In this study I examine the democratic integrity of the last three rounds of regional assembly and gubernatorial elections which were conducted in Russia on 13 September 2015, 18 September 2016 and 10 September 2017. In total 56 regional assembly elections and 46 gubernatorial elections were held over this period.Footnote 1 In particular I focus on the ways in which the regime manipulated these elections to ensure victory for the Kremlin’s “party of power”, United Russia (UR). I demonstrate that, although there were less overt forms of electoral fraud committed by the regime on election-day in these elections, other types of electoral malpractice concerning the registration process have led to scores of opposition candidates being denied entry to the contests. Thus, I conclude that Russia may still be classified as an “electoral authoritarian regime” (Schedler, 2013; Ross 2011, 2014; White, 2017).

Electoral authoritarian regimes

Schedler (2013, p. 2) makes an important distinction between “electoral democracies”, which uphold Dahl’s basic prerequisites for democracy, and what he terms “electoral authoritarian regimes” where electoral rules are grossly violated. According to Schedler (Ibid), electoral authoritarian regimes hold regular elections which are, ‘broadly inclusive (they are held under universal suffrage), minimally pluralistic (opposition parties are permitted to run), minimally competitive (parties and candidates outside the ruling coalition, while denied victory, are allowed to win votes and seats, minimally open (dissidence is not subject to massive, but often to selective and intermittent repression).’ Elections in electoral authoritarian regimes however, are not minimally democratic, as ‘governments subject them to manifold forms of authoritarian manipulation that violate the liberal–democratic principles of freedom, fairness, and integrity’ (Ibid). Rulers in electoral authoritarian regimes, ‘may place barriers on opposition parties’ ability to campaign; generate a pro-government media bias; stack electoral commissions and courts with their supporters; or resort to stuffing ballot boxes and manipulating vote tabulations’ (Donno, 2013, p. 704). All of these forms of electoral malpractice have been widely practiced in Russian regional elections (see Ross, 2011, 2014).

The Kremlin’s new strategy

As Petrov (2012, p. 1) notes, following the mass protest demonstrations against the regime, in the wake of the highly fraudulent Duma elections of December 2011, the Kremlin adopted a new strategy towards controlling elections. Rather than engaging in the risky business of outright fraud during the vote count, which was an important factor in sparking mass protests against the regime, the authorities decided to concentrate their efforts on preventing opposition parties and candidates from registering for elections. According to the “Golos Election Monitoring Association”, (hereafter, Golos), the 2015a-d election campaign ‘reinforced an emerging trend… the shifting of emphasis in the application of administrative technologies from voting day to earlier stages of the electoral process (2015a-d, p. 1). As Schulmann (201, p. 2) notes, ‘the main obstacle to competitive elections in Russia is still the participation barrier. Existing legislation favours “systemic” parties that are already in government and incumbents. The rule is: “Once you’re in, we help you stay in.”’

This study will therefore focus, in particular, on the ways in which the registration process has been used and abused by the authorities to ensure that opposition parties and candidates are prevented from competing in regional assembly and gubernatorial elections.

A key factor in the Kremlin’s ability to manipulate elections and deny opposition parties and candidates from participation in the elections is its control over electoral commissions which in many regions are far from neutral (see Popova 2006; Baekken (2015); Harvey 2016; Jarabinský, 2015; Bader, 2017). According to Article 23.6 of the Federal Law No. 67, 12 June 2002, ‘On the Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in a Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation’, half of the members of the regional electoral commissions are appointed by regional governors and the other half by the regional assemblies, taking into consideration proposals of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation, political parties, municipalities, and the previous commissions. Article 23.5 further states that, the Central Electoral Commission has two quota places. Parties which are represented in the State Duma are provided with one quota, as are parties with representation in regional assemblies where the corresponding electoral commissions are formed. The chairs of the regional election commissions are elected at the first meeting of the commissions on the recommendation of the Central Electoral Commission (Federal Law, No. 67, 12 June 2002).

United Russia which dominates regional assemblies and executive bodies has been able to use its domination of the membership of the commissions to bolster its electoral support. Thus, for example, as Bader has demonstrated in his study of the 2016 Duma elections - in those commissions chaired by members of United Russia, the reported levels of turnout and support for UR were much higher than in those chaired by members of other parties (Bader, 2017, p. 448).

