Re: updated draft

From:stephenjhadley@me.com To: autumn.brewington@washpost.com CC: chowdhry@ricehadleygates.com, eng@ricehadleygates.com Date: 2014-01-14 17:00 Subject: Re: updated draft

Autumn -- I think it looks great. Let's go with it. Thanks for all you great work! Steve Stephen J. Hadley (202) 220-5061 > On Jan 14, 2014, at 1:40 PM, "Brewington, Autumn A" <autumn.brewington@washpost.com> wrote: > > How's this? > > U.S. officials are struggling again with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. After painful and prolonged negotiations, they concluded a draft bilateral security agreement last year that lays the foundation for leaving U.S military forces in Afghanistan after 2014. It is expected to involve 8,000 to > 10,000 U.S. troops with counterterrorism, training and other responsibilities in support of Afghan forces. > > Most U.S. experts on Afghanistan believe that such a residual force is critical if Afghan forces are to continue to professionalize. Only with such help will they have a reasonable chance of containing the Taliban and giving Afghan authorities the space to negotiate a political settlement that includes the Taliban. Some NATO forces would also remain, but only if U.S. troops stay. > > Most experts also believe that without such residual forces, the billions of dollars in financial support promised for Afghan security forces and for Afghanistan’s economic development will not materialize. Few believe that any Afghan government would survive long without this assistance. So the stakes are high — for Afghanistan and for preserving the investment of lives and treasure that the United States and its coalition allies have made over the past 12 years. > > Initially Karzai said he would sign the agreement after a loya jirga, or traditional congregation of Afghan leaders, approved the pact. The loya jirga approved the deal in November, but Karzai soon demanded further concessions: an end to counterterrorism raids into Afghan homes at night, active U.S. support for the peace process with the Taliban, and non-interference in the April presidential election that will determine Karzai’s successor. Lately he has threatened to leave the matter to his successor. > > U.S. officials have responded by pressuring Karzai directly and indirectly. They have set a succession of deadlines and said the agreement must be signed in “weeks, not months.” So far, nothing has worked. U.S. officials need an alternative approach. > > One option would be for President Obama to make a public statement praising Afghanistan’s progress in assuming responsibility for its security; improving the education, health and well-being of its citizens; and preparing for the April election. To support that progress, Obama would say, he has directed U.S. forces to curtail all but essential night raids. He is committed to facilitating the peace process, he would note, and pledges full support for an election free from all outside influences. > > These statements would not represent a major U.S. policy change, but together they would offer Karzai a face-saver if he really wishes to sign the security agreement. > > Next, Obama could announce the number of troops that he is prepared to leave in Afghanistan post-2014 and direct the Pentagon to develop plans on that basis. He would call on our NATO allies to announce similar force commitments. > > This step would go a long way toward reassuring Afghan presidential candidates, and the Afghan people, of America’s post-2014 presence. The lack of such reassurance has become a source of serious instability, threatening the election and the morale of Afghan security forces. For similar reasons, Obama should at this point resist any pressure to set a date for the termination of the post-2014 U.S. deployment. > > Third, Obama could state that while he is willing to sign the bilateral security agreement with Karzai he is also willing to sign it with the next Afghan president. U.S. officials should then stop pressuring Karzai — or anyone else — for a signature before the April election. Such pressure only strengthens Karzai’s hand, encourages further delay and makes the United States look desperate. > > Obama should make clear that his commitment of troops is dependent, ultimately, on the bilateral security agreement being signed. But a post-election signing by a new Afghan president would give more than enough time to complete the necessary U.S. military planning before year’s end. Indeed, experts say that even without the deal, U.S. forces could remain in Afghanistan after 2014 under the existing status-of-forces agreement, though our allies would have to negotiate a new agreement for their forces with the new Afghan government. > > Washington Post/ABC News polling last month suggested that more than 60 percent of Americans believe the Afghan war was not worth fighting. But the same poll also found that 55 percent support leaving some U.S. forces for training and “anti-insurgency” operations. And lawmakers’ public statements suggest that a post-2014 deployment would have bipartisan support in Congress. > > Obama should avoid any suggestion that he might embrace a “zero option” and leave no U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014. Almost every Afghan expert believes it would destabilize Afghanistan, threaten the outcome of the presidential election and ultimately risk the collapse of Afghan security forces. This would profoundly affect U.S. security interests. Afghanistan would once again become a haven for terrorists — who, history shows, would ultimately attack U.S. interests and territory. Afghanistan would contribute to destabilizing a nuclear-armed Pakistan. And the Afghan people would forfeit all the progress they have made, with our help, in building a more tolerant, inclusive, secure