Kurds are in the eye of the Islamic State storm and will want to see political concessions in return for their crucial role as the proxy of the West, writes Tim Mayfield.

Today, US president Barack Obama announced the potential expansion of the US campaign against Islamic State into Syria.

Responding to this announcement, Prime Minister Tony Abbott stated that, with regard to Australian involvement, "a specific request for military assistance in the form of air capability and military advisors could come." All of this is hot on the heels of the Australian Government's commitment of military aid to assist the Kurdish peshmerga in responding to the threat posed by Islamic State.

While it is easy to get swept up in the dizzying pace of developments, it is at exactly this point that we must take pause to consider the potential longer-term effects arising from this course of action. While much of the commentary in this regard can be loosely summarised as "whither Islamic State?", Australia also has a responsibility to consider the impacts of our support for the Kurds on regional dynamics and especially the ongoing viability of the Iraqi state.

The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), led by president Masoud Barzani, has proved itself to be a reliable and steadfast ally to the West in Iraq over many years, despite issues with corruption and the political infighting that is inevitable in any fledgling democracy. However, they do come to the table rightly armed with an agenda above and beyond mere survival in the face of the threat posed by IS.

Indeed, IS represents just the latest in a long line of foes for the Kurds, which includes multiple Turkish governments, and the regimes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, that have at times challenged their very existence as an independent and united people. In light of this, it makes sense to consider how the Kurds are likely to leverage their status as the West's proxy in its war against IS.

It is also worth mentioning that the US has a sorry history of turning its back on the Kurds in their times of need. This will no doubt weigh heavily on the minds of those in the current US administration, including vice-president Joe Biden, who have formed close ties with key representatives of the KRG and are responsible for negotiating the ongoing assistance package.

However, despite the best hopes of some Kurdish groups and their international allies, it is unlikely that we are talking about a tilt at full independence. This is due to a range of factors of which the most prominent is the almost universal opposition to this option amongst key actors including Turkey, the US and Russia. A tacit understanding of this reality was reflected in the KRG's recent decision to postpone a proposed referendum on independence.

This does not mean that the Kurds won't seek to benefit from their unenviable position in the eye of the Islamic State storm. Indeed, there is much that the KRG can gain from the West without pushing for a fully independent state. For example, the Kurds have previously struggled to sell their oil on the open market due to interference from the Iraqi government backed by Western stakeholders including the US. A reversal of this position would go a long way to securing ongoing Kurdish cooperation in the fight against IS.

In addition, the Kurds will likely seek support for their claims to the disputed oil-rich city of Kirkuk, located just outside their semi-autonomous region and which they have recently reclaimed (though permanent resolution of the dispute is still the subject of negotiations) after relinquishing control in 2003 at the request of the Americans.

If the above developments were to occur, they would represent a very real challenge to the newly-minted rule of Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi as he seeks to keep the country united in the face of the fragmentary forces that are in play. In particular, the Iraqi government stands to lose considerable revenue should the international community agree to buy oil directly from the KRG.

On the other hand, a recent article in The Australian argues that conflict with IS has brought the KRG closer to Baghdad as a result of the forced transition of power from former PM Nouri al-Maliki to al-Abadi and the resulting cooperation between the peshmerga and Iraqi forces. This may well be the case right now, especially while the threat to the Kurds is so immediate, however it is unlikely to last.

If one lesson has been learned by the Kurds as a result of their tumultuous history, it is that they are ultimately on their own in a tough neighbourhood and it never pays to rely too much on partners, whether they are the Iraqi government, the US or anyone else. Therefore, we can expect the Kurds to ramp up their demands as the war against IS continues.

It is incumbent upon the Australian Government to understand the implications of the decision to arm the peshmerga and be prepared for the corollary effects. In conjunction with the US, we need to have a plan for managing the Kurds increasing assertiveness should it arise, and ensure that this can be balanced with our other objectives, including the maintenance of a strong and viable Iraqi state that can respond to the extremist threat that is ranged against it.

Tim Mayfield is the executive officer to the chancellor of the ANU. He previously worked for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Department of Defence. View his full profile here.