Compensating the Royal Irish Constabulary

1922-1932



Niamh Brennan



Hamar Greenwood, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, declared dramatically in the House of Commons in 1922 that the Royal Irish Constabulary refugees in England were: "strangers in a strange land for which they fought so long and so well". Perhaps his remarks symbolised the opinion which British Conservatives held of that force as a whole and their regret at its passing (though there was little regret even in Britain at the passing of the Auxiliaries and the Black and Tans.) 1 Viscount Wraxall claimed that "we have, collectively and individually, an immense responsibility in this matter". 2 However much the British might have felt it was their duty to see that the RIC were well treated in the upheavals caused by the change in government and disbandment, it was the Free State government which was left to pay the bill for a body of discharged British public servants who had been treated as Public Enemy Number One until the Truce- and even to a certain extent after it. Therein lay the roots of disagreement over the fate of the disbanded RIC men.

After three years of guerrilla warfare primarily directed at its members, Ireland's national police force, the Royal Irish Constabulary, was a demoralised body in the south of the country in 1922. It had survived the killing of over 400 members, the injury of 725, and the resignation of almost 2,000 (of a membership of 10,000) and the burning and looting of barracks scattered over the country. Its disbandment was par for the course of Irish independence and in 1922 that process began while a Bill was hastily drafted and debated in the British houses of parliament to ensure adequate compensation would be granted- as promised under Article 10 of the Treaty- to the force described by Greenwood as "one of the oldest....and finest police forces in the world". 3

The pressure on the British government to implement generous legislation in their favour was increased by the number and nature of the attacks on RIC members, past and present, which continued after the Truce- thus guaranteeing them martyrdom status in Britain. Fifteen men were killed between December 1921 and June 1922, including two men already dying of pleurisy in a Galway hospital. The Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association (SILRA), the official charity of the Irish Unionist Alliance which operated from London, declared in June that it had assisted 3,000 RIC men who had fled from Ireland in fear of their lives. Whether or not the threat was always real is uncertain, but RIC men, even those who had retired many years earlier, doubtless feared, as the political situation deteriorated in Ireland in early 1922, that the by now established pattern of singling out the RIC as targets would remain into any war which left extreme republicans outside the margins of the newly forming political structures. William Wilson, a former sergeant fled from Bagnelstown in Carlow with his family in September 1922 after he had received a threatening letter from the IRA which declared it was sending to town "a flying column for the extermination of RIC pensioners and spies". 4 Wilson pointed out that though he had been forcibly driven from his home, he would have willingly served any "legally established government" and was thus far from being a die-hard unionist. But as an ex-policeman he was an easy target for a group of Irregulars struggling to establish a range of targets at which to focus its burgeoning campaign. Men, of course were not the only victims; the husband of a Mrs Cadogan was given forty-eight hours to clear out of his Wexford home and he swiftly obeyed the order, leaving his wife and young family behind -though to be fair to him it is clear that his wife had no desire to follow him overseas: "It would be a heartbreak on me to upset my home and little ones to go and live in another country" she declared. 5 She was probably not unique either in her confusion over the exact origin of the notice to quit. She begged Collins to give her husband "leave" to come back again in a moving if naive plea:



Will any good man in the Department for Godsake let me have him back? He is not an Englishman or a Black and Tan- he was a true born Irishman from Cork and I dont [sic] think he ever did any wrong to his brother Irishmen, only supported his family.



Greenwood, in a letter to the Provisional Government, stated that men who had left the force 15 years ago were being persecuted and that the victimisation had recently spread from the south of Ireland to counties in Leinster and Connacht. He mentioned the tragic case of a sergeant's wife murdered while trying to stand between the assassin and her husband and another incident in which the 17-year old son of an RIC man was savagely beaten. 6

The Constabulary (Ireland) Act 1922



The 1922 Constabulary Bill was hotly debated in the House of Lords by the ultra-conservative die-hards, notably Edward Carson. Carson, though retired from his leadership of the Ulster unionists and in semi-retirement as a peer, still possessed unsurpassed oratorical skills. He believed that the fact that the RIC was almost 90% Catholic endangered them more rather than less and thus they had "a right to believe...they would not...be abandoned by the British Government" especially as their chances of securing employment at home were practically nil. 7 For the most part, Carson's several amendments were accepted in the Lords but rejected in the Commons. However, in spite of his vociferous objections the reality was that the terms were not ungenerous particularly in light of the fact that the British government had to be careful not to alienate the new government in Ireland by granting unreasonable terms as it had been agreed that 75% of the pensions ultimately would be paid by the Irish Free State. (The other 25% was the responsibility of the Northern Government). Indeed, the Ultimate Financial Agreement between Ireland and Britain in 1926 which finally committed the Free State to paying the 75% led to bitter exchanges in both the Dail and the Senate. Professor Magennis, a Northerner, denounced the agreement as a commitment to a "retrospective payment to the members of England's army of occupation". 8 But Britain always insisted it was the Free State's duty to pay the pensions because it was its will that the force be compulsorily disbanded. 9

The Bill was to grant full pension rights to every man with an added twelve years to his service, provision being made for his widow and children on his death. If he joined any police force "the expenses of which are defrayed in whole or part out of moneys provided by Parliament or by any Parliament in Ireland or out of funds assisted by the Exchequer or by any Exchequer in Ireland" the allowance might be but not necessarily would be subject to suspension for the duration of his service in that force. 10 Moreover not all of the pension would necessarily be suspended. Nonetheless Carson objected strenuously to this clause, insisting that it was absurd to preclude a man in this manner from entering the employment for which he was best suited. However, the British were acutely aware that for reasons which were both financial and political the Irish government would never agree to pay pensions for men employed in the RUC. By Autumn 1922 salaries had been suspended in the cases of 1,347 ex-RIC members employed in the RUC, three men in the Civic Guard, 473 in the Palestine forces and nineteen in other forces at a saving of £179,228. 11 Not only would the Free State government have objected vigorously to paying pensions for men employed in the RUC they also tried, in 1925, to persuade the British to debar pensions from anyone employed in a public office. The Irish government really wanted to avoid having to pay compensation allowances for men re-employed in police forces anywhere in the world but particularly in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and the United States of America - the most popular destinations of emigrants. The fact that the Irish were excused from paying pensions for those employed in police forces in colonies such as Cyprus, St. Helena and Somaliland (as well as Great Britain and Ireland) was little consolation as was the Treasury's assertion that the savings were particularly worthwhile in respect of the men serving in the Palestine force. 12 To some extent it appeared that the Irish government was campaigning on a point of principle rather than from any great expectations of financial gain as it stressed more then once the fact of not having been consulted when the 1922 Act was under consideration. "We cannot afford to allow the Treasury to be generous with our money" was a typical and perhaps not unreasonable refrain. 13

Supplying Addresses: British Decisions and Irish Objections



The humiliation felt by the Irish government over its failure to get its own way on the re-employment issue was reinforced when it became embroiled in another war of words over the seemingly innocuous question of the addresses of ex-RIC men and officers.

Not surprisingly, as the Irish government was footing the hefty annual bill for the allowances and pensions, it felt entitled to some supervision over the administration of those payments. The Finance Department wanted to be able to detect and weed out of the pension system not only men re-employed in the police but also men who had died. However, it was not ready to tell the Treasury that this was its motive, believing access to the addresses was a natural right. But Waterfield in the Treasury insisted it was the rule of the Pay Office never to divulge the addresses of pensioners to anyone, adding significantly that the situation in the case of the RIC was "greatly intensified by the political objections" which would debar communication of such information "even to your government". 14 A subsequent meeting between both Departments took place in February 1925 in which the Irish side demanded access to the records in order to make a full audit of them while the British admitted their reasons for refusing the information were "frankly political". 15 It appeared that almost two years after the end of the civil war the RIC were still marked men (at least according to the British) and the cementing of relations between two governments amounted to absolutely nothing when compared to the fate of people who had been loyal to the crown. The Irish, it seemed, could be trusted to pay the compensation allowances due to the men but not with their personal safety.

