Analysis: Leeds United

Once he had finished studying his dossier on Derby, Leeds head coach Marcelo Bielsa set his team up in a 4-1-4-1 formation; Adam Forshaw operated between the defensive and midfield lines, while Jack Clarke, Pablo Hernandez, Mat Klich and Jack Harrison played as attacking midfielders behind Kemar Roofe.

Leeds made their intentions clear that they would look to exploit the wide areas to create chances, with both goals eventually originating in these areas. The relationship between their full-backs and wingers – Luke Ayling and Clarke on the right, Ezjgan Alioski and Harrison on the left – was key to unlocking the Derby defensive unit. Occasionally Hernandez and Klich would become involved too – particularly on the left, where Alioski, Harrison and Klich would rotate to good effect.

Kemar Roofe would regularly try to stretch the Derby back line by threatening to run in behind, but the visitors tended to handle this approach well. Instead, Leeds continued to focus on the wide areas and used a variety of different movements to create the space for deliveries into the box. One was to use Klich or Hernandez to occupy the outside midfielder in Derby’s block while pushing on both full-back and winger to play in a potential two-on-one against Derby’s full-back. Another was to use the wide attackers and inside attacking midfielders to start on the outside shoulder of their direct opponent and make runs diagonally inside to drag them away – this would trigger the forward movement of the supporting full-back to receive a diagonal pass in the newly created space out wide.

Leeds used lots of opposite-movement pairings to try to drag Derby players into different areas and create spaces to penetrate through. Often the man nearest the ball would make a movement away, while a nearby teammate would move towards it; this would allow for either a pass through to the man who had moved away, a safe pass into the man dropping towards the ball, or even a pass into a third man who had become available through the space created by the movement of the other two.

Out of possession, the hosts operated in a man-oriented jump press with high intensity designed to regain possession as quickly as possible. As Derby played directly from the back for the majority of the game, Leeds had limited opportunities to initiate a co-ordinated high press. Instead, much of their defensive work revolved around centre-backs Pontus Jansson and Liam Cooper winning aerial duels, their midfielders picking up second balls and quick counter-pressing after losing possession.

When Leeds were in a position to press, they operated almost man-for-man, but left Roofe up against both central defenders, where he would try to shut off the second defender and force play one way. If a Leeds player had to leave his man to press further up the pitch, then a teammate from deeper would jump on to the man who had been left – hence the term ‘jump press’. This could also be seen when Derby dropped players from higher positions into deeper areas – simple communication from the Leeds back line, who could see the movement in front of them, worked to manage the movement.

The Leeds counter-press was immediate and intense, finally. They would try to press the ball-carrier while cutting off passing lines to their direct opponent. This often led to mistakes by Derby, who struggled to impose themselves and fell to a defeat that saw Leeds maintain their four-point lead at the top of the Championship.