While the U.S. is at a crossroads in navigating the most important foreign policy issue of the century, the U.S. public remains unengaged about the importance of getting U.S.-China relations right.

Americans have witnessed what happens in a Wuhan food market, a Xinjiang detention center, or a government compound in Beijing, ripples not only across China but the entire world. In China, we are observing a nation undertaking bold policies to move up the economic value chain, modernizing its military to project power beyond its borders, and building a global web of economic and political links. The U.S. is no less exposed to this evolution than many of China’s closest neighbors; indeed, the bilateral U.S.-Chinese relationship is now the world’s most consequential. We can expect it will remain so for the rest of our lives.

Despite this reality, the U.S. public has not been engaged in a broader discussion about the impact that a risen China will have on both global affairs, or the policy choices the country’s leaders will need to evaluate and navigate moving forward.

Americans do recognize China’s emergence—it is seen as the second most influential nation today, and deemed a "critical threat" by a plurality of the population. This is paired, however, with a muted interest in the issue. Asked by Gallup about the most important challenges facing the country, relations with China does not even register as a rounding error.

One of the consequences of this modest focus is the treatment U.S.-China relations have received from Democratic presidential aspirants. During more than 15 hours of debate airtime since September 2019, only two questions focused on China, addressing the demonstrations in Hong Kong and human rights issues. Reviewing the campaign websites of six leading candidates—Biden, Bloomberg, Buttigieg, Klobuchar, Sanders, and Warren—only one, as of late January, directly addresses engagement with the country. This is likely not an oversight by the campaigns; they are simply responding to the issues that most animate their constituents.

Several factors likely explain how we got here:

China’s transformation represents a long-running trend, not a quickly-digested news bulletin. Although not always successful, China has demonstrated discipline in its public diplomacy, seeking to avoid the sort of catalyzing events that would inspire focused attention from foreign audiences. This differs from the Soviet Union, whose unexpected development of a nuclear weapon, role in the Korean war, and success in space with Sputnik elevated public awareness and urgency.

Although not always successful, China has demonstrated discipline in its public diplomacy, seeking to avoid the sort of catalyzing events that would inspire focused attention from foreign audiences. This differs from the Soviet Union, whose unexpected development of a nuclear weapon, role in the Korean war, and success in space with Sputnik elevated public awareness and urgency. More immediate concerns closer to home. The past decade has focused the country’s attention on the fallout of a major financial crisis and deepening economic inequality, tragic gun violence, America’s “forever wars,” and the election of Donald Trump.

The past decade has focused the country’s attention on the fallout of a major financial crisis and deepening economic inequality, tragic gun violence, America’s “forever wars,” and the election of Donald Trump. There are no easy answers about where the U.S. goes from here. This discussion will require a self-assessment of the role that the U.S. sees itself playing in the world moving forward: will it redouble its commitment to the international arrangements of the 20th century Pax Americana, or concede to a diminished role?

But why, exactly, does this issue matter so much relative to competing concerns? Ordinary Americans will increasingly be impacted by how U.S.-Chinese relations are managed. Whether its the prices Americans pay for goods and services following temporary trade wars or longer-lasting economic decoupling, the return on investment of R&D amidst I.P. misappropriation, or the effectiveness of finite tax dollars deployed across shifting defense and intelligence priorities, policy decisions by American leaders will be made with an eye towards the Pacific rim. Absent meaningful transparency and legal scrutiny, China is developing and deploying novel, ethically-questionable technologies, ranging from always-on surveillance tools to CRISPR gene editing. Rather than leading the world in examining the proper use of these systems, the country risks following China’s lead. Even the underappreciated instruments of U.S. soft power face a complex new normal, judging by the NBA’s contortions to negotiate two contrary positions following a team owner’s tweet in support of Hong Kong demonstrators.

Unlike the Soviet Union of the century past, the Chinese Community Party is not saddled by defunct ideological baggage and economic rot. It has, instead, engineered a form of authoritarian capitalism that represents a far more dynamic system of government than its forebears in Moscow.

The issue is made more acute by the treatment it has received thus far from the Trump Administration, whose opening salvo in navigating this strategic evolution was focused on renegotiating terms of trade. While this is a key facet of the relationship, the White House blundered by conflating security and economic issues, undercutting efforts to persuade partner countries not to adopt Huawei technology, which the U.S. government believes is susceptible to compromise (London recently announced they would allow Huawei systems on U.K. networks). This underscores the signal importance that alliance management will play as a prong of effective engagement with China.

Beyond ties with the European allies, Pacific partners have also noticed American diplomacy taking a step back. A recent survey of government and industry leaders in ASEAN countries found that 77% believe the U.S. is less engaged with the region than it was during the Obama Administration; only 35% express confidence in Washington, D.C. as a strategic partner and provider of regional security. These trends reflect a growing deficit of trust and influence, just as China is looking to grow new partnerships through the Belt and Road Initiative and other strategies. There is much work to be done to marshal meaningful engagement not only to the American public but with partner countries, as well.

Fortunately, the trends outlined above have energized a growing body of thinkers and policymakers to the acute need for clarity and fresh thinking in U.S.-China relations. Gone are obsolete notions, such as the belief that China would necessarily adopt liberal norms following WTO ascension. Instead, the race for big ideas is on. However, just as putting our heads in the sand will not diminish this reality the world now faces, conversations about strategy cannot be limited to the halls of think tanks and academia. Sustaining a broader discussion and communicating the need and wisdom of new approaches with the American people will be necessary—the stakes are too high to treat China as anything other than the strategic rival it is.

Lulio Vargas-Cohen is a business strategist working across the public and private sectors, focusing on the intersection of technology, business, policy, and security. Previously, Lulio worked at In-Q-Tel, the venture capital arm of the U.S. intelligence community, and at Booz Allen Hamilton. He holds an MBA from the University of Michigan, an MPP from the Harvard Kennedy School, and was a Fulbright scholar.