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A former CIO of the U.S. Department of Justice discusses bureaucratic and other challenges that conspire to shorten a federal CIO’s tenure—and what Congress, agency leadership, and CIOs themselves can do about them.

On average, CIOs employed by the federal government stay in their positions no longer than two years, according to a 2011 study by the General Accounting Office. More recently, the Gartner Executive Programs 2013 CIO Agenda Survey pegged the average tenure of government CIOs around the globe at 3.8 years, compared to an average of 4.8 years in the private sector.

Such findings suggest that job satisfaction is low among many of those charged with keeping America’s increasingly digitized government running. Van Hitch, a former CIO of the U.S. Department of Justice and currently a specialist leader with Deloitte Consulting LLP, understands the challenge of CIO job satisfaction that government agencies currently face. The role of the federal CIO is defined in the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996. Also known as the Clinger-Cohen Act, this legislation describes the functions of the federal CIO position and where it sits within the chain of agency command. According to Hitch, as written Clinger-Cohen represented a step forward for federal IT. Unfortunately, it was implemented in ways that actually put strict limits on CIOs’ authority to make decisions and control budgets.

Hitch shared his thoughts on the challenges of CIO tenure in the public sector:

Why do so many agency CIOs want to leave their jobs after such a short period of time?

Hitch: It’s a very difficult job, and in many ways, a thankless one. I often equate it to running at sprint speed for an entire marathon. Crises arise every day. To keep progress moving on longer term policies and strategic initiatives, agency CIOs must run at peak speed and never slow down.

But is this kind of difficulty unique to the public sector CIO role? Surely private sector CIOs face similar challenges.

The difference lies in the decision-making authority needed to deal effectively with the challenges and crises that come with the job. Private sector CIOs often have it; agency CIOs do not.

Here’s why: Clinger-Cohen clearly gave agency CIOs oversight of IT. Unfortunately, as the law was implemented, the Office of Management and Budget allowed each cabinet agency to implement it differently. As such, CIOs rarely report directly to agency heads, and often they do not control the budget of the IT organizations they oversee. Moreover, many agency CIOs play a minimal role in the selection or evaluation of IT leaders working in various component offices of the larger agency. The net result is that agency CIOs often lack control over or visibility into decisions for which, ultimately, they are held responsible.

How does this CIO revolving door affect agency IT operations and initiatives?

The cost in terms of morale and efficiency can be significant. Leadership changes in any organization can affect productivity. In the absence of strong leadership and clear objectives, employees begin worrying about job security, strategic initiatives lose momentum, and basically everything is put on hold until the new leader is in place. When this happens every two years, the result can be a permanent—and costly—state of bureaucratic inertia. Today, the federal government spends roughly $80 billion annually on IT. I estimate that if agencies could keep strong leaders in place and employees focused and productive, the government could likely save 15 percent of its annual IT outlay, which could then be reinvested in mission-enhancing initiatives.

You served as CIO of the U.S. Department of Justice for more than nine years. What can current agency CIOs do to increase their own job satisfaction while meeting daily challenges more effectively?

The only way a CIO can overcome some of the bureaucratic barriers currently in place is through pure perseverance. In my own situation, I made a point to meet as many people as possible in DOJ, and tried to understand their groups’ missions and the organizational structure in which they operated. I tried to understand how they worked and what their problems were. Then I looked for ways to help them. I would suggest agency CIOs consider this approach. It can help them build political capital, and gain credibility with a complex web of stakeholders and contacts that will, in turn, gain support for CIO efforts.

Is there any chance that Congress might legislatively address the problems introduced by the uneven and limited implementation of Clinger-Cohen?

Currently, reform legislation called the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act is moving through committee, and is expected to come up for a vote as a standalone bill later this year. In part, it gives agency CIOs greater budget authority and more say in the operation of all aspects of agency IT. For example, it would give CIOs a strong vote in hiring and policy decisions for the various IT subgroups within an agency.

Right now, there appears to be bipartisan agreement that something must be done to strengthen the role of the CIO. I believe it will ultimately require a legislative fix because the challenges of bureaucracy and inefficiency have become so ingrained in agency culture. Since Clinger-Cohen became law, each administration has come up with new ideas for addressing problems with government IT. Though well intentioned, all of their proposals have been baby steps in terms of addressing the big structural problems associated with the CIO’s lack of authority and budget control.