The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

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Volume 1

Introduction

The Inquiry is essential because it will ensure that, by learning lessons, we strengthen the health of our democracy, our diplomacy and our military."1 Addressing the scope of the Inquiry, Mr Brown said: "No Inquiry has looked at such a long period, and no Inquiry has the powers to look in so much breadth ... the Iraq Inquiry will look at the run-up to conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons in each and every area." In his statement, Mr Brown announced that the Inquiry Committee would be made up of "non-partisan public figures acknowledged to be experts and leaders in their fields".

1.1 UK strategy 1990 to 2000

and

destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision, of all proscribed weapons, materials and facilities.46 UNSCOM's approach was to establish a "material balance", for each of the weapons categories, between items acquired by Iraq through import or production and their disposal by use or destruction.47 Iraq provided initial declarations of its holdings of prohibited weapons on 18 and 28 April 1991.48 The Butler Review was told that the JIC pre-conflict estimate that Iraq's stockpile of chemical agent was between 6,000 and10,000 tonnes was "derived from past 46 UN Security Council, 'Letter dated 25 January 1999 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security Council' (S/1999/94), paragraph 3. 1.2 Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September 2001 I don't think there was a single member of the Security Council who believed that Iraq was innocent, was not plotting to develop military capability, was not defying United Nations, was not cheating on sanctions but ... [there was a] spectrum of views about how intensely that was a problem and about how it should be dealt with."4 Mr Geoff Hoon, FCO Minister of State responsible for the Middle East from May 1999 (and the Defence Secretary from October 1999), told the Inquiry that public leaders in the Middle East: "... blamed us for ... starving the Iraqi people, for depriving them of medical supplies ... sanctions were failing ... they were not delivering the benefit that we anticipated politically and ... worse than that, we were getting the blame for things that were actually Saddam's responsibility."5 Sir William Patey, Head of the FCO's Middle East Department from 1999 to March 2002, told the Inquiry that Saddam Hussein had been "very good" at manipulating the sanctions regime, to create sympathy within the Arab world and to preserve his own regime.6 Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006, told the Inquiry that, without weapons inspectors on the ground in Iraq and "with a collapse in international will to enforce, or even merely to sustain, a sanctions regime, 'containing' the Iraqi regime became a challenge".7 4 Public hearing, 27 November 2009, pages 4-7. 2. Decision making within government The first edition of The Cabinet Manual, published in October 2011, ascribes the following specific responsibilities to the Cabinet Secretary:

"The Cabinet Secretary is head of the Cabinet Secretariat."5

"The Cabinet Secretary, unless unavoidably absent, attends all meetings of Cabinet and is responsible for the smooth running of Cabinet meetings and for preparing records of its discussions and decisions."6

