Index

Preface

This collection spans the better part of my scholarly career, as well as the better part of my theological interests. Even those pieces that concern topics at something of a tangent from the broad main courses of my work touch, for the most part, on themes quite near my heart. Two are the texts of public addresses produced for very specific occasions and have not been published before; one, a somewhat eccentric essay on the topic of thrift, was intended for print in a volume arising from one of the more peculiar projects I have participated in, but proved somewhat thematically incongruous with the rest of the book and was withdrawn (the book was intended as a hymn of celebration to thrift as a virtue, I believe, but my remarks struck a number of discordant notes); the rest have all been printed previously, and their provenances are named in the footnotes. All pieces are reprinted with permission. And I should record my thanks to my research assistant at St. Louis University, Jacob Prahlow, for his diligence in obtaining those permissions and in assembling this volume from so many disparate manuscripts.

I have altered very little, for better or worse, but I have attempted to remove from those articles that appeared in larger collections most cross-references to the articles of other contributors in the same volumes, lest I produce a one-sided impression of the discussions from which the pieces arose (and unfairly give myself the last word). I have also decided not to attempt to soften some of the more immoderate or provocative remarks in these essays, despite my new resolve to strike a more emollient tone whenever I can, because it would be wrong to change the record now, and would in any event probably be quite insincere. I ask readers only to believe that everything intemperate herein is offered in a spirit of good humor, without malice and in full expectation of reciprocal treatment in kind, and any lack of proper restraint on my part below is not really my fault, but that of the teacher of my literary infancy, H. L. Mencken (to whom any complaints should be addressed). I should mention that, in some cases, various of these essays cover some of the same ground in the same language (indeed, verbatim). In fact, the seventh essay collected here was written as a kind of distillation and reconsideration of various aspects of the essays that precede it in these pages. I might have changed the texts to avoid redundancy, and so spared the reader the tedium of grimacing more than once at the same obnoxious formulations, but each essay has its own integrity, and there is a point in time past which one cannot go back and change what one has written without doing more harm than good. So I hope readers will pardon the pleonasms.

I should also note that I have made no attempt here to bring earlier pieces into conformity with my later prejudices and predispositions. I suppose there have been fewer changes in that regard than I sometimes imagine—at least, in reviewing some of these pieces, I have found that I had already said things in them that I had not remembered already thinking—and in general I expect the only true difference of significance is one of candor. I am much more comfortable now than I once was with an open avowal of a kind of Christian Platonism (with a few Aristotelian inflections) as the imprecise but satisfactory description of my metaphysical predilections. In the past, and then only very occasionally, I thought I had to pay pious lip service to the anxieties and apprehensions of those less at ease with that designation than I was and am (much as I used to feel I was obliged to be guarded and hesitant in confessing my universalism, so as not épater le bedeau). Now I realize that this was not necessary, that Christian Platonism is not a metaphysics that dare not speak its name, and that I can trust in the intelligence, good will, and prudence of my readers. In fact, I really cannot imagine an alternative metaphysics for theology that does not ultimately collapse under the weight of its own contradictions; and I certainly have no patience for the dangerous fantasy that theology could or should be done without metaphysics. Then again, I do not really believe that much of anything can be done without metaphysics, either explicit or implicit, and so the truly liberating future course for theology in that regard (and for every field of humane reflection) should be to seek a way to get beyond getting beyond metaphysics.

Every blessing. Orate pro me, Fratres et Sorores.

ONE

The Offering of Names

Metaphysics, Nihilism, and Analogy

[A]s the cause of all and transcendent of all, God is truly without name, and yet he bears the names of all the things that are. Truly he reigns over all things, and all things revolve around him who is their cause, their source, and their final end. He is all in all.

—Dionysius the Areopagite

How is Logos the fateful . . . which sends each thing into its own? The gathering laying-out assembles all destining in itself, by bringing beings to us and letting them lie before us, keeping each being, whether absent or present, in its place and on its way, and by its assembling it secures all things in the all.

—Martin Heidegger

I. Attributes and Names

I want, in what follows,¹ to ruminate on the principal issue Janet Soskice raises in her essay:² that is, her elegant distinction between the theological enunciation of the divine names and the philosophical enumeration of the attributes of deity. The difference between the two practices, it seems clear, is nothing less than the difference between two ontologies: between a metaphysics of participation, according to which all things are embraced in being as in the supereminent source of all their transcendental perfections, and a univocal ontology, which understands being as nothing but the bare category of existence, under which all substances (God no less than creatures) are severally placed. The former permits practices of theological nomination—in liturgy, metaphor, metaphysics, and so on—because, even in asserting that there is an infinite qualitative difference between the coincidence in God’s simplicity and plenitude of all the transcendental moments that compose the creature (goodness, truth, beauty, unity, etc.) and the finite, multiplicit prismation of being’s light in the creature, it allows for a continuity of eminence between those moments and the transcendent wellspring from which they flow; thus one may in some sense name God from creatures, even though the infinite disproportion between divine being and finite beings places the truth of those names infinitely beyond the capacity of finite reason properly to grasp. Naming God, then, always has the form of analogy, an irresoluble tension between the cataphatic and apophatic, a language of likeness chastened by the pious acknowledgment of an ever greater unlikeness. The problem this would seem to raise, though, is that of the immense epistemological caesura that one must of necessity tolerate between the attributive use of a word here below and its properly nominative use in regard to God—for how much is really said (or known) when one speaks names whose truthfulness is certified precisely by their transcendence of finite comprehension? The latter ontology, it would then certainly seem, offers thought a more obvious and substantial form of analogy : a direct proportionate similitude between attributes inhering in discrete beings (albeit between finite and infinite instances); thus to say God is good is to say much the same thing as Henry is good, but with far greater certainty, and with no ambiguity. The metaphysics of participation, one could argue, precisely insofar as it regards God not as a being but as the source and ultimate truth of all beings, places an abyss between God and creatures that neither thought nor language can traverse without losing its moorings in human understanding; but a univocal ontology allows the essences of our attributions to remain intact, even when they are modified by the addition of the further attribute infinite.

The problem, though, with identifying the divine attributes univocally, as features of the divine substance in much the same way as they are features of created substances,³ is that the God thus described is a logical nonsense. A God who is a being among beings, who possesses the properties of his nature in a composite way, as aspects of his nature rather than as names ultimately convertible with one another in the simplicity of his transcendent essence, is a myth, a mere supreme being, whose being and nature are in some sense distinct from one another, who receives his being from being as such and so is less than being, who (even if he is changeless and eternal) in some sense becomes the being he is by partaking of that prior unity (existence) that allows his nature to persist as the composite reality it is. He is a God whose being has nonexistence as its opposite; he is not, that is to say, the infinite actus of all things, id quo maius cogitari nequit, but only an ontic God. There simply is no such God. Atheism is not the mirror inversion of this sort of theism, but both its inmost secret and its most necessary corrective. If God is thought of in such terms—if his true transcendence as the being of all beings is forgotten, hidden behind the imposing spectacle of a more conformable supreme being —then the longing to know the truth of God cannot help but lead to the rejection of God as truth; the inevitable terminus of ­theism, so conceived, is nihilism.

In a sense, this is merely to repeat a claim that one school of modern Continental philosophy (call it the ontological-hermeneutical ) regards as a truism: that nihilism is the hidden vocation of the Western intellectual tradition, that the will to positive truth that is the unique passion of Western thought must finally—in what Nietzsche called the inversion of the highest values—give birth to a discourse of absolute truthlessness, or the truth of innumerably many perspectives. Nihilism was first described by Jacobi, in the course of his critique of Kant, and it was he who first discerned a necessary liaison between its spiritual pathos and the intellectual ambition embodied in metaphysical systems. But it was Nietzsche who first argued that the death of God has come about as the result of the Christian (which is to say the vulgar Platonic) will to power, that pitiless, ascetic, ultimately life-denying hunger for absolute possession of the most high principle that must pursue God till it has killed him.⁴ For Gianni Vattimo, the prophet of playful nihilism or weak thought, nihilism is not simply the destiny of all Western metaphysics, but its solution, inasmuch as metaphysics is itself (he says) violence: the wresting of first principles from the intractable multiplicity of experience, the construction of a hierarchy within totality meant to contain and control the unmasterable flow of difference, a subordination of life to some supreme lifeless value (ousia, kinēsis, eidos, ego, Geist . . .).⁵ But the most interesting (and infuriating) theorist of metaphysics’ nihilistic vocation is Heidegger, and it is his treatment of the matter that, in an unexpected way perhaps, makes an explicit connection between the question of being and the question of naming God.

