Nature can be extremely cruel. Every day, millions of animals are chased and killed by their predators, a phenomenon entirely regulated by the law of the strongest. Whereas it is widely agreed that the animals people deal with are sentient beings that should deserve moral consideration, uncertainty arises when it comes to wildlife, a sphere where most of the times human beings are absent. Should we fight against natural cruelty or should we just “let it be”?

Animal Ethics is a branch of Moral Philosophy born in the 1970s, whose aim is to analyze the ethical relevance of the different animal species in order to find out and describe how they should be treated. Most of the time, research on animal[1] ethics is focused mainly on animal issues related to the human sphere such as farming, pets, the food industry or scientific research. For this reason, a huge part of animal population is often left aside, namely wild animals. Wildlife may often be considered not as much relevant as non-wild animals to the animal ethics debate, because generally humans do not interact with wild species as much as they do with domesticated animals.

However, the issue is more relevant than it may seem at the first sight. Firstly, because human activities often have a global impact on the world which goes far beyond the human species and affects every living being: it is the case of climate change, for instance, or of the effects of some global disasters, such as the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe which caused a massive negative impact on the nature around, whose effects can still be perceived today. Secondly, because wild animals, their behaviors and their relations are sometimes analogically taken as an example to explain and justify humans’ moral choices towards non-wild animals: it is often argued, for example, that killing animals can be morally acceptable for human beings because it is “natural” to do so, since in nature animals kill each other.

Taking these elements into account, it follows that sorting out the wildlife issue is fundamental in order to give the whole animal ethics debate a more reliable and solid basis. In this perspective, this work aims to answer the principal wildlife moral dilemmas by clarifying the following questions:

Who are wild animals?

Do we have moral duties towards them?

If so, which duties do we have?

One of the greatest sources of answers to these questions is Clare Palmer’s book Animal Ethics in Context[2], which gives an opportunity to various possibilities about wildlife assistance.

Wildlife, Ethics and the importance of the context

In her book Animal Ethics in Context[3], Palmer tries to conciliate two opposed positions on animal ethics. One claims that animals have some capacities and intrinsic values that make them morally relevant: according to this theory, all beings possessing the same capacities should benefit from the same level of moral consideration, and their interest should be equally respected when people make moral decisions. Discrimination in this case would always be unjustifiable and would be defined as speciesism – the theory according to which any species-based position or choice is an act of arbitrary discrimination, comparable to racism, sexism and ageism.

The other position is Clare Palmer’s approach, which focuses on the context and relations that people have with animals and claims that humans do have duties to assist domesticated animals but that they do not have the same duties towards wild animals: because of the weak relations that people establish with wild animals, they do not have any duties of assistance towards them, but they have a prima facie[4] duty not to harm them (Palmer’s laissez-faire intuition)[5].

Who are wild animals?

Clare Palmer finds both a qualitative and a quantitative answer to this question: quantitatively, something can be considered wild in a certain aspect, when it is not humanized in that aspect.[6] Therefore, this definition does not oppose dualistically wildness to domestication (and humanity), but it claims that it has to be considered according to different levels: in fact something can be more or less wild, with different degrees of wildness. Furthermore, animals’ wild nature can be understood in three different ways, from a qualitative point of view:

1) Constitutively: When it is simply defined in opposition to domestication and its features;

2) Locally: when it refers to a place, a space located outside the culture. This physical definition is presented as a spectrum with different nuances: at the one extremity we can find fully wild animals living in an unspoiled nature, inaccessible to humans; at the other extremity there are animals that live in strong contact with the mankind, such as farm animals and domestic animals.

3) Behaviorally: it refers to the behavior of animals. An animal can be considered wild when it shows specific attitudes towards humans, such as fear or aggressiveness.

In some cases, animals can be considered wild according to all these three aspects; but in other cases these three aspects can conflict with each other: for example, a squirrel can be considered constitutively wild, but it may live in a city park and show a behavior not particularly fearful or aggressive towards humans.

In any case, the idea of ​​the existence of wild animals in itself is problematic: for example, the genetic constitution of certain animals may have been modified as a consequence of contact with human beings or their activities. Moreover, the idea that some animals may be wild in a local sense poses additional difficulties, since it is not easy to determine to which extent human activities can have an impact on animals: some effects are undoubtedly global, and they affect all areas of the planet.

Among the different concepts of wildlife, Palmer privileges the ideas of constitutive and local wildness in order to formulate her final definition: wild animals are the ones that have not undergone through any process of domestication and live physically isolated from humans. This statement has the following consequences:

Non-domesticated animals that coexist in proximity of human areas cannot be considered properly wild (such as city parks squirrels);

Animals that have become genetically and behaviorally isolated from other members of their wild species through confinement cannot be considered wild (such as wild animals in a zoo).

Therefore, for Palmer it is impossible to draw a well defined line between wild and non-wild species: the philosopher claims that the majority of animals are nor wild nor completely domesticated, they can be placed in a contact zone between the two extremes, within a wide spectrum of variations. Even if probably there is no wild animal on earth that matches perfectly the ideal wildness model, wildness can still be defined: in order to be “objectively” validated, it needs to be proved by contingent elements derived from contextual observation and experience. According to Palmer, an animal can be considered wild in name of the concrete situation where we find it in a given moment, and thanks to the relations we entertain with it.

Domestication and other forms of animal dependence on human beings: pets and wild animals compared.

To define the nature of wildlife it can be useful to analyze its opposite: domesticated animals. Domestication[7] is a complicated issue because, as we have seen, the line between domestic and wild animals is not always well defined: in fact, there are many hybrid cases (such as wild animals dependent on human activities). As for the process of domestication, it is certainly the result of several factors, one of which is particularly relevant: most of domestic animals and pets existing today are the result of human decisions. According to Palmer, human beings are responsible for almost all the current situations in which domestic animals can be found: they usually carry on their lives in restricted spaces, which prevent them from being autonomous in the realization of their needs present or future. Therefore, these animals have become more vulnerable and strictly dependent on human beings in whatever concerns their development.

In opposition to Palmer’s arguments, it can be claimed that both human beings and animals are already vulnerable, in a certain sense: for example, all infants are dependent on adults. However, this type of vulnerability does not generate a continuous dependence, it is limited in a being’s life, as opposed to domestic animals’ situation, which is extended to the animal’s whole life.

Types of animal dependence

Animal dependence can be of two types:

External: wild animals kept in captivity provide a good example of this type of dependence. These animals could initially satisfy their needs in their natural habitat, but once confined to captivity they became completely dependent on human beings and they turned into beings that are unable to fulfill their basic needs. Once freed, they would no longer be able to survive without human support. Pets are also victims of the this situation: in fact, they are totally dependent on the human beings they live with, and they are not free to seek alternative solutions or resources elsewhere.

Internal: the domestication that causes internal changes, creating a deeper kind of dependence, which becomes a constitutive and permanent character. Pets are often directly created and molded by human beings, and the result of this intervention can be seen in their physical appearance, in their difficulties in adaptation to different diseases as well as their reproductive ability. For these reasons, these animals need constant human support in order to survive and to be able to attain their full development: if left alone in a wild environment, most of them would die. This is the case, for example, of caws that are no longer able to give birth to their calves without a cesarean operation; of turkeys and other birds fed up to the point of becoming overweight and therefore not being able to walk anymore; of hairless dogs or cats; of genetically modified mice that became particularly susceptible to certain forms of cancer. This is also the case of domestic horses reintroduced in nature: they are usually weaker than the other horses, they have problems in their development and wild horses often attack them.

