Executive Time Diplomacy President Trump speaking to the media before boarding Air Force One Tom Brenner/The New York Times For two years, ever since the Republican presidential primary, the world has searched for a clear throughline in how Donald J. Trump thinks about foreign policy. He was said to be guided by the ruthless transactionalism of a real estate mogul. Or the closed-borders isolationism of 19th-century nativists. Or maybe he was an arch-nationalist, seeing a world of civilizational conflict, much like the campaign adviser Stephen K. Bannon, who often claimed to speak for him. Maybe he was temperamentally inclined to form partnerships with with authoritarians. Or ideologically driven to tear down the postwar liberal order. Some called him a cold-blooded realist, others a crusading militarist, sometimes in the same week. Like everyone else engaged in the global game of deciphering Mr. Trump, we scoffed at some theories and embraced others. But it turns out we were all wrong. Events of the past two weeks, if not the past two years, should now make clear that there is no guiding foreign policy ideology. There is no unified Trump Doctrine. What there is is Executive Time diplomacy, and that came through in his recent letter — which he dictated personally — to Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader. (For anyone unfamiliar, “executive time” has been used to describe the early mornings in which Mr. Trump retreats from official duties to watch TV, usually Fox News, and post to Twitter.) The letter reads like one of Mr. Trump’s tweets: bombastic, threatening and discursive. “You talk about your nuclear capabilities, but ours are so massive and powerful that I pray to God they will never have to be used.” But the similarity to his tweets is about more than the language. It is becoming increasingly clear that Mr. Trump’s larger foreign policy resembles his Twitter usage in its motivations and habits. Mr. Trump’s deep personalization of American foreign policy comes through in his odd sign-off, in which he tells Mr. Kim, “please do not hesitate to call me or write.” Typically, important state-to-state business is conducted between official agencies, not as personal calls between leaders. This is more than a matter of breaking with custom or standard bureaucratic practice. Mr. Trump seems to treat American policy as a function of his personal relationships and desires, rather than something conducted on behalf of a superpower with 325 million citizens and complex global interests. His letter to Mr. Kim emphasizes his desire for a relationship of mutual personal respect between the leaders, which he accuses Mr. Kim of violating, but has little to say about the interests of their two nations. As another example, American trade policy with Europe appears to be determined to a significant extent by Mr. Trump’s feelings toward individual European leaders, and whether he feels that they have shown him sufficient respect. American policies toward other powers, like China or Russia, appear to be driven by Mr. Trump’s emotional needs of the moment, such as whether he desires an outlet for expressing anger. Like Twitter, American foreign policy appears to have become a tool of emotional self-reinforcement for Mr. Trump. Punitive policies often emerge when the president is said to be having a difficult week, and they are frequently issued without consultation from government agencies, suggesting they are snap decisions made outside of the normal policymaking channels. This has been the story of the North Korea summit since its conception. When it was first announced, Mr. Trump seemed focused on the validation that came from conservative media outlets and from South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-in, who had made the meeting a top priority. Mr. Trump seemed especially pleased when Mr. Moon suggested that he should be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. When discussing the summit, Mr. Trump tended to focus on the personal triumphs it might bring: the glorious victory of North Korea surrendering its nuclear weapons, personal respect from Mr. Kim and Mr. Moon, and global validation in the form of a Nobel prize. But the flip side of Mr. Trump’s desire for validation, close observers of his presidency often say, is his tendency to lash out when aggrieved — something that may ring true to anyone who follows his Twitter feed. Putting down or threatening others often appears to be a way for Mr. Trump to reassure himself that he is strong. His decision to exit the Iran nuclear agreement, for instance, came with little or no long-term strategy, but was instead explained as demonstrating Mr. Trump’s strength and toughness, particularly relative to that of his predecessor, Barack Obama. Those impulses may have helped to kill the North Korea summit. Mr. Trump echoed a comment by some of his advisers that they would pursue “the Libya model” in disarming North Korea. But, like a Twitter user composing a quick post between meetings, he seemed to be operating on a combination of misunderstanding and impulse. Mr. Trump mentioned the Libya model last week, saying in reference to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader: “If you look at that model with Qaddafi, that was a total decimation. We went in to beat him. Now that model would take place if we don't make a deal, most likely.” The “Libya model” typically refers to Libya’s decision in 2003 to surrender its bare-bones nuclear enrichment program, which had not yet produced a working bomb. But Mr. Trump seems to have confused it with the NATO-led military intervention in 2011 to topple Mr. Qaddafi. Mr. Trump’s penchant for talking tough while misstating key details — as if the tough talk were the point, and the ramifications secondary — had led him to suddenly shift American policy from asking North Korea to disarm to threatening Mr. Kim with death if he did not comply. That threat, based on North Korea’s statements, seems to have prompted the week of North Korean bellicosity that culminated with Mr. Trump canceling the summit. These impulses seem to explain Mr. Trump’s foreign policy much better than any doctrine. His decision to leave the Iran nuclear deal has almost nothing in common, in terms of policy or ideology, with his eager embrace of North Korea. Conservative cable news pundits had promised that leaving the Iran deal would demonstrate Mr. Trump’s strength, forcing disrespectful Iranian leaders into submission. This has hardly come to pass. But the televisions in Mr. Trump’s office and residence have reassured him that he proved himself brave and powerful. (Mr. Trump’s connection to cable news is so strong that new advisers are increasingly likely to be TV personalities.) The real world responded coolly to Mr. Trump’s decision, with global leaders saying it would reduce American influence and embolden Iranian intransigence, the opposite of Mr. Trump’s desired outcomes. But within the closed-loop confines of Executive Time, Mr. Trump received validation and praise. It’s too early to say how Mr. Trump’s Executive Time diplomacy will work out with North Korea. But so far, North Korean leaders are portraying themselves as the responsible actors, urging Mr. Trump to attend the summit and promising to resolve any differences, and the United States is depicted as the intransigent party. While few experts would agree that North Korea can be counted on to responsibly pursue peace, voters in South Korea, who disapprove of Mr. Trump in high numbers, might be more sympathetic to this message. Mr. Trump’s decision also appeared to surprise leaders in South Korea and China, which would both be key players in any negotiation or agreement, giving those leaders less reason to put their faith in Mr. Trump in any future round of talks. They may reach the same conclusions as European leaders who, after a year of dealing with Mr. Trump, found his impulses beyond their control. It’s a lesson even Mr. Trump’s own advisers continue to learn the hard way. Efforts to wrest away his smartphone or to dial back his television-viewing hours have failed. They thought of those outlets as distractions from Mr. Trump’s responsibilities as president. But, to Mr. Trump, tweeting and governing may not be separate activities at all