Pitching in baseball is changing at a rapid pace. (Considering the pace of other changes in the sport) Managers are beginning to manage rest in a more deliberate and serious fashion, relievers are being used longer and more often, and starters are getting fewer innings per start than ever before. Today I’d like to examine some of these trends, see where they’re taking baseball, and argue for a new, completely unfamiliar type of pitching staff.

The current pitching model starter-reliever hasn’t changed much since they let the pitcher be competitive. We’ve had some innovations, like the reliever, and the creation of the save, (a deeply flawed but nobly intentioned metric) but the Starter and Reliever dynamic has seen no changes. However, the adoption of the Leverage Index has (I believe) led to changes in the way pitching is managed. There are a number of trends that point to this. For instance, as shown on the graph below, starting pitchers are at an all-time low Innings Pitched per Game started, indicating that managers are tightening the leash on their pitchers and are more willing to put the bullpen in action if they get into trouble early.

Starting pitchers are being pulled so much earlier than ever that this year there was only one team that had and IP/GS average of 6.0, Dusty Baker’s Nationals. In 2000, when I began my query, there were 15 teams that averaged 6.0 IP/GS or better. In hand with the all-time low league IP/GS, we are seeing more pitchers per game as well, another all-time high.

Relievers are beginning to go more innings as well. The number of multi-inning appearances by relievers, while not at an all-time high, has been on the come-up since 2014.

This is followed by the beginning of a decline of relief appearances with 0 rest days. Both these stats support what I asserted above, that managers and clubs are beginning to be able to understand rest and recovery better, and are thus able to maximize the appearances by their relievers. (Except perhaps the Mets, who finished the 2017 season leading the league in relief appearances on 0 rest days)

All this data suggests the MLB is heading towards the model of pitching that I would like to propose. A pitching staff built completely around the Leverage Index.

The Model

The Indians made a splash in the post-season last year by liberally using Andrew Miller in roles other than the closer and for many more innings than normal. Terry Francona, the Indians manager, would put Miller in the game when the game was likely on the line, be it in the 5th or the 9th. This is a pretty unprecedented move in the world of relief pitching. Miller is easily the best reliever on the Indians pitching staff (and arguably in the MLB), and using him in a spot that isn’t the ninth inning is a fairly new idea for baseball.

With all this in mind, I’d like to propose a new model for pitching staffs. Made up of the typical 10-11 pitchers, leaving ample room for position players and backups.

The Compsure

4 General arms. Similar to Starters or “Long Men” of today.

3 multi-purpose pitchers. Should be able to go 2-3 innings if needed. Should be able to come into the game at any point.

3-4 “closers.” These guys should be the best pitchers on the staff, stuff wise. They should be utilized in high leverage positions.

The Reasoning

General arms are the “Low leverage” pitchers, guys that play the early parts of the game, with the goal being to get through the low leverage parts of the game. They should under no circumstances pitch a high leverage situation. Pitch count should be controlled as well. Something around 50-75 pitches. Ideally these arms are readily available for entry. (i.e. Blow out by the 5th, general arm can come in)

The Multipurpose arms should once again be ready to enter the game at any point, even starting. The idea being that they fill the “fireman” role, coming in when the team is beginning to slip, but the situation is not yet dire. These arms are also meant to be general “reliever” arms, to come in when the High Leverage arms are finished, or before the General arms see the order a second time.

The high-leverage arms are the closers of today. The best stuff on the team, highest velocity, etc. etc. They come in when the game is on the line. This could be in the 4th, the 7th, the 9th, you get the point. They are not used for long, so pitch count should be restricted, and one should be available for every game. (hence 3-4 of them on hand)

The Positives

Under this proposed model, managers would have unprecedented control over the flow of the game, able to plug in pitchers in response to the shifting momentum of the game. The restrictions of a starting pitcher are gone with this model. There are more pitchers that have to be managed, but more are available for each game, and a starting pitcher is not pressured to go 5 or more innings with every outing, fearing for a taxed bullpen. In theory at least, the whole game is run by a new dynamic of pitchers to pitchers instead of starter to reliever.

Starters can begin to fall apart as they face an opponent’s order for a second time in the game. Batters see the way the pitcher uses different pitches, and can adapt to them, leading to a higher batting average on the second time up. Under this model, pitchers don’t have to worry about showing a batter too much of their stuff. A pitcher can attack every batter they face with every pitch in their arsenal.

This model would shine in the postseason, where every game has meaning, and every at bat can change the outcome of the game. Pitchers would be able to get more rest with the travel days and time between series, meaning the staff would have more pitchers available more often.

I have no evidence to back up this claim, but I would reason that with each pitcher pitching for fewer innings every outing, arsenals would decrease in size, and pitch mastery would increase. Starting pitchers with a five-pitch arsenal would be a thing of the past. We would see pitchers with 2 or three amazing pitches, instead of one or two good pitches and three to four mediocre secondary pitches.

Essentially this model would shift most pitching from a 5+ inning marathon to a 1-4 inning sprint.

The Negatives

This model would never hold up in the regular season. It’s far too long to sustain such a model. Pitchers would need to have ample rest, and if things go wrong in even one game, and two pitchers have to be burned in one inning, (which, with the length of the regular season, the odds are it’ll happen) the whole model would collapse. Besides, the starter-reliever model is built for the regular season.

Injuries would also decimate this. While they are already significantly impactful in today’s model, my proposed model relies on pitchers staying healthy and creating an interwoven, dynamic system that would not work over 162 games without a full staff.

The Conclusion

Whether you agree with my model and its reasoning or not, I hope that I’ve presented a compelling case for the future of baseball pitching staffs. As I said above, this model would never work in the regular season. The season is too long, and the pitchers are too fragile. In the post-season however, I think it would be incredibly effective. Perhaps the regular season would still see the usual starter-reliever dynamic, with the occasional new-model game to prepare for the post season.

I know change happens slowly in baseball, but I hope this is attempted one day.