In late June 1942, the German military launched Case Blau, the operation designed to capture the oil-rich Caucasus region. In reality, Blau was a complex amalgamation of four distinct operations, each dependent on the success of the former. In the first stage, the Wehrmacht would take Voronezh, an important transportation hub connecting European Russia with the Urals and Siberia as well as the Caucasus and Ukraine. Next, German units would turn south from Voronezh while the Sixth Army attacked from Kharkov into southern Russia. In the third stage Army Group South would divide in two, with one sub-group pushing toward Stalingrad, a city at the time considered a tertiary objective, despite its importance later on. In the fourth and final stage, the remaining section of Army Group South would invade the Caucasus and take the Baku oil fields. This was a battleplan that rivaled the complication, ambition, and logistical nightmares of Operation Barbarossa, executed just the year before. Just like Barbarossa, it was expected to bring a quick end to the war based on a swift and decisive blitzkrieg.

With its manpower already depleted, Germany called on its European Axis allies to supply it with troops for the invasion of the Caucasus. These forces included five Romanian, six Italian, and ten Hungarian divisions. None of these units matched their German counterparts in equipment or training, yet they were necessary to provide sufficient cover for the ever-extending German flanks. Troops would be required occupy the Caucasian states but also to advance into the Levant toward North Africa, where the German Afrika Korps was fighting British, U.S., and Free French forces.

On June 19, 1942 the chief of operations of the 23rd Panzer Division, Major Joachim Reichel, crashed behind Soviet lines while in possession of a summary for his unit’s objectives in the coming offensive. Reichel was captured and the documents turned over to the Soviet high command in Moscow. Since a similar incident had almost compromised the German plans for the 1940 invasion of France via the Low Countries, severe consequences followed for Reichel’s superior officers for permitting another security lapse. The Soviet leadership, however, dismissed the report as unbelievable, as it was anticipated Moscow was still the primary German target for the summer. Despite the leaking of the plans for Case Blau, the German military proceeded with its preparations, unable to make changes with the operation’s launch so near. As it happened, the Soviet dismissal of the plans meant no change was needed.

On June 28 a combined German force of Maximilian von Weichs’ Second Army, Hermann Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army, and the Hungarian Second Army under Gusztáv Jány drove deep into Soviet territory planning to link up at Voronezh. Mikhail Parsegov’s Soviet Fortieth Army defended Voronezh and had the numerical advantage in tanks, with 640 in all, but the Soviet commanders were inexperienced and deployed their forces haphazardly. Coordination and logistical support among the Soviet armor was poor in comparison to their German counterparts. The Luftwaffe also aided the Germans by softening Soviet defenses, bombing airfields and infantry formations. The German kill ratio vis-a-vis the Red Air Force was more than four to one, with 783 Soviet aircraft destroyed against 175 German planes.

The Fourth Panzer Army under Hoth came within thirty miles of Voronezh on the first day. By July 4, the vanguard of Fourth Panzer, consisting of the 24th Panzer Division and the Panzergrenadier-Division Großdeutschland, reached the Don river in many places. Heavy rains slowed down attacks elsewhere, but overall the battle went exceptionally well for the Germans. The commander of Army Group South, Fedor von Bock, wanted to take Voronezh itself, but Adolf Hitler and Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder wanted Bock to quickly wheel south and finish encircling Soviet forces. On July 5 the Soviet Fifth Tank Army under Alexander Lizyukov was tasked with launching a counterattack, which took the form of near-suicidal front assaults on enemy panzer divisions. Fifth Tank Army suffered around 8,000 casualties and had a little more than a quarter of its tanks still functional after the battle. That same day, Hoth’s forces entered Vorozneh itself, but were mired down in fighting east of the city. This drew Hoth into static fighting positions, frustrating Hitler’s desire for the forces to swing south. The German units tied down around Voronezh threatened to disrupt the operation and increased the pressure on the Wehrmacht to pull off its devastating blitzkrieg quickly. It took several days before Hoth’s divisions broke out and were able to rejoin the planned invasion to the southeast.

Stalin personally prevented any Soviet military retreats until July 10, when it became abundantly clear that the German offensive was not coming toward Moscow but was focused on south. Soviet defense was far more tenacious than it was in the previous year, and the realization that German forces were in risk of overextending themselves prompted Bock to urge Hitler to delay the pace of the offensive. For this insolence, Hitler relieved Bock on July 13 and replaced him with Maximilian von Weichs, who became the commander of Army Group B. The remaining parts of Army Group South, now Army Group A, were placed under Wilhelm List. By July 29 the German forces had seized the rail lines connecting Moscow to the Caucasus, forcing the Soviets to redirect their supplies and reinforcements through the vast, unruly terrain of Central Asia.

On July 28 Stalin issued the infamous Order 227, known for the phrase: “Not One Step Back!” In it, Stalin himself ordered the cessation of any further Soviet retreats and declared a ban on pessimism within the Red Army. This move was intended as a blow against psychological defeatism, as morale was plummeting in the face of yet another summer of calamitous Soviet retreats. In Stalin’s words: “Every officer, every soldier and political worker must understand that our resources are not limitless. The territory of the Soviet state is not just desert, it is people—workers, peasants, intellectuals, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, and children.” Cowards who refused to stand and fight would be criminals before Soviet law and would be sentenced to penal battalions reserved for the most dangerous missions. The order also called for “blocking units” in the rear to fire upon troops who attempted to run away from combat. In reality, those who refused to fight or who tried to desert had long faced capital charges on the battlefield. Despite its draconian nature, Order 227 came as a relief to many Soviet soldiers, who now knew they could suffer no further disgrace. It called the Red Army to account, from the generals to the privates.

Sources

Bellamy, Chris. 2007. Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Fritz, Stephen. 2015. Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.

Glantz, David and Jonathan House. 1995. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.

Merridale, Catherine. 2007. Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945. New York: Picador.