What’s new? After President Donald Trump announced a full U.S. withdrawal from Syria, his administration decided to leave a residual force there. All parties – the U.S., Turkey, the Syrian regime, Russia and the PKK-affiliated People’s Protection Units (YPG) that control the north east – are adjusting their stance to the resulting uncertainty.

Why does it matter? The withdrawal reprieve provides an opportunity to prevent a violent free-for-all in the north east. Had U.S. troops left precipitously, Damascus might have tried to recover the territory and Ankara to exploit the vacuum to destroy the YPG. A resurgent Islamic State could have filled the void.

What should be done? Washington should use its remaining influence to address Turkish concerns about the PKK’s role in the north east while protecting the YPG; and Moscow should help the YPG and Damascus reach agreement on the north east’s gradual reintegration into the Syrian state on the basis of decentralised governance.

Executive Summary

The U.S. flip-flop on Syria – from President Donald Trump’s announcement of an immediate withdrawal to the subsequent decision to maintain a limited troop presence in the north east for an unspecified period – offers an opportunity to set the area on a path to greater stability. A precipitous withdrawal carried a major risk: that the Syrian regime, Turkey or both would have sought to advance their interests by attacking the People’s Protection Forces (YPG), which is linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Turkey, the U.S. and the EU consider a terrorist organisation. With its reversal, the U.S. retains leverage to mediate an arrangement in the north east that could survive an eventual U.S. troop departure. It will need to use its influence wisely. In particular, it should now press the YPG to reduce its monopoly on governance and loosen its PKK ties in exchange for U.S. protection from a possible Turkish military incursion. And it should stop discouraging the YPG from negotiating a Russian-backed deal with Damascus that could enable the north east’s gradual reintegration into the Syrian state on the basis of decentralised governance.

President Trump’s 19 December 2018 surprise announcement that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from Syria stunned allies and adversaries alike. The YPG, which dominates the U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controlling the north east, suddenly faced the prospect of being left without its powerful protector. Turkey, the YPG’s adversary, saw an opportunity to intervene militarily in northern Syria and deal the PKK affiliate a blow. Trump’s announcement likewise reinforced Damascus’ belief that it might soon recover territory lost to the YPG. And the Islamic State (ISIS), on the verge of battlefield defeat, may have sensed a chance to stage a comeback.

As U.S. officials scrambled to devise a formula that would save the north east from chaos, Trump’s foreign policy team and the military first stretched and then partially walked back the initial withdrawal plan. This approach can buy precious time but, on its own, it cannot resolve Washington’s basic dilemma: the president is determined to withdraw from Syria, yet so far is unable to reconcile the incompatible demands of two allies – the YPG and Turkey – and remains deeply opposed to the Syrian state’s return to the area so long as the current regime is in place.

To date, the administration has focused on finding middle ground between Turkey and the YPG. The gap is still wide. Whereas Ankara demands full control over a strip of territory inside Syria to limit YPG hegemony over the north east and keep the group from its border, the YPG requests an internationally enforced zone in roughly the same area, from which Turkish forces would be excluded and from only parts of which the YPG might agree to withdraw some of its fighters.

Absent a compromise, the contradiction that has been at the heart of U.S. policy for the past five years will remain – Washington can protect the YPG or strengthen its ties with Turkey, but it cannot do both. If it prioritises the former, Ankara likely will seek to destabilise YPG-controlled territory or conduct a war of attrition along its border with Syria. If it prioritises the latter, it risks losing a key partner in the fight against ISIS. Should the YPG feel threatened, it likely would redeploy its forces from the Euphrates valley in Deir al-Zour province to protect predominantly Kurdish towns in the north. This would leave the southerly areas, which the U.S.-backed SDF retook from ISIS in early 2019, unprotected from an ISIS resurgence.

As long as the YPG feels unsure about its future, it will be less likely to conduct an effective counter-insurgency.

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The U.S. is not alone in facing a dilemma. Russia, too, must balance twin objectives that are in tension: helping Damascus reassert its sovereignty throughout the country, on the one hand, and maintaining strong relations with Ankara, on the other. To date, its attempts to broker an understanding between Turkey and Syria and mediate between the YPG and Damascus have come up empty; the presence of a residual U.S. force in the north east further reduces Moscow’s leverage.

Meanwhile, amid this uncertainty, worrying trends are emerging on the ground. Shortly after losing its last pockets of territory to the SDF at the end of February, ISIS shifted its strategy to an increasingly robust insurgency, which by now threatens to undermine the security situation in a significant part of north-eastern Syria. As long as the YPG feels unsure about its future, it will be less likely to conduct an effective counter-insurgency; each time it has felt Turkish pressure or less than full U.S. commitment on its behalf, it has paused its anti-ISIS operations and reinforced its fighting strength near the Turkish border. The YPG also faces an almost insurmountable challenge in the form of thousands of detained Syrians as well as foreign ISIS fighters and their families.

Washington’s extension of a troop presence in the north east is not a sustainable solution. It rests on shaky legal ground, lies at the mercy of another Trump change of heart and – sooner or later – will come to an end. What matters is what happens in the meantime. Even as it deters a Turkish attack, Washington should use the prospect of its eventual withdrawal to press the YPG to address Ankara’s concerns regarding the group’s growing influence in Syria’s north east. The YPG should take steps including diminishing its hegemony over the area and distancing itself from the PKK’s command and control. Alternatively, the U.S. should use its leverage over the YPG to encourage de-escalation between Turkey and the PKK.

The U.S. also should avoid standing in the way of a putative understanding between the Syrian regime and the YPG. Today, such a deal appears unlikely. The regime has expressed hostility to genuine decentralisation and its record of breaking agreements reached with other opposition groups hardly inspires confidence. But should that change, the north east’s gradual reintegration into the Syrian state on the basis of decentralised governance would seem the most viable, longer-term outcome. In the meantime, the Trump administration should neither obstruct dialogue between the two nor use the YPG as a tool to pressure the regime, which would only heighten the likelihood of an eventual showdown with Damascus.

Amid the YPG-Turkish conundrum, one ought not to lose sight of ISIS. It may have suffered a territorial defeat, but it is a re-emerging threat in predominantly Arab areas under SDF/YPG control. The next phase in the fight against ISIS will require the YPG to devolve authority to local partners who then take the lead on governance and security in their home districts. A measure of stability has been achieved in Syria’s north east. But the area is home to a dizzying array of local, regional and international actors whose competition needs management, lest the stability prove short-lived. The consequences of chaos would be deadly.

