January camp is traditionally a time for newcomers, a lot of new comers. The fresh blood cuts their gums with the teething of international competition. The USMNT manager usually attempts to leverage an external variable, whether environmental or competitive, in order to test his troops. Jurgen Klinsmann found himself in a rare position this time around and took full advantage of it. With the recent influx of American players entering or returning to the MLS it created a more complete player pool to choose from, since the league hasn’t yet begun. This certainly points to one advantage to this recent, debated trend to our domestic league.

So, January camp. How did the squad get on? How did the veterans compliment, the newcomers introduce and the question marks prove? The traditional grading procedure seems rigid, so a few thoughts and a few grades.

Klinsmann tinkered structurally with formation and width, between the two friendlies against Panama and Chile. With both the 3-5-2 (really a 3-2-3-2) and the 4-2-3-1 he seemed to encourage width, but from different areas. With 3 at the back the width was demanded of Brek Shea and Deandre Yedlin as wing-backs. Much was required of the two, multi dimensionally. Their width was important for them to participate into the final third, amongst the other attackers, when opportunities arose. But, their vertical, up and down fitness was the key requirement. Many times both Shea and Yedlin found themselves exposing space in behind each other when too eager to progress up the pitch. Yedlin found himself more offensively involved against Chile, but also was arguable culpable for not tracking Chile’s scorer for their third goal. Shea was equally as involved in both matches, although scoring against Chile early on. He was, at times,defensively exposed as well, but was the more consistent attacking option. Yedlin – 4.5, Shea – 6.5.

In both friendlies it was clear that Michael Bradley would find himself deeper on both sides of the ball. For me, this is where he does his best work. When the USMNT is in possession we simply need Bradley on the ball to be consistently successful. He seems to be the only player dynamic enough to turn with the ball in deep lying positions and be able to make the correct decisions in a timely manner, whether its to distribute, penetrate or dictate tempo. I thought he was our best player in both games. But, when we play him in this deeper role, we lack in possession further up the field. This was entirely too obvious against Chile. Against an energetic, pressing team (previously coached by the pressing, coaching enigma Marcelo Bielsa), who floods their offensive third when they lose the ball, it is imperative to not only retain the ball, but to retain it beyond their high press. With Bradley deep and Clint Dempsey unable to consistently maintain possession in his number 10 pocket, we struggled as the game went on. Bradley – 7.5.

The two opposite sides of the pitch that will decide our success: Jones and Altidore. At this point in time, Jones is Klinsmann’s latest experiment, as he tries to shape and mold him into a center back. I like the idea. I think it adds a dimension that could be incredibly useful. Jones is comfortable in possession, more than capable of playing out of the back, vocally commands his team and has the necessary physicality to play the position. Two questions remain: does Jones have the sharpness of thought and level of focus to pick the right moments to go forward with the freedom that the manager is giving him and can he be the structural leader at the back to keep our shape? The answer to the first question is the most important and pressing with Jones. And, I do not have an answer, yet. The second might be less important if he can defer these responsibilities to another center back, but a leader for said other position has yet to emerge. Jones found himself marauding forward against both Panama and Chile with varied success. When his progression came off, the USMNT looked dynamic, surprising and attacked with pace. When it didn’t, he was left wandering and his fellow center back was exposed, often leading to a scoring opportunity for the opposition. Jones – 5.5.

Jozy Altidore has turned into an angry beast of a forward, someone that defenders do not want to defend. His latest spells in England, with Hull and Sunderland, were fruitless. Although these are early days, in his reaction he seems pissed off, looking to take it out on the nearest, opposing defender. His finish on the goal against Panama was measured, and his run withdrawn and timed perfectly. His hold up play was unwavering and patient in both matches, but this is expected. We need him to provide an option over the top more frequently. We need him to stretch the opposing connective tissue between their defensive and midfield structures to allow space for our attacking players to breath. This he did not do enough of. Altidore – 6.5.

The newcomers, January camp guinea pigs and experiments of consistency through the substitute options were largely ineffective. It consisted of starts for Steve Birnbaum, Bobby Wood, Gyasi Zardes and Miguel Ibarra, and appearances for Chris Wondolowski, Luis Gil, Matt Hedges, Lee Nguyen, Perry Kitchen, Sean Johnson and Will Trapp. The two standouts were clearly Zardes and Ibarra. Both starting on opposite wing positions against Panama, both showed flashes of what they want to bring to the table for Klinsmann. Ibarra ran all day against Panama, up and down the left flank, providing and offensive option and consistently tracking defensively. On the opposite side Zardes was an offensive threat. His pure pace and physical presence were obvious, leaving the USMNT fan contemplating the ceiling for this kid. Both are exciting prospects, but Zardes might have a more significant role to play for the United States in the future. His penetration then patient and measured through ball for a Dempsey’s finish capped off his first start in a United States jersey. Newcomers, experiments and substitutes – 5 (average between Ibarra/Zardes contribution of a 7 and the rest at a 3).