(1) Nothing is red in itself.

(2) Nothing is delicious in itself.

(3) Nothing is malodorous in itself.

(4) Nothing is loud in itself.

(5) Nothing is painful in itself.

(6) Nothing is poisonous in itself.

(7) Nothing is healthy in itself.

(8) Nothing is fast in itself.



Examples (1) through (5) are of course cases of so-called secondary qualities -- those properties or "powers" in an object that elicit particular sensory experiences in particular classes of observers. So, for example, apples are "red" because (a) they differentially reflect light within the wavelength range of 625–740 nm, which (b) causes in organisms outfitted with long cone photoreceptors the sensory experience of seeing red. To be sure, it is by dint of the apple's physical structure that they appear red to us. But apples aren't red in themselves, because organisms with visual systems sensitive to different classes of wavelengths than we are (e.g., bees) will perceive apples as being a different color than we do (e.g., "bee purple"). Thus, red is a secondary quality.

Examples (6) through (8), though not usually falling under the standard idea of 'secondary quality', are analogous enough. (For example, hydrogen sulfide is poisonous to humans, but salubrious to Thiomargarita namibiensis.) So at least for now, let's count them too among the secondary qualities.

It is common to hear secondary qualities described as "subjective." [1] There's probably no harm in this, as long as we keep in mind that the kind of "subjectivity" that characterizes secondary qualities is consistent with their being objective. It is true that the redness of the apple can adequately be conceived only by reference to some or other subjective state. But this is not to say that whether, say, I perceive an apple as being red is merely a matter of my "subjective opinion," or of my desire to see it as being red (as opposed to blue, green or turquoise). Rather, the apple and my visual system are objectively constituted such that under the right conditions, I will ineluctably see the apple as red. The property red, then, is at least in that sense an objectively real feature or constituent of the world. Thus, the fact that some property φ falls under (I) cannot motivate antirealism about φ.

Now consider the analogous claim about value:

(V) Nothing is valuable in itself (or has value in itself).



For various reasons, the fact that Nietzsche expresses views along the lines of (V) [2] has been taken by many of the leading commentators (I have Hussain, [3] Leiter [4] and Clark-Dudrick [5] in mind) to be evidence of Nietzsche's antirealism about value. Granted, this inference is never the sole, or even the main, reason given for the antirealist reading advocated. Nonetheless, for each of these authors, it does play a conspicuous, active role in making the cumulative case. And this reliance seems to be mistaken, because the fact that nothing has a given property φ "in itself" says nothing about whether φ is in some sense real or objective. [6]

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NOTES

1. For instance, the Wikipedia article on the primary/secondary quality distinction states that "[p]rimary qualities are measurable aspects of physical reality," while "[s]econdary qualities are subjective." (Visited December 2, 2008.)

And since I'm bringing up secondary qualities, I might as well note that it is not my intention here to argue that Nietzsche believes value is akin to a Lockean secondary quality. I'm only suggesting that the "in itself" locution and its ilk give us no reason to deny that he at least might.

2. “Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature — nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time.” (GS 301)

3. “Honest Illusion: Valuing for Nietzsche’s Free Spirits,” in Leiter and Sinhababu (eds), Nietzsche and Morality, New York: Oxford University Press (2007)

4. Nietzsche on Morality, London: Routledge (2002), particularly at 146-147.

5. Clark, M. and Dudrick, D., "Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity," in Leiter and Sinhababu (eds), Nietzsche and Morality, New York: Oxford University Press (2007).

6. Or alternatively that talk about φ is true or justified. There is a bit of a muddle here that I'm glossing over, in that I would count as "realist" even those of the "Privilege" readings Leiter construes as nonrealist. See "Nietzsche's Metaethics: Against the Privilege Readings," European Journal of Philosophy 8: 277-297, at 279. The only issue I'm concerned with is whether or not, as Leiter puts it, "Nietzsche [takes himself to be] doing anything more than giving his idiosyncratic opinion from his idiosyncratic evaluative perspective...." (277) I'd say it's enough to count Nietzsche as a "realist" to show that he does believe that as a matter of fact his evaluative perspective ought to be privileged over at least some others. Whether the truth or justification of this presumption would turn on the objective existence of "value" in the world, as opposed, say, to certain objective "norms of good judging" that flow from a commitment to "just" evaluation (Clark-Dudrick 220-223), seems secondary.