What policies should be undertaken to improve society? I would hope that would also be the fundamental question of politics, but it often seems to take a backseat to “how do we obtain and hold political power?”

Nonetheless, I like to push back against that worldview, and I hope this blog has somewhat succeeded at doing so. Efficient Advocacy is a way to answer the question of what policies should be undertaken to improve society, while Artificial General Intelligence and Existential Risk analyzes why we might be concerned about extremely high impact, although unlikely, events. There’s also a good discussion of the various aspects to consider when choosing where to expend resources and effort: is the policy widely known or discussed, is it popular, do candidates take a position on this issue, should political processes themselves be reformed before the policy can be implemented?

This post is going to be the first in a recurring group of posts discussing various good policies. For the most part, these posts will discuss policies that are outside of the main political discourse, but ought to be discussed more. I’ll try and note why they may or may not be politically tolerable, but I’ll also try and keep each policy discussion very brief, to 500 words or fewer, with three policies in each post. I’m not ruling out that policies will repeat, but that will depend on the frequency of posts and how good the policies are. Many of these policies may be new or incomplete, but all discussions start somewhere.

Nominal GDP Futures Targeting

The Federal Reserve is the most important institution for macroeconomic stabilization policy. It is not particularly political, it can react quicker than Congress, and it controls the money supply for the most widely used currency in the world. The 1977 Federal Reserve Reform Act gave the Fed the goals of price stability and maximum employment in what is known as the “dual mandate”. However, these particular goals are often at odds, which means the “correct” policy the Fed should be taking isn’t obvious.

The 90s saw the rise of the Taylor Rule, although Milton Friedman had argued for a rules-based policy regime long before this. The Taylor Rule isn’t an exact rule, but it is an attempt to codify monetary policy to stabilize prices, increasing the real interest rate in response to inflation, and thus targeting a specific inflation level. Nominal GDP targeting, on the other hand, doesn’t target specific interest rates, but levels of spending in the economy. Scott Sumner, and others at the Mercatus Center have argued that the Taylor Rule is inferior to Nominal GDP targeting because the Taylor Rule relies on retrieving more information, specifically both inflation and the “gap” between real and potential economic output. It’s argued that Nominal GDP is much simpler to get data on in real time, allowing the Fed to apply monetary policy with better understanding of the economy’s current state.

Additionally, NGDP targeting can be enhanced with futures markets, allowing the Fed to have direct feedback from the market on the expected levels of NGDP growth. This helps to solve the Hayekian knowledge problem, by pulling as much data as possible into a single market price. NGDP is also beneficial in that it doesn’t target specific interest rates, just spending levels, so in a low-interest rate environment, like the 2008 recession, the Fed would have had a rule to help guide the level of quantitative easing, instead of just shooting in the dark and hoping it would work.

So what is the political status of this policy? Well it’s pretty technical and so I doubt any voters have or could be persuaded to have much of a view on this. That also means it doesn’t have much political opposition, although conservatives interested in monetary policy don’t love it. The actual legislation that would need to happen would probably revolve around the legalization of NGDP Futures markets, which would essentially be speculative gambling on government data collections. Luckily, from the Fed’s perspective, policy change requires no legal hurdles; the Taylor Rule is a self-imposed policy goal that could be exchanged for NGDP targeting as soon as Fed officials are convinced of its benefits.

To convince them, here is some further reading:

Social Security Identity Theft Reform

Social Security wasn’t meant to be a national ID program, but because it is the only national program everyone is guaranteed to be enrolled in, it has become the de facto national ID number. SSNs can’t be revoked easily like credit cards, they weren’t assigned randomly until 2011, and they are used for authentication despite being universally stored, subjecting them to serious security issues. Identity theft is thus a major problem.

The solution is to make SSNs a public/private key pair. For a 5 minute intro on Public Key Cryptography, check out my post on encrypted communication apps. The basics of SSNs wouldn’t need to change. This cryptography system would utilize a particular type of Public Key Cryptography called Elliptic Curve Cryptography; the only reason this detail is important is that in ECC, any number can be a private key (as opposed to only prime numbers) and keys can be relatively short and human memorizable. I would recommend new SSNs with at least 12 digits to make them harder to guess. SSNs don’t have a checksum digit, so I’d recommend adding that as well.

The technical details of how people would use this number to authenticate themselves would be with the application of the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. For an average person, all that needs to be known is that this algorithm is standardized, like sending a message to an e-mail address; any computer can send a message without it mattering what the message says, since “sending an email to an address” is something all computers know how to do. When a person has to prove who they are to a company or the government, instead of the organization checking their SSN against a database, the person will type in their private SSN, the computer will compute a digital signature, and that will be sent to the organization. The organization would compare the signature to the public key of the person to validate they are who they say they are.

How will they know the public keys? Unlike private keys, public keys can be published freely, so the Social Security Administration can maintain a public database of public keys without issue. Digital signatures can only be computed with private keys, which should be kept secret. The benefits arise because organizations can hold signatures in their databases instead of private keys. Stealing a signature in a data breach would do nothing; today losing SSNs is equivalent to losing your private keys. Problems that could arise involve lack of knowledge on the part of organizations, which could mistakenly store private keys instead of signatures. However, this is already the problem today, so things can only get better.

Potential political pitfalls involve people believing this would be a national ID number, even though SSNs already are, and that it’s difficult to update systems for better security.

Increase the Housing Stock in US Cities

This idea was taken from the Niskanen Center’s Wil Wilkinson, in his response for the single best policy to reduce inequality in the United States . Wealth inequality doesn’t concern me too much, but this policy would solve inequality by improving the options of those least well off, allowing them to move to high productivity cities where high paying jobs are. Wilkinson’s piece is already pretty short, so I’ll be quoting it a bit here.

Wages have barely budged in decades, yet housing costs have soared in the bigger cities in which most Americans live, because restrictive municipal zoning and land-use policy have prevented housing supply from keeping up with demand. When rent takes an ever-larger chunk of workers’ paychecks, savings and wealth accumulation rates go down.

Additionally, the restrictions on housing have caused massive losses in productivity. Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti suggest in this paper that the inability of labor to relocate to high productivity cities has significant effects on GDP growth rates, leading to pretty massive losses in potential productivity. Andrii Parkhomenko suggests that federal policy that incentivizes localities to deregulate housing supply would have a pretty sizeable impact on growth rates. Going back to Wilkinson, he details what this policy might be:

If I were king for a day, I would dangle a huge pot of federal infrastructure money in front of states, and then condition those delicious, fat federal grants on big cities in those states hitting growth targets for housing supply. If big cities fail to add new housing stock fast enough, they and the states they are in will lose many, many, many billions in federal funds for new and upgraded infrastructure.

So why isn’t this happening now? Wilkinson continues:

The political power of NIMBY-ism (“not in my back yard”) has made it nearly impossible to tackle rising housing costs, and the wealth inequality it produces, at the municipal level. But a federal lever can offset the self-seeking forces of NIMBY-ism by giving city and state governments a strong incentive to cut the red tape that keeps housing supply lagging so far behind demand.

I’m skeptical that it will be straightforward to get a federal bill like this passed, although it will probably be easier than in local municipalities. The potential benefits here are far too great to be ignored, but it’s disappointing housing policy isn’t a major issue for most voters today.

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