WHEN CHINESE [sic] troops went into Korea in October 1950, the North Koreans were on the run. Two months later, Mao’s army had pushed the UN out of North Korea and restored Kim Il Sung’s dictatorship. But Kim was now militarily powerless, with his depleted 75,000-man army outnumbered 6:1 by the 450,000 troops Mao had in Korea. On 7 December, the day after the Chinese recovered Kim’s capital, Pyongyang, Kim ceded command to the Chinese. The Chinese commander Peng De-huai cabled Mao that Kim had “agreed … not to intervene in the future in matters of military command.” Peng was made the head of a joint Chinese–Korean HQ. Mao had taken over Kim’s war.



Peng wanted to stop north of the 38th Parallel, the original boundary between North and South Korea, but Mao refused. Peng pleaded that his supply lines were over-extended, leaving them seriously exposed to US bombing: “our troops are unable to receive supplies of food, ammunition, shoes, oil or salt … The main problem is no air cover, and no guaranteed railway transport; the moment we repair them, they are bombed again …” Mao insisted. He was determined not to stop fighting until he had squeezed the utmost out of Stalin. “Must cross the 38th Parallel,” he ordered Peng on 13 December. Early in January 1951 the Chinese took Seoul, the Southern capital, eventually pushing about 100 km south of the Parallel.

Chinese military successes greatly boosted Mao’s standing with Stalin, who sent extraordinarily enthusiastic congratulations, which he had not done for Mao’s triumph in taking China. Stalin particularly remarked that the victories had been won “against American troops.”



Mao had dealt an enormous psychological blow to the USA. On 15 December 1950, Truman went on radio to declare a State of National Emergency, something that did not happen in either World War II or the Vietnam War. Using almost apocalyptic language, he told the American people: “Our homes, our Nation … are in great danger.” The Chinese by then had already driven the Americans back some 200 km in a matter of weeks, in appalling conditions, with sub-zero temperatures compounded by icy winds. Secretary of State Dean Acheson described the reverse as the “worst defeat” for US forces in a century.



The Chinese won their victories at horrendous cost to their own men. Peng told Mao on 19 December:



The temperature has dropped to minus 30 degrees centigrade. The troops are very run down, their feet are incapacitated by frostbite, and they have to sleep in the open … Most troops have not received coats and padded shoes. Their padded jackets and blankets have been burned out by napalm. Many soldiers are still wearing thin cotton shoes, and some are even bare-foot

The Chinese fought with “human wave tactics” (ren-hai zhan-shu), using the only advantage they had—superiority in numbers. The British actor Michael Caine, who was drafted into the war, told us he had gone into it feeling sympathetic to communism, coming as he did from a poor family. But the experience left him permanently repelled. Chinese soldiers charged in one wave after another, to exhaust Western bullets. He could not help thinking: If they don’t care about the lives of their own people, how can I expect them to care about me?



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Mao outlined his “overall strategy” to Stalin in a cable on 1 March, which opened with the sentence: “The enemy will not leave Korea without being eliminated in great masses …” He then told Stalin that his plan was to use his bottomless reserves of manpower to exhaust the Americans. The Chinese army, he reported (which was true), had already taken “more than 100,000 casualties … and is expecting another 300,000 this year and next.” But, he told Stalin, he was replenishing the losses with 120,000 more troops, and would send a further 300,000 to replenish future losses. “To sum up,” Mao said, he was “ready to persist in a long-term war, to spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives, so they will back down …” Mao was reminding Stalin that he could seriously weaken America,* but Stalin must help him build a first-class army and arms industry.



MAO GOT MOVING on this fundamental objective from the moment China entered the war in October 1950. That very month, China’s navy chief was sent to Russia to ask for assistance to build up the navy. He was followed in December by a top-level air force mission, which had considerable success. On 19 February 1951, Moscow endorsed a draft agreement to start building factories in China to repair and service planes, as a large number were being damaged, and required advanced repair facilities in the theater. The Chinese plan was to convert these repair facilities to actually making aircraft. By the end of the war, China, a very poor country, had the third largest air force in the world, with more than 3,000 planes, including advanced MiGs. And factories were being built to churn out 3,600 fighter planes annually which, it was projected (over-optimistically, as it turned out), would come on stream in three to five years’ time. Discussions had even begun about manufacturing bombers.



Although Stalin wanted China to do his fighting for him, and was happy to sell Mao the weapons for the sixty divisions, he had no intention of endowing Mao with a full-blown arms industry, so the Chinese delegation was stonewalled in Russia for months. Mao told his chief of staff to keep on pushing, and in October the Russians reluctantly agreed to transfer the technology for producing seven kinds of small arms including machine-guns, but declined to divulge more.



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But, as his troops had been suffering heavy defeats, a breathing space was tactically useful for Mao, so he sent his Manchuria chief with Kim to consult with Stalin—and to press for more arms factories. Afterwards, Stalin cabled Mao, treating Kim as Mao’s satrap, to propitiate Mao, as he was turning him down on the arms factories. After talking “with your representatives from Manchuria and Korea” [sic], Stalin told Mao, “a truce is now advantageous.” This did not mean Stalin wanted to stop the war. He wanted Mao’s soldiers to inflict more damage on the US, but he saw that engaging in talks could be expedient, and seeming to show an interest in peace would help the Communists’ image. Interim ceasefire talks opened in Korea between UN and Chinese–Korean military teams on 10 July.



Most items were settled fairly swiftly, but Mao and Stalin turned one issue into a sticking point: the repatriation of POWs. America wanted voluntary, “non-forcible,” repatriation; Mao insisted it had to be wholesale. The UN held over 20,000 Chinese, mainly former Nationalist troops, most of whom did not want to go back to Communist China. With the memory of handing back prisoners to Stalin at the end of World War II, many to their deaths, America rejected non-voluntary repatriation, for both humanitarian and political reasons. But Mao’s line to his negotiators was: “Not a single one is to get away!” Mao’s chilling mantra prolonged the war for a year and a half, during which hundreds of thousands of Chinese, and many more Koreans, died. Kim had been only too keen to concede, and argued that “there was no point in putting up a fight” to recover “politically unstable” ex-Nationalists. But this cut no ice with Mao, as that was not his point. Mao did not care about the POWs. He needed an issue to string out the war so that he could extract more from Stalin.

BY EARLY 1952, Kim was absolutely desperate to end the war. On 14 July 1952 he cabled Mao begging him to accept a compromise. American bombing was reducing his country to rubble. “There was nothing left to bomb,” US Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk observed. The population was declining to almost critical survival levels, with perhaps one-third of adult males killed.

Mao turned Kim down by return telegram, with the cold-blooded argument that “Rejecting the proposal of the enemy will bring only one harmful consequence—further losses for the Korean people and Chinese people’s volunteers. However …” Mao then proceeded to list the “advantages” in these human losses, such as the sufferers being “tempered and acquiring experience in the struggle against American imperialism.” He signed off menacingly by saying he would report to Stalin and then get back to Kim “upon receiving an answer.”



Without waiting for Mao to tell him what Stalin thought, Kim replied at once to say that Mao was, of course, “correct,” and that he, Kim, was determined to fight on. Kim simultaneously cabled Stalin, pathetically trying to explain his wavering.



Stalin wired Mao on the 17th with his verdict: “We consider your position in the negotiations on an armistice to be completely correct. Today we received a report from Pyongyang that comrade Kim Il Sung also agrees with your position.”



Kim was frantic, but he was powerless to stop the war in his own country. Moreover, his own fate was in peril. An ominous conversation between Stalin and Chou En-lai a month later shows that he had reason to feel insecure. After Chou said that China was preparing for “the possibility of another two to three years of war,” Stalin asked about the attitude of the Korean leaders. The meeting record runs as follows (our comments in brackets):



STALIN says that the American[s] have not frightened China. Could it be said that they have also failed to frighten Korea?



CHOU EN-LAI affirms that one could essentially say that.



STALIN: [obviously skeptically] If that is true, then it’s not too bad.



CHOU EN-LAI [picking up on Stalin’s skepticism] adds that Korea is wavering somewhat … Among certain elements of the Korean leadership one can detect a state of panic, even.



STALIN reminds that he has been already informed of these feelings through Kim Il Sung’s telegram to Mao Tse-tung.



CHOU EN-LAI confirms this.

