Appendix A: Data and Methods

Consistent with case study research methods,173 the analyses drew upon numerous and diverse sources, including quantitative data from public records, a survey of residents, photo and video records, interviews of residents, city council meeting minutes, and direct observation of the communities and their respective courts.

Public Data

With data from public records, we studied city finances, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, cases that generated fines, and probation cases.

Public data fell into two broad categories: data generated by the sample cities, though not necessarily obtained directly from the cities, and census data. City-generated data included the following:

City finances

We collected the sample cities’ adopted city budgets for their respective fiscal years from 2012 to 2017. Morrow’s and Riverdale’s FYs start July 1, while Clarkston’s starts January 1. Budgets came either from the cities’ websites or through public records requests.

Georgia requires every municipality to submit an annual finance report called a “Report of Local Government Finances.” We collected all municipal RLGFs from 2012 to 2016 (the latest year consistently available at the time of data collection). These are available online at https://apps.dca.ga.gov/RLGF/Default.aspx.

When certain financial data were missing for the sample cities, we used Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports for imputation where possible. CAFRs are available at https://ted.cviog.uga.edu/financial-documents/financial-reports.

We used these data to determine fines and fees and other types of revenue and to calculate fines and fees revenue as a percentage of revenue. Where possible, we made comparisons to other Georgia cities of comparable size (n = 350), that is, with populations between 5,310 and 17,514. To avoid distortion, we dropped from the statewide comparisons non-sample cities without finance data in a relevant revenue category.

In sources of finance data, fines and fees are presented as “fines, fees, and forfeitures.” Forfeitures are not fines or fees, but there is no way to separate them. Because most published studies and reports on fines and fees use many of the same sources, this is a common condition.



Citations

We collected all citations data from the cities through public records requests. We originally requested all data from 2012 onward. The data were not available for all years, and for some years the data were incomplete. For reporting purposes, 2017 represented the only year for which complete and reliable data were available for all three cities. See Appendix B for all years of data we were able to obtain.

We organized the violations that generated citations into three broad types—property, conduct and traffic. To measure the extent to which the violations posed threats to health and safety, we further organized them into subtypes as follows, referencing municipal codes when necessary to confirm proper categorization: Property Health and safety – This included any sort of violation related to maintaining one’s property in a safe manner, such as improper emergency escapes, no smoke alarms, mold, plumbing problems and structural integrity issues. These usually fell within the city’s building regulations or property maintenance codes. State of disrepair – This included any sort of violation related to the cleanliness of one’s property that would not be considered to significantly impact health and safety. These included long grass, facial deterioration of a building, failure to meet neighborhood standards and issues with fencing. Other – This captured anything related to property maintenance that was not considered to fall under the above, including storing personal property outdoors, repairing a car in one’s driveway and violating sign codes. Conduct Socially maladaptive behavior – This included any personal conduct offense not related to driving that is considered to be a serious violation of societal morals and standards. Examples included public indecency, drug possession, shoplifting and flight from a police officer. Trivial infraction – This included any personal conduct offense not related to driving that, while perhaps dangerous, is not considered to be a serious violation of morals or standards. Examples included not leashing one’s animal and riding a bicycle on the wrong side of the street. Other – This captured any personal conduct offense not related to driving that was not considered to fall under the above. Examples included expired business permits or licenses and illegal solicitations. Traffic Non-speeding Speeding

With the violations so categorized, we calculated the number of violations per type in simple frequencies and per capita.

The citations data from the cities also indicated the amount in fines generated per citation. With this information, we calculated total fines and average fines per citation per violation type described above.

We made no comparisons to other cities since citations data are not collected in any central place.

Court caseloads

We obtained municipal court caseload data through the website of the Georgia Administrative Office of the Courts’ Office of Research and Data Analysis. At the time of data collection, the website provided static, yearly caseload reports spanning 2007 to 2016. (For an example, see here: https://web.archive.org/web/20180409173640/http://www. georgiacourts.org/content/caseload-reports.) These reports allowed us to determine the number of cases filed and disposed (i.e., completed) and to calculate a clearance rate for the sample cities and a comparison group. The comparison cities were those of similar size—as defined above—that operated municipal courts. Because not all Georgia cities operate their own courts and not all potential comparison cities had available annual data, this resulted in a comparison group of between 52 and 73, depending on the year. Specific sample sizes were: 2016: 61 2015: 70 2014: 73 2013: 52 2012: 59



Probations data

Probations data came from two sources: the Department of Community Supervision and the Administrative Office of the Courts. To collect these data, we filed a formal records request with the DCS. Oversight of probations was transferred from the AOC to the DCS in 2015. This resulted in different data collection and reporting across the years of interest. As a result, we were able to compare only certain data over all years. The compatible fields were: Quarter Year Provider Name Provider Type Jurisdiction City/County Total Fines Collected Statutory Surcharges Restitution Amount Georgia Crime Victim’s Emergency Fund Collected Total Number of Community Service Hours Total Number of Community Service Hours Converted from Fines Total Number of Warrants Total Number of Terminations Total Number of Successful Terminations Total Number of Unsuccessful Terminations

Probation finance data were available from 2012 to 2016 (Morrow did not report data for 2015, and Riverdale did not report data for 2013); number of probationers per city were available from the second quarter of 2015 to the fourth quarter of 2017; and fees generated by probation were available for 2016 and 2017.

We used data to indicate the number of probationers per city and to compare those to statewide averages. We also compared probation fees to statewide averages. We calculated fines generated through probation for each city and presented this as a percentage of all fines and fees revenue.

Crime rates

We obtained city crime data through an open records request filed with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation in May 2018 (https://gbi.georgia.gov/crime-statistics). These data are not available online.

We requested crime data from 2012 to 2017. In addition to presenting the number of full-time law enforcement, juvenile/adult arrests, and total clearances, the data showed the number of crimes committed for a variety of offenses: Violent Crime Criminal Homicide Forcible Rape Robbery Aggravated Assault Simple Assault Property Crime Burglary Larceny Theft Motor Vehicle Theft Arson

We used these numbers to calculate the total crime rates for Morrow, Riverdale and Clarkston, excluding simple assaults to be consistent with Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program.

As for census data, we used two types in this study: (a) personal or household data to determine population estimates and demographics and (b) Census of Governments. Demographic data came from the American FactFinder and other common census data sources. We used these to describe the cities’ populations. We used the Census of Governments data, particularly the Government Finance Statistics, as another source for city finance data, although the data sources described above were our primary sources.

Survey Data

To measure trust in government, we surveyed residents of the three sample cities. Using and adapting questions from pre-existing instruments, we asked the following questions:

How much do you trust: Police officers in your local community?

How much do you trust: City employees in your local community?

How much do you trust: Elected officials in your local community?

How much do you trust: City court judges in your local community?



For these four questions, participants responded using the following scale:

Would you say…

A lot = 1

Some = 2

Only a little = 3

Not at all = 4

For presentation purposes, the scale was recoded into:

A lot = 4

Some = 3

Only a little = 2

Not at all = 1

We presented the results for all questions separately and also calculated an average trust in government score across all four indicators.

We also asked participants to indicate the extent to which they believed three different sectors of city government (government, city court and police department) could be trusted to make decisions in a fair way and do what is best for the city. Those questions were:

On a scale from 0 to 100, what percent of the time do you think you can trust the government in your city to make decisions in a fair way?

On a scale from 0 to 100, what percent of the time do you think you can trust the city court in your city to make decisions in a fair way?

On a scale from 0 to 100, what percent of the time do you think you can trust the police department in your city to make decisions in a fair way?

On a scale from 0 to 100, what percent of the time do you think you can trust the government in your city to do what is best for your city?

On a scale from 0 to 100, what percent of the time do you think you can trust the city court in your city to do what is best for your city?

On a scale from 0 to 100, what percent of the time do you think you can trust the police department in your city to do what is best for your city?

We calculated average “fair” and “do what is best” scores across the three sectors.

Using the survey, we collected standard demographic data, including age, marital status, number of children under 18 in the household, education level, employment status, household income, race/ethnicity, political affiliation, ideology, sex, and home owner/home renter status. We also asked respondents if they had received a citation from their city in the past year. We used that question to disaggregate results on the theory that receiving a citation would result in different levels of trust.