At the same time as refusing this information, the British government demanded from the Free State information on cases where pensioners had been imprisoned. The Justice Department could only produce one such case and it was suggested to the British Treasury that the supply of addresses would ensure "no cases were overlooked"- but to no avail. 16

If the British had political motives for wanting to suppress the names and addresses of the RIC the Irish had their own political reasons for wanting at least some of the addresses. The government had promised compensation to RIC men who had resigned or been dismissed on nationalist grounds and needed to have the details of their service. Joseph Brennan, secretary to the Finance Department, admitted to the High Commissioner, James McNeill, that some cases might exist where it would be "politically inexpedient to disclose details" and suggested that copies or extracts be given instead, believing the situation in 1924 was different from that in 1922 when the British had refused to assist any "disloyal" members of the force in any way. 17 Since then the Treaty had been ratified, the Civil War was over and relations between both governments were good. Surprisingly in this instance the British did agree to send over the information requested, probably because the "nationalist" ex-RIC would hardly be in the same kind of danger as the loyalists and even if they were, it was an Irish, not a British problem.

The issue was finally resolved in 1926 when the Free State Finance Department was again refused access to the RIC records which it needed to carry out "test checks" of claims against the payments. Brennan even suggested withholding payment altogether unless the information was handed over and he queried the Free State's obligation to their payment per se. 18 The Public Accounts Committee was sitting at the time and for that reason Brennan was particularly anxious to have the RIC payments finalised. A compromise was reached at last. The British Auditor-General agreed to send over a certificate attesting that the claims were true and just while the Irish would retain the right to make test checks as long as information on the pensioners was regarded as "strictly confidential. 19 " It was a significant victory for the Irish Free State which tended to lose most of these administrative, pseudo-political struggles with its vastly more experienced neighbour, but it was also perhaps an indication that by 1926 the British were finally beginning to trust the Irish not to persecute ex-loyalists. Also the pressure from the loyalist sympathisers, whilst still present, had lifted somewhat by then and the time was right for conciliatory gestures.

The Tribunal



A government white paper setting out the terms of disbandment provided that an advisory tribunal be set up in London for the purpose of granting ex-RIC members - in cases of special hardship- a "disturbance" allowance if they had been forced to leave home; this was usually one or two months salary. The officer or constable was allowed to commute - that is to get an advance of- a portion of his pension for up to two years and this provision was made especially accessible to those wishing to emigrate (making the exportation of the redundant policemen easy for all concerned. 20 ) "Separation" allowance was also available for a man forced to leave his family behind and free travel was provided from the place of disbandment to his home.

Appointed by the Chief Secretary for Ireland on 12 April 1922 the Tribunal granted 886 separation allowances while 6,941 disturbance allowances were issued -an astonishing number when one considers there were only 8,000 left in the force after the Truce. RIC members could also apply to the Tribunal for advances of their pensions in order to emigrate and the great majority of these were approved - 1,598 out of 1,686 applications. Giving advances of pensions in order to dispose of a problem was not something to which the government was likely in most cases to raise any objections. Some of the 1,269 who were granted a commutation of their pensions decided to start farms or small businesses in Northern Ireland or Britain. A small number were also granted sums to buy houses. 21 However, not every victimised ex-RIC man was in the position to apply to the Tribunal for assistance. Michael Egan, another ex-sergeant was court-martialled by Irregulars in Newmarket, Cork and driven out of Ireland with his wife and three children in April 1922 although he had been a pensioner since July of the previous year. 22 Yet because he had not been disbanded but had in fact retired before the Treaty he was entitled to no compensation by the Tribunal. Others found the assistance inadequate. For these people the recourse was either to private charity, such as SILRA [See Above] or to the Irish Grants Committee, the government run committee for loyalist refugees from Ireland. SILRA, which aided loyalist refugees of all kinds and had a particular interest in ex-servicemen, did not have a huge budget and was often compelled to refer applications for assistance received by it to the Colonial Office which dealt with them through the IGC. 23 In 1927 the Treasury declared that it could not conceive of a situation in which the RIC could be included in the IGC awards, feeling that the Tribunal had been over-generous in allowing men who had remained in -or returned to- Ireland to hold onto disturbance allowances. 24 The majority had returned to Ireland within a short time of disbandment and those who remained in England had found work. However, in spite of doubts expressed by the Treasury official, G. Upcott, ex-members of the RIC were assessed by the IGC on their individual merits and not as a privileged group and hundreds were granted compensation awards.

