This is the html version of the file https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/education/research/centres/stem/publications/pmej/pome31/Ernest%20%20The%20Collateral%20Damage%20of%20Learning%20Mathematics.docx . Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.

THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE OF LEARNING MATHEMATICS



Paul Ernest

University of Exeter, UK

p.ernest @ ex.ac.uk





ABSTRACT

In this paper I challenge the idea that mathematics is an unqualified force for good. Instead I show the harm that learning mathematics can inadvertently cause unless it is taught and applied carefully. I acknowledge that mathematics is a widespread force for good but make the novel case that there is significant collateral damage caused by learning mathematics. I describe three ways in which mathematics causes collateral damage. First, the nature of pure of mathematics itself leads to styles of thinking that can be damaging when applied beyond mathematics to social and human issues. Second the applications of mathematics in society can be deleterious to our humanity unless very carefully monitored and checked. Third, the personal impact of learning mathematics on learners’ thinking and life chances can be negative for a minority of less successful students, as well as potentially harmful for successful students. I end with a recommendation for the inclusion of the philosophy and ethics of mathematics alongside its teaching all stages from school to university, to attempt to reduce or obviate the harm caused; the collateral damage of learning mathematics.



Key words: philosophy of mathematics, ethics, learning mathematics, mathematical harm, collateral damage, applications of mathematics



AMS (2000) classification : Primary; 97D20 (Mathematics education: Philosophical and theoretical contribution)





Introduction



Mathematics is a very rich and powerful subject, with broad and varied footprints across education, science, culture and indeed all of human history. Both academia and society in the large accord mathematics a very high status as an art and as the queen of the sciences (Bell 1952). Mathematics has a uniquely privileged status in education as the only subject that is taught universally and to all ages in schools. Despite all this exposure and attention it is all too rarely that ideas about the nature of mathematics, how it impacts on society, and its overall role and value in education are examined critically. It is therefore not surprising that there are some widespread myths and misunderstandings about mathematics and these roles. My aim here is to uncover and challenge one of the widespread assumptions and myths about mathematics, its role in society, and its impact in the teaching and learning of mathematics. In this paper I question and challenge the preconception that mathematics is an unqualified force for good. I argue that mathematics does harm as well as good. My claim is that mathematics in school has unintended outcomes in leaving some students feeling inhibited, belittled or rejected by mathematics. In sorting and labelling learners and citizens in modern society, mathematics reduces the life chances of those labelled as mathematical failures or rejects. In addition, even for those successful in mathematics, in shaping thought in an amoral or ethics-free way, mathematics supports instrumentalism and ethics-free governance. This is manifested in warfare, psychopathic corporations, human and environmental exploitation, and in all acts that treats persons as objects rather than moral beings that deserve to be treated with respect and dignity in all interactions. I conclude that to overcome negative collateral outcomes we need to teach the philosophy and especially the ethics of mathematics alongside mathematics itself.



Is Mathematics an Untramelled Good?

The myth that I wish to challenge is that mathematics is an untramelled good, and that promoting and learning mathematics leads solely to beneficial outcomes. The received wisdom dominating the institutions of mathematics, mathematics education and society in general is that mathematics of itself is a wonderful boon for all of humankind, and in areas where its positive benefits are not remarked it is simply neutral (Gowers n. d.). Even stronger, Burnyeat (2000) argues that studying mathematics is good for the soul, basing his claims on the arguments of Plato. In contrast, a web searches linking mathematics to harm or damage reveals nothing that challenges the claim mathematics is an untramelled good. 1



In place of the generally uncritical plaudits that mathematics receives I wish to ask what are or might be the actual outcomes and potential costs of elevating and privileging mathematics in education and society, including any unintended outcomes? Looking at such outcomes, does mathematics cause any harm or evil? To mathematicians and many others even asking this question, let alone answering it in the affirmative, might seem unthinkable, a ridiculous questioning of what has hitherto been unquestionable. To educationists it is not so difficult ask this question, or even to answer it in the affirmative, when the impact on disadvantaged students and society is considered (Stanic 1989).

Before I address the potential harm that mathematics may do, let me begin by affirming that mathematics has great value. The overall value of mathematics comprises the benefits and goods it offers to humanity as a whole. There are two types of value that mathematics posesses. First, there is the intrinsic value that mathematics has as a discipline or area of knowledge, the value of mathematics purely for its own sake. Thus teaching mathematics is enabling learners to confront and grapple with one of the great cultural products of human culture. Second, there is extrinsic value, the general social value of mathematics on the basis of its applications and uses in society. Teaching about this aspect of mathematics opens up the world of mathematical applications to learners allowing them to appreciate its immense practical power as well as to participate in making such applications themselves. In addition to the social benefits of its applications mathematics also has personal value. This is the value of mathematics for learners and for other persons more widely as it plays out in terms of individual benefit. Such benefits will vary across individuals according to personal circumstances, experiences, social contexts and so on. For many students the learning of mathematics results in great personal power, manifested in increased social, professional and study opportunities, as well as enhanced feelings of mathematical self-efficacy.

The intrinsic value of mathematics

Mathematics has intrinsic value, and as I argue elsewhere the furthering of mathematics for its own sake is an ethical good for humankind (Ernest In-press). Mathematics is a powerful exploration of pure thought, truth and ideas for their intrinsic beauty, intellectual power and interest. In its development mathematics creates and describes a wondrous world of beautiful crystalline forms that stretch off to infinity in richly etched exquisiteness. Part of the intrinsic value of pure mathematics is its widely appreciated beauty (Ernest 2015). “Like painting and poetry mathematics has permanent aesthetic value” (Hardy 1941: 14). “Mathematics possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty – a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture” (Russell1919: 60).



These virtues and values are appreciated not only by those initiated into the most exclusive inner sanctum of mathematics, the area occupied by the ground-breaking creative mathematicians. We are often confronted with complex and fascinating mathematics-based images in the media, for example multi-coloured pictures of fractals, complex tessellations and other beautiful representations. These contribute to the public perception that mathematics can be both beautiful and intriguing, and has an intrinsic value.

The Extrinsic and Social Value of Mathematics

It is universally acknowledged that mathematics provides the foundation for much of knowledge, especially science, engineering, and information and communication technologies. The essential role of mathematics throughout society is demonstrated by a consideration of three domains of application: science, computing and finance, although more could be cited.

First, with regards to science, mathematics is known as both the queen and servant of science (Bell 1952). As its servant mathematics provides the language by means of which modern science is formulated. Models, laws, theories and predications, even going as far back as 2000 years ago to the Ptolemaic model of the universe, could not be expressed without mathematics. Furthermore, scientific applications based in mathematics underpin engineering, technology and the whole material basis for modern life.

Second, enlarging on the theme of technology, computing and the information and communication technologies that form the language and basis for all our modern media, knowledge systems and control mechanisms, are wholly based on mathematics. Both the knowledge representations and the programmed instructions upon which information and communication technology depends can only be expressed by means of the coding and logic supplied by mathematics.



Third, and far from least, finance, economics, trade, business, and through them, social organisation, rest on a mathematical foundation. The tangible embodiment of economics, namely money, is the lifeblood that circulates throughout these bodies and activities. The commercial basis of modern society simply would not be possible without money and hence mathematics. For money is nothing but number utilising one possible unitisation.



Each of these three domains of application undoubtedly has many great benefits in terms of human flourishing, including improvements in health, nutrition, housing, transport, agriculture, manufacturing, education, leisure, communications and wealth. Undoubtedly more human beings than ever live longer, healthier, better educated, more comfortably and wealthier as a consequence of the mathematics-led developments in the sciences, technology and engineering in the past two centuries.



In addition to these social benefits shared by so many, mathematics has great personal value. Learners and more widely, other persons, benefit from mathematics as: an enlarging element of human culture, a means of personal development and growth, a valuable tool for use in socially, both as workers, and general citizens in society, and a means of gaining certification for entry to employment or further education.

We live in a mathematized social world, and mathematics is the basis for virtually all of modern life. The immense utility of mathematics must be acknowledged as a great strength and virtue. For without it not only would we have to forego many of the tools we as individuals and society rely on, but many of the necessities and much of our prosperity would disappear. Mathematics is arguably the most generally applicable of all human knowledge fields and many if not most of the good qualities of modern living depend on it.

