Note: This is a living document that will in sha’ Allah be updated as Yaqeen continues to publish content for the Muslim community. If you would like to contribute a scholarly critique of a Yaqeen article to be published or cited by MuslimSkeptic.com, please email admin@muslimskeptic.com.

Introduction

The Yaqeen Institute for Islamic Research is an online outlet that claims to “inspire conviction” and “fight doubts” about Islam. They publish research articles, infographics, and video content that they distribute on social media through paid advertising and other means. According to their latest available tax filings, Yaqeen received $1.4 million in charitable contributions in 2016 and $3.5 million in 2017. They also claim to be “zakat-eligible.”

Yaqeen Institute is four years old, yet little has been written to evaluate the output of the institution as a whole. This report aims to fill that gap. An organization that collects millions of dollars annually, claiming to produce Islamic material while representing the Muslim community should be independently evaluated for Islamic soundness or lack thereof. This is a communal necessity. And this is in the spirit of peer review and academic rigor, which any academic institution, which Yaqeen claims to be, should welcome.

This report is the culmination and compilation of research by nearly a dozen Islamic scholars and students of knowledge including MuslimSkeptic.com team members. Some of their names are cited in the report while others remain anonymous.

The overall conclusion of this report is that much of Yaqeen’s content contains significant errors as well as blatant misrepresentations of Islam and the Islamic tradition. Furthermore, numerous essays advance views that are contrary to Islamic principles and values. Some of their material can even rightly be described as blasphemous.

Due to all this, we ask, how can Yaqeen be seen as a reliable source of Islamic teaching? Furthermore, can they be said to live up to their name of instilling yaqin (certainty) when their content could potentially create major doubts in Islam and entrench incorrect beliefs in the minds and hearts of their readers?

This report is by no means intended as a thorough rebuttal and investigation of each Yaqeen publication referenced herein. Rather, this report serves as a broad survey of Yaqeen’s work and highlights notable problems and errors therein. The report should serve as a helpful reference for the community to be aware of these problems. We invite Muslim scholars and students of knowledge to consider the cited material below and investigate further to provide their own evaluations, as well as for well-meaning individuals within Yaqeen to rectify mistakes.

Contents

0. Disclaimers

1. Yaqeen’s Methodology

2. Ties to CVE and Counter Extremism

3. Omar Suleiman and the Politics of Doubt

4. Gender

5. Interfaith and Pluralism

6. Evolution

7. LGBT

8. Sharia

9. Who and What Yaqeen Promotes

Disclaimers

This report is not meant to condemn all those who work for, are affiliated with, or have contributed to Yaqeen. Obviously, as Yaqeen itself claims, not everyone who works with Yaqeen endorses everything the organization does or stands for. Presumably, many within the organization would strongly disavow some or all of the problematic Yaqeen content cited in this report.

It should also be disclosed that one of the principal contributors of this report, Daniel Haqiqatjou, was a former employee of Yaqeen and was hired as their Director of Research in 2016. In response to some of his earlier critiques of Yaqeen papers and people, certain Yaqeen affiliates referred to his employment history and insinuated or outright claimed that Haqiqatjou’s critiques are merely the result of his being “a disgruntled ex-employee.” Their false claim did nothing to disqualify his critiques then and if repeated, would do nothing to disqualify anything in this report now. Are former (or current) Yaqeen employees not allowed to criticize anything that Yaqeen does or publishes? They and all of us can ask ourselves: Should anyone affiliated with Yaqeen or any other Islamic organization, past or present, be muzzled from critiquing that organization? Back to Top

Yaqeen’s Methodology

Yaqeen publishes a variety of essays dealing with psychology, pedagogy, history, civil rights, and more. A subset of their material concerns what their founder and president, Imam Omar Suleiman, has termed “uncomfortable truths.”

Upon launching in 2016, Yaqeen published a study mapping these “uncomfortable truths” as sources of doubt for Muslims in the US. The study describes its methodology thus:

“We spoke to imams, chaplains, and youth coordinators across the country in order to better understand their interactions with Muslims whose belief in Islam had waned or altogether worn out. The interviews, which lasted about an hour on average, took place primarily over a four-month period beginning in February 2016.”

Based on these interviews, Yaqeen produced an infographic summarizing their results:

So, how has Yaqeen addressed these “uncomfortable truths” in its mission of combatting doubts?

Yaqeen’s methodology for addressing doubts is spelled out by Suleiman himself in numerous lectures. In one recent lecture entitled, “The Prophetic Method of Teaching Uncomfortable Truths,” Suleiman explains that there are two components to broaching these issues: The message and the delivery of the message. According to him, there can be no compromise on the message, but the method of delivering the message must take into account the recipient of that message in order to ensure a “personal connection” based on “mercy” and “approachability.” He refers to this approach as “compassionate orthodoxy.”

He cites various examples from the Quran and Sunna to justify the Islamic preferability of this method. For example, he describes at length the kind, compassionate approach of Prophet Ibrahim in speaking to his polytheist father. According to Imam Omar, Prophet Ibrahim is uncompromising in his rejection of polytheism, but he delivers that uncompromising rejection of polytheism with kindness. This is the approach that all Muslims should take in teaching Islam and its “uncomfortable truths.”

Tellingly, Suleiman does not mention another significant example from the life of Ibrahim, when he smashes the idols of his people and then ridicules them by telling them that the biggest inanimate idol was the culprit.

Suleiman also fails to distinguish between conveying the Islamic message to one person in a personal setting versus teaching to the masses. This is significant because if a person speaks to the masses in the same way that he speaks to an individual, he will always have to cater to the lowest common denominator. This is because what is compassionate to someone at one level of understanding might be uncompassionate to someone else at a different level of understanding. So to ensure that everyone is addressed with compassion, the message has to be significantly watered down or even distorted.

Now, putting aside questions about the validity or effectiveness of this “compassionate” method, the fact remains that a great deal of content produced by Yaqeen does compromise the message of Islam. There are three broad ways this happens:

Outright Denial Muddying the Waters Fake Neutrality

Back to Top

Outright Denial

Outright Denial means that on many “uncomfortable” issues that cause doubts for present day Muslims, Yaqeen simply denies that the issue exists.

For example, on the issue of slavery, Yaqeen published an in depth video that outright denies that there has ever been slavery in Islam. On the issue of Islamic conquest, Yaqeen published an essay that outright denies there is Islamic conquest in Islam and that jihad is only defensive. On the issue of the right of husbands to physically discipline their wives as mentioned in the Quran [4:34], Yaqeen published an essay that outright denies that such a right exists and calls it a “myth.”

This approach is highly problematic for the simple reason that it distorts Islam. As uncomfortable as some people are in the present day with these aspects of Islam, the fact remains that slavery, conquest, patriarchal authority, etc., are parts of Islam, as encapsulated in the Quran, Sunna, and the scholarly tradition. To outright deny them is, at best, academically dishonest and only compelling to the most uninformed. At worst, such denialism misrepresents Islam and is tantamount to “concealing what Allah revealed.” Back to Top

Muddying the Waters

Besides outright denial, Yaqeen as an institute often “muddies the waters” on issues that are clear cut in Islam, issues where there is no actual legitimate scholarly disagreement. For example, on the issue of human evolution and the origins of mankind, this is a clear cut issue that all Muslim scholars have agreed on past and present. There is no scholar who has ever said it is permissible to believe that our father Adam had parents or that it is possible for humans not to have descended from Adam. So what does Yaqeen do? They publish one paper in line with the orthodox position on evolution and then publish a second paper that contradicts the orthodox position based on nothing but the personal opinion of some academic.

Another example is with the age of marriage of the Mother of the Believers, Aisha. There is no legitimate scholarly disagreement on her being six years of age when she married the Prophet ﷺ. Accordingly, Yaqeen publishes one paper expressing precisely that but also publishes a paper claiming that she was 18.

The most egregious example is on the issue of LGBT rights. One paper from an Islamic scholar clearly explains why Muslims supporting LGBT rights and politically allying with their cause is categorically forbidden in Islam. But another paper, written by an academic, advocates the exact opposite, encouraging Muslims to affirm and support LGBT rights.

There would be nothing objectionable here if Yaqeen were presenting multiple scholarly views within a range of acceptable ikhtilaf. But in these examples and others, Yaqeen is taking an established, clear cut Islamic position and problematizing and undermining it by publishing its antithesis. What should be crystal clear and unquestioned becomes muddied and obfuscated. Is this conducive to yaqin or its opposite?

One thing that is achieved by this strategy of playing both sides at the expense of Islamic soundness is plausible deniability. If anyone criticizes these papers promoting human evolution, Aisha marrying at 18, LGBT rights, etc., Yaqeen quickly claims that it has also published the correct Islamic position. Furthermore, Yaqeen includes a disclaimer under every essay:

“Yaqeen does not endorse any of the personal views of the authors on any platform.”

This, of course, is meaningless. The act of publishing an essay is a kind of endorsement from the publishing organization. Yaqeen is not an open publishing platform like WordPress or Facebook where anyone can open an account and post content. Yaqeen board members and directors deliberately select which viewpoints to promote and which viewpoints to exclude. They select which views are within the bounds of acceptable debate. Therefore, they are responsible for any and all un-Islamic content that they publish. In other words, they are responsible for bringing un-Islamic and even blasphemous views into the circle of acceptable Islamic disagreement.

Shaykh Dr. Mateen Khan, who has written a powerful rebuttal of one of Yaqeen’s more deviant articles, sees Yaqeen’s disclaimer as irresponsible:

“Deviant opinions preluded with disclaimers such as: “The views, opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in these papers and articles are strictly those of the authors,” are simply not good enough when approaching the Muslim public. One wonders if such a disclaimer will absolve them before Allah on the Day of Judgment as they hope to be absolved in this world.”

Views that would otherwise be considered beyond the pale are now disseminated far and wide by an “Islamic” institute that has respected Muslim scholarly authorities on its advisory board. For example, the view that Muslims can accept human evolution typically has only been advocated by the most hardened modernist deviants, rejectors of hadith, etc., individuals like the infamous Adnan Ibrahim or Pervez Hoodbhoy, et al. And whenever such deviance reared its ugly head, Islamic scholars were quick to make the Islamic stance clear: accepting human evolution is an act of disbelief.

