On 15 October 1970, Anwar El Sadat succeeded Gamal Abdel Nasser as President of Egypt. Viewed as a mediocre man, Sadat's true qualities were not realized by Nasser's old guard until it was too late.

Having crushed his internal opponents in May 1971, Sadat faced the overwhelming challenge of trying to find a way out of the predicament Egypt was in after its humiliating defeat by Israel in 1967. After some hesitation, he finally moved forward by launching an attack on Israel on 6 October 1973. The initial success of the Egyptian war effort gave the country a new sense of pride and its leader a much needed legitimacy.

While the Egyptian regime maintained its verbal commitment to Nasser's socialist policies, the reality was a state bureaucracy and services network that had lost all ability to deliver due to population growth. The state's withdrawal from its active duty meant the rise of alternative networks to provide for the needy in the fields of education, health and financial assistance. Inevitably what filled the gap left by the state were religious institutions. Both the church and the rising Islamists witnessed a wide expansion of their activities, ultimately replacing the state in providing for the people.

Sadat was no friend of democracy, but nonetheless he undertook opening up the political sphere. The one-party system was abolished and political parties were allowed. But ultimately, his most important domestic decision, a decision that would eventually cost him his life, was the freedom he gave to the formation of Islamist groups. In order to counter the prevailing Nasserist and leftist domination of university campuses, Sadat allowed, and in some cases encouraged, the growth of Islamist currents on campuses and eventually beyond. More religious and conservative than his predecessor, Sadat did not realize until it was too late that he had unleashed a storm that would destroy him.

Copts under threat

Under Sadat, religion was increasingly replacing nationalism as the foundation of the country; Christianity was ridiculed daily in the press. It was only inevitable that this would alienate Copts, who were increasingly fearful for their future. On university campuses, Islamist groups began targeting Christian students. Clashes soon took place. More violence became only a matter of time.

The focal point of some attacks was buildings that Christians used for prayer and that had not obtained the necessary government approval. On 6 November 1972, an attack took place in El Khanka on such a building. Angered, the recently enthroned Pope Shenouda III (r. 1971-2012) ordered some bishops and priests to march to the place and hold Mass. Such a march was viewed as a provocation by Muslims, and the building was attacked again. The parliamentary committee tasked with investigating the attack noted that out of 1,442 church buildings in Egypt only 500 had the necessary governmental approval. It also noted that in the ten-year period from 1962 to 1972, 127 permits were given to church buildings and that only 68 of these were for the Coptic Church. These 68 included only 22 new and 46 renovation permits. The committee recommended a government solution to the problem, but none was undertaken.

The number of attacks increased. A church in Cairo was burned in 1979 and on 4 August 1981 another was bombed, leaving three dead. Attacks on priests were on the rise and a number of churches in Alexandria were bombed in January 1980. Islamist groups had obtained a fatwa from one of their religious leaders that any Copt who donated money to churches was a legitimate target for robbery. The sectarian clashes reached an epic high point in June 1981 in El Zawya El Hamra district in Cairo where for three days the killing went on with little police efforts to stop the violence that left 81 Copts dead.

The state and the Islamists competed on suggesting more laws that would guarantee the Islamization of the country. Al Azhar proposed a law in 1977 for the implementation of shari'a in the country. The law included the implementation of the Islamic penal code and the death penalty for apostates. On 21 March 1977, a court ruled that shari'a was to be applied to Copts in their personal status cases, allowing men to marry four women and obtain divorce. The personal status law governing Copts was already a problem since Nasser's abolishment of the religious courts in 1955. Under law 462 of 1955, the application of non-Muslim personal status laws was limited only to those cases where the two parties belonged to the same sect. Furthermore, this involved only marriages and divorce. In all other issues, such as guardianship, inheritance, adoption and legal capacity, Islamic shari'a was applied to all Egyptians.

The Muslim Brotherhood's magazine El Daawa published endless articles against Copts. The anti-Coptic themes introduced by Ahmed Lutfi El Sayed in the Egyptian Conference in 1911 had never completely disappeared, but they reappeared more forcefully in the Brotherhood's mouthpiece. Copts were the happiest minority in the world, it argued, and had no reason to complain. Copts should be content with their privileged position as dhimmis until, of course, they ultimately saw the light and converted to Islam. In fact, the story went, Copts were not being discriminated against in Egypt but were favoured by the state. Copts were attempting to change the face of Egypt by building more churches than they actually needed. Copts were a fifth column that aimed to subvert the country. Rumours of Copts stockpiling weapons were widespread.