Istanbul/Brussels/Deir al-Zour, 31 July 2019

I. Introduction

After the questions and confusion following President Donald Trump’s December 2018 announcement of a quick U.S. troop withdrawal from north-eastern Syria, the administration gradually walked the decision back. The continued presence of several hundred U.S. forces has deterred Ankara and Damascus from attacking the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a 60,000-strong military formation dominated by the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG, Kurdish for “People’s Protection Units”). It also has ensured that the SDF/YPG continue to conduct counter-insurgency campaigns against remaining cells of the Islamic State, or ISIS. Still, conflicting U.S. signals about the duration and objectives of its role are creating a volatile situation.

Swathes of north-eastern Syria are becoming hubs for renewed jihadist insurgency.

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President Trump triggered the uncertainty about U.S. intentions when he told Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in a December 2018 phone call that he would pull the 2,000 U.S. troops out of Syria. He pointed to ISIS’s territorial defeat as the rationale for bringing the troops home, something he had vowed to do since his presidency began. The announcement nonetheless took Trump’s senior advisers and generals by surprise and left them scrambling to carry out his orders.

A broad range of officials within the Trump administration and the U.S. military feared the consequences of a precipitous, unconditional withdrawal. While the specifics (and prioritisation) of their concerns vary sharply, they share a common belief: were the U.S. to abruptly remove its deterrent umbrella, military capacity and stabilisation support (with fellow members of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS likely to follow), north-eastern Syria might plunge into a multiparty melee over territory and resources. This turmoil, in turn, could give ISIS a new lease on life. In the days and weeks following Trump’s withdrawal announcement, two of these officials – Defense Secretary James Mattis and Brett McGurk, U.S. special envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS – stepped down in protest. Others, including James Jeffrey, the special representative for Syria engagement, pressed from inside the administration to amend the president’s decision. Ultimately, they achieved a partial success: two months after declaring that all U.S. troops would leave Syria, Trump agreed to keep 200 soldiers in the north east.

Amid this confusion, the risk of Turkish escalation and destabilisation activity backed by Ankara or the Syrian regime and its supporters appeared to increase. Security in areas taken from ISIS is eroding and swathes of north-eastern Syria are becoming hubs for renewed jihadist insurgency. The SDF has signalled that its willingness and ability to continue counter-insurgency operations and stabilise areas captured from ISIS is contingent upon continued U.S. military support, as well as the reduction of threats from both Turkey and the Syrian regime.

This report analyses the latest developments in north-eastern Syria. It addresses the danger of violent escalation and concludes with recommendations for averting it. In outlining the entanglement of local and external players and interests, it argues that what the U.S. does next will play an important role in shaping where the region is headed: a gradual reintegration into the Syrian state, on the basis of decentralised governance, or a slide into fresh mayhem. It is based on more than 100 interviews conducted in Syria, Turkey, Washington and Moscow, including during six field visits to north-eastern Syria between 2017 and 2019. It also builds upon Crisis Group’s previous reports and briefings on Syria’s north east.

II. The Search for Middle Ground

Both Washington and Moscow – the two powers with the greatest ability to shape the course of events in Syria’s north east – face the challenge of finding middle ground between the mostly incompatible demands of allies at odds with one another. The U.S. is caught between Turkey and the YPG, who are outright enemies, while Moscow is stuck between rivals Ankara and Damascus. As it stands, talks on north-eastern Syria’s future are proceeding along three separate tracks: U.S.-Turkey-YPG, Russia-Turkey and Russia-Syria-YPG. (Iran mediated talks on the north east in mid-2018, but it has played no visible role since then.)

A. The U.S.: Caught between Turkey and the YPG

Whether the U.S. fully withdraws from Syria, settles on a partial withdrawal or stays at current force levels, it will need to de-escalate tensions between Turkey and the YPG, two of its allies who are also mortal adversaries. While Turkey complains bitterly that the U.S. chose the YPG – which it considers a terrorist group, inseparable from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) – as its main partner against ISIS ever since the battle for the Syrian town of Kobane in October 2014, the U.S. contends that Ankara left it with little choice, having repeatedly come up short after vowing to set up an alternative anti-ISIS force.

The YPG’s gains created agony and anger in Ankara.

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Insofar as the YPG could not wield control over north-eastern Syria without U.S. support, the local and geopolitical complications triggered by YPG dominance are now also a U.S. problem. With the U.S. operating mostly from the air, the YPG, representing the core fighting force within the SDF, was the indispensable partner on the ground in the war against ISIS. The SDF lost around 11,000 fighters while helping retake almost all of Syria’s north east from the jihadist group. Its military victories and U.S. backing – including a constant stream of weapon supplies as well an advisory role by U.S. special forces – allowed the group to seize large swathes of Syrian territory and the majority of its natural resources.

The YPG’s gains created agony and anger in Ankara. They see the organisation as a manifestation of the PKK’s growing threat, now not just inside Turkey and from bases in northern Iraq, but also from Syria. Damascus shares the concern to a degree. It wishes to regain control throughout the country and has shown little tolerance for any form of local autonomy; it has expressly accused the YPG of inviting foreign (U.S.) occupiers to Syria. These sentiments render YPG fighters highly vulnerable to attack if and when U.S. troops depart and, in the meantime, makes them a prime target of destabilisation attempts.

How the U.S. should handle the north east was a subject of debate within the administration. Some, highly sceptical of Turkish intentions and persuaded that the region’s long-term future lies within a decentralised Syrian state, argued for using U.S. leverage to help the YPG reach an understanding with the regime and for working with Russia to that end. Others felt that, under current conditions, a return of the Syrian regime to the north east would be intolerable. The latter view prevailed. As a result, the U.S. all but rules out the prospect of the regime and its Iranian backers regaining control over the country’s sole oil-rich area. Both publicly and privately, officials allude to the importance of keeping Iran-affiliated forces from expanding north of the Euphrates, and of using the regime’s lack of access to the north east’s natural resources to pressure it to make political concessions.

1. Turkey: The alienated ally

Turkey’s determination to shift the status quo in north-eastern Syria is rooted in strategic and national security concerns that it feels Washington has done little to assuage. From Ankara’s perspective, U.S. support and protection offered to the YPG throughout the last four years has increased the PKK’s political clout and military capabilities. A senior Turkish official said, “Unconditional U.S. support for the YPG in Syria emboldened the PKK and drove it away from the negotiation table’’. Ankara perceives U.S. arms supplies and air cover for the YPG as a tacit green light for the creation of a YPG statelet in north-eastern Syria, which it fears would give the PKK strategic depth for its guerrilla warfare against Turkey.

