Zach Paikin is a frequent media commentator on public policy issues and Canadian political affairs. He also contributes research on international affairs to several Washington-based think tanks and institutes. He was a candidate for National Policy Chair of the Liberal Party of Canada at the party’s 2012 biennial convention. He holds a BA in Middle East Studies from McGill University and is currently pursuing graduate studies in Global Affairs at the University of Toronto.

Last week, we set the stage for a series of articles that would be fleshing out arguments in favour of a united Canada.

One of the arguments most often advanced by federalists – both inside and outside Quebec – is that an independent Quebec would be a financial disaster for Quebeckers. On this point, they are most certainly correct.

According to DBRS Ltd., Quebec’s debt was worth 61.7% of its gross domestic product last fall, before another small deficit was posted in this spring’s budget. Traditionally, crisis level for most countries is when this ratio reaches eighty to ninety percent.

If Quebeckers were to satisfy in sufficient numbers the requirement set out in the Clarity Act and voted in favour of succession, Quebec could achieve independence through two means: negotiating it with the rest of Canada or declaring it unilaterally.

In a recent column, the National Post’s Andrew Coyne fleshed out the disastrous consequences for Quebec of a unilateral declaration of independence, which included “capital flight, bank failures, the courts clogged with federalists petitioning for their rights, the Cree taking down hydro towers, and organized crime taking advantage of the situation in whatever ways it could” in addition to the fact that an independent Quebec under this scenario would obtain little – if any – international recognition.

Yet negotiated sovereignty, although not as catastrophic, would still turn Quebec into an economic basket case. In the negotiations over secession, Quebec would naturally be forced to accept a portion of the federal government’s debt, likely an amount commensurate with the relative size of the province’s economy or population. Nearly all issues in these negotiations would be zero-sum, so it is safe to assume that if Quebec were able to negotiate less debt for itself it would have to give ground on another issue of importance.

Hence, for argument’s sake, let’s assume that Quebec would take on the proportion of federal debt relative to its size. According to the government of Quebec, the latter’s gross debt currently stands at nearly $184 billion. Canada’s debt in 2012-13 is a projected $605 billion. At roughly 8 million residents, Quebec’s population represents nearly 24% of Canada’s. Under this scenario, Quebec would assume roughly $145 billion in debt from Canada, giving the newly-independent Quebec a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than one hundred percent on day one.

Quebec’s GDP represents slightly less than 20% of Canada’s. This scenario gives Quebec little more solace – the province would have to assume $121 billion in debt from Canada if independence happened today, giving it a debt-to-GDP level of roughly 95%. This is still above crisis level.

Take into account as well the fact that Quebec would be short $7.4 billion in annual revenue from the Canadian government in what it receives through equalization, not to mention the loss of growth through the departure from Canada’s international commitments such as NAFTA, among other looming fiscal challenges. Unless taxes are substantially raised – and Quebec already has the highest taxation rates in Canada – you can add another several percentage points to Quebec’s debt.

Suffice to say, under any scenario, Quebec’s credit rating couldn’t stay prime for long. An independent Quebec would be stopped in its tracks economically on day one.

But these arguments all belie other important facts. For instance, the economic non-viability of an independent Quebec was the primary argument advanced by the “No” camp in the 1995 referendum early on. Although this worked at first to reduce support for the “Yes” side, the latter’s passion and the former’s lack of coordination (among other things) resulted in the “Yes” side polling above 50% in the final week of the referendum campaign. It was Jean Chrétien’s recognition of Quebec as a distinct society and his warning that 50%+1 in favour of sovereignty would have irreversible consequences that secured the “No” side’s narrow victory.

This is to say: Reasonable accommodation is a must. Arguing that an independent Quebec would be economically nonviable is not enough to keep the country together.

More importantly, let us allow the following question: If Quebec gets its fiscal house in order over the next several years and an independent Quebec suddenly becomes realistic from an economic perspective, would there still be a need for a united Canada?

The answer – for both Quebeckers and other Canadians – is most certainly yes.

The question of national unity, in order to get with the times, must become one that does not focus exclusively on Quebec. Put in other words, Canada must use this question as a means of becoming outward-looking and not inward-looking as it has been in the past. This will be the theme put forward in my next column.

Follow Zach on Twitter at @zpaikin. Click here to view a list of all columns by Zach Paikin.