Anti-Dialectics For Beginners

Preliminary Remarks -- Please read First!

Hard though this might be for some of my critics to believe, nothing said below is intended to undermine Historical Materialism [HM] -- a theory I fully accept -- or, for that matter, revolutionary socialism. I am as committed to the self-emancipation of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat as I was when I first became a revolutionary nearly thirty-five years ago. My aim is simply to assist in the scientific development of Marxism by helping demolish a dogma that has in my opinion seriously damaged our movement from its inception, Dialectical Materialism [DM] -- or, in its more political form, 'Materialist Dialectics' [MD].

Naturally, these are highly controversial claims, especially since they are being advanced by a Marxist. The reason why I am airing them is partly explained below, but in much more detail in my other Essays . Exactly why I began this project is explained here .

Some readers might wonder how I can claim to be both a Leninist and a Trotskyist given the highly critical things I have to say about philosophical ideas that have been an integral part of these two traditions from their foundation. In response, readers are asked to consider an analogy: we can surely be highly critical of Newton's mystical ideas even while accepting the scientific nature of his other work. The same applies here.

[And no, I am not comparing myself with Newton!]

I count myself as a Marxist, a Leninist and a Trotskyist since I fully accept, not just HM -- providing Hegel's baleful influence has been fully excised --, but the political ideas associated with the life and work of Marx, Engels, Luxembourg, Lenin and Trotsky.

Some might think that this approach must compromise HM itself -- in that would be like a "clock without a spring". The reverse of this is in fact the case. As I aim to show below : if DM were true, change would in fact actually be impossible .

Again, some might wonder why so much effort has been devoted to what many consider a rather peripheral issue, something that isn't really of central importance either to building revolutionary socialism or the struggle to change society. This isn't, of course, how Engels, Plekhanov, Luxembourg, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, or Mao saw DM. Indeed, it is the exact opposite; they regarded this theory as integral to their politics. [Marx's name has been omitted from that list for reasons explored here and here.]

Nevertheless, it is my contention that an adherence to DM is one of the reasons why Dialectical Marxism is now virtually a by-word for failure and Marxist parties the world over have been and still are as divisive as they are sectarian. Indeed, it is my further contention (supported by evidence and argument -- on that see below , but in more detail here ) that this theory has helped ensure such parties remain small and waste valuable time on internecine warfare and petty bickering, thus leaving the ruling-class free to laugh all the way to their next attack on our side.

[Notice the use of the phrase "one of the reasons", above. I am not blaming all our woes on this theory! Also, note the use of the word "Dialectical" before the word "Marxism". What I am not claiming is that Marxism itself has been a failure; the non-dialectical version hasn't been road-tested yet.]

In addition, I contend that DM helps insulate militant minds from the easily confirmed fact that Dialectical Marxism has been such a long-term failure, which only succeeds in preventing the scientific development of revolutionary socialism (for reasons also explored below).

All this is quite apart from the clear impression created in the minds of working people the world over that revolutionaries are, at best, a political joke , an opinion that has penetrated so deep that it is now a widely accepted cliché . I believe -- and I think I can show -- that DM is indirectly responsible for this, too. Of course, all this is in addition to the all-too-familiar stereotyping of revolutionaries by the capitalist media, some of which is based on these self-inflicted wounds -- if we are honest.

Naturally, this means that it is now difficult for our movement to be taken seriously by friend and foe alike.

Once again, these are highly contentious allegations, but in view of the fact that Dialectical Marxism has been such an abject, long-term failure we have no option but to think things afresh -- like the radicals we claim to be.

This Essay is devoted to that end. May I suggest, therefore, to those who find the above allegations and accusations far too controversial to accept (or who think them patently false and thus are tempted to reject them out-of-hand) that they shelve such qualms until they have examined the arguments and evidence I have presented at this site -- outlined briefly below, but in much more detail in my other Essays .

Fair-minded readers will I am sure agree that in what follows I have at least constructed a prima facie case against the philosophical theory early Marxists imported into the workers' movement -- a case that is being advanced with the sole purpose of making revolutionary socialism more relevant, less sectarian, and hence far more successful.

[The arguments summarised below are further expanded upon in Essay Sixteen , which is a much longer précis of my core ideas. Readers who want to know more are directed there after they have read through the material presented here.]

Finally, when reading the material presented below some comrades have asked; "Well, what's your theory, then?" In fact, I reject all philosophical theories as incoherent non-sense -- I have outlined my reasons for saying that, here. In which case, I have no alternative philosophical theory to offer -- nor do we need one.

[Please note: this doesn't mean I reject scientific theory! Indeed, as noted above, I fully accept HM, a scientific theory of history and how to change it.]

~~~~~oOo~~~~~

Please note that this Essay deals with very basic issues, even at the risk of over-simplification; to repeat, this is an Introductory Essay!

It has only been ventured upon because several younger comrades, who weren't well-versed in Philosophy, wanted a very simple guide to my principle arguments against DM.

In that case, it isn't aimed at experts!

Anyone who objects to the apparently superficial nature of the material presented below must take these caveats into account or navigate away from this page. The material below isn't intended for them.

It is worth underlining this point since I still encounter comrades on Internet discussion boards who, despite the above warning, still think this Essay is a definitive statement of my ideas.

It isn't!

Several of the aforementioned critics, who have plainly ignored the above comments and who therefore think that the material below represents my considered views, when it doesn't, should perhaps read the following more carefully:

This Essay is aimed solely at novices and those who want a basic introduction to my main objections to DM. It isn't meant to be comprehensive -- nor is it.

As noted above, those who want more detail should consult Essay Sixteen and/or the main Essays published at the main site.

Any who still find this Essay either too long or too difficult might prefer to read two much shorter summaries of my ideas posted here and here .

Finally, I have had to assume that readers already possess a rudimentary grasp of DM. Anyone unfamiliar with this theory/method should read this , or this -- or, indeed, my short summary, here . A much more comprehensive account can be found here .

Main Objections

Formal Logic [FL] And Change

Dialectical Fairy-Tales

Unfortunately, Dialectical Marxists tell fibs about Formal Logic [FL], and they persist in this even after they have been told that what they have to say about logic is woefully inaccurate, if not downright misleading.

Indeed, they regularly write things like the following:

"Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless." [ Rob Sewell .]

"Formal categories, putting things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and development…because a static definition cannot cope with the way in which a new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.]

"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity....

"…If a thing is always and under all conditions equal or identical with itself, it can never be unequal or different from itself." [Novack (1971), p.20.]

[Many more quotes that say the same have been posted here.]

However, I have yet to see a single passage from a logic text (ancient or modern) that supports these allegations -- and I have been studying logic since the late 1970s. Certainly dialecticians have yet to produce even so much as one example!

And no wonder -- these allegations are completely false.

FL uses variables -- that is, it employs letters to stand for propositions, objects, processes and the like, all of which can and do change.

This handy formal device was invented by the very first logician we know of in the 'west', Aristotle (384-322BC). Indeed, Aristotle experimented with the use of variables approximately 1500 years before they were imported into mathematics by Muslim Algebraists , who in turn employed them several centuries before French mathematician and philosopher, René Descartes (1596-1650), began to use them in 'the west'.

This is what Professor Nidditch had to say about Aristotle's invention:

"One has to give Aristotle great credit for being fully conscious of this [i.e., of the need for a general account of inference -- RL] and for seeing that the way to general laws is by the use of variables, that is letters which are signs for every and any thing whatever in a certain range of things: a range of qualities, substances, relations, numbers or of any other sort or form of existence....

"If one keeps in mind that the Greeks were very uncertain about and very far from letting variables take the place of numbers or number words in algebra, which is why they made little headway in that branch of mathematics...then there will be less danger of Aristotle's invention of variables for use in Syllogistic being overlooked or undervalued. Because of this idea of his, logic was sent off from the very start on the right lines." [Nidditch (1998), pp.8-9. Italic emphasis in the original.]

Indeed, Engels himself said the following about this particular innovation having been introduced into mathematics:

"The turning point in mathematics was Descartes' variable magnitude. With that came motion and hence dialectics in mathematics, and at once, too, of necessity the differential and integral calculus…." [ Engels (1954) , p.258.]

Now, no one doubts that modern mathematics can handle change, so why dialecticians deny this of FL -- when it has always used variables -- is more than a little puzzling.

This is even more perplexing when we realise that if DM itself were 'true', change would be impossible .

Furthermore, as we will see in the next section, the 'Law of Identity' [LOI] doesn't in fact preclude change!

The 'Three Laws' Of FL

With very little variation between them, dialecticians often assert the following about FL:

"The 'fundamental laws of thinking' are considered to be three in number: 1) The law of identity; 2) the law of contradiction, and 3) the law of the excluded middle.

"The law of identity...states that 'A is A' or 'A = A'.

"The law of contradiction... -- 'A is not A' -- is merely a negative form of the first law.

"According to the law of the excluded middle...two opposing judgements that are mutually exclusive cannot both be wrong. Indeed, 'A is either B or non-B'. The truth of either of these two judgements necessarily means the falseness of the other, and vice versa. There is not, neither can there be, any middle." [Plekhanov (1908),

. Italics in the original.]

"The Aristotelian conception of the laws basic to correct thinking may be stated as follows:

"1. Law of Identity: Each existence is identical with itself. A is A.

"2. Law of Noncontradiction: Each existence is not different from itself. A is not non-A.

"3. Law of Excluded Middle: No existence can be both itself and different from itself. Any X is either A or non-A, but not both at once." [Somerville (1967), pp.44-45. Italics in the original.]

"The basic laws of formal logic are:

"1) The law of identity ('A' = 'A').

"2) The law of contradiction ('A' does not equal 'not-A').

"3) The law of the excluded middle ('A' does not equal 'B')." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.91 . In the above, quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site .]

"The basic principles of...Aristotelian or formal logic were the 'law of identity' and the 'law of non-contradiction'. The 'law of identity' stated, in symbolic terms, that A is equal to A, or an ounce of gold equals an ounce of gold.... The 'law of non-contradiction' stated that A cannot be equal to non-A, it makes no sense to say that an ounce of gold is not an ounce of gold." [Molyneux (2012), p.43. Quotation marks have been altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site . ]

Even a cursory examination of a handful of logic texts will reveal that not only are the above claims incorrect, not even Aristotle's logic was based on these so-called 'laws'! [Anyone who doubts this is encouraged to read (or, even better, study) Quine's Methods of Logic, or Bostock's Intermediate Logic (i.e, Quine (1982) and Bostock (1997) -- this links to a PDF) -- or, perhaps better still, check out this online recourse.]

To be sure, dialecticians regularly claim that Aristotle founded his logic on these principles, but they have yet to produce supporting evidence. In fact, Aristotle knew nothing of the LOI , which was a Medieval invention. [More on that here and here .]

The LOI will be examined presently, but the ' Law of Contradiction ' [LOC] merely entails that if one proposition is true, its contradictory (its negation) is false, and vice versa. [In some versions of mathematical logic , the LOC says that no contradiction can be true, but must be false.] However, the LOC says nothing about "equality", or, indeed, the lack of it, as Plekhanov, Woods and Grant, Molyneux, and a host of other dialecticians regularly assert -- once again, without even a cursory nod in the direction of substantiation.

Nor is there any connection between the so-called "negative" form of the LOI (i.e., "A cannot at the same time be A and Not-A ") and the LOC. The LOI concerns the alleged identity of an object with itself, while the LOC expresses the true/false connection (otherwise known as the " truth-functional link ") between a proposition and its negation. Hence, the LOC doesn't concern the relation between 'objects'.

Likewise, the ' Law of Excluded Middle ' [LEM] says nothing about objects being identical, or otherwise, merely that any proposition has to be either true or false; there is no third option.

[Any who think the LEM is defective in this regard (and that there can be a third option), should check this out and then perhaps think again. Moreover, there is no logical connection between the LOI and the other two 'laws', as the above dialecticians seem to think. On this, see my comments over at Wikipedia .]

Some claim that Quantum Mechanics [QM] has, among other things, refuted the LEM, but QM has merely forced us to reconsider what we should count as a scientific proposition. In that case, the LEM remains unaffected by QM.

And, contrary to what dialecticians often tell us, these 'laws' do not deny or preclude change , nor are they unable to cope with it. Indeed, we are only able to speak about change when we are clear about what is or what isn't true of whatever it is that is supposedly undergoing change.

In fact, as we will soon see , it is DM itself that can't cope with change!

The LOI has been no less mis-handled by DM-theorists. That is because they have unwisely derived their ideas about this 'law' from a German Idealist and Mystical Philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). [On that, see below, as well as here .]

The basic idea behind this misguided criticism of the LOI seems to be the following:

"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.... If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971), p.20. Paragraphs merged.]

This is incorrect. As noted above, the LOI doesn't preclude change, for if an object changes then anything identical to it will change equally quickly. If that weren't so, they can't have been identical to begin with! Moreover, if something changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self.

So, far from denying change, this 'law' allows us to determine if and when it has occurred. This is quite apart from the fact that Novack (along with many other DM-theorists) has plainly confused equality with identity!

[There is much more on this 'law', as well as Trotsky's and Hegel's misguided criticisms of it, here . The word "law" has been put in scare quotes since it is clear that this 'law' is in fact a misconstrued rule of language. Follow the above link for more details.]

