In ordinary moral discourse, the idea of desert comes up in comparing outcomes for those we consider to be morally good and morally bad. Morally good people deserve, or have some sort of special entitlement, to better outcomes; morally bad people deserve the opposite. However, in some moral dilemmas, such reasoning leads to paradoxical outcomes. Taking the example of a popular TV show, The 100, I examine a situation that occurs in which considering the idea of desert may present a paradox of sorts, and consider what possible solutions may exist to this paradox.

First, to give some context to the case, The 100 is a show about a group of young adults on a post-apocalyptic Earth. These teens descend to Earth from space where they have lived for their entire lifetime. Upon arriving, they discover the Earth to be inhabited by other groups of peoples, a relatively uncivilized group, called Grounders, and an advanced society, called Mountain Men. These two groups are locked in conflict, as the Grounders have an immunity to the radiation that exists on Earth and the Mountain Men do not, requiring them to stay cooped up in their underground construction (that is fully self-sufficient). For the sake of example (and probably in truth), we shall consider the Mountain Men to be morally bad (for reasons not highlighted as to avoided spoilers), and the group of young adult protagonists (henceforth called The 100) to be morally good.

At a certain juncture, a trade-off is reached in which there exists two outcomes: the death of Mountain Men or the death of The 100. Consider perhaps the most common idea of desert – good people deserve good things. Thus, it would seem that the good people, The 100, would deserve the good thing, that is living.

However, this is further complicated by the fact that for The 100 to survive, they must kill the Mountain Men, a morally bad action. The paradox lies in this – while the morally good group may deserve to survive, it requires moral badness to do so, perhaps stripping them of their claim of desert potentially leading the desert of life to flip to the other group. If The 100 does not deserve to survive, assume they choose not to kill the Mountain Men, this in itself is a morally good act, which would seem to again flip the desert of life back to them. Thus, again they deserve to survive, but in order to fulfill this claim of desert, they must necessarily create a situation in which the claim no longer exists.

Now, consider some possible solutions to the aforementioned paradox:

If one has a claim of desert, they are justified in taking any means necessary to fulfill it. Claims of desert (at least in situations of life and death) are not possible. Claims of desert do not entail a right to fulfill the claim.

Consider the first option. Could it be the case that any means necessary are justified to fulfill a desert claim? This seems exceedingly unlikely. Unless one would grant that actions to fulfill a desert claim are free of moral judgement, it seems that some means (for example, killing), would taint the existing desert claim. As well, it does not appear that there is any ground for assuming that actions to fulfill claims of desert are exempt from moral judgement. Thus, it seems that the first option cannot solve the desert paradox.

Now, consider the second option: claims of desert (in situations of life and death) are not possible. Intuitively, this seems implausible. It simply seems to be the case that in a situation in which a good person can get a good thing or a bad person can, the good person ought to get it because they deserve it. While this line of reasoning may lead to the paradox, the counter-intuitive idea that the good person does not deserve to live instead of the bad person causes for one to reject this second option as well.

Lastly, consider the third option: claims of desert do not entail a right to fulfill this claim. While at first glance this option seems to perhaps be an easy solution, I am of the opinion that this reduces desert claims to meaninglessness. If a desert claim does not entail that the person actually get the subject of the claim, it is not clear what the claim at all means. If desert claims exist, it would seem that it must entail that the person has a right to get what they deserve. If they cannot do so, the claim is just an empty statement amount to, “it sure would be nice if you got this, but you are not entitled to act and attempt to fulfill your claim.” Such a reduction of desert seems to make it irrelevant in moral discourse, at least in some contexts. This seems to leave the only viable option as the non-deserving person giving or allowing the deserving person to fulfill their desert claim. However, this again may lead to a paradox as the doing of this good act that is giving one what they deserve would strengthen their possible claim of desert over the object.

While in some cases it may be relatively simple to give someone something they deserve (think of a good grade on a good paper), in situations such as the highlighted example, as well as a number of cases that involve the necessity of bad means to fulfill the claim, desert runs into problems. While I do not come to any solution to the problem, I highlight what I took to be possible avenues and show why they do not seem to solve the problem.