A few months ago, we hosted a 3-part series on an upcoming COIN Series inspired game called The Troubles which deals with the struggle in Northern Ireland. Through that process I came to appreciate the designer Hugh O’Donnell’s take on this difficult conflict and really felt he was going about dealing with the nature of this bloody war as well as simultaneously providing some enlightenment and understanding about some of the issues.

Here are links to those three posts:

Part 1 – Uncomfortable questions about a game on this subject

Part 2 – Look at the map and the process behind it’s creation and genesis of events

Part 3 – Design progress to date and what “victory” looks like?

After those posts were received well, we asked Hugh if he would be interested in doing a series of Event Card spoilers for the game. The game is not yet published and has just started playtesting so there is a long road yet to travel but we thought an early look would be a good thing.

*Please keep in mind that the artwork and layout of these cards is not yet finalized and is only for playtest purposes at this point. Also, as this game is still in development, card details may still change prior to publication.

#34 Provisional IRA Formed

By the 1950’s and 1960’s, the IRA was a spent force: its Border Campaign had failed to win the guerrilla war against Britain, and now the leaders of its Army Council, Cathal Goulding and Sean Garland, were channeling their efforts – in line with Terence O’Neill’s more conciliatory approach to his Catholic Nationalists citizens in the North – into strengthening their already established left-wing, progressive means of achieving political and social parity: key to these being the end of abstentionism, that republicans would content parliamentary seats at Stormont, Leinster House (Dublin) and Westminster (pushed by Roy Johnston and Tony Coughlan Roy Johnston and Tony Coughlan Roy Johnston and Tony Coughlan Roy Johnston and Tony CoughlanRoy Johnston and Tony Coughlan).

Their reputation was further degraded when it failed to defend the largely Catholic communities during the 1968 Civil Rights marches and subsequent summer rioting in 1969. The IRA membership in the South was viewed as being unsympathetic with the threat posed to its brethren in the Northern part of Ireland; the road down Marxist ideology being tread by their southern cousins was far removed from the bloodied and often fatal offence and defence being undertaken by those on the streets and in the homes of Derry and many parts of Belfast.

The Army Council voted in favour (12:4) of this new direction, and a December IRA Convention was scheduled to finalise this.

Fom John O’Neill [1] ( Belfast Battalion: A history of the Belfast I.R.A., 1922-1969)

“Internally, the IRA refused to endorse Goulding’s plans – defence of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights (NICRA) marches wasn’t really an issue until 1969 when the IRA in Belfast repeatedly sought and were denied access to weapons (where the real threat of violence lay).

This came to a head early in the summer of 1969 when Goulding changed the composition of the IRA Army Council and then loaded it with supporters of his changes – this Army Council would only be in place until the next IRA Army Convention since, paradoxically, Goulding didn’t have the numbers or support to sustain the changes he had made and they would likely be reversed. This had prompted Jimmy Steele to criticise Goulding’s leadership in July 1969 for which he was expelled.

After the violence in the summer of 1969 and the failure of the IRA and, in particular Goulding’s leadership, to have prepared to resist a ‘pogrom’. Goulding and those around him continually refused to accept any responsibility after August 1969. I think the left/right split has been debunked by quite a few people at this stage (Matt Treacy, Brian Hanley). Even claims that some of the early Provisional leaders were arch-dissidents long out of touch with the IRA are patent nonsense since the likes of Jimmy Steele was President of the Northern Directory of Republican Clubs – the IRA’s then political arm).

Goulding and others (like Roy Johnston) advanced the explanation of the ‘split’ as a left/right one because it avoided dealing with the failure of August 1969. The Belfast IRA (which split first from Goulding in September 1969) had demanded he replaced by Sean Garland, who was seen as even more left wing than Goulding. Those who made the demand – Billy McKee, John Kelly, Joe Cahill, Jimmy Steele, Jimmy Drumm – were to become the leadership of the Provisionals.

