The first fire brigade incident commander at the Grenfell Tower fire has admitted he failed to make numerous required checks on the safety of the building in the months before the disaster and told the public inquiry he had no idea that fires could spread through cladding.

Michael Dowden, a firefighter for 14 years and watch manager at North Kensington fire station, was forced to repeatedly admit his ignorance of the risks to the building, the evacuation strategy and the vulnerability of its occupants during evidence that raised serious questions about the rigour of the London fire brigade’s procedures on high-rise safety.

Dowden said he was not aware that combustible facades were put on the outside of buildings, even though the LFB had issued a report in October 2016 which detailed exactly that risk with pictures of cladding fires in Dubai, China, Azerbaijan, Chechnya and in the UK.

He said that he had received no training in what to look for when undertaking familiarisation checks of buildings and when he did visit Grenfell in 2016, he did not inspect any of the cladding works, the conditions of the fire doors or could not remember if he went up the tower. He did not note it had a single escape route or whether there were sprinklers.

In evidence that upset and angered some of the bereaved people in attendance, the inquiry also heard that a routine document with essential details about buildings to guide firefighters during a fire was not created for Grenfell Tower. It was supposed to inform them of the dimensions of the building, number of flats, hydrant and dry riser locations, fire lift locations, stairwells, entrances, exits, sprinklers and the surrounding streets. The information that Dowden did print off and take to the fire with his crew was last updated in 2009, seven years before the completion of the refurbishment. It said the building had a “stay put” policy but little else.

In a statement, Dowden described in harrowing detail the burning debris falling from the tower, highly toxic smoke, and women and children passing him on the stairwell informing him that their loved ones were dead. He said at one point he suggested his firefighters use tables as shields to protect themselves from the debris.

He admitted he had never heard of building regulations guidance on fire safety, known as approved document B, and that he did not know anything about a letter the LFB had sent to some London councils warning “that external fire spread on high-rise residential buildings as a result of being clad in combustible panels presented a generic health and safety issue”.

He agreed with the assessment of Richard Millett QC, counsel to the inquiry, that his knowledge of this was “as good as the person in the street”.

He described how he saw bodies of the dead around the base of the tower, including one man who had jumped from the building. He and his crew battled the fire until around 8.30am by which time they were “completely shell shocked”.



“I have found it very difficult to deal with the events of Grenfell Tower,” he said.

Dowden was in charge for the first hour of the fire, until about 2am, by which time it had spread out of control. The “stay put” advice was changed only at 2.47am, but the inquiry has heard that it was redundant by 1.24am. Dowden’s evidence was cut short because he was unable to go on and was “finding it a difficult exercise”, the inquiry heard.

The bulk of his evidence was about a familiarisation visit at Grenfell Tower in 2016 as the refurbishment neared completion.

Millett asked if he had gathered information about the building as required under national guidance. Of the list of 13 issues that Millett asked about, Dowden had not checked or could not recall if he checked on 11. They included protocols about evacuation and checking whether there were people living in the building whose command of English might obstruct their understanding of those protocols, children who might need help, elderly people and people with mobility issues.

He could not recall if he had been shown the lifts or whether anyone said anything about whether the lifts were fire lifts or firefighting lifts and asked no questions about what was going on the exterior.

Dowden was cross-examined about his knowledge of the building’s “stay put” policy. He said he had received no training in how to reverse it.

Occupants of the 24-storey block who called 999 were advised to stay in their flats long after the fire had started spreading through the facade.

Dowden was asked by Millett: “Did you ever receive any training in how to re-evaluate advice offered during fire survival calls throughout the incident?”

He replied: “Not that I can recall, no.”

Had he been trained in how to inform control to change the advice?

“Not any training,” he said. “I can’t recall that I received any training as to how that was done.”

Dowden asked: “Were you trained in what were exceptional circumstances?”

He replied: “No.”

The requirement for incident commanders to be able to adapt “stay put” strategies is written into LFB policy, the inquiry heard. Dowden said repeatedly he had not received training in this and other matters such as identifying fire spread through a building’s facade, which are also required by government policy for firefighters.

He admitted he could not recall the last training he had received in fighting high-rise fires, even though his training record showed it took place on 23 March 2017, three months before the fire. He seemed unable to recall a previous session in September 2016.

He said training had been increasingly delivered through computer-based simulation since officer training and firefighter training had been outsourced to the private company Babcock.

The inquiry has already heard that the fire spread quickly from flat 16 on the fourth floor after a uPVC window frame melted and the flames spread into the cladding system.



Dowden said in his witness statement: “After about 20 minutes, I could see that something had failed to make the fire react as it did. When I saw Grenfell Tower behaving like this, I was quickly outside my comfort zone and was trying to make decisions that I have not made before.

“Although I have previous experience in high-rise firefighting, I have never seen a fire behave in this way. It was totally unprecedented.”

The inquiry, which is now in its fifth week, continues.