In March this year, the Estonian parliamentary elections witnessed the success of the liberal opposition Reform Party. Many observers thought this was the first step towards the Reform leader Kaja Kallas becoming prime minister - and forming a grand coalition with incumbent Prime Minister Jüri Ratas and his Centre Party.

But this scenario did not account for Ratas’ determination to hold on to his post. And the impressive electoral growth of the far-right Estonian National Conservative Party (EKRE) gave Ratas an alternative way out - in the form of a coalition between EKRE, Centre and the conservative Pro Patria party. By capitalising on social discontent and fear-mongering around the dangers of immigration and multiculturalism, EKRE emerged from the March elections as the third largest political force in Estonia - with 19 seats and 17.8% of the votes.

Although Ratas had given a firm commitment not to form a government with the far right during the election campaign, it turned out that the Centre leader was actually far more willing to compromise ideologically. The start of coalition talks between Centre and EKRE caught many domestic and international observers by surprise, receiving widespread criticism both within Ratas’ party and broader civil society.

The irony here, perhaps, is the very real differences between Centre and EKRE over Russia. Many observers saw the “Russia factor” as the key stumbling block to finalising a coalition agreement: while Centre has long represented Estonia’s Russian-speaking minority on an almost exclusive basis, EKRE aspires to create an ethno-state in Estonia and is known for its vocal anti-Russian rhetoric. Finalising the coalition agreement has thus required both parties to take steps to increase intra-party acceptance of the “unnatural” political partner (for their electorates) and inter-party agreements on policies and positions.

The Centre-EKRE-Pro Patria coalition agreement signed on 8 April has proven these perceived red lines wrong - and shown a clear victory of pragmatism and interest over ideology. But the significance of Russia’s power projection for Estonia and the wider European Union is not only about geopolitics – it’s also about ideology.

Ideological roots

EKRE’s trajectory started in 2012. The party originates from a merger between conservative People’s Union of Estonia (Eestimaa Rahvaliit) and the Eurosceptic and far-right Estonian Patriotic Movement (Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine). As an organisation, EKRE is family-centred – it is firmly controlled by its historical leader, Mart Helme, his son, Martin Helme, and a few members of the party’s inner circle. Since its establishment, EKRE has promoted an ethno-national model of Estonia as a state, exclusive citizenship, and publicly embraced traditional “Estonian” values and social conservatism.

In the light of this vision, in August 2013, the party signed – together with Latvia’s National Alliance, Lithuania’s Nationalist Union, and their respective youth organisations – the “Bauska declaration”. This document not only establishes a forum of cooperation and coordination among the three parties, but also an ideological platform that defines their shared political values and cements their domestic ethno-national roots.