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Adam Deen said:



My convictions are very much in line with the Hanafi Maturidi school of thought. In particular, that human reason, unaided by scripture, can arrive at what is morally right and wrong.

In order to understand why Adam Deen’s claim of finding precedent for his “rationalistic” approach in “Hanafi Maturidi” thought is misguided, it is necessary to appreciate the early theological debate over “good” (ḥasan) and “bad” (qabīḥ).



The issue of “good” and “bad” according to the Māturīdīs and its rival theological schools, Ash‘arīs and Mu‘tazilīs, is often misunderstood. Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs are traditionalist Sunnī schools, while Mu‘tazilīs are a heterodox rationalist school.



The discussion of “good” (ḥasan) and “bad” (qabīḥ) centres around three areas. On the first two, there is agreement amongst all three theological schools, and on the third, there is disagreement. “Goodness” and “badness” can be defined in three different ways:



1. Goodness in the sense of “perfection” and “completeness” and badness in the sense of “imperfection” and “incompleteness.” E.g. to have knowledge is a perfection, and hence “good” by this definition, while to be ignorant is an imperfection and hence “bad” by this definition. All schools agree that this kind of “goodness” and “badness” can be comprehended by reason.



2. Goodness in the sense of what agrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and badness in the sense of what disagrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires. E.g. good health agrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and is therefore “good” by this definition, and bad health disagrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and is therefore “bad” by this definition. All schools agree that this kind of “goodness” and “badness” can be comprehended by reason.



3. Goodness in the sense of what the Lawgiver, i.e. God, considers praiseworthy and deserving of reward, and badness in the sense of what the Lawgiver considers blameworthy and deserving of punishment. This is what Adam Deen refers to as “morally right and wrong.” The three theological schools differ on this last definition as follows:



a. The Māturīdīs say that everything that God orders via Sharī‘ah (scripture) is good and everything that God forbade via Sharī‘ah is bad, because God is All-Wise. But what He ordered is not good only because He ordered it. Rather, it was good before His command, and the order only made the goodness of it apparent. There are some things which the Sharī‘ah orders, e.g. faith in One God, truthfulness, generosity, which we know to be good, not only because the Sharī‘ah ordered it, but because our mind also reveals their goodness to us. And there are other things which the Sharī‘ah orders, e.g. praying five times a day and fasting in Ramaḍān, which we only know to be good because the Sharī‘ah orders it.



b. The Ash‘arīs agree with Māturīdīs on the fundamental point that everything the Sharī‘ah orders is good and everything it forbids is bad. They disagree, however, with Māturīdīs, on the moral absoluteness of the commands and prohibitions. They state that a command of Sharī‘ah is good only because the Sharī‘ah orders it. It was not “good” (in the sense being discussed) before the order of Sharī‘ah. Hence, it is conceivable that the Sharī‘ah would have ordered human beings to be untruthful and miserly, and in that case these traits would be “good”.



c. The Mu‘tazila, on the other hand, disagree with both groups in principle. They state that there is no need for the Sharī‘ah to even reveal to us what is good and bad in certain areas. We know this rationally, independently of the Sharī‘ah.



This summary was extracted from Qamar al-Aqmār (Maktabat al-Bushrā, p. 125), a text on Ḥanafī (Māturīdī) juristic theory.



Hence, one will notice that there is a fundamental disagreement between the first two schools and the third.



Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs both agree on the primacy of the Sharī‘ah (scripture): the Ash‘arīs because the Sharī‘ah is the absolute moral standard, and the Māturīdīs because the Sharī‘ah reveals to us what is ontologically good and bad (or right and wrong), much of which we could not have understood without it. In neither school can reason, in matters of morality, override the letter of the law. In both schools, reason is secondary to scripture and subservient to it.



[The major practical disagreement that emerges from the disagreement between the Sunnī schools, Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs, on this issue is that of the fate of a person that the Sharī‘ah has not reached. Māturīdīs state that this person, by virtue of his intellect, is religiously accountable for believing in One God; Ash‘arīs state that this obligation does not occur until the Sharī‘ah reaches him.]



Hence, Adam Deen’s claim of finding precedent in the Sunnī Māturīdī school for the view that reason unaided by scripture can discover what is morally right and wrong – and even override scripture – is certainly misguided.



The Mu‘tazila, on the other hand, say reason and intellect are independent in grasping what is religiously good and bad in certain areas. Hence, unlike the Sunnī schools, they – at least theoretically – consider the Sharī‘ah in some respects secondary or, in extreme cases, redundant. The modernists who wish to give their reason (by which they really mean the prevailing “politically correct” narrative) primacy over revelation will find precedent amongst the early Mu‘tazila, at least in theory – although, in practice, they will find that they are very different to the Mu‘tazila, as the Mu‘tazila applied this principle primarily in issues of creed, while in matters of jurisprudence and law they did not generally disagree with the Sunnī schools.



Adam Deen says:

Another way of expressing this is that our ethos should be more Qur’an focused rather than Hadith focused.

But, as the Sunnī schools said in response to the early Mu‘tazila who used a similar argument in certain issues: some of the very same “problems” you encounter in certain authentic hadiths, and consequently reject them, will be found in universally-accepted verses of the Qur’an. The Qur’an says a daughter’s inheritance is half of a son’s, the Qur’an allows slavery, the Qur’an says a thief’s hand should be cut, it prescribes corporal punishment for the fornicator and slanderer, etc. all of which would be deemed politically incorrect (and hence “irrational”) in today’s world.



Adam Deen says:

Over centuries the Hadith, to our detriment, has acquired the same epistemic position as the Quran.

The Hadith has been transmitted to us in much the same way the Qur’an has been: through oral chains of transmission. Some hadiths do indeed share the same “epistemic position” as the Qur’an as they have been conveyed to us through numerous channels of transmission just like the Qur’an. These are referred to as “mutāwatir” hadiths.



Adam Deen said:

Famously Aisha (may God be pleased with her) rejected a narration by a companion saying women like dogs broke the prayer, on the basis of comparing women to dogs, and this was well before any notion of feminist thinking influenced Hadith scholars!

Firstly, this was not mentioned to ‘Ā’isha as a “narration.” Some people said in her presence that dogs, camels and women break the ṣalāh (when they walk in front), or it was mentioned to her that this is what some people are saying. ‘Ā’isha rejected this on the basis that the Prophet (ṣallAllāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) would pray while she would be lying down in front of him. (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī) Hence, she rejected it based on what she knew from the Sharī‘ah, not her own reason or so-called “feminist thinking.” Yes, she also decried the fact that they mentioned women and dogs as sharing the same ruling.



Most jurists in fact share the opinion of ‘Ā’isha: that nothing that walks in front of a person praying will break his prayer, although it may break his concentration.



Some would have, by now, seen Adam Deen’s piece on why he joined the Quilliam Foundation, a “think tank” aimed at targeting and silencing normative Muslim views. This post will answer some of his absurd claims, particularly the claim that his approach falls in line with traditional “Hanafi Maturidi” thought.Adam Deen said:In order to understand why Adam Deen’s claim of finding precedent for his “rationalistic” approach in “Hanafi Maturidi” thought is misguided, it is necessary to appreciate the early theological debate over “good” (ḥasan) and “bad” (qabīḥ).The issue of “good” and “bad” according to the Māturīdīs and its rival theological schools, Ash‘arīs and Mu‘tazilīs, is often misunderstood. Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs are traditionalist Sunnī schools, while Mu‘tazilīs are a heterodox rationalist school.The discussion of “good” (ḥasan) and “bad” (qabīḥ) centres around three areas. On the first two, there is agreement amongst all three theological schools, and on the third, there is disagreement. “Goodness” and “badness” can be defined in three different ways:1. Goodness in the sense of “perfection” and “completeness” and badness in the sense of “imperfection” and “incompleteness.” E.g. to have knowledge is a perfection, and hence “good” by this definition, while to be ignorant is an imperfection and hence “bad” by this definition. All schools agree that this kind of “goodness” and “badness” can be comprehended by reason.2. Goodness in the sense of what agrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and badness in the sense of what disagrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires. E.g. good health agrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and is therefore “good” by this definition, and bad health disagrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and is therefore “bad” by this definition. All schools agree that this kind of “goodness” and “badness” can be comprehended by reason.3. Goodness in the sense of what the Lawgiver, i.e. God, considers praiseworthy and deserving of reward, and badness in the sense of what the Lawgiver considers blameworthy and deserving of punishment. This is what Adam Deen refers to as “morally right and wrong.” The three theological schools differ on this last definition as follows:a. The Māturīdīs say that everything that God orders via Sharī‘ah (scripture) is good and everything that God forbade via Sharī‘ah is bad, because God is All-Wise. But what He ordered is not good only because He ordered it. Rather, it was good before His command, and the order only made the goodness of it apparent. There are some things which the Sharī‘ah orders, e.g. faith in One God, truthfulness, generosity, which we know to be good, not only because the Sharī‘ah ordered it, but because our mind also reveals their goodness to us. And there are other things which the Sharī‘ah orders, e.g. praying five times a day and fasting in Ramaḍān, which we only know to be good because the Sharī‘ah orders it.b. The Ash‘arīs agree with Māturīdīs on the fundamental point that everything the Sharī‘ah orders is good and everything it forbids is bad. They disagree, however, with Māturīdīs, on the moral absoluteness of the commands and prohibitions. They state that a command of Sharī‘ah is good only because the Sharī‘ah orders it. It was not “good” (in the sense being discussed) before the order of Sharī‘ah. Hence, it is conceivable that the Sharī‘ah would have ordered human beings to be untruthful and miserly, and in that case these traits would be “good”.c. The Mu‘tazila, on the other hand, disagree with both groups in principle. They state that there is no need for the Sharī‘ah to even reveal to us what is good and bad in certain areas. We know this rationally, independently of the Sharī‘ah.This summary was extracted from(Maktabat al-Bushrā, p. 125), a text on Ḥanafī (Māturīdī) juristic theory.Hence, one will notice that there is a fundamental disagreement between the first two schools and the third.Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs both agree on the primacy of the Sharī‘ah (scripture): the Ash‘arīs because the Sharī‘ah is the absolute moral standard, and the Māturīdīs because the Sharī‘ah reveals to us what is ontologically good and bad (or right and wrong), much of which we could not have understood without it. In neither school can reason, in matters of morality, override the letter of the law. In both schools, reason is secondary to scripture and subservient to it.[The major practical disagreement that emerges from the disagreement between the Sunnī schools, Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs, on this issue is that of the fate of a person that the Sharī‘ah has not reached. Māturīdīs state that this person, by virtue of his intellect, is religiously accountable for believing in One God; Ash‘arīs state that this obligation does not occur until the Sharī‘ah reaches him.]Hence, Adam Deen’s claim of finding precedent in the Sunnī Māturīdī school for the view that reason unaided by scripture can discover what is morally right and wrong – and even override scripture – is certainly misguided.The Mu‘tazila, on the other hand, say reason and intellect are independent in grasping what is religiously good and bad in certain areas. Hence, unlike the Sunnī schools, they – at least theoretically – consider the Sharī‘ah in some respects secondary or, in extreme cases, redundant. The modernists who wish to give their reason (by which they really mean the prevailing “politically correct” narrative) primacy over revelation will find precedent amongst the early Mu‘tazila, at least in theory – although, in practice, they will find that they are very different to the Mu‘tazila, as the Mu‘tazila applied this principle primarily in issues of creed, while in matters of jurisprudence and law they did not generally disagree with the Sunnī schools.Adam Deen says:But, as the Sunnī schools said in response to the early Mu‘tazila who used a similar argument in certain issues: some of the very same “problems” you encounter in certain authentic hadiths, and consequently reject them, will be found in universally-accepted verses of the Qur’an. The Qur’an says a daughter’s inheritance is half of a son’s, the Qur’an allows slavery, the Qur’an says a thief’s hand should be cut, it prescribes corporal punishment for the fornicator and slanderer, etc. all of which would be deemed politically incorrect (and hence “irrational”) in today’s world.Adam Deen says:The Hadith has been transmitted to us in much the same way the Qur’an has been: through oral chains of transmission. Some hadiths do indeed share the same “epistemic position” as the Qur’an as they have been conveyed to us through numerous channels of transmission just like the Qur’an. These are referred to as “mutāwatir” hadiths.Adam Deen said:Firstly, this was not mentioned to ‘Ā’isha as a “narration.” Some people said in her presence that dogs, camels and women break the ṣalāh (when they walk in front), or it was mentioned to her that this is what some people are saying. ‘Ā’isha rejected this on the basis that the Prophet (ṣallAllāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) would pray while she would be lying down in front of him. () Hence, she rejected it based on what she knew from the Sharī‘ah, not her own reason or so-called “feminist thinking.” Yes, she also decried the fact that they mentioned women and dogs as sharing the same ruling.Most jurists in fact share the opinion of ‘Ā’isha: that nothing that walks in front of a person praying will break his prayer, although it may break his concentration.

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One tangential question:



We have heard so many proper Islamic scholars say that the phrase in the Quran: "لا إكراه في الدين" allows for no compulsion at all in religion (means, the listener might understand that this is the operating Muhkam Verse, all other Ahadeeth or Verses fall under the judgment of this Verse, or are abrogated, etc.). It is said that the لا is for negating absolutely all types of compulsion.



Allah knows best, but I personally see it as a weak explanation, since it would not even allow for any Shariah rules to be applied (i.e. if interpreted widely, it would set up the basis for a totally secular state that prohibits any application of religious rules whatsoever, since rules are always a form of compulsion). But is there some better explanation about this matter?

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Salam Alaykum,



I wanted to know, what would we say specifically about the argument that this 'لا' is for Nafii al-Jins and thus is totally comprehensive (At-Tabari seems to imply in the above that in any case, the narrations are Mutawaatir that this coercion is applied to Mushrik Arabs, apostates, etc., but I am not sure if this would be the comprehensive answer).



(P.S.: I would like to know if perhaps you have any comments on the question I posted about evolution and the levels of certainty in Islam: Salam Alaykum,I wanted to know, what would we say specifically about the argument that this 'لا' is for Nafii al-Jins and thus is totally comprehensive (At-Tabari seems to imply in the above that in any case, the narrations are Mutawaatir that this coercion is applied to Mushrik Arabs, apostates, etc., but I am not sure if this would be the comprehensive answer).(P.S.: I would like to know if perhaps you have any comments on the question I posted about evolution and the levels of certainty in Islam: ahlussunnah.boards.net/post/633 ).

