U.S. Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and the State Department continue to seek to silence any criticism of their framework deal with the Taliban. Prior to Afghan National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib’s visit to Washington last week, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul refused to issue a visa to Amrullah Saleh, the former chief of Afghan intelligence and interior minister and a man who has literally put his life on the line to protect U.S. troops and fight the Taliban. The reason was to prevent Saleh from briefing congressmen on the direction of Khalilzad’s framework deal with the Taliban .

Such effort to prevent criticism is already a bad sign. After all, if the deal is as solid as Khalilzad and the State Department say, the merits of the deal should survive open and honest debate.

Mohib, who is personally and professionally close to Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani, did level such criticism which, while blunt, was also valid . The core of his complaint was that Khalilzad was cutting the elected Afghan government out of the process and thereby undercutting it.

Kabul is not alone in their frustration with Khalilzad. Khalilzad refused to brief or even talk to India about his dealing with the Taliban until this past January, a curious omission given Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s calls for India to take a greater role in Afghanistan. New Delhi is right to question how they should be expected to take a greater role in Afghanistan’s future if Trump’s envoy for reasons of ego, ambition, or ease will not talk to them about his dealings to shape Afghanistan’s future. In many ways, Khalilzad’s behavior to cut out allies and subvert the normal U.S. diplomatic process is reminiscent of Christopher Hill’s diplomacy more than a decade ago with North Korea. It was common for Hill to go into a room alone with North Korea, sanitize records of conversations, and seek to silence any criticism in order to achieve a fait accompli. Suffice to say, it did not work.

Undersecretary of State David Hale has reportedly responded to the crisis by cutting off Mohib entirely. Apparently for Hale, dealing with the murderers of hundreds of American troops is one thing, but impugning the honor of a U.S. diplomat? Unacceptable!

If the report is true, and Hale acted with the approval of the U.S. National Security Council and interagency process, then the Trump administration is putting American lives at risk for the sake of a diplomatic temper tantrum because Afghanistan’s National Security Advisor is the chief liaison not for diplomats but for the U.S. intelligence community and military. On the other hand, if Hale did not act with interagency approval, then the Trump administration and National Security Advisor John Bolton appear asleep at the switch.

Either way, the situation runs counter to U.S. interests.

The State Department’s reaction is reminiscent of former President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s efforts to silence South Korea President Kim Young-sam for his criticism of the 1994 Agreed Framework, as well as former President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry’s effort to punish Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for similar criticism of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. There is an unfortunate irony in each case that the White House and State Department sought to punish democratic allies for raising concerns about naive dealings with autocratic adversaries.

Many supporters of Khalilzad and his deal argue that, after 17 years, it is time to leave Afghanistan. That may be true and that may be Trump’s intention. But if so, then it’s deja vu all over again with Trump reprising the role of Obama and Khalilzad playing the role of Kerry.

When negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Obama, Kerry, and their supporters appeared to embrace the notion that a bad deal was better than no deal. Both Republicans and then-candidate Donald Trump castigated them for such irresponsibility.

A nuclear deal might be ideal, as might peace in Afghanistan, but sometimes a bad deal only ensures more conflict. At the same time, Republicans and Trump criticized the Obama-era belief that timelines should supplant strategy based upon the actual situation in the area of operations.

So how should the United States move forward with regard to Afghanistan? Here are a few starters:



The U.S,, now and in the future, should not undercut its coordination with Afghanistan’s security forces and intelligence services. The issue is not that Afghan forces have died in far greater numbers than their American and NATO counterparts but rather American lives remain at stake.

Criticism of the deal among allies in Kabul and New Delhi should be addressed head on, not silenced.

Drop the notion that a bad deal is better than no deal. Sometimes, compromise is not wise. After all, should the U.S. compromise with Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Shabaab , and the Islamic State?

, and the Islamic State? If the goal is to bring the Taliban into the political process, fine. But, if that is the case, they should commit to the process, drop their arms, and contest elections prior to the U.S. or its allies’ withdrawal.

The strategic issue for the U.S. is not whether to stay forever but rather how to prevent or fill a vacuum in Afghanistan that poses a national security threat to the U.S. Here, it is essential to draw India closer rather than push it away or keep it in the dark.

To bargain with the Taliban without addressing Pakistan’s support and sponsorship of the group is akin to believing Hezbollah is an independent partner independent of Iran. That may be true in imagination-land, but it is not reality. It is essential the State Department constructs policy in the latter realm.

Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner's Beltway Confidential blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official.