Formulating a New Canadian Defence Policy

By Col (Ret.) L.J. Hammond, MSM, CD

As the Trudeau Government contemplates a new defence policy, here are some suggestions that they may want to consider in formulating this most important of policies.

• Home and Away Game. Unless we want to wait till threats are on our doorstep, our Defence Policy needs to think in terms of the home game and the away game. Start with a domestic security policy and define which roles the Canadian Armed Forces will play in that policy. What are the threats to Canadians on home soil? Then, formulate a cogent foreign policy, which from what I have seen so far, we don’t have. Establish a Royal Commission – what principles should guide our foreign policy? What role can and should Canada play in the world. From that, determine what role the CAF will play, and from there, what capabilities does the CAF require?

• Think of Defence Like Your Home Insurance. No one likes paying for insurance. After all, you probably won’t need it, but if you do need it, you will be really glad you have it. Like any homeowner, Canada needs to decide how much insurance we need, how much we can afford, and what are the risks we are facing. Just like insurance there are “industry” benchmarks, and in Canada, we have traditionally had our defence expenditures measured against NATO averages. Whether we use the NATO benchmark or other comparisons, we should be aware of how much risk we are taking regarding our relative expenditures.

• Realistically Assess Risks. The world is a dangerous place. Perhaps more dangerous than at any time in the last 30 years. There are state and non-state threats that range the spectrum of conflict from terrorism to state-on-state warfare. It’s possible to bankrupt the state by buying too much insurance (witness the Soviet Union). On the other hand, insufficient insurance could risk the survival of the nation. Therefore, establish a non-partisan panel to realistically assess the threats facing our nation. The government should be ready to openly discuss and educate the public on these risks, since defence expenditures are significant.

• Risk Based Versus Capability Based Planning. Canada’s Defence Policy should account for the real threats that we are facing in the world. However, we must also recognize the limits of our ability to predict the future. Many pronounced the era of state-on-state conflict over when we were involved in Afghanistan. Recent history has proven this predication to be totally false. Therefore, Canada should base its Defence Policy on a combination of known threats and a broad range of military capabilities that have been proven to be necessary in a well-balanced force – to the degree that we can afford it.

• You Can’t Create Military Capability at the Last Minute. Unlike insurance, you cannot buy a military at the last minute. Modern militaries are tremendously complex. While equipment can take decades to acquire, more important are the institutional capabilities of the people. You may be able to buy an aircraft, ship or submarine in 5-7 years (in an emergency), but it takes decades to produce the commanders and technical experts to truly take advantage of the technology. The days of assembling 600 young fit men, giving them a Lee Enfield Rifle, and sending them to war are over. It’s just not that simple any more.

• Come as you are. Modern conflicts can drag on for many years. However, the most intense conflicts can be fought very quickly and can be over well before you have time to fix any structural problems. In these circumstances, you either have the capabilities you need, when you need them, or you pay – in blood. Canada has extensive experience in this regard, with a history of sending sailors to hunt U- Boats with wooden deck guns, or soldiers dying on their way to take leave in Afghanistan, due to a lack of helicopters. Therefore, a policy where we buy the equipment we need, when we need it, is bankrupt. It will not work and the price can be very high.

• Specialization is NOT the Answer. It is often proposed that the Canadian Forces should specialize and let our allies cover any capabilities Canada does not own. “Special Forces are all we need” state some of the proponents of this strategy. In reality, military problems span the spectrum of conflict, and any one tool is only suitable for a particular problem. The British Government has recently, and embarrassingly, had to request allied Maritime Patrol Aircraft to search for Russian submarines in their own waters. It is certain that if Canada over specializes we won’t have the right tool for future scenarios. Think of the military toolbox. Some times you need a hammer (say a tank) and other times you need a scalpel (special forces, for example).

• Beware Distractions. Cyber threats, space capabilities etc. There are lots of places that Canada can expend lots of money. However, at the end of the day it’s the ships, planes and soldiers that form the heart of the Canadian ARMED Forces. The military is the tool that applies force in support of government policy objectives, when necessary. Or, sometimes, the threat of force. This means weapons and military hard power, and the people schooled in the use of force. Its not that we should ignore the softer capabilities that a government needs, but they should not come at the expense of what the military fundamentally is.

