Additional details that have emerged regarding an ambush in southwest Niger that left four U.S. Army soldiers dead continue to prompt more questions than they answer about the incident. The top American headquarters for military operations on the continent, U.S. Africa Command, has now confirmed that private contractors helped casualties evacuate the area afterwards, but has again declined to elaborate on the U.S.-Nigerien patrol's overall objectives or who is responsible for the attack. The facts as they are known at present are that, on Oct. 4, 2017, two U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers and two other members of the service attached to elements of the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Niger died after their convoy came under attack from militants near the village of Tongo Tongo, near the border with Mali. A multi-national force of American, Nigerien, and French forces responded to the incident to help drive off the hostile force and rescue the remaining friendly personnel. One of the American soldiers killed in the incident was missing for two days before U.S. forces recovered his body and it remains unclear when and how he died.

Private contractors working for Berry Aviation in Niger’s capital Niamey “were on alert during the incident and conducted casualty evacuation and transport for U.S. and partner forces,” Robyn Mack, a spokesperson for U.S Africa Command, or AFRICOM, told The War Zone in an Email. “Currently, Berry Aviation is the only contractor in Niger or Burkina Faso under CASEVAC [casualty evacuation] contract for U.S. Africa Command.” We don’t know what part of the process the company was involved in, whether it was moving casualties from Tongo Tongo to Niamey, between a third site and the Nigerien capital, or from there to the U.S. military’s Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany. Berry Aviation is presently fulfilling the terms of a three month bridge contract through the end of October 2017 that requires the firm to have one fixed wing aircraft and one helicopter situated in Niamey ready to go within three hours for operations throughout North and West Africa.

According to Berry’s website, however, the company’s fleet only includes a variety of fixed wing aircraft, such as the de Havilland Canada Dash-8 and Twin Otter, both twin engine turbo-prop planes. It is unclear whether the firm also has helicopters or subcontracts to provide that service. Contracting documents for previous iterations of this arrangement do not specify the need for any particular aircraft by name or prohibit the use of third parties to meet its requirements. That the aircraft were on call and participated in the response efforts is an important detail. The ability of the U.S. military and contractors working on its behalf, or lack thereof, to rush to the rescue during the attack has been a point of significant scrutiny.

Berry Aviation A grainy picture of one of Berry Aviation's Twin Otters at an unknown location.

Various reports had previously noted that French helicopters, likely flying in either from Niamey or their base in Gao in neighboring Mali, were able to respond relatively quickly, calling into question the preparedness of American forces in the region. Earlier in October 2017, sources told The New York Times that troops in Central Africa, where conditions are similar, understood that it might take up to 10 hours for a medical evacuation. Another simply said the time frame was “multiples” of the so-called “golden hour,” a term for the first sixty minutes after an individual suffers a traumatic, potentially life-threatening injury when medical personnel have the best chance to save them or otherwise avoid serious complications. Berry Aviation’s standard three-hour alert posture, which U.S. commanders could reduce to one hour with prior notification, underscores this issue. Under those parameters, the golden hour would be gone before the aircraft were even in the air in the best case scenario. “You’re never going to have the golden hour in Africa; it’s not possible,” retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Donald Bolduc, who led Special Operations Command Africa until June 2017, told The Times. “But you have an acceptable amount of time that commanders have agreed on.” It seems almost certain that these procedures are under review in light of the incident in Niger, which AFRICOM has already said is under investigation. Another issue will likely be the ability of dedicated rapid reaction elements to actually meet their operational requirements.

The War Zone