Crossing collision

VIA Rail Canada Inc. passenger train No. 51

OC Transpo double-decker bus No. 8017

Mile 3.30, Smiths Falls Subdivision

Ottawa, Ontario

18 September 2013

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability. This report is not created for use in the context of legal, disciplinary or other proceedings. See Ownership and use of content.

Summary

On 18 September 2013, at about 0832 Eastern Daylight Time, westward VIA Rail Canada Inc. (VIA) passenger train No. 51 departed from the VIA Ottawa Station on time and proceeded en route to Toronto. At 0847:27, OC Transpo double-decker bus No. 8017 departed from the Fallowfield Station on the OC Transpo bus Transitway. At 0848:06, while proceeding at about 43 mph, the train entered the OC Transpo Transitway crossing, located at Mile 3.30 of VIA’s Smiths Falls Subdivision. At the time, the crossing lights, bells and gates were activated. The northbound bus was travelling at about 5 mph with the brakes applied when it struck the train. As a result of the collision, the front of the bus was torn off. The train, comprising 1 locomotive and 4 passenger cars, derailed but remained upright. Among the bus occupants, there were 6 fatalities and 9 serious injuries, and about 25 minor injuries were reported. No VIA crew members or VIA passengers were injured.

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1.0 Factual information

OC Transpo is the municipal transit authority for the City of Ottawa, Ontario (the City), with a daily ridership of approximately 375 000 passengers. It provides transit services to the nearly one million people who live in the Ottawa area. OC Transpo maintains a dedicated 2-lane Transitway system (Transitway) for buses that run throughout Ottawa. The Transitway includes a number of OC Transpo stops and several “Park & Ride” terminals near the outskirts of the City. The Transitway is considered a private roadway with use restricted to OC Transpo and City emergency vehicles. In September 2013, OC Transpo‘s bus fleet of 937 buses comprised the following:

Alexander Dennis Limited (ADL) Footnote 1 E500 42-foot-long double-decker buses built in 2012/2013 (75 buses);

E500 42-foot-long double-decker buses built in 2012/2013 (75 buses); New Flyer D60LFR 60-foot-long articulated buses built between 2010 and 2011 (306 buses);

New Flyer D60LF 60-foot-long articulated buses built between 2008 and 2010 (53 buses);

Orion VII Hybrid 40-foot-long buses built in 2008 and 2009 (177 buses); and

New Flyer Invero D40i 40-foot-long buses built between 2003 and 2007 (326 buses).

VIA Rail Canada Inc. (VIA) operates up to 503 trains weekly on 7767 miles (12 500 km) of track and serves 450 communities across the country. VIA carries an average of 4 million customers annually on its fleet of 396 passenger cars and 73 road locomotives. It operates 159 passenger stations, 4 maintenance facilities, and employs about 2600 people. While most of the track infrastructure VIA uses is owned and managed by freight railway companies, VIA does own 139 miles (223 km) of track, which includes the Smiths Falls Subdivision that traverses the west end of the City.

VIA passenger train No. 51 (VIA 51) operates daily (Monday to Friday) westward from Montréal, Quebec, to Toronto, Ontario, via Ottawa (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Accident location (Source: Railway Association of Canada, Canadian Railway Atlas, with TSB annotations)

On 18 September 2013, VIA 51 was powered by a single General Electric (GE) Genesis locomotive, model EPa42 (VIA 915). The locomotive was located at the head end of the train. It was not equipped with an on-board forward-facing video camera, nor was it required to be. The remainder of the train was composed of 4 Light, Rapid, Comfortable (LRC) passenger cars (VIA 3455, VIA 3308, VIA 3331 and VIA 3353). The train weighed 312 tons and was 410 feet long. The rolling stock was in good condition. The train was last inspected at VIA's Montréal Central Station (Gare Centrale) on 18 September 2013, with no defects noted.

The train was operated by 2 qualified locomotive engineers located in the locomotive cab. The operating locomotive engineer (LE) was positioned at the controls on the right side of the locomotive cab while the in–charge locomotive engineer (ICLE) was positioned on the left side of the cab. The ICLE performed the duties of conductor. The LE and ICLE were both qualified for their positions and met fitness and rest standards. Each crew member had over 15 years of experience on the territory. VIA 51 was staffed by 4 VIA on-train service personnel and was transporting 108 passengers.

1.1 The accident

1.1.1 The train journey

On 18 September 2013, the train departed from the VIA Ottawa Station on time at 0831:57.Footnote 2, Footnote 3 The train's next stop was VIA Fallowfield Station, located at the west end of Ottawa at Mile 3.57 of the VIA Smiths Falls Subdivision. Prior to arriving at VIA Fallowfield Station, westbound trains must pass through the level grade crossings at Woodroffe Avenue and the Transitway, located at Mile 3.28 and Mile 3.30 respectively.

As the train approached the crossings, its headlights were on full power and the ditch lights were illuminated. At 0847:13, approximately 1 mile (1.6 km) east of the crossings, the train was proceeding at 80 mph (128.7 km/h). In preparation for the stop at the VIA Fallowfield Station, the LE applied the locomotive dynamic brake as well as the train service brakes and began to slow the train. As the crossings were subject to a whistle ban between the hours of 2000 and 1200 (noon), the train horn was not sounded on the approach to the crossings.

Prior to entering the crossings, the ICLE called the approach signal and began to document what the signal displayed. The LE was occupied with the task of slowing the train. The crew members first noticed the bus travelling northward toward the crossing when the train was approximately 600 feet (183 m) from the crossing. The crossing protection (i.e. lights, bells and gates) for both crossings were activated as required. Shortly thereafter, the train crew realized that the bus would not be able to stop in advance of the crossing.

At 0848:04, with the train travelling at 47 mph (75.6 km/h), the LE initiated emergency braking.

At 0848:06, with the train travelling at 43 mph (69.2 km/h), the bus collided with the left (south) side of the locomotive cab.

The train subsequently derailed and the locomotive came to a stop approximately 690 feet (210 m) west of the Transitway crossing, just east of the VIA Fallowfield Station (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Site diagram

1.1.2 The bus journey

The OC Transpo bus driver (the driver) worked as a regular spare. The driver would work different bus routes each day based on a 2-week schedule provided in advance. As a regular spare, the driver would primarily work “express” routes and work a split shift each workday. Split shifts comprised 2 distinct work periods, one during the 0600–0900 morning commute and the second during the 1500–1800 afternoon commute.

Generally, express routes operate from an OC Transpo garage to a City suburb, where passengers are picked up before proceeding downtown. A driver will typically work 2 or 3 of these routes per shift. Express routes generally operate on time, as there are not as many bus stops compared to regular routes. Drivers can get behind schedule when picking up passengers in a suburban area, but not normally to the extent that they would be concerned that they may miss the start time of their next route. A large part of an express route is typically operated on the Transitway between the suburbs and downtown Ottawa.

On the morning of the accident, the driver awoke just after 0500. At the Industrial Road OC Transpo garage, the driver picked up OC Transpo bus 8017, an ADL E500 double-decker bus. Departing from the garage at 0607, the bus deadheadedFootnote 4 to Orléans, a suburb in the east end of Ottawa.

At 0622, the driver started operating express route 35 from Orléans toward downtown Ottawa. At 0759, express route 35 terminated at the Lincoln Fields transit station. The bus then deadheaded toward Barrhaven, a suburb in the south end of Ottawa, and the bus route number was changed to express route 76. At 0828, from the intersection of Cobble Hill Road and Maravista Road, the driver started operating express route 76 and proceeded toward downtown Ottawa. The driver had driven express route 76 a total of 9 times in the previous 12 months.

At 0846:24,Footnote 5 arriving at the OC Transpo Fallowfield Station, the bus stopped just east of the south-side bus shelter at the stop sign. Passengers exited the bus and other passengers entered the bus from the front and side doors. A commuting cyclist loaded a bike onto the bike rack at the front of the bus.

At 0846:53, the side door of the bus was closed. Passengers, including the cyclist, continued to board the bus using the front door.

The driver asked a group of 3 or 4 passengers standing at the front of the bus to stand behind the yellow line on the floor. With the bus still stationary, the driver looked at the bus video monitor, located on a forward panel above the driver station and to the left of the driver seat. The video monitor display (6 inches [15.2 cm] wide by 3¾ inches [9.5 cm] high) was divided into 4 quadrants, each measuring 3 inches (7.6 cm) wide by 17⁄8 inches (5 cm) high. Each quadrant displayed a view from 1 of 4 on-board video cameras. The bottom right quadrant displayed a rearward-facing view from the front of the upper deck.

The driver announced to the passengers that there were still seats available on the upper deck.Footnote 6 A passenger accessed the upper deck, but did not see any available seats. Since there was no room below and the passenger knew that it would be difficult to reach the upper grab bars on the lower deck, the passenger remained on the upper deck, standing near the top of the stairs while holding on to a pole. A conversation ensued between the driver and the cyclist, who was standing on the lower deck near the driver, regarding seating availability on the upper deck.

Upon completion of passenger loading, the seating on the lower deck was full and there were at least 13 standing passengers, while the upper deck had 1 empty seat and 1 standing passenger.

At 0847:27, the bus departed from the OC Transpo Fallowfield Station, about 4 minutes behind the scheduled departure time. The bus immediately accessed the Transitway and continued northward.

Conversations ensued between some passengers standing near the front of the bus on the lower deck. The conversations focused on availability of seating on the upper deck and whether it was safe to go upstairs while the bus was moving. Passengers who were standing near the cyclist repositioned themselves, allowing the cyclist to move toward the front of the bus to monitor the bicycle.

At about 0847:57, the driver was busy negotiating the left–hand curve ahead as some passengers continued to look for seating and conversations continued. During this period, the driver looked upward and to the left toward the video monitor.

At 0847:59, the bus passed the point at which all of the red flashing lights at the Transitway crossing would have been fully visible, about 402 feet (122.5 m) from the south crossing gate.

At 0848:02, the bus was travelling at 42 mphFootnote 7 (67.6 km/h) with throttle (gas pedal) on. At about this time, some passengers on both decks began to shout “stop stop” and “look out”. Shortly thereafter, the driver released the throttle (gas pedal), refocused attention to the road ahead and began to apply the bus brakes.

