Ancient History Sourcebook:

Diogenes Laërtius:

The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers:

Book VII: The Stoics Contents LIFE OF ZENO LIFE OF ARISTON LIFE OF HERILLUS LIFE OF DIONYSIUS LIFE OF CLEANTHES LIFE OF SPHAERUS LIFE OF CHRYSIPPUS LIFE OF ZENO. [259>] I. ZENO was the son of Innaseas, or Demeas, and a native of Citium, in Cyprus, which is a Grecian city, partly occupied by a Phoenician colony, II. He had his head naturally bent on one side, as Timotheus, the Athenian, tells us, in his work on Lives. And Apollonius, the Tyrian, says that he was thin, very tall, of a dark complexion; in reference to which some one once called him an Egyptian Clematis, as Chrysippus relates in the first yolume of his Proverbs: he had fat, flabby, weak legs, on which account Persaeus, in his Convivial Reminiscences, says that he used to refuse many invitations to supper; and he was very fond, as it is said, of figs both fresh and dried in the sun. III. He was a pupil, as has been already stated, of Crates. After that, they say that he became a pupil of Stilpon and of Xenocrates, for ten years, as Timocrates relates in his Life of Dion. He is also said to have been a pupil of Polemo. But Hecaton, and Apollonius, of Tyre, in the first book of his essay on Zeno, say that when he consulted the oracle, as to what he ought to do to live in the most excellent manner, the God answered him that he ought to become of the same complexion as the dead, on which he inferred that ho ought to apply himself to the reading of the books of the ancients. Accordingly, he attached himself to Crates in the following manner. Having purchased a quantity of purple from Phoenicia, he was shipwrecked close to the Piraeus; and when he had made his way from the coast as far as Athens, he sat down by a booksellers stall, being now about thirty years of age. And as he took up the second book of Xenophons Memorabilia and began to read it, he was delighted with it, and asked where such men as were described in that book lived; and as Crates happened very seasonably to pass at the moment, the book-seller pointed him out, and said, "Follow that man." From [260>]that time forth he became a pupil of Crates; but though hea was in other respects very energetic in his application to philosophy, still he was too modest for the shamelessness of the Cynics. On which account, Crates, wishing to cure him of this false shame, gave him a jar of lentil porridge to carry through the Ceramicns; and when he saw that he was ashamed, and that he endeavored to hide it, he struck the jar with his staff, and broke it; and, as Zeno fled away, and the lentil porridge ran all down his legs, Crates called after him, "Why do you run away, my little Phnician, you have done no harm?" For some time then he continued a pupil of Crates, and when he wrote his treatise entitled the Republic, some said, jokingly, that he bad written it upon the tail of the dog. IV. And besides his Republic, he was the author also of the following works a treatise on a Life according to Nature; one on Appetite, or the Nature of Man; one on Passions; one on the Becoming [rather: on Duty]; one on Law; one on the usual Education of the Greeks; one on Sight; one on the Whole; one on Signs; one on the Doctrines of the Pythagoreans; one on Things in General; one on Styles; five essays on Problems relating to Homer; one on the Bearing [rather: Reading] of the Poets. There is also an essay on Art by him, and two books of Solutions and Jests [rather: Refutations], and Reminiscences, and one called the Ethics of Crates. These are the books of which he was the author. V. But at last he left Crates, and became the pupil of the philosophers whom I have mentioned before, and continued with them for twenty years. So that it is related that be said, "I now find that I made a prosperous voyage when I was wrecked." But some affirm that he made this speech in reference to Crates. Others say, that while he was staying at Athens he heard of a shipwreck, and said, "Fortune does well in having driven us on philosophy." But as some relate the affair, he was not wrecked at all, but sold all his cargo at Athens, and then turned to philosophy. VI. And he used to walk up and down in the beautiful colonnade which is called the Priscanactium, and which is also called poikilê, from the paintings of Polygnotus, and there he delivered his discourses, wishing to make that spot tranquil; for in the time of the thirty, nearly fourteen hundred of the citizens had been murdered there by them. [261>] VII. Accordingly, for the future, men came thither to hear him, and from this his pupils were called Stoics, and so were his successors also, who had been at first called Zenonians, as Epicurus tells us in his Epistles. And before this time, the poets who frequented this colonnade (stoa) had been called Stoics, as we are informed by Eratosthenes, in the eighth book of his treatise on the Old Comedy; but now Zenos pupils made the name more notorious. Now the Athenians had a great respect for Zeno, so that they gave him the keys of their walls, and they also honoured him with a golden crown, and a brazen statue; and this was also done by his own countrymen, who thought the statue of such a man an honour to their city. And the Cittiaeans, in the district of Sidon, also claimed him as their countryman. VIII. He was also much respected by Antigonus, who, whenever he came to Athens, used to attend his lectures, and was constantly inviting him to come to him. But he begged off himself, and sent Persaeus, one of his intimate friends, who was the son of Demetrius, and a Cittiaean by birth, and who flourished about the hundred and thirtieth olympiad, when Zeno was an old man. The letter of Antigonus to Zeno was as follows, and it is reported by Apollonius, the Syrian, in his essay on Zeno. KING ANTIGONUS TO ZENO THE PHILOSOPHER, GREETING. "I think that in good fortune and glory I have the advantage of you; but in reason and education I am inferior to you, also in that perfect happiness which you have attained to. On which account I have thought it good to address you, and invite you to come to me, being convinced that you will not refuse what is asked of you. Endeavour, therefore, by all means to come to me, considering this fact, that you will not be the instructor of me alone, but of all the Macedonians together. For he who instructs the ruler of the Macedonians and who leads him in the path of virtue, evidently marshals all his subjects on the road to happiness. For as the ruler is, so is it natural that his subjects for the most part should be also." And Zeno wrote him hack the following answer. [262>] ZENO TO KING ANTIGONUS, GREETING. "I admire your desire for learning, as being a true object for the wishes of mankind, and one too that tends to their advantage. And the man who aims at the study of philosophy has a proper disregard for the popular kind of instruction which tends only to the corruption of the morals. And you, passing by the pleasure which is so much spoken of, which makes the minds of some young men effeminate, show plainly that you are inclined to noble pursuits, not merely by your nature, but also by your own deliberate choice. And a noble nature, when it has received even a slight degree of training, and which also meets with those who will teach it abundantly, proceeds without difficulty to a perfect attainment of virtue. But I now find my bodily health impaired by old age, for I am eighty years old: on which account I am unable to come to you. But I send you some of those who have studied with me, who in that learning which has reference to the soul, are in no respect inferior to me, and in their bodily vigour are greatly my superiors. And if you associate with them you will want nothing that can bear upon perfect happiness." So he sent him Persaeus and Philonides, the Theban, both of whom are mentioned by Epicurus, in his letter to his brother Aristobulus, as being companions of Antigonus. IX. And I have thought it worth while also to set down the decree of the Athenians concerning him; and it is couched in the following language. "In the archonship of Arrhenides, in the fifth presidency of the tribe Acamantis, on the twenty-first day of the month Maimacterion, on the twenty-third day of the aforesaid presidency, in a duly convened assembly, Hippo, the son of Cratistoteles, of the borough of Xypetion, being one of the presidents, and the rest of the presidents, his colleagues, put the following decree to the vote. And the decree was proposed by Thrason, of Anacaea, the son of Thrason. "Since Zeno the son of Innaseas, the Cittitaean, has passed many years in the city, in the study of philosophy, being in all other respects a good man, and also exhorting all the young men who have sought his company to the practice of virtue, and encouraging them in the practice of temperance making his own life a model to all men of the greatest [263>] excellence, since it has in every respect corresponded to the doctrines which he has taught; it has been determined by the people (and may the determination be fortunate), to praise Zeno, the son of Innaseas, the Cittiaean, and to present him with a golden crown in accordance with the law, on account of his virtue and temperance, and to build him a tomb in the Ceramicus, at the public expense. And the people has appointed by its vote five men from among the citizens of Athens, who shall see to the making of the crown and the building of the tomb. And the scribe of the borough shall enrol the decree and engrave it on two pillars, and he shall be permitted to place one pillar in the Academy, and one in the Lyceum. And he who is appointed to superintend the work shall divide the expense that the pillars amount to, in such a way that every one may understand that the whole people of Athens honours good men both while they are living and after they are dead. And Thrason of Anacaea, Philocles of the Piaeus, Phaedrus of Anaphlystos, Medon of Acharnaes, Mecythus of Sypalyttas, and Dion of Paeania, are hereby appointed to superintend the building of the tomb." These then are the terms of the decree. X. But Antigonus, of Carystos, says, that Zeno himself never denied that he was a native of Cittium. For that when on one occasion, there was a citizen of that town who had contributed to the building of some baths, and was having his name engraved on the pillar, as the countryman of Zeno the philosopher, he bade them add, "Of Cittium." XI. And at another time, when he had had a hollow covering made for some vessel, he carried it about for some money, in order to procure present telief for some difficulties which were distressing Crates his aster. And they say that he, when he first arrived in Greece, had more than a thousand talents, which he lent out at nautical usury. XII. And he used to eat little loaves and honey, and to drink a small quantity of sweet smelling wine. XIII. He had very few youthful acquaintances of the male sex, and he did not cultivate them much, lest be should be thought to be a misogynist. And he dwelt in the same house with Persaeus; and once, when he brought in a female flute-player to him, he hastened to bring her back to him. XIV. And he was, it is said, of a very accommodating [264>] temper; so much so, that Antigonus, the king, often came to dine with him, and often carried him off to dine with hirn, at the house of Aristocles the harp-player; but when he was there, he would presently steal away. XV. It is also said that he avoided a crowd with great care, so that he used to sit at the end of a bench, in order at events to avoid being incommoded on one side. And he never used to walk with more than two or three companions. An he used at times to exact a piece of money from all who came to bear him, with a view of not being distressed by numbers; and this story is told by Cleanthes, in his treatise on Brazen Money. And when he was surrounded by any great crowd, would point to a balustrade of wood at the end of the colonnade which surrounded an altar, and say, "That was once in the middle of this place, but it was placed apart because it was in peoples way; and now, if you will only withdraw from the middle here, you too will incommode me much less." And when Demochares, the son of Laches, embraced him once, and said that he would tell Antigonus, or write to him of everything which he wanted, as he always did everything for him, Zeno, when he had heard him say this, avoided his company for the future. And it is said, that after the death of Zeno, Antigonus said, "What a spectacle have I lost." On which account he employed Thrason, their ambassador, to entreat of the Athenians to allow him to be buried in the Ceramicus. And when he was asked why he had such an admiration for him, he replied, "Because, though I gave him a great many important presents, he was never elated, and never humbled." He was a man of a very investigating spirit, and one who inquired very minutely into everything; in reference to which, Timon, in his Silli, speaks thus: I saw an aged woman of Phoenicia,

Hungry and covetous, in a proud obscurity,

Longing for everything. She had a basket

So full of holes that it retained nothing.

