While Priebus’s comments may signal a step in the right direction, his statement does not allay fundamental concerns about Trump’s commitment to taking all the steps necessary to ensure national-security continuity when he takes office on January 20. The risks of neglecting the intelligence aspect of preparation for the presidency are grave. History shows numerous examples of failed crisis management during presidential transitions.

Most famously, in April 1961, President John F. Kennedy launched the Bay of Pigs invasion to overthrow Fidel Castro—a covert operation that failed, causing significant embarrassment to the United States, as well as the death or capture of nearly 1,300 CIA-trained anti-Castro fighters. The roots of this failure lay in inadequate intelligence briefings during the transition between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Kennedy. Eisenhower initiated the covert CIA-led operation that would eventually become the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1959, and planning continued through 1960. Even after Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon, Eisenhower’s vice president, Eisenhower continued—and even accelerated—planning for a paramilitary operation to overthrow Castro.

During the transition period, Kennedy learned of the sketches of the Bay of Pigs scheme from his intelligence briefers. But the details continued to evolve through November, December, and January, and a scheduling snafu delayed and ultimately abbreviated Kennedy’s briefing on the operational details of the Bay of Pigs plan.

As a result, Kennedy inherited a covert operation with substantial momentum behind it. Yet, as of Inauguration Day, he had not received a full briefing on the emerging Cuban operation and had an incomplete understanding of its history and details. Even so, Kennedy had to quickly decide whether to green-light the plan, as the CIA required executive authorization to continue with its program. Kennedy had to make this determination with little help from his foreign-policy advisers, who were not cleared to learn about covert programs until after Inauguration Day. Thus when Kennedy made the pivotal decision to authorize and accelerate planning for the Bay of Pigs operation eight days after taking office, he did so under tremendous pressure to continue an ongoing operation, with insufficient understanding of the plan itself, and with little support from aides.

The results, of course, were ultimately disastrous.

As the Bay of Pigs fiasco illustrates, the United States’ most sensitive national-security operations cannot be put on hold to accommodate the domestic-political calendar. Indeed, the Bay of Pigs is not the only example of early-term foreign policy crises and embarrassments resulting from the failure to share intelligence between administrations during the transition period.