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The problem, again, is time. Even if the federal government short-circuited the B.C. process by taking the matter straight to the Supreme Court of Canada, they’d be waiting a year, at least.

Hence the sudden interest in the federal and/or Alberta governments providing Kinder Morgan with some sort of insurance their investment would not be for naught, either by taking an ownership stake, or simply by indemnifying them for their costs in the unlikely event the feds lose in court.

But that’s expensive, and not only financially: whatever the rights and wrongs, the Liberals would be taking a huge political risk, at the least, in ramming the pipeline through over B.C.’s objections.

Photo by Jonathan Hayward/The Canadian Press/File

The second broad avenue, ordinarily the preferable one, would be to persuade B.C. to come to some sort of deal, through some combination of bribes (more money) and threats (less money).

The problem here is that positions of the two sides are so absolutely and irreversibly opposed as to make any deal short of capitulation by one side or the other unlikely: between “this pipeline will be built” and “this pipeline will never be built” there isn’t much room to compromise. Again, the feds probably have sufficient leverage to force a “deal” on B.C., if they had to, but at what political cost?

That leaves a third possible avenue. It is not particularly honourable or even legal, but on the other hand it is quick and keeps the feds’ fingerprints off of it. That is to let Alberta do the job for them, by enacting certain highly painful and flagrantly unconstitutional retaliatory measures Ottawa would agree to overlook, such as cutting existing shipments of oil to B.C.

Even if it did not bring B.C. to its knees, it might soften it up enough for the feds to enter the scene as peacemakers.

As with most civil wars, it may be that more blood has to be shed before the desire for peace overtakes the desire for revenge.