Likewise her mind was less than a simdapsus [W sort of guitar or violin.]" He used to study very carefully with Philo, the dialectician, and to argue with him at their mutual leisure; on which [265>] account he excited the wonder of the younger Zeno, no less than Diodorus his master. XVIII. There were also a lot of dirty beggars always about him, as Timon tells us, where he says Till he collected a vast cloud of beggars,

Who were of all men in the world the poorest,

And the most worthless citizens of Athens. And he himself was a man of a morose and bitter countenance, with a constantly frowning expression. He was very economical, and descended even to the meanness of the barbarians, under the pretence of economy. XIX. If he reproved any one, he did it with brevity and without exaggeration, and as it were, at a distance. I allude, for instance, to the way in which he spoke of a man who took exceeding pains in setting himself off, for as he was crossing a gutter with great hesitation, he said, "He is right to look down upon the mud, for he cannot see himself in it." And when some Cynic one day said that he had no oil in his cruise, and asked him for some, he refused to give him any, but bade him go away and consider which of the two was the more impudent. He was very much in love with Chremonides; and once, when he and Cleanthes were both sitting by him, he got up; and as Cleanthes wondered at this, he said, "I hear from skilful physicians that the best thing for some tumours is rest." Once, when two people were sitting above him at table at a banquet, and the one next him kept kicking the other with his foot, he himself kicked him with his knee; and when he turned round upon him for doing so, he said, "Why then do you think that your other neighbour is to be treated in this way by you?" On one occasion he said to a man who was very fond of young boys, that "Schoolmasters who were always associating with boys had no more intellect than the boys themselves." He used also to say that the discourses of those men who were careful to avoid solecisms, and to adhere to the strictest rules of composition, were like Alexandrine money, they were pleasing to the eye and well-formed like the coni, but were nothing the better for that; but those who were not so particular he likened to the Attic tessedrachmas, which were struck at random and without any great nicety, and so he said that their [266>] discourses often outweighed the more polished styles of the others. And when Ariston, his disciple, had been holding forth a good deal without much wit, but still in some points with a good deal of readiness and confidence, he said to him, "It would be impossible for you to speak thus, if your father had not been drunk when he begat you;" and for the same reason he nicknamed him the chatterer, as he himself was very concise in his speeches. Once, when he was in company with an epicure who usually left nothing for his messmates, and when a large fish was set before him, he took it all as if he could eat the whole of it; and when the others looked at him with astonishment, he said, "What then do you think that your companions feel every day, if you cannot bear with my gluttony for one day?" On one occasion, when a youth was asking him questions with a pertinacity unsuited to his age, he led him to a looking-glass and bade him look at himself, and then asked him whether such questions appeared suitable to the face he saw there. And when a man said before him once, that in most points he did not agree with the doctrines of Antisthenes, he quoted to him an apophthegm of Sophocles, and asked him whether he thought there was much sense in that, and when he said that he did not know, "Are you not then ashamed," said he, "to pick out and recollect anything bad which may have been said by Antisthenes, but not to regard or remember what. ever is said that is good?" A man once said, that the sayings of the philosophers appeared to him very trivial; "You say true," replied Zeno, "and their syllables too ought to be short, if that is possible." When some one spoke to him of Polemo, and said that he proposed one question for discussion and then argued another, he became angry, and said, "At what value did he estimate the subject that had been proposed?" And he said that a man who was to discuss a question ought to have a loud voice and great energy, like the actors, but not to open his mouth too wide, which those who speak a great deal but only talk nonsense usually do. And he used to say that there was no need for those who argued well to leave their hearers room to look about them, as good workmen do who want to have their work seen; but that, on the contrary, those who are listening to them ought to be so attentive to all that is said as to have no leisure to take notes. [267>] Once when a young man was talking a great deal, he said, "Your ears have run down into your tongue." On one occasion a very handsome man was saying that a wise man did not appear to him likely to fall in love; "Then," said he, "I cannot imagine anything that will be more miserable than you good-looking fellows." He also used often to say that most philosophers were wise in great things, but ignorant of petty subjects and chance details; and he used to cite the saying of Caphesius, who, when one of his pupils was labouring hard to be able to blow very powerfully, gave him a slap, and said, that excellence did not depend upon greatness, but greatness on excellence. Once, when a young man was arguing very confidently, he said, "I should not like to say, O youth, all that occurs to me." And once, when a handsome and wealthy Rhodian, but one who had no other qualification, was pressing him to take him as a pupil, he, as he was not inclined to receive him, first of all made him sit on the dusty seats that he might dirt his cloak, then he put him down in the place of the poor that he might rub against their rags, and at last the young man went away. One of his sayings used to be, that vanity was the most unbecoming of all things, and especially so in the young. Another was, that one ought not to try and recollect the exact words and expressions of a discourse, but to fix all ones attention on the arrangement of the arguments, instead of treating it as if it were a piece of boiled meat, or some delicate eatable. He used also to say that young men ought to maintain the most scrupulous reserve in their walking, their gait, and their dress; and he was constantly quoting the lines of Euripides on Capaneus, that His wealth was ample.

But yet no pride did mingle with his state,

Nor had he haughty thought, or arrogance

More than the poorest man. And one of his sayings used to be, that nothing was more unfriendly to the comprehension of the accurate sciences than poetry; and that there was nothing that we stood in so much need of as time. When he was asked what a friend was, he replied, "Another I." They say that he was once scourging a slave whom he had detected in theft; and when he said to him, "It was fated that I should steal ;" he rejoined, "Yes, and that you should be beaten." He used to call beauty the [268>] flower of the voice; but some report this as if he had said that the voice is the flower of beauty. On one occasion, when he saw a slave belonging to one of his friends severely bruised, he said to his friend, "I see the footsteps of your anger." He once accosted a man who was all over unguents and perfumes, "Who is this who smells like a woman ?" When Dionysius Metathemenus asked him why he was the only person whom he did not correct, he replied, "Because I have no confidence in you." A young man was talking a great deal of nonsense, and he said to him, "This is the reason why we have two ears and only one mouth, that we may hear more and speak less." Once, when he was at an entertainment and remained wholly silent, he was asked what the reason was; and so he bade the person who found fault with him tell the king that there was a man in the room who knew how to hold his tongue; now the people who asked him this were ambassadors who had come from Ptolemy, and who wished to know what report they were to make of him to the king. He was once asked how he felt when people abused him, and he said, "As an ambassador feels when he is sent away without an answer." Apollonius of Tyre tells us, that when Crates dragged him by the cloak away from Stilpo, he said. "O Crates, the proper way to take hold of philosophers is by the ears; so now do you convince me and drag me by them; but if you use force towards me, my body may be with you, but my mind with Stilpo." XX. He used to devote a good deal of time to Diodorus, as we learn from Hippobotus; and he studied dialectics under him. And when he had made a good deal of progress he attached himself to Polemo because of his freedom from arrogance, so that it is reported that he said to him, "I am not ignorant, O Zeno, that you slip into the garden-door and steal my doctrines, and then clothe them in a Phoenician dress." When a dialectician once showed him seven species of dialectic argument in the mowing argument [The Greek is, en tôi therizonti logô, a species species of argument so called, because he who used it mowed or knocked down his adversaries  Aldob.], he asked him how much he charged for them, and when he said "A hundred drachmea,""he gave him two hundred, so exceedingly devoted was he to learning. They say too, that he was the first who ever em- [269>] ployed the word duty (kathêkon), and who wrote a treatise on the subject. And that he altered the lines of Hesiod thus: He is the best of all men who submits

To follow good advice; he too is good,

Who of himself perceives whateer is fit. [The Greek text is: Keinos men panaristos hos eu eiponti pithêtai

Esthlos d' au kakeinos hos autos panta noêsêi. The lines in Hesiod are: Keinos men panaristos hos autos panta noêsêi

Esthlos d' au kakeinos hos eu eiponti pithêtai  Works & Days, 293. That man is best, whose unassisted with

Perceives at once what in each case is fit.

