



Battle of Imphal-Kohima

Contributor: C. Peter Chen

ww2dbaseBy summer of 1943, the British forces were beginning to dominate in the skies with Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft operating out of India. While Japan had no original plans to invade India, Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi of the Japanese 15th Army knew that an offensive into India was the only way he could eliminate the aerial threat. Controlling northeastern India would also create a larger buffer zone between India and Burma. Imphal was the state capital of Manipur in northeastern India and was situated amidst a plain where an invading army from the east must march across. Additionally, a Japanese-controlled northeastern India would also cut off "the Hump" as an aerial supply route into China. As such, it was no surprise that British plans to invade Burma used Imphal as a launch point for ground troops, the same place Mutaguchi also targeted. Mutaguchi's excursion into India was originally rejected by his immediate superiors, but what would eventually become Operation U (U-Go) was approved by Southern Expeditionary Army and the Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) in Tokyo, Japan.

ww2dbaseMutaguchi planned to pin-down or destroy the forward-deployed Indian troops with Lieutenant General Motoso Yanagida's 33rd Division, then the 33rd Division will be reinforced by Lieutenant General Masafumi Yamauchi's 15th Division to take Imphal. At the same time, Lieutenant General Kotoku Sato's 31st Division was to attack Kohima, a village on a major road into Imphal, an administrative center of the state of Nagaland, and near the important airfield at Dimapur. Mutaguchi did not receive support from his field generals for his plans; most of them believe the attack plan was too risky.

ww2dbaseThe city of Imphal was defended by the Indian IV Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Geoffrey Scoones, who reported to Lieutenant General William Slim. As the Japanese troops attacked, Slim and Scoones attempted to move this troops from their forward positions back into the plains near Imphal, forcing the Japanese to fight with a longer supply line, but Scoones had reacted too late; while the Japanese offensive began by crossing the Chindwin River on 8 Mar, Scoones did not give the order to fall back near Imphal until 13 Mar. As a result, the Indian 17th Division allowed its supply dumps to become captured by the Japanese and become encircled. However, the 214th Regiment of the 17th Division successfully counterattacked at Tuitum Saddle on 18 Mar, allowing the division to recover part of the captured supplies and safely retreated to Imphal on 4 Apr 1944.

ww2dbaseThe Japanese followed the withdrawing Indian troops closely. As soon as the Indian 17th Division reached Imphal, the attack began. The Japanese 33rd Division attacked from Bishenpur from the south, though that attack was cautious and slow. From Tamu, Major General Tsunoru Yamamoto, commanding units from both the 15th and 33rd Divisions and two brigades of Indian troops attacked Shenam Saddle near Imphal, and was quickly halted by the Indian troops at this easily-defended junction. From the north, the remainder of the 15th Division attacked and first captured a small supply dump at Kangpokpi then captured Nungshigum Hill which overlooked Imphal's main airfield. The initial attack did not go as well as Mutaguchi originally planned, and the possibly prolonged campaign was now threatened by a long supply line through the Burmese jungles. It was exactly what his field generals warned of. To make matters worse particularly for the Japanese 31st Division, the British 23 LRP Brigade had been seriously disrupting Japanese supply operations behind the lines, making even foraging to the east of Kohima nearly impossible.

ww2dbaseThe attack on Kohima began around the same time, which was weakly defended by the Assam Regiment and some of the paramilitary Assam Rifles. The Indian 161st Brigade was originally posted at Kohima, but it was moved out of Kohima to Dimapur shortly before the attack. On 3 Apr, the 31st Division attacked Kohima Ridge which overlooked the main supply route between Imphal and Kohima. The siege of Kohima began on 6 Apr. Japanese mortar fire rained down on the Indian troops who were poorly supplied and lacking drinking water. Nevertheless, the Indian troops held, and combat turned into a stalemate.

ww2dbaseOn 13 Apr, the Indian 5th Division counterattacked at Nungshigum Hill outside of Imphal with support from artillery and M3 Lee tanks. The Japanese had neither anti-tank weapons nor artillery; these heavier guns had been decided against as Mutaguchi planned for a swift campaign, and these guns were simply too bulky to carry through the dense jungle. As a result, the hill was taken back by the Indian troops after dealing heavy casualties on the Japanese.