• What does a Military Do? Bottom line, the PRIMARY purpose of a nation’s armed forces is to FIGHT AND WIN WARS. Sure, the military can do other things (often at great, inefficient expense), but ultimately the military is about ensuring the survival of the nation. We need to be honest about this, explain it to Canadians, and not let wishful thinking guide our defence decisions.

• Peacekeeping is DEAD. If you design your military for Pearsonian Peacekeeping (which no longer exists anywhere in the world), then what you will actually have is a constabulary force that is focused on the lowest end of the threat spectrum. When something more serious arises, you will be beaten. Simple.

• Freeloading on Allies. Canada has, for decades, “relied”, or in my view, freeloaded on our allies. Essentially, this is offloading the security and sovereignty of our country to another power. While this has worked so far, the fundamental situation has changed. America is in a precarious financial position. The U.S. Military, while still relatively powerful, is a shadow of its former self. U.S. Generals are now admitting that they will be overmatched by China and Russia in certain key domains. The USAF has retired thousands of aircraft; the U.S. Navy is struggling to build sufficient ships, and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps will both be smaller than prior to World War II. The Royal Air Force is down to seven fighter aircraft squadrons; the Royal Navy has a frigate/destroyer force not much larger than Canada’s and the French and Italians are stretched to the limits in Africa. The German military is not the Wehrmacht of the past, or even the robust force of the 1980’s. In this situation, our allies need us to contribute. They are depending us, and thus Canada, which is an enormously wealthy G7 nation, needs to pull its weight.

• Perspective. Climate change is NOT the greatest threat to Canadians, and even if it were, there are limited things that the Canadian Government can do to eliminate this threat, since the drivers of climate change are in other countries. Indeed, since the Second World War the major threat to Canadians continues to be NUCLEAR WEAPONS – either under the control of nation states like Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, or even worse, by terrorist groups. Canada enjoys the protection of NATO Nuclear forces, which can deter nation-states, but to enjoy these benefits we need to be a credible contributing member. On the other hand, terrorists seeking to gain nuclear capabilities cannot realistically be deterred. Therefore, Canada may need to go, in concert with allies, to occasionally root out these dangerous threats where they live. That will require robust expeditionary forces.

• Modernize The Reserve Force. Our Reserve Force is based on a 1914 model. Budgets since the 1950’s have been inadequate to properly equip these units. We have the exact same number of armories today as we did in 1914. We have armoured units with no armoured vehicles, service battalions that can’t fix our equipment and artillery units with guns that are World War II technology. Consequently, the military output of these units is not commensurate with even the modest investments we are making. Create a Panel or Royal Commission to examine the future of the Reserves, determine a sustainable and effective model for the future, and then implement those plans. This will take political courage, which has been completely lacking over my career in the military. Nevertheless, what we currently have does not meet the needs of the 21st Century, and if the Liberals do want to do our Defence Policy Review thoroughly, the future of the Reserves should be examined.

• Fix Procurement. When you delay defence procurement, all you do is create a larger bow wave of future requirements until you reach the point that you are so far behind that your choices are very limited (in my view we are firmly there now). Fundamentally, we need to shift the thinking of what the Defence Budget is for. It’s not for economic development, or regional development, or to promote Canadian Business. Its purpose is to defend the country, and this should be the first and primary purpose of the funding. If Canadian businesses can fulfill the requirements, great. However, spreading the money around Canada is one of the primary reasons our procurement system is locked. Since politicians have proven incapable of taking the necessary long view of defence requirements, I would propose that the Government create a dynamic and focused process that formulates policy objectives (including supporting industrial capabilities), after which non-partisan experts use the defined funding (how much insurance can we afford) to best meet these government objectives.

• General Purpose. My advice to government would be to focus 70%-80% of your equipment investments into broadly useful, general-purpose capabilities, with the remaining into specialized niche capabilities. Examples of General Purpose? General Purpose Frigates, Amphibious Ships (no point having a military if you can’t get there), Transport Aircraft, Infantry Battalions, Engineer Regiments, Special Forces Units, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Surveillance Aircraft, Communications Equipment and Reconnaissance Equipment. Specialized equipment that delivers capabilities across a narrower spectrum of conflict would include things like tank units, artillery units, fighter aircraft and submarines. Don’t get me wrong, these high-end capabilities are not discretionary (in my view), they are the heavy hardware that will ensure success during high-end conflicts.

