The curious case of the newcoming engines of the North Korean ICBMs





We will now research the different theories behind the engines that power the new North Korean ICBM.

According to the most prominent non governmental research group on North Korea, it is awfully similar to an engine that was used to power USSR missiles, and not just any of them but it's in the same family of missiles as the one under the nato class Satan, considered the apex of nuclear missiles. That said, a US intelligence official denied that they were in possession of the engines themselves, but, rather knew how to fabricate them. This also ties in with suspicions on a Ukraine plant that made those missiles, and unsuccessful industrial espionage by North Korea to get the technology. It is a complicated situation, with numerous factors, but it can be set in a few possibilities:

- North Korea developped their engines alone

- North Korea developped their engines on the basis of the russian model

- North Korea didn't develop the engines but rather directly installed the russian model.

We will dive into each possibility with more depth, with an accent on what is most likely, but also exploring less known hypothesis, and why they matter.





First, the capabilities of North Korean engineering. They managed to have quite a few generations of missiles, and some experts weren't surprised to find out that North Korea did develop an ICBM, there are precedents for a country, even moderately sized, quickly developing ICBMs. The leap to get from what they were at to an ICBM might seem gigantic from the outside, but it's merely an increase of the range of the preceding missile by less than a factor of two, which they have been doing for each new missile generation, with the range increasing slightly between each missile of the same generation.

They also had plenty of times to develop their engines, as well as a vast budget and unlimited resources. Because the country is militaristic, and, since the 90s, the primary aim of their army is to get a working ICBM, an incredible amount of North Korea's resources, manpower and innovation went towards that goal. Given that other countries were able, with the same kind of power, to get it in a similar amount of time (1970 India), it doesn't seem far fetched.

They also are rumoured to have work on Pakistan Nuclear program, and with Iran, they might have an expertise, especially from working with different researchers, with different ideas, that is beyond what the West currently assesses.

North Korea is also already heavily industrialised, and has invested on its economy with a focus on it. They have the necessary infrastructures to be able to design and manufacture such an engine, especially since it is basically the sole area were they are developing advanced technology, not building any new planes, nor any advanced submarines, and neglecting the service aspect of their economy. Furthermore, they still have a generation of scientists who were educated in Moscow, and therefore have some knowledge of Soviet engineering, and can work in the same way. It might be how they ended up with an engine with a design so close to the Soviet one, by going through the problem the same way.

However, if it is true that North Korea developped their missile technology alone, it would spell good news, with the bad one of a working ICBM. As a matter of fact, hydrogen bombs, and even more miniaturised ones, are incredibly difficult to manufacture, so much so that neither Pakistan, nor India, were able to do so (despite India boasts). It means that, whilst some destruction might be warranted through North Korean arsenal being used, it is nowhere near the maximum amount of possible damage, and the radiations would be negligible, this makes the current NK missiles non life-threatening to the US, though they could still kill upwards of a 100000 people on mainland. This explanation is possible, but still many people consider this unsatisfactory, which is why we will analyse what possible aid they could have gotten.





North Korea is a product of the cold war, and was, a long time, an ally of two nuclear power, and neighbours, Russia and China. The fact that the engine of its ICBM shows many similarities with one produced by one of them seems a bit more than just a coincidence, even with the same mentality among the scientists who made each engine. To go through the possibilities here will be quite long, from talking about the "axis of evil" to the cold war, so we will go through them chronologically.

It could first be a gift from a forgotten past. The USSR and China didn't just protect North Korea, they also implicated themselves in its development, transferring technology. A few things might have then happened. First they might have given North Korea plans, or sent scientists with the know how. This hypothesis is reinforced by the Russian plans showed in North Korea propaganda videos about the nuclear and missile programs. That said, they took a long time to utilize this knowledge. This points towards other directions, if you consider the same time frame, because it would mean partial knowledge and techniques have been transferred. It could just be because the Russians or Chinese didn't want a too powerful and independent North Korea, and have it still mostly relies on their nuclear arsenal. Nonetheless, North Korea was known to be particularly faithful to the USSR and China, and would have still relied on them for a conventional war, and could have just used the technology for a space rocket program. This makes it more likely that if there was a partial exchange of know how, it was either because it wasn't a willing exchange, or because it was too onerous for the North Korean to buy it whole. What this means, is that it is possible that either North Korea bought some of the technology at the end of the USSR, when it was short on money and willing to do anything to stay afloat, or that it got a hold of it thanks to spies, who under cover of going to learn the latests scientific techniques, secretly stole some knowledge about ballistic missiles. This would then show that the spies who operated in Ukraine were only either the legacy of the North Korean spy cells within the USSR, or old spies who transitioned from spying the USSR to spying in Ukraine. In that era, it is unlikely that North Korea would have turned to any other nation than China and Russia, so it limits options, later though, things went quite differently.

In the late 90s, and early 2000s, Russia and China were allies with the US, during its reign as an hyperpower. This leaves few people to help North Korea, especially with the necessary technology. It could still be Russia, though not through state actions, as it would have impeded the relations with the US, rather it would have been criminal groups or semi officials (oligarchs) who wanted to get rich quickly and take advantage of the privatisation, when things weren't always accounted for, even crucial and sensitive technology and materials. It could also have been Pakistan, as a kick back for their work on its nuclear program, though it would mean that the fact that it is close to a Russian missile is likely fabricated outrage, meant to damage Russia cheaply and protect an ally. It could have been stolen from another power (Lybia, Syria, Iran, Iraq) and then given as payment. It could also have been stolen by the North Korean themselves, as was possible above. Although it would have been less likely than before, because North Korea wasn't a brother state anymore, it would have been easier to bribe an official into having a look at the designs, especially in what were peripheral states of the USSR like Ukraine. Finally it could have been criminals who obtained it from other countries than the former USSR, but that would again put the Russia narrative as a way to either protect an ally, or damage an enemy. This new found enemy that is Russia is exactly the focus on the next period, which is contemporaneous to the North Korean crisis.

Now, things are different again, Russia is not a friend anymore, Ukraine keeps getting poorer, and even China is drifting towards its own playground, Asia, and tones down its de facto alliance with the US, especially as things flare up in the South China Sea. Iran is also building up missile capabilities. Current possible source could therefore have been, criminals, the Russian government, Russian officials (intelligence agencies) either on their or with the help of the government, Chinese military to keep the US from acting against Pyongyang with its army and keeping US allies threatened to have a two front war in case the situation degenerates in the Chinese Sea, a conjoint development between North Korean and Iranians, and the final possibility is the one currently privileged, a poor factory that sells its real know how, maybe even uses it to design a North Korean command.

This gives plenty of hypothesis towards what boosted North Korean ICBMs, but maybe they weren't even as advanced as we thought and couldn't mass or reverse engineer the engines, and had to import them from somewhere else, limiting the number of ICBM warheads.





It might be engines where the North Koreans had no input at all. North Korea is known to be good at smuggling, being wildly reported to smuggle weapons to many countries, and being a major producer of meth. It is an option that they used their expertise in this field to get foreign engines, most likely Russian, to their country and then in their ICBMs. Notwithstanding the fact that it is hard to fit a random engine on a missile, and that the technology to do so likely mean they can mass produce, even a non national engine, after some reverse engineering, it limits the number of entities that could have been involved and where it would have been taken from. If it was Ukrainian, it would have at least the support of the regional government to get the engines (big, heavy, and numerous) into a North Korean ship. It's notably weird that the US military didn't monitor such an unloading in North Korea though possible (by night, when foggy, no nearby spying device). It is unthinkable that any smaller nuclear nation, like Pakistan, or rocket nations like Iran, would have sold such precious things, that they are still using for testing and that powers a limited arsenal, it would be too expensive for a very small pay back, even if paid cash in addition to the foreign policy boost (a frightened US). This leaves us with only two real contenders, if the engines were directly shipped to North Korea, Russia and China. Russia has a stockpile of old missiles, and could have shipped their spare parts. In addition it would likely have transited by land, making it harder to detect. Similarly, China could have given old Chinese engines, and be untraceable by using the border to deliver them, it could have also directly been where the North Korean outsource their engine factory, whether Chinese or Korean controlled, it may have benefited from Chinese industrial intelligence and used hacked Russian designs. It remains unlikely, but it shouldn't be excluded, as the razor of Occam doesn't work when there is no simple solution and so much variables unknown, despite the impracticability of shipping engines, if the North Korean are at a certain development stage they won't have any other choice. Maybe they have hit a critical problem that doesn't allow them to make long range missiles, or they have outsourced their engines production for years to China or Russia.



To conclude, nothing is sure about the source of the engines. It is safe to say that their engines work, but who designed and built it is not a sure bet. They could reasonably be expected to be able to build one, given their soviet connections and teaching, but the timing of when they cracked it and the apparent closeness with an existing engine are suspicious. They could also have received help, but the list is long and might be from a defunct nation. This is the most likely scenario, but whether it was made by a company, a state actor or a criminal gang, or even spying, is not decipherable with the current knowledge. To this add the fact that we might be fooled by the ones (US intelligence) giving the information because its in their, or their allies, interests, and they might want to shelter them. We might also interpret a coincidence that is just a coincidence, there are definitely ways for this hypothesis to reveal itself false, or, at least, heavily misconstrued. Lastly, the engines could have been directly imported from somewhere else. Whilst the least likely scenario, it's still interesting to think about, especially because it almost guarantees a state actor, and that would likely put North Korea in actual higher strength than what we see now, as it means quasi official backing from either Russia or China.

In the end, in site of the actual facts remaining mysterious, this analyse shows several things that might lie in North Korean infamous secret state of affair, and that this engine might either a product of the past or the cement of future alliances.







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