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PERHAPS it is carelessness or perhaps it is just a spell of bad luck. Either way, the spate of Afghan civilian deaths caused by Western forces is as dangerous as the most callous of Taliban suicide-bombs.

Fighting an insurgency while building a working state from the ruins of Afghanistan was never going to be easy, particularly with a coalition of 37 countries including both battle-hardened Americans and battle-shy Germans. But the allies have hobbled themselves by creating two separate forces—both dominated and led by American generals—that at times work at cross-purposes. One is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO-led operation that does peacekeeping, stabilisation and, for some contingents in the south, counter-insurgency against the Taliban. A more obscure group, now called Combined Joint Task Force 82, consists of special forces and elite infantry who hunt Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders under America's Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The differences can be blurry. The two forces are supposed to co-ordinate their activity, and have some “dual-hatted” officers serving in both. Both groups have killed civilians, but many of the most controversial incidents—such as the death of seven children in an air strike on an alleged al-Qaeda safe house in Paktika province on June 17th—are the responsibility of OEF (see article).

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A joint effort last month led to the death of the Taliban military commander, Mullah Dadullah. But local ISAF commanders complain that, unbeknownst to them, OEF troops often operate in their areas and undermine their work. Whatever the truth of this, everybody suffers the consequences of mistakes, none more so than the government of President Hamid Karzai. Anti-Western riots have started to break out. The Afghan leader, who is protected by Western forces, complained in May that civilian deaths and arbitrary searches of people's homes had reached an unacceptable level. Despite abject apologies from the allies, the “mistakes” go on.

When confronted with a foe that hides among civilians, whether by consent or by intimidation, no amount of care will eliminate the death of innocents. But Western countries must do better, or risk losing support and moving the spotlight away from Taliban atrocities and war crimes.

Under America's new counter-insurgency doctrine, “unity of effort” is the essential prerequisite for success. Having two separate forces makes little military sense, but it was politically expedient. Many NATO countries, seeing their role as helping to rebuild Afghanistan rather than fighting the Taliban, do not want to be too closely associated with America's more aggressive tactics in the “global war on terror”. America, for its part, is reluctant to place its warriors too firmly under the control of wishy-washy Europeans.

Neither side is wholly wrong. The Americans are right that the NATO mission would not survive without their muscle. Last year, when ISAF spread throughout Afghanistan and found itself in a war with the Taliban it had not expected, OEF came to its rescue. But the Europeans are right that the Taliban and al-Qaeda cannot be defeated only, or even mainly, by firepower. The two forces should be merged, but if that proves impossible, it should be made clear that ISAF has primacy, and should have oversight over OEF actions. More important, the aim of military operations should be to protect the civilian population and win its trust, not to kill as many insurgents as possible. Strikes against even “high-value targets” should be aborted if there is a serious risk of ordinary Afghans dying. Targets will re-appear; lost goodwill is harder to win back.

Unity of effort requires much more than rejigging command structures; it is about managing the complexity of nation-building. The problem is not just the strength of the Taliban, but also the weakness of the Afghan government, and disillusionment with corruption and slow reconstruction.

On top of this, Western and Afghan forces are too thinly stretched. Afghanistan is larger in size and population than Iraq, but has a fraction of the soldiers and police. Without enough forces on the ground, Western commanders have relied more heavily on bombing from the air, endangering more civilians. Reducing Afghan deaths will require, for some years to come, putting more Western soldiers in harm's way.