Analysis: Atletico Madrid

Diego Simeone set Atletico Madrid up in their customary 4-4-2 formation in possession, with Koke, Rodri, Saul and Thomas Lemar across midfield and Diego Costa and Antoine Griezmann up front. Their time in possession was limited (only 33 per cent), and they managed just three shots – with only one on target – over the 90 minutes. This goes some way to explaining the Atleti gameplan – they were looking to soak up pressure and hit Barcelona on the counter-attack.

In the rare phases when Atleti did have good possession, they would use Koke and Rodrigo in deep central positions and push Saul and Lemar up high to create a 4-2-4. Saul and Griezmann were relatively fluid, in that Griezmann would occasionally drift wide on the right and allow Saul to attack inside, with Costa and Lemar employing similar tactics on the left. Atleti looked to exploit wide areas and would use the ball out to the full-backs, particularly Filipe Luis on the left, as the trigger for diagonal runs into the space behind the opposition full-back. They would often leave Costa up when out of possession, so that upon regain they could clear the ball from their own area for him to hold up while they transitioned from defence to attack.

Out of possession, Atleti used a typically well-organised 4-4-2 mid-block. The primary strategy was to deny Barcelona space in central areas, and they achieved this by creating compact units both horizontally and vertically, limiting the space between the lines. The hosts were happy for Gerard Pique and Samuel Umtiti to have the ball; Griezmann and Costa were more concerned with discouraging passes into Busquets in order to stifle Barca’s most creative source from deeper positions.

If the ball was played into Arthur or Sergi Roberto, then the nearest Atleti midfielder would close them down and try to force play backwards. The key here was the cover provided by the remaining players within that unit, who would tuck in so that the ball could not be set back and played through. The Atleti defenders were happy to track higher attacking players who dropped deeper, as there was limited danger in the form of runs in behind from Barca.

The hosts had a strategy for when the ball was played wide as well. They would defend with three players: the full-back, wide midfielder and nearside central midfielder effectively trying to trap the opponent by the touchline and prevent play down the line, inside or backwards. If the ball was in a position where Barca could cross, the back four would remain compact and in position to defend the cross high or in behind the defence. The crucial detail was the role of the midfielders screening and backtracking to prevent the cutback to the edge of the box – an attacking tactic commonly used by Barcelona.