did recognise the criticisms of capitalism, and alienation. However, where Marx blamed this on private property and therefore the remedy was the abolishment of this institution (in the form of positive collective action), Hayek (2001 p.67) argued history demonstrates: since the birth of capitalism and the increase of the “general level of wealth” individual negative freedom has facilitated a time in history that is characterised by historic levels of worldwide prosperity. therefore, the issues in which Marx outlines can only be tackled through the expansion of negative liberty in the form of laissez faire economics and “organic growth”. “The guiding principle in any attempt to create a world of free men must be this: a policy of freedom for the individual is the only truly progressive policy” (Hayek 2001 p.70)

Inequality and freedom

On the other hand, Wilkinson (2010) argues this cycle of exploitation perpetuated by privately seized industry (therefore the privately appropriated value of labour) and by extension the negative freedom (in the form of State apathy to corporate alienation or state support of this) that preserves this position, breeds inequality, the cost of such inequality for Wilkinson (2010 p.31) is alienation. Wilkinson (2010 p.173) argues it is this alienation in the form of mental (Wilkinson p.63-68), physical (Wilkinson 2010 p.73-82), educational (Wilkinson 2010 p.103-109), and of security (Wilkinson 2010 p.129-134) that all contribute to class oppression, the more divided society is amongst socio-economic lines the worse this alienation is (Wilkinson 2010 p.190). However, where Marxists may suggest the private property itself inherits “unfreedom”, Wilkinson (2010 p.245) instead suggests in building a freer society we must thrive to create a more equal society. In order to build a more equal society we must use positive freedom in the form of a rugged “welfare state” this includes “redistributive taxes and benefits”, Wilkinson (2010 p.245-246) cites Japan in comparison to the USA, suggesting this application of positive freedom has allowed Japanese social mobility of poorer more traditionally alienated groups to assimilate into a large middle class, an objective the USA has struggled to achieve since the height of the “New Deal” which was a large federal social welfare programme. Though Wilkinson offer an alternative view of positive freedom, both echo the sentiment that liberty in the positive sense is an essential component in a free society and are far from being undermined by its totalitarian application on the basis that its absence would create oppression not unlike totalitarianism albeit on socio-economic lines (Wilkinson 2010 p.168).

Conclusion

Berlin (1969), and in the same breath neoliberalism have argued the nature of positive liberty (Marxist) is undermined by its totalitarian implications, from restricting economic freedom (Hayek 2001) and facilitating the grounds for totalitarian rule over the individual, to laying the framework for high society controlling low society under the guise of “knowing what is best for society” and diminishing individual freedom. However, the connotations of unregulated negative liberty facilitate and preserves (through the promotion of private property, or unregulated economic affairs) a socio-economic and class-based system of oppression that in itself mirrors totalitarianism against classes (Marx 2008b) and one that diminishes the freedom of each individual from ascertaining their own goals. Positive Liberty is an essential component in a free society – be it in the form of revolutionary redistribution/democratisation measures (Marx 2008b) or the basis of a welfare state (Wilkinson 2010) and therefore is not undermined by criticisms of lending legitimacy to totalitarianism.

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