OUTLINES OF THE SHAKHTY, INDUSTRIAL PARTY & METRO-VICKERS TRIALS

In 1928 came the trial of the engineers of the Shakhty mining area in the Donetz Basin. There’s no need to go into the details of the trial. These engineers had never lost touch with their former chiefs, the directors and large shareholders of the Donetz mines, who had fled abroad during the revolution. It was natural that those former Russian captains of industry should have many connections with influential circles in their countries of asylum, particularly France and England. From these former owners the engineers received instructions in regard to sabotage, and especially requests to flood certain mines to preserve them for the former owners. That these things had been done was fully confirmed at the trial; other charges remained unproved. But the trial showed clearly that part of an important group of educated Russians, the engineers, were absolutely opposed to the Soviet regime.

This was not the first and not the last such trial in this period of Russian history. Two years later came the case against the illegal Industrial Party. It showed plainly the lines along which the thoughts of the leading technical experts in Russia were running. The chief defendant in that case was a professor Ramzin, a prominent engineer who had played an important part during the First World War as an organizer of the heating industries and also as leader of the bourgeois Democratic Party. Later, with a number of leading engineers, he had entered the Soviet service. These engineers, with Ramzin at their head, were firmly convinced of the disastrousness of Stalin’s policy. In order to ward off chaos and to form a government, they had founded the illegal Industrial Party. Their ideology was that of the Technocrats, who hold that in our day the state should be ruled and administered by trained technicians–a sort of dictatorship of the engineers…. Ramzin had formed a secret Cabinet of engineers for the future, in which he was to be Prime Minister. They wanted to arrest the coming catastrophe. Rykov, Stalin’s more moderate opponent, who had already been removed from the Office of Prime Minister, was to become Prime Minister again after the fall of Stalin, but to yield the office to Ramzin after a period of transition. What was fatal for Ramzin and his colleagues was that they all considered it essential to enter into relations with persons abroad. His Industrial Party actually tried to get in touch with the British and French Governments, but only came into contact with the intelligence services of those countries, which showed great caution. These contacts, however, led to the discovery of the plot.

Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 173

In a…trial in Moscow in April 1933, engineers “of the old school” were accused of espionage and sabotage on behalf of Great Britain. This “Metro-Vickers” trial was the latest in a series of open proceedings against engineers and technicians of the old regime that included the Shakhty trial of 1928, and the trial of the Industrial Party in 1930…. Several of the defendants were released on bail before the trial. No death sentences were handed out, and two of the defendants received no punishment at all.

Getty & Naumov, The Road to Terror. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, c1999, p. 110

The trial of the Metro-Vickers engineers and their Russian colleagues in January 1933 revealed (though only in some of the defendants) not only cases of mild bribery and the systematic collection of information coming within the legal definition of espionage, but also a negligence that was hardly to be distinguished from sabotage, which was visited by the court with sentences of discriminating moderation. There promptly followed a renewed campaign of incitement by the emigres of Prague and Paris, with which was apparently connected the illegal and secret entry into the USSR, across its western land frontier during 1934, of more than 100 emissaries, bearing arms (and some of them bombs), nearly all of whom were, without publicity, promptly arrested, and held for interrogation. It will be recalled that it was during this period that Hitler was proclaiming his intention of annexing the Ukraine, and of securing forced concessions of much-needed minerals from the Urals–a threat which, it might be argued, implied that he was aware of there being allies within the USSR who would help him to overcome Stalin’s government, just as he later became aware of confederates in Spain among the army officers bent on overthrowing the Republic Government, and installing a Fascist regime in alliance with the Fascist Powers.

In December 1934 the head Bolshevik official in Leningrad ( Kirov) was assassinated by a dismissed employee, who may have acted independently out of personal revenge, but who was discovered to have secret connections with conspiratorial circles of ever-widening range. The Government reaction to this murder was to hurry on the trial, condemnation, and summary execution of the hundred or more persons above referred to, who were undoubtedly guilty of illegal entry and inexcusably bearing arms and bombs, although it was apparently not proved that they had any connection with Kirov’s assassination or the conspiracies associated therewith.

Webb, S. Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation. London, NY: Longmans, Green, 1947, p. 926

The Shakhty trial case was the first signal. The Shakhty case showed that the Party organizations and the trade unions lacked revolutionary vigilance. It showed that our business managers were disgracefully backward in regard to technique, that some of the old engineers and technicians, who work without being controlled, slide more easily towards the path of wrecking activities, especially as they were constantly besieged by “offers” from our enemies abroad….

Stalin, Joseph. Stalin’s Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 123

The first major political trial to have the effect of seriously aggravating the internal political situation in the Soviet Union was the so-called Shakhty case. The defendants were engineers and technicians in the coal industry of the Donetz basin. They were accused of “wrecking,” deliberately causing explosions in the mines, and maintaining criminal ties with the former mine owners, as well as less serious crimes, such as buying unnecessary imported equipment, violating safety procedures and labor laws, incorrectly laying out new mines, and so on.

At the trial some of the defendants confessed their guilt, but many denied it or confessed to only some of the charges. The court acquitted four of the 53 defendants, gave suspended sentences to four, and prison terms of one to three years to 10. Most of the defendants were given four to 10 years. Eleven were condemned to be shot, and five of them were executed in July 1928. The other six were granted clemency by the All-Union Central Executive Committee.

Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 258

From November 25 to December 7, 1930, a new political trial was held in Moscow, this time an open one. A group of prominent technical specialists were accused of wrecking and counter-revolutionary activities as members of an alleged Industrial Party….

Their alleged gains were to organize wrecking, diversionary actions, sabotage, and espionage and to prepare for the intervention of the Western powers and the overthrow of the Soviet government.

Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 263

At a trial the defendants confessed their guilt and willingly gave the most improbable detailed testimony about their wrecking and spying, their connections with foreign embassies in Moscow, even with Poincare, the president of France. A wave of meetings swept the country, with the speakers demanding that the leaders of the Industrial Party be shot. The court obligingly sentenced most of them to death, but a decree of the Central Executive Committee granted clemency, reducing the sentences to various terms of imprisonment. [The president of France denied any involvement and] It is significant that the complete text of Poincare’s declaration was published in Pravda and entered in the court record. Evidently this was done to show the court’s objectivity…. The bulk of Soviet citizens regarded Poincare’s declaration as proof of a real plot.

In March 1931, a few months after the trial of the Industrial Party, another open political trial was held in Moscow, that of an alleged Union Bureau of the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party.

Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 264

The “Union Bureau” was accused of wrecking, especially in the drafting of plans for economic development. If the indictment is to be believed, the accused systematically lowered all the draft plans, trying thereby to slow down the development of Soviet industry and agriculture. The Mensheviks were also supposed to have formed a secret block with the Industrial Party and the Toiling Peasant Party to prepare for armed intervention from without and insurrection from within. Each contracting party was assigned a certain function: the Industrial Party was to conduct preliminary negotiations with representatives of the countries that were supposed to inspire or take part in armed intervention, to organize flying brigades of engineers for diversionary and terrorist actions, and to arrange for military conspiracies with certain individuals in the high command of the Red Army; the Toiling Peasant Party was to organize peasant revolts, supply the rebels with weapons and munitions, and create disturbances in Red Army units; and the Union Bureau was to prepare a citizens’ guard in the cities, which could seize government institutions and provide the initial support for a new counter-revolutionary government.

At the trial all the defendants [of the Union Bureau] confessed, giving highly detailed accounts of their wrecking activities. As prosecutor, Krylenko tried at one session to demonstrate the objectivity of the court by reading a special declaration from the emigre leaders of the Menshevik Party. They [the emigre leaders] categorically denied any connection between the Menshevik Party and the defendants, who had quit the party in the early twenties or had never belonged to it at all…. In any case, none of the accused had ever been in touch with the emissaries of the Menshevik Party. After this declaration had been read, the accused, at the suggestion of the presiding judge, refuted it and reaffirmed their guilt. A few days later the court sentenced all 14 defendants to terms of imprisonment ranging from 5 to 10 years.

Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 265-266

The subsequent fate of these people [scholars in the humanities] worked out in different ways. Many of them were freed after a few years and went on to brilliant scholarly careers; such was the case for Tarle, Lorkh, Vinogradov, and Talanov. In the ’40s and ’50s they headed the most important scientific institutions in the Soviet Union, enjoyed great respect, and were awarded the highest honors.

Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 288

Eleven death sentences were announced [in the Shakhty case], of which six were commuted because of the prisoners’ co-operation. [Conquests distorts]

Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. New York, New York: Viking, 1991, p. 154

RAMZIN GETS A LIGHT SENTENCE AND REDEEMS HIMSELF

Two days after the completion of the Industrial Party trial, Professor Ramzin and the other four defendants who had been sentenced to death petitioned the Soviet Supreme Court for a reprieve. The court granted the petition and commuted the sentences of death to sentences of ten years imprisonment on the grounds that Ramzin and his colleagues had been the tools of the real conspirators who were outside the Soviet Union. In the years following the trial, Professor Ramzin, who was granted every opportunity by the Soviet authorities for new scientific work, became completely won over to the Soviet way of life and began making valuable contributions to the industrial program of the USSR. On July 7, 1943, Professor Ramzin was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Joseph Stalin Prize of 30 thousand dollars for the invention of a simplified turbo generator, said to be better than any other in the world. Under a decree issued by the Kremlin, the turbo generator bares the inventors name.

Sayers and Kahn. The Great Conspiracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946, p. 170

The internal detente remained in force for the deserving. Even some former anti-Bolsheviks found themselves among them. A governmental decree amnestied Ramzin and eight fellow convicts in the Industrial Party trial for their successful work on boiler design while in prison. Along with the decree was printed a letter of thanks for clemency in which Ramzin and three others took note of the “solicitude for man” that the NKVD had shown during their five-year imprisonment by providing all conditions for continued scientific work.

