THE junta that has ruled Thailand since a coup last May says it will hand back power only after it has healed political and social rifts that make democracy unworkable. On April 26th its placemen in a “reform” committee are due to finish debating the first full version of a planned new constitution intended to do just that. The charter, supposedly inspired by Germany’s electoral system, must receive royal assent by September if promised polls are to take place by the middle of next year. But it will not heal Thailand’s deep political wounds. Instead, it may well aggravate them.

Leaked on April 17th, a text of the charter confirmed rumours that had already been circulating. Its first objective appears to be to neuter Pheu Thai, a populist party hated by the establishment, but which has won every election since 2001 under various guises. By beefing up a system of proportional representation, the charter will make it difficult for any party to win a parliamentary majority. It would thus force endless coalitions between Pheu Thai and other parties—even its nemesis, the pro-establishment Democrat Party. It would also allow for an unelected prime minister, should no legislator earn enough support.

The constitution will probably also see the lower house pushed around by an enlarged and more powerful senate. Not much more than one-third of the senators will be elected, down from half at present (and only candidates vetted by the establishment will be allowed to stand). Ten or so other institutions will help to baby-sit the politicians, including a “National Moral Assembly” which will punish those who act unethically, a catch-all term that could be used against government critics. Three-quarters of the 120 seats in a new “National Reform Assembly” will be reserved for toadies now serving in one of the junta’s various conclaves. Their job will be to prevent any future government deviating from a legislative programme that the generals are now laying down.

The planned constitution—Thailand’s 20th since 1932—marks a sharp retreat from the liberal charter adopted in 1997, which had already been hobbled by amendments made by another military government eight years ago. It will allow the army to keep control until a royal succession after the ageing king’s death, and probably for long after. One clause appears to limit more explicitly the king’s ability to intervene in future bouts of political unrest, perhaps for fear that the next monarch will prove soft on enemies of the royalist establishment such as Thaksin Shinawatra, the fugitive former prime minister who dominates Pheu Thai from exile.