In the 1880s when the European powers were swept by fever of the colonial conquest, one of the guests of the famous German chancellor Bismarck drew his attention to the fact that there was no map of Africa in his office. Bismarck led his guest to the map of Europe. "Here is France. There is Russia and we are right in the middle. It is my map of Africa!"



This aphorism of the Iron Chancellor demonstrate the need for fundamental priorities of national security policy over transient and minor interests in connection with the relationships between Russia and NATO.





While members of the NATO are engaged in active campaign for 'prevention of Russian invasion of Baltic states' by approving the deployment of multinational force in three Baltic republics and in Poland Moscow retains a surprisingly passive posture in the region. Over the past four years Russia have not taken any serious steps to strengthen the grouping of Armed Forces in the Kaliningrad region and in the border with Baltic states. During the period of military reform of 2009-2010 Russian forces in the Kaliningrad region have been dramatically reduced and "unloaded" from heavy equipment and since then remain at the same low level. Suffice it to say that in the Kaliningrad region have only one tank battalion (as part of the 79th separate motorized rifle brigade). Even more significant thing is that the troops in Kaliningrad, Pskov and Leningrad regions hardly received any new modern military equipment including aircrafts while fairly active rearmament goes on in other regions of Russia. The aviation group in the Kaliningrad region is represented by only a few serviceable non-upgraded Su-27 fighters and Su-24M tactical bombers. Only bright spot is creation of the new Army Aviation Brigade in Ostrov in the Pskov region and deployment of S-400 Air Defense regiment in Kaliningrad as scheduled replacement of the old S-200 systems.



Even so popular Iskander-M missile complexes weren't stationed in the region on the permament basis. In fact local 152th Missile Brigade remains the last unit in Russian Armed Forces which preserved its old missiles Tochka-U.





Thus, Moscow, in fact, deliberately ignores all NATO hysteria around the Baltics, making it clear that it does not intend to threaten the Baltic and Scandinavian countries and Poland, and is not looking for conflict here. Where is the current Russian "Map of Africa"? While the Western media and analysts are fascinated by fate "Suwalki corridor" in Lithuania, Russia in the past year and a half is busy assembling an impressive military force on the entire length of the border with Ukraine.



In the north 1st Guards Tank Army was recreated which includes not only 'elite' Moscow 2nd Guards 'Tamanskaya' Motorized Rifle division and the 4th Guards Tank 'Kantemirovskaya' division also included the 6th Tank Brigade in Nizhny Novgorod, and most importantly - the newly reactivated 144th Motorized Rifle Division, the formation of which started in 2016 in the region of Smolensk and Yelnya.



20th Combined Arms Army was recreated almost from scratch in the south covering the area from Nizhny Novgorod to Voronezh. Revived 10th Guards Tank Division (which was disbanded in 2009) became the core of new army with headquarters in the Boguchar. The regions of Kursk, Belgorod and Voronezh are actively saturated with troops, including the transfer of two motor rifle brigades, and later, probably, here would be formed another division.



Finally the creation of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division began in Novocherkassk of the Rostov region wich was devoid of combined arms units since 1989. There was unconfirmed information about the possibility of creating another army subordinated to the Southern Military District with the corresponding further strengthening of the local forces.



The meaning of all these activities is rather obvious. The border with Ukraine was totally undefended just three years earlier and now the Russian side have three major troop concentrations here which can, if necessary to launch a swift offensive in Kiev direction from the north (it is only 270 km from Russian border through Chernihiv) and create two strong "pincers" to achieve a strategic envelopment of the main group of the Ukrainian army on the left bank of Dnieper while Ukrainan army is already constrained by the self-proclaimed republics in the Donbass. Ukraine simply have no sufficient military forces (and no ability to create them in foreseable future) to parry these attacks or a resist a possible large-scale 'deep operation' by Russian forces. And this despite the fact that Russia still have significant reserves in the Southern Military District (in the form of two armies - the 49th and 58th) and in the Central and Eastern Military District (in which, according to available data, three new divisions would be created ). There is also an active rearmament of Air Forces and Air defenses in the regions to the south of Moscow.



Thus, the current Russian military planning and build up have little connection with the "threat from NATO" or "a threat to NATO" and basically subordinated to the main and fundamental security issue for today Moscow - Ukraine. After losing almost all levers of influence on Ukraine in 2014 bar most direct ones the Russian leadership is now forced to bet on them. Creating a powerful army group on the Ukrainian theatre will allow the Kremlin to extend the range of possible responses to Ukrainian situation.



Under these conditions, Russia-NATO relations finally transformed into some sort of theater of the absurd and into 'dialogue of the deaf persons' as the two sides travel on parallel tracks. On the one hand, Moscow, in principle, does not accept the formal concerns of NATO, assuming the full absurdity of the possibility of Russian invasion of the Baltic states (not to mention Poland and Sweden) because of total absence of any motives or forces in the region for such action. On the other hand, it is obvious that the strengthening of NATO troops in the Baltic States pursues not so much a "defensive" purposes but it is a way to put pressure on Russia in various issues, including in the Ukrainian question.



The paradox is enhanced by the fact that Moscow (from its own point of view) ist now operates just in line with Russia's foreign policy ideals with its 'idee fixe' about the division of spheres of influence. The Kremlin continues to defend "their" sphere of influence in Ukraine and on post-Soviet space in general while essentially recognizing the Baltic states as a part of sphere of Western influence. West actively denying these claims of the Russian side but also has not been able yet (because of complex reasons) to create a military pressure that could divert Russian resources away from the Ukraine.



It can be concluded that up to the present time the Russian government is engaged in quite rational and reasonable policy in the field of defense resources allocation, focusing on its "Map of Africa" and avoiding being drawn into direct military competition with the West. Russia would loose any conventional arms race with United States and NATO in the current balance of forces. Apparently, Kremlin have a rather clear understanding of that.



Avoiding this arms race and restraint towards NATO's escalation (including the deployment of NATO forces at the Russian border) and maintaining even formal, but at least some kind of dialogue with the West in the military sphere (in form of NATO-Russia Council Russia, despite the shade of surreallity of its current existence) will not only save Russian resources and reduce at least some part of the western concerns, but in the longer term, can create the conditions for a hypothetical "grand bargain" between Russia and the West to resolve the broad range of mutual security issues.