In December 2017, President Trump after months of problems and aggravation demanded that all FBI agents from top down undergo polygraph tests.

To that end, Senator Grassley and others on the Senate Judiciary Committee sent a letter to the DoJ OIG for them to investigate and come to some conclusion to put the issue to rest. What OIG found puts a big fat “FAIL” on the FBI report card instead.

Turns out that the President was right — AGAIN.

OIG – Inspector General Horowitz’s Report to Congress

released March 2018

Polygraphs required as part of FBI agents employment

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a vital mission — to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats and to respond to criminal threats facing the country. This mission demands that the FBI be vigilant in its stewardship of sensitive information, systems, and spaces. The FBI uses polygraph examinations as one of many tools to assess whether job applicants and employees pose a national security risk or are unsuitable for FBI employment.

Robert Philip Hanssen, a former FBI agent, was arrested for spying for the Soviet and Russian intelligence services against the United States for 22 years from 1979 to 2001. He is currently serving 15 consecutive life sentences in a federal supermax prison.

After the arrest of Hanssen for espionage in 2001, the FBI implemented its Personnel Security Polygraph program. Among other things, the program requires FBI employees with access to sensitive national security information, systems, or FBI spaces where such information and systems are present to pass a polygraph examination within a specified period.

The problem with polygraphs are they are not accurate on the point of lying. Any who are accomplished at lying can “justify” their answers enough to fool a test. So in general, polygraphs only help provide “tells” that then alert to further investigative needs. It takes a trained polygraph expert administering the test and with a partner observing the telling signs of the subject during the test to make any kind of reasonably sound assessment.

It may also have ended up being the only criteria in the case of a few that ended a possible career for promising agents. Instead of disciplining employees for failing polygraphs, the FBI was found to have simply let them go without investigating the test results and their histories. Instead they accused the agent of using “countermeasures”to skew test results and let them go.

“Accusing a test subject of using countermeasures is a method of avoiding the requirement to find any independent evidence of misconduct and base an adverse decision solely on the polygraph process,” Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) wrote to the Justice Department’s inspector general. Firing an employee for allegedly using a countermeasure is arguably even more subjective than firing the person for failing a polygraph. Unlike polygraph results, which have some scientific basis, there is no physiological indicator to show that somebody is using a countermeasure.

There is also the typical governmental red tape and delay of investigation to deal with. If an agent fails the test, it could be months or years before the person is investigated during which time they could have been quite destructive in their spying or achieving their goals.

Finally, the use of polygraphs by a “trained” spy means little since training for agents includes ways to pass polygraphs. What it does do is provide a “tell” of possible reasons to continue investigating someone, especially someone who isn’t that good at lying. Still it is one tool in a list of many that gives some measure of control as long as it is administered and evaluated like any other test as only part of a whole.

What was reviewed

OIG analyzed FBI processes for handling alleged deception or countermeasures in FBI applicant and employee polygraph examinations

Using fiscal years 2014 through 2016;

Evaluating the FBI’s process for adjudicating unresolved results requiring additional action to resolve discrepancies or security concerns. including any subsequent adverse personnel actions in cases for which the FBI determined that an employee had used countermeasures or in which deception was indicated;

Interviewing FBI personnel, personnel from other U.S. Department of Justice components, federal agencies, and members of the U.S. Intelligence Community; and,

Conducting an in-depth review of a sample of 90 case files of investigations and adjudications of unresolved polygraph results for 12 FBI job applicants and 78 FBI employees.

Their conclusions

Poor use of standardized procedures: The FBI’s process for investigating and adjudicating unresolved polygraph results varied greatly across the cases examined. In analyzing the timeliness of 53 of the 78 employee cases in the sample and found that the 53 investigations took between 9 to 940 days to complete and that the corresponding adjudicative decision process took between 1 and 613 days.

Inconsistent use of policies: The FBI did not always comply with its own policy governing employee access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, classified national intelligence information concerning or derived from sensitive intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes, which is to be handled exclusively within formal access control systems established by the Director of National Intelligence.

Timeliness of follow-up and access to classified information: There were instances in which employees unable to pass multiple polygraph examinations were allowed to retain access to sensitive information, systems, and spaces for extended periods of time without required risk assessments — potentially posing a security risk to the FBI.

Communications between government resources: Investigations of unresolved polygraph results did not always draw on all sources of FBI information. Communication issues were identified between the FBI’s Analysis and Investigations Unit, which investigates and makes adjudicative recommendations on employee polygraph results, and other FBI personnel security stakeholders.

Thoroughness in resolving: There were also concerns about the AIU’s thoroughness in leveraging all relevant FBI information during its investigations.

These issues prevent the AIU from consistently producing thorough, efficient investigations.

Source – OIG Report

–00–

This explains a lot.

A spy or plant’s wet dream obviously. No wonder it was so easy for the management and agents of the FBI to fall into disarray and become a political arm for Obama. No wonder the Awans were allowed to operate for so long and have as yet not really been brought to justice on charges of spying. How many others could be lingering is the question that needs answered.

From the OIG analysis, it appears there may be too many sloppy or intentional cases where good agents or aspiring agents have been dropped while “plants” were allowed to continue or simply slipped through the system.

It also places testimony of Comey and others like Clapper in a very bad light when they were under oath on procedures for “handling classified information” concerning Clinton and other issues in front of Congress.

Upper enforcement management from FBI to CIA knew these were issues but were avoiding by refusing to answer, employing countermeasures themselves to avoid telling the truth, or covering up–thereby perjuring themselves or allowing “operatives” the freedom to continue with their agendas.

YES, Trump is right.

All government agents, appointees, and congressional members not just FBI should be required to undergo a current polygraph test by an independent group of experts when first entering office. If nothing else, have this “independent” group be under the OIG department so that they have greater control.

If it is determined that there may be “tells” of concern then have the subjects remanded to desk duty and limit all access to classified information until an investigation is done. Even then for congressional members who win re-elections, the same should be administered before they take their oath of office each time.

However, Congress should insist this be done within a 60 day window or have the person suspended without pay until the problem is resolved.

Who knew how hard draining the swamp was really going to be or what problems would finally see the light of day.

–Uriel–

Share this: Email

Facebook

Twitter

MeWe



Like this: Like Loading...