After gathering the challenging reigns of the Ajax first squad in 2010, de Boer has produced rumbling whispers amongst fans as of late, speculating if the Dutchman was the correct man to appoint manager for the club they adore in magnanimous manner, such as Barcelona, Manchester City, Madrid and more. Franciscus de Boer has dominated Dutch football with consummate skill since his contentious arrival, utilising his team to captivate Ajax fans in phenomenal displays of skill, technique and consistency, proving to be obvious aspects of his team as he closes in on his 4th Eredivisie title in 4 years, a thing which has never been completed before in Dutch Football, unbeknownst to many.



With historic domestic wins, all eyes now glare at the vision that disgruntles many Ajax fans knowing they are so far away from it. In short, Franciscus de Boer’s vision is to propel the Dutch giants to the pinnacle of European football.

This is the next phase for de Boer’s squad and he is fully aware of it, reportedly turning down various offers including Tottenham Hotspur in resolute fashion. But is it a realistic, doable objective for the side that has failed to breach the challenging stone wall of the UEFA Champions League Group Stages once more this year? With glimpses of brilliance portrayed in this Dutch-Dominant squad vs FC Barcelona, it has many turning their heads in admirable notice.

This piece is intended to be more of a report on Ajax throughout this season so far, not an article.

Frank de Boer’s Philosophy Of The Game

Ajax use a 4-3-3 system on paper. It is clear that de Boer is constantly working to refine this system on the levels of both group and team tactics. Ajax’s defence is largely pro-active and attack-oriented with a high pressing with a high line when the opponent is constructing play through their defensive lines. They aim to regain possession quickly and high up the pitch so they can transition into a dangerous attack with high numbers thanks to the defensive pressing application. They initiate an immediate aggressive press whenever the ball is lost high up the field in the opponent half. The nearest body moves presses quickly to the ball zone, who is supported by up to 3 players in this press both challenging for the immediate regain of possession and the 2nd ball. The build-up phase is largely based around slow-tempo rhythm from CB’s circulating until progression up the field can be found in a variety of ways. Frank de Boer clearly prefers a possession game and extremely high amounts of interchanging from 4th lines (Positional swaps) with diversional movements being key in offensive transitions as well as midfield patterns and build up phase. These movements are imperative to de Boer’s philosophy as they provide depth by decoying opponents from zones creating space allowing it to be occupied by advancing movements. It is fair to say that Frank’s philosophy is based on creating space and exploiting the space created. Position-orientated pressing in defensive phases is key as de Boer has indoctrinated a fluidic press into this system.

Frank de Boer has clearly implemented his system and philosophy into this Ajax side in fierce meticulous manner, orchestrating his side with superb detail allowing scarce deleterious influences to debase him.

Notes

1. Pressing Application

– Very Aggressive Pressing System

– Coping With Long Ball after High Press

– Pressing System vs High-Tier Teams

2. Coping With Opposition Circulation In Midfield

– Ajax Defensive System & Objectives vs the 4-3-3

– Ajax Defensive System & Objectives vs the 4-4-2

3. Covering System To Cope With Opposition Movement Between Lines

4. Retaining Stability in Defensive Transitions

Ajax possess a very detailed pressing system that varies depending on specific teams that they play.

When Ajax would face a team that does not possess great skill during build-up a very aggressive pressing system would be used.

When Ajax would face a team with a higher skill during build-up (Such as PSV, Feyenoord, Vitesse) a less aggressive system would be employed.

However, Ajax predominantly use a set of ‘triggers’ that would be executed fiercely when activated no matter which team they were playing.

