Full text of "CIA New York Times Series"

C.I.A. : Maker of Policy, or Tool? Survey Finds Widely Feared Agency Is Tightly Controlled Following is the first of five articles on the Central Intelli- gence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker , John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other members of the Times staff. Special to Thi New York Tlmei WASHINGTON, April 24— One day in 1960 ai* agent of the Central Intelligence Agency caught a plane in Tokyo, flew to Singapore and checked into a hotel room in time to receive a visitor. The agent plugged a lie detector into an overloaded electrical circuit and blew out the lights in the building. In the investigation that fol- lowed, the agent and a C.I.A. colleague were arrested and jailed as American spies. The result was an interna- tional incident that infuriated London, not once but twice. It embarrassed an American Am- bassador. It led an American Secretary of State to write a rare letter of apology to a for- eign Chief of State. Five years later that foreign leader was handed an opportu- nity to denounce the perfidy of all Americans and of the C.LA. in particular, thus increasing the apprehension of his Oriental The Central Intelligence Agency, which does not often appear in the news, made headlines on two counts in recent days. The agency was found to have interceded in the slander trial of one of its agents in an effort to obtain his exoneration without explanation except that he had done its bidding in the interests of national security. And it was reported to have planted at least five agents among Michi- gan State University scholars engaged in a foreign aid project some years ago in Vietnapa. Although the specific work of these agents and the circumstances of their em- ployment are in dispute, reports of their activities have raised many questions about the purposes and methods of the CJ.A., and about Its relationship to other parts of the Government and nongovernmental institutions. Even larger questions about control of the CJ.A. within the framework of a free government and about its role in foreign affairs are periodically brought up in Congress and among other governments. To provide background for these questions, and to determine what issues of public policy are posed by the agency's work, The New York Times has spent several months looking into its affairs. This series is the result. neighbors about the agency and enhancing his own political po- sition. Ultimately, the incident led the United States Government to tell a lie in public and then to admit the lie even more pub- licly. The lie was no sooner dis- closed than a world predisposed to suspicion of the CJ.A. and unaware of what really had happened in Singapore five years earlier began to repeat questions that have dogged the intelligence agency and the United States Government for years: q Was this secret body, which was known to have overthrown governments and Installed others, raised armies, staged an invasion of Cuba, spied and counterspied, established air lines, radio stations and schools and supported books, magazines and businesses, running out of the control of Its supposed poli- tical master?' flWas it in fact damaging, while it sought to advance, the national interest ? Could it spend huge sums for ransoms, bribes and subversion without check or regard for the consequences ? <3 Did it lie to or influence the political leaders of the United States to such an extent that it really was an “Invisible govern- ment" more powerful than even the President? N These are questions Constant- Continued on Page 20, Column 1 Continued From Page l t CoL 4 - ly asked around the world. Some of them were raised again re- 4* : ;I. cently when It was disclosed £ that Michigan State University SB?-', w as the cover for some CXA. Ji - agents in South Vietnam during 7*5 - a m ultimihion-doUar technical Jrf assistance program the univer- t*: aity conducted for the regime of 3T the late President Ngo Driith Diem. Last week, it also became known that an Estonian refugee , who was being sued for slander | in a Federal District Court in! Baltimore was resting his de-l fense on the fact that the al- leged slander had been commit- ted in the course of his duties as a CJ.A. agent. In a public memorandum ad- dressed to me court, the CJ.A. stated that it had ordered the agent, Juri Raus, to disclose no further details of the case, in order to protect the nation’s foreign intelligence apparatus. Mr. Raus is claiming complete legal immunity from the suit on the grounds that he had acted as an official agent of the Fed- eral Government. Such incidents, bringing the activities