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Interestingly, the capacity of Canadian shipbuilding firms to compete in the international marketplace diminishes withevery single delay and cost overrun – a situation, which is exacerbated by the sole-source nature of NSPS relationships and; the impact of the reduced number of vessels delivered to Canada. All things considered, if Canada cannot meet the needs of its own fleets without undue delay, then the energy and efforts focused on potential sales to foreign governments, will all be for naught.

Isn’t Canada capable of doing more?

In answering this question, it is important to understand how the NSPS got to its current state.

Prior to the program taking its present form, discussions were held with key stakeholders in the private sector. At the time, the consensus amongst Canada’s three major shipyards, as outlined in a January, 2009 letter to then Prime Minister Stephen Harper, was to allocate the work based on the experience, capabilities and capacity of Canada’s existing yards. Canada however chose to disregard this advice and instead, decided to enter into a ‘competitive’ process – a process, which in essence, saw only two shipyards respond. It was not an overly robust competition.

Out of this process, Irving Shipyard in Halifax, NS was selected to build the combat vessels. The production of non-combat vessels – the largest of which includes the Joint Support Ships and the Polar Icebreaker – was in turn allocated to a yard located in Vancouver, BC that is presently known as Seaspan. This decision was taken despite the fact, that due to physical limitations of its Vancouver facility, Seaspan would probably have to rely on the use of the Esquimalt Graving Dock (owned by Public Works, now known as Public Services and Procurement Canada) in order to build the largest of the non-combat vessels.