BY AUGUST 1952, Mao decided to push Stalin harder and nail down his twin key demands: turf and arms industries. He sent Chou to Moscow with these requests. Chou first established that Mao had done Stalin an invaluable service. At their first meeting, on 20 August, he told Stalin that Mao “believes that the continuation of the war is advantageous to us.” “Mao Tse-tung is right,” Stalin answered. “This war is getting on America’s nerves.” Echoing Mao’s dismissive comments about casualties on their own side, Stalin produced the bone-chilling remark: “The North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties.” “The war in Korea has shown America’s weakness,” he commented to Chou, and then said “jokingly”: “America’s primary weapons are stockings, cigarettes, and other merchandise. They want to subjugate the world, and yet they cannot subdue little Korea. No, Americans don’t know how to fight.” “Americans are not capable of waging a large-scale war at all, especially after the Korean War.”



China’s role in taking on the US gave Chou the cards to shoot for the moon, and he asked the Master for no fewer than 147 large military-related enterprises, including plants to produce warplanes and ships, 1,000 light tanks per year, with one factory for medium tanks to be ready within five years.



Stalin prevaricated, responding with platitudes (“China must be well armed, especially with air and naval forces”; “China must become the flagship of Asia”). But he never signed Chou’s list.



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Meanwhile, Mao kept on bombarding Stalin with requests relating to arms industries. A blockbuster eight-page cable on 17 December 1952 bluntly demanded of Stalin: “Please could the Soviet government satisfy our arms order for war in Korea in 1953, and our orders for arms industries.” Prefaced to this was Mao’s vision for the war: “in the next phase (suppose one year), it will become more intense.” As an added inducement to Stalin to cough up, Mao offered to carry Kim’s bankrupt state, informing Stalin that Peking would subsidize Pyongyang for three years—to the tune of US$60 million p.a., which happened to be exactly the amount Stalin had “lent” to Mao in February 1950; but, per capita, fifty times the amount Stalin had been willing to advance—and from a much poorer country. And, unlike Stalin’s loan, Mao’s to Kim carried no interest. A few weeks later, in January 1953, Mao put in another large request for his navy. Stalin said he would send the armaments requested, and approved Mao’s fleet taking part in naval operations on the high seas for the first time, but he firmly declined to meet Mao’s demands about arms industries.



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Ever since the first Bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, Mao had longed to possess one. One of his economic managers, Bo Yi-bo, recalled that all through the early 1950s, “at all meetings and on all occasions, Chairman Mao would talk about the fact that we had no atom bombs. He talked and talked. Chairman Mao was really anxious!” Mao successfully concealed this hankering from the public, affecting instead an image of nonchalant contempt for atomic weapons, and pretending that he preferred to rely on “the people,” a position made famous by his remark in 1946 that the atom bomb was “a paper tiger.”



As soon as Eisenhower made his remarks about possibly using the Bomb, Mao dispatched his top nuclear scientist, Qian San-qiang, to Moscow. Mao’s message boiled down to this: Give me the Bomb, so that you will not be drawn into a nuclear war with America. This confronted Stalin with a serious dilemma, as Russia had a mutual defense pact with China.

