Khrushchev Lied The Evidence That Every "Revelation" of Stalin's (and Beria's) "Crimes" in Nikita Khrushchev's Infamous "Secret Speech" to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956, is Provably False* By Gf over Fur f Erythros Press and Media, LLC Corrected Hdition, Ju/y 2011 (* All except one, which I can neither prove true nor disprove.) Khrushchev IJed First English Edition February- 2011; corrected edition July 2011 Published in Russian by Algoritm Publishers, Moscow, December 2007 under the title Antistalinskaia Podlosr http://www.algoritm-kniga.ru/ fcrr-g.-antistalinskaya-podlost.html Republished by EKSMO Publishers, Moscow, November 2010 under the title Tent XX S"ezdu. AnlistaUnskaia Podhst' http://www.eksmo.ru/catalog/882/481650/ Published by Ecythros Press and Media, LLC PO Box 291994 Kettering, Ohio 45429-0994 USA © Grover Furr 2007, 2010, 201 1 Published and printed with permission of the author, who assumes all responsibility for the content herein. IJbrary of Confess Catalcguing-in-Publicalion Da/a Furr, Cirover C. (Grover Cart) Khrushchev Lied: The Evidence That Every "Revelaiion" of Stalin's (and Beria's) "Crimes" in Nikita Khrushchev's Infamous "Secret Speech" to the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Part)' of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956, is Provably False / Grover C. Furr; translations by Grover C. Furr ISBN: 978-0-615-44105-4 1. Khrushchev, Nikita Scrgeevich, 1894-1971. 2. Khrushchev, Nikita Ser- geevich, 1894-1971. Rech' na zakxytom zasedanii dvad't'satogo S"ezda KPSS. y. Stalin, Joseph, 1879-1953. 4. Soviet Union-Politics and gov- ernment— 1917-1936. 5. Soviet Union— Politics and government- 1936- 1953. 1. Title. Table of Contents Acknowledgements and Dedication 1 Introduction. The Khrushchev School of Falsification: "The 20th Century's Most Influential Speech" 2 Chapter 1. The Cult and Lenin's 'Testament*' 7 1. The Cult 7 2. Lenin's "Testament" 1 1 Chapter 2. CoUegiality "Trampled" 21 3. "CoUegialit)'" In Work 21 4. Stalin "Morally and Physically Annihilated" Leaders Who Opposed Him 22 5. Mass Repressions Generally 24 6. "Enemy of the People" .....26 7. Zinoviev and Kamenev 28 8. Trotskjites 29 9. Stalin neglected Party 31 Chapter 3. Stalin's "Arbitrariness" Towards the Party 34 10. Reference to "a party commission under the control of the Central Committee Presidium"; fabrication of materials during repressions 34 11. December 1, 1934 "directive" signed by Enukidze 38 12. Khrushchev Implies Stalin's involvement in Kirov's murder. 39 13. Stalin's and Zhdanov's telegram to the Politburo of September 25 1936 40 14. Stalin's report at the February-March 1937 CC Plenum 42 1 5. "Many Members questioned mass repression", especially Pavel Post)'shev 45 Chapter 4. The "Cases" Against Party Members and Related Questions48 16. Eikhe 48 17. Ezhov 53 18. Rudzutak 56 19. Rozenblium 59 20.1.D. Kabakov 62 21-24. S.V. Kossior, V. la. Chubar'; P.P. Postyshev; A.V. Kosarev 64 25. The Lists 70 26. Resolutions of the January 1938 CC Plenum 73 27. "Beria's gang" 75 28. 'Torture telegram'' ; 76 29. Rodos tortured Chubar' and Kosior on Beria's orders 81 Chapter 5. Stalin and the War 84 30. Stalin didn't heed warnings about war 84 31. Vorontsov's letter 86 32. German soldier 87 33. Commanders Killed 88 34. Stalin's "Demoralization" after the beginning of the war 90 35. Stalin A Bad Commander 92 36. Khar'kov 1942 93 37. Stalin Planned Military Operations on a Globe 94 38. Stalin Downgraded Zhukov 95 Chapter 6. Of Plots and Affairs 97 39. Deportations of nationalities 97 40. The I^ningrad Affair 101 41. The Mingrclian Affair 103 42. Yugosbvia 105 43. The Doctors' Plot 105 Chapter 7. Beria, His "Machinations" and "Crimes" 109 44. Beiia 109 45. Kaminsky accuses Beria of working with the Mussavat 110 46. Kartvelishvili Ill 47. Kedrov 113 48. Ordzhonikidze's brother 114 Chapter 8. Ideolog)' and Culture 117 49. Stalin, Short Biography 117 50. The 'Short Course' 121 51. Stalin Signed Order for Monument to Himself on July 2, 1951 124 52. The Palace of Soviets 126 53. The Lenin Prize 1 26 Chapter 9. Stalin's Last Years in Power 128 54. Stalin Suggested Huge Tax Increase on Kolkhozes 128 55. Stalin Insulted Postyshev 129 56. "Disorganization" of Politburo Work 130 57. Stalin Suspected Voioshilov an "En^sh Agent" 131 58. .Andreev; 59. Molotov. 60. Mikoian 132 61. Expansion of the Presidium 135 Chapter 10. A Typology of Prevarication 137 A Typology of Khrushchev's Prevarication 137 Exposing a Lie is Not the Same as Establishing the Truth 143 Historical vs. Judicial Evidence 145 Torture and the Historical Problems Related To It 147 A typology of Khrushchevian prevarication 150 The "Revelations" 152 The lypolog)' 153 Chapter 11. The Results of Khrushchev's "Revelations"; Falsified Rehabilitations 159 Falsified Rehabilitations 159 Conclusion 169 Chapter 12. Conclusion: The Enduring L^acy of Khrushchev's Deception 192 Why Did Khrushchev Attack Stalin? 192 The Khrushchev Conspracy? 196 Aleksandr S. Shcherbakov 202 Implications: The influence on Soviet society » 208 Political Implications 213 Trotsky 214 Unresolved weaknesses in the Soviet system of socialism 215 Appendix - Quotations from Piimafy and Other Sources 218 l.Cult 218 2 Lenin's "Testament" 232 3. "CoUegiality" In Work 240 4. Stalin "Morally and Physically Annihibted" Leaders Who Opposed Him. 250 5. Mass Repressions generally 250 6. "Enemy of the people" 257 6a. "Convindng and Educating" 260 7. Zinoviev & Kamenev 260 8. Tiotskyires 261 9. Stalin neglected Part}' 266 10. Ref. to "a party commission under the control of the Central Committee Presidium"; fabrication of materials during repressions 268 11. December 1, 1934 "directive" signed by Enukidze 269 12. Khrushchev Implies Stalin's involvement in Kirov's murder 269 13. Stalin's and Zhdanov's telegram to the Politburo of September 25 1936 271 14. Stalin's report at the February-March 1937 CC Plenum 273 1 5. "Many Members questioned mass repression". Especially Post^-shcv. 282 16. Hikhe 288 17. Ezhov 292 18. Rudzuiak 306 19. Rozcnblium 310 20. Kabakov 312 21. Kosior, 22. Chubar'; 23. Post)'shev; 24. Kosarev 316 25. The Lists 322 26. Resolutions of the January' 1938 CC Plenum 322 27. "Beiia's gang" 327 28. 'Torture telegram" 328 29. Rodos tortured Chubar' & Kosior on Beria' orders 333 30. Stalin didn't heed warnings about war 334 31. Vorontsov's Lcner 340 32. German soldier 341 33. Commanders Killed 347 34. Stalin's "Demoralization after beginning of war 349 35. Stalin A Bad Commander 353 36. Khar'kov 1942 355 37. Stalin Planned Militai)' Operations on a Globe 360 38. Stalin Downgraded Zhukov 362 39. Deportations of nationalities , 365 40. Leningrad .Affair 367 41. Mingielian Affair 369 42. Yugoslavia 371 43. Doctois' Plot 372 44. Bena 375 45. Kaminsky- about Beiia working with Mussavat 378 46. Kaxtvelishvili (Lavrent'cv) 382 47. Kediov 383 48. Ordzhonikidze's brother 387 49. Stalin, Short Biography 388 50. The Short Course 394 51. Sialin Signed Order for Monument to Himself on July 2, 1951 395 52. Palace of Soviets 397 53. Lenin Prize 398 54. Stalin Suggested Huge Tax Increase on Kolkhozes 403 55. Stalin Insulted Postyshev 406 56. "Disoiganization" of Politburo Work 406 57. Stalin Suspected Voroshilov as an "English Agpnt" 407 58. .Andreev; 59. Molotov; 60. Mikoian 408 61. Expansion of the Presidium 41 1 )graphy and Sources 414 1 415 Acknowledgements and Dedication I wish to express my special gratitude to my editor, translator, and friend Vladimir L Bobrov, of Moscow. Without his encouragement and help at eveiy step this book would never have been written. My special thanks to the Inter-library Loan librarians at Harry S. Sprague Library, Montclair State University - Kevin Prendetgast, Arthur Hudson, and Seigio Ferreira, for their tireless help in obtaining hard-to-find Soviet and other books and articles. * * * I dedicate this book to the memory of my son Jbseph Furn wonderful son and friend, skilled diesel truck mechanic, and one of "the salt of the earth." Intxoduction. The Khrushchev School of Falsification: "The 20th Century's Most Influential Speech" The fiftieth anniversary of Nikita S. Khrushchev's "Secret Speech", de- livered on February 25, 1 956, ehcited predictable comment. An article in the London (UK) Telegraph called it "the 20th century's most influential speech." In an article the same day in the New York Times William Taub- man, whose biography of Khrushchev won the Pulitzer Prize for Biogra- phy in 2004, called it a "great deed" that "deserves to be celebrated" on its anniversary. > Some time ago I reread Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" for the first time in many years. I used the HTML version of the edition of the speech published in a special issue of The New Leader in 1962.^ During my read- ing I remarked that the noted Menshevik scholar Boris Nikolaevsky, in his annotations to Khrushchev's talk, expressed his opinion that certain of Khrushchev's statements were false. For example, early in his speech Khrushchev says the following: Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Bcria gang, the Central Committee looked into a series of matters fabricated by this gang. This revealed a very ugly picture of brutal willfulness connected with the incorrect behavior of Stalin. Boris Nikolaevsky's note 8 to this passage reads: This statement by Khrushchev is not quite true: Investigation of Stalin's terrorist acts in the last period of ' 'Ilic full text of Khrushchev's speech is available online ar http://chss.mc>ntdair.edu/english/furr/ research /kl/ spcech.html ^ Khrushchev, Nikita S. 'Ilie New I x-ader/llie (Irimes of the Stalin ICra. Intrcnluction by Anatol Shub, notes by Horis Nikolaevsky. New York: 'llie New Ix'adcr, 1962. IntnxJuction. 'I lie Khrushchev School of I'alsification 3 his life was initiated by Beria. ... Khrushchev, who now depicts himself as having well-nigh initiated the probe of Stalin's torture chambers, actually tried to block it in the first months after Stalin's death. I remembered diat Arch Getty wrote something very similar in his magis- teiial work Origins of the Gnat Pur^s Other inconsistencies in Khrushchev's account include an apparent confusion of Ezhov for Beiia. Although Ezhov's name is mentioned occasionally, Beria is charged with as many misdeeds and repressions; however, the latter was merely a regional secretary until 1938. Further, many reports note that the police terror began to subside when Beria took over from Ezhov in 1938. Could Khrushchev have conveniently substituted Beria for Ezhov in his account? What else might he have blurred? At any rate, Beria's recent execution by Khrushchev and the leadership made him a convenient . scapegoat. Khrushchev's opportunistic use of Beria certainly casts suspicion on the exactitude of his other assertions, (p. 268 n.28; emphasis 'added GF) So I suspected that today, in the light of the many documents from for- merly secret Soviet archives now available, serious research might dis- cover that even more of Khrushchev's "revelations" about Stalin were false. In fact, I made a far different discovery. Not one specific statement of 'Vevelation'* that Khrushchev made about either Stalin or Beria turned out to be true. Among those that can be checked for verifica- tion, every single one turns out to be false. Khrushchev, it turns out, did not just "lie" about Stalin and Beria - he did virtually nothing else except lie. Tlie entire "Secret Speech" is made up of fabrications. This is the "great deed" Taubman praised Khrushchev fori (A separate, though much shorter, article might be written to expose the falsehoods in Taub- man's own New York Times Op-Ed article celebrating Khrushchev's meretricious speech).' ^ A few examples here: It was Heria, not Khrushchev, who released many piisonere, though not "millions", as Taubman claims. 