By any metric, North Korea’s People’s Liberation Army is far overmatched by the armed forces of South Korea. The Kim regime, however, may not share that assessment. Frequently, North Koreans refer to the “indomitable spirit” of their people, and celebrate in story and song mythicized triumphs where they were outnumbered and outgunned and yet ultimately successful in overcoming the odds. Their propagandists have explained away South Korea’s forces as a creature and creation of the United States, much as North Vietnam believed South Vietnam to be a mere shell. They also insist that South Koreans chafe under the influence of foreigners and want America gone. North Korean forces are not configured for territorial defense. They are right up at the border, poised to fulfill a mission of unification.

Comical as it may appear, there’s a purpose to all these theatrics: the North Koreans want to reduce the exercises in scope and content. It would be the first step is weakening the relationship between the South Korean and U.S. militaries.

Successfully dissuading Kim from his nuclear ambitions will obviously be a challenge; some analysts have even argued it is an impossible task. After all, so the argument goes, what on earth can be a powerful enough inducement to give up his weapons? That the nuclear-aspirant former dictators of Libya and Iraq are now long gone offers a compelling reason for him never to do so. Moreover, North Korea is much further along than these technology-challenged countries ever were, making its hypothetical denuclearization an enormous concession no matter the terms.

Interestingly, those who advocated “strategic patience” during the Obama administration now seem among the first to suggest that the time for a zero option on the Korean peninsula is long-since past, and the Washington must shift to “containment” and an acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status. In fact, the United States must do everything possible to prevent North Korea’s acquisition of a deliverable nuclear weapon. It is a race against time now: Since Donald Trump took office, North Korea has tested a hydrogen weapon and more missiles than ever before and also claims to have perfected miniaturization, a key part of making a nuclear device into a nuclear warhead.

It is often said that there are no good options. In fact, there are several that can only work if they are all part of an integrated strategy.

No lone element of a strategy can work on its own, and that goes for sanctions. But it is impossible to conceive of a successful strategy that does not include across-the-board sanctions of the kind recently implemented by the Security Council. These will directly stymie North Korea’s trade in areas where it hurts the most: coal exports and gasoline imports. Vigorous enforcement—especially by China—will tell the tale of whether they intend to be effective partners in containing North Korea.