This was a very strange football match; universally compelling, but at times it felt just absurd. But good absurd. Sevilla possess that intangible ability to come back, to return from deficits, and display the grit and determination that their coach Unai Emery evidently demands of them. They had it last season, and seemingly this. Barcelona ultimately won and take another step down the road to their ‘sexteple’ — by winning six competitions in the calendar year of 2015. Lionel Messi was great (no surprises there), as was Andres Iniesta and Barcelona controlled the flow of play almost entirely in the first half. But what was more interesting in this game was how Emery tried to combat the enviable the qualities that the Spanish and European champions boast.

Emery is one of the most engaging, infectious and creative coaches in Europe at the moment, and he proved that yet again in this match. He actually has a terrible record against Barcelona. He had never beaten them with any of the clubs he has managed — that’s accumulatively nineteen games before this Super Cup, with all of Almeria, Valencia and Sevilla.

So what kind of tactical plan would he develop to contain nine of the Barca XI that started in the 3–1 win over Juventus in the Champions League final back in May (Jordi Alba out injured and Neymar, ill with the mumps)? How would he counter Messi, Iniesta, Luis Suarez, and the toxic nature of Barcelona’s high press. And he was faced with the central defensive absences of Timothée Kolodziejczak and Daniel Carriço — plus new signing Steven Nzonzi, a defensive midfielder formerly of Stoke City. Midfielder Grzegorz Krychowiak was forced to play further back that he ordinarily would have done, funnelling into defence out of necessity.

But ever the innovator, and ever ready and courageous enough to implement highly unorthodox tactical ideas, Emery developed a plan and gave it a go. Fundamentally he placed his focus on dislocating the Barcelona front six from their defensive back four. Sevilla would dice with possession at the back, attempting to circumnavigate the Barcelona press, coaxing their forward and midfield players up the pitch. All the while Sevilla’s tall, combative and aerially competent players — Vitolo, Kevin Gameiro and Vicente Iborra — would move aggressively up the pitch. Then someone, usually Ever Banega, would slam the ball long and over the top for the aforementioned group to contest; they would try to win their one-on-one battles, and knock the ball onwards for someone to chase or counter-attack onto, or flick down to Jose Antonio Reyes who was roaming and ready to collect second balls. That was presumably why Emery started with Banega and Michael Krohn-Dehli in the band of two in their 4–2–3–1 formation. Ordinarily they are two prototypical playmakers, smooth with the ball and more prosaic without it; it was incongruous considering those positions are usually occupied by running hustlers and tough atavistic ruffians. But Emery could trust the former duo to play precise elevated passes forwards.

Basically it was a lively and brave attempt to turn the Barcelona press against itself, to separate the Catalans — to de-compact their spatial distribution. And an extreme way of playing the percentages: it was a tactic founded upon chance — seeking to take advantage of fortunate drops or lucky bounces.

Of course tactics, football methodologies are only as effective as the end result they yield. The proof is in the pudding. Did this elaborate approach work? Not really. Or, at least, it did a little bit. Perhaps Emery was hoping that the Barca press might be a little rusty, hoping it would be dulled by the lesions of late pre-season. But it wasn’t. Barcelona were ferocious in their attempts to seize the ball from Sevilla’s defensive line, probing deep into their opposition’s half. And Sevilla’s backline frequently blundered into losing the ball and ceding dangerous transitions. All provoked by diligent manner in which Barca’s front six condensed the play and sealed the passing avenues.

And while Banega and Krohn-Dehli may indeed offer technical ability and precision with long kicks, their defensive abilities were not so thorough. The two free-kicks from which Messi scored sublimely in the first fifteen minutes originated from desperate fouls committed in futile attempts to close the spaces they left behind.

The third Barcelona goal however was pure counter-attack and bad defending, coming straight from a Sevilla set-piece up the other end. Suarez providing for Rafinha. It was a boon to Luis Enrique however, and a boon to his gradual introduction of greater dynamism and increased direct passing to the Barcelona machine. The fourth goal was a direct a result of Emery’s tactics as outlined above: albeit poorly implemented by left-back Benoit Tremoulinas who miscalculated a square pass in front of his own penalty area. Sergio Busquets intercepted and laid the ball on a plate for Suarez.

But! Reyes’ goal and Vitolo’s assist were a direct result of Emery’s intended dislocation of the Barca formation. An elevated pass was relayed over Barcelona’s forward and midfield lines to an unmarked Vitolo. He flew up the left wing and Gerard Pique, Javier Mascherano et al were isolated from their teammates and overwhelmed by the Sevilla players rushing to support Vitolo. The latter crossed and Reyes overloaded on the right to tap in.

And the tide changed. Central hub and whirling passing metronome Iniesta was replaced by Sergi Roberto. It was presumably a precautionary measure to prevent the former from aggravating a small injury he seemed to pick up a few minutes before. But suddenly Barcelona lost control of possession, sat a bit deeper, and lessened the intensity of their press. Suddenly Sevilla had space and were able to play through the midfield along the ground. They parked Emery’s specialist tactics, and Banega was able to move further forward and dictate with the ball. They didn’t dominate per se but definitely had the momentum.

One of Barcelona’s weaker plays last even season (and even during the Guardiola era) was the propensity for the defence to become isolated — usually that didn’t matter so much because the attack was scoring so many goals. But in the transition from offence to defence, Barcelona looked ropey again. And they paid for it this time. Sevilla’s third goal saw Vitolo fouled, a penalty given and Gameiro converting. That play came about because Sevilla full back Tremoulinas prowled up the left wing virtually unopposed; and Jeremy Mathieu’s feeble marking in the six yard box. Sevilla’s fourth can be attributed to an individual error, namely Marc Bartra’s slip and Ciro Immobile’s firm cross for Yevhen Konoplyanka to knock in. But the pressure was fully on Barcelona and they failed to cope.

At 4–4 Unai Emery moved Krychowiak forward into midfield and played conventionally: five in midfield, staying compact and narrow, sitting deeper, being organised, pragmatic and making it difficult for Barcelona. In extra-time Enrique brought on Pedro Rodriguez. It was from another foul that Sevilla gave away just outside the box and the latter substitute who finished after Beto’s (marvellous) one handed save from Messi’s shot. Sevilla committed more men forward in the search for an equaliser but were, just, unable to do so despite crafting some excellent chances.

This was an enthralling game, not merely for the goals and the drama that ensued, but for the tactical interest that Unai Emery provided with his unorthodox 4–2–3–1. Tactics is about maximising your team’s scoring potential and minimising your team’s conceding potential (if we were to render it in the base language of economics) and regardless of the Spaniards invention and creativity — not to mention pluck in attempting to implement such a plan — it did ultimately fail. They conceded at most three goals and scored two that could possibly be directly linked to his tactics. It might have been different if Emery had opted for something more conventional, but we shouldn’t wander into the field of counter-factuality without due trepidation — suffice to say it was worth a go considering the qualities and pedigree that Barcelona possess. And of course, it could have worked on another day. That’s why we love Unai Emery.