3 Developments in northern Syria

28.The Syrian government has long viewed Kurdish identity as a threat, suppressing the group’s political and cultural rights and denying citizenship to many of them until 2011. The Syrian Kurds are characterised by many groups and factions. But the Democratic Union Party (PYD), along with its predominantly-Kurdish armed affiliate the People’s Protection Units (YPG), is now the most influential group on the ground in much of northern and eastern Syria. It is not the sole Syrian Kurdish group or the oldest, and it has a prominent political opponent in the Kurdistan National Council (KNC). But, following its foundation in 2003, the PYD significantly expanded its areas of military and political operation as the YPG took territory from Daesh between 2014 and 2018. After 2015 it did so while operating as part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition that includes non-Kurdish elements and that received military support from the Global Coalition against Daesh (including the UK). The FCO told us that the expansion of the PYD/YPG risked triggering new conflicts in the region, and that expansion is therefore the focus of this chapter.

29.The FCO acknowledges the role of the PYD/YPG in the fight against Daesh. It has said that “the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) have made an important contribution to counter-Daesh efforts”. But the FCO was also clear that there were limits to the military support that the UK has provided. Unlike in Iraq, the FCO emphasised that “the UK has not provided weapons to any actors in the Syrian conflict” [emphasis in original]. The military support that the UK had provided, the FCO said, was indirect and came in the form of “air strikes to support the campaign to liberate Raqqa and other areas of Syria”. The United States, by contrast, has provided weapons and direct military support to the SDF, including the YPG. The Foreign Secretary wrote, in response to a written question, that “the decision to provide arms is a matter for the US government”.

30.The PYD told us that it does not seek independence from Syria. But it has declared a self-governed region in northern Syria, which it refers to as ‘Rojava’ or ‘the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria’. The PYD has worked to establish governing structures in this region, which the group’s written submission strongly argues are in line with the UK’s values. It said that its model was based on local elections, and represented “the true expression of democracy”. The PYD also emphasised its commitment to gender equality and civil liberties, as well as arguing that “we have kept the door of dialogue and alliances open to all Syrian parties” while fighting Daesh on the ground. This region, we were told, also hosted large numbers of internally-displaced people. But the Syrian government rejects the declaration of this self-governing region, and has threatened to re-establish its own control by force. Because this region was declared unilaterally, the FCO said that the UK would not recognise it.

31.A further consideration for UK policy is that Turkey sees the PYD/YPG as an integrated extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Like Turkey, the UK considers the PKK to be a terrorist organisation. Unlike Turkey, the UK does not apply that designation to the PYD/YPG, and it draws a distinction between that group and the PKK. The UK has diplomatic contact with the PYD (which the FCO described as “occasional” and “very infrequent” ), but the FCO said that it does not have “any contact” with the PKK. Despite the PYD’s denials, Turkey also accuses the PYD/YPG of committing a range of human rights abuses. Other parts of our evidence also referred to such allegations. The FCO said that it expressed “concern over reports of human rights abuses” to the PYD. But when asked whether the PYD had been intolerant of political opposition, the Middle East Minister the Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP replied “I don’t know the answer to that question”.

32.The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey described the military support given to the PYD/YPG against Daesh as a “reckless course of action [that] poses a direct threat to the Turkish people and Turkish security”, saying that

[The] PKK and PYD share the same leadership cadres organizational and military structure, modus operandi, strategies and tactics. They both use the same propaganda tools and financial resources and conduct trainings in the same camps. The perpetrators of PKK terrorist attacks in Ankara of 17 February 2016 and of 13 March 2016; in Bursa of 27 April 2016; in Adana of 24 November 2016 and in İstanbul of 10 December 2016 were trained in YPG camps in Syria.

In January 2018, and citing these security concerns, Turkish and Turkish-backed forces began a military operation to remove the YPG from the northern Syrian region of Afrin. Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said that his country next intended to remove the group from Manbij in northern Syria.

33.A year earlier, in January 2017, when the FCO had been asked directly about the risk of fighting between Turkey and the YPG, it had appeared reluctant to comment. The two sides, it said, were both fighting Daesh. But in November 2017 the FCO told us that Turkey aimed to prevent further expansion by the YPG, and that there was a risk of “military clashes”. When the Afrin operation began, the Foreign Secretary Mr Johnson wrote on Twitter that “Turkey is right to want to keep its borders secure”. But Bill Park, from KCL, cautioned that “it is far from clear that Turkish forces could militarily defeat [the YPG]”, and Guney Yildiz, a Visiting Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), warned that

it is inevitable that the campaign will drag out into a prolonged conflict and may spread to other Kurdish areas across Northern Syria. This will not only help ISIS—who have been held at bay by Kurdish forces—to regain a foothold in the region, from which to potentially launch attacks on Europe. It will also re-ignite conflict within Turkey between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the state […]. Mr Johnson’s support for the Turkish intervention is thus remarkable for its short-sightedness.

34.It appeared from our evidence that military support provided to the SDF, by the Global Coalition including the UK, is likely to have benefitted the YPG. Although the FCO emphasised that the UK had not provided weapons to any group in Syria, it said that the UK has provided “military support” within Syria in the form of airstrikes. The FCO told us that “the UK does not provide any direct assistance to the YPG or PYD, but as part of the Global Coalition, has provided military support to the SDF”: the ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’, a coalition of which the YPG is a part. While the FCO said that “we don’t regard the SDF as a YPG force”, it also said that the YPG was “a dominant force” in the SDF with a “significant presence” and “significant leadership role”. When asked directly whether UK airstrikes had benefitted the YPG on the ground in their fight inside Syria, the Minister for the Middle East replied that “if it is a fight against Daesh forces, then that is important, and important for the United Kingdom to support”.

