Very recently in a Kentish police station the following sparkling encounter occurred between me and two police officers. It involved two allegations and one Suspect, one offence occurring in a public house and then another committed soon after in a nearby restaurant. The client reported to be very drunk on arrest.

Pre-interview ‘disclosure’

Me: is there any CCTV? OIC. (Officer in charge of investigation/interview)That is all the disclosure as a solicitor you need. Me: is the IP (injured party) supporting? OIC. That is all the disclosure as a solicitor you need. Me: Are there any other witnesses? OIC. That is all the disclosure as a solicitor you need. Me: Was he identified at the first or second location? OIC. The second. Me: In relation to which offences? OIC. That is all the disclosure as a solicitor you need. Me: what are the circumstances of the ID? Who identified him and how? OIC. That is all the disclosure as a solicitor you need. Me.: Your disclosure refers to pre cons. What were they and when were they? OIC. That is all the disclosure as a solicitor you need. Me. Please don’t tell me what I need when you mean that’s all you will disclose. Is he eligible for a caution? OIC. That is all as a solicitor you need. Me. Again. Don’t tell me what I need as a solicitor please. OIC. That’s all we can tell you. It our training! I can ask the custody sergeant. Me. Please get the CS. Wait 5 mins. OIC. Here is the full printout of pre-cons Me. Thank you. CS was badly trained was he? Me .The Disclosure does not deal with any CCTV, whether the IP is supporting, whether there are other witnesses, the circumstances of the street identification. I am satisfied that no inference of guilt could be raised from a ‘No Comment’ interview. I tell you that ‘as a solicitor’ I smiled and asked to see my client. Ends.

Now this completely useless form of disclosure from the defence point of view is increasingly commonplace. I am used to it as this was the norm years ago with legal representatives treated as hostile alien beings who were, despite PACE, to be given as little information as possible. The situation eased considerably over the years and most experience and well trained police interviewers adopted the view that if they had a case it was in the police interest to disclose as much as possible (with obvious exceptions such as forensic evidence location). Fuller disclosure triggered the inference of guilt if there was a failure by the suspect to provide an account. It enabled a sensible out of court disposal where a caution was possible, and helped save the police, CPS and courts time and costs if, under pressure from the disclosure, the suspect decided to admit obvious guilt to gain maximum credit at court.

Now however we are back where we started in many cases. The account of the pre interview disclosure interview above is not untypical of my experience. It can amount to ‘your client has been charged with robbery in the high street and we want to ask him questions about it’. If you are lucky you will have an experienced sensible officer dealing with disclosure but increasingly we are confronted by badly trained automatons who trot out the mantra ‘that is all I am obliged to give you’. Just in case it was a local phenomenon I conducted a legal Face Book group survey and also a Twitter survey (with all their inherent limitations). I asked the question: Over the last 5 years has the quality of pre-interview disclosure deteriorated, remained about the same or improved?

The combined response was:

64 % Deteriorated 33% Remained about the same 3% Improved

‘Remained the same’ is not necessarily good news as some indicated that this was also a poor standard.

Now I appreciated the anecdotal nature of this type of survey but if anyone wishes to challenge the basic truth of decay in disclosure provision please feel free to conduct and fund a more grand polling/survey exercise. This is not an academic research paper. But I doubt the results will change.

It is not just the fact of the poor disclosure but also the insouciant manner in which it is handled that aggravates. Some respondents were moved to add these comments. I select but a few:

The quality of disclosure has significantly deteriorated over the last few years. ‘Disclosure’ is usually in the form of written disclosure and officers typically refuse to disclose any further information once that document has been handed over. The issue is even worse with the newer intake of officers.

In the police station there are no rules, that’s the problem. Once in Court, the rules are ignored and worked around, but there are a set of rules and we know when they are being abused.

For PS disclosure, there are no rules. The plan is indeed to undermine the credibility of the suspect, to catch him/her out lying, and pull the damning rabbit from the sodding hat with a flourish

There is no supervision of the individual detective; review Inspectors are supine; Custody Sergeants obliging to the investigators (have we not all seen the cosy pre-refusal-of-post-charge-bail between OIC and CS?). The only pleasure that I get is watching the clock run down and telling suspects in front of investigators that PACE helps us not them.