of the C.LA. into dim and often dismaying public view, have caused members of Con- gress and many publications to question ever more persistently the role and propriety of one of Washington’s most discussed and least understood institu- tions. Some of the misgivings have been shared by at least twd' American President, Harry S. Truman and John F. Ken- nedy. A Wide Examination To seek reliable answers to these questions; to sift, where possible, fact from fancy and theory from condition; to deter- mine what real questions of public policy and international relations are posed by the exist- ence and operations of the C.I.A., The New York Times has compiled information and opinions from informed Ameri- cans throughout the world. It has obtained reports from 20 foreign correspondents and editors with recent service in more than 35 countries and from reporters in Washington who interviewed more than 50 present and former Govern- ment officials, members of Con- gress and .military officers. This study, carried out over several months, disclosed, for instance, that the Singapore affair resulted not from a lack or political control or from reck- lessness by the C.I.A., but from bad fortune and diplomatic blundering. It found that the C.I.A.. for all Its fearsome reputation, is under far more stringent politi- cal and budgetary control than most of its critics know.. or con- cede, and that since the Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba in 1961 these controls have been tightly exercised. The consensus of those inter- viewed was that the critics’ favorite recommendation for a stronger rein on the agency — a Congressional committee to oversee the CJ.A. — would prob- ably provide little more real control than now exists and might both restrict the agency's effectiveness and actually shield i It from those who desire more knowledge about its operations. A Matter of Will Other important conclusions of the study include the follow- ing: q While the Institutional forms of political control appear ef- fective and sufficient, it is really the will of the political officials who must exert control that is important and that has most often been lacking. qEven when control is tight and effective, a more important question may concern the extent to which C.LA. information and policy judgments affect political decisions in foreign affairs. q Whether or not political con- trol is being exercised, the more serious question is whether the very existence of an efficient C.I.A. causes the United States Government to rely too much on clandestine and illicit activities, back-alley tactics, subversion and what is known in official jargon as “dirty tricks." q Finally, regardless of the facts, the C.I.A.’s reputation in the world is so horrendous and its role in events so exaggerated that it is becoming a burden on American foreign policy, rather that the secret weapon it was intended to be. The Singapore incident, with its bizarre repercussions five years later, is an excellent lesson in how that has happened, al- though none of the fears of the critics are justified by the facts 1 of the particular case. Problem in Singapore The ill-fated agent who blew out the lights flew from Tokyo to Singapore only after a pro- longed argument inside the C.I.A. Singapore, a strategic Asian port with a large Chinese population, was soon to get its independence from Britain and enter the Malaysian Federation. Should CJ.A. recruit some well- placed spies, or should it, as be- fore, rely on MI-6, the British » secret service, and on Britain’s ability to maintain good rela- tions and good sources in Singa- pore? I Allen W. Dulles, then the fc.I.A.'s director, decided to in- | filtrate the city with its own J agents, to make sure that the f British were sharing everything they knew. Although the deci- sion was disputed, it is not un- common in any intelligence serv. * / ice to bypass or double-check on an ally. (On Vice President Humph- rey's visit late last year to the capitals of Japan, South Korea. Taiwan, and the Philippines, Secret Service agents found at least three “bugs,'’ or listening devices, hidden in his private quarters by one of his hosts.) J The agent who flew from Tokyo to Singapore was on a jfecruitin g mission, and the lie <#?tector, an instrument used by fixe C.I.A. on its own employes, Jvas intended to test the relia- bility of a local candidate for a fpy’s job. When the machine shorted out the lights in the hotel, the visiting agent, the would-be spy and another C.I.A. man were discovered. They wound up in a Singapore jail. There they were reported to have been “tortured” —either for real, or to extract & ransom. The