From the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris the first week of January to the San Bernardino shootings in December, the kind of self-inspired, small-scale brutality the Sunni Muslim Islamic State group has seeped into the cracks left by a Western security apparatus hardened around preventing a 9/11-style massive attack.

Now intelligence agencies scramble to adapt to a more nimble and unorthodox extremist movement that nobody could have predicted would have become so effective at sowing violence and fear from the Iraq-Syria border to the outskirts of Los Angeles. “2015 was a year of transition in the nature of the ISIL threat,” as one analyst observed, using an alternative name for the Islamic State group.

No longer do those in Washington refer to the group and its far-flung band of sympathizers as the “JV” team, as President Barack Obama once famously did.

A new year beckons, with the Syrian civil war entering its sixth bloody year, the Iraqi government needing to prove it can protect all of its people, not just the Shiites, and Muslims worldwide coming under greater scrutiny by a fearful public, all of which hinge in part on the future of the Islamic State group.

Here are the five key points Western observers and policymakers will be considering as they monitor the terrorist network in 2016:

Smoke billows from the northern Iraqi town of Sinjar, Mosul province, during an operation by Iraqi Kurdish forces backed by US-led strikes on Nov. 12, to retake the town from the Islamic State group and cut a key supply line to Syria.

Safin Hamed/AFP/Getty Images

Retaking Territory, and Governing It

The Islamic State group has proven frustratingly adept at lingering in areas it once held. It repeatedly attacked the key oil hub at Beiji, Iraq, in the summer of 2014, losing and retaking territory in protracted skirmishes with government forces. Fighting continues there, requiring strikes from U.S.-led coalition aircraft as recently as late December.

Even before it seized Mosul last summer, the Islamic State was able to infiltrate its criminal and black market networks and begin undermining the local government. That connective tissue reportedly remains in places like Sinjar, which were formally cleared of Islamic State group control by Kurdish forces in November.

In late December, the Iraqi security forces began their siege to chase Islamic State group fighters out of the city of Ramadi. Even if they are successful, however, the real success will lie in whether Baghdad can convince the citizens of this largely Sunni Muslim area that it can serve them as a trustworthy federal government. Otherwise, the Islamic State group will continue to capitalize on Sunni dissent toward a government they see as dominated by the Iraqi Shiite majority and influenced by fellow Shiites in neighboring Iran.

“Their thinking allows them to cede territory sometimes, even while utilising delaying tactics that maximize casualties on the other side,” says Firas Abi Ali, London-based senior manager of violent risk analysis with IHS. “This comes from a realization they will always be outnumbered by their rivals, and they seem to plan accordingly.”

"That lets them lose territory because they think they can regain it."

In Sinjar, reports emerged that the Yazidis who had been targeted by the Islamic State group as heathens had subsequently began executing Sunnis in an act of retaliation. Similar concerns abound regarding the highly effective Shiite militias partnering with government troops, known as popular mobilization forces, and whether they will exact similar violence on Sunnis after clearing extremists out.

That kind of uncontrolled retaliation will only drive Sunnis back toward extremist forces like the Islamic State group or whatever replaces them if the Iraqi government doesn’t focus its attention on establishing the rule of law after the fighting ceases.

Members of forces loyal to Libya's Islamist-backed parliament General National Congress prepare to launch attacks as they fight Islamic State group jihadists on the outskirts of Libya's western city of Sirte on March 16. Mahmud Turkia/AFP/Getty Images

Expanding to Libya, a "Plan B"

Multiple terrorist organizations around the globe have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group, from Boko Haram in Nigeria to the Taliban in Afghanistan. But the only place military officials believe the Islamic State group has direct connection beyond its symbolic homeland in Iraq and Syria is Libya, with its eyes on even shinier prizes nearby.

“That’s where the biggest connection has been, in Libya, because of the chaos there and the government challenges,” U.S. Africa Command’s Gen. David Rodriguez told reporters in late November. Civil unrest throughout Libya since the 2011 NATO mission that ousted despot Muammar Gadhafi has created the kind of environment in which the Islamic State group can thrive and, as the Army general observed, allow Islamic State group operatives and resources to slip back and forth between North Africa and the Middle East.

The Islamic State group prioritizes Libya and its chaotic smokescreen because of its geographic position at the apex of all major smuggling routes in Africa, providing it with an alternative flow of resources as Western agencies try to choke off it off in Iraq and Syria. Libya also serves as a potential staging ground for attacks on Europe, and for strengthening the Islamic State group’s presence in volatile Tunisia, from which thousands of fighters have joined its extremist movement. It’s also a pathway to Egypt, where an established Islamic State group presence among existing extremists in the Sinai would be a great win for the terrorist network.

Still, leaders of the Islamic State group inspire their following by a perversion of Islamic history, centered around Raqqa and the city of Dabiq, where they believe an apocalyptic battle between Islam and the West will take place.

“They can’t just roll up shop and flee to Libya. That totally undercuts their credibility and their claims,” says Scott Stewart, vice president of tactical analysis for Texas-based security firm Stratfor.

A foothold in Libya could only bolster the Islamic State group’s existing presence in Syria and Iraq to maintain that premise, not replace it, or serve as a “Plan B” if some leaders need to flee to relative safely.

Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighters standing on a berm watch the landing of a small surveillance drone flown by a French volunteer near the town of Daquq, north of Baghdad, on Dec. 7. Jean-Marc Mojon/AFP/Getty Images

Finding Unity in the War, and Choking Off the Extremists

One of the largest obstacles to victory against the Islamic State group in Syria is the country’s porous border with Turkey, and convincing Ankara to become more involved in the fight. Kurdish fighters from groups like the peshmerga in Iraq or the YPG in Syria have proven themselves the most capable fighting force for retaking ground from the Islamic State group. But the Turks have a wary view of the Kurds, particularly those it believes are aligned with groups it considers terrorist organizations at home.

Finding some sort of unity between the two, and assurances that empowering the Kurds would not necessarily lead to their attempting to form a breakaway state, is key to closing off the Islamic State group’s borders and rallying those who must help destroy it.

Another major obstacle lies in the Sunni populations throughout Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State group, which evolved from al-Qaida in Iraq, was largely able to seize and hold territory during its initial onslaught last summer due to support, or at least complicity, from the Sunni populations in the areas they now control. The brutal rule of Syrian President Bashar Assad and the U.S.-backed government in Iraq under then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gave high preference to the Shiite Muslim populations, and, in the case of Iraq, reneged on promises made for equality in government that secured the so-called “Sunni Awakening” during the last Iraq war and united the country against al-Qaida.

Until the Sunni populations in these regions believe the West has a vested interest in their security, and that they will ensure inclusion at the top levels of government, the Islamic State group will never be defeated, or another like-minded insurgent group will pop up in its place.

That work remains a gargantuan effort, particularly amid a new poll that shows a majority of people living throughout Iraq and Syria believe the U.S. literally created the Islamic State group. A glimmer of hope emerged through the U.N. Security Council resolution in late December that plots a path to peace in Syria – albeit an unspecific one.

“That doesn’t change what’s happening on the ground,” IHS’ Ali says. “Regional Sunni forces will likely stall in the hope a future U.S. president will support them more.”

Fabio Ahumada and Christina Lynn, San Bernardino EMTs, attend a vigil on Dec. 3 at San Manuel Stadium in San Bernardino, Calif., after two shooters killed 14 and wounded around 20 others at a social services center the day before.

Barbara Davidson/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images

A Coordinated Attack on the U.S.

The U.S. has so far been spared from an attack on the U.S. coordinated by the Islamic State group headquarters in Syria, as authorities suspect happened with the shooting in Paris in November. The attacks in San Bernardino, California, were carried out by a married couple who were reportedly inspired by the Islamic State group. But investigators currently do not believe there was any direct connection either through planning or sharing of resources.

“I believe we’re going to continue to see more attempts and more attacks by grassroots-type jihadis, whether they are returnees or whether they are more the people who are not directed but influenced by the Islamic State group and al-Qaida,” says Stratfor’s Stewart.





It would be a major leap, particularly in public perception, if an attack arose that was orchestrated by terrorist masterminds overseas, and undercutting what has become the chief focus of American intelligence agencies since the 9/11 attacks.

Yet those limited-scale attacks with a loose connection to the Islamic State group may be enough for them to maintain their version of success. Its brand of diffused leadership makes the group less vulnerable to the kind of “decapitation strategy” the U.S. has employed against al-Qaida.

“It may imply they can’t pull off a 9/11,” says Michael O’Hanlon with the Brookings Institution. “But if they can do a lot of Parises and San Bernardinos, arguably they don’t need to pull off another 9/11, if their main goal is to keep the world on edge.”

“In radical terms, I’m not sure what their goal can ever be. Even if they keep killing us now and then, it’s hard to see that that accomplishes anything and it certainly won’t lead to the end of Western civilization.”

Kashmiri demonstrators hold up a flag of the Islamic State group during a demonstration against Israeli military operations in Gaza, in downtown Srinagar on July 18, 2014.

Tuaseef Mustafa/AFP/Getty Images

Shutting the Islamic State Group’s Mouth

One of the extremist network’s greatest successes has been its use of propaganda, both to control those under its rule but even more potently to recruit disenfranchised young people from overseas, who continue to flock to its homeland.

Western security agencies remain befuddled how affluent young people see something in the slick messaging the Islamic State group puts forth, and its elusive use of social media as a way to directly connect with potential recruits.

The solution, however, cannot come from the U.S., as that would be too easily dismissed by extremist leaders who see America as the living symbol of everything they oppose. Instead, finding a solution must come from one of the other greatest holes in the anti-Islamic State group strategy, which is greater support from Muslim nations like Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

These nations have long been the recipients of U.S. military aid and support, and touted by President Barack Obama as evidence of the potency of the coalition he leads, even though the U.S. and its European partners carry out almost all of the military strikes. But questions among their top leadership of U.S. priorities, and the extent to which America is willing to go in the Middle East, has resigned them to focusing on their own internal problems, such as the refugee crisis spilling into Jordan or Saudi Arabia’s war in neighboring Yemen.

But, perhaps merely exposing the reality of life under the Islamic State group is the most potent form of counter-propaganda.

Reports have emerged from Iraq saying the Islamic State group has begun to ban access to satellite broadcasts for those under its control.