Much of the discussion in the aftermath of the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani last week has focused on the legality of the attack: whether or not his death was carried out by “assassination” or “targeted killing.”

Administration officials have chosen the latter, following the war-on-terror playbook. They consider the strike a targeted killing, elaborating that it was justifiable as an act of self-defense. General Suleimani, officials say, was “actively plotting” a “big action” that would have cost “hundreds of lives,” thus posing an imminent threat. Others, such as Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, have rightly rejected the term “targeted killing” and called it an assassination, implicitly raising a question about the legality as well as the wisdom of the strike.

The distinction is important as a matter of policy and strategy, as well as one of law. In 1975, the Church Committee, a select Senate committee, launched an investigation into the activities of the United States’ intelligence agencies, spurred on by reports of covert assassination attempts on foreign leaders, among them failed attempts against Patrice Lumumba of Congo and Fidel Castro of Cuba. The committee found that assassination was “incompatible with American principle, international order, and morality.” Its final report recommended a ban on assassination in the absence of war and except in cases of imminent danger. Though no such law was passed by Congress, President Gerald Ford issued an executive order in 1976 banning political assassination.

Since that executive order, some presidents have claimed the authority to circumvent the ban when they deemed it necessary. Ronald Reagan, reportedly claiming to act “in good faith” and within the context of an “approved operation,” launched a failed attack on the Lebanese cleric Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. The Clinton administration, in considering plans for targeting Osama bin Laden, determined it would be an act of self-defense, and therefore not an assassination.