The vulnerability of animals dependent on human beings

According to Goodin,[8] domesticated animals’ dependence upon human beings implies an asymmetry of power and a relationship in which animals are subordinated to human beings. Moreover, Palmer claims that when people deliberately create dependent animals that are not able to meet their needs anymore without human support, they make these animals vulnerable: therefore, they have some special obligations towards them. These obligations are present when animals are made dependent both in an internal (constitutively) and an external way (wild animals kept in captivity for some time).

Palmer compares the situation of domestic animals to the choice of having a child: like for domestic animals, having a child also involves the creation of a sentient being, vulnerable and completely dependent – and this condition would not have existed if human beings had not generated it. Moreover, while children’s dependence is limited in time - because one day a child will grow up and become independent from his parents and he will carry his life alone - this evolution is not applicable to domestic animals: once made dependent and assisted, they will not be able to adapt to their original conditions anymore.

Finally, Palmer points out that a child is the result of someone’s choice and this choice generates some special obligations, not only because the baby is vulnerable and dependent, but also because it is their child. If a couple decides to procreate, their choice generates special obligations towards the future child, but this couple will not have the same obligations towards all the other children on Earth. Palmer claims that the same rule can be applied to animals: therefore, human beings do not have special obligations towards all animals, but just to the ones our species has made dependent.

Problems generated by the concept of special obligations towards animals

According to Palmer, there are at least two major problems related to the issue of special obligations towards pets and other domestic animals. The first one concerns a collective responsibility and aims to answer the following question: who is responsible for the situation of domesticated animals? This is a particularly thorny dilemma because domestication is a process that took place over centuries and millennia: the result is that the causal relationship between its actual responsibility and its moral responsibility is unclear and hard to establish – as a consequence, moral responsibility is usually attributed to the human species as a whole. The second problem, instead, is related to the fact that special obligations should be voluntarily accepted, not imposed: but when we think about domestic animals, every person finds herself to have special obligations that she has never consented before as such.

Palmer brings some light to these dilemmas with the following example: a person walking by accident near a dumpster notices that there are some kittens inside. The kittens were left in the dumpster by their breeder: does the person walking by have a moral duty to help the kittens, even if she was not responsible for their present condition? Let’s imagine another situation now: the person does not find abandoned kittens in the dumpster, but baby rats left there by their mother. In this case, the animals involved are wild (or not voluntarily domesticated by human beings, at least), and their condition does not directly depend upon any specific human act. Does the person have any duties towards the rats as well? Or can she act differently than in the kittens’ case? According to the utilitarian, it is equally important to assist both cats and rats, as both species are capable of suffering in the same way. However, even if cats and rats are similar in their capabilities and their sensitivity, they have a different past as individuals and as a species. The kittens are pets that were born from domestic parents and left in a dumpster by a human being, while rats, even if they live close to the human environment, have not been domesticated: human beings did not create a volunteer relationship with them, and they were not harmed by any human being. As a conclusion, it shall be said that there are certainly some prima facie negative duties not to damage the rats, but there are no relational responsibilities that generate a positive duties of assistance.

The difference between special obligations and moral duties

Some philosophers make clear a distinction between moral duties and special obligations: special obligations, unlike duties, indicate something that must be voluntarily assumed. Moral duties, on contrary, are universal and always valid in the same situation, irrespectively of the moral agent’s perceptions and choices. According to Palmer, the wildlife question is a voluntarist one that concerns special obligations, and not moral duties.

Among special obligations, some of them are of such nature that they do not require an explicit consent from the moral agent; they are somehow “tacitly shared”. Some relationships, in fact, can generate types of obligations that are not voluntarily assumed: for example, we do not choose our brothers and our parents, we just find ourselves to be in these relationships, which most of the times generate special obligations. To sum up, we can define three types of voluntarism:

When moral obligations must be voluntarily assumed;

When we enter in certain relationships and we tacitly approve the obligations that come with it;

When we entertain certain relationships and an official approval is not needed because we get some advantages from that relationship.

As for the person and the stray kittens found in the bin, we can conclude that the person has some special obligations towards the kittens, even if she did not intentionally agree about it because:

The person is part of a community that somehow benefits from the presence of cats, and through this community the person finally gains some personal benefits, even if indirect;

The person contributes to the creation of a shared attitude towards animals that makes harming permissible, and as such she shares a moral responsibility to assist them, even if she does not cause the harm.[9]

According to Palmer, those who voluntarily accept the benefits of a given relationship implicitly accept the special obligations that may come along with it: this is the reason why the person should assist the kittens. However, it is more difficult to prove that she has special obligations towards the rats, because they are wild animals and her relationships with them does not generate any moral duties or obligations.

Moral duties[10] towards wildlife

In the cats and rats example it has been argued that people do not have any duties or special obligation towards the latter. However, Palmer claims there may be some cases in which we have special obligations towards wild animals, and that is most of the times when these obligations arise from past harms to these animals. Animals that have been hurt in the past by human beings should deserve some moral consideration as a sort of reparation for the harm inflicted to them. This statement may lead to complex debates, because it can be difficult to determine who is responsible for the past damages and how to draw the line between who is responsible and who is not.

Therefore, how should moral duties be applied in this case? To clarify this problem, Palmer gives the example of a group of coyotes forced to leave their habitats due to the creation of a new residential area in that zone. The animals, once left their original area, had to face several problems: difficulties in finding a new place where to live because of the presence other groups of coyote, troubles in finding food, etc.: in general, their original condition was worsened due to human intervention.

How could human beings pay their debts towards these coyotes? If we tried to find the direct responsible of this situation we would probably be on the wrong path, because the issue involves a whole area, and a great number of people was responsible for the final decision and its realization. Therefore, to solve this problem it would be useful to identify who are those who take advantages from the present situation: namely current residents who, as a result, should have some moral duties towards the coyotes.

In the end, how should human beings help the coyotes, concretely? Palmer excludes such actions as feeding or assisting them, because these actions would create dependency in the long run and make them more vulnerable. An acceptable solution could be, for example, to accept living in close proximity to these animals, to let them carry on their lives in their original habitat by leaving some spaces available to them.

Do we have moral duties towards wild animals?



Having defined what are the criteria to identify wildlife and having established that there are moral duties towards wild animals in some special cases, we need to determine whether some universal moral duties for Animal Ethics are possible (or impossible). Palmer replies to this dilemma with the intuition of laissez-faire, which is claims that we have duties of assistance towards pets, but not towards wild animals, because the relations we have established with the former are different from these established with the latter.

Even if the laissez-faire intuition may appear somehow obvious and evident to our common sense, in reality it poses numerous problems: first of all, because it is an intuition, and as such it needs to be proved and justified with philosophical principles. Secondly, because this particular intuition can have several different interpretations and variants: according to one of them assisting wildlife cannot be considered a strict moral duty, but it is still morally acceptable and even desirable to do so. As stated by another interpretation, however, wildlife assistance is not only not required, but also not permitted: this means that assisting wildlife is always wrong and unpermitted.