A forged report of a secret meeting between Pope Shenouda and priests in Alexandria in 1972 was extensively distributed. It gave birth to the Islamist myth that everything had been fine in Egypt between its Muslims and Christians until Shenouda became pope. According to the report, which ran along the lines of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, it was claimed that the pope told his secret audience that Egypt would be re-Christianized just as Spain had been. Copts should have many children while making sure to decrease the fertility rate of Muslim women. The conspiracy theories resulted in Copts being discriminated against in the field of gynaecology. Other departments in universities were not spared. It was becoming impossible for any Christian to obtain the necessary grades to be appointed lecturer in the university. Discrimination against Copts in government cooperatives and the bureaucracy became widespread. Hardly any Copts were elected to the Egyptian parliament and Copts were scarce in the top positions in government.

No church leadership could watch idly by as such an assault took place, and certainly not one led by Pope Shenouda. Some of the other bishops - most importantly among them Bishop Samuel - were afraid that undertaking a forceful response would result in a backlash against Copts, and instead argued for using intermediaries from the old Coptic elite and petitioning the president for protection. For its part, the Coptic elite had accepted dhimmitude and feared any reaction from the church.

Pope Shenouda would have none of that. In the face of Copts flocking to the church for protection, he opened its gates to them. The church had to assert itself and defend the collective rights of Copts. True, Christ had taught forgiveness of transgressions, but that was only in personal cases. No one had the right to forgive collective transgressions, Shenouda reasoned. It is left to history to judge which approach was wiser, but it was only natural for Copts to side with their pope and his stand. The Coptic elite had become completely separated from the plight of their brethren and grew delusional as to the dimension of the challenge they faced. At their moment of crisis, Copts chose Shenouda as their hero.

The President versus the Pope

Alexandria had been an early focal point in the clash with Islamists. Its priests naturally took the lead in defending Copts against the Islamist onslaught. In July 1972, the priests of Alexandria gathered at a conference and declared that Copts preferred martyrdom to giving up their faith. They begged the state to protect their rights and their religion from the Islamist attacks. Their pleas went unanswered. On 16 December 1976, as a result of the push for the implementation of shari'a, and especially the apostasy laws, the second Coptic Conference in Egyptian history gathered.

Exemplifying the change the Coptic community had undergone, it was the church and not members of the laity that was at the forefront in organizing and leading the conference. The conference issued eight demands. It demanded the protection of religious freedom and rejected attempt of forced conversion to Islam and the implementation of the apostasy law. It rejected the imposition of shari'a on Copts in their personal status cases, viewing it as a threat to the foundation of the Christian family. It demanded an end to discrimination and equality in employment and parliamentary representation. It also asked the state to take appropriate measures to deal with extremists and put an end to their attacks on Copts. Concluding its deliberations, it urged that all Copts fast for three days and pray for God's intervention to save them from their plight.

The Coptic Conference was followed by an Islamic one in July 1977. Unlike its predecessor in 1911, this conference did not aim to hide its agenda in name or substance under the guise of nationalism. It bluntly demanded the complete implementation of shari'a.

The pope wrote a memorandum to the presidency on 30 August 1977, objecting to the proposed implementation of the apostasy law. In September 1977, the Holy Synod announced another three-day fasting for God to intervene. Twice delegations from the Holy Synod met with high-ranking Egyptian officials to plead for an end to the discrimination Copts faced. In face of the complete silence of the state to their pleas and an increase in the number and potency of the attacks they were subjected to, Pope Shenouda announced on 26 March 1981 that he would not receive any state representative sent bearing congratulations for the Easter celebration. Instead, he was travelling to the monastery to pray for God's salvation of his people. The man who sat in the seat of St. Mark had played his hand. The response from the man who sat at the head of the Egyptian state was not late in coming.

On 14 May 1980, Sadat had delivered a fiery speech to the Egyptian Parliament. He accused the pope of seeking to establish a Christian state in the south of Egypt in Asyut. He decried what he called the church's attempt to be a state within a state, and accused Copts of aiming to provoke foreign powers against Egypt and of receiving weapons and training from the Phalangists in Lebanon. He concluded his speech with the ominous words: "I am a Muslim president of an Islamic country."