The total sample size across all cities was 377. Disaggregated by city, the sample sizes were 71 for Morrow, 254 for Riverdale and 52 for Clarkston. All data were collected over the telephone by the survey firm Technometrica between June and August 2018. As an incentive to complete the survey, respondents were entered into a drawing for one of 20 $50 cash prizes. We weighted results so each city’s share of total respondents would match its share of the sample cities’ combined population. For example, while Clarkston represents 34.95% of the three-city population total, it represents only 13.8% of the three-city survey respondent total. Thus, we weighted up the responses from Clarkston.

Photo and Video Records

We collected two types of photo records for this study. The first were photos of properties that received citations. The photos were taken by code enforcement officers and archived by the cities. We obtained these through public records requests. Riverdale provided approximately 3,400 pictures for 2017 and 2018. Clarkston provided 44 usable photographs for 17 properties cited between May 2016 to December 2017. Morrow also provided photos, but they proved unusable for analysis because we could not reliably match them to citations. We used these photos to examine the extent to which code violations threatened public health and safety. We used all of Clarkston’s photos but only a random sample (n = 375) of Riverdale’s. We coded the photographs using a five-point scale ranging from 1 = completely aesthetic to 5 = significant health/safety risk.

The second collection of photos we gathered ourselves by photographing residential neighborhoods during fieldwork visits to the three cities. These observations occurred from July 31 to August 8, 2018, in Morrow and Riverdale and August 5 to 10, 2018, in Clarkston. Effectively, we mimicked the work of a code enforcement officer by directly observing and photographing properties and looking for any apparent code violations. We then scored those “violations” using the five-point scale.

We also performed a similar analysis of traffic violations. For this, we drove around the cities taking video recordings of traffic, cutting them into five-minute segments and coding for traffic violations (Morrow, n = 26 recordings; Riverdale, n = 26 recordings; Clarkston, n = 19 recordings). We shot videos at different times of the day to capture a diversity of traffic patterns. We also gathered video data on different days of the week and on different kinds of roads, including highways, major city roads and minor arterials. With this exercise, we were mimicking the work of police officers, although we did not measure speeding violations. For coding, we used a risk scale similar to the property violation severity scale described above: 1 = no safety risk, 5 = significant safety risk.

Court Observations

During fieldwork visits in August 2018, we observed court sessions in the three cities. In Morrow and Riverdale, we observed four sessions, which included arraignments and bench trials in both cities. Observations in Clarkston included two successive evenings of arraignments. Observations in all sessions spanned the entire time the courts were in session. We observed 91 cases in Morrow, 36 in Riverdale and 37 in Clarkston.

To assist with data collection, we created an observation instrument that enabled us to gather the following:

Docket number

Defendant number

Start time

Number of questions asked by defendant

How well does defendant understand events? (1 = very little; 6 = very well)

Does defendant contest circumstances?

Was fines and fees schedule described?

Did judge ask whether defendant understands rights?

Did judge ask whether defendant understands process?

Did judge accept defendant’s story?

Number of times judge questioned prosecutors/law enforcement

Nature of questions to prosecutors/law enforcement

How well did judge follow standardized procedures? (1 = very little; 6 = very well)

What is the pace of proceedings? Very quick or with deliberation? (1 = with a lot of deliberation; 6 = very quick)

Was defendant represented by attorney?

Was ability to pay determined?

If translator was needed, was one provided?

Other notes about proceedings

What was the outcome?

Was defendant sentenced to probation?

Did judge engage in horse-trading?

Defendant race/ethnicity

Defendant gender

Defendant age

Was defendant a primary English speaker?

Other notes about defendant

End time

The instrument also included space for us to make field notes, such as events or quotes, information about courtroom personnel, and general observations about the settings and proceedings. We approached data collection strictly as observers. Had the proceedings allowed for it, we would have pursued interviews with defendants. However, the rapid pace of the cases required full attention to data collection.

Interviews

Interviews with residents facilitated an understanding of how city residents experience the fines and fees phenomenon. To create an interview sample, we concluded our survey by asking respondents who had received citations if they would be willing to complete a follow-up interview. We also used contact information contained within citation data provided by cities to call individuals and ask if they would complete an interview. This process yielded a sample of six respondents who completed a full interview. All potential interview respondents were only from the sample cities.

We completed all interviews by phone at the time of day most convenient for respondents. The full interview protocol is provided below:

Thanks for doing the interview. Please know that anything you say will be strictly confidential and will not be attributed to you in any way. We are doing these interviews to gain a greater understanding of people’s experiences with and opinions about their cities. I have a few follow-up questions about your experience with the court in [CITY].

When you completed the survey, you said you received a citation from the city for [VIOLATION]. Can you describe the circumstance that led up to that violation? Was the officer correct in his or her assessment in giving you a citation? If no, why not?

If the officer was not correct, what do you think led him/her to give you a citation? After you received the citation, what did you have to do to either pay or contest it? What was the process you had to go through? [FOR THOSE WHO DID NOT SIMPLY PAY] How long did that process take? How well did you understand the process required to [pay or contest] the citation? [FOR THOSE WHO CONTESTED] What did you do to prepare to contest the citation? Did you talk to an attorney, or talk to witnesses, ask for help from someone or anything else like that? What was the eventual outcome of your case? How were you treated throughout the process by people in the court, city employees or others you interacted with? And why do you think that? [FOR THOSE WHO WENT TO COURT] How would you describe the level of professionalism among those in the court, city employees or others you interacted with?

That is all the questions I have for you at this time. Is there anything else on this topic that I should have asked or you think would be important for me to know?

Thanks again for talking with me.

City Council Meetings

To track and gain greater insight into decisions made by city leaders, we gathered city council meeting agendas, minutes and related documents for 2012 through 2017. Some of these documents were available online from the respective city websites, but others required we make public records requests to the cities. Meetings included regularly scheduled public meetings, working meetings, business meetings and special meetings. This yielded a sample of 398 meetings in Morrow, 246 in Riverdale and 315 in Clarkston.

We were particularly interested in gaining information about the following:

Discussions or decisions relevant to fines and fees.

Discussions or decisions relevant to Ferguson, Missouri; articles on “speed traps” and related topics; or other circumstances locally or nationally focused on the fines and fees behaviors of municipalities.

Discussions or decisions relevant to changes in municipal taxes.

Discussions or decisions relevant to city expenses as would be relevant to fines and fees.

Discussions or decisions relevant to personnel vis-à-vis fines and fees.

A focus on these constructs yielded data from 45 meetings in Morrow, 54 meetings in Riverdale and 26 meetings in Clarkston. These data are not presented systematically in the results above. Rather, we used them to help us interpret and better understand the other quantitative and qualitative data analyzed and presented above.

Appendix B: Detailed Data Tables

Table B1: City Finance Data, Fiscal Years 2012–2016

Revenue Source Clarkston Morrow Riverdale Comparison Cities Taxes $13,328,217 $31,785,755 $54,826,840 $33,886,836 Fines, Forfeits & Court Fees $5,495,304 $9,479,748 $10,704,452 $2,842,397 Service Charges $497,035 $2,195,422 $5,621,663 $2,202,408 Public Utilities & Other Enterprise Funds $2,055,902 $4,614,033 $2,657,142 $60,866,481 Intergovernmental $690,470 $4,315,339 $2,912,534 $5,708,915 Other $850,433 $648,379 $632,387 $2,175,693 Total Revenue $22,917,361 $53,038,676 $77,355,018 $107,682,731

Invisible Space

Table B2: City Finance Data per Capita, Fiscal Years 2012–2016

Revenue Source Clarkston Morrow Riverdale Comparison Cities Taxes $210 $1,160 $695 $647 Fines, Forfeits & Court Fees $87 $348 $136 $54 Service Charges $8 $80 $72 $42 Public Utilities & Other Enterprise Funds $32 $168 $33 $1,161 Intergovernmental $11 $157 $36 $109 Other $13 $24 $8 $41 Total Revenue $362 $1,937 $980 $2,054

Invisible Space

Figure B1: Fines and Fees, Fiscal Years 2012–2016

Note: Morrow did not report fines and fees revenue for 2015. The number reported here is an interpolation. Riverdale’s 2013 fines and fees figure was not reported, so we imputed it using the city’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for that year.

Figure B2: Fines and Fees per Capita, Fiscal Years 2012–2016

Note: Morrow did not report fines and fees revenue for 2015. The number reported here is an interpolation. Riverdale’s 2013 fines and fees figure was not reported, so we imputed it using the city’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for that year.

