A conventional wisdom has emerged that goes something like this: Canada’s Senate is an anti-democratic anachronism stuffed with self-absorbed party hacks who care more about their perks than the public interest. The Red Chamber operates like the worst kind of private club and is rife with corruption and possibly criminal conduct. The Senate serves no useful purpose, costs lots of money, and if it cannot be reformed it should be scrapped.

The outrageous expense habits and grotesque entitlement mentality of a handful of senators lend credibility to such generalizations. Nevertheless, Canadians cannot afford to scrap the Senate because it serves an increasingly important function in our increasingly dysfunctional Parliament.

What we do not need the Senate for today is one of its original purposes — to represent the interests of the provinces in the federal legislative/policy process. Federal “regional ministers,” powerful voices within every Cabinet that have special responsibilities to represent their province at the Cabinet table, accomplish that function today. People like Lloyd Axworthy in the Chrétien government, who ensured anything of significance that Ottawa did touching on Manitoba was subject to his scrutiny. Or Ralph Goodale, who fought hard for Saskatchewan’s interest around the Cabinet table for more than a dozen years. John Baird, the regional minister for Eastern Ontario today, is a current equivalent. The provincial interest is taken care of by regional ministers in a way that no senator or group of senators could hope to match.

The reason we need the Senate today is not to further amplify provincial views in Ottawa, but rather to compensate for the increasing marginalization of the House of Commons in the legislative and policy process, and the fact that the vast majority of MPs are unwilling to develop and voice expertise on key issues facing the country. Many senators and their committees, by contrast, have proven over the years to be quite capable of achieving fairly deep policy knowledge — and even technical legislative expertise — that can be important in shaping better public policy and improving legislation.

Some Senate committees — the committee on banking, trade and commerce, the national finance committee, the committee on social affairs, science and technology, for example — have enriched public policy thinking, sparked debate on important issues, and helped improve legislation in a way few House of Commons committees have in many years. Senate committees increasingly do the work the House can no longer do because of the bitter partisanship, permanent campaign mindset, and attendant unwillingness to do substantive policy work that characterizes the orientation of MPs. For many years now Members of Parliament have been complicit in this gradual debasement of their policy and legislative function such that we now need the Senate to do the work the House should be doing.

There is good reason for such behaviour on the part of MPs. There are few rewards for the backbench MP who becomes a recognized expert in his or her party in a particular field. Rewards — notably a Cabinet position or high-profile critic post — increasingly go to those who can score political points on their opponents, are camera friendly and satisfy geographic quotas, less so those who have public policy knowledge and the skills to work with their opponents to advance the public interest. As a result, fewer and fewer MPs with ambition aspire to develop such expertise. Senators, by contrast, only get rewarded, i.e. noticed, if they or a committee they are on does something important and of substance. And Senate committee reports are invariably regarded as far more objective, substantive and thorough than what comes from House committees.

The willingness of senators and their committees to delve deeply into issues, hold lengthy public hearings with experts to better grasp the nuances of policy, and write thoughtful reports that might not always align with the views of their party are positive attributes of this flawed institution. Senators, unlike their colleagues in the House, can act somewhat independently of the party line, secure in the knowledge that they never have to rely on the party leader to sign their nomination papers. Most senators are also realistic enough to know they have little chance of ever ending up in Cabinet (typically only one senator is appointed to Cabinet), obviating the need to play sycophant to the party leader and parrot whatever talking points are foisted on them by his or her staff.

In other words, membership in the exclusive club that is the Senate has its privileges beyond loose expense accounts. Senators, as distinct from their colleagues in the House, have a certain room to manoeuvre and freedom of thought that some senators choose to exercise. And senators are incentivized in a way MPs are not to develop knowledge that can improve policy and governance.

These are qualities Canadians cannot do without and are worth paying something for.

Eugene Lang is BMO Visiting Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Glendon College, York University. He was a senior adviser to three ministers in the governments of Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin and was an official in the Department of Finance.