"Permanent Secretaries are responsible to the Cabinet Secretary or the Head of the Civil Service for the effective day-to-day management of the relevant department, or the particular issues for which they are responsible ..."7 3 Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Wilson of Dinton. 3.1 Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002 It is important to recognise that the way in which the United States of America has proceeded so far is exactly right: in a calm and considered way, and in close consultation with allies such as ourselves."32 Mr Blair added that it was: "... important that ... we base our identification of those responsible on proper evidence, but then that we are relentless in our pursuit of those responsible and bringing them to justice." In the subsequent debate on international terrorism, Iraq was mentioned briefly by a number of speakers, including Mr Tam Dalyell (Labour), who argued that a generation in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East was "growing up absolutely to loathe the United States and Britain" and urged the Government to look again at "10 years of bombing of Iraq and sanctions".33 Asked when he had taken the decision that "we should be prepared to join the Americans in using force and that we should be prepared to use force ourselves" against Iraq, Mr Blair told the Inquiry: "I think I said in my statement of 14 September 2001 that I think this issue of WMD is going to take on a different meaning now. 3.2 Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 - "axis of evil" to Crawford In response to a question about whether international law provided a mandate to attack Iraq during an interview on Breakfast with Frost on 24 March, Mr Straw replied: "... we have never been involved in any military action in our history since the establishment of the United Nations without the backing of international law and we're not going to be ... "We don't have a mandate to invade Iraq now, no ... what we need to do however is to ensure the full compliance by Iraq ... with these United Nations obligations ... if Iraq refuses to comply ... then the position in international law may very well change ... Nobody wants military action ... at all and the way out lies very clearly in Saddam Hussein's hands. Volume 2 3.3 Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002 Mr Webb's discussion of the possible scale and timing for any UK military contribution is addressed in Section 6.1 Mr Hoon informed Mr Blair on 31 May that he and Mr Straw had agreed a "preliminary objective" to guide work on contingency planning for military operations of: "A stable and law-abiding Iraq, within its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by its obligations on WMD."47 Sir Peter Ricketts told the Inquiry that it was "hard to imagine that an Iraq [as envisaged in the objective] ... would still have Saddam Hussein in charge".48 Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, 5 June 2002 In preparation for a visit to the UK by Mr Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, on 5 June, Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair on 31 May. UK contingency planning had concluded that, for the UK to have influence on US planning, a significant military contribution would be needed. 3.4 Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002 Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002 "We must not allow an outlaw regime that incites and uses terror ... to threaten the world by developing the ultimate weapons of terror ... the civilised world must come together to deal with the threat posed by the Iraqi regime." Sir Jeremy Greenstock's advice, 3 September 2002 Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised on 3 September that none of the options identified by the FCO for a draft resolution, giving Iraq an ultimatum which might then provide legal cover for military action, would be achievable. 3.5 Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 - the negotiation of Resolution 1441 "... In case of Iraqi non‑compliance, the resolution sets out a procedure whereby the Security Council will convene immediately in order to secure international peace and security." Singapore "It makes clear that Iraq will be given a full and final opportunity to comply with its obligations under the relevant resolutions ... Colombia Cameroon Guinea Mauritius "The difference between successful and unsuccessful inspections may be the difference between peace and war ..." "We insisted on preserving the central role of the Security Council ... This resolution is not, nor could it be at this time, a resolution to authorize the use of force." "My country welcomes the clear statements ... by the sponsors spelling out the fact that the resolution ... does not contain traps or automaticity ... they are working, and will always work, for the centrality of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security." "My country ... reaffirms the unity and the role of the Security Council as the guarantor of international peace and security." "We are pleased to see the clear and unambiguous role of the Security Council and the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security through peaceful means." China "China stands firmly for a peaceful solution to the question of Iraq, through political and diplomatic means and within the framework of the United Nations. Volume 3 3.6 Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003 and ... that there is an elaborate programme of concealment ... forcing the inspectors to play a game of hide and seek." Asked if he had sufficient evidence to back action, Mr Blair replied: "... I've got no doubt at all that he's developing these weapons and that he poses a threat but we made a choice to go down the UN route ... "... our judgement, the American judgement ... is that Saddam has these weapons, but the purpose of the inspectors ... is ... to report back to the UN and say whether he is fully co‑operating or he's not." Asked whether a second resolution was needed, required or preferred, Mr Blair replied: "Of course we want a second resolution and there is only one set of circumstances in which I've said that we would move without one ... all this stuff that ... we're indifferent ... is nonsense. 3.7 Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003 394 Introduction and key findings This Section addresses the development of the UK position on Iraq between Mr Blair's meeting with President Bush on 31 January 2003, at which he sought US support for a further, "second", Security Council resolution before military action was taken, and the meeting of the Security Council on 7 March, at which the UK, US and Spain tabled a revised draft resolution stating that Iraq would have failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 unless the Council concluded on or before 17 March that Iraq was demonstrating "full, unconditional, immediate and active co‑operation" with its obligations to disarm. 3.8 Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March 2003 I have tried to do that over the past few months ..." SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK'S PROPOSAL TO REVISE THE DRAFT RESOLUTION OF 7 MARCH Sir Jeremy Greenstock suggested early on the afternoon of 12 March that in the Security Council that day the UK should:

table a revised draft resolution explaining that the UK was "setting aside the ultimatum concept" in operative paragraph 3 of the draft of 7 March "because it had not attracted Council support"; Volume 4 4. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction SECTION 4 IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Introduction Section 4 addresses:

how the Joint Intelligence Committee's (JIC) Assessments of Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and the intent of Saddam Hussein's regime to retain, produce, use or proliferate such weapons, evolved between 2000 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003; 4.1 Iraq's WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iraq's people and

Saddam Hussein remained "determined to retain and rebuild his Weapons of

Iraq had "admitted hiding chemical, biological weapons and missile parts in the

"We believe Iraq is still hiding WMD in a range of locations."

UN inspectors had been unable to account for significant quantities of precursor

"We fear Iraq is taking advantage of the absence of UN weapons inspectors to

If Iraq's weapons programmes remained "unchecked", Iraq "could redevelop offensive chemical and biological capabilities within a very short period of time and develop a crude nuclear device in about five years. 4.2 Iraq's WMD assessments, July to September 2002 If we do not, the message to Saddam and anyone else will be that they can develop these weapons with impunity and that the international community lacks the will to deal with them."

"... [T]he point is that if we know that someone has weapons of mass destruction, if they have used them before and if, as a result, the international community has said they must be disarmed of those weapons, surely the greatest risk is letting them carry on developing those weapons and not doing anything about it."

"... [I]n the past four or five years the issue of Iraq, weapons inspections and what to do about that regime has come over my desk pretty much week after week ... [I]t has been there as an issue the whole time ... What we know now from the assessment given by our Joint Intelligence Committee is that the very thing that we feared is the very thing that the Iraqi regime is working on."

