Washington Kurdish Institute

August 20, 2019

Robert Sanford

Ever since the United States began its support of the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, under the Obama Administration, U.S.-Turkey relations have declined steadily. In July, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent over 10,000 of his troops to the Syrian border, and by the beginning of August, he had declared his intention to invade the territory “east of the Euphrates” – in other words, territory under the protection of the SDF. The SDF was vital in defeating the terrorist group Daesh, but Turkey views the multi-ethnic, multi-religious group as a threat to its sovereignty given its Kurdish roots.

Under the protection of the SDF, northeastern Syria has flourished into an oasis of stability in war-torn Syria. This was only possible through the work of the Syrian Democratic Council, the SDF’s political wing, which created a decentralized governing body based on ethnic equality and self-determination. In light of Turkish aggression, this system and the hundreds of thousands of civilians it serves are under threat. American diplomats appeared to delay a potential invasion via an August 7th agreement with their Turkish counterparts, but the implications of that agreement remain unclear.

To learn more about both the origins and current situation of Syrian Democratic Council, the Washington Kurdish Institute spoke with Bassam Ishak, one the SDC’s lead representatives in the United States and the president of the Syriac National Council.

To begin, I asked Mr. Ishak about the origins of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC)



So, it was announced in Syria late 2013 and then, I announced it in Europe myself, then Ilham Ehmad and Salih Muslim in Switzerland, in Geneva, in January of 2014. Many things came together, actually, for this to happen. I can speak for the Syriac situation; I was at the Syrian National Council, and in late 2012, we started the Syriac National Council in Istanbul. At the time, I was a member of the Syrian National Council’s General Secretariat. We were like 33 people, and I was one of two Syriacs, one of three Christians, on the council at the time. And [Jabhat] al-Nusra came into Hasakah, but even before that, the Kurdish parties in northeast Syria started the Kurdish National Council, and the Arabs started a couple of councils, the tribal Arabs of Jazira of northeast Syria.

And we [Syriacs] felt like we needed to say that there is a rainbow, and we are here too, and we need to be a voice for pluralism – that this is not just about ethnicities and one powerful ethnic group or another powerful ethnic group, that even smaller groups are there, and it’s really a pluralistic Syria. So, our goal was not just to defend the cause of the Syriacs, but really the cause of pluralism and diversity, and to address issues like how could Syrian people find unity through our diversity, not by the Ba’ath party ideology and practice of imposing unity through imposing Arab identity on all Syrians. We thought that this was actually feeding conflict rather than resolving conflict.

The other thing was that also pressed us to [start] the Syriac National Council was the al-Nusra invasion of Raas al-Ein (Sara Kani) in northeast Syria. Once they invaded, the Syriac Christians and other Christians of that Raas al-Ein became a target of al-Nusra. They took over their churches. They arrested some Christians because they were Ba’athists or they were accused of being agents of the regime. That started a mass emigration of Christians from northeast Syria. Now, of course, we wanted to do something about this, and as a first step, we started the Syriac National Council. It was mostly Syriac NGOs in Syria and outside of Syria. At the time, they were mostly outside of Syria because we had not organized them inside of Syria, but eventually they were organized in Syria. The Syriac Unity Party, for example, joined us, and it was established in Syria and it started the Syriac police force, Sutoro, and the idea actually came after the Self-Administration was started. It was started in three cantons in northeast Syria, Jazira, Kobani, and Afrin. These were regions that had either a majority Kurd population, like Afrin or Kobani, or a mix, a population of Arabs, Syriac Christians and Kurds, like in Jazira. So, the pluralistic model could be demonstrated in Jazira because you have three major ethnic groups, but many other groups as well, like Armenians, Chechens, and others. So, this was al-Jazira, the land where this pluralistic model would be tested because [the region is] really pluralistic. But for us, as Syriacs, we kind of ended up there through several steps. It didn’t happen immediately. So at first, as I said, we started the council, the Syriac [National] Council in Istanbul because we were, at the time, and with the Syrian National Council.

The people who were in it were not all the Syriacs, you know, it was the Syriac Unity Party and several independent Syriac political figures and some Syriac NGOs. We also had Syriac people in the Assyrian Democratic Organization, but we wanted to have a council in the name of Syriacs because their identity was being targeted, and the Assyrian organization wanted to emphasize the name ‘Assyrian,’ but we wanted to emphasize Syriac. So, in that way, it didn’t include everybody, but we felt it included enough people to really be a voice that represents the aspiration of Syriac Syrians for a Syria that is pluralistic that would be based on citizenship, but also respects ethnic identities, recognizes and respects the cultures, and even political representations.