Features and characteristics of mathematics

An immediate question is what are the components and dimensions of mathematics that contribute to its great intrinsic and extrinsic value? The most obvious is that of number and calculation. Calculation is central to mathematics, in that it dominates history and schooling. Mathematics as a scientific discipline is claimed to originate around 3000 years BCE (Høyrup 1980). Thus it was already halfway through its history (C. 500 years BCE) before proof as we know it today entered into mathematics. Prior to that, number recording and calculation, including some geometric measurement, constituted pretty well the totality of mathematics. Even since then, numbers and calculation have dominated both the practical uses of mathematics and its educational content, with Euclidean geometry overall playing a minor role, and that just in elite education.

At the heart of calculation are rule-based general procedures in which the meaning of numerals, especially their place-value meaning, by virtue of their relative positioning, is ignored. Further, largely as a result of Islamic contributions, algebra emerged in the middle ages providing the abstract language of mathematics upon which all modern developments depend. Algebra is primarily generalized arithmetic in origin and is subject to generalized arithmetical procedures and rules, and its strength is that specific meanings are detached. This was explicitly noted over 300 years ago by Bishop Berkeley.

… in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.” (Berkeley 1710: 59).

At its heart, algebra is variable based, thus forcing a unique linguistic move in the language away from specific values and meanings to general rules and procedures. This move has some great benefits. It enables the miracle of electronic computing in which mathematical rules and procedures are wholly automated and no reference to or comprehension of the meaning of mathematical expressions is required.

A further characteristic of school, university and research mathematics is that they are represented in the symbolism and language of mathematics, fundamentally in sentences. Mathematical sentences, although often containing symbols, conform to the usual subject-verb form, or more generally, to the terms-relation form, where a relation is a generalised verb. In a detailed analysis Rotman (1993) has found that although there is some limited use of the indicative mood, the predominant verb form in mathematical language is the imperative mood. Imperatives are orders that instruct or direct actions - either inclusively, such as: let us …, consider …, or exclusively, such as: add, count, solve, prove, etc. Mathematics is more richly studded with imperatives than any other school subject (Rotman 1993; Ernest 1998). Mathematical operations require rigid rule following. At its most creative mathematics allows choices among multiple strategies, but each of the lines pursued involves strict rule following. Mathematics is very unforgiving too. There is no redundancy in its language and any errors in rule following derails the procedures and processes. The net result of extended exposure to and practice in mathematics is a social training in obedience, an apprenticeship in strict subservience to the printed page. Mathematics is not the only subject that plays this role but it is by far the most important in view of its imperative rich and rule-governed character. Furthermore, the rule following is done without any need for attention to the meaning of the signs being worked on and transformed.

One of the most important ways that a social training in obedience is achieved is through the universal teaching and learning of mathematics from a very early age and throughout the school years. The central and universal role of arithmetic in schooling provides the symbolic tools for quantified thought, including not only the ability to conceptualize situations quantitatively, but a compulsion to do so. This compulsion first comes from without, but is appropriated, internalized and elaborated as part of the postmodern citizen’s identity. We cannot stop calculating and assigning quantified values to everything, in a society in which what matters is what counts or is counted.



The teaching and learning of mathematics in schools, and thus the development of mathematical identity requires that, from the age of five or soon after, depending on the country, children will (Ernest 2007):



1. acquire an object-oriented language of objects and processes,

2. learn to conduct operations on and with them without any intrinsic reasons or sense of value (deferred meaning),

3. decontextualise their world of experience and replace it by a deliberately unrealistic and very stylized model composed of simplified static objects and reversible processes,

4. suppress subjectivity, experiential being and feelings in their mathematical operations on objects, processes and models,

5. learn to prioritize and value the outcomes of such modelling above any personal or connected values and feelings, and apply these outcomes irrespective of such subjective dimensions to domains including the human “for your [their] own good” (Miller, 1983).



King (1982) researched the mathematics in 5-6 year old infant classrooms. He found that mathematics involves and legitimates the suspension of conventional reality more than any other school subject. People are coloured in with red and blue faces. “A class exercise on measuring height became a histogram. Marbles, acorns, shells, fingers and other counters become figures on a page, objects become numbers” (King, 1982, p. 244). In the world of school mathematics even the meanings of the simplified representations of reality that emerge are dispensable.

Most teachers were aware that some children could not read the instructions properly, but suggested they ‘know how to do it (the mathematics) without it.’ … Only in mathematics could words be left meaningless (King, 1982, p. 244).

In the psychology of mathematics education instrumental understanding, consisting of knowing how to carry out procedures without understanding, versus relational understanding that also comprises knowing how and why such procedures work, is much discussed as a problem issue (Skemp, 1976; Mellin-Olsen, 1987). It is no coincidence that what is termed instrumental understanding is also a form of the instrumental reasoning critiqued by the Frankfurt School, and which is discussed in the sequel.

In summary, many procedures on signs are carried out with abstracted or deferred meanings, and many mathematical texts, be they calculations, derivations or proofs, involve the reader following rule-governed sequences or orders. In education mathematics is the subject most divorced from everyday or experienced meaning, and the objectification and dehumanisation of the subject are a necessary part of its acquisition.

However, I need to qualify these claims. Although mathematical signs and procedures are detached from meaningful referents in the world, mathematics creates its own inner world of meanings. Mathematicians work within a richly populated conceptual universe which is very meaningful for them. Success at mathematics at most levels is associated with persons involved having a meaningful domain for the interpretation of mathematical signs and symbols, even if it is within the closed world of mathematics. Furthermore, applied mathematicians interpret mathematical models in the world around us so in applications meanings are reattached. Likewise, although mathematical language is very rich in imperatives, successful users of mathematics at all levels have certain degrees of freedom available to them, such as which methods and procedures to apply in solving problems. These qualifications notwithstanding, the study of mathematics does instil both the capacity to, and the expectation of, meaning detachment during reasoning and calculative procedures. Likewise, it does prepare its readers to follow the imperatives in the text during the technical and instrumental reasoning involved in mathematics.

Mathematical thinking as detached instrumental and calculative reasoning

My claim is that the linguistic characteristics and moves indicated above have costs, including unanticipated negative outcomes when extended and applied beyond mathematics. For as I have argued, the mathematical way of thinking promotes a mode of reasoning in which there is a detachment of meaning. Reasoning without meanings provides a training in ethics-free thought. Ethical neutrality/irrelevance is presupposed because meanings, contexts and their associated purposes and values are stripped away and discounted as irrelevant to the task or thought in hand. Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, there is a widespread perception of mathematics as absolute, universal and imbued with certainty, and hence an ethics and value-free domain of thought (Ernest 2001, Ernest 2016a, 2016b). Such perspectives and reasoning contributes to a dehumanized outlook, for without meanings, values or ethical considerations reasoning can become mechanical and technical and thing/object-orientated. These modes of thinking foster what have been termed separated values.

Gilligan (1982) proposes a theory of separated and connected values that can usefully be applied to mathematical and other types of reasoning. Her theory distinguishes separated from connected values positions and places them in opposition. The separated position valorises rules, abstraction, objectification, impersonality, unfeelingness, dispassionate reason and analysis, and tends to be atomistic and thing-centred in focus. The connected position is based on and valorises relationships, connections, empathy, caring, feelings and intuition, and tends to holistic and human-centred in its concerns. These two values positions can be seen as oppositions, with separated values (first) contrasted with connected values (second, respectively), providing the following oppositional pairs: rules vs. relationships, abstraction vs. personal connections, objectification vs. empathy, impersonal vs. human, unfeeling vs. caring, atomistic vs. holistic, dispassionate reason vs. feelings, analysis vs. intuition.

The separated values position applies well to mathematics. Mathematical objects are entities resulting from objectification and abstraction and are naturally impersonal and unfeeling. Mathematical structures are constituted by abstract and rule-based sets of objects and their structural relationships. The processes of mathematics are atomistic and object-centred, based on dispassionate analysis and reason in which personal feelings play no direct part. Thus separated values fit mathematics very well and indeed can be said to be an essential part of mathematics. Mathematics both embodies and transmits these values.

Separated values and the associated outlooks are necessary, indeed essential, by the very nature of mathematics, and their acquisition constitute assets and are undoubtedly beneficial for thinking in mathematics. A separated scientific outlook is also useful in reasoning in other inanimate domains, such as in physics and chemistry, where atomistic analysis, strictly causal relationships and structural regularities yield high levels of knowledge. However, thinking exclusively in the separated mode can lead to problems and abuses when applied outside mathematics and the physical sciences to society. In the human sphere exclusively separated values are unnecessary and potentially harmful, since they factor out the human and ethical dimensions. In seeing the world mathematically, the beautiful richness of nature and human worlds, with all their contextual complexity and ethical responsibilities, are replaced by simplified, abstracted and objectified structural models. The outcome parallels Wilde’s dictum about the outlook “that knows the price of everything and the value of nothing”. Although mathematical perspectives and models are powerful and useful tools for actions in the world, including the improvement of human life conditions, when overextended they can become a threat to our humanity. Inculcating these values can lead to a dehumanized outlook if applied to social and human worlds. Furthermore, separated values extended too far beyond mathematics lead to the view that mathematics and its applications have no ethical or social responsibility. While there are legitimate philosophical arguments that pure mathematics is ethically neutral, although I argue the opposite (Ernest In-press), it is near universally agreed that mathematical applications bear full social responsibility, just as do the applications of science and technology.

My argument is that subjection to mathematics in schooling from halfway through one’s first decade, to near the end of one’s second decade, and beyond if one so chooses, structures and transforms our modes of thought in ways that may not be wholly beneficial. I do not claim that mathematics itself is harmful. But the manner in which the mathematical way of seeing things and relating to the world of our experience is integrated into schooling, society and above all the interpersonal and power relations in society results in the transformation of the human outlook. This is a contingency, an historical construction, that results from the way that mathematics has been recruited into systems thinking instead of empathising (Baron-Cohen 2003) and separated values instead of connected values (Gilligan 1982) that dominate western bureaucratic thinking. It also results from the way mathematics serves a culture of objectification, termed a culture of having rather than being by the critical theorist Fromm (1978).



One framework that subsumes these aspects of the application of mathematics is the critique of instrumental reason or rationality of Critical Theory. Instrumental reason is the objective form of action or thought which treats its objects simply as a means and not as an end in itself. It focuses on the most efficient or most cost-effective means to achieve a specific end, without reflecting on the value of that end ( Blunden n. d.). Instrumental reason has been subjected to critique by a range of philosophers from Weber to Habermas (Schecter 2010). This includes Heidegger, who argues that Instrumental reason and what he terms calculative thinking lead us into enclosed systems of thought with no room for considering the ends, values and indeed ethical dimensions of our actions (Haynes 2008). As Heidegger puts it, even ‘the world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought’ (Dreyfus 2004: 54). The original argument that means must never trump or eclipse ends, when human beings are the ends comes from Kant in his 1785 Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. There he derives his Categorical Imperative from first principles, with the following conclusion. “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.” (Kant 1993: 36)



A broader-based critique comes from the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School (including Adorno, Fromm, Habermas, Horkheimer and Marcuse) who see instrumental reason as the dominant form of thought within modern society ( Bohman 2005 , Corradetti n. d.). By focussing on technical means and not on the ends of their actions, persons, governments and corporations risk complicity in the treatment of human beings as objects to be manipulated, in actions that threaten social well-being, the environment and nature. This outlook underpins the behaviours of some governments and multinational corporations in reducing costs and chasing profits without regards for the human costs. Such actions by corporations have been termed psychopathic (Bakan 2004). We are now so used to the economic, instrumental model of life and human governance that most persons see it as an unquestionable practical reality, a necessary evil, and are not shocked or outraged.



Much of the Frankfurt School critique was prompted by the rise of Nazism in Germany, with its authoritarian leaders (Adorno et al. 1950) and the heartless complicity of ordinary citizens in Germany and occupied territories before and during World War 2. The capture, transportation, enslavement and murder of millions of fellow citizens was not simply undertaken by monsters. These wholesale activities would not have been possible without many ordinary citizens unquestioningly doing their everyday jobs as part of this monstrous programme. Arendt (1963) terms this ordinariness, from the actions of Eichmann downward, the ‘banality of evil’. The fact that many ordinary citizens were highly educated did not prevent them from complicity in mass murder. As Dr. Haim Ginott, a school principal who survived a Nazi concentration camp, wrote in his advice to his teachers:



I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no man should witness: gas chambers built by learned engineers, children poisoned by educated physicians, infants killed by trained nurses, women and babies shot and burned by high school and college graduates. So I am suspicious of education. My request is: help your students to become human. Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled psychopaths, educated Eichmanns. Reading, writing and arithmetic are important only if they serve to make our children more humane. Ginott (1972, page unknown)



My argument is that mathematics plays a central role in normalizing instrumental and calculative ways of seeing and thinking. From the very start of their education children are schooled in these ways of seeing and being. As I have argued, the detachment of meaning and the following of imperatives in mathematical texts provides the central platform for instrumental thought. 2



There is a further factor too. Among philosophers, mathematicians, as well as in school and more generally, in society, mathematics has the image of objectivity, of unquestionable certainty, with claims being settled decisively as either true or false as well as being ethically neutral (Ernest 1998, Hersh 1997). Thus a training in mathematics is also a training in accepting that complex problems can be solved unambiguously with clear-cut right or wrong answers, with solution methods that lead to unique correct solutions. Within the domain of pure mathematical reasoning, problems, methods and solutions are value-free and ethically neutral. But carrying these beliefs beyond mathematics to the more complex and ambiguous problems of the human world leads to a false sense of certainty, and encourages an instrumental and technical approach to daily problems. This is damaging, for when decision making is driven purely by a separated, instrumental rationality, then ethics, caring and human values are neglected, if not left out of the picture altogether. Kelman (1973) observes that ethical considerations are eroded when three conditions are present: namely, standardization, routinization, and dehumanization. Since mathematics is the essence of instrumental reason, with its focus on means to ends and not on underlying values, and its procedures require standardization, routinization, and dehumanization, the concomitant erasure of ethics is no surprise. Thus a training in mathematical thinking, when mis-applied beyond its own area of validity to the social domain, is potentially damaging and harmful.



The social impacts of mathematics and its application

One of the key areas where instrumental modes of thinking are widespread lies within the applications of mathematics. I have described some of the broad range of applications of mathematics in society and their widespread benefits. Alongside these beneficial outcomes the qualifications and caveats I offer here are relatively small, but nevertheless significant negative outcomes. The direct applications of mathematics underpin science, technology including information and communication technologies, and finance and business. Thus, for example, mathematics underpins military applications such as nuclear weapons, missile guidance systems, battlefield computer systems, drone technologies, and so on. I am not claiming bad uses of such weapons makes mathematics and science evil. This would be fallacious. But I am claiming that applied mathematicians should try to be aware of the uses to which their applications are made, and if they are potentially hurtful or harmful should at least consider the consequences and their own involvement as facilitators. It has been suggested that there should be a Hippocratic oath for mathematicians (Davis 1988). Given the widespread views of the neutrality of mathematics, even of applied mathematics, this would seem to be an unlikely development. Although there is a British Society for the Social Responsibility of Science, and even a group called Radical Statistics concerned with its social responsibility, there is no society for the social responsibility of mathematics (pure or applied). Indeed the very idea of the social responsibility of pure mathematics will seem to many an oxymoron.



There is an outstanding use of mathematics that is not usually counted among its applications. This is the role of mathematics as basis of money and finance. Money and thus mathematics is the tool for the distribution of wealth. It can therefore be argued that as the key underpinning conceptual tool mathematics is implicated in the global disparities in wealth and life chances manifested in the human world. It is not an exaggeration to claim that many current forms of capitalism distort equality in and across global societies to the detriment of social justice, as well as promoting consumerism. Of course this is a hot political issue. My argument is not that we should oppose the western capitalist system like the Anti-Globalization and Occupy movements (Wikipedia n. d. a, b). Instead, my proposal is that we should foster an ethical and in particular a critical, social justice oriented attitude towards applications alongside mathematical skills, so that students and citizens in our democracies can make up their own minds. There is a substantial literature on critical mathematics education that promotes this goal (Ernest 1991, Ernest et al. 2016, Skovsmose 1994, Powell and Frankenstein 1997), Furthermore, the idea that our actions should be ethical and, in particular, promote social justice is now mainstream thinking, at least in Europe, for example the European Union Treaty stipulates that it shall promote social justice (European Union, n. d.).





