"But when are they going to build something?"

The question has been asked seemingly since day one of the rebuild, often by folks who can't quite find anything specific to criticize amongst Philadelphia 76ers General Manager and President of Basketball Operations Sam Hinkie's myriad decisions at the helm, but who feel the need to voice some opposition to the perceived perpetual optimism of #trustingtheprocess.

The answer to this question, of course, is as simple as it is self evident. Sam Hinkie and the Sixers started building something on the day he was hired, broke ground the night of the 2013 NBA Draft when Jrue Holiday was traded to the Pelicans for Nerlens Noel and the Pellies 2014 1st round pick, and have been laying the foundation ever since.

What most people mean, however, when they ask this question is something more along the lines of 'When will they try to field a coherent, competitive team that allows me to envision with some clarity what their future will be?' Now, qualms about the illusion of certainty in the NBA aside, the answer to this question admittedly is the ostensibly more opaque 'When the opportunity presents itself.'

Unlike the construction of a building, be it a shed or a skyscraper, which moves forward on a roughly preset timeline according to an architect's preconceived design, making use of widely available and fairly uniform construction materials, the players necessary to build a truly great basketball team are incredibly scarce and difficult to acquire. So, if a franchise genuinely wants to build a great team, it is confined to a very limited set of opportunities to acquire the right construction materials. The goal then, for any team that is not already a contender, should be to maximize their opportunities to bring in elite players through any and all means. The tank was necessitated by the reality that the draft is clearly the best opportunity for teams that lack a star to find one. It is not remotely the only opportunity though, and maintaining the roster flexibility to strike via trade or free agency will remain an increasingly vital consideration as the Sixers draft-and-develop their way out of the dregs of the NBA over the next few years.

In an effort to get a better sense of the Sixers full timeline of opportunity, I produced a rough salary cap projection for the next 6 years, trying to air on the conservative side for potential salary cap space.

Take a look:

Non-Guaranteed (Red), Team Option (Purple)

*all salary numbers courtesy of Basketball Insiders

*please don't take any draft picks to be predictions, I merely guestimated a reasonable high end position to give the salary projections a more conservative slant

What stands out to me immediately, once I come down emotionally from scrolling through all the draft picks (but good laaawd the draft picks!!), is the cap space. As presently constructed, and even while paying all three bigs their respective maximum contract extensions, the Sixers will be able to make use of significant cap space for the next three off-seasons.

While I didn't include them, we can probably expect some additional salary outlays for a select few role players currently signed to 'HInkie Specials'. Aside from Robert Covington, I won't make any predictions as to which of those players the team might resign, but you can bet that anyone retained won't be difficult to move.

As posited above, the reason for the tank is the fact that the draft represents the best opportunity for a team without a star to acquire one. Whether they find elite talent there or not however, as the Sixers improve it will become increasingly difficult to take significant steps forward through their own picks, which means maintaining roster flexibility will become even more essential as trades and free agency inflate in relative importance as means of adding additional high level talent.

In the next few seasons I expect we'll see the Sixers' payroll begin to resemble the Rockets' current salary cap structure, with (hopefully) several great players commanding maximum salaries, several role players on easily trade-able contracts, and the rest of the roster filled with young players on the rookie scale or Hinkie Specials. One of the most important roles of the GM during this time is balancing the often competing goals of talent acquisition/retention and future flexibility. Even for a team that's close to contention, it's not enough to merely ask 'Will this player make us better?' A good GM must fully consider 'Will this player move us towards contention more than this contract will inhibit us from getting there?'

Daryl Morey & the Rockets answered this question last year after the Mavericks offered Chandler Parsons a massive, very player friendly three year deal. Ultimately Morey judged that keeping Parsons would not put them over the top but that his contract would prevent the Rockets from signing the caliber of player who would, so they had to let him walk. Morey spoke very openly about his thought process in the wake of his decision in a fascinating interview; follow this link and scroll down to the bottom of this page to give a listen.

In relevant part:

"Every single move we make, every single decision we make is 'What move will up our championship odds?', not 'get us to first round and lose', not "get to the second round and maybe lose there.' Everything we do is about 'How can we make a championship Houston Rocket team.' .... It takes at least three elite players with very little exception throughout history. It takes three elite players and a good set of players that fit around them. Once Bosh said 'No,' it put us into another very difficult decision of 'Do we have a better chance of winning a title by matching [Dallas' offer to Parsons] or not matching it?' That comes down to a very simple question 'Are Harden/Howard/Parsons a three that can be a championship three?'"

"Dwight Howard has been through it. He's been through [being] on a team that was close to winning, but because of a lot of the moves around him, they got completely locked in with no ability to continue to improve the team, so he knows first hand the value of being able to continue to improve."

"We go for it, man. We are just about getting a championship. Sometimes, you swing for it and get the guy like Harden and Howard the last two summers. Sometime, you swing for it and don't get it. That happens. The key is to stay in the game and focus on just one thing -- 'Will we be more likely to be a championship team this way or that way?'"

Unless several of the Sixers draft picks play themselves into their respective maximum contracts and put the team, now 'pregnant with elite players,' over the cap and into contention, maintaining the cap and asset flexibility to add stars via free agency or trade will remain a significant priority.* This means being very choosy about how cap room is utilized. While the Rockets didn't have a maximum salary slot open this summer, they still met with LaMarcus Aldridge and could have easily cleared the necessary cap space for him. All of their contracts were either non-guaranteed, rookie scale, or relatively trade-able (as they also maintain the draft assets and young prospects sought by rebuilding teams with the space to take on a salary dump).

Luckily the Sixers are not yet close to such a decision point with anyone significant, and looking at this projection it's clear that on their current trajectory they have a substantial amount of time to use their cap space before losing it. Without trading any significant player the team has two to three more off-seasons with substantial cap space or a relatively easy path to creating it. And, even assuming Hinkie pulls no more draft assets out of the ether, the Sixers will be loaded with the types of young players and picks teams forced to trade away a star covet.

In two followups I will explore some possible opportunities for the Sixers to capitalize on their flexibility in the next few years, both via trade and in free agency.

*Operating above the cap is a completely different set of calculations, the most important of which are often maintaining the level of talent on the team (if a player leaves he is much more difficult to replace, especially now that the mid level exception can hardly be considered a mid-level contract in light of the dramatic rise of league revenue/the salary cap) and the increased luxury tax expense of keeping that talent. We saw this dynamic play out with OKC this summer. They had to pay an outrageous cost to keep Enes Kanter, a middling player at best, because they had no feasible way of replacing him and they couldn't afford to lose talent with Durant still unsigned.