Tucker, Robert. Stalin in Power: 1929-1941. New York: Norton, 1990, p. 322

Stalin was capable of gratitude. The main defendant, Ramzin, was sentenced to death by shooting, but this was commuted to imprisonment. The same Ramzin whose name had been anathema to the country at large was shortly released, and eventually became director of the very same Technological Institute, and a winner of the country’s highest award, the Stalin Prize. Several other of the “inveterate wreckers” would be numbered among Stalin’s pet scientists.

Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 251

STALIN SAYS BY LAW FOREIGNERS ARE TREATED VERY WELL AND FAIRLY IN THE SU

It is true that, after the arrests had been made public, Mr. Barnes, the Moscow correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune, wrote to Stalin at the Kremlin asking for an assurance that American citizens in Russia were in no danger of molestation or of arbitrary arrest…. Stalin wrote to the ecstatic Mr. Barnes, who showed me the original as one of his most precious documentary possessions, the following letter:

Dear Mr. Barnes,

There is not the slightest ground for your fears about the security of American citizens here.

The USSR is one of the few countries in which the display of hate or unfriendliness towards foreigners, as foreigners, is prohibited by law. There has been no case, nor can there be one, of anyone becoming the object of persecution because of his nationality.

This is especially true in the case of the foreign specialists in the USSR , including Americans, whose work, in my opinion, is worthy of appreciation.

As for the few Englishman, the employees of the Metropolitan-Vickers Co., they are being prosecuted, not as Englishmen, but as persons who, according to the affirmation of the investigating authorities, have violated the law of the USSR …. J. Stalin.

One statement in Stalin’s letter I can amplify and endorse from personal experience. Not merely is “the display of hate or unfriendliness towards foreigners, as foreigners” prohibited by law; but foreigners are treated with the utmost kindness and goodwill. One of the most frequent questions asked me on my return to England was whether during the trial or afterwards I had been molested because of my nationality, or threatened or treated with harshness and discourtesy. My answer is that I never once met with a sullen look or an insulting or unkind word. In Moscow no such passions were aroused as in London , where the sudden display of frenzied emotion startled the whole world. Even at the height of the trial, when feeling against Mr. Thornton in particular was strong and strongly expressed–inside and outside the Court, and the street, in the hotel, in tramcars and in official quarters–there was not the slightest change in this friendly attitude…. My experience was that of other Englishmen in Moscow who compared notes with me and were as surprised as I was that we were called upon to suffer no reprisals even in the mildest form.

The “law” as to foreigners is in fact faithfully observed. I know of no country in the world in which individual foreigners, to whatever nationality they may belong, can be so assured of being treated with affability and good manners.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Vic. Gollancz, 1933, p. 63-65

POLICE METHODS OF OBTAINING EVIDENCE AND CONFESSIONS ARE EXCELLENT AND ENVIABLE

In connection with these “systematic breakdowns” proceedings were instituted against the Russian engineer Gussev, chief of the Zlatoust Electric Power Station. Gussev, whose personality at the trial deeply interested me, seems to have given himself away as promptly as he gave away the English installation engineer MacDonald.

From this standpoint the indictment, both in form and substance, should be an inspiration to the earnest student of the records of police transactions. In the completeness of its presentation, in the dovetailing one into another of all the parts of the case, in the intelligent detailed exactitude with which most of the accused persons incriminate themselves and give away others, in the skill with which at just the right moment one prisoner is confronted with the testimony or person of another prisoner and so induced to confess and corroborate, it is something of a masterpiece. There is not a police organization in the world which would not regard the final result with admiring envy as an almost perfect artistic achievement or would not be glad to discover the secret of the GPU’s technique and in practice imitate the method….

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 75

DEFENDANTS CONFESS AND IMPLICATE OTHERS IN THE METRO-VICKERS TRIAL

Gussev, admitting everything, gives away MacDonald. MacDonald gives himself away and gives away Thornton . Thornton , admitting less, yet gives away himself and his colleagues. Monkhouse apparently gives away something; Cushny very little, Nordwall not much. The remaining eleven Russians follow eagerly Gussev’s example, making full and voluminous confessions, telling all they claim to know and of course giving away in turn one or more of the six Englishmen….

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 76

GUSSEV CONFESSES AND IMPLICATES MACDONALD WHO IMPLICATES THORNTON

When the evidence so far obtained was put before him by the officers of the GPU, Gussev admitted at once that he was guilty of organizing a group of wreckers at Zlatoust and added that for causing the breakdowns he received money from MacDonald. He testified also that from 1922, during the whole period of his duties at Zlatoust , he was “sharply hostile” to the Soviet Government and mixed in hostile circles.

As he grew more intimate with MacDonald, Gussev became more and more frank with him, openly expressed his anti-Soviet views, and told him about his service in the White campaign against the Red Army.

At one meeting in MacDonald’s flat, MacDonald (said Gussev) “openly proposed to me that I should engage in collecting information about the work at Zlatoust . It was clear that he meant espionage work. When he spoke to me again two or three days later I consented because of my striving to be more active in my anti-Soviet hostility.”

…Having done so well with Gussev the interrogators turned their attention to MacDonald, who, “after the concrete facts of his crime had been presented to him admitted in the very first examination on March 12 the correctness of Gussev’s evidence and corroborated it at a confrontation on March 13.”

… Just before his departure for Zlatoust he was asked specifically by Thornton to “collect for him information about the production of military supplies there and about the state of the power supply….”

…MacDonald “corroborated” Gussev as to the character and scope of his espionage activities.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Vic. Gollancz, 1933, p. 77-79

GUSSEV AND MACDONALD DESCRIBE IN DETAIL THE WRECKING THEY DID

The indictment then passes on to what the prosecution regarded as “the main content of Gussev’s counter-revolutionary activity”–the organization of the breakdowns at Zlatoust and the delay of work on the extension of the electric power station “for the purpose of undermining the industry and the military power of the USSR .”

Gussev made frequent admissions on these matters. He received, he said, from MacDonald two tasks: (1) to reduce the output of shells and cold weapons at the mechanical works and (2) to reduce the output of high-quality steel at the metallurgical works. He was helped in this work by Sokolov, who said he agreed in the first place as “a school chum of Gussev’s and knowing that Gussev was on good terms with MacDonald.”

MacDonald, completing this agreeable picture of deliberate sabotage, once more admitted “the correctness of the evidence,” and supplemented with further information of his own.

The industrious and enterprising Gussev then told his examiners how he had drawn up a plan which he had submitted to MacDonald, who accepted it, and with what zeal he carried out the following wrecking acts:

(1) Put out of action five or six times the 1400 horsepower motor which serves to drive the large shaping rolling mill.

(2) Froze L. M. Z. boiler No. 8.

(3) Put out of action the coal conveyor by, among other means, throwing small metal objects into the cylindrical gear drive.

(4) Delayed the installation of U. M. T. boiler No. 11 by sending working parts to the scrap melting furnace on the pretense that they were scrap.

The damage to the rolling mill motor put the shell shop itself out of action for six weeks.

As to this effective piece of sabotage, MacDonald said:

“I told Gussev that for the purpose of a struggle with the Soviet power one must use also such means as the organization of breakages in the works and especially in their most important points. I requested him, considering it to be a very important undertaking in order to stop the production, to organize a breakage of the above-mentioned motor, being aware that it will lead to most definite effective consequences. Gussev first hesitated but afterwards agreed to it.”

The next point to be considered was what was to be done in the event of war.

Thus Gussev: MacDonald discussed with me the measures to be taken to put the equipment of the station out of order in the event of war. He told me and gave me direct instructions to cause breakdowns on the declaration of war in the most important sections of the station, namely in the boiler house and the coal conveyor. By this means I was to strive to keep the station constantly at a level considerably below that which was provided for in the mobilization plan. In this way, had I succeeded in maintaining the level at about 6000 kW instead of 12,000 nominal kW, provided for in the mobilization plan, that would have meant the disruption of the work of munitions supply in wartime.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 80

CILIGA BACKS UP CLAIMS OF METRO-VICKERS WRECKING ACTS

Of course, people spoke with caution, for the most part only of what they had seen and heard. Nevertheless, I did on three or four occasions hear open and direct criticism of the government. One of the most outspoken in this respect was a young student from among the specialists. He declared that he had been imprisoned “on account of a counter-revolutionary organization in the electrical industry.” The public trial of this case took place, if I remember correctly, in Moscow in the spring of 1933. Apart from the Russian accused there were also some English engineers on trial, who were freed after being sentenced, and extradited at the request of the British government. [The Metro-Vickers trial, 12-19 April, 1933].

This young fellow’s story struck me not only because of its outspokenness against the government, but also, and particularly because of his detailed account of the “counter-revolutionary organization.” According to him the affair was far more serious than had been made public by the Court proceedings. The government, he thought, did not want too many revelations, and deliberately conducted it as a wreckers’ case, whereas it was in fact a real conspiracy. He asserted that the organization had a complete plan to plunge the whole of Moscow into darkness at a moment’ s notice and to blow up the Kremlin and other strategically important points in the town by means of some mysterious rays. The blowing up of the Kremlin would result in the overthrow of the government and its replacement by one composed of specialist-technicians.

“Only by means of modern technique and only with the aid of technicians and specialists can the communists be overthrown,” the young fellow declared, repeating one of the clichEs fairly widespread in Soviet circles.

The conspiracy had apparently been exposed quite accidentally. One of the chief engineers of the “Electric Combinat” in Moscow , a leader of the plot, while taking some papers from the safe in his office, had inadvertently dropped a map of Moscow with the points to be blown up marked on it in front of the nose of a communist who happened to be there. According to the student, he himself was a close relative of one of the principal accused, but had contrived to escape immediately after the first arrests had taken place. With false papers he had managed to get taken on at a ship-building yard on the Baikal, and thought that having traveled so far he was no longer in danger. However, after six months he had been traced and arrested.

“When arresting me the GPU addressed me by my real name. I realized then that further denial was senseless and I admitted everything. I was threatened with shooting of course, but on account of my youth I got off with 10 years in a concentration camp.”

