Michael Rubin | American Enterprise Institute

This paper was presented to the 13th International Conference on the European Union, Turkey, the Middle East, and the Kurds held at the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium on December 7-8, 2016.

Thank you for the opportunity to present here today. The Kurds have organized and risen to the point where it is impossible for Western powers to ignore them. As Kurdish aspirations rise, many regional powers would like to see a 21st century equivalent of the Treaty of Lausanne, sacrificing Kurdish interests to those of other regional powers. The Kurds, however, are more organized and more powerful than they have ever been. It is unlikely that they can be betrayed without consequence.

Still, it is essential that the Kurds not wait for a hand-out from the United States, European Union, or other entities. Western assistance is no substitute for Kurdish leaders getting their own house in order. The simple fact is that Kurds remain divided. In Iraqi Kurdistan, family interests trump nationalism. The Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga remain as divided today as they were a decade ago. Massoud Barzani, the de facto regional president, speaks of an independence referendum only when grumbling about economic mismanagement and unpaid salaries gets too great.

Turkey’s Kurdish organizations face a crisis given the information and military campaigns waged against them. Many Turkish Kurdish leaders assume that they stand on the side of justice and popular aspirations, but they have done little to bring that message to the non-Kurdish audience in the West.

Too many politically-active Kurds write for Kurdish websites or portals and debate with fellow Kurds in coffee shops and restaurants catering to a Kurdish clientele. They must write for the Washington Post, New York Times, Le Monde, and Der Spiegel, rather than for Kurdish outlets of which few congressmen, parliamentarians, or ministers have heard. Unfortunately, Kurdish leaders make little effort to reach out to the broader policymaking community whose decision-making may not be based upon a Kurdish consensus about social justice and morality. If Kurds want Western countries to offer support, they must first inform non-Kurdish audiences.

If Kurds march under flags bearing the hammer-and-sickle, the symbol of an ideology that contributed to the deaths of tens of millions of people during the 20th century, they risk losing sympathy from mainstream officials in the West. Ditto any embrace of Che Guevara, a man responsible for the murder of hundreds of innocents. Simply put, Kurdish movements must decide whether they want to cultivate support only from the left, or from the right as well. Unless they win the support of both, Kurds will likely fail to achieve broad Western support for their political aims and national aspirations.

Outreach is important. The world knows about crimes against humanity in Darfur, Rohingya, and Aleppo, but they know little about similar actions perpetrated by the Turkish army and intelligence services against Kurdish civilians in southeast Anatolia. Journalists and policymakers debate atrocities in Aleppo, but they know little about similar destruction in Cizre. Kurds must document Turkey’s destruction of Kurdish towns and cities despite the obstacles placed in their path.

And, in the United States, they must lobby. The Kurdistan Regional Government office in Washington, DC, does not lobby for Kurds broadly or even for Iraqi Kurds specifically; its representative is unapologetically partisan and speaks only on behalf of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. While the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) has a talented and capable representative in Washington, one man is not enough to sway a Congress conditioned by apathy or decades of a narrative shaped by the Turkish government, nor does a party representation equate to a lobby. Lobbying is expensive and requires a non-Kurd to make the case that a new U.S. approach is required. Congressmen listen to former congressmen and diplomats listen to former diplomats. Leveraging the business community is also important, although this will be difficult given many Kurdish parties’ hostility to free market capitalism and foreign direct investment.

Western states are naturally inclined toward the status quo. This is even truer now, as so many have concluded (perhaps wrongly) from the Iraq War and Arab Spring that strongman dictators better contribute to security and stability than democratization and popular sovereignty. This attitude will be hard to overcome. Kurdish officials often pitch their political goals as win-win, no-cost solutions. Some point to federalism in countries like Canada, Spain, Switzerland, and Belgium as the model for Kurdistan. Those who seek independence cite Czechoslovakia’s divorce into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Western diplomats and security officials, however, are natural pessimists: They focus on what might go wrong. What happens if only one side wants federalism, but the other is willing to fight to prevent it? And, for every Czech Republic and Slovakia, isn’t there an East Timor, South Sudan, Kosovo, and Eritrea? That is not to say Kurdistan would descend into civil war or become a failed state, but it behoves Kurdish officials to convince Western governments about why such fears are unfounded.

Of course, overshadowing our discussions today is the failure of the peace process in Turkey and the descent of Turkey into civil war. Turkey has traditionally been an important NATO ally and has a decades-long security relationship with the United States and almost every country in Western Europe. Even if Turkey’s values are at odds with Europe and with NATO, it is important to remember two characteristics of NATO: It is governed by consensus and there is no mechanism to force a member to leave the alliance against its will. This may not win Turkey friends, but it does give Turkey leverage in its negotiations with Western powers vis-à-vis the Kurds.

How can Kurds overcome the natural inclination of Western states to work with Turkey and ignore the Kurds? First, the Kurds must convince the West that a return to the status quo ante is impossible. Thanks to Erdogan’s cynical abuse of the peace process, his arrest of Kurdish politicians, and the horrific violence he has inflicted on ordinary Kurds, most Kurds in south eastern Turkey do not identify themselves as citizens of Turkey and they never will again. Western officials may intervene diplomatically when they realize that there is no other option but to recognize a different political order.

Kurds may also seize the opportunity presented by Erdogan’s increasingly unhinged descent into conspiracy. Erdogan’s manipulation of intelligence is clear. Turkey’s intelligence service’s support and supply for Jebhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Syria raise questions about its trustworthiness. The Turkish dossiers provided to the U.S. Justice Department in support of Turkey’s demand to extradite Fethullah Gülen not only raise questions about the quality of evidence in that case, but also about the quality of intelligence provided by Turkey in all previous cases.

Much of the U.S. position toward senior Kurdish leaders—including those resident here in Brussels—is based on intelligence provided by Turkey. Take those accused of complicity in drug smuggling: Can the United States realistically take Turkey at its word given the Turkish penchant for fabricating such material? The same holds true with regard to the Kurdistan Workers Party. Kurds have a case that Turkish intelligence contribution dating back to the Cold War should be re-assessed and if the intelligence upon which U.S. officials based designations is not defensible, those designations should be reversed.

Kurds have an opportunity to achieve real change, but they cannot achieve it on their own. If they will be successful, however, rather than simply demand Western sympathy and solidarity, they must make a pragmatic rather than moral case about why decades of Western policy should be reversed.

Thank you.

Michael Rubin is a former Pentagon official whose major research areas are the Middle East, Turkey, Iran and diplomacy. He is author of “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter, 2014). He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute AEI. His major research area is the Middle East, with special focus on Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdish society.

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