And next to him, he is surely most wise,

Who willingly submits to good advice.] For he said that that man who had the capacity to give a proper hearing to what was said, and to avail himself of it, was superior to him who comprehended everything by his own intellect; for that the one had only comprehension, but the one who took good advice had action also. XXII. When he was asked why he, who was generally austere, relaxed at a dinner party, he said, "Lupins too are bitter, but when they are soaked they become sweet." And Hecaton, in the second book of his Apophthegms, says, that in entertainments of that kind, he used to indulge himself freely. And he used to say that it was better to trip with the feet, than with the tongue. And that goodness was attained by little and little, but was not itself a small thing. Some authors, however, attribute this saying to Socrates. XXIII. He was a person of great powers of abstinence and endurance; and of very simple habits, living on food which required no fire to dress it, and wearing a thin cloak, so that it was said of him:  The cold of winter, and the ceaseless rain,

Come powerless against him; weak is the dart

Of the fierce summer sun, or fell disease,

To bend that iron frame. He stands apart,

In nought resembling the vast common crowd;

But, patient and unwearied, night and day,

Clings to his studies and philosophy. [270>] XXIV. And the comic poets, without intending it, praise him in their very attempts to turn him into ridicule. Philemon speaks thus of him in his play entitled the Philosophers : This man adopts a new philosophy,

He teaches to be hungry; nevertheless,

He gets disciples. Bread his only food,

His best desert dried figs; water his drink. But some attribute these lines to Posidippus. And they have become almost a proverb. Accordingly it used to be said of him, "More temperate than Zeno the philosopher." Posidippus also writes thus in his Men Transported : So that for ten whole days he did appear

More temperate than Zenos self. XXV. For in reality he did surpass all men in this description of virtue, and in dignity of demeanour, and, by Jove, in happiness. For he lived ninety-eight years, and then died, without any disease, and continuing in good health to the last. But Persaes, in his Ethical School, states that he died at the age of seventy-two, and that he came to Athens when he was twenty-two years old. But Apollonius says that he presided over his school for forty-eight years. XXVI. And he died in the following manner. When he was going out of his school, he tripped, and broke one of his toes; and striking the ground with his hand, he repeated the line out of the Niobe:  I come: why call me so? And immediately he strangled himself, and so he died. But the Athenians buried him in the Ceramicus, and honoured him with the decrees which I have mentioned before, bearing witness to his virtue. And Antipater, the Sidonian, wrote an inscription for him, which runs thus : Here Cittiums pride, wise Zeno, lies, who climbd

The summits of Olympus; but unmoved

By wicked thoughts neer strove to raise on Ossa

The pine-clad Pelion; nor did he emulate

Th immortal toils of Hercules; but found

A new way for himself to th highest heaven,

By virtue, temperance, and modesty. And Zenodotus, the Stoic, a disciple of Diogenes, wrote another:  [271>] You made contentment the chief rule of life,

Despising haughty wealth, O God-like Zeno.

With solemn look, and hoary brow serene,

You taught a manly doctrine; and didst found

By your deep wisdom, a great novel school,

Chaste parent of unfearing liberty.

And if your country was Phoenicia,

Why need we grieve, from that land Cadmus came,

Who gave to Greece her written books of wisdom. And Athenaeus, the Epigrammatic poet, speaks thus of all the Stoics in common O, ye whove learnt the doctrines of the Porch,

And have committed to your books divine

The best of human learning; teaching men

That the minds virtue is the only good.

And she it is who keeps the lives of men,

And cities, safer than high gates or walls.

But those who place their happiness in pleasure,

Are led by the least worthy of the Muses. And we also have ourselves spoken of the manner of Zenos death, in our collection of poems in all metres, in the following terms: Some say that Zeno, pride of Citium,

Died of old age, when weak and quite worn out;

Some say that famines cruel tooth did slay him;

