Robert Beckhusen, “China’s ‘Carrier-Killer’ Was Born in the Balkans: The DF-21D is China’s Answer to America’s Carriers, With an Unusual Origin in the Kosovo War,” War is Boring, 9 September 2013.

… That’s the history according to a new book from Andrew Erickson, a specialist on the Chinese military at the U.S. Naval War College. The book has wonky title: Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications. But it’s the most comprehensive overview of a weapon — the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile — that poses perhaps the greatest threat to American aircraft carriers that’s not a nuclear bomb.

“The bottom line is that the era of ‘ASBM denial’ is over,” Erickson writes. “China’s ASBM is not science fiction. It is not a ‘smoke and mirrors’ bluff. The DF-21D is not an aspirational capability that the United States can afford to ignore until some point in the future.” …

According to Erickson, there were two events that pushed Beijing to build its missile.

In 1995, Chinese leaders became very worried when then-Taiwan Pres. Lee Teng-hui prepared to visit the United States. The U.S. granted Teng-hui a visa, which provoked Beijing to carry out a series of missile tests and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait.

The U.S. responded in kind by sending the Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups towards China…. According to Chinese military technical papers compiled by Erickson, the humiliation wrought by the carriers accelerated Beijing’s first steps towards an ASBM.

… Beijing “could not build a steel Great Wall at sea to keep the enemy outside the nation’s door, and could only serve as an auxiliary of the ground forces in defending a trifling twelve nautical mile territorial water line,” one Chinese arms control expert wrote. …

Then the U.S. bombed the Chinese embassy.

Accidentally…. During the 1999 Kosovo War against Serbia….

“[The forces of the] Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were always in the position of having to take a beating passively and completely lacked the power to fight back, [not only] because they lacked comprehensive and supporting weapons systems, but especially because they lacked ‘assassin’s mace’ weapons systems,” Zhang Wannian, a preeminent official in the Chinese Central Military Commission, said during a 1999 speech. …

“By this time, it was startlingly clear to China’s leaders that they had to acquire a means of preventing the kind of airpower and accompanying firepower available during the Kosovo air war from being directed into or near China,” Erickson writes. …



But still, Navy officials say they can deal with the Chinese missile. The range of potential countermeasures, Erickson notes, are mainly focused around all the other steps a missile has to take before it can hit its target. For China, the missile itself is the easy part: “Physics, however, allows for an ASBM; physics is the same for the Chinese as it is for everyone else. We are witnessing the results today as well as the ability of China’s once-moribund defense industry to integrate existing technologies in innovative ways,” he writes. …

“Amid ongoing uncertainty, this much is clear: with the DF-21D ABSM, China appears to be intent on fielding a system that directly threatens U.S. carriers. If not countered properly, this could weaken the U.S. military alliances and reassurances that have helped maintain peace in the Western Pacific for nearly seven decades in part by preventing costly and dangerous arms races. The game and its governing rules are changing, whether Washington likes it or not.”

FOR OTHER RECENT ANALYSIS, SEE:

Andrew S. Erickson, “How China Got There First: Beijing’s Unique Path to ASBM Development and Deployment,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13.12 (7 June 2013).

Andrew S. Erickson, “China Channels Billy Mitchell: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Alters Region’s Military Geography,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13.5 (4 March 2013).

FOR FURTHER DETAILS, SEE:

The 2011 ROC National Defense Report has confirmed that “a small quantity of” DF-21D ASBMs “were produced and deployed in 2010,” thereby (in the report’s view) “increasing the difficulty of military maneuvers in the region for the U.S. Army.”

Now a key question remains: what are the missile’s specific capabilities? Unfortunately, open sources do not yet offer conclusive information on this subject. In fact, a Chinese state media source has confused the situation with what appears to be mis-applied datapoint.

On 11 July 2011 PLA Chief of General Staff General Chen Bingde became the first Chinese government official to confirm publicly that China is developing the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). According to an English-language China Daily article, the missile has “a maximum range of 2,700 kilometers” (1,678 miles). Of note, General Chen did not in any way ascribe a range or other specific missile performance parameters at the press conference. Indeed, an official in his position would be unlikely to do so. This was the China Daily’s own (likely erroneous) inject. China Daily was probably citing the DF-21A’s range, whichSinoDefence and Wikipedia both list as 2,700 km. The reporters and editors at China Dailymost likely mistook the DF-21A range figure for that of the DF-21D.

Here is a translation of General Chen’s statement:

Q: “I’m with the Associated Press and I have a question for General Chen. …There’s been much speculation about the operational readiness of the Dong-Feng 21-D, the so-called “carrier-killer” missile…. Can you give us some up-to-date information about these programs….”

