5| Ghosts of Winter Past

Operation Al-Badr’s biggest champion at Army GHQ was no longer General Musharraf but his Chief of General Staff, Lt. General Mohammad Aziz Khan. Himself a Kashmiri, his ideological immersion and tactical commitment were complete. He had led Pakistan’s Dalunang Operation in 1988, which captured Post 5353 on the LC (a controversy National Identity will hopefully return to in the future!). Not known to doubt himself, or his ill-conceived plans, he prevailed upon, nominally at least, an equally powerful Lt. General — Mahmood Ahmad, 10 Corps Commander. 10 Corps Pindi would have operational command of Badr. They appointed Major General Javed Hassan, Force Commander Northern Areas, to oversee the operations which involved moving regular soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry over peaks and passes ranging from 13,000–19000 feet into bunkers and posts vacated by the Indian Army in the winter.

The operation was doomed from the beginning. While volunteers were sought from across the Army for ‘operations in Kashmir’ as early as November 1998, a month after Musharraf assumed the office of COAS, they weren’t told that half of them would act as porters. Predictably, these proud soldiers reacted with near mutinous intent when Major General Hassan informed them of their role.

A contingent of the Northern Light Infantry (Image: GlobalSecurity.org)

The four units which had managed to occupy the commanding heights in Kargil and Drass were exhausted and the supply lines behind them were barely reinforced. It is easy to guess the reason. The Quarter Master General, Master General of Ordinance, other Corps Commanders and Chiefs of other arms were not informed. Wanting to keep a tight circle, the Commander 10 Corps Engineers was not even allowed to enter the Operations Room in 10 Corps Pindi — the nerve centre of this perfidy. Little wonder then, they were in no position to react to India’s fury.

While India’s initial measured and muted response in late April/early May was in keeping with the lie of mujahideen occupying these heights, India unleashed her entire heavy artillery and considerable air might once Pakistani regular Army involvement became clear. Disastrously for Pakistan, India refused to open another front, either across the LC or the international border, in this war. Whatever India’s actions now, Pakistan was boxed in — just like General Zia had predicted a decade ago. All-out war or just Kargil — it was a war they had already lost by the first week of June.

The imposing Tiger Hill — which overlooks National Highway 1A. (Image: Times of India)

Pakistan, whose regular army involvement, was made clear to the world, could ill afford to open another front in this war. India, by refusing to do so, already won the moral war. Evicting Pakistan from the heights was just a matter of time. This allowed India to focus her entire energies on clearing the heights in Kargil and Drass.

PM Nawaz Sharif, who either did or didn’t know of these operations beforehand, at least managed to act with surprise. He lay the entire blame on the cabal of four generals and tried to wash his hands off Badr. Despite many photos of him in forward areas close to the LC, scholarly evidence rests on his side that he was always told this was a mujahideen operation, with no regular or paramilitary involvement, meant to ‘keep up the heat in Kashmir’.

Hence when he repeated the Mujahideen trope, it only sounded like half a lie

The interlocutors Niaz A. Naik and R.K. Mishra met at least six times in June, but a final negotiated settlement came to naught on June 27 — when the identity of the negotiators was leaked. Quite credibly, this leak seems to have come from the Indian side, where the Foreign Ministry and hawks were furious at being left out of the loop. India sensed a complete victory and had no interest in ‘settling’. The negotiated settlement was Sharif’s only chance of saving his government. This entire time, the US exerted pressure on Pakistan to pull back. Half a century of mistrusting India and supporting Pakistan had been finally proven to be a foreign policy blunder. Naturally, this pressure was exerted on the civilian leader of Pakistan, PM Nawaz Sharif.

Indian soldiers atop Tiger Hill. The assault was led by 18 Grenadiers, 2 Naga and 8 Sikh.

General Musharraf’s evil genius didn’t lie in executing this Napoleonic conquest, for he was always militarily inept— it lay in understanding the winds of Pakistani politics. Even while troops of Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry lay emaciated and bayoneted because the promised relief and supplies never came under the threat of an Indian counterattack; he started blaming Sharif for being unable to stand up to the United States. Pakistan’s citizens, victims of the largest whispering campaign in their history, had expected a glorious victory and a redrawing of the Kashmir border — but they were subjected to a unilateral withdrawal and a defeat more complete and permanent than earlier ones. Backed into a corner, the Indian Army fought for survival and won — unlike the glorious vision Musharraf tried to spin for his army. Pakistan’s initial tactical boldness was defeated by their own generals’ failures at the all other levels.

Nawaz Sharif was, by now, desperate to save his own skin, his government and his country. He had to bend over backwards to engage the US in placating India.