At 0848:04, the bus had reduced speed to 35 mph (56.3 km/h) and, at 0848:05, the speed had further reduced to 25 mph (40.2 km/h) with no throttle on and the brakes applied.

At 0848:06, the bus speed had reduced to 4.8 mph (7.7 km/h) with no throttle on and the brakes applied as the bus collided with the south side of the train.

Shortly after the accident, 2 OC Transpo buses (a 60-foot-long articulated bus and a 40-foot-long single bus) stopped behind the occurrence bus at the crossing. A number of passengers from the trailing buses exited to assist.

1.2 Site examination

At the railway crossing, the Transitway crosses the track at a 50-degree angle. The relative orientation of the bus and the locomotive just prior to impact is depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Orientation of the bus and train just prior to impact

1.2.1 Bus examination

The front of the bus body was collapsed and torn off. The bus debris primarily came to rest on the west side of the roadway and along the railway right-of-way for about 100 feet (30.5 m) down the track in the direction of train movement.

The right side wall of the bus had little damage, except for the panel located above the front door, which was bent to the left, in the direction of train movement. The right front corner pillar, which serves as the foremost vertical beam for the front door frame, was deformed and disconnected from the chassis at its lower end. Most of the front dome glazing (window) was missing, except for a small portion hanging from the right top corner. The remaining glazing was about 30 inches (76 cm) wide at the bottom. The contour of the remaining glazing was consistent with that of VIA 915's bodywork (Photo 1), as this was the last portion of the bus that contacted the train.

Photo 1. Right side view of the bus (the dotted line represents contour of locomotive VIA 915)

The front portion of the chassis was deformed to the left. The lower and upper front-end framing had separated from the bus and were found adjacent to the main wreckage. The remainder of the separated front structure was extensively broken up (Photo 2).

Photo 2. Front view of the bus

The driver's seat and the 4 seats on the 2 foremost rows of passenger seats on the left side of the upper deck were torn from the bus along with their supporting floor structure (Figure 4), coming to rest on the adjacent roadway west of the bus. The frame of these passenger seats had no significant damage, as the seats had not been directly struck by the train, nor did the impact with the ground exceed the seat design strength.

Figure 4. Schematics illustrating floor separation (lower deck on left; upper deck on right). The solid lines outline the boundary of floor separation. The dotted lines show the estimated line of train movement.

A portion of the left side wall of the bus (approximately 10 feet [3 m] long), containing the 2 foremost panels of the upper and lower decks, had separated from the left front corner of the bus and was bent toward the left (Photo 3). The left front corner pillar was missing. The left front corner of the roof was deformed upward. The foremost left side wall at the lower deck (below the driver's side window) had separated completely.

Photo 3. Left side of OC Transpo double-decker bus 8017

Although the stairwell within the bus was damaged, passengers on the upper deck were able to use it to evacuate.

Short skid marks (about 3 inches (7.6 cm] long) were present on the Transitway extending southward under the rear tires of the bus (Photo 4).

Photo 4. Skid marks on Transitway under rear drive tires

The bus was examined in situ. The bus batteries were disconnected to preserve any data that may have been recorded on various electronic modules. The memory card was removed from the Intelligent Vehicle Network (IVN).

The tires were marked to identify their location on the pavement, and then removed so that the treads and brake components could be examined in detail. All wheels were replaced with substitute wheels prior to transporting the bus to a secure facility for further detailed examination.

1.2.2 Train and track damage

VIA 915 (Photo 5) and all 4 passenger cars derailed, but remained upright.

Photo 5. Damage on locomotive VIA 915

No impact marks were present on the front of VIA 915's hood. The left side of VIA 915's short hood exhibited a vertical dent consistent with the contour of the left front corner of the bus, as the bus left front corner was just inside the line of movement of VIA 915 when the collision occurred.

The bottom portion of VIA 915's diagonal sheeting that transitions from the front to the side of the locomotiveFootnote 8 was made of ¼-inch-thick (6.4 mm) steel with a 1.5-inch (38.1 mm) flange along the trailing edge secured to the frame by a gusset. There were signs of impact at this location, but there were no dents or deformation (Photo 5).

Horizontal lines of denting and scoring extended on the left side of VIA 915's bodywork and onto the first 20 feet (6.1 m) of the first passenger car (VIA 3455), as the bus had kept moving forward after the initial impact until it stopped. There was shallow denting along the body side sheets of VIA 915, but the frame of VIA 915 was not deformed.

The bottom portion of the skirt behind the pilot of VIA 915 was 20 inches (51 cm) above the ground level at the point of collision. The side panel was 44 inches (112 cm) above the ground. The chassis of the ADL E500 bus, which was about 17 inches (43 cm) above ground level, had passed beneath the bottom portion of the skirt behind the pilot and side panel of VIA 915.

Impact marks were present on the left rear truck of VIA 915, just behind the underframe-mounted battery box (Photo 6). The battery box had separated. The electrical wiring providing power to VIA 915 was severed, and the locomotive event recorder (LER) had stopped recording. The rear truck of VIA 915 had derailed to the north side of the rails, on the crossing.

Photo 6. Impact mark on locomotive VIA 915's rear truck side frame (arrow) and separated battery box

The south crossing gate had broken away. Train wheel flange marks were present, extending westward from near the middle of the Transitway to past the west end (Photo 7) of the crossing. From that point, wheel impact marks were observed on the track ties and ballast extending westward from the crossing onto the diverging VIA siding located just north of and adjacent to the main track.

Photo 7. Looking eastward from the west end of the crossing, train wheel flange marks were observed from the middle of the crossing extending westward

VIA 915 and the first passenger car (VIA 3455) had jackknifed and came to rest straddling the main and siding tracks. The front truck of VIA 915, the rear truck of VIA 3455 and the 3 other passenger cars came to rest on the main track. The rear truck of VIA 915 and front truck of VIA 3455 came to rest on the siding track. The locomotive and passenger car trucks sustained various degrees of damage as a result of the derailment.

The main and siding tracks were displaced by the jackknifed equipment (Photo 8), as the track gauge had spread and rail on both tracks had rolled to the field side.

Photo 8. Westward view of derailed cars and displaced track

Track damage was present on both the main and siding tracks extending westward for about 600 feet (183 m) from the east end of the siding. The combined track damage for the main track and the siding track was about 1200 feet (365.8 m). The main track No. 12 turnout containing the east-end siding switch was also damaged.

1.3 Injuries

On the VIA train, there were no injuries to crew members or passengers. Among the bus occupants, there were 6 fatalities, 9 serious injuriesFootnote 9 and about 25 minor injuries. The location of the bus occupants who sustained fatal and serious injuries is depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Double-decker bus layout with location of occupants who sustained fatal and serious injuries

The driver and the 4 passengers seated in the first row of the upper deck were ejected from the bus and sustained fatal injuries. An additional passenger on the lower deck was thrown to the front of the bus and later succumbed to fatal injuries.

Four passengers seated in rows 2 and 3 of the upper deck were also ejected from the bus. These 4 passengers and a 5th passenger in the 5th row of the upper deck as well as 4 passengers on the lower deck sustained serious injuries.

During the accident, many of the other passengers were ejected from or fell out of their seats. A total of 34 passengers were transported to hospital for various injuries.

The most common injuries included bruises, lacerations, broken bones and head, neck, shoulder, back and leg injuries. The injuries were primarily sustained by passengers being ejected from the bus, falling out of a seat, falling from a standing position, being struck by another passenger, being struck by other items or a combination of these. Seat restraints are not provided for transit buses, nor are they required by regulations.

1.4 Weather

At the time of the accident, it was sunny with clear visibility and the temperature was 14°C. The sun was positioned about 70 degrees southeast of the crossing at an elevation of 21 degrees.

1.5 Emergency response

The City maintains an Emergency Management Plan, which is based on an all-hazard and multi-departmental approach. The plan is designed to be used by all City services during planned and unplanned events. Each City service has a function to fulfill under the plan. Each City service also develops its own supporting emergency plan and corresponding response capability.

The City services responded immediately and coordinated their activities in accordance with the established emergency plans. About 350 personnel representing over 30 City departments, federal agencies, VIA staff and sub-contractors attended the site.

Following the accident, the City activated its Emergency Operations Centre. At 0926, senior management at the City and the City Council were notified of the accident. They were also updated on response activities as the information became available. As the response continued, the Emergency Operations Centre received information reports from the Traffic Incident Management Group, the Paramedic Service Command Centre, the Police Service Mobile Command, and OC Transpo.

1.5.1 Ottawa Police Service

Starting at 0848, the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) and Emergency Medical Services received numerous 911 calls regarding a collision involving an OC Transpo double-decker bus and a VIA passenger train at the Transitway crossing, adjacent to Woodroffe Avenue, near Fallowfield Road. Callers indicated that there were a number of injuries and possible fatalities. The OPS immediately dispatched patrol officers and a duty inspector. The Ottawa Fire Services and Ottawa Paramedic Service were also immediately notified and dispatched.

At 0851, the first police patrol officer arrived on scene. Initially, police officers assisted with first aid, maintained the safety of responders and secured ingress and egress routes for emergency vehicles. As these initial priorities were addressed, other emergency responders arrived and were directed toward establishing police perimeters, directing traffic and locating witnesses. Close proximity to the scene was initially hindered by vehicles blocking access to the Transitway. The OPS subsequently removed vehicles to allow site access to paramedic vehicles.

At 0940, a unified command was established to coordinate the emergency responder activities at the site. At 0957, the OPS command post arrived. Formal situation report meetings were established and maintained for the duration of the event. The OPS controlled and preserved the site and surrounding area until the site activities were completed at 1330 on 20 September 2013. During the response, about 200 OPS officers attended to various site tasks.

1.5.2 Ottawa Fire Services

At 0855, the Ottawa Fire Services arrived on site and assumed Incident Command. A Mass Casualty Incident was declared. Information on the number of injured passengers was gathered and disseminated. The Incident Commander surveyed the bus and spoke with VIA personnel to assess the condition of the train passengers and crew. The train was confirmed to be stable and locked in place. Ottawa Fire Services crews were assigned to assist paramedics with triage and first aid. Additional personnel were deployed as they arrived. The Ottawa Fire Services had a total of 46 personnel on scene throughout the response.

