Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic Encyclopedia Arctica 11: Territorial Sovereignty and History

TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ARCTIC

January 1, 1950

Elmer Plischke, Ph.D.



Associate Professor of



Government and Politics



University of Maryland



College Park, Maryland

TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ARCTIC

The struggle for sovereign rights in the Arctic has been under



way for several centuries, and reached its climax in the nineteenth



century. Today there is little if any territory in the Arctic that



is legally "unpossessed," inasmuch as the various known islands and



archipelagoes have been officially claimed and, with one or two ex–



ceptions, existing pretensions generally are uncontested. In part



this is due to reluctance on the part of the United States, Denmark,



and Norway to press competing claims to such territories as Elles–



mere Island and Axel Heiberg Land and to the north of Canada and to Franz



Josef Land and Wrangel Island. The most critical jurisdictional



dispute in recent years was occasioned by Norway's claim to Eastern



Greenland, which was amicably resolved by arbitration. Except for



Greenland, Iceland, and Spitsbergen, major Arctic islands are claimed



by the Soviet Union and the Dominion of Canada.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOVEREIGN JURISDICTION

In order to understand the legal principles and problems con–



cerned with the acquisition and exercise of sovereign rights over



Arctic territory it is essential to understand the principles of inter–



national law governing sovereign jurisdiction over landed territory



( terra firma ) in general. International law is dynamic and changes



with the times. Individual pretensions therefore must be weighed in



the light of the contemporary validity of the legal principles on which



they are founded.

The acquisition of territorial rights involves the following two



elements: the animus , that is to say, the intention of the state to



acquire and retain the territory and subject it to its jurisdiction;



and secondly, the corpus , or the physical act by which that intention



is manifested in fact. The animus is the mental act of sovereign



authority, determined by that branch of government which is constitu–



tionally competent to assume jurisdiction over territory. The corpus ,



on the other hand, is performed by any agent properly acting in the



name of the state . (29, p.284).

Except in cases of conquest of cession, described below, the terri–



tory to be acquired must at the time of its acquisition be either un–



inhabited, or, if peopled by native tribes which are not politically



organized under any government possessing the marks of responsibility



under international law, it must have remained unappropriated by any



other state. For a territory to be terra nullius --that is, unpossessed



by a recognized state, and therefore appropriable--it must not be in–



habited by a political society accepted as an equal in the Family of



Nations. Areas which may be considered to constitute terra nullius



include uninhabited lands, territories inhabited by individuals not



permanently united for political action, and derelict areas that have



been abandoned by former possessory states. All of these have been con–



cerned in resolving issues of Arctic sovereignty.

Legal Methods of Territorial Acquisition

In the twentieth century there are five clearly recognized modes



by which a state may acquire valid title to territory:

1. Conquest or subjugation, which means the incorporation of



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foreign territory after its subjection by force, evidenced by some



overt act, such as a decree of annexation, indicating the intention to



appropriate the territory, and a demonstrated ability to maintain per–



manent possession. In the Arctic little territory has been acquired in



this fashion, except where sovereign control has been wrested from a



native group by an imperial power.



which means the incorporation of foreign territory after its subjection by force, evidenced by some overt act, such as a decree of annexation, indicating the intention to appropriate the territory, and a demonstrated ability to maintain per– manent possession. In the Arctic little territory has been acquired in this fashion, except where sovereign control has been wrested from a native group by an imperial power. 2. Cession , which consists of the formal transfer by treaty of



territory from one state to another, whether it be voluntary or forcible.



It may be achieved by a peace treaty signed under duress, by simple



cession, or by sale. Thus, the American purchase from Russia of the sub–



Arctic territory of Alaska was consummated by treaty (1867) and it is



possible that Denmark may some day sell Greenland to the United States.



Of a somewhat similar nature, though strictly speaking not a matter of



cession, territory may be acknowledged as belonging to a state by general



multilateral convention. In this fashion Norway acquired a clear title



to Spitsbergen and Bear Island in 1920.



, which consists of the formal transfer by treaty of territory from one state to another, whether it be voluntary or forcible. It may be achieved by a peace treaty signed under duress, by simple cession, or by sale. Thus, the American purchase from Russia of the sub– Arctic territory of Alaska was consummated by treaty (1867) and it is possible that Denmark may some day sell Greenland to the United States. Of a somewhat similar nature, though strictly speaking not a matter of cession, territory may be acknowledged as belonging to a state by general multilateral convention. In this fashion Norway acquired a clear title to Spitsbergen and Bear Island in 1920. 3. Prescription, which is defined as the acquisition of rights



over territory by virtue of a protracted and uncontested exercise of



jurisdiction--or adverse holding--engendering the general conviction



that such possession is entirely in keeping with proper international



order. It commonly is agreed that long-continued and uninterrupted



possession purges a title which may originally have been in question.



Prescription is likely to be of increasing significance in matters of



polar jurisdiction today, especially for the Canadian and Soviet is–



lands of the Arctic . (38).



which is defined as the acquisition of rights over territory by virtue of a protracted and uncontested exercise of jurisdiction--or adverse holding--engendering the general conviction that such possession is entirely in keeping with proper international order. It commonly is agreed that long-continued and uninterrupted possession purges a title which may originally have been in question. Prescription is likely to be of increasing significance in matters of polar jurisdiction today, especially for the Canadian and Soviet is– lands of the Arctic 4. Accretion , which is of comparatively minor importance, particu–







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larly in the Arctic, since it involves the increase or enlargement of



landed territory through the alluvial action of rivers or the ocean.



New promontories or islands created by alluvial deposits accrue auto–



matically to the littoral state.



, which is of comparatively minor importance, particu– larly in the Arctic, since it involves the increase or enlargement of landed territory through the alluvial action of rivers or the ocean. New promontories or islands created by alluvial deposits accrue auto– matically to the littoral state. 5. Effective occupation, by which a state intentionally appropriates



terra nullius through the practical exercise of jurisdictional authority



over it, as described more fully below. It is of fundamental importance



in determining Arctic sovereignty. Discovery , symbolic appropriation ,



contiguity , and continuity sometimes also are mentioned as according



valid jurisdiction al titles, and, whereas they enjoyed some validity in



the past, today they are subject to serious question.





Broadly speaking, the history of international law governing the



acquisition of terra nullius may be divided into three periods: (a)



The era prior to the sixteenth century, when papal grants constituted



the chief source of territorial pretentions, (b) The sixteenth and



seventeenth centuries, during which the validity of papal grants was



attacked, chiefly by those states that were too late to benefit thereby



or were unable to do so for religious reasons, and when discovery and



symbolic appropriation were propounded as the basis of jurisdictional



claims. (c) The period commencing with the beginning of the eighteenth



century, when the principle of effective occupation was developed by



international law writers and incorporated into general practice.

Papal Line of Demarcation

Papal edicts conveyed title to territory until the end of the



fifteenth century, when they reached a climax with the expansive grants



of the 1490's . (7, 41, and 54). Following the discoveries of Columbus and his return



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to Spain, in May, 1493, Pope Alexander VI awarded to Ferdinand and



Isabella exclusive control over discovered and undiscovered islands and



continental areas to the west of a line drawn 100 leagues west of the



Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, simultaneously warning other coun–



tries, under threat of excommunication, from entering the regions ex–



cept with permission of the monarchs of Spain.

When Portugal objected that this line was drawn too far to the



east, Spain agreed to the Treaty of Tordesillas on June 3, 1494, shift–



ing the line of demarcation 270 leagues farther west to 370 leagues



west of the Cape Verde Islands, which was confirmed by Pope Julius II



in 1506, twelve years after its consummation. The papal line of demar–



cation ostensibly extended from pole to pole, thereby dividing the globe



into two gigantic sectors.

Spain and Portugal do not currently claim title to Arctic or



Antarctic territory on the basis of papal grants. But the practice of



prescribing geographical areas bounded by astronomical or artificial



boundaries, within which is claimed all terra nullius , recently has



been revived and applied to the polar regions by a number of publicists.



This procedure currently is known as the sector principle, or, if the



presumption may be made to use a new term, as polar "sectorism."

Discovery

Opposition to the papal grants soon developed on a widespread scale,



led particularly by the English, French, and Dutch — the new maritime and



commercial states. In part their argument was that if Spain and Portugal



could disregard papal bulls--as they did when they negotiated the Treaty



of Tordesillas--other states had even more reason to ignore them. The



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states which did not benefit under the papal grants introduced the counter–



claim of discovery as giving a more substantial title to new territory. It



seems quite logical that discovery came to be regarded as a more tangible



jurisdictional right in an era when half a dozen of the more powerful Euro–



pean states were competing to the point of war for the lands of the New



World and the East.

