Alone and without air support, Bismarck found herself surrounded by opposing forces during the night of 26-27 May 1941. Although none of the 16 torpedoes fired by British destroyers hit Bismarck, their active presence did cause her to fire her 380mm and 150mm guns and wore down the stamina and morale of her crew. Other than minor splinter damage, these British destroyers escaped their encounters with Bismarck unscathed.

According to the recollections of Baron von Müllenheim-Rechberg and Mr. Statz, these destroyers achieved no torpedo hits. We did find evidence, however, of a fire on the starboard bow of Bismarck, presumably caused by a star shell falling on the deck and burning out. Mr. Statz has confirmed that his CPO, Gerhard Sagner and a detachment of sailors was ordered to extinguish this fire, but that they were unable to access it due to heavy seas washing over the bow and gun blast from the guns of turrets Anton and Bruno. Eventually, heavy seas washing over the bow put out the fire. This star-shell fire was reported as a definite torpedo hit by the British destroyer Maori.

On the morning of 27 May 1941 Bismarck was surrounded by British forces consisting of battleships King George V (ten 14-inch guns) and Rodney (nine 16-inch guns), battlecruiser Renown (six 15-inch guns), aircraft carrier Ark Royal, heavy cruisers Norfolk and Dorsetshire (each with eight 8-inch guns), cruiser Sheffield and nine destroyers.

Admiral Tovey's strategy was to quickly close Bismarck from her port bow with King George V and Rodney. Renown, with her light protection, was ordered to accompany Ark Royal and remain well clear of the scene of the gunnery engagement. Renown was to be used only if the primary force sustained incapacitating damage. The battle began at 0847, commencing at a range of 20,000 meters, with the British ships firing first. Below is a British track chart of the action.

Bismarck, unable to steer, was at the mercy of the gale-force storm. To fire guns from a platform that had unpredictable ship motions created a difficult gunnery problem, but Adalbert Schneider, Bismarck's gunnery officer, was able to obtain a straddle on Rodney before his ship began taking hits from British shells. Rodney's gunnery was very accurate in these opening moments, before she began to have difficulty in ranging. King George V, with her more modern equipment and radar, also found her target early and between 0920-0924 hit Bismarck with a number of her 14-inch shells. Cruiser Norfolk concurrently fired at Bismarck from starboard and shortly after 0900 cruiser Dorsetshire approached Bismarck from the starboard stern quarter. The volume of fire directed at Bismarck was remarkable, as Table 3 shows:

Table 3: British Shells Fired at the Bismarck (27 May 1941) Ship 16" 14" 8" 6" 5.25" King George V -- 339 -- -- 660 Rodney 380 -- -- 716 -- Dorsetshire -- -- 254 -- -- Norfolk -- -- 527 -- --

A total of 2,876 shells were fired at Bismarck from 0847-1019, most at relatively close ranges (see Table 4). During that time, it is possible that as many as 300-400 shells hit the German ship. Why did she not blow up and sink?

Table 4: Ranges to the Bismarck (in meters) (27 May 1941) Time Rodney King George V Remarks 0847 23,000 -- Rodney commences to fire. 0848 -- 22,500 King George V opens fire. 0913 -- 11,500 Rodney and King George V close at 16 knots. The Rodney does not fire until 0918 due to a change in course. 0918 9,100 -- Rodney resumes fire. 0920 -- -- "A" turret of King George V out of action because of jammed training gear. 0930 5,500 -- Rodney closes on Bismarck's port side. 0950 -- -- Seaman Josef Statz appears on the bridge of the Bismarck. 0954 -- 7,300 King George V resumes fire from all her turrets. 1003 3,700 -- Rodney approaches on the Bismarck's starboard quarter. 1008 -- -- Rodney continues salvo fire, scoring repeated hits. 1014 3,700 -- Rodney ceases fire. 1021 -- 3,700 King George V ceases fire.

As previously discussed, Bismarck had excellent stability characteristics, with a substantial metacentric height (GM), large righting arms (GZ) and a great range of positive stability (see Table 5). Such stability was necessary to offset the effects of the flooding of large off-center compartments. As a result, it was necessary to cause massive off-center flooding to capsize and sink a Bismarck-class battleship. As will be seen, the extensive damage sustained by Bismarck was sufficient to overwhelm and defeat the ship, but was not of a nature to cause her to sink quickly.

