By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Jul 8th 2016 20:26Z, last updated Saturday, May 27th 2017 16:56Z A Delta Airlines Airbus A320-200, registration N333NW performing flight DL-2845 from Minneapolis,MN to Rapid City Regional Airport,SD (USA) with 130 passengers, was on approach to Rapid City Regional Airport's [ICAO: KRAP] runway 14 but aligned with Rapid City's Ellsworth Air Force Base's runway 13 and landed safely on the runway of the Air Force Base.



The aircraft remained on the ground for about 2.5 hours, then performed the short hop of about 6nm from Ellsworth [KRCA] to Regional Airport.



The NTSB announced they are investigating the occurrence, when the A320 landed at Ellsworth AFB instead of Rapid City Regional Airport.



The airline confirmed their aircraft mistakenly landed at Ellsworth Air Force Base. The aircraft later positioned to Regional Airport arriving there with a delay of 3:10 hours. The crew has been suspended pending internal investigation by Delta and pending investigation by NTSB.



On May 27th 2017 the NTSB released their final report concluding the probable cause of the incident was:



The flight crew's misidentification of the desired landing runway due to excess altitude requiring an extended downwind, and failure to use all available navigation information.



The NTSB reported that the flight crew had briefed for an approach to Rapid City's runway 32, however, the wind shifted and favoured runway 14, which on the other hand required more track miles to lose altitude, the crew discussed the necessity to descend more rapidly. The aircraft was not altitude restricted by ATC. The aircraft was vectored onto downwind about 9nm abeam the Rapid City Regional Aerodrome at 12,000 feet (aerodrome elevation at 3,200 feet), with an estimated remaining flying distance of 15-18nm the aircraft was thus well above the usual 300 feet/nm descent. The controller noticed the aircraft was high and fast on approach.



The captain called the airport in sight, at that point the Regional Aerodrome was at their 8 o'clock position and Ellsworth Air Base at their 10 o'clock position, and instructed gear down and flaps one configuring the aircraft for a more expeditious descent. The NTSB analysed that it was likely the captain was actually looking at Ellsworth Air Base.



A short time later ATC provided a vector for the base leg, the crew however requested to extend the downwind due to high altitude, which ATC approved.



Descending through 5800 feet the crew accepted a base vector, at that time about 5.5nm north of Ellsworth and about 12 north of Regional (RAP). The NTSB analysed that this was consistent with the RNP14 Procedure into Regional, but required a steeper descent into Ellsworth (RCA).



ATC cleared the flight for "visual approach runway one-four. Use caution for Ellsworth Air Force Base located six miles northwest of Rapid City Regional." The NTSB wrote: "During interviews, the crew stated they misheard the controller's warning for the typical position advisory given on an instrument approach, and it supported their idea that the correct landing runway was 6 miles away. The FO did query the Captain if he had the right airport in sight, who expressed some uncertainty. Both crewmembers had little to no experience flying into either RAP or RCA, however, they did not verify their position to the desired landing runway using either the automation, or by querying ATC; and switched off the autopilot and Flight Directors removing possible cues as to their position related to RAP."



The NTSB concluded the report:



At the time ATC cleared the flight for the visual approach the airplane was positioned on the final approach course of the RNAV14 approach, and at a reasonable altitude for that approach, therefore, there was no immediate indication to ATC that the crew had identified the wrong airport.



Shortly after, the captain increased the descent rate as high as 1,200 feet per minute, resulting in an unstable approach as he was focused on the wrong landing runway. The crew realized the mistake just prior to touchdown, but considered it was safer to complete the landing at that point.



Metars:

KRAP 080352Z 24005KT 10SM CLR 18/08 A3001 RMK AO2 SLP144 T01780083

KRAP 080252Z 12003KT 10SM CLR 19/10 A2998 RMK AO2 SLP135 T01890100 53007

KRAP 080152Z 15003KT 10SM CLR 22/11 A2997 RMK AO2 SLP130 T02220106

KRAP 080052Z 17003KT 10SM CLR 24/08 A2996 RMK AO2 SLP125 T02440078

KRAP 072352Z VRB04KT 10SM CLR 24/08 A2996 RMK AO2 SLP125 T02440078 10256 20217 58006

KRAP 072252Z 05004KT 10SM CLR 25/07 A2997 RMK AO2 SLP127 T02500072

KRAP 072152Z VRB05KT 10SM CLR 26/08 A2997 RMK AO2 SLP127 T02560078



http://flightaware.com/live/flight/DAL2845/history/20160708/0111Z/KMSP/KRAP



Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):







