Bellona Report nr. 2:96. Written by: Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrik and Alexandr Nikitin.

The Russian Northern Fleet

Nuclear-powered vessels

Table of Contents

In the former Soviet Union/Russia, 247 nuclear submarines and five nuclear-powered surface ships were built in the period from 1955 to 1996.[66] In addition, a nuclear reactor which can be installed in diesel powered submarines was also built. Nuclear powered naval vessels are in service with the Northern Fleet (2/3) and with the Pacific Fleet (1/3), but have never been assigned to either of the other two Russian Fleets (the Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet.) Until the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Navy had more nuclear submarines than all other countries put together.[67] As a result both of the START II disarmament treaty and the high age of some of the earlier generations of Soviet submarines, 138 Russian submarines are now no longer operative. This number is expected to increase over the years to come as more of the ageing classes of submarines are decommissioned and dismantled. At the present time, there are 67 nuclear submarines and two nuclear-powered battle cruisers in service with the Northern Fleet, while in the Pacific Fleet, there are 42 operative nuclear submarines, one nuclear powered battle cruiser, and one nuclear powered communications ship.[68]

Soviet nuclear submarines are designed by three main design bureau's, each of which has several subdivisions. The first Soviet nuclear submarine was designed by Special Design Bureau No. 143 (SKB-143). This bureau later merged with SKB-193 and SKB-16 and formed Malakit Design Bureau in St. Petersburg. SKB-143 designed the Project 627 A-November class, Project 645 ZhMT, Project 671 - Victor class, Project 705 - Alfa class, Project 971 - Akula class and Project 661 - Papa class attack submarines. Rubin Central Marine Designs Bureau (SKB-18) in St. Petersburg designed the Project 658 - Hotel class, Project 659/675 - Echo I-II class, Project 667 - Yankee and Delta I-IV classes, Project 941 - Typhoon class, Project 685 - Mike class and the forthcoming Project 885 - Severodvinsk class submarines. The construction bureau Lazurit (STB-112) in Nizhny Novgorod developed the Project 670 - Charlie class and Project 945 - Sierra class nuclear submarines.[69]

Table 3: A summary of the Design Bureau's

In the former Soviet Union, nuclear submarines were built at four different shipyards.[70] One of these, Sevmash (formerly shipyard No. 402) in Severodvinsk, has been operative since 1955. The Amursky Yard (formerly shipyard No. 199) at Komosomolsk-na-Amur was operative from 1957, and has a subdivision in Bolshaya Kamen near Vladivostok. Nuclear submarines have also been built at Krasnoye Soromovo (formerly shipyard No. 112) in Nizhny Novgorod and at the Admiralty Yard (formerly shipyards No. 194 and 196) in St. Petersburg since 1960.[71]

At each of these four shipyards, approximately five to ten nuclear submarines were built a year until 1992. Today, only the Severodvinsk yard is in operation with a maximum production of one or two submarines a year. Of the four yards, Severodvinsk turned out the largest number of nuclear submarines with a total of 127 vessels.[72] Komosomolsk-na-Amur produced a total of 56 submarines, 39 were produced in St. Petersburg and 25 in Nizhny Novgorod.[73] Some of the submarines built in Nizhny Novgorod and St. Petersburg were transported by the Volga and Karel canals to Severodvinsk for completion, ostensibly weapons fitting and reactor equipment.[74]

The Soviet resolution to build nuclear submarines was adopted in a state decree dated December 21, 1952.[75] At this time, research and development of reactor technology was already in progress. A pressurised water reactor was built at the Obninsk Centre outside Moscow, and shortly thereafter a liquid metal cooled reactor also came on line. Both reactors were used for testing reactor technology and for the training of submarine crews. Later the men trained here would be transferred to Soviet Union's first nuclear submarines.

The selection and training of the first nuclear submarine crews began in 1954. In 1955, the first naval reactor in Obninsk was started and training of recruits for the first two nuclear submarines K-3 and K-5 begun. Naval recruits for the submarines K-8, K-14 and K-19 were trained the following year. Simultaneously, a liquid metal cooled reactor prototype was started up for the purposes of training personnel for the submarine K-27.[76]

Construction of the first Soviet nuclear submarine K-3 ( Leninsky Komsomol ), a Project 627 A - November class vessel, started September 24, 1955, in Molotovsk (Severodvinsk).[77] The submarine was launched August 9, 1957, and the two reactors started up for the first time between July 3-4, 1958.[78] The first American nuclear submarine USS Nautilus was commissioned three years earlier on January 17, 1955. Since the United States had a three year head start, the Soviet Union decided to commission K-3 even before the reactor test results were in.[79] Nuclear-powered submarines enabled both the United States and the Soviet Union to carry nuclear weapons close to their mutual coastlines unnoticed. Indeed, the placing of nuclear missiles onto nuclear submarines became a significant contributing factor to the arms race.

The first generation Soviet naval submarines included: Project 627 A - November class, 658 - Hotel class, 659 - Echo-I class and 675 - Echo-II class. In total, from 1955 to 1964, a total of 55 first generation nuclear submarines were built. There were 13 November class, 8 Hotel class, 5 Echo-I class and 29 Echo-II class vessels. With its three ballistic nuclear missiles, the Project 658 - Hotel class submarine, K-19, was the first strategic submarine of the Soviet Union. K-145, a submarine of the same class, was refitted a few years later to carry six ballistic nuclear missiles. The Echo-I/Echo-II class submarines each carried eight cruise missiles. Some of the Echo-II submarines were rebuilt to be able to carry mini submarines. By 1992, all first generation nuclear submarines had been decommissioned.[80]

From 1964 to 1974, the Soviet Union built 34 Project 667 A - Yankee class nuclear submarines. These submarines each carried 16 ballistic nuclear missiles with a range of 3000 kilometres. Having been constructed under the same fundamental principles as the American submarine class George Washington,[81] they consequently received the NATO classification "Yankee".[82] Of these 34 submarines, 10 were assigned to the Pacific Fleet and 24 to the Northern Fleet. The Yankee-class submarines are no longer operative and are presently being dismantled.

The Project 667 B - Delta-I class submarines are a modified version of the Yankee class submarines.[83] These submarines have been modified to carry 12 intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles with a range of 9000 kilometres. Considerable improvements were made to the navigation systems. With the possession of intercontinental missiles, it was no longer necessary to patrol the American coasts. Missiles directed at the American continent could be launched from submarines stationed just off the Kola coast or from patrolling areas beneath the polar ice cap. The successors to the Delta-I class submarines, Project 667 BD - Delta-II, Project 667 BDR - Delta-III and Project 667 BDRM Delta-IV were fitted with 16 intercontinental missiles with a range which enabled them to be launched directly from the submarine's base. These later models of the Delta class were also developed to be considerably quieter than their Yankee and Delta-I class predecessors. This was in direct response to the American construction of the SOSUS listening network, which is a network of submerged cables for the purpose of detecting Russian submarines. The network was laid along the east and west coasts of the United States as well as along the coasts of northern Norway, Greenland, Iceland, the Faeroe Islands and Great Britain.[84] A total of 43 submarines of Delta I-IV classes were constructed from 1971 to 1992.

