New York- After an absence that lasted almost a year, Christopher Ross, the United Nations Secretary General’s Personal Envoy to the Western Sahara, has finally made a trip to the region in an attempt to break the deadlock in the stalled negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario.

Since the publication of the Secretary General’s most recent annual report on the situation in the Western Sahara last April, Morocco has expressed its discontent with the approach adopted by the United Nations towards the conflict. Over the past five years, this approach has been marked by a tendency to focus on the politicized question of human rights rather than on bridging the gap between Morocco and the Polisario and Algeria, its main baker, and pave the way towards genuine and effective negotiations to reach the long-needed political and mutually acceptable solution.

Moroccans pointed their fingers to Christopher Ross who, in the eyes of Rabat, is the one behind the perceived switch of the United Nations’ focus from striving to iron out the differences between Morocco and the Polisario and pushing for the resumption of direct talks between them.

Ross’s visit to the region coincided with the inauguration of Kim Bolduc as Ban Ki-moon’s Special Representative in the Western Sahara. Bolduc’s assumption of her duties as head of MINURSO, the UN peacekeeping operation that has monitored the ceasefire arrangement between Morocco and Polisario since 1991, comes 9 months after her appointment.

Ban Ki-moon reassures King Mohammed VI on parameters of MINURSO’s mandate

Her assumption was made possible only after a phone conversation held between King Mohammed VI and Ban Ki-moon on January 22, during which the UN’s top diplomat gave assurances to the Moroccan monarch that the UN “reports to the Council on this issue will remain objective and reflect facts”, adding that MINURSO “will continue to exercise its existing mandate as set forth by the Security Council.”

This phone conversation put an end to a tense year-long silence between Morocco and the United Nations over the nature of the offices that the UN has charged to help the parties reach a political solution to the territorial dispute.

Following this conversation between King Mohammed VI and Ban Ki-moon, Morocco’s Foreign Minister, Salaheddine Mezouar, told the press, “following the clarifications submitted to the King and Rabat’s commitment to facilitate the mission of the UN envoy, Christopher Ross, and the head of MINURSO Kim Bolduc are welcomed in Morocco in order to complete their mission in the region.”

Now, the questions that analysts are asking are: What is the reason behind this Moroccan about-face regarding Christopher Ross? Have their concerns regarding the bias of the UN envoy dissipated after the phone call held between King Mohammed VI and Ban Ki-moon? Can the international community expect any progress to be made through his mediation efforts? What are the possible scenarios that explain this sudden change in Morocco’s hardline position towards the UN envoy?

It is of paramount importance to shed light on these questions if we are to understand the underlying reasons that pushed Rabat to renew its confidence in a UN official that it has been distrusted since 2012.

Maintain the status quo or adopt a more realistic approach

There are two possible scenarios to explain why Morocco accepted that Christopher Ross resume his good offices as the UN Secretary General’s personal envoy and the assumption of Kim Bolduc to her functions as head of MIUNRSO. The two scenarios are not mutually exclusive.

The first scenario is the existence of an arrangement between King Mohammed VI and Ban Ki-moon to allow the United Nations Secretariat to report to the Security Council on the conflict ahead of its April annual meeting, which will decide whether or not to renew MINURSO’s mandate in the territory. In line with Article 9 of Security Council Resolution 2152, the UN Secretary General is requested to brief the Security Council on developments regarding the disputed territory at least twice a year, and to provide a report on the situation in the Western Sahara before the end of MINURSO’s mandate on April 30.

The first briefing to the Security Council was to be presented by Ross last October. But as he was unable to travel to the region, and his colleague Kim Bolduc had still not taken up her functions as UNSG special representative, there was literally nothing new to report to the members of the Security Council.

This explains why, after his briefing to the UN body, the American diplomat didn’t give any statement to the press, unlike with his previous briefings. Without the presence of Kim Bolduc in the territory and a tour by Christopher to the region, it would have been unlikely for the UN secretariat to submit to the Security Council a meaningful report on the situation in the Western Sahara. Under UN practices, the presence of UN personal envoys and representatives on the ground is of paramount importance when reporting to the Security Council on any conflict.

For this reason, King Mohammed VI and Ban Ki-moon might have reached a deal to allow the UN officials to be present on the ground and enable them to draft their report to the Security Council. As a quid pro quo, the UN would steer away from any focus on the question of human rights and stick to its core mandate, which is helping the parties to the conflict find a political and mutually acceptable solution. This explains why Ross didn’t visit the Western Sahara, unlike in his previous tours to the region. The UN official can’t report on the situation of human rights in the territory without being on the ground and hearing the usual complaints of a few Pro-Polisario NGO’s on alleged violations of human rights there.

In this hypothesis, we would not witness any progress towards a political solution to the conflict, and the status quo would prevail with the Security Council repeating its routine calls that the parties negotiate “in good faith and without preconditions.”

