—“I can’t see anywhere in P that conflicts with my strong belief in Republicanism. Am I correct?”— Robert

You can create any form of government with P-law you just have to state it truthfully and reciprocally in a constitution.

A republican government refers to elected representatives. But that is all. It doesn’t tell us who does the electing. And it doesn’t state the strengths, weaknesses, and limits of republican governments.

But the limit of any democratic government is homogeneity and scale. To create prosperity we incrementally add to the division of labor. As the division of labor increases the division of political interest diverges. The homogeneity of the people limits the conflict between those interests and the heterogeneity of the people increases the heterogeneity of those interests.

So heterogeneity breaks down democratic processes and generates demand for authority instead. When the democratic process fails, people resort to political activism outside of the government as we see today at the cost of truth, reciprocity, harmony and the civil society creating the chaos we see today.

We are too tolerant of competitors to rule of law (false promise, baiting into hazard), homogeneity, and markets in everything, including markets in political representatives as proxies for markets for political policy. We should be ruthlessly intolerant of those competitors.

The general presumption was that we would elect people who were demonstrably capable in the making of policy (the senate as the professionals) and people who were capable in limiting the popular acceptability of policy (house of representatives as the jury) together continuing the adversarialism of our ancestral argument before the jury – but the house was given too much power, and changing the constitution creating the popular election of senators destroyed the professionalism of the senate, and gave via positiva power to the jury (house).

The optimum form of representative government is rule of law of natural law, constitutional monarchy as judge of last resort (veto, nullification, dismissal power), a cabinet of professional executives (appointed by the senate vetoed by the monarchy), and houses of parliament including one for regions, one for business and industry, and either one family under one household one vote, or two houses separated into labor and mothers, if under one person one vote. The constitution fully enumerates rights and obligations, and requires strict construction of legislation and regulation, and that the court does not veto the legislation and regulation, and that the monarchy does not veto the legislation and regulation. In P-Law we correctly label legislation as ‘contracts of the commons’. There is only one law, and and the findings of the law under that law.

The alternative optimum form of government would eliminate the representatives and therefore the power of political parties and special interests, and provide the people with collective(propositional) and transactional (line item) veto. This is the optimum form of government and is now possible due to technology. This would eliminate the house of representatives, and limit the senate to representatives of the governors of the several states OR, use the governors of the several states as the senators.

The constitution and the law provide a sliding scale of authority from the senate (republic-production) in ordinary times, the monarchy in times of war(concentration), and the houses or people in times of windfalls (redistribution) which is a minor improvement on the roman model.

This entire system is predicated upon a universal militia, a constitution of natural law that they swear to defend, and an independent judiciary sufficiently self-auditing, and sufficiently fearful of the militia that the court can adjudicate disputes under the law.