This was an intriguing fixture. Truchel’s Borussia Dortmund against Schmit’s Bayer Leverkusen, but it wasn’t only the quality of player on show which made the game such a spectacle, but to see two teams renowned for their high pressing go toe to toe made the game a great watch despite a first half short of highlights. Watching the game unfold it was always going to be a piece of magic either from a slight change in tactical approach or that moment of quality or maybe a bit of luck that was going to turn the game on it’s head. That’s exactly what happened when Bender competed for the ball with Kiessling deep inside Dortmund’s own half, the referee decided against a free-kick for Leverkusen instead giving the foul for Dortmund. The Leverkusen players were stunned, but Dortmund continued and three passes later Aubameyang had the ball at his feet with an open net, and in the form Aubamaeyang has been in this season with 20 goals in as many games before this game there was only going to be one outcome, and it was no surprise when he kept that ratio going. Leverkusen continued to fight their case that it was indeed a foul by Bender on Kiessling not vice versa. The referee couldn’t handle the situation, and decided to send Schmidt to the stands for his complaints to the fourth official. When Schmit refused, one of the most shocking things in the modern age of football took place when the referee walked off the pitch with his fellow officials. Players, coaches and pundits were completely bemused, but when Schmidt finally took his seat in the stands the game continued. In the dying moments of the game the ball was cut back into Javier Hernandez inside the box. He turned with great confidence, and at this moment there was only going to be one outcome surely with half the goal to aim for? With 13 goals in 18 appearances only behind Robert Lewandowski and Pierre Emerick Aubameyang in the race for Bundesliga’s golden boot. But Javier Hernandez/Chicharito Lervkusen’s man of the moment put the ball a yard wide of the near post. It wasn’t luck that won the game, but Tuchel’s slight difference in almost formation when Dortmund committed players forward to that of Schmidt’s Leverkusen.

Before the game Tuchel must have been aware of the pressure that his two centrebacks Sokratis and Mats Hummels would be up against throughout the game. So as has been done by Busquets since his introduction to Barcelona’s starting line-up by Bayern Munich’s very own Pep Guardiola, Tuchel gave Bender that exact role as he dropped between Sokratis and Hummels when both of Dortmund’s fullbacks committed forward. Not only did this give another passing option for Hummels, Sokratis and even the Dortmund goalkeeper Roman Burchi when the mass of pressure was applied to by Leverkusen, but also if Leverkusen’s press did indeed work as a result of Dortmund having to rush their passes forward, Bender gave Dortmund that cover almost playing as a third centreback at the back, and the bonuses of high flying fullbacks were able to star throughout the game.

Leverkusen also decided that high flying fullbacks was going to be the way to break down Dortmund’s tight and narrow defence, but where Tuchel realised that this could potentially leave them open at the back and adapted to this, Leverkusen’s Schmidt did not, and against the pace of Aubameyang and Reus (in the second half) Dortmund worked this to their advantage by moving the ball quickly, and playing the ball into the space left by the fullback on the counter-attack.

At the end of the first half despite Dortmund having that safety net playing Bender alongside the two centrebacks, Leverkusen were beginning to have a lot of joy pressing the defensive trio (along with Bender) as a result of the midfield being disjointed from the defence. Therefore, Tuchel adapted again by allowing only Durm to commit forward whilst Pisczek became a part of this defensive trio, but where the other midfielders committed to the attack in the first half, Bender held a deeper position in the midfield which meant there was a diamond shape always between the defensive quartet. As a result Dortmund weren’t so exposed to Leverkusen’s pressure.

As the second half began Leverkusen were getting increasing joy as a result of there high flying fullbacks creating overlaps on Dortmund’s two fullback. This meant that Leverkusen’s wide players could use the fullback’s overlap run as a decoy, and instead would dart inside as Bellarabi did on this occasion.



With the introduction of Marco Reus in the second half he was able to drift centrally as a result of Durm commiting forward. This lead to Aubameyang on many occasion making runs out to the right flank as a result of the space left by Wendall. The problem Dortmund had was when Aubameyang came out wide to receive the through ball on the right flank Dortmund often lacked a threat in the box.

Despite the clear attacking threat Marco Reus brings to the team, as the second half continued it was clear to see why Tuchel decided against starting Reus as he’s a defensive liability. Leverkusen noticed this, and despite the threat Wendall was causing down their left flank, Bellarabi took a position on the right flank as Reus wasn’t returning to his defensive position quick enough following an attack. This resulted in Jedvaj committing forward on numerous occasions. But despite the attacking opportunities this created for Leverkusen chances were still far and between for Leverkusen as a result of the tight and narrow defence of Dortmund, and their willingness to stay central whilst willingly allowing room for Leverkusen on the flanks. But this is what lead to the downfall of Leverkusen as far as the result of the match.

As Leverkusen once more committed their midfielders forward this lead to Durm overlapping the Leverkusen fullback which creates a 2 v 1 on the fullback as a result of Reus getting goal-side of the Leverkusen midfield. This means that Jedvaj either presses Reus and leaves Durm free, or continues to mark Durm allowing Reus to dribble freely towards the Dortmund box. Jedvaj decides to press Reus leaving Durm free. Reus plays a great ball out wide, Aubameyang coming in from the right gets in front of his defender and it’s a tap in for Aubameyang.

We discussed Reus not getting into his defensive position alongside his fellow midfielders quick enough, and this was working a treat for Leverkusen who continued to attack down the right flank. It wasn’t the fact that Reus wasn’t willing to put his shift in he just couldn’t read where the danger was coming from defensively which resulted in him being caught too high or too central on numerous occasions leaving Durm exposed. In the dying moments of the game this is what lead to the chance which should’ve resulted in the equaliser. Durm actually manages to deal with the original threat well despite the overlap, but when Dortmund regained the ball Leverkusen once again produced their mass pressure commiting 4 or 5 players on a press towards the player on the ball. Reus fails to make up for his original mistake instead loosing the ball as a result of the Leverkusen pressure. Which leads to Durm again being exposed to a very difficult situation alike the one witnessed by Jedvaj for the Dortmund goal. Durm decides to press leaving 2 Leverkusen attackers against Hummels. The ball is played into Javier Hernandez centrally, who plays the ball out wide to Bellarabi who returns the ball into Hernandez inside the opposing penalty area, but despite the confidence in which Hernandez turned inside the box he failed to find the gaping net.

This was a great spectacle for me personally witnessing two teams pressing high up the pitch, but with a slightly different way of doing so. Schmidt’s Leverkusen pressed/counter-pressed with 4 or 5 players committing to the press on the player with the ball. Where as Tuchel’s Dortmund committed only 1 or 2 players maximum to the press on the player with the ball whilst the other players who are a part of the press stood tight/almost man-marked their men. This brought me back to the days when Heynckes’s Bayern Munich met Klopp’s Borussia Dortmund. Heynckes used the same pressing style to that of Tuchel whilst Klopp used a very similar style of pressing to that of Klopp. But as Heynckes got the better of Klopp in the final game they played against one another (which was the 2013 Champions League Final) it was Tuchel who got the better of Schmidt, and ironically I wouldn’t be surprised if Tuchel’s Dortmund surpass the achievements of Klopp’s Dortmund. That’s the quality of coach I believe Dortmund have in Tuchel.