Price Was High Secret discussions — apparent- 1 r through CIA. channels — > ere held about the possibility c r buying the agents' freedom \ ith increased American for- < gn aid. but Washington even- t tally decided Singapore's price was too high. The men were subsequently released. Secretary of State Dean Rusk — the Kennedy Administration had succeeded to office in Janu- ary. 1961 — wrote a formal apol- ogy to Premier Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and promised to discipline the culprits. That appeared to have ended the matter until last fall, when Premier Lee broke away from the Malaysian Federation and sought to establish himself for political reasons as more nearly a friend of Britain than of the United States, aitnougn msanu Americanism was .short of pro- Communism. To help achieve this purpose, Mr. Lee disclosed the 1960 “af- front" without giving any de- tails, except to say that he had been offered a paltry $3.3-million bribe when he had demanded ffl3-milllon. J The State Department, which bad been routinely fed a denial ft wrongdoing by CXA. officials |vho did not know of the Rusk Ipology, described the charge as lalse. Mr. Lee then published Mr. Rusk's letter of 1961 and threatened also to play some interesting tape recordings for the press. Hastily, Washington confessed —not to the bribe offer, which is hotly denied by ail officials connected with the incident, or to the incident itself, but to having done something that had merited an apology, fl London, infuriated in the first ilstance by what it considered the CJ.A.'s mistrust of MI-6, nbw fumed a second time about clumsy tactics in Washington. Acting on Orders Errors of bureaucracy and mishaps of chance can easily be found in the Singapore incident, but critics of the CJ.A. cannot easily find in it proof of the charges so often raised about the agency — "control, ” “making policy" and “undermining poF- The agent in Singapore was acting on direct orders from Washington. His superiors in the C.I.A. were acting within the directives of the President and the National Security Coun- cil. The mission was not con- trary to American foreign pol- icy, was not undertaken to change or subvert that policy, and was not dangerously fool- hardy. It was not much more I than routine— and would not have been unusual in any in- telligence service in the world. Nevertheless, the Sinagpore incident — the details of which have been shrouded in the C.I.A.’s enforced secrecy — add- ed greatly to the rising tide of dark suspicion that many people .throughout the world, including I many in this country, harbor about the agency and its activi- ties. £Carl Rowan, the former di- rector of the United States In-* formation Agency and former Ambassador to Finland, wrote la it year in his syndicated col- u in that "during a recent tour o East Africa and Southeast A sia, it was made clear to me tJ at suspicion and fear of the C LA. has become a sort of Achilles heel of American for- efign policy.” President Sukarno of Indo- nesia, Prince Norodom Siha- nouk, Cambodia’s Chief of State, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, former President Kwamt Nk rum ail of Ghana and many other leaders have repeatedly insisted that behind the regular American government there is an "invisible government," the C.I.A., threatening them all with Infiltration, subversion and even war. Communist China and the Soviet Union sound this theme endlessly. "The Invisible Government” was the phrase applied to American intelligence agencies, and particularly the C.I.A., in a book of that title by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. It was a best-seller ii\ the United States and among many gov- ernment officials abroad. Subject of Humor | So prevalent is the CJ.A. rep-, utation of menace in so much| of the world that even humorists have taken note of it. The New Yorker magazine last December printed a cartoon showing two natives of an unspecified coun- try watching a vocano erupt. One native 4s saying to the other: "The CXA. did it Pass the word." In Southeast Asia, even the most rational leaders are said to be ready to believe anything about the C.I.A. "Like Dorothy Parker and the things she said,” one observer notes, "the CXA. gets credit or blame both for what it does and for many things it has not even thought of doing.” | Many earnest Americans, too, are bitter critics of the C.I.A. I Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, has charged that the agency “is making foreign policy and in so doing is assuming the roles of President and Congress." He has introduced a proposal to create a special Foreign Relations sub- committee to