Deteriorated to the extent event the custody record DOESN’T record MY own submissions made several times with express direction to make note on the record!!

Disclosure has deteriorated significantly in fact so much so that it is quite evident that the officers do not truly understand the purpose of the process except in their minds to give you as little information as possible. They don’t even seem to understand the process in the context of the offence they are investigating.

The problem is of course the pressure that suspects are under due to the adverse inference provision under section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, where it is open to the courts to draw an adverse inference from the applicants’ silence during interview. (About which see later in this piece).

In a sense the disclosure process at police stations is being again increasingly (sorry for this phrase) ‘weaponised’. In a recent and I think important piece in the Criminal Law Review.2018. The “near miss” of Liam Allan: critical problems in police disclosure, investigation culture and the resourcing of criminal justice by Dr Tom Smith the author said therein ‘Police disclosure is thus treated as an adversarial negotiation tactic rather than an obligation directed at truth-seeking;’ he adds;

‘The ability of the police to control disclosure of information provides them with an obvious advantage, and the danger of miscarriages occurring is heightened by both an entrenched adversarial culture in police investigations and other pressures on suspects.’ Considering that “there is simply no rule of law or practice requiring the police to disclose the full extent of their relevant evidence before questioning a suspect”, there exists an opportunity to “lure” a suspect into silence, and consequent adverse inferences, by limiting or refusing disclosure. The suspect (devoid of information) may be pressured into remaining silent —after all, how should a suspect respond to accusations if he or she knows little about them?

But as I argued above this may also result (and often does) in lost opportunities for alternative disposals and the saving of costs if the case does proceed to court. Lack of proper disclosure at interview inhibits early guilty pleas which are a target for the ‘Transforming summary justice policy’ and. Early guilty pleas save resources and impact on the whole system so the police should be encouraging this by full disclosure. This should resonate particularly with police senior ranks under budgetary constraints.

Those who wish to read more about research into police pre inteverivew behaviour should look at the academic sources such Vicky Kemp at http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51145/1/Country%20Report%20England%20and%20Wales%20Final%20.pdf and here: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/27834/1/Kemp%20BLAST%20Final%20Report.pdf or Hannah Quirk’s book ‘The Rise and Fall of the Right to Silence: Principle, Politics and Policy’ (available from Amazon plus all good book sellers) but see for now the Criminal Law Review 2017 review, quoting therefrom by Andrew Green and Claire McGourlay.

There is an obvious conflict of interest in giving the police absolute discretion over disclosure where they see their role not to provide information but to trap the suspect into silence or a mistake under pressure of an information vacuum. Auld LJ in his review of the criminal courts said “The criminal trial is not a game under which a defendant should be given a sporting chance“. The Law is not a game we are told and yet that is exactly the problem here with the police ‘gaming the disclosure system’. It is treated as a game by the police but it is a game using a stacked deck of cards.

How do lawyers avoid or counter the tactical gamesmanship of police?

There are a number of ways. Here are some examples:

By guile and persuasion in the hope of some flexibility. But this is difficult with junior officers who often seem more terrified of their unenlightened supervisors than losing the case.

By pointing out that poor disclosure may not result in the court drawing an inference : R. v. Roble [1997 ( a good reason for silence might be non-disclosure of the nature of the case against the accused). This usually falls on deaf ears or is not properly grasped or understood to be frank.

a good reason for silence might be non-disclosure of the nature of the case against the accused). This usually falls on deaf ears or is not properly grasped or understood to be frank. By advising the client to refuse to leave his cell to be interviewed. See R v. Johnson and Hind, The Daily Telegraph, April 21, 2005, C.A. I know some lawyers favour this tactic in the belief that it avoids the section 34 inference but this is risky tactic. Firstly it relies upon the strength of will of a detained person who may be vulnerable and certainly may feel so in custody and who may find this concept hard to grasp. Further it does raise the risk of a cell door interview that may not avoid the inference at all. If it was simply a refusal to leave the cell that was under consideration that would not be a problem the inference does not apply to a suspect who refused to leave his cell to be interviewed. The inference and the caution apply to ‘questioning”’ not a refusal to exit the cell. So refusal to leave the cell may result in a cell door interview without the protection of a recording or in the absence of a lawyer and in my view is a dangerous tactic. Also remember that an adverse inference could be drawn from D’s silence at interview or charge where there was no unfairness to D in doing so. (No bad faith by the police). In R . v Dervish (Mulayim) Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 12 December 2001 the interviews were excluded but there remained an adverse inference at the charging stage.