Realities on the ground at least partially validate Turkish concerns: while the YPG and its political manifestation, the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD, or Democratic Union Party) have created an array of local administrative and political bodies, most of these entities hold little authority themselves. They provide avenues for local participation but not local empowerment; they are best understood as the YPG/PYD’s way of rebranding and facilitating the decisive influence of its senior PKK-trained cadres, some of whom rotate between Syria and PKK headquarters in the Qandil mountains of northern Iraq.

The YPG still holds areas west of the river, most importantly the town of Manbij.

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The U.S. may not have intended to contribute to the creation of an autonomous YPG-run statelet in Syria. Still, in the course of its war against ISIS it ended up midwifing one – a territory five times the size of Lebanon that is home to millions of Syrians and that sprawls well beyond the majority-Kurdish areas from which it sprang. This territory shares a 400km border with Turkey and is the locus of 80 per cent of Syria’s natural resources, chiefly oil and gas but also water and wheat. The PYD-run “autonomous administration” (idara dhatiya) pays salaries to 60,000 fighters of the YPG-led SDF, many of whom are involved in mopping up ISIS remnants and other counter-insurgency operations, as well as 30,000 police officers and 140,000 civil servants who provide rudimentary government services.

As Ankara sees it, Washington’s broken promises and its failure to condition military support to the SDF on fulfilment of political commitments regarding the YPG’s intentions in northern Syria exacerbated tensions and eroded trust. U.S. officials take a different view. They argue that Turkey dragged its feet in the fight against ISIS, prioritising its struggle against both the PKK/YPG and the Syrian regime, and often treating the counter-ISIS campaign at best as an afterthought. They likewise emphasise that Washington went to great lengths to appease Ankara, and seriously probed the option of partnering with Turkey-supported groups instead of the YPG, before deeming the plan unworkable due to what they saw as insufficient capabilities of the Turkish-allied opposition fighters that Ankara intended to deploy. In the end, Obama officials say, the U.S. had no choice but to cooperate with the YPG, the only local force willing to take on the terrorist group.

Competing versions aside, Turkish officials point to the YPG’s failure to honour U.S. requests in 2014-2015 to curtail ties with the PKK in Syria, reach out to the Syrian opposition and devolve more power to local Arabs in areas it controlled. Yet U.S. support steadily increased, signalling that as long as the fight against ISIS was ongoing, Washington would find it virtually impossible to hold the YPG accountable or to effectively press it to distance itself from the PKK.

Likewise, despite the U.S. telling Turkey that the YPG would withdraw to areas east of the Euphrates, the YPG still holds areas west of the river, most importantly the town of Manbij. Lethal assistance, which Turkish officials say President Trump committed to stop in November 2017, increased in 2018. U.S. officials argue that the YPG has been responsive to their demands to pull its cadres out of Manbij and that the group has devolved governance to non-YPG-dominated local civil councils. But PKK cadres still dominate governance in north-eastern Syria and PKK insignia, including large portraits of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, remain ubiquitous in public facilities and along roadsides. From the Turkish perspective, Trump’s December 2018 withdrawal announcement was only the latest in a series of broken U.S. promises.

Convinced that the U.S. would not address its concerns, Turkey repeatedly acted on its own (often with an apparent Russian green light), and moved militarily into two parts of northern Syria to undo or contain YPG gains. In October 2018, it took further action, deploying troops to its southern border and shelling YPG-controlled locations in Kobane, Tal Abyad and neighbouring towns. It thus signalled that it found the status quo intolerable. It also escalated its rhetoric and enlisted Turkish media to suggest that a major incursion might be imminent. At the time, the YPG took the threat extremely seriously, pausing an offensive against ISIS in north-eastern Deir al-Zour. In response, the U.S. established observation posts along the Syria-Turkey border. This move further antagonised Turkey, which – rightly – saw the posts as buffers designed to protect the YPG. The YPG later acknowledged this point.

Reaching agreement on a safe zone acceptable to both Turkey and the YPG has proved difficult.

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In early December 2018, Turkey once more dispatched troops to its border with Syria and announced that it would conduct a cross-border operation in northern Syria, targeting YPG forces east of the Euphrates. It was this announcement that precipitated the telephone conversation between the U.S. and Turkish presidents on 14 December.

The current trajectory points toward a repeat of what happened in late 2018: as its frustration rises with negotiations it perceives as both endless and fruitless, Turkey may once again escalate. In July 2019, Turkey started bolstering its military deployment on the Turkish-Syrian border, sending heavy weapons to an area near the Syrian town of Tal Abyad. The U.S. responded by expressing concern over a potential unilateral Turkish military operation in north-eastern Syria. The heavy weapons movements could be a bluff: Ankara might well be loath to target an area that still hosts U.S. troops, and it cannot predict how President Trump would react. But the risk of miscalculation is ever-present, especially as relations with Washington further sour over Ankara’s decision to purchase the Russian S-400 air defence system. Should Turkey decide to try to destabilise the YPG-controlled area, the U.S. arguably would have less political capital and possibly fewer troops on the ground to help dissuade it – and certainly less credibility with Ankara to advocate a new round of talks.

2. “Safe zone” or dead end? The buffer debate

U.S. officials have prioritised efforts to avert Turkish military action in Syria, but their approach risks leaving the crux of the Turkey-YPG conundrum unaddressed. It is at best a way to buy time – and, should the U.S. withdraw soon, perhaps not much of it.

Since President Trump’s withdrawal announcement, senior U.S. officials have travelled multiple times to Ankara and north-eastern Syria to fashion an arrangement that would avoid a direct confrontation between Turkey and their YPG partner. On 14 January, Trump went so far as to announce via Twitter that he might endorse Turkish ideas for a 32km-deep safe zone inside Syria.

Yet reaching agreement on a safe zone acceptable to both Turkey and the YPG has proved difficult. Their central demands appear irreconcilable: each insists that such a zone should be under its de facto control. Ankara is demanding that Turkish forces wield ultimate authority, potentially in cooperation with local proxies, much as Turkey has done in Euphrates Shield areas and Afrin. For its part, the YPG calls for an internationally enforced buffer zone that could deter a Turkish incursion, and thus in essence preserve its own hegemony over Syria’s north east.

U.S. negotiators have floated a number of ideas that they hope will prove mutually tolerable to Ankara and the YPG. These include removing all YPG heavy weapons from the zone, boosting local groups to replace the YPG there and monitoring the situation with a mix of U.S. and allied European soldiers. But this package of ideas has gained neither Turkish blessing nor genuine YPG buy-in. Additionally, Washington’s European allies have made clear that they will not fill the gap in the event of a significant U.S. drawdown and evinced scepticism about the safe zone idea. France, a major player in the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, conveyed to the U.S. that it would not be part of any internationally enforced buffer zone and would keep its troops in Syria far from the Turkish border to ward off an angry response from Ankara.