The whole tale sounded fantastic, incredible, pure conceit and boasting–if not worse. I mention it only because this was the sole case where an accused assured me that the accusation of wrecking was not a frame-up but the truth. It goes without saying that I cannot vouch that this young man had really been accused of the things of which he told me. One thing, however, was undoubtedly true. He came from the technical-intelligentsia circles of Moscow , and yet he did not look like a son of the old-style bourgeois-intelligentsia.

Ciliga, Ante, The Russian Enigma. London : Ink Links, 1979, p. 344-345

GUSSEV AND SOKOLOV RECEIVE MONEY FROM MACDONALD FOR WRECKING

Thus MacDonald: The respective declaration of Mr. Gussev coincides with my instructions.

And like an echo then comes the corroborative voice of the faithful Sokolov.

Gussev next informed his accusers that he received at various times from MacDonald sums of money amounting to between 2000 and 3000 rubles.

“Yes,” said MacDonald, “I gave money to Gussev for his spying work and breakages in accordance with my commissions. The total sum I handed over to him was about 2000 or 3000 rubles.”

“In June 1932,” says Sokolov, “Gussev in his office gave me 1000 rubles; and in handing it to me said, ‘Here is a bonus from MacDonald.’ “I consider,” continues Sokolov, “that I received this sum principally for putting the 1400 horsepower motor out of order.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 82

THORNTON ADMITS ENLISTING AND PAYING MACDONALD FOR ESPIONAGE

The depositions of Gussev and MacDonald as to the complicity of Thornton “in the activities of the counter-revolutionary group” and their references to Thornton as the source of the payments for counter-revolutionary acts led to his arrest.

He was examined, and when confronted with his two accusers, Gussev and MacDonald, he is alleged to have to the following effect:

(1) In those places where MacDonald was engaged in installation work “MacDonald did indeed engage in collecting information for Thornton and on his instructions.”

(2) Thornton first enlisted MacDonald for espionage activity in May-June 1930 in Losino-Ostrovskaya.

(3) Thornton did indeed receive information from MacDonald concerning the Zlatoust and Zuevka districts.

(4) Thornton admitted also that he knew that Gussev “was the person whom MacDonald had brought in to collect information about the work of the Zlatoust electric power station on his ( Thornton ‘s) instructions.”

Thornton also corroborated the evidence of MacDonald that the latter had received from him a sum of money to pay “these people” who had given espionage information.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 82

VITVITSKY SAYS THORNTON PAID HIM BRIBES FOR ESPIONAGE INFORMATION

This scene of action now passes to Chelyabinsk , at which station, according to the investigators, the counter-revolutionary group was acting under Vitvitsky (one of the accused Russians) who were also connected with MacDonald, Gussev, and Thornton.

… Thornton promised that the information, which should be conveyed to MacDonald at Zlatoust through Gussev, would be well paid for; and as a reward for his “wrecking acts” Vitvitsky said he received repeated bribes amounting altogether to 6900 rubles. The money was usually handed to him by Gussev when he gave the latter the letters with the information asked for.

According to Vitvitsky, the “wrecking” chiefly employed at Chelyabinsk was to slow down the development of the station by various subtle means which he enumerated and which included, among other things, the concentration of attention on objects that had nothing to do with the station and failing to take adequate measures when anything went wrong. Like the group at Zlatoust , the wreckers at Chelyabinsk “also had a program of action drawn up in the event of war.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 84

KOTLYAREVSKY SAYS HE ENGAGED IN WRECKING FOR MACDONALD AT ELECTRIC POWER PLANT

Now for the electric power station at Zuevka. There MacDonald comes again into action. The “chief wrecker” at Zuevka was Kotlyarevsky, who, on being charged, admitted that he carried out the work in conjunction with MacDonald with whom he became on very friendly terms “which MacDonald tried to maintain all the time.”

Kotlyarevsky insisted that he did no more than conceal defects in the equipment. But the examiners refute such attempts “to belittle his wrecking work” by quoting a statement made on April 3 by MacDonald in which he said “In June or July 1932 there was organized a breakdown of the third generator. This breakdown took place as a result of leaving a bolt in the air gap of the generator. It was done under my instructions by Fomichev or Kotlyarevsky.”

From Zuevka the melancholy and monotonous tale is transferred to Ivanov, at which station, in addition to various breakdowns and accidents recorded by the Expert Committee, a number of cases of direct damage to equipment are set out in detail in the indictment.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 85

LOBANOV & ZIVERT SAY NORDWALL & THORNTON PAID THEM FOR WRECKING

Here the Russian villain of the peace is Lobanov, the anti-Sovietist son of a factory owner, who was “in league with” Nordwall, another Metro-Vickers employee.

According to Lobanov, Nordwall urged that the damage should be carried out systematically, so as to interrupt the supply of electric current to industry, and that “attention should be paid to the damage of equipment from Metro-Vickers, and that if such equipment, on which the period of guarantee had not expired, were damaged, it should be done in such a way that the responsibility could not be thrown on the company.”

Lobanov, after enumerating in detail his acts of wreckage, says he received as his reward 5000 rubles. Nordwall first gave him 3000 rubles, “wrapped in a newspaper,” and promised a larger reward if the work was more energetically carried on. Of this sum Lobanov gave 1000 rubles to Lebedev and 800 to Ugrumov.

Zivert, a foreman at the station, declared that he was drawn into the same business by Thornton whom he met first at the Gorky station in 1925.

He was, he said, “won over by Thornton ‘s promise to reward him.” In the course of ten months “there were 15 accidents to the oil pipes”; and for this and other work Zivert received from Thornton a further 300 rubles.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 86

SUKHORUCHKIN, KRASHENINNIKOV & ZORIN ADMIT BEING PAID BY THORNTON TO DO WRECKING

Breakdowns at the 0rekhevo Thermo-Power station were caused deliberately by the engineers Sukhoruchkin, Krasheninnikov and Zorin, “acting in collusion with the employees of Metro-Vickers.” Sukhoruchkin, “on his own admission,” established a connection with Thornton as early as 1927, systematically supplying him with economic information. From the middle of 1929, in addition to this, he “kept quiet about the number of defects in the equipment supplied by the firm,” and in 1931 “passed on to direct acts of diversion in accordance with the instructions given me by Thornton personally.”

Sukhoruchkin also made the remarkable statement that, in February 1930, when they were examining the switch gear together, not only did they discuss a number of acts of “diversion” they intended to carry out on a larger scale in case of war, but Thornton actually demonstrated to him in technical and exact detail “how easy it would be” to wreck the switch house. And in subsequent conversations Thornton explained other methods.

Sukhoruchkin said he received from Thornton 2000 rubles, and 350 rubles in Torgsin checks.

Krasheninnikov said Oleinik gave him 500 rubles on Thornton ‘s behalf for concealing defects in the equipment. Zorin, chief engineer of the steam turbine group, was given 1000 rubles by Thornton for the same kind of work; and was “prudently warned” by Thornton “of the criminal work of Sukhoruchkin and Krasheninnikov so that he would not expose their “wrecking.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 87

THORNTON ADMITS TO KUTUZOVA THAT HE IS BRIBING RUSSIANS FOR SECRET INFORMATION

As early as 1930 she [Kutuzova] began to notice that something was wrong, when Thornton, Cushny, MacDonald, Monkhouse and others “had secret conversations with Soviet citizens, often locked themselves up in their private office and made secret notes, etc..”

She soon came to the conclusion that they were spying and that they sent information to England . She pressed Thornton to let her know the truth. At first he would only say that, in addition to his work for Metro-Vickers, “he had other tasks of a secret nature.” But at length he told her that he and other English engineers “were collecting secret information of a political and economic nature through the medium of Russian engineers and technicians recruited by them to whom they paid money for this work.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 89

KUTUZOVA ADMITS MAKING PAYMENTS FOR THORNTON & HEARING HIM PLAN WRECKING ACTS

She admitted that she then took part in making these payments; and in the presence of Thornton stated that the expenses for the remuneration of the Russian engineers and technicians who supplied secret information had been recorded by Thornton “not in the office books but in notebooks which he took to England in 1932.”

Questioned about the participation of the British engineers in acts of diversion, Kutuzova asserted that several times she heard Thornton and Monkhouse planning to damage the turbines of the Nizhni, Zuevka, Leningrad and Baku power stations. On the subject of espionage she said she “supposed” that Thornton and the other workers in the firm’s office gave their information to Richards and carried on their espionage under him. She drew this conclusion “from the fact that when Richards came over, secret talks were held with him; and, besides this, Thornton and Monkhouse mentioned the name Richards in their secret conversations.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 90

THORNTON SAYS ENGINEER ALBERT GREGORY GAVE BRIBES

“Among the other employees of Metro-Vickers who gave bribes, according to the statement of Thornton , there was also the engineer Albert Gregory.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 92

ALL 12 RUSSIANS CONFESS WHILE THE ENGLISH CONFESS IN VARYING DEGREES

The confessions of the 12 Russians were full and exhaustive; only in one instance did a Russian make a faltering suggestion that he was not guilty on all counts, and his attempt to “belittle” his participation in crime was quickly disposed of by his interrogators.

Of the British citizens, MacDonald made a full, complete and very damaging confession implicating his superiors and immediate colleagues. Thornton , while denying sabotage, made certain admissions, none of them so serious as those in a document which was not published in the indictment but was reserved for the trial. Monkhouse admitted receiving information that “might be interesting to the firm,” the writing off of money given by Thornton to Dolgov, and machinery defects which caused breakdowns in the power stations. Nordwall admitted “anti-Soviet conversations” with Lobanov but denied everything else. Cushny admitted virtually nothing. As for Gregory, there was no indication even that he was questioned.