'Ilie "thaw" he celebrates had begun during the last Stalin years. Khrushchev limited it to "rightist", anti-Stalin material only. Stalin 4 Khrushchev lic-d For me, as a scholar, this was a troubling and even unwelcome discovery. If, as I had anticipated, I had found that, say, 25% or so of Khrushchev's "revelations*' were falsifications, my research would surely excite some skepticism as well as surprise. But in the main I could anticipate accep- tance, and praise: "Good job of research by Furr", and so on. But I feared - and my fears have been bom out by my experience with the Russian -language original of this book, published in December 2007 - that if I claimed evefy one of Khrushchev's "revelations" was false, no one would believe me. It would not make any difference how thoroughly or carefully I cited evidence in support of my arguments. To disprove the whole of Khrushchev's speech is, at the same time, to challenge the whole historical paradigm of Soviet history of the Stalin period, a para- digm to which this speech is foundational. llie most influential speech of the 20^^ century - if not of all time - a complete fraud? The notion was too monstrous. Who would want to come to ^ps with the revision of Soviet, Comintern, and even world history that the logic of such a conclusion would demand? It would be infinitely easier for everyone to believe that I had "cooked the books," shaded the truth - thjit I was falsifying things, just as I was accusing Khrushchev of doing. Then my work could be safely ignored, and the problem would "go away." Especially since I am known to have sympa- thy towards the worldwide communist movement of which Stalin was the recognized leader. \Xlien a researcher comes to conclusions that sus- piciously appear to support his own preconceived ideas, it is only prudent to suspect him of some lack of objectivity, if not worse. So I would have been much happier if my research had concluded that 25% of Khrushchev's "revelations" about Stalin and Beria were false. However, since virtually all of those "revelations" that can be checked are, in fact, falsehoods, the onus of evidence lies even more heavily on me as a scholar than would ordinarily be the case. Accordingly, I have organized my report on this research in a somewhat unusual way. The entire book is divided into two separate but interrelated sections. had tried t() rctia* in Ocnibcr 1952, but the \9'*^ Part\- (!()ngn:ss had rcTuscd to permit it. I aubman claims Khrushchev said he was "not involved" in the repressions, yet Khrushchev had not a-sponded to Stalin's urgings, but had taken the inidadvc, demanding higher "tjuotas" for repressions than the Stalin leaderiihip wanted. 'I'aubman claims "Khrushchev somehow retained his humanit)'." It would be more accurate to say the opposite: Khrushchev appears more like a thug and murdeicr. Inuixlucbon. 'llic Khrushchev Sch(N)l of l*alsificadon 5 In the fust sections, consisting of Chapters 1 through 9, 1 examine each of the statements, or assertions, that Khrushchev made in his report and that constitute the essence of his so-called "revelations." (To jump ahead a bit, I note that I have identified sixty-one such assertions). Each of these "revelations" is preceded by a quotation from the "Secret Speech" which is then examined in the light of the documentary evi- dence. Most of this evidence is presented as quotations from primary sources. Only in a few cases do I quote from secondary sources. I have set myself the task of presenting the best evidence that I can Hnd, drawn in the main from former Soviet archives in order to demonstrate the false character of Khrushchev's Speech at the 20* Party Congress. Since, if interspersed with the text, long documentary citations would make for difficult reading, I have only briefly referred to the evidence in the text and reserved the fuller quotations from the primary (and occasionally secondary) sources themselves in the sections on each chapter in the Ap- pendix.. The second section of the book. Chapters 10 through 12, is devoted to questions of a methodological nature and to a discussion of some of the conclusions which flow from this study. I have given special attention to a t)'pology of the falsehoods, or methods of deception that Khrushchev employed. A study of the "rehabilitation" materials of some of the Party leaders named in the Speech is included here. I handle the references to primary sources in two ways. In addition to the traditional academic documentation through footnote and bibliography I have tried wherever possible to guide the reader to those primary docu- ments available either in part or in full on the Internet. All of these URL references were valid at the time the English language edition of this book was completed. In a few cases, I have placed important primary documents on the Inter- net myself, normally in Adobe Acrobat (pdf) format. In a few cases this has made it possible for me to refer to page numbers, something that is either clumsy or impossible if using hypertext markup language (HTML). In conclusion I would like to thank my colleagues in the United States and in Russia who have read this work in its earlier drafts and given me the benefit of their criticism. Naturally, they bear no responsibility for any errors and shortcomings that remain in the book despite their best efforts. 6 Khrushchev I icxl My espedal gratitude goes to my wonderful colleague in Moscow, Vladi- mir L'vovich Bobrov. Scholar, researcher, editor, and translator, master of both his native Russian and English, I would never have undertaken this work, much less completed it, without his inspiration, guidance, and assistance of all kinds. I will be grateful for any comments and criticisms of this work by read- ers. Chapter 1 . The Cult and Lenin's "Testament" 1. The Cult Khrushche\': Comrades! In the report of the Central Committee of the part)' at the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during the plenarj' CC/CPSU [Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] sessions, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences. After Stalin's death the Central Committee of the party began to implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behavior. Such a beUef about a man, and specifically about Stalin, was cultivated among us for many years. ITie objective of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of Stalin's life and activity. Concerning Stalin's merits, an entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies had already been written in his lifetime. The role of Stalin in the preparation and execution of the Socialist Revolution, in the Civil War, and in the Rght for the construction of socialism in our country, is universally known. Everyone knows this well. At present, we are concerned with a question which has immense importance for the party now and for the future - with how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually growing, the cult which became at a 8 Khrushchev lied certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of party principles, of part)' democracy, of revolutionary legality. This Speech is often referred to as one of "revelations" by Khrushchev of crimes and misdeeds done by Stalin. The issue of the "cult of person- ality", or "cult of the individual", around the figure of Stalin was the main subject of the Speech. Khrushchev did not "reveal" the existence of a "cult of personality" itself. Its existence was, of course, well known. It had been discussed at Presidium meetings since immediately after Stalin's death. Yet Khrushchev does not speciBcally state at the outset that Stalin pro- moted the "cult". This was clearly deliberate on Khrushchev's part. Throughout his speech Khrushchev implies - or, rather, takes it for granted - what he ought to have proven, but could not: that Stalin him- self fostered this cult in order to gain dictatorial power. In fact, through- out his entire Speech, Khrushchev was unable to cite a single truthful ex- ample of how Stalin encouraged this "cult" - presumably, because he could not find even one such example. Khrushchev's whole speech was built on this falsehood. All the rest of his "revelations" were fitted within the explanatory paradigm of the "•cult" around himself which, according to Khrushchev, Stalin created and cultivated. This study will show that virtually all of Khrushchev's "revelations" con- cerning Stalin are false. But it's worth mentioning at the outset that Khrushchev's explanatory framework itself - the notion of the "cult" constructed by Stalin and as a result of which the rest of his so-called "crimes" could be committed with impunity - this is itself a falsehood. Not only did Stalin not commit the crimes and misdeeds Kluushche\' imputes to him. Stalin also did not construct the "cult" around himself In fact, the evidence proves the opposite: that Stalin opposed the disgust- ing "cult" around himself. Some have argued that Stalin's opposition to the cult around himself must have been hypocrisy. After all, Stalin was so powerful that if he had really wanted to put a stop to the cult, he could have done so. But this argument assumes what it should prove. To assume that he was that powerful is also to assume that Stalin was in fact what the "cult" absurdly made him out to be: an autocrat with supreme power over everything and everyone in the USSR. (Chapter One. 'Ilic C^ult and Ixnin's "Testament" 9 1. StaJin's Opposition to the Cult Stalin protested praise and flattery directed at himself over and over again over many years. He a^eed with Lenin's assessment of the "cult of the individual", and said basically the same things about it as Lenin had. Khrushchev quoted Lenin, but without acknowledging that Stalin said the same things. A long list of quotations from Stalin is given here in evi- dence of Stalin's opposition to the "cult" around him.^ Many more could be added to it, for almost every memoir by persons who had personal contact with Stalin gives further anecdotes that demonstrate Stalin's op- position to, and even disgust with, the adulation of his person. For example, the recently-published posthumous memoir Stalin. Kak la Z/m/ ("Stalin As I Knew Him", 2003) by Akakii Mgeladze, a former First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party later punished and marginalized by Khrushchev, the author often comments on Stalin's dis- like of the "cult" around him. Mgeladze, who died in 1980, recounts how Stalin wished to suppress any special celebration of his 70^ birthday in 1949 and acceded to it with reluctance only because of the arguilients made by other Party leaders that the event would serve to unite the communist movement by bringing together its leaders from around the worid. Stalin was more successful in preventing others in the Politburo from renaming Moscow "Stalinodar" (= "gift of Stalin") in 1937. But his at- tempt to refuse the award of Hero of the Soviet Union was thwarted when the award, which he never accepted, was pinned to a pillow which was placed in his coffin at his death. 2. MaIenkov*s Attempt to Call a CC Plenum Concerning the "Cult" April 1953 Immediately after Stalin's death, Malenkov proposed calling a Central Committee Plenum to deal with the harmful effects of the cult. Malenkov was honest enough to blame himself and his colleagues and reminded them all that Stalin had frequently warned them against the "cult" to no avail. This attempt failed in the Presidium; the special Plenum was never called. If it had been, Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" could not have taken place. '' Sec the quotations for Chapter 1 in Appendix 1 for a long list of ijuotations of Stalin showing his opposition to the "cult" around him. 10 Khnishchcv lied Whether Khrushchev supported Malenkov's proposal or not - the evi- dence is unclear on this point - he was certainly involved in the discus- sion. Khrushchev knew all about Malenkov's attempt to deal with the "cult" openly and early on. But he said nothing about it, thereby effec- tively denying that it had occurred. 3. July 1953 Plenum - Beria Attacked for Allegedly Opposing "Cult" At the July 1953 Plenum, called to attack an absent (and possibly already dead) Beria, a number of the figures blamed Beria for attacking the cult. Khrushchev's leading role at this Plenum and in the cabal of leaders against Beria shows that he was complidt in attacking Beiia and so in supporting the "cult" as a weapon with which to discredit Beria. 