I don’t know enough about methodology, Reb Akiva Eger or lamdus to claim that I know about Reb Akiva Egers usage or opposition to lamdus. The other day, I was thinking about how sometimes we get so caught up with the bells and whistles of a sugya, our understanding of everything is shaped by it and we miss a very valuable component to the sugya. Four questions from Reb Akiva Eger came to mind of which I was so caught up with the “lamdus of the sugya” I was taken aback by the fact he asked them, and I noticed a pattern. I am currently lying in my bed in a sweatshirt and do not have the Seforim with me to properly source this, so no sources will be sighted, you’ll have to trust me.

Safek Brachos

The Gemara in Brachos is puzzled by a seeming contradiction, one pasuk states “LaHashem haaretz umalohu” The earth and its contents are G-d’s, andanother pasuk says “VeHaaretz noso lebni adam” And the earth he has given to the people. So which one is it, is the world G-d’s or the peoples? The Gemara answers, “Kan Lifni habrachah kan leacher haberachah” Here it is before the brachah, here it is after the brachah. And the gemara adds, one who benefits from this world without a brachah it as if he stole.

The rule is; if you are unsure if you made a brachah on something you do not have to make another one, “Safek brachos lehakel” An uncertainty about brachos is lenient. This is based on the fact the brachos ar derabanan, and the rule is “Saferk derabanan lekula” a rabbinic ruling is lenient.

Reb Akiva Eger asks; While it’s true that saying brachos is derabanan (As to why that is I strongly recommend seeing the Penai Yehoshuah on that Gemara, which sadly I can’t hyperlink) stealing is dearaisah. Therefore, since if one eats without saying a brachah it is as if he stole, if one has a question wheter or not he made a brachah, despite brachos being derabanan, it is also a question about stealing, a dearaisah, and should be stringent.

The stealing of which the Gemara is referring to has not of the halachic principles of stealing. The question Reb Akiva Eger asks cannot exist on the level of lamdus, and yet he asks it.

Rov and Muchzak

The Gemara in Chulin asks, “What is the source for a chazaka in the Torah” and goes on to list several things until finally the case of the Kohen leaving a house to declare Tzorahs. The Gemara also asks “What is the source that we go based on rov (majority) in the Torah” and brings several proofs, most famously going based on the ruling of two out of three judges.

The rule is; “Ruba vechazaka, ruba adif” if you have a rov vs. a chazaka you go based on the rov.

Reb Akiva Eger asks, given that a rov is stronger than a chazaka, once we have a biblical proof that we follow a chazka, why do we need a biblical source to follow a rov?

On the level of lamdus, there is a din that the Torah introduced called “Chazaka” another din called “Rov” and a third, the ruling that you follow the rov in a case of conflict. But Reb Akiva Eger is not caught by that trap, he faces it based on its logic; if we can understand that a rov is stronger, we do not need a source for it once a chazaka is introduced.

Eidim Zomamim

The Gemara in Makos introduces the concept of “Eidus shei atah yachol lehazimo” Testimony of witnesses that you cannot turn in to Zomimim. Such testimony is not accepted because as a rule testimony must be from witnesses able to become Zomimim. The Gemara goes a step further; if the next set of witnesses would not be able to become Zomimim the initial testimony would not be accepted either (Zomimi Zomimim).

Reb Akiva Eger asks, given that there are a finite amount of people in the world, how can there ever be accepted testimony? At some point you will run out of people and the last set will not be able to become zomimim thereby nullifying the initial testimony.

On surface this may seem extremely lamdus, but I do not believe that one who goes through the lamdus of the sugya in Makos will be open to accepting this question. I know I had a hard time.

Ubar Yerech Imo

The Gemara rules that if one committed bestiality with a pregnant animal, not only is the animal forbidden on the mizbeach, the child is as well.

Reb Akiva Eger asks, given this logic, how is a man permitted in relations with his wife while she is pregnant? it is as if he is having relations with his daughter, which is forbidden. He answers, since his daughter is less than three years old it is not considered halachic intercourse.

The Lamdim take great issue with this, sighting the rule of “Ubar yerech Imo” halach views the fetus as part of the mother, and surely that is why the child of the animal is forbidden on the mizbeach. But Reb Akiva Eger is not short sited by halachic terminology; he sees a ruling and applies it to like circumstances.

Each of these questions, had it been asked by that kid in 11th grade who tries too hard and underlines random parts of his kovatz, we would attribute it to him “not getting it” but we can all agree that Reb Akiva Eger knew what was going on, and yet he asked them, perhaps there is a brilliance in simplicity we were all too busy to notice.