Recently, John Molyneux had this to say about Marxism:

"Marxist materialism is repeatedly attacked by the method of oversimplifying and caricaturing it to the point where it is obviously false.…" [Molyneux (2012), p.36.]

He is right, but, that is precisely what Molyneux and other dialecticians constantly do with respect to FL!

As a result, anyone trained in logic will conclude that Marxist dialecticians are a woefully ignorant, dissembling bunch . In turn, this will inevitably have a negative effect on their opinion of Marxism itself. Apparently, DM-fans don't care about this.

This is quite apart from the fact that scientists have discovered trillions of absolutely identical objects in each microgram of matter -- on that see here.

Hegel's 'Logical' Howlers

As noted above, the criticisms of FL advanced by most dialecticians were borrowed from Hegel , who, alas, committed a series of egregious logical blunders which, to this day, dialecticians have failed to notice. In fact, committing these blunders was the only way that Hegel could make his 'system' even seem to work.

Many of his core 'logical' ideas have been destructively analysed here ; I have omitted that material from this Introductory Essay because of its more technical nature. However, a basic outline -- once again written for novices -- can be accessed here .

Unfortunately, these blunders completely undermine the legitimacy of 'Dialectical Logic' [DL]. Hegel's entire system is based on these errors -- some of which he himself inherited in a bowdlerised form from Medieval Theologians.

Naturally, this means that since DM itself is founded on these blunders (upside down or 'the right way up'), it enjoys absolutely no rational support, either.

I t is no surprise, therefore, to discover that DM has presided over 140+ years of almost total failure .

Motion Isn't Contradictory

According to Hegel, motion itself is a 'contradiction'. Unfortunately, dialecticians have bought into this rather odd idea. Here is Engels:

"...[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another[,] [t]hen we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152 .]

This an age-old confusion was derived from a paradox invented by an Ancient Greek mystic called Zeno (490?-430?BC).

[Have you noticed how these ideas keep originating from the musings of self-confessed mystics?]

So, Engels appears to be claiming that a moving object is (i) in two places at the same time, and that it is also (ii) in one of these places and not in it at the same moment.

In fact, as should seem obvious, all objects (which aren't mathematical points) occupy several places at once whether or not they are moving. For example, while you are sat reading this Essay your body isn't compressed into a tiny point! Unless you have suffered an horrific accident, your head won't be in exactly same mathematical location as your feet, even though both of these body parts now occupy the same place -- i.e., where you are sat.

So, occupying several points at the same time isn't unique to moving bodies. In which case, this 'paradox' has more to do with linguistic ambiguity than it has with anything that is 'contradictory'.

The ambiguity here is plainly connected with the use of words like "move", "place" and "location", the meaning of which Engels simply took for granted; more on that presently.

Hence, an object can be in several places at once (in one sense of "place") -- i.e., it can be in one location and in another at the same time. Moreover, it can accomplish this 'astonishing' feat while being absolutely stationary (relative to what scientists call an "inertial frame").

For example, let us suppose that you are now sat at a desk in your house, office or flat (etc); plainly, you are also located in your home, village, town or city, and this would still be true if you were sat perfectly motionless. In that case, you would be in at least two places at once, but still not moving. Notice, once again, the obvious and intentional ambiguities involved here.

Consider another example: a car can be parked half in, half out of a garage. In this case, the car is in one and the same place and not in it; in addition, the car is in two places at once (in the garage and in the yard), even while it is at rest relative to a suitable frame of reference.

Plainly, the alleged 'contradiction' here fails to distinguish moving from stationary bodies; that is, if moving and stationary bodies are both capable of doing supposedly 'contradictory' things, then, and once more, this conundrum has more to do with linguistic ambiguity than it has to do with anything supposedly paradoxical or 'contradictory' about 'reality'.

Exception might be taken to the above in that it implicitly uses phrases like "not wholly in one place" (i.e., the car in question is "not wholly in the garage"). Hence, it could be argued that Engels was quite clear what he meant: motion involves a body being in one place and in another at the same time, being in and not in it at one and the same moment. There was no mention of "not wholly inside/in" by Engels.

Or, so it could be maintained.

Clearly, this objection depends for its force on what Engels actually meant by the following words:

"[E]ven simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it." [Ibid.]

Here, the problem centres on the word "in". It is worth noting that Engels's actual words imply that "not wholly in" is a legitimate, alternative interpretation of what he said (paraphrased below):

A1: Motion involves a body being in one and the same place and not in it.

If a body is "in and not in" a certain place it can't in fact be totally in that place (otherwise, if it were, it couldn't be in any other place at the same time). So, Engels's own words allow for his "in" to mean "not wholly in".

Once again: notice the implicit ambiguity here.

A mundane example of this might involve, say, a 15 cm long pencil sat in a pocket that is only 10 cm deep. In that case, it would be perfectly natural to say that this pencil is in, but not entirely in, the pocket -- that is, it would be both "in and not in" the pocket at the same time (thus satisfying Engels's definition) --, but still at rest with respect to some inertial frame. A1 above certainly allows for just such a scenario, and Engels's use of the word "in", and the rest of what he said, plainly carry this alternative interpretation.

Hence, it seems that Engels's words are compatible with a body being motionless relative to some inertial frame!

Independently of these obvious ambiguities and the above interpretation of his words, there are serious problems with what Engels did say: a moving object is supposedly "in one and the same place and also not in it". But, if moving object, B, isn't located at X (i.e., if it is "not in X"), then it can't also be located at X, contrary to what Engels asserted. If it isn't there then isn't there. On the other hand, if B is located at X, then it can't also not be at X. Otherwise, Engels's can't have meant by "not" what the rest of us mean by that word.

But, if so, what did he mean?

Unfortunately, he neglected to say, and no one since has been any clearer. Other than DM-fans holding up their hands and declaring it a 'contradiction', there is nothing more they could say. Once more, this can only mean that they, too, understand something different by "not". So, for example, it seems that for DM-theorists "is not" means "is and is not"! If so, they certainly can't now respond by saying "The above is not what we mean", since this use of "not" implies that they really mean "The above is and is not what we mean"! (as each "is not" is replaced by its 'dialectical equivalent', "is and is not"), and so on.

As we can see, anyone who falls for this linguistic conjuring trick will find it impossible to tell us what they do mean!

Nor can it be replied that Engels's words only apply to movement and change, so that when a dialectician uses "is not" in, for instance, "This is not what we mean" they don't also mean "This is and is not what we mean". That is because, if everything is constantly changing into what it is not (as DM-theorists insist) then this must also be true of the meaning of the words they use. In that case, "This is what we mean" must have changed into "This is and is not what we mean"!

[The usual 'relative stability' of language response has been neutralised in Essay Six, here and here .]

In Essay Five , I have made several attempts to disambiguate and clarify Engels's words in order to make sense of what he was trying to say. Alas, every attempt failed! As things turn out, there is nothing comprehensible that Engels could have meant by what he said. The last few paragraphs merely give a brief hint of the problems his odd use of 'dialectical' language itself creates.

[The reader is referred to the above Essay for more details.]

Any attempt to circumvent these objections with the counter-claim that moving objects occupy regions of space equal to their own volumes (hence a moving object will occupy two of these regions at the same time, occupying and not occupying each at the same time) won't work either. That is because this option would picture a moving body occupying a region greater than its own volume at the same time -- since, according to this view, it will now occupy two such volumes at once --, which would in turn mean that it wouldn't so much move as expand, or inflate!

Worse still, Engels's account depicts objects moving between successive locations outside of time -- that is, he has them moving between locations with time having advanced not one instant --, otherwise the said objects couldn't be in two places at the same moment. This is impossible to reconcile with a materialist (or even with a comprehensible) view of nature. According to Engels, motion takes place outside of time!

So, if object, B, is in one place and then in another (which is, I suspect, central to any notion of movement that Engels would have accepted), it must be in the first place before it is in the second. If so, time must have elapsed between its occupancy of those two locations, otherwise we wouldn't be able to say it was in the first before it was in the second. But, if we can't say this (that is, if we can't say that it was in the first place before it was in the second, and that is was in both at the same time), then that would undermine the assertion that B was in fact moving, and that it had travelled from the first location to the second.

Hence, if B is in both locations at once, it can't have moved from the first to the second. On the other hand, if B has moved from the first to the second, so that it was in the first before it reached the second, it can't have been in both at the same time.

If DM-theorists don't mean this, then they should either (a) refrain from using "before" and "after" in relation to moving objects, or (b) explain what they do mean by their words. Option (a) would prevent them from explaining -- or even talking about -- motion. We are still waiting for a response to option (b).