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A response to criticisms of my theological claims within ‘My Reasons for Joining the Quilliam Foundation’ piece



adamdeen.com/2016/01/11/a-response-to-criticisms-of-my-theological-claims-within-my-reasons-for-joining-the-quilliam-foundation-piece/ Adam Deen seems to have responded to Mufti Zameel on the following link:A response to criticisms of my theological claims within ‘My Reasons for Joining the Quilliam Foundation’ piece





He writes:





Some preliminary comments: I have not read the text in question – nevertheless, I will go on the assumption that the summary is a fair representation of its contents. However, it is important to note that this is a commentary, of a commentary of a ‘usul al fiqh’ (juristic methodology) book, rather than a major textbook on theology, which is the discipline this topic accurately falls under.

The first thing to note is that although he criticises my sources, he hardly presents any sources for his comments. It seems we are supposed to accept his comments unquestioningly, and adopt scepticism of whatever anyone else says.



The irony is that the one quote he does provide from a classical text (i.e. Mīzān al-Uṣūl by the famous jurist ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, author of Tuḥfat al-Fuqahā’) is a text on juristic theory/methodology, and not theology, let alone a "major textbook on theology"!



The same explanation that I quoted from Qamar al-Aqmār (a super-commentary on Manār al-Anwār of Abu l-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 710 H)), categorizing ḥasan and qabīḥ into three categories and describing the three theological positions, can be found in much earlier texts. E.g. it can be found in the direct commentary on Manār by Ibn al-Malak (d. 801 H) (Sharḥ al-Manār, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, p. 47-8). It can also be found in Ibn al-Humām’s Taḥrīr (with Taqrīr, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2:115-7), Ibn al-Humām (d. 861 H) being a scholar of jurisprudence, juristic theory and theology.



Adam Deen is of course right that this is properly a discussion of theology and not jurisprudence or juristic theory. This is one reason why you find this discussion has hardly any consequences in the practical application of the law. The Ḥanafī jurists who were Māturīdī, Mu‘tazilī or Ash‘arī all broadly followed the same law. The disagreements between them on the epistemology or ontology of good and bad had little practical consequences. For example, there is disagreement between them on the question: How do we know that Allāh will not order a human being to do something he is unable to do? According to the Māturīdīs and Mu‘tazila, we know this by reason because we know rationally that it is wrong to order someone to do something that he cannot. According to Ash‘arīs, we know this based only on scripture. (See: Taḥrīr, 2:105). Hence, disagreements were over conceptual notions on how we know things are good or bad/how we know Allāh will or will not do something, or about the ontological grounding of good or bad, not over what good and bad actually were.



Can Adam Deen show some examples of Mu‘tazilī/Māturīdī Ḥanafī theologians who disagreed with Ḥanafī jurists on the basis of reason alone deeming something good or bad? If he believes there are laws found in classical texts of Ḥanafī law, which would be at odds with Ḥanafī theology, surely he will find some classical Ḥanafī theologians over the last one thousand years who pointed out some discrepancies?



Adam Deen writes:





Firstly, it is clear that the author is not familiar with philosophical terms and “misuses” them. In particular, he conflates ‘moral absoluteness’ with ‘moral objectiveness’. He writes, “The Ash’aris agree with Māturīdīs on the fundamental point that everything the Sharī‘ah orders is good and everything it forbids is bad. They disagree, however, with Māturīdīs, on the moral absoluteness of the commands and prohibitions.”

It is obvious to anyone reading that the word “absoluteness” was used literally to mean “independent of divine command”, and no reference was made to philosophical terms or jargon.



Adam Deen says:





“Good and evil may be known by the intellect according to us and the Mu’tazila, contrary to the Ahl al-Hadith.” Ala al-Din al-Samarqandi, Mizan al-Usul (p. 167)

Moreover, how Zameel positions the three Schools’ relationship is at odds with how the Maturidi School viewed itself within the spectrum of schools. Early presentations of Maturidis had positioned themselves together with Mu’tazila on one side and Ash’arites on the other. As the Central Asian jurist, ‘Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abu Ahmad `Ala’ al-Din al-Samarqandi states clearly,“Good and evil may be known by the intellect according to us and the Mu’tazila, contrary to the Ahl al-Hadith.” Ala al-Din al-Samarqandi, Mizan al-Usul (p. 167)

The very text I quoted says the same:



وعندنا وعند المعتزلة هو عقلي أي واقعي لا يتوقف على الشرع

“According to us (Māturīdīs) and the Mu‘tazila, good and bad is known through reason.” (Qamar al-Aqmār, 1:125)



It also explains that one difference between the Māturīdīs and the Mu‘tazila is that according to Māturīdīs, the mere fact that reason grasps something as good or bad does not entail that Allāh must issue a ruling according to it, while according to Mu‘tazila He must.



