In its use of the words "capable of bearing children" in the 1982 policy statement as the criterion for exclusion, Johnson Controls explicitly classifies on the basis of potential for pregnancy. Under the P.D.A., such a classification must be regarded, for Title VII purposes, in the same light as explicit sex discrimination. Respondent has chosen to treat all its female employees as potentially pregnant; that choice evinces discrimination on the basis of sex.

. . . Moreover, the absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. Sex Discrimination

We hold that Johnson Controls fetal-protection policy is sex discrimination forbidden under Title VII unless respondent can establish that sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification."

Under Sec. 703(e)(1) of Title VII, an employer may discriminate on the basis of "religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." We therefore turn to the question whether Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy is one of those "certain instances" that come within the B.F.O.Q. exception.

The B.F.O.Q. defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly. . . .

The wording of the B.F.O.Q. defense contains several terms of restriction that indicate that the exception reaches only special situations. . . . But the most telling term is "occupational"; this indicates that these objective, verifiable requirements must concern job-related skills and aptitudes.

The P.D.A.'s [ Pregnancy Discrimination Act ] amendment to Title VII contains a B.F.O.Q. standard of its own: Unless pregnant employees differ from others "in their ability or inability to work," they must be "treated the same" as other employees "for all employment-related purposes." This language clearly sets forth Congress's remedy for discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and potential pregnancy. Women who are either pregnant or potentially pregnant must be treated like others "similar in their ability . . . to work."

In other words, women as capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to choose between having a child and having a job. . . . Employment late in pregnancy often imposes risks on the unborn child, but Congress indicated that the employer may take onto account only the woman's ability to get her job done. With the P.D.A., Congress made clear that the decision to become pregnant or to work while being either pregnant or capable of becoming pregnant was reserved for each individual woman to make for herself. Clear Language of Law