He has said in conversations with colleagues that there was no wrongdoing in the design and certification of the Max and that discussing accountability would distract from the company’s efforts to safely return the plane to service, according to four people familiar with the matter.

On Friday, however, a task force of 10 international regulators released a report that found that Boeing hadn’t fully explained the automated system, known as MCAS, to the Federal Aviation Administration and that company engineers delegated to help certify the plane on behalf of the regulator had faced “undue pressure” internally. Last month, Boeing’s board made public the findings of its own review of the company’s policies, recommending changes to the design of future airplanes and a restructuring of its engineering group.

“Boeing’s leadership team is committed to our enduring values of safety, quality and integrity as they implement the board’s recommendations and additional actions to strengthen and elevate safety,” a Boeing spokesman said in a statement on Saturday to The Times.

Behind closed doors, questions have also been raised among top executives about how Kevin McAllister, the head of Boeing’s commercial division, which produced the troubled plane, has managed the Max crisis, according to several people familiar with internal discussions who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the situation. Mr. McAllister joined Boeing in November 2016, after the development of the Max was largely completed but before it had been certified by regulators.

He has been the focus of criticism from Boeing executives who worry that he has not been proactive enough in reaching out to airlines to explain what steps the company is taking in the wake of the two accidents, according to the people familiar with the matter.

Mr. McAllister had previously worked at General Electric with Mr. Calhoun, the board’s new chairman, who was key in his hiring at Boeing. The commercial division, Boeing’s largest business, is facing problems beyond the Max, including manufacturing issues at its Charleston plant, cracking on the Max’s predecessor, the 737 NG, and the discovery of foreign objects inside the KC-46 tanker, a military aircraft that is built by the group.