A deeper understanding of why this is happening requires grappling with the broader strategic picture. ISIS still holds most of southeastern Syria, but as its control collapses, two fragile coalitions are racing to retake its territory to better position themselves for post-war negotiations in Iraq and Syria. The first is a U.S.-supported coalition that includes Kurdish fighters, Iraqi Security Forces, and various local Sunni-Arab tribes in Syria and Iraq. The second includes Assad regime forces, Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, Russian jets, and Hezbollah fighters.

There are, of course, legitimate reasons for the United States to contest this territory. The area is strategically important for Iran. If its proxies take and hold it, they could clear a corridor to Shia-controlled areas of Iraq, potentially creating a so-called “land bridge” stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean. This is alarming for America’s Sunni-Arab partners; Israel and Iranian IRGC commanders have also spoken publicly about the benefits of the bridge.

But these concerns may be overblown. Moving large amounts of weaponry across a 1,000-mile stretch of difficult territory in Iraq and Syria isn’t exactly an ideal logistics plan. Plus, Iran already has the ability to fly supplies into Damascus, and, from there, move them to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

This region is also the opportune place to push back on Iran’s destabilizing actions throughout the Middle East, and reassure regional partners anxious about its growing influence. The United States has long operated in this airspace, establishing an informal de-confliction zone in a wide swath of eastern Syria in the aftermath of the Russian intervention in the fall of 2015, and a more formal zone immediately around al-Tanf, which could potentially be expanded. Thus far, however, the Iran-supported incursions have not drawn on Russian air support—the Russians may be fine sitting this fight out. Eastern Syria is less strategically important to them than the west, which is much more essential to Assad’s survival, and where their Tartus naval base is located.

So it would seem that the United States and its coalition already have the upper hand. The coalition could potentially deter Iranian incursions and send a clear message that it will be American partners who will ultimately retake this territory from ISIS without a significant escalation in its airstrikes or further troop commitments.

Then again: It’s also true that, for years, the United States has been trying, with little success, to build out a force capable of retaking this territory from ISIS. So it may not be worth risking a full-on confrontation with Iran if the United States does not have a viable alternative to displace ISIS fighters. And it may also not be worth risking a major escalation with Iran and possibly Russia over a sparsely populated patch of sand in eastern Syria.