North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is seen as having solidified his grip on power in the wake of the execution of his powerful regent Jang Song-thaek. The young leader's unpredictability is expected to be the biggest variable determining geopolitical situations in Northeast Asia. / AP-Yonhap



The Korea Times held a round-table discussion on Dec. 26 to take a close look into the North Korean situation following the purging of the once-powerful Jang Song-thaek, uncle of the communist regime's leader Kim Jong-un. Three experts offered their insights. They are Professor Son Tae-gyu of Dankook University, Free North Korea Radio head Kim Seong-min and professor King Myung-do teaching North Korean Studies at the Kyungmin University. Both Kim and King defected from the North. — E.D.



By Kim Tae-gyu, Jun Ji-hye, Nam Hyun-woo

Question: Did Kim Jung-un solidify his grip on power with the execution of his uncle Jang Song-thaek?

King: By and large, Kim's measure would have a short-term effect. But in the long run, it would end up generating confusion. Who would remain loyal to a leader who purges his own uncle?

Take a look at the unprecedented nationwide campaign of pledging allegiance for Kim. Even the previous events on Feb. 16 (birthday of former dictator and Kim Jong-un's father Kim Jong-il) and on April 15 (birthday of North Korean founder Kim Il-sung) fell short of it. That means that people are currently not loyal in earnest.

Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae's attitude at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun (on Dec. 16) drops a hint. While trembling, he promised to be royal to just one leader, namely Kim. He would have known Jang's power better than any other persons. In a situation where even Jang can be executed through a summary trial, others would be killed without a trial. Let me remind you that Jang was Kim's uncle. His charges were just about the possibility of a coup. Against this backdrop, who wouldn't be scared?







It was a bad move. But Kim had no choice because he was afraid of Jang's influence in just two years after he took charge. Reports possibly made their way to Kim that Jang grabbed all the power and he even did not respect Kim, which would have been simply impossible under the leadership of Kim Jong-il. Kim might feel such an atmosphere while being with Jang. The accusations like Jang clapped his hands half-heartedly would hold some truth.

From the perspective of Kim, his biggest mistake was the purge of former Vice Marshal Lee Yong-ho. After that, Jang's strength got way too big since Jang's major rival was gone. Choe and others promise their allegiance for now but nobody knows who would revolt. I expect quite big confusions. It would not be about expelling Kim. It would be about competing to gain Kim's confidence to strengthen their own power base.

Kim: There are so many analyses on Jang. Kim is now too strong. Jang swayed Kim over the past two years unlike the North Korean system of the past 17 years. Jang could not break it but anyway he shook it, which eventually led to his fall. It was rumored that Jang pulled the strings behind Kim and senior officials knew that they have to go through Jang to reach Kim.

Everybody is in panic now and Choe is not a No. 2 man but like a rank-and-file officer. All would have to lie on their face to serve their leader. For now, the system got back to the past and in the sense, Kim's grip on power is stronger. But we can hardly predict the future.





Q: Do you think execution of Jang was well prepared?

Kim: I bet Kim was emotionally hurt by Jang for some reason. North Korea is based on a dictatorship but Jang might be reported as a potential threat to the top leader. In the beginning, I think Jang's critics could not do anything with the powerful figure. Kim might have been uneasy with Jang. He might have been afraid of Jang.

King: Kim has always depended on Jang. Video footage showed that they always talked gently. But once again, the miscue was the purge of former Vice Marshal Yi Yong-ho. I expected that Jang would be executed, but not this quickly. I thought that it would take at least a year because there are so many questions to be asked.

If Jang is alive, however, his followers may come up with some moves like exiles en masse. Hence, Kim seems to have executed Jang so fast. In the case of Vice Marshal Chae Ryong-hae, he is so weak. Do you know why the North promotes him? That's because he is too feeble to control the military.

Son: We need to learn who spearheaded the purge of Jang. I wonder whether Kim masterminded it or some others pulled the strings behind him as some North Korean defectors claimed of late. We can make a correct analysis on Kim's status only after being clear about such questions.