Table B3: Clarkston Violation Frequencies, Per Capita, and Percentages by Violation Type, 2016-2017

Frequencies Per Capita Percentages Violation Type/Subtype 2016 2017 Total 2016 2017 Total 2016 2017 Total Property Health and Safety 32 22 54 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.01 State of Disrepair 8 14 22 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 Other 24 58 82 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.01 0.02 0.01 Property Total 64 94 158 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.02 0.03 0.02 Conduct Socially Maladaptive Behavior 273 340 613 0.021 0.026 0.024 0.09 0.10 0.10 Trivial Infraction 30 98 128 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.01 0.03 0.02 Other 228 174 402 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.07 0.05 0.06 Conduct Total 531 612 1,143 0.041 0.048 0.045 0.17 0.19 0.18 Traffic Non-speeding 2,143 2,392 4,535 0.167 0.186 0.177 0.69 0.73 0.71 Speeding 372 170 542 0.029 0.013 0.021 0.12 0.05 0.08 Traffic Total 2,515 2,562 5,077 0.196 0.199 0.198 0.81 0.78 0.80 Grand Total 3,110 3,268 6,378 0.242 0.254 0.248 1.00 1.00 1.00

Note: Citations span May 3, 2016, to December 27, 2017

Table B4: Morrow Violation Frequencies by Violation Type, 2012–2017

Frequencies Violation Type/Subtype 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total Property Health and Safety 3 0 2 3 1 0 9 State of Disrepair 55 60 24 27 33 67 266 Other 21 7 6 11 22 34 01 Property Total 79 67 32 41 56 101 376 Conduct Socially Maladaptive Behavior 678 544 393 268 321 353 2,557 Trivial Infraction 2 8 2 1 2 10 25 Other 41 21 33 18 20 56 189 Conduct Total 721 573 428 287 343 419 2,771 Traffic Non-speeding 5,115 5,197 3,729 4,140 3,220 4,661 26,062 Speeding 1,610 2,047 1,556 1,040 762 1,068 8,083 Traffic Total 6,725 7,244 5,285 5,180 3,982 5,729 34,145 Grand Total 7,525 7,884 5,745 5,508 4,381 6,249 37,292

Invisible Space

Table B5: Morrow Violations per Capita by Violation Type, 2012–2017

Per Capita Violation Type/Subtype 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total Property Health and Safety 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 State of Disrepair 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.006 Other 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.002 Property Total 0.012 0.010 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.014 0.009 Conduct Socially Maladaptive Behavior 0.101 0.083 0.056 0.037 0.045 0.047 0.061 Trivial Infraction 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 Other 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.004 Conduct Total 0.107 0.087 0.061 0.040 0.048 0.056 0.066 Traffic Non-speeding 0.761 0.791 0.531 0.577 0.452 0.624 0.619 Speeding 0.240 0.311 0.222 0.145 0.107 0.143 0.192 Traffic Total 1.001 1.102 0.753 0.721 0.558 0.767 0.811 Grand Total 1.120 1.200

0.818

0.767

0.614

0.836

0.886



Invisible Space

Table B6: Morrow Violation Percentages by Violation Type, 2012–2017

Percentages Violation Type/Subtype 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Property Health and Safety 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 State of Disrepair 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 Property Total 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 Conduct Socially Maladaptive Behavior 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 Trivial Infraction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Other 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 Conduct Total 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07 Traffic Non-speeding 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.75 0.73 0.75 Speeding 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.17 Traffic Total 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.92 Grand Total 1.00 1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00



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Table B7: Riverdale Violation Frequencies, Per Capita, and Percentages by Violation Type, 2016–2017

Frequencies Per Capita Percentages Violation Type/Subtype 2016 2017 Total 2016 2017 Total 2016 2017 Total Property Health and Safety 129 172 301 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.01 0.02 0.02 State of Disrepair 102 105 207 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.01 0.01 01 Other 39 44 83 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.00 0.01 0.00 Property Total 270 321 591 0.017 0.020 0.018 0.02 0.04 0.03 Conduct Socially Maladaptive Behavior 1,116 1,124 2,240 0.069 0.068 0.069 0.10 0.13 0.11 Trivial Infraction 12 4 16 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 Other 180 208 388 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.02 0.02 0.02 Conduct Total 1,308 1,336 2,644 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.12 0.15 0.13 Traffic Non-speeding 8,018 5,639 13,657 0.494 0.343 0.418 0.73 0.65 0.70 Speeding 1,379 1,371 2,750 0.085 0.083 0.084 0.13 0.16 0.14 Traffic Total 9,397 7,010 16,407 0.579 0.426 0.502 0.86 0.81 0.84 Grand Total 10,975 8,667 19,642 0.676 0.527 0.601 1.00 1.00 1.00

Note: Citations span January 1, 2016, to December 30, 2017.

Table B8: Clarkston Total Fines and Average Fines per Citation by Violation Type, 2016–2017

Total Fines Average Fines per Citation Violation Type/Subtype 2016 2017 Total 2016 2017 Total Property Health and Safety $8,435 $7,173 $15,608 $291 $399 $332 State of Disrepair $1,650 $6,000 $7,650 $275 $429 $383 Other $6,223 $18,128 $24,351 $346 $412 $393 Property Total $16,308 $31,301 $47,609 $308 $412 $369 Conduct Socially Maladaptive Behavior $61,967 $97,073 $159,040 $310 $339 $327 Trivial Infraction $2,555 $18,474 $21,029 $183 $205 $202 Other $83,940 $61,323 $145,263 $398 $398 $398 Conduct Total $148,462 $176,870 $325,332 $349 $334 $341 Traffic Non-speeding $524,227 $720,146 $1,244,373 $299 $337 $320 Speeding $52,554 $17,808 $70,362 $151 $145 $149 Traffic Total $576,781 $737,954 $1,314,735 $274 $326 $301 Grand Total/Average $741,551 $946,125 $1,687,675 $287 $330 $310

Note: Citations span May 3, 2016, to December 27, 2017.

Table B9: Morrow Total Fines by Violation Type, 2012–2017

Total Fines Violation Type/Subtype 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total Property Health and Safety $589 $0 $632 $0 $280 $0 $1,502 State of Disrepair $2,720 $5,889 $712 $3,195 $3,373 $5,313 $21,202 Other $3,281 $646 $0 $1,124 $3,679 $3,633 $12,363 Property Total $6,590 $6,536 $1,344 $4,318 $7,333 $8,946 $35,067 Conduct Socially Maladaptive Behavior $374,449 $262,813 $173,168 $115,561 $161,456 $276,556 $1,364,003 Trivial Infraction $504 $481 $104 $0 $0 $1,217 $2,306 Other $23,263 $1,896 $1,131 $1,302 $1,343 $4,075 $33,009 Conduct Total $398,217 $265,190 $174,402 $116,862 $162,799 $281,848 $1,399,318 Traffic Non-speeding $1,319,193 $1,202,932 $801,170 $956,297 $857,943 $1,369,227 $6,506,762 Speeding $448,555 $523,212 $385,575 $281,966 $222,738 $292,673 $2,154,718 Traffic Total $1,767,748 $1,726,144 $1,186,744 $1,238,263 $1,080,681 $1,661,900 $8,661,481 Grand Total $2,172,554 $1,997,870 $1,362,491 $1,359,444 $1,250,812 $1,952,694 $10,095,865

Invisible Space

Table B10: Morrow Average Fines per Citation by Violation Type, 2012–2017

Average Fines per Citation Violation Type/Subtype 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total Property Health and Safety $196 $0 $316 $0 $280 $0 $167 State of Disrepair $49 $98 $30 $118 $102 $79 $80 Other $156 $92 $0 $102 $167 $107 $122 Property Total $83 $98 $42 $105 $131 $89 $93 Conduct Socially Maladaptive Behavior $552 $483 $441 $431 $503 $783 $533 Trivial Infraction $252 $60 $52 $0 $0 $122 $92 Other $567 $90 $34 $72 $67 $73 $175 Conduct Total $552 $463 $407 $407 $475 $673 $505 Traffic Non-speeding $258 $231 $215 $231 $266 $294 $250 Speeding $279 $256 $248 $271 $292 $274 $267 Traffic Total $263 $238 $225 $239 $271 $290 $254 Average $289 $253 $237 $247 $286 $312 $271

