BOOK EXTRACT Why CSK win and RCB lose Freddie Wilde Tim Wigmore Share Tweet

To watch Dhoni and Kohli captain is to observe two strikingly contrasting operators - a microcosm of the teams they represent. ©BCCI

"The fight is won or lost far away from witnesses - behind the lines, in the gym, and out there on the road, long before I dance under those lights," Muhammad Ali once said. And so it was in the IPL: in many ways the league was not won or lost on the field of play but in the air-conditioned function rooms of glitzy hotels that staged the annual player auction.

The divergent fortunes of Chennai Super Kings and Royal Challengers Bangalore started at the first auction in 2008. Unbeknown at the time were how the rules on player retention would evolve, which allowed teams to maintain a core squad across a number of seasons. This placed a disproportionate influence on the first auctions, in which franchises formed the nucleus of their team. Franchises who misjudged their strategy in early auctions were left scrabbling around for the remaining quality players.

"When they got into the IPL, Chennai probably had an advantage over a lot of other franchises because their owners, India Cements, were already in the business of running cricket teams," explained Rahul Dravid, who had a legendary career for India before playing for RCB and Rajasthan Royals in the IPL. "CSK was just the most high-profile team that they ran. So in a sense they've always had people on the ground and their scouting system was probably better right at the start than any other team."

The sagacity of India Cements contrasted with RCB's owners. The United Breweries Group, headed by the multi-millionaire businessman Vijay Mallya, had no prior cricket experience. Despite Mallya's naivety, he commanded great authority over RCB's team and its auction strategy. "Mallya used to sit in the meetings and had a veto on what could be done," explained Murali Kartik who played for four IPL teams, including RCB.

"It has to be left to the professionals. Just because you are owned by a big businessman or a film star they don't know cricket. You don't teach them how to run a business. Cricket should be run by cricketing professionals. The CSK team is handled by professionals."

It was upon these contrasting foundations that both teams were built.

Arguably the most significant auction signing in IPL history was Chennai's acquisition of MS Dhoni in 2008, just after he had led India to the inaugural T20 World Cup. He was the perfect cricketer for the T20 age: an explosive batsman, sharp wicketkeeper and very astute captain. Chennai paid GBP 750,000 for Dhoni, making him the most expensive player in the first auction.

Alongside Dhoni, Chennai formed a strong Indian core, recognising the importance of local players who knew the conditions and whose availability would go unchallenged by clashes with international cricket. In the first auction CSK signed the dynamic batsman Suresh Raina and an upcoming off-spinner Ravichandran Ashwin, both of whom would have notable careers for India. CSK also targeted less-heralded players who played their state cricket in Chennai: the fast bowler Lakshmipathy Balaji and the batsman Subramaniam Badrinath were the two most prominent examples. In 2012, CSK completed the nucleus of their team when they signed the left-arm spinning all-rounder Ravindra Jadeja, another Indian international. The Indian quintet of Raina, Dhoni, Ashwin, Badrinath and Jadeja have now all played over 100 matches for CSK.

Targeting the best Indian players amounted to shrewd economic logic: focusing on where the supply of elite talent was scarcest. "It's a case of market resources," explained Dravid. "There are a lot of foreign players available for four slots. But there are a limited number of quality Indian players available, and the fact that CSK have been able to get some of the best guys has meant that they have always had that core."

Chennai supplemented this Indian core with overseas players in roles harder to fill with Indian players. In 2008, the powerful openers Matthew Hayden and Stephen Fleming and middle order batsman Mike Hussey were joined by the finisher Albie Morkel. Unlike the stable Indian core, the overseas players changed slightly over the years: Faf du Plessis, Shane Watson, Dwayne Bravo and Imran Tahir later became regulars. But while the characters evolved their place within the broader system did not. Overseas players were important but they were not defining, such was the strength of CSK's Indians.

Bangalore's approach to squad building was the antithesis of Chennai's: they struggled to form a stable Indian core back in the early seasons and relied heavily on overseas players instead. By the end of the 2019 IPL, CSK had five Indian players with over 100 caps and eight with more than 50; RCB had just one Indian player with over 100 caps and five with more than 50.

By IPL 2019, 5 India players had played 100 games for CSK compared to just 1 for RCB - Kohli ©BCCI

This could partly be attributed to the original auction, in which RCB's two most expensive Indian players - Dravid and Anil Kumble - were already approaching the end of their careers and retired soon after. At that auction Bangalore spent most of their purse on overseas players rather than Indian talent.

RCB had scope to change tack. Yet in the 2011 mega auction, when teams were forced to release the majority of their squads at the end of the first contract cycle, Bangalore doubled down on their previous folly. Instead of focusing on quality Indian players, RCB splurged money on overseas stars such as AB. de Villiers, Tillakaratne Dilshan and Chris Gayle. These were all terrific batsmen - but, when the amount spent on them was added together, they did not create a balanced and well-rounded side. "Bangalore have never balanced their team very well," Dravid said. "I think they've been very poor with selections and auctions."

The difficulty facing RCB was that most star Indian players were continually retained by rival teams. Yet the examples of Mumbai Indians and Kolkata Knight Riders, who both recovered from similarly tumultuous early seasons, showed that it was possible to build an Indian core by focusing on intelligent scouting to identify good T20 players who had not yet been noticed by rival teams.

When they got into the IPL, Chennai probably had an advantage over a lot of other franchises because their owners, India Cements, were already in the business of running cricket teams - Rahul Dravid ***

It was hard to detect a systematic approach to recruitment at Bangalore. For instance, in the 2011 auction they spent GBP 990,000 on Saurabh Tiwary - a 21-year-old Indian batsman who had shown promise but who had only played 31 T20 matches. The fee made Tiwary the most expensive player at the auction who had not played international cricket. After three underwhelming seasons, in which he made just one 50 in 31 innings, Tiwary was released.

RCB also developed an unfortunate penchant for releasing players who then excelled at other teams. In 2018 and 2019 RCB released Lokesh Rahul, Gayle, Shane Watson, Sarfaraz Khan and Quinton de Kock - all of whom enjoyed excellent seasons immediately after leaving.

Another auction trick that Bangalore struggled to exploit was utilising local state players as Chennai did. While Ashwin, Badrinath and Murali Vijay all made more than 75 appearances for CSK, not a single Karnataka player did so for RCB.

For all the complexities inherent in the auction, Bangalore's travails made them figures of fun. In 2017 Bangalore were bowled out for 49 by a Kolkata bowling attack comprising Chris Woakes, Nathan Coulter-Nile, Umesh Yadav and Colin de Grandhomme. Next year, RCB promptly signed all four players at the auction. Although this might not have been a predetermined plan, it could be considered a classic example of what psychologists term the availability bias, with decision-makers drawn to who came to mind most readily - the bowlers who had flummoxed Bangalore the year before and it rather encapsulated what Bangalore had become. If you can't beat them, sign them.

***

If you can't beat them, sign them - Before IPL 2018, RCB signed all four fast bowlers who'd bowled them out for 49 in the previous year ©BCCI

Do teams win because they pick the same team or do teams pick the same team because they are winning? It is not an easy question to answer but over a decade CSK and RCB provided two fascinating case studies.

Bangalore finished in the top four in two of the first three IPL seasons but without a title retained just one player, Virat Kohli, before the 2011 mega auction. At the auction itself, they only bought back four players. CSK - who had reached three play-offs and had one title to their name - retained four players and bought back seven, foreshadowing the approach they would adopt at the 2014 and 2018 mega auctions.

Chennai were not only more patient with players than Bangalore when they were enjoying success, but also avoided overreacting to defeats. On average CSK made 0.9 team changes after a victory and just 1.6 after a defeat while RCB made an average of 1.2 team changes when they won and a lofty 2.4 when they lost.

The benefits of this consistency of selection were myriad. Firstly, the stability bred familiarity of roles for the players who became accustomed to their job in the team. As players continued to be involved they became better at what they were tasked with doing. At the start of new seasons at Chennai, Hussey recalled that there was no need for big strategy meetings to outline roles and responsibilities: the large majority of players were simply continuing their jobs from the year before. "Everyone knew each other inside out so it was a case of just get our heads down and just get into it."

The trust placed in players also encouraged them to play with freedom - particularly essential in T20 where failure, even for the best batsmen, was wired into the format. In the IPL, where an overseas player's salary was directly linked to the number of games they played, consistency of selection helped avoid situations where players might play selfishly.

Thirdly, the patience afforded to players at Chennai demonstrated an understanding and acceptance of the format's vicissitudes. Compared to other sports, T20 seasons were very short, with no more than 14 matches in a regular round-robin stage. This gave rise to short-termism among coaches, prone to overreacting to defeats because they were fretting about their own jobs.

Chennai took a different approach. "Even if you miss out in three or four games, if they know you're a good player they'll keep backing you no matter what, whereas you see with a lot of other teams that they really chop and change a lot," said Hussey. "In a game like T20 where it can be quite volatile you are going to have a period where you are going to miss out a few times."

The 2019 IPL season distilled the contrasting approaches CSK and RCB took to selection. Having spent GBP 475,000 at the 2019 auction on the brilliantly talented 22-year-old West Indies batsman Shimron Hetmyer, RCB gave him just four innings - three in the middle order, two of them in the difficult number five position, and one as opener - in which he scored just 15 runs. Having lost all four matches, Bangalore paid little heed to the complexity of Hetmyer's role or the small number of opportunities he had and unceremoniously dropped him, leaving him out for nine matches. Hetmyer wasn't selected again until the final match, when RCB were already out. A match-winning 75 underlined Bangalore's mismanagement.

While Hetmyer struggled, Watson was in similar strife for Chennai, averaging 18.75 across his first eight innings of the season. CSK persisted with Watson. In his following eight innings he scored 251 runs with three 50s, including one in the final.

By the end of 2019 Chennai had used only 74 different players across 189 matches - easily the fewest of the original eight IPL teams, both overall and on a per-game basis. Their captain, Dhoni and vice-captain Raina, had remained the same in every season. In contrast, Bangalore had been led by six different captains and had used 129 different players across 196 matches, the most of all teams overall, and almost twice as many new players as Chennai for each match.

The difference between the two teams was 'simple,' said Brendon McCullum - who played for both sides. "One team gives selection loyalty and works on the team they have; the other chases a perfect team and doesn't have a blueprint for how they are going to play."

RCB haven't invested in a gun death bowler since Mitchell Starc spearheaded their impressive 2015 campaign. ©BCCI

Chennai's stability extended beyond the players. Having represented CSK in the inaugural season, Fleming was appointed head coach in 2009, where he has remained ever since. A number of Fleming's support staff also used to play for Chennai: in 2019, both the batting and bowling coaches had played for CSK in the 2008 final.

Ostensibly T20 was an action-packed format that demanded youth. Yet this perception belied the importance of experienced players able to maintain their cool.

One team gives selection loyalty and works on the team they have; the other chases a perfect team and doesn't have a blueprint for how they are going to play: Brendon McCullum ***

In 2018, Chennai recruited 11 players over the age of 30 and four over 35. That season their average age of 34 years and six months was comfortably the oldest in the league: the nickname 'Dad's Army' naturally followed.

Fielding was considered one area where Chennai's older side would cost them. Yet fielding was one area of cricket that remained misunderstood. Chennai's older players were slower movers than younger opponents and weren't as quick to the ball or as swift across the ground - but generally this might cost them four or five runs per match. The one area of fielding that impacted the scoreboard most significantly was catching, where Chennai's age was no impediment.

"We will never be a great fielding side, but we can be a safe fielding side," said Dhoni in a post-match press conference during the 2019 season. "We might bleed a few runs here and there, but as long as we use our experience, we'll make it up with our batting and bowling."

Chennai's faith in experience was rewarded with a third IPL title in 2018; Watson, approaching 37, scored a match-winning century in the final. CSK's season was defined by winning tight matches: eight of their victories came in the last over or by a margin of less than ten runs.

The very next season Chennai - who had retained 22 players of their title-winning squad - finished second in the league table, only falling short of consecutive titles with a one-run loss to Mumbai Indians in the final.

***

T20 was designed to be determined by very fine margins. The brevity of the format heightens the role of luck. Such a volatile game increases the need to manage and exploit home conditions. Teams that dominate at home in leagues often only require one or two wins away to ensure qualification.

Some teams ask groundsmen to tailor pitches and boundary sizes to their strengths - for instance, a team with a strong seam attack might request pitches with pace and bounce. But in the IPL, franchises essentially drop into venues owned by the state associations for two months of the year. Rather than tailor the ground to the team, franchises need to tailor their team to the ground.

Chennai's home venue, the M.A. Chidambaram Stadium in Chepauk, is one of the most spin-friendly venues in world cricket. The hot weather in southern India bakes the soil, producing dry pitches where the ball grips and turns. Ever since the inaugural auction CSK structured their squad around these conditions.

By the end of the 2019 IPL, the only team to have bowled a higher proportion of spin overs than Chennai were KKR, who also successfully built a bowling attack to exploit turning pitches at home.

Chennai's spin-heavy strategy both exploited home conditions and ensured that the team could use the most successful type of bowler extensively. In T20, spinners boasted lower economy rates than pace bowlers in every single over of the innings.

To support their spin strategy, Chennai generally recruited Indian batsmen, who were typically more adept at playing spin, in the middle order and focused on overseas players as openers, where less spin was bowled.

By the end of the 2019 IPL, Chennai had won 41 of their 59 matches at the Chepauk, over two of every three they played, meaning they only had to win around one-third of their away games to reach the play-offs. Among all T20 teams only the Rajasthan Royals and Lancashire could boast a better home venue win percentage than Chennai's 69% in Chepauk.

While Chennai dominated at home, Bangalore floundered. T20 was played to a very different tempo at the M. Chinnaswamy Stadium. Notoriously flat pitches, tiny boundaries and being at altitude placed an emphasis on destructive batsmen who could utilise the advantages provided by the surroundings and, crucially, excellent bowlers who could nullify the threat of batsmen running riot.

Despite his early failures in IPL 2019, Watson was persisted with by the CSK management and he nearly guided them to consecutive titles. ©BCCI

"There is zero home advantage at Chinnaswamy," said Trent Woodhill, who worked at RCB as a batting and fielding coach. "We tried to create one but there isn't one there because the surface is too good."

In the early seasons RCB misunderstood not only the venue but the format. Their squad bore more resemblance to a Test match world XI than a T20 XI.

"For RCB, you always felt they will be chasing a gun death bowler," said Dravid. "Then the first thing you realise is they've spent 15 crores on Yuvraj Singh and you think, 'Oh, sh!t! They aren't in the market for that!'" and by the time a death bowler comes round they won't be able to spend any money so we can outbid them." ***

By 2011 Bangalore addressed this problem, belatedly moving towards players more suited to the T20 format. But their shift to power hitters came at a cost. As RCB splurged money on Gayle, de Villiers and Dilshan they left themselves less to spend on bowlers.

This unadulterated focus on batting prowess was a directive that insiders say came largely from Mallya, RCB's majority owner and chairman between 2008 and 2016. "Mallya was the main decision-maker and he loved the superstars of batting," said a team insider. "Bowlers like Mustafizur Rahman were shouted down at the auction by Mallya because he wanted batting gurus.

"Definitely RCB were a batting team," said the team insider. "It just worked that way with the big three. They fell into it with Gayle, A.B. and Virat, and then found it difficult to afford the best bowlers."

"Bangalore have never balanced their team very well," observed Dravid. "They had their best year when they had a bowler like Mitchell Starc who was able to close out games for them. But they kept going out and picking gun batsmen."

RCB's batting-heavy approach embraced the fundamental inequity of T20 - a bowler was limited to 24 balls, while a batsman could be there for an entire innings - and prioritised players who could have the greatest possible impact on a game. When it came off, there was nothing quite like it, as anyone who went to the Chinnaswamy and witnessed one of those Kohli-de Villiers partnerships would attest. Bangalore's perfect game could probably beat anyone else's.

The snag was that securing those two required stumping up a lot of cash. In 2019, RCB paid Kohli and de Villiers a combined GBP 3.47 million, over one-third of their entire allocated playing budget. Bangalore's bowling was compromised by this spending imbalance. Across their history their only bowler who consistently excelled was the leg-spinner Yuzvendra Chahal. Pace bowlers in particular struggled.

While tapping into the inequity of T20 could bring benefits, the approach was laden with risk. On a near-perfect day a batsman might face 60 balls but on a bad day they might face just one. In contrast, bowlers could deliver 24 balls in every match. While the involvement of a batsman was determined by how long they could survive, the involvement of a bowler was determined by their captain.

On the very best days, when the batting clicked and everything fell into place, Bangalore could post and chase gargantuan totals. But the vulnerability of their bowling - particularly at home - meant that they found it very difficult to defend even very large totals. Bangalore won 51% of matches chasing but just 40% of matches when defending. The Chinnaswamy demanded a quality of bowler that Bangalore simply couldn't afford.

The problems associated with Bangalore's batting-heavy team were compounded by the way in which they deployed their batting stars. Aside from spending copious cash on batting firepower there was no discernible strategy that defined them. Instead there was something of a Fantasy XI feel about Bangalore: throw together some of the world's biggest hitters and hope for the best.

Where RCB's batting lacked structure, CSK's was defined by it. While some teams saw the Powerplay as an opportunity to get ahead in the game, Chennai generally saw it as a period to set up the rest of the innings. In run chases Chennai's steady Powerplay ensured they took the game deep; once they took it that far they were clinical. With experience and know-how at the death, Chennai won 57% of run chases that went to the last over, comfortably the highest proportion of any IPL team.

RCB have always had to score above par to protect their weaker bowling ©BCCI

"The goal was always to get 40 or 45 runs for no wickets down in the first six overs," recalled Hussey, who opened for CSK from 2010 to 2015. "We knew we had the power to finish with Raina, Dhoni and Morkel. The idea was to keep wickets in hand for the back end."

This was a strategy informed by Chennai's bowling strength and the lower-scoring nature of their home venue. By taking a measured approach to the first six overs and not risking a top order collapse, Chennai ensured that, when they batted first, they could at least progress safely and post a respectable total. Their bowling was capable of defending even sub-par scores; RCB had to score above par to protect their weaker bowling. "That's where Chennai have always been successful because they've often had stronger bowling than Bangalore," said Dravid.

Though Chennai's batting had structure, they were not dogmatic in their approach. In 2014 and 2015 they adapted their strategy according to their resources, deploying Dwayne Smith and McCullum to attack in the Powerplay.

Chennai also showed flexibility with perhaps the most significant strategic decision in the game: the toss. Between 2008 and 2011 CSK batted first in 81% of matches when they won the toss. From 2012, they inverted that strategy, choosing to chase 62% of the time.

CSK's team of the early 2010s was among the first T20 sides to think in terms of roles rather than set positions. Below a solid opening pair - Vijay and either Hayden or Hussey - Chennai had a series of powerful hitters - left-handers Raina and Morkel and right-handers Dhoni and Bravo. These four players would not be assigned batting positions. Instead, they moved up and down the order depending on the match situation, the opportunity to capitalise on a particularly short boundary or to exploit a favourable match-up.

Roles applied to Chennai's bowling too. In the 2019 IPL Deepak Chahar, a classical seamer who bowled full and swung the ball, was deployed almost exclusively as a Powerplay bowler, regularly bowling three consecutive overs to start the innings. In contrast Dwayne Bravo was deployed almost entirely in the second half of the innings when his variations were most valuable.

***

Captaincy is arguably more important in cricket than any other major team sport. The importance of the strategic side of the game may be even greater in T20. In a format with such tiny margins between victory and defeat, the significance of every captaincy decision is amplified. This applies not only to macro-strategies - such as bowling changes and batting orders - but to micro-strategies like field placements and ball-by-ball tactics.

"The value of every over is much more in T20," said Dravid, who captained India, RCB and Rajasthan Royals. "The ability to come back from a bad decision is much easier in 50-over or Test cricket."

