Each document depicted alleged funding from OSF to various projects in Italy like “organizing a national day against Islamophobia” or “to encourage young people to actively engage in political process.”

Within Italian politics, the alleged OSF documents name only one candidate, Emma Bonino of the firmly left Piu Europa party. The documents also specifically name one political party, Lega, which is considered far-right, anti-migration, and ideologically opposed to the OSF’s more eurocentric programming.

Next Quotidiano, a center-left leaning online Italian newspaper, the EU Disinfo Lab Italia, and others asserted the documents list incorrect points of contact for certain projects and organizations. Closer studies of the images posted on Twitter also reveal some letters, symbols, and stylistic elements different from those typically used in similar reports released by the OSF, which could indicate tampering.

These sources also posit that the dates listed for the alleged projects in the documents (which are for 2018) are false because the Foundation has not previously released data on its activities for the current year. Comparisons from earlier OSF reports suggest that the data in the photos could be copied from the organization’s 2014 report.

Another interesting aspect of the documents was the specific language used in reference to the Italian political landscape. One of the listed initiatives is described as an effort to target “unfamiliar movement such as the Lega Nord to collect the votes of disgruntled Italians but not to risk the permanence of Italy in the European Union.” The document also described another project with the Associazione Luca Coscioni designed to “pushfrnch [sic] public opinion to encourage Emma Bonino to welcome refugees and work for United States of Europe.” The explicit nature of these descriptions and goals, the naming of Italian candidates with specific ideologies, and the typo in the Bonino project line raise questions over the source of these documents.

The @DFRLab has not independently verified these claims.

Reaction

Both Next Quotidiano and the EU Disinfo Lab Italia released helpful analysis exposing and explaining this disinformation. Next Quotidiano, as a credible, local Italian source, placed a stronger focus on examining the documents and their content, while the EU Disinfo Lab emphasized the propagation of the disinformation, mainly on Twitter.

The EU Disinfo Lab also highlighted the roles of active Twitter users who were able to amplify the #SorosLega5Stelle and mobilize other communities, including @lucabattanta, an anti-establishment Italian political blogger. Battanta later refuted the accusation, replying to several of the Disinfo Lab’s tweets. The Disinfo Lab also explained that less than one percent of the Twitter users engaging with the hashtag overlapped with the Russian network they mapped, reinforcing the assertion that the operation was orchestrated domestically by CasaPound.

Translated from Italian: “What did I mobilize? Present me your first and last name before you quote me out of turn.” (Source: Twitter / @lucabattanta)

In response to this reporting, Twitter Public Policy appeared to quickly remove or suspend several of the malicious accounts that played key roles in the propagation, including @RussianTwe and @nina_moric. Although there was less activity on Facebook, the platform has not yet taken any action in response to the content or users amplifying the hashtag.

While there are still weaknesses in these social media platforms’ approach to addressing these types of threats, this case underscores a positive development in their ability to spot disinformation, decipher the context, and determine a course of action to respond.

Implications

Twitter does not have a decisive audience in Italy, but the occasion of coordinated automation or botnets on that platform is a good indicator for similar influencing activity elsewhere. Those pushing out coordinated messages ahead of the elections would be negligent to invest fully in one platform as opposed to a range of engagement tools. The goal is audience penetration by any means, which is why disinformation is a pervasive challenge. Disinformation, which is deliberate, and misinformation, which is not, can exist anywhere information and engagement meet. Both can effectively take the form of “fake news,” which is at the front of Italians’ collective conversation ahead of the elections.

The timing of #SorosLega5Stelle was of particular interest. Italian election law demands that domestic media outlets refrain from coverage of polling data two weeks prior to voting or candidate activity 48 hours prior to voting. The narrative around #SorosLega5Stelle was released on Friday afternoon ahead of the Sunday vote, with the intent to spread during the normative weekend quiet.

While campaigning via social media does not fall under the institutional norms of Italian elections, the prospect of disinformation — especially social media campaigns that spike in traffic, and thus attention due to automation — in the final hours was a potential vulnerability.

The Atlantic Council @DFRLab’s will continue to monitor the lead-up to Italian elections. Follow along with our #ElectionWatch coverage.