4. Who Fostered the "Cult"? A study of the origins of the "cult" is beyond the scope of this article. But there is good evidence that oppositionists either began the "cult" around Stalin or participated eagerly in it as a cover for their oppositional activities. In an unguarded moment during one of his m:hitye siavki (face- to-face confrontations with accusers) Bukharin was forced to admit that he> urged former Oppositionists working for li^estua to refer to Stalin with excessive praise, and used the term "cult" himself Another Opposi- tionist, K^l Radek, is often said to have written the first full-blown ex- ample of the "cult", the strange futuristic Zodchii Sotsialistichesko^ Oh- shchestva ("The Architect of Socialist Society"), for the January 1, 1934 issue of I^stiia^ subsequendy published as a separate pamphlet. 5. Khrushchev and Mikoian Khrushchev and Mikoian, the main figures from the Stalin Politburo who instigated and avidly promoted the "de-Stalinization" movement, were among those who, in the 1930s, had fostered the "cult" most avidly. If this were all, we might hypothetically assume that Khrushchev and Mikoian had truly respected Stalin to the point of being in awe of him. This was certainly the case with many others. Mgeladze's memoir shows one example of a leading Party official who retained his admiration for Stalin long after it was fashionable to discard it. But Khrushchev and Mikoian had participated in the Presidium discus- sions of March 1953 during which Malenkov's attempt to call a Central Chapter Unc. 'Ilic Cult and I xnin's "rcstamcnc" 11 Committee Plenum to discuss the "cult" had been frustrated. They had been leaders in the June 1953 Plenum during which Beria had been shaipty criticized for opposing the "cult" of Stalin. lliese matters, together with the fact that Khrushchev's "revebtions" are, in reality, fiibticabons means there must be something else at work here. 2. Lenin's "Testament" Khrushchev: Fearing the future fate of the party and of the Soviet nation, V. I. Lenin made a completely correct characteiization of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessar)' to consider the question of transferring Stalin from the position of the Secretary General because of the fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a proper attitude toward his comrades, that he is capricious and abuses his power. In December 1922, in a letter to the Party Congress, Vladimir Ilyich wrote: 'After taking over the position of Secretary General, Comrade Stalin accumulated in his hands immeasurable power and I am not certain whether he will be always able to use this power with the required care.' We must interrupt this quotation to note an important fact. Khrushchev here attributes to Lenin the accusation that Stalin "abuses his power." In reality, Lenin wrote only that he was "not certain whether he [Stalin] will be always able to use this power with the required care." There is nothing in Lenin's words about accusing Stalin of "abusing his power." Khrushchev continues: This letter - a political document of tremendous importance, known in the party history as Lenin's "testament" - was distributed among the delegates to the 20th P^rty Congress. You have read it and will undoubtedly read it again more than once. You might reflect on Lenin's plain words, in which expression is given to Vladimir Ilyich's anxiety concerning the party, the people, the state, and the future direction of party policy. 12 Khrushchev lied Vladimir Ilyich said: Stalin is excessively rude, and this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which cannot be tolerated in one holding the position of the Secretary General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another man would be selected for it, a man who, above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious temper, etc. 'Iliis document of Lenin's was made known to the delegates at the 13 th Part)' Congress who discussed the question of transferring Stalin from the position of Secretary- General. The delegates declared themselves in favor of retaining Stalin in this post, hoping that he would heed the critical remarks of Vladimir Ilyich and would be able to overcome the defects which caused Lenin serious anxiety. Comrades! The Party Congress should become acquainted with two new documents, which confirm Stalin's character as already outlined by Vladimir Ilyich I^nin in his "testament." These documents are a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaia to (Lev B.] Kamenev, who was at that time head of the Political Bureau, and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin. I will now read these documents: LEV BORISOVICH! Because of a short letter which I had written in words dictated to me by Vladimir Ilyich by permission of the doctors, Stalin aUowed himself yesterday an unusually rude outburst directed at me. This is not my first day in the party. During aU these 30 years I have never heard from any comrade one word of rudeness. The business of the party and of (Jhaptcf One. 'IIil- Cult and Ixiiin's '"I'cstamcnt" 13 Uyich are not less dear to me than to Stalin. I need at present the maximum of self-control. What one can and what one cannot discuss with Uyich I know better than any doctor, because I know what makes him nervous and what does not, in any case I know better than Stalin. I am turning to you and to Grigorii [E, Zinoviev] as much closer comrades of V. I. and I beg you to protect me from rude interference with my private life and from vile invectives and threats. I have no doubt as to what will be the unanimous decision of the Control Commission, with which Stalin sees fit to threaten me; however, I have neither the strength nor the time to waste on this foolish quarrel. And I am a living person and my nerves are strained to the utmost." N. KRUPSKAIA Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on December 23, 1922. After two and a half months, in March 1 923, Vladimir Uyich Lenin sent Stalin the following letter: TO COMRADE STALIN: COPIES FOR: KAMENEV AND ZINOVIEV Dear Comrade Stalin! You permitted yourself a rude summons of my wife to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her. Despite the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget what was said, nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenev heard about it from her. I have no intention to forget so easily that which is being done against me; and I need not stress here that I consider as directed against me that which is being done against my wife. I ask you, therefore, that you weigh carefully whether you are agreeable to retracting your words and apologizing or whether you prefer the severance of relations between us. SINCERELY: LENIN 14 Khnishchcv lied MARCH 5, 1923 (Commotion in the hall.) Comrades! I will not comment on these documents. They speak eloquently for themselves. Since Stalin could behave in this manner during Lenin's life, could thus behave toward Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaia - whom the party knows well and values highly as a loyal friend of Lenin and as an active fighter for the cause of the party since its creation - we can easily imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negative characteristics of his developed steadily and during the last years acquired an absolutely insufferable character." The document in question was not widely "known in the party history as Lenin's Testament'". Khrushchev took this term from Trotsky, who wrote a book with that title in 1 934. It had never been known as such in the Bolshevik Party except among oppositionists. In fact there is a history to the very use of the term "Lenin's Testament" - one that does not re- flect well on Khrushchev. • In 1925 Trotsky, in a shaq) criticism of Max Eastman's book Since L^nin Died, had explicitly repudiated Eastman's lie that Lenin left a "testament" or '^^Aoll." Along with the other members of the Politburo, Trotsky said that Lenin had not done so. And that appears to be correct: there is no evidence at all that Lenin intended these documents as a "testament" of any kind. Then, in the 1930s, Trotsky changed his mind and began writ- ing about "Lenin's Testament" again, this time as a part of his partisan attack on Stalin. Therefore Khrushchev or, more likely, one of his col- laborators, must have taken this usage from Trotsky - though they would never have publicly acknowledged doing so. Other aspects of Khrushchev's speech are similar to Trotsky's writings. For example, Trotsky viewed the Moscow Trials as faked frame-ups - naturally enough, because he was an absent co-defendant in them. Al- though the first Moscow Trial defendant, Akbal Ikramov of the March 1938 "Bukharin" Trial, was not officially "rehabilitated" until May 1957, after the 20'** Party Congress^ Khrushchev did deplore the executions of ^ Ikramov wxs rehabilitated on June 3. 1957. Sec RfabiJUla/aia. Kak EJo Bjh. FArraJ' 1956 - itofikdf gO kh gulov. Moskva: 'Tilalmk". 2003. (hcit-aftcr RKEB 2), 851. Sec also http://www.mcmo.ru/mcmof)'/communarl(a/chaptcr5.htm Chapter One. 'Ilic Cult and Ixnin's 'Testament" 15 Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotskyites in the Secret Speech. This consti- tuted at least an implicit declaration of their innocence, since their pun- ishment would not be considered too harsh for anyone really guilty of the comes to which they confessed in 1936. But in fiict the whole tenor of Khrushchev's speech, which blamed Stalin alone for derailing socialism through immense crimes of which Khru- shchev held him alone responsible, was identical to Trotsky's demonized portrait of Stalin. I'rotsky's widow recognized this fact, and applied for the rehabilitation of her late husband and within a day of the "Secret Speech".^ The &ct that Natalia Sedova-Trotskaia learned of the suppos- edly "secret" speech immediately it happened suggests that the Trotsky- ites may have still had high-level informants in the CPSU. There are good reasons to suspect that Lenin's letter to Stalin of March S, 1923 may be a for^ry. Valentin A. Sakharov has published a major scholarly book on this subject on this thesis with Moscow University Press. His general argument is outlined in several articles of his and in reviews of the book.^ • There is no question that at the time Stalin himself, and everybody who knew about it, believed that it was genuine. But even if genuine, Lenin's letter to Stalin of March 5 1923 does not show what it has often been assumed to show - that Lenin was estranged from Stalin. For less than two weeks later his wife Nadezhda Konstantinova Krupskaia (called "c(omrade) Ul'ianova (N.K.)" in this exchange) told Stalin that Lenin had very insistendy asked her to make Stalin promise to obtain cyanide cap- sules for him, in order to end his great suffering. Stalin agreed, but then reported to the Pobburo on March 23 that he could not bring himself to do it, "no matter how humane it might be." ' Aimcrmakhcr, I., V.IU. Afiani, ct al. cds. Doklad Khrushcheva o knPk i'cbmsfi Staiiia na XX j"e^KPSS. DokMmeHtj. Moscw: ROSSPEN, 2002. (hereafter DokJad Khmshcbeva) Razdcl r\', Dok. No. 3, p. 610. The editors of this official volume note that the letter must be dated on or after February 25; that is, they relate it to Khrushchev's Speech, which was delivered the same day. Another possibility is that Scdova's letter was written in response to Mikoian's speech to the (Congress on i'cbfuaty 16. A facsimile of Scdova's letter to the Presidium of the 20''' Party (!ungrcss is at http:/ / chss. montclair. ed u/english /fan/ research/ sedovaln022856.ipg ' V.A. Sakharov, "PoBttehukoe ^^atnuicbaiue'VJ. l^miia: ntU'nost' istoiii i miff poBliki. Moscow: Izdatcl'stvo MClU (Moscow State University], 2003. 16 Khrushchev I JliJ These documents were quoted by Dmitrii Volkogonov in his very hostile biography of Lenin.* Copies of them remain in the Volkogonov Papers in the Library of Congress. There is no doubt about their authenticity. Lidia Fodeva, one of Lenin's secretaries, had made a note in 1922 that Lenin had told her he would request cyanide capsules if his illness progressed beyond a certain point.^ Therefore, even if Lenin's letter of March 5, 1923 be genuine - and Sak- harov's study calls this into serious question - Lenin siill trusted and re- lied upon Stalin. There was no estrangement between them. According to Volkogonov (and others). In the morning of December 24 Stalin, Kamenev and Bukharin discussed the situation. They did not have the right to force their leader [Lenin] to be silent. But care, foresight, the greatest possible quite, were essential. A decision was taken: 1. Vladimir Ilich is given the right to dictate daily for 5- 10 minutes, but this must not be in the form of correspondence, and Vladimir Ilich must not expect answers to these notes. No meetings are allowed. . 2. Neither friends nor family are permitted to communicate anything of political life to Vladimir Ilich, so as not to thereby present materials for consideration and excitement.'*' According to Robert Service (L^/im), Lenin suffered serious "events" (probably strokes) on the following dates: • May 25, 1922 - a "massive stroke" (p. 443); • December 22-23, 1922 - Lenin "lost the use of his whole right side" (p.461); ^ A facsimile of Stalin's letter to the Politburo of March 23, 1923 is published in D.A. Volkogonov, L/ff/ff. PMebeskii point. V 2-kh knigakh. Kji. 11. Moscow: Novosti, 1994, pp. 384-385. Stalin's letter to the Politburo of March 23, 1923 is rcproducctl, with commentary, at hnp://www.hrono.ru/libfis/stalin/1 6-67.html and in Appendix 1 of the present b<M)k. ' This note was published in 1991 and can be consullcxl at http://www.hrono.rU/Iibrii:/stalin / 1 6-9.htfnl >•> Volkogonov, Dmitri. Sta/in. Vol. I. M., 1992, Ch. 2, par. 156; cited at http://militera.lib.ru/bio/volk()gtjnov_dv/02.html (Chapter One. 'Ihc (iult and Ix-nin's "Testament" 17 • The night of March 6-7, 1 923 - Lenin "lost the use of the extremities of the lig^t side of his body." (pp. 473-4). On December 18 the Politburo put Stalin in charge of Lenin's health and forbade anyone to discuss politics with him. Krupskaia violated this rule and was reprimanded for it by Stalin, on December 22. That very night Lenin suffered a serious stroke. On March 5, 1923 Krupskaia told Lenin that Stalin had spoken rudely to her back in December. Incensed, Lenin wrote Stalin the famous note. According to Krupskaia's secretary V. Dridzo, whose version of this e\'ent was published in in 1989, it happened this way: Now, when Nadezhda Konstantinovna's name and Stain's relationship with her is more frequently mentioned in some pubUcadons, I wish to tell about those matters I know for certain. Wh)' was it only two months after Stalin's rude conversation with Nadezhda Konstantinovna that V.I Lenin wrote him the letter in which he demanded that Stalin excuse himself to her? It is possible that I am the only one who really knows how it happened, since Nadezhda Konstantinova often told me about it. It happened at the very beginning of March 1 923. Nadezhda Konstantinovna and Vladimir Ilich were talking about something. The phone rang. Nadezhda Kcwistantinovna went to the phone (in Lenin's apartment the phone always stood in the corridor). When she returned Vladimir Ilich asked her: *Who called?' - 'It was Stalin, he and I have reconciled.' — "What do you mean?' And Nadezhda Konstantinovna had to tell everything that had happened when Stalin called her, talked with her very rudely, and threatened to bring her before the Control commission. Nadezhda Konstantinovna asked Vladimir Ilich to pay it no mind since everything had been settled and she had forgotten about it. But Vladimir Ilich was adamant. He was deeply offended by I.V. Stalin's disrespectful behavior towards Nadezhda Konstantinovna and on March 5 1923 dictated the latter to Stalin with a copy to Zinoviev and Kamenev in which 18 Khnjshchcv 1 Jed he insisted that Stalin excuse himself. Stalin had to excuse himself, but he never fotgot it and did not fo^ve Nadezhda Konstantinovna, and this had an effect on his relationship with her."'* The next day Lenin had a further serious stroke. In each case Lenin had a stroke shortly after Krupskaia discussed political matter with him - something that, as a Party member, she was not sup- posed to do. This cannot have been a coincidence, for Lenin's doctors had specifically warned against getting Lenin upset about anything. So it seems more than possible that, in fact, it was Krupskaia's actions that precipitated Lenin's last two serious strokes. As one of Lenin's long-time secretaries Lidia Fotieva said, Nadezhda Konstantinovna did not always conduct herself as she should have done. She might have said too much to Vladimir Ilich. She was used to sharing everything with him, even in situations when she should not have done that at all. . .For example, why did she tell Vladimir Ilich that Stalin had been rude to her on the telephone?. . . '2 Incidentally, when Stalin's wife committed suicide in 1932, Krupskaia wrot£ the following letter of consolation to Stalin, which was published in Pravda on November 16, 1932: Dear losif Vissarionych: These days everything somehow makes me think about you, makes me want to hold your hand. It is hard to lose a person who is close to you. I keep remembering those talks with you in Ilich's office during his illness. They gave me courage at that time. I press your hand yet again. N. Krupskaia.'^ V.S. l^rid/o, "Vospominania." K/mmiimst S '2 1.. I'odcva. (3ircd in .\. Kck, "K istorii poslcdnikh Icninslcikh dokumcntov. V/. arkhiva pisatclia, bcscdovavshcgn v 1967 s lichnymi sckrctafiami I mina." Moskavskit Nomti No. 17, April 23, 1989, pp. 8-9. ( jtcd in i:..N. (iu:>lian)v, StaHn » ^hi^L Sisltmatijjnvamtji svoH vospominanH sommtmikav, dokjimeiilov ^Um, venii istonkov. Moscow: ()l.M.\'Prcss, p. 237. Online at http://www.stalin.su/lx)()k.php?action=pagc&fr_pag»;=6fltfr_book_id=l Al«> cited in Novoe VrtmiaHiy 46. Nov. 14. 2004. ChapicrOnc. llic (^ult ami Ixnin's "Testament" 19 This letter shows once again that Stalin was not estranged from Lenin's wife after the December 1922 dispute. Stalin was held in very high esteem by all those in Lenin's household. The writer Aleksandr Bek wrote down the reminiscences of Lidia Fotieva, in which she said: You do not understand those times. You don't understand what great significance Stalin had. Stalin was great... Maria Il'inichna [Ul'lanova, Lenin's sister] during Vladimir Ilich's lifetime told me: 'After Lenin, Stalin is the most intelligent person in the party. . . Stalin was an authorit}' for us. We loved Stalin. He was a great man. Yet he often said: 'I am only a pupil of Lenin's.' (In Bek, op.iil.) Khrushchev was simply trying to make Stalin "look bad," rather than transmit any understanding of what went on. It is obvious that Khrushchev took Lenin's letter to Stalin out of context, and in so doing he seriously distorted the situation. He omitted die fact that the Central Committee had instructed Stalin to make sure Lenin was isolated from political issues for the sake of hi^ health. This prohibition explicit])' mentioned "friends" and "domestic persons." Since Lenin's secretaries were not likely to violate a Central Committee directive, probably the term "domestic persons" was specifically intended to in- clude Lenin's sister and Krupskaia, his wife. Stalin had criticized Krup- skaia for violating this isolation. Nor did Khrushchev mention Stalin's reply of March 7, 1923 to Lenin's note, or Lenin's later request to Stalin for poison. By omitting these facts, Khrushchev seriously distorted the context in which Lenin's note to Sta- lin of March 5 1923 occurred, and deliberately distorted Lenin's relation- ship with Stalia Khrushchev omitted the accounts of Lenin's sister Maria Il'inichna. Lenin's secretaries Volodicheva and Fodeva, and Krupskaia's secretary Dridzo, were still alive, but their testimony was not sought. He omitted the evidence that Krupskaia's actions in violating the CC's prohibition about getting Lenin upset may well have been the cause of two Lenin's strokes. He omitted the fact that, far from making any break with Stalin, two weeks later Lenin trusted only Stalin with the secret request to be given poison if he asked for it. Finally, he omitted Krupskaia's reconcilia- tion with Stalin. 20 Khrushchev liud Khrushchev strove to depict Stalin in a bad light in this affair at all costs He showed no interest in what had really happened or an understanding of the events in their context. Chapter 2. Collegiality "Trampled" 3. "CoUegiaUty" In Work A( several points in his speech, Khrushchev complains about Stalin's lack of collegiality and violation of collective leadership. Here is a typical pas- sage: We have to consider seriously and analyze correcdy this matter in order that we may preclude any possibility of a repetition in any form whatever of what took place during the life of Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate collegialit}' in leadership and in work, and who practiced brutal violence, not only toward everything which opposed him, but also toward that which seemed, to his capricious and despotic character, contrary to his concepts. This very general accusation can be easily refuted, but only in similarly general terms, by citing the testimony of many others who worked with Stalin, some more closely than Khrushchev ever had. Marshal Georgii Zhukov had worked with him closely during the war, and testifies to Sta- lin's method of work. In the first quotation he obviously has the "Secret Speech" in mind and calls Khrushchev a liar. General Shtemenko says much the same thing. According to Ivan A. Benediktov, long-time Minister for Agriculture, decisions were always taken coUegially. Dmitrii T. Shepilov, by far Stalin's junior, did not work as closely with Stalin, but his anecdote is revealing. Even Khrushchev himself, in his memoirs, contradicted himself and called Stalin's ability to change his own mind when faced with someone who disagreed with him and defended his viewpoint well, "characteris- tic." I'' 'rhvsc and other quotations arc g;ivcn in Appendix 1. 22 Khrusihchcv 1 icd Anastas Mikoian supported Khrushchev wholeheartedly and was very antagonistic to Stalin. Yet Mikoian complained that democracy and col- lective leadership were never achieved at any lime under Khrushchev or Brezhnev. It was Khrushchev himself who refused to lead collectively, and was re- moved in large part for that in 1964. It appears that Mikhail A. Suslov, who gave the main speech against Khrushchev, echoed in his wording both Lenin's "characteristics" letter about Stalin of 1922 and Khru- shchev's "Secret Speech" attacks on the "cult" around Stalin. The irony could not have been lost on Khrushchev or his audience. 4. Stalin ^^Morally and Physically Annihilated" Leaders Who Opposed Him Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and patient cooperation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. \X'hoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint and the correctness of his position was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. There is not one single example, during Stalin's whole life, of his **removing'* someone "from the collective leadership*' because that person disagreed with Stalin. It is significant that Khrushchev himself does not even allege a specific instance. Stalin was the General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee. He could be removed by the Cenlral Committee at any time. Flis was only one vote in the Politburo and in the Central Committee. Stalin tried to resign from his post as General Secretary four times. Each time his at- tempt was rejected. The last such attempt was at the 19'** Party Congress, in October 1952. It too was rejected. Khrushchev and the rest not only could have opposed Stalin, but did in fact oppose him. Some examples are given below - for example, that of the taxes on the peasantry, which apparently came up in Februar}' 1953.'^ None of those who opposed the tax increase were "removed from the 'lliis daim of Khrushchev's is discusiSL-d in (Ihaptcr9. (.'haptir Twu. "(^(illq^lity" 'I'nmplcd 23 leading collective," "morally annihilated" - whatever that means — or "physically annihilated" Although Stalin never removed anyone from the leadership for opposing him, Khnishchev did Khrushchev and the others had Lavrentii Beria arrested suddenly on June 26, 1953, on false charges and without any evidence. Subsequendy they had Beda killed, together with six others — Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik, and Vlodzimixskii - who had been close associates of his. Nor was Beiia the only person in the leadership of the Party whom Khmshche^' had removed for disagreeing with him. In July 1957 Khru- shchev called a CC Plenum to have Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov removed firom the leadership simply because they disagreed with his policies and had tried to get Khrushchev voted out of the Patty leadership. Khrushchev's high-handedness was a main reason for his re- moval by the Central Committee in 1964. Khnishchev and those who supported him needed to have some kind of explanation or excuse for failing to oppose Stalin in all his alleged "crimes" during all the years they shared the Party leadership with him. It seems that this - the threat of "annihilation" - became their alibi. Khru- shchev evidently said many times that, if "the/* had tried to "restore Leninist norms to the Party," or to ask him to retire, "not even a wet spot would have remained of us."'