According to reports from numerous news outlets, fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham now control the city of Mosul. In addition, Reuters is reporting that “28 Turkish truck drivers ferrying diesel to the northern Iraqi city of Mosul have been abducted” by ISIS fighters.

If the reports turns out to be true, Ankara will soon be faced with an even more precarious security situation than before. For much of the Syrian civil war, the Turkish government was of the opinion that Bashar al Assad was the root cause of the conflict’s extremism. For Ankara, the “extremist problem” would naturally resolve itself once the Syrian dictator was forced from power and the “moderate Syrian led opposition” turned its guns on the extremist foreigners.

Things have now changed. The empowerment of ISIS has forced Ankara to adopt a more U.S.-style counter terrorism approach to the conflict. Ankara has listed the anti-Assad Islamist organization Jabhat al Nusra as a terror group and has recently worked to empower the “moderates” to put pressure on ISIS and the regime.

The Kurdish dimension

This effort has come at a time when Turkey’s Kurdish issue, and Ankara's peace process with the country's main Kurdish militia group, has become more problematic.

Recently, clashes in Lice over the Turkish military’s construction of a military outpost resulted in the killing of two protesters. Kurds in Lice took to the streets in protest. And, in Diyarbakir, a man infiltrated an air base and took down the Turkish flag. This action prompted nationalist Turks to take the streets. The resulting tension has caused some concerns about the viability of the ongoing peace process.

Mosul sits right on the diving line between Arab and Kurdish-controlled Iraq. The further encroachment of ISIS forces in to Iraqi Kurdistan risks destabilizing an area of extreme interest for Ankara.

Turkey faces challenges in its relationship with its own Kurdish population. Iraq's Kurds are a different story. Turkey has broken with the United States and supported the export of Kurdish oil from Iraqi Kurdistan, invested heavily in the region, and taken numerous steps to tighten ties with the Barzani clan, the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government's leaders.

The expansion of ISIS’ territory, which now runs from Mosul to Al Anbar in Iraq out to Al Raqqah in Syria, has put extra pressure on Ankara.

This development actually gives Turkey a very strong incentive — and buy-in from the security leadership — to continue with peace talks with the Kuridstan Workers Party (PKK), the major Kurdish militia group in Turkey. The elimination — or at least, management — of the PKK allows for Ankara to retain its slipping strategic depth in the region, while also giving it a buffer zone against the looming ISIS threat in Syria.

And in Iraqi Kurdistan, the relationship with the regional government remains crucial, and helps to ensure that the ISIS threat is contained in Arab Iraq.

The Collapse of Zero Problems

In a way, the events in Mosul demonstrate how Turkey's once-vaunted strategic depth-based foreign policy is dead. It is over. Put a fork in it.

Turkey has sought to tack back to the core principles of "Zero Problems" — its longstanding policy of maintaining good relations with each neighboring state — since the election of Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran. However, regional events that are largely outside of Turkey’s control have made the resumption of this policy all but impossible.

Turkish foreign policy during the Erdogan era has always necessitated the maintenance of powerful central states on Turkey's borders. These strong states could keep a lid on Kurdish nationalism (as is the case in Iraq, Syria, and Iran) and make quick decisions to tighten trade ties with Turkey.

As state after state in the region falls into chaos, the main actors with which Ankara needs to coordinate policy are losing the ability to implement their political will — or at the very least keep a lid on potential security problems. In Syria and Iraq, this represents a serious problem for Ankara moving forward.

Turkey now finds itself having to deal with a pseudo-state throughout Kurdistan, where most people don’t think too highly of Ankara. In the Gulf, Turkey has been labeled as pro-Muslim Brotherhood. While Ankara has been cooperating with Saudi Arabia in Syria, the political suspicions decrease the potential avenues for support outside of the Syrian context. All of this comes against a backdrop of the emergence of the ISIS pseudo-state.

Turkey has few levers to really deal with this threat. The Iraqi state — and its security forces have proven to be a political and military joke. Absent strong centralized states, Turkey has few real links to the emerging political actors, outside of the Brotherhood in Egypt, Barzani in Kurdistan, and certain groups in Syria.

All of this suggests that Ankara is certain to face serious challenges moving forward in the region. And with little influence with weakened neighboring central governments, Ankara now faces a reality of marginal influence and increased security threats.