Some that he fell, and striking hard the ground,

Said, "See, I come, why call me thus impatiently?" For some say that this was the way in which he died. And this is enough to say concerning his death. XXVII. But Demetrius, the Magnesian, says, in his essay on People of the Same Name, that his father Innaseas often came to Athens, as he was a merchant, and that he used to bring back many of the books of the Socratic philosophers, to Zeno, while be was still only a boy; and that, from this circumstance, Zeno had already become talked of in his own country; and that in consequence of this he went to Athens, where he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that it was he who first recommended a clear enunciation of principles, as the best remedy for error. He is said, too, to have been in the habit of swearing "By Capers," as Socrates swore "By the Dog." XXVIII. Some, indeed, among whom is Cassius the Sceptic, attack Zeno on many accounts, saying first of all that he denounced the general system of education in vogue at the [272>] time, as useless, which he did in the beginning of his Republic. And in the second place, that he used to call all who were not virtuous, adversaries, and enemies, and slaves, and unfriendly to one another, parents to their children, brethren to brethren. and kinsmen to kinsmen; and again, that in his Republic, ho speaks of the virtuous as the only citizens, and friends, and relations, and free men, so that in the doctrine of the Stoic, even parents and their children are enemies; for they are not wise. Also, that he lays down the principle of the community of women both in his Republic and in a poem of two hundred verses, and teaches that neither temples nor courts of law, nor gymnasia, ought to be erected in a city; moreover, that he writes thus about money, "That he does not think that men ought to coin money either for purposes of traffic, or of travelling." Besides ail this, he enjoins men and women to wear the same dress, and to leave no part of their person uncovered. XXIX. And that this treatise on the Republic is his work we are assured by Chrysippus, in his Republic. He also discussed amatory subjects in the beginning of that book of his which is entitled the Art of Love. And in his Conversations he writes in a similar manner. Such are the charges made against him by Cassius, and also by Isidorus, of Pergamus, the orator, who says that all the unbecoming doctrines and assertions of the Stoics were cut out of their books by Athenodorus, the Stoic, who was the curator of the library at Pergamus. And that subsequently they were replaced, as Athenodorus was detected, and placed in a situation of great danger; and this is sufficient to say about those doctrines of his which were impugned. XXX. There were eight different persons of the name of Zeno. The first was the Eleatic, whom we shall mention hereafter; the second was this man of whom we are now speaking; the third was a Rhodian, who wrote a history of his country in one book; the fourth was a historian who wrote an account of the expedition of Pyrrhus into Italy and Sicily; and also an epitome of the transactions between the Romans and Carthaginians; the fifth was a disciple of Chrysippus, who wrote very few books, but who left a great number of disciples; the sixth was a physician of Hesophila, a very shrewd man in intellect, but a very indifferent writer; the [273>] seventh was a grammarian, who, besides other writings, has left some epigrams behind him; the eighth was a Sidonian by descent, a philosopher of the Epicurean school, a deep thinker, and very clear writer. XXXI. The disciples of Zeno were very numerous. The most eminent were, first of all, Peraeus, of Cittium, the son of Demetrius, whom some call a friend of his, but others describe him as a servant and one of the amanuenses who were sent to him by Antigonus, to whose son, Halcymeus, he also acted as tutor. And Antigonus once, wishing to make trial of him, caused some false news to be brought to him that his estate had been ravaged by the enemy; and as he began to look gloomy at this news, he said to him, "You see that wealth is not a matter of indifference." The following works are attributed to him. One on Kingly Power; one entitled the Constitution of the Lacedaemonians; one on Marriage; one on Impiety; the Thyestes; an Essay on Love; a volume of Exhortations; one of Conversations; four of Apophthegms; one of Reminiscences; seven treatises, the Laws of Plato. The next was Ariston, of Chios, the son of Miltiades, who was the first author of the doctrine of indifference; then Herillus, who called knowledge the chief good; then Dionysius, who transferred this description to pleasure; as, on account of the violent disease which he had in his eyes, he could not yet bring himself to call pain a thing indifferent. He was a native of Heraclea; there was also Sphaerus, of the Bosphorus; and Cleanthes, of Assos. the son of Phanias, who succeeded him in his school, and whom he used to liken to tablets of hard wax, which are written upon with difficulty, but which retain what is written upon them. And after Zenos death, Sphaerus became a pupil of Cleanthes. And we shall speak of him in our account of Cleanthes. These also were all disciples of Zeno, as we are told by Hippobotus, namely : Philonides, of Theles; Callippus, of Corinth; Posidonius, of Alexandria; Athenodorus, of Soli; and Zeno, a Sidonian. XXXII. And I have thought it best to give a general account of all the Stoic doctrines in the life of Zeno, because he it was who was the founder of the sect. He has written a great many books, of which I have already [274>] given a list, in which he has spoken as no other of the Stoid has. And his doctrines in general are these. But we will enumerate them briefly, as we have been in the habit of doint in the case of the other philosophers. XXXIII. The Stoics divide reason according to philosophy, into three parts; and say that one part relates to natural philosophy, one to ethics, and one to logic. And Zeno, the Cittiaean, was the first who made this division, in his treatise on Reason; and he was followed in it by Chrysippus, in the first book of his treatise on Reason, and in the first book of his treatise on Natural Philosophy; and also by Apollodorus and by Syllus, in the first book of his Introduction to the Doctrines of the Stoics; and by Eudromus, in his Ethical Elements; and by Diogenes, the Babylonian; and Posidorus, Now these divisions are called topics by Apollodorus, species by Chrysippus and Eudromus, and genera by all the rest. And they compare philosophy to an animal, likening logic to the bones and sinews, natural philosophy to the fleshy parts, and ethical philosophy to the soul. Again, they compare it to an egg; calling logic the shell, and ethics the white, and natural philosophy the yolk. Also to a fertile field; in which logic is the fence which goes round it, ethics are the fruit, and natural philosophy the soil, or the fruit-trees. Again, they compare it to a city fortified by walls, and regulated by reason; and then, as some of them say, no one part is preferred to another, but they are all combined and united inseparably; and so they treat of them all in combination. But others class logic first, natural philosophy second, and ethics third as Zeno does in his treatise on Reason, and in this he is followed by Chrysippus, and Archidemus, and Eudromus. For Diogenes of Ptolemais begins with ethics; but Apollodorus places ethics second; and Panaetius and Posidonius begin with natural philosophy, as Phanias, the friend of Posidonius asserts, in the first book of his treatise on the School of Posidonius. But Cleanthes says, that there are six divisions of reason according to philosophy: dialectics, rhetoric, ethics, politics physics, and theology; but others assert that these are not divisions of reason, but of philosophy itself; and this is the opinion advanced by Zeno, of Tarsus, among others. XXXIV. Some again say, that the logical division is [275>] properly subdivided into two sciences, namely, rhetoric and dialectics; and some divide it also into definitive species, which is coversant with rules and tests; while others deny the propriety of this last division altogether, and argue that the object of rules and tests is the discovery of the truth; for it is in this division that they explain the differences of representations. They also argue that, on the other side, the science of definitions has equally for its object the discovery of truth, since we only know things by the intervention of ideas. They also call rhetoric a science conversant about speaking well concerning matters which admit of a detailed narrative; and dialectics they call the science of arguing correctly in discussions which can be carried on by question and answer; on which account they define it thus: a knowledge of what is true, and false, and neither one thing nor the other. Again, rhetoric itself they divide into three kinds; for one description they say is concerning about giving advice, another is forensic, and the third encomiastic; and it is also divided into several parts, one relating to the discovery of arguments, one to style, one to the arrangement of arguments, and the other to the delivery of the speech. And a rhetorical oration they divide into the exordium, the narration, the reply to the statements of the adverse party, and the peroration. XXXV. Dialectics, they say, is divided into two parts; one of which has reference to the things signified, the other to the expression. That which has reference to the things signified or spoken of, they divide again into the topic of things conceived in the fancy, and into those of axioms, of perfect determinations, of predicaments, of things alike, whether upright or prostrate, of tropes, of syllogisms, and of sophisms, which are derived either from the voice or from the things. And these sophisms are of various kinds; there is the false one, the one which states facts, the negative, the sorites, and others like these; the imperfect one, the inexplicable one, the conclusive one, the veiled one, the horned one, the nobody, and the mower. In the second part of dialectics, that which has for its object the expression, they treat of written language, of the different parts of a discourse, of solecism and barbarism, of poetical forms of expression, of ambiguity, of a melodious voice, of music; and some even add definitions, divisions, and diction. [276>] They say that the most useful of these parts is the consideration of syllogisms; for that they show us what are the things which are capable of demonstration, and that contributes much to the formation of our judgment, and their arrangement and memory give a scientific character to our knowledge. They define reasoning to be a system composed of assumptions and conclusions; and syllogism is a syllogistic argument proceeding on them. Demonstration they define to be a method by which one proceeds from that which is more known to that which is less. Perception, again, is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal; and perception they divide into, comprehensible and incomprehensible: Comprehensible, which they call the criterion of facts, and which is produced by a real object, and is, therefore, at the same time conformable to that object; Incomprehensible, which has no relation to any real object, or else, if it has any such relation, does not correspond to it, being but a vague and indistinct representation. Dialectics itself they pronounce to be a necessary science, and a virtue which comprehends several other virtues under its species. And the disposition not to take up one side of an argument hastily, they defined to be a knowledge by which we are taught when we ought to agree to a statement, and when we ought to withhold our agreement. Discretion they consider to be a powerful reason, having reference to what is becoming, so as to prevent our yielding to an irrelevant argument. Irrefutability they define to be a power in an argument, which prevents one from being drawn from it to its opposite. Freedom from vanity, according to them, is a habit which refers the perceptions back to right reason. Again, they define knowledge itself as an assertion or safe comprehension, or habit, which, in the perception of what is seen, never deviates from the truth. And they say further, that without dialectic speculation, the wise man cannot be free from all error in his reasoning. For that that is what distinguishes what is true from what is false, and which easily detects those arguments which are only plausible, and those which depend upon an ambiguity of language. And without dialectics they say it is not possible to ask or answer questions correctly. They also add, that precipitation in denials extends to those things which are done, so that those [277>] who have not properly exercised their perceptions fall into irregularity and thoughtlessness. Again, without dialectics, the wise man cannot be acute, and ingenious, and wary, and altogether dangerous as an arguer. For that it belongs to the same man to speak correctly and to reason correctly, and to discuss properly those subjects which are proposed to him, and to answer readily whatever questions are put to him, all which qualities belong to a man who is skilful in dialectics. This then is a brief summary of their opinions on logic. XXXVI. And, that we may also enter into some more minute details respecting them, we will subjoin what refers to what they call their introductory science, as it is stated by Diocles, of Magnesia, in his Excursion of Philosophers, where he speaks as follows, and we will give his account word for word. The Stoics have chosen to treat, in the first place, of perception and sensation, because the criterion by which the truth of facts is ascertained is a kind of perception, and because the judgment which expresses the belief, and the comprehension, and the understanding of a thing, a judgment which precedes all others, cannot exist without perception. For perception leads the way; and then thought, finding vent in expressions, explains in words the feelings which it derives from perception. But there is a difference between phantasia and phantasma. For phantasma is a conception of the intellect, such as takes place in sleep; but phantasia is an impression, tupôsis, produced on the mind, that is to say, an alteration, alloiôsis, as Chrysippus states in the twelfth book of his treatise on the Soul. For we must not take this impression to resemble that made by a seal, since it is impossible to conceive that there should be many impressions made at the same time on the same thing. But phantasia is understood to be that which is impressed, and formed, and imprinted by a real object, according to a real object, in such a way as it could not be by any other than a real object; and, according to their ideas of the phantasiai, some are sensible, and some are not. Those they call sensible, which are derived by us from some one or more senses; and those they call not sensible, which emanate directly from the thought, as for instance, those which relate to incorporeal objects, or any others which are embraced by reason. Again, those which are sensible, are produced by a 278>] real object, which imposes itself on the intelligence, and compels its acquiescence; and there are also some others, which are simply apparent, mere shadows, which resemble those which are produced by real objects. Again, these phantasiai are divided into rational and irrational; those which are rational belong to animals capable of reason; those which are irrational to animals destitute of reason. Those which are rational are thoughts; those which are irrational have no name; but are again subdivided into artificial and not artificial. At all events, an image is contemplated in a different light by a man skilful in art, from that in which it is viewed by a man ignorant of art. By sensation, the Stoics understand a species of breath which proceeds from the dominant portion of the soul to the senses, whether it be a sensible perception, or an organic disposition, which, according to the notions of some of them, is crippled and vicious. They also call sensation the energy, or active exercise, of the sense. According to them, it is to sensation that we owe our comprehension of white and black, and rough and smooth: from reason, that we derive the notions which result from a demonstration, those for instance which have for their object the existence of Gods, and of Divine Providence. For all our thoughts are formed either by indirect perception, or by similarity, or analogy, or transposition, or combination, or opposition. By a direct perception, we perceive those things which are the objects of sense; by similarity, those which start from some point present to our senses; as, for instance, we form an idea of Socrates from his likeness. We draw our conclusions by analogy, adopting either an increased idea of the thing, as of Tityus, or the Cyclops; or a diminished idea, as of a pigmy. So, too, the idea of the centre of the world was one derived by analogy from what we perceived to be the case of the smaller spheres. We use transposition when we fancy eyes in a mans breast; combination, when we take in the idea of a Centaur; opposition, when we turn our thoughts to death. Some ideas we also derive from comparison, for instance, from a comparison of words and places. There is also nature; as by nature we comprehend what is just and good. And privation, when for instance, we form a notion of a man without hands. Such are the doctrines of [279>] the Stoics, on the subject of phantasia, and sensation, and thought. XXXVII. They say that the proper criterion of truth is the comprehension, phantasia; that is to say, one which is derived from a real object, as Chrysippus asserts in the twelfth book of his Physics; and he is followed by Antipater and Apollodorus. For Boethius leaves a great many criteria, such as intellect, sensation, appetite, and knowledge; but Chrysippus dissents from his view, and in the first book of his treatise on Reason, says, that sensation and preconception are the only criteria. And preconception is, according to him, a comprehensive physical notion of general principles. But others of the earlier Stoics admit right reason as one criterion of the truth; for instance, this is the opinion of Posidonius, and is advanced by him in his essay on Criteria. XXXVIII. On the subject of logical speculation, there appears to be a great unanimity among the greater part of the Stoics, in beginning with the topic of the voice. Now voice is a percussion of the air; or, as Diogenes the Babylonian, defines it, in his essay on the Voice, a sensation peculiar to the hearing. The voice of a beast is a mere percussion of the air by some impetus: but the voice of a man is articulate, and is emitted by intellect, as Diogenes lays it down, and is not brought to perfection in a shorter period than fourteen years. And the voice is a body according to the Stoics; for so it is laid down by Archidemus, in his book on the Voice, and by Diogenes, and Antipater, and also by Chrysippus, in the second volume of his Physics. For everything which makes anything, is a body; and the voice makes something when it proceeds to those who hear from those who speak. A word (lexis), again, is, according to Diogenes, a voice consisting of letters, as "Day." A sentence (logos) is a significant voice, sent out by the intellect, as for instance, "It is day;" but dialect is a peculiar style imprinted on the utterance of nations, according to their race; and causes varieties in the Greek language, being a sort of local habit, as for instance, the Attics say thalatta, and the lonians say hêmerê. The elements of words are the twenty-four letters and the word letter is used in a triple division of sense, meaning the element itself, the graphical sign of the element, and the name, as Alpha. There are seven vowels, a, e, ê, i, o, u, ô; six mutes, b, g, d, k, p, t. But voice is different from [280>] a word, because voice is a sound; but a word is an articulate sound. And a word differs from a sentence, because a sentence is always significative of something, but a word by itself has no signification, as for instance, blitri:. But this is not the case with a sentence. Again, there is a difference between speaking and pronouncing; the sounds are pronounced, but what are spoken are things which are capable of being spoken of. XXXIX. Now of sentences there are five parts, as Diogenes tells us in his treatise on Voice; and he is followed by Chrysippus. There is the noun, the common noun, the verb, the conjunction, and the article. Antipater adds also quality, in his treatise upon Words and the things expressed by them. And a common noun (prosêgoria) is, according to Diogenes, a part of a sentence signifying a common quality, as for instance, man, horse. But a noun is a part of a sentence signifying a peculiar quality, such as Diogenes, Socrates. A verb is a part of a sentence signifying an uncombined categorem, as Diogenes (ho Diogenês) or, as others define it, an element of a sentence, devoid of case, signifying something compound in reference to some person or persons, as, "I write," "I say." A conjunction is a part of a sentence destitute of case, uniting the divisions of the sentence. An article is an element of a sentence, having cases, defining the genders of nouns and their numbers; as ho, hê, to, hoi, hai, ta. XL. The excellences of a sentence are five,good Greek, clearness, conciseness, suitableness, elegance. Good Greek (Hellênismos) is a correct style, according to art, keeping aloof from any vulgar form of expression; clearness is a style which states that which is conceived in the mind in such a way that it is easily known: conciseness is a style which embraces all that is necessary to the clear explanation of the subject under. discussion; suitableness is a style suited to the subject; elegance is a style which avoids all peculiarity of expression. Of the vices of a sentence, on the other hand, barbarism is a use of words contrary to that in vogue among the well-educated Greeks; solecism is a sentence incongruously put together. XLI. A poetical expression is, as Posidonius defines it in his introduction on Style, "A metrical or rhythmical diction, proceeding in preparation, and avoiding all resemblance to prose." For instance, "The vast and boundless earth," "Th expanse of heaven," are rhythmical expressions; and [281>] poetry is a collection of poetical expressions signifying something, containing an imitation of divine and human beings. XLII. A definition is, as Antipater explains it in the first book of his treatise on Definitions, a sentence proceeding by analysis enunciated in such a way as to give a complete idea; or, as Chrysippus says in his treatise on Definitions, it is the explanation of an idea. Description is a sentence which, in a figurative manner, brings one to a knowledge of the subject, or it may be called a simpler kind of definition, expressing the power of a definition in plainer language. Genus is a comprehending of many ideas indissolubly connected, as animal; for this one expression comprehends all particular kinds of animals. An idea is an imagination of the mind which does not express actually anything real, or any quality, but only a quasi reality and a quasi quality; such, for instance, is the idea of a horse when a horse is not present. Species is that which is comprehended under genius, as man is comprehended under animal. Again, that is the most general genus which, being a genus itself, has no other genus, as the existent. And that is the most special species, which being a species has no other species, as, for instance, Socrates. XLIII. The division of genus is a dissection of it into the proximate species; as, for instance, "Of animals, some are rational, others irrational." Contrary division is the dissection of genus into species on the principle of the contrary; so as to be by a sort of negation; as, for instance, "Of existent things, some are good and some not good;" and, "Of things which arc not good, some are bad and some indifferent." Partition is an arrangement of a genus with reference to place, as Crinis says, for instance, "Of goods, some have reference to the mind and some to the body." XLIV. Ambiguity (amphibolia) is an expression signifying two or more things having an ordinary or a peculiar meaning, according to the pronunciation, in such a way that more things than one may be understood by the very same expression. Take, for instance, the words aulêtris peptôke. For you may understand by them, a house has fallen down three times (aulêtris peptôke), or, a female flute-player has fallen, taking aulêtris as synonymous with aulêtria. LV. Dialectics are, as Posidonius explains them, the science [282>] of what is true and false, and neither one or the other, and it is, as Chrysippus explains it, conversant about words that signify and things that are signified; these then are the doctrines asserted by the Stoics in their speculations on the subject of the voice. XLVI. But in that part of dialectics which concerns things and ideas signified, they treat of propositions, of perfect enunciations, of judgments, of syllogisms, of imperfect enunciations, of attributes and deficiencies, and of both direct and indirect categorems or predicaments. XLVII. And they say that enunciation is the manifestation of the ideal perception; and these enunciations the Stoics pronounce some to be perfect in themselves, and some to be defective; now those are defective, which furnish an incomplete sense, as for instance, "He writes." For then we ask further, "Who writes?" But those are perfect in themselves, which give a sense entirely complete, as for instance, " Socrates writes." Accordingly, in the defective enunciations, categorems are applied; but in those which are perfect in themselves, axioms,. and syllogisms, and questions, and interrogations, are brought into play. Now a categorem is something which is predicated of something else, being either a thing which is added to one or more objects, according to the definition of Apollodorus, or else a defective enunciation added to the nominative case, for the purpose of forming a proposition. Now of categorems, some are accidents . . . . as for instance, "The sailing through a rock." . . . . And of categorems, some are direct, some indirect, and some neither one nor the other. Now those are correct, which are construed with one of the oblique cases, in such a manner as to produce a categorem, as for instance, "He hears, he sees, he converses." And those are indirect, which are construed with the passive voice, as for instance, "I am heard, I am seen." [283>] And those which are neither one nor the other, are those which are construed in a neutral kind of manner, as for instance, "To think, to walk." And those are reciprocal, which are among the indirect ones, with out being indirect themselves. Those are effects, energêmata, which are such words as, "He is shaved;" for then, the man who is shaved, implies himself. The oblique cases, are the genitive, the dative, and the accusative. XLVIII. An axiom, is that thing which is true, or false, or perfect in itself, being asserted, or denied positively, as far as depends upon itself; as Chrysippus explains it in his Dialectic Definitions; as for instance, "It is day," "Dion is walking." And it has received the name of axiom, axiôma, because it is either maintained, axioutai, or repudiated. For the man who says, "It is day," appears to maintain the fact of its being day. If then it is day, the axiom put before one is true; but if it is not day, the axiom is false. And an axiom, a question, and an interrogation, differ from one another, and so does an imperative proposition from one which is adjurative, or imprecatory, or hypothetical, or appellative, or false. For that is an axiom which we utter, when we affirm anything positively, which is either true or false. And a question is a thing complete in itself, as also is an axiom, but which requires an answer, as for instance, " Is it day?" Now this is neither true nor false; but, as "It is day" is an axiom; so is, "Is it day?" a question. But an interrogation, tusma, is a thing to which it is not possible to make an answer symbolically, as in the case of a question erôtêma, saying merely "Yes," but we must reply, "He does live in this place." The imperative proposition is a thing which we utter when we give an order, as for instance this Do you now go to the sweet stream of Inachus.

