Did Kyle Shanahan simply benefit from having a star quarterback when Robert Griffin III broke excelled during his rookie season? Or is there more to the Cleveland Browns offensive coordinator?

Robert Griffin III III entered the NFL with very high expectations. The then 22 year old was the second overall pick in the 2012 draft, behind only the exceptional Andrew Luck, and became a Week 1 starter for Mike Shanahan in Washington. Griffin finished the 2012 regular season with 3,200 passing yards, 20 touchdowns and five interceptions while completing 65.6 percent of his passes. He also added seven rushing touchdowns and 815 rushing yards on 120 attempts.

Griffin entered the league after playing in a high-powered offense at Baylor in college. In spite of that, nobody expected him to be so productive from the first week of his rookie season.

There was no questioning Griffin's raw talent and his potential to develop into an all-around quarterback, but an adjustment period full of mistakes was anticipated. Winning rookie of the year wasn't completely out of the question, but very few sane people were expecting Griffin to lead his new franchise to the playoffs after a 10 win regular season. Griffin was clearly a special talent, but he didn't deserve all the credit for his production and efficiency as a rookie.

Becuase his father is the head coach and because he had worked with some below-par quarterbacks before Griffin arrived in Washington, it was easy to discount Kyle Shanahan as an offensive coordinator.

In 2011, Shanahan guided an offense run by Rex Grossman and John Beck. That unit ranked 19th in total DVOA, Football Outsiders' metric for measuring efficiency, while ranking 20th in rush DVOA and 22nd in passing DVOA. Grossman threw for over 3,100 yards and 16 touchdowns with 20 interceptions in 13 games and Beck added 858 yards, two touchdowns and four interceptions in three starts. Four different backs, Roy Helu, Tim Hightower, Ryan Torrain and Evan Royster, combined for 1,489 rushing yards and just four touchdowns.

Considering the talent at his disposal, Shanahan's offense seemingly overachieved in 2011. Beck and Grossman turned the ball over too much and couldn't find the endzone, but that was largely a result of their own inability to execute. Shanahan put them in position to move the ball and rack up yardage. When you combine their passing yards to create a 16-game sample size, the quarterback position in Washington produced 3,958 yards in 2011. When you add in Brandon Banks' one completion for 49 yards, you have an offense that created over 4,000 passing yards on 591 attempts while throwing to Jabarr Gaffney, Fred Davis, Santana Moss, Donte Stallworth, Leonard Hankerson and Terrence Austin.

When Griffin became his quarterback in 2012, Shanahan made some adjustments to his offense but kept many of the same principles and staple plays. The result was a very quarterback friendly passing attack that also took advantage of his quarterback's athleticism.

A key piece of the offense was rookie running back Alfred Morris. Morris carried the ball 335 times for 1,613 yards and 13 touchdowns. He averaged 4.8 yards per carry and the offense's running game as a whole ranked second in DVOA for the season while rushing for a league-leading 169.3 yards per game. Morris' production was vital, but it was the threat he created for the opposing defense that allowed Shanahan to build his offense off of play action and heavy use of the screen game.

This chart tracks the first 12 weeks of Griffin's rookie season under Shanahan. During this time, Griffin threw for 78 percent of his regular season passing yards and 80 percent of his passing touchdowns. Passing attempts don't include throwaways or laterals that drift forward on read option plays, but they may include plays that were erased by penalty.

Passing Attempts Play Action in Pocket Play Action Outside Pocket Rollout Screens Production Week 1 27 12 3 1 7 320 yards 2 TD 0 INT Week 2 28 10 1 0 6 206 yards 1 TD 1 INT Week 3 34 8 2 1 5 221 yards 1 TD 0 INT Week 4 36 11 5 0 7 323 yards 0 TD 0 INT Week 5 15 6 0 0 2 91 yards 0 TD 0 INT Week 6 20 11 3 3 3 182 yards 1 TD 1 INT Week 7 27 7 3 0 2 258 yards 2 TD 1 INT Week 8 35 11 4 2 4 177 yards 1 TD 0 INT Week 9 41 13 2 0 6 215 yards 0 TD 0 INT Week 11 15 9 0 0 5 200 yards 4 TD 0 INT Week 12 28 10 2 1 2 304 yards 4 TD 1 INT Total 306 108 25 8 49 2497 yards 16 TD 4 INT

As the chart shows, Shanahan's offense used play action or a rollout on 141 of Griffin's 306 pass attempts(46%) and threw a screen pass on 49 of 306 pass attempts(16%).