I know some lawyers favour this tactic in the belief that it avoids the section 34 inference but this is risky tactic. Firstly it relies upon the strength of will of a detained person who may be vulnerable and certainly may feel so in custody and who may find this concept hard to grasp. Further it does raise the risk of a cell door interview that may not avoid the inference at all. If it was simply a refusal to leave the cell that was under consideration that would not be a problem the inference does not apply to a suspect who refused to leave his cell to be interviewed. The inference and the caution apply to ‘questioning”’ not a refusal to exit the cell. So refusal to leave the cell may result in a cell door interview without the protection of a recording or in the absence of a lawyer and in my view is a dangerous tactic. Also remember that an adverse inference could be drawn from D’s silence at interview where there was no unfairness to D in doing so. (No bad faith by the police). In R the interviews were excluded but there remained an adverse inference at the charging stage. By adopting the ‘guerrilla war’ tactic of a stop start interview until the police weary of the process and provide proper disclosure or until after an arduous experience finally they disclose their case by the questions they ask or assertions they make. For example. Police: ‘ you see we have an eyewitness who had a close view of this incident and saw you commit this offence’. Lawyer: ‘That’s interesting officer and something you utterly failed to mention in your pre-interview disclosure’. Turns to client: ‘As the officer informed you at the beginning of this interview, you have a continuing right at any stage to free and independent legal advice and this may be a good time for you to ask the Officer to pause the interview so we can have a private consultation’ And repeat this attrition process over and over.

By advising preparation of a prepared statement. This is a way of helping the suspect to cover possible anticipated areas of questioning and with a subsequent no comment interview avoids the risk of police ambush. (It can be supplemented or even followed by answering questions or volunteering to do so prior to the close of questioning.) An inference cannot be drawn that the defendant’s explanation at trial is a late invention if it was there in the prepared statement. Provided it covers areas that later are raised at trial by the defence. Ali and others [2001] 6 Archbold News 2 and see R v Mcknight (Paul Anthony) [2013] EWCA Crim 937 where the Court of Appeal held that the judge had been wrong to direct the jury that they could draw an adverse inference in circumstances where the defendant had made a no comment interview but had provided the police with a written defence statement. The defendant had only relied upon facts that he mentioned in his written statement and as such, no adverse inference could be drawn from his having given a no comment interview.

and see where the Court of Appeal held that the judge had been wrong to direct the jury that they could draw an adverse inference in circumstances where the defendant had made a no comment interview but had provided the police with a written defence statement. The defendant had only relied upon facts that he mentioned in his written statement and as such, no adverse inference could be drawn from his having given a no comment interview. By advising a no comment interview in the face of poor disclosure . R. v. Roble [1997 But here is the problem. It is a high risk strategy. Courts often do not like ‘no comment’ interviews despite that right being preserved (albeit heavily qualified by section 34.) The risk of an adverse inference is very real. I am not sure the special Judicial warning direction given outweighs the suspicion of the Jury or lay bench that the suspect had something to hide. What tends to stick in their minds is not the inadequate disclosure but the perceived instinct of the suspects to not account for themselves. You would have thought the courts might uphold the right to remain silent especially following legal advice but the courts have steadily eroded this right even where strong legal advice is given.

But here is the problem. It is a high risk strategy. Courts often do not like ‘no comment’ interviews despite that right being preserved (albeit heavily qualified by section 34.) The risk of an adverse inference is very real. I am not sure the special Judicial warning direction given outweighs the suspicion of the Jury or lay bench that the suspect had something to hide. What tends to stick in their minds is not the inadequate disclosure but the perceived instinct of the suspects to not account for themselves. You would have thought the courts might uphold the right to remain silent especially following legal advice but the courts have steadily eroded this right even where strong legal advice is given. By preparing an explanation that can be e mailed to the police with an instruction to attach to the custody record as to why the disclosure is hopelessly inadequate. It can be read into the interview post interview caution. One word of warning though is not to link this to ‘advice’ you provide unless you and the client are happy about waiving privilege. It should have the legal basis as a representation on the disclosure issue not referred to as a basis for advice unless you and the client are quite sure that is a safe approach.

