NEW YORK CITY—For four weeks, I attended a world conference which went virtually unnoticed in the press. Since its inception in 1975, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference (RevCON) has been held every five years at the United Nations in New York for UN delegates, NGOs, and activists to discuss nuclear disarmament progress.

In my free time, I’m a documentary filmmaker covering the life of a nuclear disarmament activist who is also one of the hibakusha (Japanese for "atomic bomb survivor") from Hiroshima. This year, my documentary subject was invited to speak to the UN delegates at RevCON about her experience 70 years ago.

All of which meant my camera and I had a front row seat as a major international conference failed to make any significant progress.

The treaty

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, written in 1968 (indefinitely extended in 1995), has three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. It is one of the more controversial weapons ban/disarmament treaties, along with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1996), which is still to be put into effect. Others like the Chemical Weapons Convention (1997) and the Ottawa Treaty (banning land mines, also 1997) have been almost universally accepted. (The US did not sign the Ottawa Treaty, but the country abides by it everywhere except the DPRK/South Korea border.)

The portion of the NPT most referred to at the conference is Article VI:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

It's idealistic rhetoric—and vague as the day is long. When I pictured an international treaty signed by 188 countries that would eventually abolish the most destructive weapon in world history, I imagined something far more detailed. This text is partly why the disarmament process has been so slow, and it's partly why signatories (mainly the five nuclear weapons states: US, UK, Russia, China, France) continue to argue about wording rather than developing a universally accepted disarmament process.

One of the controversies that arose during this year's NPT RevCON involved the establishment of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-free zones in the Middle East. Israel, a country essential to this process, showed up to discuss the matter. But the Middle East NPT signatories refused to actively negotiate with Israel, because Israel has never actually signed the NPT. And since the US backs Israel in these matters, a stalemate on one of the most important issues in the world looked possible right from the get-go.

Humanitarian focus

Starting last year, many governments have been shifting to a humanitarian focus to push progress on the NPT rather than using a political or military focus. In addition to inviting the hibakusha to speak about their experiences, the UN presented a photo exhibit in the main UN lobby featuring the human effects of the a-bomb. This shift began at the 2014 Mexico Conference and continued at the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, during which Austria issued the following statement:

“Austria calls on all nuclear weapons possessor states to take concrete interim measures to reduce the risk of nuclear weapon detonations, including reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons and moving nuclear weapons away from deployment into storage, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and rapid reductions of all types of nuclear weapons.”

In total, 107 countries have now signed this "Austrian Pledge"—but the five main nuclear weapons states and their nuclear umbrella states (including Japan) have not. In fact, multiple governments claim to have been pressured by the US not to sign the Austrian document. My very determined documentary subject (who calls for a total ban, rather than weapons reduction) addressed this exact issue in her speech to the UN Trusteeship Council:

"In international politics, this type of arm-twisting tactic or sabotaging behavior may be common among the nuclear weapon states… but from the perspective of the majority of people of the world, such shady diplomacy is nothing but repugnant, and blasphemous to the lives of those incinerated by the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”

Deterrence?

In addition to speaking as an activist at world conferences, the subject of my documentary often talks to high school students about her experience in Hiroshima. To gain more clarity into the disarmament fight, we followed her to some of these talks in NYC. Multiple students asked some form of, “If we get rid of all the nuclear weapons, what if someone makes one in secret? Shouldn’t we keep some to defend ourselves, just in case?”

This question quite obviously upsets the hibakusha, who experienced the effects of the bomb (and it's worth noting the atomic bombs that exploded in Japan were mere firecrackers compared to the warheads ready to launch today). Despite the emotion involved in the issue, my subject's response to the question generally relies on practical arguments, relating her response to the message of the NPT: maintaining a nuclear stockpile for deterrence is quite a risky thing to do.

Hundreds of recently declassified stories of nuclear weapons accidents are outlined in Eric Schlosser’s Command and Control, many more are left untold. The book will leave you unsettled as you learn that nuclear weapons have often been guarded by drug addicts, alcoholics, and untrained individuals who often had no idea what they were guarding or how to handle the bombs. It’s staggering how many nuclear weapons have come close to detonation because of miscommunication (Cuban Missile Crisis), weather patterns (the Russians almost hit the button because of "rays of sunlight reflected off clouds," see p. 448), faulty tech, and security measures. That's to say nothing of the nuclear bombs that have actually blown up, caught on fire, been accidentally dropped from planes, or mistakenly armed. Thanks to luck and incompetence, none detonated their nuclear cores.