The current U.S. approach does not seem to be moving Syria’s north east closer to a sustainable solution.

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Thus far, Turkey has shown no readiness to compromise on its demand for exclusive control throughout a 30-40km zone (which would stretch to predominantly Kurdish areas), while the YPG has offered no concession that might placate Ankara in the course of discussions about U.S. ideas for a buffer zone. From the YPG’s viewpoint, the presence of Turkey or Turkey-supported groups in north-eastern Syria would mean a direct threat to the YPG’s presence and control.

The YPG proposal is just as unappetising for Turkey. According to SDF commander Mazloum Kobani, the YPG proposed pulling back its uniformed officers from a 5km border strip – excepting Kurdish-majority towns right on the border, such as Qamishli – while maintaining a nominally self-governing local force connected to the “autonomous administration” that would act as a border guard alongside Coalition forces. The flaw in this offering from Turkey’s perspective is that any local force tied to the “autonomous administration” would be an extension of the YPG. In other words, while the YPG might consider these proposals to be big concessions, they would not dilute the YPG’s monopoly over strategic territory or assets. Nor do they address Turkey’s core concerns that the PKK is gaining political legitimacy, military capacity and financial resources through its hegemony in Syria’s north east while persisting with its insurgency in Turkey. With both sides firm in their positions, U.S. efforts risk becoming stuck in endless haggling over details that fail to resolve the question of who is to wield direct authority where.

Without a compromise, Washington may end up imposing a fait accompli on Turkey by maintaining its military protection of the YPG to avoid war. Even without an explicit commitment, a residual U.S. presence almost certainly would deter an all-out Turkish offensive. That said, it would not necessarily discourage or prevent Turkey from destabilising the area or launching a war of attrition against the YPG. Such Turkish actions would have significant ramifications for the YPG’s capacity to contain a deteriorating security situation in swathes of eastern Syria. They might prompt the YPG to pull its troops out of the Euphrates valley to protect northern Kurdish cities. Such a move would leave areas retaken from ISIS unprotected from the group as it tries to make a comeback.

In short, the current U.S. approach does not seem to be moving Syria’s north east closer to a sustainable solution. Even if the U.S. succeeds in narrowing the gaps sufficiently to enforce a safe zone, it would not address the core of the Turkey-PKK/YPG conundrum. Besides, the idea that residual U.S. forces will stay in Syria indefinitely appears at odds with Trump’s stated preference for an eventual full withdrawal and thus is vulnerable to yet another reversal.

B. Moscow’s Missed Opportunity?

Russia is seeking to balance its desire for a low-cost Syrian regime takeover of areas remaining out of its control against its wish to deepen valuable relations with Turkey. In response to Trump’s December withdrawal announcement, Turkish and YPG officials separately rushed to Moscow to try to reach an arrangement with Russia. They understood that if the U.S. were to pull all its forces out of the north east, Russia could become the dominant military presence there, especially if the U.S. were to also reduce the role of its airpower.

YPG leaders sought Russian mediation for talks with Damascus, hoping to safeguard their autonomous region if and when U.S. troops departed. The YPG presented its positions to Moscow in a “roadmap” outlining its vision for constitutionally guaranteed local autonomy within the framework of the Syrian state that would leave security and governance in local hands and enable regional governance bodies such as the “autonomous administration” to resist interference from the capital. In essence, the YPG roadmap asked that Damascus recognise the group’s self-rule in all the north east and send reinforcements to the Syria-Turkey border to prevent a Turkish incursion. It also requested the presence of Russian military police to guarantee the agreement. In return, the YPG would formally recognise Bashar al-Assad as the legitimate president of Syria and the integrity of the Syrian state, its borders, flag and the army.

Moscow [...] has found no middle ground between Ankara and Damascus.

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As Moscow saw it, the high ceiling of these demands suggested that the group remained confident about some degree of continued U.S. protection, at least for the time being. In response, Russia proposed to the YPG a full return of regime forces to the city of Manbij first, followed by their deployment along the Syria-Turkey border. Russia also requested that the SDF hand over the entire southern (non-Kurdish) flank of SDF-controlled areas, including Deir al-Zour and Raqqa, and conveyed the regime’s insistence that it reacquire full control, albeit gradually, over the security sector in all SDF-held areas. With a gap that wide, the talks failed to reach concrete results and have since fizzled out.

Russia hurt its own credibility as guarantor of a deal between the YPG and Damascus with its inability or unwillingness to uphold its promises in other areas of Syria, where opposition groups agreed to reconciliation deals under Moscow’s auspices. As a result, the SDF has refused to negotiate any military arrangement or temporary power-sharing formula prior to an agreement on the core components of a final settlement that would recognise the “autonomous administration” and preserve their military capabilities. Russia’s prefers the reverse: temporary deals and immediate cooperation (specifically on revenue-sharing from SDF-held oil resources) while postponing talks over a final settlement knowing the width of the gap between the respective bottom lines of the YPG and the regime.

Moscow likewise has found no middle ground between Ankara and Damascus. On 23 January, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested, in a meeting with his Turkish counterpart Erdoğan, that Ankara invoke a secret protocol attached to the 1998 Adana Agreement between Turkey and Syria, giving it the right to conduct “hot pursuit” counter-terrorism operations inside Syria. Since the protocol requires bilateral cooperation, the Russian proposal appeared aimed at fostering broader rapprochement through a common fight with terrorists. Yet each side appears to spurn the idea of dealing with the other, leaving the Russian proposal with neither party’s buy-in. Erdoğan reiterated that Ankara would eschew high-level contacts with the regime; Damascus accused Turkey of violating the Adana accord since 2011 by “supporting terrorists and occupying Syrian territory”, and conditioned its future validity on withdrawal of all Turkish troops from Syria. An informal regime adviser said, “There is no room for a reconciliation between the Syrian state and the Turkish government during Erdoğan’s presidency’’.

Both the YPG and the regime appear to believe that time is on their side.

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A residual U.S. force in north-eastern Syria will make it more difficult for Moscow to arrange deals on behalf of the regime with either Ankara or the YPG. The presence of U.S. troops in vital locations poses a potentially prohibitive impediment to regime return to the north east under any agreement. Similarly, it will prevent (or render irrelevant) a Russian green light to Turkey’s use of Syria’s airspace, as Washington will retain de facto control over north-eastern Syrian skies for at least as long as it keeps troops on the ground.

Russia remains keen on preserving its good relationship with Turkey and on mediating between the YPG and Damascus. But the wide gap between the parties’ demands and the lingering U.S. presence are leading Moscow to prioritise its talks with Turkey about the de-escalation zone in Idlib, rather than attempting to press any of the three protagonists to accept a non-satisfactory deal for the north east.