The Court of Appeal in R. v Howell (Jeffrey John) [2003] EWCA Crim 1; [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 1 has stated that the question is whether the defendant’s reliance upon legal advice was ‘reasonable.’ So that puts the suspect at some risk because despite inadequate disclosure the Court may second guess the Lawyers legal advice on this. So the law provides for the right to legal representation but then undermines this right by allowing courts to ‘second guess’ this on the basis that they –non lawyers- think it was unreasonable advice! It makes legal advice not so much a matter of the lawyer’s judgement but the potential courts judgement. A form of procedural roulette.

R V Howell was decided when the police were under no obligation to disclose information prior to interview. It might be time soon to test this again.

There is another issue. There are some officers who intend by withholding disclosure to trap the suspect and the lawyer into that risk of inference. As Hannah Quirk argues in her book “By making custodial legal advice of evidential significance, perhaps requiring representatives to testify at the trials of their clients, the CJPOA has compromised the lawyer-client relationship, thus further eroding the protective benefits of legal advice and tipping the balance even further against suspects.” (p.172)

What is wrong with the inference provision under section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994?

There were many critics outside Parliament about this provision but having read the Hansard record the extent and quality of the debates in Parliament were poor considering the threat to and undermining of the burden of proof the provision represented. The right to silence has been with us for centuries but too often the courts have been the handmaiden to its erosion. In R. v Gilbert (Raymond Sidney) (1978) 66 Cr. App. R. 237 that the judge could “remind” the jury if a defence was first advanced at trial. This was a judicial attempt to pre-empt S34. Since the introduction of S34 instead of limiting its scope the courts (especially the Court of Appeal) has with almost what appears to be gleeful relish set about undermining the burden of proof and the right to remain silence whilst playing lip service to both. They swallowed ‘hook line and sinker’ the police line about ambush defences. They attack by implication the role of lawyers. But in case this is forgotten, access to legal advice has been held to be an essential component to the right to a fair trial enshrined in art.6 of the ECHR. See Salduz v Turkey (36391/02) (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 19. As a result of that and the Beckles case Section 58 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 amended the 1994 Act in order to prevent an adverse inference from being drawn from the defendant’s silence during police interview unless first given the opportunity to receive legal advice . The aim was to ensure that the legislation is compatible with the ECHR However the absurd position we have reached can be illustrated by what the court said in R v Beckles (Keith Anderson) [2004] EWCA Crim 2766; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2829: “If the jury consider that the defendant genuinely relied on the (legal) advice that is not necessarily the end of the matter. It may still not have been reasonable for him to rely on the advice, or the advice may not have been the true explanation for his silence.” Now a word on this. What is the point of free and independent legal advice if the reality is that the rug can be violently tugged away from under a suspects feet by the courts? It’s like a magicians disappearing trick ‘now you see the law’s protection – and now you don’t’. The need to protect suspects from police oppression that led to appalling miscarriages of justice was exemplified by the introduction protective legislation in the form of PACE 1984 which enshrined the right to access to legal advice in the police station. What the former Home Secretary Michael (‘prison works’) Howard did was to introduce a measure (S35) that substantial undermined that right by introducing the risk that the legal advice would be second guessed later by non-legal specialists without their having been at the police station and by that stage of the trial influenced by other evidence that was not available to the advising lawyer or the suspect. What may have seemed very reasonable advice at the time may be clouded in the tribunal’s collective mind by such other evidence that no Judges direction or warning can overcome. Of course we must trust the court to assess the actual evidence but why on earth should ‘silence’ – based upon legal advice – be ‘evidence’ at all? Police station legal advice (often offered at unsocial hours on paltry fixed fees) should be respected especially in these days of CCTV and forensic evidence, mobile phones etc.? Whereas PACE 1984 was brought in to protect the public from the overreliance by police on the formal interview (leading to oppressive police behaviour) we have now replaced that form of oppressive conduct with another. That is the deliberate withholding of evidence to trap the lawyers and their clients into an inference of guilt under S34. The over reliance on confessions has been replaced by the over reliance upon the S34 inference of guilt. This is another form of oppressive behaviour and as my little surveys referred to above reveal it is on the increase. As Hannah Quirk argues in her book ‘Confessions, formerly the aim of most interviews, are no longer considered essential once silence has evidential value’ (p.73). This police disclosure abuse also has other most unfortunate side effects. Recently I have become aware of quite a number of cases where the paucity of police disclosure has inevitably led to a no comment interview when had the evidence been revealed an attempt may have been made by the suspect to admit the offence and where appropriate receive a non-court disposal such as a caution. People in custody sometimes have a hard job recalling events due to intoxication. A fuller disclosure sometime helps the progress of recall prior to the interview. Sometimes people simply do not believe the complainant will support but if told they are supporting will readily admit the offence. This failure to disclose breeds lazy behaviour by the police. Often they do not feel the need to investigate properly by obtaining witness statements. Poor authorising decisions by the CPS compound this sloppiness. The end result is that at the first hearing all that is served is a brief summary without the statements. This can result in unnecessary adjournments or not guilty pleas that are later changed. This is costly to all concerned. It is the opposite of what was intended by the programme called ‘Transforming Summary Justice’ e. reducing delays in the magistrates’ courts, holding fewer hearings per case etc. One has to ask why our Pace Codes are at odds with international law. The EU Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings – came into force on June 2, 2014 and by art.6 (1) of the EU Directive requires that suspects be provided with information about the criminal act of which they are suspected, promptly, and in such detail as is necessary to safeguard the ‘fairness of the proceedings’ and the effective exercise of the rights of the defence – ‘in sufficient detail (taking into account the stage of the proceedings) to safeguard fairness and effective exercise of defence rights’. Code C, para.11.1A now provides that before a person is interviewed “… they and, if they are represented, their solicitor must be given sufficient information to enable them to understand the nature of [the suspected] offence and why they are suspected of committing it, in order to allow for the effective exercise of the rights of the defence“.

Code C, para.11.1A, thus does not go so far as the EU Directive, which makes it clear that in addition to enabling the effective exercise of ‘defence rights’, information must be provided in such detail as is necessary ‘to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings’

What is the difference? The distinguished professor Ed Cape gave a telling example of a ‘defence right’ as distinct from ‘fairness of the proceedings’. He makes the point that the right to silence is severely attenuated by the inference provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Plus the courts have seemed eager to circumscribe these rights. As in Howell, where Laws LJ gave a strong steer that a suspect is under an obligation, in the public interest, to disclose relevant facts to the police, although this was qualified by the obligation arising where the suspect is “faced with a set of facts that accuse him”. Laws LJ went on to state that:

“There must always be soundly based objective reasons for silence, sufficiently cogent and telling to weigh in the balance against the clear public interest in an account being given by the suspect to the police.”

So the good professor showed how a ‘right of the defence’ to silence’ may not mean the same as ‘fairness of proceedings’ intended by the EU Directive. See his excellent article at Criminal Law Review 2015 – ‘Transposing the EU Directive on the right to information: a firecracker or a damp squib?’ Ed Cape.

Here is the crucial question. ‘Was the information was sufficient to enable the suspect to understand why they are suspected in order that they may make an informed decision about whether to disclose relevant facts’. That is the point. That is the crux of this piece you are kindly reading. Given that the profession complains that police pre-interview disclosure is regressing badly in quality, how can a suspect fairly be penalised under S34 under this present PACE and statutory regime? As I hope I have demonstrated earlier the penalisation begins during the police interview process not just at court. As a suspect and a lawyer advising you are caught ‘between the devil and the deep blue sea’. The derisory disclosure sometimes almost contemptuously provided leaves you with the choice. Either to properly exercise the right to silence but to risk the adverse inference if you get it wrong (and on appropriate cases the loss of an alternative disposal). A description of the famous literary work by Kafka ‘The Trial’ is that it is about ‘a man arrested and prosecuted by a remote, inaccessible authority, with the nature of his crime revealed neither to him nor to the reader’. This will be a familiar experience to defence lawyers representing clients in UK police stations.

So as we descend into a new police disclosure Dark Age how do we rise out of this?

After all the publicity over poor prosecution disclosure (Liam Allen etc.) it is time to address this problem. Disclosure injustice begins in the police station. The present culture of permissiveness of evidential suppression ought to be countered by the courts but history tells us that sadly we cannot always rely upon the Judiciary to uphold the right to remain silence. They are more likely to restrict it by reliance upon the S34 inference. So we must campaign for change. What changes do we need?

Ideally the repeal of S34 as it contrary to the burden of proof and an incentive for poor police work becoming over reliant upon an inference of silence.

The PACE code needs to be brought into line with art.6 (1) of the EU Directive so that the police disclose all that is fair. No more games. The law is not a game remember? The PACE Code 11 A as amended should provide sufficient disclosure be given to enable the suspect to understand why they are suspected in order that they may make an informed decision about whether to disclose relevant facts. By all means withhold the ‘disclosure of details at a time which might prejudice the criminal investigation. (such as location of forensic marks) But the presumption should be in favour of disclosure. The notes for guidance should encourage full disclosure and discourage withholding information to ‘catch a suspect out’. In these days of CCTV and forensic evidence, mobile phones in addition to witness statement this crude tactic should not be needed. Silence should not be elevated to the status of evidence in cases where disclosure is withheld or poor.

The police are absurdly over anxious about disclosure helping the defence formulate a response. Firstly I would point out that many defendants are not that bright or calculating! The police should not over estimate their intelligence. Secondly appropriate disclosure is not in all cases disclosure of every detail. “We have a forensic link that puts you client inside the property” is sufficient to require an explanation from the defendant without needing to disclose where exactly it was found or what it is DNA or fingerprint. In some cases the evidence will be completely overwhelming as to not to cause any concern at all and where it is why not disclose all? The more the case looks overwhelming in the absence of a genuine explanation the more likely the advice to plead guilty. As I tell police officers I secure more confessions than they do by simply giving robust advice in the face of proper disclosure. There also needs to be a degree of proportionality applied, if it is a minor simple case then the pole should just disclose everything, In the more serious the case the more tactical considerations might apply but again giving as much as is possible is much more likely to result in either a guilty plea and/or responses being given. But the police must be obliged to record and at trial disclose their reasons for withholding evidence prior to the interview. That way the court will be able to see if the reasons were genuine or simply to trap to secure an inference from silence that would not otherwise apply. It would be open to the Court to decide that the inference should apply but take note if there is a direction to the contrary. This answer the issue of staged disclosure in bigger cases . The police should be obliged to justify it at trial. It should be a disclosable matter to be places on the disclosure schedules. Sunlight is the best disinfection and the answer to any suspicion of bad faith or sharp practice on pre- interview disclosure.

The PACE code should expressly support a more formalised method of dealing with a caution disposal. It is absurd that some police are terrified of being accused of offering an inducement to the suspect confess by simply mentioning the possibility of a caution being on offer. Both side should not operate in an information blackout silos. If the suspect agrees with the evidence disclosed or even where in cases of pre arrest intoxication they do not dispute credible police evidence why cannot a caution should not be discussed openly during the interview based upon that understanding? It’s not an inducement. It is accepting reality and saves a great deal of conflict and public money.

The Police and other authorities have a public relations but also a financial incentive to support this change in the code as poor disclosure cost more public money. Our representations have achieved a change in the PACE code before so it is very possible. See: https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/police-interviewing-loophole-must-be-tackled-urgently/65336.article and ‘changes to code C: https://www.clsa.co.uk/index.php?q=251

A change to the Criminal Procedure rules to ensure all relevant evidence is available at the first hearing under CrimPR 8.3 including statements as I argued here: https://wp.me/p8G6bw.

This is a serious problem facing our Justice system but with a few tweaks simply remedied so the innocent are not prejudiced and the guilty helped to benefit from swift admissions that will assist them in out of court disposal or in sentencing.

Robin Murray.

30/08/2018

Boring Biog

Robin Murray is a solicitor who founded Robin Murray and co on the 1st June 1988, which grew into a multi branch firm now known as the ‘Tuckers Kent Branch’ which is a combination of the might of firms of Robin Murray & Co and Kent Defence who merged as part of the nation-wide leading criminal defence firm Tuckers Solicitors.

Robin is a former winner of the Legal Aid Lawyer of the year award, plus a Kent Law Society Outstanding Achievement Award, and was nominated for Law Society Gazette Legal personality of the Year award. He was a former Vice Chair of the CL SA. He writes for many publications and has appeared on a number of media outlets campaigning for legal aid and for proper disclosure of evidence.