One of the bigger debates in the foreign policy realm is the Trump administration’s approach to the Iran deal. The more absolutist opponents of the deal demand that it be torn up but the nature of the agreement complicates such a straightforward response. To understand why will require a bit of background on both Iran and the deal itself.

First, let’s take a look at Iran and their nuclear goals and aspirations. Allow me to state the obvious but often left unsaid, Iran is fully capable of making a nuclear bomb whenever they so choose and has been for quite some time. The technology is nearly ancient at this point. The US did it with far inferior technological capability back in the 1940s and the know how is well known. There is however a wide gap between making a nuclear bomb and being a nuclear power because the latter entails an ability to project nuclear power. The Iranian regime’s goal is not to make a nuclear bomb, but rather be regarded as a nuclear power. Why is the distinction important? Because the ability to project power means a credible method of delivery and a sufficiently powerful and threatening bomb and the ability to manufacture them.

So let’s look at the deal with these goals in mind. Under this deal, there are no restrictions on missile technology. Iran is ‘called upon’ to not advance their missile program, vague enough wording that they’ve seen no reason to even attempt to abide by it. Not only that, but the deal actually repeals UN restrictions against selling Iran missiles and missile technology in 2023, some of which were immediately implemented by the Obama admin, namely delisting two major banks from financial sanctions. So the deal effectively enables the first requirement in Iran’s quest to become a nuclear power by advancing their delivery capabilities. It allows ballistic missile testing, reduces current impediments to their program, and codifies the repeal of long standing sanctions against the program. As to the second point, creating a powerful bomb, the agreement purports to slow development of advanced centrifuges, but in reality does little to do so. Yes, it does limit the total number of centrifuges to about 6,000 of the older models for 10 years. Good news, right? Well, that means they can only use 6,000, but the newer models and excess centrifuges are stored under Iranian control, though monitored by the IAEA. Further, it allows R&D to continue on their most advanced centrifuges from day one, with the only restriction that enrichment R&D must be done ‘in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium’ and R&D be limited to work done on only 2 of each model of Iran’s more advanced centrifuges. Why is R&D important? Not to get into the weeds of nuclear weapons too much, but there are two distinct types, the older type that uses fission and the newer type that uses fusion. The older one is the type the US dropped in WWII and the newer one is over a thousand times more powerful. To make this more powerful bomb you need highly enriched uranium, which means more advanced centrifuges. The first type needs about 80% enrichment and Iran has already shown it can well exceed these levels, but to be considered a major nuclear power it needs the big bombs. Allowing them to advance their technology gives them international legitimacy to create and maintain a nuclear program able to develop thermonuclear weapons. One final point on the centrifuges, the limitations on their number and production is lessened after 8.5 years and fully removed shortly thereafter in year 10. In sum, the two key elements that Iran needs to be regarded as a nuclear power are, if not unhindered, then furthered by the deal.

We’ve covered a little of what the deal, but looking at the deal’s structure makes difficulty of significant revisions apparent. The short answer is that the deal effectively surrendered most of the leverage the US had at the outset in exchange for promises of compliance. The main thrust of the deal is the reversal of sanctions on Iran by the US, EU, and UN in return for Iranian promises to dismantle a plutonium reactor and limit both the number of centrifuges and quantity and quality of their uranium. The first point to note about this is that this reversed long standing US and UN policy by officially granting Iran the right to enrich uranium. This in and of itself was a major achievement for Iran because the basis of the sanctions was the very act of enrich uranium. It’s now very difficult to walk back this concession barring some major shakeup of the status quo. As explained, enrichment levels are meaningful and the deal bars enrichment beyond 3.67% as well as limiting storage to only 300kgs, ostensibly to limit the ability for Iran to quickly develop multiple nuclear weapons. There are other restrictions as well, dealing with centrifuge manufacturing and other nuclear materials, but for our purposes let’s assume it includes oversight of all relevant activities. Questions would then shift to the quality of oversight and the punishments for violations. Much has been written about the inspection regime and there is reason to believe it has significant flaws, however, let’s again assume that the deal has perfectly structured to detect any violation. So we now assume that everything that would push Iran closer to creating a bomb is watched and that nothing happens that we don’t know about. That’s the best case, and it is the argument of the deals defenders. For 15 years we know Iran will not build a bomb so long as the deal is adhered to. Even taking them at their word we then look at how the deal punishes violations, the farce comes to light.

There is no method to ratchet up pressure on Iran if opposed by Russia, China, or even Iran. Disputes must go through the JCPOA, but these decisions require the consensus of all and includes the Security Council, Iran, Germany, and the EU. In other words if not all parties agree about how to respond to a violation, no response will be made. This does not mean there is nothing the US can do. In fact any member of the Security Council has the ability to blow up the deal. If any Security Council member makes a veto at a certain stage of the proceedings, the UN sanctions ‘snap back’ into place. Iran has declared that such a move will cause them to withdraw from the agreement. In other words, the ONLY way to punish Iran for cheating under the terms of this deal is to get them to agree to it themselves or blow up the entire deal. The US could of course impose its own sanctions, but the crux of the matter is that the deal creates no gradual escalation for punishing misbehavior. Further, many point out that the strength of these sanctions largely relies on the goodwill of others in the UN, so if the US ends the deal under protest from other parties, the sanction regime will be largely in name only.

However, once more, imagine the ideal outcome of Iran cheating and refusing to abide by the agreement. The sanctions snap back in full force with all parties on board. What does Iran lose? They’ve received about $50 billion from the US so far and hundreds of millions in cash which is critical to funding terror activities according to most experts. They’ve continued progress on their R&D in both missiles and nuclear infrastructure. They’ve retained all their centrifuges and can quickly bring them back online. All business deals that were established prior to the sanction snap back are legally allowed to continue. Essentially, thanks for the money and the ability to rest easy from attack, in the mean time we’ve advanced our program and advanced our interests in the Middle East, typically through violent means, see Syria, Yemen, Iraq.

There are no good options for Trump in my mind. Iran will continue to test the limits of its bonds, and it has already violated some of the black letter text without repercussion. I think the normal political response would be risk averse and barring some major violation end up keeping the deal in place so that any fallout, no pun intended, could be blamed on someone else. Trump however is anything but a normal politician, so it would not be surprising if he chooses something other than the expected response.

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/07/21/a-comprehensive-timeline-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/

http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IranDealDefinitiveGuide.pdf