It’s hard to write a more poignant article on the football strategy behind the slanting nose tackle and the 3-tech as invented by Chuck Noll in Pittsburgh than has already appeared on this site, written by Raf here.

That article addresses how Kansas City coached by Hank Stram used the Unbalanced 43, a turn on the Even 43, to pilot themselves to a Superbowl, and then how the Unbalanced 43 developed further in to the Under/Over defenses written about here. That Kansas City team also inspired the Oakland Raiders, as coached by John Madden, to use the Unbalanced 43. They had the addition of a drop back Defensive Tackle, themselves a harbinger of the early 34.

A funny thing happened to the 43 and the Under/Over defenses of Pittsburgh after the 1970s in their rise to prominence in the late 1990s NFL. They became irrelevant. After “Mean” Joe Greene retired, even Chuck Noll began running the 34 in Pittsburgh. When Tony Dungy was hired to be the secondary coach in Pittsburgh in 1981, he coached the 43 for one year before they switched to the 34 in 1982. By 1989 when Jimmy Johnson came to the Dallas Cowboys, 20 of 28 NFL teams were running the 34 and many of the others were using a variant of Buddy Ryan’s defense. Greene and his defense were firmly part of the past.

The Miami 43 was not anticipated to do well in established NFL circles. It had been successful for Johnson at Oklahoma State, where he recruited athletes over established position players because he could not out-recruit Oklahoma for the better position players. In the NFL Johnson’s players were seen as undersized, vulnerable to the run, and too simple for the NFL QB’s. Johnson’s scheme was not apart of the Buddy Ryan revolution. 34s and Buddy Ryan’s scheme had all been spending the last decade advancing blitz schemes and disguised coverages. In contrast, Jimmy Johnson’s scheme was simple, easy to teach and out dated looking running a 43. Critics probably saw a few of the advantages it offered but gave it no heed.

Reviewing NFL Philosophy, the essential problems in philosophical approaches to managing the game often lie in the segregation of phases. The head coach usually comes from either defense or offense and is not competent in the other. Jimmy Johnson had a uniquely holistic view of game planning, based on scoring quickly and following it up with a pass rush made of well rested guys like Charles Haley. Johnson spoke a lot about special teams, and according to news writers of the time he’d spend a full 1/3 of practice time on special teams. Critics said Johnson’s defense was vulnerable to the run, but opponents were rarely in a tactical situation where running made sense. His special teams dedication always gave him a slight advantage in field position.

Jimmy Johnson was not a strong coach on offense, and was fortunate to get Norv Turner. Norv’s deep passing scheme had grown up in the NFL has was fully mature when it hit Dallas. Dallas is remembered for it’s power running, most notably the Draw. Fans see the Draw and think it’s relying on the passing game to prop up the run but in fact the Draw is one of the simpler Power Runs. It allows the Offensive Lineman to square up his target and catch the defensive lineman off balance. It’s also easy to teach, has a deception that’s relevant today, and a long track record of success. Norv Turner’s power running suited the Dallas personnel well and helped them dominate the NFL, using the key plans of scoring early and pass rushing late. The Miami 43 was the perfect compliment to the scoring bonanza fielded by the Dallas Triplets.