But now, anyone who wants to advocate the compatibility of human evolution and Islam can point to an “Islamic” institute with a staff that includes several scholars and claim that their position is within the bounds of acceptable disagreement. Back to Top

Fake Neutrality

On its About – Mission page, Yaqeen claims that one of its key values is neutrality. They define neutrality as follows:

“Yaqeen will not take sides on any research topic. We believe our neutrality is the optimum way to foster dialog on the important topics of the day.”

As mentioned above, “not taking sides” on an issue is not always Islamically sound. On many issues, there is only one Islamically valid “side” and to pretend there are multiple sides on such important issues does nothing more than muddy the waters.

But besides this, Yaqeen’s neutrality is also a facade because, on many issues, they only publish one side, and consistently it is the side that most aligns with the sensibilities of liberal progressive American politics and culture.

For example, Yaqeen publishes an essay from Jonathan Brown that claims that hudud in the Sharia should not be implemented in the modern day. But, the validity of Brown’s position aside, Yaqeen has no essay that argues the contrary position.

Yaqeen publishes an essay from Tamara Gray asserting that traditional gender roles have nothing to do with Islam and are the product of white colonialism and “immigrant cultural baggage.” But, the validity of her assertion aside, Yaqeen has no essay that argues that traditional gender roles are Islamic and stem from the Quran and Sunna.

Yaqeen publishes an article about how “immigrant” Arab and South Asian Muslims in the US are racists and intolerant. But, the validity of this assertion aside, there is no essay that argues the contrary position.

In these and many other examples, Yaqeen demonstrates that it is a highly partisan organization pushing a very specific interpretation and practice of Islam (one that, as we see later in the report, is highly problematic). Empty claims of “neutrality” and “impartiality” are bandied about by the Institute to mask this reality. Back to Top

Modernist Revisionism By Another Name

In reality, Yaqeen’s methodology for addressing “uncomfortable” truths is nothing new. Their methodology is precisely how many Muslim modernists historically attempted to reconcile Islam with Western values and thought. Whatever in Islam conflicts with the dominant Western position is “dealt with” in one way or another.

Western hegemony says husbands and wives should have exactly the same rights?

Modernists misrepresent or outright reform Islamic family law as necessary.

Western hegemony holds religious freedom paramount and religious legislation barbaric?

Modernists deny that Islam requires implementation of Sharia.

Western hegemony promotes gay rights?

Modernists claim that Islam also accommodates gay rights.

Of course, different modernists will pursue different strategies for defending their reforms. Some justification methods are more or less sophisticated and will rely on traditional Islamic religious texts to greater or lesser degrees. But the overall motive shared by all modernists is the same: To exaggerate Islam’s compatibility with modern Western values and to mitigate or outright deny any divergence between the two.

Sadly, this is exactly what we find in much of Yaqeen’s output. And the listed claims above are all defended by various essays on Yaqeen’s website even if those authors do not describe themselves as “modernists” per se. Back to Top

Yaqeen Undermines Scholars and Imams

We cannot overemphasize the extent to which Yaqeen’s work on these “uncomfortable” issues has the potential to harm Muslim scholars, dawah carriers, Islamic school teachers, and imams. These are individuals who are already facing an uphill battle against the onslaught of modern ideologies eroding the iman of many Muslims.

Take the example of gender roles. According to modern feminism and “social justice” status quo, few things are more barbaric and regressive than traditional gender roles, with husbands as breadwinners and leaders and wives as caretakers and followers. Because of the power and influence of this feminist status quo, many Muslims today affirm these attitudes, implicitly or explicitly, and believe that Islam, as a religion of truth and justice, also rejects traditional gender roles. When those same Muslims, however, read about gender distinctions in the Quran relating to inheritance, witness testimony, male authority, male leadership, etc., and read hadith that exemplify traditional gender roles practiced by the Prophet ﷺ and his righteous Companions, and learn about how these roles are enshrined in Islamic law, all these facts can cause an acute faith crisis.

How does Yaqeen address this crisis? Through outright denial. As discussed in the Gender section of this report, Yaqeen papers on the issue, claim outright that gender roles are not a part of Islam and that, outside a small handful of “rituals,” Islamic ethics treat men and women exactly the same. In fact, women can and should be warriors, political leaders, social justice reformists, etc., and any resistance to this vision of women’s empowerment is an outmoded relic of “immigrant culture.” In other words, the very idea of distinct gender roles with men as leaders and authorities over women is foreign to Islam and its entire history. This, of course, flies in the face of all Islamic schools of fiqh and it belies the biography of the Prophet ﷺ and the Quran itself. But it affirms contemporary feminist liberal values of “gender equality” and “gender justice” while reinforcing the illusion that Islam is fully compatible with this dominant Western ideology.

Now, what happens to those present-day Muslim scholars who teach the correct orthodox Islamic position, citing ayat of the Quran, examples from the prophetic biography, hadith, history of the righteous Companions, detailed works on fiqh regarding gender roles, the authority of husbands and fathers, etc.?

Those scholars are made to look like the bad guys. In light of Yaqeen’s papers on the subject, those scholars look, at best, ignorant, at worst, intolerant. The Muslim who doesn’t know better will question, “Why is my local imam teaching me these things when a large, well-funded institute is saying the exact opposite?” The local imam, the scholars, etc., are undermined in this way, where they could be seen as “extremists” who are teaching a “harsh,” “misogynist,” or “homophobic” version of Islam vis-a-vis Yaqeen.

And if those scholars were to insist that what they teach is correct and what Yaqeen promotes on these issues is Islamically incorrect or even, in some cases, blasphemous, they can be labelled as “intolerant,” ignorant of “valid ikhtilaf,” and accused of “lacking adab.”

In fact, Yaqeen itself encourages exactly these conclusions at an institutional level, particularly in their 2018 paper, “What Causes Muslims to Doubt?” which we now discuss. Back to Top

“Religious Muslims” Are the Real Problem

In 2018, Yaqeen published a follow-up study revisiting the “Sources of Doubt” for Muslims. While the 2017 study tried to understand Muslim doubts by interviewing imams, chaplains, and community leaders, the 2018 study conducted a survey asking Muslims directly what causes them to have doubts. The 2018 study says that it based its survey on the 2017 study, using the information from the imams, chaplains, and community leaders to develop the questions.

But when we look at both studies, we find a huge discrepancy. Both studies identify “Moral and Social Norms” as a major source of doubt. But what is listed under that heading in 2017 is completely different from 2018.

2017 Study: Moral and Social Concerns Causing Muslim Doubt

Hijab

Islamic Law

Jihad

Slavery

Non-Muslim Rights in the Sharia

Homosexuality

Transgenderism

Hadd Punishments

Prophet’s Marriages

Women’s Rights

The fact that scholars historically were predominantly male

2018 Study: Moral and Social Concerns Causing Muslim Doubt

Teachings about the role of women

The hypocrisy of religious people; that is, the nonreligious behavior of supposedly religious individuals

The bad things that people do in the name of religion

The intolerance that some religious people show toward other faiths

The way that religious people sometimes insist that there is only one “right” way to practice faith

The intolerance that some religious people show toward certain other people (e.g., homosexuals)

Why the discrepancy? The 2018 study explicitly says that their survey questions were based on the imam, chaplain, and community leader interviews, but the 2017 study says nothing about subjects like “hypocrisy of religious people” or the “bad things done in the name of religion,” etc. If the 2017 imam/chaplain interviews didn’t identify these as significant sources of doubt, where did Yaqeen get them from? And what changed? Why didn’t the 2018 study include the sources of doubt that had been described by imams, scholars, chaplains, and community leaders just one year prior? Were the imams, chaplains, et al., extremely misinformed about what causes doubts for their communities?

It is bizarre to say the least that Yaqeen would so drastically negate the results of their previous study and then introduce new issues to base survey questions on. This makes the results of their survey highly suspect. For example, the 2018 study found that the number one cause of doubt for Muslims is: “The way that religious people sometimes insist that there is only one “right” way to practice faith.”

Is this really the number one thing that causes Muslims to doubt and/or leave Islam? The next two biggest sources of doubt were: “The bad things that people do in the name of religion” and “The intolerance that some religious people show toward other faiths.” “Intolerance for homosexuals” is also high on the list.

Were these things really the top sources of doubt for Muslims in 2018? Would a significant number of Muslims identify these things as doubts if Yaqeen hadn’t limited their survey to this very particular set of specific issues?

Putting aside such glaring methodological irregularities, what is the significance of Yaqeen identifying “religious people” and their “intolerance” and “bad” actions as overwhelmingly the cause of Muslim doubt? The term “religious people” was used throughout the survey, but nowhere are “religious people” defined in the study.

What does Yaqeen itself define as “religious people” given that their study identified their behavior to be such a significant source of problems for the community as a whole? Did the survey questions define “religious people” or did it allow participants to just assume?

The 2018 study concludes with:

“The upshot is that the primary driver of doubt appears to be the actions of Muslims rather than the doctrines of Islam.”

We know the expression, “If all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.” If this analogy can be extended, we could say, “If you’re selling hammers, tell people that all their problems are nails.” Is it a strange coincidence that Omar Suleiman’s entire “compassionate orthodoxy” project discussed above is grounded on the assumption that “conservative” Muslims are not tolerant and gentle enough and then his institute produces a research survey that finds that the lack of tolerance and gentleness of “religious people” is the main source of doubt and apostasy? Maybe there is no coincidence and it is just that Omar Suleiman has his fingers on the pulse of the Muslim community, fully in tune with its problems. But that explanation doesn’t work because the 2017 interviews with imams, chaplains, et al., from across the US didn’t surface “intolerant, mean religious people” as a significant factor. Do Omar Suleiman and Yaqeen know better than all these imams and scholars combined?

