By Patrick BAHZAD



Social media, news outlets and TV networks are buzzing with information about a possible build-up to another Russian/Syrian/Iranian offensive in NW Syria. Looking at some hard evidence available, then cross-referencing and analysing it, here is a guess - as good as any I suppose - about where the next "big one" is going to start.

Let's be up-front about this: this is all conjecture. Besides, any future offensive conducted by SAA troops, probably reinforced by Hezbollah infantry and possibly IRGC units, will not be about a final and decisive push all the way to Aleppo.

The built-up to such a large scale operation will take some time still, if it is going to take place at all. Manpower, equipment, logistics, command and control, close air support, all these aspects would have to be taken carefully into consideration. Going into Aleppo is not going to be a "walk in the park".

However, if push comes to shove, it has got to come from somewhere and that is the only question up for debate in this post. There are many ways to examine existing evidence in order to make a forecast about coming events, and it is not necessary to do a full spectrum analysis to give a realistic assessment.

In this case, we'll just take two data sets and cross-reference them. It is a simple version of "proxy comparative analysis". The methodological advantage resides in its simplicity, but the methodological bias also resides in the aforementioned simplicity. Overall, it is only valid as one method among others, that is, as a corroborating element in an evidence chain.

The two data sets that have been cross-referenced are the following:

location and intensity of ongoing SAA offensives (Rastan enclave, North Hama salient and Ghab plain)

concomitance and number of RuAF strikes on targets close to the "frontline"; hits against targets deep in rebel controlled areas have not been taken into account, as they follow a different logic.

Putting together these two data sets, it appears that the ongoing Syrian offensives only occured after or simultanesouly with a large number RuAF strikes. There is one notable exception to this rule and that is the engagement in Ghab plain, which can be explained by the nature of the terrain, the extensive use of Russian attack helicopters in this area and the maximum number of "sorties" the Russians can conduct at the moment.

Based on this model, it also appears that one area has been consistently hit by the RuAF over the past few days, without triggering any major ground operation (yet). This area is located NE of Latakia.

Therefore, considering the methodological limits of this exercise, it would look probable that the next "big" government push into rebel territory is going to happen in this area - as forecast previously on SST - in the triangle of Kibilli, Al Haffah and Slinfah.

Such a possibility seems all the more likely that the mountainous terrain will make close air support through fighter jets more difficult, even more so with the nearby Turkish border, and fighting is likely to involve mostly infantry units, against entrenched rebel positions. Russian attack helicopters may be used as support, but will incur a higher risk.

Given that we still haven't seen large Hezbollah units engaged in any of the three offensives currently taking place, and considering that rebel units have been stretched thin along a front line that goes now from North Hama to North-East Latakia, a powerful thrust by a large infrantry force on the northern flank of the rebel held territory seems a distinct possibility.

To be discussed ...