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The most popular assumptions about the big risks would have been: lack of market access, competition from U.S. shale production, green campaigns against the oilsands, policy initiatives related to climate change and investment scarcity because of tighter federal rules on state owned enterprises.

Indeed, if Canada’s high-cost oil production has grown so much, it’s because of widespread belief OPEC would always aim to get the highest possible price for its non-renewable resource, without killing demand.

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No one will be surprised to learn that higher oil prices spurred more oil production, but the increase was surprisingly modest: The average growth rate of after the 2002 was 3.6%, compared to 2.6% during the preceding 12 years. But since other sectors have been growing even faster, the oil and gas sector’s share of GDP declined from 6.4% in 2002 to 6% in 2014. Its share of employment has increased, but is still only 1.7% of the total. Claims to the effect that Canada has become a “petro state” or that its economy is largely dependent on oil simply do not mesh with the facts. As far as output and employment are concerned, the Canadian economy of 2015 is surprisingly similar to what it looked like in 2002.

One area where oil has played a significant role is exports. Oil exports have increased in value by over 150% — although they still account for less than one-fifth of the total. But here the story is primarily one of prices: The effect of higher prices received outweighs that of the increase in the quantity exported. Now that oil prices are falling, this effect will be reversed. The adjustment in prices — mainly through a depreciating exchange rate — will be painful: It will reduce consumers’ purchasing power. But the adjustment would be even more painful if we had a fixed exchange or rate — or worse, if we didn’t have an exchange rate to depreciate.