If you want something done properly, as the old adage goes, you have to do it yourself.

For the longest time, the failure to produce a good, usable Windows tablet was twofold. Microsoft lacked an operating system usable with finger input, and the PC OEMs failed to produce devices that were thin enough and light enough to be comfortable when handheld.

The first problem is, to a greater or lesser extent, addressed by Windows 8 and its ARM counterpart, Windows RT. But the software is nothing without the hardware to run it on.

PC hardware is plagued with mediocrity, but to a large extent it can get away with it. The simple fact is, the PC is an entrenched, dominant tool. It doesn't have to wow anyone or win them over, because it already has.

Tablets are different. The market is still new, the exact limits and roles that the form factor can fill are still being determined, and only one company has achieved any real tablet success with a tightly integrated package of software and custom-designed hardware.

To allow Windows 8 to compete with iOS, Microsoft needs hardware to compete with the iPad. Bad hardware would jeopardize Redmond's ability to play in the tablet space, but the PC OEMs have established for themselves a track record of producing little else. And while many of the OEMs have produced Android tablets to try to compete with the iPad, they've also consistently failed to match its quality.

A Consistent Form Factor

The news coming out of Computex earlier this month suggested that their Windows 8 and Windows RT tablets were going to be more of the same. This is not to say that the concepts on show were necessarily bad; units such as MSI's Slider S20 are interesting enough ideas. But whether weird sliders, convertible tablet/laptop hybrids, or just plain tablets, a couple of things are clear.

First, the OEMs don't really seem to be sure what form factor to go for. There's a sense of throwing stuff at the wall to see what sticks, which is why we see so much variety. Microsoft, in contrast, is quite unambiguously following the basic iPad form: a tablet with a magnetically-attached lightweight cover, just with the twist that the cover doubles up as a keyboard too.

Second, and a direct consequence of the scattergun approach, none of the devices on show seems to demonstrate the same level of attention to detail that the Surface has.

The risk of trusting the PC OEMs is one that Microsoft was unwilling to take. Hence Surface, a pair of best-of-breed Windows 8 tablets.

The Windows business model is predicated on selling the operating system to third parties, and leaving the actual task of system-building to those third parties. We're so used to Microsoft's existence and the success of Windows that it's easy to forget that it's actually something that's essentially unique. Apple sells hardware/software combinations. So does IBM with its z/OS mainframe platform and its AIX UNIX. So too does Oracle, with Solaris (though Sun did of course dabble with opening up the operating system), and HP, with HP-UX. The same was true historically, too; Amigas were paired with AmigaOS, Ataris with TOS, NeXT workstations with NeXTStep, and so on and so forth.

While some of these operating systems had shared elements—the various UNIX platforms share a common, if convoluted, heritage, and customized versions of Digital Research's CP/M and GEM found their way onto numerous platforms—the practice of shipping a single operating system designed for a family of compatible devices available from multitudinous vendors (the "PC"), and making a tremendous amount of money in so doing, remains unique to Microsoft.

This is a business model that needs the OEMs. Without the OEMs, there's nothing to run Windows on, and no Windows business.

That doesn't mean that the relationship with the OEMs is always a happy one. Redmond wanted tight control of the Windows 95 desktop, preventing OEMs from customizing it or preinstalling software of their own choosing, and suffered a lengthy and expensive lawsuit as a result. But even then, Microsoft never challenged the fundamental role of the OEMs.

The Surface machines turn Microsoft's business model on its head.

Sending OEMS a mandate to improve

Microsoft took pains at its announcement to highlight that it had built hardware before. This is true; it's been building mice for 30 years, keyboards for 15, and of course has the Xbox 360. Microsoft even explained that it had built hardware to help sell software—the original Microsoft Mouse was created and sold to partner Windows 1.0.

But what Microsoft hasn't done before is compete with the OEMs directly. It's always left the task of actually building PCs to third parties. And now it's muscling in on their turf.

