The debacle in Somalia in rubber-tired trucks came as no surprise to us. After 1st TSG (A) Director, Mike Sparks experienced first hand what a LIGHT M113 Gavin track could do, it changed his entire military perspective of what was possible! In the years prior, he had only walked or rode in medium-weight and heavier vehicles...the all-terrain mobility and agility of the Gavin was exactly what LIGHT infantry needs...he wrote a detailed proposal in the Jan-Feb 1995 issue of U.S. Army ARMOR magazine to exploit this for contingency forces during the "heavy" era of America's Army.

Read the article here: www.combatreform.org/contingencym113a3gavins.htm

We wrote an entire Operations PLAN (OPLAN) for a XVIII Airborne Corps M113 Gavin DESERT FORCE (sorry we can't post on www), but here is the cover letter:

And surprisingly, we got a reply from an Army Lieutenant General from a completely different agency:

We Told You So back in the 1990s: Why Are Medium Bradleys and Heavyweight Abrams Tanks Sitting in Motor Pools in the USA while American Light Infantry is Getting Creamed in Wheeled Trucks and On Foot in Afghanistan when LIGHT M113 Gavins are Available?







INFANTRY LETTERS

"NEXT IFV" IS TOO HEAVY I am writing in response to Captain Greg Pickell's article "Designing the Next Infantry Fighting Vehicle" (INFANTRY, July-August 1996, pages 22-32). As you're going to see in Bosnia, the 33-ton M2 and 63-ton M1A1 are too heavy for most roads and bridges in the Third World. Instead of spending $100 million now so we can have a light tank the M8 AGS (armored gun system) we're "researching" a 43-ton external gun tank to replace the M1 series. While I appreciate Captain Pickell's idea of making a turretless M1 into an IFV in the style of the Israeli Defense Force, this is not what we need desperately in a world that moves by air. If it cannot be airdropped or STOL (short takeoff and landing) airlanded directly onto the battlefield-not a heavily defended airfield with concrete runway it will not be there in time. His 50-ton IFV is too heavy if it takes weeks or months to get to the battlefield. I know the capabilities of the C-17 aircraft; less than a dozen delivering one M1 main battle tank or turretless IFV at-a-time isn't going to deploy significant combat mass. The United States will again become a "paper tiger," reluctant to deploy its light troops because it has given or thrown away its M113 armored personnel carriers. (See the article in the December 1996 issue of Soldiers magazine on building reefs in the Atlantic using demilitarized M113s and M60 tanks). An M113A3 with an EX-35 105mm external gun or 106mm recoilless rifle would be a better use of our money and would save lives. An M113A3 or an M8 is better than nothing-but nothing is what we'll have if we keep pursuing 50-ton monster armored vehicles. The Army should be geared to the best fighting efficiency, not to keeping Bradley infantrymen and Abrams tankers employed. Waiting for them to airland and forcing the airborne units to seize a heavily defended airfield for them is tantamount to suicide. We've got to look past self-serving narrowness and see that the U.S. is a strategic air power, just as England was once the world's preeminent sea power. Like the Russians, we need our airborne to be a completely mobile combined arms team that after landing can converge on the enemy's vulnerable center of gravity while he's still disoriented. Waiting for anything instead of moving out at once is a recipe for disaster on the information-age battlefield. Even the "bad guys" have cell phones and watch CNN. Except as a future replacement for the Bradley in heavy divisions, I disagree with Captain Pickell's idea. We are ignoring the force structure of the units that are going to actually fight, not languish in a motor pool in the continental United States. I, for one, do not want to see the world lost to aggression because we are dependent upon heavy vehicles to deploy a force that can fight and win. When we really have to fight somewhere in a hurry, this mindset will result in nothing-our light troops fighting with only the weapons they have in their hands because the heavy elements cannot get to the fight. We cannot afford to have our light units sacrificed because they lack the backup of heavy units and their commensurate firepower. Somalia was only a foretaste of the future. Let's hope we can get some air-deliverable armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) to our airborne and light troops before North Korea invades or Iraq overruns Kuwait again. What would happen if Iraq seized our pre-positioned M1s and M2s in Kuwait and destroyed the airfield before we could get our tankers into theater? We have M113A3 AFVs that weigh exactly the same as vulnerable road bound five-ton trucks that can be turned into flaming wrecks by a mere burst of small-arms fire. But we take the tracked M113A3 (which can swim and protect our men from enemy fire by traveling cross-country) and throw it into the ocean to make reefs and keep the five-ton trucks, using the excuse that "we don't have enough airlift". Certainly, if all we have available is 30 to 70-ton AFVs, we'll never be able to air-deliver enough fighting vehicles to give our light troops shock November-December 1996 INFANTRY 3 action. Our enemies mount heavy cannon on almost anything that moves, while we make excuses and rationalize. How can we expect anything but another "Task Force Smith" in our future? MIKE SPARKS Fort Bragg, North Carolina November-December 1996 INFANTRY 4 We then suggested M113 Gavins with 106mm RRs again to the top Army General, Reimer in 1996 after the M8 Buford Armored Gun System cancellation:

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)





Stan Crist's Modernize the Airborne

www.combatreform.org/modernizetheairborne.htm











PROFESSIONAL NOTES Modernizing the Airborne

By Stan Crist

In the years preceding, World War II, the combat triumvirate of the U.S. Army was composed primarily of foot-mobile infantry, towed artillery, and a handful of light tanks. The onset of hostilities, however, was the catalyst for a modernization effort that would dramatically change the organization, training, and equipment of U.S. ground forces. The Army transformed itself, from a force trained and equipped for the static nature of World War I, into one well adapted to the high-mobility demands of blitzkrieg.

The increased use of truck transport allowed the infantry to be moved about the battlefield much faster, although only when out of contact with the enemy. To overcome that problem, the thinly armored M3 "half-track" was developed, which provided improved cross-country ability and some degree of protection from small arms fire, although its open-top design left it vulnerable to artillery airbursts. In the 1960s the creation of the M113 [Gavin] armored personnel carrier (APC) produced another leap ahead in mobility and protection, thanks to its full-tracked, completely enclosed configuration. Two decades later, the adoption of the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) gave the U.S. infantryman even greater combat capability.

The artillery branch evolved in a

Page 8 INFANTRY July-December 1997

STANLEY C. CRIST

similar fashion over the past six decades, going from completely unprotected, towed artillery pieces to improvised mountings of howitzers on half-tracks and tank chassis, to purpose-built self-propelled guns such as the MI09A6 Paladin. The tank force, which began with combat vehicles that were inadequately armored and woefully under-

When the 82nd Airborne Division was activated in 1942, it was primarily made up of foot-mobile infantry, with a few small-caliber, towed artillery pieces--and no tanks.

gunned, now fields the best main battle [heavy] tank (MBT) ever made-the M1A2 Abrams. The history of the airborne stands in stark contrast to the progress of the infantry, artillery, and armor. When the 82nd Airborne Division was activated in 1942, it was made up primarily of foot-mobile infantry, with a few small caliber, towed artillery pieces-and no tanks. The 82nd has changed little since its inception half a century ago. It is still mainly a light infantry force, with a small number of towed howitzers for support; it also has some additional combat power in the form of TOW missile launchers mounted on HMMWVs (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) and a single battalion of M551A1 Sheridan light tanks. Essentially, the paratroopers are stuck in World War II mode, while "leg" infantry is becoming a 21st Century force, having advanced from foot mobility to truck, then half-track, APC, and IFV. The traditional role of paratroopers is to drop into the enemy's rear area, seize critical objectives, and hold on until relieved by conventional ground forces.

This linkup must occur quickly to achieve mission success and paratroop survival. A prime example of the inherent weakness of this strategy is Operation Market Garden (September 1944), in which British and Polish airborne forces were annihilated by German Panzer units while attempting to capture and hold Arnhem bridge. Many paratroopers were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, in large part because they were outclassed in firepower, armor protection, and mobility: They couldn't run, they couldn't hide, they had precious little with which to fight, and the relief force failed to reach them!

www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSm5nBZ4X0A

As a consequence of similarly bitter wartime experience---along with some thoughtful, farsighted analysis-the Russian (formerly Soviet) General Staff eventually concluded that airborne units must have the means to conduct operations without the need to link up with ground troops. Doing this meant giving the paratroops roughly the same degree of tactical and technological advantage enjoyed by the heavy forces. The result was the introduction in 1970 of the BMD airborne combat vehicle (ACV), which enabled the innovative creation of the world's first fully mechanized airborne force.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=_hrvgYEI90c

Somewhat ironically, the parachute deliverable M113 APC had entered production a decade earlier, a fact that would have permitted the modernization of U.S. airborne forces ten years before their Russian counterparts.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=zD4RWmotso0

Curiously, the interest--and the vision-has been lacking in this country. Instead of embracing mechanization as a means of expanding and enhancing their warfighting capability, the U.S. airborne community seems to decry the concept stating two basic reasons: "There is not enough airlift," and "We can fight heavy forces, successfully in all but the most open kinds of terrain, so why make a change that would rob us of our strategic mobility?" These issues are certainly serious enough to merit examination and analysis in an effort to determine their validity and provide possible alternatives.

Not enough airlift? If this is true, the obvious answer is, "Get more!" If, however, politico-economic factors prohibit the acquisition of additional transport aircraft for this purpose, then what options are available that could be implemented with existing airlift assets?

Just how many transports would actually be required to lift a mechanized airborne force? Before answering these questions, it is first necessary to know the basic specifications of the airborne combat vehicle.

The Vehicle

Although it would be desirable to develop a state-of-the-art ACV family-an airborne combat system (ACS}---budget constraints would doubtless prevent it. Fortunately, a vehicle currently in service--the M113A3 APC (and certain of its variants) has most of the required characteristics: First, with its small size and light weight, the M113A3 is capable of transport and low-velocity airdrop (LVAD, or "heavy drop") by all four major U.S. Air Force cargo planes-the C-130, C-141, C-5, and C-17; it can also be carried a short distance as a sling load by the CH-47D helicopter. The only other full-tracked, armored vehicle now in the inventory that has the same LVAD capability is the M551A1 Sheridan tank. If the Sheridans of the 82nd's 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor (originally slated to be replaced by the now-defunct XM8 [Buford] armored gun system) are withdrawn from service as planned, M113 variants will be the Army's only tracked combat vehicles with full LVAD capability.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=htdQVbmvLgQ

The M113A3 is a vast improvement over the previous M113s. A more powerful but more fuel-efficient turbocharged engine and a new transmission deliver automotive performance on a par with that of the Bradley fighting vehicle. Internal kevlar spall liners and external fuel tanks provide a great increase in crew survivability; mounting provisions for bolt-on armor packages make possible the upgrade of protection trom the basic level (small arms, artillery fragments) to 14.5mm heavy machinegun, 30mm cannon, and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds. The MI13A3's tactical mobility is further enhanced by its ability to swim across small bodies of water with little or no preparation.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=9VMgdFUd1JU

While basic armament-a .50-caliber [heavy] machinegun-is rather minimal for modem warfare, the elegant simplicity of the M113A3's box-like structure makes it ideally suited to a "modular" approach to armament installation.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=9SPHgpLWPws

Weapons that can be mounted on the vehicle include the M2 .50-caliber heavy machinegun (HMG), the Mk 19 40mm grenade machinegun (GMG), the M60/M240B 7.62mm medium machinegun (MMG), the M40A2 106mm recoilless rifle, TOW, Dragon, and Javelin antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), 81mm and 120mm mortars (in the M125 and M1064 mortar carrier variants). Even the Hellfire missile has been fired from a modified M113 that was fitted with a prototype eight-shot turret assembly. With the exception of the multiple Hellfire launcher, the weapons listed can be mounted in various combinations according to mission needs. The following are some examples:

General Purpose, Urban Terrain.