Other second generation nuclear submarines include the Project 670 - Charlie class and Project 671 - Victor class. These submarines were developed simultaneously with the Yankee class.[85] There were 17 submarines in the Charlie-I-II classes, while a total of 48 Victor I-III class submarines were built. A number of these are still in service. The Charlie class submarines are fitted with cruise missiles, and their main purpose is to counter hostile aircraft carriers and surface ships. Submarines of the Victor classes are attack submarines whose objective is to counter enemy submarines.[86] These vessels are also the first Soviet submarines to be equipped with only one pressurised water reactor.[87] Today, almost all of the Yankee class submarines have been decommissioned. The other second generation nuclear submarines are gradually being replaced by third and fourth generation submarines.

Construction of the first class of third generation nuclear submarines, the Project 941 - Typhoon class, began in 1977,[88] and the first of these vessels was taken into service in 1981. By 1989, six Typhoon class submarines had been built, and the vessels in this class are definitively the world's largest submarines, carrying 200 nuclear warheads each. The Typhoon class submarine was developed to ensure the Soviet capability of massive retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack. A seventh Typhoon class submarine was under construction at the Severodvinsk shipyard, but the work was halted, ostensibly due to the political changes in the Soviet Union towards the end of the 1980s.[89]

The third generation of submarines is substantially improved, both in reactor technology, additional and improved electronic equipment, and quieter machinery compared to previous generations of submarines. In 1980, the Northern Fleet's first submarine in the new Project 949 - Oscar I class, went into service. The Oscar class of submarines carry cruise missiles and were designed to hunt down and sink hostile aircraft carriers. The first Project 949 A - Oscar-II class submarine came on stream a few years later. Four attack submarines of the Project 945 - Sierra class, were taken into use between 1984 to 1993. These vessels have a titanium hull.[90] In 1990, an improved version of the Sierra class, the Project 971 - Akula class came into operation. This is the quietest and most modern submarine in the Russian Navy.[91] Some of the earliest of the Akula class submarines have been modernised to further reduce the noise level,[92] and the most recently built vessels have been improved to such an extent that they are even quieter than those that were commissioned in 1990. These submarines are classified Akula II and are 4 metres longer than the earlier vessels of the Akula I class.[93] Of the third generation nuclear submarines, only the Project 949 A - Oscar-II class and Project 971 - Akula-II class are still under construction.[94]

In late December 1993, construction began on a fourth generation of nuclear powered submarines, the Project 885 - Severodvinsk class.[95] The prototype was launched in 1995, but it is not scheduled to be transferred to the Navy until 1998 at the earliest.[96] This submarine is even more silent running than those of the Project 971 - Akula class; American experts consider it to be the most advanced nuclear-powered submarine in the world.[97] There are three Severodvinsk class submarines under construction, and four more are planned.[98] The latter four have the classification Severodvinsk-I. It is not known how the two submarine projects differ from one another. Construction of this class of vessels will probably begin in 2002-2004 at the Severodvinsk shipbuilding yard, and they will then enter service from 2006-2008.[99] These submarines will probably be fitted with both strategic and cruise missiles with multiple nuclear warheads.[100]

Work is also underway on the development of a new type of strategic nuclear-powered submarine, and these submarines will join the strategic forces represented today by submarines in the Project 667 BDRM - Delta-IV and Project 941 - Typhoon classes, perhaps one day replacing them. The class is known as Project 935. The Project 935 submarines will probably be half the size of the Typhoon submarines and will be equipped with 20 SLBM missiles.[101] There is no information confirming that this class of vessels will actually be built.[102] The Project 935 vessels may well be the fifth generation of Russian nuclear-powered submarines, and they will, if constructed, enter service in 2015 at the earliest.[103]

Right after the Soviet Union's first nuclear-powered submarine was put in operation in the summer 1958, preparations were made for the construction of Project 645 class K-27, a submarine powered by two liquid metal cooled reactors (lead bismuth).[104] This vessel was designed by SKB-143 in St. Petersburg and was built at the Severodvinsk shipyard. Due to demands from the Supreme Soviet for rapid construction, the submarine was built using the already developed hull of the Project 627A-November class submarines. According to the Soviet designers, the advantages of the liquid metal cooled reactors is that less electrical power is needed for start up and shut down. Subsequently, the capacity of the batteries in K-27 was only a fourth of that in the submarines with pressurised water reactors. The submarine was also equipped with automatic turbo generators.[105] The K-27 suffered a series of accidents with its nuclear reactors, but remained in operation until the occurrence of a major accident with the reactors in 1968. In 1981, the entire vessel was dumped in the Kara Sea, near Novaya Zemlya.[106]

The experiences from the Project 645 submarine class formed the basis for a series of seven Project 705 and 705 K-Alfa class submarines. All were equipped with liquid metal cooled reactors, and they were smaller and faster than all of the preceding submarine types.[107] The Alfa class submarines were noisy and easy to detect, but superior in speed so that in battle, they would probably be able to outrun the torpedoes aimed at them. The principal task of the Alfa class submarines was to destroy the enemy's strategic submarines. Today, only one of these vessels, K-123, remains in operation .[108]

The Soviet Union has built five prototype submarines. The Project 645 class submarine (K-27) was the first and is described above. The next one was Project 661 - Papa class (K-162), a submarine developed in answer to a resolution of the Ministry of Defence and the Supreme Soviet to construct a fast nuclear submarine for the purposes of research. This submarine was powered by a new type of reactor, and had a hull built of titanium.[109] Project planning for the new submarine began in 1960 under the direction of chief designer N. N. Isain. It became operative in December 1969, and has the highest registered underwater speed for submarines at 44.7 knots.[110] The advantage of a titanium hull is that it becomes stronger, and can better endure the increased pressure at great depths while at the same time increasing its speed. Later, two series of nuclear submarines were constructed with titanium hulls: the Project 705 - Alfa class and the Project 945 - Sierra class.[111] Today there are no submarines being built with titanium hulls, presumably because these hulls are very expensive.[112]

The next prototype was the ill-fated Project 685 - Mike class submarine K-278 Komsomolets .[113] This vessel was also built with a titanium hull, and was the world's deepest diving nuclear submarine, with a registered diving depth of 1 022 metres.[114] Komsomolets sank in the Norwegian Sea in April 1989.

