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Having lost the resumed Chinese Civil war in 1949 the Kuomintang (Nationalist ) government of China retreated with around 2 million of its remaining soldiers, bureaucrats and refugees to the Province of Taiwan ( recently recovered from the Japanese empire) and as Mao announced the foundation of the Peoples Republic of China the Kuomintang kept up their claim as the rightful and legitimate government of the entirety of China. This view of the Kuomintang as the legitimate government was backed by the USA in its Cold War rationale(although other major western powers such as France and Britain, realizing the reality on the ground switched recognition to the PRC in the early 50’s). This stand off across the Taiwan strait was roughly maintained until the early 1970s punctuated by the two Taiwan crisis’ of 1955 and 1958.





The geopolitical change which set the basic foundation of the PRC’s view of its relationship with the ROC beyond the legacy of the Chinese civil war was the opening to China by Kissinger and Nixon in 1971. With the historic visit of Nixon to China in 1972 the first communiqué, the Shanghai Communiqué, outlined the respective positions of the two powers as a path to eventual recognition. A perquisite of this path was the acknowledgment of “One China”. The “One China” policy is that there is territoriality one China but what the legitimate government of that territory is left open. The PRC claims sovereignty over the territory currently controlled by the PRC plus Taiwan while the ROC claims sovereignty over its currently administrated island of Taiwan as well as the rest of the China of which the Taiwan and the mainland are a part of. This One China policy was furthered developed in the 1992 consensus between the ROC and PRC but it was perquisite of establishment of relations in 1972 that the USA did not consider Taiwan independent or would not push Taiwanese independence . The USA stated that it “acknowledges all China on either side of the strait maintain that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of It”









The Second communiqué in 1979 was the formal recognition of the PRC as the sole authority in China and that diplomatic recognition would switch to the PRC and formal diplomatic ties would end with the ROC. This ended the formal defense alliance which had existed between the ROC and the United States and also did not allow full government to government contact and protocol between the ROC and United States. This was not without domestic consequences in the USA as an influential “Taiwan lobby” had developed mainly though the successful business communities of Taiwanese immigrants and the anti- communism of the Republican party. The Taiwan Relations Act passed in April 1979 only 3 months after the switch in recognition. The Taiwan relations act defined Taiwan as the governing authority on the islands, it did not mention the ROC. Most importantly the Act set a goal for the USA to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantities as may be necessary to maintain a sufficient self defense capability”. The act also committed the USA to seek the determination of Taiwan's status by peaceful means but also “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by anything other than peaceful means…[will be] of grave concern to the United States”. The One China policy and TRA provides what Kissinger called “Strategic ambiguity “ on the part of the United States role in the security of the Taiwan. It is this strategic ambiguity which allowed the establishment of formal PRC – USA relations but also kept some level of security provision to Taiwan with the PRC or even Taiwan not being sure of what specifically it would be, whilst continuing the desire for a peaceful resolution.





At the same time as the Second communiqué, the PRC issued the "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" which emphasizes One China; “The Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand of one China and have been opposed to an independent Taiwan. We have this stand in common and it is the basis for our co-operation.” The message also hopes that a speedily reunification can take place “ Early reunification of our motherland is not only the common desire of all the people of China, including our compatriots in Taiwan…”. With the Message the broad framework of the PRC view and what was deemed acceptable was laid out to Taiwan. This would be further elaborated and responded to by Taiwan in the 1992 consensus which is the center point of cross strait relations today.





