Populists tend to ask the right questions. They raise legitimate issues about the economic and social fallout of globalization, and thrive on demands for political accountability. In Greece, they asked what brought the country to its current predicament, how corruption flourished, and why the economic medicine administered to cure its economic ailments appeared only to spread the contagion. Mainstream parties had failed to prevent the crisis; once it erupted, they could not manage its social impact.

But while the populists were right to blame the establishment, they had no solutions. While in the opposition, they peddled empty slogans and old-fashioned economic ideas, rejected necessary reforms, and argued that they could force Greece’s creditors to fund their policies. That makes for good opposition policy. But when the populists win, they must deliver. In Greece, the populists not only couldn’t deliver on their promises—they delivered the opposite of what they’d promised: even more austerity. Protracted negotiations between the Greek government and its European creditors failed to produce the breakthrough that SYRIZA had promised. In fact, they further damaged the Greek economy and killed the nascent recovery. The renewed fear of Grexit sparked a mass deposit flight from Greek banks, bringing the economy to its knees.

Even then, the populists refused to recognize what was possible, choosing instead to double down on their mistakes. In July 2015, they announced a referendum, asking the electorate to reject the deal on the table, which entailed the continuation of fiscal adjustment and structural reforms. They argued that such an outcome would strengthen their hand and lead to a better outcome. But they were wrong, ending up with a worse outcome that necessitated even more austerity.

In Greece, many experts were appalled by the government’s call for a referendum on the deal, which they viewed as a dangerous gamble. In fact, Greece’s top economists advised against rejecting the deal. But their warnings went unheard. Facts did not matter; only emotions. With banks closed and capital controls in place, voters followed the populists, defiantly rejecting the deal. Faced with no realistic options, the populists then executed a complete U-turn, accepting a deal even worse than the one that had been rejected, but suddenly necessitated by the damage their tactics had inflicted on the economy. The estimated price tag of their policy error? A staggering 86 billion euros. The populist governed reacted to this failure by doing what all populists do: sow division and polarization, a strategy it honed while in opposition, and painting its opponents as puppets in the hands of foreign patrons, thus appealing to deep-seated nationalist feelings.

The abysmal incompetence of populists leads to the mistaken belief that their rule will end quickly. Although SYRIZA’s deafening failure looked certain to spell its political death, Tsipras engineered a snap election in September 2015, which he won easily. It was just too early for the stunned electorate to admit its mistake and turn back to the discredited mainstream parties. Through its complacency towards populist parties, the opposition placed itself at a marked disadvantage. By assuming that the populists’ inability to deliver on their promises would doom them, it ultimately helped them remain in power.