IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Citation: Robert John: of the familymacmillan v. Johannson, 2017 BCSC 1069

Date: 20170626

Docket: S188258

Registry: New Westminster

Between:

Robert John: of the familymacmillan

Plaintiff

And

Julie Johannson, Canada Revenue Agency

Defendants

Corrected Judgment: The text of the judgment was corrected at paragraph 10 on July 7, 2017.

Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Blok

Reasons for Judgment

Appearing on his own behalf: The Plaintiff Counsel for the Defendants: S. Singh Place and Date of Hearing: New Westminster, B.C. June 21, 2017 Place and Date of Judgment: New Westminster, B.C. June 26, 2017





I. Introduction

[1] There are cross-applications in this matter. The plaintiff applies for judgment and the defendants apply to strike the plaintiff’s claim in its entirety.

[2] The plaintiff’s action is against the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and one of its employees. The plaintiff’s essential complaint is that CRA’s execution proceedings against his property are wrongful because he does not owe anything to the government.

[3] Some context is necessary here. Robert MacMillan currently owes about $220,000 for unpaid income taxes (and perhaps other charges) relating to the 2012, 2013 and 2014 taxation years, and about $43,000 for unpaid goods and services tax (GST) accrued between June 2012 and March 2017.

[4] The Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) has taken steps to collect the monies owing, including issuing requirements to pay to several financial institutions and to clients or customers of the plaintiff. In addition, a writ of seizure and sale was executed by sheriffs in Toronto, which resulted in the seizure and sale of some shares. The Minister also registered a judgment against the plaintiff’s residence.

[5] These various collection efforts have garnered sums totalling about $94,000. Still, the sum of about $263,000 remains owing.

II. The Action

[6] The plaintiff commenced this action on February 23, 2017. The statement of facts contained within the notice of civil claim is very difficult to understand, but with the benefit of submissions made at the hearing it emerged that the plaintiff draws a distinction between liability incurred against the name that has been imposed on him by the government and any liability or debts which he “as a man” might properly owe. He says that the Minister’s collection efforts constitute a trespass on his property and have harmed him in various ways. He seeks the restoration of his property, “just and fair compensation for the harm and loss caused”, a return of all taxes and monies he has paid from age 19 onward, payment of $1.2 million for the correspondence that CRA has sent to him (for which they owe him $50,000 per letter), as well as compensation for pain and suffering in the amount of $9.5 million.

III. The Hearing

[7] The plaintiff began the presentation of his application by questioning the nature of the court and of the person presiding over it. While generally indicating that I am not in the habit of responding to any sort of interrogation, in response to his query as to whether this was a “common law court” or a “statutory court” I responded that “it was a little of both”. The plaintiff then asked whether he was addressing “a man or a judge”, to which, I suppose, the answer would have been the same had I not considered it an inappropriate question.

[8] In his submissions, the plaintiff said he had filed materials showing “I have detached myself from my legal name”. He indicated that his legal name is a construct of the government that was carried out through a fraudulent birth certificate scheme. The false construct that is his legal name is not, he said, something that involves him “as a man” and he has no connection with it. Accordingly, the tax debts in question are not owed by him.

[9] On behalf of the defendants, counsel said that their application to strike is based on the fact that the plaintiff's claim is nonsensical and, to the extent that the plaintiff might have a grievance over his taxes or the efforts taken to collect unpaid taxes, the plaintiff is in the wrong court

IV. Discussion

[10] It is obvious that the plaintiff relies on the very type of baseless pseudo-legal arguments that Associate Chief Justice Rooke discussed at length in Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571. Simply put, these sorts of arguments are sheer and utter nonsense. It is hard to know whether to condemn the proponents of these preposterous arguments or whether to sympathize with them for having been duped by others into believing them, but the result is the same. These arguments have never been successful in any court, and they have never been successful because they are, as I have said, sheer and utter nonsense.

[11] The plaintiff's claim that he is somehow distinct from a separate entity that is his given name was dealt with by Rooke A.C.J. in Meads at paras. 322 to 324. It is a subset of nonsense from the greater nonsense that typifies these sorts of cases. It is a concept unknown to the law, to logic and to common sense.

[12] It is obvious that the claim is frivolous and vexatious as those terms have been described by the authorities.

[13] Although it is perhaps unnecessary to do so, I would add that I agree with the submissions of the defendants that the plaintiff has brought his action in the wrong court, if not for all of his claims then certainly with respect to most of his claims. To the extent that he questions the tax assessments made against him, his remedy lies within the exclusive purview of the Tax Court of Canada: s. 12 of the Tax Court of Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2. To the extent that he seeks the return of money or wishes to compel the Minister to return money, or to prohibit further collection activity, his remedy is exclusively within the purview of the Federal Court of Canada: s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.

[14] But as I have said, the plaintiff's claim is founded upon a nonsensical premise and so it must be struck in its entirety. Accordingly, the notice of civil claim filed by the plaintiff is struck and the action is dismissed. The plaintiff’s application for judgment is also dismissed.

[15] As to costs, the defendants sought either special costs or lump-sum costs on a party and party basis, in the fixed amount of $5,000. I accept that the defendants are entitled to costs, but even though I have found the plaintiff's claim to be baseless, that in itself is not a reason to order costs to be paid as special costs. As to party and party costs, I am unaware of the various steps that have been taken in this action and so I am not in a position to quantify costs on a lump sum basis in even an approximate sense. Accordingly, the party and party costs awarded to the defendants will have to be assessed in the normal way by the registrar.

[16] Finally, I make the further order that the plaintiff’s approval as to the form of the order is dispensed with, but I direct counsel for the defendants to have the draft order brought to my attention so that I may ensure that it is accurate.

“Blok J.”