Brad Stevens’ offense cannot be categorized into one specific, pre-existing system. It is perpetually-changing and bears no resemblance to any other offensive archetype. It borrows elements from every other offense, yet remains original at the same time.

However, some coaches like Phil Jackson will forever be associated with one definitive offense. For Jackson, it’s the “Triangle Offense”, which he popularized coaching his championship-winning Bulls and Lakers teams. Current-Lakers head coach, Byron Scott always uses the Princeton Offense, which he ran with his Jason Kidd Nets squads of the 2000’s.

These half-court offenses are designed to instigate ball movement and create a variety of attack options. Both systems have a default set-up, from where the offense is activated at the start of each possession.

The Triangle and the Princeton offensive sets begin with a big and a wing (usually an off-guard) positioned on the weak side. From there, their teammates on the strong side can choose to pass the ball to the weak side big man – who can either post-up or trigger a two-man game with the wing. Meanwhile, the other three players will make a series of movements to either produce ball movement or isolate the wing, who’s presumably their best one-on-one scorer.

At the 32 second mark in the above video, watch the Lakers give the ball to their best one-on-one scorer, Kobe Bryant. The Celtics attempt to combat Bryant by double-teaming him, yet by doing so, they opened up a shooter in the corner. Ultimately, it was the sloppy defense which allowed Kobe to create an easy shot for Pau Gasol inside the paint.

While the Triangle is undeniably a winning formula, the biggest reason it appeared so unstoppable with Phil Jackson at the helm was because of his teams’ advanced level of talent. Any offense with that same caliber of talent as those Bulls and Lakers teams would inevitably shine. The Triangle’s biggest contribution to those teams was its ability to isolate both Michael Jordan and Kobe Bryant – both of whom are the best isolation scorers of all-time.

While many of those famous triangle sets would end with the ball in Jordan or Bryant’s hands, they primarily began with the ball in either Ron Harper or Derek Fisher‘s hands. After carrying the ball up the court, the point guard passes to the strong side small forward or shooting guard located at the wing. The point guard then cuts to the strong side corner, besides the wing who at that time has the ball. At this point, the wing ideally passes to the strong side big. If that pass is successful, there are an infinite number of directions the offense can go from there. Although the repetition of the triangle makes it somewhat predictable, it can be virtually unstoppable depending on the quality of its players.

Unfortunately for Brad Stevens, he doesn’t have Michael Jordan or Kobe Bryant to work with. To compensate for this lack of star power, Stevens had to get creative. He devised an extremely uptempo offensive game plan – effective against the NBA’s modern defensive paradigm (ICE). Unlike the triangle, individual offensive possessions begin wildly different from one another. Each lineup variation plays an entirely different brand of basketball served to capitalize each player’s strengths. While there’s no real name for Stevens’ offense, analysts – in an attempt to define it – have dubbed it the “Pace and Space” offense.

Pacing And Spacing

Pace indicates the team’s tempo. “Pace” – as a statistic – is quantified by the average number of offensive possessions per-48 minutes. According to Basketball-Reference, the Celtics played at the fifth-highest pace last season – averaging 98.4 possessions every 48 minutes.

Meanwhile, “space” expresses a team’s ability to stretch their opponent’s out on offense. To ensure maximum spacing, teams need several three-point options on the floor to force their defenders outside the paint, and onto the perimeter. Maximum spacing means wide open lanes for cutters to ensure high-percentage shots inside the paint.

Brad Stevens combined the elements of “pace” and “space” to craft an exciting offense capable of picking apart the league’s most elite defenses – despite their limited offensive arsenal. While their offense wasn’t the league’s most efficient (they finished 20th in offensive efficiency), it was effective enough to land the Celtics a playoff berth. Their pedestrian efficiency can be attributed to their volume of three-pointers taken. Last season, they attempted the 13th most threes (2,021 total 3PAs), yet converted only 32.5% (fourth-worst in the NBA).

Where the Celtics currently stand, they don’t have the personnel to make a major leap in three-point percentage. Besides Avery Bradley, every Celtic who shot more than 100 threes last season made less than the league-average 35%.

Despite their poor three-point shooting, the Celtics remained positive floor-spacers since their bigs could shoot. Unfortunately, it’s generally difficult for big men to create their own shots since most of them are slow. The best way to get them open shots is to execute what’s called a “pick and pop”. Pick and pops begin the same as a pick and roll, but instead of the big “rolling” to the basket after setting the screen, he fades back to create space between him and the closest defender, so he can shoot the ball under little coverage. Pick and pops also helped the Celtics impose their fast-pace tempo since pick and pops take mere seconds to set-up.

Pick And Pops: Three-Point Option

At 2:33 in the video featured above, Kelly Olynyk screens Evan Turner, and as a result, a large pocket of space is created between Olynyk and his defender. While Turner held on to the ball for a few seconds after the screen, the necessary space was already created for Olynyk to bury the three. If Olynyk’s defender instead opted to defend him tighter, there would have been more space for Turner to drive to the basket.

