Inside Syria, meanwhile, the al Qaeda-affiliate al Nusra Front openly distributed vast amounts of weapons, cash and other assistance. Today, the jihadists are far more visible than the Western-backed coalition.

"Our competition in liberated areas -- mainly the al Nusra front -- don't abide by the same principals," Ward said, referring to American efforts to carefully distribute aid. "It's hard to compete with them in the short term, but longer term our assistance will endure and the Syrian people will notice."

The United States' track record in similar efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, though, is grim. From Kabul in 2001 to Tunis today, Washington has struggled to identify, work with and strengthen local moderates. In some countries, these moderates simply did not exist. In others, they had no power. In many cases, the American government - particularly its civilian agencies -- did a poor job of implementing its policies and promises.

Vast amounts of blame for the folly of the last decade lie with corrupt local leaders like Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai. But there is need for a reckoning in Washington as well.

Ryan Crocker, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, said the United States rushed into countries, relied primarily on military force and expected immediate change.

"Let's punch out their lights and realign their society," is how Crocker explained it. "And then when we find out the latter is more difficult than we expect, we say 'OK, let's go somewhere else.' That's what our enemies count on -- and our allies fear."

U.S. officials should "listen a bit more than we speak," Crocker said, focus on economics, and ask local moderates how best to marginalize extremists.

Crocker's view echoed that of dozens of U.S. officials -- Republicans and Democrats, civilians and soldiers -- I interviewed while covering Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq for eight years.

Over and over, people from divergent backgrounds had reached the same conclusion: The best way to counter militancy was working through local allies and creating economic growth. Deadly force was necessary at times, but the civilian effort was as important as the military.

Since 2001, though, Washington has mounted an overwhelmingly military effort. Of the roughly $1.3 trillion spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, 95 percent went to military costs. When civilian initiatives were mounted, Republican and Democratic administrations alike threw money at the problems. Sweeping change that would take years at best to achieve was expected in months.

The United States spent more than $67 billion in Afghanistan and Iraq on civilian aid programs. By almost any measure, the results were meager. Washington squandered billions on private contractors, largely failed to strengthen local moderates and struggled to use its most potent non-lethal tools: U.S. private investment, technology and education.