Bashar al-Assad has no exit strategy in Syria and does not believe he needs one. Two years after President Obama called for him to "step aside," he is still in power and still supported by a well-woven web of loyalists. Since Bashar's father Hafiz rose to power—first as part of a coup in 1966, then by claiming the presidency for himself in 1970—the Syrian regime has developed into a network of elite military officers and businessmen connected by familial and sectarian loyalties. This network has yet to collapse despite pressure from the ongoing civil war. Yet a closer look at recent developments and the language of U.S., EU, and Arab League sanctions indicates where wedges could be driven if Washington wants to bring about a real transition.

WHO'S WHO IN THE SYRIAN REGIME?

The Assad regime's core is a family business: the president is surrounded by his brother, his uncle, and a slew of cousins.

Although Bashar still wields executive power, his younger brother Maher has robust powers of his own. Maher is a Republican Guard commander whose marriage to a Sunni woman—Manal (nee al-Jadaan)—strengthened his business connections with the Sunni elite. His brother in-law is Mohammed Hamsho of Hamsho International Group, a large holding company with subsidiaries and affiliates in multiple industries (e.g., construction, horse breeding). Washington and Brussels have sanctioned these companies along with Hamsho himself. Sanctions have also been applied to some of Maher's other Sunni business associates.

In addition, Maher oversees the regime's newest and perhaps most menacing manifestation: the armed Alawite militia known as the Shabiha. His paternal cousins Fawaz and Munzer lead the militia; along with Ayman and Mohammad Jaber, they coordinate with the regime through Maher.



Elsewhere, Bashar's maternal uncle and cousins, the Makhlouf family, head the security and telecommunications sectors, a major cash cow. Cousin Hafez Makhlouf heads the General Intelligence Directorate in Damascus, where Iyad Makhlouf works as well. Cousin Ihab and his father, Mohammed, are chairman and vice president, respectively, of SyriaTel, one of the country's two cell phone companies; Ihab's brother Rami works there too. The expansive Makhlouf businesses also include financial firms and the country's only private "second-national carrier" airline, Syria Pearl.



The next layer out from the core consists of Hafiz al-Assad's old friends serving in security and intelligence directorates under the Ministry of Defense (Air Force Intelligence and Military Intelligence) or Ministry of Interior (Political Security and General Intelligence). Regime elites have served in multiple offices within these ministries over the years, often working with each other. One such official, Abdul Fatah Qudsiya, moved across the Defense Ministry's intelligence agencies, serving as head of Air Force Intelligence, then as head of Military Intelligence from 2009 until his promotion to deputy chief of the National Security Bureau in 2012. While most elites rose to prominence through normal rank advancement, a few were "cross-trained." For example, Rustum Ghazali, a Sunni from the Houran region south of Damascus, served in both the Defense and Interior Ministries. He was head of Military Intelligence in Damascus and Lebanon until 2012, when he became head of the Political Security Directorate—a post he took over from Mohammad Dib Zaitoun, who became head of the General Intelligence Directorate in 2012.

Yet movement between the four intelligence agencies is rare, and their existence as separate entities allows the regime to balance and limit the power of individual elites. Like Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Syria's intelligence structure seems designed to build up elites with varied backgrounds while limiting their actual power and, therefore, the potential threat they pose to the familial core.