Sunday was the first time in 2016 that I was happy to be wrong about an important election. While I had predicted both the UK referendum and the US presidential elections to be close, I had not expected Brexit or Donald Trump to win. I did expect Norbert Hofer to win the re-run of the Austrian presidential elections, however, and was happily surprised at Alexander Van der Bellen’s quite comfortable victory.

Whatever the reasons for Hofer’s defeat – his speculation about an Öxit or Nigel Farage’s support of him – the results give us a chance to put the rise of rightwing populism into perspective and, more importantly, to try to change the increasingly self-defeating narrative surrounding it.

It’s important first to acknowledge that Hofer achieved the best result of any populist radical right candidate in an established European democracy. His 46.2% of the national vote is significantly above the best electoral result of his own party, the Austrian Freedom party (FPÖ), which had already achieved a stunning 26.9% in the 1999 parliamentary elections.

It is also well above the current FPÖ support in the polls (roughly 35%) and the highest results of any populist radical right party in an established European democracy: 29.4% for the Swiss People’s party (SVP) in 2015. In short, this is no time for complacency. One battle is won but the war over liberal democracy is still very much on.

Within the new reality of an embattled liberal democracy, it is important to note that a populist radical right candidate has still not won a true electoral majority in any established democracy in the postwar era. Even Trump was, by American standards, handsomely defeated by Hillary Clinton in the popular vote. At the latest count Clinton received more than 2 million votes than Trump, which means she beat him by 2%. That is almost five times bigger than the margin with which Al Gore lost the presidency in the highly contested elections of 2000.

The first important lesson to learn from this is that (angry) white men are not the voice of the people. After almost every election in which a populist radical right candidate or party does well, the media adopts an essentially populist frame in which “the political establishment” is claimed to be “out of touch” with “the people”. These (real) people are almost exclusively the core support base of the populist radical right – that is (nativist) white working-class men.

But the fact of the matter is that white working-class men are only a small minority of the electorate – even of the electorates of the more successful populist radical right parties. In fact, in most European countries white men are a minority of the population – and increasingly of the working class too. The fact that white men are still portrayed as the voice of the people says a lot about the media and punditry, which continue to be dominated by (older) white men.

But not only are nativist white men not the voice of the people, in both the Austrian and US presidential elections the majority of the voters supported candidates with an explicitly inclusive and positive socio-cultural message. Neither Clinton nor Van der Bellen pandered to the populist radical right by adopting nativist-light policies or rhetoric. They stood for a different Austria and America, inclusive and tolerant. And the majority of the people voted for that programme. Despite years of Islamophobic and xenophobic messages from much of the media, and the new political correctness that talks of a “failed multiculturalism”.

Rather than seeing Clinton and Van der Bellen as anomalies, blips in an inevitable trend towards populist radical right dominance, liberal democratic parties and politicians of all persuasions should learn lessons from their successes.

Similarly the continued popularity and power of Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, despite the now dominant media narrative of “an embattled leader”, shows that a pro-refugee policy can be successfully defended, even when you almost stand alone.

Copying populist messages may work for one or two elections, if that, but will inflict lasting damage on liberal democracy in the long run. The vast majority of the people are looking for convincing and consistent policies that address the realities of today’s challenges in an inclusive and positive way.

Populist radical right parties will remain a political reality for years, if not decades to come, particularly in the countries where they were already successful before the recent economic and refugees crises, but their core support is relatively limited. Liberal democratic parties should not sacrifice the interests and values of the majority of the people to endear themselves to the radical right. This hardly ever works anyway. As Jean-Marie Le Pen noted many decades ago: the people prefer the original over the copy. They will mainly take the pandering of liberal democratic parties as evidence that the illiberal democratic parties were right all along and that “the establishment” only acts when pressured by a strong populist radical right.

The past two years have been a catalyst of a longer ongoing transformation of western societies and politics. At the electoral level these have been the decrease in support for liberal democratic parties, the growing support for populist parties, and the (sometimes sharp) decrease in turnout. The coming years don’t simply have to be a continuation of this. But in order to prevent it, liberal democrats must learn the right lessons from the past – which, incidentally, are not those of the populist radical right ones. This starts by putting the rise of the far right in proper perspective, and by creating an inspiring, rather than a defeatist, narrative.