1.5.3 Ottawa Paramedic Service

Twenty paramedic units (40 paramedics in total) were dispatched to the accident site. At 0856, the first paramedics arrived on site and immediately commenced with on-site triage, assessment, treatment and transport of patients.

The most severely injured bus passengers were triaged and rapidly transported to local hospitals that had been notified in advance of the potential for casualties. By 0920, the most seriously injured passengers were transported to hospital. By 1050, the casualties had been removed from the site and transported to area hospitals. Over the course of the response, the paramedics had assessed and transported 34 patients and identified 5 fatalities.

1.6 Subdivision and track information

Prior to 2010, VIA owned a portion of the Smiths Falls Subdivision. In 2010, VIA purchased the remainder of the Smiths Falls Subdivision from Canadian National (CN). Following the purchase, VIA completed extensive infrastructure upgrades, which included equipping all public crossings with automatic warning device (AWD) protection that included flashing light-emitting diode (LED) lights (upgraded from incandescent), bells, gates and constant warning time (CWT) track circuits. As VIA does not have its own maintenance forces, RailTerm and other contractors were sub-contracted to maintain its signal system and track infrastructure on the Smiths Falls Subdivision.

The VIA Smiths Falls Subdivision consists of a single main track that extends from Mile 0.0, located 6.0 miles (9.7 km) west of the VIA Ottawa Station, to Smiths Falls, Ontario (Mile 34.40). Train movements on the Smiths Falls Subdivision are governed by the centralized traffic control system, as authorized by the Transport Canada (TC)–approved Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR) and supervised and directed by a RailTerm rail traffic controller (RTC) located in Dorval, Quebec.

In the vicinity of the accident, there was a main track and a 2298-foot-long (700 m) siding, which is located just north of and parallel to the main track, between the Woodroffe Avenue (Mile 3.28) and the Transitway (Mile 3.30) crossings, and the Fallowfield Road (Mile 3.88) crossing. A number of VIA trains only traverse the Woodroffe Avenue/Transitway crossings as they either originate or terminate at the VIA Fallowfield Station. From Monday to Friday, up to 23 passenger trains and 2 freight trains operate over the Woodroffe Avenue/Transitway crossings each day. Similarly, up to 16 passenger trains and 2 freight trains operate over the Fallowfield Road crossing (Mile 3.88) each day (Appendix B).

The VIA Fallowfield Station (Mile 3.57) is located between the Transitway and Fallowfield Road crossings (Figure 6). This inter-city passenger railway station was built in 2002 to serve the developing Ottawa south community of Barrhaven. The station is a stop for all VIA trains operating between Montréal, Ottawa and Toronto. The station is located adjacent to the OC Transpo Fallowfield bus station and the Park & Ride terminal, which provides direct access to local transit connections.

Figure 6. Roadway and track layout in vicinity of VIA Fallowfield Station

In the vicinity of the accident, the track is Class 5 track as defined in the TC–approved Rules Respecting Track Safety (Track Safety Rules). The track is authorized for speeds up to 100 mph (160.9 km) for passenger trains. To accommodate regulatory requirements for crossing AWD protection activation time (20 seconds), VIA trains depart from the VIA Fallowfield Station at a speed of 10 to 15 mph (16.1 to 24.1 km/h) in both directions. While VIA trains arriving at the station are slowing to prepare for a stop at the station, these trains can enter the Woodroffe Avenue/Transitway crossings (westbound trains) and the Fallowfield Road crossing (eastbound trains) at speeds in the range of 40 to 50 mph (64.3 to 80.5 km/h).

The main track consisted of 115-pound RE continuous welded rail. The rails were laid on 14-inch double-shouldered tie plates secured to hardwood ties with 3 spikes per plate. The rail was box-anchored every tie. The cribs were full with crushed rock ballast and the drainage was good. The Transitway crossing was a concrete-panelled crossing.

The siding track was constructed with bolted 39-foot sections of 115-pound RE rail, laid on 11-inch double-shouldered tie plates and secured to hardwood ties with 3 spikes per plate. The rail was box-anchored every second tie. The cribs were full with crushed rock ballast and the drainage was good.

The tracks were visually inspected in accordance with regulatory and company requirements and were in good condition. The most recent track geometry test and ultrasonic rail test through the accident area had been conducted on the main track on 26 July 2013 and 14 August 2013 respectively, with no defects noted.

1.7 Recorded information

The locomotive was not equipped to record audio of in-cab conversations between crew members, nor was it required to be. There were no forward-facing or in-cab video recorders installed on the locomotive nor were there required to be. Neither the train crew nor the bus driver cell phones were in use at the time of the accident.

1.7.1 Locomotive event recorders

Part II, section 12, Event Recorders, of the TC–approved Railway Locomotive Inspection and Safety Rules requires that controlling locomotives be equipped with a crashworthy LER that meets specified minimum design criteria. Each LER records a minimum of 26 critical functions, which include, but are not limited to, date, time, train speed, distance travelled, throttle activation and position, air brake pipe pressure as well as the operation of all applicable brake systems.

For locomotives built prior to 01 January 2007, the rules require that an LER must record a minimum of 9 functions, which include, but are not limited to, time, distance, speed, brake pipe pressure, throttle position, emergency brake application, independent brake cylinder pressure, horn signal, and, where applicable, the reset safety control function. The LER on VIA 915, which was built in 2001, recorded 21 functions, including the required 9 functions.

Railway companies routinely use LER data in conjunction with operator proficiency testing to identify potential areas of improvement within the context of the company's safety management system (SMS).

A number of locomotives in the industry are also equipped with wireless communication technology that can transmit an LER download to a central location in real time. In the event of an emergency brake application, the information can be transmitted immediately for review. Similar technology could be adapted for the bus transit industry.

1.7.2 Crossing signal bungalows

The Woodroffe Avenue and the Transitway crossings each had their own control and monitoring circuitry, but the 2 crossings are linked to work in unison. As the clocks for each bungalow were independent, the recorded time stamps had to be manually synchronized between the 2 log files. The time stamp was synchronized to the Woodroffe Avenue crossing log, which was offset from the Transitway crossing log by about 2 seconds. Based on the known time of the collision, the signal logs were further synchronized to coincide with the LER timing.Footnote 10

The rate at which the warning lights were flashing, as well as the current being drawn by the lights, fell within the design range. At the time of the accident, the lights were activated by the system, were on and functioning normally. The crossing protection for both the Woodroffe Avenue and Transitway crossings operated as designed with no malfunctions. The bells and lights of the Woodroffe Avenue and Transitway crossings were activated about 49 seconds before VIA 51 arrived. All of the crossing gates had been fully horizontal for at least 26 seconds before the accident.

1.7.3 Synchronized summary of events

Table 1 shows a summary of the events that occurred between the time the train left the VIA Ottawa Station and came to rest following the accident. The events were recorded from the LER, crossing signal bungalow downloads, closed circuit television (CCTV) at the OC Transpo Fallowfield Station and the bus engine control module (ECM). All event times were normalized to coincide with the time log of the LER.

Table 1. Summary of events based on data from various recording devices Time* Event 0831:57 VIA 51 departed from the Ottawa Station. 0846:24 The bus arrived at the OC Transpo Fallowfield Station, south-side bus shelter.

Passengers exited the bus and other passengers entered the bus from the front and side doors. 0846:36 A passenger (cyclist) secured a bike on the bike rack at the front of the bus. 0846:53 The side door of the bus closed and passengers continued to board at the front door. 0847:13 The train was proceeding at 80 mph (128.7 km/h) approximately 1 mile (1.6 km) east of the crossings. The LE applied the locomotive dynamic brake and train service brakes and began to slow the train in preparation for the stop at the VIA Fallowfield Station. 0847:17 The bells and lights at the Woodroffe Avenue and Transitway crossings were activated about 49 seconds before VIA 51 arrived. 0847:22 The train had slowed to 75 mph (120.7 km/h) approximately ¾ of a mile (1.2 km) east of the crossings with the locomotive dynamic brake and train service brakes applied. 0847:27 The bus departed from the OC Transpo Fallowfield Station. 0847:40 The Transitway crossing gates were fully down about 26 seconds before VIA 51 arrived at the crossing. 0848:02 The bus was travelling at 42 mph (67.6 km/h) with throttle (gas pedal) on. 0848:03 The bus was travelling at 42 mph (67.6 km/h) with no throttle (gas pedal) on. 0848:04 The bus speed reduced to 35 mph (56.3 km/h) with no throttle on and the brakes applied.

The train was proceeding at 47 mph (75.6 km/h) with the locomotive dynamic brake and train service brakes applied. The LE activated the train emergency brakes and engine bell. 0848:05 The bus speed reduced to 25 mph (40.2 km/h) with no throttle on and the brakes applied.

While travelling at 46 mph (74.0 km/h), the train arrived at the Transitway crossing.

The bus struck the south crossing gate, initiating a broken gate alarm on the crossing signal log. 0848:06 The bus speed reduced to 5 mph (8.0 km/h) with no throttle on and the brakes applied. The bus collided with the south side of the train.

The train slowed to 43 mph (69.2 km/h). The electrical wiring for VIA 915 was severed and the LER stopped recording. * All times are synchronized with the time log of the locomotive event recorder

1.8 TSB accident re-enactment

A re-enactment of the accident was conducted on the Transitway on 28 September 2013. The re-enactment was documented by photographs and video utilizing OC Transpo ADL E500 double-decker bus 8016 and from the bus driver's position. The re-enactment was conducted at about the same time of day as the accident and under similar environmental conditions.

Timed runs and measurements were made with the bus travelling from the stop sign at OC Transpo Fallowfield Station up to and beyond the crossing on the Transitway (Figure 7 and Appendix C).

Figure 7. Locations of re-enactment measurements

The following observations were made during the re-enactment:

With the crossing gates inactive, it took between 35 and 40 seconds for the bus to travel from the stop sign to the crossing at the posted road speed of 60 km/h. While proceeding northward from OC Transpo Fallowfield Station on the Transitway, approaching and into the curve, there were trees and brush that obstructed Woodroffe Avenue and the crossing from view until the bus exited the curve and began to proceed directly toward the crossing. The height of the trees between the Transitway and the rail tracks varied from 43 feet to 46 feet (13 m to 14 m) above ground level near the VIA Fallowfield Station to 36 feet to 39 feet (11 m to 12 m) above ground level near the Transitway crossing. The foliage was about 24 feet (7.4 m) thick along the tree-line over a length of 387 feet (118 m). Advance warning of the crossing consisted of a sign along the northbound lane to indicate that there was a crossing ahead. There were no advance warning lights interconnected with the crossing AWDs to indicate that the crossing protection had activated and a train may be approaching. The Woodroffe Avenue crossing lights were first visible from the Transitway when the bus was 748 feet (228 m) from the Transitway crossing (Photo 9).

