24 AD and insurgency has taken Northern Africa by storm. For the past seven years, numerous native tribes have been launching a destructive guerrilla war against Roman oppression. Their leader, the ‘desert hydra’ Tacfarinas.

Previous success has been limited, yet victory is finally in sight. Now this rebel leader sees an opportunity that could decide the war. Leading a fresh rebellion, only one force remains between him and wreaking havoc in the Roman provinces.

Background: Roman Africa

By the beginning of the first century AD, Rome had established itself as the dominant power on the African coastline – its control now stretching all the way from Tingis (Tangier) to Lepcis Magna (Labdah) and beyond. Owning such a large domain brought rich rewards to the superpower; Africa’s Mediterranean coastline was, after all, abundant in fertile lands.

Such lands were perfect for Rome to give – along with Roman citizenship – as payment to its soldiers at the end of their military careers. Retired servicemen therefore quickly settled in Africa en-masse. With this influx of its own citizens, Rome cleverly managed to strengthen its control over its southern-most possessions. They quickly made Northern Africa their own.

Yet the Romans were not the only people to inhabit this land. Semi-nomadic native tribes co-existed with this power on the fringes of the Sahara. These were the Berber tribes; tribes such as the Garamantes in Tripolitania, the Musulamii and Gaetuli neighbouring Africa Proconsulares and the Mauri in Mauretania. They preferred to fight lightly-armed and with extreme mobility – the hot climate being no friend to slow, heavily armoured units. Truly, these people were the masters of desert warfare.

These tribes lived a migratory lifestyle. They did not recognise ‘borders’ and regularly crossed deep into Roman territory to escape the harsh inland desert environment. The unrestricted movement of these peoples onto fertile Roman land was bound to bring problems. And it did.

Uprising

In 17AD, open hostilities broke out between these two peoples. This revolt likely (although the Roman historian Tacitus claims otherwise) erupted from an extortionate Roman Imperial policy consistent on frontier communities throughout its Empire; a policy of heavy taxes, encroachments on local lands, as well as forced recruitment into the army. No wonder, therefore, that resentment and anger quickly gripped the local African tribes. Rome was bleeding them dry! In the west in Mauretania however, there is another clearer explanation for the outbreak.

At this time, the province of Mauretania was what we would call a client state of Rome. Its King, Juba II, was effectively a pawn of the Empire, ready to serve whenever they commanded. The Berber Tribes in the region, especially the Mauri, knew this. They could not respect such an uninspiring puppet of a leader who realistically had very little authority. I mean could you respect such a person? By lacking authority, you cannot hope to control large swathes of people. Insurgency inevitably followed throughout the province.

For all the above reasons, open hostilities broke out between the Berbers and Rome across Northern Africa. Powerful tribes such as the Musulamii, Mauri and Cinithii quickly united, realising their common purpose. Their unity, however, was due to one man.

Tacfarinas

Tacfarinas, by Roman standards, was the lowest of the low; a former auxiliary soldier turned deserter. To the Berbers, however, this man was the leader of the resistance.

Having deserted the Roman army, Tacfarinas quickly returned to his native Musulamii tribe and became one of their chiefs. His knowledge of how the Romans trained and fought was invaluable to them. Indeed, Tacfarinas even armed some of his soldiers in the heavier Roman manner! A nice addition to his mostly light-armed army.

Despite these ‘Roman’ units, however, Tacfarinas quickly realised his troops could not compete with his opponent in open battle. He learned the hard way too, being beaten by the Romans on multiple occasions.

Yet this should not hide the seriousness of his threat to Rome. It was these defeats, funnily, that INCREASED the danger of these desert warriors to Roman lands. How so? Well, following defeat, these tribes returned to their most devastating tactic. A tactic of raiding, looting and harassing their enemy; guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare

The result of such warfare was devastating as panic and insecurity seized the African provinces. It was the common people, after all, who were now in the front line of this war. At any time, their land could be raided by small bands of these desert warriors; their livelihood left in tatters.

These guerrilla tactics of the nomads proved remarkably successful at demoralising their foe. The Roman soldiers were simply not used to such unconventional fighting and as a result suffered heavy losses.

Indeed, these tactics had been so effective that the Romans, to counter the problem, reintroduced decimation. This was one of Rome’s most severe punishments for poor performing soldiers, where every tenth man of a certain unit was beaten to death by his comrades.

