Putin Cares About Russia’s Presidential Election: You Should Too

Timothy Frye

Columbia University and Higher School of Economics, Moscow

[792 words]

On March 18th voters in Russia will elect a President and we have a very good idea of who will win. With the winner known in advance critics have dismissed the elections as a mere attempt to demonstrate President Putin’s political power. But that is precisely the point. Non-democratic elections like Russia’s are important not for choosing a ruler, but for providing a rare public signal that potential rivals can use to gauge the president’s power. Those who might challenge Putin’s rule will surely be scrutinizing the election results for signs of weakness even as they know he will win.

Autocrats do lose elections but rarely. Since 1946, 51 autocratic parties have lost rigged elections. Far more often, rulers in non-democracies like Russia lose power via challengers from within the elite. More than 60 percent of autocrats have lost power via various forms of coups by formerly loyal elites since 1946. Autocratic rulers also face challenges from the mass public via street protests and few topics enrage the Kremlin more than the possibility of a so-called “Colored Revolution” in Moscow.

Elections under autocracy always involve a degree of fraud and coercion, but if voters are willing to go to the polls and vote for the incumbent in large numbers without a great deal of coercion or electoral fraud, then potential challengers among the elite and mass public will think twice about challenging the leader. Large and more or less “honest” margins of victory send a strong signal to potential rivals that their efforts to depose the ruler will be futile.

However, if vote totals are seen as wholly fraudulent, or turnout is obtained via coercion, even an impressive victory may signal to potential challengers among the elite and the mass public that the incumbent is actually not very popular. Elections under autocracies like Russia contain an inherent dilemma. Fraudulent elections make it easier for the autocrat to win, but higher levels of fraud also make it harder for the autocrat to convince potential rivals and opposition leaders that he is actually popular. After all, if he is so beloved, then why does he need so much fraud?

In the upcoming election, the Kremlin is seeking a so-called 70/70 solution in which President Putin receives 70 percent of the vote with 70 percent voter turnout. Higher figures may be seen as not credible, while lower figures may signal vulnerability. A seventy percent vote share for Putin is within sight as opposition voters will likely split their ballots among the seven other fringe candidates. The most outspoken opposition politician in Russia — the anti-corruption activist Aleksei Navalny — was barred from running for the Presidency on a legal technicality that many see as politically motivated.

Hitting the 70 percent turnout target can be complicated because regional officials have been known to inflate their vote totals for Putin because they compete for his affection. Uncoordinated ballot stuffing by regional governors can create a herding effect of “too many” votes for the Kremlin. On the other hand, the level of apathy among the public toward this election is high and the regime may struggle to gain 70 percent turnout without significant ballot box stuffing. Voter turnout in parliament elections in September 2016 was just 48 percent and turnout in Russia’s municipal elections in September 2017 was much lower than usual. In Moscow’s municipal elections of last fall only 12 percent of voters bothered to vote.

Even though President Putin has high approval ratings, faces an opposition in disarray, and no serious political rivals, the Kremlin has undertaken a massive mobilization campaign to support Putin’s re-election. From cuddly grandmas rapping a get out the vote ad, to massive pressure on employers to turn out their workers to vote, to scheduling the election on the 4 year anniversary of the annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin is pulling out all the stops for the incumbent.

Putin is in no great immediate danger, but given Russia’s stagnant economy, a good bit of Putin-fatigue after 18 years in power, and increasing restrictions on political activity, the Kremlin is clearly uneasy about the upcoming election. And it should be. Many have hinted that Putin’s next six-year term will be his last and that he will step down in keeping with the constitutional ban on holding office for three consecutive terms. But Putin’s ability to impose his will on policy, to choose a successor, or even to stay in power for the full six-year term may be shaped by his ability to demonstrate his power in an election that he is sure to win. Rather than dismissing these elections as trivial because we know Putin will win, we should be paying attention to how he does it.