Sega Genesis vs Super Nintendo

Lifespan: 1989-1996 CPU: 7.67 MHz 16/32-bit 68000 Co-Processors: 3.58 MHz Z80 (Audio/SMS):

Can write to 68000's Work RAM

Can access cartridge's ROM data

Texas Instruments 76489 (PSG Audio):

4 Channels

Yamaha 2612 (FM Audio):

6 Channels:

One 8-bit Stereo Digital Audio Channel (DAC) replaces one FM channel

10 Audio Channels total

Output Frequency: 52 kHz Video Processing: VDP

Master System Compatibility

Hardware Shadow and Lighting

Direct Memory Access (DMA):

Transfer Rate: 7.2 KB per 1/60th second Resolutions: 256x224, 320x224, 320x448 Work RAM: 64 KB Video RAM: 64 KB Video RAM Bandwidth: H32 Mode: 166.0 bytes per line

H40 Mode: 204.0 bytes per line Audio RAM: 8KB Color RAM: 72 Bytes VSRAM: 40 Bytes Colors On Screen: 61 (30-75 in game, average 50) Color Palette: 512 Sprite Max & Sizes: 80 sprites at 320x224

64 sprites at 256x224

Sprite Sizes:

8x8, 8x16, 8x24, 8x32

16x8, 16x16, 16x24, 16x32

24x8, 24x16, 24x24, 24x32

32x8, 32x16, 32x24, 32x32 Sprites per Scanline: 20 at 320x224, 16 at 256x224 Background Planes: 2 layers with 16 colors per 8x8 pixel tile

VDP handles scrolling as single planes, independently scrolling 8 line rows, and independently scrolling lines.

Each 8 line row can can be displayed over or under others. Storage: Cartridge up to 32 Mbit (4 MByte)

Bankswitch method allows more than 32 Mbit of storage.



Capacity chronology:

• 1988: Osomatsu-kun: Hachamecha Gekijou (2 Mbit), Space Harrier II (4 Mbit).

• 1989: Daimakaimura (5 Mbit), Phantasy Star II (6 Mbit). • 1990: Columns (1 Mbit), Strider Hiryu (8 Mbit).

• 1991: Star Control (12 Mbit).

• 1992: LandStalker (16 Mbit).

• 1993: Street Fighter II': Special Champion Edition (24 Mbit).

• 1994: Panorama Cotton (20 Mbit), Saturday Night Slam Masters (32 Mbit), Sonic 3 & Knuckles (32 Mbit) (Lock-On Technology), Super Street Fighter II: The New Challengers (40 Mbit) (Bankswitching Method).

• 2010: Pier Solar and the Great Architects (64 Mbit).

Lifespan: 1991-1997 CPU: 3.58 MHz 16-bit 65c816

6502 Compatibility (unused) Co-Processors: SPC700 (Sound CPU)

S-DSP (Sound Generator)

8 Digital Audio Channels

Independent Stereo Panning (per channel)

Filters for audio smoothing and echo

Compressed audio decoding

Output Frequency: 32 kHz Video Processing: PPU 1

PPU 2 (On the same chip)

Mozaic/Pixelation

DMA

Transfer Rate: 5.72 KB per 1/60th second shared by 8 Channels

HDMA

Used for per line updates Resolution: 256x224, 256x448, 512x224, 512x448 Work RAM: 128 KB Video RAM: 64 KB Video RAM Bandwidth: 170.5 bytes per line Audio RAM: 64 KB Sprite RAM: 512 + 32 bytes Color RAM: 512 Bytes Colors On Screen: 240-256

(90-150 average in game)

Color Palette: 32,768 Sprite Max & Size: 128 sprites at:

8x8 & 16x16, 8x8 & 32x32, 8x8 & 64x64, 16x16 & 32x32, 16x16 & 64x64, 32x32 & 64x64, 16x32 & 32x64, 16x32 & 32x32 Sprites per Scanline: 32, 34 8x8 tiles, 256 sprite pixels per line Background Planes: Eight Modes Numbered 0 - 7

