Follow the action as the former foreign secretary - and current justice secretary - becomes the first serving cabinet minister to give evidence to the Chilcot panel

12.02pm: Jack Straw is giving evidence to the Iraq inquiry this afternoon - he's the first member of Gordon Brown's cabinet to appear - and there are at least two letters he wrote to Tony Blair that are likely to come up.

The first is one that Straw sent to Blair in March 2002, before his meeting with George Bush at Crawford.

We can read the whole thing because it was published in the Sunday Times at the weekend. It's not sensational, but it does reveal that Straw - who was foreign secretary at the time - was sceptical about going to war in Iraq and that he accurately anticipated many of the problems that subsequently arose.

Interestingly, Geoff Hoon, the then defence secretary, told the inquiry on Tuesday that he raised similar concerns with Blair before Crawford.

But the really interesting one is the secret letter that Straw sent to Blair in March 2003, just before the war started. He appears to have used it to urge Blair to pull out at the last minute, but the text has never been published and, as Patrick Wintour said in a story about this recently, the contents remain "one of the great mysteries of the high politics of the British invasion".

That said, there is plenty that we do know already about Straw's reservations at the time. In his biography Blair Unbound, Anthony Seldon describes what happened when Straw met Blair in Downing Street on 11 March 2003, just after Donald Rumsfeld suggested an invasion could go ahead without the British.

'Jack said, "Here is an opportunity for the UK not to participate",' recalled one witness. 'I don't recall anybody else saying the same thing. Blair would have none of it; he dismissed his suggestion out of hand.'

And here is what Seldon says about the secret letter.

After an anguished conversation with his close friend and adviser [Michael Jay, head of the Foreign Office], [Straw] took up his pen one final time to write Blair a 'personal minute', urging him to think about alternatives ... To colleagues, Straw explained his post-Azores letter to Blair as part of his 'duty' as foreign secretary. Yet Straw's reservations went far further than that, and are a matter of record. To some, his failure to speak out in cabinet was weak; to others it was a fine demonstration of service.

The hearing starts at 2pm. See you then.

1.58pm: Oh no! Straw has prepared a "witness statement" for the inquiry. And it runs to 8,000 words, according to Sky. I presume the inquiry will put it up on its website when Straw starts speaking.

2.03pm: The hearing has just started. And the Straw memorandum is on the website now. Here are some key extracts:

My decision to support military action in respect of Iraq was the most difficult decision I have ever faced in my life. I had actively supported the military action in the Falklands and in the first Gulf War, whilst in opposition. I had agreed as a member of the cabinet the action over Kosovo and Sierra Leone. As foreign secretary I had been directly involved in the post-9/11 strategy which had led to the invasion of Afghanistan. But those choices were much easier. Iraq was very different, and the moral as well as political dilemma were profoundly difficult. If I was also fully aware that my support for military action was critical. If I had refused that, the UK's participation in the military action would not in practice have been possible. There almost certainly would have been no majority, either in cabinet or in the Commons.

Those final three sentences are interesting. Straw is saying that he could have single-handedly stopped Britain going to war. That makes him sound tremendously self-important. But it's probably true.

2.14pm: Straw has just told the hearing the the Iraq containment policy was a "stodge" by the summer of 2001. 9/11 changed everything in the US, he said. It was the largest loss of life on US soil since the Civil War.

I'm still looking through his document.

2.16pm: Here is Straw's final paragraph:

I made my choice. I have never backed away from it, and I do not intend to do so, and fully accept the responsibilities which flow from that. I believed at the time, and I still believe, that we made the best judgments we could have done in the circumstances: we did so assiduously and on the best evidence we had available at the time.

2.18pm: Some more points from the final pages of the Straw document:

• Straw said his assessment of the threat posed by Iraq "did evolve" from the beginning of 2002.

• He said that if the weapons inspections had continued without an ultimatum, "all that would have happened is that the inspections process would have petered out, the unresolved disarmament questions would have remained unresolved and the Iraqi regime would have been re-emboldened".

• He said the war had been the "most divisive" issue of his political lifetime.

• He said he "deeply regretted" the "grave loss of life".

