The classified report into Chinese government intelligence and interference operations in Australia – what has become known as the Garnaut-ASIO report – is a case in point. Undoubtedly there are sources and methods used in the production of this report that have enduring value and require protection.

On the other hand, much of the material in this report is not only a call to action, but also part of the solution.

Transparency required

First, some of this information could greatly inform Australian debate on the issue of Chinese interference. The current debate is devoid of common facts such that each side of the argument starts with entrenched philosophical positions and then assembles an army of supporting facts. Transparency would allow allegations to be aired, countered, and assessed.

Second, transparency would not only allow Australians to determine what is acceptable influence and what is not. Where do the boundaries between soft power, sharp power and illegal interference lie? These are tricky issues to ponder in the absence of concrete examples.

The discussion triggered by the release of this information would allow us to communicate clearly to the Chinese government where our boundaries lie. Building international business and cultural relationships is desirable, and a clearer delineation of limits would help keep our relationship with China within acceptable bounds.

Transparency has consistently been promoted as one of the solutions to Chinese interference, including by Garnaut, and Western Australian MP Andrew Hastie's use of parliamentary privilege to reveal information on Chinese interference implies that he agrees. Assessing the positive value in releasing intelligence is part of the cost-benefit equation that is not done in the intelligence community, nor should it be – the intelligence community can only be strong advocates for protecting sources. But government as a whole should take a positive decision on when and how to invest the effort to reveal information when possible.

And this isn't a binary decision about publishing everything and burning all our sources. There are many shades of grey that would allow much of the report to be released with redaction or light obfuscations so that we could get the greatest transparency for the least loss of capability.

This report illustrates the tension that lies in the use of secret intelligence. Intelligence is meant to inform action, yet sometimes the resulting action reveals the unique source of intelligence such that the intelligence source is lost. The benefit of action must be weighed against the ongoing value of a secret source. Sometimes, an ongoing source of intelligence is so valuable the possibility of loss prevents action been taken.

During the Cold War, for example, Soviet bugging of the US embassy in Moscow seems to have been too valuable to jeopardise. A US Department of State report assessing the damage stated that Soviet intelligence had the ability to read "most, if not all, of our telegraphic messages between Washington and Moscow and between Washington and posts in Eastern Europe". Despite this the report found that "an extensive review of major crises and negotiations over the past 12 years does not provide evidence that the Soviets made use of knowledge thus gained to the detriment of our interests". And further "An explanation for this paradox may be that the Soviets valued the source far more than the use of any particular piece of information they got from it. In order to keep us from discovering their intelligence coup the Soviets appear to have sacrificed many of the specific gains they might have made, and eschewed actions that might have given them away."

Tom Uren is a visiting fellow in the International Cyber Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, on secondment from the Department of Defence. The views above reflect his own opinions.