• People. The true strength of any military is its people. It takes decades to train and educate professional warriors in the 21st Century. If they get fed up and leave, the costs of replacing these personnel is enormous. Frankly, there are a lot of fed up service personnel now days – the reward for service in Afghanistan were cuts to benefits and equipment procurement. Recognizing the importance of the people in the CAF, and how fragile this component of the CAF is, must be a central principal of any Defence Policy. Equipping them “adequately” puts them at risk, and committing them indeterminately to never ending missions can produce broken veterans. Numbers matter, because modern servicemen and women are like other Canadians – they have families, children and dreams. Having 94, 000 Regular and Reserve personnel to protect over 35 million Canadians in the 21st Century is asking too much. Its time we are realistic about the size of the military we need.

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In his paper Professor Moens asks and answers a series of questions.

The first is: specialized or general purpose forces? He looks at the Europeans but concludes that “there are several reasons why the Canadian situation remains different from the smaller West European allies. Canada cannot simply go the way of specialization in terms of military capabilities … the bulk of Canadian defence must remain based on broad capabilities and a wide scope of action.” He goes on explain why this is so and concludes that “The sum of the matter is this: our geography and ad hoc defence relationship with the United States call for broad-based capabilities. When we have them – even when they are a bit thin – we can work together with the US military on a wide variety of things. US capabilities can then augment what we are doing. Submarines is an example of a maritime awareness and self-defence task we cannot leave out and the Americans can readily augment. If we cut back our broad-based and overall capabilities too much, we eliminate American opportunities to augment what we are doing. This scenario not only risks Canadian security but also difficult political relations with the United States.“

Next he makes the case for putting considerations of allies and partners first, and he points out that these partners “include Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.” He explains that except for purely domestic operations we will almost always work within the framework of some larger coalition, starting with the United Nations but embracing e.g. NATO, too. The reason for this is that “Canada is in the Allies and Partners Framework because we find our values there and we find the multiplier effect for our capabilities. Together this forms our core interest. We do not find the same efficiency and effectiveness of values and capabilities in the UN framework. Important UN obligations and ad hoc peacekeeping operations may arise from time to time, but Canada’s core defence policy must be designed and equipped for working with Allies and Partners. If we aim for such a Framework, we would retain our capability to do ad hoc UN operations. But, if we make ad hoc UN operations our main way of thinking, we lose clarity about our values and we lose efficiency for our multiplier effect. In sum we lose our compass.“

The third question is: how to deal with known dangers and unexpected threats, too? After reviewing the situation in Europe, Prof Moens asks: “What specifically must be done by Canada?” He explains that “NATO’s Spearhead Force alone does not pack enough practical deterrence. It is not a trip-wire and likely does not have enough follow-on forces. It may act too slowly. NATO Allies and Partners need to boost the conventional defence posture in Europe. The American plan to pre-position equipment for another combat brigade and to keep deployments rotating among several NATO states offers the best current option for trip-wiring the Baltic to Black Sea line. Canada could then join CAF components alongside a US combat brigade or with the British initiative as ‘framework nation’ to set up a hub of expeditionary capability with several Northern European countries. Our defence review has to make the case for Canadian air, sea, and land capabilities to be put to use at a higher rate and with more intensity (but rotationally like US forces) in Northeast Europe and the North Atlantic.“

“The defence review must also,” he says, “clarify the military challenges we face regarding the Islamic State,” and, he adds, “the final big challenge Canada’s defence review must consider is the risk of a significant conventional conflict arising from the territorial and resource disputes in Asia Pacific.“

He concludes that “Canada’s 2016 defence policy review is confronted by two arduous challenges. The Canadian economy is under duress and the external threat to Canada’s values and interests is higher than it has been since the close of the Cold War. The pressure to find ‘savings’ in Canada’s defence budget will be high even as the need for Canada to maintain broad military capabilities has gone up. Every new government wants to examine a range of options to formulate its defence policy vision … [and] … the new Liberal government has indicated that it is leaning towards a blend of multilateral diplomacy and UN-based peacekeeping. Such ‘internationalist’ tools are always needed. However, the means available in the UN are ill-suited to reduce acute danger in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and the growing risks in Asia-Pacific. The Russian, Chinese, and Islamic State challenges Canada faces today, can only be mitigated in the context of an Allied and Partners Framework. This framework offers a sorely needed military policy to present strength in the face of encroachment on global world order. The top priority for Canada’s defence policy is to add strength to this framework and to do so quickly.“

Colonel Hammond and Professor Moens agree on several key points, including: