On the brink of a nuclear deal with world powers by the end of June that will also herald a new opening in ties with the United States, Iran will have to reconcile its goal of expanding its influence in the Middle East with US expectations that a nuclear deal would moderate this goal.



The challenge places Iran at a crossroads.

Tehran expects its regional influence to grow as a consequence of a deal that lifts international sanctions. At the same time, it supports the Syrian government, the Yemeni Shia Houthis, and Iraqi and Lebanese Shias. This puts it at odds with US regional allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Tehran asserts that unless it secures its regional interests through helping its allies, it has a harder time negotiating with the US from a position of power. The implications are clear: Iran aims to lift the sanctions regime while also retaining regional leverage.

If Iran wants its cake, and to eat it, then Washington should use the right incentives and pressures to encourage Tehran to develop a balanced regional policy. Tipping Tehran with too many incentives when a nuclear deal is made, through increased international investment and trade, could blind the US to the wider goal of keeping Iranian foreign policy in check.

Provoking Tehran by containing its regional allies, or through slash-and-burn tactics to destroy its nuclear infrastructure, would be unhelpful. An Iran with fewer regional allies, or without an advanced nuclear programme, might appear weaker. But it is unclear if it would be less assertive or aggressive in the region.

A good nuclear deal should embrace some current options under discussion, including allowing Iran to retain limited enrichment at grade levels of 5% and a modest nuclear research and development programme. It can also place restrictions on a new generation of advanced centrifuges which Iran has developed. According to the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation (AEO), Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran is prepared to examine these options.

The former head of the AEO Fereydun Abbasi has also confirmed that Tehran is not keen to produce the higher grade levels of 20% enriched uranium - used in medical treatment - if supply of the fuel is guaranteed from abroad.

Iran may not close down Fordo, its fortified underground enrichment facility, or scrap the nuclear reactor in the heavy water plant at Arak. But it has signalled that it might scale down enrichment in Fordo to research levels, and according to Abbasi, re-scale Arak’s production of heavy water such that it would take five or more years to revert to current levels of production.

A stripped-down nuclear weapons breakout capability of one year or longer, as is currently under discussion in talks between Iran and world powers, and a strong safeguards and inspections regime, could then perhaps render useless the potential nuclear aspects of the Iranian ballistic missile program.

A face-saving nuclear exit strategy could also let Tehran cash in on restricted items after a deal is made. Tehran has spent millions of dollars developing its nuclear infrastructure, and it wants to sell what it cannot use, according to Hassan Firuzabadi, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces.

Sanctions against Iran should be removed in stages. Iran initially opposed this idea, but reports suggest it agreed in principle during the last round of talks held in Lausanne in March.

This could encourage Tehran to restrict the funds earmarked for its allies, which though small compared to the money or weapons that Saudi Arabia distributes to counter Iranian influence in the Arab world, have been sufficient to encourage fears of Iranian power.

With a balanced nuclear deal, Tehran could engage in regional peace initiatives to build common understanding of its goals and future role. Its problematic behaviour should be taken into account, but so should its potential to be part of the solution to regional conflicts.

In return, it can be rewarded with the further easing of sanctions and provocations from Saudi Arabia or Israel, and from the US insistence on keeping open a military option or Congressional threats to backtrack on a nuclear deal.

To make an agreement stick, the US and its allies should recognise Iran’s regional meddling is frequently a responses to the security threats it faces from forces like the Islamic State group in Iraq, al-Qaeda in Iraq and Yemen, and a host of armed groups fighting in Syria, in addition to its fears of Saudi, Israeli and US plans to contain it.

If its security interests are disregarded, Tehran will meddle in the region the way it wants even with a nuclear deal in place. The less threatening these security threats, the more likely Iran will remain a rational player in its regional dealings and in committing to a long-term nuclear deal.

Banafsheh Keynoush is a Middle East scholar and consultant, who previously interpreted for four Iranian presidents and Iran’s Nobel Laureate. You can follow her on Twitter @BanafshKeynoush