Civilians at the Pentagon who specialize in military decision-making warned earlier this spring about the optics of a plan to deploy 1,500 U.S. troops to the Middle East following intelligence assessments that Iran posed new, dangerous threats to Americans and their allies in the region.

Despite subsequent assurances from the Pentagon that the surge would serve only to protect U.S. forces in the Middle East – and did not represent some sort of buildup ahead of a preemptive attack against the Islamic Republic – members of the civilian policy staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, known as OSD, expressed deep concern that the high-profile deployment of uniformed troops at a particularly volatile time posed an unnecessary risk of escalation.

But the civilians' concerns were overruled by the military's logic: The deployment of more troops served as a necessary bulwark against the increasingly unpredictable threats to American lives. The final decision, which then-acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan approved, served as yet another example of uniformed military advice winning out.

What had previously been two cohorts of defense professionals – military and civilian – designed to approach problems differently but ultimately to work together has become an imbalance of power, many current and former officials say. Uniformed members of the military serving on the Joint Staff under its outgoing chairman, Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, have in recent years sought and won more influence over the decisions that govern how their troops fight and die in foreign war zones. A perception continues to grow among the civilian staffers within the offices of the defense secretary – the ultimate authority on military matters – that they have become ostracized from the critical work that leads to the decisions top leaders up to the president ultimately make, fundamentally undermining the concept of civilian control of the military.

At the center of the concern is a specially created position known as the "global force integrator" – an official meant to be the ultimate authority on identifying where U.S. military resources, including the troops themselves, are needed most and who makes the final recommendation on where to dispatch them. Congress in 2016 quietly bestowed the role upon the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in legislation that allows the top officer to serve as the principal adjudicator among military planners on threats the U.S. faces and how it should respond. It's a role Dunford has considered essential and sought for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The chairman's camp says the new responsibilities have "transformed" the role of the nation's top military officer. They represent a subtle but dramatic shift turning the position that was originally designed to be the "principal military adviser to the president" into the principal official considering global tradeoffs, broadening the scope of advice the chairman was tasked with providing.

Most of those familiar with the inner workings of Pentagon decision-making in the 21st century agree about the need for a position dedicated to understanding existing and future threats to the U.S., broader themes like great power competition with China and Russia, and the complex work of determining how to allocate limited assets. But many question whether that role should be held by military officers.

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"That's a job that belongs to civilians," says Nora Bensahel, professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. "The civilian authorities of the Defense Department should be making those kinds of calls, and you need a strong OSD in order to be able to do so. You're talking about decisions that have enormous strategic consequences."

Elevating the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to that position essentially relegates the civilians to making yes-or-no decisions about going to war, while the military leaders in the department have planned many of the other details, Bensahel says.

"That's deeply problematic," she says.

The military counterparts to the secretary's civilian offices were formed originally to support the top officers from each of the services – the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They, by policy, leave the military's chain of command for the privilege of advising top civilian leaders directly, including the president.

Two major factors created the current imbalance, those familiar with the process say: Dunford's purposeful, and overt , reorganization of how the uniformed military prioritizes the threats its forces face with an eye toward how to best position its limited resources as well as an increased deference to military advice within the Pentagon in recent decades – but particularly during the Obama and Trump administrations.

The resulting realities for civilians within the military has driven out many career staffers, causing an atrophy of its work force and leaving long-lasting consequences within the Pentagon.

Civilian Power

Dunford has earned a reputation as a thoughtful, dedicated leader who has built a storied career defined by decades of experience in foreign U.S. wars and more recently as a critical linchpin in addressing American foes such as Russia. One former civilian official speaking privately acknowledged the Joint Staff's accumulation of influence but referenced the turbulence of military decisionmaking under the Trump administration and added, "If it's Dunford making the decisions, then color me relieved." Indeed many, including those who have criticized his actions, applaud his ability to maintain steady management in tumultuous times.

But others expressed concern about the precedent the new responsibilities set for the chairman's role, which Army Gen. Mark Milley will inherit on Sept. 30 when Dunford steps down, and for yet-unknown successors in the near future.

Dunford himself declined to be interviewed for this story, but his spokesman pushes back on any assertions that efforts to, as he says, quickly "enable the secretary of defense and the president to make globally informed decisions" has in any way undermined a chain of command with civilians at the top.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Joseph Dunford, second from left, attends a meeting of military leaders at the White House in April. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

"There has been no weakening of civilian control over the military," Air Force Col. Patrick Ryder tells U.S. News. "Everything the chairman and the Joint Staff do is done under the principles of civilian control of the military."

Ryder points out that the chairman exercises "no operational control" over any American troops and that his work is purely advisory, in keeping with the laws and rules that govern his position.

"In fact, the Joint Staff's global integration efforts are all focused on enhancing the ability of the secretary and DOD civilian policymakers to make globally informed decisions as they lead the Department of Defense in today's complex strategic environment," Ryder says.

However, a bipartisan commission formed by Congress last year expressed deep concern about the growing divide between civilians and their military counterparts at the Pentagon – and the latter group's beefed-up influence.

"Civilian voices have been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian control," the National Defense Strategy Commission wrote in its final report after studying the latest strategy document then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis created to guide Pentagon policy for the coming years.

Without referencing him by name, the report cited Gen. Dunford's "effort to centralize defense direction" and warned of "profound strategic problems" if civilians fail to regain control of managing America's global forces.

Stifled Generals

Efforts by Dunford and his team to bolster the influence of the Joint Staff began over the last few years. The congressionally approved language enshrining the responsibility to serve as the ultimate military adjudicator of threats across the globe – and to provide those conclusions directly to the secretary – appeared in the military's budget document for 2017, known as the National Defense Authorization Act. It included new language stating the chairman should be responsible "in matters relating to global military strategic and operational integration" and "advising the secretary on the allocation and transfer of forces among geographic and functional combatant commands" to address threats that exist across regions and arenas of war.

Many who spoke with U.S. News debated what originally prompted the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to need these additional responsibilities. Some referenced stories of President Lyndon Johnson's specifying to his commanders which bridges to bomb in Vietnam as an example of the kind of micromanagement that a generation of officers instilled in their successors – like Dunford – to work to avoid.

Others cited much more recent trends, specifically the Obama administration's perceived centralization of military planning at the White House, stifling generals' ability to carry out wars as they believed they should, followed by an absence of direction with what many consider the Trump administration's mismanagement, resulting in troubling levels of vacancies among top civilian jobs.

In his new book released earlier this month, former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis issued a blistering critique of former President Barack Obama's handling of the Iraq War, which the former Marine general who fought alongside Dunford says became mired by political rhetoric that didn't match realities on the ground. While serving as the civilian Pentagon chief under Trump, Mattis reportedly expressed frustration that he was unable to direct the department as he wished or even hire those he preferred for top positions amid White House imposition.

"Civilian voices have been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian control."

Dunford believes that America's enemies have changed and, as a result, the way the military makes decisions needs to change in kind.

"Previously, we assumed that threats against the U.S. could be regionally contained," Ryder says. "Today that's no longer true. Decisions have to be made faster; threats are no longer limited to specific geographical regions; and warfare spans all domains, including land, sea, air, space and cyberspace."

The military has changed the way it plans, makes decisions, manages its force – using direction from civilian leaders, Ryder says – and prepares for what the military will look like in the future.

"The bottom line is we do all this to enable the secretary of defense and the president to make globally informed decisions at the speed of relevance in today's complex security environment."

Regardless of the source of the change, those who have worked at the Pentagon cite a noticeable difference as a result of Dunford's tenure.

"It was a palpable change when Dunford came in," says Mara Karlin, a former defense official with deep experience managing strategy planning on the civilian side of the Pentagon, ultimately becoming the deputy assistant secretary for strategy in 2015 – Dunford's first year as chairman.

The Islamic State group at the time had reached the height of its onslaught spanning a massive swathe of the Middle East, routing an Iraqi army that American troops had fought and died to build over the prior decade. And Dunford did not seem to believe his position was as influential as he thought it should be.

"Dunford felt the need to consolidate power because he didn't really see the chairman's role as sufficiently empowered, and he saw challenges as increasingly global, increasingly multi-domain, and thought there needed to be someone senior to make the call," Karlin says. "His view is, the chairman should make that call."

Officials who spoke with U.S. News say the transition began under then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter – Obama's last Pentagon chief – who reportedly enjoyed a particularly good relationship with Dunford and was amenable to granting his staff greater authorities in planning for the decisions he would ultimately approve.

That sense of empowerment reportedly took off under his successor, Mattis, who knew Dunford intimately from their shared experiences in war. As Trump's first defense secretary struggled to find candidates to fill positions that the White House would approve, he willingly deferred much of those planning responsibilities to Dunford, officials say.

Neither Carter nor Mattis responded to requests to comment for this story.

Some who oversaw the work of the commission that warned about the military's outsized influence and others who advised the Joint Staff on creating the new integrator policy push back against claims Dunford sought to accumulate power for himself. They say he was simply responding to inherent shortcomings in civilians' ability to oversee Pentagon policy.

"When you don't have civilians who know how to make those decisions and what questions to ask and make sure policy aligns with practice and practice aligns with policy, you're going to have a distorted relationship," says Paul Hughes, a retired Army colonel who served as executive director of the National Defense Strategy Commission.

The legislation that helped form the modern Joint Chiefs of Staff – the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act – also spurred a revolution within the military of how it trains its officers, picking the most promising ones to break from their traditional career paths to attend elite military schools designed to challenge their thinking and prepare them for top-level positions. At these posts, they won't only have to plan and advise leaders about complex and complicated enemies but also balance how the U.S. employs its finite resources to address those threats without leaving vulnerabilities elsewhere.

Such an institutional system for creating thinkers to address these problems does not exist on the civilian side of the Defense Department, nor are there as many career paths that allow aspiring leaders to move as freely between jobs associated with their primary responsibilities and opportunities that prepare them for the future. That difference has led to a divide between the level of preparation given to military officers and their civilian counterparts.

"If you don't have stronger civilian oversight, you may have activities by the military under the chairman that, while it may solve short-term problems, may produce something that longer-term causes problems," Hughes says.

Transforming the Role

Dunford's supporters and top advisers have touted the global integrator role as a key component of his tenure as chairman. Former Air Force Gen. Paul Selva, who stepped down from his role as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs in July, described the position to a group of reporters before he retired as important, and underreported .

In a glowing column earlier this month, writer David Ignatius of The Washington Post described an admonition from the storied World War II-era Army Gen. Omar Bradley that sits on Dunford's desk, warning his staff against the "luxury" of considering only potential foes within a particular region rather than addressing global threats. And he hints at the efforts Dunford has undertaken to consolidate influence within the military toward a global strategy, not one divided as "separate fiefdoms." And that effort is designed to fill a void created by a "decayed" National Security Council at the White House.

"Some grouse that the joint staff is now too powerful," Ignatius wrote, "but it helped fill a dangerous vacuum."

The supposed grousing is not limited to the authorities Dunford has acquired but how other officers who take over his position in the future may wield them.

Issues of civilian oversight of the military arose during Defense Secretary Mark Esper's confirmation process to become the current Pentagon chief. In his written responses to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee, the former Army officer and Raytheon lobbyist denied any troubling trends in that regard, disagreeing with the National Defense Strategy Commission's findings.

"Civilian leaders within the department continue to exercise their necessary authorities and responsibilities for U.S. defense and national security policy, while working closely with the military leadership. If confirmed, I will continue to stress the importance of close collaboration between civilian and military personnel," he wrote.

Responding to a specific question about the global force integrator position, he stressed that he would serve as the "ultimate approval authority" for those decisions.

His response and subsequent public statements to the same effect prompted praise from Karlin, the former Pentagon strategy planner, and others who worked at the Pentagon in recent months, urging Esper to do more.

It's too early in Esper's tenure, however, to determine whether he has the clout to follow through on these pledges. A relative unknown outside of Washington and reportedly not a close confidante of Trump's, it remains unclear whether he has the ability, should he disagree, to offset the advice of Milley, who reportedly has formed a solid working relationship with the unpredictable president.

As Ignatius documented, Dunford has demonstrated steadiness as a leader and calm determination in his last active duty post to protect himself and his staff from the perennial tumultuousness of political influence, which in recent years has tainted the reputations of many of the general's former colleagues.

Those familiar with how the military makes decisions hope his successors will demonstrate similar restraint. For his part, Dunford and his staff believe that future chairmen must maintain these responsibilities.