Porto’s defensive errors

It only took 3 minutes for Krasnodar to get themselves back into the tie after winning a corner from Petrov’s blocked cross. Porto adopted a mix of zonal and man-marking on the corner. The image below shows what this looked like:

Three Porto players are responsible for marking a zone while the rest go man-to-man. Interestingly, two players were positioned next to each other by the front post, with no zonal coverage on the back post. This is a tactic which they have used in previous games and is possibly employed with the aim of allowing the Porto goalkeeper space to come out and catch or punch the ball away. In theory, by leaving the back-post area open, Marchesín has more space and therefore is better suited to deal with incoming balls into that area. This tactic has also been used by Manchester City in the past, although there were variations in the positioning of players, with City having slightly better coverage of the back-post area (check it out here).

However, although this tactic sounds great in theory, it doesn’t always work out. Krasnodar decided to place a player on the goalkeeper, forcing Pepe to pick him up. As seen above, these two players were standing right in front of Marchesín, stopping him from getting a good view of the kick-taker and therefore inhibiting him from reacting quickly and coming out cleanly to win the ball.

Furthermore, Porto left two players upfield while the corner was being taken, and while this was still enough to create numerical superiority in the box, they had not accounted for the 5v4 (in Krasnodar’s favour) created around the penalty spot area. The fact that Porto had more numbers in the box possibly justified leaving two players upfield in order to take advantage of a potential counter (a tactic known as gambling), but it was risky and left Porto vulnerable in this particular situation. Once the ball was played in, it was knocked on to Vilhena who — completely unmarked and in plenty of space around the back-post area — volleyed it past the keeper.

Vilhena free around the back-post area

For the second goal, Porto’s defensive organisation was exposed once again. After a long freekick was smashed into the wall by Oliveira, they were not well prepared to counter-press and were caught on the counter. Preparation is key as in order to properly press the ball after it is lost, the players have to be in the right areas before it is lost. This is sometimes referred to as ‘defending while attacking’ and was touched on by ex-Porto manager Jose Mourinho in his recent punditry with Sky (you can see the full video here). He said “There is another principle… I think when a team has the ball you have to anticipate the moment you are going to lose the ball. But the moment we lose the ball, it’s the moment you have to anticipate and not react.” What he is saying is that players cannot be completely focused on attacking at all times, they must also think about what will happen if they lose the ball and position themselves accordingly.

By preparing and anticipating well, teams are able to counter-press much more effectively, therefore stopping the opponent from transitioning into their attacking organisation phase and often allowing the team to win the ball straight back.

In this particular situation, Porto failed to anticipate and were positioned poorly once the ball was lost, therefore forcing them to react to how Krasnodar were attacking instead of determining the areas in which Krasnodar attacked and controlling how they attacked.

Porto fail to anticipate. Arrows represent possible movements/positions which were not made/taken in order to close the space and prevent the counter

Individually, certain players could have done better to prevent the second goal. There were two failed attempts to win the ball before Wanderson played it through to Suleymanov. First, Danilo made the tackle but knocked it into the path of an opposition player, before Corona did the same thing with an interception, this time knocking it into Wanderson. Furthermore, Nakajima had a lapse of concentration and should have done better tracking the run of Suleymanov as the image below shows.

Finally, the reasons for the third goal can be split between poor defending and unfortunate circumstances. After a nice combination, Vilhena picks up the ball and switches play with a long diagonal pass to Suleymanov, who is in acres of space. The youngster then exploits the space, advances towards the box, cuts in and fires it into the bottom corner. The reason this is unfortunate is that Porto’s left back, Telles, was on the floor on the other side of the pitch, still recovering from a knock to the face he had received in the previous play. Porto’s left winger, Díaz, was covering for Telles but lacked support (and, in this case, the defensive capabilities in the 1v1) to stop Suleymanov from scoring.

However, at the same time, Porto could have done better defensively to prevent the goal. Firstly, in the combination before Vilhena’s cross-field pass, Saravia really should have marked Krasnodar’s number 10 tighter and prevented him from making the lay-off to Vilhena. Costinha was right when he said in the commentary that Saravia should have been more aggressive in the duel; he looked lethargic and made it too easy for Wanderson. In fact, the Porto right back was subbed off a few minutes later (although this was likely a tactical decision with Porto needing goals).

Next, Porto should have communicated better and someone should have filled in for Díaz while he was covering for Telles. This would have allowed Porto to be more balanced and better suited to deal with the switch. Lastly, it should also be noted that more could have been done to stop Suleymanov from cutting in and getting a shot off. Marcano and Danilo both could’ve supported Díaz better and gotten closer to Suleymanov, although credit is due to the Russian winger whose individual quality was decisive.

Krasnodar were lethal and took their chances in the first half. They had a total of 7 shots in the game, with 5 on target and 3 resulting in goals. However, other than the three goals, Krasnodar failed to create much (besides the two chances in the second half which were saved brilliantly by Marchesín). The Russian side did not build up that well against Porto’s press and possession stats highlight this as Krasnodar had 32% possession in comparison to Porto’s 68%.

However, it should be noted that their offensive strategy definitely changed after scoring the two early goals as they no longer needed to go all out to reverse the first-leg deficit and win the game. This meant that Krasnodar became very conservative and didn’t commit too many players forward when attacking. The focus was switched to defensive stability and maintaining the lead while trying to catch Porto on the counter.