March 9, 2008

Examining the Methods of Deception

Deceit in the 9/11 Commission Report as exemplified by endnote 121

121. In response to allegations that NORAD responded more quickly to the October 25, 1999, plane crash that killed Payne Stewart than it did to the hijacking of American 11, we compared NORAD's response time for each incident. The last normal transmission from the Stewart flight was at 9:27:10 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time. The Southeast Air Defense Sector was notified of the event at 9:55, 28 minutes later. In the case of American 11, the last normal communication from the plane was at 8:13 A.M. EDT. NEADS was notified at 8:38, 25 minutes later. We have concluded there is no significant difference in NORAD's reaction to the two incidents. See NTSB memo, Aircraft Accident Brief for Payne Stewart incident, Oct. 25, 1999; FAA email, Gahris to Myers, "ZJX Timeline for N47BA accident," Feb. 17, 2004. [p. 459]

"This Payne Stewart thing has come up often enough. We do actually have a note that discusses the Payne Stewart story. The story is basically this: Gee, we were able to scramble airplanes in time to be at/intercept Payne Stewart's aircraft; why then couldn't we scramble airplanes in time to intercept these airliners? And the answer has to do with the details of the Payne Stewart story and how much time people had. And we actually have an endnote breaking down the timeline of the Payne Stewart story and why they were able to respond and why they had time to respond. And its a quite different story than the story of the notifications we had on 9/11."

Philip Zelikow, Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, in reply to a caller, who had referred to the Stewart aircraft incident [C-SPAN July 23, 2004].

Analysis:

In response to allegations that NORAD responded more quickly to the October 25, 1999, plane crash that killed Payne Stewart than it did to the hijacking of American 11, we compared NORAD's response time for each incident.

The Commission does not compare NORAD's response times. Instead, it compares the times taken to make notifications, which come from the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], not the North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD], a component of the US Air Force. NORAD's responses would begin after notifications. Payne Stewart was a well-known professional golfer.

The last normal transmission from the Stewart flight was at 9:27:10 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time.

Although the endnote compares the FAA's "quickness" of notifications, not NORAD'S reaction times, the time of the last normal transmission is not the correct time, from which to measure the FAA's response to notify NORAD, since the emergency would not yet have begun. The proper time to begin would be from that of an abnormal transmission (or other emergency condition arising), or from a failure to respond. In both the case of the Stewart flight and of American Airlines Flight 11, the first indications of an emergency situation existing were failures to respond to routine communications from their respective air controllers.

The Southeast Air Defense Sector was notified of the event at 9:55, 28 minutes later.

The 9:55 notification time is not given in, nor supported by the cited National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB] Aircraft Accident Brief. (see below) Since the second cited source, "FAA email, Gahris to Myers, 'ZJX Timeline for N47BA accident,' Feb. 17, 2004," does not appear to be in the public record, one is unable to confirm whether or not it supports the 09:55 EDT notification time, as claimed by the Commission. The asserted 9:55 notification time is the only datum, pertaining to the Stewart flight, in note 121 not provided by the NTSB report. Why an e-mail message, over four years after the fact, would hold greater weight than the official NTSB accident report is not addressed. [Doug Gahris, a FAA systems specialist, to, presumably, Air Force General Richard Myers; ZJX is the designation of the Jacksonville, Florida airport]. 28 minutes is measured from the incorrect start time. The Southeast Air Defense Sector is a sector of NORAD.

In the case of American 11, the last normal communication from the plane was at 8:13 A.M. EDT. NEADS was notified at 8:38, 25 minutes later.

25 minutes is measured from the incorrect start time. NEADS is the Northeast Air Defense Sector of NORAD.

We have concluded there is no significant difference in NORAD's reaction to the two incidents.

Again, NORAD's reactions are not being compared. By using the incorrect measure (to compare the FAA's notification times), the result shows no substantial difference (28 min. to 25 min.). The Commission even purports that "the response time" was quicker for AA Flight 11 than for the Stewart flight. This false conclusion derives from the disingenuous choice of using the incorrect measure, since it masks the fact that large commercial airliners, like AA 11 are typically (and in this case, actually) in far more frequent contact with their controllers, than small private nonscheduled aircraft, like the Stewart flight. The false conclusion also derives from a claim (notification at 9:55) apparently unsubstantiated by any document in the public record.