I recently posted a commentary by Han-Yi Shaw, a scholar from Taiwan, arguing that Japan in effect stole the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands from China in 1895 as the spoils of war. I invited Japanese scholars to make the opposing case, and I am happy to post a response from Takayuki Nishi, a Project Assistant Professor at the Global Center for Asian and Regional Research at University of Shizuoka, in Shizuoka, Japan.. As always, I welcome your comments and feedback. – Nicholas Kristof



The People’s Republic of China’s claim that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are an “inherent territory” of China contradicts its own demands before 1970.

Before 1970, the People’s Republic of China did not merely acquiesce to Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China demanded self-determination for the U.S.-administered Ryukyu Islands, with an option of return to Japanese administration, while specifically including the “Senkaku Islands”. Thus, China agreed with the United States and Japan that, in the event of the Ryukyu Islands’ return to Japanese administration, the United States should also return the Senkaku Islands to Japan.



The common law doctrine of estoppel prevents a party from gaining by making an allegation or denial that contradicts what the party has previously stated as a fact.

According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, if Japan and China ever agree to refer China’s claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to the Court, the Court shall either apply the following four standards, or if the parties agree thereto, ignore them and decide the case ex aequo et bono (i.e., according to what is right and good, rather than according to the law):

a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;

b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

The Court has applied the general principle of estoppel in a number of cases, including disputes over islands.

Thus, the most important evidence for judging China’s claim legally is China’s demand before 1970 for self-determination of the U.S.-administered Ryukyu Islands, specifically including the “Senkaku Islands,” with an option of return to Japanese administration.

For instance, the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, published an article titled “The Struggle of the People of the Ryukyu Islands against U.S. Occupation” (Liuqiu Qundao renmin fandui Meiguo zhanling douzheng) on January 8, 1953. It was published in the “Documents” (ziliao) section, which is usually edited carefully to give the party line. The whole article is posted in simplified characters here. An image of the first half of the article is here.

The first sentence defines the Ryukyu Islands:

The Ryukyu Islands lie scattered in the sea to the northeast of our country’s Taiwan and southwest of Japan’s Kyushu Island, and includes seven groups of islands, namely Senkaku Islands [Jiange Zhudao], Sakishima Islands, Daito Islands, Okinawa Islands, Oshima Islands, Tokara Islands, and Osumi Islands, each with large and small islands; more than fifty islands have names and more than four hundred are unnamed and small; their land area totals 4670 square kilometers.

Self-determination for the Ryukyu Islands, with return to Japanese administration as an option, is demanded in the final sentence (and elsewhere):

The Ryukyu people’s struggle against transformation of Ryukyu by the United States into a military base, against enslavement by the United States, and for freedom, liberation, and peace is not isolated; it is inseparable from the Japanese people’s struggle for independence, democracy, and peace; it is inseparable from the struggle of Asian and Pacific peoples and the peoples of all countries of the world to defend peace; therefore, despite the ongoing barbaric repression of the Ryukyu people by the U.S. occupiers, final victory belongs inevitably to the Ryukyu people.

In short, China demanded the U.S.-administered “Senkaku Islands” outcomes other than transfer to China, even while fiercely fighting U.S. armed forces in Korea, which were supported from Okinawa and mainland Japan. This Chinese demand cannot be explained away as a result of ignorance about the islands’ situation.

I do not evaluate here Mr. Han-yi Shaw’s selection and interpretation of documents from the nineteenth century and before, because they are irrelevant to the estoppel over the most recently recognized border.

However, for the sake of argument, if Mr. Shaw’s interpretation were entirely correct, then the People’s Republic of China (and less explicitly, the Republic of China on Taiwan) has legally disowned the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by mistake, through sheer lack of interest in the islands before 1970.

Takayuki Nishi is a Project Assistant Professor at the Global Center for Asian and Regional Research at University of Shizuoka, in Shizuoka, Japan.

Update: Han-yi Shaw has responded to Mr. Nishi and other commenters in the comment linked here.