The nuclear issue even caused the first and only raid of a government agency by other government agencies in Rocky Flats, CO, where a plutonium production plant conveniently did not inform local residents about the effects of leaks and accidents. The consequences were severe. (The story is the subject of a recent book and future HBO documentary). Such carelessness is sure to continue; consider the recent Trident whistleblower in the UK.

The US claims to have disarmed enough warheads to satisfy the NPT—the US stockpile has dropped from 31,255 warheads in 1967 to 4,717 in 2014. This is definitely progress, but according to Schlosser, “high ranking Air Force personnel” stated that the US only needs about 311 nuclear weapons as an effective deterrence measure (p. 483).

Bad news

May 22 was the final day of the conference. The President of the Conference mediates, advises, and then compiles the final documents. Then a final plenary session is held where the delegates give statements to ratify (or not) the final documents. It must be a consensus.

Final conference documents contain items such as general conference procedures (like allowing non-signatories to attend and submit documents but not actively participate; i.e. Israel), agendas, financial reports, and action plans. Some are documents submitted by countries regarding specific matters, such as Iran's final document. That complained the US is violating the NPT by spending billions on maintaining its nuclear arsenal as well as by its unwavering support of Israel:

"...the Zionist regime, confident of the political and military support of the United States through its persistent rejection of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, remains the main obstacle to the establishment of such a zone."

Two hours and twenty minutes late, the session began. Several delegates from countries like Tunisia and Nigeria read statements in agreement with the final documents. But the brusque statements of the US, UK, and Canada were clear: there is no agreement on the documents because the Middle East countries will not discuss Middle East WMD-free zones with Israel if they continue to reject the NPT.

The final statement of the session came from the Iran delegate (representing the Non-Aligned Movement), who again reminded the delegation that the reason for this denial is that Israel is not an NPT signatory. He requested the session be suspended for further talks, and the Conference President complied at 6:00pm.

The plenary resumed at 6:57pm, so Iran’s delegate resumed his talk. He expressed “disappointment and dismay” at the statements of the US, UK, and Canada and was “highly surprised” that they could not compromise on the common denominators of the conference in order to come to consensus.

The same view was expressed by all delegates that followed, including Egypt (representing the Arab League), Japan, Russia, France, China, and Austria (representing dozens of countries). Everyone expressed regret. The Austrian delegate was one of the few who found any positive in the situation: now that non-nuclear weapons states are more empowered, the humanitarian consequences may someday sway this process.

But essentially, the conference was a failure.

Lessons

I learned many lessons learned in the past few weeks listening to the hibakusha, the NGOs, the activists, and delegates. A few of the highlights:

I learned that not everyone believes “disarmament” is synonymous with “ban," demonstrating the “look ma, we only have this many warheads to destroy the earth a thousand times over, not a million times over!” stance.

The conference consists of a confusing series of unconnected events where people talk at others; practical discussion isn't always very effective.

The only news organization that covered events surrounding the conference was Al Jazeera.

UN delegates like to use the words “cornerstone," “regime," “grave," “implementation," “failure,” and “regret.”

Russia likes to say “it’s not our fault” about official stuff.

The United Nations is a noble idea but not an effective body for quick action.

It’s really hard to get a short paragraph agreed upon by 188 countries, let alone an official treaty.

UN Delegates refer to each other by their country, not their names. (As a note taker, I’m thankful.)

These people have a lot of work to do.

The NPT will continue to remain an active guideline to world governments, and the tide seems to be shifting in favor of total disarmament rather than to maintain deterrence. The settlement of the Middle East issue appears to be the key to that future. In the meantime, nuclear weapons will continue to exist, more conferences and government talks will occur, and the NPT review will resume again in 2020.

My journey will also continue as my tireless documentary subject speaks at more world events, including a return to Hiroshima in August for the 70th anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb.