Notably, freedom of movement for EU/EEA nationals is shown in green, indicating that it’s a good thing.

That’s because, largely, it is.

One may argue that past transition arrangements for new EU countries were mismanaged, however Britain does actually retain control of its borders – the most visible manifestations being the blocking of migrants at Calais and the somewhat tiresome EU/EEA queues at the UK border inside Heathrow airport. There are indeed weaknesses at the UK border, and in visa enforcement, and also in policing illegal migrant accommodation and employment but these are all within the power of the British state to correct, even while inside the EU. The British state is also responsible for other “pull factors” such as, arguably, the creation of a living wage. Setting aside that specific debate, the point is that domestic policy choices can have impacts on immigration.

So there are things a British government could do about immigration now, today, but they choose not to. Indeed it may suit them for the EU to take all the blame on this subject. In that sense, UKIP may be doing them a favour.

But moving the UK to an EEA position would not change British responsibilities.

Alleged drawbacks

An EEA country’s full participation in the Single Market means, by definition, being part of the four freedoms – of goods, services, capital and people. Most Leavers appear to accept the first three of these freedoms. Liberal Leavers are quite relaxed about the fourth.

Of course, such access does not come for free but has certain costs and obligations attached to it. It is these that the Remain lobby point to as disadvantages of the EEA position.

The Remain lobby’s allegations against the EEA position can be roughly paraphrased as:

Unlike EU members, EEA countries have “no say” in making the laws that apply to the Single Market. They are subject to such laws without representation “at the top table” - sometimes called “fax democracy” whereby an EEA government is said to stand passively by their fax machine awaiting orders from Brussels. Furthermore, EEA countries end up adopting “75% of EU law” this way. EEA countries “still pay” almost as much into EU coffers as Britain does as an EU member, yet suffers the two big drawbacks above. The EEA doesn’t address the issue of free movement which is wanted by some Leavers.

Let’s take each of those allegations in turn plus a few others.

1. “No say”

The argument about having “no say” in EU law-making requires some explanation and can be addressed on several levels.

Firstly, “So what?” We have no say in making American laws either, yet we don’t complain about that and the USA is Britain’s single largest national trading partner.

If that feels a bit glib - and it does - the next level of argument is that the “no say” argument is factually incorrect.

Formal EFTA/EEA influence comes from a complex system of consultative structures, the foundation of which is the “two-pillar” system between EFTA/EEA and the EU. In this system, there is formal consultation and participation between the EU and EFTA/EEA, particularly in the crucial early stages of the law-making process. For example, Norwegian officials take part in over 200 committees in the European Commission. The EEA countries don’t however get a final vote in the EU’s institutions and that is what the Remain lobby actually means. A more accurate Remain statement would therefore be that they have “no say when it comes to the final EU vote on a particular matter”. Shortening this to “no say” makes for a good sound bite but it is false.

Some Norwegians are clear on Norway’s influence in the EEA and the opportunities to advise and influence the EU. This is verified by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, which acknowledges that Norway does not have a formal vote in the decision making process but:

“Experience has shown that this is less important than the opportunities we have to influence other countries by putting forward effective, coherent arguments”.

…with the emphasis on “this is less important than…”.

Participation in the early stages involves providing experts to give their input. The extent of influence at this stage depends on the quality of the expertise provided but clearly influence can be considerable. Norway has played a key role in shaping directives and influenced amendments to the Consumer Rights Directive in 2008 by lobbying the European Commission. It has also fought off challenges from the British bookmaker, Ladbrokes, over state control of gaming machines (which itself influenced an EU member state to make a similar challenge via the ECJ).

Therefore the “no say” allegation is not only false, but even when it is corrected to the more accurate “no vote”, it still doesn’t tell the full story and one can still demonstrate that influence is exerted.

