Causes, Patterns and Trends in France’s Projection of Military Force in West Africa and the Sahel by Marcel Kitissou and Beniam Awash that writes for the Sahel Consortium, a Young Diplomat’ partner.

Summary of Key Ideas

Ever since the demise of Charles De Gaulle’s ambitious project for a “Great French Sahara” in the 1960s, the projection of French military force has resulted in over 100 military operations. The logic for doing so was a combination of recurrence – to maintain its status as a global power and hegemonic presence in francophone Africa – and deterrence – to keep threats out of this region. The most recent French military interventions in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, and Mali demonstrate its stabilizing and destabilizing qualities and also illustrate deterrence – in deterring violent extremists from destabilizing the region – and recurrence – in intervening for the purposes of maintaining French influence and protecting its historic privileges.

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The establishment of a security architecture capable of facilitating Saharo-Sahelian and North African cooperation requires, in part, evaluation of the rationale and consequences of France’s military projections on the security and political stability of this vast and conflict-prone area. In addition, identification of the sources of local grievances, i.e. economic and political marginalization, which engender political violence, is the primary mechanism for guaranteeing enduring political stability and security of this area.

In 2002, France’s intervention of recurrence in Cote d’Ivoire, Operation Licorne, led to the arrest and removal of Laurent Gbagbo from power, stabilizing the political situation in Cote d’Ivoire. In contrast, the 2011 France-led NATO intervention in Libya, Opération Harmattan (Operation Odyssey Dawn for the US), leading to Gadhafi’s demise has two unfortunate unintended regional consequences: (i) proliferation of armed militias and jihadists in Libya; (ii) destabilizing the Saharo-Sahelian states through arms trafficking and opportunistic attacks from jihadi extremist groups.