In the present day secession is one of the single most divisive issues in Europe. From Spain, where opposition to separatism in Catalonia has contributed to a resurgence of the national far-right; to Corsica, where even in this year alone there have been 8 successful and 2 unsuccessful bombings by separatists; to Ukraine, where Europeans shed one another’s blood over language and identity in the Easternmost regions. Separatism is impossible to ignore. The prevailing opinion in Europe, at least in federalist circles, is that separatism is not only undesirable, but unnecessary in the age of the European Union.

This opposition to separatism is being tested, however, by events in the troublesome Britain. In response to Brexit, ardent near majorities agitate for independence in Scotland and unification in Northern Ireland. European politicians have flirted, publicly and often, with the ideas of Scottish independence and Irish unification as possible solutions to the democratic deficit that Brexit has exposed. Even states once ardently opposed to Scottish secession have started to warm to the idea.

Distinguishing the cases

With the Scottish Parliament laying out the framework for a second independence referendum late next year, it is necessary to look at these two cases of potential secession and distinguish them from other contemporaneous European movements.

In 2014, at the culmination of a two-year campaign, the people of Scotland voted on their possible secession, and chose to remain. The Yes movement (the primary campaign in favour of independence, supported by multiple parties and factions) was a vibrant, progressive, pro-European movement, but it wanted to separate from a state that was, at the time, seen as a relatively safe EU member.

European officials and leaders were cautious of the movement, despite its pro-European character, for multiple reasons; mostly to avoid tensions with an already problematic member state, and to avoid encouraging similar separatist movements across Europe. The Yes movement was, after all, very closely entwined with the Catalonian independence movement.

However, five years is a long time in politics, and in the UK’s case it has seemed far longer than that. While Scotland voted to remain in the UK by a margin of ten percent, the two deciding factors in that vote were: one, a pledge of greater, near federal, powers for the Scottish parliament, and two, the desire to avoid crashing out of the EU as a consequence of leaving the UK (15% of no voters listed their desire to remain in the EU as their primary motivation for voting against independence).

With the UK’s (allegedly) imminent departure from the EU, and with the complete failure for “devolution-max” to materialise, the Scots’ claim that the result of the 2014 referendum are somewhat outdated is a solid one. What’s more, while before the Scottish independence movement was one to leave an EU member state to become another one, it is now a movement to remain in the EU and depart a leaving state. This places it in stark contrast with every other independence movement in the EU.

The Northern Irish issue seems rather easier, but is far riskier too. The Good Friday Agreement, the foundation of peace in Northern Ireland, is put under threat by the UK’s departure from the EU without concrete assurances over the Irish border. To ensure the Irish peace, many have discussed the possibility of re-uniting Ireland as a single state within the EU, which would bypass the necessity of Northern Ireland meeting EU accession criteria on its own and possibly avoid the return to a conflict that has already claimed a life in its recent upsurge, and seen a bombing campaign across the UK.

If Irish unification is to be touted as a solution to the Northern Irish issue, then grave consideration must be given to the opinions and temperament of traditional loyalist communities in the North too. While the legal implications are simpler than an independent Scotland’s accession, the practical considerations and risk of violence should give pause to any European politician who espouses Irish unification as a simple solution to the Northern Irish issue.

Thus, we have two populations, both with strong pro-European tendencies, with the possibility of leaving a departing EU member in order to remain in the EU. No true parallel can be drawn with the Corsican, Breton, Catalonian, Flemish or any other contemporaneous European secession movement inside the EU, as their circumstances are different. It is therefore possible for the EU to accept the legitimacy of Scottish separatism and Irish unification. Their political goals are aligned with the EU and all its member states, and it wouldn’t give weight to the secessionist movements within other member states. In fact, by creating a clear distinction, the EU could even undermine the Europhile credentials of other European separatist movements.

The case for EU recognition

If the EU is to make a clear distinction between the cases of Scotland and Northern Ireland and other separatist movements, why should it recognise their secession, and place no impediments in their way back to the union?

First, this would be the most democratic of options. If a people or nation vote to remain in the EU but their wider state decides to leave, and then that same people or nation vote to leave their state to form their own with a view to re-join the EU, then there is an argument to be made that there is an onus on the EU to welcome them back. To not do so would be to undermine their democratic rights as recent, or even current, European citizens. The national will would be clear, and if their attempts to remain in the EU were rejected it would not be a case of a state or people voting to leave, but rather the EU deciding that they must.

However, this appeal to respect the will of the people must obviously be applied both ways, and the wishes of the rest of the European people need also be considered. That said, polling has shown that there is strong support for the accession of an independent Scotland into the EU in other European countries, and there is no reason to assume that same feeling of European solidarity and desire for re-unification would not apply in future similar cases, where the drive for separation is one to remain in Europe.