The next level of argument surrounding “no say” is that despite not having a vote in EU institutions, EEA countries have some ability to protect their own interests from EU law. They retain a “right of reservation” - a veto - as set out in Article 102 of the EEA agreement and thus have the right to opt out of new EU legislation. This is a right that the UK as an EU member does not have.

The EFTA Secretariat has identified more than 1,200 EU acts considered EEA relevant by the European Commission that have then been contested by the EEA/EFTA Member States.

Examples for Norway include postal services and oil & gas, while Iceland was responsible for one of the biggest rejections of the EU in history when the Icesave bank’s online savings account collapsed.

And that brings us neatly to the next level of argument about EEA countries having “no say”, which is that we must recall the UK’s own influence inside the EU is itself severely constrained in a community of 28. Even the big fanfare over David Cameron’s “veto” in December 2011 came to nothing – the other members just went ahead anyway without Britain. One can now add the recent failed EU renegotiation, which further showed starkly the limits of Britain’s influence inside the EU. That’s perhaps why the government quickly stopped talking about it.

The UK does not have anything like the level of freedom of EFTA members, and has the additional constraint of the UK not being able to conduct its own international trade negotiations/policy. These are conducted by the European Commission after agreeing a “common position” with Member States via the Council.

It is also worth noting that the powers of the Parliament and the Council are strictly limited. The ever increasing number of EU laws originating from global standards are increasingly implemented as “delegated legislation” using the EU’s “comitology” procedure. These committees consist of anonymous officials from member states with absolutely no power to amend or reject Commission proposals. They can only approve them or refer them to the Council.

The UK’s influence in the EU is therefore diminishing as the Union further centralises and quashes democratic protections in its pursuit of full supranational government – its ultimate objective.

That just leaves the final level of argument against “no say”: that EEA countries play a fully independent role in global bodies where the majority of Single Market legislation now originates. In other words they are exerting their influence “upstream” in a way the UK cannot because of its EU membership.

2. “They adopt 75% of EU laws”

The “no say” argument is an important one, however the allegation about “75% of EU laws” is arguably even more misleading than “no say” and has been completely discredited on more than one occasion. The 75% is derived from single market-related directives being applied to EEA countries. What isn’t accounted for are the far more numerous regulations that come from Brussels but have little EEA relevance. When looking across the number of directives and regulations that constitute the full EU body of law in force and comparing that to what EEA countries have actually implemented, the figure is only 21%. Using different methods of calculation, it is anywhere between 10% and 28%. And the majority of this covers standards originating at global level where EEA countries exert their influence. The allegation is therefore not only wrong but wildly so.

3. “Still pay”

EEA/EFTA members pay a small amount for Single Market access but when discussing this subject, the Remain lobby tends to focus on Norway specifically and then conveniently include the “Norway Grants” (that aren’t paid to the EU) into the calculation. This creates an inflated figure which is then misrepresented as the fee Norway pays to the EU for market access. When that distortion is removed, Norway pays significantly less than the UK’s net membership contribution and can be seen as a very reasonable contribution for market access and joint action with neighbours.

On a pessimistic view, Brexit Britain could easily end up paying something like half of its current net contribution to the EU, not least because payments are likely to become a negotiating point (the EU extracting its pound of flesh on exit). That would be a significant saving on where we are now but it should be noted that while many Leavers see EU contributions as an argument for Brexit, this Leaver does not. Even if net contributions dropped to £7.99 a year, the real arguments for leaving would be unchanged. The saving would be very useful, but generally de-risking Brexit via the EEA is much more valuable.

4. No change to free movement

This is very nearly true but for the fact that the EEA countries have a permanent “emergency brake” on the four freedoms including free movement that they have the full sovereign power to pull. Such a brake on free movement is something David Cameron attempted to win during his renegotiation but ended up getting in a bit of a muddle over it. So once again, the EEA countries are in a stronger position while the UK’s much-vaunted influence inside the EU turns out to be very limited. And if EU leaders are unwilling to demonstrate UK influence on such a key point when the UK is threatening to leave, how much weaker will our influence be if we choose to Remain?

