Raw content

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000256 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2018 TAGS: PHUM, PREL, UNHRC-1 SUBJECT: OIC POWER PLAY DOMINATES HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL SEVENTH SESSION REF: 07 GENEVA 2626 Classified By: Ambassador Warren W. Tichenor. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d). 1. (C) SUMMARY: The seventh session of the Human Rights Council, which ran March 3-28 with an April 1 extension, highlighted the power of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in that still evolving body. The session's defining moment came in the closing minutes of its last scheduled day of work, when the OIC and its allies rammed through amendments that subverted the Freedom of Expression resolution. This culminated relentless OIC efforts throughout the session to press its interests, which generally undermine the promotion and protection of human rights. The results included, inter alia, the passage of a resolution on defamation of religions, and the Council's by-now customarily unbalanced approach to Israel. On the positive side, the Council preserved some important country mandates, and provided the forum for a discussion of China's behavior in Tibet. The balance sheet, however, continued to favor the OIC and its allies. As several like-minded ambassadors agreed in an April 2 meeting with Ambassador Tichenor, the seventh session raises deep concerns about the Council's future direction and strongly argues for more active and more effective coordination among like-minded states. END SUMMARY. AN OIC TRIUMPH -------------- 2. (SBU) OIC efforts to amend -- and in effect subvert -- the Freedom of Expression resolution had been a dominant subtext throughout the Council's seventh regular session. With support from the U.S., the EU and others, Canada, as chief sponsor, had sought to fend off an OIC amendment that would instruct the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression to report on "instances in which the abuse of the right of freedom of expression constitutes an act of racial or religious discrimination." The OIC, taking advantage of its internal discipline, had held firm throughout. China, apparently angered by criticism during the Council's March 25 meeting of its behavior in Tibet, floated its own killer amendments two days before the vote. Canada rejected these as having been raised too late in the game. 3. (U) The decisive action on the freedom of expression resolution and its amendments came on the session's last day. We had joined Canada and others in efforts to sway moderate OIC members, but these had fallen short. Meanwhile, Canada had sought to find compromise language that would avoid the OIC amendment. When those efforts failed, and with the session having been extended beyond its scheduled 6pm closing time, the OIC called for a vote on its amendment, which passed (27-17-3). The U.S., Canada, the EU and others dropped their co-sponsorship. With the momentum clearly favoring the OIC and its allies, Cuba then pulled an unexpected move, proposing an oral amendment underscoring "the importance for all forms of media to report and to deliver information in a fair and impartial manner." That amendment passed (29-15-3). Canada and the EU failed in last minute procedural efforts to head off the fully amended resolution, which then passed (32-0-15). 4. (C) The Ambassador's April 2 meeting with like-minded ambassadors to take stock of the session provided additional insights into the dynamics behind the last-minute maneuvering. Canada's ambassador expressed frustration at the African Group's solidarity with the OIC. Madagascar and Angola, for instance, had expressed discomfort with the amendment in conversations with the Canadians but had eventually been pressured into voting for it. The OIC had also exerted immense pressure on others during the end game, he reported; Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, had been pressed hard, although it had ended up voting against the amendment. Both the Canadian and Danish ambassadors expressed particular resentment toward China: though the Chinese had ostensibly kept their promise, made on the session's last day, not to put forth an oral amendment, they had clearly struck a deal for Cuba to do so. 5. (U) In an April 1 extension of the seventh session to allow for closing statements, several OIC members defended the newly amended resolution. Pakistan argued that the OIC amendment had done nothing beyond providing an "add-on" that made the resolution more "comprehensive and holistic," in order to protect the stability of multicultural societies. Sri Lanka echoed that theme and expressed hope that the decisions on the freedom of expression mandate would not leave the Council as a "house divided." The U.S. was among several delegations that sharply criticized the amendments. 6. (U) The OIC had scored an earlier victory with adoption of a resolution on defamation of religions (21-10-14). It also succeeded in rescheduling the Item 7 discussion of the Occupied Palestinian Territories to early in the Council session in order more quickly to condemn Israel's response to rocket attacks from Gaza. In addition to the resolution passed on that occasion, the Council also passed three other anti-Israel resolutions. One of these, on Israeli settlements, passed 46-1-0, with only Canada voting against it. MODEST SUCCESS ON COUNTRY MANDATES, OHCHR UNDER ATTACK --------------------------------------------- --------- 7. (U) In recent months, the OIC and its allies had continued their criticism of country mandates, arguing that they had become unnecessary particularly given the imminent start of the Universal Periodic Review mechanism. The seventh session saw two important casualties: the mandate of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was eliminated, to be replaced with a far weaker arrangement for monitoring the situation on the ground in the DRC, and the Council passed a weak resolution on Sudan. Nonetheless, two important country mandates, on Burma and the DPRK, were adopted (the former by consensus and the latter by a vote of 27-7-18). 8. (SBU) At the session, new appointments were made to fill a number of special procedures mandates. This followed a difficult and highly politicized process that drew complaints from many delegations about lack of transparency. In the end, two AmCits were selected, both of whose records suggest they will not address their mandate responsibilities even-handedly; none of the USG nominees for mandates was selected. In the April 1 session, Egypt, Russia, Algeria and others sought to undercut the principle under which mandate holders are extended, with little review, for a second three-year term if they perform well in their first term; the EU and others resisted this effort, seeing it as a ploy to impose pressure on mandate holders who prove overly independent. 9. (SBU) Meanwhile, a resolution criticizing the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for failing to ensure balance in its hiring of staff was adopted 34-10-3, playing into the hands of those seeking to whittle away at the independence of the OHCHR. By most accounts, we are likely to see more such resolutions criticizing the OHCHR in future sessions. High Commissioner Louise Arbour also came under attack at various points throughout the session, including in the aftermath of the report she presented to the Council, during which she also announced that she would step down from that post at the end of her term in June. TIBET ON THE AGENDA ------------------- 10. (C) On the positive side, the Council session proved an opportunity to shed light on China's reaction to protests in Tibet. Slovenia (on behalf of the EU), Switzerland and Australia joined the U.S. in raising concerns about the issue, as did a number of NGOs, generally in harsher terms. China's delegation, supported by a few others, repeatedly raised procedural objections on the grounds that the discussion was taking place under Item 8 (Vienna Declaration), which should not address country situations. In response to the objections, Council President Costea took a middle ground, urging speakers to address the Vienna Declaration and its implementation but allowing all but one NGO speaker to speak about Tibet. Switzerland is among several countries planning to write Costea to underscore its view that country situations may be addressed under Item 8. In the view of many, China's repeated objections only played into the hands of those criticizing it for seeking to squash dialogue on the subject. COORDINATION WITH THE EU: SOMEWHAT IMPROVED -------------------------------------------- 11. (C) As noted reftel, the Council's last session, in December, had been plagued by a reluctance of the Portuguese EU presidency to coordinate with potential allies, including the U.S. Prior to the seventh session, Ambassador Tichenor, supported by other ambassadors, had highlighted to the incoming Slovenian presidency in the Council the importance of better coordination, and the Slovenians appeared genuinely committed to improving matters. In practice, the EU's record in the seventh session proved mixed. In a number of cases, including on coordination with the Latin American regional group (GRULAC) on a resolution on the rights of the child, the EU continued its weak coordination with other interested delegations, and on a number of resolutions, it often failed to keep the U.S. and other allied delegations properly informed. In other instances, however, it communicated and coordinated well, both through direct contact between Slovenian delegates and their counterparts and through EU burden-sharing of those responsibilities. In perhaps the best example of coordination, the EU brought the U.S. and Australian delegations into its last-minute negotiations with ASEAN on the Burma resolution, and later acknowledged that this had strengthened its position. COMMENT ------- 12. (C) Burma was among a number of issues where U.S. engagement proved important. Another was Mexico's resolution on counter-terrorism: while Mexico sought to be accommodating, it did so at least in part because the U.S. made clear its desire to be actively involved in hammering out acceptable language. Similarly, U.S. engagement both in the run-up to the session and during the session itself shaped the Maldives' resolution on climate change. In these cases and others, the primary sponsors' willingness to cooperate with the U.S. proved fundamental -- and encouraging. 13. (C) Despite a few bright spots, however, the seventh session has been deeply troubling. The OIC appears to have further strengthened its internal discipline, and the statements of its leading delegations, notably Pakistan and Egypt, became more aggressive. We also have been particularly struck by the increasing aggressiveness of the Sri Lankan PermRep. The OIC and its allies also appear to have coordinated well in their lobbying on the floor of the Council. Meanwhile, the EU and its allies are not only outnumbered but have at times been reluctant to challenge the OIC directly. Several ambassadors expressed deep concern in our April 2 stock-taking session, stressing that U.S. membership in the Council could be pivotal and arguing that a new long-term strategic approach might be needed; Slovenia's ambassador said his delegation was drafting a concept paper, initially for EU consideration. From our perspective, it will be difficult to reverse the dynamic of an ascendant OIC in the Council, making cooperation among states that share our human rights goals all the more essential. TICHENOR