For the Democratic Party, the autopsy report is grim. The Party is propped up by blue states indifferent to turnout and supplying diminishing returns, while it has simultaneously proven ineffective in galvanizing voters in purple and red states.

Parsing this failure is an important but imperfect exercise. So far, within the Democratic Party, the well-platformed establishment has explained the election results by assigning great causal weight to the interference of FBI Director Jim Comey. The comparatively less powerful but still well-situated Left establishment has produced a variety of explanations, some proximate, and others more profound. I think it is reasonable to assume that, in the case of the Clinton campaign, as with any other significant event, the failures can be organized and discussed as immediate (Comey’s letter, for example), intermediate (inept allocation of campaign resources), and long-running (a refusal to acknowledge both Clinton’s and the Democratic Party’s weakness among voters). The last two categories should be the focus of productive energy, because only they include the kinds of decisions that the Democratic Party has the power to change.

And in fact, when it comes to the Party itself, it only makes sense to talk about intermediate and deeper levels of causality. Like a large ship, no evasive maneuver should alter its ultimate trajectory or steer it off course. The Party’s infrastructure ought to serve as a bulwark against the most dire consequences of surprise assaults on a candidate, even when launched from unexpected quarters. In blaming the election result on Jim Comey, Democratic Party insiders offer up an effective indictment of themselves. If a tremble at the top of the ticket produces such seismic effects all the down to the bottom, then that, in itself, is damning.

Succeeding and Failing Well: State Party Platforms and Ballot Propositions

State Democratic parties that succeeded or failed “well” all had something in common: they have their own state platforms. In each of these states, Democrats convened delegates to deliberate and to articulate a vision — some of it national in scope, much of it specific to the circumstances of a particular state. Democrats discussed, debated, and decided; the resulting document expressed their collective ambition, and endowed the Democratic Party with policy dimensions that could reach voters even if the national campaign did not.

Trump won in Arizona, Texas, and Utah, but not without the Democrats drawing blood — increasing their margin by 4% or more. All have platforms, and Texas has one of the most comprehensive in the nation. Likewise, in Clinton’s win column, Massachusetts and California, both of which ran the Democratic margin up significantly, are platform-states.

While a platform alone does not guarantee major success, there is no state that met with major success that did not have one.

Conversely, Democratic parties that choose to simply adopt the national platform after it passed the convention are over-represented among those that succeeded “badly.” Voter turnout went up, but the Democratic margin went down significantly, in Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Nevada, New York, and Rhode Island. Of these, only Delaware and New Hampshire have a platform.

Thirty out of fifty states have a platform — a clear majority. Crafting one does not inoculate a state party against failure, but it does function as a slightly imperfect but useful proxy that signifies an active and engaged party. There are exceptions in both directions. Oklahoma seems to have a vibrant Democratic Party without a platform, and West Virginia Democrats have entered into a death spiral even with the benefit of one. Nevertheless, the relation between a platform and failing or succeeding well is striking.

Platform-states are also more apt to put propositions and referenda on the ballot. But they are not alone. Nevada, a platform-less state, saw a big increase in the Democratic turnout — although not in the Democratic margin. Voters there considered and passed both background checks for gun purchases and legalizing recreational marijuana. (Both California and Massachusetts, the Democrats biggest success stories this election cycle, had successful recreational marijuana initiatives on the ballot.) Clinton managed to win Nevada, despite a huge increase in Trump’s vote total over Romney, because the Democratic Party in that state drove up her vote total more.

Like platforms, ballot items cannot be considered a silver bullet. Maine, also a platform-less state, was a powerhouse of referenda questions this fall: minimum wage, marijuana legalization, gun purchase background checks, and — my favorite — ranked choice voting. (All except background checks passed.) I would hate to see what Democratic results would look like absent these propositions, but the Democratic margin in Maine took a steep dive (-12%) nonetheless.

Ballot propositions and platforms provide hope that an active party can bring voters in even when the presidential campaign does not. In this light, it is interesting to note how the identity and driving ambition of a party diverges based on whether it has a platform or not. A visit to the state’s Democratic Party homepage of a platform-less state like Ohio or New York tends to feature state politicians or party chairs prominently — as if the party were their personal property.

Meanwhile, active parties, like the one in Idaho (where the Democratic margin went up!) tend to feature local scenery, an immediate action item, or an upcoming event. Interstitial web features are common among non-platform states; less so among platformed states. A party with a platform wants your ideas, your engagement, and your vote; a party without one only wants your money.