Invisible Space

Table B11: Riverdale Total Fines and Average Fines per Citation by Violation Type, 2016–2017

Total Fines Average Fines per Citation Violation Type/Subtype 2016 2017 Total 2016 2017 Total Property Health and Safety $37,796 $111,305 $149,101 $293 $647 $495 State of Disrepair $3,907 $905 $4,812 $38 $9 $23 Other $2,750 $1,000 $3,750 $71 $23 $45 Property Total $44,453 $113,210 $157,663 $165 $353 $267 Conduct Socially Maladaptive Behavior $378,073 $521,963 $900,036 $339 $464 $402 Trivial Infraction $685 $469 $1,154 $57 $117 $72 Other $28,245 $27,088 $55,333 $157 $130 $143 Conduct Total $407,003 $549,520 $956,522 $311 $411 $362 Traffic Non-speeding $1,159,407 $1,006,268 $2,165,675 $145 $178 $159 Speeding $265,113 $259,719 $524,832 $192 $189 $191 Traffic Total $1,424,520 $1,265,987 $2,690,507 $152 $181 $164 Grand Total/Average $1,875,975 $1,928,717 $3,804,692 $171 $223 $194

Note: Citations span January 1, 2016, to December 30, 2017.

Table B12: Court Caseloads, 2012–2016

Clarkston Morrow Riverdale Year Filed Disposed Clearance Rate Filed Disposed Clearance Rate Filed Disposed Clearance Rate 2012 5,515 3,021 0.55 7,801 5,386 0.69 20,047 20,175 1.01 2013 6,350 3,423 0.54 8,143 4,510 0.55 14,009 11,500 0.82 2014 5,075 2,791 0.55 6,063 3,521 0.58 12,221 9,820 0.80 2015 6,212 3,917 0.63 5,809 3,433 0.59 13,544 9,511 0.70 2016 4,787 3,096 0.65 4,010 2,548 0.64 11,619 9,115 0.78 Total 27,939 16,248 31,826 19,398 71,440 60,121 Average 5,588 3,250 0.58 6,365 3,880 0.61 14,288 12,024 0.84

Invisible Space

Figure B3: Clarkston Levels of Trust in Government, People Who Received a Citation vs. People Who Did Not

Note: Scale is 1 = not at all, 2 = only a little, 3 = some, 4 = a lot. Example of question asked: “How much do you trust: Police officers in your local community?”

Figure B4: Morrow Levels of Trust in Government, People Who Received a Citation vs. People Who Did Not

Note: Scale is 1 = not at all, 2 = only a little, 3 = some, 4 = a lot.

Figure B5: Riverdale Levels of Trust in Government, People

Who Received a Citation vs. People Who Did Not

Note: Scale is 1 = not at all, 2 = only a little, 3 = some, 4 = a lot.

Figure B6: Clarkston Levels of Trust in Government to Do What Is Fair and

What Is Best for the City, People Who Received a Citation vs. People Who Did Not

Note: Examples of questions asked: “On a scale from 0 to 100, what percent of the time do you think you can trust the police department in your city to make decisions in a fair way?” and “On a scale from 0 to 100, what percent of the time do you think you can trust the police department in your city to do what is best for your city?”

Figure B7: Morrow Levels of Trust in Government to Do What Is Fair and

What Is Best for the City, People Who Received a Citation vs. People Who Did Not

Figure B8: Riverdale Levels of Trust in Government to Do What Is Fair and

What Is Best for the City, People Who Received a Citation vs. People Who Did Not

Endnotes

1 Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 112, Brucker v. The City of Doraville (S.D. Ga. May 23, 2018) (No. 1:18-CV-02375-RWS) [herein after Complaint], https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Brucker-et-al.-v.-City-of-Doraville_Plaintiffs-Complaint-for-Declaratory-and-Injunctive-Relief.pdf

2 Berson, S. (2018, June 1). People in this city are sick of ‘ludicrous’ fines from officials. Now they’re suing. Ledger-Enquirer. https://www.ledger-enquirer.com/news/state/georgia/article212322284.html ; Wilson, L. (2018, May 24). Doraville residents file federal lawsuit to fight ‘excessive’ fines and fees. WSB-TV Atlanta. https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/doraville-residents-file-federal-lawsuit-to-fight-excessive-fines-and-fees/755810220

3 Fonville, C. (2018, June 5). Doraville officials respond to lawsuit, accusations of ‘policing for profit.’ DeKalb Neighbor. https://www.mdjonline.com/neighbor_newspapers/dekalb/news/doraville-officials-respond-to-lawsuit-accusations-of-policing-for-profit/article_92df9270-68fb-11e8-9220-4b271f4ccfc6.html

4 Schallhorn, K. (2018, May 31). Georgia city sued by fed-up residents over ‘ridiculous’ fines for chipped paint, driveway cracks. Fox News. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/georgia-city-sued-by-fed-up-residents-over-ridiculous-fines-for-chipped-paint-driveway-cracks

5 Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 115.

6 Fonville, C. (2019, July 23). Fines and fees: Is Doraville ticketing for revenue? A lawsuit that may move forward states the city is in serious violation. DeKalb Neighbor. https://www.mdjonline.com/neighbor_newspapers/dekalb/is-doraville-ticketing-for-revenue-a-lawsuit-that-may-move/article_3bfc5a8e-a96d-11e9-b891-0f20afc94d8f.html

7 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. (2017). Targeted fines and fees against communities of color: Civil rights and constitutional implications [briefing report]. Washington, DC. https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf; Kopf, D. (2016, June 24). The fining of black America. Priceonomics. https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america/

8 City of Doraville. (2015). Corally Rivera and her team help keep administrative “order in the court.” Doraville Insight, 2(2), p. 3. http://www.doravillega.us/Departments/Public%20Information/spring2015.pdf

9 Bailey, M. (2012, Apr. 3). “No taxation through citation!” New Haven Independent. https://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/red_light_cameras_protest/; Mitchell, J. (2015, May 21). Sen. Schatz reports progress was made in legislative session. emissourian.com. http://www.emissourian.com/news/state/sen-schatz-reports-progress-was-made-in-legislative-session/article_9b6beb81-aa90-5f5f-951a-ff3cace4d969.html; Foldvary, F. (2015, Nov. 15). Taxation by citation. Progress. https://www.progress.org/articles/taxation-by-citation; Dieterle, C. J. (2017, Apr. 4). Citation nation. City Journal. https://www.city-journal.org/html/citation-nation-15093.html

10 U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. (2015).Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department. Washington, DC. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf

11 U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015.

12 U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015.

13 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2017; Kopf, 2016.

14 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2017.

15 See, e.g., Foldvary, 2015; Dieterle, 2017.

16 Simmons, A. (2014a, Oct. 18). Atlanta’s ticket traps: Slow down or pay up. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. https://www.ajc.com/news/transportation/atlanta-ticket-traps-slow-down-pay/6JZfycaeaKQ3jYJGRxtHII/

17 Maciag, M. (2019, Aug. 21). Addicted to fines. Governing. https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/fine-fee-revenues-special-report.html

18 Simmons, A. (2014b, Oct. 23). Ticketed in rural Ga.? Here’s what it bought. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, p. 1A.

19 Simmons, A. (2015, Oct. 30). Traffic tickets: Some cities use interstates as cash registers. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. https://www.ajc.com/news/local/traffic-tickets-some-cities-use-interstates-cash-registers/PULjG07fwkFbQUadT4YGvL/

20 Similarly, law enforcement pay or promotions may depend on ticketing prowess. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015.

21 Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927).

22 Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 248–49 (1980).

23 Ginkowski, R. A. (2018, Spring). Beyond Ferguson: Community-based or cash-register justice? Criminal Justice, 33(1), 14–22.

