The history of tactics is the history of the manipulation of space. Space is created – or emerges – for one player, and he begins to have a disproportionate influence on the game. Then a way is found to block him, and in turn space will appear somewhere else on the pitch.

As the centre-half became a centre-back in the 20s, so the inside-forwards had to drop deep to cover the space he left in midfield. The withdrawn centre-forward terrorised sides in the 50s, and so by the 60s the holding midfielder had been developed to counter him.

More recently, the attacking full-back has become increasingly important. Ashley Cole's performance for Chelsea on Sunday showed exactly the damage such a player can cause if he can dominate an essentially attacking wide midfielder – Aaron Lennon in this case – and then exploit his lack of defensive ability. Their rise, as predicted by Jack Charlton after the 1994 World Cup, stems from the fact that when 4–4–2 meets 4–4–2, they are the only players on the pitch with space in front of them, as centre-backs pick up centre-forwards and four-man midfields tend to cancel each other out.

In turn, that has promoted the use of defensive forwards to block them, which is a natural consequence of the modern preference for the 4–3–3 or 4–2–3–1. Using only one central attacking presence with a midfield platform allows teams to push their wide players higher up the field, and that cuts down the space that initially encouraged the full-backs to maraud.

The modern game's key contest

In a number of games recently the key contest has been that between full-back and wide attacker. When England won 4-1 in Zagreb, for instance, Fabio Capello's use of Theo Walcott high on the right exposed the defensive shortcomings of the Croatia left-back Danijel Pranjic, and prevented him surging forward to provide an overlap for Ivan Rakitic, the left-sided midfielder, as he cut infield. That Walcott then scored a hat-trick was almost a bonus.

The Euro 2008 semi-final was fairly even for 34 minutes, until David Villa was injured. On came Cesc Fábregas, Spain changed shape from 4–1–3–2 to 4–1–4–1, and the two Russian full-backs, Alexander Anyukov and Yuri Zhirkov, who had been getting forward, found themselves with a direct opponent against whom they had to defend. Russia lost their attacking thrust, Spain came to dominate both territory and possession, and ended up winning 3-0.

Manchester United's 0-0 draw away to Internazionale in the Champions League second round last season was achieved, at least in part, because of the way Park Ji-sung negated Maicon as an attacking threat. Similarly in the quarter-final, after Aly Cissokho, Porto's left-back, had repeatedly surged by Cristiano Ronaldo in the 2–2 draw in the first leg at Old Trafford, Sir Alex Ferguson stymied him at the Dragao by deploying Wayne Rooney on the right and Ronaldo at centre-forward.

Whether United will continue to be so effective at stopping attacking full-backs following their shift back to 4–4–2 remains to be seen. Certainly Park, usually so effective in such a role, didn't really get to grips with Ashley Cole during the Community Shield. Nonetheless there is no reason to believe that those skirmishes in wide areas will not continue to be a key part of the battle, particularly if the trend for "false nines" – that is, centre-forwards who drop deep, as Francesco Totti did for Roma three seasons ago, Ronaldo and Carlos Tevez did for Manchester United two seasons ago, and Leo Messi did for Barcelona last season – continues.

The wide forward, more dangerous than in the middle

Already other effects are beginning to be seen that hint at what the future may hold. The question is always where is the space, and two trends have begun to emerge. The first involves the wide forwards. If they are tight against the full-back high up the field, there is no space, but if they drop deeper, whether the full-back follows or not, space is opened on the diagonal in to goal.

In a sense, there is nothing new to that realisation, for it was that space that Italian forwards exploited in il gioco all'Italiano, when it was common for one of the two centre-forwards to operate to the left, being picked up by the opposing right-back, while the left-back was more attacking (it remains one of football's curious constants that good attacking left-backs are far more common than good attacking right-backs).

But it is intriguing to see it reapplied and reinterpreted, whether by Robinho in Brazil's 4–2–3–1, or by the likes of Ronaldo, Messi and Thierry Henry, all of whom have been prolific in recent seasons. "When forwards attack from wide to inside, they are far more dangerous," Ferguson said last season.

"It's funny when I see centre-forwards starting off in the middle against their markers and then going away from goal. Strikers going inside are far more dangerous, I think. When Henry played as a striker, and sometimes when Wayne does, they try to escape and create space by drifting from the centre to wide positions, when that actually makes them less dangerous."

Space for the centre-backs

But looking further ahead, there is also another player who has space, and that is one of the centre-backs. A single central striker is marked by one central defender, leaving the other one as a spare man. Of course that is useful defensively, but there is no reason why the extra player should only be useful defensively. After all, when 4–4–2 met 4–4–2 two central defenders picked up two centre-forwards and nobody worried about having additional cover (with the slight caveat that full-backs, without a wide player playing high against them, could drift inside to provide some cover). Why shouldn't that extra defender stride forward into midfield as the likes of Franz Beckenbauer and Ruud Krol once did?

The classic liberi had disappeared by the early 80s, but even in 3–5–2 there was an expectation that the sweeper would step forward and become an extra man in midfield.

Klaus Augenthaler, for instance, twice wandered forward to hit long range drives for West Germany in the 1990 World Cup semi-final, and so giddy were England with the possibilities of a formation they had only just adopted that Terry Butcher, deployed as libero in that game because Bobby Robson was concerned Jürgen Klinsmann or Rudi Völler would exploit his lack of pace if he were used as a marker, attempted a backheel in the centre-circle.

The 3–5–2 formation has fallen into disuse because of the prevalence of single-central-striker formations. With only one forward to mark, two of the centre-backs are left as spare men, which effectively leaves one redundant. With the wing-backs picking up the opposing wide men, that curtails the width of the side playing 3–5–2 and almost certainly gives their opponents' full-backs free reign.

But that does not invalidate the central point of using three-centre-backs, which was to leave one spare. Whether it's three on two or two on one, there is one player left free, and it seems only logical that the new libero should begin to act as the old libero did. Attackers are increasingly been called upon to defend; it seems that defenders will be increasingly be called upon to attack.