Let’s imagine for a second: If Yaqeen wanted to preach a message of cultural integration, interfaith tolerance, pro-LGBT tolerance, feminist reform, anti-”extremism,” anti-”conservatism,” anti-traditionalism, etc., it would be very convenient if it turned out that those exact things were the real culprits destroying Muslim faith. Then Yaqeen could swoop in and claim that it is compassionately solving a “very real” problem and “saving” the iman of Muslim by preaching its thinly-veiled, modernist “American Islam.” Now, if only there were quantitative results, perhaps through some kind of survey, that could back up such an institutional mission…

It is amusing that the 2018 study explicitly says:

“It is worth underscoring that, contrary to anti-Muslim assertions that have gained prominence in the past decade (particularly since the start of the last presidential cycle), the overwhelming majority of Islamic doctrine and practice is wholly compatible with living as an American citizen.”

There is no citation or reference for this assertion, nor further explanation or qualification, etc. It seems that Yaqeen considers this to be a patent, manifest reality like, “The sky is blue.”

It is also worth noting that both 2017 and 2018 studies were authored by Youssef Chouhoud. Chouhoud is also a research fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU), which is a research institute that conducts studies on American Muslims. The Research Director of ISPU is Dalia Mogahed. As we will see below, Mogahed is heavily involved with counter extremism government programs and the progressive political movement in the US. She is also on Yaqeen’s advisory board and her ISPU collaborates extensively with Yaqeen. Back to Top

Ties to CVE and Counter Extremism

Government agencies and tech companies have made concerted efforts in the post 9/11 world to “counter extremism” in the Muslim community. These “de-radicalization” efforts involve numerous methods and strategies. What academics and independent analysts have noted, however, is that “fighting terror” is only a convenient excuse to pursue the much larger project of advancing Western political and economic interests in the Muslim world.

Pursuing these interests requires changing how Muslims understand their own religion. As policy makers and think tanks like RAND have explicitly stated, the battle for Muslim hearts and minds is a battle that can’t be won on the battlefield. It has to be won on the minbar, from Muslim preachers and imams themselves, who will preach a version of Islam that is aligned with Western values and welcomes Western influence in the Muslim world.

But how can governments gain control of the minbar to ensure that imams are preaching this message? In countries ruled by despots, the matter is easy. The despotic governments overtly control the mosques and only permit government-approved imams to teach at them.

There are several acute problems with this iron-fisted strategy, the most significant of them being that the Muslims of these countries grow to distrust any religious figure tied to the government and view them as obvious distorters of Islam. Secondly, the iron-fisted strategy is ineffective if increasingly Muslims get their religious information from online sources instead of the mosques. Furthermore, Western governments, especially the US and UK, cannot directly exert control over mosques because of “religious freedom” restrictions. Indirect methods have to be used.

How could all these problems be solved? A big part of the solution pursued by the US government in the Bush and especially the Obama era was “community outreach,” i.e., bring well-placed liberal Muslim representatives into the fold of the administration, give them “a seat at the table,” empower them with counter extremist material, and coordinate their deployment of this material through the Musim community in the mosques and other community hubs, both offline and online.

How does Yaqeen fit into this government strategy? Back to Top

Yaqeen’s Alignment with Counter Radicalization/Extremism

Yaqeen says explicitly in its mission that it aims to battle extremism:

“In addition to translating and analyzing classical works on the subject matter, we also aim to actively participate in the current day discourse touching on all topics that are related to establishing conviction in the hearts and minds of Muslims, and battling the false notions that underlie Islamophobia and extremism.”

Interestingly, they consider Islamophobia and extremism as both being undergirded by the same false notions and distortions of Islam. They say this explicitly on their Mission page:

“Islamophobia/Extremism: With the rise of Islamophobia on one hand and extremism on the other, Islam has been cast as irrational, incompatible with modern civilization and inherently violent. This has put Muslims in a defensive position in which they constantly have to justify their convictions, while fighting off the natural doubts and insecurities that arise from such a climate. Research in this area will include topics such as Jihad, Shariah, gender issues, Muslim/Non-Muslim relations, slavery and explaining controversial texts in Islam.”

In other words, Muslim extremism and Islamophobia are two sides of the same coin.

Yaqeen explicitly addresses the issue of Muslim extremism and radicalization in two main articles. The first by Nazir Khan titled, “Forever on Trial—Islam and the Charge of Violence,” was published in November 2016. The second was published in March 2019 by Tarik Younis titled, “Counter-Radicalization: A Critical Look into a Racist New Industry.”

As with much of Yaqeen’s content, the two essays fundamentally contradict each other. Younis argues that counter radicalization is inherently flawed for a variety of reasons, not least of which because of the implicit and explicit association made between Islam and extremism. Meanwhile, Khan’s article makes precisely this association! He argues that terror groups are driven by a corrupted understanding of Islam. Khan goes so far as listing specific doctrines held by terror groups:

“So what are the characteristic components of the ideology that defines modern-day groups like ISIS? Their mythology may be summarized as comprising five key pillars: 1) Caliphal Utopianism; 2) Dehumanization in the name of Walaa’ wal-Baraa’; 3) Takfeerism; 4) Totalitarian Jihad; and 5) Apocalypticism.”

What is disturbing is that all of these “key pillars” have a basis in orthodox Islam. Yet Yaqeen pushes this article, in effect reinforcing the counter extremist narrative that intolerant, us vs. them, dehumanizing attitudes can be found in Islamic doctrines. Rather than affirm an important concept like al-wala’ wal-bara’ and explain in a nuanced but principled way the importance for Muslims to have allegiance to other Muslims and spiritually disassociate from kufr, Yaqeen prefers to attribute this key Islamic value to ISIS. Of course, the concept of al-wala’ wal-bara’ undermines the numerous unprincipled calls to interfaith unity and love coming from Yaqeen and its founder. So it gets thrown under the bus or is redefined and remolded beyond recognition.

Now, given Khan’s article, it should be noted that US, Canadian, and UK counter extremism programs also refer to these doctrines as part of “extremist Islamic ideology” and consider the adoption or expression of these doctrines by Muslims as a “mobilization indicator” that can trigger surveillance, detention, travel bans, etc. The National Counterterrorism Center, a branch of the Department of Homeland Security, lists the following as some of the ideological indicators of potential extremism and eventual terrorist activity:

The West is waging war with Islam

The leaders of Muslim countries are apostates

Contemporary mainstream scholars have “sold out”

Muslims should defend themselves with violence if necessary

Strictness on religious clothing choices

Lack of tolerance for interfaith relations and other groups

Exclusivist language distinguishing Muslims from disbelievers

UK counter radicalization programs also use risk factors to label and track Muslims deemed to be on a track to terrorism. The Extreme Risk Guidance (ERG22+) framework, a government-funded risk assessment, lists 22 social, psychological, and ideological indicators of radicalization, which include:

Need to redress injustice and express grievance

Need to defend against threat

Need for identity, meaning, belonging

Need for dominance

Susceptibility to indoctrination

Political/moral motivation

Over-identification with a group or cause

Us vs Them thinking

Dehumanization of the enemy

Attitudes that justify offending

As one can see, most of these points overlap with Yaqeen’s 2018 study on “intolerant religious Muslims” as being the primary source of doubts. And many Yaqeen articles are dedicated to portraying Islam as fundamentally interfaith, human-focused, open to reinterpretation, non-violent to a fault, etc., and categorically opposed to intolerance, “us vs. them” thinking, dominance, etc.

Given Yaqeen’s mission to fight extremism with a “balanced,” “compassionate” understanding of Islam, one has to question how much of their overall work is directly and/or indirectly informed by a government-created counter radicalization program.

In fact, there is significant evidence of Yaqeen’s direct involvement with agencies, organizations, and individuals pushing that agenda. Back to Top

Dalia Mogahed

Dalia Mogahed has served as an Advisor to Yaqeen since their inception and has appeared in numerous Yaqeen videos and posts. The biography of Mogahed on the Yaqeen website mentions:

“Why you should listen [to Mogahed]. She served on Obama’s Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships in 2009, advising the president on how faith-based organizations can help government solve persistent social problems.”

This description is vague and leaves out the significant fact that Mogahed played a central role in the development of Obama’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program directed against the Muslim community. The explicit mission of the program is to confront “extreme” Muslim ideology. But in a landmark report on CVE, the Brennan Center concludes that, “CVE programs are surveillance and intelligence programs masquerading as community outreach programs.”

In her role, Mogahed “testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about U.S. engagement with Muslim communities, and she provided significant contributions to the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Countering Violent Extremism Working Group recommendations.”

Her organization, ISPU, also played a big part in public relations, softening the Muslim community to the prospect of cooperating with federal and local agencies in order to police themselves. This was done through debates on the positives and negatives of CVE, held at the national ISNA convention and elsewhere, making it seem like an argument could be made for such a problematic initiative, one that has now been completely discredited and is seen by many activists and academics alike as an arm of structural racism against the Muslim community.

Mogahed, who played a central role in the development of the CVE program itself, continues to enjoy a highly visible role in the community, headlining ISNA panels annually and sitting comfortably in advisory board positions for the Yaqeen Institute and The Islamic Seminary of America.

Mogahed’s activities with ISPU and with Yaqeen ought to be seen in the context of over a decade of continuous cooperation and shocking public appearances with a cavalcade of some of the most vile individuals of ill repute the world has to offer, from Martin Indyk to Reza Aslan, from Madeline Albright to Irshad Manji.

A prominent example of this sort of collaboration, one that merits a much deeper look than can be done here, is her long-time participation in events and activities overseen by Meryl Chertoff and her husband Michael Chertoff, often under the auspices of the Aspen Institute.

From 2009 to 2019 Meryl Chertoff acted as the Executive Director of The Aspen Institute’s Justice and Society Program. And in 2011, Michael Chertoff launched the Aspen Institute Homeland Security group, saying at the time, “This group of dedicated and experienced homeland security and counterterrorism veterans provides a unique forum to make recommendations and raise awareness to the ongoing and ever evolving security challenges of our time.”

In 2008, both Dalia Mogahed and Michael Chertoff spoke at the 2008 Aspen conference and each had an article published in the Harvard International Review. Chertoff’s was titled “Preventing Terrorism: A Case for Soft Power”. The next year Mogahed was added to Obama’s Advisory Council.

