Through our research, we examined dozens of open sources including technical documents published on the government's procurement agency website, zakupki.gov.ru. Russian law requires all government agencies, including the secret services, to buy the equipment through this site.

We studied presentations and public statements made by government officials and top managers of firms involved with the Sochi Olympics and Sochi city. We also gathered public records of government oversight agencies such as the telecoms watchdog Roskomnadzor. For example, we found documents showing how the watchdog monitored how properly Sochi's ISPs were installing Sorm; we also found presentation documents about using Sorm at the Games which were drawn up by RNT, a firm tasked by the FSB with developing an information security architecture for Sochi.

What quickly became apparent was the contrast between judicial oversight in Russia and that in most western nations. In the west, law enforcement or intelligence agencies must get a court order before wiretapping (in the UK, a warrant signed by a secretary of state, usually the home secretary). That warrant is sent to phone operators and ISPs, which are then required to intercept the requested information and forward it to the respective government agencies.

In Russia, the FSB must also obtain a court order to eavesdrop, but once they have it, they are not obliged to show it to anybody except FSB superiors. Telecoms providers have no right to demand to see the warrant; they must pay for Sorm equipment and installation, but are denied access to the boxes. The FSB does not even need to contact ISP staff; instead it calls the FSB controller, who is linked by a protected cable to the Sorm device installed on the ISP network.