David Benatar, author of Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence, is an antinatalist. He believes that coming into existence is a great harm, and that it would be best if everyone were to stop reproducing so that life could disappear altogether. Benatar’s writings are perhaps the most influential antinatalist texts, and the arguments he presents for his position are accepted and repeated by many other antinatalists.

Over the years I have had many encounters with Benatar’s ideas without ever actually reading his book, and always found his arguments unconvincing. Recently, however, I came across an article by him, titled “Why it is Better Never to Come Into Existence” and published in 1997, in which he presents a more developed form of his arguments than what I’d been exposed to in online forums and articles in which he was interviewed. Having finally got the chance to analyze Benatar’s arguments for antinatalism, I found them all absolutely terrible, so plagued by self-contradictions and fallacious reasoning that I can’t see how anyone could take him seriously.

Granted, it’s perfectly possible that in the 22 years since the article was published Benatar fixed some of the problems found in this article, but having read some more recent articles he’s written has given me no indication of it, and while I still haven’t read his book, “Better Never to Have Been,” this article seems to give a thorough enough description of his philosophy to justify rejecting it definitively, as I will try to show in this post.

The “Non-Existent”

I would first like to draw attention to the phrase “come into existence,” in the title of the article. The phrase suggests that prior to our existence we were somewhere else, since to “come” somewhere implies to “come from” somewhere else. In this case, the only “somewhere else” we could have been in is nonexistence, but this is a paradox since only things that exist can be anywhere, or be at all. To say that we are brought into existence implies that we already existed in nonexistence.

This might seem like I’m just nitpicking Benatar’s choice of words. Maybe he was a bit careless with his words, or maybe he just chose to use the most common way of phrasing the idea despite its philosophical baggage because it would best communicate his meaning–something I find perfectly understandable, and which I’ll also be doing later on in this post–and so we shouldn’t assume that he actually holds this contradictory notion of people “existing” as nonexistent entities.

Indeed, if the only thing that suggested he might actually hold this notion that people can “be” nonexistent were his use of “come into existence” and similar phrases I wouldn’t even be bringing this up here. Unfortunately, this notion is implicit all throughout Benatar’s article.

For instance, in section II he writes: “None of this befalls the non-existent. Only existers suffer harm.” This phrasing implies the existence of a group called “the non-existent,” and that whose who form part of this group are spared of all the harms that befall the living. But nonexistent people don’t exist, thus they can’t be anything, not even part of a group of nonexistent people.

Then there are the times Benatar says things like “better never to come into existence,” or “there are benefits both to existing and non-existing.” These phrases raise the questions: Who is nonexistence better for? Who is benefitted by nonexistence? It can’t be better or beneficial for the nonexistent because there are no nonexistent people; they can’t be better off or benefitted by anything, so what could Benatar mean with these phrases?

Even Benatar himself sees that his language raises this issue and makes an attempt to explain himself:

“Note that when I say that non-existence is ‘better than,’ ‘preferable to’ or ‘has an advantage over’ existence, I am not committed to saying that it is better, preferable, or advantageous for the non-existent. The non-existent are not, and so things cannot literally be better for them or to their advantage. When I say that non-existence is preferable, that judgment is made in terms of the interests of the person who would or has otherwise come to exist. The claim is that for any person (whether possible or actual), the alternative scenario of never existing is better. It is because the evaluation is always made in terms of the person that would (or does) exist (that is, the person in scenario A) that my view is not what has been called ‘impersonalist,’ even though the comparison is with a state of affairs (scenario B) and not with the state of a person.”

So Benatar here disowns both the interpretation that says nonexistence is “better” for the nonexistent and all interpretations that say it’s impersonally better (better without being better for anyone). With this in mind, what possible interpretations are left for his claims that nonexistence is better than existence?

The only alternative which occurs to me is that Benatar is saying that all people who exist or could exist prefer or would prefer nonexistence to existence. This interpretation doesn’t posit that the nonexistent are any better off than “existers”, so it doesn’t fall into the paradox of the first interpretation, and it takes into account the preferences of the person who does or could exist so it’s not impersonalist.

