It has been apparent for a long time that the basic model for the international management of refugees is broken. The scale of the crisis caused by the Syrian civil war has only made its failure more evident, and the convening of a major Syrian donor conference in London this week represents a very belated recognition of the urgent need to change it. The old idea was that the neighbours of countries whose difficulties were generating refugees should host them, while the international community, meaning in practice the world’s 40 or so richest nations, would pay for the housing and healthcare and other services. The neighbours would provide the space, while the distant well-off would cover the costs.

The immediate problem was, and remains, that while international law forbids the return of refugees to their original country if they would be in danger on their return, there is no international law forcing wealthy states to pay up. In practice, some are generous, some are less than generous, and some give hardly anything. And it is typical in these situations that countries make financial commitments, but then fail to write the cheques. This matters less if a crisis is soon over, before compassion fatigue sets in and before other problems distract donor governments. But when the crisis grinds on, the financial shortfall gets worse. As more refugees flow in, fewer funds arrive – the worst possible combination. In Jordan, for example, the Jordan response plan has received only 34% of the required funds, while the United Nations high commissioner for refugees 2015 appeal received only 20%.

It is not only a matter of there not being enough money. The other fundamental flaw in the model is that in most of the host countries, refugees are not allowed to work, largely because of the political problems which arise when local people see newcomers taking “their” jobs. In practice, some refugees do work, including minors, but in the black economy and on low wages and without whatever labour protections the country concerned affords its own people. Enforced idleness for some, illegal and precarious occupations for others: as many observers have pointed out, this is a recipe for despair, and, of course, swells a second migratory wave moving out of the affected region to seek haven elsewhere. These people are not fleeing physical danger – they have already escaped that – but the psychological and social void into which current refugee policy has thrust them. Legal work opportunities could change their perceptions.

The new seriousness about refugee finance – although final judgment must wait on the fulfilment of the pledges made by Britain and others in London on Thursday – owes much to the panic in Europe over the refugee influx. That the donors have ulterior motives is obvious, but that does not mean that a new deal for refugees within the region is not desirable. Better treatment there and better treatment here are not incompatible. Both should be objectives.

The most promising single idea, touched on by Gordon Brown in his proposal for a new Marshall plan, is for economic zones. Ideally they would be initially financed by international agencies and donor governments. Both foreign and local firms would participate. Jordan’s Wana Institute, assisted by two distinguished British academics, has produced a pioneering paper on the subject. The zones might enjoy certain tax and trade advantages. They would employ both refugees and local people, thus creating a win-win situation that would defuse local resentment. Refugees could maintain the skills they brought with them, and some would acquire new skills and qualifications which they could take back with them when and if they are able to go home. Better schooling for children should be another essential element in the package.

As the donors conferred, the fate of Aleppo hung in the balance. The prospect of another 300,000 refugees fleeing to Turkey from that city underlines the fact that the real solution to the refugee crisis will only be found when the root causes of the war are addressed. As the breakdown of the Geneva talks has just shown, addressing them will need much more than summitry. But, in the meantime, some of the effects on those who have been forced out of their country can be mitigated: by more money, more imagination, more sympathy, and more determination.