The Syrian debacle

The U.S. should provide both Assad and Putin with guarantees and incentives in order to rebuild trust, mitigate disagreements and ultimately arrive at viable solutions.

The widespread Syrian ambivalence over the insurrection was not tied to a lack of confidence in the opposition’s ability to prevail over the regime. With U.S. support, there was little doubt that the rebels could win the war. Syrians have firsthand knowledge of Washington’s prowess in engineering regime change as well as its inability to ensure good outcomes in the aftermath. A series of U.S.-backed coups in the 1950s turned Syria into one of the least stable countries in the Middle East. It is not a history Syrians hope to repeat. Rather, the 2011 Syrian uprising failed because the public lacked confidence in the opposition’s ability to provide a viable and superior alternative to the existing government. It was not a question of whether Assad’s foes could prevail on the battlefield but of what would happen next. It remains painfully obvious that neither the opposition nor its patrons in the U.S. government have any cogent plan for the day after Assad’s downfall (which is also likely why the U.S. has not yet deposed Assad). None of the United States’ orchestrated transitions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Libya or Yemen offer models that Syrians would want to emulate. These failures go to the heart of the credibility gap that the U.S. and its proxies face in Syria. The White House has been offering the Syrian people the right to vote but not necessarily the ability to feed their families or live in relative stability and security. Meanwhile, Assad’s regime has been highly focused on the latter, providing these benefits in government-held territories and depriving them in rebel-held areas. This is why his beleaguered government is more or less winning the war. The Obama administration’s refrain that Assad has lost all credibility with the Syrian people is demonstrably false. For those who have to live with whatever becomes of Syria, the most credible actor will be whoever can, first and foremost, hold the state together and ensure its continued functioning. Questions about reforming the system, while important, will be secondary. One has to first preserve the state for reforms to be relevant.

Resolving crises