In 1923 the Treasury had decided to tighten up on the grants given to men as "disturbance allowances" by the RIC Tribunal, targeting men like Garda Matt McCarthy who obviously did not use the money for the purpose for which it had been given. These allowances had been intended for persecuted, loyalist policemen forced to flee to England or possibly the North, certainly not for men like McCarthy who not only stayed put but then proceeded to join the national police force of the new Irish government. McCarthy insisted that he had been forced to leave his home (if not his country), having moved from Belfast to Dublin in April 1922. Probably because he moved south instead of north and joined the Guards the British suspected that he was on the wrong side of the political tracks and were determined to get back any moneys which had been granted him in good faith during the Irish Civil War. The Irish government, having received so little assistance over the issues of re-employment and addresses, was understandably reluctant to go out of its way to squeeze the miserly sums which the Treasury demanded from McCarthy and a few other men (£20 on average). 25

Again as in the dispute about giving information the British attitude over such small sums was obviously based more on political than financial grounds. The RIC Tribunal had been set up specifically to assist police refugees of the civil war and a member of the new Civic Guard could be hardly counted among that body. Not surprisingly the British government resented giving handouts to ex-RIC men who clearly did not fit into the category of victim. In spite of its own resentment at British parsimony, the Irish government made sure that the money was paid back. However the numbers requested to refund disturbance money- 642 in all- made up a tiny percentage of the almost 7,000 who originally had received grants in 1922.

The "Nationalist" RIC



Apart from having to adhere to its promises to foot the bill for the RIC pensions, Cosgrave's government had to recognise the sacrifices made by some members of the Constabulary who had resigned or been dismissed for their nationalist beliefs during the Anglo-Irish war. A Committee of Enquiry was set up to see what could be done for them. It sat between 1922 and 1923 and granted pensions to 573 of a total of 1,300 applicants. 26 The large number of applicants was not surprising for the government had made a promise in the Dail to compensate deserving patriots on terms as good as those granted under British laws to the disbanded men who had remained with the despised force until the bitter end. However it would be inaccurate to deduce from such a large number of applicants that a majority of RIC men were nationalist in spirit. Anthony Gaughan claims that most of the evidence "indicates that the RIC as a body (also the DMP) until the advantage began to swing to Sinn Fein remained remarkably loyal to the British authorities." 27 It was not easy therefore to judge the political affiliations of even those who had resigned or been dismissed during the "Troubles" as the Irish ministers with that responsibility soon discovered. Timothy Healy, the governor-general, expressed to the Duke of Devonshire, the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 7 February, 1923 the "great difficulty" being experienced by the government in "forming conclusions as to the motives which actuated ex-members of the RIC in resigning". 28 As no assistance was forthcoming from the British in the form of information, the Irish side was forced to rely on its own resources. It was decided to concentrate on each man's length of service, the date he resigned and the sacrifices he made by resigning, proof that he received the circulars issued by Sinn Fein clubs calling for mass resignations from the RIC, the local area in which he had worked and other possible personal motives he may have had for wanting to leave the force. It was not a fail-save method because personal and political motives were not always easy to separate and compartmentalise.