24 Vill. of Sister Bay v. Hockers, 317 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).

25 State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 201 N.W.2d 778, 781 n.1 (Wis. 1972).

26 Vill. of Sister Bay, 317 N.W.2d at 508.

27 State ex rel. Pedersen, 201 N.W.2d at 784.

28 U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015.

29 Wilson, J. J. (2018, May 21). Federal court approves historic consent decree ending “policing for profit” in Pagedale, Mo. [press release]. Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice. https://ij.org/press-release/federal-court-approves-historic-consent-decree-ending-policing-for-profit-in-pagedale-mo/; Karins, J. (2018, May 30). Pagedale agrees to consent decree to stop frivolously and illegally ticketing residents. The St. Louis American. http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/pagedale-agrees-to-consent-decree-to-stop-frivolously-and-illegally/article_c8fb8060-6443-11e8-a01b-8b545946b9c7.html; Mitchell, T. (2018, May 24). Lawsuit says Doraville budget relies too heavily on fines. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt–politics/lawsuit-says-doraville-budget-relies-too-heavily-fines/6Ff8riVSV9hR6XOWFuRGuM/; Mitchell, T. (2019, Apr. 4). Judge: Lawsuit aginst Doraville over tickets, fees can continue. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt–politics/judge-lawsuit-against-doraville-over-tickets-fees-can-continue/Ox9nDMs5frOgSS5QXAfk8K/

30 Hummel, D. (2015). Traffic tickets: Public safety concerns or budget building tools. Administration and Society, 47(3), 298–319; Makowsky, M. D., & Stratmann, T. (2009). Political economy at any speed: What determines traffic citations? The American Economic Review, 99(1), 509–527.

31 Hunter, G. (2009, Feb. 1). More tickets in hard times. Car and Driver. http://www.caranddriver.com/features/a15148830/more-tickets-in-hard-times/

32 Hunter, 2009.

33 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983). See also Shaer, M. (2019, Jan. 13). The new debtors’ prison. The New York Times Magazine, p. 34.

34 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 664; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398–99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242–43 (1970).

35 Shaer, 2019.

36 https://ij.org/case/doraville-ticketing/; https://ij.org/case/charlestown-property-rights/; https://ij.org/case/chicago-impound/;https://ij.org/case/dunedin-foreclosure/;https://ij.org/case/indio-fines/;https://ij.org/case/norco-ca-enforcement-fees/; https://ij.org/case/pagedale-municipal-fines/

37 Goldstein, R., Sances, M. W., & You, H. Y. (2018). Exploitative revenues, law enforcement, and the quality of government service. Urban Affairs Review; Robinson, M. W. (2017). Fines: The folly of conflating the power to fine with the power to tax. Villanova Law Review, 62, 925–951; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2017.

38 Citrin, J., & Muste, C. (1999). Trust in government. In Robinson, J. P., Shaver, P. R., & Wrightsman, L. S. (Eds.), Measures of social psychological attitudes: Vol. 2. Measures of political attitudes (pp. 465–532). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

39 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2017.

40 Goldstein et al., 2018; Robinson, 2017.

41 Robinson, 2017.

42 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2017; Kopf, 2016.

43 Institute for Justice. (Forthcoming 2020). Municipal fines and fees: A 50-state survey of state laws. Arlington, VA

44 Stake, R. E. (1995). The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Yin, R. K. (1989). Case study research: Design and methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

45 The city descriptions in this section combine observations we made during fieldwork in the cities in the summer of 2018 and details from other sources.

46 GeorgiaInfo. (n.d., b). Morrow, Georgia. https://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/topics/historical_markers/county/clayton/morrow-georgia; GeorgiaInfo. (n.d., a). City of Morrow. https://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/topics/cities/morrow; City of Morrow (n.d., a). About the city of Morrow, Georgia. https://www.cityofmorrow.com/aboutmorrow.asp

47 Mutzabaugh, B. (2019, Mar. 13). The world’s busiest airport? Yep, it’s still Atlanta …. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2019/03/13/worlds-busiest-airport-atlantas-hartsfield-jackson-top-yet-again/3151729002/

48 These statistics were posted in Morrow’s city hall when we conducted our fieldwork.

49 Clayton State University. (n.d.). Fast facts. https://www.clayton.edu/about/fast-facts

50 U.S. Census Bureau. (n.d., c). QuickFacts: Morrow city, Georgia. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/morrowcitygeorgia

51 U.S. Census Bureau (n.d., b). QuickFacts: Georgia. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ga

52 U.S. Census Bureau. (n.d., e). QuickFacts: United States. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/SEX255217

53 U.S. Census Bureau, n.d., c.

54 Green, J. (2017, Mar. 9). Will the abandoned Olde Towne Morrow be revived? Atlanta. https://www.atlantamagazine.com/news-culture-articles/will-abandoned-olde-towne-morrow-revived/

55 Yeomans, C. (2011, Oct. 31). ‘Olde Towne’ looms over Morrow mayoral race. Clayton News-Daily. https://www.news-daily.com/news/olde-towne-looms-over-morrow-mayoral-race/article_45a6edcb-c34e-5d52-a105-485f93e61c44.html

56 Kemp, R. (2019, Apr. 30). Olde Towne Morrow could become SWAT training ground. Clayton News-Daily. https://www.news-daily.com/features/olde-towne-morrow-could-become-swat-training-ground/article_aa34592a-66a1-11e9-af88-0385610ae5b3.html

57 We obtained city crime data through an open records request filed with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation in May 2018. The percentages we report in text do not include simple assaults. We excluded these to ensure consistency with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program. Total crime rates with and without simple assaults for Morrow are as follows:

With Simple Assaults Without Simple Assaults 2012 17.1% 16.3% 2013 14.0% 13.5% 2014 12.1% 11.3% 2015 10.4% 9.7% 2016 11.5% 10.8% 2017 10.8% 10.0%

58 Simmons, 2014a.

59 Morrow did not report finance data for FY2015, so the 17% figure does not include that year.

60 Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services. (2018). Financial assessment of sources and uses of municipal court fines. Washington, DC. For this study, we engaged the consulting firm Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services to analyze the three sample cities’ finances. The firm provided the results to us in a November 2018 report.

61 Morrow: May 21, 2015, Special called meeting minutes; July 12, 2016, Regular meeting minutes.

62 Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services, 2018.

63 Eisenberg, R. (2018, Oct. 22). The next retirement crisis: America’s public pensions. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2018/10/22/the-next-retirement-crisis-americas-public-pensions/#14223f5226f2

64 Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services, 2018.

65 Riverdale, Georgia. (n.d., b). History. https://www.riverdalega.gov/136/History

66 U.S. Census Bureau. (n.d., d). QuickFacts: Riverdale city, Georgia. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/riverdalecitygeorgia

67 U.S. Census Bureau, n.d., b.

68 U.S. Census Bureau, n.d., e.

69 U.S. Census Bureau, n.d., d.

70 U.S. Census Bureau, n.d., b.

71 U.S. Census Bureau, n.d., e.

72 We obtained city crime data through an open records request filed with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation in May 2018. The percentages we report in text do not include simple assaults. We excluded these to ensure consistency with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program. Total crime rates with and without simple assaults for Riverdale are as follows:

With Simple Assaults Without Simple Assaults 2012 7.6% 6.6% 2013 6.6% 5.9% 2014 7.3% 6.3% 2015 7.7% 7% 2016 6.2% 5.7% 2017 8.1% 7.4%

73 Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services, 2018.

74The Promenade: The birth of a Town Center project. (n.d.). Riverdale, GA. http://www.riverdalega.gov/DocumentCenter/View/379/THE-PROMENADE-The-Birth-of-a-Town-Center-Project-?bidId

75 The city’s OPEB liability was $533,000 as of FY2016, but the actuarial accrued OPEB liability was $909,000 as of July 2015. Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services, 2018. OPEB liability measures benefits a government expects its employees to earn in the future. Actuarial accrued liability includes that plus benefits employees have already earned. Because previously earned benefits can change—for example, when governments improve benefits retroactively—they must be accounted for. Government Accounting Standards Board. (n.d.). Other postemployment benefits: A plain-language summary of GASB statements no. 43 and no. 45. https://www.gasb.org/resources/ccurl/553/517/opeb_summary.pdf

76 Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services, 2018.

77 City of Clarkston. (n.d., b). History. https://clarkstonga.gov/history

78 U.S. Census Bureau. (n.d., a). QuickFacts: Clarkston city, Georgia. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/clarkstoncitygeorgia/PST120218

79 U.S. Census Bureau, n.d., a.

80 U.S. Census Bureau, n.d., b.

81 U.S. Census Bureau, n.d., e.

82 We obtained city crime data through an open records request filed with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation in May 2018. The percentages we report in text do not include simple assaults. We excluded these to ensure consistency with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program. Total crime rates with and without simple assaults for Clarkston are as follows:

With Simple Assaults Without Simple Assaults 2012 3.3% 2.3% 2013 5.9% 3.6% 2014 14.4% 11.3% 2015 6.8% 4.9% 2016 6.1% 4.2% 2017 6.0% 4.5%

83 Belzer, R. S. (2017b, Oct. 30). Clarkston candidates debate issues, personalities. The Champion. http://thechampionnewspaper.com/news/local/clarkston-candidates-debate-issues-personalities/

84 Haney, A. (2019, May 10). Clarkston approves first-of-its-kind tiny home neighborhood. 11 Alive. https://www.11alive.com/article/news/local/clarkston-approves-first-of-its-kind-tiny-home-neighborhood/85-dd8212d9-b7cc-47a5-8ef3-99ab7e73640a. The neighborhood will be developed by MicroLife Institute, an Atlanta-based nonprofit that works to promote tiny home communities. The development is intended to increase much-needed housing opportunities in the city, but a recent analysis suggests Clarkston’s housing needs could be addressed, in significant part, by changes to the city’s zoning laws to boost housing density and commercial development. In particular, the analysis recommends cutting minimum residential lot sizes in half, raising the maximum building height, and allowing mixed commercial and residential developments on the city’s downtown corridor. Zaiac, N. (2019). Testimony on land use regulation: Clarkston, GA. R Street Institute. https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Clarkston-Land-Use-Policy-Reform.pdf. The analysis, commissioned by a city council member, generated enormous backlash in the community, with some residents worried the rezoning would “harm the city’s character.” The negative response owed, in part, to the analysis’s source, the right-of-center think tank the R Street Institute; Clarkston is known for its left-of-center climate. In response, Clarkston’s mayor announced the city would hire a professional planning firm to study the city’s zoning laws and make “expert” recommendations. Capelouto, J. D. (2019, May 23). Right-leaning think tank’s idea to shrink city’s lots draws backlash. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. https://www.ajc.com/news/local/right-leaning-think-tank-plan-shrink-lots-draws-backlash/My6Y69UsXI3WH8Z15Q9rfM/

85 Long, K. (2017, May 24). This small town in America’s Deep South welcomes 1,500 refugees a year. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/24/clarkston-georgia-refugee-resettlement-program

86 Shaer, M. (2017, Jan. 19). Ellis Island South: Welcome to the most diverse square mile in America. Atlanta. https://www.atlantamagazine.com/great-reads/ellis-island-south-welcome-diverse-square-mile-america/; Belzer, R. S. (2017a, Sep. 15). Clarkston mayor seeks four more years. The Champion. http://thechampionnewspaper.com/news/local/clarkston-mayor-seeks-four-more-years/

87 City of Clarkston. (n.d., c). Interesting facts. https://www.clarkstonga.gov/interesting-facts

88 Butler, K. (2018, Oct. 23). Can Georgia’s “hipster mayor” help America embrace refugees again? Mother Jones. https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/10/clarkston-georgia-hipster-mayor-queer-eye-ted-terry-america-refugees/; Belzer, 2017a. Terry’s progressive policies have garnered a great deal of media coverage praising the city and even secured him—and the city—a feature in a popular Netflix show. Tran, C. (2018, Aug. 3). What happens when a Georgia mayor gets a Queer Eye makeover. CityLab. https://www.citylab.com/life/2018/08/what-happens-when-a-georgia-mayor-gets-a-queer-eye-makeover/566441/

89 Butler, 2018.

90 Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services, 2018.

91 City of Clarkston. (2018, May 4.) City of Clarkston hosts Streetscape Project groundbreaking ceremony; SRTA contributes to project funding [press release]. Clarkston, GA.

92 Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services, 2018.

93 Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services, 2018.

94 Gordon, T. (2012, Dec. 31). State and local budgets and the Great Recession. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/state-and-local-budgets-and-the-great-recession/; Robinson, 2017.

95 Stumm, T. J., & Khan, A. (1996). Effects of utility enterprise fund subsidization on municipal taxes and expenditures. State and Local Government Review, 28(2), 103–113.

96 Afonso, W. (2017). Local sales tax laws: State by state details. http://afonso.web.unc.edu/files/2017/05/local-sales-tax-laws-1.pdf

97 Robinson, 2017.

98 Additionally, Riverdale did not report its fines and fees total for 2013. We have therefore imputed that figure using the city’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for that year.

99 Simmons, 2014a.

100 Zoellner, T. (2014, June 2). The Ludowici trap. Oxford American. https://www.oxfordamerican.org/magazine/item/1023-the-ludowici-trap

101 Niesse, M. (2016, Aug. 5). Extra fees added to DeKalb traffic tickets. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt–politics/extra-fees-added-dekalb-traffic-tickets/SNOt6FFBKKq9k80XwN3nSN/

102 Brown, W. (2013, June 12). Police retirement fund, county programs benefit from traffic ticket fines. The Augusta Chronicle. https://www.augustachronicle.com/news/crime-courts/2013-06-12/police-retirement-fund-county-programs-benefit-traffic-ticket-fines

103 Yan, H., & Blackwell, V. (2013, June 26). Atlanta police union defends using traffic tickets to fund pay increases. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/26/justice/atlanta-speeding-ticket-raises/index.html

104 Ga. Code Ann. § 40-14-11(d); Simmons, 2015, 2014a.

105 Gordon, 2012.

106 At least one other author has suggested a similar relationship between the recession and fines and fees revenue trends: Sisson, P. (2018, May 24). How the municipal court money machine burdens city residents. Curbed. https://www.curbed.com/2018/5/24/17382120/tickets-fees-fines-criminal-justice-ferguson

107 Yeomans, C. (2013, Oct. 13). Morrow council candidates address city issues. Clayton News-Daily. https://www.news-daily.com/news/morrow-council-candidates-address-city-issues/article_6fd202d3-acf5-592e-bf88-0024fbe5d9cd.html; O’Brien, C. (2015b, Nov. 6). Next Morrow mayor, Jeff DeTar, hopes to rebuild trust with residents, neighbors. Clayton News-Daily. https://www.news-daily.com/community/next-morrow-mayor-jeff-detar-hopes-to-rebuild-trust-with/article_1eef2932-e2fc-5890-ad9f-342eb9286c4e.html

108 Clarkston: July 7, 2015, Regular meeting minutes.

109 Morrow: Nov. 12, 2013, Mayor and council regular meeting action minutes; Feb. 24, 2015, Work sessions agenda; Mar. 23, 2015, Special called meeting minutes.

110 Riverdale: Apr. 22, 2013, Mayor and council meeting work session minutes.

111 Morrow: Oct. 11, 2016, Work session minutes; Riverdale: Oct. 10, 2016, Work session action minutes. See also Adgie, J. (2016, Oct. 4). Clayton County looks to create enterprise zone. Clayton News-Daily. https://www.news-daily.com/news/clayton-county-looks-to-create-enterprise-zone/article_c4f47f96-310d-5bed-af8c-166cc56d63ab.html

112 Alvarez & Marsal Public Sector Services, 2018.

113 Morrow: Trial balance for July 2011; Trial balance for July 2012; FY 2013 revenues budget and expenditures summary budget; FY2014 budget; FY2015 budget; FY2016 budget; FY2017 budget; Riverdale: Adopted budget for the FY 2012; FY 2013 adopted budget; FY 2014 adopted budget; Annual operating budget fiscal year ended June 30, 2015; Annual operating budget fiscal year ended June 30, 2016; Annual operating budget fiscal year ended June 30, 2017; Clarkston: 2012 adopted operating & capital budget; 2013 adopted operating & enterprise fund budget; 2014 adopted operating & enterprise fund budget; 2015 adopted operating & enterprise fund budget; 2016 proposed operating & enterprise fund budget; 2017 adopted operating & enterprise fund budget.

114 Riverdale: Aug. 12, 2013, Mayor and city council meeting work session minutes; Aug. 12, 2013, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes; Apr. 7, 2015, Budget work session; Clarkston: Apr. 3, 2012, Council meeting minutes; Oct. 1, 2013, Council meeting minutes.

115 Riverdale: June 10, 2013, Mayor and council meeting work session minutes; July 22, 2013, Mayor and council meeting work session minutes; July 22, 2013, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes; Clarkston: June 2, 2015, Council meeting minutes; July 6, 2017, Council meeting minutes.