"What has happened ... is that, whether we like it our not, now is the point

"... We have to be clear that the consequences of saying now to Iraq that

"... [W]e have to make the decision, and I do not think we can duck the we are not going to do anything will be really, really serious." of decision." consequences of that decision." Mr Blair concluded that the threat was not that Saddam Hussein was going to launch an attack on the UK "tomorrow": "... the threat is that within his own region, or outside it given the missile capability that he is trying to develop, he launches an attack that threatens the stability of that region and then the wider world. 4.3 Iraq's WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 Intelligence indicates Iraq is ready to use CBW weapons and that munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 20-45 minutes." Addressing the judgements in the Assessment, the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, chaired by Lord Butler of Brockwell, stated: "The judgement that Iraq was continuing to produce chemical agent was supported by one new intelligence report received on 30 September."15 "... The most significant change in this assessment was in the JIC's indication ... that the intelligence on mobile biological agent production facilities had been 'confirmed' ... based on the receipt of one intelligence report, from a reliable and established source quoting a new sub-source. 4.4 The Search for WMD The draft mission for the ISG was to: "Organise, direct and apply capabilities and expertise in Iraq to discover, take custody of, exploit, disseminate and disable, eliminate information and material on individuals, records, NBC samples, weapons systems, materials, facilities, networks, and operations relative to:

Terrorism

Iraqi intelligence

WMD (Main Effort)

Individuals associated with the Iraqi regime/leadership with WMD

Individuals detained by the Iraqi regime

War crimes and crimes against humanity." Mr Watkins reported that the UK would be providing the Deputy Commander, Brigadier John Deverell, who would "be running all ISG operations, with Maj Gen Dayton addressing external and higher level ISG issues". Volume 5 5. Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003 Previous Law Officers have of course advised in these terms ..." Ms Adams concluded: "For my own part, I think that the first view is the better interpretation, but that the arguments in favour of the second view are probably as strong as the legal case for relying on the revival argument in December 1998 when the UK participated in Operation Desert Fox." Ms Adams wrote that she understood the statement that Lord Goldsmith's advice was not "required now" reflected Mr Straw's views, and: "While it is certainly true that definitive advice could not be given at this stage on whether a further Council decision is required (because such advice would need to take account of all the circumstances at the time, including further discussions in the Council), there is no reason why advice could not be given now on whether the use of force without a further Security Council decision." Ms Adams added: "... I think a serious issue for consideration is whether, if you were to reach the view that resolution 1441 was under no circumstances capable of being interpreted as authorising force without a further Council decision ... this should be relayed to the Foreign Office and No.10." Observing that "the Foreign Secretary (and other Ministers) have gone beyond the neutral line suggested ... stating that resolution 1441 does not 'necessarily' require a further Council decision", Ms Adams suggested that if Lord Goldsmith was "not minded" to give advice: "An alternative option ... might be for me to reply to Michael [Wood]'s letter confirming that you do not propose to advise at this stage, but stressing the need for neutrality in HMG's public line for so long as you have not advised on the interpretation of the resolution." Lord Goldsmith told the Inquiry that the instructions set out both arguments "without expressing a view between them, although I think I knew what view Sir Michael took about it".37 Mr Straw told the Inquiry that he had asked Mr Wood to ensure Lord Goldsmith was given a balanced view.38 Mr Straw added that, if Sir Michael had thought there was only one view, that was "what he would have written" to Lord Goldsmith. 6.1 Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq Mr Hoon discussed Mr Webb's advice of 27 February at a meeting on 19 March, at which AM French "and others" were present.55 In relation to the options for military action, Mr Hoon was advised that, if a UK contribution to US military action against Iraq were to be sought, it: "... might be a 'division minus', ie the largest of the options [for the deployment of UK ground forces] foreseen in the SDR [1998 Strategic Defence Review]."56 Mr Hoon was also told that a "key issue would be the size of any continuing military presence required to sustain a post‑Saddam regime". 6.2 Military plamning for the invasion, January to March 2003 Lt Gen Reith described the US plan as based on four assumptions: as the only viable alternative to the North."

"The UK desires a significant role in land combat operations, now in the South

"The UK wishes to operate at divisional level, with a divisional area of

"Recognition that the UK logistic liability should be minimised."

"The UK experience in wider peacekeeping, and subsequent ability to conduct responsibility (AO)." early Phase IV - post conflict - operations." Lt Gen Reith advised that the UK had yet to "conduct a formal tactical estimate on the proposed mission"; Volume 6 6.3 Military equipment (pre-conflict) A report by the House of Commons Defence Committee produced a different categorisation of UORs: Table 2: Categories of UORs for the start of Op TELIC232 Category of UOR UORs that hastened existing programme UORs that introduced new capabilities not previously programmed UORs that topped up holdings of items already on MOD's inventory UORs modifying existing equipment/infrastructure % by value232 The MOD's assessment of UOR availability for the start of operations was: Table 3: Availability of UORs before the invasion233 234235 Environment % of UORs delivered % of UORs requested % of UORs considered on time234 by this component effective/highly fitted in time235 effective Maritime Joint Joint Communications Infrastructure (J6) Overall Desert uniforms Stocks for desert clothing were insufficient to support a large scale deployment in the time available. 6.4 Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003 Afghanistan, prolonged civil war." The paper listed likely short-, medium- and long-term post-conflict military tasks: "Immediate (0 - 6 months): rebel ... for inter-ethnic violence, or opportunity for organised crime

Provide external and internal security, law and order to prevent any potential

Detention and processing of key regime figures ...

