That’s largely because the tax bill so emphatically tilts its benefits toward Republican constituencies and directs its costs mostly to Democratic ones. Recent studies have found the new plan lavishes more than twice as great a share of its savings on the wealthiest earners than even the Bush tax cuts did. The nonpartisan Tax Policy Center concluded this week that the top 5 percent of earners will sweep up nearly half of all the plan’s benefits by 2025 and fully 99 percent by 2027.

On the flip side, the plan’s biggest losers remain residents of blue-leaning states, particularly those in the major metropolitan areas with high housing costs that are now the geographic cornerstone of the Democratic coalition. Though the final bill removed many of the House’s most egregious arrows at Democratic constituencies—such as those targeted at graduate students and alternative-energy producers—the legislation’s limits on state-and-local tax deductions still threaten tax hikes for many blue-state suburbanites. As New York Republican Representative Lee Zeldin, a staunch Trump defender, put it when announcing his opposition, “this bill remains a geographic redistribution of wealth, taking extra money from a place like New York to pay for deeper tax cuts elsewhere.” The Democratic-leaning Millennial generation, which will receive few direct benefits and inherit the tab for up to $2 trillion in additional federal debt, are also on the short end.

The result is legislation far more unpopular in opinion polls than other tax cuts—and less popular even than Obamacare. One compilation of public polls from March 2010, when Obama signed the ACA, found it averaged support from 42 percent of the public and opposition from 50 percent. But a FiveThirtyEight roundup of this month’s public surveys found the tax bill drawing support from just 33 percent of respondents, with 52 percent opposing. No public poll in 2010 put support for the ACA below 30 percent. At least four this month have found support for the tax plan cratering below that number.

Like Democrats in 2010, Republicans now insist voters will warm to the tax plan as it’s implemented. But Seth Masket, a University of Denver political scientist who studied the ACA’s electoral impact, told me the law didn’t gain significantly more public support until this year, when Trump tried to repeal it. Masket is dubious the tax bill will look much better by next November’s elections. “Generally speaking, legislation isn’t likely to become much more popular after it passes,” he said.

Seven years ago, Democrats hoped the ACA would allow them to recapture working-class whites by providing them a tangible benefit. Instead, the law hastened their shift away from Obama because most of them viewed it as a welfare program: In the exit poll for the November 2010 midterms, 57 percent of non-college-educated whites backed Obamacare repeal and 63 percent voted Republican for the House.