Introduction

In the SEP entry on the problem of evil, Michael Tooley says that the notion of libertarian freedom is problematic:

One problem with an appeal to libertarian free will is that no satisfactory account of the concept of libertarian free will is yet available. Thus, while the requirement that, in order to be free in the libertarian sense, an action not have any cause that lies outside the agent is unproblematic, this is obviously not a sufficient condition, since this condition would be satisfied if the behavior in question were caused by random events within the agent. So one needs to add that the agent is, in some sense, the cause of the action. But how is the causation in question to be understood? Present accounts of the metaphysics of causation typically treat causes as states of affairs. If, however, one adopts such an approach, then it seems that all that one has when an action is freely done, in the libertarian sense, is that there is some uncaused mental state of the agent that causally gives rise to the relevant behavior, and why freedom, thus understood, should be thought valuable, is far from clear. The alternative is to shift from event-causation to what is referred to as ‘agent-causation’. But then the question is whether there is any satisfactory account of causation where causation is not a relation between states of affairs. Some philosophers, such as Timothy O’Connor (1995, 1996, 2000a, 2000b, and 2002) and Randolph Clarke (1993, 1996, and 2003) have claimed that such an account can be given, but their suggestions have not been widely accepted. [1]

I am going to put these objections aside for the sake of argument.

Suppose that an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god exists, and that we have libertarian freedom. Further suppose that the earliest a person could possibly exercise libertarian freedom is when one is 3 years old. Suppose a child dies at the age of 2. This child never exercised libertarian freedom. Will this child go to heaven, hell, or neither?

Suppose that God will grant one eternal life if and only if one has satisfied certain conditions. Many theists would say that a child who dies without having exercised libertarian freedom will satisfy these conditions.

Suppose that Adolf Hitler’s father, Alois Hitler, had the libertarian freedom to kill Adolf when he was 2 years old. If Alois had killed Adolf, would Adolf have gone to heaven?

Suppose that the god that exists is omniscient, and knows what anyone would choose to do in any situation (suppose he has middle knowledge). God knows what Adolf would have done had Alois not killed him when he was a child.

Let {Hitler} be the set of all possible worlds in which Hitler exists. For every world in this set, Hitler either goes to heaven or he does not go to heaven. It seems that there would be an infinite number of worlds in {Hitler}. If God has middle knowledge, then he knows what Hitler would do in each of these possible worlds.

Suppose two propositions are jointly sufficient for God to know whether or not a person will go to heaven in a given possible world.

God knows what the person would do in the possible world. God knows the extent to which the person would have libertarian freedom in the possible world.

Suppose these propositions are true for every person in every possible world. If this is the case, then for any given world that includes Hitler, God knows whether or not Hitler would receive eternal life in that possible world.

If there is at least one possible world in which Hitler receives eternal life, then why would God not create that world? The theist may respond that there is another person, who, like Hitler, would receive eternal life in some but not all possible worlds. I will call this person John Smith. The theist may claim that there is no possible world in which Hitler and John Smith both receive eternal life. One way the theist can justify this claim is by saying that in any world in which Hitler receives eternal life, John Smith does not exist. For example, the theist could say that only a descendent of Hitler could be John Smith, and any world in which Hitler has a child is not a world in which Hitler receives eternal life.

This raises the question of what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for a person to exist. The theist is claiming that John Smith only exists if he is a descendent of Hitler. Should we accept this claim?

Essentiality of Origins

Catholic philosopher and mathematician Alexander Pruss summarizes the essentiality of origins thesis as “the principle that the causes of things are essential to them.” [2] The essentiality of origins thesis supports the theist’s claim that John Smith only exists if he is a descendent of Hitler. Someone who accepts the essentiality of origins thesis would say that person A and person B are the same person if and only if they are or were associated with a body that developed from a certain sperm-egg pair.

A theist might reject the essentiality of origins thesis by saying that God could have put my soul in a body that developed from a different sperm-egg pair. This theist can say that if God had put my soul in your body, then the soul in your body would be me.