A major reason why stretch-fours are becoming an NBA staple, is because three-point shooting bigs create a natural mismatch on the perimeter. Since big men are traditionally slow, they are not the most effective perimeter defenders. Additionally, removing a big from the paint weakens the defense because without a rim protector, the paint becomes easily accessible to cutters. If the opposing big man opts to sag-off the shooting big to better defend the paint, players like Kelly Olynyk, Amir Johnson and Jonas Jerebko will punish them behind-the-arc.

The Celtics’ bizarre stash of floor-stretching big men creates a “Catch-22” for opponents: if opposing big men decide to cover the Celtics big men behind-the-arc, there won’t be enough rim protection; yet, if the opponent keeps their big man in the paint, the Celtics will light them up from three.

Pick And Pops: Mid-Range Option

Last season, mid-range pick and pops proved deadly for the Celtics. Yet, they were deadly in a different manner than pick and pops behind-the-arc were. The efficacy of three-point pick and pops is contingent on exploiting defensive mismatches, while the efficacy of mid-range pick and pops is built on disrupting ICE defenses.

The Celtics’ best basketball last season was played in the midst of their playoff run, when Brad Stevens started Tyler Zeller and Brandon Bass. Since neither big is a three-point threat, the team’s opening offensive sets were very traditional – having both bigs alternate between the high post and low post. The big who was set up in the low post was positioned to offensive rebound and set off-ball screens. Meanwhile, the big in the high post was set up to screen the team’s primary ball-handler positioned at the top of the key. After screening him, the big would be in prime position for an open pick and pop jumper.

In the above game, the Celtics began the game running a modified-HORNS set: setting both off-guards up at the wings, while the bigs hovered towards the elbows. In contradiction to HORNS, one of the bigs instantly faded from the elbow to the low post. This is evident in the first play, where instead of beginning at the elbow like Zeller, Brandon Bass initially sets up behind-the-arc. This effectively disguises the team’s next step – which is for Bass to take a strong step inside the arc once Turner swings the ball to him. From here, Zeller abandons the elbow and cuts into the lane to create space at the elbow, where Bass then hands the ball off to Bradley, who then hits an open off-the-dribble jumper (a strength of his). Both Bass and Zeller have behaved as this hand-off man, since both are capable at hitting the elbow jumper – in case Bradley doesn’t cut hard enough to shed coverage.

Zeller and Bass were relatively efficient from mid-range. However, Bass’ efficiency decreased since last season between 10 and 16 feet, where he only hit 40%. He did increase though from 16 and 25 feet, where he hit 46%. Meanwhile, Zeller thrived from mid-range, hitting 60% between 10-16 feet and 48% between 16 and 25 feet.

Throughout the above game, Nerlens Noel opted to sag-off of Zeller to allow him to shoot. This lackluster defense can be attributed to Philly’s quality of talent and the fact that the lottery-bound 76ers were probably a little disillusioned by this point of the season.

The Pick And Pop: A Defense Against ICE

In today’s NBA, many bigs are deliberately left open following screens since it has become a common practice for modern defenses.

Back when Tom Thibodeau was the Celtics’ assistant coach during the Doc Rivers era, he pioneered a defensive tactic called ICE. It has has since become the NBA’s preferred method of defending the pick and roll. ICE defense cuts off the driving lane created by on-ball screens. It does this by double-teaming the ball handler. When the opposing big man sets a screen for his point guard, the on-ball defender pivots behind the ball-handler, so his rear faces the half court line. Now that the on-ball defender is behind the ball-handler, the ball-handler has an open lane in front of him. But before he can drive to the basket, the defending big man cuts in front of him to block the lane.

ICE is most effective against pick and rolls originating at the wing. The double-team invariably traps the point guard in the corner, where they are prone to commit turnovers since he is stuck along the baseline where he has little court vision.

ICE defense can be stymied, though. Shooting big men are the best counterattack for it, considering bigs are left open following the screen in ICE defenses. After getting “ICED”, the point guard can just pass the ball to the big man following the screen – who can then hit the open jumper.

One issue with combating ICE with a pick and pop though, is successfully getting the pass out of the double-team. Getting ICED makes it difficult to swing the ball over to the big, since the on-ball defender blocks the point guard’s field of vision. Deploying the 6’7″ Evan Turner at point guard comes in handy here. Turner’s height allows him pass over the trailing defender in ICE to escape the baseline trap.

What To Expect Next Season

We can assume Amir Johnson will be used far more as a pick and pop option in Boston than he ever was in Toronto. His strength will mean harder picks to create space for ball-handlers to shed their coverage and also find Johnson for an open look. The Celtics offense should improve next season considering they still have last season’s core, but now equipped with more offensive options like David Lee, who will give the Celtics another solid pick and roll/pop option.

Yet, in order for this team to win a playoff series, they will need to improve their from three-point range. If they can do that, it should improve all aspects of their game, since it will give opponents more of a reason to defend the perimeter tighter. With wide-open lanes, Isaiah Thomas and Evan Turner will be able to tear apart defenses because of their knack at getting to the basket.

Even if they don’t improve from three-point range, Brad Stevens will find a way to adapt and put his Celtics team in a position to win.