C. The YPG and Damascus: Playing for Time

Both the YPG and the regime appear to believe that time is on their side. Damascus is patiently waiting for an eventual U.S. withdrawal, confident that once the U.S. removes its military umbrella, the YPG will have to accept the regime’s terms. An informal regime adviser said:

We are in no rush to solve the Kurdish problem. In the meantime, the Kurds are driving a wedge between the two foreign occupiers [Turkey and the U.S.], which is beneficial to us.

The YPG, in turn, hopes to benefit from U.S. air cover for an extended period of time to strengthen its grip over the north east and create facts on the ground that would make the autonomy to which it aspires hard to reverse. Its ultimate aim is that Damascus recognise the autonomous region – or at least accommodate it.

Relations between the YPG and Damascus have been defined by limited security and governance cooperation, economic transactions and stumbling political talks. Damascus maintains a limited security presence in north-eastern Syria (including in the cities of Qamishli and al-Hasaka) and engages in security coordination with the YPG in a Kurdish neighbourhood of regime-held Aleppo. Tensions periodically arise between regime and YPG security personnel in Qamishli, but the regime retains a symbolic presence in the town centre and controls the airport. It continues to pay the salaries of some civil servants, and the two main government bakeries in al-Hasaka still receive subsidies from the central government, which also operates some public schools. In Tal Rifaat and the Sheikh Maksoud neighbourhood of Aleppo, the YPG coordinates with the regime and regime-affiliated groups on security matters. A senior YPG official said: “The regime is our guest in Qamishli, while we are their guests in Aleppo’’.

On political matters, however, there has been little progress. Senior YPG officials say the last direct political talks occurred in mid-2018, when the regime twice hosted the SDC in Damascus. These talks quickly stalled over fundamentally divergent views of the north east’s future. SDC representatives put forward an agenda to discuss constitutional changes aimed at securing a degree of autonomy sufficient to block the regime from reasserting dominance over local governance. Regime representatives refused to discuss any governance arrangements that went beyond existing legislation on decentralisation (Legislative Decree 107 of 2011), focusing instead on SDF disarmament and reintegration into the Syrian Arab Army.

While the YPG at times has used conciliatory rhetoric vis-à-vis Damascus, its actual positions remain relatively uncompromising. Its leadership has repeatedly and publicly expressed its desire to find a tolerable arrangement with Damascus. It has also maintained a moderate diplomatic tone toward the regime, to both distance itself from the opposition and leave the door open for a peaceful settlement. This politesse, however, should not to be mistaken for a willingness to capitulate to regime demands. A senior YPG official said: “We never pursued regime change, but we have legitimate rights that we are willing to die for. We will not accept to surrender’’. The YPG insists on preserving both its civil and military structures to guard against the possibility of the regime reneging on any future agreements. “Our red lines in talks with Damascus are preserving the SDF and recognition of the autonomous administration”, said SDF commander Mazloum Kobani.

Damascus has not budged from its desire to regain every inch of the country and reinstate regime institutions.

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The YPG says it also refuses partial arrangements that would entail ceding control over non-Kurdish areas to Damascus. When the YPG seized Raqqa from ISIS in 2017 and later took over the oil and gas fields in Deir al-Zour, regime opponents in these areas were concerned that the YPG would offer to hand the predominantly Arab regions of Manbij, Raqqa and Deir al-Zour back to Damascus in return for federal autonomy in al-Hasaka, Kobane and Afrin. But the YPG has been adamant that it seeks to include all territories currently under its control in its autonomous administration.

For its part, Damascus has not budged from its desire to regain every inch of the country and reinstate regime institutions (including security and military agencies). It considers anything short of that a step toward partitioning Syria. The north east is no exception. While the leadership in Damascus has often shown willingness to discuss limited concessions on administrative decentralisation based on Decree 107, it has not compromised on wanting to assert full central authority over security services. Regime representatives also emphasise that U.S. support will not give the YPG leverage in its relationship with Damascus, and that its reliance on this support only serves to sour Damascus’ attitude. A regime adviser said:

We have attempted to negotiate with the Kurds, but they have committed a strategic mistake by using their alliance with the U.S., thinking it would enhance their negotiating position with us. The longer this continues, the more difficult it will be for them to renegotiate with the Syrian government.

An eventual agreement between the YPG and Damascus remains essential for the north east’s longer-term stability and sustainability as part of Syria. It also will be important in order to avoid a clash between the two parties when the U.S. eventually removes not only its remaining ground troops but also its air protection – an undeclared but distinct possibility. Without Russian and/or U.S. involvement, however, both parties seem to be holding on to their zero-sum views, relying on their international backers and playing a waiting game.

III. A War of Attrition with ISIS Remnants

Amid stalemate on the three negotiation tracks, worrying dynamics are emerging on the ground: Shortly after losing its last pockets of territory to the SDF at the end of February, ISIS shifted its strategy to an increasingly robust insurgency, which by now threatens to undermine the security situation in a significant part of north-eastern Syria. Its operations have taken the form of hit-and-run attacks, often by fighters embedded in tribal communities. Some tribes tolerate the presence of ISIS operatives in their midst out of fear of retaliation in areas where SDF forces are virtually absent. The SDF and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS have been unable to fully address this growing problem; worse, some of their policies in dealing with ISIS detainees and remaining ISIS cells exacerbate the risk that the terrorist group will mount a resurgence. More broadly, the SDF’s willingness and ability to continue the counter-ISIS campaign for now is likely contingent on continued U.S. support, even at reduced levels and on there being no increase in the perception it has of threats emanating from Turkey and the Syrian regime.

A. The SDF’s Approach to ISIS Detainees

The SDF holds approximately 7,000 ISIS fighters, including around 2,000 foreign militants, in prisons or refitted public buildings. It also holds thousands of family members in ill-supplied makeshift camps. The “autonomous administration” has repeatedly called upon Western countries to repatriate their citizens. It says its detention capacities are overextended. During the last round of anti-ISIS operations in the Hajin area in December 2018, an exodus of more than 50,000 people poured out of then-ISIS-held territory, sparking a humanitarian crisis in the SDF-run camps for the internally displaced to which the SDF transported civilians. These camps now comprise a mix of displaced civilians along with ISIS-affiliated women and children (both local and foreign), guarded by under-equipped SDF forces.

Some tribes fear that cooperation with the SDF puts them at risk of being targeted by ISIS.

