by Badger on August 16, 2013

The 4-1-4-1 formation – especially when its main proponent describes formations as being like telephone numbers – probably needs some sort of working definition, before much else can be said about it. So, for the purpose of this article, it means teams which play attacking, possession football in a 4-1-4-1 formation.

When those same teams switch to defence, it may morph into something that looks like 4-2-3-1, or even 4-3-3, but that does not change the fact that the team’s attacking philosophy is 4-1-4-1, and it differs from the teams which base their football philosophy on a 4-3-2-1 formation, a 4-3-3 formation or any other formation from the outset. The difference may sometimes be small, but it is necessary to recognise it in order to avoid some ambiguity in discussions of it.

Little need be said about 4-1-4-1 in attack. Its advantages are fairly obvious and generally acknowledged. The extra midfielders help maintain possession, thus taking control of the game and increasing the attacking threat. Even in their games using it so far, Bayern Munich have looked good. It is in defence that most weaknesses occur, giving rise to the majority of concerns and negative comments about the formation. A study of where the weaknesses of 4-1-4-1 actually lie, and how they can be addressed, is a worthwhile exercise, because it might even lead to the conclusion that 4-1-4-1 shouldn’t be impossible to defend and Bayern should have the capacity to master it, or might at least debunk some myths around the 4-1-4-1 formation.

The main principle to note – and it is a very very important one – is that the only significant weakness in 4-1-4-1 is when the opponents score from a fast counterattack where attackers outnumber defenders. If, on the one hand, the counterattack is a slow build-up, allowing defenders and midfielders to drop back and help out, then any goals which are scored are not specifically the fault of 4-1-4-1. If, on the other hand, the counterattack is in equal numbers of attackers and defenders – 3 against 3, 2 against 2, etc – then any goals scored are the fault of individual errors and not specifically the fault of 4-1-4-1.

Understanding that principle shows, then, how to defend when a team playing in a 4-1-4-1 formation loses possession. In short, the players must (1) do all possible to delay the attack, (2) get numbers back to help in defence, and (3) employ great positional awareness. There are numerous things they can do to achieve these requirements, and many of them are interrelated, but for the sake of clearer discussion they are presented here in groupings.

Do all possible to delay the attack

Pressing has many aspects, and it is likely that a whole book would hardly cover the subject. The pressing which the attackers make is invaluable, even when they don’t tackle or win the ball; they can hinder the opponent from making a quick pass, from making the best pass and from making an accurate pass. All these things slow down the counterattack, enabling the defence to assemble a more robust lineup in stronger numbers. Much the same is true of the pressing which the defenders make – particularly the defensive midfielder. If a defender can immediately press the player who receives the ball, so that that player must receive the ball with his back to goal, and must proceed in a longer indirect route towards goal, that is all buying back useful time for the defence. A little bit of physical barging the opponent around and running side by side, cutting into the opponent’s path, can help too. After pressing to delay, which gives the defence time to assemble, the team can then press to tackle. Defenders tackling too early, however, can be a huge risk – depending on circumstances – because, if the tackle is not successful, it can quickly give the opponents a very good opening to outnumber the defenders and create a better scoring opportunity.

Get numbers back to help in defence

When a team playing 4-1-4-1 loses possession, midfield players need to drop back to create a more robust defensive lineup in stronger numbers. Generally, one central midfielder will drop back more often than the other, and that player effectively creates a 4-2-3-1-type defence. If this happens a lot, the player can become something of a “shuttle player”, switching frequently between a more creative central-midfield role and a more defensive role in a double pivot. If there is heavy pressure and the opponents have high levels of possession, the second central midfielder may do the same, creating a 4-3-3-type defence. These transitions are not difficult, but they need alert, intelligent and, not least, willing midfielders to make them work.

The wing backs need to exercise greater awareness too, because a fast counterattack which catches both of them too far out of position is a serious threat. For each wing back, it is no longer just a case of each watching out to avoid being caught out of position himself, but each needs an awareness of where the other wing back is positioned. Indeed, when play is on the left side and the left back is far advanced, the right back needs to drop back to a midway position, so that he can join the defence very quickly, if required, or join the attack, if the ball is crossed to him on the right wing – and vice versa. This is partly true in other formations too, but more so in a 4-1-4-1 formation.

Beyond that, pressure in numbers from the opposition may mean that even more offensive players need to get back to help defend, but that is a general matter, and not specific to 4-1-4-1.

Employ great positional awareness

The 4-1-4-1 formation demands defensive positional strategies and levels of positional awareness that are vital to its success. The main strategy is a high defensive line. Some think that this is for the purpose of playing the offside trap but, in reality, the offside trap is a minor reason and, on its own, rarely enough reason for playing with a high defensive line. The primary reason is that opponents would like to develop a counterattack by playing the ball, just beyond the four midfielders, into the space patrolled by the lone defensive midfielder. If this is a large space, then the task is easy. If there is a high defensive line, high balls, etc, played beyond the four midfielders are likely to be picked up by the defenders and, in general, there will be less space to exploit for a counterattack. A secondary reason for the high defensive line is that midfielders and wing backs don’t have as far to track back, and therefore don’t need as long, as they would with a regular defensive line, so any brief delay to the counterattack is likely to give some of them enough time to get back into position.

