Of course this problem isn’t confined to the co-op movement. Experts have long pondered the ‘agent/principal’ problem when managers act in their own interests rather than for their investors’. A series of corporate governance initiatives and reports have unsuccessfully tried to address this problem, each following a corporate collapse. Enron, WorldCom, Rover, Northern Rock, RBS, HBOS, Lloyds TSB, Southern Cross, City Link… The procession seems unstoppable.

Executive capture is not a modern phenomenon. Members were complaining about their society managers in the 1850s. In those days it wasn’t sophisticated boardroom power struggles, just managers running off with the takings. But the theme is the same. If a co-operative is an association of people set up to provide for their needs, how can we ensure our employee managers are really running the enterprise in our interests?

Democracy throws another spanner in the works. An oligarchy, a clique, often seems to seize dominance by election and then suppress legitimate opposition.

Robert Michels coined his Iron Law of Oligarchy in 1911, which states that a self-reproducing, self- defining ruling clique is unavoidable in all representative democracies. He eventually joined Mussolini’s fascists to celebrate the inevitability of oligarchy. Most people would however still agree with Churchill’s quip that democracy is the least worst form of government.

In the aftermath of the Co-op Group implosion, we have a new governance structure intended to balance the interests of members and executives. It has the three parties recommended in classical ‘separation of powers’ theory: a legislature to make the decisions, an executive to enact them and a judiciary to ensure the other two do what they are supposed to.

But, under the current Group rules, how well does the annual meeting, board and council (including the senate) measure up to this ideal?