On June 7 and 8, China’s legions of high school students in their last year sat down for the Gaokao after a long year of rote study. The nine-hour exam sets the course of achievement for decades to come and is seemingly sacred in a society that places extremely high value on educational achievement and job security. Parents often take their kids to Buddhist temples to pray before the exam. In major cities, the public transportation system is cleared to allow students a quick commute to their exam location.

Similar to the SATs, students complete an essay portion that is designed to test writing ability—or at least it used to be. Conspicuous changes in this year’s essay prompts suggest that it is now intended to serve political purposes. This year’s questions ask for students’ thoughts on highly ideological topics, making it a test of students’ loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Several of the essay prompts focused on quotes from President Xi Jinping about the “rejuvenation” of China. Another prompt asked for a discussion on “the New Era—Growing up in the Motherland’s Development”. “New Era” is a term borrowed from the official name of Xi Jinping’s own political doctrine to describe the current era of Chinese prosperity, technological prowess, and global power.

In order to get a high score on the exam, students must display their knowledge of CCP propaganda terms (particularly those of Xi Jinping’s) and must demonstrate pride in China’s recent national achievements. The Guangdong provincial examination authority published a set of seven high-score example essays, all of which stuff in official terms from Xi Jinping and list key national achievements since the millennium (such as China’s bullet train system, mobile payments technology, and targeted poverty reduction). These are for national essay questions and guidelines for high-score essays vary little, if any, between provinces.

With such dramatic changes in what is arguably the country’s most important educational institution, students and observers are left wondering why the authorities did this. The answer was obvious to many of China’s netizens who promptly ridiculed these changes. One Weibo (China’s Twitter) user said, “In the past few years, the full-score essays were thoughtful and deep. This year's full-score essay is...simply a job of ass-kissing”.

Another Weibo user sarcastically suggested that the exam changes are a clever ploy to disseminate state-run propaganda on CCTV news. The user said, “The baton of the college entrance examination guides students to return to the CCTV news and away from the Internet. The ratings of the news broadcast will be guaranteed!”

A large number of Chinese netizens expressed a more sober concern about what these changes mean for the future of independent thinking in their country. One user said, “High school is a time when kids are quite literary and artistic…They have now begun to write on the ‘Chinese dream’, ‘clear water and green mountains’, Xiong’an New Zone - isn’t it doing harm to the growth of their minds?”

It is difficult to overstate the perceived importance of the exam for one’s future prospects. These dramatic changes suggest that the Party has attempted to bundle a student’s life prospects with their loyalty to the CCP. Students now have a far greater incentive to absorb Party doctrines and narratives throughout their education. Moreover, those with greater Party loyalty, and an ability to demonstrate that loyalty through writing, will likely get into better universities and ultimately have better job opportunities.

While this is new for contemporary China, the use of politicized essay questions in the Gaokao is a return of the same practice from the 1950s and 60s, in which the essays on the exam tested students on their political loyalty to Mao’s regime. This period saw tens of millions of people die due to Mao’s policies. At that time, the Party dictated nearly every aspect of people’s lives. The educational system played a vital role in indoctrinating the populace and engaging them in the common struggle against China’s perceived enemies (e.g. the West, Japan, and intellectuals).

Since the end of the Mao-era in 1976, the CCP has gradually let go of its control over society, allowing greater freedoms while maintaining authoritarian control over the political system. However, this course took a distinctly illiberal turn when Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013. The state is more repressive than it has been in decades and grows more so each year.

In 2018, China, in some ways, looks like a caricature of 20 th century totalitarianism. The country operates reeducation camps in the Muslim-dominated region of Xinjiang, imprisoning and indoctrinating nearly one million people in that region alone. Large signs with propaganda slogans from Xi Jinping are ubiquitous throughout the country. Disgraced officials accused of corruption are regularly seen giving forced confessions on state-run television. Even private businesses (both foreign and domestic) are being pressured to make room for communist party groups within their organization, as the state is increasing its role as the national economic planner.

The Chinese government has been forthcoming about its desire to exert greater control over society. This was, in fact, among the main topics of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2017. An article in state-run media reported that “The Central Government ordered the promotion of the spirit of the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party to enter companies, the countryside, government institutions, schools and campuses, communities, barracks, and the internet. This will inspire the spirit of the cadres and the people to forge ahead and work harder, and further encourage them to strive and courageously move forward.”

As the statement suggests, the Chinese educational system plays an important role in the state’s tightening grip on society. Xi Jinping has begun reshaping the educational system to enhance the state’s influence on young people’s minds. This is affecting nearly every educational institution including the examination system, primary and secondary education, higher education, and academic scholarship.

In a speech given at a primary school in Beijing, Xi Jinping described his desire for students to absorb the CCP’s doctrine. Xi said, “Children should memorize the core socialist values by heart, have them melt in their hearts, and carve them into their brains.” And earlier this year, China’s Ministry of Education established an ideological “preaching” team to spread Xi Jingping Thought “to the very nerve endings” of students, according to state-run media.

In the near future, Chinese primary and high school students will be fed an even more robust regimen of Xi Jinping Thought. Educators and the government are currently designing these educational changes. An article to promote the new curriculum appeared in state-run media in November 2017 with the title “Arm Teachers and Students’ Minds with Xi Jinping Thought - Push forward the Introduction of Xi Jinping Thought into Textbooks, into Classrooms, and into (students’) Brains.”

Primary schools are already holding regular lessons on Xi Thought from the 19 th Party Congress. Kids then create imaginary newspapers and exhibition boards on these ideas in order to understand “the mission and responsibilities they shoulder” in the “rejuvenation of China”, according to state-run media.

The Chinese government is changing textbooks to alter key historical narratives in such a way as to increase the perceived legitimacy of the CCP. Until recently, the national history textbook for 8 th grade students referred to the Cultural Revolution as a mistake that is “never to be repeated”. In the new history textbook, however, it is described simply as a “detour” on the path towards China’s present-day strength and prosperity, with nearly all details spared. By refraining from acknowledging any major mistakes, the CCP effectively paints a picture of itself as a leader that can do little wrong and needs neither oversight nor questioning.

Similarly, the educational curriculum is downplaying China’s rich legacy of public intellectuals and social thinkers by removing lessons on key historical figures like Lu Xun, a prominent intellectual that advocated for the popular struggle against tyrannical government.

Chinese universities are also playing a role in the dissemination of Xi Jinping Thought. The central government has established 10 dedicated research centers on Xi Jinping Thought that are focused on developing more sophisticated ways of exposing children to the doctrine, such as the simultaneous use of many different new media to generate a sense of omnipresence.

The CCP has always been aware of the importance of indoctrinating youth for the preservation of its power. Required lessons on Mao’s triumphs and the supremacy of dialectical materialist philosophy have been a staple of Chinese education for decades. Chinese primary school students have never stopped being required to learn communist songs and wear uniforms with a red scarf representing the blood of soldiers fighting for communism. Nonetheless, these recent changes across the educational system now greatly increase the indoctrination component of the curriculum. On Chinese-language media, the government confidently announces such intentions to the general public.

The China that sees itself as a global power that should lead the world in a variety of ways (technologically, economically, militarily, and ideationally) is the same China that is now pushing to indoctrinate its populace to historically significant levels. China not only wishes to become an innovation powerhouse to lead the world in strategic industries, but is also putting its innovative drive towards indoctrinating its youth, by its own admission. As the most “successful” autocracy today, with a comprehensive strategy to spread its influence globally, it is setting a very clear example to its non-democratic peers throughout the world on the mechanics of autocratic governance.

