It is easy to get side-tracked by Hannibal’s campaign in Italy – the extraordinary battles at Trebbia, Trasimene and Cannae testifying to his military genius. But confronting the sheer might of Rome alone was impossible.

His brother Mago had already returned to Carthage to appeal the senate for reinforcements. But what of the middle Barca boy – Hasdrubal – who has been somewhat overlooked in the shadow of Hannibal’s achievements? This is his story.

Hasdrubal takes the spotlight

Since 218 BC, Hasdrubal had been based in Qart-adasht, preoccupied with uprisings in the Iberian peninsula. Despite the disaster at Trebbia, Rome’s naval supremacy continued to operate unchallenged. So, in the spring of 217 BC, Rome launched a numerically superior fleet to engage the Carthaginians at the mouth of the Ebro River.

A convincing Roman victory followed, which resulted in numerous Iberian rebellions sparking against Carthaginian rule. Hasdrubal would spend the next two years suppressing these insurrections – no small task. This gave the Romans a chance to gain a foothold in Spain. In command were Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio and his brother Publius, now fully recovered after his wound at the Ticino River.

Hasdrubal had no intentions of remaining confined in Iberia. Following his elder brother’s great victory at Cannae, he had begun his own advance north intending to follow in his brother’s footsteps, quite literally, over the Alps and combine forces with Hannibal. This was something the Scipio brothers could never allow.

Detorsa

Hearing of Hasdrubal’s intentions, the Scipios’ immediately targeted the city of Ibera, a city on the southern side of the Ebro and a Carthaginian ally. Hasdrubal responded to this by marching north; but rather than challenge the brothers in the open field, he diverted their attention by besieging the nearby Roman ally of Dertosa. Sure enough, the Scipio brothers withdrew from Ibera, descending upon Dertosa.

Both armies were evenly matched in terms of numbers. Yet unsurprisingly, it was the Romans who had the stronger infantry; Hasdrubal had the better cavalry, as well as twenty elephants.

Similar to the battle of Cannae, Rome committed her stronger infantry early in the battle. Their skill and numbers soon showed itself against the opposing Iberian infantry in the centre. Swiftly, the superior Roman foot began to push back their Iberian counterparts.

However, this buckle had been part of Hasdrubal’s plan; he was trying to imitate his brother’s execution of the double envelopment manoeuvre at Cannae by placing his weakest infantry in the centre. Meanwhile, on Hasdrubal’s flanks, his more formidable Libyan spearmen managed to repel the remaining Roman infantry. Yet the plan soon faltered.

The failed envelopment

Although victorious, Hasdrubal’s elite Libyans were unable to outflank the bulk of the Roman infantry pushing forward in the centre. Determined to encircle the Romans, Hasdrubal ordered his Numidian cavalry and elephants to crush the Roman cavalry on the wings.

But despite the Carthaginians’ superior cavalry, they were unable to drive the Roman horses from the battlefield. There was to be no glorious repeat of Hannibal’s victory at Cannae for his younger brother.

Just as at Cannae, the Carthaginian centre crumbled. Unlike his brother’s however, Hasdrubal’s forces had failed to outflank the Romans on either side. When the Roman infantry inevitably broke through the Iberian line, the Numidian cavalry fled rather than trap the Roman infantry from the rear. Now, free to manoeuvre, the Roman infantry in the centre turned full circle and routed the Libyans.

The battle demonstrated the dangers of attempting a double-envelopment of the enemy. Hasdrubal’s slight miscalculation – how long his centre could hold – had cost the Carthaginians the battle.

Its result proved devastating for Hannibal and Punic fortunes in the Italian peninsula. Not only did this victory crucially prevent Hasdrubal from crossing the Alps and reinforcing Hannibal in Italy, but it also resulted in the 12, 000 reinforcements the Carthaginian Senate had entrusted to Mago being diverted to Spain instead.

All that the Carthaginian Senate was prepared to send their esteemed general in Italy was 4,000 Numidian horses and forty elephants. Both Hasdrubal, via the Alps, and Mago, via the Mediterranean, had failed in their mission to support their older brother. Hannibal’s dependency on Carthage had cost him dearly.

