2500 years have passed since the notion of free speech was first put into practice in Ancient Athens. Since then, virtually every democratic nation has enshrined it as one of their foundational principles of governance. In the UK, free speech is protected by the 1689 Bill of Rights. The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen declared free speech to be an inalienable human right during the French Revolution. In America, freedom of speech is safeguarded by the very first of ten amendments that make up the Bill of Rights. Most recently, free speech has been protected by Article 19 the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights which states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Clearly, our forefathers regarded the protection of free speech as a high priority when reforming the structure of governance from oppressive feudalism to democracy. However, religious dogmatism, no platforming at universities and the exile of whistle-blowers suggest the debate on free expression is far from over. This article will focus on the state of free speech on university campuses. But first let us clarify the specific tenets of free speech as a human right by looking at the works of those who first recognised its great importance.

John Stewart Mill’s formalisation of freedom of speech as a right, was one of the first and is arguably the most famous. It is a good place for us to start. In the second chapter of On Liberty, he wrote:

“He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion... Nor is it enough that he should hear the opinions of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them...he must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form”.

This passage serves as a corollary to his claim that “there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered”. For Mill, the necessity for universal freedom of expression is founded on the epistemological claim that diversity of opinion is a requirement for the accumulation of knowledge of all kinds. In order for one’s opinions to be well informed, Mill argues that our convictions must be robustly put to the test in a public marketplace of ideas; and the provision of free speech is the currency that allows for its smooth operation.

It is important to note that Mill did not advocate complete, unrestricted Freedom of expression. Rather, freedom of expression ought to be unregulated to the extent that it did not violate the harm principle, which states that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”. I argue that it is confusion over the kinds of speech that violate this principle which result in the problematic erosion of free speech that we are seeing in western democracies today.

The most surprising place in which freedom of speech is being contested is in our universities. In November 2014, Oxford Students for Life organised a debate at Christ Church College, Oxford on the motion: “this house believes Britain’s abortion culture hurts us all”. Before the event could take place, a group of feminist student protesters argued, on the behalf of the entire Oxford student community, that it is indefensible for two individuals “who do not have uteruses” to debate this issue. They accused Tim Stanley and Brendan O’Neill, the two speakers at the debate, of advocating “really shitty anti-choice rhetoric and probs some cissexism”. They also vowed to “take along some non-destructive but oh so disruptive instruments to help demonstrate to the anti-choicers just what we think of their ‘debate’.” This is not the only example where the subjective opinions of a few individuals undermined the ability of others to access a wide variety of opinions at their university. At British and American universities, Condoleezza Rice, Maryam Namazie, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Germaine Greer, Christine Lagarde, Marine Le Pen, Sam Harris, John Cleese, Bill Maher and many others have been the victims of attempted no platforming. Returning to Mill’s harm principle, is it really the case that the speech of these individuals would cause harm to others? I posit not. Universities ought to be the last place in the world where speakers should be no platformed. A common argument that is given in favour of no platforming is that the views expressed by a speaker cause offence in those who hear it. This was the charge levied against all of the individuals listed above. However, offence does not equal harm. If one takes offence at what is being said, then one should inform the speaker why, as is our right. If that is too adversarial, then we ought to stay at home. What we ought not to do is to allow our subjective taking of offence to affect the access of those who would like to constructively engage in debate, to a diverse range of opinions, particularly in universities. John Milton put it best in his moving claim against censorship:

"Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”

In the spirit of free expression, comments, critiques and outright admonitions are encouraged.





By Keyana C. Sapp