In addition to the prototype nuclear submarines, the Soviet Union also developed a nuclear reactor which by simple means could be installed into a diesel-driven submarine. The reactor carries the classification Nurka class, and today is located at Olenya naval base in Ara Bay. The diesel submarines in the Northern Fleet are the Project 940 - India class, Project 641-B - Tango class and Project 887 - Kilo class.[115], but it is not known into which of the diesel-powered submarine classes the Nurka reactors can be installed.[116]

The Soviet Union has also developed three classes of mini submarines, all of which belong to the Northern Fleet. The mini submarines are as follows: one submarine of Project 10831 class, one of Project 1851 - X-ray class and three submarines of Project 1910 - Uniform class. Mini submarines are equipped with one pressurised water reactor each,[117] and are probably used for special missions. They do not carry nuclear weapons.[118]

Since 1974 three nuclear powered battleships, Project 1144 - Kirov class, have been built and taken into service,[119] namely the Admiral Ushakov , the Admiral Lazarev and the Admiral Nakhimov . In the latter half of 1995, a fourth one, the Pyotr Veliky , was tested at the shipyard in St. Petersburg, and is expected to become operational in 1996.[120] This ship will be transferred to the Northern Fleet.[121]

A nuclear-powered communication ship, Project 1941 - Kapusta class (SSV-33 Ural ), was based with the Pacific Fleet, but was later laid up because it was too complex for the Navy to operate.[122]

The main problem with nuclear powered battle cruisers is the lack of properly equipped naval bases and facilities for servicing the reactors. In addition to the problem of reactor maintenance, the ships' diesel motors are worn out.[123] Hence, virtually none of these ships are operative, and are therefore laid up.[124] Secondly, another serious drawback is the lack of naval base facilities for refuelling the reactors.[125] Again, this reflects the problems described in Chapter 1 in that the construction of the necessary supporting naval bases and shipyards have not kept pace with .the development of nuclear powered naval vessels.

Project Nato Class No. built Reactores Total reactors in class Number operative in the Northern Fleet Reactors operative in the Northern Fleet 1st generation 627 A November 13 2 (PWR) 26 0 0 658 Hotel 8 2 (PWR) 16 0 0 659 Echo I 5 2 (PWR) 10 0 0 675 Echo II 29 2 (PWR) 58 0 0 2nd generation 667 A Yankee 34 2 (PWR) 68 0 0 667 B-BDRM Delta I-II-III-IV 43 2 (PWR) 86 18 36 670 Charlie I-II 17 1 (PWR) 17 0 0 671 /RT/RTM Victor I-II-III 48 2 (PWR) 96 18 36 3rd generation 941 Typhoon 6 2 (PWR) 12 6 12 949 /A/ Oscar I-II 12 2 (PWR) 24 8 16 945 Sierra 4 1 (PWR) 4 4 4 971 Akula 12 1 (PWR) 12 5 5 LMR 645 ZhMT 1 2 (LMR) 2 0 0 705 Alfa 7 1 (LMR) 7 1 1 Prototype 661 Papa 1 2 (PWR) 2 0 0 685 Mike 1 1 (PWR) 1 0 0 Mini submarines 10831 10831 1 1 (PWR) 1 1 1 1851 X-ray 1 1 (PWR) 1 1 1 1910 Uniform 3 1 (PWR) 3 3 3 Surface vessels 1144 Kirov 4 2 (PWR) 8 2 (3) 4 (6) 1941 Ural 1 2 (PWR) 2 0 0 Total: 247 456 67 119

Table 4: Number of nuclear powered vessels built in the Soviet Union/Russia in the period 1958 1995.

Illustration, 9 kb.

Number of nuclear- powered submarines built in the USSR/Russia in the period 1958-1995

Parallel to the development and launching of four generations of nuclear submarines has been the development of four generations of naval nuclear reactors. Furthermore, prototype reactors have been developed for use in the submarines of Project 645 ZhTS class (K-27) and Project 661 - Papa class along with the submarines of Project 10831, Project 1851 - X-ray class and Project 1910 - Uniform class. A liquid metal cooled reactor has been put into serial production. There are minor differences in the construction of the reactors within each reactor generation as well as within each class of submarines. For example, both the OK-350 reactor found in submarines of the Project 670 - Charlie class and the reactor type OK-300 installed in Project 671 - Victor class submarines, are considered second generation submarine reactors.

A principal difference between submarine reactors and the reactors found in conventional nuclear power plants is in the size and power in proportion to volume.

The uranium fuel used in civilian nuclear power plants mainly has an enrichment of four percent 235 U.[126] The enrichment is considerably higher in submarines. In Russian vessels, enrichment can be as much as 90 percent[127] so that submarines can go for longer periods between refuelling the reactors.

The thermal power of Russian submarine reactors varies from 10 MWt for the smaller reactors used in the Project 1910 - Uniform class submarines, to 200 MWt for the reactors used in the new Project 885 - Severodvinsk class submarine. The nuclear powered surface vessels, Project 1144 - Kirov class, have reactors with a thermal power of 300 MWt.

In the descriptions of naval reactors, the technical defects of the various reactors are emphasised, especially those that have led to accidents and an ensuing leak of radioactivity. It is important to keep this section in context with Chapter 8 to gain a complete picture of accidents involving Russian submarines.

Several design and construction bureau's, manufacturers and corporations in the former Soviet Union have been involved with the construction of nuclear powered vessels. In 1952, the construction of the first nuclear powered submarine began, and it became necessary to solve a whole new series of engineering problems. For example, one of the main tasks was to construct the submarines' nuclear reactor, along with the various systems and mechanisms that would ensure its running without problems. Scientific director for some of the earliest work was academy member A. P. Aleksandrov, while principal builder of the nuclear reactor was academy member N. A. Dollezyal.[128]

Illustration, 29 kb.

The drawing shows a reactor of the first generation of Soviet nuclear submarines

The decision was made to develop a pressurised water reactor to power the first nuclear submarine. This reactor was the first of its kind in the Soviet Union, for the construction of pressurised water reactors for use in land based nuclear power stations did not begin until 1955. During the development of naval pressurised water reactors, a whole new range of important problems arose, in which experience from the existing graphite moderated reactors offered no answers. (Graphite moderated reactors were built in the Soviet Union in order to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons).

Thus the first set of problems to be solved was as follows:[129]

Optimal cooling of the nuclear reactor;

Methods of regulating the neutrons;

Methods for describing neutron behaviour in a pressurised water reactor;

High burnup of nuclear fuel and accumulation of fission products from 235 U.

U. Development of heat transfer models for the nuclear reactor.

Development of automatic control procedures for nuclear reactors.

In order to solve these problems, a small nuclear reactor that could be used in a submarine was built. Later, four generations of such reactors with a series of modifications were constructed on the basis of this reactor.[130]

The construction of nuclear reactors for use in submarines was at that time a major technological achievement. However, from a radiation safety point of view, the reactors suffered from a number of serious flaws. These flaws resulted in a number of accidents, of varying degrees of severity. During the active life of the first generation submarines, there were five accidents in which the reactor was irreparably damaged. These were as follows (listed by the name of the submarine and the year of the accident): K-19 in 1961, K-11 in 1965, K-222 in 1980, K-431 in 1985 and K-192 (formerly K-131) in 1989. In addition, a first generation liquid metal cooled reactor on board the submarine K-27 broke down in 1968. Besides this, there have been two near critical accidents involving K-19 in 1961 and K-116 in 1979 There have also been 18 accidents involving first generation reactors that have resulted in releases of radioactivity. The first generation reactors were produced from 1957 to 1968.[131]

Flaws in first generation reactors:[132]

Large volume and distribution of space in the primary circuit. Pipes connecting the reactor with steam generators, pumps, heat exchangers, volume compensatory devices etc., were too large in diameter. This caused major problems in protection against leakage in the primary circuit (see breakdown of the K-129 submarine ), and easily caused wear of small pipes connecting monitoring instruments to the primary circuits. These were often ruined and became the cause of leaks (see accident involving the K-19 submarine).

Poor reliability of heavy equipment, and in particular, the electric devices located in and around the nuclear reactor. Much of this equipment was not designed to endure large variations in temperature levels and pressure. The temperature in the primary circuits was approximately 300 o C, the steam had a temperature of 250 o C and the pressure level was approximately 200 atmospheres.

C, the steam had a temperature of 250 C and the pressure level was approximately 200 atmospheres. Operational problems in the automation of the reactor control processes.

Poor reliability of data from monitoring instruments was a problem for the operating personnel. The reliability of reactor control and protection systems was also poor (see breakdown of the K-222 submarine).

The third safety barrier was underestimated. Calculations later proved that the third safety barrier would lose its airtight qualities in the event of a breach in the primary circuit. This would result in the radioactive contamination of the reactor compartment. (see breakdown of the K-192 submarine).[133]

Insufficient system for the control of chain reactions in the reactor core - safety of the system questionable. Starting equipment can control nuclear processes in the reactor during start up only at minimum power. Before, the nuclear reactor was started up according to a special program calculated by the operating personnel. In some instances this program could be wrong.[134]

A lack of space around the lid of the reactor increased the danger of the lid being opened without the operators maintaining full control of the process. This, together with overloading of equipment and possible failure to follow procedures by the operating personnel, could lead to over pressure in the reactor core followed by an explosion (see accidents with K-431 and K-222 in 1980).[135] The cooling circuits in first and second generation nuclear submarines are such that reactor accidents resulting in explosions due to over pressure cannot occur because under all operating conditions, there will always be a certain amount of coolant in the reactor core.

There are a number of other flaws in the first generation reactors, especially in equipment that could lead to minor releases within the reactor compartment. Releases to the surrounding environment are eliminated by the submarine hull.

Today, all of the first generation submarines have been taken out of service and are awaiting decommissioning. (see table).[136] The ecological problems associated with these vessels are related to defuelling, deactivation of reactor equipment and the storing of radioactive equipment taken from the vessels.[137] Extra precautions must be taken when defuelling submarines containing damaged nuclear fuel. This is especially true of the submarine K-192 which in 1989 suffered a meltdown in one of its reactors. (See Chapter 6 on the decommissioning of nuclear submarines).

Another important point is that the first generation reactors were operated by self-taught crews who did not have the same sense of radiation safety as has become common in the operation of nuclear reactors today (see account of the accident involving the submarine K-19).[138] The lack of concern for radiation safety at that time was owing largely to the lack of experience in operating nuclear reactors in submarines.

During the last years of operation of the first generation of nuclear submarines, the vessels were staffed by officers and quartermasters who for various reasons could not work on the newer vessels.[139] This is also true of the vessels that have been taken out of service but not yet defuelled, and it affects the safety of laid up vessels waiting to be decommissioned.

As stated earlier, the second generation submarines (Project 667 Yankee and Delta class, Project 670 - Charlie class and 671 - Victor class) were developed and built from 1967 onwards. The first submarine with a second generation naval reactor came to the Northern Fleet in the second half of 1967.[140] Construction of the Project 667, the largest series of Soviet submarines, came to a stop in 1990.

The second generation reactors were developed based on the experiences gained from operating the former generation of reactors. Design flaws in the first generation reactors were taken into consideration and remedied. However, the consciousness of radiation safety was still in its infancy in the Soviet Union. The world had not yet seen the accidents of Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986).

Nor had any one anticipated reactor accidents entailing a loss of coolant. Leaks in the heat transfer pipes within the reactor were thought to be the worst conceivable problem that could arise. Therefore, only a limited number of safety standards were instituted to prevent loss of coolant in the reactor and thereby secure the safety of the submarine. [141]

Experience from the first generation reactors showed that the main operational problem was leakage of water from the primary to the secondary circuit. This occurred mainly through the steam generators. There were also problems of leaks in the pumping systems and the gaskets of the steam generators. The pumps and steam generators were intended to cool the reactor in the event of a power failure.

These experiences formed the basis for modifications introduced in the second generation reactors. Nevertheless, the loop pattern (i.e., a system of spiralling cooling pipes) was retained. The volume and distribution of the primary circuit was sharply reduced, and a system of pipes within pipes was used for the steam generators, especially for the newest pumps leading to the primary circuit.

The number of wide diameter pipes used in connecting some of the central components of the reactor (filter of the primary circuit, volume compensators and so forth) was also reduced. Practically all of the pipes (both large and small) were placed with biological shielding in the uninhabited parts of the submarine. The monitoring systems and the automatic control systems were also modified substantially. Remote control equipment became more common. In the second generation submarines, alternating current replaced the direct current used in the submarines of the first generation, and this change made it possible to reduce the size of some of the equipment. Finally, the turbine-generator was automated.[142]

Despite the changes, there were still safety problems in the operation of the second generation nuclear reactors. From 1967 to the present, there have been three major accidents involving these pressurised water reactors, on the submarines K-140 in 1968, K-320 in 1970 and K-314 in 1983. There also have been several minor incidents of leakage in the second generation reactors.[143] A very basic flaw in the second generation reactors was the poor quality of equipment used in the reactor core, steam generators and automatic equipment.

Reactor accidents are principally caused by cracks in the fuel assemblies with the ensuing leakage of water from the primary circuit to other cooling circuits via the steam generators. The poor quality of the equipment has caused accidents because of uncontrolled starting up of the reactor, as was the case in an accident involving the submarine K-146. There have also been problems of the automatic systems failing to function properly.

Other unsolved problems include:[144]

Cooling of the nuclear reactor at complete power failure in the submarine;

Control of nuclear processes in the reactor during near-critical conditions (except some submarines in which an auxiliary start up system has been installed during repairs).

Loss of coolant in the reactor core in the event of a break in the primary circuit.

Towards the end of the 1970s came a growing awareness of safety. In that spirit, regulations for radiation safety were set that went beyond the government's own interests. General rules concerning safety (FBS, OPB (FBS-73) and OPB (FBS-82)) were established as well as safety rules and guidelines for nuclear reactors in which recommendations from MAGATE were taken into account. (These are abbreviations for Russian safety control authorities and safety regulations which are not easily translated into English).

Development on the third generation nuclear reactors began in the early 1970s, and it is these reactors that power submarines in the Project 941 - Typhoon class, 949 - Oscar class, 945 Sierra class and 971 Akula class. Henceforth reactors would be constructed with the intent of minimising the likelihood of accidents and breakdowns. New safety systems were developed, especially to ensure the cooling of the reactor core in emergency situations. New instruments and monitoring equipment were developed that would rapidly pinpoint problems inside the reactor. These systems were developed in order to handle many different types of leaks in the pipe systems at any time. This was especially important with respect to potential leakage in cooling pipes that were large in diameter.[145]

A new block system was developed to protect the cooling circuits from leakage. By replacing the old system of pipes with a block system, in which the reactor and the cooling system were treated as one block, the dimensions of the pipes and other components could be reduced because the cooling efficiency of the system could be increased.

From a safety point of view, this solved number of problems. First of all, this system permitted a natural circulation of coolant within the primary circuit, even at high power. This was important for the flow of coolant into the reactor core at complete or partial power failure. With the block system, pipes to the primary circuit were replaced with short, wide diameter pipes which connected the main components (reactor, steam generators, and pumps).[146] The reactors were equipped with a cooling system which operated independently of the batteries and that started up automatically in the event of a power failure.

The control and shielding system of the reactor was altered extensively. Emergency start equipment gave the possibility of controlling the state of the reactor at any level of power, even in near-critical situations. An automatic mechanism was installed on some of the control rods which in the event of power failure, would lower the reactor lid to its lowest level, thus completely halting the reactors. This would also occur should the submarine capsize. A number of other technical improvements contributing to increased safety were also introduced.[147]

The main safety problems of the third generation reactors were problems with the main components, especially the reactor core, and keeping them properly cooled during operation. The numerous mechanical processes increased the likelihood of operational problems. The safety systems were designed in a way such that mechanical parts or cooling pipes would burst before the reactor was irreparably damaged. This made it easier to locate damages and implement repair before it was too late.[148]

At the present time, none of the fourth generation submarines have come into service, but plans call for the completion of several Project 885 - Severodvinsk class vessels. The first will probably be ready in 1998.[149] The reactor for the first submarine was finished in 1995. Fourth generation nuclear reactors are formed into a single block. The monoblock design has the advantages of localising the coolant in the primary circuit into one volume of fluid and eliminates the need for pipes of wide diameter. The fourth generation reactors are constructed consistent with modern requirements for radiation safety. Due to the awkwardness of access to the reactor's mechanical parts, remotely controlled equipment is necessary, both during operation and partly during maintenance and repairs.[150]

The liquid metal cooled reactor (AIFMV) is a special category of nuclear reactors. A series of submarines using liquid metal cooled reactors have been built (Project 705 - Alfa class). The first submarine to have a liquid metal cooled reactor was a Project 627 ZhTS class vessel, K - 27). The reactor of this submarine was severely damaged after a pipe in the reactor compartment was contaminated by corrosion particles from the liquid metal (a lead bismuth compound). Subsequently, one of the nuclear reactors overheated.[151]

On the initiative of Admiral G. Gorshkov (former chief admiral of the Navy), a series of seven submarines of Project 705 - Alfa class were constructed. The first Alfa class submarine, under the command of A.S. Pushkin, experienced a number of problems and small accidents during its sea trials and the short experimental period. It was finally dismantled after a series of large cracks occurred in the reactor compartment. The reactor along with its spent nuclear fuel was filled with furfurol and bitumen, and is now at the Zvezdochka Shipyard in Severodvinsk. The remaining six submarines of this class were in operation for 10 years.[152] The submarines of the Alfa class as a whole had a total operational life of approximately 70 years.[153]

The advantages of the liquid metal cooled reactor lay in its dynamics which provided greater power from reactors that were more compact than the traditional pressurised water reactor. The main electrical system was designed to operate at a frequency of 400 hertz, which in turn permitted a reduction in size of some of the reactor equipment. On the other hand, the operation of the reactor became more complex. Nuclear reactors with lead-bismuth cooling systems were developed by Gidroprosess and by the OKBM design bureau in Nizhny Novgorod. [154]

The operation of liquid metal cooled reactors was complicated. The main problem was that the metal mixture solidified if the temperature fell below 125º C, and if this happened, the reactor could be damaged. At Zapadnaya Litsa, the base of the Project 705 - Alfa class submarines, a special land-based complex was built for the support of these submarines. A special boiler room to provide steam to the submarines was built in order to prevent the liquid metal from solidifying when the reactors were turned off. In addition to this, a destroyer and floating barracks supplied steam from their own boilers to the submarines at the piers. Due to the inherent dangers of using these external sources of heat, the submarine reactors were usually kept running, albeit at low power.

The high degree of automation was a further cause of operational problems with these submarines. Only two of the compartments were habitable. All systems and equipment were controlled from a control panel in the command centre. Since the submarines were designed to be as compact as possible, the crew on the Alfa class vessels was considerably smaller than that on other types of Russian submarines (30 as opposed to 100).[155]

Despite the occurrence of two accidents on submarines with liquid metal cooled reactors, these reactors are considered to be safer than the pressurised water reactors, for reasons related to qualities of the liquid metal coolant and the design of the reactor:[156]

High boiling point of the metal mixture (approximately 1680°C) with low pressure in the primary circuit, ruling out over pressure leading to an explosion in the reactor and the ensuing release of radioactivity.

Rapid solidification of the liquid metal mixture in the event of leakage. The melting point of the mixture is 125°C, thereby excluding the possibility of reactor damage and loss of coolant.

Very little long-lived Alfa activity in the coolant.

No release of 210 Po gas (half-life 138 days).

Po gas (half-life 138 days). Qualities of the reactor in the event of fractures in the fuel cladding or leaks in the primary circuit. Rules out significant releases of radioactive iodine, which constitutes the main danger to the crew.

Small contents of radioactivity, which rules out uncontrolled start up of the reactor with prompt neutrons, as well as the possibility for automatic shutdown of the reactor in the event of accidents.

The pressure immediately outside the primary circuit is higher than within this circuit, preventing the release of radioactive coolant.

The designers of the reactor have now solved the problems of "freezing" and "thawing" in the liquid metal mixture in the core, but submarines with liquid metal cooled reactors are no longer being built. The recently repaired K-123, based at Zapadnaya Litsa, is the only one left in service.[157]

The nuclear reactors in use on Russian surface vessels were constructed drawing on experience gained from the building and operating of reactors for the nuclear icebreakers. The construction of the reactor is almost identical to that used in the nuclear icebreakers of the Arktika class. They have the classification KN-3 (OK-900) with a VM-16 type reactor core.

From the point of view of safety, the shortcomings in the construction of these reactors are the same as in the third generation submarine reactor,.[158] although there are greater problems entailed with the installation of nuclear reactors on surface vessels than on submarines. This is because no solution has been found to the problem of building land bases with the necessary support equipment for these vessels. As a result, the reactors on board the Admiral Ushakov and Admiral Nakhimov were shut down for long periods, because the land base simply could not supply enough electrical power, steam and other necessities to keep them running. The components in these reactors were soon worn out, and there were no funds to implement repairs. The vessels were finally taken out of service.[159]

Illustration, 6 kb.

This is a cross-section of the reactor compartment in the civilian nuclear icebreaker Arktika. The reactor is a type KN-3 (OK-900) with a type VM-16 reactor core. This reactor is almost identical to the reactors used on board the nuclear powered battle cruisers.

1: Reactor

2: (inner) protection tank

3: (outer) shield

4: emergency exit

5: control room

6: steam generator

7: reactor room

The problem of refuelling the reactors on these ships is not yet solved. It was assumed this operation would take place at the Sevmorput shipyard in Murmansk, but the shipyard lacks the proper facilities to undertake such an operation. Subsequently the decision was made to transfer the work to the shipbuilding yards in Severodvinsk. This has not yet happened either, for the water in Severodvinsk is so shallow that it is difficult for the big battleships to come alongside quay. It is not expected that more nuclear powered surface vessels will be built after the fourth battleship Pyotr Veliky leaves the St. Petersburg shipbuilding yard, and is delivered to the Northern Fleet.[160]

Fuel assemblies for Russian submarines with pressurised water reactors are produced at the machine building factory in Elektrostal outside Moscow. Fuel assemblies for the liquid metal cooled reactors on submarines of the Project 705-Alfa class and Project 645 ZhTS were produced at the Ulbinsky Metallurgical Works in Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan.[161]

The reactor core in Russian nuclear-powered submarines consists of between 248 and 252 fuel assemblies, depending on the type of the reactor. Most Russian nuclear-powered submarines have two reactors. Each fuel assembly contains tens of fuel rods, and these vary from the traditional round rods to more advanced flat rods.[162] The flat fuel rods are used particularly in the more recent generations of reactors. The point of the flat fuel rod is to enlarge the surface of each fuel rod so as to improve the thermal efficiency. Most of the uranium fuel assemblies are clad in steel or zirconium.[163]

Project/class Number of reactors Type of reactors Assumed degree of enrichment (%) Power of reactors (thermal power)MWt 1st generation 627 A - November 2 PWR, VM-A 21 70 658 - Hotel 2 PWR, VM-A 21 70 659/675 - Echo-I-II 2 PWR, VM-A 21 70 2nd generation 667 A - Yankee 2 PWR, OK-700, VM-4 21 90 667 B-BDRM - Delta I-IV 2 PWR, OK-700, VM-4-2 21 670 A - Charlie-I 1 PWR, OK-350, VM-4 21 90 670 M - Charlie-II 1 PWR, OK-350, VM-4 21 75 671 - Victor I-II 1 PWR, OK-300, VM-4 21 75 671 - Victor III 2 PWR, OK-300, VM-4 21 75 3rd generation 941 - Typhoon 2 PWR, OK-650, W 21 - 45 190 949 - Oscar I-II 2 PWR, OK-650 b 21 - 45 190 945 - Sierra 1 PWR, OK-650 21 - 45 190 971 - Akula 1 PWR, OK-650 b 21 - 45 190 Prototypes 685 - Mike 1 PWR, OK-650 b-3 21 - 45 190 661 - Papa 2 PWR, VM-5 m Unknown 177 1910 - Uniform 1 PWR Unknown 10 Liquid metal cooled 645 ZhTS 2 LMR, VT-1 90 73 705 - Alfa 1 LMR, OK-550, MB-40 A 90 155 Surface vessels 1144 - Kirov 2 PWR, OK-900 KN-3 Unknown 300 1941 - Kapusta 2 PWR, OK-900 KN-3, VM-16 55 - 90 171

Table 5: Russian naval reactors; types, degree of enrichment and power.[97]

The enrichment of fuel in pressurised water reactors varies from 21% 235 U in first generation reactors to 43-44 % 235 U in third generation reactors. The enrichment of the fuel assemblies stolen from a storage facility in Andreeva Bay in 1993 was said to be 36%, and were suitable for insertion into third generation nuclear reactors. The fuel assemblies stolen from a storage facility in Rosta the same year were enriched to 28%,[165] and were suited for submarines of the Project 671 RTM-Victor-III class. The fuel of some pressurised-water reactors have even higher enrichment than this. The Project 1941 - Kapusta class nuclear powered communication ships of the Pacific Fleet have reactor cores with an enrichment of 55-90%. The enrichment of fuel in liquid metal cooled reactors can be as high as 90 percent U 235 .[166] Some submarines have probably utilised fuel of a different enrichment than is standard for the reactor on an experimental basis.

The reactor cores of third generation nuclear powered submarines contain fuel assemblies of varying degrees of enrichment. The fuel assemblies in the middle of the reactor core are enriched to 21% 235 U, while the outermost fuel assemblies are enriched as much as 45% 235 U. The reactors of third generation nuclear submarines contain approximately 115 kilograms of 235 U. The reactors on second generation submarines contain a total of approximately 350 kilograms of uranium, of which 70 kilograms are 235 U.[167] A standard reactor core of a first generation nuclear submarine has a total of approximately 250 kilograms of uranium, of which 50 kilograms are 235 U. These are also the quantities stated for each reactor dumped in the Kara Sea while still containing its nuclear fuel.[168]

For each reactor type, there is an almost identical list outlining the risk of nuclear accidents or dangers in radiation exposed work. These lists are derived in various radiation protection documents, and outline procedures with the highest risk of exposure to ionising radiation.

Nuclear accidents may be characterised in their entirety under the following criteria:

Start and progress of an uncontrolled chain reaction

Problems in cooling the reactor core

As a result of such an event, the crew could be exposed to higher than permitted doses of radiation or the fuel assemblies in the reactor could be damaged such that it can no longer be used.[169] Methods for preventing these kinds of situations are developed by the designers of the reactors, and the Navy is responsible for seeing that these rules are followed.

Included in the list of high risk operations are start up and shut down of the reactor, and routine procedures carried out while the reactor is running, such as taking hydraulic samples and water samples from the primary circuits. In addition, there is the risk of accidents during the monitoring of gases and the monitoring of functional and complex systems of control and safety.[170]

Past experience indicates that the most high risk work is in refuelling the reactor,[171] for the following reasons:

The work is done by many different people with varying levels of qualification for the work at hand;.

Approximately 50 different technical operations are carried out during the process, 25 percent of which may potentially expose the operators to radiation.[172]

The most dangerous situations during the removal of spent nuclear fuel are as follows:

Disassembly and mounting of mechanisms for control and safety systems;

Disassembly and mounting of the reactor lid;

Removal and replacement of fuel assemblies;

Refilling of primary circuits in the thermal system and testing of hydraulics;

Connecting, adjusting and checking of safety devices;

Manual checking for movement of the compensation register;

Reactor start up, measurement of neutrons and thermal measurements and checking.

All of the above-mentioned operations are executed by personnel at the shipbuilding yards and on the floating bases (the Project 326 M and 2020-Malina class) for the reloading and transport of spent nuclear fuel. Start up of the reactor is carried out by personnel from the physics laboratory, trained at the Kurchatov Institute. The most dangerous technical operation is the removal of the reactor lid. Experience from earlier accidents during this very procedure, indicates that this operation can unleash a nuclear accident with a significant release of radioactivity to the water and air over a large geographical area.[173]

In the 1990s, a safer method was developed for removing spent nuclear fuel from pressurised water reactors on submarines. First, the reactor tank is emptied of the water before the work begins. This water slows the neutrons inside the reactor. By removing the water from the tank, the risk of an uncontrolled chain reaction in the reactor core is reduced. The drawback with this method is that the level of radiation in the reactor compartment increases dramatically because there is no longer any water present to moderate the neutrons. Subsequently, extra measures must be taken to prevent the exposure of the workers to radiation. Hence this method of defuelling can only be carried out on submarines that have been laid up for a number of years whereby the level of radiation has decreased naturally.[174]

The construction and start up of new nuclear-powered submarines also entails operations involving risks of radiation exposure, as is also the case when restarting a reactor which has been in for repair or modernisation.

The operations entailing a risk of exposure to radiation are primarily:[175]

Installing the uranium fuel into the reactor;

Mounting and adjusting the control and safety systems of the reactor;

Removing samples from the primary cooling circuit and the reactor core;

Starting up the reactor, and the first trial of equipment.

Other related high-risk operations:

Collection of radioactive waste during operation;

Compression, sorting and burning of solid radioactive waste;

Temporary storage and transport of radioactive waste;

Deactivation of contaminated equipment and purification of radioactive gases.

Today, the start up of new naval reactors takes place at the shipyards in Severodvinsk. Newly refuelled reactors are started up at the shipyards on the Kola Peninsula or in Severodvinsk. Possible accidents will mainly contaminate the immediate surroundings near the nuclear submarine. Many of the shipbuilding yards are located close to densely populated areas. In Severodvinsk, there is a inhabited area only 400 metres away from the shipyard where operations involving hazards of radiation are carried out.

The risk of exposure to radiation during repair work, modernisation or the dismantling of inactive nuclear submarines, is two and a half times greater than during construction and normal operation of the submarines. This work generates four to five times more radioactive waste than during operation.[176] Accidents may occur during the removal and transport of the spent nuclear fuel from the reactors. The risk of accidents of criticality is great, for the containers of spent fuel assemblies may be damaged during reloading and transport. This could result in a release of radioactivity to the environment with the ensuing exposure to radiation of personnel and the civilian population.[177]

Most of the naval shipyards on the Kola Peninsula and in Severodvinsk that undertake this work are located near fairly densely populated areas.

A number of organisations within the Navy and the Ministry of Defence are responsible for monitoring the safety of the reactors on board nuclear submarines. None of them come under the authority of a civilian regulatory authority.

OPB (FBS)-73 delegated the responsibility for supervising nuclear installations to three government agencies. Gosatomnadzor (Radiation Protection Authority) in the Soviet Union was charged with the responsibility of monitoring compliance with safety regulations and standards, especially with regard to the strength of constructions and the use of equipment and pipelines. The national Committee for Nuclear Power ensured that regulations governing nuclear safety were followed. The Ministry of Health monitored radiation safety regulations and procedures, ensuring that these standards were followed. There were routine checks to ensure that the crew on board nuclear submarines were not being exposed to undue amounts of radiation. Monitoring of safety procedures at nuclear power plants was not independent, since all three of the regulatory authorities fell under the auspices of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. The main task of the Federal Committee for Nuclear Power was to encourage the use of nuclear power. Later Gosatomnadzor was developed (now the Federal Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety).

The Ministry of Defence, which until the middle of the 1980s was responsible for approximately 200 nuclear reactors was not answerable to any of above-mentioned committees or ministries. It was not until 1979 that a department for nuclear safety was established in the Ministry of Defence, answerable to the Commander in Chief of the Navy (not even the Minister of Defence). In charge of inspections was Vice-Admiral N. Z. Bisovka. The Ministry of Defence's nuclear reactors and the nuclear facilities and complexes supporting these reactors have still not been placed under a federal authority in Russia; nor are they open to international inspection by the IAEA.

Safety procedures for nuclear reactors were re-evaluated following the Chernobyl accident (including within the Ministry of Defence). This resulted in a decision whereby inspections of nuclear safety would be carried out by the Ministry of Defence.

All supervision and control over nuclear installations and issues of nuclear safety were thereby given to the Ministry of Defence at all stages, from project development to decommissioning. New regulations of nuclear safety (RAS) PBYa(RAS)-13.08-88 were developed for the reactors of the submarines. Design bureau's and construction yards analysed both operative nuclear reactors and those under construction and planning with regards to modern safety requirements. Regulation No.332 which required that nuclear projects under construction be brought up to safety standards consistent with regulations, was adopted. The regulation concerned first and foremost the third generation of nuclear submarines (which were then under construction) and the fourth generation of nuclear submarines (which were under design).

[66] Pavlov, A.S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945-1995 , and Jane's Fighting Ships 1995-1996 , 98th edition. Return

[67] Nezavisimaya Gazeta , October 25, 1994. Return

[68] Jane's Fighting Ships 1993-1994 lists 49 nuclear submarines in the Pacific Fleet as operative. The actual number is probably around 25 to 30. Source: Handler, J., Greenpeace, Radioactive Waste Situation in the Russian Pacific Fleet, Nuclear Disposal Problems, Submarine Decommissioning, Submarine Safety, and Security of Naval Fuel , p. 35. October 27, 1994. Return

[69] Bukharin, O., and Handler, J., Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning , 1995. Return

[70] Izvestia , July 13, 1993. Return

[71] Lee, R., Active Naval Shipyards , last updated October 24, 1995. Return

[72] Bukharin, O., and Handler, J., Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning , 1995. Return

[73] Ibid. Return

[74] Mormul, N., Note, 1995. Return

[75] Decree No. 570-2011 from the Supreme Soviet, December 21, 1952, Moscow. Referred by Mormul, N., Note, 1995. Return

[76] Mormul, N., Note, 1995. Return

[77] Pavlov, A.S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945-1995. , 1994 Return

[78] Mormul, N., Note, 1995. Return

[79] Morskoy sbornik, No.1, 1995. Return

[80] Pavlov, A.S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945-1995 , 1994 Return

[81] Krasnaya Zvezda , January 28, 1995. Return

[82] Severny Rabochy , January 27, 1994. Return

[83] Krasnaya Zvezda , January 28, 1995. Return

[84] Nezavisimaya Gazeta , October 25, 1994. Return

[85] Krasnaya Zvezda , April 29, 1995. Return

[86] Krasnaya Zvezda , January 29, 1995 Return

[87] Pavlov, A.S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945-1995 , 1994. Return

[88] Krasnaya Zvezda , January 28, 1995. Return

[89] Pavlov, A.S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945-1995 , 1994. Return

[90] Na Strazhe Zapolyarya , April 22, 1995. Return

[91] Krasnaya Zvezda , January 28, 1995. Return

[92] Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade , (3rd edition), May 1995. Return

[93] Jane's Defence Weekly , No. 9, February 28, 1996. Return

[94] Morskoy sbornik , No. 7, 1995. Return

[95] Pavlov, A.S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945-1995 . 1994. Return

