Analysis: Manchester City

City set up in a 4-1-4-1 attacking shape in possession, with Raheem Sterling, Leroy Sane, Bernardo Silva and David Silva operating ahead of Fernandinho and behind Sergio Aguero.

City looked to dominate possession and create overloads in the wide areas and half-spaces to penetrate Southampton’s out-of-possession structure. To do this, they generally looked to use groups of three or four players – typically the wide attacker and inside attacker, along with the full-back and centre-back on that side.

Within this diamond structure they would utilise a variety of movements to separate the Saints. These movements were typically designed to draw players to the ball and away from the man, attracting the press before moving to create a passing lane that would take the opponent out of the game.

Against the pressing of Southampton, this was straightforward in the first half, but it became more difficult in the second period when the visitors changed their structure.

In the first half, City would try to get Nathan Redmond and Shane Long to press their centre-backs, at which point they would merely bounce the ball into Fernandinho and out to full-backs Kyle Walker or Benjamin Mendy. The aforementioned pair couldn’t be marked by midfielders Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg or James Ward-Prowse as they were busy dealing with David Silva and Bernardo Silva. Cedric Soares and Ryan Bertrand were similarly tasked with taking care of Sane and Sterling.

The principle in the second half remained the same in terms of attracting pressure and ensuring the opponent lost sight of their man, but City started to play around rather than through, bringing Mendy inside and dropping the wide attacker much deeper. While this approach didn’t necessarily take the wide opponent out of the game, it presented Sane with the option of getting on the ball and beating the wide midfielder, or playing inside to David Silva who would advance as Mendy moved inside.

Similarly, Aguero could be seen dropping into the midfield areas and receiving the ball – this would again attract Southampton midfielders towards him and free up spaces elsewhere for his teammates.

City would look to counter-press immediately after losing the ball and did so with high intensity and numbers, often forcing an immediate regain or a mistake. If the counter-press was broken, or their opponents moved the ball backwards to a point that was too far to continue the pressure without the ball being switched, they would drop into a 4-1-4-1 mid-block, generally taking up the same positions as their in-possession structure.

With their lead so comfortable, they opted for the mid-block in the second half. In favouring this defensive tactic over sprinting after the ball, they were able to preserve energy and ultimately add to their lead. They would typically wait for a pressing trigger, such as a slow, horizontal pass or even a pass into an opponent who was marked, at which point they would initiate high pressure again.