FOR those seeking evidence that Emmanuel Macron is set on a radical overhaul of the economy, France’s new budget, now being debated in the Senate, offers mixed evidence. For all his bold talk of “transforming” France, some measures—notably on public spending—so far look tentative.

Undoubtedly there has been much to cheer. Mr Macron had already signed off on reforms to boost flexibility in the labour market earlier this autumn. Assessing the full impact of these is tricky, because implementation takes time and an upturn in the economic cycle means unemployment should drift down from 9.7% in any case. A big unknown is whether unions will keep their de facto power to set some national terms on pay and conditions, limiting firms’ flexibility no matter what the laws may say. Economists will be scratching their heads over this for years.

The budget is easier to assess. Two measures stand out. The president talks of a France that encourages wealth creation rather than envy of the rich. Scrapping the wealth tax, introduced in 1982 and in force (mostly) since then, is bold. It is partly replaced by a levy on pricey properties. Revenues will drop from a modest €5bn in 2016 to just €1.8bn next year. The benefit should be that fewer wealth-creators will emigrate (by one estimate, France has seen a net loss of 60,000 millionaires since 2000). More might invest in France, perhaps in tech startups. But Mr Macron has been dubbed “president of the rich”.

The second notable measure is to keep the projected budget deficit below 3% of GDP, as required under EU law. It is likely to be 2.9% in 2018. This is a matter of totemic importance to Mr Macron. He wants to be the first French leader in a decade to get it below 3%. “The pressure on the administration to deliver such an outcome is very, very strong,” notes Bruno Cavalier, of Oddo Securities. Mr Macron seeks fiscal credibility, partly to convince future German governments to pay more attention to his plans for euro-zone reform. For a measure of his resolve on this score, consider how officials responded to a €10bn hole that appeared in the budget after the constitutional court ruled that a surcharge on dividends that companies previously had to pay was illegal. Rather than let the 3% mark be breached, as earlier administrations might have, officials instead dreamed up a one-off levy on France’s 320 biggest firms. That shoves up corporation tax, temporarily, despite Mr Macron’s promise to bring the rate down from 33.3% to 25% in five years. Better a capricious tax, it seems, than missing the deficit target. Yet Mr Macron took a knock last week when the European Commission included France on a list of (only six) countries that it worries may breach the 3% rule next year. It is also concerned about the high level of public debt in France. Other steps are modest and welcome. Some pensioners will pay higher social-security charges, even as firms pay lower imposts for employing people. A flat tax of 30% on investment earnings, a markedly lighter burden than before, is designed to cheer entrepreneurs. Gradually exempting 80% of households from a property tax (separate from the one levied on the richest) is popular, but means €3bn of lost revenues in 2018, and more later. Those who dared hope for a one-off radical change in the first year of Mr Macron’s presidency, followed by years of stability, are disappointed. “I was expecting more and quicker. I’m not sure they are building a situation of freedom that will relaunch growth,” says Marc Ivaldi of the Toulouse School of Economics. He sees no overriding “strong idea or strategy” to guide policy.

Mr Cavalier also laments the lack of “big bang” changes. He is most disappointed by the lack of a strong signal that “completely crazy” public spending will soon be cut. The state spends some 56.4% of GDP, far above the European average of 46.3%. Mr Macron has talked this year of reducing spending to Nordic levels (Sweden was at about 50% in 2016). Mr Cavalier calls that goal “very ambitious”, given the lack of a big, early push. The IMF thinks this is urgent, too. In September it said swift and comprehensive spending reforms would be needed if Mr Macron is to keep his promise to save €60bn over his five-year term. If growth exceeds official projections of 1.7% next year, and central government spending is kept steady as planned at roughly €385bn, then the ratio of spending to GDP could improve. But there is little sign of the structural change that Mr Macron previously said he would deliver, such as when he spoke of cutting 120,000 public-sector jobs over five years. No plan for trimming such posts has been announced (though failing to replace those who retire could help). Meanwhile spending by local and regional governments, which soared in recent years, is to fall modestly next year. Another big challenge is pensions. A comparison with Swedish public spending is instructive, given talk of a Nordic approach. The OECD compares the two and finds that more generous pension provision in France explains most of the gap between the two countries: 10% of Swedish GDP goes on paying them, whereas France devotes a much heftier 14.3% of GDP to its ones. That suggests a priority should be, for example, to raise the retirement age in France, something Mr Macron has shied away from doing. Is there other evidence that France will shrink its overbearing state? The finance minister, Bruno Le Maire, talked in the summer of trying to sell roughly one-tenth of the country’s vast public holdings. An audit of these early this year described public investments worth almost €100bn in nearly 1,800 firms. Firms part-owned by the state employ some 800,000 people—far more than in any other big European country. However, the pace of privatisation so far only matches the rate managed (to little fanfare) late in the term of François Hollande, Mr Macron’s predecessor. No one talks of more radical change, such as swiftly injecting competition into the state-run, hugely subsidised railways, where debt amounts to more than €40bn.

Mr Macron is in a strong position for now, without serious opposition in parliament or on the street. He might use this time to push on with more change, for example with a second round of promised labour and unemployment reforms, potentially weakening the entrenched power of the unions, or cutting pension costs. The chance to bring about structural shifts is fleeting—it would pay to grab it early.