Table 5: Bismarck-Class Stability Characteristics Condition Displacement

(Metric Tons) GM

(Meters) Range of Stability

(Degrees) GZ

(Righting Arm)

(Meters) Light Ship 41,250 3.60 65 2.00 Standard 43,200 3.55 59 2.25 Full Load 47,700 4.00 55 2.45 Capacity 53,200 4.40 53 2.70

Most of the gunfire damage was concentrated on the forward superstructure and command tower. Many shells ricocheted after hitting the water surface or simply exploded in the sea. The armor citadel, designed for close-range gunnery actions in the North Sea, prevailed.

Despite the close range at which most of this action was fought we have found that the 50mm main deck armor of Bismarck was penetrated by two of the 16-inch shells from Rodney. The pitching and rolling of the German battleship may have somewhat decreased the obliquity permitting penetration. Once penetration occurred, the 50mm armor deflected the shells downward, enhancing their ability to penetrate the main armor deck directly below due to their more nearly normal angles of impact. Ironically, reducing the main deck plating thickness might have actually enhanced the protection of Bismarck as heavy shells would not have been deflected downwards, with improved chances for penetration.

There are reports of heavy shells exploding in the port turbine room and in one of the starboard boiler rooms between 0920-0930, when Rodney was at ranges of less than 9,000 meters. Mr. Statz has confirmed these two shell hits and stated that one was near his position in Damage Control Center, thereby preventing his escape aft with the party of Commander Oels. This shell exploded in the starboard boiler room, started a fuel oil fire and burst steam pipes. Superheated steam scalded a number of ratings who had survived the shell burst.

These two hits and those which silenced the forward turrets and the main battery director led the Executive Officer, CDR Hans Oels, to order the scuttling of the ship (Measure V, where V = "Versenken" = Scuttling) between 0920-0930.

One American battle damage experience in World War II, very similar to the Bismarck situation, aided our analysis. The American battleship USS South Dakota, with a profile generally similar to that of Bismarck, was engaged by Japanese forces off Guadalcanal during a night action on 13-14 November 1942. At a range of 5,800 yards, South Dakota was silhouetted by Japanese searchlights and fired on by Japanese heavy cruisers Atago and Takao (each with ten 8-inch guns), battleship Kirishima (eight 14-inch guns) and several destroyers. The Japanese gunners' probable aiming point was the forward superstructure and some 27 shells hit the ship. Due to the close range of the engagement, most of the shells hit the superstructure, with very few striking below the main deck. Based upon this damage, which is documented in a battle damage report which we have thoroughly studied, the action resulted in a Gaussian distribution of shell hits on South Dakota with a peak located at her forward superstructure. The distribution of shell hits observed on Bismarck is surprisingly similar.

Most of the British shells struck the forward superstructure of Bismarck with the hits late in the action simply rearranging the debris created by earlier shell hits. A few shells struck and penetrated the 350mm conning tower, the upper splinter belt and the lower side belt. However, based upon the distribution of hits during the South Dakota action, which also took place at a close range, we believe that there must have been numerous serious shell hits in the area between the Admiral's bridge and the stack. We know from photographic evidence that there was an internal explosion in the forward port 150-mm turret and its magazine, probably caused by either 16-inch or 14-inch shells. Again, the historical record and probability theory can be used to determine the origin of these shells. One important point that we have discovered in examining the video of the port and starboard sides of the forward conning tower is that the penetrating damage from 356mm and 406mm shell hits was all on the port side.