116 Morrow: June 27, 2017, Meeting minutes.

117 Riverdale: May 28, 2013, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes.

118 Riverdale: Feb. 27, 2012, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes; Mar. 14, 2016, Work session action minutes. See also Jefcoats, K. (2012, June 22). Riverdale’s CRUSH unit works to keep city safe. Clayton News-Daily. https://www.news-daily.com/news/riverdale-s-crush-unit-works-to-keep-city-safe/article_c579cc7d-92f3-5477-85ba-d4e10b5973f9.html

119 Riverdale: May 11, 2015, Mayor and council work session meeting minutes; May 11, 2015, Mayor and council work session action minutes.

120 Clarkston: Feb. 7, 2012, Council meeting minutes; Dec. 6, 2016, Council minutes.

121 Morrow: Apr. 23, 2013, Minutes of regular meeting; Aug. 27, 2013, Minutes of regular meeting; Riverdale: Jan. 27, 2014, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes; July 14, 2014, Mayor and council meeting business minutes. Apr. 10, 2017, Business session action minutes; Clarkston: Sept. 3, 2013, Council meeting minutes; Mar. 7, 2017, Council minutes.

122 Riverdale: Nov. 13, 2017, Work session action minutes; Clarkston: July 3, 2012, Council meeting minutes; July 2, 2013, Council meeting minutes.

123 Morrow: Aug. 27, 2013, Minutes of regular meeting; Riverdale: Jan. 27, 2014, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes; July 14, 2014, Mayor and council meeting business minutes; Nov. 13, 2017, Work session action minutes.

124 Clarkston: Feb. 4, 2014, Council meeting minutes.

125 Morrow: Apr. 24, 2012, Minutes of regular meeting; Sept. 11, 2012, Minutes of regular meeting; Oct. 9, 2012, Minutes of regular meeting; June 25, 2013, Minutes of regular meeting; Sept. 24, 2013, Regular meeting action minutes; Riverdale: Apr. 23, 2012, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes; May 28, 2013, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes; June 10, 2013, Mayor and council meeting work session minutes; Oct. 14, 2013, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes; Nov. 25, 2013, Mayor and council meeting work session minutes; Jan 27, 2014, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes; July 14, 2014, Mayor and council meeting business minutes; Mar. 23, 2015, Mayor and council meeting business minutes; Mar. 23, 2015, Mayor and council work session meeting minutes; Dec. 14, 2015, Work session action meeting minutes; July 10, 2017, Work session action minutes; Aug. 28, 2017, Work session action minutes; Nov. 13, 2017, Work session action minutes; Clarkston: Feb. 7, 2012, Council meeting minutes; Sept. 4, 2012, Council meeting minutes ; July 2, 2013, Council meeting minutes; Sept. 3, 2013, Council meeting minute; June 2, 2015, Council meeting minutes; Mar. 7, 2017, Council minutes; July 6, 2017, Council meeting minutes.

126 O’Brien, C. (2015a, Oct. 6). Jeff DeTar – Morrow mayoral candidate. Clayton News-Daily. https://www.news-daily.com/community/jeff-detar—morrow-mayoral-candidate/article_054d9d4b-8ef1-5209-ac47-91e0c0269dca.html

127 Riverdale: May 28, 2013, Mayor and council meeting business session minutes.

128 Riverdale: Feb. 23, 2015, Mayor and council business session minutes.

129 Riverdale: Apr. 22, 2013, Mayor and council meeting work session minutes.

130 Clarkston: Feb. 7, 2012, Council meeting minutes.

131 These observations occurred from July 31 to August 8, 2018, in Morrow and Riverdale and from August 5 to 10, 2018, in Clarkston.

132 These observations occurred from July 31 to August 8, 2018, in Morrow and Riverdale and from August 5 to 10, 2018, in Clarkston.

133 Thompson, L. (2016, July 6). High hopes for Clarkston’s marijuana ordinance. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt–politics/high-hopes-for-clarkston-marijuana-ordinance/cODE7cmyzgVEb16makQoTK/

134 In Clarkston, the “no contest” plea was presented as “nolo contendere,” a Latin term with the potential to confuse defendants.

135 These observations occurred during August 2018.

136 Not every city in Georgia has its own municipal court. Cities both comparable in size to the sample cities and with their own courts averaged 63 across the five years covered in this table. This is an average because court data were not always available for every city for every year. The number of comparison cities with their own courts ranged from 52 in 2013 to 73 in 2014.

137 City of Morrow. (n.d., b) City of Morrow CAFR (annual financials). https://www.cityofmorrow.com/government-mayorcouncil-financialreports.asp; Riverdale, Georgia. (n.d., a) Budgets. http://www.riverdalega.gov/159/Annual-Budgets; City of Clarkston. (n.d., a). Budgets. http://clarkstonga.gov/financial-documents/546; Ga. Code Ann. §§ 15-21A-6(b)–10.1(b), 36-32-7(b). Under state law, certain fees are also designated for special funds, such as the Peace Officers’ Annuity and Benefit Fund (Ga. Code Ann. § 47-17-60) or the Sheriffs’ Retirement Fund (Ga. Code Ann. § 47-16-60).

138 Ga. Code Ann. § 36-32-2(a).

139 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 36-32-2, pt. 1 § 2.1; Morrow, Ga. Code of Ordinances pt. I § 4.11(b), (d); Riverdale, Ga. Code of Ordinances pt. I § 23; Clarkston, Ga. Code of Ordinances pt. I § 3.04.

140 J. F. (2014, Jan. 20). A judicially sanctioned extortion racket. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2014/01/20/a-judicially-sanctioned-extortion-racket

141 Cook, R. (2014, Jan. 18). Spotlight falls on private probation companies over fees, supervision. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. https://www.ajc.com/news/crime–law/spotlight-falls-private-probation-companies-over-fees-supervision/RpFbLaD9tsQN9yp43xLWXN/; Cohen. A. (2014, Jan. 21). Georgia’s debtors’ prisons belong in a Dickens novel. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/01/georgias-debtors-prisons-belong-in-a-dickens-novel/283204/

142 J. F., 2014.

143 CSG Justice Center Staff. (2017, May 10). Georgia governor signs bill to strengthen probation and increase public safety. The Council of State Governments Justice Center. https://csgjusticecenter.org/jr/georgia/posts/georgia-governor-signs-bill-to-strengthen-probation-and-increase-public/; Harvell, S., Warnberg, C., & Thomson, C. (2019, Apr.). Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI): Georgia [factsheet]. Urban Institute. https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/jri-factsheet-ga.pdf

144 CSG Justice Center Staff, 2017.

145 CSG Justice Center Staff, 2017.

146 Elsewhere in the report, we compare the sample cities to cities of like size. We were unable to do so here because probation data use a different unit of analysis than the financial data used in the report. The unit for probations is court, while for finances it is cities.

147 Cities like Morrow and Clarkston that use private probation companies still receive fines revenue. Of the total amount probationers pay, the probation company receives fees (e.g., for supervision or courses), the state receives fees (e.g., for the Peace Officers’ Annuity and Benefit Fund and the Crime Victim’s Emergency Fund) and the respective cities receive fines. Freidlin, A. (2017, Apr. 19). The poor shouldn’t pay for punishment. Slate. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/04/georgias-pay-only-system-funded-government-at-the-expense-of-the-poor.html

148 We imputed fines revenue for Morrow in 2015 and Riverdale in 2013 using the cities’ Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports.

149 Teegardin, C. (2016a, Feb. 15). Can traffic court grab my tax refund? Yes, it can [Blog post]. https://www.ajc.com/blog/investigations/can-traffic-court-grab-tax-refund-yes-can/MyW1TG6ENzgoqqaLMF0W6O; Teegardin, C. (2016b, Feb. 15). Georgia traffic courts taking a bite out of tax refunds [Blog post]. https://www.ajc.com/news/crime–law/georgia-traffic-courts-taking-bite-out-tax-refunds/CoHjEwRntiGTm2yN6R7v2N/

150 Wallace, L. R. (2019, Mar. 18). In this small Georgia city, an unpaid court fine can get your utilities cut off. Rewire.News. https://rewire.news/article/2019/03/18/in-this-small-georgia-city-an-unpaid-court-fine-can-get-your-utilities-cut-off/

151 Locke, J. (2013). Two treatises of government. The Federalist Papers Project. https://www.thefederalistpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Two-Treatises-of-Government-by-John-Locke.pdf (Original work published 1689)

152 Clarkston, Ga. Code of Ordinances pt. § I 7-1(b).

153 Morrow, Ga. Code of Ordinances §§ 8-6-22(i)(1), 8-4-28; Riverdale, Ga. Code of Ordinances §§ 30-178(h)(2), 30-184(h)(1), 30-213(i)(1), 38-26, 70-72(e)(1); Clarkston, Ga. Code of Ordinances §§ 5-171, 22-2(c), 22-96(b).

