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The intention is understandable, but this remedy is unworkable and unachievable. No president in the modern era has accepted the absolute requirement of congressional consent on war-making powers. Moreover, any scenario for the first use of nuclear weapons implies great urgency because, over time, America’s conventional military advantages would presumably suffice.

A congressional debate authorizing first use would have to be very hurried, and this process could speed up hostile actions rather than slow them down. And when the executive branch has occasionally sought support for war-making powers, Congress has seen fit to provide that backing, rather than deny it.

A far more realistic check on the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States can be found, oddly enough, in the case of a Soviet diesel submarine that was depth-charged to the surface during the most harrowing days of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Back then, diesel submarines had limited capabilities to remain submerged and to “phone home.” So the captain, second captain and deputy political officer on the B-59, a Foxtrot-class vessel, observed a compact in the event that they were unable to receive instructions from Moscow authorizing the use of a nuclear-armed torpedo on board. They agreed that to fire the torpedo against a surface ship, their vote had to be unanimous; if not, they would hold their fire.

The United States Navy was unaware that Soviet submarines carried nuclear-armed torpedoes, just as the Pentagon and the American intelligence community, while planning pre-emptive strikes, were unaware that nuclear weapons had already been sited on Cuban soil. The job of enforcing President John Kennedy’s naval quarantine of Cuba fell to the chief of naval operations, Adm. George Anderson. He, like the Air Force’s chief, Gen. Curtis LeMay, wished to strike first, rather than seek a diplomatic settlement, which they perceived to be a riskier option.