Investigators should pursue the events leading to the 2011 SU-GBP and 2008 N799AX fires and subsequent actions by responsible manufacturer and regulatory authorities to remediate the cause and prevent such a specific airborne fire class leading to an inflight calamity (such as befell MH370). This would seem to be a logical start point for inquiry and investigation. Below you will see copies of FAA Airworthiness Directives that address the same electrically conductive wiring (inside crew LP oxygen hoses) in other Boeings (including the 787 ) but not requiring remedial action for many months.

The responsible authorities seem to be seizing upon MH370's disappearance as a total mystery without logical explanation, but surrounded by sinister implications and presumptive inferences - and thus obviating any affirmative technical action to prevent a recurrence. Once an airplane has been lost, regardless of whether or not it is searched for or found in the far distant future, the priority now must be to identify the most probable cause and take preventative action. This has always been the modus operandi in previous less complex accidents. The oxygen flare fire scenario has glaringly plausible precedents and deserves to be considered in-depth - and thus future-proofed against a possible recurrence. There was nothing enigmatic about the 29 July, 2011 fire that destroyed Egyptair's SU-GBP or (earlier still ) the B767 reg N799AX and RAAF Orion A9-300. However the fact that these were all ramp accidents without fatalities has tended to mask their relationship to a possible MH370 airborne equivalent. The differences between an oxygen flare fire on the ground and one in the air would be chalk and cheese.

Timings, lack of emergency comms, human factors, FCS characteristics and mystical turns during its "ghost-flight" until fuel exhaustion - all known MH370 factors tend to support this particularised scenario described above. In particular, the effect of a non-incendiary self-extinguishing oxygen flash-fire (i.e. a DDT or Deflagration to Detonation Transition due to oxygen enrichment reaching its flash-over trigger level) and its effect upon circuit-breakers and cockpit plastics (such as pushbutton switches and their encapsulating housings) should be researched. The unique characteristics of a self-extinguishing oxygen flash fire tends to create environmental conditions within an airplane flight-deck that would pose a circumstance in which certain systems could be heat-disabled or partially compromised...... and others left unaffected. However these outages would not necessarily be to the extent that the aircraft could not continue uncontrolled (non-autopiloted) flight at cruise altitude - despite flight-deck surfaces being superficially scorched and all on board being deceased due to hull burn-through, lack of pressurization and supplementary oxygen depletion. It is important to note that oxygen enrichment is as insidious as Carbon Monoxide poisoning, oxygen being colorless and odorless and its enrichment level being undetectable. A DDT event would be audibly little more than a dull thump and probably unnoticeable aft of the locked flight-deck door. Even though the flight-deck is not hermetically sealed from the cabin, oxygen enrichment levels would climb quickly in that enclosed space - once inflows became uninhibited.

An examination of the known and technically interpreted MH370 post-event evolutions (loss of contact followed by a muted turn-back), plus satellite handshake data, once weighed against prior known 777 events and instinctive pilot reactions in extremis, leads easily to a conclusion that an oxygen flash-fire "fits the bill" very well (per the prior SU-GBP oxygen fire accident in Cairo in July of 2011 and the 2008 767 oxygen fire in San Francisco) .

It's important to note that in these circumstances of severe to extreme turbulence encounters, the 777's survivability structurally would be much greater than if the autopilot WAS engaged and fighting the attitude and speed changes wrought by the turbulence encounters inside the tops of these cumulo-nimbus build-ups. Despite the 777 having the inherent capability of self recovery from an extreme attitude, the post-exit heading (from cloud) that it could end up on is the one factor "left in the lap of the gods".

Convective Activity is always maximally focused upon the Centroid of the ITCZ where cumulo-nimbus (thundercloud) build-ups in excess of 55,000ft are often encountered. Google "Hadley Cells". Weather radar importantly assists pilots in avoiding these destructive turbulent areas. A blundering unpiloted aircraft not on autopilot would suffer extreme attitude changes within these highly localized areas of severe turbulence, but an un-autopiloted 777 would recover quickly (albeit on a totally different heading) once "spat out" - courtesy of its highly redundant and unique Active Flight Control System .

Much has been made of the various course changes determined to have been made by MH370 following the pilot-initiated turnback towards Malaysia. The facile explanation for that is courtesy of the typical cumulo-nimbus activity in the vicinity of the ITCZ (Inter-Tropic Convergence Zone)... a latitudinally wide zone of convective atmospheric hyperactivity that seasonally moves north and south of a median position (approximating the equator - i.e. it "follows the sun"). If MH370 had flown into an active thunderhead or building cumulo-nimbus after entering the Straits of Malacca, north of Sumatra, it would have been spat out on a much different heading to that which it entered on..... notwithstanding its Active Flight Control System . Once MH370 had progressed further South, it would have entered a zone of very reduced convective activity and been much higher, well above any non-ITCZ weather, due to its fuel-consumption, reduced All-Up Weight, static (i.e. motionless) pax-load and consequent propensity to climb as its weight decreased.

The distinct difference between the 777 and other model airliners of its ilk is the 777's ACTIVE flight control system (AFCS) . Even if its autopilot's functions (control wheel steering, various heading-stabilizing and derived steering functions as well as barometric altitude hold) are disengaged or non-functional, the 777 is quite capable of autonomous wings-level steady flight. Over time, as its fuel burns off, the net effect of not being auto-trimmed would be a continuing climb at its aerodynamically trimmed speed to a thrust-limited ceiling for its weight. This would have the effect of extending its total range by around 250kms. The noteworthy effect of an ACTIVE FCS is that if a wing drops in rough air, it's instantly picked up.... and the nominal original heading in relatively smooth air would remain essentially constant within a quite narrow range of left/right meander. The 777 has a very stable phugoid in pitch such that any turbulence or weight-shift induced pitch attitude aberrations are soon self-cancelling to a trimmed norm. This characteristic, coupled with its similar lateral flight control stability, permits safe autonomous flight without human input or autopilot guidance, and would avoid a loss of control "upset" in all but severe turbulence. Following any such "upset", the 777's AFCS is itself quite capable of soon returning to trimmed straight (i.e. wings level) flight.

It used to be the case that some airlines' standard operating procedures for a two-man crew required one pilot to don his oxygen mask once the other pilot had indicated that he needed to go aft into the cabin (on a toilet break, say). This mask-donning activity may have been the initiator for the oxygen flash-fire.... or it may have been the directed radio frequency change (oxy face-masks have built-in microphones)

Physiological Factors: Lung-searing/temporary blinding/misting of spectacle lenses, but total incapacitation may have not happened until 30+ seconds to a minute after the event (i.e. at the onset of hypoxia following hull burn-through due to a cockpit sidewall blowtorch effect at the oxygen fire's source). This hiatus would've afforded sufficient time for either pilot to wind in a turn-back heading selection for the nearest available airport before unconsciousness intervened (due to injury and/or time of useful consciousness being limited to less than a minute at height.

Pilot immediate disablement would be dependent upon whether both were seated or in the flight-deck. Instinctively averting one's face from the point-source flash-fire might avoid instant incapacitation for the pilot on the opposite side of the cockpit - yet spectacles would be protective but rendered useless. A surviving pilot's reaction would have instinctively been to initiate a turn-back heading bug selection - and then later, upon hearing the depressurization aural alarm, initiating an autopilot disconnect and a yoke-forward nose-down descent, prior to passing out due to hypoxia. It's instructive that in the Apollo 11 fire, the last communication from inside the capsule came 27 seconds after the fire was reported ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_1 ). Once the MH370 pilot had passed out due hypoxia and relaxed the forward pressure on his yoke, the aircraft's dive energy and out-of-trim state would have permitted a nose-high zoom-climb to height, whereupon it would have stalled and recovered itself. Such a manoeuvre was detected on military radar. Any instinctive simultaneous attempt to don an oxygen mask would've been (unbeknownst to that pilot) "unproductive". Both pilots' oxygen supplies are from the same source.... and unprotected by non-return valves.

Flare-up duration of 10 to 15 seconds (or 25 to 30 seconds at most) until oxygen exhausted, hull rupture or leak blocked by melting surrounds at the leak.

Finding: "contact between aircraft wiring and oxygen system components may be possible if multiple wire clamps are missing or fractured or if wires are incorrectly installed.". SU-GBP investigators also found that, inside the F/O's side console, an unsupported and unclamped wiring loop existed across all 777 builds. It was an ex-factory oversight that was contrary to the Boeing specs, and likely to have been rectified by a non-urgent "all operators letter" (S.I.L), pointing it out as a simple discrepancy and with the inference that it should be rectified. Unsupported wiring was found by the FAA's Wiring ATSRAC (Aging Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee) to be the main cause of chafing leading to arcing and short-circuits.

wiring concerns. The original type simply had an internal helical spring inside the full length of the hose. The second had the conductive spring inserted into the hose wall (i.e. internalized, between two layers of hose). Unfortunately this proved to be no solution as the spring's cut ends only had to make contact at either end to provide a heating element (once shorted out) over the length of the hose.

"The aircraft was found to differ from Boeing's design in that a clamp supporting the first officer's wiring to the oxygen mask light panel was missing. The wiring was not sleeved and a large loop of unsupported wire was found. The investigation determined that about 280 aircraft including all of Egyptair's Boeing 777s were delivered that way."

777 has electrically latched relays rather than magnetically latched relays. These were first introduced with the very modernised and novel electrical system of the Boeing 717. However it's correct to say that electrically latched relays are more vulnerable to the facsimile "EMP" of an oxygen flash-fire. This fact tends to underpin the contention that plastics (switches, keypads and screens) of a modern flight-deck are much more sensitive to a transitory flash-fire (in comparison to the old school technologies of metal toggle-switches).

The underlying premise of this theory is that a high altitude fire would quickly be extinguished by hull burn-through and instant oxygen depletion via the consequent depressurization outflows. Prior to hull rupture, pressurization differential pressures would assist blowtorch weakening of the adjacent hull, speeding up the hull rupture (i.e. accelerate the hull burn-through via the oxygen blowtorch at the pilot's side-console leak source). An oxygen enrichment inspired DDT (see later) would complete the hull rupture.

Due to a sudden oxygen flare fire in the cockpit - based upon at least two vital identical Precedents ... (per the Egyptair 777-200 SU-GBP destroyed on the ramp in Cairo on 29 July 2011 and 767 N799AX destroyed on the ramp in San Francisco on 28 June 2008 - see NTSB Report at tinyurl.com/nml93ap ). See tinyurl link tinyurl.com/mwnfn3s for the official report of the Egyptair 777 ramp fire and the considerable differences /outcomes that could be reasonably expected if the equivalent oxygen flare fire was to happen in-flight at cruise altitude. The Cairo and SFO ramp-fires weren't blown out by ingress of a high-speed airflow after their hull burn-throughs and thus the SU-GBP and N799AX cockpit fires "caught" and their flightdecks were burnt out....due to the fire-crew's prioritisation of evacuating personnel. See graphic cockpit hole imagery in links. Other examples of ramp oxygen fires include a CRJ-200 (Canada) and a SCAT 737. These also sport the characteristic hull burnthrough.

This entire oxygen flash-fire theory is being actively quashed by the proxy owners of the Pprune.org professional pilots forum by a very deliberate program of permanently (but discreetly and not publicly) banning thread-posters - immediately applied to any-one who puts it forward or refers to it obliquely. The bannings have been very widespread and mainly involve responsible long-term experienced posters (i.e. a preponderance of concerned professional pilots and engineers). The new covert owners of Pprune are a consortium of industry vested interests -and the prime purpose/tasking of their paid forum operators Internet Brands Inc (i.e. paid censorial moderators) would appear to be to actively (but surreptitiously) suppress any forum postings considered to be deleterious to the airline and industry interests that they covertly represent. The spate of disappearing posts on the MH370 thread would appear to point to Boeing being the active conspirator (rather than Airbus). i.e. the prior (but similar) Air France Flt 447 thread was apparently unaffected by this active vetting and culling. The very well-known and successful Pprune.org forum was bought a few years back, for a very considerable sum, from its original owner and operator/chief moderator Captain Pprune (aka Captain Danny Fynne - an active airline pilot). Fair game or sneaky and reprehensible? In similar fashion, the Pprune mods are deleting references to the fact that access to the cavernous 777 Main Electrical Load Centre (the "MEC") is totally insecure - both in-flight from the pax cabin and on the ground (from the tarmac). Why? Because the legacy access design on 747-400's and 777's is pre-911 and it'd be too expensive to rectify this security anomaly. This situation has been compared to a body armour vest with a missing 3" diameter aperture to directly access the heart (front and back).

Due hull burn-through resulting from a cockpit oxygen flare fire and (at inflamed leak source) a quick blow-torch penetration of the hull - likely inside 60 seconds. Such fires (involving sudden oxygen flare) have distinctive characteristics. Airborne, at high altitude, they are quite short-lived conflagrations and in no way incendiary i.e. their effects are restricted to instantly high (but quickly abating) temperatures, superficial scorching of enriched oxygen "wetted" surfaces and functional compromise of plastic push-buttons (due distortion of their housing surrounds, other low melting point componentry such as LED screens and keypads, thermal circuit breaker actuations etc). Many electrical circuits (and associated avionics) would be "taken out" by the heat's effect on flare-exposed plastic push-buttons (together with their internal illuminated placarding). However, unlike avionics systems (environmental, comm and nav related), the airplane's fundamental functions (thrust and primary flight controls) would/could be un affected (due multi-path redundancy and non-exposure). The Cairo fire was caused by an electrical short to the helically wound internal stiffener wire that afforded rigidity, preventing hose-kinking and flow restrictions to the low pressure oxygen concertina hose leading to the first officer's regulator. The stiffener wire was unfortunately and inexplicably electrically conductive. Boeing's Service Bulletin (SB) was not mandated by an FAA Airworthiness Directive for US 777 and operators of most other Boeing types until well after MH370 disappeared (i.e. circa mid April) and, in any case, the proprietary Boeing SB resulting from the Egyptair event was believed to be a proto-typical under-response of "inspect and report" (only). There would appear to have never been any imaginative interpretations or prognostications of what might have happened in-flight (if such a chafed wiring initiated oxygen flash-fire should occur).

...but doors cannot be opened in-flight and cabin windows are also plug-type and multi-layered - however there was an Airworthiness Directive related to empennage cracking in the vicinity of the ACARS antenna - just forward of the vertical fin

...and alarms have permitted crews to correct the problem and communicate to ATC their follow-up actions (such as an emergency descent). Hull rupture is in a different category of pressurization failure.

Loss of pressurization issues have normally been associated with pressurization system component failure or crew error in the climb to height - not whilst stable in the cruise....

- but cargo hold and cabin fires have always allowed flight-crews to communicate their plight well before calamity strikes. e.g. SAA 747 Combi in 1987- and many others.

- ongoing developments would likely have revealed such a scenario for what it was (although a more sophisticated hijacker may have elected to perpetuate the enigma via non-disclosure). No passenger with terrorist or similar propensities has been identified.

- favoured by media, airlines and a wealth of anti-terrorist experts - but likely would have disabled the aircraft and caused a crash in situ, not a continued apparently-controlled flight over many hours.

Note: It is interesting to compare the distinct parallels between the disappearance of MH370 and the fate of the crew of the Mary Celeste (see "Vapour emission from barrels of alcohol" at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mary_Celeste ). The main theory behind the crew's Dec 1872 abandonment in mid-Atlantic of the Mary Celeste was a vapour explosion caused by nine barrels of alcohol seeping their contents into the cargo hold and violently blowing the fwd hatch (but without any resulting fire - it was a pressure-wave explosion - see DtD later). 9 of the 1701 barrels of alcohol in the hold were found to be empty, these 9 barrels being made of red oak (and not white oak - as were the others). Red oak was porous, prone to seepage and could easily emit vapours. It was assumed that the one missing lifeboat had been boarded by the 10 persons aboard and that the hawser found parted and trailing the vessel astern was more than a simple clue, it was tell-tale evidence, i.e. that the captain had ordered the vessel temporarily abandoned after the hatch had blown violently. However whilst they waited safely (astern under tow) to see if the dangerous (obviously leaking) cargo of alcohol would detonate, the hawser parted as the ship entered a squall and overstressed the inadequate tow-line. The violence of the cargo hold's forward hatch explosion was evidenced by a deep gouge in the vessel's hand-railing. The facts and the clues proved sufficient to wholly unravel that mystery - eventually. It's unlikely that MH370 will ever be found in the vastness of the Southern Ocean so a sufficient solution to this enigma must lie in the sum of the antecedent probabilities. Sufficient precedents and pointers exist for a conclusion to be reached. The eventual Mary Celeste solution was arrived at by considering the evidence, especially the history of red oak barrel explosions.

So for the full story of a likely MH370 explanation, be sure to read on - note #11 in particular - and examine the links hereunder. Points-list prior to #11 simply emphasize the improbability of any alternate propositions.

The final arbiter is always going to be hypoxia and an asphyxia death whichever way you try and re-compute this scenario. In this equation of inaction following the stark Cairo event's pointer towards the lethal airborne potentials, there was always going to be a quandary denominator - as per the Helios 737 ghost-flight from Cyprus to Athens. When there's a 2008 precursor to a 2011 precedent, you have to wonder about questions of responsibility, culpability and liability for any ensuing accident.

Scientific mathematical and logician attempts to resolve the present sea-bed location of 9M-MRO by applying esoteric math and nebulous projections of its likely average speed etc are not much more than aeronautical proselytism. There is no precision in that satellite-based religion when it is evident that the whimsy of wind and an unknown power-setting and height/configuration (etc) plus a random averaging heading of an autopilotless flight control system was guiding MH370 every which way but down - until its fuel was exhausted. The very best we can say with some surety is that it was tracking generally south and gradually climbing as its fuel burnt off and all-up weight reduced. There is a cogent explanation as to why it was finally southbound. It's disclosed in this document and its links. Passenger and crew im mobility would have assisted that process of continued flight by zeroing out any trim changes at all in pitch. The cautionary tale in all this is that a modern aircraft not on autopilot can meander left and right of track once in an unguided "ghost-flight" mode - following pilot death due to their life-affording oxygen depletion via an oxy flare-fire and their consequent desperate (but soon death-thwarted) attempt to do the right thing by initiating entry into a descent toward breathable air levels.

Malaysian and Vietnamese airspace at 17:22. At 18:22, Malaysian military radar tracked MH370 flying northwest along the Strait of Malacca; this was the final radar data indicating the airplane’s position. After disappearing from military radar, MH370’s satellite communications system exchanged seven signaling messages—also referred to as “handshakes”with the ground station, a satellite over the Indian Ocean, and the aircraft’s satellite communications from 18:25 until 00:19.27. According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the final signaling message, a log-on request from the aircraft, indicated a power interruption on board that may have been caused by an exhausted fuel supply. At 01:15, MH370 did not respond to the signaling message from the ground station. Using the handshake data to determine that it continued to fly for several hours after disappearing from radar and estimates of the aircraft’s range based on the fuel quantity included in the final ACARS message, investigators placed MH370’s final location somewhere in Australia’s search and rescue region on an arc in the southern Indian Ocean. The current phase of the search is focused on an area of approximately 60,000 square kilometers.

Typically, the aircraft transmits a “log-on” request in order to connect to the satellite communications system and this is acknowledged by the ground station. Once connected, if the ground station has not heard from the aircraft within an hour, it will check that the connection is still operational by transmitting a “log-on interrogation” using the aircraft’s unique identifier. If the aircraft receives this information, it returns a short message—the handshake— reassuring that it is still logged on to the network.

MH370 departed from Kuala Lumpur at 16:42 UTC on March 8, 2014 on a scheduled flight to Beijing, China. According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the agency leading the search for the plane, MH370’s flight path includes three distinct sections: 1. an initial stage after takeoff in which the aircraft was under secondary radar, the transponder was operational, and ACARS messages were being transmitted; 2. a second stage in which onboard communications equipment were no longer working and the plane was only being tracked by military radar; and 3. a final stage in which the only available information on the flight’s path comes from satellite communications log data. At 17:07, the aircraft transmitted its final automatic ACARS message, which included the weight of the fuel remaining on board. The flight crew’s last radio contact with Malaysian air traffic control occurred at 17:19 and then MH370 lost contact with air traffic control during a transition between

Pprune is a well-known aviation themed forum purchased in recent times from its British airline pilot owner/initiator/moderator and now operated by a US-based professional media monitoring and moderation company on behalf of vested airline and industry interests. The Pprune moderators' speciality is now notably in quietly vetting, suppressing and deleting key material - and accomplishing this by surreptitiously banning posters whose technical knowledge and theories are too incisive or of proprietary concern to its proxy forum owners (i.e. aspects of accidents not to be promoted publicly). The fact that this MH370 theory has been actively expunged on numerous occasions (and its poster banned by the Pprune truth-police) gives this theory great credence and credibility. Criminalization of pilots and/or unlawful interference is a much-favoured proposition for the industry - for obvious reasons it can derail litigation costs. However a large-scale calamity based upon a prior accident and subsequent industry and regulatory inactivity is hopefully not as "containable" as they would wish. The oxygen flare theory contains the logically derived answers being sought .... firmly based upon the precedent losses of a 767 in 2008 and a 777 in 2011.

This examination also conveys vitally relevant observations on the unique-to-777 active flight control system (AFCS) and the relevance of the ITCZ's weather (and/or orographic turbulence at lower levels) upon MH370's post-turnback flight-path (i.e. its various stage-by-stage turns, or rather, course changes - once NW of the Malay Peninsular). Even if the active flight control system's ability to maintain wings level is refuted, it remains the case that a 777 on autopilot. with or without heading and baro hold. blundering into a heavy cloud build-up will end up spat out on some other heading.... at some other height and will recover itself. The aileron roll circuitry is programmed to respond correctively to anything that's not a pilot input. The link to this theory is tabbed at #11 at address http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2 (Document also contains a compendium of links to other explanatory prior forum posts on the same theme that have been expunged from the Professional Pilots forum - www.pprune.org ). #1 to #10 at this tinyurl link (and hereunder) is a dismissal (for various reasons) of other possible widely publicised theories.

Fly-by-wire control systems allow the 777's aircraft computers to perform tasks without pilot input. Automatic stability systems operate in this way. Gyroscopes fitted with sensors are mounted in the aircraft to sense movement changes in the pitch, roll and yaw axes . Any movement (from straight and level flight for example) results in signals to the computer, which automatically moves control actuators to stabilize the aircraft

Regarding the interpretation (and relevance to MH370) of a much earlier destructive B777 oxygen-initiated cockpit fire accident on the ground at Cairo on 29 July 2011. (Final official Accident Report on Egyptair's 777-200 SU-GBP is no longer at: http://tinyurl.com/lxg34rl i.e. removed from Egypt Accident Board's website.... so try https://tinyurl.com/v5bsf6e ). The identical precursor ground accident (to SU-GBP) was the earlier destruction of a Boeing 767 (N799AX) on the ramp at San Francisco on 28 June 2008. Both accidents were found to have had an identical cause. Only the fact that nobody was killed in either accident kept them low profile. That 2011 Cairo ramp accident has been extrapolated by me to an airborne scenario in this document - i.e. as it may have happened aboard MH370. A number of vital differences that would have been manifested by an airborne oxygen flare fire occurrence are addressed. Many (if not most - or even all) of the present mystery surrounding known developments aboard MH370 have been explained by the author (an ex P3 Orion pilot, ATPL licence-holder and one-time Editor-in-Chief of Air Safety Week, a PBI Media publication). The author questions why the FAA Airworthiness Directive stemming from the Cairo fire findings was not punched out to global airlines (and made mandatory for US airlines) until more than a month after the MH370 loss. The US NTSB had already criticised the American FAA for not acting to address the known cause of the 767 fire in their 2009 published report. Did this serious anomaly act further to down MH370? It would appear so, as the known facts of an airborne occurrence match the probable circumstances of the MH370 loss scenario - quite exactly, in fact precisely. On 07 Sep 2016 MH370 Researcher Blaine Gibson turned over to the ATSB a burnt interior panel from MH370. It's being called a "game-changer". This March 2014-dated document is an in-depth examination of the MH370 downing. It examines and discards other MH370 theoretical possibilities and explanations in favour of a final airborne-themed variation of the much earlier SU-GBP and N799AX oxygen flare fires on the ramp in Cairo and in San Francisco. It examines the differences wrought by the airborne cruise height environment and in particular the depressurization that would've been caused by the sort of oxy-blowtorch rupture of a pressurized hull -a holing that was seen on both SU-GBP and N799AX (see those reports for the graphic imagery - to be seen above and here and here ). One of the most relevant aspects of the treatise is in examining the likely effect of a non-incendiary, very short-lived and self-extinguishing oxygen flare fire upon the omni-present plastics on the modern flight-deck (illuminated push-buttons, dissimilar plastic button housings, keypads (and their surrounds), screens, console surfaces and thermally actuated circuit-breakers).... with the emphasis on distortion of these plastics and compromise of their functionality - rather than flammability and toxicity.

link 9 above 2014-16-09.pdf (FAA punched this out quietly - as recently as 19 Aug 2014) - requiring action for US Airlines within 36 months SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 707 airplanes, Model 720 and 720B series airplanes, Model 727 airplanes, and Model 737-100, -200, and -200C series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a fire that originated near the first officer's area and caused extensive damage to the flight deck on a different airplane model. This AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses in the flight compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from inadvertently passing through an internal, anti-collapse spring of the low-pressure oxygen hose, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn, leading to an oxygen-fed fire and/or smoke in the flight deck. Implementation: " Oxygen Hose Replacement Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD: Replace the low-pressure oxygen hoses in the flight compartment with non-conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin specified in paragraphs (g)(1) through (g)(3) of this AD, as applicable. DATES: This AD is effective September 23, 2014. link

Rebuttal (to: ....see input below this cell - by John Cox) I can understand your reticence being based upon having taken a publicly "otherwise" stance. You say: "In every case of a major onboard fire the crew has had time to communicate with ATC. No airplane with a major onboard fire has ever flown for 7+ hours." However a dismissive approach based upon a flawed premise (major fire?) makes it unlikely that the enigma of MH370 would ever be explicable in terms of logical determinations. 1...Moreover there are many distinct "differences" between an onboard fire (SR-111 et al) and an oxygen flare - which is quintessentially a low-level explosion or fast-moving flamefront, albeit in "slow time" compared to a high explosive's flame-front propagation with its associated destructive pressure-wave. There was no "major onboard fire" being premised by me. You need to excise that viewpoint and the historicity of airborne fires from your assessment of the facts (as known to date).... and seek other viable explanations. I've proposed one that has a known 777-200 precedent. The oxy-flare heat peak (following its enrichment trigger) passes very quickly; in fact its persistence is a mere matter of seconds if it precipitates the hull rupture and depressurization. But it would be sufficient to sear a pilot's lungs and blur his vision, dependent upon whether he is facially directly exposed. If the electrical short was caused by a pilot donning his full-face mask (due to the other pilot proceeding aft, say), lung searing, vision impairment and physical disablement would be minimal (if any) for that individual. The likelihood of any ongoing conflagration would be constrained by the lack of readily flammable materials on the modern flight-deck. As I have said, some residual plastics smouldering on consoles (only) may be the outcome - in particular after the oxy blowtorch has holed the fuselage and the enriched oxygen environment has given way to the very diluted thin ambient atmosphere of high altitude. You might counter by claiming that the plastics on a modern flight deck are indeed combustible. However you need sustained very high temperatures for these plastics to combust and be self-sustaining. In short, dismissing the oxy-flare theory as just another "fire" is simplistic, unworthy of an accident investigator and doesn't reflect the circumstance described. In fact because it occurred at high altitude, the environment and resultant aftermath was crucially quite different to the SU-GBP ramp-fire. SU-GBP burnt out because priority was given to evacuation.... and ready access to the flight deck was precluded by that. That fire "caught" (sea-level pressure and flight deck door open etc). Unfortunately nobody ever extrapolated the SU-GBP accident into a "what if this had occurred airborne?" format - and treated it with the precautionary and deliberative response it deserved. 2. You say "the evidence only shows that someone with knowledge reprogrammed the FMC and the ACARS. The transponder ceased to transmit but there was electrical power available for the remaining 7 hours. " This actually makes me doubt that you read the document in toto, or if you did, fully analyzed the suggested scenario.. My counter to this "evidence" is to point out that touch-screens, plastic switches and their surround housings (of dissimilar plastics) are vulnerable to melting, losing solenoid- (or direct mechanical) latching and ultimately, distortion in an oxygen flare of finite duration. Compared to the largely metal switches of yesteryear, plastics proliferation has opened up a wholly new vista of failure possibilities. Similarly, circuit breakers are vulnerable to heat-induced tripping dependent upon their direct or indirect exposure to the flame-front. What you end up with is an indefinable total or partial loss of some systems and not others. This characteristic of a modern plastic flight-deck has confused the issue greatly with MH370 analysis. The underlying premise of this theory is that a high altitude fire would quickly be extinguished by hull burn-through and oxygen depletion via the consequent depressurization outflows. Pressurization would assist and accelerate the hull burn-through via the oxygen blowtorch at the pilot's side console leak source. 3. The fact that MH370 continued to send out uninitiated/automated ACARS handshakes (and yet lost its transponder due to the oxygen flare) would only indicate that the transponder was disabled by the flare (yet the ACARS satellite interface was not). No (re)programming involved. Points of vulnerability and flame-front aspect exposure becomes the question. Is a system housed in the flight-deck more vulnerable than one largely located in the main electrical centre below? Whether some individual latched switches or subsidiary busses were disabled in toto by the oxy-flare is a matter for specialist conjecture .... but disabling of some particular systems certainly doesn't nullify the oxygen flare theory. I consider that it actually reinforces it. The lack of communications (per se) would point to a sudden disabling event (not the usual "dark brown smell" of detected fumes and overheated wiring and arcing circuitry giving rise to a precautionary alerting transmission to ATC ). 4. I readily concede that the turn onto a reciprocal heading for Pulau Langkawi was most likely to have been pilot-initiated by winding a heading bug. However the pilot's time of useful consciousness would have been subsequently limited by the lack of available oxygen following the hull-rupture, whether he was present for the oxygen flare or re-entered the cockpit soon afterwards. Disabling the autopilot and entering an emergency descent manually is a natural and instinctive response to a pilot hearing a loss of pressurization alarm. However, manually trimming into a descent is not. Pilots are inured to having pitch auto-trim take care of that, so thumbing a yoke switch or grabbing a trim-wheel and winding it forward is not on his programmed instinctive agenda. There are ample examples of this (Air NZ A320 off Perpignan for instance, even AF447). The result of that pilot passing out upon entering an autopilot OFF descent (due to hypoxia) must be a zoom back to height (aircraft being well out of trim for the higher speed). We could also argue that the oil-rig worker's sighting of a "flare/fire" accords with my theory - whereas it wouldn't be sympatico with any hijacking or suicide theory (your perspective evidently). "A Compendium of Witnesses" is at link 5. So if it's accepted that this scenario was the prelude to a ghost flight into the Southern Ocean, how do we explain away what you've interpreted as the FMS re-programming? Actually that's not difficult at all. In normal enroute circumstances and particularly within the ITCZ latitudes, pilots are very circumspect about diverting around build-ups ahead. The ITCZ was predominantly north of the equator on 08 March and there would've been a significant number of very active convective thunderheads on any route. Upon entering one, the MH370 track would've been "upset" significantly and (upon exit) the 777 would've taken a few minutes for its phugoid to settle back down into its set pitch trim-state - and the 777's Active Flight Control System to re-impose itself upon the resultant post-upset ("spat out") track. The 777 is unique in that its Active Flight Control System reacts very quickly and positively to a wing-drop. Despite being NOT on autopilot, it instantly picks up that dropped wing (because it didn't result from a pilot's yoke input) - and the resultant meander either side of its mean track in relatively smooth air is quite minimal (much less than a few degrees, averaging out over time to more or less a straight tracking). Because its last encounter with a build-up left it on a southerly track, the further MH370 proceeded southbound, the smoother the enroute air (as it climbed continually due to fuel burn-off (FBO)) and an unchanging Centre of Gravity (onboard inactivity and lack of crew/pax movement). In equatorial latitudes with a Northern hemisphere located ITCZ, the further South you go, the lower and fewer are the cloud-tops. i.e. MH370 would not have flown into any build-ups once south of the Equator.... due to lowering cloud-tops and much sparser cloud build-up activity. Thus there was no reason this final Southerly track or FBO climb would have changed significantly over its remaining flight-time (with the exception of some very minor degree of fuselage asymmetric drag perhaps). The constant climb would have enhanced its range by some 200 to 250 kms in comparison with a stepped climb. Have you asked yourself why the ATSB extended its search area coords 200+ kms further south after I posted the links to my theory on the ATSB forum? 6. As Editor-in-Chief of Air Safety Week, I often speculated upon explanations for accidents. You could say that I specialized in analysis. This more often than not centred upon known precedents. MH370 had one in the form of SU-GBP, the ramp fire at Cairo and N799AX. If you review the Service Bulletins and Airworthiness Directives that emanated from that prior on-ground destruction of a 777, you'd have to say that it was very much low-keyed and de-prioritized. After MH370's high profile disappearance and loss-of-life, Boeing and the FAA bumped that up to a steady stream of AD's related only vaguely to SU-GBP - but all to do with electrically conductive LP oxygen hose replacement. These AD's affected most Boeing models including the 787 (link to AD) and required replacement of the potentially lethal LP oxygen hoses that had been found to be the cause of SU-GBP's fire. 7. Ross Coulthart of Channel 7 Sydney has looked into my theory and proposes to do a documentary on it. I'm sure that he'd like to hear your logical arguments against the theory. Rossco has won many TV journo awards (Swissair 111, Kapton wiring etc). I'd like to hear any cogent arguments against it also. If there's any sort of conspiracy related to MH370, it's most likely to be a cover-up than any inflight intervention by some evil-doer(s). I hope to hear more from you and encourage you to forward my suggested theory to anyone with a vested interest in pursuing the truth.... rather than vague conspiracy theories. regards John S Mr. S, I have read the article and, unfortunately, it adds little. The likelihood of a fire causing the accident is very, very remote. In every case of a major onboard fire the crew has had time to communicate with ATC. No airplane with a major onboard fire has ever flown for 7+ hours. In the end the evidence only shows that someone with knowledge reprogrammed the FMC and the ACARS. The transponder ceased to transmit but there was electrical power available for the remaining 7 hours. MH370 does, indeed, remain a mystery. Best regards, John Cox Subject: MH370 - not really a mystery http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2 A canvas of the unlikely possibilities, culminating in an exposition (see final entry #11) on the likely sudden developments aboard Malaysian Flight MH370. This explanation is detailed and based upon two little known precedents (the prior on-ground destruction of an Egyptair 777-200 reg: SU-GBP) and the furtive conduct of Boeing in quietly (after the MH370 disappearance) “fixing” the SU-GBP cause. Be aware of the existence of an almost identical occurrence (Boeing 767 N799AX at SanFranscisco in 2008 and RAAF Orion P3B at RAAF Edinburgh in 1984) Short Synopsis: http://tinyurl.com/lh7sv2g Shortly after I posted these links on the ATSB website forum covering the MH370 follow-on search, suggesting that the likely flight mode of MH370 (constant IAS climb) would achieve around 200 to 300 kms additional range, the current search area was extended a further 200+ kms to the South. That oil-rig worker's distant sighting may well have been the 20 to 40 second oxygen flare that kick-started this MH370 saga. Whilst the actual aftermath may have been locally ongoing and a burner (i.e. blowtorch) to some degree inside the cockpit, the actual initiating incident's DDT "flare" would only have been visible from the earth's surface at any distance for a very finite period. You could liken it to a low order "explosion" (i.e. visually attention-getting but dissipating quickly to the distant observer). Oxy flare fires aren't infernos but they do have the capacity for incapacitating exposed and vulnerable plastic pushbuttons, circuit-breakers, solenoid-held paddle switches etc etc. I'd liken it to the firemen's backdraft effect of opening a door with a fire on the other side, then quickly closing it (i.e. that backdraft flare-up is something you caused by introducing fresh air/oxygen to an oxygen starved fire in an enclosed space). If one pilot wasn’t directly exposed (e.g. had gone aft on a toilet break), he may have initiated the autopilot ON turn towards Pulau Langkawi before initiating the “autopilot OFF” emergency descent. Due to the lack of pilot oxygen, he’d have then (soon after) expired, leaving MH370 to continue on, courtesy of its very redundant and reliable systems. I haven't checked lately where Boeing is up to in replacing those lethal electrically conductive, helically wound wire stiffeners inside the low pressure oxygen hoses. However one of the latest Airworthiness Directives (after the 737 and 747 ones) was on the 787 cockpit LP oxygen hose replacement (link). No doubt they are now moving fast but very subtly on that issue - but keeping their fingers crossed that nobody will ever associate its hose replacement program with MH370 (or as a very belated response to the Cairo ramp-fire that destroyed that Egyptair 777-200). It's in fact a very sobering proposition that these hoses have been around a very long time across all makes and models - and are only ever replaced "upon condition". Regards John S P3 skipper (multi-tour) and 3 time Cat A maritime captain RAAF Ex Editor-in-Chief Air Safety Week ATPL Licence Holder

The sparking Oxygen Hose Story goes on and on............ through even the very latest Boeings Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2014-0174; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-212-AD; Amendment 39-18028;

AD 2014-23-12]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule. (link)

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company

Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that, on a different Boeing

airplane model, there was an oxygen-fed fire, which caused extensive damage to the flight deck. This

AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive hoses in the crew oxygen

system. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current from passing through an

internal, anti-collapse spring of the low pressure oxygen hose, which can cause the low-pressure

oxygen hose to melt or burn, leading to an oxygen-fed fire and/or smoke beneath the flight deck in

the forward electronics equipment bay.

DATES: This AD is effective December 31, 2014.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain

publications listed in this AD as of December 31, 2014. **download pdf copy of AD

The 777's Active Flight Control System http://www.askcaptainlim.com/-airplanes-aviation-39/631-how-does-the-fly-by-wire-in-boeing-777-differs-from-the-airbus-system.html This document section = http://tinyurl.com/nu6dsxm Once the oxygen flare fire of 15 to 20 seconds erupted in MH370's cockpit, a number of systems were affected by the melting of plastic push-buttons (and their housings) on exposed consoles. Some keypads fused, some circuit-breakers tripped thermally and some LED screens melted and sagged. However the active Flight Control system on the 777 is totally unique. That ACT-FCS has fail-safe and fault-redundant redundancies.

Even though one or both pilots' lungs may have been seared by the oxygen flash-fire, one of them was still capable of instantly selecting a reverse course heading to Pulau Langkawi Airport. At some point during that turnback, the oxy blowtorch caused by the copilot's regulator's LP hose melting (per Egyptair's SU-GBP on the Cairo ramp over 3 years earlier), weakened the side fuselage (see imagery from Egypt's report linked at http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2 ). With the assistance of the 4.5 psi cabin pressurization differential pressure, the cockpit sidewall ruptured outwards causing a rapid depressurization and the aural alarm. Whether that hull rupture coincided with an oxygen enrichment level flash-over is an unknown. So the pilot flying disconnected the autopilot, "stuffed" the nose down, but didn't manually trim it nose-down (airline pilots very rarely touch that manual trim wheel or yoke-mounted trim switch due to autotrim - i.e. it's so rarely touched that it's easily forgotten, as it was on AF447 and Air NZ's A320 stall off Perpignan). When he then passed out due to hypoxia and lung-searing (mask on, but no oxygen left), he relaxed the fwd pressure on his yoke and the aircraft pitched back up into a zoom climb, sealing the fate of all onboard. For the next seven odd hours, the MH370 ghost ship flew on, not on autopilot but control being maintained by the flight envelope protection built into the 777's ACT-FCS and the aircraft's inherent stability. In essence, a 777 not on autopilot will instantly pick up a dropped wing and (in pitch) will maintain its trimmed speed due to a very well damped phugoid. Its heading will remain static plus or minus only a few degrees of heading - so its mean line of advance tracking into the Southern Ocean was quite apparently "autopiloted" - even though it was not. As the aircraft headed south and burnt off fuel, it would have constantly climbed, greatly improving its range. Why the tracking changes after it overflew the Malay Peninsula? It simply flew into some thunderheads (ITCZ being north of the Equator at that time of year) and got spat out on a new heading, following its encounter with heavy turbulence (or even orographic turbulence - highest point on Sumatra is 12,500feet). Once south of the equator and clear of the ITCZ ( InterTropic Convergence Zone and its 50,000 foot tall thunderheads), it would have been flying in quite calm air and climbing through 40,000ft due to the fuel burn-off trim change. In a 777, a ghost flight capability is quite coincidentally "built-in" to the primary flight controls - via the uncharacteristic inherent stability of its ACT-FCS. One of the immutable rules of aviation is that most accidents have a precedent that, if not addressed, will eventually recur. Obviously nobody extrapolated what had happened to SU-GBP (on the ramp at Cairo ) into an airborne context. Both the Cairo and San Francisco ramp oxygen flare fires did turn into destructive fires as the priority for firemen was the evacuation. The airborne variant was always going to be quite different due to pressurization and the almost immediate loss of the richly oxygenated cockpit environment - once the cockpit sidewall blew out (due to the blowtorch effect of the oxygen fire at source and the pressurization differential). Because a cockpit oxygen flare doesn't have the flammables that (say) Swissair 111 had - like metallized mylar thermal acoustic batts linings and Kapton wiring insulation with its arcing/flash-over characteristics, the residual effect would've been non-incendiary, just some scorching and a few hot-spots smouldering for a short period (only) - after the rapid depressurization. What may have caused the oxygen flare fire to erupt at that point? If one pilot announces his intention to leave the cockpit on a toilet break, it used to be "de rigeur" (i.e. SOP standard) for the other pilot to haul his oxygen mask out of its housing and don it. The original problem (an electrically conductive stiffener wire running internally within the LP hose to stop kinking) was probably still there on the MAS 777's. Only US registered airplanes are compulsorily affected by FAA Airworthiness Directive mandates to modify equipments. As recently as October 2014, the FAA's AD's were still playing catch-up with other Boeing airplane types that were still equipped with the lethal hoses. One further point to reflect upon. On the ground the cockpit door is open and the pilots have a readily available emergency exit (and rescuers/firemen have unhindered access). Airborne, the door is locked and the pilots have nowhere to go and no oxygen to breathe (but they'd just not know that). It's quite likely that, because of the limited duration of the cockpit fire, nobody aft of the locked cockpit door would've been aware of the outbreak of fire on the flight-deck. Oxygen flare fires don't make explosive noises. In the prior ramp fires it was reported that the pilots heard only a hiss and a pop. So if the pilots weren't villains, were they heroes then? Not really, just victims. But perhaps the villains are still identifiable and responsible for their inaction.

MAS Credibility? The 30-day beacon battery on MH370's flight data recorder was later discovered to have life-expired more than a year before its final take-off, thus raising very valid questions over whether this contributed to the inability of a multi-nation search to find an Indian Ocean crash site. A battery life expiry date is almost impossible to cover up for a number of supply chain and records reasons. But when MAS claimed (right upfront in the first few pages of the interim Malaysian Report) that the incendiary oxygen hoses had been swapped out (per the FAA AD below) on 9M-MRO prior to the fatal flight, should we blandly believe them? Reflect on the fact that subsequent to the 2002 China Airlines Flt 611 B747 crash in the Taiwan Straits, a clumsy paperwork post-crash cover-up of a rear-fuselage tail-strike failure-to-repair 22 years earlier would never have been discovered - except for a very diligent investigator insisting upon a more total wreckage recovery from the sea-bed.... which eventually disclosed the deception (...with it also being the cause). For a foreign airline (that doesn't operate under the regulatory eye of the FAA), an implementation delay (until the next scheduled hangar visit) of any AD-mandated Service Bulletin is always a convenient option. But that AD below didn't address the other flammable oxygen hoses down back in the 772 and 773 passenger cabins ( i.e. that AD came out much later - in 2016)

. ...... look at the distinctions between remove / replace / INSTALL / re-install etc as defined by the FAA here below - in mandating that 777 AD.... (as highlit below in the Final Rule) i.e. How would you expect a Malaysian national (even though an engineer) to react / fail to react to /or just dismiss these subtle distinctions? Is 18 months leeway for replacing the oxygen hoses a responsible interval? Inject the Mh370 possibilities into this context and you may very well say: "No way!". http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-07-12/html/2012-15893.htm [Federal Register Volume 77, Number 134 (Thursday, July 12, 2012)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 41045-41047] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2012-15893] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2012-0104; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-279-AD; Amendment 39-17107; AD 2012-13-05] and AD 2014-09-06 (link) RIN 2120-AA64 Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, -300ER, and 777F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that a fire originated near the first officer's area, which caused extensive damage to the flight deck. This AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses in the flight compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from passing through the low-pressure oxygen hose internal anti-collapse spring, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn, and a consequent oxygen-fed fire in the flight compartment. DATES: This AD is effective August 16, 2012. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of August 16, 2012. ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206- 544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (425) 227-1221. Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Susan Monroe, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057- 3356; phone: 425-917-6457; fax: 425-917-6590; email: susan.l.monroeatfaa.gov. [[Page 41046]] SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Discussion We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM published in the Federal Register on February 8, 2012 (77 FR 6518). That NPRM proposed to require replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses in the flight compartment. Relevant Service Information Since we issued the NPRM (77 FR 6518, February 8, 2012), Boeing has issued Alert Service Bulletin 777-35A0027, Revision 1, dated April 19, 2012. This service information was issued to remove airplanes from the effectivity that have had certain changes incorporated in production, update warranty information, and material price information. No additional work is necessary for airplanes changed in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777-35A0027, dated December 15, 2011 . We have changed the final rule to reference Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777-35A0027, Revision 1, dated April 19, 2012. Additionally, we have updated the Costs of Compliance section of the final rule regarding the parts cost and warranty information. Comments We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal (77 FR 6518, February 8, 2012) and the FAA's response to each comment. Support for the NPRM (77 FR 6518, February 8, 2012) The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) stated it supports the NPRM (77 FR 6518, February 8, 2012). Request To Shorten Compliance Time The ALPA requested we shorten the compliance time for the replacement of the oxygen hoses from 18 months to 12 months. The commenter based this request on the impact that an oxygen fed fire on the flight deck would have on flight safety. We disagree. In developing the proposed compliance time, we We disagree. In developing the proposed compliance time, we considered the safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for the timely accomplishment of replacement of the oxygen hoses. Further, the proposed compliance time is in keeping with the manufacturers' recommended compliance time. In consideration of all these factors, operators are always permitted to accomplish the requirements of an AD at a time earlier than the specified compliance time. If additional data are presented that would justify a shorter compliance time, we may consider further rulemaking on this issue. We have not changed the AD in this regard. Request To Increase Compliance Time United Airlines requested we increase the compliance time for the replacement of the oxygen hoses from 18 months to 24 months. The commenter stated that based on parts availability and its normal maintenance schedule, it believes that 24 months would be an appropriate interval for the timely accomplishment of the actions while maintaining an adequate level of safety. We disagree with increasing the compliance time. As stated previously, in developing the proposed compliance time, we considered the safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for a timely accomplishment of replacement of the oxygen hoses. Further, the proposed compliance time is in keeping with the manufacturers' recommended compliance time. However, under the provisions of paragraph (i) of the final rule, we may approve requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are submitted to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not changed the AD in this regard. Request To Add Applicability Language Boeing requested that we add language to paragraph (h) of the NPRM (77 FR 6518, February 8, 2012), stating that this paragraph applies only to any airplane ``affected by this AD.'' We do not agree with the commenter's request. The applicability statement in all AD actions lists all airplanes affected by that AD. All of the requirements stated in an AD are applicable only to the airplanes listed in the applicability. We find no justification for making the requested change. We have not changed the AD in this regard. Request for Clarification of Parts Installation Requirement American Airlines (American) requested clarification of the requirement in paragraph (h) of the NPRM (77 FR 6518, February 8, 2012) that prohibits installing certain oxygen hoses after the effective date of the AD. American stated that the compliance time of paragraph (h) of the NPRM is prior to the compliance date of the low-pressure oxygen hose removal, and if a maintenance procedure is accomplished which would require the removal of the low-pressure oxygen hose, the same low-pressure oxygen hose cannot be re-installed. We agree to clarify the requirement. Once we have determined that an unsafe condition exists, we generally specify not to allow that condition to be introduced into the fleet. Although the word install'' is generally considered to be broader than the word ``'' is generally considered to be broader than the word replace,'' for this AD operators can interpret it as meaning ``,'' for this AD operators can interpret it as meaning ``replace'' while remaining within the intent of the ``Parts Installation'' paragraph (paragraph (h) of this AD). By simply reinstalling a part removed during maintenance, the operator is not ``installing'' a different part. Therefore, Conclusion We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously. We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of the AD. Costs of Compliance We estimate that this AD affects 169 airplanes of U.S. registry. We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD: Estimated Costs ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cost per Cost on U.S. Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Replacement......................... 18 work-hours x $85 per $1,066 $2,596 $438,724 hour = $1,530. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 41047]] According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected individuals. As a result, we have included all costs in our cost estimate. Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. Regulatory Findings This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Adoption of the Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 0 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. Sec. 39.13 [Amended] 0 2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): 2012-13-05 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-17107; Docket No. FAA- 2012-0104; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-279-AD. (a) Effective Date This AD is effective August 16, 2012. (b) Affected ADs None. (c) Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR, - 300, -300ER, and 777F series airplanes; certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777- 35A0027, Revision 1, dated April 19, 2012. (d) Subject Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 35, Oxygen. (e) Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by a report indicating that a fire This AD was prompted by a report indicating that a fire originated near the first officer's area, which caused extensive damage to the flight deck. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from passing through the low-pressure oxygen hose internal anti-collapse spring, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn, and a consequent oxygen-fed fire in the flight compartment. (f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Replacement This AD is effective August 16, 2012. (18 months later is 16 Feb 2014)- MH370 disappeared on 08 March 2014 Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD: Replace Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD: Replace the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses in the flight compartment, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777- 35A0027, dated December 15, 2011, or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777-35A0027, Revision 1, dated April 19, 2012. (h) Parts Installation Prohibition (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in the Related Information section of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requestsatfaa.gov. (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office. (j) Related Information For more information about this AD, contact Susan Monroe, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM-150S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: (425) 917-6457; fax: (425) 917-6590; email: susan.l.monroeatfaa.gov. (k) Material Incorporated by Reference (1) You must use the following service information to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the following service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. (i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777-35A0027, dated December 15, 2011. (ii) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777-35A0027, Revision 1, dated April 19, 2012. (2) For service information identified in this AD, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206- 544-5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. (3) You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (425) 227-1221. (4) You may also review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html. Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 21, 2012. John Piccola, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2012-15893 Filed 7-11-12; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-13-P The TellTale Helical Spring : link (extracts from the SU-GBP Report' findings)

Boeing : FAA Adopts Airworthiness Directive for Boeing 707-Series Airplanes 08/20/2014 | 07:06am US/Eastern by JOANN VISTA Targeted News Service WASHINGTON , Aug. 20 Federal Aviation Administration has issued a final rule adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Co. Model 707 airplanes, Model 720 and 720B series airplanes, Model 727 airplanes, and Model 737-100, -200, and -200C series airplanes made by Boeing Commercial Airplanes , Seattle, Washington . This directive is effective on Sept. 23 . A Federal Register notice (Docket No. FAA -2014-0252) issued by Aircraft Certification Service Transport Airplane Directorate Manager Jeffrey E. Duven stated: "This AD was prompted by a report of a fire that originated near the first officer's area and caused extensive damage to the flight deck on a different airplane model. This AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses in the flight compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from inadvertently passing through an internal, anti-collapse spring of the low-pressure oxygen hose, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn, leading to an oxygen-fed fire and/or smoke in the flight deck." For more information for Model 707 airplanes, Model 720 and 720B series airplanes, and Model 727 airplanes, contact Patrick Farina , Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety, Mechanical and Environmental Systems Branch, FAA , Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard , Lakewood, CA ; 562/627-5344, fax 562/627-5210, Patrick.Farina@faa.gov. For Model 737-100, -200, and -200C series airplanes, contact Tracy Ton, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety, Mechanical and Environmental Systems Branch, FAA , Los Angeles ACO, 3960 Paramount Boulevard , Lakewood, CA ; 562/627-5352, fax 562/627-5210, Tracy.Ton@faa.gov. For more information about Targeted News Service products and services, please contact: Myron Struck , editor, Targeted News Service LLC , Springfield, Va. , 703/304-1897; editor@targetednews.com; http://targetednews.com. TNS 22VistaJ-140819-1172730 (c) 2014 Targeted News Service http://www.4-traders.com/THE-BOEING-COMPANY-4816/news/Boeing--FAA-Adopts-Airworthiness-Directive-for-Boeing-707-Series-Airplanes-18924790/ MH370 lost 08 Mar 2014 Short Synopsis (MH370 most probable cause): http://tinyurl.com/lh7sv2g



A fuller explanation: http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2

How many will read this (below) and weep?

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 84 (Thursday, May 1, 2014)] - attached at link below

************************************************************* This AD is effective June 5, 2014.

AD 2014-09-06 (copy is at this link: EASA_AD_US-2014-09-06_1.pdf

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a fire that originated near the first officer's seat and caused extensive damage to the flight deck. This AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses in the stowage box and supernumerary ceiling area. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from passing through an internal, anti-collapse spring of the low-pressure oxygen hose, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn and lead to an oxygen-fed fire near the flight deck.

DATES: This AD is effective June 5, 2014. ___________________________________________________________________-_ Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by a report of a fire that originated near the first officer's seat of a parked Egyptair 777 and caused extensive damage to the flight deck. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from passing through an internal, anti-collapse spring of the low-pressure oxygen hose, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn and lead to an oxygen-fed fire near the flight deck.

__________________________________________________________________ Request To Shorten Compliance Time ALPA recommended that we reduce the 36-month compliance time to replace the low-pressure oxygen hoses to 12 months because of the impact that an oxygen-fed fire on the flight deck would have on flight safety. We do not agree with the commenter's request to reduce the compliance time. In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for timely accomplishment of replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive low-pressure oxygen hoses. In consideration of all of these factors, we determined that the compliance time, as proposed, represents an appropriate interval in which the low-pressure oxygen hoses can be replaced in a timely manner within the fleet, while still maintaining an adequate level of safety.

Also, reducing the compliance time of the NPRM (78 FR 63130, October 23, 2013) would necessitate (under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act) reissuing the notice, reopening the period for public comment, considering additional comments subsequently received, and eventually issuing a final rule. In light of this, and in consideration of the amount of time that has already elapsed since issuance of the original notice, we have determined that further delay of this final rule is not appropriate. also published on:

http://tinyurl.com/pmmvbpk

The "hypothetical" below was disguised as it is (as a food-poisoning with no reference to MH370 and mounted in the Techlog Forum thread) in order to get it past the Pprune.org censors and avoid having the thread instantly padlocked or removed. (i.e. before experts in the field could comment upon the ideations). However it is destined to be deleted.

[quote]The original premise:

"I must select a single speed (as fast or slow as I please) and altitude (as high or low as I please), head to it ASAP, and stay with it until flameout." [/quote]



I'll venture just a similar hypothetical in the same vein - but with some vital differences peculiar to aircraft type. Disregarding cost index and fixed altitudes and speeds, can we look at a slightly different set of impertinent theoretical parameters?



In this scenario, my F/O has passed out after suddenly projectile vomiting. He's incapacitated and I'm starting to feel quite queasy myself. I'm not thinking straight and instantly find myself wondering whether it's hypoxia so I sweep my quick-donning mask on. I'm not ex-military and I've never done a hyperbaric or hypobaric chamber run, so I have no real idea what hypoxia is like at the onset. I'm feeling no better, my head is swimming and I'm losing focus so I decide to descend and so I disconnect the autopilot and lower the nose. Shortly thereafter, just before passing out, I suddenly realize that we both ate at the same mukkin cart outside Fatties just before heading to our beds last evening. We have a 772F freighter now not on autopilot and left to its own devices. The flight deck door is locked.... and access is not available.... not that there's anyone aft who can access the cockpit or likely to want or need to.



So having dispensed with its pilots (sorta like Arthur C. Clarke's computer HAL in "2001: A Space Odyssey" - but not in any extra-terrestrial context), what would my aerospaceship 772F now get up to? Once "left to its own devices", i.e. what exactly are those devices capable of?



Unlike an Airbus (an A320 like Egyptair's crashed MS804 say), without its normal FBW system's protections, my 777 won't enter a descending and tightening spiral . It has a completely different FBW system called the AFCS (an "Active' Flight Control System). Rather than different modes of degradation such as alternate 1 and 2 etc, Boeing's FBW design has quadruple redundancies and sports a multiplicity of fallback power sources and fault-tolerant workarounds - and it's not easily subjected to any degraded "laws". Its proclivities are to keep on aviating no matter what. Unlike the Airbus philosophy, my 777 won't disallow a pilot-selected overbank - but at anything above a pilot-selected 30 degs angle-of-bank, it will disproportionately increase the yoke's roll axis feedback in order to remind me that I shouldn't be unnecessarily trying to aerobat an airliner. But if it isn't due to a pilot's roll input, my 777's FBW will "actively" impose a restorative rolling moment back towards wings-level. In fact it's so good at this inherently "active" sub-routine that it can pick up a gust-induced "dropped" wing of a mere 5 degrees Angle of Bank much faster than the speed of vomit.... and promptly get us back on an even keel. So even if my unpiloted 777 should enter some nasty ITCZ induced turbulence and get a little "upset", as soon as it exits it will phugoid a little and quickly resume wings level flight - albeit upon a new heading. And it can keep on doing this all day (and night). But, believe it or not, I'm blithely and blissfully unaware of this 777's model-specific peculiar flight control pecadillo, as I've rarely hand-flown this noble beast - and certainly never broken the law and done it up there at height, where RVSM rules the roost. It's not in any simulator syllabus and I've never read it anywhere. But the Boeing test pilots know all about it and it's not for publication. What operator needs its pilots to go prove or disprove it? It's just a natural and little known adjunct to the Boeing FBW design philosophy. Keep the bank vector somewhere near vertical and the crashworthiness is never tested. My 777F can motor on forever - to fuel exhaustion.



So there I am, firmly ensconced in the messy subliminal soporifics of regurgitated exotic Asian food fanciers (and even though erupting unconsciously at both ends), it matters not a whit - my trusty steed is "taking care of business". The Man of La Mancha and his rusty sidekick Sancho Panza are both out of the picture and quite non-interventionist - however Don Quixote's trusty steed Rocinante knows what to do. It's in his genes.



But back to the postulated conundrum. Once spat out on a heading that's going to take my 772F southbound and clear of the ITCZ, what's the effect of a static cargo and trim-state as fuel burns off? I'll help you out with this. The 772 will gradually climb as fuel burns off. If its AFCS is always going to oppose any bank angle's lift vector that's other than vertical and if it's by nature "a climber" due to fuel burn-off, why should it do other than "proceed" on course (whatever that course might happen to be)? In fact why should it meander more than 3 to 5 degrees left or right of its final spat-out recovery heading in ever-smoothening upper air, well above any cumuloNimbus tops? What's its anmpp (air nautical miles per pound of fuel or aka specific air range) going to be? I'll help you out again here. Eventually the 772F will be up at around FL440 and its range will be super-optimized..... as good as it's ever going to get and around 103% of a fixed FL350 LRC cruise... and 105% of a stepped climb profile.



The only question remaining is Rocinante's conduct and technical decorum at:



a. first flame-out



b. second flame-out



c. APU start-up



d. APU flame-out (i.e. what can the AFCS now achieve RAT-wise?). i.e. Rather pointless having a RAT deploy as a lender of electrons of Last Resort - if it can't help the batteries provide the ergs required for the flight-control system's final earthbound functionalities.



e. I'm assuming that a RAT-powered Rocinante will just fly a 12 to 15 degrees nose-up wings level glide attitude to a nice optimal ditching. It may dig a wingtip into a swell and shed a flaperon (in its full aileron deflection response) and maybe some aileron trailing edge on the same side - but that's not a Boeing design deficiency.



What say you? I'd be interested in some knowledgeable researched input.



I awake from my reverie, reach for my lunch-box and ruminate upon my boring freight-dawg existence. These projectile vomiting spasms sure leave you peckish. You can sign me up for one of these pilotless projects any day. It's a freightening prospect.



http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/549606-challenging-endurance-problem-3.html#post9483337



http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/549606-challenging-endurance-problem-3.html#post9483337

FEEDBACK emails [and my Responses]

25 Dec 2014 Tim Lost your biz card with the email address, then found it again. My explanation the other day probably didn't cover all aspects of my MH370 theory so I'll give you a little background. When I was MOPS (Maritime OPS Staff Officer) at Headquarters Operational Command RAAF, I was involved in the investigation into an early 1980's ramp fire at RAAF Edinburgh South Australia. A9-300, a P3B Orion of 11Squadron 92 Wing burnt on the ramp whilst undergoing servicing. It was easily established that injudicious application of a lubricant had inadvertently caused spontaneous combustion of the crew oxygen system in the cockpit and the flight station was badly scorched in the oxygen flare fire that followed. 100% oxygen and any oily substance will readily cause combustion. It's frequently forgotten just how dangerous breathing oxygen, even at low delivery pressures (versus storage pressures), can be. At the time I was impressed by the fact that a number of circuit breakers in the flight station CB panels had tripped during that short duration flare fire, whilst the ripple effect of those trips had caused CB trips elsewhere in the aircraft (i.e. trip a control CB and the isolated distant power CB trips). The auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and many other systems continued to run throughout the incident. When systems are powered, it's far more likely that the trip of one thermally activated circuit-breaker will affect subsidiary circuitry and kill the odd system. Being an old 1960's design, there weren't many plastic pushbuttons or LCD screens in that cockpit - unlike the much later design of the digitalized P3C Orion. I recall wondering what damage a similar fire in a P3C would have resulted in. The difference of course is the dissimilar melting points of plastic illuminated push-buttons, keypads and LCD screens used in all modern aircraft. Those pushbuttons (unlike metal toggle switches found in older technology) then become additional points of potential failure when heated by direct or indirect exposure to an oxygen flare fire. Melting of a plastic switch can have different outcomes, depending upon the characteristics of the switch surround housing, and whether it's mechanically or electrically "latched". N799AX on the ramp at San Francisco What's distinctive about (and unique to) an oxygen flare fire? Firstly it may have been electrically initiated, but it will be focal at the point of efflux (delivery side of the Low Pressure pilot's regulator on his side console most likely). That's where the blowtorch effect will be most concentrated (and the potential for airframe structural weakening and hull rupture most likely). The likelihood of Hull rupture is greatly enhanced by the aircraft's maximal cabin pressurization differential pressure (and that's greatest at cruise altitude). Once that blow-out occurs, there will likely be a net inflow of "thin" air and the oxygen enriched atmosphere within the cockpit will quickly become diluted, quenching that flare-fire. The residual effect (and after -effects) of that 20 to 45 second flare is hard to specify, but some aspects would be a "given". i.e. 1. Pilots' lungs would be seared if both were seated. The more distantly seated pilot would be less affected and might be able to "wind into his heading bug" a turn towards the nearest available airport (Pulau Langkawi in this case). 2. The first aural alarm after hull burn-through would be visual and aural alerts for depressurization, triggering a surviving pilot response of donning his oxygen mask (i.e. it's unlikely that he would be aware or conscious of the likely unavailability of oxygen and would just act by rote). 3. It's universally a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the second urgent response action to be a de-selection of the autopilot and entry into a manual steep descent to get down to circa 10,000ft (and breathable ambient air). However without an oxygen supply, the time of useful consciousness would be as little as 30 seconds and it's unlikely that any sort of PA announcement was able to be made. After passing out, the pilot's forward nose-down pressure on his yoke would've been relaxed and the aircraft, not yet trimmed into the nose-down dive attitude, would zoom up due to the increased speed and pitch trim state, stall, recover itself and then As the pressure was released by the cabin rupture, the convective rush of air caused the flames to spread across the cabin, beginning the second phase. The third phase began when most of the oxygen was consumed and was replaced with atmospheric air, essentially quenching the fire, but causing massive amounts of smoke, dust, carbon monoxide, and fumes to fill the cabin. Report on the Apollo-1 capsule fire https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_1 gradually subside toward its previously "trimmed for" altitude. That's the unique characteristic of the 777 "active" FCS (Flight Control System). It acts as a quasi autopilot, only lacking any sort of heading "lock". The 777's inherent phugoid characteristic in pitch would quickly enable the aircraft's thrust and pitch trim state to sinusoidally reconcile and something tantamount to a normal high altitude cruise to resume. 4. Because of the locked cabin door, compromised intercomm and CB trips, anyone aft of the cockpit would be unaware of much more than the rubber jungle of oxygen mask dropdowns. The existence of a flight-deck flare fire they'd have been quite unaware of. Pax oxygen is of very limited duration so the longest surviving onboard would be the flight attendants with walk-round bottles. However they would have had to have been alert and very fast and deliberate in getting to one. The power of surprise and pax angst would be very debilitating and distracting in such a circumstance. 767 Oxygen Fire San Francisco Pursuant to the zoom, stall and subsidence towards their prior trimmed cruise height, the aircraft's redundant redundancies without its autopilot guidance (courtesy of the active FCS) would have coped well with the odd encounter with Cumulo-Nimbus thunderheads up around the ITCZ (Intertropic Convergence Zone).... but each time it was spat out (after a minor or major upset), it would've been on a NEW heading. Eventually its final exit heading of generally southbound would've ensured its survival as a long-distance "ghost flight". Cloud tops south of the equator (in comparison to those within the ITCZ) would've been well below MH370's altitude. As it progressed further and further south, all the while climbing gradually as fuel burnt off, MH370 would've been in increasingly quiescent and calm upper-level air south of the Northern hemisphere located ITCZ - and thus its heading would've been quite steady with a heading "meander factor" due to minor turbulence of something less than plus or minus 5 degrees. It would easily average out to the observed ACARS satellite-tracking until fuel exhaustion. Because of the constant climb (vice a normal ATC controlled step-climb procedure), the 777 may have achieved a "bonus" range of circa +250 to 350kms. The active FCS has fail-safe redundancies built-in. If a wing drops even a minor amount due to turbulence (say), the aircraft's FCS immediately compensates. It can also cope well with the flame-out of one engine or hull damage asymmetry. Is Boeing and the FAA aware of this scenario? Yes of course. The response to the Cairo Ramp fire on Egyptair's 777-200 "Nefertiti" SU-GBP was undertaken by the Egyptian version of the NTSB, downplayed and ultimately under-assessed by the FAA (and NTSB) in respect of the airborne threat ramifications of such a flash-fire - and they are all very much aware of that lethal error now. Ever since March 2014, Boeing has been quietly releasing Airworthiness Directives on most Boeing models (including the 787 - link) to eliminate the electrically conductive helically-wound coil spring inside the pilots' low pressure oxygen flexible concertina delivery hoses (examples are in the referenced links). However, unless the cockpit or Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder are found, Boeing will likely be able to avoid liability for their mismanagement of this potent threat. The suppression of informed comment on the Professional Pilots forum by selective deletions of posts and mass individual covert bannings tend to support the theory. Banned commenters, such as myself, are silently "disappeared". A consortium including Boeing bought that very popular internet forum (www.pprune.org) off its UK airline pilot owner Danny Fynne (aka Capt Pprune) about four years ago and charged its present commercial operator with the responsibility for vetting posts and protecting the interests of its secret owners via suppression of "undesirable" informed comment. This ploy says volumes about the destiny of free speech on the internet. The "mystery" of MH370 events and its subsequent erratic flight-path quickly fades once the above scenario is applied to what is known of the probable sudden deterioration of the environmentals aboard MH370..... Any hijack/ interference plot fails the credibility test in comparison with the known precedent of the unique characteristics of an essentially self-quenching airborne oxygen flare fire. When the uninitiated consider and dismiss a fire scenario, they do it simplistically and without due regard to the quite unique characteristics (and implications for a selective cascading systems failure) of a limited duration oxygen flare fire. Short synopsis: - http://tinyurl.com/lh7sv2g Longer dissertation: ( An_MH370_Analysis-of-Likelihoods.htm ) - http://tinyurl.com/or9bzf2 regards John S The Part Played by the AUDIO SELECT PANEL ( http://tinyurl.com/ovhgnpy ) See attached compendium of FAA AD’s (all at the NPRM – Notice of Proposed Rule-making - stage). It's at http://tinyurl.com/odp5v52 These draft AD's, covering oxygen hose fires, contain many surprises and eye-openers. A skim review of Airworthiness Directives for oxygen hose related fires on the ground reveals that all Boeing models are in play. The search also surfaces (within those NPRM documents) mention of a 757 and a Bombardier RJ-100 fire, both being an identical cause/circumstance to the SU-GBP Egyptair 777 fire in Cairo. The gamut of Boeing models affected by this defect is all-inclusive (i.e. all models and sub-species have Notices of Proposed Rule-making AD's). So you could say that it was an omnipresent threat across all the Boeings plying the skies of our globe. It's unsurprising then that the threat could/would explode into an actual fire now and again. It most probably required far more urgent action than an entreaty to fix “within 36 months” – given the scope of the issue across all Boeing models (i.e. how many in-service airframes world-wide??) The following points are shown elsewhere but it's worthwhile re-presenting it again. Many of the AD's included here mention that the oxygen fire was triggered by a fault (i.e. an electrical short) in the close adjacent (to pilot's mask stowage) "audio select panel". That panel also gets a mention in the final NTSB Report on the 767 San Francisco fire. Don't disregard or overlook that the oxygen masks include a microphone and that it has a hardwired connection to that audio select panel via the oxygen delivery hose. Much has been made of the MH370 final transmission: "Goodnight, Malaysian 370". However to inspect further the relevance of that frequency sign-off's timing, should we ask what would have / should have happened immediately after that MH370 F/O's transmission? Quite simply, the copilot would have made a selection on that audio select panel to use another VHF box to call Hanoi, leaving the last used good frequency undisturbed on the original VHF set. Why not dial it up on the set already in use? It's easier than trying to recall the frequency that you were "last on" if comms with the new agency are unsuccessful, and thus sensible to just use another VHF set to call the new agency to which you've been transferred - in fact to already have that frequency set up on that second box. Use of another VHF set also "proves" the serviceability of that 2nd VHF set. This assumption of the incident (i.e. the electrical short) being triggered by that 2nd VHF box selection might logically also serve to explain why: a. Nothing further was heard from MH370 (i.e. difficult to transmit once that audio select panel has shorted out). b. Comms between pilots may have been affected (as intercom is routed through the same box). c. If full-face oxygen masks were donned due to smoke from the short, cross-cockpit conversation between pilots would be wholly reliant upon headsets and intercom being functional.... but they wouldn't have been. Would comms to the aft cabin been similarly affected? (i.e. once pilots had donned masks). d. The Cockpit Voice Recorder's contents might be questionable (i.e. to what extent would the recorded pilot and open area cockpit mikes feeding the CVR be affected)???? So, well may you pose the following question. What might be the two most critical systems in the event of airborne fire and/or depressurization? Few pilots would answer: "The audio select panel" and “oxygen system”. It's food for thought. Sometimes the simplest answer is Occam's Razor (in fact if you google "the simplest answer", the first 10 responses (in fact, the whole first page) show “Occam's Razor”). Once you've found that simplest answer, you just have to fill in all the gaps. I think that I've done that.... adequately. i.e. Occam's Razor plus adequate accident precedents plus an infill explanation for all the mysterious "gaps" in the MH370 scenario and timeline. 11Aug2014 Paul The real concern is that the new promulgated southern boundary of the future search area will fall short by around 350kms if I'm correct in the cause and aftermath flight profile and configuration. Why? The range achievable difference for the elapsed time period in question is around +350 kms for an autopilot-off 777 aircraft achieving an ongoing constant attitude climb as the fuel burns off. i.e. 9M-MRO would have flamed out at around 50Kft when empty of the go-juice. The question then becomes whether it then spiralled and plummeted. I'd actually guess that would not have been the case, that the RAT (ram air turbine) would have deployed and that the active FCS would have enabled it to retain a more or less consistent track despite a significant degree of unopposed thrust asymmetry and yawed flight over a period of around 5 to 10 minutes until the 2nd engine flamed out. You could also argue that at near-empty fuel levels, once the first engine snuffed for lack of fuel, the resultant yaw could cause the other tank's fuel outflow hole to become uncovered and so the two flame-outs could be within a couple of minutes of each other. Only testing could disclose that to be a possibility. I'm unsure whether the AFCS asymmetry compensation would've still been in play at that point.

Paul, I believe that you are an author excelling and specialising in airliner (and similar) catastrophe bathos. If it is indeed that aspect of drama that you can specialize in, it would be a good story to write into prospect for an MH370 "best guess" (i.e. as near as we will ever come to an answer). The conjunctive contrast of the rampant worst imaginable terrorist scenario blended down to a silent passive and unknowing pax passage into death. i.e. masks suddenly drop down, pax don them, rear end crew and pax wonder what's happening (no announcements at all on the PA); they note the turn and the attitude changing to an abrupt nose down, then suddenly (as the last pilot passes out), see it change to an equally abrupt trim-stat