For over a decade, Mogahed has shared the Aspen Institute’s stage with reformers like Reza Aslan, Irshad Manji, Shadi Hamid, Maajid Nawaz, and others like them. Usually her participation is framed as the scarf-wearing conservative counterpoint to the progressives, but that is problematic because aside from giving credibility to these figures by sharing the stage with them, much of what she actually says in her appearances is wrong and harmful.

In 2018, Aspen launched a book called “Pluralism in Peril: Challenges to an American Ideal.” The book and event was the culmination of a seven-year effort led by Meryl Chertoff and Co-Chairs David Gergen and Madeline Albright. Yes, Madeline Albright, the witch who infamously said US interests are worth more than the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children. On pages 66-67, in a subsection entitled, “Muslims and the LGBTQ Community,” Mogahed states:

“While often singled out as “anti-LGBTQ,” Muslim Americans resemble mainline Protestants in their views on the LGBTQ community. a. Muslims do not include an anti-gay agenda in their political platform. Muslim political priorities are economic growth and job creation, pluralism, and education, rather than social issues. Muslim piety resembles more the religious left than the religious right. b. The majority of Muslims (52%) say homosexuals should be accepted by society, identical to 52% of Protestants who say the same and far higher than 34% of white evangelical protestants.”

Finally, in 2019, the El-Hibri foundation’s Farhan Latif (also a panelist in Meryl Chertoff’s 2018 “Pluralism in Peril” book launch) awarded Dalia Mogahed the Peace Education Prize. Present at the award ceremony and specially recognized was Meryl Chertoff. And, who was sitting front and center next to Dalia? It looks like it could be Michael Chertoff himself. Was it?

Now, consider the few examples of Mogahed’s activities and statements above in the context of the following critically important facts about the Chertoffs. In 2001, Michael Chertoff co-authored the Patriot Act — yes, the Patriot Act — and from 2005 to 2009 he was the Director of the Department of Homeland Security. Chertoff’s wife Meryl worked in the Office of Legislative Affairs at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) participating in the agency’s transition into the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, two years before her husband became Director where he “led the country in blocking would-be terrorists from crossing our borders or implementing their plans if they were already in the country”. Currently, Michael Chertoff is the Chairman of the fourth largest defense contractor in the world, BAE Systems. He is also Chairman of the Chertoff Group, a global security advisory firm.

The true extent of the negative impacts on the Muslim community of Mogahed’s whitewashing engagements with bad actors is hard to overstate. Rubbing shoulders for years with the creators and promoters of the Patriot Act itself is more than enough for her to answer for. But consider also any one of the threads of batil radiating from her appearances with any of the other deviants she collaborates with. Take her appearances with Reza Aslan, for example, which started at least ten years ago. The Islamic Scholarship Fund, for which Aslan was a board member in 2015, used Aslan’s 2015 Aspen panel appearance with Mogahed to legitimize and promote their organization. And Dalia obliged and promoted them as an antidote to extremism. As a result, many well-meaning Muslims have become a part of it.

At the same time, in October 2019, ISF awarded a 15K film grant to lesbian actress and LGBT activist Fawzia Mirza. Yes, an Islamic scholarship for a lesbian actress who has spent a decade making lesbian movies and was recently writing queer characters for CBS. Then in November 2019, the Muslim Public Affairs Council put Mirza on a panel, and put her image alongside the community leader they were supposedly honoring, Dr. Ahmed Soboh. Today, we find both Dalia Mogahed and Dalia Fahmy actively promoting ISF as it scouts out 2020 grantees. What did they know about Mirza and what do they think about her work? Why did ISF promote her? Why do they promote ISF?

Yaqeen’s Dalia Mogahed is the patron of all of this. Will she clarify? Will she disassociate? Or will she stand by her misguiding, pro-LGBT allies like she has stood by Amani al-Khatahtbeh of Muslim Girl? This accolyte of Mogahed is now, astoundingly, making a fool of the Muslim community by running for Congress in NJ, USA. Is this the example of women’s empowerment which Yaqeen advocates for?

In November 2019 Mogahed presented Omar Suleiman the ISPU Research Making an Impact Award. What instances of impact specifically is the pro-LGBT ISPU happy about?

Why is Dalia Mogahed, someone who has a long history deeply involved with government counter extremism efforts, an advisor to Yaqeen? Isn’t this alarming that an institute dedicated to shaping Muslim understanding of Islam has a “de-radicalization” official advising it, awarding its founder, and being a means of Yaqeen working with ISPU scholars who are pluralism advocates and not scholars of Islam? To what extent does Mogahed’s involvement with CVE, etc., inform the work of Yaqeen and what Yaqeen decides to publish?

Beyond merely an advisory role, Mogahed has her ISPU directly collaborating to create Yaqeen content (called “toolkits”).

“ISPU works to strengthen American Muslim communities by injecting research into conversations. To advance that goal, ISPU partnered with the Yaqeen Institute to integrate ISPU research into a series of Talk Toolkits developed by Yaqeen, allowing communities around the country to receive evidence-based and inspiring talks.”

What kind of “research” is ISPU “injecting” into Yaqeen? Is it the progressive “moderate American Islam” research Mogahed developed with the Aspen Institute and Obama’s CVE racket?

Interestingly, Mogahed’s boss, the executive director at ISPU, Meira Neggaz is a major promoter of abortion. As we reported last year on MuslimSkeptic:

“Before joining ISPU, Neggaz worked at Marie Stopes International. Marie Stopes International is one of the biggest promoters of abortion, birth control, and sexual “freedom” in Muslim countries and the rest of the world. They are at the forefront of pushing demographic war on the Muslim world and spreading fahisha in the name of “women’s choice.” So it is quite telling that a former official of that major organization is now executive director of ISPU and is the person Dalia Mogahed answers to.”

Interestingly, Yaqeen includes in their essay on abortion in Islam a glowing endorsement of Planned Parenthood, the largest promoter of abortion and LGBT fahisha in the US. Could Mogahed and her progressive connections have had a hand in making sure that endorsement made its way into an article about the fiqh of abortion? Back to Top

Yaqeen Collaborates with CPOST?

Other than Mogahed, other Yaqeen affiliates and staff have past histories working with counter extremism. Much more could be written on these connections, but for now, some brief highlights.

Yaqeen openly boasted in one post about collaborating with CPOST, the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism/Threats. This is an organization that actively works with government security and intelligence agencies.

“Several universities have collaborated with local and national security agencies by establishing research centers for studying terrorism. For example, the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) based at the University of Chicago.”

CPOST also works for the Department of Defense and published a major study “The American Face of ISIS,” which argued that “homegrown” Muslim terrorism is more of a danger than foreign militants attacking the US from other countries. Summarizing CPOST’s result, Foreign Policy magazine writes:

“The policy point here is obvious. Clamping down on the travel and immigration of Muslims in general and of people from Muslim-majority countries in particular would have had a minimal impact on limiting the reach of the Islamic State in the United States. […] The primary threat is now at home. This is an example wherein facts and fact-based analysis should be an important antidote to emotional-based responses.”

Robert Pape summarizes the results CPOST’s study on the American Face of ISIS:

“US ISIS indictees look more like average Americans than is commonly understood. […] In short, they’re engaged with society and have educational and career opportunities. They aren’t loners operating from the fringes of society. […] the indictees are truly homegrown.”

Trump assumed office in January 2017 and at the time many American Muslims feared that the new president was planning to round up Muslims for concentration camps. In February 2017, Robert Pape of CPOST publishes his report saying that the US has a “truly homegrown” terror problem and these Muslim extremists “look more like average Americans.” Then in March 2017, Yaqeen meets with Pape, Omar Suleiman takes a selfie with him and they make plans for future collaboration. Are we missing something here?

It should also be noted that CPOST analyzes extremist content consumption online and makes counter extremism policy recommendations based on their results:

“The CPOST researchers found that propaganda consumption has quickened the pace of radicalization and encouraged people to act on their growing belief in the Islamic State cause. For some, the violence depicted in the videos — including executions — were the attraction, while others were attracted by videos showing the Islamic State helping the innocent people of the caliphate. Other research done by CPOST suggests that Islamic State videos showing that one can achieve hero status by joining the cause play a significant role as well. These findings suggest that the United States should focus more on Islamic State propaganda.”

CPOST’s interest in online de-radicalization aligns perfectly with Yaqeen’s stated mission of fighting extremism through content creation and “reclaiming the narrative.”

While CPOST is praised for providing “fact-based analysis” on the “American face of ISIS,” Yaqeen Institute announces that they are eager to collaborate with them on future projects. Which projects are those? Should the Muslim community be concerned that Yaqeen is collaborating with such orgs that directly work with security and intelligence agencies? As we see below, their ties to CPOST and counterterrorism go even deeper than this. Back to Top

WISE

Omar Suleimain and two Yaqeen Research Directors, Nazir Khan and Jonathan Brown, have all worked with WISE, Women’s Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equality. WISE has organized several counter extremism initiatives. WISE’s founder, Daisy Khan, has an extensive history working with Zionist organizations as well as counter extremism programs like CVE. Among her notable activities is being a signatory to the “Coalition Letter on Civil Society Engagement with the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism,” in 2018, a major push to have the UN adopt CVE policies globally. She also visits police departments to train them on Muslim extremism.

In November 2017, WISE held its first summit on extremism, with Omar Suleiman as a panelist on “Understanding Extremist Recruitment and Early Intervention.”

Why is Suleiman participating in such conferences and working with problematic figures like Daisy Khan?

WISE also published a 375 page book on extremism, titled WISE UP: Knowledge Ends Extremism, edited by Daisy Khan, collecting essays from the likes of Reza Aslan, qadiyani Qasim Rashid, as well as US Army General Douglas Stone. Essay after essay in this book is filled with the most “model American Muslim minority” tripe imaginable. But more disturbing are the essays that push a deviant reformist message that often bleeds into kufr. Feminist reformist Laleh Bakhtiar has an essay dedicated to tolerance towards variant interpretations of the Quran: feminist, modernist, philosophical, etc. Mike Muhammad Ghouse has an essay “debunking” the idea that “There Is Only One Way to God,” advocating religious pluralism. Shia polemicist Ammar Nakshawani writes on martyrdom.

