Putin, ever conscious of both subtle and not-so-subtle symbolism, seems to be sending a message with these dual visits. One is billed as personal, the other official; one is on friendly territory, while the other will take place on decidedly chillier terrain. (An article on the German-language version of Sputnik, the Kremlin-aligned propaganda site, underscored that with its take on the two meetings: “Putin’s Quick Visit: First Pleasure, Then Work.”)

The Russian leader’s visit to Berlin, announced Monday, comes amid increasingly tense relations between the two countries. The Merkel spokesman Steffen Seibert named the ongoing conflict in Syria, violence in eastern Ukraine, and the progress of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline as the primary three topics the two leaders will discuss. These are all issues on which both sides have clearly defined positions, and on which foreign-policy observers in Berlin see little chance for significant progress. Russia remains Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s strongest ally on the world stage; Germany has strongly condemned Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons and Merkel has said her country would stand with its Western allies (non-militarily) should they choose to take action against him. In eastern Ukraine, Putin supports pro-Russian rebels; Germany has worked with France to coordinate a cease-fire there, though the violence has continued. And while Russia is on board for Nord Stream 2, the pipeline’s construction remains controversial in Germany.

With U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs on steel and aluminum, as well as his “America First” foreign policy, Merkel and Putin have been forced into an awkward collaboration on some issues. That includes deciding how best to respond to Trump’s protectionist trade measures, as well as his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, a subject that came up when the leaders met in May. Still, none of that changes the fact that the two embody opposing worldviews and visions of the future of Europe, Gustav Gressel, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, told me. Merkel has always viewed Putin as “this classical KGB conspiracy-minded operative” who “lives in his own sort of Russian-intelligence world,” Gressel said—a view no doubt informed and aided by Merkel’s own upbringing in former East Germany. “That is part of what she feels is her response: to be one of the counterparts that can’t be manipulated, that pushes against him,” Gressel added. “Most of her [strategy] is just to tell Putin that he won’t get away with this stuff and that the rest of the world doesn’t share his vision.”

Austria, however, is another story. Unlike Germany, which under Merkel has positioned itself as a counterweight to Putin and his attempts to influence Europe, Austria has long regarded itself as a “bridge builder” between East and West. And the new government, run by Kurz and the far-right FPÖ, has positioned itself as Russia-friendly. Where previous governments have been more subtly tolerant of Russia, the FPÖ, at least, is not quiet about its pro-Russia views: The party leader, Strache, traveled to Moscow back in 2016 to sign a cooperation agreement with Putin’s United Russia party. The idea that the Russian president would attend the wedding of Austria’s foreign minister, even given the ties between her party and the Kremlin, sends a strong message about how close the FPÖ wants that relationship to be.