Rather than being a comprehensive review of

contemporary North Korea, James Pearson and Daniel Tudor’s North Korea

Confidential is meant to be up-to-date introduction for the growing pool of

readers who are curious about the truth behind the headlines. This book offers

more than a simple appetite whetting however; it challenges our preconceptions

about North Korea by confronting them with inside information attained from

defectors, NGO workers, Pyongyang officials, diplomats, traders, and more. This

access, coupled with the duo’s expertise in crafting compelling arguments,

infuses the book with a mix of street smarts and scholarly wisdom. Ultimately, North Korea Confidential illuminates what has been a dark spot in the popular

literature on the North: how the fallout of 1990’s famine, or “Arduous March,” prompted an

unprecedented shift in the attitudes, governance, and livelihoods of everyday North

Koreans. After losing confidence in their state’s ability to provide for them,

the entire population began leading a double life. The result: people today

have one foot in the state factory and one in the jangmadang (grey market), one

ear trained to Kim Jong Eun and the other tuned to foreign news broadcasts

through jerry-rigged radios. In the new North Korea, even Workers’ Party

officials must wear at least two hats. North Korea Confidential evaluates the

causes and consequences of these two worlds colliding.

Elsewhere in the literature, there seems to

be a schism between soapy human interest pieces and stolid historical

overviews. By giving readers a bird’s eye view of everyday life, North Korea

Confidential strikes a balance between the two. As befitting of the authors’

roots in journalism, the writing style dispatches of linguistic flourishes in

favor of concise, imagistic prose. While Pearson and Tudor certainly aren’t

apologists for the regime, they refuse to limit their depictions to the typical

oppressor/oppressed archetypes that readers of the genre have become so

accustomed to. Even though the transgressions of the Kim Regime and Worker’s

Party remain unforgivable, we are presented with a context in which their

actions no longer look bewildering or irrational. Instead of a grim list of

human rights violations, we get a glimpse into how real North Koreans navigate

a landscape of bribes and clandestine negotiations, love and secrets, homemade

hooch and stark contradictions. The authors’ analytical style falls in line

with “Marxist theory” and “ecological materialism”– their general argument is

that all this social, political, and cultural change has essentially flowed

from a fundamental shift in the economic environment.

The book is divided into chapters that each

delve into a different aspect of North Korean society, including the emergence

of private markets, cultural trends, communications, and the anatomy of the

party leadership. Most of the book focuses on contemporary North Korea, but Chapter

3 breaks this mold by going all the way back to Kim Il Sung’s rise in order to

illustrate how the distribution of political power has changed over time. Some

readers might be less interested in this, but it would be impossible to discuss the anatomy of the DPRK government without addressing the history of

the Kim family and their relationship with the OGD.

My only real gripe with the book isn’t one

of substance, but rather one of style. At times, the authors’ use of footnotes

– many in mid-sentence –interrupts the narrative flow. Some readers will lament

seeing important points being tossed out as mere asides. Footnotes seem rather

out of place in a popular, reader friendly work like this. On the other hand,

it is quite possible that other readers will find the tangential anecdotes and

supplementary information contained in the footnotes to be charming and

interesting, a worthy detour. At the end of the day, it is simply a matter of

taste.

Now to the heart of the story. Pearson and

Tudor dispel a number of common misconceptions about North Korea. First and

foremost is the idea that North Koreans are robots who can’t think for

themselves and are basically slaves to the state. While the vast majority of

North Koreans continue to toil in poverty, the authors show, through vivid

examples, how drastically things have changed over the last twenty years. Here

is a short list of the most common misconceptions, followed by a brief account

of how the authors have been able to put these myths to bed.

1. “North Koreans are mindless automatons;

they can’t think for themselves and are slaves to the state.”

The authors show that before the famine,

the career trajectory of North Koreans was restricted by the quality of their

songbun (family ties and political loyalty). Upward mobility was unheard of

outside a trusted circle of Pyongyang elite. But the 1990 famine or “Arduous

March” was devastating: an estimated one million died of hunger, food

allotments dried up, state salaries withered away, and entire government

agencies were required to fund themselves. The post famine free-for-all opened

up the country up to an entirely more mobile class structure. Pearson and

Tudor describe a North Korea that flies in the face of our expectations.

Everyday North Koreans watch foreign films and movies under the cover of

darkness, bribe their way up the ladder and out of jams, sell comic books at

market, and listen to foreign broadcasts through jerry-rigged radios. They can

even get “double-eyelid surgery” for 2 USD in a back alley.

2. “North Koreans know nothing of the

outside world; they know and believe only what the regime tells them.”