A comparison of wildlife moral theories

In order to better understand Palmer’s laissez-faire intuition, it is useful to compare and analyze other philosophers’ positions on the wildlife issue. In fact, Palmer's theory stands in conflict with several animal welfare theories, which give the priority to animals’ capacities - as opposite to her theory of relations and context. Capacities often play a fundamental role in the ethical debate on animals, and they are crucial to at least three animal rights branches: Peter Singer’s utilitarianism, Tom Regan’s theory of rights and Martha Nussbaum’s theory of capabilities. These three positions, however different, all share the assumption that if someone has duties towards an animal, he also has the same duties towards all the other animals with similar capacities.

1) Peter Singer - Utilitarianism

Peter Singer claims that for a being the necessary elements to benefit from a moral status are the ability to be sentient (to have a central nervous system) and to have interests: moreover, the psychological capacities are also crucial, as they can help us define different levels of moral significance. Therefore, for Singer no differentiation based on species can be justifiable, and logically no distinction between domestic and wild animals can be made in terms of moral relevance.

Secondly, it is important to point out that Singer is a utilitarian[11] consequentialist[12]: what counts in a moral theory is the best outcome of an action in the future, not its causes. As a consequence, the source of suffering is irrelevant and regardless of its cause, suffering should always be minimized as much as possible. Therefore, what can be said about the predators that hunt and kill their preys, causing them terrible pain? The utilitarian Peter Wenz[13], tries to answer this enigma: all predators should be painlessly killed, he claims, and preys number should be controlled through sterilization operations to prevent ecological imbalances and famine among animals. Peter Singer, however, disagrees with Wenz, arguing that that the ecological consequences of such intervention in nature can be hardly foreseen, and it is probably more likely that the damage in the ecological systems would be greater than its benefits.

Singer's position raises some important issues: first, he believes that animal and human suffering are relatively similar; therefore they can be put on the same moral level. Second, because he also claims that human suffering, no matter how far away it is happening from us, should always be equally considered from a moral point of view: it follows that human beings are called to make great sacrifices to help other human beings suffering, for example, because of hunger or thirst. In this perspective, Singer’s line of thinking logically contradicts his critique to Wenz’s theory of predators’ painless killing: since animal and human suffering are equally important, how can we be allowed to ignore the suffering of wild animals, which is often more intense and frequent than human suffering? Singer argues that the consequences of human intervention cannot be easily foreseeable and that they would probably worsen the overall condition of animals and of the ecosystem: however, with the technical tools and data available today, can we still claim that consequences are not predictable?

In the end, Singer admits that if we could predict exactly the outcome of human intervention in nature, it would be permissible to interfere with ecosystems and with wildlife issues such as predation. However, a weak point of the singerian theory consists in the fact that it does not take into account unconventional or contingent elements, cultural or historical, in the name of which we could be called to protect and assist certain wild animals at the expense of others.

2) Tom Regan – The theory of Rights

Tom Regan is one of the main supporters of the theory of rights, which holds that animals are entitled to the right to be treated with respect and they should not be harmed or killed. What rights does Regan refer to? First, it is important to point out that there are two types of rights: negative and positive rights. The former merely imply that moral agents[14] should respect them without breaking them; the latter involve moral agents’ active participation, which means that not only people are called to respect these rights, but they should also actively engage to make others respect them, providing assistance to moral patients and protecting them when needed. Almost no animal rights theory presents both positive and negative rights, including Regan’s theory. In fact, this would result problematic, particularly from a practical point of view: for example, arguing that wild animals have both negative and positive rights to life would imply not only that it is wrong to kill them, but also that people should take action whenever their lives are threatened - which would require extremely intensive interventions in nature.

According to Regan’s theory of rights, all adult mammals (generally at least one wear old) can be defined subjects-of-a-life[15] because they show a set of morally relevant qualities: they have desires, perceptions, memory, a sense of the future, an emotional life, feelings, preferences, and they can be considered as a unique physical and mental being. However, Regan does not strictly exclude the possibility to extend the subject-of-a-life status to other animals, too (mammals below one year, birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish). Animals who are subjects-of-a-life demonstrate a particularly significant autonomy, they are able to make choices and satisfy their preferences: these elements guarantee them an intrinsic value (not simply an acquired one), which is not measurable and not reducible to an empirical fact. Animals with an intrinsic value must be treated so that their value is respected; which implies the right not to be harmed or killed. Moreover, moral agents also have a duty to assist and protect animals when someone violates their rights: this opens in fact a possibility to positive rights for animals, but only in case if other moral agents violate the rights. Only human beings can be moral agents: therefore, other entities such as nature or animals cannot be considered responsible for respecting or violating moral rights. Consequently, there is no duty for a human being to intervene when animals are threatened by other animals, nature and, in general, by any cause that is not a moral agent: for example, there is no duty to intervene in predation because this action is the result of an interaction between moral patients only (two or more animals), and no moral agents are involved directly (human beings).

Regan’s solution, however, seems somehow limited. Following his arguments, in fact, we can deduct that we have no responsibility towards children who die of natural causes; the duty to intervene subsists only if another human being causes the harm. Therefore, for example, it follows that if we could predict a natural catastrophe and save thousands of people, it would still not be strictly compulsory from a moral point of view to do so, because the cause of the disaster is a natural event and not a person. Pushed to its extremes, Regan’s theory leads to several paradoxes, therefore two possibilities are left: admitting that this theory is limited and restricted on certain aspects, or expanding it towards new possibilities that Regan did not consider.

3) Martha Nussbaum – The capabilities theory

Martha Nussbaum’s moral theory on animals takes it roots from her theory of capabilities, which is primarily referred to human beings. According to the philosopher, there is a potential of what humans are capable of doing and being, which is expressed by a range of basic capabilities that we have to achieve to become truly “human”:[16] therefore, the realization and achievement of these capabilities is crucial to develop and lead a life in human dignity. According to Nussbaum, this approach is stronger than the utilitarian one because the latter accepts, for example, the possibility that someone's welfare can be sacrificed for the welfare of the community. Moreover, utilitarianism tends to understand welfare in terms of individual preference, often forgetting that preferences, as opposed to capabilities, can be socially conditioned.

What is the relation between Nusbaumm’s theory of capabilities and her position on animal ethics? First, like the utilitarians, Nussbaum claims that the ability to feel pain is a fundamental element in order to determine whether a being is worth of moral consideration or not. However, this quality alone cannot provide a strong moral guidance on how we should treat animals: unlike the utilitarians and the supporters of the theory of rights, Nussbaum believes that it is important to maintain a distinction between the different species, since each species has its own capabilities, and therefore its own dignity. Individuals belonging to a given species have a specific way to develop their capabilities, and once we have identified the capabilities of each species, our duty as moral agents should be to protect them. A consequence of this theory is that animals can be considered “harmed” not only when they suffer, but also if they are not allowed to develop their basic capabilities, even if this does not cause them any pain. Which rights does the capabilities approach give to animals, concretely?

The right to a healthy life;

The right to the integrity of their bodies;

The right to experience pleasant activities;

The right to avoid harm and pain when it is useless and unnecessary to them;

The right to establish relationships with other beings of their species;

The right for their natural habitats to be preserved;

The right to life: painless killing is not permitted, because life is the conditio sine qua non of capabilities.

Nussbaum also claims that sometimes the consideration of a species’ capabilities is not enough: in some cases, a being’s capabilities should be taken into account instead. According to the philosopher, this should be a guaranteed right for all human beings: in fact, the fulfillment of capabilities should be promoted in every possible way, both involving negative (the right not to be harmed) and positive rights (the right to receive assistance, when needed). When we talk about animals, the question is more complicated: securing both positive and negative rights to all animals is not that obvious. Nussbaum illustrates the problematic nature of this topic through an example, called the imagined argument: [17]

1) It may be that each species has a specific responsibility to secure its own development;

2) If we interfere in wildlife trying to play the role of “benevolent despots of nature”, we may cause more chaos and confusion than benefits and help;

3) The idea of ​​a benevolent despotism of human beings over animals, where humans help animals to satisfy their needs is morally repugnant, just like the idea of ​​a nation that governs over the other nations;

4) A key part in a being’s development is the fact of being able to determine certain important issues by itself, without any external intervention at all - even if benevolent.

This argument could seem easily applicable to any animal of any species, but in reality it cannot be applied to any situation: it is, in fact, just an imaginary argument and it cannot be a real one, for several reasons. Firstly, because many animals - both domestic and wild - are directly dependent on human decisions: therefore, they cannot be considered fully responsible for their own development - even if human beings do not harm them, do not disturb them and do not make them suffer directly. Secondly, as it was mentioned earlier, human activities often affect the entire ecosystems, and it is difficult to define to what extent this influence can be detectable and where a dividing line can be drawn. Because of these reasons, Nussbaum supports the idea of a direct human intervention in nature and wildlife, seen as a sort of paternalism towards animals: its aim should be to preserve and ensure the independence of species, by helping them in the respect and development of their capabilities. The idea behind this concept is that human interference with wildlife should ensure a kind of benevolent assistance when needed, without annihilating the species by forcing them to live an unnatural life.

Nussbaum’s position presents some conclusions in common with utilitarianism: for example, the philosopher is in favor of interactions with predation, when this can reduce the overall suffering without causing a major overall damage. Nussbaum and Singer focus on those who suffer (moral patients) and on the suffering itself, while Regan is interested above all in moral agents (human beings) and on the responsibility for a certain action. Moreover, Nussbaum points out that nature is not and will never become a moral model, because it will not be able to provide a cooperative solution to the relationship between the different species. For this reason, nature must gradually melt with moral law, and human beings should intervene to protect the different species, by respecting their hierarchies and trying to avoid the suffering of the most vulnerable species.

Clare Palmer’s critique to Singer, Regan and Nussbaum: the importance of context and relationships

According to Palmer, however, Singer’s, Regan’s and Nussbaum’s positions all share a weakness: giving too much weight to the capacities of animals only. As a result, they propose two contrasting solutions: the first one (Nussbaum’s and partly Singer’s) supports intensive interventions in nature, finalized to prevent, for example, predation; the second one (Regan’s) is completely uninterested in situations that do not depend directly on moral agents. Palmer’s innovation in this debate consists in underlining the importance of relations and context. Relationships are emotional connection that can have a past, actual or potential effect on another being: they guarantee the existence of an interaction between two or more entities in such a way that this interaction generates some modifications of state. According to Palmer, relations and capabilities are interconnected; and the former are not considered as a static, immutable factor- they can be shaped, developed and modified by the context in which they take place. Moreover, context is very important because it can help a being develop certain skills, and prevent the development of other elements: this affects both animals and human beings. For example, domesticated animals develop very different skills compared to wildlife, and this is a result of human intervention: certain skills can also be the direct product of some relationships.

A critique to Palmer’s relationship based theory is that it seems to conflict with a fundamental ethical principle: that of universability, which has its origins back in Kant and claims that all what is right for a being in a given situation is also right for every other being in the same circumstances. In fact, relationships are contingent, empirical elements: however, Palmer argues that her theory does not deny the principle of universability, it simply moves its goal forward by holding that the similarities on which the universalisation is made are both a being’s capabilities (such as, for example, being able to feel pain) but also its relations (such as those that determine an agent’s causal responsibility for an patient’s given situation). Palmer also points out that there are three basic types of relations:

1) Affective / emotional: these are based on moral emotions such assistance, empathy and sympathy, which set the basis of our relations with animals (and even human beings) and depend on the emotional distance existing between the moral patient and us. Depending on the type of relations and on the emotional bonds existing between two or more beings, moral agents’ obligations towards the patients can be strong, weak or non-existent. From this point of view, it follows that we have different responsibilities towards domestic and wild animals.

However, according to Palmer emotional relations can only have a limited value in ethics: beyond being controversial as a philosophical principle, they do not give us precise directions on how we should treat those with whom we share our emotions, and those with whom we do not share anything – and why. The merit of emotions is only to foster the development of relationships – claims Palmer – but they cannot be considered a solid basis for any moral theory;

2) Causal: these types of relations can exist when moral agents have caused, or partially caused, a modification in a moral patient’s given situations or context, which usually worsens the patient’s initial condition. Causal relations are behind the concept of compensatory justice, forged by Regan, that claims that there should be special duties towards some beings that have been harmed in a particular way by another moral agent in the past.

3) Contractual: this concept refers to a particular type of relation, which is often considered as a special contract between humans and animals and it is commonly called domestication. Domestication causes a change of state of the animal’s original condition, determining a process of transition that leads animals from wildness to the "human" and "cultural" society.

Getting deeper into the laissez-faire intuition and its variants: strong, weak, no-contact

According Clare Palmer’s intuition of laissez-faire, as we have seen, there is a duty to assist domestic animals, but not wild ones. Moreover, this intuition has three different variants:

1) Strong: We must not (prima facie) harm wild animals, nor assist them - we must not interfere with them at all;

2) Weak: We must not (prima facie) harm wild animals, and it is not strictly required to assist them, but (sometimes or always) assistance may be permissible;

3) No-contact: We must not (prima facie) harm wild animals, and it is not strictly required to assist them, but (sometimes or always) assistance may be permissible. In addition, certain circumstances may require necessarily positive duties of assistance (for example when animals get harmed by moral agents).

According to the first variant, assistance to wildlife is never allowed; according to the second and the third one it is not always required. All these variants share the assumption that in any case people have (at least some) duties of assistance towards pets, duties that do not apply to wild animals (except for some special cases of no-contact intuition of laissez-faire). They also claim that while negative duties (not to harm animals) are based on capacities; the duties of assistance depend on the kind of relations that animals establish with human beings.

Of the three variants, one is according Palmer particularly difficult to justify a priori: the strong one, according to which intervention in nature is always morally negative. For this reason, Palmer gives more credibility to the other two laissez-faire variations. However, the weak and the no-contact laissez-faire intuition still pose some problems, because they do not define clearly when assistance shall be allowed and when not – which gives these theories a certain amount of ambiguity. Palmer tries to shed light on these issues by analyzing and answering the following questions:

Is there a real distinction between harming and non-assisting?

Should we assist wild animals?

Is there a real distinction between harming and non-assisting?

According to Regan and to the theorists of rights, there is a distinction between positive and negative rights, and therefore between harming and non-assisting (because assisting implies the presence of positive rights). However, the issue seems more complicated to the consequentialists and the utilitarians: what is important is not the cause of an action, but its outcome, which should always maximize the global welfare. As a consequence, they claim that we cannot deny assistance to animals when it implies a decreasing of the overall suffering in the world and a maximization of the global welfare, which is always desirable. Therefore, what would their position towards the laissez-faire intuition be? A consequentialist paradox is that if it is permissible to accept a certain amount of suffering when it can be prevented, it is also permissible to cause it. In the same way, if causing suffering is unpermitted, then it is also necessary to prevent it: what matters is the existence or non-existence of suffering in itself, not its cause. As a conclusion, a possible utilitarian answer would be: we should determine the principles that will let us distinguish between causing a certain amount of suffering to an animal (for example, harming) and allowing a certain amount of suffering inflicted to an animal to continue, even if we can reduce it (for example, by refusing him assistance). However, Schleffer[18] criticizes this assumption: according to him, consequentialism underestimates the independence of the moral agent’s point of view, reducing them to automatons, programmed “robots”, whose only mission is to act in order to maximize the common welfare. Schleffer claims that it is important to act in the view of global welfare, but that a moral agent’s personal reasons are equally and intrinsically important, too. As a solution, he enriches the utilitarian conclusion with some agent-centered prerogatives[19], thanks to which the individuals can deviate from pure consequentialism and introduce their personal issues to their moral choice. However, for Schleffer impersonal priorities are still more important than the personal ones: the innovative element consists just in letting moral agents readjust the impersonal method in accord with their personal choices.

What are the agent-centred prerogatives exactly? Bernard Williams[20] defines them as an individual’s priorities, which can be "family, friends, interests, commitments, hobbies". These factors are of central importance in the life of the majority of people. Considering that every individual has his personal prerogatives, assisting animals every time they suffer may not be easy and would probably conflict most of the time with these personal priorities: in fact, if we push the consequentialist theory to its extremes, it follows that:

Wildlife suffering should be everyone’s priority;

Everyone should spend most of their free time (holidays, weekends, etc.) in the forests and other natural areas searching for injured animals in order to help them;

Everyone should look for wild animals around the world (as many as possible) and vaccinate them against diseases;

Everyone should constantly offer financial support to organizations that help wild animals;

If human beings had to care about every animal suffering in the world, as the utilitarian theory suggest, it would require enormous amounts of effort that would most of the times conflict with the individual prerogatives: these strongly challenging duties would not leave enough space to the moral agent’s personal priorities.

Therefore, Schleffer’s agent-centered prerogatives theory seems to support at least the weak variant of the laissez-faire intuition. The weak variant of the laissez-faire intuition is a combination of moral duties, personal prerogatives and restrictions: duties to assist pets and domesticated animals, prerogatives thanks to which moral agents must not always give assistance to wildlife in trouble, restrictions not to harm any animal. According to Schleffer, if an agent has set as his personal goal to provide assistance to wild animals, he would be free to pursue his objective. However, for those who have other priorities in life it would be equally permitted to focus on their personal goals, without having to organize their whole life in order to prevent wildlife suffering. While Schleffer’s solution does not make the possibility of duties towards wildlife relative (because some duties may still be more important than personal prerogatives, especially if the moral agent is causally responsible for a given situation), the agent-centered prerogatives have the merit of reducing somehow the categorical value of duties: whenever wildlife assistance is difficult to realize and it interferes with someone’s fundamental projects, the moral agent does not have a compulsory duty to assist wild animals. Duties exist only if they are not particularly challenging, or if moral issues are stronger than personal prerogatives.

Even if this conclusion seems logically consistent, a counter-example reveals its flaws: let’s imagine an opposite situation where assisting wildlife was simple and assisting pets and domesticated animals was difficult and contrast with our life projects. What should we do? Another limit to Schleffer’s theory is given by his prerogatives theory: in fact, their nature is not always clear and well defined; moreover, these priorities are subjective and may vary from person to person, presenting different moral weights, yet being all equally important on a personal level.

According to the deontological position, instead, there is a clear distinction between harming and non-assisting: what counts is the role of the moral agent, and not only the outcome of an action. Unlike the consequentialists, the deontologists claim that even if the result of two actions is equal, harming and non-assisting are two different concepts: what makes a difference is the agent’s responsibility. In this perspective the question of relations plays a critical role: a moral agent, in fact, will entertain different relationships when he will find himself in a situation where he harms directly a moral patient, and in other situations when the harm is not directly caused by him.

In fact, when we hurt someone, we deprive them of something that they had before, independently of us: this results in an imposition from our side on someone else. We take away something from someone, and our intervention causes a deterioration of the initial situation of the moral patient: this is morally unjust from a deontological point of view. Assistance, on contrary, has the merit of improving someone’s condition, by positively imposing our action on the moral patient. However, if we do not provide assistance to the patient in need, we just leave the situation as it is, without bettering or worsening it. Therefore, the deontological position proposes two solutions:

There are negative duties not to harm animals, but there are no positive duties to assist them, unless we have created relevant relationships with them. All forms of laissez-faire intuition are mainly based on the first solution;

There are both negative (not to harm) and positive (to assist) towards animals, but negative duties are generally stronger and have a priority over assistance duties.

Should we assist wild animals? - The importance of relationships

Clare Palmer claims that the kinds of relationship we establish with animals are a key issue in order to determine whether we have any moral duties towards animals. Before considering her position, however, let’s compare three different points of view on this topic:

1) Peter Singer’s utilitarianism and the ecologist argument

Singer claims that all suffering, included that of wild animals, generates duties of assistance: relations do not make a difference in this process, what counts is suffering in itself. However, the potential consequences of human intervention in nature could be problematic, especially their impact on the long term, which is not always easy to forecast with precision: assistance in some cases could worsen wildlife’s overall condition, by making these animal more vulnerable and dependent. Taken these risks into consideration, no intervention in wildlife shall be acceptable. The ecologist argument also supports Singer’s point of view: it claims that human intervention in wildlife would have negative effects on ecosystems, even if the overall animal suffering would be reduced effectively. This position, however, requires the premise that there are certain intrinsic ecological values, independent from the suffering of sentient beings that deserve to be equally taken into account from a moral point of view – and values ​​of this type are difficult to support without further argumentations. The ecological solution could eventually be compatible with an entirely contingent version of the laissez-faire, according to which wildlife suffering is prima facie equally important as domestic animals’ suffering, but that environmental goals have the priority over it. In case of absence of negative environmental consequences, wildlife assistance would not only be morally permissible, but it would also be required.

2) Jennifer Everett’s solution: welfare of the individual or of the species? What is the true good for wild animals?

Jennifer Everett[21] claims that wildlife’s nature is “wild”: therefore, it may be reasonable to think that the best thing to do in regards to it would be neither harming nor assisting them. To support her position, Everett takes back Regan’s theory, which claims that animals are subjects-of-a-life with intrinsic value: this entails that they deserve respectful treatment and assistance. However, this does not imply, for example, the need to save a prey from his predator, and more generally, to assist wildlife in any situation of trouble, as assistance would prevent wild animals to develop their skills according to their own nature. Assistance to domestic animals, by contrast, is compatible with the development of these animals according to their nature and therefore should be allowed.