One GMG or HMG, one Javelin ATGM, two MMGs, and one LMG.

Configuration allows maximum, continuous 360-degree observation and target engagement.

Direct-Fire Support (Version 1).

One 106mm recoilless rifle, one 40mm GMG, and one 7.62mm MMG-a no cost "armored gun system." Direct-Fire Support (Version 2).

Two 106mm recoilless rifles, one .50 caliber HMG. Spanish TC-7/l06 one-man turret would provide armor protection for the gunner.

Page 9 July-December 1997 INFANTRY

Antitank.

Incorporates a two-man turret similar to that on the French AMX-1O HOT vehicle, with four ready-to-fire ATGMs-TOW, TOW follow-on, or Javelin.

Indirect-Fire Support or Antitank.

M1064A3 self-propelled 120mm mortar has almost three times the lethality of 81mm mortar, six times that of 60mm mortar currently used by airborne. 120mm precision-guided rounds would allow engagement of enemy armor at extended range (7,000-plus meters) and in defilade.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Y-j4KCNqKM

Airlift Requirements

In addition to the paratroopers, an airborne infantry battalion has 20 x TOW HMMWVs, 36 x cargo HMMWVs, and 10 x 2.5-ton trucks [ED: these weigh 10.5 tons--exactly the same as M113s]. The artillery battery has six HMMWVs to serve as prime movers for the M1l9A1 [105mm] howitzers, the air defense platoon has four HMMWVs, and the engineer platoon has several pieces of heavy earthmoving equipment. Ten C-130s or eight C-17s would be needed to transport the 730 jumpers of the battalion task force. To airlift all of these vehicles and heavy equipment mentioned would require about 54 x C-130s or 19 x C-17s. An ACS battalion with, for instance, 45 x M1l3A3s, nine x M1064A3s, and six scout HMMWVs would need 57 x C-130s or 19 x C-17s. If the paratroopers were to "tailgate" the vehicles-jump from the same aircraft, immediately following the heavy drop load--the personnel aircraft would not be needed, thereby freeing eight to 10 airlift sorties. A mechanized force might require slightly more (C-130), the same amount (C-17), or even significantly fewer ("tailgating") aircraft for transport than does the current organization; this is quite contrary to the widely held belief that a mechanized airborne unit would require excessive airlift resources.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=50cpPAVoxJQ

Organization

Two organizational approaches seem worth considering. One of these is to follow conventional practice and mechanize each battalion in all three brigades. This route would cost more to implement and would place greater administrative, logistical, and maintenance demands on the units, but it would also permit all nine battalions to be mechanized at the same time.

This configuration would have been very appropriate in August 1990 when

One organizational approach is to follow conventional practice and mechanize each battalion in all three brigades.

the entire 82nd Airborne Division deployed to Saudi Arabia. There in a landscape without cover and concealment or shade from the sweltering summer sun-and facing a mobile, armored opponent-the foot-mobile paratroopers could do no more than dig in and hold on until the heavy forces arrived. Fortunately, although the Republican Guard T-72s may have been superior to the World War II German Panthers and Tigers, the Iraqi soldiers displayed only a fraction of the competence--and none of the will to fight-that the Panzer crews showed at Arnhem, thereby avoiding a replay of that debacle.

Another factor to consider is the pending retirement of the M551A1 Sheridans. When the Sheridans are gone, the paratroopers will not have an armored gun system that can be parachuted into the drop zone alongside them. In a mechanized airborne force, however, some of the M113A3s could be equipped with recoilless rifles to provide organic direct-fire support; both the M40A2 106mm and the M3 84mm Ranger antiarmor, antipersonnel weapon system (RAAWS) could be used in this role. Although the M40A2 has greater range and lethality, the M3 is light enough for easy dismounted use should the need arise. There are a few M40A2s still in storage at Anniston Army Depot (28 serviceable, as of this writing), but the 106 has been manufactured recently by Israeli Military Industries, and the 3A-HEAT-T round made by the firm of BOFORS reportedly has twice the penetration of the conventional 106 round and can defeat explosive reactive armor. These options are clearly less than ideal, but they are still far superior to hand-held weapons such as the LAW (light anti-armor weapon) and the AT-4.

The other organizational approach is to have an autonomous ACS brigade within the 82nd Airborne functioning in much the same manner as the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor. Indeed, the armor battalion is probably the logical choice to serve as the nucleus of the proposed ACS brigade. (This battalion could also initially serve as a battalion-size Airborne Experimental Force to test the concept in Advanced Warfighting Experiments.)

There would be a number of advantages to having a separate brigade. The infantry battalions would not be saddled with the added maintenance and supply efforts required by organic light armor, nor would the paratroopers lose their dismounted skills, because they would have the use of the M113s only for required training and maintenance and periodic operations.

This should not be viewed as simply an armored transportation brigade, however. Even though it would function in that role for operations requiring mechanized infantry, it has the potential for employment in a variety of roles and missions.

In a Desert Shield type of scenario, for example, the M113A3s could be configured as tank killers, with ATGM launchers installed for line-of-sight engagements, while M1064A3 120mm self-propelled mortars could have precision-guided mortar munitions for long-range and indirect-fire use. This configuration would need only four crewmen per M113; a substantial reduction in personnel requirements compared to the manpower-intensive infantry units.

A single ACS brigade could field as much antitank firepower as two bri-

Page 10 INFANTRY July-December 1997

gades of parachute infantry--twice the combat power, with half the troops. Class III supply (petroleum, oil, lubricants) would be about as demanding as for those same infantry brigades, but this should be mostly (if not completely) offset by the greatly reduced requirements for Class I (food) and water, the latter being as critical as fuel in a desert environment. The need for items in Classes II, IV, VI, and VIII should also be minimized because of the reduced number of Soldiers.

As for deployability, only 22 C-5 sorties would be required to transport the brigade's 170-plus armored vehicles. A force of armored, high mobility, high-lethality weapon systems could maneuver according to the evolving situation-instead of just sitting and waiting behind a "line in the sand" hoping the enemy would attack at the most favorable time and place.

During World War II, the available technology did not permit the mechanization of parachute infantry. The workhorse of the air fleet--the legendary C-47-was not designed for parachute delivery of light armor; and the existing APC-the M3 half-track-was too big and heavy to be airdropped.

With the post-war development of the C-130 and other, larger transport aircraft, and the adoption of the aluminum-hulled M113, the technological aspects of the situation changed. Unfortunately, the U.S. airborne community failed to take advantage of these new circumstances. Other nations have been more adaptive, however. Israeli paratroopers readily incorporate the M113 into their operations, making full use of the vehicle's tactical mobility and armor protection. The German airborne has recently added a mechanized antitank battalion-armed with the ultralight, helicopter-transportable Wiesel (TOW and 20mm cannon versions}-to its force structure. And, of course, the Russians have equipped several divisions with BMD variants.

These countries have taken the lead in adding a new dimension to airborne warfare. By combining the superior tactical potential of mechanization with the inherently unique advantages of vertical envelopment, they are creating parachute-deliverable forces capable of employment across the entire operational continuum. Since 1989 the U.S. Army has been downsized from 18 divisions to ten, and there is talk that end strength could be reduced even further. This smaller Army of the 21st century cannot afford large, special-purpose units. Every division needs to be equipped and trained to fight and win on all types of terrain, and across the entire spectrum of ground combat scenarios. If the 82nd Airborne Division is to become a full-spectrum force, it must mechanize; failure to do so is an open invitation to military obsolescence and battlefield defeat.

Stanley C. Crist served in the 3rd Battalion, 185th Armor. He has written numerous articles on small arms testing and evaluation, some of which have appeared in INFANTRY.

Nevertheless, we never give up (Compare WW2 "Greatest Generation" adage: "If you first don't succeed, try, try again!" To current slacker generation: "If you can't win, don't try")--so we tried again in 1997...

Here was the pass-the-buck, non-responses we got from: Fort Benning USSOCOM General Shelton

We have never gotten a reply from either Fort Benning, the Rangers or USSOCOM to our reasonable and urgently needed improvements to Airborne/Special Operations/Light forces....

We know now that the 1st TSG (A) warned everyone in the Army quietly through letters and externally through web pages and magazine articles...and EVEN BOOKS...that the coming non-linear combats would require the services of the mighty Gavin and that the flimsy Humvee and Stryker trucks would not do...now over 4, 000 men are dead and 60, 000 wounded from Iraq and Afghanistan...and America is still at risk from moslem terrorist attack...HOW MANY MORE MEN WILL HAVE TO DIE BEFORE WE ADAPT CORRECTLY TO NON-LINEAR COMBAT WITH THE M113 GAVIN LIGHT TRACKED AFV?

1995 BOSNIA: THE M113 GAVIN RUMBLES ALONG IN COLD WEATHER!

Military Technology

"JOINT ENDEAVOR also witnessed the widespread use of the "classical" M113 many versions and variants which were used by Canadian, Malaysian, Turkish and even U.S. Army units, which on several occasions did prefer it to the Bradley in order to stress the stated low intensity nature of their deployment. Indeed, the M113 proved to be nearly optimal solution; as a tracked vehicle, it offers better protection and higher mobility than wheeled AFVs, although its road speed is slower."



[Editor's note: A3 model M113 with band tracks are just as fast as rubber-tired armored cars!]

1999 EAST TIMOR: AIRBORNE DEPLOYMENT OF TRACKED M113s SAVE THE DAY AGAIN!, WHEELED LAVS A MISERABLE FAILURE



New Zealand up-armored M113A1 Gavin loading into USAF C-130 to fly to East Timor. While RAAF C-130s were flying in compact, tracked M113s, the sexy wheeled LAVs (ASLAVs) that the Australian Army also have were trudging along in ships for a port to offload. When they ASLAVs were put on duty, they got stuck in the mud. While the ASLAVs were unable to free themselves from the mud, M113s roamed through the countryside finding and arresting bandits. An American exchange officer reports: "Just returned from Australia. While there, the Australian officers to include their senior leadership outlined the problems they encountered with the LAVs in East Timor. Apparently, the LAVs were never able to operate off the roads and when the rains washed out the asphalt road surfaces, the LAVs bellied out and the Australians became entirely dependent on the M113s for operations in the interior. They have decided that the LAVs are useful on roads inside Australia where the requirement to cross the northern deserts quickly make them useful. However, for deployments, they are inclined to restrict the use of LAVs to urban areas where the roads are good and rely otherwise exclusively on the new upgraded M113s that they are purchasing . Apparently, the ground pressure exerted by the LAVs is very high indeed and this was a problem on East Timor's poor roads as well. Plus the LAVs provide little or no protection against mines . Australian Generals like MG Abigail and Brigadier Quinn along with a host of Australian Majors and Lieutenant Colonels left me with the impression that the LAVs could be useful in the context of home defense, but should not be the first consideration for use in the deployable formations of the active army. Not sure this is really news, but in view of the language in the QDR that urges acceleration of the U.S. Army's 3400 man LAV-equipped motorized infantry brigades called IBCTs, the side-by-side testing with tracked vehicles is more critical than ever."

"As the combined Aussie/Kiwi/Brit Special Forces Group secured Komoro Airport and its environs, the bulk of the 3d Brigade operatonal deployment force was already inbound. 2d RAR which had been waiting in full combat order on a patch of grass at RAAF base Townsville since the previous evening was loaded into RAAF C-130s for a 4 hour direct flight fron Townsville into Dili. Inside the Herks the 2d RAR Digs were packed like sardines, unable to remove their packs or webbing for the duration of the flight. The arrival of the Battalion in Dili just before lunch was greeted with great relief by the 2 RAR Diggers who, along with a few M113A1 APCs from "B" Squadron 3/4 Cavalry Regiment were quickly deployed around the strip to secure it for following troops and supplies.

"After the securing the airport, members of the Special Forces Group moves into Dili proper, the city was almost deserted (except for groups of refugees huddling along the beach and thousands of Indonesian Soldiers) and complete disarray. Plumes of smoke rose from hundreds of burning homes and buildings."

Date: September 20, 1999

Unit: Australian Airborne SAS, Para-Commandos, New Zealanders, British Gurkhas

Operation: Stabilize

Troopers: 2,500 Peacekeepers

Country: East Timor, Indonesia

Dropzone: Dili airport

Aircraft: Airfield secured by UH-60 Blackhawks carry SAS troops, 37 sorties x 6 C-130 RAAF Hercules

Equipment/supplies air-delivered: Ammunition, Food (MREs), water, medical supplies

Type Air delivery: STOL airland troops, M113A1 Armored Personnel Carriers, airdrop of foodstuffs to refugees in mountains

An international peace force airlifted more than 1,000 Soldiers to East Timor by nightfall today, seeking to take control of the provincial capital from pro-Indonesian militias who burned, looted and killed in a rampage that left Dili in smoking in ruins.

Dozens of Hercules transport planes from northern Australia landed at 20-minute intervals carrying the tools of war - vehicles and tons of ammunition, explosives, land mines and supplies.

Mark Colvin:

"Soldiers are moving around everywhere, Hercs are flying in every, you know, within half an hour sometimes, they're offloading quickly, they're walking off in full combat gear and then I've just seen two armoured personnel carriers, quite imposing vehicles, driving out of the airport, which is the first serious armoury we've seen turn up in Dili today."

Securing the airport, some commandos waded into high grass and palm trees and others crouched near the tarmac, guns at the ready, while the planes landed, swiftly unloaded, and took off for another sortie.

As the peacekeeping force spread across Dili toward the wharf, columns of black smoke from burning houses billowed over the city, apparently from fresh fires. Despite the arrival of the peacekeepers, it was still too dangerous to walk freely around the capital to investigate. More fires could be seen outside Dili and along the coast.

Flights were to continue through the night, and 500 more troops set sail from Darwin, Australia, aboard the Australian navy's seacat HMAS Jervis Bay. By daybreak Tuesday, operation commanders said they hoped to have 2,300 troops in East Timor.

Within hours of beginning the operation at dawn, heavily armed combat troops from Australia, New Zealand and Britain were in control of the airport and the harbor, the two vital links to Dili.

Indonesian soldiers watched in apparent bemusement as the force moved into position, outfitted in heavy battle fatigues, armored vests, packs and ammunition belts in the sweltering tropical heat.

Men wearing the red and white bandanas of anti-independence militias were among hundreds of people at the garbage-strewn harbor who watched the armed and helmeted Soldiers take positions near destroyed warehouses.

The chaotic port area was crowded with thousands of refugees waiting to escape after more than two weeks of violence. Throngs of people tried to clamber aboard a passenger ferry and Indonesian naval supply ship, which many believed were the last ships out.

Pro-Indonesia militias rejected East Timor's overwhelming vote for independence on Aug. 30 and went on a rampage in collusion with Indonesian security forces. Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in 1975.

As the peacekeeping forces poured into East Timor, the militia groups opposed to independence have banded together to form a coalition called the United Nation Front, a news report said today.

''We won't attack the U.N. peacekeeping troops. We only want to defend our ground,'' coalition chief Joao da Silva Tavares said in a report broadcast on Indonesia's SCTV television.

The coalition was formed Sunday near the East Timorese town of Balibo. Indonesian military veterans from East Timor are also among the members, SCTV said.

So far, the troops ''met absolutely no resistance'' as they spread through the shattered capital, according to the peacekeeping force commander, Australian Maj. Gen. Peter Cosgrove. Despite reports of shooting Sunday night, ''by and large it has been a cordial reception,'' he said in Dili.

Peacekeeping officers shook hands with the Indonesian commanders, but the Indonesian presence at the airstrip was light, and it quickly became obvious who was in charge.

Before the first plane approached, Indonesian forces chased a herd of goats off the airstrip.

Peacekeepers disarmed two men who rode into the port area on a motorbike. They offered no resistance and sped away after troops ordered them to leave.

Many of the Australian troops took an intensive language program and speak Indonesian. A large majority of Dili's residents speak no English.

The peacekeeping mission, named Operation Stabilize, got under way five days after the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved the force under Australia's command to quell the chaos.

The huge air operation deprived the United Nations of the planes it was using to drop of food to starving refugees in East Timor's mountains.

''There's a massive amount of relief ready to go,'' said David Wimhurst, spokesman for the U.N. Mission to East Timor, or UNAMET. ''The question is getting it in as soon as possible.''

In a report made available today, the U.N. Children's Fund estimated 190,000 to 300,000 refugees were hiding in East Timor, in addition to 141,000 who fled to West Timor. Fears were rising of epidemics in overcrowded refugee camps from the lack of water and sanitation, UNICEF said.

Sadako Ogata, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, met Indonesian President B.J. Habibie to discuss her visit Sunday to camps in West Timor, where independence supporters were herded by the militias in an attempt to evict the secessionists from East Timor and nullify the referendum.

She said she had to trust the Indonesian police to safeguard the refugees in West Timor, as well as operations the UNHCR hopes to set up there.

Look through the several hundred pics of the Aussies in action like I did, and you will see the wheeled LAVs on the roads while the TRACKED M113s are doing the dirty work hunting down the terrorists in INFANTRY terrain...

www.defence.gov.au/army/4rar/index.htm

Which would you fight in?

More Australian twin Medium Machine-Gun turret equipped M113A1s on combat patrol in East Timor, 1999...

AUSTRALIAN ARMY: UPGRADING ITS M113s AFTER THE FAILURE OF LAVs IN EAST TIMOR

Unlike some stupid armies and stupid marine corps that lust for rubber-tired armored cars, the Australian Army has learned its lesson and is upgrading their M113 light tracked WAR machines:

TENIX company M113 upgrade for Australian Army

Good job, Diggers!

2000: THE WHEELED LAV-III THINLY ARMORED TRUCK DISASTER BEGINS

The fix was in from the beginning that the LAV-III would "win" the competition with many of the senior officers who made this decision now retired and working for General Dynamics: Heebner, Keane, Abrams and others. The Soldiers who now suffer in the road-bound Stryker truck deathtrap have been fed a daily diet of lies about "how much better they are than walking" to smokescreen the FACT that the mighty M113 Gavin beat the LAV-III in ALL tests and the Army's officials not only lied and covered this up to preserve their "meal ticket" they could be better protected, more mobile and dozens of them ALIVE and not maimed today if the BEST vehicle was chosen to equip the new brigade combat teams.

We warned the Army brass with an entire book, laying out ALL of the exact details in 2 editions of "Air-Mech-Strike" and even delivered a copy onto Army Chief General Shinseki's desk. The preponderance of evidence backs a tracked transformation as even the Future Combat System (FCS) will be on band tracks as announced recently in 2005. We also wrote many letters and articles like the April 2000 one below in Armed Forces Journal "Its the weight not wheels" by 1st TSG (A) Director, Mike Sparks in good faith that the Army's officials were also acting in good faith in the best interests of our country and our Soldiers and not their egos and pocket books.

We were wrong about our officials being open to the truth and putting service before self, but we have been 100% right all along about what's BEST for America's Soldiers, our mission and our future: to fully exploit the greatest AFV of all time, ever: the M113 Gavin!

IRAQ II: 2002-PRESENT: victory liberating from Saddam, holding bad situation together during the occupation





173rd Airborne Brigade jumps into Northern Iraq: follow-on echelon of 4 platoons of M113A3 Gavins, M2 Bradleys and M1 Abrams airland afterwards

Now if we had only parachute airdropped the M113A3 Gavins and their infantry to get into blocking positions sooner....we might have gotten Saddam before losing 500+ dead Soldiers. We should follow up this success in the 173rd ABN BDE by placing their IRF-M into parachute jump status with M113A3 Gavins to rapidly fan out from drop zones and execute decisive 3D air-ground maneuvers.

M113 Gavins Airlanded in closing days of Iraqi Freedom attack Phase

Interesting, check out this article in the last issue of MILITARY REVIEW:

www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/download/english/NovDec03/barclay.pdf

Seems that 4 platoons of M113 Gavins WERE airlanded as part of the Northern Front, along with a platoon of Brads and of Abrams. Would love to see the logistic AAR for that operation. The article also says an innovative e-mail based logistic system located and moved parts to the airhead with a 24 hour turn around time, without moving mountains of stuff to theater. The young sergeants and officers are doing real logistic transformation with the tools they have, without waiting for DA to do it top-driven.

U.S. ARMY'S 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) and CTJF121 SPECIAL FORCES (AIRBORNE) get Dictator Saddam Hussein---finally

M113A3 Super Gavins in Iraq combat by 1st Cavalry

This is a pic from a recent Fort Benning BAYONET newspaper showing a heavily up-armored M113A3 Super Gavin in Iraq being used as a HOOAH! backdrop showing its still a vehicle beloved by Soldiers in the Army; in this case, the Cavalry---who should have had these light tracks all along!

We thought Saddam Hussein was killed in the first "Shock and Awe" USAF air strike firepower?