Moreover there is a disagreement over the ontology (grounding in reality) of good and bad. According to Mu‘tazila, good and bad is grounded entirely in reason, while according to Māturīdīs, good and bad come only from God, although reason at times can reveal to us what God has assigned as good and what He has assigned as bad. As Ibn al-Malak explains:



وعند المعتزلة: الحاكم بالحسن والقبح هو العقل لأن الأصلح واجب على الله تعالى بالعقل ففعله حسن وتركه قبيح، وعندنا الحاكم بهما هو الله تعالى هو متعال عن أن يحكم عليه غيره، خلق بعض الأشياء حسنا وبعضها قبيحا وأمر به لأنه كان حسنا في نفسه وإن خفي على العقل جهة حسنه فأظهره الشارع بالأمر به فيكون الحسن من مدلولاته

“According to the Mu‘tazila, good and bad is determined by reason, because doing what is best is necessary for Allāh Almighty based on reason, so doing it is good and not doing it is bad.* According to us, they are determined by Allāh Almighty, and He is elevated beyond something besides Him decreeing over Him. He created some things as good and some as bad. He ordered good because it was good in itself, even if the basis of its goodness is hidden to the intellect. Thus the Lawgiver revealed its goodness by ordering it. Goodness is thus indicated by the command [and not caused by the command as in Ash‘arī belief].”



* That is, according to Mu‘tazila, reason determined “doing what is best” as good prior to God determining it as such, hence why it is necessary for Him.



Hence, it is clear the Mu‘tazila give far more weight to reason than do Māturīdīs, and that was the point.



It is also clear from this passage that there are situations in which good and bad cannot be recognised by reason alone, even according to Māturīdīs.



Adam Deen criticises the quote from Mullā ‘Alī al-Qāri saying reason can only grasp some of what is good and bad. But this can be found in earlier Māturīdī/Ḥanafī texts. For example, Qāsim ibn Quṭlūbughā (d. 879 H) said in his commentary on Manār:



والعقل آلة يدرك بها حسن بعض الأشياء وقبحها

“Reason is an instrument by which the goodness and badness of some things are realised.” (Khulāṣat al-Afkār, Dār Ibn Ḥazm, p. 63)



Even the text he quotes, Mīzān al-Uṣūl, explains there are situations in which the goodness of something is known only through scripture. [1]



Adam Deen says:





Also, historically some Ash’ari theologians held the same beliefs of the Maturidi in terms of knowing good and evil through reason, which is not known or simply omitted by Zameel.

But the opposite is also true: historically, some Māturīdī theologians held the same beliefs of the Ash‘arīs in terms of knowing good and bad (i.e. what is rewarded or punished by God) only through scripture, as mentioned in the book Adam Deen himself references. [2] The scholars of Bukhārā, a prominent group of Māturīdī scholars, famously held the same position as Ash‘arīs with regards to the unreached: if the message of Islām does not reach a group of people are they obligated to believe in God and His Oneness or not? Famously, the Māturīdīs say yes, but Māturīdī scholars of Bukhārā along with the Ash‘arīs say no. It appears Ibn al-Humām agreed with the view of the Māturīdī scholars from Bukhārā (i.e. the same view as the Ash‘arīs). (Taḥrīr, 2:115) Since this is a disagreement premised on the disagreement over how we know something to be good or bad, it follows that the Māturīdī scholars from Bukhārā were in agreement with the Ash‘arīs on this question (as also mentioned in Mīzān al-Uṣūl). [3]



Adam Deen says:





It is surprising that al-Qari is used, since al-Qari is not considered a primary source for Maturidi theology and there are primary sources that can be found. Not to mention al-Qari is known to be influenced by ahl-hadith

Adam Deen then needs to present "primary sources" which show that Māturīdī Ḥanafīs have historically said some laws (that are based on scripture) that we feel are “outdated” or “unreasonable” may be overridden by reason. After all, that is his objective and that is what he is attempting to impute to the “Ḥanafī Māturīdī” school.





[1]المعنى الذي ثبت به الحسن إذا لم يكن معلوماً، فالحسن لم يعرف إلا بمجرد الأمر (ميزان الأصول



[2] وجه قولنا: إن المشروعية تكون سابقة على ورود النهي في العبادات: أما على قول من وافق أصحاب الحديث في أن حسن الأشياء وقبحها يعرف بالشرع... وأما على قول عامة مشايخنا: إن حسن هذه الأفعال المشروعة، من العبادات والمعاملات، يعرف بالعقل، من حيث الأصل... وإذا ثبت هذا، فطريق من قال بأن حسن المشروعات لا يعرف إلا بالشرع (ميزان الأصول



