







Eritrea is one of the sole recognized country of the horn of Africa that remains stable, with Djibouti, his neighbour, that also enjoys safety. But whilst Djibouti is internationally recognized and accepted, and has foreign military bases of several countries on its territory, Erythrea is often considered as a human's right abuser, and the sole echo about it in the western media is about all the refugees fleeing it.

Even Somaliland, a breakaway territory from Somalia, is going to be the host of a United Arab Emirates, in this crucial region that controls the strait of Bab El Mandeb. Meanwhile, what is arguably one of the most stable, and safest country in the region, and less risk prone than other, further away, neighbours like Egypt, in addition to regionally, was only proposed to host the Saudi Coalition after a fallout with Djibouti. It puts this stable country on par with a non recognized territory who is near a strong insurgency and areas of heavy lawlessness that includes pirates, a situation less than optimal for a port.





What are the reasons for Eritrea to be left alone despite its strategic position, and more largely, why is it under an arms embargo by the UN?





Eritrea has a tumultuous history, stemming from a Marxist rebellion against a communist (not for the whole rebellion) Ethiopia. Ethiopia, especially in its Marxist-Leninist years, was known for trying to dominate the region, going to war with Somalia despite their close ideological alignments. That said, the refusal by Ethiopia to see Eritrea break away, and the reason why it kept it annexed after world war 2, eventually trying to totally incorporate it, is because it is the key province to avoid Ethiopia from being landlocked. This is the first instability problem for Eritrea. Ethiopia, after finally letting go of Eritrea, still went to war with it in the 2000s, over "border disputes". This was clearly a way to try to get closer to the sea, although it remained somewhat unsuccessful despite Ethiopian victory. It also had several consequences, and spilled over in the region.

Eritrea isn't particularly loved by its neighbours, it went to war with Djibouti in 2008, and clashed with Sudan. This impedes the small nation influence, but it still managed to wreak havoc in the region. The most important act Eritrea uses to destabilize its, often hostile, rivals, is to support enemy guerillas. As a matter of fact it support the Oromo Liberation Front which remains a thorn on the side of the Ethiopian government, and last but not least, it support Al Shabaab in Somalia according to the UN. This is what makes the second factor of why Eritrea isn't the pearl in the middle of the horn of Africa, but is rather shunned by the International Community. It also put in perspective the alliances the gulf makes in the region.





The allegations by the UN that Eritrea funds and arms the djihadists in Somalia is what defines Eritrea modern history. It is not strongly corroborated, but is the basis for a weird paradox by the UN, because Eritrea doesn't want to open itself to the UN mission it keeps getting sanctions, but the sanctions, which are supposed to be about a support to Al Shabaab, are not proven until they inspect the proofs that are in Eritrea. Which means that Eritrea is currently sanctioned for its sovereignty, and this is unfortunately one of many moves by the UN to strongman small countries who don't have powerful allies. It could very well be true, but, as Ethiopia is a US ally, it could also be a way to avoid Eritrea from either being able to strongly defend itself, or, more likely, to give Ethiopia the advantage in case there is an accidental escalation, not wanted by any side. Anyway, the current sanctions leave Eritrea vulnerable, as it prohibits arms sales to it, whilst it still has either bellicose neighbours, or slightly unfriendly ones. An isolated state, with no ally, doesn't have many it can turn to, to violate a UN embargo. So, obviously, they imported weapons from cash deprived North Korea, creating the unattended consequence of bigger sanctions by the UN. And this chain of consequences made Eritrea an international pariah.

But these allegations also give a new colour to the alliance with the UAE and the Saudi coalition, and a reason why they might have avoided Eritrea, in addition to the arms embargo, that renders foreign bases on its soil murky in international law. The Al Shabaab is part of what is called, the political Islam, a branch of political parties that include Islam as their foundation, and armed paramilitary group, that are sometimes associated with the political parties. In opposition to common wisdom, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, wage war on political islam, though it sometimes uses it on its enemies. Saudi Arabia sees political Islam as dangerous for its democratic aspect, often practicing an Islam way stricter to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. The UAE, due to social, political and historical differences, is more moderate and more secular. It is therefore the one that fights the most political Islam in the Gulf, on both the ground of unwanted democratization and populism, and for the extremism that threaten their society and wealth, as it a base for numerous westerners and western companies in the Gulf. They have officially put Al Shabaab as a terrorist organisation.

This turnaround by the UAE is telling, as they accept to be hosted by a country that reportedly sponsor what they consider terrorists. It can be either because they had assurance that the financing and support of terrorists has stopped, but given that the Coalition fled Djibouti in catastrophe, after diplomatic upheaval, and that Eritrea proposed to host them within days, it is most likely that they simply had no other choice. The Somaliland base might then be to counterbalance the Erythrean one, as Eritrea is not a long term partner of the UAE like Djibouti was, or might even be, at term, a way to replace a questionable ally with opposite interests.

