The Andrew Gillum and Bill Nelson campaigns in Florida make it clear: Democrats are too quick to concede close elections.

Andrew Gillum rescinding his Election Night concession. Source: The Daily Beast.

The 2018 midterm elections, held last Tuesday, are still not over. Several races across the country, at both the highest and lowest levels, have not been decided. These races are in several states, from California with its mail-in ballots to Georgia with its razor-thin gubernatorial race (and election chicanery). But the most controversial races that have attracted the public’s attention have been in Florida. That state has two high-profile races that are in the midst of a recount. Both the Florida gubernatorial and senate races were called on election night but have significantly narrowed as votes have continued to be counted. On Saturday, a machine recount was ordered, and Democratic gubernatorial candidate Andrew Gillum withdrew his concession, replacing his concession speech with “an uncompromising and unapologetic call that we count every single vote.”

Much has been made of the drama behind these races and the personalities involved. The progressive energy behind Andrew Gillum has helped attract attention, with Gillum’s Saturday speech gaining a wide social media visibility. And, because this is a controversial event during the Trump presidency, Donald Trump got involved as well, tweeting out a baseless accusation of voter fraud in order to bolster Senate candidate Rick Scott’s earlier allegations. Liberal commentators have cried foul at Trump’s comments and the behavior of other Florida Republicans. When Marco Rubio suggested that Democrats were engaged in a conspiracy to use fraud to flip the Senate race, New York Magazine’s Eric Levitz accused him of “reckless demagoguery” on par with Trump’s behavior.

But the undecided Florida races should highlight yet another norm that should be abolished in the era of the Trump presidency: the close-election concession. Like the filibuster, the blue slip, and deference to a president’s Supreme Court nominee, the close-election concession is yet another tool that has been used by conservatives to protect their own candidates under the banner of decorum, then abandoned the moment it does not serve their self-interest. Like those other institutions, the close-election concession should also end.

The close-election concession is a concept with a valid basis behind it. In most instances, even in most close elections, one candidate is so far behind another candidate that counting all of the votes would not make the difference between victory or defeat. If a candidate cannot win, they should admit defeat, act in a gracious manner, and avoid the headache and financial burden that go along with a potential recount. This argument is the deafening roar that often comes from the winning side in any close election. It is the current clarion call of conservative media this week against both Bill Nelson and Andrew Gillum. This behavior is not entirely partisan, however. During the 2017 Alabama Senate special election, liberals frequently criticized Roy Moore for refusing to concede. When Moore argued that he should wait until the election was certified by the Alabama Secretary of State before conceding, Slate’s Elliott Hannon quipped, “OK, yeah, sure, but that’s kind of, like, a technicality at this point, Roy.”

But there are downsides to the constant chorus of concession. The earliest projections for victory are often based on exit polls and voter data that can sometimes be incorrect. Some level of voter manipulation and vote misplacement can always occur. Ballots are occasionally “found,” and provisional ballots are challenged. These events can lead to recounts and the counting of provisional ballots that can swing an election. A concession that is not awkwardly rescinded ends this entire process and may lead to an election outcome that is not what the total vote count would have determined.

In recent years, this desire to concede close elections has often been felt more on the Democratic side than the Republican. In 2000, Al Gore’s decision to temporarily concede on election night helped shape the rest of the Florida recount debate. While he could not have stopped the Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore ruling, he was eventually vindicated by a 2001 University of Chicago project that discovered he had, in fact, won more votes than George Bush in Florida. In 2008, calls from across the country for Minnesota Senator Norm Coleman to concede to his victorious opponent, Al Franken, went unheard. Coleman simply refused to concede, taking a legal challenge all the way to the Minnesota Supreme Court. This decision to fight the election had consequences. Democrats were unable to seat their entire filibuster-proof Senate majority for six months due to Coleman’s battle. That six-month period diminished what they were able to accomplish.

A recount does not guarantee Democratic victory in the Florida races. In fact, most observers believe that the Republican leads in the Senate and House are too substantial to be reversed by recounted or provisional ballots. But no matter what happens in Florida, Democrats must take heed and plan for the next close election. They should look again at the benefits of concession versus the real risks of an unnecessary electoral loss. Finally, they should take Andrew Gillum’s words to heart, and let all the votes be counted before making a close election decision.