1 Introduction

I will suggest that for Nietzsche: Forgetfulness is a central topic.

Forgetfulness is the tendency to forget, to engage in forgetting. Our normal view of it is negative. It is generally unhelpful when we forget where we have placed important items. Our focus in education, especially at school, is on trying to remember facts. Forgetfulness is our enemy here. We fear Alzheimer’s Disease greatly, primarily because it adversely affects memory. This loss is an attack on what makes us ourselves

In philosophy, forgetfulness has received much less attention than memory. And generally then only as the negative opposite pole to memory. Nietzsche has a unique view of forgetfulness which is positive, active and essential to much of life and thinking. Since this is so unusual and illuminating, and goes against much of common sense and philosophy, it is worth careful consideration.

Nietzsche will not deny that forgetfulness is unhelpful in many prosaic circumstances. It is never good to forget where your car is parked. Neither do you want to forget which hotel room you are staying in. Nevertheless, I will argue that active forgetfulness plays an important role in Nietzsche’s writings, with mentions occurring throughout them. It is significant in connection with major themes such as the doctrine of eternal recurrence and the Übermensch. Most importantly, it is central to his ethical project.

The Revaluation Of All Values

That project, involving the revaluation of all values, is arguably Nietzsche’s most important message. Therefore, since I shall show we cannot understand it without an active conception of forgetfulness, that conception is essential to interpreting Nietzsche. We would also do well to consider the alternate valency of forgetfulness Nietzsche provides in analysis of other philosophy, particularly in relation to memory.

Nietzsche: Forgetfulness — What Is It?

We need to know what forgetfulness is for Nietzsche and why it is important. I will argue for the following linked theses: that forgetfulness:

is active and is essential to action; is central to Nietzsche’s ethical project.

I will show also that there are clear links between thesis one and thesis two by discussing the Masters. We know the Masters by their activity, and they are actively forgetful. Moreover, the Masters, like the Übermensch, create their own values. They exemplify what Nietzsche wants us to do or to prepare for. This is his central ethical project.

2 Action

There are three reasons why forgetfulness is essential to action. Firstly, without forgetfulness, we would have at the forefront of our minds the Heraclitean flux. That will mean that we fail to believe in a fixed self, and also note the immensity of change within all space-time. Both of those realizations will tend to make activity seem pointless.1

Secondly, forgetfulness is the opposition to and the cure for an excess of historical sense, which is paralysing.2 This paralysis derives from the crushing weight of comparison with previous ages and great deeds. Nietzsche’s cure for this is to exhort us not to think of ourselves as latecomers to the historical scene.3

Thirdly, forgetfulness is essential to action. Otherwise the consequences paralyse us. We need sufficient strength to ignore injustice since all other than the most trivial actions will be unjust in some way, will injure someone. This means that absent the accepted morality and purported equality of humans, both of which Nietzsche opposes, there are no justifications for any actions since almost everything one does affects someone.4

In addition, forgetfulness aids in focussing on single objectives, in that apart from the aforementioned absence of conscience, paralysing knowledge is eliminated.5

Nietzsche: Forgetfulness Of One’s Self

Nietzsche notes in UM6 that forgetfulness of one’s self will assist in the untimely task of transcending the stifling conformity of one’s age:

“The heroic human being despises […] the measuring of things by the standard of himself […]. His strength lies in forgetting himself.”

This is also a call for the courage we need to go against our age. This will involve forgetting about the concomitant risks to one’s person.

The “Unhistorical”

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There is an equation of “the unhistorical” with the active powers of forgetfulness. One may act only within artificial finiteness because otherwise our actions are like drops in the ocean of space-time, fleeting and of no significance. Science does not accept these bounds, and while science is correct in believing this, and “correct” in that that is the aim of science, to that extent science is the enemy of action.

