ANOTHER day, another milestone: there appears to be no let-up in the frenetic pace of Myanmar's political transformation. In early February, for the first time in memory, the finance minister revealed details of the government budget. In a speech to parliament (of all places: the place had been considered a joke), he also divulged how much Myanmar owed in foreign debt ($11 billion). Then, a couple of days later, the hitherto secretive and repressive dictatorship told a UN human-rights envoy that it will now consider allowing monitors into the country for by-elections on April 1st.

It would be an extraordinary step. These will be the first parliamentary seats to be contested by Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), since it was unbanned by the government just a few months ago. Ms Suu Kyi herself is running for a seat, and she recently held her first political rallies outside the capital since being released from house arrest in November 2010. The by-elections will be a test of the government's sincerity. If they are seen to be free and fair, that might go a long way to persuading American legislators to start lifting sanctions imposed on Myanmar in the mid-1990s.

Parliament is also considering a new media law that would, in theory, give Myanmar one of the most liberal reporting environments in the region. Only a year ago papers were not allowed even to mention Ms Suu Kyi's name, and the few independent-minded publications had to resort to imaginative ruses. On Ms Suu Kyi's release from house arrest, a sports paper jiggled around with some innocuous headlines from English football. The list “Sunderland Freeze Chelsea”, “United Stunned by Villa” & “Arsenal Advance to Grab Their Hope” was highlighted in varying colours to give readers the real news: “Su Free Unite & Advance to Grab the Hope”.

It all seems like ancient history. Yet the question remains why an entrenched military regime, in power since 1962, is doing all this now, and so fast. In comparison with the bloody political upheavals in the Middle East, Myanmar's political revolution has been top-down and largely peaceful. The changes may yet prove to be more profound than in Libya or Egypt.

Long-term anxieties contributed to the generals' change of heart. After decades of failed socialist planning followed by a few more of military crony capitalism, the regime became increasingly aware that once-rich Myanmar had in its hands fallen embarrassingly far behind the neighbours. At some point, this humiliation trumped the ability of a few to make very corrupt fortunes.

In the spirit of openness now sweeping the country, officials acknowledge that the economy was in no shape, for instance, to prosper after Myanmar's planned entry into a single market among the ten-country Association of South-East Asian Nations in 2015. What is more, many in government badly want their country to be reconnected to sources of international finance, especially the IMF and the World Bank. Myanmar has been denied this under Western sanctions. If prisoners must be freed to get sanctions lifted, so be it.

Many presumed that these sanctions did not worry the generals because they could rely on Chinese aid instead. Not so. Particularly in northern Myanmar, the often arrogant and sometimes brutal behaviour of Chinese companies in the end alienated even the government. What is more, the sort of technical and educational assistance—“capacity-building” in the jargon—that Myanmar now craves is just what China does not do. Thus the generals have been obliged to turn back to the West, and political reform.

Government types now acknowledge that other factors were at work, too. One high-up official concedes that the reform process was greatly accelerated last year by the Arab spring. This scared the generals: “it was a very critical time for us”. The regime was afraid that opposition groups would take to the streets again, as they had done in 1988 and 2007, maybe in conjunction with the many armed groups, including among the Karen and Kachin minorities, fighting ethnic insurgencies in the border regions. It was time, this official says, to pursue national reconciliation.

Then there was the emergence of Thein Sein, a former general who became the new president in March 2011, succeeding the hardline General Than Shwe. Even his own officials were surprised by how enthusiastically Mr Thein Sein embraced reforms. In stark contrast to his predecessors, Mr Thein Sein is ready to admit to the regime's failures and says the country must learn from others. One person who dealt with him described the president as “a listener, sincere and sympathetic….it's largely down to his personality”. Some Burmese think that his loyalties to the army were largely cut once he took off his uniform. One visiting foreign minister has reported that Mr Thein Sein told him last year that it was ages since he had spoken to General Than Shwe (who was presumed still to be pulling the strings).

Another person who testifies to the president's sincerity is Ms Suu Kyi. The personal trust that the two have established has enormously contributed to moving Myanmar's changes along. The government knows that Ms Suu Kyi has the first and last word on lifting any sanctions, a powerful bargaining position. Yet Ms Suu Kyi has had to be flexible too. To the bewilderment of those who admired her intransigence, by running for parliament she seems to have reneged on her principled opposition to participating in politics under the terms of a constitution, passed in 2008, which, above all, entrenches the army in politics.

Both Mr Thein Sein and Ms Suu Kyi have learned the virtues of pragmatism. At their crucial meeting last August, which Ms Suu Kyi will not discuss, some sort of deal was worked out, and after that the pace of change quickened. Broadly, it seems that Mr Thein Sein promised to push ahead with the release of political prisoners, and give the nod to political reforms that might one day allow the NLD to take power. In exchange, Ms Suu Kyi promised to rejoin (and so legitimise) the political process, and to work to lift sanctions. Tacitly, at least, the NLD seems to have agreed that no retribution or prosecutions will follow against the generals for past crimes and misdemeanours, should they one day lose power.

This last demand is critical, and has probably allowed Mr Thein Sein to win the sceptical generals round. Fears of the junta being dragged off to The Hague have stymied progress before. Now the army will feel a bit more secure about relaxing its grip on power. Certainly, interlocutors from the opposition play down expectations of holding the army to account, instead cajoling everyone to look firmly to the future. Thus in Myanmar the generals and their families may get to keep their Ferraris, while peace may prevail over justice. Such is the price of change.