[96] Jane's Defence Weekly , No. 11, September 16, 1995. Return

[97] Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade , (3rd edition), May 1995. Return

[98] Jane's Defence Weekly , November 4, 1995. Return

[99] Jane's Defence Weekly , No. 11, November 16, 1995. Return

[100] Lee, R. State of the Russian Navy data page , latest update, January 9, 1996. Return

[101] Ibid Return

[102] Jane's Fighting Ships 1995-1996 , 98th edition. Return

[103] Jane's Defence Weekly , No. 9, February 28, 1996. Return

[104] Mormul, N., Note, 1995. Return

[105] Severny Rabochy , March 3, 1994. Return

[106] Yablokov, A. V., Facts and problems related to radioactive waste disposals in seas adjacent to the territory of the Russian Federation , Moscow 1993. Return

[107] Burov, V. N., Otechestvennoye voyennoye Korablestroyeniye , St. Petersburg, 1995. Return

[108] Jane's Defence Weekly , November 4, 1995. Return

[109] Osipenko, L., Shiltsov, L., and Mormul, N., Atomnaya Podvodnaya Epopeya , 1994. Return

[110] Krasnaya Zvezda , May 27, 1995. Return

[111] Mormul, N., Note, 1995. Return

[112] Na Strazye Zapolyarya , April 22, 1995. Return

[113] Morskoy sbornik , No. 4, 1994. Return

[114] Na Strazye Zapolyarya , April 22, 1995 and Morskoy sbornik, No. 4, 1994. Return

[115] Jane's Fighting Ships 1995-96 , 98th edition. Return

[116] Information from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, 1994. Return

[117] Ibid. Return

[118] The Norwegian periodical Vårt Vern , No. 3, 1993 Return

[119] Pavlov, A.S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945-1995 , 1994. Return

[120] Na Strazhe Zapolyarya , April 22 1995 and Krasnaya Zvezda, October 13 1995. Return

[121] Krasnaya Zvezda , October 13, 1995. Return

[122] Pavlov, A.S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945-1995 , 1994. Return

[123] Handler, J., Greenpeace, Radioactive Waste Situation in the Russian Pacific Fleet, Nuclear Disposal Problems, Submarine Decommissioning, Submarine Safety, and Security of Naval Fuel , p. 35, October 27, 1994. Return

[124] Morskoy sbornik , No. 6 -1993. Return

[125] Ibid. Return

[126] Nilsen. T., and Bøhmer, N., Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties , Bellona Report no.1 :1994. Chapter 5 - The Kola Nuclear Power Plant Return

[127] Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Waste in the Arctic, an Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts from Soviet Nuclear Contamination , September 1995. Return

[128] Morskoy sbornik , No. 1 - 1995. Return

[129] The items below are listed in Atomnaya Energiya , Vol. 73, No.4 - 1992. Return

[130] Ibid. Return

[131] Nilsen. T., and Bøhmer, N., Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties . Bellona Report no.1 :1994. Return

[132] Unless otherwise stated, this information is from Bakhmetyev, A. M., Methods of judging safety levels and securing nuclear energy generators , 1992 Return

[133] Sudostroenie , No. 11-12, 1992. Return

[134] Alyeshin, V. S., Vessel Nuclear Reactors . Return

[135] Atomnaya Energiya , No. 4 - 1993. Return

[136] Nezavisimaya Gazeta , April 22, 1995 Return

[137] Krasnaya Zvezda , July 13, 1995. Return

[138] Atomnaya Energiya , No. 2 - 1994. Return

[139] Morskoy sbornik , No. 6 - 1993. Return

[140] Krasnaya Zvezda , April 29., 1995. Return

[141] Atomnaya Energiya , No. 2 and 4 - 1994. Return

[142] Atomnaya Energiya , No. 4 - 1993. Return

[143] Nilsen. T., and Bøhmer, N., Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties . Bellona Report no.1 :1994 and Osipenko, L., Shiltsov, L., and Mormul, N., Atomnaya Podvodnaya Epopeya , 1994. Return

[144] Kremlin, A. E., Security at Nuclear Energy Installations and Sarkisov , A. A., Physical Basis for the Use of Nuclear Steam Producing Installations and Atomnaya Energiya , No. 4 - 1993. Return

[145] Atomnaya Energiya , No. 4 1996. Return

[146] Atomnaya Energiya , No.4 -1993 and No. 6 1994. Return

[147] Ibid. Return

[148] Ibid. Return

[149] Jane's Fighting Ships 1995 - 96 , 98th edition. Return

[150] Atomnaya Energiya , No. 1 - 1992 and No. 2- -1984 Return

[151] Vårt Vern , No 1 1993. Return

[152] Pavlov, A. S., Military Vessels of the Soviet Union and Russia 1945 - 1995 , 3rd edtion, 1994.. Return

[153] Atomnaya Energiya , No. 1 - 1992 and No. 2 - 1992. Return

[154] Ibid. Return

[155] Burov, V. N., Otechestvennoye voyennoye Korablestroyeniye , St. Petersburg, 1995. Return

[156] Ibid. Return

[157] Pavlov, A.S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945-1995 , 1994. Return

[158] Sudostroenie (shipbuilding), No.9-1990 and No.1-1991. Return

[159] Handler, J., Greenpeace, Radioactive Waste Situation in the Russian Pacific Fleet, Nuclear Waste Disposal Problems Submarine safety, and Security of Naval Fuel . p.44, October 27, 1994. Return

[160] Krasnaya Zvezda , October 13, 1995. Return

[161] Bukharin, O., and Handler, J., Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning , 1995. Return

[162] Ibid. Return

[163] Nilsen. T., and Bøhmer, N., Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties . Bellona Report no.1 :1994. Return

[164] Information collected from; Pavlov, A. S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1946-1995 , 1994.; Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Waste in the Arctic, an Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts of Soviet Nuclear Contamination , 1995; Bukharin, O., and Handler, J., 1995. Return

[165] Moscow News , No. 48, December 8-14, 1995. Return

[166] Bukharin, O., and Handler, J., Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning , 1995. Return

[167] Nilsen. T., and Bøhmer, N., Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties . Bellona Report no.1 :1994. Return

[168] Yablokov, A. V., Facts and problems related to radioactive waste disposals in seas adjacent to the territory of the Russian Federation , Moscow 1993. Return

[169] Regulations concerning nuclear and radiation safety on naval nuclear energy installations . Return

[170] Sarkisov, A. A., Physical Basis for the Use of Nuclear Steam Producing Installations , Moscow. Return

[171] Severny Rabochy , June 3, 1993 Return

[172] Handbook for the firm GRTsAS . Presented to the Russian Government, Moscow, 1993. Return

[173] Atomnaya Energiya , No.2-1994. Return

[174] Information given on a pressconference in Severodvinsk, in connection with removal of spent nuclear fuel from the submarine with fabrication no. 401., march 1995. Return

[175] Handbook for the firm GRTsAS . Presented to the Russian Government. Moscow, 1993. Return

[176] Ibid. Return

[177] Ibid. Return



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