You can support us by donating to our Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/TheNewRealityinForeignPolicy

You can get the latest updates by subscribing to our Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/The-new-reality-in-foreign-policy-492287754467588/

For a long time call have been made for an independent unified Kurdistan. Unfortunately, the territories that would constitute this country are currently held by other nations, and they are not reputed for their transparency or democratic traditions. As a result, not only the creation of a Kurdistan is inhibited, but the Kurd population of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey are severely oppressed.Syria has, as can been seen in news regularly, been in a bloody civil war for many years. One can wonder why, in this brutal conflict, its army has preferably targeted pockets of islamic or democratic resistance, while passively accepting this ethnic minority's autonomy in the north-east of the country. Multiple explanations can be drawn, often along a similar line as the reasoning behind Saddam Hussein's forced surrender of his Kurdish territory to local authorities after 2003, but, contrary to Saddam, while there has been some clashes, they have been mostly in small scales, and there has also been a tactical alliance and acceptation of the other, most recently against turkey backed offensives. This shows that Kurds in Syria have a very particular status, reinforced by their organization, which is mostly united as opposed to the two enemy blocks in its Iraqi neighbor. Their particularity is reinforced by their alliance with Arab forces, although there have been questions over a lack of integration in the leadership, and their militant marxist/anarchist ideology. This is really that ideology along with their good organization and ability to work beyond sectarian lines that has defined their role in the civil war.It is no secret that the civil war has long devolved into a sectarian conflict, in particular a religious one. Here, a marxist force could only logically align with other non religious forces, and would be targeted by extremists. However, this organization was really brought on by the conflict, and not vice versa, as one of the Islamic state objective was ethnic cleansing, proven by their treatment of the Yazidis. The tremendous pressure on Kurdish communities, best exemplified with the siege of Kobani, forced them to band together in the particular way described above, using an existing structure to create a military force capable to resist attacks from a powerful non state actors, empowering it with its successes to then become a governing force, founding Rojava. This morphing into governance and expansion from survival wouldn't have been possible without the tactical help of western nations, trying to curb the Islamic State rise into a large, and threatening, cross-national entity.The Islamic State, starting in Iraq and then expanding into Syria wasn't just a regular terrorist organization. Much like the Talibans, in a never seen before way in the middle east, it took over institutions, and had full control over its territories, acting like a state more than a guerrilla. This was possible by its incorporation of many former Saddam officials, unsatisfied with power now being in the hands of the Shia majority, who had a large network of influence and governing influence, and the easy takeover of weapons stockpiles of the Iraqi army, that included modern American weapon systems. They soon met additional resistance in Iraq, while trying to expand east and north, and so, expanded west instead, into Syria, a country to weakened to oppose it with any force. There, their expansion along Sunni Arab communities, that felt abandoned by their government and under stress due to recent extreme droughts, was rapid and durable. The tactical decisions by the Turkish authorities to allow their oil trafficking also ensured a continued revenue stream, strengthened by the sale of many archeological artifacts. This threat was recognized as such by western nations, under recent pressure by their populations from terrorist attacks, however, direct intervention was unpopular, especially in such a complicated situation. What is more, any economic embargo would be too long to take effect and limited due Turkey's role, a Nato ally, into the smuggling. The only direct solution, aerial attacks, had proven, with the drone program, as insufficient to root out terrorist organizations from a location. In the meantime, the Islamic State committed a series of atrocities and, importantly for western observers, this included high profile executions of westerners while an increasing number of foreign citizens trickled into the organization. This prompted a change in policy where funding was more oriented to people who could stop the Caliphate instead of the earlier funding of the Syrian opposition. The group that was best placed to beat back IS, that was local, and that, in addition didn't harbor any potentially dangerous tendencies, like islamism, was the one that was chosen, the PYD. This was a logical step, as the West already funded the Iraqi Peshmergas, and they had proven to be dependable and trustworthy. The PYD, much like the Peshmergas in Iraq, has already coalesced the Syrian Kurdish resistance, and