and prosperous society. > > Afghanistan’s presidential election is less than three months away. U.S. policy must not be based on frustration with Karzai’s mercurial behavior but on ensuring the election of a legitimate successor to Karzai with whom the United States can sign a security agreement that is overwhelmingly in the interests of both countries. > > The writer was national security adviser in the George W. Bush administration. > > __________________________________________ > Autumn Brewington > Op-Ed Page Editor > Autumn.Brewington@washpost.com > 202-334-5120 > > ________________________________________ > From: Stephen Hadley <stephenjhadley@me.com> > Sent: Tuesday, January 14, 2014 1:26 PM > To: Brewington, Autumn A; Brewington, Autumn A > Cc: Aysha Chowdhry; Catherine Eng; Hiatt, Fred; Diehl, Jackson K > Subject: Re: An Op Ed on Afghanistan if you want it > > Autumn -- > > Very nice job, as usual. Just a few points of mine and then responses to your questions. > > 1. The Loya Jirga approved the deal in November, 2013. > > 2. Karzai's request was not for a "pledge" of non-interference in the election but actual non-interference -- and that was one reason he gave for waiting till after the election, to see whether the United States actually interfered or not. So I would go back to the original: "non-interference in the April presidential election that will determine Karzai's successor." > > 3. As to Obama's statement giving Karzai "a face-saving way out," I think the reader will not understand what we are saying if we don't follow with the original phrase "if he really wishes to sign the BSA." > > 4. On the paragraph on which Obama fixes the troop numbers, the introductory word should not be "Alternatively" but "Secondly." This is all one statement, given at one time. This is the second point Obama must make in the speech. For we won't know for some time after the speech is given whether Obama's statements in the prior paragraph are enough to move Karzai to sign the BSA. And even if he signs it, Obama will still need to announce the troop number in this statement since the number is NOT in the BSA. So "Secondly" was right. > > 5. The results of the poll on public support for the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and for leaving a residual force was published in your paper. I am forwarding the site (which Aysha found) to you separately. > > 6. In the second to last paragraph, it's not just that the zero option would "threaten the safety of the presidential election" but would "threaten the outcome" (as I original wrote) in many ways: as you suggest, threaten the safety, but if the zero option did collapse the Afghan security forces, the election might not even be held -- or the turn out (especially in Sunni areas) would be so low that the outcome would have no legitimacy. This is why "threaten the outcome" seemed the right term. > > Let me know if there is anything else you need from us. > > And please confirm that you received these comments. > > Thanks again for your great work on this piece. > > Steve > > > Stephen J. Hadley > (202) 220-5061 > >> On Jan 14, 2014, at 12:07 PM, "Brewington, Autumn A" <autumn.brewington@washpost.com> wrote: >> >> Thanks so much for your patience, and I apologize for the delay. Can you let me know, please, how this looks? >> >> Best regards, > >> Autumn >> >> U.S. officials are struggling again with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. After painful and prolonged negotiations, they concluded a draft bilateral security agreement last year that lays the foundation for leaving U.S military forces in Afghanistan after 2014. It is expected to involve 8,000 to 10,000 U.S. troops with counterterrorism, training and other responsibilities in support of Afghan forces. >> >> Most U.S. experts on Afghanistan believe that such a residual force is critical if Afghan forces are to continue to professionalize. Only with such help will they have a reasonable chance of containing the Taliban and giving Afghan authorities the space to negotiate a political settlement that includes the Taliban. Some NATO forces would also remain, but only if U.S. troops stay. >> >> Most experts also believe that without such residual forces, the billions of dollars in financial support promised for Afghan security forces and for Afghanistan’s economic development will not materialize. Few believe that any Afghan government would survive long without this assistance. So the stakes are high — for Afghanistan and for preserving the investment of lives and treasure that the United States and its coalition allies have made over the past 12 years. >> >> Initially Karzai said he would sign the agreement after a loya jirga, or traditional congregation of Afghan leaders, approved the pact. The loya jirga approved the deal in XXX, but Karzai soon demanded further concessions: an end to counterterrorism raids into Afghan homes at night, active U.S. support for the peace process with the Taliban, and a pledge of? non-interference in the April presidential election that will determine Karzai’s successor. Lately he has threatened to leave the matter to his successor. >> >> U.S. officials have responded by pressuring Karzai directly and indirectly. They have set a succession of deadlines and said the agreement must be signed in “weeks, not months.” So far, nothing has worked. U.S. officials need an alternative approach. >> >> One option would be for President Obama to make a public statement praising Afghanistan’s progress in assuming responsibility for its security; improving the education, health and well-being of its citizens; and preparing for the April election. To support that progress, Obama would say, he has directed U.S. forces to curtail all but essential night raids. He is committed to facilitating