Enlarge By Eric Gay, AP The Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research in San Antonio could be one of the labs mentioned in an upcoming government report calling for higher security at such facilities. WASHINGTON (AP)  Another frightening new government report is heightening fears about the safety of U.S. biodefense laboratories that study some of the world's deadliest germs. The latest worry: Intruders could easily break into two of the labs due to lax security. Now some lawmakers and members of a new citizen coalition are asking whether it's time for a timeout in the expansion of the Bush administration's biowarfare defense program. The Bush administration decided after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks that the nation needed to develop cures, drug treatments, vaccines and diagnostic tests to combat germs that could be used in a terrorist attack or accidentally released. And, while U.S. officials say there are no known incidents where outsiders attacked anyone with germs from a U.S. lab, the FBI concluded last summer that a microbiologist at the Army's lab in Ft. Detrick, Md. was responsible for anthrax attacks in 2001. Two House lawmakers and members of a new citizen coalition — people "living in the shadow" of these labs — say the defensive biowarfare program has expanded too fast since Sept. 11, 2001. Security measures have not caught up, they said. The latest government study, initially obtained by The Associated Press and released publicly Thursday, found that intruders could easily break into two laboratories handling organisms that could cause illnesses with no cure. The AP identified the vulnerable lab locations as Atlanta and San Antonio. The Government Accountability Office did not identify the labs except to say they were classified as Biosafety Level 4 facilities — requiring the highest level of security. But the report included enough details for the AP — and others knowledgeable about such labs — to determine their locations. In Texas, the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research features an outside window that looks directly into the room where the deadly germs are handled. The lab, which is privately run, also lacks sufficient security cameras, intrusion detection alarms or visible armed guards at its public entrances. Officials there said they will tighten security. "We already have an initiative underway to look at perimeter security," said Kenneth Trevett, president of the lab in San Antonio. "We're waiting for additional input but we're not waiting long. The GAO would like us to do some fairly significant things. They would like us to do it sooner rather than later." The other lab described with weak security in the report is operated by Georgia State University in Atlanta. That lab lacked complete security barriers and any integrated security system, including any live monitoring by security cameras. During their review, investigators said they watched an unidentified pedestrian enter the building through an unguarded loading dock. "Georgia State clearly wants its BSL-4 to be as safe as possible," said DeAnna Hines, assistant vice president for university relations. "We are already taking steps that will enhance the lab's safety and security standards." Hines did not confirm the school's research lab was the one mentioned in the congressional report as lacking proper security. The new report, coupled with several investigative findings over the past year, revealed security and safety problems covering every aspect of the facilities: poor perimeter security, a growing number of accidents inside the labs, and the FBI conclusion last summer that a civilian Army scientist at Ft. Detrick, Md. was behind deadly anthrax attacks in 2001. Beth Willis, a member of the citizen group from Frederick, Md. near Ft. Detrick, said, "We understand we're not going to make the labs go away but we have a lot of concerns about safety. "Biomedical research is very important. We're not saying it all should stop. We are saying the size and scale of the ramp-up with pathogens, considered by the government to be biowarfare pathogens, is a dangerous thing," Willis said. "It's an opportunity to say 'time out' and address this." Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, repeated this week his call for suspension of all further design and construction of biodefense laboratories until security problems are fixed. In a letter to President Bush in August, Dingell and Rep. Bart Stupak, D-Mich., urged the suspension of all further design and construction of laboratories in the program — until security problems are fixed. "We found that many of the labs are probably unnecessary or redundant. Shockingly, the Government Accountability Office reported that no one in the government even knows the total number of BSL (Biosafety Level) 3 and 4 labs currently in existence. "Ironically, their proliferation has only exacerbated the potential risk of a terrorist incident or accidental release, not enhanced our nation's security." BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories are those handling the most dangerous germs and toxins and requiring the most stringent security. The BSL-4 labs handle organisms that cause diseases without a cure. They include ebola, marburg, junin and lassa viruses. Five BSL-4 labs operate now, but the number could triple with labs planned or under construction, the GAO said. Copyright 2008 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. Guidelines: You share in the USA TODAY community, so please keep your comments smart and civil. Don't attack other readers personally, and keep your language decent. 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