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When one acts intentionall y, what one does is a function of how one i s, mentally speaking. Therefore, to be ultimately responsible for one’s action, one must be ultimately responsible for how one is, mentally speaking—at least in certain respects. But to be ultimately responsible for how one is in the relevant respects, one must have chosen to become (or intentionally brought it about that one would becom e) that way in the past. But if one chose to become that way, then one’s choice was a function of the way one was in certain mental respects. Therefore, to be ultimately responsible for

that

choice, one would need to be ultimately responsible for being

that

w ay. But this process results in a vicious regress. Therefore, one cannot be ultimately responsible for any of one’s intentional actions. And one clearly cannot be ultimately responsible for any of one’s unintentional actions. Therefore, one cannot be ultimately responsible for any of one’s actions.

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More concisely, u ltimate responsibili ty requires ultimate self- origination, which is impossible

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For further reading, I recommend:

o

“Free Will,” entry by Galen Strawson in the

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

o

“Concerning the resilience of Galen Strawson ’s Basic Argument,” by Michael Istvan

o

Freedom and Belief

, by Galen Strawson Moral nihilism

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Moral nih ilism is the view that there are no moral facts

o

Therefore, under moral nihil ism, nothing is “good” or “bad” or “right” or “wron g” or “just” or “unjust” or “moral” or “immoral”

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If moral facts existed, they would be metaphysically queer. They would have inescapable practical authority, which is to say that they would provide normative reasons for action that are independent of one’s desires and interests. At the same time, they would be non-natural, since moral naturalism cannot account for the categorical quality of moral requirements.

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On atheism, posi ting the existence of such metaphysi cally queer entities amounts to an extraordinary claim, and extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. But the only appa rent evidence for this claim is our (so-called) shared moral intuition, which is plausibly explained by evolution, without invoking moral facts.

o

Plausible evolution ary explanations are available for sympathy, empathy and disgust, for norms of reciprocity, fairness and justice, and for moral belief. For detail, please see the recommended reading below (particularly Joyce and Tomasello).

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For further reading, I recommend:

o

Moral Error Theory

, by Jonas Olson

o

Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong

, by J. L. Mackie

o

The Myth of Morality

, by Richard Joyce

o

The Evolution of Morality

, by Richard Joyce

o

A Natural History of Human Morality

, by Michael Tomasello

o

A Very Bad Wizard

, by Tamler Sommers

o

Beyond Morality

, by Richard Garner Thanatophobic irrationalism

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Thanatophobic i rrationalism is the view that the fear of death is irrational

o

I define “death” as the endin g of the dyin g process—the loss of the very last trace of lif e. As such, death is virtually instantaneous.

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