Apart from the testimony of two employees at Zlatoust as to the nature of the damage done and the instructions given by Gussev, the only independent witnesses were Ryabova, MacDonald’s elderly housekeeper, who conveyed letters from Gussev to MacDonald; Yemelyanov, who said he heard Cushny speak of the necessity of damaging the Red Power Station in order to stop the development of the oilfields; and Dolgov, head of the control department of Electro-Import (and, I strongly suspect, a GPU spy), who received 3000 rubles from Thornton and handed them over at once to the GPU.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 98

CONFESSIONS AND MUTUAL ACCUSATIONS OF PRISONERS MADE THE PROSECUTION CASE

Therefore the prisoners’ confessions and accusations against others under arrest provided the core of the case for the prosecution.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 99

THE SOVIETS PRODUCED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR INDICTMENT AND PUBLIC INQUIRY

Allowing for all reasonable objections that can be directed against the form and character of the indictment I defy any fair-minded person to read it through without acknowledging that the Soviets had produced a prima facie case for public inquiry.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 100

BRITISH PAPER CAN’T GET THE FREED BRITISH PRISONERS TO SAY THEY WERE TORTURED

Whatever methods may have been employed on the Soviet citizens, it is only fair to say that even The Times, in an unimpressive and characteristically sour review of what it describes as a “fishing” inquiry, was unable to extract from the returned British engineers any complaint that “direct physical terror was applied to those of the British prisoners who are now free to speak for themselves.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 101

When the British prisoners agreed in court that no torture or other form of pressure had been applied to them, a section of the press declared that if the prisoners were freed from the grip of the OGPU they would tell another story. A few months later, all the prisoners are freed, and can reveal the frightful tortures by which “all human reflexes are destroyed” in order that prisoners may be forced to confess to crimes which they did not commit. Alas for the credulous! The opportunity afforded to these three gentlemen to expose the methods of torture practiced by the OGPU has not been utilized to this day.

Campbell, J. R. Soviet Policy and Its Critics. London: V. Gollancz, ltd., 1939, p. 257

ALL OF THE BRITISH ACCUSED WERE ASSIGNED SOVIET LAWYERS & SO WERE THE RUSSIANS

His [Judge Ulrich] first business was to recite the names of the prisoners and to obtain from each one of them their age, occupation, and nationality and a formal acknowledgement of the receipt of the indictment. It was then announced that “at the request and choice of the accused” Braude, one of the most celebrated and flamboyant lawyers in Russia , was to defend Thornton ; Smirnov was to act for MacDonald; Kommodov, a very able advocate for Monkhouse; Lidov for Cushny; and Dolmatovsky for Gregory and Nordwall. Four other counsel were engaged for the Russians.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London : Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 115

THE CENSORS WERE FAIR AND REASONABLE WITH REPORTERS AT THE TRIAL

I have no serious complaint to make against the censors. They did their duty in a reasonable spirit and with an obvious desire not to hamper our work unduly or cause us needless irritations as long as we observed the decencies.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 116

REPORTERS ARE SHOCKED THAT THE BRIT MACDONALD ADMITS HIS GUILT

It had been assumed as a matter of course that all the Russian prisoners would plead guilty and all the British prisoners not guilty.

In a dead silence the President turned towards the dock. “Accused Gussev,” he said, “do you plead guilty to the formulated accusations?”

GUSSEV: Yes, I plead guilty.

THE PRESIDENT: Accused Sokolov, do you plead guilty?

SOKOLOV: Yes, I do.

THE PRESIDENT: Accused MacDonald, do you plead guilty?

MACDONALD: Yes, I do you.

The audience gasped in astonishment at this totally unexpected answer.

One heard all the Russians admit their guilt. One heard each of the remaining Englishmen plead not guilty in tones all the sharper and clearer perhaps because of their colleague’s defection.

… And a horde of newspaper men dashed out of the hall to tell the world without a moment’s delay that one of the six innocent British engineers had pleaded guilty to his crime.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 116-117

MACDONALD ADMITS ASKING GUSSEV FOR MILITARY INFORMATION

VYSHINSKY: What exactly do you mean by that? Did you ask Gussev for information on the power supply?

MACDONALD: I did.

VYSHINSKY: Military information?

MACDONALD: I did.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 120

GUSSEV ADMITS BEING PAID BY MACDONALD TO WRECK AND MACDONALD ADMITS PAYING HIM

Gussev next passed to a comprehensive account of the way in which he organized and carried out, in conjunction with his assistant Sokolov, the engineering breakdowns in the concern. The purpose, he said, was to stop entirely the production of shells and non-firing weapons at Zlatoust, and he decided that the best means of ensuring this was to put out of commission the 1400 horsepower motor, because the work of the mill depended upon it. He accomplished the end by leaving a small piece of sheet iron in the ventilation intake. He described in detail several other breakdowns, upon which Vyshinsky turned again to MacDonald with the question: “Do you corroborate Gussev’s testimony in this part?”

MACDONALD: I do.

Gussev said he received altogether about 3000 rubles from MacDonald for his work.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 120

MACDONALD ADMITS GETTING THE MONEY TO PAY GUSSEV FROM THORNTON

VYSHINSKY (to MacDonald): Do you corroborate Gussev’s testimony in this part or not?

MACDONALD: I gave him money.

VYSHINSKY: How much?

MACDONALD: About 2500 rubles.

VYSHINSKY: Where did you get it?

MACDONALD: From the firm–from the Moscow office.

VYSHINSKY: From whom personally?

MACDONALD: Through chief engineer Thornton.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 121

GUSSEV ADMITS HE MET WITH MACDONALD AND THORNTON TO PLAN WRECKING ACTS

ROGINSKY: Did you have a talk with Thornton concerning your work as one of their men?

GUSSEV: Yes. On the second occasion this plan [for wrecking activities] was discussed by all three of us–myself, Thornton and McDonald.

ROGINSKY: Where?

GUSSEV: In my office. I was warned by MacDonald that meetings with Thornton outside my office would be unwise.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 122

MACDONALD ADMITS ENGAGING IN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY ESPIONAGE

VYSHINSKY: When in Leningrad did you collect any information?

MACDONALD: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: What information?

MACDONALD: As indicated in my depositions.

VYSHINSKY: You said in them that you engaged in systematic economic espionage. Do you confirm this?

MACDONALD: I confirm it.

VYSHINSKY: Political– do you confirm that?

MACDONALD: I confirm it.

VYSHINSKY: And military?

MACDONALD: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: And where did you get that military information.

MACDONALD: From the “Bolshevik” works near our electric power station.

Airplane motors, MacDonald explained, were tested there; and there were firing ranges at which artillery was tested. And he passed on “whatever there was to hear” to Thornton.

He added, in further replies to questions, that he assumed other engineers of Metro-Vickers, besides Thornton, to be sharing in the intelligence work, including Cushny.

When he went to Zlatoust in 1930 and met Gussev he received from Gussev information “with military data in it” and passed it on to Thornton.

MACDONALD ADMITS TELLING GUSSEV HOW TO WRECK A 1400 HP MOTOR

VYSHINSKY: About wrecking equipment, you deposed that you gave Gussev instructions to wreck the 1400 horsepower motor. Do you confirm this, or not?

MACDONALD: Yes.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 141

MACDONALD REPEATEDLY CONFESSES AND IMPLICATES THORNTON

And so it went on. Vyshinsky carried him at a canter through his various preliminary self-admissions; and in case after case, one after another, MacDonald verified the statements and so incriminated himself (not to mention Thornton) beyond hope of redemption in a Soviet Court.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 141

MACDONALD SAYS THORNTON ASKED HIM TO GET MUNITIONS INFO AND THORNTON DENIES IT

VYSHINSKY: I want to refresh your memory. Did you not ask MacDonald to get you information about the manufacture of munitions at the Zlatoust works?

THORNTON: That is an absolute lie.

VYSHINSKY: (to MacDonald): At the examination you deposed that ” Thornton asked me to obtain information about the manufacture of munitions.” Do you confirm this?

MACDONALD: I confirm it.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 144

MACDONALD ADMITS TO VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING INCLUDING ESPIONAGE AND WRECKING

… The prosecution, however, had no further difficulties with MacDonald, who “confirmed” virtually everything that was put to him. He confirmed the secret nature of the “military information” he received from Gussev. He confirmed the passing of it on to Thornton. He confirmed the request to Gussev to organize a breakage of the motor as part of the organization of works breakages in their most important points “for the purpose of a struggle with the Soviet power.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 146

THORNTON ADMITS TO BRIBING FOR ESPIONAGE INFORMATION AND WRECKING

ROGINSKY: I asked you: Do you confirm your words “I obtained espionage information of a military character about the Putilov works”?

THORNTON: Yes, but this does not apply to the Donald.

ROGINSKY: And from the Mytischy Works?

THORNTON: Yes.

ROGINSKY: That means that you collected information of a military nature?

THORNTON: This was common gossip.

ROGINSKY: Did you collect this common gossip that had State and military importance?

THORNTON: No, I did not collect it; it came casually.

Turning to Thornton, Roginsky said: “After this you wrote the following: ‘I admit that I am guilty according to the charge presented to me, with the exception of paragraph 4, in which it is stated that I gave instructions to wreck installations.’

“Consequently,” added Roginsky leaning forward and thrusting out his chin, “you pleaded guilty to economic and military espionage?”

THORNTON: In that document–yes.

ROGINSKY: You pleaded guilty to paying money for economic and military espionage?

THORNTON: In that document–yes.

ROGINSKY: You pleaded guilty to giving brides for concealing defects in equipment?

THORNTON: In that document–yes….

ROGINSKY: According to this record, when it was presented to you, you admitted the following: “(1) That being the chief erecting engineer of Metro-Vickers and the USSR I carried out espionage.” Did you say this?

THORNTON: Yes.

ROGINSKY: Further “(2) That for carrying out the above-mentioned spying activities I drew in certain Russian engineers and technicians whose names I enumerated in previous testimonies.” Is that your deposition?

THORNTON: Yes.

ROGINSKY: “(3) That financial remuneration was given to the persons recruited by me for carrying on espionage.” Is that your deposition?

THORNTON: Yes.

ROGINSKY: “That this work I have carried out in conjunction not only with Russian engineers and technicians whom I drew in, but I have carried out and organized it in conjunction with certain employees of Metro-Vickers–MacDonald, Cushny, and others whom I mentioned in the protocol of March 13, 1933.” Is that right?

THORNTON: Yes….

ROGINSKY: Further: “I plead guilty to the charge that I gave bribes to Russian engineers and technicians for concealing defects and discrepancies in the operation of the plant and equipment which had been supplied by us.” Did you make this deposition?

THORNTON: Yes, I did.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 147-151

THORNTON TRIES TO DENY HIS EARLIER CONFESSIONS BUT ADMITS THEY WERE FREELY GIVEN

VYSHINSKY: And moreover on March 19 when the question was specifically asked as to how he had made his depositions at the preliminary investigation at the OGPU he gave the following reply which I ask leave to read out. The statement was as follows:

“These testimonies were given by me wholly of my own free will without outside influence or pressure. The testimonies were given by me in the English language and were written in my own handwriting. The protocols of interrogations, first in Gussev’s, mine, and each other’s presence and then in Kutuzova’s, mine, and in each other’s presence that were shown to me during this interrogation, and in which I confessed facts about my spying activities and my connections with other persons, I have read. I can make no additional remarks about the records of these protocols. The protocols are taken down directly and are confirmed by my signature. The protocol was read by me and I confirmed its accuracy. 1933 (Signed) Leslie Thornton.”

VYSHINSKY: Do you confirm this?

THORNTON: No, it was written and I signed it.

VYSHINSKY: Do you confirm that you made it voluntarily without being influenced, without any pressure?

THORNTON: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: Everything that you wrote?

THORNTON: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: Then you signed it?

THORNTON: Yes, and now the court will examine it.

THE PRESIDENT: But why did you give such information? Was it only to take up everyone’s time, the Court’s and the Public Prosecutor’s? Or did you have some special reason? What you are saying is absurd. You have been making depositions for three weeks so as to deny them now.

THORNTON: I merely–

THE PRESIDENT: Decided to provide work for the Court?

THORNTON: I did it because, as I have said, I was frightened.

THE PRESIDENT: How were you frightened? By whom were you frightened? Where and when were you frightened?

THORNTON: I was not frightened by arrest and by the consequences, but simply this way–

THE PRESIDENT: No, you give a straight reply so that it will be clear and plain to everybody. Who frightened you? When did they frighten you? In what room?

THORNTON: I want to speak through the interpreter.

THE PRESIDENT: When you find it difficult to reply you always resort to the aid of the interpreter; but, very well, you may.

THORNTON: No, I will speak in Russian. I was simply afraid, but of what I do not know myself.

VYSHINSKY: Let me ask you something else. I am interested in the circumstances in which you were questioned in the office of the Public Prosecutor by my assistant, Roginsky, in my presence. Were the facts which are set down here written down exactly as you told, or not?”

THORNTON: As I spoke. Yes, correctly.

VYSHINSKY: Nothing was distorted?

THORNTON: No, you did not change anything.

VYSHINSKY: But perhaps Roginsky did?

THORNTON: No.

VYSHINSKY: Perhaps the OGPU distorted it?

THORNTON: No, I signed it with my own hand….

VYSHINSKY: It is important to establish the facts. We will try conclusions later. At present it is important for me to confirm from the deposition which you made on March 19 that the facts which are here set down were really told by you, that there was no falsification and no juggling.

THORNTON: That is so.

VYSHINSKY: (speaking with great deliberation and looking Thornton straight in the eyes): The depositions which you made before were given quite freely and voluntarily, without any pressure or coercion. Understand you correctly?

THORNTON: (in a subdued voice, after a long pause): Correctly.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 154-157

THE USE OF TIBETAN DRUGS TO OBTAIN CONFESSIONS WAS ABSURD

… “Among Russian refugees it was then stated that the OGPU resorted to the use of certain potent drugs to compel its victims to make ‘confessions’ that suited the purpose of the Soviet Government.”

…”These drugs, it was explained (so the newspaper narrative proceeds–The Daily Mail), were unknown in the West; but they were prepared by Tibetans in the employ of the OGPU from herbs and were administered in the food of prisoners without their knowledge. The effect of such concoctions was totally to destroy the will power of those being questioned, and to place them entirely in the psychic power of their jailors, ready to assent to any suggestions.”

Of all the witless trash published in the course of the trial, nothing was quite so witless as this maudlin acceptance of the malicious fable of a handful of Russian refugees.

…Since also MacDonald never again departed from his plea of guilty, either the Tibetan drug must have been sufficiently potent to endure for a week or it must have been administered two or three times daily.

Further, if Thornton, during his stay in prison, made serious admissions because he too was a victim of the Tibetan drug, how was it that the same brilliantly successful treatment was not applied to Cushny and Gregory and Nordwall and last of all to Monkhouse himself, the chief representative of his firm in Moscow, whose “confessions” under the influence of this mysterious oriental herb would have been more important than those of all his colleagues combined? I leave the answer to the resourceful ingenuity of the Daily Mail.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 161-162

The defendants in the show trials had certainly not been drugged.

Laqueur, Walter. Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations. New York: Scribner’s, c1990, p. 129

THORNTON ADMITS IN DEPOSITION THAT SPYING WAS DONE BY BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AGENTS

Vyshinsky then picked up from his table a large open document which he held head high for all to see; and, leaving his seat and walking straight to Thornton at the witness stand, presented it to him with a theatrical flourish. “Take it please,” he said, standing face to face with Thornton, “and examine it carefully from beginning to end, and then we will have it read. Is it your deposition?”

Thornton’s nervousness was apparent. He looked at it with evident repugnance, thrust it away from him and replied curtly “Yes.”

VYSHINSKY: In your own hand?

THORNTON: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: Did you write it?

THORNTON: Yes.

VYSHINSKY: Now we will have it read in full, if necessary, in English first.

This is what he [Judge Martens] read in the deposition written and signed by Thornton.

“All our spying operations on the USSR territory are directed by the British intelligence Service, through their agent, Richards, who occupies the position of Managing Director of the Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Export Co. Ltd.

…Spying operations on the USSR territory were directed by myself and Monkhouse, representatives of the above-mentioned British firm, who are contractors, by official agreement, to the Soviet Government, for the supply of turbines and electrical equipment and the furnishing of technical aid agreements. On the instructions of Richards given to me to this end, British personnel were gradually drawn into the spying organization after their arrival on USSR territory and instructed as to the information required. During the whole period of our presence on USSR territory, from the total of British staff employed, 27 men were engaged in spying operations. Of the above, 15 men which included: Monkhouse, Thornton, MacDonald, Nordwall, [and others] were engaged in economic and political spying, also in the investigation of the defense and offense possibilities of the Soviet Union.

The remaining 12 men who included the following: Cushny, Gregory, Richards, [and nine others] were engaged in political and economic spying.

On March 11, 1933, the following men were engaged in spying operations:

Nordwall–economic, political, defense and offense investigation.

Gregory–economic and political.

Thornton–economic, political, defense and offense investigation.

Monkhouse–economic, political, defense and offense investigation.

Cushny–economic and political.

[And others]

Facts above [about?] the spying activities of the above-mentioned men who were under my direction, I shall give in a further protocol.” (Signed) Thornton

Like others in the Court I was dumbfounded. It seemed to me an incredible production. I could well understand why the Soviet authorities had not inserted it in the indictment but had saved it up as the bonne bouche of the trial.

It is not necessary for me to emphasize the serious nature and the full significance of the statement. Not only does Thornton’s confession “present” as spies himself and 26 of his colleagues of the Metro-Vickers staff in Russia and thus expose them to the risk of capital punishment, but it implicates Mr. Richards, a director of the firm, and identifies him and them directly with the British Intelligence Service.

… This was manifestly the trump card the Soviet authorities were able to play in the trial. It created a profound impression in the Court. It created a great impression in all parts of the world to which the text was being dispatched within a few minutes of its recital.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 164-168

FIRST WITNESS DOLGOV SAYS THORNTON GAVE HIM 3000 RUBLES

Dolgov was the first witness called. He is the manager of the control department of Electro-Import, and he described at once the circumstances in which Thornton early in 1932 gave him the 3000 rubles.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 177

KOTLYAREVSKY & MACDONALD ADMIT THE LATTER PAID HIM FOR ESPIONAGE & WRECKING

Kotlyarevsky, a burly engineer of sullen manners who was in charge of the turbine department at Zuevka, was the next witness. He described how he and MacDonald got friendly because they were both fond of music and McDonald had a gramophone and very good records; and how, as they became more intimate, MacDonald suggested that he should obtain for him plans of the station building and pay no attention to defects in the equipment, besides giving a false estimate of any breakdowns which might take place with the turbines. At MacDonald’s instance he also wrecked a turbine by leaving a bolt in the air cap of the generator. For the information he supplied to McDonald he received in two sums a thousand rubles. McDonald freely admitted to the Court the accuracy of Kotlyarevsky’s statements.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 179

LOBANOV WAS A COLD-BLOODED WRECKER AND TRAITOR WARRING AGAINST THE SU

Lobanov, the next witness, interested me more than any of the other Russian prisoners. I should describe him without hesitation as a deliberate cold-blooded wrecker. For the first time I saw before me in the flesh one of those “miscreants” about whom we have heard so much from the Soviets as traitors conducting actively a concealed war against the Soviet Union.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 179

THE COMMENTS OF GUSSEV, LOBANOV, ZORIN & OTHERS DEFINITELY PROVE THEIR GUILT

After hearing his evidence an Englishman who has lived in Moscow for the last 10 years said to me that he had never hitherto fully believed in the existence of saboteurs and wreckers in the sense of the charges established in the famous Ramzin trial. But Lobanov, he added, had convinced him of their actuality and had revealed the type. The same, I think, could be said of Gussev, a fortiori of Sukhoruchkin.

After listening to the evidence of Gussev, Lobanov, Sukhoruchkin and Zorin, I personally am no longer left in any doubt of the reality of the wrecking practices in Russia. One must reject altogether any suggestion that either Lobanov or Sukhoruchkin invented the details of their work in trying to put State property out of commission, or that they were agents-provocateurs. These men are convinced and enthusiastic anti-Sovietists.

Lobanov, a close-shaven, hatchet-faced individual, neatly dressed and wearing pince-nez, gave his evidence with extraordinary cynicism and with a glacial hostility to the Soviet regime which astonished the Court and which clearly was not the outcome of any GPU promptings or persuasions.

