Changes in Corporate Governance and Top Executive Turnover: The Evidence from Japan

NBER Working Paper No. 23812

Issued in September 2017

NBER Program(s):Corporate Finance



We examine the turnover of top executives in Japanese firms throughout the period from 1990 to 2013. During this time, the presence of a main bank has been weakened, the ownership of institutional investors has dramatically increased, and independent outside directors have been introduced in many firms. We find that top executive turnover sensitivity to corporate performance has not changed, although return on equity (ROE) and stock returns displace return on assets (ROA) as performance indicators that turnover is most sensitive to. The evidence also indicates that instead of the main bank, foreign institutional investors have begun to play an important governance role in Japan. However, the main bank does not abandon its governance role. While the scope of the main bank’s authority may have substantially contracted, main banks continue to perform a certain role in disciplining management.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w23812

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