This is part of a two-week discussion on trans issues. Kathleen Stock's previous article is here. All other essays in the series are here.

I have found all of the contributions to the “Transgender Identities” series stimulating and enlightening, and am very grateful to The Economist for modelling civil discussion in this area. In this follow-up, I wanted to think a bit more about something that Adam Smith says in his very interesting essay. In his contribution, Mr Smith argues that there are parallels between being gay as an identity, and being transgender as an identity, and that in both cases, this should be the basis for protecting rights and benefits for the people concerned. As my own essay suggests, I think things aren’t quite so straightforward, at least with respect to the last part. Giving gay people the rights and benefits traditionally afforded to straight people doesn’t take anything significant away from straight people. There’s no question that trans people should have all human rights; however, when it comes to benefits, giving trans women some of the benefits afforded to females—for instance, access to sex-segregated spaces and resources—does seem to remove some benefits and even rights from females; or so I argue in my essay.

But here I want to concentrate on Mr Smith’s idea that there are parallels between gay and transgender identity. He points out that the idea of being gay as an identity, in the sense of it being a fundamental part of oneself, only emerged relatively late on in the long history of sexual activity between people of the same sex. I’m sure this is right. However, I think we also need to capture an ambiguity between two possible senses in which “being gay” can count as an identity, or fundamental part of oneself.

The first sense refers to being gay as a sexual orientation, and is generalised to all gay people, as such. People get hung up on the fact that sexual orientations aren’t chosen, and this is true; but then again, none of our feelings are chosen, and hardly any of them are fundamental parts of us. Most feelings are fleeting, in fact. The sense in which sexual orientation is fundamental is not just that it's unchosen, but that it’s also relatively stable and persistent. The same point applies to being heterosexual or bisexual.

The second, different sense in which being gay can count as part of your “identity” is as a matter of it being highly personally meaningful for you. Many people with a gay sexual orientation don’t feel like it defines them, or that it’s of much importance at all in describing who they are. So only some gay people have a “gay identity” in this second sense. But all gay people have it in the first sense, by definition. It’s what makes them gay.

Mr Smith suggests that for trans women and men, being trans is an identity, just as it is for gay people. I certainly agree that being trans is an identity for many people in the second, personally meaningful, sense; but as before, not for all. For instance, many older transsexuals whose transition is long behind them think of themselves, and would rather be personally related to by others, in ways that aren’t anything to do with their being trans.

Meanwhile, is being trans an identity in the first sense? If we take “trans people” to just be “the group of people who call themselves trans people” then I think the answer is: for some trans people, yes, but not all of them. This is because, for some of the people who call themselves trans, it is not true that it is a relatively stable and persistent state. Take the burgeoning numbers of adolescent girls that now self-declare as trans. One study from 2013 suggests that around two-thirds will detransition. So for these people, it can’t be a fundamental part of their identity in that sense. For others, of course, and in particular most post-operative transsexuals, it’s a lifelong commitment, and absolutely a stable and persistent part of them.

In an ideal world, in recognising a legal change of gender (in Britain currently called a gender-recognition certificate) we would be able to distinguish the latter group—those for whom being trans is a persistent and stable part of themselves, no matter what their personal attitude towards it—from the former group, for whom the feelings are more fleeting. That distinction isn’t infallible under Britain’s current system, which involves a proven demonstration of some commitment on the part of the applicant and a medical diagnosis, but at least there is a reasonable chance. The problem with the proposals now under consideration in Britain to grant a gender-recognition certificate on the basis of self-declaration is that it makes this distinction absolutely impossible in practice.