

S E C R E T PANAMA 000639



NOFORN

SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2039

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SNAR, KCRM, PM

SUBJECT: MARTINELLI WIRETAP QUEST SHOWS DARK SIDE OF NEW GOP



Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reason 1.4 b and d.





Summary

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1. (S//NF) President Martinelli has reached out to the

Embassy, among other actors, to request help in building

infrastructure to conduct wiretaps against ostensible

security threats as well as political opponents. The

Ambassador has made it clear to the president that the USG

will continue our successful judicialized law enforcement

wiretap program with Panama, but we will not be party to any

effort to expand wiretaps to domestic political targets.

Martinelli's seeming fixation with wiretaps and his comments

to Ambassador during an August 12 meeting demonstrate that he

may be willing to set aside the rule of law in order to

achieve his political and developmental goals. Martinelli

has publicly declared that wiretapping will be a key law

enforcement tool, and has submitted a draft wiretap bill to

the national assembly. Civil liberties advocates are girding

for a fight, and this issue could provide the first serious

challenge to Martinelli's popularity.



"I Need Help"

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2. (S//NF) Late last month Martinelli sent the Ambassador a

cryptic Blackberry message that said, "I need help with

tapping phones." The Ambassador, who was traveling outside

Panama at the time, did not respond to the substance of the

message, but directed DCM and DEA chief to meet with

Martinelli's staff to get a better understanding of the

president's request. DCM and DEA chief met Minister of the

Presidency Jimmy Papadimitriu on July 29 and again August 1.

The latter meeting also included chief of intelligence Jaime

Trujillo and newly-appointed Security Secretary Jose Abel

Almengor. Papadimitriu explained that the Martinelli

administration's aggressive anti-corruption campaign is

taking on powerful and corrupt individuals whose economic

status is being threatened. He said some of those

individuals may attempt to retaliate by threatening

Martinelli's personal safety. In addition, Martinelli

believes that his right-of-center political orientation makes

him a target of leftist governments in the region who will

attempt to infiltrate Panama's trade unions and destabilize

the GOP. Papadimitriu said Martinelli believes he is not

getting adequate information from Panama's security services

to counter these potential threats, and that he hoped to gain

greater insight by establishing a wiretap program.



3. (S//NF) DCM and DEA chief explained the USG's "Operation

Matador" judicialized wiretap program which currently

operates in conjunction with Panama's police and security

services. They emphasized the requirement that all targets

must be related to drug trafficking and related crimes, and

that all taps must be approved by a Panamanian supreme court

judge, following basic legal protections that are

well-established in the U.S. The present program provides

half of the wiretapped lines to the GOP for its own organized

crime investigations, which could include national security

targets. Under current procedures, DEA prepares an affidavit

every 30 days which contains a list of DEA and GOP wiretap

targets, which is reviewed and approved by the supreme court.





4. (S//NF) Papadimitriu, Trujillo and Almengor suggested that

the current system did not allow the GOP enough flexibility

to select targets, and mentioned short-fuse incidents such as

kidnappings where rapid wiretap capability was needed. DCM

and DEA chief countered that the technical capacity already

exists, and that the GOP should explore a new rapid-response

procedure for getting court orders that would authorize taps

for emergency situations. DCM made very clear to

Papadimitriu that the USG would not assist in expanding the

program to include domestic political targets. Papadimitriu

laughed and said that Panama's security problems were far too

serious to waste limited investigative capacity on political

enemies.



Darker Intent

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5. (S//NF) A recent conversation with President Martinelli,

however, paints a less benign picture. On August 12 Vice

President Juan Carlos Varela invited Ambassador, DCM and DEA

chief to meet with him and Papadimitriu to discuss the issue

further. Upon arrival at Varela's office, we were redirected

to Martinelli's office as the president had taken over the

meeting.



6. (S//NF) Martinelli opened by repeating his request for USG

help to expand wiretaps, saying "we are in darkness" fighting

against crime and corruption. He said it is not fair that

DEA collects information but that Panama does not benefit

from that information. He made reference to various groups

and individuals whom he believes should be wiretapped, and he

clearly made no distinction between legitimate security

targets and political enemies. Martinelli suggested that the

USG should give the GOP its own independent wiretap

capability as "rent" in exchange for the use of GOP

facilities.



7. (S//NF) The Ambassador forcefully defended the DEA program

and pointed out that the jointly-investigated cases were

taking criminals off of Panama's streets and making the

country safer. Martinelli made an implicit threat to reduce

counter-narcotics cooperation if the USG did not help him on

wiretaps, to which the Ambassador promptly countered that she

would readily inform Washington and we would all see Panama's

reputation as a reliable partner plummet dramatically.

Martinelli immediately backed off, and said he did not want

to endanger cooperation.



8. (S//NF) Martinelli said the GOP could expand wiretaps on

its own, but would rather have USG help. He said he had

already met with the heads of Panama's four mobile phone

operators and discussed methods for obtaining call data. The

Ambassador reiterated the points made in our earlier

meetings, that the current technical capacity was adequate

and that the GOP should streamline its process for obtaining

court orders for emergencies.



Naive and Dangerous

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9. (S//NF) Martinelli's near-obsession with wiretaps betrays

a simplistic and naive attitude toward the criminal

investigative process. He appears to believe that wiretaps

are the solution to all of his crime problems, and seems

unable to grasp the concept that wiretaps are only one tool

in the investigative process. We believe that he has tasked

several subordinates to obtain wiretap capacity by reaching

out to other governments and the private sector. His effort

is an open secret among security professionals in Panama

City. His behavior also tracks with an attitude of suspicion

and vindictiveness we have seen since the early days of the

campaign, when he was convinced that the PRD-controlled

security service was tapping his phones. (Comment: This was

very probably true.)



10. (S//NF) More worryingly, Martinelli seems prepared to

dispense with legal procedure in order to achieve his reform

agenda. During the August 12 meeting he proudly recounted to

the Ambassador how, earlier that day, he had twisted the arms

of casino operators and threatened to cancel their

concessions if they did not pay their back taxes and cut

their ties to the opposition political figures who had

granted their generous concessions. Referring to businessmen

who received corrupt concessions, Martinelli promised to

"throw them to the sharks." He chided the Ambassador for

being "too legal" in her approach to the issue of wiretaps.



11. (S//NF) Martinelli has visited the DEA/GOP wire room and

has been fully briefed on how the joint program operates.

Our conversation made clear that he wishes to establish his

own independent wire program under the cover of the DEA

program. If he were able to establish such a program, he

could blame it all on the gringos if it were exposed, which

in this tiny country it inevitably would be. That could

provoke a political backlash that would endanger the DEA wire

program and its significant value to USG law enforcement.

Martinelli's bullying style with the Ambassador made it clear

that he is prepared to push the limit to get what he wants,

even with his "friends." VP/FM Varela went out of his way to

apologize to the Ambassador and to minimize fallout from the

meeting, noting that he hates Martinelli's bluster but has

not yet convinced him that whatever his persona is as

"Ricardito," such behavior is inappropriate for the President

of the Republic.



Big Fight Coming

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12. (S//NF) The GOP last week introduced a draft bill to the

national assembly that would require registry of prepaid cell

phones and compel mobile operators to submit call data to the

GOP for criminal investigations. Panama's outspoken

"civilista" sector has already voiced its strong opposition

to the bill. In addition to the wiretap bill, civil

liberties advocates are deeply concerned about Martinelli's

intent to defer modernization of the criminal code through

transition to an accusatory system, as well as his moves to

distance the new GOP from the process of civil society input

to judicial policy dialogue established under the previous

government. The noisy and potentially powerful forces who

once resisted Manuel Noriega could unite in common cause over

these issues to negatively impact Martinelli's popularity.

At the very least, Martinelli's comportment manifests the

autocratic tendencies which have long been predicted by

friend and foe alike.



Comment:

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13. (S//NF) A president only gets his "first hundred days"

once, and Martinelli is spending his obsessing about

vengeance against his political foes. Most of his government

appointments have favored loyalty over competence. This is

negatively affecting his ability to pursue his top

priorities, as well as our bilateral cooperation on shared

priorities. His penchant for bullying and blackmail may have

led him to supermarket stardom but is hardly statesmanlike.

He risks losing the good will of his backers in the

Panamanian elite and business communities. Martinelli is not

a member of Panama's traditional elite, and he could be on

thin ice if his "anti-corruption" measures end up being seen

primarily as shake-downs for fast cash.



14. (S//NF) Martinelli ran as a pro-U.S. candidate, and now

assumes the U.S. owes him a debt as a right-of-center

counterbalance to Hugo Chavez in the region. Our challenge is

to convince him and others in his government that the 1980s

are over in Central America. In our discussions with

Panamanians across the board, we are emphasizing the message

that the U.S. has no interest in a left-right divide in the

hemisphere, but rather in long-term institutional stability.

Our desire is that ten years from now, Panama is a stable,

secure, democratic, prosperous country which is friendly to

the U.S. and capable of administering and protecting the

Canal.



15. (S//NF) In addition to sending that message, we are

carefully directing embassy programs to take advantage of new

opportunities, for example a reinvigorated effort to reach

"youth at risk" and reduce street crime, while avoiding

potential pitfalls, particularly in the security arena. Our

wiretap program, which works well and upholds the rule of

law, would easily withstand public scrutiny were it to come

to light. We are coordinating closely with counterparts in

the Council for National Security and Public Defense

(Consejo) to meet our own collection requirements, but we

must remain vigilant against the danger of local officials

trying to commandeer the program for internal political

games. We must be able to defend every action we take and in

doing so make ourselves immune to threats to reveal our

programs if we don't cave to pressure. Close coordination by

all USG agencies with Embassy Panama City is therefore more

important than ever.

STEPHENSON