Night vision goggles. Missile guidance chips. Triggered spark gaps used to detonate nuclear weapons. Electronic sensors used in improvised explosive devices. Military-grade body armor. Digital radios employed by U.S. Special Forces. Tags, to let troops identify one another in the dark. That's just some of the sensitive military gear that investigators from the Government Accountability Office were able to openly purchase – and then "illegally expor[t] without detection."

During a 13-month investigation, the GAO used "a bogus front company and fictitious identities" to buy the gadgets "in demand by foreign governments and terrorist organizations" around the world, Office special investigations chief Gregory Kutz told a Congressional panel today.

Most of the purchases were made online, with seller relying on only the flimsiest of security checks to make sure the gear isn't shipped to hostile governments or groups.

Take the "infrared flags," currently in use by U.S. military forces to help identify friendly soldiers during nighttime operations. In normal light, they look like black squares. "However, with the use of U.S. military night-vision technology, the patches reveal a U.S. flag, and are the same IR flags used on U.S. military combat uniforms. An enemy fighter wearing these IR flags could potentially pass as a friendly service member during a night combat situation, putting U.S. troops at risk. "

The distributor's web site claims that the company always "checks for military identification" when selling the tags. "However, the seller failed to request identification from our undercover investigator.. In the end, our fictitious buyer was only required to provide a name, credit card, and domestic address for shipment to purchase these items. After purchasing and receiving the IR flags, we also obtained a price quote for an additional 400 IR flags." Hundreds of people could have presented themselves as American forces.

The deal for night vision goggles was even looser. Not only did the distributor ship the gear to a bogus company at a fake address, Kutz reported. "During our undercover purchase, the seller certified our bogus company to be a distributor of the item by signing a dealer/reseller agreement. This allowed us to circumvent the seller’s voluntary restrictions on only selling the items to military and law-enforcement agencies."

Shipping the goods overseas was just as easy, and just as sketchy. "Dummy" versions of the items were sent through the commercial mail in nondescript packages. "The boxes passed through U.S. customs controls without being inspected," despite the destination being "a known transshipment point for items being sent to terrorist organizations and other foreign governments," Kutz eplained.

When we discussed our covert shipments with State, Commerce, and various law-enforcement agencies responsible for monitoring packages, vehicles, and persons exiting the United States, they were not surprised by our success. Officials from several agencies stated that there is no practical way to ensure that otherwise unsuspicious people, vehicles, or packages leaving the United States that carry or contain export-controlled items can be identified and searched consistently.

*[Photo: GAO]

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