Security forces have standard operating procedures (SOPs) in areas susceptible to terror strikes. In the light of the car-bomb attack in Pulwama, Shaurya Gurung takes a look at the SOPs, what happened at Pulwama and history of terror attacks on convoys:*The CRPF will improve its standard operating procedure by adding additional armed personnel in buses that transport troops to and from Kashmir*Adequate distance between vehicles*Fix time to reach destination from starting point*Fix halts for convoys*Road Opening Party: ROP secures a particular stretch of a road by sanitising them from mines, bombs etc. Each force is given an area of responsibility. The blast took place in area which was CRPF’s responsibility*Civilian traffic: Civilian vehicles are not stopped while the convoy moves. They are allowed to overtake and be between convoy vehicles. This was not the case before 2003 in J&K, when CRPF could stop civilian vehicles from entering convoy path. After J&K government alleged civilians were harassed, forces were asked not to restrict civilian vehicles*CRPF has 61 battalions, 48 in Kashmir and 13 in Jammu, besides other formations. The total strength is 65,000*CRPF convoy moves from Jammu to Srinagar (271 km) and viceversa on alternate days*In summer it is regular but landslide and snowfall makes it erratic in winter*Jammu camp has capacity to accommodate only 1,000 personnel. If snow blocks highway, personnel are shifted to nearby locations. Number of stranded personnel may reach 4,000 at times*Convoy strength increased to clear ‘pile-up’. On February 4, convoy had 91 vehicles with 2,871 transients*Plying lesser number of vehicles reduces risk but not good enough to stop suicide attacksSOPs followed, says CRPF*The convoy from Jammu has plied only thrice in the last fortnight, as snow blocked road and CRPF jawans were stranded in Jammu since February 4*16 vehicles dropped out at Qazigund on reaching destination but 16 ‘mobile bunkers’ joined convoy to deal with terrorist ambushes which increase beyond Qazigund. The convoy left Qazigund at 2:38 pm*At Latoomode of Awantipora in Pulwama, an explosive laden vehicle entered the Jammu-Srinagar highway from a left bylane. It overtook a bus, fi fth in the convoy and exploded. The bus was blown to smithereens. The sixth bus was also impacted by the blast*Thursday’s convoy of 78 vehicles, transporting 2,547 jawans, left Jammu transit camp at 3:30 am. The jawans were returning from leave or going to areas of deployment*40 CRPF jawans died, 39 in the 5th bus and one from the ROP. Five more men in the sixth bus were injured*This is the first time a suicide bomber in an explosive laden vehicle has attacked a CRPF convoy. About 80kg of explosives suspected to have been used*Nine IED blasts, including two in Pulwama, in 2018, no casualties*Attack on CRPF ROP in Nawgam on Dec 11, 2013, 1 personnel killed*Attack on CRPF ROP on Dec 3, 2014, in Pulwama, 1 killed*CRPF convoy attacked on Dec 7, 2015, in Pampore, 5 injured*CRPF convoy attacked on Feb 20, 2016, 2 killed*CRPF convoy attacked on June 25,2016, 8 killed*Attack on ROP on May 11, 2015, in Bejbiera, 2 killed*Amarnath Yatra convoy attacked on July 10, 2017, 7 pilgrims killed*Army follows SOPs similar to CRPF*Jammu-Srinagar highway has many bylanes and monitoring civilian vehicles entering highway diffi cult, says Army insider*Civilian traffi c is stopped only at the starting point and end point of convoy*An Army convoy does not consist of more than 20-30 vehicles