Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu showcased the results of an impressive intelligence operation by Mossad agents earlier this week.

55,000 pages of documents and another 55,000 files on 183 CDs – a half ton of documents.

The documents provide definitive proof that Iran has been lying to the International Community from beginning.

National Review summed the Israeli discovery succinctly:

The regime lied to the International Atomic Energy Agency about the existence of a nuclear-weapons program, and, in direct violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), hid its massive archive of nuclear knowhow.

It’s worth reminding ourselves of the situation Iran found itself facing prior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – also known as the Iranian Nuclear Deal.

On February 9, 2010, Iran began the process of producing 20 percent enriched uranium.

In response, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 on June 9, 2010.

The Resolution significantly expanded sanctions against Iran – tightening proliferation-related sanctions, banning Iran from carrying out nuclear-capable ballistic missile tests, and imposing an arms embargo on the transfer of major weapons systems to Iran.

The resolution contained the following language:

Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities.

We shall return to the Resolution’s missile language later.

On June 24, 2010, Congress adopted the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act.

The Act tightened U.S. sanctions against firms investing in Iran’s energy sector and imposed new sanctions on companies selling refined petroleum to Iran.

The EU followed suit on July 26, 2010, agreeing to further sanctions against Iran:

The Council Decision provides a comprehensive and robust package of measures in the areas of trade, financial services, energy, transport as well as additional designations for visa ban and asset freeze, in particular for Iranian banks, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL).

On May 8, 2011, Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant began operations and successfully achieved a sustained chain reaction two days later.

On June 8, 2011, Iran announced intentions to triple the rate of 20 percent-enriched uranium production using more-advanced centrifuge designs.

On December 31, 2011, Congress passed legislation (see: Section 1245) allowing the United States to sanction foreign banks if they continued to process transactions with the Central Bank of Iran.

On January 23, 2012, the EU imposed a phased ban on oil purchases from Iran – with a total halt on EU importations of Iranian oil on July 1, 2012.

On February 15, 2012, Iran announced a number of nuclear advances, including new centrifuges allowing for faster Uranium enrichment.

On August 30, 2012, the IAEA reported that Iran increased the number of centrifuges installed at the Fordow enrichment plant and was continuing to produce uranium enriched to 20 percent in excess of its needs for the Tehran Research Reactor.

You can see the back and forth being played by Iran during this period. These are familiar tactics and should have surprised no one.

But here’s the thing. Those sanctions were rapidly taking their toll. The Iranian economy was coming under serious pressure.

Iran’s GDP contracted by 6.6% in 2012.

The official unemployment rate jumped to 14% in the Spring of 2012.

Ultimately, Iran’s GDP shrank by 9% between March 2012 and March 2014.

Iran’s economy was later estimated to be 15-20 percent smaller than it would have been without the 2011/2012 round of sanctions.

The U.S. Treasury stated that sanctions cost Iran $160 billion between 2012-2015. More than $120 billion in Iranian reserves held in banks abroad were inaccessible.

As a result, Iran’s currency, the rial, utterly collapsed:

In the first ten months of 2012, the Iranian currency, the rial, lost more than 80% of its exchange value. In a single day, on October 1, 2012, it dropped by 15%.

The collapse of the rial caused inflation to spike from an already uncomfortable 20.6% in 2011 to 27.4% in 2012. Inflation in Iran would peak at 39.3% in 2013.

Iran was under enormous economic pressure.

Which is precisely why Iran continued production of 20 percent enriched uranium.

U.S. civilian power plants typically use 3 to 5 percent uranium.

Weapons use “highly enriched uranium” with over 90 percent uranium.

By maintaining production, Iran was expected to have a 250 kg stock of 20 percent enriched uranium by the end of 2012 – along with more than 4 tons of 3.5 percent enriched uranium.

The step from 20 percent enriched uranium to weapons-grade uranium is rather small as noted by a 2012 Foreign Policy article:

If Iran decides to produce weapons-grade uranium from 20 percent enriched uranium, it has already technically undertaken 90 percent of the enrichment effort required.

What remains to be done is the feeding of 20 percent uranium through existing additional cascades to achieve weapons-grade enrichment (more than 90 percent uranium).

