THE debate over the right terms and conditions for Britain’s departure from the European Union is often simplified into two clashing concepts: a soft Brexit and a hard one. The first tends to be favoured by those who voted Remain in the 2016 referendum, the second by those who voted Leave. Yet what is the real, practical difference between the two? And can bits of both be combined to some degree?

A soft Brexit is usually taken to refer to one that keeps Britain closely aligned with the EU. The objective is to minimise the disruption to trade, to supply chains and to business in general that would be created by diverging from the EU’s regulations and standards, thereby reducing the cost of Brexit. In practice a soft Brexit means staying within both the EU’s single market (like Norway) and its customs union (like Turkey). Soft Brexiteers are willing to be bound by EU rules and tariffs even though Britain will lose any say in making them. They also accept the inevitable consequence that it will be hard, even impossible, for Britain to do any trade deals with third countries.

A hard Brexit rejects the whole idea of close alignment. The goal is to escape burdensome EU regulations and tariffs, so as to be able to draw up rules and customs arrangements of Britain’s own choosing. In practice a hard Brexit means leaving both the single market and the customs union. Hard Brexiteers believe that staying in either would turn Britain into a “vassal state” of the EU. They are willing to accept the short-term disruption and potentially high costs of breaking free from Brussels, because they believe that the long-term gains from better regulation and the striking of free-trade deals all round the world will do more than enough to offset them.

Theresa May’s declared policy is to take back control of Britain’s laws, borders and money, which seems to imply a hard Brexit. She still insists on red lines that include leaving both the single market and the customs union. Yet in the Brexit negotiations in Brussels she has agreed to a transition during which Britain will continue to be bound by all EU rules. And to guarantee that there will be no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, she has also accepted that there must be a “backstop” solution that keeps Britain in a customs union and in close regulatory alignment with the EU for some years, until another way is found of avoiding any infrastructure, customs checks or associated controls on the border. As Mrs May keeps softening her red lines, many expect the eventual result to combine elements from both a hard and a soft Brexit. One possible answer would be to stay in a customs union and the single market for goods alone, but not for services. Like most compromises, such an outcome would please neither side. Yet both may just have to learn to live with it.