Demonstrations by Copts in the United States during his visit there did not cool his temper. Irritated by the opposition in general and finally realizing the threat Islamists posed to his regime, he ordered most of Egypt's opposition leaders and members of Islamist groups arrested on 5 September 1981. Father Matta El Meskeen pleaded with him to protect the church as an institution. Sadat announced the cancellation of the presidential decree appointing Pope Shenouda. While unable to touch his religious authority, Sadat had removed him as the official representative of the church in the eyes of the state. Furthermore, he ordered the pope's confinement in the St. Bishoy Monastery. He had tens of bishops and priests arrested. He ordered the formation of a committee composed of five bishops to replace the pope in managing the affairs of the church. His decisions were put to a vote in a popular referendum five days later, and the results were declared to be overwhelmingly in favour.

While accepting Sadat's decisions, the Holy Synod and the Milli Council both declared that the pope was the spiritual head of the church and could not be replaced while he lived. One month later, on the eighth anniversary of the October war of 1973, and celebrating his greatest accomplishment among his army, Sadat was struck down by Khaled El Islamboli and his colleagues. The bullets did not take the life of Sadat alone. Bishop Samuel, who was seated among the audience, was also killed.

The church and state had collided in a way never before seen in Egyptian history. While under Muslim rule, popes had largely accepted dhimmitude and fallen silent, only raising their hands in prayer as their people were persecuted, a modern pope could not ignore the screams of his people. Faced with the rise of Islamism and watching the state fail to protect its Coptic citizens, the church raised its voice. The caution and warnings of Bishop Samuel were ultimately not suitable for the times. But the clash was not only that of two institutions, but perhaps more importantly of two men. The two personalities were set on a collision course from the very start. In a sense, Egypt was too small to hold both of them. One of them had to go.

Realising Pope Shenouda's vision of the church

Pope Shenouda III had survived the rule of President Sadat. During his forty-year reign he managed not only to transform the church along the lines of his revivalist vision, but more importantly to institutionalize those changes making them impossible to reverse. Today's Coptic Church as an institution is built solely on his vision.

Pope Shenouda had inherited a Holy Synod composed of twenty-six bishops. Some of them belonged to the old guard and he had to move cautiously with them. Others like Bishops Samuel, Gregorious, Andrawous and Athanasius had competing visions of how the church should be governed and where it should go. Given the Coptic understanding of the pope as merely first among equals, Shenouda had to move cautiously. The powers he had at his disposal however were not small; chief among them was the fact that he alone could consecrate new bishops. He used that weapon extensively in three ways:

He dramatically increased the number of general bishops. He had inherited two general bishops from Pope Kyrillos and during his reign he consecrated 45 more. Eight of these he later placed in dioceses after their previous bishops had died, thirteen he sent to serve newly established dioceses and churches abroad, and three he consecrated as heads of monasteries.

The enormous expansion of the Coptic Church abroad allowed him to create new dioceses. The Coptic Church today has seventeen official dioceses plus nine general bishops overseeing churches abroad.

Most importantly, upon the death of a bishop the pope divided his diocese into smaller ones. The diocese of Sharkia was thus divided into seven smaller ones, Qena into four, and Beni Suef into five. The result was to increase the number of bishops of dioceses inside Egypt from twenty-one to forty-eight. Throughout his reign he consecrated a total of 117 bishops. Outliving all of his competitors, Pope Shenouda had time on his side. The Holy Synod of the Coptic Church is today composed of ninety-six bishops only one of whom, Metropolitan Mikhail of Asyut, was consecrated by a previous pope.

This final move was not purely a political one, though without a doubt it allowed the pope absolute control of the church. The old bishops had ruled over large dioceses and some of them had had hardly any effective contact with their congregations. The expansion of the church's role in the lives of Copts and their population increase meant that smaller dioceses were required to effectively serve a growing population. Smaller dioceses allowed bishops to know all Copts they served, and to cater to their spiritual and material needs.

Nonetheless, by virtue of his long reign and the number of bishops he consecrated, Shenouda had made the position of bishop much less powerful than it had been in the past with no individual bishop able to mount a challenge to his authority. Many of the new bishops had been the pope's disciples before entering the monastery and most shared his vision for the church. The huge expansion in the number of bishops was not without its negative aspects, however, as new bishops were often chosen after spending only a very short period in the monasteries.

Himself consecrated as a bishop for the theological seminary and Coptic upbringing, Pope Shenouda devoted countless hours to teaching. His weekly sermons continued to be a popular attraction for the Coptic public. He personally taught theological subjects in the theological seminaries in Cairo and Alexandria as well as abroad. He continued until his death as editor in chief of Al Keraza magazine and personally oversaw and edited all of its articles. He contributed countless articles to newspapers and magazines in Egypt and abroad. Through his sermons, lectures, and articles he was able to define what Coptic Orthodoxy meant and succeeded in sidelining all those - such as Father Matta El Meskeen and Bishop Gregorious - who held different views on theological matters. His detractors pointed out that, by popularizing theological issues, he had trivialized them and weakened the foundations of Coptic theology.

Institutionalizing Pope Shenouda's vision for the Coptic Church necessitated codifying the changes to make them permanent. In 1985, for the first time in its history, the Holy Synod organized its internal laws, created a permanent secretariat, and divided its members into permanent committees dealing with various church matters. Yearly meetings of the Holy Synod have produced a large volume of laws and decisions organizing every aspect of the church's activities. Likewise, services and rituals were no longer haphazard but institutionalized and systematized throughout the Coptic Church. Each church received a board of directors to manage its affairs. Hundreds of priests were consecrated by the pope for churches in Cairo, Alexandria and abroad in order to expand services to the growing community. Priests received trainings before and after being consecrated and so did their wives. The church laws governing deacons were modernized and, for the first time in the modern history of the Coptic Church, women were consecrated as deacons.

An administrative apparatus was created throughout the church and thousands of ordinary Copts were brought into church activities and services, not just as recipients but as active participants. Everyone had a role to play and could contribute not just money but more importantly his or her time for helping out in the expanding social and spiritual services. The Milli Council was reestablished in 1973, though with virtually no authority and little role to play besides approving the pope's plans. Books sold in Coptic Church bookstores had to be reviewed in order to make sure they did not divert from Orthodox theology. Special attention was given to combating the infiltration of Protestant preachers and ideas inside the Coptic Church. The Holy Synod issued statements warning Copts not to associate with Protestant preachers and not to attend Protestant meetings. Excommunications were issued against those Coptic priests and monks who showed signs of endorsing Protestant theological positions.

The scope of the services provided by the church was enormous. By the time of his death in 1973, Bishop Samuel's vision of a church that provided for both the spiritual and material needs of its members had become the de facto policy of the church. Through his enormous ecumenical network and contacts, Bishop Samuel had managed to acquire enormous Western funding for his projects as well as scholarships for church servants. Hospitals for the sick, literacy classes for those who could not read, libraries, small cinemas, sports clubs in every church, Sunday schools for every youngster and vocational training for workers - the dreams of Bishop Samuel had come true as the church adopted an all-encompassing model for community development.

Most of the new young bishops shared his passion and services were no longer centralized in Cairo but took a local shape in each diocese, although there were some new bishops, such as Bishop Amonious of Luxor, who had little interest in such work and remained committed to a view of the bishop's role as solely a man of prayer. Most of the others expanded in areas that went beyond Bishop Samuel's dreams such as cattle breeding and a leather factory in the diocese of Minya. Bishops who did not have Bishop Samuel's foreign contacts depended on donations from local rich families, Cairo industrialists and finally on the growing flow of donations from Copts abroad.

The lives of Copts had become centred around their church. Copts flocked to their church seeking a life within its walls in face of a growing discrimination against them in the public sphere. Faced with the rise of Islamists in Egypt, and Copts' growing exclusion, they ran to their church seeking solace. It was a two-way street - the church expanded its services to provide for the community and the community demanded that the church provide for its growing needs. Copts went to their priests and bishops to ask for advice and guidance on everything in their lives and the church became the sole representative of the community. The doors that were opened to them inside the church in its expanding services gave them opportunities for personal and professional growth.

Copts who were denied leadership positions in their country found an opportunity to occupy those leadership positions inside their churches. In face of a public sphere that suppressed and humiliated them, expecting them to act as happy dhimmis, the church gave them self-esteem and helped them regain their lost confidence.

The story, however, was not only that of church growth and a community running to it out of fears of the outside world. The revival and growth of the Coptic Church was an internal story that had its roots in the Sunday School Movement, and had more to do with an inner spiritual and religious revival than with an outside threat. If there was an outside instigator of that revival, the Sunday School Movement was born in response to the Protestant challenge and not the Islamic one.

The Coptic exodus

The most important development in the history of the Coptic Church and one that would have profound implications for its future took place outside the borders of Egypt. In the second half of the 1950s, the first substantial wave of emigration by Copts to the West took place. The first wave was composed of highly qualified professionals who were seeking a better future. Following Nasser's socialist policies in 1961, a second wave of Copts, composed of members of the upper middle class and upper class, left and joined the first immigrants in the West.

The rise of Islamists in the 1970s led to a third wave emigrating to escape an Egypt that was becoming alien to them. Emigrants of the third wave were more diverse in background and economic and social standing and included many poverty-stricken Copts. The continuous drain of Copts from Egypt only intensified in the following years. Another wave of emigration was not permanent in nature and involved Copts emigrating to the Gulf States and Libya to take part in the building of the booming economies in those countries after the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979.

The Coptic Church was facing a serious crisis. It was suddenly tasked with caring for the spiritual needs of those Coptic emigrants and it had no means at its disposal to deal with such a challenge. The burden fell on the shoulders of Bishop Samuel and he proved up to the challenge. Bishop Samuel travelled across the globe visiting Coptic emigrants, providing them with sacraments and, most importantly, organizing their communities in order to build churches. He used his extensive contacts with Western churches to acquire funds to help those communities build their first churches. He arranged for priests from Egypt to travel abroad to provide for those Copts' spiritual needs and kept sending them pastoral letters and following their work and lives.

In 1964, the first priest specially consecrated for serving Copts abroad, Father Morcos Morcos, was sent to Toronto and another priest was sent to live in Germany for a year to serve Copts there. In 1961 the first Coptic Church was established in the Gulf in Kuwait. In 1969, a priest was sent to Australia and, in 1973, Father Antonious Henin was sent to Los Angeles. The first churches were rented from Protestant and Catholic churches until Copts could collect enough money to build their own. Priests started building churches, and when Pope Shenouda ascended to the papacy in 1971 there were seven established Coptic churches abroad in Jersey City, Los Angeles, Sydney, Melbourne, Toronto, Montreal and London. Those first churches were carved in the rock with few resources and enormous obstacles.

Under Pope Shenouda the increase in the number of emigrants meant a dramatic increase in the number of churches. Father Salib Suryal travelled to Germany in 1975 and within two years had established seven Coptic churches and, two years later, a Coptic monastery there. By 1976 there were seventeen churches in the United States alone, and by 1995 that number had grown to fifty-seven. By 1995, Australia had twenty-three Coptic churches, Canada thirteen and forty-five were spread across Europe. Today the Coptic Church has 202 churches in the United States, fifty-one in Canada, forty-seven in Australia and twenty-nine in the United Kingdom. More than a hundred churches are spread across Europe in Germany, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Ireland, and Hungary. In Asia and Oceania, there are churches in Japan, New Zealand, Fiji, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Pakistan. Today there are also Coptic churches in Brazil and Bolivia, each with its own bishop. The Coptic Church is no longer just the Church of Egypt, but is now a worldwide church that serves its adherents across the globe.

Today the Coptic Church has twelve Coptic bishops with dioceses in the West as well as four Coptic general bishops with many of the churches abroad still under the direct control and supervision of the pope himself. Pope Shenouda undertook numerous trips to the West to visit Copts abroad, consecrate priests for them, bless their churches and strengthen their bond with the motherland. By 2003 he had visited the United States twenty-eight times, the United Kingdom twenty-six, Canada eleven and Australia six times.

Coptic fortunes under Hosni Mubarak

Pope Shenouda III was larger than life, both in his virtues and vices. His personality impacted every corner of the Coptic Church and the church today is the product of his vision and work. His reign witnessed the ultimate clash between the state and the church, and the evolution of a working formula between them under President Hosni Mubarak.

At the moment of crisis facing the Coptic community with the rise of the Islamist threat, Pope Shenouda emerged as their undisputed leader. Nasser's policies had managed to destroy the secular leadership of the community and only the church remained as the true representative of its adherents. For millions of Copts, the pope was the only father and leader they had ever known. While at the end of the day solving the Copt's predicament was beyond his means, he was able to give them a new sense of pride and purpose in serving their ancient faith. His absolute success was inside the church where he succeeded in sidelining his competitors and removing his opponents. A strong-headed man who never accepted criticisms to his approach, he shaped the church to his vision and will.

Hosni Mubarak replaced Sadat at the helm of the Egyptian state in 1981. Fouad Ajami brilliantly described him in a 1995 Foreign Affairs article as "a civil servant with the rank of president." In the tumultuous 1940s, when every young man joined a secret organization, Mubarak had stuck to the barracks as a non-politicized officer not taking sides in the internal army battles of the 1950s and 60s, and rose in military rank as any competent officer would. A man who lacked the grandiosity of his two predecessors, he chose to move cautiously handling the responsibility thrown upon his shoulders in a bureaucratic manner by not making any major decisions and dealing with political questions as merely technocratic decisions.