* Others in the communist movement saw through this thin excuse: VChen the Soviet leader Anastas Mikoian led the CPSU delegation to China to attend the CCP's 8* Congress in 1956, P'eng (Te-huai] asked him face to face why it was only now that the Soviet party was criticizing Stalin. Mikoian apparently replied: 'We did not dare advance our opinion at that time. To have done so would have meant death.' To which P'eng retorted: "What kind of a communist is it who fears death?'*^ But of course the accusation itself was false. <6 by ]Urii Shapuval, "Proshchanic s vlast'iu". ZtrhJo NtM Oct 23-29, 2004. .\t http://www.zcrkalo-ncdcli.com/nn/pnnt/481 1 3/ ■7 Rodcnck Macfarquhar, The Orient oj Ae CtAur^ Revobitioii, VoL 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 194, 24 Khrushchev I Atl 5. Mass Repressions Generally Khrushchev: Worth noting is the fact that, even during the progress of the furious ideological fight against the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites, the Bukharinites and others, extreme repressive measures were not used against them. The fight was on ideological grounds. But some years later, when socialism in our country was fundamentally constructed, when the exploiting classes were generally liquidated, when the Soviet social structure had radically changed, when the social basis for political movements and groups hostile to the party had violently contracted, when the ideological opponents of the party were long since defeated politically - then the repression directed against them began. It was precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass repression through the Government apparatus was bom, first against the-enemies of Leninism - Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, long since politically defeated by the party - and subsequently also against many honest Communists, against those party cadres who had borne the heavy load of the Civil War and the furst and most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization, who actively fought against the Trotskyites and the rightists for the Leninist party line. Nothing in Khrushchev's speech was more shocking than his accusation that Stalin had instigated massive and unjustified repression against high- ranking Bolsheviks. We will examine his specific allegations below, and preface those remarks here by stressing a few basic points. Khrushchev himself was responsible for massive repressions, possibly more than any other single individual aside from Nikolai Ezhov, head of the NKVD from 1936 to late 1938, who was certainly bloodier than any- one else.'" Unlike Stalin and the central Party leadership to whom he re- ported, but like Ezhov and many others, Khrushchev either had to know I" lUrii /.hukov adds Robert I. Mikhe to this group of bltxxJiest repressors. See "INidlinnaia istoriia lostfa Stalina?" Utenaimuia Ga^la No. 8 , l*ebniafy 28, 2007. We will return to this quesiian below. (^haplcr 'I'wa "CvAKgaiixy" Trampled 25 that many, probably the vast majonty of those he repressed were inno- cent or, at the very least, that their fates were decided without detailed investigation. Khrushchev was defending both Ezhov and Genxikh lagoda (Ezhov's predecessor as head of the NKVD) as late as February 1 1956, twenty- four days before the "Secret Speech". He reiterated this defense, though in somewhat more moderate terms, in the "rough draft'' of his speech dated February 18, 1956. This is hard to explain unless Khrushchev were already trying to deny that any conspiracies had actually taken place, and therefore that all those who had been repressed were innocent. Khru- shchev did in fact take that position, though not till well after the 20*'' Part)' Congress. In his Speech Khrushchev claimed Stalin must have been responsible for aU of Ezhov's repressions. He had to know this was false, since he had far more evidence at his disposal than we do today. It is clear from what relatively litde we now have that Ezhov was guilty of huge illegal repressions. Khrushchev was either candidate or full Politburo member during the investigations that established Ezhov's guilt. However, so were others, such as Mikoian, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov. Mikoian was a close accomplice of Khrushchev's. But the acquiescence to Khrushchev's speech by Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov, though only tempo- rary, can't be explained in the same way.*' Khrushchev declared many executed Party leaders "rehabilitated", inno- cent, in defiance of the evidence we have today, after the release of a small fraction of the documents relating to them. Sometimes he declared them to have been innocent victims of unfounded repression j priori^ even before the formality of a study of the evidence. Prosecutor's protest, and Supreme Court decision had been completed or even b^un. The Pospelov Report^' was drawn up to provide evidence for Khrushchev that the Party leaders had been unjustly executed, and came to foregone " Wc return to this (question in the final chapter. ^'Ilic "Pospdov (Commission Report" or simply "Pospelov Report" is dated l*ebruary 9, 1956. Its official tide is '"llic Report of the Commission of the CC CPSU to the Presidium of the CC CPSU tolvstabUsh the ('auscs of the Mass Rcpncssions Against Members and Candidate Members of the CC CPSU lUccted at the \7'^ Party Congress." 'llic Report was signed by A.B. .\ristov,N.M. Shvcmik, and P.l'. Komarov in addition to Pospelov. I'or the Russian text sec DokJad Khmsbdimi 185-230; RKEB 1 317-348 does not contain the appendices, including Eikhc's letter. 26 Khrushchev lied conclusions. It failed to consider a great deal of the evidence we know exists. Even as it stands it does not prove the innocence of the persons whose repression it studies. All the evidence we presently have points to the existence of a wide- spread Rightist-Trotskyist series of anti-govemment conspiracies involv- ing many leading Party leaders, both NKVD chiefs lagoda and Ezhov, high-ranking militar)' leaders, and many others.^' Broadly speaking, this is more or less the picture drawn by the Stalin government at the time, ex- cept that some vital details, such as Ezhov's involvement in the leader- ship of the Ri^tist conspiracy, were never publicly revealed. There is a lot of circumstantial evidence to suggest that Khrushchev him- self may well have been a participant in this Right-Trotskyite conspir- acy.22 Such an hypothesis makes sense of much of the evidence we have, but it is suggestive rather than conclusive. However, such a hypothesis would go far towards explaining Khrushchev's attack on Stalin, and even the subsequent history of the CPSU. Included in the Appendix section below and online in Russia and English are: • evidence of Khrushchev's massive repressions; ^ • excerpts from confessions by lagoda, Ezhov, and Frinovskii (Ezhov's second-in-command) concerning their participation in the Rightist-Trotskyist conspiracy, in the separate section on Ezhov. 6. "Enemy of the People'* Khrushchev: Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people." This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven; this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legalit)', against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad 2' Sec (Chapter 4. ^ l*()r some of this sec the Appendix on the present chapter. (ihaplcr 'I'wix "CuUct^ity" 'I'ramplcd 27 reputations. This concept "enemy of the people" actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological 6ght or the making of one's views known on this or that issue, even those of a practical character. In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the "confession" of the accused himself; and, as subsequent probing proved, "confessions" were acquired through physical pressures against the accused. This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality and to the fact that many entirely innocent persons, who in the past had defended the patty line, became victims. We must assert that, in r^ard to those persons who in their time had opposed the party line, there were often no sufficiently serious reasons for their physical annihilation. The formula "enemy of the people" was specifically introduced for the purpose of physically , annihilating such individuals. Stalin certainly did not "originate the concept." The phrase I'ennemi du ptupk was widely used during the great French Revolution. It was used by the writer Jean-Paul Marat in the very first issue of his revolutionary newsletter UAmi duPeupk in 1793.^ Subsequent use of the term derives from the French Revolution. It is famously the name of a play by Ibsen. Maxim Gorky used the term in his sketch "The Taudde Chersonese" ("Khersones Tavricheskii") in the "Oath of the Chersonesers," a sketch published in 1897. Because all the revolutionaries of 1917 tended to view the revolution in Russia through the lenses of the revolution of 1789, the term was used widely from the very beginning. Lenin used the term before the revolu- don. The Constitutional Democratic Party, called the "Cadets", which was the party of the rich bourgeoisie, was banned by the Coundl of Peo- ple's Commissars on November 28 1917 as an "enemy of the people." It was signed by Lenin. A locus classicm iox the use of the term "enemy of the people" during the 1930s is the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People's Commissars of August 7, 1932, also known as "the law of the ^ Sec hnp://mcnibrcsJycos.fr/ipmafat/ipmif.html (Chapter Twu "(Julkgialit)-" 'I nmplcd 29 really existed - is a private letter from Stalin to Kagaoovich, Sist pub- lished in 2001. It's dear from this letter that Stalin is reading the confes- sions of the defendants at tiial and trying to learn and draw conclusions from them. The section of Dmitriev's confession first published in 2004 is part of an investigative report sent to Stalin by Beria on October 23, 1938. Beda was in the process of rooting out NKVD men who had conspired to frame innocent people, mislead investigations, and aid the Rightists Buk- harin, Rykov and others to overthrow the government. The accused.here, D.M. Dmiiriev, had been head of the NKVD in Sverdlovsk oblast'. He refers directly to the interrogation of Kamenev's wife to which Stalin had referred, and so provides striking verification of the genuine nature of Stalin's letter to Kaganovich of August 23, 1936 printed among the documents in the Appendix. It is completely consistent with a Rightist plot. We now have a few of Zinoviev's, Kamenev's, and Bukharin's pre-trial interrogations from the Volkogonov Papers, in which all mutually, accuse one another - that is, all their confessions are mutually reinforcing, and consistent with their testimony at trial. We also possess their appeals for clemency to the Supreme Court, which they wrote after their sentencing. In them they again reaffirm their guilt Even the Rehabilitation report on them published in 1989, though heav- ily edited, contains suggestions of their guilt, for in it Zinoviev twice states that he is "no longer" an "enemy." Sentencing Zinoviev and Kamenev, among others, to be shot for treason was not arbitrary if they were guilty, as all the evidence at our disposal at present su^ests. We may assume Khrushchev had no evidence of their innocence, or he surely would have had it released. Therefore, we have every reason to conclude that Khrushchev lied hypocritically when he deplored Zinoviev 's and Kamenev's fates. 