SECRET //NOFORN

SECRET //NOFORN

10

numerous local emirs, but these losses initiall y did

little to slow AQI’s momentum, according to

clandestine and US diplomatic reporting.

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118

HVT operations i n 2007, how ever, complement ed

broader Coalition and Iraqi Sunni actions against

AQI, such as efforts to cut A QI off from its support

base, and have cont ributed to its decline since that

time, according to clandestine and US diplom atic

reporting.

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120

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122

(S//NF)

Israel—Hizball ah and HAMA S, Mid-1990s-

Present

In the mi d -1990s, I srael’s targeting efforts shifted

from secular rejectionist grou ps to Islamist militant

enemies, culminating in a targeted-killings campaign

during the Second I ntifada. In contrast to t he

Palestine Liberat ion Organization (PLO) and secul ar

rejectionist groups, HAMAS and Hizballah present ed

Israel with decentralized comm and structures,

compartmented leader ship, strong succession

planning, and deep ties to their comm unities, making

the groups highly resilient to leadership losses,

according to the International Crisis Group.

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124

The

absence of other cou nterinsurgency measures such as

amnesty programs limited th e HVT programs’

contributions to I srael’s overall security efforts,

according to an academ ic expert on

counterinsurgency .

125

(C//NF)

Israel—PLO and Secular Rejectio nist Groups,

1972–Mid-199 0s

Following the killing of 11 Israeli athletes during the

Munich Oly mpics in September 1972 by the Black

September fact ion of the PLO Fatah organi zation,

Israeli leaders initiated a multidecade effort to

eliminate PLO leaders. The subsequent killings of

suspected PLO militants across Europ e and the

Middle East included low-ranking officials wi th

questionable con nections to the Munich events, as

well as a Moroccan waiter in Lillehammer, Norway ,

who had no con nection to terrorism, according to a

book by a British journalist.

126

The program ’s secrecy

prevented it s integration with other dipl omatic and

military initiati ves. International pressu re following

the July 1973 death of the M oroccan waiter forced

Israel to curtail the effort.

127

The PL O had a highly

centralized and personality-driven comm and structure

that made it vulnerable to leadership strik es, but the

limited num ber of successful Israeli strikes suggests

that group’s strong operat ional security prot ected it

against the loss of top figure s. (C//NF)

Northern Ireland —IRA, 1969-98

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged from the

Anglo-I rish War of 1919-21 and has pursued t he

political objective of a united Ireland on b ehalf of

nationalists among the Catho lic minority, according

to an academic study .

128

“The Troubles” in Northern

Ireland began i n 1969 and ended w ith the 1998 Good

Friday Agreement. Extensive high- level penetrat ions

of the Provis ional Irish Republ ican Army (commonly

referred to as IRA) gave the British visibili ty into the

group’s leadership dy namics, internal ideological

conflicts, and operational plans, according to a US

press report and a boo k by an Irish j ournalist.

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130

IRA leader Gerry Ad am s init iated a secret peace

dialog with the B ritish in 1986 in which he identified

himsel f as far outside the mainstream I RA leadership

in his willingness to accept an eventual nonviolent

settlement of the conflict, according to the same book

by an I rish journalist.

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This dial og suggests that the

British saw an interest in pro tecting him and m e mbers

of his faction, which i ncluded Martin McGuinness.

Acting on intelligence gained through penetrations,

the British eliminated some ra dical I RA mem bers

who could hav e obstructed the peace process or

challenged the Adam s factio n for leadership of the

group, according to t he same book by an Irish

journalist.

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(C//NF)

Peru—Shinin g Path, 1980- 99

Abimael Guzm an, a philosophy professor and

admini strator at a provincial university, founded the

Maoist insurgent group Sendero Lum inoso (Shining

Path or SL) i n 1970.

133

SL launched an arm ed

struggle in 1980, s eeking to topple Peru’s soci al order

and to im pose a new utopian society . From 1980 to

1992, the group was a dogmatic, cent ralized, and

disciplined m ovement that revolv ed around its

charismatic leader, who skillfull y maintained control

of SL’s l eadership cadre through manipulati on,

according to an academ ic expert on

counterinsurgency .

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In what m a y be a

governm ent’s most decisive use of HVT, accordi ng to