With any rookie quarterback, there are two primary concerns. The first is that player's ability to manipulate the pocket on the professional level and the second is that player's ability to read coverage before making good decisions under pressure. Using plenty of play action and screens alleviates the need for a quarterback to manage the pocket or read through his progression. However, it takes a creative offensive coordinator and consistent running game with the right kind of receivers and quarterback to use play action and screens that much without limiting the production of the offense.

Griffin's Washington team had Morris setting the tone, so the defense always had to be wary of the running game. Griffin himself was a running threat so the defense also had to account for him as a scramble when deciding what coverage to play in the secondary.

Because of how the offense in Washington was set up and run, Griffin was regularly left alone in space without any pass rushers attacking him on play action plays. Furthermore, his first read was regularly open on those plays because Shanahan's play design was so impressive and his play calling kept the defense off balance.

Shanahan primarily uses zone-blocking upfront. That has allowed him, and his father before him, to take unknown runnning backs and get production from them. It also makes the offense's play action more effective because the defensive front has to slide with the offensive line in order to account for the run threat. This pulls most of the potential pass rush away from the quarterback even when he doesn't leave the pocket.

With the hesitation created from Washington's rushing attack and their dynamic runner at the quarterback position, defenses were regularly hesitant at the snap. Shanahan took advantage of this hesitation and tried to create even more doubt in the secondary with his creative screen plays and quick passes underneath. This meant that Griffin was regularly able to get rid of the ball very quickly and he wasn't often punished for seemingly staring down his first read(something that all rookie quarterbacks inevitably do).

While we can never be 100 percent certain what a quarterback is reading in the defense because those of us on the outside don't regularly attend their quarterback meetings, we can get an idea with an educated guess on every play.

This chart reflects how often Griffin took his eyes from one receiver at one point of the field to another at another point on the field.

The 'Qualifying Plays' column is the same as on the previous chart. The 'Apparent First Read Throw' signals how often Griffin appeared to throw to his first read, while the three columns after that break those throws down in greater detail. 'Open' means the receiver had at least three yards of space around him when he caught the ball and no defender got near the ball through its trajectory. 'Tight Coverage' means the ball passed close to a defender on its trajectory or the receiver was within two yards of a defender when the ball arrived. 'Covered' means the defender tipped the ball away or was in a good position to.

Qualifying Plays Apparent First Read Throw Open Tight Coverage Covered Completion Percentage Week 1 27 23 11 7 4 73.1% Week 2 28 17 8 7 2 69.0% Week 3 34 23 17 3 3 61.8% Week 4 36 31 17 6 8 74.3% Week 5 15 12 6 5 1 66.7% Week 6 20 18 15 1 2 77.3% Week 7 27 19 10 8 1 71.4% Week 8 35 25 19 1 5 47.1% Week 9 41 31 20 6 5 59.0% Week 11 15 12 8 3 1 93.3% Week 12 28 22 9 9 4 70.4% Total 306 233 140 56 36

Griffin appeared to throw the ball to his first read on 76 percent of his throws. Essentially, him finding his first option was the basis of their passing offense. When he didn't find his first option, he generally checked the ball down or scrambled. On those 233 plays where he threw to his first option, an incredible 84 percent gave Griffin realistic opportunities to complete passes.

If you have an offense that can be effective with lots of play action and screens, then you are more likely to have a quarterback whose first read is regularly open. For a rookie quarterback who isn't adept at reading defenses or managing pockets at this level, this is massively beneficial.

This may seem like a bizarre way to look at an offensive coordinator, but what this does is isolate the impact of the offensive coordinator as much as possible. The offensive coordinator designs the offense and specifies who is the first read on a given play(at least, traditionally that is the case). The first read is clearly within the structure of the offense and the part of the play you would expect a rookie quarterback to execute perfectly. After the first read, many more factors out of the offensive coordinator's control become more important and the execution of his players matters more than his offensive design.

Because of those other factors, of which there are almost too many to count, offensive coordinators can't accurately be judged by the outcome of plays or the overall production of the offense alone.

All of that brings us to Johnny Manziel and the Cleveland Browns. Shanahan is now the offensive coordinator for the Browns after being fired by Dan Snyder in Washington. Manziel is another first round rookie who could potentially start from Week 1. Manziel seemingly needs to beat out Brian Hoyer, but while relatively impressive for a short stretch last season, Hoyer is at best a stop-gap until Manziel eventually becomes the starter. Manziel may not be as talented as Griffin, but he is a similar style of player because he is a dual threat quarterback with the ability to throw the ball down the field.

If the Browns had any other coordinator running their offense, the idea of Manziel starting as a rookie would be somewhat concerning. However, in Shanahan's offense, Manziel could potentially put up huge numbers from Week 1.

Griffin opened his rookie season with 320 passing yards, two touchdowns and zero interceptions on 26 attempts with a 73.1 completion percentage. He threw a season high seven screen passes on that day. Every team in the NFL runs screen plays. Some teams have simple plays that they execute to perfection, others have many more plays that all fail. The beauty of screen plays is that the most simple of plays can be effective, but the potential for creativity is almost endless.

Shanahan combines simple screen passes and more complex screen passes to consistently keep the defense guessing. He not only throws the ball to his receivers and running backs on screen plays, he also throws the ball past the line of scrimmage for some and uses different kinds of play action to set up others.

25 of Washington's 49 screens during the first 12 weeks of the 2012 season came on first down. Creating easy yards on first down for a rookie quarterback allows the offense to stay out of situations where the defense can be more exotic and aggressive with its pass rush. One of the staples of Shanahan's screen attack was this very well designed play.

It's First-and-10. Shanahan's offense initially comes out with two receivers to the right and two to the left. Fred Davis is a tight end who is lined up as a slot receiver to the left. After the snap, the slot receiver to the right motions into the backfield so he is directly behind Griffin. As we can see from the side angle, that player is very deep behind Griffin, but Alfred Morris is also in a position to receive the ball as he is lined up almost a yard behind Griffin while offset to the right. This is a formation that affords the offense a variety of options running the ball, especially to the left side of the defense.

Left tackle Trent Williams is vitally important for the success and the design of this offense. Williams is very athletic, so he is comfortable with difficult assignments in space. When the offensive line initially begins to flow to the right side on this play, Williams flows with them for a split second before working upfield. The closest defender, number 50, is responsible for any potential cutback on a stretch run to the far side, so his eyes are on the running back because it looks like Williams is simply releasing to the linebacker on the second level as part of the run play.

At the same time, Davis in the slot starts out his motion that makes it look like he is trying to get inside of the defender across from him to help block on the play. Because all of the offense's pieces are flowing to the right side before Williams turns to the other side and Davis cuts back, all of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers defenders are being dragged that way also.

When Griffin carries out the play fake and turns around to look back to the other side of the field, he has a wide open receiver in the slot as his read and a very simple throw to make. Because Williams leaked out from the offensive line unnoticed, the offense now has two blockers to account for the two defenders who can stop Davis early in the play. Williams isn't initially in a good position to block his man, but the play fake to the far side drags that defender closer to him and Williams' athleticism allows him to get to his outside shoulder.

Griffin didn't need to manage the pocket and he didn't need to make any difficult reads, yet the design of the offense still allowed for a 12-yard gain and a first down.

While screens were a big part of keeping the offense ahead of the down-and-distance and keeping the pressure off of Griffin, play action plays an even bigger role in the design of Shanahan's offense. Because Johnny Manziel is just 6'0" it will be tougher for him to consistently complete passes from the pocket. Russell Wilson is slightly shorter than Manziel and he has excelled from the pocket to this point in his career, but he has also excelled at finding throwing lanes and adjusting in the pocket to see the field through the bigger bodies in front of him.

Because Griffin was taller, Shanahan didn't feel the need to consistently move him out of the pocket to let him throw the ball down the field. He still did it a lot, but Shanahan's ability to create space within the pocket on play action plays meant that he didn't need to be overly reliant on it. It's unclear if Manziel will be able to be a quality pocket passer at the next level, but these kinds of play action plays will make it easier for him to throw the ball down the field.

Just like with his screen plays, Shanahan has one staple play action play that he relies on more than any other.

Against the St. Louis Rams in Week 2, Shanahan showed off his staple play for a touchdown on First-and-10. As they so often did, the offense came out with an offset fullback to the same side as an inline tight end, with a receiver in motion at the snap. The Rams responded with eight defenders in the box and the remaining three defensive backs lined up off the line of scrimmage. Each defensive back appears to be watching the quarterback at the snap.

Shanahan's offense aggressively sells the initial play fake to Alfred Morris up the middle. Griffin does this by extending the ball away from his body in a position where all of the defenders can see it, while Morris reacts to the ball by extending his arms to welcome it into his chest. The offensive line runs one of its typical run blocking calls that leaves right defensive end Robert Quinn completely alone to the top of the screen and every player to the other side of the field.

The play fake creates hesitation on the Rams defensive line as they watch the ball for the threat of the run. Behind the defensive line, all but one of the linebackers are sliding towards the right side of the offense. The one linebacker who is not sliding to that side of the field is attacking the backfield. However, that linebacker, number 50, angles his route into the backfield to put himself in position to meet Morris rather than attack Griffin. The three deep defensive backs are all hesitating and watching the ball in the backfield.

After the initla play fake, the defensive front is still watching Griffin as he carries out another fake to Morgan running the end-around. Griffin executes the play fake perfectly by hiding the ball with his left hand while extending his right hand. His back is turned to Quinn at the top of the screen who is watching to account for the end-around, while the linebackers towards the other side of the field can't see the football anymore through the traffic in front of them.

This end-around play fake keeps Quinn out wide and draws the linebackers towards the other sideline. The only linebacker who can see the ball is in position to be blocked by Morris. On the backend, two of the three defensive backs are committed to coming forward because of the end-around threat, while the cornerback to the top of the screen, Janoris Jenkins, is still watching the ball and not his receiver.

When Griffin turns around, he has a huge amount of space to work in and one receiver essentially running free down the middle of the field. Three rams defenders in the front seven, including Quinn who has a great matchup against fullback Darrell Young on the outside, are taking themselves out of the play as they react to Morgan on the end around, leaving the offense's five offensive linemen to block just three defensive linemen.

Only one front seven player can threaten Griffin and he is being well blocked by Morris to the bottom of the screen. The secondary on the back end has completely blown the deep coverage as Leonard Hankerson is running free down the seam.

Remember, this is the first point in the play where Griffin has turned around to look at the defense. He hasn't done anything except carry out play fakes to this point in the play. Now he doesn't need to manage the pocket or read the coverage, because there is no real pass rush threat and his first read is wide open down the middle of the field.

Griffin needs enough arm strength to throw the ball down the field, but he doesn't even need to fit the ball into a tight window or rush his throw to make sure it gets there before the defender recovers. Hankerson is in a huge amount of space. For a quarterback with the physical throwing ability of Griffin(or Manziel) this is a very easy throw.

This play didn't require anything spectacular from the quarterback and it didn't even require anything spectacular from the receiver.

Hankerson ran straight down the seam and was able to do so unopposed because Janoris Jenkins was distracted by the play fakes in the backfield.

While relying on defensive mistakes to be productive isn't always the best way to produce because better defenses make fewer mistakes, the ability to force defensive mistakes is one of the most valuable attributes an offensive coordinator can have.

Because of the mobility of Griffin, something Shanahan will have in Manziel, the Washington offense featured many differeny play action fakes. Griffin could extend wide to fake a handoff before settling back into the pocket, he could extend wide to fake the handoff before taking off and running to the opposite sideline, he could do a quick fake from the shotgun when threatening with the read option, he could do a more elaborate fake from the shotgun threatening the read option, he could fake the pitch to one side before turning to run to the other sideline or he could fake the run himself before pulling back up and throwing the ball downfield.

Sometimes the play fake wasn't even necessary as Shanahan used rollouts on many occasions in situational football.

What we see on the broadcast tape with Shanahan's play action is only one part of how his scheme makes life easier for his quarterbacks. The unseen aspect comes at the receiver position, where his route combinatinos are very well thought out and generally decisive.

Rarely ever does a receiver in Shanahan's offense run a route that isn't directly linked to another route and rarely ever does he run a route that would be classified as slow developing. The impact of losing Josh Gordon for the Browns can't simply be ignored, because his absence will be felt, but they have a coordiantor who isn't completely committed to throwing the ball down the field on every play, so the impact can be softened.

When Griffin was a rookie, he threw very few intermediate passes that didn't come off of play action. Furthermore, he rarely ever had to look at one receiver outside the numbers on one side of the field before finding his second read on the other side of the field. Shanahan used very intelligent route combinations to give Griffin multiple options in specific, confined areas on the field.

On this play against the Steelers, we again see that staple play action motion for the quarterback behind the line of scrimmage. This time when he looks down the field, he finds the deep crossing route after holding the ball for a split second. The crossing route is wide open, but the completion and open receiver isn't the most significant aspect of this play.

The replay angle shows us that Griffin had three options in his line of vision. Two of those options were open because of the presence of the first, so Griffin had a simple read to make while again not being under pressure because of the play action motion's impact on the defensive front. This is a relatively simple design that many teams in the league use, but it reflects a point of emphasis for the offense that Shanahan run with Griffin in 2012.