Officially speaking, North Koreans are only

allowed to watch preset TV and radio channels. But engineers at the jangmadang

can tweak your hardware for a price, giving you access to broadcasts from

international sources. But even the North Koreans who have come to realize the

ineptitudes of their government through exposure to foreign media do not thirst

for revolution. They instead favor graduated reforms, vis-a-vis more chances to

make money. USB sticks, containing movies, songs, and dramas, have exploded in

popularity of late. By and large, North Koreans mainly seek out foreign

information as a way to relax and they mainly sell it as a way to make money.

DVD and USB smuggling has increased proportionally, becoming an extreme

nuisance for Central Authorities. But since state salaries have been reduced to

pittance, agents from the Ministry of People’s Security are willing to look the

other way for a bribe. Money then has become an equalizer, affording those with

lots of curiosity, a risk taking personality, some spare won in their

pocket, and a glimpse at the outside world.

3. “North Korea is the world’s last holdout

Communist Dictatorship. There is no market to speak of, and the private sector

plays no role.”

Due to dried up central funding, most

government agencies now operate partnerships with local businesses to stay

afloat. Even the National Library started a trading company in the 1990s. De

jure systems for regulating the amsijang (black market) were introduced in fits

and starts. That necessitated an extensive and pervasive system of bribes and

kickbacks to fill in the cracks between state-sanctioned projects and private

enterprise. Members of the public and private worlds now exist as mutual

hostages of one another, unable to live with or without their counterparts. The

resulting corruption and necessity for constant bribes has created an uneasy

balance. The authors liken this system to a “protection racket,” with

entrepreneurs seeking out the sponsorship of powerful officials to legitimize

their operations. The regime uses every tool at its disposal to suppress

private sector leaders from usurping power. The most well cited example of a

government crackdown on the black market was the 2009 redenomination, during

which time the government devalued the relative worth of the North Korean won.

This wiped out the cash savings of amsijang (blackmarket) traders and created a

slave class by drastically reducing the market value of the wages doled out to

state employees. But the measure was an overall unsuccessful attempt to control

the grey markets. In the long run, it only succeeded in “pushing North Koreans

even further beyond the orbit of the state economic control.” The systematic

implementation of bribery on all levels has changed people’s perceptions, their

dreams, and their ability to climb upwards. Before the famine, the ideal North

Korean was loyal, spartan, and dedicated to the worker party. A smartly dressed

young professional using an iPad in a Pyongyang cafe is now the epitome of

success.

4. “The Kim Regime is focused only on

concentrating and abusing power at the expense of its people. It is backwards,

dysfunctional, and irrational.”

The authors depict the Kims and other top

officials in such a light that it’s often possible to understand their motives. Power sharing among the ruling

elite in North Korea has been a high-wire balancing act for some time now: the

Kims do not have absolute control. Like any country, factionalized sects duke

it out for control of appointments, policy decisions, and access to lucrative

deals. Pearson and Tudor reject the liberal/conservative, old power/new money

dichotomies that have typically been used by the Western media to describe the

situation, instead mapping out a much more complex web of individual actors and

institutions. In 1976, Kim Jong Il took it upon himself to secretly reroute his

father’s telephone lines through his office. He used the information he got

from spying on his father to curry favor and usurp power. Kim Il Sung never

intended for North Korea to be a hereditary dictatorship, but from 1973, Kim Jong Il

began revamping and shifting the locus of power towards the OGD, with him at

the helm. He used surveillance and control as a means to create an atmosphere

of fear among his people, banished 500 “non-loyal” officials, and carefully

appointed only those who demonstrated fierce loyalty to him. He was more astute

than the Western media would have you believe: he drank colored water in his

later years so he could watch his comrades drunkenly reveal their hands.

This book recommends itself. Anyone with

even a passing interest in North Korea is likely to find it captivating. To the

careful reader, it is clear that Pearson and Tudor have taken pains to

indicate that the vast majority of North Koreans remain poor, overworked, and

oppressed. The one thing that worries me is the prospect that a small minority

of readers might walk away thinking the outliers are the new norm, thinking the

new prototypical North Korean is a cell phone toting business man who spends

his weeknights wooing party cadres and his weekends watching American movies.

While that kind of Pyonghattanite no doubt exists, he is by no means

representative. Looking at the facts on the ground, it certainly is the

case that the economy has improved since the famine days, people are forcing de

facto liberalizations by disregarding anachronistic laws, and the songbun caste

system’s slow degradation is opening up room for an emerging middle class. The

authors also shine a light on the North’s draconian penal system, the pervasive

system of bribery that has saturated every nook and cranny of institutional

life, and the endemic corruption at the heart of the political system. It is a

measured and balanced look at North Korea, one that doesn’t shy away from the darkness

or the light. Overall, the authors’ voice is refreshing, their storytelling is

gripping, and their analysis is perceptive. North Korea Confidential is

definitely worth a read.

North Korea Confidential, already out in Asia with releases in both the United States and Europe to come in mid-April, is available here .

Those unable to view the embedded video can listen here .