Confine and monitor remaining elements of Iraqi Armed Forces likely to

Secure and account for WMD capability (materiel and intellectual)

Enable humanitarian relief

Assist in restoration of key infrastructure elements

Secure oilfields and oil distribution/refining infrastructure

Negotiate and secure alternative lines of communication (LoC) through

Scope of tasks likely to demand large numbers of ground troops, Syria/Turkey/Jordan comprehensive C2 [command and control] and air mobility (circa 200,000 plus) "Medium Term (6 months - 2 plus years)

Continue to provide both external and internal security, law and order to prevent any potential for inter-ethnic violence, or opportunity for organised crime, but commence transfer of requirement to new Iraqi security structures

Detention and processing of key regime figures

Develop SSR [Security Sector Reform] model, with DDR [disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration] aimed at reducing size and scope of internal security forces

Support SSR with training and equipment

Begin transfer [of] security of oilfields and production facilities to Iraqi forces

Provide international security guarantees

Scope of tasks is likely to continue to demand large scale138 forces. 6.5 Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003 The first task of the new Iraq Planning Unit (IPU) would be "to start assembling answers to the many questions thrown up by PJHQ as they begin to plan for coping with the situation military forces will find in Iraq as soon as conflict finishes".110 Mr Straw commented: "Good note ... I need to talk to [Secretary] Powell re this."111 Creation of the Iraq Planning Unit The inter-departmental (FCO/MOD/DFID) Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), based in the FCO, was established on 10 February to improve Whitehall co-ordination on post-conflict issues. 7. Conclusions: pre-conflict strategy and planning The JIC Assessment of 29 January 2003 sustained its earlier judgements on Iraq's ability and intent to conduct terrorist operations.150 Sir David Omand, the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office from 2002 to 2005, told the Inquiry that, in March 2002, the Security Service judged that the "threat from terrorism from Saddam's own intelligence apparatus in the event of an intervention in Iraq ... was judged to be limited and containable".151 Baroness Manningham-Buller, the Director General of the Security Service from 2002 to 2007, confirmed that position, stating that the Security Service felt there was "a pretty good intelligence picture of a threat from Iraq within the UK and to British interests".152 Baroness Manningham-Buller added that subsequent events showed the judgement that Saddam Hussein did not have the capability to do anything much in the UK, had "turned out to be the right judgement".153 While it was reasonable for the Government to be concerned about the fusion of proliferation and terrorism, there was no basis in the JIC Assessments to suggest that Iraq itself represented such a threat. Volume 7 8. The Invasion At present leading elements of the US V Corps are just south of Najaf ... The focus of air activity is now on counter-land operations against SRG [Special Republican Guard] and RG [Republican Guard], although command and control, WMD and regime HQs are also being targeted." A letter from Mr Watkins to Sir David Manning on the same day, forwarding an initial assessment of progress against the main military campaign objectives, recorded that the military campaign was "broadly proceeding to plan", with pockets of resistance but "no signs of internal uprisings".114 The MOD update that evening stated that 7 Armoured Brigade was "arrayed around [the] outskirts of Basra ... Will not be in Basra tonight, as previously thought." 115 The COBR overnight report for 23/24 March stated: "Reporting from Basra suggests the heavy presence of internal security forces from the Saddam Fedayeen, the DGI [Directorate of General Intelligence] and the Ba'ath Party militia ... Key (UK) decision now concerns when and how to enter the city [Basra]." 116 Adm Boyce told the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 24 March that local militias in Basra were putting up resistance and 1 (UK) Div would proceed with caution in taking control there.117 Mr Hoon stated that the Iraqis would try to draw the Coalition into the cities, where fighting would be difficult. 9.1 March to May 2003 The figure of 30,000 contrasts with what was understood in PJHQ in late April, when Gen Reith reported that Gen Franks had told him that he still expected the US "to have to provide between 120,000 and 150,000" personnel.111 At around the same time as Gen Franks' order, Mr Donald Rumsfeld (US Secretary of Defense) cancelled the deployment of a further 50,000 combat troops who had been scheduled to arrive in Iraq shortly.112 According to Hard Lessons: "Rumsfeld's decision shocked some commanders on the ground, including Coalition Forces Land Component Commander Lieutenant General David McKiernan, who were counting on the additional manpower to provide a secure environment for post-conflict stabilization." Lt Gen Sanchez's view was that "overall, the concurrence of Franks' drawdown orders and Rumsfeld's ... directive created havoc throughout the forces ... Confusion was the order of the day".113 Earlier in 2003, giving evidence to the US Senate Armed Services Committee, General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the US Army, had commented that, in his view, any Occupation of Iraq would require "several hundred thousand" troops.114 At the time, Gen Shinseki's comment was dismissed publicly by the Pentagon, and Mr Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, told the US House of Representatives' Budget Committee that the number was "wildly off the mark" and that the figure was closer to 100,000.115 In his account of his time in Iraq, Ambassador L Paul Bremer recalls having been shown a draft report prior to his deployment to Iraq which suggested that, for a population the size of Iraq, around 500,000 ground troops would be required for the stabilisation operation. 9.2 May 2003 to June 2004 Lt Gen Binns told the Inquiry that he thought there was a need to improve "campaign continuity" and that one solution was for senior commanders to serve longer, where appropriate, but: "... we have to be careful that this doesn't become the default setting, because one can get very tired, if you are being rocketed every day, if you have got the responsibility of command during a very difficult period, then simply extending people's period there isn't necessarily the answer."98 Throughout the course of Op TELIC, 11 individuals held the post of Senior British Military Representative-Iraq, changing roughly every six months until September 2006:

May to September 2003: Major General Freddie Viggers (also appointed as Deputy Commander of CJTF-7)

September 2003 to April 2004: Major General Andrew Figgures

April 2004 to October 2004: Lieutenant General John McColl

October 2004 to April 2005: Lieutenant General John Kiszely

April 2005 to October 2005: Lieutenant General Robin Brims

October 2005 to March 2006: Lieutenant General Nicholas Houghton

March 2006 to September 2006: Lieutenant General Robert Fry

September 2006 to July 2007: Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb

July 2007 to March 2008: Lieutenant General William Rollo

March 2008 to March 2009: Lieutenant General John Cooper

March 2009 to July 2009: Lieutenant General Chris Brown Some of those who served as SBMR-I offered the Inquiry similar views to those who served as GOC MND(SE). 9.3 July 2004 to May 2005 Mr Blair and President Bush spoke by video conference on 22 July.20 Mr Blair asked about progress on the "Iraq Security Plan" and noted that: "... showing progress on controlling the violence was the toughest issue - for the UK public a real sense that Iraq was on the way to a peaceful future was essential." An early draft of a security strategy for the IIG, drawn up by US, UK and Iraqi representatives in Baghdad - but not seen by Prime Minister Allawi - was reviewed by a meeting of senior officials chaired by Mr Bowen on 27 July.21 At the meeting, Mr Blair's Private Secretary said: "... the Prime Minister believed the security strategy should be a key document in communicating the IIG's plans on security to the Iraqi people. 9.4 June 2005 to May 2006 DOP(I) met on 21 July, chaired by Mr Blair, and considered Dr Reid's paper on operational transition.45 The Chairman's Brief, written by Cabinet Office officials for Mr Blair, suggested that he would "want to focus the meeting on ensuring individual Departments drive forward work over the summer".46 As the Committee would not meet again until after the Parliamentary recess, Mr Blair should "emphasise that the UK effort must not lose impetus over the summer as the preparations for key events in Iraq (Constitution, elections, and transition) will need to be well advanced." DOP(I) agreed Dr Reid's recommendation that, subject to the continuation of current trends in the capacity of the Iraqi security forces and to there being no major deterioration in the security situation, the UK should plan to implement transition to Iraqi control in two provinces of southern Iraq around October 2005, and in the other two around March 2006.47 Mr Blair emphasised the importance of avoiding giving the "erroneous impression that we intended to leave whatever the circumstances" and gave the instruction that no further written papers should be produced until there had been consultation with the US and the Iraqi Government. Volume 8 9.5 June 2006 to 27 June 2007

