Abu Ivanka Al Amriki is now a national hero for many Syrians opposed to Bashar Al Assad. Abu Ivanka is the moniker some chose for the American president, Donald Trump, for ordering strikes on a Syrian airfield 72 hours after the regime carried out a chemical weapon attack on civilians in Idlib. The humorous honorific reflects the widespread sense of exuberance among Syrians about the US finally acting, however symbolically, against the regime.

The one-off hit sent a message that US policy over the past six years can change. Joy replaced, for now, a profound sense of despair that prevailed within the opposition in recent months, particularly since the regime’s recapture of eastern Aleppo. The loss of a symbolic area had come amid the exit of many of the opposition’s backers from the scene and the regime’s increasing gains on military and political levels.

Responses to the air strikes in Syria and the region open new possibilities, and the side effects of the air strikes might prove to be more lasting than the direct objective of the punitive measure.

First, there is the limited goodwill about the American role in Syria created by the response to the regime’s use of poison gas. This may be short lived but it helps an American policymaker understand what it takes to change how the US role is perceived inside the country. As the US increases its footprint significantly in Syria, in preparation for the Raqqa battle, it needs to define its involvement in a way that it did not before.

The need for the United States to produce a policy for Syria has to do with the stage it has reached in the fight against jihadists. Raqqa, not Damascus or Aleppo, is where the unravelling of Syrian politics seems to be taking place. It is where the interests of foreign countries such as Turkey, the US and Russia collide. The regime also sees the increased US involvement as a threat. And the opposition conceives of the US policy there as favourable either to the regime or to forces willing to work with the regime.

Policymakers in Washington should understand that dropping bombs from the air is not policy and does not safeguard the gains made against extremism. A policy is necessary to place the US involvement in the politics of Syria and lay the groundwork for dealing with the post-Raqqa fight against jihadists. Does the US want to hand over the territory it extracted from ISIL to the regime? How does it seek to maintain its ability to dictate how best to prevent ISIL from returning or other groups from filling the vacuum? The air strikes put on the table options the previous administration was not willing to consider. The US is creating a sphere of influence in areas currently or previously held by ISIL, in the form of an arc stretching from eastern Aleppo to Iraq to southern Syria. The regime increasingly wants to be there, and the US will have to decide whether it is in the long-term interest of the anti-jihadism fight to somehow oblige.

In other words, the US is entering uncharted territory – figuratively and literally.

Second, regional countries that have effectively abandoned the rebel cause against Bashar Al Assad might now return to the scene. Even before the air strikes, Turkey realised it was being played by Russia in northern Syria after the two reached an understanding over the Turkish intervention in the summer to disrupt the expansion of Kurdish militias and fight ISIL. The honeymoon between the two came to an end last month, as Russia and the regime opposed further Turkish expansion.

The return of the opposition backers in the region, including the Gulf states and Jordan, could be prompted by the prospects of a changed American approach in Syria. Gulf officials have already indicated the recent escalation could lead to a new state of play in the way they deal with the regime and Iran in Syria.

Third, the air strikes could help bring to the fore in foreign policy an undercurrent within the Trump administration that has the intention and the plan to roll back Iranian influence in Syria and the wider neighbourhood. The reinvigoration of regional support to the opposition is currently a real possibility, especially to roll back Iran’s influence in Syria.

Regional actors have indicated they will get back in the game if the US indeed pursues such a plan against Iran in Syria. The air strikes could have the unintended consequence of empowering those within Team Trump who want to do just that.

None of the three potential changes above is directly related to the objectives of the move to punish the regime for the use of chemical weapons. And the US could find itself compelled to increase its cooperation with Russia, which will surely seek to prevent the possibility of an active American policy in Syria.

But the air strikes open new possibilities for the US, Syrians opposed to the regime and to their backers in the region – possibilities that seemed so remote just a week ago.

Hassan Hassan is a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy and co-author of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror

On Twitter: @hxhassan