The Norman invasion and subsequent conquering of England was a crucial turning point in English history. This invasion, led by William the Conqueror, established a new dynasty of monarchs in England. The reasons for the initial success of the Norman invasion and following successes with consolidating power in the years after have been debated. One of the main debates is how much of this success is due to merit versus circumstance. Mainly, was the Norman invasion and occupation a circumstance of uncontrollable events, Norman ingenuity, or a hybrid of the two? While the Normans were definitely aided by weather conditions and Harald Hardrada’s attempted invasion, it appears that superior Norman military strategies combined with William’s political brilliance were the keys to the initial Norman success. These included William’s brilliance as a tactician and political figure, the Norman military tactics used during the invasion, and the use of castles and total war to maintain occupation in England. The actions of William the Conqueror both in preparation for the conquest and succeeding occupation suggest that William’s initial success was not the result of luck. Therefore the purpose of this essay is to highlight William’s political and tactical genius coupled with the ferociousness of the Norman military machine as the primary reasons for the successful occupation of England and to dismiss the claims that it was a circumstance of weather and accidental strategy.

William the Conqueror’s reasons for claiming legitimate rule of England must be looked at to understand the Norman invasion. After Edward the Confessor died in 1066, Harold Godwineson claimed to receive the right to rule from a deathbed grant by Edward. According to historian Hugh Thomas, “had Harold’s claim been trumped up, there is little doubt that the Normans would have heard of it…and would surely have benefited from revealing any subterfuge.”[1] However, William claimed that Edward had already offered him the right of succession in 1051 and further developed his own claim by stating that King Harold owed him vassalage duties. Sometime between 1064 and 1065 Harold was captured by the Count of Ponthieu.[2] After this “Duke William intervened and Harold ended up at William’s court. While with William, Harold served in a campaign by the duke in Brittany. More important, he swore to support William’s attempt to gain the English throne.”[3] It is this pledge from Harold that gave William the justification needed to engage on this military expedition. As David Douglas notes, “One of [William’s] first acts after he received the news of Harold’s coronation was to take counsel with his magnates, and in particular with that inner circle of the new Norman nobility which had shared in his rise to power.”[4] He made sure to have Harold’s oath made in public, which suggests he wanted this oath to be seen by the nobles and magnates.[5]

Another piece of evidence which demonstrated William’s strategic thinking of this campaign was the protest he sent to Harold’s court after Harold took the crown.[6] This protest combined with Harold’s broken oath meant that William could further legitimize his claim after he conquered England. This is because he now had the authority to say that his predecessor was an oath breaker and that William tried to resolve things without the initiation of force. Whether or not he actually expected this protest to have any effect outside of legitimizing his claim is a different issue. What is important is that William’s tactical ability was sharp well before the conquest and occupation. The tactical ability of the conqueror is further demonstrated in his use of the church to legitimize his claim. Douglas points out that “at some undetermined date within the first eight months of 1066 [William] appealed to the papacy, and a mission was sent under the leadership of Gilbert, archdeacon of Lisieux, to ask for a judgment in the Duke’s favour from Alexander II.[7] This is evidence that William used Harold’s oath breaking as a tool to give him another authority over England; the authority of God. William’s appeal to the papacy led Pope Alexander II to publicly support William’s campaign for the throne of England.[8] William needed to use these different political strategies in order to build momentum for his campaign. This already demonstrates that it was the tactical thinking and political savvy of William that enabled him to build the structure needed for the conquering of England.

William’s effectiveness as a leader is further shown in an often overlooked part of this history. Historian John Bliese wrote that “William had to assure himself of the firm support of his own men. This was apparently a greater problem than has often been realized.”[9] William faced several great challenges in the several months prior to the Battle of Hastings. One such challenge was rallying troops to fight the war. Although his vassals owed the conqueror support in Normandy, they were not required to fight for him overseas.[10] Another problem that William faced was getting his top magnates to agree with the conquest of England. As Bliese writes, theses magnates “stressed Harold’s great treasures, large fleet and skilled sailors. England was much richer than Normandy, in both wealth and military strength.”[11] William’s effectiveness as a leader was put to the test as he had to raise an army to go against what his own advisors thought was a poor military endeavor. Military disaster was not the only thing keeping the magnates from initially backing William’s aspirations for a conquest of England. They were also worried about the precedent that such an endeavor would set for them. Specifically, “they feared the extra requisitions of their resources would set a precedent for future demands by the duke.”[12] Nevertheless, William prevailed, mainly through “arm twisting, cajoling, and generous promises.”[13] William was able to change the magnates’ minds through the claim of authority from the pope and the promise of riches should they succeed. Thomas concludes that “without such a resolute leader, the Norman Conquest would never have gotten out of the council chamber.”[14] Thus, William had the political capability to muster voluntary forces for what was originally an unpopular assault on England. William prepared a fleet and waited after he gained the support needed to launch his campaign against England.

The Battle of Hastings has often been at the center of debate among historians arguing why the Norman Conquest was successful. However, comparing and contrasting these different arguments leads to the conclusion that it was William’s aptitude combined with Norman military innovation that led to the success of this battle. The “Bayeux Tapestry” is an embroidered cloth chronicling the Norman Conquest and the Battle of Hastings. This cloth was most likely sponsored by William’s half brother bishop Odo.[15] Because of this relationship, parts of the story line of the “Bayeux Tapestry” are unreliable. Therefore, most of the storyline is useless in any real military historical analysis. However, the images themselves depict the modern military tactics that the Normans were using and the ancient tactics used by Harold and the Anglo-Saxons.[16] It is these insights on how the militaries operated that show why the Normans were successful. For example, the Anglo-Saxon militia is embroidered with interlocking shields.[17] This represents an ancient Greek military formation known as a Phalanx. The logical conclusion deduced from this is that the Anglo-Saxons were using outdated military combat techniques in the Battle of Hastings. In this same illustration, the Normans are seen on horseback, a military tactic that enabled them to “turn back from their retreat and easily strike down many of their enemies.”[18] This was part of a military strategy credited to William where he “ordered his archers to shoot from a distance high into the air so that their arrows might fall on the heads of the defenders, and at the same time he sent his weary horsemen once again up the hill for yet another attack.”[19] William’s strategy as a general was effective and it is this strategy that is credited with the death of Harold.[20] Therefore it is William’s success as a military strategist that led to the victory of Hastings.

Hugh Thomas however, does not necessarily agree that it was mainly William’s political and military know-how that caused him to be successful. For example, Thomas credits William’s initial success at an easy landing near Hastings with the weather. Specifically, William was delayed by wind for a long period of time and that led to Harold disbanded his defensive troops.[21] These winds did give William an advantage in the timing of his attack. Therefore, according to Thomas, the Norman success at Hastings was most likely a coincidence caused by weather. Thomas also suggests that William’s key strategy of Hastings was one of accidental luck, stating “indeed, this accidental strategy worked so well that William’s men began pretending to flee in order to trap more unwary English fighters and weaken the English still further.”[22] Hugh believes a lot of William’s initial success was left up to chance rather than military ingenuity. However, there are some arguments that can be made against his claims. For example, it seems highly unreasonable that a military tactician such as William would not have thought of entrapment as a means to get Harold’s army off of the high ground. Hugh bases this claim off of accounts such as the story line of the “Bayeux Tapestry.”[23] Specifically, he is referring to the part of the story where William reveals that he has not died in battle in order to stop his troops from fleeing the battle.[24] This is most likely a fabricated event to give the story-line more depth. The Normans were the modernized military in this fight. Logically, it makes more sense that William or one of the military commanders would have purposefully deployed this strategy of faux-retreat rather than accidentally stumbling upon it.

