The basis of the Sudanese Problem is Sudan’s identity crisis, and I don’t mean the Arab-African debate, which is little more than a symptom of the larger problem. No, Sudan’s true identity crisis is in how the Sudanese understand identity, a collectivist interpretation that, by its very nature, necessitates exclusion and discrimination.



Basically, the Sudanese people understand identity in terms of collectives: a tribe has an identity, a village has an identity, a region has an identity, and society as a whole has an identity. These identities were seemingly designed by an elusive group known as “our norms and traditions” (“عاداتنا وتقاليدنا”), with there being a widespread implicit understanding that these norms and traditions were practiced and designed by our ancestors.



This is where the issue begins: the Sudanese people see identity as something imposed by a group whose authority is not to be questioned upon another group, whose members are all obligated to remain within the confines of this identity. This idea is, to an extent, present in all societies: John D. Ramage refers to it as “readymade identity.” The issue then, is not the presence of readymades, but rather two issues: the first being the amount of readymades, and the second being a refusal to recognize the importance of what Ramage calls “constructed identities,” which are made by an individual as an amalgamation of various readymades.



Beginning with the issue of the amount of readymades, Sudan’s problem is that it has too few accepted readymades, and the accepted readymades it does have come with a lot of stipulations. For instance, there are only two acceptable religious identities in Sudan: basically invisible Christian and Muslim. But a Muslim in Sudan is not simply one who believes in Islam; rather, they’re some sort of angel who prays five times a day, doesn’t drink, doesn’t swear, dresses a particular way, etc. Any other type of Muslim is rejected, not in the sense of being socially isolated, but rather, in the sense of being deprived of the right to represent themselves. Take a look at the Sudanese response to “You Will Die at Twenty”; you see people criticizing the depictions of swearing and Sufism by saying “Sudanese people aren’t like this” or “these behaviors don’t represent Sudan.” They don’t say this because there are no people like those in “You Will Die at Twenty” in Sudan: they say this because they believe there’s only one type of identity that’s allowed to represent Sudan, which is that of a perfectly religious Muslim who never swears, drinks, engages in Sufism, etc.



This restrictive perception of Sudanese identity leads to many very real Sudanese people becoming “rejected,” and the majority that adheres to the dominant readymade acts as though these rejected groups don’t exist, and disdains to see them represented in the media, especially positively. At the same time, these rejected groups attempt to conceal their true nature (i.e. people who drink in secret).



The issue is that this type of rejection and exclusion allows Sudanese people to hold an narrow-minded and inaccurate perception of their society. This type of thinking is also what makes the Arab-African issue an issue at all: the Sudanese people believe that there must be only one identity that represents Sudan, and it’s society’s duty to impose this identity on others, and erase all other identities from the media, the government, from how they define Sudan itself. This is the basis of hatred and exclusion in Sudan: any identity or behavior that fails to adhere to the readymade of the majority is treated as a danger to society that must be fought. This is why Public Order Laws existed, this is why people were angry to see that footage of a woman smoking. The issue was not that she was smoking, but that she was defying the Sudanese woman readymade, which is why many of those who were outraged are so often silent when a Sudanese man smokes — it fits within the Sudanese man’s readymade to do so.



This type of thinking also forms the basis for the next issue, which is the refusal to recognize constructed, individual identities. The Sudanese people are very collectivist, and often don’t see an individual as a mere individual: they’re a representative of their family, their tribe, their region, and their country. So when a woman smokes, it is seen as natural to respond with “is this the type of civilianism you guys wanted?” (“دي ياها المدنية الدايرينه؟ا”) — within the minds of many Sudanese, this woman can’t just be representing herself, but the country as a whole, including the government, so she must be criticized along with the government.



We also see this type of thinking in criticisms of “You Will Die at Twenty”: the characters in the film are not seen as representatives of themselves, but of Sudan, and when people say “this film doesn’t represent Sudan” what they’re really saying is “this film doesn’t represent me.”



What one should do when watching a movie that doesn’t represent them is use it is an opportunity to learn about the life and identity of another person or group, an exercise in empathy and tolerance. But instead, we Sudanese get upset and criticize, and in doing so we reinforce an exclusionary culture. The Arab-African debate could be entirely solved if we as a society responded to the question with “some are one way, some are the other, and all have the right to represent Sudan.” But instead, society chooses to defend its exclusionary philosophy on the basis that these are “our norms and traditions”: in reality, though, our ancestors drank alcohol, our grandmothers smoked cigarettes, Tirhaqa wasn’t Muslim, and the kandakas of Nubia regularly went outside wearing no shirt at all, much less a hijab. The truth is, Sudan has chosen its readymades and chosen what it wants its norms and traditions to be, and, contrary to how most Sudanese make it sound, these things change frequently.



The conclusion to draw from this is that fixing the Sudanese Problem requires that we fight the idea that everyone has to have one identity, rather than sit and decide what our one identity should be. We have to expand the types of people we’re willing to accept and allow to represent themselves in the media. Furthermore, we have to treat individuals as representatives of themselves first and foremost. Otherwise, the removal of Public Order Laws and censorship laws will have been useless when society is willing to enforce the philosophy behind these laws all by itself.

