Full text of "Anatoliy Golitsyn Perestroika Deception"

T > 'I N The world's slide towards THE 'SECOND OCTOBER REVOLUTION' ['WELTOKTOBER'] Anatoliy Golitsyn Author of 'New Lies For Old' Anatoliy Golitsyn's first book, 'New Lies for Old', caused a long-running sensation when it was discovered that, unlike most Western analysts, the Author had accurately predicted, some years ahead of the events, the 'Break with the Past' which took place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-91. In his book 'Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA' [Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1994], Mark Riebling, who carried out a methodical analysis of Golitsyn's predictions in 'New Lies for Old', credited the Author with 'an accuracy record of nearly 94%'. This singular achievement puts all other analysts, including some official services, to shame; and it is precisely because of his record of pin- point accuracy that Western Governments, policymakers and even some intelligence services, whose record bears little comparison with Golitsyn's, have competed with one another over the years to find reasons why Golitsyn's perceptive explanations of Soviet strategy should be ignored. But events as they unfold are relentlessly proving this remarkable analyst of Soviet strategy to be right. 'The Perestroika Deception' explains the devious secret intent behind the Leninist strategy which the 'former' Communists are pur- suing under cover of fake 'reform' and 'progress towards democracy'. The immediate strategic objective is 'convergence' with the West - on their terms, not ours. The ultimate objective is Lenin's: replacement of nation states with collective regional governments as building blocks of the 'New World Social Order' - World [Communist] Government. THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION V In Memory of Jim Angleton Founder and outstanding chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Counter-intelligence, a man of vision and courage, a warrior and comrade-in-arms, who recognised the dangers of the Soviets' new strategic challenge VI THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION ABOUT THE AUTHOR Anatoliy Golitsyn was born in the Ukraine in 1926. While a cadet in military school, he was awarded a Soviet medal Eor the defence of Moscow in the Great Patriotic War' for digging anti-tank trenches near Moscow. At the age of fifteen, he joined the Komsomol (League of Communist Youth) and, at nineteen, he became a member of the Communist Party. In the same year, he joined the KGB, in which he studied and served until 1961. He graduated from the Moscow School of Military Counter-espionage, the counterintelligence faculty of the High Intelligence School, and the University of Marxism-Leninism and completed a correspondence course with the High Diplo- matic School. In 1952 and early 1953 he was involved with a friend in drawing up a proposal to the Central Committee on the reorganisation of Soviet intelligence. In connection with this proposal he attended a meeting of the secretariat chaired by Stalin and a meeting of the Presidium chaired by Malenkov and attended by Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Bulganin. In 1952-53 he worked briefly as head of a section responsible for counter-espionage against the United States. In 1959 he grad- uated with a law degree from a four-year course at the KGB Institute (now the KGB Academy) in Moscow. From 1959 to 1960, at a time when Soviet long-range strategy was being for- mulated and the KGB was being reorganised to play its part in it, he served as a senior analyst in the NATO section of the Information Department of the Soviet intel- ligence service. He served in Vienna and Helsinki on counterintelligence assign- ments from 1953 to 1955 and from 1960 to 1961, respectively. He defected to the United States in December 1961. Subsequently, his contri- bution to the national security of leading Western countries was recognised by the award of the United States Government Medal for Distinguished Service. He was made an Honorary Commander of the British Empire (CBE). A promise of membership of the Legion d'Honneur made when President Pompidou was in power was not fulfilled owing to the change of government. Since 1962, the Author has spent much of his time on the study of Communist and international affairs, reading both the Communist and the Western press. In 1980 he completed, and in 1984 he published, 'New Lies for Old', a study of the Soviet long-range strategy of deception and disinformation. For over thirty years, the Author has submitted Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency, in which he has provided the Agency with timely and largely accurate forecasts of Soviet Bloc developments and on the evolution of Soviet/Russ- ian/Communist strategy. By applying the dialectical methodology which drives the strategy, the Author has been able to score innumerable 'bulls-eyes'. This unparal- leled track record reflects the Author's personal experience of four years in the KGB's strategy 'think tank', together with his deep understanding of the dialectical nature of the strategy and the Leninist mentality of its originators and implementers. The Author is a citizen of the United States. CONTENTS VII Contents About the Author VI Acknowledgments XVI Foreword by the Author XVII Introduction by Christopher Story, Editor & Publisher, Soviet Analyst XXI Part One: The Perestroika' Deception 1 The world's slide towards the 'Second October Revolution' ['Weltoktober'J Organisation of the documents 2 About the Memoranda 2 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: March 1989 3 Predicting, understanding and dealing with 'Perestroika' 3 Predictions of 'perestroika' in 'New Lies for Old' 3 Additional predictions on 'perestroika' in Memoranda to the CIA: 8 July 4,1984; July 5,1985; August 1985 8 Winter 1986; March 1987 10 Correct predictions based on the new method of analysis 11 The adoption of the long-range strategy of 'perestroika' 12 Soviet research and preparation for the strategy 13 The KGB's role in the preparation of 'perestroika' 14 Experiments and rehearsals for 'perestroika' 15 'Perestroika', the final phase: its main objectives 17 The essence of 'perestroika': An application of 1920s' Leninism 18 The choice of Party and Government leaders for 'perestroika' 20 Gorbachev as Party Leader and President 20 The choice of Ligachev and Yeltsin as critics from right and left 21 Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister 21 Yakovlev as Head of the Foreign Policy Commission 2 1 Chebrikov as Head of the Judicial Commission 22 Kryuchkov as Head of the KGB 22 Dubinin as Soviet Ambassador in Washington 23 President Reagan hugs the Bear 23 The Soviet campaign to engage the American elite 24 Dialectics of the strategy and the predictive power of the new method 26 Predictions on the execution of the strategy's Final Phase 27 Increased role of the Communist Party 27 Stronger, maturer ideology 27 An improved, reorganised KGB 28 The new model Soviet regime 28 'Restructuring' in Eastern Europe and China 29 'Restructuring' in Western Europe 29 'Restructuring' in the Third World 30 VIII THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION 'Restructuring' American military-political alliances 31 'Restructuring' in the United States 31 The Soviet campaign against anti-Communists in the West 32 Soviet intentions towards the next elections in the United States and Western Europe: The Radical Left 33 The possible replacement of Gorbachev 34 China: A strategic enemy of the United States 35 Defective Western methods of analysis 36 The defects of Western counterintelligence 39 Fallacies about Gorbachev and 'perestroika' 39 The need for an American counter-strategy 41 The crisis of analysis and measures to improve it 42 Dr Brzezinski's strategy for the West in Eastern Europe 43 The need to improve Western intelligence and counterintelligence 45 The pressing need for public exposure of the strategy of 'perestroika' 45 The advantages of exposure 47 PartTwo:CommunistGrandStrategiesandWestern Illusions 49 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 4 January 1988 50 An assessment of Gorbachev's visit to the United States in the light of the Grand Soviet Deception Strategy 50 The three Grand Strategies 5 1 The First Grand Strategy 51 The Second Grand Strategy 52 The Third and present Grand Strategy 54 The Third Grand Strategy's main objectives 54 'Convergence' through tactical changes and disinformation 56 American official tactics versus Soviet bureaucratic strategy 57 Gorbachev's US visit a Trojan Horse to engage the American elite in the strategy of 'convergence' 60 The need for counteraction by the United States 61 The Author's suggestions 63 Part Three : Western counter-strategy against 'perestroika' 65 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: September 1988 66 Western counter-strategy against 'perestroika' 66 Past American strategic mistakes in dealing with the Communist world 66 The mistakes of the Vietnam period 66 The late ex -President Nixon's scenario for dealing with Gorbachev 67 Western counter-strategy against 'perestroika' 68 CONTENTS K Part Four: The Execution of the Strategy of 'perestroika' and the bund western response to it: The seven keys to understanding 'perestroika': The need to reconsider our response 71 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: March 1990 72 The execution of the strategy of 'perestroika' The blind Western response to it The seven keys to understanding 'perestroika' The need to reconsider our response 72 The Bush Administration's erroneous assessment of 'perestroika' and its blind response have led the West astray 72 The seven keys to understanding the strategy of 'perestroika' 75 The first key: Lenin's New Economic Policy [NEP] as a precedent for 'perestroika' 75 The crisis of the Soviet Empire 76 Outline of attempts to cure the crisis in the Soviet Bloc prior to the adoption of the strategy of 'perestroika' 76 Zhdanov's policy scenario 76 Beria's policies: Personal dictatorship with liberalisation 77 Malenkov's policy: A short-lived but genuine attempt to 'break with the past' 78 Khrushchev's policies before the adoption of the strategy in 1 958-60 79 The principal elements of Lenin's New Economic Policy' [NEP] 80 The consequences of Lenin's New Economic Policy' 82 Secret research on the lessons of the New Economic Policy' 82 Gorbachev on perestroika' 84 The second key: Preparation for the use of the Communist Bloc's full political and security potential 84 The third key: The creation of controlled 'political opposition' in the Communist countries 85 The fourth key: Lenin's 'forging of old and new forms' for developing socialism, and Chicherin's idea of false representative institutions through the admission of non-Communists 86 The fifth key: The deployment of controlled 'political opposition' in 'democratic' and non-Communisf structures 87 The sixth key: Lenin's use of formal political 'independence' for the Far Eastern and Georgian Republics 87 The seventh key: The deployment of the Bloc's political and security potential in the execution of anti-Western strategy 91 Fukuyama and 'the end of ideology' 93 The process of 'perestroika' in the Communist countries: Common pattern and specifics % Partnership between the old and new generations of leaders 97 The meaning of the reorganisation of the KGB and the East European security and intelligence services 98 X THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION The meaning of the Communist Parties' surrender of their monopoly and of Party and Government reorganisation 100 The common pattern indicates a 'Revolution from Above' 102 The success of 'perestroika' 103 Specifics in individual Communist countries 104 The specifics of 'perestroika' in Romania 105 The specifics of 'perestroika' in China 107 Selective killing of the unorganised elements in Tienanmen Square 109 The difficulties of the Western media in covering 'perestroika' 1 10 Comments on an Article by 'Z' in Daedalus' 1 13 Conclusions and the need for reconsideration of the West's blind response to 'perestroika' 1 14 The main priorities for re-thinking 1 15 Part Five: exposing 'perestroika' as the soviet strategy for a 'second october revolution' ['weltoktober'] Non-violent revolution, controlled fake 'democratism' and strategic disinformation 119 1 . Exposing 'perestroika' as the strategy for a second October World Socialist Revolution ['Weltoktober'] 2. the new pattern of non-violent revolution, not by communist parties, dictatorships, the soviet army and violence, but through false reform, influence and the political action of the soviet forces engaged in party-controlled 'democratisation' and the so-called multi-party system in the ussr 3. the paramount role of soviet strategic disinformation in the successful execution of the 'perestroika' strategy 1 20 Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency: September-November 1990 120 Soviet rejection of the discredited pattern of violent revolution in selected parts of the world 120 Why did the Soviet strategists opt for a non-violent pattern of World Revolution? 