In the early nineteen thirties de Valera was responsible for the setting up of another such committee to review the rejected claims. He asserted that many pensions had been denied to men simply because they had been supporters or members of the Anti-Treatyites during the Civil War. Yet, although 330 applied only a further 50 were accepted. 29 This seems to signify either that the government had inherited its predecessor's healthy scepticism at the extent of nationalist belief held by those who had resigned or been dismissed from the RIC or perhaps that it had inherited Cumann na nGaedheal's reluctance to part with the State's money. It might also indicate of course that the setting up of the second inquiry was merely a political device by Fianna Fail to prove that Cumman na nGaedheal's efforts at rewarding nationalists were inadequate and the Committee's greatest importance was in the work on behalf of nationalists that was being seen to be done.

Ironically the only incident in the Anglo-Irish War involving an actual revolt by RIC members caused the greatest controversy among the members of the second Committee of Enquiry. On 19 June 1920 the Divisional Commissioner of Munster, Lieutenant-Colonel Gerald Bryce Ferguson Smyth and General Henry Tudor attended a special meeting of the RIC and Black and Tans in Listowel to announce a new policy of "frightfulness" and reprisals against the IRA. Sixteen men walked out in protest and five of them resigned almost immediately. Others were dismissed within the next six to seven months. They were led by Constable Jeremiah Mee who felt that those who resigned deserved greater compensation from a nationalist Irish government than those who waited to be sacked. The first Committee in fact compensated all who applied except those who had a very short period of service in the force at the time of the "mutiny". Among the men claiming belated compensation in 1935 was a Constable Patrick O'Neill who had been a signatory of the protest at Listowel yet whose subsequent conduct in the RIC was described by the Fianna Fail Minister for Finance as "disgraceful". 30 He had remained in the RIC until the British obtained a full list of the signatories to the protest and dismissed all of them. His motives for signing the protest seem ambiguous to say the least and perhaps were due more to a misguided sense of political opportunism than to any personal misgivings about Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth's ruthless proposals to bring the guerrilla campaign to a quick and bloody end. Another signatory, M. Fitzgerald, had joined after the Anti-Conscription Campaign of 1918 and was a British ex-serviceman. His claim of ignorance of Irish affairs as his excuse for joining the RIC in the nationalist climate of 1918 did not satisfy the Committee, though his subsequent membership of both the National Army and the Gardai certainly proves an admirable determination to bury any unionist past. It was felt however that being allowed to join the Gardai was adequate compensation in itself. After his dismissal John MacNamara had had his passage paid to the United States by Sinn Fein where he gave evidence to a Commission on Conditions in Ireland. The best the second Committee could do for him in 1935 (because he had only three years service in the RIC) was to offer him a post in the Gardai.

Therefore in the eyes of both the first and second independent governments the Listowel incident was not so much a mutiny as a spontaneous protest undermined by most of its protagonists. Their backgrounds in the force and behaviour after the event could not be cancelled out by their participation in the incident itself. Experienced politicians in Ireland had discovered long before 1936 that the line drawn between certain self-styled unionists and nationalists was very thin indeed when the main activating force was monetary compensation. The proposed solution which both governments tended to experiment with, that is, the listing of certain criteria to define a claimant's natural affinities, more often than not failed simply because the motivation was far more complex than was appreciated.