8. Trotskyites Khrushchev: Or, let us take the example of the Trotikyites. At present, after a sufficiendy long historical period, we can speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete calm and can analyze this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose 30 Khrushchev 1 Jed origin cannot by any means be traced to bourgeois society. Part of them belonged to the party intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited from among the workers. We can name many individuals who, in their time, joined the Trotskyites; however, these same individuals took an active part in the workers' movement before the Revolution, during the Socialist October Revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and returned to Leninist positions. Was it necessary to annihilate such people? In a speech to the February-March 1937 Plenum on March 3, Stalin did refer to Trotskyites in very hostile terms. But he did not advocate perse- cuting them. While stressing the need for renewed vigilance Stalin also proposed the establishment of special ideological courses for all leading party workers. That is, Stalin saw the problem of Trotskyism as a result of a low level of political understanding among Bolsheviks. Meanwhile at the same Plenum, in his concluding speech on March 5, Stalin argued strongly against punishing everyone who had ever been a Trotskyist, and called for "an individual, differentiated approach." This is prec^gely what Khrushchev, in the "Secret Speech," claimed that Stalin did not do. So Khrushchev advocated exactly what Stalin advocated at the Feb.-March 1937 Plenum,^ while denying that Stalin did this. The parallel between Khrushchev's and Stalin's speeches are so close that Khrushchev may in fact have copied this passage out of Stalin's very speech! There's a great deal of documentary evidence that Trotsky and his sup- porters were involved in anti-Soviet conspiracies, including with the Na- zis. Full documentation must await a separate study,^ but General Pavel 'llicrc is now c()nsiJcrablc evidence t() supp<irt Soviet allegations of the 1930s that Trotsky was involved with other ( )ppositionists within the USSR in a conspiracy to ovenhn>w the Stalin ^ivemmcnt, and even that he was in touch with the (icnnan and Japanese military. 'Iliere Ls also evidence that clandestine I'rot.skyist groups, both out.sidc and inside the Party, were involved in sabotage and espionage within the USSR, and in spreading false accusations of treason against others. ^ Sec ( J rover I'urr, "Mvidence of 1^-on 'I'rorsky's (loilaboration with Cietmany and Japan." Cu/liirt^Lopc (2009), at http://clugic.cserver.org/2009/l-urr.pJf ff!1iiln'irij''T— jfad 31 Hisrrii diifD, together with some Nazi documentation showing ^Pyillir iras idling the tzulfa^ is dted in Appendix 1 at this point. 9. Stalin neglected Party (Hioea^ dudng the 6rst few yeafs after Lenin's death, ^utf congiQses and Central Committee plenums took pihoemoieorless r^ulaxiy, later, when Stalin b^n ioaeaaog^ to abuse his power, these principles were hnilalty violated. This was especially evident during the fast 15 years of his life. Was it a normal situation when over 13 years ebpsed between the 18th and 19th Party CoDgiesses, years during which our party and our country had expenenced so many important events? Hcnhdiev implies chat Stalin fiiled to call any such Congress. The little Wdatct dut has been published so far &om the former Soviet archives ■ggesti that the Stalin leadership wished to call a Congress in 1947 or , 1948^ but that diis suggestion was rejected by the Politburo for some rea- lOD that has Dot been disclosed. The proposal was made by Andrd ^^liuusv, who was very close to Stalin. It is hig^y unlikely that Zhdanov ■Duld have made this proposal without Stalin's agreement. Ruthmnore, as a member of the Politburo Khrushchev would have beeo dicre to hear iti This makes the fact that Khrushchev does not actu- ilty Male, in so many words, that Stalin "refused" or "failed** to call a Coi^Kess, significant, many in his audience may have been aware of the plan fior an earlier conference. Nor did Khrushchev mention the war of 1941-45 or the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40. If peacetime years only aie counted, then a Congress in 1947 or 1948 would have been timely - difcc peacetime years (1940-1, 1946, 1947) since the Eighteenth Party CoQgrtss in 1939.2^ So once s^in Khrushchev was not being honesr. a Congress was plaoned for 1947 or 1948, but was never held. Khrushchev must have known the details of this very interesting discussion, including the rea- sons for not calling the Congress. But he never alluded to the fact at all. Nor did he or any of his successors ever release the transcript of this and succeeding CC Plenums. It has not been released to date. " See Usiav Vs«s«iuznoi KomniunistichL-skoi I'litii (bol'iihcvikov) . . . Moscow, t94S, p. 13. 32 Khrushchev lied Khrushchev also made the following similar and equally false accusation: It should be sufficient to mention that during all the years of the Patriotic War not a single Central Committee plenum took place. It is true that there was an attempt to call a Central Committee plenum in October 1941, when Central Committee members from the whole country were called to Moscow. They waited two days for the opening of the plenum, but in vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and talk to the Central Committee members. This fact shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war and how haughtily and disdainfully he treated the Central Committee members. Even Boris Nikolaevsky's note to the original Neuf leader edition of this speech recognized that this is a lie, though in his final sentence Ni- kolaevsky shows that he prefers to believe Khrushchev rather than Stalin- era Soviet sources. If one were to trust official Soviet sources, this statement by Khrushchev would not be true: According to the collection, The Communist Part)' of the Soviet Union in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums (published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute of the Party Central Committee in 1954), one Central Committee plenum was held during the war (|anuary 27, 1944), when it was decided to give the various Union Republics the right to have their own foreign ministries and it was also decided to replace the Internationale by the new Soviet national anthem. But it is likely that Khrushchev is correct, that there was no Central Committee plenum in 1944 and a fraud was perpetrated: The plenum was announced as having occurred although it never had. Wishful thinking on Nikolaevsky's part! For if Khrushchev lied here, where else might he have lied? The 1989 Russian edition of Khrushchev's Speech acknowledges that these two Plena were scheduled,^ and that » DuMaJ Khnjshchcva 152 n. 23. (.'hapicr 'I'wo. "CJolk.-giaiii)'" I'lamplcd 33 one of them took place, though without pointing up the obvious conclu- sion - that Khnishchev had lied In October 1941 leading party members were at the front and at this, the most cnidal time of the war. With the Nazi annies near Moscow, they could not be recalled for a CC meeting. And not only was there, in fact, a CC Plenum on January 27, 1944 — it was the Plenum at which the Soviet National Anthem was changed. Virtually everyone in Khrushchev's 1956 audience had Co know this! Yet Khrushchev still said itl^ Perhaps this is best explained as one of Khrushchev's blunders. It was certainly one of many falsehoods in his speech that must have been obvious even at the time. Chapter 3. Stalin's "Arbitrariness" Towards the Party 10. Reference to ^^a party commission under the control of the Central Committee Presidium"; fabrication of materials during repressions Khrushchev: The commission has become acquainted with a large quantity of materials in the NKVD archives and with other documents and has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of cases against • Communists, to false accusations, to glaring abuses of socialist legality, which resulted in the death of innocent people. It became apparent that many party, Soviet and economic activists, who were branded in 1937-1938 as "enemies," were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always honest Communists; they were only so stigmatized and, of ten, no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves (at the order of the investigative judges -falsifiers) with all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes. [...1 It was deteniiined that of the 139 members and candidates of the party's Central Committee who were elected at the 17th Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70 per cent, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-1938). (Indignation in the hall.) ... The same fate met not only the Central Committee members but also the majority of the delegates to the 17th Party Congress. Of 1,966 OMpierlluoc. Sulin's ".AibitrariiK'Ss" to the Patiy 3S delates with either voting or advisory rights, 1,108 persons were arrested on charges of anti-revolutionary ditnes, it., decidedly more than a majority. This statement is one of my three "Special Cases''^' for the fdlowing leason: Khmshchev implies that Stalin was responsible for something, but docs not say precisely what. Nor does he make an explicit accusation. Therefore, stricdy speaking, there is no ''revelation,'* and nothing to ex- pose. However, Khrushchev's statement was certainly meant to imply that Sta- lin simply had all these Party members murdered. That implication is con^letely false, and it will be refuted in the present section of this essay. However, even though this implication was clearly intentional and is, as we shall see, false, Stalin is not explicitly accused of anything. We now have the report of this commission, known as the Pospelov Commission,"^' after Petr N. Pospelov, director of the Institute of Marx- Engels-I^enin and secretary of the Central Committee. An historian, Pospelov directed this commission and later wrote the first draft of Khrushchev's "Secret Speech." During Stalin's lifetime Pospelov's works were among the most flagrant examples of the "culi.^' He became a close ally of fGirushchev's. Pospelov is considered to have been a very politi- cally-biased historian. Given his position, it would be surprising if he had not been. Even if we knew nothing about him, however, the report that bears his name would suggest that this was the case. The Pospelov Commission report does indeed conclude that many exe- cuted Party f^ures were innocent. But the evidence cited in the report does not demooBtrate their ioooceQce. The Commission simply de- clared them innocent. The whole structure of the report makes it clear that its purpose was to find Stalin guilty of massive repressions and to hush up any evidence that contradicted this foregone conclusion. We also have the summary reports prepared (on the ^^rehabilitations" of those leading Party figures repressed duiing the 1930s. Some of these " Sec Chapter tO, ".\ Typolc^ of Khtushchcv's Prevarications," for discussixMi of this and other catcgotk's of Khtushchcv's prevarications. Cr. RfobtStatsiia. Kak Elo Bjb. DokMrnw/f Pn^nma TsK KPSS idntpe mataii^. V )-kb tsmakk Tom I. Mart 1953 - Frvrat 1956. Moscow: MczhdunaroUnyi Fond Dcmokratiia, 2000, pp. 317'34S. Also at http.