Chain of events

Unless otherwise noted, the following summary of the events of 21 February 2005 is based on information contained within the Esplin report.

At the domestic terminal

07:12 — the Airport Coordination Centre was notified that a female newsagency employee had collapsed at the base of the escalators in the southern domestic terminal (mezzanine level), a distance of 15 metres from her workplace located in the terminal. The Aviation Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) service responded and she was transported to hospital by the Metropolitan Ambulance Service (MAS).

The report failed to give a cause for her condition (although witnesses later told a journalist that she “was under stress and hadn’t eaten for hours”).2 It concluded, however, that the incident was “unrelated then and later to the incident that developed”.1 The reasoning for this conclusion was not provided.

08:48 — the Airport Coordination Centre was notified that a second female employee of the same newsagency had collapsed inside the agency. ARFF responders found her to be conscious and breathing.

09:02 — a female American Express counter employee, 15 metres from where the woman involved in the second incident was being treated, collapsed and vomited. (She was the only one of three people working at the counter to fall ill [Andrew Bolt, journalist, personal communication], which was not mentioned in the Esplin report.)

09:05 — the immediate vicinity of the incidents was cordoned off and air sampling undertaken by the ARFF and airport staff for “breathability” and “flammability”. Test results were unremarkable, although the test was considered incapable of detecting any chemical or biological contaminants.1 After testing, the southern terminal’s air-conditioning system was switched to spill mode (ie, air is expelled from the building to the outside) between 09:30 and 09:45, possibly removing any harmful agents that may have been in the facility.1

09:15 — the next person to feel ill was a nearby security guard who had approached MAS personnel while they were treating the American Express employee. He then phoned his union, which alerted and advised that all security guards employed by Group 4 Securitas should be checked by the MAS.

Shortly thereafter, two security guards from the airport departure security screening point — about 600 metres from the earlier collapses — reported feeling ill. The next two airport staff to be “counted” as ill were security guard union members reporting to the MAS, as per union instructions. (This was not made clear in the Esplin report.) The MAS at this point relocated to a position outside the terminal to set up patient triage.

09:55 — two domestic airline staff, whose counter overlooked the area where people first reported feeling unwell, arrived at the triage location, saying that they also felt ill. The ARFF Commander ordered that the southern terminal be evacuated and closed, and the international terminal was cordoned off from the southern terminal. Everyone in the southern terminal was evacuated in an orderly and safe manner to an open air assembly area. MAS personnel were advised to don protective clothing and masks. Around this time, the MAS gave the first of a number of informal media interviews.

13:00 — the MAS advised that it had so far transported 38 people to hospital. Some were believed to be affected by sun exposure in the outdoor triage area.

13:40 — further, more sophisticated, atmospheric sampling was conducted by scientific staff of the Metropolitan Fire Brigade for the presence of volatile organic compounds, and some specific chemicals and chemical warfare agents. The equipment included photoionising detectors (to detect high concentrations of foreign material in the atmosphere) and rapid alarm identification detectors.1 Unfortunately, the Esplin report does not mention the specific agents that these devices were designed to search for. There were no readings to indicate suspected agents, only very minor readings (i) for materials related to aircraft exhaust fumes and (ii) in the proximity of two bins containing seized aerosol cans.

14:00 — a total of 57 people had by now been seen in the triage area: 47 had been transported to hospital, and 10 had refused transportation. Patients were already arriving back at the airport from hospital.

15:00 — the MAS advised that no further casualties had presented to the triage area.

18:20 — state and federal emergency services declared the area safe and the southern terminal was reopened. All of the casualties, except one with pre-existing asthma, were released from hospital the same day, including the very first case. A few reported lingering symptoms for “a number of days”.1