5. Rules of Origin

Because EEA countries are not part of the EU Customs Union and are free to negotiate their own trade deals with third countries, exported goods from such countries to the EU need to have their true origins certified to understand whether duties or restrictions apply. While this causes some upfront administrative burden (and that is what raises the objections), it is important to note that Rules of Origin (‘ROO’) are not generally considered by the EEA countries to be a problem with the EFTA-EEA agreement. Indeed they can incentivise use of local/national suppliers. Also such rules are commonplace all around the world. And just to complete the picture, changes coming into force in January 2017 will significantly reduce the ROO burden.

This has not however stopped the government, in a Treasury report published on 18th April, from suggesting an EEA exit would still result in lower GDP over a 15 year time span largely because of ROO. However the report conveniently takes a figure for ROO’s impact (3.4%) that is higher than other studies on this subject and indeed higher than an earlier government paper released under Freedom of Information that suggested 2%. The Treasury report takes no account of the coming reforms to ROO which will reduce administration costs further and also appears to suggest that Britain’s trade profile is the same as Norway’s, which has a greater percentage of exports going to the EU. But Britain is not the same as Norway and the report has therefore over-stated the ROO effect by a considerable margin.

6. Anti-Dumping Measures

The EU has previously pursued an anti-dumping measure against Norwegian fish in 2006. But this was later withdrawn when the WTO ruled against the EU (Norway of course has a thriving fishing industry outside the Common Fisheries Policy). In ten years, this is the only case of EU anti-dumping action taken against an EEA country and more recently it has been noted that “As a result of the strict competition rules incorporated into the EEA Agreement, anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties and other trade measures are, as a general rule, forbidden.”

Alternatives to the EEA position

No other exit deal is likely to offer the speed of exit that an EEA deal can, and as noted above, the UK government would be under time pressure to strike a deal. Other models of engagement with the EU could take ten years and more to negotiate. Some, like the Canada ‘CETA’ agreement, are very limited and simply not appropriate for Britain’s needs.

Indeed, the regular suggestion that many other countries have agreements to trade with the EU without needing to be inside the single market and without needing to sign up to free movement, generally misses the fact that those countries do not have the level of economic integration that Britain has and so did not have the vast task of trying to disentangle over forty years of EU membership. Because one can’t on the one hand say that the EU is sclerotic and 60% of our laws come from there, and in the next breath say the EU will leap into action and agree a very good bespoke trade deal in two years (that the EU could never be seen to allow anyway due to reasons of self-preservation) This is an organisation that needed over a year and multiple meetings to agree a trivial change on migrant benefits. And it has taken seven years to agree a limited deal with Canada. Because as noted earlier, the EU is very slow at forging trade deals. One might add that the EU wants to give its focus to fixing the euro and Schengen without a decade of distraction helping the UK unwind its membership. In other words, the very issues that the Leavers correctly highlight as being reasons to leave are also obstacles to leaving, and therefore have to be considered and confronted.

We are a near neighbour to the European continent, and would need to do much more than conclude a mere trade agreement. Again, Leavers correctly and often point out that the EU is far more than just trade, but in the next breath suggest that a trade deal is all that’s needed to leave. Their concerns about the depth and breadth of integration need to be followed through into considerations for the Brexit process.

Examples of UK/EU entanglements are:

The EU and UK have a joint interest in managing airspace for civilian airliners We cooperate on maritime surveillance We jointly regulate radio and television frequencies and mobile telecoms generally to avoid conflict between services and to manage limited resources We have integrated approval systems for medicines, medical appliances, pesticides and hazardous chemicals We have also integrated systems for the approval of road vehicles and aircraft, and both road and aviation safety are areas for joint action Our consumer safety systems and approvals have been harmonised, so has food safety For better or worse, we are fully involved in the Galileo GPS programme, with a very heavy investment in the system – withdrawal from which would involve heavy losses We are also deeply embedded in the European Defence Agency, which is managing the Airbus A-400 project, on which we depend for our next generation of military transport aircraft We work together formally on monitoring the flow of illegal drugs into the region, and on drug addiction We cooperate on occupational health and safety systems, research and enforcement, and on improving work environments. We work together on weather (and climate) research and monitoring We have joint science programmes We have joint schools/university exchange programmes (which don’t actually require EU membership, as it happens) We are building a system of mutual recognition of professional qualifications – with a harmonisation programme in some specialities.