Kim: I don't think that a scenario makes sense that Kim is controlled by any secret power. It would be claims from those who have no deep understanding of the North Korean system.

King: To form a force, there should be a central figure. But there is no outstanding candidate for now. Prime Minister Park Bong-ju and Vice Marshal Chae Ryong-hae cannot be such centers. In particular, nobody follows Chae in the military now.

Kim: North Korea returned to the autocratic system of the past.

King: It remains to be seen whether those who promises their allegiance to Kim are sincere. If I am in North Korea, I would criticize Kim in my heart. People there are presently loyal because they are scared but they would have some complaints. How one can televise the purge of his uncle? Only a figure with the caliber of Jang can put his gun at Kim. Others cannot even approach Kim with a gun.





King Myung-do, a professor of Kyunmin University, left, speaks during a forum about where North Korea is headed following the execution of Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of leader Kim Jong-un. Participants in the forum agreed that Kim will continue the "reign of terror," at least in the near term, to further tighten his control over the reclusive country.

/ Korea Times photo by Nam Hyun-woo

Q: Do you think that people's uprising against the Kim regime is possible?

King: North Koreans are educated not to do so from childhood. They should risk lives of their families to make such an attempt. Even one succeeds in coup, he would not be praised as an hero. He wouldn't be admired in the United States or South Korea, either.

Son: There was a big event of Jang's execution. But such events took place in the past and that led to the iron-fisted control. Things would be similar now.

Q: Do you think Jang could ever detect Kim's intention to execute him?

King: I don't think so. Jang had been probably living in ease. He would have not been able to imagine that Kim could go so far as to kill him.

Jang could have showed saucy manner to Kim. When the two appeared in official meetings, they were sometimes wearing exactly the same suits. Even the buttons, collars and sleeves were the same. Wearing the same suit with the leader was just unimaginable in the past. This could have led to Jang misunderstanding that he is in the same position as Kim.

King Myung-do

King Myung-do is a defector professor teaching North Korean

Studies at the Kyungmin University in Gyeonggi Province.

King, who flew to North Korea in 1994, is a son-in-law of Kang

Song-san who served the Premier of North Korea from 1984 to

1986 and again from 1992 to 1997, and passed away in 2007.

King's family is a relative of Kang Pan-sok, the mother of the North Korea's former leader Kim Il-sung.

He, born in Pyongyang, graduated from the Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies, the leading foreign-language institute of North Korea.

He had assumed the key posts of the isolated state between the

1970s and early 1990s tasked with dealing with the International affairs.

He also worked as a researcher specializing in defense at the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces. While working in the ministry, he had been confined to the detention center in the South Pyeongannam Province between March 1990 and February 1991 for contacting foreigners without permission.

When he entered the South in 1994, he attracted a lot of attention from the public and the media because he was from one of the most prestigious families unlike general defectors. Kim Seong-min

Kim Seong-min, a North Korean defector, heads the Free North

Korea Radio, operated by North Korean defectors in Seoul.

Since entering the South in 1999, he engaged in a various activities to help North Korean defectors including volunteer work to protect and rescue refugees from the North.

He opened the radio station in 2004 after being concerned

about decreasing media reports in the South about the real status

of North Korea. The main goal of his radio station is to send messages to the North and to notify the international community as well as Seoul of the truth about the Stalinist State.

Kim, born in Pyongyang, is also a well-known poet both in the

South and North.

After graduating from a noted educational institute nurturing

writers in the North, he worked in the art unit of the North Korean People's Army.

His late father Kim Soon-seok (died in 1974), who was a professor at the Kim Il-sung University, is one of the most famous poets in North Korea.

Kim carried on his literature career after settling in the South by receiving a Master's degree in Creative Writing from Chungang

University and making his debut in 2003. Son Tae-gyu

After graduating from Sungkyunkwan University, Professor Son Tae-gyu of Dankook University started his professional career at the Hankook Ilbo, a sister company of The Korea Times, in 1984

and worked on many beats at the politics and city desks.

He covered Cheong Wa Dae in the mid 1990s.

Son got his master's degree in politics at University of Connecticut in 1991 and his doctorate in journalism at the University of North Carolina in 2002 before becoming a professor at Dankook the next year.

He now teaches politics there.

He is regarded as one of the foremost experts in journalism and politics, in particular on North Korean issues.

The journalist-turned-professor has taken many other significant

tasks in state-run or private entities because he worked for such organizations as the Korea Communications Standards Commission and the Kwanhun Club.

He authored several books on the freedom of journalism, reform

of journalism and a three-way comparison of journalism in Korea, Japan and the United States.

Son is also a renowned columnist in local newspapers.

Q: Do you think rumors involving Jang and Kim's wife Ri Sol-ju are credible?

Kim: I heard from many diplomats that Jang is a lady-killer.

King: Considering such evaluation, I don't think rumors that Jang and Ri had been in immoral intimacy are totally untrue.

Rumors say Ri and Jang met while Ri was in the Unhasu Orchestra and Wangjaesan Light Music Band. The orchestra was established by Jang, not Kim.

Q: How Ri got married to Kim then?



King: Kim was probably charmed by Ri's beauty and the two went on a date. I don't think Kim's father (Kim Jong-il) allowed them to get married while he was alive because Ri continued to sing in the orchestra just until Kim Jong-il died. If the former Northern leader gave green light to their marriage, Ri would not have sung like that.

Q: How is Kim Kyong-hui? She has not been showing up after her husband Jang's execution.



Kim: I think rumors are true that she is suffering from Alzheimer's disease.

King: I believe that Kim Kyong-hui gave a nod to Kim to execute Jang as she was probably aware that she also could die instantly due to her disease. The reason why she disappeared from the official meetings after Jang's execution could be also because of her health problems.

If she is not appearing although she is healthy, that would indicate that there was a huge problem in Jang's execution. If Kim killed Jang without his aunt's agreement, this could greatly impact the North as Kim Kyong-hui's force emerging from Kim Il-sungrelatives still remains undiminished.

Q: How do you evaluate the possibility that North Korea could launch military provocation between January and March?

King: I expect Pyongyang to take cautions attitudes. When I look at President Park Geun-hye, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) director Nam Jae-joon and Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin, they seem to be ready to strike back in the event of North's provocation.

I heard when Prongyang shelled Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, the South was not capable of attacking the North's artillery unit. The isolated state ratcheted up their verbal salvo after the Yeonpyeong incident, saying it can plunge into was at any time.

To counter that, the United States and the South have set up appropriate reaction systems by bringing in strategic bomber B-52 for example so that Seoul can attack the North whenever it provokes military actions. These are not my personal anticipation. These words are from officials of the intelligence entities.

NIS chief Nam recently said in a private meeting that the two Koreas could be possibly unified in 2015. I don't think he made such comments without any reasons.

If the North makes any provocative action, Seoul could shot back, which could lead to the full-scale war. Kim Jong-un is probably aware of the Seoul's move, so it could keep his attempt to make provocation at bay.

Kim: The President, defense minister and the NIS chief are all conservative. This could render Pyongyang reluctant to act thoughtlessly.

But in my opinion, the North could commit such provocations as cyber attack.

Inter-Korean relations will be uneasy for the time being.

For people in the North, they were already swayed by the fact that a nephew killed his uncle. This emotional fear is difficult to be healed even from reign of terror. The year 2014 could become period of turbulence.

Son: I agree with the two. Provocative behaviors would be no easy matter for the North as the current South government is different from the previous ones under Kim Dae-jung or Roh Moo-hyun. But I want to point out one thing— how Pyongyang sees relations between Seoul and Washington.

The only event that the North apologized about its misdeed was when two U.S. Army officers were slain by ax-wielding North Korean soldiers while trimming a tree inside the Joint Security Area (JSA) in the truce village of Panmunjeom in 1976.

At the time, the North made apology because the U.S. was actually made preparations for the all-out war including paralyzing communication in the North. This incident shows that the Stalinist state is afraid of Washington's move.

Relations between Seoul and Washington have recently become estranged. Pyongyang is definitely looking into the situations as well. The North is possibly watching for a chance by using a gap between the South and the U.S.



Q: When talking about the North, not only relations between Korea and the U.S., but also those between Pyongyang and Beijing are cited as a significant factor. How do you evaluate that?

Son: To be honest, expectations (especially from people in the South) that China will play a role in dealing with the North is the wrong perspective.

Beijing is not in such position that it can do something to handle various sensitive incidents such as Jang's execution.

I have talked about this with high-ranking Chinese officials many times. Their views were more realistic than those of people in the South. They sufficiently understood that China is not playing a proper role regarding matters related to the North.

King: But I still think China is the most significant factor in inter-Korean relations. If Beijing tries to break off relations with the North, everything in the North will all stop. When you go to the local market in Pyongyang, 90 percent of goods there are from China. Even electricity, iron ore and coal are all from China. If China cuts those off, the North will collapse within a month. But Beijing is not doing that.

Kim: North will possibly experience troubles with China though after Jang's execution, because it was Jang that maintained relations between the two countries. How people in the North see Kim is different from how those in China see the young leader. From Chinese perspective, Kim is actually too young to be a partner and Jang's existence could have been helpful. Beijing could have been in panic after Jang's execution.

Q: How do you evaluate Kim's character? Is he violent or what?

King: Kim is clumsy. He is interested in politics, but his political capacity doesn't seem to match with it. While his father was alive, the late leader once appeared at a discussion session and asked which of his children he would like to success his leadership.

He said the oldest son is not interested in politics, while Kim Jong-un and youngest daughter are interested. He said he wishes to bequeath his leadership to the daughter unless she was a female. This means that the daughter was clever than her brothers, regardless of her young age, and Kim Jong-un is not smart enough, though he had interest in politics.

That's why he sacked former Vice Marshal Ri Young-ho and Jang. If he was in his right mind, he couldn't have done such things and would have accompanied them, politically. His big postures during TV appearances are all a bid to style himself on his grandfather and founder of North Korea, Kim Il-sung. As he imitates his grandfather, he does not look the same as he was young. There is a rumor that the young leader went through plastic surgery to resemble his grandfather.

Q: In a series of photos of Kim taken after executing Jang, he seemed exhausted. What does that mean? Was that Kim showing a sign of remorse for cruelly executing his uncle?

King & Kim: That seems more like hangover after binge drinking.

King: Under Kim Jong-il's leadership, every meeting between Kim and other high-ranking officials was punctual. When a meeting was scheduled at 10 a.m., it sharply started at then. If a meeting that broadcasts live is scheduled at 11 a.m., however, Kim Jong-un attends it some 20 minutes lately.

He usually puts on make-up before attending aired meetings. But in those photos in which he appears worn out, it seems that he was running so late that he did not have time to do so. There were speculations that he had his eyebrows waxed, to make eyebrow drawing easier. The point is that he seems to have been rushed, not implying any other significant meaning.He could have ordered Jang's execution while he was under influence of alcohol.

Kim: How can a 30-year-old have such a physique?

Son: Kim is not bright. Unlike his father's succession, the absence of Kim Jong-il comes as a factor of frustration to his leadership.The situation is different from the time of Kim Jong-il's succession; Kim Ii-sung was still alive then. While being educated at Switzerland, he had experienced the taste of capitalism, but has to rule his Stalinist regime now. He is not bright enough to do the conflicting two things at the same time.

Q: What are your suggestions to the South's North Korea policy down the road?

King: Naive ideas that the South's should pursue more flexible North Korea policy makes them (the North) to engage in further provocations. As politicians said, we have to prepare for a war to avoid it.

A lunatic is just a lunatic. We have to cure the mental illness. During the Kim Dae-jung administration, the South offered too much amount of aids to the North. That does not deter any provocation from the North. The South should pursue more stern policy against the North. The North's nuclear experiments all occurred during the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

Q: But bombardment on Yeonpyeong Island and sinking of the South's naval ship Cheonan occurred during the Lee Myung-bak administration.

Son: During the Lee administration, there was no distinct North Korea policy. When Kim Jong-il took power, there were concerns over his reckless actions against the U.S. Nothing has changed. The South should come up with humanitarian approach toward the North only after it shows some sign of reconciliation, such as abandoning its nuclear program.

King: There still are controversy over Cheonan's sinking over who is behind it, but artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island was clearly done by the North. The South should have countered to the North with more sternly. Offering sign of talk to the North further will only give images to it which they can make use of.

Q: There are a number of cases that North Korean defector made their way back to the North.

King: In order to bring the unification between the two Koreas, defectors should settle down in the South more successfully. Some 25,000 defectors here send money to their family members in the North even though they live in poverty in the South, because life in the North is much harsher.

At least they remit money twice in a year. Many North Korean say the family members of a defector never run out of money or food. Such families usually have gathering each other and chat about their defected family members, such as "How much did him (defector) sent to you?"

If there were 300,000 defectors here and if all of them sent money to the North, the two Koreas must have unified.

This is the way to achieve unification without arms. Kim ordered barbed fences between the North and China to be poisoned. One of my acquaintances got prinked while crossing over. He has to amputate his legs.

Since the North has no remedy at law, the classic unification measure that unified the East and West Germany doesn't work. We should use defectors here and bring all those sojourning in China. On average, I learned that it costs some 7 million won for a North Korean to flee from the country.

The amount has increased from 1 million won in the past, but the sluggish economy raised the cost. Coast guard officers escort defectors safely to Guangzhou if they were paid. The South's government should subsidize defectors here instead of wasting tens of billions of dollar.

Kim: Separating the Ministry of Unification and defectors is important. The ministry is in charge of defectors who the North hates. If the ministry takes care of defectors, they cannot engage in talks with the North. For example, former the main opposition Democratic Party's former lawmaker Chung dong-young was one of the favored figures of the North.

However, as he brought defector issues to negotiation table, the North turned down the negotiation. The Ministry of Unification cannot play actual role in helping defectors. Defector issues should be dealt by a ministry with nationwide administrative network, such as the Ministry of Security and Public Administration (MOSPA).

King: I agree with that. The MOSPA should manage defectors scattered around the country. It costs too much for a defector living in Busan to visit the unification ministry in Seoul. It should be done as same as the government's multicultural policies.

There are many defectors who failed to settle down in the South's society because they were so accustomed to socialism. The government should come up with measure to help them. Many defectors face difficulties here because of ostracism.

Kim: Defectors are evolving though. I have observed them for the past 15 years, they have changed a lot. In the past they were busy only receiving government subsidiary, but they now know that they have to work in order to feed themselves.

Son: The government has no plan on how to deal with defectors for unification. It only exerted efforts on controlling the divided situation of the two Koreas. It has to segregate North Korean citizens from its leadership, including Kim. Such an approach will disrupt the regime.

Also, it should bolster efforts on broadcasting, sending leaflets to the North and helping defectors to spread what life in North Korea is miserable compare to outside world. It is difficult to expect any effective measure by the Ministry of Unification, since it has been under progressive administration more than 10 years.

Q: Do the leaflets are working?

King: A lot of things spread through leaflets quickly. The only source of information about Kim families' corruption and the regime's reality is leaflets. Other things are almost impossible. If North Korea citizens were caught while listening the South's radio broadcasting, they will be imprisoned in gulags. Radios available in market are tuned limitedly to North Korean broadcastings. Radios imported from China are also manipulated. North Koreans modify it to listen Japanese and South Korean radio broadcasts.

Son: I served for military in Imjingak, border town. I first saw leaflets there and learnt a lot about the North. In the 70s and 80s, there were a significant number of South Korean soldiers who defected to the North because of physical abuse rampant in the South's military.

People going up to the North outnumbered defectors from the North. About 1,100 went to North Korea.

King: Physical abuse was rather rampant in South Korean army then that of the North.