Report

American Enterprise Institute

Key Points

For the first two to three decades after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” was little more than rhetoric, ascribing greater unity of effort to an amalgam of states, semi-states, and non-state actors that opposed the Middle Eastern status quo than was ever the reality.

Because of the events of 2014–16, when key Shi’a groups and governments faced severe threats, there has been a significant shift in the Axis’ composition and effectiveness. Today, the Axis is comprised of an increasingly cohesive coalition of groups functioning more directly under Iranian guidance.

Iranian support for these groups has also shifted from covert terrorist collusion, funding, intelligence sharing, rhetorical support, and tacit diplomacy to overt force deployments, joint military operations, economic assistance, deterrence, and alliance solidarity.

Nevertheless, Iran’s successes have led to additional problems. The Axis of Resistance strategy was born out of necessity, and it is unclear, especially without Soleimani, whether Iran will be able to adapt moving forward.

Read the PDF.

Executive Summary

Since the earliest days after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian regime has sought to build a coalition across the Middle East to help it achieve its ideological and geostrategic goals. Tehran understood that its ability to secure the Islamic Republic in Iran, overturn the regional status quo, drive out the United States, and make Iran the regional hegemon was limited if it acted on its own. It could only succeed with the help of others.

However, for the next two decades, the Axis was little more than rhetoric, ascribing greater unity of effort to an amalgam of states, semi-states, and non-state actors than was ever the reality. It was primarily a psychological ploy to frighten its adversaries and make its members feel less isolated in the face of American hostility. However, the Axis today has evolved into an increasingly cohesive coalition functioning more directly under Iranian guidance.

Events in the Middle East over the past five to six years, most of them unanticipated and unwelcome to the Axis members, forged a greater integration of their activities under the stewardship of former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani. Guided by his leadership, the Axis moved from largely covert terrorist collusion, funding, intelligence sharing, rhetorical support, and tacit diplomacy to increasingly overt force deployments, joint military operations, economic assistance, deterrence, and alliance solidarity.

This reflects a meaningful change in the Axis’ functioning, capabilities, and potential threat toward the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, the Axis is hardly a well-oiled machine; there is still considerable friction among its component parts, and the death of Soleimani in January 2020 could significantly impede further progress.

As it stands currently, the Axis is comprised of both state and non-state actors. These groups include Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and occasionally the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. State and quasi-state actors openly aligned with Tehran include Hamas in Gaza, Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen.

Ultimately, the new operating method of Iran’s Axis of Resistance is a strategy born of necessity. It is a strategy of the weak, unlikely to succeed against the strong except when they are badly constrained by politics, diplomacy, or other exogenous factors. Thousands of Afghan and Iraqi militiamen will not enable Iran to hold off an American armored force, nor will it allow them to conquer Israel. In the context of the new Middle Eastern cold war, it is a clever approach to waging long-term, low-intensity struggles at low cost. By itself, it will not overcome those with the ability and willingness to escalate to more potent forms of warfare.

The challenges that Iran and its Axis pose to the region raise crucial questions for the future of American leadership in the Middle East. The Trump administration’s policy toward the region can be described as a seesaw wavering between retrenchment and reengagement. Whichever approach wins out, this report informs those with interest about the future of US policy in the Middle East, the region broadly, and the obstacles that Iran’s Axis of Resistance face moving forward into the future.

Introduction

Since the earliest days after the 1979 revolution, the Iranian regime has sought to build a coalition across the Middle East to help it achieve its ideological and geostrategic goals. Tehran understood that its ability to secure the Islamic Republic in Iran, overturn the regional status quo, drive out the United States, overthrow America’s Middle Eastern allies, obliterate the state of Israel, and make Iran the regional hegemon was limited if it acted on its own. It could only succeed with the help of others.

Thus, beginning in the 1980s, Iran began to cultivate other like-minded groups and states to try to weld them into a more unified alliance pursuing a common set of goals—Tehran’s goals, as best as Iran could persuade them. Like in a bad superhero movie, thus was the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” born. And as if it leapt from the laptop of a bad screenwriter, through the mistakes and inactions of the heroes, this league of villains has grown stronger over time, to the point where it threatens American interests in a way it has not before.

In particular, there has been an important shift in the Axis of Resistance, especially over the past five to six years. Events in the Middle East, most of them unanticipated and unwelcome to the Axis members, forged a greater integration of their activities under the stewardship of former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani.

For the first two to three decades after the Iranian Revolution, the Axis was little more than rhetoric, ascribing greater unity of effort to an amalgam of states, semi-states, and non-state actors than was ever the reality. It was largely a psychological ploy to frighten their adversaries and make its members feel less isolated in the face of American hostility. Today, the Axis is comprised of an increasingly cohesive coalition of groups functioning more directly under Iranian guidance.

Of greatest importance, in the past decade, cooperation among the Axis of Resistance has grown from largely covert terrorist collusion, funding, intelligence sharing, rhetorical support, and tacit diplomacy to increasingly overt force deployments, joint military operations, economic assistance, deterrence, and alliance solidarity. They went from a pickup basketball team where the players showed up when and if they could and played all over the court in whatever style they liked to a semi-pro team with regular practices, assigned positions, set plays, and a coach calling the shots.

This reflects a meaningful change in the Axis’ functioning, capabilities, and potential threat toward the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, the Axis is hardly a well-oiled machine; there is still considerable friction among its component parts, and the death of Soleimani in January 2020 could significantly impede further progress.

Read the full report.