4 (96-colors, 24 per background, 3/tile)

3 (two 120-colors, one 24-colors)

2 (120-colors)

2 (240-colors, 120-colors)

2 (240-colors, 24-colors)

2 (120-colors, 24-colors, interlaced)

1 (120-colors, interlaced)

1 (255-color, scaled, rotated, etc)

Storage: Cartridge up to 32 Mbit (4 MByte)

• Tales of Phantasia (1995) (48 Mbit)

• Star Ocean (1996) (48 Mbit)

Average: 8 Mbit ('91), 16-32 Mbit ('92-'97)

It is demonstrable that the SNES could actually display 2-3 times the colors on screen, while the Genesis could display 2-3 times the sprites and independently scrolling 2D planes. The SNES also could scale and rotate one 256 color plane, which could be made to look like large objects such as Bowser in Super Mario World or the Bomber in the first level of Contra IV. Alternately, games on the Genesis typically ran with less slowdown, featured faster scrolling levels, "tilted" sprites and backgrounds, and featured more custom special effects like scaling backgrounds and fully polygonal gameplay without any cart loaded processors. The Genesis' software effects are best seen in Contra Hard Corp, Castlevania Bloodlines, Batman and Robin, Ranger X, Sonic 3D Blast's bonus levels, LHX Attack Chopper, and Red Zone, for starters. Much as was the case with the NES library, the Super Nintendo saw full fledged releases for several years after the Genesis was discontinued. Combined with the SNES's dominance in Japan, the system consequently had a larger worldwide library by the end of its cycle. Because Square and Enix released their titles exclusively, the SNES has a greater number of RPGs available for it in the US. Despite superficial marketing tactics, the battle between NEC, Sega and Nintendo produced a wide variety of exclusive and critically acclaimed games for each platform. The Genesis has the largest library, and eventually gained the most third party support, of any Sega console. The Genesis' action genre is packed with arcade ports and unique home offerings like the Shinobi and Streets of Rage series. Yet the Genesis was also home to exclusive Sega RPGs like Sword of Vermillion, Phantasy Star 1-4, Shining in the Darkness, and Shining Force 1+2, amongst other notable series like Super Hydlide, Ys, and Dungeons & Dragons. Lunar the Silver Star, Lunar Eternal Blue and Vay, along with other Working Design’s localization efforts of Game Art’s games, were also released on the Sega CD. Regrettably, popular history uses the same measuring stick for all success stories. Sales is what most ill advised people look to in order to validate or invalidate their purchase decisions and sales is what the media is biased towards. The Genesis outsold the SNES in the US overall up until its discontinuation in 1995. The SNES managed to more than catch up in the two years before the Nintendo 64 took hold. The SNES clearly won out in sales worldwide and software sales in every region.



The truly important thing is that the war between the two companies produced some of the best games to ever be made. The game player that has only owned one system to the exclusion of the other has definitely lost out. What is worse is that in the new millenium the entire industry is bent toward anti-competative corporations. The preference for Mega-Corporations and Mega-Publishers are reflected by the media's excessively positive portrayal of the Super Nintendo.

1989-1990: Competing with Speculation Summer 1989, before NEC and Sega launched their 16-bit consoles, "Shooter" meant flying an advanced space craft against an evil armada and Nintendo, which owned ninety percent of the worldwide video game market, signified "video game." Before Fall, NEC focused its audience on the technical prowess of its newly dubbed TurboGrafx-16 and the merits of "16-bit gaming." NEC was not alone in advertising the generational leap, Sega also focused on a single characteristic turned marketing term for its new console, "16-bit." Undaunted, Nintendo Power, a magazine owned and operated by Nintendo, continued as it had for more than a year promoting Nintendo Entertainment System and then Gameboy portable games. Video game magazine start-ups Electronic Gaming Monthly (EGM) and Gamepro, however, mutually thrived on rumors and speculation about new hardware. In the same issues that extolled, for the first time, the soon-to-be released Genesis and TG16, both magazines devoted equal space to a "super" system from Nintendo. This represents an unprecedented public relations campaign for a game console that barely existed as a prototype.

