We’ve already discussed that the 49ers’ current swoon into the chasms of NFL irrelevance are largely the doing of general manager Trent Baalke.

From 2011 to 2015, the 49ers should have been restocking to prepare for the coming exodus of veteran players. While the team thrived, making three straight conference title games and a Super Bowl, the foundation for the future had far too many cracks.

Two coaches and two years of neglect at key positions has left the team at 6-17 over its last 23 games. Baalke’s team went from the NFL’s elite to a punchline while the rest of the teams at the top with them have continued to thrive.

Why is that? How did it happen so suddenly? The answer lies in Baalke’s “draft and develop” mantra.

The 49ers’ draft classes by any standards have been lacking.

The website Pro-Football-Reference.com uses a metric called “approximate value” (AV). AV assigns a numerical value to every player in the league. Zero is the lowest number issued. The highest total they’ve ever given out in a single season is 26 (LaDainian Tomlinson’s 2006 campaign).

From PFR’s Doug Drinen:

“Essentially, AV is a substitute for — and a significant improvement upon, in my opinion — metrics like ‘number of seasons as a starter’ or ‘number of times making the pro bowl’ or the like. You should think of it as being essentially like those two metrics, but with interpolation in between. That is, ‘number of seasons as a starter’ is a reasonable starting point if you’re trying to measure, say, how good a particular draft class is, or what kind of player you can expect to get with the #13 pick in the draft. But obviously some starters are better than others. Starters on good teams are, as a group, better than starters on bad teams. Starting WRs who had lots of receiving yards are, as a group, better than starting WRs who did not have many receiving yards. Starters who made the pro bowl are, as a group, better than starters who didn’t, and so on. And non-starters aren’t worthless, so they get some points too.”

AV is far from a perfect statistic, but it’s good as a succinct, general indicator of player production, which is how we’re going to use it here. There are all sorts of variables at play when it comes to building a football team. For our purposes, AV is an easy way to quantify a GM’s draft resume.

The best statistics for a general manager, of course, are wins and losses. The use of AV illustrates why the 49ers went from an NFC powerhouse to 14-24 since the fall of the franchise starting in 2014.

Trent Baalke drafted for the 49ers in 2010, but he wasn’t officially the team’s general manager until just before the draft. Scot McCloughan heavily influenced that year’s draft before his “mutual parting” from San Francisco (sound familiar?).

McCloughan’s 2010 draft class featuring Anthony Davis, Mike Iupati and NaVorro Bowman is far and away the team’s best draft class over the last six years (excluding 2016 – that AV won’t be calculated until after the season). It had an average AV of 26.83 per season thanks largely to three All-Pro nods from Bowman and one from Iupati.

That 2011 draft netted the 49ers a total AV of 101 and a 20.2 average AV per season, second behind the previous class. The 2011 group also landed them a Pro Bowler and All-Pro in Aldon Smith. Smith, of course, is no longer with the 49ers. It also landed them Colin Kaepernick, who was the choice of Jim Harbaugh.

From a production standpoint, the 2012 draft might as well not have even happened. That draft should have landed the 49ers a couple of starters in 2016. Instead, it totaled an AV of five. FIVE. Below average players do that in one season. The 49ers entire draft class did that over a course of three seasons.

On top of that, none of the seven members of the 2012 draft class is still in San Francisco, and only one of them (Joe Looney) is still even in the NFL.

The 2013 draft was a little better, and totaled an AV of 45 over its first three seasons (15 average). Of the 11 players selected that year, five are still with San Francisco, and Eric Reid (round 1, pick 18) made a Pro Bowl his first year as an alternate.

The problem with 2013 is the 49ers needed a home run after 2012 turned out to be a total bust. Instead it turned out to be a middling class devoid of valuable contributors (Vance McDonald, Tank Carradine, Corey Lemonier, Quinton Patton, Marcus Lattimore, etc.). When that happens, you wind up with a middling football team.

Baalke’s 2014 class has turned into a little better version of the 2013 group with 40 AV in two years. There haven’t been any Pro Bowls from the 11 players selected, although Carlos Hyde (round 2, pick 57) should probably get to one soon. Jimmie Ward (1, 30) looks like he’ll be a solid player, and Aaron Lynch (5, 170) looks to be an every down type of player – but he was suspended four games to start the season.

Beyond that, it appears the 49ers are left with a bevy of guys that haven’t proven to be contributors on a winning team.

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The 2015 crop of draft picks, albeit with only one full year of production under its belt, looks a lot like 2013’s group. In the 2015 season, Baalke’s 10 draft picks gained a total AV of 10. Seven of the 10 are still in San Francisco, which is good news, but Trent Brown (7, 244) is shaping up to be the best player from this bunch that’s most provided depth as reserves.

Here’s the average AV per season of each 49ers draft class since 2010:

So that’s a lot of numbers and it certainly doesn’t look good on paper, but how have the 49ers drafted in relation to other perennial playoff contenders?

For our purposes, we compared Baalke’s drafts to those of the Bengals, Patriots and Seahawks, who all have made the playoffs at least the last four seasons and do the vast majority of their roster construction through the draft.

The Bengals have made the playoffs every year since 2011. Their 2011 draft netted a total AV of 149. Their 2012 class has earned an AV of 105, 2013 has gotten an AV of 37, 2014 was even better with 41, and 2015 finished their first season with a total AV of 4.

While they haven’t had wild success drafting superstars (not many teams do), they’ve produced a trio of Pro Bowlers. AJ Green has made five Pro Bowls. Andy Dalton has made a pair of trips to the NFL’s all-star game, while Tyler Eifert has also been named to one Pro Bowl.

That’s eight total Pro Bowls for three Cincinnati draft picks – all of whom are still on the team. Keep in mind the 49ers have had two draft picks go to two Pro Bowls, and one of those players is no longer in San Francisco (Aldon Smith).

Perhaps, most importantly the Bengals drafted 45 players from 2011 to 2015. Of those 45 players, 27 still play for Cincinnati. By comparison, San Francisco has selected 49 in that time frame, 21 still play for San Francisco, and arguably only four of those guys (Reid, Ward, Hyde and Lynch) are impact starters.

The Bengals roster is littered with quality starters they’ve drafted over the last few years, which is necessary for teams building via the draft. Empty drafts haven’t happened in Cincinnati, while they’ve mostly been the norm for San Francisco.

Since 2011, San Francisco’s NFC West rival Seattle Seahawks have been very good at building in the draft. It’s no coincidence Seattle has made the playoffs every year since 2012 and was within one yard of winning consecutive Super Bowls in 2013 and 2014.

In 2010, the Seahawks found Russell Okung, Earl Thomas, Golden Tate, Walter Thurmond and Kam Chancellor.

Their 2011 class featured KJ Wright and Richard Sherman. Sherman is a three-time Pro Bowler and three-time First Team All-Pro with a career AV of 72. In total, their 2011 draft picks have netted them an AV of 169.

The Seahawks followed that up with a 2012 group that’s gone for an AV of 162, and includes current Seahawks Bobby Wagner and Russell Wilson. Wagner has been a First Team All-Pro, with two Pro Bowl appearances, while Wilson has three Pro Bowls to his credit. These two drafts are prime examples of how you build a football team via this method.

The Seahawks put together three straight grand slam drafts in a row. No wonder they’re so good.

In 2013 Seattle was without a first round pick after they traded that selection to Minnesota for Percy Harvin. They addressed a need for a perimeter threat using draft picks – a novel concept to the 49ers front office. This draft posted a 55 AV for Seattle, with no Pro Bowlers or All Pros, but they could afford to have a draft that landed them some depth after home runs in the previous three seasons.

Following their season-ending interception at the goal line in the Super Bowl, Seattle decided they needed a red zone threat. So what did they do? They sent their center and 31st overall pick to New Orleans for Jimmy Graham. Again, their draft AV suffered because of this, posting a total of 12 in that stat, but they got an elite play maker in Graham.

Additionally, they drafted wide receiver Tyler Lockett who quickly burst on the scene as an exceptional return man and landed a spot in the Pro Bowl and was a first-team All-Pro.

In total, Seattle drafted eight Pro Bowlers between 2010 and 2015, along with four first-team All-Pros. They made 47 picks in that span and have only kept 15 of them. That’s not a great percentage, but when the players they’ve drafted (Wilson, Sherman, Wright) are as high quality as they are, they can afford to lose guys and fill those spots with cheaper free agents or they can trade for players to plug those roster gaps.

Seattle’s also been among the NFL’s best teams at finding undrafted free agents. But that’s an entirely different discussion.

Trading draft picks to fill needs is something San Francisco hasn’t done often. If they do trade in the draft, it’s typically back, or a minor move up in the middle rounds. It’s never significant, and they’ve needed to make some sort of impact for years. They haven’t, Seattle has, and that’s why Seattle continues to make the postseason and the 49ers dwell in the NFC West basement.

The class of the NFL when it comes to churning out playoff appearances is the New England Patriots. They’ve made the playoffs 13 of the last 15 seasons.

One major key to the Patriots’ success is that they are working with one of the best quarterback-coach duos in league history. However, that doesn’t mean they don’t have to continually restock via the draft, which they’ve been doing since 2001.

From 2011 to 2015, the Patriots went to the playoffs every year, all resulting in trips to the AFC Championship Game with two trips to the Super Bowl (one win).

The Patriots drafts in this time frame don’t jump off the page, with zero total Pro Bowls or first team All-Pro selections.

They’ve also been pretty average in the AV department, with AVs of 97, 79, 52, 30 and 23 from their last five drafts. Of the 43 players taken in those five years, 18 of them still reside with the Patriots.

Where New England differs is their ability to identify where they need to improve and fill those gaps with enough depth that they can afford to miss on a player now and then. New England doesn’t need huge drafts, they just need to find players they can comfortably slot in around their stars like Tom Brady and Rob Gronkowski – and they’ve done that to perfection.

They got four years of good production from running backs Shane Vereen (2, 56) and Stevan Ridley (3, 73), both taken in 2011.

Their first round pick in 2012, Chandler Jones (No. 21 overall) was outstanding for them for four seasons before they traded him this offseason to Arizona.

Not to mention they snagged Jimmy Garoppolo in the second round in 2014, and Garoppolo played very well for them in Brady’s absence.

This team finds those quality pieces and then can afford to let them go because they know they can draft replacements for them.

The 49ers aren’t in a position to do that. They’ve needed a home run draft for the last four years, yet their drafts shake out like New England’s.

Here’s how Baalke’s drafts stack up to Seattle, New England and Cincinnati from 2010 to 2015.:

Each of the teams we’ve talked about has had glaring needs over the last five years, and they’ve addressed them with mighty swings.

But Baalke continues to operate as if the 49ers have an elite roster that needs minor tweaks and adjustments. That isn’t the case. They need an overhaul.

Whether it’s ineptitude, arrogance or some combination of both, Baalke’s aversion to addressing what everyone else on the planet recognizes as the team’s biggest needs has ultimately led to the team’s demise.

Inside linebacker is one example. Sure, the retirements of Patrick Willis and Chris Borland were tough to predict. But had two drafts to make adjustments in that department and hasn’t. The answers were Gerald Hodges, Mike Wilhoite, Nick Bellore, Shayne Skov and Ray-Ray Armstrong.

Related: the 49ers are one of the worst teams in the NFL defending the run. That’s not going to get it done. Nobody needed two full seasons to figure that out.

Wide receiver is another Baalke black hole on San Francisco’s roster. The 49ers struggles to find quality receivers have been well-documented since the team was throwing to Brett Swain in the 2011 playoffs. Their only real attempt to land a big-time, number one receiver was AJ Jenkins in 2012. We all know how that turned out.

The flaw here is that constructing a team is about finding players at positions of need. Baalke’s neglected important positions while stubbornly sticking to his draft board.

Baalke’s drafted 16 defensive backs since 2010 and just seven receivers. And of those seven, only four made catches for the team and only two are currently on the roster (Patton and Aaron Burbridge). Only one receiver (Jenkins) was selected before the fourth round while he took a defensive back in the first three rounds in four straight drafts.

The coaches have changed. The players have gotten worse, and now it’s time the 49ers turn their eyes towards their front office that’s left the roster a remedial mess.

If San Francisco’s going to compete, it needs a roster overhaul. Based on the last six years, we can say confidently Trent Baalke is not the guy for that job.