FOR most shoppers, January is a good time to pick up a bargain. Not for football clubs. In 2002 FIFA, football’s governing body, introduced international “transfer windows”. Rather than clubs being able to buy and sell players at will, business was confined to two set periods. One window opens during the close season, and a second for a month in mid-campaign. In much of Europe, this means transfer deals must be done either in July and August or in January. The thinking behind the window is sound. It helps stability, ensuring that smaller teams’ squads are not picked over if they begin the season well. And it puts more emphasis on the skill of managers. Once the window closes, they must rely on tactical nous and motivation, rather than the chairman’s chequebook, to make the team succeed. It also makes January a bad time to buy. Few clubs want to lose their best players halfway through a season. And with such a limited buying period, clubs sometimes panic. The biggest spenders are often those threatened with relegation, or underachievers whose finances depend on qualification for the Champions League, a lucrative European competition for clubs that finish toward the top of their leagues. Hence, there is little value to be had for those shopping in the January sales. During the window that closed on January 31st, English Premier League (EPL) clubs’ gross transfer spending was a relatively modest £120m ($189m), according to Deloitte, a professional services firm (see chart). This is just 20% of the total money spent on new players for the season. Last year, clubs had an even more parsimonious winter; just £60m was spent, or 11% of the season’s total.

This might be telling. Two years ago a record £225m was shelled out. A fair chunk of this was splurged on just two players. Chelsea, which was underperforming, paid £50m to Liverpool for Fernando Torres in the belief he would help them launch a late title challenge. This was the biggest deal ever between two British clubs. Liverpool, meanwhile, spent £35m on another striker, Newcastle United’s Andy Carroll. Both fees were, to some degree at least, inflated because they occurred in January. Despite mammoth price tags, both strikers flopped. So perhaps such lessons have made clubs more cautious. Still, it is surprising that more was not spent during this last window, says Paul Rawnsley, the director of Deloitte’s Sports Business Group. Thanks to a new deal, EPL clubs will receive between £20m-£30m more television revenue next season, an increase of around 50%. But teams may have been persuaded of the virtues of moderation because of the new “financial fair play” rules that are due to come into force in next season. Although complicated, in essence these state that clubs must break even or face being barred from European competitions. Importantly, benefactors' cash does not count as revenue, so clubs with a sugar daddy should not, in theory, have an advantage. But some worry that UEFA, European football’s governing body, lacks the will to exclude a club that breaks its rules, particularly if it is a big one, such as Real Madrid, Chelsea or Manchester City. Still clubs are at least paying lip service to the rules, even if just as a handy tool with which to drive down players’ wage demads. Cash over glory Weighed against this is the unthinkable cost of being relegated from the Premier League. Mr Rawnsley estimates that a club in the Championship, the second tier of English football, can expect at least £40m less revenue than one in the top division. Even though relegated clubs receive a “parachute payment” of £48m over four years, so that they might absorb this shock, such high stakes can encourage clubs who are at the bottom of the table at Christmas to gamble millions on players that they believe to be good enough to give them a chance of survival.

The problem is that such highly-rated players do not usually fancy the idea of joining a relegation scrap. Unless, of course, the lucre sways them. Queens Park Rangers (QPR) are currently at the bottom of the EPL and odds-on to be relegated. But the club has deep pockets. It is owned by Tony Fernandes, the multi-millionaire founder of AirAsia. QPR reportedly offered to treble the wages of Peter Odemwingie (pictured), a West Bromwich Albion striker, in an attempt to lure him to the club. West Brom, 11 places above them in the league, declined the offer, prompting the undignified spectacle of Mr Odemwingie hotfooting it down from the Black Country to try and conduct personal negotiations. As a player must have the permission of his current club to talk to an interested party, he found QPR’s gates locked when he arrived. The peeved striker was forced to return to West Brom, where he can expect a hostile reception from fans.

QPR, meanwhile, did manage to spend over £20m on half a dozen new players to add to a squad already considered bloated and overpriced. This seems to be a reckless gamble with the club’s future. If it avoids relegation, it will have been worth it. However, given its lowly league position, it is much more likely that it will drop out of the EPL and face financial meltdown, from which it could take many years to recover. It will not be the first. Portsmouth, Leeds, Doncaster: recent football history is littered with the shells of clubs whose ambition bore little relation to their means.