As an indictment of the PC OEMs, Surface is damning. Microsoft isn't even waiting for the OEMs to try (and, quite possibly, fail) to build viable Windows 8 tablets before stepping in with its own system (as it did when it killed the PlaysForSure scheme and released the Zune media player). Instead, Redmond is preempting their failure and ensuring that Windows 8 will come to market with at least one good tablet.

To make matters even worse for the OEMs, it seems that they didn't get much of a warning that Surface was coming. According to Reuters, all they got was a vague phone call from Steven Sinofsky, president of the Windows division, a couple of days before the unveiling.

Microsoft's dissatisfaction with the OEMs is plain, and the OEMs aren't happy about the way they've been treated, but all is not lost for them just yet. Microsoft has fired its first shot at the OEMs, but it's a warning shot: at the moment, Surface looks like it's more Nexus than it is iPad.

Many early Android phones were pretty nasty. The Nexus One, developed by HTC according to Google's specification, sporting Google branding, and sold by Google online, was an important device in Android's evolution. Not because it sold in great numbers, but because it set the standard: Android devices had to be at least that good, with the same features, fast processor, plentiful RAM, and so on. The Nexus One also ran the stock Android operating system, without carrier-provided crapware or OEM front-ends. It showed Android in the best possible light: the operating system as Google wanted it to look and act, with all the hardware necessary to support the latest features.

Subsequent Nexus-branded phones have played a similar role: showcasing Android and introducing new hardware capabilities, acting as standard-setters and benchmarks.

In a surprising parallel to Google's initial Nexus One sales effort, Microsoft too is going the online route. When announcing the Surface, Microsoft said that it would be sold direct, through its online store and its handful of bricks-and-mortar retail sites.

If Microsoft were Apple, with its 364 stores worldwide, including 246 in the US alone, this would be a serious and highly visible retail presence. But Microsoft isn't Apple; it currently has only 18 stores (with another couple opening soon), all of them in the US. The company said that it may also sell Surface internationally online, but didn't specify which specific markets.

The net result of this is that lots of people won't be able to buy Surface at all, and even within the US, many people won't be able to get their hands on the thing to try it out before they buy it.

If Microsoft wanted to seriously challenge the OEMs, that would be a big problem. For a new tablet that has such a strong emphasis on physical design, and with a new operating system that has to be used to be fully appreciated, getting these things in front of consumers so they can try them out for themselves is essential.

But if Surface is aimed at the OEMs—telling them "we can do this just as well as you can, if we have to"—and setting them a challenge—"your tablets have to be at least this good"—then the limited availability isn't necessarily such a big deal. As long as the OEMs heed the warning and raise their game, so that Redmond can be assured that bad hardware won't jeopardized Windows 8's success, Microsoft could safely keep Surface operating as a small-scale operation, playing the Nexus role without upsetting the PC market.

And if they don't?

Microsoft has no shortage of relationships with retailers, both large and small, thanks to its mice, keyboards, and, of course, games console. If it wants widespread retail availability, it's there for the taking. The only limits to Microsoft's reach will be the speed at which it can build the tablets, and the willingness of consumers to actually buy them.

The OEMs have been warned, and the ball is, for the time being, in their court. The only question is, will they listen?

Surprisingly, the early answer appears to be "no." Reuters has reported that Oliver Ahrens, Acer's senior VP and president for Europe, Middle East and Africa, believes that Microsoft is making a failed attempt to mimic Apple. He's quoted as saying "I don't think it will be successful because you cannot be a hardware player with two products"—an astonishing stance, given that Apple is dominating the Tablet market with just two products, the "new iPad" for the high-end, the iPad 2 for everyone else. Two products, and Apple has an entire market locked up.

If other OEMs share Acer's policy of not simply ignoring, but actively rubbishing the only strategy that's proven to be effective then a broader offering of Surface is not just likely; it is an essential inevitability.