Q. Is the Indiana law, as some critics have stated and Mr. Pence denies, a “license to discriminate”?

A. Mr. Pence is right when he says there has been exaggeration of the likely effects of the law and misunderstanding of how it works. It does not create an unchecked new right for restaurant owners, for example, to refuse to serve gay men or lesbians. And those who invoke the law to avoid fines or lawsuits must go through a judicial process in which the burden on their beliefs is compared with the state’s interest in carrying out a mandate or imposing a fine.

Many of those who pushed for Indiana’s law have explicitly said that they hope it will protect vendors who refuse to participate in same-sex wedding ceremonies, helping them avoid actions that according to their beliefs are onerous and sinful. Less clear is how often that might occur, and how often those vendors might win in court.

To civil rights advocates, “religious freedom,” in this case, is code for simple discrimination and would not only inconvenience gay and lesbian couples, but also would relegate them to a form of second-class status. Those selling to the public should not be able to turn away customers because of their own private beliefs, these advocates say; the vendor is, after all, selling flowers, and is not required to embrace the beliefs of the customers. These critics ask: How would the public respond if businesses offered religious reasons for refusing to serve interracial couples?

Q. Are the new laws different from the original federal law and those in other states?

A. Mr. Pence has said that the Indiana law is identical to earlier renditions supported by Mr. Clinton when he was president and Barack Obama when he was a state senator in Illinois.

On Tuesday, Josh Earnest, the White House spokesman, said that the Indiana law was a “significant expansion” of the religious protections in the federal law.

In fact, the bills in both Indiana and Arkansas include provisions that are not in the federal law or most other states’ laws, and that could broaden the scope of protection for religious businesses. Both of them say that for-profit corporations that are substantially owned by members of a faith can claim protections under the law. And both of the versions broaden the definition of “state action,” stating, in the Indiana legislation, for example, that a person who feels his religious rights are being violated may assert protection under the law “in a judicial or administrative proceeding, regardless of whether the state or any other governmental entity is a party to the proceeding.”