In light of recent events I believe that it is helpful to understand the context of the Korean war. Understanding the mind of someone that is in power and being able to make sense of seemingly senseless decisions and policies can be impossible without a broader understanding of the events that have led up to the present.What you are seeing in North Korea right now is not unique to either Korean, or Chinese history. Although understanding the past will not allow you to accurately predict the future, it will help you understand what is going on behind the scenes and allow you to understand the political subtext of what is being said by these leaders.There is a long tradition in reading propaganda and being able to read beyond it and to try to understand what is really being said. It is somewhat of an art.Of particular importance here is understanding theandto power. Especially in the context of KJU still trying to consolidate his power. What you see below, with Mao and Peng, is a "text book" example of what is going on in North Korea right now.You will be able to see what Mao wanted to get, and how focused he was on it, but you will also note (at the very end) that Peng was nearly ready to quit, and Mao had to hold back and "saber rattle" in order to get what he wanted. This was Mao and at this time he was in complete control of China. And even he had ato the limit of his power.So one has to remember here when reading about North Korea that KJU is still trying to consolidate power. We know that he survived at least one assassination attempt last year, and we know that half of the military was split on accepting his leadership. In order to move on without there being a huge power struggle (that could lead to another civil war) then KJU is going to have to exert his control over the military and manufacturing a crisis is a great way to see who is completely loyal to you. This is the priority before this situation can deescalate and before KJU can start to work to disarm the nuclear program and close down the prison camps --> work to reform the country so that internal conditions improve.North Korea needs food. They're desperate. They cannot continue to maintain and hold power over the North Korean people unless conditions improve. Maybe another week. Maybe another deacde. But their situation is untenable over time. At the same time, KJU cannot appear weak or to be out of control over the military or he could be internally removed from power. All of this is going on against the context of the possibility of him being removed from power externally. Further comments on the situation can be found here here , and here These views are challenged here . Please read them and then determine for yourself whether this criticism is valid or not.Taken from Mao: The Unknown Story (Chapter 35,, pg. 359) by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday Please look at the criticism of the work and then decide for yourself whether the follow passages are biased or not: CHEN JIAN : For Mao, intervention in Korea was not just for the purpose of supporting a friendly regime, it was also a decisive step taken to spread the influence of the Chinese revolution. So, unless the Chinese could morally justify the decision to intervene, the Chinese would not send troops to Korea and in this regard the cooperation and the willing invitation from Kim Il-sung became very important and then no American analysis had ever mentioned this.And in terms of MacArthur --Or in other words the Chinese had to fight in Korea not just because they are concerned about the security of Chinese border area, not just because they are concerned about the safety of a friendly regime, Kim Il-sung's regime, but because they are concerned about establishing a new image of new China. China now had to emerge as a central actor in the world revolution and this was something that MacArthur did not take into full consideration.MacArthur, who had done as he pleased his whole life, began talking of "marching to the Yalu". He did not yet know he was in a war he would not be allowed to win. He felt he had the freedom to do what he wanted. The first dark clouds were beginning to appear on the horizon. Would anyone dare challenge MacArthur's judgment ? Truman reminded him that operations North of the 38th had to be authorized by the U.S. MacArthur, used to ruling in Japan with an iron hand, made policy statements without first clearing them with his superiors. In spite of his Inchon success he was not infallible. He had been warned by Truman many times, and now received notification that he was to obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory. MacArthur's military plan was to proceed with all deliberate speed in advancing to the Yalu. He did not believe that the Chinese would intervene and would remain on their side of the Yalu. He had no knowledge that the Chinese decision to intervene had already been made by Mao, who was pressuring Russia to upgrade nine divisions to counter the U.S. hardware. Again MacArthur was warned not to provoke the Chinese, as it could draw not only China but Russia into a third World War. There were repeated warnings that the Chinese were already preparing to cross the Yalu and attack the U.S. forces. MacArthur in his usual pompous attitude anticipated immediate victory after his success at Inchon. Truman scheduled a showdown meeting with MacArthur on Wake Island. MacArthur was extremely displeased over the proposed meeting, which went on exactly as predicted. Truman expressed his growing concern over Chinese intervention, being careful not to anger the explosive MacArthur. It was here that MacArthur made his biggest mistake. He announced that the war "would be terminated by Thanksgiving - they are thoroughly whipped. The winter will destroy those that we don't --- In North Korea, unfortunately, the government is pursuing a forlorn hope. It has no possibility of success". What an arrogant and unfortunate statement. He ranted on further, declaring that the North Koreans were poorly trained, led, and organized. He reiterated that "it will be over by Thanksgiving". He said " the Chinese have no air umbrella. There would be the greatest slaughter if China tried to put ground troops across the Yalu. They would be destroyed". Little did he know that even as he spoke tens of thousands of Chinese were swarming across the Yalu. MacArthur's prediction was that any intervention would be pounded into a "rabble", and that the Russian air force would not be a match against ours. With the conference nearing an end, MacArthur continued his tirade of "complete annihilation of any troops who dared to intervene". Truman and MacArthur parted with kind remarks to each other and how successful the meeting had been. He would soon have to eat his eloquent words.Asked about the Soviet Union supplying air cover for the Chinese, Stalin held that the Soviet Union was not ready for this. [note] Mao had been expecting the Soviet Union to supply air cover for China's forces, and after receiving a telegram from Moscow informing him of developments there, Mao sent an urgent telegram of his own, ordering that his armies on the Yalu river put their operations on hold and concentrate on training. And when the commander of China's forces, Peng, learned that the Soviet Union would not be supplying air cover he threatened to resign.Noes: