By Michael Breen





The decision by President Moon Jae-in to reconsider the deployment by the U.S. forces Korea of a THAAD battery has prompted commentary in some quarters about how South Korea should re-position itself in relation to the two superpowers.

But the link between the specifics of this missile defense issue to broad strategic questions is fraught with distractions.

The THAAD matter involves three moving parts, each with its own logic. The first concerns the tactical ability, or lack thereof, of the defense system to protect us folk in South Korea against North Korean missiles.

Second is how to respond to the strong objection of China. Given how close we are to Chinese airspace, the Korea-based THAAD tracking system will be able to spot Chinese missiles as well. It is possible that full deployment ― what we have now is just the beginning ― might do this so well as to remove China's first strike capability, thereby neutralizing its nuclear deterrent. Indeed, China sees this as the main U.S. intent. As a measure of its determination to persuade its South Korean friends not to go along with it, Beijing has retaliated economically. This is the diplomatic equivalent of punching below the belt

Third, South Korea is a close military ally of the United States. If the two countries' strategic planners say THAAD is a necessary shield here, civilian leaders in Seoul have to take note. They must also not forget that, as the system is operated by U.S. troops (and is also for their own protection), South Koreans get protected free of charge.

With such tactical and strategic elements, how may we approach this issue without getting into Fox TV-style yelling matches? How to consider what is truly in South Korea's national self-interest?

Many people, it seems to me, think that this country's interest lies in a kind of la-la land where stronger powers are happy. By that, I mean the discussion often consists of strategizing about how to respond to superpower anger and maintain harmony.

If that's your thing, the solution is easy. It's to do what China wants. If China is happy, trade will pick up again, and the U.S. will just swallow its annoyance and say, "The alliance is stronger than ever." Job done, or as we say in England, "Bob's your uncle, Fanny's your aunt." (Don't ask, I've no idea).

This is a common approach in Korea. It explains that odd feature of Korean diplomacy ― bad faith towards allies and obsequiousness towards strong non-allies.

To be fair to them, though, a lot of South Koreans sincerely believe that China is its natural and desired ally over both Japan and the U.S., because it is less culturally foreign and geographically distant. They see the U.S. alliance as historically temporary.

Many of these people consider themselves to be progressive. But actually, their position is conservative to the point of being behind-the-times.

The way to figure out who are and are not your friends is to look at core values. What are South Korea's core values? Filial piety, harmony, nationalism, race? If you pick those, or even two of them, the chances are you are living in the past. That is because South Korea's values have changed. Now that it is a democracy, its core values are now those of a democracy ― freedom, justice, fairness, equality.

Korea's natural allies do not depend on history. They are those that share the same values, regardless of race, history, religion and physical appearance or proximity. From this perspective, guess who is the best natural ally of South Korea in this part of the world? Yes, it's Japan. And, guess what? It wasn't in 1941, but in 2017, Japan actually is South Korea's closest ally in East Asia.

The anti-Japanism of the handful of protestors who turn out every Wednesday in front of the Japanese embassy and the bile that spews into editorials in this and other newspapers from time to time is just froth on the waves. Underneath is an ocean of common interest.

That is not the case with China. It is a good economic partner for Korea but not a friend. It is like Korea under Chun Doo-hwan. I am convinced it will have its democracy moment as Korea did, but it hasn't had it yet and for this reason is not yet qualified to be best friends.

So, now that we've cleared that up, how to address THAAD? Actually, I don't know. But switching friends over it, as I have seen people suggest online, is not in keeping with South Korean national interest as an ally of the world's democracies.

That doesn't mean Seoul has to accept THAAD. President Moon may decide that the military benefit to South Korea does not merit the animosity generated with China. Provided he remains committed to Korea's real allies, he has every right to reach that decision.

Michael Breen is the CEO of Insight Communications Consultants, a public relations company, and author of "The Koreans" and "Kim Jong-il: North Korea's Dear Leader."