In early February, a disaffected soldier killed his commanding officer and went on a shooting rampage in Korat that left 30 people dead and 58 more injured.

It was the worst mass shooting event in Thailand’s history.

In the aftermath, local media reported that the soldier had an argument with his commanding officer over a botched land deal before going on his deadly rampage.

Like any good media outlet, we assigned journalists to cover various aspects of the shooting including the land deal in question.

The following is a short history of our failed investigation into the army and the way that their welfare is managed.

The story

Normally the story begins here, with a personal anecdote. Maybe it would highlight another soldier who had been cheated out of his welfare scheme.

Stories like the shooter’s are not uncommon.

An investigation by Thai PBS and other local media have highlighted other cases where infantrymen have been cheated out of their earnings by their commanding officer.

What we didn’t know going into this story is how widespread the practice was.

Out of 12 low-ranking or mid-grade officers contacted by Thai Enquirer, all 12 said that they have heard similar stories to the one experienced by the Korat shooter.

11 out of the 12 refused to be quoted, interviewed or used as an anonymous source.

The one soldier that did talk to Thai Enquirer asked to do so anonymously, afraid that he would be punished by those in command.

What he told us, which has since been corroborated by higher-ranking army personnel, is that the army’s welfare scheme has been problematic.

Ostensibly, the welfare scheme is designed to provide loans for career army personnel. These loans were meant to be used for housing or familial support.

In reality, the low-interest loans are abused by soldiers and COs looking for quick, easy, cash.

In the case of the Korat shooter, the commanding officer had acquired cheap land and built low-cost housing for a certain amount. He would encourage his subordinates to ask for loans from the welfare scheme up to three times the amount of the cost of the house.

Once the house was paid for, the remaining money would be split between the CO and the soldiers.

In the case of the Korat shooter, the CO refused to split the money evenly.

It is not uncommon practice according to our source. What’s even more egregious is that as both parties have committed fraud, there is little recourse for the soldier and no channel for any kind of complaint.

The problem did not go unnoticed by army command. Army Chief Apirat Kongsompong said that he would be introducing reforms to the welfare scheme after the shooting happened and the news got out about the circumstances precipitating the event.

The army would go on to sign a deal with the Ministry of Finance which would let the ministry manage the army’s welfare scheme as well as its commercial assets.

The list of assets was extensive and includes over 1 million rai of land, petrol stations, hotels, resorts, horse racing tracks, commercial shops, and even golf courses, all of which were managed by army officers operating under the welfare scheme.

Once again, calls to the armed forces about this extensive list of assets were either unanswered or rebuked.

Dual track culture

The problem with our investigation into these welfare schemes was not only the stonewalling of our inquiries but the culture of fear which pervades the military.

Those that said they were unwilling to talk said that the matter was “too sensitive” or that it was inconvenient for them to do so.

What is more likely is that common footsoldiers feel resigned to their fate, in a military culture where complaints are looked upon as betrayals and reprisals from senior officers are arbitrary and unchecked.

“There are two tracks in the military, those that went to cadet school and those that entered the armed forces as adults,” said one senior general who asked to not be named.

“If you go to cadet school, you’re considered a management-officer and you have the opportunity to promotion at the highest level,” he said. “If you’re on the other track, you’re basically a civil servant with a gun.”

This dual-track system, unfortunately, creates a culture where cadet-tracked officers feel superior to their subordinates. In an organization where orders must be obeyed without question, officers sometimes treat their commands like personal fiefdoms.

“A good officer treats his men like brothers because in combat that bond must be strong,” said the general we interviewed. “However, as in society, not everyone is 100 per cent good. There will be officers that abuse their power like in the Korat case.”