[One comrade has recently sought to challenge me on this; the details can be found here . In fact, I have shown that Hegel and Engels's ideas about motion lead to even more ridiculous conclusions than those outlined above. The reader is once again directed to Essay Five for more details -- for example, here , here , and here .]

Nevertheless, none of those who look to Engels for inspiration have noticed how vague and imprecise his hyper-bold 'theory' of motion actually is. For example, we are never told h ow far apart the two proposed places are that a moving object is supposed to occupy while at the same time not occupying one of them. The answer can't be "It doesn't matter; any distance will do." If it doesn't matter how far apart these "two places" are, Engels's theory would, for example, imply that the aeroplane that takes you off on your holidays must land at the same time as it takes off! If any distance will do, then the distance between the two airports involved is as good as any.

On the other hand, if just any distance won't do, then the question returns: how far apart are the two places a moving object occupies at the same time? In the many centuries since this conundrum was first aired, no one -- not one person -- has even so much as attempted to say, nor have they even asked this question! And it is reasonably clear that no one could say. So, the classical theory is just as vague and confused as Engels's superficial version of it is. He simply appropriated it uncritically, as have dialecticians since.

But, the serious difficulties this ill-considered theory do not stop there: Do these 'contradictions' increase in number, or stay the same, if an object speeds up? Or, are the two locations depicted by Engels (i.e., the "here" and the "not here") just further apart? That is, are the two points that an accelerating body occupies at the same moment just further apart? If they aren't, and if that body occupies these two at the same time, it can't have accelerated. That is because speeding up involves covering the same distance in less time, but that isn't allowed here -- since, and once more, such a body is in both places at the same time. On the other hand, if they are further apart the theory faces the serious problems outlined in E1-E13, below.

[ I am of course using "accelerate" here as it is employed in everyday speech, not as it is used in Physics or Applied Mathematics.]

The next difficulty with this 'theory' is that it is in the end incoherent.

[I have set out the following argument in a series of steps since it is a little more involved than the other things I have said. I have then summarised it in much plainer language straight afterwards.]

The following argument is based on this uncontroversial assumption (which DM-theorists themselves accept):

E1: If an object is located in one place during two contiguous moments in time, it must be at rest there. So, no moving body can be in one and only one location during two such moments.

With that in mind we can now proceed:

E2: Assume that body, B, is at rest; if so it will be in a given location -- say p(k) -- for at least two 'moments in time' (leaving for now the word "moment" as vague as Engels left it) -- say, t(n) and t(n+1). [Where t(k) is a 'moment in time'.]

E3: Assume further that B is now moving and hence that it is in two places at once -- say p(1) and p(2), both at t(1).

E4: If so, then, unless it is in a third place at the same time -- say, p(3) at t(1) --, B will in fact be at rest in p(2).

E5: That is because if B isn't located at p(3) at t(1), it must be there at a later time -- say, t(2).

E6: And yet, B has to be in p(2) and p(3) at the same time -- according to E3 -- in this case, it must be there at t(2).

E7: But, if B is in p(2) and p(3) at t(2), it must be in p(2) during two moments, t(1) and t(2) -- according to E3 and E6.

E8: In that case, B will be at rest in p(2) (since it is there for two moments in time, t(1) and t(2) -- according to E1 and E2), contrary to the assumption that it is moving.

E9: So, we are forced to conclude that B must be in p(2) and p(3) at the same moment, t(1), or abandon the claim that it is moving.

E10: Hence, if B is in p(2) and p(3) at t(1), and is still moving, it is in three places at the same time, p(1), p(2) and p(3).

E11: However, the same considerations also apply to p(3) and p(4); B has to be in both at the same time, which now means that it is in p(1), p(2), p(3) and p(4), all at t(1).

E12: It takes very little 'dialectical logic' to see where this is going (no pun intended): if there are n points along its path, then B will be in p(1), p(2), p(3)..., p(n-1), p(n), all at t(1).

E13: So, this 'world-view of the proletariat' would have a moving object occupy all the points along its trajectory at the same time!

For those who might find the above a little too abstract, here it is again expressed in more ordinary terms:

According to Engels, a moving object has to be in two places at the same time -- call that moment "t(1)". If it is still moving at the second of those two points then it must be in that second place and a third place, at the same moment in time -- t(1). Otherwise, it will be in that second place for two moments -- t(1) and t(2) --, which would mean it would be at rest there. So, if it is still moving it must be in this third place also at t(1). But, the same considerations apply to the third and fourth place, the fourth and fifth place, and so on... Hence, if Engels is to be believed, a moving object must be located at every point along is path at the same moment, t(1)!

Returning to a point made earlier: Assume the two places an accelerating body, B, occupies at the 'same moment in time' are further apart, after all. Call these two points p(i) and p(ii). But, between any two points there is a potentially infinite number of intermediate points. Call these intermediate points p(1)-p(n) from earlier. But, we have already established that B will be in p(1) at the same time as it is in p(2). This isn't affected by the fact that B is accelerating since B is in p(i) and p(ii) at the same time, and p(1) and p(2) lie between p(i) and p(ii). So, B must be in all four places at the same time. But, this is also true if B isn't accelerating (since, as we have seen, B must be in all the points along its trajectory if it is moving, and un-accelerating bodies are certainly moving).

So, this theory can't distinguish an accelerating body from one travelling at a constant speed. In which case, it is difficult to see how, in a DM-universe, moving bodies can possibly accelerate if they are in all these points at the same time whether or not they are accelerating.

But, and worse: no (moving) 'dialectical object' can occupy more points in a given time, and it matters not whether they are the same distance apart or are further apart -- since, in all cases, they occupy them at the 'same moment in time'. If, as we have just seen, a moving object occupies all the points along its trajectory at the same time, then that conclusion isn't affected if these points are a nanometre, or a thousand kilometres, apart. That being the case, there can be no acceleration in a 'dialectical universe'!

Finally, as noted above, this 'contradiction' is a direct consequence of the ambiguities built into this theory -- i.e., they are the result of the incautious use of words like "moment", "move", and "place". In turn, this means that when these equivocations have been resolved, the alleged 'contradiction' simply vanishes. [Once again, that disambiguation has been carried out here . Readers are directed there for more details.]

Be this as it may, Engels's argument is a prime example of apriorism, about which DM-fan, George Novack, had this to say:

"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]

Even Engels argued as follows:

"The mistake lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them. This is the source of the whole forced and often outrageous treatment; the universe, willy-nilly, is made out to be arranged in accordance with a system of thought which itself is only the product of a definite stage of evolution of human thought." [ Engels (1954) , p.62. Bold emphasis added.]

But, the above comments also apply to Engels's theory that motion is 'contradictory', which wasn't derived from evidence, but from a 'law of thought' -- in fact, it is based on a superficial exercise in word juggling -- concocted in Ancient Greece and promoted by that Christian Mystic, Hegel, two thousand or more years later.

As noted above, this theory not only wasn't based on evidence, it can't be. [On that, see below.]

Hence, this idea has been imposed on nature, not 'read from it'.

It is to this seldom acknowledged feature of DM that I now turn.

DM Has Been Imposed On Nature

Given the above considerations, the question naturally arises: Is it really the case that dialectics been imposed on nature? At first sight, it would appear that that allegation can't be correct since we regularly encounter the following, seemingly modest disclaimers from dialecticians themselves:

"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [ Engels (1976) , p.13. The on-line version uses "building...into" here in place of "superimposing".]

Why is this important? Well, as dialecticians themselves also tell us, the reading of certain doctrines into reality is a hallmark of Idealism and dogmatism . So, if DM is to live up to its materialist and scientific credentials, its theorists must make sure this never happens -- which is, of course, why they often agree with Engels.

Indeed, we have already seen George Novack argue along the following lines:

"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17. Bold emphasis added.]

Here, too, are the thoughts of Communist Party theoretician, Maurice Cornforth :

"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…." [Cornforth (1976), p.15. Bold emphasis added.]

That seems pretty clear.

However, when we examine what dialecticians do, as opposed to what they say, we find that the exact opposite of this is the case. For example, Engels himself went on to claim the following about motion:

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted…." [Engels (1976), p.74 . Bold emphasis alone added.]

How could Engels possibly have known that "Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be"? Was he a minor deity of some sort? Had he been seated at the right hand of 'God'?

If his observation about motion had been derived from the facts available even in Engels's day (a policy to which he had just sworn allegiance), he would have expressed himself perhaps as follows:

"Evidence so far suggests that motion is consistent with what we might call, 'the mode of existence of matter'. Never anywhere has matter without motion been observed, but it is too early to say if this must always be the case…. Matter without motion isn't in fact inconceivable, nor indeed is motion without matter, we just haven't witnessed either yet…." [Re-vamped version of Engels (1976), p.74.]

It is worth recalling that motionless matter isn't in fact inconceivable. Indeed, that very idea had been a fundamental precept of Aristotelian Physics , which was the dominant scientific paradigm for the best part of two thousand years!