The social impact of the image of mathematics

An indirect way through which mathematics impacts on society and individuals is through its images, which I divide into social and personal images. Social images of mathematics include public images, which are representations in the mass media, such as film, cartoon, pictorial, and computer representations of mathematics and mathematicians. They also include school images which incorporate classroom posters, equipment, textbook, teacher presentations, and school mathematical activities as experienced by the learners. Parent, peer or others’ narratives about mathematics also contribute to its social image. Personal images of mathematics include mental pictures, visual, verbal or other mental representations, and can be assumed to originate from past experiences and encounters with mathematics, as well as from social talk and other public representations. Personal images of mathematics comprise both cognitive and affective dimensions and effects. The types of mathematics as portrayed in its images can include research mathematics and mathematicians, school mathematics, and mathematical applications, both everyday and more complex. Social and personal images of mathematics are intimately related, as personal images must be assumed to result from the lived experiences of learning and using mathematics and from exposure to social images of mathematics. Likewise, social images of mathematics are constructed by individuals or groups drawing on their own personal images, which are then represented and made public. Both kinds of image can have implicit elements of which individuals are not explicitly aware. Thus, what is termed the hidden curriculum comprises those accidental or unplanned elements of knowledge representations and learning experiences within the school curriculum, which can include images of mathematics (Ernest 2012).



A widespread public image of mathematics in the West is that it is difficult, cold, abstract, theoretical, ultra-rational, mainly masculine but nevertheless important (Buerk 1982, Buxton 1981, Ernest 1996, Picker and Berry 2000).). It also has the image of being remote and inaccessible to all but a few super-intelligent beings with ‘mathematical minds’. For many people the image of mathematics is also associated with anxiety and failure. When Brigid Sewell was gathering data on adult numeracy for the Cockcroft Inquiry (1982) she asked a sample of adults on the street if they would answer some questions. Half of them refused to answer any questions when they understood it was about mathematics, suggesting negative attitudes. Extremely negative attitudes such as ‘mathephobia’ (Maxwell 1989) probably only occur in a small minority in western societies, but are nevertheless make up a significant extreme within the distribution of attitudes.



Some of the problems associated with widespread social (and personal) images of mathematics are the perceptions that it is a masculine subject, much more accessible to males; and that it is a difficult subject only accessible to a gifted minority. The effect of these images, coupled with the negative learning experiences reported by some students, is to foster negative personal images of mathematics incorporating negative attitudes such as poor confidence, lack of self-efficacy beliefs, and dislike and even anxiety with respect to mathematics. One of the contributors to the negative images of mathematics is the absolutist image of mathematics as objective, superhuman and value-free (Ernest 1998). For many this contributes to a sense of alienation and exclusion from mathematics (Buerk 1982, Buxton 1981). Of course, for a successful minority this image is part of the attraction of mathematics, namely that it is unchanging, perfect, and a safe haven from the chaos and uncertainties of everyday life. Thus no simple generalization can express the complex and varied effects of the public images of mathematics.



Two of the detrimental effects of images of mathematics are thus the masculine image of mathematics with its negative impact on female students, and the negative impact of mathematics on the attitudes and self-esteem of a minority. The problem with these negative impacts is that mathematics is a highly esteemed and valued subject in schools and universities. Because of this, mathematics examinations are used as a sifting or filtration device in society, and life chances and social rewards are disproportionately correlated with success at mathematics. Sells (1973, 1978) has termed mathematics the ‘critical filter’ in determining life-chances. While mathematical knowledge has important uses and applications in modern societies, the status and value of mathematical achievement is elevated beyond its actual utility. Mathematics is increasingly hidden from citizens in modern society behind complex systems including information and communication technology applications, and the immense computerised control and surveillance systems that regulate and monitor modern societies. Advanced mathematical skills are not needed by the many that operate these systems, and can do so successfully without awareness of their mathematical foundations (Niss 1994, Skovsmose 1988).



In addition, success in school mathematics is strongly correlated with the socio-economic status or social class background of students. Although this is true with virtually all academic school subjects, mathematics has a privileged status. It is the examinations in mathematics in particular that serve as a fractional distillation device that is class reproductive, at least to some extent. Talented mathematicians from any background may be successful in life, nevertheless the net effect of mathematical examinations is the grading of students into a hierarchy with respect to life chances. This hierarchy doubly correlates with social class socio-economic status and social class in terms of both the social origins and the social destinations of students. So it is not merely raw mathematical talent that is reflected in mathematical achievement. It is also partially mediated by cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986, Zevenbergen 1998). My claim is that the social image of mathematics as experienced by learners contributes to their personal image of mathematics and that this is an important factor in their success in mathematics. Personal images of mathematics include attitudes to mathematics and attitudes to mathematics play a key role in success at mathematics via multiplying mechanisms which I call the success and failure cycles (Ernest 2013).



The mechanisms are as follows. Some students suffer from negative attitudes to mathematics, including poor confidence and poor mathematical self-concept, and in a minority possible mathematics anxiety (Buxton 1981). Following Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs theory, persons will do a great deal to avoid risks including threats to personal self-esteem. So negative attitudes lead to reduced persistence and some degree of mathematics avoidance, resulting in reduced learning opportunities. A consequence of this is lack of success in mathematics including failure. Students who experience an overall lack of success and repeated failure at mathematical tasks and tests develop or strengthen their negative attitudes to mathematics, completing a self-reinforcing cycle, leading to a downward spiral in all three of its components, illustrated in Fig. 1.



Figure 1: The Failure Cycle (adapted from Ernest 2013).



Negative attitudes to mathematics Poor confidence and mathematics self-concept. Possible mathematics anxiety

  Mathematical Failure Failure at mathematical tasks and tests. Repeated lack of success in mathematics.

 Reduced Learning Reduced persistence and learning opportunities Mathematics avoidance

In this, as in any proper cycle, there is no beginning point. All three elements develop together, and any one of them could be nominated as a starting point. Failure leads to poor attitudes, negative attitudes lead to disengagement, and disengagement reduces success. But once the cycle is started it becomes self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating, a vicious cycle.



In contrast, positive student attitudes to mathematics, including confidence, a sense of self-efficacy, pleasure in and motivation towards mathematics lead to increased effort, persistence, and the choice of more demanding tasks. This is because of the intrinsic rewards such as intellectual satisfaction and the pleasure in success. The increased efforts and engagement in turn lead to students’ improved learning, as well as experiencing further success at mathematical tasks and mathematics overall. Consequently, positive student attitudes to mathematics are reinforced, completing a success cycle, in an enhancing upward spiral.



Figure 2: The Success Cycle (adapted from Ernest 2013).



Positive Attitudes to Mathematics. Confidence, Sense of Self-Efficacy, Pleasure, Motivation in mathematics

  Mathematical Success Success at Mathematical Tasks. Increased Success in Mathematics overall

 Engagement and Learning More effort, Persistence, Choice of more demanding tasks in mathematics

Psychologists including Howe (1990) have shown that a mechanism like that shown in Fig. 2 is an important factor in the development of exceptional abilities among gifted and talented students. Students who demonstrate some giftedness and talent at around the age of 10 are very significantly further ahead of their peers at the age of 20 precisely because of the factors shown in the figure. Early success and the attitudes it breeds lead to much greater effort, persistence, and choice of more demanding tasks which lead to the flowering of the later manifested exceptional abilities. Howe found that the exceptionally talented invested an extra 5,000 hours in practice of their skills and abilities. This was double the time spent by their capable but less outstanding peers. This finding has been popularized as the ‘10,000 hour rule’ by Gladwell (2008).



Another impact of the social image of mathematics is in sex-differences. Traditionally Western females have had lower levels of achievement in school mathematics and lower levels of participation in advanced mathematical study and careers than males. Although school level achievements in mathematics have now balanced out, research shows that females continue to have, on average, more negative attitudes to mathematics than males, and this continues to be reflected in continuing lower levels of participation after the age of 16 years (Forgasz et al. 2010). It is claimed that the social image of mathematics is a significant causal factor in these sex-differences (Mendick 2006). Thus widespread gender stereotyped social images of mathematics include the view that mathematics is a male domain and is incompatible with femininity (Ernest 1996). This contributes to gender stereotyped school images of mathematics which are manifested in a lack of equal opportunities, such as in classroom interactions in learning mathematics (Walkerdine 1988, 1998). Social images, as well as these school factors lead to gender-stereotyping in females’ individual images of mathematics and impact negatively on their confidence and perceptions of their own mathematical abilities (Isaacson 1989). The disadvantaging effects of these factors result in underachievement and lower participation rate in mathematics post-school.



However, in the past two decades, female underachievement has been balanced out by male underachievement due to a separate set of factors, such as many young men’s disengagement from school, especially in Anglophone countries such as United Kingdom (Forgasz et al. 2010). However, rather than meaning that equality between the sexes has been achieved, it means that there are now two gender-rated problems related to school mathematics, and that these partially cancel out by negatively impacting differentially on both boys and girls. Furthermore, the lower female participation in higher mathematics post-school remains a significant problem.



Of course I have reported this in a primarily Anglocentric way, and many countries do not follow this pattern. For example in West Indian, Pacific Island states and some Middle Eastern countries girls have been outperforming boys in all subjects, including mathematics. In Latin American countries and Southern European countries the stereotypically male pattern of success in mathematics and science related studies and careers has fallen away. Furthermore, in many Eastern countries mathematical success is seen to be due to student effort and not due to inherited ability, including that associated with sex. However, where such problems persist, as they do in the most populous English speaking countries, images of mathematics are regarded as making a significant contribution.



Summary and provisional solutions



I have critiqued the idea that mathematics is an untrammelled force for good. Instead I offer the metaphor that mathematics has two faces, the good and bad faces. The good face displays the benefits and value of mathematics. I have argued that mathematics is intrinsically a force for good, a creative development of the human spirit and imagination. It is also good in its utility, for it has many benefits in its social applications and personal value that benefit human flourishing. But, more controversially, I also claim that mathematics has a bad face. It does harm through dehumanized thinking which fosters instrumentalism and ethics-free governance. Also, because of its over-valuation in the modern world through education it facilitates social reproduction and the perpetuation of class-based social injustice. Through its social image it aids the development of negative attitudes in some learners, and its gender-biased image maintains social disadvantage for females, especially in the English speaking world.



There are of course, in addition, ethically questionable and harmful applications of mathematics, as there are of any scientific and technological subject. Thus, for example, mathematics, science and technology are used in the manufacture of guns, explosives, nuclear and biological weapons, battlefield computer systems, tobacco products, and other potentially destructive artefacts and tools. But, there is a well known and legitimate argument that it is only in the choice of applications of mathematics in such activities that ethical considerations and violations emerge. My critique is independent of such deliberate applications, and perhaps even precedes them. I question whether mathematics itself, even before its wider applications beyond schooling, is solely a force for good, incapable of detriment and social harm. This view, which I might term a myth, hides the fact that mathematics through its actions on the mind is already implicated in some potentially harmful outcomes even before it is deliberately applied in social, scientific and technological applications.



However, some caveats to this argument are required. First of all, from the perspectives that I term absolutist philosophies of mathematics, the image of mathematics that I have condemned follows as a necessary feature of mathematics emanating from its very nature. Although I and some others reject the associated absolutist epistemologies and ontologies, these remain legitimate philosophies of mathematics. Secondly, the fact that the mindset fostered by mathematical thinking can lead to harm when it is misapplied to social and other philosophical issues is a defect of human or social thinking, and not an intrinsic weakness of mathematics. Thirdly, the damage done by social images of mathematics is mediated by interpretations of mathematics, that is, socially and personally constructed images of mathematics. These images are not inescapable logical consequences of mathematics itself, for they can, are, and have been different in different societies and at different historical times. Thus the force of my critique is not directed at mathematics itself, but at the social institutions of mathematics, including training in mathematics, and the false social images of mathematics that they legitimate and project. The harm that I am highlighting comes from what are largely unconscious misapplications of mathematics, including the modes of thought it generates, and from the image of mathematics that many find excluding and off-putting, as well as the current overvaluation of mathematical achievement in school and society.



Thus mathematics is not intrinsically bad or harmful, but as I have argued, its applications, both conscious and unconscious can be detrimental to many. This provokes the question: how can we prevent, ameliorate, or rectify this? In the space here I can only sketch a few possibilities for addressing these problems. My two main proposals are that we should include, in the teaching mathematics at all levels from school to university, both elements of the philosophy of mathematics and the ethics of mathematics and its social responsibility.



1. Teaching the philosophy of mathematics



My argument is that we should include selected aspects of the philosophy of mathematics in the school mathematics curriculum and in university mathematics degree courses. Students at all levels should have some idea of proof and how mathematical knowledge is validated. This includes knowing that no finite number of examples can prove a generalisation, whereas a single counterexample can falsify it. Students need to understand the limits of mathematical knowledge, including the following: the certainties of mathematics do not apply to the world, there is always a margin of error in any measurement; no mathematical application or scientific theory can ever be proved true with certainty, and this applies to any mathematical model of the world. Likewise we need to teach the limits of mathematical thinking: the true/false dichotomies we find in mathematics do not apply to the world, matters are almost never so clear cut. In addition, students need to be aware that there are controversies in the philosophy of mathematics over the nature of mathematics, the basis and status of mathematical knowledge and mathematical objects; that there are controversies over whether mathematical knowledge is absolute, superhuman with an existence that predates humanity, and over whether the objects of mathematics exist in a superhuman Platonic space. A recent issue concerns whether humanly unsurveyable computer proofs, such as that of the 4-colour theorem, are indeed legitimate proofs. Strong disagreements rage over whether mathematics is intrinsically value- and ethics-free or value laden, and over whether it is invented or discovered. I believe that elements of the history of mathematics and mathematics in history can serve to make some of the above recommended points and to humanize mathematics. This can be reinforced by illustrating the ubiquity of mathematics in culture, art and social life. I have just picked out here some philosophical questions and issues that mathematics raises,and many more could be added.



Overall, my proposal is that students should see mathematics as more than just a set of tools, and instead be shown that it is long-standing discipline with its own philosophical issues and controversies, including human and ethical dilemmas. They should learn that mathematics is not an isolated and discrete area of knowledge, which despite having a distinct identity has rich connections with all other dimensions of human activity, practice and knowledge. The importance of grasping aspects of the complex mathematics/human world interrelationships is that some of the misunderstandings arising form an isolated and separated view may be obviated. By exploring some of the basic philosophical issues and presuppositions underpinning mathematics, as well the nature, validity and limitations of its knowledge, some of the ills that I have described can be reduced or avaoided.



2. Teaching the ethics and social responsibility of mathematics



Although there is a widespread misperception, from my perspective, that mathematics is neutral and bears no social responsibility clearly its uses and applications are value-laden. We should, in my view, add the ethics of mathematics to all university mathematics degree courses so that mathematicians gain a sense of its social responsibility. We need to teach that mathematics must be applied responsibly and with awareness, and that it is wrong to ignore or label its negative social impacts as ‘incidental’ outcomes or as ‘collateral damage’, and permit them to be viewed as outside of the responsibilities of mathematicians. In addition to teaching the ethics of explicit mathematical applications we also need to teach that mathematics has unintended ethical consequences. Thus, we need to teach the limits and dangers of instrumental thinking which mathematics can foster, and how it can lead to dehumanized perspectives in which people are both viewed and treated as objects.



Part of its social responsibility is to foster the public understanding of mathematics. Mathematicians, and more widely the professional mathematics community, have the responsibility to promote the understanding of mathematics and to counter misconceptions and misunderstandings about the meanings and significance of the uses and applications of mathematics made public, especially in the media. Modern citizens should be critically numerate, able to understand the everyday uses of mathematics in society. As citizens, they need to be able to interpret and critique the uses of mathematics in social, commercial and even political claims in advertisements, newspaper and other media presentations, published reports, and so on. Mathematical knowledge needs to be critical in the sense that citizens can understand the limits of validity of uses of mathematics, what decisions are conveyed or concealed within mathematical applications, and to question and reject spurious or misleading claims made to look authoritative through the use of mathematics. Citizens need to be able to scrutinize financial sector and government systems and procedures for objectivity, correctness and hidden assumptions. Ideally they should able to identify the ethical implications of applications of mathematics to guard against the instrumentalism and dehumanization that often accompany technical decisions. My claim is that every citizen needs these capabilities to defend democracy and the values of humanistic and civilised societies, and it is part of the social responsibility of mathematics to help provide them.