GEN. CHEN: “Thank you for – (inaudible) – your questions to me. As for DF 21-D, in our meeting, Admiral Mullen talked about it. As for this type of weapons system, it is still under research-and-development process. It is not equipped yet. Even though we – if – even though if, in the future, we are successful in research and development of this kind of weapons system, it will, and remain, be a system for defense. And I expect that Chinese scientists will make some contributions in this aspect.

However, for all kinds of high-tech weapons systems, as far as the research and development is concerned, that is not an easy thing to do, because it requires a huge amount of resources, timings, technologies and so on. …”

FURTHER DETAIL FROM MY EARLIER POST, NOW UPDATED TO REFLECT LIKELY CHINA DAILY RANGE CONFLATION

General Chen addressed the topic of Chinese ASBM development by telling Chinese reporters that it was one of the issues that he had discussed with Admiral Mullen. He took pains to emphasize, however, that China’s ASBM is “still in the research stage” (还处于研究阶段), and “has not yet achieved operational capability” (尚未形成作战能力). Specifically, “the DF-21D is undergoing research, development, and testing, has not developed into an operational capability [or developing into capability is not an issue at present]” (东风21D正在研究, 正在科研, 在试验之中, 还没有形成能力问题). Xinhua paraphrases General Chen as explaining that he “hopes Chinese experts can contribute in this regard, but this sort of high-technology advanced weapon is very difficult to bring to maturity” (希望中国的专家们能在这方面有所贡献, 但是这种高新技术的尖端武器很难成熟). It quotes him directly once again as stressing that doing so “requires funding inputs, advanced technology, and high-quality talented personnel; these are all fundamental factors constraining its development” (要经费投入, 要先进的技术, 还要有高素质的人才, 这都是制约它发展的根本因素). The English-language China Daily article renders this as “It is a high-tech weapon and we face many difficulties in getting funding, advanced technologies and high-quality personnel, which are all underlying reasons why it is hard to develop this.” Specific documentation for these and other quotations is provided in the articles appended below.

Additionally, in YouTube and other footage of the 11 July 2011 press briefing with his closest American counterpart, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which General Chen takes questions from reporters, it appears that he also uses the phrase “numerous difficulties” (困难重重) to describe the course of the missile’s development. This tone could be interpreted to reflect a high level of uncertainly and ambivalence about the missile’s immediate prospects, directed at a Chinese audience through Chinese media. Viewed in this light, the three factors General Chen outlines (funding, technology, talent) may be viewed as serious constraints, even bottlenecks, in the challenging task of successfully maturing and integrating an ASBM system of systems.According to Aviation Week’s Bradley Perrett, “Chen’s comments imply that any DF-21Ds that have been deployed are not regarded as properly developed.”

However, it is unclear why General Chen would choose a prominent venue to raise the issue of such a controversial and provocative a weapon as China’s ASBM only to say something that might undermine deterrence credibility—the equivalent of having ‘the onus without the bonus.’ As Perrett correctly points out, “The appearance of his statement in the China Daily is itself meaningful. The English-language newspaper’s special role is to act as a government mouthpiece directed at the outside world. Its reports on sensitive subjects often show signs of being carefully written to deliver a message for Beijing. The DF-21D is one such sensitive subject.”

As for the definition of “operational,” it seems likely that the U.S. and Chinese militaries have different definitions of what it means for a weapon to be operational, with the PLA’s definition in this case being more stringent, at least in certain respects. This would explain why Admiral Robert Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, stated in December 2010: “I would gauge it as about the equivalent of a U.S. system that has achieved [Initial Operational Capability] IOC.” Perhaps also whereas Admiral Willard was speaking of the U.S. concept of IOC, General Chen is alluding to a Chinese benchmark closer to the U.S. concept of Full Operational Capability (FOC)—a much higher standard to meet, and one that no U.S. official has claimed publicly that China’s ASBM has achieved. In any case, this apparent discrepancy highlights the pitfalls of using U.S.-specific terms to describe foreign systems and capabilities. But it is worth revisiting Admiral Willard’s own statement of December 2010, which is not necessarily so different from General Chen’s: “The anti-ship ballistic missile system in China has undergone extensive testing. An analogy using a Western term would be ‘initial operational capability,’ whereby it has—I think China would perceive that it has—an operational capability now, but they continue to develop it. It will continue to undergo testing, I would imagine, for several more years.” As in so many other areas, authorities on the respective sides of the Pacific may be talking past each other when in fact they are saying broadly similar things. It would be a mistake to let semantic issues obscure real Chinese progress with real strategic implications.