The Norman invasion was not successful because of lucky circumstances. It was successful because it had a politically and militarily gifted man leading an army of modern strategy and equipment. Military historian Edd Wheeler provides an insight to the equipment that would have been used by the Normans, extrapolating information from the “Bayeux Tapestry.” Wheeler states that “from that great gauge of art and history, the Bayeux Tapestry, we know that the Norman ships were of single mast and sail. The tapestry also shows what logic would suggest, namely, that the ships were of different sizes.”[25] Wheeler uses data like this to draw conclusions about the operations of the fleet rather than the storyline narrative. This style of analysis of the “Bayeux Tapestry” is a better approach than the approach by Thomas. This approach also produces useful conclusions as to assessing the military might and technology of the Normans at this time. Wheeler states that some of the ships “may have been on the Skuldelev class, but others doubtless were smaller. All the ships were intended for simple debarkation. There would have been no docking upon arrival.”[26] The ships used by the Normans were most likely small, easily maneuverable boats capable of quick unloading for a swift storming of the beach. This feature would have been especially useful if Harold had not disbanded his troops around August of 1066.[27] These boats could also be brought up as a counterpoint to Thomas’ suggestion about the storm delay as a key reason for William’s victory at Normandy, although there is no way to definitely prove it. The main point is that focusing on Norman strategy and technology at this time period, rather than unreliable narratives, leads to the conclusion that it was William’s political insight and military understanding that led to the victory at Hastings.

William was declared king of England on Christmas day 1066. However, “despite his victory at Hastings, despite the surrender of London and Winchester, William’s position was still a precarious one and he had good reason to tremble.”[28] The Battle of Hastings is often focused on as the focal point of the Norman Conquest. However, the subsequent occupation and dynasty of Norman kings in England would not have been successful without the brilliance of William and the Norman military complex. There are three areas to focus on, after the Battle of Hastings, which highlight the reasons as to why the Norman dynasty was successful. These areas are Norman offense, defense, and the political aptitude of William the Conqueror.

Norman offensive strategy against rebelling peoples of England is laid out in one section of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles.

“A.D. 1068. This year King William gave Earl Robert the earldom over Northumberland; but the landsmen attacked him in the town of Durham, and slew him, and nine hundred men with him. Soon afterwards Edgar Etheling came with all the Northumbrians to York; and the townsmen made a treaty with him: but King William came from the South unawares on them with a large army, and put them to flight, and slew on the spot those who could not escape; which were many hundred men; and plundered the town.”[29]

This response from William is not an isolated event. In fact, the very next year “went he northward with all the force that he could collect, despoiling and laying waste the shire withal; whilst the fleet lay all the winter in the Humber, where the king could not come at them.”[30] William reacted to rebels and threats to the crown in a politically and militarily brutal way. He engaged in offensive total-war campaigns in which his troops slaughtered the rebels, destroyed their cities, and left the survivors without resources. This brutally offensive campaign was important in establishing the Norman dynasty. It is a type of warfare that not only aims at destroying everything the enemy owns; it also aims to make a public display of what happens to those who go against the crown. Therefore this type of warfare not only stopped Harold’s sons from taking the crown, it also prevented others from rising up against the Norman state.[31]

There is one potential problem in attributing part of William’s success to this strategy of total war. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle was written by Anglo-Saxons, the same people William had conquered three years before these total warfare accounts were written. Therefore it is possible that the authors may have been biased towards the Norman invasion and attempted to portray William as a cruel king. Fortunately, the “Bayeux Tapestry” offers some information to dissuade this argument. As previously stated, the “Bayeux Tapestry” was sponsored by the Normans and therefore any bias would logically be in favor of the Normans during the Battle of Hastings. Several sections of the “Bayeux Tapestry” imply that the Normans used a total war approach as one of their military tactics.[32] The tapestry displays a burned down house with the inscription “here the house is set on fire.”[33] Another section of the tapestry illustrates the Norman military raid of Hastings’ food supply to support the Norman soldiers.[34] Seeing how both the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans make note of the Norman use of total war, it is safe to assume that it was a common military tactic employed by the Normans to assert force and maintain peace in the English kingdom.

