Karl Smith (1, 3) and Daniel Kuehn (2, 4) debate over secular morality, its justification, and pluralistic politics. I, like Daniel, do not have as much of a problem with justifying my “secular” morality, but probably for somewhat different reasons. In the end, I am not sure justification really matters that much, because what is is important is obtaining a result. This result is not simple “coexistence,” but peaceful, productive coexistence.

Ultimately, all moral justification is subjective. What I mean by this is that all moral justification appeals to the individual. This does not imply deep critical thought, as it could be justified on the basis of what “feels right.” The factors which dictate its appeal depend on the conditions which, in turn, decide what is important to the individual and what is not. In less abstract terminology, like all other decisions, choosing a justification is a choice made on the margin; the costs and benefits are influenced by “non-economic” preferences and considerations, but this does not change the nature of choice. Note, this is not to say that all justifications are equally as reasonable, only that the person in the position to judge reason is the individual being appealed to.

Ross Douthat and Karl Smith are correct to claim that secular morality is difficult to justify. They are right in the sense that it is impossible to put forth an objective morality that basis itself in the laws of nature. This is not only true of secular morality, but of religious morality — a higher authority essentially trumps the laws of nature. It is because of this that we see such a wide divergence in metaphysical ethical justifications and even moral principles (even religious morality is not exactly the same across religions). Ethics and morality are interpretations.

Where do philosophers get the basis for their interpretations? That is, what are they observing? They are observing reality; philosophers are interpreting why society is how it is, and then, maybe, suggesting ethical justifications for things they think ought to be difference. How philosophers go about doing what they do, of course, depends on what they think they are doing. One could make a general dichotomy between moral philosophers of the likes of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Smith, and others — they were commenting on what brings order to society. When the foundations of classical philosophy were set, others could discuss what society ought to do or how society ought to be, but these philosophies are all grounded on what is.

Note, ordered society existed before philosophy. Contra Douthat, ordered society and the concepts of right and wrong existed before Christianity (even if the specific principles of pre-Judeo-Christian morality were different). In fact, we know that, in many ways, Judaism was influenced by other Near East cultures. Morality, justice, and order developed with the growth of society. It is no coincidence that Judaism was influenced by other cultures which developed in what is today considered the cradle of civilization. These cultures were shaped by a process of societal cooperation and the beginnings of advanced conceptions of justice.

A successful society does not require an ultimate ethical justification or a uniform body of moral principles. Society has coped with a divergence in beliefs — as a result of the subjective nature of these beliefs — since the origins of its existence. Indeed, society is the result of the coping with differences between the individuals that constitute it. Moral philosophy is but an ex post interpretation, that might attempt to suggest where society can go from here. There is no “pluralistic ethic,” as argued by Daniel, there is only pluralistic politics: cooperation, consensus, or arbitration that allow for personal gain. Neither are there limits to coexistence, as claimed by Karl. Society is a process. The limits of today may not exist tomorrow, much like slavery was prevalent in the 1800s and soon petered out (whether “voluntarily” or through the state [e.g. American Civil War], it does not matter, since this all manifests means of transforming society in the presence of divergent opinions).

My interpretation here may seem dialectical and deterministic, but it is not. I do not purport to know, with any certainty, the direction society will progress towards. All I am claiming is that society is a process, and it is a process precisely as a result of moral/ethical pluralism. Its direction is determined by those who take part in giving shape to the process. I endorse a more Humean vision: a separation of justice and morality. I will even go as far as to claim that ethical interpretations will change as much as society will, and as society progresses how people conceive justification will also progress.

Tangential side-note: Some time ago, David Gordon emailed me and argued that my interpretation of morality is unconvincing, because if I were right then by what moral compass is the individual to act on. I responded that the individual acts on a subjective moral compass. I realize now that this may be interpreted as me claiming that all morality is derived from the person. This is not what I mean. I do not deny the role of the collective, broadly defined, in shaping morality or the moral compass an individual might decide to abide by. What I mean is that whatever moral compass is ultimately chosen is one that appeals to the individual — this is implied in the fact that it is a choice. There is no single objective morality that all reason and logic must necessarily lead to; it is not just a question of education, but of personal interpretation.