A side effect of the high defensive line and the lone defensive midfielder is that that area of the pitch, and the duties involved, are best covered by at least one central defender who thinks and plays like a defensive midfielder. The player needs to read the game very well, step out like a defensive midfielder when a counterattack suddenly develops too far away from the lone defensive midfielder to pick up, and generally break up attacks before they reach the last line of defence. So the choice is whether to use a defensive midfielder as a central defender, or get a central defender to start thinking and playing like a defensive midfielder. The safest approach seems to be to use a defensive midfielder as a central defender, and that is precisely what Pep Guardiola has done with Javi Martinez.

The flip side of having a small space between the four midfielders and the four defenders is that a high defensive line creates another dangerous space behind the four defenders. This problem is made worse if the goalkeeper tends to stay on his line. A high defensive line, therefore, also needs a goalkeeper who has excellent judgement and positioning for coming out of his area. Guardiola found one of the essentials for 4-1-4-1 already in place when he came to Bayern: Manuel Neuer, one of the best goalkeepers in the world at coming off his line and even outside his box. Additionally, while it is not a positional-awareness matter, this problem area between the defender and the goalkeeper also needs at least one central defender who is quick-reacting, fast and physical, to challenge any attacker who does break through the defence.

Early observations

It is difficult to tell what way things will develop at Bayern, but that is all part of the fascination too. For now, many opinions and predictions have been formed around Borussia Dortmund’s win and Borussia Moenchengladbach’s number of goalscoring chances, in their respective games against Bayern. The picture is broader than that. One or two bad games are still not conclusive in determining that a player is unsuited to a role, and 1-2 mistakes in a game are even less conclusive in determining that a player won’t eventually master the role.

Thomas Mueller, as a central midfielder, does not seem defensively oriented enough for 4-1-4-1; he can put in man-of-the-match performances elsewhere on the pitch, but he simply doesn’t get back quickly enough and early enough or press enough for a central-midfield role in 4-1-4-1. He might improve given time, but his best position would currently seem to be elsewhere.

Toni Kroos, in contrast, appears to be learning fast and adapting well to the role, both in attack and in pressing to delay counterattacks.

Thiago Alcantara had mediocre games as the lone defensive midfielder, but he was up against Dortmund, one of the fastest counter-attacking teams in Europe, and his team mates in defence weren’t very competent in defending 4-1-4-1 at that stage either; he may – and should – get another chance there sometime.

Bastian Schweinsteiger handled the defensive-midfielder role somewhat better than Alcantara, but he too has a lot of room for improvement. It may turn out that he is better as the shuttle player, the central midfielder who switches between 4-1-4-1’s central midfield and 4-2-3-1’s double pivot.

Jan Kirchhoff has had two excellent games in the defensive-midfielder role, but they were against an already defeated Gladbach, in one case, and against weaker opposition, in the other.

Martinez could return to the defensive-midfielder role, but that defeats some of Guardiola’s other purposes and, although he has played him there in one or two games, Guardiola doesn’t seem to be committed to a complete return just yet.

The central defenders – quite aside from 4-1-4-1 – have not yet hit last year’s form or sharpness, and 4-1-4-1 has received unjustified criticism as a result. Hopefully, the solution there is just a matter of match practice.

Philipp Lahm and David Alaba have had excellent performances going forward, but have been caught out of position many times. That will always be the case now and then, but they both probably need to learn better how to minimise it.

Overall, the potential seems to be there in the team, but 4-1-4-1 has a very steep climb up to the plateau of mastery. In some respects, 4-1-4-1 seems like the ultimate tactical quest of football; only elite teams can reach it but, if they do, they can win against big opponents with it and become a dominant force in football. Viewed in that light, it would look like a great pity – and some degree of failure – if 4-1-4-1 had to be abandoned because Bayern can’t completely master it.

Guardiola is likely to try it for a few more weeks, but if results leave Bayern trailing 5-6 points behind Dortmund in the Bundesliga, other measures and alternatives will almost certainly to be adopted. That still mightn’t be the death of the 4-1-4-1 formation for Bayern; it could be that Guardiola merely shelves it and gives it another try, perhaps with 1-2 different players, next season.

The simplest compromise would seem to be to play with a sham 4-2-3-1, with one of the players in the double-pivot roles playing in a forward position so often that it has nearly all the benefits of 4-1-4-1. That would silence the critics. It would also carry the benefits of being more familiar to the players, while facilitating continued practice and more gradual introduction of 4-1-4-1. Nevertheless, that option should be unnecessary with a Bayern team of this calibre; they have almost mastered 4-1-4-1 possession and attack; they aren’t impossibly far away from mastering 4-1-4-1 defence; they should be able to rise to the occasion.

(Badger is a fan of Bayern München and a member of BayernZone forum)



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