However, what does it mean according to their nature? For Everett, it is a species-centered question: the nature of an animal is determined by the species it belongs to, and every species has a pre-established development pattern. Regan, however, does not agree with Everett’s point of view: according to the former, the development of a species is not a morally relevant topic, what matters are also individual beings, and following a species-centered argument animals would somehow be manipulated, used as a means to an end. In addition, the “good of a species” does not always coincide with the good of an individual. Let’s think about human beings, for example: suppose that a man wants to spend his life climbing the mountains at high altitude, without any precautions. This would certainly be dangerous: therefore, we could think it would be good to intervene to save his life, by stopping him from climbing the mountains. In this way, we may save the man’s life but we will also prevent him from realizing his deepest wishes. Therefore, it could be argued that our intervention would threaten the man’s development as a person, as he would be prevented from satisfying his deepest desire: even if the man will live longer, does it really matter if he cannot fully express himself and realize the life he is meant to? It could be claimed, for example, that what matters is not life in itself, but rather its quality at a mental and physical level. However, even if this argument seems reasonable in the human case, it poses further questions when related to animals: desires such as being wild or avoiding human interference are merely conceptual, and hardly attributable to animals without presupposing a different levels of mental capacities. In fact, wild animals show instinctive behaviors, which lead them to avoid threats and to escape from human beings that often naturally represent a danger to them. However, in some cases wild animals could benefit from the human interference, thanks to humans they could for example get some food when they are hungry, or be cared for when they are ill. As a consequence, it is difficult to argue that human interference is always negative and frustrating for wildlife development, taken into consideration animals’ individual experience and well being (and sometimes their well-being as a species, too).

However, another problem arises: even if human interference with wildlife did not cause negative effects in the short term to an individual animal, it cannot be excluded that in the long term their welfare would not be affected. On the one hand, the interference with human beings would probably change some interests and behaviors of animals over the time, making them more dependent upon human beings. On the other hand, this is an empirical argument, that can be valid in some situations but not in others: for example, let’s imagine the case of a hungry (but not starving) wolf to which we give some food. The wolf would become used to getting fed by human beings if they feed it regularly, and if one day people decide not to feed the wolf anymore, its final condition will be worsen off. However, let’s imagine another case: a wild mountain sheep contracted a rare disease. If people intervene and vaccinate the infected animal, this will prevent the contagion and death of many other sheep from the flock. Therefore, it seems that it is impossible to claim a priori that human interference with wildlife always affects animals’ development in a negative way - when development is understood in terms of empirical well being over time. Which solutions are left? A possibility could be to think about animals’ development in purely objective and unempirical terms, transcending completely the individual. According to Everett, an objective conception of wildlife development could be related to Nussbaum’s theory of capabilities: in this sense, wildness could be defined as a positive capability, a potential that animals should develop. However, this unempirical definition seems not always so accurate. In fact, if we observe the development of wild animals, we can notice that often the full realization of their wildness depends on some special relations: this, for example, the case of a mammals, that need a particular contact with their parents in order to be able to grow adequately according to their nature. Moreover, taken as a relation, wildness can also mean a negative relation with human beings, which describes their absence in the animal’s life. Moreover, it is also argued that human non-interference in wildlife would let animals develop according to their nature, by leaving them an adequate space to manifest their objective capabilities without contaminating them with human factors. However, even in this case, if animals found themselves in severe danger, their ability to objectively develop as individuals would be already compromised, and human intervention to help them would restore their capabilities. Taken these issues into consideration, it follows that even an objective and unempirical theory of animal welfare does not help to solve our initial dilemma: is human intervention in wildlife necessary, permitted or forbidden? As we have seen, people can sometimes help animals to develop their capabilities objectively, and it is impossible to claim that human assistance is always negative for animals’ development according to their nature.

3) Norton’s theory on wildlife ethics: moral consideration depends on the context.

According to Norton, in most situations wild animals are not in such a condition to be morally considerable: what makes a difference is the context, the place in which wild animals are located. For example, an animal in the forest would not be morally considerable, while the same animal in a zoo would be ethically relevant, which and implies specific duties towards it. An objection to Norton’s theory is that in some cases human intervention in nature may be permissible in the name of wildlife’s autonomy. To understand the concept of autonomy, we can think about the relationship between parents and their children: once the children become adult, the best attitude his parents could have towards them would be to let them live their life. However, this parallelism poses several problems: firstly, the conclusion itself seems questionable, because most of “wise” parents are likely to care for their children even when they grow up; they get concerned at least about the fundamental life issues, such as family, health, death. Moreover, animals do not show to have the same rational capacities of autonomy that human beings have when making choices, and they probably do not even understand conceptually the idea of autonomy. Animals certainly show to have desires such as being free to eat, to sleep, to move around, but this is not enough to support the idea that animals are autonomous in the way human beings are.

Moreover, Norton redefines the concept of wildness, which is for him an intrinsically appreciable value related to the individual animal. On the one hand, almost all animals show a highly appreciable life experience, which makes them morally considerable and therefore suggests that we have certain duties to prevent them from suffering; on the other hand, wild animals’ wildness is itself an intrinsic value. In the case of wild animals, the importance of their wildness is stronger than each individual animal: to respect it fully, we should never intervene in wildlife. Furthermore, Norton’s argument also takes into account the kind of relations that human beings have with wild animals: the context in which these animals are located does not generate duties of assistance, and the richness of their life experience is therefore irrelevant as a moral argument (as opposite to pets with which people have relevant relations). However, for Norton wildness is not considered an overwhelming value: it is sometimes legitimate to intervene in nature, for example to save endangered species.

4) Clare Palmer’s solution: the importance of relationships and of the context

Clare Palmer laissez-faire intuition recalls one of Norton’s conclusions: we should not (prima facie) assist wildlife because we do not build with them the kind of relations that could generate some duties of assistance. On contrary, we can establish with pets and domesticated animals relations that generate some obligations of assistance towards them. Why should we have duties towards domesticated animals but not towards wildlife? There are several arguments in support of this position. Some of them are based on the concept of distance: this recalls the theory of local wildness that we have discussed before, and it claims that wild animals are located outside the human context, which makes them morally inconsiderable. However, this is a complex and controversial issue, which can be arguable: according to the utilitarians, for example, distance is not a morally relevant factor. Peter Singer[22] claims that we have the same duties to save a child dying next to us and children starving far away from us. Another philosopher, Unger[23], argues that distance-based duties are just the result of psychological conditioning: if this was true, the laissez-faire intuition would result to be itself a sort of psychological conditioning.

However, in most cases distance has some moral relevance because it is based on a deeper concept: it is conceived for instance in emotional terms, in name of which we have different duties to those who are emotionally closer to us rather than to those who are far away from us – sentimentally, physically or both. Moreover, distance can also be conceived as cultural, social and political bond, that forges the concepts of a community or a nation: in this perspective the distant are those who did not contribute to the development of a culture, a community, or a nation. Another way of understanding distance is by considering it a kind of independence between individuals or groups: some entities are not responsible for the situation of another entity, as there is no relationship between the two. To sum up, distance can refer to various ideas: it can indicate those who are physically or emotionally distant, those who live beyond a certain essential threshold (such as a community or a nation), or those with whom we do not entertain any causal relation - and in fact, wildlife is distant from human beings in many of these ways. There are also various arguments in support of the idea that we have very weak or no duties to assist foreign human beings, with whom we have never had any interaction, even indirect. To explain better the concept of distance with relevance to her moral theory, Clare Palmer recalls two examples:

The example of starving Venusians

Palmer quotes the philosopher Thomas Pogge, who formulated a hypothetical case of starving Venusians:

“Suppose we discovered people on Venus who are very badly off, and suppose we could help them at little cost to ourselves. If we did nothing, we would surely violate a positive duty of beneficence. But we would not be violating a negative duty of justice, because we would not be contributing to the perpetuation of their misery”. [24]

From Pogge’s passage, we can deduce the existence of two kinds of duties:

Negative duties not to harm the Venusians;

Positive duties of beneficence to assist the Venusians. These duties may be much weaker compared to those we have towards people in our own community, but still existing to some extent: their strength increases as the strength of our relationship with the entity increases.

