I've been pretty unfortunate in having been proven correct in my prediction, made just over 14 months ago, that the Congressional subpoena power we were being promised was coming with a Democratic majority would be frontally attacked by the Bush "administration's" refusal to prosecute contempt charges.

Was it really that good of a prediction, though? Not really. After all, all I did was ask questions about the assumptions we were making regarding the subpoena power. Specifically, what were the mechanics of it? So I did a little Googling, and found this at what was, at the time, the Wikipedia page for contempt of Congress:

In order to be convicted of contempt of Congress, the congressional committee subject to the contempt first reports a resolution that the affected individual is guilty of contempt. This takes a majority vote of the committee. The full United States House of Representatives or United States Senate then must approve the resolution, which sends the matter to a federal attorney, who may call a grand jury to decide whether to indict the affected individual, and prosecute if the grand jury affirms an indictment.

Right away, I knew so long as the power to actually punish contempt rested in the hands of the executive, that this "administration" would not permit such charges to go forward. I suppose the only "prediction" involved was that at the time, nobody was talking about the rampant politicization of the US Attorneys' offices, and very few of us were talking about the hints they were dropping about defying judicial orders.

But the point is that all it really took to figure this out was asking myself what had to happen procedurally in order for this "subpoena power" thing to work. As soon as I did, the problems began to present themselves. From then on, it was just a waiting game -- waiting for the "administration" to demonstrate for more eyes what I originally suspected they would do.

So I thought it might pay to turn to another issue with the same sort of questions: the proposals to end the occupation of Iraq by "defunding" it. (To be clear, I do consider them separate issues, though the interests behind them can overlap. I have never been an Iraq impeacher, though I fully understand the motivations of those who are. My interest in seeing Bush impeached arose originally from the NSA spying revelations. So in no sense have I ever considered impeachment and defunding to be competing methods to the same ends.)

The idea most commonly suggested involves the Congress refusing at some future point to consider any new Iraq funding bills, the advantage being that there's no bill to veto, and it requires no affirmative votes -- just the commitment of the requisite number of House or Senate members not to support any effort to bring such a bill to the floor against the will of the leadership (assuming they were on board with the defunding idea).

There seems to be no doubt that this would work, as far as it goes. But how far does it go? That's where we need to be asking questions about the mechanics of funding Defense Department operations. And here's what I found when I did ask: a report by the Congressional Research Service entitled, "A Defense Budget Primer" (PDF)

What does it tell us? Well first, it reminds me that there's more to the budgetary process than Congressional authorization and appropriations. What we really need to find out about is what happens after the Congress says, in this case, that the "administration" is not authorized to spend money on this.

Page 41 seems informative. Under the section describing continuing appropriations resolutions (what Congress passes to keep the federal government operating in the event that the regular appropriations bills are delayed or otherwise left unpassed or unsigned), the report outlines the basics of what happens in the event that no continuing resolution is passed either, and the government is forced into a shutdown:

If Congress fails to pass regular appropriations acts by the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1, DOD (and other affected agencies) can be left with no money to pay personnel, fund daily operations, or execute new contracts. Standing law allows essential government activities, including national security-related functions, to continue even in the absence of funding, but non-essential programs may not continue, and day-to-day agency operations are disrupted.

Can anybody envision this "administration" declining to classify Iraq operations as national security-related?

Does that mean standing law would allow the occupation to continue even in the absence of funding? I don't know the answer to that. But dollars to donuts the "administration" has an answer they want you to believe is definitive, should it become necessary to spring it on us.

Page 39 has more of interest:

While the [appropriations] acts themselves do not specify funding by line item, committee reports on the defense appropriations acts do specify levels of funding at the line item level. Moreover, the military departments provide detailed budget information on programs in "justification" materials presented to Congress, and if appropriations reports do not specifically change the request, Congress assumes that DOD will carry out the programs as requested. In a strict legal sense nothing requires DOD to adhere either to the recommendations in congressional reports or to its own program budget proposals in spending money appropriated by Congress at the line item level. A failure to spend funds in accordance with the detailed justification materials and committee reports, however, could cause Congress to lose confidence in the requests and might result in reduced appropriations or in line item appropriations acts. As a result, DOD procedures require officials to act in accordance with congressional intent, as expressed in the committee reports. [Emphasis added.]

That's something, I guess. But I could see the Pentagon not having any tremendous fear that Democrats are going to cut Defense appropriations in the face of the Worldwide Terra ThreatTM. What do you think?

The third question I have is not directly addressed by the CRS report, and will require more research. But basically it comes down to this: While Congress has the "power of the purse," who actually holds the purse Congress has this power over? It seems to me that in a political atmosphere that supports both the "unitary executive" theory and assertions by the executive of their right to be free of all interference from all other branches of government in exercising the "inherent powers" of the "Commander in Chief," that the conditions are ripe for the assertion that since the Department of the Treasury is a part of that "unitary executive," then the president may well believe he has the "inherent power" to order disbursements in direct defiance of Congressional instructions to the contrary.

Again, I don't know "the answer," but does anyone have confidence anymore that George W. Bush knows how far is too far?