One of the great failures of SegWit2X is that they gave away SegWit without any assurance of the 2X. What if, instead of merely putting a single bit in a mined block to signal other miners of their desire to fork, miners had to lock up some bitcoins as a part of their signaling? Would it even be possible for the fork to be canceled?

One of the great failures of SegWit2X is that they gave away SegWit without any assurance of the 2X. What if, instead of merely putting a single bit in a mined block to signal other miners of their desire to fork, miners had to lock up some bitcoins as a part of their signaling? Would it even be possible for the fork to be canceled?

One of the great failures of SegWit2X is that they gave away SegWit without any assurance of the 2X. What if, instead of merely putting a single bit in a mined block to signal other miners of their desire to fork, miners had to lock up some bitcoins as a part of their signaling? Would it even be possible for the fork to be canceled?

A staking mechanism has often been suggested as a replacement for mining when it comes to putting together blocks, but these stakes are based on the amount of a base currency held by the miner. As I explained in my previous post, liquid assets invite a certain class of flighty investors. This ability to exit quickly makes their stake less reliable than the investment miners have made into mining, who’s capital is tied up in ASICs dedicated to that coin. However, while staking mechanisms might not be workable when mining regular blocks, they could properly be applied to forking governance. So how would a miner tie up coins that could only be recovered after a hard fork?

A staking mechanism has often been suggested as a replacement for mining when it comes to putting together blocks, but these stakes are based on the amount of a base currency held by the miner. As I explained in my previous post, liquid assets invite a certain class of flighty investors. This ability to exit quickly makes their stake less reliable than the investment miners have made into mining, who’s capital is tied up in ASICs dedicated to that coin. However, while staking mechanisms might not be workable when mining regular blocks, they could properly be applied to forking governance. So how would a miner tie up coins that could only be recovered after a hard fork?

A staking mechanism has often been suggested as a replacement for mining when it comes to putting together blocks, but these stakes are based on the amount of a base currency held by the miner. As I explained in my previous post, liquid assets invite a certain class of flighty investors. This ability to exit quickly makes their stake less reliable than the investment miners have made into mining, who’s capital is tied up in ASICs dedicated to that coin. However, while staking mechanisms might not be workable when mining regular blocks, they could properly be applied to forking governance. So how would a miner tie up coins that could only be recovered after a hard fork?