NATIONALIST politicians come in many varieties, from blustering to downright scary, but most share a common flaw. They forget, or do not care enough, that foreigners have politics, too. The marrow-deep hopes, fears and grievances of their own citizens fascinate them. But all too often, nationalist and populist leaders behave as if other countries are bloodless technocracies, guided by coolly weighed interests.

President Donald Trump is guilty of just this error whenever he predicts that other governments will bend to his will because they know what is good for them. Whether demanding that allies pay more for their own security, browbeating commercial rivals, or menacing geopolitical adversaries, Mr Trump seems sure that once foreign rulers realise he is serious about putting America first, and calculate the costs of defying him, they will swallow their pride and obey. He is oddly incurious about foreign publics.

A European ambassador recently told Lexington an instructive tale. On November 9th, a day after Mr Trump won the presidency, top officials held a crisis meeting in the envoy’s capital to discuss their country’s defence spending, which falls short of the target agreed to by NATO members, which is 2% of GDP. We’re screwed, the officials concluded, or words to that effect. We want this alarming new president to stand by NATO, so we are going to have to find more money for tanks, planes and bombs.

Then came the NATO summit in Brussels on May 25th. On the eve of the summit American diplomats briefed the envoy’s government that Mr Trump would, after months of equivocation, formally commit himself to Article 5, the mutual-defence clause that anchors the alliance. But to the dismay of the assembled leaders Mr Trump left that line out of his speech, instead scolding them for owing “massive” sums to NATO (he finally endorsed Article 5 in a press conference on June 9th).

Soon after that Brussels summit, the same group of government mandarins convened in their European capital again, and this time their political calculations had changed. Screw Trump, we’re not going to spend another cent on defence, they agreed, or words to that effect. Our voters despise this American president. As for the biggest European leaders, Angela Merkel distrusts him and Emmanuel Macron dislikes him. So we’re off the hook.

Americans may be forgiven for finding this tale frustrating. Many European countries are free-riders when it comes to defence. Indeed, though Barack Obama never used the phrase “America First”, he was vocal about prodding allies to take more responsibility for their own security, so that America could wind down costly overseas wars and start nation-building at home.

Where the current president breaks new ground is in his willingness to offend foreign publics, and bet everything on deal-making with national leaders. Mr Trump and close aides concede that it was once shrewd public policy to help war-ravaged nations, from Europe to Japan, rebuild and prosper as allies, markets and bulwarks against communism. But Mr Trump believes that foreign governments have abused that generosity, aided and abetted by stupid, weak and feckless American leaders, so that it is time to become more ruthless and selfish.

The German Marshall Fund, a think-tank, this month gathered American, Chinese and European diplomats, officials, politicians and analysts for the “Stockholm China Forum”, a biannual conference. Among other questions, the forum considered whether Europe or China might come forward to lead the liberal, international world order if America tires of that task.

Since Mr Trump came to power, optimists have suggested that his boldest America First moves, such as withdrawing from the Paris climate-change accords, or abandoning the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade pact with 11 Asia-Pacific nations, might prompt other powers to unite and promote global goods without him. The most starry-eyed watched a speech defending globalisation given by Xi Jinping, China’s president, to the World Economic Forum, and saw a new global leader emerge.

Uncorking the nationalist genie

Not so fast, was the gloomy message from the Stockholm forum, which Lexington attended. Without American leadership, squabbling self-interest remains the rule. At a summit this month with the European Union, Chinese envoys made clear that their country is more interested in the trappings of global leadership than in the responsibilities that go with it. Asked to help on climate change, China reverted to arguments about being a developing country that can only do so much. Warm talk about trade cannot conceal the barriers that shield China’s domestic markets.

At a summit in April with Mr Xi, Mr Trump thought he had secured personal assurances to put unprecedented pressure on North Korea to stop developing nuclear weapons and missiles that could carry them to American soil. Alas, Mr Xi appears to fear the collapse of North Korea on his border more than he fears displeasing Mr Trump—especially given the need for domestic stability ahead of a reshuffle of Chinese leaders later this year.

Mr Trump seems to have over-estimated his personal bond with Mr Xi, telephoning him so often to ask about Korea co-operation that Chinese officials grumbled to American contacts that their president is “not our North Korean desk officer”. On June 20th Mr Trump tweeted something between an admission of failure and a warning that he is losing patience: “While I greatly appreciate the efforts of President Xi & China to help with North Korea, it has not worked out. At least I know China tried!”

As for the EU, it failed to reach a common position on Chinese human-rights abuses at a UN meeting this month. EU unity was blocked by Greece, a recipient of hefty Chinese investment and run by populists sworn to put Greeks first. A looming America-EU trade row over steel could turn nasty. As Mr Trump is finding out, America has no monopoly on nationalist grievances.