The New York Times this morning has an analysis of the "fragile, and possibly fleeting" situation in Iraq.

Officials attribute the relative calm to a huge increase in the number of Sunni Arab rebels who have turned their guns on jihadists instead of American troops; a six-month halt to military action by the militia of a top Shiite leader, Moktada al-Sadr; and the increased number of American troops on the streets here.

The Kurdish Deputy Prime Minister described it as "more a cease-fire than a peace." The point about a cease-fire is that they can easily cease. Here is the rub:



all of these changes can be reversed, and on relatively short notice. The Americans have already started to reduce troop levels and Mr. Sadr, who has only three months to go on his pledge, has issued increasingly bellicose pronouncements recently. The Sunni insurgents who turned against the jihadists are now expecting to be rewarded with government jobs. Yet, so far, barely 5 percent of the 77,000 Sunni volunteers have been given jobs in the Iraqi security forces, and the bureaucratic wheels have moved excruciatingly slowly despite government pledges to bring more Sunnis in.

One of the major problems with both the surge and "Sunni awakening" strategy has been their long term sustainability. For the surge, we never had enough troops to adequately implement a counter-insurgency strategy over the long term. The ground forces are simply stretched too thin to make the necessary long-term commitment. Additionally, the Sunni strategy may have serious unintended consequences, as we have organized an armed Sunni group that the Shia-led government is loathe to incorporate. We have armed both sides in the civil war. And...



it is likely that the old divisions will rapidly resurface as the United States reduces its troop levels. If that happens, extremist Sunnis will renew their assaults on Shiites and Mr. Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia will respond in kind.

What sense did it make to institute a strategy that was not sustainable from the get-go?