So we’ll count that as a subsidy.

The city allowed the Yankees to build atop a city park. In turn, the city built a handsome new park for the working-class residents near the stadium.

Mr. Levine tossed down another that-ain’t-no-subsidy soft-shoe.

“The parks are a home run, a great use of public funds,” he said. “The Metro-North station, people wanted that forever.”

The Yankees could not simply steal a park — someone had to pay to replace it. And they wanted that train station. I am grading this test, and like the staff of the Independent Budget Office and Mr. Brodsky, I declare all of this a subsidy, good for about $380 million.

Then there is a property-tax exemption and tax-exempt bonds, which saved the Yankees $400 million. Here the story deepens. Let’s dispense with the obvious: This was a subsidy.

“The City has determined to use its property taxes” to “finance the construction and operation” of the Stadium, the bond counsel for the Yankees wrote to the Internal Revenue Service in 2006.

Now let’s turn to Mr. Brodsky and the heart of his objections.

The new stadium — which as of a few years ago produced 15 full-time jobs — almost certainly was ineligible for a city subsidy. So officials pretended the Yankees were at imminent threat to relocate to the New Jersey Meadowlands, or Newburgh or Troy, N.Y. This allowed the city to offer a retention subsidy. Mr. Brodsky inquired about this at his hearings.

Which city official heard the Yankees say they might leave?

“I don’t recall,” replied Seth Pinsky, who was charged with overseeing this project.