Mubarak's immediate task was to defuse the bomb Sadat had planted with his mass arrests of opposition figures across the political spectrum and deal with the Islamist insurgency that followed Sadat's assassination. In the long run, he needed to start a rapprochement with the Arab countries that had boycotted Egypt, uphold the peace treaty with Israel, and find a solution to Egypt's growing economic ills. Among his list of priorities, the Coptic problem was near the bottom, if it existed at all.

Less than two months after assuming the presidency, Mubarak started releasing members of the opposition. Unlike Sadat's confrontational approach during his last years, he allowed the opposition some room to breathe and a limited participation. Through those measures he hoped to be able to defuse the political crisis. Dealing with the Islamists proved to be tougher. Those who were immediately responsible for the assassination of Sadat were tried and killed, but others were released after short prison stints, though not before they endured the security's torture machine. His initial mistake was to haunt him later.

The one person who lingered on in confinement was Pope Shenouda. Bishops and priests were released, but some of them were prevented from returning to their dioceses and parishes for some time. Shenouda remained banished until 3 January 1985, when Mubarak issued a presidential decree reinstating him as Coptic pope.

The man who emerged from the walls of St. Bishoy Monastery was not the same fiery pope who had traded blows with Sadat, but a broken man. While the pope never forgave his enemies inside the church and slowly took his revenge against those who still lived - such as Father Matta El Meskeen and Bishops Gregorious and Athanasius, as well as tarnishing the image of Bishop Samuel - his new policy of keeping good relations with the state baffled many observers. Some argued that his years of confinement had broken his will, while others stressed the expanding Islamist threat as a reason behind his new thinking.

Faced with a much greater threat in the Islamist insurgency than the state's discrimination, the pope was forced to choose the lesser of two evils and put his bets on the state. The pope initiated the practice of Ramadan dinners in which he hosted government and Islamic dignitaries in celebration of the Muslim month of fasting. The practice soon spread in every diocese. During presidential referendums on Mubarak in 1993 and 1999, the Holy Synod issued statements declaring its support for his leadership. With even the "liberal" Wafd party allying itself with the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1984 parliamentary elections, who could blame him?

The Islamist insurgency in the south of Egypt during the 1990s far surpassed any other threat Copts had been subjected to in modern times. As the government lost effective control of the south, Copts were left at the mercy of Islamist groups. Numerous large attacks left Copts dead in Abu Qurqas, Manfalout, Imbaba, Temma, Asyut, Kafr Dimiana, El Badary, Abu Qurqas and Ezbet Daoud. In many villages in the south, Copts were required to pay the jizya and those who didn't met violent deaths. Coptic jewellery stores were a prime target of attacks by Islamists seeking avenues to finance their operations. Though unnoticed at the time, the severity of the attacks led to a massive Coptic emigration from the south to the suburbs and slums of Cairo. Some managed to escape further - to the West.

The government met the insurgency with massive violence. Hundreds of Islamists were killed and thousands arrested and tortured. But more important in the long run was the government's attempt to out-Islamize the Islamists. Mubarak's government aimed to take control of Islam and monopolize it for its goals. By entering a competition on who was more Islamic, the government, without realizing it, was helping the Islamists' cause and further Islamizing Egyptian society.

The main tool in the hands of the government was the official religious establishment represented by Al Azhar. In order to win over the conservative institution, the power of Al Azhar was increased, giving it the right to confiscate and ban books deemed deviant from the official interpretation of Islam. While the move aimed to target Islamist writings, secular writers paid the heaviest price. Islamic messages increased in the media and in educational textbooks. While the educational policy was later reversed, the damage was already done. Textbooks could be changed, but the minds of teachers could not.

While the Islamist insurgency was eventually defeated by force, more problematic for Copts was the increase in random mob violence by non-politicized Egyptian citizens against them. The increased participation of their neighbours and co-workers in violent attacks against them alarmed Copts the most. A massacre in El Kosheh on 2 January 2000, which left twenty-one Copts dead after three days of uncontrolled mob violence, was a prime example. Mob attacks often started after a rumour of a church being built, a sexual relation between a Christian man and a Muslim woman, or a supposed insult to Islam at the hands of a Copt. The details of each attack varied but the end result did not. These attacks always resulted in homes burnt, shops looted and the police forcing a reconciliation session that meant no perpetrator was ever put on trial and punished. The mob had good reason to believe that it could attack Copts with no reprisal.

