There is a raw qualitative feel or a “what it is like” to have a mental state such as a pain. [No physical state has this quality]

Many mental states have intentionality—ofness or aboutness—directed toward an object (e.g., a thought is about the moon). [A physical state can’t be of or about anything]

Mental states are inner, private and immediate to the subject having them. [No physical state is private or limited to one individual’s perception]

Mental states fail to have crucial features (e.g., spatial extension, location) that characterize physical states and, in general, cannot be described using physical language). [A thought, for example, doesn’t occupy space, possess mass, or obey the laws of physics]

J. P. Moreland, “The Image of God and the Failure of Scientific Atheism,” in God is Great, God is Good (IVP 2009), p. 38.

Thus, mental states cannot be merely physical events in the brain. The better explanation for these qualities of mental events is a substantial self that transcends the physical world – i.e., a soul.



