Open source confronts its midlife crisis

Midlife is tough: the idealism of youth has faded, as has inevitably some of its fitness and vigor. At the same time, the responsibilities of adulthood have grown: the kids that were such a fresh adventure when they were infants and toddlers are now grappling with their own transition into adulthood — and you try to remind yourself that the kids that you have sacrificed so much for probably don’t actually hate your guts, regardless of that post they just liked on the ‘gram. Making things more challenging, while you are navigating the turbulence of teenagers, your own parents are likely entering life’s twilight, needing help in new ways from their adult children. By midlife, in addition to the singular joys of life, you have also likely experienced its terrible sorrows: death, heartbreak, betrayal. Taken together, the fading of youth, the growth in responsibility and the endurance of misfortune can lead to cynicism or (worse) drastic and poorly thought-out choices. Add in a little fear of mortality and some existential dread, and you have the stuff of which midlife crises are made…

I raise this not because of my own adventures at midlife, but because it is clear to me that open source — now several decades old and fully adult — is going through its own midlife crisis. This has long been in the making: for years, I (and others) have been critical of service providers’ parastic relationship with open source, as cloud service providers turn open source software into a service offering without giving back to the communities upon which they implicitly depend. At the same time, open source has been (rightfully) entirely unsympathetic to the proprietary software models that have been burned to the ground — but also seemingly oblivious as to the larger economic waves that have buoyed them.

So it seemed like only a matter of time before the companies built around open source software would have to confront their own crisis of confidence: open source business models are really tough, selling software-as-a-service is one of the most natural of them, the cloud service providers are really good at it — and their commercial appetites seem boundless. And, like a new cherry red two-seater sports car next to a minivan in a suburban driveway, some open source companies are dealing with this crisis exceptionally poorly: they are trying to restrict the way that their open source software can be used. These companies want it both ways: they want the advantages of open source — the community, the positivity, the energy, the adoption, the downloads — but they also want to enjoy the fruits of proprietary software companies in software lock-in and its concomitant monopolistic rents. If this were entirely transparent (that is, if some bits were merely being made explicitly proprietary), it would be fine: we could accept these companies as essentially proprietary software companies, albeit with an open source loss-leader. But instead, these companies are trying to license their way into this self-contradictory world: continuing to claim to be entirely open source, but perverting the license under which portions of that source are available. Most gallingly, they are doing this by hijacking open source nomenclature. Of these, the laughably named commons clause is the worst offender (it is plainly designed to be confused with the purely virtuous creative commons), but others (including CockroachDB’s Community License, MongoDB’s Server Side Public License, and Confluent’s Community License) are little better. And in particular, as it apparently needs to be said: no, “community” is not the opposite of “open source” — please stop sullying its good name by attaching it to licenses that are deliberately not open source! But even if they were more aptly named (e.g. “the restricted clause” or “the controlled use license” or — perhaps most honest of all — “the please-don’t-put-me-out-of-business-during-the-next-reInvent-keynote clause”), these licenses suffer from a serious problem: they are almost certainly asserting rights that the copyright holder doesn’t in fact have.

If I sell you a book that I wrote, I can restrict your right to read it aloud for an audience, or sell a translation, or write a sequel; these restrictions are rights afforded the copyright holder. I cannot, however, tell you that you can’t put the book on the same bookshelf as that of my rival, or that you can’t read the book while flying a particular airline I dislike, or that you aren’t allowed to read the book and also work for a company that competes with mine. (Lest you think that last example absurd, that’s almost verbatim the language in the new Confluent Community (sic) License.) I personally think that none of these licenses would withstand a court challenge, but I also don’t think it will come to that: because the vendors behind these licenses will surely fear that they wouldn’t survive litigation, they will deliberately avoid inviting such challenges. In some ways, this netherworld is even worse, as the license becomes a vessel for unverifiable fear of arbitrary liability.

Legal dubiousness aside, as with that midlife hot rod, the licenses aren’t going to address the underlying problem. To be clear, the underlying problem is not the licensing, it’s that these companies don’t know how to make money — they want open source to be its own business model, and seeing that the cloud service providers have an entirely viable business model, they want a piece of the action. But as a result of these restrictive riders, one of two things will happen with respect to a cloud services provider that wants to build a service offering around the software:

The cloud services provider will build their service not based on the software, but rather on another open source implementation that doesn’t suffer from the complication of a lurking company with brazenly proprietary ambitions. The cloud services provider will build their service on the software, but will use only the truly open source bits, reimplementing (and keeping proprietary) any of the surrounding software that they need.

In the first case, the victory is strictly pyrrhic: yes, the cloud services provider has been prevented from monetizing the software — but the software will now have less of the adoption that is the lifeblood of a thriving community. In the second case, there is no real advantage over the current state of affairs: the core software is still being used without the open source company being explicitly paid for it. Worse, the software and its community have been harmed: where one could previously appeal to the social contract of open source (namely, that cloud service providers have a social responsibility to contribute back to the projects upon which they depend), now there is little to motivate such reciprocity. Why should the cloud services provider contribute anything back to a company that has declared war on it? (Or, worse, implicitly accused it of malfeasance.) Indeed, as long as fights are being picked with them, cloud service providers will likely clutch their bug fixes in the open core as a differentiator, cackling to themselves over the gnarly race conditions that they have fixed of which the community is blissfully unaware. Is this in any way a desired end state?

