Zangelbert Bingledack said:



Satoshi wrote about two very different kinds of "voting" or "consensus" in the whitepaper:

Nakamoto (chain-tip) consensus through PoW (consensus on a single chain; determines transaction ordering / the ledger state, given a certain set of block validity rules)

through PoW (consensus on a single chain; determines transaction ordering / the ledger state, a certain set of block validity rules) Fork prediction market consensus (on protocol rules) through PoW (determines which set of block validity rules prevail in the event of controversy; now kind of busted or maybe even defunct due to mining specialization) There is an important thing I think our camp has been misunderstanding or conflating, and I have a sense that it is a key confusion in the year-long impasse.Satoshi wrote about twokinds of "voting" or "consensus" in the whitepaper: Click to expand...

How would a futures market prevent manipulation by short-term speculators (doesn't self-identify as a "bitcoiner") and anti-bitcoin interests? Does the presence of manipulation even matter? If so, how much?

Satoshi started the project without the benefit of a certain market - there was literally no demand for bitcoins before Satoshi started sending out emails about a Bitcoin P2P ecash paper (and, ultimately the Bitcoin thread on the cryptography listserv was shutdown as being too political). The market that existed when Satoshi left the project was small in comparison to today's diverse, pretty-much-global market. With little-to-no-market for bitcoins, the decision to mine during Satoshi's era was based on a different set of factors than the factors used by today's miners (although there probably are some "timeless" factors). Decisions to attack the network during Satoshi's era were based on a different set of factors than the factors used by attackers today. Deciding and executing on certain network functionality, security, etc. matters during Satoshi's era carried less economic risk than they do today. There were far fewer ways to participate in Bitcoin AND crypto/digital/virtual currency during Satoshi's era. Choice in the digital currency ecosystem during Satoshi's era was practically bi-polar (Bitcoin vs. Not Bitcoin) whereas today choice is multi-polar.

(Deleted most of the article to save space)RE: Consensus DistinctionsThis is a good insight. I like how it adds nuance and context to the discussion. More of that needs to be done all around probably.RE: Prediction MarketsA prediction market might be an interesting idea. A fork-future could act as both an incentive and insurance policy for miners wanting mine a particular forked chain (i.e., miners can buy futures to hedge risk of some amount of loss should they end up on the wrong chain). The market itself would be a nice way to structure the interactions between the current set of market participants.However, I'm not sure participating on a futures exchange - as a prediction market - is a reliable form of voting. I'm not sure what that means exactly, but its something to think about . . . I guess. Here's the tension I perceive: participation on a futures exchange would certainly communicate a measure of demand for X, but participation alone does not say who is sending the communication. That probably matters in some important way. As an example, think about these questions:You've really opened a complicated can of worms, Zingleback.More [explicit] historical context is warranted. Clearly, the Bitcoin eco-system is different today than it was during Satoshi's time in a variety of ways. Consider:I could see a prediction market both stoking and extinguishing embers in a variety "proxy-war" - like scenarios. Again, not sure if any of this matters either way, and how much if so.I think Satoshi probably saw blocksize limit-type battles as inevitable clash-of-civilizations-like disputes. The analogy is kinda interesting because there really is no winner in a clash of civilizations - the clash is too gradual (if not glacial) and things just kinda are. One side is basically co-opted or bred out of existence over time, maybe unnoticeably.Maybe @jonny1000 has some wisdom with the win-big approach, especially when there's a movement for a fast consensus level change. Otherwise, prepare for the long-haul and/or try to become a Kore developer.Consensus on how to get to consensus-level changes in the protocol should be a priority IMHO.