By implementing such a rare and drastic measure to restore discipline shows the serious threat Tacfarinas and his rebels posed. Fear of the enemy and their tactics had gripped the Roman army!

Down but not out

Finally, in 22AD, the Romans hounded the tribes away from guerrilla tactics and forced them to do battle. A decisive Roman victory quickly followed and war, at last, looked to be over. One man, however, had other ideas. Tacfarinas, the ‘desert hydra,’ escaped back to the fringes of the desert and began to raise new forces.

The reason why I call him the ‘desert hydra’ is because this man’s resilience was remarkable. Whenever the Romans defeated one of his armies, this leader would quickly raise a new force to once again challenge his enemy. Only by killing Tacfarinas could the revolt be ended.

Within two years, therefore, this rebel figurehead rose once again to challenge Rome with a new army. Only now, however, he realised he had an unbelievable opportunity.

A new hope

Following the victory against these partisans in 22AD, the Emperor Tiberius made a potentially game-changing decision. Believing the southern border of his Empire was now safe, he relocated one of the African legions to Europe.

In this one act, Rome’s military power in Africa significantly decreased; only one legion remained to protect the provinces. Tacfarinas knew this. Now was his time to prove to Tiberius that he was not just some mere bandit.

It was then that the Roman general in Africa at the time, P. Cornelius Dolabella made the crucial decision to demand military aid from Rome’s puppet state of Mauretania, now ruled by Juba II’s son Ptolemaeus.

These local troops would be crucial; being lightly armed and effective to counter such a fleeting foe. Seven long years of war with these desert warriors had finally proven that the heavily armoured Roman legionaries were ill-prepared to deal with this enemy.

The critical moment

With these light forces, Dolabella designed a plan to surprise their elusive foe at a place called Auzea. Such surprise tactics were what Tacfarinas and his rebels had been doing for years. Now, Dolabella’s own light-armed units would give them a taste of their own medicine.

The surprise attack on the nomad forces was a crushing success, so effective that,

The enemy, by contrast unaware of anything, had no weapons, no order, no plan; like sheep, they were dragged off, butchered or captured.

(Tac. Ann. 4.25)

In one decisive move, Dolabella crushed the new insurgent threat. He had caught the tribes off-guard and slaughtered them. There would be no escape for Tacfarinas this time either as he, along with many other tribal leaders, died fighting. He had simply been out-generalled.

The success of this surprise attack can draw comparisons to that of George Washington’s crossing of the Deleware in 1776. Here, like with the Berbers against Dolabella, the British Hessian troops outnumbered Washington significantly. Any surprise attack against them, therefore, could easily have backfired if it failed. Fortunately for Washington, however, his rebels crossed the Delaware river undetected. The British, not expecting a battle, were caught unawares and quickly capitulated.

Both Washington and Dolabella used a risky surprise attack to beat their foe that paid off. Although both Tacfarinas and the Hessians had the advantage of a larger force, their inability to effectively fight back meant that quantity counted for nothing.

The result

Following the demise of Tacfarinas, Rome’s African provinces emerged from seven years of fear and insecurity. Yet much would change due to these events.

For starters, Rome realised the incapability of Mauretania as a client state. Both Juba II and his son Ptolemaus had proven their inadequacy at handling the nomadic revolt. Indeed, rather than helping put down the uprising, arguably the portrayal of these Kings as mere puppets of Rome encouraged more people to join Tacfarinas and his rebels!

Soon after, the following Emperor, Caligula, summoned Ptolemaus to Rome and there had him killed. Rome then annexed Mauretania for itself and divided it in two. All this, likely due to Tacfarinas and his irregulars.

As for Dolabella, he received no triumph for his victory. Tiberius had already given three to previous generals, believing they had already defeated Tacfarinas. He could not give a fourth for the same war! Yet Dolabella’s record of defeating this tribal confederation gained him much renown. It was he, after all, who had finally killed the elusive tribal leader and ended the war.

The war may now have officially ended, but insurgency by the Berbers would continue against Roman rule for centuries. Tacfarinas was just the start. His revolt showed to the Romans, however, how crucial light-armed troops were to combat this desert threat. With this knowledge, relative peace and stability returned to these lands.

What if?

Now consider how different North African history would look if Dolabella’s limited troops had not been able to defeat Tacfarinas. What if his audacious surprise attack had failed? In such circumstances, we must consider a world where this nomad revolt became a much more serious threat in antiquity than history would have us believe.

