Dubai: The decision of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain to withdraw their ambassadors from Qatar in protest of the latter’s intervention in the formers’ domestic affairs, according to their joint statement, is a culmination of a set of attempts to reconcile a post-Hamad Qatar with Saudi-Emirati-Bahraini and occasionally Kuwaiti club.

There are already a number of articles that have captured the attempts of Kuwaiti mediation of this simmering crisis up to this moment.

The Qataris are trying to frame this incident as the latest act over fundamental disagreements and differing views on extra-GCC affairs (mainly Egypt). The statement by the three Gulf States has stated the opposite; to them it is primarily about Qatar’s intervention in their domestic affairs. A battle of narratives is upon us.

But this is a space that Qatar is very comfortable in. In many ways, Qatar excels as the underdog in the corner. Also, the scores of Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists in the gulf — some of whom it’s been rumoured have received funding from Doha — will sympathise with its position as an agent of change. The three countries need to do a better job at winning the narrative.

Aided by Al Jazeera, the Qataris will probably do a stellar job at appearing to be the new kid on the block bullied by bigger states run by elder shaikhs. The questions remain as to how serious those three countries are towards reorienting Qatar towards a more inclusive regional policy and more importantly how far they will go.

There has been talk for months of freezing economic cooperation, pressuring international players to choose between the three countries vs Qatar and even closing its airspace. This is the stuff of cold wars and everyone is holding their breath to see how far the Gulf’s troika is willing to go. From Qatar’s perspective, this is reminiscent of the early 2000s when the Saudis withdrew their ambassador there in protest of Al Jazeera’s coverage of Saudi dissident.

Eventually, the Saudis returned their ambassador but after Qatar affected Al Jazeera’s editorial policy on the kingdom.

In other words, they believe they’ve been there before and that they have more political and media resilience. The Qataris also believe that any severe economic sanctions and boycotts, which they can fiscally wither, will help bolster their position as bullied progressives and populists.

The onus is on the three to demonstrate their commitment to their stated goal of getting Qatar “back in the fold”. Qatar believes they will eventually blink. They will probably try to break the alliance and bolster their cooperation with the other two Gulf States, Oman and Kuwait. Qatar could for example offer Saudis a cessation of support for the Houthis in Yemen, a Shiite militant group they have been rumoured to support in return for some normalisation.

They could also offer them further cooperation from specific Islamic militias in Syria, which it allegedly finances. Such tactics could offer the Saudis very valuable regional diplomatic wins that would help it demonstrate capacity to lead in a post-American Middle East.

Having done this they could then work with Iran (with whom both states’ foreign ministers have recently met in Tehran and discussed expanding their shared gasfield) to pressure the Bahraini opposition to cease militant activities and return to the national dialogue initiative.

Qatar would probably offer Oman a bouquet of economic aid and investment and Kuwaitis with some easing of support of the opposition — whom Qatar has been long-rumoured to support — or even orchestrate a breakthrough with the government there.

This would leave the UAE at the forefront of the dispute with Qatar and would make it easier for the latter to characterise the UAE position as a fundamentally anti-Qatari/Muslim Brotherhood position due to disagreements on Arab politics instead of Gulf politics. From the Saudi-Emirati-Bahraini alliance perspective, it would seem apt to start expanding this alliance. Within the Gulf the Omanis are extremely unlikely to join.

The Kuwaitis have made their position as mediator clear. The expansion seems more likely outside the GCC but within the Arab world; Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and potentially Yemen come to mind. Also, the alliance could resort to political lobbying and the prospect of investments with global allies and partners.

So, it seems that Qatar has the advantage of experience in political isolation and resilience as well as Islamist sympathy; they are in familiar space. The trilateral group has the opposing advantage; they have never been this fed up with Qatar’s policies and may go all the extra miles they find before them. This could be the climax of two very opposed narratives for the region. Hold on tight.

Mishaal Al Gergawi is an Emirati current affairs commentator.