Washington continues to believe, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that it enjoys the luxury of being able to change only one element of its choosing in the Syrian equation, in this instance the decision to arm the “vetted opposition,” and that Assad and his allies will have little choice but to simply roll over. However — to borrow a word often used by US officials — to believe this is delusional. Just as Washington has the option to escalate its involvement, so too do its adversaries, whose diplomatic and military successes in recent months have forced Washington's hand.

The decision to increase the supply of arms to the opposition is variously rationalized as a response to Russia, Iran and Hezbollah’s successes on the battlefield; as a necessary response to Syria's violation of the US “red line” on the use of chemical weapons; or as an instrument to consolidate opposition ranks around the self-described reliable and moderate forces led by Salim Idriss. The opposition, however, needs to force its way to the negotiating table not as a compliant client of third parties but as an authentically Syrian party to ending the conflict, a goal it has thus far failed to achieve. There is no reason to assume that simply adding more guns to the mix will improve matters.

In February, Obama's new secretary of state, John Kerry, argued that the objective of US efforts was to compel Assad to “change his calculation.” Kerry got his wish, although not in the way he had hoped. Indeed, Assad and his allies altered their policies, effectively escalating the battle against a fractious opposition while agreeing to participate in the Geneva process . The Obama administration also modified its own calculation, accommodating Russia’s views on Geneva II even as its Syrian allies proved unwilling to organize to attend.

This demand remains the boldest statement Obama has made on the issue, and it identified the president personally with the goal of Assad's ouster. At the time of his announcement, however, Obama was voicing an aspiration more than a policy. There have been no more bold statements since. Instead, Washington has been playing catch-up, on the battleground and in merry-go-round meetings across Europe and the Middle East. The announcement to expand military support for the rebels in an undefined manner continues this uninspiring pattern.

US President Barack Obama's decision to arm the Syrian opposition represents another episode in the tortuous process of pushing from behind, a process that began with the president’s August 2011 demand that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad step aside.

In some respects the atmosphere in Washington these days is reminiscent of the dark days of its Iraq adventure. The policy cognoscenti, armchair strategists suddenly expert in all things Syrian, are now focused on the tactical elements of the battle — which arms to provide, the benefits of no-fly zones or cruelly fanciful notions of preparing Syrians for the “day after.” Skeptics compare the current policy toward Syria to the US policy of incremental escalation in Vietnam, which proceeded in the face of public disenchantment and despite the knowledge that victory was impossible.

There is no doubt whatsoever that if it chooses to, the United States can defeat Syria militarily — together with any combination of its allies. It can destroy Syrian air defenses and occupy Damascus, which would make it the fifth Arab capital “liberated” by the United States in three decades. It may even succeed in installing a “moderate” of its own choosing in Damascus. Idriss is the current flavor of the month.

But so what. The vital question is not what US military power can achieve, but in the service of what strategic objective will it be deployed.

Washington, to its credit, has never been prepared to go “all in” on Syria, in large part because of the continuing historical failure of the opposition to present a compelling governing alternative. Unlike the George W. Bush administration, the Obama White House does not revel in the idea of the destruction of an Arab country as a guiding strategic objective. Simply “breaking the china” does not in and of itself benefit US interests, or for that matter, those of the Syrian people. US policy has come to acknowledge the value of retaining Syria's governing institutions, including the military, “in a political transition to a tolerant and diverse post-Assad Syria.” The exclusion of those with “blood on their hands,” for example, is seldom heard nowadays, and neither is the grander, illusive notion of victory.

“It's not a question to me of whether or not the opposition can, quote, 'win,'" explained Kerry recently. “It's a question of whether or not we can get to this political solution.” Yet the Obama administration's failure to commit to victory, whatever that may mean, is difficult to defend in an environment defined by misplaced notions of good and bad.

From the outset, Syria has been ill-defined as a morality play between the forces of light, represented by Washington and its Syrian allies, if not always their jihadist friends, and the forces of darkness, who include everyone else. Those preoccupied more realistically with the ambiguities of a situation in which all the choices are bad — and I would include the US professional military services in this corner— are less than convinced by the rationale for escalating US intervention. But as in the run up to Iraq, such reservations cannot today be articulated without risking ridicule, so deep is the sentiment that US policy is so clearly on the side of the angels. There are real reasons to be skeptical of the new US effort; there are almost too many to contemplate. The mood in Washington, however, is such that one cannot easily raise such doubts in polite company.

This depressing Washington reality also recalls the colossal failure of the United States in Iraq, a failure that exposed systemic shortcomings in its ability to define, debate and execute its policy objectives. Now, as then, Washington is exhibiting a willful intention to establish a policy and moral foundation for the US effort in Syria that at best reflects a flawed understanding of the issues at play and at worst is simply an invention.

Geoffrey Aronson has long been active in Track II diplomatic efforts on various Middle East issues. He writes widely on regional affairs.