Bernard Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University is the author of “Revival and Reform in Islam” and the editor of “Saudi Arabia in Transition.”

It has become axiomatic in the West to blame violent Islamism on the propagation by Saudi Arabia of its religious ideology, which is commonly known as Salafism or Wahhabism. Salafism advocates a literalist interpretation of Islam’s sources of revelation — the Quran and Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith) — and promotes intolerance of the other sects of Islam, most notably Shiites, Sufis and other heretics according to the Salafis.

The answer to jihadism must include Riyadh as an ally in the fight against a scourge that has resulted in the death and suffering of more Muslims than Westerners.

But intolerance does not imply, nor does it necessarily lead to, violent extremism. Moreover, the data we have does not correlate violence with Saudi religious activism — which began in earnest in the early 1960s, and has involved billions of dollars to support institution- and mosque-building, scholarships, professorships, publication of books and journals and the salaries for preachers. The Saudis, for instance, have been very active in India since 1963 and yet Indian Salafis are deeply invested in national democratic politics, and have not produced any jihadis, local or global.

The Saudis have never been involved in spreading Salafism in Iraq, yet this is where ISIS emerged. Also, United States government officials have repeatedly asserted that the Saudi government has been a strong ally for at least a decade in the fight against Al Qaeda and more recently ISIS, both of which wish to conquer the Kingdom and destroy its royal family. It beggars belief that the royals would be willing supporters and funders of those who wish to topple them. It is beyond doubt, however, that there are private individuals with large pockets in Arabia who support violent jihadism, and that the Saudi government has been trying to identify and shut them down.

The jihadi phenomenon is a global problem, and, as we notice from everyday tragedies, is not tied to a single country, a particular sociopolitical context or a psychological or sociological profile. The vast majority of Salafis are nonviolent and the few jihadis appear motivated by a sense of collective and personal humiliation as well as a fantasy political utopia — called the caliphate — that the Saudi government has never advocated.

The reasons for jihadism cannot be captured by single-cause explanations, such as “it is all Saudi Arabia’s fault.” Were it so, the solution would be easy and quick. Because it is not, the answer to jihadism must involve a set of policies — military, economic, ideological and cultural — that includes Riyadh as an ally in the fight against a scourge that has resulted in the death and suffering of many many more Muslims than Westerners.



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