Ajax, main triggers for 1st and 2nd defensive phase press

-FB/CB/GK receives low tempo pass horizontally or backwards pass

-FB/CB carries ball into semi-lateral/lateral position

-FB/CB receives from body who passed with back to Ajax goal

Yet, Ajax would not press during the opponent midfield preparation possession phase when CB’s are circulating at half line as the risk of pressing conceding too much space would be too high. Instead Ajax would cover all available options and press 1st receiving line 3v4, leaving the man in possession un-marked forcing play long where Ajax would usually recover possession due to their large height and physicality (Average height 6”1). Ajax would know when to carry out this pattern when opponent CB’s are facing pl

Pressing Application

– Ajax Very Aggressive Pressing System

In this system de Boer’s pressing is extremely fluid and he permits no structured ‘defensive shape/formation’ in 1st defensive phase but instead prefers position-orientated pressing with player orientated aspects in it against teams that lack quality in build-up. When the 1st pressing wave of 4 is breached with a pass Ajax immediately concede to numerical equality in defensive transition but their strong 1v1 players usually licence this high press and see out most of opposing counter attacks. If the opposing team after breaching the 1st pressing wave cannot move forward fast enough (DM closes open ball situation in defensive transitions, halts progress) then Ajax immediately restructure into a 4141 medium-block shape in 2nd defensive phase with players leaving their midfield lines to carry out the pressing application when triggers occur and force play back to 1st phase, seeing the 4141 re-alternate to the fluctuating pressing system.

Ajax press 1st receiving line 4v4 with wingers double zonal marking with intelligent skill. Here Schone is in his standard pressing situation double marking CM and LB, (CM he marks correlates with his wing/channel positioning) initiating a press towards the LB who is about to receive a low tempo horizontal pass, a pressing trigger.

Ajax wingers, Fischer and Schone in this game, would take up aggressive positions occupying the deepest CB during the Goalkick phase. Here ADO Den Haag’s RCB drops to the right-outside zone out of the box to receive in ‘unmarked’ position from GK. However Fischer has intelligently positioned himself near the RCB where he can let the opponent receive but still be in a perfectly dangerous area to press, forcing the RCB to a quick-hasty decision on what he must do with the ball. The winger on the weak side of the pitch would position himself in a deeper position where he could mark double mark the LB and CM, less aggressive 1v1 marking. Wingers would always position themselves in these positions whenever the GK was in possession.

This pressing wave is extremely effective against teams that lack build-up skill and would rarely be breached. Ajax’s 3 man midfield with wingers compact to their midfield line (Due to double-zonal marking, previously stated) & pressing approach forcing opponent wide would virtually title the press impenetrable through vertical areas. When the ball would find penetration beyond the 1st wave in wide areas, the FB would immediately track the receiver and press relentlessly as the opponent received back to goal.

Here the RB tracks his direct opponent goal side so he can press him back to goal as he receives, forcing a mistake which would lead to a 2nd ball. Ajax’s position orientated defensive shape in the midfield area (2nd phase) would see the team largely shift over to the ball zone which would create a strong side and usual overload of 4v3, 3v2 in wide areas. This overload would be put to great use in recovering possession as the aggressive pressing of the common ‘back to goal’ philosophy would see the opponent either lose possession via bad touch (In which Ajax would close the ball zone with overload of numbers winning 2nd ball) or try to dribble his way out of a 1v1 or 1v2.

After this high press the opposition usually resorted to either a short risky pass to a man who would be pressed immediately or a long ball instantly progressing play up the field to Ajax’s defensive line. Winning the 1st and 2nd ball after these passes were key to retaining possession.

Pressing Application

– Coping With The Long Ball After Press

Dealing with this long pass effectively was of key importance to retaining defensive solidity as Ajax committed a heavy amount of bodies during pressing phases, usually leaving the defensive line isolated. If the 1st ball was lost, then a dangerous transition would occur.

Ajax fields a high line when deploying the very aggressive press mainly to cage play into the oppositions half and to cover free zones that become vacant when then midfield triumvirate are advancing to press. It is also very effective vs the long ball. This is because the back four realise when the opposition is about to concede possession riskily by playing long and they push forward leaving the opponents offensive positioned players in offside zones. The signs for the extended pass of course is when the opposition player is surrounded by Ajax bodies and all options are intelligently covered.

