The problem isn’t, as you speculate, that a “module” has no inherent meaning or that a “customization module” is defined by its result. Rather, the problem is that there is not a deeper layer of definition in the specification for the term “customization module.”

You can’t invent a function, the function is consequence of physics. You can only invent a structure that has the utility of achieving a function. That’s why 112(f) exists in the first place – Claims that were defining terms by function were constantly being found indefinite even when their spec had a particular structure that achieved the result. That’s what happened in Halliburton. All 112(f) does is import structure from the spec into the claims, thus avoiding the problem that nobody has invented a function.

The fundamental problem people don’t seem to grasp is that NOTHING IS STRUCTURAL. Any claim limitation is functional and simply narrows the claim to the class of things that satisfy the function associated with the limitation.

What a silly statement. Why write a section 112(f) at all then if all terms are the same, hahaha.

First of all, a screw does have a structural definition, and it does require a thread. The fact that you don’t know the definition of a screw doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist. Structures are separate from results. This applies even to machines that are nominally named for their functions. There are a class of machines that have similar structures that are called toasters. There are machines that perform the function of toasting, and you might call those toasters. The two sets are not the same, and in fact if the specification fails to nominate which it was talking about, claims may be indefinite regardless of being in means-plus or not.

So, let’s get practical. The only real-world difference between reciting a “screw” in your claim and reciting a “customization module” (assuming no deeper definitional layer in the specification for either term) is that judges are comfortable with the word “screw” but not with the word “customization module,” so they don’t reject the claim with the word “screw” but do reject the claim with the term “customization module.” It’s as simple as that, and we all know it.

No, it’s that “screw” connotes a particular structure in the mind of the POSITA, while customization module connotes no structure at all to the POSITA. You mind as well argue that Written description is a fake requirement because you could always be more descriptive, as if the fact that it’s a continuum inherently means there is no threshold for sufficiency.

Stepping back, the 112(f) law is really just asking for one definitional layer deeper than what is recited in the claim. That’s it.

Simply wrong. If you were correct, then every means-plus invocation would surpass 112(b) so long as the spec was more definitive. But there are cases that find the disclosure in the spec to be insufficient, which would be impossible under this logic. Again, like written description, it is enough when it connotes a particular structure in the mind of the POSITA.

Pretty straightforward, if you understand it this way.

Let’s assume that there is a computer program that calculates an estimated driving time between point A and point B. A claim to “means for estimating driving time” invokes means plus, as does “a module configured to estimate driving time” as does “a processor configured to estimate driving time” because all of them are seeking a result (an estimated time) without a limitation that nominates how it is achieved.

If the specification states “the means for estimating driving time is computer code comprising a program that estimates driving time between point A and point B” that is indefinite as failing to provide a structure. If the specification further states “The program takes inputs of the positions of A and B and uses them to estimate driving time” that still isn’t structural. Nor is “The program takes inputs including positions of A and B and calculates a distance, then assumes a base driving time and modifies the base time by historic traffic data” it STILL isn’t structural. It only becomes structural when an algorithm nominates inputs and explains what is done to the inputs in order to achieve a definite output. The claim is indefinite until the specification states something akin to “distance divided by 15mph” – that is a full description with transmutes the input into the output. The question is not if the spec is more detailed than the function, the question is if the spec discloses a concrete algorithm that achieves the result.

It ought to be obvious that it has to be this way, because otherwise someone will come up with a terrible, inaccurate algorithm, and use means-plus to find any algorithm, even extremely accurate ones that were wholly unposited by the inventor, infringing.

And since you have a lot of trouble separating structure and function, you should know that the same rule applies outside of means plus too – When a function is claimed and it isn’t clear what actions are encompassed by the functional result, the function is indefinite.

Some basic reading for you:

545 F.2d 141 (Means plus indefiniteness is related to written description)

304 US 364 (functionality without sufficient structural description is invalid)

277 US 245 (Claim to functionality not limited by structure is invalid as inherently overclaiming)