Secondly, we discuss the extent to which insights from Europe travel to other regions of the world (see also Checkel, 2016 ). Here, the empirical evidence on the relationship between community‐building and region‐building is scanty. However, and comparable to the European experience, elites involved in region‐building in Latin America, the Middle East and sub‐Saharan Africa (less so in North America) almost always develop identity narratives linking their national experience to the respective regions. Moreover, evidence from – primarily – the World Value Surveys (WVS) suggests that the difference between inclusive national identities (allowing for secondary regional identities), on the one hand, and exclusive nationalist identifications, on the other hand, travels beyond Europe. What is more, the latter have recently been mobilized by the likes of Donald Trump in the USA Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and now Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. This suggests that the cultural cleavage structure underlying these mobilization strategies may also be valid in other world regions. We conclude with some suggestions for further research.

Our contribution proceeds in two steps. Firstly, after having clarified our key concepts, we concentrate on the European experience. We argue that elite identities have been crucial for the evolution of European integration, from the beginnings during the 1950s to the Maastricht Treaties. With regard to citizens, European integration has been brought about by the permissive consensus of EU citizens with inclusive national identities (that is, with Europe as a secondary identity). Most recently, however, the politicization of EU affairs in many member states after the Euro crisis on has been driven by populist eurosceptical forces that have been mobilizing considerable minorities of citizens holding exclusive nationalist identities. Thus, identity politics can also work against regional integration. The mobilization of exclusive national identities maps unto a realignment of political forces alongside a cultural cleavage of cosmopolitan versus exclusive nationalist attitudes, which is discernible across Europe.

This special issue explores the relationship between political identities with a territorial dimension, on the one hand, and the transfer of core state powers to the EU and other regional institutions, on the other hand (see introductory article by Kuhn and Nicoli, 2020 ). Our contribution explores the path from collective identities – both that of elites and of ordinary citizens – to the integration of core state powers. We argue that, irrespective of functional demands for cooperation and integration, identity politics as well as the degree to which they resonate with the public are crucial ingredients of processes of regional integration. Moreover, identity politics can work both ways, in favour of and against the transfer of core state powers and integration. Firstly, collective identification and mutual trust among political elites enables them to overcome the collective action problems associated with political integration at the regional level and the transfer of core state powers to supranational institutions. At the same time, the lack of a sense of community among elites might still enable some sort of (intergovernmental) cooperation, but it is likely to inhibit integration. Secondly, elite identity narratives linking the nation‐state to region‐building need to resonate with citizens in order to generate diffuse support (Easton, 1965 ) for regional integration. At the same time, exclusive nationalist identities can also be mobilized against regional integration, as we are currently witnessing in Europe and in other parts of the world.

I. The Transfer of Core State Powers, Identity Politics, and the European Experience

By transfer of core state powers, we refer to two features of (regional) integration (see also the article by Bremer, Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2020, and Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2016). Firstly, the core policies of the state such as defence and monetary and economic policies are communitarized in a multi‐level system of governance. 1 Secondly, the core competencies of the state are supranationalized through a system of pooling and delegating powers to the regional level (Hooghe and Marks, 2015). States thus voluntarily accept intrusions in their Westphalian sovereignty, that is, deep interference into what used to be their domestic affairs, be it in policy areas or power resources. Scholars defines this as integration in contrast to mere cooperation, where the ultimate decision‐making power still resides with the nation‐state.

With regard to collective identities and in line with social identity as well as self‐categorization theories (Abrams and Hogg, 1999; Tajfel, 1974), we define collective identities as the way in which individuals relate to social groups, including imagined communities such as the nation‐state or Europe (Anderson, 1991, see Risse, 2010, Chapter 1, for details). Social identities are composed of two ingredients, namely the special characteristics of the group, and the delineation of borders between the in‐group and the outgroup. In this article, we distinguish further between the social identities that are discursively constructed by political elites and the social identification of citizens with larger imagined communities. Lastly, by identity politics we mean the deliberate use of identity discourses for political purposes, for example, to justify or legitimate policies or the transfer of powers and authority onto regional levels. Of course, identity politics can also be a means to oppose regional integration, for example, through the mobilization of nationalism.

