Debaters Jeffrey Lewis is a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Kori Schake, a fellow at the Hoover Institution, has worked in the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the State Department.

They Are Safe and Increase the World’s Safety U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey are under the control of U.S. military forces, so they would be defended by ferociously well-trained and well-equipped American troops. Maintaining control of the weapons would be the top priority if seizure was ever threatened, with all of America’s military power put to the task. Countries have avoided building nuclear weapons because of our commitment. Turkey might choose otherwise if we remove the bombs. Moreover, American nuclear forces cannot be used without codes, making the weapons impossible to set off without authorization. So the fact that nuclear weapons are stationed in Turkey does not make them vulnerable to capture and use, even if the country were to turn hostile to the United States. At the NATO summit just two weeks ago, President Obama and other NATO leaders reiterated that “deterrence and defense, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.” Only U.S. nuclear forces are shared within the alliance, and they remain under U.S. control but are matched with allied air crews from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. Weapons are stationed in those countries to maximize the demonstration of alliance solidarity. If the weapons are in the U.S. and we have to choose to send them, enemies might think they could give us second thoughts (like Obama had about the Syria red line). That's destabilizing. Even the perception that the United States would not honor its NATO pledge would dangerously erode Europe’s security. The most effective nonproliferation policy has actually been security guarantees by the United States to its allies. Several countries — including Germany, Japan and South Korea — have the ability to build nuclear weapons but have chosen not to because they trust in our commitment to defend them. If the U.S. were to withdraw weapons from Turkey, it would be a further signal to already worried allies that the United States can no longer be relied on as a security partner. And that could easily lead countries like Turkey to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

They Are Useless and Leaving Them There Is Dangerous Should the United States remove the nuclear bombs stored at Incirlik air base in Turkey? Well, the Turkish commander of the base just used the assets under his command to help the coup plotters mount an F-16 strike on the parliament. What do you think? No U.S. or Turkish aircraft has the capability to deliver the bombs. And the Air Force found that security at all foreign bases can be inadequate. Yes, the bombs are stored in vaults, inside protective aircraft shelters, inside a security perimeter and require special codes to arm them. But none of these features are intended to protect the weapons against a host nation that attempts to seize them. They can buy time, but that is all. These weapons serve no purpose. Neither Turkish aircraft nor U.S. aircraft in Turkey can deliver the bombs. The United States Air Force regards them as an expensive distraction from the mission of countering the Islamic State. The Turkish government regards them as a political liability that shouldn’t be mentioned. Why do they stay? We are told the weapons are an important symbol of our commitment to NATO. What the bombs at Incirlik really symbolize, however, is our inability to relinquish our nuclear stockpiles, even once they have no purpose and are an evident security threat. It isn't just Turkey that is a problem. Peace activists have repeatedly breached the security at an airbase where U.S. nuclear weapons are stored in Belgium. Belgium, of course, was also the victim of a series of horrific terrorist attacks. A recent Air Force review found that security at all the foreign airbases that host U.S. nuclear weapons was inadequate. People who oppose sending the weapons back to the United States argue that we should not reduce the remaining 200 or so American nuclear weapons in Europe until Russia reduces its stockpile of several thousand tactical nuclear weapons. But the weapons in Turkey or other locations don’t have to return to the United States. They could be consolidated elsewhere in Europe, at U.S.-operated airbases in politically stable countries such as Germany, Italy or the United Kingdom. Of course that would require the U.S. explain to the German, Italian and the British publics why they should offer asylum, so to speak, to nuclear weapons fleeing Turkey. And if you think the sight of the Turkish commander of a NATO nuclear base being arrested for treason worries some people in NATO’s nuclear bureaucracy, it is nothing compared to the terror of defending this posture in public.

They Provide Deterrence to Conventional Threats It is not true that NATO nuclear weapons in Turkey serve no purpose. They serve political, military and economic purposes. Wars start when combatants think they can achieve political objectives by force — that is, when they think they can win. Nuclear weapons make wars between countries that have them unwinnable. Shared responsibility for nuclear weapons demonstrates to Russia and other adversaries the solidarity of the NATO allies. So nuclear weapons stabilize relations between the strongest powers. Shared responsibility for nuclear weapons missions in NATO demonstrates to Russia and other adversaries the solidarity of the NATO allies, our willingness to fight to preserve the independence of our countries. Removing those weapons from Europe might reasonably cause adversaries to think the United States could be divided from Europe in a crisis, or wouldn’t come to Europe’s defense. Those kinds of calculations make Europe less secure and war more likely. Nuclear weapons reduce the conventional forces necessary to deter adversaries. Much larger armies would be necessary if we and our European allies wanted to make it impossible for an enemy to believe they could win a war against us. Since the mission of NATO militaries is defensive, war would be fought on the country of our allies, at enormous human cost. Both for reasons of reassurance and the cost of regaining Europe if it were overrun, the United States would need to station much larger forces in Europe to prevail in a conventional-only war. It is also not true that European governments are unwilling to persuade their publics of the value of nuclear weapons. Just yesterday the British Parliament voted to continue with their nuclear submarine programs; the majority of opposition MPs even voted in favor after an extensive public debate. Two weeks ago Germany and Belgium also reaffirmed the role of nuclear weapons in NATO defenses. If we did not consider it a provocation to Russia, other allies would be willing to participate in nuclear stationing and nuclear missions. That the U.S. Air Force considers nuclear missions an expensive distraction is true. But it says more about the fighter pilot culture of the Air Force as an institution than it does about the nuclear mission. Pilots prefer the operational challenge of non-nuclear missions; that does not mean they are more valuable than the strategic mission of nuclear weapons strikes. The military also does not like fighting in cyber-degraded environments or using chemical weapons protection gear, but unless they do, our enemies have enormous advantages. And yes, peace activists breached defenses. That our military treats civilian protests without recourse to deadly force is to their great credit; that in no way demonstrates they are incapable of carrying out their missions against enemies. War between major powers has been so long deterred by nuclear weapons that we in the West have grown inured to the risk of war against a country that could conceivably destroy our cities, take our political sovereignty, or impose tens of thousands of military casualties on our forces. We have the luxury of fighting enemies incapable of those things because nuclear weapons have stabilized higher-end threats. But just because nuclear weapons have become unfashionable in the West does not mean that our adversaries consider them so.