1.

Findings

Congress finds the following:

(1) The insurgency in Iraq has been fueled by the United States occupation and the prospect of a long-term presence as indicated by the building of permanent United States military bases.

(2) A United States declaration of an intention to withdraw United States troops and close military bases will help dampen the insurgency which has been inspired to resist colonization and fight aggressors and those who have supported United States policy.

(3) A United States declaration of an intention to withdraw United States troops and close military bases will provide an opening in which parties within Iraq and in the region can set the stage for negotiations toward a peaceful settlement in Iraq.

(4) The cost of withdrawing United States troops from Iraq could be as low as $10 billion according to the Congressional Budget Office.

(5) A United States shift in policy away from unilateralism and toward cooperation will provide new opportunities for exploring common concerns about the situation in Iraq.

(6) The United Nations is best equipped to build a political consensus in Iraq through the crafting of a political agreement.

(7) The end of the occupation of Iraq creates a political environment that enables the world community to assist the United States in an orderly transition.

(8) The United Nations is the only international organization with the ability to mobilize and the legitimacy to authorize peacekeeping troops.

(9) The United Nations can implement the basis of an agreement that will end the occupation of Iraq and begin the transition to international peacekeepers.

(10) The United Nations can field an international security and peacekeeping mission, but such a mission cannot take shape unless there is a peace to keep, and that will be dependent upon a political process which reaches agreement between all the Iraqi parties.

(11) Reconstruction activities must be reorganized and closely monitored in Iraq by the Iraqi Government, with the assistance of the international community.

(12) Any attempt to sell Iraqi oil assets during the United States occupation will be a significant stumbling block to peaceful resolution.

(13) There must be fairness in the distribution of oil resources in Iraq.

(14) A reconciliation process that brings people together is the only way to overcome their fears and reconcile their differences.

(15) It is essential to create a minimum of understanding and mutual confidence between the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds.

(16) The process of reconciliation must begin with a national conference, organized with the assistance of the United Nations and with the participation of parties that can create, participate in, and affect the process of reconciliation, defined as an airing of all grievances and the creation of pathways toward open, transparent talks producing truth and resolution of grievances.

(17) The only sure path toward reconciliation is through the political process.

(18) All factions and all insurgents not associated with al-Qaeda must be brought together in a relentless process which involves Saudis, Turks, Syrians, and Iranians.

(19) Achieving peace requires a process of international truth and reconciliation between the people of the United States and the people of Iraq.