[This line is from the Inachus of Sophocles, (one of his lost plays).] The appellative proposition is one which is used in the ease in which, when a man says anything, he must address somebody, as for instance : Atridos, glorious king of men,

Most mighty Agamemnon.

[Homer, Illiad, ii, 484] A false judgment is a proposition, which, while it has at the [284>] same time the appearance of a real judgment, loses this:character by the addition, and under the influence of, some particle, as for instance The Parthenon at least is beautiful. How like the herdsman is to Priams Sons. There is also the dubitative proposition, which differs from the judgment, inasmuch as it is always uttered in the form of a doubt; as for instance: Are not, then, grief and life two kindred states?

[This line is from, the Citharista of Menander.] But questions, and interrogations, and things like these, are neither true nor false, while judgments and propositions are necessarily one or the other. Now of axioms, some are simple, and others are not simple; as Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Athenodorus, and Antipater, and Crinis, agree in dividing them. Those are simple, which consist of an axiom or proposition, which is not ambiguous, (or of several axioms, or propositions of the same character,) as for instance the sentence, "It is day." And; those are not simple, which consist of an axiom or proposition; which is ambiguous, or of several axioms or propositions of that character. Of an axiom, or proposition, which is ambiguous, as "If it is day;" of several axioms, or propositions of that character, as, "If it is day, it is light." And simple propositions are divided into the affirmative, the negative, the privative, the categorical, the definite, and the indefinite; those which are not simple, are divided into the combined, and the adjunctive, the connected and the disjunctive, and the causal and the augmentative, and the diminutive. That is an affirmative proposition, "It is not day." And the species of this is doubly affirmative. That again is doubly affirmative, which is affirmative of an affirmative, as for instance, "It is not not day;" for this amounts to, "It is day." That is a negative proposition, which consists of a negative particle and a categorem, as for instance, "No one is walking." That is a privative proposition which consists of a privative particle and an axiom according to power, as "This man is inhuman." That is a categorical proposition, which consists of a nominative case and a categorem, as for instance, "Dion is walking." That is a definite proposition, [285>] which consists of a demonstrative nominative case and a categorem, as for instance, "This man is walking." That is an indefinite one which consists of an indefinite particle, or of indefinite particles, as for instance, " Somebody is walking," "Re is moving." Of propositions which are not simple, the combined proposition is, as Chrysippus states, in his Dialectics, and Diogenes, too, in his Dialectic Art; that which is held together by the copulative conjunction "if." And this conjunction professes that the second member of the sentence follows the first, as for instance, "If it is day, it is light." That which is adjunctive is, as Crinis states in his Dialectic Art, an axiom which is made to depend on the conjunction "since" (epei), beginning with an axiom and ending in an axiom, as for instance, "Since it is day, it is light." And this conjunction professes both that the second portion of the proposition follows the first, and the first is true. That is a connected proposition which is connected by some copulative conjunctions, as for instance, "It both is day, and it is light." That is a disjunctive proposition which is disconnected by the disjunctive conjunction, "or" (êtoi) as for instance, "It is either day or night." And this proposition professes that one or other of these propositions is false. That is a causal proposition which is connected by the word, "because;" as for instance, "Because it is day, it is light." For the first is, as it were, the cause of the second. That is an augmentative proposition, which explains the greater, which is construed with an augmentative particle, and which is placed between the two members of the proposition, as for instance, "It is rather day than night." The diminutive proposition is, in every respect, the exact contrary of the preceding one; as for instance, "It is less night than day." Again, at times, axioms or propositions are opposed to one another in respect of their truth and falsehood, when one is an express denial of the other; as for instance, "It is day," and, "It is not day." Again, a conjunctive proposition is correct, when it is such that the opposite of the conclusion is contradictory of the premise; as for instance, the proposition, "If it is day, it is light," is true; for, "It is not light," which is the opposite to the conclusion expressed, is contradictory to the premise, "It is day." And a conjunctive proposition is incorrect, when it [286>] is such that the opposite of the conclusion is not inconsistent with the premise, as for instance, " If it is day, Dion is walking." For the fact that Dion is not walking, is not contradictory of the premise, "It is day." An adjunctive proposition is correct, which begins with a true premise, and ends in a consequence which follows of necessity, as for instance, "Since it is day, the sun is above the earth." But it is incorrect when it either begins with a false premise, or ends with a consequence which does not follow properly; as for instance, "Since it is night, Dion is walking," for this may be said in the day-time. A causal proposition is correct, when it begins with a true premise, and ends in a consequence which necessarily follows from it, but yet does not have its premise reciprocally consequent upon its conclusion; as for instance, "Because it is day, it is light." For the fact of its being light, is a necessary consequence of its being day; but the fact of its being day, is not necessarily a consequence of its being light. A causal proposition is incorrect, which either begins with a false premise, or ends with a conclusion that does not follow from it, or which has a premise which does not correspond to the conclusion; as for instance, "Because it is night, Dion is walking." A proposition is persuasive, which leads to the assent of the mind, as for instance, "If she brought him forth, she is his mother." But still this is a falsehood, for a hen is not the mother of an egg. Again, there are some propositions which are possible, and some which are impossible; and some which are necessary, and some which are not necessary. That is possible, which is capable of being true, since external circumstances are no hindrance to its being true; as for instance, "Diocles lives." And that is impossible which is not capable of being true; as for instance, "The earth flies." That is necessary which, being true, is not capable of being false; or perhaps is intrinsically capable of being false, but still has external circumstances which hinder its being false, as for instance, "Virtue profits a man." That again, is not necessary, which is true, but which has a capacity of being false, though external circumstances offer no hindrance to either alternative; as for instance, "Dion walks." That is a reasonable or probable proposition, which has a [287>] great preponderance of opportunities in favour of its being true; as for instance, "I shall be alive to-morrow." And there are other different kinds of propositions and conversions of them, from true to false, and reconversions again; concerning which we must speak at some length. XLIX. An argument, as Criuis says, is that which is composed of a lemma or major premise, an assumption or minor premise, and a conclusion; as for instance this, "If it is day, it is light;" "But it is day, therefore it is light." For the lemma, or major premise, is, "If it is day, it is light." The assumption, or minor premise, is, "It is day." The conclusion follows, "Therefore it is light." The mode of a proposition is, as it were, a figure of an argument, as for instance, such as this, "If it is the first, it is the second ; but it is the first, therefore it is the second." A conditional syllogism is that which is composed of both the preceding arguments; as for instance, "If Plato is alive, Plato breathes; but the first fact is so, therefore so is the second." And this conditional syllogism has been introduced for the sake, in long and complex sentences, of not being forced to repeat the assumption, as it was a long one, and also the conclusion; but of being able, instead, to content ones self with summing it up briefly thus, "The first case put is true, therefore so is the second." Of arguments, some are conclusive, others are inconclusive. Those are inconclusive which are such, that the opposite of the conclusion drawn in them is not necessarily incompatible with the connection of the premises. As for instance, such arguments as these, " If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore, Dion is walking." But of conclusive arguments, some are called properly by the kindred name conclusions, and some are called syllogistic arguments. Those then are syllogistic which are either such as do not admit of demonstration, or such as are brought to an indemonstrable conclusion, according to some one or more propositions; such for instance as the following: "If Dion walks, then Dion is in motion." Those are conclusive, which infer their conclusion specially, and not syllogistically; such for instance, as this, "The proposition it is both day and night is false. Now it is day; therefore, it is not night." Those again, are unsyllogistic arguments which have an air [288>] of probability about them, and a resemblance to syllogistic ones, but which still do not lead to the deduction of proper. conclusions. As for instance, "If Dion is a horse, Dion is an animal; but Dion is not a horse, therefore, Dion is not an animal." Again, of arguments, some are true, and some are false. Those are true which deduce a conclusion from true premises, as, for instance, "If virtue profits, then vice injures." And those are false which have some falsehood in their premises, or which are inconclusive; as, for instance, "If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore, Dion is alive." There are also arguments which are possible, and others which are impossible; some likewise which are necessary, and others which are not necessary. There are too, some which are not demonstrated from their not standing in need of demonstration, and these are laid down differently by different people; but Chrysippus enumerates five kinds, which serve as the foundation for every kind of argument; and which are assumed in conclusive arguments properly so called, and in syllogisms, and in modes. The first kind that is not demonstrated, is that in which the whole argument consists of a conjunctive and an antecedent; and in which the first term repeats itself so as to form a sort of conjunctive proposition, and to bring forward as the conclusion the last term. As, for instance, "If the first be true, so is the second; but the first is true, therefore, so is the second." The second kind that is not demonstrated, is that which, by means of the conjunctive and the opposite of the conclusion, has a conclusion opposite to the first premise. As, for instance, "If it be day, it is light; but it is night, therefore it is not day." For here the assumption arises from the opposite of the conclusion, and the conclusion from the opposite of the first term. The third kind that is not demonstrative, is that which, by a negative combination, and by one of the terms in the proposition, produces the contradictory of the remainder; as, for instance, "Plato is not dead and alive at the same time but Plato is dead; therefore, Plato is not alive." The fourth kind that is not demonstrative, is that which, by means of a disjunctive, and one of those terms which are in the disjunctive, has a conclusion opposite to what remains; as, for instance, "It is either the first, or the second: but it [289>] is the first; therefore, it is not the second." The fifth kind that is not demonstrative, is that in which the whole argument consists of a disjunctive proposition, and the opposite of one of the terms, and then one makes the conclusion identical with the remainder; as, for instance, "It is either day or night but it is not night; therefore it is day." According to the Stoics, truth follows upon truth, as "It is light," follows upon "It is day." And falsehood follows upon falsehood; as, "If it is false that it is night, it is also false that it is dark." Sometimes too, truth follows from falsehood; for instance, though it is false that "the earth flies," it is true that "there is the earth." But falsehood does never follow from truth; for, from the fact that "there is the earth," it does not follow "that the earth flies." There are also some arguments which are perplexed, being veiled and escaping notice; or such as are called sorites, the horned one, or the nobody. That is a veiled argument* which resembles the following one; "two are not a few, nor three, nor those, nor four, and so on to ten; but two are few; therefore, so are ten few." [* It would appear that there is a considerable hiatus here; for the instance following is a sorites, and not a specimen of the veiled argument. And there is no instance given of the concealed, or of the horned one. Still, the mere fact of the text being unintelligible, is far from proving that we have not got it as Diogenes wrote it; as though in the language of the writer in Smiths Biographical Dictionary, vol. i. pp. 1022, 1023, "the work contains a rich store of living features, which serve to illustrate the private life of the Greeks," it is equally clear that the author "was unequal to writing a history of Greek philosophy. His work in reality is nothing but a compilation of the most heterogeneous and often contradictory accounts .. The traces of carelessness and mistakes are very numerous; much in the work is confused, and there is also much that is quite absurd. And as far as philosophy itself is concerned, Diogenes very frequently did not know what he