How great was

Kim Jong Eun’s power when he was propelled to the nexus of Party, military

and bureaucracy upon the death of his father? Some commentators

believe it was rather limited. The general

consensus after Kim Jong Il’s death was that either a collective leadership system would form, or that Jang Song Taek would rise to prince regent. A collective leadership would have allowed Kim Jong Il’s power to be dispersed across a number of elite figures. A Jang Song Taek-led regency

would have created a second-in-command with enough power to rival the leader.

The presumption that

Kim’s power was limited is reflected in the claim that the dictatorial

regime was strengthened following the purge of Jang Sung Taek; in other words, that Kim’s power

was enhanced dramatically by Jang’s removal. However, this is to misunderstand the

nature of the North Korean power structure and the way power is allocated within it. After the death of Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Eun’s power was all but identical to

that of his father. Why? It is the

quintessential feature of a system that concentrates all power in the Suryeong. The main issue now is whether

Kim Jong Eun, who holds absolute power, has the skill set necessary to utilize that

power.

A Kim’s power is greater than the combined influence of the Party, military, and state bureaucracy. As such, it is impossible for a challenge to emanate from the military. A collective leadership

or regency under Jang Song Taek was always impossible. In the North Korean system, it is impossible for political factions

or individuals to challenge the Suryeong.

Kim Jong Eun has absolute authority, and receives systematic protection under a Suryeongist monolithic

regime governed by Party, military and bureaucratic institutions. A device to check the power of the Suryeong

does not exist. Party and state organs protect the power of the leader and act as tools of implementation. They can neither divide the Suryeong’s power nor act as checks upon it. The “Suryeong” is the brain, the Party is the body and the people

are the arms and legs – this is “Suryeongism.”

Organs of power and

surveillance (the Party Secretariat, Organization and Guidance

Department of the Party, State Security Department, Military Defense Command, Escort

Command, and Ministry of People’s Security) systematically oversee Party,

military and bureaucracy to stabilize and protect the power of Kim Jong Eun. Because

of this, no political faction or leader can mount a challenge. Having

thoroughly purged all rival political factions in the period

after 1953, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il constructed this monolithic Suryeongist regime. By 1974, all competitors had completely

disappeared.

Military and Party

elites can only wield the political influence granted them by Kim Jong Eun;

they cannot forge independent power bases. Therefore, the very

moment Kim Jong Eun withdraws his confidence in an individual member of the elite, that member disappears from the stage. The dismissal of Ri Yong Ho and purge of Jang Sung Taek were results of this logic.

Therefore, we can say that Kim Jong Eun inherited absolute power upon the death of Kim Jong Il. However, North

Korea became more unstable under the novice successor. Why? It was not due to

the fact that Kim Jong Eun’s power was weak, or that there was a powerful rival. Rather, it was because Kim Jong Eun was politically inexperienced, and his ability

as a state leader remained unverified. It was like giving the wheel to someone who

had just received his learner’s license.

The two years of Kim’s rule have

shown that the only source of real instability in the North Korean regime is his own incompetence.

Kim Jong Eun has not proven

that he is capable of resolving the structural instability wrought by a collapsed

planned economy and concomitant marketization. His economic policy not only fails to embrace opening and reform; it serves to obstruct economic

development.

The Byungjin Line of simultaneous

nuclear and economic development squanders scarce resources on nuclear development, and thwarts the introduction of foreign capital and advanced scientific and technical skills.

The closure of the Kaesong

Industrial gave an extremely

negative perception of the North Korean investment climate to would-be foreign investors. Meanwhile,

Kim Jong Eun has been using his limited capital

frivolously: on more luxury imports, recreational facilities, and the

idolization of his father, Kim Jong Il.

Given these facts, it becomes increasingly likely that the Kim regime will grow less stable over the medium to long term. Kim lacks the ability to solve North

Korea’s structural crises. With Kim Jong Eun as incompetent as he is, the

elite cadre class is going to grow dissatisfied, and this will create cracks

in the system. Thereafter, one cannot expect the power organs and public security

agencies that presently maintain his absolute authority to function well. This is not an issue of power, but one of whether

Kim Jong Eun can start displaying the monarchic discipline he inherited

from his father.