Minxin Pei hopes there would not be a „Tiananmen solution“ to quell the relentless protests in Hong Kong. It is clear that protesters are determined to stand their ground, and China has no intention of succumbing to their demands. As Beijing rejects any outside interference, there is no way for a third party to mediate. If tensions escalate, and when there are “no good options,” he urges the leadership in Beijing to “choose the least bad one.”

In order to stop any spillover effects into mainland China, the author believes Chinese leaders may still consider a military crackdown, while piling more pressure on the Hong Kong police to handle the unrest. China’s top policy office on Hong Kong also warned that protesters not to “mistake restraint for weakness.” There are voices in Beijing calling for asserting total control over the territory, which would involve the deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Strongly criticising the protesters, Beijing has hinted it might intervene militarily. The PLA has about 5,000 personnel based in Hong Kong since 1997, and is keeping a fairly low profile, maintaining a symbolic presence to mark China’s sovereignty. Critics fear Beijing might eventually lose patience, after seeing protesters vandalising the outside of the Chinese government’s liaison office; staging a general strike that paralysed the city; occupying the airport that disrupted flights etc.

Hong Kong’s Basic Law - a mini constitution since it was handed back to China in 1997 - states very clear, that Chinese military intervention can only come at the request of the Hong Kong government, and for the "maintenance of public order and in disaster relief". Observers believe it is most unlikely that even a highly pro-Beijing government would consider this nuclear option. Images of Chinese troops marching through Hong Kong crushing pro-democracy protests, even if they would not use lethal force, would be disastrous for the territory's reputation, risk destabilising its economy and cause international outrage.

Playing on the threat of intervention, on 31 July, the garrison broke its silence and released a video which showed troops advancing against protesters. It was a stark warning about how China could respond, if called upon. But the political risk for the leadership, both domestically and internationally, of a military crackdown would have “catastrophic consequences” and even worsen the crisis, leading to further resistance. Even without a military option would not end the protests. Hongkongers resent China imposing its will on them. They want self-determination, and Beijing’s political interventions had been a driving factor behind recent protests.

If protests escalate, the author believes any military action to restore Beijing’s authority in Hong Kong will not be taken before October 1, which marks the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. No doubt the leadership does not want to spoil the celebratory mood, should the crackdown be brutal and attract global condemnation. “But, whether now or in two months, a Tiananmen-style crackdown is not the answer.”

The 31,000 strong police force is not “up to the task” to launch a large-scale crackdown, which would be met with massive resistance. And its members might be reluctant to slaughter the protesters. Deploying the PLA could lead to a civil war, because the Hongkongers would see it as an “invasion.” Apart from high number of casualties and mass exodus of wealthy and skilful residents, it would also be an official end to the “one country, two system arrangement,” plunging the economic powerhouse into an uncertain future.

The author believes Beijing would have a hard time to control Hong Kong. Its “ability to reinstitute control rested not only on the presence of tens of thousands of PLA troops, but also on the mobilization of the Party’s members. In Hong Kong, where the CPC has only a limited organizational presence (officially, it claims to have none at all), this would be impossible. And because the vast majority of Hong Kong’s residents are employed by private businesses, China cannot control them as easily as mainlanders who depend on the state for their livelihoods.’’

However despite talks of direct intervention, Beijing's most effective tool to quell protests is likely to be a subtle but potent economic one. Cities on the mainland like Shenzhen and Shanghai have rapidly caught up in recent years. If Hong Kong continues to challenge Beijing's authority, the leadership could further redirect investment and trade towards the mainland, squeezing Hong Kong's economy and making it far more reliant on Beijing's goodwill.