by PETER DÖRRIE

Boko Haram is officially an international problem. At least according to the African Union, which asked the United Nations Security Council on Jan. 29 to greenlight an intervention force to bring the Islamist group to its knees.

The A.U. plans a 7,500-strong military force, named the Multinational Joint Task Force, and staffed by Nigerian, Cameroonian, Chadian and Beninese troops.

If the coalition gets the go-ahead, the soldiers will base in their respective countries, but coordinate and assist each other.

The decision by the A.U. to establish the MNJTF is an important development in the fight against Boko Haram.

Boko Haram controls a territory approximately the size of Belgium, centered in Nigeria’s northeastern states Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. The terror group also staged frequent and large-scale attacks into Cameroon in recent months, one of the main reasons that international action has become a pressing concern.

The Islamist group thrives because of an overwhelmed Nigerian army, porous borders and lack of coordination between national militaries—all things the MNJTF is supposed to prevent.

But the MNJTF is not necessarily that important from a military perspective. Rather, it indicates a shift in Nigerian policy, which until now has acted like the situation was under control. For years, Abuja gave the impression that all it needed were more and better weapons.

There’s a chance the Nigerian government was either hallucinating—a kind of shock at Boko Haram’s metastasizing territory and civilian death toll—or there were political calculations at play. With the country’s hotly-contested presidential elections almost over, Abuja seems ready to ask for help.

But while establishing the MNJTF in the form envisioned by the A.U. is a long overdue step, it’s unlikely to bring a quick end to the conflict.