Selecting a Successful Top of the Ticket Candidate: When a Silent Primary Shouts

Although a political party cannot guarantee delivery of a successful candidate, it should at least be engineered in favor of producing one.

Right now, the Democrats are not.

In 2016, the Party nominated the wrong candidate in its most important race. Most likely, the “right” one never ran. Evidently, perhaps like Andrew Cuomo in New York, the Clinton machine had such a stranglehold on the decision-making apparatus of the national Democratic Party that it suffocated competition, stifled well-justified concerns, and relegated disagreements to a category of suspicious dissent. A feedback loop designed to favor only that which you want to hear is an excellent way to lose an election you should win.

But more than just a cast of personalities orchestrated this failure; the primary process was marred from start to finish.

DNC Chair candidate Keith Ellison has made the promise of DNC “neutrality” in primaries a prominent part of his campaign, and for good reason. Without it, voters will be unable to trust in the impartiality of the organization, or believe that the Democratic playing field treats all candidates fairly.

Yet this is not nearly enough. The most meaningful bias in favor of Hillary Clinton came during the “silent primary,” the fundraising and endorsement race that takes place before most Americans cast a single vote. Unless Democrats reconfigure the unwritten rules of the nominating process, it will continue to run the risk of producing candidates beloved by a set of stakeholders, but spurned by the American electorate.

The Party could also better balance the nominating system in favor of success by reconsidering the primary process itself. First and foremost:

Caucuses should be eliminated entirely, not only for their chaotic nature and imposition on voters’ time, but also for their intrusiveness. No person should be asked to cast a ballot while observed by their boss or their union steward. It is a setting ripe for abuse.

In addition, the primary calendar is a cause for concern. Much has been made that of the fact that, of the fifteen states that choose a Democratic nominee early (on or before Super Tuesday), seven are considered reliably Republican. Given the outsized role they play in the media narrative, I think more blue, purple, and populous states should be added to this first cut of elections. But what troubles me more is that, of the 15 early primary/caucus states, only 4 produced a higher margin for Democrats this past November. That means that in 2016, in exchange for amplifying a particular state’s voice in the presidential selection process, the Democrats got precious little in return.

Regardless of whether a state is blue, red, or purple, the privilege an early primary should be awarded to active state Democratic parties that have demonstrated an ability to improve upon the Democratic margin — that is, they have shown the capacity to deliver voters in the general election, regardless of whether Democrats win or lose the state.

Unless and until the electoral college is abandoned, elections in the United States will be won or lost on a state-by-state basis. Right now, “electability” is not an abstract quality or one measured against national popular vote totals: it is a metric to be applied to each state. The old canard about privileging red states in the early primary process in order to favor more “electable” candidates means nothing if these same states cannot demonstrate that electability in the general election.

Building a Democratic Argument: What the Democratic Convention Did Not Do

Democratic fortunes depend heavily on the top of ticket, but the Party will endure beyond success or failure in that race. On the other hand, a Democratic candidate will rise or fall based upon Democratic turnout. The nominee for president is a creature of the Party, not the other way around.

Naturally the Democrats should look to celebrate the record and boost the image of its most important candidate at its national convention. But the 2016 convention suffered from a lack of argumentative “connective tissue” that was, on its own, a terrible missed opportunity — and in retrospect, indicative of the failure to name an organizing truth to structure Democratic campaign efforts. Quoting myself reflecting on the first night of speeches:

By the end of the second night, I grew a little more exasperated:

You get the idea.

This can never happen again. As I said at the time, “instead of weaving a tapestry of common goals that would energize the faithful and could ultimately work as a safety net for Mrs. Clinton’s campaign, the Democratic convention has devoted itself to unwinding only one thread from the spool: Hillary Clinton is great.” In contrast, the Republican convention did provide a message that set the tone for their campaign: “The nation is under siege and the GOP will protect you, (white) America.” Again, quoting myself: “The fact that this message is premised on preposterous policy ideas and deeply offensive notions should not―at least in this particular context―detract from its accomplishment. As a theme, it will resonant with voters susceptible to it long after Trump’s unique capability to both embarrass and endanger the country is on full display this fall.”

Considered from a purely pragmatic perspective, the Republican Party got much more “earning” out of Trump at their convention than the Democrats did out of Clinton. I wonder if anyone even thought to negotiate the point with the Clinton campaign, let alone try to drive a bargain. To this day, voters have no idea what the organizing truth of the Democratic Party is. It is a party without an argument.