Hard truths from Pyongyang's prodigal son

By Andrei Lankov

May 31, 2012

SEOUL - It seems that every royal family is bound to have a maverick prince - and Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son of Kim Jong-il, fills the role for North Korea's ruling family.



Kim Jong-nam was born in 1970. Soon afterwards, his mother Song Hye Rim, a beautiful actress, broke up with his father. Nonetheless, the boy spent his childhood in the palaces of the Kim family and then in expensive overseas schools. For a brief time, he was even considered the most likely successor to his father.



For various reasons, things went awry and for the past 15 years or so, Kim Jong-nam has lived in China and the Chinese territory of Macau, visiting North Korea only occasionally.



From 2002 or 2003, Kim Jong-nam began to behave strangely (at least in one important regard) - he became the only member of

the Kim family who was not completely and unconditionally media shy. If intercepted by foreign journalists, he usually was happy to engage in conversation.



In most cases, what transpired was merely a little small talk, but it showed in and of itself the fact that North Korea's black prince was nonetheless witty and charismatic. With the passage of time, his occasional interviews have become more substantive in content and more politically frank. In 2010, he even went so far as to openly voice his disapproval of the hereditary power transfer at that point developing in Pyongyang, with Kim Jong-eun being prepared to take over from his father, which happened after Kim Jong-il died in December last year.



However, the real bombshell was dropped earlier this year when Yoji Gomi, a journalist for Japan's Tokyo Shimbun, published a book that described his interactions with Kim Jong-nam. In most cases, these were limited to the exchange of e-mails, but there were a few meetings as well and at one point, Yoji Gomi was granted a long interview with Kim Jong-nam.



This interview was published in the Tokyo Shimbunin early 2011, but the book itself adds much to what was initially published.



Interestingly, it was Kim Jong-nam that sought out Yoji Gomi. In 2004, at Beijing Airport, Kim Jong-nam ran into a group of foreign journalists, most of whom handed to the North Korean prince - then still widely seen as the most likely successor - their business cards. Somewhat surprisingly, Kim Jong-nam sent e-mails to some of them, but as far as we know now, Yoji Gomi was the only journalist to successfully establish a long-term connection with Kim Jong-nam.



For the subsequent years, they exchanged e-mails and occasionally met in person as well.



In these exchanges, Kim Jong-nam was seemingly quite careful. He did not divulge information related to the personal lives or factional struggles of the leadership in Pyongyang. He also made it clear that he has no political power in the North (he is a half brother to current leader Kim Jong-eun). He has studiously avoided explaining how he was able to enjoy the highly agreeable lifestyle he does in Macau and refused to talk about the origins of his considerable personal wealth.



In other words, it is clear that Kim Jong-nam said only a fraction of what he knows. Nonetheless, the book is the most frank testimony to have emerged from the ruling elite in Pyongyang, of whom Kim Jong-nam was once a very important part.



The single-most important topic in the Japanese-language book, titled My Father, Kim Jong-il, and Me, is the (im)possibility of Chinese-style reforms in North Korea (the book is also published in Korean). Indeed, for nearly two decades, many outside observers have expected that North Korea would eventually emulate the stunning success of China and embark on similar market-orientated reforms which are apparently all but certain to revive the country's moribund economy.



Some other observers, including the present author, have been less optimistic; they have indicated that in the peculiar case of North Korea, which faces a "dirty rich" and free South, attempts at reform and relaxation are highly dangerous politically. In the unique case of North Korea, attempts at reform are likely to produce a collapse followed by absorption by the South, rather than a Chinese-style boom.



It seems that Kim Jong-nam's statements have confirmed that the pessimists were correct in their assessments of North Korea's reasoning on the issue (being one of the pessimists himself, the ego of present author feelings well massaged by Kim Jong-nam's remarks).



In a number of his letters and interviews, Kim Jong-nam has clearly stated his belief that market-orientated reforms would probably revive the North Korean economy. In one case, addressing his half-brother Kim Jong-eun (by that time already the successor to Kim Jong-il), he implored him to have pity on the common people and follow the Chinese example.



However, in many other cases, Kim Jong-nam is far less certain about the potential positive impact of reforms. In his interview in January 2011, he said, "I personally believe that economic reforms and openness are the best ways to make life better for the North Korean people. However, taking North Korea's unique position into account, there is a fear that economic reforms and openness will lead to the collapse of the present system."



