From WikiLeaks





“ The use of chemical weapons by US forces was explicitly banned by President Gerald Ford in 1975 after CS gas [tear gas] had been repeatedly used in Vietnam to smoke out enemy soldiers and then kill them as they ran away. Britain would be in a particularly sensitive position if the US used the weapons as it drafted the convention and is still seen internationally as its most important guardian. The [UK] Foreign Office [Minister of State, Mike O'Brien] said: "All state parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention have undertaken not to use any toxic chemical or its precursor, including riot-control agents. This applies in any armed conflict." [1] „ — US Prepares to Use Toxic Gases in Iraq, The Independent (London), March 2, 2003

The M33A1 bulk CS chemical dispenser, 21 of which appear together with their M254 high pressure loading kits in the leaked U.S weapons list for Iraq

JULIAN ASSANGE (julian@wikileaks.org, investigations editor)

November 8, 2007

The United States has at least 2,386 "non-lethal" chemical weapons deployed in Iraq. The items appear in a spectacular 2,000 page battle planning leak obtained by government transparency group Wikileaks. The items are labeled under the military's own NATO supply classification Chemical weapons and equipment.

In the weeks prior to the March 19, 2003 commencement of the Iraq war, the United States received a widely reported rebuke from its primary coalition partner, the United Kingdom, over statements by the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggesting that the US would use CS gas for "flush out" operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Subsequently Washington has been quiet about whether it has deployed CS gas and other chemical weapons or not. [2]

The use of chemical weapons such as CS gas for military operations is illegal. The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997, drafted by the United Kingdom and ratified by the United States, declares “Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare”. Permissible uses are restricted to "law enforcement including domestic riot control."

Riot control agents, according to former Clinton Administration National Security Council analyst Elisa D. Harris, speaking to the New York Times, are cited explicitly because they have a history of escalating misuse leading into uncontrolled chemical warfare. They are given special treatment under the convention in a number of ways. They are uniquely and explicitly:

defined (Art. II.7), prohibited for use as a method of warfare (Art. I.5), required to be declared (Art. III.1(e)), cited in Art. X.8(b) on investigation and assistance if used against a State Party, and permitted for a purpose not prohibited by the Convention, namely, “law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes” (Art. II.9(d))

[3]

Most items on the Chemical weapons and equipment list were registered via the US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, 5183 Blackhawk Rd, Gunpowder, Maryland. [4]

There is the M33A1, as pictured above, a high pressure backpack CS/CR gas or liquid dispenser and the M254, its high pressure loading kit. On April 11, 2003 the US military TACOM contracting office put out a tender solicitation for 75 to 225 units. [5]

The most numerous item on the chemical weapons equipment list is a vehicle mounted gas canister launcher, the "DISCHARGER GRSCL XM7", used to launch 66mm smoke and CS gas grenades. The split between smoke and CS gas usage cannot be determined as the list does not cover expendables such as munitions.[6]

Similarly regular field artillery or grenade launchers may be used to launch CS gas or other chemical weapons shells, and there are references to items as the L96A1 CS grenade in training literature on US Army websites[7] , but the list would not cover these cases. Prior to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the US produced a GB (sarin) binary nerve agent weapon, the M687 projectile (a 155-mm artillery shell), and was in the late stages of development of two other binary weapons when its known offensive chemical warfare program was terminated. [8]

N otable units with purely chemical weapons

The most commonly deployed weapon classified under 1040 - Chemical weapons and equipment is the "DISCHARGER GRSL XM7" a vehicle mounted grenade launcher. Since this can be used with smoke or CS gas grenades we consider those units carrying purely CS gas weapons.

M ilitary Police (MP)

It is of interest that US MP units carry large quantities of pure CS gas weapons. For instance, the 144th carries 13 pure CS gas dispensers, not including its 34 XM7 smoke/CS gas grenade launchers. If these weapons are used to disperse gatherings of Iraqi civilians then we must ask to what extent US soldiers in Iraq are suppressing legitimate political dissent or undermining the just purview of the national government of Iraq.

If CS gas weapons are not being used to suppress protests or other gatherings ("riot control", but clearly not domestic) then we must ask what purpose these weapons are for given that riot control agents are prohibited for use as a method of warfare under the Chemical Weapons Convention (1997).

N on-policing units using purely CS gas weapons

If we exclude military police units and "dual use" weapons like the XM7 & FN303, we are left with a number of combat units equipped with purely CS gas weapons.

The following information suggests that the United States has breached the Chemical Weapons Convention by employing riot control agents not only for non-domestic riot control, but as a method of warfare. In particular, the M33A1, pictured at the start of this article, is ideally suited to offensive urban "flush out" operations but with its full body suit has limited defensive application.

C onclusion

The extensive provisioning of CS gas by the United State to troops in Iraq appears appears to undermine the Chemical Weapons Convention.

S tory development notes for journalists

The attention given to the US chemical weapons interpretation grab in 2003 a indicates strong public interest. In summary, the US via Rumsfeld -- a long term opponent of the CWC -- made noises about wanting to use CW in combat operations and was quickly smacked down to boldness only on border cases surrounding the 'law enforcement' exception (using it for extraordinary rendition flights and other detainee operations). The US has since been conspicuously quiet, probably in-order not to inflame the UK, who drew up the CWC. The situation was left "up in the air" as far as the public record is concerned, not, as far as I can determine, because of a lack of public interest, but because the war intervened before there was a settled public position.

