The difference between Pakistan and India is this: Pakistani strategy is decided by the army, which uses civilian governments to send out dovish messages even while deciding the stance on the border without civilian intervention. In India, civilian government is deciding strategy (no doubt, with military inputs) both on the diplomatic front and on the border.

India-Pakistan ties are back to normal - that is, the usual state of semi-peace and semi-war. That this is being interpreted in political and media circles as a defeat for Narendra Modi's recalibration of Pakistan policy to resume talks shows how little people understand strategy.

The correct Indian strategy against Pakistan will always have to be multi-faceted - realistic dialogue, backed by tough action and aggressive retaliation on the ground, when required. Both peace talk and war-like actions are critical to strategy. We do not seem to understand that war and peace go together, not separately. The readiness to wage peace, when the time is opportune, and the readiness to wage war, when required, is what makes for successful strategy. One without the other will lead to failure.

Indian policymakers, unfortunately, have never understood the importance of the iron fist in a velvet glove. We have let strategy be decided by public emotion or political peace fantasies, leading to regular failure. This is why we have lurched from extraordinary optimism when peace talks appear to be heading somewhere (Shimla, Lahore, and last May), and undiluted anger when Pakistani perfidy becomes visible (this usually follows the first).

To those who think that India's strategy should only focus on Pakistan's perfidy and nothing else, the simple point is this: this response, too, is driven by anger. It is not effective. Those who say we should not engage Pakistan at all, should ask themselves this: if this policy is right for Pakistan, why don't they apply this logic to China, India's bigger enemy and more potent threat to our long-term territorial and strategic interests? But all analysts steadfastly, without any fear of contradiction, maintain that we should both engage China and be prepared to defend our borders with it.

The logic of engagement and tough ground postures on the border with Pakistan is stronger for another reason: we cannot have a Pakistan strategy that is separate from our China strategy. What we are up against is a Sino-Pak joint strategic gameplan where Pakistan will take on India from the west while China will start pressuring us from the east (Myanmar, Arunachal).

There is huge strategic convergence between Pakistan's and China's postures towards India right now because both are "greedy" powers that want the territorial status quo with India altered without any concessions on their part. Pakistan wants to keep PoK and wrest a bit of Muslim Kashmir, and China wants to keep China-occupied Kashmir and grab a piece of Arunachal, especially Tawang. These are problems left behind by our mistakes in 1948, and China's in 1962. In 1948, we failed to keep the war going in Kashmir long enough to recapture PoK (we possibly needed another month or two to finish the job), and China made the mistake of retreating from large parts of our north-east due to the onset of winter and its own doubts about its ability to hold on. It now wants to make up for that lapse, now that it has the military and economic capacity to do so. Tawang is key to final Chinese control of Tibet.

This convergence of Sino-Pak territorial interests makes it vital for us to work both prongs of dialogue and defence capability simultaneously. We need to carry this strategy forward till we are in a position to deter both our enemies with the development of economic and military strength.

The Chinese are trying to do exactly that with Pakistan. They are planning to build a $40 billion economic corridor to ensure that Pakistan is strengthened economically and strategically to counter India - and to slow down our economic and military renewal process. This is an economic-cum-military race we cannot afford to lose.

So, the Modi government is right to work on both axes - dialogue and determined military responses to cross-border provocations. That Pakistan is busy testing our determination so soon after Ufa should come as no surprise. It was to happen and has happened.

The difference between Pakistan and India is this: Pakistani strategy is decided by the army, which uses civilian governments to send out dovish messages even while deciding the stance on the border without civilian intervention. In India, civilian government is deciding strategy (no doubt, with military inputs) both on the diplomatic front and on the border. Till recently we had a half-baked non-strategy decided by hope or anger or despair with Pakistan.

Manmohan Singh had the right idea on engaging Pakistan, but the wrong one on not ever responding to border provocations. Under Modi and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, the ground response is being made robust - and as long as talk and military action below the threshold of war continue consistently, Pakistan will get the message. The only danger is this government too will behave emotionally to Pakistani provocations by suspending talks - as we did last year. We cannot afford to again be so inconsistent. Then we are back to square one - that is, a situation of zero strategy, where our enemies have the initiative and we are only reactive.

The fact that Pakistan has felt it necessary to demolish the Ufa goodwill so quickly is proof that the dual-strategy of dialogue-plus-military response is working. We need to stay the course.