But the question is whether Barzani’s leverage vis-à-vis Baghdad will indeed be boosted by the chorus of “yes” voters when he proceeded against the wishes of not only his enemies, such as Iran, but also those of his friends Turkey, the United States, and European states. He might have earned international backing in his independence talks with Baghdad if he had settled for a deal with his Western allies to defer the referendum, as they had urged him to do. That chance now looks remote. Yet he must have been aware of this scenario as well, and prepared for it.

For a long time, Barzani made his bid for a referendum seem more like a bargaining strategy rather than an immutable promise to actually hold one. The time between the announcement of the vote and the event itself certainly saw intensive bargaining, as well as a good deal of threats and intimidation. Barzani took an uncompromising position, saying he would accept nothing less than guaranteed international support in negotiations with Baghdad leading to independence within a period of two years or so. But all that the United States and the Kurds’ other friends were willing to offer was their support for Kurdish leaders’ negotiations with Baghdad over the terms of their future relationship, not the terms of separation. The fact remains that no one, apart from the majority of Kurds themselves, as well as Israel (which needs the Kurds for its own geo-strategic considerations), supports Kurdish independence. The post-Ottoman borders remain sacrosanct for fear that a single change will trigger many more.

Yet Barzani can rightly argue that even if he fails to make tangible progress on statehood now, he still accomplished a great deal. He can assert that the Kurds have taken one step forward towards independence. Barzani himself, the son of Mustafa Barzani, the founder of the Kurdish national movement, can claim that he has gone further than his father, whose own effort failed dismally beyond building the movement that his son inherited. Masoud Barzani can now bequeath this legacy upon his own son, Masrour, who may complete the project of creating the Kurdish state should the regional balance of forces tilt in the Kurds’ favor.

Perhaps as importantly, Barzani bolstered his own tenuous domestic position as Kurdish president by mobilizing the popular “yes” vote and sowing disarray among the opposition. His detractors in Suleimaniya, in particular, who support Kurdish independence in principle, but oppose it if it delivers a Barzani-led state, told their supporters that they would be free to cast their vote. Barzani’s move also allowed the reopening of parliament, which he shuttered two years ago after the opposition refused to extend his tenure for another two years, without an election. The main opposition party, Gorran, decided to stay out, resulting in a more pliant parliament for Barzani.