As we have seen, neither the argument from Axiological Invariance nor the argument based on a connection between better-for and better-off succeed in showing that existence cannot be extrinsically better for a person than non-existence. We have also seen how existence could be better or worse for a person than non-existence on different theories of well-being. While this certainly supports the conclusion that existence can be extrinsically better than non-existence, I will in this section argue that it does little to solve the practical problems connected with the harm or benefit of coming into existence.

In the previous section I argued that a crucial feature of an axiological theory which allows for existence to be extrinsically better (worse) for a person than non-existence is that extrinsic betterness is defined in terms of the actual intrinsic value of possible worlds. The problem with this feature is that in certain cases an agent who is guided by extrinsic value will have an alternative, ϕ, which is extrinsically better for her than not ϕ-ing, but were she to ϕ then it would have been extrinsically better not to have ϕ-ed. In situations such as these it seems impossible for a rational and well-informed agent to deliberate about what to do, in so far as she is guided by the extrinsic value of ϕ-ing. However, if the extrinsic value of existence has any practical relevance then it should be possible for a well-informed and rational agent to be guided by this value in deliberation. Since this is not possible in certain cases, the extrinsic value of existence lacks practical relevance.

In order to see what such a case might look like, suppose that prudential value depends on attitudes. More precisely, suppose that S is intrinsically good (bad) for a iff (and because) a has a pro (con)-attitude of the right kind towards S for its own sake. Consider a person, a, who has a stronger pro-attitude of the right kind towards the states of affairs which would obtain were she to exercise than she has towards the states of affairs which would obtain were she not to exercise. It follows from the analysis of extrinsic value that exercising is extrinsically better for a than not exercising. However, suppose that if a were to start exercising then her attitudes would change. In fact, if she were to start exercising then she would have a stronger pro-attitude towards the states of affairs which would obtain were she not to exercise. This means that in the closest possible world where she exercises, not exercising is extrinsically better for her than exercising.

This puts a in a peculiar situation. In so far as a is guided by the extrinsic value of exercising, it is reasonable of a to start exercising. However, if she were to start exercising, then it would be extrinsically better for her not to exercise. It would therefore be reasonable of her to stop exercising. Whatever a does, she will end up with something which is extrinsically worse for her, and whatever she does it would have been extrinsically better for her not to have done it. Note also that this result is not due to any shortcoming on a’s part and that the same situation arises even if we assume that a is a well-informed, rational and conscientious agent who is guided by promoting extrinsic value. It is at least unclear what kind of shortcoming this would be since the mere fact that a person’s preferences can depend on the circumstances does not seem to be evidence of irrationality or unreasonableness.

If extrinsic value is to have any practical importance, whether morally or prudentially, then this is a serious problem. In situations where one will end up with a state of affairs which is extrinsically worse whatever one chooses, it seems impossible to deliberate about what to do, in so far as one is guided by extrinsic value. This suggests that the person in the example should not be guided by the actual extrinsic value of exercising, but rather something else.Footnote 10

A possible objection is that it is too hasty to discard the practical relevance of extrinsic value on the basis of this example. It might be claimed that it is the theory of prudential value, not the practical relevance of extrinsic value, which is the source of the problem in the example above. However, note that the problem above only arises for preferentialism in so far as preferentialism is combined with the claim that one ought to be guided by actual intrinsic value. An alternative version of preferentialism according to which one ought to be guided by the extrinsic value the outcomes would have does not imply that there are dilemmas of this kind. In the example with shifty preferences above, such a view would recommend that the person ought to start exercising iff the pro-attitude she would have for not exercising, were she to start exercising, are weaker than the pro-attitude she would have for exercising, were she not to start exercising. This is one way to formulate the preferentialist theory such that it avoids these problems, but note that it does so by denying that actual extrinsic value is practically relevant.

Even though certain forms of preferentialism will avoid the problem of shifty preferences, it might be argued that the example above still reveals a flaw in preferentialism since the same problem does not seem to arise for other theories. In the case of hedonism, for example, it might be thought that this theory is not vulnerable to the same kind of problem since itdoes not make prudential value dependent on anything as shifty as a person’s attitudes.

However, it is possible to construe similar cases even for hedonism. By hedonism I mean, roughly, the view that a state of affairs S is intrinsically good (bad) for a iff (and because) S is an instance of a experiencing pleasure (pain). Suppose now that a creature, a, lacks the capacity for experiencing pleasure or pain. We can give a this capacity, but if we were to do so then a would only experience pain.

It is plausible to assume that nothing is good or bad for a in the actual world, assuming hedonism. The intrinsic value for a of the actual world is therefore neither good nor bad, and likewise for the closest possible world where a experiences only pain. Having the capacity for pleasure and pain is therefore neither extrinsically good nor bad for a. It is an open possibility that it is not neutral either: it may be that it is undefined for example. However, it is clear that if we are guided by the extrinsic value for a of having the capacity for pleasure and pain, then there is no relevant difference between giving a this capacity and not giving a this capacity. But note that if we were to give a the capacity for mental states then it would be extrinsically worse for a to have this capacity. Therefore, in so far as we are guided by promoting extrinsic value for a, we will not be able to rule out the alternative of giving a the capacity for mental states. However, in so far as we are concerned about a it is clear that we should not give a the capacity for mental states, despite the fact that this world is not extrinsically worse for the person.

We can even construe deliberative dilemmas for hedonism, similar to the one about exercising. Suppose for example that there are two creatures, a and b, which lack the capacity for pleasure and pain and that we can give one of them this capacity. If we give it to a then a will only experience pain, and same is true of b. In this case if we give the capacity to a then we ought to have given it to b and vice versa, in so far as we are guided by the actual extrinsic value for a and b of having this capacity. If we give it to a, then having the capacity is extrinsically worse for a. However, the extrinsic value for b of having the capacity is neutral since nothing has any value for b when b lacks the capacity for pleasure and pain. It is easy to see that this leads to the conclusion that if we give the capacity for mental states to a then we ought, in so far as we are guided by promoting extrinsic value, to have given it to b, and vice versa.

I have argued that both a certain form of preferentialism and standard hedonism are vulnerable to deliberative dilemmas if we assume that actual extrinsic value is practically relevant. We should therefore conclude that actual extrinsic value lacks practical relevance. More precisely, the examples above support the conclusion that what matters to practical deliberation is not the value, intrinsic or extrinsic, which a non-obtaining state of affairs has for a person, but rather the value it would have for the person, were it to obtain. One possible interpretation of this result is that the actual value of non-obtaining states of affairs is only practically relevant if the state of affairs would have the same value, were it to obtain. That is, something like Axiological Invariance holds, perhaps not for every kind of value, but at least for every kind of value which is relevant to practical deliberation.Footnote 11