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Unable to handle the challenge, the SDF has released a large number of Syrian ISIS fighters as well as their followers and families. In so doing, it continued the approach it adopted since it pushed into predominantly Arab areas of Syria’s north east in 2015. At the time, the YPG took the strategic decision to defer to the tribes and show leniency in dealing with Arab communities – where it does not have the benefit of long-standing social or political ties – by pardoning hundreds of ISIS detainees as part of reconciliation deals with tribal figures. The YPG also realised that the large number of Arabs entangled in the ISIS bureaucracy made it impossible to deal with all those directly or indirectly associated with ISIS with a purely coercive policy of arrests and detentions.

Upon releasing ISIS followers, the YPG/SDF relied primarily on communal leaders to reintegrate them into Syrian society. In Raqqa and Manbij, where Kurds had long lived and the SDF had a good understanding of local dynamics, they identified tribal interlocutors whom they could trust to provide intelligence in return for pardons of low-ranking ISIS fighters and supporters from the tribe. Despite the fragility of the deals they struck with tribes and the clear lack of proper policies for reintegrating ISIS members in the long term, they quickly secured lands they had captured from ISIS while avoiding feuds with local Arabs over detaining large numbers of local men, especially tribal members.

But such policies are less effective in the north-eastern parts of Deir al-Zour, an area that has become a hub for ISIS activities across Syria’s north east. Because the YPG lacks sufficient local knowledge in the area, it struggles to find interlocutors who can help them locate ISIS affiliates. Several other factors complicate the SDF’s task. First is the large number of IDPs in the SDF-controlled parts of Deir al-Zour province – some 300,000 out of a total population of 1.5 million. Many of these displaced fled the regime advance on the Euphrates’ western bank in late 2017. Local notables and tribal elders have found it difficult to act effectively as brokers with many of these people, who are strangers to the area.

Secondly, the area’s size militates against the SDF fully using its network of neighbourhood committees to maintain security, as it lacks the fighters and resources it would need to saturate the territory. This deficiency and its lack of local knowledge has led it to often rely on pre-existing structures that ISIS created to co-opt tribes as informants for the group’s security branches. Today, the SDF uses them for the exact same purpose. Thus, in Deir al-Zour some of the SDF’s local intermediaries, who once similarly cooperated with ISIS, today turn a profit by securing the release of ISIS followers in exchange for money and (not necessarily reliable) information. Acting on such undependable intelligence, the YPG has frequently mistakenly directed resources to fighting ISIS in areas where it was not present, while missing actual ISIS activity. On a number of occasions, these misbegotten operations have led to civilian casualties; such incidents, in turn, have fuelled tensions with locals.

In addition to those who were released or never apprehended, many former militants escaped detention. Local security structures in eastern Syria are decentralised and dominated by tribes within the SDF that run detention centres and often feud. The loose supervision of these detention centres and frequent corruption among local SDF groups allowed a number of detained fighters to escape with outside help. During a series of hiatuses in the fight against ISIS in Deir al-Zour between November 2017 and December 2018, smuggling networks facilitated such escapes and sold off captured weapons at rock-bottom prices.

B. Deteriorating Relations between the SDF and Local Tribes

A widening rift with tribes in eastern Syria is undermining the SDF’s ability to wage counter-insurgency. It also often leads the SDF to respond to growing local protests with heavy-handed tactics that cause civilian casualties and fuel grievances. Residents are angered by poor service provision and often abusive and corrupt SDF security agents; these factors contribute to tensions with some tribes, which increasingly refuse to cooperate in anti-ISIS actions and are pulling out of SDF security structures. Some prominent tribal figures in eastern Syria are vexed by what they describe as lax SDF security measures, which they blame for enabling ISIS to step up its hit-and-run attacks on local Arabs. Some tribes fear that cooperation with the SDF puts them at risk of being targeted by ISIS, at a time when they feel the SDF neglects security. It was not always so: in the weeks following ISIS’s territorial defeat, the Baggara and Ageidat, eastern Syria’s largest tribe and tribal confederation, respectively, worked closely with the SDF, volunteering many of their youth and providing intelligence on ISIS supporters.

The SDF [...] coordinated with U.S. diplomats on sensitive political issues.

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Tensions with the SDF coupled with uncertainty regarding continued U.S. protection has led some tribes to pursue alternative alliances in order to feel safe. In addition to procuring light and medium-range arms, some sought a rapprochement with Damascus. For example, the “public relations office” of the Sheaitat, a tribe in eastern Syria, went to Damascus to obtain pardons for their members. Members of other tribes quietly revived their allegiance to ISIS to protect themselves from the group.

To some degree, growing local defiance vis-à-vis the SDF explains the level of protection ISIS cells enjoy in eastern Syria, where they are semi-structured, sometimes visible and invariably embedded in the population. These cells often have mutual “non-aggression” pacts with tribes, arranged through a mix of intimidation and persuasion, playing on the lack of trust between locals and SDF authorities.

C. A Shrinking U.S. Footprint

Uncertainty prompted by Washington’s confused messaging on the future of the U.S. presence in Syria inevitably undermines the YPG’s willingness and ability to stabilise the area. With questions looming about its future and potential vulnerability to Turkish and regime attacks, the Kurdish-dominated force risks being distracted from the task of dismantling remaining ISIS networks. Abrupt decisions and flip-flopping policies, including cuts in stabilisation aid, have also jeopardised the safety of local groups working on U.S.-funded programming and undermined local perceptions of the U.S. as a security guarantor.

Doubt about the future has particularly hindered the SDC’s ability to respond to local needs in areas that suffered massive destruction. Until December 2018, the SDF had been collaborating with dozens of USAID and State Department officials and contractors (under the protection of U.S. troops) in demining and rubble removal, restoring services such as water and electricity, and getting schools and hospitals running again – in short, in making damaged areas liveable. The SDF also coordinated with U.S. diplomats on sensitive political issues, such as the repatriation of foreign ISIS fighters, Arab-Kurdish relations and governance in the predominantly Arab areas under SDF control. This cooperation was part of a longer-term strategy to prevent these areas from becoming an insurgent breeding ground once more. Yet, in the aftermath of Trump’s December 2018 withdrawal announcement, the administration told its diplomats and civilian advisers to evacuate within 24 hours, and counselled diplomats from allied Western nations, who had depended on U.S. military protection, to do the same.

As the U.S. posture veers back and forth, European governments have been reluctant to support YPG-led governance in the north east out of fear of antagonising Turkey, though some have continued to fund early recovery and stabilisation programs.

Military escalation would propel new waves of refugees toward the border.

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As a result, the SDC is struggling even harder than before to address the overwhelming needs in areas its controls. Its difficulties can only heighten local discontent over poor service provision and foster instability. The situation could deteriorate further because the autonomous authority’s legitimacy, which derived from the SDF’s military victory over ISIS, will likely erode as the local population shifts to assessing the SDC on its ability to provide basic services while maintaining security.