The second argument for allowing the accession of leaving-to-remain states is a similarly value laden. If the purpose of the EU is to unite the people of Europe, then it would be counter-productive to turn away Europeans who wish to remain in the EU rather than leave. Unlike the citizens of states wishing to join such as Bosnia, Turkey, Georgia etc, the citizens of departing states are already European Union citizens, with all the rights and duties that entails. They have been a part of the European framework, their taxes contributing to the European budget, their rights entwined with their fellow citizens across the continent. More important than expanding the EU is to keep those within its borders in the fold, thus maintaining the unity that Europe has fought so hard to achieve.

The final reason is purely pragmatic. The unification of Ireland avoids conflict, and while possibly an initial financial burden for the Irish state, it is a burden that the people of the Republic appear happy to bear to achieve unification of their ancient nation. Retention or rapid accession of Scotland would maintain Europe’s access to one third of the continent’s oil supplies, keep a nation with some of the highest potential renewable energy capability in the Union, and boost the proportion of pro-EU members of the European Parliament, at least for for some time.

A 21st Century Trianon

With the 99th anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon recently passed, the intentional dismembering of states, and the possible consequences of such punitive action, loom large in many minds. This does not dissuade some from believing that the EU should deliberately support the breakup of the UK to dissuade other states from following in its steps, however. To some, separatist movements in departing Member States should not only be accepted but encouraged. While a 21st century Trianon would be an anathema to most, how could it be done, and would there be any incentives for the EU in embracing such extreme measures?

For the how, there are several ways. The first and least extreme would be the EU simply providing support to secessionist political parties and movements that would aim to remain in the EU. Through the provision of such support and the guarantee of entry into the union secessionist movements would probably be more likely to succeed. This is unarguably meddling in the internal affairs of a member state, but if the intention is to punitively divide up the departing member then such measures hardly seem extreme in comparison to the goal.

A second would be to mandate, as part of any negotiation between the departing state and the EU, that all sub-state regions with potential secessionist movements be granted a chance to pursue a referendum on independence, if the aim is to remain in the EU. This would likewise be considered meddling in the departing state’s affairs, but arguably less so as it is simply a negotiating condition, as opposed to a provision of aid.

The third option for the EU in this regard is much like the second option, but far harsher. This would be to include as a part of any negotiated settlement with the EU the condition that sub-state regional entities with national characteristics, which voted to remain, be partitioned from the departing state to remain as successor states. This could be further bolstered as a mechanism by including this provision, or the mandate of secession-to-remain referendums, within the very architecture of the departure process. In effect, requiring any state seeking to leave the EU by referendum to promise the unilateral right of secession to its constituent sub-state regional assemblies.

As to the incentives for the EU, there is one overriding one: deterrence. Under this framework, states seeking to depart the EU would put themselves at risk of, at the very least, increased chance of secession, and at worst a treaty mandated dismembering of the state; it would make the possibility of a slim departure highly unpalatable. At the same time, this would achieve the aims of maintaining as much European unity as possible and supporting the democratic wishes of European citizens who wish to remain in the EU.

Its is unlikely, however, that this position, or anything remotely close to it, will ever be taken by the EU, and it’s for the very same reason it would be endorsed by those with greater federalist tendencies: it would add a grave barrier to exit for member states. Member States don’t tend to agree to sacrifices of sovereignty unless clearly beneficial to themselves, and endorsing an EU position of dismembering departing states would be a sacrifice of freedom that no state with possible secessionist movements of their own would accept.

Even among those who seek to strengthen the EU and are happy to put up barriers to Member State exit, these conditions would likely prove extreme or even draconian. Such moves would most certainly be moving beyond ensuring democracy and attempting to keep the Europe united and into the realms of punishing departing states, an accusation that has dogged the EU even in the comparatively generous Brexit negotiations. It could be argued that becoming a bloc that is seen as punishing those that try to leave would, in the long run, encourage the very division of Europe it is attempting to prevent, although it would momentarily dissuade departure.

Unity through secession?

Much as the appeal of dismembering the UK is clear to some, a 21st century Trianon would do nothing but destroy the good will between central EU bureaucracy and Member States, and potentially set the stage for revanchism and conflict. The cause of pro-European secessionists cannot be ignored though.

In the face of departure from the Union, the EU itself should be more flexible when it comes to secessionist movements from departing states. The aims of the EU, to unite Europe, to spread democracy, to ensure the voice of the European people is heard and respected, are best served in recognising the legitimacy of movements that seek to remain through secession. For a more united Europe, let’s give the secessionists a chance.