The second scenario, which appears to be the more plausible, is that the United Nations, under the pressure of influential powers, might be moving its focus away from the politicized question of human rights towards finding a political solution to the conflict and away from a winner-take-all approach. In this second scenario, the Security Council might do away with independence as an option, to put an end to the conflict, and call on the parties to negotiate a formula of self-rule within Moroccan sovereignty.

The assurances given by Ban Ki-moon to King Mohammed VI might be an indication that the United Nations is finally realizing that a referendum of self-determination on the independence of the Sahara from Morocco is not a viable option, hence the need to press for an alternative solution that would save the face of both conflicting parties based on a win-win approach.

Seven years ago, Peter Van Walsom, the UNSG’s former Personal Envoy to the Western Sahara, admitted that it was impossible to organize a referendum in the territory as envisaged by the settlement plan of 1991. In an interview with Spanish daily El Pais, the Dutch diplomat further argued, “the establishment of a viable state in the Western Sahara was not a viable solution.”

Peter Van Walsom is not the only former UN official to admit the impossibility of the UN organizing the called for referendum of self-determination. In his book Western Sahara, Anatomy of a Stalemate* Erik Jensen, who served as head of MINURSO from 1994 to 1998, said, “the referendum planned for the Western Sahara resembles a mirage.”

According to Jensen, the impossibility of the UN organizing this popular consultation lies in the difficulty to identify “who is Saharawi, who is Western Saharan, and who should be entitled to vote.” The former Swedish diplomat argued that the idea of organizing a referendum was based on the flawed premise that both parties, Morocco and the Polisario, would cooperate to reach a final solution to the conflict.

Twenty-three years after the launch of the settlement plan, this premise has proved its limits, with each of the parties relying on its own interpretation of the concept of self-determination without any willingness to compromise.

With the deteriorating security situation in North Africa and the Sahel region, there are some indications that might signal that the UN is moving towards clearly adopting a more realistic approach with regards to the Western Sahara conflict.

First, the fact that Reinaldo José, the Venezuelan Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid a visit to Tindouf and met with the Polisario leaders is an indication that the Polisario and Algeria are concerned about the recent developments in the conflict, which do not seem to be in favor of their approach. The Venezuelan official’s visit can be understood as an action taken by Venezuela, a member of the Security Council and one of the few countries that recognize the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, to reassure Polisario leaders that it will spare no effort to avoid that the upcoming UNSG report and the UNSC resolution move away from their focus on human rights or make a new shift in the political process.

Second, the fact that the European Union made public a compromising report that shows the direct implication of Algeria and the Polisario in the embezzlement of humanitarian aid destined to the population living in the Tindouf camps is not a coincidence. That this report was made public at a time when the UN is facing a stubborn stalemate in the conflict may signal that it is being used by some influential powers to put pressure on the Polisario and Algeria and press them to compromise and sit at the negotiation table with Morocco. This report reveals that Algeria and the Polisario have been deceiving the international community for four decades and that they have not acted in good faith to cooperate with the United Nations to put an end to the conflict. The publication of this report is a huge blow to the image of both the Polisario and Algeria, whose leaders have long presented themselves as the champions of the oppressed people.

Furthermore, the publication of this report is a tool that will most likely be used by the international community to compel Algeria to allow a census of the population in the Tindouf camps to determine the actual number of people living there.

But pressure is not only being placed on Algeria and the Polisario to show their good faith and willingness to find a political settlement, but also on the UN personal envoy, who may have his last chance to come up with a realistic approach or admit his failure to bring any progress and step down. Christopher Ross is aware that after six years at the helm of the negotiation process, his mediation efforts have proved ineffective at best, and the time has come for him to put forward a clear and realistic proposal.

The fact that Ross did not include the city of Laayoune, the main city of the Western Sahara, in his last visit to the region might signal that the United Nations is now more amenable to Morocco’s calls for the respect of MINURSO’s mandate and the need to strive towards reaching a political solution based on Morocco’s autonomy proposal, presented to the Security Council in April 2007. This also might lead one to conclude that the upcoming UNSG report to the Security Council on the situation in the territory might not give the question of human rights the same paramount importance as in previous reports and focus rather on the approach that is most likely to break the deadlock and help the UN fully play its role in helping the parties reach a political solution.

The upcoming report and the subsequent Security Council resolution to renew MINURSO’s mandate could signal a new phase in the conflict, in the same way as when the UN Security Council started changing its approach towards the conflict with the resignation of former UNSG Personal Envoy, James Baker, in 2005.

Eight years after the adoption of the Security Council resolution that called on the parties to strive towards reaching a political solution, the UN body might go a step further by calling for a political solution that is either based on the Moroccan autonomy plan or another formula of self-rule under Moroccan sovereignty, such as a system of federation.

*Erik Jensen, Western Sahara, Anatomy of a stalemate, Lynne Reinner Publishers, London, 2005, p.13

Samir Bennis is a political analyst. He received a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Provence in France. He also holds a Master’s degree in political science from the University of Toulouse I, a Master’s degree in Iberian studies ...