What is infuriating is that 500 dead and 2000 wounded, 8 months later it took 2D GROUND maneuver by the U.S. Army's mechanized 4th ID and some SF troops to get him, even though the RMA/Tofflerians are constantly badgering Congress for more funding for sexy aircraft bombs. What should be learned from the U.S. Army--and will be missed until the gloating is over----is that had we used 3D air-mech maneuver like we did when we parachuted troops and light tracked AFVs in Panama in 1989 when we quickly got Manuel Noriega---we could have surrounded Baghdad quickly before Saddam could have fled to home town Tikrit. This means we should get upgraded M113 Gavins and M8 Buford AGS light tanks quickly into service in a parachute forced-entry unit ASAP so they next time we get the Bin Laden and Saddams before they can flee---and early to save American and civilian lives.

The heavy combats in Iraq have been done from the Army's light M113 Gavins, medium M2/M3 Bradleys and heavy M1 Abrams tanks....not "Stryker" rubber-tired armored cars....but the wheeled HMMWV and FMTV trucks used there have been clobbered by the enemy as the Strykers tragically soon will be. The Army's Shinsekiite senior leaders in love with their own Tofflerian mentalism hubris have wasted $$$BILLIONS of dollars on vehicles that are flaming coffins for our men and neglected the actual combat-proven light, medium and heavy tracked AFVs that have kicked enemy ass. For example EVERY U.S. Army M113 Gavin should have RPG-resistant applique' armor and gunshields fitted as well as belly armor:

Belly Armor Kit / Cage No. 80212, P/N 4240277

Chapter III: Growth of U.S. Armored Forces in Vietnam

www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/mounted/chapter3.htm

"To reduce mine damage to M113's, 'belly armor' kits arrived in 1969. When this supplemental armor was applied to M113's and Sheridans, it protected them from mine blast rupture, saved many lives, and gave the crews added confidence"

What current Army leaders do not understand is the way you achieve excellence in life and win battles and wars is by doing EVERYTHING in your power to win. We do not have the time or the M1/M2s to outfit the Army Soldiers running around in Iraq on foot and in HMMWV/FMTV trucks; BUT WE DO HAVE 13,000+ M113 Gavins. If we harden our supply convoys, stop running around naked when doing city raids AND clear the Main Supply Route (MSR) with the Engineer Cavalry (ECAV) troops the SUM TOTAL of these improvements is greater than the whole of its parts looked at in isolation. Synergism. Everybody fights, everybody works.

We cannot afford the fuel costs (tactical and human life) of more M1s even if we could remove turrets and make "Tank Fighting Vehicles":

Estimate 400 x M1/M2s are in just one 4th ID BDE over there now. 200 x M1s with diesel need complete fill-up once a day. Round fuel capacity to 500 gallons thats 100,000 gallons a day for M1s. M2s only need refuelling every two days; so 200 x M2s need 100 gallons a day = 20,000 gallons for a grand total of 120, 000 gallons a day.

The HEMMT can carry 2,500 gallons of fuel.

To carry 120,000 gallons requires 48 x HEMMT trucks.

These are big, vulnerable targets. I'd say it ends up creating 48 x convoys so each convoy doesn't have a rolling molotov cocktail to incinerate everyone involved.

Least risk per convoy = 1 HEMMT tanker per convoy = 48 convoys along the MSR

2 x HEMMT tankers per convoy = 24 convoys....and so on.

48 x POL plus other supply convoys forces us to if we disperse run 1 convoy every 30 minutes. Running all 48 at one time would be suicidal.

The answer is to realize the modern battlefield is NON-LINEAR and stop having troops riding around in wheeled vehicles in COMBAT AREAS.

U.S. ARMY'S 3rd INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED): Soldiers in TRACKS BEATS marines-in-trucks to Baghdad; triumph of 4GW ground maneuver over Tofflerian RMA mental firepower hubris

This is the story of the tracked, mechanized "Thunder Run" into Baghdad that collapsed the Iraqi resistance. It looks like the "Thunder Run" will replace the Battle of 73 Easting as the most studied ground engagement in U.S. History.

