First, the arms embargo on Iran dealt a blow to the credibility of the UN Security Council because it was motivated by selfish political calculations rather than global security imperatives and common interest. In 2006, former US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, speaking at the American Israel Public Action Committee policy conference, famously referred to the Security Council as a "tool in the toolbox" that would be used to curtail Iranian ambitions . The same year, when the Security Council issued its first resolution against Iran, in an official statement, Iran repurposed the exact same expression to question the real function of the council . The subsequent imposition of the unwarranted arms embargo only confirmed the idea that this international body is all too willing to transgress its past practice and mandate for political scores against Iran. It also reinforced the idea in Tehran that Western powers are using the nuclear program as a pretext to justify measures to weaken Iran — militarily and economically — for the purpose of engineering a regime change.

In fact, the concerned resolutions' perambulatory clauses — which normally define the purpose of the resolutions — do not address any issue other than the nuclear program, reinforcing the idea that just like other economic sanctions meant to provide leverage at the negotiating table, the arms embargo is also used as a negotiating tool, notwithstanding its security implications.

While arms embargoes by the UN are usually "counteractive measures" in reaction to an ongoing civil war, a war of aggression, genocide, an illegal coup, war crimes and other serious humanitarian crises, the arms embargo against Iran is an unprecedented coercive measure that seeks to pressure the country into making concessions on its nuclear program at the negotiating table. In other words, unlike in the cases of Afghanistan, Angola, Ivory Coast, Haiti, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Sudan or Yugoslavia, where the embargoes' function was actually to prevent an unfolding disaster or to quickly restore security, in Iran's case, it is used as an instrument of duress over an issue that has nothing to do with conventional weapons.

Since the UN Security Council took over Iran's nuclear dossier in 2006, it has issued a number of resolutions that cumulatively impose a stringent arms embargo on Iran. These restrictions on Iran's conventional weapons capabilities were mostly adopted under US pressure and greatly differ from other typical arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations.

Second, the arms embargo on Iran completely neglected the practical implications of isolating a country that has been for many years the front line in the war against groups such as the Islamic State (IS) in the sensitive Middle East region. Indeed, Iran has been fighting armed terrorist organizations such as Jaish al-Adl and Jundollah at its eastern border for over a decade. It is the one country in the region that has staved off the spread of the Taliban, al-Qaeda and associates, preventing them from taking even more territory in the Middle East. Iran has also contained Sunni extremist groups in and around Khuzestan province, quelling their influence in the sensitive Persian Gulf area, where most of the world's crude oil reserves are located. The embargo did not seem to mind curtailing Iran's ability to act as a fortress against these groups.

Third, the UN arms embargo is disturbingly out of touch with the realities and current geopolitics on the ground. In fact, had Iran abided by its terms, it would have had to refrain from arming Kurds against IS to prevent a genocide; it would have avoided helping the Iraqi government break the IS siege in Amerli; and it would not have helped the Iraqi army, peshmerga forces and Shiite militias and let IS take over Baghdad. Of course, maintaining an unrealistic embargo that is already being breached out of necessity by both Iran and Iraq is yet another dent in the authority of the Security Council.

Fourth, for decades, Iran has been at the forefront of a costly all-out war against global drug trafficking, standing alone before dangerous drug cartels that operate in the main heroin corridors linking Afghanistan to the European and Russian markets. In the process, Iran has already lost more than 4,000 security personnel over the years and saved billions of dollars for the Americans and Europeans in their own fight against drugs. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 2013 report, despite arms and financial sanctions, Iran is responsible for 80% of the world’s opium seizures and 30% of heroin seizures, to the benefit of the rest of the world. However, while drug cartels at Iran's eastern border are increasingly arming themselves with the latest weapons and high-tech equipment, the UN — the same international organization that produced these drug reports — saw fit to place Iran under an arms embargo that curtails the country's ability to fight drug trafficking effectively.

The arms embargo on Iran does not stand the test of reason.

Today, the gravity of the situation with IS makes the need to lift the arms embargo even more pressing. In fact, the situation is so alarming that even high-ranking US officials have signaled openness to engage in some sort of security cooperation with Tehran. Of course, the Security Council provisions that impose the arms embargo still remain in effect and constitute the most important legal hurdle before any eventual joint effort.

If Iran and the Security Council agree at the end of the negotiations that UN sanctions would be lifted gradually through a step-by-step process commensurate with Iran's compliance, removing these legal obstacles through a new resolution at the very onset seems to be the logical thing to do. Not only would it pave the way for urgent and indispensable security cooperation with Iran against IS, but it would restore the credibility of the council. With the embargo lifted through a legal process, countries will no longer need to undermine the authority of the council by flouting the law.

On the other hand, maintaining a situation whereby Iran is called to cooperate on IS and other security issues in the region while remaining under an unwarranted arms embargo would only reinforce the idea that the United States and its allies do not have any clear foreign policy strategy for the Middle East.