Take this statement: This statement is false. Now is this statement true or false? Let’s take the first case, that it is true. If it is true then the statement is false. That would make it false. So obviously cannot be true then since that is contradictory. Now let us take the second case, that it is false. If this statement is false is false then it is true! Ugh! we have gone in circles, no matter what we do whether we say the statement is true or false it is both. This special statement is called the liar’s paradox, and you have probably heard of it in some fashion.

There are many objections to the liar’s paradox, some of those include various methods of saying that the liar’s paradox is nonsensical. One of the ways to resolve the paradox is to say that it isn’t a truth claim. By doing this you can go to your comfy little philosophy chair and relax because you resolved it. But I don’t think this is a solution at all. I do think that this sentence is a truth claim. I won’t take the easy way out and ignore the implications of the paradox. I believe that it is a truth claim because the sentence is referring to its own truth claim. It makes no sense to remove ‘is false’ from the sentence, it is a vital part of the sentence. Which is why this sentence is false is false is a very different statement from merely this statement is false. If we add this statement is false twice, what you begin to say is that: this statement is false is true. The statement cannot be removed from its own claim of truth, to alter it would be removing a vital part of the sentence that is required to make sense of it. Let us take the opposite example: This statement is true. If this statement is true then, if I were to say it is false the statement as a whole would be false! You see this idea would claim that self-referential statements in logic are nonsensical but there are a wide variety of statements that are self-referential but not paradoxes and so this is not a solution.

Self-referential statements instead should be treasured. Take this statement: Statements about this statement are either true or not true. This statement is talking about the law of the excluded middle. In more general terms, this statement can also be written like this: All statements are either true or not true. This is a statement about the law of excluded middle. It is also self-referential since it talks about all sentences including itself. It is clear that such statements are sensical and rational. So I think it asinine to throw out self-referential statements which many of the people who attempt to reduce to the absurd the liar’s paradox.

I think it clear we need something you will probably think is ridiculous at first: A logic that contradictory, a logic that violates one of the most sacred laws in western philosophy, a logic that is consistent both when true and not true. A paraconsistent logic. As an epistemological nihilist, I believe that truth is indeterminable. This statement is a paradoxical one, so people often reduce it to the absurd by saying it is self-referential and absurd. I believe that this is just a display of the absurdity of knowledge itself, as in my view anyone that doesn’t claim to have ultimate knowledge is, whether they realise it or not, an epistemological nihilist. Everyone I have talked to holds to the position, besides some presuppositionalists, that there are things they don’t know that they don’t know. The famous unknown unknowns, problem makes everyone a nihilist and thus have to deal with this paradoxical problem that comes with it.

Now take this sentence: either this statement is true or false or this statement is both true and false. If this statement true then you must use a paraconsistent logic to understand it, in essence, you accept that this statement can be contradictory. If this statement is false then it still violates the law of non-contradiction because it is a part of the statement itself. How? If I say it is false then the statement is true. It is either true or false or both true and false.

Now that I have given several justifications for dialetheia–that some statements are paraconsistent–I will go on to give my final reason that reducing Nihilism to the absurd is ridiculous. This is the statement: Truth is indeterminable. The statement is self-referential just like the statement I gave before, and just like the last time, its justification is sound. Why? Because reducing it to the absurd is nonsensical, the moment you try to do so you fall into its very abyss. If you say that ultimate scepticism is false., that Truth is determinable you actually don’t get rid of this belief because the idea that truth is indeterminable allows for the possibility that truth is determinable. Your reductio is simply a subset of the belief itself, which means the reductio is included within it as a possibility!

Often people, nihilists, in particular, will say that it isn’t that truth is indeterminable, but that there is no truth or that truth is nonsensical or some variation of that. And thus it makes no sense to say it is contradictory, but all those statements are talking about truth claims themselves, and are thus paradoxical. It is true that nihilism is a denial of truth claims but if you deny truth claims doesn’t that also allow for them? If I say truth is nonsensical for example or that truth doesn’t exist, I am talking about it, no? See, the very same problem arises. But as I have demonstrated above it isn’t really a problem rather a property.

I hope you enjoyed this journey into the absurd. For more information on the subject, I recommend this video and Graham priest’s book: A very short introduction to logic. Also, consider the Standford encyclopedia on the subject. I rather simplified things here, I will probably go more into detail later.