IT'S election season in America, which means that China is in the rhetorical crosshairs. Both President Obama and Mitt Romney have been complaining about Chinese economic misbehaviour, but Mr Romney has attacked Mr Obama especially viciously on the subject of currency manipulation and the administration's failure to label China a manipulator and slap it with tariffs. Paul Krugman says that the time for such actions has passed:

In 2010 an undervalued renminbi was a significant drag on advanced economies, including the United States. Since then, however, two big things have happened: relatively high inflation in China, and some appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar. As a result, the real exchange rate of China against the United States (based on consumer prices), has appreciated significantly... At the same time. China’s surplus has come way down...

I'm happy to agree with most of that. This newspaper has argued that, on some measures, the yuan is close to fair value. As my colleague noted recently, net exports have been a drag on Chinese growth over the past two years. And at times this year, China has faced substantial capital outflows.

But Mr Krugman leaves something important out of this discussion, which is: how did we wind up here? In particular, how did we wind up here without America's government ever "getting tough" with China?

Let's rewind. Back in 2010, Mr Krugman argued animatedly that China's currency manipulation was having a very nasty effect on America's economy and that a very tough line with the Chinese leadership, including a battery of punitive tariffs, was justified. I felt quite differently: that the currency manipulation was less important than he thought, that aggressive action would very probably be either counterproductive or destructive, and that as everyone agreed appreciation was in China's long-run interests the problem would eventually solve itself. As recently as October of last year, when Mr Krugman still thought China bashing would be economically useful, I said:

The question I'd ask myself if I were Mr Krugman is this: is American pressure likely to lead to appreciation over and above the current pace with acceptable costs to the global economy and important international relationships? Now, maybe Mr Krugman would argue that the answer is yes. For now, he simply ignores the possibility that anything truly bad could happen as a result of a "get tough" approach in America. That's just not good enough; typically we're somewhat careful about trying to force major economies to do something they clearly are reluctant to do, particularly when the benefits are likely to be relatively small. I'm not sure that what the global economy needs right now is a round of sabre-rattling between the two largest economies. (Mr Krugman would argue that China was the initial agressor, but ongoing—slow, but meaningful—yuan appreciation means that China is effectively disarming.)

I'd put the question to Mr Krugman again. Given that he seems to accept that China's real exchange rate has adjusted to an acceptable level in just two years, how confident is he that an even faster appreciation could have been achieved at acceptable economic and diplomatic cost? Because I'm feeling a bit smuggish about my past assessments of the issue.