Here is a screenshot of how the long ball is to be dealt with. One CB (Closest to Ball zone) pushes off defensive line and the defensive line drops to provide cover. This allows easier dealings with the 2nd ball and a solid shape to track oppositions runs from goalside positions.

However there were of course times when this method did not go to plan.

After Ajax initiate the very aggressive pressing system, PSV are forced long and the CB’s prepare to deal with the 1st ball. However there is a clear miscommunication between the two centre-halves and both of them challenge for the ball in the air with a 2v1 in favour of the opposition. This allows Park to run onto the 2nd ball in a gifted free-zone which he exploits and scores with ease.

Pressing Application

– Ajax Pressing System vs High-Tier teams

Frank de Boer, like most teams, would indoctrinate a pressing system with a game-specific plan that would vary depending on the level of ‘tier’ team that Ajax would face. Bar the game vs FC Barcelona, Ajax wouldn’t press as aggressively against teams in the group stages of the Champions League and teams in the upper echelons of the Eredivisie. This is due to the skill that increases in build-up phase with teams such as PSV, Feyenoord, Vitesse, Celtic and many others.

The pressing system would involve some key differences and some unchanged aspects.

– Less aggressiveness in pressing

– Shape would be more compact at the cost of less possession

– Pressing would not be as high in final third

– More focus on shape, position orientated adjusting to ball zone

Ajax would utilise a 4141 medium block in 2nd defensive phase with an approximate 8-12 yard distance between the defensive and midfield line. When Blind was the Holding Midfielder between the two banks of four, he could cover half spaces well with an increased level of skill in comparison to other midfielders and allow the CB’s more freedom to cover penetrative defensive line runs. When Poulsen was the Holding Midfielder and Blind was LB, Poulsen could not cover halfspaces as well due to his lack of mobility and the CB’s (or FB’s when the CB’s were occupied marking runs) had to push off their line to deal with in-stepping wingers in halfspaces. This led to the possibility of being victim to defensive line penetration in exchange for the defensive experience and ability of Blind at LB. However, when Blind converted to a Holding Midfielder, Boilesen rose to the occasion and has excelled in the LB position since.

The pressing application would be more ‘structured’ when breaking out of the 4141 block to carry out pressing when a trigger would occur.

Ajax have forced Feyenoord play further down the pitch with the tough-to-penetrate 4141 de Boer has implemented. Feyenoord’s 1st receiving line carry out a trigger and Fischer can initiate a pressing phase which results in possession gain.

Whenever opposition retracted play backwards, Ajax as a 10 would propel up the pitch as a unit.

Here is the same phase moments later. Ajax’s first wave would include at least one central midfielder pressing one of two CB’s (Varies on opposing teams) and the ST ready to press the spare CB. This first wave would spark from central areas and would prevent passes to the deep CM’s. Feyenoord play a 4-4-2 and with the lack of midfield numbers Ajax could prevent the verticality that Feyenoord thrive on with ease, preventing passes through central areas by pressing directly with body shape forcing opposition defensive line wide.

The third image in this pressing phase. Ajax have successfully transitioned play from Feyenoord’s strong side to the weak side lateral area in which Ajax overload the ball zone 4v3. Fischer originally presses the RB who received a low tempo pass and forces the tempo dangerously high for defensive line circulation, which sees Feyenoord be hasted into quick thinking in uncomfortable scenarios in which their only option is the short pass to the RB which would foresee him endure an aggressive 2v1 or play long, usually conceding possession.

Coping With Opposition Circulation in Midfield, 2nd Def phase

– Ajax Defensive Shape & Objectives vs the 4-3-3

– Ajax Defensive Shape & Objectives vs the 4-4-2

– The Covering System

Ajax would not often see the opposition circulate amongst their CB’s at the half line as Ajax would often reluctantly be that deep – de Boer’s main ideas is to always field a high defensive line. As a result they would press at whatever opportunity would arise, eager to break free of their deep positioning.

Ajax Defensive Shape & Objectives vs the 4-3-3

Ajax would field a 4141 medium narrow block with wingers compact to their CM’s and the midfield triangle would usually be marking their direct opponents goal side in order to have a clear visual on what their opponents aiming to do and have the option of pressing back to goal and prevent the turn facing play. Ajax would aim to funnel play wide where they could overload and win 2nd ball. This objective applies to no matter what system and shape they are facing. The 4-3-3 vs upper-tier teams causes Ajax the most problems as they have to face numerical equivalence in midfield along with high activity movements looking to receive from CB’s that are skilled in build-up phase. As a result, Ajax would find less opportunities for pressing triggers and they would be forced to remain moderately deep, covering all options for CB’s to play too instead of pressing aggressively from balanced positions.

However, due to the moderately deep positioning of Ajax’s outfield players, the opposition would have to work to penetrate the block. Teams would often aim for high activity movements, such as packing the furthest line and overlapping both FB’ trying to utilise the wide-areas that Ajax allow to be controlled. The numerical equality in most parts of the pitch would result in an intense covering system that has to be implemented by de Boer in order to track opponent runs from deep positions, but I’ll get to that later.

There would be an emphasis on goalside marking vs upper tier teams. This is to allow easy visual on their direct opponents and easy tracking of their runs, in exchange for less possession. This compact shape results in a defensively sound team when facing opposition circulation. When facing lower tier teams, balanced positioning of players in front of direct opponents would be in use. This is to accommodate the very aggressive press and allow the high defensive line.

Goal side marking vs the 433 would be particularly employed against teams with a lot of skill in the possession phase. All players are in goalside positions with their direct opponents. A compact medium block is the result with defensive strengths however Ajax lack intensity in pressing and also lack of possession as emphasis on defensive stability is highlighted.

Balanced marking vs the 433 would be deployed against teams that lack the quality in build-up phase to provide a significant threat to Ajax’s compact defensive shape. Thus, Ajax could afford to press very aggressively and field a high defensive line caging play into the oppositions half. Balanced positioning would be encouraged where the back four and midfield line stay level with their direct opponents allowing them to press the opponent ball carrier from distance but at the same level marking their direct opponent aggressively preventing the passing option. The two wingers would lodge themselves between the CB and the FB. If the FB receives then he will be pressed immediately by the Ajax winger and the FB. The ST would hassle the CB’s and encourage play wide by body positioning and preventing the vertical pass. He would be accompanied by the CM in this 2nd defensive phase pressing application totalling in a 4v4 press.

Assessment

Wingers positioning would often correlate with their opposition full backs, tracking their runs quite often into Ajax’s own third. This tracking back would be made far easier due to the goal side positioning in 2nd defensive phase that would be used vs upper-tier teams. Against lower tier teams, a balanced positioning would take place from wingers and they would usually stay high in defensive phases.

CM’s would maintain goalside positions with their direct opponents in this phase for the same defensive reasons as the wingers when facing upper-tier teams. However when facing lower-tier teams the risky aggressive pressing system would be used in which CM’s are in-front of direct opponents passing on a larger role to the back four as they have to push off their line to press opponents between lines.

When facing a 433 the ST wouldn’t press as high, waiting patiently for triggers to leave zone. His main objective is to block central passing options by standing 5-10 metres in front of the CB’s and only break out to press once triggers occur where he would have the support of a CM who would breach out of 3rd defensive line. The ST could not press as high in these phases as there is numerical equivalence in midfield and he must patiently block passing vertical passing lanes from CB’s.

This virtually explains the roles of the Ajax team when facing the 433.

Ajax Defensive Shape & Objectives vs the 4-4-2

Ajax predominantly used the same pressing applications as previously stated. The goalside vs upper tier teams would be implemented, and the balanced vs lower-tier teams. The same compact 4141 formation in this 2nd defensive phase would be utilised but the shape would rarely be seen against lower-tier teams as Ajax usually finds many opportunities for triggers, and pressed the opposition backwards quite often.