so was the actor to talk to, however, the fact that it was the actor empowered would have heavy consequences in the future.To the Syrian regime, fighting a multi-front war, it was more than happy to leave the bulk of the fighting against IS to the Kurds, especially given immediate threats at the time against its center, from the suburbs of Damascus to Hama and Homs.When we fast forward closer to the present day, when the fast decline of IS started, the Kurds inevitably grew in power, their commitment to put themselves on the line helping with the lengthy reconquest. However, this rise in power, from a corner in North Eastern Syria, led to an increase scrutiny from other actors. One, they had started to govern over traditionally Arab cities, which led to them incorporating Arab forces, partially at the request of western nations, but also to protests from more conservative Arabs against what was seen as a very secular government, led only by one ethnic group, very similar to protests against Assad regime, although their democratic and liberating aspect, meant that this was circumvented to more rural areas. Those protests will be important for later. Another problem was their crossing of the Euphrates to retake Manbij from IS, a move seen as unacceptable by the Turkish government, that made possible a link up with Afrin, further west, and putting half of the Syrian-Turkish border in Kurdish hands. This led to the first Turkish led offensive to reduce the power of the Kurds, Euphrates shield, which while it didn't take Manbij, forbade any further Kurdish advance with their capture of Jarablus, a key town on the highway that leads to Afrin. In the meantime, as the Syrian regime grew stronger with the Russian intervention and the decline of IS, relations became more adversarial as the Syrian army and the YPGs raced to take the remnants of the Islamic State, leading to some stand-offs, particularly the much publicized failed raid by Russian mercenaries against a gas plant on the Kurdish side, and the reduction of the Syrian army pockets in Kurdish territory, eventually ending with a demarcation of the two camps as being roughly each bank of the Euphrates river. However, the Syrian regime quickly prioritized other operations more important for its continued power, such as the recapture of Aleppo, and the destruction of rebel pockets close to its core.The Kurdish authority is in a difficult position, with a powerful adversary, Turkey. This enmity, first acted on with the Euphrates shield operation, but soon taking a much more destructive turn for the Kurds is due to the perceived closeness of the PYD and its fighters the YPGs with the PKK. Turkey argues that they are one and the same, and given that they consider the PKK as a terrorist organization that has waged guerrilla warfare against them for 40 years, a powerful governing organization led by them on their border would be an unacceptable security risk, much like if the Talibans were implanted on part of the US-Mexico border. This characterization of the PYD is mostly considered false, while they do stem from the same organization and, most importantly, they have a similar ideology, mixing marxism and anarchy, the PYD has not intervened in Turkey and has tried to separate itself from the issues, in order to ensure its survival. The actions of some radical splinters, that have arguably helped prepare terrorist attacks in Turkey, has made this exercise difficult, as well as the Islamist and absolutist turn of Erdogan's presidency, instrumentalizing the conflict for a military build-up, and to root out any opposition. This is worsened by the enmity between Turkey and Syria, which, as the Kurds are a tactical ally to Assad, means that there is even more reason for an armed confrontation. To add to this volatile situation, the western nations, following the fall of all the major cities belonging to IS and increasing calls from their respective populations, began to disengage. This was also motivated by the increased victories of the regime against the opposition and the visible radicalization of the latter, with almost half being now in coalition with an affiliate of Al Qaeda, and the other half being almost as radical, although not part of an international network.In recent time, Turkey has stepped up its attacks against Kurds, first with taking Afrin after a relatively quick operation, Olive Branch, and then by attacking throughout its heartland, retaking a significant portion of the border, including strategically important border towns, Ras Al Ayn and Tell Abyad. This goes along with the Turkish strategy of creating buffer zones along its border, and reimplanting there many of the Syrian refugees it has taken. Those moves have forced the Kurds to cooperate with the regime, taking first refuge in regime-controlled areas after the loss of Afrin, and then having government troops guard important parts of the border, and push back against Turkish backed rebels. What is more, with the recent departure of embedded American, British and French special forces, that triggered the latest Turkish offensive, the Turks but the Syrian government too, have much more maneuvering room, while the fight against remnants of IS is increasingly impeded.Now, multiple fault lines and trends are intersecting on the position of the Kurds