Recently, I wrote an article on a topic that is very controversial among Libertarian communities: closed vs open borders , in which I argued the open border stance. Writing that article got me thinking about other topics that are highly contested among libertarians and which I feel very strongly about. I inevitably arrived at the topic of abortion. Although I feel quite confident in arguing the pro-choice side, for many libertarians this is a undefined gray area.

In this piece, I will present a clear-cut case as to why, if one follows the Non-Aggression Principle, one must arrive at the logical conclusion that pro-choice is the ethical stance, that an agreement between an abortion clinic and a pregnant woman to perform an abortion is a voluntary contract, and that any attempts by a third party to interfere in the execution of such a voluntary contract must be considered acts of aggression.

The Non-Aggression Principle

Before I get into the complex topic of abortion, I would first like to define the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP) for those who are unfamiliar with the doctrine:

The non-aggression principle (or NAP, also called the non-aggression axiom, the anti-coercion, zero aggression principle or non-initiation of force) is an ethical stance which asserts that "aggression" is inherently illegitimate. "Aggression", for the purposes of NAP, is defined as initiating or threatening the use of any and all forcible interference with an individual or individual's property.

From this definition, we can see that any acts of violence or threats thereof against a person or their private property is considered "aggression" and therefore violates the NAP.

Self-ownership

Self-ownership rests on the axiom that man acts , in that man formulates a plan to utilize a given means to achieve a desired end. The ability for man to act is what makes him a full self-owner. For those questioning this axiom, it is quite simple to prove it true. For example, if you were to exclaim that, "Man doesn't act!", you would have proven the axiom, as the process of acting is required to attempt to make the argument that man does not act. In other words, by trying to disprove the action axiom, one would be committing a performative contradiction.

A newborn is only a potential self-owner

Unlike an adult, a newborn is unable to think for itself ipso facto it cannot utilize its mind to work towards achieving a certain end. Thus, a child does not act, and therefore is not a self-owner. A newborn will presumably develop the mental capacity to pursuit ends in the future, however. As a result, a newborn is classified as a potential self-owner; it is not currently able to act, but it will most likely be able to act in the future.

The common measure

When debating pro-life and pro-choice stances, libertarians usually rely on a specific measure of humanity to attempt to arrive at a consensus: the stages of the fetus/newborn. They engage in the tedious task of identifying the many stages of child development within the womb, and then proceed to bicker over which stage the matter officially transformed into a human being. To help identify the point of humanity, they utilize signs of humanity, such as brain activity, only to arrive at a disagreement over whether or not brain activity is present at one stage or the other.

Now these libertarians have managed to work themselves into a frenzy, only to remain ignorant of the fact that the "point of humanity"—stage in which the mass of cells within a woman's womb can be considered an actual child—is utterly irrelevant by the nature of our own knowledge. We know that the cluster of cells within a woman is destined to become a child, to be birthed, and to eventually become a full self-owner. Whether or not one can classify a certain stage of child development as living, breathing life does not matter when one knows that a newborn will be formed inside the womb in nine months.

What matters is that each pregnant woman is carrying potential life. This potential life may one day become a potential self-owner, and then eventually a full self-owner. Since we know within a reasonable doubt that a child will be formed, terminating the pregnancy at any time is akin to killing the child. Ultimately, the common measurement used between debating libertarians is irrelevant.

Killing a child (or potential life) within the womb is not aggression

If the stage of child development within the womb is irrelevant—which we have established to be true—we must now question the ethics of killing an unborn child. Although cruel-sounding, the abortion of a child/potential life within the womb does not violate the NAP. This is not because the child's life is not valuable, but rather because the rights of a potential self-owner does not override the full self-owner in which the child is contained.

Although many would argue I am oversimplifying the situation, I think that the dilemma we face is inherently simple: if a mother no longer wishes to have a child/potential life contained inside her, she has the exclusive right to remove said child at any time, any way she sees fit. The child is not entitled to the support of the mother; technically speaking, the child is committing an act of aggression against the mother for remaining in her body without her continued consent. Furthermore, a potential self-owner's right to exist does not override the mother's right to free choice to do with her body as she pleases. At no point in time does the child, while in the womb or otherwise, claim any level of ownership over the mother's body.