Here Ajax are facing Feyenoord, an upper tier team that uses the 442 as their standard shape. Ajax using a 433, would have common 3v2 in midfield that would work to their advantage in forcing play out wide, suiting the defensive objectives. Feyenoord’s ST however dropped deeper than his partnering frontman, restoring balance to numbers in midfield and complimenting their common idea of verticality, midfield play focused through the centre. This forced Ajax’s holding midfielder for that game, Poulsen, to drop behind the deep ST leaving a 2v2 in midfield. As a result Sigthorsson dropped deeper in 2nd defensive phase pressing situations and was a short distance away from Feyenoord’s 2 CM’s that regularly dropped to aid build play. This was recurring theme against many sides that utilised the 442 against Ajax.

Yet due to the opposition lack of numbers in midfield, Ajax could easily prevent central penetration by overloading on a regular basis. This aided the team and they stayed compact against most sides. The 3v2 in midfield also allowed Ajax to allocate an extra man forward in pressing phases aiding the ST, alternating the 4141 press to an asymmetric lopsided pressing shape.

Eriksen (8) moves forward to multi-task in the defensive phase. He prevents the vertical pass from the CB, threatens to press and occupies the opposition CM dropping to receive as 6. Eriksen would push forward when there was an overload in midfield.

This 424/4123 would alternate depending on various stages of play, orientating around opposition player and ball positioning. The high first wave would be licenced by the numerical equivalence in central midfield.

Assessment

This system was largely solid when defending against opposition midfield preparation, but when coping with upper-tier teams it was difficult to cope with movements ahead of the ball. Frank de Boer indoctrinated a covering system to cope with these movements between Ajax’s block.

The Covering System

De Boer’s philosophy exhumes ‘Cruyff’ vibes and it is evident in his play, both defensively and offensively. The high & medium block that Frank deploys most games requires constant effort from the defensive line to cope with endless movements between the two banks, relentlessly working at all times, knowing when to leave the line, knowing when to cover for a teammates covering run, etc. This difficult work is evident and at points tiring as Ajax often struggle to cope with upper-tier teams’ as the opposition often find progression through possession with long passes played to lateral zones or space creating movement, forcing the defensive line backwards into deep areas of the pitch, mostly in the latter stages of the game where Ajax are endured with the fatigue that has been ignited in their lungs from the high press and possession game. But in these few paragraphs I’ll be reciting the covering system that has evidently practiced heavily on the training ground.

The covering system is focused on player orientated movement that would see players perform singular swaps of structured positioning, such as FB’s stepping inward and wingers dropping to cover. Each player would have an opposing player to mark in the defensive phase. The ST’s would follow the CB’s surprising runs into midfield, the wingers would track FB’s, the CM’s would track opposing CM’s and so on. This would foresee numerical equality in all parts of the pitch and if moved correctly with intelligence then the 4141 shape would be maintained with the only few adjustments being the singular positional swaps of players. The covering system requires intense focus to be sustained at all times.

Here is an example of Ajax’s covering system. Blind marks instepping winger Park to maintain the midfield triangle that the system is predicated on. Serero slips behind and covers for Blinds movements.

As a result of the high demand of maintaining of intense focus, there were of course times were the players concentration would be scattered i.e ‘ball watching’ and their direct opponent would slip away unmarked into space. One of these occasions was the 4-0 battering Ajax succumbed too away to rivals PSV.

Here the PSV player receives back to Ajax goal. This is a pressing trigger for Ajax as de Boer encourages to never let the opponent turn to face play when they can. Blind carries out this defensive aggressive press and advances from his zone inwards believing Fischer to cover his position. However Fischer’s concentration has vanished and Park exploits the free space. This play results in PSV finding the killer third goal as Ajax can’t retreat and stabilize defensive shape in time.

One of the main aspects in Ajax’s shape re-structure was the key to neutralising open ball situations in defensive transitions and closing down the ball zone. This leads me to the next chapter.

Retaining Stability in Defensive Transitions

One of the main aspects in Ajax’s shape re-structure was the key to neutralising open ball situations in defensive transitions and closing down the ball zone. The defensive midfielder was key in these plays and had to cover lateral zones if the wide players were unavailable. He had to possess the aspects of mobility (To cover lateral zones), defensive strength (Tackles against moving play), strong 1v1 capability and intelligent positioning (For counterpressing ball zone in these transitions while rest of team is retreating). These demanding aspects resulted in the conversion of Blind from Left-Back to the holding midfielder spot for most of the season as he is the only midfielder to possess most of these qualities, overseeing Poulsen on the team-sheet on a regular basis as well as the occasional experimental start of Schone.

Due to Blind’s exceptional qualities he was often the catalyst to retaining stability in defensive plays, often making the correct decisions at vital times. However whenever Ajax pressing application involved balanced positioning and aggressive pressing, Blind was sometimes caught out of position misreading the situation by counterpressing immaturely in the incorrect circumstances and conceded vital space that was often exploited. Blind is fielded whenever Ajax wanted to carry out an aggressive press.

Poulsen however was an alternative when Ajax permitted a goal-side marking philosophy. This was because of the stability offered and experience when defending against midfield possession play. However his mobility has deteriorated over the years and he stays strictly central in defensive transitions forcing wide players to deal with lateral play. Poulsen is fielded when a deep defensive block is the objective (Barcelona Away) and there is less intensity focused on pressing.

Frank de Boer tinkered with the holding midfield role for a short while with players like Schone, Poulsen and Blind all sharing the role until the two latter found consistency in the system over the mixed results of employing Schone to the position.

In defensive transition Poulsen stays central obligating more mobile players (Blind, Denswil, Fischer, Schone) to cover wide areas.

If the ball was out in lateral positions and the wide players were able to close down the ball player, the defensive midfielder always took a position between the wide player and the CB. This was to allow:

– Cover for the FB in case he was beaten in a 1v1 scenario

– A 2v1 in the box as the CB didn’t have to cover, nullifying crossing threat

However there were significant setbacks in these scenarios. If the Ajax Midfield didn’t retreat in time, then the cutback zone would be totally free. Here is a case of this happening and Ajax were forced to pay the ultimate price conceding the third goal.

In the 4-0 thrashing that PSV excelled in, Schone was experimented with as the 6. Ajax are in mid-defensive transition where the ball is now closed, but de Boer’s idea and Schone’s role of lodging between the CB and the FB fails intimately here as Ajax cannot cover the cut-back zone due to CM’s not retreating in time and Hiljemaark receives and scores. When the midfielders were not quick enough in defensive transitions to re-stabilize the defensive shape after the ball was closed, the cutback zone was often left unattended. This was a recurring theme throughout the season and can prove to be an error in de Boer’s defensive transitional philosophy.

Here is an image which highlights the Holding Midfielder’s (Number 17) role in defensive transition. It involved closing down the ball defusing the open ball situation into a closed one, allowing the back four to stop retreating and allow Ajax to stabilize defensive positions. Blind was able to do this much more effectively and with consistent success, as compared to Poulsen. Daley Blind in essence licences the high pressing system as he provides the much needed cover behind the pressing waves, fully capable of covering maximal width with sufficient ease. He was absolutely vital for the extremely high press against Barcelona in the Champions League for the first half.

Frank de Boer’s defensive philosophy is clearly one that contains microscopic detail with numerous variations for each phase of play, resulting in a treat to analyse. I will be looking at Ajax’s offensive organisation for my next piece which will be hopefully out soon.

Follow me on twitter @TheNumber6Role

© Sean Patrick McBride 2014