Imagine the reaction in Britain if armed Islamist jihadists were to burst in on a Sunday church service in a Surrey village, spraying automatic weapon fire at the congregation and killing the vicar and at least 23 worshippers. Horror and fury would be unconfined. The attack would be an immediate worldwide media sensation.

This is exactly what happened to Protestant churchgoers in Pansi, a village in northern Burkina Faso, on 16 February – though you would hardly know it, judging by the ensuing international silence. The increasing frequency of such atrocities in Africa’s Sahel region is one possible explanation for this apparent indifference, although there are others.

In January, Islamist militants killed dozens of villagers in Silgadji, in Burkina Faso’s Soum province. Days later, 20 people died in Lamdamol, a village north of the capital, Ouagadougou. Victims are reportedly chosen for their faith, their links to government, or their ethnicity. Whatever the “reason”, the effect is the same: pure terror.

Burkina Faso is the new hotspot in an expanding confrontation between Islamists and the ostensibly western-backed governments of the Sahel, a vast, semi-arid area south of the Sahara stretching from Senegal and Mauritania on the Atlantic seaboard through Mali, Niger and Chad to Sudan and Eritrea on the Red Sea.

It may not have made headlines in Europe and the US, but about 1,800 people died in insurgent violence in Burkina Faso last year. About 500,000 are internally displaced. The UN warns it could become “another Syria”. Add in Mali and Niger, and the 2019 death toll rises to an estimated 4,000, a fivefold increase since 2016. Millions more are in need of food assistance.

What began in 2012 as a localised, part-separatist revolt in northern Mali has spread inexorably. The Sahel is now seen as the new battlefront between Islamist extremists and the west. West African coastal states fear contagion. And Isis and al-Qaida affiliates, exploiting ungoverned spaces, endemic poverty, religious and tribal tensions, and disruption caused by climate change, have a growing presence.

In the Sahel, as elsewhere, Macron is trying to fill the western leadership void. Right now, it looks to be a losing battle

In other words, the terrorist menace that first grabbed global attention in Afghanistan in 2001, and was later reconfigured in Iraq and Syria, has found a fresh centre of operations. Given recent history, it would be a big mistake to think this supposedly distant threat has no bearing on the future security of London, Paris and New York.

If Sahelian suffering is not a sufficient spur to action, self-interested calculations of this type surely should be. Yet the relative inertia of western governments, including Britain’s, suggests otherwise. The rising threat is widely recognised. But effective, joined-up action to combat it is lacking. France, with its colonial past and continuing Francophone links, has tried to show a lead. It sent 4,500 troops to Mali in 2013 and recently added reinforcements. In January, France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, met leaders of the so-called G5 Sahel countries. At the end of February there was a follow-up summit hosted by Mauritania.

The problem is partly one of resources – of limited capabilities, logistical support and training. A plan by the G5 – Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad – to form a 5,000-strong joint military force has been delayed by lack of funds and equipment.

Other African countries have failed to step up, although the African Union (AU) claims that is changing. The UN maintains a 13,000-strong peacekeeping force in Mali, and the EU has allocated €8bn in development aid to G5 countries, but instability continues to rise.

Sudan and Chad, both negatively affected by the Libyan war, are particularly vulnerable. Sudan’s efforts to democratise following last year’s revolution have had scant reward in terms of western aid and sanctions relief. If disillusion sets in, an Islamist counter-coup in Khartoum could result.

“A surge in mobilisation, coordination or prioritisation is necessary,” Jean-Yves Le Drian, France’s foreign minister, told February’s summit. He said the overall aim was to integrate security and development.

Le Drian’s interlocutors left him in no doubt about their pressing need. “More than ever the Sahel requires heightened and coordinated attention from states in the region and the international community to break the spiral of violence,” said Mauritania’s president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani. “We urgently need concrete victories against terrorism,” said the AU’s Moussa Faki.

The problem is political as much as practical. While Italy joined Franceat the summit in pledging to do more, Britain’s military involvement is minimal, as is Germany’s. Controversy also attends Macron’s interventions, which some find unpleasantly reminiscent of colonial times. Critics suggest France’s support for the status quo underpins undemocratic, abusive and corrupt governance – and that its approach relies too much on diktat and brute force. Far from vanquishing insurgents, it could boost them.

To these contradictions must be added the quixotic attitude of the Trump administration. American forces are no longer directly engaged in the Sahel, after sustaining casualties in Niger in 2017. But about 1,000 US troops provide vital back-up, including transport, air refuelling and drone surveillance. This support could be lost under developing Pentagon plans that envisage the withdrawal of all 5,000 US soldiers based in Africa. US ground commanders fully appreciate the Sahel terror threat, but for Donald Trump, who shows zero interest in Africa, the priorities are Iran and possible future confrontation with China.

Trump plainly does not care about Burkina Faso. Yet to be fair, the same criticism could be levelled at many in Europe. In the Sahel, as elsewhere, Macron is trying to fill the western leadership void. Right now, it looks to be a losing battle.

• The headline of this piece was amended on 1 March 2020 because an earlier version incorrectly referred to “Islamic insurgents” when “Islamist insurgents” was meant.