While situational football may not seem vitally important for fantasy football owners, winning in situational football is what allows offenses to stay on the field and continue to be productive. An offense that sustains drives is a lot more likely to put up stats than an offense that simply wants the big play on every snap. Shanahan uses stacked receivers and bunches in situational football to create easy offense.

On this Third-and-4 against the Minnesota Vikings, Shanahan exploits the short side of the field. Not only does he stack two receivers together on the short side of the field with a tight end inside of them and a running back also aligned to that side of the field in the backfield, the outside receivers are on the inside of the numbers. This brings too many bodies together at the line of scrimmage for the defense to press at the line of scrimmage even though it's Third-and-4.

At the snap, the defense drops into a zone coverage, but the underneath defenders are immediately pulled away by the receiver at the top of the stack and the tight end. The receiver at the bottom of the stack pauses for a moment before taking advantage of his clean release and running into open space at the first down marker.

The receiver, Santana Moss, is only open for a second, but Griffin throws the ball on time for the easy completion.

Stacked releases are very useful for receivers who struggle to beat press coverage. Andrew Hawkins could prove to be a nightmare for opposing defenses in the AFC North if Shanahan uses him in this kind of a role. When the stack prevents the defense from jamming the receiver at the line, it becomes almost impossible for the defense to disrupt the timing of the offense.

Essentially everything is uncertain for the Browns right now because they are installing a new offense with new pieces. However, Manziel is talented enough that there won't be major concerns over his ability to perform in the right system, even if he makes more mistakes than Griffin did. The real concern for the Browns is whether they can establish the run as well as Washington did in 2012. Being able to force the defense to play more zone and give more cushions to the receivers outside so they can stack the box on the inside would go a long way to erasing any concerns the team has at the receiver position.

Against off coverage, Shanahan's route combinations underneath become very difficult to stop.

Against the New Orleans Saints in Week 1 of the 2012 season, Shanahan's play design gave the offense an easy touchdown. Again, it was a relatively simple concept, but a concept that you expect to be effective when you have a dominant running game and a quarterback who can break away for big gains when the secondary doesn't have eyes on him.

The Saints send a blitz from the second level that the offensive line picks up comfortably. Griffin stands in the pocket and appears to be staring down the receiver who was closest to him on his right side. Based on the play design, it would actually make more sense if Griffin wasn't watching his receiver at all, but rather the defender covering his receiver. Shanahan has his two inside receivers arc towards the pylon with the outside receiver running underneath.

Because the defense was playing off coverage, the defensive back lined up over the outside receiver has no chance of getting to him before he makes it to the end zone. The only way Griffin doesn't throw the ball to his outside receiver coming in is if the inside defender drops into a zone in front of him. That means Griffin needs to know where that defender is before he throws the ball.

The beauty of this play is that the inside receiver immediately arcs back down the seam when he runs inside the defender that Griffin is looking at. This means that Griffin has two options in his line of sight and just one defender. A simple decision should lead to an easy touchdown.

In the end Griffin could have thrown the ball to either receiver as the Saints defenders ran into each other, but he took the easier option underneath.

One question with Shanahan's offense moving forward is how much he will allow his quarterbacks to run the ball. Griffin was an exceptionally good rushing quarterback during the 2012 season. He finished the regular season with over 800 yards and 7 touchdowns while carrying the ball 120 times. However, he then tore his ACL in the playoffs.

Shanahan didn't just allow Griffin to scramble whenever he wanted, he also ran read option plays and called designed runs for him. He even sent Griffin on a route down the sideline once against the Pittsburgh Steelers.

Obviously Griffin's 2012 season went about as well as anyone could have expected it to go when he was selected with the second overall pick in the draft that year. Individually, Griffin deserves a huge amount of credit because he ran Shanahan's offense almost to perfection and he made plenty of plays on more traditional drop backs also. It's impossible to completely hide the quarterback position with screens and play action no matter how effective those plays are when you do use them.

Griffin was clearly a better prospect than Manziel coming out of college. He has a better deep ball and was bigger, something that does actually affect how the quarterback can play the game even if Russell Wilson succeeds in spite of his height.

With that said, there is no reason to think that Manziel can't also be very productive during his rookie season. Shanahan's offense doesn't turn bad quarterbacks into good quarterbacks, but it has a track record of getting the most out of those who do navigate his offense because it creates a baseline for those quarterbacks with plays that any professional passer should expect to make.

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