The Story behind the Story

On Apr. 17, 2017, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson described the Iran nuclear deal as a failure but said Tehran was complying with its terms. Tillerson stopped short of threatening to abandon the 2015 accord brokered by the major powers or saying if the Trump administration would penalize Iran with new sanctions on ballistic missiles or state-sponsored terrorism. Tillerson announced the National Security Council (NSC) would review the accord.

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For Iran, being a state sponsor of international terrorism and proliferator of ballistic missiles since Jan. 1984 are two sides of the same coin. The State Department designated Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984; Iran continued its terrorist-related activity through 2014, including support for Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza (Hamas), Lebanese Hezbollah, and various groups in Iraq and throughout the Middle East, which are a threat to allies like Israel and friends, such as Jordan and the Gulf States. Tehran also transferred short-and mid-range ballistic missiles to Hamas and Hezbollah.

So, as of 2014, Iran was a state of proliferation concern. Despite multiple UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) requiring Tehran to suspend its sensitive nuclear proliferation activities, Iran continued to be in noncompliance with its international obligations.

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The nuclear accord imposes few restrictions on Iran regarding ballistic missiles and does not prohibit new sanctions from being levied on Iran. UNSCR 2231, which gave international legal authority to the nuclear deal, “called upon (Iran) not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,” and Tehran vowed to ignore the Resolution. It does not prohibit new sanctions from being imposed on Iran, providing an occasion for the review to do so.

President Trump gave the NSC 90 days to finish the review; however, he will need to make a series of decisions soon about whether to extend executive order waivers President Obama used to suspend some sanctions against Iran. Consider evidence for holding Iran accountable in the review for its deceptions and refraining from extending executive order waivers.

The Story and Iran’s Reactions

On Apr. 21, the National Council of Resistance of Iran U.S. Representative Office (NCRIUS) exposed yet another nuclear site in Iran. It provided detailed information about continuation of work by a unit and individuals responsible for nuclear weaponization in Parchin, a site that had been targeted by NCRI intelligence. NCRI said Iran pursued weaponization experimentation on large-scale high explosives as a trigger mechanism. When combined with enriched uranium or plutonium and a delivery device like a missile, discovering and penalizing weaponization becomes a final barrier against a nuclear-capable Iran.

On Sep. 21, 2015, CNN reports International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials conducted their first inspection of Parchin, but Iran furnished the sample for IAEA analysis. At a press conference on Nov. 7, 2014 the NCRI provided a comprehensive picture why Tehran does not want inspectors to access Parchin, claiming that Iran can inspect itself.

An NCRI spokesman stated that allowing Tehran to inspect Parchin and offer the results to IAEA is akin to permitting a murderer investigate a murder he committed and provide the relevant DNA to the police! In any event, the explosive chamber at Parchin is part of a project under the supervision of the nuclear weapons division of Iran, prima facie evidence of duplicity.

So, the Apr. 21, 2017 revelation follows from prior disclosures, each one adding a layer of Iran hiding its nuclear weapons program in a pattern of deception.

Tehran’s responses to the 2017 Parchin revelation are telling: An indication of the significance of NCRI disclosures is the reaction of the regime. Tehran’s disputations against NCRI allegations bereft of evidence shows the regime is worried the NSC review of the nuclear deal might be affected by the disclosures.

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Top Iranian officials, including Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan; deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi; former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezai; spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Behrouz Kamalvandi; vice chairman of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee Abolfazl Hassan Beigi, as well as one of its members, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh (to name a few) all took to the podium to try and fend off the disclosure’s international impact.

Dehghan described the NCRI revelations as a “devil plot,” vowing the regime “has not accepted any humiliation and imposition and will not accept and will spare no effort in strengthening defense and pre-emptive capability in line with the country’s regional and international role.”

Araghchi, the regime’s main nuclear negotiator said on Apr. 22 that “the IAEA Director General’s visit to Parchin and his report on the lack of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program led to the closure of the fake file of PMD and caused a scandal for its claimants.”

Abolfazl Hassan Beigi, vice chairman of the Committee of National Security and Foreign Affairs of the “Parliament” said: “The Americans would better not go down with Mojahedin (NCRI) rotten rope ... No new measure has taken place in Parchin and past measures to build war equipment and to strengthen defense capability go on.”

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None of the officials, all of whom appeared to be using the same talking points, categorically denied the disclosures or invited IAEA inspectors to visit Parchin. Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a member of the Committee of National Security and Foreign Affairs said currently Iran is observing the Additional Protocol and according to it, there is sufficient access for the IAEA — an unbelievable statement, given the regime’s history of fabricating its weaponization work.

The Way Forward for the NSC Review

My research shows that the review should take three actions:

First, penalize Iran with new sanctions on ballistic missile production, testing, and proliferation as well as state-sponsored terrorism; refrain from extending executive order waivers that suspended sanctions against Iran.

Second, consider prior Iranian cheating and not just rely on the current situation; the 2014 revelations are a part of this ignoble history.

Third, take into account Iran’s reactions to NCRI revelations: The louder Tehran screams, the more likely it is that the regime is hiding something that must be uncovered, evidence of duplicity.

Dr. Raymond Tanter, @Americanchr, served on the senior staff of the Reagan National Security Council, 1981-82, personal Representative of the Secretary of Defense to security talks in Europe, 1983-84, and now is Professor Emeritus at the University of Michigan.

The views expressed by contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.