by David Kavanagh

To many political economy scholars, the 21st Century belongs to, for all intents and purposes, the East Asian region.

Nowhere else on Earth have nation states exploded with such sudden and rapid economic growth and a general rise in living standards as in places like Singapore, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and of course the heavyweight People’s Republic of China (PRC).

As such, many also are beginning to fear the rising influence of the latter, a country whose GDP and general economic power is expected to soon surpass that of the United States, the one superpower that has exercised substantial hegemonic influence over global affairs since the end of the Second World War.

While the pervasive fear of the Commies that permeated international politics and relations throughout the Cold War period has dwindled, China remains America’s most major source of economic competition.

Although still nominally a Communist state governed by the single and powerful Communist Party of China (CPC), China is more invested in international trade and the liberal capitalist system than most.

It beckons the belief that its political system will soon follow suit and that China will, within the next generation according to some, democratize fully.

There are a number of reasons for this and a further multitude of theories about how and when exactly it will take place – be it rapidly, in the guise of populist discontent and revolution, or more gradually, with incremental adjustments to governance structures – but the end picture is the same.

The most common argument stems from the theoretical groundwork of what political scientists refer to as Modernization Theory.

While it is complex and specific elements are necessarily hotly debated, the basic gist of modernization theory, as put by prominent theorist Walt Whitman Rostow, is as follows.

Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth

Most societies throughout human histories begin in their infancy as agrarian (or agriculture-based) and feudal societies with subsistence economies, low levels of trade and basic technology, and limited enfranchisement. The power is in the hands of the few.

Eventually gradual economic growth leads to a period of industrialization and innovation during which technologies and economies begin to expand and a small and educated middle class emerges.

As the period of industrialization continues and surplus goods lead to further profit, the middle class grows and society becomes generally more prosperous.

Then, when the middle class is large, prosperous and, to put it simply, smart enough, their expectations about the standard of living and the political environment around them begin to evolve or rise.

They begin to make demands of their leaders. They want to be rid of corruption and wealth inequality. They want to begin a discussion of fundamental rights, citizenship, and all of its associated features. They want to live, fundamentally, in a democratic or at least liberal egalitarian society in which civil and political freedoms are protected and respected and power is not abused.

All that said, it must be pointed out that modernization, although greatly increasing the likelihood of liberalization or democratization (and there is a difference, but that’s a debate for another time), does not always result in a country becoming democratic.

With China, however, present conditions suggest that it may very well do just that.

The case for China

As a one-party Communist system, the Chinese government has extensive power over the populace. By controlling most of the mainstream media and restricting certain civil liberties and political rights it can quash a great deal of dissent and opposition.

But even authoritarian regimes need to keep their population content in order to avoid revolutions either so violent and desperate or so widely supported that they become dangerous.

In China, a majority of the population seems content to surrender some of their rights if it means continued growth and, as was said before, the consequent rise in living standards. After all, everyone likes to live in a clean and progressive society.

It would even be narrow minded to suggest that this approach is in any way inferior to the typical democratic experience which stresses individual rights and freedoms sometimes at the expense of organised development.

Singapore, for example, owes a substantial amount of its enormous wealth and high standard of living to the authoritarian principles espoused by its former and even now much revered and recently deceased Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, who believed that some state control would be necessary to prevent instability and allow economic and human development – which it did. His approach is commonly referred to as “authoritarian pragmatism”.

But in China, it’s becoming the case that the sacrifices made by its people are no longer balanced alongside worthwhile development.

Although it remains a global economic leader, far surpassing the GDP of its neighbours, its citizens are beginning to face a number of internal economic problems.

Not only are people becoming frustrated with the constant abuses of power, environmental degradation and censorship, but Chinese citizens are facing rapidly rising wages, industrial labour shortages, and pressure on healthcare, welfare and pensions.

Furthermore, education has seemingly reached a limit and urbanization, a primary driver of productivity within the country has decelerated drastically.

Anger is brewing in some segments of society. Protests have been and continue to be organised by those dissatisfied enough to challenge the system.

And so, China finds itself in a Catch-22 of sorts.

On the one hand, if China successfully finds a way to continue substantial economic growth in order to satisfy the populace, it will still have to deal with prospects of liberalization. Remember, modernization usually means liberalization.

As the Financial Times Philip Stephens adequately put it:

Authoritarian regimes, most notably China, have traditionally seen growth as the answer. They are mistaken. For one thing, as we have seen in recent months, rising states are not immune to global economic cycles.”

Similarly, the Atlantic Times Larry Diamond says:

China cannot keep moving forward to the per capita income, educational, and informational levels of a middle-income country without experiencing the pressures for democratic change that Korea and Taiwan did more than two decades ago.

On the other hand, discontent resulting from the gradual slowing down of growth where it counts for its citizens and an increased spread of democratic values worldwide may lead to dramatic cries for reform and potential liberalization anyway.

To put it concisely: more growth may lead to democracy and less growth may lead to democracy. The distinction will be made in how exactly it gets there.

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