-//w>irttr.a)cundciyakovlcv.oig/almaiuh/insidc/alinanah- duc/S57S2 36 Khrushchev lied reports were prepared before the Pospelov Report, and most of them were prepared afterwards. Edited and published by Alexandr N. lakov- lev's "Memorial" fund, they include the Pospelov Report within them, but much other material too. "Memorial" is a very anti-communist or- ganization extremely hostile to Stalin. It can be assumed that they would have included any and all evidence that tended to make Stalin look guilty of repressing innocent people. ^2 In this section we cover the following matters: • There is a great deal of evidence suggesting that a significant number of the high-ranking Part)' members whose repression is cited by Khrushchev appear to have been guilty after all! At the very least, there is sufficient evidence of their guilt that the short summaries of their cases given in the Pospelov Report are utterly insufficient to establish their innocence. • Hzhov was responsible for fabricaiing cases against many Soviet citizens. It is possible that this includes a few of the Party members cited by Khrushchev. Ezhov confessed to doing this and was tried and executed for it (See the separate section 17 on Ezhov, below). • Many, if not most, of the investigations that established the fact of fabrications of confessions and torture against those arrested, were done during Beria's tenure as head of the NKVD, after he replaced Ezhov in late 1938. • Khrushchev initiated a covenip of the specific reasons for arrests, investigative and trial information, and executions of Central Committee members. Khrushchev referred to the large per centage of the Central Committee elected at, and Delegates to, the 17''' Party Congress in 1934 who were subsequently the victims of repression. As with the more detailed "ac- ^2 Op^ dl. Wc have also studic-tJ the two further volumes of "rehabilitation" materials, but as they publish materials later than the 2£fi* Party (Congress, they have no direct bearing on Khrushchev's "Secret Speech." Chaptn'l'hRr. Stalin's "iAtbitnrincss" to the I^arty 37 counting" of the CC delegates later published^^ Khrushchev g;ives no details about when and why different delates were arrested, tried, and many of them executed. His account gives the impression that his was done in an undifferentiated way by "Slalin." But Khnishchev knew bener. We can be sure of that, because we have the "rehabilitation" leports, including the Pospelov Commission report. Their contents make dear that there were several different reasons for these arrests and executions. According to the Commission, • "Most" were innocent. That implies that some were not, although the Commission did not specify which were guilt)', except for Ezhov. • Some were falsely implicated by others. Both Eikhe and E.G. Evdokimov speak of falsely accusing others, including CC members, when they were beaten or otherwise tortured • Some were tortured into signing false confessions and accusations against others. In addition the Commission emphasizes that Stalin was sent confessions and interrogations of many of those accused, which he then sent on to others on the Politburo. We know this is true, since a few of these have now been published. Both Khrushchev and the Pospelov Commission try to blame Becia for repression as well as Ezhov. But their own facts - many gathered during Beha's investigation of NKVD crimes and excesses during Ezhov's ten- ure - and their own statistics, give the lie to this theory. The reality is that Beria put an end to the "Ezhovshchina". The Pospelov Commission report lifts the curtain a tiny bit on what was really going on, while Khrushchev's ''Secret Speech" keeps it all reso- lutely hiddea But neither during the existence of the USSR nor since 1991 have the relevant materials been made available to researchers. So the truth of what went on continues to be covered up. It is reasonable to iurmise that this is so because such a study would tend to exculpate both ' In I^liia TtKKPSS No. 12, 1989, pp. 82-1 13. 38 Khrushchev lied Stalin and Beria, whom Khrushchev and Co. went to great lengths to blame for everything. In fact Khrushchev himself was one of those most guilty of mass repres- sion. We discussed this briefly in the previous chapter and cite docu- ments as evidence in the Appendix. In this chapter and the following one, we will examine the case of each of the repressed Party figures named by Khrushchev. In none of these cases did the "rehabilitation" materials, including the Pospelov Commission report, cite sufficient evidence to establish their innocence. In fact, in a number of cases the report itself admits the existence of contradictoi\' evidence. Since the end of the USSR and the very partial opening of former Soviet archives to a few researchers some evidence relating to the charges against the high Party officials mentioned by Khrushchev and discussed in the Pospelov Commission's report has come to light. The Russian government has refused to make public the full investigative materials about any of these figures. Therefore, we cannot be certain that these men were guilty. But the evidence available to us today demonstrates the utter inadequacy of the Pospelov Commission's conclusions that these men were innocent. The vast preponderance of evidence available to us today points towards their guilt. 11. December 1, 1934 "directive" signed by Enukidze Khrushchev: On the evening of December 1, 1934 on Stalin's initiative (without the approval of the Political Bureau - which was passed two days later, casually)... This is a false statement. Khrushchev was complaining to the Party lead- ership that this law had been signed by the Governmental body - the Presidium of the TsIK - but not by the Politburo of the Party. But the Soviet Constitution said nothing about the Politburo of the Party, and there was thus no reason for the Politburo to pass on this decision. It was signed by Kalinin and Enukidze, Chairman and Secretary' of the Cen- tral Executive Committee respectively. Khrushchev gives no evidence that it was passed "on Stalin's initiative." Stalin wrote a note on the draft that he was "for publication." This means it had been submitted to him (ihaptcr llinv. Stalin's "Arbimnncss" to the Patty 39 10 ask him if he agreed with publishing it. Since it had been submitted to him, this draft at least cannot have come from him in the first place.^ llie question of this decree is distorted in the 1989 official Russian edi- tion of Khrushchev's Speech, which states that it was not submitted for confinnation by a session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. No CN'idence is given in support of this statement. But even if this is so - what does it have to do with Stalin? He was not Chairman of the CEC. And it is irrelevant to our purpose anyway, as Khrushchev was not referring to ratification by the CEC at all. He was complaining that the PoUtburo - a Part)' organ - had not passed on it beforehand. But there u"as no need for it to do so. The fact that Khrushchev complained Stalin had not sought approval by the Politburo for this decree supports the theory put forward by some researchers that one of Khrushchev's motives in attacking Stalin was Sta- lin's attempt to move the Party out of governing society and running the economy. This theory has been supported in various ways by researchers such as lurii Zhukov, Arch Getty, and lurii Mukhin, as well as the aethor of this present work,'* 12. Khrushchev Implies Stalin's involvement in Kirov's murder. Khrushchev: It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirov's murder hide many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination. There are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolaev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was to protect the person of Kirov. A month and a half before the killing, Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious 40 Khrushchev lied behavior but he was released and not even searched. It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for an interrogation, on December 2, 1934, he was killed in a car "accident" in which no other occupants of the car were harmed. After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces of the organizers of Kirov's killing. In this passage Khrushchev implied, though without stating it overtly, that Stalin was involved in Kirov's murder. As Arch Getty has pointed out, several Soviet and post-Soviet commissions tried to find evidence that Stalin was involve in Kirov's assassination, and all failed. In a longer discussion in The Road To Terror (\4\-T) Getty concludes that there is no evidence at present that Stalin had anything to do with Kirov's assassina- tion. Sudoplatov too concluded there was no reason to suspect Stalin in this assassination. Getty, along with most Russian researchers, believes that Stalin "framed" — fabricated a false case against - the Oppositionists who were tried, convicted, and executed for involvement in Kirov's assassination. But there is good evidence that they were not framed at alL For example, though only a tiny amount of the investigative material from the Kirov assassination is even open to researchers, and much less than that has been published, we have a partial transcript of an interrogation of Ni- kolaev, the assassin, in which he incriminates an underground Zinovievist group that included Kotolynov, and a partial interrogation of Kotolynov of the day before in which he accepts "political and moral responsibility" for the assassination of Kirov by Nikolaev.^ 13. Stalin's and Zhdanov's telegram to the Politburo of September 25 1936. Khrushchev: ^ LubtMJka. S/aHi, I V'ChKGPV-OGPU-NlKVD. lAwar' 1922 - lUkabr' 1936. Mosc<.w: 2003, N()S. 481 and 482, pp. 575-577. Vladimir Hobrov and I arc preparing a detailed study ()f the Kirov Assassination. jptcf Ihtix. Stalin's "Arbitrariness" to the Pait>' 41 Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936 after a telegram from Stalin and [Andrei] Zhdanov, dated from Sochi on September 25, 1936, was addressed to Kaganovich, Molotov and other members of the Political Bureaa The content of the telegram was as follows: 'VC'e deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Ezhov be nominated to the post of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU is four years behind in this matter. This is noted by all party workers and by the majority of the representatives of the NKVD.' This Stalinist formulation that the "NKVD is four years behind" in applying mass repression and that there is a necessity for "catching up" with the neglected work direcdy pushed the NKVD workers on the path of mass arrests and executions. lin's phrase did not refer to repression, much le&s mass repression, at but to dissatisfaction with the invesdgadon of the recendy-discovered )tskyite-Zinovievite bloc. Getty^^ shows that the phrase "four years lind" must mean four years, not from the Riutin Platform but from discovery of the bloc of Rights and Trotskyites formed in 1932. That it showed suspicion of lagoda. Thurston and Jansen and Petrov Ee.M &ct, Khrushchev knew this too, but hid the fact in the "Secret €ch." The Pospelov-Aristov draft of Khrushchev's speech stated di- ly that the "four years" was since the formadon of the bloc in 1932. khd Kbrushcheva, 125). Pospelov and Axistov introduced the words nial' ufmhchetitioe ("catch up what has been n^lected*'). But this was nvention of theirs. Stalin had not used these words. IT)', OriffHs, Chapter 5; Cictty, "The C»rcat Puigi*s Rcconsidcrcd". Unpub. PhD diss. >n College, 1979, p. 326. ben lliurston. Life ami Temriii StaSifj Rjusia, 1 934- 1941. (Yale University Press; I, p.35; Marc Jansen, Nikita Petrov. SlaBits LajfoJ Extatioiitr Piopyi Commissar Nikala 1, 1895-1940. (Hoover Institution Press, 2002), p.54. 42 Khrushchev lied Khrushchev picked up this expression, but omitted the fact that the '*four years" was since the formation of the bloc. The Pospelov Report also omitted reference to the "bloc," interpreting the "four years" to mean the need for repression {DokJod Khrushcheva^ 220). An important part of Khrushchev's and Pospelov's basic premise is that no bloc ex- isted It's clear that the "neglected work" Stalin and Zhdanov meant in their telegram was the investigation of the Right-Trotskyite bloc and its in- volvement with representatives of foreign governments in planning a "palace coup" and with "terror" {terror = assassination, murder). Both Getty and prominent Trotskyist scholar Pierre Broue affirm that such a bloc really existed. Their studies in Trotsky's own archives at Harvard University, opened in 1980, prove this beyond doubt.''