In a rare display of European unity, the EU27 vowed to make the European Union “stronger and more resilient" through greater solidarity and "respect of common rules." But let us not fool ourselves. Differences of opinion over the future of Europe and its politics still loom large. They are not only driven by disagreement over specific policies but by fundamental questions of democracy and rule of law — and they are unlikely to be resolved by a "multi-speed Europe."

Take Hungary and Poland. Both countries have loudly rejected the idea of a “multi-speed Europe,” which made a comeback as a possible scenario for the future of the bloc in the European Commission's white paper. And yet, as part of the Visegrád Four — alongside the Czech Republic and Slovakia — the two have railed against a common asylum policy that would introduce burden-sharing among member states and are nowhere close to adopting the euro.

More important, Hungary and Poland have drifted away from basic values of liberal democracy. The Hungarian parliament has just passed a higher education bill that will make it virtually impossible for the George Soros-funded Central European Unversity from operating and granting both Hungarian and U.S. degrees. In December last year, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said that the coming 12 months "will be about the squeezing out of Soros and the powers that symbolize him.”

The country's parliament is also likely to soon pass legislation that will impose new restrictions on the operation of foreign-funded non-governmental organizations — or "agent organizations," in the words of János Halász, a member of Orbán's governing Fidesz party.

The leaked details of the new bill on NGOs include strict registration and disclosure requirements for NGOs receiving more than $25 thousand in funding from abroad. Although it bears a striking resemblance to the infamous Russian law requiring organizations that receive foreign funding to register as “foreign agents,” the Hungarian government has dismissed the parallel. The law, it says, is simply a less strict version of the Foreign Agents Registration Act adopted in the United States in 1938, in response to the threat of Nazi propaganda.

Brussels should not forget that Central Europe’s aspiring autocrats have an Achilles heel: they need the EU.

What Orbán’s government argument fails to consider is that the U.S. legislation applies narrowly to organizations and individuals involved in political activities — not foreign-funded NGOs per se. And since its 1966 revision, FARA has resulted in exactly zero successful criminal prosecutions, according to the U.S. Justice Department.

It is not the first time that Hungary’s government has taken a hardline position on NGOs. Two years ago, Hungarian authorities harassed a civil organization responsible for distribution of the so-called Norway Grants — aid that Norway provides to some EU countries — accusing it of corruption and raiding its offices. The only thing the court found to be unlawful was the raid itself.

Since taking office in 2010, Orbán has clamped down on opposition. First, he amended the constitution to curtail the power of the constitutional court and, ahead of major elections, he tailored election laws to benefit Fidesz. When he won reelection in 2014, he lost any remaining inhibitions. In a speech later that summer, he vowed to end liberal democracy and install an illiberal state modeled after Russia and Turkey.

Borrowing from the same playbook, Jarosław Kaczyński — leader of the governing Law and Justice Party and Poland's shadow ruler — promised in 2011 that “there will be a day when we'll have a Budapest in Warsaw.” His party's victory in October 2015 parliamentary elections was followed by an attack on the independence of the country's constitutional tribunal and journalists in public broadcasting organizations.

European institutions are at a loss for answers on how to deal with Hungary's promised crackdown on NGOs. The Hungarian government's decision was, at least in part, catalyzed by Donald Trump’s upset electoral victory in Washington, but even the current U.S. administration appears to be taking a more critical view of the situation than the EU. A report released after Rex Tillerson’s appointment as U.S. secretary of state provides detailed evidence of human rights violations against asylum seekers and the key challenges to upholding the rule of law in Hungary.

Meanwhile, with the exception of the refugee question, Brussels is eager to maintain the peace with Fidesz, a member of the mainstream European People’s Party. And the rule of law procedure the Commission initiated against the Polish government over its constitutional crisis has stalled — and looks unlikely to get over the impasse.

Brussels should not forget that Central Europe’s aspiring autocrats have an Achilles heel: they need the EU. Hungary's foreign minister may say “To us, Hungary comes first,” but, in per capita terms, his country is among the largest recipients of EU funds.

In Poland, the expected influx of EU funds — €112 billion over the coming years — is by far the largest element of the Polish government's "Morawiecki Plan" aimed at reviving domestic investment and boosting growth. At the same time, Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski has called for Poles to “drastically reduce [their] level of trust in the EU” and to start “playing a very aggressive game.”

If the leaders of Hungary and Poland are determined to undo the progress that their countries have seen since 1989, Brussels cannot stop them. However, by reminding the Visegrad countries just how much they have gained from their EU membership, European institutions can make it clear what it is at stake — and remind them that there is no reason for European taxpayers to pay the bills for the region’s aspiring authoritarians.

Máté Hajba is director of the Free Market Foundation in Budapest. Dalibor Rohac is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.