Dec 20, 2016

After a long period of heavy fighting over the city of Aleppo, the Syrian army and its allies have managed to retake almost all of it from the rebel forces. It is a considerable achievement not only for the Syrian government, but also for Russia and Iran as its main allies. The victory in Aleppo came amid continued diplomatic efforts to address the violence in Syria.

On Dec. 8, Moscow announced a new round of talks between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his US counterpart, Secretary of State John Kerry, to try to find a solution for the embattled city and possibly the entire country. As anticipated from the moment the talks were announced, and like the previous peace efforts by the two powers, the new diplomatic initiative did not lead to a successful outcome. Indeed, as early as Dec. 12, it was declared that the dialogue had ended in deadlock.

Of interest, however, is that Iran was once again not a part of Russia’s diplomatic maneuvering on Syria, and this raises questions about Tehran's place in Russia’s overall Syrian strategy. In fact, although Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bugdanov said that he had informed Iran of the latest US proposal, the Iranians denied receiving information in this regard.

That said, Russia’s agreeing to enter a new round of talks with the United States was not a serious effort to reach a peace agreement, but had primarily been driven by two other factors: First, Russia’s decision was announced a short time after the Barack Obama administration showed a willingness to increase support for Syrian rebels with deliveries of more sophisticated weapons. Second, international pressure on Moscow and its Syrian policy increased after Moscow vetoed a proposed resolution on humanitarian access to Aleppo at the UN Security Council Dec. 5. Thus, declaring its willingness to hold talks with the United States was merely a tactical move by Moscow to suggest that it is ready for a political resolution on Syria, effectively killing time until the next US administration, which by all indications will probably have a more positive attitude toward Russia. Awareness of these dynamics may have caused Tehran to stifle any expressions of opposition it might have had to the US-Russian talks, and the Syrian government’s victory in Aleppo proved that the tactic had been successful, as it paused any intention by the United States to take more serious steps regarding Aleppo. What will come next?

As discussed in Al-Monitor early in the year, keeping the current Syrian ruling establishment in place and preventing its opponents from seizing power has been the overriding objective bringing Iran and Russia together in Syria. This shared interest aside, each is also pursuing individual goals that they do not necessarily share entirely. Thus, as the situation moves closer to the realization of these separate goals, one can anticipate that differences in the Russian and Iranian approaches will become more apparent.