[3] وقال عامة أصحاب الحديث من الأشعرية وغيرهم ومن تابعهم بأنه لا يجب عليهم الإيمان ولا يحرم عليهم الكفر، حتى لو ماتوا على الكفر أو على الإيمان قبل بلوغ الدعوة، فهم في مشيئة الله تعالى: إن شاء عذبهم وإن شاء أدخلهم الجنة. وهو قول بعض معتزلة بغداد الذين قالوا: إن المعارف ضرورية. وهو اختيار بعض مشايخ بخارى وغيرهم. غير أنهم قالوا إنهم من أهل الجنة في الأحوال كلها بمنـزلة الصبيان والمجانين. وحاصل الخلاف أن العقل وحده قبل قرينة الشرع- هل يعرف به وجوب الإيمان وحرمة الكفر، وهل يعرف به الحسن والقبح؟ فعند الفريق الأول يعرف به أصله، وإن كان لا يعرف المقادير والأوقات والهيئات. وعند الفريق الثاني لا يعرف شيء من هذا بالعقل (ميزان الأصول I will address a few points from his piece:He writes:The first thing to note is that although he criticises my sources, he hardly presents any sources for his comments. It seems we are supposed to accept his comments unquestioningly, and adopt scepticism of whatever anyone else says.The irony is that the one quote he does provide from a classical text (i.e.by the famous jurist ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī, author of) is a text on juristic theory/methodology, and not theology, let alone a "major textbook on theology"!The same explanation that I quoted from(a super-commentary onof Abu l-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 710 H)), categorizingandinto three categories and describing the three theological positions, can be found in much earlier texts. E.g. it can be found in the direct commentary onby Ibn al-Malak (d. 801 H) (, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, p. 47-8). It can also be found in Ibn al-Humām’s(with, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2:115-7), Ibn al-Humām (d. 861 H) being a scholar of jurisprudence, juristic theory and theology.Adam Deen is of course right that this is properly a discussion of theology and not jurisprudence or juristic theory. This is one reason why you find this discussion has hardly any consequences in the practical application of the law. The Ḥanafī jurists who were Māturīdī, Mu‘tazilī or Ash‘arī all broadly followed the same law. The disagreements between them on the epistemology or ontology of good and bad had little practical consequences. For example, there is disagreement between them on the question: How do we know that Allāh will not order a human being to do something he is unable to do? According to the Māturīdīs and Mu‘tazila, we know this by reason because we know rationally that it is wrong to order someone to do something that he cannot. According to Ash‘arīs, we know this based only on scripture. (See:, 2:105). Hence, disagreements were over conceptual notions on how we know things are good or bad/how we know Allāh will or will not do something, or about the ontological grounding of good or bad, not over what good and bad actually were.Can Adam Deen show some examples of Mu‘tazilī/Māturīdī Ḥanafī theologians who disagreed with Ḥanafī jurists on the basis of reason alone deeming something good or bad? If he believes there are laws found in classical texts of Ḥanafī law, which would be at odds with Ḥanafī theology, surely he will find some classical Ḥanafī theologians over the last one thousand years who pointed out some discrepancies?Adam Deen writes:It is obvious to anyone reading that the word “absoluteness” was used literally to mean “independent of divine command”, and no reference was made to philosophical terms or jargon.Adam Deen says:The very text I quoted says the same:“According to us (Māturīdīs) and the Mu‘tazila, good and bad is known through reason.” (, 1:125)It also explains that one difference between the Māturīdīs and the Mu‘tazila is that according to Māturīdīs, the mere fact that reason grasps something as good or bad does not entail that Allāh must issue a ruling according to it, while according to Mu‘tazila He must.Moreover there is a disagreement over the ontology (grounding in reality) of good and bad. According to Mu‘tazila, good and bad is grounded entirely in reason, while according to Māturīdīs, good and bad come only from God, although reason at times can reveal to us what God has assigned as good and what He has assigned as bad. As Ibn al-Malak explains:“According to the Mu‘tazila, good and bad is determined by reason, because doing what is best is necessary for Allāh Almighty based on reason, so doing it is good and not doing it is bad.* According to us, they are determined by Allāh Almighty, and He is elevated beyond something besides Him decreeing over Him. He created some things as good and some as bad. He ordered good because it was good in itself, even if the basis of its goodness is hidden to the intellect. Thus the Lawgiver revealed its goodness by ordering it. Goodness is thus indicated by the command [and not caused by the command as in Ash‘arī belief].”* That is, according to Mu‘tazila, reason determined “doing what is best” as good prior to God determining it as such, hence why it is necessary for Him.Hence, it is clear the Mu‘tazila give far more weight to reason than do Māturīdīs, and that was the point.It is also clear from this passage that there are situations in which good and bad cannot be recognised by reason alone, even according to Māturīdīs.Adam Deen criticises the quote from Mullā ‘Alī al-Qāri saying reason can only grasp some of what is good and bad. But this can be found in earlier Māturīdī/Ḥanafī texts. For example, Qāsim ibn Quṭlūbughā (d. 879 H) said in his commentary on“Reason is an instrument by which the goodness and badness of some things are realised.” (, Dār Ibn Ḥazm, p. 63)Even the text he quotes,, explains there are situations in which the goodness of something is known only through scripture. [1]Adam Deen says:But the opposite is also true: historically, some Māturīdī theologians held the same beliefs of the Ash‘arīs in terms of knowing good and bad (i.e. what is rewarded or punished by God) only through scripture, as mentioned in the book Adam Deen himself references. [2] The scholars of Bukhārā, a prominent group of Māturīdī scholars, famously held the same position as Ash‘arīs with regards to the unreached: if the message of Islām does not reach a group of people are they obligated to believe in God and His Oneness or not? Famously, the Māturīdīs say yes, but Māturīdī scholars of Bukhārā along with the Ash‘arīs say no. It appears Ibn al-Humām agreed with the view of the Māturīdī scholars from Bukhārā (i.e. the same view as the Ash‘arīs). (, 2:115) Since this is a disagreement premised on the disagreement over how we know something to be good or bad, it follows that the Māturīdī scholars from Bukhārā were in agreement with the Ash‘arīs on this question (as also mentioned in). [3]Adam Deen says:Adam Deen then needs to present "primary sources" which show that Māturīdī Ḥanafīs have historically said some laws (that are based on scripture) that we feel are “outdated” or “unreasonable” may be overridden by reason. After all, that is his objective and that is what he is attempting to impute to the “Ḥanafī Māturīdī” school.[1]المعنى الذي ثبت به الحسن إذا لم يكن معلوماً، فالحسن لم يعرف إلا بمجرد الأمر (ميزان الأصول[2] وجه قولنا: إن المشروعية تكون سابقة على ورود النهي في العبادات: أما على قول من وافق أصحاب الحديث في أن حسن الأشياء وقبحها يعرف بالشرع... وأما على قول عامة مشايخنا: إن حسن هذه الأفعال المشروعة، من العبادات والمعاملات، يعرف بالعقل، من حيث الأصل... وإذا ثبت هذا، فطريق من قال بأن حسن المشروعات لا يعرف إلا بالشرع (ميزان الأصول[3] وقال عامة أصحاب الحديث من الأشعرية وغيرهم ومن تابعهم بأنه لا يجب عليهم الإيمان ولا يحرم عليهم الكفر، حتى لو ماتوا على الكفر أو على الإيمان قبل بلوغ الدعوة، فهم في مشيئة الله تعالى: إن شاء عذبهم وإن شاء أدخلهم الجنة. وهو قول بعض معتزلة بغداد الذين قالوا: إن المعارف ضرورية. وهو اختيار بعض مشايخ بخارى وغيرهم. غير أنهم قالوا إنهم من أهل الجنة في الأحوال كلها بمنـزلة الصبيان والمجانين. وحاصل الخلاف أن العقل وحده قبل قرينة الشرع- هل يعرف به وجوب الإيمان وحرمة الكفر، وهل يعرف به الحسن والقبح؟ فعند الفريق الأول يعرف به أصله، وإن كان لا يعرف المقادير والأوقات والهيئات. وعند الفريق الثاني لا يعرف شيء من هذا بالعقل (ميزان الأصول

