In his Thursday column, Nick argued that building schools and educating people in Afghanistan and Pakistan would do more to stabilize these societies than military interventions. In response, a number of U.S. servicemen wrote in with their own stories about education as an effective counterinsurgency measure. One of the most detailed came from Lt. Col. Michael Fenzel. We post it here with his permission.

Very much enjoyed your OpEd on the importance of education in Afghanistan. I have served two tours in Afghanistan that amounted to nearly 2.5 years on the ground. As an infantry battalion commander my number one priority was education. As visitors and congressional delegations moved through our little corner of the country in Eastern Paktika (where the literacy rate is at 2%) there was typically disbelief that this was a legitimate counterinsurgency priority. Normally, after hearing of our perspective and efforts, there were converts. But what we found is that the “Three Cups of Tea” solution is more complex since it is rarely how many schools you build, but instead, and more importantly, how many teachers you train. The only thing worse than no school in a village is a school without a teacher. We reached out to the University of Nebraska and Columbia University’s Teachers College to develop a partnership in our effort to raise literacy and broaden educational opportunities in Paktika. The Governor of the province (Akram Khapalwak) dubbed this effort “developing a Province of Education Excellence in a place that has been forgotten by Kabul.” Importantly, he became the primary proponent for the initiative and garnered support from Kabul’s enlightened (amazingly, given the level of corruption within ministries) Minister of Education who offered his own enthusiastic support. The effort began with a 30-day education needs assessment where I committed nearly a company of infantry for security to the University of Nebraska and Columbia team. They traveled to each of the province’s 22 districts and talked to teacher after teacher and district governor after governor. This assessment cost us (the battalion) $179,000 in CERP funds…a pittance. Indeed, this is how much it often costs to pave one kilometer of road! They came back to us with a 3-year plan to place up to 9 qualified teachers in every district and remain on a trajectory to continue mentoring and developing teachers after the three years of funding ran dry (i.e. self-sustaining — the watchword of the development community). This three-year program cost us $359,000, about the cost of one 2,000-pound bomb, yet dramatically more powerful in a counterinsurgency effort. Afghan communities that are largely illiterate are subject to propaganda and intimidation of the Taliban on a scale that cannot be compared to the university cities where there is almost no support for the Taliban. These university cities are indeed those 10 cities comprising the focus of the defense strategy reported on yesterday in the NY Times. This is an incredibly challenging effort where the only solutions are tremendously complex and the key to success (which is embedded in history) lies in the rural population…not the cities. The lessons of the first two Anglo-Afghan wars make this clear. Granting an education and discerning view to the some 26 million farmers in rural Afghanistan is the most important step to giving the country a future that won’t be rife with violence.

LTC Mike Fenzel, PhD Student, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA