Not all managers have an ideology. Well, at least a clear ideology that has followed them to every club they’ve managed. Neither is it imperative that a manager needs a strong ideology to succeed. Mourinho, for example, has not carried a method of play to each of the many clubs he’s managed.

Yet it’s the managers with a strong ideology that seems to capture the imagination of football fans. Think Guardiola, think Bielsa, think Cruyff. Their sides have really resonated with people, and in my case, caused me to fall in love with football.

What separates the great managers like Guardiola and cult heroes like Bielsa is the ability to adapt and compromise. In short, it is flexibility. Just look at Guardiola in his first season at Manchester City. The players he had at his disposal did not fit what he wanted, and as a result, the football suffered. The games against Leicester and Everton (1-5 and 4-0) respectively showed what happens when you try to play an expansive style of football with players that can’t execute it. After a poor start, Guardiola acknowledged this, changing to a slightly more conservative style while planning ahead for next season, when he could recruit the players he needed. The result speaks for themselves.

As Guardiola was winning the Premier League with 100 points, Bielsa was having a, let’s say, not as successful spell as Lille manager. While Bielsa is rightly admired for his trademark high-octane style of football, he is hardly what you would call ‘flexible’. His time at Lille ended after just 13 games, with his sitting in the relegation places. His decision to force 11 experienced players out before pre-season, a notoriously taxing training regime and his enforcement of a 3-3-1-3 that didn’t suit the team ultimately cost him his job. His time at Lazio was even more fleeting, ending after just 2 days after directors failed to pursue his transfer targets.

In short, while great managers such as Guardiola are flexible in how they apply their ideology, others are less adaptable.

Sampaoli’s the perfect example in this regard. I want to preface this section by stating that I feel, despite this disastrous spell with the Argentina NT, that Sampaoli is a fantastic manager. His most successful spell by far came in Chile, where he firstly led Universidad de Chile to domestic and continental success before winning the Copa America with the national team. What aided Sampaoli was that this period came after Bielsa had rejuvenated Chilean football. Therefore Sampaoli, one of Bielsa’s many disciples, was able to implement his ideology without a hitch. A club side, especially one with financial resources and a squad lacking superstars, like Sevilla, also suited Sampaoli, as he was able to buy players who suited his playstyle (he spent £67 million) and sell those who didn’t.

To work out why he failed at Argentina, let’s look at how he likes to play.

High tempo

Press high up the pitch

Likes to use 3-at the back formations

Fluidity in attacking movement

Straight away, this style of football doesn’t seem to fit Argentina’s squad

Aging and/or slow centre-backs such as Fazio and Otamendi leave Argentina vulnerable to long balls, especially when the fullbacks have bombed forward

Attacking full-backs are important to his play style, but Argentina lack world class players in these positions, forcing Sampaoli to rely on natural wingers such as Acuña and Salvio

The fluidity he requires is hard to train at national team level with such little time. He regularly complained in the lead up to the world cup that he would rather have more time on the training ground than playing friendlies

When looking at all the attacking talent in the squad, who plays regularly in a side that presses high up the pitch?

Argentina’s midfield situation is grim, with no Vidal-esque dynamism

After a disastrous spell of friendlies, including thrashings at the hands of Nigeria (4-2) and Spain (6-1), for the finals Sampaoli seemingly abandoned any trademarks of his playstyle, playing a slow-paced 4-2-3-1 lacking in flair and creativity. Sampaoli likely hasn’t played in that manner, at the top level at least, and it showed.

The examples of Bielsa and Sampaoli show the extremes of compromising an ideology. Bielsa stuck to his ideology, regardless of the individuals he was working with, while Sampaoli abandoned his style completely when it was clear it wouldn’t work with his side.

Although I want to stick to my ideology, as outlined in the very first blog, I have already had to compromise. Firstly, I don’t have the dynamic left back I would like to offer an attacking threat on the left-hand side. My centre-backs are all either too slow or too weak in the air, causing me to push the defensive line back on several occasions. Finally, Adam Rooney’s skillset has caused me to use the Advanced forward role, hardly dynamic.

In certain match-ups, I have to acknowledge that my side is far worse than the opposition, as in this case against the 24 times Dutch champions.

When thinking of how I want to compromise, I first consider what aspects of my ideology I want to keep. For this game, they are:

Attack and defend as a unit

Press the opposition

Offer a threat on the counter-attack

Unfortunately, PSV hasn’t even played a friendly yet, and the team report I requested gave me very little to work with. So I’ll have to use my football knowledge (shit) to assess the strengths of the opposition.

I looked online for inspiration and found this video from the excellent Tifo Football. While it focuses specifically on Hirving Lozano, it also offers insight into how PSV play in real life, giving me an idea of the profile of each player.

Clearly, the dangerman is the aforementioned Hirving Lozano, last seen mugging of Jerome Boateng in the world cup. As a Fifa Ultimate team player, I am well aware of his pace and dribbling ability, although I fear my usual tactic of pressing the right stick down to prevent the low-driven may not working in football manager. He largely supplies the man mountain Luuk De Jong, an aerial presence with a worrying goalscoring record in his native Holland. Furthermore, pacey fullbacks Brenet and Arias offer additional width high up the pitch as well as an attacking threat. The midfield will see Jorrit Hendrix providing stability, with Chelsea loanee Marco Van Ginkel keeping things ticking for his side.

In response, I’ve gone with this. Stewart and GMS drop deeper to offer defensive support for my fullbacks, who may well have to deal with both a winger and wingback simultaneously. Kenny McLean has been told to hold his position to protect the back four, while Shinnie has been told to kick anything within ten yards of him (the ball would be a bonus). McKenna and Arnason have been chosen to deal with De Jong’s aerial threat. Logan has been told not to bomb forward as regularly to prevent either Lozano or Bergwijn from exploiting the space in behind. A standard mentality has been selected rather than counter to prevent inviting too much pressure on ourselves. Finally, the back line has been dropped back slightly to prevent the opposition getting in behind us.

For those wondering, Rangers were knocked out by Austrian side Sturm Graz on away goals in the last round. While St Johnstone beat Haugesund on where promptly rewarded with a game against Bilbao. Celtic beat FC Europa of Gibraltar with ease but face a far harder test in the form of Rijeka.

Their line-up is pretty much as expected, but with natural right-back Luckassen playing in front of the defence.

The first thing I noticed as the game kicked off was that Brenet was playing as an inverted wing-back and as a result PSV were able to create overloads on that side. They quickly drew a good save from Rogers after just 80 seconds.

Yet it was us that created the first chance, McLean finding Stewart who stung the palms of Zoet from just inside the box. After a close 15 minutes, I was feeling quite confident. Then, as football manager always seems to do, this happened.

https://gyazo.com/32cda78a9f4da18969dcf5f7a9783136

Straight away we were on the offensive, Rooney forcing a fantastic save from Zoet down low. Our persistence soon paid off. GMS’ initial shot was saved at his near post by Zoet, the ball came back out wide to Considine who played a tantalizing ball to the back post for Stewart to tap in. Parity, although I can’t help but feel we should be ahead.

But football manager won’t let me have nice things. Despite another strong 10 minutes after the goal, we conceded as De Jong headed in Lozano’s corner. We almost got the good fortune of a kick-off goal but Rooney twice hit the post from GMS’ cross.

Our dominance continued into the second half, GMS twice having shots blocked on the line from well-worked corner routines. Then suddenly the game changed. Luckassen was sent off for a shocking challenge on Christie, and suddenly we had the numerical advantage. PSV sacrificed their left-winger to maintain midfield numbers. As a result, I pushed Logan right up the pitch.

And there’s why. As Stewart collects the ball deep, he attracts the left back (4), the only PSV player on that side. As a result, Logan has the Freedom of Aberdeen.

The second half was agonizing. We did everything but score. As I pushed for an equalizer, we inevitably left gaps which the pace of Lozano could exploit. Arnason was caught of the position and daydreaming, allowing Lozano to break free and score a third.

I’m absolutely devastated. We were by far the better team in all regards. It ultimately came down to individual errors and a set piece. We should, and on most other days, would have scored a few more goals. But I am not disappointed. I’m incredibly proud of the performance. We were brave, ambitious, and made a far better side look ordinary. While people stay there’s no victory is defeat, we can hold our heads up high.

The second leg also ended 3-1 to the dutch side, who scored 2 early goals as we tried to find a way back into the tie.

The 6-2 aggregate defeat may see us bow out of Europe but it doesn’t tell the whole story. I’m incredibly proud of the team.