Conditions for validity of means of cognition:



(a) the knowledge which one means of cognition furnishes must be new and not attainable by any other means;



(b) one means of cognition may aid another in furnishing knowledge, but the means of cognition in question should not be reducible to another;



(c) the knowledge obtained by one means of cognition should not be contradicted by another means of cognition;



(d) the accepted means of cognition should appeal to reason. 15 By about the third century of our era the different schools were quite established with their fundamental ontological, metaphysical and epistemological theories clearly summarized in their respective basic works. The basic ideas contained therein, which were compiled by the different thinkers into a system of thought, were certainly older. The commentators to these basic works elaborated the fundamental points from within their own tradition in order to make them understandable to the uninitiated, whilst at the same time defending the tradition against attacks from opponents. It is significant to note that the commentators took the first opportunity to mention the means or instruments of cognition accepted by the school, because this epistemological concern set the framework within which the ontology and the metaphysics were established.

16 Each school accepted a fixed number of means of cognition and, for the major schools of Indian philosophy, the number ranges from one to six. So, for example, the materialist accepts only sense perception as the most important and reliable means of cognition, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika school accept inference as well, the Sāṁkhya school accepts verbal testimony or scriptural authority in addition to these two, with the Nyāya school accepting four means by granting, in addition to the three, ›comparison‹ also as a means of valid cognition, etc. The enumeration of the means of cognition accepted by a school, although traditional, is not merely arbitrary. Reasons are supplied by the commentators to show why the specific number and nature of the instruments of knowledge are adequate for the school in question, thereby preempting any criticism by an opponent for being irrational. In other words, there are a certain implicit conditions on the basis of which the number of the instruments or means of cognition were regarded as valid by each school.

17 These conditions may be summarized into four points: (a) the knowledge which one means of cognition furnishes must be new and not attainable by any other means; (b) one means of cognition may aid another in furnishing knowledge, but the means of cognition in question should not be reducible to another—so, e.g., when perception aids inference, as in inferring fire by seeing only the smoke in the distance, the knowledge gained here cannot be reduced to the cognition supplied by perception (of the smoke) alone; (c) the knowledge obtained by one means of cognition should not be contradicted by another means of cognition; and (d) the accepted means of cognition should appeal to reason, a condition that applies especially to verbal testimony or scriptural authority as a means of cognition, in which case the knowledge concerning the revealed truth must appear probable and be made intelligible in terms of human experience, otherwise such a means of cognition would fail in its intention.

18 A noteworthy feature in the history of Indian epistemology, and one relevant for inter-cultural dialogue, is that when one discusses the theories of other schools by way of a critique of their views, this has to be done on the basis of their own basic presuppositions. In other words, the materialists, for example, cannot be simply criticized for merely accepting the validity of only sense perception as a means of cognition. A case has to be made out for the fact that sense perception alone cannot by itself prove the validity of sense perception itself since it can be asked: how can one perceive that sense perception alone is valid? This is to say that the materialist should be shown that arguments in favour of sense perception as the only means of cognition would entail inference as well. Such an attitude, namely, discussing a system of thought on the basis of its own presuppositions, can be immensely fruitful in inter-cultural dialogue when employed constructively.

19 Let us assume that theories of cognition of the different schools of Indian philosophy are acceptable for the reasons they themselves supply. However, these theories do not in themselves guarantee that cognition in each and every case is valid because, on the assumption of human fallibility, one would also have to grant the possibility that cognition can be invalid or incorrect. In other words, the theories of what constitute the means of valid cognition should, in addition, seek to explain the phenomenon of human error. Indeed the success of a theory of valid cognition is commensurate with the success in which error in our cognition is also explained. It is not often noticed that Indian thinkers dealing with epistemological issues also implicitly dealt with theories of error as well. So, in addition to the theories of what constitutes valid cognition we also find a similar number of theories of error in cognition. Let us look at a couple of these theories of error for the point being made here.

In terms of the twofold concern in Indian epistemology a distinction may be drawn between ›cognition-experience‹ and ›knowledge-experience‹. 20 Some thinkers (e.g., Rāmānuja of the Vedānta school of qualified monism) say that error should be seen rather as a lack of knowledge. In other words, there is no error as such and one should speak, instead, of a failure in cognition to distinguish the positive features of an object from the negative ones. Error is thereby explained away by saying that, for example, seeing a rope as a snake is a confusion of two elements, namely, the memory of a snake over-shadowing the perception of the rope which under certain conditions may resemble a snake. The criterion which finally decides the problem of whether the cognition is erroneous or not is the application of the cognition to practical life.

21 Another theory of error (e.g., of the Śaiva Siddhānta and Yoga schools) is that error is the cognition of an object as something ›other than what it is‹. A rope seen as a snake entails an affirmation of qualities which in fact can only be denied of the object. Separately, both the rope and the snake are real objects, and the realization later that in fact ›the rope is not a snake‹ is for all intents and purposes the same as to say ›this is a rope‹. Here the object perceived is seen as something different from what it is on the grounds of features ascribed to it which in fact should be denied.

22 The Yogācāra school of Buddhism, for example, holds the view that experience as such, including the cognition of an object, is in its objectivised mode illusory and, by extension, the ›error‹ that may occur in daily life is a ›double error‹. In other words, life is a kind of dream and therefore unreal. The cognitions that take place in dreams are errors to a second degree. It is only the subjective consciousness which exists per se, without any corresponding object outside. Just as the waking state reveals the unreality and error of the dream state so too, it is claimed, the errors, and even unreality, of the waking state will be revealed when a knowledge of ultimate reality is gained (as defined by the school, with the means to its realization).

23 According to the theory of error of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism error consists in the cognition of what does not exist. The view is more radical than the above theory in that all knowledge as such is questioned. Since nothing really exists the objects of everyday experience are as non-existent as those which are erroneously cognized.

24 The renowned thinker Śaṅkara (perhaps 8th century CE) holds the view that finally one cannot adequately explain or account for how an object is erroneously cognized. How a rope comes to be seen as a snake, for example, cannot be determined. In error there is some kind of reality that exists as long as the error obtains, which is why one may be afraid of the so-called ›snake‹. Some kind of relative truth has to ascribed to such a (false) cognition; just as in a dream water can quench thirst, and seeing a rope as a snake can cause fear, a certain validity obtains as long as one remains in error. When the actual truth dawns on one, when waking up or when realising that the ›snake‹ is in fact a rope, then the error disappears. How such (error) experiences take place may be ascribed to ›ignorance‹, insofar as we do not cognize the objects as they really are, but the role of ›ignorance‹ itself has to be explained. Precisely here it is impossible, according to Śaṅkara, to account for it adequately.

25 In the Indian context one can speak of a twofold function of the concern with epistemology: 1. a concern which is closely connected with what comes under the general theme of the cognition of an object, and 2. a concern—on the basis of the ›validity‹ of cognition (in which case error, doubt and illusion are ruled out)—with knowledge (jñāna) as such. The Sanskrit term for epistemology, prāmāṇyavada (literally: the ›theory of being established by proof‹), entails three cognate words which are useful for the distinction that may be drawn between ›knowledge‹ and ›valid cognition‹, namely, prameya or the object of cognition, pramā or pramiti which is the cognition itself, and pramātṛ or the subject that cognizes.

26 In terms of the twofold concern in Indian epistemology a distinction may be drawn between ›cognition-experience‹ and ›knowledge-experience‹. The former would then be the contact which takes place between an object and a subject of cognition through the means of the senses, leading to such experiences as listening, tasting, touching, etc. Cognition in this sense would encompass inference, verbal testimony and other means of cognition. The latter, ›knowledge-experience‹, on the one hand, may be equated with valid cognition-experience, as when one knows the reality of an object through a perception of it (without any error in the process) and, on the other hand, it would involve an experience, for example, of one's nature which cannot be derived through the usual means of valid cognition. Knowledge, or self-knowledge, in this latter sense would also preeminently include an experience that can be described as intuitive, transcendental, or religious, namely without the subject-object distinction which characterizes cognition.

»There exists no greater knowledge than that of the ātman . One should be intent on this knowledge of the ātman ; what the ātman is is the supreme.« 27 At the empirical level, therefore, knowledge may be said to involve or include cognition but not vice versa, that is, cognition, insofar as it could be false or erroneous, does not necessarily involve or assume the status of knowledge. Moreover, granted the possibility of self-knowledge (which all schools accept as a basic presupposition) one cannot compare such a knowledge with a knowledge of the external world. Knowledge or valid cognition of the external world entails a clear distinction between the subject and object of cognition; whereas self-knowledge obviously cannot involve making the subject the object of valid cognition involving a means of knowledge different from those used for a knowledge of the external world.

28 The question that now arises in the context of self-knowledge or a knowledge of the subject is: what are the means of knowledge for it? How can the subject be known? It is in this context that the second role of epistemology comes into play and one enters in the realm of intuition, religion, and even mysticism, especially when ones comes across statements like this about the ātman, the self or the true subject of cognition or knowledge: »One should contemplate the ātman through the ātman ; the abode of the ātman is verily the ātman « and »There exists no greater knowledge than that of the ātman . One should be intent on this knowledge of the ātman ; what the ātman is is the supreme« . 9