We felt that for a democracy to succeed in a diverse country, ethnically and religiously, like Syria, it would require both addressing individual freedoms and needs, and as the revolution said, dignity to individuals and also to groups. Many in the [Syrian] opposition would say dignity to the individuals, but in my experience with the Syrian National Council and throughout my conversations, they really meant dignity for the largest group. And look, I respect these guys. I think they do it intuitively. They take for granted that everybody is the majority, you know, but then they don’t have sensitivity we have because we are minorities –but, [to be fair] to these young guys I watched in Damascus during peaceful demonstration who died and faced bullets with their chests– those guys who were chanting for dignity, they meant all Syrians. So, this is why I’m actually helping the majority to be faithful to these people’s sacrifice, that the democracy respects the dignity of all Syrians. I am not anti-majority, I am not against any Syrian groups, we are not as Syriacs, but we want to be a voice for pluralism and for dignity for all individuals. This our message, this is our goal now.

Mr. Ishak also spoke about the role of faith in the SDC’s creation. As northeastern Syria is diverse in religion, interfaith dialogue was essential to its success.

So, I organized through an NGO in DC called the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, a faith-based reconciliation workshop and mediator. The idea was to bring people from diverse religious backgrounds and from northeast Syria –Muslims, Christians– and also to bring different ethnicities –Kurds, Syriacs ,and Arabs– to try to address the question of how we want to live together in northeast Syria. The reason I chose a faith-based [organization] is because of the religious diversity. And because our culture is faith-based, even though we may be from different political affiliations, even some of us who may be communists and anti-religion [laughs], still, it’s this part of the culture. It’s been there for years, hundreds and thousands of years. So, it was very successful. And of course, the day before we started the workshop, Turkey objected to PYD participating in the workshop. So, it was very awkward to disinvite PYD, but still the Kurdish National Council came and the leadership participated, and many NGOs from inside Qamishli and Jazira came.

I asked Mr. Ishak about the SDC’s current operations, goals, and struggles, beginning with whether or not it had a presence in Europe.

Yes. Well, actually the SDC started first operating in Europe, where many Syrians had gone to live in Europe, as many Syrian politicians went and became, you know, political refugees there and many of them who are for our vision. You know, we have supporters, but in time, you realize that it needs representation in the U.S. because we have the military, SDF allied with the US, we need to also have a political voice that explains really what is our vision and also to counter these Turkish and other ultra-Arab nationalist, you know, defamation, you know, and labeling of us as terrorists. I mean here, we’re fighting ISIS and terrorism with the help of the international coalition led by the US, but they call us terrorists because they’re trying to make a connection between the YPG/YPJ and the PKK. I mean, why don’t they make an ideological connection between PYD and HDP? You know, they’re trying to diminish this political agenda, which actually is the target, you know, and painted like this is terrorism, and I think it’s a big mistake if the U.S. and Europe surrenders to this effort because in a way you are surrendering to ISIS ideology. What’s the point of defeating ISIS militarily but losing the ideological war in Syria? That means ISIS will be rebrand and come again under new names, and as we saw in Iraq. And the other problem, the other lesson from Iraq that we’re trying to learn from in Syria is that we want decentralization for all Syria, not just for one group, like what happened in Iraq. So now, you have just the federation for the Kurds in Iraq, but you don’t have a federation for other [demographics] in Iraq where it will take into consideration empowering locals. Because if the locals are empowered, then power is not centered in Iraq, in Baghdad, [and] then probably we wouldn’t have seen ISIS come up, you know, if it’s done the right way. We think with decentralization in Syria, we could influence rural Syria that is very conservative and is a hub for religious extremist ideology because we’re going to live with these people, you know, so we need to work on the cultural change, the cultural revolution, which means really fighting ISIS ideologically. But we are not given the space to do that.

We are not being recognized politically, and we’re not being allowed to be a part of the political conversation. Now today, we hope that this US-Turkish agreement or understanding could be a step in the right direction, and we hope, eventually, we’ll be in a political atmosphere where we can directly talk with all parties involved in the Syrian issue, the regional, the national, and the local, internal Syrian parties because we believe that it’s only through peaceful negotiation that we can achieve a political solution.

Mr. Ishak also responded to an August 7th statement by Turkish and American officials regarding northeast Syria. The statement said that the pair of governments had reached an agreement on a “safe zone,” but it provided few specifics.

Now we’re still vague on the details, but we don’t necessarily see this as negative. We feel like this is just a step of defusing the war conversation and giving more space to political dialogue and political action.

President Erdogan’s government has threatened a military incursion for months, increasing its aggressive anti-Kurdish rhetoric and sending thousands of troops to the Syrian border. I asked Mr. Ishak if he believed a Turkish invasion was still possible after the August 7th statement.

