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[Analytical & Intelligence Comments] RE: U.S. and Pakistan: Afghan Strategies

Released on 2013-03-11 00:00 GMT

Email-ID 1334572 Date 2011-06-22 03:34:08 From gfowkes@aol.com To responses@stratfor.com

[Analytical & Intelligence Comments] RE: U.S. and Pakistan: Afghan

Strategies





Gordon S Fowkes sent a message using the contact form at

https://www.stratfor.com/contact.



Counterinsurgency as originally defined did not mean social transformation,

but building durable institutions within the context of the native

cuilture(s). South Vietnam had a shifting set of cultures, one traditional

Vietnamese, and the other French (from Left to Right). In that mix, the

concept of a republican form of government was consistent with political

value sytems which had a wide variety of meanings from fake to functional.



CORDS which handled the economic and political development operated under

MACV coordination. The US military focused on the mobile war against main

force units which had been driven out of the populated areas after Tet 68.

The South Vietnamese military was trained and expert at area stabiiization

efforts and the ejection of VC/NVA units with US involvement.



The notion that Counterinsurgency necessarily includes transformation of the

Middle East into the Middle West forgets that the East should be West was an

underlying, if unstated, goal of the original post-SF operation. The

concepts of building a Afghan National Army on the same format as the Draft

Era US Army failed as did the original model in prolonged war. The

Lifer-Draftee model only works in wars a foreign exernal threat. It doesn't

export well nor does it tolerate long wars.



The Lifer-Drattee model is no longer being used by the US although not

everyone in the Pentagon knew this as they originally broke up Guard and

Reserve units to use as fillers into the regular establishment. The

governors of the states eventually brought that concept to heel.



The combination of Reserve and Guard units on active duty as such and not as

part of a WW2/Korea model in which all components were rolled into one, is a

reversion back to the model used under the Militia Act of 1793 which remained

in force until after the debacle in Cuba during the Spanish American War.

The advantage of the reversion to the Eighteenth Century model was that

effective units with the special experience of working with civil authority

inherent in the Guard mission allowed certain Guard units to teach the

Regualrs how to deal with civilians. Particular credit to the Arkansas Army

Guard.



The default US defense establishment per the Constitution is the "well

regulated militia" of the states. That preserved the sense of security of

the states apprehensive of Federal forces rampaging about enforcing Federal

Law. That apprehensiveness drew from the experiences of the English

Commonwealth under Oliver Cromwell, and of King Charles II thereafter. The

Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 which reinforced restrictions on Federal use of

military force in domestic issues as initially posed in the Insurrecction Act

of 1807 is a pill the Pentagon finds distatefull.



Nevertheless, the concept of a national defense based on the sum of the parts

is the model most likely to be accepted by the Afghans. The persistent

effort to produce the Lifer-Draftee clone also includes the misbegotten

notion that the military must be under civilian leadership. This notion is

repugnant to Afghan warriors. This notion is also not found in our

Constiuttion, anywhere. The President is not a civilian, he is the CinC. The

Congress doesn't command or supervise the military, they provide for it.

There is no reason why the Secretaries of defense establishments be military.

Gates was no civilian, nor is the CIA.



Certain local efforts such as the National Guard Agricultural teams brought

the know how to Afghantistan (and a few other places) ways to improve

agricultrual productivilty. This, however, is not cultural cloning of the

sort preferred by the Senior Executive Service which runs the Pentagon.



Thats too much for one pitch











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