Indeed, the sanctions regime orchestrated by the Obama administration has succeeded beyond the imagination of its skeptics and has managed to largely segregate Iran from the global economy.

But a conclusive resolution of the prevailing impasse is unlikely to be achieved through an exchange of nuclear concessions for sanctions relief. For the great powers to continue to make progress on this issue, they need to consider not just Iran’s economic distress but also its security predicament.

An important facet of America’s strategy of pressure that seldom gets much notice is the massive naval deployments in the Gulf and sale of considerable arms to the Arab sheikdoms. The conventional balance of power in the Gulf is decisively tilted to Iran’s disfavor. For a nation with historical pretensions of playing an important role in its immediate neighborhood, such a disadvantageous position only enhances the lure of nuclear arms. An important constituency in the Islamic Republic has long suggested that the only way the regime can negate the existing imbalance of power is through acquisition of the ultimate weapon.

Today, the international community is seeking to disarm a country whose practical security is being systematically endangered. All this is not to suggest that the United States should withdraw from the Gulf or abandon its allies and its long-term treaty commitments, but as part of its nuclear diplomacy Washington should be more cognizant of Iran’s security dilemmas.

The United States may want to consider what role Iran can play in its evolving Gulf security architecture. Along these lines, Washington may want to consider ideas that have stabilized other conflict-prone regions such as Europe. A Gulf security dialogue could encompass such issues as navigational rights, a mechanism for addressing border disputes, an early-warning system for military exercises, and even the prohibition of certain categories of weapons from the region.