Perhaps the “settlements” that have prevailed in some areas in the countryside of Damascus and the old neighborhoods of Homs are the most important gains for the Syrian army in light of these internal fights among jihadist groups.

Some factions have taken advantage of this confusion to hurl accusations of collaboration against one another, whether collaboration with the Syrian army or with some regional and international intelligence services. The fight of jihadist groups against each other should ostensibly come to the advantage of the Syrian army, as its enemies are eliminating one another, which is a priceless gift to any army in the same situation. However, this could entail some negative outcomes, without even tipping the balance in favor of the Syrian army.

The northern and eastern areas of Syria have turned into a muddled, complex battlefield , to the extent that some factions can no longer distinguish between friends and foes, allies or opponents.

The “war of elimination” among the jihadist factions in Syria has entered its sixth month. If the consequences of this war on the factions are well-known, the pertinent question is about the pros and cons of this war vis-à-vis the Syrian army and its options?

Indeed, for many factions, the Syrian army is no longer the obvious enemy, as it has been pictured since the very beginning of the Syrian crisis. Many factions now view other groups as their main enemy whom they need to fight. The idea of reconciliation with the Syrian army has become more acceptable, especially since many have come to think that the enemy of my enemy could be … my friend.

As for the factions that were not affected by this concept, they continued to fight on more than one front, while the Syrian army is reaping many benefits from the ongoing fights among the groups, as they are no longer unifying their combat capabilities against it. They are also suffering from great losses in terms of manpower and equipment. Moreover, one ought to mention the high morale of the Syrian army fighters, who are witnessing their enemies eliminating each other. All this has tipped the balance in favor of the Syrian army, renewing its hope that it will settle the war to its advantage.

However, these benefits do not come with a small price, especially since many countries supporting the armed groups in Syria do not wish to see the Syrian army having the upper hand in this battle, while the ranks of the opposition factions are being pulverized.

In light of the many fragmented factions, some countries believe that they can still unify the ranks of some of these groups against the Syrian army, as happened in the city of Kassab, in the countryside of Latakia and in al-Zahra neighborhood in Aleppo. This is not to mention the ongoing efforts of some countries to supply certain factions with high-tech weapons to impede the progress of the Syrian army on the ground. These countries are supporting the Hazem Movement and the Syria Revolutionaries Front, among other groups.

Although these attempts are not affecting the course of events, as the Syrian army has had the upper hand on the ground since its victory in the city of Qusair last year, they undoubtedly have an impact on the speed of events [to the advantage of the Syrian army].

On the other hand, the fighting of factions in a certain area could be an impediment to the Syrian army to intervene in this area, as this could give the warring groups a chance to re-unite against it.

Moreover, some factions have taken advantage of the muddled situation to start propagandas against the Syrian army. Most importantly, claims have emerged in the past months about the relations between the Syrian army and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the growing talks about coordination between the two sides. Some have gone as far as to claim that ISIS was the fabricated product of the Syrian army and its intelligence services. This propaganda came as a result of the fight between ISIS and other opposition groups, which can be seen as a downside for the Syrian army.

It is interesting that the Syrian army is deliberately keeping silent on such campaigns, trying to absorb its media impact while taking advantage of its repercussions on the ground, by creating further illusions and fears among other factions so they can no longer be certain whether the rumors they started are true or not.

The Syrian army has been playing this card very well, benefiting from the previous expertise of its intelligence apparatuses, whether in the war in Lebanon or in Iraq. Nevertheless, this does not mean that this campaign will not have adverse impact on the army’s supporters, who are also confused about the reality of matters.