Last week, the Washington Post reported that the White House is considering a plan that would not only escalate U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, but also allow the Department of Defense to set troop levels there, a departure that veers into the president's constitutional duty as commander-in-chief. The report comes on the heels of a similar announcement authorizing Defense to set troop levels in Iraq and Syria. These are significant departures from standard practice: In short, President Trump is abdicating the office of commander-in-chief of the United States Armed Forces.

There are a finite number of troops available for deployment. When the Pentagon sets troop levels for one theater of operations (much less three), it is in fact making personnel decisions for the entire world. And by ceding this authority, Trump isn't just allowing generals to determine the number of boots on the ground. He is giving away the power to dictate the intensity of American involvement in any given conflict to a department that is not privy to the wider needs and priorities of American foreign policy.

The founders, with the histories of Caesar and Cromwell in mind, never intended for the U.S. to have a permanent standing military. Armies hold vast power, and centralized power can destroy a republic. For precisely this reason, when Congress created the position of Secretary of Defense after World War II, it mandated that the person be a civilian at least 10 years removed from military service. (The required wait time was later shortened to seven years.)

Trump is giving away the power to dictate the intensity of American involvement in conflict.

Yet today, current or recently retired military officers wield a remarkable level of influence and authority over our foreign policy. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who still maintains a cult-like following among uniformed troops, retired from the Marine Corps less than four years ago; he received a waiver to be confirmed. Marine Gen. John Kelly became Secretary of Homeland Security a year to the week after retiring from the military. And less than three years after he was fired by President Obama, retired Army Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn served three and a half weeks as Trump's National Security Advisor. He was temporarily replaced by retired Army Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg and then permanently by Army Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster. The proposed Afghanistan escalation is now known among White House staff as "McMaster's War."

Generals see the world as "structured, hierarchical, strategic and operational," Gordon Adams, an American University professor who worked on national security issues in the Clinton administration, wrote in The New York Times. They are not trained to consider statecraft beyond the use of force, and it is irresponsible to entrust huge swaths of that policy agenda to them. It also diminishes the role of the civilian leaders who are typically tasked with considering a broad range of national priorities, not simply the ability to achieve martial victory. "The uniformed leadership is certainly what's driving the train, but how does that square with the political will of the country?" says Phillip Carter, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.

Secretary of Defense James Mattis Getty Images

The State department, CIA, FBI, Treasury, and many other agencies have important voices and distinct priorities in determining American foreign policy. History is littered with examples of disastrous consequences of the balance of input skewing too far toward the military, from Iraq to Vietnam to Thermopylae. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy was inundated with advice from his uniformed advisors to unilaterally strike Soviet missile sites, a recommendation that likely would have led to nuclear war. Instead, he listened to his attorney general—his brother Bobby—and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Civilian advice is not always better, but it is always necessary. In Trump's policy process, those civilian voices are increasingly sidelined.

Adams argues that this week's announcement that the U.S. will arm Kurdish forces in Syria shows the imbalance between military and civilian experts is already affecting our international relationships. "As far as I know, there doesn't seem to be much input from the State department side about how that will affect our relationship with the Turks," he says. The decision, rather, is "largely based in McMaster and Mattis in their territory. Who cares what Rex Tillerson thinks?"

House Armed Services Committee member Rep. John Garamendi (D-CA) agrees. "It is equally important that non-military advisers also be involved in a decision about war," he says. "Right now, [Jared] Kushner is the outside advisor."

The uniformed leadership is certainly what's driving the train, but how does that square with the political will of the country?

When Trump began rolling out his cabinet soon after he was elected, the number of recently retired military officers he appointed was met by a chorus of reluctance. Even Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-AZ), a former Marine who served under Mattis in Iraq, opposed his appointment. "I have absolute admiration for General Mattis," says retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who served with Mattis in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. "But he will never stop being a general. I don't think anybody can."

Managing troop levels "is the purview of the president of the United States. This is something the president should never delegate, particularly to a general serving as Secretary of Defense," Eaton continues. "You have to have a skeptic somewhere."

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