Companies often resort to lobbyists and lawyers to fight unfair trade policies. But sometimes there are easier alternatives. Consider the case of Chiquita and Dole, organizations that faced restrictive new trade policies in the early 1990s that limited banana exports into Europe.

Following World War II, Chiquita became Europe’s main banana provider, exporting to Germany (its principal European market), as well as to Great Britain and other countries. While Germany permitted free inflow of Latin American bananas, Great Britain and France gave preference to bananas from their former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (the ACP countries).

Chiquita provided bananas from both places. But in 1986, confident of its dominance in the European banana market, the company sold its British subsidiary Fyffes, its main marketer of ACP bananas. Chiquita saw the fall of Communism in the late 1980s and the creation of the European Union in the early 1990s as great opportunities to increase sales. Anticipating a growing market, the company invested, with debt, in more production facilities in Latin America. By 1992, Chiquita’s European market share was more than double Dole’s (30% versus 12%), and Chiquita had 40% of the German market.

Then, in 1993, the newly formed EU unified its banana policy, restricting Latin American bananas—Chiquita’s main export—in favor of ACP providers. This new policy didn’t sit well with Chiquita, of course. The company launched an aggressive and costly lobbying campaign in Washington denouncing the EU policy. Under pressure from the United States, the World Trade Organization ruled that the policy was discriminatory and ordered that it be dismantled. But the Europeans were slow to comply, and so began the “banana war”—the worst transatlantic economic dispute since World War II.

With a limited ability to export ACP bananas, Chiquita lost a third of its European market share between 1992 and 1995. Determined to regain its position, Chiquita continued to fight the EU policy, increasing its debt as its hold in Europe kept slipping.

Dole, meanwhile, quietly executed an end run around the policy. By capitalizing on its existing ACP relationships and increasing its investments in ACP production facilities, Dole gained rapidly on Chiquita, expanding its European market share from 12% to 16% by 1995. The EU did eventually agree to reopen its markets to Latin American bananas, but too slowly, and with too many constraints, to be of much help to Chiquita. In 2001, stretched by its legal battles and dwindling market share, Chiquita filed for Chapter 11 protection. (The company reemerged from bankruptcy in 2002.)

Given the unpredictable politics that drive trade disputes, and the uncertain influence of arbitration institutions like the WTO, betting on a legal battle can be highly risky. It may be smarter to maneuver around a barrier than to try to tear it down.