Moral imperative or ‘do-somethingism’?

4. (SBU) With over 400,000 people dead, hundreds of thousands still at risk from regime sieges, and 12 million people from a population of 23 million displaced from their homes, we believe the moral rationale for taking steps to end the deaths and suffering in Syria, after five years of brutal war, is evident and unquestionable. The regime’s actions directly result in broader instability and undermine the international system responsible for protection of civilians, prevention of mass atrocities, and accountability for grave violations. The strategic imperatives for taking steps to end the bloodshed are numerous and equally compelling.

This line indicates both why these diplomats are speaking up and why their dissent is being met with skepticism. Because the White House has chosen to emphasize diplomacy, the State Department is being asked to pursue a strategy it does not fully support. Citing the war’s toll is a way for the diplomats to express their frustration with that arrangement. It is also a way to draw attention to the costs of allowing the status quo to continue.

However, opponents of intervention argue that just because the status quo is bad does not mean that bombing Syrian government forces would improve things. Some accuse State Department officials like these dissenters of “do-somethingism”: a reasoning that the situation is so awful that something must be done, and airstrikes are something, therefore airstrikes are a good policy.

Forcing a stalemate

5. (SBU) First, with the regime deploying tactics that overwhelmingly target civilians (barrel bombs and air strikes in cities) to achieve battlefield objectives and undermine support for the moderate opposition, impeding or ending such atrocities will not only save lives but further our political objectives. While the regime maintains the advantage, an undeterred Asad will resist compromises sought by almost all opposition factions and regional actors. Shifting the tide of the conflict against the regime will increase the chances for peace by sending a clear signal to the regime and its backers that there will not be a military solution to the conflict.

This statement argues that airstrikes will entrench Syria in an unsolvable stalemate, thereby giving the Syrian leader no choice but to negotiate.

The latest peace efforts have gone nowhere at a time when Mr. Assad, backed by Russian forces, is winning on the battlefield. If Mr. Obama wants to negotiate an end to the conflict, the dissenters say, the United States and its allies have to show a willingness to match Russian muscle and give Mr. Assad a clear signal that he cannot win a meaningful victory solely on the ground.

This approach risks worsening the war’s toll in the short term, and there is no guarantee that the United States could break the Syrian president’s will soon. But the memo highlights the fact that Russia’s expanded military involvement changed the status quo, and the United States has not found a way to change it back, leaving the administration with less leverage.

Striking Assad to defeat ISIS

6. (SBU) Secondly, a more assertive U.S. role to protect and preserve opposition-held communities, by defending them from Asad’s air force and artillery, presents the best chance for defeating Da’esh in Syria. The prospects for rolling back Da’esh’s hold on territory are bleak without the Sunni Arabs, who the regime continues to bomb and starve. A de facto alliance with the regime against Da’esh would not guarantee success: Asad’s military is undermanned and exhausted. Kurdish YPG fighters cannot — and should not — be expected to project power and hold terrain deep into non-Kurdish areas. And, crucially, Syria’s Sunni population continues to view the Asad regime as the primary enemy in the conflict. If we are to remain committed to countering Da’esh in the Levant without committing ground forces, the best option is to protect and empower the moderate Syrian opposition. Tolerating the Asad regime’s gross human rights violations against the Syrian people undermines, both morally and materially, the unity of the anti-Da’esh coalition, particularly among Sunni Arab partners. Failure to stem Asad’s flagrant abuses will only bolster the ideological appeal of groups such as Da’esh, even as they endure tactical setbacks on the battlefield. As brutal as Da’esh is, it is the Asad regime that is responsible for the vast majority of the thousands of victims in this conflict.

Airstrikes against Syrian government forces, the memo argues, would also help defeat the Islamic State. Most analysts agree that Mr. Assad’s abuses and the Syrian civil war have both fueled the Islamic State’s rise, as the memo says.