Organized violence 1989–20181

In 2018, the number of fatalities in organized violence decreased for the fourth consecutive year, now being at the lowest level since 2012. Figure 1 shows that UCDP recorded almost 76,000 deaths in 2018: a decrease of 20% compared to 2017, and 43% compared to the latest peak in 2014. As in most years, state-based conflict drives this trend. The de-escalation of violence in Syria and Iraq was the primary cause of this decrease. The number of civilians killed in one-sided violence also dropped in 2018, reaching its lowest level since 2012. In contrast, non-state conflict continued on a high level.2

The general decline in fatalities from organized violence does not correspond with the trend in the number of active conflicts. In fact, the world has seen a new peak in the number of conflicts after 2014, matched only by the number of conflicts in the early 1990s. In 1991, the peak in the number of armed conflicts corresponded with a similar peak in the number of signed peace agreements. However, the most recent rise in armed conflicts has not been matched by a similar rise in the number of peace agreements.

Non-state conflict 1989–2018 Non-state conflict remained on a high level in 2018, in terms of both the number of conflicts and the number of fatalities in these conflicts. UCDP has recorded 721 non-state conflicts since 1989, with a yearly average of 39 active conflicts. In 2018, UCDP registered 76 non-state conflicts. Albeit a decrease by seven from the 83 conflicts recorded in the peak year of 2017,5 the number of active non-state conflicts remains on a high level. UCDP registered just under 18,300 deaths in 2018, almost the same level as in 2017, which is the peak year of the entire 1989–2018 period. The past six years have all recorded higher levels of non-state violence than any other year since 1989. The better part of this surge in non-state violence is due to the many interrebel conflicts in Syria, intercartel violence in Mexico, and communal conflicts in Nigeria, mainly along farmer–herder lines. As in previous years, the countries hardest hit by this type of violence in 2018 were Syria and Mexico, together responsible for 30% of the non-state conflicts, and 67% of the deaths. In Syria, many rebel groups were severely weakened by the government offensive against rebel-controlled areas, including the siege of Eastern Ghouta during the first months of the year, and there was also a merging of groups into bigger alliances fighting common enemies. The net result was a decrease in the number of conflicts in Syria from 15 in 2017 to 10 in 2018. This decline in the number of conflicts corresponded to a reduction by 35% in the number of fatalities. By contrast, the recent trend in Mexico has been one of fragmentation among the main cartels, particularly of the Sinaloa Cartel. As the Cartel has been losing ground, others have stepped in to fill the void, most notably the Jalisco Cartel New Generation that was involved in six different non-state conflicts in 2018. In total, Mexico registered 13 intercartel conflicts, an increase by five compared to the year before, making it the country with the largest number of non-state conflicts in 2018. In both Syria and Mexico, formally organized groups, such as rebel groups or criminal cartels, were involved in the non-state conflicts recorded. Formally organized groups generally have access to more resources, better training, and sturdier command structures than informally organized groups such as communal groups. Therefore, these conflicts may result in more severe encounters and more deaths. Rebel groups are also more likely to function as proxies for other states and, thereby, increase their capabilities through military support from these external actors (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2014). The data show that conflicts between informally organized groups, on average, result in lower fatality numbers but Figure 4 reveals that for many years in the late 1990s Download Open in new tab Download in PowerPoint 6 Since 2014, however, conflicts between formally organized groups have dominated the picture. Of the 18,300 deaths recorded in non-state conflicts in 2018, at least 14,800, or 81%, occurred in conflicts between formally organized groups. and early 2000s, conflicts between such groups resulted in more fatalities than conflicts between more organized groups.Since 2014, however, conflicts between formally organized groups have dominated the picture. Of the 18,300 deaths recorded in non-state conflicts in 2018, at least 14,800, or 81%, occurred in conflicts between formally organized groups. Although less lethal than the recent interrebel and intercartel violence, conflicts between informally organized groups increased in intensity in 2018, reaching the highest level of fatalities since 2011. Two countries driving this trend were Ethiopia and DR Congo. In Ethiopia, the political reforms of the new regime under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed have resulted in economic liberalization and increased political openness, which in turn enabled the peace processes of 2018 discussed below. However, this loosening state control also led to an upsurge in ethnic violence, resulting in five different communal conflicts, and more people becoming internally displaced in Ethiopia than in any other country in the world during 2018 (ICG, 2019). In Western DR Congo, a longstanding history of rivalry between Nunu and Tende ethnic groups resulted in heavy fighting during December 2018. Although the burial of a Nunu leader in Tende territory sparked the recent violence, some reports attributed increased tension to the December elections, with Tende supporting the then ruling coalition and Nunu the opposition (ACAPS, 2019). By the end of the year, the conflict had caused almost 900 deaths. The 2019 version of the dataset is the first to code troop support from an external state in non-state conflicts, covering the 1989–2018 period. This change in the non-state conflict data was made in order to capture a type of situation that has become more common following the expansion of transnational groups such as al-Qaida and IS. State support in non-state conflicts became an important feature in Syria following the IS declaration of an Islamic caliphate in 2014. A pertinent example of a non-state conflict with external involvement is the fighting between IS and the Kurdish-led alliance Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) supported by US-led coalition airstrikes as well as ground troops. This conflict alone has caused almost 19,000 deaths over the past four years, more than any other non-state conflict recorded by the UCDP.7 The total number of non-state conflicts with external state involvement is too small to draw any clear conclusions from, but most of the cases occurred in the past four years. The number peaked in 2015, with seven of the 67 non-state conflicts having external state support. In 2018, this number had dropped to three out of 73.