For almost thirty years, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) tragically allowed public outrage and political pressure to dictate its strategy in combating the street gangs that terrorized Chicago’s neighborhoods. Now that the violence has slowed to record-low levels, President Obama and his administration need to look no further than his own hometown to find the best strategy for addressing the ISIS threat.

Until a recent change in CPD tactics, gang violence destroyed communities with law enforcement’s blindly implemented anti-gang policing strategies proving ineffective. These tactics were the result of public outrage and political pressure and they showed a fundamental lack of understanding of the threat they intended to address. So, too, is the U.S. military’s plan to combat ISIS with traditional military tactics.

ADVERTISEMENT

In 1978, Larry Hoover, the leader of a violent Chicago street gang known as the Gangster Disciple Nation, persuaded the leaders of the city’s various ethnic gangs to form an alliance, creating the nation’s first domestic “supergang.” The founding principles of this organization, now called the Folk Nation, were to establish a social and financial support structure for disenfranchised inner city youth, profit from illicit activities, and consolidate power within the geographic borders of their “turf.”

Over the ensuing years, the gang found footholds throughout the Chicagoland area and the public paid little attention. But on October 13, 1992, after seven-year-old Dantrell Davis was killed during a shootout between the Folk Nation and a rival gang, the public demanded immediate action from city officials. Under considerable political pressure, the CPD was forced to initiate an aggressive campaign to stamp out violent street gangs in the Windy City.

In attempt to quash the gang threat, the CPD engaged specialized strike forces to attack strategic strongholds, initiated aggressive suppression tactics in high-crime neighborhoods (e.g., random stops), and targeted gang leaders for heightened surveillance and stiff criminal justice sanctions. All three proved to be woefully inadequate and as a result, street gangs actually became entrenched in the social fabric of the communities they operated in, gaining power rather than being neutralized.

The tactics and strategies of the Folk Nation have shown striking similarities to those employed today by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – a modern international “supergang” – and the U.S. military is resorting to the same tactics the CPD used to no avail.

In 2006, what is known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was formed by an alliance between the Mujahedeen Shura Council in Iraq, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Jund al-Sahhaba, and certain groups within Jabhat al-Nusra. The group overran US-trained and equipped Iraqi troops in Mosul and Tikrit for months, gaining ground and taking hold. As with the Dantrell Davis killing, it wasn’t until ISIS released the video execution of journalist James Foley that the public at large demanded action and began to call for an immediate armed response.

We are not recognizing that while ISIS has adopted more conventional battle tactics than Al Qaeda ever utilized, it shares more traits with U.S. street gangs in its origin, operating style, and culture than it does with any traditional military force. Like a street gang, ISIS is a social movement more than a military unit, which is why we are seeing young disenfranchised American Muslims leave the United States to join ISIS. Therefore, conventional wartime strategies will fail to neutralize it.

Look no further than how communities reacted to the CPD’s gang response strategies. Specialized strike units led to corruption and further misconduct. Gang suppression campaigns snared combatants and civilians alike, causing community relations to break down and making it harder for officers to work effectively in their communities. Increased search and arrest tactics fomented tensions between community leaders and those charged with their protection, putting officers at odds with those who could provide a counterbalance to influential gang leaders. As a result, youths fled to the open arms of street gangs.

Similarly, using drone strikes to target ISIS “leaders” fails to acknowledge that ISIS has a somewhat disorganized and remarkably fluid leadership structure. The eradication of one leader leads to someone else filling the vacuum, which further destabilizes communities as younger, less experienced leaders emerge and revert to violent measures to consolidate power.

Back in Chicago, last month marked the 22nd anniversary of Dantrell Davis’ death. After three decades of steady gang violence, in 2013 the city finally realized an overall crime rate reduction to a level not seen since 1972. The number of shooting incidents involving victims sixteen and younger dropped by more than 40 percent.

City officials insist these numbers are evidence that revisiting its anti-gang strategy to empower local community groups, eliminate barriers to reintegration, create and expand after-school programs, and establish mentoring programs for young people have directly resulted in the reduction of street violence.

To be sure, the CPD’s new tactics – social mobility programs, increased financial aid, and community outreach – will not eliminate ISIS altogether, but the lessons the CPD learned after 30 years provide a rough guide to how we should view these organizations and address these threats.

We cannot afford to continue charging forth into a blind conflict with ISIS where the strategies are dictated by political pressure instead of well thought out tactics. If we do, any measure of military success will prove to be a pyrrhic victory in the region, radicalizing another generation of Middle Eastern men and women and further exacerbating the problem. With history as our guide, these are lessons we should take note of sooner rather than later.

Hillmann is a director at LEVICK, where he provides crisis and geopolitical strategic communications services to foreign heads of state and C-suite executives in a variety of industries, including technology, energy, defense, and finance.