make a "full and complete” study ofthe effects of CJ.A. operations on United States foreign relations. Senator Stephen M, Young, Democrat of Ohio, has proposed that k joint Senate-House com- mittee oversee the C.I.A. be- cause, “wrapped in a cloak of secrecy, the C.XA. has, in effect, been making foreign policy." Mayor Lindsay of New York, while a Republican member of Congress, indicted the CXA. on the House floor for a long series of fiascos, including the most famous blunder in recent Amer- ican history— the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Former President Harry S. Truman, whose Administration established the C.I.A. in 1947. said in 1983 that by then he saw “something about the way the CJ.A. has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historic positions, and I feel that we need to correct it." Kennedy’s Bitterness a And President Kennedy, as the enormity of the Bay of Pigs disaster came home to him, said t& one of the highest officials ofl his Administration that he \glnted “to splinter the CJ.A. in ^thousand pieces and scatter iP'to the winds." I Even some who defend the I. A. as the indispensable eyes id ears of the Government— r example „ Aileo^uUes, the ;ency’s most famous director— iw fear that the cumulative iticism and suspicion, at home id abroad, have impaired the I.A.’s effectiveness and there- re the nation’s safety. They are anxious to see the criticisms answered and the sus- picions allayed, even if — in some cases — the agency should thus become more exposed to domes- tic politics and to compromises of security. “If the establishment of a Congressional committee with responsibility for intelligence would quiet public fears and re- store public confidence in the C.I.A.,” Mr. Dulles said in an interview, "then I now think it would be worth doing despite some of the problems it would cause the agency.” Because this view is shared in varying degree by numerous friends of the C.I.A. and because its critics are virtually unani- mous in calling for more “con- trol," most students of the prob- lem have looked to Congress for a remedy. In the 19 years that the C.I.A. has been in existence, 150 resolutions for tighter Congres- sional control have been intro- duced — and put aside. The stat- istic In itself is evidence of widespread uneasiness about the CJ.A. and of how little is known about the agency. For the truth is that despite the CXA.’s international repu- tation, few persons in or out of the American Government know much about its work, its organ- ization. its supervision or its re- lationship to the other arms of the executive branch. A former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for in- stance, had no idea how big the CXA. budget was. A Senator, experienced in foreign affairs, proved, in an interview, to know very little about, but to fear very much, its operations. Many critics do not know that virtually all CXA. expenditures must be authorized in advance — fli*st by an Administration committee that includes some of the highest-ranking political of- ficials and White House staff assistants, then by officials in 1 the Bureau of the Budget, who have the power to rule out or reduce an expenditure. They do not know that, in- stead of a blank check, the CXA. has an annual budget of a little more than 5500-million— only one-sixth the $3-biilion the Government spends on its over- all intelligence effort. The Na- tional Security Asrencv. a cryp- tographic and code - breaking operation run by the Defense Department and almost never questioned by outsiders, spends twice as much as the CXA. The critics shrug aside the fact that President Kennedy, after the most rigorous inquiry into the agency's affairs, meth- ods and problems after the Bay of Pigs, did not “splinter” it after all and did not recommend Congressional supervision. They may be unaware that since then supervision of intelli- gence activities has been tight- ened. When President Eisen- hpwer wrote a letter to all Am- b Lssadors placing them in charge c all American activities in ‘their ( umtries, he followed it with a s cret letter specifically exempt - p the C.LA.; but when Presi- d int Kennedy put the Ambassa- <$rs in command of all activi- E t he sent a secret letter spe- cally including the C.I.A. It still in effect buit, like all sotives, variously interpreted. Out of a Spy Novel The critics, quick to paint to the agency’s publicized blunders and setbacks, are not mollified by its genuine achievements — its' precise prediction of the date on which the Chinese Commu- nists would explode a nuclear device; its fantastic world of electronic devices; its use of a spy, Oleg Penkovskiy, to