Washington And The World How to Stop Putin’s War in Ukraine

Steven Pifer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.

The bloody crisis in Ukraine has entered a new phase, with regular Russian military forces now apparently fighting in the country’s rebel-held east. Although the elements of a possible political settlement are visible, so far, the Kremlin has shown little interest in de-escalating the conflict. Instead, at every turn, Russian President Vladimir Putin has met Western sanctions and opprobrium with fresh violence. Let’s admit it: The West’s current strategy isn’t working. It’s time for new steps designed to encourage Moscow to change course.

Putin met with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in Belarus on Aug. 26. Apparently the meeting did not go well. Ukrainian sources initially reported agreement on securing control of the Ukraine-Russia border and a prisoner release, but Russian sources gave a more downbeat assessment. For his part, Putin denied that Moscow had any role to play in achieving a ceasefire in eastern Ukraine—holding to the increasingly unsustainable fiction that Russia is not involved in the fighting.


With little tangible having emerged from Minsk, and with growing evidence of Russian forces bolstering the rebels, the sides seem set for more continued fighting.

On Thursday, Poroshenko told Ukrainians not to “panic” at Putin’s escalation, but he is clearly concerned: He does not want a new “frozen conflict” to emerge in eastern Ukraine. His military has displayed increasing competence the past two months, pushing back the separatists and Russian fighters in their strongholds of Donetsk and Luhansk. In doing so, he enjoys solid backing from the Ukrainian populace, which has rallied in the face of Russian aggression.

Kyiv’s approach faces a major problem, however. The greater the progress made by the Ukrainian army, the greater the flows of weapons, supplies and fighters that have streamed across the Russian border into eastern Ukraine. Putin has staked much—perhaps his very political survival—on victory … or at least on avoiding defeat. So he has steadily escalated Russian support, and, by many accounts, regular Russian army units are now fighting on Ukrainian territory.

Finding a way out of the conflict will not prove easy. The Russian army will not march on Kyiv, but it may well escalate the fighting in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Poroshenko should hold open the prospect for a negotiated settlement, one that does not force Putin into a humiliating reversal. Ultimately, Kyiv needs a solution that Moscow can accept. If not, the Russians have many levers—military, economic, energy—that they can exert to destabilize Ukraine. The Kremlin can make it very difficult, if not impossible, for Poroshenko to tackle the major economic and political reform challenges that he faces.

The Ukrainians have already laid out ideas that could provide the basis for a settlement that would be of interest to many in eastern Ukraine and, arguably, should interest Moscow as well. Poroshenko has proposed decentralization of power, which would push some political and budget authority from Kyiv to the regions, and official status for the Russian language. As for Crimea, he seems to accept that the occupied region’s status has to be addressed in the longer term.

On the foreign policy front, Poroshenko has already ruled out deepening Ukraine’s relationship with NATO. That is a logical position, as a move toward the transatlantic alliance would prove hugely controversial in eastern Ukraine, and NATO has no appetite to take the relationship with Ukraine to a deeper level. Kyiv and the European Union have begun discussions with Moscow on steps that might alleviate the negative impact of the Ukraine-EU free trade agreement—the deal that set off last fall’s political crisis—on Ukrainian-Russian economic relations.

These elements do not go as far as Moscow would like—and they should not, as Russia seeks an outcome that would undermine Ukrainian sovereignty. But clever diplomats could shape them into a basis for a settlement that meets the Russians’ key demands. Unfortunately, the Kremlin thus far has shown little interest in such an approach. The Russians—including Putin in his Thursday statement—simply call on Kyiv to cease its military operations.

If Putin eschews a political settlement, the test of will and capacity will continue between Kyiv and Moscow. If the Ukrainians keep making progress militarily, how far will the Russians escalate their overt military involvement? Some 2,500 Ukrainians have already died in the fighting, and thousands more have been injured. But the violence could get much worse.

Washington is grappling with what to do next, as presumably are European governments. European leaders will have a chance to discuss Ukraine this weekend, as will NATO leaders when they gather next week in Wales.

The West should aim to encourage a political settlement that ends the fighting and leaves Kyiv in charge in Donetsk and Luhansk, albeit with provisions that take account of Russian concerns. That will require additional Western pressure on Moscow as the conflict changes from a fight against separatists to a fight against an invading Russian army.

First, the West should adopt additional economic sanctions on Russia. Those applied to date have had an impact, as evidenced by increasing capital flight, a rising inflation rate and an economy that teeters on the verge of recession. The prospect of additional economic pain will cause greater unease in Moscow and could press Putin to reconsider his course.

Second, the United States and Europe should provide Ukraine with lethal military assistance, such as light anti-armor weapons and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. The West cannot give Ukraine enough to defeat the far stronger Russian army, but it can enable the Ukrainian military to drive up the cost of aggression. The Kremlin has tried to cover up reports of Russian casualties in Ukraine. Although the Russian people have supported Putin’s policy toward Ukraine, polls show that an overwhelming majority do not want the Russian army there. That could be significant, especially if the number of Russian casualties grows, which could well erode the political support that Putin enjoys. That might push him to change his calculus.

It is regrettable that the West’s options now boil down to imposing more economic pain on the Russian economy and helping to inflict greater costs on the Russian army. But that is the unfortunate juncture to which Putin has brought us. Absent a change in his course, the West will have to prepare to watch the Kremlin inflict a longer, bloodier and more costly conflict on the people of Ukraine—and perhaps pursue more aggressive policies elsewhere.