Let’s imagine the Venusians existed for real and they were hit by a strong famine caused by natural disasters on their planet. We have never met Venusians before and we have no relations at all with them. Would it be morally required for human beings to take action in order to alleviate their suffering? According to utilitarians certainly yes, because the distance is irrelevant and what matters is suffering in itself; but in the opinion of several other moral and political philosophers these duties, if existing, would still be much weaker compared to the duties we would have towards human beings on Earth in a similar situation.

The example of Robinson Crusoe

Another example can help to clarify this concept. Let’s imagine that there are several Robinson Crusoe, living each one on his own island, independently from each other. Each island’s conditions and resources are different from the others and the Crusoes have different capabilities and skills to adapt to life and survive. One day the Crusoes discover the existence of each other, find a way to communicate and to transfer the resources one to the other: therefore, this would also allow the Crusoe in the best position to assist the Crusoes who are in worse conditions. However, would the Crusoe in the best condition be required to assist the Crusoe in the worst condition? Nozick’s[25] answer is negative, because the Crusoes have been living always independently from each other, therefore they do not share a common idea of ​​justice: they are in a situation of social non-cooperation, in which everyone gets what he can according to his forces and his abilities. The Venusians’ and the Crusoes’ examples encourage us to rethink the very concept of justice, which is relevant to the wildlife debate as well because one of the main reasons why some philosophers support moral duties towards wildlife are based on the assumption that their suffering is an expression of some unfair, unjust condition. The Venusians’ and the Crusoes’ examples suggest instead that these beings’ condition cannot be defined unjust because their existence happens outside the world of justice. Similarly, wild animals live outside the social and political human sphere: therefore, wildlife starvation as well as preys’ suffering cannot be considered unjust in itself. This argument matches with the strong variant of the laissez-faire intuition: we should not (prima facie) harm wildlife, as they are sentient beings that are morally considerable, but we do not have any duties of assistance towards them. Therefore, even if they are harmed or killed, this cannot be considered unjust.

If we are not required to assist wild animals in trouble, are we not required to assist human beings in trouble as well?

An answer to this dilemma is given again by Pogge,[26] who claims that thinking analogically about human beings and wild animals is not always pertinent: not because of some human superiority over other animals, but because the condition of human beings is certainly always the result of some injustice, while the same statement cannot be applied to animals. Human injustice depends always on (at least) one of these reasons:

The consequences of the institutional decisions;

The exclusion of some populations from the use of natural resources;

The effects of historical injustice and violence.

Pogge’s solution, however, is somehow incomplete: supposing that there is a duty to help people suffering all over the world, for their condition is always a result of some human injustice, what should be done when human suffering depends purely on natural causes?

Final considerations

Ethics in wildlife: impossibility, possibility or necessity? Palmer’s work has certainly the merit to clarify our initial question: human intervention in wildlife finalized to the alleviation of animal suffering is most of the times not desirable and not necessary. However, it can still be acceptable in some cases, which means it can also be possible, according to the no-contact and the weak laissez-faire intuition. Therefore, the philosopher succeeds in analyzing a thorny topic in a deep and holistic way, proposing solutions that are never reductive and supporting them with strong arguments. She offers a different possible alternative to the utilitarian conclusion, according to which we should not interfere with wildlife because the consequences of our intervention could be unpredictable and make the overall condition worse. In fact, as Palmer points out, on the one hand it would be almost impossible to find out all the wildlife suffering scenes happening in the world; on the other hand it would also be difficult to predict the exact consequences of a massive human intervention in nature: the effects would probably be different and specific in every situation, meaning that sometimes the final result would end up being positive, but other times it would worse off the initial condition. Moreover, Palmer also develops and broadens Tom Regan’s theory, according to which wildlife should be assisted only if a moral agent causes the harm: her merit in this case is to insist on the importance of relations in this issue.

However, a weak point of Palmer’s arguments is that they do not always reach a clearly defined conclusion from an analytical perspective. If the wildlife problem seemed to be sorted out with the coyotes’ example, in fact it was not: Palmer also claims, for example, that if we found an injured wild squirrel in a park, it would be advisable to assist it when in trouble, even if its injury is not caused by any human being. Moreover, she believes that this act would be an admirable demonstration of empathy and other morally relevant qualities (even if it would still not be considered mandatory as a moral duty). Similarly, Palmer also claims that the scene of a cat chasing a little sparrow that fell from its nest under the eyes of its owner is not comparable to the scenes of predation between wild animals: once again in this case human intervention to prevent the sparrow’s suffering and death would be morally desirable.

Empathy

However, is there a real difference between an observer of a wounded animal chased by a pet and an observer of an predation scene in the forest? In the end, a pet is still an animal with its specific instincts. The strict distinction between the two observers seems based rather on a dichotomy that separates the mankind from nature, as if human beings were not part of it, but just external spectators. Therefore, the belief that people should not interfere with nature is somehow based on a dogmatic statement deriving from a strict distinction between culture and nature, which implies that human beings should not get involved into the natural process because they are not part of this context.

According to Palmer, wildness is not an intrinsic value or a property manifested by some animals, but rather a relational factor, which indicates the absence of interactions between animals and human beings, particularly in what concerns the physical location where these animals live and the absence of an ongoing domestication process in their life. Wildness is not defined by clear boundaries, and it is not considered as an objectively detectable factor, but rather as a spectrum, in which animals can be more or less wild: therefore, human beings are also part of this spectrum. In this sense, claiming that there is a dichotomous opposition between human beings and nature is contradictory. In addition, according to Palmer’s laissez-faire intuition interfering with nature is not morally wrong in every situation a priori: it is a prima facie duty not to harm and not to intervene in wildlife because the context where these animals live is such that it does not generate special moral obligations towards them. It follows that assisting and saving a prey chased by its predator is not a mandatory moral duty, not because it is unacceptable in itself for human beings to interfere with nature, but because we do not have the kind of relationship with the prey that can generate these obligations from our side (and yet the laissez faire intuition does not forbid this intervention strictly).

However, is it true that there is no relationship between a chased prey and a potential human observer? If so, can this element alone be strong enough to support the moral statement that there are no obligations to save a suffering pray? In fact, this assumption seems somehow unclear, because relationships can be of various types. For example, a human observer watching a predation scene may experience emotions that put him in an empathetic or sympathetic relationship with the animal, even unintentionally; or, in case he did not experience any personal emotions towards this situation, he could still feel rationally empathetic towards the scene, which means that he could understand the amount of suffering generated by the hunting scene. Because there is no causal relationship between the observer and the prey, and the former is not responsible for the latter’s suffering, the spectator does not have an overwhelming moral duty to intervene in favor of the pray. However, a human being will find himself implicated in a wild context, by observing a scene which is somehow problematic from a moral point of view - a situation that in some cases could be alleviated without requiring much effort from the observer’s side. Therefore, taking into consideration the possibility of an empathetic relation between the pray and the spectator, it is also possible to claim that if the observer could intervene and save the pray, it would be morally recommended and desirable to do so.

