AMID the gloom of recent assessments of the progress of its war in Afghanistan, NATO has seen a flicker of light in an unexpected province: Uruzgan. This 8,000 square-mile (20,000 square-kilometre) tract of the starkly beautiful Afghan central highlands is fast becoming its star performer. If the optimism is justified, it would be a vindication for the Netherlands, which took control of Uruzgan in 2006, deploying 2,000 soldiers, and has faced sniping from NATO's bigger powers ever since.

Uruzgan was the birthplace of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, and is dominated by the conservative ethnic Pushtuns from whom the Taliban draw their strength. Yet the Dutch forces lost only six soldiers killed in 2008, while the British in neighbouring Helmand lost 51 dead and Canadian forces in Kandahar lost 32 soldiers. Critics claim the Dutch are good at being a “best friend” to local people, but less convincing as a “worst enemy” to the Taliban: “flower-strewers”. Dutch commanders put it differently. Brigadier-General Tom Middendorp, the Dutch commander, denies his soldiers avoid combat. They have been in more than 1,000 firefights since 2006. But Dutch priorities are to engage local people and help them with development.

Dutch army commanders have pursued an “ink-spot” approach, in which they focus on controlling the three central districts where 70% of the 627,000 population is concentrated. Other areas have been ceded, they say, until they can win popular support by demonstrating progress in the centre. General Middendorp points to recent success in the Baluchi Valley as proof that a “population-based” approach is bearing fruit. Dutch forces fought a long battle in the valley in late 2007, built patrol bases at either end of it and then stood back for a year, content to study the complex dynamics of the area from afar.

They were then able in late 2008 to occupy the whole valley without serious opposition. Grudgingly, local people concede there has been some improvement. Haji Zal, a tribal elder in Tirin Khot, the provincial capital, points to better security and new roads, and judges things “10%” better than a year ago. Other locals say much of the progress is due to the more robust Australian and American special forces who operate alongside the Dutch: “The only time the Dutch are fighting is when they are in bed and dreaming,” sniffs one local police commander. But with fewer fights come fewer local civilian casualties and, suggests Thomas Rutting, an analyst in Kabul, less local hostility to the Dutch.

Afghanistan, however, has a history of turning success stories into horror movies. Khost province, for example, used to be held up by American commanders as a model, until apparently lasting progress crumbled last summer. Similarly, Dutch achievements will be tested by the summer spike in insurgent violence. The Afghan army's commander in Uruzgan, General Abdul Hamid, says the Taliban use remote districts of Uruzgan as training areas. So they have a reason to “live and let live” for now. He estimates local insurgent numbers at around 1,700.

But General Middendorp argues that the Taliban are less of a threat to the tottering structures of the Afghan state than feuding local tribes and predatory warlords. The Uruzgan insurgency is mixed up with a notably vicious tribal war between the Popolzai tribe and minority Ghilzai tribes. Jan Mohammad Khan, a Popolzai warlord and former Uruzgan governor, marginalised the Ghilzais. This seems to have created lasting turmoil which is exploited by the Taliban. NATO commanders have begun talking not of the “Taliban” but of “anti-government militias”.

Since the Dutch arrived, the number of Uruzgan children in school has risen from 12,000 to 50,000; 100 health centres have been built; there are 31 doctors, up from just two; and infant mortality, still a horrifying 25%, has fallen from 36%. General Middendorp is upbeat, but admits the place is still like “the Old Testament”. To secure lasting change, even if security improvements are retained, will take decades. The illiteracy rate is well over 80%, corruption is endemic and tapping the limited pool of educated bureaucrats in Kabul for officials to come and run Uruzgan is currently all but impossible.

For the Dutch, success in Uruzgan may help to lay the ghost of Srebrenica, where their peacekeepers stood by in 1995 during a massacre. But they are in a hurry to go—by 2010, according to the Dutch government. And despite progress in building Afghanistan's fledgling armed forces, it is unclear who will replace them.