Introduction

Some theists, such as Leibniz [1], have maintained that determinism is true. I am going to argue that the existence of an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god is not compatible with determinism.

Metaphysical Modality

It seems to me that the following proposition is true: “If an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god exists, then there is no world that is better than the actual world.” In order to understand this proposition, we have to understand the concept of a possible world. In his paper A New Cosmological Argument [2], philosopher Alexander Pruss defines a possible world as follows:

A possible world is a maximal, compossible conjunction of abstract propositions. It is maximal in that, for every proposition p, either p is a conjunct in this conjunction or its negation, not-p, is, and it is compossible in that it is conceptually or logically possible that all of the conjuncts be true together. Let us call the maximal, compossible conjunction that a given possible world is identical with the Big Conjunctive Fact of that world. The Big Conjunctive Fact for a given world comprises all the propositions that would be true if this world were to be actualized. The actual world comprises all the propositions that are actually true.

Now we must ask which types of propositions are included in the BCF of a possible world. Necessary propositions are true in every possible world, so by definition, necessary propositions are included in the BCF of every possible world. The following propositions are necessary:

N 1 : No bachelors are married.

: No bachelors are married. N 2 : 2 + 2 = 4.

There is no possible world that includes married bachelors, so N 1 is necessary. There is no possible world in which 2 + 2 does not equal 4, so N 2 is necessary.

Contingent propositions are true in some but not all possible worlds. The following proposition is contingent:

C 1 : Liam exists.

There is at least one possible world in which my parents never meet, so this proposition is not true in every possible world. Thus, this proposition is true in the actual world but not in every possible world. Any proposition that is true in the actual world but not in every possible world is a contingent proposition.

It may seem that C 1 does not make a reference to time. However, it is unclear which of the following propositions are expressed by C 1 :

C 1A : There is more than one point in time, and Liam exists during all points in time.

: There is more than one point in time, and Liam exists during all points in time. C 1N : There is more than one point in time, and Liam exists during at least one point in time (and one of these points in time is presumably the present moment).

: There is more than one point in time, and Liam exists during at least one point in time (and one of these points in time is presumably the present moment). C 1O : There is only one point in time, and Liam exists during this point in time.

I cannot think of any other propositions that could be expressed by C 1 , so we can assume that C 1 must express either C 1A, C 1N , or C 1O . C 1A, C 1N , and C 1O all make a reference to time, so based on my assumption, C 1 implicitly makes a reference to time. I cannot think of any contingent propositions that do not make a reference to time, either implicitly or explicitly, so I am going to assume that all contingent propositions make a reference to time.

Since necessary propositions are necessarily true during all points in time, necessary propositions do not make a reference to time.

Now consider the four following contingent propositions:

CP-D 1 : Liam currently exists.

: Liam currently exists. CP-D 2 : Liam came into existence approximately 22 years ago.

: Liam came into existence approximately 22 years ago. CP-I 1 : Liam exists during at least one point in time.

: Liam exists during at least one point in time. CP-I 2 : Liam comes into existence during the year 1998.

CP-D 1 and CP-D 2 refer to an objective present, as the phrases “currently exists” and “22 years ago” both rely on an objective present to serve as a reference point. CP-I 1 and CP-I 2 do not refer to an objective present, as neither an arbitrary point in time nor the year 1998 rely on an objective present to serve as a reference point. I will call propositions that refer to an objective present “present-dependent propositions,” and propositions that do not refer to an objective present “present-independent propositions.” Present-independent propositions are part of the BCF of a possible world. Present-dependent propositions should not be included in the BCF of a possible world, as their content can be expressed by time-independent propositions. Including both time-independent and time-dependent propositions in the BCF of a possible world would be redundant. Any possible world can be described without referring to an objective present.

Defining Goodness and Badness

It is important to note that things are not affected by how we define them. The thing that we refer to with the word “tiger” is not affected by how we define the word “tiger.” If the things that are referred to by the words “good” and “bad” exist, they are not affected by how we define the words “good” and “bad.” Regardless, it is important for us to define these words.

There are at least two different senses in which the words “good” and “bad” are used. Firstly, people may say that something is good if it is effective at accomplishing a certain goal, or if it has accomplished a certain goal. Similarly, people may say that something is bad if it is not effective at accomplishing a certain goal, or if it has failed at accomplishing a certain goal. If a car is constantly breaking down, then we may say that the car is bad. Similarly, if an athlete is effective at helping his team win games, or has won a lot of games, then we may say that he is good at the sport he plays. If the athlete helps his team win a game, then we may say that he did a good job or played a good game.

This is not the sense in which we are using the words “good” and “bad” when we discuss ethics. In ethics, we use the words “good” and “bad” in an axiological sense. Axiology is the study of value. I don’t think value can be defined without using a synonym of either “good” or “bad.” An action or state of affairs is good or bad in an axiological sense if it has an axiological value that does not depend on its ability to accomplish a certain goal. We say that murder is bad even though it is effective at accomplishing the murderer’s goal or has accomplished the murderer’s goal. Similarly, we say that everyone being happy is good even though no goal is accomplished through everyone being happy (besides possibly the goal of everyone being happy).

