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Memorandum of Decision

of the

Honourable Mr. Justice S.N. Mandziuk

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I. Introduction

[1] This litigation involves a dependent adult, DKD. On November 8, 2018 this Court received an application to discharge the current Public Guardian and Public Trustee, and for two individuals jointly to replace the Public Guardian and Public Trustee as DKD’s private guardians and trustees. The Public Guardian and Public Trustee supported that application.

[2] When this matter was heard in Chambers on December 10, 2018, DKD’s birth parents, BMP and BGD were present. They indicated that they had only recently learned of the November 8, 2018 guardianship and trustee application. Both objected to the application. They want to be DKD’s guardians. BMP and BGD expressed concerns over DKD’s care. The matter was rescheduled to February 25, 2019 so that BMP and BGD would have a full opportunity to respond to the proposed new private guardians/trustees.

[3] Subsequent to that, on December 12, 2018, the Court received an irregular three page “NOTICE” document from the father BGD. The “NOTICE” claimed BGD owned his son as property in common law, that his “property” had been trespassed, kidnapped and damaged, and that BGD would assess penalties in gold and silver against those responsible.

[4] BGD’s “NOTICE” exhibited the characteristics of a class of legally incorrect “secret laws” or “cheat codes” concepts marketed commercially by “gurus” to abusive litigants. In Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, 543 AR 215, Rooke ACJ of this Court described and classified these legal sounding but false concepts as “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments” or “OPCA”.

[5] In a written decision reported as DKD (Re), 2018 ABQB 1021 [DKD #1] I concluded that BGD’s “NOTICE” was incorrect in law, and his attempts to claim his son as property and unilaterally foist penalties on others had no legal effect, are an abuse of the Court’s processes (paras 12-16), and were “... repugnant to modern Canadian society, values and law.” (para 11).

[6] In DKD #1 I held that it was appropriate for the Court, on its own motion and under its inherent jurisdiction, to investigate whether BGD should be made subject to court access restrictions by what is sometimes called a vexatious litigant order: paras 18-30. This process would be conducted in writing only (Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 335 at para 105; Stoney v 1985 Sawridge Trust, 2017 ABQB 436 at paras 60-62, appeal deemed abandoned (3 March 2018), Edmonton 1703-0195AC (Alta CA)), and BGD was given until January 11, 2019 to submit to me written argument and affidavit evidence:

1. as to whether he should be subject to court access restrictions in Alberta Courts, and

2. if so, what form those court access restrictions should take.

[7] In the meantime BGD was made subject to interim court access restrictions: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 335 at para 105, enforced in Hok v Alberta (Justice & Solicitor General), 2016 ABCA 356 at para 7; Bourque v Alberta Lawyers Insurance Association, 2018 ABCA 257 at paras 5-7.

[8] On the deadline date I received a reply from BGD. In light of his response, I conclude that prospective court access restrictions are not required at the present time, and the interim court access restriction order is vacated, effective immediately.

II. BGD’s Written Submissions

[9] BGD in his written submissions immediately and explicitly apologized for the “NOTICE”. He explained that he takes court processes seriously and that he meant no disrespect to the Court or to me by filing the “NOTICE”. BGD claimed he never intended to collect on the fee schedules he foisted on others; he recognized that this would create an unlawful hardship.

[10] BGD then commented on my criticisms of the OPCA concepts and the guru I identified in relation to the “NOTICE”. It is clear to me that BGD investigated those criticisms, and he thanked me for pointing out that the people who teach OPCA concepts are grounded in falsehood. For example, in relation to Carl (Karl) Lentz, BGD wrote:

As for Karl Lentz Yes He is a nut cake. I do realize that now. Thanks for pointing that out to me. A little late for me. But you know that. Just saying that. ...

[11] BGD also identified the recently deceased self-proclaimed judge David Wynn Miller (see Knutson (Re), 2018 ABQB 858 at paras 18-26, 72-80) as another pseudolegal influence on him. BGD explained in his submissions that he now sees how the manner in which these gurus teach what they say is the law is misleading: “... With all these ideas one only gets half the story. ...”.

[12] BGD elaborated on his difficult personal background and circumstances. He talked about his concerns about DKD’s future care. Since that information is relevant to the February 25, 2019 hearing I will not discuss that further, other than to say BGD is entitled to present his position and receive a fair and impartial hearing.

