Our cover leader this week argues that Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, and his Bharatiya Janata Party are creating sectarian divisions that imperil the world’s biggest democracy. The BJP, which increased its parliamentary majority last May despite a slowing economy, has pursued a Hindu-nationalist agenda. A citizenship law, passed last month, makes it easier for long-term immigrants to naturalise as Indians—if they are not Muslims. Mr Modi also wants to create a register of citizens, which would oblige Indians to provide evidence of citizenship; many Muslims do not have the necessary papers, so risk being made stateless. But Mr Modi is meeting resistance. The citizenship law sparked protests that have lasted weeks. He could have used his parliamentary power to pass badly needed economic reforms; yet, our Briefing concludes, he has created a broad coalition against himself.

A polite crowd of 22,000 gathered in Richmond, Virginia, on January 20th to protest against gun-control measures proposed by the state’s Democrat-controlled legislature. (Fears of a repeat of a far-right rally in Charlottesville, also in Virginia, in 2017, in which a counter-protester was killed, came to nothing.) The proposals are mainly modest; the most controversial would allow relatives or the police to petition a court to take away the guns of someone who may be dangerous. Yet many protesters suspect a wider confiscation plan. The rally reflects a widening political division: as suburbs around Richmond and Washington, DC, have grown, Virginia has become more Democratic, even while the rest of the state has leaned more Republican.

Despite the lowest unemployment for 50 years, during Donald Trump’s presidency America’s budget deficit has widened from 4% to 5.5%, by far the largest of any rich country. It may get wider still. That means issuing lots of debt—but as we report this week, America is having no trouble finding buyers. American companies and households are saving more and investing in Treasuries; post-crisis regulations oblige banks to buy more safe, liquid assets. Europeans are the keenest foreign buyers, although some Chinese purchases may be made (believe it or not) by Belgian intermediaries. Low interest rates and inflation may allow America’s fiscal looseness to continue. That doesn’t necessarily make it wise.

At first glance Europe may look certain to become more reliant on Russian gas. Its own production is declining, whereas Russian supply (37% of the market in 2018) is rising and new pipelines from the east are coming. This month one, TurkStream, was launched; American sanctions will delay another, Nord Stream 2, but not halt it. Yet the European Commission believes Europe has become less vulnerable in the past decade, thanks to rising competition. Renewables have supplanted some gas, and imports of liquefied natural gas have doubled since 2017. LNG has spawned a spot market, which has in turn loosened the rigid oil-linked pricing favoured by Gazprom, Russia’s giant state-owned supplier. None of this means Europe is free of Gazprom, whose market share is likely to decline only slightly in the next few years. But LNG has made it harder to fleece pipeline customers.