Discovery therefore became the basis of title to terra nullius in the



sixteenth century . (6, 41, and 42). With the discovery of the immense American continent, the



nations of Europe were eager to appropriate as much territory as they could,



and, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war with one



another, it was necessary to establish a recognized principle of law by which



the rights of acquisition should be regulated as between themselves. This



principle provided that discovery gave jurisdictional title to the government



under whose authority it was made, was effective against all other European



governments, and might be consummated by actual possession.

There are many illustrations evidencing reliance upon discovery as the



basis of sovereign rights. The British Government relied upon it to justify



its claims to Virgi [ ?] a, New England, and Canada. France and the Netherlands



also claimed portions of North American territory on the basis of discovery,



while Spain and Portugal asserted pretensions to the southern part of North



America, Central America and the Caribbean, and South America . (44, pp.113 ff.). However, as



claims conflicted in interior areas, other legal tenets had to be found, lead–



ing to the development of the principle of effective occupation.

Since the eighteenth century when state practice and international law



treatises commenced to recognize effective occupation as the most valid title



to terra nullius , discovery was relegated to the background. To what extent



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discovery currently conveys sovereign rights is not definitively settled in



international law, but it generally is agreed that it does not in and of it–



self afford a genuine title. At most, it is inchoate , the discovering state



merely acquiring the right to occupy effectively the discovered territory,



provided this is done within a reasonable time, and that in the interim other



states are conversely barred from occupying such territory . (6, p.67; 29, p. 137; 45, p. 48).

Symbolic Appropriation

As a matter of fact, it appears that even in the days of its ascendency



discovery often was accompanied by an overt act of appropriation in order to



furnish proof of jurisdiction. At any rate, it is certain that in territorial



conflicts, states tended to fortify titles to discovered lands by asserting



that they had "taken possession" of them . (11).

A real or effective possession was not demanded at the outset; a ficti–



tious or formal act of appropriation was considered to be sufficient. Claims



thus were founded upon seemingly trivial and sometimes isolated acts, such as



reading a proclamation of appropriation, reciting the explorer's letters patent



or commission, setting up a pillar or erecting a cross, sometimes bearing the



royal coat of arms or a marker with an inscription attesting to the appropria–



tion, raising a national standard or marching ashore with flag unfurled,



celebrating a religious service, performing the truf and twig ceremony (the



presentation to a representative of the sovereign of a clod of earth and a



twig to indicate acceptance of jurisdiction), and recording in a signed docu–



ment the ceremony performed . (20).

States varied the procedure, but one or another of these ceremonies was



practiced in most cases. For example, James Poole erected a cross with an



inscription on Bear Island for Great Britain in 1610, and much the same procedure



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was followed by Captain William Baffin in Spitsbergen in 1613. William



Barents set up a post bearing the Dutch arms in the same archipelago in 1596, Captain John



Cunningham utilized the turf and twig ceremony on Greenland in 1605,



appropriating it for Denmark, Russian practice included such acts as the



levying of tribute in Siberia, the erection of a cross and the building



of huts by Ataloff on Kamchatka in 1697, the leaving of trinkets and



coins at Kayes Island by Vitus Bering in 1743, the exaction of tribute



in Alaska by Bering the same year, and the buriel of copper plates and



the erection of crosses by Ismaelof and Betsharoff at Kodiak Island in



1788. Additional illustrations are referred to below.

Effective Occupation to 1884

The principle of effective occupation began to assert itself with



considerable emphasis in the literature of the eighteenth century . (11, 40).



Concomitantly it was denied that discovery and symbolic appropriation



continued to prove rights of jurisdiction. It was necessary for a state



to take the territory into effective and real possession in order to estop



other states from laying claim to it. Virtually all authors came to require



an effective act of appropriation to render jurisdictional title complete . (45, pp. 16–17). .

But states did not universally adopt this principle in actual prac–



tice until somewhat later, and even then their usage was marked by vacilla–



tion. By the early nineteenth century, however, they began enforcing the



principle as a matter of recognized jurisprudence in their mutual relations,



and it was more and more frequently applied as the century advanced.

North America. The Nootka Sound controversy of the late eighteenth



century, involving jurisdictional pretensions over the Pacific coast of



North America, resulted in one of the first major capitulations to the



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principle in this hemisphere. As a consequence, imperial Spain, still



struggling to maintain its monopolistic control over the Pacific, grounded



on papal bull, finally was obliged to admit other states to the area, pro–



vided that the principle of effectiveness was strictly observed.

Subsequently, it also was involved in the dispute of the United States



and Spain over the boundaries between Louisiana and Texas, in the conflict



with Russia concerning her wholesale pretensions to the northwest coast of



North America, and in the Oregon question. In the Louisiana issue both



Spain and the United States sought desperately to prove the prior establish–



ment of effective occupation. Rejecting the Russian decree of September,



1821, laying exclusive claim to the Bering Sea and the Pacific area of



North America down to 45° 50′ N. latitude, both the United States and



Great Britain insisted upon effective occupation. Ultimately Russia



acquiesced, as evidenced by the limitations she accepted by treaty with the



United States (1824). During the Oregon dispute, the United States and



Great Britain agreed that discovery was insufficient to convey full title



to the territory. Both approved the principle of effectiveness, and the



dispute consequently centered about the priority and degree of occupation



effected.

Latin America . Effective occupation also was resorted to in Latin



America territorial questions. When the United States requested Peru to



define the status of the Lobos Islands in 1852, for example, the Peruvian



Government convincingly argued that its rights rested on substantial and



unequivocal acts of jurisdiction and possession exercised from time imme–



morial, which satisfied the United States Government completely. Navassa



Island, off the southeast coast of Haiti, was explored by an American in



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1857, guano was taken, and thereafter, despite Haitian contestation, it



was claimed to come under United States jurisdiction on the grounds that



when possession was taken the island was entirely unoccupied and unused



by the Haitians.

One of the most protracted territorial disputes in Latin America



concerns the Falkland Islands. It commenced early in the nineteenth cen–



tury. Although Great Britain has been in actual possession of the archi–



pelago for over a century, Argentina still challenges the validity of



British sovereignty, and both countries base conflicting Antarctic sectoral



claims on the islands.

Africa . In the case of Baluma Island, off the mouth of the Rio Grande



River on the west coast of Africa, Portugal and Britain submitted the ques–



tion of title to arbitration by the President of the United States. The



award prepared by Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, Assistant Secretary of State,



in 1870 accorded the island to Great Britain on the grounds of real pos–



session, settlement, and actual use. In the dispute between Britain and



Portugal concerning Delagoa Bay in 1875, the president of France, as arbiter,



supported the Portuguese claim for a variety of reasons, including the ex–



ercise of possessory rights for three centuries, and the temporary interrup–



tion of such occupation was held to be insufficient to negate a title in



existence for so long.

The Pacific . Preliminary rules of occupation as understood in the



Roman law were laid down as the criteria for determining jurisdictional



rights in the dispute between Spain and Portugal over the Molucca Islands



in the early sixteenth century. Three centuries later, Britain and Germany



recognized Spain's jurisdiction over such parts of the Sulu archipelago as



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were effectively occupied, but refused to do so for the remainder.

Berlin Conference , 1884–1885

Such was the status of effective occupation when the Berlin



Conference convened to deal with African territorial affairs, to which



all of the states of Europe (except Switzerland) and the United States



were invited. In Article 35 of the General Act of Berlin, signatory



powers recognized the obligation to assure, in African coastal territories



occupied by them, the existence of an authority sufficient to cause acquired



rights to be respected. Excepting the United States, which had no imperialist



interests in Africa, all signatory states ratified the Act in 1886. Effec–



tive occupation therefore became binding international law for African ter–



ritory.

The principle was renewed in somewhat broader scope for a number of



states in 1919. Article 10 of the Convention Revising the General Act of



Berlin, agreed to at St. Germain-en-Laye, provided that the signatory powers



recognize the legal obligation to maintain authority and police forces suf–



ficient to ensure protection of persons and property and, if necessary, free–



dom of trade and transit. This agreement was ratified by Belgium, the British



Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and the United States, reaffirming the



fundamental principle of effective occupation.

Effective Occupation Since 1885

Since the Berlin Conference the principle of effectiveness has



universally been relied upon. Many illustrations may be cited, such as



the bitter British Guiana-Venezuela boundary affair which lasted for some



years and even threatened to precipitate war. The arbitral award in this



dispute, although not emphasizing the reasons upon which it was based, drew



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the compromise boundary line in such a way as to give each party the



territory in which it was able to prove the more effective control.



The award of 1911 resolving the Anglo-German conflict over Walfisch



Bay in southwest Africa was based on the principle of effective oc–



cupation, asserting that the exercise of police jurisdiction and the



granting of pardons evidences such occupation.

