As war prolongs, internal strains begin to surface among pro-Houthi elements. It is unclear if tensions between Supervisors (mushrefeen) in areas like Amran and Sana’a surfaced from misperceptions over events in Hodeida since the signing of the Stockholm plan or recent shifts in the leadership structure.

Public reports of infighting among Houthi elements are rare, but two incidents this year hinted at potential tensions among individuals charged with supervising government institutions and overseeing cities and provinces under the Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC) led by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi. Supervisors, generally from Sadah, go by nicknames and local residents are unaware of their real names, merely identify their regional accent. They are appointed for their loyalty rather than any significant skill or experience in security forces.

Incidents involving aggression against civilians by Supervisors or power struggles with government officials are not new or unique occurrences in northern Yemen, but incidents are on the rise and illustrate a new trend. Two recent events in Sana’a served to illustrate the lawlessness in the Capital under Houthis and the level of aggression perpetrated by Supervisors. 0n 23 June video surfaced of gunmen entering a shop and violently harassing the owner, on 14 June a Supervisor was accused of stabbing with his jambiyya a restaurant security that asked him to pay his bill. In mid-May a doctor at al-Thawra hospital was beaten by a Supervisor for protesting over unpaid salaries. Earlier in February another Supervisor was accused of looting shops in the Bab al-Yemen area. Even the wives of Supervisors have been accused of harassment at private events like weddings.

Major incidents involving Supervisors include arrests of civilians for minor disputes, accusing people of spying or act as paid enforcers for people with personal feuds in neighborhoods. In April, a Supervisor killed Shaykh Ahmed Salem al-Sakani, a GPC member and head of Local Council in Rayda district of Amran, during a personal dispute. Such incidents threaten weak political alliances with the party of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh (d. Dec. 2017) and tribes in areas north of the Capital. In late May, a member of the Supreme Political Council (SPC), Sultan al-Samei’, accused Houthi officials during a televised interview of corruption and looting of state funds. In the latest round of armed clashes, Abd al-Hafidh al-Saqqaf, police chief of Ibb province and a Deputy Minister of Interior, clashed with Houthi militia in Sana’a over arrests of tribesmen from Khawlan area by al-Saqqaf. Ibb’s Deputy Governor Ismail Sufyan was killed on 24 June as clashes continued between al-Saqqaf and a Houthi Supervisor in the Central Yemen province.

On 11 July Houthi Protective Security elements killed Shaykh Sultan al-Waruri in northern Amran. Shaykh al-Waruri had been released by the Hadi government under a prisoner exchange with Houthi following his capture in al-Jawf province months ago. He is said to have played a major role in helping Houthis capture Amran. Local tribes are now demanding Houthis hand over the killers.

This rise in tension and instability within Houthi ranks may have been the reason for the appointment of Abd al-Kareem Amir al-Din Hussain al-Houthi as Minister of Interior in early May. He is uncle to Houthi leader Abd al-Malek Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and previously oversaw the Executive Committee from behind the scenes. Abd al-Kareem is also regarded as the man over the Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC), the network of Supervisors and the Houthi military wing. Coming out of the shadows and taking over the Ministry of Interior is not merely a public display of power consolidation under the Houthi family, but it also signals increasing unpredictability requiring direct control over security elements by the family. Abd al-Kareem now has the entire security establishment under his control, along with vital State organizations that include the Red Sea Ports Corporation, the Coast Guard, tribal relations, and militia elements.

Although a degree of instability within the lower ranks seems to increase, the hierarchy at the top tiers of the military and political wings remains cohesive, as most top leaders are family members, Hashimi loyalists or those from Sadah province that fought the six wars against the former regime between 2004 and 2010. Yet, the farther the tribal leader, militia commander or Supervisor is from the top tier leadership, the less predictable and more concerned they become over their economic interests or patronage. The current conflict between Houthis and UN Humanitarian Agencies has surfaced as most recent series of events to impact confidence among such local leaders.

In mid-June, the World Food Programme (WFP) threatened to suspend all delivery of humanitarian aid to northern areas under Houthi control. Citing obstruction by Houthi authorities during the campaign to register recipients, accusing Houthis of diversion of aid. WFP and OCHA expressed a firm stance against Houthis since the start of the unilateral redeployment from Hodeidah port. Accusations of diversion and obstruction were later strengthened by Houthi targeting of grain silos in Hodeidah and the bombing of commercial facilities owned by the Thabet Brothers in mid-June.

Threats from WFP and other aid agencies have upset the lower ranks among Houthis, from Hodeidah to Amran and Sana’a. Houthi loyalists were expecting the unilateral redeployment from Hodeidah’s Port to produce an increase in aid delivery and commercial goods, increasing their own economic gains from a monopoly over the entire process. Delays since the agreement of mid-May in Hodeidah raised concern over the leadership’s handling of relations with the UN, primarily over the top-down patronage for militia and tribal loyalists and the economic interests of business allies.

WFP announced resumption of aid delivery the first week of August. But during the month a number of UN agencies cited lack of funding as reason so delay or decrease in aid, and in September medical care providers announced closure of dozens of clinics due to lack of medical supplies and medicine.

As in the case of Hajja a few months ago, the opportunity to leverage this level of instability was missed by the internationally recognized government of Yemen and the Coalition. The conflict in Hajour, Hajja was mishandled by Hadi’s government and the Coalition. Air strikes caused more damage than help for tribal elements led by shaykh Fahd al-Dahshoush opposing Houthis in the area.

Although opposition to Houthis was growing in Ibb province, Hadi’s government also failed to capitalize and make any progress there as well. These missed opportunities have allowed Houthis to strengthen their position along the periphery, even as financial resources dwindle. The stalemate continues in Hodeida, and there seems to be no urgency by any party to resume delivery of aid and commercial goods, which directly affects the Houthi patronage network across the northern territories. Data published by the Yemen Polling Center from their recent poll indicated Yemenis residing in Houthi controlled areas reported living under worse condition than others.

Abd al-Kareem bin Amir al-Din al-Houthi remains behind the scenes. It is unclear if the lack of similar reporting on clashes among Houthi allies is due to the handling of tensions by the new Minister of Interior, or simply due to a media black-out. It will be important to follow the withdrawal of southern forces from Hodeida to reinforce Security Belt forces in Abyan and Aden, as well as Elite Forces in Shebwa, and the impact this will have across battle fronts around the Red Sea Coast. As no new elements from the National Army seem to move into Hodeida so far in early September, it appears as though even Houthis are on a wait and see mode without making any major moves around the city of Hodeida or the southern flank close to Taiz.

FC.