Looking back at over a decade of European engagement beyond its eastern periphery, one fundamental challenge of the Eastern Partnership programme has been dealing with unresolved conflicts. One of the more daunting, if not deadly, of these challenges has been the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has embroiled Armenia and Azerbaijan – two partnership, or EaP, members – in a diplomatic deadlock that pre-dates even their own post-Soviet independence.

Against that backdrop, the relevance of this unresolved conflict to wider European security was most recently demonstrated by a “discussion” of the Karabakh conflict at the recent Munich Security Conference.

Organised as a moderated panel discussion, Armenian Prime Minster Nikol Pashinyan and Azeri President Ilham Aliyev went head to head on February 15 in a contentious 45-minute exchange that was more of a duel of historical diatribes than a debate over diplomatic discourse. For example, speaking first, Aliyev opened with a look backwards, contending that “first we need to go back and look at the history of the issue” that continued with a historical narrative that started with a reference to an obscure 1805 treaty. Sadly, taking the bait, Pashinyan then tried to outdo his rival by reaching even further back, turning to the first-century B.C. period of history.

From this point on, the speakers largely lost and never fully regained the attention of the audience, which despite a polite silence, was clearly confused by a flurry of obscure historical references. And in an exchange that seemed aimed at their own domestic audiences, the leaders not only spoke beyond the Munich audience, but also spoke past one another.

For many observers with little or no prior awareness of the Karabakh conflict, the panel was a disappointment. And for those with a deeper knowledge of the conflict, it was a missed opportunity to elevate the discourse above and beyond the same stale script and bellicose rhetoric that has come to dominate diplomacy over the issue.

Nevertheless, the exchange was important for several reasons. And it started off well, with the Armenian premier warning that “we are repeating every time the same thing,” and noting that “the international community is tired of hearing the same thing, and I think we need to bring some new ideas.”

First, the Munich event offered a unique and unprecedented opportunity for the Armenian and Azeri leaders to present their views and visions of the conflict in a public setting before and interested yet neutral audience. For a conflict that is a centerpiece for a strictly closed, confidential and closeted form of diplomatic mediation, the public airing of the differences of each side was an important achievement.

In fact, such public presentations are far too rare, although there is an obvious need for greater engagement by both leaders, of their own population, as well as before the international community. In this regard, however, there has been some progress to date.

Swept into power by a rare victory of non-violence that became known as a “Velvet Revolution,” Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan has introduced a refreshing degree of transparency and accountability before his domestic constituency, stressing that any resolution to this conflict must be acceptable to all parties, including the population of both Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, and not just Armenia.

For his part, Aliyev has fulfilled earlier promises to mediators, including the restoration of a “hotline” with Armenia to foster communication to diffuse crises and a commitment to implement “confidence-building mechanisms,” such as an exchange of journalists, for one example. And in a welcome display of maturity and sincerity, Pashinyan hailed the positive reduction in casualties and ceasefire violations, commending Aliyev for carrying out “a mini revolution” by ensuring that “the tension in general (was) reduced unprecedentedly.”

In that context, a second important aspect of the Munich exchange was the fact that despite a degree of disappointment with the devolution of discourse, it was a revelation of the reality of this conflict. From the over-reliance on history to the stark divergence of views, the event only confirmed the inherent difficulty in bridging the divide between the Armenian and Azeri positions. Such a wide divide was only reinforced at the close of the discussion, as Aliyev instead insisted on getting in the last word to reiterate a bellicose repeat of historical claims that extended to even the Armenian capital Yerevan.

And a third, related significance was the importance of revisiting this particular conflict as both a unique element of insecurity along Europe’s eastern borders and as reminder of the need for greater European attention and engagement in the Karabakh conflict. Moreover, as the only such conflict with no Russian military presence, it also has the dangerous potential for broader spillover, drawing in both Turkey and Iran, as well as Russia, in the event of renewed hostilities.

Thus, although it is important to note the achievement of these leaders in agreeing to effort to begin “preparing their population” for peace, it is also imperative that equal attention is devoted to preparing the politicians for peace as well.