In addition it highlighted: Prime Minister Tony Abbott tables in Parliament the royal commission's report on the Rudd government's home insulation scheme. Credit:Alex Ellinghausen The Department of Environment was ill-equipped to deal with a program of its size and complexity. This problem was made worse by a switch in the delivery model from a regional brokerage model to a direct delivery model A failure by the federal government to identify and manage the risk to the installers of injury and death. The reflective foil insulation was "manifestly unsuitable and dangerous"

The decision to relax training and competency requirement Allowing the program to move to "phase 2" without a robust audit program The federal government's reliance on states, territories and employers to enforce health and safety requirements Decisions made under the insulation program were found to have "unnecessarily exposed workers, particularly inexperienced ones, to an unacceptably high risk of injury or death". "There was no compelling reason to commence the main phase of the Home Insulation Program on 1 July 2009, other than the generally perceived need to commence it as soon as reasonably possible, and because the prime minister had publicly announced that as the starting date."

"The reality is that the Australian government conceived of, devised, designed and implemented a program that enabled very large numbers of inexperienced workers – often engaged by unscrupulous and avaricious employers or head contractors ... to undertake potentially dangerous work. It should have done more to protect them." The deaths of four young Australians – Queenslanders Matthew Fuller, Rueben Barnes and Mitchell Sweeney and Marcus Wilson from NSW – who lost their lives while working on the economic stimulus program "would, and should, not have occurred had the Home Insulation Program been properly designed and implemented". The use of reflective foil sheeting had directly contributed to the deaths of Mr Fuller and Mr Sweeney and "should never have been permitted". Rushed introduction The report notes that no one, including former prime minister Kevin Rudd and former ministers Mark Arbib and Peter Garrett, had given evidence of the economic imperative for a July 1, 2009 start date.

Mr Arbib, the former minister for government service delivery, had not technically had the authority to make decisions, yet "at all times pushed the commencement date of 1 July, 2009 despite any concerns expressed by others as to whether it was properly attainable". The commissioner also found that Mr Arbib had received a risk assessment "shortly after his request for it" and rejected his denial of having received it. And at the level of the political executive, "Mr Rudd, Mr Garrett and Mr Arbib all had direct and close involvement in various aspects of the program. Mr Garrett, as the Minister for the Environment had formal control over the HIP. Mr Rudd, as, in effect, the 'Secretary of Cabinet' had control in an overall governmental sense". Additionally, the scheme "wreaked havoc" with pre-existing installation businesses, which initially scaled up their operations to meet program demand and then were hard hit by the snap suspension of the program in February 2010. Many of the businesses that existed before the scheme was put in place had been devastated and compensation should be made available to them. Much of the report is critical of the public service's handling of the scheme, with the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet slated for its insistence on undue speed in its implementation.

Deficiencies in the technical expertise of public service employees are identified, while the Department of the Environment had "no experience with a delivery model such as this". The Commonwealth had deliberately chosen not to use states and territories to help with the program, despite their experience, and "that the Home Insulation Program was a particularly bad example of shortcomings caused by a very inexperienced Department having been asked to deliver it". Overall, the report found, the scheme was "poorly planned and poorly implemented" and in the case of the HIP "the failings of senior management [in the public service] assured the failure of the project. There can be no substitute for the leadership, advice and decision making that senior managers are required to provide". Mr Abbott told the Parliament that "four young men lost their lives as a consequence of this bungled programme. As well, homes were damaged or destroyed and businesses badly affected. I hope this report brings some comfort to everyone affected." The federal government will deliver an initial response into the report by the end of the month and a final response will be handed down by the end of the year.

Series of inquiries There have already been numerous inquiries into the failed program, including by state coroners and the Australian National Audit Office. During the 12 months it operated, there were 1.1 million insulation installations. A total of 224 fire incidents were linked to the program, with 144 involving flames, though that rate was no higher than it had been before the program started. Opposition Leader Bill Shorten said he had not yet seen the report but "in terms of the tragedy of four people losing their lives that's what matters to me". He said his colleagues would be standing up later on Monday to discuss the findings of the report and he wanted to see better workplace safety.

"My interest is first and foremost the safety of people going to work," Mr Shorten said, adding he was not up for a "political blame game". Queensland Premier Campbell Newman said the deaths of the three Queensland insulation workers was a "terrible tragedy" and his first thoughts were with their families. He said the lack of government planning was clear. "It just shows that governments need to plan properly when they implement programs or infrastructure," Mr Newman said. "That comes out loud and clear."

Compensation under consideration Mr Newman said compensation for the families could now be considered. He stressed that he was yet to look at the insulation report findings in any detail. "I think these sorts of things now need to be looked at," he said. Gold Coast lawyer Bill Potts said Murray Barnes, whose son Rueben was electrocuted laying batts in the ceiling cavity of a house at Stanwell, did not want compensation. "For him, it has never been about money. No amount of money can bring a much-loved son back. No amount of money will compensate for a life," Mr Potts said.

"Murray Barnes has only ever wanted answers and for him at least he has the start of the answers. But he has to live with the questions. And the question at the end of the day is, 'Why did his son have to die in this way?' "A 16-year-old son is worth effectively not a very large amount of money. I know that sounds brutally cruel, but that's the simple truth. At the end of the day, the government will no doubt make up its own mind about what it wants to do. "For Murray, it has been about answers, not about money." Speaking on behalf of the Sweeney family, Peter Koutsoukis of Maurice Blackburn Lawyers called upon the federal government to compensate grieving relatives. "I call on the government to compensate the families affected by this program," he said.

"The Sweeney family has been profoundly affected by this. Members of the family have had an inability to work, substantial grief and ... if as the report finds, the Australian government is clearly to blame to this, well why shouldn't they get compensation." Mr Koutsoukis said the firm would also consider suing the Australian government as part of a civil claim lodged against Mr Sweeney's employer, Titan Insulations. With Tony Moore and Marissa Calligeros Follow us on Twitter