Sep 3, 2015

In a rare interview Aug. 25, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad commanded self-assurance: “We have strong confidence in the Russians, as they have proven throughout this crisis, for four years, that they are sincere and transparent in their relationship with us.” Speaking to the Lebanese satellite TV channel Al-Manar, Assad characterized the Russian stance vis-a-vis his country as “principled” and “constant.”

The statement may have been perceived as a message to the West: The Syrian leader signals he is politically alive and kicking and has his back covered by Moscow. Some of the most vocal critics could have even interpreted the statement as a sign of Russian complicity with the actions of the Syrian regime. However, Assad’s message has a more profound undertone. Above all, it characterizes the perception of the Syrian president of his own standing at the moment.

First, the very context of the interview and its wording is a strong message for “his own people” — inside and outside Syria. Al-Manar that interviewed Assad is believed to be closely connected to Hezbollah. Therefore Assad couldn’t escape mentioning the organization's fighters backing his forces, calling their presence “legitimate.” Neither could he have omitted mentioning Iran disavowing President Barack Obama’s remarks last month that “Russia and Iran … recognize that the trend lines are not good for Assad.” Indeed, over several recent months Assad forces have lost a lot of ground battling armed opposition groups on the one hand, and trying to halt Islamic State expansion on the other. The Syrian army lacks manpower and recruitment is not going well, which Assad himself recognized not long ago. Against these existential challenges to his regime, the president not only has to showcase his own leadership, but — most importantly — demonstrate he still possesses the resource of outside support. In this regard, references to Russian and Iranian loyalty are critical for Assad and his main supporters.

Second, Assad's greatest fear may be that he could lose Russian support. In this sense, Assad’s statement is a message to and for Moscow. His interview was happening at the same time that Russian President Vladimir Putin met with King Abdullah II of Jordan. Obviously, the crisis in Syria was a central issue to the agenda of that encounter as well. This was just a part of a series of high-profile meetings between Putin and leaders of the states that Moscow had incredibly tense relations with. However, the dynamics are changing fast: Before the end of the year, heads of at least four more Arab states — Kuwait, Qatar, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates — will visit Russia to discuss Syria. The information background over the Russian position on the conflict has also been transforming in the regional media — both in the agenda and the presentation. Some even seriously argue Moscow changed its course toward Damascus.

Whether it is wishful thinking or a genuine shift in Russia’s stand, this may create a perception of Moscow giving up on Assad. Such a context may, and most probably will, push the Syrian president to measures that in the long run can narrow policy options for Russia itself. His statements publicly raise reputation risks for Moscow: “The United States abandons its allies, abandons its friends. … This was never the case with Russia’s policy. … Russia has never said that it supported President So-and-So and then decided to abandon him.” Following this logic, any transformation of the Russian stance on the Syrian leader can be interpreted as “abandonment” and thus bears risks for Russia of losing the image of “staunch ally” of those it once accommodated. For Moscow, which has for months been actively engaging “the opposite camp” — Gulf monarchies and Syrian opposition groups — being marked as a stalwart Assad supporter is something rather undesirable. There seems to be an understanding among Russian policymakers that such a “badge” may hamper effective promotion of Russia’s own agenda in the conflict. This is why Russian diplomats prefer to focus on the significance of the negotiation process, engagement of all of the responsible parties — except those Moscow perceives as terror groups — with a final goal of marrying opposing interests while keeping the integrity of the Syrian state. Some, however, including the Syrian president, emphasize the factor of the very personal support of Assad by the Kremlin. In case Moscow continues to diversify its contacts and Assad starts to feel “abandoned,” it may face an unpleasant dilemma: have its initiatives with opposition groups derailed to keep the ”ally-supporting” image or stay what seems to be its new course but possibly get its reputation destroyed. In any case, Assad somehow created — intentionally or not — this reputation trap for Moscow.