On a purely theoretical level, it is hard to see how regional integration or the transfer of core state powers onto the regional level (as defined above) can be legitimized or sustained without some sense of community and, thus, collective identification among elites and citizens. Two fathers of integration theories – Karl W. Deutsch and Ernst Haas – were deeply aware of the relationship between integration and community‐building. Haas defined integration as the shift of loyalties to a new supranational centre (Haas, 1958, p. 16). In a similar way, Deutsch's transactionalist approach saw security communities as bound by a mutual sense of community (Deutsch et al., 1957; for a more recent treatment see Hooghe et al., 2019; Kuhn, 2015). However, if identity is used as a constitutive feature or as an indicator of (regional) integration or the transfer of core state powers, we can no longer investigate how the two relate to each other. Thus, in line with the special issue, we distinguish between the two.

The direction of the causal arrows between identity and integration is less clear. Does regional integration lead to collective identification, is community‐building a precondition for regional integration, or do we observe mutually reinforcing processes of integration and identification? Let us look at the European experience.

Identity politics, that is, the mobilization of collective identities for political purposes, has been crucial throughout the history of European integration. Until about the 2000s, Europeanized elite identities have been supported by a permissive consensus of inclusive national identities among a majority of EU citizens. We illustrate this point with regard to the beginnings of European integration in the early 1950s and the Maastricht Treaty of the early 1990s, which introduced the single currency and, thus, initiated a most profound transfer of core state powers to the European level. Over the past 15 years, however, we have observed the development from permissive consensus to a constraining dissensus (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Most recently, this has resulted in the mobilization of exclusive nationalist identities by populist eurosceptical forces in events ranging from the Euro crisis to the migration challenge. This last example serves to show that identity politics can work both ways, in favour of and in opposition to enhanced regional integration. Indeed, as we argue below, the mobilization of collective identities against regional integration has a long history, even in Europe.

Note that we do not suggest that there were no functional demands for European integration, such as security needs since World War Two or economic reasons. As we have argued elsewhere (Börzel and Risse, 2019), elite identities and the development of identity narratives are crucial for the supply side of regional integration and the transfer of core state powers in terms of overcoming problems of collective action as well as to mobilize public support. We are not concerned with whether political elites actually believe in what they are saying. Our argument about identity politics is about discourse, not belief systems or motivations (see Schmidt, 2002, 2008).

The Beginnings: Integrating External Security to Overcome War and Destruction If we start the history of European integration with the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) rather than the 1957 European Economic Community (EEC), dominant theories of European integration such as neo‐functionalism (Haas, 1958) and liberal inter‐governmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998) have a hard time accounting for it. They both assume that economic interdependence serves as a major driver for regional cooperation and integration. In the case of Europe, however, economic interdependence took off only after the first steps towards integration have been taken (for details see Börzel and Risse, 2019). It took until the 1960s for Europe to reach the level of commercial and financial interdependence that had existed on the eve of World War One (Graph et al., 2013). The history of the ECSC demonstrates that sharing a common history of destruction relating to not one but two world wars united the discourse of the founding fathers of the European integration project (see also contribution by Hoffmann and Mérand, 2020). In their pursuit of a united, peaceful and prosperous Europe, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi and Robert Schuman drew on the European peace initiatives promoted by the Pan‐European and other movements founded in the 1920s or the European union, which French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand proposed to the General Assembly of the League of Nations, with the support of his German counterpart, Gustav Stresemann, in September 1929 (Stevenson, 2012; Loth, 2015, pp. 1–19). Twenty years later, French foreign minister Robert Schuman responded to German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's proposal to mutualize heavy industry in the Ruhr with his plan for a coal and steel community as a way of preventing further war between France and Germany (Loth, 2015, pp. 20–36; Patel, 2018, pp. 75–76). The Schuman Plan presented on 9 May 1950 placed the Franco‐German production of coal and steel under a common high authority to ‘make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’. 2 In other words, the narrative surrounding the ECSC was not only and not primarily about fostering economic integration but to cement peace between two historical enemies. This was to be achieved by a supranational framework, open to other European countries, which involved the substantial integration of core state powers in the area of security policy. The next step towards securing peace in Europe, consequently, was not a common market for goods but the European Defense Community (EDC) that would place ‘army, weapons, and basic production under a common sovereignty at the same time’ (Monnet, 1976, p. 401). France hoped to put the rearmament of West Germany under the control of the EDC, which would join the ECSC under the umbrella of a European political community. This provoked the counter‐mobilization of more nationalist French identities in the Assemblée Nationale emphasizing the loss of French sovereignty. Only when the ratification of the EDC failed in 1953 did integration efforts shift to the realm of ‘low politics’. Four years later, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Loth, 2015, pp. 36–74). In short, the beginnings of European integration were originally driven by attempts of interwar and postwar elites to integrate core state powers over external security. Their attempts were legitimized by their shared narratives of overcoming a common past of war and destruction (see also Hofmann and Mérand, 2020; Patel, 2018, pp. 88–90). This identity construction based on ‘othering’ Europe's own past has continued to shape the integration of core state powers for more than 60 years (for details see Risse, 2010, Chapter 3).

