They’re both easy targets.

If you’ve been paying attention to the security industry for any length of time then you’re probably familiar with the non-disclosure vs responsible disclosure vs full disclosure stances researchers take with regard to vulnerabilities they discover. As the value of vulnerabilities has been steadily going up over the years, more and more individuals and organizations are aligning themselves with the non-disclosure crowd and not for the traditional reasons. These days there seem to be an increasing number of cases of individuals hiding behind non-disclosure for reasons that generally tend to end up revolving around them making more money than reputable outlets provide.

When I read that a new company out of Italy Malta called ReVuln has discovered vulnerabilities in SCADA software and decided not to inform the affected vendors, but rather sell the information privately to their customers, I was intrigued.

Here is some of the press coverage they received:

Security Firm Showcases Vulnerabilities in SCADA Software, Won’t Report Them to Vendors

ReVuln claims 0day vulnerabilities for SCADA systems

Security Firm ReVuln Showcases SCADA Zero-Days

ReVuln showcases vulnerabilities in SCADA software, but won’t report them to vendors

Exploit broker releases EXPLICIT VIDS of holes in industrial control kit

As ReVuln founder Luigi Auriemma is quoted as saying:

“ICS-CERT has just contacted us some minutes ago requesting more details but we don’t release information,” “[The vulnerabilities] are part of our portfolio for our customers so no public details will be released; they will remain private.”

For those of you who do not know, SCADA systems run things like power plants, airports, manufacturing facilities, and so on (read the wikipedia page for more info). While these may not be defined as “Internet infrastructure”, I would argue that they are even more crucial to the safety and security of the general populace (especially when you think about the national security implications of vulnerabilities in these systems).

On Thanksgiving day I had a morning’s worth of time to wait for a turkey to cook, so I decided to take a shot at finding as many SCADA 0day vulnerabilities as possible. As we at Exodus we responsibly report all vulnerabilities we deal with, my goal was to report any such findings for free to ICS-CERT, the group responsible for collaborating with SCADA vendors to ensure vulnerabilities are fixed.

Here’s a list of the vendors and types of vulnerabilities I found (23 in all):

Rockwell Automation 1 remote code execution vulnerability

1 denial of service vulnerabilty

discovery that one piece of Rockwell software installs Adobe Reader 8 which is susceptible to an innumerable amount of remote code execution flaws Schneider Electric 3 remote code execution vulnerabilities

1 denial of service vulnerability Indusoft 1 denial of service vulnerability RealFlex 8 denial of service vulnerabilities Eaton Corporation 3 remote code execution vulnerabilities

2 denial of service vulnerabilities

1 arbitrary file download vulnerability

1 arbitrary file deletion vulnerability

1 arbitrary file upload/overwrite vulnerability

The most interesting thing about these bugs was how trivial they were to find. The first exploitable 0day took a mere 7 minutes to discover from the time the software was installed. For someone who has spent a lot of time auditing software used in the enterprise and consumer space, SCADA was absurdly simple in comparison. The most difficult part of finding SCADA vulnerabilities seems to be locating the software itself. I plan to put in a request to the ICS-CERT that they perhaps establish a repository of SCADA software for researchers like myself to audit (provided they agree to disclose the vulnerabilities, that is). Even a list of what software is of interest would be beneficial.

All of the vulnerabilities listed above will be responsibly disclosed to the ICS-CERT team just following the publication of this post.

Now, I realize I haven’t found nearly all the vulnerabilities in these products, but hopefully there is some overlap with those that were never going to end up in the hands of those able to fix them. I will probably take another (longer than one morning) shot at similar software sometime in the future, but for now it was just a nice way to pass the time.

Happy Thanksgiving.

—

Aaron

@aaronportnoy