IRAN’S LEADERS HAVE long had immodest ambitions in the Middle East, pining for the respect of the neighbours who once conquered and converted them and even dreaming of leading a pan-Islamic alliance, however unlikely. In recent decades they have been exporting their revolution, propelled by national pride and an urge to pass on lessons from the long road to independence, but also driven by a deep fear that they—Shia Persians facing mostly Sunni Arabs—are not so much independent as alone in a hostile region. In the 1980s the Islamic Republic set out to cultivate friends in Arab countries after bloodily thwarting an invasion by Iraq. In Syria (pictured above) it became the main sponsor of the Assad regime after the collapse of the country’s traditional patron, the Soviet Union. In Lebanon the Islamic Republic nurtured the Hizbullah militia which became the dominant political force there and, with support from Tehran, repeatedly gave Israel a bloody nose. Iran also sponsored Hamas, the most successful of the Palestinian groups warring with Israel. Support for the fight against the Jewish state won Iran plaudits in the wider Arab world.

In the aftermath of 9/11, America, Iran’s arch enemy, presented it with two gifts by removing regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan that were hostile to both of them. Revolutionary guards made sure that Saddam and the Taliban were succeeded by Iranian allies. They also acquired friends in places like Sudan and elsewhere in Africa. Iran’s influence grew steadily.

Sunni neighbours worried about a “Shia crescent” stretching from Tehran via Baghdad and Damascus to Beirut. Long-standing rivals, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, drew attention to Iran’s nuclear programme and suggested military action to destroy it. But after getting mired in Iraq, America lost interest and eventually pulled out in 2011. The Islamic Republic never looked mightier.

Spring’s false promise

When the Arab spring began in December 2010, it seemed like a boon at first. Arab youths appeared to be following Iran’s script, rising up against secular rulers. The Muslim Brothers that were gaining ground across the region were quasi-allies of Iran. The country’s Sunni rivals became alarmed. But before long the Arab spring went as wrong for Iran as it did for almost everyone else. The protesting youths had no interest in backward-looking Islamism and anti-Western sloganeering. The Iranian protests of 2009 were among their models and Facebook was their friend. The Muslim Brothers were soon outgunned by harder sorts who target Shias as unbelievers.

The greatest calamity awaited Iran in Syria. Thanks in part to Iranian aid the regime there did not fall, but Bashar Assad, the president, did not regain his footing either. Vicious fighting destroyed the country, and the Islamic Republic’s stature arguably suffered more damage than if he had fallen swiftly.

Support for the slaughter of Syrian rebels destroyed much of the goodwill Iran had painstakingly garnered among ordinary Arabs over decades. By drafting in Hizbullah to fight for the Assad regime, Iran also damaged the Shia militia’s popularity. And Iran lost its close relationship with Hamas, which had been headquartered in Syria but refused to support its hosts. In evident disgust, and perhaps sensing Iranian weakness, Hamas moved to Qatar, into the arms of a new sponsor.

All the while Iran spent billions of dollars propping up the Assad regime, turning public opinion at home against the war. University students openly grumble about the waste of money as tuition fees rise. “How do you say ‘quagmire’ in Farsi?” asked an American website last year, suggesting that Syria could be “Iran’s Vietnam”.

After three years of trying and failing to defeat the insurgency in Syria, another Iranian ally has now fallen victim to it. Hardline Salafi rebels who have made a habit of beheading Western hostages this year swept across the border into parts of Iraq and declared a Sunni “Islamic State” (IS). This damaged the Iran-friendly government in Baghdad and once again brought hostile forces close to Iran’s borders—both Salafists and Americans.

After decades of exporting revolution, Iranian generals are learning a new term: “blowback”. If Iran had aided rather than hindered America’s campaign against al-Qaeda insurgents in Iraq a decade ago, it would not have to worry about those same militants occupying the country’s north-west now. It had originally handed weapons to some of them to kill Americans.

Gone is the talk of a Shia crescent. Now Iranians worry about being surrounded by a “Salafi circle”, bearing in mind the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. The growing Shia-Sunni divide in the region, fuelled in part by Iran’s paramilitary efforts, is a greater threat to it in the long run than to the Sunni majority.

Once again Iran is almost friendless. Even China, Iran’s biggest oil customer but no fan of separatist insurgencies, voted for sanctions against Iran at the UN. In August Sudan expelled an Iranian diplomat and closed a cultural centre. An Iranian agent in Nigeria, where a Sunni insurgency rages in the north-east, has been jailed for arms-smuggling.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s vision of Iran as leading Muslims against the West is out of date. Since Saudi Arabia and Egypt have become noticeably less friendly with America, they can no longer be depicted as stooges. An ideological construct is crumbling. As the Iranian scholar Mohammad Tabaar put it, “There was a time when Iran would rely on its revolutionary ideology to project power. Today, Iran uses its power to project ideology.”

Iran must now co-operate with powers in the region that are interested in preserving the status quo, as it itself has become

Even more worryingly for Iran, it is not immune to the extremist bug that has befallen its Sunni neighbours. Independent Shia extremism, once unknown, is on the rise. Based outside Iran, radical Shia satellite TV channels such as Fadak preach war against the Islamic Republic, which they regard as insufficiently fervent. Hizbullah in Lebanon, increasingly enmeshed in the compromise-laden business of government, faces similar attacks. Intra-sect fighting could undermine Iran’s historic claim to be the Shias’ leader.

Iran must now co-operate with powers in the region that are interested in preserving the status quo, as it itself has become, despite the revolutionary rhetoric. Overstretched and broke, it can no longer handle its commitments. Engagement with rivals would suit its interests, now more closely aligned with theirs.

The Rohani government has taken first tentative steps to reach out to neighbours, not least following the rise of IS, which has altered the geopolitical calculus for everyone. Officials have held talks with the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia. Joint military operations may be some way off, but informal co-ordination between once hostile forces is already in progress in Iraq. In the country’s north, American jets have cleared the way for Iranian-controlled militias. America and Iran are also accommodating each other in Baghdad’s corridors of power. At American insistence, Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s highly divisive prime minister, was forced to step down this summer by his patron, Iran, and replaced by someone less sectarian.

International relations in the Middle East still involve fierce competition for influence. Deep chasms remain. But the big powers know that the most likely solution to their multiple conflicts is a brokered peace, along the lines of the one that ended the Lebanese civil war in 1990. Iran has already published a plan for a “political solution” in Syria. It is not especially attractive, yet it points the way forward.

In the end, the likelihood of detente hinges on what happens in the nuclear negotiations. A deal with the West on its own would not calm the region down. Saudi Arabia and Iran will continue to view each other with mutual suspicion. But a deal would remove the threat of a military attack by Israel and America on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, and of the inevitable retaliation, which has hung over the region for years.

If such a deal can be reached, Iran stands to regain stature over time. America would draw down troops in the Gulf in due course—one of the prizes that is rarely acknowledged. Until 1986 America had almost no presence along the Iranian shore. Today 35,000 troops sit on Gulf bases. It is conceivable—even likely—that the majority of them will leave if the situation stabilises, given defence cuts in Washington, America’s “pivot to Asia” and the shale-gas boom which makes the country less dependent on energy from the Middle East.

The American government has already begun to move away from unquestioningly backing traditional Arab allies and is shifting towards a balance-of-power policy. If Iran can lure America farther down this path, it stands to reap big benefits.

Next in our special report on Iran:





Prospects: We shall overcome, maybe

(8/8)