An example can be helpful to clarify the topic: let’s imagine that an adult human being comes across a group of unknown children. The children are playing with each other in an aggressive way, and hold some dangerous guns in their hands. Suddenly, a child grabs a gun and following his instinct (just like the predator with its prey), he tries to shot the other children. The children are too young to understand the moral gravity of their act; they probably believe they are playing and act according to their nature. The adult has the opportunity to intervene in the group and rebalance the situation by taking the gun away from the child’s hands and encouraging him to play in a different way: by doing so, he can save several children’s life. Why should the adult not be required to intervene in this case? Similarly, if the same adult had the opportunity to intervene in a predation scene with little effort, saving the prey and satisfying the predator’s hunger by feeding it, why should he not do it? This act does not imply that the same person should have the same duty or special obligation in every similar situation happening in the world (just like he would not be required to intervene in all the children’s fights in the world). As we have seen, looking for every morally problematic case in the world would raise several problems, such as the unpredictability of the consequences or the pragmatic difficulty concerning the identification of all the predation scenes happening in the world.

A similar example was also given by Thomas Pogge with his hypothetical case of starving Venusians. As we have seen earlier, Pogge[27] supported the theory of the existence of two kinds of duties that human beings should have towards the Venusians: negative duties not to harm them and positive duties of beneficence to assist them. However, the latter are much weaker than the former, and their strength depends on the strength of our relationship with the given entity. According to Trevor Hedberg,[28] Pogge’s observation forms the basis for an analogue from humans to animals: in fact, the duties of beneficence imply the existence of a general duty to assist those in need, even when they have no relations with us. In his critique to Clare Palmer’s laissez-faire intuition, Hedberg contrasts Palmer’s theory with his Gradient View theory:

One should (prima facie) not harm wild animals, and there is a weak presumptive duty to assist them, which typically arises only when their needs are great and the costs to us are minimal; however, beneficial assistance is always permissible. Stronger duties to assist may also be generated when we have contact with wild animals that adversely affects them in nontrivial ways. [29]

Hedberg’s position is opposed to any variant of the laissez-faire intuition, because it supports the existence of positive duties towards wildlife, and it claims that wild animals are prima facie owed some assistance when in difficult situations: this duty gets stronger as our relationship with animals grows stronger. Therefore, we have stronger duties towards animals in the contact zone (those who are directly affected by human activities) and that are made worse off by human beings rather than wild animals that do not have any contact with us. Moreover, according to Hedberg we have also weak duties to assist wild animals just as we have weak duties to assist humans with whom we have no personal relations: since we have some duties to assist wild animals, Palmer’s laissez-faire intuition is inconsistent[30]. In the light of Hedberg’s arguments, a question remains still unanswered: which cases always impose these duties and which actions do these duties imply?

As we have seen earlier, according to Norton the context in which wild animals are located is not such that makes these animals morally considerable. Human beings and wild animals usually live in two different spheres; they do not have any spontaneous collaborative relations. However, from a biological point of view human beings are animals as well, they are also part of nature: in fact nature can be seen as an organism composed of many microcosms which coexist and interfere with each other but that are also isolated from each other, due to their specific characteristics: who gives us the right to invade the others’ microcosm and humanize it? After all Ethics, in the way it is conceived, is a purely human matter: would it be right to impose our moral concepts in a massive way, even to those who do not understand its meaning? In his work Brave New World, Aldous Huxley illustrated the consequences of a world where human beings are forced to live an artificial life, controlled from outside by an established hierarchy. Similarly, if one day a group of aliens arrived on Earth, and imposed on us what they believed to be “morally right”, would it be justifiable and acceptable, considering that the context would be the Earth and not on their planet?

Moreover, how could it be sure that it does not exist in nature, in the animal world, one or several other moral languages ​​of which our species is not (yet) aware? In fact, if we observe animals we can see that many of them show actions and gestures that are somehow similar to ours: they are able to express responsibility, affection, friendship, and much more. One of the most evident examples is the case of mothers’ behavior towards their babies: sometimes it is hard to claim that animals’ behavior depends entirely on their instinct, because in this case whenever some stronger instinct prevailed, animals would naturally leave aside their maternal duties and follow their primary instinct (such as pursuing their own survival). However, animal mothers, especially mammals and birds, accurately look after their young and sometimes scarify their life to save them.

The idea that animals could have their own moral system is indeed a possible path: however, when human beings find themselves assisting directly to a predation scene, for example, the cruelty of nature directly meets and interrogates the mankind. The spectator observes a scene of extreme cruelty and also a situation of injustice, entirely regulated by the law of the strongest: a weaker creature succumbs just to satisfy a stronger being’s contingent needs. This would just be a singular case and it would not influence the entire ecosystem: therefore, if the spectator could intervene and save a prey without worsening off its predator’s condition, why should he not do so?

To conclude, it is important to recognize that Clare Palmer’s laissez-faire intuition has the merit of providing arguments in favor of a prima facie principle of non-interference with wild animals, probably valid in many cases, but still not universal. It opens the way to two possibilities: on the one hand, the research of a universal principle of non-interference (or interference) in wildlife; on the other hand, the definition of a method implying the analysis of each specific case, because nature can be multiple, varied and unpredictable - and so are the possibilities of human thought.

[1] “Animals” stands for “non-human animals”

[2] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press

[3] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press

[4] A « prima facie duty » is an obligation that may be later overruled by another more pressing one.

[5] Herberg, Trevor. Animals, Relations and the Laissez-Faire intuition.

[6] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.10

[7] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.7-8, 65-67, 159-60

[8] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.92-93

[9] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.111

[10] As mentioned before, some philosophers make a distinction between moral duties and special obligations: however, to avoid confusion with the philosophical positions that do not make this distinction, the term moral duties here will be used in a wide way and include also special obligations.

[11] Utilitarianism is a normative ethics theory holding that the best moral action is the one that maximizes the overall utility. Utility can be defined in various ways, but is usually related to the well-being of sentient entities.

[12] Consequentialism refers to the normative ethical theories according to which the consequences of one's action are the ultimate basis for any judgment about the rightness or wrongness of that action: the morality of an ethical choice is to be judged solely by its consequences.

[13] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.29

[14] Human beings

[15] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.32

[16] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.40

[17] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.41

[18] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.70

[19] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.71

[20] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.73

[21] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.79

[22] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press , p.85

[23] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press, p.85

[24] Pogge, Thomas. 2007. Eradicating systematic poverty: Brief for a global resources dividend, Blackwell, 2007, p.634

[25] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press, p.87

[26] Palmer, Clare. Animal Ethics in Context, The White Horse Press, p.87

[27] Pogge, Thomas. 2007. Eradicating systematic poverty: Brief for a global resources dividend, Blackwell, 2007, p.634

[28] Hedberg, Trevor. Animals, Relations and the Laissez-Faire intuition, The White Horse Press, p.17

[29] Hedberg, Trevor. Animals, Relations and the Laissez-Faire intuition, The White Horse Press, p.13

[30] Hedberg, Trevor. Animals, Relations and the Laissez-Faire intuition, The White Horse Press, p.21

References