• He said the judgments made by the government were widely shared. "'It is for the Iraqi regime to end this crisis by complying with the demands of the security council' was the view of the European Union, France, and Germany included. It was my profound view too."

• He cited Kierkegaard. "To paraphrase Kierkegaard, whilst life can only be understood backwards, it has to be lived forward. We do not have the benefit of hindsight."

2.26pm: In the hearing, Straw has criticised George Bush's decision to link Iran, Iraq and North Korea in the axis of evil speech. That made handling Iran "much more difficult".

Asked about the government's failure to anticipate problems in post-war Iraq, he also said "what we anticipated were different problems".

Sir Roderic Lyne is questioning Straw now. Lyne was a diplomat, so Straw is his old boss!

2.30pm: From what I've seen of it so far, the Straw memo does not seem to mention his last-minute "think again" letter to Blair. (See 12.02pm)

2.32pm: Straw has just said this:

I don't know what the difference is between a perception of risk and risk.

This was in response to a question from Lyne, who asked what the difference between the two was.

Straw says that, as justice secretary, he knows that you cannot tell someone worried about being burgled that they should not worry about it because, objectively, the risk of being burgled had gone down.

(That's a good point, although ministers are often telling people that they should not worry so much about crime because the probability of being a crime victim has gone down.)

2.35pm: Lyne mentions the memo published by the Sunday Times. (See 12.02pm) Straw says the paper took it off a website. He says it first appeared on the web in 2004.

2.39pm: Straw says:

Military action for regime change could not be an objective of British foreign policy.

2.40pm: Straw says he offered Blair his "best judgment and his loyalty".

He says he expected people who work for him to say when they disagree. But he expects them to by loyal too. That is the approach he took with Blair.

2.41pm: I've finished my preliminary skim through the Straw document. His conclusions sound measured and sincere, and he goes through the diplomatic developments in lawyerly detail. But there's quite a lot that he does not write about. He does not cover the legal advice he received about the war, and I didn't see a reference to the September dossier. And, as I mentioned earlier, he does not comment on his private discussions with Blair. Perhaps it will come up this afternoon. Now I'm tuning in and giving the hearing my full attention.

2.46pm: Lyne asks if Iraq ever posed a terrorist threat.

Straw says there was no evidence that Iraq had been involved with al-Qaida.

There was evidence, however, that Saddam was ready to sponsor terrorism where he thought it was appropriate.

Straw says he cannot speculate on what would have happened if containment had been allowed to wither and die.

Lyne says containment could have been strengthened.

2.49pm: Straw says he wants to make a point about intelligence. Some things sit in the "psyche" of decison makers, he says. During the Falklands, there were accusations that Lord Carrington, the then foreign secretary, had ignored intellegence. This meant policy makers absorbed the lesson: take notice of intelligence.

2.52pm: Lyne asks about Blair letters to Bush.

Straw says he saw some in draft, and some after they had been sent. It depended where he was. He spent a lot of time abroad. On one occasion he spoke to Blair about one of the letters on a plane.

Asked if he saw all of them, he says: "I think so."

He certainly saw all the key ones.

Lyne asks about one delivered by David Manning to Bush in late July 2002. He says the text is not in the public domain, but it has been written about.

Straw says he recalls the letter.

Lyne asks if Straw was "entirely comfortable" with what Blair said.

Straw said: "This would be easier if there were private sessions."

He explains: "I happen to place a high value on the confidentiality of relations with foreign states."

He says he had a very good relationship with David Manning, Blair's foreign policy adviser. He had known Manning for 20 years.

On the letter, he says:

Would I have written the memorandum in the same way? Probably not.

Straw says Blair had been close to the Clinton administration. That led to "considerable suspicion" by the Bush adminstration about whether this "socialist" and the "worse socialists, or better socialists behind him" could be trusted.

Blair went to the US to push the Bush adminstration down the UN route, Straw says.

2.58pm: Lyne says that the British support for the US led to an assumption on the part of the Americans that Britain would definitely support war.

Sir John Chilcot starts coughing badly. Straw whips out some cough sweets and offers him one.

