The 2007 financial crisis foreclosed a future of financial stability for today’s young people, and required nations to take on austerity measures whose burdens are disproportionately borne by youth. As a result, across the OECD countries, political parties on the left are increasingly relying on young voters to voice their discontent at the ballot box.

In Britain and France, age is a key predictor of voting behavior. The increasingly progressive bent of young people offers important potential, since voting and partisanship tend to be sticky and today’s youth will eventually become a central voting bloc. At the moment, however, the growing reliance of progressive parties on the youth vote carries immense political peril, because young people tend to vote at lower rates than the key constituencies for conservative parties.

In the US context, young people’s turnout is particularly low, in part because of onerous voter registration requirements but also because the political system is increasingly unresponsive to their needs. Democrats need to fight to make voting more accessible and to embrace a progressive agenda, which will create a durable progressive coalition.

In the 2010 and 2014 US midterms, and then the 2016 presidential election, Democrats saw first-hand how a demobilized youth vote can wreck their electoral potential. Yet, in contrast with intense discussions of how Democrats can win back “the white working class,” there has been little in the way of exploring how Democrats can mobilize a potentially powerful electoral coalition, a “Rising American Electorate” made up of young people, low-income people, single women, and people of color.

The recent Labour surge in the UK provides some hints at a path to success for the Democrats: they must run on policies that directly and substantively address the concerns of the Rising American Electorate. At the same time, they must pursue policies that empower young people at the ballot box by removing unnecessary barriers to registration and voting.

There is increasingly strong evidence that a youth turnout surge occurred in the UK and that it is key to explaining Labour’s pick-up of 30 seats in Parliament. Young people drove a last-minute surge in registrations and contributed to Labour’s gains.

A YouGov survey finds that turnout for those 18-19 was 57%, and turnout for those 20-24 was 59%. This is a massive surge from the 2015 general election, where an Ipsos MORI poll found 43% of those 18-24 turned out to vote. For comparison, in the United States, the 2016 voter turnout rate for young people (aged 18-24) was 43%, according to the Census Bureau. Even more jarringly, only 55% of 18-24 year-olds were registered, and could therefore even vote. Among those over 65 in the United States, 78% were registered and 71% voted.

Low turnout among young people plagues Democrats, who have failed to mobilize young voters, particularly young “drop-off” voters – those who voted for Obama but were uninspired or unable to vote in 2016. Addressing the needs of these drop-off voters and young non-voters, while reducing structural and political barriers to voting, are critical steps for the Democrats going forward, far more so than trying to win back Obama-to-Trump voters.

In 2012, 57% of milennials said that Obama’s policies would be “good for people like me,” compared to only 38% in 2016 saying the same about Clinton’s policies. According to the same research, Democratic messaging centered too much around personality and Trump’s unfitness for office, rather than on how Democrats would improve the lives of young voters.

At the same time, the 2016 election was the first presidential election without the full protections of the Voting Rights Act, and across the country new restrictions disproportionately suppress young votes. Automatic voter registration (which places the burden of registration on state, rather than individuals) has been shown to increase youth registration and turnout.

Progressives should embrace policies like pre-registration (allows young people to register when they get their drivers license) and same-day registration (allows people to register the day they vote) that can improve turnout.

Democrats can do much more to energize and enable young voters. Parallels are evident in the recent UK campaign, such as the issue of free tuition that Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn added to his platform. In the United States, public disinvestment in higher education has created an epidemic of student loan debt, young people are graduating college with an average of $30,000 in debt, and Demos research finds that student debt disproportionately affects young people of color, and it is no coincidence that the disinvestment in public higher education accelerated as a new, more racially diverse generation reached college age.

Today, young black households are more likely to be indebted, despite fewer years of post-secondary schooling and while contending with racism in the labor market. Student loan delinquencies and defaults remain high, imperiling borrowers’ savings for other needs.

While Clinton included debt-free college in her platform, her campaign focused on personal attacks and failed to provide a clear progressive policy vision or to give voice to the needs and concerns of young people and others left behind in an economy and political system that are increasingly controlled by wealthy elites, for their own benefit.

According to polling done by Demos and Hart Research during the 2016 US election, at least 68% of 18-34 year-old Americans supported providing federal financial assistance to states to make public colleges and universities more affordable. But debt-free college policies aren’t popular only among US youth; there is strong cross-generational support from every age group, including seniors.

Around 80% of registered voters think we need to return to a system enjoyed by previous generations, in which students could afford to go to a state college or university by working a part-time job, and not have to take on debt.

It’s important not to over-interpret results, especially cross-nationally; the British and US situations are similar in some ways – both are infused with a surge in right-wing populism – but quite distinct in other ways. The countries have different electoral systems, and different histories of racism and austerity.

The way campaigns are run changes electoral strategies (British elections require far less money and are far shorter than American races), and the multi-party system influences strategic voting behavior.

But in the broader sense, the recent UK campaign tells an important story: without youth voters, progressive parties will be hard-pressed to retake power and with them, long-term progressive power is increasingly within reach. For too long, pundits and political strategists have exhorted left parties to embrace business-friendly policies to win over the mushy (and mythical) middle. The lesson from Labour’s comeback in 2017 is different: embrace progressive policies to mobilize young voters.