A lot (or at least a lot within the Fire fan community) has been made of the Fire’s ability in the preseason to change up their tactics. While they mostly stuck to a 4-2-3-1 in their tune-up games, on Saturday, in the final game of the Simple Invitational, they lined up in a 3-5-2 against Portland. The switch mostly worked, as the Fire absorbed Portland’s pressure and possession for 90 minutes, snatching a 2-0 victory that, to be honest, didn’t look that uncomfortable for Chicago. Veljko Paunovic continually emphasized this tactical flexibility throughout the off-season. He’s stressed that he wants to make it a hallmark of the team.

While working on my season preview for Sporting Kansas City, I came across some stats that spoke to the lack of flexibility Frank Yallop’s side exhibited last year, on the offensive side of the ball. A lot of this probably won’t be news to Fire supporters, but it’s useful to see it borne out in some of the data.

The following table shows the total number of shots created off of crosses, by team, for the 2015 season. It also includes the average expected goals of those shots. Expected goals measure the quality of a shot. A shot calculated at .5 expected goals has a 1 in 2 chance of going in (with some amount of error from the model).

So, the Fire had the second highest number of shots off crosses, but the third lowest average shot quality on those shots. Essentially, the Fire loved to lump the ball in from the wings. But the chances they got from those balls were pretty poor. For a team without a strong target forward to make the right runs, and without anyone particularly good at crossing the ball to find those runs (though Joevin Jones and Patrick Nyarko were decent), this is exactly what’d you’d expect to happen. Kennedy Igboananike and Quincy Amarikwa were supposed to split the duties of that target forward, and Harry Shipp and Joevin Jones were supposed to provide some of that service. Those plans, of course, were never realized. Harry Shipp, in particular, had a tough time playing on the wing. Of his 55 key passes (passes leading to a shot), only 15 came off crosses. Those 15 had an average of .08 expected goals. Simply put, he didn’t create much from out wide, and the opportunities he did create were not of high quality.

A tactically flexible coach would adapt to this. In June, after the Fire took just 14 points from 14 games, changes probably should have been made. Instead, Frank Yallop forged ahead.

The plot below shows the Fire’s shots created from crosses by game, and shots created from through balls by game. (Here’s an excellent article from Alex Olshansky on the efficacy of each).

As you can see, the Fire never got much going with through balls, even after Gilberto’s pace was added in August. The team preferred, for the most part, to continue crossing it in, unsuccessfully, from the flanks.

Even if Paunovic is unsuccessful (and all indications so far point to that not being the case), at the very least, he’s shown the ability to change things when they’re not working, or when they might work better. For Fire fans, that willingness to adapt should be a breath of fresh air.