

American spies went out of their way last week, to answer questions about that mysterious nuclear facility that once sat in the Syrian desert. But the spooks' presentation to Congress seems to have raised nearly as a whole heap of new issues, even as it put others to bed.

The question that's coming up the most is: Why now? American and Israeli spies have had clues of Syria and North Korea cooperating to build a nuclear reactor since 1997. Satellite images show the so-called "Al Kibar" facility under construction in 2003. Why wait so long to take the reactor out?

"I think the administration believes it will help them get to a deal with North Korea," Rep. Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, told CNN's "Late Edition."

Gary Samore, with Council on Foreign Relations, comes to a similar conclusion:

For over a year the talks have been stuck over the issue of North Korea making a declaration of all of its nuclear activities. The main question there is North Korea’s refusal to acknowledge a secret uranium-enrichment program and then more recently, its nuclear assistance to Syria. So the administration has made a compromise with

North Korea. In the compromise the North Koreans will declare how much plutonium they’ve produced over the years and instead of North Korea having to directly acknowledge the uranium-enrichment program and their assistance to Syria, the United States will make a statement expressing its belief that these activities have taken place and the North Koreans will not refute or challenge that U.S. statement.

The next question: What was the reactor for, exactly? The Syrian site now known as "Al Kibar" was initially billed in the press as being "virtually identical"

to the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, which has been known to process plutonium of Kim Jong Il's nuclear weapons program. However, as our buddy Jeffrey Lewis notes, the spies' actual claim "was much more careful — that there were

similarities in the configuration and in the size and capacity of the reactor."

But just how similar are the two? Jeffrey and his merry band of nuclear geeks have been taking a very, very careful look over at ArmsControlWonk.com.

It appears that Al Kibar was smaller than Yongbyon. Which means it would make for a less-than-ideal site for arms-production, since it would take a number of years to generate enough plutonium for a bomb.

Officials from the Director of National Intelligence's shop say that

"the reactor inside that building was clearly not configured to produce electricity. We saw no way and there are no power lines coming out of it, none of all the switching facilities that you would need."

Counterpunch quotes Joseph Cirincione, director of nuclear policy at the Center for American Progress, as saying, "It is a basic research program built around a tiny 30 kilowatt reactor that produced a few isotopes and neutrons. It is nowhere near a program for nuclear weapons or nuclear fuel."

But Jeffrey figures its probably too soon to jump to conclusions. "There's a lot that doesn't add up yet," according to the Wonk – like why the Syrians didn't properly defend this oh-so-important facility, for instance.

While we're all trying to figure this out, the irreplaceable Allen Thomson has put together an 812-page sourcebook on the Syrian affair. "Additional information would be welcome," he says.

UPDATE: More mysteries. The *L.A. Times' Babylon & Beyond *blog picks up on some possible Photoshop shenanigans in the spies' recent Al Kibar presentation.

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