3.00pm: Straw says regime change was never the objective of the British government.

Nor would I have ever been willing to be party to that.

But he concedes it was the American policy.

3.01pm: Lyne asks about the conditions for Britain supporting the war.

Chilcot asks Straw to confirm that these were not pre-conditions without which Britain would not take part; they were conditions designed to ensure that the strategy was successful.

Straw says that's correct, although he points out that having a legal basis for war was an absolute condition.

3.04pm: Straw talks about dealing with the Americans. He says when he started the job he was influenced by three particular documents: the third volume of Skidelsky's volume of Keynes (which descibes how Keynes negotiated with the Americans: an internal Foreign Office paper on dealing with the Americans written by Roderic Braithwaite; and a book by Sir Robin Renwich called Fighting with Allies.

3.07pm: Lyne asks about a meeting Straw had with Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, in the summer of 2002.

Straw, who obviously takes maintaining confidences quite seriously, says he does not want to quote from what Powell said. But it is known that they shared similar views.

They've stopped for a break. I'll summarise the key points in a moment.

3.12pm: Here are the key points:

• Straw claimed that he could have stopped Britain going to war if he had wanted. The implication of this is that he considered resigning, although he does not say this. (See 2.03pm)

• Straw said he was strongly opposed to regime change. But he hinted that Blair did not feel about this as strongly as he did. (See 2.40pm and 3pm)

• Straw said at one he would have felt more comfortable giving evidence in private. (See 2.52pm)

3.23pm: The Press Association has got a good version of a key exchange about regime change. Here it is:

Straw said:

[Regime change] was off the agenda as far as the UK was concerned. A foreign policy objective of regime change I regard as improper and also self-evidently unlawful. It had no chance of being a runner in the UK, it certainly would not have got my support. The case therefore stood or fell on whether Iraq posed a threat to international peace and security by reason of its weapons of mass destruction.

Lyne asked if Blair shared this view. Straw replied:

I think the best way to find that out is to ask him. We are two different people.

Then Lyne said:

But one government. I am trying to find out what the government's policy is.

Straw replied:



It is no great surprise to know that people at senior levels in government hold different views and debate those. What I had to offer the Prime Minister was my best judgment and my loyalty.

3.28pm: They're back, and talking about Israel. Straw says Israel has a "completely ridiculous system of proportional representation". That won't surprise those in the Labour party who suspect Straw is trying to stop the Commons debating electoral reform before the election.

3.29pm: Straw was Blair was "relentless" in trying to get Washington to take more interest in the Middle East peace process. It was unfortunate that he was not successful, he says.

Lyne says Blair and Straw were pushing Bush in one direction. But the Israelis were pushing Bush in another direction "and the Israelis won".

Straw says getting Bush to back a road map for the Middle East was an achievement. But he seems to concede the point.

Lyne suggests Britain "failed".

And I miss the answer. I've been following on Sky and they decide to pull out.

3.35pm: Sir Lawrence Freedman is asking the questions now. He asks Straw if it's true that the cabinet would not have supported war if the UN had not been involved.

Straw says that's correct.

Freedman suggests this means autumn 2002 was a critical moment.

Straw says many in the US adminstration were opposed to the UN. Britain was embarked on a strategy that could have led to a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

3.39pm: Straw says that, as someone who "cared about the United Nations and aware of the history of the failure of the League of Nations pre-war", that maintaining the authority of the UN was very important.

3.43pm: Freedman says that Sir David Omand said yesterday that, if you were to look hard at the intelligence on Iraq, you might conclude: "Is that all there is?"

Freedman says Straw at one point described the intelligence as "thin".

Straw does not seem to recognise this. He says that if Freedman says he has used the description, he will take his word for it.

Straw says that the case for war did not just rely on intelligence. He writes about this at length in his 8,000-word memo.

3.46pm: Freedman asks about Blair's decision to use the phrase "beyond doubt" in relation to the intelligence in the September dossier.

Straw says the dossier was not as important as Freedman suggests. Andrew Gilligan, the BBC journalist, described the dossier as "dull" after it was published, Straw says.