A purist objection to such activities is, first of all, that they would steal valuable time and thus detract from the teaching of mathematics, and second that these not the responsibilities of mathematicians. With respect to the first objection it can be said that what I am proposing is not intended to take up even 2% of the time devoted to mathematics teaching in schools and universities. At school, such issues can be brought up within the mathematics curriculum periodically but without taking even a whole lesson. A discussion of examples, models and applications can lead to the issues being raised ‘naturally’, provided mathematics teachers have been well prepared to do this. At university a small, time limited course could be added as a mandatory course alongside pure, applied or service courses in mathematics. Thus this objection can be met, the costs in time could be very small, although the positive impacts, in terms of mathematicians’ and other mathematics users’ awareness of the social responsibility of mathematics, could be significant.



With regard to the second objection, it is first interesting to contrast the received views about the responsibilities of mathematics and mathematicians with parallel views about the social responsibilities of science and scientists. Unlike the case in mathematics, there is widespread acknowledgement of the social responsibility of science. Many have argued that what they term the Promethean power of modern science and technology warrants an extended ethic of social responsibility on the part of the scientists and technologists (Bunge 1977, Cournand 1977, Jonas 1985, Lenk 1983, Luppicini 2008, Moor 2005, Sakharov 1981, Weinberg 1978, Ziman, 1998). In particular, The Russell-Einstein Manifesto called for scientists to take responsibility for developing weapons of mass destruction and urged them to “Remember your humanity, and forget the rest” (Russell and Einstein, 1955). This manifesto initiated the Pugwash meetings which emphasised “the moral duty of the scientist to be concerned with the ethical consequences of his (sic) discoveries.” (Khan 1988, p. 258). When accepting The Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of himself and the Pugwash conferences Joseph Rotblat stated “The time has come to formulate guidelines for the ethical conduct of scientist, perhaps in the form of a voluntary Hippocratic Oath. This would be particularly valuable for young scientists when they embark on a scientific career.” (Rotblat 1995). Thus Rotblat and his colleagues propose that ethics needs to be included in the training of young scientists, a call that is echoed by many others including Bird (2014), Evers (2001) and Frazer and Kornhauser (1986). This call has been taken up authoritatively by UNESCO which emphasizes the theme “Ethics of Science and Technology” (UNESCO n. d.), and according to which “The ethics and responsibility of science should be an integral part of the education and training of all scientists”. UNESCO (1999: section 3.2.71). Ziman claims that what is needed is what he calls ‘metascience’, an educational discipline extending “beyond conventional philosophy and ethics to include the social and humanistic aspects of the scientific enterprise” (Ziman 2001, p. 165). He argues that metascience should become an integral part of scientific training in order to help equip scientists of the future with the skills necessary to tackle ethical dilemmas as they arise (Small 2011).



The situation is rather different in mathematics with the exception of the Radical Statistics group (n. d.), which publishes analyses of social problem topics with the aim of demystifying technical language and promoting public understanding and the public good. Generally, very few mathematicians acknowledge the ethical and social responsibilities of mathematics, although there is some acknowledgement of the social responsibility of mathematicians, as I recounted above. Hersh (1990, 2007) discusses ethics for mathematicians , Davis (1988) proposes a Hippocratic oath, and the American Mathematical Society (2005) provides Ethical Guidelines for mathematicians. However, the content of these recommendations is primarily about professional conduct in research and teaching for professional mathematicians. Davis (1988) goes beyond this and argues that mathematics should not be put in the service of war or other harmful applications, and mathematicians should exercise their consciences. Ernest (1998, 2007) and Davis (2007) argue that mathematics needs to acknowledge its social responsibility, with Davis (2007) arguing for the need for ethical training throughout schooling for mathematicians and non-mathematicians alike. These, however, represent marginal voices in the mathematical and philosophical communities of scholars.



If one looks beyond mathematicians and philosophers to the area of mathematics education, there are many voices asserting the social responsibility of mathematics. Of course it is uncontroversial to claim that education is a value-laden and ethical activity, since it concerns the welfare of students and society, and the objectivity, purity and neutrality of mathematics itself is not at stake. In consequence, there is a very large literature comprising many thousands of publications on social justice and social responsibility in mathematics teaching. 3 Some of the main themes in this literature are mathematics and exclusion based on race and ethnic background (Powell and Frankenstein 1997), gender and female disadvantage (Rogers and Kaiser 1995, Walkerdine 1988, 1998), low ‘ability’ and handicap as obstacles (Ernest 2011), and disadvantages correlated with or caused by social class and its correlated cultural capital or other factors (Cooper and Dunne 2000). Another theme is the role mathematics plays in critical citizenship and the public understanding of mathematics (Frankenstein 1990). A related third theme is the Mathematics Education and Society (Mukhopadhyay and Greer 2015), Critical Mathematics Education (Skovsmose 1994, Ernest et al. 2015) and Ethnomathematics (D’Ambrosio 1998) movements which consider both the role mathematics plays in society and how it impacts on the first two themes. The Critical Mathematics Education movement also looks critically at mathematical knowledge and the institutions of mathematics and their role in denying the relevance of ethics and values to mathematics, and thus denying its social responsibility (Skovsmose 1994). It shares this concern with the Philosophy of Mathematics Education movement (Ernest 1991, 2016a, 2016b), to which this paper represents a contribution. However, within the mathematics education research community, beyond any commitment to the teaching of mathematics in a socially just way, the idea that ethics needs to be taught alongside mathematics remains a minority opinion, except perhaps within research in the third theme distinguished here.



Conclusion

In this paper I question and challenge the idea that mathematics is an unqualified force for good. I acknowledge the traditional argument that like any other instrument, mathematics can be applied in both helpful and harmful ways, and I acknowledge the many benefits it brings. But I nevertheless endorse the minority view that mathematicians and other students of mathematics need to be taught the ethics of mathematical applications to question and limit harmful applications. My main argument, however, is more radical. I argue that in addition to the explicit and intended applications of mathematics, the nature of mathematical thought and the role mathematics plays in education and society lead to collateral damage; some unintended but nevertheless harmful consequences. Mathematics has a hidden role in shaping our thought and society that is rarely scrutinised for its social effects and impacts, some of which are negative.



First of all, there is the harm caused by the overvaluation of mathematics in society and education, with its negative impacts on the confidence and self-esteem of groups of student including females and lower attainers in mathematics. These unintended outcomes of mathematics in school in leaves some students feeling inhibited, belittled or rejected by mathematics and perhaps even rejected by the educational system and society overall. In sorting and labelling learners and citizens in modern society, mathematics reduces the life chances of those labelled as mathematical failures or rejects (Ruthven 1987). This is a hidden impact of mathematics that is usually brushed over as the fault of the individuals that suffer, rather than as a direct responsibility of the role accorded to mathematics in education and society.



Second, even for those successful in mathematics, in shaping thought in an amoral or ethics-free way, mathematics supports instrumentalism and ethics-free governance. Instrumental thinking leading to the objectification and dehumanisation of persons in business, society and politics, has the potential to cause great hurt and harm. This is manifested in warfare, the actions of psychopathic corporations, the exploitation of humans and the environment, and in all acts that treat persons as objects rather than moral beings deserving respectful and dignified treatment throughout (Marcuse 1964).



I do not claim that mathematics is intrinsically harmful, but that without more careful thought about its role in society and thought it leads to harmful, albeit unintended, outcomes. My proposal is that to obviate or prevent the potential harm done by mathematics we need to teach the philosophy and especially the ethics of mathematics alongside mathematics itself. Part of this teaching is needed to overcome the idea that mathematics, unlike any other domain of human knowledge bears no social responsibility for its roles in society, science and technology. All human activities should contribute to the enhancement of human life and general well-being and no domain can stand apart from such ethical scrutiny, although this should never be used as a reason for limiting advances within pure mathematics itself. However, the intended and unintended applications of mathematics and their consequences do need to be scrutinised and held accountable within the court of human happiness and human flourishing.



References



Adorno, R., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. and Sanford, R. (1950) The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper.

American Mathematical Society (2005) Ethical Guidelines, retrieved on 1 May 2015 from <http://www.ams.org/secretary/ethics.html>.

Arendt (1963) Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil, London: Faber and Faber.

Bakan, J. (2004) The Corporation, London: Constable.

Baron-Cohen, S. (2003) The Essential Difference: Men, Women and the Extreme Male Brain, London: Penguin Books.

Bell, E. T. (1952) Mathematics Queen and Servant of Science, London: G. Bell and Sons.

Berkeley, G. (1710) The Principles of Human Knowledge. Reprinted in Fontana Library, Glasgow: W. Collins: 1962.

