In 1999, Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire battled for the National League home run title, just one year after their record-setting chase that ended with both breaking Roger Maris‘ single season home run record. On September 18, 1999, Sosa drilled a Jason Bere offering over the ivy at Wrigley for his sixtieth home run of the season, becoming the first man to hit sixty roundtrippers in two separate seasons. McGwire became the second man to accomplish this feat eight days later and again beat Sosa out for the home run crown, 65 to 63. Though both again bested Maris’ old record, their 1999 campaign is now a footnote to the history of the home run chase that re-energized baseball in the late 90’s.

Just as an out-of-the-blue bolt of plate discipline presaged Sosa’s assent, his decline might have been predicted by his tendency to swing and miss that haunted him even in his stellar 1999 season. Sosa swung at and missed 475 pitches in his record-setting 1999 campaign. This is the highest total for any major-league batter over the last five seasons and isn’t the “swing and a miss!” call of the announcer the cruelest fate in baseball? But what does it mean in the greater scheme?

Does having a tendency to swing and miss more than most impair a batter’s productivity as we have been told since Little League? Do batters with better batting eyes tend to be more productive than the average batter? Is it better to be patient at the plate or go for the first pitch you can hit? Does this data tell us anything new and could that be used to help build a better team or find successful players?

First, let’s take at the Sosa-inspired SAM (Swing And Miss) batter. As you can see from this list of the leaders in swinging strikes over the past five seasons, the concept is aptly named:

Swinging Player Year Strikes Home Runs Strikeouts --------------------------------------------------------- Sammy Sosa 1999 475 63 171 Sammy Sosa 2001 431 64 153 Sammy Sosa 2000 422 50 168 Alfonso Soriano 2002 406 39 157 Mo Vaughn 2000 405 36 181 Jim Thome 2003 403 47 182 Preston Wilson 2000 394 31 187 Richie Sexson 2001 389 45 178 Jim Thome 2000 387 37 171 Sammy Sosa 2002 385 49 144 Dean Palmer 1999 383 38 153 Jacque Jones 2002 374 27 129 Richie Sexson 2000 372 30 159 Craig Wilson 2004 371 29 169 Jose Hernandez 2002 365 24 188

If this is any indication, then a large number of swinging strikes does not appear to be a detriment to one’s ability to produce. All of the batters listed had some degree of offensive success–the lowest home run total is 24. However, they struck out a ton. Does power hitting require this type of all or nothing approach?

Perhaps a glimpse at the other end of the spectrum will shed some light. Here are the batters who collected the lowest number of swinging strikes while batting enough to qualify for a batting title:

Swinging Player Year Strikes Home Runs Strikeouts -------------------------------------------------------- Brian Roberts 2003 54 5 58 Placido Polanco 2003 57 14 38 Juan Pierre 2003 58 1 35 David Eckstein 2003 59 3 45 Juan Pierre 2001 63 2 29 Juan Pierre 2004 63 3 35 Placido Polanco 2004 63 17 39 Eric Young 1999 64 2 26 Luis Castillo 2001 67 2 90 Mark Grace 2001 68 15 36 Jason Kendall 2002 68 3 29 Luis Castillo 2003 70 6 60 Fernando Vina 2002 71 1 36 Scott Hatteberg 2003 71 12 53 Scott Hatteberg 2004 72 15 48 Mark Grace 2000 73 11 28 Brian Giles 2002 74 38 74

There is not a lot of power there. You should note the exception is Brian Giles and his 38 dingers in 2002. Clearly, there seems to be some relationship between high swinging strike totals and high home run totals, but it is far from absolute.

Let’s take a look at a few examples to see if swinging strikes have plagued those batters’ careers:

Sammy Sosa:

Strikes Total Yr Swinging Pitches HR Strikeouts BA OPS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1999 475 2889 63 171 .288 1.002 2000 422 2956 50 168 .320 1.040 2001 431 2867 64 153 .328 1.174 2002 385 2746 49 144 .288 .993 2003 349 2363 40 143 .279 .911 2004 319 2158 35 133 .253 .849

Adam Dunn, who set the new single-season strikeout record last year:

Strikes Total Yr Swinging Pitches HR Strikeouts BA OPS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2001 120 1185 19 74 .262 .948 2002 300 2945 26 170 .249 .854 2003 213 2032 27 126 .215 .819 2004 301 2895 46 195 .266 .956

Jose Hernandez, who came close to breaking the record a couple of times:

Strikes Total Yr Swinging Pitches HR Strikeouts BA OPS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1999 261 2311 19 145 .266 .764 2000 240 2005 11 125 .244 .687 2001 348 2367 25 185 .249 .743 2002 365 2384 24 188 .288 .834 2003 343 2253 13 177 .225 .634 2004 117 930 13 61 .289 .910

Barry Bonds, who has had a remarkably low number of swinging strikes especially considering his home run totals:

Strikes Total Yr Swinging Pitches HR Strikeouts BA OPS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1999 111 1700 34 62 .262 1.006 2000 141 2381 49 77 .306 1.127 2001 141 2678 73 93 .328 1.379 2002 104 2397 46 47 .370 1.381 2003 123 2185 45 58 .341 1.278 2004 85 2425 45 41 .362 1.422

Do you have to swing big to connect big? There seems to be a bias towards the “three true outcomes”–walk, strikeout, homerun–that typify the careers of Rob Deer and Dave Kingman. The insights from the MLB.com database are plentiful. At the heart of this, what we want to know is how often a batter sees a hittable pitch but misses. Total number of pitches does not capture that. Certain types of pitches such as called balls must be ignored–credit cannot be given for not swinging at those.

We must first define what is and is not a hittable pitch. We can say with confidence that every pitch that a batter swung at, successfully or unsuccessfully, was hittable. Watching too many games with Vladimir Guerrero or Alfonso Soriano can shake this assumption. SAM will then be the number of times a batter swung and missed (including bunts) divided by the hittable pitches that a batter saw: called strikes, swinging strikes, fouls, foul tips, and balls in play (including bunt attempts). Balls called, intentional balls, hit by a pitch, and all pitchout attempts are not considered hittable. The assumption is that a batter is never required to swing at a ball.

Now, here are the highest SAM totals for all batters who qualified for the batting title, 1999-2004:

Name Yr SAM HR SO BB BA OBP SLUG OPS ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sammy Sosa 1999 .283 63 171 78 .288 .367 .635 1.002 Sammy Sosa 2001 .272 64 153 116 .328 .437 .737 1.174 Jacque Jones 2002 .254 27 129 37 .300 .341 .511 .852 Dean Palmer 1999 .252 38 153 57 .263 .339 .518 .857 Richie Sexson 2000 .251 30 159 59 .272 .349 .499 .848 Jose Hernandez 2002 .249 24 188 52 .288 .356 .478 .834 Andres Galarraga 2000 .249 28 126 36 .302 .369 .526 .895 Sammy Sosa 2000 .249 50 168 91 .320 .406 .634 1.040 Jim Thome 2003 .248 47 182 111 .266 .385 .573 .958 Greg Vaughn 1999 .248 45 137 85 .245 .347 .535 .881 Sammy Sosa 2004 .248 35 133 56 .253 .332 .517 .849 Sammy Sosa 2002 .247 49 144 103 .288 .399 .594 .993 Sammy Sosa 2003 .247 40 143 62 .279 .358 .553 .911 Craig Wilson 2004 .247 29 169 50 .264 .354 .499 .853 Mo Vaughn 2000 .245 36 181 79 .272 .365 .498 .864 Jeromy Burnitz 2004 .244 37 124 58 .283 .356 .559 .916 Jose Hernandez 2003 .243 13 177 46 .225 .287 .347 .634 Richie Sexson 2001 .239 45 178 60 .271 .342 .547 .889 Jim Thome 2000 .239 37 171 118 .269 .398 .531 .929 Mo Vaughn 1999 .238 33 127 54 .281 .358 .508 .866 Geoff Jenkins 2003 .237 28 120 58 .296 .375 .538 .913 Greg Vaughn 2001 .235 24 130 71 .233 .333 .433 .766 Preston Wilson 2000 .234 31 187 55 .264 .331 .486 .817 Mark McGwire 1999 .233 65 141 133 .278 .424 .697 1.120 Jose Hernandez 2001 .232 25 185 39 .249 .300 .443 .743 Jacque Jones 2004 .232 24 117 40 .254 .315 .427 .742 Vinny Castilla 2001 .232 25 108 35 .260 .308 .467 .775

SAMmy, indeed! Sosa himself is the archetype for the free-swinging, powerful slugger (or he was before 2005…). Only Jose Hernandez really defies the typecasting, though Jacque Jones is no lumbering basher. The low of 13 stands out due to the 30, 40 and even 50 and 60 home run seasons represented. Perhaps it is more telling to note that the OPS is skewed more towards the exceptional.

Now here are the lowest:

Name Yr SAM HR SO BB BA OBP SLUG OPS Juan Pierre 2003 .035 1 35 55 .305 .361 .373 .734 Juan Pierre 2004 .036 3 35 45 .326 .374 .407 .781 Brian Roberts 2003 .043 5 58 46 .270 .337 .367 .704 Luis Castillo 2001 .044 2 90 67 .263 .344 .341 .685 Juan Pierre 2001 .044 2 29 41 .327 .378 .415 .793 Jason Kendall 2004 .044 3 41 60 .319 .399 .390 .789 David Eckstein 2003 .045 3 45 36 .252 .325 .325 .651 Luis Castillo 2003 .045 6 60 63 .314 .381 .397 .778 David Eckstein 2004 .048 2 49 42 .276 .339 .332 .671 Jason Kendall 2002 .048 3 29 49 .283 .350 .356 .706 Chuck Knoblauch 1999 .048 18 57 83 .292 .393 .454 .848 Omar Vizquel 1999 .048 5 50 65 .333 .397 .436 .833 Placido Polanco 2003 .049 14 38 42 .289 .352 .447 .799 Scott Hatteberg 2004 .049 15 48 72 .284 .367 .420 .787 Luis Castillo 2004 .049 2 68 75 .291 .373 .348 .720 David Eckstein 2002 .049 8 44 45 .293 .363 .388 .752 David Eckstein 2001 .049 4 60 43 .285 .355 .357 .712 Scott Hatteberg 2003 .049 12 53 66 .253 .342 .383 .725 Fernando Vina 2002 .050 1 36 44 .270 .333 .338 .670 Jason Kendall 2003 .050 6 40 49 .325 .399 .416 .815 Placido Polanco 2004 .050 17 39 27 .298 .345 .441 .786 Paul Lo Duca 2002 .051 10 31 34 .281 .330 .402 .731 Luis Castillo 2000 .052 2 86 78 .334 .418 .388 .806 Omar Vizquel 2002 .053 14 64 56 .275 .341 .418 .759 Eric Young 2000 .053 6 39 63 .297 .367 .399 .766 Mark Loretta 2004 .053 16 45 58 .335 .391 .495 .886 Luis Castillo 2002 .053 2 76 55 .305 .364 .361 .726

Maybe we should have called it the Juan! As a group, the high SAM batters are clearly more valuable. Again, the highest OPS on the low SAM groups barely make register when compared to the high SAM group.

Using the data for all batters who met the batting title eligibility requirements, the data was checked for correlations between SAM and a number of conventional baseball stats. The only thing that seems to be affected by the free-swinging high SAM scores are strikeouts. This is not much of a news flash.

The surprising part is that it does not seem to lead to more conclusions. A high SAM does seem to lead to more home runs and slightly more power. However, one would expect that free swingers walk less frequently. That’s the conventional wisdom, but the facts don’t bear that out. Actually, walks per plate appearance ever so slightly tend to increase with a higher SAM. One would also expect that all the hacking would lead to fewer appearances on the basepaths. Again, it just isn’t so. On-Base Percentages are barely affected.

When someone swings so freely, does it affect the kinds of pitches he sees? Does he get fewer hittable pitches? Hittable pitches in the strike zone? Does he end up doing the pitcher a favor by going down on strikes on fewer pitches? Are free swingers continually behind in the count, are at least more so than the average batter? Do young batters swing more freely than veterans?

Actually, the answer to all these questions is “no.” None of the associated statistics has anything whatsoever to do with SAM.

In the end, high SAM scores do not really help us to define a hitter. Yes, they strike out a lot. Yes, the big swings do lead to slightly more power. But aside from those factors, free swingers are not a homogeneous group. Some run deep counts. Some don’t. Some get on base often. Some draw walks more often. Some get pitched around more often. But in all these cases, some don’t. Some are young. Some are old. Also, however you want to evaluate batters overall, there’s no way to say that high SAMs lead to more or less effective batters.

Again, conventional wisdom dictates that batters who swing and miss more often are a drag on the batting order. However, nothing seems to indicate that. This begs a question. A favorite stathead of ours asks “If we know that a high SAM rate does not necessarily lead to a low walk rate, what does that mean about these players? Is it their superior batting eye that enables them to cut loose more often? Or does it suggest that if they took shorter, more controlled swings, they might miss less and maybe hit for a higher average, but at the expense of the slugging ability that is the key to their offensive value?” It’s something we hope we can answer soon.

