TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT IMPLICATIONS

Prepared to Use Force

The authors have seen discussions on message boards—even in training classes—where officers suggest the only training needed to respond to ASEs is to get to the scene quickly. The belief is that most events will be over, or suspects will kill themselves. While it is true that 1) 49 percent of the events end before officers arrive and 2) suspects kill themselves after the police arrive 14 percent of the time, responding officers used force to stop the attack in 31 percent of the ASEs assessed. This 1 in 3 chance of having to use force makes it clear that simply training officers to show up is not enough. Officers must learn the tactical skills needed to successfully resolve these events. Because not all events occur indoors (18 percent happen outdoors), officers must be trained to operate in both environments. Indoor (i.e., close-quarters) battle tactics are not suitable in outdoor environments, and using them outdoors can be fatal.

Being prepared to use force also means having the equipment needed to act effectively. The data clearly support equipping officers with patrol rifles. Many ASE sites involve open spaces or long hallways that create engagement distances beyond the ability of most officers to effectively engage a suspect with a pistol. Add this to the possibility that the officers may have to place precision fire on a suspect while avoiding hitting fleeing or injured victims, and the need for patrol rifles is clear. Additionally, about a quarter of attackers are armed with rifles. Officers ought to have firepower at least equivalent to what they will face if they go in harm’s way.

Because shooters often carry rifles and frequently shoot at officers in these events, law enforcement personnel should wear body armor that can protect them from rifle fire. This means that officers should be equipped with ballistic plates. Most of the rifle rounds used by active shooters can be stopped with type III plates, but some shooters have fired rounds that would be stopped only by type IV plates. Many of the commercially available plate carriers also have attachment points that can be used to carry other equipment, which proves useful during ASEs. This allows the plate carrier to serve as a “go bag” in addition to providing enhanced protection.

Some agencies recommend the use of ballistic shields in ASEs. The danger inherent in these events argues for increased protection, but that generally comes with a tradeoff. For instance, most shields are designed to be used with pistols, which would require the officer to give up the ballistic advantage of a rifle. Also, man-portable shields currently are not rated to stop rifle fire. In the roughly 1 of 4 events where the shooter is armed with a rifle, a shield would not provide additional protection.

Ready to Provide Medical Assistance

During the confusion of an ASE, it is common for different descriptions of the shooter to be phoned into 911 or communicated to responding officers. This often creates a situation where, even though the police have found the body of or dealt with a shooter directly, they cannot be certain that this was the only shooter. Additionally, it is common for people to continue to call in reports of people with guns after the shooter has been dealt with. In some cases, this is caused by a lag between observation and reporting. The person calling saw the actual shooter, fled, and then reported what he or she saw several minutes later. In others, the caller has seen police officers responding in plain clothes or nontraditional uniforms and mistaken the officers for attackers. In yet other cases, the callers are simply wrong. Regardless of the cause of the confusion, the officers on scene often must engage in a systematic search of the attack location to confirm that there is not another shooter. In a large attack site, this search can take hours.

This creates a problem for those wounded and in need of medical care because most EMS providers will not enter a scene until it is declared “secure” or “cold.” Securing the scene can take hours. During this time, victims may bleed to death or go into shock and die. To combat this problem, national organizations have endorsed the Rescue Task Force (RTF) concept.5 This involves having EMS personnel enter attack sites to stabilize and rapidly remove the injured, while a ballistic or explosive threat still may exist. EMS personnel operating in RTFs wear body armor and are provided security by law enforcement personnel. This concept represents a significant improvement in EMS response to ASEs, but it undoubtedly will take substantial time to implement nationwide.

Even with faster EMS response, responding officers will face situations where they can save the lives of victims by quickly applying proper hemorrhage control techniques after the immediate threat has been dealt with. Additionally, in a mass-casualty event, the number of wounded may overwhelm the capabilities of responding EMS personnel. Recognizing that the primary objective of a responding officer is to neutralize the threat, if officers have some medical training, they may be in a position to aid the injured and possibly save lives.6 This training currently is available, and the authors strongly recommend that all law enforcement officers receive it to maximize their ability to help those injured during these horrible events.7

Obviously, if officers are going to be trained to provide medical aid, they need equipment to provide this aid. Numerous wound care kits are commercially available and easily can be attached to a plate carrier. Also, the authors suggest that all officers carry tourniquets. Tourniquets are useful for stopping extremity bleeding, whether it is caused by a gunshot wound or other trauma. In numerous cases across the country, officers have saved not only the lives of other officers but also civilians by applying a tourniquet.

Civilians Trained to React

Police have, generally, done an excellent job responding to active shooter events quickly. Despite the dramatic improvement in police response since the Columbine High School shooting incident, attacks that result in high numbers of casualties continue. The five highest casualty events since 2000 happened despite police arriving on scene in about three minutes. Clearly, fast and effective police response comprises only part of the answer to limiting the damage done during these attacks.

Also important are the actions that civilians take to protect themselves during the three or more minutes that it takes the police to arrive. Civilians need to be trained about what to do if one of these attacks occurs. A variety of resources are available at no cost. Federal agencies, including both the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, endorse the use of the teaching technique of Run, Hide, Fight to explain to civilians how they can protect themselves and others around them.8 Police departments and the communities they serve should work together to implement this training.

CONCLUSION

The frequency of active shooter events has increased in recent years. These incidents also have generated a substantial amount of public concern. The authors hope that the data provided in this article will provide police administrators with the information they need to form sound, evidence-based best practices in responding to these events and that these best practices will help save lives.