III. Court Access Restrictions

[13] In most instances a person will be made subject to court access restrictions where that individual adopts OPCA concepts and then engages in “offensive” litigation, since that is “... a basis for immediate court intervention to prevent that from recurring. ...”: 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 74, 13 CPC (8th) 92, see also Gauthier (Re), 2017 ABQB 555 at paras 77-78, 83, 87 CPC (7th) 555, aff’d 2018 ABCA 14; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at paras 39-41, 46, result confirmed 2018 ABQB 399; d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 438 at paras 5-7, 34; Alberta Treasury Branches v Hawrysh, 2018 ABQB 618 at para 29; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 834 at para 14; Knutson (Re), 2018 ABQB 1050 at para 17.

[14] That was the reason why in DKD #1, at paras 14-16, I concluded that this Court should investigate whether BGD ought to be made subject to court access restrictions. I have now concluded that, at present, such litigation management steps are unnecessary. I believe it is useful to explain why.

[15] The modern approach to court access restrictions is authorized under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its processes: DKD #1, at paras 18-19. This gatekeeping function is a prospective rather than punitive mechanism to control anticipated future litigation misconduct: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at para 36, 273 ACWS (3d) 533, leave denied 2017 ABCA 63, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37624 (2 November 2017); 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), at paras 42-76; Templanza v Ford, 2018 ABQB 168 at paras 102-104, 69 Alta LR (6th) 110. As Thomas J observed in 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), future litigation abuse may be suggested by a person’s litigation history, however a critical consideration is what the Court can anticipate. Therefore, statements of intent, motivation, political ideology and behavioural pathology are also in some instances highly relevant.

[16] I issued DKD #1 on the basis that BGD was exhibiting a clear affiliation with OPCA gurus who promote very problematic, corrosive and illegal conduct. His ideological connection with persons who ignore court and legal authority plausibly foreshadowed the likelihood of future litigation misconduct. BGD has, in his written submissions, explicitly rejected pseudo-law and its commercial promoters. This is a substantial indication that he has altered his litigation trajectory to one that acknowledges the law of Canada, the authority of its Courts, and indicates a willingness on his part to work within that apparatus.

[17] This Court has adopted an approach to problematic litigation management where intervention is not limited to where a person has a history of bad litigation misconduct. As Justice Thomas observed in 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), at paras 55-59, it would be strange that a court is prohibited from responding to a statement by a litigant that the litigant intends to abuse the court and other parties. That scenario leads to an absurd (or at least grossly inefficient) result. A judge would have to wait until a threat to disrupt court function was carried out, the damage is caused, and only then attempt to clean up the resulting mess, ex post facto. This issue is one of the reasons why this Court now operates under its inherent jurisdiction, and not per the authority provided by Judicature Act, RSA 2000, c J-2, ss 23-23.1, which authorizes court access restrictions after “persistent” litigation misconduct.

[18] But that principle goes both ways. BGD has expressed insight. He now knows what he did was wrong. He investigated further the gurus whose ideas he had adopted. He now sees they were the proverbial “evil counsellors” described by Associate Chief Justice Rooke in Meads v Meads, at para 669, who advise others to engage in fraud. I note an interesting fact. BGD denounced “Judge Plenipotentiary David Wynn Miller” of the “:Federal-Postal-Court”, who I did not identify in DKD #1, though Miller is a well-known Sovereign Citizen OPCA guru. I interpret this to mean BGD did exactly what he reports. He dug deeper into the people who had influenced him, and who I and other Canadian judges have criticized. BGD is now acting as best he can in response to what he has discovered.

[19] There is a triage aspect to litigation management. Attention goes to promising cases where court intervention may make a difference. Here, I conclude that BGD deserves explicit Court notice of his efforts, and the opportunity to act on those. BGD has indicated what he will do, and in the following weeks and at the February 25, 2019 hearing, he has the opportunity to demonstrate what he said are his intentions.

[20] I think it goes without saying that where a Court takes this step, acknowledging a statement of good litigation intent, and then the opposite occurs, then stricter litigation management intervention will result. However, I have confidence that in this instance that will not occur.

IV. Conclusion

[21] The Interim Court Filing Restriction for [BGD] Order, dated December 17, 2018, in Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket DA03 16734 is vacated immediately. BGD is no longer subject to any of the court access restrictions imposed in DKD #1.

[22] BGD is cautioned that if he chooses to file an application, documentary evidence, and/or written argument in relation to the February 25, 2019 hearing, in the current trustee and guardianship proceedings for DKD, then he must meet the filing guidelines set out in Civil Practice Note 2, which is available for review on the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench website.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 16th day of January, 2019.

S.N. Mandziuk J.C.Q.B.A.

Written submissions:

BGD

Self-represented Litigant