3. The Ministerial powers we examined all flow from the ancient prerogatives of the Crown. The royal prerogative itself is a notoriously difficult concept to define adequately.[2] The classic definition was given by A.V. Dicey,[3] who described the royal prerogative as

" the remaining portion of the Crown's original authority, and it is therefore the name for the residue of discretionary power left at any moment in the hands of the Crown, whether such power be in fact exercised by the King himself or by his Ministers".

4. In preparing for our inquiry we identified three main groups of prerogative powers. This informal division allowed us to concentrate mainly on those prerogative powers which give executive authority to Ministers, and largely to exclude other areas of the prerogative from our consideration. The three areas are described in the following paragraphs.

5. The Queen's constitutional prerogatives are the personal discretionary powers which remain in the Sovereign's hands. They include the rights to advise, encourage and warn Ministers in private; to appoint the Prime Minister and other Ministers; to assent to legislation; to prorogue or to dissolve Parliament; and (in grave constitutional crisis) to act contrary to or without Ministerial advice. In ordinary circumstances The Queen, as a constitutional monarch, accepts Ministerial advice about the use of these powers if it is available, whether she personally agrees with that advice or not. That constitutional position ensures that Ministers take responsibility for the use of the powers.

6. Although we received some evidence about the merits or demerits of these prerogatives,[4] they are not the subject of our inquiry, which is solely concerned with the powers of Ministers. We are not considering any change in the constitutional position of The Queen.

7. The legal prerogatives of the Crown, which The Queen possesses as the embodiment of the Crown. There are many such prerogatives which are legal (rather than constitutional) in character. Several are historical remnants, such as the Crown's rights to sturgeon, certain swans, and whales, and the right to impress men into the Royal Navy. But two legal prerogatives have more modern legal significance, namely, the principle that the Crown (or the state) can do no wrong, and that the Crown is not bound by statute save by express words or necessary implication. Many of these legal prerogatives have been amended by parliamentary legislation; others are in need of reform; some others may be obsolete. It has been suggested that the Law Commission should review this group of prerogatives.

8. Prerogative executive powers form the category of prerogatives which has been the main subject-matter of the Committee's inquiry. Historically, the Sovereign by constitutional convention came to act on Ministerial advice, so that prerogative powers came to be used by Ministers on the Sovereign's behalf. As Ministers took responsibility for actions done in the name of the Crown, so these prerogative powers were, in effect, delegated to responsible Ministers. But Parliament was not directly involved in that transfer of power. This constitutional position means that these prerogative powers are, in effect though not in strict law, in the hands of Ministers. Without these ancient powers Governments would have to take equivalent authority through primary legislation. As with the legal prerogatives just outlined, the connection between these powers and the Crown, or The Queen, is now tenuous and technical, and the label "royal prerogative" is apt to mislead. Indeed, Members have been prevented from raising certain matters in the House (such as honours) on the ground that these matters involve a royal connection, even though it may be merely formal. It makes more sense to refer to these powers not as 'royal prerogative' but as 'Ministerial executive'.