The base also show that rumours of help from Eritrea to Yemeni rebels is blatantly false, as most of the economy is publicly driven, sanctions for going against the state are heavy (one of the reason Eritrea is so secure) and state interests are with the Coalition.

To conclude this section, it has been shown that the arms embargo reason couldn't be verified, but it also demonstrates extreme swing in alliances in the region, especially from the UAE.





Eritrea, is, has said previously, isolated, especially in its immediate vicinity. It has been created by a tumultuous and contentious independence and by a spill of its war with Ethiopia over Somalia, and subsequent actions it took following this isolation. Despite this, it is safer than its neighbours, with no reported terrorist attacks for the last 5years, despite being equally divided between Christians and Muslims. It also seems to fare better during droughts, though the lack of access to the country forbids an assessment of how much it is impacted by starvation and malnutrition. But this comes at a price: the national service. Every Erythrean is required to perform this service for several years, and what often ends up being decades. It is not only for the military, but as most companies are public, they use it to staff their shops and factories for cheap, and the army itself is used for menial jobs like repairing roads. It's not well paid either, though the salaries were recently raised. This creates a perfect ground for youth to leave, to avoid this service. This is even more telling because it is not uncommon for migrants from the Horn of Africa to get kidnapped and smuggled into Sinai, where they are tortured until a ransom is paid, or they're dead. This, with the already hefty price of going to Europe, means that only very determined and somewhat affluent people will attempt the journey.

Libya was destabilised into near oblivion, lifting the cap on immigration from Africa to Europe, that before had only two long and arduous routes, to Morocco, and then hoping to cross the high security into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, or trying to cross the whole near east to Turkey, before going into Europe. This meant that a majority of those migrants actually used the easy crossing into Yemen, and settled there, whereas now, especially with the increase of intensity of the Yemeni conflict, the flux to Europe is actually almost on par with the one to the Gulf.

Eritrea meanwhile suffers from this, a significant proportion of its youth is emigrating, and the fact that they are guaranteed asylum in Europe, and often have a diaspora in those countries, from previous refugees, make for those that are ready for the difficult journey, and are prepared to take the risk to die, a new life readily available once Europe is reached. As a matter of fact, over half of the migrants from the Horn of Africa to Europe are Erythreans, despite its population being dwarfed by Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan.

This migration upended already tensed relations with Europe, and it doesn't look like it's going to be better any time soon, with the European Union having separate sanctions on Eritrea, and heavily supporting Djibouti. This leaves Eritrea with even less possibilities to have allies.





Eritrea is safer than most places in the horn of Africa, it's not as affected by hunger, but it's still under a widely considered authoritarian regime (only one party), that forces a national service onto its population, service unpopular enough that tens of 1000s prefer to make a risky trip to Europe than to be conscripted. Its economy is not in a great state, but it is mainly due to several armed confrontation with neighbours, mostly with Ethiopia, who previously had control over Eritrea. The animosity with all of its regional neighbours leaves no choice but to consider accepting any alliance, like the quick courting of the UAE showed.

It always had to develop "self-reliance", but the need for it was increased when they were condemned by the UN for helping terrorist group that threaten stability in the region, doing so during a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia, using Al Shabaab to hit their rival indirectly. A logical end of the search of friends was to buy weapons from North Korea, but it only increased UN sanctions, and furthered even more the need for self-reliance.

Eritrea had the possibility to be the star of the region, with a near zero crime rate, and better conditions of living, but its history keeps it down, and questionable policies by its government keeps making it a pariah. Nonetheless it still bets on its positive to attract tourism.

This gives it a real North Korean vibe, isolation, trying to grow tourism, safety and order, fuelling regional instability, but the difference is that Eritrea doesn't have any powerful backer, it's a smaller country, in a place very susceptible for drought, and it remains mainly agrarian. Nevertheless, whilst it doesn't have complex achievements like North Korea and its missile program, it can surprisingly feed its population and protect it better compared to its neighbours. Its achievements shouldn't be overstated as it has one of the lowest human development indicator on the planet, but given it is extrapolated from incomplete data, this shouldn't be what solely defines Eritrea either. Eritrea has plenty of qualities and a unique coastal location that should have given several opportunities, but, like North Korea, it instead struggles, and spirals into a worse relationship with its regional neighbours and more widely with most of the International Community.









Is Tourism the salvation for the 21st century isolated communist or close to communist regimes, that are North Korea and Eritrea like it was for Cuba?

To know, wait for the second part of this miniseries on Eritrea.

the part 2 is now available here: https://thenewrealityinforeignpolicy.blogspot.co.uk/2017/09/eritrea-paradise-lost-except-for.html

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