Photo 9. Crossing lights on Woodroffe Avenue were first visible when the bus was 748 feet (228 m) from the Transitway crossing (see location 2 on Figure 7)

The Woodroffe Avenue crossing lights were fully visible from the Transitway when the bus was 694 feet (211.5 m) from the Transitway crossing (Photo 10).

Photo 10. Crossing lights on Woodroffe Avenue were fully visible when the bus was 694 feet (211.5 m) from the Transitway crossing (see location 3 on Figure 7)

The crossing lights on Woodroffe Avenue and on the Transitway were fully visible when the bus was 402 feet (122.5 m) from the Transitway crossing (Photo 11).

Photo 11. Crossing lights on Woodroffe Avenue and on the Transitway were fully visible when the bus was 402 feet (122.5 m) from the Transitway crossing (see location 4 on Figure 7)

There were 2 road signs installed on the west side of the Transitway that obscured the driver's view of the crossing back lights (short) on the left side of the crossing at different times on the approach (Photo 12 and Photo 13).

Photo 12. Traffic sign obscuring back lights Photo 13. OC Transpo Fallowfield Station sign

From the driver's location stopped at the crossing, the bus window pillars and door structure obscured the driver's view of the train (Photo 14).

Photo 14. Wide angle view of approaching train from a bus stopped at the crossing

From inside the bus with the windows and doors closed and the bus idling, the locomotive's emergency horn was heard faintly as the train entered the Woodroffe Avenue crossing and was slightly louder as it entered the Transitway crossing. Brake simulation tests were performed to determine stopping distance, time required to stop, tire condition and road surface marks with full braking force applied (Table 2).

Table 2. Empty ADL E500 double-decker bus stopping distances recorded* Run Speed Stopping distance Time to stop

(seconds) Feet Metres Run 1 60 km/h 71' 3" 21.73 2.7 Run 2 50 km/h 57' 3" 17.47 2.4 Run 3 50 km/h 53' 5" 16.31 2.3 Run 4 40 km/h 33' 1" 10.09 1.8 * Calculations for stopping distances of a loaded bus were also carried out by the TSB Engineering Laboratory.

Rubber abrasion was evident and consistent around the circumference of each tire. Abrasion was more pronounced on the front tires. Repositioning of the bus between test runs provided sufficient driving to produce a clean tire surface for the next run. Tire skid marks were evident on the road surface after the brake tests.

Although the crossing LED lights were clearly visible to roadway vehicles on the Transitway, the LED lights facing southward for the Transitway were misaligned. For a road speed of 60 km/h (i.e. Transitway speed limit at the time of the accident), the short lights (back lights located on the north stanchion – L1 and L2 in Figure 8) should have been aimed at a location 50 feet (15.2 m) south of the northbound lane stop line at the crossing, at the driver position, 5.2 feet (1.6 m) above the road surface. The long lights (front lights located on the south stanchion – L3 and L4 in Figure 8) should have been aimed at a location about 280 feet (85.3 m) south of the northbound lane stop line. For the north-side back lights (short), the east light (L2) was aimed at 62 feet (18.9 m) on the northbound lane while the west light (L1) was aligned about 50 feet (15.2 m) to the east, 62 feet (18.9 m) from the south stop line.

For the south-side front lights (long), the west light (L3) was aligned properly at 280 feet (85.3 m) while the east light (L4) was aimed about 50 feet (15.2 m) to the west, 280 feet (85.3 m) from the south stop line (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Transitway crossing light layout and alignment

The larger road sign also obscured the driver's view of the south-side front lights (long) earlier on in the approach.

1.9 Grade crossing regulations in force at time of the accident

On 15 September 1980, the Canadian Transport Commission (CTC), pursuant to section 46 of the National Transportation Act and sections 198 and 200 of the Railway Act, revoked the Highway and Railway Crossing at Grade Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1184 made by General Order No. E-4, and implemented the Railway-Highway Crossing at Grade Regulations, C.T.C. 1980-8 RAIL. The Regulations applied to all crossings constructed after 14 January 1981. For crossings that were constructed prior to 1981, General Order No. E-4 applied. The 2 documents contained essentially the same requirements governing construction of railway crossings.

The original 2-lane Woodroffe Avenue and Fallowfield Road crossings were constructed in accordance with the regulatory requirements.

1.9.1 Highway Crossings Protective Devices Regulations

The Highway Crossings Protective Devices Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1183 stipulate that protective devices of the flashing light type installed by railway companies subject to the jurisdiction of the CTC shall comply with the specifications contained in the Regulations for protective devices of the flashing light type, and shall be maintained and tested in accordance with these Regulations. In particular, Part I of the Regulations sets forth criteria required for flashing light type protection (with or without gates) and states in part:

Electric light units shall conform to the A.A.R. [Association of American Railroads] Signal Section Specification No. 190, or the equivalent; the proper roundel within such specification shall be used as determined by local conditions. Electric light units shall be equipped with a lamp having a rating of at least 18 watts and operated within 10 per cent of rated voltage. [...] (1) Signals shall operate for not less than 20 seconds before the crossing is entered by a train at a speed in excess of 10 m.p.h.; [...] signals shall continue to operate until the train has cleared the crossing. [...] Where train speeds on a main track vary considerably, additional control circuits may be required with timing devices so arranged that a warning time [...] will be automatically adjusted. [...] (1) All highway crossing protective devices shall be maintained by the company to operate as intended and shall be tested as follows: for all crossings protected by flashing light signals and bells, or by flashing light signals, bells and gates, the tests shall be made at least once in each calendar week.

The original 2-lane, and subsequently upgraded 4-lane, Woodroffe Avenue and Fallowfield Road crossings were equipped as required.

1.10 Crossing design and draft RTD 10

TC's draft technical document, entitled Road/Railway Grade Crossings: Technical Standards and Inspection, Testing and Maintenance Requirements (RTD 10), issued in 2002, was developed with the intention of providing technical guidance for new grade crossing regulations. While the new regulations were being developed, RTD 10 was widely distributed and used as the de facto standard by TC, the rail industry and road authorities.

RTD 10 set forth guidance relating to the minimum safety criteria for the construction, alteration, maintenance, inspection and testing of grade crossings, and of their road approaches. In addition to RTD 10, road authorities typically consulted the Transportation Association of Canada (TAC) Geometric Design Guide for Canadian Roads.Footnote 11

RTD 10 also provided guidance for maintenance of other land adjoining the railway line that may contain features that could also affect the safety of the grade crossing. VIA had used the RTD 10 as its standard for constructing, testing and maintaining crossings on all its subdivisions, including the Smiths Falls Subdivision.

The RTD 10 guidance includes in part:

Section 3 - Grade Crossing Safety Assessments

3.1 A detailed safety assessment of a grade crossing shall include a review for compliance with the requirements of the Road Railway Grade Crossing Regulations, and an evaluation of all factors that may impact on the safety of the crossing.

Section 4 – Design Considerations

4.1 The design of a grade crossing and its approaches for vehicles depends significantly upon the design vehicle braking and acceleration characteristics, as well as the vehicle length. The design vehicle characteristics are very important, along with the road approach gradient and the length of the grade crossing clearance zone for determining safe stopping sight distances, sightline requirements along the rail line, and the advance warning time and gate descent time requirements of a grade crossing warning system. […] Stopping Sight Distance 4.4 Stopping sight distance is the sum of the distance travelled during perception and reaction time and braking distance. Braking distance is the distance that it takes to stop the vehicle once the brakes have been applied.

When braking, 2.5 seconds is generally accepted as a baseline for perception reaction time.

The recommended stopping sight distance (SSD) for a transit bus is the same as that for a large truck. RTD 10 values for a truck travelling at speeds between 40 km/h and 80 km/h (RTD 10 Table 4-5) are summarized in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Stopping sight distances for large trucks/buses Posted speed limit

km/h (mph) Stopping sight distance – truck class

metres (feet) 40 (24.9) 70 (229.7) 50 (31.1) 110 (360.9) 60 (37.3) 130 (426.5) 70 (43.5) 180 (590.6) 80 (49.7) 210 (689.0)

Vehicle Travel Distance 4.6 The total distance the design vehicle must travel to pass completely through the clearance distance [….] Departure Time – 'Design Vehicle' 4.7 […] It includes the time required for the driver to look in both directions along the rail line and to start the vehicle in motion, and to pass completely through the clearance distance.



The design vehicle departure time depends upon the clearance distance, the length of the design vehicle, and the vehicle acceleration. […] Determination of Design Vehicle Departure Time The design vehicle departure time (Tv) is given by the expression; Tv = J + T Where J = 2 seconds perception reaction time of the driver to look in both directions, shift gears if necessary, and prepare to start

T = the time for the design vehicle to travel completely through the clearance distance. T may be obtained through direct measurement of time required for the selected design vehicle to travel through the grade crossing clearance distance [...] at the grade crossing [....]

For example, a loaded tractor-trailer can take over 20 seconds to clear a crossing.

Section 7 – Road Geometry (Grade Crossing and Road Approaches)

7.6 A grade crossing where the maximum railway operating speed exceeds 15 mph shall be constructed as specified […] with the angle of intersection between the road and the track of: not less than 70 nor greater than 110 degrees without a grade crossing warning system; or not less than 45 nor greater than 135 degrees with a grade crossing warning system.

A grade crossing where the maximum railway operating speed exceeds 15 mph shall be constructed as specified […] with the angle of intersection between the road and the track of:

Section 8 - Sightlines

Sightlines for grade crossings with a grade crossing warning system 8.4 (a) Sightlines at grade crossings with a grade crossing warning system shall be provided in accordance with [RTD 10] Figure 8-2.

RTD 10 Figure 8-2 states the following:

Sightlines of a Railway Crossing Sign, and at least one set of front lights of the grade crossing warning system must not be obstructed within the SSD. Particular attention should be given to: trees, brush, other vegetation, pole lines, signs, bus shelters or other roadside installations; and parked vehicles, or buses loading or unloading passengers.

