The Constantinople Treaty of 1724 was an uneasy topic for Armenian historiography and textbooks portraying Russia as a friend. The treaty is reflected in post-independence, but, still uses euphemisms typical of the Soviet period, such as, “inability of the Russian troops to move further” rather than simply saying that it was directly agreed to by their own government, and that both the Ottoman and Russian empires “were trying to avoid conflict at all costs.” [v] On the whole, the impression is that even if presenting factual information, the 1724 Constantinople Treaty narrative surprisingly does not provide a chiefly Armenian perspective, as could be expected in a national history textbook and is less critical of the Russian policies than any other big power in the same position could be.

To prove that point, it is enough to compare critical remarks towards the European Great Powers in different passages, noting that they were “creating obstacles” for Russia to take over the Western part of Armenia in the 19th century, which, as the textbook rightfully asserts, could be a positive change in the life of the local Armenian population.

An interesting topic is the downfall of the first Armenian Republic in 1920 against the background of the alliance of Soviet Russia with Republican Turkey and the treaties of 1921 essentially partitioning Armenia between the two powers.

When tackling the Russian-Turkish alliance, the textbook often mentions its anti-Armenian aspects, however, in some instances one may observe a certain “blame shifting” by mentioning “anti-Armenian lobbying” rather than direct responsibility and political will behind Soviet Russia’s authorities for decisions clearly unfavorable for Armenia.[vi]

For instance, the fact that the Soviet Armenian delegation was not admitted as a party in the Moscow Treaty negotiations in February and March 1921 was explained by “the efforts of the Turkish side,” without explaining why the Soviet Russian government, which is said in the textbook, to have favored both Soviet Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s participation in the talks, complied to Turkish demands. In the same section of the textbook, a passage says that Soviet Azerbaijan’s leadership was also involved in what can be called “pro-Turkey lobbying” before the Soviet leadership, however this hardly can be considered as a plausible explanation for excluding the Armenian delegation from talks.

Yet the textbook’s statement, “Neither Soviet Russia nor Kemalist Turkey had any right to make arrangements on Armenian territory without the participation of the Armenian party,” sounds only partially plausible. In reality, Soviet Armenia’s predecessor, the Armenian Republic was at war with the de-facto government of Turkey, so the Turkish Republic could definitely be a signatory party to such a document. Meanwhile, Soviet Russia’s signature in the document is more problematic, as it formally had no involvement in the conflict and Soviet Armenia was nominally an independent state.

The tradition of using euphemisms is still present in the narrative of the beginning of the Soviet regime in Armenia. In a couple of cases we find the odd expression, “the unfavorable attitudes of the Soviet Russian leadership towards Armenians” in places where otherwise the simple term “anti-Armenian” is used, when, for instance, describing Azerbaijani diplomatic activities in 1918-1921.

The textbook also mentions several representatives of the Soviet Armenian leadership as “preoccupied with Armenian national issues” during the Soviet regime. However, we do not clearly see what odds they were fighting against and what messages they received or sanctions they faced from Moscow for their nationalist activities.

The national policies of the Soviet authorities are rather blurred in the picture, although they are represented in a negative tone.

There is little attempt to explain to students why Armenia, like any other constituent republic in the Soviet Union had very limited self-governance, let alone sovereignty.

In two consecutive pages, the ninth grade history textbook says that the “sovereignty of the [constituent] republics [in the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic] was very limited” and that, according to the USSR Treaty, the Republics had to “maintain their sovereignty.” The authors fail to explain the reasons for this discrepancy between reality and paper.

These are only a few examples of the overall pattern, which generally can be said to be adjusted to the current patterns of the relationship between Armenia and Russia, on the one hand, and on the currently circulating nationalist mythological patterns, on the other.