Offensive total war was not William’s only strategy in consolidating his power in England after being crowned. A huge reason for the Norman’s ability to stay in England without being thrown out was the defensive campaign William initiated as soon as he landed near Hastings. The Normans under William had to deal with rebellions in the first few years after the initial invasion and therefore “had to live like an army of occupation, living, eating, and sleeping together in operational units. They had to build castles-strong points in which a few men could dominate a subject population.”[35] Defensive castles were another modern military tactic employed by the Normans. This type of military defence was critical in a country where there may have only been 10,000 Normans occupying a country with as many as 2 million natives.[36] These castles that William and his descendents built are rooted in Norman and French military innovation.[37] Castles were scarce in pre-Norman England and social historian Robert Bartlett stated that “William the Conqueror’s army built two castles in the fortnight between their landing and the Battle of Hastings and, in this respect, they started as they meant to go on.”[38] The fact that the Normans brought over this military tactic and used it from the invasion to the end of the Norman dynasty shows the effectiveness of the castles at the time and is another reason as to why the Normans were successful in the occupation of England. As Douglas notes, William’s offensive total war campaigns were more successful in rural areas where the Norman cavalry could be used in full force and that it was much harder to use these strategies alone against urban areas of unrest.[39] Therefore, “the establishment of fortified strong-points was essential, and contemporaries are unanimous in their opinion that much of William’s success in these campaigns was due to his use of the castle.”[40] To put it simply, the Norman use of castles was a key reason for the successful hold over England against the Anglo-Saxons. Furthermore, William used the castles as a defense against the Welsh and by the end of his rule “the river valleys and coastal plains of Wales were dotted with the mounds of motte-and-bailey castles.”[41] These types of fortifications offered security to England and further legitimized William’s rule.

Not all problems following the initial Norman invasion could be solved through military feats. The events leading to the conquest have shown that William was highly capable of political maneuvering when he needs to be. It is this political savvy that is the final piece to the successful post invasion Norman occupation. Specifically, William’s foreign policy relationship with Ireland was one of peace so that he could focus on consolidating and holding onto his power in England. Benjamin Hudson states that “there are reasons for believing that, in order to diminish the peril from the west, William deliberately promoted good relations with one particular Irish prince – Toirrdelbach ua Briain, king of Munster and claimant to the high-kingship of Ireland.”[42] By establishing peace with Ireland, William was able to focus on defensive castles and offensive strikes against the sons of Harold. William needed this stability with Ireland so that he did not have to expend resources on defending against an attack from the west. Viking colonies had been established on Ireland and it was not unheard of for Vikings to launch raids on Britain from Ireland before the Norman Conquest.[43] William’s treaty with Toirrdelbach most likely resulted from the fact that “in the years 1068 and 1069 Harold’s sons in Ireland used fleets supplied by Diarmait and sailed across St George’s Channel to attack south-west England.”[44] By making this treaty, William did not have to worry about being attacked through Ireland. This freed up resources that he otherwise would have had to expend to make sure a repeat of 1068 did not occur. Another beneficial part of this treaty rests within the fact that “Irish military intervention in Welsh affairs of the eleventh century is well known.”[45] William’s ability to get Ireland to intervene in Welsh affairs is important. As Hudson points out, “the Welsh marches were also a worry to the Normans not only because of border raids, but also because of the invasions of England by the Welsh in the period 1055-60.”[46] This alliance demonstrates the same magnitude of political knowledge that William first demonstrated by claiming he was the legitimate successor to Edward. William effectively took care of two major concerns by making an alliance with Toirrdelbach. William no longer had to worry about invasion from Ireland and also did not have to expend all his troops on Wales in order to keep the peace. Ireland’s military intervention in Wales gave William the breathing spell he needed to focus on creating the Norman dynasty.

William the Conqueror and the Norman Conquest of England were successful for two main reasons. The political and military brilliance of William the Conqueror combined with the Norman forces having the most modern military tactics and tools at the time. These reasons are shown through the events leading up to the conquest of England, the Battle of Hastings, and William’s subsequent rule thereafter. The events leading up to the conquest demonstrates William’s political brilliance as he is able to claim rightful ownership of England through the pope. It is this justification that allows William to assemble a voluntary army to invade England. The Battle of Hastings was won necessarily because of William’s brilliance and the Norman forces more modern war tactics. William came up with a strategy to lure Harold’s troops off the high ground and the Norman cavalry was able to cut down the Anglo-Saxon Phalanxes. Finally, the reason William and the Norman ruling class were able to create a stable dynasty was a combination of employed Norman offensive and defensive strategies with William’s brilliant way of manipulating politics. The Norman castles made it possible for small groups of Normans to hold ground against much larger forces and the Norman offensive of total war disheartened enemies. William’s peaceful foreign policy with Ireland allowed him the leisure to focus on these Norman offensive and defensive strategies. Ultimately, these are the reasons why the Normans were successful in England. It was not because of a changing of winds and it most definitely was not the result of an accidental strategy during the Battle of Hastings.

[1] Hugh M. Thomas, The Norman Conquest: England after William the Conqueror (Plymouth, U.K.: Rowman and LittleField Publishers, 2008), 18. [2] Thomas, The Norman Conquest, 23. [3] Thomas, The Norman Conquest, 23. [4] David C. Douglas, William the Conqueror: The Norman Impact upon England (Los Angeles,: University of California Press, 1964), 184. [5] Thomas, The Norman Conquest, 23. [6] Douglas, William the Conqueror, 184. [7] Douglas, William the Conqueror, 187. [8] Douglas, William the Conqueror, 187. [9] John R. E. Bliese, “Leadership, Rhetoric, and Morale in the Norman Conquest of England,” Military Affairs 52, no. 1 (1988): 23 http://jstor.org/stable/1988376 (Accessed November 12, 2012). [10] Bliese, “Leadership, Rhetoric, and Morale in the Norman Conquest of England,” 23. [11] Bliese, “Leadership, Rhetoric, and Morale in the Norman Conquest of England,” 23. [12] Bliese, “Leadership, Rhetoric, and Morale in the Norman Conquest of England,” 23. [13] Thomas, The Norman Conquest, 31. [14] Thomas, The Norman Conquest, 31. [15] David MacLeod, “The Bayeux Tapestry: Unpicking the Past,” British History, February 02, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/normans/bayeux_tapestry_gallery_03.shtml (accessed October 3, 2012). [16] William Shanahan, “Embroidery Examined: A ‘Look’ at the Bayeux Tapestry,” History 337-01 (2012), 1. [17] Glen Ray, “The Full Bayeux Tapestry,” https://hastings1066.com/bayeux29.shtml (accessed October 3, 2012) [18] Thomas, The Norman Conquest, 41. [19] Douglas, William the Conqueror, 201. [20] Douglas, William the Conqueror, 201. [21] Thomas, The Norman Conquest, 32. [22] Thomas, The Norman Conquest, 41. [23] Thomas, The Norman Conquest, 41. [24] Ray, “The Full Bayeux Tapestry,” https://hastings1066.com/bayeux32.shtml (accessed October 3, 2012) [25] Edd Wheeler, “The Battle of Hastings: Math, Myth and Melee,” Military Affairs 52, no. 3 (1988): 130 http://www.jstor.org/stable/1988246 (Accessed October 4, 2012). [26] Wheeler, “The Battle of Hastings” 130. [27] Thomas, The Norman Conquest, 31. [28] John Gillingham and Ralph A. Griffiths, Medieval Britain: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press 2000), 1. [29] James H. Ford, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, trans. by James Ingram (El Paso, Texas: El Paso Norte Press, 2005) 160. [30] Ford, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 161. [31] Ford, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 161. [32] Shanahan, “Embroidery Examined” 4. [33] Ray, “The Full Bayeux Tapestry,” https://hastings1066.com/bayeux24.shtml (accessed October 3, 2012) [34] Ray, “The Full Bayeux Tapestry,” https://hastings1066.com/bayeux21.shtml (accessed October 3, 2012 [35] Gillingham, Medieval Britain, 2. [36] Gillingham, Medieval Britain, 2. [37] Robert Bartlett, England under the Norman and Angevin Kings: 1075-1225 (OxfordU.K.: Claredon Press, 2000) 269. [38] Bartlett, England under the Norman and Angevin Kings, 269. [39] Douglas, William the Conqueror, 215. [40] Douglas, William the Conqueror, 215-16. [41] Bartlett, England under the Norman and Angevin Kings, 69. [42] Benjamin Hudson, “William the Conqueror and Ireland,” Irish Historical Studies 29, no. 114 (1984): 145 http://www.jstor.org/stable/30006739 (Accessed November 1, 2012). [43] Hudson, “William the Conqueror and Ireland,” 145. [44] Hudson, “William the Conqueror and Ireland,” 146. [45] Hudson, “William the Conqueror and Ireland,” 154. [46] Hudson, “William the Conqueror and Ireland,” 155.