Rationality is intrapersonally permissive just in case there are multiple doxastic states that one agent may be rational in holding at a given time, given some body of evidence.

His topics include the road to probabilism--a new doctrine on the use of opinions, the new dual concept of probability and the demise of the endoxon, stand-along authority and majorities as guide to truth, the great debate on probable opinions 1556-1700, believing what we want--a new doxastic voluntarism, and the scholastic background of modern probability.

I am not speaking of argument here (and nor is Anselm) as a rule-governed application of rules on unquestioned premises, resulting in doxastic rectitude, or properly fixed belief.

The next presupposition of democracy is what philosophers call doxastic voluntarism.

(41) According to these types of views, it may be rational for agents with misleading higher-order evidence to believe (falsely) that [phi]-ing is rational and supported by reasons in cases where [phi]-ing is actually irrational and not supported by reasons (these proposals tend to focus on doxastic attitudes, but the arguments motivating them can be generalized to other attitudes and responses).

Cases of epistemic akrasia, however, also raise worries concerning doxastic rationality.

"Peer disagreement" refers to the state wherein epistemic peers have irreconcilable doxastic attitudes on a given topic.

The beliefs were definitely outside of the doxastic norms of the culture.

Differences in the type of abnormalities and doxastic contents they involve make delusions worthy of a more specific treatment within clinical diagnosis.

I contend that the distinctive embodied practices of its adherents as well as the doxastic outlooks they maintain are useful windows onto human nature, human society, and even the nature of the world.

Furthermore, although policy debate typically regards evidence as something taken from a newspaper, academic journal, book, or blog, this does not mean that narratives, personal experiences, and beliefs (narratological, phenomenological, and doxastic reasoning) should be excluded as forms of evidence.