So this is my first

post back from a prolonged break. As I mentioned in a previous—albeit

brief—entry, I’ve had a busy but enjoyable summer. I got married, defended my

dissertation at the beginning of July, and my wife and I have since relocated

to Tuscaloosa, Alabama where I’ve accepted a position as a post-doc. We’re both

pretty excited about the move and we’re really enjoying ourselves. Having grown

up in the Adirondacks in upstate New York, summers that extend beyond a two

month window have a certain appeal. And now that we’re getting settled in down

here, I’m slowly getting back into a routine for work. I’ve been sitting on

some papers for a while now that I’m finally turning my attention to, and it’s

my experience with one of these papers that motivated me to write this

particular post.

I’ve been thinking recently about how we view the place that

history holds in our discipline. Now, I suspect there is an initial reaction

that many people (particularly quantitative political scientists) are likely to

have to the word “history,” and I’m guessing that is probably one of derision.

It’s not that political scientists necessarily dislike history or historians, but

this reaction is conceivable given that these disciplines are marked by some

important epistemological differences, and many quantitative political

scientists are often taught from the outset to avoid relying

on single cases when drawing more generalizable lessons and conclusions (with

good reason). When we think of historians, it is often in the context of

someone who provides an excruciating level of detail about one particular event,

and then tries to explain its origins and broader implications/lessons. My

issue is not in fact with this particular point—as social scientists, we want

to be able to assess just how generalizable the relationships that we’re looking

at really are. We are typically interested in exploring systematic relationships,

trends, and patterns that hold over broader periods of time and apply to a wide

range of actors than are many historical studies. So to be clear from the

outset, I am not advocating that quantitative political science should attempt

to emulate the professional approach or methods that many historians employ.

My issue, really, stems more from the assertion by many quantitative

political scientists that a study that is time bound in some way is “history”. This

does not apply to all political scientists, but it’s been my experience that reviewers

will often look at the temporal range of a study and dismiss its if it is

explicitly bound to a particular period of time that does not overlap with the

present (allowing a few years of slack on just what constitutes the “present”,

that is). Indeed, some seem to be under the impression that it’s not even

political science if the gap between the time period covered by a study and the

present is sufficiently large. For example, let’s say I’m interested in

understanding the domestic determinants of pre-hegemonic US foreign policy

behavior. In this particular instance, there are theoretical reasons to suppose

that the behavior of the US could be different in this time period as compared

to later periods. Let’s further suppose that I have theoretical expectations

regarding the relationship between X and Y, and I write a paper on this

relationship for the period between 1900 and 1945. I would not at all be

surprised to receive reviews rejecting the paper at least in part because the

reviewer(s) questioned the study’s broader relevance, given that it’s bound to

a 46-year time period.

I think these sorts of reactions expose some problems and some

important assumptions that we often make as political scientists. First, not

every study necessarily needs to neatly map onto the present time period—or any

other arbitrarily chosen time period. There is nothing inherently unscientific

about the notion that certain relationships or phenomena can only be found in a

particular temporal context. I’m fairly certain people have not abandoned the

study of dinosaurs simply because we no longer see T-Rex roaming around the

countryside. And our field is rife with examples of research, the temporal

context of which is fundamentally limited in some way. Scholars of American

politics provide perhaps the clearest example of an entire sub-field that

cannot be held to apply to a period extending back beyond 1789. The sub-field

of international relations is similarly dependent in many ways upon the

existence of the modern nation-state, which we typically trace back to 1648,

and some of the most widely used only go back to 1815. Do we consider our

endeavors in these areas “history” because our studies are bound to these time

periods?

Also on this point, there seems to be a double standard when

we consider the broader implications of our research. Taking my example from

earlier, reviewers will commonly ask how the study of US foreign policy between

1900 and 1945 is relevant for today, but rarely do we consider how a study of US

foreign policy from 1945–2013 informs our understanding of the 1900–1945

period. It strikes me that this is (1) perpetually moving the goalpost, and (2)

that it may be the wrong goalpost. This may seem like an odd point, but what it

“relevant” by current standards is something that obviously changes on a

day-to-day basis, and it’s a standard that says nothing about the quality of a

paper as a piece of social science, or whether or not a paper helps us to

understand a particular question about a given set of relationships. Really,

this only represents our own innate temporal biases, but it says nothing about

how scientific a piece of research is. If the goal is truly generalizable theoretical and empirical knowledge,

in a temporal sense, then this kind of consideration should apply just as much

as thinking about how a study informs our understanding of the present. Conducting

a study with the purpose of expanding our knowledge of systematic relationships

between societal actors is not synonymous with expanding our knowledge of

systematic relationships between societal actors for the purposes of informing

our understanding of the present.