We hope not, I think not because it would be very awkward time for Turkey to do a military invasion, and it will be very awkward for the U.S. They still haven’t finished the job of defeating ISIS in the northeast, and an invasion would mean a resurrection of ISIS. So, I think both Turkey and the U.S. have the incentive to stop a military operation at this time. Now, we need to work [so] this really become a lasting thing of political dialogue rather than, you know, dialogue with the stick.

Mr. Ishak also commented on President Trump’s December 2018 move to withdrawal American forces from Syria, a decision he has since walked back.

I hope that he’s realized that it wasn’t practical, and it wasn’t in the interest of the U.S.

Despite President Trump’s ultimate decision to keep a U.S. military presence in Syria, Mr. Ishak believes more could be done. I asked if the current number of coalition troops in the region was sufficient.

Yeah, I think it’s more symbolic in one way. But then also, I think the military people here, the Pentagon, the SDF, know more about how many troops you need to do a final military defeat of ISIS. We need not just the support of the Pentagon, which we appreciate a lot, as does the SDF. And also, we appreciate the support in Congress, but we also need the really the State Department and the [Trump] administration to come along.

President Erdogan has expressed intentions to relocate Syrian refugees living in Turkey to northeastern Syria. I asked Mr. Ishak for his response to such a move.

We looked into this. We always – from, I remember, even before we were SDC, when we were just the Self-Administration, and we would meet with European and U.S. diplomats, we always said: we want Syrian refugees to come back Syria. But we don’t want that somebody brings them back with an agenda, to achieve their political agenda that is not a Syrian agenda, so that they become, the refugees, a tool for an outsider. This is- we want to make sure it’s not the case. Otherwise, we are open and we would love to have the Syrian refugees back, whether in our area or wherever they are. And we want to cooperate with the U.S. and really any humanitarian organization with helping Syrian IDPs (internally displaced people). But we also want to make sure also that there is no ex-ISIS or ex-Nusra or ex any extremist group, to come in and abuse our willingness to have Syrians return.

Mr. Ishak emphasized the need for Syrian refugees to be treated like people, not political pawns. I asked if he believed President Erdogan planned on using Syrian refugees as part of a larger political strategy.

I’m not saying this, but I’m saying we want to make sure that this is not the case. We want to start a new page with Turkey, but of course, starting a new page with Turkey is something that would require another kind of negotiation and mediation between the US, Turkey, and us, because now the mediation more involved the military end, and we need to go into the negotiation on political matters. We need to address the issue of Efrin – and what about the refugees from Efrin, who have been pushed out of Efrin? We want to welcome the Syrian refugees who come from Turkey or anywhere, you know, but what about the people who are pushed out of their homes and land in Efrin? There should be justice, and the same principle that applies to refugees in Turkey should be applied to refugees who left their homes in Efrin.

We don’t want the case where you have a powerful country like Turkey looking out only for its own interests to satisfy the internal demands of Turkish people and pressure on the Turkish government to make the Syrian refugees leave not also mean that there is a respect for that principle, that our refugees in Syria and other areas, from Efrin, can go back to Efrin or anywhere in Syria. People who have become refugees, whether internally or externally, should have the right to return to where they want to return to in Syria.

And Syria is one country. These refugees can return to wherever they want, including our areas, and we welcome them. And when I say our areas, it is because we have a political system, but it is the areas of all Syrians.

I wondered if an influx of refugees would destabilize northeastern Syria given that the region is already in need of greater humanitarian and infrastructural support. Mr. Ishak stated that the SDC welcomes the return of Syrians but also wants to positive that a return would be handled in the best possible manner.

It has to be done as I said. We want to make sure that it is not being abused, so a mechanism has to be developed, but we were willing to cooperate and help with the humanitarian groups or countries like European countries or the U.S. who want to help the refugees. We are willing to cooperate with them, but also we have the right to vet just like the U.S. has the right to vet who comes to the U.S.

These are Syrians, yes, and they have the right to come back. But because of the political consideration and sensitivity, we want to make sure that these are really civilians, and they have no political agenda, and they’re not they’re not going to be used politically by other outsiders. We have the right to address them and have a mechanism to deal with them.

Currently, the Syrian regime is battling the remnants of opposition forces in Idlib, northwest Syria. I asked Mr. Ishak if the SDC had been in contact with Bashar al-Assad’s government considering that Assad has stated that he intends to retake all Syrian territory

We talked before twice. We negotiated in 2018 with the regime, and then we had negotiation indirectly in Moscow with the Russians as mediators, just like how the U.S. mediates between us and Turkey, the Russians mediated between us and the regime. And we just had also recently a delegation that went to Moscow, but there has been no development, no improvement in the regime position.

I then asked if Mr. Ishak viewed the Syrian regime as a threat.