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Can Adam Deen show some examples of Mu‘tazilī/Māturīdī Ḥanafī theologians who disagreed with Ḥanafī jurists on the basis of reason alone deeming something good or bad? If he believes there are laws found in classical texts of Ḥanafī law, which would be at odds with Ḥanafī theology, surely he will find some classical Ḥanafī theologians over the last one thousand years who pointed out some discrepancies?

I think this is one of the issues that the Avicenna Academy is 'controversial' for, is it not? For example, saying that the Quran [being Mutawaatir] does not allow killing of people without just cause, and the Ahadeeth about killing apostates (for example) don't reach this level of certainty, thus the rule is to be dropped according to the 'real Hanafi Usool'.



But yes, I agree with the prime conceptual issue: Even if we follow an "extreme Quran-centric approach" akin to the Mu'tazilites, the practical changes to the Shariah rules will be here and there (again alluding to the Avicenna people, the huge controversy with the "real Hanafi timings for Ramadhan" that there was a few months back is a very small matter when seen in the big picture)... but nowhere near that of a 'secular liberal democracy'... exactly because the 'Reformer' has placed some modern concept of "Justice" or "Human Rights" as "obviously undergirding" the Quran and all Islamic texts, thus forcing a reinterpretation of Verses of Inheritance, Polygamy, Corporal Punishments, etc. (much in the same way we say that Allah has a knowable Reality even prior to Revelation, any texts that 'appear to contradict' this Reality must be interpreted to fit what we necessarily know to be true of Allah).



Maybe you can expand on these two points.



Wa Salam.



Salam Alaykum dear Mufti,I think this is one of the issues that the Avicenna Academy is 'controversial' for, is it not? For example, saying that the Quran [being Mutawaatir] does not allow killing of people without just cause, and the Ahadeeth about killing apostates (for example) don't reach this level of certainty, thus the rule is to be dropped according to the 'real Hanafi Usool'.But yes, I agree with the prime conceptual issue: Even if we follow an "extreme Quran-centric approach" akin to the Mu'tazilites, the practical changes to the Shariah rules will be here and there (again alluding to the Avicenna people, the huge controversy with the "real Hanafi timings for Ramadhan" that there was a few months back is a very small matter when seen in the big picture)... but nowhere near that of a 'secular liberal democracy'... exactly because the 'Reformer' has placed some modern concept of "Justice" or "Human Rights" as "obviously undergirding" the Quran and all Islamic texts, thus forcing a reinterpretation of Verses of Inheritance, Polygamy, Corporal Punishments, etc. (much in the same way we say that Allah has a knowable Reality even prior to Revelation, any texts that 'appear to contradict' this Reality must be interpreted to fit what we necessarily know to be true of Allah).Maybe you can expand on these two points.Wa Salam.