Marketing hype did not only affect video game related magazines. Journalist David Sheff, who authored Game Over in 1993, described most of the TurboGrafx game library as "not fun" or "unexceptional" to explain why the system's sales lagged behind competitors. Sheff also stated "the best entertainment-software companies were too busy making Nintendo games to bother making ones for TurboGrafx." Dismissing the early Genesis library as "sports games and arcade knockoffs," Sheff explained that Genesis developers created "great-looking games ... but not great-playing games." Sheff's analysis reflects the majoritarian view in the game industry from the late 1990s on, and is probably a result of his many developer and executive interviews rather than personal play time. Yet game reviews, and press coverage in general, were consistently more positive of the Genesis and TG16 than they were of Nintendo's NES from 1989 and 1990.



Emblazoned on the November 1989 cover of EGM was a close up screen image of Sega's award winning Ghouls n' Ghosts conversion for Genesis and a stamp reading "SEGA * SEGA: More Master System More Genesis." Steve Harris, Editor and Publisher of EGM, was pressured enough by readers to introduce his fourth issue excusing his magazine's tendency for Nintendo content. Harris also dedicated one fifth of his editorial to "owners of other machines" such as the TG16, and Atari systems. David White, an Associate Editor for EGM, maintained in the same issue that a "video game system is only as good as the games it plays" and asserted the TurboGrafx was the one system that stood above the crowd in this respect. In addition to reminding his audience of the ease of localizing successful PC-Engine titles to the TG16, White also began his Sega Genesis editorial with a full page about Sega Master System compatibility.



Fall 1989 issues of Game Player's, a long running electronics magazine, dedicated dozens of pages to NES software and news, but had much to say about 16-bit consoles and their games. In a multi-page spread, Editor-In-Chief Tom Halfhill argued the merits of Sega's Altered Beast, which was a pack in game for the Genesis. Among his qualifications for "true arcade quality in your living room" Halfhill listed detailed and colorful screens that include multiple scroll layers, which he asserted "create an illusion of three dimensions." Smoothness and speed of character animation, "voice synthesis and stereo sound," and two player cooperative play were also listed as next-generation advantages due to "advanced computer chips inside the Genesis." Halfhill used similar terms when discussing the TurboGrafx CD-ROM add-on. Like EGM's David White though, Halfhill reasoned the merits of 16-bit gaming primarily in the context of game quality and reminded his audience that licensed games boosted console sales more than graphic and sound quality.



Even in the new millennium, gameplay related comments on the Internet shine a dim light on at least three dozen worthwhile games released for the Genesis and nearly sixty for the TG16 by the end of their first full year. Among these games' developers were Data East, Hudson, Irem, Namco, NCS, and Victor for NEC's console and Asmik, Sunsoft, Electronic Arts, and Renovation for Genesis. Even without NEC and Sega's own offerings, these early third parties contributed greatly to the launch and first year libraries of both 16-bit consoles. Nintendo's NES had a monopoly on software developers and sales during these formative years, but exclusive and well received software was shared by all three of these game consoles.



Gamepro accordingly progressed from its premier issue moniker "The Nintendo, Sega, and Atari Video Game Magazine," to include TurboGrafx, Genesis and Gameboy by the beginning of 1990. All game magazines were still subject to the dominant force in the industry. The majority of all game magazine advertisements in Gamepro and EGM during 1990 were for NES software, but majority rule affected EGM far more than Gamepro. EGM's Steve Harris contended, in summer of 1990, for his magazine's multi-platform objectivity even while he defended its position that the Genesis had proven itself "better" than the TurboGrafx-16. In the same issue that Harris argued EGM's judgments were exclusively about published games, EGM declared the still unnamed Super Nintendo "superior to anything that has every (sic) before been created." Nintendo's brand and largely incorrect hardware specifications was the only proof EGM needed of the SNES's preeminence. Harris' magazine listed the rarely used 512x448 interlaced resolution and 256 color modes for the SNES as though they would be used in the average game. A six page spread printed in EGM's December issue dubbed the Super Nintendo as "the ultimate in 16-Bit gaming" even before its Japanese launch. Gamepro, which had a special section every issue titled "The Cutting Edge," notably lacked any pre-launch editorials of the "ultimate" 16-bit console after its second issue back in 1989. Notable hardware, like NEC's portable TurboGrafx-16 the Turbo Express, were given full attention by Gamepro but suffered attached editorials about the Super Nintendo in EGM. As a result of these two magazines' competing views all three console manufacturers received much needed free publicity. EGM reasonably presumed that the next Nintendo console would take over when it was eventually released. Gamepro, which apparently was not sending representatives to Japan at the time, represented a more impartial exposition of new games and hardware. Only the next year could tell what the American public actually wanted, but it was evident by the end of 1990 that Nintendo was losing its hold on the US game console industry.

1991: Hype vs Reality Not until March 1991 did issues of Gamepro and Game Players dedicate an editorial to the Super Nintendo. Unlike EGM's numerous articles comparing specifications provided by marketing departments, both Gamepro and Game Player's focused on the games that had already been released in Japan. Gamepro exhibited pictures of Super Mario World, F-Zero and Final Fight, while pointing squarely at the "massive support by third-party licensees" as the system's biggest advantage. Game Player's Tom Halfhill argued similarly that launch games for the Super Famicom, which was the console's final name in Japan, could have been made as well on the Genesis and TG16. Crassly dismissing exaggerated maximum color count and resolution differences for each system, Halfhill concluded "quality software and clever marketing are more likely to carry the day." Marketing influenced more than the sales of these consoles or their games, it created the popular perception about the machines' capabilities and the quality of their libraries. All game magazines that mentioned the Super Nintendo prior to its US launch noted something about its games displaying more colors on screen, but they disagreed on how significant the gap was. This disparity in journalist reviews was probably most influenced by the outputs and target of each of these system's graphics. TurboGrafx, Genesis and SNES consoles were packaged with RF cables intended for the coaxial cable input of an NTSC television, which was the standard in the US and Japan. Answering one Phil Kennington in the February 1991 issue, EGM ranked all available output cables for game consoles from RF, to Composite, and finally RGB. The editor also explained that EGM had to modify the hardware of all of their game consoles to support RGB monitors.



A consumer who wanted to view their console of choice with anything better than RF cables in 1991 had to buy a brand new television if they wanted to connect with AV Composite cables (Yellow video, with Red and White audio cables). Composite cables required an investment of twenty dollars in addition to a new television that would also improve cable and VCR quality. Obtaining a cable compatible with an RGB monitor required an investment of around one hundred dollars and a specialized monitor that cost significantly more than the new televisions being sold in electronics stores. EGM admitted that game companies targeted the lower quality outputs that the mass market could buy in stores, which severely impacted how many distinct colors could appear on the consumer's screens. Answering similar questions, Gamepro warned one Spanky Smith of Greensville South Carolina that Japanese RGB cables could have been incompatible with US equipment.



Unencumbered by pertinent facts, EGM proceeded to advocate the "Super Famicom." Showing computer generated shots of three dimensional trees in a preview for Hole In One Golf, immediately following a four page promotion for Super Mario World, EGM explained "The Super Fami, with its large color palate(sic), can show shadings that give the illusion of 3-D." When Hal's Hole In One Golf was actually published that Fall it was notably absent of any three dimensional objects as shown in EGM's preview. Hole In One Golf actually does exhibit a unique feature of the Super Nintendo in the same manner of other launch titles. The SNES's Mode 7 allowed Hole in One Golf a fly by of a very low color two dimensional still image of the courses. Hole in One's courses were strictly overhead and two dimensional, with a special angled view that rendered the landscape in low detail to show elevation.



