Britain made a bad decision on Tuesday to allow Huawei to build out its 5G network, but the United States can mitigate the damage.

The central concern: Huawei is not actually a communications provider in the vein of Verizon or AT&T. It is actually a Chinese intelligence cutout. Correspondingly, Huawei's ultimate authority does not begin and end with its CEO Ren Zhengfei and its executive board but rather with Xi Jinping. And Huawei's strategic objective is not maximized profit and service delivery, but the provision of that service as a cover for Chinese intelligence service interception and disruption of communications.

These points are not debatable.

As the United Kingdom's own intelligence services have shown, Huawei's software is designed with specific flaws to enable Chinese intelligence operations under a pretense of deniability. In short, China uses Huawei's systems to spy. If caught, Huawei will claim that the espionage was a consequence of design mistakes rather than shared intent.

The Trump administration and senators from both parties are concerned about this. They recognize that China's access to the 5G networks of America's closest ally is a significant problem. They also rightly reject Prime Minister Boris Johnson's claim that British security and U.S. intelligence material will be protected by ensuring that Huawei does not operate any "core" 5G network capabilities.

Johnson is being disingenuous here.

5G networks are specifically designed to push data and data access closer to users. The advent of cloud-based systems means that Huawei's towers will gain ever-increasing access to data streams in the years to come. China will use this access to monitor devices near intelligence facilities, steal compromising information for blackmail, and otherwise disrupt British and allied security. It is for that reason that the U.S. is warning it will reduce operations at certain joint intelligence centers, such as the National Security Agency station at RAF Menwith Hill.

To be sure, Xi has scored a big win today. Expect him to reward Johnson with near-term multibillion-dollar Chinese investments in the U.K. economy. After all, Huawei's access to Western networks is a very high priority for Xi. He intends to use that access to serve his long-term global strategy of replacing the U.S.-led international order with one centered on Chinese hegemony and feudal mercantilism. It is reflected both in China's state propaganda and by Huawei's public relations campaigns.

But as I say, the U.S. can mitigate the damage here.

First, the NSA can transfer operations away from areas served by Huawei towers. More importantly, when (as it will) China uses Huawei to spy on Britons, the U.S. can make public the evidence of that intrusion. Let's see how Johnson, who has been briefed on Huawei's threat, handles the political fallout. And right now, the U.S. can make public more evidence of Huawei's connection to the Chinese state. This will increase domestic pressure on Johnson to reconsider his plans.

The U.S. can also keep up the heat on Huawei's access to U.S. hardware and software. Thus far, that tactic has allowed the U.S. to turn Huawei's cellphones into junk that few want to buy. Applying the same approach to 5G, as the Senate has taken steps to do, Britain will be forced to use alternate providers. President Trump or his successor will be critical here: That person must resist China's pressure to include intellectual property transfer to Huawei in any stage two trade deal.

So yes, Britain's decision is bad news. But this isn't the end of the road. The U.S. can still defeat this insidious enemy.