So those are the two cases, and they are both essentially bad for the open source project. Now, one may notice that there is a choice missing, and for those open source companies that still harbor magical beliefs, let me put this to you as directly as possible: cloud services providers are emphatically not going to license your proprietary software. I mean, you knew that, right? The whole premise with your proprietary license is that you are finding that there is no way to compete with the operational dominance of the cloud services providers; did you really believe that those same dominant cloud services providers can’t simply reimplement your LDAP integration or whatever? The cloud services providers are currently reproprietarizing all of computing — they are making their own CPUs for crying out loud! — reimplementing the bits of your software that they need in the name of the service that their customers want (and will pay for!) won’t even move the needle in terms of their effort.

Worse than all of this (and the reason why this madness needs to stop): licenses that are vague with respect to permitted use are corporate toxin. Any company that has been through an acquisition can speak of the peril of the due diligence license audit: the acquiring entity is almost always deep pocketed and (not unrelatedly) risk averse; the last thing that any company wants is for a deal to go sideways because of concern over unbounded liability to some third-party knuckle-head. So companies that engage in license tomfoolery are doing worse than merely not solving their own problem: they are potentially poisoning the wellspring of their own community.

So what to do? Those of us who have been around for a while — who came up in the era of proprietary software and saw the merciless transition to open source software — know that there’s no way to cross back over the Rubicon. Open source software companies need to come to grips with that uncomfortable truth: their business model isn’t their community’s problem, and they should please stop trying to make it one. And while they’re at it, it would be great if they could please stop making outlandish threats about the demise of open source; they sound like shrieking proprietary software companies from the 1990s, warning that open source will be ridden with nefarious backdoors and unspecified legal liabilities. (Okay, yes, a confession: just as one’s first argument with their teenager is likely to give their own parents uncontrollable fits of smug snickering, those of us who came up in proprietary software may find companies decrying the economically devastating use of their open source software to be amusingly ironic — but our schadenfreude cups runneth over, so they can definitely stop now.)

So yes, these companies have a clear business problem: they need to find goods and services that people will exchange money for. There are many business models that are complementary with respect to open source, and some of the best open source software (and certainly the least complicated from a licensing drama perspective!) comes from companies that simply needed the software and open sourced it because they wanted to build a community around it. (There are many examples of this, but the outstanding Envoy and Jaeger both come to mind — the former from Lyft, the latter from Uber.) In this regard, open source is like a remote-friendly working policy: it’s something that you do because it makes economic and social sense; even as it’s very core to your business, its not a business model in and of itself.

That said, it is possible to build business models around the open source software that is a company’s expertise and passion! Even though the VC that led the last round wants to puke into a trashcan whenever they hear it, business models like “support”, “services” and “training” are entirely viable! (That’s the good news; the bad news is that they may not deliver the up-and-to-the-right growth that these companies may have promised in their pitch deck — and they may come at too low a margin to pay for large teams, lavish perks, or outsized exits.) And of course, making software available as a service is also an entirely viable business model — but I’m pretty sure they’ve heard about that one in the keynote.

As part of their quest for a business model, these companies should read Adam Jacob’s excellent blog entry on sustainable free and open source communities. Adam sees what I see (and Stephen O’Grady sees and Roman Shaposhnik sees), and he has taken a really positive action by starting the Sustainable Free and Open Source Communities project. This project has a lot to be said for it: it explicitly focuses on building community; it emphasizes social contracts; it seeks longevity for the open source artifacts; it shows the way to viable business models; it rejects copyright assignment to a corporate entity. Adam’s efforts can serve to clear our collective head, and to focus on what’s really important: the health of the communities around open source. By focusing on longevity, we can plainly see restrictive licensing as the death warrant that it is, shackling the fate of a community to that of a company. (Viz. after the company behind AGPL-licensed RethinkDB capsized, it took the Linux Foundation buying the assets and relicensing them to rescue the community.) Best of all, it’s written by someone who has built a business that has open source software at its heart. Adam has endured the challenges of the open core model, and is refreshingly frank about its economic and psychic tradeoffs. And if he doesn’t make it explicit, Adam’s fundamental optimism serves to remind us, too, that any perceived “danger” to open source is overblown: open source is going to endure, as no company is going to be able to repeal the economics of software. That said, as we collectively internalize that open source is not a business model on its own, we will likely see fewer VC-funded open source companies (though I’m honestly not sure that that’s a bad thing).

I don’t think that it’s an accident that Adam, Stephen, Roman and I see more or less the same thing and are more or less the same age: not only have we collectively experienced many sides of this, but we are at once young enough to still recall our own idealism, yet old enough to know that coercion never endures in the limit. In short, this too shall pass — and in the end, open source will survive its midlife questioning just as people in midlife get through theirs: by returning to its core values and by finding rejuvenation in its communities. Indeed, we can all find solace in the fact that while life is finite, our values and our communities survive us — and that our engagement with them is our most important legacy.