However, this interpretation has to be rejected for two reasons: Firstly, it’s simply false that all, or even most, people find nonexistence preferable to existence, and so it’s not compatible with Benatar’s antinatalism. Secondly, the very next paragraph Benatar writes rejects this interpretation; by calling nonexistence better than existence, he’s trying to say that it’s objectively better, not just preferable or subjectively better, as can be seen in these passages:

“The fact that one enjoys one’s life does not make one’s existence better than non-existence.”

“Even if one cannot be mistaken about whether one currently is glad to have been born, it does not follow that one cannot be mistaken about whether it is better that one came into existence.”

So now that Benatar has implicitly or explicitly rejected every interpretation I could think of, how are we to understand the phrase? Well, of all the interpretations, the one which I think jives best with Benatar’s arguments is the first: that nonexistence is better for the nonexistent. Though Benatar disowned this interpretation, I believe his unconscious continues to hold onto it, and this is why it continues to inform his arguments without him ever realizing it.

Benatar’s Asymmetry

Thus far I haven’t actually addressed any of Benatar’s arguments for antinatalism, so let’s leave aside the question of who is nonexistence better for and address Benatar’s first argument for antinatalism–the asymmetry that’s come to be named after him. Benatar writes:’

“It is uncontroversial to say that:

1) the presence of pain is bad and that

2) the presence of pleasure is good.

“However, such a symmetrical evaluation does not apply to the absence of pain and pleasure, for:

3) the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, whereas

4) the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.”

To support his asymmetry, Benatar brings up three “commonly-held” moral judgements or intuitions:

A) The view that “while there is a duty to avoid bringing suffering people into existence, there is no duty to bring happy people into being.”

B) That “whereas it seems strange to give as a reason for having a child that the child one has will thereby be benefited, sometimes we do avoid bringing a child into existence because of the potential child’s interests.”

C) That “bringing people into existence as well as failing to bring people into existence can be regretted. However, only bringing people into existence can be regretted for the sake of the person whose existence was contingent on our decision.”

Benatar believes that the underlying reasoning behind these intuitions makes use of his asymmetry. If true, that means that all people who hold these intuitions unconsciously accept this asymmetry.

In order to show the implications of his asymmetry for the question of whether existence or nonexistence is better, Benatar presents this diagram:

According to Benatar, we can ascertain whether or not existence is better than nonexistence by comparing the left side of the diagram with the right side. Since both good and bad things are included in existence, but only good things are included in nonexistence, nonexistence comes out the clear winner in every possible case.

As Benatar writes elsewhere, “One of the implications of my argument is that a life filled with good and containing only the most minute quantity of bad—a life of utter bliss adulterated only by the pain of a single pin-prick—is worse than no life at all.” However, this conclusion contradicts what most people feel about life.

Most people feel their existence is better than nonexistence. Most people also believe that there’s nothing inherently bad about bringing people into existence. This is significant because it means that Benatar’s interpretation of the three intuitions he mentioned goes against other very common intuitions, which suggests that Benatar has misinterpreted his intuitions–that his asymmetry is not the reason why people hold these intuitions.

Even if Benatar’s interpretation is correct, the fact that some of our intuitions support antinatalism while others contradict it means that if he wants to use the former in support of antinatalism, he would first need to argue against the validity of the latter, something which I’ve never seen him do.

A second issue I find in Benatar’s three intuitions is that he’s mischaracterized what people actually believe.

I don’t believe most people agree with intuition A’s claim that “there is a duty to avoid bringing suffering people into existence.” I say this because we don’t react to parents with suffering children the way we react to people who shun their duties. Towards the latter, most people react with contempt, disappointment, anger, or other similar emotions; towards the former, people are more likely to react with pity and empathy.

I also don’t think that most people hold intuition C–that they would feel regret that a suffering person was brought into existence and feel it for the sake of that person. What most people would regret, I believe, is that the person is suffering, not that they were brought into existence.

The only intuition I think is commonly held is B, though I would like to suggest an alternative interpretation as to why people have this intuition.

Upon deciding to have a child, the prospective parents take on certain duties, including the wellbeing and happiness of the child. If the parents believe that the life of the child would not be worth living–that it would suffer from some terrible condition and would come to wish for death–then the parents might choose to preemptively grant the potential child’s wish to not exist.

The reason why the wellbeing or wishes of a potential child can be given as a reason to not have the child, but can’t be given as a reason to have the child, is because only the people who want to have a child take on parental responsibilities regarding the wellbeing of their potential children. Someone who has no intention of having children has no responsibility towards any potential child of theirs as long as they refrain from having children.

If you recall, this is one of the possible interpretations of Benatar’s claim that existence is better than nonexistence–the one where the claim is taken as meaning that the person in question would prefer to not exist. This interpretation is perfectly compatible with the common view that it is better for some people–not all people, as Benatar’s interpretation implies, but some–not to come into existence.

Going back to the asymmetry, Benatar presents two alternative ways of evaluating the absence of pain and of pleasure that try to restore a symmetry and defends his asymmetry against them. He says that, in order to be valid alternatives, they should be compatible with the three intuitions he brought up. I’ve already addressed those intuitions so I’m not going to go any further into this part of his argument. What I do want to comment on is Benatar’s criticism of the second alternative he presents, which claims that:

1) The presence of pain is bad

2) The presence of pleasure is good

3) The absence of pain is not bad

4) The absence of pleasure is not good

I quote here the entirety of Benatar’s criticism of this alternative. (Note that it was originally just one paragraph but is presented here as three for the sake of readability)

“On one interpretation, ‘not bad’ is equivalent to ‘good’ and ‘not good’ is equivalent to ‘bad.’ But this is not the interpretation which is operative in this matrix, for if it were, it would not differ from, and would have the same shortcomings as the previous matrix. ‘Not bad’ means ‘not bad, but not good either.’ This is too weak. Avoiding bringing a suffering child into existence is more than merely ‘not bad.’ It is good.

“Judging the absence of pleasure to be ‘not good’ is also too weak in that it does not say enough. Of course the absence of pleasure is not what we would call good. However, the important question, when the absence of pleasure involves no deprivation for anybody, is whether it is also ‘not bad’ or whether it is ‘bad.’ The answer is that it is ‘not good, but not bad either’ rather than ‘not good, but bad.’ Because ‘not bad’ is a more complete evaluation than ‘not good,’ that is the one I prefer.

“However, even those who wish to stick with ‘not good’ will not thereby succeed in restoring a symmetry. If pain is bad and pleasure is good, but the absence of pain is good and the absence of pleasure not good, then there is no symmetry between pleasure and pain.”

First off, Benatar provides no arguments against the proposition that the absence of pain is neither good nor bad, he just asserts that his evaluation of it as “good” is correct.

He also acts as if there’s a dichotomy between calling the absence of pleasure either “not good” or “not bad”, but “neither good nor bad” is a viable third alternative. “Neither good nor bad” is a more complete evaluation than either “not good” or “not bad”, so it would be preferable by his standards. Also, Benatar’s preferred phrasing of “not bad” is worse than “not good” because it implies that the absence of pleasure can be good.

Finally, in the last sentence quoted, Benatar says that the evaluation of the absence of pain as good and the absence of pleasure as not good doesn’t restore symmetry. This is true, but it’s irrelevant because the alternative he’d criticizing doesn’t claim that the absence of pain is good; it claims that the absence of pain is neither good nor bad, as he himself pointed out at the start of the paragraph and apparently forgot not ten sentences later.

Anyways, after concluding that he’s sufficiently argued against alternatives to his asymmetry, Benatar presents an analogy which is supposed to demonstrate that “For the good to be a real advantage over non-existence, it would have to be the case that its absence were bad.” Here is his analogy:

“S is prone to regular bouts of illness. Fortunately for him, he is also so constituted that he recovers quickly. H lacks the capacity for quick recovery, but he never gets sick. It is bad for S that he gets sick and it is good for him that he recovers quickly. It is good that H never gets sick, but it is not bad that he lacks the capacity to heal speedily. The capacity for quick recovery, although a good for S, is not a real advantage over H. This is because the absence of that capacity is not bad for H (and H is not worse off than he would have been had he had the recuperative powers of S). S is not better off than H in any way, even though S is better off than he himself would have been had he lacked the capacity for rapid recovery.”

However, I don’t believe that this analogy exemplifies what Benatar thinks it does. To show this, let’s first translate the terms “illness” and “recovery” into the language of pain and pleasure which Benatar uses in his asymmetry: Illness is a type of pain while a recovery is a return to the absence of that pain. S can benefit from a capacity for recovery because he has pains to recover from, whereas H can’t benefit from a capacity for recovery because he has no pain to recover from. None of the elements in Benatar’s analogy can be mapped onto pleasure or the absence of pleasure, so his analogy doesn’t show anything about these.

The confusion, I think, lies in Benatar’s equivocation of the terms “good” and “bad” with “pain” and “pleasure”. Notice how these last two terms, which his asymmetry is based on, are wholly absent from his analogy. Notice also that he’s not trying to show that the absence of pleasure is not bad–he’s trying to show that the absence of “the good” is not bad. But this contradicts his own claims that the absence of pleasure (a good) is bad when there is someone being deprived of pleasure–a claim that needs to be true, if his asymmetry is to support antinatalism.

How Great a Harm Existence is

Benatar now turns to a different issue–that of our general quality of life. Benatar believes that our lives are not as good as we think they are. He points out people’s opinions about what constitutes an acceptable quality of life differ, and even the same person might come to hold a different opinion at different times. He also points out that people’s opinion on whether or not they would prefer not to have come into existence can change at different times.

He suggests that this lack of consensus is evidence that people are bad judges of what constitutes an acceptable quality of life and of whether it’s better to exist or not exist. However, this conclusion takes it for granted that there is such a thing as an objectively correct minimum acceptable quality of life and an objectively correct answer to whether existence or nonexistence is better. If one doesn’t already accept these propositions (which Benatar doesn’t argue for), then the fact that opinion on these questions differs can be taken as evidence that these issues are subjective, not objective.

Also, even if we were to accept Benatar’s conclusion that people are bad judges of their quality of life, it doesn’t follow from this that people are overestimating their quality of life. It is just as valid to suggest that people are underestimating their quality of life.

On Death

The last thing I would like to address is Benatar’s comments on death. Benatar believes that all death is a harm, but I can’t see how this opinion can fit with his overall argument that existence is so much worse than nonexistence. He says:

“Whereas pre-conception non-existence or the non-existence of possible people who never become actual is not something which happens to anybody, death (the cessation of existence) is something that happens to somebody. It happens to the person who dies. Whereas Epicurus is correct that where death is, I am not and where I am, death is not, it does not follow that I have no reason to regard my death as a harm. It is, after all, the termination of me and that prospect is something that I can regret intensely.”

However, this argument proves nothing about death itself being a harm. Up until now, the only criteria Benatar has supplied that could determine how harmful, or how bad, something is are pain and the absence of pleasure in the existent. Benatar’s argument here is that the fear of death causes him psychological pain, but this only shows that the fear of death is a harm, not that death itself is harmful. Death itself doesn’t cause any pain and represents, according to Benatar’s arguments, a passing into a state which is far superior to existence.

If death is to be considered harmful, then, it must be by some criteria other than how much pain or pleasure it causes or prevents, but so far as I know, Benatar has suggested no such criteria, neither here nor anywhere else.

Benatar’s claim that death is bad seems more a rationalization of an instinctive fear of death than a conclusion arrived at through application of his arguments for antinatalism–an attempt to cover up a disagreement with his own philosophy, which suggests that he’s already so committed to antinatalism that his response to any apparent contradiction is to rationalize it away so it doesn’t threaten the validity of antinatalism.

Indeed, Benatar’s arguments and reasoning as a whole are more suggestive of someone trying to rationalize an idea they’ve already been seduced by, who won’t be satisfied until they’ve shown that it’s a reasonable idea to have, than of someone honestly trying to follow a line of reasoning wherever it may lead. A harsh judgement, perhaps, but one I feel is justified