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The White House’s move on January 17 to impose new sanctions over Iran’s ballistic missile program may seem counterproductive. Obama declared the need for the new sanctions within minutes of announcing sanction relief as part of the nuclear deal’s implementation.

These sanctions stem from an incident on October 16th, 2015, when Iran conducted a ballistic missile test. It’s this incident that Obama was referring to in his statement from the 17th, when he both praised the diplomatic accomplishment the nuclear deal and rebuked Iran’s test.

The administration’s call for new sanctions in a speech celebrating the nuclear deal looks paradoxical. But both Iran and the US are acting out of complex internal interests and looking to strike a diplomatic balance.

Iran’s ballistic missile program is a threat to US hegemony in the region. While US regional ally Israel has a more sophisticated ballistic missile system, Iran’s is “the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East.”

Iran’s missiles currently have a known range of up to 1300 miles, but estimates of the country’s weapon’s program show that Iran could develop the capacity to strike the US by 2020 at the earliest.

That potential capability to strike the US in four years is at issue with the new sanctions. The US and its allies in Western Europe- who themselves may see Iranian missile capabilities threatening them as early as 2017- want to slow the growth and development of the Iranian ballistic missile program.

Realistically, there’s not much the US and its allies can do about the Iranian program. The sanctions Iran faced for its nuclear activities were only made possible by convincing much of the world of the potential danger of another nuclear state in the volatile Middle East.

The ballistic missile program sanctions, on the other hand, will prove a tougher sell.

After the successful negotiations over the nuclear program, many on the right in the US suggested blocking the implementation of the deal and instituting tougher sanctions.

The reality the US faced if the deal had not been implemented is that they would have had to go it alone on enforcing existing sanctions. The rest of the world made it clear they were uninterested in maintaining sanctions on a country that acted in relative good faith during the bargaining process.

In other words, derailing the nuclear deal would have been a net loss for the US, leaving capitulation or open war as the only alternatives to the collapsing sanction regime.

Now, neither of these were realistic responses to Iran’s potential continuation of its nuclear program, and the reason for that is very simple.

Iran could flatten Saudi Arabia Egypt, Israel, or another US proxy state in the region with its ballistic missile capabilities.

The fact that the Iranian government’s leaders wouldn’t take part in such an attack without sufficient provocation- if they were to even do it then- is immaterial to the threat level. The potential capability acts a deterrent. And the deterrent is controlled by a regional power that often acts contrary to the interests of the US and its proxies.

Thus, in the view of the US, “Iran’s ballistic missile program poses a significant threat to regional and global security.” These were the words of Adam J. Szubin, the acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, on January 17.

Obama’s Treasury Department drew up a statement on sanctions over three weeks ago. But the president was unable to deliver it then, due to the impending prisoner exchange between the two countries.

The timing of all these events is very interesting and instructive.

In December, the cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, mainly fought in Yemen, escalated. On the 26th, Iran conducted a ballistic missile test in plain view of American ships close to its territorial waters. This prompted the drawing up of new sanctions relating to that test.

In January, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran increased, stemming from the execution of a prominent Shia cleric by the former, protests at the Saudi embassy in Tehran in response, and an alleged strike on an Iranian embassy in Yemen by Saudi forces.

In addition, a naval incursion- mistake or not- by US boats on January 13 into Iranian territorial waters resulted in 10 US soldiers being detained. Without going too deeply into that incident, it’s important to note that the sailors were released within 24 hours.

This was followed by the prisoner exchange on January 16. The exchange happened hours before the announcement of the nuclear sanction relief. Obama waited until the American prisoners were in the air before announcing the new ballistic missile sanctions.

The Obama administration called for opening dialogue with Iran back in 2008, when then-candidate Obama proposed a slightly less bellicose foreign policy than his rival John McCain. Obama said then that he believed in talking to the enemies of America.

Opening up lines of communication with one’s enemies, especially when one is the hegemonic nuclear and military power in the world, is not a bad thing. Far from it. It’s undeniable that without the dialogue between the Obama administration and the Iranian government, there would be no nuclear deal today.

However, the lines of communication opening and the deal being made do not in any way change the fundamental truths of American diplomacy- the US will do whatever it can to maintain its strategic position in the Middle East and control the regional balance of power.

This isn’t to suggest Iran is blameless. Iran’s maneuvering is as much about outward appearance as it is about internal politics. While the country works to ensure the sanction relief it will see from the nuclear deal, it also must deal with regional and domestic pressures.

This can help to explain Iran’s actions. Facing the relief of the nuclear deal, it still flexes it muscles to assert itself as a counterbalance to US regional dominance. Iran’s leaders had to know they would face sanctions for the act, but they did it anyway.

As a political gamble, it’s a good one. Both sides get most of what they want in the nuclear deal; both sides get to rattle their sabers a little over ballistic missiles for the home crowd.

Otto von Bismarck said in 1867 “politics is the art of the possible.” Almost one hundred and fifty years later, the delicate diplomatic dance between the US and Iran is proving the continuing applicability of that statement.