There were many structural reasons why Chennai won and why Bangalore lost, but the captaincy of Dhoni and Kohli heightened these fundamental differences. Although Chennai's squad was well structured and Bangalore's was not, CSK consistently overperformed and RCB did the opposite.

To watch Dhoni and Kohli captain was to observe two strikingly contrasting operators. Dhoni epitomised equanimity: from behind the stumps he calmly marshalled his bowlers and his field, never looking panicked.

Dhoni's phlegmatic leadership was juxtaposed by Kohli, who - often patrolling the boundary rope - was a hurricane of emotion, totally transparent and volatile. Wickets would send him into raptures; dropped catches into a frenzy. Boundaries would be met with a kick of the turf and a shake of the head. And, after defeats, he was far more prone to changing the team than Dhoni.

Their respective appearances reflected the tactical clarity present at both teams. "CSK has very little "white noise" around them," observed McCullum. "RCB have too much."

Dhoni's brilliance as a tactician and the stability of his relationship with Fleming established the pair as the primary decision-makers at Chennai. Success on the field entrenched this hierarchy.

At Bangalore, Kohli was appointed captain in 2013, aged just 24 yet already the new face of Indian cricket. But in his first seven IPL seasons as skipper, Kohli struggled to establish a strong strategic presence; in tight, tactical matches his judgement calls would often backfire. Unlike the stability of Chennai, Kohli worked with three different coaches in seven seasons.

Yet such was the cult of personality surrounding Kohli in Indian cricket, direct criticism of his captaincy was rare.

In 2019, former KKR captain Gautam Gambhir became Kohli's most high-profile public critic. "I don't see him as a shrewd captain and I don't see him as a tactful captain," said Gambhir on Star Sports. "You cannot compare him to someone like Rohit or Dhoni at this stage because he has been part of RCB, and captaining RCB for the last seven to eight years, and he has been very lucky and should be thanking the franchise that they stuck with him because not many captains have got such a long rope."

Of course, to a large extent Kohli was hamstrung by RCB's weak squads. But it seemed that his leadership compounded rather than helped alleviate those problems.

Unlike Kohli, Dhoni appeared to have a preternatural understanding of captaincy. By the end of the 2019 IPL, Dhoni had played 862 matches at professional level in all formats and captained in 547 of them; only eight players in the history of the game had captained more often. This vast memory bank of experience gave Dhoni a mind unlike any other in the modern game.

Chennai used data analysis but Dhoni was very rarely exposed to it. It wasn't that CSK rejected the premise of calculated decision-making. Instead, Dhoni's mind, fine-tuned by 100s of matches, did the calculations alone, like a cricket supercomputer.

Dhoni's influence extended beyond the pitch. Hussey believed Dhoni's calmness informed the franchise's stability and consistency of selection. "He hardly ever panics and that comes through obviously with all the selections." Dhoni's equanimity meant that he understood the uncertainty inherent in T20 and avoided overreacting to defeats, giving Chennai the best chance of enjoying sustained success.

CSK has very little "white noise" around them. RCB have too much: Brendon McCullum ©BCCI

The cocktail of Dhoni's captaincy, the role clarity produced by Chennai's consistency of selection and the experience in the squad bred a remarkable team environment.

After CSK won their opening two matches in 2019 Dwayne Bravo revealed that Chennai "don't have team meetings".

"We don't plan," said Bravo in a press conference. "We just watch the situation and adjust and adapt quickly. That's where the experience comes in."

In many respects this was the acme of T20 strategy. Chennai had built their squad so carefully, defined their player roles so clearly and grooved their method so consistently that very little needed to be said for them to perform.

T20 was so young, the seasons were so short and the competition was often haphazard and confused with players and coaches coming and going. Yet in a game as volatile as T20, Chennai's record of progressing to the play-offs in every season was a beacon of sustained excellence.

Chennai's extraordinary consistency and Bangalore's perpetual struggle carried lessons for teams in different leagues around the world. It affirmed that simply buying the world's very best players would not guarantee success. In T20, strategy, man-management and nuance mattered more than even the most star-studded team.

Cricket 2.0: Inside the T20 Revolution-described as"the tract for our times"by former Wisden editor Scyld Berry-is available to buy on Amazon now.

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