Within the Trump administration, some have tried to push back against the cuts. They have sought to frame stabilisation of Syria’s north east as a national security imperative, highlighting the challenges the SDF would face holding thousands of detained ISIS members and policing areas taken from ISIS without continued financial support and military cover. Yet so far they seem to be having little success at convincing their own government or most coalition members to invest additional resources to stabilise areas recaptured from ISIS.

IV. Looking Ahead

A. Avoiding a New War

The U.S. and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS have made great strides. Making their success stick, however, requires stabilising areas taken from ISIS and preventing further military escalation there. For now, the initiative lies with the U.S., as other actors are making their calculations based on what they expect will be the Trump administration’s next move. The U.S. should use the time provided by the president’s about-face to ensure that its withdrawal, when it occurs, does not invite chaos.

The immediate priority should be for the U.S. to secure an arrangement with the YPG and Turkey that dissuades Ankara from attacking or otherwise destabilising the north east in an effort to defeat or degrade the YPG. Military escalation would propel new waves of refugees toward the border and divert YPG forces from fighting ISIS remnants in the Euphrates valley, potentially enabling them to regain their potency and expand to other areas. Past U.S. efforts to assuage Ankara’s strategic concerns since 2015 gained little traction, in part because U.S. officials were reluctant to twist YPG leaders’ arms as long as they depended on the group to conduct major counter-ISIS offensives, particularly in territory far from the YPG’s core majority-Kurdish areas of control; the threat of withholding support rang hollow when the YPG knew how critical it was to the administration’s success. With major ground operations now complete and President Trump clearly keen on eventually withdrawing U.S. troops, Washington arguably is in a stronger position to press the YPG to take steps to address the heart of Turkish concerns.

To date, the U.S. has directed the bulk of its efforts at bridging the gap between the two sides’ conflicting demands for a buffer zone along the Turkey-Syria border. But even should these efforts succeed – and there is no sign that they will – the underlying source of tension will remain and with it, the potential for a Turkish military response to the perceived YPG threat. Accordingly, and regardless of the future of talks over a buffer zone or other stopgap measures, the U.S. should reorient its diplomacy, and leverage its diminishing military presence, toward reaching a political agreement between Turkey and the YPG/PKK. Prospects for a return to the negotiating table seem remote. But the parties might be able to agree on de-escalation that paves the way for an eventual return to talks.

Turkey ought to be receptive to the notion of finding a non-military solution to its dilemma in Syria’s north east. Its capacity to defeat the YPG in open battle is not in doubt; the region’s flat topography strongly favours conventional mechanised warfare. But a Turkish incursion would likely push the YPG back to guerrilla tactics and could fuel the PKK insurgency in Turkey. In addition, a Turkey-YPG conflict in north-eastern Syria would further strain Ankara’s already tense relations with Washington; it could backfire, persuading the U.S. to prolong its military presence in the north east in order to defend the YPG.

PKK leader Öcalan called on the SDF to pursue solutions in Syria through means other than armed conflict.

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As noted, the YPG likewise should see recent developments as reasons to reach an understanding with Ankara. The main factor that currently protects the YPG from both Turkey and Russian-backed regime forces is the U.S. military presence. That umbrella is far from secure or guaranteed, however. Concessions on governance and security control the U.S. might demand in exchange of a deal with Turkey, while hard to accept, likely would serve the YPG’s longer-term interests in protecting its hard-fought gains.

Any U.S.-mediated agreement would need to address Turkey’s two major concerns: preventing the emergence of a PKK-affiliated statelet south of its border and blocking YPG involvement in an insurgency against Turkish personnel in Afrin or – via the PKK – inside Turkey. It also would need to offer the YPG protection from a battle it would surely lose and give it the kind of international legitimacy that it yearns for but lacks. Under such an understanding:

The YPG would lessen its control over governance, resources and security in Syria’s north east; in particular, it would need to phase out the parallel control it now wields over governance and security structures through its PKK-trained cadres, which Turkey regards as steps toward the creation of a PKK-affiliated statelet. It should devolve authority to bodies that are efficient and enjoy local buy-in rather than evince loyalty to the YPG/PKK.



True, PKK-trained cadres played a crucial role in stabilising areas newly captured from ISIS. But their presence now comes at a high political cost and makes these areas a military target for Ankara. At the same time, the YPG should remove all its non-Syrian cadres from governing positions, replacing them with local technocrats, and remove all PKK insignia from north-eastern Syria.



There is reason to believe the PKK leadership might be ripe for such gestures. In May 2019, PKK leader Öcalan called on the SDF to pursue solutions in Syria through means other than armed conflict. This seeming willingness to de-escalate tensions with Turkey and push for a political arrangement that would include Syria’s north east – while still unproven – merits being tested by Ankara and Washington. To be sure, PKK concessions might appear unpalatable to its leaders and cadres unless matched by reciprocal steps from Ankara demonstrating that it embraces priorities broadly held among Turkey’s Kurdish population, including reinstating local and national politicians who were removed from office, releasing those imprisoned, providing mother-tongue education and enabling a form of decentralisation. Ultimately, however, as Crisis Group has previously argued, the YPG will find it increasingly difficult to both maintain its control over north-eastern Syria and preserve its ties to the PKK while the latter maintains its insurgency in Turkey.



True, PKK-trained cadres played a crucial role in stabilising areas newly captured from ISIS. But their presence now comes at a high political cost and makes these areas a military target for Ankara. At the same time, the YPG should remove all its non-Syrian cadres from governing positions, replacing them with local technocrats, and remove all PKK insignia from north-eastern Syria. There is reason to believe the PKK leadership might be ripe for such gestures. In May 2019, PKK leader Öcalan called on the SDF to pursue solutions in Syria through means other than armed conflict. This seeming willingness to de-escalate tensions with Turkey and push for a political arrangement that would include Syria’s north east – while still unproven – merits being tested by Ankara and Washington. To be sure, PKK concessions might appear unpalatable to its leaders and cadres unless matched by reciprocal steps from Ankara demonstrating that it embraces priorities broadly held among Turkey’s Kurdish population, including reinstating local and national politicians who were removed from office, releasing those imprisoned, providing mother-tongue education and enabling a form of decentralisation. Ultimately, however, as Crisis Group has previously argued, the YPG will find it increasingly difficult to both maintain its control over north-eastern Syria and preserve its ties to the PKK while the latter maintains its insurgency in Turkey. Through U.S.-Turkish joint patrols and other mechanisms along the Syria-Turkey border, Turkey could monitor the removal of all YPG heavy weaponry to, say, 20km from the border and deter smuggling, including via tunnels, between Syria and Turkey and between Syria and Iraq.