121 The objectives, targets and methods of the Communist strategy and political offensive 122 The resources for the Soviet political offensive 122 The enhanced role of the Party as the guiding force behind the strategy 122 The 'multi -Party system' is a fabricated instrument of the KGB 123 The Soviet media as a strategic weapon for the political offensive 124 The success of the Soviet political offensive against the United States and NATO 124 The Soviet political breakthrough in Germany: The development of the Soviet-German partnership 125 An assessment in strategic terms of the Iraqi invasion CONTENTS XI of Kuwait and Soviet and Chinese condemnation of it 126 The threat of future deniable Soviet military or nuclear action 126 The basic differences between Soviet and Western concepts of democracy and the market economy 127 Why the West ignores the essence and dangers of Soviet 'democratisation' 128 Evidence of the strategy 129 The stranglehold of Soviet strategic disinformation 131 The probable outcome 132 Part SIX: The fake 'August coup' and its calculated failure A deliberately engineered Break with the Past' 135 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: April 1991 136 A touch of realism in assessing the struggle between Gorbachev's supporters, Yeltsin's supporters and nationalists in the Soviet Republics 136 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 19 August 1991 137 Behind the Soviet coup: Soviet strategy and its development: The main objectives of the coup 137 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 20 August 1991 139 A further analysis of the objectives of the Soviet 'coup' 139 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 26 August 1991 141 The Author's analysis of the objectives of the calculated Soviet 'coup' and of its calculated 'failure' 141 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 2 September 1991 145 An assessment of the Soviet decision to suspend the activities of the Communist Party 145 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 26 March 1992 149 Geopolitical strategies of Russia, the so-called 'Commonwealth ot Independent States' and China: A comment on ex-President Nixon's advice on massive aid to Russia 149 The dangerous advice of Mr Richard Nixon 151 Retaining the capacity to think 152 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 28 September 1992 154 Proposed study of the economic intentions of the 'new' Russia in the light of the political strategy of the Second October Revolution' { Weltoktober' } 154 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: February 1993 155 The importance of the strategic factor in assessing developments in Russia and Communist China 155 Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency: 26 March &12 October 1993 162 Assessment of the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the Congress of People's Deputies: Observations on the Reichstag Fire' episode, October 1993 162 XII THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 30 April 1993 164 A warning of the perils of partnership with Russian 'reformers' and 'democrats' 164 Golitsyn on political assassination [Note 64] 168 Appendix: Extracts from Anatouy Golitsyn's Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency between 1 973 and 1 985: Predicting 'perestroika' 169 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 1973 170 A critical review of three recent books: Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence, 1973, by Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Richard Soil Science and Technology as an instrument of Soviet Policy, 1972, by Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure and Vladimir Prokofieff Convergence of Communism and Capitalism: the Soviet View, 1973, by Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, Richard Soil and Annette Siefbold 170 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 1974 174 A critique of Mr James Schlesinger's assessment of the Soviet challenge and the military potential of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union and of certain changes in US military strategy - in the light of inside information on the situation in the Communist Bloc 174 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 15 January 1978 175 The long-range political objectives and intentions of the Soviet leaders: An assessment of an official report by a Soviet emigre in the light of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy and its disinformation offensive 175 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 1 1 February 1982 179 An analysis of the developments in Poland in the light of Communist strategy 179 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 12 December 1983 181 The risk to President Reagan's life 181 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 4 July 1984 182 Soviet strategic intentions and the forthcoming U.S. presidential election 182 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: January 1985 184 Understanding the new active methods they are using 184 Communist political activism and new methods 184 The active methods of the KGB 184 Future strategy and its objectives 185 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: April 1985 186 An assessment of the invitation to Billy Graham to preach in Soviet Churches during his second visit to the USSR 186 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: August 1985 188 The Danger for the West: An assessment of the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, the role of 'liberalisation' in Soviet strategy, and its implications for the West 188 CONTENTS XIII The new phase of Soviet totalitarianism: The domestic aspect 189 The dangers of 'liberalisation': Soviet strategic designs against the West 189 The objectives of the political offensive 190 New opportunities 190 The role of the KGB : Its covert operations and agents of influence 190 'Liberalisation' and its impact on strategic negotiations: Strategic designs against the United States' military posture 191 'Liberalisation' as part of the strategy of the international Communist movement 192 The Western response to 'liberalisation' and the political offensive in Western Europe: The problem for the leadership of the West 192 The need to rebuild the US intelligence and counterintelligence potential 193 The vital need to preserve US and NATO military strength 193 About the Summit Meeting 193 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 12 November 1985 194 The Summit Meeting 194 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 21 November 1985 195 An assessment of the Summit Meeting: A strategic miscalculation with long-term consequences for the United States 195 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: December 1985 197 Gorbachev has launched a political offensive: The need to expose 'his' strategy and covert operations 197 Editor's Note on the Postscript - The long-range deception strategy 198 Postscript. Analysis of the Soviet long-range deception strategy And the world's slide towards the 'Second October Revolution' 199 The long-range deception strategy 200 Summary of the Author's background, work and purpose 200 Seven keys to understanding what the Soviets are up to 200 The main objective of Lenin's New Economic Policy [NEP] strategy 201 Soviet strategy matures from one to two dimensions 202 Partnership between the old and new generations of leaders 203 False 'independence' of the Soviet Republics 204 Central purposes of the strategy 205 The West's failure to understand the Leninist programme 205 New 'Democrats' remain committed to 'Socialism' (Communism) 205 Mimicking the American system, to create 'equivalence' 206 Monopoly of power 'surrendered' in order to promote the strategy 206 How this situation arose 207 Accumulated misconceptions in the West 207 The appropriate response to the challenge 209 The United States is being diminished 210 Western prospects significantly undermined 210 They will retain the upper hand until we come to our senses 211 XIV THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION Editor's Note on the Addendum 212 Addendum: Further relevant memoranda to the CIA 213 1. THE COST OF MISPLACED TRUST. 2. Warning to the CIA, the FBI and the US intelligence community CONCERNING THE FORTHCOMING DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN EXPLOITING THE ALLEGED DISCLOSURE OF KGB FILES. 3 . Destruction through KGB penetration of the Central Intelligence Agency of its capacityto interpret developments in Russia and China correctly, taking their strategy and disinformation into account. The events in Chechnya explained in terms of Russian strategy. The Kremlin's objectives and the Chechnya crisis. The urgent need to reconsider prevailing assumptions about Russia and China. 4. CONTROLOFPOLraCALEVriNTSINRUSSIA. 213 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 27 September 1993 214 The cost of misplaced trust [following the murder of Mr Fred Woodruff] 214 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 28 April 1992 217 Warning to the CIA, the FBI and the US intelligence community concerning the forthcoming disinformation campaign exploiting the alleged disclosure of KGB files (The disclosure of state secrets in the interests of strategy) 217 Conclusion 220 Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 1 February 1995 221 Destruction through KGB penetration of the Central Intelligence Agency of its capacity to interpret developments in Russia and China correctly, taking their strategy and disinormation into account 221 The events in Chechnya explained in terms of Russian strategy 224 The Kremlin's objectives and the Chechnya crisis 227 The urgent need to reconsider prevailing assumptions about Russia and China (1) In the political arena: 230 (2) In the defence arena: 231 (3) In the intelligence arena: 231 (4) In respect of counter-intelligence:233 Appended Memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency: 1 October 1993235 Control of political events in Russia 235 Index to Pages 1 -237 239 Index 240 THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION XV 'All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme skill... Disrupt his alliances... Therefore I say: '[If you] know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal; if ignorant of both your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril', sun tzu, The An of War', Oxford University Press Edition. '... n'oubliez jamais... que la plus belle des ruses du diable est de vous persuader qu'il n'existe pas!'