Suppose that at the instant of my conception, God intervened and changed my DNA so that I would have brown eyes instead of blue eyes. If God had done this, would the person who developed from that zygote still be me? I’m not sure how those who subscribe to the essentiality of origins thesis would answer this question.

Pruss has also discussed Radical Essentiality of Origins:

Radical Essentiality of Origins (REO) is the thesis that the complete origins of an entity x are necessary and sufficient to the identity of x. In other words, for any x, if D is a complete description of the origins of x (all the history prior to x, as well as x‘s initial state), then necessarily something is an x if and only if it has D. [3]

We have to determine what is included in the history prior to x. Does the history prior to me include what was going on in China the instant before I was conceived? If so, then REO seems ridiculously counterintuitive to me.

My understanding is that EO and REO are based on Thomism. Given my aversion to Thomism, it makes sense that I would find EO and REO to be counterintuitive. I am going to reject EO and REO based on their counterintuitiveness. Perhaps I will discuss essentiality of origins in more detail in a future post.

Other Theories of Personal Identity

Can the theist justify the claim that only a descendent of Hitler could be John Smith without subscribing to the essentiality of origins thesis. The theist needs to justify a theory of personal identity other than Derek Parfit’s no-further-fact view, and I don’t think the theist can. The Wikipedia entry on Parfit’s book Reasons and Persons [4] summarizes Parfit’s view as follows:

At time 1, there is a person. At a later time 2, there is a person. These people seem to be the same person. Indeed, these people share memories and personality traits. But there are no further facts in the world that make them the same person. [5]

My problem with theories of personal identity other than Parfit’s view is that they assume that the self is something other than just an abstract idea. I said the following in my first post on the problem of evil:

There are sensory experiences (based on my appearance and personality) that are associated with the abstract object denoted by the phrase “the author of this post.” Different people will associate different sensory experiences with this abstract object depending on how much they have interacted with me. To say that these sensory experiences are intrinsic to who I am (whatever that is) seems incorrect to me. I could get in an accident that changes my appearance and my personality, but I don’t think this would mean I have stopped existing and have been replaced by someone else.

Until the theist can justify a theory of personal identity other than Parfit’s view, I am going to assume that Parfit’s view is correct. If Parfit’s view is correct, then the view that only a descendent of Hitler could be John Smith is incorrect. God could have made someone with John Smith’s appearance and personality without that person being a descendent of Hitler. If Parfit’s view is correct, then for all intents and purposes, this person is John Smith.

If Parfit’s view is correct, then God can create a world where both Hitler and John Smith exist and receive eternal life (this is not to say that they must be alive at the same time).

A Trilemma for Libertarians

Suppose it is the case that there is a nonempty set of worlds in which both Hitler and John Smith exist. Does this entail that there is at least one possible world in which both Hitler and John Smith receive eternal life? It seems to me that it does, as God could create a world in which both Hitler and John Smith die before they exercise libertarian freedom.

If any person who dies before exercising libertarian freedom goes to heaven, then why did God give us libertarian freedom in the first place? Theists often say that only beings who have libertarian freedom can be loving, but this implies that beings who have never had libertarian freedom have never been loving.

The theist can say that those who die before having exercised libertarian freedom can still exercise libertarian freedom in heaven. Does this freedom include the ability to not be loving? If those in heaven have to be loving, and if those in heaven have libertarian freedom, then libertarian freedom does not necessitate the ability to not be loving. If libertarian freedom does not necessitate the ability to not be loving, then being able to make libertarian choices unrelated to love, such as which flavor of ice cream to eat, is sufficient for one to have libertarian freedom. But the theist is claiming that being able to be loving entails that one could have chosen to not be loving. The theist’s claim forces the theist to reject the claim that the ability to make libertarian choices unrelated to love is sufficient for one to have libertarian freedom.

The following propositions are jointly incompatible:

Everyone in heaven has libertarian freedom. It is impossible for anyone in heaven to not be loving. If it is impossible for anyone in heaven to not be loving, then no one in heaven has libertarian freedom.

Libertarian freedom theodicies are weakened by the fact that one of these propositions is false.

References

Revisions

Added quote from SEP entry