a response to people playing with nihilism

Critique:

A naturalistic critique of anything which is entails that the critic–at the times that the critic agrees with the critique– thinks that at least something (or some phenomenon more broadly) which is not absolutely identical to that which is should be. A critique is not merely an appraisal or an evaluation–although it is an evaluation of a specific kind– it is an evaluation that looks for what ought to be and ought not be that attempts to find ways that something (or some phenomena) could be better. Naturalistic critique of that which is entails a separation between what is and what could be and what is and what should be while looking at what is possible to find out what should be. Critique implies that at least some phenomenon ought to be better according to some valued criteria–that there is an alternative to something (or phenomenon) that the critic thinks ought to be. The difference between what is and what could be and what is and what should be allows us to hope for something different than that which is. For an ought to be a naturalistic ought–that is an ought that is naturalistically possible– the should needs to be embedded within what can be becoming. There may be a-conditional abstract prescriptions that are not possible–such as snapping one’s fingers to provide access to food for every human for free with food that they all enjoy– but they are distinct from should statements that are actually possible (what I called above a naturalistic ought that is consistent with and derivative from the classic “ought implies can” from Kant). If what a person is saying ought to be is something that actually can be, then the prescribed should is objectively grounded within potentiality.

Hope:

Hope is an aspiration for something (or at least some phenomenon) to happen. If there are at least some aspirations that are possible, then at least some hope is objectively grounded in potentiality. Such a hope is naturalistic but is not necessarily ethical. At least some aspirations are actually possible–for example people have aspired to want a specific kind of food and then acquired it, and people have wanted to cross the street and then crossed it, and people have aspired to abolish an unjust law and then helped to abolish it, and people have aspired towards instituting a new freedom and then helped to institute it, and people have aspired towards having a revolution that then actuates in part through such aspirations of many people (combined with many other factors beyond mere aspirations). If it is true that the above examples have happened, then at least some hope has been objectively grounded in potentiality throughout history, and through a strong inductive claim we know that at least some developing aspirations are objectively grounded in potentiality if we merely grant that some people will want to cross the street later on and succeed at doing so or want to eat an apple and then eat an apple. If people do things they do in part because of the aspirations that they have, then such aspirations are causal factors for various kinds of actions and effects–whether or not such hope is grounded in what is naturalistically possible (for example someone or some collective with supernatural hope might act differently because of such supernatural aspirations even though they are not naturalistically possible).

Hope does not imply optimism. Optimism claims that things will get better or are likely to get better. Naturalistic hope can be optimistic but it does not have to be. There is nothing about thinking that things could and should get better that entails any kind of attribution of likeliness to such an aspiration. Naturalistic and ethical hope can be pessimistic or ambivalent about any statistical likelihood about what ought to be actuating.

Rational Hope:

At least some hope is both an aspiration and something that is objectively grounded in potentiality (naturalistically possible) and rooted in developmental approximations of what ought to be (or ought to be permissible) in regards to means, ends, character traits, relations, and institutions as characteristically prescribed by virtuous persons and virtuous collectives. This can be seen in various historical examples such as people hoping to abolish unjust laws that were then abolished–such as but by no means limited to abolishing some laws that legalized slavery– that virtuous persons and collectives would characteristically want to abolish. Given that there are some laws that ought to be abolished that still exist and given historical precedent, there are other unjust laws that could and should be abolished. Aspiring to abolish such unjust laws would be rational hope. For hope to be rational it must not only be possible; it must have good reasons– that is ethical reasons which can only happen through gradations of the virtues constitutive of good reasons– including but not limited to phronesis, sophia, beneficence, compassion, epistemic virtues, etc. Such rational hope is objectively rooted in potentiality but is not merely possible but ethical. Such an ethical hope–which is distinct from theological hope– is the right kind of hope, for the right reasons, with the right intentions, towards the right ends, etc. If such a hope is for something (or some phenomenon) that is not identical to that which is, then there must be an evaluative critique of that which is in relation to other possibilities and good criteria if the hope is to be something that ought to be or ought to be permissible according to virtuous rationality.

There is nothing about thinking phenomena could and should get better that entails one’s ethics are actually good. There could be–and are– actual possibilities that people have hope for that ought not exist. It is possible for conditions and relations to get better or worse in various ways according to good ethical criteria–which is an objective ground for both rational hope and rational fear. Something being a potential, or attributed as an ethical potential, is not equivalent to that potential actually corresponding to what ought to be developmental ethical criteria according to good reasoning.