Poland is facing increased tensions with Russia and the EU. In this context it is looking to rebalance its diplomatic relationships, cementing existing strong ties with the US.

For the US administration, Poland is well positioned to become a priority contact in Europe. The Polish and US governments share common views on NATO and the EU.

The energy and military sectors seem well suited to form a special relationship between Poland and the US.

Twice in Poland's history Russia and Germany have acted together to seek to erase Poland from the European political map. Today the country feels that it is again being squeezed by Russia and the EU. Although this time its existence is certainly not in danger, Poland has reasons to believe that it might be threatened by the EU and Russia. Devoid of powerful friends in its immediate proximity, Poland is now turning to the US for military aid, economic co-operation and political reassurance.

Poland is no match for Russia in the military sphere

Russia's recently intensified sabre-rattling with the EU is not going down well in Poland. Despite being a NATO member, much of Poland's military equipment can be traced back to the time when the country was a member of the Warsaw Pact, a political and military alliance led by the former Soviet Union that included seven other eastern-bloc countries. Polish weapons tend to be obsolete and outclassed by the new Iskander weaponry currently deployed by Russia in the Kaliningrad oblast, near the Polish border.

Russia's aggressive anti-NATO rhetoric and military build-up along its borders with former eastern-bloc satellites such as Poland have been accompanied by hostile anti-Polish propaganda in the Russian media. We see no plausible scenario involving a full-scale Russian attack on Poland, but the sharp deterioration in Russian-Western relations in the years since the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2013 has given Poles cause to feel vulnerable. Poland cannot feel safe if it believes that it is in the firing line of an East-West conflict and is a potential target of potent weapons against which it cannot defend itself.

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline project will make it easier for Russia to bypass Poland

Although the military threat comes from the east only, aspects of Poland's economic developments are under threat from both the east and the west. The Polish economy depends heavily on supplies of Russian natural gas, which covers almost 70% of its total demand. For now Poland has a solid bargaining position vis-à-vis Gazprom, the Russian state gas exporter, as Gazprom has to use transport and storage facilities on Polish territory to deliver natural gas to West European markets.

This, however, will soon change. There is already a route that allows Russia to supply natural gas to Europe bypassing Poland—the Nord Stream pipeline, which connects Russia directly to the Greifswald hub in Germany, from where natural gas enters the network of pipelines leading to major markets throughout Western Europe. Nord Stream 1's existing capacity of 55b cubic metres per year is expected to double upon completion of the Nord Stream 2 project by the end of 2019. With a combined capacity of 110b cubic metres per year, both Nord Stream pipelines will theoretically allow Gazprom to partly bypass the Polish gas infrastructure network. Furthermore, Poland believes that Nord Stream 2 would increase the EU's dependency on Russian gas supply.

Germany is a strong supporter of Nord Stream 2, as it would strengthen its position as an energy hub in the EU. Gerhard Schröder, the former German chancellor, is the chairman of the Board of Directors of Nord Stream 2. Poland therefore sees the construction of Nord Stream 2 as a major impediment to having good relations with Germany.

The risk of marginalisation within the EU is growing

In 2017 Poland found itself embroiled in a confrontation with the EU over three controversial issues. The first is related to Poland's refusal to comply with European resettling schemes for migrants, and the second to a controversial judicial reform that would make the Polish judiciary more dependent on the legislative and executive branches of power. On both issues the EU has warned Poland that it is considering infringement proceedings or triggering sanctions under its Article 7 rules. The third issue is related to the controversial logging of a Polish forest; the EU has referred Poland to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on this matter. These three issues illustrate the growing divide between Poland and the EU, which is pushing the Polish government to strengthen alliances outside the European bloc.

Towards a rapprochement between Poland and the US?

On July 6th Donald Trump, the US president, visited Warsaw, the Polish capital. During this visit Mr Trump had high-level meetings with the Polish government. In the military field he signed a memorandum for the sale of US Patriot air defence complexes to Poland. The US administration and Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) ruling party share scepticism over NATO. Furthermore, the US administration appreciates the fact that Poland is one of a handful of European countries that spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence.

The US and Poland have another reason to strengthen their already strong relationship. Poland needs to diversify its sources of natural-gas supply, and the US is in search of foreign markets for its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Poland has one LNG terminal, which is scheduled to reach full capacity of 5b cubic metres per year by 2018 (with a possible expansion to 7.5b cubic metres)—that is to say almost half of Poland's annual demand.

US LNG supplies will help Poland to leverage its negotiating position vis-à-vis Gazprom. Meanwhile the US, which started to supply LNG to Poland from an export terminal in Louisiana a month before Mr Trump's visit to Warsaw, has found a new market for its LNG exports.

The development of Polish LNG facilities, although crucial for the country's energy independence, is also useful for the US as a foothold for LNG exports to new European markets. In the longer run the Baltic states and central European countries could restructure their energy infrastructure networks around newly built LNG terminals (such as that of Klaipeda, in Lithuania).

In the long run it is unclear whether Poland will continue to seek to rebalance its diplomatic relationship further away from the EU and towards the US, especially if the current PiS party does not have a majority in the next parliamentary election, which is due to be held before November 2019. Furthermore, the outcome of the EU proceedings against Poland and Russia's behaviour towards eastern European countries will surely play a great role in shaping Poland's long-term diplomatic strategy, which at the moment remains unclear.