Viktor Drachev/AFP/Getty Images

Invasions are tricky things. It's not always shock and awe—waves of precision bombs pounding targets or foreign troops flooding into cities. Russia's intervention—no matter what blatant violation of sovereignty it might represent, has so far been well-run and strategically intelligent.

Think about it: On Thursday, the Ukrainian Parliament formed a government. By the end of the next day, they had lost control over a vital 10,000-square mile-province with nearly 2 million people in it.

Things could go badly for Russia in the long term. But in the short term, the operation seems to be the kind of success that geopolitical types will pore over for years. So how did Vladimir Putin do it.

Define Your Objectives

Putin has one major objective: to secure the Black Sea Fleet base in Crimea, which gives Russian naval access to the Mediterranean Sea and beyond. The opposition government in the Ukraine had been discussing booting the Russian military from the base, a real threat to the Kremlin.

Secondly, Putin wants to create a bloc of supportive nations—most of them former Soviet states—to counter the European Union. Every Russian is mindful of enemies at the borders, never forgetting the invasions of Napoleon and Hitler. So the annexation of the Crimea is a national imperative that is easy for Russia to justify. The fact that vast percentages of people in Crimea speak Russian, and culturally identify with the nation, makes things more personal.

Act Fast, When Your Foes Are Weak

So Russia thinks the Black Sea Fleet base must be preserved, and that goal requires separating Crimea from the now hostile Ukrainian government. The time to act is immediate, when the fledgling government is too weak to respond and has few allies to call on.

The first blow came in the night. Armed men—either Russian special operations professionals, local guerillas trained by operators, straight up mercenaries, or a fun mix of all of the above—seized government buildings. This eliminated rallying points for the legitimate Crimean government. This stage of the operation is the riskiest, when a building seizure could become a pitched gun battle. Reports that the Russians moved troops out of the Black Sea Fleet base to support the special operators shows how critical this phase was.

The seizures of Parliament and other critical government buildings went smoothly, or so it seems, and the armored personnel carriers went back into the base. That's important, because the Kremlin wanted to keep the stamp the Russian military stamp off the operation, at least at first.

Confuse and Destroy

Thursday saw armed gunmen in control of buildings, roadways and, soon, Sevastopol and Simferopol airports. They were seemingly unopposed. Even though the men raised Russian flags, no one was sure who they were, only that it was clear they were professionally trained, well armed, and acting in a concerted effort.

Soon, reports spread that "Crimean separatists" has risen up to oppose the new government. In fact, they were the advance team for an annexation/invasion. Those hours of confusion helped solidify the next stage of the operation.

Establish a Narrative

Thursday also saw coordinated statements from Russian allies in the Ukraine. Deposed president Viktor Yanukovych spoke to the public, maintaining he was the legitimate head of state. "I am compelled to ask the Russian Federation to ensure my personal security from extremists," he said. The same day, the Crimean regional Parliament announced elections in May to determine its status. These bold moves happened after the operation began, emboldening pro-Russian elements in the Crimea to begin the process of detaching from the rest of the nation. It's important to note that Putin used the legitimate pro-Russia sentiment to force the annexation. Good planners use what they have to make an operation work.

The narrative was in place: A revolution deposed a leader, sparking a counter revolt, and the Russian-allied population were begging for help. That help was on the way in the form of Russian troops and attack helicopters that arrived on Friday.

Cut Communications

Ukraine's largest telecom company, Ukrtelecom, announced on Friday that it had lost data and voice connectivity between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine. The news reports said "unknown people seized telecommunications nodes and destroyed cables. There is almost no phone connectivity or Internet service across Crimea."

Two things jump out here. First, despite the emphasis on cyber war, the Russians went after the physical connections that wired the province to the capital. It's a vivid reminder that infrastructure defense comes in layers, and each layer needs protection.

Second is how effectively Russia isolated the region. Cutting off roads is vital, and so is severing information highways. When it comes time to launch any counter-effort against the Russians, the Ukrainians in Kiev won't have many ways to reach potential allies in Crimea. And Russia's demonstration of communication control is another way of showing that it runs the place now.

Consolidate Your Gains

By the time thousands of Russian troops landed at airports in cargo planes, no one was really surprised. And no one was in position to oppose them. The Ukrainian forces in the Crimea were not strong enough to put up a fight even if the opposition government was in a position to order such an action. Fighting when the other guy is ready for it and you're clearly not is a bad idea: That's one of the lessons the Georgians learned in 2008 when they fought Russia over the breakaway republic of Ossetia.

By the end of Friday, the Russian military had deployed into key transportation sites, controlled communication, funneled thousands of troops into the province, controlled communication, and dominated the region's airspace. And it did so basically without firing a shot.

That's a full two day's work, executed flawlessly. Now comes the harder part—keeping control of the situation as the region and world reacts.

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