protection for the Iraqi Council of Representatives to ensure the uninterrupted functioning of the Government of Iraq.21 On 15 June, the UN Security Council reviewed the mandate of the MNF in Iraq and the arrangements for the Development Fund for Iraq, as required by resolution 1546 (2004).22 Mr Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, told the Security Council that "contrary to media portrayal, a civil war was not taking place in Iraq" and that the continued presence of the MNF was "critical to attaining the goal of self sufficiency in defending Iraq and securing peace".23 Ms Angela Kane, Assistant UN Secretary General for Political Affairs, said: "While it may be understandable that, due to their transitory character, previous Governments were unable to take some of the hard decisions required to address the urgent needs of the Iraqi people, the establishment of a constitutionally elected Government for a full four-year term offers new hope." The UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York reported that: "The meeting achieved our key aim - a straightforward review with the Council agreeing on the need for the MNF presence to continue. 9.6 28 June 2007 to April 2008 This is bound to accelerate when we withdraw from Basra City ... "So we do not believe the 'overwatch' period in Southern Iraq should be envisaged as lasting more than a matter of months from the date of PIC in Basra ... "Our planning should assume that the UK civilian presence in Basra will have to be wound up shortly before the removal of the UK military envelope which enables it to operate (though if the US were to decide to move a military presence of their own to Basra Air Station, and to retain a US civilian presence, we could expect US pressure for us to maintain some sort of ongoing commitment to the Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team)." The paper recommended early engagement with the US on a renewed political strategy, including a "change of Iraqi Government" and setting a date for coalition troop withdrawal. 9.7 May 2008 to October 2009 But their ability to defeat AQ-I and JAM Special Groups will depend heavily on their Special Forces, which will rely on MNF support for aviation, airborne surveillance and operational planning for some years." Recent operations in Basra led the JIC to conclude that "significant problems" remained in the ISF's ability to tackle determined opposition alone: "We assess their ability to successfully manage security outside Baghdad by the end of 2008, without MNF ground support will continue to be patchy and depend heavily on progress being made on national reconciliation and the maintenance of MNF-led security gains." Mr Brown, Mr David Miliband (the Foreign Secretary), Mr Douglas Alexander (the International Development Secretary) and Mr Des Browne (the Defence Secretary), plus Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup (the Chief of the Defence Staff), Mr Christopher Prentice (British Ambassador to Iraq), Mr Simon McDonald (Mr Brown's Foreign Policy Adviser) and Mr Matt Cavanagh (Mr Brown's Special Adviser) met General David Petraeus (Commanding General Multi-National Force - Iraq) and Ambassador Ryan Crocker (US Ambassador to Iraq) on 1 May.2 Mr Brown's Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs reported that Gen Petraeus had emphasised the political dynamic in Iraq as increasingly more important than the military. 9.8 Conclusions: the post-conflict period Approximately 350 personnel from 1st Battalion, the Royal Highland Fusiliers were also deployed to Iraq to provide additional security across MND(SE) during the election period in January and February The UK remained reluctant to commit any further forces in the longer term: when Dutch forces withdrew from Muthanna province, the UK instead redeployed forces from elsewhere in MND(SE) plus a small amount of additional logistic support. Volume 9 10.1 Reconstruction: March 2003 to July 2004 Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon's Principal Private Secretary, advised Mr Lee on 28 March that Mr Hoon agreed that "given the likely scale of the Phase IV task, there are good practical as well as political reasons to engage early with potential partners" and that Mr Hoon had, after discussion with Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), written to the Defence Ministers of the "most willing" countries.68 On the same day, Mr Hoon informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq that he had written to selected Defence Ministers asking them to consider a military contribution to the post-conflict phase.69 On 1 April, the Cabinet Office reported that, during the core group's first conference call, the UK, Spain, Australia and Japan had suggested that "reconstruction must go through the UN, with an early new UNSCR [resolution] and the IFIs engaged".70 On 10 April, the FCO issued instructions to overseas posts to seek military contributions from host governments to support Phase IV in the UK sector of Iraq.71 The FCO stated that the UK hoped to be able to reduce its military deployment by two-thirds during Phase IV, but advised posts to: "... base your approaches on the need for widespread international support for consolidating security and stability and getting Iraq back on its feet, which should be a more powerful argument for potential contributors than offsetting the effects of a UK drawdown. 10.2 Recontsruction: July 2004 to July 2009 progress on security plan".142 Mr Benn discussed the World Bank's engagement in Iraq with Mr Wolfensohn on 1 March in the margins of the Palestine Conference.143 Following a meeting with Mr Benn on 8 March, Mr Michael Anderson, Head of DFID's Middle East and North Africa Department, advised officials in the UK Delegation to the World Bank that Mr Benn had "very little patience" with the Bank: "The SoS [Mr Benn] is very clear in his view that the slow disbursement by the Bank under the IRFFI [Trust Fund] is unacceptable ... "... if the Bank is not able to show a significant increase in its engagement in Iraq by the end of March, we will be writing to the Bank to seek refund of the funds to the UK for disbursement through our bilateral programme ... "His commitment to this line is strong, and we will need to find a way to carry forward his views despite the legal and reputational risks that may arise."144 141 Letter Hoon to Benn, 25 February 2005, 'Iraq: Reconstruction Priorities in MND(SE)'. 10.3 Reconstruction: oil, commerical issues, debt relief, asylum and stabilisation policy 26 and 27 March.118 In advance of the meeting, Mr Straw's Private Office sent Mr Rycroft a negotiating brief for what was to become resolution 1483, the resolution defining the roles of the UN and the Coalition in post-conflict Iraq.119 The negotiating brief, prepared by the IPU, identified five "key issues" on which US and UK positions differed, including the arrangements for dealing with Iraqi oil revenues: "Some in the US are ... tempted to arrogate to themselves charge of the direction of a Trust Fund for Iraqi oil and other revenues, which will be used for meeting the costs of their administration of Iraq as well as for reconstruction ... this will open them (and by association us) to criticism that they are reneging on their promise to devote the oil revenues exclusively to the Iraqis." Such a proposition had "nil chance" of approval by the Security Council: "Either the UN or the Iraqis themselves (perhaps with World Bank/IMF help) must be seen to be in control of Iraqi revenues - certainly not the Coalition." The brief concluded that, overall, the US approach amounted to: "... asking the UNSC [Security Council] to endorse Coalition military control over Iraq's transitional administration, its representative institutions and its revenues until such time as a fully-fledged Iraqi government is ready to take over." The brief set out a number of "propositions" which the IPU hoped Mr Blair and President Bush would agree, including: "The UN or the Iraqis, not the Coalition, should manage oil revenues." Also as briefing for the meeting, Mr Straw sent Mr Blair an FCO paper on Phase IV issues.120 The FCO advised that, on oil sector management, the US and UK agreed that the "overarching principles" were:

disruption to the flow of Iraqi oil should be minimised; 10.4 Conclusions: Reconstruction Sir Hilary wrote in his memoir that his arrival, along with the British military command of MND(SE), established "some sort of British Fiefdom" in the South, but one which he saw as "still entirely dependent on American resources for its lifeblood".16 Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the Prime Minister's Special Representative on Iraq from September 2003 to March 2004, told the Inquiry that there was a "separation in the American mind between the British area and the rest of Iraq, which was their area".17 Sir Jeremy added that that separation was reflected in the US resources available for the South: "The Americans said let the Brits look after Basra."18 14 Annotated Agenda, 12 June 2003 Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting attaching Paper DFID/MOD, 11 June 2003, 'UK Support to the CPA South Area - Next Steps'. Volume 10 11.1 de-Ba'athification Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi, a potential candidate for Prime Minister, told Mr Patey on 1 January that "he would be ready to look at the possibility of appointing a judge to head the de‑Ba'athification Commission" and to reduce the role of politicians within it.202 Prime Minister Ja'afari told Mr Patey on 3 January that, although the Ba'ath Party and its ideology should remain outlawed, "the half‑million former Ba'ath members Ja'afari saw as his 'children' should not and the de‑Ba'athification Commission and its procedures should be reviewed".203 On 3 January, Mr Ayad Allawi told Mr Blair that in forming the new government "the key bridge to the Sunnis would be revision of the de‑Ba'athification process".204 An IPU brief for Mr Straw's visit to Baghdad in early April listed "participation by all (including former Ba'athists) who are committed to furthering the political process and can run government effectively" as one of the main issues for the new Iraqi Government to address.205 After the announcement of Mr Nuri al‑Maliki as the nominee for Prime Minister, the British Embassy Baghdad's pen picture of him recorded that he had been Deputy Chair of the de‑Ba'athification Commission and "a driving force for that body's work".206 The 200 eGram 359/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 9 January 2006, 'Iraq: Visit by Foreign Secretary, 6‑7 January 2006: Elections and Formatio[n]'; 11.2 Conclusions: de-Ba'athification The UK lacked the deep understanding of which levels of the Iraqi public sector were highly politicised that would have been desirable in developing a de‑Ba'athification policy, but did recognise that party membership was likely to have been a matter of expediency rather than conviction for many Iraqi citizens. 12.1 Security Sector Reform We fully appreciate the constraints of the operating environment, but we are keen to keep up momentum and build on progress made."210 Training of the Iraqi Police Service begins Formal police training began in late June.211 On 16 July, the first 150 students graduated from the Transition Integration Programme - a three‑week course designed for existing police officers and run by the US Military Police in Baghdad.212 The same month, Ambassador Bremer recommended that the training of police be accelerated and that additional international police be deployed to protect critical infrastructure.213 208 Annotated Agenda, 17 July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation attaching Paper IPU, 16 July 2003, 'Security Sector Reform the Next Steps'. 12.2 Conclusions: Security Sector Reform The initial action would be deployment of "an armed International Police Monitoring Force ... to Baghdad and Basra, to conduct joint patrols with the current Iraqi police force and Coalition military", requiring 3,000 armed police officers. 13.1 Resources US$351m from CERPs in the four Iraqi provinces comprising Multi‑National Division (South‑East) (MND(SE)).32 In comparison, between the UK financial years 2003/04 and 2008/09, DFID spent at least £100m in MND(SE)33 and UK forces spent £38m from UK funds on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).34 The UK Government has not been able to provide the Inquiry with information on the total amount of CERPs funding available to and used by UK military commanders, but has provided documents that show available CERPs funding in some financial years.35 MOD briefing provided for an October 2005 Parliamentary Question advised that US$74m of CERPs funding had been "received and expended" by MND(SE) in the financial years 2004/05 and 2005/06.36 MOD briefing for an October 2006 Parliamentary Question advised that US$66.2m of CERPs funding had been allocated to MND(SE) in the US fiscal year 2005/06.37 In comparison, in the UK financial year 2005/06, DFID spent some £35m on infrastructure and job creation in MND(SE)38 and UK forces spent £3m from UK funds on QIPs.39 Estimates and arrangements for funding military operations Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, wrote to Mr Blair on 31 May 2002 setting out the "preliminary conclusions" from the MOD's contingency planning for Iraq.40 A copy of his minute was sent to Mr Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 13.2 Conclusions: Resources Arrangements for funding military operations and civilian activities The Government used the existing - separate - arrangements for funding military operations and civilian activities to fund the UK's involvement in Iraq. Volume 11 14.1 Military equipment (post-conflict) To his great credit he then realised we had a problem and began to put some leadership and energy into it."434 Mr Brown told the Inquiry that FRES was the programme "that was interesting the military the most", but his understanding was that "even if it had been carried out in full", it would "not have given us the right vehicles ... for Iraq".435 The Inquiry asked Lord Drayson about the concerns about FRES expressed by Generals Jackson and Dannatt, and the relationship between progress on FRES and concerns about Snatch.436 Lord Drayson replied: "The FRES project had become delayed, partly because the experience on operations ... led to repeated changes to the specification, and partly because the user requirement had become much too complicated ... "The project to improve/replace Snatch was always separate ... The Generals stressed the urgent need to replace the ageing fleet of Army Fighting Vehicles as a whole when voicing their concerns over delays to FRES ... Snatch was a Protected Patrol Vehicle rather than an AFV ... In terms of augmenting Protected Patrol Vehicles such as Snatch the focus in early 2006 for the Army was ... Vector which in March 2006 I was told was General Dannatt's highest priority ... "Progress on FRES and concerns about Snatch should not have been connected in theory ... In reality however, I believe the Army's difficulty in deciding upon a 433 Gen Dannatt's evidence during his public hearing was that this meeting was in 2005. 14.2 Conclusions: Military equipment (post-conflict) It concluded that the UK needed a more effective expeditionary capability, including "deployable and mobile" forces, with "sufficient protection and firepower for war‑fighting".1 As a result, the MOD established a requirement for a family of vehicles to replace existing medium weight armoured vehicles. 15.1 Civilian Personnel Table 9: DFID staff and contractors deployed to Basra, 2003‑2009 ORHA/CPA Basra DFID Basra Basra PRT Mar 2003 Jun 2003 Sep 2003 Dec 2003 Mar 2004 Jun 2004 Sep 2004 Dec 2004 Mar 2005 Jun 2005 Sep 2005 Dec 2005 Mar 2006 Jun 2006 Sep 2006 Dec 2006 Mar 2007 Jun 2007 Sep 2007 Dec 2007 Mar 2008 Jun 2008 Sep 2008 Dec 2008 Mar 2009 Jun 2009 Table 10: DFID staff and contractors deployed to Iraq, 2003‑2009 DFID staff DFID contractors Mar 2003 Jun 2003 Sep 2003 Dec 2003 Mar 2004 Jun 2004 Sep 2004 Dec 2004 Mar 2005 Jun 2005 Sep 2005 Dec 2005 Mar 2006 Jun 2006 Sep 2006 Dec 2006 Mar 2007 Jun 2007 Sep 2007 Dec 2007 Mar 2008 Jun 2008 Sep 2008 Dec 2008 Mar 2009 Jun 2009 Nor is it required by law to underwrite the steps taken by NGOs to support their staff working in Iraq." On 29 July, Treasury Solicitors added that DFID should "consider carrying out formal, periodic risk assessments as a further safeguard, and amending advice and procedures as a result of any relevant risks identified".221 The first version of the DFID guidance on duty of care seen by the Inquiry is dated January 2005.222 It stated: "DFID has a responsibility to take reasonable measures to protect its employees from risk of injury (physical, psychological) or death ... DFID does not guarantee that an employee will not be injured ... In taking reasonable care, DFID will only be liable if there is some lack of care on its part for failing to prevent something that was reasonably foreseeable ... "All employees have a duty to take all reasonable steps to mitigate any risks to their safety and security to which they are exposed ... "All UK‑based DFID staff visiting or working in Iraq are volunteers and are under no obligation to travel to Iraq and can leave Iraq at any time without penalty ..." On the question of DFID's obligations to non‑DFID staff, the guidance stated: "Individual consultants are not the employees of DFID and are ultimately responsible for their own well‑being and security arrangements ... However, bearing in mind the prevailing security conditions and difficulty of working in Iraq, DFID aims to provide solo and singleton consultants with the same levels of security, logistical and counselling support as it does its own staff ... 221 Letter Marriott and Treasury Solicitors [junior official] to Department for International Development [junior official], 29 July 2004, 'Duty of care document'. 15.2 Conclusions: Civilian Personnel The number of civilian personnel in Baghdad and Basra fluctuated as Ministers and officials sought to reconcile departments' duty of care to staff with operational needs and the finite resources available for enhanced security in the face of a constantly evolving threat:

On 27 May 2004, Mr Stuart Jack, Head of the FCO Iraq Operations Unit (IOU) advised Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary: "we are currently at the limit of technical measures we can apply to protect staff in Iraq".13

On 8 October 2004, officials advised Mr Straw that the FCO was "reaching the limits" of its ability to increase effective protection.14 13 Minute Jack to PS [FCO], 27 May 2004, 'Iraq: Civilian Staffing and Security'. Volume 12 16.1 The welfare of Service Personnel That is correct ... I think we were getting quite close to a seizing-up moment in 2006."98 The Inquiry asked Gen Dannatt whether work to bring the military covenant back into balance should not have begun earlier.99 He told the Inquiry that he had no criticism of his predecessor, and that it was: "... often easier to start something at the start of an appointment when you have had the chance to survey the landscape ... and coming from the position of Commander-in-Chief ... with time to go round the Army, [I] could sense both at home and abroad the pressures building on soldiers and their families and deciding something had to be done." Introduction of the Operational Allowance Mr Browne's Private Secretary wrote to No.10 on 9 October, setting out proposed new arrangements for supporting Service Personnel on operations.100 The letter reported that, to reflect the current, high operational tempo and provide an immediate boost to the lowest paid Service Personnel, Mr Browne had agreed with Mr Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the Government would introduce a tax-free Operational Allowance of £2,400 for all Service Personnel who completed a six-month tour in either Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans or certain other operations. 16.2 Support for injured Service Personnel and veterans "We therefore need to act early this time and put in place as soon as possible a robust programme of research ... and respond as necessary." Dr Moonie agreed that recommendation.68 The MOD subsequently commissioned the King's Centre for Military Health Research (the King's Centre) at King's College London to undertake a large-scale epidemiological study into the physical and psychological health of personnel deployed on Op TELIC.69 The "primary objectives" of the study were: