It was early evening on April 17, 1999, when the counting of votes in the confidence motion moved by Atal Bihari Vajpayee ended. We had been holed up inside his room for over two days, watching heated exchanges between the treasury benches and the opposition. After the hour-long voting process, Speaker G M C Balayogi announced that the Vajpayee government had fallen by one vote. I remember Vajpayee emerge from the House looking shocked and stricken. It was a verdict he did not expect.

He had known there would be difficulties. Leaders had been talking to each other and there was an understanding this was still “open-ended” and the verdict could be in our favour. I was in his room when he had telephoned BSP chief Kanshiram and sought his support. Kanshiram had refused to back Vajpayee, but he had also conveyed to him that BSP’s five MPs would abstain from voting.

On D-day, however, the BSP MPs not only showed up but they voted against the government. Saifuddin Soz of National Congress, which had pledged its support, turned rogue and voted against the government. Congress’s Odisha CM Giridhar Gamang, who had still not resigned his membership of Lok Sabha, also showed up to vote. The net result was for all to see.

Vajpayee recovered quickly. A few hours after the vote, the now ‘former’ PM had recovered his composure. The week that followed saw much political drama. Sonia Gandhi claimed to have the numbers but Kanshiram, once again, did not concur.

A few days later, word about Pakistan infiltrating into Kargil came in. This was another shock. The first official briefing to the PM could not indicate the seriousness of the situation. It was reported simply as “some movement of Pakistan inside the Line of Control”. It was only after General V P Malik, away in Poland on an official tour, returned and assessed the situation that India began its preparations to retaliate in right earnest. Under Vajpayee’s watch, Gen Malik ordered full mobilisation of troops.

India was clear it had no option but to safeguard its territory. Vajpayee sought at least one briefing on the ground situation every day. When Indian fighter planes began operations, he also sought video footage. But the line was clearly drawn. India would defend its territory on the LoC and push back aggressors but would not enter Pakistani airspace.

In Vajpayee’s mind, withdrawing from the field or letting Pakistan hold on to Indian territory was out of the question. Eventually, the Americans understood. Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif was summoned to Washington on July 4 after the Indians gained the upper hand. Sharif was told in no uncertain terms that Pakistan must return to their side of the LoC. Vajpayee established that India and Pakistan should not be clubbed.

If there was an article of faith for Vajpayee, it was to see India assert itself as a responsible nuclear power. When he assumed office in 1998, he ordered the Pokhran tests There was great secrecy around the preparations, and camouflage nets were thrown over the drilling site. India’s preparations were not detected.

When the Pokhran mission was accomplished, it was with great satisfaction and pride that India wrote to world leaders explaining the need for the tests. Contrary to what the west projected — India and Pakistan as reckless nuclear powers — India asserted that it was the growing influence and aggression of China that had led to the tests. China, at that time, made aggressive inroads into Indian territory in the east.