A failed surprise attack could have easily resulted in a crushing victory for Tacfarinas. Remember, the troops that Dolabella sent to stupefy the tribesmen were all lightly-armoured. The Berbers, likely, would have easily crushed them if the Romans had lost the element of surprise; the hunter becoming the hunted.

Mauretania

With Tacfarinas’ victory over Dolabella at Auzea, this could easily have been the nail in the coffin for the Mauretanian client kingdom. As aforementioned, Juba and then Ptolemaus had been unable to handle this revolt of their own.

It is possible that, without Roman military aid and many of Ptolemaus’ troops perishing at Auzea, this puppet dynasty would crumble. History portrays Ptolemaus as a man who lacked authority and the ability to rule effectively. Perhaps this defeat would have been the last straw?

Rome losing its control over Mauretania to their enemy would have been a massive blow to its Imperial image. Not only was this province extremely wealthy, but Mauretania was a main supplier of the light-armed troops Rome so desperately needed to counter the guerrilla warfare of their enemy. Now, however, these soldiers would belong to Tacfarinas.

It is unlikely that this revolt intended to drive the Romans completely out of Africa. Instead they had simply wanted assurances that this power would not seize their lands unjustly. Yet victory at Auzea would have put Tacfarinas in an incredibly strong negotiating position. Rome, as highlighted, had already reduced their military forces in Africa, but there was an even more important reason why this is likely.

The grain supply

By this time, Rome had grown so large that it heavily relied on food imports to prevent its population from starving. Although the irrigated lands of the Nile undoubtedly became the key source of these imports, the rest of the fertile African coast was a close second. In a world where Dolabella perished at Auzea,

Tacfarinas and his now significantly-increased forces would have had ‘free-roam’ in northern Africa until Rome could send more troops. In the meantime, farms and lands, critical to providing grain for the Eternal City, would be pillaged. Such acts would have put Rome on its knees.

If Tacfarinas had hindered the Roman grain supply, then it is fascinating to consider whether the Emperor Tiberius would have come to terms with a man he previously viewed as no more than a mere bandit. So desperate would this man have been to keep his city’s links to the fertile North African lands open.

From common bandit to one of Tiberius’ greatest threats; an incredible journey to consider for the former deserter if Dolabella’s surprise attack had failed.

Conclusion

Tacfarinas’ revolt has gone down in history as one of relatively little importance. It is therefore fascinating to consider whether there was any chance this was a greater threat than Tacitus would want us to believe. After writing this, I believe it was.

Rome’s eventual victory was due to Dolabella’s surprise attack at Auzea. If this had failed, perhaps Tacfarinas could have whittled down the Romans with his perfected guerrilla tactics. From then on, who knows, but the possibilities are fascinating to consider.

Enjoy the article? Please leave a like! It’s only one click.

Notes, Links and Further Reading

Views are my own unless references stated.

Please SUBSCRIBE if you enjoy the content

Online translation of Tacitus: Annals here.

Strabo: Geography 17.3.7 (description of the nomadic tribes) available here

Grunewald, T. 1999. Bandits in the Roman Empire: Myth and Reality. Mainz: Akademie der Wissenschaften und de Literatur

Fishwick. D, Shaw. B. D. 1976. ‘Ptolemy of Mauretania and the Conspiracy of Gaetulicus,’ Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte 25 (4): 491-494.

Saddington, D. B. 1978. ‘Notes on Two Passages in Tacitus (Ann. 4.24.3 and 15.25.3),’ The Classical Quarterly 28 (2): 330-332.

Whittaker, C. R. 1996. ‘Roman Africa: Augustus to Vespasian,’ The Cambridge Ancient History 10 (The Augustan Empire, 43 BC – AD 69): 586-618

Vanaker. W. 2013. ‘Conflicts and Instability in Mauretania and Gaius’ Realpolitik,’ Latomus: Revue D’Etudes Latines 72 (3): 725-741

Author: Tristan Hughes Twitter Facebook

Did you enjoy this article? Signup today and receive free updates straight in your inbox. We will never share or sell your email address. I agree to have my personal information transfered to MailChimp ( I agree to have my personal information transfered to MailChimp ( more information

Share this: Tweet





WhatsApp



Like this: Like Loading...