In the midst of all this shocking material, Jonathan Brown and Nazir Khan make their own contributions, on hadith and islamophobia respectively. Why are these two Yaqeen directors collaborating with such problematic elements, contributing to a book dedicated to “fighting extremism”? What is the extent of their involvement with such counter extremist initiatives?

And finally, we mention Yaqeen’s Director of Research Operations, Dr. Julio Rivera. Rivera has extensive professional experience working with the Department of Defense with a focus on the Middle East, “briefing senior military and allied officials.” He also worked on counterterrorism studies with the aforementioned CPOST.

Yaqeen’s Director of Research Operations is literally a counterterrorism specialist.

Back to Top

Omar Suleiman and the Politics of Doubt

Part of understanding what Yaqeen stands for requires understanding its founder’s connections to the wider American political establishment. Suleiman has demonstrated time and again deep engagement with the liberal progressive movement. We have discussed the extent of these engagements and how they undermine his position as an orthodox imam for the Muslim community in other reports on MuslimSkeptic.

There are two separate questions here. Is it appropriate for a Muslim, much less an imam or daee, to have open, public collaboration with known deviants and fussaq, not to mention non-Muslim factions who express an animosity toward orthodox Islam, not to mention counter extremism orgs, etc.? This is not really a question, but for the sake of the few who want to defend Suleiman at all costs, we can pretend it is.

But, putting that first question aside, we should ask, is it prudent to have such a figure running an institute dedicated to teaching Islam and fighting doubts? Won’t his politics necessarily color what Yaqeen publishes? And if so, doesn’t that mean that the fighting of Muslim doubts is, in this way, connected to the viscitudes of American politics? Throughout the report, we see how such political considerations sully much of Yaqeen’s work at the expense of orthodox Islam. Back to Top

Interfaith Love

Besides inappropriate political connections and associations, Suleiman himself often makes Islamically problematic statements. We see examples throughout this report. But here are some examples worth mentioning.

In one recent interview, Suleiman is speaking with a Christian pastor and a female rabbi, and he says:

“I hope we can get as close to each other once again as possible soon and I hope we can be able to transfer that love that that’s so apparent when we’re together once, again physically together.”

In this appropriate language?

Suleiman often expresses this kind of love and affection that goes beyond professional cordiality or even allyship.

In one article, Suleiman expresses his deep sentiments for other religions:

“I also believe that others should be afforded the same right to discover and practice what they believe to be true. Allah said in the Quran that there is no compulsion in religion, and far be it for me to force my way on anyone else. I honor the right of a Christian or a Jew or anyone else to feel about their faiths as I feel about mine. Despite the difference in beliefs, I insist that we can work together to establish a society permeated with justice and peace, and that we can subsequently coexist in a loving way.”

What is the status of such statements in Islam? Many within the Muslim community have become so desensitized to this language that they won’t even be able to recognize a problem. Can there be a society of justice and peace that is suffused with kufr and disobedience to Allah?

Why is Suleiman idealizing a secular humanist status quo of pluralism? Is this Islam’s vision for society? If somone truly cared about Christians and Jews, he would desire that they become Muslim. He would not “honor” their “right” to feel about their faiths as he feels about his. What does that even mean? Suleiman honors Christians and Jews and “anyone else” to feel like their respective religions are the truth? Is that kind of “honor” Islamically correct or appropriate?

Unfortunately, this kind of deeply problematic language is often deployed by Suleiman and absorbed by his most devoted followers, who are conditioned to think and feel in ways antithetical to the values of Islam. Now, Suleiman might protest that when Muslims are living in non-Muslim societies, they have to be neighborly and kind. There is no problem with being neighborly and kind given the right circumstances, but there is no need for that to be elevated to “love” and “deep respect” for their religion, etc. One can be neighborly with a person without honoring the falsehood that he may be on. These things are not mutually exclusive. Back to Top

Muslims Should Ally with Pro-LGBT Groups on Shared Goals

Recently, Omar Suleiman has had multiple engagements with ISPU scholar Asma Uddin under the banner of Religious Freedom. Under this banner, in February 2020, Omar Suleiman gave a bizarre speech on doing advocacy and cooperating with LGBT groups. He gave this speech in the masjid, and it has received some important criticism from Sh Saajid Lipham, though a closer analysis of his speech remains to be done. Uddin also shared the platform with Suleiman and gave her argument for Muslim support of LGBT rights.

Just before Ramadan of 2020, Asma Uddin has advertised another event with Omar Suleiman entitled #RamadanReligiousFreedom, featuring a Sikh, Uddin, and Suleiman. What other public and private events and meetings has he had with Uddin? What are they preparing and pushing for the Muslim community?

It is important to understand what sort of religious freedom Uddin is fighting for. It is important to note that Uddin and many other religious freedom activists tie Religious Freedom with LBGT issues. Why do they do that? Consider what Uddin states in this NPR interview:

“UDDIN: Well, I think that even in the space of Christianity, increasingly, you hear the sort of outcry from more progressive Christians that they feel that the way that Christianity is being defined and championed tends to only happen from this particular angle. And, of course, a constant concern in the context of, specifically, the sexuality-related culture wars is that the rights of LGBT individuals, including LGBT individuals of faith or people who hold different positions on abortion, contraception from a religious standpoint, are being undermined. “And to that end, I think that it has to come from an understanding that religious liberty is not in some way just a safeguard for traditional religious beliefs. It is a safeguard just for beliefs of wide diversity, anywhere they fall on the political spectrum and, again, on the diverse religious spectrum. And so what I hope for – and I do see some movement in this from more progressive religious liberty groups – to bring to the floor more progressive religious claims and say, look; religious liberty is for this, too. My concern is if the rhetoric and the enforcement of some of these policies continues to be only thought in the frame of traditional religious beliefs, then there will be other types of religious claims that won’t be as protected.”

We discuss Uddin further below, in the section on LGBT. For now, let’s consider how Omar Suleiman justifies aligning so closely with liberal deviants, LGBT advocates, CVE experts, female imams, reformists, etc.

Suleiman lays out his justification for his political alliances in a Yaqeen essay titled, “Faithful Activism: A Sunnah Framework.”

This essay intends to prove that Suleiman’s progressive politics is actually the Sunna. How does he argue this?

He first claims the following:

“The golden rule of organizing meaningfully is to build broad coalitions around bold platforms. This means having as many partners possible around as specific a platform as possible. The Sunnah precedent of this model is found as alluded to above in the Prophet’s example of participating in Hilf Al Fudool; i.e., the pact of justice.”

So, immediately, Suleiman claims that the ideal is to have as many partners as possible. Is there any group that one would not work with? Is Suleiman willing to form a broad coalition that includes White Supremacists? How about Zionists? If White Supremacists and Zionists stand for justice on a particular issue, would Suleiman join hands with them?

Much of Suleiman’s argument rests on Hilf al-Fudul.

“The Messenger ﷺ said: Certainly, I had witnessed a pact of justice in the house of Abdullah ibn Jud’an that was more beloved to me than a herd of red camels. If I were called to it now in the time of Islam, I would answer it. Before the Prophet ﷺ received revelation, a man from the tribe of Zubaid came to do business in Makkah. On his journey, he encountered a man who was from the Quraysh. The Qurayshi man asked him to hand over his merchandise and told him that he would give his payment for the merchandise the next day. There was no doubt in the Zubaidi man’s heart that he would receive his payment as people from outside Makkah respected and trusted the Quraysh. The next day he went to collect the money from the Qurayshi man who denied any knowledge of such payment. The Zubaidi man was distraught at the situation and went to all of the leaders complaining of the Qurayshi man who took his belongings. They ignored and dismissed him. The next morning he went to the Ka’aba, stood at the door, and took his shirt off as a sign of desperation. He cried out and read some verses of poetry, addressing the Makkans as a people of dignity and honor, asking how theft and oppression could occur in the city of Makkah. Embarrassed about the whole ordeal, the Quraysh called a meeting to address the situation and the youngest attendees were the Prophet ﷺ and Abu Bakr (ra). They came to the agreement that they would stand with the oppressed regardless of what tribe they were from.”

Suleiman takes this story and uses it as a basis to derive an entire framework of behavior that he deems is the Sunna. What qualified scholar would agree with Suleiman making personal ijtihad like this and deriving rulings on the basis of one incident from the sirah?

Suleiman goes quite far in the lessons he derives from Hilf al-Fudul. He says:

“The Prophet ﷺ acknowledged that Muslims and non-Muslims could work together in such pacts and coalitions even if there were bigger issues that they disagreed on. The Makkans at this time maintained all sorts of idolatry, lewdness, and oppressive practices, but that didn’t stop the Prophet ﷺ from joining them in achieving this specific good. He wasn’t normalizing their practices, he was addressing the specific harm of one of those practices that had tainted them collectively.”

There is a fundamental disanology between Hilf al-Fudul and the progressive political coalitions Suleiman is proposing. Hilf al-Fudul involved the powerful and influential tribe members of Makka coming together in support of the marginalized. But the progressive social justice movement is not like this. Social justice political organizing involves separate “marginalized” groups coming together to “fight the power.” Many of these groups see the overall power structure of society as fundamentally oppressive. These activists do not want to form pacts with the rich and powerful or the “patriarchy.” They want to topple the entire structure. In fact, many of these activists would be fundamentally suspicious of the rich and powerful in society coming together to form a supposed pact for justice.

A correct analogy would be if the powerful of American society came together for a pact. Imagine Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Bill Gates, Chuck Schumer, Sheldon Adelson, et al., came together for some charitable cause (which they often do). Should Muslims join those efforts? Is that the “Sunna Activism” Suleiman has in mind? If not, why not? Isn’t that the correct analogy to derive from Hilf al-Fudul?

Suleiman remarks:

“In many cases, religion does not fail because it is refuted, but because it is no longer relevant or worse, viewed as a tool of oppression. The greatest threat to religion is stagnation, not refutation.”