Section 13 – Flashing Light Units

Number and Location of Light Units […] 13.1 (b) Sufficient light units shall be provided in a grade crossing warning system and located to ensure that while a driver is approaching the grade crossing within the distances specified for the primary set of light units in [RTD 10] Table 19-1, or from a road intersection or a property access: flashing light units are located within, or as close as possible to, 5 degrees horizontally of the centreline of the road; and the approaching driver is within the effective distribution pattern of luminous intensity of a set of flashing light units;

Sufficient light units shall be provided in a grade crossing warning system and located to ensure that while a driver is approaching the grade crossing within the distances specified for the primary set of light units in [RTD 10] Table 19-1, or from a road intersection or a property access: (c) Sufficient back lights shall be provided in a grade crossing warning system and located to ensure that all drivers stopped at the grade crossing are within the effective distribution pattern of luminous intensity of a set of back lights.

Section 14 – Prepare to Stop at Railway Crossing Sign

14.1 A Prepare to Stop at Railway Crossing Sign as specified in the Traffic Control Devices Manual, shall be installed: on a road approach where at least one set of front light units on a warning signal or on a cantilever at the grade crossing cannot be seen clearly within the minimum distance specified in [RTD 10] Table 19-1; or on road approaches to a grade crossing on a freeway or an expressway, as defined in the Geometric Design Guide; or where adverse local environmental conditions which obscure grade crossing warning signal visibility frequently occur.

A Prepare to Stop at Railway Crossing Sign as specified in the Traffic Control Devices Manual, shall be installed: 14.2 The Prepare to Stop at Railway Crossing Sign shall provide warning:

during the time of the operation of the flashing lights of the grade crossing warning system; in advance of the operation of the flashing lights of the grade crossing warning system for the time required for a vehicle travelling at the maximum road operating speed to pass the Prepare to Stop at Railway Crossing Sign that is not activated and to: clear the grade crossing in advance of the arrival of all trains where there is a grade crossing warning system without gates; or clear the grade crossing before the start of the descent of the gate arms where there is a grade crossing warning system with gates; and following completion of the operation of the flashing lights of a grade crossing warning system for the time required for vehicles queued for the grade crossing to resume the maximum road operating speed on all roads that meet the criteria for a “freeway” or “expressway” classification in the Geometric Design Guide and on any other road approach where visibility at a safe stopping sight distance of vehicles queued for the grade crossing is restricted.

The Prepare to Stop at Railway Crossing Sign shall provide warning:

Section 19 – Bells, Gates and Flashing Light Units

Light Unit Alignment 19.4 The alignment point of the axes of the beams of sets of light units shall be appropriate for the conditions at each grade crossing. They shall be aligned for approaching drivers, taking into consideration the maximum road operating speed and the distance at which the light units first can be seen. Alignment Height - Front and Back Lights 19.5 Light units shall be aligned so that the axis of the light units pass through a point 1.6 m above the road surface at the required distance. Alignment Distance- Primary Front Light Units For Vehicles 19.6 (a) Grade crossing warning system light unit visibility distance is defined as the distance in advance of the stop line or vehicle stop position from which a set of light units must be continuously visible for various approach speeds.



Sets of primary front light units on the warning signal, and on a cantilever structure where provided, shall be aligned through the centre of the approaching traffic lane, or lanes, for which they are intended, at: the recommended distance, adjusted for gradient of the road, specified in [RTD 10] Table 19-1; or the point at which the light units are first clearly visible, if this point is less than the recommended distance specified in Table 19-1.

Grade crossing warning system light unit visibility distance is defined as the distance in advance of the stop line or vehicle stop position from which a set of light units must be continuously visible for various approach speeds. Sets of primary front light units on the warning signal, and on a cantilever structure where provided, shall be aligned through the centre of the approaching traffic lane, or lanes, for which they are intended, at:

Relevant speeds and distances from RTD 10 Table 19-1 are summarized in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Minimum front light alignment distance for heavy trucks (buses) Maximum road operating speed

km/h (mph) Minimum distance primary set of light units for heavy trucks

metres (feet) 50 (31.1) 110 (360.9) 60 (37.3) 130 (426.5) 70 (43.5) 180 (590.6) 80 (49.7) 210 (689.0)

Alignment - Back Lights 19.9 At least one set of back lights shall be aligned through the centre of the approaching lanes, or separate traffic lanes for which they are intended, 15 m (50 ft) in advance of the crossing warning signal on the opposite approach.

The back lights are intended to provide warning for vehicles stopped at the crossing.

Section 21 - Grade Crossing Warning Systems

21.2 Grade crossing warning systems shall be maintained, inspected and tested to ensure that they operate as intended.

Operation of crossing AWD protection is tested weekly. In addition, monthly inspections include checks for

light units with obvious misalignment and for physical damage;

cleanliness of light roundels;

standby power operating voltage; and

flashing light units, gates, and signs for operation, damage, cleanliness and visibility.

21.3 (a) [...] Local circumstances may require inspection and testing more frequently than the maximum intervals specified.

1.10.1 Crossing gates

Where 2 or more main tracks cross a section of highway or where there is heavy vehicular traffic, gate arms and gate mechanisms are commonly installed to supplement flashing lights. In these cases, the main purpose of installing gates is to discourage vehicular traffic from occupying the crossing after one train passes, if there is another train approaching on the second track.Footnote 12

Crossing gates are covered with alternating strips of highly reflective red/white coating supplemented by 3 small 4-inch-diameter flashing lights on the top of the gate. The light nearest the tip of the gate is lit steadily while the other 2 lights are located to suit local conditions and flash alternately in unison with the crossing signal lights. When positioning the lights on the gate arm, the rightmost light must be in line with the edge of the roadway and the centre light should be placed between the 2 outer lights.

Crossing gates are intended as a barrier to cars within the immediate vicinity of the crossing. The lights on the gate arm are intended to identify the position of the gate in situations where there is inadequate light (e.g. dusk). Crossing gates are not intended to be conspicuous from a distance as the crossing signal lights serve that function.

For crossings equipped only with flashing lights and bells (no gates), crossing accidents sometimes occur when a trailing vehicle inadvertently follows another vehicle onto a crossing while the flashing lights and bells are activated. When these types of accidents occur, the crossing AWDs are often upgraded to include gates.Footnote 13 Gate deployment also minimizes the potential of a trailing vehicle entering the crossing when following another vehicle.

1.11 New grade crossing regulations

TC had been developing new grade crossing regulations for over 20 years. At the time of the accident, the new regulations were in the draft stage, but have since come into force on 27 November 2014. The previous Railway-Highway Crossing at Grade Regulations and the Highway Crossings Protective Devices Regulations have since been repealed.

The new regulations define a grade crossing as a road crossing at grade, or 2 or more road crossings at grade where the lines of railway are not separated by more than 30 m. The new Grade Crossings Regulations (GCR) and the accompanying Grade Crossings Standards technical manual provide more detail on crossing design, testing and maintenance as compared to the regulations in place at the time of the accident. While many of the RTD 10 requirements were incorporated into the new Grade Crossings Standards, the requirement to conduct detailed safety assessments of level crossings every 5 years was removed.

Part C, section 9, Warning Systems Specification, of the new Grade Crossings Standards states in part

9.1 The specifications for a public grade crossing at which a warning system without gates is required are as follows: where the forecast cross-product Footnote 14 is 2,000 or more; [...]

[...] 9.2 The specifications for a public grade crossing at which a warning system with gates is required are as follows: 9.2.1 a warning system is required under article 9.1 and; the forecast cross-product is 50,000 or more [....]



The new GCR and accompanying Grade Crossings Standards technical manual only apply to level cros2.sings. While the GCR set forth criteria for when a grade crossing cannot be built, TC has no guidance as to when construction of a grade separationFootnote 15 should be considered.

1.12 Regulatory overview

Crossing safety is a responsibility shared by the public, TC, the infrastructure owner (railway) and the road authority.Footnote 16 Responsibilities under the Railway Safety Act include the following:

TC is responsible for oversight of railway crossings under federal jurisdiction, which includes the following activities: promote compliance with railway safety requirements developed under the authority of the Railway Safety Act and related regulations, rules, engineering standards as well as encourage adoption of guidelines and best practices; monitor for compliance and safety through its national and regional oversight inspection programs for the crossings and signals functions; and enforce non-compliances and mitigate threats to safety with respect to railway operations.

Railways are responsible for maintaining crossing infrastructure and sightlines along the railway right-of-way (ROW).

Road authorities are responsible for traffic control devices (traffic lights, road signs, etc.), maintenance of roadway approaches up to the railway ROW, sightlines on civic property, and ensuring that there is adequate SSD for vehicles approaching the crossing, based on road geometry.

When a crossing is constructed or significantly upgraded, there is usually an agreement among the parties involved to share costs.

1.12.1 Risk assessment tool for grade crossings

TC uses the GradeX risk assessment tool to identify risk levels for the approximately 15 000 public and 9000 private level crossings in Canada. This risk ranking system can vary by region and is based on a mathematical model developed by the University of Waterloo in 2001.

Through GradeX, a series of crossing parameters are input into the system, a mathematical algorithm is applied, and the higher-risk locations are identified. The input parameters to GradeX include

train and vehicular traffic volume;

road and track posted speed;

track configuration;

sightline visibility and road approach configuration;

collision history; and

type of crossing and protection.

The resulting GradeX rankings may prompt an inspection, a referral to the Grade Crossing Improvement Program (GCIP), or both. While GradeX will rank level crossings based on risk, it does not specifically identify crossings that should be considered for grade separation.

1.12.2 Grade Crossing Improvement Program

The GCIP provides funds to upgrade and improve safety at selected federally regulated level crossings. In April 2013, the annual GCIP funding for Canada was 10.9 million dollars. The program funds up to 50% of eligible project costs to a maximum of 550 000 dollars per project.

TC uses the GradeX risk rankings to help determine which level crossings will receive funding. Eligible upgrades include

upgrade of passive crossing protection to include AWDs;

addition of gates or extra lights to existing AWD protection;

replacement of incandescent lights with LED lights;

interconnection of crossing signals to nearby roadway traffic signals;

modification of operating circuits within automated warning systems; and

improvement of existing roadway alignment and/or approach grades.