. Charles Baudelaire, 'Le Spleen de Paris'. A ruling class which is on the run, as ours is, is capable of every fatuity. It makes the wrong decisions, chooses the wrong people, and is unable to recognise its enemies - if it does not actually prefer them to its friends'. MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE, 'Tread Softly for You Tread on My jokes'. XVI THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my deep gratitude to Edward Harle Limited and to Christopher Story for publishing my manuscript. They deserve my admiration for their grasp of the significance of the manuscript and for having the courage to publish such a con- troversial book. I am especially grateful to Christopher Story who made the final editing of the manuscript. I also wish to express my gratitude to my friends and retired intelligence officials for their encouragement and assistance; to "N" for editing my typescript; to other friends who read it and gave me valuable advice, with special thanks to Newton S. Miler, Arthur Martin, CBE, John Leader, Esq., the late Mary Leader, John Walker, Frank F. Friberg and William Hood. I also thank Mark Riebling who showed interest in my ideas and made valuable suggestions. I am especially grateful to my wife, Svetlana, for her support and encouragement. BEHIND AND BEYOND PERESTROIKA': SOVIET STRATEGY Convinced from the early days after his arrival in the United States in December 1961 that conventional Western interpretations of developments in the Communist world were seriously defective, the Author embarked on a study of Soviet strategy including the use of strategic disinformation. The results of his researches were embodied in a book, 'New Lies for Old', completed in 1980 and published, with seven additional pages, in 1984. Since then, he has contributed a number of Memoranda on the subject to the Central Intelligence Agency. The selections in this book are edited versions of some of these Memoranda. THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION XVII FOREWORD BY THE AUTHOR This collection of my Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency is about Soviet grand strategy and the new dimensions of the threat to the Western democracies. There is a marked difference between the American and the Communist use of the term 'strategy'. Americans tend to think of strategy in short-range terms in relation to presidential election campaigns, in football or baseball games or in such instances as the 'strategy of stone-walling' during the Watergate investigations. For Russian Communists on the other hand, strategy is a grand design or general Party line which governs the Party's actions over a long period and contains one or more special manoeuvres designed to help the Party achieve its ultimate objectives - the seizure of power in Russia in 1917, the subsequent expansion of the Communist camp and the final world-wide victory of Communism. This book shows that the essence of the special manoeuvre in the present grand strategy for Communism lies, internally, in the creation and use of controlled 'political opposition' to effect a transition to new 'democratic', 'non-Communist', 'nationalist' power structures which remain in reality Communist-controlled. Inter- nationally, the essence of the manoeuvre lies in the use of the political potential of these new power structures to develop contacts and promote solidarity with the Western democracies as a means towards the achievement of world Communist vic- tory through the convergence of the Communist and non-Communist systems. The main purpose of my defection at the end of 1961 was (a) to warn the American Government about the adoption of the current grand strategy for Commu- nism and the political role of the KGB and the use of disinformation and controlled political opposition which the strategy entailed, and (b) to help the West neutralise KGB penetration of their governments. On arrival in Washington, I asked to be received by President Kennedy. I was assured by General Taylor, the President's security adviser, that the President would see my appropriate contributions. Mr Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, told me that in due time a meeting with the President would be arranged. General Taylor wrote to me in the following terms: TheWhiteHouseWash]NGIDN,21 December 1961 Dear Mr. Golitsyn, I have your letter of December 19, 1961, addressed to the President of the United States. The subject matter is one of considerable interest to this government and your request has received careful consideration. I wish to assure you that the officials with whom you are now in contact have the full authority and responsibility for handling matters of this nature, and I therefore request that you give them your complete cooperation. I have asked that I be kept informed of developments in this matter, and you may be confident that information concerning your contribution will be brought to the attention of the President if and when appropriate. Maxwell D. Taylor While waiting for the meeting, I limited my cooperation with the CIA, FBI and allied services to the problems of KGB penetration of the American, British and French governmental institutions. After Present Kennedy's assassination, I briefed XVIII THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION the head of the CIA and the head of that agency's counterintelligence staff about Communist long-range strategy, the creation of the disinformation department and Shelepin's reorganisation of the KGB into a political arm of the Party. On many subsequent occasions, I had opportunities to brief other leading Western services on the subject of Soviet long-range strategy and the new r61e of the KGB, recommending a reassessment of the Communist problem. A few counterintel- ligence officials in the CIA and the British and French services began to understand and accept the validity of my views. For me, the most encouraging development was the understanding I received from Count de Marenches, the Chief of the French intel- ligence service under the late President Pompidou. Count de Marenches provided me with opportunities to work with his service on the reassessment of Communist developments in terms of Soviet strategy. In the presence of a dozen senior officials of his service, Count de Marenches stated that he was in agreement with my views on the existence of the strategy and of disinformation but I was unable to explain my ideas in detail because my project with his service was terminated. This growing awareness about disinformation and the political role of the KGB in implementing the strategy was interrupted by the Watergate hearings (which weakened the American services) and by the unfortunate death of President Pompidou (which weakened the position of the French service). Despite adverse circumstances, I have made a consistent attempt to analyse important developments in the USSR and other Communist countries through the prism of Communist long-range strategy, strategic disinformation and the political r61e of the KGB. I continued to submit my Memoranda to the CIA about significant Communist developments and made suggestions on how to improve the Agency's understanding of Communist strategy. In 1984, I published a book, 'New Lies for Old', about Communist strategic political disinformation. In the book and in my Memoranda, I made several signifi- cant predictions about future developments in the Communist world. I predicted that the Communist strategists would go beyond Marx and Lenin and would introduce economic and political reforms in the USSR and Eastern Europe. I predicted the legalisation of Solidarity in Poland, the return to 'democratisation' in Czechoslovakia and the removal of the Berlin Wall. I warned about a political offensive to promote a neutral socialist Europe which would work to Soviet advantage. I also warned that the West was acutely vulnerable to the coming major shift in Communist tactics. It is axiomatic that political ideas should be tested out in practice. And it is a fact that many of my predictions, particularly about the coming economic and political reforms in the USSR and Eastern Europe, passed the test and were confirmed by subsequent events, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia. It remains also a fact that leading Soviet experts like Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski failed to make accurate predictions about these developments. This failure on the part of Mr Brzezinski and other experts in Washington was noticed by an 'indepen- dent observer' in The New York Times' of 12 September 1989. Since then, I have submitted new Memoranda to the CIA and American poli- cymakers in which I explained Soviet grand strategy and its strategic designs against the West, the essence of 'perestroika' (the final phase of the strategy), the new use of FOREWORD BY THE AUTHOR XIX the Bloc's political and security potential for introducing new deceptive controlled 'democratic', 'nationalist' and 'non-Communist' structures in the Communist coun- tries, and the deployment of the political and security potential of the renewed 'democratic' regimes for the execution of the strategic design against the West. In the Memoranda, I provided seven keys for understanding 'perestroika', explained the danger of Western support for it and proposed a reassessment of the situation and a re-thinking of that support as priority items of business. I suggested also how the West should respond to the challenge of 'perestroika' and its destabilising effect on the Western democracies. Since the Central Intelligence Agency did not react to my Memoranda, I decided to publish them and asked the CIA to declassify them for the purpose. The Agency agreed. Several considerations forced me to take my decision. First, the democracies of the United States and Western Europe are facing a dangerous situation and are vulnerable because their governments, the Vatican, the elite, the media, the industrialists, the financiers, the trade unions and, most impor- tant, the general public are blind to the dangers of the strategy of 'perestroika' and have failed to perceive the deployment of the Communist political potential of the renewed 'democratic' regimes against the West. The democracies could perish unless they are informed about the aggressive design of 'perestroika' against them. Secondly, I could not imagine that American policymakers, and particularly the conservatives in both the Republican and Democratic parties, despite their long experience with Communist treachery, would not be able to grasp the new manoeu- vres of the Communist strategists and would rush to commit the West to helping 'perestroika' which is so contrary to their interests. It has been sad to observe the jubilation of American and West European con- servatives who have been cheering 'perestroika' without realising that it is intended to bring about their own political and physical demise. Liberal support for 'perestroika' is understandable, but conservative support came as a surprise to me. Thirdly, I was appalled that 'perestroika' was embraced and supported by the United States without any serious debate on the subject. In the fourth place, I am appalled by the failure of American scholars to point out the relevance of Lenin's New Economic Policy to understanding the aggressive, anti- Western design of 'perestroika' or to provide appropriate warning to policymakers, and their failure to distinguish between America's true friends and its Leninist foes precisely because these foes are wearing the new 'democratic' uniform. Given the pressures they face, policymakers have no time to study the history of the period of Lenin's New Economic Policy, or to remind themselves of Marxist-Leninist dialectics. But how could such learned and distinguished scholars as S. Bialer and Z. Brzezinski have failed to warn them about the successes of the New Economic Policy, the mistakes made by the West in accepting it and Gorbachev's repetition of Lenin's strategy and its dangers for the West? What happened to their credentials as great scholars? Why was it left to Professor Norman Stone of Oxford University to detect and make the parallel in his article in the London 'Daily Telegraph' of 1 1th November 1989, and to express concern at the euphoria over Gorbachev? In his book, The Grand Failure', Brzezinski limited his description of Lenin's New Econ- XX THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION omic Policy to three brief phrases. He described the New Economic Policy as amounting to a reliance on the market mechanism and private initiative to stimulate economic recovery. In his words, it was probably 'the most open and intellectually innovative phase' in Soviet history. For Brzezinski, the NEP is 'a shorthand term for a period of experimentation, flexibility and moderation' [see The Grand Failure', Charles Scribner and Sons, New York, 1989, pages 18-19]. I am appalled by Brzezinski's failure to explain the rele- vance of Lenin's New Economic Policy to 'perestroika'. This failure is further illustrated by the following: (a) S. Bialer, a former defector from the Central Committee apparatus of the Polish Communist Party, wrote a foreword to Gorbachev's book 'Perestroika', intro- ducing it to the US public without inserting any warning about the parallel with the New Economic Policy and its dangers for the Western democracies. (b) During his recent visit to Moscow, Z. Brzezinski, the former National Security Adviser in the Carter Administration, met leading Soviet strategists including Yakovlev, an expert on the manipulation of the Western media, and advised them on how to proceed with 'perestroika'. Furthermore, Brzezinski delivered a lecture on the same subject to the Soviet diplomats at the High Diplomatic Academy! In the fifth