But perhaps we’re being too hasty. SAM may not equate to certain characteristics in analysis of all players. However, for an individual player, could a change in SAM portend a change in other characteristics for that player? If he swings and misses more often, does his on-base average drop? If he cuts down on his SAM, do his homers go up?

We looked again to the data, comparing the statistics of all of the players who batted enough to qualify for a batting title over the last five years from one season to the next. For each of these two-year pairings, the average player’s SAM went from .132 in year one to .130 in year two. As a whole, SAM had very little variance from year to year, supporting our fledgling stat SAM as a true measure of a consistent characteristic of a player.

Given that, what are the largest one-year swings and what has that meant for the given player’s performance? Let’s take a look:

Prev Yr Yr Name SAM SAM SAM Diff Prev Yr OPS OPS OPS Diff 2002 Alfonso Soriano .156 .220 .064 .736 .880 .143 2004 Ron Belliard .076 .138 .062 .760 .774 .014 2001 Andruw Jones .144 .199 .055 .907 .772 -.135 2002 Jim Edmonds .139 .194 .054 .974 .981 .007 2002 Jacque Jones .199 .254 .054 .751 .852 .101 2002 Corey Koskie .155 .203 .049 .850 .815 -.035 2004 Bret Boone .141 .188 .047 .902 .740 -.162 2000 Vladimir Guerrero .163 .208 .044 .978 1.074 .096 2004 Jose Valentin .154 .197 .043 .776 .760 -.016 2003 Jim Thome .205 .248 .043 1.122 .958 -.164 2002 Aramis Ramirez .147 .187 .040 .885 .666 -.219 2001 Manny Ramirez .165 .202 .036 1.154 1.014 -.140 2004 Adam Kennedy .111 .146 .035 .743 .757 .014 2004 Carlos Pena .174 .206 .033 .772 .810 .038 2001 Jeromy Burnitz .184 .216 .032 .811 .851 .039 2000 Richie Sexson .219 .251 .032 .818 .848 .030

Now here are the largest one-year declines in SAM:

Prev Yr Yr Name SAM SAM SAM Diff Prev Yr OPS OPS OPS Diff 2002 Manny Ramirez .202 .117 -.085 1.014 1.097 .083 2000 Damion Easley .180 .115 -.065 .779 .766 -.013 2002 Vinny Castilla .232 .176 -.056 .775 .616 -.158 2003 Corey Koskie .203 .150 -.053 .815 .845 .030 2004 Shea Hillenbrand .118 .070 -.048 .782 .812 .030 2000 Dean Palmer .252 .204 -.048 .857 .809 -.048 2004 Pat Burrell .186 .139 -.047 .713 .821 .107 2000 Carlos Delgado .192 .146 -.046 .948 1.134 .186 2000 Juan Encarnacion .206 .161 -.046 .736 .764 .027 2001 Jason Kendall .109 .063 -.045 .882 .693 -.189 2002 Scott Spiezio .125 .081 -.044 .764 .807 .044 2001 Steve Finley .132 .089 -.043 .904 .767 -.137 2002 Albert Pujols .149 .108 -.041 1.013 .955 -.058 2003 Derrek Lee .189 .149 -.040 .872 .888 .016 2000 Alex Rodriguez .195 .155 -.040 .943 1.026 .083 2004 Brad Wilkerson .173 .133 -.040 .844 .872 .028 2004 Mark Kotsay .137 .098 -.040 .726 .829 .102

Then a change in a batter’s SAM doesn’t correspond to a change in his value as a batter, if OPS is any indication–that is, at least not for the extremes. What about the relationship overall for all players?

The verdict is that OPS has nothing whatsoever to do with changes in a player’s SAM. Neither do OBP, Slugging percentage, isolated power, batting average, walks per plate appearance, home runs per plate appearance, pitches per plate appearance, hittable pitches per plate appearance, or balls per plate appearance. Strikeouts per plate appearance were just about the only stat that increased with an increase in SAM.

The next time that the announcer’s voice drips with disgust at a swinging strike, remember that overall, the big whiffs are meaningless. It won’t help when that last strike ends the game, leaving the bases loaded in the ninth, but it might end the bias against the free swingers that baseball’s held for decades. A strikeout, it turns out, is just another out. Take your cuts, men.

Mike Carminati writes for Baseball Toaster and hopes the Phillies are paying attention.