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The Houthi family hierarchy and military chain of command remain unclear to both governments and analysts. The Yemeni government, according to the party orientation of source one contacts, has a particular view of each depending on the issue being discussed. A number of Houthi-aligned officials and military officers are related to military officers of the National Army under President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi or their rivals in the Sunni Islamist party al-Islah. It’s a complicated thing.

Adding to the already complicated matter, there is the debate over whether the Sana’a-based rebels should be referred to as Houthis, followers or supporters of the family leading the insurgency against the Saleh Regime and the coup of September 2014, or Ansar Allah (used ‘officially’ prior to start of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) for the first time, it is not a legal name of any registered entity in Yemen, not a Constitutionally recognized organization/group) ), the so-called political apparatus as adopted for the delegation to the NDC in 2013. The latter label is often used by observers as an umbrella, due to the fact many non-Zaydis, some former Socialists along with members of the GPC have joined the ranks under the leadership of the Al Houthi family. The latter being a Hashimi (Sayyid) family and not a tribe, who claim their role as leaders of all Zaydis by way of two justifications: a claim of marriage relation with the last Zaydi Imamate in Yemen under the Hamid al-Din, and by way of an Imam from the Houthi lineage in the 1800s. Both giving this Hashimi/Sayyid family a right to rise (Khuruj), and lead against the despot, corrupt leader or government, which was the original justification for the 2004 uprising under Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, joining protests in 2011 against Saleh and the coup of September 2014 (NOTE, there’s been NO Da’wa, or CALL to follow as claimant of Imamate).

One of the most notable members of Ansar Allah, and example of the diversity under this umbrella group, was journalist Ali al-Bukhaity. He was part of the Ansar Allah delegation at the NDC, then became one of their most outspoken rivals. His relatives remain staunch supporters of the Houthi family, like Mohammed al-Bukhayti (brother), Hamed al-Bukhayti and Hussein al-Bukhayti (son-in-law to Mohammed al-Makaleh: from a Qadhi family in Ibb, related to Bayt al-Ruwaishan). Ansar Allah gathers Zaydis and non-Zaydis from Sa’dah to Taiz, al-Baydha, al-Dhale, and even some Hashimis from Abyan province. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths has opted to use the label Ansar Allah in reference to the Sana’a-based rebels, a slight departure from his predecessors who saw no problem using the label Houthis, especially since they were both Arabic speakers. Ansar Allah forms part of this evolution of organizations or institutions under the banner of Zaydi Islam in search for public or international recognition, during more than five decades of an absence of a legitimate Imam. From the imamate (officially ends in 1967) to early attempts by Mohammed al-Zubayri to establish Hezb Allah, to the rise of Hezb al-Haq, the Believing Youth in Sa’dah (1990s) and the impact of the six wars (2004-2010).

My perspective is, that even though Al Houthi (the family, not to say THE Houthi) aim to represent the whole of the Zaydi Umma, they are the family leading the current insurgency and aim at retaining influence over the political future of all Yemen, long term. Ansar Allah is merely a façade to take away from this reality, to remove the idea of a family-led insurgency and present an image of a ‘movement’ well rooted in Yemeni society (not just the north). The family rejects the idea of forming a political party, tried and failed with al-Haq, simply because parties (say institutions) are difficult to control. Ansar Allah is a pillar supporting the family, as are militias and tribal alliances. Unfortunately, such support relies on reciprocal relations based on: the legitimate opposition to central government (as directed by vested interests of each party) and patronage or access to economic resources (works for militia commanders and tribal shaykhs).

Below is an overview of the Houthi hierarchy, the overt hierarchy that we can point to. Many Hashimi families of higher rank support Al Houthi’s insurgency, as it serves their overall goals in Yemeni politics and society but are also threatened as the conflict prolongs. Abd al-Malek Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his uncle Abd al-Kareem Amir al-Din al-Houthi have placed a number of Hashimis from Sa’dah in key positions, often replacing higher ranked Hashimis with extensive employment history in government and established historical presence since the era of the Imamate. This has created tension among Hashimis in Sana’a, as well as in the exterior. Sa’dah Hashimis are loyal to Al Houthi, not only for protection in Sa’dah but also for the new economic opportunities granted since the 2014 coup. Many of the higher ranked Hashimis were loyal to Saleh, their families had been pillars of al-Jumhuri State since the revolution of 1962. The placing of Sa’dah Hashimis in key government posts or as mushrefeen (supervisors) also represents an extension of the Sa’dah wars into Sana’a, a ‘real’ take over beyond mere physical military presence. These Sa’dah Hashimis also worked to remove all GPC influence over government institutions, rejected by Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2016, later led to the conflict that ignited in April 2017 leading to his execution in December 2017.

There is a second tier, a hierarchy that includes the tribal and militia leaders conducting the war effort along various fronts. While Hashid tribes facilitated the fight against Salafis from Dammaj and Islah in 2013, these tribes have been partly marginalized due to their relations with Ali Abdullah Saleh and current Vice President Ali Muhsin. Soon after Saleh’s death, Houthis began a shift toward Bakil confederation, marked by the appointment of Sadeq Amin Abu Ras as new leader of the GPC in Sana’a. Bakil has risen in strength throughout Amran (home to Bayt al-Ahmar, former leaders of al-Islah party and leaders of Hashid Confederation), al-Jawf and western Mareb. Bakil also has a historical presence around Ibb and Taiz. Militia commanders tend to be from Sa’dah or close associates of Houthi leaders like Yahya ‘Abu Ali’ al-Hakem and Mohammed Ali al-Houthi. Some military commanders, many Zaydis, formerly loyal to Saleh also climbed the ladder under Houthi patronage. It is difficult to point out particular individuals in this tier because many are merely known for their kunyah (nickname) and identified regionally by their spoken Arabic. This makes it difficult for any analyst to dig deeper into the hierarchy and group network.

In addition to the list of personalities below, there are also: Hisham Sharaf al-Din (Hashimi) MoFA, Ibrahim al-Dailamy (new Ambassador in Iran), Hussein al-Izzy (MOFA), who play a major public role.

(yes, notice how I skipped that whole ‘Iran-supported’ line here….we’ll leave that for another day)

FC.