place, I am disappointed that Gordievsky, a recent KGB defector, did not help much to explain 'perestroika' as the final phase of Soviet long-range strategy, to describe its essence or to point out the deceptive nature of the changes and the strategic danger for the West. Gordievsky's articles in The Times' of London of 27-28 February and 1 March 1990, contained a rather optimistic, if not laudatory, description of the 'reforms' initiated under Gorbachev and Yakovlev. I am puzzled that he should write so enthusiastically about them in the London Times'. He might as well have published his comments in the Party newspaper Pravda' or in Korotich's 'Ogonek. His assessment of 'perestroika' and its meaning for the West is in complete contradiction to that set out in my Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency. Further comment would be superfluous. I leave it to the reader to make his own judgment. In the sixth place, misguided Western support for 'perestroika' at all levels, and especially among the Western media, is destabilising Western societies, their defence, their political processes and their alliances. It is immensely accelerating the successful execution of the Soviet strategic design against the West. In 19841 thought that, in the event of Western resistance to Soviet strategy, the scenario of convergence between the two systems might take the next half century to unroll [see 'New Lies for Old', pages 365-6]. Now, however, because the West has committed itself to the support of 'pere- stroika' and because of the impact of the misguided and euphoric support for it in the Western media, convergence might take less than a decade. The sword of Damocles is hanging over the Western democracies, yet they are oblivious to it. I believe in truth and the power of ideas to convey the truth. Therefore, I present my Memoranda to the public - convinced that they will help them to see the 'perestroika' changes, and their sequels, in the Communist world and beyond, in a more realistic light, and to recover from their blindness. Anatoiiy Goutsyn, United States, 1995 THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION XXI FOREWORD BY THE EDITOR In July 1991, I was asked by the former British Prime Minister, Mrs (now Lady) Thatcher, to see her at her room in the Palace of Westminster. The subject to be dis- cussed was the network of bilateral treaties, declarations and accords which the Soviet Union had been signing with leading Western countries. By then, the list of such signatories already included Germany, France and Italy, while a treaty had been negotiated between the USSR and Spain, and a Political Declaration had been signed inter alia by the Soviet Union and Finland. Germany had in fact signed two bilateral treaties with Moscow. I had carried out a preliminary analysis of these treaties and accords, and had published translations of the texts, and some early find- ings, in several documents issued by my serials publishing firm in London, placing the treaties in the context of the implications of the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States and the Charter of Paris which Mrs Thatcher had signed on 19th November 1990 amid the disruption and anxieties surrounding the challenge to her leadership. At the meeting, the former Prime Minister expressed great interest in the texts of the treaties and in my explanation of their significance. After admitting that her officials had not, during her final weeks in office, informed her about them, our con- versation broadened to include my developing assessment of Soviet strategy in general, and the Soviet agenda for Europe, in particular. When I had finished explaining, as best I could, that Soviet behaviour and what I understood of Moscow's strategy bore familiar Leninist dialectical hallmarks, Mrs Thatcher remarked: 'I don't think Gorbachev is a Leninist any more'. Later in the interview, after she had become aware of my acquaintance with Anatoliy Golitsyn's work 'New Lies for Old', and after hinting that she did not share Golitsyn's analysis, the former Prime Minister pro- nounced: 1 don't think we have been deceived -at least, I hope we haven't'. These remarks have haunted me ever since. Obviously, the qualifying after- thought had revealed that the Prime Minister whose action in opening the door ajar had enabled the Soviets to thrust it wide open for the purpose of exporting their insidious 'perestroika' deception to the West, had retained a niggling doubt that the West might indeed have fallen victim to Soviet strategic deception. That she was pre- pared even to admit such a doubt is a tribute to her inherent intellectual integrity and strength of character. It is more than can be said for most of the West's leaders today, who have evidently allowed Gorbachev and his successors and collaborators to 'restructure' their minds, in accordance with the true meaning of 'perestroika' - the 'restructuring' not of the Soviet system, but of the outlook, thinking and mentality of the West. For Stalin, 'perestroika' meant 're-shoeing' - as of a horse: that is to say, not of the regime itself, but of the system's means to consolidate its power. Greatly though Lady Thatcher is to be admired, it is unfortunately the case that she was never the best judge of character. Reviewing the former Prime Minister's book The Downing Street Years' in The New York Times' Book Review section on 14th November 1993, Dr Henry Kissinger drew attention to the passage in which the former Prime Minister described her reaction on meeting Gorbachev for the first time: If at this time I had paid attention only to the content of Mr Gorbachev's remarks - largely the standard Marxist line - 1 would have to conclude that he was XXII THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION cast in the usual Communist mould. But his personality could not have been more different from the wooden ventriloquism of the average Soviet apparatchik. He smiled, laughed, used his hands for emphasis, modulated his voice, followed an argument through and was a sharp debater... His line was no different from what I would have expected. His style was. As the day wore on I came to understand that it was the style far more than the Marxist rhetoric which expressed the substance of the personality beneath'. In this passage, as Dr Kissinger had evidently realised, Lady Thatcher had admitted that she had been beguiled by Gorbachev's style. As he cast his spell, Gorbachev unlocked the key to the control of the Western mind - and to the 'restructuring' of the entire world. The West followed Lady Thatcher's prompting, mistaking the style for the substance. The disastrous consequences of this millennial error are now crowding in upon Western civilisation, threatening its very survival. Ambition to control the Western mind is a long-standing objective of Soviet policy, embracing the ideas of the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci, who argued that mastery of human consciousness should be a paramount political objective. As Richard Pipes has pointed out [in 'Survival is Not Enough', Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984, page 80], 'such mastery is secured, in the first place, by control of the organs of information'. The objective is 'to control thought at the source - that is, in the mind that absorbs and processes the information - and the best way of accomplishing this is by shaping words and phrases in the desired manner'. Moreover control of the Western mind is to be achieved not only by means of the dishonest use of language, but also through operations to demoralise the West - through corrosive attacks on society's institutions, the active promotion of drug abuse, and the spread of agnosti- cism, nihilism, permissiveness and concerted attacks on the family in order to desta- bilise society. Religion and the traditional cultural and moral hegemony must first be destroyed, before the revolution can be successful - a message stated unequivocally by the American activist Ellen Willis, who has written that 'feminism is not just an issue or a group of issues; it is the cutting edge of a revolution in cultural or moral val- ues... The objective of every feminist reform, from legal abortion to child-care pro- grams, is to undermine traditional family values' [see "The Nation', New York, 14 November 1981, pages 494-5]. The still unproven assumption of the strategists is that with Western society 'deconstructed', its leaders will meekly accept and cooperate with the Soviet plan for a 'New World Social Order', or World Government. In this context, it is interesting to recall that the spy George Blake told Kenneth de Courcy in the early 1960s that 'individual choice would eventually be mastered by a central Soviet control of thought process' [cited in Traitors: The Labyrinths of Treason', Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1987, page 157]. The primary objective of 'perestroika', then, is to restructure the Western mind using both deceptive language and the ideas of Gramsci so that it becomes more receptive to, and more inclined to collaborate with, the implementation of Soviet global strategic objectives. As one of the leading strat- egists, Georgi Arbatov, made clear in his book The System' [Random House, Inc., New York, 1992, page 211], the ideas of Gramsci and other Marxists, whose work seeks to 'restructure' the Western mentality and to promote decadent lifestyles, had been con- sciously incorporated into the 'New Thinking': 'I do respect quite a few Marxist works and ideas. I include not only the "founding fathers" of Marxism but also outstanding FOREWORD BY THE EDITOR XXIII leaders of the Socialist International, as well as people like Antonio Gramsci, Gyorgy Lukacs, Ernst Bloch and Herbert Marcuse'. The importance of Gramsci's ideas as an element of Gorbachev's' 'New [Leninist] Thinking' was further confirmed in the Soviet literature towards the end of the domestic 'perestroika' period. Thus the lune 1990 issue of 'Sputnik', published by Novosti in Moscow, stated that 'modern world [sic] culture is inconceivable without a consideration of the contributions made by influential Western Marxist philosophers G Lukacs [and] A Gramsci...'. The Perestroika Deception' reveals how the largely unseen Soviet collective lead- ership, borrowing the mind-control ideas of Gramsci, implemented their long-pre- pared shift from Lenin's 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to his 'state of the whole people', the primary characteristic of which is a theatrical display of 'democratism' designed to convince the West that a decisive 'Break with the Pasf has taken place, in order to encourage Western Governments to abandon caution and to embark upon an open-ended programme of collaboration with the 'former' Soviet Bloc. Implicit in such collaboration is the threat of a 'return to the Cold War' - or worse - if the West does not cooperate. The equation can be summed up as 'cooperation-blackmail'. In the 1960s, the strategists had established specialist Institutes under the control of the USSR Academy of Sciences. These were instructed to study Western attitudes and to inform the leadership of likely Western reactions to given tactical manoeuvres or scenarios. As the strategists had anticipated as a result of these studies, the West was caught off guard and enticed by the 'Break with the Pasf. Indeed it was enthusiastic since, as Anatoliy Golitsyn explains, a deception, to be successful, must match the known aspirations of the target as closely as possible. Thus the West interpreted the cosmetic changes as a deepening of the process of Soviet 'reform', offering fresh opportunities for policy and trade. In reality the West faced an 'acceleration in the unfolding of Soviet convergence strategy which is intended to procure the sub- servience of the West to Moscow under an ultimate Communist World Government 7 . Like the works of Sun Tzu, Machiavelli and Clause witz, this work is devoted to explaining strategy. Unlike the works of those classic authors, however, The Perestroika Deception' deals with the contemporary world, explaining how Russia and China adopted the attitudes and ideas of these thinkers and have applied them globally for a generation. They seek the irreversible 'restructuring' of Western thinking, responses and society itself, as their price for 'no war' and for 'changes' which the West has accepted as genuine, and liable to lead to the normalisation of 'post'-Com-munist society accompanied by the abandonment of revolutionary objectives. The Perestroika Deception' is unique in the literature on the Communist and 'former' Communist states in that it addresses the unbroken continuity and imple- mentation of the 'convergence' strategy, a grand overall design - or what the Soviet Leninists call 'the general line' - since it was decided upon in 1958-60. As the Author explains on page 51, 'the general line' - which is flexible as to timing, contains a variety of options and takes full account of risks and possible losses - guides the course of the Party's actions over a period of twenty to thirty years in pursuit of its unchanging Communist objectives. The feature of strategy which distinguishes it from policy is that it contains within itself a secret, concealed or deceptive manoeuvre, designed to take the adversary by surprise and thus secure victory for the strategy'. 