An Inspector General’s Office audit issued warnings on the Wisconsin Crime Lab’s DNA section.(1)

It turns out that security has been none too good. The lab uses CODIS, and the FBI has protocols in place to keep the system clean from mixups.

The 2006 inspection revealed that access to the DNA lab was open and persons not associated with the lab and testing were visiting the DNA area. Whether logs of persons entering the lab were kept is unknown, but unlikely. This raises the specter that outside persons biasing lab results. Trial testimony shows that field investigators were instructing, via email, DNA lab personnel on what the investigators wanted for results. Now, we know that unauthorized people could easily enter the DNA lab and directly influence results. If an investigator wanted incriminating evidence, the doors were open.

The report noted “This unrestricted access to the lab by non‑DNA staff presents opportunities for inadvertent or deliberate misuse of the CODIS system or the alteration of information.”

This unrestricted access is contrary to rules governing use of CODIS.

The report also noted that an incorrect sample was uploaded to the CODIS database. Out of one‑hundred samples, one victim sample was discovered during the audit and removed.

This error does not reflect on the accuracy of DNA analysis. It does reflect the ease which this laboratory mixes samples. Here, the error was one percent. So what happens when a lab technician gets samples mixed and the wrong sample has a CODIS profile match? Can this type of error lead to a false conviction and more?

During the Steven Avery trial, lab supervisor Sherry Culhane admitted that she once mixed her DNA into the uploads for CODIS. When she was informed of the error, she removed the sample from the database. But, she claimed that this was an innocent error. The problem is that how many samples were mixed up during evaluations that were not so easily discoverable.

The inspector General’s report also noted chronic lateness with reports. CODIS users are required to sign NDIS reminder forms each year. The 2004 forms were not signed until November, 2004, and the 2005 forms were unsigned until July, 2005.

One item in the Steven Avery trial that was curious was that lab supervisor Sherry Culhane asked for a one‑time waiver on a bungled DNA test so she could use the results for incrimination. And she got the waiver producing the magic bullet. But, if the reduced protocol is good enough, then why not make that the protocol for everything? A one‑time departure indicates institutional bias.(2)(3)

Would Ms. Culhane request a waiver to eliminate the person that a Wisconsin Special Agent stated he wanted to incriminate? Or would she request a different protocol to exonerate a wrongfully convicted citizen?

We simply cannot afford the problems and costs that come with the need to reinvestigate cases, but the entire concept of justice demands that bungled lab results are redone. The cost of keeping the innocent in prison is simply too high economically and emotionally for a cavalier hand washing.

This has happened before. The Oklahoma City lab scandal showed how corrupted a state crime lab could be. There, like Madison, investigators told a lab supervisor what they wanted. In Oklahoma City, they got the requested results, and sometimes samples were destroyed.

The person at the center of the Oklahoma City scandal was called Black Magic. Will Wisconsin have its Blonde Magic?



Compliance with Standards Governing Combined DNA Index System Activities at the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory at Madison, Madison, Wisconsin (1) Audit Report GR‑50‑06‑006 Sept 2006 Executive Summary

(2) Culhane testified that she had to consume all the DNA on the magic bullet that was belatedly discovered in the Avery case. This destructive test occurred after Special Agent Tom Fassbender demanded that evidence of Teresa Halbach be found in the Avery house or garage. If there is not enough DNA for amplification, is there enough for a valid analysis?

(3) In 2003, The head of the Milwaukee Branch of the State Crime Lab, Michael J. Camp, dealt with another magic bullet. In the Laurie Bembenek case, Camp made a one day change in protocol so a weapon (known to be unfired at the time of the crime) was included as a match for the one bullet recovered from the body of Christine Shultz. This information is from Case No. 04‑C‑0002, US District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin.

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by Brian McCorkle