The Euro: Integrating Monetary Policy to Advance the Political Union Forty‐one years after the Treaty of Paris that had established the ECSC and 35 years after the Treaty of Rome, the EU took another giant step toward further integration when the 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and, thus, the single currency (see Risse et al., 1999; Risse, 2003 for the following; see also Kaelberer, 2004). Germany and France had been at the forefront of those promoting a single currency ever since the Single European Act had come into force. The UK, in contrast, remained on the sidelines and opted out of the EMU at the negotiations on the Maastricht treaty (McNamara, 1998; Moravcsik, 1998, Chapter 6; Verdun, 2000). How can we explain this difference in attitudes? In the following, we concentrate on Germany and the UK (for France see Risse et al., 1999). Neither economic nor geopolitical or security reasons can account for the variation in elite attitudes toward the single currency in the UK and Germany. The UK was as integrated economically with the continent during the late 1980s and early 1990s as other countries that joined the single currency. Moreover, it could have easily met the Maastricht convergence criteria, and its government shared a neoliberal economic ideology (details in Risse et al., 1999, 160; for the following paragraphs see Börzel and Risse, 2019; Risse et al., 1999, pp. 159–163). The British attitude toward the single currency remained the same over two decades. At the Maastricht summit the British government reserved the right to decide for itself whether the UK would join EMU in 1999. The Labour government under Tony Blair confirmed this position and decided that the UK would continue with the ‘wait and see’ attitude of its predecessor. While the few British proponents of the euro used interest‐based arguments to support their claims, conservative eurosceptics routinely invoked identity‐related statements to justify their opposition to the EMU arguing: ‘[A]bolish the pound and you abolish Britain’ (Redwood, 1997, p. 19). Their discourse closely resembles that of the Brexiteers two decades later. In the case of Germany, its government had agreed to the EMU early on and stubbornly supported the euro throughout the 1990s. The German government never wavered in its support for the single currency, even though most German economists objected to the euro on economic grounds (Risse et al., 1999, 150; for the following see ibid., pp. 163–169). Chancellor Kohl framed the single currency as the symbol of European integration and he identified his political fate deeply with the realization of the euro. He also labelled 1997 – the year of reference for the fulfillment of convergence criteria – as the key year of Europe, as being existentially necessary for further integration. He even argued that the success of the EMU was a matter of war and peace. 3 In essence, Chancellor Kohl framed the issue in the German political discourse by constructing a powerful equation linking support for the euro to German identity, based on a rejection of the German militarist and nationalist past. By mobilizing Europeanized identities, Kohl managed to overcome the considerable opposition to his policies – that existed in his own party, among most economic experts, and among the social democrats in the opposition. Part of the narrative of opposition was also framed in more nationalist identity terms, namely Deutsche Mark patriotism. However, Kohl's framing of the issue also served to silence political discourse on the EMU. It was no longer possible to argue about the pros and cons of a single currency and to weigh up policy alternatives in a neutral way. As a result, even those opposed to the EMU did not dare to address the German consensus on European integration, but framed their criticism in terms of asking for a delay or demanding the strict application of the convergence criteria. In this case then, the Europeanization of German identity largely shaped the definition of economic interests. In sum, discourse on the euro in major EU member states was framed to a large degree in terms of identity politics and political visions of a European order. Supporters of the project shared a common idea of European integration as a modernization project that would overcome the historical divisions of the continent (Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998). They used the single currency as a means to get closer to this political vision. The euro symbolized a collective European identity, while the Deutsche Mark was constructed as symbolic remnant of a nationalist past. There are good functional reasons for first instituting the single market and afterwards a single currency. However, the supranationalization of core state powers in the security realm and with regard to heavy industries (in the early 1950s, just 6 years after World War Two) and over monetary policies in the 1990s necessitated a sense of community among political elites that could enable them to supply the demand for integration by pooling and delegating authority at the EU level. Europeanized identity narratives constructing Europe's own past of nationalism and wars as the ‘other’ signaled their preparedness to overcome the considerable problems of collective action involved in supranational integration. At the same time, these discourses served to justify and legitimize European integration to their citizens. The British opposition to the euro confirms our point. The UK had as many good as bad economic reasons for joining the single currency. Yet, pro‐European British elites never used identity language to justify British membership of the EU, but reverted to economic (and political) interests in their public discourse. In contrast, British opposition to the EU, from the euro to Brexit, has always been framed in terms of an exclusive nationalist identity (Risse, 2010, pp. 81–86). We suggest that this, to a large degree, explains why the UK has always been on the sidelines of further transfers of core state powers to the EU level. However, how and to what extent have the various elite discourses resonated with public opinion and citizens over time? After all, identity politics is meant to create diffuse support and legitimacy for policy decisions, in this case the transfer of core state powers to the EU.