All these programmes, and many more – including joint action through the numerous executive agencies – far transcend the limited scope of a free trade deal. It is an extraordinarily complex relationship, with massive areas of cooperation and joint action, some of which we may want to continue after we leave the EU.

The trade deal alone is therefore barely the half of it, and that is without taking into account the high-level arrangements on defence and foreign affairs, overseas aid, police and customs cooperation, and matters like extradition, currently managed through the European Arrest Warrant.

So there are obstacles and opportunities to be addressed that require great care and time. A step back to the EEA provides that.

Closing thoughts

Much of the case for staying in rests on being able to influence and reform the EU - which is also where the case collapses. Our influence is severely constrained and much more so than when the UK first joined the EEC. After the limp renegotiation outcome, the UK could never again credibly argue for EU reform if we stayed in.

At a deeper level still, the question of why we would want to stay in is rooted in the idea that the EU, through its size, has ‘clout’ in the world and that we should ‘piggy-back’ on that. The issue is that any ‘clout’ that might be gained is more than lost by the EU’s in-built inertia.

The core of the Remain argument is therefore flawed and by extension the need to Leave becomes compelling. But given the depth of the UK’s entanglement with the EU – at political/legal level but also at an every-day level in company supply chains and in people’s lives – leaving will be all about the transition.

As argued near the start of this article, after a Leave vote, the UK government supported by the civil service is very likely to take the EEA route out because of its obvious benefits and evolutionary nature. Any alternative plans pitched by the Leave campaigns in the run-up to June 23rd will fall away on June 24th even if Britain votes to leave.

In contrast to other exit plans that seek varying degrees of cut-off from the EU, the EEA option starts from a very liberal, cooperative agenda that is practical and realistic, and evolves the UK away from EU membership. This will be the first step of an ongoing evolutionary process that ultimately promises the start of a reinvigoration and re-maturing of Britain’s wilting democracy that is increasingly and worryingly held in contempt by many voters. And all the while, maintaining the very open trade and free exchange we have with our nearest neighbours and friends.

This route would answer the call from a popular vote to leave – the proposition on the ballot paper – and is also relatively quick and painless, killing off a mountain of fear-mongering and uncertainty suggested by the Remain side. Such an exit would also enable Britain to make an early start on retaking control of its affairs in key policy areas.

It would keep the good things from the EU – genuine cooperation in a series of areas, and yes even free movement - because freedom of movement for EU/EEA nationals would be only marginally addressed by this move and would essentially stay in place. That is a positive thing and would allow trade with the EU to continue uninterrupted at the point of exit.

Europe, however, is always changing – nothing is ever static. And the UK’s moment of exit from the EU is a big change that would bring about other changes, not least with some other liberal and sceptical EU countries reconsidering their positions. That will change the nature of both the EEA and the EU. Knock-on effects from such a Brexit are therefore probable, such that the structure of the single market and the four freedoms may have other checks and balances added that befit the many countries who reject the journey to political union.

Over time the UK and indeed Europe will shift to an amended settlement - a liberal one where democracy is nurtured not neutered; where Europe’s diversity is genuinely celebrated and not constantly shoe-horned into a political one-size-fits-none structure born in a bygone age. It will focus much more on a single open trading area and not on a single government.

Brexit could be the catalyst. And an EEA position the first step.

It could be our very own Glorious Revolution.