Where does he get this stuff? Is there some reference from anything in the Islamic tradition to back this up? Or has Suleiman reached such heights of understanding that he can make grand definitive statements about Islam in this way? The Prophet ﷺ states clearly what he knew to be the greatest threat for his Ummah: love of dunya and dislike of death.

Next Suleiman specifies the first level of coalition building:

“Commitments to genuine condemnations of hate, dehumanizing rhetoric, bullying. Condemn violence and precursors to violence. We reject bullying in schools, workplaces, and media spaces. We reject violence against anyone in our society, and vigilantism in all of its forms. We remain reflective on our own language and challenge others to do better as well. We check hate against us or anyone in our presence when we see it, and elevate the discourse.”

What is considered “hateful”? What is considered “dehumanizing”? And what does “precursors to violence” mean? This is CVE counter extremism rhetoric that Suleiman is pushing. In his LGBT speech referenced above, Suleiman makes his point more explicitly:

“So what’s the first commitment that everyone in society can make? Everyone in society can commit to genuine condemnations of hate, dehumanizing rhetoric, bullying, against whoever it may be, whether it is the LGBT community or the Jewish community or whatever it may be, all types of communities. We can commit ourselves to again avoiding hate, dehumanizing rhetoric, bullying. We can condemn violence. We can and should condemn precursors to violence. We should revisit those things all the time and not because it’s bad PR or good PR but because we start from the place of the Prophet ﷺ.”

First of all, why is Suleiman equating the LGBT “community” with the Jewish community? Islam recognizes religious categories, but do we accept any group that comes to us claiming to be a “community” with shared interests?

And, again, how “hate” is defined is significant. The fact of the matter is many factions within social justice politics and LGBT activism view orthodox Islam and the content of Quran, hadith, and Islamic teachings in general as hateful, dehumanizing, and as precursors to violence. Suleiman pays no attention to such a glaring, obvious problem with his entire framework.

Beyond this, Suleiman’s conception of “hate” means that Muslims cannot effectively practice al-wala’ wal-bara’. As Muslims, we must hate kufr. And that entails that we hate certain groups. That doesn’t mean we violate the laws of the land or unnecessarily antagonize people, but the internal state is what is important. Is there anything illegal about hating certain groups? The progressive left has no problem expressing their boiling hate for the right wing, for white supremacists, for alt-right, etc. Hate is an accepted part of political and social discourse as long as the “right” people are the objects of that hate. Why can’t Muslims hate certain groups as well? By denouncing hate in this unprincipled and ultimately incoherent way, Suleiman is negating this necessary hate for Allah’s sake that is so crucial in Islam.

It is also very alarming that he repeatedly uses the counter extremism jargon of “precursors to violence.”

Suleiman continues with Level 2:

“Political tribes seek the welfare only of their particular tribes, and we have to transcend that. That doesn’t mean ignoring systemic elements of these issues, but immersing yourself in them primarily as a member of the shared human family enables a perspective beyond politics or tribalism. This is, in fact, the purest form of khidma and where the majority of the community should be involved.”

No reference, no nothing for why we should consider this “transcending tribalism” for the sake of “shared human family” is the “purest form of khidma.” These are heavy statements to make. What gives Suleiman the right to define the “purest form of khidma”? And then he says that the majority of the community should be involved in these Level 2 issues. What is the basis for that?

“Ḥadīth, therefore, form a necessary component of the religion (al-maʿlūm min al-dīn bi ḍarūra). Essentially, ijmāʿ serves as our Pope and there is no changing it unless it is proven to have been claimed falsely.”

Is this an appropriate way to speak about Islam?

He writes:

“We should constantly both think and act in accordance with what Muhammad ﷺ would do. There should be some reservation however with expressing definitely what the Prophet would do with things that are not so clearcut. It isn’t wise or intellectually honest to state that if the Prophet were here, he would validate my precise platform. We should, however, strive to make our actions as consistent with his example as possible, while engaging thoroughly the things that we know with certainty the Prophet would engage. We can take from some prominent Christian and Jewish thinkers and activists in this regard.”

What is he talking about? Maybe he should have used some of that reservation he talks about here back when he was telling us about the “purest form of khidma.” And what does he mean “engaging thoroughly the things that we know with certainty the Prophet ﷺ wound engage”?

How does Omar Suleiman know with certainty what the Prophet ﷺwould engage? And does Suleiman imagine that the Prophet ﷺ would engage in the outrageous associations with LGBT activists, reformist deviants, feminist SJWs, etc., that he constantly praises and endorses and puts on a pedestal?

The Prophet ﷺ is reported to have said: “If anyone introduces an innovation or gives shelter to a man who introduces an innovation (in religion), he is cursed by Allah, by His angels, and by all the people.”

Unapologetically associating with clear deviants and fussaq is no light matter. This hadith also seriously put into question Suleiman’s unqualified, haphazard appeal to Hilf al-Fudul. There are limits set by the Prophet ﷺ himself on who can and cannot be engaged, as expressed in hadith like this one.

Suleiman also pays lip service in response to a common criticism leveled against him:

“While Suhayl Ibn Amr demanded things like “Al Rahman Al Raheem” and “RasulAllah” be removed from the treaty [of Hudaybiyya], there was no doubt or lack of clarity amongst the Muslims about Who the Most Merciful was and who the Prophet ﷺ was. As we engage society for its collective betterment, we must retain clarity of our deen to the greatest extent possible.”

How can “clarity of deen” be maintained when Suleiman regularly associates with fussaq and fahisha mongers? He never denounces these people in a clear unequivocal way, so how is he retaining clarity to “the greatest extent possible”?

Ultimately, one of the bigger problems with Suleiman’s proposal is that he never once mentions service to the masjid. He never once mentions service to Islam. He never once mentions service to make the Word of Allah Highest (that might be considered “hateful” and a “precursor to violence”). Suleiman presents this long, meandering “Sunnah Activism Framework,” but it is so concerned with “serving humanity” as the “purest form of khidma” that it forgets that Muslims are humans too, and we have a purpose on this earth to serve Allah and the cause of Islam. Suleiman is so outwardly focused, that none of this factors into his six-level structure. This oversight belies his claim to desire the “betterment of society.” How can society improve unless Muslims are a strong force, a strong community of believers, with strong iman, strong taqwa, strong willingness to sacrifice for the sake of Allah? How can society improve when Muslims are weak, when our institutions, our masajid, our ulama are lacking volunteers, lacking funds, lacking attention because an external focus on politics and social activism is draining the community’s energy and focus?

How can young and growing Muslims be effective in any capacity facing the onslaught of culture and social justice hysteria without a foundation or a strong “home base” to be anchored to? They will be swept away without it.

These issues deserve further analysis. Back to Top

Gender

In most places where Yaqeen has addressed the topic of gender, their tendency has been to downplay differences between Islam and dominant feminist notions of gender equality and gender roles in the West. In some cases, this downplaying of differences reaches the level of outright distortion. And in other places, Yaqeen authors forward their own personal ijtihad in revising Islamic rulings.

This kind of revision is justified by a principle mentioned in one of the more problematic essays from Yaqeen on gender, discussed below. The authors state:

“In the case of many rulings related to women, historical scholars may have provided views based on the cultural norms of their society. Evaluating whether those norms are still relevant today is part of the process of fiqh.”

This view that past scholars predicated their rulings on the particularities of the cultures and time periods in which they lived is an oft-repeated refrain from modern reformists. It is a view that has the potential to undermine all fiqh rulings on all issues. How far does Yaqeen take this principle in their own collection of papers on gender? Quite far, as we shall see.

One small but telling fact that captures Yaqeen’s understanding of gender: In 2019, they released a series of papers in what they called a “Gender Series.” In that series, there were 24 instances of words related to leaders and leadership. Out of those 24 instances, 19 were mentioned in association with women. Only 5 were mentioned in association with men. But this is really the least of Yaqeen’s problems with this topic. Back to Top

Muslim Women Turn to Feminism Because of Bad Treatment

Nour Soubani and Tasneem Alkiek wrote, “Is Feminism the Problem: Why Ideological Bandwagons Fail Islam,” to explain the phenomenon of Muslim women turning to feminism. To their credit, they don’t give a full endorsement of feminism and acknowledge that there may be “potential contradictions” between Islam and aspects of feminism. But their overall argument is flawed and only serves as defense of the feminist cancer that continues to cause great damage to the iman of some Muslims.

Their main thesis is that it is wrong to see feminism as a source of Muslim women leaving Islam. Rather, Muslim women turn to feminism because they have been treated poorly by the Muslim community, i.e., Muslim men. They say:

“To focus on feminism as the primary reason for women leaving the faith is problematic for at least two reasons: 1) it involves addressing what we see as a symptom of Muslim women’s alienation and not its root causes; and 2) it risks further alienating those who already feel they have no space in the Muslim community.”

The question is, is the adoption of feminism by Muslim women a symptom of a deeper problem, or is it the cause of problems? The Yaqeen authors attempt to prove the former: Adoption of feminism is merely the symptom.

So what is the cause of this alienation that some Muslim women feel? The authors cite three main things:

Mosques are not welcoming because They do not have women leaders They do not have adequate, clean space for women They don’t amplify women’s voices Islam is used to justify sexual harrassment and domestic abuse against women Muslim women face the brunt of Islamophobia

Because of this alienation, the authors argue, Muslim women turn to the only discourse that adequately speaks to their woes: Feminism.

Is this a compelling argument?

Not at all, for several reasons. First, the biggest problem with Soubani and Alkiek’s argument is that it does not acknowledge that many Muslim women are alienated by actual features of Islam itself.

How many Muslim girls are alienated from Islam because they view hijab as inherently oppressive? How many Muslim women are alienated from Islam because they think it is misogynistic that women pray behind men? How many Muslim women are alienated from Islam because Allah uses the pronoun ‘He’ to refer to Himself in the Quran? How many Muslim women are alienated from Islam because Islam allows Muslim men to marry Jewish and Christian women, as well as allowing polygyny (multiple wives) but not polyandry (multiple husbands)? How many Muslim women are alienated because of the wife’s religious obligation to obey her husband? And so on.

