Five short years ago, the AKP was a lot more vulnerable to this type of critique. Turkey was coming off a series of wide-ranging political and social reforms that had been passed as part of the European Union accession process, and the AKP had in fact been initially elected by running on a stridently pro-EU platform. The Erdoğan government was reluctant to do anything that would endanger this process, and condemnation from Western governments and NGOs was taken seriously. Furthermore, the AKP was in the midst of a reelection campaign and, like any other political party in a democracy, more attuned to criticism.

On top of all of this, the seeds for the government's subsequent - and unfortunately short-lived - Kurdish Opening were being sown, and Ankara was demonstrating its willingness to rethink its Kurdish strategy and try to solve the longstanding tensions between the government and its Kurdish citizens. These variables all combined to create an environment in which a tough critique on freedom of speech, and particularly one so wrapped up in Kurdish issues, would have had a chance of moving the needle.

Today, however, is a vastly different story. To begin with, the pressures associated with EU membership have dissipated. It has become increasingly clear to Turks that the EU is not inclined to grant membership to Turkey any time soon, making threats about the need for Turkish reforms ring hollow.

Even if that were not the case and Turkey's accession was not being held up, the financial crisis decimating the Eurozone has given Ankara pause as its own economy has been one of the great growth stories of the last half decade. In fact, the disparity between the Turkish and EU economies has been so great that Turkey has informally adopted the position that Europe needs it more than it needs Europe, and thus the threat of authoritarian backsliding harming its EU bid no longer carries the weight that it once did.

Erdoğan's near-term political goals also factor into what is likely to be Turkey's non-responsiveness to the lambasting from the CPJ. Whereas in 2007 Erdoğan was first and foremost concerned with consolidating the AKP's gains and building on its first electoral victory by getting reelected, now his eye is on a different prize following the AKP's third consecutive victory last year and its largest vote share. Erdoğan is currently aiming to rewrite Turkey's constitution, which is a much-needed initiative, but in the process create a newly empowered and directly elected president with the intention of serving as the first occupant of the office.

Because the AKP fell three seats short in the Grand National Assembly of being able to complete this process by itself, Erdoğan has indicated on numerous occasions that he will band together with the nationalist MHP to get the votes he needs. While Erdoğan will get to create a presidential system, the MHP wants a set of nationalist policies in return, and this primarily means that the government will keep the pressure on the Kurds and snuff out any nascent Kurdish nationalism or calls for Kurdish autonomy. It also means that when outside organizations call for the government to relax its restrictions on journalists reporting on Kurdish issues and the PKK, these calls will fall on deaf ears.