The YPG should cease its insurgency against Turkish personnel and proxies in Afrin. In return, Turkey should address the property and security concerns of Afrin’s native inhabitants by ending violations perpetrated by the armed groups it supports there. Turkey should also allow the return of those who have been displaced from Afrin as a result of its military operations in the district.



Turkey should drop its veto over SDC inclusion in the UN-led political process. Enabling the SDC to participate could encourage the organisation’s Syria focus and help cement its commitment to settling the status of the north east through the framework of a multilateral nationwide agreement that preserves Syria’s territorial integrity. Ankara wields significant influence within the political process, thanks to its leverage over the Syrian opposition and role in northern Syria. It is well positioned to ensure that any eventual agreement takes into account Turkish national security concerns.



The U.S. should cease discouraging the YPG from reaching arrangements with Damascus, recognising that the north east’s future rests in its reintegration in the Syrian state. In the same spirit, it should refrain from using YPG control over natural resources as a tool to pressure and weaken Damascus. Pursuing the current approach would diminish odds of a sustainable political settlement for the north east and render SDF-controlled territory more vulnerable to regime attacks or destabilisation attempts through local proxies.

The primary obstacle to a broader agreement between Damascus and the YPG has been both parties’ tendency to cling to maximalist positions, in the belief that waiting out their opponent would yield better results than compromising. The U.S. and broader coalition in principle could help loosen that knot by signalling to the regime that it will not recover the resource-rich north east without offering substantial concessions on local autonomy (or substantive decentralisation) to the YPG; and by making clear to the YPG that U.S. protection is not permanent.

More than 3,000 foreign children who are in makeshift camps in north-eastern Syria are innocent victims of the conflict.

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Persuading the regime to display flexibility likely will require an equally clear message from Russia that it is committed to a negotiated solution for the north east and will not back a regime offensive, even after a U.S. withdrawal. In so doing, Moscow could accomplish its goals of helping the regime assert its control over the area and preserving the state’s territorial integrity. What is more, if Russia wishes to see the end of the U.S. presence, it is more likely to occur if the YPG and Damascus reach agreement on the future of areas currently outside of regime control in a manner that both is acceptable to Turkey and keeps Iran-affiliated groups out of the north east. By contrast, a contrary approach – ie, an effort by the regime and its backers, whether Iran or Russia, to press the U.S. to withdraw via escalation and/or destabilisation – could provoke U.S. counter-escalation and reinforce in Washington’s eyes the strategic importance of eastern Syria and thus of its continued presence there.

B. Avoiding an ISIS Resurgence

The Global Coalition should revitalise its approach to stabilising the north east by supporting an inte­grated civilian-military process in which local Arab authorities play a central role. Such a process, which would help consolidate security gains in ISIS-affected areas, likely will require external pressure on the YPG to devolve authority to local governing bodies, including local security actors, to avoid backlash from which ISIS would benefit. Local forces are less likely than the YPG to alienate and anger tribes when conducting counter-insurgency operations; the YPG – which locals view as a band of outsiders – is also prone to using heavy-handed methods and causing civilian casualties, thereby fuelling additional grievances. The YPG will have to establish strong oversight over these local actors, impose strict accountability and follow up quickly on claims of abuse.

An answer is also needed to the challenge posed by ISIS prisons and IDP camps where ISIS families are held. Managing these facilities is stretching the SDF’s capacity beyond breaking point, despite its best efforts. The coalition is rightly concerned about escapes and/or riots that could turn into prison breaks.

Western governments ought to accept responsibility for their own nationals present in these camps. They should urgently repatriate orphaned children and investigate the possibility of returning whole family units. No matter the crimes their parents may have committed, the more than 3,000 foreign children who are in makeshift camps in north-eastern Syria are innocent victims of the conflict. They should be repatriated to their countries of origin.

Coalition partners also need to contribute additional funding and protection to help preserve SDF detention centres that hold foreign fighters. At the same time, they should offer technical and financial assistance to the SDF to enhance its capacity to prosecute Syrian ISIS members in its custody or under its control, including by setting up courts and acceptable detention facilities. Finally, they should aid SDF efforts to reintegrate these former fighters into Syria society. The YPG cannot and should not be expected to address this problem on its own.

V. Conclusion

Ever since Syria descended into chaos, the country’s north east has experienced varying degrees of turbulence. In the north, along the border with Turkey, the YPG has provided a degree of stability in majority-Kurdish areas, even as some of the local population contested its rule. By contrast, majority-Arab areas in the Euphrates valley to the south saw major fighting, including the YPG’s successful campaign, backed by the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, to defeat the Islamic State as it withdrew eastward before making its last stand near the Iraqi border.

Yet ISIS’s territorial defeat did not put an end to the north east’s misery. U.S. support for the SDF was intended to promise quiet through well-funded stabilisation, but the Trump administration’s decision to scale back the U.S. troop presence and freeze stabilisation funds has raised questions about the area’s immediate future. Seeing its enemy exposed, Turkey threatened to enter Syria to fight the YPG as part of its struggle against the PKK; its negotiations with the U.S. to create a buffer zone inside northern Syria to remove the YPG from the border have yet to bear fruit. Impatience in Ankara is visibly mounting. The Syrian regime for its part has made no secret of its ambition to reclaim every inch of Syrian territory, including the north east, now that its confrontation with various rebels has wound down in the rest of Syria minus Idlib.

Trump’s revision of his own decision offers a reprieve, but one of unknown duration. At some point, the U.S. presence will come to an end, and the SDF will be vulnerable to attack in the area it dominates from foes to the north and south. Added to this picture, ISIS remnants are rearing their heads, carrying out assassinations in Arab villages and making the roads unsafe again at night.

The key now is to use the opening created by the prolonged U.S. presence to work on a longer-term, more sustainable arrangement. This task will require both mediating a deal between Turkey and the YPG that addresses the former’s core interests while continuing to protect the latter. And it will require working on an understanding between Damascus and the YPG that re-establishes the state’s presence in the north east while preserving a degree of local autonomy that would protect both Arabs and Kurds living in the area from a coercive regime return. Failure to move on these two fronts could undo the victory over ISIS and reduce an area that appeared to have turned the corner on conflict into violently contested terrain yet again.

Istanbul/Brussels/Deir al-Zour, 31 July 2019

Appendix A: Map of North East Syria

CRISISGROUP

Appendix B: List of Acronyms

ISIS Islamic State in Syria

PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party

PYD Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party)

SDC Syrian Democratic Council

SDF Syrian Democratic Forces

YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection Units)