At other points, Kim Jong-nam repeated the same point: "The North Korean leadership is stuck in a bind. Without reforms the country's economy will go bankrupt, but reforms are fraught with the danger of systemic collapse."



In one of his letters discussing with Yoji Gomi the then-recent Fukushima nuclear disaster and resultant electricity shortages in Japan, Kim Jong-nam emphasized that apparent similarities with North Korea were superficial. He said, "North Korea's electricity problems result from North Korea's systemic economic problems."



One cannot be more certain on this issue. Kim Jong-nam confirms that North Korea's leaders are aware of the potential economic benefits of reforms. They are, however, concurrently aware of the huge associated political risks and hence they remain indecisive.



Kim Jong-nam mentions that around 2006, the North Korean leadership created a special group whose task was to study the Chinese experience and suggest ways in which North Korea could emulate China's success.



The head of the group was Chang Song Taek, the brother-in-law of Kim Jong-il, and at present seemingly regent (either as advisor or maybe as actual ruler) to Kim Jong-eun. According to Kim Jong-nam, the "Chang Song Taek committee" could not come up with any recommendations. Thus North Korea has continued its politically safe and economically disastrous course.



Kim Jong-nam touched on another sensitive issue - the hereditary succession. He is known to have voiced his disapproval of hereditary transfer of power in other interviews, but in his exchanges with Yoji Gomi he sounded more ambivalent.



On one hand, Kim Jong-nam admits that the idea of hereditary succession is clearly anachronistic. He said, "[The world] having left behind the era of feudal monarchies, so we are an unusual laughing stock."



Kim Jong-nam has even claimed that his father was initially unsupportive of further hereditary succession. On the other hand, Kim Jong-nam is less critical, he emphasizes the fact that the hereditary power transfer makes a lot of sense domestically since the people of North Korea have grown used to the idea of being run by members of the "Paektusan family".



Kim Jong-nam does not explicitly use the word "legitimacy", but this is clearly what he means. He goes on to claim that hereditary succession might not be such a bad idea after all, since it will lead to continued stability in the North, which he claims is in everyone's interests.



Another important issue that is raised in the book is the growing level of North Korea's economic dependency on China. These remarks are important because Kim Jong-nam is often seen as a "Beijing man", a person who lives under Chinese control and might be even become a head of a pro-Chinese regime if such a regime was ever to emerge in Pyongyang.



Actually, Kim Jong-nam admitted that the Chinese had much interest in him, so he lived under a mixture of protection and surveillance by the Chinese authorities.



Kim Jong-nam is not particularly hostile to China, but he is hardly sycophantic when it comes to describing Chinese policies. On the one hand, Kim Jong-nam admits that China's major goal is to maintain the status quo in the region. At the same time, however, he also states that China hopes to establish control over the North Korean economy - a development that "cannot be welcomed from North Korea's point of view".



Therefore, we have an interesting piece of important evidence coming from a source very close to Pyongyang's decision-makers. Kim Jong-nam's revelations confirm that these people are smart, rational and know perfectly well what they are doing. Unfortunately, their overriding goal is regime survival and this goal is not necessarily compatible with the interests of their own people, let alone outside players.



But this leaves us with an important question: why did Kim Jong-nam reveal all of this? After all, Kim Jong-nam initiated contacts with Yoji Gomi and did not mind discussing many sensitive issues (and he also talked to a number of other foreign journalists with comparable level of openness).



Does this mean that he has decided to partake in the high politics, so he wants to position himself as the voice of moderate opposition and win some domestic (or foreign) political support? Or does it mean the opposite - that Kim Jong-nam wants to distance himself from North Korean politics, whose moral shortcomings he obviously knows only too well?



Or is it a non-political gesture, an attempt to voice some opinions and concerns that Kim Jong-nam believes should be voiced?



We do not know the answers to these questions. Nonetheless, the surprisingly frank comments of this charming, smiling and overweight North Korean princeling provide us with a rare insider's view into Pyongyang's way of thinking.



Unfortunately, these insights do not create much ground for optimism about North Korea's future.



Andrei Lankov is an associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, and adjunct research fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea. He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia.

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