Minxin Pei believes China’s charm offensive has its „limits“ despite largesse showered on neighbours in Asia and countries beyond. Thanks to Trump, many leaders in Asia are enjoying a “respite” from Chinese aggression. Meanwhile Beijing has moderated its jingoistic rhetoric and avoided antagonising littoral countries in the East and South China Seas. From Manila to Tokyo, leaders are willing to let themselves in for Beijing’s new strategy, without being “fooled by sweet talk – or even sweet trade deals.”

The author says as long as the decades long territorial disputes remain unresolved, China will not be able to gain friends in the region that “can withstand strategic conflict with the US.” Its charm offensive is merely a “tactical approach,” that reaps solely “tactical gains.” Despite prospects of trade and Chinese investments, “few in East Asia want to live in the shadow of a hegemonic China.” This allows the US to maintain its foothold in the region, and “to act as a strategic counterweight.”

China had beefed up its military and become more self-assertive under Xi Jinping, who is authoritarian, overconfident and nationalistic. But China’s economic expansion and military power raised awareness already a decade ago, when in 2005, Beijing launched its charm offensive, producing a 32-page policy document entitled China's Peaceful Development Road. Denying claims about its geo-strategic ambitions, Beijing pledged to seek a "harmonious world" where all nations could share in bigger markets without fear or threat.

In 2005 China sought to surpass the UK to be the world's fourth biggest economy. It came second in 2011, overtaking Japan. It is not a question of whether, but when China will dethrone the US as the world’s largest economy. For this reason Beijing sees this ongoing trade war as a US move to contain China’s political rise. The Trump administration sees the “Made in China 2025” plan as a threat to US hegemony, as it aims to break China's reliance on foreign technology and upgrade its hi-tech industries to Western levels.

Regional leaders are wary of Xi’s pledge to “make China great again.” They also fear that the ongoing standoff would divide the international community into two camps. “Most East Asian countries prefer not to choose a side outright. But if the US and China were to engage in direct strategic conflict – an increasingly likely prospect – it is the US that would gain the most support, especially from allies like Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam. Malaysia and Singapore would probably also back the US.”

What Xi does is nothing new. In the 1960s Mao poured hard work, money and considerable skill into extending China’s influence throughout the world. Beijing enjoyed much internatonal soft power, as Mao’s peasant revolution appealed to leftwing rebels, civil rights and anti-racism campaigners in the West. Across the developing world, Maoist politics inspired postcolonial countries to become self-reliant, and to opt for party rectification and revolutionary spontaneity.

After Mao’s death in 1976, China pragmatically withdrew from the world stage and focused instead on domestic politics, like economic reform. After decades of double digit growth, Xi has abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s slogan: “Hide your strength and bide your time.” While he believes that China has grown so strong that it can return to its authoritarian past, he is also ready to adapt himself to geopolitical reality when it comes to assuaging the fear of China’s neighoburs.