TO gain a better understanding of how our elections have been conducted and the reforms that are needed to make them clean and fair, The Edge speaks to Penang Institute Senior Fellow Dr Wong Chin Huat. In an ongoing series based on his presentation to the Institutional Reforms Committee, he discusses the choices we must make to address weaknesses in the current system.

Part 7

The Edge: What are the alternatives to the first-past-the-post (FPTP) election system that are not prone to unhealthy two-party competition?

Wong Chin Huat: We have to leave out France’s Two-Round System and Australia’s Alternative Vote since they are merely reinforced versions of FPTP. Therefore, we cannot expect them to deliver what FPTP cannot.

In the Two-Round System, the top two candidates have a run-off in the second round, while the Alternative Vote system allows voters to rank their choice of candidates.

Singapore’s Group Representation Constituencies system will not work to foster moderation because our parties have strong regional bases that are centred on ethnic, religious or regional cultural identities.

If we want to avoid nasty two-party competition, then proportional systems like Indonesia’s Party-List Proportional Representative System (List-PR), Ireland’s Single Transferable Vote, Germany’s Mixed Member Proportional System and Japan’s semi-proportional Mixed Member Majoritarian System may be useful.

With a system that is less aligned to a winner-takes-all outcome, we may hope to see non-communal-based parties like Parti Sosialis Malaysia and, in future, perhaps the Green Party gaining some small ground.

If we move away from two parties to many parties, and single-party governments become less likely, then what may moderate the behaviour of parties is the prospect of joining a coalition government.

It is the prospect of coming to power that brought PAS and DAP together and Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim together. While the opposition may be too weak to wrest back federal power, they can start at the state and city level. So, what we need here — hand-in-hand with a more proportional system — is decentralisation and local elections.

Can you explain how the electoral system influences the diversity, quality and independence of lawmakers?

Despite the significance of party labels, especially when the election choice is about government change, as in 2018, voters in FPTP elections essentially vote for an individual politician rather than a party. This has two implications, one on the diversity and quality of lawmakers, the other on the independence lawmakers may enjoy from the dictates of their parties.

Let’s look at the diversity and quality of lawmakers first.

One legitimate concern with FPTP elections is they tend to suppress diversity in the legislative makeup. Descriptive representation — lawmakers’ social backgrounds reflecting the diversity of the population — is normally wanting.

The problem is most glaring for women, who constitute half of the electorate but only around 11% and 12% of the lawmakers at the federal and state levels in Malaysia. The state of Terengganu does not even have a single woman candidate.

While parties are picking more talented women to stand in elections, many more women interested in politics are left behind because of organisational, socioeconomic and cultural obstacles.

Candidates representing minorities are fielded but their number is often constrained by the number of constituencies with an ethno-religious make-up that is “favourable” for them to win. As many voters emphasise the ethno-religious identity of candidates, minority candidates are often ruled out in certain constituencies.

For example, most Indian candidates in both the Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Harapan (PH) camps are fielded in constituencies with sizeable Indian populations. Some ethno-religious categories like the Eurasians have been occasionally represented but no Orang Asli or Thai lawmaker has been elected so far.

Elected representatives who can speak for special interest groups or on special issues are even rarer. There was no trade unionist elected to the parliament after V David and Ahmad Nor. Except for the late Karpal Singh, who met with an accident in 2005, one can not think of a disabled federal lawmaker although a few were found in state assemblies. Neither do we have any advocate of persons with HIV/AIDS or other severe diseases. Even for women lawmakers, questions arise on how many of them do speak up on women’s issues to provide for substantive representation.

To cultivate “personal votes”, lawmakers are often driven by FPTP elections to emphasise local constituency services rather than national issues for functional constituencies.

For example, an elected representative may be passionate about helping single mothers but if her constituency has very few single mothers who need help, then servicing local constituents is electorally more rewarding than championing policy reforms for single mothers nationwide.

Undoubtedly, for our legislatures to better represent the population, we need lawmakers from more diverse backgrounds, or who have specialisations in various issues. But FPTP is inherently ill-suited for both functional representation and group quotas — when only a single member can be elected from each constituency, a quota imposed becomes a personal zero-sum game for other contenders for candidature. This generates a lot of resistance and party leaders often bow to such resistance for fear of electoral setbacks. This explains why no Malaysian party has nominated 30% women candidates even though no party has openly rejected the idea.

How does an elected member’s independence from his or her party influence the functioning of the legislature?

One important consequence of the electoral system is lawmakers’ independence from the party.

If the voters vote for parties on their ballot, then lawmakers are representatives of their parties and should rightly abide the party’s position.

On the other hand, if voters vote for individual candidates (regardless of their party symbols) on their ballot, as in the case of FPTP, then lawmakers should be allowed to act according to their conscience.

Owing to the bitter experiences of having state governments brought down by the defection of lawmakers, Malaysians may find it hard to agree with the second position. However, the independence of lawmakers is the essential quality that determines how the British parliamentary system operates.

Frontbenchers — Cabinet ministers and junior ministers — must support the government as per the doctrine of “collective responsibility” or they should resign and return to the backbench. Government backbenchers can vote against the government, that is, the cabinet, and the threat of “backbench revolt” often forces the government to be more consultative and accommodative of dissent within the party.

In fact, without the room and potential for “backbench revolt”, the parliament would be reduced to a rubber stamp because a majority government can bulldoze any bill and motion if it commands the absolute loyalty of all its parliamentarians.

Revolting backbenchers normally do not get sacked from the party — technically, they “have the whip removed”, that is, they have to sit as independent MPs — because parliamentary candidates are normally selected by local party branches, not anointed by party headquarters. The autonomous local base protects dissident backbenchers from being axed on the one hand, but, at the same time, denies lawmakers the freedom to switch parties at whim.

One may argue that bottom-up candidacy selection keeps British parties competitive in the long run.

Bottom-up candidacy selection is, however, not possible in Malaysia because of coalition politics. As allies divide up constituencies on a near-permanent basis, and party headquarters are given tremendous power to nominate candidates, often, parachuted candidates do not have a strong local base and depend heavily on the party symbol and, if in government, patronage to rally voters.

This prevents the development of strong and democratic political parties in two separate ways. First, where popular incumbents can be easily denied candidacy to recontest, parties risk being controlled by oligarchs, which in the long run makes the party/coalition less competitive.

To compensate for its under-competitiveness, BN had depended heavily on patronage, vote buying, gerrymandering and even increasing the number of legislative seats.

Second, lawmakers with weak ideological links with voters may be tempted to switch allegiance with a better patronage offer.

An anti-hopping law may curb lawmakers from jumping ship, but it may also make parties more susceptible to oligarchic control and factional infighting and reduce legislatures to rubber stamps of the executive.

The independence of lawmakers can be protected without encouraging government change by way of party-hopping if the mandate for the party and the mandate for the lawmaker can be separated.

Next: The best alternative