To truly understand the destructive impact of feminism, these attacks on orthodox Islam by the feminist ideology cannot be ignored. But Soubani and Alkiek conveniently leave out these sources of alienation and loss of faith perhaps because they cannot blame Muslim men and the wider Muslim community for these sources of alienation and loss of faith. The only possible source of these doubts is the feminist ideology.

Soubani, Alkiek, and Yaqeen itself might try to evade this obvious conclusion by arguing that these doctrines of Islam, like polygyny, the husband’s authority, hijab, etc., only cause alienation because they have not been taught in the most “compassionate” way.

But this claim is undermined by the fact that many of these doubts only became a problem in recent history, as Muslim women were introduced to feminism. There is no historical record of large segments of the Muslim female population expressing dissatisfaction with the differential treatment of men versus women in Islamic Law, gender roles, etc. Therefore, what accounts for the unprecedented surge, a veritable tidal wave, of “gender equality”-related doubts expressed by many Muslim women and girls today? Did Muslim teachers, preachers, scholars, imams, etc., all suddenly lose their “compassion” in the past few decades? If so, what was the “compassionate” manner in which these issues were addressed 30, 40, 50, 100 years ago so that we can revive it instead of adopting the “compassionate orthodoxy” of Yaqeen, that is more about distortion than anything else, as this report shows.

Or perhaps feminism really is the culprit.

The other conceptual problem with Soubani and Alkiek’s claim is that feminism contributes to distorting women’s expectations and thereby creating dissatisfaction that wouldn’t otherwise exist.

For example, consider the number one factor they mention: Treatment and representation at mosques. There doesn’t seem to be much actual independent data to corroborate Soubani and Alkiek’s claim that a significant number of US mosques are not welcoming (the link they cite doesn’t have the actual data they mention). Let’s accept their claim at face value. The problem is, determining what is or is not “welcoming” depends on subjective attitudes. One day, a female mosque member might not have any problem with her masjid not having regular programs for women to stand on the minbar and deliver speeches. The next day, due to some feminist influence, she might feel that the lack of such representation is a great injustice. Suddenly the masjid went from being “welcoming” to “unwelcoming,” but nothing with the masjid actually changed.

To what extent is any dissatisfaction with mosques or any Muslim institution the result of such subjective attitudes that are heavily influenced by feminist ideology distorting expectations and attitudes?

None of this is predicated on the assertion that no mosques have legitimate problems. Some certainly do. But how big is the problem really and is it commensurate with the significant changes in Muslim women’s attitudes?

In the US, for well over two decades, we have been hearing the claim that mosques are unwelcoming towards women. Yet, most of the major mosques in the US have taken steps to accommodate women. For many of them, it would be in their financial interest to do so since, at the very least, it would increase potential donors. But, even if we are skeptical about whether most mosques have taken pro-women measures, we can be more certain that, over the years, directionally US mosques are accommodating more women’s activities and making sure to improve on any deficiencies in the women’s facilities. That seems to be obviously the case. It would be very surprising if it turned out that with all the political and social pressure for women’s inclusivity inside and outside the Muslim community that it turned out mosques had become less inclusive of women over the past 10 to 20 years.

Be that as it may, the problem for Soubani and Alkiek’s argument is that, despite this trend toward women’s inclusivity, the trend of Muslim women accepting feminism and being alienated by Islam has only worsened year by year. If unwelcoming mosques were the root cause of this adoption of feminism, we would expect at least some decline, or at least stagnation, not an exponential increase. Back to Top

Is Islam Pro-Choice on Abortion?

Yaqeen addresses the issue of abortion in an essay titled: “Islam and the Abortion Debate.” When this paper was originally published in 2017, it listed three co-authors: Hatim al-Haj, Mohammad Shinawy, and Omar Suleiman. Now the paper only lists Omar Suleiman. It is not clear why the names of these previously listed co-authors have been removed.

The essay has two main problems. First, is the following:

“Between 40 and 120 days from conception, the four madhabs disagreed, even within their own ranks, and so we will state the dominant position of each school. The Mâlikis traditionally were the strictest in this regard; they opposed any medical technique as a means of birth control (such as drinking medicine), with some even opposed to seeking to expel the semen after intercourse. The dominant Ḥanafi position was far more lenient in permitting abortion up until 120 days from conception, with some even allowing it without the husband’s permission. Nowadays, many contemporary juristic assemblies prescribe the position held by the Ḥanbalis; permitting abortion up until 40 days, and only up until 120 days when a pressing need is present (such as rape, or an extreme fetal deformity incompatible with life).”

The way that this is phrased makes it seem like there is a full spectrum of opinions on abortion in Islam — from not even allowing contraception to full autonomy of a wife to terminate well into the second trimester without even needing to be in agreement with her husband — and the scholars are evenly distributed between these two poles. This is a false impression, since the dominant position in three out of the four schools of fiqh all require valid medical or life-and-death reasons to abort after 40 days, and before 40 days, require, at the very least, consent from the husband.

And even with the Hanafi school, it is a misrepresentation to characterize the school as “more lenient” given that the predominant position among contemporary Hanafi jurists is that a valid excuse is needed to terminate pregnancy even up to 120 days, and the subset of Hanafi jurists who didn’t qualify that a valid excuse is needed, still required the agreement of the husband. It was only a subset of this subset of Hanafi jurists who seemingly allowed termination without valid medical reason and without husband’s agreement. So for Yaqeen to foreground this minority of a minority of a minority view gives the wrong impression.

But it is a convenient wrong impression. It is the wrong impression that Islam is “pro-choice” in a way that is analogous to modern feminist conceptions of a “woman’s right to choose.” This is convenient for Muslim activists who want to passionately march for “reproductive rights” alongside their non-Muslim feminist friends. But the reality is, there is no such thing as “my body, my choice” in the Hanafi school or anywhere else. The body of women and men belong to Allah and no one has the right to treat his body according to his personal agency beyond the scope of what the Creator and Master of that body has permitted.

The suspicion, however, that Yaqeen is playing into progressive politics is further supported by the bizarre inclusion of a section at the end of the essay praising Planned Parenthood. Planned Parenthood is an extreme leftist organization responsible for facilitating hundreds of thousands of abortions every year. According to US abortion statistics, the majority of these abortions are done purely for convenience sake and often passed the 120 day mark, which means that Planned Parenthood is responsible for thousands of natal deaths annually. Beyond abortions, Planned Parenthood is a major promoter of LGBT and specifically LGBT education for children as young as four.

How could a Muslim praise such a Satanic organization? Yaqeen writes:

“Advocates of Planned Parenthood point out that their services primarily provide low-income and uninsured people access to contraceptives and sexual health care. In 2009, Planned Parenthood’s abortion care represented only 3 percent of its medical services (332,000 terminations out of a total of 11.4 million services). Beyond statistics, it is quite obvious that access to contraceptives naturally reduces the need for unwanted pregnancies, which may result in abortions. Islamic legal theorists always point to the priority of preventing unwanted circumstances instead of simply remedying problematic outcomes. That includes reforming the moral ethics of society as well as the inequities that disproportionately force the marginalized into painful decisions.”

Why would Yaqeen include this random endorsement of Planned Parenthood? All the statistics mentioned are talking points from Planned Parenthood itself, sourced from an article written by one of their executives, “Five Myths About Planned Parenthood.” Are Muslims supposed to support Planned Parenthood because it is supposedly helping “low-income and uninsured people”?

Why doesn’t Yaqeen mention the fact that Planned Parenthood was founded by a white supremacist eugenicist, Margaret Sanger, who founded the organization in an effort to reduce the African American population? Sanger infamously said:

“We do not want word to go out that we want to exterminate the Negro population, and the minister is the man who can straighten out that idea if it ever occurs to any of their more rebellious members.”

Perhaps Omar Suleiman can quote Planned Parenthood’s founder on that. Or maybe this is more suitable:

“Birth control is not contraception indiscriminately and thoughtlessly practiced. It means the release and cultivation of the better racial elements in our society, and the gradual suppression, elimination and eventual extirpation of defective stocks— those human weeds which threaten the blooming of the finest flowers of American civilization.”

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Mother of the Believers, Aisha, Married When 18 Years Old

Here is an example of Yaqeen “muddying the water,” with a paper titled: “Aisha (ra): The Case for an Older Age in Sunni Hadith Scholarship.” This paper is a translation of an argument provided by a contemporary Syrian scholar named Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Idlibī. The translation and a short opening essay are provided by academic Arnold Yasin Mol (who is discussed separately later in the report: Leaders in the Reformist Movement Writing for Yaqeen?).

Now, there is no reason for Yaqeen to include this paper on our mother Aisha being 18 when she married the Prophet, as there is consensus on this issue among scholars based on clear narrations from Aisha herself stating that she was married at 6 and the marriage was consummated when she was 9 years old. The other Yaqeen papers addressing this issue make this exact point. So why does Yaqeen decide to undermine the other papers in their “Aisha Series” by including this? Doesn’t this just lead to confusion and the dangerous impression that everything that has long been considered sahih and reliable could potentially be overturned if you’re creative enough with your matn criticism?

Be that as it may, al-Idlibī presents ten convoluted, twisting arguments, and after much spilt ink, he concludes that Aisha was actually 14 when married and consummated at 18 years old. This would imply that Aisha was very inaccurate in remembering her age when marrying the Prophet, since people generally have a good sense in knowing the difference between being 9 years old versus 18. Therefore, Idlibi’s argument doesn’t seem very plausible. Furthermore, Idlibi’s entire calculation hinges on speculative inferences like:

“An eleven-year-old girl would usually not be able to carry such heavy water skins and pour them into the mouths of the wounded, then refill them, and go back again.”

Is it that hard to imagine an eleven-year-old girl carrying waterskins? Or:

“Before the age of four, a child cannot usually comprehend the fact that his or her parents are practicing a religion contrary to the religion of the majority of those around them.”

Do children as young as four really not remember such details? It seems like many children in our time do recognize such things and remember them later in life. There is no strong reason why al-Idlibi rejects the possibility.