^ 14. Stalin's report at the February-March 1937 CC Plenum Khrushchev: Stalin's report at the February-March Central Committee plenum in 1937, 'Deficiencies of party work and •methods for the liquidation of the Trotskyites and of other two-facers', contained an attempt at theoretical justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext that as we march forward toward socialism class war must allegedly sharpen. Stalin asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this. Stalin's report at this Plenum did not contain any such theoretical justifi- cation. Khrushchev seriously distorted Stalin's words. Stalin never said that "as we march forward towards socialism class war must sharpen." What he said was: . . . the further forward we advance, the greater the successes we achieve, the greater will be the fury of the remnants of the broken exploiting classes, the sooner will they resort to sharper forms of struggle, the more ^ J. Arch (icny, "'I'rotsky in Mxilc: 'llic l-'ounding of the I'ourth Intcraational." Switl S/udiaii No. 1 (lanuary 1986), 28 and n. 19 p. 34; Pierre Broue, "Trotsky et Ic bloc Jl-s oppositions de 1932." Cahim Lion Tntskj 5 (1980) S-37. llhafcSiilm's "Aifainrificss" to the Paity 45 «iM diC7 seek to hanii the Soviet state and the more will fhcf dutch at the most desperate means of snuggle, as die last Ksoct of doomed people. It should be borne in miod that the renmants of the broken classes in the US5.R. are not alone. They have the direct support of our enemies beyond the bounds of the U.S.S.R.^ $lilia went on to call for an individual approach and for political educa- fioa,BOt for anything like repressions or "terror." But about the "direct mppott of eoemies beyond the bounds of the USSR" Stalin was correct. A fftat deal of evidence that foreign a^its were recruiting Soviet citi- aens iolo sabotage and espionage had already been ^thered, and a lot moce would be uncovered in the months after the Plenum. Aod, in fact, Lenin had said something very similar to this in a passage Stalio had quoted in a speech of Apol 1929. Even in this speech the solu- doos Stalin called for were vigibnce, along with political education courses to be organized for all Party leaders above a certain rank. This call for politiwi education, not mass repression, marks the culn)inating point of his speech. On March 5 1937 Stalin also made another, concluding report at the Feb- luaiy-March CC Plenum. This closing speech of the Plenum could never be teimed a "theoretical justiEcacion of the mass tccror policy". Stalin explicitly aigued that "there must be an individual, differentiated ap- pcoach. Further on in the report Stalin made the same point again, explic- itty aiguing agaiost a mass approach. Stalin argues that there are, at most, only a few thousand Party members who could be said to have sympathized with the Trotskyites, or "about 12,000 Party members who sympathized with Trotskyism to some extent or other. Here you see the tola] forces of the Trotskyite gentlemen."^' Rather than calling for a "mass terror policy," Stalin made a strong argu- oient against it. ludi Zhukov (Inoi Suslin^ 360 ff.) agrees that Stalin's speech was very mild. A resolution was prepared on his report It was passed unanimously, but has never been published. Zhukov quotes it irom an archival copy (362-3). «>J.V. Sialin, Maitmiig tMshevim (New York: W<Klicts I Jbraiy, 1937). p. 30. .\t hop:/ / www.inan2nuo.ccmi/Scilin/MB57.hnnl 44 Khrushchev lied Far from calling for "mass repression", as Khrushchev falsely claimed, Stalin called for more inner-Party political education, espedally for Party leaders such as those at the Central Committee Plenum. He called for each such Party leader to pick two replacements for him so he could go to Party courses that would last four months, while more local Part)' leaders would go to courses lasting six months. Many or most of the Delegates to the Plenum were First Secretaries and local Party secretaries. They could have interpreted this plan as a threat. In effect, they were to choose their own potential replacements. A kind of "competition" for these high Party posts seemed to be in the offing. If the Party Secretaries went off to these courses, who could say that they would return? In reality, it was the Party First Secretaries and others around the counin' - including, as we have seen, Khrushchev himself - who turned to "mass repression." These courses were never set up. At the next Plenum in June 1937, the Secretaries instead turned to Stalin with frightening stories of threats by reactionaries and returning kulaks. They demanded extraordi- nary powers to shoot and imprison tens of thousands of these people. This will be discussed in more detail below. Earlier in the Plenum also, on February 27, Stalin gave the report of the commission on the investigation of Bukharin and Rykov. This marked a total of three reports by Stalin — the most he ever made at any Plenum. In this report he recommended a very mild resolution. Getty and Naumov (411-416) study the voting of the commission and point out that Stalin's recommendations were mildest of all - internal exile. Ezhov, the original reporter, along with Budienniy, Manuil'skii, Shvemik, Kosarev and lakir all voted to "turn [them] over to trial with a recommendation to shooi them." See the detailed discussion by Vladimir Bobrov and Igor' Pykhalov^^in an article that examines a rumor, spread by Bukharin's widow Larina in her memoirs, that Stalin had been for execution and and laldr had op- posed it - exactly the opposite of what really occurred, but a bit of and- Stalin "folklore" that became elevated to the status of historical "fact" until the documents were published in post-Soviet times. "lakir I Bukharin: Splvrni I Dokumc-iit)'." http://dcl()sialina.ru/?p=333 and clsnvhca*. It is reprinted in Igor' !*ykhal()v, ViBkii OInlgflHirjfi Va^M' (Moscow: Yau;:a, 2010), (Chap- ter 6, 355-366. (ihapK.T'lhfn.-. Stalin's "vVrbitranncss" to the Fart)' 45 Stalin had outlined a view that the class struggle had to shaipen as the Soviet Union developed towards socialism. But this was not in 1937, but at the April 1928 Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission: What is the issue here? It*s not at all the issue that the further ahead we drive, the stronger the task of socialist construcbon becomes developed, then the stronger will grow the opposition of the capitalists. That isn't the issue. The issue is why does the opposition of the capitalists grow stronger? (Emphasis added, GF)^^ •According to Bordiugov and Kozlov this thesis had been further devel- oped by Valerian Kuibyshev at the September 1928 Plenum. They add that Bukhann had opposed it at the April 1929 Plenum, but in an equivo- cal wa)-: Bukharin had agreed that class struggle sharpened at certain times - and agreed that 1929 was one of those times - but said that it was not a general principle. • 15. '^Many Members questioned mass repression**, especially Pavel Postyshev Khrushchev: At the February-March Central Committee plenum in 1 937 many members actually questioned the rightness of the established course r^arding mass repressions under the pretext of combating "two-facedness. Comrade Postyshev most ably expressed these doubts. He said: I have philosophized that the severe years of fighting have passed. Party members who have lost their backbones have broken down or have joined the camp of the enemy; healthy elements have fought for the party. These were the years of industrialization and collectivization. I never thought it possible that after this severe era had passed Uncorrected transcript of Stalin's speech at the Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC of the .\UCI>(b) .April 22. 1929, in Kak lomaB NEP. Sttmffoimj Pkmam TsK VKP(b} t92S- 1929 gg. VStomakh. Tom 4. (Moscow: MDI',2000). p.655. 46 Khrushchev lied Kaipov and people like him would find themselves in the camp of the enemy. (Karpov was a worker in the Ukrainian Central Committee whom Postyshev knew well.) And now, according to the testimony, it appears that Kaipov was recruited in 1934 by the Trotskyites. I personally do not believe that in 1934 an honest party member who had trod the long road of unrelenting fight against enemies for the party and for socialism would now be in the camp of the enemies. I do not believe it. . . I cannot imagine how it would be possible to travel with the party during the difficult years and then, in 1934, join the Trotskyites. It is an odd thing. . . ^ In the mid-1990s the trsuiscript of this February- March 1937 Central Committee Plenum was finally published. We can now see that, while this quotation of Postyshev is genuine, Khrushchev's commentary is deliber- ately false. Khrushchev obviously knew he was lying about it. Khrushchev said "many members... questioned the rightness..." In fact, not a single member did so. Even Postyshev did not do sol After the section quoted by Khrushchev, Postyshev went on to condemn Karpov, and anyone else who had joined forces with the enemy. Postyshev was actually harshest of all at expelling large numbers of peo- ple, and was removed as candidate member of Politburo for this at the January 1938 CC Plenum. Getty demonstrates at length how Postyshev was raked over the coals at this Plenum for excessive repression, speak- ing of "the overvigilant Postyshev as being sacrificed for the sake of end- ing mass expulsions in the party. . (Getty & Naumov 517; cf 533ff.) ** Sex- Lubiaiihi. StaSn i Glmtm uprm/kmi guhc^pasimH NKID 1937-1938. Moscow: MI!)!'. 2004 (hcrc-aftcr I.ubianka 2) No. 17, pp. 69 ff., a report made to Stalin by Itzhov on I'ebruary 2» 1937 of an interro)ration of .Asranfian about a "Ri^ht-lieftist" ot^nization in the Ukraine that was collaborating with the 'rrotsk)'ist and Ukrainian Nationalist undergrounds. In the transcript of .Nsranfian's confession of January 14, 1937 Stalin circled Karpov's name and wrote "AX'lio is thisr^' in the margin - p. 7 1 -2. (lelt)', J. Arch and Oleg \'. Naumov, Tht Rixui/o Tenw. Statin ami tht St^-Dtstnuthii e/tbt Bobbmks, 1932-1939. New I laven: Yale University Press, 1999 (hereafter (ietty & Nau- mov)., 517; cf. 533 ff. 'llie dtKument confirming Postyshcv's expulsion and arrest is nrproduced on pp. 514-516. (iluptcf lliai-. Stalin's "Arfaitcaiincss" to the Puiy 47 luii Zhukov's analysis agrees that at the January 1938 Plenum the Stalin leadership again tried to put brakes on the First Secretaries' illegal repres- sions. The document confirming Postyshev's expulsion and arrest for repressing innocent people in a mass way is quoted at length, in transla- tion, by Getty and Naumov. Khnishchev was present at the January 1938 CC Plenum, and certainly knew all about Postyshev's fate and why he was sacked. As a Plenum panidpant Khrushchev also had to know that "many members" did not "question the rightness" of the repressions. Khrushchev himself made a hanh, repressive speech at the February-March 1937 CC Plenum in uiiich he supported the repression wholeheartedly. Futtheimore, it was Khrushchev who replaced Postyshev as candidate member of Politburo.^ According to Getty and Naumov Khrushchev himself was one of those who were **speaking up forcefully against Po- siy'shei'.*^' Therefore, Khrushchev was lying. Far from "questioning" the mass re- pressions, Postyshev was one of those who most flagrantly engaged in them himself, to the point where he was the 6rst to be removed from candidate membership in the Politburo, and soon after that expelled from the I\irty and arrested The partial transcript of this Plenum now available confirms this. Postyshev's lawless and arbitrary repressions are dociunented in a letter &om Andreev to Stalin of January 31, 1938. Postyshev was soon arrested, and later confessed to involvement in some kind of conspiracy to participating in a Rightist conspiracy, naming a number of others, including other First Secretaries and CC members. According to Vladimir Karpov, Postyshev confirmed his confession to Molotov. Given the documentation cited above — a small fraction of all that is available but not yet released — there is every reason to believe that Posty- shev's arrest, trial and execution were justified. His execution came more than a year after his arrest. We know there is a lengthy investigative file on him, and a trial transcript, but virtually none of this has been released by the Russian government. ^ Stalinskoc Politbiuro v iO^ gody. Sbotnik dokumentov (Moscow: AIRU-XX, 1995), p.l67. Getty & Naumov, 512 Chapter 4. The "Cases" Against Party Members and Related Questions 16. Eikhe Khrushchev: The Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to inform the Congress of many such fabricated "cases" against the members of the party's Central Committee elected at the 17th Party Congress. An example of vile provocation, of odious falsification and of criminal violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the former candidate for the Central Committee Political B