1.12.3 Grade separation

In 1989, the Government of Canada implemented a policy to no longer appropriate funds for grade separation projects pursuant to section 13 of the Railway Safety Act. Consequently, TC no longer provides funding for grade separation projects. Since 1989, railway companies and road authorities can apply for funding under Infrastructure Canada programs. For grade separations, road authorities are typically responsible for the planning of such installations as part of their road transportation network while the railways are involved in the detailed design of the structure to ensure safe railway operations. To assist in identifying potential grade separation projects in Canada, cross-product has always been one of the primary criteria used. Historically, a cross-product of 200 000 was the accepted benchmark used by TC and industry for a grade separation project to be considered. However, there is no record of when or why the 200 000 threshold was established.

TC records indicated that, for the approximately 15 000 public crossings across Canada, there are 43 level crossings protected by AWDs that have cross-products in excess of 400 000, and 15 of these have cross-products in excess of 600 000.

TC has no firm cross-product value that requires a grade separation to be built. In Canada, there are no regulations, standards or guidelines that identify when level crossings should be grade separated.

1.12.4 United States Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook

The United States Department of Transportation (DOT) Federal Highway Administration (FHA) Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook (2007) provides general information on rail crossings, including the characteristics of the crossing environment and the crossing users as well as physical and operational improvements that can be made to enhance crossing safety. The guidelines and improvements presented in the handbook have been accepted nationwide in the United States.

Chapter V of the handbook discusses methods for selecting crossing alternatives. Part A, Section 6 of this chapter, Grade Separation, states in part

Highway-rail grade crossings should be considered for grade separation across the railroad right of way whenever the cost of grade separation can be economically justified based on fully allocated life-cycle costs and one or more of the following conditions exist: The highway is a part of the designated National Highway System. The highway is otherwise designed to have partial controlled access. The posted highway speed exceeds 88 km/hr. (55 mph). AADT [average annual daily traffic] exceeds 50,000 in urban areas or 25,000 in rural areas. Maximum authorized train speed exceeds 161 km/hr. (100 mph). An average of 75 or more trains per day or 150 million gross tons per year. An average of 50 or more passenger trains per day in urban areas or 12 or more passenger trains per day in rural areas. Crossing exposure (the product of the number of trains per day and AADT) exceeds 500,000 in urban areas or 125,000 in rural areas; or Passenger train crossing exposure (the product of the number of passenger trains per day and AADT) exceeds 400,000 in urban areas or 100,000 in rural areas. The expected accident frequency for active devices with gates, as calculated by the U.S. DOT Accident Prediction Formula including five-year accident history, exceeds 0.2. Vehicle delay exceeds 30 vehicle hours per day. An engineering study indicates that the absence of a grade separation structure would result in the highway facility performing at a level of service below its intended minimum design level 10 percent or more of the time. Whenever a new grade separation is constructed, whether replacing an existing highway-rail grade crossing or otherwise, consideration should be given to the possibility of closing one or more adjacent grade crossings.

1.13 Grade crossing considerations at the City of Ottawa

In 1995, due to the planned and expected urban development in the area of what is now the south Ottawa suburb of Barrhaven, the city of Nepean, Ontario (prior to amalgamation with the City),Footnote 17 undertook 2 environmental assessments (EA). One EA was conducted for the southwest Transitway extension and the second was for the widening of Woodroffe Avenue and of Fallowfield Road from their 2-lane configuration to the present 4-lane configuration. At the time, the Smiths Falls Subdivision was owned by CN.

During the planning stage for Woodroffe Avenue, the Transitway, and Fallowfield Road, the need for grade separations was examined due to the expected population growth and the ongoing development of the road and Transitway system. In 1997, the southwest Transitway extension EA considered several alternative alignments. One proposal considered constructing the Transitway on the east side of Woodroffe Avenue, which would provide a longer, straighter approach to the crossing, but it was not recommended. This EA also included various grade separation options for Woodroffe Avenue, the Transitway, and Fallowfield Road.

During public consultation, there was local opposition to any roadway overpass proposal due primarily to the perceived adverse aesthetic, noise and environmental impacts on properties. Some of the farmland adjacent to the proposed projects was owned by the National Capital Commission (NCC). The NCC, which was also consulted, supported the public position and also preferred the underpass alternatives given that the views of the Greenbelt would be preserved, which was the NCC's primary planning interest in the matter. Once the underpass alternative was selected as the preferred option, the EAs only considered this option. Any future consideration for roadway overpass alternatives would have required reopening the EAs. Upon completion of the EA process, the EAs recommended the present alignment of the Transitway, which was later refined during the detail design phase.

1.13.1 Geotechnical studies

In 2001, the City contracted Delcan Corporation (Delcan) to manage the proposed grade separation projects for Woodroffe Avenue, the Transitway, and Fallowfield Road. Delcan sub-contracted Golder Associates Limited (Golder) for a number of geotechnical studies in order to establish preliminary engineering guidelines and construction considerations related to the geotechnical aspects of the projects. In late 2001, Golder conducted preliminary geotechnical testing at the 2 proposed underpass locations to determine the general soil and groundwater conditions.

A letter from CN to the City dated 08 May 2001, stated the following:

CN would not permit permanent at-grade crossings at Fallowfield Road and Woodroffe Avenue due to the projected rail - road cross product, which is in excess of 200,000, and the current and future safety concerns, which justify the need for grade separated structures. Further justification is provided by VIA Rail's plan to add two daily trains and increase train speed. In addition, train volumes are expected to increase with plans for future commuter service.

In July 2002, Golder conducted additional geotechnical testing to assess the hydrogeological properties of the bedrock, to estimate the pumping rates required to enable construction to take place, and to establish the potential impacts and design mitigation measures should they be required.

In October 2002, VIA completed construction of the VIA Fallowfield Station and commenced with passenger service at this location. Since that time, all VIA trains along this route stopped at the station. However, due to the signal circuitry in place at that time, the crossing protection on Woodroffe Avenue and Fallowfield Road, both of which were 2-lane roads at the time, remained activated while the trains were stopped.

In November and December 2002, Golder submitted 2 reports,Footnote 18, Footnote 19 indicating that the preferred design option at each location was to have a roadway underpass. This design option would involve significant open-cuts for the roadway, related storm sewers for drainage, utility relocation and temporary detours for both vehicular and train traffic during construction. The open-cuts would be about 8 m (26.2 feet) below the structures. The structures would be 105 m to 115 m (344.5 feet to 377.3 feet) long, supported by 4 piers and 2 abutments at Woodroffe Avenue and a the Transitway, and 3 piers and 2 abutments at Fallowfield Road.

In January 2003, Golder submitted another reportFootnote 20 summarizing the additional geotechnical testing performed in July 2002. The report indicated that the roadway underpass option would likely involve the pumping/recharging of large quantities of groundwater during construction and potentially throughout the life of the underpass. This option presented risks and significantly increased the cost of the projects from the original estimate of 40 million dollars to over 100 million dollars. The Golder report further indicated the following:

Once excavation of the permanently open-cut option is completed, the pumping would have to be maintained in order to prevent bottom heave and/or filling of the lower portion of the underpass.

Mitigation measures should be taken to reduce the effects of water depletion of the soils in the areas where buildings are present, due to the potential damage that could result from the consequent settlement.

The impacts of depressurization of the bedrock evaluated from the results of the pumping test and of the modelling are significant. The possible mitigating options and alternatives for grade separation included bedrock grouting and/or installation of recharge wells for temporary depressurization of the bedrock in conjunction with a watertight underpass structure; raising the grades related to the grade separation; and construction of a roadway overpass in conjunction with a potential lowering of the railway.

It should be possible to adapt the design of the pumping and recharging to the site and maintain adequate groundwater conditions.

For a raised roadway underpass or a lowered railway grade option, any grade raise over 2 m (6.6 feet) required the use of lightweight fill to prevent overloading the grey clay on site.

A roadway overpass could be considered provided that lightweight fill would be used to construct the 9.2 m-high (30.2 feet) embankment approaches.

In February 2003, Golder further indicatedFootnote 21 that, with the open-cut underpass option, if a pumping interruption should occur at the site, the water table would rise rapidly in the bedrock and would result in slope instability and/or bottom heave of the road in the lower portion of the cut, which would also fill with water. Slope instability and bottom heave would begin to occur within minutes of the interruption.

Following the Golder comments, Delcan indicatedFootnote 22 to the City that, because significant groundwater dewatering was required during the construction stage, if a pumping interruption was to occur, the risks could be potentially catastrophic and could include

loss of all infrastructure constructed up to the time of a pumping interruption causing the slope instability and/or bottom heave;

loss of utilities in the side slopes (water mains, gas main, hydro lines);

loss of the rail line;

loss of the roadway detours;

loss of residential and commercial property south of Fallowfield Road; and

potential loss of life.

Due to the risks identified, it was recommended that the open-cut option should not be pursued and that it was necessary to consider other alternatives.

1.13.2 Other alternative options

A number of roadway overpass alternatives were initially considered. Roadway overpasses could have been constructed using light approach fills and multiple bridge spans. However, the previous public and NCC consultation identified the preferred option to be a roadway underpass. Consequently, the EAs did not consider overpass alternatives. The time required to reopen the EAs to reconsider roadway overpass options would have made completion of the projects within the time constraints imposed through the Government of Canada Millennium project funding (end of March 2006) difficult. This would likely have resulted in the loss of the Millennium funding, which accounted for approximately 70% of the original estimated project cost. The additional costs associated with the remaining grade separation options, the potential loss of the Millennium funding and the position of both the public and NCC related to any roadway overpass alternative limited the options considered by the City in 2004.