There may be other factors at play as well: General Chen may be downplaying Chinese capabilities to attempt to minimize foreign development of countermeasures to them. At the same time, the PLA may feel the need to meet a higher standard of testing before it can be confident of a novel weapon’s effectiveness because it lacks the U.S. military’s years of experience in high-intensity combat, sophisticated testing, and simulation. But it would be a mistake to assume that China’s DF-21D ASBM lacks what the U.S. military would consider to be lower-end “operational” capabilities just because it apparently does not yet meet General Chen’s definition. Here an American example may be relevant. The U.S. Air Force did not receive its first E-8 Joint STARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), an airborne battle management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform, until June 1996—meaning that the aircraft officially did not achieve IOC until then. However, two developmental aircraft were employed operationally as early as 1991 in Operation Desert Storm even though it was still in test and evaluation at the time.

Definitional issues aside, the bottom line is that General Chen would likely not be mentioning China’s ASBM in public if the PLA were not confident that it was maturing effectively and already had reached the necessary development level to begin to credibly shape regional strategic thinking in Beijing’s favor. China seeks not to wage war, but to have to have an effective conventional deterrent capability; and, in a worst case scenario, to have a strike capability if deterrence failed. This is why, General Chen is quoted as stressing in the English-language China Daily article, China’s ASBM “will be used as a defensive weapon when it is successfully developed, not an offensive one.” The goal is to push foreign aircraft carrier groups away from sensitive areas in the event of a crisis or conflict, and to influence the perceptions of people in Taiwan, Japan, and other parts of the region about the likelihood, and likely effectiveness, of U.S. intervention therein. From a Chinese perspective, this appears inherently defensive; from the perspective of the U.S. and other regional actors, it may not appear “defensive” at all. Herein lies a substantial challenge for Sino-American strategic relations even as the two great powers move to explore possibilities for mutually beneficial security cooperation in the future.

This will bear close study as further data points become available. Stay tuned!

“Press Availability with General Chen Bingde,” Transcript of Remarks by Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Chen Bingde, Beijing, China, 11 July 2011.

For the latest official analysis on the status of Chinese ASBMs, see “English-Language Version of 2011 ROC National Defense Report Confirms: ‘a small quantity of’ DF-21D ASBMs ‘were produced and deployed in 2010, increasing the difficulty of military maneuvers in the region for the U.S. Army.’”

For a link to, and a rough translation of, the Chinese-language edition of this report, see “Taiwan 2011 National Defense Report: DF-21D ASBMs ‘have been produced and deployed in small numbers in 2010’.”

Comments on China’s ASBM by a Pentagon spokeswoman are available in “Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg: ‘China Has “Workable” Anti-Ship Missile Design, Pentagon Says’.”

For recent analysis and sources on Chinese ASBM development, see “China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches Equivalent of ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC)—Where It’s Going and What it Means.”

Detailed analysis by top subject matter experts of Chinese ASBM development and strategic implications is offered in five dedicated chapters in Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, eds., Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011).

For an explanation of Chinese ASBM development and its larger implications, see the China Maritime Studies Institute Lecture of Opportunity, “Chinese Sources Discuss the ASBM Threat to the U.S. Navy,” that I presented at the Naval War College on 21 March 2011.

For detailed analysis of Admiral Willard’s statement regarding China’s ASBM reaching IOC, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “China Deploys World’s First Long-Range, Land-Based ‘Carrier Killer’: DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC),” China SignPost™ (洞察中国), No. 14 (26 December 2010).

For further background on Chinese ASBM development, see also “China Testing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM); U.S. Preparing Accordingly–Updated With Latest Analysis & Sources.”

OTHER RELEVANT ARTICLES:

Alexa Olesen, “China Says U.S. Spends Too Much on Military,” Navy Times, 11 July 2011.

… During their talks earlier Monday, Chen said he and Mullen also discussed China’s development of a new missile system, the Dong Fang 21D. Analysts have said the “carrier killer” missile might threaten U.S. warships and alter the regional balance of power.

Chen told reporters the DF 21D system was “not operational yet,” and was intended for defenses purposes only. …

陈炳德：东风２１Ｄ导弹还在研究中

新华社北京７月１１日电（记者梁淋淋）中国人民解放军总参谋长陈炳德１１日表示，中国的东风２１Ｄ导弹还处于研究阶段，尚未形成作战能力。

陈炳德是在和来访的美军参联会主席马伦会谈后共见记者时作上述表述的。

“东风２１D正在研究，正在科研，在试验之中，还没有形成能力问题。”陈炳德说，“就算它今后能用，成武器了，也是防御性的，不是进攻性的。”

陈炳德说，希望中国的专家们能在这方面有所贡献，但是这种高新技术的尖端武器很难成熟。“要经费投入，要先进的技术，还要有高素质的人才，这都是制约它发展的根本因素。”