'One can', as Arbatov XXIV THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION explains in The System', 'trace most clearly a direct continuity between the ideas of the Twentieth Party Congress, detente, and the New Political Thinking'. Indeed, one can; and for the elimination of all doubt, further confirmation of 'post' -Communist adher- ence to the strategy of deceptive 'convergence' with the West has been helpfully pro- vided by Viktor Chernomyrdin. Speaking on the 'Russia' TV Channel [Moscow, 2030 GMT, 15 December 1992], the newly appointed Russian Premier reaffirmed 'the gen- eral line', asserting the inherent flexibility of the strategy without, of course, revealing its content: 'My colleagues in the Government who are working today will pursue this line. The planned line. The one which has been worked out... Life makes amendments to our programme, additions, perhaps, changes. But we will keep to the basic line'. Behind the impressive smokescreen of pseudo-democracy, pseudo-capitalism and pseudo-reform, this Russian-Chinese 'cooperation-blackmail' strategy is irrecon- cilably hostile to the West. Again, this is no mere presumption. It was explicitly con- firmed in May 1994 to Clark Bowers, a member of an official US Republican delegation to Peking, by Mr Mo Xiusong, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, who is believed to be the highest-ranking Chinese Communist official ever to have answered questions put to him by a knowledgeable Western expert on Communism: Bowers: Is the long-term aim of the Chinese Communist Party still world Communism? Mo Xiusong: Yes, of course. That is the reason we exist. Illuminating the cooperation-blackmail 'convergence' strategy with his first- hand experience of the origination of the strategy and his knowledge of how Moscow applies the dialectical political method of Marx, Hegel and Lenin in practice, Golitsyn challenges the fashionable, and increasingly laughable, Western assumptions that the West 'won the Cold War', that the enemy 'disappeared', that 'Communism is dead', that the Soviet Union 'collapsed' and that Russia has embarked upon 'progress towards democracy' (never actually reaching it) - patiently showing that because the West fell for the 'perestroika' deception, it has failed to connect its present malaise to the impact of Soviet-Chinese strategy, and is unable to see the threat arising from the hostile Sino-Russian axis to which countries like North Korea, Iran and Iraq adhere. In his book Wedge: The Secret War between the FBI and CIA' [Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1994], Mark Riebling pays tribute to the remarkable predictive record of the Author's famous earlier work, TSfew Lies for Old', crediting Golitsyn with 'an accur- acy record of nearly 94%' [page 408]. Because this record validates the 'secret, con- cealed or deceptive manoeuvre' within the strategy of 'convergence', all manner of attempts have been made to discredit the Author and the late James Jesus Angleton, who understood the significance of his analysis. For instance, Riebling himself observes that 'British journalist Tom Mangold even went so far as to say, in 1990 - after Golitsyn's prescience had become clear - that "As a crystal-ball gazer, Golitsyn has been unimpressive". Mangold reached this conclusion by listing six of Golitsyn's apparently incorrect predictions and ignoring the 139 correct ones'. Counting the Author's accurate predictions and awarding him a 94% accuracy rating has certainly been helpful in 'rehabilitating' the Author at a time when the process of achieving control over the Western mindset has reached an advanced stage. But in one sense, this overdue accolade misses the whole point of the Author's work. FOREWORD BY THE EDITOR XXV For it is not even necessary to enumerate Golitsyn's accurate predictions, to recognise that he is revealing the truth. All that is required is an understanding that the 'general line' provides the necessary dialectical framework without which the otherwise incomprehensible behaviour of the 'post'-Communists cannot be understood. Once the Western observer has grasped the continuity of Leninist strategy, he possesses the key to interpreting and predicting events correctly. Put another way, it will be found that, as a reward for studying the dialectical nature and continuity of the 'general line', the open- minded sceptic becomes potentially capable of achieving a predictive record as impressive as the Author's. Why, then, is it that, despite Golitsyn's service at the heart of the KGB in Moscow when the strategy was first adopted; despite his proven track record of providing accurate, verifiable information to the West since his arrival at the end of 1961; despite his 94% predictive accuracy rating; and despite his obvious integrity (as I know from my personal experience of editing this work and responding to his patient, constructive and transparently honest criticisms of my own inadequate understanding of the strategy); why is it that his warnings have been overlooked by Western policymakers? The first main reason for the general (but not in fact complete) rejection of the Author's analysis is that, as the case of Aldrich Hazen Ames has shown, the Russians won the intelligence war through their penetration of Western intelligence services - a message which, naturally, these services do not wish to hear [see Author's Note 80, page 219]. In the course of his work with the American, British and French services, the Author found that penetration had destroyed their ability to interpret events in the Communist world correctly. Since 1969, the West has lacked the necessary genuine secret intelligence to expose the deception buried within the strategy, let alone the exis- tence of the long-range Russian-Chinese 'general line' itself; so policymakers have not been provided with the appropriate correctives to fashionable and conventional diplo- matic and journalistic perceptions. A second factor appears to be an extraordinary reluctance among some ana- lysts to study the available documents. Again from personal experience as Editor and Publisher of SOVIET ANALYST, I can confirm that it is possible for even a private student to identify the existence, outline, characteristics, elaborations and continuity of the strategy from sources such as successive issues of the Russian Foreign Ministry's journal International Affairs', from a study of Soviet and 'post' -Communist official documents and statements in the public domain, and from articles by known agents of influence and implementers of the strategy in the Western press and specialist journals. Is such study too boring or too much like hard work? The strategists are in little doubt that private study can indeed lead to enlightenment. 'The dangers lie', said President Gorbachev at a press conference with President Mitterrand on 6 May 1991, 'in the fact that someone, analysing at some private moment or other, this or that instance or episode, or even event, including a dramatic event, should not make hasty conclusions and cast doubt on all that has been acquired, and what we have created in putting international relations onto new channels, onto new rails [sic], entering, as all of us have said, a period of peaceful development'. Note that, in addition to his expression of anxiety that 'someone, analysing at some private moment or other' would indeed succeed in obtaining independent corroboration of the essence of the deception XXVI THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION strategy, Gorbachev also predicted here the forthcoming fake 'August coup' ['a dra- matic event'] and warned that collaboration with the West meant that only one direc- tion was to be permitted in constructing the 'New World Social Order' ['new rails']. As a lifelong disciple of Lenin, who taught his followers the creative use of language for deception purposes, Gorbachev chose his words with characteristic care. He could have said 'new road' instead of 'new rails'; but a train travelling along a railway line can proceed in only one direction - in this context, that intended by the strategists. A third general reason for the lack of interest in the Author's accurate analysis is the familiar one that the horizons of Western politicians are usually limited to the forthcoming general election. One consequence of this is that they find it hard to understand that Communist and 'former' Communist systems are capable of evolving strategies which remain valid, with tactical adjustments, over many decades. Likewise, many Western analysts and observers tend to focus obsessively on the behaviour and fortunes of particular individuals - Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Kozyrev, Rutskoi, Yavlinski, Shevardnadze, or whoever - as though each was a personally motivated careerist, like Western politicians jockeying for power and influence. This overlooks the fact that all such characters - each of whom emerged from the security services, Komsomol and other controlled structures - are bound together as collaborators in the pursuit of the common strategy. The 'democratism' display is deliberately intended to obscure this. An exception to the rule was President Pompidou of France. Unlike his towering predecessor, de Gaulle - who was taken in by deception, cancelled France's military commitments to NATO and embraced the Soviet concept of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' - President Pompidou accepted strategic political disinformation and the influence of Sun Tzu as realities. Unfortunately [see pages 168,177 and 181] he did not survive long enough to make his influence felt in France and elsewhere. A fourth reason, touched upon earlier, for the shameful neglect of the Author's analysis, is that it is often difficult for an intelligence service to persuade its political masters that they are being deceived. Obviously, it is also contrary to the interests of the services generally to admit that they themselves have been misled. In the fifth place, it has to be repeated that, over the years, a partially successful diversion campaign has been mounted to discredit both Angleton and Golitsyn. By contrast, no comparable sustained attempt seems to have been made to detract from the work of other prominent defectors - suggesting that the strategists have good rea- sons for helping the West to continue rejecting Golitsyn's findings, even though he has a predictive record of such distinction that he puts everyone else to shame. Finally, the Western media routinely publicise the views and interpretations of agents of influence, both journalists and experts, thereby adding successive layers of confusion which blur the perceptions of analysts and especially of politicians - who are usually reluctant to absorb information which does not correspond with their understanding of the current fashion, or of the opinions of their often misinformed col- leagues. Politicians confer mainly among themselves, and with officials who feed them the 'accepted line'. It is therefore particularly hard for them to find 'some private moment or other' in which the 'general line' might be revealed and confusion dis- pelled. This book is intended to assist them, and many others, in that urgent task. Christopher Story, London, May 1995. PART ONE The Perestroika Deception The world's slide towards THE 'SECOND OCTOBER REVOLUTION' ['WELTOKTOBER'] 2 THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION ORGANISATION OF THE DOCUMENTS This book consists, in the main, of Memoranda written by Anatoliy Golitsyn and filed with the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]. The documents are dated, and in order to assist the reader to remain constantly aware of the period when the relevant Memoranda were filed, the date appears at the top of the right-hand page. Reference to the date of filing is necessary, from time to time, in order for the context of the Memorandum in question to remain clear in the mind of the reader, and to illuminate the accuracy of the Author's predictions. The Memoranda have been published in the sequence requested by the Author, which is not necessarily the same as the date order. Reasons for this presentation will become apparent as the reader progresses through the work. Notes appear throughout the main text, and on the same page as the note references, rather than at the end of the work. Most notes are labelled according to whether they were added by the Author or by the Editor. ABOUT THE MEMORANDA Anatoliy Golitsyn's Memoranda to the Central Intelligence Agency reveal that the method he applies in order to interpret and understand Soviet/Russian strategy is impressively reliable. The essence and purpose of intelligence is to provide govern- ments with accurate advance information on developments - not to provide retrospective evaluations of events which were not anticipated. By reference to the date or period when Golitsyn's Memoranda were filed with the CIA, the reader is provided with irrefutable proof of the reliability of the Author's system of analysis, yielding inspired predictions grounded in his familiarity with, and understanding of, the Leninist dialectical political method. The proven accuracy of his forecasts flows precisely from Golitsyn's recognition of the fact that the 'former' Communists continue to apply this method. Thus, in order to comprehend developments in the so-called 'former' Soviet Bloc, in China and concerning the intended 'New World Social Order' which the 'for- mer' Communists are secretly collaborating to establish, Western analysts must follow Gorbachev's example and 'go back to Lenin'. Re-reading Lenin, or at least taking the trouble to be informed about Lenin's use of the dialectic of Hegel and Marx, is an essential prerequisite for making sense of the world in which we live - not, of course, in order to re-evaluate events through Lenin's evil eyes, but in order to understand that the West is still having to deal with Lenin's successors, who continue to apply his method. The West's continuing failure to recognise this reality, which stems from its acceptance of the false 'Break with the Past' as genuine, threatens the very continua- tion of Western civilisation. As the Author explained in 'New Lies for Old' [page 43], 'to be credible and effective, a deception should accord as far as possible with the hopes and expectations of those it is intended to deceive'. Certain experts and parties in the West will approach this work from the basis of partial knowledge of the Author's involvement with Western intelligence communities. They would find it more illuminating to set aside any preconceived ideas they may hold about Golitsyn, and to allow the Author to speak for himself through this profound work. An essential prerequisite for understanding Soviet strategy is to see it in the context of the fact that 'New Thinking' means 'New Leninist Thinking'. MARCH 1989 3 Memorandum to the CIA: March 1989 PREDICTING, UNDERSTANDING AND DEALING WITH 'PERESTROIKA' [Written in the light of President Reagan's switch from denunciation of the 'Evil Empire' to acceptance of 'perestroika' or 'restructuring' and at a time when a reassess- ment of 'perestroika' was being conducted in the early months of the new administration of President George Bush]. PREDICTIONS OF 'PERESTROIKA' IN 'NEW LIES FOR OLD Many aspects of 'perestroika' were predicted in 'New Lies for Old' [1984]. For instance [page references refer to editions cited on page ii] : Pages 327-328: 'The Communist strategists are now poised to enter into the final, offensive phase of the long-range policy, entailing a joint struggle for the com- plete triumph of Communism. Given the multiplicity of parties in power, the close links between them, and the opportunities they have had to broaden their bases and build up experienced cadres, the Communist strategists are equipped, in pursuing their policy, to engage in manoeuvres and stratagems beyond the imagination of Marx or the practical reach of Lenin and unthinkable to Stalin. Among such... strata- gems are the introduction of false liberalisation in Eastern Europe and, probably, in the Soviet Union and the exhibition of spurious independence on the part of the regimes in Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland'. Pages 224-226: It would be worthwhile for the West to study the scenario and techniques of the Czechoslovak experiment [of 1968] - so as not to be taken in again. The scenario could well be repeated in essence, although with local variations ... The staging of the "quiet revolution" and its reversal served a wide variety of strategic and tactical objectives. [Among them:] O To arouse sentiment against military pacts in Europe. O To increase pressure in the West for the convening of a conference on security in Europe, the Communist interest in which is to promote the dissolution of military pacts, the creation of a neutral, socialist Europe, and the withdrawal of the American military presence. O To rehearse and gain experience for the repetition of "democratisation" in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, or elsewhere in Eastern Europe during the final phase of the long-range policy of the Bloc'. Pages 241-242:'The creation of a false, controlled opposition movement like the dissident movement serves internal and external strategic purposes. Internally it provides a vehicle for the eventual false "liberalisation" of a Communist regime; it provokes some would-be opposition elements to expose themselves to counter-action, and others are driven to conformity or despair. Exter- nally, "dissidents" can act as vehicles for a variety of disinformation themes on the subject of the evolution of the Communist system... It sets the scene for an eventual dramatic "liberalisation" of the system by heightening the contrast between neo-Stal- 4 THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION inism and future "socialism with a human face." It creates a cadre of figures who are well known in the West and who can be used in the future as the leaders and sup- porters of a "multi-Party system" under Communism. "Dissident" trade unions and intellectuals can be used to promote solidarity with their Western counterparts and engage them in joint campaigns for disarmament and the reform of Western "mili- tary-industrial complexes". In the long run the Western individuals and groups involved will face the choice of admitting that their support for dissidents was mis- taken or accepting that Communism has undergone a radical change, making "con- vergence" an acceptable, and perhaps desirable, prospect'. Page 262: 'One of the objectives [of Euro-Communism] was to prepare the ground, in coordination with Bloc policy in general, for an eventual "liberalisation" in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and a major drive to promote the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the American military presence from a neutral, socialist Europe'. Page 323: The Western strategy of a mildly activist approach to Eastern Europe, with emphasis on human rights, is doomed to failure because it is based on misconceptions and will lead ultimately into a trap when a further spurious liberali- sation takes place in Eastern Europe in the final phase of the long-range Communist policy. Not the least disturbing aspect of the present crisis in Western assessments and policy is that, if it is recognised at all, its causes are misunderstood. As matters stand the West is acutely vulnerable to the coming major shift in Communist tactics in the final phase of their policy'. Page 331: The conclusion [is that] the "renewal" in Poland was planned thoroughly, and well in advance, by the Polish Communist Party in cooperation with its Communist allies and with a view to furthering the Communist strategy for Europe. The conclusion is further supported by the evidence of the Polish Communist Party's involvement in the formation and functioning of Solidarity'. Page 334: The creation of Solidarity and the initial period of its activity as a trade union may be regarded as the experimental first phase of the Polish "renewal". The appointment of Jaruzelski, the imposition of martial law, and the suspension of Solidarity represent the second phase, intended to bring the movement under firm control and to provide a period of political consolidation. In the third phase it may be expected that a coalition government will be formed, comprising representatives of the Communist Party, of a revived Solidarity movement, and of the church. A few so-called liberals might also be included. A new-style government of this sort in Eastern Europe would be well equipped to promote Communist strategy by campaigning for disarmament, for nuclear-free zones in Europe, perhaps for a revival of the Rapacki Plan, for the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and ultimately for the establishment of a neutral, socialist Europe. The revival of other elements of Communist strategy for Europe [such as human rights negotiations] would be timed to coincide with the emergence of such a government'. MARCH 1989 5 Page 335: 'A coalition government in Poland would in fact be totalitarianism under a new, deceptive and more dangerous guise. Accepted as the spontaneous emergence of a new form of multi-Party, semi-democratic regime, it would serve to undermine resistance to Communism inside and outside the Communist Bloc. The need for massive defence expenditure would increasingly be questioned in the West. New possibilities would arise for splitting Western Europe away from the United States, of neutralising Germany, and destroying NATO'. Pages 338-340: 'The intensification of hardline policies and methods in the Soviet Union, exemplified by Sakharov's arrest and the occupation of Afghanistan, presages a switch to "democratisation" following, perhaps, Brezhnev's departure from the political scene... Brezhnev's successor may well appear to be a kind of Soviet Alexander Dubcek. The succession will be important only in a presentational sense. The reality of collective leadership and the leaders' common commitment to the long-range policy will continue unaffected.... The Brezhnev regime and its neo- Stalinist actions against "dissidents" and in Afghanistan would be condemned as Novotny's regime [in Czechoslovakia] was condemned in 1968. In the economic field reforms might be expected to bring Soviet practice more into line with Yugoslavia, or even seemingly, with Western socialist models... The Party would be less conspicuous, but would continue to control the economy from behind the scenes as before... Political "liberalisation" and "democratisation" would follow the general lines of the Czechoslovak rehearsal in 1968. This rehearsal might well have been the kind of political experiment Nikolay Mironov [former head of the Party's Adminis- trative Organs Department] had in mind as early as 1960. The "liberalisation" would be spectacular and impressive. Formal pronouncements might be made about a reduction in the Communist Party's role; its monopoly would be apparently cur- tailed. An ostensible separation of powers between the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary might be introduced. The Supreme Soviet would be given greater apparent power and the president and deputies greater apparent independence. The posts of President of the Soviet Union and First Secretary of the Party might well be separated. The KGB would be "reformed". Dissidents at home would be amnestied; those in exile abroad would be allowed to return, and some would take up positions of leadership in government. Sakharov might be included in some capacity in government or allowed to teach abroad. The creative arts and cultural and scientific organisations, such as the writers' unions and the Academy of Sci- ences, would become apparently more independent, as would the trade unions. Political clubs would be opened to non-members of the Communist Party. Leading dissidents might form one or more alternative political parties. Cen- sorship would be relaxed; controversial books, plays, films, and art would be pub- lished, performed and exhibited. Many prominent Soviet performing artists now abroad would return to the Soviet Union and resume their professional careers. Constitutional amendments would be adopted to guarantee fulfilment of the provisions of the Helsinki agreements and a semblance of compliance would be maintained. There would be greater freedom for Soviet citizens to travel. Western 6 THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION and United Nations observers would be invited to the Soviet Union to witness the reforms in action. But, as in the Czechoslovak case, the "liberalisation" would be calculated and deceptive in that it would be introduced from above. It would be carried out by the Party through its cells and individual members in government, the Supreme Soviet, the courts, and the electoral machinery and by the KGB through its agents among the intellectuals and scientists...'