Fourth, war may become increasingly nihilistic, as an increasing number of actors gain the ability to inflict extreme, precise damage. The West has already experienced the routinization of terrorist attacks that seem senseless. Throw non-state precision-guided munitions into that mix, and that senseless violence could be directed at specific individuals, military assets, or other high-value targets. Violence may become increasingly devoid of political strategy. In a kaleidoscopic world of multiple armed groups, concluding a war does not simply mean breaking an adversary's will; it means consolidating the control of violence under a legitimate authority that provides political order. The democratization of violence gives more and more groups the ability to veto an emerging political settlement. That veto will become increasingly powerful as armed groups can precisely target counterinsurgent forces.

Fifth, the balance of power between states and non-state actors will increasingly tilt in favor of the latter. States will maintain overwhelming conventional military advantages, but will find it increasingly difficult to impose desired strategic and political outcomes. In today's world, we can still count on high-technology weapon systems to ruthlessly punish non-states actors such as the Islamic State that undermine state authority. Employing such systems against insurgent groups is expensive, but it works. Relying on high-tech weapons systems to reassert state authority will be much harder when those systems are themselves vulnerable to attack.

If a threat to high end-systems indeed materializes, acquisition reform will become an even greater national defense imperative.

Sixth, our broken acquisition system and government over-regulation will become even greater liabilities. The acquisition system is optimized to produce large, expensive weapons systems of the sort that are most vulnerable to this developing capability. It is almost impossible for the U.S. to build distributed low-cost systems, and to do so with agility and speed. If a threat to high end-systems indeed materializes, acquisition reform will become an even greater national defense imperative. Over regulation is also a barrier. For example, accessing ranges to develop and test C-UAS solutions can take months of coordination. We will never lead the threat or build adequate defenses in that kind of environment.

If there is one positive strategic outcome, it is that this proliferation of precision-guided munitions may contribute to conventional deterrence between states, because it will be easier than ever to destroy each other's most expensive military assets.

Addressing Objections

Skeptical readers may object that the threat is overstated. To date, Islamic State drones have had only a marginal impact on the battlefield. Although they have proven lethal, they have not fundamentally changed the character of warfare in Syria and Iraq. Defenses based on radio frequency have been marginally successful, and the coalition has decimated the network. The Islamic State has not used drones to directly target expensive military assets, and drone-delivered munitions are only a few pounds at most.

All of this true, but must not breed complacency: the revolution has barely started. The Islamic State has only scratched the surface of what is possible in a world of greater autonomy. Rapid advances in autonomous flight behavior, machine learning, and optical navigation and targeting will reduce the reliance of drones on data links and GPS, making them immune to many existing defenses. Even rudimentary swarming attacks will overwhelm most defensive systems, allowing some degree of attack to get through. These technologies already exist, but are difficult to use. One reason the Islamic State has not widely employed these capabilities is that the coalition has killed many fighters with the requisite technical expertise. The counter-network operation has been extremely effective in this case, but the U.S. and its allies will not always be so well-positioned to glean the requisite intelligence and take offensive action. With sufficient talent, a cell of motivated actors could easily surpass the capabilities ISIS has demonstrated thus far.