reach Into the Kremlin itself; its work jh keeping the Congo out of Communist control; or the feat — straight from a spy novel — of arranging things so that when Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in Egypt the “manage- ment consultant" who had an office next to the Arab leader’s and who was one of his prin- cipal advisers was a C.I.A. operative. i T,r hen the U-2 incident is men- ed by critics, as it always Is, emphasis is usually on the \.’s — and the Elsenhower linistrtFWfcn’s — blunder in nitting Hrancis Gary Pow- i flight ofer the Soviet Union 960. just oef ore a scheduled mlt conference. Not much is illy said of the incalculable LUgence value of the undis- *d U-2 flights between 1956 1960 over the heartland of sia. And when critics frequently charge that CXA. operations contradict and sabotage official American policy, they may not know that the C.I.A. is often overruled in its policy judg- ments. n an example, the C.LA. igly urged the Kennedy Ad- stration not to recognize Egyptian-backed Yemeni ne and warned that Presi- Nasser would not quickly his troops out of Yemen, assador John Badeau ght otherwise. His advice accepted, the republic was rnized. President Nasser’s s remained — and much mill- and political trouble fol- 1 that the C.LA. had fore- |een and the State Department had not Nor do critics always give the CXA. credit where it is due for Its vital and daily service as an accurate and encyclopedic source of quick news, information, anal- ysis and deduction about every- thing from a new police chief in Mozambique to an aid agree- ment between Communist China and Albania,, from the state of President Sukarno’s health to the meaning of Nikita S. Khru- shchev fall from power. Yet the critics' favorite indict- ment* art ipectacular enough to explain the world’s suspicions and fears of the C.I.A. and its operations. JA sorry episode in Asia in the early ninteen-fifties is a fre- quently cited example. C.J.A. ™~ents gathered remnants of defeated Chinese Nationalist aflmies in the jungles of north- west Burma, supplied them with gold and arms and encouraged them to raid Communist China. , 9 ne a bn was to harrass Pek- ing to a point where it might retaliate against Burma, forcing Che Burmese to turn to the United States for protection. Actually, few raids occurred, and the army became a trouble- some and costly burden. The CJ.A. had enlisted the help of Gen. Phao Sriyanod, the police caief of Thailand — and a leading narcotics dealer. The National- ists, with the planes and gold furnished them by the agents, went into the opium business. By the time the “anti-Commu- nist’ force could be disbanded, and the C.I.A. could wash its hands of it, Burma had re- nounced American aid, threat- ened to quit the United Nations and moved closer to Peking. Moreover, some of the Nation- alist Chinese are still in north- ern Burma, years later, and still fomenting trouble and infuriat- ing governments in that area, although they have not been supported by the C.LA. or any American agency for a decade. In 1958, a C.I.A.-aided opera- tion Involving South Vietnamese ‘agents and Cambodian rebels was interpreted by Prince Siha- nouk as an attempt to over- throw him. It failed but drove him farther down the road that ultimately led to his break in diplomatic relations with Wash- ington. Indonesian Venture In Indonesia in the same year, against the advice of American diplomats, the C.LA. was au- thorized to fly in supplies from Taiwan and the Philippines to aid army officers rebelling against President Sukarno in Sumatra and Java, An Ameri- can pilot was shot down on a bombing mission and was re- leased only at the insistent urg- ing of the Kennedy Administra- tion in 1962. Mr. Sukarno, na- •k-.-.-.- w-r -fvxv .pe». ^ yP; turaUy enough, drew the obvious conclusions; how much of his fear and dislike of the United States can be traced to those days is hard to say. *In I960, CJ.A. agents in Laos, disguised as "military advisers," si Lifted ballot boxes and engl- n ered local uprisings to help a h nd-picked strongman, Gen. P Loumi Nosavan, set up a "pro- A nerican" government that was d sired by President Eisenhower a d Secretary of State John F >ster Dulles. ^This operation succeeded— so much so that it stimulated So- viet intervention on the side ol leftist Laotians, who counter- attacked the Phoumi govern- ment When the Kennedy Ad- ministration set out to reverse the policy of the Eisenhower inistration, it found the •A- deeply committed to loumi Nosovan and needed o years of negotiations and ts to restore the neutralist me of Prince Souvanna ouma. ’ro-Communist Laotians, how- i ver, were never again driven tom the border of North Viet- 3 am, and it is through that re- « on that the Vietcong In South ietnam have been supplied and 1 fplenished in their war to de- i Toy still another CXA.