Hardening Hypervisors Against VENOM-Style Attacks (Xen Project Blog)

[Security] Posted May 15, 2015 20:20 UTC (Fri) by jake

The Xen Project looks at a mechanism to mitigate vulnerabilities like VENOM that attack emulation layers in QEMU. "The good news is it’s easy to mitigate all present and future QEMU bugs, which the recent Xen Security Advisory emphasized as well. Stubdomains can nip the whole class of vulnerabilities exposed by QEMU in the bud by moving QEMU into a de-privileged domain of its own. Instead of having QEMU run as root in dom0, a stubdomain has access only to the VM it is providing emulation for. Thus, an escape through QEMU will only land an attacker in a stubdomain, without access to critical resources. Furthermore, QEMU in a stubdomain runs on MiniOS, so an attacker would only have a very limited environment to run code in (as in return-to-libc/ROP-style), having exactly the same level of privilege as in the domain where the attack started. Nothing is to be gained for a lot of work, effectively making the system as secure as it would be if only PV drivers were used." The Red Hat Security Blog also noted this kind of mitigation for VENOM-style attacks.

Comments (2 posted)