Conclusion



The RIC as the most victimised group on the loyalist side in the pre- and post-truce conflict in Ireland were suitably also the most generously dealt with by their supporters in the wake of that conflict. In the eyes of those whose influence could ensure they were not neglected the disbanded men had an almost unblemished tradition of loyal service and a recent history of heroism. This record guaranteed them compensation privileges which ex-servicemen for example- left to their own devices after demobilisation- must have envied. Individuals no doubt suffered, especially those who had retired before the end of the Civil War, but Carson's melodramatic cries that the only award for their loyalty was abandonment and desertion ring hollow if one considers the young men working in the dominions' police forces and collecting both wage and pension. To the Free State Department of Finance, regularly receiving invoices for such pensions, his complaints must have seemed ironic indeed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY



Unpublished Sources

National Archives, Dublin (NA)

Department of Finance Files (DF)

Department of Justice Files (DJ)

Department of the Taoiseach Files (DT)



National Library of Ireland (NLI)

Joseph Brennan Papers



Public Record Office, Kew, London (PRO)

Colonial Office Papers (CO)



Official Publications

Annual Catalogues of British Government Publications (Ann. Cat.s)

1920-1935, Vol.2, (Hertfordshire, 1974)

Public General Statutes of Great Britain

Hansard, Parliamentary Debates of Great Britain

Oireachtas Debates, Ireland (Free State)



Newspapers

Morning Post



Books

Gaughan, A. (1975), The Memoirs of Constable Jeremiah Mee, Kildare.

1 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, (Vol. 153), Second Reading of Constabulary (Ireland) Bill 1922, 10 May 1922, col. 2288

2 ibid, House of Lords, Second reading of Constabulary (Ireland) Bill, 4 July 1922, col. 224

3 ibid, HC, 10 May 1922, col. 2229

4 National Archives, Dublin, Department of Finance 303/15, W. Wilson to Minister for Finance, 9 September 1922

5 NA, Department of Justice, H5/387, Mrs Cadogan to M. Collins, 12 June 1922

6 NA, DT/S 1842, Greenwood to Secretary, Provisional Government, 22 June 1922

7 Parl. Debs, HL, Committee Stage of Constabulary (Ireland) Bill, 24 July 1922, col. 707

8 ibid, Dail, (vol. 17), 8 December 1926, col. 656

9 National Library of Ireland, Dublin; Joseph Brennan Papers, MS 2507A, Brennan to Minister for Finance, 3 December 1922

10 Constabulary (Ireland) Act, 1922

11 NA, Department of the Taoiseach, S1839; O. Niemeyer, Financial Controller, Treasury to W. O'Brien, Sec. Dept. Finance, 11 October 1922

12 NA, DF/200/65/25, E. W. Millar, Treasury, to J. J. McElligott, Dept. Finance, 18 March 1926

13 NA, DF/200/65/25, Finance Department Minute undated

14 NA, DF/37/11/24, A. P. Waterfield, Treasury, to McElliott, 11 December 1924

15 ibid, Note of meeting between British Treasury and Irish Department of Finance administrators, 16 February 1925

16 NA, DF/37/1/24, Brennan to Waterfield, 29 April 1926

17 NLI, Brennan Papers, MS 26012, 5 April 1924

18 NA, DF/37/2/26, Memo, Brennan to Minister for Finance, (undated) and to Attorney-General, 5 March 1926

19 ibid, G. Upcott to Secretary, Minister for Finance, 28 July 1926

20 British parliamentary Command papers 1618 and 1673, Ann. Cat.s

21 Public Record Office, London, Colonial Office, 762/1 Report of RIC Tribunal

22 NA, DF/303/17, M. Egan to Minister for Finance, April 1922

23 Morning Post, 12 August 1922

24 PRO, CO, 762/1, Upcott to L.M. Odgers, RIC Tribunal Committee member, 8 April 1927

25 NA, DJ/H99/9, Loughnane, Treasury, to O' Friel, Dept. Justice, 5 November 1923

26 NA, DT/S2085, Memo, Finance Department, 4 October 1932

27 Gaughan, (1975) p. 81, footnote 20

28 NA, DT/S1764, Healy to Devonshire, 7 February 1923

29 NA, DT/S2085, Memo, Minister for Finance to Executive Council, 9 April 1935

30 NA, DT/S15330, Memo, Minister for Finance to Cabinet, 1 February 1936

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