Skilfully manipulating perceptions, Iran is exploiting a heavy-handed US strategy to strengthen its position at home and abroad. But will that be enough to avert new conflict?

Red-bellied black snake in Museums Victoria Collections Museums Victoria Staff

Since the recent buildup of US force levels in the Middle East, some observers have characterised the Iranian response as that of a turbaned peasant blowing his horn, taming the US cobra and astounding the worried onlookers. Others evoke a judo master, turning the weight of the opponent into a disadvantage. Whether strategic brilliance, or merely an abundance of chutzpah, Iran’s skilful manipulation campaign may delay and perhaps avoid armed conflict in the region.

Tensions between the two long-time adversaries have been rising since President Donald Trump pulled out of the nuclear deal in 2018. But prospects of a full-fledged military conflagration seemed more likely with the announcement this month that the US would deploy more warships and bombers to the Middle East, prompted by intelligence warning of imminent Iranian attacks on US interests. Soon after the warning, a sub-surface attack struck oil tankers in the United Arab Emirates, a drone attacked a Saudi pipeline and a Katyusha rocket exploded near the US embassy in Baghdad.

Although their words were laden with threats, both sides insisted they did not want war. Top US officials kept repeating they did not seek armed conflict but would attack if provoked. The Iranians essentially responded ‘go ahead and try, we’ve been ready for this since 1979’. This rhetorical tit-for-tat seems to have been won by the Iranians, shrewdly claiming these attacks were a modern-day Gulf of Tonkin incident, providing justification for an American response. For now, we should expect to see similar accusations and counter-accusations as the near-term battles are likely to be fought not with weapons but words. On that battlefront, the Iranians are both skilled and shrewd.

A war of perceptions

Beyond these recent incidents, the rhetoric of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton has been characterised as ‘sabre rattling’ — and even warmongering.

In Iran and elsewhere in the world — except perhaps in Saudi Arabia — this rhetoric has played straight into the hands of the Iranian government, which comes across not only as a measured voice of reason, but also as a persecuted victim. It is a far cry from the ‘America is the Great Satan / Death to America’ days; their current language of ‘we will stand up to the Americans and defeat them’ rings hollow, and even arouses pity among their target audience.

What Americans have painted as provocative activities by Iran — drone, rocket and undersea attacks — has been described as ‘baiting’ by the Iranians, who imply these are false flag operations intended to goad them — or their proxy groups — into retaliatory action. As one former Iraqi minister said, clearly showing the strength of the Iranian argument, ‘I personally believe that the Iranians have little choice now but to escalate.... [and] force the Americans to contemplate a ground invasion, which would be a political and military nightmare. Iranians will rally around their government.’

The decline of American popularity and credibility in the Middle East region is partly due to bungled messaging, of which the recent standoff with Iran is but the most recent example. While the Americans say ‘We don’t want war’, television screens are filled with aircraft carriers, B52s and troops on the ground. The conflicting messages coming from Bolton and Pompeo on one hand and Trump on the other demonstrate an old maxim of advertising: ‘The worst kind of messaging is confused messaging.’ The Iranians, for their part, have been skilful in amplifying the mixed US messaging while remaining markedly consistent in theirs.

And, while the threat of a US-Iran war may be on hold for now, the challenge extends beyond the Gulf into Iraq. The US has struggled to ‘push back’ on Iran’s expanding presence in Iraq for years, and part of the problem lies in the messaging. For example, there was Trump’s ham-handed comment in a televised interview on 3 February describing America’s ‘incredible base’ in Iraq from which ‘to be able to watch Iran’. That provoked an immediate and almost universal rebuke from Baghdad. Since those comments, the Iraqis have reopened the debate on whether to allow US troops to remain now that the threat from ISIS is mitigated. Trump, by shining a light on the US troops, put their future in question. The Iranians, without doubt, reacted with glee at this unforced error.

The post-ISIS battle for influence in Iraq is also affected by the rhetoric. America’s military-centric approach has been less successful in winning the hearts and minds of average Iraqis than Iran’s focus on day-to-day needs from fresh produce to natural gas and automobiles.

While Americans are perceived to seek some measure of gratitude for the billions they’ve spent in liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein and later ISIS, the Iranians play the brotherhood card, using words like ‘commonalities’, ‘historical affinities’ and ‘cooperation’. Simply put, the Iranians say they want to help, and Iraqis are grateful. The US says it wants to use Iraq as a listening post, and Iraqis are incensed. After the Trump comment, Iraqi President Barham Salih sent a clear message to the US: ‘Don’t burden Iraq with your issues.’

For Farhad Alaaldin, chairman of the Iraq Advisory Council and former political advisor to President Fuad Masum, the American ‘maximum pressure’ campaign is eliciting even more sympathy for Iran. ‘Many Iraqis feel the pain of Iranian people who are suffering the sanctions, given that [Iraqis] have endured tough sanctions two decades ago and know the effects of such action on ordinary people.’ Such views among Iraqis may be surprising, given that many painfully suffered during the brutal eight-year war with Iran.

Winning the battle, losing the war

The US has held a poor record in the perception wars for years. Whether in Vietnam, Iraq or now in the Arab-Persian Gulf, its adversaries abroad and its own citizens remain highly suspect of the Leviathan’s motives, purposes or even its credibility. During the cold war, even the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles to Europe created massive protests, although these weapons — unlikely to be used — were directly responsible for tipping a faltering Soviet Union over the edge.

Much of this is natural disdain. The size, strength and capability of the US, especially its military, attract legions of critics. Everyone loves the underdog; everyone admires a David fighting Goliath. Even the Spartans were admired for standing up to the then-massive Persian army. By this measure, the US starts any conflict at a disadvantage — especially against a country such as Iran.

‘This [current] conflict is not just an Iranian-American conflict. In many ways, it is a conflict between the US and its allies on one side, and Iran and its allies on the other side. Right now, it is a show of flexing muscles and imposing wills,’ said Dhiaa al-Asadi, political representative of Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

But either side risks winning the battle but losing the war. For the United States, its messaging has achieved some small measure of success. Despite significant opposition to armed conflict, the US seems to have reached agreement among its allies that Iran should not be allowed to pursue a nuclear weapons programme nor allow its Quds force to continue what the US calls ‘malign activities’ in the region.

Despite those small wins, Iran seems to occupy the rhetorical high ground. Through its control of the message, Iranians paint the US as an aggressor, a bully, and a warmonger inciting provocations and false flag operations to achieve its goal of regime change. The best metric of Iran’s success may be the absence of coalition support for the US forces’ buildup. The Gulf is filling with aircraft carriers, and neighbouring countries are filling with bombers and troops, and those ships and jets wear US uniform. While there is concern over Iran’s possible ‘malign activities’, there is no unanimity on a military solution.

Some dispute the role of messaging. Alaaldin rejects the assertion that the Iranian government has ‘cleverly manipulated’ the narrative to its advantage. In his view, ‘it is a genuine feeling with no manipulation.’ He said: ‘There is genuine concern that Iraq would be in the centre of any war that could break out and it is difficult to predict how Iraq can come out of it intact.’

For now, we can expect more rhetorical swordfights between the US and Iran. As for the snake charmer, he seems to have the cobra under control and his supporters in admiration of his skills. But the US cobra is dangerous; it seems fixated on demonstrating its readiness for a military battle and less concerned on winning over hearts and minds. While a skilled messaging campaign is important, if the Iranians think that messaging alone will deter the cobra, they should rethink that assumption. Ayatollah Khomeini once referred to the US as ‘the wounded snake’. It is wise to remember that no matter how wounded the snake, how skilled the snake charmer, even the best charmers get bitten.