SUPPOSE for a moment that you are sitting on the Federal Open Market Committee and therefore share the FOMC's view of what's going on in America's economy, and therefore think that it was sensible to raise the fed funds target in December. This means that you look at the data from the second half of 2015 and see an economy experiencing a robust, broad-based recovery, apart from energy-related businesses and some manufacturers. You see employers adding workers at a sustained, rapid clip, despite the fact that the unemployment rate has fallen to 5%. And you say, look, oil can't fall that much farther, and payroll growth at this pace and unemployment rate has to eventually lead to much faster wage growth and higher inflation. There's a risk that high inflation would be hard to bring down, and we don't want to create a new recession by hiking rates a lot in a short period of time. So best to get started with the hikes now, so that we can shepherd the economy toward sustained growth at 2% inflation. So you raise rates. And then, let's suppose, all hell breaks loose. Stock markets suddenly lose their minds and start to swing violently, generally in the downward direction. Bond yields tumble, too (except on the government bonds of big emerging markets in vulnerable financial situations). Commodity prices fall off a cliff, led by oil. Market-based measures of future inflation trip on a stone and faceplant. And the dollar floats irrepressibly higher. Meanwhile, the economic data coming in looks ever so slightly less robust—not recessionary, by any means but not invulnerable, either. So then you all meet again in January and have to figure out what to tell the panicky traders of the world you're going to do next. What do you do, then?

Well, you release a statement like the one the Fed released yesterday, which makes the best of December's unforced error. And hopefully, behind the scenes, you think very hard about how to change gears in March if things continue on as they have in January.

The Fed faced only bad choices at its meeting this week. It could not simply point to the real-economy data, which don't look that different now than they did in December, and say that its outlook hadn't really changed, much as it might have wanted to. Where a few weeks ago Fed officials were hinting that four rate hikes might be on the cards in 2016, markets now anticipate only one. A statement to the effect that it remained as hawkish as before would force markets to suddenly and violently adjust their view of the path of interest rates, leading to a nasty market panic. And enough panic can become self-fulfilling.

The statement therefore needed to note that the Fed was aware of global financial developments and stood ready to adjust policy if they threatened the recovery. But it couldn't be too reassuring on this point, for two reasons. First, Fed reassurances could overdo things, and convince markets that things really are looking quite bad. Second, a too-dovish statement would begin to look awkward if new economic data showed an acceleration in the pace of American growth. Another directional reversal in guidance at the next statement—"actually, things are grand and we plan to hike away"—would leave markets more perplexed than usual concerning what the Fed is after. The statement needed to demonstrate that: the Fed's view is basically unchanged, but the Fed is also aware of potential trouble brewing and stands ready to act accordingly, but the brewing trouble isn't the sort of thing that should cause anyone to worry. And that is, just about, what it did.

The problem is that now the Fed doesn't meet again until March. There are long weeks ahead during which all sorts of financial-market havoc could unfold. If the panic is bad enough, the Fed could call an unscheduled meeting in order to act: at the cost of signalling that conditions were dire indeed (and that it had made a huge blunder in December). Yet if it chooses to wait while markets do their thing, a March policy reversal could come too late to prevent a sharp deceleration in American economic activity.

It isn't certain that markets will continue to act up, or that economic developments will make clear that a December hike was a bad idea. It is possible that America's recovery will roar ahead, and the Fed will be able to hike four times in 2016. But the Fed is now in a very uncomfortable position, which could easily become much more uncomfortable still. That was always the risk in hiking before economic conditions really demanded it. When both interest rates and inflation are very low, there is unlimited room to increase rates in response to an unexpected (and improbable) surge in inflation to a rate well above the target. On the other hand, under those circumstances it is very hard to react in time and with adequate force to an unexpectedly weak economic performance.

There are times when jumping off a high cliff into the sea below might make sense, but there's no sense rushing into it when you don't have to: you run out of options pretty quickly once you're in the air.