Translator’s Note: The following text is an approximate translation of a 26 March 2018 Kommersant op-ed authored by Konstantin Makiyenko of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. – Allen Maggard

Two years ago, on 2 April 2016, Azerbaijani forces attacked positions held by the military of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). The attackers crushed their opponent’s weak advance positions and seized several tactically important hills, after which they halted their offensive push. Elite Azerbaijani incurred heavy losses during the first day of fighting: one special forces brigade even lost its commander and chief of staff. Armenian counterattacks were not too stubborn and proved unsuccessful. Using modern Israeli weapons, most notably advanced anti-tank weapons and kamikaze drones, the Azerbaijani forces retained their held positions and dealt usually large losses to the NKR contingent.

The confrontation that took place two years ago was inevitable. The principal cause was the collapse of the equilibrium that had been maintained through the first decade following the end of the Karabakh War. After 2004, fueled by a rise in oil prices, Azerbaijan’s military budget soared upwards. Arms purchases increased. Since 2008,Baku has radically changed the model of military imports, transitioning from the acquisition of Soviet arms to orders of newly manufactured high-tech weapons, sourced not only from post-Soviet republics but also from Israel and the West. As a result, by 2014 Azerbaijan had extended its military-technical advantage over Armenia and NKR. Baku achieved a twofold superiority in the number of tanks and artillery units greater than 100 millimeters, and a threefold superiority in multiple rocket launchers, acquiring an absolute advantage from high-power 300-millimeter caliber rocket launchers. Azerbaijan’s gigantic superiority in heavy long-range rocket systems represents the main destabilizing factor. The evolution of Azerbaijan and Armenia potentials is clearly shown in the new report “In Anticipation of the Storm: South Caucasus,” which was published on 24 March 2018 by the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

Historical experience shows that a sharp change in the balance of forces seriously raises the risk of armed conflict. Having invested close to USD 25 billion in arms purchases and military modernization, Baku simply could not help but test the new balance of forces. In April 2016, Azerbaijani’s lacked the sufficient military-technical advantage to succeed outright, but the balance of losses became close to unacceptable for the Armenian side. As such, long-term demographic and economic trends continue to favor Azerbaijan, which means that the probability of a new probe of force remains high.

The situation around the Karabakh conflict poses complex challenges for Russian diplomacy, which must preserve an uneasy balance in relations with a formal ally (Armenia) and a valuable partner (Azerbaijan). The main task is to maintain the “frozen” status of the conflict, if not to achieve a political settlement – which is today an impossibility. It should be noted that the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is one of the few remaining cases where Russia and the West are not engaged in a zero-sum game. The United States and Europe also support maintaining a perpetual ceasefire. Moreover, Russia and the West share a common position on the Karabakh conflict with Iran as well. This unique consensus provides an excellent basis [for cooperation], but, alas, far from guarantees the prevention of new bloodshed.