This step is much faster than the earlier ones. Growing the stockpile of 3.5 percent and 20 percent enriched uranium, as Iran is now doing, provides the basic material needed to produce four to five nuclear weapons.

Using 20 percent enriched uranium as a feed, 250 kg UF6 [Uranium Hexafloride] with that level of enrichment can be turned to weapons-grade material in a month’s time.

Iran began 20 percent enriched uranium production in early 2010. By late 2012 Iran had produced enough 20 percent enriched uranium to produce weapons grade uranium in roughly one month.

In other words, Iran already had weapons grade uranium capability in 2012.

Iran’s problem, similar to North Korea, was lack of a delivery system – a medium or long-range ballistic missile.

Iran’s 2012 ballistic missile capability was outlined in a December 6, 2012 Congressional Report, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs:

The vast majority of Iran’s heavy artillery rockets and ballistic missiles are short-range of less than about 500 kilometers.

Iran still probably relies on others for some key components. Gaining access to these kinds of critical components and materials has grown increasingly difficult for Iran.

Iran must rely on others for certain key missile components and materials in its MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] program. Export controls and sanctions have made it increasingly difficult, but certainly not impossible, for Iran to acquire the best of such items.

Iran also has a space launch program. Many believe Iran’s space launch program could mask the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

It is increasingly uncertain whether Iran will be able to achieve an ICBM capability by 2015 for several reasons: Iran does not appear to be receiving the degree of foreign support many believe would be necessary, Iran has found it increasingly difficult to acquire certain critical components and materials because of sanctions, and Iran has not demonstrated the kind of flight test program many view as necessary to produce an ICBM.

Recall, that UN Resolution 1929 specifically focused on banning ballistic missile testing.

Sanctions had severely impaired Iran’s ballistic missile program – to the point that medium-range ballistic missile production was severely limited and ICBM’s were simply not attainable.

In late 2012 Iran found itself in the following situation:

Iran had achieved 20 percent-enriched uranium production. Stockpiles were now sufficient to produce weapons-grade uranium. Iran was facing intense International pressure regarding its nuclear ambitions. The Iranian economy was on the verge of collapse. Iran’s ballistic missile technology – the nuclear delivery system – was lagging, underfunded and component constrained due to economic sanctions. Sanctions were costing Iran tens of billions each year. Iran had no access to significant overseas cash reserves.

On June 14, 2013, Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. Rouhani was a former nuclear negotiator.

Three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for the resumption of negotiations with China, France, Germany, Russia the United Kingdom, and the United States (the P5+1 – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) on Iran’s nuclear program.

On September 27, 2013, Obama personally called Rouhani – marking the highest level contact between the U.S. and Iran since 1979.

Talks began in October 2013 in Geneva.

On November 23, 2013, Obama announced the first round of sanction relief for Iran. Congress had been pushing for further tightening of sanctions in front of negotiations.

Obama’s sanction relief was significant:

$3 billion in cash, plus another $16-17 billion [in gold, petrochemical and automotive sanction relief], totaling $20 billion in sanctions relief giving a staggering 25 percent boost to Iran’s total foreign exchange reserves.

The announcement by Obama translated to a flood of Trade Delegations visiting Iran – including ten in the first two weeks of January 2014.

Iran’s economy began to recover almost immediately. Iran’s GDP grew 3% in 2014. Inflation fell from 39% to 17%.

As the Iranian economy began growing again so did Iran’s negotiating power.

On July 14, 2015, six world powers – United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France and Germany – reached an agreement with Iran on Iran’s Nuclear Program.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action lifted all economic sanctions and allowed Iran to access $120 billion in reserves held in banks abroad.

The JCPOA also contained a fatal flaw – Sunset Clauses:

The sunset clauses permit critical nuclear, arms, and ballistic missile restrictions to disappear over a five- to 15-year period. Tehran must simply abide by the agreement to soon emerge as a threshold nuclear power with an industrial-size enrichment program.

