Equally important, increased American assistance has been accompanied by closer institutional links between the two countries’ defense and intelligence communities, as well as more intimate personal ties between both communities’ top echelons. Through numerous meetings in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Washington, the Obama administration has used these connections to convey an unambiguous message: Do not attack before all nonmilitary efforts to roll back Iran’s nuclear program have been exhausted.

Ever deeper American-Israeli defense ties have created what might be labeled a “United States lobby” among Israeli security professionals, who now have a strong interest in continuing the close partnership. It is no accident that the security institutions have become among the most vocal opponents of attacking Iran. No one knows better than they what is at stake if they ignore Washington’s concerns.

And their views have resonated with the Israeli general public: a poll conducted jointly last month by the Truman Institute at Hebrew University and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 77 percent of Israelis now oppose a military attack on Iran that is not approved by Washington, although 71 percent would support an attack with American consent.

The plain fact is that the Obama administration achieved its objective of persuading Israel to refrain from a premature attack largely without explicit or implied threats. Instead, it has built a closer relationship with Israel’s defense community, and has capitalized on it.

And that should be a model for the future.

Especially when allies are as close as Israel and the United States, the relationship between them should not depend on whether the personal chemistry between their leaders is strong or weak. Instead, it should be based on firm mutual respect for the enduring national interests each side has. On that score, the professional security officials on both sides can be counted on to put domestic politics aside and to try to find a mutual approach to thorny problems, so long as they can talk candidly, and often, with each other.

A related conclusion is that an American administration will be most successful when it speaks, publicly and privately, with one voice — with the same message coming from the White House, the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs. Then, its interests and priorities will be unmistakable to Israeli leaders, all of whom know how important American largess is to their own country.

These are important lessons not only for the future American-Israeli discourse on Iran, but also in the event that the next American administration, re-elected or new, will attempt to resurrect efforts to achieve Arab-Israeli peace. In that case, too, the United States is most likely to gain Israel’s cooperation by coupling a demonstrable commitment to the country’s security with a clear, unambiguous and sustained articulation of American national interests. And a thick, multilayered conversation between the national security elites in Israel and the United States could ensure that the two countries remain in sync, even when their leaders are not.