During any generation of hardware, effects that the systems handled with the least programming effort are employed in games more often and more uniformly than effects that developers had to hand code. Mode 7 was marketed by Nintendo, and their allies, to become synonymous with real time scaling and rotation. Scaling is the term used for simulated zooming of backgrounds or characters, rotation allows the same to turn like a wheel. Mode 7 could only scale and rotate a single two dimensional background layer, no SNES game scales characters or objects in a Mode 7 scene. The effect was most often used to "jazz up" certain non-gaming scenes and racing games. Mode 7 offered nothing that was not technically already being done in similar scenes on other consoles, and was totally trumped by arcade machines from the late 1980s. The effect had a distinctive look, however, and its frequent use was the most obvious characteristic of Super Nintendo games. These facts gave Nintendo the ability to easily point out the look and sound of Super Nintendo games and made rumors about the system's technical superiority seem true.



Introducing his April issue of EGM, Ed Semrad explained the importance of rumors to his readers and explained game magazines' function as free advertising for game companies. Semrad was also one of the first editors to print the term "vaporware" in regard to the Nintendo-Sony CD-ROM add-on for the affectionately abbreviated "Super Fami." Even while Semrad lamented that "a very short nondescript press statement" tore the industry's attention from real consoles and games, the editor failed to note how similar that was to EGM's constant coverage of the SNES for the previous two years. In the previous issue's letter section, one T. Jones wrote that four different Nintendo representatives denied the accuracy of EGM's Super Famicom coverage so vehemently that their words were not fit for print. EGM responded that everything it had written about the SNES was correct regardless of the facts that the system name, its specifications and even the appearance of its games were significantly different in the final product.



Hardware specifications in the game industry are only the product of marketing. It is evident from the published comments in all game related media that even the companies themselves were unsure of the technical limitations of their hardware. Advertising for the "consolized" NEO GEO arcade machine demonstrated the disparity between engineers and marketers very well. While SNK tried to convey that its arcade-machine-turned-console had "more" of everything, the TurboGrafx and Genesis specifications are reversed in two out of three categories.



Nintendo's public relations people out of Japan used similar terms to successfully, if inadvertently, convince EGM's publisher and editor to advertise the Super NES for several years in advance of its launch. As much as one million of the game industry's core demographic were exposed to EGM's Super Nintendo promotions every month. By tossing out theoretical specifications without regard for television output, and knowing its audience did not have adequate programming knowledge of any system, Nintendo succeeded in establishing its upcoming console as "better" than anything else.



As a result of the Super Nintendo's preconceived superiority, the gaming media, retailers and public took an entirely different approach to Nintendo's second console than they did for the 16-bit consoles released two years prior. Instead of the usual skeptical "wait and see" consumer approach, the SNES might as well have already been a smashing success in all respects. The Genesis and TurboGrafx saw a couple of months of coverage prior to their US launch, which merely showed off the difference between their graphics and those of 8-bit consoles. The Super Nintendo, thanks largely to EGM, had seen monthly exposure for two years prior to its launch and enjoyed a full fledged buyer's guide in the August issues of Gamepro and EGM. Similar guides, that contained reviews, previews and pictures for every game announced for the US were finally published for the two existing 16-bit consoles the same year, which was two years after their US launch. Unfortunately for Nintendo, the hype failed to carry the NES' dominance into the new generation.

1991: Part 2, Value Propositions Gamepro referred to the SNES library as "fully three-quarters ... upgrades from 8-bit programs," even while it referred to Super Ghouls N Ghosts as a "new generation." Previews of the SNES library over the next five pages were oddly broken up by advertisements, the first two of which featured Genesis games prominently along with their prices. Over thirty five SNES games were previewed in typical promotional fashion however and almost all of them are made by third parties that owners of Nintendo's first console recognized.



Never to be upstaged, EGM dedicated twelve pages to the SNES Buyer's Guide within their August 1991 issue, which posted review scores for sixteen games and previews for thirty four more. EGM's review system had four separate reviewers rank a game on a scale of one to ten. The SNES buyer's guide ranked three games with nines and eights, five games scored eights and sevens, and eight more were scored four through six. That is, half of the SNES games reviewable at launch came recommended by EGM's reviewers, and half were relegated to mediocre or worse. In addition to amassing a large game library for the Genesis, Sega had debuted two things that summer which stole these magazine's spotlights from Nintendo. Sonic the Hedgehog and the Mega CD-ROM add-on combined with one hundred and fifty nine other Genesis games were impossible for game magazines, and by reflection consumers, to ignore. Sega's CD add-on for the Genesis will be dealt with in more detail in its own section, but its show floor debut in summer of 1991, months from its Japanese release, lent Sega significant media coverage. Sega also managed to spend more on advertising than ever before, as EGM's October issue contained a 96 page promotion for everything that was licensed for release on the Genesis. During the Christmas season of 1991 EGM and Gamepro printed reader letters and 16-bit buyer's guides that defined the game industry as a three way race with Sega and Nintendo roughly equal in all respects. Reader letters showed a disparity rarely seen in the US game industry over which system carried absolute superiority. One William Miller of Lawndale California simplistically compared popular Genesis and SNES games, the two system's central processors, and included the Sega CD to conclude "the S-NES is totally lame." Meanwhile Brian McSwain of Sanford Florida felt that the Sega CD would merely bring the Genesis to equality with the SNES' "graphics, sound, play control and Mode 7." John Sikes of Detroit Lakes Minnesota assumed that most of the advantages that the Sega CD would provide were already offered by the TurboGrafx-16 CD-ROM attachment. EGM itself responded to Ron Ward of Newark California to point out that the Sega CD would have more RAM than the Turbo CD and would be more proficient at scaling and rotation than the SNES' Mode 7. Noah Freer of Los Angeles just wrote in to compliment Sega's 96 page advertisement in EGM's October issue. Despite the incongruity of comments EGM held nothing back in favor of the Super Nintendo. In EGM promotion speak the SNES was "unlike any other consumer game system," and it captured "the crisp color and detailed graphics that today's players are demanding." The magazine also listed the system's advantages as scaling, rotation and audio and its disadvantages as slowdown, flicker, and limited objects on screen. That objects on screen observation is particularly important, as the Super NES is supposed to have the strongest "sprite engine" of the three 16-bit consoles by a wide margin. Whether the cause be its slower CPU or poor programming, SNES games always struggle to put as many characters and objects on screen as top TG16 games. Genesis games handily beat both the TG16 and SNES libraries in the category of sprites on screen. In order for the SNES to live up to its prelaunch hype as a "16-bit Mega Monster" and the "Ultimate in 16-bit gaming" these deficiencies needed to be ironed out. Instead of listing hardware specifications and eyeballing graphical glitches Gamepro listed the prices, described the game libraries and controllers, and forecasted what each system's library would be like in 1992. The Genesis was listed at $149 with Sonic The Hedgehog and one control pad, another controller brought the total cost to "only $30 less than a Super Nes." Sega's game library was described as "a terrific mix of licensed character games...sports simulations...arcade action carts...and Weird Funko-Dudes Lost in Outer Space." Game costs were $45-$60 although "8-megabit role playing games" were $75. Special note was given to the Power Base Converter, listed at $35, which allowed "backward compatibility with dozens of great 8-bit Master System titles." Wrapping up, Gamepro assured its readers that the next year would provide even more of the same qualities to the Genesis library, and numbered the total release list at one hundred and fifty nine. NEC's console was by contrast introduced with a zinger about its 8-bit CPU making it "less advanced" than the Genesis or SNES. The Turbo CD attachment was brought up only to mention that it was not selling well and that Sega and Nintendo would likely release something similar. The TurboGrafx retail package cost $99 with one controller and Keith Courage in Alpha Zones. To which Gamepro complained about why Keith Courage, released in 1989, had not been replaced with the $50 "Mario equivalent" Bonk's Adventure. Also