Leonid Bershidsky is Bloomberg Opinion's Europe columnist. He was the founding editor of the Russian business daily Vedomosti and founded the opinion website Slon.ru. Read more opinion SHARE THIS ARTICLE Share Tweet Post Email

photographer: DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP/Getty Images photographer: DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP/Getty Images

The European Commission is cautiously dipping a toe into the void left by U.S. President Donald Trump when he deleted an affirmation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's mutual defense commitment from his recent speech at NATO headquarters. And it's not just an initiative of Brussels bureaucrats: Germany, too, is clearly looking to conduct a more independent defense policy that isn't all about being a good U.S. ally.

The Commission on Wednesday extended its series of reflection papers on the future of Europe with a paper on offering scenarios for closer defense cooperation. "The Transatlantic relationship is evolving," says the document, signed by two Commission Vice Presidents, Federica Mogherini and Jyrki Katainen. "The onus of improving European security lies first of all in European hands." This statement echoes German Chancellor Angela Merkel's recent remarks about the need for Europeans to take their destiny into their own hands, and Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's words last year that "Europe can no longer afford to piggy-back on the military might of others."

Defense self-sufficiency is easier to discuss than to achieve. The European Union, including the U.K., spends less than half on defense than the U.S. One way to close the gap is for the 21 countries within the EU that are also NATO members to increase military spending to 2 percent of economic output, something that Trump demands as a condition of further U.S. protection. The Commission offers an alternative: Better coordination of defense spending and establishing a single market for the military industry, which would foster competition and eventually lead to a more manageable arsenal (currently, EU armies use 178 weapon systems compared with 30 in the U.S.).

It's the norm for EU reflection papers to offer several scenarios for the future. The defense paper makes clear its support for the deepest degree of military integration -- a common defense and security system with EU-led military operations that are independent of NATO, and EU-level cybersecurity, border and coast guards. Such a system, with joint procurement financed from the EU budget, should produce economies of scale. The Commission is already proposing, for the first time, a defense allocation in the 2017 EU budget -- at this point, a mere 25 million euros ($28 million) for joint defense research, to be expanded to 500 million euros a year after 2020. There is also a plan for a fund that will leverage 1 billion euros a year contributed by member states to produce 5 billion euros a year in joint investment in military hardware.

The numbers, of course, are tiny compared with the total defense spending of some 227 billion euros a year. They are as understated as the establishment of a small joint headquarters to run the EU's non-executive military missions, those that involve training and advice rather than fighting. And all the Commission proposals stress that they are meant to strengthen, not weaken NATO cooperation. But they only look timid; in reality, they are about laying the groundwork for an alternative safety system that will be needed if practical U.S. steps match Trump's rhetoric.

That's not really happening yet. Take the Trump administration's proposal that the European Reassurance Initiative -- an allocation meant to bolster European resistance to a potential Russian aggression -- be boosted to $4.8 billion from $3.4 billion. European governments assume the U.S. isn't protecting Europe out of altruism but rather as part of its own national security interests. But since these can now change with Trump's mercurial moods, an alternative mutual defense infrastructure needs to be put in place carefully, without irritating the U.S. That's what the Commission is trying to do.

The alternative to NATO is also necessary because the alliance is no longer the most comfortable framework for northern European countries, whose relations with a key NATO member, Turkey, have cooled in recent months. On Wednesday, Germany announced it would be moving its 260 personnel and its reconnaissance planes to Jordan from Turkey's Incirlik airbase, where they've been stationed to conduct reconnaissance flights over Syria. The Turkish government wouldn't let German parliament members visit the troops at Incirlik because of numerous political disagreements with Germany, so Merkel's cabinet retaliated. It has also led several European countries in rejecting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's invitation to hold the next NATO summit in Istanbul.

Though NATO's popularity in Germany has been increasing, a majority of Germans, according to a recent Pew Global study, wouldn't want their country to defend a NATO ally if it got into a military conflict with Russia. So Merkel has a political license to act outside NATO, whose leaders now include, from her point of view, two of the most irritating figures in global politics -- Trump and Erdogan. As in other areas of EU cooperation, she can expect support from French President Emmanuel Macron, who recently appointed Sylvie Goulard, a strong European federalist, as his defense minister.

NATO is not breaking up, the EU is not building an army and Germany is not really looking to develop a nuclear capability, as some conservatives in Germany have proposed. Rather, a new, less restrictive framework is being explored for European defense. If the U.S. and Turkey eventually stop rocking the boat, it can at least save the EU members some money and make their militaries more compatible and more battle-ready.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

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Leonid Bershidsky at lbershidsky@bloomberg.net

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Therese Raphael at traphael4@bloomberg.net