Hungarian soldiers and policemen stand next to a train from Croatia at the railway station in Zakany | EPA/ZOLTAN MATHE Opinion Why Western liberals misunderstand Hungary The country has rejected liberal universalism and is being punished for it by the European public.

To understand Hungary’s response to the migration crisis, it is important to consider its primary principles: compassion, legality and political responsibility.

The Hungarian government’s first priority is the rule of law; i.e., its obligations under the Schengen and the Dublin regulations and its responsibility to Hungarian citizens, who expect security and competence. Recent surveys that place public support for the government at 80 percent suggest that it’s fulfilling its domestic responsibility. Much the same can be said for the Hungarian government’s responsibility under Schengen and Dublin. For all that the building of the fence on the Serbian border has been criticized, these are Hungary’s obligations to its EU partners.

The mass migration of 2015 demands a deeper analysis, because the assessment adopted by many is simplistic. Neither economic considerations, nor compassion, nor the 1951 Geneva Convention offer a sufficient basis for a migrant policy. These overlook the cultural, historical and psychological experiences of the Hungarians.

The arrival of migrants involves three stages: reception, integration and then assimilation, even though this last stage is widely rejected by Western European elites who remain committed to multiculturalism. So, what are the ground rules with which migrants are expected to conform, and which will pave the way to acceptance as full members of the host community?

The Western answer seems to be: obey the law, and pay your taxes. This could seem broadminded, but is, in reality, nothing of the kind, because a community — with its customs, trust, moral norms, and codes of conduct — is built on much deeper foundations. And to become a member means not merely to be integrated, but to be assimilated. Since World War II, the idea of assimilation has been rejected. Non-European immigrants are expected only to be multicultural, which gives rise to parallel societies that generate rival codes of loyalty and impedes their full membership.

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The liberal paradigm, with its universalist pretensions and overweening self-confidence, frowns on assimilation. Where does this conceit come from?

In broad historical terms, liberalism believes that it has defeated all its opponents. From the 18th century on, it successfully marginalized Christianity as the primary source of morality in Europe. Then, at terrible cost, liberalism defeated Fascism (strictly speaking, it did not do so on its own, but let that pass). Two generations on, liberalism saw off Marxism, again attributing the victory entirely to itself — Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” being the clearest example of this.

In the 1990s in the West, liberalism also concluded that it must put an end to ethnic nationalism: Ethnicity was declared unacceptable and to be a nationalist was beyond the pale. The wars of Yugoslav succession were the trigger. Note that liberalism’s victory did not mean that its defeated antagonists were destroyed. A hegemony was established, under which political and economic propositions could only be advanced from inside the liberal thought-world. In that sense, it was a famous victory.

If we put these propositions together — that liberals consider the community to be marginal and are convinced that liberalism will overcome its opponents — we see why liberals are so lackadaisical about Islam. If they’ve sent Christianity into retirement, they will — so they believe — deal similarly with Islam.

And yet, if the liberal thought-world is built on human dignity, universalism and consensual conflict resolution, then Islam gives rise to a collision. Islam has its own version of universalism, and little sympathy for Western liberal values. This collision is a serious challenge to liberalism, which liberals are keen to avoid, even while describing attempts to characterize Islam in this way as racist and xenophobic.

Against this background, what Hungary is doing constitutes a multiple challenge. It rejects liberal universalism and insists that Christian values are as valid as secular liberal norms. It applies the rule of law and further insists that this transcends glib compassion. And it treats the safeguarding of Hungarian nationhood as a justification for its policies and practices. It’s no wonder that Western liberals — and their frontline soldiers in the media — despise and detest Hungary, a country they have made no attempt to understand.

A final thought: In the migrant crisis, Hungary has been exercising agency. This is unusual in West-East relations, where for the most part, Central European states follow the Western model. Some of the opprobrium heaped on Hungary is more than likely derived from the West’s dislike of Central Europeans behaving like other European states, no longer subalterns but as agents in history.

György Schöpflin is a Hungarian MEP from the Fidesz party.