The Permissive Consensus and the Europeanization of Citizens' Identities European political leaders have been able to invoke identity discourses to legitimate moves towards an ever closer union because they resonated with mass public opinion. Up until the early 2010s European elites routinely used identity‐related arguments to silence major debates about European policies and European integration in general in the various national public spheres. As Milward has argued, European integration strengthened national executives by shielding policy‐making in Brussels from national public scrutiny (Milward, 1992). Yet the silencing mechanism worked only because of the permissive consensus in favour of European integration among the publics in most member states (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). The support of most EU citizens has hinged on their Europeanized national identities whereby ‘Europe’ was added as a secondary identification to citizens’ national identities. Over the past three decades a plurality of citizens in most member states have held Europeanized identities – except for the UK. Figure 1, based on Eurobarometer data, demonstrates that the main divide in mass public opinion is between those who include Europe into their national identity (inclusive or Europeanized nationalism) and those who exclusively hold national identities (exclusive nationalism; for a detailed discussion see Risse, 2010, Chapter 2). If we add those citizens who claim Europe as their first or even exclusive identity (very small minorities), those with some degree of European identity make up more than 60 per cent of the population on average across member states. The numbers have not fluctuated much over the past 25 years – and there is little reason to assume that the picture was any different prior to 1992 (for most recent data showing a similar picture, but with national variation see Krastev et al., 2019, p. 5). Figure 1 Open in figure viewer PowerPoint Europeanized Identities versus Exclusive Nationalism among EU Citizens (1992–2018). Source: Retrieved from European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart//themeKy/41/groupKy/206/savFile/112 , accessed June 1, 2019. [Colour figure can be viewed at , accessed June 1, 2019. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com Europeanized identities correlate strongly with other attitudes, among which are support for European integration (Citrin and Sides, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014; McLaren, 2006) and ‘solidarity among strangers’ (Habermas, 2006) in terms of the preparedness to support redistributive policies across the EU (see Kuhn et al., 2018 for details; see also contributions by de Vries; by Nicoli, Kuhn and Burgoon; and by Karstens, 2020). In contrast, exclusive national identities go together with opposition to European integration as well as hostile attitudes toward migrants and foreigners. We argue that the permissive consensus that has been widely reported in the literature, was at play up to about the mid‐2000s and that the Europeanized identity discourse of the political elites reported above tapped into this consensus and, thus, was able to generate successfully diffuse support for European integration among most citizens in most member states. This has dramatically changed since then.