Following Leicester City’s incredible run to the Premier League title last season FC Rostov have been left under the radar despite their own magnificent success despite low funds available for transfers and wages. They managed to finish 2nd in the Russian Premier League missing out by just two points to the eventual winners CSKA Moscow. Following their recent success in the Champions League beating Ajax 5-2 on aggregate to achieve a place in the Champions League group stage I wanted to find out exactly how FC Rostov set-up from a tactical viewpoint, and their strengths and weaknesses.

Defensive structure:

As you can see from the image above, when Rostov are in their deep defensive structure they keep a zonal-orientated 5-3-2 shape. They are very compact horizontally and diagonally. Have a look at how compact horizontally and diagonally their three centre midfielders and 2 strikers are. This leads to the opposition being unable to create any easy attacks through the centre or through the left or right half-space meaning that the opposition must attack in the wide zones, and of course as a result of the touchline the players receiving the ball in that zone have 180degrees less of pitch to work with meaning it is the least effective zone to attack through on the pitch.

One of the weaknesses to a 5-3-2 defensive structure is of course the fact you only have 2 strikers who have the ability to press the opposition during there build-up phase whereas in a 4-3-3 for example you have two wingers and a striker who can press during this phase. Rostov resolve this issue in a very similar way to that of Conte with his Italian National team during the recent Euro’s. They resolve this issue through allowing the near-side midfielder of the 3 to come up alongside the other 2 strikers to create a triangle between the three of them. The 2 players on the side of the triangle stand in the right and left half space thus not allowing easy build-up through the half-spaces whilst the striker creating the top of the triangle occupies the centre zone. This creates a 5-2-3 zonal-orientated shape. Although the near-side midfielder of Rostov would come forward on both sides the this is a more common theme on the left. The reason for this is that the right half-space is already occupied by one of the strikers from when the left centre-midfielder had originally came up, therefore there is no need for the right centre-midfielder to come up and create the right side of the triangle as the triangle has already been created between the LCM, and the 2 strikers.

Another weakness to the 5-3-2 defensive structure is of course the lack of width in the midfield, especially when the near-side midfielder pushes up to create that triangle to make it harder for the opposition during the build-up phase. Rostov solve this again in a very similar way to that of Conte’s Italy team in the Euro’s where the near-side wingback will press high, thus creating a pendulating back 4. This means in simple terms that when the ball-side wingback goes to press in the wide-zone that the rest of the defensive line shift across to make a back 4. If the ball returns to the centre of the pitch the back line will then return to it’s original 5. From the images above you can see Rostov’s zonal-orientated 5-3-2 and 5-2-3 shape which adapts from the two when the ball-side midfielder comes up alongside the two strikers or doesn’t. Also you’ll notice that the central, left and right half-space are very well occupied where as the wide zones are not, meaning that attacks from the opposition are forced down the wing. As a result of the narrowness of there defensive structure you might think that despite the pressure of the ball-side wingback that they might be outdone on the wing despite the fact the opposition have 180 degrees less of pitch to work with, and this is where the defensive structure of Conte’s Italian side varies to that of FC Rostov. Whereas Conte had confidence that his trusted and experienced back 3 of Chiellini, Bonucci and Barzagli would stop everything that came into the box from the wide zones (the majority of the time through crosses), Rostov would set-up a trigger-press. This means that when the opposition play the ball out-wide that the near-side players would press horizontally as a unit out wide. Cover shadows are vitally important for Rostov as a result of this commitment to the press (as at least 4 players commit), if the ball manages to find a player back inside they are very exposed. Therefore, Rostov must press quickly, as a unit and they must have one eye on the movements of the opposition players behind them to make sure that there cover-shadow are in the way ball carrier’s vision. We call this a passing lane oriented trigger-press, and the skills needed for this trigger press out wide are used during the transition from attack to defence in Rostov’s counter-press as will be explained later on.

If the ball is played into the pocket (zone 14) it is the job of the near-side centreback to apply the pressure as you can see from the images above. Also you can see from the image that when the near-side centreback does press the player in the pocket within zone 14 this leaves gaps in the defensive line. This can be resolved easily through the other 4 defenders in the defensive line covering his movements by coming closer together thus insuring the compact defensive structure. CSKA Moscow should have used this weakness to there strength through a third-man run from one of there three centre-midfielders to make the most of that gap created in the back line.