the peace process, he would note, and pledges full support for an election free from all outside influences. >> >> These statements would not represent a major U.S. policy change, but together they would offer Karzai a face-saving out. >> >> Alternatively, Obama could announce the number of troops that he is prepared to leave in Afghanistan post-2014 and direct the Pentagon to develop plans on that basis. He would call on our NATO allies to announce similar force commitments. >> >> This step would go a long way toward reassuring Afghan presidential candidates, and the Afghan people, of America’s post-2014 presence. The lack of such reassurance has become a source of serious instability, threatening the election and the morale of Afghan security forces. For similar reasons, Obama should at this point resist any pressure to set a date for the termination of the post-2014 U.S. deployment. >> >> Third, Obama could state that while he is willing to sign the bilateral security agreement with Karzai he is also willing to sign it with the next Afghan president. U.S. officials should then stop pressuring Karzai — or anyone else — for a signature before the April election. Such pressure only strengthens Karzai’s hand, encourages further delay and makes the United States look desperate. >> >> Obama should make clear that his commitment of troops is dependent, ultimately, on the bilateral security agreement being signed. But a post-election signing by a new Afghan president would give more than enough time to complete the necessary U.S. military planning before year’s end. Indeed, experts say that even without the deal, U.S. forces could remain in Afghanistan after 2014 under the existing status-of-forces agreement, though our allies would have to negotiate a new agreement for their forces with the new Afghan government. >> >> Recent polling suggests that more than 60 percent of Americans believe the Afghan war was not worth fighting. [DO YOU HAVE A LINK FOR THIS?] But the same poll also found that 55 percent support leaving some U.S. forces for training and “anti-insurgency” operations. And lawmakers’ public statements suggest that a post-2014 deployment would have bipartisan support in Congress. >> >> Obama should avoid any suggestion that he might embrace a “zero option” and leave no U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014. Almost every Afghan expert believes it would destabilize Afghanistan, threaten the safety of the presidential election and ultimately risk the collapse of Afghan security forces. This would profoundly affect U.S. security interests. Afghanistan would once again become a haven for terrorists — who, history shows, would ultimately attack U.S. interests and territory. Afghanistan would contribute to destabilizing a nuclear-armed Pakistan. And the Afghan people would forfeit all the progress they have made, with our help, in building a more tolerant, inclusive, secure and prosperous society. >> >> Afghanistan’s presidential election is less than three months away. U.S. policy must not be based on frustration with Karzai’s mercurial behavior but on ensuring the election of a legitimate successor to Karzai with whom the United States can sign a security agreement that is overwhelmingly in the interests of both countries. >> >> The writer was national security adviser in the George W. Bush administration. >> >> >> >> >> __________________________________________ >> Autumn Brewington >> Op-Ed Page Editor >> Autumn.Brewington@washpost.com >> 202-334-5120 >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: Stephen Hadley <stephenjhadley@me.com> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 14, 2014 10:54 AM >> To: Brewington, Autumn A >> Cc: Aysha Chowdhry; Catherine Eng >> Subject: Re: An Op Ed on Afghanistan if you want it >> >> Autumn -- >> >> Great. Standing by and will turn to it promptly. >> >> Steve >> >> Stephen J. Hadley >> (202) 220-5061 >> >>> On Jan 14, 2014, at 10:30 AM, "Brewington, Autumn A" <autumn.brewington@washpost.com> wrote: >>> >>> I will have an edited draft back to you in the next hour; and thanks for e-mailing all of us. The e-mail was somehow delayed in getting to my inbox, so I'm glad Fred saw it right away. >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>> Autumn >>> >>> __________________________________________ >>> Autumn Brewington >>> Op-Ed Page Editor >>> Autumn.Brewington@washpost.com >>> 202-334-5120 >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: Stephen Hadley <stephenjhadley@me.com> >>> Sent: Monday, January 13, 2014 10:37 PM >>> To: Hiatt, Fred; Hiatt, Fred; Diehl, Jackson K; Diehl, Jackson K; Brewington, Autumn A; Brewington, Autumn A >>> Cc: Aysha Chowdhry; Catherine Eng >>> Subject: An Op Ed on Afghanistan if you want it >>> >>> All -- >>> >>> The purpose is to help the Administration out of the box on the signature of the BSA. The op ed reflects a lot of input from U.S. experts on the subject, some key Afghan leaders, and from some Administration officials. I believe that the Administration would find it helpful -- and this is a problem that certainly needs solving. >>> >>> Let me know what you think. >>> >>> >>> "U.S. officials are struggling again with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. After painful and prolonged negotiations, they reached agreement on a draft "bilateral security agreement" or BSA. The draft BSA lays the foundation for leaving U.S military forces in Afghanistan after the end of 2014. It is expected to involve 8,000 to 10,000 U.S. troops with counterterrorism, training, and other responsibilities in support of Afghan forces. >>> >>> Most U.S. Afghanistan experts believe such a residual force is critical if Afghan forces are to continue to improve and professionalize. Only with such help will they have a reasonable