Foreign Policy describes the Sunset Clauses in the following manner:

Under the JCPOA, by 2030 Iran will be permitted to build an industrial-size nuclear industry. It will be able to operate an unlimited number of advanced centrifuges and accumulate as large a stockpile of fissile material as it desires. That, in theory, includes weapons-grade uranium. At that point, it would be weeks, maybe even days, away from having the fuel for a small arsenal of nuclear weapons.

There was another problem.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s Key Requirements noted the following:

For eight years the ballistic missile restrictions will remain in place.

This assertion was repeatedly put forth by the Obama Administration. But Obama had quietly made several notable changes to the language on ballistic missiles.

Buried deep within the JCPOA, on page 99 (of 104 total) in Annex B (3) resides the actual language:

Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

Called upon. Designed to be capable.

Note the crucial differences versus the original language contained within Resolution 1929:

Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities.

These slight variances would prove crucial.

Since the JCPOA went into effect, Iran has worked diligently to bolster its ballistic missile capabilities. Currently, “Iran has several short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) that can reach from 150 to 700 kilometers. Iran also has two operational medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) with ranges up to 2,000 kilometers, the Shahab-3 and Sejjil… [and] has slowly been developing variants of the Shahab-3, such as the Qadir, Emad, and Khorramshahr.”

As further noted in a letter sent by UN Ambassador Nikki Haley to the Chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee:

On July 27, 2017, Iran launched a Simorgh space launch vehicle, inconsistent with UNSCR 2231. The Simorgh is a space launch vehicle system that, if configured as a ballistic missile, would have a range of well over 300 kilometers (km) and has enough payload capacity to carry a nuclear warhead.

On August 13, 2017, Iran’s parliament voted unanimously to increase spending on its ballistic missile program which will receive an additional $260 million.

Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami of the Revolutionary Guard boasted that “the rate of our missile production is so high that we are faced with the problem of space”.

More troubling, Iran has been building missile complexes in Syria and Lebanon. On August 15, 2017, The Times of Israel reported Iran’s construction of a missile production facility in Syria near the coastal city of Baniyas, north of Tartus.

Since the conclusion of the JCPOA, Iran has launched as many as 23 ballistic missiles. For a complete listing of launches see here.

On August 22, 2017, Iran’s atomic chief Ali Akbar Salehi shocked the International Community by stating that Iran needs only five days to ramp its uranium enrichment back up to 20 percent – the level at which the uranium could quickly be further enriched for use in a nuclear weapon:

If there is a plan for a reaction and a challenge, we will definitely surprise them. If we make the determination, we are able to resume 20 percent enrichment in at most five days.

Recall the situation Iran found itself in 2012:

Iran had achieved 20 percent-enriched uranium production. Stockpiles were now sufficient to produce weapons-grade uranium. Iran was facing intense International pressure regarding its nuclear ambitions. The Iranian economy was on the verge of collapse. Iran’s ballistic missile technology – the nuclear delivery system – was lagging, underfunded and component constrained due to economic sanctions. Sanctions were costing Iran tens of billions each year. Iran had no access to significant overseas cash reserves.

The JCPOA effectively solved all of Iran’s’ problems:

Iran, by their own admission, managed to retain full capability to resume 20 percent uranium enrichment almost instantaneously. The JCPOA preserved Iran’s nuclear capability. It was not materially reversed, merely suspended. International pressure abated. The Iranian economy immediately rebounded with the lifting of sanctions. The JCPOA materially loosened restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile advancement. Iran’s ballistic missile program is far more advanced today. Foreign investment flooded back in. Iran was allowed access to $120 billion in cash.

At the time of JCPOA, the New York Times summed the situation perfectly:

Mr. Kerry described an Iranian capability that had been neutralized; the Iranians described a nuclear capability that had been preserved.

Iran had taken its Nuclear Program to the limit of what would be allowed by International bodies. Meanwhile, Iran’s missile technology lagged far behind.

Iran negotiated with a willing counterpart in the Obama Administration and emerged with its Nuclear Program slowed – but essentially intact.

In return, Iran was given access to a huge pool of overseas cash and a flood of foreign investment. Iran could rebuild its economy and focus on what it lacked.

A reliable nuclear weapons delivery system.

An excellent and detailed timeline of events relating to the JCPOA can be found here.

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