Four years ago, the United States went to war in Iraq because we, and, admittedly, the rest of the world, believed that Saddam Hussein was harboring weapons of mass destruction. Within months after the fall of the Ba’athist regime, the intelligence that supported that conclusion was proven to be completely inaccurate.

Now, it seems that the danger posed by North Korea’s supposed nuclear weapons program may have been exaggerated as well:

The Bush administration is backing away from its long-held assertions that North Korea has an active clandestine program to enrich uranium, leading some experts to believe that the original U.S. intelligence that started the crisis over Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions may have been flawed.

The chief intelligence officer for North Korea, Joseph R. DeTrani, told Congress on Tuesday that while there is “high confidence” North Korea acquired materials that could be used in a “production-scale” uranium program, there is only “mid-confidence” such a program exists. Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, the chief negotiator for disarmament talks, last week told a conference in Washington that it is unclear if North Korea ever mastered the production techniques necessary for such a program.

As the article points out this isn’t exactly what the Bush Administration was saying five years ago:

The administration’s stance today stands in sharp contrast to the certainty expressed by top officials in 2002, when the administration accused Pyongyang of running a secret uranium program — and demanded it be dismantled at once. President Bush told a news conference that November: “We discovered that contrary to an agreement they had with the United States, they’re enriching uranium, with a desire of developing a weapon.”

Fortunately, we weren’t foolish enough to go to war with North Korea over the faulty intelligence we had back then.

Unfortunately, one cannot say the same thing for Iraq.