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IT REPRESENTS a remarkable change of opinion. Just two years ago the consensus view of America's 16 intelligence agencies was tough and unambiguous: Iran was “determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure.” The fact that Iran then, in 2006, overtly restarted nuclear enrichment—the process to make nuclear fuel which can also be used to make fissile material for bombs—in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions only increased the sense of alarm. Speculation has since grown that America might take matters into its own hands and bomb Iran. George Bush said in a recent speech that an Iranian bomb could contribute to “world war three”. Dick Cheney, the hawkish vice-president, gave warning of “serious consequences” if Iran did not suspend uranium enrichment.

Yet on Monday December 3rd the intelligence agencies revamped their view of Iran's nuclear-weapons programme. In a new official estimate released that day, the National Intelligence Council states frankly that “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its weapons programme.” A few sentences later it states with “moderate confidence” that “Tehran had not restarted its nuclear-weapons programme as of mid-2007.” The weapons programme is defined as relating to weapons design, weaponisation work and covert uranium work. It also concludes that Iran is susceptible to outside diplomatic pressure and scrutiny, which together were responsible for the halt in the weapons programme in 2003. The Democrats have promptly called for a “surge of diplomacy” towards Iran.

No explanation has been given for the agencies' about turn. But there is speculation aplenty. One analyst notes that the defection to the West of an Iranian general in 2007 may have produced better intelligence from inside Iran. The spies may also have concluded that earlier assessments were overly alarming, perhaps as a result of pressure from Mr Cheney, who may have sought an intelligence document to bolster any case for bombing Iran. Mr Bush's administration has been accused of stretching official intelligence on Iraq's arms capability in making the case for invasion of that country in 2003. The spies, by publishing this report, have made it harder for military action in Iran.

The timing of the report's release is intriguing. It coincides with suggestions that China may be willing to support a third, tougher, round of UN sanctions on the Islamic Republic, after a long period of stonewalling. (This would mean new financial sanctions and more stringent travel bans for Iranian leaders, although China remains loth to imperil its business interests in Iran.) America has also said that the number of explosively formed projectiles used against its troops in Iraq has declined markedly in recent months. America has stated that such sophisticated weapons are probably provided by Iran (a charge that Iran denies). Such a drop might indicate that Iran, despite its president's bluster, is keen to avoid military confrontation, as the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) now suggests.

None of this, however, suggests that Iran's nuclear programme is no longer a threat. America's national-security adviser, Stephen Hadley, argues that the new NIE only shows that “the international community has to turn up the pressure [on Iran]”. The NIE itself says that Iran “at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.” Even if Iran is not currently working on warheads or missiles to make a nuclear weapon (as it has been saying for years), it is publicly enriching uranium. Getting the right kind of fissile material is the hardest part of making a bomb.

Iran says it has 3,000 centrifuges enriching uranium; according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, if they have mastered the technical challenges of making the centrifuges work together properly, this could produce material for a bomb in about a year. The NIE seems to discount this, saying that Iran may have enough fissile material by late 2009, but probably not until sometime between 2010 and 2015 because of technical problems. America's spies may think that Iran's enrichers are having trouble doing their job, but they still expect the Iranians to get there eventually.

Iran has welcomed the new NIE, repeating claims that its nuclear programme is not intended for weapons use. Israel, Britain and France have all called for continued pressure to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb. The NIE strongly suggests that there may be a political way out of confrontation with Iran, saying that the country's nuclear programme is guided by “a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs.” Thus it may be amenable to a combination of threats, diplomatic pressure and “opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige and goals for regional influence.” The NIE admits that it is difficult to know what sort of grand bargain might work, but that is a matter for diplomats not intelligence agents to ponder.