The reasonable policy, then, is for the United States to keep just enough troops in Europe to deter Russia from mischief while focusing its spare resources on Asia. A President Romney might have been kinder to Europe than Obama when announcing the policy change, but he would have pivoted all the same.

America’s focus on Asia puts NATO in unchartered waters. For most of its existence, the allies had a reasonably clear agreement on who the enemy was and each country fielded enough troops to make itself useful if war came. NATO maintained this outward unity during the wars in Afghanistan and Libya, even though many allies sent only symbolic contributions, or none at all. This was partly because some countries were not convinced of the chosen strategy, and because many had little to contribute.

The U.S. pivot now further widens the gap between America’s defense priorities and European capabilities: If war between China and Taiwan or Japan were to break out, the Europeans would make sympathetic noises but leave the United States to do the fighting. This is not for lack of courage, but mainly for lack of weapons — the right kinds and the right quantities. Never before in NATO’s history were America’s allies of so little use for the kinds of scenarios that most occupy America’s defense analysts.

What is NATO to do? One school of thought in Europe holds that an alliance with such widely different capabilities will not survive. The Europeans must therefore build forces to complement America’s, which mostly means expanding their navies. Moreover, the argument goes, Asian security is in European interests, too — so the allies should be ready to fight in the Pacific regardless of whether the Americans expect their help or not.

But this is pure fantasy: European forces were built for conflicts closer to home. They are wholly unprepared to play a meaningful role in the Pacific, and are not going to acquire the necessary skills and hardware anytime soon — certainly not in the middle of the worst economic crisis in decades. The only two naval powers that come anywhere near being useful in Asia are France and Britain. And even France, in its present strategic review, is leaning toward keeping only a symbolic presence in the Pacific.