Another demand was that Goulding use money raised for various northern ‘defence funds’ for that purpose, whereas he was refusing saying he would use it for his political projects. Notably other elements of what the Provisionals proposed (e.g. a separate Northern Command) had been demanded in the early 1960s (and had been in place in 1938-1946) or were reversals of changes to the IRA constitution made by Goulding (e.g. on the make-up of the Army Council). Internally, the IRA refused to endorse Goulding’s plans – defence of NICRA marches etc wasn’t really an issue until 1969 when the IRA in Belfast repeatedly sought and were denied access to weapons (where the real threat of violence lay). This came to a head early in the summer of 1969 when Goulding changed the composition of the IRA Army Council and then loaded it with supporters of his changes – this Army Council would only be in place until the next IRA Army Convention since, paradoxically, Goulding didn’t have the numbers or support to sustain the changes he had made and they would likely be reversed. This had prompted Jimmy Steele to criticise Goulding’s leadership in July 1969 for which he was expelled. After the violence in the summer of 1969 and the failure of the IRA and, in particular Goulding’s leadership, to have prepared to resist a ‘pogrom’. Goulding and those around him continually refused to accept any responsibility after August 1969. I think the left/right split has been debunked by quite a few people at this stage (Matt Treacy, Brian Hanley). Even claims that some of the early Provisional leaders were arch-dissidents long out of touch with the IRA are patent nonsense since the likes of Jimmy Steele was President of the Northern Directory of Republican Clubs – the IRA’s then political arm). Goulding and others (like Roy Johnston) advanced the explanation of the ‘split’ as a left/right one because it avoided dealing with the failure of August 1969. The Belfast IRA (which split first from Goulding in September 1969) had demanded he replaced by Sean Garland, who was seen as even more left wing than Goulding. Those who made the demand – Billy McKee, John Kelly, Joe Cahill, Jimmy Steele, Jimmy Drumm – were to become the leadership of the Provisionals. Another demand was that Goulding use money raised for various northern ‘defence funds’ for that purpose, whereas he was refusing saying he would use it for his political projects. Notably other elements of what the Provisionals proposed (eg a separate Northern Command) had been demanded in the early 1960s (and had been in place in 1938-1946) or were reversals of changes to the IRA constitution made by Goulding (eg on the make up of the Army Council).

Sean MacStiofain left immediately for Belfast after failing to convince the IRA membership to reject this new trajectory.

MacStiofain garnered the support of the Belfast units who had participated in the recent activities, and agreed to set up a new movement. He and twenty others met in a small town in the Irish Midlands to proclaim – their first ever public declaration – their allegiance to ‘the thirty-two County Irish Republic proclaimed at Easter 1916, established by Dail Eireann in 1919, overthrown by force of arms in 1922 and suppressed to this day by the British-imposed Six County and Twenty-six County partitionist states’.

This was the first cries of the provisional movement, which would be formalised in September 1970. So entrenched in their republican roots, however, they sought was the blessing of Tom Maguire, former commandant general and last surviving member of the 1922 Dail, to deliver them their imprimatur.

And he did.

This new Provisional Army Council met for the first time to consider its strategy, fearing that the Troubles in the North were deepening.

Goulding et al would continue to control the Official IRA.

****

The IRA Faction Board is double sided: the starting side depicts an image that was used in recruitment literature from the 1920’s; the reverse side shows the Provisional IRA’s ‘Phoenix From the Flames’.

When this event card is played, the Faction Board may be flipped to its ‘phoenix side’ to mark the schism that occurred in 1969/1970. The Northern Provisions continue to have relations with its northern cousins, but the transferal of Volunteers and – specifically – bases upwards connotes both the philosophical and the material concentration that prefaced the new decade. That dark and bloody decade that was the Seventies.

If this card is not played, it is returned to the deck and the deck is shuffled. The two Bases remain in Dublin and therefore cannot contribute to the VC’s as they would if they were in ‘active’ play in the North. Furthermore, the Faction will not benefit from the award of the additional Bases and Volunteers.

[1] Dr John O’Neill is originally from Belfast. A former researcher and lecturer in Archaeology in Queens University Belfast and University College Dublin, he has published a number of books on Irish archaeology, mainly prehistory, which was extraordinarily useful preparation for researching a clandestine organisation like the I.R.A.. He keeps a blog on Irish history, mainly on Belfast republicanism, at http://www.treasonfelony.com.

As always thank you Hugh for this great insight into the history behind the game and the salient issues. One of things that draws me to these COIN Series games is the learning of something about history and this game is going to shed some really interesting light on the subject for many who do not know much of the details.

-Grant