The recent Finnish white paper on defence (fi. Puolustusselonteko) is grim reading, but should be commended for its honesty. Most importantly, the picture it portrays is far more serious than it has been reported.

The current environment (found in chapter 2) is dominated by Russia. The country is modernizing its armed forces, and in addition to the ‘Ukrainian conflict’ and Syria, it has shown its ability ‘to make strategic decisions swiftly’ and use military and non-military measures in a coordinated way to reach its goals. It also maintains units from all services in a constant state of high-readiness, and is able to transfer these rapidly over significant distances. Other security authorities, such as EMERCOM, are also able to take part in and provide resources to the defence forces in times of crises.

Crucially, this ability is coupled with a voiced goal of reinstating spheres of influence as a part of the international security environment.

This is contrasted with NATO, which is developing its military readiness, with the ‘aim of stabilising security in its own area’.

Chapter four describes the politics behind the Finnish national security decisions in further detail. As this was not the focus area of this white paper but of earlier ones, this is largely a rehash of old phrases. Finland is militarily non-aligned, maintains an option to apply for NATO-membership, taking part in military exercises strengthens our national ability, and so forth.

What is eye-catching is the first sentence of chapter 4.3:

Finland’s defence requires […] the ability to receive international assistance.

This is a bizarre statement. Not in and by itself, but because it clearly gives away the fact that the higher echelons of the national security leadership believe that we aren’t able to defend ourselves with our own resources, but will need outside assistance. This isn’t a new opinion in the defence discussions, but the higher political (and sometimes military) leadership has usually been keen to deny this being the case.

The reason is obvious: if we can’t defend ourselves, then we ought to remedy this be securing assistance, right? Maybe by joining a bunch of other democratic countries which have the ‘aim of stabilising security in its own area’?

Having glossed over this obvious follow-up question, the rest of the white paper is largely dealing with current and future capabilities of the defence forces.

Chapter three describes the current state of the Army as ‘satisfactory’. Modern material has been bought to replace those that have become obsolete, though financial restraints means that the quantities bought are too small. On the whole, it is repeated in a number of places that the Finnish Defence Forces is unable to build up the stocks of weapons and other equipment needed to fight a prolonged conflict. Especially when it comes to intelligence gathering, C3, logistics, and deep strike capabilities, there are significant deficits in the current organisation and stocks.

The Air Force and the Navy are currently in somewhat better shape, and they also have clear plans for how to maintain their fighting power in the upcoming decades. Still, the mentions about the small number of long-range munitions is probably as true for the Air Force as it is for the other branches. An interesting side note is the fact that the Air Force in several places is mentioned as taking part in not only land battles but sea ones as well, by providing fire support. The Air Force currently lacks weaponry to provide any kind of serious anti-ship (not to mention ASW) capability, so it remains to be seen how this hole is to be plugged.

The Voluntary Local Defence Forces and MPK will take a more prominent role in localised defence duties, as well as by providing support to other government agencies. These are to be equipped according to the threat picture they face, and MPK will be developed ‘as a strategic partner of the Defence Forces, in line with the Nordic concept’. Maakuntajoukot, meet Hjemmeværnet / Hemvärnet / Heimevernet?

For the wartime forces, the number of lightly equipped units will increase, apparently both in absolute and relative terms. This goes against the message of the Defence Forces so far, which has been that the Defence Forces is unwilling to muster more troops than it can equip (which the white paper admits actually is the case even today). Or as a senior officer recently expressed it: “The war we prepare for is not what you see on TV from Aleppo, nor is it ‘model Cajander’”

The increase in wartime strength from 230,000 to 280,000 has been the most widely publicised change of the paper. However, as is clear from the text, this is not in fact a real increase, but creative accounting. A number of units which earlier has not been included in the official wartime strength, including training units, the Border Guards (sorting under the Ministry of Interior in peace, but subordinated to the Defence Forces if the situation so requires), and any currently serving conscripts that have received an adequate level of training. The optimist says this is a case of clever strategic communication, in which Finland signals its willingness to defend itself. The cynic says this is internal politics by minister of defence Jussi Niinistö trying to turn the party’s downward trend before the upcoming elections.

The new high-readiness units of the Army

The general picture is that money is missing everywhere, and the new higher readiness units and the generally higher level of readiness further increases the deficit. Again, this impacts the Army the hardest, as it traditionally has maintained a lower level of readiness compared to the Navy and especially the Air Force. The meager increase in funds allocated will barely cover the higher level of readiness, it costs money to store equipment in a state of being ready to use as opposed to soaked in grease, and the mountain of ageing equipment is still largely unaddressed.

On the positive side, the white paper is at least honest about this. As we all know, admitting you have a problem is the first step to solving it.