*My goodness, that certainly would be embarrassing if it hadn’t taken more or less forever and was also sort-of barely published exclusively in German.

https://annalist.noblogs.org/post/2018/02/14/weapons-of-mass-surveillance-german-snowden-inquiry/

(…)

3. Mass surveillance in Germany and the rest of the world

The evidence gathered by the committee indicated indiscriminate and unauthorised mass surveillance, not only in the framework of Operation Eikonal but also by means of ‘selectors’ (search terms) used by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND). German nationals and companies have also been among the perennial targets. No further light could be shed on direct mass surveillance conducted by the NSA in Germany and in other countries from a German base, because files and witnesses from the United Kingdom and the United States were not available.

The term ‘indiscriminate mass surveillance’ was coined as a result of the Snowden revelations. It expresses the particular nature of the surveillance infrastructure that was first exposed in 2013. Many details of the systems and activities of the Five Eyes alliance that were described in the published documents could not be examined in committee, because the Federal Government systematically withheld from the committee almost all files relating to the intelligence services of the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. There were, however, no grounds whatsoever to doubt the truth of the information contained in the Snowden documents, nor did any witness statement suggest otherwise. The committee found compelling evidence that the BND in particular is part of this global surveillance structure.

4. BND cooperation with the NSA in Bad Aibling

The Memorandum of Agreement of 2002 between the BND and the NSA on joint telecommunications surveillance in Germany was intended, among other things, to give the NSA access to data from the Frankfurt Internet exchange point (IXP) but did not enter formally into force in the absence of the requisite consent from the Bundestag.

5. Data tapping in Frankfurt without a G-10 restriction order

Between 2005 and 2008, as part of the joint BND/NSA Operation Eikonal, the BND engaged in data tapping in Frankfurt am Main without legal authorisation. The operation was executed by Deutsche Telekom without a restriction order having been issued under the Act Restricting the Privacy of Posts and Telecommunications (G-10 Act), in spite of very strong reservations among Deutsche Telekom staff. In this way, data were leaked to the BND over several years through unauthorised breaches of telecommunications privacy. Deutsche Telekom and the BND thus deliberately deceived and subverted the established system of parliamentary oversight as well as conniving in a sustained infringement of the law.

6. The myth of the functioning filters

The practical implementation of Operation Eikonal typifies the NSA practice of conducting surveillance activities jointly with local intelligence services. A key feature of that particular case was the technological aspect of its objective, since it was based on a ‘data for technology’ deal, whereby the NSA supplied software in exchange for data and intelligence from the BND and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV).

The technology required for tapping transit cables should not have been used by the BND because it had been ‘certified’ without having been fully tested by the Federal Office for Information Security. The data filters that were used were never able to filter out reliably from transfers to the NSA all data protected by the G-10 Act.

7. Problematic NSA selectors in BND data

It has been and remains a feature of the cooperation between the BND and the NSA that the BND filters its captured data with the aid of NSA search terms. The results are then forwarded to the NSA. On paper, all communication data concerning Germans should have been filtered out. Although the files concerning these selectors ought to have been handed over immediately to the committee of inquiry, because they relate to key elements of its investigation remit, the opposition had to table its own request for evidence in order to obtain them. Very many of the selectors had nothing to do with terrorism or illegal arms trafficking but did impinge on German and European interests. This issue, however, ultimately proved impossible to clarify, because the Federal Government denied the committee the right to peruse the selectors. Through the concocted construct of a ‘Federal Government trustee’, who examined the NSA selectors together with the BND, a clarification was simulated which never actually took place.

8. BND data transfer to the NSA from Bad Aibling (((etc etc etc)))