Palmas and Clipperton Islands . The United States and the Nether–



lands contested jurisdiction over Palmas Island, lying between the



Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. The award of the Hague Tribunal



(1928) recognized Dutch hegemony founded on the continued occupation



and exercise of governmental jurisdiction for some time as being of



greater legal significance than the inherited rights of the United States



grounded on discovery and contiguity.

In the Clipperton Island arbitration between Mexico and France,



King Victor Emmanual of Italy (1931) awarded the island to France by



virtue of its appropriation and effective occupation, and rejected



Mexico's argument that the general conviction that the island belonged



to her constituted effective occupation.

Eastern Greenland . The dispute between Norway and Denmark over



Eastern Greenland involved some of the aspects of the problem that arise



to-be-faced in the Arctic, and it serves as one of the landmarks in decid–



ing the legal principles governing the acquisition of polar territory . (28, 37).



The real issue was whether Denmark actually enjoyed complete possession



of the entire island, including the eastern part between Carlsberg Fiord on the



south and Bessel Fiord on the north, lying between the sea and the inland



ice cap.

Denmark asserted jurisdiction on the grounds that she enjoyed pos–



session for an extended period of time without contestation until Norway



propounded her claim, and, secondly, that Norway recognized Danish rights



by treaty. Norway replied that in fact the Danish Government did not ex–



ercise jurisdiction over the portion of the island annexed and occupied



by Norway in 1931. The Permanent Court of International Justice held that



display of authority — the basis of the Danish claim — involves two elements,



each of which must be shown to exist, namely, the intention to act as



sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of governmental authority.



The court took a very liberal view with respect to the latter, holding that



complete policing or settlement was unnecessary and that merely the establish–



ment of administration for the area and the enforcement of regulations was



adequate to validate the title. The court therefore decided in favor of



Denmark.

Conclusions . As illustrated by state practice particularly since the



Berlin Act of 1885, international law requires the establishment of



effective occupation for a genuine acquisition of terra nullius . With very



few exceptions, state practice adheres to the principle, and a number of



important arbitral decisions have liberalized its interpretation considerably.



As a consequence, recent disputes have been less concerned with the determina–



tion of the legal principle to be applied than with an interpretation of the



degree of effectiveness required in each particular case.

Prescription

The validity of prescriptive title to territory has universally



been recognized by international publicists and in international practice.



Prescription on the part of one state presupposes the existence, at least



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in theory, of an earlier title held by another. The new title is acquired



on the ground of a presumed abandonment of the territory by the original



owner.

One of the most uncertain features of the principle is the length of



time required to render title effective. But this is understandable, be–



cause it varies with circumstances. No general rule can be laid down, but



when the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute in Guiana was submitted to arbi–



tration in 1897, it was agreed that adverse holding for fifty years should



consummate a good title. The same period was proposed by the Russian Govern–



ment in the controversy over northwest North America in the 1820's.

Contiguity and Continuity

On some occasions the geographic position of territory is alleged to



create rights of sovereignty . (56) Such geographical relationship is variously



known as territorial proximity or propinquity, of which there are two types,



namely, contiguity and continuity. They are differentiated in that contiguity



refers to territories separated by water whereas continuity is concerned with



continuous territory not separated by water . (56, p. 520).

Contiguity . The preponderant number of international law publicists



reject the principle of contiguity as according sovereign rights, except



for either the minor islands of archipelagoes in which the main islands are



effectively occupied or islands located within the confines of territorial



waters . (29, pp.228–229; 33, p. 244; 35, pp. 77–78). Contiguity is said to create merely an inchoate or presumptive title,



and then only for comparatively small or moderate areas. State practice also



recognizes that islands lying within territorial waters are appropriable,



but the position of governments is more difficult to determine with respect



to islands located close to the mainland but beyond the marginal belt.



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The United States Government has consistently denied the validity of



contiguity, as it did in the controversies concerning the Lobos Islands,



Aves and Navassa Islands, and the Falkland Islands, and the same opinion



was acknowledged in the Palmas Island award.

Continuity . The principle of continuity — or the hinterland doctrine —



which has reference to the extension of possessions landward from a



tract effectively occupied, has had a somewhat different development. In



the days of the great explorations it was common for charters to grant



jurisdiction from "sea to sea." When American diplomats were discussing



the limits of the Louisiana Territory in 1805, they supported the principle



by arguing that the hinterland embraced interior count r y drained by all



rivers and their tributaries to their very sources. The principle also was



of importance in the Oregon controversy, in the scramble for African territory,



and in the Venezuelan boundary dispute.

Neither contiguity nor continuity, in and of itself, affords a perfect



right to adjacent territory. Contiguity is definitely rejected, and, at best,



continuity may create a presumptive title which, within a reasonable time,



must be followed by effective occupation. Whereas it was incorporated into a



number of African territorial treaties, it nevertheless was superseded by



effective occupation in arguing a case before an arbitral body and in the



awards of the arbiters. A contemporary version of these principles has made



its appearance in connection with the polar regions, as described in the fol–



lowing section.

POLAR SECTOR PRINCIPLE

In recent decades a new legal concept has been developed by a number



of writers for the solution, in advance, of problems of polar jurisdiction.



This generally is referred to as the sector principle. It has both geographic



and juridical implications. Geographically, a sector means a triangular



slice of polar territory, with its apex at the pole, bounded by two meridians



of longitude, and usually having a parallel of latitude or a territorial coast–



line as its base. Arctic sectors converge at the North Pole whereas Antarctic



sectors meet at the South Pole. However, in some cases a longitudinal line



must deviate to circumvent foreign territory; both Greenland and Spitsbergen



necessitate such deviations.

The sectors differ in the two polar regions for geographic reasons.



In the Arctic, where there are great sub-polar land masses, the base of the



sector supposedly is formed by the northern boundary of the subjacent con–



tinental territory abutting upon the Arctic. In the Antarctic, on the other



hand, where there are no prominent land masses (the southern coasts of Africa,



Australia, and South America being neither large nor subjacent to the polar



area), more or less arbitrary parallels of latitude are selected as the



northern bases of the sectors, while the sides are extended to the widest expanse



possible under existing claims of discovery, exploration, and symbolical



annexation. The bases of Antarctic sectors therefore bear no relationship



to the width of the possessions of the claimant state outside the Antarctic



Circle.

Delineation of Arctic Sectors

In the past, six Arctic sectors have been demarcated, one assigned



respectively to each of the following: Norway (based on Spitsbergen and



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Jan Mayen Island), Finland, the Soviet Union, the United States (based on



Alaska), Canada, and Denmark (based on Greenland and Iceland). Since the



poleward extension of the prewar Finnish longitudinal boundaries was in–



terrupted by the Spitsbergen Archipelago, some sectorists eliminated Finland



from the list. Today, in any case, she would be excluded by virtue of her



cession of the Arctic coastal Petsamo District to the Soviet Union in the



Peace Treaty of 1947. Since the establishment of the complete independence



of Iceland, it appears might be urged that a logical representation of polar sectorism in



the Arctic would require a separate sector for her, so that six Arctic



sectoral states would remain.

As a juridical theory, the sector principle originally was propounded



on February 20, 1907, by Canadian Senator P. Poirier, who allocated sectors



to Norway, Russia, the United States, and Canada. Although the idea did not



originate with him, David Hunter Miller, an American statesman, apparently was



one of the first to actually slice the Arctic pie into definite sectors . (32, 33). He



delineated three of them--the Russian, lying between an "undefined" line in



the neighborhood of 30° or 40° E. longitude and 169° W. longitude; an American,



between 169° and 141° W. longitude; and a Canadian, between 141° and 60° W.



longitude. The remainder of the Arctic, between 60° W. and 40° E. longitude



would, so far as the theory goes, be unassigned, but it seems to contain no



land north of Spitsbergen and Greenland.

Subsequently two publicists presented somewhat more detailed theories



concerning the principle and sought to justify them with legal, historical,



and pragmatic arguments. These are Leonid Breitfuss and Vladimir Leont'evich



Lakhtine.

Breitfuss divided the Arctic into five sectors . (2, 3):



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1. Joint Norwegian-Finish: from 10° W. longitude to 32°



4′ 35″ E. (42° in extent).



4′ 35″ E. (42° in extent). 2. Soviet: from 32° 4′ 35″ E. longitude to 168° 49′ 30″



W. (158° in extent).



W. (158° in extent). 3. Alaskan: from 168° 49′ 30″ W. longitude to 141° W.



(29° in extent).



(29° in extent). 4. Canadian: from 141° W. longitude to 60° W. (81° in



extent).



extent). 5. Greenland (Danish): from 60° W. longitude to 10° W.



(50° in extent).