To formulate the argument I want to make very simply: the forgetfulness of the difference between naming God and describing his attributes, characteristic of Western thought since—let us say—at least the early modern period, is one and the same with the forgetfulness of the ontico-­ontological difference. Admittedly, there is a certain irony in resorting to Heidegger’s rebarbative patois in order to argue (as I shall) that only classical Christian metaphysics escapes such forgetfulness; for Heidegger himself, Christian metaphysics is nothing but a strikingly intense form of Seinsvergessenheit; but my use of the term is appropriate. The event of modernity within philosophy, after all, consisted for Christian thought in the death of a certain vision of being: it was the disintegration of that radiant unity where the good, the true, and the beautiful coincided as infinite simplicity and fecundity, communicating themselves to a world whose only reality was its dynamic participation in their gratuity; and so consisted also in the consequent divorce between this thought of being—the supereminent fullness of all perfection—and the thought of God. In this moment (which occurred over several centuries), being somehow became the name of what formerly would have been regarded almost as being’s opposite: a veil or an absence, explicitly or implicitly invoked, but in either case impenetrable—the veil veiling itself, the empty category of sheer uniform existence that adds nothing to the essence of things, and whose only determination is an absolute privation of all determinacy. And God’s transcendence, so long as philosophy suffered any nostalgia for that hypothesis, came to be understood as God’s absence, his hiddenness behind the veil of being, breaking through, if at all, only as an explanatory cause. However hostile, then, Heidegger’s own diagnosis of the oblivion of being may be to Christian thought, it nevertheless proceeds from a sadness quite familiar to theology in the post-Christian era; Heidegger recognizes that the particular pathology of modernity lies—to some very large degree—in the loss of a certain kind of wonder or perplexity, a certain sense of the abiding strangeness of being within the very ordinariness of beings. Not, it must be said, that he really desires to reverse the course of this decline: for him the nihilistic dissolution of every transcendental structure of being—every metaphysics—is something both good and bad, both a promise and a risk, and something that must be followed to its end. Following Nietzsche, he reads the history of nihilism as the story of the Western will to positive truth, which must—before it can be transcended—exhaust itself, and so bring metaphysics to its ultimate collapse. And, in this account of things, the theological understanding of the transcendence of being over beings appears as merely a particularly acute instance of a duality intrinsic to every metaphysics: like every speculative system, Christian philosophy is subordinate to that original forgetfulness that allows metaphysics its fruitful but erring reign over Western thought, and so while theology possesses a kind of understanding of the ontological difference, it arrives at that understanding only by abstracting some general characteristic of beings and projecting it as the ground or principle or truth of beings—which it then identifies with God. This is what Heidegger calls the double founding of onto-theology, the grounding of beings in being, and then the further grounding of being in some supreme being. Thus Christian philosophy is, at the end of the day, merely metaphysics once more, oblivious of the utter qualitative distinction between being and beings; and while metaphysics may illuminate the ontological difference for thought in some measure, it does so necessarily by way of a more original obscurity, a withdrawal or hiding of being behind one or another ontic exemplar—behind one or another of the masks being wears in the drama of its passage through successive metaphysical epochs and regimes.

Thus Heidegger’s genealogy of nihilism is perfectly seamless: after that first lightning flash, that blissful dawn, when being originally manifested itself for thought in the West, in the naïve but for that very reason pure language of the pre-Socratics, the West’s initial moment of philosophical wakefulness necessarily began to harden into fixed and rigid forms. Whereas the pre-Socratics, immersed in the lighting of being, enjoying a poetic immediacy of language to event, understood being as alētheia or physis or logos—as, that is, the unveiling of being in beings, the temporal arising and passing away of beings, and the gathering laying-together of the event that grants beings and being to one another—thought could not long endure the mystery of these names for being, and soon had to begin to substitute for them the inert conceptual properties of being. This is the apostasy of Plato, for instance, in turning his gaze away from the silent mystery of being’s yielding hiddenness and toward the visibility of original essences, eidē, the frozen, eternalized looks of things. Here the search for truth as a positive possession of reason—a thing among the things of the world—takes hold of reason, and here the history of metaphysics is inaugurated in earnest, and—no matter what new concept will displace eidos (ousia, actus, ego, Geist)—the entire course of this epochal destinal sending is set in motion by this always more essential oblivion. Now, in the twilight of the metaphysical age, we find ourselves in the time of realized nihilism, of the technological Gestell, in which reality is understood as just so many quanta of power, the world as nothing but the representation of the self-established subject, and the things of earth as mere material, a standing reserve awaiting exploitation by the merciless rationality of technology. The ancient nuptial ecstasy of word and world—of poetic saying and ontological unveiling—has now become all but impossible. This is the moment of highest risk. But if in this moment we reclaim the more essential truth of this nihilistic destiny—that truth is not an object to be possessed, that the world is not reducible to the sufficient reason for its existence, that we should not press toward foundations and principles but should rather dwell in the worlding of the world and find the truth of things in their limpid Anwesen—we can perhaps heal ourselves of the positivist passion, await the world in a state of poetic and passive expectancy, look for a new dawning of the light of being, speak thoughtfully the names of that nameless mystery as it shows itself to us . . .

All of which has an undeniable charm about it; but it is at just this point that one should pause and ask whether the sweet, melancholy quietism in such language does not dissemble a certain kind of metaphysical ambition. For Heidegger’s account of nihilism, and of what stands beyond nihilism, is dictated not simply by a scrupulous honesty regarding the history of Western thought, but much more by his own ontology—which itself could well be characterized as nihilistic. For Heidegger, whose earliest attempt at a fundamental ontology transcribes into ontological terms Husserl’s phenomenological collapse of the distinction between it is and it appears, being is so entirely pure of determination as to be convertible with nothing. It is simply the manifestation of the manifest, the inexhaustible movement of manifestation itself, the silence whose self-­effacement allows beings (in their absolute difference from being) to sound forth. Being’s generosity—its es gibt, its withdrawal or nothinging, which lets beings come to presence in the juncture of being and, in due order, give way to other beings—is merely its nothingness among beings, its refusal to appear as the absolute. Here, certainly, the metaphysics of light (of being as the overflowing fullness of the transcendentals) has been overcome (or, more accurately, abandoned), but only in favor of a metaphysics of darkness. For being is, in a sense, darkness itself, the dialectical negation that indifferently grants all beings their finitude. Its every mittence is, as Heidegger says, an errance ; it gives light only by being dark, by hiding and leading astray; as much as truth is a peaceful letting-be-manifest, it is also a struggle of obscurity and light, Erde and Welt, in which peace and strife are inseparably joined. Logos forces physis into a gathered containment. No less than the Stoic image of the cosmos as a finite totality in which every form is continually displaced by another, the whole under the irresistible sway of anankē, the later Heidegger’s understanding of the destinal epochality of being’s temporality ever more absolutely identifies the event of being not only with the presencing and whiling of beings, but with their annihilation. Like Hegel, Heidegger thinks of truth as also, intrinsically, destruction. If this is indeed how being must be conceived in order for the thinker to escape the oblivion of being that lies at the heart of metaphysics, then indeed theology has no name for being—or, it would seem, for God.

This if, though, is precisely the question I want to raise: Is Heidegger’s ontology genuinely an alternative—the alternative—to onto-theology, or does Heidegger himself perhaps fail adequately to think the difference between being and beings, and so the difference between nomination and attribution? This is worth asking for many reasons. For one thing, Heidegger’s thought gives powerful expression to the deepest impulse of modern Continental philosophy in its interminable struggle to liberate itself from theology, and thus it is a particularly transparent instance of philosophy functioning as a theology evacuated of transcendence. In Heidegger’s attempt to ask the question of being anew, free from the heritage of metaphysics, he presents us with an exquisitely poignant image of the descent of thought into an absolute and self-sealing discourse of immanence. And this by itself makes it profitable to ask whether his understanding of the oblivion of being is one to which theology must pay heed; for the ontologist and the Christian metaphysician alike may concur that something has been forgotten, but it also remains the case that what each regards as forgotten is what the other regards as the most extreme form of forgetting. More to the point here, however, our question is worth asking simply because Heidegger’s thought is very much concerned with naming (with the poetic logos, in which the silence of being peals forth, veiled in its very unveiling, with the naming of the gathering of the ring-dance of the fourfold, etc.), because he wants so desperately to free the discourse of truth from the morbid mythology of grounds and of sufficient reason, which finds the truth of the world only in the world’s barest and most meager possibility or featureless principles, and which must in some sense erase the event of the world to establish the ground of the world. For Heidegger the truth of an apple (say) lies not in the metaphysical principles that secure it within the rationality of being, but in the event of the apple in its appearing, in all the richness and poverty of its transient particularity, and the language of truth that alone can correspond to this truth is a poetic speaking that allows the event of the apple within the world to show itself within words. Such a view of things certainly attests to a quite earnest desire to free thought from the destructive passion of instrumental reason, in order to return philosophical reflection to a condition of peaceful dwelling in the givenness of the world; and there is moreover a clearly discernible theological pathos in Heidegger’s longing to see a peaceful belonging together and intimacy between res and signum, sustained by their coincidence in the event (or act?) that embraces them both. But the most important reason for asking our question is that, in Heidegger’s terms, the naming of being in beings is impossible: for if beings show forth being only in the occlusion of being, in being’s nihilation, then the names we speak are—at the end of the day—so many opaque signifiers ; if being shows itself only through the immemorial event of its self-effacement, upon which thought (bound as it is to static representations) can then only supervene with a quaint anachrony, then being is silence itself, absolutely different from all saying, a nothingness against which all beings are set off, and the naming of being (or the naming of the God who is not a being among beings) is an empty paradox; this is the Derridean vocation of Heideggerean ontology.

Happily, though, when it is disentangled from Heidegger’s Seinsgeschichte, Christian philosophy proves to possess resources for understanding and overcoming the nihilistic terminus of modernity in a way that does not arrive at this hopeless impasse; and it can moreover provide an account of the ontological difference far more cogent than any Heidegger ever enunciated. For Heidegger was in error, and for the most surprising of reasons: because he, perhaps more than any other philosopher in Western thought, was oblivious of the difference between being and beings. In taking phenomenological givenness to a dialectical extreme, and abstracting from it an ontology, he hid from himself the true question of being—which was raised uniquely in theological tradition, and answered there in a way beyond every nihilism (nowhere more perfectly than in Denys’s Divine Names). And in constructing his genealogy of metaphysics as one continuous decline from philosophy’s first moment of ontological wakefulness to a final eclipse of being in the age of the world-picture, Heidegger succeeded in concealing from himself the most remarkable aspect of the history of Western metaphysics: to wit, its Christian interruption.

II. Ereignis and Actus

I should note, I suppose, that Heidegger’s purblindness is in some great degree willful, and even a little perverse. As I have said, his early journey from phenomenology to ontology was made possible by—and so was confined to—phenomenology’s collapse of any meaningful distinction between it is and it appears. At some level, perhaps, this represented a kind of transcendental restraint on his part, or critical sobriety, but it by no means purged his thinking of metaphysical presuppositions. How, after all, can one elect such a point of departure unless one has arrived, in advance, at a decision—a conjecture—that has foreclosed the very question of the relation between being and manifestation? More importantly, how much sense does it make to attempt to extract a fundamental ontology from a philosophical discipline from which the question of being has been scrupulously and necessarily bracketed out? Inasmuch as Heidegger was obliged, at the beginning of his project, to argue toward the legitimacy of any ontology at all, and then had to do so only in terms that the phenomenological realm of inference (the economy of appearance and hiddenness) permitted, there was no point in the early development of his thought at which it became possible to think of being outside of the closed circle of what appears and what does not appear. Not that Heidegger was in any way discomfited by the epistemological limits he thus imposed upon himself. In truth, the acceptance of such limits was, more than anything else, a decision taken in the service of a rather transparent play for power—one nowhere more evident than in the essay of 1927, Phänomenologie und Theologie. ⁶ It was here that Heidegger attempted to seize away from theology the high ground of metaphysics, discourse on being, by drawing an absolute distinction between philosophy’s properly ontological sphere of inquiry and theology’s ontic science of faith—the science, that is, of something called Christianness, and of the special comportment of belief toward the cross of Christ (which, when all is said and done, reduces theology to a purely psychological and local pursuit). Heidegger could easily, it is true, have called upon a well-established tradition of Protestant dogmatics to defend the peremptory division of prerogatives for which he argued, but to any attentive reader it should be clear that his only genuine concern was to secure for his philosophy an inviolably unique claim upon ontology, and to do so precisely by despoiling theology of the language of being and beings that—contrary to Heidegger’s account of things—had become available to human reflection only when the Christian doctrine of creation assumed, but altered, antique metaphysics. Granted, Heidegger claims that he discriminates between the spheres of faith and philosophy not so as to accord one priority over the other (the ontic and the ontological, or the empirical and the theoretical, he argues, simply belong to different orders), but he no sooner makes this assertion than he demonstrates its duplicity: the philosopher, for example, is able to see that the theologian’s special language of sin falls under the more original, ontological determination of Dasein’s guilt (Schuld), and thus the analysis of guilt can clarify and correct the concept of sin, but never the reverse.⁷ There is no such thing as a Christian philosophy, ⁸ Heidegger helpfully informs us.

However—and there is a piquant irony in this—it is precisely Hei­deg­ger’s assiduous struggle to begin his project from a vantage pure of theology that ultimately renders his project incoherent, and in fact makes it impossible for him genuinely to contemplate being in its difference from all beings. This is obvious from the period of Sein und Zeit onward. By denying himself any stirring of reason’s necessarily ecstatic movement toward a horizon continuous with and yet transcending the scope of experience, and by seeking to capture the truth of being (or meaning of being) entirely within the horizon of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, Heidegger condemns himself to circling interminably between the two poles of the ontic process of arising and perishing, within which ambit he can do no more than arbitrarily isolate certain existentiell structures of experience and treat them as existential openings upon the question of being. It scarcely matters, then, how comprehensive or thorough his phenomenology of this being-­in-­the-­world may be, because any conclusions he may draw therefrom regarding being (or even regarding how Sein appears for Dasein) are little more than intuitive—indeed, oracular. Nowhere does this essential mystification in the early Heidegger’s thought disport itself more flagrantly than in 1929’s Was ist Metaphysik? It is tempting to allow oneself to be carried away by this essay’s beguiling treatment of the nothing’s power to awaken us to beings as beings, or by its lovely meditation on boredom, or especially by its treatment of anxiety as a Stimmung possessed of a unique ontological probity;⁹ but, if one succumbs, one will in all likelihood fail to note how many baseless assertions throng each of Heidegger’s moves. To take the most striking example: it may be true that anxiety apprises us that all things are set off against the nothing, but to cross from what is after all a simple recognition of ontic contingency to any conclusion concerning being as such requires either that one abandon to some degree the ontic economy of existence and nonexistence (of finite determination), or that one treat this economy as the sole truth of being (which leaves the real question of being, as distinct from all beings, unaddressed). Heidegger chooses the latter course, but one should not be deceived that in doing so he is fleeing the metaphysical and embracing the scientific. Simply said, it does not matter which fundamental mood—boredom or anxiety, happiness or wonder—reveals to us the uncanniness of existence; the only nothing made available within this experience is merely the opposite of existence. Thus, to do as Heidegger does, and argue for a kind of secret synonymy between the nothing and being (following a rather impressionistic logic: being discloses beings as beings, the nothing discloses to us that beings are beings, thus in the being of being the nothing nothings . . .), is simply to avoid the question actually at issue. That is to say, in this obviously dialectical scheme, the nothing can be taken as ontological only if being is to be conceived as the opposite of the existence of (ontic) things. But this is vacuous. If being is really, ontologically different from all beings—even if one grants that it is the ontic oscillation between existence and nonexistence that first wakens us to this difference—then being cannot be the opposite of anything;¹⁰ it stands over against neither existence nor nonexistence within finite reality, but is the is both of it is and of it is not, and so the difference of one from the other is something utterly distinct from the difference of being from both. The simple opposition of is and is not, understood as the simple functioning of noncontradiction within finite things, is not an ontological determination, but is merely what raises the ontological question in the first place. To confuse being with the simple nonexistence that anxiety has the power to reveal is as much a species of Seinsvergessenheit as it is to confuse being with simple existence; one has simply mistakenly identified being with one moment in the determination of finite essences —with, that is, the ontic not this rather than the ontic this. It is true that the distance between beings and nonbeing reveals to us that being is not a being among beings; but, at the same time, if we resist lapsing into dialectic, it should also reveal to us that being is as mysteriously beyond nonbeing as beyond everything that is. After all, it is the synthesis within beings of what they are and that they are (and so of what they are not) that makes it impossible, within the grammar of ontic process, to speak properly of being qua being. The ghost of Leibniz still haunts us with his maddening question: How is it that there are beings at all, and not much rather nothing? And no obscure conflation of being and the nothing will suffice to dispel philosophical perplexity here, as the question might just as well be phrased thus: What permits beings and nonbeing to be distinct from one another, such that beings are the beings they are while nothing (ex quo nihil fieri potest) remains nothing? How can there be such a distinction and such a unity?

I think that, at some level, Heidegger can be accused of a very basic logical mistake. Granted, it is not always easy to follow Heidegger’s logic well enough to identify either its strengths or its flaws, especially in his earlier period, where it is often annoyingly difficult to assign any clear meaning to his use of the word Sein; there it is even occasionally possible to read him as being concerned solely with something like esse commune—a general existence, which is nothing apart from what exists. In his mature work, however, after his so-called Kehre, Heidegger supposedly turns his eyes from Dasein to Sein, and then to the es gibt of the event that grants the ontico-ontological difference (albeit in the form of a forgetting) to every age of thought. Here we discover—so says John Caputo¹¹—that the abstract beingness of beings is clearly not what Heidegger means by Sein.¹² At some level this is certainly so: when he speaks of being, Heidegger does indeed mean more than the existence of existents ; he clearly means the possibility or event of such existence. That said, he confines the concept of being to a finite economy of presencing that is nothing but the process of beingness, of becoming and passing away, and as a result his ontology remains a reflection only upon how beings appear within this economy. This is a problem, because properly speaking the question of being is: Why is there an economy of existence at all, and not, much rather, nothing? And this would seem to mean that no moment within this economy, at the end of the day, can account for the economy as a whole. Nor does Heidegger escape the realm of the merely ontic by turning from the question of being to that of the Ereignis. As Caputo points out, Heidegger came to argue not that metaphysics is utterly oblivious of the ontological difference as such—philosophy has always known something of the difference, even where it reduces being to a being—but that metaphysics always fails to grasp the distance of the difference between being and beings:¹³ being and beings are imagined as a circle of mutual grounding, between two separate kinds of thing, which blinds the metaphysician to the mystery of being’s purity from beings, and so to the mystery of the eventfulness of the passing over of being to beings and of beings to being. The mystery is hidden from view behind the splendid machinery and intricate hierarchies of rigid presence, substance, structure; the givenness of beings in their Anwesen—their arrival, their tremulous whiling, their passing away again into concealment—goes unremarked in its self-effacing silence.

For this reason, Heidegger claims that we must begin the thinking of being anew, not merely from the vantage of the difference, but from the vantage of the event of the difference. In 1957’s Identität und Differenz, he takes two steps back from beings: the first is a step into the ontico-­ontological difference, of which metaphysics is conscious, but only according to some generalized model of a characteristic proper to beings; but the second is a step into the still more original differing of the difference, the Austrag (auseinander-zueinander-tragen) that grants being and beings to one another and opens for each epoch of thought the possibility of its forgetful thinking of the difference.¹⁴ This appropriating event (Ereignis) must not be confused with creation, according to Heidegger; it is a letting-be-seen, not a kind of causality or actus; it is the giving that gives by withdrawing itself. And what it gives is the process of alētheia, or physis, the surging-up and whiling of beings in the juncture of the event. In 1946’s Der Spruch des Anaximander, Heidegger had described this juncture as lying between two concealments—the future to-come and the past having-been ¹⁵—a twofold absence that it holds apart so as to allow things to come to presence.¹⁶ Nor is what the juncture makes present some kind of discrete perduring substance poised between these absences; the present presences only in allowing itself to belong also to the absent¹⁷—and here we glimpse something of the essence of tragedy.¹⁸ In a footnote added to the text in 1950, Heidegger says that the discrimination (Unter-Schied) of which he is here speaking "is infinitely distinct (unendlich verschieden) from being, which remains the being of beings."¹⁹ This event may also be called Logos, which Heidegger takes to mean, originally, a laying-out before that gathers together :²⁰ Logos gathers all destining (Schicken) to itself, keeping each being, whether absent or present, in its place and on its way, sending each into its own, and by its assembling, Logos secures all things in the all. ²¹ Heidegger’s temporalization of being consists, then, simply in this: being and beings are given to one another by an event that opens a finite juncture between the arrival of the concealed future and the departure of the concealed past, where beings waver into presence, linger, and waver away into nothing. Time is being’s passage from nothing to nothing, surmounted by a mysterious, noncausal event that assembles, limits, apportions, and sustains the economy of nihilation. And this event, as Logos, occurs for us in language, and then in the thoughtful hearing of language’s gathering saying of the world’s worlding —as is nowhere more powerfully expressed than in the almost incantatory conclusion of Brief über den Humanismus : as clouds are the clouds of the sky—making it visible, distinctly, as sky precisely by obscuring it—so language is the language of being; and, as the vast depths of the earth are barely scored by the inconspicuous furrows drawn by the farmer’s plow, so thought is a humble laboring at the surface of language, whose immensity it scarcely touches.²²

Again, I would not care to deny how seductive and impressive Heidegger’s vision can be: so seductive and impressive, indeed, that only the most humorlessly pertinacious reader is likely to notice the little man hiding behind the screen, working the levers. Nevertheless, I reiterate my earlier charge: however much Heidegger may have succeeded at producing the appearance of a new kind of ontology, he never succeeded in understanding being as truly ontologically different from beings. Even his tortuous meditations upon the Ereignis serve only to confirm the event of the world in its own immanence, its ontic process, and all the while the real question of being fails to be posed. How is it that becoming is? This is never truly Heidegger’s question; and one passage in Anaximander seems to me perfectly to express why it cannot be:

Whatever has its essence in arrival and departure we would like to call becoming and perishing, which is to say, transience, and therefore not what has being (das Seiende); for we have long been accustomed to opposing being (Sein) to becoming, as if becoming were a nothingness and did not even belong to being, which one habitually understands only as sheer perdurance. If, though, becoming is, then we must think being so essentially that it not only comprises becoming in some empty concept, but that, rather, being ontologically (seinsmäßig) supports and characterizes becoming (genesis—phthora) in its essence.²³

I must say, it seems to me that there is almost nothing in these sentences that is not obviously wrong. To begin with, to say that, in distinguishing between becoming and being, metaphysics customarily treats becoming as a kind of nothingness is to say something simply false; it sounds like one of those silly slanders of Platonism for which a serious scholar should have no patience. Surely it is more correct to say that the problem of philosophy has always been that of the synthesis of nothingness and essence within becoming, the persistence of unity within change, and so—quite logically—Western metaphysics has traditionally recognized that nothing that is (including becoming) is able to account for itself; hence being and becoming are not to be accounted synonyms. But that is a mere cavil compared to what one should say regarding the far graver problem bedeviling Heidegger’s central argument: "if becoming is. . . ." Not to be too cavalier here, but I must observe that one could just as easily argue that being has always been characterized as altogether different from any number of things—lampshades, armchairs, clever ideas, lizards, passion fruit—but if these things are. . . . In every case, it is the is of the thing—whether it be becoming, a lampshade, a clever idea, or what have you—that proves irreducible to the thing. It would be convenient, of course, if one could dissolve the verb—the mysterious to be —into its subject, but one cannot. And becoming is no exception to this rule: it refers to the ontic how of finite existence, which means it cannot refer, of itself, to the ontological that of existence. Moreover, while it is an article of faith for Heideggereans that being has been understood, throughout metaphysical history, simply as sheer enduring presence, it is a belief gaily unencumbered by evidence.

This is not to deny that eternity has traditionally, in Western thinking, been regarded as an aspect of that which is other than all beings, but certain things must be kept in mind. To begin with, the difference between timeless eternity and substantial perdurance is an absolute difference, a qualitative difference, rather like that between truth and truths, or between being and beings, and so it is no more correct to speak of eternity as sheer presence than to speak of it as sheer absence—which any garden-­variety Neoplatonist could tell you. Moreover, even if the metaphysical certitude that becoming is not being might occasionally take the form of a crude distinction between changing things and a great changeless substance (though nowhere in Platonism or Christianity, as far as I know), it is a certitude that arises from the recognition that nothing in the ontic play of existence and nonexistence (not even becoming, or the process of unhiddenness ) is its own is, and that the is cannot be something that becomes, that has an opposite, or that contains potential. And, perhaps most importantly, as a negation, eternity is an absolutely necessary and entirely benign moment in prescinding from beings to being, to which there is no alternative that is not nonsensical. For Heidegger, the incorrigible tendency of metaphysics is to isolate some general characteristic of beings, convert it into a concept of being qua being, and then treat beings as though they were mere instances or reflections of this supreme, changeless abstraction. Curiously enough, though, this is precisely what Heidegger himself does: he chooses to make the world of finitude the ground of the truth of being, and does so by taking the ontic characteristic of temporal change, of becoming and transiency, generalizing it as the process of hiddenness and unhiddenness, and abstracting from it various names for being; this process he then mistakes for the ontological difference itself, which means that he can conceive of being only as a reflection of our own beingness. Then, over this entire dialectic of existence and nonexistence, he erects an arch of fate, of a destining that apportions finite things to their placement and displacement in a cycle of interminable immanence,²⁴ and so confirms beings in their potentiality (their nothingness) as the ground of being.²⁵ In scholastic terms, Heidegger has merely elevated possibility over actuality.²⁶ What he certainly has not done is address the essential mystery: How is it that either possibility or actuality is? Whence comes the is in it is possible ?