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I wanted to add some things Insha Allah it is not a problem:



One is that there should be a study perhaps about how the "very rational" yet "traditional" Mu'tazili Fiqhi issues were derived, in comparison to what the 'Reformers' might say; it might seem like a truism, but both sides see that there some "very, very obvious" rational rules that must be true of Allah's Commands and Prohibitions, yet the only obvious thing is that one side cannot agree with the other as to what these rules actually are and what the conclusions in terms of final Fiqh rulings actually are.



Second, the whole issue of 'cleansing Islam of old-fashioned ways of thinking' can go on and on, and can even reach the classical Arabic language itself, since there are very well-known elements in the Arabic language seen throughout the Quran and all primary texts of Islam which the opponent can say "smack of patriarchy", yet I believe we should not entertain the beginnings of such matters, and simply cut of the root of the argument.



Wa Salam.



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Member Back to Top Post by geek on I posed the following questions to Adam Deen as a reply to his article on his website. Unfortunately, he repeatedly deleted my comment which I posted four times and it was subsequently deleted each time. In all, ten comments off mine were deleted.



@ Dear Brother Adam Deen – Salam,



Brother Adam it was you who initially utilised the Maturidi theological school to substantiate your position in you QF article.



Thus, wouldn’t the burden of proof be upon your shoulders? If not, then why? Mufti Zameel is doing counter objections.



All positions (claims and counter claims) need to be demonstrated.



This is an ideal opportunity for you, brother, to provide a thorough diachronic and synchronic analysis of the early and later Maturidi theological school in order to actually demonstrate your initial position rather than merely asserting it repeatedly.



Your engagement up to this point has been devoid of any significant referencing to primary or even secondary sources, or even eminent theologians within the school.



The first article does not have a single reference to a Maturidi theologian or primer to establish your position.



This current article provides only two quotes which are not necessarily making any specific or significant point and can be interpreted in your favour or against your. Thus they are not bona fide evidences.



Could you substantiate the following points from your first article via explicit and specific referencing as well as examples from the Maturidi scholastic literature:



You say:



(1) My convictions are very much in line with the Hanafi Maturidi school of thought. In particular, that human reason, unaided by scripture, can arrive at what is morally right and wrong. This position has provided the rationalist schools with an essential tool to guide the Sharia when arriving at ethical rulings.



– please substantiate your convictions (i.e. your supposed interpretation of the school) with specific quotes rather than general ones.



Are you making an epistemological or a legal point with regards to “unaided by scripture, can arrive at what is morally right and wrong”?



Are you saying that, according to Maturidi scholars, epistemological discernment led to legal obligation akin to the Mu'tazila? As to know right or wrong does not necessarily make it legally binding prior to scripture. Please clarify and explicitly reference via the texts.



Please also provide examples of these ethical rulings which the supposed rationalists derived. What was this 'aql based usul? How did it work? How did it affect their fiqh? Who (scholars) and where (texts) was it articulated? Why was the Ash'ari school less rationalistic? Again extensive referencing via literature would be ideal.



(2) When classical Maturidi scholars were faced with a problematic Hadith they would override its ‘authority’ since it was at odds with reason.



– please provide examples from the theological corpus, as well as the fiqhi one too, to demonstarte this proposition. Three or four examples will suffice.



I will leave it here and ask further questions once you have provided an actual demonstration to the issues raised above.



Jazakallahu khayra and requesting du'as.

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Member Back to Top Post by Abu Idris on Adam Deen has responded to Mufti Zameel’s second critique. Due to the post containing numerous speech marks, I shall paste the response between squared brackets:



[In brief. Zammel losses sight of his own argument and decides to focus on minor points I raised against his response and struggles to understand who shoulders the burden of proof.



“It is obvious to anyone reading that the word “absoluteness” was used literally to mean “independent of divine command”, and no reference was made to philosophical terms or jargon.”



Is it obvious? One should learn how to express philosophical concepts adequately before using them. Also, there seems to be a contradiction here. It is either, he agrees with my use of terms and is claiming I have not understood the term “absoluteness” “literally” (whatever that means) or he is disputing how I expressed the terms and therefore is asking for references to back them up. Which one is it? In terms of referencing, they can be found in any basic introduction to ethics book.



Zameel states that Mu‘tazila give far more weight to reason than do Māturīdīs and does not spell out what these “situations in which good and bad cannot be recognised by reason alone” are. Of course there are differences between the two schools. However, the point is, can Zameel show how these differences demonstrate that my theological claims are unorthodox. All Zameel has shown is that the Maturidi and Mu’tazila Schools are not identical, which my response already assumed.



Lastly, Zameel’s original piece argued how apostasy killing was not irrational. He has subsequently (before I had responded), edited this out without an explanation. Why?



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