The Phoenix Suns have an important decision to make and they don’t have all the information they need — it’s a gamble either way.

Every franchise can look back at a specific period of time and say, “yep, that’s where everything changed.” For better or worse (to be determined), the 2015 NBA Trade Deadline is going to be that period for the Phoenix Suns. The Suns gambled by massively shaking up the chemistry and identity that caused them to be thought of as one of the young, up-and-coming teams in the NBA. The idea was that they would go for upside and risk over known commodities.

In one fell swoop, they moved their most consistent player (Goran Dragic) and their best shotmaker (Isaiah Thomas), bringing in a talented, young guy who hasn’t proven he can do either on a regular basis (Brandon Knight). The Suns knew they’d have a big decision to make at the end of the season, with Knight as a restricted free agent, but they didn’t know they’d have so little information to work with.

The thought was that general manager Ryan McDonough and head coach Jeff Hornacek would have 30 games (plus playoffs, potentially) to evaluate how Knight fit in their system and more importantly — how he’d adjust playing next to the face of the franchise, Eric Bledsoe. Instead, they got an injury riddled 11 games, which amounted to just 347 minutes.

We’ve heard the term “upside” a million times — a billion if you watch certain ESPN draft experts — and Knight definitely has more upside than Dragic or Thomas. Knight is a 23-year-old combo guard with the potential to be an above-average two-way player (I’m not in the he’s-a-star camp).

WHAT BRANDON BRINGS

Knight was having one of the finest seasons of his career before getting traded, setting career highs with the Milwaukee Bucks in each shooting category (.435 FG/.409 3P/.881 FT), rebounds per game (4.3), assists per game (5.4), steals per game (1.6) and efficiency rating (18.5). Knight had stepped up as a leader and was comfortable with the ball in his hands in late game situations.

Perhaps what made it so easy to trade Thomas was the fact that Knight had established himself as a guy who could close out games. With the Bucks in 2014-15, Knight was shooting 56.5 percent (13-for-23) in games within five points with a minute or less remaining. He missed just one of his 16 free throws during that time (93.8 percent), netting him a plus-12 in 23 minutes of clutch time.

The idea was solid, with Bledsoe as a late-game defensive stopper and Knight as the offensive closer. They wouldn’t have to hide Knight defensively the same way they did Thomas and they wouldn’t have an unhappy point guard on the bench, stewing about playing time and/or role.

Any time you go to a new team, there will be growing pains. Add to that the fact that Knight went from being arguably his team’s best player to potentially the third best player on the Suns and you can see why things might take a while to click. The fact is, when Knight moved to Phoenix, his usage dipped from 26.6 to 22.6 — and his production followed suit.

In the limited time he was in Phoenix, Knight played just one minute less per game but saw every single number plummet. His shooting line of .357/.313/.828 combined with averages of 13.4 points, 2.1 rebounds, 4.5 assists and .5 steals made it look like the Suns made a massive mistake. Knight had grown into playing on the ball and now he’d been forced to take a step back.

For those wondering, Knight managed just three shots in six minutes with Phoenix during those same clutch conditions, making just one. He did make all four of his free throws.

WE’VE SEEN THIS BEFORE

It feels like ancient history, but don’t forget that there was some worry in 2013-14 that Dragic and Bledsoe would have some troubles coexisting early on. We weren’t quite sure how Dragic and Bledsoe would coexist, with Goran going from a ball-dominant player to playing more off-ball. As it turned out, the two-man lineup of Dragic/Bledsoe was an average of plus-5.0 and was the best lineup of any two players who averaged more than 10 minutes together.

The fact is, coach Hornacek was able to lean on the fact that both players would need to rest at some point and it wouldn’t have to be together. Dragic got his share of time running the offense, as did Bledsoe. Both players excelled when they were allowed to be out there on their own.

Bledsoe shot 43.5 percent from the field when Dragic was on the court and 55 percent when Dragic was off the court in 2013-14. Dragic shot 47 percent with Bledsoe on the court and 52.2 percent without him. The point is that they were able to coexist because there was enough time that they could spend on their own where they could still hold onto their respective basketball identities.

In 2014-15, a huge wrench was thrown into things — there was a third player in the mix. That meant both Dragic and Bledsoe were forced to defer more than they wanted to…yet one thing remained — when Dragic and Bledsoe came together, only Dragic/Markieff Morris (+3.8) performed better than Dragic/Bledsoe (+1.9) among two-man lineups that played more than 12 minutes together per game.

It took them a bit to get comfortable — and don’t forget about Bledsoe’s injury-riddled 2013-14, but in 2014-15, Dragic shot 50.1 percent with Bledsoe on the floor, and 50.1 percent with him off. Bledsoe shot 46.4 percent with Dragic on and actually got worse when Goran went to the bench, at 43.1 percent.

TO GAMBLE OR NOT TO GAMBLE

This question involves something more — available options. If the Suns decided to let Knight walk, what would they do with the money? They definitely have glaring holes at shooting guard, backup point guard and they need a veteran big man. Would the $12-14 million that Knight could command leave the Suns with enough money to shore up their other deficiencies?

We’re assuming the top-tier unrestricted guys like LaMarcus Aldridge and Marc Gasol and the big name player options (LeBron James, Kevin Love) aren’t coming and the Chicago Bulls will donate $70 million in blood to keep Jimmy Butler.

Phoenix has roughly $43.7 million in salary committed for 2015-16. That leaves them with approximately $22-23 million left, based on an approximated $66 million cap. That leaves two real options:

Sign Knight, try to use $10-12 million to fill out roster cheaply

Go after three above-average free agents

The Suns can’t snag Paul Millsap and Wesley Matthews and still keep Knight. That’s a pipe dream. However, what if they let Knight walk and try to pry Patrick Beverley away from Houston? Could they get Millsap, Matthews and Beverley for $23 million?

THERE’S ONLY ONE REAL OPTION

Spoiler — the Suns won’t get Millsap, Matthews and Beverley $23 million. The point guard market is brutal this offseason, with Dragic, Knight, Rajon Rondo and Reggie Jackson leading the charge.

If the Suns want to compete (without breaking the bank next offseason), they’re going to have to re-sign Knight (or else usher in the Jeremy Lin era), throw the remaining $10 million at Millsap (unlikely) or Matthews (probably close) and try to use their mid-level exception to woo a veteran big (Tyson Chandler in my dreams).

The most likely is the Suns overpay for Knight, keep Brandan Wright and pray for great development out of Len, Archie Goodwin and the Morris Twins. Sounds like another 42 win season.