Now I can try to define “good” and “bad” in an axiological sense. I don’t think it is possible to define “good” or “bad” in a non-circular way. It seems that if a word relating to consciousness, space, or time is defined using words, then the definition will be circular. However, I think words relating to consciousness, space, or time can be defined in a non-circular way by defining them without using words. We experience our own consciousness, we experience ourselves and other things moving through space, and we experience the flow of time. We can define words related to these things without using other words by invoking these shared experiences through an ostensive definition. We could try to do the same with the words “good” and “bad.” However, it is unclear to me how we experience goodness or badness. We experience thinking that something is good or bad. You probably think that someone saving another person’s life is good and that someone committing murder is bad. But what are you experiencing when you think these things? Are you just experiencing your own desires?

Most people would say that losing your wallet is bad. If badness refers to a person’s desires, then what we mean when we say that losing your wallet is bad is that from the perspective of the person who owns the wallet, losing the wallet is undesirable. We can think of scenarios where from someone else’s perspective, a person losing his wallet is desirable. If you find a wallet with $200 in it, you might keep the money for yourself, and be glad that the person lost his wallet. Does this mean that from the other person’s perspective, him losing his wallet was bad, while from your perspective, him losing his wallet was good? This would entail that the goodness of a situation depends on your perspective.

One can see how speaking of “good” and “bad” in reference to your desires is, well, undesirable. Can we speak of an axiological standard that is not determined by your desires? I don’t think such a standard exists in a metaphysical sense, but we can still assign desire-independent axiological values to different actions or states of affairs.

If the words “good” and “bad” refer to a possibly nonexistent desire-independent axiological standard, then I think the best way to understand them is through the notion of possible worlds.

Imagine a number line that extends from negative infinity to positive infinity. We can assign an axiological value to a possible world by placing it somewhere on the number line. A possible world is worse than all possible worlds that have a higher value, and better than all possible worlds that have a lower value. If a possible world has a negative value, then it is bad. If a possible world has a positive value, then it is good. If a possible has a value of 0, then it is neither good nor bad.

Suppose we are comparing two worlds on the number line. Even if both worlds have negative values, we can still say that the world with a higher value is better than the other. Similarly, even if two worlds both have positive values, we can still say that the world with a lower value is worse than the other. Saying that one world is better than another does not entail that the better world is good, and saying that one world is worse than another does not entail that the worse world is bad.

Just as we can assign an axiological value to a possible world, we can also assign an axiological value to an aspect of a possible world. In other words, just as we can assign an axiological value to a set of propositions, we can also assign an axiological value to an individual proposition. We can assign an axiological value to the proposition “A man loses his wallet, and someone else finds it and keeps the money.” We can speak as if the axiological value of this proposition is the same for everyone.

Throughout the rest of this post, I am going to use the words “good” and “bad” under the assumption that they refer to a hypothetical desire-independent axiological standard.

The Set of All Best Possible Worlds

A possible world W 1 is a best possible world if and only if there are no possible worlds that are better than W 1 . It is conceivable that two or more possible worlds are equally good, and that no worlds are better than these worlds. If this is the case, then there are multiple best possible worlds. I will call the set of all best possible worlds {Best possible worlds}, or {BPW}.

A theist may say that a possible world is a member of {BPW} if and only if it satisfies the three following conditions:

For every person that exists during at least one point in time, the person never stops existing, the person eventually goes to heaven, the person is eventually in the best possible state, and once the person is in the best possible state, the person never stops being in the best possible state. X number of people exist during at least one point in time. Every proposition P n in the set of propositions {P} is true, where each of these propositions claims that a certain person exists during at least one point in time.

Being in the best possible state could include the conditions that one is in a maximally loving relationship with God, that one is free from the tendency to sin (this seems to be how Hart defines true free will), that one is as happy as possible, that one is not suffering, as well as other possible conditions.

Justifying Suffering

Let us suppose that the theist is correct, and that any world that satisfies conditions 1-3 is a member of {BPW}. Now we must consider the proposition “In the actual world, at least one being experiences suffering at some point.” I will call this proposition “S.” We must consider which of the following propositions is true:

E: S is part of the BCF of every world in {BPW}.

B: S is part of the BCF of some but not all of the worlds in {BPW}.

N: S is not part of the BCF of any of the worlds in {BPW}.

I am going to refer to the proposition “God exists” as “G,” and I am going to refer to the proposition “If God exists, then the actual world is a member of {BPW}” as A.

Some Christians reject A. In his book The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami? [3], Greek Orthodox philosopher David Bentley Hart writes:

Voltaire was not an atheist; he was a deist of the most austere variety, whose reverent admiration for the God who made the universe and then left it to its own immanent devices was evidently quite genuine. His poem [4] was a lacerating attack not on the idea of a creator God, but on the sort of theodicy that had become standard by his time, that odd, bland metaphysical optimism – most scintillatingly expressed in Pope’s Essay on Man [5], but derived from the works of Leibniz, Shaftsbury, and Bolingbroke – that says that this is the “best of all possible worlds,” and that thus “tout est bien” [all is good].” (p. 17)

Hart and Voltaire’s rejection of A doesn’t make sense to me. It seems to me that God’s nature is such that he would only create worlds that are members of {BPW}.

