In the current philosophical climate, virtue ethics remains a relatively uncommon position in comparison to both deontology and utilitarianism, only being held by approximately 18% of philosophers. Virtue in itself however, is undoubtedly an integral concept to any moral theory. Virtue ethics rests on the idea that virtue is the most important concept in morality, so it is necessary to examine the goodness of virtue in comparison to both duty and pleasure, held by rival theories to be the ultimate goods. It can thus be seen that virtue may not be sufficient as a standalone, but in combination with pleasure, may provide the best account of morality.

The importance of pleasure can be seen as both as good in-and-of-itself, as well as an instrumentally good. Instrumentally, pleasure is good as happy people (those with high levels of pleasure) typically are better are promoting pleasure in others. This would not be conducive to goodness if pleasure in itself were not good. The most basic argument for pleasure as a good is based on its inherent desirability. People who experience pleasure desire it, and are motivated to perform actions that bring them pleasure. While this is commonly good, there also can be downsides associated with pleasures desirability. If one receives pleasure from activities we typically deem to be bad (perhaps unvirtuous), the instrumentality of pleasure can promote intuitively bad behaviour.

It is necessary to examine whether our intuitions about bad pleasures are indeed correct, and if so, how to solve them. Things typically deemed bad pleasures are typically seen as so because the means in which we undertake to achieve them is seen as bad. Hypothetically, if one approaches an abandoned child in an alley, one has three options. The first, to save the baby, the second, to leave it, the third, to brutally torture it. Utilitarianism remains indifferent to which means are taken in this situation, only stipulating the we ought to do what promotes the most pleasure. If the third option, that of brutally torturing the abandoned baby promotes the most pleasure, one ought to do it. While this is an atypical scenario, it is not necessarily unrealistic in a society in which sadists certainly exist. However, despite the sadist receiving enough pleasure to justify the torture of the baby according to utilitarianism, it still seems to be wrong. Perhaps this is due to the fact that receiving pleasure from such bad means would make one more inclined to do so in the future, even if it typically promotes bad consequences. Thus, despite in the single scenario possibly being “good,” it seems our intuitions are not misplaced in wanting to restrict this behaviour.

In restricting this behaviour, perhaps the most common approach is to appeal to rule utilitarianism. Under this theory, one ought to abide by rules which typically promote the most good. While certainly the source of much contemporary debate, it seems arbitrary to restrict act utilitarianism to rules, if disregarding the rule promotes more pleasure.

However, while it may be arbitrary to restrict utilitarianism to rules, by referencing another good, virtue, it is possible to abide by our intuitions, without deriving seemingly arbitrary rules. By viewing not only pleasure, but virtue as ultimate goods, we are able to restrict “good” acts to those that promote the most pleasure while also taking virtuous means. Virtue can be seen as good inasmuch as it typically promotes good behaviour. A virtuous person, one of good character, will typically perform actions we deem to be intuitively good. As well, by influencing the person of good character in such a way that they seek to maximize pleasure, they will perform the act that produces the most pleasure through virtuous means.

In order to accept virtue as an ultimate good, it must also be desirable as an end in-and-of-itself. While one may want to be virtuous, can virtue be seen as desirable for itself, rather than the fact that it typically is conducive to intuitively good actions? To promote virtue as an ultimate good, one can appeal to the inherent desirability of virtue. One typically wants to be a good, that being virtuous, person. One typically wants to harbour good qualities, rather than bad ones. Thus, it seems that virtue is not only desirable instrumentally, but as an end in itself, as each agent strives to be a cultivate virtue, and be virtuous person.

It can then be seen that it is possible to provide a moral theory that not only is non-arbitrary, but intuitive, by advancing pleasure and virtue as ultimate goods. Utilitarianism appears to have counter-intuitive results as to what is good, and is seemingly unable to non-arbitrarily solve these issues. However, seeing as virtue is not only instrumentally desirable, but in-and-of-itself, it may also be an ultimate good. This allows for one to solve the issue of counter-intuitive results of what is good. However, seemingly a problem of incommensurability arises in having two seemingly incomparable goods in a theory. Virtue must be applied in the means we take, but it also must be cultivated, thus at times there will seemingly be a trade-off between pleasure and virtue. Perhaps this will be touched on in a separate blog post, perhaps it won’t; however, it seems that it is possible to have these two ultimate goods and solve many of our problems with utilitarianism’s intuitions.