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Media scholars like Siva Vaidhyanathan and Shoshana Zuboff have argued convincingly that ordinary citizens and regulators should be concerned about the immense power Google has amassed over many parts of our lives. Yet Amazon, nearly as ubiquitous, and also a frequent target of critical press, maintains a much less troubled public profile than Google. This should hardly be the case. Amazon’s role in developing disturbing new workplace trends, especially for non-white-collar workers, should be of central concern for labor advocates. While both Amazon and Google famously maintain resort-like “campuses” to recruit and retain top IT workers, Amazon relies on a workforce three times the size of Google, not including its army of contingent workers, for critical aspects of its business. As a 2011 story about the company’s Allentown, PA warehouse reported, many of Amazon’s warehouse workers are temps employed by a third-party staffing firm, and it manages its warehouse workers using the same web-centric, piecemeal, “just-in-time” methods it uses for other aspects of its supply chain, enterprise planning, and customer relationship management. According to a recent report in the Harvard Business Review, Amazon will release a change [to its enterprise software management systems] about once every 11 seconds, adding up to about 8,000 changes per day. In the time it takes Staples to make one new [software] release, Amazon has made 300,000 changes. Its software-heavy strategy relies on the use of enterprise-wide tools, similar to companies like Walmart. These tools, which Amazon is beginning to market (or help its partners sell) through its Web Services cloud-based platform, track and manage every aspect of the company’s business — from the location of products in the warehouse to the time it takes for warehouse workers to pick them out of their bins to the seconds spent by customers on a product’s web page (and the number of products left unpurchased in their shopping carts). Amazon’s development of a wide range of labor and what might be called “quasi-labor” practices (including what Tiziana Terranova and others refer to as “free” or “immaterial” labor activities such as producing customer-based rating and referral systems) meshes uncomfortably with how Amazon micro-manages its customers as producers of value for its commercial enterprises. This is similar to Facebook and Google, though Amazon is rarely mentioned in the same breath as those paragons of immaterial labor. A number of recent announcements and actions by the company put these problems into focus. All of them in one way or another show the company contributing to the casualization of labor, and to blurring the lines between private and public spaces and between labor and leisure.