ADEN, Yemen — If planting a flag denotes a territorial claim, then the assortment of banners displayed across Aden southern Yemen are indicative of the complex web of players involved in attempts to control the city.



Various flags are coiled around poles at checkpoints, sprayed on walls, painted on cars, stuck on ammunition clips and cellphone covers. No single group’s leaders or followers have yet asserted control of the ruined city after many months of war.



Among the multitude of markers are three national flags: Saudi Arabia’s, the United Arab Emirates’ and the defunct socialist state of South Yemen’s, which is now a symbol of independence for the secessionists calling for renewed separation from the north. Despite all these representations of nationhood, there is no state here or, most notably, any sign of the Yemeni tricolor. That flag — viewed by southerners as a vestige of northern oppression and now aggression — would indicate the government’s presence. In the absence of the state, there is often another banner in Yemen. Not for the first time, the black rayat al-uqab flag, embraced by Al-Qaeda and subsequently assumed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), can be spotted on walls in districts across the city. When the combined forces of the predominantly northern Shia Houthis — along with loyalists of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh — descended on Aden in mid-March, their pretext for war was the city’s being a stronghold for Daesh (the Arabic acronym for ISIL). The Houthis and their supporters adopted the name as a blanket term to describe Yemen’s Al-Qaeda offshoot, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as well as the more recently emerged ISIL affiliate in Yemen. While this appellation overstated the presence of the two groups at the other end of the spectrum, representatives of the Yemeni government — who largely remain in self-imposed exile in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia — insist Al-Qaeda does not exist and that its presence in Aden is a Houthi-made myth. The reality lies somewhere in between.

As the last echoes of airstrikes and shelling rippled across the city to its Arabian Sea coastline last month and fighting drew to a close, the void where a government should be — along with the accompanying police force, army and municipal institutions — lay bare. In its place is the motley throng of the Southern Resistance, a fighting force made up of local men defending their homes, former soldiers of the socialist-era army and, in lesser numbers, those fighting for religious reasons, including some elements from Al-Qaeda. The common enemy — the Houthi-Saleh forces that united this disparate militia — is no longer a tangible threat. But in its wake is a population of disgruntled armed men looking for jobs, while AQAP and ISIL are looking to take advantage. The combination is potentially toxic. “There is no single official group responsible for the security system of Aden,” admitted the commander in charge of the Southern Resistance, Aidaroos al-Zoubadi, who has been part of a group of leaders trying to resolve the issue of who will secure the city. While the Southern Resistance busied itself with the military advance out of Aden into neighboring provinces last month, it appears the radical fighters were already thinking ahead and planning for the postconflict environment. During the last few weeks of battle, members of the Southern Resistance noticed a surge in presence of ISIL men who followed the push into Lahij and Abyan provinces but, they say, never took part in the fighting. Loitering at the rear, they swooped in as the fighting subsided to loot heavy weapons and ammunition left behind when the Houthis fled. “They knew exactly where to look,” noted one field commander who observed the tactic repeatedly. But in the increasingly gray area of who is and who is not AQAP or ISIL, trying to ascertain the actual threat posed by both groups is a difficult task. Among the young members of the Southern Resistance, bushy beards and lip-hugging mustaches became fashionable during the conflict in mocking defiance of the Houthis’ insistence they were all Daesh. Others describe themselves merely as fans of radical groups rather than fully fledged members or fighters.

‘There is no single official group responsible for the security system of Aden.’ Aidaroos al-Zoubadi commander, Southern Resistance

The cruel twist of Aden’s conflict — sparked by the Houthi-Saleh forces, whose stated aim was to defeat AQAP and ISIL — is that the war appears to have had the opposite effect. More than four months of heavy fighting in a city under siege that left thousands dead has fueled the radicalization of young men and accelerated the rise of ISIL. Extreme acts of violence became the norm in a city where previously only soldiers carried guns. Although ISIL fighters never took part in the battle for control of the city, the group’s more openly brutal tactics, compared with Al-Qaeda’s, appear less excessive to some who are now familiar with bloodshed. The Bureiqa district, also known as Little Aden, 20 miles west of the heart of the city, is the well-known birthplace of AQAP. Youths there say the group is being eclipsed by the popularity of ISIL, with a fan base fostered by “journalists” deployed to spread ISIL’s ideology through videos and propaganda songs. “ISIL is bigger, better and stronger than Al-Qaeda now,” said Omar, 24, who became aware of the group in Aden only after the conflict began. With the infamous black banner stuck on the back of his cellphone, he gave only his first name and described himself as a fan of ISIL rather than a member of the group. “ISIL is structurally stronger than Al-Qaeda in Yemen,” noted a Yemeni expert in Islamic groups who asked not to be named. The veteran scholar has observed the formation of ISIL in Yemen, which he says is based on intelligence gathering, similar to the methods used in Iraq and Syria. However, its leadership in Yemen consists of foreigners with experience garnered in Iraq and Syria.

‘ISIL is bigger, better and stronger than Al-Qaeda now.’ Omar ISIL supporter in Aden