AP Photo In The Arena The Flimsy Case Against No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons Obama wants to do it, but his advisers are squeamish. Here’s why they shouldn’t be.

Bruce G. Blair is a nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton and the co-founder of Global Zero.



In one of the less noted exchanges at Monday night’s debate, Donald Trump appeared to rule out the idea that if he were president he would deploy “first use” of nuclear weapons in a crisis—and then to take back what he said. “I would certainly not do first strike,” he told Lester Holt, before going on to say: “I can’t take anything off the table.”

President Barack Obama is said to be weighing the same question right now—with grave possible consequences for the world. With the delivery to the Oval Office 10 days ago of a high-level internal review of the pros and cons of adopting a policy of “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons, it’s finally up to Obama to give thumbs up or down, with just four months to go in his presidency. His inclination is to adopt the policy, as he nearly did several years ago during his Nuclear Posture Review. Several months ago, Obama had made up his mind in favor, or so I’ve been told, but ruling out first-use has stirred strong headwinds from some of our key allies and rear-guard attacks by key Cabinet officers. Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom and France reportedly oppose it on the grounds that it could embolden adversaries like North Korea, China and Russia to attack with conventional weapons. Secretaries Ash Carter, John Kerry and Ernest Moniz argue that that no-first-use could encourage our allies to build their own nuclear weapons, thus sparking a new wave of nuclear proliferation.


These arguments are unpersuasive. The available evidence in the public domain and surely special intelligence assessments completed during Obama’s deliberations as well do not support them.

Would taking a nuclear first strike off the table encourage conventional aggression? Hardly, given that potential adversaries already believe they could wage limited conventional warfare with the United States without triggering escalation to the nuclear level. The threat of nuclear escalation rings hollow; it is certainly not credible enough to dampen aggression at the low end of the conflict spectrum—such as cyberattacks, covert special operations like Russia’s stealthy incursion into Ukraine and likely infiltration of the Baltic NATO states, and North Korea’s routine assaults on South Korea. Nor have nuclear first-strike plans against countries like Iran, Syria, Iraq and Libya discouraged them from fighting the United States and our allies directly or through proxies.

One could imagine that nuclear first-use threats affect behavior at the high end of the spectrum. But again, the facts suggest otherwise. The threat of nuclear escalation has not weighed heavily on anyone’s readiness to wage limited conventional war if their vital interests or sovereignty are threatened. For instance, China undoubtedly would initiate head-to-head combat with U.S. forces protecting Taiwan if the latter declares independence with America’s approval. In the case of Russia, while it seeks to avoid a conventional war with NATO, it certainly envisions a conventional phase of war with NATO. That its nuclear doctrine allows Russia to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, probably for demonstration purposes, if the survival of the state is threatened clearly indicates that Russia entertains waging war with NATO below the nuclear threshold.

A potential aggressor would be far more emboldened by its adversaries’ conventional weakness than by its nuclear no-first-use policy. Conversely, North Korea, China and Russia would not fail to appreciate that the conventional balance tilts heavily against them. North Korea, for instance, would be totally irrational to invade the South knowing that it opponents would decisively defeat it within a short period. A U.S. declaration of no-first-use would not change these facts on the ground that work to deter any rational adversary.

The opposition of U.S. senior officials also rests on scant evidence. A recent Global Zero study finds that neither elite nor public opinion among our 30 key allies believes that U.S. nuclear first use is critical to their defense. This threat has long been discounted, knowing that U.S. presidents would be very reluctant to carry out such a threat and that conventional forces are adequate to successfully defend the sovereignty and vital interests of these 30 nations against non-nuclear aggression, including chemical and biological threats. Nuclear forces, and nuclear first use, are simply not needed to protect them.

What counts far more to our allies is the credibility of the U.S. threat to retaliate against a nuclear aggressor by responding in kind with nuclear weapons. A consistent and growing majority in South Korea supports an independent nuclear weapons program because of eroding trust in U.S. extended deterrence—but it is the reliability of a second strike, not a first, that preoccupies the public. This is not a baseless angst, which Trump has deepened by his questioning U.S. defense obligations, but it is not the same question as the credibility or necessity of resorting to U.S. nuclear weapons first. First use is beside the point.

Just as its detractors exaggerate “the potential military and diplomatic costs of a U.S. no-first-use doctrine,” they also slide past the myriad costs likely to be incurred by a country that pursues an indigenous nuclear weapons program. That nation would have to cast aside its obligations to the non-proliferation treaty and jeopardize its defense alliance with the United States. It would risk losing U.S. security commitments and support, as well as suffer diplomatic punishment, if not isolation. International sanctions could exact a large toll on trade, banking and other vital economic activities.

The domestic political price of a weapons program could also be high. Polls in various nations allied with the U.S. suggest strong disapproval for domestic nuclear programs, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil and the use of nuclear weapons by NATO.

The arguments mustered by allies and U.S. senior officials lack merit. President Obama would stand on firm ground if he chooses to make no-first-use a cornerstone of U.S. nuclear policy. It would be a step worthy of his Prague vision of a nuclear-free world, and would live up to his recent Hiroshima speech in which he said, “we must have the courage to escape the logic of fear.” If the president decides the strongest and most secure nation on earth cannot forgo the option of initiating the use of nukes in a confrontation, then these words are just platitudes.