TIME was when “Polnische Wirtschaft” (Polish economy) was a German byword for chaos and backwardness. Now it's a compliment. Germany trades more with Poland's healthy economy than it does with Russia's sickly one, including oil and gas. Other once-communist countries such as the Czech Republic are closely linked to German industry's supply chains—more so, in fact, than some “western” neighbours like Belgium or Denmark. The political consequences of Germany's historic eastward integration are still unfolding. The biggest shift is the end of distrust. This dated in part from the scars of the second world war, and more recently from Germany's close relationship with Russia under Gerhard Schröder. Since 2005, under his successor as Germany's chancellor, Angela Merkel, that has changed. From the Baltic to the Balkans, Germany is now seen as the natural leader in efforts to reform Europe's economy. In November Poland's foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, gave a big speech in Berlin in which he urged Germany to act to save the euro. So long as Poland was consulted, he said, it would follow Berlin's lead. Some Poles cried treason, but support elsewhere was strong. Germany's finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, said he was “moved almost to tears”. The Czech foreign minister (and possible future president), Karl Schwarzenberg, called it a “Copernican revolution in Polish political thought”. So far, Poland is pleased with the result. Its priority is not to be left out: the great Polish fear is that France, never enthusiastic about enlargement to the east, wants to recreate a more tightly integrated European Union without Poland and the other easterners. Poland counts on Germany to block that. Poland and the Baltic states also bemoan French arms sales to Russia, including four Mistral amphibious assault ships with no defensive role. Germany steers clear of such deals.

The ex-communist countries are economic liberals by EU standards. They detest talk of tax harmonisation or any weakening of the single market. But in most other respects they are not a group: three (Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia) sit alongside Germany in the euro zone's inner councils. They tend to take a hawkish view, cross that their hard-up taxpayers are bailing out richer countries like Greece. They urge Germany to stay tough on monetary loosening, Eurobonds and other mooted concessions (pressure that Germany privately welcomes, some say). For Eurosceptic Czechs, the priority is quite different. They fear inclusion, not exclusion. This week the Czech Republic joined Britain outside Germany's new fiscal pact. Mr Schwarzenberg has warned Germany not to throw its new-found weight around.

The Germans also hold a big carrot with the EU budget for 2014-20. For the ex-communist east the “cohesion funds” that pay for roads, railways and other modernisation projects have been a huge boon. More of that is vital; friendly ties with Germany may ensure that the deal struck in the months ahead is a good one.

The budget issue divides the easterners from their old friends. Sweden and Britain are seen as stingy budget-cutters. Memories are still sore from the last budget round, when the then prime minister Tony Blair dumped his ex-communist allies to secure a better deal for Britain. Also waning is American power. The Obama administration's explicit reorientation towards Asia and military withdrawal from Europe is eroding old Atlanticist loyalties.

That gives Germany more diplomatic space. It is working with Poland and Ukraine to broker a deal between the Moldovan government and the breakaway region of Transdniestria. Russia and America once took the lead roles there. It is also trying to speed Romania and Bulgaria's accession to the Schengen passport-free travel zone, against the protests of the Dutch.

German policymakers react modestly to all this, insisting that they have no desire to run Europe. But for their eastern neighbours, the prospect is no nightmare.