Later, in his turn, Sukhoruchkin, also another self-confessed anti-Sovietist, admitted six separate acts of wreckage at the Moscow Power Station, of which he was manager, with as much detachment, as Vyshinsky afterwards observed, as if he were at an academic meeting of professors, describing a number of wonderful scientific achievements.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 181-182

THE STORY OF THE TREASON OF ONE MAN, KONAR, SETS THE STANDARD AND SAYS IT ALL

The story behind these 35 executions [on the previous day 35 Russian officials accused of agricultural sabotage had been condemned to death by shooting by the Collegium of the OGPU; 22 to 10 years and 18 to 16 years imprisonment] was told me by a leading Communist and by some well-informed foreigners in Moscow. It is a dramatic tale of almost unbelievable treachery. The central figure was a person named Konar, lately Vice-Commissar for Agriculture in the Soviet Union, who in that capacity had access to the meetings and minutes of the Council of Commissars when his chief was absent on leave or on business. In 1920, Konar had been expelled from the Party on the ground of his responsibility for the failure of the Soviet Government established in Polish Galicia during the Soviet-Polish war. But he managed to persuade Moscow that there had been a confusion of identities; and in the following year he went to live in Moscow with his brother, who also was a prominent member of the Communist Party.

The flat which he and his brother occupied became the center of the “true blue incorruptibles of the Kremlin policy,” and these men were on excellent terms with the highest officers in the State. Suddenly towards the end of last February, it was discovered that Konar was also on excellent terms with persons in the Polish Intelligence Service; and this discovery led to his arrest and the exposure of a long and successful career in espionage and sabotage.

If Konar had been content with his employment as a Polish spy he might have been alive today; but he rose to such distinction in the councils of the Soviet State that he decided to desert his Polish masters and to become a good Soviet citizen, in the belief that he would soon rise to very high office. Unfortunately, when information ceased to pass from him through the usual channels to the Polish Intelligence Service, an emissary was sent to Konar to ask the reason for this scandalous negligence. The angry conversation between Konar and the emissary from abroad was overheard and thus his secret was betrayed.

The GPU made an exhaustive investigation. They found that not only had this man been acting as a spy for 13 years but that with his associates he had struck at the most vital point in the Soviet programme by diminishing the food supplies and driving the peasants to ruin and hostility by deliberate mismanagement and sabotage of the grain collections.

I believe it was established that he had actually gained credit as a zealous administrator by shooting peasants whom he accused of having destroyed grain crops which in fact had been burnt upon his own secret orders.

In his position as Vice-Commissar for Agriculture he had control of hundreds of large tractors in Southern Russia; and one of his most successful methods of sabotage was to arrange for the oil taps of these tractors to be loosened on the night before the machines were to be worked, so that after they had been in service for an hour or two they “seized up” and were rendered useless.

The story goes that he was summoned by the GPU guards, but tried to bluster them away by threatening to ring up the Kremlin at once. When the guards showed him Stalin’s signature on the warrant, he buried his head in his hands and confessed everything.

This is in brief the true, if nightmare, story of an episode which has never appeared in the Press, except sketchily in the New York Times, to justify the executions admitted by the Soviets….

I asked a high Soviet official why his government had not the “nous” to publish a short statement setting forth the facts as soon as the British White Paper appeared. He merely shrugged his shoulders. I suppose the gesture meant that such a statement, even if it had appeared in the British Press, would have found no credence in a capitalist country riding on the crest of an anti-Bolshevik tidal wave.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 183-186

LOBANOV ADMITS NORDWALL RECRUITED HIM FOR EXTENSIVE WRECKING

At the witness stand Lobanov was the picture of complete self-possession and answered Vyshinsky’s questions, in fact all questions, with distant calm. He explained to the Court that his anti-Soviet sentiments were due very largely to the capitalist associations of his family.

His father had a flour mill and an oil refinery, and his brother had also rented a a flour mill. After he was appointed manager of the electrical operating department of the Ivanovo Power Station towards the end of 1930, he became acquainted with Nordwall.

“One fine morning,” he said with something very like a yawn, “some time in February 1931, in my office, Nordwall, after a conversation on general topics, approached me with a proposal to carry on acts of wrecking at Ivanovo.

VYSHINSKY: Why did he make that proposal to you?

LOBANOV: He knew perfectly well by anti-Soviet sentiments.

VYSHINSKY: How did they express themselves?

LOBANOV: In utterances of dissatisfaction with the existing order, in all kinds of complaints of hardships in my personal life.

“After many talks of this kind,” went on Lobanov, “Nordwall said, ‘if you desire personal well-being, then let us pass from words to deeds.’ That is just the way he said it. He told me it was necessary to hit at trifles so as not to get caught, but that these trifles should be such as to bring about heavy consequences. He pointed out that as a rule it was necessary to hit at the important equipment in order to pump out the foreign currency reserves of the Soviet Union and in this way to undermine its economic strength. It was necessary also, he said, to spread out these acts of diversion, to damage the equipment of Metro-Vickers as well as that of other firms, but that this should be done in such a way as to make it impossible to lay the blame on the firm.”

Asked to define the concrete acts of wrecking which took place, Lobanov said it consisted of putting the motors of 10 grates out of service, disconnecting the house feeders, damaging the bearings of the feed pumps, clogging the bearings, causing short circuits, and burning out the motor of boiler No. 5.

But Lobanov had forgotten one thing. Vyshinsky asked him about the telephone connections.

LOBANOV: Ah! That’s right, we interfered with the telephone connections. So it was.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 186-187

SUKHORUCHKIN DESCRIBES WHAT HE DID AS A WRECKER WORKING WITH THORNTON

Sukhoruchkin, whom I previously mentioned as a wrecker of the first class, was the central figure at the witness stand when the Court reassembled. He is a man of great ability, of high academic distinctions and up to the time of his arrest was chief of the operating department at the First Moscow Power Station, a very responsible position. All his evidence was more like a scientific lecture than the confessions of a man charged with offenses for which death was the maximum penalty.

Many of the technical descriptions and terms he used were clearly outside Vyshinsky’s fairly comprehensive understanding; but he left no doubt in the minds of anybody as to the extensive nature of the six wrecking acts which he described with so much particularity.

One of his plans for putting out of order a section of the Power Station would have cut off the current, he said, to several important factories and barracks, to all the radio stations, and to the Kremlin itself. He drew up this plan in conjunction with Thornton, who remarked to him in the switch-board-room how easy the switchboard made it for an act of diversion to be carried out.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 193-194

KRASHENINNIKOV ADMITS HE ENGAGED IN WRECKING WHICH WAS TREASON

KRASHENINNIKOV: I began to conceal defects in the equipment. It all began from that moment.

VYSHINSKY: And how did it end?

KRASHENINNIKOV: It ended in my finding myself in the dock….

Krasheninnikov said his anti-Soviet feelings were modified somewhat when the Government sent him to a rest home. But he didn’t stop wrecking….

KRASHENINNIKOV: Yes, I realized this. Such activity as mine should be considered as–

VYSHINSKY: Treason?

KRASHENINNIKOV: Treason.

VYSHINSKY: Which according to our laws is punished; you know how treason is punished by our law.

KRASHENINNIKOV (in a whisper): Yes, I know.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 195-198

ENGINEER ZORIN ADMITS HE ENGAGED IN SABOTAGE AND SCHEMING WITH THORNTON

The dismal tale of sabotage was continued by Zorin, senior engineer at Mosenergo and a lecturer and writer on technical engineering questions. His evidence was full of the now familiar talk of wrecking groups, to one of which he belonged.

ROGINSKY: “Who told you about this group?”

ZORIN: Engineer Thornton.

ROGINSKY: When did he tell you?

ZORIN: In November 1932.

ROGINSKY: Where did the talk take place?

ZORIN: In the offices of the firm…. From our previous conversations Thornton had gathered that as an anti-Sovietist I was a person whom it was easy to use and this is what happened in November 1932.

“I was to conceal the defects of the firm and cover-up the actions of the groups he had organized,” stated Zorin.

ROGINSKY: Also to keep contact with the groups he had organized and to be a link between him and them?

ZORIN: Yes.

Answering Thornton’s counsel, Zorin said money as well as his counter-revolutionary convictions played a part and his activities. But quite apart from Thornton he would have committed acts of wreckage.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 199

OLEINIK ADMITS ENGAGING IN MILITARY WRECKING & ESPIONAGE FOR THORNTON & MONKHOUSE

ROGINSKY: What wrecking work did you do?

OLEINIK: Concealing defects in the equipment, collecting information, and engineering breakdowns.

ROGINSKY: With whom in the office were you directly connected in this work?

OLEINIK: After Thornton was appointed chief installation engineer, I dealt only with him.

ROGINSKY: And before in 1929?

OLEINIK: With Monkhouse.

Both Monkhouse and Thornton, he said, instructed him to conceal all defects. The only instructions he received from Monkhouse were not to run the tests but to persuade the customers to delay the testing of the turbines, which could not stand the guaranteed steam pressure.

ROGINSKY: But what instructions did you receive from Thornton?

OLEINIK: All kinds of instructions. I had to gather information on the technical conditions of electric power stations, enlargements of stations and works, proposed orders, the sentiments of the masses, and the movement of troops and munitions.

ROGINSKY: You accepted the task?

OLEINIK: Yes.

ROGINSKY: Did you take any steps to carry it out?

OLEINIK: I partly carried it out….

VYSHINSKY: Did Thornton tell you to obtain information on the military work in the factories near Perm when you were sent there, or not?

OLEINIK: He not only gave instructions, but he came there himself.

VYSHINSKY (to Thornton): Were you there?

THORNTON: I was.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 202-204

KUTUZOVA SAYS SHE HEARD THORNTON & MONKHOUSE PLAN WRECKING & DIVERSION ACTS

She [Kutuzova] corroborated briefly what she had said before in the course of her interventions; that she was aware of the bribing of the Russian engineers and technicians for spying purposes. She knew, she said, that this work and the “wrecking activities and acts of diversion” were organized by Monkhouse and Thornton, because she had lived in one house with them for about four years. Her business was to transmit the money.

Though an involuntary accomplice she did not know how to put a stop to these things, because she was tied to Monkhouse and Thornton “organizationally.” “Secondly,” she said, “I had given my word and when I have given my word I keep it.” The money spent on this work was entered by Thornton in special books, which he took away with him to England in December 1932.

Thornton standing up in his seat and looking earnestly at Kutuzova at the witness stand, challenged her to cite details of the wrecking work about which he was alleged to have given instructions.

Kutuzova, looking steadfastly not in the direction of her friend and superior, but at the presiding judge, said, “I cannot give details, but I heard general conversations.”

THORNTON: Perhaps you will tell us which?

KUTUZOVA: I heard you, together with engineer Monkhouse, plan to damage the turbines at the Baku, Nizhny, and Zuevka Power Stations. I remember your explaining to me that if one throws a foreign object into a turbine–a rag, or a piece of wood–the turbine might blow through the roof.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 215-216

THORNTON & KOTLYAREVSKY ADMIT RUINING A GENERATOR WITH A BOLT

ROGINSKY (to Thornton): Was a bolt put into the generator at the Zuevka Power Station, or not?

THORNTON: Yes, but not into the turbine.

ROGINSKY (to Kotlyarevsky): Was it left there deliberately?

KOTLYAREVSKY: Yes.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 217

VYSHINSKY NOTES THAT THORNTON NEVER REJECTED HIS ORIGINAL TESTIMONY

All these questions led up to the Prosecutor’s comment that not on one of these dates, nor when he was subsequently examined for March 14 to April 1, had Thornton annulled his vital record of March 13.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 220

THORNTON REPEATEDLY SAYS HE WAS NOT PRESSURED OR TORTURED

VYSHINSKY: Here at this court when I examined you during the first days of the trial, did you declare that this record was written under pressure? Answer my question.

THORNTON: No, I didn’t.

VYSHINSKY: I put three questions to you: Was pressure brought to bear on you? You answered “No.”

THORNTON: I answered “No.”

VYSHINSKY: I asked you, Were you tortured? You answered “No.”

THORNTON: That is so.

VYSHINSKY: I asked you, Were you subjected to the third-degree? What did you answer?

THORNTON: “No.”

VYSHINSKY: And now what do you say?

THORNTON: I understood it to mean, was I tortured physically.

VYSHINSKY: Physical or moral torture is torture. I asked you who of the Englishmen in Moscow has taught you not to tell the truth?

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 221

WHEN ALL THE EVIDENCE IS CONSIDERED IT SHOWS THE ENGLISHMEN WERE CLEARLY GUILTY

And one must repeat that the evidence of Russians who admitted their guilt and implicated the six Englishmen would have been subjected in an English court to a far more penetrating scrutiny by counsel for the defense.

But when the large body of testimony is examined separately and as a whole; when the allegations and counter-allegations, the denials, the denunciations, the explanations, the full confessions, the partial admissions, and the documents are carefully sifted and looked at in their true relation to one another–I wonder how many people would accept as a final assessment Monkhouse’s statement in Court that the case was a “frame-up,” built solely on the evidence of terrorised prisoners. That was the attitude which the British government,… adopted from the beginning and from which it could not afterwards withdraw without losing face.

Yet, to most of us who were not utterly blinded by national prejudice, the frame-up theory as the trial proceeded looked more and more like a piece of hypocritical nonsense; and the futile attempts of The Times to discredit the hearing of the case by placing the word “trial” daily within inverted commas seemed a piece of childish stupidity that could not deceive for any length of time even the most devoted readers of that impartial organ of national opinion.

I look forward with a certain curiosity to the moment when some future editor of The Times, in making an historical allusion to the trial at Moscow of the Russian engineers and the Metro-Vickers employees, will tacitly acknowledge that it was something more than a theatrical farce by printing the sacred word without its setting of inverted commas.

I have thought it well to publish these numerous extracts of the actual evidence, not only because I think they are extremely interesting in themselves in showing the interplay between the various figures at the trial, but also because they are a corrective to the highly colored and necessarily imperfect accounts which were received in this country at the time of the trial.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 225-226

THERE WAS NO BULLYING OF DEFENDANTS AND THEY WERE SHOWN COURTESIES IN COURT

Though Thornton was severely questioned and had to bear the chief burden of the case, there was no bullying of the witnesses, they were not pressed beyond a reasonable point, and the presiding judge showed them little attentions such as allowing the crippled McDonald to be seated at the witness stand while other persons were being questioned. One should bear in mind these points in reflecting that outside Russia in some sections of the Press the trial scenes were represented as something very much like a lunatic bear-garden.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 227

VYSHINSKY ATTACKS THORNTON FOR NOT SHOWING HOW HE WAS BROWBEATEN & TRICKED

I recall an illustration at the close of Thornton’s evidence. Thornton, speaking in English, had complained that he was tired and browbeaten, and that, when told that “everything would be all right,” if he confessed, had then signed the document implicating himself and others. Upon that statement Vyshinsky became red in the face with indignation, and working his right arm up and down like a steam hammer and for the first and only time pitching his voice high, demanded to know in a torrent of words why Thornton had failed to use the numerous opportunities available before the trial to challenge a statement written in his own words, signed by his own hand, as he had admitted in Court, without any exercise of methods known as the third-degree.

Thornton, said Vyshinsky did not like the document in which he revealed his network of spies guided by the British Intelligence Service through its agent, Richards, who occupied the position of managing director in Metro-Vickers. He tried to discredit what he had written by talking about “moral pressure.” “But why, Thornton,” asks Vyshinsky with growing intensity of expression, “did you not tell in detail what this moral pressure was? How was that moral pressure brought to bear upon you? You said ‘I was told that if I gave correct information it would be all right.’ I will not hesitate to say the same thing now in this hall, in the hearing of the whole world; it will be better if you give correct information than if you say what is untrue. You said, ‘I was told that if I gave other information I should be useless both to England and in the USSR.'” Then, gazing with a penetrating glance at the unhappy Thornton, who sat with his head resting wearily on his right hand, Vyshinsky delivered himself of the celebrated passage which, with slight verbal variations, has since appeared in every important newspaper in the civilized world.

“Citizen Thornton,” he exclaimed, “you are already useless both here and there, because as a spy you have proved your utter bankruptcy, because 24 hours after your arrest you betrayed your agents and did it because you are a coward and a traitor by nature, so that even your own British spying organization can no longer trust you.

“You have fulfilled your duty neither to our country, because you betrayed your trust, nor to the institution which had confided its secrets to you. You say your deposition of March 13 contains an untruth. Let us suppose it does. But have you considered that when you wrote what you did on March 13 you were playing with the heads of your own comrades?

“Let it remain on your conscience. So far as this country is concerned your only use would be to manure the soil of our Soviet fields.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 233-234

QUESTIONING WAS SPEEDED UP FOR THE BRITISH BUT NOT FOR THE RUSSIAN DEFENDANTS

Replying to what he described as Monkhouse’s unsuccessful attempt, at the instigation of others, to “discredit our preliminary investigation” by complaining about long hours of questioning, Vyshinsky argued that the British government could not have it both ways, and that in order to meet the urgently expressed desire of the British Embassy the Soviet authorities had worked at high pressure to speed up the proceedings. Under normal conditions examination of Nordwall and Monkhouse would have taken several weeks. It was in fact accomplished in three days.

No such opportunities awaited the counsel defending the accused Russians. All they could do for those who had admitted their guilt was to plead for mercy and to talk of their remorse and their anxiety to work in the future as true citizens for the glory of the Soviet Union. In the case of Gussev and others it was urged, in mitigation, that they had found it impossible to escape the clutches of “these English gentlemen.”

“Simple trustful old Zivert,” said lawyer Pines, with a tear in his voice too, did not even suspect “that the principal subject he was being taught in the study where Thornton helped him in his technical difficulties was the theory and practice of espionage and wrecking.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Gollancz, 1933, p. 245-246

MACDONALD’S LAWYER SAYS HE WAS TAKEN IN BY GUSSEV

Lawyer Smirnov, counsel for McDonald, made an earnest appeal for the only Englishman who had pleaded guilty to be given another chance to “go honest.” McDonald, he said, had been led astray by Gussev and was a tool of his bosses and should not be put on the same level as Thornton and Monkhouse.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 247

LAWYERS FOR THE DEFENSE GAVE A GOOD, STRONG DEFENSE WITH ZEAL AND EFFICIENCY

All the members of the “Collegium of Defense” discharged their duties with much greater zeal and efficiency than I had been led to suppose possible. I had been told that they would not dare to make a serious attempt to tear down the fabric of evidence or even to make a strong show of opposition. It was breathed into my ear that any counsel who, in the enthusiasm of the moment, allowed his zeal to outrun his discretion might soon disappear from the Collegium of Defense and perhaps be arrested on some pretext and shot.

If the whisper had a few grains of truth in it–and I rather think it had no more–then some of the defending counsel, especially Lidov, ran considerable risk. I do not pretend that those acting for the five men who pleaded not guilty gave a first-class exhibition of aggressive court advocacy.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 249

RUSSIANS WHO PLED GUILTY ASKED FOR MERCY AND PROMISED LOYALTY

One after another in a melancholy procession the Russians who had pleaded guilty came from the dock to the witness stand before the judges to ask for merciful consideration and pledge their loyalty in the future to the Soviet state.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 252

MONKHOUSE & NORDWALL SAID THEY WERE TREATED FAIRLY AND CONSIDERATELY IN PRISON

He [Monkhouse] admitted that he had been shown consideration in prison.

… Nordwall, in protesting his innocence, expressed appreciation of the fairness with which he had been treated in prison by the OGPU and said he was still a friend of the Soviet Union.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 254

US BUSINESSMEN SAID REPEATEDLY THEY KNEW THE BRITISH USED SPIES

… The remark made to me by an American businessmen, and repeated to me in different forms many times by foreign diplomats and others, was: “Are you surprised that we are all laughing at your Government’s attempt to make us believe that it was a sheer impossibility for Englishmen to play the part of spies in Soviet Russia or elsewhere? We know perfectly well that your Government employs spies wherever it can, as other governments employ them, and that, like other Governments, it must employ them in Russia if it employs them anywhere at all. The Metro-Vickers men may be as blameless as new-born babes; but don’t ask me to pretend that there exists a single foreign firm which does business in Russia without transmitting secret information to its own Government.”

