After a months-long publicity offensive during which federal officials intermittently attempted to lecture, guilt, and sweet-talk technology industry leaders to support their policy proposals mandating government “back doors” in encryption technologies, the White House suddenly appears to have reversed course.

Yesterday, the Washington Post reported that the Obama administration may be abandoning its plans to legislatively compel technology firms to build security-weakening federal access points into encryption techniques. Citing an anonymous official authorized to discuss this issue and an apparently leaked National Security Council (NSC) strategy document outlining possible courses of action for encryption, the Post reports that the president may soon publicly support widespread encryption or even officially oppose any legislation that would compel back doors in secure transfer methods.

In general, this is very good news. Many in the computer security, online privacy, and tech industry communities were deeply concerned that they were witnessing the newest incarnation of the counterproductive “Crypto Wars” of the 1990's at a time when we need strong security more than ever.

Fortunately, the dangerous security risks that these policies would create are too compelling for officials to simply ignore. Thanks to the hard work of researchers, activists, and open-minded officials, we can at least breathe a sigh of relief that the head of the executive branch will not openly support foolhardy legislative measures that will weaken both privacy and security.

However, this is no time for complacency. Reading between the lines of the NSC strategy document, it appears that the administration may not have been strictly moved by arguments for strong widespread encryption per se, but rather believe that a gentler touch may encourage technology companies to voluntarily build such back doors without the need for legislation.

The good news: Security arguments are very effective

Many questions involving a potential privacy/security trade-off often contain a built-in bias for the “tough-on-crime” crowd. Hypothetical security benefits are limited only by our imaginations, while concrete privacy limitations can be made to seem inconsequential to law-abiding people.

Encryption turns this debate on its head. Officials cannot discuss the normal security benefits that they usually tout — stopping terrorists, preventing harm to children, catching the bad guys more quickly — without opening themselves up to the criticism that those same “bad guys” can exploit the security holes that law enforcement created.

In other words, advocating for mandated back doors for encryption forces officials to make the argument that we should have less privacy and security.

This rhetorical point proved especially potent this summer, with a little help from professional cryptographers and the federal government itself.

First, a superstar team of computer scientists and cryptographers that were instrumental in defeating the Crypto Wars 1.0-era “Clipper Chip” issued a landmark report on the concerning security risks posed by mandating government back doors in encryption. The widely-discussed paper clearly laid out the new vulnerabilities that mandated encryption access would create in a way that educated lay people could understand.

In addition to emphasizing the ever-present risk that malicious parties could obtain or fashion a “secure golden key” to surreptitiously exploit government access points, the researchers point out the wide-ranging effects on existing software and technologies that would need to backwards-engineer compatibility with the new government standard.

Software is buggy and insecure enough as it is. Suddenly imposing an unpopular and ham-fisted government surveillance scheme onto this already-delicate infrastructure is sure to introduce numerous unforeseen vulnerabilities into the web that can be used by hostile or criminal groups.

Universal key fail.

Second, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) inadvertently and humorously taught us about the dangers of entrusting governments to secure universal keys when the Washington Post accidentally published a photograph of the TSA’s universal luggage keys that can unlock virtually any passenger bag in the world.

The TSA agent who displayed these keys to the Post apparently saw no problem with allowing the photograph to be taken and disseminated. It did not take long for lockpickers to study, design, and publish the schematics for a 3-D printed version of the TSA’s master key for all to enjoy.

The NSC strategy document indicates the extent to which this combined academic and real world evidence about the security risks of compelling back doors into encryption techniques have prevailed. Their messaging reads like something that I could have written:

The shift from an inappropriate debate over privacy vs. security to one that recognizes encryption as a key security tool is very fortuitous for supporters of strong encryption.

The new threat: Secret industry collaboration

This is not to say that we’re out of the woods, yet.

There is a good chance that this softened stance on encryption back doors will be accompanied by a more aggressive behind-the-scenes courting of technology companies to quietly implement the surveillance measures that law enforcement seek through their own volition.

The Obama administration may not be defending strong encryption for its own sake, but switching strategies to achieve their objectives using soft rather than hard power.

Take a look at the NSC strategy document:

If the Obama administration indeed pursues this plan, they will begin reaching out to technology firms by the end of the year to explore how they might “build voluntary cooperation in the absence of compulsion.” Vinegar didn’t work, so it looks like they might give honey a shot.

To their credit, the technology industry has almost unanimously opposed plans to mandate government back doors in encryption. However, the extent to which some firms are merely generating good public relations in a post-Snowden age is still murky.

Some companies may be more willing to collaborate with the government if it is not globally advertised by a public law. Working candidly with law enforcement to implement such schemes behind-the-scenes would provide firms with the double benefits of shielded liability and brownie points with the intelligence community.

Instead of public legislation that is at least somewhat transparent, customers may be instead subject to unknown agreements between industry and government that quietly compromise privacy and security without indication or recourse.

The bottom line: Focus should be on policy, not technology

Law enforcement officials do air legitimate concerns. It is not hard to imagine a scenario where critical evidence cannot be accessed without procuring a person’s private encryption key. If the company itself does not hold a copy, and law enforcement fails to access this information using its typical methods, the key cannot be compelled from a suspect because that could mean self-incrimination.

However, the argument that encryption technology must be changed to suit law enforcement’s needs will always be a losing one, whether it is achieved through legislative or “voluntary” means. The security risks and vulnerabilities will exist either way.

The focus on changing encryption must be shifted altogether. The challenge now will be to explore and develop policy or procedural changes that can assist law enforcement without compromising security or violating established civil liberties protections.