was talking about when he abridged the theories of the philosophers."] The nobody is a conjunctive argument, and one that consists of the indefinite and the definite, and which has a minor premise and a conclusion; as, for instance, "If any one is here, he is not in Rhodes." L. Such then are the doctrines which the Stoics maintain on the subject of logic, in order as far as possible to establish their point that the logician is the only wise man. For they assert that all affairs are looked at by means of that speculation [290>] which proceeds by argument, including under this assertion both those that belong to natural aud also those which belong to moral philosophy for, say they, how else could one determine the exact value of nouns, or how else could one explain what laws are imposed upon such and such actions? Moreover, as there are two habits both incidental to virtue, the one considers what each existing thing is, and the other inquires what it is called. These then are the notions of the Stoics on the subject of logic. LI. The ethical part of philosophy they divide into the topic of inclination, the topic of good and bad, the topic of the passions, the topic of virtue, the topic of the chief good, and of primary estimation, and of actions; the topic of what things are becoming, and of exhortation and dissuasion. And this division is the one laid down by Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Zeno, of Tarsus, and Apollodorus, and Diogenes, and Antipater, and Posidonius. For Zeno, of Cittium, and Cleanthes, have, as being more ancient they were likely to, adopted a more simple method of treating these subjects. But these men divided logical and the natural philosophy. LII. They say that the first inclination which an animal has is to protect itself, as nature brings herself to take an interest in it from the beginning, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his treatise on Ends; where he says, that the first and dearest object to every animal is its own existence, and its consciousness of that existence. For that it is not natural for any animal to be alienated from itself, or even to be brought into such a state as to be indifferent to itself, being neither alienated from nor interested in itself. It remains, therefore, that we must assert that nature has bound the animal to itself by the greatest unanimity and affection for by that means it repels all that is injurious, and attracts all that is akin to it and desirable. But as for what some people say, that the first inclination of animals is to pleasure, they say what is false. For they say that pleasure, if there be any such thing at all, is an accessory only, which, nature, having sought it out by itself, as well as these things which are adapted to its constitution, receives incidentally in the same manner as animals are pleased, and plants made to flourish. Moreover, say they, nature makes no difference between [291>] animals and plants, when she regulates them. so as to leave them without voluntary motion or sense; and some things too take place in ourselves in the same manner as in plants. But, as inclination in animals tends chiefly to the point of making them pursue what is appropriate to them, we may say that their inclinations are regulated by nature. And as reason is given to rational animals according to a more perfect principle, it follows, that to live correctly according to reason, is properly predicated of those who live according to nature. For nature is as it were the artist who produces the inclination. LIII. On which account Zeno was the first writer who, in his treatise on the Nature of Man, said, that the chief good was confessedly to live according to nature; which is to live according to virtue, for nature leads us to this point. And in like manner Cleanthes speaks in his treatise on Pleasure, and so do Posidonius and Hecaton in their essays on Ends as the Chief Good. And again, to live according to virtue is the same thing as living according to ones experience of those things which happen by nature; as Chrysippus explains it in the first book of his treatise on the Chief Good. For our individual natures are all parts of universal nature; on which account the chief good is to live in a manner corresponding to nature, and that means corresponding to ones own nature and to universal nature; doing none of those things which the common law of mankind is in the habit of forbidding, and that common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things. Again, this very thing is the virtue of the happy man and the perfect happiness of life when everything is done according to a harmony with the genius of each individual with reference to the will of the universal governor and manager of all things. Diogenes, accordingly, says expressly that the chief good is to act according to sound reason in our selection of things according to our nature. And Archidemus defines it to be living in the discharge of all becoming duties. Chrysippus again understands that the nature, in a manner corresponding to which we ought to live, is both the common nature, and also human nature in particular; but Cleanthes will not admit of any other nature than the common one alone, as that to which people ought to live in a manner corresponding; and re- [293>] pudiates all mention of a particular nature. And he asserts that virtue is a disposition of the mind always consistent and always harmonious; that one ought to seek it out for its own sake, without being influenced by fear or hope by any external influence. Moreover, that it is in it that happiness consists, as producing in the soul the harmony of a life always consistent with itself; and that if a rational animal goes the wrong way, it is because it allows itself to be misled by the deceitful appearances of exterior things, or perhaps by the instigation of those who surround it; for nature herself never gives us any but good inclinations. LIV. Now virtue is, to speak generally, a perfection in everything, as in the case of a statue; whether it is invisible as good health, or speculative as prudence. For Hecaton says, in the first book of his treatise on Virtues, that the scientific and speculative virtues are those which have a constitution arising from speculation and study, as, for instance, prudence and justice; and that those which are not speculative are those which are generally viewed in their extension as a practical result or effect of the former; such for instance, as health and strength. Accordingly, temperance is one of the speculative virtues, and it happens that good health usually follows it, and is marshalled as it were beside it; in the same way as strength follows the proper structure of an arch.  And the unspeculative virtues derive their name from the fact of their not proceeding from any acquiescence reflected by intelligence; but they are derived from others, are only accessories, and are found even in worthless people, as in the case of good health, or courage. And Posidonius, in the first hook of his treaties on Ethics, says that the great proof of the reality of virtue is that Socrates, and Diogenes, and Antisthenes, made great improvement; and the great proof of the reality of vice may be found in the fact of its being opposed to virtue. Again, Chrysippus, in the first book of his treatise on the Chief Good, and Cleanthes, and also Posidonius in his Exhortations, and Hecaton, all agree that virtue may be taught. And that they are right, and that it may be taught, is plain from men becoming good after having been bad. On this account Panaetius teaches that there are two virtues, one speculative and the other practical; but others make three kinds, the logical, the natural, and the ethical. Posidonius [293>] divides virtue into four divisions; and Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater make the divisions more numerous still; for Apollophanes asserts that there is but one virtue, namely, prudence. Among the virtues some are primitive [viz., primary] and some are derived. The primitive ones are prudence, manly courage, justice, and temperance. And subordinate to these, as a kind of species contained in them, are magnanimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, wisdom in council. And the Stoics define prudence as a knowledge of what is good, and bad, and indifferent; justice as a knowledge of what ought to be chosen, what ought to be avoided, and what is indifferent; magnanimity as a knowledge of engendering a lofty habit, superior to all such accidents as happen to all men indifferently, whether they be good or bad; continence they consider a disposition which never abandons right reason, or a habit which never yields to pleasure; endurance they call a knowledge or habit by which we understand what we ought to endure, what we ought not, and what is indifferent; presence of mind they define as a habit which is prompt at finding out what is suitable on a sudden emergency; and wisdom in counsel they think a knowledge which leads us to judge what we are to do, and how we are to do it, in order to act becomingly. And analogously, of vices too there are some which are primary, and some which are subordinate; as, for instance, folly, and cowardice, and injustice, and intemperance, are among the primary vices ; incontinence, slowness, and folly in counsel among the subordinate ones. And the vices are ignorance of those things of which the virtues are the knowledge. LV. Good, looked at in a general way, is some advantage, with the more particular distinction, being partly what is actually useful, partly what is not contrary to utility. On which account virtue itself and the good which partakes of virtue are spoken of in a threefold view of the subject. First, as to what kind of good it is, and from what it ensues; as, for instance, in an action done according to virtue. Secondly, as to the agent, in the case of a good man who partakes of virtue. * * * * * [The third point of view is wanting; and those that are given appear to be ill selected. The French translator, following the hint of Huebner, gives the following passage from Sextus Empiricus (a physician of the Sceptic school, about b.c. 250), in his work against the Philosophers, which he says may serve to rectify and complete the statement of Diogenes Laertins. "Good is said, in one sense of that which produces the useful, or from which the useful results; that is, the good per excellence, virtue. For virtue is as it were the source from which all utility naturally flows. In another sense it is said of that which is accidentally the cause of utility; under this point of view we call good not only virtue, but also those actions which are conformable to virtue, for they are accidentally useful. In the third and last place, we call good everything that possibly can be useful, comprehending under this definition virtue, virtuous actions, friends, good men, the Gods, &c., &c."] [294>] At another time, they define the good in a peculiar manner, as being what is perfect according to the nature of a rational being as rational being. And, secondly, they say that it is conformity to virtue, se that all actions which partake of virtue, and all good men, are themselves in some sense the good. And in the third place, they speak of its accessories, joy, and mirth, and things of that kind. In the same manner they speak of vices, which they divide into folly, cowardice, injustice., and things of that hind. And they consider that these things which partake of vices, and actions done according to vice, and bad men, are themselves in some sense the evil; and its accessories are despondency, and melancholy, and other things of that kind. LVI. Again, of goods, some have reference to the mind, and some are external; and some neither have reference to the mind, nor are external. The goods having reference to the mind are virtues, and actions according to the virtues. The external goods are the having a virtuous country, a virtuous friend, and the happiness of ones country and friend. And these which are not external, and which have no reference to the mind, are such as a mans being virtuous and happy to himself. And reciprocally, of evils, some have reference to the mind, such as the vices and actions according to them; some are external, such as having a foolish country, or a foolish friend, or ones country or ones friend being unhappy. And these evils which are net external, and which have no reference to the mind, are suck as a mans being worthless and unhappy to himself. LVII. Again, of goods, some are final, some are efficient, and some are both final and efficient. For instance, a friend, [295>] and the services done by him to one, are efficient goods; but courage, and prudence, and liberty, and delight, and mirth, and freedom from pain, and all kinds of actions done according to virtue, are final goods. There are too, as I said before, some goods which are both efficient and final; for inasmuch as they produce perfect happiness they are efficient, and inasmuch as they complete it by being themselves parts of it, they are final. And in the same way, of evils, some are final, and some efficient, and some partake of both natures. For instance, an enemy and the injuries done to one by him, are efficient evils; fear, meanness of condition, slavery, want of delight, depression of spirits, excessive grief, and all actions done according to vice, are final evils ; and some partake or both characters, since, inasmuch as they produce perfect unhappiness, they are efficient; and inasmuch as they complete it in such a way as to become parts of it, they are final. LVIII. Again, of the goods which have reference to the mind, some are habits, some are dispositions, and some are neither habits nor dispositions. Dispositions are virtues, habits are practices, and those which are neither habits nor dispositions are energies. And, speaking generally, the following may be called mixed goods: happiness in ones children, and a happy old age. But knowledge is a pure good. And some goods are continually present, such as virtue; and some are not always present, as joy, or taking a walk. LIX. But every good is expedient, and necessary, and profitable, and useful, and serviceable, and beautiful, and advantageous, and eligible, and just. Expedient. inasmuch as it brings us things, which by their happening to us do us good; necessary, inasmuch as it assists us in what we have need to be assisted; profitable, inasmuch as it repays all the care that is expended on it, and makes a return with interest to our great advantage; useful, inasmuch as it supplies us with what is of utility; serviceable, because it does us service which is much praised; beautiful, because it is in accurate proportion to the need we have of it, and to the service it does. Advantageous, inasmuch as it is of such a character as to confer advantage on us; eligible, because it is such, that we may rationally choose it; and just, because it is in accordance with law, and is an efficient cause of union. And they call the honourable the perfect good, because it [296>] has naturally all the numbers which are required by nature, and because it discloses a perfect harmony. Now, the species of this perfect good are four in number: justice, manly courage, temperance, and knowledge; for in these goods all beautiful actions have their accomplishment. And analogously, there are also four species of the disgraceful: injustice, and cowardice, and intemperance, and folly. And the honourable is predicated in one sense, as making these who are possessed of it worthy of all praise; and in a second sense, it is used of what is well adapted by nature for its proper work; and in another sense, when it expresses that which adorns a man, as when we say that the wise man alone is good and honourable. The Stoics also say, that the beautiful is the only good, as Hecaton says, in the third book of his treatise on Goods, and Chrysippus asserts the same principle in his essays on the Beautiful. And they say that this is virtue, and that which partakes of virtue; and this assertion is equal to the other, that everything good is beautiful, and that the good is an equivalent term to the beautiful, inasmuch as the one thing is exactly equal to the other. For since it is good, it is beautiful; and it is beautiful, therefore, it is good. LX. But it seems that all goods are equal, and that every good is to be desired in the highest degree, and that it admits of no relaxation, and of no extension. Moreover, they divide all existing things into good, bad, and indifferent. The good are the virtues, prudence, justice, manly courage, temperance, and the rest of the like qualities. The bad are the contraries, folly, injustice, and the like. Those are indifferent which are neither beneficial nor injurious, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, riches, a good reputation, nobility of birth; and their contraries, death, disease, labour, disgrace, weakness, poverty, a bad reputation, baseness of birth, and the like; as Hecaton lays it down in the seventh book of his treatise on the Chief Good; and he is followed by Apollodorus, in his Ethics, and by Chrysippus. For they affirm that those things are not good but indifferent, though perhaps a little more near to one species than to the other. For, as it is the property of the hot to warm and not to chill one, so it is the property of the good to benefit and not to injure one. Now, wealth and good health cannot be said to benefit any more than to injure any one: therefore, neither [297>] wealth nor good health are goods. Again, they say that that thing is not good which it is possible to use both well and ill. But it is possible to make either a good or a bad use of wealth, or of health; therefore, wealth and good health are not goods. Posidonius, however, affirms that these things do come under the head of goods. But Hecaton, in the nineteenth book of his treatise on Goods, and Chrysippus, in his treatises on Pleasure, both deny that pleasure is a good. For they say that there are disgraceful pleasures, and that nothing disgraceful is good. And that to benefit a person is to move him or to keep him according to virtue, but to injure him is to move him or to keep him according to vice. They also assert, that things indifferent are so spoken of in a twofold manner; firstly, those things are called so, which have no influence in producing either happiness or unhappiness; such for instance, as riches, glory, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible for a man to be happy without any of these things; and also, it is upon the character of the use that is made of them, that happiness or unhappiness depends. In another sense, those things are called indifferent, which do not excite any inclination or aversion, as for instance, the fact of a mans having an odd or an even number of hairs on his head, or his putting out or drawing back his finger; for it is not in this sense that the things previously mentioned are called indifferent, for they do excite inclination or aversion. On which account some of them are chosen, though there is equal reason for preferring or shunning all the others. LXI. Again, of things indifferent, they call some preferred (proêgmena), and others rejected (apoproêgmena). Those are preferred, which have some proper value (axian), and those are rejected, which have no value at all (apaxian echonta). And by the term proper value, they mean that quality of things, which causes them to concur in producing a well-regulated life; and in this sense, every good has a proper value. Again, they say that a thing has value, when in some point of view, it has a sort of intermediate power of aiding us to live conformably to nature; and under this class, we may range riches or good health, if they give any assistance to natural life. Again, value is predicated of the price which one gives for the attainment of an object, which some one, [298>] who has experience of the object sought, fixes as its fair price; as if we were to say, for instance, that as some wheat was to be exchanged for barley, with a mule thrown in to make up the difference. Those goods then are preferred, which have a value, as in the case of the mental goods, ability, skill, improvement, and the like; and in the case of the corporeal goods, life, health, strength, a good constitution, soundness, beauty; and in the case of external goods, riches, glory, nobility of birth, and the like. Rejected things are, in the case of qualities of the mind, stupidity, unskilfulness, and the like; in the case of circumstances affecting the body, death, disease, weakness, a bad constitution, mutilation, disgrace, and the like; in the case of external circumstances, poverty, want of reputation, ignoble birth, and the like. But those qualities and circumstances which are indifferent, are neither preferred nor rejected. Again, of things preferred, some are preferred for their own sakes, some for the sake of other things, and some partly for their own sakes and partly for that of other things. Those which are preferred for their own sakes, are ability, improvement, and the like; those which are preferred for the sake of other things, are wealth, nobility of birth, and the like; those which are preferred partly for their own sake, and partly for that of something else, are strength, vigour of the senses, universal soundness, and the like; or they are preferred, for their own sakes, inasmuch as they are in accordance with nature; and for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are productive of no small number of advantages; and the same is the case in the inverse ratio, with those things which are rejected. LXII. Again, they say that that is duty, which is preferred, and which contains in itself reasonable arguments why we should prefer it; as for instance, its corresponding to the nature of life itself; and this argument extends to plants and animals, for even their nature is subject to the obligation of certain duties. And duty (to kathêkon) had this name given to it by Zeno, in the first instance, its appellation being derived from its coming to, or according to some people, apo tou kata tinas hêkein; and its effect is something kindred to the preparations made by nature. Now of the things done according to inclination, some are duties, and some are contrary to duty; and some are neither duties nor contrary to duty, [299>] These are duties, which reason selects to do, as for instance, to honour ones parents, ones brothers, ones country, to gratify ones friends. These actions are contrary to duty, which reason does not choose; as for instance, to neglect ones parents, to be indifferent to ones brothers, to shirk assisting ones friends, to be careless about the welfare of ones country, and se on. Those are neither duties, nor contrary to duty, which reason neither selects to do, nor, on the other hand, repudiates, such actions, for instance, as to pick up straw, to hold a pen, or a comb, or things of that sort. Again, there are some duties which do not depend on circumstances, and some which do. These do not depend on circumstances, to take care of ones health, and of the sound state of ones senses, and the like. Those which do depend on circumstances, are the mutilation of ones members, the sacrificing of ones property, and so on. And the case of these actions which are contrary to duty, is similar. Again, of duties, some are always such, and some are not always. What is always a duty, is to live in accordance with virtue; but to ask questions, to give answers, to walk, and the like, are not always duties. And the same statement holds good with respect to acts contrary to duty. There is also a class of intermediate duties, such as the duty of boys obeying their masters. LXIII, The Stoics also say that the mind is divisible into eight parts; for that the five organs of sensation, and the vocal power, and the intellectual power, which is the mind itself, and the generative power, are all parts of the mind. But by error, there is produced a perversion which operates on the intellect, from which many perturbations arise, and many causes of inconstancy. And all perturbation is itself, according to Zeno, a movement of the mind, or superfluous inclination, which is irrational, and contrary to nature. Moreover, of the superior class of perturbations, as Hecaton says, in the second book of his treatise on the Passions, and as Zeno also says in his work on the Passions, there are four kinds, grief, fear, desire, and pleasure. And they consider that these perturbations are judgments, as Chrysippus contends in his work on the Passions; for covetousness is an opinion that money is a beautiful object, and in like manner drunkenness and intemperance, and other things of the sort, are judg- [300>] ments. And grief they define to be an irrational contraction of the mind, and it is divided into the following species, pity, envy, emulation, jealousy, pain, perturbation, sorrow, anguish, confusion. Pity is a grief over some one, on the ground of his being in undeserved distress. Envy is a grief, at the good fortune of another. Emulation is a grief at that belonging to some one else, which one desires ones self. Jealousy is a grief at another also having what one has ones self. Pain is a grief which weighs one down. Perturbation is grief which narrows one, and causes one to feel in a strait. Sorrow is a grief arising from deliberate thought, which endures for some time, and gradually increases. Anguish is a grief with acute pain. Confusion is an irrational grief, which frets one, and prevents one from clearly discerning present circumstances. But fear is the expectation of evil; and the following feelings are all classed under the head of fear: apprehension, hesitation, shame, perplexity, trepidation, and anxiety. Apprehension is a fear which produces alarm. Shame is a fear of discredit. Hesitation is a fear of coming activity. Perplexity is a fear, from the imagination of some unusual thing. Trepidation is a fear accompanied with an oppression of the voice. Anxiety is a fear of some uncertain event. Again, desire is an irrational appetite; to which head, the following feelings are referable: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, enmity, rage. Want is a desire arising from our not having something or other, and is, as it were, separated from the thing. but is still stretching, and attracted towards it in vain. And hatred is a desire that it should be ill with some one, accompanied with a certain continual increase and extension. Contentiousness is a certain desire accompanied I with deliberate choice. Anger is a desire of revenge, on a person who appears to have injured one in an unbecoming way. Love is a desire not conversant about a virtuous object, for it is an attempt to conciliate affection, because of some beauty which is seen. Enmity is a certain anger of long duration, and full of hatred, and it is a watchful passion, as is shown in the following lines:  For though we deem the short-livd fury past,

Tie sure the mighty will revenge at last.

[Homer Illiad I 81.] But rage is anger at its commencement. Again, pleasure is an irrational elation of the mind over something which appears to be desirable; and its different species are enjoyment, rejoicing at evil, delight, and extravagant joy. Enjoyment now, is a pleasure which charms the mind through the ears. Rejoicing at evil (epichairekakia), is a pleasure which arises at the misfortunes of others. Delight (terpsis) that is to say turning (trepsis), is a certain turning of the soul (trotropê tis psychês), to softness. Extravagant joy is the dissolution of virtue. And as there are said to he some sicknesses (arrhôstêmata) in the body, as, for instance, gout and arthritic disorders; so too are those diseases of the soul, such as a fondness for glory, or for pleasure, and other feelings of that sort. For an arrhôstêma is a disease accompanied with weakness; and a disease is an opinion of something which appears exceedingly desirable. And, as in the case of the body, there are illnesses to which people are especially liable, such as colds or diarrhea; so also are there propensities which the mind is under the influence of, such as enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and so on. There are also three good dispositions of the mind; joy, caution, and will. And joy they say is the opposite of pleasure, since it is a rational elation of the mind; so caution is the opposite of fear, being a rational avoidance of anything, for the wise man will never