Voluntary contract between the mother and doctor

Seeing as the mother choosing to abort the being inside her is not considered aggression, the voluntary contract between the pregnant woman and the abortion doctor/clinic is to be recognized as legitimate. Any attempts to forcefully interfere with the conducting of said voluntary contract, such as through the passing of anti-abortion legislation, must be seen as acts of aggression.

However, the refusal of medical establishments to perform abortions is protected under that establishment's property rights. Conversely, if a medical establishment were forced to perform an abortion against its proprietor's will, such as through pro-abortion legislation, such an act is to be condemned as an act of aggression against the medical practice.

Morals and Ethics

In Libertarian philosophy there is a clear distinction between morals and ethics. Morals are a personal stance while ethics are a universal code for peace. For example, I could have the moral stance that cigarettes are harmful, and spread my negative view via a nonprofit's ad campaign. However, if I instead attempted to prevent the sale of cigarettes by passing legislation or utilizing other means of force, I would then be violating people's right to conduct peaceful, voluntary contracts. Someone cannot impose their people in a way that violates the universal Libertarian ethic and NAP.

So, one can have a moral stance against abortion. They can even start a nonprofit that argues their moral views and, for example, fund projects that may make birth control more easily accessibly. And as previously discussed, someone a medical clinic capable of terminating pregnancies is well within their rights to refuse to perform abortions. But if a pro-life supporter attempted to pass legislation to prevent someone else from having an abortion, they are violating the NAP.

But didn't the mother agree to care for the child by conceiving it in the first place?

I do not want to get too deep into the counter arguments, as I only mean to expose people to the pro-choice stance, and I also wish to keep this piece relatively short, but I feel a specific counter argument needs to be addressed: that the mother agrees to care for the child when she voluntarily conceives it.

Again, without going to deep into this, the simple answer is "no". A woman can do as she pleases with her body, even if that means she wishes to change her mind and no longer carry a child. A woman is not conducting a voluntary contract by having sex without birth control.

Not only does this line of thinking not puncture any holes in the ethics described throughout the rest of this piece, but it also carries some illogical consequences. If the mother is responsible for a child because she created it, wouldn't she be responsible for caring for the child for the entirety of the child's natural life? If not, then at what point would she no longer be responsible for caring for the child? If a pro-life proponent were to answer with the age in which the child is no longer helpless, to which I would answer with a quote from Evers in his work, Political Theory :

The parents are still the creators of the child, why aren't they obliged to support the child forever? It is true that the child is no longer helpless; but helplessness (as pointed out above) is not in and of itself a cause of binding obligation. If the condition of being the creator of another is the source of the obligation, and this condition persists, why doesn't the obligation?

Such an argument would also require that a victim of rape be allowed to abort her child, given that she never consented to conceiving the child. But I will not get to deep into this counter argument; I only wish to address it and explain why I do not agree with it, which I have done.

Summary

Although it may sound cruel, a woman has the right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, on the grounds that the child's right to exist inside her womb depends on her consent. It does not really matter what stage of development the child is at, and any attempts to legislate away the pregnant woman's right to abort her child is an attempt to undermine the voluntary contract between her and her abortion doctor, and is therefore an act of aggression. To conclude this writing, I would to quote a quick explanation by Rothbard in one of his greatest works, The Ethics of Liberty :

Our theory also enables us to examine the question of Dr. Kenneth Edelin, of Boston City Hospital, who was convicted in 1975 of manslaughter for allowing a fetus to die (at the wish, of course, of the mother) after performing an abortion. If parents have the legal right to allow a baby to die, then a fortiori they have the same right for extra-uterine fetuses. Similarly, in a future world where babies may be born in extra-uterine devices ("test tubes"), again the parents would have the legal right to "pull the plug" on the fetuses or, rather, to refuse to pay to continue the plug in place.