Re: Here's what I mentioned

From:john.podesta@gmail.com To: hrod17@clintonemail.com Date: 2014-08-19 16:04 Subject: Re: Here's what I mentioned

Yes and interesting but not for this channel. On Aug 19, 2014 9:22 AM, "H" <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote: > Agree but there may be opportunities as the Iraqi piece improves. > > Also, any idea whose fighters attacked Islamist positions in Tripoli, > Libya? > Worth analyzing for future purposes. > > *From*: John Podesta [mailto:john.podesta@gmail.com] > *Sent*: Tuesday, August 19, 2014 09:19 AM > *To*: H > *Subject*: Re: Here's what I mentioned > > > Hit send too soon. Meant to say Syria elements are vexing. > On Aug 19, 2014 9:17 AM, "John Podesta" <john.podesta@gmail.com> wrote: > >> I think we are headed down this path in Iraq, but the Syria elements are >> On Aug 17, 2014 3:50 PM, "H" <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote: >> >>> Note: Sources include Western intelligence, US intelligence and sources >>> in the region. >>> >>> >>> >>> 1. With all of its tragic aspects, the advance of ISIL >>> through Iraq gives the U.S. Government an opportunity to change the way it >>> deals with the chaotic security situation in North Africa and the Middle >>> East. The most important factor in this matter is to make use of >>> intelligence resources and Special Operations troops in an aggressive >>> manner, while avoiding the old school solution, which calls for more >>> traditional military operations. In Iraq it is important that we engage >>> ISIL using the resources of the Peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Regional >>> Government (KRG), and what, if any, reliable units exist in the Iraqi >>> Army. The Peshmerga commanders are aggressive hard fighting troops, who >>> have long standing relationships with CIA officers and Special Forces >>> operators. However, they will need the continued commitment of U.S. >>> personnel to work with them as advisors and strategic planners, the new >>> generation of Peshmerga commanders being largely untested in traditional >>> combat. That said, with this U.S. aid the Kurdish troops can inflict a >>> real defeat on ISIL. >>> >>> >>> >>> 2. It is important that once we engage ISIL, as we have now >>> done in a limited manner, we and our allies should carry on until they are >>> driven back suffering a tangible defeat. Anything short of this will be >>> seen by other fighters in the region, Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, as >>> an American defeat. However, if we provide advisors and planners, as well >>> as increased close air support for the Peshmerga, these soldiers can defeat >>> ISIL. They will give the new Iraqi Government a chance to organize itself, >>> and restructure the Sunni resistance in Syria, moving the center of power >>> toward moderate forces like the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In addition to air >>> support, the Peshmerga also need artillery and armored vehicles to deal >>> with the tanks and other heavy equipment captured from the Iraqi army by >>> ISIL. >>> >>> >>> >>> 3. In the past the USG, in an agreement with the Turkish General Staff, >>> did not provide such heavy weapons to the Peshmerga, out of a concern that >>> they would end up in the hands of Kurdish rebels inside of Turkey. The >>> current situation in Iraq, not to mention the political environment in >>> Turkey, makes this policy obsolete. Also this equipment can now be >>> airlifted directly into the KRG zone. >>> >>> >>> >>> 4. Armed with proper equipment, and working with U.S. advisors, the >>> Peshmerga can attack the ISIL with a coordinated assault supported from the >>> air. This effort will come as a surprise to the ISIL, whose leaders >>> believe we will always stop with targeted bombing, and weaken them both in >>> Iraq and inside of Syria. At the same time we should return to plans to >>> provide the FSA, or some group of moderate forces, with equipment that will >>> allow them to deal with a weakened ISIL, and stepped up operations against >>> the Syrian regime. This entire effort should be done with a low profile, >>> avoiding the massive traditional military operations that are at best >>> temporary solutions. While this military/para-military operation is moving >>> forward, we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence >>> assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, >>> which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and >>> other radical Sunni groups in the region. This effort will be enhanced by >>> the stepped up commitment in the KRG. The Qataris and Saudis will be put >>> in a position of balancing policy between their ongoing competition to >>> dominate the Sunni world and the consequences of serious U.S. pressure. By >>> the same token, the threat of similar, realistic U.S. operations will serve >>> to assist moderate forces in Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, where >>> insurgents are increasingly fascinated by the ISIL success in Iraq. >>> >>> >>> >>> 6. In the end the situation in Iraq is merely the latest and most >>> dangerous example of the regional restructuring that is taking place across >>> North Africa, all the way to the Turkish border. These developments are >>> important to the U.S. for reasons that often differ from country to >>> country: energy and moral commitment to Iraq, energy issues in Libya, and >>> strategic commitments in Jordan. At the same time, as Turkey moves toward >>> a new, more serious Islamic reality, it will be important for them to >>> realize that we are willing to take serious actions, which can be sustained >>> to protect our national interests. This course of action offers the >>> potential for success, as opposed to large scale, traditional military >>> campaigns, that are too expensive and awkward to maintain over time. >>> >>> >>> >>> 7. (Note: A source in Tripoli stated in confidence that when the U.S. >>> Embassy was evacuated, the presence of two U.S. Navy jet fighters over the >>> city brought all fighting to a halt for several hours, as Islamist forces >>> were not certain that these aircraft would not also provide close ground >>> support for moderate government forces.) >>> >>> >>> >>> 8. If we do not take the changes needed to make our >>> security policy in the region more realistic, there is a real danger of >>> ISIL veterans moving on to other countries to facilitate operations by >>> Islamist forces. This is already happening in Libya and Egypt, where >>> fighters are returning from Syria to work with local forces. ISIL is only >>> the latest and most violent example of this process. If we don’t act to >>> defeat them in Iraq something even more violent and dangerous will >>> develop. Successful military operations against these very irregular but >>> determined forces can only be accomplished by making proper use of >>> clandestine/special operations resources, in coordination with airpower, >>> and established local allies. There is, unfortunately, a narrow window of >>> opportunity on this issue, as we need to act before an ISIL state becomes >>> better organized and reaches into Lebanon and Jordan. >>> >>> >>> >>> 9. (Note: It is important to keep in mind that as a result >>> of this policy there probably will be concern in the Sunni regions of Iraq >>> and the Central Government regarding the possible expansion of KRG >>> controlled territory. With advisors in the Peshmerga command we can >>> reassure the concerned parties that, in return for increase autonomy, the >>> KRG will not exclude the Iraqi Government from participation in the >>> management of the oil fields around Kirkuk, and the Mosel Dam hydroelectric >>> facility. At the same time we will be able to work with the Peshmerga as >>> they pursue ISIL into disputed areas of Eastern Syria, coordinating with >>> FSA troops who can move against ISIL from the North. This will make >>> certain Basher al Assad does not gain an advantage from these operations. >>> Finally, as it now appears the U.S. is considering a plan to offer >>> contractors as advisors to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, we will be in a >>> position to coordinate more effectively between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi >>> Army.) >>> >>>