Worse still, as we saw earlier, Engels's argument about motion was based on " abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source" -- that is, it was predicated on speculative ideas he borrowed from Hegel and Zeno. It most certainly wasn't based on evidence, but on an argument about what certain words (such as, "motion", "moment" and "place") supposedly meant. As I have argued in Essay Five :

An appeal to evidence would be irrelevant, anyway. That is because the examination of countless moving objects would fail to confirm Engels's assertion that they occupy two places at once. That would still be the case no matter what instruments or devices were employed to effect these hypothetical observations, and regardless of the extent of the magnification used to that end -- or, indeed, the level of microscopic detail enlisted in support. No observation could confirm that a moving object is in two places at once (except in the senses noted below), in one of these and not in it at the same time. That explains, of course, why Engels offered no scientific evidence whatsoever in support of his belief in the contradictory nature of motion. And the picture hasn't altered in the intervening years -- indeed, the author of no book, article, or talk about DM by one of its adepts even so much as thinks to quote or cite such evidence --, and that situation isn't ever likely to change .

Quantum phenomena that supposedly violate this caveat (i.e., the claim there is no evidence that moving objects occupy two places at once, etc.) do not affect this negative conclusion. No one supposes that in experiments which suggest an electron, for example, can be in two places at once that this particle moves from one of these places to the other -- or, indeed, in no time at all. What is supposed to happen is that when one electron is aimed at a double slit and focused on a screen, it appears to have taken two separate paths at the same time. So, it hasn't moved between the latter two trajectories at the same time; it has, it seems, merely followed two paths. Why DM-supporters view this a confirmation of their theory, is, therefore, something of a mystery.

It could be objected to this that if, say, a photograph were taken of a moving object, it would show by means of the recorded blur, perhaps, that such a body had occupied several places at once. In that case, therefore, there is, or could be, evidence in support of Engels's claims.

The problem with this is that no matter how fast the shutter speed, no camera (not even this one, or this) can record an instant in time, merely a temporal interval -- that is, such devices record what happens in the time interval between opening and closing the shutter, or other light permitting aperture. Clearly, to verify the claim that a moving object occupies at least two places in the same instant, a physical recording of an instant would be required. Plainly, s ince instants (i.e., in the sense required) are mathematical fictions, it isn't possible to record them....

It could be countered that as we increase a camera's shutter speed, photographs taken will always show some blurring. This supports the conclusion that moving objects are never located in one place at one time. Despite this, it still remains the case that no photograph can catch an instant, and thus none can verify Engels's contention.

Again, it could be argued that it is reasonable to conclude from the above that moving objects occupy two locations at the same moment. Once more, since an instant in time is a fiction, it isn't reasonable to conclude this. Not even a mathematical limiting process could capture such ghostly 'entities' in the physical world, whatever else it might appear to achieve in theory. But, even if it could , no camera (radar device, or other equipment) could record it. Hence, even if an appeal to a mathematical limiting process were viable (or available), it would be of no assistance. No experiment is capable of substantiating any of the conclusions Engels reached about moving bodies.

And that explains why he and those who accept these ideas have had to foist this theory of motion onto nature....

Hence, Engels's thesis about moving bodies wasn't derived from a consideration of the facts -- it has been imposed on them -- in defiance of what Engels himself said. There were no such cameras in his day, but he still asserted the truth of something that was impossible to confirm in his day, and now even in ours.

Indeed, as one comrade (inadvertently) admitted, this doctrine is based solely on a series of thought experiments :

" Heraclitus , the ancient Greek philosopher, famously said that 'everything changes and nothing remains the same' and that 'you can never step twice into the same stream' [this is not what Heraclitus actually said -- here it is: 'On those stepping into rivers staying the same other and other waters flow' (sic) -- RL]. It is the ideas of ceaseless change, motion, interconnectedness and contradiction that define dialectical thought.

"The philosopher Zeno famously tried to illustrate how essential dialectical thinking is to our understanding of the world by using thought experiments. He poses the following:

"Imagine an arrow in flight. At any one durationless instant in time (like the freeze-frame in a film) the arrow is not moving to where it is going to, nor is it moving to where it already is. Thus, at every conceivable instant in time, there is no motion occurring, so how does the arrow move?

"To answer this we are forced to embrace what appears on the surface to be a contradictory idea -- that the arrow is, at any one time, in more than one place at once. This thought experiment serves to highlight the contradictory nature of the movement of matter in the world.

"The German philosopher Hegel further developed the dialectical (sic) in a systematic form. Instead [of] trying to discard contradictions Hegel saw in them the real impulse for all development. In fact Hegel saw the interpenetration of opposites as one of the fundamental characters of all phenomena. Hegel's philosophy is one of interconnectedness where the means and the end, the cause and the effect, are constantly changing place. It explains progress in terms of struggle and contradiction, not a straight line or an inevitable triumphal march forward...." [Quoted from here ; accessed 02/08/2015. Bold emphases and links added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

Of course, as the above confirms: it isn't as if we don't already know where these ideas originated; they didn't arise from a body of detailed observations of moving bodies carried out by Zeno or Hegel -- or anyone else, for that matter --, but from a series of thought experiments dreamt up by these two mystics!

In which case, Novack and Cornforth 's comments also apply to Engels's dogmatic assertions about 'motion itself'.

Here, too, are several examples of Lenin's dogmatic impositions on nature:

"Flexibility, applied objectively, i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world." [Lenin (1961), p.110 . Bold emphasis added.]

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Ibid., p.358 . Bold emphases alone added.]

Lest we are tempted to search back through the archives to find the countless container-loads of evidence that Lenin had marshalled in support of these dramatic claims about everything in the entire universe for all of time (for what else does "eternal development" mean?), a consideration of the next passage will at least relieve us of that onerous task. Here, at last, Lenin is disarmingly honest about where he obtained these hyper-bold generalisations:

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Ibid., pp.196-97 . Bold emphasis alone added.]

Lenin is quite open about his sources in these private notebooks: dialectics derives its 'evidential support', not from a "patient empirical examination of the facts", but from studying Hegel! As far as evidence goes, that is it! That's all there is! The search for evidence begins and ends with a dialectician leafing through Hegel's Logic. That is the extent of the 'evidence' Lenin offered in support of his assertions about "everything existing", about "eternal change", about "all phenomena and processes of nature", and about nature's "eternal development", etc., etc.

As is relatively easy to show, all dialecticians do likewise (the small mountain of evidence substantiating that allegation can be found here ). First, they disarm the reader with modest claims like those we saw above; then, often on the same page, or even in the very next sentence, they proceed to do the exact opposite, imposing dialectics on nature.

Why they do this, and what significance it has, will become clearer as this Essay -- but more specifically, as the very next section -- unfolds.

Traditional Thought

In the 'West' since Ancient Greek times, Traditional Thinkers have been imposing their theories on nature (again, as Cornforth and Novack pointed out). In fact, this practice is so widespread and has penetrated so deeply into Traditional Philosophy that few notice it, even after it has been pointed out to them. Or, rather, they fail to see its significance. And that includes DM-theorists.

This ancient tradition taught that behind appearances there lies a hidden world -- populated by the 'gods', or assorted 'spirits' and mysterious 'essences' -- which was more real than the material universe we see around us, but which is accessible to thought alone. Theology was openly and proudly built on this premise; so was Traditional Philosophy.

This way of viewing the world was concocted by ideologues of the ruling-class, which class (or their "prize-fighters", as Marx called them) ensured that the majority were educated --, or, rather, they were indoctrinated -- to see things the same way.

[I am not running-together religious affectation with Theology and Traditional Philosophy. Those caught up by former (i.e., religious affectation) might look to invisible 'spirits' and the like for some sort of consolation, 'salvation' or guidance, but the leisured minority who promoted the latter two approaches (i.e., Theology and Traditional Philosophy) theorised and systematised this condition, and that is what I am referring to here.]

They invented this 'world-view' because if you belong to, benefit from, or help run a society that is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.



The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).



Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" -- philosophers, administrators, editors, bishops, educators, 'intellectuals', and the like) that the present order either (a) works for their benefit, (b) is ordained of the 'gods', (c) defends 'civilised values', or (d) is 'natural' and hence cannot be fought against, reformed or negotiated with.

T hese ideas were then imposed on reality -- plainly, since they can't be read from it .

As Marx pointed out, members of the ruling-class often relied on these other layers in society to concoct and then disseminate such ideas on their behalf in order to persuade the rest of us that each successive system was 'rational', 'natural', or 'divinely ordained':

"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch...." [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65, quoted from here . Bold emphases added.]