Los Angeles Times Magazine

December 7, 2003 The Thunder Run



The most successful combat vehicle in Iraq has been the M113 Gavin 'Are you kidding, sir?': Fewer than 1,000 Soldiers were ordered to capture a city of 5 million Iraqis. Theirs is a story that may become military legend. By David Zucchino Nine hundred and seventy-five men invading a city of 5 million sounded audacious, or worse, to the U.S. troops assigned the mission outside Baghdad last April 6. Ten years earlier, in Mogadishu, outnumbered American Soldiers had been trapped and killed by Somali street fighters. Now some U.S. commanders, convinced the odds were far better in Iraq, scrapped the original plan for taking Baghdad with a steady siege and instead ordered a single bold thrust into the city. The battle that followed became the climax of the war and rewrote American military doctrine on urban warfare. Back home, Americans learned of the victory in sketchy reports that focused on the outcome-a column of armored vehicles had raced into the city and seized Saddam Hussein's palaces and ministries. What the public didn't know was how close the U.S. forces came to experiencing another Mogadishu. Military units were surrounded, waging desperate fights at three critical interchanges. If any of those fell, the Americans would have been cut off from critical supplies and ammunition. Embedded journalists reported the battle's broad outlines in April, but a more detailed account has since emerged in interviews with more than 70 of the brigade's officers and men who described the fiercest battle of the war-and one they nearly lost. Times staff writer David Zucchino, who was embedded with Task Force 4-64 of the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), returned to the United States recently to report this story. On the afternoon of April 4, Army Lt. Col. Eric Schwartz was summoned to a command tent pitched in a dusty field 11 miles south of Baghdad. His brigade commander, Col. David Perkins, looked up from a map and told Schwartz he had a mission for him. "At first light tomorrow," Perkins said, "I want you to attack into Baghdad." Schwartz felt disoriented. He had just spent several hours in a tank, leading his armored battalion on an operation that had destroyed dozens of Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles 20 miles south. A hot shard of exploding tank had burned a hole in his shoulder. "Are you kidding, sir?" Schwartz asked, as he waited for the other officers inside the tent to laugh. There was silence. "No," Perkins said. "I need you to do this." Schwartz was stunned. No American troops had yet set foot inside the capital. The original U.S. battle plan called for Airborne Soldiers, not tanks, to take the city. The tankers had trained for desert warfare, not urban combat. But now Perkins, commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), was ordering Schwartz's tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles on a charge into the unknown. Schwartz's "thunder run" into the city the next morning was a prelude to the fall of Baghdad. It triggered a grinding three-day battle, the bloodiest of the war-and dismissed any public perception of a one-sided slaughter of a passive enemy. Entire Iraqi army units threw down their weapons and fled, but thousands __`Ý______ô1S+__9ù~`Î_ùG`1ÇOÂ"'rrillas fought from bunkers and rooftops with grenades, rockets and mortars. The 2nd Brigade's ultimate seizure of Baghdad has few modern parallels. It was a calculated gamble that will be taught at military academies and training exercises for years to come. It changed the way the military thinks about fighting with tanks in a city. It brought the conflict in Iraq to a decisive climax and shortened the initial combat of the war, perhaps by several weeks. But when Eric Schwartz got the mission that would prime the battlefield for the decisive strike on Baghdad, he had no idea what he had taken on. Task Force 1-64, a battalion nicknamed Rogue, rumbled north on Highway 8 toward Baghdad. The column seemed to stretch to the shimmer panicked and leaped out, breaking his leg. A Bradley cr squat tan forms bathed in pale yellow light. It was dawn on April 5, a bright, hot Saturday. Schwartz's battalion had been ordered to sprint through 10 1/2 miles of uncharted territory. The column was to conduct "armored reconnaissance," to blow through enemy defenses, testing strengths and tactics. It was to slice through Baghdad's southwestern corner and link up at the airport with the division's 1st Brigade, which had seized the facility the day before. In the lead tank was 1st Lt. Robert Ball, a slender, soft-spoken North Carolinian. Just 25, Ball had never been in combat until two weeks earlier. He was selected to lead the column not because he had a particularly refined sense of direction but because his tank had a plow. Commanders were expecting obstacles in the highway. The battalion had been given only a few hours to prepare. Ball studied his military map, but it had no civilian markings-no exit numbers, no neighborhoods. He was worried about missing his exit to the airport at what fellow officers called the "spaghetti junction," a maze of twisting overpasses and offramps on Baghdad's western cusp. Ball's map was clipped to the top of his tank hatch as the column lumbered up Highway 8. He had been rolling only about 10 minutes when his gunner spotted a dozen Iraqi soldiers leaning against a building several hundred yards away, chatting, drinking tea, their weapons propped against the wall. They had not yet heard the rumble of the approaching tanks. "Sir, can I shoot at these guys?" the gunner asked. "Uh, yeah, they're enemy," Ball told him. Ball had fired at soldiers in southern Iraq, but they had been murky green figures targeted with the tank's thermal imagery system. These soldiers were in living color. Through the tank's sights, Ball could see their eyes, their mustaches, their steaming cups of tea. The gunner mowed them down methodically, left to right. As each man fell, Ball could see shock cross the face of the next man before he, too, pitched violently to the ground. The last man fled around the corner of the building. But then, inexplicably, he ran back into the open. The gunner dropped him. The clattering of the tank's rapid-fire medium machine gun seemed to awaken fighters posted along the highway. Gunfire erupted from both sides-AK-47 automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, or RPGs, followed minutes later by recoilless rifles and antiaircraft guns. Iraqi soldiers and militiamen were firing from a network of trenches and bunkers carved into the highway's shoulders, and from rooftops and alleyways. Some were inside cargo containers buried in the dirt. Others were tucked beneath the overpasses or firing down from bridges. In the southbound lanes, civilian cars were cruising past, their occupants staring wide-eyed at the fireballs erupting from the tank's main guns and the bright tracer flashes from the rapid-fire medium and .50-caliber machine guns. From onramps and access roads, other cars packed with Iraqi gunmen were attacking. Mixed in were troop trucks, armored personnel carriers, taxis and motorcycles with sidecars. The crews were under strict orders to identify targets as military before firing. They were to fire warning shots, then shoot into engine blocks if a vehicle continued to approach. Some cars screeched to a halt. Others kept coming, and the gunners ripped into them. The crews could see soldiers or armed civilians in some of the smoking hulks. In others, they weren't sure. Nobody knew how many civilians had been killed. They knew only that any vehicle that kept coming was violently eliminated. As the column lurched forward, buses and trucks unloaded Iraqi fighters. Some were in uniform, some in jeans and sports shirts. Others wore the baggy black robes of the Fedayeen Saddam, Hussein's loyal militiamen. To the Americans, they seemed to have no training, no discipline, no coordinated tactics. It was all point and shoot. The machine guns sent chunks of their bodies onto the roadside. The Americans were suffering casualties, too. A Bradley was hit by an RPG and disabled. The driver panicked and leaped out, breaking his leg. A Bradley commander stopped and dragged the driver to safety. At a highway cloverleaf, a tank was hit in its rear engine housing and burst into flames. The column stopped as the crew tried desperately to put out the fire. But the flames, fed by leaking fuel, spread. The entire column was now exposed and taking heavy fire. Two suicide vehicles packed with explosives sped down the offramps. They were destroyed by tank cannons. After nearly 30 minutes of fighting, Perkins ordered the tank abandoned. To keep the tank out of Iraqi hands, the crew destroyed it with incendiary grenades. By now the resistance was organizing. Fighters who appeared to be dead or wounded were suddenly leaping up and firing at the backs of American vehicles. Schwartz ordered his gunners to "double tap," to shoot anybody they saw moving near a weapon. "If it was a confirmed kill, they'd let it go," Schwartz said later. "If it wasn't, they'd tap it again. We were checking our work." At the head of the column, Ball was approaching the spaghetti junction. His map showed the exit splitting into two ramps. He knew he wanted the ramp to the right. He had been following blue English "Airport" signs, but now smoke from a burning Iraqi personnel carrier obscured the entire cloverleaf. In the web of overpasses, Ball found the ramp he wanted and stayed right. He was halfway down when he realized he should have taken a different one. Now he was heading east into downtown Baghdad, the opposite direction from the airport. The entire column was following him. He told his driver to turn left, then roll over the guardrail and turn back onto the westbound lanes. The rail crumbled, the column followed, and everyone rumbled back toward the airport. Behind Ball, a tank commanded by Lt. Roger Gruneisen had fallen behind. Some equipment from the crippled tank had been dumped onto the top of Gruneisen's tank, obstructing his view from the hatch. With the emergency addition of Staff Sgt. Jason Diaz, commander of the burning tank, and Diaz's gunner, Gruneisen now had five men squeezed into a tank designed for four. The gunner had swung the main gun right to fire on a bunker. In the loader's hatch, Sgt. Carlos Hernandez saw that the gun tube was headed for a concrete bridge abutment. He screamed, "Traverse left!" But they were moving rapidly. The gun tube smacked the abutment. The entire turret spun like a top. Inside, the crewmen were pinned against the walls, struggling to hold on as the turret turned wildly two dozen times before stopping. It was like an out-of-control carnival ride. The crew was dizzy. Hernandez looked at the gunner. Blood was spurting from his nose. His head and chest were soaked with greenish-yellow hydraulic fluid. The impact had severed a hydraulic line. Except for the gunner's bloody nose, no one was hurt. The main gun was bent and smashed. It flopped to the side, useless. The tank continued up Highway 8, Gruneisen on the .50-caliber and Hernandez on a medium machine gun. They rolled up to the spaghetti junction into a curtain of black smoke-and missed the airport turn. They were headed into the city center. Hernandez saw that they were approaching a traffic circle. As they drew closer, he saw that the circle was clogged with Iraqi military trucks and soldiers. It was a staging area for troops attacking the American column. From around the circle, just a block away, a yellow pickup truck sped toward the tank. Hernandez tore into it with the machine gun, killing the driver. The tank driver slammed on the brake to avoid the truck, but it was crushed beneath the treads. The impact sent Hernandez's machine gun tumbling off the back of the tank. The tank reversed to clear itself from the wreckage, crushing the machine gun. A passenger from the truck wandered into the roadway. The tank pitched forward, trying to escape the circle, and crushed him. The crew was now left with just one medium machine gun and the .50-caliber. Firing both guns to clear the way, the crewmen helped direct the tank driver out of the circle. As they pulled away, they could see a blue "Airport" sign. They were less than five miles from the airport. They caught up with the column. They passed groves of date palm trees and thick underbrush, and everyone worried about another ambush. In the lead platoon, Staff Sgt. Stevon Booker was leaning out of his tank commander's hatch, firing his M-4 carbine because his .50-caliber machine gun had jammed. Enemy fire was so intense that Booker had ordered his loader, Pvt. Joseph Gilliam, to get down in the hatch. As Booker leaned down, he told Gilliam: "I don't want to die in this country." As he resumed firing, he shouted down to Gilliam and the gunner, Sgt. David Gibbons: "I'm a baad mother!" Gilliam, 21, and Gibbons, 22, idolized Booker, who, at 34, was experienced and decisive. He was a loud, aggressive, extroverted lifer. His booming voice was the first thing his men heard in the morning and the last thing at night. As Gibbons, in the gunner's perch at Booker's feet inside the turret, fired rounds, he felt Booker drop down behind him. He assumed he had come down to get more ammunition. But then he heard the loader, Gilliam, scream and curse. He looked back at Booker and saw that half his jaw was missing. He had been hit by a machine-gun round. [EDITOR: WHERE ARE THE GUNSHIELDS?] The turret was splattered with blood. As Gibbons crawled up in the commander's hatch, he saw that Booker was trying to breathe. He radioed for help and was ordered to stop and wait for medics. Gibbons and Gilliam tried to perform "buddy aid" to stop the bleeding. The medics arrived and, under fire, lifted Booker's body into the medical vehicle. The driver sped toward a medevac helicopter at the airport, just as the physician's assistant radioed that Booker was gone. The assistant covered the sergeant's bloodied face and, not knowing what else to do, held his hand. Booker's body arrived just ahead of the rest of the column, which rolled onto the tarmac in a hail of gunfire. Some of the tanks and Bradleys were on fire and leaking oil, but they had survived the gantlet. At the airport that morning, Col. Perkins spoke on the tarmac with his superior, Maj. Gen. Buford C. Blount III, the 3rd Infantry Division commander. Rogue battalion had lost a tank commander and tank, but they had killed almost 1,000 fighters and torn a hole in Baghdad's defenses. Blount wanted to keep the pressure on Saddam's forces. He had seen intelligence suggesting that Saddam's elite Republican Guard units were being sent into Baghdad to reinforce the capital. But, in truth, he really didn't have good intelligence. It was too dangerous to send in scouts. Satellite imagery didn't show bunkers or camouflaged armor and artillery. Blount had access to only one unmanned spy drone, and its cameras weren't providing much either. Prisoners of war had told U.S. interrogators that the Iraqi military was expecting American tanks to surround the city while infantry from the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne cleared the capital. And that was the U.S. plan-at least until the thunder run that morning altered the equation. Blount told Perkins to go back into the city in two days, on Monday the 7th. Blount wanted him to test the city's defenses, destroy as many Iraqi forces as possible and then come out to prepare for the siege of the capital. Perkins was eager to go back in, but not for another thunder run. He wanted to stay. He had just heard Mohammed Said Sahaf, the bombastic information minister, deliver a taunting news conference, claiming that no American forces had entered Baghdad and that Iraqi troops had slaughtered hundreds of American "scoundrels" at the airport. When Perkins got back to the brigade operations center south of the city, he told his executive officer, Lt. Col. Eric Wesley: "This just changed from a tactical war to an information war. We need to go in and stay." The brigade was exhausted. It had been on the move day and night, rolling up from Kuwait and fighting Fedayeen and Republican Guard units-sprinting 435 miles in just over two weeks, the fastest overland march in U.S. military history. Their tanks and Bradleys were beat up. The crews had not slept in days. Now they had just one day to prepare for the pivotal battle of the war. The charge up Highway 8 on April 7 was similar to the sprint by Rogue Battalion two days earlier. Fedayeen and Arab volunteers and Republican Guards fired from roadside bunkers and from windows and alleys on both sides of the highway. Suicide vehicles tried to ram the column. Gunners pounded everything that moved, radioing back to trailing vehicles to kill off what they missed. It took only two hours to blow through the spaghetti junction and speed east to Saddam's palace complex. Schwartz's lead battalion, Rogue, rolled to Saddam's parade field, with its massive crossed sabers and tomb of the unknown Soldier. Rogue also seized one of Saddam's two main downtown palaces, the convention center and the Rashid Hotel, home to the Baath Party elite. Lt. Col. Philip deCamp's Task Force 4-64, the Tusker battalion, swung to the east and raced for Saddam's hulking Republican Palace and the 14th of July Bridge, which controlled access to the palace complex from the south. The targets had been selected not only for their strategic value, but also because they were in open terrain. The palace complex consisted of broad boulevards, gardens and parks-and few tall buildings or narrow alleyways. The battalions could set up defensive positions, with open fields of fire. The Tusker battalion destroyed bunkers at the western arch of the Republican Palace grounds, blew apart two recoilless rifles teams guarding the arch and smashed through a metal gate. The palace had been evacuated, but there were soldiers in a tree line and along the Tigris River bank. The infantrymen killed some, and others fled, stripping off their uniforms. At a traffic circle at the base of the 14th of July Bridge, Capt. Steve Barry's Cyclone Company fought off cars and trucks that streaked across the bridge, some packed with explosives. There were three in the first 10 minutes, six more right after that. The tanks and Bradleys destroyed them all. By midmorning, Perkins was meeting with his two battalion commanders on Saddam's parade grounds. They gave live interviews to an embedded Fox TV crew. Lt. Col. DeCamp and one of his company commanders, Capt. Chris Carter-both University of Georgia graduates-unfurled a Georgia Bulldogs flag. Capt. Jason Conroy toppled a massive Saddam statue with a single tank round. As his tankers celebrated, Perkins took a satellite phone call from Wesley, his executive officer. Wesley ran the brigade's tactical operations center, a network of radios, computers, satellite maps and communications vehicles set up on the cement courtyard of an abandoned warehouse 11 miles south of the city center. It was hard for Wesley to hear on his hand-held Iridium phone; a high-pitched whine sounded over his head. He thought it was a low-flying airplane. Wesley shouted into the phone: "Congratulations, sir, I-" and at that instant an orange fireball blew past him and slammed him to the ground. The whine wasn't an airplane. It was a missile. The entire operations center was engulfed in flames. Wesley still had the phone. "Sir," he said. "We've been hammered!" "What?" "We've been hit. I'll have to call you back. It doesn't look good." Rows of signal vehicles were on fire and exploding. A line of parked Humvees evaporated, consumed in a brilliant flash. Men were writhing on the ground, their skin seared. A driver and a mechanic were swallowed by the fireball, killed instantly. Another driver, horribly burned, lay dying. Two embedded reporters perished on the concrete, their corpses scorched to gray ash. Seventeen Soldiers were wounded, some seriously. The brigade's nerve center, its communications brain, was gone. The entire mission-the brigade's audacious plan to conquer a city of 5 million with 975 combat Soldiers and 88 armored vehicles in a single violent strike-was in jeopardy. It got worse. As Wesley and his officers tended to the dead and wounded, Perkins was receiving distressing reports from Lt. Col. Stephen Twitty, a battalion commander charged with keeping the brigade's supply lines open along Highway 8. One of Twitty's companies was surrounded. It was "amber" on fuel and ammunition-a level dangerously close to "black," the point at which there is not enough to sustain a fight. [EDITOR: why M1s need diesel engines not turbine engines] The Baghdad raid, launched at dawn, was now approaching its sixth hour-well past the Hour Four deadline Perkins had set to decide whether to stay for the night. That benchmark was critical because his tanks, which consume 56 gallons of fuel an hour, had eight to 10 hours of fuel. That meant four hours going in and four coming out. To conserve fuel, Perkins ordered the tanks set up in defensive positions and shut down. They couldn't maneuver, but they could still fire-and each hour they were turned off bought Perkins another hour. Even so, time was running out for Twitty, whose outnumbered companies were clinging to three crucial interchanges. "Sir, there's one hell of a fight here," Twitty told Perkins. "I'll be honest with you: I don't know how long I can hold it here." Even after Twitty received reinforcements, tying up the brigade's only reserve force, his men had to be resupplied. But the resupply convoy was ambushed on Highway 8; two sergeants were killed and five fuel and ammunition trucks were destroyed. The highway was a shooting gallery. If Perkins lost the roadway, he and his men would be trapped in the city without fuel or ammunition. American combat commanders are trained to develop a "decision support matrix," an analytical breakdown of alternatives based on a rapidly unfolding chain of circumstances. For Perkins, the matrix was telling him: cut your losses, pull back, return another day. His command center was in flames. He had spent his reserve force. And now his fuel and ammunition were burning on the highway. On the parade grounds, Perkins stood next to his [M113 Gavin] armored personnel carrier, map in hand, flanked by his two tank battalion commanders. The air was heavy with swirling sand and grit. Black plumes of oily smoke rose from burning vehicles and bunkers. Perkins knew the prudent move was to pull out, but he felt compelled to stay. His men had fought furiously to reach the palace complex. It seemed obscene to make them fight their way back out, and to surrender terrain infused with incalculable psychological and strategic value. Sahaf, the delusional information minister, was already claiming that no American "infidels" had breached the city's defenses. Perkins had just heard Sahaf's distinctive rant on BBC radio: "The infidels are committing suicide by the hundreds on the gates of Baghdad." A retreat now, Perkins thought, would validate the minister's lies. It would unravel the brigade's singular achievement, which had put American soldiers inside Saddam's two main palaces and American boots on his reviewing stand. Perkins turned to his tank battalion commanders. "We're staying." Lt. Col. Stephen Twitty is right-handed, but early that morning he found himself drawing diagrams with his left hand. He was crouched in a Bradley hatch, holding a radio with his right hand while he tried to diagram an emergency battle plan. Over the radio net, Twitty had heard the tank battalions in the city celebrating and discussing the wine collections at Saddam's palaces. He was only a few miles away, at a Highway 8 interchange code-named Objective Larry, but he was in the fight of his life. Twitty had survived the first Gulf War, but he had never encountered anything like this. His men were being pounded from all directions-by small arms, mortars, RPGs, gun trucks, recoilless rifles. The two tank battalions had punched through Highway 8, but now the enemy had regrouped and was mounting a relentless counterattack against Twitty's mechanized infantry battalion. As he scratched out his battle plan, Twitty spotted an orange-and-white taxi speeding toward his Bradley. A man in the back seat was firing an AK-47. He realized how absurd he sounded. So he shouted at his Bradley gunner: "Slew the turret and fire!" The gunner spotted the taxi and fired a blast of 25mm rounds. The taxi blew up. It had been loaded with explosives. Twitty's China battalion, Task Force 3-15, would destroy dozens of vehicles that day, many of them packed with explosives. They would blow up buses and motorcycles and pickup trucks. They would kill hundreds of fighters, as well as civilians who inadvertently blundered into the fight. Twitty ordered his engineers to tear down highway signs and light poles and pile up charred vehicles to build protective berms. But several suicide cars crashed through, and Twitty's men kept killing them. Twitty was astonished. He hadn't expected much resistance, but the Syrians and Fedayeen were relentless, fanatical, determined to die. Twitty saw a busload of soldiers pull straight into the kill zone. A tank round obliterated the vehicle-burning alive everyone inside. The driver of a second busload saw the carnage, yet kept coming. The tanks lit up his bus, too. From Objective Moe, about two miles north, and from Objective Curly, about two miles south, Twitty received urgent calls requesting mortar and artillery fire-"danger close," or within 220 yards of their own positions. Mortars and artillery screamed down, driving the Syrians and Fedayeen back. But at Curly, a stray round wounded two American infantrymen, and the artillery was shut down there. At Curly, Capt. Zan Hornbuckle had enemy fighters inside his perimeter. He sent infantrymen to clear the ramps and overpasses. It was dangerous, methodical work. The infantrymen crept up behind a series of support walls, tossed grenades into trenches, then gunned down the fighters inside as they rose to return fire. The Americans were killing fighters by the dozens, but the infantrymen were getting hit, too. Their flak vests protected vital organs, but several men were dragged back with bright red shrapnel wounds ripped into their arms, legs and necks. Dr. Erik Schobitz, the battalion surgeon, treated the wounded. Capt. Schobitz was a pediatrician with no combat experience. He had never fired an automatic rifle until a month earlier. Schobitz wore a stethoscope with a yellow plastic rabbit attached-his lucky stethoscope. It was hanging there when a sliver of shrapnel hit his face, wounding him slightly. With Schobitz was Capt. Steve Hommel, the battalion chaplain. He moved from one wounded man to the next, talking softly, squeezing their hands. Hommel had been a combat infantry sergeant in the first Gulf War, but even he was alarmed. He feared being overrun-there were hundreds of enemy fighters bearing down on just 80 combat Soldiers, who were backed by Bradleys but no tanks. Hommel tried to appear calm while comforting the wounded. Enemy fighters were firing on the medics, and some of them fired back. The chaplain grabbed one medic's M-16 and shot at muzzle flashes east of the highway. Hommel didn't know whether he hit anyone, and he didn't want to know. He was a Baptist minister. Several miles north, at Objective Moe, Capt. Josh Wright was struggling to keep his perimeter intact. Two of Wright's three platoon sergeants were wounded, and two engineers went down with shrapnel wounds. A gunner was hit with a ricochet. An infantryman dragging a wounded enemy soldier to safety was hit in the wrist and stomach. One Bradley's TOW missile launcher was destroyed. Another Bradley had a machine gun go down. One of the tanks lost use of its main gun. Wright radioed Twitty and asked for permission to fire on a mosque to the north. Through his sights, he could see an RPG team in each minaret and another on the mosque roof. Under the rules of engagement, the mosque was now a hostile, nonprotected site. Twitty granted permission to fire. All three RPG teams were killed, leaving smoking black holes in the minarets. By now, Wright had managed to get infantrymen and snipers into buildings north of the interchange. They were able to kill advancing fighters while mortar rounds ripped into soldiers hiding in the palm grove. Then the mortars stopped. The platoon mortar leader at Objective Curly radioed Wright and apologized profusely. He was "black"-completely out of mortar rounds. He couldn't fire again until the resupply convoy was sent north. Wright's own men were now telling him they were "amber" on all types of ammunition. Wright wasn't certain how much longer he could hold the interchange. At Objective Curly, Hornbuckle tried to sound positive on the radio but Twitty could hear the stress in his voice. He asked the captain to put on the battalion command sergeant major, Robert Gallagher. A leathery-faced Army Ranger of 40, Gallagher had survived the battle at Mogadishu, where he had been wounded three times. Twitty knew Gallagher would be blunt. "All right, sergeant major, I want the truth," Twitty said. "Do you need reinforcements?" "Sir, we need reinforcements," Gallagher said. Twitty radioed Perkins and told him he could not hold Curly without reinforcements. "If you need it, you've got it," Perkins assured him. Twitty called Capt. Ronny Johnson, commander of the reserve company defending the operations center, which was still burning. "How fast can you get here?" Twitty asked. "Sir, I can be there in 15 minutes," Johnson said. It was only about two miles from the operations center to Curly. "That's not fast enough. Get here now." Johnson and his platoon raced north on Highway 8, fighting through a withering ambush. With 10 Bradleys and 65 infantrymen, the convoy bulked up the combat power at Curly. They plunged into the fight, stabilizing the perimeter. At the burning operations center, executive officer Wesley was directing casualty evacuation and trying to build a makeshift command center, combining computers and communications equipment that had escaped the fireball with gear salvaged from burning vehicles. Within an hour, they had fashioned a temporary communications network across the highway from the scorched ruins. Back in radio communication, Wesley resumed helping Perkins direct the battles. He offered to send the rest of Johnson's company to Curly to solidify the interchange. That left the stripped-down operations center virtually unprotected. At Objective Larry, Twitty's men were beginning to run low on ammunition. He could hear his gunner screaming, "More ammo! Get us more ammo!" Twitty had to get the supply convoy to the interchanges, a dangerous endeavor. The fuel tankers were 2,500-gallon bombs on wheels. The ammunition trucks were portable fireworks factories. In military argot, they were the ultimate "soft-skin" vehicles. Worse, there were no tanks or Bradleys to escort them; they were all fighting in the city or at the three interchanges. Twitty called Johnson at Curly and asked for an assessment. "Sir," Johnson said, "what I can tell you is, it's not as intense a fight as it was an hour ago but we're still in a pretty good fight here." Twitty asked to hear from Gallagher. "Boss," Gallagher said, "I'm not going to tell you we can get 'em through without risk, but we can get 'em through." Twitty put the radio down and lowered his head. He had to make a decision. And whatever he decided, American Soldiers were going to die. He knew it. They would die at one of the interchanges, where they would be overrun if they weren't resupplied. Or they would die in the convoy. He picked up the radio. "All right," he said. "We're going to execute." Just north of the burning operations center, Capt. J.O. Bailey was in a command armored personnel carrier, leading the supply convoy-six fuel tankers and eight ammunition trucks. He felt vulnerable; he had no idea where he was going to park all his combustible vehicles in the middle of a firefight. The convoy had gone less than a mile when Bailey spotted a mob of about 100 armed men across railroad tracks. He was on the radio, warning everyone, when the convoy was rocked by explosions. Near the head of the convoy, Sgt. 1st Class John W. Marshall opened up with a grenade launcher in the turret of his soft-skin Humvee. Marshall was 50-one of the oldest men in the brigade-and had volunteered for Iraq. Marshall had just sent grenades crashing toward the gunmen when the top of the Humvee exploded. In the front seat, SPC. Kenneth Krofta was stunned by a flash of light. Black smoke was blowing through the Humvee. Krofta looked up into the turret. Marshall was gone. He had been blown out of the vehicle by a grenade blast. {GUNSHIELDS?] The driver, PFC. Angel Cruz, stopped and got out, looking for Marshall. He saw gunmen approaching and squeezed off a burst from his rifle. Bullets ripped into the Humvee. The radio squawked. Cruz was ordered to move out. Soldiers in another vehicle had seen Marshall's body. He was dead. The convoy was speeding up, trying to escape the kill zone. A week would pass before the battalion was able to retrieve Marshall's corpse. As the convoy raced through the ambush, an RPG rocketed into a personnel carrier. Staff Sgt. Robert Stever, who had just fired more than 1,000 rounds from his .50-caliber machine gun, was blown back into the vehicle, killed instantly. [GUNSHIELDS?] Shrapnel tore into Chief Warrant Officer Angel Acevedo and Pfc. Jarred Metz, wounding both. Metz was knocked from the driver's perch. His legs were numb and blood was seeping through his uniform. He dragged himself back into position and kept the vehicle moving. Acevedo was bleeding, too. Screaming instructions to Metz, he directed the vehicle back into the speeding column with Stever's body slumped inside. Riddled with shrapnel, the convoy limped into the interchange at Curly-and directly into the firefight. Bailey was trying to move his convoy out of harm's way when something slammed into a fuel tanker. The vehicle exploded. Hunks of the tanker flew off, forming super-heated projectiles that tore into other vehicles. Three ammunition trucks and a second fuel tanker exploded. Ammunition started to cook off. Rounds screamed in all directions, ripping off chunks of concrete and slicing through vehicles. The trucks were engulfed in orange fireballs. Mechanics and drivers sprinted for the vehicles that were intact. They cranked up the engines and drove them to safety beneath the overpass, managing to save five ammunition trucks and four fuel tankers-enough to resupply the combat teams at all three intersections. Fuel and ammunition were unloaded under fire. The surviving vehicles headed north to Objective Larry, escorted by Bradleys, breaking through the firefight there and arriving safely. Twitty felt overwhelming relief. He knew he could break the enemy now, and so could the combat team at Objective Curly. But he still had to resupply Capt. Wright at Objective Moe. Capt. Johnson, whose Bradleys had escorted the convoy to resupply Twitty, headed north toward Moe. By radio, Johnson arranged with Wright to have Highway 8 cleared of obstacles so that the convoy could pull in, stop briefly and let the resupply vehicles designated for Wright peel off. Then Johnson's vehicles were to continue on, obeying a new order from Perkins to secure the mile-long stretch of highway between Objective Moe and Perkins' palace command post in the city center. The convoy broke through the battle lines and stopped at the cloverleaf at Moe. But there had been a communication breakdown. The full convoy, including the supply vehicles, pulled away under heavy fire, leaving Wright's company still desperate for fuel and ammunition. Wright's heart sank. He had been forced to tighten his perimeter to save fuel, giving up ground his men had just taken. Now he watched his fuel and ammo disappear up the highway. But the smaller perimeter also meant Wright could afford to send two tanks to a supply point a mile away that Johnson set up near the palace. There the tanks refueled as their crews stuffed the bustle racks with ammunition. A second pair of tanks followed a half-hour later, bringing back more fuel and ammunition. Wright's men were set for the night. In the city center, the tank battalions led by Schwartz and DeCamp were holding their ground but still desperately low on fuel and ammunition. With the combat teams at all three interchanges able to hold their ground, two supply convoys were now sent up Highway 8 toward the city center. It was a high-speed race. Every vehicle was hit by fire, but the convoys rolled into the palace complex just before dusk, fuel and ammunition intact. Tankers at the 14th of July circle cheered, and there were high-fives and handshakes when the trucks set up an instant gas station and supply point next to the palace rose beds. Perkins was convinced now that Baghdad was his. He didn't need to control the whole city. He just needed the palace complex and a way to get fuel and ammunition in. Now he had both. "We had come in, created a lot of chaos, lots of violence and momentum all at once," Perkins said later. "We had speed and audacity. And now with the resupply, we were there for good and there was nothing the other side could do about it." The next morning, Capt. Phil Wolford's Assassin tank company would repel a fierce counterattack at the Jumhuriya Bridge across the Tigris River. Rogue battalion would engage in running firefights throughout central Baghdad. At the three interchanges on Highway 8, Syrians and Fedayeen mounted more attacks for much of the day, bringing the China battalion's casualties to two dead and 30 wounded. But the American forces now fought from a position of strength. On the third day, April 9, Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed. On the night of April 7, after a long day of sustained combat, there had been an extended lull at the palace complex and up and down Highway 8. The tankers and the infantrymen sensed a shift in momentum. Some dared to speak of going home soon, for they now believed the war was nearly over. There would be two more days of fierce fighting before Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed. But on the night of April 7, theirs would be a decisive victory, the last one in Iraq for a long time. David Zucchino is a Times national correspondent based in Philadelphia.