ww2dbaseOn 15 Apr, the British 2nd Division which had been in training in southern India arrived at Dimapur near Kohima. The fresh troops relieved the Indian 161st Brigade, who rested for three days before going on a counterattack toward Kohima. As the siege at Kohima listed on about 20 Apr, the incoming troops were shocked by what they witnessed. The once picturesque village was now in ruins, building walls marked with bullet holes and surrounding hills covered by broken trees. "Every inch of ground were disputed in the bloodiest and most desperate hand-to-hand fighting", described historian Frank McLynn.

ww2dbaseBy 1 May 1944, the Indian troops had a firm hold on the line, and their British commander could entertain the notion of a counter offensive, especially with the arrival of the 33rd Brigade of the Indian 7th Division on 4 May. Although the Japanese line was tough to break, the supply situation had become critical. The Japanese divisions had not been receiving adequate supplies, including food, and the soldiers' health were becoming dangerously poor due to malnutrition. The situation took a worse turn on 12 May when the Indian 114th Brigade arrived near Kohima. Under Montagu Stopford's command as XXXIII Corps, British and Indian forces attacked southward from Kohima toward Imphal. The Japanese troops, despite the difficult conditions they were in, fought back fiercely. Nevertheless, the Japanese troops were drove out of the Kohima region by the end of May; with 38 3.7-inch mountain howitzers, 48 25-pound field guns, and 2 5.5-inch medium guns, the Japanese could hardly hold their line for an extended amount of time. The RAF also stepped up their involvement, bombing and strafing Japanese positions, destroying Japanese morale that had already been faltering.

ww2dbaseOn 25 May, troops near Kohima reported that unless adequate food supplies had been delivered, the troops there could not last past 1 Jun; in fact, General Sato threatened he would disobey direct orders and withdraw if he did not see supplies flowing in. On 31 May, Japanese troops withdrew from Naga village and fell back southward.

ww2dbaseThe XXXIII Corps was then joined by IV Corps and attacked the Japanese troops further along the Dimapur-Imphal road on 22 Jun near Milestone 109. When the battle at Milestone 109 was won by the British and Indian troops, the siege of Imphal was lifted.

ww2dbaseThe Japanese 33rd Division, now under command of Lieutenant General Nobuo Tanaka and freshly reinforced by battalions from 53rd and 54th Divisions, continue to assert pressure on the Indian troops despite the recent setbacks. The 33rd Division nearly broke through the line set by the Indian 17th Division at Bishenpur, but in the end the Japanese suffered such a high casualty that the offensive was called off by the front line generals on 3 Jul 1944. In fact, by this time, many Japanese units were unfit for combat due to various reasons that they had already been disobeying orders to press forward. Reluctantly, Mutaguchi withdrew the remnants of the Japanese 33rd Division from Imphal, India back into Burma. The Japanese defeat at Imphal and Kohima represented the largest defeat in Japanese military history. Of the 65,000 front-line troops, 30,000 were killed, 23,000 were wounded, and 600 were captured; among the 50,000 support troops, there were 15,000 casualties. The Allies only suffered 17,500 casualties in comparison.

ww2dbaseThe Allied victory at Imphal and Kohima allowed the RAF to continue assert pressure from the skies on Japanese troops in Burma. "The Hump" into China was also allowed to continue because of the successful defense. The RAF also contributed greatly to the battle directly as RAF aircraft delivered most of the supplies the British and Indian forces needed; the RAF flew 19,000 tons of supplies and 12,000 men into the Kohima-Imphal region and flew out 13,000 casualties and 43,000 non-combatants.

ww2dbaseLouis Mountbatten latter described the Allied victory at Imphal and Kohima as "probably one of the greatest battles in history,... in effect the Battle of Burma.... [It was] the British-Indian Thermopylae."

ww2dbaseSources:

Frank McLynn, The Burma Campaign

Wikipedia

Last Major Update: Oct 2006

Battle of Imphal-Kohima Interactive Map

Battle of Imphal-Kohima Timeline

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