George Osborne was a worried man. It was May 2016 and the EU referendum was only a month away. The polls were tight, much too tight for comfort as far as the then chancellor was concerned.

This had not been for the lack of effort on Osborne’s part. He had published a Treasury paper looking at the long-term implications of Brexit and had orchestrated heavyweight overseas support for the remain side from the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

But with voters seemingly impervious to the barrage of warnings, it was time to put the frighteners on them. The earlier Treasury paper had predicted what the economy might look like in 2030; the one published in May 2016 was about the immediate impact of leaving the EU. It predicted a year-long recession, an increase in unemployment of 500,000, turmoil in the financial markets and falling house prices – all of which turned out to be well wide of the mark. To put it mildly, this was not the Treasury’s finest hour.

In one respect, though, the Treasury was right. The vote to leave the EU resulted in a sharp fall in the value of sterling, which pushed up the cost of imports and reduced consumers’ spending power. The impact of the pound’s depreciation was clearly evident in the batch of official statistics released last week – most notably in the rise in the annual inflation rate since the referendum and the sluggishness of retail spending.

Clearly, the economy has not collapsed since the Brexit vote in the way that Osborne said it would. But nor is it in the best of health. Unemployment is falling rather than rising, but the UK’s productivity performance is woeful. The fall in the value of the pound should help to rebalance the economy by making exports cheaper and imports dearer, but the squeeze on consumers has come through much more quickly than the boost to the trade figures. The retail sales figures would look even more sickly were it not for the spending by overseas tourists, who are finding the UK a cheap place to shop.

Following a spurt of (largely) debt-financed spending in the second half of 2016, Britain has fallen back into a low-growth period of around 0.2-0.3% a quarter. Some modest acceleration can be expected in 2018, because by then inflation will have fallen back and real incomes will start rising again. But it will be the wrong sort of growth – the traditional UK model based on rising consumption rather than rising investment and exports. Quite simply, the UK lacks the productive capacity to take advantage of the boost to competitiveness provided by a falling currency, so when consumption is weak, growth overall is weak too.

The reasons for that are familiar enough. An overvalued currency attracted hot money into the City, but disadvantaged manufacturers. Britain’s management has been poor. There has been too little attention paid to skills and training. The further education system is not really fit for purpose. Britain has nothing like Germany’s KfW government-run development bank, which prefers to nurture businesses with patient long-term finance rather than gouging them with high interest rates.

Solving these deep structural problems will take time and effort, which UK governments have tended to lack. It has been far easier, sadly, to get a sugar rush by stimulating the housing market. A hollowed-out manufacturing sector and a chronic trade deficit are the inevitable results.

Understandably, there is currently a great deal of debate about the sort of trading arrangements Britain will have with the EU and with the rest of the world after Brexit. But in some ways this is putting the cart before the horse. For Britain to have a successful post-Brexit trade strategy it first needs to have a productivity strategy and an industrial strategy.

The lessons of Learndirect do not flatter the private sector

As it pondered the future of apprenticeship quango Learndirect in 2011, the coalition wanted two things: to raise cash and cut down the number of “Neets” (those not in education, employment or training). It thought it had found the answer: sell the quango. The result has not been a good advert for privatisation.

The proceeds were minor, raising £36m from the private equity arm of Lloyds Bank, which at the time was 40% owned by the government. But at first, the company appeared to do well. The number of trainees reached nearly 73,000, and over the years Learndirect’s owners reaped millions in dividends from mostly taxpayer-provided work training young people. There was enough money for the company to spend £504,000 sponsoring a Formula One team.

However, education watchdog Ofsted last week issued a withering report branding its training “inadequate” and pointing out that 70% of Learndirect’s apprentices did not meet the minimum standards. Standards were so low that the Department for Education said it would withdraw all funding from the company.

Learndirect knew that Ofsted’s report was going to be damning and was so fearful about the impact that it fought a court battle to prevent its publication. One of Learndirect’s concerns was that the report could have such a “catastrophic” impact that it might have to call in administrators.

It lost the battle and the report was published; the DfE pulled its contracts. But Learndirect has not gone under and has reassured trainees, staff and investors that it is financially stable.

Is this because Learndirect’s parent has set up an ostensibly mirror company – Learndirect Apprenticeships – which it tells us is a “separate legal entity” and therefore not removed from the government’s approved list?

Andy Palmer, Learndirect’s chief executive, and Ken Hills, its chairman, did not respond to questions. Neither did Learndirect Apprenticeships’ two directors listed at Companies House – Andy Palmer and Ken Hills.

Ryanair might regret denying passengers a third G&T

Michael O’Leary is rarely cast in the role of killjoy. But if he gets his way, passing the hours and minutes in departure lounges will be a considerably drier experience for holidaymakers. Ryanair, the budget carrier of which he is boss, has demanded a two-drink limit at airport bars, on the grounds that airlines have to deal with the consequences of drunk passengers – such as emergency landings at airports even more far-flung than the average Ryanair destination.

O’Leary is now a very powerful executive in European aviation and his words should not be shrugged off by airports. But there could be consequences. If airports cut back on booze sales, they will make less money, and could plug that gap with higher landing charges. This means: higher fares. So there might be fewer drunk passengers for O’Leary to deal with, but also fewer passengers in general.