Jayanthi and her predecessor Jairam used environmental clearances to hurt ‘unfriendly’ businessmen

Jayanthi Natarajan’s revolt and claim that Congress vice president Rahul Gandhi used to instruct her in her term as environment minister (2011-13) has clearly cut very close to the bone. The man himself used a public meeting in Delhi to accuse Natarajan of batting for BJP and said he had only sought to uphold rights of tribal forest dwellers. Since Vedanta’s aluminium project in Odisha was at the heart of the matter, the former Congress MP from the region, Bhakta Charan Das, jumped into the fray to defend Gandhi.

Tiresome and theatrical as all this may be, it is also instructive. The fallout of the Vedanta episode is central to understanding what went wrong with UPA II, and why Rahul Gandhi and Congress were so out of tune with India’s hopes and dreams.

As is well known, the project sought to mine the Niyamgiri hills in Odisha’s Kalahandi district for bauxite and use this mineral to produce aluminium in a new facility nearby. For various reasons, the project was killed. The loss was not just that of Vedanta and its creditors — they had invested Rs 30,000 crore — but frankly that of India.

In the National Advisory Council (NAC) and NGO circles of Delhi, the project’s death was celebrated. In Odisha and Kalahandi, it was seen as a missed opportunity. Absent of assured supply of bauxite, the aluminium facility was scaled back. Tens of thousands of jobs — direct and indirect — in the region remain affected.

Bauxite mining was famously blocked by Rahul Gandhi on the grounds that the hills were culturally and religiously important for about 1,200 local tribal people. In attempting to satisfy the few, Gandhi affected the livelihoods and aspirations of many, many thousand more. It needs to be asked that if what Gandhi and Natarajan did — or what Natarajan now insists Gandhi made her do — was so popular, why did people in Kalahandi vote out Congress in 2014? At that time, the sitting MP, Das, was not only unseated but finished third behind BJD and BJP.

Had he lost to BJP, Das could have contended he was felled by the Modi wave. Yet, that was not the case. He was beaten by BJD in a campaign that focused on local issues and prosperity concerns. To what degree was the crushing of the biggest industrial project to come to the region responsible? It may not be popular or convenient to ask that question, but it is necessary.

Other than the argument that cultural and religious rights were non-negotiable and no happy compromise with economic expansion was possible, the Niyamgiri project faced two obstacles from the UPA government: environment clearances; and land acquisition and the consent of the community. On both, the regime brought into play by UPA was either dodgy or requires serious examination.

It was very apparent Natarajan and her predecessor as environment minister, Jairam Ramesh, used green clearances as a tool to hurt individual businessmen and state governments regarded as unfriendly by Congress. It was common knowledge in Delhi in the UPA years that the Vedanta project had suffered collateral damage in this atmosphere of suspicion. It was not out of character for the Congress-led government. In 2011, six public sector banks dropped out of Vibrant Gujarat at the 11th hour following orders from the finance ministry.

The final roadblock came when the environment ministry and the government’s lawyers used a provision under a new forest law, drafted by UPA or more specifically NAC, to seek concurrence of the local community for land acquisition. In his wisdom, a Supreme Court judge agreed. In theory, the concurrence of the local community sounded like a noble idea. In practice what did it amount to?

Twelve gram sabhas and the collective view of a few hundred decided the fate of the project and in a sense of future economic benefits for two districts, if not a larger region. There was little question that informed consent as propaganda was rampant. A coalition of local and international NGOs — some of them said to be backed by rival aluminium companies – and Congress and NAC ecosystem ran a fervent campaign. In the end all 12 gram sabhas refused to agree to have land from their hamlets acquired. The industrialisation initiative in Kalahandi, among India’s poorest and most impoverished districts, was over.

There are two issues that flow from this. First, mining is never a picnic but if other countries can put in place jurisdictions and regulations for mining that are ecologically and socially sensitive (at least relatively so) and spread economic benefits to a broader community, what stops India? Second, are the stakeholders and veto-holders of a project only those immediately involved? Do i have a right to stop the construction of a flyover outside my house if it could ease traffic conditions for many thousands in the city?

Ordinary Indians have a much more enlightened and realistic view of such matters than those who advised Rahul Gandhi and populated NAC. If it were not so, Bhakta Charan Das would not have been rejected by Kalahandi’s voters eight months ago.