On the face of it, this latest, apparently impromptu, outing looks less substantive than Singapore, or the abortive February summit in Hanoi, which broke up after the two sides failed to find common ground on denuclearisation. US President Donald Trump walks to the North Korean side of the border with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the border village of Panmunjom. Credit:AP Trump and Kim’s “handshake” moment at the 38th Parallel, accompanied by South Korean President Moon Jae-in, had the feel of a hastily organised photo opportunity set against a theatrical backdrop. For sceptics of Trump’s well-known proclivity for publicity stunts, this weekend’s events resemble the latest instalment in a TV melodrama designed mainly to boost his ratings with “the base”. They will judge this as more vacuous grand-standing on the world stage; alternately picking quarrels with rogue states like North Korea and Iran, only to subsequently “make nice” with a fanfare deal that fails to address the underlying security issues, while distracting US attention from the bigger fish challengers, Russia and China.

Trump is again being criticised for lionising dictators, like Kim, and up-staging democratic allies, like Moon, who took a back-seat role at Panmunjom. Alek Sigley, who is living in North Korea, has not contacted his Perth family since Tuesday. If Trump is a consummate showman, Kim doesn’t lack in the melodrama department either. To that end, they are a well matched pair. But symbols do count in international affairs. And this was another big one. What is the fallout of this weekend’s events for Australia? Canberra sees the North Korean issue largely through the prism of nuclear non-proliferation and the US alliance. Canberra must also decide whether it is prepared to live with a compromise outcome that leaves North Korean nuclear weapons in place.

Australia’s distance from the Korean Peninsula – similar to that of Hawaii – makes this a less pressing dilemma than for Seoul or Tokyo. Loading But there is a more human and urgent issue that looms front and centre for Canberra, following reports last week that an Australian student, Alek Sigley, has been taken into custody by North Korea’s authorities. Sigley has been studying for the past year at Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung University. His whereabouts remain unknown, despite efforts by Australian diplomats to contact him. The regime has not announced any charges against him, but in an indication of Canberra’s concerns Prime Minister Scott Morrison reportedly discussed his case at last week’s G20 summit in Osaka.

If Trump failed to press Kim on Sigley’s case, that was a golden opportunity missed. However, the resumption of working level meetings provides US North Korea envoy, Steve Biegun, with a chance to call for his immediate release – if he has not done already. Loading Replay Replay video Play video Play video Australia’s consular efforts are hamstrung by the lack of diplomatic representation in Pyongyang and Canberra. It can only be hoped that an improved US-North Korean dynamic will have a positive influence for an early resolution of Alek Sigley’s case, so that he may return to Australia without delay. The most charitable interpretation of Trump’s willingness to cross into North Korea, and to issue an open invitation for Kim to visit the United States, is that this signals the US President’s intention to accept North Korea not only as a state, but as a nuclear power that it can live with.

That interpretation is sharply at odds with the stated policy of complete denuclearisation. But since the US has no means to compel the regime to give up all its nuclear weapons, short of risking apocalyptic force, Trump may be preparing the ground for something less than that, whereby North Korea keeps some of its nuclear arsenal, but agrees to trade away its ability to directly threaten the United States. This, after all, is consistent with Trump’s bottom-line interest in an “America first” foreign policy. Moon would probably support such an outcome, given his bottom-line priority is the avoidance of war on the Peninsula and inter-Korean rapprochement. Japan, as the other state most obviously in North Korea’s nuclear sights and dependent on Washington for extended nuclear deterrence, would be more vexed. Whether Kim is prepared to wear such an outcome is unclear. The lower-risk option for him would be to simply to keep the negotiations ticking along, avoiding another crisis, until the outlook for next year’s US presidential elections is clearer. But the onus is now back on Kim to offer a substantive concession if there is to be any prospect of US sanctions relief.