Blog Post

AEIdeas

Wars are easy to initiate, but far harder to end.

The Vietnam War turned into a morass. Ahead of the Iraq War, former Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke of the “Pottery Barn rule,” that is, “you break it, you own it.” The Soviet Union never expected defeat at the hands of the Afghan mujahedeen and the Taliban are now on the offensive in Afghanistan which, at fifteen years, is now America’s longest war. Khaled bin Sultan, from Saudi Arabia’s perspective the hero of Operation Desert Storm, lost his shot at further promotion or even becoming king when he got bogged down in Yemen. Saudi Arabia re-entered Yemen in 2015, and there is no end in sight. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, no Israeli commander expected to remain for 18 years. Today, Iran remains increasingly bogged down in Syria. In short, call it hubris or call it reality: Few countries fully consider the possibility that wars might not go according to plan or that their adversaries might actually win.

Few countries right now are as over extended as Turkey. Even before the abortive July 15 coup attempt, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had purged many of Turkey’s most experienced military leaders. Erdoğan may want to compete with Atatürk’s legacy, but he has no exit plans from Turkey’s most recent interventions in Syria and Iraq. The greater problem for Turkey is what is going on in its fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). In 1984, the PKK launched a terror campaign and insurgency against Turkey, one in which many press outlets suggest upwards of 40,000 have died.

Kurdish successes in Iraq and Syria have given the community greater international sympathy than ever before. The Kurds are well on their way to becoming the new Palestinians.

Initially, Turkey’s Kurds had hopes that Erdoğan would be different from Turkey’s previous rulers. Even if Turks and Kurds differ in ethnicity, both populations are overwhelmingly Muslim and Erdoğan seemed to prioritize religion above nationalism. For his part, when Erdoğan believed he might be able to co-opt the Kurds as political allies, he launched a peace initiative which included negotiation with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. An uneasy truce resulted, one which collapsed when Erdoğan recognized that Turkey’s Kurds preferred to vote for the largely Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) rather than his own Justice and Development Party (AKP). There are conflicting accounts of what led to renewed fighting but, suffice to say, both the PKK and the Turkish military joined the fight. Today, Turkey is at war with the PKK and its Kurdish population more broadly. There have been hundreds of casualties on both sides. Portions of southeastern Turkey are now effectively outside the control of the Turkish state if not during the day then certainly at night.

For Turkey, the PKK insurgency is an expensive distraction and one which shows no sign of ending in a Turkish victory. For the Turkish press, analysis of the fight against the PKK is a forbidden topic; any deviation from Erdoğan’s own assertions can land a journalist or academic in prison. But, for Turkey, here is the uncomfortable reality:

Turkey has no path to military victory against the Kurds. It might be able to inflict heavier casualties, but it cannot place cities like Diyarbakir, Mardin, Cizre, and Van under martial law into perpetuity.

If Turkey finds itself bogged down in Syria and Iraq, it will have fewer resources with which to fight the Kurds.

Ordinary Turks have less stomach for the fight than Kurds. Few Turks ever visit southeastern Turkey; they see the region as poor and backward, especially compared to cosmopolitan Istanbul, Izmir, or Antalya. Mothers fear having their sons sent for service in the southeast, especially when so many come back in body bags. The Turkish press, like the Russian press with regard to the ongoing fight in the Ukraine, isn’t allowed to report on mounting casualties, but no amount of censorship can repress the whispering of mothers or an uneasy sense that funerals are increasing. Kurds, on the other hand, feel that they tried negotiation and peace without success. Ordinary Kurds — more than most Turks — believe their struggle is justified both politically and culturally. Regardless, in an asymmetric guerrilla conflict, the weak can nullify the advantages of the strong.

Kurdish successes in Iraq and Syria have given the community greater international sympathy than ever before. The Kurds are well on their way to becoming the new Palestinians.

The question then becomes what will Kurds demand in exchange for peace? It’s a topic I explore in Kurdistan Rising. The Kurds may not be able to defeat Turkey outright, but is a divorce on the horizon? The Kurds might not initially demand an independent state, but might Turkey have a federal future much like Iraq has and Syria will?

Both fans and critics of the Turkish leader agree that Erdoğan is a transformative leader. Certainly, Erdoğan sees himself as a great leader on par with Selim I and Suleiman the Magnificent, even if critics recognize him as more akin to Mustafa I. But while Erdoğan may see himself as returning Turkey and Turks to greatness, his policies and hubris may lead him to defeat in the one conflict that matters: the one to preserve Turkey’s unity.

Erdoğan may not see it yet, and his circle of sycophants and family members will not bring him bad news, but it is time for Turks to consider the possibility that in their decades-long fight against the PKK and, more broadly, Kurdish nationalists, the Kurds might win. It’s time to for Turks and the outside world to consider what that might mean.