The contract between government and those they govern has broken down, and there is no official organisation they will allow to speak on their behalf.

Another time, another place: street fighting in Alexanderplatz, Berlin, during the 1848 German revolution Ullstein Bild · Getty

Politicians have not been so worried about a social movement in a long time: the scale, duration and determination of the yellow vest protests were an unwelcome surprise, catching politicians off guard because the protestors come from all walks of life, do all sorts of jobs, and have diverse political allegiances. They cannot be written off as being from a traditional union or political organisation, because they come from what politicians think of as the silent majority, which politicians claim to speak for but ignore, except when it is time to solicit votes.

Injustice, by US political scientist Barrington Moore Jr, provides clues to the rise of this largely spontaneous, loosely coordinated movement (1). It was written in the 1970s, when academics were trying to understand the big US protest movements of the era; it shifted perspectives by replacing the question ‘Why do people revolt?’ with ‘Why don’t they revolt more often?’ While Moore’s peers discussed the role of economic inequality and racial oppression, he suggested that these were constant factors throughout history but did not always cause insurrection. They might be necessary preconditions of revolt but were not a causal explanation.

Without the concept of reciprocity — or better, mutual obligation — it becomes impossible to interpret human society as the consequence of anything other than perpetual force and fraud Barrington Moore Jr

Moore examined the actions of German workers from 1848 to the late 1930s to explain why they mostly accepted unfavourable social and political orders, and to identify the conditions which, rarely, led them to rebel. He concluded that stability depends on the concessions those in power make to those they dominate: ‘Without the concept of reciprocity — or better, mutual obligation, a term that does not imply equality of burdens or obligations — it becomes impossible to interpret human society as the consequence of anything other than perpetual force and fraud.’

Moore argued that conflicts are the consequence of breaking an implicit social pact; often they result from economic or technological changes that affect the status quo and give the elite the opportunity to downgrade previous concessions. Members of the elite who no longer play the game then appear parasitic or exploitative and lose their legitimacy.

Moore’s analysis is still valid if you consider the current transformation of the workplace, which, according to sociologist Robert Castel, has produced ‘a destabilisation of the stable’ (2). Yellow vests say the standard of living for many in work has fallen so far that they struggle to make it to the end of the month. The situation has worsened because of the progressive erosion of state protection. In France, the state has been central to moderating the tensions between work and capital. The development of high-quality, low-cost, nationally available public services in education, healthcare, transport, communications and energy has made it possible to mitigate the most harmful consequences of an employment relationship structurally unfavourable to workers since the mid-1970s.

Sense of abandonment

But state reforms since the 1990s have created two-tier public services (3), with hospitals, courts or higher education in a regional centre very different from those in a medium-sized or small town. The logic of profit and competition has supplanted the aim of reducing social and geographical inequalities. That has caused both the public’s sense of abandonment and the disorientation of state employees presented with a radically revised mission. There is a vague sense that the old universal protections are now reserved exclusively for those who already have the most.

This transformation has resulted in the feeling of injustice Moore described, and explains in part the yellow vests’ anti-tax position (4). The representatives of the state have lost their role as arbiters, and are classed among the parasites, as well as the economic elite. Protestors blockading roundabouts (see France’s yellow vests don’t do politics, in this issue) criticise the real or imagined lifestyles of ministers and parliamentarians, in part because of the corruption scandals, tax fraud and acts of collusion with business revealed in recent years.

Some politicians confirm how remote they are from ordinary people whenever they speak. Emmanuel Macron said: ‘A station is a place where you pass people who are succeeding and people who are nothing’ (3 July 2017); François Hollande privately mocked ‘the toothless people’ (5). They were probably revealing their fundamental view of society: that there are winners and losers. They were also substantiating many of their fellow citizens’ deep feelings of contempt. So now the presidency has become the focal point for pent-up anger, as in the protestors’ chant ‘Macron out!’

All political parties have lost credibility, even when they put forward alternative positions. This explains why no party has yet been able to ally itself with the yellow vests or offer them anything other than further elections. It also explains why the yellow vests have resorted to self-organisation and direct action. They do not want mediation via a party or union and do not resort to the usual channels of protest. They want their message to go direct to those in power, to the Elysée Palace and prefectures, which some protestors want to occupy; then they want to broaden it by blocking strategic points, roundabouts, motorway toll stations, borders and fuel depots.

Why the violence?

The violence can be explained by a combination of factors: a collectively expressed feeling of having had enough, direct action, absence of mediation, and the way the forces of law and order have been deployed. Especially in Paris, seasoned activists have undoubtedly been involved in clashes with police and caused damage. The media and government highlighted this, blaming both ‘anarcho-autonomists’ and rightwing extremists. The extent of these actions, and what we know about those who have appeared in court, show that they are not the only people involved. It cannot be claimed they are behind everything: fires at government offices in Le Puy-en-Velay and motorway toll stations at La Ciotat and Narbonne, and violent clashes throughout France, including small towns.

A few years ago, a senior police official said in an interview that violence is by nature relational: ‘We are the ones who, as an institution, set the level of violence at the outset. The higher our level, the higher the demonstrators’ level will be.’ Recent police strategy has done nothing to defuse tensions: there have been mass arrests (1,723 on 8 December), water cannon, armoured vehicles, helicopters and mounted police, widespread use of tear gas grenades (more than 10,000 in Paris on 1 December) and flash-balls (a type of rubber bullet).

These tactical choices are a consequence of the ‘splendid isolation’ of the French police and gendarmerie, which means they have no interest in methods developed by their European counterparts, such as de-escalation. Twenty years of security policies have significantly increased their powers and their autonomy. Their approach to terrorism, petty crime and urban riots is rarely questioned, so they are convinced of the soundness of their expertise and sometimes automatically deploy familiar tactics in new contexts and against different targets. Images of the police arresting school students in Mantes-la-Jolie and forcing them to kneel were shocking, but this is a relatively common tactic on some urban housing estates.

Most politicians back these tactics and see an opportunity to assert ‘firmness’ in the hope of political dividends, repudiating responsibility for violence and blaming ‘troublemakers’. The media, always eager for footage of clashes and destruction, play along. Politicians may be misjudging the disastrous impact such tactics will have on their legitimacy. They give the impression they can remain in power only as long as they are protected behind riot shields and batons and able to fast-track protestors through the courts. They lend credence to the perception that political power rests solely on ‘perpetual force and fraud’. Moore showed how risky that could be. In fact, it is reciprocity that determines long-term social and political stability.