The obvious exception is coal, which had made the largest contribution to extra energy as of late July, only to falter in August and collapse in September and October.

As of the time of writing, coal had produced about 12,500 GWh less electricity than it had by the same date in FY19, roughly the amount, for perspective, consumed by Delhi and its 24 million residents in five months.

Given the scale and speed of coal’s decline and its dominant generation role in India, it is noteworthy that overall electricity generation growth remains positive for the year so far, showing the continuing success of the Government of India’s plans to diversify and decarbonise.

Three related points can be made about this abrupt fall.

Firstly, it is not primarily the consequence of any shortage of coal, despite claims to the contrary. Power plant stocks are now 8.5 million tons (66%) higher than at the end of October last year when generation was much higher, despite 29 plants having ‘critically low’ stocks (only three plants are in that position today).

Not only have the Rail and Coal Ministries succeeded in increasing power plant stocks overall, they have evened out the distribution to reduce the number with only a few days’ supply (even though these now include more high capacity plants).

More to the point, the 77 plants that generated less energy in late October this year than they did a year ago had on average 7.8 more days of stock on hand (using October 28 as the day for comparison and only plants whose capacity was the same in both years).

Thus while specific individual plants clearly do have supply problems because of strikes, weather (e.g. Talcher STPS), the Dipka mine flood, and others (such as Tuticorin JV TPS) are receiving less coal than a year ago, this is not typical. Nationally neither unmet energy nor unmet peak demand has increased.

Warnings that a supply crunch threatens to restrict India’s economy by 2024 may or may not eventuate, but they are not today’s reality. Rather, India’s economy appears to be limiting the use of available coal.

The second point is that the duration of the thermal coal downturn cannot be accurately forecast.

To the extent it is driven by India’s economic conditions, it could be relatively brief if the economic optimists are correct (such as Gaurav Dalmia, interviewed at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton Business School), or longer-lasting, if we rely on those who see more intractable and structural factors at play.

The Economist’s take is that higher growth will largely depend on whether India adopts appropriate economic reforms: “With luck, in a few years’ time, the present slump may be regarded as a useful catalyzing moment.”

The third observation is that the coal slump offers India an unusual opportunity. While not under pressure from burgeoning electricity demand growth, India could fortify its necessary energy transition plans, reduce the country’s 1.2 million annual air pollution-related deaths, and stimulate urgently needed rural job growth, all while enhancing India’s energy security through greater domestic capacity.