G, A, N, and S are jointly incompatible. I am going to assume that G, A, and S are true, which forces me to reject N. If G, A, and B are true, then God actualized a world that contains suffering when he could have actualized an equally good world that does not contain any suffering. I am going to assume that God would not do this. Based on these assumptions, E is true.

If the theist accepts my assumptions, then he must show why E is true. One of the ways the theist can justify E is by claiming that the three following propositions are true:

In order for one to be in the best possible state, one must know what it is like to suffer. In order for one to know what it is like to suffer, one must have memories of suffering. If one has memories of suffering, then one must have actually suffered (it would be immoral for God to give us false memories, perhaps because doing so would be immoral).

I will concede that the first proposition is epistemically possible. However, I do not see why the second or third propositions should be believed. If God is omnipotent, then it seems he can give us knowledge of what it is like to suffer without us actually having memories of suffering. If one must have memories of suffering in order for one to know what it is like to suffer, then I don’t see why it would be immoral for God to give us false memories of suffering. If giving us false memories would spare us from all of our suffering, then it seems to me that giving us false memories would be the right thing to do.

The theist can also justify E by claiming that being in the best possible state does not necessitate that one has knowledge of what it is like to suffer, but rather, it necessitates that one has actually suffered. The theist may say that suffering purifies us. But if determinism is true, then it is unclear to me which part of us needs to be purified. Our tendency to sin would just be the result of the natures God has given us. Why did God give us sinful natures in the first place, if we cannot choose to not act upon our sinful natures?

If determinism is true, then our circumstances determine our actions. If our circumstances determine our actions, then there is no sense in which we can improve, or in which we can be purified. If we improve or are purified, all that has changed are the circumstances that will determine our decisions. Thus, I cannot see why God would desire for us to improve or to be purified.

In both of the theist’s responses, the theist is claiming that we must suffer in order for us to eventually be in the best possible state. But if God is omnipotent, then he should be able to either create us so that we are already in the best possible state, or create us so that we can reach the best possible state without ever having to experience evil or suffering.

In his essay Providence and Causality [6], Hart writes:

Simply said, if God required evil to accomplish his good ends—the revelation of his nature to finite minds—then not only would evil possess a real existence over against the good, but God himself would be dependent upon evil: to the point of it constituting a dimension of his identity (even if only as a ‘contrast’) (p. 49).

I see no reason to reject what Hart says here, so I see no reason to reject the claim that God could either have created us so that we were already in the best possible state, or have created us so that we could reach the best possible state without ever having to experience evil or suffering.

The theist could then turn to condition 3 and say that one of the propositions in the set of propositions {P} is that I exist. The theist could say that any being who was created in the best possible state is not me. Let us suppose that one is in the best possible state if and only if the four following propositions are true:

One is in a maximally loving relationship with God. One is free from the tendency to sin. One is as happy as possible. One is not suffering.

The theist is claiming that any being who fulfills these four conditions as soon as he is brought into existence is not me.

Alternatively, the theist could claim that even if a being is not in the best possible state as soon as he is brought into existence, if that being reaches the best possible state without ever suffering, then that being is not me.

The problem with these claims is that they assume that the self is something other than just an abstract idea. There are sensory experiences (based on my appearance and personality) that are associated with the abstract object denoted by the phrase “the author of this post.” Different people will associate different sensory experiences with this abstract object depending on how much they have interacted with me. To say that these sensory experiences are intrinsic to who I am (whatever that is) seems incorrect to me. I could get in an accident that changes my appearance and my personality, but I don’t think this would mean I have stopped existing and have been replaced by someone else. If I can survive the transition from this universe to heaven or hell, then I think God could have created me in heaven, or in a world with no suffering.

Conclusion

The following propositions are jointly incompatible:

If an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god exists, then the actual world is in {BPW}. In the actual world, at least one being experiences suffering at some point (S is true). S is not part of the BCF of every world in {BPW} (E is false). If two worlds are both members of {BPW}, and one contains suffering while the other does not, an OCMG will create the world that does not contain suffering. An OCMG exists.

It seems to me that the proposition that God exists has the highest epistemic probability of being false, especially if determinism is true.

I discuss libertarian freedom theodicies here.

References

Leibniz’s Modal Metaphysics by Brandon C. Look (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) A New Cosmological Argument by Alexander Pruss The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami? by David Bentley Hart Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne by Voltaire An Essay on Man by Alexander Pope Providence and Causality by David Bentley Hart

Revisions

2/28/20: Following Eric’s comment, I added the section titled “Defining Goodness and Badness.”

3/1/20: Stipulated that the type of god I am referring to is an orthodoxly conceived monotheistic god.

3/2/30: Removed my conjecture that Hart defines free will as freedom from the tendency to sin.

3/2/20: Noted that Hart probably rejects the second proposition.

3/5/20: Discussed Hart’s rejection of proposition A.

3/8/20: Removed my claim that Hart rejects the libertarian conception of free will.

3/20/20: Changed the title