There has been an assumption that the public reception of the dossier was 'My God, have you seen this' ... It wasn't. It was treated as telling people what they already knew.

Freedman suggests the document was important given the "criticality" of the moment. Criticality - that's a new word for me.

3.50pm: Sir John Chilcot asks about the headlines that appeared in some papers after the publication of the September dossier suggesting Iraqi missiles could hit British troops in 45 minutes. Did anyone try to correct them?

Straw says he read Alastair Campbell's judgment. He thought Campbell was saying it was not within the power of Number 10 to correct those headlines.

But he accepts that the 45-minute claim should have been much clearer.

3.53pm: Straw says his whole aim during this period was to resolve the dispute through peaceful means.

He says people of the "highest integrity", like John Scarlett and David Omand, were involved in the preparation of the September dossier.

He also says an International Institute of Strategic Studies report published two weeks before the publication of the September dossier contained an even more alarming assessement of the threat from Iraq.

3.56pm: Straw says intelligence is "patchy and sporadic" by its very nature. He says he made this point in his memo.

He's right. Here's a quote from the memo:

Intelligence gathering in any environment is by its nature difficult. The picture presented is inevitably going to be partial and incomplete. This is true in any circumstances, but was especially true for closed authoritarian societies, with ruthless systems of enforcement, like Iraq.

That does rather contradict what Blair said in his foreword to the September dossier about the intelligence establishing "beyond doubt" that Iraq had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons.

4.03pm: Freedman mentions something Straw said in his memo. Straw revealed that he told two Times journalists on an unattributable basis in early January 2003 that the odds of avoiding war were 60/40.

4.06pm: Freedman says there was an assumption in early 2003 in the papers - I presume he means government papers - that if the pressure on Saddam became severe, there might be a coup.

Straw confirms that that is the case.

Freedman asks what would have constituted a "material breach" of UN security council resolution 1441.

Straw says this was set out in "OP4" of the resolution. That's operative paragraph 4.

Freedman says people expected the weapons inspectors to find a smoking gun.

Straw says the inspectors did find things. They discovered missiles with a greater range than UN rules allowed.

I think what you are asking is was compliance impossible for Saddam in the circumstances ... My short answer to that is no.



The resolution required "cooperation". It did not say that unless Saddam produced a certain amount of mustard gas etc, there would be war. If Saddam had cooperated with the inspectors, and allowed scientists to be interviewed, "that would have been the end of it", Straw says.

4.14pm: Straw says the level of international consensus that Iraq had WMD was "very broad".

There was "no war party" on the UN security council.

If Hans Blix had said "this regime is complying", that would have been the end of it from the point of view of the UK. "The strategy of 1441 would have succeeded," he says.

Freedman says David Omand complained yesterday that MI6 "overpromised and under-delivered" on the intelligence.

Straw says he used to question people from MI6 about the intelligence. He was concerned "we weren't getting as much intelligence as we ought to".

But he quotes from something Hans Blix wrote in his book after the conflict. Blix said:

My gut feeling, which I kept to myself, suggested that Iraq still engaged in prohibited activities and retained prohibited items, and that it had the documents to prove it.

But it's not clear from what Straw is saying at what point Blix was experiencing this "gut feeling".

They've now stopped for another short break.

4.23pm: It's been a slightly scrappy hearing so far. The questioning has veered from subject to subject and the revelations have been low-grade. Here are the latest of them:

• Straw complained to MI6 that he was not happy with the quality of intelligence coming out of Iraq. (See 4.14pm)

• He said that intelligence is "patchy and sporadic" by nature and (in his memorandum) that it is "inevitably going to be partial and complete". (See 3.56pm)

• He said the 45-minute claim in the September dossier should have been clearer. (See 3.50pm)

4.31pm: Freedman says that resolution 1441 was designed to ensure that Britain and America did not need a second resolution to go to war. So why did the government go for a second resolution?

Straw says getting a second resolution would have made the handling of the matter easier in the UK.

The government also wanted to give Iraq a second final opportunity. The proposed second resolution had clear benchmarks. Straw thought this would ensure compliance.

Freedman asks when it became clear that there would not be a second resolution.