All the arguments al-Idlibi gives are like this in that they rely on a speculative premise that he just asserts without little to no justification. Ironically, this exercise proves exactly the problem with modern matn criticism — it ends up mostly being a reflection of the criticizer’s assumptions about what is or isn’t possible, what words could or could not mean in what context, and other slippery determinations of that nature.

In any case, what is far more interesting about this paper is the translator, Arnold Yasin Mol. He is discussed in a dedicated section later in the report: Leaders in the Reformist Movement Writing for Yaqeen? . Back to Top

There Is No Such Thing as Femininity in Islam

Yaqeen’s obfuscation of distinct Islamic gender roles is furthered in the article “Courage & Commitment: The Femininity of Muslim Women.” The article was written by Tamara Gray, an American Muslim teacher and loud advocate for feminism, who wrote “Lean In: Our Feminist Manifesto” and teaches pro-feminist values in her classes and lectures.

Her Yaqeen article begins by describing her project:

“We must find a way to break out of preconceived ideas around femininity and masculinity that we have adopted subconsciously. In the following pages, I first discuss Western myths around femininity. I then look to the women mentioned in the Qur’an and Muslim women throughout the centuries.”

This sounds promising, but she quickly reveals what she means by “Western myths around femininity.”

“During colonialist rule, Western governments and missionary schools introduced their own beliefs about femininity to Muslim lands. Their concept of the delicate and fainting woman clashed strongly with the example of bravery in battle of Safiyya bint Abdul Muttalib رضي الله عنها but it began to permeate local cultures nonetheless. Eventually the ‘ideal woman’ who cooks, cleans, docilely serves her husband, and gently raises her children became part and parcel of khutbas and halaqas—all without questioning where that ideal came from in the first place.”

Here, Gray creates an absurd dichotomy between the Western “delicate, fainting woman” and the Muslim warrior woman, as if Islamic femininity is defined by “bravery in battle.” This has quickly become a cliched mainstay of modern Muslim feminists, who cherrypick exceptions to the norm in an attempt to undermine traditional Islamic gender norms. The fact that in some situations of dire need, where the Ummah faced an existential threat from enemy forces, Muslim women would pick up the sword, does not mean that that is an appropriate or accepted role for women. In fact, Islamic scholars prohibit women from the battlefield, except for the exceptional circumstances of last resort. Furthermore, this is not something unique to Muslim women, as there are many examples in history of women from all cultures forced into combat due to life-and-death situations.

Gray continues:

“Sitcoms in the 1950s showed so-called ‘ethnic’ men as unable to ‘control’ their wives, whereas the middle-class white housewife was well behaved. An image of ideal femininity attached to gentle and sweet housewifery was born and then exported across the world via movies and television for peoples of every culture to absorb. Suddenly, in Muslim societies, there was women’s work (housework) and men’s work (office work)—though our very Prophet ﷺ had never endorsed this distinction.”

Is this true? Did the notions of wifely obedience only originate in the Muslim world due to white Western influence? Is it true that, prior to white influence, there were no norms in Islam to differentiate between men’s work and women’s work?

Both of Gray’s assertions are patently false. The Quran and Sunna are explicit about the religious duty of wives to be obedient to their husbands, i.e., what Gray pejoratively calls “control.” And the distinction between traditionally male work versus female work is attested to in many narrations about the Prophet ﷺ, his wives, and the Companions as a whole. For example, the Prophet ﷺ said: “When a man calls his wife to fulfill his need, then let her come, even if she is at the oven.” Would anyone consider it sexist to speak of women as generally being around ovens? Or consider the narration regarding the beloved daughter of the Prophet, Fatima, who asked for a servant because of blisters on her hand from using a millstone. In one narration, the beloved wife of the Prophet ﷺ Aisha is reported to have said:

“I never saw any woman who made food like Safiyyah. She sent a dish to the Prophet ﷺ in which was some food, and I could not keep myself from breaking it. I asked the Prophet ﷺ what the expiation was for that, and he said: ‘A dish like that dish, and food like that food.'”

In another narration, Aisha remarked:

“I used to wash the traces of janaba from the clothes of the Prophet ﷺ and he used to go for prayers while traces of water were still on it.”

The distinct roles of men and women are also clear in Islamic jurisprudence, based on unequivocal ayat of the Quran. For example, Allah says that men are authorities over their wives and are responsible for providing for them and protecting them. He also says, “Mothers (should) suckle their children for two full years, for one who wants to complete the (period of) suckling. It is the obligation of the one to whom the child belongs (the father) that he provides food and clothing for them (the mothers) with fairness. Nobody is obligated beyond his capacity.” Based on these ayat and other evidences, the scholars gave men a clear role as breadwinners. The main responsibilities of women, as defined by the Sharia, were being sexually available for their husbands and being caretakers of children. The ability to care for children was especially crucial in times of when Muslim men were obligated to go on expeditions for jihad. If women’s main role was not staying home and managing children and other household affairs, the Muslim community would have quickly collapsed.

Now, the modern feminist will shudder at this delineation of duties, but for virtually all of human history, women did not seem to mind. It was not like the man’s role of toiling from dawn till dusk as a farmer or merchant to provide food for his family was a glamorous job for the vast majority of men for the vast majority of history, certainly not jobs that women would be pining for. It is only due to the modern feminist movement that this natural, God-given order with distinct gender roles was questioned. This is why feminists like Gray have to make the silly claim that traditional gender roles were the invention of American sexists in the 1950’s.

Now, in an essay supposedly dedicated to elaborating what it means to be feminine, Gray paradoxically trashes the entire exercise as a Western colonial byproduct:

“The question ‘What is women’s role in society’ is a question resulting from the globalization of Western thought. Instead, Muslim women have been asking, ‘What does society need from me?’”

Gray continues by asking:

“If the image of the domesticated woman is a false ideal, what is the Muslim version of womanhood?”

She answers her question by surveying examples of women in the Quran and history and concludes:

“If we were to define femininity according to the Qur’an, we could easily use words like confidence, courage, and commitment to promises. […] The stories of women in the Qur’an narrate bravery and belief disconnected from their social or familial status.”

This definition from Gray does not define femininity. To the contrary, it destroys femininity as a unique concept because confidence, courage, commitment, bravery, and belief are all positive characteristics that Muslims must strive to exemplify regardless of gender. Nothing about those traits are specific to the female gender, so how can they be cited as defining characteristics of femininity?

Gray continues:

“The word umm or mother in Arabic is related to the words ummah (community) and imam (leader). As such, it contains the meanings of both leadership and community. In Western thinking, the Great Mother is an archetype for individuals and societies. She is a giver and a key to transformative mysteries. She is fundamental to spiritual transformation. The archetype of mother is symbolic of growth, change, and development. It is deeply connected to religion because it is a directional force. Indeed, the Arabic term imam means to stand in front of and ummahat—or mothers—stand in front of the next generation in leadership.”

First of all, why does Gray revert back to “Western thinking” in her attempt to explain Arabic terminology? She says herself that Muslims need to break away from Western tropes in defining womanhood, yet here she commits the very mistake she warned readers against.

Secondly, why is she trying to extract guidance on Islamic femininity from Arabic linguistics when these concepts and concomitant roles are elaborated in the Islam tradition? For example, we have detailed rules in Islam about who leads the prayer, the household, and the Ummah as a whole. These are the roles of men. The roots of the Arabic word are irrelevant and certainly wouldn’t trump the norms elaborated by centuries of righteous jurists and scholars. Gray ignores all of that tradition in her meandering essay, which is a conspicuous omission, to say the least.

She spends the rest of the essay detailing examples of Muslim female teachers, political activists, and scholars. Given that most of the scholars, political leaders, and soldiers in Muslim history were men, her examples do little more than liken women to men, while underming distinction between the genders and their roles as such. In no part of her essay does she acknowledge a single unique and exclusive characteristic of womanhood.

This following paragraph starts off promising as it is the only place in the essay where she seemingly elaborates on the concept of motherhood. But things take a turn for the worse:

“But there is also the framework of ‘mothering’—the feeling of obligation to a child is not unlike the feeling that Muslim women demonstrated to their community. The women in the examples here did not pause to ask if they should serve but, like mothers of infants, woke up at night and toiled during the day to do what was necessary in order to keep their child, Islam, alive. This definition of mothering—courage and commitment—is quite different from the Western tropes of docility and obedience.”

Rather than extolling motherhood as the unique role of women, Gray opts for a clumsy, inappropriate metaphor, likening Islam as a religion to an infant crying for milk at night, needing its mother for survival.

Ultimately, defining motherhood and womanhood as “courage and commitment” only tells us that Gray doesn’t seem to understand the difference between defining something versus describing incidental attributes of something. A construction worker can demonstrate courage and commitment. That doesn’t mean that construction work is defined as courage and commitment. Back to Top

Muslims Suffer from Toxic Masculinity

Note: This section is also a stand-alone article here.

Jonathan Brown writes “An Open Letter to Muslim Men: The Sunnah Trumps Toxic Masculinity.” The term “toxic masculinity” is a highly politicized term used by contemporary feminism to attack notions of patriarchy and traditional gender roles. Brown’s contrasting the Sunna with toxic masculinity implies that the Sunna is aligned with this feminist project.

As we discussed above in light of Tamara Gray’s essay, according to feminist thought, the “traditional man” and the “traditional woman” are nothing more than constructions created by “the Patriarchy” used to oppress women and lock them into demeaning roles of domestic drudgery — cooking, cleaning, taking care of children, while men sit back like kings, enjoying life with a cold drink in hand. The feminist, therefore, fights this oppression by teaching women and men that there are no defined gender roles, domestic chores must be divided equally, and women must be front and center leading the Ummah into battle.

Brown caters to this feminist fantasy throughout his essay. We might as well start with where he speaks about gender roles or lack thereof in Islam:

“In light of ongoing debates about differences between sexes and expectations of gender roles, it’s worth looking at how the men and women of Islam’s ideal, founding generation conducted themselves. In the Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet ﷺ, men and women are distinct in their duties of prayer and fasting (women don’t do either when menstruating), in their dress (they must cover different areas of their body), and other legal issues. Men have the duty to guard and protect (qiwāma) their womenfolk because of some of the