Bird, S. J. (2014) ‘Social Responsibility and Research Ethics: Not Either/Or but Both’, retrieved 1 May 2015 from http://www.aaas.org/news/social-responsibility-and-research-ethics-not-eitheror-both

Bishop, A. J. (1988) Mathematical Enculturation, Dordrecht, North Holland: Kluwer.

Blunden , A., Ed. (n.d.) Encyclopedia of Marxism, Glossary of Terms, Instrumental Reason and Communicative Reason, retrieved on 12 March 2009 from http://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/i/n.htm .

Bourdieu, P. (1986) ‘The forms of capital’, in J. G. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education, New York: Greenwood press, 241-258.

Buerk, D. (1982) ‘An Experience with Some Able Women Who Avoid Mathematics’, For the Learning Of Mathematics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 19-24.

Bunge, M. (1977) ‘Towards a technoethics’, Monist, Vol. 60, No. 1: 96-107.

Burnyeat, M. F. (2000). Plato on why mathematics is good for the soul. Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 103. Retrieved from < http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/proc/files/103p001.pdf >. (Accessed on 15 September 2013).

Burton, L. (1995) Moving Towards a Feminist Epistemology of Mathematics. P. Rogers and G. Kaiser, Eds. (1995) Equity in Mathematics Education, London: Taylor and Francis, 209-225.

Buxton, L. (1981). Do you Panic about Maths? Coping with Maths Anxiety, London: Heinemann Educational Books.

Cockcroft, W. H., Chair, (1982) Mathematics Counts (Report of the Committee of Inquiry on the Teaching of Mathematics), London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Cooper, B. and Dunne, M. (2000) Assessing Children's Mathematical Knowledge: Social Class, Sex and Problem-Solving, London: Open University Press.

Corradetti, C. (n. d.) ‘The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory’, The I nternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved on 5 May 2015 from http://www.iep.utm.edu/frankfur/.

Cournand, A. (1977) ‘The code of the scientist and its relationship to ethics’, Science, Vol. 198 (No. 4318): 699-705.

D’Ambrosio, U. (1985) ‘Ethnomathematics and its Place in the History and Pedagogy of Mathematics’, For The Learning of Mathematics, Vol. 5, No 1: 44-48.

D’Ambrosio, U. (1998) ‘Mathematics and Peace: Our Responsibilities’, Zentralblatt für Didaktik der Mathematik (ZDM), Vol. 30, No. 3 (June 1998): 67–73.

Davis, C. (1988) ‘A Hippocratic oath for mathematicians?’, In C. Keitel, Ed., Mathematics, Education and Society, Paris: UNESCO: 44- 47.

Davis, P. J. (2007) ‘Applied Mathematics as Social Contract ’, Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal, No. 22 (Nov. 2007), retrieved on 2 May 2015 from http://people.exeter.ac.uk/PErnest/pome22/index.htm.

Davis, P. J. and Hersh, R. (1980) The Mathematical Experience, Boston: Birkhauser.

Dreyfus, H.L. (2004) ‘Heidegger on gaining a free relation to technology’, in D. M. Kaplan, Ed., Readings in the philosophy of technology, Summit, Pennsylvania: Rowman and Littlefield: 2004: 53-62.

Ernest, P. (1991) The Philosophy of Mathematics Education, London: Routledge.

Ernest, P. (1994a) ‘The dialogical nature of mathematics’ in Ernest, P. Ed. Mathematics, Education and Philosophy: An International Perspective, London, The Falmer Press, 1994, 33-48.

Ernest, P. (1994b) ‘Conversation as a Metaphor for Mathematics and Learning’ Proceedings of British Society for Research into Learning Mathematics Day Conference, Manchester Metropolitan University 22 November 1993, Nottingham, BSRLM, 1994: 58-63.

Ernest, P. (1996) A Bibliography of Mathematics Education, Exeter: University of Exeter School of Education, 1996, retrieved on 3 May 2015 from http://people.exeter.ac.uk/PErnest/reflist6.htm.

Ernest, P. (1998) Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

Ernest, P. (2007) ‘Values and the Social Responsibility of Mathematics ’, Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal, No. 22 (Nov. 2007), retrieved on 1 May 2015 from http://people.exeter.ac.uk/PErnest/pome22/index.htm.

Ernest, P. (2011) Mathematics and Special Educational Needs, Saarbrucken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Ernest, P. (2012) ‘What is our First Philosophy in Mathematics Education?’, For the Learning of Mathematics, Vol. 32 no. 3: 8-14.

Ernest, P. (2013) The Psychology of Mathematics, Amazon Digital Services, Inc.: Kindle edition

Ernest, P. (2015) The problem of certainty in mathematics, Educational Studies in Mathematics , Vol. 90, No. 3, pp 1-15

Ernest, P. (2016a) Values and Mathematics: Overt and Covert, Culture and Dialogue, Volume 4, No.1 (special issue Culture, Science and Dialogue, Guest Editor: M. Ovens).

Ernest, P. (2016b) A Dialogue on the Ethics of Mathematics, The Mathematical Intelligencer 08/2016; DOI:10.1007/s00283-016-9656-z

Ernest, P. (In press) Challenging Three Myths about Mathematics: Recognising the social responsibility of mathematics. P. Blaszczyk, Ed. Mathematical Transgressions.

Ernest, P. Ed. (1990-2014) The Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal, Nos. 1 to 28, retrieved on 7 May 2015 from http://people.exeter.ac.uk/PErnest/.

Ernest, P., Sriraman, B. & Ernest, N. Eds. (2016) Critical Mathematics Education: Theory, Praxis and Reality, Charlotte, NC, USA: Information Age Publishing.

European Union (no date) Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union

Title I: Common Provisions, Article 3, consulted on 20 April 2015 via https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Consolidated_version_of_the_Treaty_on_European_Union/Title_I:_Common_Provisions#Article_3

Evers, K. (2001) ‘Standards for Ethics and Responsibility in Science’, retrieved on 1 May 2015 from http://www.icsu.org/publications/reports-and-reviews/standards-responsibility-science/SCRES-Background.pdf

Forgasz, H. J., Becker, J. R., Lee, K. and Steinthorsdottir, O., Eds., (2010) International Perspectives on Gender and Mathematics Education, Charlotte, N. C.: Information Age Publishing.

Frankenstein M (1990) Re-Learning Mathematics, London: Free Association Books.

Frazer, M. J. and Kornhauser, A. (1986) Ethics and Social Responsibility in Science Education , The Netherlands: Elsevier Ltd.

Fromm, E. (1978) To have or to be? London: Jonathon Cape.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1986) The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, (transl. P. Christopher Smith), New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Gillies, D. A. Ed. (1992) Revolutions in Mathematics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gilligan, C. (1982) In a Different Voice, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,.

Ginott , H. G. (1972) Teacher and Child: A Book for Parents and Teachers, London: Macmillan.

Gowers, W. T. (n. d.) ‘The importance of mathematics’, retrieved 5 May 2015 from https://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/~wtg10/importance.pdf

Hardy, G. H. (1941) A Mathematician's Apology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harper , D. (n.d.) Online Etymology Dictionary , retrieved on 14 September 2013 from < http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=justification >.

Haynes, J. D. (2008) ‘Calculative Thinking and Essential Thinking in Heidegger’s Phenomenology’, retrieved on 3 May 2015 from http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/sistm/staff/Heidegger_calculation_essential_March08.pdf

Hersh, R. (1990) ‘Mathematics and Ethics’, The Mathematical Intelligencer , Vol. 12, No. 3, 1990, pp. 13-15.

Hersh, R. (1993) ‘Proving is Convincing and Explaining’, Educational Studies in Mathematics, Vol. 24, No. 4: 389-399.

Hersh, R. (1997) What Is Mathematics, Really?, London, Jonathon Cape.

Hersh, R. (2007) Ethics for Mathematicians , Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal, No. 22 (Nov. 2007), retrieved on 1 May 2015 from http://people.exeter.ac.uk/PErnest/pome22/index.htm.

Howe, M. J. A. (1990) The Origins of Exceptional Abilities, Oxford: Blackwell.

Høyrup, J. (1980) ‘Influences of Institutionalized Mathematics Teaching on the Development and Organisation of Mathematical Thought in the Pre-Modern Period’, in J. Fauvel and J. Gray, Eds., The History of Mathematics: A Reader, London, Macmillan, 1987: 43-45.

