Donald Trump appears poised to make one of the most damaging moves yet of his presidency: to pull out of the multilateral agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that severely restricts Iran’s nuclear program and closes all pathways to a possible Iranian nuclear weapon. Iran is adhering—as inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency have repeatedly certified—to its obligations under the agreement. Despite this record, Trump’s administration already has been violating U.S. obligations, by withholding licenses for commercial transactions permitted under the accord and by actively discouraging other countries from conducting normal commerce with Iran. Trump has been chomping at the bit to withdraw from the JCPOA altogether. He reportedly has been restrained from doing so only by the strong urging of senior subordinates who understand that such a step would be contrary to U.S. interests and to the interests of nuclear nonproliferation.

With Trump’s dismissal of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, some of the most significant restraints on Trump’s impulses are gone. The replacements, Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, have been just as viscerally opposed to the JCPOA as Trump and can be expected to encourage, rather than restrain, his destructive impulses.

Nothing good can come out of a U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. The very best scenario one could hope for, in which the other six parties to the agreement keep some version of it going without U.S. participation, would mean isolation of the United States rather than Iran and additional divisions and acrimony between the United States and its allies. Other scenarios, in which the JCPOA collapses—as suggested by some statements from Iranian officials that if the U.S. pulls out, so will Iran—are worse. This would mean the end of all the special restrictions that the JCPOA placed on Iran’s nuclear program. It would mean Iran could reopen shut-down facilities, enrich as much uranium as it wanted to as high a level as it wanted, and get back to where it was before the JCPOA went into effect, which was within striking distance of being able to build a nuclear weapon. And just as was the case before the negotiations that led to the JCPOA got under way, Iran’s likely response to more and more pressure from the United States would be to spin more and more enrichment centrifuges.

While all this was happening, the absence of the unprecedently intrusive international inspections that the JCPOA provided for would mean we would be put back in the dark with regard to exactly what Iran was doing with its nuclear program. The Trump administration would have a new nuclear crisis, totally of its own making, at the very time that efforts to deal with the problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons enter a critical period.

Trump’s animus toward the JCPOA, like much of the opposition to it, is rooted in political impulses that have nothing to do with the terms of the agreement. For Trump the overriding motivation, as with much of the rest of his presidency, has been to undo whatever his predecessor did. With Bolton, there is the further inclination to oppose diplomacy generally and to look to military force as the solution to any foreign problem.

In times such as these, we should look for guidance to those whose dedication to U.S. national security interests is unquestioned, whose detachment from current political fights is sufficient for their advice to be guided by long-term concern for those interests, and whose experience gives them deep understanding of the issues and problems involved. Such people are to be found in a group of more than a hundred American national security leaders who, calling themselves a National Coalition to Prevent an Iranian Nuclear Weapon, issued today a statement supporting adherence to the JCPOA. The signatories include several dozen retired generals and admirals from the U.S. military. They include 31 former ambassadors, including five former U.S. ambassadors to Israel. They include former members of Congress, both Republican and Democrat, including former chairs of the foreign relations and armed services committees. They include former senior executive branch officials as well as those who have studied intensively from the outside the problems of relations with Iran and of nuclear proliferation. These leaders would disagree among themselves on many issues, but they agree on the wisdom of maintaining the landmark agreement that is the JCPOA.

Here is their statement:

Keep the Iran Deal — 10 Good Reasons Why

Statement of the National Coalition to Prevent an Iranian Nuclear Weapon

March 2018

President Trump should maintain the U.S. commitment to the Iran nuclear deal. Doing so will bring substantial benefits and strengthen America’s hand in dealing with North Korea, as well as Iran, and help maintain the reliability of America’s word and influence as a world leader. Ditching it would serve no national security purpose.

Maintaining Rigorous Implementation of the Agreement Enhances U.S. and Regional Security

1. Iran will be prohibited from exceeding severe limits on its nuclear program under continuing, unprecedented international monitoring, preventing it from moving toward a nuclear weapon for the duration of the agreement. If there is no follow-on agreement that maintains constraints on Iran and if Iran should move toward acquiring a nuclear weapon, nothing prevents the U.S. from taking action.

2. Direct U.S.-Iran communications will be better maintained for crisis management if the nuclear agreement remains in place. The potential for military confrontation, inadvertent accidents and consequent misjudgments in Syria and the Gulf may require the contingency for emergency contacts made possible through the Joint Commission of the nuclear agreement.

3. North Korea could not claim that the U.S. abrogates agreements without cause and would be more likely to negotiate an end to its nuclear program. Efforts to limit nuclear proliferation would be strengthened.

4. Other states in the region would have significantly reduced motivation to develop nuclear weapons if Iran’s program remains under intense scrutiny and restrictions.

The Agreement Enhances U.S. Stature and Leadership

5. U.S. relations with major European allies, who all oppose U.S. withdrawal, would be preserved for advancing U.S. national security interests beyond the nuclear deal.

6. The U.S. will build credibility and retain influence with its negotiating partners to ensure strict implementation with the agreement, be able to lead efforts to strengthen it, or garner strong support for imposing additional sanctions if necessary. Should U.S. efforts with allies fail to reach understandings on remaining in the agreement, the Western Alliance would face significant additional strain.

7. Iran will be denied the opportunity to blame the U.S. should it renew its nuclear program in response to a U.S. withdrawal. Russia and China will be denied the opportunity to claim they are true guardians of international order.

Maintaining the Agreement Provides Opportunities to Decrease Tensions in the Region

8. U.S. political and diplomatic influence would not be eroded, improving the U.S.’s ability to advance the resolution of regional conflicts. There are no military solutions to the conflicts in the Middle East. The U.S. should not cede to Russia, Iran, or others, control over political settlements in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.

9. Iranian hardliners who claim the U.S. can never be trusted would be proven wrong and their influence weakened.

10. Russia and China would have greater difficulty moving closer to Iran politically, economically, and militarily which could lead to increased transfers of conventional weapons and a Russia-Iran strategic alliance.

Ambassador (ret.) Morton Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Ambassador to Thailand and Turkey

Graham Allison, Assistant Secretary of Defense

Ambassador (ret.) Brooke D. Anderson, Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; Chief of Staff and Counselor of the National Security Council

Brigadier General (ret.) Ricardo Aponte, U.S. Air Force and Director of Innovation and Experimentation, U.S. Southern Command

Vice Admiral (ret.) Donald Arthur, U.S. Navy and Surgeon General, U.S. Navy

Major General (ret.) Donna Barbisch, U.S. Army and Director, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Program Integration

Brigadier General (ret.) Roosevelt Barfield, U.S. Army and Deputy Director of Operations, U.S. Africa Command

Rear Admiral (ret.) Jamie Barnett, U.S. Navy and Deputy Commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command

Howard Berman, U.S. House of Representatives and Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Ambassador (ret.) Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State and Ambassador to NATO and Greece

Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senate

Brigadier General (ret.) Donald C. Bolduc, U.S. Army and Commanding General, Special Operations Command-Africa

David L. Boren, U.S. Senator and Governor of Oklahoma

General (ret.) Chuck Boyd, U.S. Air Force and Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command

Major General (ret.) David P. Burford, U.S. Army and Deputy Commander for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Special Operations Command

Brigadier General (ret.) Jeffrey B. Cashman, U.S. Air Force and Director, Manpower, Personnel and Services, Air National Guard

Brigadier General (ret.) Stephen A. Cheney, U.S. Marine Corps and Inspector General, U.S. Marine Corps

Joseph Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund

Lieutenant General (ret.) James Clapper, U.S. Air Force and Director of National Intelligence