Social contract theory, broadly, is a methodology in political philosophy that attempts to ground the legitimacy of the state in a hypothetical (or perhaps literal) contract between the governed and government. However, such a methodology is flawed due to one of its fundamental presuppositions. Social contract theory assumes that the state is composed only of the government and human governed, however, there are a variety of non-human actors that are members of the state that are ignored in such a way that the methodology cannot account for.

To begin, it is necessary to flesh out the idea of what is meant by ‘members of the state.’ To be a member of the state is not simply to partake in the social contract, but to inhabit the geographical location of the state and generally be affected by the state’s actions. This definition can be taken to include not only humans, but non-human animals and even ecosystems.

Contracts in their most primitive form are based on consent; however, consent is an impossibility for the non-human members of the state. Consent is largely possible through language, and through commonly known forms of body language. I can consent to different relationships with other humans by either verbally entering into the/an agreement, or through a variety of non-verbal actions that can be taken to fulfill the same role. Non-verbal consent seemingly is possible through one’s ability to relate their own non-verbal acts to another’s and through this, deduce whether the act constitutes consent. In certain contexts, it may be possible for non-human animals to consent non-verbally. Consider something like taking a dog for a walk, through our actions we may convey our intentions to the dog and through their response we can reasonably assume the dog is consenting to this act. While non-verbal consent may be possible in simple situations, in complex scenarios such as social contracts, it is entirely unreasonable to assume that non-human animals could possibly consent. Thus, there is no possibility of including non-human animals (and perhaps non-sentient beings like ecosystems) in a social contract.

Despite this impossibility of consent, one may charge that we need not include non-human members of the state in the social contract – the social contract is only to include those who are affected and can possibly consent. This approach, however, also appears to have a fatal flaw. If we consider that the possibility of consent presumably only applies to adult humans, and not to non-adults. If we take the social contract in the sense that contracts are typically taken – that is, it applies only to those who partake in it – this generates the unintuitive result that individuals living in the state have no duties, obligations or restrictions as to how they can treat non-adults. Not only is this unintuitive in the sense that it is typically thought that stronger duties exist to children than to other adults due to their vulnerable nature, it also generates grotesque possibilities as to how children can be treated such as child-slavery and worse.

Given this precarious situation, social contract theorists may appeal to the idea that as former-children and parents, adults can consent to the social contract on behalf of their kin. This allows for consent as the adults presumably, through their upbringing have an idea of the sorts of things that are good for children that are required for consent, while also possessing the domain over their children that would allow for them to plausibly consent for them. However, to include children on this basis appears to be ad hoc. There does not appear to be a solid basis as to why we ought to consent for children and not for others, such as non-human animals and ecosystems. At most an appeal could be made to their likeness as potential adults, but again it is unclear why an arbitrary restriction to adults is reasonable when non-human animals are affected by the state just as much, if not more.

If this idea of other-consenting is taken seriously it is important to note how reliant it is on the idea that it is possible to know what is good for the other we consent for. In the case of children this may be possible as we are both former children and parents, but it becomes less plausible in the case of non-humans. The exists an epistemic barrier to knowing what is good for non-humans as our ability to see what really is good for these things is limited by our lack of knowledge, experience and imperfect science. So, if children are granted entrance into the social contract because they are affected, it seems plausible that we are obligated to do so for non-humans as well, although due to epistemic barriers, consent is impossible in this case.

While social contract theory has a rich history, that history has also been limited to hypothesizing in terms of a state consisting only of adults. This assumption is not only untrue, but a harmful one to make. There exists a variety of beings that are affected by state-relations, and seemingly they ought to be included in our considerations. The most intuitive notion relating to this is children, but it also seems they cannot be included, while also excluding non-humans in a non-ad hoc way. Further, due to the impossibilities of consent by non-humans, as well as for non-humans, it seems that there exists a methodological flaw in social contract theory that makes it implausible, once the historical presupposition of a restricted state consisting only of adults is exposed.