3rd ID lessons learned from the nation-state conflict

From Chapter 7 at:

www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint

"As the Army fields Stryker Brigades and continues transformation, the OIF experience will influence combat development. Tanks and Bradleys performed brilliantly in OIF, but they did not meet all of the operational requirements. Despite their advantages in armor, tanks and Bradleys evinced a number of disadvantages --they could not elevate their weapons far enough to fire at the upper floors of buildings from close range. But as 3rd ID discovered, the lowly M113, full of engineers armed to the teeth, could engage the second and third stories. Clearly no weapon system is perfect for all environments, and even the superbly equipped forces that fought OIF have..."

Army Special Forces Soldier in Iraq NOW during the sub-national conflict writes:

"You betcha. Brads are great for rolling around like a turtle and knowing nothing can touch you, but the problem with the insurgents here is that every time they take a shot at you and no one shoots back, they get bolder.

Now, take my boys in 91st engineers. We roll around with a gun in the tub, the back top open and guys hanging out with ARs and optics.

Go ahead, step out from behind that building against riflemen who are excellent snap shooters.....and can engage 360 degrees and up and down almost 180 degrees.....pretty much wherever they can point the rifle.

In a M113, this is almost everywhere.

Just my firsthand experience day after day in Gazalea and Abu Graib.

XXXX

GENERAL M113 GAVIN TIPS

GUNSHIELDS & SANDBAGS: DO-IT-YOURSELF APPLIQUE'ARMOR





"Sandbags improve the survivability of thin-skinned and armored vehicles in MOUT. Sandbags protect Soldiers from ricochets, sniper rounds and fragments. Sandbagging vehicles also gave a limited standoff protection from RPG rounds fired from above." "Gunner protection for HMMWV crews, similar to the old A-CAV kit for M113s, is desirable for MOUT and convoy escort operations."

NSNs

Track Commander's Cupola

Shield Kit, Machine Gun / 2510-00-121-8990

Shield, Protective / 2510-01-006-4587

TC's cupola gunshields + side gunshields for the two troop hatch MGs

M60 Medium Machine Gun only interface Side Gunshield



The Mighty M113 Gavin ACAV! Infantry firepower and vigilance in all directions!

1ST TSG (A) EXCLUSIVE! CLOSE-UP PICS OF THE ACAV SIDE GUNSHIELDS!

Click on picture for full-size version!

REVELATION! IS YOUR LIFE WORTH $375?

SARCO Inc. of New Jersey offers a M113 Gavin gunshield with cradle assembly and ammo can holder for just $375! If I were in Iraq and my life were on the line I'd order this ASAP. I would also use my own money to cut through the Army BS to make it happen. If you die NOTHING FOLLOWS.

Part # MNT010

SARCO Inc

323 Union Street

POB 98

Stirling, NJ 07980

(908) 647-3800

FAX: -9413

www: www.sarcoinc.com

email: info@sarcoinc.com

If the "system" doesn't have the shields (likely) the DSC bids for someone to make them like they did in 1999:

25 - SOL:SHIELD KIT, MACHINE GUN (10/29/99)

http://www.fbodaily.com/cbd/archive/1999/10(October)/29-Oct-1999/25sol001.htm

COMMERCE BUSINESS DAILY ISSUE OF OCTOBER 29,1999 PSA#2465

Defense Supply Center Columbus, PO Box 16595, DSCC-PBAB, Columbus, OH 43216-6595

25 -- SHIELD KIT, MACHINE GUN SOL SP075000R2737 DUE 121799 POC For Information Only, Point of Contact -- Carol Black Phone:614-692-1346 Fax: 614-692-1577 NSN: 2590-00-121-8990, YPC99201000244. Shield Kit, Machine Gun. Made in accordance with Army drawing 11660854 and all current related data. Full and open competition applies. Quantity is 52 each to be delivered within 150 days after date of award to Richmond, Va. All responsible sources may submit an offer which shall be considered. See note(s) 12 and 26. Copies of this solicitation are available at the address above or by faxing 614-692-2262 or e-mailing: incoord @ dscc.dla.mil and will not be available until 15 days after this notice is published in the CBD. Requests should include the company name, address and solicitation number(s). The small business size standard is 750 employees. Technical drawings/bid sets are available from DSCC-VTCD via one of the following medias: internet at http://abiweb.disc.dla.mil; facsimile at 614-692-2344; e-mail at drawings @ dscc.dla.mil or by mail at Defense Supply Center Columbus, ATTN: DSCC-VTCD, P O Box 3990, Columbus, OH. 43216-5000. Requests should include theRFP number, opening/closing date, NSN, Purchase Request number (e.g. YPC), Buyer's name and your complete name and address. FEDERAL, MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL SPECIFICATIONS CANNOT BE PROVIDED BY DSCC. Proposed procurement contains a 100% option for increase quantities. This is an unrestricted acquisition. While price may be a significant factor in the evaluation of offers, the final award decision will be based upon a combination of price, delivery, past performance and other evaluation factors as described in the solicitation. Estimated issue date is 18 Nov 99. Posted 10/27/99 (W-SN395719). (0300)

Loren Data Corp. http://www.ld.com (SYN# 0194 19991029\25-0001.SOL)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

25 - Vehicular Equipment Components Index Page

POC:

Mr. Tom Reuter

United Defense

M113 Field Service & Spares

(800) 235-0015 Ext: 825

cell @ 256-453-7049

NEW! M113 GAVIN TRANSPARENT ARMORED GUNSHIELD SYSTEM (TAGS) FOR ALL CURRENT U.S. ARMY MACHINE GUNS

The Standard M113A3+ Super Gavin TAGS will mount outside the Cargo Hatch. pn 80212-4265690. Comes with a universal pintle for M240B medium machine gun or M249 light machine gun interface.

Even if you don't have machine guns for the sides, your two Soldiers at the top cargo hatch could use the protection of a TAGS gunshield!

Compared all of these M113-unique features to the LAV-III's measley 14mm thick steel (little more than 0.5 of an inch), the M113A3 has rolled 5083/5086 H32 aluminum alloy armor that varies from 1.5 to 1.75 inches (38.1mm to 44.45mm thick), not to mention spall liners inside the hull. We have not even talked about applique' armor yet.

http://afvdb.50megs.com/usa/m113.html

So the M113A3 as-is has armor that is 3 times thicker and is thus much stronger and lighter than the LAV-III's thin steel.

We can work with this and get a far greater level of protection against RPGs, 30mm autocannon and ATGMs using M113A3 Gavins!

If you want to be in a thin-walled, air-filled rubber-tired LAV-III in a a shooting war, then the fitting nickname for the LAV-III would be the "Custer".