154 Morrow, Ga. Code of Ordinances § 2-4-9.

155 The DOJ’s 2015 report on Ferguson, Missouri, included examples of how police officers were told promotions and raises depended on “productivity,” which was defined as issuing citations. For instance, a patrol supervisor wrote to his patrol lieutenants and sergeants that “[t]he monthly self-initiated activity totals just came out,” and they “may want to advise [their] officers who may be interested in the open detective position that one of the categories to be considered when deciding on the eligibility list will be self-initiated activity.” The supervisor also wrote: “Have any of you heard comments such as, why should I produce when I know I’m not getting a raise? Well, some people are about to find out why.” U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015.

156 Goldstein et al., 2018. In the municipal context, social control refers to the means by which cities compel residents to adhere to social, legal and behavioral norms and curtail disruption and deviance. Although social control has been viewed as a positive mechanism for ensuring stable and functional communities, it also takes on discriminatory forms when it is used to target “disorder” in poor or minority communities. Soss, J., Fording, R. C., & Schram, S. F. (2008). The color of devolution: Race, federalism, and the politics of social control. American Journal of Political Science, 52(3), 536–553.

157 Gershtenson, J., & Plane, D. L. (2007). Trust in government: 2006 American national election studies pilot report; Pew Research Center. (2013). March 2013 political survey. Washington, DC; Saguaro Seminar. (2000). 2000 social capital community benchmark survey. Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

158 Clarkston’s results departed from those of the other cities in two respects. First, Clarkston citation recipients reported greater levels of trust in court judges than did nonrecipients. Based on our interviews of Clarkston residents, it appears dissatisfaction with the city’s fines and fees behavior may manifest itself in distrust more of the police than the court and its judges. For example, when we asked one resident why he had received a code enforcement citation, he said, “I just think in a small town like the one I live in, they run out of things to do.” But when asked about his experience paying the fine in court, he told us he felt the court was very professional and efficient. Similarly, a resident who had received a traffic ticket told us he believed police pursue citations in order to benefit themselves financially. He said, “In Clarkston … the police here look for any and everything to give someone a ticket. I’m sure that’s how they get paid, bonuses or whatever. They’re really on the hunt. Even if it’s not anything major, they’ll hunt you down for it.” And second, Clarkston citation recipients also reported greater levels of trust in elected officials compared to nonrecipients. This may reflect the popularity of Clarkston’s mayor. The head of the executive branch (e.g., the mayor or governor) is often a government’s most recognizable elected official, so people responding to a question about elected officials are likely expressing an opinion about the holder of that office. In this case, Clarkston’s mayor was reelected with almost 60% of the votes in the year prior to our survey. DeKalb County. (2017, Nov. 17). Election summary report. https://www.dekalbcountyga.gov/sites/default/files/user305/2017%20MUNI%20%26%20SE%20ELECTION%20SUMMARY.pdf

159 Here, too, Clarkston’s results differed somewhat from those of the other cities. Clarkston citation recipients were more likely to say they trusted the court to be fair and to do what is best for the city.

160 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2017.

161 Goldstein et al., 2018; Robinson, 2017.

162 Robinson, 2017.

163 Coleman, D. (2014, Oct. 31). Traffic ticket fines add up to big bucks for Chatham County cities. Savannah Morning News. https://www.savannahnow.com/news/2014-10-31/traffic-ticket-fines-add-big-bucks-chatham-county-cities; Hunt, A. (2015, Sep. 11). Are citations, and revenue, up in Atlanta? PolitiFact. https://www.politifact.com/georgia/statements/2015/sep/11/reader-email/are-citations-and-revenue-atlanta/; Simmons, 2014a, 2015; Teegardin, 2016a, b.

164 Coleman, 2014; Hunt, 2015; Simmons, 2014a, 2015; Teegardin, 2016a, b.

165 Makowsky, M. D., & Stratmann, T. (2011). More tickets, fewer accidents: How cash-strapped towns make for safer roads. Journal of Law and Economics, 54(4), 863–888.

166 Robinson, 2017.

167 Bunch, B. S., & Strauss, R. P. (1992). Municipal consolidation: An analysis of the financial benefits for fiscally distressed small municipalities. Urban Affairs Quarterly, 27(4), 615–629; Selden, S. C., & Campbell, R. W. (2000). The expenditure impacts of unification in a small Georgia county: A contingency perspective of city-county consolidation. Public Administration Quarterly, 24(2), 169–201.

168 Bailey, J. B., & Thomas, D. W. (2017). Regulating away competition: The effect of regulation on entrepreneurship and employment. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 52(3), 237–254; Klapper, L., Laeven, L., & Rajan, R. (2006). Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial Economics, 82(3), 591–629.

169 Quigley, J. M., & Raphael, S. (2005). Regulation and the high cost of housing in California. American Economic Review, 95(2), 323–328.

170 Ihlanfeldt, K. R. (2004). Exclusionary land-use regulations within suburban communities: A review of the evidence and policy prescriptions. Urban Studies, 41(2), 261–283.

171 Robinson, 2017.

172 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2017.

173 Stake, 1995; Yin, 1989.

About the Authors

Dr. Dick Carpenter is a director of strategic research at the Institute for Justice. He works with IJ staff and attorneys to define, implement and manage social science research related to the Institute’s mission. His work has appeared in academic journals such as Economic Development Quarterly, Economic Affairs, The Forum, Fordham Urban Law Journal, International Journal of Ethics, Education and Urban Society, Urban Studies, and Regulation and Governance, as well as magazines including Regulation, Phi Delta Kappan and the American School Board Journal. His research results have also been quoted in such newspapers as the New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal. Carpenter’s research for IJ has resulted in reports including License to Work: A National Study of Burdens from Occupational Licensing, 2nd ed., Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, 2nd ed., Designing Cartels: How Industry Insiders Cut Out Competition, Victimizing the Vulnerable: The Demographics of Eminent Domain Abuse, Disclosure Costs: Unintended Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform and Private Choice in Public Programs: How Private Institutions Secure Social Services for Georgians. He is also co-author of Bottleneckers: Gaming the Government for Power and Private Profit. Before joining IJ, Carpenter worked as a school teacher and principal, public policy analyst, and faculty member at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs, where he currently serves as a professor. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Colorado.

Kyle Sweetland is a researcher at the Institute for Justice, where he provides research and analysis on issues central to the Institute’s mission. He is a co-author of the second edition of IJ’s License to Work report as well as an article in the academic journal Economic Affairs titled “The Continuing Burden of Occupational Licensing in the United States.” Prior to joining IJ, Sweetland participated in the Young Leaders Program at the Heritage Foundation. He holds a bachelor’s in business economics and public policy from Indiana University Southeast.

Jennifer McDonald is a senior research analyst at the Institute for Justice, where she conducts original social science research as part of the strategic research team. Her work has appeared in the academic journals Economic Affairs and Food Policy, and her research results have been cited in national media outlets such as the Washington Post, New York Times, Politico and Los Angeles Times. Her research is featured in IJ reports on civil forfeiture, government transparency, occupational licensing and home-based businesses. She also works closely with IJ’s litigation team on cases involving the federal Freedom of Information Act and other public records laws. Prior to joining IJ, McDonald worked in California politics. She holds a Master of Public Administration, with emphases on management and economic policy, from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a bachelor’s degree in history with a political science minor from California State University San Marcos.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the following individuals for their contributions. Anthony Ward extracted and formatted voluminous amounts of data used in the study. Ricard Pochkhanawala analyzed the three cities’ codes to determine the extent to which they protect citizens’ rights. Mindy Menjou provided expert editing and guidance in production. Nathalie Walker created the sharp and engaging report design.

This publication was made possible through the support of Arnold Ventures. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Arnold Ventures.