US Secretary of State John Kerry’s major concern these days seems to be to save the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. When he succeeded in securing the Palestinian National Authority’s (PNA) agreement to resume talks at the end of July 2013, the goal was to reach a comprehensive agreement within nine months. As he started to explore the difficult nature of the conflict, his aim changed and became one to reach a “framework agreement”. And when this initiative also failed, his main concerns changed into merely extending the talks and prevent a total failure.

The original timeframe for negotiations ended after Israel broke its commitment to release the fourth batch of Palestinian prisoners and blackmailed the Palestinian side by making the prisoner release a condition of the PNA’s acceptance to extend the talks for a year. When the PNA rejected this, Israel announced plans to build 700 new housing units in occupied East Jerusalem. In response, the PNA requested accession to 15 international conventions and charters. Ultimately, these actions imply that the negotiations have failed.

In fact, peace talks have always been used by Israel to buy as much time to build as many colonies in the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem in a bid to annex them when the regional and international conditions are ripe for that. Israel also uses the negotiations as a means to avoid international isolation and sanctions. Throughout the talks, Israel has maintained its positions on all of the main contested issues, with the US administration failing to secure the slightest concession and hence save the talks.

Israel’s infamous negotiating style has been employed to pressure the PA into giving in. The Netanyahu government threatened to withhold the PNA’s local public revenues. Should Israel carry this threat out, the Palestinian government would simply go bankrupt.

The PNA decided to fight back; and despite the US opposition, President Mahmoud Abbas took advantage of Palestine’s status as a non-member-state in the United Nations and signed 15 international conventions. This step was intended to put pressure on Israel to release the prisoners so that he can agree to resume the talks as the US administration wishes. This is why Abbas avoided signing a request to accede to the most significant international body, the International Criminal Court, which could expose Israeli officials to charges of having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. Most of the charters and conventions presently signed by the PNA primarily address human rights, international humanitarian law, and diplomatic protocol, and, therefore, cause Israel little worry.

In addition, Abbas sent a delegation from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) factions to the Gaza Strip to explore ways to achieve national reconciliation. On Wednesday, the rival Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah agreed to form a unity government and hold new elections in an attempt to overcome a seven-year split that has left them divided.

Last March, Egypt, which has always played the role of mediator between the different Palestinian factions, banned Hamas and dubbed it a hostile movement, thereby ceasing all contacts between the two sides. During the latest Israeli assault on Gaza, tension was absolutely apparent when Egypt ignored Hamas and communicated instead with Islamic Jihad in Gaza to restore the truce with Israel.

Abbas also sought support from the Arab League to ward off US and Israeli pressure. He managed to secure political and financial cover for the PNA’s position should Israel carry out its threats. At their recent meeting in Cairo, Arab foreign ministers affirmed their support for the Palestinian efforts in obtaining membership in all international agencies. In addition, Arab states have pledged to launch a diplomatic push on the international level in support of Palestine. They also promised to provide a financial safety net, especially after the Arab Summit in Kuwait promised to donate $100 million (Dh367.8 million) per month to the PNA. The ministers also reiterated their outright rejection of the Jewish nature of the state of Israel.

Despite this, there is considerable doubt as to the extent of the Arabs’ commitment to these decisions, particularly concerning financial support. Theoretically, the Arab financial safety net has been in place since 2010, but this has not translated into practice. If anything, the Arab states have reduced their aid to the PNA, which was forced to borrow from banks and international financial institutions to cover its budget deficit. It was then forced to issue government bonds in order to raise funds to restructure part of the government debt that it must repay the Palestinian banking system.

Having tried all means to respond to Israel’s intransigence on the peace talks, the PNA may need to explore new territories. Abbas may need to consider the Samson option, i.e. dissolving the PNA and forcing Israel to take full responsibility for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including security, economic and legal responsibilities — something Israel would do everything to avoid.

Dr Marwan Kabalan is the Dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Diplomacy at the University of Kalamoon, Damascus.