35.The UK has not designated the PYD or the YPG as a terrorist organisation. The Foreign Secretary, Mr Johnson, told the Committee that “we don’t share the perspective of the Turkish Government on this matter, though we are certainly aware of Turkish sensitivities”. When asked why the UK had designated the PKK as a terrorist organisation but not the PYD/YPG, the Middle East Minister Mr Burt replied: “because we believe they are separate organisations”. But our witnesses overwhelmingly argued that the PYD/YPG and PKK were linked. Some argued that these links were more abstract and historical (based on a common heritage and ideology, as well as a shared esteem for Abdullah Öcalan as a figurehead), while others described a deeper current relationship (involving common organisational structures and the exchange of weapons, fighters, finance, or other support).

36.The FCO’s own view on the existence of links between the PYD/YPG and the PKK nevertheless appeared to be incoherent. Its statements routinely refer to “reported links”, and Amy Clemitshaw—the Head of the Eastern Mediterranean Department at the FCO—told us that “in terms of the existence of those links, it is not right for us to comment”. But, moments later in the same session, the Middle East Minister told us that “when we talk to the PYD-YPG in relation to this, we say that they should sever links with the PKK. The practicalities are that they are probably not doing that, so those links are there”. Mr Burt later said of the groups that “they have clearly got links. It is a messy situation on the ground”.

37.The FCO was also ambiguous in its assessment of whether the PYD/YPG could be involved in the Geneva peace talks. The FCO emphasised the UK’s support for these talks and said that “all Syrians” should be involved. The Middle East Minister Mr Burt said that the process “does include Kurdish representatives […] through the Kurdish National Council’s participation”. But our evidence, including from the FCO, was clear that the Kurdistan National Council (KNC) consisted of political opponents of the PYD. The PYD itself told us that it had been excluded from the Geneva. It blamed Turkey for that exclusion. Mr Burt called the PYD “the main Kurdish actor on the ground”, and we asked him whether it should therefore be included in the Geneva process. Mr Burt replied that “there will not be a settlement in the region unless all voices are heard”, but that inclusion within the Geneva process was “a matter for [the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria] Staffan de Mistura to decide upon”.

38.Although the UK says that it has not provided any weapons to any Syrian group, it has carried out airstrikes to support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF consists of other units in addition to the YPG, but our evidence shows—and the FCO appeared to agree—that the YPG is the preeminent component in the coalition. Given how integral the YPG is to the SDF, UK military support to the SDF is likely to have assisted the YPG. The FCO should:

i)provide an assessment of whether the YPG has benefitted militarily from UK airstrikes.

ii)explain its future policy towards the YPG and SDF in all areas under their control, including whether the UK will continue to provide military or other support to the SDF after the defeat of Daesh.

iii)explain its position towards Turkish military intervention in northern Afrin, and other areas of northern Syria.

39.The Turkish government considers the PYD/YPG to be an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and therefore considers it to be a terrorist organisation. The UK defines the PKK as a terrorist organisation, but does not define the PYD/YPG as such. The PKK and the PYD/YPG operate in different contexts, but the evidence to our inquiry clearly argued that they were linked. There is nevertheless debate about whether those links are abstract and historical, or deep and current.

40.The FCO’s view about the nature and extent of the links between the PYD/YPG and the PKK, or about whether those links exist at all, is not coherent. Its repeated reference to these links being ‘reported’ is not sufficient or credible. To have a clear policy the FCO should have a clear view. In light of the group’s influence in Syria, the FCO should clarify its own position on the relationship between the PYD/YPG and the PKK. The FCO should:

i)specifically answer whether it sees no links between the PYD/YPG and the PKK, OR it sees abstract and historical links (such as a common heritage or ideology or inspiration), OR it sees deep and current links (such as shared organisation, or the exchange of weapons, personnel, finances, training, or safe-havens).

ii)answer whether it sees a risk of the PYD/YPG providing support to the PKK in the future.

iii)explain, having refused to speculate a year ago about the risk of clashes between the YPG and Turkey, what prior assessments it made of the impact that the provision of military support to the SDF by the Global Coalition would have on the security of, and relations with, the UK’s NATO ally Turkey. It should provide an assessment of how the operation in Afrin will impact on these issues, as well as on the possibility of Daesh’s re-emergence in the region.

41.There is a high risk that the expansion of the PYD/YPG will result in new conflict in the region. Turkey has already moved militarily against the group. The Syrian government has threatened to do so. But the PYD/YPG has not been included in any way in the Geneva negotiations, which the UK supports as the sole way of resolving the Syrian civil war and determining the future of that country. Their absence is notable, given the extent of the PYD/YPG’s territorial and military influence in northern and eastern Syria, its apparent degree of popular legitimacy, and its claim to support democratic values. The FCO should clarify:

i)whether, given that the decision of who to invite to Geneva is ultimately that of the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura, the FCO sees merit in recommending, either unilaterally or with its allies in the international community, to Mr de Mistura the inclusion of the PYD/YPG in order to avert future fighting and to ensure improved representation at the talks for the population of northern Syria.

ii)whether Turkey is blocking the diplomatic inclusion of the PYD/YPG.

iii)what level of engagement it has had, or plans to have, with the de-facto local administration in northern Syria.