This framework, which can be used when considering the introduction of a high-value targeting (HVT) program or evaluating one already under way, outlines potential strategic effects of HVT operations, factors that shape HVT programs’ effectiveness, and best practices identified in a review of current and historical HVT programs. (C//NF)

Potential Strategic Effects of HVT Operations (C//NF)

Eroding Insurgent Effectiveness. HVT operations can cause greater disruption than a group can absorb when military pressure outpaces a group’s ability to replace its leaders or results in the loss of individuals with critical skills. (C//NF)

Weakening Insurgent Will. Leadership losses can erode morale at all levels and reinforce the costs and risks of involvement, especially when the group has no clear succession plan in place. (C//NF)

Changing the Level of Insurgent Support. The death or capture of key insurgents may lead to reduced domestic or foreign support for the group, as supporters recalculate the insurgent group’s chances of winning the conflict, or may increase support for the insurgents, particularly if these strikes enhance insurgent leaders’ lore. (C//NF)

Fragmenting or Splitting the Insurgent Group. The removal or marginalization of unifying leaders can exacerbate divisions in a group and cause it to fragment, particularly when the group is made up of coalitions or factions. (C//NF)

Altering Insurgent Strategy or Organization. An HVT program may lead an insurgent group to change its goals and strategy. By altering internal divisions, an HVT program may push an insurgency toward a more moderate or militant approach. Some insurgencies adapt to leadership losses by adopting a flat organizational structure and taking other measures to improve operational security, such as dismantling an aboveground political wing. (C//NF)

Strengthening Government Morale and Support. Because both insurgents and counterinsurgents communicate with the wider audience as they fight, a government may find that HVT successes send a message to the government’s supporters that the state is taking serious steps to attack the insurgency. (C//NF)

Misdirecting Government Focus. HVT operations can capture the attention of policymakers and military planners to the extent that a government loses its strategic perspective on the conflict or neglects other key aspects of counterinsurgency. (C//NF)

Best Practices in HVT Operations (C//NF)

Identifying Desired Outcome. Because HVT operations can have unforeseen effects, governments tend to be most successful when they are clear about the desired impact on the insurgent group’s trajectory. (C//NF)

Basing Decisions on Knowledge of an Insurgent Group’s Internal Workings. Governments’ successful use of HVT operations generally draw on a deep understanding of the targeted group’s internal workings and specific vulnerabilities, which is usually gained by penetrating the group or debriefing defectors. (C//NF)

Integrating HVT Operations With Other Elements of Counterinsurgency Strategy. Governments with effective HVT programs have integrated them into comprehensive counterinsurgency strategies, the other elements of which could be adjusted to capitalize on and compensate for the effects produced by HVT operations. (C//NF)

Protecting Potential Moderates. Directing HVT operations against the most violent and extremist leaders may increase the likelihood of an eventual political settlement. Most insurgencies have internal divisions between the more militant leaders and those more politically oriented. (C//NF)