Notice that Marx tells us they do this "in its whole range", and that they "rule as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age."

In Ancient Greece , with the demise of the rule of Kings and Queens, the old myths and T heogonies were no longer relevant. So, in the newly emerging republics and quasi-democracies of the Sixth Century BC, far more abstract, de-personalised ideas were required.

Enter Philosophy.

As Marx also noted:

"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [ Marx (1975b), p.381 . I have used the on-line version here. Bold added.]

It is no accident then that Philosophy emerged as Greek society began to change in the above way.

From its inception, Traditional Philosophers concocted increasingly baroque , abstract systems of thought invariably based on obscure and arcane terminology, impossible to translate into the language of everyday life.

Again, as Marx pointed out:

"One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life. "...The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [ Marx and Engels (1970) , p.118. Bold emphases alone added.]

Philosophers felt they could read their doctrines into nature, since, for them, nature was 'Mind', or the product of 'Mind' (i.e., it was 'rational'). In that case, the human mind could safely concoct and then project its thoughts onto this 'rational' world that had been created by just such a 'Mind'.

As the late Professor Havelock pointed out:

"As long as...communication remained oral, the environment could be described or explained only in the guise of stories which represent it as the work of agents: that is gods. Hesiod takes the step of trying to unify those stories into one great story, which becomes a cosmic theogony. A great series of matings and births of gods is narrated to symbolise the present experience of the sky, earth, seas, mountains, storms, rivers, and stars. His poem is the first attempt we have in a style in which the resources of documentation have begun to intrude upon the manner of an acoustic composition. But his account is still a narrative of events, of 'beginnings,' that is, 'births,' as his critics the Presocratics were to put it. From the standpoint of a sophisticated philosophical language, such as was available to Aristotle, what was lacking was a set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could describe the physical world conceptually; terms such as space, void, matter, body, element, motion, immobility, change, permanence, substratum, quantity, quality, dimension, unit, and the like. Aside altogether from the coinage of abstract nouns, the conceptual task also required the elimination of verbs of doing and acting and happening, one may even say, of living and dying, in favour of a syntax which states permanent relationships between conceptual terms systematically. For this purpose the required linguistic mechanism was furnished by the timeless present of the verb to be -- the copula of analytic statement .

"The history of early philosophy is usually written under the assumption that this kind of vocabulary was already available to the first Greek thinkers. The evidence of their own language is that it was not. They had to initiate the process of inventing it....

"Nevertheless, the Presocratics could not invent such language by an act of novel creation. They had to begin with what was available, namely, the vocabulary and syntax of orally memorised speech, in particular the language of Homer and Hesiod. What they proceeded to do was to take the language of the mythos and manipulate it, forcing its terms into fresh syntactical relationships which had the constant effect of stretching and extending their application, giving them a cosmic rather than a particular reference." [Havelock (1983), pp.13-14, 21. Bold emphases and links added; quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Spelling modified to agree with UK English.]

Havelock then shows in detail that this is precisely what the Presocratic Philosophers proceeded to do: eliminate verbs and invent abstract nouns to put in their place, transforming the verb "to be", for example, in the required manner, into "Being". [I have explained these developments, and expanded on their significance for subsequent thought, in Essay Three Parts One and Two.]

For these theorists, true thoughts were a "reflection" of the underlying, 'Divine Order'. " As above, so below ", went the old Hermetic saying. The microcosm of the mind "reflected" the macrocosm of the universe. The Doctrine of Correspondences thus came to dominate all ancient and modern theories of knowledge. On this view, 'philosophical' truth corresponded with the hidden 'essences' that supposedly lay 'underneath', or 'behind', the superficial world of 'appearances'. These 'essences' were impossible to detect by any physical means whatsoever, and hence were accessible to thought alone -- and, of course, by means of the aforementioned, 'thought experiments'.

As Novack pointed out , this rendered all such theories Idealist .

Indeed, as Marx hinted, and as the record confirms, these philosophical systems were based on the idea that language expressed a secret code, a cipher which, once unravelled, 'enabled' Traditional Theorists to represent to themselves the 'rational' order underlying 'appearances' -- the so-called " secrets of nature " --, and, in some cases, the very 'Mind of God'.

As the late Umberto Eco pointed out (in relation to the 'Western' Christian tradition, which, of course, drew heavily on Greek Philosophy):

"God spoke before all things, and said, 'Let there be light.' In this way, he created both heaven and earth; for with the utterance of the divine word, 'there was light'.... Thus Creation itself arose through an act of speech; it is only by giving things their names that he created them and gave them their ontological status ....

"In Genesis..., the Lord speaks to man for the first time.... We are not told in what language God spoke to Adam. Tradition has pictured it as a sort of language of interior illumination, in which God...expresses himself....

"...Clearly we are here in the presence of a motif, common to other religions and mythologies -- that of the nomothete , the name-giver, the creator of language." [Eco (1997), pp.7-8. Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site.]

Philosophical language and thought were thus viewed as an esoteric medium, or channel, that enabled the "inner illumination" of the 'soul' -- a hot-line to 'God'.

Unsurprisingly then, the philosophical theories and theological dogmas concocted by countless generations of ruling-class hacks almost invariably turned out to be those that rationalised and 'justified' the status quo. 01

Either that, or they were employed in order to 'justify' a change in, and then a subsequent defence of, a new status quo as one Mode of Production -- or, indeed, as one ruling-class -- was replaced by the next in line.

To this end, language was viewed primarily as a means of representation -- a vehicle that 'God' could employ to 'illuminate the soul', and then re-present 'His thoughts' to humanity --, but not as a means of communication, as Marx and Engels had maintained .

[More on that, here .]

As noted above, this ancient tradition has changed many times throughout history (with the rise and fall of each Mode of Production) , but its form has remained basically the same throughout: fundamental 'truths' about 'reality' can be derived from language or 'thought' alone, which in turn meant that such 'cosmic verities' could be imposed on nature, dogmatically. This was considered a legitimate exercise since 'God' made the world and hence if human beings can re-construct 'His' thoughts in their heads, that must be how the world works. In that case, imposing such ideas on nature seemed perfectly justified, indeed, entirely uncontroversial.

Some might object that philosophical ideas can't have remained the same for thousands of years across different Modes of Production since that notion itself runs counter to core principles expressed in and by HM. But, we don't argue the same for religious belief. Marx put no time stamp on the following, for example:

"The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man -- state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.

"Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people." [ Marx (1975c), p.244 . Italic emphases in the original.]

The above remarks applied back in Babylon and the Egypt of the Pharaohs, just as they did in Ancient China and the rest of Asia, The Americas, Greece, Rome and throughout Europe, Africa, Australasia, and as they have done right across the planet ever since.



The same is true of the core thought-forms that run through Traditional Philosophy: that there is an invisible world, accessible to thought alone --, especially since Marx also argued that:

"[P]hilosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned...." [ Marx (1975b), p.381 . Bold emphasis added.]

And:

"[O]ne fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms. The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas." [ Marx and Engels (1848), p.52 . Bold emphases added.]

This, of course, helps explain why Marx thought this entire discipline (Philosophy) was based on distorted language (see below), and contained little other than empty abstractions and alienated thought-forms -- and, indeed, why he turned his back on it from the late 1840s onward. [On that, see here .]

So, just like Theology, but in this case in a far more abstract and increasingly secular form, subsequent philosophers sought to reflect the 'essential' structure of reality that 'justified' and rationalised class division and oppression, mystified now by the use of increasingly esoteric terminology and obscure jargon. Again, as Marx noted:

"Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content." [ Marx and Engels (1970) , p.118.]

[Exactly how this series of developments is connected with an ideologically-motivated attempt to legitimate class domination and systematic oppression is outlined here .]

'Materialist Dialectics' was conceived in, and was then developed out of, this ruling-class tradition, as Lenin himself acknowledged (plainly failing to appreciate the significance of what he was saying):

"The history of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that there is nothing resembling 'sectarianism' in Marxism, in the sense of its being a hidebound, petrified doctrine, a doctrine which arose away from the high road of the development of world civilisation. On the contrary, the genius of Marx consists precisely in his having furnished answers to questions already raised by the foremost minds of mankind. His doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy and socialism.

"The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression. It is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism." [Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism . Bold emphases alone added.]

In its modern form, this ancient 'world-view' was re-invented and re-packaged by that quintessentially Idealist Philosopher, Hegel, working in the mystical Neoplatonic , Christian, and Hermetic Traditions . It was appropriated by Marxist classicists before the working class could provide Marxism with a materialist counter-weight. DM was thus born out of Idealism, and, as we will see, it has never escaped from its class-compromised clutches -- despite the 'materialist flip' dialecticians claim to have inflicted upon it.

