Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen. Joshua Roberts/Reuters The success of the Federal Reserve System is linked to independence, nonpartisanship and the ability to make decisions without undue political influence.

President Trump is preparing a hostile takeover aimed at remaking the Fed, reducing independence, pushing his deregulation agenda and ignoring what works.

In his eight years, President Obama was able to appoint only three of seven Fed Board of Governors, which helps set vital monetary policy and manages bank regulatory oversight.

In an extreme power grab, Trump will have the chance to appoint up to five — 70% — over the next year.

This would compromise the independence of U.S. monetary policy, weaken bank oversight and move the Fed precariously closer to a faulty Bank of Japan model.

The abrupt resignation last week of Daniel Tarullo, the third highest ranking Fed Board member and de facto Vice Chair of Supervision, is a harbinger of a dangerous policy shift. Trump’s aggressive plan to weaken the Dodd-Frank Act signaled Governor Tarullo’s services were no longer wanted.

Although his term wouldn’t expire for six years, his departure by April 5, 2018, opens the door for a regulation-light replacement, most likely, unwinding important post financial-crisis changes to protect consumers, enhance safety and bolster financial stability.

The Board seats held by Chairman Janet Yellen and Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer also are vulnerable, top spots up for grabs in February and June of 2018, respectively.

Historically, Fed chairs serve more than one four-year term.

Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke. Jason Reed/Reuters Paul Volcker and Ben Bernanke each served eight years and Alan Greenspan operated through Republican and Democratic administrations alike over 18 years. To dump a chair after the first term is rare and impairs Fed stability on the monetary and regulatory policy side.

Trump has shown no interest in retaining Yellen or Fischer. He has made disparaging remarks about Yellen, claiming before the November election that she kept interest rates intentionally low to favor his opponent.

A non-renewal of these two chair positions would be a demotion. While their board terms do not expire until 2024 and 2020 respectively, Yellen could resign as soon as March 2018 and Fischer even sooner.

Two other Board seats remained open, which has left the Fed operating at less than full strength. The new GOP-controlled Congress also guarantees Trump the ability to quickly fill these seats. His appointees could include those more interested in politics than in doing what is best for promoting long-term economic growth, further eroding the nonpartisanship nature of the Fed.

Glenn Hubbard, Columbia University Business School Dean, is rumored as a possible Fed chair nominee. Others on the shortlist include Stanford Prof. John Taylor, who would apply a more mechanized and formulaic approach. And Harvard economist Greg Mankiw, who is known as level-headed but perhaps too moderate for Trump advisors on the right.

Glenn Hubbard. Lucas Jackson/Reuters But it is not just who will be the next head; it also is the direction Trump could move the Fed. The policy shift could be enormous.

Fed governance reflects the division of powers in the U.S. Constitution. When it created the Fed in 1913, Congress purposely delegated power through the Federal Reserve Act.

Board members are nominated by the President but approved by the Senate. The Fed is accountable to Congress, but Congress cannot directly influence policy decisions. Central bank independence is also preserved as it doesn't formally coordinate policy with the president.

The goal of the Fed remains to provide the U.S. with a safe and stable monetary system, diligent bankers with steady hands working behind the scenes to ensure the trains run on time. Politicians with shortsighted focus can inject an inflationary bias to monetary policy, ignoring the key long-term goal of price stability.

The Fed was never meant to be a tool of the executive branch. Theoretically, the Fed is politically insulated.

Once confirmed, the chairperson is immune from being fired.

It also is financially independent, not beholden to Congress for funding. In 2015, after covering expenses, it sent a record $98 billion to the Treasury’s coffers. And appointments are for staggered 14-year terms to buffer against one political party having too much influence.

However, as proven by Trump, terms can be cut short and intent compromised.

More independent central banks produce better results. While the Fed is independent, other central banks have less autonomy. For example, the Japanese central bank and governing political party are interlinked, policies and goals closely aligned.

Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda. Kim Kyung Hoon/Reuters Under the Abe government, Bank of Japan was forced to adopt a 2% inflation target despite strong opposition from its head, who later resigned. This tight political union has proven ineffectual. Japan’s economy remains stagnant, well off of 1980s market highs, and long-term prospects have faltered.

The next unsafe level of interference is the Peoples Bank of China model, where all economic decisions — monetary and regulatory — are controlled by one party. Under Trump, the Fed could be on its way to China.

Since inception, the Federal Reserve System has been market tested, made needed adjustments and shown great resiliency.

In 2009, without the decisive and nonpartisan actions by Bernanke, the U.S. economy would have fallen into another Great Depression.

Since then, unemployment has dropped to under 5%, the economy has rebounded and stocks have hit new market highs. A deeper recession was averted. For the Fed, a job well done.

As was painfully learned during the Great Recession of 2008, the strength or weakness of our economy is inextricably linked to that of our banks and their regulation. If these lessons are not heeded, political meddling could weaken our financial system and create a Bank of Japan effect, undermining the Fed’s long-term ability to effectively grow the economy and improve wellbeing of U.S. citizens.

The best outcome now for the economy, citizens and the Fed, would be for Yellen and Fischer to stand firm and serve their full terms. Given the new drive towards fiscal policy and the related unknowns to the economy, having a steady, market-tested team in place should be a priority.

If their premature departure is certain, however, Trump should reconsider his hostile-takeover approach, and learn from his predecessors, picking Fed replacements that put running the economy and regulating its banks above politics.

So some advice about the Fed: Please don’t fix what isn’t broken.

Mark T. Williams teaches finance at Boston University, is a former Federal Reserve Bank Examiner and author of “Uncontrolled Risk” about the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the key drivers of the 2008 financial crisis.

Follow Mark on Twitter here.