Internal disputes and political rivalries within the Islamic State have recently led to a series of executions and armed struggles between commanders in the field, as well as attempts by volunteers from Iraq and Syria to desert or flee.

For example, The Financial Times reported over the weekend that the organization had executed 100 foreign volunteers who had tried to flee the city of Raqqa in Syria, a stronghold of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.

A few days ago, the group arrested five British citizens, three Frenchmen, two Germans and two Belgians who sought permission to return to their homelands. According to the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, some 30 to 50 British citizens have sent messages indicating their desire to return to the U.K..

This week, the organization released a video in which it reported the arrest of four of its Turkish-speaking fighters, who were allegedly plotting a coup in the organization because they felt it wasn’t radical enough. In the video, which ISIS spokesmen said was recorded without the four’s knowledge, they speak of taking up arms against the Islamic State and its killing leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi because he is “an infidel.”

Near Bokmal on the Iraqi-Syrian border, an Islamic State activist killed one of the group’s commanders in an argument over control of the crossing, while in Syria itself a serious dispute emerged between Chechen volunteers and the IS leadership over the refusal of the Chechen militia operating in the Latakia area to declare its loyalty to the organization.

Another dispute emerged on Wednesday between the Chechens serving the organization in the Raqqah area and the local IS commander over how to deal with the Jordanian pilot taken prisoner by ISIS. The Chechens wanted to execute him, but the organization’s leadership prefers to keep him alive as a bargaining chip.

Might such differences lead to the collapse of the organization from within? At this stage they are still local disputes rather than broad phenomena, but in the near future we may see some small groups breaking off from the Islamic State and establishing their own areas of control in cooperation with Syrian armed militias that are not part of the organization.

Meanwhile some of the Sunni tribes in Iraq have been intensifying their battles against ISIS forces, though without much success. Thus, for example, ISIS has retaken the city of Baiji from the Iraqi military after the latter retreated “to regroup and receive aid.” The Islamic State is reporting that it has broadened its control over military bases along the border between Iraq and Syria and is firming its control over the Anbar area in western Iraq, in which some 300 American soldiers are positioned, aided by combat helicopters.

The Islamic State, which has set up its own prisons in several cities it controls that are also used for the interrogation and incarceration of group members suspected of disloyalty, must overcome the differences between its own volunteer forces and units that are more reliant on local residents. Thus, for example, the Green Battalion of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, most of whose fighters are from Saudi Arabia, joined the ranks of the Islamic State in November. But most of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar comprises Chechens who are loyal to the Caliphate Army, based in Chechnya. Being part of ISIS does not neutralize the integral structure of the affiliated militias; their commanders remain in their positions and the units operate independently, although they get financial help from the umbrella organization.

This dispersal of the Islamic State’s units and the independent operation of each unit in a way that obviates the need for a high command to coordinate their activities calls into question the benefit of the coalition forces’ air strikes. The Islamic State does not have large military bases or camps that can be worthy targets, and to date, despite the numerous coalition attacks, the results haven’t been too impressive. Their clearest achievements up to now have been the destruction of a few oil fields and drilling installations in Syria, which significantly reduced the organization’s income from the sale of crude oil.

At the same time, international efforts to forge a diplomatic solution for Syria are moving at a snail’s pace. The most active player at the moment is Russia, which plans to hold a summit on Syria at the beginning of the year. On Wednesday it was reported that some 20 Syrian opposition groups and factions would meet in Cairo to formulate a joint position for the Russian summit. A date for these deliberations has yet to be set.

These factions are not part of the official Syrian opposition, which hasn’t yet decided whether to respond to the Russian initiative.