And that is why dialecticians are only too happy to impose their ideas on nature: it is thoroughly traditional to do so, as Novack noted . Indeed, since DM is based on ancient, Idealist abstractions -- which, plainly, can't be derived from the material world -- its doctrines have had to be read into it.

Unfortunately, in so doing, dialecticians are (unwittingly) identifying themselves with a tradition that wasn't built by working people , and which doesn't serve their interests.

Worse still , since DM isn't based on material reality it can't be used to help change it.

Small wonder then that it has failed us for so long .

Some might think that if the above conclusions were correct, science itself would be equally compromised. That is mistaken. Science has always been dominated by individuals who don't just theorise about nature, they interacted with it, they observe it, experiment on it and learn from it, modifying their ideas accordingly. [On this, see Conner (2005).] Scientific theory has always been tested and confirmed by its complex relation to the world and by humanity's endeavour to control nature. Traditional Philosophy not only hasn't, it can't.

[However, further discussion of this particular topic would take us way beyond the scope of this Basic Introductory Essay. It has been dealt with in more detail here , a summary of which can be found here .]

Hence, for all their claim to be radical, DM-theorists are thoroughly conservative when it comes to Philosophy.

[Why that is so will also be explained below .]

Indeed, despite the fact that DM-theorists appear to be challenging traditional ideas, their theoretical practice reveals that they belong to an intellectual tradition that is quite happy to derive fundamental truths about nature -- valid for all of time and space -- from thought alone, emulating the approach adopted and promoted by boss-class theorists from time immemorial.

The Three 'Laws' of Dialectics

Engels And Mickey Mouse Science

The traditional philosophical tactic of imposing a theory on nature (discussed above) can further be seen in practice if we examine Engels's so-called 'Three Laws of Dialectics':

"Dialectics as the science of universal inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation -- spiral form of development." [ Engels (1954) , p.17.]

All dialecticians who accept these 'Laws' impose them on nature in like manner (indeed, as did Hegel, from whom Engels learnt them).

[Again, the evidence supporting that allegation can be found here and here . ]

What little evidence dialecticians have scraped-together in order to substantiate these 'Laws' is not only woefully inadequate, it is selective and highly contentious.

Anyone who has studied and practiced genuine science will know the lengths to which researchers have to go in order to modify, revise or up-date even minor aspects of current theory, let alone justify major changes in the way we view nature.

[For those who haven't had this sort of background, I have posted several short examples of genuine science here .]

In the place of hard evidence, what we invariably find in DM-texts are the same hackneyed examples offered up, year-in year-out. These include the following hardy perennials: boiling or freezing water, cells that are 'alive and dead', grains of barley that 'negate' themselves, magnets that are UOs, Mamelukes' somewhat ambiguous fighting abilities when matched against French soldiers, Mendeleyev's Table, the sentence "John is a man", homilies about parts and wholes (e.g., "The whole is greater than the sum of the parts", etc.), characters from Molière who discover they have been speaking prose all their lives, laughably weak and misguided attempts to depict the principles of FL, "Yay, Yay", and "Nay, Nay", anything more than this "cometh of evil", wave/particle 'duality', 'emergent' properties popping into existence all over the place, etc., etc. Even then, we are never given a scientific report about these phenomena; all we ever find in DM-texts are a few brief, amateurish and impressionistic sentences (or, at best, a few paragraphs) devoted to each example.

From such mantra-like banalities dialecticians suddenly 'derive' universal laws, valid for all of space and time!

Even at its best (in, say, Woods and Grant (1995/2007) -- which is one of the most comprehensive attempts to defend classical, hard-core DM there is -- or Gollobin (1986), which is in many ways an up-market version of Woods and Grant, but written from a Maoist perspective), all we find are a few dozen pages of secondary and tertiary 'evidence', padded out with no little repetition and bluster (much of which has been taken apart here ). Contrary evidence (of which there is plenty) is simply ignored or hand-waved aside. DM-supporters are plainly guilty of Confirmation Bias.

This is indeed Mickey Mouse Science at its best.

In many ways this feeble and superficial endeavour to substantiate Engels's 'Laws' resembles Creationist attempts to show that the Book of Genesis is scientific! As noted above, what little evidence DM-theorists have cobbled-together is highly selective and heavily slanted. More often than not it is merely anecdotal , and therefore deeply contentious -- as we are about to find out.

'Law' One -- 'Quantity' And 'Quality'

Here is the First 'Law', the alleged change of 'quantity into quality':

"It is said, natura non facit saltum [there are no leaps in nature -- RL]; and ordinary thinking when it has to grasp a coming-to-be or a ceasing-to-be, fancies it has done so by representing it as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we have seen that the alterations of being in general are not only the transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from quality into quantity and vice versa, a becoming-other which is an interruption of gradualness and the production of something qualitatively different from the reality which preceded it. Water, in cooling, does not gradually harden as if it thickened like porridge, gradually solidifying until it reached the consistency of ice; it suddenly solidifies, all at once. It can remain quite fluid even at freezing point if it is standing undisturbed, and then a slight shock will bring it into the solid state." [ Hegel (1999) , p.370, §776. Bold emphasis alone added.]

"...the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63 . Bold emphasis alone added.]

"With this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state, and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. -- Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Engels (1976), pp.82-83 .I have used the online version here, but quoted the page numbers from the Foreign Languages edition. Bold emphasis added.]

"We gave there one of the best-known examples [of this Law, RL] -- that of the change of the aggregate states of water, which under normal atmospheric pressure changes at 0°C from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water." [Ibid., p.160 .]

Notice how Engels felt he could derive an "impossible" from what little evidence he supplied his readers:

"...the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63 . Bold emphasis alone added.]

But, how could he possibly have known that it is "impossible" to change the quality of a body without the addition of matter or energy?

Indeed, this inference is something Engels himself (inadvertently) acknowledged was invalid:

"The empiricism of observation alone can never adequately prove necessity." [Ibid., p.229 .]

In fact, he couldn't possibly have known this; in which case, he clearly "foisted" it on nature.

These changes in 'quality' aren't supposed to be smooth or gradual, either:

"For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change." [Engels (1976), pp.82-83 . Bold emphasis added.]

"It will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…." [Plekhanov (1974), p.613 . Bold emphases alone added.]

"What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness...." [Lenin (1961), p.282 . Bold emphases added.]

However, and contrary to what Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin asserted, not everything in nature changes 'qualitatively' in sudden "leaps" (or "nodally"). Consider melting glass, rock, resin, tar, metal, butter, toffee, and plastic. When heated, these substances change from solid to liquid slowly, with no 'nodal' points or 'leaps' anywhere in sight. Who doesn't know that metals soften and then melt gradually when heated?

[For anyone who doubts this, I have posted several videos of melting metal, plastic and chocolate here . More details, including my answers to various rather weak objections, can be found here .]

Some critics of my argument appeal to the exact melting points of solids, for instance, as clear examples of "nodal" change; however, this is what we read about the so-called "amorphous solids" (e.g., glasses, gels, and plastics):

"Amorphous solids do not have a sharp melting point; they are softened in a range of temperature." [Quoted from here ; accessed 03/05/2015. Bold emphasis added.]

"[A]morphous solids tend to soften slowly over a wide temperature range rather than having a well-defined melting point like a crystalline solid." [Quoted from here ; accessed 08/04/2015. Bold emphasis added; spelling modified to agree with UK English.]

Furthermore:

"Almost any substance can solidify in amorphous form if the liquid phase is cooled rapidly enough...." [Ibid. Bold added.]

This means that "almost any substance" will lack a sharp melting point after it has been cooled in the above manner. This in turn implies that there are countless non-"nodal" (non-"leap"-like) changes in nature.

[Notice that I am not arguing that there are no sudden changes in nature and society, only that not everything changes this way; so this 'law' is defective, at best. I have responded to counter-arguments that focus on an appeal to latent heat, here.]

Do DM-theorists even so much as mention, let alone consider, these counter-examples?

Are you serious!?

Once more: DM-fans suffer from a bad case of Confirmation Bias.

Furthermore, not every change in quality is produced by quantitative increase or decrease in matter/energy (again, contrary to what Engels and other DM-theorists assert). There are in fact countless differences in quality that aren't produced in this way. For example, molecules called Stereoisomers share exactly the same number and type of atoms, and yet they are qualitatively dissimilar because of the different spatial arrangement of their constituent atoms.

So, here we have qualitative difference created by different geometry. That is just as important a material constraint as any Engels himself considered.

[Some critics have objected to this point because there is no "development" in such cases. I have responded to that criticism here .]

Other qualitative changes in nature and society can be produced by (i) different timing, (ii) a different ordering of the relevant events (for the same amount of matter and/or energy involved), or even by (iii) altering their context. [Several examples of the latter can be accessed here .]

