From Junio C Hamano <> Subject [ANNOUNCE] Git v2.17.1, v2.13.7, v2.14.4, v2.15.2 and v2.16.4 Date Wed, 30 May 2018 02:01:17 +0900 The latest maintenance release Git v2.17.1 and updates to older

maintenance tracks are now available at the usual places.



The tarballs are found at:



https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/



The following public repositories all have a copy of the 'v2.17.1'

tag and the 'maint' branch that the tag points at, as well as the

v2.13.7, v2.14.4, v2.15.2 and v2.16.4 tags:



url = https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/git/git

url = git://repo.or.cz/alt-git.git

url = https://github.com/gitster/git



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Git v2.17.1 Release Notes

=========================



Fixes since v2.17

-----------------



* This release contains the same fixes made in the v2.13.7 version of

Git, covering CVE-2018-11233 and 11235, and forward-ported to

v2.14.4, v2.15.2 and v2.16.4 releases. See release notes to

v2.13.7 for details.



* In addition to the above fixes, this release adds support on the

server side that reject pushes to repositories that attempt to

create such problematic .gitmodules file etc. as tracked

contents, to help hosting sites protect their customers with

older clients by preventing malicious contents from spreading.

This is enabled by the same receive.fsckObjects configuration on

the server side as other security and sanity related checks

(e.g. rejecting tree entry ".GIT" in a wrong case as tracked

contents, targetting victims on case insensitive systems) that

have already been implemented in the past releases. It is

recommended to double check your configuration if you are hosting

contents for other people.





Git v2.13.7 Release Notes

=========================



Fixes since v2.13.6

-------------------



* Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file, but we

blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our on-disk repo

paths. This means you can do bad things by putting "../" into the

name. We now enforce some rules for submodule names which will cause

Git to ignore these malicious names (CVE-2018-11235).



Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of concept from

which the test script was adapted goes to Etienne Stalmans.



* It was possible to trick the code that sanity-checks paths on NTFS

into reading random piece of memory (CVE-2018-11233).



Credit for fixing for these bugs goes to Jeff King, Johannes

Schindelin and others.



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