(1) Goldman would need to make a credible commitment to employees to “take care of them next year.” But any legally binding commitment would be as good as a cash bonus (who knows, they could even be traded over-the-counter). And any verbal promises would be completely noncredible--among other things, Goldman cannot know for sure how the coming perfect storm will play out: the supertax on bankers in Europe, Sheila Bair’s good idea of tying deposit insurance premiums to the risk in banks’ compensation structures, Hank Paulson’s memoir on February 1, Chris Dodd’s resignation and the collapse of any meaningful Obama financial reform--allowing the Democrats to wake up to how they can run hard against Big Finance in 2010, etc. And besides, how much would you trust your boss at Goldman? The old culture there is gone.

(2) For all their communication blunders in recent months (internally they wince at “God’s work“), the responsible executives think they can hide the size of the bonuses or talk more about how stock and option grants encourage the right kind of behavior or put in some sophisticated clawback language. Some of the best lawyers in the country are working very hard on this question, but it’s all for naught. The headline bonus number will be at least $20 billion and if they try to hide this with sophisticated mumbo-jumbo, that will only bring greater attention and spread the pain over many news cycles as we run through denials, further exposures, more denials, and damning details. When you’re in a hole, stop digging--Goldman is talking with top p.r. consultants; perhaps they should bring in Tiger Woods to advise on this point.

(3) The most important reason is also Goldman’s greatest weakness: Throughout the organization, people really think they are worth the money. But remember these facts and keep track of how many times you hear them repeated: Goldman Sachs essentially failed in September 2008; it was saved by extraordinary and unprecedented government efforts at the end of September and subsequently (particularly through its conversion to a bank holding company, which gave access to the Fed’s discount window); partly this treatment was shaped by the special favor with which Hank Paulson viewed Goldman (documented in nauseating detail in Andrew Ross Sorkin’s Too Big To Fail); and the strategy of allowing Goldman to recapitalize through taking huge risk with an unconditional government guarantee in 2009 only makes sense if they use the proceeds to boost their capital--not if they pay out massive bonuses. In any reasonable economic analysis, the entire bonus pool at Goldman should be paid--with gracious thanks--to the government.

The refrain that will be repeated by Goldman executives is: We need to pay the bonuses in order to keep the best people. But think about this like a stockholder for a moment--where exactly would these people go to work if this year’s bonus is set at zero?