U.S. military officials sought permission to send an armed drone near a patrol of Green Berets before a deadly ambush Oct. 4 in Niger, but the request was blocked, raising questions about whether those forces had adequate protection against the dangers of their mission.

New information shows the Green Beret team was part of a larger mission, one potentially more dangerous than initially described, and one believed to merit an armed drone. But the request was blocked in a chain of approval that snakes through the Pentagon, State Department and the Nigerien government, according to officials briefed on the events.

One focus of military investigations into what happened in Niger will be what a military official now says were two changes in the mission of the Green Beret team—from initially training Nigerien forces, to advising on a mission to capture or kill a wanted terrorist, to investigating the terrorist’s abandoned camp.

U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers observe Nigerien armed forces service members during an exercise in Niger this year. Photo: zayid ballesteros/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

On Oct. 4, after the U.S.-Nigerien team had destroyed the camp, four Americans and five Nigerien soldiers were killed in a firefight with suspected Islamic State fighters, and two other Americans and as many as eight Nigeriens were wounded.

The ambush and the circumstances surrounding it have taken on political weight in Washington as the deadliest military clash for Americans since President Donald Trump took office. Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has pressed for more information, and a public spat broke out about condolence calls by Mr. Trump.


The drone request suggests that military officials were aware of a change in the security landscape in western Niger, where more than two dozen previous patrols had been conducted without incident. Intelligence indicated a low risk of enemy contact, and there had been no enemy attacks on U.S. forces there for the past year, according to officials investigating the incident.

The initial decision against the use of an armed drone reflects an effort by the U.S. mission in Niger to maintain a light footprint in the country amid local resistance to the deployment of armed aircraft—a challenge for officials also seeking to adequately support U.S. troops there.

An Department of Defense handout shows U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Bryan C. Black (top left), Sgt. La David Johnson (top right), Staff Sgt. Dustin M. Wright, (bottom left), and Staff Sgt. Jeremiah W. Johnson, (bottom right), the four U.S. soldiers killed in the attack on U.S. and Nigerien forces on Oct. 4. Photo: DEOARTMENT OF DEFENSE/EPA/Shutterstock

An Department of Defense handout shows U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Bryan C. Black (top left), Sgt. La David Johnson (top right), Staff Sgt. Dustin M. Wright, (bottom left), and Staff Sgt. Jeremiah W. Johnson, (bottom right), the four U.S. soldiers killed in the attack on U.S. and Nigerien forces on Oct. 4. Photo: DEOARTMENT OF DEFENSE/EPA/Shutterstock

After the firefight broke out on Oct. 4, some military officials also wanted an armed drone, but it is unclear if one was in the area and whether any request was made, according to a military official. An unarmed drone was dispatched, and French Mirage jet fighters arrived about an hour later, followed by French helicopters.

U.S. officials have repeatedly modified the timeline as facts trickle in.


The Green Beret patrol was one of two operating in the area at about the same time, Pentagon officials said. The second consisted of an elite commando team specializing in missions to track down wanted jihadists; both were involved at the time in a hunt for an associate of Adnan abu Walid al-Sahawi, the leader of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, according to current and former officials briefed on the events.

The targeted militant was operating in the border region, moving between Niger and Mali, and the elite team was also operating on both sides of the border, officials said. The jihadist is an important figure in Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, an organization operating in the two countries, according to a person briefed on the investigation.

The Green Beret team’s role in Niger was initially to help train the country’s security forces. But then, before the October mission began, the group was asked to advise the Nigerien quick-reaction force that was to assist the elite commando unit on its mission to capture or kill the terrorist target, according to a military official.

That mission was scrubbed because weather conditions increased the risk for helicopter flight to the site where the jihadist was thought to be, the official said.


The commando unit then sought another U.S. team to check out what appeared to be an abandoned terror camp that the jihadist had used, according to current and former officials briefed on the events.

The Green Beret patrol, now available to be retasked, was sent to the camp, the officials said.

The patrol was made up mostly of Green Berets, with other soldiers attached. All were considered well trained, having gone through the comprehensive work-ups of the elite Special Forces, according to Pentagon records. But their experience levels varied, according to the records; at least one had never deployed and at least four hadn’t seen combat.

The team, along with 30 Nigerien troops, left the country’s capital, Niamey, the morning of Oct. 3.


The new mission, to find the abandoned camp and shelter, was considered relatively low-risk. An assessment showed there was little likelihood of an enemy attack, officials have said, after the wanted terrorist was known to have abandoned the camp.

Military investigators have been examining the official orders that led to the assignment. A key unanswered question is who formally changed the Green Beret-led team’s mission—the U.S. Africa Command, known as Africom, the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, or another agency.

Investigators also are working to find out if there was adequate intelligence to evaluate the likelihood of enemy contact and whether the team was prepared for helping an elite commando team track and kill Mr. Sahawi’s associate.

Investigations into the ambush by military officials, aided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are likely to take weeks, according to officials briefed on the inquiry.

Mr. Sahawi is considered a top target in the “tri-border” region of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, according to European officials. The area is made up in large part of wildlife preserves, allowing militants, often in groups of just a few dozen, to move across borders, hide out and strike as needed.

The joint U.S.-Nigerien team relatively quickly located and arrived at the camp that had been abandoned by Mr. Sahawi’s lieutenant. The team, according to military reports, collected some information and destroyed the shelter they found, though military officials don’t know if it was a regular camp or had only been used once.

From there, late on Oct. 3, the team began the trek back to their base camp, according to a military official.

Based on the reports submitted by the Green Berets after they left the abandoned terrorist camp, the team hiked throughout the night of Oct. 3 to Oct. 4, never staying in one place for more than a couple of hours.

While on the route back to their camp, in the morning of Oct. 4, the Nigerien forces asked to stop at a village to get breakfast and refill their canteens.

When U.S. forces visit a village, it is standard procedure to meet with the elder, explain their broader mission and enlist a measure of support from the local population.

That meeting went longer than expected. At 10:40 a.m. local time, minutes after leaving the village, the troops were ambushed.

Investigators are probing the question of how the jihadists found the Green Berets, since intelligence hadn’t documented any militants operating in the area of the village.

The length of the village meeting has caused some military officials to question whether villagers tried to delay the Green Berets. But military officials said they now believe the village elder wasn’t involved.

Military officials don’t know if the fighters who ambushed the Green Beret-led team were affiliated with the terrorist being hunted by the elite team.

One official noted that the areas were far apart, and the Green Beret team had taken steps to avoid being tracked. Other officials believe he was likely responsible for the attack.

An hour into the fight, minutes after a request from the team for air support, the unarmed drone arrived, allowing more senior military commanders to watch the firefight.

The French Mirage jet fighters from an airfield in Niamey were underway within a half-hour and in the area 30 minutes later, the Pentagon said. French helicopters left from Mali, officials said.

During the fight, four soldiers became separated from the rest of the team. Those soldiers would be the Americans killed.

Late on the afternoon of Oct. 4, French helicopters evacuated two wounded U.S. soldiers. It wasn’t until that evening that the bodies of three of the four U.S. soldiers killed were evacuated.

The body of the fourth soldier, Sgt. La David Johnson, was still missing. He was found two days later by Nigerien forces.

Military officials declined to say why the initial request for an armed drone was made. The U.S. Africa Command, which is responsible for military operations for most of the continent, typically must request permission from the U.S. ambassador or the chief of mission at a U.S. embassy in a given country for any military operation, according to current and former officials briefed on the events.

If the ambassador blocks the mission, the decision can be appealed by military officials to the Pentagon.

That step typically requires a discussion between the secretaries of Defense and State. Military officials said top officers are reluctant to take disputes with an ambassador to the secretary of Defense, out of concern of sending a signal that the command isn’t able to work effectively with its diplomatic partners. No high-level discussion in advance of the Green Beret patrol that began Oct. 3 appears to have taken place.

State Department officials denied that their teams in Africa can block military requests for drone flights or strikes and said diplomats didn’t stop a request for an armed drone in Niger.

“The U.S. ambassador in Niger did not deny support or protection for military personnel involved in the October 4 ambush,” State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said. “The ambassador supported all efforts to ensure the safety of our military colleagues in the field.”

One of the officials briefed on the events said sensitivities in Niger concerning the use of armed drones have delayed their use. The two countries signed an agreement in 2013 allowing Washington to establish a drone base there. The $100 million base is set to be completed next year.

—Joe Parkinson, Gordon Lubold and Felicia Schwartz contributed to this article.

Write to Julian E. Barnes at julian.barnes@wsj.com, Nancy A. Youssef at Nancy.Youssef@wsj.com and Ben Kesling at benjamin.kesling@wsj.com