Following a very long period of inactivity, I here present an argument that, I believe, demonstrates the untenability of the notion that a causative actor—such as, for example, a creator deity—can be timeless while still being causative.





To start, I will define two key terms:



"Bound by time" is defined as follows: "in the case of two or more things, when each one has a temporal location relative to the other(s)."



"A timeless being" is defined as follows: "a being that does not have a temporal location relative to anything."





Now, the argument:



Premise 1: Any two things [X] and [Y] that have a temporal relationship are bound by time.

Premise 2: "Cause" and "effect" have a temporal relationship.

Conclusion 1: "Cause" and "effect" are bound by time.





Premise 3: A timeless being is not bound by time.

Conclusion 2: A timeless being is neither "cause" nor "effect."





If this argument is, as I believe, sound, then a creator (causative) deity that is ostensibly a timeless being is, in fact, a non-existing manifestation of absurd reasoning.

Labels: First Cause, Kalam, syllogism, William Lane Craig