of note is that the TurboGrafx required an expensive peripheral called the Turbo Booster or Turbo Booster Plus, $35 or $60 respectively, to hook up with newer televisions using Composite A/V cables. In addition, to play multiplayer games on the TG16 one had to purchase an extra controller at $20 and a TurboTap 5-Player Adapter at $20. Assuming that Gamepro was correct to compare the value proposition of each system, the Turbo Booster, TurboTap and an extra controller alone brought the total starting cost to the same as a Genesis with an extra gamepad. Adding any game from 1991 to the mix sent the total cost of the "entry level" TG16 over $200. Gamepro proceeded to trash the TG16's library as limited and quirky to US audiences, before explaining that it had "bottomed out" for players without the CD add-on. The Turbo CD itself was priced at $299 and its games cost between $19 and $62. The total library for the TurboGrafx-16 and the Turbo CD at the end of 1991 was reported to be sixty-seven "regular games" and fourteen CD games. The Super Nintendo segment placed it at the "top-of-the-line price of $199.95," which included Super Mario World and two controllers. The Genesis and TG16 controllers were described in the previous sections, with the Genesis pad having a total of three "fire buttons" a start button and a directional pad and the TG16 pad being "the same as the NES." The SNES pad was conversely called "the most advanced anywhere" and potentially "too complex" for children. Nintendo's 16-bit library was presented as updates to NES games, with the cons being disappointing sequels and no NES compatibility. Gamepro's final analysis boiled down to "price, games, hardware power, and future expansion." The TurboGrafx was relegated to the "low end" inexpensive entry system with "psuedo 16-bit" shooters and multiplayer games. The TG16 was clearly excluded from Gamepro's consideration, which consumers had apparently already done, so the value proposition left only Nintendo and Sega products. The Genesis and SNES were portrayed as roughly equal in hardware capabilities, with the SNES' Mode 7, higher colors and "stronger sprite engine" being offset by being "only half the speed of the Genesis." In terms of library the Genesis was unequivocally found to have won by a landslide in 1991. Much more prone to hyperbole, EGM asserted that "1991 saw the first real explosion of 16-bit interest, spurred largely by Nintendo and the long-awaited release of their Super Nintendo Entertainment System." Editor Ed Semrad also mentioned that price drops by both NEC and Sega and slowing NES game sales were defining characteristics of the year. Reducing thousands of letters each month to a few pages, EGM spent two columns of its December letter section over when the newly released Street Fighter 2 arcade game would be brought home to the Super NES. Street Fighter 2 is thought to have been responsible for revitalizing the arcade industry in the US, so its exclusive release on the SNES would have been very significant. Yet the battle for 16-bit supremacy was no longer one sided. D.J. Thomas of Houston Texas wrote EGM to ask which system and games won awards that year. EGM responded that it had released an entirely separate issue for the purpose of its annual awards stating "as to who won the best game of the year, and the best system of the year ... they're either Nintendo or Sega products." The SNES' primary weakness came up again as Doug Erickson of Chehalis Washington mused to EGM about why Nintendo went with a "slow processor" instead of a "80386 or 68000 series processor." Ignoring the ignorance over which x86 series processor was equivalent to the Genesis' CPU, Erickson's question is substantial for several reasons. Erickson's letter shows that EGM's readers had been bombarded by technical specifications enough to actually start questioning the engineering of a proprietary device as though they were qualified to do so. His assertion also shows that consumers in 1991 were comparing games across platforms and manufacturers. Nobody would have felt that the SNES was slow if they only compared it to Nintendo's NES. That is in contrast to what will happen in future generations where entire markets migrate to a new console without shopping other manufacturers' products. EGM revealed that "a lot of letters" like Erickson's were questioning Nintendo's engineering "wisdom," eliminating the likelihood that this letter was not representative of a typical consumer. The Japanese market's preference for slower moving Role Playing Games and that game developers would learn to better exploit the SNES' hardware were offered by EGM as alternative views to Erickson's and others. It should not be ignored, though, that this kind of exchange of generally negative comments would not have happened if Nintendo and its game advertising was still the dominant force in the industry.