Brothers fight brothers

By 214 BC, Hannibal’s campaign had lost its impetus; a war of attrition was developing and the same was occurring in Spain. Despite their victory at Dertosa, the Scipio brothers were unable to break out of the north-eastern corner of Spain.

Furthermore, resources and troops were now becoming stretched to their limits: Rome now found itself struggling to cope with channelling the necessary supplies to the Iberian, Italian and Greek theatres of war (in 215 BC, king Philip V of Macedon had started attacking Roman allies in the Eastern Adriatic). Yet this would not stump Roman aggression.

Hoping to bypass this rationing of provisions, the Scipios persuaded Syphax, a Numidian king in North Africa, to declare war against Gala, a Carthaginian ally. With the military training the Scipios’ offered, Syphax soon overwhelmed Gala. This forced Hasdrubal to act, quickly leaving Iberia to come to the aid of Gala and overwhelm Syphax.

The Scipios seized this opportunity, breaking out of north-eastern Spain. Many towns voluntarily sided with Rome in Hasdrubal’s absence. Yet the Barcid’s return to Spain with a larger army and thirty more elephants brought the Roman advance to a halt. They were back to a stalemate.

Celtic aid

By 211 BC the Scipios, having grown increasingly frustrated with their confinement in north-eastern Spain, sought the help of Celtiberian mercenaries – ferocious Celtic warriors that inhabited the Iberian Peninsula. The wisdom of this decision would soon reveal itself.

Word now reached the Scipios that the Carthaginians had divided their armies into three separate forces to once again quash Iberian uprisings: Hasdrubal commanded one force, his younger brother Mago – now a grizzled veteran from Hannibal’s campaign and who had recently arrived with reinforcements from Carthage – commanded another; the final army was led by Hasdrubal Gisco, a prestigious Carthaginian commander. The Scipios saw a great opportunity.

As the Carthaginians had divided their troops into three, the Roman generals split their own forces in two, intending to use their newly-acquired Celtiberian support to wipe out two of the Carthaginian armies in one devastating offensive before all three could combine forces against them. They had a plan.

The Battles of the Upper Baetis

Publius Scipio advanced on Mago near Castulo. Neither Scipio knew however, that Hasdrubal Barca had already sent Iberian chieftains, allies of the Carthaginians, to aid his younger brother. As Publius drew nearer, he realised one of the chieftains was covering his line of retreat. Altering his plans, he thus decided to attack the Iberian force first. The Carthaginians would not remain idle.

As the outnumbered Iberians desperately held their ground against Publius’ army, Punic aid quickly arrived. Deadly Numidian cavalry began to heckle the Romans, giving the two Carthaginian armies under Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco enough time to close the distance. Exhausted and outnumbered Publius Scipio’s troops were sitting targets. A Roman slaughter soon followed.

Meanwhile, Gnaeus Scipio had already begun his attack on Hasdrubal Barca’s camp. To withstand the Roman assault, Hasdrubal bribed the Celtiberian mercenaries to abandon Gnaeus leaving the Romans outnumbered. The Scipios’ decision to put their faith in the Celtiberians had come back to haunt them.

Overwhelmed, Gnaeus retreated towards Ilorca, unaware of his brother’s fate and unprepared for the Numidian scourge that was rapidly closing in on his position. Unable to outrun the swift Numidian horses, Gnaeus made a futile final stand as the three armies of Hasdrubal Barca, Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco enclosed his army. His death came soon after.

Rome in retreat

With the two Scipio brothers dead, only several thousand Romans safely made it back over to the northern side of the Ebro. The very fact these remaining Romans then managed to hold the three Carthaginian armies at bay long enough to allow two legions of reinforcements to arrive was no small military feat. Still, this could not make up for the preceding disaster. The Romans were back to square one.

Yet persistence was a virtue that the Romans had an abundant supply of! The following year they mustered another ten thousand soldiers to reignite the Iberian campaign. In command was none other than the other Publius Cornelius Scipio – the son who had saved his father’s life at the Ticino River. He wanted to avenge his father’s death!

The war in Spain takes the spotlight

In 210 BC, the younger Scipio landed in Spain at the mouth of the Ebro River bolstering the Roman numbers to 30,000. Despite being a mere 26 years old, he had been unanimously chosen as proconsul to lead Rome’s new army in Spain.

Though Hasdrubal Gisco and the two Barca boys had defeated the Scipio brothers, they were still not a cohesive fighting force – suffering from their personal animosities towards one another. Plus, the intensity with which most Iberian tribes defied the harsh, overbearing Carthaginian rule ensured Iberian resistance remained a constant thorn in Hasdrubal’s side; crushing the Roman opposition as well would be no easy task.

Qart-Hadasht

When the younger Scipio arrived, these three Carthaginian armies were thus once again strewn far apart; Hasdrubal Gisco near modern day Lisbon, Mago close to Gibraltar and his brother in central Spain.

Just as his father and uncle had done, Scipio saw the opportunity this division of forces provided. Rather than going after these armies individually however, Scipio went for the head of the snake, advancing south to Qart-Hadasht, the epicentre of Punic power in Iberia.

With all three Carthaginian armies at least 10 days from their Iberian capital, Scipio was confident he could seize the fortress.

Qart-Hadast was located on a peninsula, in the centre of a gulf which was connected to the mainland by an isthmus to the east, not more than a quarter of a mile wide. To the north and west of the peninsula was a swamp (a stagnum), with a calm bay welcoming sailors from the south.

After months secretly planning the siege, Scipio launched his coordinated attack – the Roman fleet bombarding the city from the south while Scipio began his siege from the eastern isthmus. This provided a diversion for Roman troops to wade through the swamp to the north and west, creating a four-pronged assault which Qart-Hadast could not endure.

In one stroke, Scipio had usurped Carthage’s hold on the whole of Spain’s eastern coast. Scipio had achieved what his father could not: he had established a permanent base in Spain south of the Ebro.

The Battle of Baecula: 208 BC

With his opponents geographically scattered and having captured their main base in the Iberian peninsula, Scipio pressed southwards, closing in on Hasdrubal Barca.

Hearing of Scipio’s advance, Hasdrubal occupied a plateau near Baecula which offered protection – a river covered his rear with ravines guarding his flanks.

Scipio’s velites advanced straight towards the enemy line as a hail of missiles slowed their climb up the steep slope. Hasdrubal, relying on his camp’s natural strength, had delayed assembling all his forces, believing Scipio was merely offering a skirmish. His confidence in the natural obstacles Scipio would have to scale had blinded Hasdrubal.

Pincer

Scipio knew that time was against him. He could not afford to delay with pointless skirmishing lest he be surrounded by Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco’s approaching forces.

While the velites engaged the Carthaginian centre, Scipio made his way round to Hasdrubal’s left flank and Gaius Laelius, one of his commanders, encircled the right. Before Hasdrubal could fully deploy his forces, this Roman ‘pincer’ movement had spread panic amongst his troops. The battle was already over.

According to Polybius, Hasdrubal had already persuaded himself that if Fortune chose he should lose the battle, he would no longer hesitate to combine forces with Hannibal in Italy.

Determined therefore to minimise his losses, Hasdrubal withdrew with his heavy infantry and elephants, abandoning his light infantry and Iberian allies to a slaughter. Despite knowing this was Hasdrubal’s goal, Scipio restrained his troops from pursuing the Barcid general – he did not want to fall into the same trap as his father.

Hasdrubal crosses the Alps

Seven years had passed since Hasdrubal’s first attempt to join Hannibal in Italy. In that time he had failed even to reach the Pyrenees. What was more, after his humiliating defeat at Baecula, Hasdrubal had already lost a third of his army before even setting off north. But thanks to his brother’s initial Alpine crossing, the scale of the feat which now stood in front of Hasdrubal was not as daunting.

Hasdrubal had no serious opposition from tribal chieftains, as Hannibal had. In fact, passing through this region only served to reinforce Hasdrubal’s numbers with Gallic allies. Nor was Hasdrubal beset by the challenges of the looming winter. In the late spring of 207 BC, Hasdrubal finally reached Italy.

The forgotten flashpoint

Reuniting with Hannibal had always been the plan – one that was long overdue. However, successfully combining forces would be difficult to pull off in enemy territory. Organising a rendezvous was fraught with danger when communications could easily be intercepted.

Even with the home advantage and with rampant mobilisation, the Romans shied away from major battles with either Barca brothers. Despite a levy of 40,000 Roman troops under the consul, Claudius Nero, the Romans sought merely to contain Hannibal’s numerically inferior forces in southern Italy with a minor engagement at Grumentum.

Meanwhile Hasdrubal was proceeding southwards; the other consul, Marcus Livius was checking Hasdrubal’s advance and allowed him to cross the Metaurus River.

Painful reminders of Cannae were in the back of the consuls’ minds. But as Fabius had drilled into the Romans – patience was a virtue that paid dividends, especially against an adversary like Hannibal. This patience, some might say tentativeness, gifted the Romans with a golden opportunity.

Shortly after action at Grumentum, Carthaginian messengers were intercepted. Hasdrubal’s top secret plans of meeting his brother in Umbria had fallen straight into the lap of Claudius Nero. With breath-taking speed, Claudius Nero marched north through the nights intending to crush Hasdrubal.

Retreat

Claudius’ rapid march caught Hasdrubal completely off-guard. Arriving to camp under the cover of darkness, Claudius managed to deceive Hasdrubal. He only realised Livius’ forces had grown the following day when he drew his formations up for battle, despite the fact the Carthaginian and Roman camps were just a half-mile away from each other.

Though the exact size of Hasdrubal’s forces is unclear, Claudius’ additional 7, 000 troops were enough to deter the Barcid. Likewise, the Romans were unwilling to make the first-move by attempting to storm the Carthaginian camp, suggesting the two armies were evenly matched.

Hasdrubal decided to disengage and retreated towards the Metaurus River at night. Yet this soon turned disastrous.

According to Livy, Hasdrubal’s guides abandoned him which scattered his army in disarray. Indeed, if this was the case the guides could quite easily have led the Carthaginians into a trap. Most likely, the guides did not betray Hasdrubal and the blunder was purely accidental.

As it was, Hasdrubal still managed to reach the river during the night but could not find an adequate crossing to the northern bank.

Exhaustion

Navigating at night, with or without guides, was still a gamble for Hasdrubal. When sunrise came Hasdrubal’s troops were exhausted and on the wrong side of the river. Instead of determinedly seeking out a crossing in the pale morning light, Hasdrubal ordered his troops to set up camp – a costly mistake.

Meanwhile, the Romans awoke at first light to find the trails of the Carthaginians’ hastily abandoned camp. Without hesitation, Claudius Nero’s combined cavalry chased down Hasdrubal with the praetor, Licinus, following close behind with his velites and Marcus Livius with the main chunk of the army on his heels.

Though troops on both sides must have been tired after their marches, the Romans were keen to engage Hasdrubal as soon as possible. Battle was imminent.

The Battle of the Metaurus River: 207 BC

Precisely where Hasdrubal and the consuls’ assembled their battle formations has been lost to us. Still the southern bank of the Metaurus River seems most likely; its uneven terrain favoured the Romans who had grown accustomed to the guerrilla warfare against Hannibal in southern Italy.

Nero took the right wing; Marcus Livius held the left with the bulk of the cavalry whilst Licinus’ forces made up the centre. Across the battlefield Hasdrubal posted his ten elephants, (or possibly fifteen according to Appian), in front. He placed his Ligurian allies along the centre behind in an uncharacteristically deep deployment. On his left, the Barcid commander positioned his Gauls, while his Spanish troops occupied the right wing.

Battle soon commenced. Marcus Livius engaged the Carthaginian right whilst Hasdrubal’s elephants charged down the Roman centre. Panic duly spread in the Roman line, with Hasdrubal seemingly gaining the advantage. Furthermore on the other wing, Nero could not hope to make a successful head-on assault against the Gauls: Hasdrubal had cleverly stationed them on high ground that was impossible to outflank.

Realising the futility in fighting the Gauls, Nero made a bold move. He sent half of his forces around to the Roman left wing to outflank Hasdrubal who was fighting amid the Spanish ranks.

The death of Hasdrubal

Overwhelmed by this two-pronged assault, the Carthaginian right flank crumbled. Hasdrubal himself would be among the fallen, dying courageously in the throes of battle. The incredible military career of Hannibal’s younger brother had met its end.

The collapse of the right flank induced panic throughout the Carthaginian centre. Very quickly, Licinius routed the wavering soldiers from the front; Nero and Livius soon enclosed the desperate Punic forces from the sides and rear, thus completing the victory.

Roman victory

For such an influential battle the ancient sources are frustratingly contradictory. Overblown figures of the Carthaginian forces range from 48,000 men, 8,000 cavalry and 15 elephants which Appian posits or Livy’s extraordinary claim that 61,000 Carthaginian troops were killed or captured.

However, Polybius offers us more reasonable figures: 10,000 Carthaginian and 2,000 Romans lying dead at the end of the day. The numbers the Romans fielded are unlikely to have exceeded 40,000. Hasdrubal’s decision to avoid from a pitched battle when he saw Claudius Nero’s reinforcements, also suggests the Carthaginians were outnumbered.

The victory at Metaurus was joyously received at Rome. Livius – the consul in charge on the day of the battle – was awarded a triumph; Claudius Nero was granted the smaller honour of an ovation.

However, it was the latter’s daring decisions in dividing his forces between the two flanks which was pivotal in achieving victory – not merely at the Metaurus but also in the Punic Wars as a whole.

By trapping Hannibal in the south, intercepting Hasdrubal’s message, advancing north to support Livius and after the battle marching southwards to contain any manoeuvres Hannibal may have attempted in his absence, demonstrates Nero’s logistical preparation and discipline. It was this that made the battle of the Metaurus so remarkable.

Instead of basking in the glory of this victory, Nero hastily returned to southern Italy. In a mere six days, he had Hasdrubal’s severed head thrown into the Carthaginian camp – a psychological blow to Hannibal with clear symbolism: sooner or later you’ll be next!

Metaurus’ place in history

Whilst characterising the battle of Metaurus as a forgotten flashpoint is an exaggeration, it is certainly easy to overlook. More awe-inspiring clashes inevitably occurred during the Second Punic War: Hannibal’s three victories at Trebbia, Trasimene and Cannae or Scipio’s triumph at Zama –which made Rome the undisputed power of the Western Mediterranean.

What if Hasdrubal’s reinforcements had managed to join Hannibal?

Would the combination of these forces been enough for the Barca brothers to capture Rome? Would it have been enough to rewrite the course of history?

‘The determining crisis’

Entertaining this alternate history is certainly tempting; it illustrates what was potentially at sake at the Metaurus. This is the argument of Sir Edward Creasy who in 1851 included the Metaurus as one of history’s fifteen most decisive battles.

Metaurus joined Marathon, the siege of Syracuse during Athens’ disastrous Sicilian Expedition plus the battles of Gaugamela, the Teutoburg Forest and Châlons as the most important conflicts of antiquity. However, Creasy’s Eurocentric view of military history – the battle of Saratoga being the sole conflict to take place on another continent – is merely the product of the increasingly Anglicised outlook on the world which the British Empire galvanised. For Creasy the Metaurus was:

“the determining crisis of the contest, not merely between Rome and Carthage, but between the two great families of the world.”

(Creasy, 1851, 80.)

Unlike Creasy’s bold statement, Paul Davis’ compilation of history’s hundred most decisive battles – including the Metaurus alongside Zama – comes to a more measured conclusion.

Davis argues the battle of the Metaurus was pivotal as it required Hasdrubal to effectively abandon Spain to Scipio Africanus. Rome was quick to exploit this, using the Iberian peninsula as a springboard to North Africa and Carthage’s final defeat.

As a pair the Metaurus and Zama shaped the world.

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Notes and Further Reading

This 3-part article was written by Alex Bygate, an extremely talented, aspiring historian. Show him some love by leaving a like/ comment!

Huge thanks to Johnny Shumate and his fantastic illustrations!

Click here for Johnny’s website.

Johnny’s Etsy page, check it out here.

For Appian’s Roman History, click here.

For Livy’s account of the Battle of the Metaurus (Book 27.44- 27.48) can be found here.

Polybius text here.

Creasy, E. (1851), The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World.

Goldsworthy, A. (2003), The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars, 264 – 146 BC.

Reynolds, C. G. (1998), Navies in History, Ann Abor.

Tegellen-Couperus, O. (1993), A short history of Roman law, London.

Warmington, B. H. (1960), Carthage: A History, London.

Author: Alexander Bygate

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