In many departments, officers have developed a pathological aversion to “second-guessing.” There is a pervasive belief that scrutinizing officer’s use-of-force decisions will lead officers to hesitate, exposing them to dangers that swift action might have averted. The result is a reluctance to engage in an in-depth, critical review of incidents in which an officer injures or kills a civilian and resentment when an outsider calls for such a review. That’s a problem. When an incident ends badly, it should be critically dissected to identify what contributed to that result, as is done when an officer is seriously injured or killed. The primary purpose is not to blame an officer, although poor judgment and failures to follow policy and training must be addressed, but to learn how best to avoid a similar situation in the future.

The aversion to what officers derisively refer to as “second-guessing” does not only make officers less receptive to a critique of their actions, it also makes them reluctant to provide their own complete and honest critiques. That, too, is a problem. Informal interactions between officers shape agency culture and affect officer actions at least as much, and often more, than formal rules. But while empowering officers to engage in peer conversations may help in the effort to self-critique, policing culture also needs to be addressed.

Much of the issue made evident in the Baltimore trial stems from a culture in which officers see themselves as soldiers on the front lines in a war on drugs, crime, and terrorism. Military equipment, weaponry, and tactics were introduced to policing in the 1960s in the form of Special Weapons and Tactics teams, but the so-called warrior culture did not become a visible mainstay of day-to-day policing until the massacre at Columbine High School in 1999.

Officers began wearing alternative uniforms, such as BDUs, that created a more military appearance. Police agencies increasingly acquired and deployed armored vehicles, high-powered rifles, and other military equipment. Officers were taught, formally and informally, to view themselves as warriors, seeking out enemies and ready to attack at the first sign of crisis. The warrior culture has since become more ingrained with every sporadic active shooter, act of domestic terrorism, and ambush that takes the life of a fellow officer.

But using these incidents to justify an aggressive, adversarial approach to policing is a dangerous trend. The warrior culture undermines police-community partnerships, public trust, and the level of cooperation that effective policing depends on. The result, therefore, can be increasing amounts of violent crime, the amount of force that officers use, and even police misconduct. In short, such a culture compounds the very problems that officers and police agencies are struggling to address.