[bitcoin-dev] Authentication BIP

Hi As already mentioned in the recent BIP151 thread (https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2016-June/012826.html), I propose the following authentication scheme to basically allow MITM detection and rejection in conjunction with BIP151. The proposed authentication BIP does require BIP151. The propose BIP does assume, node operators want to build trusted connections for various reasons. BIPs mediawiki github page available here: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/compare/master...jonasschnelli:2016/07/auth_bip?expand=1 =================================================== BIP: ??? Title: Peer Authentication Author: Jonas Schnelli <dev at jonasschnelli.ch> Status: Draft Type: Standards Track Created: 2016-03-23 == Abstract == This BIP describes a way how peers can authenticate – without opening fingerprinting possibilities – to other peers to guarantee ownership and/or allowing to access additional or limited services. == Motivation == We assume peer operators want to limit the access of different services or increase datastream priorities to a selective subset of peers. Also we assume peers want to connect to specific peers to broadcast or filter transactions (or similar action that reveals sensitive informations) and therefore they want to authenticate the remote peer and make sure that they have not connected to a MITM. Benefits with peer authentication: * Peers could detect MITM attacks when connecting to known peers * Peers could allow resource hungry transaction filtering only to specific peers * Peers could allow access to sensitive information that can lead to node fingerprinting (fee estimation) * Peers could allow custom message types (private extensions) to authenticated peers A simple authentication scheme based on elliptic cryptography will allow peers to identify each other and selective allow access to restricted services or reject the connection if the identity could not be verified. == Specification == The authentication scheme proposed in this BIP uses ECDSA, ___secrets will never be transmitted___. ___Authentication initialization must only happen if encrypted channels have been established (according to BIP-151 [1]).___ The ___encryption-session-ID___ is available once channels are encrypted (according to BIP-151 [1]). The identity-public-keys used for the authentication must be pre-shared over a different channel (Mail/PGP, physical paper exchange, etc.). This BIP does not cover a "trust on first use" (TOFU) concept. The authentication state must be kept until the encryption/connection terminates. Only one authentication process is allowed per connection. Re-authenticate require re-establishing the connection. === Known-peers and authorized-peers database === Each peer that supports p2p authentication must provide two users editable "databases" # ___known-peers___ contains known identity-public-keys together with a network identifier (IP & port), similar to the "known-host" file supported by openssh. # ___authorized-peers___ contains authorized identity-public-keys === Local identity key management === Each peer can configure one identity-key (ECC, 32 bytes) per listening network interface (IPv4, IPv6, tor). The according identity-public-key can be shared over a different channel with other node-operators (or non-validating clients) to grant authorized access. === Authentication procedure === Authentication after this BIP will require both sides to authenticate. Signatures/public-keys will only be revealed if the remote peer could prove that they already know the remote identity-public-key. # -> Requesting peer sends `AUTHCHALLENGE` (hash) # <- Responding peer sends `AUTHREPLY` (signature) # -> Requesting peer sends `AUTHPROPOSE` (hash) # <- Responding peer sends `AUTHCHALLENGE` (hash) # -> Requesting peer sends `AUTHREPLY` (signature) For privacy reasons, dropping the connection or aborting during the authentication process must not be possible. === `AUTHCHALLENGE` message === A peer can send an authentication challenge to see if the responding peer can produce a valid signature with the expected responding peers identity-public-key by sending an `AUTHCHALLENGE`-message to the remote peer. The responding peer needs to check if the hash matches the hash calculated with his own local identity-public-key. Fingerprinting the requesting peer is not possible. 32bytes challenge-hash `hash(encryption-session-ID || challenge_type || remote-peers-expected-identity-public-key)` `challenge_type` is a single character. `i` if the `AUTHCHALLENGE`-message is the first, requesting challenge or `r` if it's the second, remote peers challenge message. === `AUTHREPLY` message === A peer must reply an `AUTHCHALLENGE`-message with an `AUTHREPLY`-message. | 64bytes || signature || normalized comp.-signature || A signature of the encryption-session-ID done with the identity-key If the challenge-hash from the `AUTHCHALLENGE`-message did not match the local authentication public-key, the signature must contain 64bytes of zeros. The requesting peer can check the responding peers identity by checking the validity of the sent signature against with the pre-shared remote peers identity-public-key. If the signature was invalid, the requesting peer must still proceed with the authentication by sending an `AUTHPROPOSE`-message with 32 random bytes. === `AUTHPROPOSE` message === A peer can propose authentication of the channel by sending an `AUTHPROPOSE`-message to the remote peer. If the signature sent in `AUTHREPLY` was invalid, the peer must still send an `AUTHPROPOSE`-message containing 32 random bytes. The `AUTHPROPOSE` message must be answered with an `AUTHCHALLENGE`-message – even if the proposed requesting-peers identity-public-key has not been found in the authorized_peers database. In case of no match, the responding `AUTHCHALLENGE`-message must contains 32 bytes of zeros. | 32bytes || auth-propose-hash || hash || `hash(encryption-session-ID == Post-Authentication Re-Keying == After the second `AUTHREPLY` message (requesting peers signature -> responding peer), both clients must re-key the symmetric encryption according to BIP151 while using ___a slightly different re-key key derivation hash___. They both re-key with `hash(encryption-session-ID || old_symmetric_cipher_key || requesting-peer-identity-public-key || responding-peer-identity-public-key)` == Identity-Addresses == The peers should display/log the identity-public-key as an identity-address to the users, which is a base58-check encoded ripemd160(sha256) hash. The purpose of this is for better visual comparison (logs, accept-dialogs). The base58check identity byte is `0x0F` followed by an identity-address version number (=`0xFF01`). An identity address would look like `TfG4ScDgysrSpodWD4Re5UtXmcLbY5CiUHA` and can be interpreted as a remote peers fingerprint. == Compatibility == This proposal is backward compatible. Non-supporting peers will ignore the new `AUTH*` messages. == Example of an auth interaction == Before authentication (once during peer setup or upgrade) # Requesting peer and responding peer create each an identity-keypair (standard ECC priv/pubkey) # Requesting and responding peer share the identity-public-key over a different channel (PGP mail, physical exchange, etc.) # Responding peer stores requesting peers identity-public-key in its authorized-peers database (A) # Requesting peer stores responding peers identity-public-key in its known-peers database together with its IP and port (B) Encryption # Encrypted channels must be established (according to BIP-151 [1]) Authentication # Requesting peer sends an `AUTHCHALLENGE` message AUTHCHALLENGE: [32 bytes, hash(encryption-session-ID || "i" || <remote-peers-expected-identity-public-key>)] # Responding peer does create the same hash `(encryption-session-ID || "i" || <remote-peers-expected-identity-public-key>)` with its local identity-public-key # If the hash does not match, response with an `AUTHREPLY` message containing 64bytes of zeros. # In case of a match, response with an `AUTHREPLY` message AUTHREPLY: [64 bytes normalized compact ECDSA signature (H)] (sig of the encryption-session-ID done with the identity-key) # Requesting peer does verify the signature with the `remote-peers-identity-public-key` # If the signature is invalid, requesting peer answers with an `AUTHREPLY` message containing 32 random bytes # In case of a valid signature, requesting peer sends an `AUTHPROPOSE` message AUTHPROPOSE: [32 bytes, hash(encryption-session-ID || "p" || <client-identity-public-key>)] # Responding peer iterates over authorized-peers database (A), hashes the identical data and looks for a match. # If the hash does not match, responding peer answer with an `AUTHCHALLENGE` message containing 32 bytes of zeros. # In case of a match, responding peer sends an `AUTHCHALLENGE` message with the hashed client public-key AUTHCHALLENGE: [32 bytes, hash(encryption-session-ID || "r" || <client-identity-public-key>)] # Requesting peer sends an `AUTHREPLY` message containing 64 bytes of zeros if server failed to authenticate # Otherwise, response with signature in the `AUTHREPLY` message AUTHREPLY: [64 bytes normalized compact ECDSA signature (H)] (sig of the encryption-session-ID done with the identity-key) # Responding peer must verify the signature and can grant access to restricted services. # Both peers re-key the encryption after BIP151 including the requesting-peer-identity-public-key and responding-peer-identity-public-key == Disadvantages == The protocol may be slow if a peer has a large authorized-peers database due to the requirement of iterating and hashing over all available authorized peers identity-public-keys. == Reference implementation == == References == * [1] [[bip-0151.mediawiki|BIP 151: Peer-to-Peer Communication Encryption]] == Acknowledgements == * Gregory Maxwell and Pieter Wuille for most of the ideas in this BIP. == Copyright == This work is placed in the public domain. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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