Jacek Rostowski dissects the "anatomy of illiberal capitalism" by scrutinising how Vladimir Putin, Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Hungary's Viktor Orbán, and Polish Law and Justice Party Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński abuses market economy to legitimise their authoritarian rule. Although Donald Trump is not in the same league, he embraces protectionism, cheap money policy and nepotism, adopting an economic nationalism, like the one in the 1930s in Nazi Germany.

Market economy in a liberal democracy is "a means of boosting dynamism, efficiency, prosperity, and individual freedom." In illiberal democracies, the market is not free and serves "mainly as an instrument for strengthening state power." Economic growth brings prosperity and appease ordinary people, who turn a blind eye to autocracy. "Illiberal capitalism" had been an Asian phenomenon. China stunned the world with its state capitalism - a free market economy in a communist country. Its double digit growth inspired a number of developing countries - Vietnam, Venezuela etc - to emulate the formula.

Modern history has seen "various schools of authoritarian right-wing thought about the relationship between the market and the state." In Nazi Germany, Hitler's policy was a planned economy, "while maintaining private property and a high level of income inequality. " After years of high unemployment, Germans were glad to have a job. No wonder they were ready to sacrifice their political and religious freedoms for an income. At the turn of the 20th century, social Darwinists urged for laissez-faire economics - a policy of "unfettered domestic free markets" with minimum governmental interference. This created a society, in which only the "fittest" would survive.

Russia's economy reminds of Saudi Arabia's, which is a rentier state, heavily reliant on its energy revenues. In order to maintain political power, Putin had established a regime of authoritarian rule based on the popular vote of the masses. During the boom years, he showered social largesse on ordinary people, who could benefit from subsidies. The middle class could invest and make profits. They could afford holidays abroad and spend on other goods and services. But Putin has no desire to control the masses. Instead he sends his "secret police to manage just a few dozen oligarchs."

All the while, officials, oligarchs, regional strongmen and mafia fought over the spoils of Russia's natural resources. Despite the wealth they had accumulated, Putin "believes that the Russian state has 'ultimate ownership rights' to its citizens’ private assets not just in Russia, but also abroad." The author says, Russian individuals and companies that operate internationally - like those that had "interacted" with Trump's campaign team - "are thus potential instruments of Russian foreign policy." Even the richest oligarch is "essentially a serf of the state."

Since the modern republic was established by Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s, Turkey embraced a market economy. Progress towards democracy halted after his death in 1938, and the army - seeing itself as guarantor of the constitution - repeatedly ousted governments seen as defying secular values. After decades of stagnation, Turkey began to reap what economy minister, Kemal Derviş sowed in 2001. When Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power, he could lay the ground for years of economic growth. Despite support for free markets, he tends to criticise "imaginary economic conspiracies" and is on his way to "usher in a return to statism."

Viktor Orbán panders to the well-heeled in Hungary. Like Putin, his favouritism towards oligarchs - some control the media - helped him "shore up his power. Orbán's "illiberal" economic policy is a combination of "social Darwinism and nationalism." Poland's steady growth since its EU-membership could soon propel the country to the club of advanced economies. But the ruling party under Jarosław Kaczyński embraces right-wing nationalism, and has been at loggerheads with the EU, which accused Warsaw of interfering with the courts, cracking down on the media and dissent.

Hungary, Russia and Poland had emerged as "illiberal" capitalists - ironically thanks to a globalised free-market economy. Although communism had failed as an economic system, its statist rule is still their political weapon of choice. But a liberalised economy evokes in time the spirit of political freedom, and generates new forces and tension that will make it hard to uphold authoritarian rule. With prosperity comes expectation. And people clamour for the rule of law that protects "contracts and private-property rights." If businesses "lose confidence" and there will be no "strong long-term growth" they will question the "legitimacy" of their illiberal leaders.