The rule, which came into effect in 2015, was always going to create some headaches. Banks trade regularly to meet the demands of customers and to hedge their own risks. The Volcker rule allows that sort of trading, but regulators had to have ways of making sure a bank wasn’t speculating for its own gain under the guise of serving customers or hedging. To do that, the final rule included requirements that effectively forced banks to show that they were only doing the legitimate types of trading. Banks complained about the rule’s complexity, and regulators said it was hard to enforce. The changes proposed on Wednesday give the banks considerable new leeway.

Here are three ways in which traders gain ground.

• Currently, a bank’s short-term trading positions are at the outset presumed to be in violation of the rule, and banks must show that the positions were held to serve customers or hedge. The new Volcker rule presumes compliance. The balance of power will tip immediately to traders from regulators.

• Under the Volcker rule now, banks have to show that trading positions held for customers are in line with what those customers’ might actually demand in the near term. Assessing a legitimate level of demand can be difficult. Customers’ appetites can change quickly – and the metrics used to predict demand were complex. To try and simplify this exercise, the new rule would allow banks to establish ahead of time the “risk limits,” or position sizes, they set for each trading desk. If a bank does not exceed those limits, they would be presumed to have a position that meets customer demand. Regulators on Wednesday said they would try to make sure that the banks’ risk limits was in fact in line with customer demand, but the change clearly gives the initiative to the banks.

• As it was written, the Volcker rule required banks to show carefully and intricately that trades classified as hedges are tied to specific positions and risks. The new rule would remove the requirement that the banks provide an analysis that shows correlation between the hedging trade and the underlying asset being hedged. Banks would also no longer have to show that a hedge “demonstrably reduces or otherwise significantly mitigates” a specific risk. This is a big concession from the regulators. The large trading losses that JPMorgan racked up during the London Whale scandal occurred in part because huge hedging trades got out of hand.

In theory, as they relaxed the Volcker rule, regulators could have found simple new ways to increase the chances of compliance. For instance, they could have strengthened the part of the rule that requires C.E.O.s to attest that their banks are in compliance with the Volcker rule. But no changes appear to give it more bite.