Yet the empire Eastman started to build at the end of the 19th century, and which dominated the 20th, did not last long into the 21st century. On January 18th Eastman Kodak filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in New York. The firm was laid low by the rapid shift to digital photography and away from film, where Kodak once earned 70% margins and enjoyed a 90% market share in America.

These handsome profits meant that the firm could invest huge sums in research and development. Yet ironically, extensive R&D contributed to Kodak's undoing, since the firm ended up pioneering the very digital cameras that went on to kill its core business. The profits also allowed Kodak to be a generous and caring company for generations of employees in Rochester (New York), where it is based, and beyond. This, too, added to its troubles, since its pension obligations left it with less capital to diversify or invest in promising areas that might have saved it.

Kodak says that it has secured a credit facility of $950m with an 18-month maturity from Citigroup to help it through the restructuring process. It has also appointed a "chief restructuring officer", Dominic Di Napoli of FTI Consulting. Under the rules of the Chapter-11 procedure, companies remain going concerns, but a court will supervise debt repayments and restructuring. In some cases operations are shuttered and assets sold off, but Kodak hopes that bankruptcy protection will give it the time to transform itself into a profitable business.

The company's digital imaging and printer businesses generate billions of dollars in revenue a year—but not enough to cover costs. When film sales collapsed in the 2000s, Kodak tried to diversity into new business areas, from drugs to chemicals—with mixed success. In some cases pricey acquisitions were abandoned.

It is a historic comedown for a firm that once defined American industrial power and inventiveness. Yet its problems were not unlike those that other big American technology near-monopolists had to deal with in the 20th century. National Cash Register (NCR) was once one of the world's top computer makers, but has been reduced to making ATM machines and high-end registers. Xerox, the pioneer of copying machines, is struggling in the competitive market for imaging products and services. Even AT&T, the telecoms giant, was not able replicate the dominance it once enjoyed in handling long-distance calls. The only American technology heavyweight that has successfully reinvented itself is IBM—and more than once. In recent years the firm deftly managed the shift from selling hardware to offering software and services.

The morale of Kodak's fate is that technology trends are often clearly visible, but changing a successful company is exceedingly hard. NCR was not able to adapt to the world of personal computers. Xerox could not find the right formula to compete in a world with many rivals. AT&T failed to adjust to the Internet (and was acquired by one of its smaller "baby bell" local phone companies, that later took its former parent's grand name).

Kodak fared the worst since the shift to digital photography was so massive and sudden. Perhaps a new management team will be able to revitalise the firm. It still owns an extensive portfolio of valuable patents, a legacy of its past R&D prowess, which generates millions annually. Its brand name is recognised the world over.

Yet Kodak's fate ought to be a lesson for today's technology powerhouses such as Google, Microsoft and Facebook. No firm, however strong, can count on continued success: market dominance is only a snapshot in time.