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The takeaway idea is that the IMF is the sole authority behind the crisis. The Fund has always had a privileged role in managing international crises, but the debtor relation has never been directly with the IMF. What typically occurs is a country finds itself indebted to many banks and eventually reaches a point where it can’t pay. The IMF shows up at that point and assumes the role of guarantor of future payment.

However, Argentina’s current debt with the Fund is on par with what is owed to the banks. Argentina has received a historic $57 billion bailout package from the IMF, which is actually a problem for the IMF. In that sense, the crisis is not only a concern for Argentina but for the IMF itself.

The way this unfolded was unusual: the United States demanded the Fund loan money to Argentina for purely geopolitical reasons — with an eye on Venezuela, the United States is trying to shore up an important ally in the Southern Cone. This was against the Fund’s own wishes, because they knew they were lending to a client that will never pay them back.

When Argentina does reach insolvency, for the first time in history it won’t be with the banks but directly with the Fund. Hence international financial analysts are concerned about the effects Argentina could produce within the IMF.

What all this means is that the Fund will assume a hardline stance towards Argentina. In practice that won’t mean further repayment demands, but instead a series of deferrals on payments in exchange for deepened austerity.

The International Monetary Fund currently has its own representative set up in Argentina’s Central Bank. The minister of economy is essentially IMF director Christine Lagarde.

However, what is especially troubling nowadays is the level of naivety one finds locally with regard to the IMF. People seem to think that the government is the sole culprit and that the IMF is here to lend a helping hand.

Even the Kirchnerist opposition has embraced an image of the IMF as if it were a benevolent institution, like an old friend. The opposition is eager to meet with Fund representatives and send a message that “we are willing to negotiate.”

It’s alarming to see the opposition rushing off to Washington, rather than raising awareness and encouraging social mobilization. In contrast with other periods, the bulk of the opposition isn’t rallying against the IMF. There were some gestures in that direction in May-June 2018, but those efforts were swept under the rug. This is worrying, because sooner or later the Fund will come back and say, “Very well, now it’s time for a labor reform bill and a pension reform bill,” which is the priority of the IMF.

The IMF wants to impose a labor reform bill like in Brazil, and a pension reform bill like Greece’s.

Now more than ever, we need to remember two examples: Greece and Ecuador. In Ecuador, Lenín Moreno campaigned with Rafael Correa on the slogan “I am the anti-right candidate.” He beat the right wing as a progressive candidate and then applied the same austerity measures as Macri. It’s disheartening to find right-wing economic policy embraced by so-called progressives. A more conservative sector of Kirchnerism is starting to fall in line with this tendency.