Investigation of the gunnery records of King George V and interviews with several of her officers reveal that there were problems with the mechanical safety interlocks designed to prevent explosions within the turrets from being transmitted to the powder magazines below. Her gunnery during the battle averaged 60% between 0920-0950, with only the twin turret performing at 100% effectiveness. Rodney, however, kept up a steady barrage, with few misfires. With the failure of Rodney's fire-control equipment around 0930, Bismarck was tracked and ranges estimated visually. Despite this, we believe Rodney did most of the serious damage to Bismarck. Her 2,048-pound shells were extremely effective at ranges of 2,500-8,000 meters and could easily penetrate any vertical armor surface of Bismarck. Near the end of the battle, when Bismarck was completely defenseless, King George V closed to 3,000 meters, at which range her 14-inch armor piercing shells could penetrate all of Bismarck's vertical armor.10

All the guns aboard Bismarck used cartridge-type powder cases. The Germans believed cartridge-type ammunition was much safer than bag ammunition and decidedly less susceptible to magazine explosions such as those which devastated several British battle cruisers at Jutland. There were, however, magazine fires in Gneisenau in February 1942 and Bismarck's sister ship Tirpitz on 12 November 1944 which were caused by red-hot splinters from bomb hits which ignited some cartridges. In Gneisenau, turret Anton was uplifted a few feet before magazine flooding put out the deflagration.11 In Tirpitz, turret Caesar was actually blown overboard.3a

In the case of Bismarck, we believe that the magazines of turrets Anton, Bruno and Dora were flooded and no magazine deflagrations occurred. Turret Bruno was displaced upward slightly by an internal explosion which did not reach the magazines but was sufficient to blow off the rear armor plate. Thereafter, the turret was pitched forward in its barbette. This all has been confirmed from survivor testimony of Mr. Statz.

Most of the damage done by Dorsetshire and Norfolk was relatively superficial. A hit from Norfolk sheared away the forward radar and gun director atop the forward command tower and other shells damaged a number of 37mm and 105mm gun mounts along the starboard side. According to our interviews of Baron von Müllenheim-Rechburg and Mr. Josef Statz, the gunfire of Dorsetshire was devastatingly accurate, smashing gun mounts, gouging into armor, ripping away light plating and sweeping away debris left by hits from the battleships. In many cases, damage came from multiple hits causing debris to be swept overboard or piled in large heaps along the port side from the amidships catapult to turret Bruno. Baron von Müllenheim-Rechberg and Mr. Statz have told us that the two after main battery turrets sustained gouges several centimeters deep in their armor surfaces. The evidence regarding the final condition of these turrets is limited because they were buried in the seabed after the ship capsized on sinking.

Our examination of the wreck of Bismarck does not permit us to conclusively determine exactly when the battered stern end fell away - it had almost certainly failed structurally during the capsizing process. Prior to the capsizing, the stern no longer contributed any buoyancy to the stability and survivability of the battleship. We do know from the testimony of Mr. Statz that Bismarck's stern was in place when he was carried past it by the prevailing seas around 1035. Mr. Statz was within 50 meters of the ship when she capsized and sank. There is the possibility that as the ship sank and righted herself, the hydrodynamic forces caused the stern to fail completely underwater.

We attribute the structural fatigue-type failures in the stern to poor welding, a structural continuity problem resulting from the design mistake of not extending the longitudinal bulkheads bounding the Steering Gear Room aft into the stern-end structure and gunfire damage to the plating just aft of the transverse armored bulkhead to the steering compartments. The structural design deficiency was later recognized in Bismarck's sister ship Tirpitz and the longitudinal bulkheads were extended into the stern during repairs in Norway. In fairness, it must be noted that welding was a new technology in ship construction in the 1930s and that other German and foreign warships also experienced cracks in welded joints after sustaining damage. There is also evidence that welding failures occurred in the torpedo bulkhead in Compartment VII where it was necessary for damage-control teams to insert hammocks in the cracks of the welded joints.

Remarkable evidence of the failure in the heat affected zone of the welded seam at Bismarck's stern was observed on the seabed in 1989. A large piece of plate from the port side shell just aft of the Steering Gear Room was found in the debris field. We could absolutely identify this plate by a unique row of portholes and a straight edge, which gave clear evidence of structural failure in the welded joint. One jagged end had a large hole, which we believe resulted from a 16-inch shell hit. The authors were aware of the severity of the damage in the stern end from 1983 correspondence with Wilhelm Schmidt, who was the leader of the damage control team aft and from testimony of British observers aboard Rodney.