Straw says between March 7 and March 14. The moment when he saw President Chirac on television say that, whatever the circumstances, France would veto a second resolution was the moment he realised it would not happen.

Chirac's move was designed to stop the second resolution happening, Straw says.

After Chirac gave his interview, the president of Mexico admitted himself to hospital with a bad back. Straw says this was a surprise because no one realised his condition has become acute. But it meant the alliance in favour of a second resolution fell away.

4.36pm: Freedman asks if the military planning created a deadline.

Straw says some in the US wanted to invade in January. The British wanted to delay. Straw spoke to Colin Powell - a former head of the US armed forces - how long troops could be kept on standby without the force "degrading". Powell said they would have to go by late March or early April.

Freedman suggests there were "two contradictory timetables".

Chilcot intervenes. He suggests the critical moment was right at the final moment because that was when pressure on Iraq was most intense.

Straw says one of his "great frustrations" was that the French and the Germans did not agree to a second resolution. That would have enabled the dispute to be resolved peacefully. Military action would have been delayed.

Straw says Blix and his team needed to interview Iraqi scientists. If this had happened, and if Blix had concluded that the Iraqi WMD programme was degraded, then war would have been avoided.

Freedman says Blix did not want to take scientists out of Iraq.

Straw says: "He never said that to me."

He goes on:

There are some of those who were involved who have sought to give an account of what they said at the time without gloss.

Others have given an account of what they said at the time "with gloss".

It is not clear which camp Blix is in, Straw says.

4.45pm: Straw says he had a meeting with Hans Blix. He told Blix he had read "every word" of the document that Blix was presenting to the UN security council. Blix replied: "That's more than I have done."

Straw says he was astonished.

The following day, at the UN security council meeting, a copy of Blix's document was not available.

Straw says UNMOVIC, the United Nations monitoring, verification and inspection commission produced it. In his memorandum, he says that the report convinced him that Iraq's non-compliance with the UN was profound.

The UNMOVIC document was published on March 7 2003, but only after the ministerial security council meeting at which it should have been discussed.

4.52pm: Straw says he does not know what the Americans would have done if Blix had said Iraq was complying.

But he personally would not have supported war if Blix had said Iraq was complying. And, even if he had still been in favour of war, there would not have been "a dog's chance" of getting that through the House of Commons.

The March report from Blix concluded the Iraqis were not complying with the UN requirements. But Straw again said it was strange that Blix did not release it until after the relevant UN meeting.

4.57pm: Freedman says one interpretation of what Chirac said was that he did not want a second resolution then, not that he did not want a second resolution at any point.

Straw says there has been textual analysis of Chirac's use of "le soir". But this was "a great Chiracian pronouncement". He was ruling out a second resolution "whatever the circumstances".

5.01pm: Freedman says the Americans went along with plans to get a second resolution "as a favour to the UK". Is that correct?

Straw says it would have been easier for the government to win the vote in parliament with a second resolution. A second resolution might also have avoided war, he says.

Freedman asks if there was a point where Straw and colleagues thought 'let's stop and think. Do we need to take another course?"

Straw says he was "profoundly concerned" about the anger of the British public, "which included many friends of mine".

Many of the Muslims in his constituency were opposed. And many of the non-Muslims were opposed too.

Freedman asks if there was a "plan B" when it became clear there would not be a second resolution.

Straw says in February it was not clear that there would not be a second resolution.

5.04pm: Straw says:

I thought about, and made submissions, about alternative approaches.

Freedman asks Straw if it is true that he suggested Britain not taking part in the military invasion.

Yes, says Straw.

That's the first time he has confirmed this, I think. He is saying he told Blair to considering pulling out of the invasion.

5.06pm: Freedman asks Straw how his advice was received.

Straw replies:

You'll have to ask Mr Blair, this.

Straw has used the "Mr Blair" several times in the hearing. It sounds very formal, given that they used to be close colleagues.

He says he submitted his ideas in a formal minute. It was "far too serious" to do verbally, he suggests.

Straw says he "may" have discussed his alternative approach with Geoff Hoon. He did not discuss it with Clare Short.