The Kremlin has also been able to maintain its dominance in the regions by manipulating election and party laws. Indeed, since Putin came to power in 2000, no election in Russia has been held according to the same rules as its predecessor and there have been scores of amendments to election and party legislation in the regions. As Hutcheson notes, over the period 2003–16, the State Duma law was amended 40 times; the Law on Political Parties 36 times, and the Law on Fundamental Guarantees of Electoral Rights, 78 times (2017, pp. 389–390).

Changes to the legislation on parties

In the wake of the mass protest demonstrations against the regime, radical changes to electoral and party registration laws were adopted in Spring 2012, which made it much easier for parties to register and participate in elections. According to these amendments the number of party members required for registration was drastically reduced from 40,000 to just 500! (Federal Law 28, 2 April, 2012). As a result of this new legislation the number of parties rose sharply from 7 in 2011 to 74 in September 2015. This has led to the creation of a weak and fragmented opposition (see Ross, 2014). In 2015 48 parties took part in the regional elections, in 2016 there were 55 parties and in 2017, 28.

Legislation on electoral registration

An important development which impacted on the registration process took place in 2009 when electoral deposits were abolished, which meant that parties could only register for elections by submitting nomination signatures (in most regions the number required was 2% of the regional electorate). According to amendments made to Federal Law, No. 67 (Article 38.24), a candidate’s nomination was rejected if they did not submit enough signatures or if 10% of their signatures were found to be invalid.

However, in the aftermath of the mass demonstrations which erupted in 2011, positive changes were made to electoral legislation in 2012 which stipulated that party list candidates no longer needed to submit nomination signatures to register for elections, and the maximum number of signatures required by independent candidates was lowered from 2 to 0.5% (see, Federal Law No. 41, 2 May 2012). These developments made it easier for opposition parties to pass the registration hurdles. In the first two rounds of regional elections to be conducted under the new rules, in October 2012 and September 2013, there was a dramatic reduction in the number of party lists which were prevented from competing. The average number of registered party lists per region rose from 13.2 in 2012 to 17.2 in September 2013, the highest on record (Kynev and Lyubarev, 2016, p. 18).

However, ‘the liberalisation of the electoral rules soon came to an end as the mass protests movement against the regime lost momentum and the Putin regime began to feel more secure’ (see Korgunyuk et al. 2017:). Thus, in 2014 new legislation was adopted which reversed many of the positive changes enacted in 2012 (see Borisov et al. 2015). Thus, for example, in May 2014 the requirement of party list candidates to collect nomination signatures was reinstated (although the percentage of signatures required was lowered from 2 to 0.5% of the electorate). At the same time, the number of signatures demanded for candidates in the single mandate elections was raised from 0.5 to 3% of the electorate (Federal Law, No. 95, 5 May 2014). One positive feature adopted by Federal Law No. 95 (5 May 2014), reduced the maximum allowable electoral threshold for regional elections from seven to five per cent which gave smaller parties a better chance to win seats (see Korgunyuk et al. 2017).

However, the registration process is not a level playing field. Parties which hold seats in the Duma or receive 3% of the votes in elections to the State Duma are exempt from gathering signatures (Ibid). This meant that the four Duma parliamentary parties UR, CPRF, LDPR, and JR qualified for the 2015–2017 elections by default. The non-parliamentary opposition party Yabloko also qualified for the elections held between 2011 and 2016: as it won 3.4% of the votes in the Duma elections in 2011 it did not need to gather signatures to register.

In addition, parties which hold seats in, or win 3% of the votes in regional assemblies, or 0.5% of the total number of seats in a region’s municipal councils, are exempt from submitting signatures in those particular regions, and this has allowed a number of opposition parties, to compete in a few regions without submitting signatures. Thus, for example, Yabloko failed to gain the required 3% of the votes in the 2016 Duma elections but was nonetheless able to compete in some regions in 2017 without submitting nomination signatures as it held the required number of seats in regional/municipal parliaments.

The reinstatement of the need to gather nomination signatures in 2014 resulted in a sharp fall in the average number of party lists which were registered for regional assembly elections, from 17.2 in 2013 to 7.8 in 2015, 6.9 in 2016 and 7.7 in 2017 (Kynev, Lyubarev and Maksimov, 2017a, b, p. 5).