chance of containing the Taliban and giving Afghan authorities the space to negotiate an inclusive political settlement including the Taliban. Some of our NATO allies will also leave forces but only if we do. >>> >>> Most experts also believe that without such residual forces, the billions of dollars in financial support promised for the Afghan security forces and for Afghanistan's economic development simply will not materialize. Without this assistance, few believe any Afghan government can survive for very long. So the stakes are high -- for Afghanistan, and for preserving the investment of lives and treasure that the United States and its coalition allies have made over the last twelve years. >>> >>> Initially President Karzai said he would sign the BSA after its approval by a traditional convocation of Afghan leaders called a Loya Jirga. The BSA received overwhelming approval, But Karzai nonetheless declined to sign. He has required further concessions: an end to counterterrorism raids into Afghan homes at night, active U.S. support for the peace process with the Taliban, and non-interference in the April election to choose President Karzai's successor. Lately he has threatened not to sign at all and to leave it to his successor. >>> >>> U.S. officials have responded by pressuring President Karzai directly and indirectly and setting a succession of missed deadlines, most recently saying that the BSA must be signed in "weeks, not months." So far, nothing has worked. U.S. officials need an alternative approach. >>> >>> One option would be for President Obama to make a public statement along the following lines. >>> >>> First, he would praise Afghanistan's progress in assuming greater responsibility for its security, in improving the education, health, and well-being of its citizens, and in preparing for the upcoming Presidential election. He would state that, to support that progress, he has directed U.S. forces to curtail all but essential night raids, he is committed to facilitating the peace process, and pledges full support for an April election free from all outside influences. >>> >>> These statements would not represent a major U.S. policy change, but together they would offer President Karzai a face saver if in fact he wishes to sign the BSA. >>> >>> Second, President Obama would announce the specific number of troops that he is prepared to leave in Afghanistan post-2014 and direct the Pentagon to develop plans on that basis. He would call on our NATO allies to announce similar force commitments. >>> >>> This step would go a long way to reassuring the candidates for the Afghan Presidency and the Afghan people of America's post-2014 presence. The lack of such reassurance has become a source of serious instability, threatening the success of the Afghan election and the morale of the Afghan security forces. For similar reasons, President Obama should resist any pressure to set at this point a date for the termination of the U.S. post-2014 deployment. >>> >>> Third, President Obama would state that while he is willing to sign the BSA with President Karzai, he is also willing to sign it post-April with a new Afghan President. U.S. officials should then stop pressuring President Karzai -- or anyone else -- for a signature before the April election. Such pressure only strengthens President Karzai's hand, encourages further delay, and makes the United States look weak and desperate. >>> >>> President Obama should make clear in his statement that his troop commitment is dependent upon the ultimate signature of the BSA. But a post-election April or May signing by a new Afghan president would give more than enough time to complete the necessary U.S. military planning before the end of the year. Indeed, informed experts say that even without the BSA, U.S. forces could remain in Afghanistan after 2014 under the existing Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (although our allies would have to negotiate a new SOFA for their forces with the new Afghan government). >>> >>> Recent polling suggests that over 60% of the American people believe the Afghan war was not worth fighting. But the same poll suggests that 55% support leaving some U.S. forces for training and "anti-insurgency" operations. And public statements by members suggest that a post-2014 deployment would have bipartisan Congressional support. >>> >>> President Obama should avoid any suggestion that he might embrace a "zero option" and leave no U.S. troops post-2014. Almost every Afghan expert believes it would destabilize Afghanistan, place the Presidential election in doubt, and ultimately risk the collapse of the Afghan security forces. It would profoundly affect U.S. security interests. Afghanistan would become once again a safe haven for terrorists -- who, history shows, would ultimately attack U.S. interests and territory. Afghanistan would contribute to destabilizing a nuclear-armed Pakistan. And the Afghan people would forfeit all the progress they have made (with our help) in building a more tolerant, inclusive, secure, and prosperous society. >>> >>> There are less than three months to go before elections to replace President Karzai. U.S. policy must not be based on frustration with Karzai's mercurial behavior. It must be based on ensuring the election of a legitimate successor to President Karzai with whom the United States can sign a BSA that is overwhelmingly in the interests of both countries." >>> >>> >>> All -- That's it. May be a little long for you but Autumn has shown great skill in helping to shrink my stuff without losing the substance. And I will help. At the same time, the subject is important enough to warrant an extended treatment. >>> >>> Thank you for your consideration. >>> >>> Steve >>> >>> >>> >>> Stephen J. Hadley >>> (202) 431-9797