In the humdrum of a high-profile election and declaration of results which have caught everyone’s attention, the nation has a propensity to forget the negatives of the past; times as important as when its sacred democracy was under threat from elements which cannot stomach its success.

On 13 December 2001, India’s Parliament House building, the iconic piece of architecture in Lutyen’s New Delhi was attacked by five gunmen resulting in the death of 14 people and injuries to 22 others. The attack was aborted by the security forces at the Parliament House avoiding what could have been a huge tragedy.

A context to this incident is necessary as many have forgotten that ill-fated day and can only recall it in passing.

On 11 September 2001, the twin towers in New York were attacked with two hijacked airliners in a carefully planned and coordinated operation by a band of 19 Islamic terrorists owing allegiance to Osama bin Laden, the chief of the renegade terrorist organisation, Al Qaeda. It took just half a million US dollars to execute that terror attack (total four were planned and two aborted by circumstances) almost akin to an invasion of the US mainland, an event which has never occurred in history.

The US response to the attack on its homeland and its financial capital was quick and intense, homing on to the Al Qaeda leadership, which was held responsible and known to be ensconced in Afghanistan. As the battle for Tora Bora, the supposed bastion of Bin Laden, raged there was a necessity on the part of the Pakistan ISI, which was clandestinely hand in glove with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, of creating a diversionary to justify a supposedly forced redeployment of Pakistani troops to create the necessary conditions for Bin Laden to escape.

With the Pakistan Army’s 11 Corps deployed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in aid (forced by US president George Bush’s ultimatum) of the US Special Forces the chances of Bin Laden being killed in an accidental encounter were high; thus the necessity for the ISI to engineer a situation forcing redeployment of 11 Corps.

There was no better way than to create a major threat on Pakistan’s eastern border with India thereby forcing Pakistan’s 11 Corps (one of the strategic reserves for the eastern front) to redeploy to the east. Such a threat could only materialise with a high profile negative event, which would be considered as a major threat to India’s national security.

Exploiting the ongoing ISI sponsored proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), where the Indian Army was battling the large number of foreign terrorists from Pakistan, and the existing clandestine networks, which had been established to take the proxy war to India’s hinterland, the ISI chose the most high profile target to launch a terror strike. It was obvious that a successful targeting of India’s Parliament House, the symbol of its extremely successful democracy, would cause a major setback to the Indian government forcing it to respond in a parallel to the US response to 9/11.

It may be recalled that in the history of the proxy war the maximum turbulence in the form of terrorist violence was witnessed in 2001 leading to the neutralisation of more than 2,100 terrorists by the Indian security forces lead by the Indian Army.

Approximately two years prior to that, the hijacking of an Indian airliner in flight from Kathmandu and the drama that followed it, had led to the release of Maulana Masood Azhar from the Kot Bhalwal jail at Jammu. Azhar then went on to raise the Jaish e Mohammad (JeM), a terror organisation to target India that continues to exist to the day.

On 13 December 2001, five gunmen in a car bearing official labels penetrated the security of the Parliament gate and almost reached the entry to the Parliament House. By a stroke of luck, the car ran into the motorcade of the security team accompanying the vice-president of India. Disembarking from the car, the terrorists made an attempt to dash for the entry to the building but were clearly identified by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) security elements deployed, due to the weapons and the rucksacks they carried. Without describing further detail, in the ensuing gun battle all five terrorists were killed. One CRPF lady constable and five Delhi Police personnel were martyred among many others from the staff of Parliament and a journalist.

The terror strike could have been an even bigger tragedy had the penetration into the Parliament succeeded because India’s home minister L K Advani was present along with many other legislators. India’s response was one of deep anger. Just a month ago, the building of the J&K Assembly had been targeted resulting in 31 deaths. The cumulative effect of public anger, built up over time due to a series of negative events, forced the government to order a mobilisation of the Indian armed forces.

International pressure, particularly from the US, however, prevented the triggering of a war. Former president Pervez Musharraf, on 13 January 2002 promised that Pakistan’s space would never be used for any terror attacks but never lived up to it then or thereafter.

Seventeen years later, with Pakistan continuing to target India through the proxy war, alongside the doublespeak of peace gestures, is there a possibility of such an event being repeated?

Geopolitically, the environment presents a situation, where the US has drawn down from Afghanistan but yet its interest remains in Pakistan pursuing the security of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Yet, the kind of need it had in late 2001 has largely diluted. Pakistan’s economic situation does not permit it to risk a full blown war with India but its control on the maverick radical India-focused elements continues to be marginal.

While the J&K situation may be festering at low-level militancy/terror, the attempts to expand it to Punjab are evident, though not yet in a fully-focused way; testing of waters is yet underway.

India’s intelligence community has largely prevented attempts of the sponsors of proxy war achieving any major success outside J&K. Yet, enough networks exist and a cooperative effort by radical elements could yet be possible.

While the Islamic State (IS) has not found its feet in India in any decided way, it is attempting to establish itself in northern Afghanistan. The IS has not been completely evicted from the Middle East and its networked existence is still a force to reckon with. One big event is what such terror organisations seek to execute. It gives them the adrenaline to continue for many years thereafter.

Given India’s counter-terror structures, it may not be easy to penetrate its defences but chinks can always be identified for an unpredictable act, especially when the nation’s guard is down. We are coming into a period when the guard will per force shift towards internal security of a different kind; the securing of the electoral environment for the national election in mid-2019.

The best way a nation can secure itself is to avoid a divisive polity, pursue democracy in the spirit of ‘cooperative opposition’ which does not in any way produce the kind of disaffection which throws up antipathy leading to any radical anti-national fervour.

The other way is for the public to realise that narrow interests must always remain subservient to the national interest. Unfortunately, the phenomenal growth of social media facilitates the growth and expression of hard opinion, which is never in national interest.

We do have internal security threats, which arise from social and economic triggers such as rural distress, farmer agitation and reservation-based agitations but none of these offer the opportunities that religious and anti-national radicals seek. Even the threat from the left wing extremism bears no similar parallel.

The three areas free for the ISI to build upon a potential high profile terror act remain the J&K imbroglio, radical Islamic groups within rest of India influenced by persecution perception, and Punjab. The last one does not yet have that traction although in the field of terror one big act is sought to spur a campaign.

India’s intelligence agencies are as professional as one can get and growing in capability by the day. Where we are failing is in bringing influence to social media to prevent growth of alienation and antipathy. For this recommendations on information handling and influencing have been rife for some time without sufficiently serious efforts on a larger scale. Use of other technologies such as drones or kinetic nonmilitary tools remain a threat of which greater public sensitisation is necessary.

Terror acts by alien elements through infiltration by land or sea remain a threat. While intelligence agencies enhance their pick up capability, there can be no cutbacks on response agencies, which if efficient can ensure minimisation of damage and a quick end to negative events.

The National Security Guard (NSG) is an efficient force but even with its regional hubs its response cannot always be as rapid as desired. There are a plethora of other forces which need to be equipped better and remain in training mode at several times of the year. Training is one thing which seems far from the mind of security managers in India.

On the positive side, I can relate with many other nations under similar threat and say that India in many ways is better equipped to handle it. After all we have been at the receiving end for as far as one can remember.

However, that should give us no room for complacency. In fact, we should be ever willing to learn more from experiences of other nations and share many of our own rich experiences. As a part of corporate social responsibility, perhaps, India’s high profile corporate houses can spend a part of their mandatory expenditure towards the sensitisation to and training for such potential negative events.

Hopefully, India will remain secure through 2019 and well beyond.