Fabio Capello must be awfully sure that Gareth Barry is on his way to a complete recovery, because nothing else could explain his lack of interest in addressing England's principal weakness in their final match before embarking for South Africa. Unless, that is, he really believes himself to be the one man in the entire world capable of devising a way in which Frank Lampard and Steven Gerrard can function successfully together in central midfield.

England played the second half of today's match with the Chelsea and Liverpool kingpins alongside each other, after Gerrard had replaced the clearly underpowered Tom Huddlestone at the interval. With Shaun Wright-Phillips and Joe Cole out wide, Gerrard and Lampard formed a double pivot as England went from a goal down to a 2-1 win by courtesy of a brace of Japanese own-goals.

The performance was certainly better in the second 45 minutes – less stodgy, more fluid, with fewer misplaced passes – but to ascribe this to a sudden blooming of the central midfield partnership would be to submit to an old and damaging delusion.

Many are happy to do so. During ITV's post-match analysis, Andy Townsend and Gareth Southgate could be heard uttering comforting phrases like "They're such good players" and "They're intelligent enough to know that when one of them goes [forward], the other sits" and "Maybe they have to do it now…". Being former good professionals themselves, neither Southgate nor Townsend can see any reason why such unusually gifted players as Gerrard and Lampard cannot form themselves into an effective partnership.

Sven-Goran Eriksson used to think the same thing. For season after season, or so it seemed, the Swede struggled to get the pair to combine effectively in matching roles, while the intensity of the national debate grew around him. Something that seemed so obvious was refusing to produce the necessary result, and its failure affected everything.

Looking back exactly four years, Eriksson's uncertainty is plain to see. In the first of the two warm-up matches, against Hungary, the manager started with Jamie Carragher in front of the back four, Lampard between David Beckham and Joe Cole in midfield, and Gerrard playing behind Michael Owen. Against Jamaica four days later Gerrard and Lampard were together in the middle, Peter Crouch had joined Owen up front, and there was no one shielding the defence.

No doubt encouraged by a 6-0 win, Eriksson retained Gerrard and Lampard in tandem for the opening group match against Paraguay in Frankfurt, a thoroughly unsatisfactory 1-0 win courtesy of an own-goal. There was no change to the midfield for the next match against Trinidad and Tobago, an equally unconvincing 2-0 victory.

Something had to change for the final group match against Sweden, and finally Eriksson recognised the need for a defensive specialist in midfield, Hargreaves coming into the starting line-up in place of Gerrard for a 2-2 draw that allowed England to top the group. There were injury problems at right-back, however, and against Ecuador the versatile Hargreaves was asked to fill the gap, while Carrick sat in front of the defence and Lampard and Gerrard were reunited in midfield behind a lone striker, Wayne Rooney. Nobody's reputation was enhanced as England scraped into the quarter-finals where, with Hargreaves restored in place of Carrick, they took Portugal to penalties.

The outcome was disappointing, but there was no doubt that England had been rendered more effective by the decision to play a dedicated shielding midfielder, just as Alf Ramsey had discovered when he shifted the emphasis of his side by creating the role for an unconsidered Manchester United player called Nobby Stiles a year before the 1966 finals. It would be flabbergasting were Capello only now, two and a half years into his tenure as England manager, to be going through the same tortuous process on his way to the same inevitable conclusion.

On paper and probably on the training ground, Lampard and Gerrard might seem ideal partners. But the old "when one goes, the other sits" formula only works if both of them have a complete grasp of a complex and demanding role.

The holding midfield player is an expert in the arts of positioning and anticipation and a master of quick tackling and the sort of shrewdly weighted short passes that establish the momentum for the attacking midfielders. Discipline and self-denial are his watchwords, unremitting concentration his trademark. Playing alongside Barry under Capello, Lampard has shown that he can make a decent fist of the job, even though it restricts his important ability to make an impact around the edge of the opposing penalty area. Gerrard, quite simply, has never demonstrated a similar aptitude.

Had Capello not been convinced that Barry will be fit and ready for action against the United States on 12 June, surely he would have given a run-out to Scott Parker. The decision to leave the West Ham man on the bench against both Mexico and Japan may turn out to have been as foolhardy as the refusal of English football as a whole to groom players for such a pivotal role.

Given the manager's own playing career, this seems a little curious. For club and country, Capello was exactly the kind of player he now needs, and he might have been expected to do better than reopen an exhausted debate. Or perhaps, like Ramsey, he has something up his sleeve.