VICTORIA — The date was Jan. 10, 2012 and Premier Christy Clark’s inner circle was hard at work on a strategy to capture the ethnic vote.

“Anecdotal reports suggest that some ethnic communities, particularly Chinese, feel that they are ignored by government between elections,” wrote the premier’s hand-picked deputy chief of staff Kim Haakstad in a confidential memo to key staffers in the government.

“This plan outlines steps that will be taken to re-engage with ethnic voters and media, and includes accountability structures to ensure that the plan is sustained.”

There followed a 17-page Multicultural Strategic Outreach Plan, ambitious in its scope, breathtaking in its cynicism, and all of it directed by a senior staffer, Haakstad, who is closer to Clark than anyone in the government.

The contents of the year-old document offered devastating insights into the way they do business inside the B.C. Liberal government. And it was leaked holus-bolus to the New Democrats, who tabled it in the legislature Wednesday to further salt the government’s wounds.

Reading through the passages highlighted by gleeful NDP researchers, one discovered that a goal of the strategy was to “build goodwill and political capital with target communities through simple and thoughtful actions to show ongoing care and concern.”

As for the means by which this might be accomplished, the premier’s office urged the pursuit of “quick wins,” for instance: “Identify and correct ‘historical wrongs,’ such as the Komagata Maru apology in the house.”

For some, the aforementioned apology, like the one the Liberals are planning to deliver for the Chinese head tax, represent long-overdue redress for genuinely wrong actions in the provincial past.

But for Haakstad and her little band of hacks — the distribution list included Clark staffers Pamela Martin, Barinder Bhullar and Lorne Mayencourt — the apologies were merely a vehicle for scoring a quick win with ethnic voters.

Other elements of the strategy ranged from the borderline sneaky: “Develop a stable of supporters willing to write letters to the editor or call in to open-line shows in non-English media.”

To the bloody obvious: “MLAs to have name tags including translated versions for main ethnic languages.”

To the unintentionally hilarious: “Failing to ensure a sustainable outreach effort could be seen as time-limited pandering ... If not done correctly we will appear opportunist.”

But a thorough reading underscored a more insidious element. The premier’s office proposed to combine the resources of the public service and the resources provided to MLAs to represent their constituents — both taxpayer funded — and bend them to the partisan purposes of the Liberal party.

From the to-do list dictated by Clark’s deputy chief of staff:

“Make sure that government, caucus and the party are all working toward the same goal in a co-ordinated and effective manner. Explain and break down government silos and share information with the party. Ensure co-ordination on translation of government materials and party materials. Identify internal (MLA and staff; riding executive) connections to ethnic communities.”

The reference to making use of “government translation resources” was particularly telling. Later on in the document, one discovered that the Liberals wished to establish “a party website in more languages.”