IF THEY have said it once, they’ve said it a million times. Hardly a press briefing goes by at the foreign ministry in Beijing without a stern reminder of the importance China places on the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. These days the phrase is trotted out whenever a spokesman is asked about China’s stance on Ukraine. Yet, oddly, the spokesman never goes on to criticise Vladimir Putin or Russia, which, in annexing Crimea, has interfered in Ukrainian internal affairs in the crudest way imaginable. Swift to pounce on any alleged hypocrisy in Western foreign policy, China now seems to be upholding double standards of its own. In truth, it always has. But the crisis in Ukraine has exposed the contradictions in China’s “principled” diplomacy with unusual starkness.

China has not explicitly taken Russia’s side. Rather, it calls on all parties to resolve their differences through dialogue and negotiation. It opposes the sanctions imposed by America and threatened by Europe. And it harps on about the “complexity” of the situation. But America has tried in vain to persuade China to be explicit in condemning Russia. A telephone conversation between Barack Obama and China’s president, Xi Jinping, yielded no change in the Chinese script. According to the Chinese press, Mr Xi said China hoped “that all parties concerned would tackle their differences through communication and co-ordination”. In the context of Russia’s bullying approach, Huang Jing of the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore says that China’s supposedly neutral stance amounts, in effect, to backing Mr Putin.

Several reasons suggest why that might appear the best option to China’s leaders. Russia is a fellow permanent member of the UN Security Council and an important strategic and diplomatic partner. It lines up with China and on the opposing side to America on a range of international issues, such as Iran and Syria. Also, China shares Russia’s distaste for the sort of people-power revolution that saw Viktor Yanukovych ousted as Ukraine’s president last month after confrontations in the centre of Kiev that to some recalled Beijing’s abortive pro-democracy uprising in 1989. As with every such movement since—across eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and, three years ago, the Middle East—China’s leaders have fretted about how their own citizens might react. Sure enough, this time, some users of Sina Weibo, a microblogging service, drew poetical parallels: “In Kiev dawn is nigh; how long can the moon remain full over the Chinese capital?” asked a post by a widely followed writer. The censors later deleted it.

Like Russia, China saw Western meddling behind the unrest that led to Mr Yanukovych’s downfall. A commentary published on March 7th by Xinhua, the official news agency, lamented the West’s “fiasco” in Ukraine. “The West’s strategy for installing a so-called democratic and pro-Western Ukrainian government”, it argued, “did not get anywhere at all. On the contrary, they have created a mess they do not have the capacity or wisdom to clean.” Global Times, a daily owned by the Communist Party, argued that “the world should see Russia’s resistance as the dissatisfaction of many countries towards Western powers.”

So, though willing enough to criticise supposed Western interference, China’s official spokesmen are silent about—or even favourable towards—the Russian variety. Yet it is not as if this approach isolates China. Other Asian countries are also mealy-mouthed over Ukraine. India’s national security adviser, Shivshankar Menon, expressed pious hopes for a “satisfactory resolution”, and acknowledged the “legitimate Russian and other interests involved”. Not only does India have long-standing defence and other ties with Russia, its relations with America are rather tetchy at present. And perhaps India recognises that, like Russia, it too at times likes to throw its weight around in its own near abroad. Even Japan, although it put its name to a strong condemnation of Russia by the G7 group of rich countries, has been less forthright outside that forum, and sought to avoid imposing sanctions. The government of Shinzo Abe has set great store on improving relations with Russia, which is an important energy supplier, as well as the occupier of four islands claimed by Japan.

For China, Russia’s annexation of Crimea seems to violate the most fundamental principles of its foreign policy. And it gets worse. The referendum to be held in Crimea on March 16th to legitimise Russia’s takeover is a quite appalling notion. Suppose Tibetans or Uighurs in China were to be offered a vote on their international status? Or, slightly less fancifully, the people of Taiwan? (India must have similar qualms, seeing an awkward parallel with the parts of Kashmir claimed by Pakistan that it controls.) Shi Yinhong, an international-relations expert at Renmin University in Beijing, insists China can never accept such a referendum, and says Mr Xi has appealed to Mr Putin to call it off. But, he says, “in no case will China criticise Russia publicly.”

Bully for China

If Mr Shi is right, then China hopes to have its cake and eat it too. It will avoid criticising Russia, yet will not line up explicitly on Russia’s side of the argument, so as not to antagonise the West; all the while insisting China’s foreign-policy “principles” remain sacrosanct. Among China’s neighbours, with many of whom it has territorial disputes, the failure to speak out about Russia’s strong-arm tactics in its region suggests that maybe China might favour them in its own. Its foreign minister, Wang Yi, pledges that China will “defend every inch of territory that belongs to us”, including, presumably, those inches it does not control. Perhaps China, like Russia, thinks that it gains something from being seen as a bully.

But this approach has costs. China’s policy looks inconsistent and opportunistic, damaging its image and soft power. If China really wants the respect due to a global power, it has to assume global responsibilities. It cannot opt out of the role just when things gets awkward.

Economist.com/blogs/banyan