When one considers the discourse surrounding neoliberalism, it seems that the commentary revolves almost exclusively around the virtues and vices of neoliberal economic policy. Proponents of neoliberal economic policy exalt the innovation and economic growth that markets have brought domestic consumers. Neoliberals also praise the reduction of poverty and boost to economic development which a free(ish) movement of goods, people, ideas, and capital has brought about.

Meanwhile, those on the other side of the argument focus on the increasing global wealth inequality we are experiencing, the accelerating concentration of economic and political power within unprecedentedly large multinational corporations, or the degradation of culture and norms that liberal economics supposedly encourages.

Whilst this philosophical debate on neoliberal economics has become the defining theoretical and policy nucleus by which the movement revolves, it is important to stress that a normative economic theory alone — whilst important — can not make for a totalizing theory of neoliberalism.

The lack of a unifying theory is damaging because it leaves open questions of whether it is neoliberal or not to support sanctions on Russia, or to support the Iran Deal, or militarily intervene to protect lives in humanitarian crises.

This creates issues when trying to generate strong neoliberal principles on issues that are not strictly economic in nature, and has created a level of debate within and outside of the community about what neoliberalism stands for aside from market-led, global economic growth.

Specifically, the question of what a neoliberal foreign policy would be – or whether a unified theory of foreign policy under the neoliberal mantel could exist – is becoming an important question for those examining what neoliberalism can offer, and represents the problem this theoretical void poses for the longevity and broad appeal of the movement.

The lack of a unifying theory is damaging because it leaves open questions of whether it is neoliberal or not to support sanctions on Russia, or to support the Iran Deal, or militarily intervene to protect lives in humanitarian crises. This stops successful advocacy for foreign policy goals of any kind — effectively ring-fencing the movement outside of those important debates and potentially stifling important progress therein.

Unfortunately, there has not yet been an attempt within the movement to construct a unified and theoretically consistent foreign policy agenda out of the fundamental principles of neoliberalism. For the reasons outlined above, this is an uncomfortable state of affairs that needs remedy.

The tenets of neoliberal foreign policy

In exploring what such a policy would look like, one must first define the fundamental tenets of neoliberalism itself — its animating assumptions and goals — before then refashioning those assumptions into a cogent set of foreign policy objectives. If these two things are not consistent with each other, it would not make sense to call the foreign policy manifesto generated ‘neoliberal’ in any meaningful way.

Firstly, the foreign policy objectives must be compatible with the idea of moral egalitarianism: the belief that all people are born equal, and have equal moral worth. This idea makes the wellbeing of people from other nations, races, and creeds important to our moral calculations, and is the main reason why neoliberals are so concerned with reducing suffering abroad, and why the poverty-reducing force of global markets is such a coveted feature of them.

Secondly, this egalitarian commitment must operate in tandem with a distinct liberal cosmopolitanism: the belief that the moral sanctity of individual liberty is universally true. These principles together generate a strong moral responsibility for us to globally uphold and defend liberal rights: association, speech, conscience, religion, and so on. As a result, any neoliberal foreign policy must have at its heart a strong commitment to protecting human rights and alleviating human suffering that transcends borders, be this through foreign aid, trade deals, military intervention, etc. This core commitment immediately sets a neoliberal foreign policy apart from the isolationism of the libertarian, as well as the narrow self-interest of the nationalist.

Thirdly, neoliberal foreign policy must adhere to a consequentialist ethic: the belief that outcomes matter more than processes. This is what creates a tendency for neoliberalism to be pragmatic and technocratic. If the most effective way of achieving gains for people is to let experts make all the decisions, that is fine so long as the consequences are beneficial — with ‘beneficial’ defined as upholding rights and reducing human suffering. From this, a neoliberal foreign policy would be largely technocratic and results-driven. It would put faith in experts to develop policies well-supported by evidence that work towards promoting global welfare, defending liberal values, and protecting individual rights from violation. If this calls for sanctions, savvy diplomacy, or military intervention, it does not matter: it will be down to the experts to decide.

Fourthly and finally, the policy agenda must be compatible with the belief that formal institutions are uniquely important for coordinating the fundamentally self-interested nature of human beings, and, by extension, nation-states. This point ties in with the point on technocracy above, but I believe it also goes deeper than that. Liberal theory conceptualizes institutions as the privileged vehicle by which autonomous and self-interested individuals can achieve gains above and beyond their own efforts : the animating premise of all social contract theories. The institution is thereby lauded for changing the rational calculations of human beings through (dis)incentives that transform the naturally fragmented and mutually harmful self-interested actions of people into a harmonious order of overlapping and mutually beneficial interests. On the foreign policy level, this belief feeds through into a strong preference for a rules-based order governed by international law, norms, and formal treaty; through institutions, the anarchic nature of international relations will be turned into a regulated system governed by rules, disincentives, and mutual cooperation. This makes sanctions for bad actors paramount, and collective action through multilateral institutions such as the UN and the EU will be the privileged path by which all foreign policy goals will be pursued.

Compassionate foreign policy

When considered all together, these different tenets create an interesting picture, and they show that a unified theory of neoliberal foreign policy is necessarily compassionate, cooperative, interventionist, institution-centric, technocratic, and pragmatic. It is also clearly distinct in its nature and goals to the libertarian and nationalist schools of foreign policy, which advocate for complete abstention and amoral self-interest, respectively.

Whilst it is too early to say that the economic debates around neoliberalism will become less important to the movement as a whole in the near future, it is clear that a unified vision of a quintessentially neoliberal foreign policy is possible and desirable. Furthermore, by embracing its fundamental principles of justice without borders, moral equality, pragmatism, and a belief in institutions, the movement will be better able to campaign for what is important — making the world better as a result.