Many have promoted closer commercial relations with Beijing, joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank it spearheaded, and collaborating on trade, investment and major infrastructure projects. Some have expressed support for China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative and participated in the Xiangshan Forum, a security dialogue hosted by Beijing. And some — South Korea, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand — even sent representatives to the military parade in Beijing in September celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, despite the pointed absence of high-level officials from America and its key allies.

But smaller and mid-level states in Asia have also tried to reduce the risks of becoming dependent on China. Some, like Indonesia, have rejected or distanced themselves from several of Beijing’s initiatives, such as its proposal to conduct joint military drills with Asean countries in the South China Sea. Others, like Vietnam, have responded cautiously to China’s proposed maritime Silk Road.

States in the region have internationalized the South China Sea issue by bringing it to Asean-led multilateral forums. They have insisted on the need to conclude a code of conduct in those waters. They are developing military ties with as many powers as possible.

This is logical behavior. Hedging is less about countering either the United States or China per se than managing the systemic risks of dealing with any great or rising power. And it is all the more rational in Southeast Asia today because of concerns about the long-term sustainability of America’s commitment to the region, wariness over an ascendant China’s future intentions and uncertainty about the direction of U.S.-China relations.

Although the hedging of small and middle powers means keeping the greater powers at arm’s length, China and the United States should embrace and encourage the approach. This is partly because it helps maintain stability in the region by preventing the polarization of power. It also ensures Asean’s neutrality, and so its centrality, as an inclusive platform for discussing and managing the security and prosperity of the region. Compelling or inducing regional powers to take sides would only risk triggering vicious cycles of actions and counteractions, heightening tensions between the two major powers.

Washington may not quite be getting its way with states like Malaysia, but that’s for the better — for Malaysia and the region, as well as China and the United States itself.