In January 2004, after considering the projected increase in the cost of grade separation for Woodroffe Avenue, the Transitway, and Fallowfield Road, and since passenger trains at this location were now slowing down to stop at the VIA Fallowfield Station, the City and CN agreed to reconsider the level grade crossing options. Subsequently, the City contracted Jock Valley Engineering Limited (Jock Valley) to conduct a detailed safety assessment (DSA) for level crossing upgrades in consideration of the proposed widening of Woodroffe Avenue and the construction of the Transitway.Footnote 23 Jock Valley was also contracted to conduct a DSA for the proposed widening of Fallowfield Road and construction of the southwest Transitway extension.Footnote 24

On 20 June 2004, VIA sent a letter to the City of Ottawa regarding the proposed changes to Woodroffe Avenue and Fallowfield Road level crossings. VIA acknowledged that, at that time, CN was the owner of the rail infrastructure and, as such, had full control over the proposed expansion of the affected level crossings. However, as the maintainer and primary user of the crossings at the time, VIA had some safety-related concerns as summarized below:

The Woodroffe Avenue crossing will basically triple in size from the original configuration (from 2 to 6 traffic lanes), which would increase the exposure of public road users to rail traffic at this point.

The Fallowfield Road crossing, combined with the proposed new extension of the OC Transpo Transitway in close vicinity to the level crossing, would increase the complexity of the level crossing.

The addition of dedicated cycle paths and recreational walkways outside the confines of crossing warning gates could put users at risk.

The Woodroffe Avenue and Fallowfield Road AADTs at the time were 22 000 and 20 000 vehicles respectively. This will likely increase as the population grows, which will also increase the risk exposure at both crossings.

VIA also indicated that the expansion of the level crossings would place additional ongoing operational constraints on the railway as summarized below:

All trains will be required to stop at the VIA Fallowfield Station.

The Transitway would run adjacent to the Fallowfield Road level crossing and required the pre-emption of the related traffic signals. As a result, all westbound VIA trains would incur a delay departing from the VIA Fallowfield Station.

The proposed number of traffic lanes and the anticipated AADT at each of the crossings will eliminate any opportunity for the expansion of passenger rail service (i.e. installation of double track through this area) without first replacing the crossings with grade separations.

VIA also asked the following questions:

Has any consideration been given to having the road pass over the railway? Would it be feasible to construct only 1 of the 2 grade separations (i.e. Woodroffe Avenue or Fallowfield Road) with the second to be completed in the future? Would it be feasible to reroute Fallowfield Road along the north side of the CN ROW on the existing NCC vacant lands such that the Fallowfield Road level crossing could be eliminated?

On 22 July 2004, the City responded to VIA's letter and provided answers to VIA's questions as summarized below:

Multiple overpass scenarios were investigated during the preliminary engineering phase of the project.



In each case, it was recognized that overpass alternatives would require reopening both the southwest Transitway extension and the Fallowfield Road EAs undertaken earlier and subsequently approved by the City of Ottawa and the Ontario Ministry of the Environment. The public input that had been received as part of both EAs indicated widespread and vigorous opposition by the residents to any overpass alternative due to the adverse aesthetic, noise and other environmental impacts on their properties. The farmland adjacent to the project is owned by the NCC, which was similarly opposed with a clear preference for the underpass alternatives.



Therefore, the excessive cost of an overpass structure in conjunction with the loss of Millennium-funded subsidy and the opposition of both the public and NCC effectively eliminated the overpass options. The surficial soils in the area have very limited load-bearing capacity. Either structure, including utility, road and rail detours, storm water requirements and outlets as well as ongoing pumping requirements, far exceeded the available budget. Multiple alternative geometric configurations were investigated to see if there were other less conventional alternatives that could reduce costs but still operate effectively. However, the alternative alignments would have been subject to EAs, again resulting in lost subsidy. Furthermore, it was inevitable that they would undergo opposition from both the public and NCC.

The end result was that the City proceeded with its preferred option of expanding the level crossings for Woodroffe Avenue, the Transitway, and Fallowfield Road.

On 25 August 2004, an update on the Woodroffe Avenue, Transitway and Fallowfield Road grade separation projects was provided to City Council.Footnote 25 It was recommended that the open-cut underpass option be abandoned. It was further recommended to transfer the 2004 spending authority, the pre-commitment of the 2005 capital budget, and the associated Millennium-funded subsidy from the Woodroffe Avenue, Transitway and Fallowfield Road grade separation projects to a number of other projects throughout the City. This left the grade crossing issues related to the widening of Woodroffe Avenue and Fallowfield Road unresolved. The City had indicated that the construction of grade separation for Woodroffe Avenue, the Transitway, and Fallowfield Road was not possible due to geotechnical issues.

1.13.3 Woodroffe Avenue and Transitway detailed safety assessments - 2004

The final report for the Woodroffe Avenue and Transitway DSA was submitted to the City on 28 October 2004. The report noted that Barrhaven had experienced tremendous growth and was expected to reach a population of 105 000 by 2021. Road and transit facilities had to be expanded in order to serve the public.

The DSA had been conducted using the draft Canadian Road/Railway Grade Crossing Detailed Safety Assessment Field Guide. This guide had been produced in conjunction with RTD 10 dated 24 October 2002. The DSA was based on the proposal to widen Woodroffe Avenue from a 2-lane road to a 4–lane road and to construct a new north-south 2-lane bus Transitway running parallel to and just west of Woodroffe Avenue. In conjunction with the project, new level grade crossings would have to be constructed for Woodroffe Avenue and the Transitway.

The DSA indicated the following:

Rail traffic at this location consisted of 5 passenger trains and 1 freight train in each direction for a total of 12 trains per day. While no increase in the number of freight trains was foreseen, the number of passenger trains could increase by 2 trains in each direction within the foreseeable future for a forecasted total traffic of 16 trains per day.

The City conducted a traffic survey at the Woodroffe Avenue crossing in May 2004. At the time, daily roadway traffic was approximately 21 000 vehicles. Using a growth factor of 2.8%, the traffic volume on Woodroffe Avenue was predicted to increase to about 24 000 vehicles by 2009.

Prior to any construction or alteration of the original crossings, all passenger trains stopped at the VIA Fallowfield Station. However, freight trains were not required to stop. The maximum speed on this section of track was 60 mph (96.6 km/h) for freight trains and 95 mph (152.9 km/h) for passenger trains. A temporary speed restriction of 20 mph (32.2 km/h) was put in place for all trains to eliminate unnecessary operation of the crossing signals at the Woodroffe Avenue and Fallowfield Road crossings. This speed restriction remained in place until 2010.

The design of the proposed crossing circuit was based on the assumption that all passenger trains would continue to stop at the VIA Fallowfield Station. When trains were ready to depart, the locomotive engineer would activate the crossing warning system from the cab of the locomotive using a radio code transmitted on channel 1 of the locomotive radio. When the desired warning time had elapsed, the locomotive engineer would receive a signal (white strobe light) to indicate that the crossing warning system had been activated and that it was safe to proceed.

To ensure that the crossing warning system would not be activated by movements stopping at the VIA Fallowfield Station, the CWT for the eastward approach to Woodroffe Avenue was extended to the edge of the VIA Fallowfield Station platform. This extension would also provide the required warning time to allow through freight movements at a maximum speed of 20 mph (32.2 km/h).

Passenger trains would continue to approach the Woodroffe Avenue crossing from the east at 95 mph (152.9 km/h), but would enter the crossing at a substantially slower speed as they were required to stop at the VIA Fallowfield Station.

All crossing surfaces would be constructed in accordance with the requirements of section 6 of RTD 10 and would be designed in consultation with CN.

The horizontal alignment of Woodroffe Avenue was within the safe SSD as the road was straight in both directions with the exception of slight lane shifts to accommodate the introduction of a median in the vicinity of the crossing.

The design speed for this section of Woodroffe Avenue was 100 km/h (62.1 mph) with a posted speed limit of 80 km/h (49.7 mph).

The horizontal alignment of the Transitway within the SSD was straight on the north approach with a slight shift to bring it closer to the road through the crossing. The south approach included a 250 m (820 feet) radius curve with a straight portion of about 20 m (66 feet) before the crossing. The design speed for the Transitway in the vicinity of the crossing was 80 km/h (49.7 mph) with a posted speed of 60 km/h (37.3 mph).

The maximum size vehicle to regularly use the Transitway was a 60-foot-long articulated bus (i.e. design vehicle). For a design speed of 80 km/h, the SSD for the design vehicle was 210 m (689 feet). For the posted speed limit of 60 km/h, the recommended SSD was 130 m (427 feet).

The vehicle travel distance for the Transitway was 46.6 m (153 feet).

The vehicle departure time for an articulated bus on the Transitway was 14 seconds, which was within the time provided by the grade crossing warning system.

For vehicles stopped at either the Woodroffe crossing or the Transitway crossing, the existing sightlines were adequate.

As the reconstructed crossings were to be designed to meet the requirements of section 16 of RTD 10, there was no necessity to continue train whistling during daylight hours once the crossings were reconstructed.

The DSA recommendations included the following:

The traffic signals at the entrance to OC Transpo‘s Fallowfield Station located 270 m (886 feet) south of the Woodroffe Avenue crossing must be removed. The intersection must be removed completely and the road in this area must be reconstructed to provide a smooth approach to the crossing.

The next DSA should be conducted in 5 years (2009/2010) unless required earlier by some other event.

The DSA concluded that the proposed crossing reconstruction would include a number of improvements over the existing crossing, including the following:

The introduction of a median would discourage motorists from driving around lowered crossing gates.

The problem of unnecessary operation of the crossing warning devices as a result of trains stopping at the VIA Fallowfield Station would be resolved.

The proposed widened crossing would have a high level of safety, exceeding that of the existing level crossing.

1.13.4 Fallowfield Road and Transitway detailed safety assessment – 2005

The final report for the Fallowfield Road and Transitway DSA was submitted to the City on 29 April 2005. The DSA contained much of the same background, rail traffic volume and operation information as outlined in the Woodroffe Avenue and Transitway DSA, and requirements for the crossing to be constructed in accordance with RTD 10.

The DSA was based on the proposal to widen Fallowfield Road from a 2-lane road to a 4–lane road and to construct a new north-south 2-lane bus Transitway running parallel to the rail line in the vicinity of Fallowfield Road. In conjunction with the project, a new level grade crossing would have to be constructed for Fallowfield Road.

The DSA indicated the following:

The proposed level grade crossing would be complex and would push the limit for normal design in a number of areas, including the close proximity of the Fallowfield Road/Transitway intersection, the crossing angle, traffic volumes and high driver workload. Subsequently, the City engaged Delphi-MRC to conduct a “road safety oriented” peer review of the preliminary crossing design. The peer review detailed the following: The design option for Fallowfield Road provided a workable solution to a difficult situation in which substantive constraints and impediments existed. The option provided a reasonable basis for handling anticipated train and traffic volumes, but would also require careful long-term management and monitoring. A number of formal recommendations and endorsements of actions were planned, but not clearly indicated in the preliminary drawings. A number of suggestions were made relating to the risk management of the ongoing maintenance and operation of the crossing. While these were not formally identified as recommendations, given the complexity of this crossing, the peer review recommended that they also be implemented. For example, the peer review strongly recommended investigating the potential for improving the various warning and traffic control measures associated with the crossing using the driver simulation laboratory at the University of Calgary.

The City conducted a traffic survey at the Fallowfield Road crossing in May 2004. At the time, daily roadway traffic comprised approximately 20 000 vehicles. Using a growth factor of 2.8%, the traffic volume on Fallowfield Road was predicted to increase to about 23 000 vehicles within 5 years (2009).

In the future, an intersection between Fallowfield Road and the southwest Transitway would be constructed immediately east of the proposed crossing. No turns to or from the Transitway would be permitted from Fallowfield Road.

The horizontal alignment of Fallowfield Road was within the SSD as the road was straight in both directions.

The maximum size vehicle permitted to operate on Ontario roads was a B-train double (BTD) otherwise known as a semi-tractor hauling 2 trailers. As BTDs hauling gasoline regularly used Fallowfield Road, a BTD with a length of 25 m (82 feet) was selected as the design vehicle.

Based on the Fallowfield Road design speed of 80 km/h, the SSD for trucks (and buses) was 210 m (689 feet). For the posted speed limit of 60 km/h, the recommended SSD was 130 m (427 feet).

The vehicle travel distance for the Fallowfield Road crossing was 57 m (187 feet).

The vehicle departure time for the design vehicle on the Fallowfield crossing was 17.5 seconds and was within the time provided by the grade crossing warning system.

For a vehicle stopped at the crossing, the existing sightlines were adequate.

The construction of the 4-lane section of Fallowfield Road over the crossing will reduce driver workload, particularly for the approach for eastbound traffic, which currently reduces from 2 lanes to 1 lane immediately west of the crossing.

The rail crossing was at an acute angle of 33 degrees, which was less than the minimum 45 degrees specified in RTD 10 for new construction. Options to realign Fallowfield Road to produce a more favourable angle were explored, but were deemed to be unfeasible. As a result of the crossing angle, the grade crossing clearance distance was greater than usual. The acute angle required motorists to look back over their right shoulders in order to view any trains approaching from behind and to the right.

The proposed Transitway intersection, adjacent to the crossing, would also be at an angle less than standard for new construction, resulting in a combined length of about 100 m (328 feet) for motorists to traverse both the Transitway and the crossing.

A single roadway stop line for the crossing, in conjunction with a traffic pre-signal interconnected with crossing AWDs, would reduce confusion for eastbound traffic. When a pre-signal is activated, westbound traffic and eastbound traffic would receive an amber traffic signal light followed by a red traffic signal with a minimum 13-second duration prior to the activation of the crossing AWDs. This redundancy would reduce driver workload as all vehicles would either be stopped or clear of the crossing when the crossing lights are activated.

The DSA recommendations included:

The risk management recommendations identified by the peer review relating to the ongoing monitoring and maintenance of the crossing should be implemented.

The next DSA should be conducted in 5 years (2009/2010) unless required earlier by some other event.

The DSA concluded that safety could not be guaranteed. However, if the recommendations contained in the peer review and the DSA were implemented, and the detailed design was carried out in accordance with RTD 10, the crossing would have a high level of safety.

1.13.5 Road and crossing construction

In May 2005, construction commenced for the Woodroffe Avenue twinning between Fallowfield Road and the Nepean Sportsplex, for the Transitway from the OC Transpo Fallowfield Station to the Nepean Sportsplex and for the Fallowfield Road twinning between Woodroffe Avenue and Greenbank Road. The road construction was conducted in accordance with City guidelines and the 1999 TAC Geometric Design Guide for Canadian Roads.

On 25 July 2005, the City contracted CN to install level grade crossings at Woodroffe Avenue (Mile 3.28), at the Transitway (Mile 3.30) and at Fallowfield Road (Mile 3.88). The crossing construction was conducted in accordance with the DSAs, RTD 10 and established railway engineering standards and practices. Construction of the crossings and the roadways was completed by December 2005.

The design speed for the straight portion of the Transitway was 90 km/h. The design speed for the curved portion of the Transitway just south of the crossing was 80 km/h. The curved portion of the Transitway was assigned a posted speed limit of 60 km/h. According to the TAC, the SSD for a bus (or truck) on a road with a design speed of 80 km/h is 210 m (689 feet) and 130 m (427 feet) for a design speed of 60 km/h.

1.13.6 Crossing positive guidance analysis

The City contracted Delphi-MRC in conjunction with the University of Calgary to conduct a crossing positive guidance analysisfor the Fallowfield Road railway crossing and southwest Transitway roadway crossing. A detailed evaluation of driver behaviour and performance using a driving simulator was conducted. The information and observations were used to develop a positive guidance plan for road users of the Transitway roadway crossing and the VIA railway crossing that traversed Fallowfield Road.

In January 2007, the Fallowfield Road at Grade Railway/Transitway Crossing Positive Guidance Analysis Final Report was submitted. The report contained a guidance plan for the placement of signs and warning devices to assist roadway users with safely negotiating the crossings. The City committed to implementing the recommendations. In July 2009, construction commenced on the Transitway and extended south from the OC Transpo Fallowfield Station. This construction was completed in April 2011.

1.13.7 Engineering Review of Smiths Falls Subdivision - October 2010

In 2010, after VIA purchased the Smiths Falls Subdivision from CN, it contracted AECOM to undertake an engineering review of the planned speed improvements on the VIA Smiths Falls Subdivision. The engineering review included DSAs for all crossings on the Smiths Falls Subdivision.Footnote 26

The review focused on safety, track, bridges, crossings, and signals. VIA had planned to increase passenger train speed up to 95–100 mph (153-161 km/h) wherever the infrastructure was found to be adequate. Where the infrastructure was not suitable for these speeds, the necessary next steps required to achieve the proposed speed increases were to be identified. The AECOM engineering review assessed each crossing to the RTD 10 standards and requirements. The DSAs for the Woodroffe Avenue, Transitway and Fallowfield Road crossings were completed by 11 September 2010. The results were generally similar to the DSAs conducted in 2004.

The AECOM report highlighted that the need for a grade separation is typically based on cross-product and that a cross-product greater than 200 000 generally warrants consideration for a grade separation. The report noted that

the Woodroffe Avenue crossing (Mile 3.28) had a cross-product of 236 599 (11 trains X 21 509 vehicles);

no vehicle data were available for the Transitway crossing (Mile 3.30); and

the Fallowfield Road crossing (Mile 3.88) had a cross-product of 166 111 (11 trains X 15 101 vehicles).

The report suggested that VIA re-evaluate the information for Woodroffe Avenue with the City to confirm the cross-product as it was in the range requiring grade separation, yet the crossing met TC requirements. The report also recommended that VIA approach the City regarding potential plans for grade separation for Woodroffe Avenue.

1.13.8 Pre- and post-opening audits for the Fallowfield Road railway crossing and the Transitway roadway crossing

The City contracted Delphi-MRC to conduct audits of the Fallowfield Road/Transitway in November 2011 (pre-opening) and June 2012 (post-opening).Footnote 27, Footnote 28 Both audit reports indicated that the Fallowfield Road/Transitway crossing was a very unusual crossing. The pre-opening audit identified a number of measures that had been put in place and concluded that additional items may be accommodated after the opening. The pre-opening audit report also indicated that, when risks exist, interim mitigating measures should be considered. The post-opening audit concluded that, while most of issues identified had been dealt with, a number of issues still remained. The report recommended that the outstanding issues be dealt with, and the City subsequently mitigated the issues.

1.13.9 Risk assessment for train speed at Woodroffe Avenue, Transitway, and Fallowfield Road crossings

In 2012, the City received notification from VIA that it intended to move from the designated and required low-speed train operations through the Woodroffe Avenue, Transitway and Fallowfield Road crossings to higher speed operations of up to 100 mph (160.9 km/h) for some of its trains. This increase in speed for some VIA trains represented a significant change in train operations at the crossings, raising concerns regarding the risk environment and the potential impact on safety at the crossings.

The City contracted Delphi-MRC to conduct a risk assessment for the increase in train speed.Footnote 29 The final report concluded in part:

The Fallowfield Road grade crossing was already an exceptional crossing as the cross-product exceeded the 200 000 threshold typically used to trigger an examination of grade separation. The ultimate decision to proceed with the grade crossing at this location had been obtained primarily as a result of the City's technical review based on the assumption that trains would either stop at the VIA Fallowfield Station or slow down to 10 mph (16 km/h) as they travelled through the station.

Planned growth in the Barrhaven area was expected to result in significant increases in traffic volume on Fallowfield Road. These forecasted traffic volumes would result in a cross-product that would be 2 to 3 times greater than the 200 000 threshold. This indicated that there would be a significant increase in risk at this level grade crossing.

The Fallowfield Road crossing was a key link in the active transportation network for Barrhaven. Field observations indicated that young children were regular users of this crossing, warranting particular concern. Undesirable pedestrian and cyclist behaviours had been observed during field reviews, raising concerns regarding the safety of the level grade crossing when high-speed rail operations are present.

1.13.10 Draft detailed safety assessment for the Fallowfield Road Crossing – 2013

In 2013, VIA commissioned a DSA for the Fallowfield Road crossing.Footnote 30 This was triggered by a proposal to operate express trains daily that would not stop at the VIA Fallowfield Station, with an associated increase in the maximum train speed to 100 mph (160.9 km/h) over the crossing. The draft DSA noted that a number of changes had taken place since the previous DSA (2005). These changes included the construction of a siding between the Woodroffe Avenue and Fallowfield Road crossings and an increase in the posted speed limit on Fallowfield Road from 60 km/h to 80 km/h.

The DSA indicated the following:

In March 2013, the City had conducted a traffic survey at the Fallowfield Road crossing. The results indicated that the AADT was 26 646. Using a 2.8% growth factor, the AADT on Fallowfield Road was predicted to 