Automatic budget sequestration cut deeply into the U.S. Air Force’s training in 2012. Air Combat Command got just $3.1 billion—three-quarters of what it needed to fully train the thousands of pilots flying the command’s 1,600 F-15, F-16 and F-22 fighters, A-10 attack jets and B-1 bombers.

So the command did something radical—and with far-reaching consequences as American air power retools for fighting high-tech foes following more than decade bombing insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Air Combat Command stripped certain airplanes of many of their missions, thus cutting back on the number of flight hours a particular pilot needed to be officially war-ready. Air-to-air dogfighting and low-altitude maneuvering suddenly became much rarer skills.

Perhaps most interestingly, the command essentially barred F-16s—at a thousand strong, America’s most numerous fighter—from engaging any enemy jet newer than a 1970s-vintage MiG-23.

The mission cuts originated in a May 2012 conversation between four generals—ACC boss Mike Hostage, his operations director Charles Lyon, Donald Hoffman from Air Force Materiel Command and Air Mobility Command’s Raymond Johns.

Hoffman asked Hostage whether, in light of sequestration cuts, the Air Force could finally dispose of its obsolete LANTIRN infrared navigation pods and free up the related maintenance funds.

“From this initial question, a broader question emerged,” Air Combat Command recalls in its official history for 2012, a heavily-redacted copy of which War Is Boring obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

Johns and Lyon joined the conversation. Johns wanted to retire other aging hardware to save money. Lyon’s idea was to eliminate training.

Lyon proceeded to ask the generals in charge of numbered air forces—each of which usually includes several wings and potentially hundreds of planes—which “systems, skills and tactics” they though were no longer important. “For example, low-altitude weapon-delivery or low-level navigation.”

“How good do B-1 aircrews need to be at running around in formation at low altitude?” ACC vice commander Gen. William Rew asked. “They can do it, it’s challenging and it’s hard to do well. But it may not be tactically relevant.”

Based on the feedback, Air Combat Command narrowed the missions it assigns to many planes—and by extension the flying hours pilots spend preparing for those mission.

When it all shook out, Air Combat Command’s roughly 60 B-1 bombers mostly stopped flying low-level attacks—and the command’s hundreds of F-16s gave up a lot of their dogfighting responsibilities.