Venezuelan leaders have also been preparing for “asymmetrical” warfare for more than a decade. And there is no chance that countries in the region would participate in an effort to topple Mr. Maduro — Brazil has already stated as much.

There are few good options for addressing the crisis. But while the Maduro government has the upper hand inside Venezuela, two external forces are putting pressure on the regime.

First, the most significant countries in the Western Hemisphere — like Brazil, Colombia, the United States and most of the European Union — do not recognize the National Constituent Assembly, a body created by Mr. Maduro to rewrite the Constitution and tailor the government to fit his needs. Members of the body were elected in July, despite a boycott by the opposition, but the lack of international recognition has weakened it, and little has been accomplished in the past five months.

Second, the “debt sanctions” levied by the Trump administration that prohibit United States citizens or institutions from buying or issuing new Venezuelan debt have hamstrung the Maduro government’s ability to raise new funds.

These factors are bringing the Maduro government to the negotiation table in the Dominican Republic, where the government and opposition met last week after meeting twice in December. The government wants the opposition to facilitate the lifting of sanctions and enable international recognition — this gives the opposition significant leverage.

In addition to the recent debt sanctions, for almost three years the United States has had targeted sanctions on Venezuelan officials accused of human rights abuses or corruption. Versions of this sanctions regime have been adopted by Canada, Mexico and the European Union. The increasingly multilateral character of sanctions makes them more effective.

The United States and its partners need to avoid the temptation to broaden the scope of the sanctions. Widening economic sanctions to an oil embargo, for example, would further harm a population that is barely hanging on. And such a broadening of targeted sanctions, which are supposed to drive a wedge between those who are sanctioned and those who are not, would dull their effect: If almost everyone is sanctioned, the unity of the Maduro government would be reinforced.