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 257

DELIBERATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN JUDGES WAS SECRET AND USED STRICT GUIDELINES

Over a tumbler of tea a Russian lawyer, who was acting as interpreter for a French newspaper correspondent, explained to me the subsequent judicial procedure as required by Soviet law. While the judges were considering their verdict, he said, they were not allowed even a momentary contact with any other person. No official, shorthand writer, typist, not even a waiter with refreshments, was permitted inside the deliberating chamber; even if their discussions lasted 24 hours they must remain in complete isolation. The judgment must be set down by the President in his own handwriting and signed by himself and at least one of his colleagues. If only one signature was appended, or if there was the smallest infringement of the imposed conditions, the judgment would be invalid

“Would there be a retrial?” I asked in genuine alarm at that ghastly prospect. The Russian lawyer did not seem to know; but the suggestion struck him with so much dismay that he ordered at once three more tumblerfuls of tea.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 257

THE LENIENCY OF THE SENTENCES SHOCKED THE SPECTATORS AND THE PRISONERS

The mildness of the sentences comes as a genuine surprise to all the spectators; and, judging by their strikingly evident expressions of relief, to the prisoners as well.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 262

STRANG VISITED THE PRISONERS, FOUND THEM IN COMFORTABLE QUARTERS & LOOKING WELL

… And still they remained in prison, visited now and again by the watchful Mr. Strang, who found that they were in relatively comfortable quarters, looked well and had no complaints to make about the treatment they were receiving.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 265

BRITISH THOUGHT DEFENDANTS WOULD BE SHOT BUT NO RECORD OF FOREIGNERS BEING SHOT

After the arrests the British public had been induced to believe that the accused men might be “shot without trial,” though, so far as I am aware, there is no instance on record of the shooting in Russia of foreign experts, with or without trial. [Said in early 1933]

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 267

RETALIATION OF THE BRITISH GOVT FOR THE VICKERS TRIAL WAS STUPID AND EXCESSIVE

These are the realities. Instead of facing them and considering them for the good of its own people in a spirit of cool common sense, the [British] Government of the day has declared economic war to the knife upon one of its greatest potential customers because a few Englishmen were judged to be spies and “wreckers” in a properly constituted Court of Justice and mildly punished. That action by a British Government was, in my judgment, a masterpiece of iimbecility unparalleled in the political annals of our time.

Cummings, Arthur. The Moscow Trial (Metro-Vickers). London: Victor Gollancz, 1933, p. 287

HISTORY OF THE LENIENT SENTENCES OF THE TRIALS OF THE 20’S AND EARLY 30’S.

I went over the various precedents in my mind. The great trials of the Revolution had never ended in executions. The one in which the Socialist Revolutionary Party had been involved in 1922 had produced a conditional death sentence at most, although the accused had made civil war against the State and fired on Lenin. The trial of the Shakhty engineers, accused of sabotage, had, it is true, sent a few men to their deaths, but only when they had been found guilty of espionage. The prisoners in the Ramzin affair [the Industrial Party trial], who had pleaded guilty of plotting with the French General Staff to bring about armed intervention in Russia, had been pardoned and were now reinstated. The Social Democrats who had figured in the next big case, and on similar charges, had gotten off with long terms of imprisonment. The Thornton trial [Metro-Vickers trial] in 1933– a suspicious business (I had been in court at the time)–produced a crop of very mild punishments.

Barmine, Alexandre. Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat. London: L. Dickson limited,1938, p. 315

… In March 1931 a number of ex-Menshevik leaders were publicly tried and sentenced to prison for ‘wrecking’ and being counter-revolutionaries. By mid-1931, however, the degree of non-cooperation and active sabotage by the technical intelligentsia had lessened considerably, and, in response, the state’s attitude was relaxed, insofar as the number of those arrested and tried for such activities decreased after spring 1931, while those convicted now received more lenient sentences.

Szymanski, Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 226

The standard sentence for most of those arrested for counter-revolutionary activities in the 1936-38 period, however, was 5 to 10 years hard labor.

Szymanski, Albert. Human Rights in the Soviet Union. London: Zed Books, 1984, p. 242

[At the closed joint meeting of the ECCI party organization and the ECCI Komsomol organization on 28 December 1934]

MAGYAR [Member of the Hungarian Communist Party who supported the New Opposition in 1925]:

Kotelnikov is not quite correct when he says that I returned to the party. I was not expelled from the party; the party was extremely lenient toward me. I received an extremely mild party reprimand for my active participation in the Zinovievite, anti-Soviet, anti-party counterrevolutionary group.”

Chase, William J., Enemies Within the Gates?, translated by Vadim A. Staklo, New Haven: Yale University Press, c2001, p. 64

NOT JUST RUSSIANS CONFESSED AT THE TRIALS

The idea that only Russians confessed in such circumstances is quite erroneous–the British engineers in the Metro Vickers trial long ago proved that.

Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 165

SENTENCES IN THE SOCIAL-REVOLUTIONARY/MENSHEVIK TRIAL OF 1922 ARE LENIENT

The verdict [of the SR and Menshevik trial], announced on August 7, 1922, came as no surprise, since Lenin had broadly hinted at what to expect…. Walter Duranty reported to the New York Times on July 23 that the proceedings had demonstrated the “truth” of the charges, that the condemnation of the majority of the defendants was “certain,” and that “several death sentences will be carried out.” The accused were sentenced under articles 57 through 60 of the Criminal Code. Fourteen were condemned to death, but three who had collaborated with the prosecution received pardons. Defendants who had turned state’s evidence were also pardoned. Those in the first group admitted to nothing: they refused to stand up when the judges entered to announce the verdict, for which they were expelled (in the words of Duranty) “from their own funeral.”

…and although the SRs refused to petition for pardon, the judges announced a stay of execution.

Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1993, p. 408

SEVERAL EARLY SABOTAGE TRIALS LISTED

The Shakti trial of wreckers in 1928 was the forerunner of events which soon followed one another in rapid sequence. Who were the wreckers? They were counter-revolutionaries intent on fomenting revolt by creating an impression of “Bolshevik inefficiency” through the derailment of train’s and the blowing up of factories. In 1930 a group of professional engineers known as “The Industrial Party” were put on trial for sabotage of industrial construction. 1931 was noticeable for the Trial of the Mensheviks on charges of counter-revolutionary activity. In 1933 came the famous trial of the Metro — Vickers engineers who had become involved in conspiracies to impede construction.

Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 162

KIROV ’S KILLING CHANGED ALL

The assassination of Kirov in early December, 1934 fell like a bomb into this dream of security.

Strong, Anna L. The Soviets Expected It. New York, New York: The Dial press, 1941, p. 128

The murder of Kirov at Leningrad in December 1934 was a turning point in Soviet history, if not in the history of Europe and the world.

Duranty, Walter. The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 21

Kirov had been Stalin’s man from the start, and Stalin had made him party chief in Leningrad to counteract the influence of the opposition leaders….

Duranty, Walter. The Kremlin and the People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 25

KIROV’S KILLING WAS FIRST SINCE 1918

Kirov’s assassination by Nikolaev was the first murder of a leading member of the party in Soviet Russia since Uritsky had been killed in 1918.

Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 162

PRIOR TO KIROV KILLING THERE WAS NO CRACKDOWN

Prior to this tragic finale [the decision of the Opposition to use terror and sabotage], Stalin and his colleagues displayed no blood thirsty passion to exterminate opponents, but on the contrary, acted with remarkable patience and toleration in an effort to conciliate and reconvert the dissenters.

Schuman, Frederick L. Soviet Politics. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1946, p. 198

POLITBURO CHOSE KIROV AS STALIN’S SUCCESSOR

Kirov, one of Stalin’s closest collaborators, was regarded at the time as his probable successor. After the last of the old Bolsheviks, Rykov and Bukharin, had been thrown overboard by the Politburo, the party leaders decided that steps ought to be taken without delay to make sure that in the event of Stalin’s sudden death there should be no doubt as to who should succeed him. There must not be another struggle for power as after Lenin’s death. The members of the Politburo and the most influential secretaries of provincial party organizations accordingly agreed upon the choice of Kirov.

This assassination [of Kirov] was thus a heavy blow for Stalin and the party leadership…. Nothing had so affected Stalin as this news since the death of his wife….

Stalin was no friend of Yagoda, and did not trust the secret police; and he broke into one of his most fearful outbursts of rage [over the killing of Kirov].

Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 284

LENINGRAD SECRET POLICE PROSECUTED FOR NEGLECT

The responsible leaders of the Leningrad secret police were, of course, dismissed and prosecuted for neglect of their duties; they were sentenced to three years imprisonment.

Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 286

Finally, several high officers of the Leningrad GPU were charged with “neglect of duty” and sentenced, with surprisingmildness, to two or three years.

Deutscher, Isaac. The Prophet Outcast. London, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963, p. 279

The trial of the chiefs of the Leningrad section of the People’s Commissariat for Home Affairs took place in even greater secrecy. It was held, however, in a different atmosphere. The charges were more mildly formulated. The accused admitted their guilt, but blamed it on the orders that had been issued by Kirov. The sentences were astonishingly mild, especially when it is recalled how severely mere negligence in the guarding of the persons of our “leaders” is usually punished. Balzevich, who was responsible for the guard service at Smolny, was charged only with “criminal negligence” in the exercise of his official duties, and sentenced to 10 years in a concentration camp. The chiefs of the Leningrad section of the Commissariat for Home Affairs and their deputies received only two or three-year sentences, and were, at the same time, given responsible posts in the administration of the concentration camp to which they were sent. Actually, therefore, the punishment meant nothing more than a reduction in rank.

Nicolaevsky, Boris. 