Transition from attack to defence

During Rostov’s transition from attack to defence Rostov use a counter-press. The main benefits of this is that the opposition are forced to play the ball quickly when not in total control of the ball, and with a lack of time to ready into their surroundings and realise their options on the ball. This means that if done correctly there is a very good chance that the possession will be surrendered from the opposition despite only just regaining possession of the ball. Counter-pressing is one of the buzzwords around football at the moment since Klopp became Liverpool manager. But what people don’t realise is that there is a lot more to counter-pressing than there may seem. Firstly there are different ways to counter-press. There is the possibility to counter-press through a man-oriented set-up similar to that of Bayern Munich’s treble winning side in 2013, where one player will press, and the other players will man mark there markers. There is the possibility to press through a leeway-oriented system similar to that of Liverpool’s Jurgen Klopp. This is where there is little or no consideration for the opposition players and this is a hectic press from the near-side players. Finally there is the possibility to counter-press in a passing lane oriented system where the near-side players will press like that of Klopp’s although they will adapt their runs meaning that the passing lanes will be shattered as a result of the players cover-shadows being within the ball carrier’s vision. Secondly a counter-press will only be successful if the press takes place in a certain time frame. According to prozone the first player in the counter-press must press within 2.4 seconds and the second must press within 5.5. seconds. Therefore, there isn’t an incredible amount of time to transition from attack to defence through this method of a counter-press. But how Rostov solve this issue of being able to counter-press within this time is though having a clear structure around the ball in order to counter-press. It’s quite simple. If you have a good shape constantly present around the ball then if you do loose ball possession as a result of that shape around the ball when you were in possession you have many bodies to counter-press around the ball. This is something that Thomas Tuchel has introduced into his Borussia Dortmund side since taking the reings on from Klopp, and has had a magnificent impact on his side.

Transition from Defence to attack

During the transition from defence to attack Rostov have two main options. The first is a simple yet very effective counter-attack. This method is used by Rostov when the opposition commit bodies forward meaning there is space to exploit in very promising positions (in the central axis and half-spaces). CSKA Moscow were aware of these very promising counter-attacks, and therefore managed to set-up a tactical plan against this threat although in the 93rd minute when CSKA committed forward for the late equaliser they were made to pay as you can see below.

If you are going to commit bodies forward then during the opposition’s counter-attack they must be forced out wide meaning there is more time for the returning players to get back into there defensive structure as of course it takes a shorter distance to attack down the centre/in the half-spaces and therefore less time to reach the goal in comparison to forcing the counter-attack out into the wide zones.

For the majority of this match CSKA didn’t allow Rostov during the transition from defence to attack to do so through counter-attacking as a result of CSKA not committing too many bodies forward. Therefore, Rostov had to find another way to create meaningful attacks, and to get players deep into the opposition’s half. As Rostov aren’t great in possession of the ball instead of attempting to play through the press they play over it. In the images below you will see that players as a result of this method are running away from the ball. This might seem crazy as this is one of the main things that is taught from a young age to not do. But if all of the players are on the same page, and they know in what area the long ball is going to be played into then it’s actually a very effective method. You’ll also see when the long ball has reached it’s target there is a clear structure around the ball (linked with transition from attack to defence) meaning that even though they might not win the first ball, they’re likely to win the second or the third as a result of a counter-press, as a result of the shear number of bodies they have within the area the long balls are played into. This is a very similar method to that used by Roger Schmidt of Bayer Leverkusen. This is used prominently by Rostov throughout a match whereas Leverkusen will look to use this method sometimes whilst also using a more conventional method of creating shapes around the ball meaning players run towards the ball instead of away from it. Meaning they have the possibility of passing through the opposition’s press while also possessing the possibility to use this clever long-ball method like Rostov.

Attacking structure

As you might have guessed Rostov’s philosophy is built on a strong defensive structure and then effective transitions. Therefore, this was about the only time that we actually got to see Rostov’s attacking structure in this match, and it’s not a very strong structure. Firstly you have 4 players who are in the same horizontal line. There aren’t players attempting to create shapes around the ball, and therefore there are weak connections between the players in this structure.

Conclusion

Despite their weak attacking structure this is understandable as there philosophy isn’t built on their attacking structure. As a result of the way they play the game they hardly have the opportunity to get into this structure as there game plan is of course built-on a strong defensive structure and effective transitions. However a strong attacking structure would help Rostov when building-up from deep, and even during a counter attack for example within a switch of play. Looking at their defensive structure and their transitional structures this is a very strong Rostov side who will cause a nuisance for Europe’s elite. The other teams within Rostov’s Group D in the Champions League group stage are Bayern Munich, Athletico Madrid and PSV Eindhoven, and for some of these teams Rostov will not only be a nuisance. Don’t be surprised if Rostov cause an upset not only in a one off game, but by getting through this tough group and continuing in this vein deep into the knockout stages of this highly anticipated competition, which of course possesses the highest quality of teams from a tactical point of view, and of course these teams possess individual talent superior to any other competition.