Syria was on the agenda of the “2+2” summit on Aug. 9, when US Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel hosted their counterparts, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, in Washington. That day, US President Barack Obama mentioned Syria as “one more in a number of emerging differences” with Moscow — the most prominent being the asylum granted by Russia to Edward Snowden — necessitating a “pause” and reassessment in US-Russia relations. On Aug. 7, the White House announced , “There is not enough recent progress in our bilateral agenda with Russia to hold a US-Russia summit in early September.”

“As recently as six months ago, many analysts considered Russia’s approach stubborn and desperate. The impression is different today. The long-discarded Assad is still in power, the Shiite alliance of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah are not retreating, while growing signs of disarray are appearing among ranks of regional opposition leaders. Tehran is confident, and the smooth transfer of power confirmed the stability of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s regime. … The hopes that Russia will at some point change its course are groundless. If Russia did not do so when everybody expected Assad to collapse, why would it now?”

On July 31, at a meeting in Moscow, Bandar bin Sultan, director-general of the Saudi Intelligence Agency, offered Russian President Vladimir Putin a buyout for Russia’s backing of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad: a Saudi promise to purchase $15 billion worth of Russian arms and an assist for Russia to play a larger role in the Middle East.

Lavrov, in his remarks before the 2+2 meeting, said, “The most important task for the Geneva II [conference] would be to honor the commitment of all G-8 leaders made in Lough Erne, when they called upon both government and opposition to join efforts to fight terrorists and force them away from Syria.”

Following the meeting, US officials said that the United States and Russia “remain committed to holding a Geneva II conference as early as is practically possible, both stressing the belief that a political settlement is the only way to prevent sort of institutional collapse and further instability in Syria.”

The United States has still not agreed to Russia’s insistence that Iran participate in a Geneva II conference, and administration officials said that getting the Syrian government to come to Geneva, as Damascus has already agreed to do, is not enough. “The test is not whether the Syrian government will come to Geneva; it’s whether the Syrian government will come to Geneva prepared to negotiate the transition of full — the full executive powers to a transitioning governing body,” a US official said.

This statement is itself worth a "pause" for what it might say about the US approach to a "political settlement" in Syria. Is the United States deferring the decision on convening the Geneva conference to the Syrian opposition and its regional patrons, who like Iran seem otherwise willing to stomach a long and destructive regional and sectarian war? Is the United States expecting a shift in the balance of forces between Assad and the opposition? And can the United States choreograph a commitment by the Syrian government to negotiate itself out of power, as a precondition for Geneva, especially without a diplomatic channel to Iran?

If the answers to these questions are yes — either by design or default — then it is worth reflecting on the consequences: The war goes on, Syria becomes more divided, more killing, more refugees, more terrorism (including in Iraq and Lebanon as well as Syria); greater political instability in Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon; and perhaps the slippery slope for an even deeper US military engagement in Syria, since there is no victory for either side in sight.

Maybe the likely narrow window of opportunity with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani will include an initiative on Syria as well as in the nuclear talks. A US official said after the 2+2 meeting that discussions about participants in Geneva II are “ongoing.” As we wrote in this column in December 2012, and many times since, Iran’s influence in Syria surpasses that of Russia, and Iran is the key to either a political solution or a seemingly endless bloodbath.

To get Geneva II on track, it may also be time for Washington to press its own leverage with its allies — including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey — to help shut down the flow of terrorists to Syria and to encourage the Syrian opposition to prepare for imminent negotiations in order to bring this war to an urgent close.

Egypt’s Sit-ins

Bassem Sabry writes from Cairo this week that the Egyptian government should contain, not break up, the sit-ins by supporters of deposed President Mohammed Morsi: “The most effective course of action is to contain the sit-ins — make sure no more bloodshed occurs while curbing any excesses and dealing decisively with transgressions. Additionally, the best way to create pressure for compromise on the pro-Morsi camp is to move briskly with the road map and the transition to civilian democracy. It would be important for them to realize that there are many at the sit-ins who are truly worried about exclusion, their own immediate safety or the return of the Mubarak police state under which many of them suffered. The signals that these individuals have been reading thus far have not been sufficiently encouraging or calming.”



Wael Nawara, also writing from Cairo, places the burden on the Muslim Brotherhood to reconsider its approach on Egyptian sovereignty, nationhood and identity, if there is to be a solution to the present crisis. He writes, “If the Brotherhood’s survival rests on its ability to evolve its doctrine so that it better adapts to the prevailing societal circumstances, will the new generation of Brotherhood leaders — or those of the Freedom and Justice Party — be able to achieve a quantum leap in thought, organizational style and level of transparency, that would transform the Brotherhood into a modern political organization whose existence is harmonious with that of Egypt — or any other nation-state for that matter?”

The Return of Iran’s Reformists and Islamic Chic

Al-Monitor’s Barbara Slavin was one of a very few Western reporters to cover the inauguration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on Aug. 4. She reports on the return of reformists to the public sphere, and on how “Iranian hijab has blossomed into a colorful array of hues and figure-hugging styles that satisfy the letter if not the spirit of Islamic law.”