He discussed his views with colleagues in his office, and with David Manning and Colin Powell.

Freedman reminds Straw of what he said in his memo about his position being critical. Was there any point at which he contemplated resigning?

Straw replies:

I never got to that point. I have been very anxious in all of this not to put a gloss on what I was thinking at the time. You're historians. It's very easy to do.

He says an "absolutely fundamental point" was the role of the Commons. He thought it was "preposterous" that the Commons never voted on the Falklands war.

Had I not got agreement that we had to have a series of debates on substantive resolutions ... then I would not have been able to continue in my job.

He goes on:

Did I ever think I'm going to resign over this. No. We all have our bottom lines.

But it did weigh "heavily". He supported the war "very reluctantly".

5.12pm: Straw says the minutes he wrote to Blair were not ciculated to the cabinet. He says he knows the inquiry team have seen them.

Straw seems to be coughing a lot. A sign of nerves?

He goes on:

Was there a cabinet or cabinet committee where my alternative was discussed? The answer to that is no.

Freedman asks who knew about Straw's concerns.

Straw says Hoon knew about them. And Gordon Brown did too.

It was extremely important in terms of international diplomacy that we were talking with one voice.

Freedman asks what other ministers thought.

Straw is avoiding the question. He says he was making proposals based on a contingency. At that time they thought they might not get a majority in the Commons.

But he doesn't tell us what Brown said when he raised his concerns with him. Freedman does not pursue the question, and so we don't get an answer.

5.17pm: Straw says that the Foreign Office acquired protective clothing for its staff in Iraq because it was so worried about Saddam using chemical and biological weapons.

5.21pm: Sir Roderic Lyne asks for a clarification about Chirac. Chirac's comments were ambiguous. Did Straw go back to the French to try to find out what he really meant? Or did he just say, 'that's it, game over'?

Straw says he watched Chirac make that statement. "My French isn't bad." Although it was not a formal government statement, it was,"President Chirac pronouncing to La France". Straw said he assumed that Chirac knew what he was doing.

Lyne says he takes that to mean that Straw did not go back to the French.

Straw says he wil check.

5.24pm: Chilcot says that Straw is coming back for a second evidence session in the next week or so. And, with that, he winds up the hearing.

Well, finally it did take off. I'll sum up in a moment.

5.30pm: Before I sum up, a colleague points out that I missed one good line from Straw. At one point he told the panel: "You'll need to talk to Robin Cook about that."

Sadly, that's not going to be possible.

5.33pm: Here are the highlights from the last hour.

• Straw confirmed that he told Blair at the last moment to consider an alternative to going to war. (See 5.04pm and 5.06pm)

• He said that he discussed his doubts about the war with Geoff Hoon and Gordon Brown. (See 5.17pm)

• He sidestepped a question about whether Brown shared his concerns. (See 5.17pm)

• He said that he did not consider resigning over going to war. (See 5.06pm)

• But he said that he would have resigned if Blair had refused to allow the Commons to have a vote on going to war. (See 5.06pm)

• He said that Hans Blix, the UN weapons inspector, had not read a 167-page report produced by his own team of inspectors just before it was due to be presented to the UN. (See 4.45pm)

5.59pm: After a week or so of hearings where the questioning has been fine, this was one of those sessions that left me wishing Sir John Chilcot had a journalist on the panel. Straw gave a reasonably candid account of his involvement in the run-up to the war and the written memo he submitted suggests that he has thought deeply about the pros and cons of what had happened.

But the really interesting questions were the ones that did not get asked or, if they did get asked, did not get answered. Straw told us that he advised Blair to consider "alternative approaches" at the last minute. But we did not find out exactly when, or how? Straw was asked how Blair reacted, but he fobbed the inquiry off with a "you'll have to ask him" and he was not asked what he felt about having his suggestions rejected. And he told us that he had discussed his concerns with Gordon Brown. But he dodged a question about Brown's reaction and the panel did not chase him up.

One reader who has been emailing me about the hearings suggests that today's session will increase the chance of Gordon Brown giving evidence before the election. He may have a point.

That's it for today. Thanks for the comments.