. Pages 340-342: The dissident movement is now being prepared for the most important aspect of its strategic r61e, which will be to persuade the West of the authenticity of Soviet "liberalisation" when it comes. Further high-level defectors, or "official emigres", may well make their appearance in the West before the switch in policy occurs. The prediction on Soviet compliance with the Helsinki agreements is based on the fact that it was the Warsaw Pact countries and a Soviet [agent of influence] who initiated and pressed for the [negotiations]... "Liberalisation" in Eastern Europe would probably involve the return to power in Czechoslovakia of Dubcek and his associates. If it should be extended to East Germany, demolition of the Berlin Wall might even be contemplated... Western acceptance of the new "liberalisation" as genuine would create favourable conditions for the fulfilment of Communist strategy for the United States, Western Europe, and even, perhaps, Japan... Euro-Communism could be revived. The pressure for united fronts between Communist and socialist parties and trade unions at national and international level would be intensified. This time, the socialists might finally fall into the trap. United front govern- ments under strong Communist influence might well come to power in France, Italy, and possibly other countries. Elsewhere the fortunes and influence of Communist Parties would be much revived. The bulk of Europe might well turn to left-wing socialism, leaving only a few pockets of conservative resistance. Pressure could well grow for a solution of the German problem in which some form of confederation between East and West Germany would be combined with neutralisation of the whole and a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. France and Italy, under united front governments, would throw in their lot with Ger- many and the Soviet Union. Britain would be confronted with a choice between a neutral Europe and the United States. NATO could hardly survive this process. The Czechoslovaks, in contrast with their performance in 1968, might well take the initiative, along with the Roma- nians and Yugoslavs, in proposing (in the Helsinki context) the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in return for the dissolution of NATO. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact would have little effect on the coordi- nation of the Communist Bloc, but the dissolution of NATO could well mean the departure of American forces from the European continent and a closer European alignment with a "liberalised" Soviet Bloc. Perhaps in the long run, a similar process might affect the relationship between the United States and Japan leading to abrogation of the security pact between them. MARCH 1989 7 The EEC on present lines, even if enlarged, would not be a barrier to the neu- tralisation of Europe and the withdrawal of American troops... The efforts by the Yugoslavs and Romanians to create stronger links with the EEC should be seen, not as inimical to Soviet interests, but as the first step in laying the foundations for a merger between the EEC and COMECON. The European Par- liament might become an all-European socialist parliament with representation from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" would turn out to be a neutral, socialist Europe. The United States, betrayed by her former European allies, would tend to withdraw into fortress America or, with the few remaining conservative countries, including perhaps Japan, would seek an alliance with China as the only counter- weight to Soviet power'. Page 348: The timing of the release of the Solidarity leader and the news of the appointment of Andropov confirm.... that the "liberalisation" will not be limited to the USSR, but will be expanded to Eastern Europe and particularly to Poland. The experiment with "renewal" in Poland will be repeated again. This time, however, it will be with full strategic initiatives and implications against Western Europe and NATO. The appointment of Andropov, the release of the Solidarity leader, and the invitation to the Pope to visit Poland in June 1983, made by the Polish government, all indicate that the Communist strategists are probably planning the re-emergence of Solidarity and the creation of a quasi-social democratic government in Poland (a coalition of the Communist Party, the trade unions, and the churches) and political and economic reforms in the USSR for 1984 and afterward'. Pages 349-350: 'How will the Western German social democrats respond when the Communist regimes begin their "liberalisation" by making concessions on human rights, such as easing emigration, granting amnesty for the dissidents, or removing the Berlin Wall? One can expect that Soviet agents of influence in Western Europe, drawing on these developments, will become more active. It is more than likely that these cosmetic steps will be taken as genuine by the West and will trigger a reunification and neutralisation of West Germany and further the collapse of NATO. The pressure on the United States for concessions on disarma- ment and accommodation with the Soviets will increase. During this period there might be an extensive display of the fictional struggle for power in the Soviet leadership. One cannot exclude that at the next Party Congress or earlier, Andropov will be replaced by a younger leader with a more liberal image who will continue the so-called "liberalisation" more intensively... It is not inconceivable that the Soviets will make concessions on Afghanistan in order to gain new strategic advantages'. 8 THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION Additional predictions on 'perestroika' in Memoranda to the CIA July 4,1984: 'At this time, the Soviet strategists may replace the old leader, Konstantin Chernenko, who is actually only a figurehead, with a younger Soviet leader who was chosen some time ago as his successor, namely Comrade Gorbachev. One of his major tasks will be to implement the so-called liberalisation. The strat- egists may also replace the old 'hardliner' Andrei Gromyko with a younger 'soft- line'... The new Soviet leadership may introduce economic reforms and striking political initiatives in order to project a clear message that the changes in the Soviet leadership and in Soviet policy require changes in US leadership, in US military policy and in the US budget. Inasmuch as both conservatives and liberals are confused by strategic disinformation about Soviet strategic intentions, it is possible that these manoeuvres, assisted by Soviet agents of influence, will be successful'. July 5,1985: The changes in the Soviet leadership should be seen, not as indicating the consolidation by Gorbachev of his personal power, but as meeting the requirements of strategy. The appointment of Gromyko as President and of Eduard Shevardnadze as Minister of Foreign Affairs should be viewed as preparation for the coming programme of calculated economic and political reform which has already been described. Shevardnadze was chosen because of his experience as Minister of Internal Affairs in Georgia during the 1970s. His role will be to link the strategy of so- called "liberalisation" with the strategies of Europe and disarmament. In all proba- bility, the model for his appointment was Janos Kadar in Hungary. It was Kadar, the Minister of the Interior under the old regime, who launched the so-called liberalisa- tion in Hungary. Gromyko's image as an old Stalinist would have made him unsuit- able for the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs during "liberalisation". But his promotion to the Presidency is very important. It is a mistake to regard the position of President of the Soviet Union as purely ceremonial. Since the adoption of the pre sent long-range policy in 1960, the Soviet President, then Brezhnev, later Podgorniy, has played an important role in the execution of that policy. As a member of the Politburo, Gromyko will provide Gorbachev with important advice on strategy. As President, he will use his exalted position to give guidance to Soviet agents of influ- ence among heads of state in Europe and the Third World'. August 1985: There are no valid grounds for favourable illusions or for the euphoria in the West over the Gorbachev appointment and the coming 'liberalisa- tion'. In fact, these developments may present a major challenge and a serious test for the United States' leadership and for the West. The liberalisation will not be sponta- neous nor will it be genuine. It will be a calculated liberalisation patterned along the lines of the Czechoslovak 'democratisation' which was rehearsed in 1968. It will be initiated from above and will be guided and controlled by the KGB and the Party apparatus. The 'liberalisation' will include the following elements: (a) Economic reforms to decentralise the Soviet economy and to introduce MARCH 1989 9 profit incentives on the lines of those in Hungary and China. Since Gorbachev is a Soviet agricultural expert, one can expect a reorganisation of the kolkhozy or collective farms into sovkhozy or state farms. In fact, Lavrentiy Beria was already planning the liquidation of the kolkhozy in 1953. (b) Religious relaxation along the lines of Iosif Stalin's relaxation during the Second World War. The recent sensational Soviet invitation to the Reverend Billy Graham to preach in Soviet churches indicates that the Soviet strategists have already introduced this element and have not waited for the formal installation of Gorbachev as Party leader. (c) Permission for a group of Jewish emigres to leave the USSR. (d) Relaxation of travel restrictions to allow Soviet citizens to make visits abroad. This will be done to impress the West with the Soviet government's compli ance with the Helsinki agreements. (e) Some relaxation for Soviet intellectuals and cultural defectors. Soviet writers and producers will be permitted to write books and produce plays on controversial subjects. Cultural defectors, musicians and dancers will be allowed to perform in the USSR and to travel and perform abroad, thus getting the best of both worlds. One can expect that an amnesty will be declared for the so-called dissidents. (f) Some reduction in the military budget and the transfer of some military funds to improve the state of the economy '. If presented and advertised by the innocent and uninitiated media as a major radical change in the Communist system, the "liberalisation" will allow the Communist leaders immediately to regain the political initiative and to revive the political and diplomatic detente which was so disastrous for the West and so beneficial to the Communists in the past. The charismatic personality of Gorbachev may play an important role in the over-reaction of the Western media'. The Soviet "liberalisation" is a major part of the strategy of the whole Com- munist Bloc, and particularly of Poland and East Germany, against the West. The main objective is to launch a political offensive against the United States and NATO and to develop a military detente in Europe by changing the political and military sit- uation. This strategy is designed to accomplish the following: (a) To bring about a "German Confederation" of East and West Germany and withdrawal from both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. (b)To break up NATO and force a United States withdrawal from Europe'. 'One can expect that, in order to accomplish their objectives, a similar "liber- alisation" will be introduced in Poland and East Germany. Presented and advertised as a new reality in Europe, the Soviet, Polish and East German "liberalisation" will have a stunning and mesmerising effect on both West Europeans and Americans. The resulting confusion will be exploited by the Soviet, Polish and East German leaders through their activist diplomacy especially towards West Germany. Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Romanian leaders may actively contribute to this strategy...'. 10 THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION The "liberalisation" in the USSR, Poland and East Germany may set off a chain reaction in the West and inflict irreparable damage particularly on the NATO countries and the US military posture unless its true nature and role in Communist strategy are realised. The "liberalisation" and its strategic manipulations, combined with overt and covert Communist operations, will also present problems for the leadership of the West. It will be aimed at confusing the Western leaders, splitting the West European allies from the United States and then splitting the people from their elected leaders. The leaders who are taken in by the "liberalisation" can be expected to make erro- neous and costly decisions, albeit unwittingly, in the interests of the Communists'. Winter 1986: The essence of the strategy is to introduce a calculated and controlled false democratisation and to revive a discredited regime by giving it an attractive aspect and a "human face". Its strategic objective is to generate support, good will and sympathy in the West and to exploit this sympathy in order to shape new attitudes and new political realities which will favour Soviet interests. Another objective is to undercut and isolate traditional political parties and their leaders, par- ticularly the conservatives and the realists in the West. A further objective is to shape new attitudes towards the Strategic Defence Initiative, the budget and the US mili- tary and to disarm the United States, basing these new attitudes on the premise that "the new regime which has emerged in the USSR is liberal and no longer poses any threat to the United States". Given the surprise aspect of the Soviet strategy, it may succeed. The possible implications of a failure to understand the essence of this strategy would be damaging to both the United States and Western Europe. The Americans, the West Europeans, their leaders and their military strategists would be influenced and misled by these developments all to the detriment of the national interests of the democracies. The probable impact on the West of such a Soviet revival would be equal to or greater than that of the October Revolution. The impact would in fact be greater and deeper because it would not be alarming but disarming for the West. The revival would become a significant influ- ence in the political life of the United States and Western Europe. The revival might have a disproportionate influence on the attitudes of the democracies towards their military strategy, the NATO alliance and the Strategic Defence Initiative, all to the detriment of their national interests. It might eventually lead to the realisation of the final goal of Soviet strategy, namely the convergence of the capitalist West with the Communist East on Soviet terms and the creation of a World Government as a solution to the arms race and nuclear confrontation'. March 1987: The USSR, China, Poland and probably East Germany are now in a position to launch a political and diplomatic offensive against the West to shatter its structure and its foundation... The next strategic moves will include: (a) Mass Jewish emigration intended to swing Western public opinion towards acceptance of "democratisation" as genuine; (b) The revival of "liberalisation" in Poland and the introduction of economic reforms there; (c) New initiatives around the time of the Pope's visit to the USSR; (d) An initiative leading towards German federation'. MARCH 1989 11 CORRECT PREDICTIONS BASED ON THE NEW METHOD OF ANALYSIS The great majority of the predictions both in 'New Lies for Old' and in my subsequent Memoranda to the CIA have proved accurate both in substance and in detail. The question arises: why were these predictions correct and why did Western experts fail to predict these developments? The answer lies in the different methods of analysis. The new method takes into account the adoption by the leaders of the Communist Bloc in the period 1958 to 1960 of a long-range strategy of which 'perestroika' is the logical culmination. The new method incorporates the following elements: (a) The Author's inside information on the adoption of the strategy, the essence of which was the revitalisation of Communism through the economic and political reform of the earlier repressive Stalinist system. (b)The Author's inside information on Shelepin's 1959 report allotting the KGB a crucial role in the new strategy, in particular the task of creating a controlled political opposition which would give the Soviet and other Communist regimes a more liberal image. (c) The Author's inside information that the Party and the KGB launched a programme of strategic disinformation to support their strategy. (d)The Author's twenty-eight years of experience in interpreting develop- ments in the Communist world in the light of this knowledge. (e) Study of the official documents of the 1958-60 period in which the long- range policy was openly expressed and approved. In addition to predictions on forthcoming 'liberalisation' in the Soviet Union, 'New Lies for Old' contained a critique of Western methods of analysis and an account of the new method. It is worth mentioning that the late Sir John Rennie, at that time head of the British Secret Service, read the whole of the chapter on this subject in New York in 1968 and expressed the opinion that it should be published. He offered to help in arranging this through his friendship with Mr Armstrong, then editor of 'Foreign Affairs'. The Author acknowledges that he mistakenly declined this offer. When 'New Lies for Old' was published in 1984, its message did not attract the attention of the American media and public. Only the late Mr James Angleton and his colleagues in the Intelligence and Security Foundation' realised the importance of the book as the basis for understanding 'perestroika' and devoted three special reports to a review of the main ideas in the book on long-range strategy. In subsequent Memoranda to the CIA, the Author emphasised that 'perestroika' is not Gorbachev's invention but the logical culmination of the long-range strategy of 1958-60. The new method applies 'creative Leninist thinking' to the analysis of Soviet strategy. Leninist thinking, freed from Stalinist dogma and stereotypes, continues to be a principal source of inspiration in the Soviet strategic approach to national and international problems. The new method augments Leninist thinking by taking three further factors into account in its analysis: Vladimir Lenin's introduction of a limited form of capitalism into the Soviet system in the 1920s in order to strengthen 12 THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION the drive for world Communist revolution; Felix Dzerzhinskiy's creation of GPU 1 - controlled 'political opposition' in the USSR in the same period and its introduction to Western intelligence services and general staffs for strategic political deception purposes; and the thirty years of Soviet experience in applying the strategy culmi- nating in 'perestroika'. The adoption of the long-range strategy of 'perestroika' It was not in 1985 but in 1958 that the Communist leaders recognised, after the Hungarian and Polish revolts, that the Stalinist practice of mass repression had severely damaged the system and that radical measures were necessary to restore it. It was then that they decided to transform the Stalinist system into a more attractive form of 'Communist democracy'. It was not in 1985 but in 1958 that the Communist leaders accepted that their economic system was ineffective and lagging behind the West in productivity. It was then that they decided that it would have to be revived through the introduction of market incentives. It was then that the Communist leaders realised that Communism could not be spread abroad against a background of fear and mass repression and that world Communist victory could only be achieved by transforming the Soviet and other Communist regimes into a form more attractive to the West. It was during 1958-60 that the Communist leaders envisaged the convergence of restructured and transformed capitalist systems leading ultimately to one system of World Government. Taking account of the military strength of NATO, the Communist leaders decided to build up their military strength as a guarantee of the success of their programme of domestic 'reform' and as a pressure weapon for disarmament negotiations with the West and the execution of their strategy of convergence. Accepting the necessity for stability in the political leadership of the USSR for the execution of the long-range strategy, the Soviet leaders rejected Stalin's practice of eliminating his rivals and reverted to Lenin's style of leadership. They solved the problem through the selection by the Central Committee of Nikita Khrushchev's suc- cessor in advance of Khrushchev's own retirement. Leonid Brezhnev had already been chosen in this way in July 1960 when he was made President and was given a special briefing by the Chairman of the KGB in preparation for the new responsibili- ties he would be assuming when Khrushchev stepped down. A common commitment to the long-range strategy itself became a factor in the prevention of further power struggles. Western experts failed to understand this because Khrushchev's retirement was deliberately misrepresented by the Soviet leaders to the West as his dismissal. In this and in other ways, the origin of the long-range deception strategy of 'perestroika' was successfully concealed. 1 Editor's Note: GPU = State Political Directorate - the first label change' of the 'Cheka', which was given this new identity with the reorganisation of February 1922. MARCH 1989 13 Soviet Research and Preparation for the Strategy Under the guidance of the Party apparatus, special research studies were initiated and carried out from September 1957 onwards by the Soviet Academy of Sciences in preparation for the strategy. The Party apparatus and its 'think-tanks' - the Higher Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences - employed the results of this research in seeking scientific and theoretical solutions to the primary domestic prob- lems associated with the strategy. It was these 'think-tanks' which developed the scenarios for Soviet reforms and trained Soviet and Bloc Party leaders, such as Dubcek, in the spirit and demands of the strategy. The KGB Institute and its Research Department conducted a number of spe- cial studies for the Central Committee. Among them were studies on 'new methods of neutralising political opposition in the USSR', and 'disclosure of state secrets in the interest of strategy' which has an obvious connection with the present 'openness' or 'glasnost' - one feature of which is the disclosure of quantities of accurate information together with disinformation. Special studies of the economies and international relations of the leading capitalist countries were conducted by the Institute of World Economy and Interna- tional Relations. The Institute paid close attention to the European Common Market and to clashes of economic interest between the United States, Western Europe and Japan. The appointment of the Director of this Institute as a chief economic adviser to Gorbachev can be explained by the contribution made by the Institute to the strategy. A special research organ, the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, was set up in 1960 in Moscow to meet the demands of the strategy. For almost the whole period of the strategy, the Institute, led by Academician Georgiy Arbatov, has studied in depth every major political, social, cultural and racial problem in the United States. The Institute keeps a close watch on the workings of the Executive, Congress, the press, political parties and the more important religious organisations. Arbatov and his subordinates have established close relations with the Amer- ican elite, cultivating many leading politicians, scientists, religious leaders, experts in Soviet affairs, journalists and cultural figures through meetings in Washington and invitations to visit the Soviet Union. Soviet-American student exchanges have been used to study the workings