The idea of the white man’s burden was the idea that it was the duty of the White Man to bring civilization and Western values to the non-White peoples of the world. Writing at a time when colonialism was coming to an end and the idea of a white man’s burden was more likely to draw jeers instead of admiration, the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal in his monumental work Asian Drama, took pains to emphasize that he was not some know-it-all Westerner trying to foist Western solutions on the people of South Asia, but rather he was interested in looking at the problems of South Asia from the point of view of the interests, ideals, norms and aspirations of the people of South Asia themselves.

As it turns out, the people of South Asia were already developing a taste not only for Western habits but also for Western-Enlightenment ideas such as the commitment to social and economic progress. Encouraged by this, Myrdal proceeded to develop a list of 12 ideals that he saw as underlying the modernization push in South Asia.

For convenience, I have shortened this list to include what I consider to be the most essential of Myrdal’s modernization ideals:

Rationality. This involves the application of modern technology in order to increase productivity but it also extends to broader economic and social issues. Policies should be founded on rational considerations. Superstitious beliefs and illogical reasoning should be eradicated. Rise of Levels of Living. This is to be achieved by greater capital accumulation and higher productivity and the inculcation of attitudes and beliefs which are favourable to rising productivity. Improved Institutions and Attitudes. Under this ideal, it is held that social and economic institutions and attitudes should be changed in order to increase labour efficiency and promote competition, mobility and entrepreneurship. Such changes in turn call for nothing less than the creation of a “new man” who embodies qualities of efficiency, diligence, punctuality, orderliness, integrity, self-reliance, and so on, qualities which presumably were not currently in abundant supply! National Consolidation. In essence, national consolidation means a national system of government, courts, and administration that is effective, cohesive, and internally united in purpose and action.

If one studies the modernization ideals listed above, one cannot fail to notice the similarity between them and the ideals professed by African governments. In practice, however, while the quest for modernization in Africa has lent Africa the outward appearance of modernity (e.g., hospitals, highways, shopping malls, etc.), it seems to have yielded only a skin-deep kind of modernity.

The Cargo Cult Mentality

Many years ago I read an article in a now-defunct magazine called South. The article, titled Decolonising the Economy (South, May 1983, p. 45-48), still happens to be one of my all-time favourite essays! In this essay, Chinweizu, a noted Nigerian thinker and social critic, attributed the lack of genuine modernization in the Third World, and particularly in Africa, to a cargo-cult mentality.

Cargo cults are millenarian cults that arose amongst the native peoples of the Melanesian islands during World War II. The native peoples couldn’t help noticing that despite their hard work they remained poor whereas the European and American soldiers stationed on their islands, who seemed to do no work at all, seemed to have an endless supply of material wealth or “cargo”. So, putting two and two together, the belief arose amongst the islanders that if the proper ceremonies were performed shipments of cargo would be sent to them by the gods on aeroplanes and ships.

As part of these ceremonies elaborate mockups of aeroplanes, military-style landing strips, docks and immense warehouses were built using twigs and branches. Devotees would then perform rituals involving military parades all in an effort to induce the gods to send the cargo. Eventually, the failure of the cargo to arrive would be blamed on the malice of the Europeans, who, it was held, had intercepted the cargo and diverted it elsewhere. More recent cargo cults await the return of John Frum (believed to be a corruption of John from America), a saviour-god figure who will bring wealth and prosperity to his followers.

The elites of the Third World may laugh at the bizarreness of the cargo cults, Chinweizu notes, but what has so far passed for development efforts in the Third World bears much resemblance to cargo cult ritualism. The Third World elites may understand that the manufactured goods that they crave come from factories but they still display confusion about the fundamentals of industrial culture and about how to organise an industrial economy. In present-day analogues of cargo cults, writes Chinweizu, the great and expected cargo ship, the bringer of consumer goods, is a mysterious process called development. The industrial countries of the rich North are the gods and the magico-religious rites are those of development planning, infrastructure building and foreign investment.

When the first spurt of national infrastructure building failed to bring about the desired bounty, additional rituals were invented. North-South dialogue was started to persuade the spirits of development to bring aid, to transfer technology, and to grant better terms of trade. When this ritual also failed, Third World spokesmen resorted to blaming the West for holding up Third World development. Like the cargo cultists, they accused “selfish” westerners of blocking aid to the Third World and putting up protectionist barriers against their exports.

The Will to Development and the Failure of Leadership in Africa



The failure of Melanesian cargo cults and Third World development, according to Chinweizu, arises from a superficial understanding of industrial culture. Both groups have grasped some of the forms of industrial culture, but not its essence. But whereas the failure of the cargo cults is perfectly understandable given their unfamiliarity with modern industry, the failure of the Third World elites is not.

One of the ways in which Third World’s failed cargo cultism manifests itself is in the perpetuation of a consumerist model of development. As Chinweizu describes it, the consumerist model of development is characterised by the development of a consumer culture without the prior development of the industrial culture which could produce the goods desired. As a result, most of what is consumed in the Third World is imported. Cargo cult consumerism gives the appearance of development by providing some of its fruits while sparing the population the rigours of genuine development. All it requires of a nation is that its leaders secure the funds to pay for sufficient imports to satisfy the population’s hunger for consumer goods. Hence the desperate need for foreign exchange which preferably is to be obtained from aid, from payments for exports of primary commodities and from loans, anything that does not require the leaders to undertake fundamental social reorganisation. This sort of “development” naturally suits a West which is interested in markets and raw materials, but not in the emergence of competing productive capacity or the proliferation of industrial powers.

Circumstances have however arisen which now threaten the consumerist model. With exploding populations and the rising demand for consumer goods, Third World elites have had to import more and more and have come to need much more foreign exchange. They have therefore sought more aid, more loans, and higher prices for their exports in order to raise more foreign cash. This has pitted them against their allies in the West who do not want to pay more for raw materials, or give more aid, or grant loans to risky customers who already have enormous debts. This provides an opportunity for Third World leaders to shift the blame for chronic poverty to the North. The general intransigence of the North, its curtailment of aid, its refusal to publicly admit to past exploitation and its refusal to discuss reparations for that exploitation, all this can be used to the advantage of Third World leaders who can claim that they are “fighting hard for the welfare of their people. But it is the wicked, greedy and shameless West which denies them the means to development.”

But the true causes of chronic Third World poverty are rather different from what those claiming to champion the interests of the poor would have us believe. While there’s little denying that the plunder of the Third World by the West is one of the factors responsible for Third World poverty and Western prosperity, the primary obstacle to development is the Third World elites’ lack of a “will to development”. The paramount desire of Third World elites is not development but the perpetuation of their rule with minimum disruption to their enjoyment of the spoils of power. These leaders have no stomach for the challenges and risks of development and would rather demand the fruits of development but avoid the costs of fashioning a new industrial culture with all the painful changes and upheavals that go with such a process. Chinweizu likens this to wanting to go to heaven but not wanting to die!

The consumerist model of development, however, is destined to fail. The enterprise of development is one of sacrifice, innovation, and hard work, not of waiting for miracles or heavenly cargoes. Development, Chinweizu declares, will depend on the will to development and on strategies which acknowledge that the North cannot be expected to voluntarily sacrifice its interests for the benefit of the South.

Some things have changed since Chinweizu wrote his essay a little over three decades ago. For instance, we rarely use terms like Third World, North and South nowadays, and a few of the countries that would have been labelled as Third World in the 1980’s are fast gaining on the rich countries of the West. However, as far as Africa is concerned, many of the problems Chinweizu decried in his essay are still very much in evidence (e.g., appallingly bad leadership, though not in all cases, high indebtedness, over-dependence on exports of primary commodities, etc), and so for the most part his critique of the development process in Africa remains relevant.

In Defence of the Nation State

Like Myrdal, Chinweizu has composed a list of characteristics necessary for the creation of an industrial culture. Chinweizu’s list has a lot in common with Myrdal’s list. For example, Chinweizu lists the cultivation of a rationalistic world outlook and the development of a system of effective state institutions as two important characteristics that are necessary for successful industrial transformation.

One of the items I’d like to single out that appears in both lists is the importance of strengthening the nation state. All the modernization ideals mentioned by Myrdal and Chinweizu can only be realized in the setting of a well-defined and stable polity. In Europe, the task of consolidating and strengthening nation states unfolded gradually over several centuries. In the Third World, nation states were created virtually overnight and maintaining and strengthening these newly created states with arbitrarily drawn borders has been a constant challenge ever since.

Part of the emotional appeal of the modernization ideals stems from the expectation that as they begin to be realized the nation state will become stronger, more united and better consolidated. Nationalism has therefore been seen as a force for good by supporters of modernization. To them, fostering nationalism will provide the means of breaking down inhibitions and obstacles to modernization and modernization in turn will lead to a stronger nation state so that the process becomes self-reinforcing. While such a nationalistic outlook may not be so fashionable in our increasingly borderless world, there are good practical reasons why we still need the nation state and why the goal of consolidating and strengthening the nation state is still a goal worth striving for. This message should have particular resonance in Africa where nation states are fragile and where there is much need for measures that can increase stability and cohesion.

But even as we defend the nation state, let us remember the words of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere: “African nationalism is meaningless, dangerous, anachronistic, if it is not, at the same time, pan-Africanism”.

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