How the story unfolds will be largely dependent on what mistakes the state department and the mod make in their public responses and how much the story is the leaking itself ("digital mutiny by whistleblower soldiers").

The 2005 white phosphorus allegations, Italian media ones at that, over the 2004 Fallujah assault saw extended public response that was a combination of reporting of a J'accuse against a liberal enemy and public sensitivity to chemical weapons hypocrisy after protracted US WMD hype (weak in the white phosphorus case, since it was used to burn, rather than poison people, which is not covered by the CWC, but the potential for CW violating uses of white phosphorus was enough get interest) but most of all an official denial.. later followed by a qualified recant.

For the CS gas CW weapons, the leak and a few commentators quotes can be framed, psychologically, as the J'accuse event.

The US and the MoD are in a difficult position in making public statements. MoD is either going to have to go with its earlier statements, in which case the US is giving it the finger, or look like it is prevaricating or submissive. The CWC is black and white about CS/OC use in combat -- it is absolutely illegal. The weapons deployments revealed by the leak and 2003 statements are indicative of the US attempting to smash a truck through the spirit, and many say the letter of the CWC CS gas exemption provisions ("law enforcement and 'domestic' riot control"). These and other complexities in the CWC make any US response torturous and liable to gaffs. There are three possible replies:

1) "Yes -- using it in combat". Clear criminality. I don't think they'll admit this, but there is a chance of a screw up. Regardless, there are plenty of notables who will hammer them for an allegation of combat use and say it is illegal, including under domestic US law. Easy to start a fight here and report it.

2) "No -- not using CW at all". A reversal of the 2003 position, unsustainable and likely to result in an embarrassing retraction. There is a possibility of 'We equipped troops with CS/OC weapons, but deny ever employing them'. I doubt this statement will be made, since a single use falsifies it. The CWC also requires that use and possession is reported to the OPWC

3) "Use only for 'law enforcement and riot control' operations in Iraq and Afghanistan". This is the most probable reply, but is a huge can of worms.

Let us look in detail at this last, most probable, unfolding:

The leak reveals CS only weapons in the hands of combat units. The CWC gives provision for governments to possess CWCs for 'law enforcement and DOMESTIC riot control'. Elsewhere the CWC outlaws military use of 'toxic' chemicals entirely, preventing the military using CS/OC for military law enforcement, and although the US dissents from this interpretation, there are plenty of quotable sources who say the US is incorrect. Following earlier statements by Rumsfeld, the US will likely state that it is only using CS/OC in iraq on prisoners and transporting prisoners on airplanes. Torturous prevarication is needed to prevent the following claims:

a) planned illegality -- leak shows several combat troops have the weapons

b) deviousness and giving the finger to the UK -- 'law enforcement and domestic riot control' is clearly aimed at home-country use.

c) crushing political dissent -- what riots are they suppressing in iraq?

d) undermining the just preserve of the Iraqi national government. "law enforcement and domestic riot control" is the Iraqi government's function. So either the iraqi government is not functional (a US failure) or it is being undermined in its policing activities.

e) earlier US claims about (wanting to) use CS gas in prisons and transportation of can be put to Washington. Either they will claim to have aborted this policy (why? more news..), knocking out an excuse for possession, or they'll agree or prevaricate. The latter cases are a PR disaster, because they combine public resonances of previous prevarications about chemical weapons with extraordinary rendition and the conduct of the US military in running prisons such as Abu Grahib and Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) aka 'Gitmo'...

C omment from Edmond Hammond, Director of the sunshine-project.org

The US has an idiosyncratic interpretation of the CWC as it apples to RCAs. It also has an idiosyncratic definition of RCA, different tha the CWC's The governing rules are in Executive Order 11850, which was signed by Gerald Ford in the backlash from US use of CS in Vietnam (as a lethal force multiplier). EO11850 is not consistent with the CWC but was nevertheless reaffirmed at the time of US ratification of the CWC. EO11850 restricts US military use of RCAs and essentially requires the authorization of the President or, in certain circumstances, the Secretary of Defense. I actually FOIAed for any such authorizations a few years ago. Surprise.... no response!

The kinds of uses foreseen in EO11850 were to protect nuclear weapons (this is 70s ... image protesting Filipinos getting unruly at Subic Bay, or some crazy hardcore West German protestors trying an unarmed assault on a US nuke) and downed pilot rescue; but the language is squishy.

http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr070203.html

It's up for argument about how sensitive the US CS data is (I would say there is no reason for it to be secret); but it would likely be held in close proximity to stuff that truly is extremely sensitive. OPCW has all sorts of data on location and quantity and security measures for undestroyed Russian, US, South Korean, and other chemical munitions (VX, Sarin, et cet.). As well as all sorts of commercial data. They would take information security extremely seriously. I have no sympathy for the companies; but OPCW does know some things that are probably best left in as few hands as possible. Also, leaks from OPCW might provide ammunition for the bad guys who would like to weaken the treaty regime.

The US declarations to the OPCW, however, would not only be in The Hague. They would of course be in Washington too...

EH

L ist of chemical weapons and the U.S units employing them in Iraq

The data here was extracted extracted from the original Iraq_OIF_Property_List.csv, which may be consulted for additional confirmation.

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