In the face of recent development in China – the abolition of presidential term limits and the fear that the country would slide from autocracy into dictatorship – Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng say the “right way” to judge Chinese governance is not to see it through our Western lens. They simply mean to say: “Leave China alone” and it does not have to live up to the “Western expectations.” Besides the current global order – Pax Americana – is unravelling, and the world “is shifting from a unipolar to a multipolar system.”

China derides liberal democracy and decries Western criticism of its governance model. Indeed, Beijing had during Trump’s campaign laughed at the pitfalls and perils of Western democracy, which has been undermined by “serious internal threats” like the rise of populism that advocates nativism, protectionism and against globalisation, from which Beijing has hugely benefitted. Its vast pool of cheap labour helped keep prices down in the West, fuelling resentments among the working class in Europe and the US.

Unlike most major economies, China had survived the 2008 global financial crisis and thrived. The West was totally ill prepared, because governments overspent for years and ran high deficits to keep the welfare state afloat and secure their re-elections. When they had to borrow massively to stabilise the economy, austerity measures were implemented. Their inability to manage the economic meltdown and failure to address social grievances resulting from income inequality and dwindling living standards, enable populists to beat mainstream parties in elections.

The “political polarization, rising debt, and failing infrastructure” in Europe and across the US underlie China’s argument that Western democracy is dysfunctional, and vindicate its form of governance as a bulwark against disruptive forces that would jeopardise the country’s long-term goal to secure economic growth and stability. So seeing Xi’s “growing authority” as a “dangerous trend,” may just be a distraction from the “anxiety over growing challenges to democracy” in the West.

The authors say China under Xi does not seek to emulate the “failure” that dogs Western democracies, which embrace this “short-termism.” They say the “short electoral cycles” in the West force politicians to pander to voters and focus on “cyclical issues” instead of “structural impediments to long-term productivity gains and income growth.” These myopic policies are not always optimal, offering only instant or short-term solutions, while politicians often “neglect long-term risks and opportunities.”

But the Chinese leadership is risk averse, and has little appetite for a trial-and-error process. In the West disaffected voters have the choice to unseat their politicians in the ballot box, hoping that those elected would deliver. Chinese citizens can not vote and escape the iron grip of their Communist Party. Perhaps its cadres foresee the logisitic headache of holding elections cyclically in a country with 1.4 billion inhabitants. With more than one political party vying for power, it will spell the end of the Communists’ monopoly power.

The authors say Chinese leaders indulge in long-term planning “in terms of decades,” and Xi has “set a 30-year target for modernizing the country’s economy and governance – a long-term goal that reflects the kind of vision that few countries have managed to articulate, let alone implement.” This should justify the removal of the presidential term limit, allowing the leader to realise his “vision” and improve his “chances of success.”

Obviously the current system enables an “effective response” to problems. In the West an executive action is subject to checks and balances. The authors say the National People’s Congress “has approved a major overhaul of China’s governance structure, creating a new National Supervision Commission to check corruption by all Chinese officials, regardless of their affiliations or status in the Communist Party of China.” But the Commission does not control executive power, making the whole country vulnerable to the whims of one man, who has abolished the “first among equals” leadership. As a core leader, Xi will emerge as an all-powerful leader.

What the authors fail to see is that “short electoral cycles” do not plunge the West into chaos. On the contrary they strengthen democracy and make their people resilient to disruptive forces, like populism and hostile propaganda. Despite political turmoil in the US and uncertainty in some EU countries, their civil society is robust and institutions are strong – they function even in the absence of a government.

China has come a long way since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform in the 1980s. It seeks to rule the world by 2049, when it celebrates the centenary of the People’s Republic of China. In our world of economic interdependence China has become “too big to fail.” Many believe that if the country sneezes, the rest of the world will catch a cold. Hence it is crucial that it continues to thrive, but it remains to be seen whether its model of governance would outdo liberal democracy.