Analysis: Real Madrid

Real Madrid set up in a 4-3-3 in possession, with Casemiro, Luka Modric and Dani Ceballos operating as a midfield three behind Lucas Vazquez, Vinicius Junior and lone forward Karim Benzema. Madrid dominated the ball, with 66 per cent possession through the game, but came up against a very organised and compact low block from Sevilla.

The hosts tended to use Vazquez and Vinicius to provide the width, and play to their feet for them to receive and dribble inside. These dribbles inevitably attracted several opposition players, which created spaces elsewhere for the ball to be released and the attack to continue. Madrid also looked to exploit the Sevilla defence’s tendency to drop with their forwards with the use of runners from deep. Modric and Ceballos would often look to receive in the half-space and drive towards the Sevilla full-backs; as the full-back began to commit, the Madrid central midfielders could use the overlapping run of their full-back, or the already high and wide positioning of their attackers, to create a two-on-one.

The difficulty Madrid then had was that Sevilla would still have strong numbers in their own area, so both crosses and cut-backs were often intercepted or cleared. With space limited between and in behind the Sevilla lines, the hosts created very few clear-cut chances and were largely limited to shots from distance – fortunately for them, one such effort from Casemiro got past Tomas Vaclik in the Sevilla goal to give Madrid a late lead that Modric extended in added time.

Real spent very little time out of possession, but when they did they used a few different structures. In the Sevilla half, they matched their front three up against the opposition back three, with Dani Carvajal and Sergio Reguilon pressing the Sevilla wing-backs if they received the ball; this would leave Sergio Ramos and Rapahel Varane two-versus-two against the Sevilla forwards, although the opposite full-back could tuck round if the ball hadn’t been played down his side.

The crucial element to this strategy was the use of the Madrid central midfielders to track runners. As Carvajal and Reguilon would travel a long way up the pitch to press, there would be a large space between them and their nearest centre-back – but Casemiro took responsibility for tracking in these areas, although Ceballos occasionally helped out in these areas too.

In Madrid’s half, the structure became more of a 4-4-2, with Modric usually joining Benzema on the top line. Vinicius and Vazquez would tuck in alongside Casemiro and Ceballos in midfield, and would track the Sevilla wing-backs all the way to the Madrid penalty box if necessary. Modric would rejoin the midfield line should the ball bypass him and Benzema, to avoid a three-on-two underload in central areas. Finally, the hosts would also use a quick counter-press upon losing possession, if they had players near to the ball with sufficient access.