Høyrup, J. (1994) In Measure, Number, and Weight, New York: SUNY Press.

Isaacson, Z. (1989) ‘Of course you could be an engineer, dear, but wouldn’t you rather be a nurse or teacher or secretary?’, in P. Ernest, Ed. Mathematics Teaching: The State of the Art, London: Falmer Press, 1989: 188-194.

Johannesen, R. L. (1996) Ethics in Human Communication, Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press.

Johnson, T. C. (2012) ‘Ethics and Finance: The Role of Mathematics’, retrieved on 15 September 2013 from < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2159196 >.

Jonas, H. (1985). The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics for the technological age, Chicago: The University of Chicago.

Kant, I. (1993).Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Ellington, James W. (3rd ed.). Indianapolis and Cambridge, USA:: Hackett.

Kelman, H. C. (1973). ‘Violence without moral restraint: reflections on the dehumanization of victims and victimizers’, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 29, No. 4, 25-62.

Khan, R. N. (1988) ‘Science, scientists and society: Public attitudes towards science and technology’, Impacts of Science on Society, Vol. 1, Nos. 3&4: 257-271.

King, R. (1982) ‘Multiple realities and their reproduction in infants’ classrooms’, in C. Richards, Ed., New directions in primary education, Lewes, Sussex: Falmer Press 1982: 237-246.

Kitcher, P. (1984) The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press.

Kitcher, P. and Aspray, W. (1988) ‘An Opinionated Introduction’, in W. Aspray and P. Kitcher, Eds., History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988: 3-57.

Knuth, D. E. (1985) Algorithmic Thinking and Mathematical Thinking, American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 43, 170-181.

Lakatos, I. (1976) Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lenk, H. (1983) ‘Notes on extended responsibility and increased technological power’, in P. T. Durbin and F. Rapp, Eds., Philosophy and Technology, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983: 195-210.

Lerman, S. (2010) ‘Theories of Mathematics Education: Is Plurality a Problem?’, in Sriraman, B. and English, L. D., Eds., Theories of Mathematics Education: Seeking New Frontiers, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer, 2010: 99-109.

Luppicini, R. (2008) ‘The emerging field of technoethics’, in R. Luppicini and R. Adell, Eds., Handbook of research on technoethics, Hersey: Idea Group Publishing, 2008: 1-18.

Marcuse, H. (1964) One Dimensional Man, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Maslow, A. H. (1954) Motivation and Personality, New York: Harper.

Maxwell, J. (1989) ‘Mathephobia; in P. Ernest, Ed., Mathematics Teaching: The State of the Art, London, Falmer Press, 1989: 221-226.

Mellin-Olsen, S. (1987) The Politics of Mathematics Education, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Mendick, H. (2006) Masculinities in Mathematics, Maidenhead: Open University Press.

Miller, A. (1983) For Your Own Good: Hidden cruelty in Child-Rearing and the Roots of Violence, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.

Moor, J. (2005) ‘Why we need better ethics for emerging technologies’, Ethics and Information Technology, Vol. 7, No. 3, (2005): 111-119.

Mukhopadhyay, S. and Greer, B., Eds. (2015) Proceedings of the Eighth International Mathematics Education and Society Conference, Portland State University, Oregon, United States, 21st to 26th June 2015, Draft Volumes 1-3, Portland State University, retrieved on 1 May 2015 from http://mescommunity.info/.

Niss, M. (1994) ‘Mathematics in Society’, in R. Biehler, R. W. Scholz, R. Straesser, and B. Winkelmann, Eds., The Didactics of Mathematics as a Scientific Discipline, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994: 367-378.

Picker, S. H. and Berry, J. (2000) ‘Investigating pupils’ images of mathematicians’, Educational Studies in Mathematics, Vol. 43, No. 1, 65-94.

Popper, K. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Routledge.

Powell, A. B. and Frankenstein, M., Eds. (1997) Ethnomathematics: Challenging Eurocentrism in Mathematics Education, Albany, New York: SUNY Press.

Radical Statistics group (n. d.) Radical Statistics Group, retrieved on 8 May 2015 from http://mescommunity.info/http://www.radstats.org.uk/.

Rogers, P. and Kaiser, G., Eds. (1995) Equity in Mathematics Education, London, Falmer Press.

Rorty, R. (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Rotblat, J. (1995) ‘Remember Your Humanity’, Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, retrieved 23 April 2015 from http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1995/rotblat-lecture.html.

Rotman, B. (1993) Ad Infinitum The Ghost in Turing's Machine: Taking God Out of Mathematics and Putting the Body Back in, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Russell, B. (1919) Mysticism and Logic: And Other Essays. London: Longman .

Russell, B., and Einstein, A. (1955) The Russell-Einstein Manifesto, retrieved 23 April 2015, from http://www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htm.

Ruthven, K. (1987) ‘Ability Stereotyping in Mathematics’, Educational Studies in Mathematics, Vol. 18 (1987): 243-253.

Sakharov, A. (1981) ‘The responsibility of scientists’, Nature, Vol. 291, No. 5812: 184-185.

Schecter, D. (2010) The Critique of Instrumental Reason from Weber to Habermas, London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Sells, L. W. (1973) ‘High school mathematics as the critical filter in the job market’, Proceedings of the Conference on Minority Graduate Education, Berkeley: University of California, 37-49.

Sells, L. W. (1978) ‘Mathematics - Critical Filter’, The Science Teacher, February 1978 issue: 28-29.

Shelley, N. (1995). Mathematics: Beyond good and evil. P. Rogers and G. Kaiser, Eds. (1995) Equity in Mathematics Education, London: Taylor and Francis, pp. 248-266.

Skemp, R. R. (1976) ‘Relational Understanding and Instrumental Understanding’, Mathematics Teaching, No. 77: 20-26.

Skovsmose, O. (1988) ‘Mathematics as a Part of Technology’, Educational Studies in Mathematics, Vol. 19, No. 1: 23-41.

Skovsmose, O. (1994) Towards a Philosophy of Critical Mathematics Education, Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Small, B. H. (2011) Ethical relationships between science and society: understanding the social responsibility of scientists, Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, New Zealand: University of Waikato, retrieved 23 April 2015 from http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/handle/10289/5397

Stanic, G. M. A. (1989) ‘Social inequality, cultural discontinuity, and equity in school mathematics’, Peabody Journal of Education, Vol. 66 , No. 2 (1989): 57-71.

Tymoczko, T., Ed., (1986) New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics, Boston: Birkhauser.

UNESCO (1999) World Conference on Science - Science Agenda Framework for Action, Budapest, Hungary 26 June – 1 July 1999, retrieved on 1 May 2015 from http://www.unesco.org/science/wcs/eng/framework.htm .

UNESCO (n. d.) Ethics of Science and Technology, retrieved on 1 May 2015 from http://en.unesco.org/themes/ethics-science-and-technology.

Walkerdine, V. (1988) The Mastery of Reason, London: Routledge.

Walkerdine, V. (1998) Counting Girls Out (second edition), London: Falmer Press.

Weinberg, A. (1978) ‘The Obligations of Citizenship in the Republic of Science’, Minerva, Vol. 16, Nos. 1-3: 1978.

Wikipedia (no date a) ‘Anti-globalization movement’, Wikipedia, retrieved on 20 April 2015 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-globalization_movement.

Wikipedia (no date b) ‘Occupy movement’, Wikipedia, retrieved on 20 April 2015 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupy_movement.

Wilder, R. L. (1974) The Evolution of Mathematical Concepts, London: Transworld Books.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1956) Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, revised edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1978.

Zevenbergen, R. (1998) ‘Language, mathematics and social disadvantage: a Bourdieuian analysis of cultural capital in mathematics education’, retrieved on 3 May 2015 from http://www.merga.net.au/documents/RP_Zevenbergen_1_1998.pdf.

Ziman, J. (1998) ‘Why must scientists become more ethically sensitive than they used to be’, Science, Vol. 282: 1813-1814.

Ziman, J. (2001) ‘Getting scientists to think about what they are doing’, Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 2: 165-176.



1 The one exception is feminist critiques of mathematics as oppressive and patriarchal, see, e.g., Burton 1995 and Shelley 1995.

2 Of course the right social circumstances are needed too. A society with values of strong social-conformity and a culture of obedience to authority is needed, as Milgram (1974) showed in his experiments. However, as I have argued, subjection to thousands of hours of school mathematics and schooling in general will contribute to this.