Months of arguments about the Greek financial crisis have this week cumulated in a highly emotional debate about a possible Grexit. As Athens will be unable to satisfy its financial obligations after a default, many hardliners expect Greece to leave the eurozone, and printing as much neo-drachma as necessary. Some see this as the only solution to the Greek crisis: it would allow Greece to devalue its new currency, supposedly making the country competitive and resulting in economic growth and the ability to repay its debt. Others are more sceptical: they fear that the new drachma would be an obstacle to trade, increasing the cost of imports and making it impossible for Greece to ever repay anything.

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What many commentators appear to be missing, however, is that Greece may not have to leave the eurozone after a default. The legal basis for “forcing” a country out is certainly shaky. Since both the treaty on the European Union (Maastricht, 1992) and the treaty on the functioning of the European Union (Rome, 1958) are designed to strengthen integration, becoming a member of the EU and eurozone is meticulously regulated, while only article 50 of the EU treaty regulates how a state can leave the union. And a mechanism for leaving only the eurozone or for expulsion even has not been provided for at all.

Using the euro without being a member of the eurozone or even the EU is hardly unprecedented: Montenegro, Kosovo, the Vatican City, Andorra, San Marino and Monaco all do so at the moment. Nor are these exceptions euro-specific oddities. The US dollar is currently legal tender in Ecuador, El Salvador, East Timor, several micro-states and Zimbabwe, while in Panama only dollar bills are in use.

If this is common practice, Greece cannot be put into a worse position than states using the euro without being a member of the EU and who did not have to meet the convergence criteria. Instead, Athens’s voting rights on euro-related issues could be suspended, as well as the right to mint coins and print banknotes until Greece meets the convergence criteria again.

Keeping Greece in the eurozone despite a default would preserve its access to the eurozone market, avoid the vast expense of reintroducing of the drachma, and pave the way for negotiations on credit payments in the future – while still remaining in line with the EU treaties. This procedure would also defend the integrity of the euro: an important goal if the currency is to be perceived as a stable alternative to the US dollar. Above all, it is possible that the markets are going to test the eurozone’s stability by attacking other states – as in 1992, when the European exchange rate mechanism was destroyed. Making use of a weak spot in the system cost European taxpayers billions at that time.

Of course, nobody really knows what happens if Greece chooses to leave the eurozone or stay within, or if it is forced out, for instance by the ECB severing the money supply.

According to the EU treaty, its aim is to promote peace and the wellbeing of its peoples

Regarding bankruptcy, there are several hints that a default might not be quite as catastrophic for Greece’s economy as many assume. In 2014, Carmen Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch stated in their paper A Distant Mirror of Debt, Default and Relief, “the economic landscape after a final debt reduction is characterized by higher income levels and growth, lower debt servicing burdens and lower government debt”. Not only were growth rates after a default significant, but access to new credits recovered surprisingly quickly: in the 1980s it took on average four years while credits in the 1990s were handed out almost immediately after bankruptcy.

Certainly, another bankruptcy immediately after a default is less likely, making a new credit an attractive investment. Additionally, Greece should also have access to EU support – unlike those states that were part of the aforementioned study.

No matter what the proposal on aid for a post-default Greece, whether a parallel currency or a new Marshall plan, details are open to debate and a constructive debate needs time. This June, the UN independent expert on foreign debt, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, stated the “no bailout clause” of the Lisbon treaty would function best in combination with a human rights-based sovereign insolvency mechanism. In the meantime, the IMF research team under Oliver Blanchard debunked the myth of the trickledown effect and admitted that the effects of IMF policies in Greece were misunderstood. Both examples show that the discussion with new ideas has just started.

According to the EU treaty, the EU’s aim is to promote peace and the wellbeing of its peoples. Based on the rule of law, the EU should achieve economic growth, price stability, full employment, social progress and solidarity among its member states. A Juncker administration rediscovering the European commission’s role as the guardian of the treaties should lead a meaningful and honest discussion on state bankruptcy. Keeping Greece in the eurozone after a default is in line with the treaties but can only be a first step. Taking one’s time for a fruitful discussion is the second.