With the end of the Islamist insurgency, Mubarak was willing to be more accommodating to the Coptic plight. In 2000, permits for thirty-five new churches and two hundred for renovations were granted. In 2005, Mubarak delegated governors the authority to handle renovation petitions while retaining the authority over the building of new churches. While in some governates, his decision helped ease the situation for Copts, in others the fanaticism of local officials ensured that little was done to solve the problem. Copts continued to be underrepresented in all elected and governmental positions. There were no Coptic university presidents, deans of departments, or heads of public companies. Coptic representation in the military and police force was capped at a bare minimum. In 2002, Mubarak made another gesture towards Copts by returning most of their confiscated endowment land and declaring Coptic Christmas as a national holiday.

The last years of Mubarak's rule witnessed a significant opening of the political and media spheres in the country. Pressured by President George W. Bush's "Freedom Agenda," the Egyptian regime was forced to allow the opposition more political space. The political and media opening helped shed some light on the Coptic problem and the discrimination Copts faced though it resulted in no practical solutions. The Egyptian state insisted there was no Coptic problem and Islamists shared that sentiment and maintained that Copts were the luckiest minority in the world. Others resorted to leftist interpretations that aimed to portray the Coptic problem as one of class discrimination. Some members of the Coptic elite continued to deny the existence of the problem consoling themselves that the discrimination and persecution remained rampant in faraway villages and hoping that their denial might help them continue living peacefully. Their fantasies were of little help as the attacks kept occurring closer to their doorsteps.

The Egyptian elite in general continued to live in a state of denial arguing that everyone suffered equally under Mubarak. Politicians and academics lamented a golden age under Egyptian liberalism before the arrival of money and Wahabist ideas from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states when there was no Coptic problem, an age that existed only in their imagination.

After Tahrir ...

The fall of the Mubarak regime in February 2011 unleashed a monumental and contagious wave of optimism. Images of Christians and Muslims holding hands in Tahrir Square were broadcast around the world and gave credence to the narrative that a new more liberal and democratic Egypt was being born. The truth was entirely different.

Copts were never enthusiastic about the revolution. Perhaps it was the wisdom of centuries of persecution that taught minorities the eternal lesson of survival: that the persecuting dictator was always preferable to the mob. The ruler, after all, could be bought off or persuaded to back off , or constrained by foreign powers - but with the mob, you stood no chance. Some of the Coptic youth were lured by the promise of a liberal Egypt in which their plight might finally come to an end, but the older generation knew better.

The promises of January 2011 soon gave way to the reality of May, when the churches of Imbaba were attacked, and October, the time of the Maspero massacre. The complete collapse of the police and the state's repression apparatus liberated Islamists from any constraints. On the national level, Islamists soon swept elections and dominated the political sphere; on the local level, Islamists, much more emboldened by the rise of their brethren nationally and the collapse of the police were asserting their power on Egyptian streets and villages and enforcing their views. While their leaders, such as the Muslim Brotherhood's Deputy General Guide, Khairat El Shater, were proclaiming their goal of the "Islamization of life," local Islamists were making that goal a reality on the ground.

Patterns of persecution continued after the revolution and were reinforced. The number and scope of the attacks swelled dramatically and they were no longer limited to obscure villages or shantytowns, but spread to the streets of Cairo and in front of the official television headquarters. Church buildings were attacked and burned, mob violence against Copts was on the rise, and the new horror of forced evacuations from villages was becoming more common. Copts in small villages were increasingly forced to adhere to the Islamists' standards and vision enforced on the ground. Accusations of blasphemy and insulting religion rose with Copts as their primary targets. The most worrisome aspect for Copts remains the participation of their neighbours, co-workers and people they had grown up with in attacking them. Even if the Egyptian state ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood miraculously decided to intervene, the local hatreds are now impossible to contain.

On the national level, the picture is also gloomy. While the Muslim Brotherhood paid lip service to Western and Coptic concerns before its ascent to power promising equality and freedom for all, once it came to power, those promises were forgotten. The dynamics of Egyptian politics and the rise of the Salafi s and the threat they pose to the Muslim Brotherhood ensured that the Muslim Brotherhood would not attempt to address Coptic grievances. The Muslim Brotherhood insisted on using sectarian rhetoric that inflames local angers against Copts, and its leaders used Copts as scapegoats for the problems Egypt faces from train accidents to opposition demonstrations. The new Egyptian Constitution, passed in December 2012, further enshrined both the Islamic nature of the state and second class status for Copts.

The Islamists' goal is not the annihilation of Copts. Copts are not likely to face a holocaust in the future, though local pogroms are all but guaranteed. The Islamists' goal is to subjugate Copts to their notions of their proper place as dhimmis under benevolent Islamic rule. It is for Copts to accept dhimmitude, live by it and embrace it. Copts will be allowed to live in Egypt, tolerated as second-class citizens recognizing and accepting their second-class status. Any attempt by Copts to break those chains of dhimmitude and act as equals is frowned upon as an affront to the supremacy and primacy of Islam in its own land.

The Coptic Church in the balance

Indisputably, there is today a Coptic nation. But it is not a nation that seeks to achieve independence and statehood. That nation is neither racial nor, after the loss of the Coptic language, is it based on a distinct language or on purely religious lines. Instead, it is a nation that is founded on the unique history of a church. It is a nation, as S.S. Hassan described it, whose topography is invisible. The nature of the dangers facing that nation have varied throughout its history from assimilation in an imagined liberal Egypt, to the erosion of Coptic uniqueness, the threat of Protestant missionaries and of modernity and its discontents.

Today, this nation faces a more serious threat. It can fight back against persecution, although overwhelming odds lined up against it assure its defeat. It can accept dhimmitude and live as second-class citizens, or it can withdraw inside the walls of its ancient church finding comfort within those walls.

The prospects for Copts in Egypt are, to say the least, bleak. Unlike the Jewish emigrants escaping Egypt in the 1940s and 50s, for Copts driven out of their ancestral homeland there is no Israel to escape to. Nor does their overall percentage in Egypt allow them to play a key role in shaping its future. The only option in front of them is to pack their bags and leave, putting an end to two thousand years of Christianity in Egypt.

A new wave of Coptic emigration has already started and it is immense. Most are heading to the countries their brethren settled in past decades: the United States, Canada and Australia. Richer Copts are buying houses in Cyprus and with it receiving residence there, while Georgia is becoming a favoured destination for their poorer brethren. The sad reality, however, is that not all of them will be able to flee. There is simply no place in the West for millions of Coptic immigrants. In the end, those Copts with better English and skills will be able to escape, leaving their poorer brethren behind. The community will lose its best elements, those who provide jobs for their brethren, those who donate to the church, further elevating its misery.

When Copts leave Egypt, it is not only a loss to them and their church. A country and region will lose a portion of its identity and history. Devoutly religious, Copts point to the promises of the Lord in Isaiah 19:19 of the altar to the Lord in the heart of Egypt, and to the Coptic Church's history. Coptic history has been an endless story of decline and despair, but it has also been a story of survival, endurance in the face of persecution, and the courage and blood of martyrs becoming the seeds of the church. Persecution has taken its toll on the church and on Copts, but Coptic history has also been a story of triumph amid despair and of the Lord's protection of his people.

Under the Coptic Cathedral in Cairo are the relics of two men: St. Mark, who brought the message of Christ to the Egyptians and ultimately shed his blood on its soil, and St. Athanasius, the defender of faith and the man who stood against the whole world and kept the Orthodox faith alive. It is as if the cathedral and the whole Coptic Church stands on those two pillars, martyrdom and faith.

Pope Tawadros II, who rose to the throne of St. Mark on 18 November 2012, faces enormous challenges. He has declared his intention to focus on organizing the Coptic Church internally and has already undertaken some very positive initiatives in that regard - but, no matter what his intentions are, he will inevitably find himself forced to deal with the growing plight of his people.

The Coptic exodus from Egypt will pose a colossal challenge to the Coptic Church. Today the Coptic Church has more than 550 churches outside of Egypt. At a moment in the not so distant future, the centre of gravity of the Coptic Church will no longer be inside Egypt's borders. The nature of this challenge is one the church has never faced before and is currently ill-equipped to address: How to become a truly universal church and open up the Coptic Church to the rest of Christendom while maintaining its uniqueness? How to keep both the Christian faith of the new immigrants who will move to Western countries and the specific Coptic identity in face of an open market competition between Christian denominations? What does being Coptic actually mean for those living outside of Egypt's borders? How to provide for the material needs of the new immigrants who cling to the church not only seeking spiritual guidance? And how to cater to the ones who remain and whose lives will be increasingly difficult. These are all open questions that await history's judgment.

Samuel Tadros is a Research Fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Religious Freedom. He is the author of Motherland Lost: The Egyptian and Coptic Quest for Modernity, published by Hoover Institution Press, from which this article is an edited extract.