The following idea could be done at our own level without need of bureaucratic approval and funding to buy from an outside contractor. YOU can give the vehicle the respect it deserves by calling the M113 family the "Gavin" after General James M. Gavin, legendary U.S. Army combat leader who advocated the light, air-dropable tracked vehicle for troop mobility/firepower in his book, "Airborne warfare" in 1947 which eventually resulted in the M113's development and legendary service. Just imagine what could be accomplished with a little contractor help and effort from the U.S. Army instead of wasting BILLIONS on road bound rubber-tired LAV-III armored cars!

*RPG, autocannon-resistant applique armor

*Remote weapons and or gun turrets

*Quiet Band-tracks

*Infared camouflage

*Stealthy Hybrid-Electric drive (600 mile range)

*FBCB2 C4I digital comms

*Lightweight hatches to facilitate air transport

M113A3 GAVIN EXTERNAL STOWAGE BIN MODIFICATION

Here is a do-it-yourself upgrade for the M113A3!

External storage volume needed: acts as spaced armor against RPGs

The M113A3 is a superb light tracked Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV) with more internal space than other AFVs for troop gear by its external fuel tanks. However, it does not have external side storage provisions and even the M113A3's volume is soon used up by a Combat Engineer or Infantry unit. This has led to the MTVL stretched variant with more internal volume for both Soldiers and gear. However there are some items of Soldier equipment that clearly are too big and shouldn't be kept inside for safety reasons. Mines, demolitions and long bangalore torpedo sections would be better carried OUTSIDE the M113A3, if detonated they would exploded out and away from the vehicle hull whereas if set off INSIDE the vehicle it would be disastrous for the men.

Outside storage bins

The M113A3 has bolt-on armor points that are currently not being utilized.

U.S. Army Sergeant First Class Gregory T. Dean (now Retired) in Bosnia used these bolts to attach unused ammo cans he wrote in the March/April issue of U.S. Army ARMOR magazine:

These bolts could be used to attach a metal framework with thick metal mesh to create storage area all along the length of the vehicle. These storage bins could be created by local units as per TM specifications for very low cost. The long nature of the bins would allow long bangalore torpedo sections to be carried securely outside the vehicle, stretchers, spine boards for Medical M113A3s, as well as a huge supply of land mines, ammunition, demolitions and/or even Soldier rucksacks.

Applique' armor is what applique' armor does...

We realize the powers-that-be hate the M113A3 and have consistantly blocked attempts to buy the applique' armor that was always intended for it to have to protect it from landmines, RPGs and weaponry up to 30mm autocannon. Do not list this side benefit of external storage bins if these biased individuals will veto the local modification. Perhaps later on Soldiers will figure the following out or we could "discover" the application and advocate it after the storage bin becomes officially accepted. Ammo cans and storage bins could be filled with dirt, sand or even concrete to bolster armor protection as the situation demands.

But in Vietnam, Soldiers erected chain-link fencing around their M113A1s and M48 tanks to pre-detonate Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). In Chechnya, Russians today have placed wire screens around ther vehicles to defeat RPGs. The metal mesh M113A3 storage bins would act as RPG screens. This is just the beginning.

BURNED-UP STRYKER IN IRAQ: NOTE THE GAPS BETWEEN THE TILES (click on picture for larger version)





The reason the ceramic tiles on Stryker do not work well is that they are made of inexpensive aluminum oxide ceramics. GD put out a price bogey for the ceramics and a company from Germany, IBD, claimed that their armor could do more than it can. This is why the Stryker ceramic tiles failed to stop 14.5mm heavy machine gun bullets in testing last year and had to be reinforced with steel. This ceramic is much lower quality and capability than the silicon carbide ceramics being tested for FCS. The other problem as you can see from the above photo is that the Stryker ceramic tiles have big spaces between them.

In contrast, the M113 Gavin light tracked AFV is composed of 1.5" to 1.75" thick armor and is only 10.5 tons empty. This weight savings results in the ability to add up to 7,000 pounds of extra armor. M113 Gavins in IDF and other armies often have:

1.) external storage racks to hold troop gear that can pre-detonate RPGs,

2.) a layer of spaced or reactive armor

3.) peel 'n stick ceramic tiles and kevlar-type ballistic panels (that work) tightly placed together on the hull outsides

4.) the vehicle's 1.5" to 1.75" hull and

5.) internal kevlar spall liners and

6.) lots of sandbags.

7.) gunshields

That's 7 layers of protection rolling on steel tracks with rubber pads and solid metal road wheels, STILL LIGHTER than the 19-21 Stryker armored car which struggles to carry a mere 5,000 pound "bird cage". Since the Army bureaucracy does not supply this extra armor to make the mighty M113 Gavin more "vincible" units and Soldiers need to do-it-yourself: get your welders to create external storage racks and bolt them to the outside after buying and applying peel 'n stick armor panels:

Peel n stick armor panels defeat .50 cal @3000 FPS, AP proven in U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground Tests

Armor Systems International

110 Columbia Street

Vancouver, WA 98660

phone: (360) 993-5181

toll free: (866) 993-5181

fax: (360) 737-0743

info@armorsystemsint.com

www.armorsystemsint.com

The picture above from Vietnam shows a crafty crew that has hung 30 sandbags (900 pounds of weight) on the outside of each side of their flamethrower M113 Gavin and covered it with mesh fencing to help pre-det RPGs and boost protection from heavy machine gun bullets.

Sadly, you may not even have a M113 Gavin to fight with. You might be lucky and have one, but not have the "mother Army" up-armoring them into M113A3+ SuperGavin configuration...what do you do?

If you have welders, external storage racks can hold troop gear and sandbags to pre-det RPGs..if you don't....HANG SANDBAGS! or add a layer of sandbags or MRE cases filled with dirt into the M113A3 side storage bins to add additional armor protection---applique' armor by field expedient. A layer of sandbags stops all 7.62mm/.30 cal MG bullets cold. Combined with the M113A3's 1.5 inch thick hull armor and spall liners, you would have 7 layers of protection. The outside storage bin screen: pre-detonates RPGs, breaks up bullets, the sandbags absorb shaped charge effect of RPGs/ATGMs, decelerate bullets, put some on the driver's floor area. The M113A3 Gavin has a crushible driver's seat with foot rests. The hull armor hard plate stops fragments/bullets already slowed that are not stopped by previous layers. The M113A3 Gavin spall liner stops the fragments (if any) that penetrate beyond this. The cumulative effect of the storage bins would be greater mission effectiveness by greater amounts of weaponry, equipment being carried and greater Soldier protection via the side benefits of adding outside layers to the vehicle itself. Adding steel or titanium applique' armor to stop 30mm autocannon fire would bolster this even more though Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) to defeat hollow-charge RPGs and ATGMs is another option. This kind of protection is not possible with an overweight Stryker or HMMWV wheeled vehicle.

THE FUTURE: THE M113 GAVIN WILL MAKE IT VICTORIOUS

Gavins with "band tracks" are lighter on roads than rubber-tired vulnerable wheeled armored cars, while still able to go cross-country that would be no-go terrain for LAVs.

Mighty M113A3 Gavin versus LAV-III Custer armored car FACT SHEET M113A3 vs. LAV-III Detailed specifications FYI: The actual wheeled [Interim Armored Vehicle] "IAV" based on the LAV-III armored car is going to have computer gadgets, a remote machine gun weapons station and applique' armor at its body that will make a 19-ton armored car an even heavier and immobile 20-24 ton death trap. A medium-weight vehicle with light, thin armor and armament. Even the WWII "1942" M4 Sherman tank had 4 inches of armor, the "2003", "modern" LAV-III/IAV Stryker is a mere 1/2 inch of thin metal and unable to accept satisfactory applique' armor to protect against autocannon and RPGs. Is this forward progress? Is this "transformation" or "trance-formation"? How about suicide? Superb comparison of Tracks and Wheeled Drivetrains explains why: Tracked and Wheeled Drivetrain power point show

"... A military operation has tempo -- an M113 that can cross a paddy field > and flank a position in a minute is more use than a vehicle that must drive > all the way around the field's edge -- that will only work if the wheeled vehicle has a very significant turn of speed. ..."

Another good study on wheels and tracks by Bill Fisher:

He's right on except regarding fuel consumption, he should be informed about the hybrid-electric M113 system, band tracks and the FSCS/Tracer study that showed tracks actually have better fuel consumption in some scenarios because they can take a much shorter path from point A to point B. In fact, fuel-miserly M113A1/M48 medium tanks were completely resupplied by the air in Vietnam, freeing them from having to secure road main supply routes (MSRs) that are often mined/ambushed.

Regarding reliability, the flaw in most analyses is that they compare LAV's operating largely on improved roads, with M113 operating in a full-spectrum mission profile (go where you have to for combat missions, including cross-country). It is not clear when both vehicles are operated under the same mission profile, that wheels are more reliable at all, in fact the tracks may be the far more reliable and lower O&S cost choice. Compare the complexity of a wheeled drivetrain, with the simplicity of a modern tracked one!

ARE WE IN A MISSILE AGE?



Swiss mechanized infantry dismount from their up-armored, autocannon-equipped M113A3 Gavin: why can't the U.S. Army do this to its own M113A3s? Screening infantry to destroy top-attack ATGMs will be critical in the future.

Analogy analysis

1. USN simply changed its battleships from guns to aircraft carrier armored decks

2. Other USN missile combatants wrongly have no guns capable of massed shore fire support to support ground forces and are incapable of taking many missile hits nor are "stealthy" to avoid being hit = the worse of all possible situations

Analogy applied

1. Sea warfare is not land warfare, because unless you go under the water, the sea does NOT offer natural concealment nor cover. On land you have vegetation, folds in the terrain, buildings etc. etc. so threats can appear suddenly far closer than at a safe stand-off. Closest naval analogy would be submarine catching surface ships unawares and firing, though still not close enough because sensors could detect the sub if the conditions are right. Hidden land targets are far more hidden.

2. Iconoclasm for avante garde': top-attack missiles are not the only threats a land force has to overcome; close-in attacks require a vehicle that can take a main gun hit and all types of infantry weapons from ALL ANGLES to:

*Survive surprise direct line-of-sight meeting engagements

*Prevail in MOUT

*Defile fights

*Heavy mines from below

20 tons will not do. In fact 20 tons is too heavy for the 3D capable force, it should be under 17 tons so a C-130 can fly it. The current FCS at 20 tons "cookie-cutter" (too heavy for C-130s) to replace ALL Army vehicles, even if tracked is fatal non-sense. Land forces do not have the option to think they will encounter/detect the enemy at a safe, convenient stand-off as being on the water handicaps you. C4I situational awareness is a fatal crutch that should be avoided. We should embrace the fact that land forces have more cover/concealment instead of longing to be handicapped like the Navy/AF are in the open and have to rely on just measures and countermeasures gadgets to survive.

Better Analysis

1. There are 2 ways to optimize vehicles for land combat, 2D and 3