And it’s not as though we don’t attempt to deal with “unique”

time periods and cases in our current research. However, it’s often the case

that the manner in which we deal with these cases is fairly crude. For example,

we might include a dummy variable in a model to control for a time period (or characteristics

of a time period) that we believe to be unique in some way. Bipolarity during

the Cold War, for example. Similarly, we might include a dummy variable in our

model to control for states that we believe to be unique—depending on our

topic, it might be a state like Israel, Egypt, the US, or maybe a group of

states like the “Great Powers”. Sometimes we might also include an interaction

term to account for how the effect of one variable might be conditional upon

another.

But these approaches are not always appropriate methods for

dealing with the questions that we want to answer. Dummying out a particular

time period is only going to tell us whether or not a given time period or

group has a higher or lower intercept than the alternative time period or

group. This approach is also often atheoretical. For example, we might have a

belief that a time period is somehow different, but cannot fully articulate why

or how. Similarly, interaction terms with a variable capturing a particular

time period, for example, are implicitly suggesting that a given relationship

is time-bound in some way. However, these approaches don’t allow us to examine

whether or not the remaining variables in our models also have different

effects in the context of a particular time period. For example, maybe we’re

interested in whether or not both regime type and economic interests have a

different effect on conflict propensity during the Cold War as compared to

after. This, then, would suggest that maybe splitting our sample into two time

periods is the more appropriate means of addressing our question. In fact, the

notion that we would dummy out a particular time period because we suspect that

it’s “different” in some way, but don’t exactly know how, is exactly the reason

why we would want to conduct a study that is temporally bound in the first

place.

This points to another issue. I think these biases are

somewhat rooted in, and reinforced by, our relatively limited access to “good”

data. Almost every journal article contains passages wherein the authors

attempt to assert the broader relevance of their work. In the case of

international relations, it is also quite common for these articles to then

proceed to test their arguments using data that is only available for the

post-World War II period. Sometimes, these tests will use data for a single

country—often the US. Yet the arguments the authors make are often asserted as

applicable to a broader set of countries than just the US, and rarely do such

papers even address their own temporal limitations. We implicitly accept the

generalizability of papers in which the tests of broader theoretical arguments

rely on data from an incredibly narrow and often unrepresentative set of

states, but push back when a study openly acknowledges its more narrow temporal

confines. Why should we automatically assume that such studies inform our

understanding of international relations and state behavior in the 1800s?

This is understandable. Particularly in the field of

international relations, the availability of data is exponentially greater in

the post-World War II period than before. Commonly used indicators like GDP and

trade either don’t exist, are often missing, or are highly inaccurate for

earlier time periods. Accordingly, many of our studies focus on this 50–60 year

time period—not because it somehow matters more, or because we are interested

only in this particular time period, but because this is the period for which

we have access to relatively abundant data sources. But even in the post-World

War II time period some of the data we use can still be of questionable

reliability. Accordingly, when we see an article that focuses on a much earlier

time period it sticks out like a sore thumb, and reviewers will often proceed

to subject that paper to a different standard than other papers—a standard that

really has nothing to do with the execution of the paper or the soundness of

its argument.

This knee-jerk reaction against studies that are temporally

bound in some way can also have deleterious consequences for our ability to

understand the world. Finding that a particular relationship between two

variables holds only for a given time period can reveal new and interesting

questions. For example, we have evidence

that Republicans and Democrats have switched their positions on military

spending over the course of the Cold War. If we were looking for a relationship

between Republicans and higher military spending over the entirety of this time

period, we might erroneously conclude that there is no relationship.

Alternatively, the finding that this relationship is temporally bound in some

way raises new questions: Why did they switch? What caused the switch? Etc.

If our goal is to continuously develop and refine our

understanding of how the world works then we must think carefully about the

standards we set. If that standard is that we must only examine relationships

that hold for centuries at a time, then we are imposing some very serious limitations

on ourselves as researchers. These kinds of “big” systematic relationships are

clearly important, but the march of scientific progress is not marked

exclusively in these terms.

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