Lakhtine, on the other hand, established six sectors, giving Nor–



way and Finland each a separate slice . (24, 25). His divisions included:

1. Norwegian: between 10° E. longitude and a line fixed by



the Paris Convention of 1920.



the Paris Convention of 1920. 2. Finnish: 31° E. longitude to 32° 4′ 35″ E. longitude



(which ceases at Spitsbergen).



(which ceases at Spitsbergen). 3. Soviet: 32° 4′ 35″ E. longitude (which curves to about



35° E. longitude in the vicinity of Spitsbergen) to



168° 49′ 32″ W. longitude.



35° E. longitude in the vicinity of Spitsbergen) to 168° 49′ 32″ W. longitude. 4. American: 168° 49′ 32″ W. longitude to 141° W.



5. Canadian: 141° W. longitude to 60° W. (which curves



along the western coast of Greenland).



along the western coast of Greenland). 6. Danish: 60° W. longitude to 10° E. longitude.





Lakhtine briefly listed the known territories that lie within each



of these sectors . (25, pp. 705–707). Thus, the Norwegian portion includes Spitsbergen, Bear



Island, and Jan Mayen Island, whereas that of Finland contains no discovered



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territory. The Soviet sector embraces the entire group of islands and



archipelagoes north of the Soviet mainland. No islands of importance



are to be found in the Alaskan sector. The Canadian segment includes



vast territories comprised of the archipelago lying to the north of the



Dominion, and that of Denmark is comprised of Iceland and the entire



island of Greenland.

Since 1928 a number of additional writers have supported the prin–



ciple. Ernst Sorge, a German geographer, accepts the five-fold division



of Breitfuss . (48). He distinguishes a Norwegian sector (embracing Spitsbergen),



a Soviet sector (including all islands within the entire area between 32°



4′ 35″ E. longitude and 168° 49′ 30″ W. longitude), an American sector



(Alaska, for which he specifies no Arctic lands), a Canadian sector (the



Franklin Archipelago), and a Danish sector (Greenland). Like Breitfuss,



he omits Finland from the roster.

Professor Bruce Hopper, who has written extensively on the work of



the Soviets in the Arctic, cuts the Arctic into six slices . (12). He refrains



from defining exact longitudinal delineations but gives the sizes of these



sectors: Norwegian--21° Finnish--2° Soviet--159° United States--28°



Canadian--81° Danish--69°. Comparing this division with that of Breitfuss,



it is noted that there is agreement on the size of only one sector — the



Canadian.

Arctic sectors also are identified by latitudinal sizes in the



publications of the Canadian writer, D. M. Le Bourdais . (26, p.9). He omits Finland,



but acknowledges a Norwegian sector of 20° in width; a Soviet sector of



160° an[d?] American of 30° a Canadian of 80° and a Danish of 45°.

The prominent Norwegian jurist Gustav Smedal, in his excellent



020 | Vol_XI-0025

study of polar jurisdiction, says that if the Arctic were to be divided



into sectors--the juridical validity of which he strongly denies--then



Norway, Finland, the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, and Denmark



would be entitled to segments. But he does not attempt any specific



delimitation . (45).

A number of these publicists appear to accept the principle without



attempting to justify its validity. It is interesting to note that, while



all of these exponents pretend to explain the same principle, each employs



his own subjective interpretation, and consequently they fail to agree on



the allocation of the sectoral lines and the number and size of the sectors.



As a matter of fact, there is very little agreement even among Soviet



authorities, except as far as the Canadian sector is concerned, which is



held to comprise the polar area between 60° and 141° W. longitude.

Legal Validity of Sector Principle

In and of themselves, the opinions of publicists do not create law,



however. Its existence must be validated by international usage and



treaties. No general conventions have been agreed to by the interested



powers acknowledging polar sectorism. Nor is it commonly accepted in inter–



national practice in the Arctic (although it is more widely adhered to in



the Antarctic). The Soviet Union is the only subjacent state that actually



incorporated it into its municipal or national law. Others either have



clearly rejected it, or, as in the case of Canada, where a number of public



officials openly approved the principle, the government has neither manifestly



denied nor condoned it. Individual state action is described in greater



detail below.

SOVEREIGNTY OVER ARCTIC TERRITORY

Having summarized the basic legal principles governing the exercise



of sovereign jurisdiction in general, it is necessary to apply them specifi–



cally to Arctic territory and to analyse state practice in this area. Norway,



the Soviet Union, the United States, the Dominion of Canada, and Denmark cur–



rently are the states of chief concern. Although the peculiarities of Arctic



island territory may suggest a new legal principle, such as the sector theory,



it will be noted that in an actual conflict of claims, effective occupation



is resorted to whenever possible and that, in reality, it is the final test



of sovereign authority.

Norway

The Norwegian Government has not accepted the sector principle for



the Arctic. As a matter of fact, it rather has categorically denied its



validity. As noted above, those writers who delineate a Norwegian sector



differ widely in their specific interpretations. Gustav Smedal, a Norwegian



upholding the interests of his homeland, flatly repudiates the principle and



denies that Norway ever claimed a sector in the Arctic . (45, p. 73).

The present Arctic possessions of Norway include Spitsbergen, together



with Bear Island, and Jan Mayen Island. From the legal point of view these



islands play an important role in two respects. In the first place, it is



argued that Norway claimed and obtained jurisdiction over them by virtue of



the sector principle. Secondly, it is contended that the Norwegian sector



is founded on the i s la n ds. Though publicist s may debate these premises, the



facts disp or ro ve their validity beyond a doubt

Spitsbergen . The history of Spitsbergen may readily be divided into



022 | Vol_XI-0027

three periods. In the first, lasting until 1871, Denmark-Norway established



preponderant interests in the archipelago; in the second, continuing until



1920, the islands were declared to be terra nullius by the interested powers;



and, in the third, Norway actually acquired complete sovereignty under the



multilateral Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920.

There has been some dispute over the discovery of the archipelago,



involving a Norwegian claim that Vikings discovered "Svalbard" in 1194, a



Russian visit to the islands prior to 1435, "rediscovery" of the islands by



William Barents, chief pilot of a Dutch expedition in 1596 accompanied by



symbolic annexation, and annexation by symbolic act a few years later by a



British expedition sailing under a charter granted the Muscovy Company. Early



interest in the islands was due to their location in choice whaling grounds.

By the mid-seventeenth century the question of jurisdiction declined



in importance owing to the departure of the whales. Despite the competing



claims of Britain, the Netherlands, and Russia, it appears that Denmark–



Norway possessed the strongest pretension. This was confirmed by a letter



King Christian addressed to various powers in 1616 in which he affirmed his



sovereignty over the archipelago, and a number of agreements conceding this



were signed with the interested states, except Russia. Throug h out this period



the latter asserted no claim to the islands, and, despite an increasing interest



in them during the eighteenth century, it was not until 1871 that the Russian



Government alleged historical grounds for possession.

For almost three-fourths of the nineteenth century Spitsbergen played



a minor part in international affairs, when about 1870 attention of the world



was directed to the mineral wealth of the islands. There was no satisfactory



governmental administration providing for the granting of land titles and



023 | Vol_XI-0028

mining rights and the judicial settlement of disputes. But it also became



evident that no interested power would permit any other to take undisputed



possession.

In 1872 Norway-Sweden and Russia agreed that they would regard Spits–



bergen as terra nullius , allowing free right to establish scientific and



industrial enterprise. Other states did not contest this arrangement. Since



Denmark voiced no objection at the time, presumably she surrendered her



original claims through dereliction.

Norway then began to sponsor a series of international conferences



concerning the matter of jurisdiction in the archipelago. After several



abortive attempts, she met with Sweden and Russia in a secret conference at



Christiania in 1910, where a proc è s verbal was negotiated, outlining the inter–



national status of the islands and providing for a tripartite scheme of govern–



ment. A more detailed protocol was agreed to by the three states two years



later. Finally, in 1914 Norway convoked a general conference, which rapidly



adjourned, however, to permit participating states to examine the plan for–



mulated at the preliminary tripartite conferences. World War I intervened,



accentuating interest in the archipelago for both its strategic position and



its mineral resources.

When the Paris Peace Conference met, therefore, the Norwegian Govern–



ment requested it to consider the Spitsbergen question. The Supreme Council



appointed a special Spitsbergen Commission, which decided to place the archi–



pelago under Norwegian jurisdiction. This was embodied in the Spitsbergen



Treaty signed early in 1920. It received almost universal acceptance, with



the exception of the Soviet Union which was not represented at the conference,



but Moscow acceded in 1924. Upon the acquisition of Spitsbergen, the Norwegian



024 | Vol_XI-0029

Government immediately rendered its title effective by a series of public



proclamations and the establishment of administrative services.

Bear Island . Bear Island — located between North Cape (Norway) and



South Cape (Spitsbergen) — also was acquired by Norway under the 1920 Spits–



bergen Treaty. Despite differences in matters of detail, the history of this



island tends to parallel that of Spitsbergen. Without a doubt it constituted



terra nullius at the time of its acquisition.