If the U.S. withdraws like President Trump was at one point in late December of 2018 expressing then, yes, the regime is a threat, but it’s not so much the regime, as it’s not a very powerful army now. I think SDF is more powerful than the Syrian regime, except for the air power, and this is where the value of the U.S. presence is. As long as we have air covering, Iran cannot really come in because it’s not the regime who would come in, it’s not a very powerful army, and if it comes in, it would be the first time that they’re not fighting extremist Syrians, but fighting secular Syrians who defeated ISIS, who defeated extremists. They will not have any moral cause with the Syrian people or with the international community. SDF is just a defensive force, you know, and it fought only outside powers. ISIS was mostly non-Syrians.

We don’t want to fight Syrians, whether they’re Free Syrian Army, whether they are of the regime or any Syrian, you know, unless if somebody comes and attacks, and we’re obligated to defend ourselves. 11,000 of our young men and women died, 22,000 [were] injured, you know, and then just surrendering to that Assad regime, one party rule with Bashar Assad as dictator and now even a weakened Bashar Assad who’s on the, you know, under the agenda of Russia and Iran. I mean, why surrender to that, you know? [Laughs] It will be a defeat, you know, so we have a moral obligation to those, to our people there and to those who are martyrs, you know, and to really continue to stand up and, and insist on the vision of the people for a decentralized Syria, for a secular Syria, for gender equality, and most importantly, for religious freedom because we have in our regions that SDF controls, a model that is based on religious freedom and religious freedom hasn’t been in Syria and in most of the region ever. Always in these cultures, political power and religion went hand in hand. You know, so this is the revolution we are trying to start. And if we succeed, this will be really the big knockout of religious extremism and ideologies such as ISIS ideology.

So, this is again another aspiration of our people. Remember I talked to you about the faith-based reconciliation workshop? This was one of the first thing [the participating parties] agreed on. This was one of the first things we put in the social contract of the Self-Administrations of Jazira, Kobani, and Efrin because we know this is how we are going to break the ideology of operations and Syria. This is how we can start toward the ideology of dignity.

Finally, I asked Mr. Ishak for his response to a recent Carnegie Endowment article criticizing the Self-Administration in northeast Syria. The article claimed that while the administration was ethnically and religiously diverse, Kurdish military officials held the real power. Mr. Ishak urged critics to realize that the region is in a period of transition, and given the severity of current security threats, it is normal that the military would have more authority.

I don’t think it’s accurate. I’ll tell you, look, first you have to know we are in a transition time and in a transition time, of course the military will have power. That’s natural. And as I said, PYD pioneered this ideology. And then PYD has to be defensive against those who are trying to fight this ideology, even from within the Kurdish political spectrum. And especially you hear stories about those who are being supported by Turkish political agenda, you know, or any other agenda.

So, it’s a transition time, but I believe the more- once we come into a political agreement that is satisfactory to the people of northeast Syria, you will see more power to the civilians, and our organizations will relax, and they will be more and more practicing of democracy. But during war time –even in the most established democratic countries– during war times, you have to have, you know…

I see what you’re saying. You have to have power in the hands of the military so they can respond quickly to threats. (Not re-recorded)

Right. Yes. But we have to give them credit; with all these political challenges and internally from Kurds and other Kurds, still, they have a form of democracy that is promoting democratic ideas. Like I said, religious freedom. It’s for real. You go, you see, there are Kurds today who are free to convert to any religion they want. Look at gender participation in power – it’s real. We have women who are powerful, who have powerful positions, and look at the education system. Now, you have Kurds who study in their mother tongue and also study the languages of the other groups, and you will have, for the first time, Syriacs who take some classes in their mother tongues. We couldn’t pull it all off like because the church who still owns or runs the school, they are under pressure from the regime to not to abandon the regime curriculum because if they abandon the regime curriculum in Jazira, Qamishli, Hasakah, Malikiyah, the regime can take the license of their schools in Damascus and Aleppo and Hama.

So, I think these are historical applications of democratic principles. Of course it’s not perfect now, but whatever measure of democracy you can implement now in this, given the challenges, is great. And not to forget, the security that has been provided to the minorities –because, you know, democracy should start, should provide security and should start with the human rights– in our region, we’ve started it. Now, Turkey and pro-Turkey people, will try to say ‘no, there are human rights abuses, there is this, that,’ but you have to take into consideration the political struggle within the system, that there are outside hands trying to maneuver and threaten this political system. It’s not yet stable.

Thank you again to Mr. Bassam Ishak, co-representative of the Syrian Democratic Council in Washington, D.C. Mr. Ishak and many others helped create an effective pluralistic administration in northeastern Syria, but a potential Turkish military offensive has placed that administration, as well as the hundreds of thousands of civilians it benefits, in serious jeopardy. With the U.S. and Turkey locked in negotiations, the future remains unclear.

This has been Robert Sanford with Washington Kurdish Institute. Thank you for listening.