-aided j reject, the non-Communist gov- i rnment In Saigon. Catalogue of Chargee It was the C.I.A. that built up Ngo Dinh Diem as the pro- American head of South Viet- nam after the French, through Emperor Dai, had found in a monastery cell in Bel- gium and broi&ht him back to dgon as Premier. And it was C.LA. that helped persuade he Eisenhower and Kennedy dstrations tft ride out the etnamese storm with Diem — bly too long. r These recorded Incidents not only have prompted much soul- searching about the influence of an instrument such as the C.I.A. on American policies but also have given the C.I.A. a reputa- tion for deeds and misdeeds far beyond its real intentions and capacities. Through spurious reports, gos- sip, misunderstandings, deep- seated fears and forgeries and falsifications, the agency has , been accused of almost any- thing anyone wanted to accuse . it ot. ; It has been accused of: Plotting the assassination of ' Jawaharlal Nehru of India. q Provoking the 1965 war be- I tween India and Pakistan. q Engineering the "plot" ±hat became the pretext for the mur- der of leading Indonesia gen- . erals last year. , q Supporting the rightist army plots In Algeria. qMurdering Patrice Lumum- ba in the Congo. q Kidnapping Moroccan agents in Paris. q Plotting the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah of . Ghana. All of these charges and many similar to them are fabrications, authoritative officials outside the C.I.A. Insist The C.I.A.’s notoriety even enables some enemies to recover from their own mistakes. A for- mer American official uncon- nected with the agency recalls that pro-Chinese elements in East Africa once circulated a document urging revolts against several governments. When this inflammatory message backfired on its authors, they promptly spread the word that it was a CJ.A. forgery designed to dis- credit them — and some believed the falsehood. Obvious Deduction “Many otherwise rational Af- rican leaders are ready to take forgeries at face value," one ob- server says, "because deep down they honestly fear the CJ.A. Its image in this part of the world couldn't be worse." The image feeds on the rank- est of fabrications as well as on the wildest of stories— for the simple reason that the wildest of stories are hot always false, and the CJ~A. is often involved and all too often obvious. When -an embassy subordi- nate in Lagos, Nigeria, known to be the CJ.A. station chief had a fancier house than the United States Ambassador, Ni- gerians made the obvious deduc- tion about who was in charge. When President Jo«Lo Goulart of Brazil fell from power in 1964 and C.LA. men were accused of being among his most ener- getic opponents, exaggerated conclusions as to who had oust- ed him were natural. It is not only abroad that such CJ.A. involvements — real or imaginery — have aroused dire fears and suspicions. Theodore C. Sorensen has written, for in- stance, that the Peace Corps in * its early days strove manfully, and apparently successfully, to i ke€ P Its ranks free of CJ.A. in- ; filtration. Other Government agencies, American newspapers and busi- ness concerns, charitable foun- dations, research institutions and universities have, in some- cases, been as diligent as Soviet agents in trying to protect themselves from CJ.A. penetra- tion. They have not always been so successful as the Peace Corps. Some of their fear has been ; misplaced; the CJ.A. is no long- er so dependent on clandestine agents and other institutions' resources. But as in the case of its overseas reputation, its ac- tual activities in the United States — for instance, its aid in financing a center for interna- tional studies at the Massachu- : setts Institute of Tecnnoiogy — have made the fear of infiltra- tion real to many scholars and businesses. The revela>tion that C.I.A. agents served among Michigan State University scholars In South Vietnam from 1955 to 1959 has contributed to the fear. The nature of the agents’ work and the circumstances of their employment are in dispute, but their very involvement, even relatively long ago, has aroused concern that hundreds of schol- arly and charitable American efforts abroad will be tainted and hampered by the suspicions of other governments. jThus, it is easy for sincere pen to believe deeply that the J.I.A. must be brought "to heel" Xi the nation’s own interest. Yet $ery well-informed official and 7£mer official with recent no wl edge of the CJ.A. and its tivitles who was interviewed ifirmed what Secretary of Rusk has said public- at the C.LA. "does not Ate actions unknown to the f policy leaders of the Gov- hent" , he New York Times survey — ' no doubt that, whatever its miscalculations, blunders and misfortunes, whatever may have been the situation during its bumptious early days and dur- ing its over-hasty expansion In and after the Korean War, the agency acts today not on its own but with the approval and under the control of the political leaders of the United States Government. But that virtually undisputed fact raises in itself the central questions that emerge from the survey: What is control? And who guards the guards ? For it is upon information provided by the C .LA. itself that those who must approve its ac- tivities are usually required to decide. It Is the C.LA. that has the money (not unlimited but ample) and the talent (as much as any agency) not only to conceive but also to cany out projects of great Importance — and com- mensurate risk. Action, If Not Success It is the C.I.A., unlike the Defense Department with its service rivalries, budget con- cerns and political Involvements, and unlike the State Depart- ment with its international dip- lomatic responsibilities and its vulnerability to criticism, that Is freest of all agencies to advo- cate its projects and press home ts views; the C.LA. can prom- ise action, if not success. S And both the agency and who must pass upon its are shielded by security the outside oversight and v under which virtually all officials operate, at home and abroad. Thus, while the survey left no doubt that the CXA. operates under strict forms of control, It raised the more serious question whether there was always the substance of control. In many ways, moreover, public discussion has become too centered on the question of control. A more disturbing 1 mat- ter may be whether the nation has allowed itself to go too far in the . grim and sometimes deadly business of espionage and secret operations. One of the best-infprmed men described that business as "ugly, mean and cruel." The agency loses men and no one ever hears of them again, he said, and when "we catch one of them" (a Soviet or other agent), it be- comes necessary "to get every- thing out of them and we do it with no holds barred." Secretary Rusk has said pub- licly that there is "a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world." "It’s a tough one, it’s unpleasant, and no one likes it. but that is not a field which can be left entirely the other side." he said. The back-alley struggle, he concluded, is "a never-ending war, and there’s no quarter asked and none given." Struggle for Freedom* . struggle, Mr. Rusk insisted, is "part of the strug- gle for freedom." No one seriously disputesthat the effort to gain intelligence about real or potential enemies even about one’s friends, is a v ™.P art ot any government’s activities, particularly a govern- ment so burdened with responsi- bility as the United States Gov- ernment in the 20th century j But beyond their need for in- Jbrmation, how far should the political leaders of the United States go in approving the clan- destine violation of treaties and borders, financing of coups, in- fluencing of parties and govern - agents, without tarnishing and retarding those ideas of freedom and self-government they pro- claim to the world? I And how much of the secrecy and autonomy necessary .to car- ry out such acts can ot should be tolerated by a free society? There are no certain or easy answers. But these questions cannot even be discussed knowl- edgeably on the basis of the few glimpses — accidental or inten- tional that the public has so ^**«5 £ ve " lnto the private' world of the C.I.A. . That world is both dull and lurid, often at the same time. A year ago, for instance, it was reported that some of the anti-Castro Cuban survivors of the Bay of Pigs were flying in combat in deepest, darkest Af- rica. Any Madison Avenue pub- W ? md reco £ niz e that as nght out of Ian Fleming and James Bond. But to the bookish and tweedy who m *** Pastoral setUng of the C.LA.’s huge building on the banks of the Potomac River near Langley, vaM the story was only a satis- .ying episode in the back-alley don?" 11 ** ,<Stru SS le *>r Free- I Tomorrow; Who and what w the CJ.A.T (< Th* C.r.A. did it. Pass it along” „„„ „ . . Drtwlni by AUn Dunn; o 1»B5 Th« NewYorker lUcuine. Inc. . THE C. I. A. GOOD, BAD OR OTHERWISE? Much discussed and criticized, the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency has not escaped humorous treatment either. Its detractors loudly condemn it, nearly everyone talks about it, but very few really understand it.