Kirk Fisher appeals the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether section 134-7 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes constitutionally prohibits him from owning or possessing firearms because of his 1997 conviction for “harassment” [of his wife and daughter] in violation of section 711-1106 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes. …

This appeal involves the interaction of three statutory provisions: (1) section 134-7(a) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, which prohibits a person from owning or possessing firearms if that person is prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons convicted of any “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”; and 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), which provides that a person “shall not be considered to have been convicted of [a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence] … if the conviction has been expunged or set aside, or is an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.” …

We have previously determined that section 922(g)(9) burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment and upheld its constitutionality, facially and as-applied, under intermediate scrutiny. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, (9th Cir. 2013), considered, among other things, whether section 922(g)(9) could be constitutionally applied to a defendant based on a fifteen-year-old domestic violence misdemeanor conviction. We recognized that keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers is an important government interest and noted the high rate of recidivism for domestic abusers and the number and likelihood of domestic violence deaths involving the use of a firearm.

We also rejected Chovan’s argument that section 922(g)(9) could not constitutionally apply to him because he had committed no further acts of domestic violence in the fifteen years following his conviction. Even assuming that Chovan had committed no such acts, we explained, Chovan had failed to adduce sufficient evidence:

… Fisher argue [that] his harassment conviction occurred many years ago, and he has not committed any other crimes since that time. This argument is not meaningfully distinguishable from the one that we rejected in Chovan, and we reject it here as well. …

Fisher [also] argues that section 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional as applied to him because Hawaii law provides for only one of the four restoration mechanisms listed in section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii): gubernatorial pardon. [T]his second argument is not foreclosed by Chovan … [Footnote: [I]n Chovan, we applied “intermediate” rather than “strict” judicial scrutiny in part because section 922(g)(9)’s “burden” on Second Amendment rights was “lightened” by [the availability of mechanisms for restoration such as expungement or civil rights restoration]. Id. at 1138; see also id. at 1151 (Bea, J., concurring) (concluding that section 922(g)(9) was “narrowly tailored” to a “compelling” government interest in part because of the restoration mechanisms listed in section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii)).] [But] we decline to address it here.

Fisher concedes that he has not applied for a gubernatorial pardon for his 1997 conviction. Thus, Fisher has failed to avail himself of the one restoration mechanism that is available to him under Hawaii law, and he is in no position to argue that Hawaii’s restoration mechanisms are constitutionally insufficient. See In re Coleman, 560 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Where a dispute hangs on future contingencies that may or may not occur, it may be too impermissibly speculative to present a justiciable controversy.”).