Moreover, and perhaps far worse, this 'Law' only appears to work because of the vague way that "quantity", "quality" and "node" (or even "leap") have been defined by DM-theorists -- that is, if they ever bother to do so. Indeed, after nearly thirty years of research, I have been able to find only a handful of DM-texts (out of the scores I have had to study) that attempt, even superficially, to inform us what a DM-"quality" is; for example, Kuusinen (1961), Yurkovets (1984), and Gollobin (1986)!

[Once more, their arguments have been batted out of the park in Essay Seven .]

Indeed , after nearly two hundred years (if we include Hegel), not one single DM-theorist has even thought to tell us how long a "node" is supposed to last!

Here is how Hegel 'defined' "quality":

"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975), p.124 , §85. Bold emphasis added.]

This is an Aristotelian idea.

Similarly, the Marxist Internet Archive defines "quality" as follows:

"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby becoming something else.

"Thus, if something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a ' quantitative change '. " [Quoted from here . This definition has been altered slightly since it was first consulted. Bold emphases added.]

But, given the above definition, many of the examples to which dialecticians themselves appeal to 'illustrate' this 'Law' in fact fail to do so. For example, water as a solid, liquid, or gas is still H 2 O. Quantitative addition or subtraction of energy doesn't result in a qualitative change of the required sort; nothing substantially new emerges. This substance stays H 2 O throughout. Indeed, iron is still iron as a liquid or as a solid; Nitrogen remains nitrogen whether it is in a solid, liquid or a gaseous state. Again, nothing substantially new emerges when these -- and all the other elements -- are heated or cooled (in an inert atmosphere).

Furthermore, c ountless substances exist in solid, liquid, or gaseous form, so that can't be what makes each of them "what it is and not something else". What makes lead, for instance, lead is its atomic structure, and that stays the same whether or not it exists as a solid or a liquid. As such, it remains "the same kind of thing", when heated or cooled.

In fact, the by-now-familiar DM-vagueness here 'allows' its theorists to see changes in "quality" whenever and wherever it suits them, just as it 'permits' them to ignore the many instances where this just doesn't happen, applying this 'law' entirely subjectively. This perhaps helps explain why Engels's 'Law' has been left so vague and imprecise for so long.

If the above allegations are difficult to believe, try the following experiment: ask the very next dialectician you meet precisely how long a 'node'/'leap', for example, is supposed to last. You will either receive no answer or your query will be hand-waved aside. But, if no one knows how long a 'node' is supposed to be, then anything from a Geological Age to an instantaneous quantum leap could be 'nodal'!

Plainly, this introduces a fundamental element of arbitrariness into what is supposed to be an objective law.

And, it really isn't good enough for dialecticians to dismiss this as mere " pedantry ", or "semantics". Can you imagine a genuine scientist refusing to say how long a crucially important time period in her theory is supposed to last, accusing you perhaps of "pedantry", or "semantics", for daring to ask?

This isn't a minor, nit-picking point either; recall what Lenin said:

"What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness...." [Lenin (1961), p.282 . Bold emphases added.]

But, not even Lenin told us how long one of these "leaps" is supposed to last. In which case, how might anyone tell the difference between a "dialectical transition" and one that isn't?

[One comrade took great exception to my asking how long a 'node' is supposed to last. I have responded to him here .]

The Other Two 'Laws'

The other 'Laws' fare no better. The Second 'Law' -- the "Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites" (coupled with change though "Internal Contradiction") -- will be examined in the next sub-section. Since the "Negation of the Negation" [NON] -- the Third 'Law' -- is really an extension of the Second, its credibility plainly depends on that 'Law'. Hence, the next sub-section will (in effect) deal with both of these 'Laws' together.

[However, several detailed objections to the NON can be accessed here .]

' Internal Contradictions '

Dialectical Vs Mechanical Materialism

Among other things, Mechanical Materialism holds that all things are set in motion by an external 'push' of some sort. By way of contrast, dialecticians claim that because of their 'internal contradictions', objects and processes in nature and society are in fact "self-moving".

Lenin expressed this idea as follows:

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.

"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58 . Italic emphasis in the original ; bold emphases added . Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. ]

However, there are several serious problems with this passage, not the least of which is that it clearly suggests that things are self-moving. In fact, Lenin did more than just suggest this, he insisted upon it:

"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [ Lenin (1921) , p.90 . Bold emphases added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. ]

Other Marxists say more-or-less the same. Here are Woods and Grant (readers will no doubt notice that these two comrades are quite happy to impose this doctrine on nature, holding it valid for all of space and time):

"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction.... So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle -- RL] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....

"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites.... The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter.... Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [ Woods and Grant (1995) , pp.43-45, 47, 68, 72. Bold emphases alone added. Several paragraphs merged.]

But, if that were indeed so, nothing in nature could have any effect on anything else. So, while you might think that it is your kick that moves a football, in fact -- according to the above -- the ball moves itself!

Now, in order to avoid such absurd consequences, some dialecticians (mainly Stalinists and Maoists) have had to allow for the existence of "external contradictions" (or "impulses", contrary to what Woods and Grant, for example, assert), which are somehow involved in such changes.

Here, for example, is Stalin:

"Our country exhibits two groups of contradictions. One group consists of the internal contradictions that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry.... The other group consists of the external contradictions that exist between our country, as the land of socialism, and all the other countries, as lands of capitalism....

"Anyone who confuses the first group of contradictions, which can be overcome entirely by the efforts of one country, with the second group of contradictions, the solution of which requires the efforts of the proletarians of several countries, commits a gross error against Leninism. He is either a muddle-head or an incorrigible opportunist." [ Stalin (1976b), pp.210-11 . Bold emphasis added.]

[More details can be found here and several more quotations, here. There are deeper, philosophical reasons (explored by Hegel and accepted by Lenin) why 'external contradictions' would totally scupper DM. I have covered that topic, here .]

But, as seems obvious, this makes a complete mockery of the idea that all change is internally-generated, just as it undermines the contrast drawn above between mechanical and 'dialectical' theories of motion. Indeed, what becomes of Lenin's "demand" if there are countless changes that violate this 'dialectical principle'?

Worse still, if 'contradictions' are the result of a 'struggle of opposites', and all motion is a 'contradiction', what sort of 'struggle' is going on inside, say, a billiard ball that keeps it moving? Do all billiard balls possess an 'internal motor' -- supposedly these "internal contradictions" -- which impels them along? If so, much of modern Physics will need to be ditched.

In addition, as we saw above with Lenin, DM-theorists appeal to these "internal contradictions" in order to undercut theism. Here, for example, is Cornforth:

"The second dogmatic assumption of mechanism is the assumption that no change can ever happen except by the action of some external cause. Just as no part of a machine moves unless another part acts on it and makes it move, so mechanism sees matter as being inert -- without motion, or rather without self-motion. For mechanism, nothing ever moves unless something else pushes or pulls is, it never changes unless something else interferes with it.

"No wonder that, regarding matter in this way, the mechanists had to believe in a Supreme Being to give the 'initial push'.... No, the world was not created by a Supreme Being. Any particular organisation of matter, any particular process of matter in motion, has an origin and a beginning.... But matter in motion had no origin, no beginning....

"So in studying the causes of change, we should not merely seek for external causes of change, but should above all seek for the source of change within the process itself, in its own self-movement, in the inner impulses to development contained in things themselves." [Cornforth (1976), pp.40-43. Bold emphasis added. Quotation marks altered to conform with the conventions adopted at this site. Several paragraphs merged. ]

But, if external causes are now permitted -- or are required -- in order to prevent this theory from becoming absurd, then that will simply allow 'God' to sneak back in through a side door.

Of course, all this is independent of whether or not it makes sense to say that anything in nature or society (outside of language) can be described as a "contradiction". Dialecticians, following Hegel, certainly believe it does make sense, but up to now they have been content merely to assert this for a fact, neglecting the proof.

Apparently, Hegel's mystical authority was sufficient!

[It is also worth reminding ourselves that Hegel's own use of "contradiction" was based on series of sub-Aristotelian, logical blunders .]

Dialectics Can't Actually Explain Change

But, even if every object and process in nature did in fact have "internal contradictions", exactly as DM-theorists suppose, that would still fail to explain why anything actually moved or changed. Quite the opposite, in fact, as we are about to find out.

As is relatively easy to confirm, dialecticians have been hopelessly unclear as to whether:

(1) Objects and processes change because of a "struggle" between their "internal contradictions" and/or "opposites", or whether they,

(2) Change into these "opposites";

Or, indeed, whether they,

(3) Create such "opposites" when they change.

Here are just a few passages that illustrate this confusion:

"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ulti