First, none of the 279 AIS profiles transmitted an International Maritime Organization (IMO) number—a permanent identification number assigned to every ship with few exceptions. Participation in the IMO number system requires submission of the vessel’s basic ownership and management information to an IMO-designated entity. Without an IMO number, the identities of the individuals and entities involved are obscured. The lack of transparency limits the ability of investigators to map the network back onto shore, where they are more vulnerable to law enforcement.

Second, the AIS profiles transmitted identifiers associated with Chinese registration, ownership, or management. We assessed that over 97 percent of the Haeju vessels reported a romanized Chinese name and over 96 percent transmitted a maritime mobile service identity (MMSI) number corresponding to a China flag registration. While it is not unusual for ships to change names and MMSI numbers, it is significant that the overwhelming majority of the Haeju vessels broadcast common identifiers.

Third, the age of the AIS profiles and timing of their creation may point to coordination and further attempts to obfuscate the identity of the vessels and their owners and managers. Over 92 percent of the AIS profiles were created after March 2018—just one year before the start of dredging activities in Haeju Bay. Furthermore, nearly half appeared for the first time between March and August 2019 when dredging activities were ongoing in Haeju Bay.

Conclusion

The dredging and shipping of sand from Haeju Bay to China constitutes a violation of UNSC Resolution 2397 (2017). In other words, the sale of sand or sand-dredging rights is a typology of North Korean financing practice that the international community should be monitoring to enforce global compliance of sanctions on the DPRK. The Haeju case also demonstrates the importance of looking beyond established vectors of North Korean illicit financing and proliferation activities to date, such as coal, oil, or arms, and provides analysts with another angle through which to explore the DPRK’s participation in the illicit economy.

Moreover, the sand shipment activity in Haeju Bay is unprecedented in its scale and coordination, and speaks to the sophistication of DPRK capabilities to leverage entities and networks outside of its borders. The international community has never previously witnessed the DPRK engage in activities involving over 200 vessels over a sustained period of time and in coordinated fashion—the sheer number of transmissions within North Korean waters showcases the boldness and impunity with which sanctions evasion networks operate, even under close scrutiny.

Despite the audacity of the Haeju fleet, the international community is hard-pressed to find effective means to disrupt such illicit activity. The tactics deployed to obfuscate vessel identities on AIS transmission significantly complicate the task of identifying the vessels involved in sanctions violations, and connecting them to entities on shore. What we have seen in Haeju therefore prompts broader questions of how these capabilities and connections may be further leveraged for other forms of illicit revenue generation and proliferation activities by the DPRK.

In our follow up to this blog post, we hope to provide more insight into the strategic importance of North Korea’s sand trade. Stay tuned for more to come.

The authors would like to thank C4ADS research consultants Andrew Boling and LukeSnyder; Evan Accardi, C4ADS Analyst; Anna Wheeler, C4ADS Design Lead; and the many other individuals for their invaluable contributions to this project. The authors would also like to thank Ines Nastali and Christopher Owen of IHS Markit, and Kiran Pereira, Founder and Chief Storyteller at SandStories for sharing their expert insights.