It is allied with an excess of historical sense; both seek knowledge and too much consideration of knowledge of either type causes inactivity. So Nietzsche uses the term “unhistorical” for the power of forgetting, which is against unlimited horizons, against science and against knowledge.7 Alternatively, the strength of a nature might be measured by how much historical sense it could deal with. So all of the paralysing effects of excessive historical sense are purged either by being overcome or forgotten.8

The Doorkeeper in Nietzsche: Forgetfulness

In GM [5, I.1], forgetfulness is described as “effective, leading, decisive” for our development. We learn later of

“active forgetfulness, a doorkeeper as it were, an upholder of psychic order, of rest, of etiquette.” [5, II.1]

The “porter” metaphor here needs some interpretation because “bar[ring] admission” is not the same thing as “erasure,” which would be closer to expulsion after admission. We should note that doorkeepers are as able to eject those already inside as to bar entry to newcomers. It is this former sense that Nietzsche is using. Indeed, forgetfulness is “an active faculty of suppression” which makes “space for new things, above all for the nobler functions.” [5, II.1] This is the active forgetfulness which serves the Masters in their ressentiment-free activity.9

The Case For Active Forgetfulness

I will now argue that we can see further grounds for thinking that forgetfulness is active for Nietzsche by examining the case of the Masters, who are both active and active users of forgetfulness.

Another aspect of action linked to forgetfulness is that the Masters own forgetfulness. It counteracts ressentiment. Forgetfulness is the prerogative of the Masters for two reasons. Firstly it is a reflection of their essentially active nature, in contrast to the enforced passivity and reactive nature of their counterparts, the Slaves.

The second reason allows us to see why forgetfulness is importantly different to ignorance;10 the reason flows from the difference between the self-affirmation of the Masters and the parallel double negation of the Slaves. The latter lack the ability to simply affirm themselves and have the denial of what is not themselves result from that. Instead, they deny that the Masters are good and then derive self-affirmation from the second negation, which is that they, the Slaves, are not the Masters. While the Slaves can “say no to what is outside”11 this means they cannot forget it — they must not forget it because they need to continue to deny it.

The Masters Have No Ressentiment

The Masters require forgetfulness and have permission for it. they do not have or need ressentiment and so correlatively they have no need of its driver, the absence of forgetfulness — and forgetfulness is what enables them to act. Note that all of these considerations show why forgetfulness is not ignorance and is more important. The difference between the two is that one can only forget items one has previously known, whereas one has usually never known items of which one is ignorant.

While ignorance can allow action it cannot drive it, because facts which one does not know cannot be motives. So ignorance cannot replace forgetfulness in the dialectic driving the Masters: action causes forgetfulness and forgetfulness causes action. This shows the importance of forgetfulness however, because it is a key component of Nietzsche’s analysis of morality, and because forgetfulness of existing values could, unlike ignorance, be a precursor of their destruction.

Nietzsche: Forgetfulness – Digestion

Nietzsche compares [5, II.1] the active power of forgetfulness to a properly functioning process of digestion. Material must be taken in, made use of and then eliminated. This again shows a clear opposition between forgetfulness and ignorance. Nietzsche describes an opposition to memory. Nietzsche argues it has the function of making guilt and debt relationships possible via pain12 inflicted as punishment for non-payment of debts and in order to provide pleasure to creditors.

Health and Strength

Only “strong” and “healthy” animals in whom forgetting “represents a force” can disconnect forgetfulness in the special cases when they make a promise. Only in such specimens will memory have a positive role as recording words representing promises made or debts incurred, as opposed to the more reactive, passive, dyspeptic nature of memory in the slaves — to be understood as all of us — where it records difficulties and slights which we struggle to eliminate. This, paradoxically, is what allows apparently superior active forces to be ineffective in the face of inferior reactive forces.

The latter do not overwhelm the former, but separate active force from what it can do.13 This then becomes ressentiment, which is not the healthy situation where reactive forces are not simply acted upon and thereby eliminated, but the unhealthy counterpart where they are turned back on the subject, recorded in memory and invade consciousness. Thus a failure of active forgetfulness leads directly to the phenomenon of ressentiment, one of Nietzsche’s central concepts in his analysis of how current morality has arisen.

Defining The Masters

Forgetfulness is then one of the defining characteristics of the Masters, who are active in virtue of their powers of forgetfulness and have the concomitant power of “acting” their reactions — of giving them force.14 The Slaves, by contrast, possess a “prodigious memory.” We must avoid however the idea that forgetfulness is solely the prerogative of the Masters, since in fact all humans are forgetfulness embodied.15

Forgetfulness Is Active

So we have seen that forgetfulness is itself active and essential to action. I will now show the ethical dimension of forgetfulness, beyond what is already clear from the facts that The Masters are central to understanding Nietzsche’s ethical project of revaluation, and The Masters are active and forgetful.

3 The Ethical Project

We see an ethical importance in HA, where Nietzsche writes:

“how little moral would the world appear without forgetfulness!” [10, II.92]

Nietzsche has ambivalent attitudes towards (post-Christian) morality and the decline of the influence of religion due to its passage under the microscope of scientific history. He is an atheist, yet regrets the passing of Christianity and believes that Christian ethics apply to everyone.

Later, the forgetfulness as “doorkeeper” metaphor appears, being necessary to preservation of “human dignity.” This means we may need the hypocrisy involved in asserting that we believe in “the equal value of all human life” while at the same time doing nothing about, for example, widespread starvation in other countries.

Revaluation Of All Values

https://ccrma.stanford.edu/~pj97/Nietzsche.htm

We may also consider under the ethical heading Nietzsche’s project of revaluation of all values, which heralds the coming of the Übermensch — or is his task. There are three metamorphoses of the spirit to be found in Z [11]: the spirit becomes first a camel, then a lion, and then a child. The camel, a beast of burden, accepts the status quo, and labours uncomplainingly under extant values. The camel must become the lion, who fights and destroys existing values. The lion’s strength is only negative though — it succeeds in destroying existing values but not in creating new ones. The lion must become the child16, which is:

“innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes.” [11, I, `Of the Three Metamorphoses’]

Nietzsche: Forgetfulness Is Necessary For Creation

We have already seen one of Nietzsche’s meanings here: that of forgetfulness being necessary for creation — because creators must forget the impermanence of everything. The second meaning is that they must also forget existing values and the “value” of those values. Nietzsche has a doctrine of eternal recurrence under which we are asked to imagine our reaction to the prospect of everything returning exactly as it is an infinite number of times. Those passing the test of willing this return are possessed of uncommon psychological strength. [14, x3] The “Yes” can therefore be seen as the affirmation given by those passing the test of affirming eternal recurrence, but it could also be seen as the affirmation of the new values.17

Forgetfulness then is part of the necessary negation of existing values which we must forget. Then we can negate them. The “wheel” is the infinitely repeated cycles in the doctrine. But the “self-propelling” description refers both to the fact that creators are driven by themselves and not society — they are untimely — and that they create their own values. In this way, they are a first motion which may have consequent movements, but are not the result of prior movements: they are essentially active and not reactive. The importance of the link between forgetfulness and creation (of new values) may be seen from the fact that the image of the self-propelling wheel recurs in a section on Creators. [11, I, `Of the Way of the Creator’]

Nietzsche: Forgetfulness – Zarathustra

In the next section, Zarathustra meets an old woman who wishes to have truths explained to her which Zarathustra thinks are inappropriate for her ears. She though thinks she is old enough to soon forget them. Thus we see an echo of the line in UM that the amount of historical sense or truth a person can stand is a measure of their strength; or alternatively that a power of forgetfulness would be a source of such strength. [11, I, “Of Old and Young Women”]

There is also a link elsewhere [5, I.3] to this line, admittedly via an explanation which Nietzsche sees as false though psychologically plausible. Here, forgetfulness is a filter of values. Only those of the highest importance survive the filtration. We could see this as a precursor to the revaluation of all values because it reminds us of the key question as to what it is — if anything — which gives value to values.

Human Equality

Nietzsche accepts the idea of human equality only for the sake of argument in [1, `David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer’, x7]. There, he notes that since it is a precondition of success in evolutionary competition to forget that others in theory possess the same rights, forgetfulness is a mark of strength if one accepts Darwinian ideas. Forgetfulness here plays an important supporting role in Nietzsche’s attack on the idea that morality could have evolved or must be right because it is natural.

Commentators give many reasons to think that forgetfulness is closely related to Nietzsche’s ideas on values.18 Since that latter area is of central importance for him, we have shown that forgetfulness is also key to Nietzsche’s work. I will finally make some remarks on the linked topic of how forgetfulness has some positive valorisations for Nietzsche. We should expect this because he must to some extent have a positive valorization of aspects of forgetfulness if he valorizes action and creation of new values, as I argue, and also sees forgetfulness as key to those two beneficial steps.

Nietzsche: Forgetfulness Required For The Illusion Of Truth

Nietzsche observes that:

“[o]nly through forgetfulness could human beings ever entertain the illusion that they possess truth to the degree described.”

[See Nietzsche’s On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense: Summary]

By “degree.” Nietzsche means the illusion that truth is external to us as opposed to a creation of language. Without that illusion, we would be unable to act or think.

Nietzsche argues that forgetfulness is essential to abstract thought. Martin [18] draws our attention to a Borges story bearing on Nietzsche’s point here. In Borges’s story, the hero is unable to connect a dog seen at 3:14 from the side with one — as we know, the same one — seen at 3:15 from the front. Nietzsche’s own example is a leaf. Once we have seen one leaf, we use it as a metaphor for all other leaves we see, which permits us to use the same name for all of them.

The Leaves

This requires forgetfulness of the differences between all of the leaves.19 Since we have shown above that truth is intimately bound up with Nietzsche’s ethical project — because we are to find a pure drive to truth unsullied by personal considerations — and that forgetfulness creates truth, such as it is, we have a further reason to see that active forgetfulness is central to that ethical project. Active forgetfulness is a strategy Nietzsche “recommends” in approaching the paradoxical and self-contradictory nature of his work.

Contradictions And Subterfuges

Commentators have adopted a variety of subterfuges20 in order to avoid perceiving these contradictions, including the ascription of madness and the division of Nietzsche’s thought into various incompatible phases. The approach Nietzsche wants us to take is to handle the contradictions using active forgetfulness to take only what we need and thus create our own Nietzsche along with our own values.

Nietzsche describes active forgetting as a “divine ability.”21 This is characteristically double-edged. It suggests ultimate value and at the same time unattainability. Language is necessarily metaphorical. Nietzsche needs to forget this in order to write at all. Z. is a rhythmic alternation22 between sections where active forgetfulness allows language to be used “innocently” — that is, as if it had a stable meaning — and sections remembering that very critique of language, that such stable meanings can only be constructed.

Dionysus vs Apollo

We can describe this opposing polarity of forgetfulness vs remembering (or self-consciousness) in terms of Nietzsche’s oppositions between Dionysus and Apollo23, or intuition and analysis, or even group vs individual. Moreover, we can see (self-) forgetfulness as a product of Dionysiac excess of intoxication24 and music for Nietzsche, adding that the ecstatic state is the one in which affirmation of all life as it is takes place. So forgetfulness is linked to passing the test of the doctrine of eternal recurrence.

Indeed, Hutchings [21] identifies Zarathustra with Dionysus. Since all pair members require their opposite, we see an additional dialectical importance of forgetfulness in that it is a precondition for memory: it creates space for the new. Dionysus and forgetting are linked by intoxication. Since we know that Nietzsche will choose Dionysiac excess over Apollonian asceticism, we have a further positive valorization of forgetfulness.

Tragedy

Consideration of BT [13] adds tragedy and Socraticism to the opposed pairs.25 We know that Nietzsche holds that the artistic imagination creates all values, and also our pure drive to truth. (In fact, poetry is the music of forgetfulness and seeks to be the unvarnished truth.) So eventually we have a progress from forgetfulness via art/tragedy to values. Dionysus is a figure representing death or dissolution who is nevertheless life-sustaining — this is a clear parallel to forgetfulness and shows us another Nietzschean double-valorization.26.

Forgetfulness As A Weapon

Z. is an encouragement to use forgetfulness as a weapon against our own will to truth, but it is also a biblical parody.27. The ridiculous aphorisms that are in Z. couched in biblical solemnity show that weighty language does not guarantee truth. Indeed, distracting sounds and words are a means of forgetting [19, p. 111] and so they would be “divine:” I am the word and yet the word is false. The counter-myth of the Übermensch also becomes a “poetic lie” which is only true to the extent it is useful for us to believe it and so finally, only we ourselves can be the source of values.

4 Conclusion

We have shown that forgetfulness is active and this active forgetfulness is essential to action, and is a major characteristic of The Masters. Since The Masters are a key to Nietzsche’s central ethical project, being a call to the revaluation of all values, we have shown that active forgetfulness is important in the context of that project, which would also require forgetfulness of existing values.

See Also:

Quine And Fine on Reference and Modality

Is Experience Time the same as Experienced Time?

Does Nietzsche Support A Collective Memory Type?

Nietzsche’s Account Of Truth

Footnotes

1Nietzsche writes:

“a man who did not possess the power of forgetting at all and who was thus condemned to see everywhere a state of becoming: such a man would no longer believe in his own being […]. Forgetting is essential to action of any kind.’ [1, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.” x1]

Carlson [2], reviewing Grundlehner on Nietzsche’s poetry — which is “the music of forgetting” [3] — discusses Grundlehner’s argument that “forgetting dismembers the integral self” and that this fragmentation is reflected in the dissonance of Nietzsche’s poetry.

2Kariel [4, p. 217] also notes that we need to forget facts about the future — and in particular the fact of our own deaths — to continue to act at all. We might add that those who seek to avoid that conclusion by procreation must forget that procreation, being the creation of new human life, can only solve problems which are not essential to human life.

Further Footnotes

3We learn that:

“it is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting […] there is a degree of sleeplessness, […] of the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal” [1, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.” x1]

Moreover, the end of history has been falsely announced before now and doubtless will be again: we must “forget the suspicion that [we] are epigones.” [1, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.” x6]

Further Footnotes

4″It requires a great deal of strength to be able to live and to forget the extent to which to live and to be unjust is one and the same thing.” [1, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.” x3]

5We see this since:

“[a]s he who acts is, in Goethe’s words, always without a conscience, so is he also always without knowledge; he forgets most things so as to do one thing” [1, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.” x1]

6I will use standard abbreviations for Nietzsche’s works such as are to be found at [5, p. xxxvii]; here I refer to [1, “Schopenhauer As Educator”]

7 “With the word “the unhistorical” I designate the art and power of forgetting and enclosing oneself within a bounded horizon […] science […] hates forgetting, which is the death of knowledge, and seeks to abolish all limitations of horizon.” [1, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” x10]

Further Footnotes

8Nietzsche describes the most powerful nature as one that:

“would no know boundary at all at which the historical sense began to overwhelm it […] [t]hat which such a nature cannot subdue it knows how to forget; it no longer exists” [1, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.” x1]

9Corngold [6, fn. 27] argues that even the existence of a self for the Masters requires active forgetfulness. He says that in BGE, [7] Nietzsche argues that the noble human possesses a natural certainty about the self. This could be in tension with what Corngold sees as a quasi-Heideggerean notion of self as that for which its being is in question. The noble human, however, wishes to overcome himself in anticipation of the Übermensch.

Corngold notes that “This suspension of the explicit question of the self is connected in Nietzsche to the entire complex of ideas that comes under the head of “active forgetfulness.” ” Thus we see that forgetfulness is shown to be necessary, via the concept of the (noble) self, to the coming of the Übermensch and the revaluation of all values. Corngold also sees forgetfulness as “condition of action and truth.”

10We may note here that “putting to the back of one’s mind” is different to active forgetting. One may recall an item at will but choose not to. This more passive forgetting is different to the active forgetting that we are discussing.

Further Footnotes

11We can see this denial of what is other at [5, I.10]. Deleuze [8, x1.4] notes that ressentiment replaces action. Action will produce forgetfulness because it extinguishes its own causes or rather their resultant intermediary motivations while ressentiment, which would be extinguished by forgetfulness, must continue for the Slaves to allow them to continue in their parody of self-affirmation.

12O’Sullivan [9] cites this connection between pain and forgetfulness, and regards the former as an “ever recurrent theme of [Nietzsche’s] work.” O’Sullivan argues that pain is a function of intelligence that drives us into various displacement activities such as mechanical labour — we are reminded here of Wittgenstein — which function by inducing self-forgetfulness. Pain is valuation and so active forgetfulness is a precursor of revaluation of values. O’Sullivan also notes that we need to forget the blood-soaked origins of our institutions and customs in order to continue to observe them.

Further Footnotes

13Deleuze notes this separation. [8, x4.2] Deleuze also observes [8, x4.11] that forgetfulness becomes opposed to a memory of the future — a facilitation of the redemption of promises — in the active and strong individual.

14Deleuze note this characteristic of The Masters at [8, x4.4].

15Nietzsche describes the human animal as “forgetfulness in the flesh” at [5, II.3].

16Downard [12] notes that “purity” is one characteristic needed to make the transition from the value-destroying lion to the value-creating child, and notes that “[o]ften, this requirement of purity is referred to as innocence, solitude, honesty, or forgetfulness.” This is in the context of discussing Nietzsche’s suggestion that we should have a pure drive to truth; that is, one that involves forgetfulness of our selves and our personal desires.

Obtaining that would permit the self-overcoming and revaluation Nietzsche seeks by way of noting that currently many — less useful — truths are created by convention. [13, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”] Convention employs forgetting as well [1, “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth.” x6], so that we forget what we wanted to say, thus enabling the standard hypocrisy required for social life.

Further Footnotes

17Deleuze [8, x5.13] takes this latter view.

18Crawford [15] argues that Nietzsche’s conception of time drives his urging that we live unhistorically — i.e. use forgetfulness — and connects this to the Übermensch and the doctrine of the eternal return via the line that the former perceives the latter. She coins the neologism Overchild to represent the link between the unhistorical child who lives in the moment and the superhistorical Übermensch who perceives the whole of the eternal return and that the world is always already complete and achieved. These are the only two remedies to an excess of historical sense.

Gillespie [16] also sees the forgetfulness of the child as the key to new values. Clearly mere ignorance of the old values would not suffice to reject them decisively and overcome them. Forgetfulness is needed for the transition from the child to the Übermensch but is not enough — affirmation of the eternal return is also needed to pass beyond good and evil. Gillespie also sees forgetfulness as a measure of the strength of individuals, some of whom can use it to repress the “horrifying truth” that total destruction must precede creation. Peters [17] holds that linear temporality must be subjected to forgetfulness in the revaluation of all values; this also includes “remembering” the circular time of the doctrine of eternal recurrence.

Zarathustra — the “advocate of the circle” — is a philosophically sophisticated version of the unhistorical man. Creativity requires a shrinking of the temporal horizons to the zero point of the current moment. There is also a parallel between active forgetfulness and active silence — the pauses in different pieces of music are not the same, as what is omitted in different discourses is not the same.

Further Footnotes

19On this point depends Nietzsche’s important doctrine of perspectivism, which holds that there is no privileged viewpoint from which an ultimate truth may be perceived.

20Kuenzli [19, p. 100] draws attention to these.

21Kuenzli. [19, p. 107] gives this Nachlaß reference.

22Kuenzli [19] observes this alternation.

23These polarities are outlined by Astell [20].

24Hutchings [21, p. 240] draws attention to this function of intoxication.

25Pippin [22] discusses this polarization.

26Pippin [22, p. 40] describes these characteristics of Dionysus.

27The controversial fourth part, which was somehow published and yet not published, is a parody of the parody; the fourth part exists in the penumbra of the Nachlaß.

References

[1] F. W. Nietzsche and R. J. Hollingdale, Untimely meditations. Friedrich Nietzsche ; translated by R.J. Hollingdale ; with an introduction by J.P. Stern. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York :, 1983.

[2] T. A. Carlson, “Review: [untitled],” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. pp. 398{401, 1989.

[3] F. Nietzsche, B. Williams, J. Nauckho , and A. Caro, “The gay science: with a prelude in German rhymes and an appendix of songs” Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[4] H. S. Kariel, “Nietzsche’s preface to constitutionalism,” The Journal of Politics, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. pp. 211{225, 1963.

[5] F. Nietzsche, M. Clark, and A. Swensen, “On the genealogy of morality: a polemic” Hackett Classics, Hackett Pub. Co., 1998.

[6] S. Corngold, “The question of the self in nietzsche during the axial period (1882-1888),” boundary 2, vol. 9/10, pp. pp. 55{98, 1981.

[7] F. Nietzsche and R. Hollingdale, “Beyond good and evil: prelude to a philosophy of the future.” Penguin classics, Penguin, 2003.

[8] G. Deleuze, “Nietzsche and philosophy” Continuum impacts, Continuum, 2006.

[9] L. O’Sullivan, “Nietzsche and pain” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, no. 11, pp. pp. 13{22, 1996.

[10] F. Nietzsche and R. J. Hollingdale, “Human, all too human : a book for free spirits” Friedrich Nietzsche ; translated by R.J. Hollingdale ; introduction by Erich Heller. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York :, 1986.

[11] F. Nietzsche and R. Hollingdale, “Thus spoke Zarathustra: a book for every-one and no one.” Penguin classics, Penguin Books, 1961.

Further References

[12] J. Downard, “Nietzsche and Kant on the pure impulse to truth,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, no. 27, pp. pp. 18{41, 2004.

[13] F. Nietzsche, R. Geuss, and R. Speirs, “The birth of tragedy and other writings.” Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[14] R. Wicks, “Friedrich Nietzsche,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (E. N. Zalta, ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford Univer- sity, summer 2011 ed., 2011.

[15] C. Crawford, “Nietzsche’s overhuman: Creating on the crest of the time-point,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, no. 30, pp. pp. 22.48, 2005.

[16] M. A. Gillespie, “Slouching toward Bethlehem to be born: On the nature and meaning of Nietzsche’s superman,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, no. 30, pp. pp. 49{69, 2005.

[17] G. Peters, “The double stillness: Speech, silence and musicality in Nietzsche,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, no. 2, pp. pp. 11.43, 1991.

[18] C. W. Martin, “Borges forgets Nietzsche,” Philosophy and Literature, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 265.276, 2006.

[19] R. E. Kuenzli, “Nietzsche’s zerography: Thus spoke Zarathustra,” boundary 2, vol. 9/10, pp. 99–117, 1981.

[20] A. W. Astell, “Nietzsche, Chaucer, and the sacrifice of art,” The Chaucer Review, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. pp. 323–340, 2005.

[21] A. Hutchings, “Nietzsche, Wagner and Delius,” Music and Letters, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. pp. 235–247, 1941.

[22] R. Pippin, “Truth and lies in the early Nietzsche,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, no. 11, pp. pp. 35–52, 1996.