Aside from Viking-Norwegian discovery in the late tenth century, "re–



discovery" by William Barents (Dutch) in 1596, a formal claim by the English



Muscovy Company in 1609, hoisting of the Russian flag in the late nineteenth



century, and active German interest at the end of the nineteenth century,



Norway and Russia were the chief contenders for the island by the time of the



Paris Peace Conference. But neither possessed claims sufficient to justify



possession. Although the matter was not especially pressing in 1920, the



island also was placed under Norwegian sovereignty.

Jan Mayen Island . Norway's acquisition of Jan Mayen Island provides



a somewhat different and far less complicated story . (36). The island probably was



known to the Norwegians at an early date, since there is evidence that Norse



hunters frequented its waters. When Norway declined as a seafaring nation



in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the island was forgotten, and she



lost the claims she then may have possessed.

Jan Mayen was "rediscovered" in the seventeenth century. It is dif–



ficult to assign credit because a number of independent discoveries probably



were made at about the same time, each guarded as a secret to prevent rival



whalers from using the island's waters. Henry Hudson formerly was regarded



as having first "rediscovered" the island in 1607, but today it is believed



025 | Vol_XI-0030

that the true discovery was that of the Dutch voyager Jan Jacobsz



May in July, 1614. The first authenticated English visit was made



in 1615. Other claims lack substantiating evidence. With the de–



cline of whaling the island once more was abandoned, so that only



an occasional traveler visited the island after 1642. Although



early in the seventeenth century the island presumably was the un–



disputed possession of the Dutch, whose occupation lasted into the



following century, nevertheless rights created during this early



period were forfeited by dereliction.

A new phase of the jurisdictional development of the island



began with its occupation by a Norwegian subject in 1920 and the



erection of an official Norwegian wireless and meteorological sta–



tion the following year. On the basis of these and additional acts



of effective occupation for eight years without opposition, the



Norwegian Government formally annexed the island on May 8, 1929.



Appropriation apparently was made without objection. Valid title



therefore was created by effective occupation substantiated by uni–



versal acquiescence. Upon annexation the Norwegian Government imme–



diately proceeded to render its jurisdiction certain by applying its



civil and criminal law and judicial procedure to the island, and by



placing its administration under the Governor of Spitsbergen.

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union has taken a stronger official position in support



of the sector theory for the Arctic than any other state, and its



action is the only instance of incorporating the principle into nation–



al legislation for the Arctic . (53).

Russian Pretentions, 1916 . The first step was taken on October 3,



1916, when the Russian Foreign Minister notified the allied and friendly



026 | Vol_XI-0031

powers that the Russian Empire embraced the following Arctic territory (25, p. 708; 32, p.53):



Vilkitski Island; Tsar Nicholas II Land (now Severnaia Zemlya);



Tsesarevicha Alekseya Island (now called Small Taimyr); Starokadomski



and Novopashennyi Islands; Henrietta, Jeanette, Bennett, Herald, and



Viedinenia Islands; the New Siberian Islands; Wrangel Island; and



others situated near the Asiatic coast of the Empire. The Russian



Government did not judge it necessary to include in this notifica–



tion Novaya Zemlya, Kolguev, Vaigatch and other smaller islands locat–



ed near the European coast of the Empire, because they were universally



recognized as Russian territory.

This decree embraced the known islands lying to the north of



continental Russia, with the glaring omission of Franz Josef Land.



There is no evidence to indicate that either Britain (or Canada),



the United States, or Norway made formal objection to the decree



when it was announced. The Soviet Government renewed this claim in



1923, and on November 4, 1924, a special memorandum was addressed to



the governments of several states, repeating the notification of 1916



and affirming that the Arctic islands mentioned were part of the



territory of the Soviet Union.

Soviet Sectoral Decree . The definitive delineation of a Russian



Arctic sector, however, was made in 1926, when on April 15th, the



Presidium of the Central Executive Committee decreed (53, p.320):

All discovered lands and islands, as well as



all those that may in the future be discovered,



which are not at the date of the publication of this



decree recognized by the Government of the U.S.S.R.



as the territory of a foreign Power, are declared to



be territories belonging to the U.S.S.R., within the



following limits:

In the Northern Arctic Ocean, from the northern



coast of the U.S.S.R. up to the North Pole, between



the meridian 32° 4′ 35″ east longitude from Greenwich,



passing along the eastern side of Vaida Bay through



the triangulation mark on Kekursk Cape, and meridian



168° 49′ 30″ west longitude from Greenwich, passing



through the middle of the strait which separates



Ratmanov and Kruzenstern Islands of the Diomede



group of islands in the Bering Straits.

The text of this decree was communicated to the interested



governments. No express official declarations of acquiescence were



made, but aside from the question of the validity of the sector



principle as legal dogma, there seems to be little opposition to the



Soviet pretension. The two territories which have occasioned the most



poignant discussion are Wrangel Island and Franz Josef Land.

Wrangel Island . The development of the jurisdictional wrangel



over Wrangel Island is an interesting episode in Arctic history.



A Russian heard of the island in 1824, and several unsuccessful attempts



were made to find it, including the four-year explorations of Lieu–



tenant (later Baron) Wrangel. An Englishman, Captain Henry Kellett



of the Herald , first saw the island in 1849. In 1867 it was given



its name by Captain Thomas Long of the American whaling bark Nile,



and in this same year much of the American whaling fleet operated



in the region and saw the island.

Another American, Captain Calvin L. Hooper of the Corwin , was



first to land on the island, in August, 1881, raising the American



flag, depositing a record of the visit in a cairn, and claiming the



island for the United States. A few weeks later Lieutenant Robert M.



Berry of the United States Navy made the second land ing , remained 19 days,



and explored much of the coastline. Britain and the United States



thus acquired the strongest, though still imperfect, claims to the



028 | Vol_XI-0033

island. The first Russian visit was that of Captain Konstantin V.



Loman, of the Vaigatch , in 1911, which is poorly reported and fails



to prove Russian intention to acquire jurisdiction.

The initial attempt to establish claims founded on effective



occupation was made in 1914, when seventeen survivors of the wrecked



Karluk , icebound flagship of the Canadian Arctic Expedition, succeeded



in landing on the island early in March and remained throughout the



summer. On July 1, three members of the party raised the Canadian



flag and claimed the island as a British possession. In attempting



further to perfect the Canadian title, the Arctic explorer Vilhjalmur



Stefansson organized the Arctic Exploration and Development Company



and sent a small expedition to the island, 1921–1923. Upon landing,



the party issued a proclamation declaring the island to belong to



Canada.

These occupational pretensions were not substantiated by the



Canadian Government, however, inducing Stefansson to sell his company



to an American, Carl Lomen, in 1924. A United States expedition



proceeded to the island to take possession, but because of unfavorable



ice conditions it failed to get through. Meanwhile the American



Government announced that temporarily no effort would be made to assert



United States jurisdiction in the Arctic.

Canadian and American defection paved the way for the assertion



of Soviet pretentions. In 1924 the Krasny Octiabr , a gunboat carry–



ing a company of infantry, managed to get through to the island,



raised the Soviet flag, and took formal possession without contesta–



tion by Britain, Canada, or the United States. Two years later Soviet



authorities adopted a policy of settlement and continuous occupation



029 | Vol_XI-0034

for the island. Parties have been left on the island, wrieless sta–



tions erected, and the island is included in Soviet administrative and



aerial defense establishments. Despite the 1926 sectoral decree,



perhaps particularly for strategic reasons, the Soviet Government is



not relying upon sectorism for its title.

Franz Josef Land . Franz Josef Land was discovered in 1873 by



an Austro-Hungarian expedition, in quest of the Northeast Passage by



sailing around the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya. But the Austro–



Hungarian Government pressed no claim to legal rights. Throughout



the next decades the islands were regarded as one of the preferred



jumping off points in the race to reach the North Pole. The most



significant pole-bound expeditions that used the archipelago were



the Jackson-Harmsworth Expedition, 1894–1897 (British), the Wellman



Expedition, 1898–1899 (American), the Duke of Abruzzi Expedition,



1899–1900 (Italian), and the two Ziegler Expeditions, 1901–1902 and



1903–1905 (American). None, as far as is known, however, gave rise



to jurisdictional pretensions to these islands.

From 1905 to the end of World War I, Franz Josef Land lost



much of its appeal, primarily because it was no longer considered



a suitable route to the Pole, which, in any case, had been reached



a few years before the outbreak of hostilities. During the war years,



no state appears to have sought possession on the basis of discovery,



exploration, or symbolic annexation. Even Russia, despite several



expeditions, seemed unconcerned over the status of the archipelago,



as evidenced by its omission from the 1916 decree.

By 1923 interest in the islands was reawakened, with the Soviet



Union and Norway assuming the leading roles, the latter ultimately



gaining the ascendency. Five Norwegian expeditions set out for the



030 | Vol_XI-0035

islands between 1923 and 1931, three of which reached their goal.



During the 1920's the Soviet Union also inaugurated a new series of



expeditions and in 1929 that led by Professor Otto Y. Schmidt raised



the Soviet flag and erected a scientific station. Thereafter the



Soviet Union maintained continuous and effective occupation and con–



structed a number of weather and air stations, bases, and other faci–



lities. Furthermore, since 1931, it appears, no non-Soviet expedi–



tion has visited the islands. Whereas the pretensions of Soviet



Russia to Franz Josef Land were virtually non-existent prior to 1929,



in view of her actual occupation, she has since established a stronger



claim to the archipelago than any other state.

Effective Occupation . Clearly evidencing Soviet reluctance to



rely upon polar sectorism to substantiate its title to Arctic terri–



tory is the variety of administrative measures undertaken in the



past quarter century (13, 46, 47). Briefly these include:

1. Central Administrative Supervision . Integrated direction



dates back several decades to the establishment of the All-Union



Arctic Institute (a scientific enterprise) and the Northern Sea



Route Administration ( Glavsevamorput ), to exploit the resources of



the northern sea route . (53, pp. 74 ff.)



. Integrated direction dates back several decades to the establishment of the All-Union Arctic Institute (a scientific enterprise) and the Northern Sea Route Administration ( ), to exploit the resources of the northern sea route 2. Colonization . The principle of colonization is practiced



wherever it is feasible and desirable for the extraction of resources,



the erection and maintenance of meteorological and air stations, or



the pursuance of scientific investigation (46)



. The principle of colonization is practiced wherever it is feasible and desirable for the extraction of resources, the erection and maintenance of meteorological and air stations, or the pursuance of scientific investigation 3. Discovery , Exploration , and Annexation . The Soviet Government



is carrying out a wholesale, centrally controlled program of explora–



tion and annexation . (2, 3). When new land is explored the Soviet flag is



raised and possession is formally taken. Meanwhile the Soviet



Government has sought to arouse popular enthusiasm for the Arctic,



031 | Vol_XI-0036

emphasizing the concept of mastery over polar elements.



, , . The Soviet Government is carrying out a wholesale, centrally controlled program of explora– tion and annexation When new land is explored the Soviet flag is raised and possession is formally taken. Meanwhile the Soviet Government has sought to arouse popular enthusiasm for the Arctic, emphasizing the concept of mastery over polar elements. 4. Arctic Stations . While information is incomplete, it goes



without saying that the Soviet Government is establishing whatever



scientific, weather, and air stations are feasible and necessary.



At the same time an Arctic air service is in operation, connecting



posts and providing communications and transport facilities . (2, 46).



. While information is incomplete, it goes without saying that the Soviet Government is establishing whatever scientific, weather, and air stations are feasible and necessary. At the same time an Arctic air service is in operation, connecting posts and providing communications and transport facilities 5. Administration . Soviet polar islands have been brought



within the jurisdiction of various agencies of the Soviet Government



in an attempt to completely Sovietize the economy and political affairs



of the islands, and bring them under Soviet law and judicial procedure [ . ?] (53).





Thus, although asserting claims to territorial jurisdiction



founded on sectorism, in actual practice the Soviet Union is proceed–



ing to substantiate her claims with effective occupation wherever pos–



sible. Tacit acquiescence in her actions by other states at least



creates the presumption of the validity of her title, which is in the



process of being perfected by effective state administration.

United States

In 1867 the United States purchased Alaska from Russia for



$7,200,000. Article 1 of the treaty of sale defines the territory



ceded, prescribing a dividing line through Bering Strait which



"proceeds due north, without limitation, into the same Frozen Ocean...."



(original French provides: " en ligne directe , sans limitation , vers



le Nord , jusque'a ce qu'elle se perde dans la mer Glaciale ....").

The question whether this treaty delineates an Arctic sector and



therefore proves United States support of the principle has been dis–



puted at length. A number of writers cite the treaty words as indicat–



ing beyond a doubt that the United States and Russia thereby fixed



indisputably their territorial rights in this area (25, pp. 307–708; 53, pp. 331, 333). Others, on the



other hand, favor interpreting the treaty as meaning that the demarca–



tion line extends only up to the Arctic; that, if extended to the pole,



032 | Vol_XI-0037

at most it merely fixed the territory acquired from Russia in 1867



which could not have conveyed title to territory then unpossessed;



and that, in any event, the treaty could in no way obligate the United



States to admit its approval of the then unknown sector system . (15).

United States Interests in the Arctic . Officially the United



States Government has not condoned the sector theory either in theory



or in practice, nor has it recognized any hypothetical Arctic sectoral



divisions claimed by another state. Occasionally, in direct viola–



tion of polar sectorism, American pretensions have controverted the



claims of other powers.

Although premature, late in the 1870's Congress considered a



proposal submitted by Senator Henry W. Howgate to support officially



an expedition to reach the North Pole, and to go about it by establish–



ing a base of operations at Lady Franklin Bay, on the northeastern tip



of Ellesmere Island, connecting with Robeson Channel. The recommenda–



tion was to establish there a "colony" to be supplied by the United



States Navy . (14).

Somewhat later an American polar expedition led by Lieutenant–



Commander George W. De Long of the United States Navy, on its return



southward after its vessel, the Jeanette , floundered, discovered



Jeanette, Henrietta, and Bennett Islands, landed on the last two,



and formally took possession of Bennett Island in July, 1881. These



islands lie to the north of Siberia, northeast of the New Siberian



Islands. The same year Captain C. L. Hooper, sailing in the cutter



Corwin , took possession of Wrangel Island in the name of the United



States, as indicated above, to which Russia raised no objection.

In 1909, the Committee on Foreign Relations recommended that the



Guano Act of 1856 be amended so that whenever an American citizen



discovers a deposit not only of guano, but also of phosphates, coal,



033 | Vol_XI-0038

or other minerals, on any island or portion of an island not within



the lawful jurisdiction of any other government, and takes possession



and occupies the island, the United States Government could, at the



discretion of the President, consider it as appertaining to the United



States. The movement was engendered by growing interest in Spitsber–



gen coal. The proposal was passed by the Senate in 1910, but was



again referred to committee where it ultimately died. Had it become



law, perhaps many claims to Arctic lands would have been filed in the



name of the United States.

In the 1920's, Soviet fears were aroused by a number of American



activities beyond the Soviet sectoral line. For example, in 1920



a United States Coast and Geodetic Survey magnetic observation station



was erected in the Bay of Emma, on the Chukot (or Chukotski) Penin–



sula, west of St. Lawrence Island in Bering Strait, and on several



occasions was visited by the American cruiser Bear . The Soviet Govern–



ment objected strenuously to this action in 1924, to which no reply



appears to have been made. On another occasion, the crew of the



American gasoline schooner Herman under Captain Louis Lane hoisted



the American flag on Herald Island, claiming it for the United States.



But, significantly, the United States Government failed either to



comment upon or to substantiate the act.

As preparations were being made for the MacMillan Expedition



to visit the Arctic "White Spot" north of Alaska in 1925, in con–



ferring with President Calvin Coolidge, MacMillan urged the American



Government to appropriate territory near the North Pole. According to



the press, the Canadian Government consequently informed Washington



that any territory which might be discovered to the north of the



Dominion would be claimed by Canada. MacMillan also asked the De–



partment of State whether Canada possessed a valid title to Axel



Heiberg Land and if a permit therefore should be obtained from the



034 | Vol_XI-0039

Dominion for the landings expected to be made, and, secondly, whether



the hypothetical land expected to be discovered should be claimed as



American territory. It appears that no communication was forwarded



to the Canadian Government requesting permission for our Navy planes



to fly over territory claimed by the Dominion. With respect to the



second question, the State Department replied that our government was



not then disposed to pass upon the matter of jurisdiction of newly



discovered territory.

In practice, the United States apparently recognizes the juris–



diction of Canada over known territory to the north of her mainland.



Our main consideration in this area in the post-war period is strate–



gic, and that is being resolved by bilateral agreements establishing



the Canadian-American Joint Board of Defense and providing for the



mutual use of polar territory for the establishment of bases purposes .

For some time the United States also has manifested an active



interest in the disposition of Greenland. After the purchase of



Alaska, Secretary William H. Seward was concerned over the matter



because at the time the United States was believed to possess inchoate



rights. In 1910 the American Minister to Denmark, on the inducement



of Danish friends, recommended to the Department of State that in



return for Greenland and the Danish West Indies, the United States



cede the Island of Mindanao (Philippines) to Denmark, which the latter



could then cede to Germany in return for Northern Schleswig. Other



complicated proposals for the acquisition of Greenland were made from



time to time. The explorer Robert E. Peary, however, simply urged



the outright purchase of the island by the United States. But in



that very year the American Government recognized the Danish exten–



sion of its political and economic interests to the whole of the island.

For strategic reasons, American interest in Greenland is today



as acute as ever. During the war years the United States occupied



both Greenland and Iceland in order to forestall German control of



the North Atlantic, in each case with specific consent based on an



understanding that American authority would be withdrawn at the close



of the war. Early in 1947, it was rumored that Denmark contemplated



selling the island to the United States, but these rumors were offi–



cially denied. Because of the heavy administrative expenses for Den–



mark and the island's important strategic location for the United



States, the potential sale of the island to the United States remains



a distinct possibility.

Canada

Canada claims title to the entire archipelago lying to the north



of her mainland. This includes Axel Heiberg, Baffin, Banks, Bathurst,



Borden, Byam Martin, Cornwallis, Devon, Ellesmere, King William,



Lougheed, Melville, Prince Patrick, Prince of Wales, Somerset,



Sverdrup, Victoria, and other islands. Such wholesale claims, pre–



cluding sovereign rights of other states, though never officially



founded on the sector principle, nevertheless convey the appearance



of polar sectorism.

Sector Principle . As early as 1895 the Canadian Government



notified other states that all territory between 141° W. longitude



and a line running west of Greenland appertains to the Dominion.



Twelve years later, in 1907, Senator P. Poirier proposed a resolution



in the Canadian Senate to the effect that the time had arrived for



Canada to make a formal declaration of possession of the islands



located to the north of the Dominion, extending to the North Pole.



He gave four arguments for such an assertion, including discovery,



036 | Vol_XI-0041

purchase (by the Hudson 's Bay Company), effective occupation--and



the sector principle.

The tacit acceptance of jurisdiction between the limits sug–



gested by Poirier seems to be implicit in the implementation of



Canadian policy on a number of occasions--sometimes even by high–



ranking public officials. To mention but a few, Captain Joseph



Elzear Bernier, commander of a Canadian expedition, erected a copper



plate on Melville Island in 1909, commemorating the taking of pos–



session for Canada of the entire "Arctic Archipelago" to the North



Pole between 60° and 141° W. longitude. It was preceded and suc–



ceeded by a number of expeditions which annexed more specific por–



tions of the archipelago . (19). Thus, in 1904 possession was taken of



Ellesmere Island at Cape Herschell; in 1906 Cornwallis, Griffith,



Bathurst, Byam Martin, Melville, Prince Patrick, and the Parry



Islands were annexed; in 1908–1909 possession was taken of Corn–



wallis, Bathurst, Byam Martin, Banks, and Victoria Islands; and in



1913–1918 the Stefansson Canadian Arctic Expedition took possession



of Borden, Lougheed, and other islands. All of these acts were con–



doned by the Canadian Government.

Among the Canadian statesmen referring on occasion to the sec–



tor principle are the Dominion Secretary of the Interior Charles



Stewart who asserted claim to all territory between 60° and 141° W.



longitude in an address to the Canadian Parliament in 1925; Minister



of the Interior Thomas G. Murphy, who in his 1931 annual report refer–



red to the "Arctic sector" north of the Canadian mainland; and Minister



of Mines and Resources T. A. Crerar, who went so far as to tell the



House of Commons in 1938 that polar sectorism, and the Canadian sec–



tor in particular, were universally acknowledged.

In view of the attitude taken by the United States and Norway,



the latter statement is subject to serious doubt. But it cannot



037 | Vol_XI-0042

be denied that Canada has claimed in the past and claims today all



known territory lying north of its mainland as far as the pole, be–



tween the meridional lines drawn northward from its longitudinal



extremities, and publicists generally acknowledge this claim . (4, p.170; 31, p.50; 32, p.50).

But Canadian territorial interests outside the island territory



to th e north of her mainland would appear to belie any official reli–



ance on the sector principle. Thus, Wrangel Island was claimed as a



Canadian possession in 1914 and an occupation was undertaken by the



Stefansson party in 1921 with the support of the Dominion Ministry.



The establishment of Canadian jurisdiction over the island was taken



for granted by both Prime Minister Arthur Meighen and his successor,



Mackenzie King. In 1922 and again in 1938, however, members of the



Cabinet had to admit lack of Canadian sovereignty.

Canada also has evidenced interest in expanding eastward into



Greenland. This possibility was broached on a number of occasions and



reached its climax during World War I, when shortly after the American



purchase of the Virgin Islands it was rumored that Denmark also con–



templated selling the polar island to the United States. The British



Government, speaking for both Canada and itself, declared that it would



be extremely undesirable for Greenland to pass out of the hands of



Denmark into those of any other power, and that in the event of the



disposition of the island, Britain would have a prior claim. Soon



thereafter the British Government recognized Danish sovereignty over



the entire island with the reservation that Britain must be consulted



in the event that Denmark contemplated disposing of the island . (19, p. 37). Thus



the governments of Canada and Britain were opposed to the disposal



of Greenland to any other state.

In the meantime other states have refused to recognize a Cana–



dian polar sector by asserting pretensions to portions of the North



American archipelago. The United States refrained from recognizing



038 | Vol_XI-0043

Canadian jurisdiction by not applying for flying permits to traverse



Ellesmere Island and Axel Heiberg Land at the time of the MacMillan



expedition. At an earlier period, American explorers actually took



possession of the central portion of Ellesmere Island in the name of



the United States, a claim that was reasserted in 1914 but has subse–



quently been abandoned.

Nor has Norway acknowledged a Canadian sector. In 1899 the



Norwegian Government claimed jurisdiction over Axel Heiberg and the



Ringnes Islands, discovered by Otto Sverdrup, and to the northern



and western sections of Ellesmere Island. But these claims were



abandoned in 1930 with the specific provision that this action was



not founded on any sector principle. In 1918 Denmark also claimed



part of Ellesmere Island, regarding it as terra nullius and therefore



subject to acquisition by any state through effective occupation.



Canada protested against this attitude in 1920, to which the Danish



did not reply.

Effective Occupation . As in the case of the Soviet Union, the



Dominion of Canada is careful to fortify its juridical position by



means of the various techniques of state control applicable to the



polar regions, thereby establishing valid claims on the basis of effec–



tive occupation . (8, 15, 19, 34, 49, 52). Illustrative of its practice are the propounding of



hunting and trapping controls and the issuing of appropriate licenses,



the granting of flying and landing licenses, and particularly the es–



tablishment of law and order by the Eastern Arctic Patrol and the



Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The latter is engaged in carrying out



a plan of occupation and police control, enforcing both criminal and



civil law throughout the Northwest Territory which embraces the island



empire. It also administors justice, carries mail, and aids the sick.



039 | Vol_XI-0044

In order to fulfill its responsibilities, it maintains a network of



posts, out of which Mounted Police patrols operate.

There scarcely is any doubt today that Canada possesses a valid



claim to the known Arctic islands to the north of her mainland terri–



tory. This claim is not founded on the sector principle, however, but



rather on effective occupation, aside from such original rights as



may have been based on discovery and symbolical annexation. Canadian



pretensions are the more certain because other states, such as the



United States, Norway, and Denmark, have permitted their tenuous



claims to lapse by dereliction. Though some states, relying upon



effective occupation, occasionally have refused to recognize the vali–



dity of Canadian pretensions, this was due rather to the belief that



Dominion occupation was inadequate than to a failure to recognize



the validity of the principle. In other words it simply is a matter



of time for the Canadian title to become absolute.

Denmark

Danish polar territory has been comprised of the sub-polar islands



of Greenland and Iceland, over which jurisdiction was acquired many



centuries before sectorism was first conceived. Iceland was occupied



as early as the ninth century, and Greenland was discovered and colon–



ized from Iceland about the end of the tenth century. The Icelandic



Althing (Parliament) took an oath of allegiance to King Haakon of



Norway in 1262. Norwegian rights to these islands followed it into



the joint Scandinavian state when the three kingdoms of Norway, Den–



mark, and Sweden formally united under one king by the Kalmar Act of



Union in 1397. From the fifteenth to the early eighteenth century



Greenland was left largely to itself and the European population dis–



appeared, but in 1721 the island was recolonized by a party of Norwe–



gians. Sweden left the tripartite union in the sixteenth century



040 | Vol_XI-0045

while Norway, with Greenland and Iceland, remained united with Den–



mark. When the latter ceded Norway to Sweden by the Treaty of Kiel



in 1914, the islands continued under Danish jurisdiction.

Greenland . It is obvious from history that jurisdiction over



Greenland and Iceland can scarcely be attributed to the sector prin–



ciple. As a matter of fact, even the most ardent sectorists, with



the exception of Lakhtine, hesitate to ascribe a polar sector to Den–



mark based on Greenland. On occasion the Danish Government has laid



claim to territory lying to the north of Canada, as indicated above.

Danish jurisdiction over Greenland, despite an absence of complete



effective occupation, was recognized by other power s . (50). During World War



I when the United States purchased the Virgin Islands, the Secretary



of State thus assured Denmark that the American Government had no ob–



jection to an extension of her political and economic interests through–



out the island. In 1919 the Danish Government asked a number of the



leading states to do the same. On the recommendation of Canada, the



British Government did so in 1920, subject to the reservation noted



earlier, and the French, Japanese, Italian, and Swedish governments



rapidly followed suit, without reservation. Only Norway contested the



Danish claim to sovereignty over the entire island, which was resolved



by the Eastern Greenland arbitration in 1933 on the basis of effective



occupation, as indicated above . (28, 37).

Iceland . When considered from an international point of view,



the question of sovereignty over Iceland raises even fewer complica–



tions than does that of Greenland . (51). Though Iceland has enjoyed sover–



eign status during various periods of history, for a long time it



possessed a definite constitutional relationship with Denmark and,



as such, its early history parallels that of Greenland. The nineteenth



041 | Vol_XI-0046

century was marked by a gradual political and economic emancipation,



however. The island received its first recorded constitution in 1874,



which was followed by a grant of home rule 30 years later. In 1915



it achieved virtual autonomy and in 1918 Denmark recognized it as a



sovereign state with allegiance to a common monarch. Following World



War II, it separated completely from Denmark, was admitted to member–



ship in the United Nations, and became a signatory of the North



Atlantic Treaty.

Polar Sectorism . Neither the government nor the publicists of



Denmark subscribe to Arctic sectorism. There is no evidence to sup–



port Danish adherence to the principle either in pertinent diplomatic



correspondence or in the arguments of Denmark concerning Eastern Green–



land before the Permanent Court of International Justice. Denmark



clearly supports the principle of effective occupation, as was the case



in the Ellesmere Island affair with Canada. In the Eastern Greenland



dispute with Norway, effective occupation again was relied upon as



Denmark's chief bulwark for possession.

JURISDICTION OVER THE POLAR SEA AND ICE FORMATIONS

Inasmuch as the Arctic is an oceanic basin, the problem of



sovereign jurisdiction is concerned not only with landed territory.



Most of the area is water- or ice-covered, and consequently the legal



principles governing jurisdiction over the seas and ice formations



are equally important. While international law concerned itself with



the former for some centuries, the latter has been given serious con–



sideration only in the last few decades.

Arctic Seas

It is universally agreed today that international law recognizes



the high seas to be free ( mare liberum ), for the common use of all



042 | Vol_XI-0047

nations. It also is commonly held that states exercise sovereign



jurisdiction over adjacent territorial waters or marginal seas. Per–



haps the most serious problem associated with territorial waters is



one of defining their extent. There is no definite international agree–



ment fixing their width, although the majority of states accept the



three-mile rule. Nevertheless, it is rather common practice to extend



marginal jurisdiction for specialized purposes such as the enforce–



ment of customs restrictions.

Whereas prior to its appropriation, landed territory constitutes



terra (or res ) nullius (belonging to nobody, and therefore appropri–



able), the status of water-covered areas has not been as clearly es–



tablished. By and large, however, it is contended that it constitutes



res communis (belonging to all) or res publica (the public property



of the international community), and therefore, coming under the juris–



diction of all, cannot be appropriated by any state without the con–



sent of the others.

The complexity of the problem of maritime jurisdiction is due



mainly to the distinction in international law between territorial



waters and the high seas. Were the sector principle accepted juridi–



cally, there would be little difficulty, since the elements within a



given sector, including marginal waters and the high seas, would then



fall under the jurisdiction of subjacent polar states. But the prin–



ciple has not been incorporated into international law, and even Soviet



authorities disagree on the applicability of sectorism to water-covered



areas . (25, pp. 712 ff.; 53, pp. 346). The Soviet Government itself distinguishes between territorial



waters and the high seas in the Arctic. The 1926 decree refers only



to landed territory, and additional Soviet decrees specify the extent



of Soviet marginal jurisdiction for fishing and other purposes.

Inasmuch as no special juridical rules have been universally



adopted for the polar seas, the ordinary principles of law applicable



043 | Vol_XI-0048

elsewhere must be applied to the Arctic. Riparian states consequently



enjoy sovereign rights in territorial waters adjacent to their landed



territory, but the high seas are free. If the sector principle were



applied to Arctic waters, there would be the difficult problem of de–



fining southern latitudinal boundaries in the channels between landed



territory, as in Bering Strait, between Greenland and the islands to



the west, and particularly in the Greenland Sea between Greenland and



Spitsbergen as well as the Barents Sea between Spitsbergen and Norway.

Arctic Ice Formations

Polar sovereignty is further complicated by the question of juris–



diction over ice-covered areas. There frequently is no visible dis–



tinction between land and sea in the Arctic. The transition from flat,



snow-covered land to the ice-covered sea often is imperceptible and



the coastline hardly distinguishable. Because the polar basin is not



entirely covered by [ o ?] pen water or by ice, the juridical principles



governing jurisdictional rights over both landed territory and water–



covered areas sometimes are considered to be inapplicable to ice



formations.

Soviet writers contend that some jurisdiction should be exercised



over Arctic ice by subpolar states (3, p. 28). S. V. Sigrist (43) and E. A. Korovin (21, 22, 23)



further agree that the limits of this jurisdiction should be coter–



minous with sectoral boundaries, while Lakhtine believes in complete



control over only immobile ice of considerable dimensions . (25, p. 712). Needless



to say, the meaning of the latter would be difficult to define. The



majority of non-Soviet writers refuse to acknowledge sovereign rights



over ice-covered areas of the Arctic Basin, though several are prepared



to admit some hegemony over coastal permanent ice.

Aside from Lakhtine's complicated and indefinite suggestion,



three alternatives are possible. In the first place, were polar



sectorism completely and universally approved, the matter of juris–



diction over ice would be resolved very simply. But this is not the



case and even the Soviet sectoral decree of 1926 fails to apply the



principle to ice-covered areas. Secondly, if no distinction is made



between ice and water, states exercise jurisdiction over the ice for–



mations within territorial waters but ice located in the bulk of the



Arctic Basin is considered as res communis , as are the high seas.

Thirdly, a compromise might be devised, recognizing jurisdiction–



al rights over permanent ice attached to the coasts of littoral Arctic



states and extending to an arbitrarily prescribed maximum distance.



Such jurisdiction would be limited to 12 or 15 miles, or whatever



might be commonly agreed upon for the effective administration of re–



venue, fishing, and other national regulations. This, plus the mar–



ginal belt should prove sufficient for the enforcement of national



laws, except in the case of shelf ice (such as the Antarctic Ross



Barrier), over which jurisdiction would extend to its seaward limits.



Of course, if the edge of the permanent, coastal fast-ice is less



than the designated distance from the shoreline, the territorial



waters would be measured from the edge of the ice.

If this theory were accepted as law, it would provide for some



control over a marginal strip of ice, plus the customary extent of



territorial waters, even though the latter area were likewise ice–



covered. Sovereign rights over both would be assimilable to juris–



diction over territorial waters. The remainder of the ice-covered



area of the Polar Basin would constitute the high seas, subject to



the laws governing mare liberum .

Admittedly, this suggestion is merely an hypothetical solution



and is not actual law. Until the community of nations accepts a



proposal such as this by means of an international convention or some



other form of "international legislation," the present law remains as



outlined, namely, that states possess no jurisdiction over ice forma–



tions beyond the limits of their territorial waters, the degree of



congelation in no way determining the legitimacy of exercising juris–



dictional control.

* * * * *

The sovereign status of known Arctic territory thus is fairly



well defined. The juridical disputes of the nineteenth century appear



to be satisfactorily resolved. With the improvement of trans–



continental aviation, the atom bomb, rocket propulsion, the guided



missile, and the possibility of trans-polar warfare, however, it is



not unlikely that interest in the question of polar sovereignty will



continue.

The Soviet Union will jealously guard her possessions against en–



croachment, as will the Dominion of Canada. The United States, enjoy–



ing a poleward bastion to the northwest in Alaska, will seek to but–



trees her defenses to the north and northeast. Mutual defense agree–



ments with Canada render the Dominion's islands available for common



defense arrangements to the north. Interest therefore is likely to



be concentrated particularly on Greenland and Spitsbergen, and Denmark



and Norway may be confronted with specific inducements or demands to



cede sovereignty, or at least base rights, in these polar territories.



046 | Vol_XI-0051



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