The 1992 consensus shifted the relationship towards a more conciliatory approach from the PRC whilst maintaining the rejection of independence .The PRC dropped its claim that reunification should take place as fast as possible to the claim that it should take place at some point. From the ROC it accepted the consensus and moved away from claiming that it was the only legitimate government of China to the agree to disagree over the legitimate government but that both Taiwan and the mainland are part of China. The difference from 1972 was that this recognition by the ROC was done not on the basis of maintaining the Kuomintang idea of retaking the mainland but of possible peaceful reunification. Another important point was the internal politics of Taiwan. As Taiwan was moving towards democracy their was concerns in Beijing that Taiwan would loosen its commitment to One China it had made under the Kuomintang, so the consensus was a way of making the framework of cross straight relations more formalized and predictable around One China rather than separate proclamations, which in Taiwan could be seen as more likely to change as democratic selection of leaders took place. The consensus did run in to one early problem, the Third Taiwan strait Crisis in 1996 over a possible visit by the President of Taiwan to the USA and a possible moving away from the consensus which resulted in increased missile and artillery activity from the People liberation Army near Taiwan. This was eventually deescalated by the showing of American military force in the form of two aircraft carriers in the strait.





Since the 1992 consensus and notwithstanding the crisis, the PRC view has stayed quite consistent. There is one China; It is a internal Chinese problem; it does not accept outside interference; peaceful reunification is preferable; unification can be completed on the basis of “One country, two systems”; it reserves the right to use force if independence is declared. Hu jintao in 2009( 30th anniversary of the message to compatriots) was even more open to some participation by Taiwan in international organizations, as long as it did not promote independence or external diplomatic changes in Taiwan’s status. This resulted in Taiwan partaking in WHO programs as Chinese Taipai as a non-member organization. The use of the term to refer to Taiwan has also changed since 1992 with Taiwan no longer referred to as province but as region, making it more akin to Hong Kong in usage.





The PRC message to Taiwan has been constant since 1979 and Xi's speech falls into this broader message the retaining the privilege of the possibility of force is not a new development nor is the offer of increased economic and social ties. What has been variable across the period is the attitude of the presidents of Taiwan to the 1992 consensus and the changing public opinion in Taiwan. The presidents of Taiwan who have been from the Kuomintang since 1992 have generally supported the consensus although President Lee did further sour relations in 1999 by saying relations were a “ special state to state relationship”. Under the second elected Kuomintang President , Ma Ying-Jeou (2008 to 2016), pursued close relations with the Mainland with direct flights expanded and tariffs reduced. Ma favored the political status quo which was now more acceptable to Beijing as it no longer demanded reunification as soon as possible. Under the DPP presidents the status of the One China policy has been less clear. Under the first DPP president Chen Shui- Bian (2000 to 2008) who was suspected to be in favor of independence; as this was one of the contributing factors towards his election as many in Taiwan assumed that this was the case as it had been DPP policy since 1991. Economic ties increased but political relations were nonexistent especially as he described relations as “one country on each side”. The current president Tsai Ing Wen is considered by Beijing to be more independence minded than Chen as she has not been publicly recorded as supporting the 1992 consensus but that she supports the “status quo”. Tsai also believes it is a democratic decision of the Taiwanese people to decide on any offer of reunification, a problem which does not bode well for voluntary reunification as surveys suggest that although only around 5% support independence as soon as possible around 86% supporting variants of the status quo. Although part of the 86 % who support the status quo 15% want some movement towards independence later. Only around 2% support reunification as soon as possible. Demographic and cultural trends are against the support of reunification as individuals with direct relations and memories of the mainland are replaced with those who have grown up in a democratic Taiwan and who identify as Taiwanese not Chinese.









Any comment on Taiwan by the leaders of the PRC or ROC has to take into account the long agreements and negotiations over what terms apply and don’t apply. The 1992 consensus provides detail to the centerpiece of the One China policy of which Xi remarks were consistent with earlier statements and with the promise of increased incentives for movement towards the mainland, they didn’t indicate any large policy shift. The burden of peaceful relations, in the short term at least, may fall more on the responsibility of the leaders of Taiwan as they are a operating in a democratic system which reflects the views of its citizens, and those views, whilst they are at maintaining the status quo at the moment, but are likely to have an ever increasing support for independence. The dropping of “as soon as possible” has encouraged cross straight relations in the last 27 years, especially in economics, but a looming horizon may be ahead; the CCP plan for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the associated Chinese Dream, if this is to include reunification as rejuvenation then pressure may increase on Taiwan.