in Syria, they have, for now, an autonomous region, it remains to be seen whether, the pro-regime troops, now more and more needed by the Kurds, will turn their guns to force the reuniting of the country after Assad has won over the rest of the country. Similarly, the divide that was mended with the PYD Arab involvement might be reopened by the politicization of the Arab and Turkic minorities in their region by Turkey to create a proxy that would follow an agenda more amenable to it. Turkey has been in hot water over the last troop deployment, but has also received increased support from Russia, behind the Syrian Army resurgence, to increase tensions in NATO.What is sure is that Syria wants to see its territory reunited but doesn't want an additional campaign, especially given the difficulty that will be the Idlib one, and while it is the opposite in political terms to the PYD it still has many common traits, like secularism and a mandatory draft. It sees Turkey as the enemy as it fosters rebels that won't stay in their area but instead want a new form of government overall, along a more theocratic line. It has, along with Russia, only accepted the ceasefire and the demilitarization zones, to better prepare the next offensive. It is prepared to see the Kurds weakened, but given their unity, will take a stake in their activity over their weakening given that they are not the primary threat, and that it can be used for leverage later. To Syria, what is best is a reunited Syria with a parity in governance in the Kurdish region, leaving them somewhat autonomous, but not cut from the rest of the country, like with the Iraqi Kurdistan.Russia has a difficult balancing act, as getting Turkey on its side would mean the destruction of the NATO alliance, but Syria is a traditional ally, and it is directly militarily involved in ensuring that the government remains. It still is not ready to bargain much of Syria's territory due to the opposition to, now islamist, rebels, but would surely allow something along the line of a full demilitarization of the border, that would demand Syria's ownership, at least nominal, over all its border territory. For now it is okay with transactional ceasefire agreements, counting on the future destruction of the Idlib pocket, and, given Nato's fallout with Turkey, to give them some bargaining chips in the form of S 400 potential deliveries.Turkey is, with Erdogan's leadership, under a Jingoistic path towards Kurdish submission, and there will certainly be more military operations to achieve this goal. They have clearly stated their goal of a pro-turkish buffer zone, throughout Kurdish territory. They are, however, making a miscalculation on what Syria, and mostly Russia, are ready to bargain. It is not in Russian interest to green light this plan, even if it breaks up NATO. Indeed this would mean a permanent thorn on the side of Syria, a permeable area from which terrorists can come and go, a major Russian concern, and all this for either a Turkey either staying in NATO, or that was going to leave anyways. Instead what is looking more and more likely now, is that they will use those offensives to regain a foothold in Kurdish territory, while leaving them some autonomy, and will ensure that Turkey is either forced to leave, or cannot meaningfully help the rebels it back anymore, to regain the rest of the country, which will be a major victory for both Assad and Putin. In doing so, and letting Erdogan hang himself by keeping on attacking the Kurds, they will ensure that a durable wedge is placed in NATO, thanks to the overwhelming reaction in NATO countries against a Turkish offensive, maybe even leading to the forced dismissal of Turkey from the alliance, that the Kurds come back to the Syrian fold due to their help, and that American influence is durably neutered in the region, while the Iranian and Hezbollah one take a back seat, to the new Russian influence.In conclusion, Kurds in Syria are in a precarious situation, leaving in an autonomous region that Turkey wants to invade and Syria wants to control again. Furthermore, their foreign backing is drying up with the American withdrawal, and division inside the places they control is sowed between more conservatives Arabs and radical Kurds, not helped by the still vivid memory of IS rule. However, it seems that one of its enemies, namely Turkey, has overplayed its hand, and not much more territories will be lost to them, with the Syrian army interposing itself between the two parties. On the other hand, Assad has no desire to lengthen any further the civil war and will try to negotiate with the Kurds on amicable terms, especially since they have been more successful than him in including the Sunni majority. This means that, while an independent country might be a long way away, their dreams of Rojava won't be totally crushed as they will keep an autonomy, especially easier to gain since the regime released some of its iron grip on governance and power, allowing for some form of conciliation, since it has taken back some of its lost territory. What remains to be known is whether they will keep an independent armed force or will be integrated back to the SAA, which would be one of the hard part of any negotiation, and many might still die before a durable peace is reached between all parties