In this exclusive extract from his new book, Warrior Elite, Robert Macklin shows how Australia’s military and intelligence agencies, leaning more and more on special forces, are rethinking how we must defend our nation

Apart from the federal cabinet itself, Australia’s defence planners are a relatively small group – no more than two dozen decision-makers – and after Tony Abbott abolished the office of the National Security Adviser held by Dr Margot McCarthy, they are almost exclusively white, middle-aged, Anglo-European males. Many have a military background; all have been initiated into the operations of the intelligence agencies; all are respectful of the American alliance. While some have had diplomatic experience in the region – notably in Indonesia and China – almost all view the world through the reassuring prism of our “Five Eyes” intelligence relationship with the US.



They are not altogether homogenous. There are variations of age, background, education and personality. There are traditionalists to whom the communist menace lives on. There are rock-ribbed racists who conceal their atavism behind a clubby politesse. There are warriors to whom the resort to arms is the only credible response to international disagreements. Happily, they are balanced by a well-read, highly intelligent and perceptive brigade who abhor human combat except in the last degree.

As the 21st century gathered momentum through its second decade, they were confronted by the defence planner’s ultimate nightmare: international disorder caused by climate change. For despite the views held by former prime minister Tony Abbott and a motley combination of rightwing extremists, greedy miners and professional controversialists, the ice is melting, the seas will rise, tornadoes are becoming more powerful, droughts longer and more intense, bushfires ever more destructive, and adequate food and water supply ever more problematic.

“[Climate change] has generated little interest in either the ADF or the Defence Department." 2013 Australian Strategic Policy Institute report

An Australian Strategic Policy Institute report published in March 2013 warned that global warming “has generated little interest in either the ADF or the Defence Department, [yet] climate change is transforming the conventional roles of security forces. As a threat multiplier, it has the potential to generate and exacerbate destabilising conditions that could reshape the regional security environment”.

The report confined itself to generalities. But it was plain to the planners and environmental scientists alike that no one could tell exactly how the Australian mainland will fare. As tropical conditions move south, for example, they might well bring higher rainfall to some marginal areas, while other more settled country crumbles to dust.

But Australia is so big that in all likelihood it will be able to sustain itself almost indefinitely. The threat will come from those countries thrown into chaos around the globe with hundreds of millions of refugees in search of a place to live. Australian sovereignty will be under continuous hazard. Indeed, nationalism itself will be disputed in a world where the ravages of climate ignore all man-made borders.

In such a world, Australia’s security – as descendants of an invading force that dispossessed its original owners, with barely a backward glance a mere two centuries ago – is less manifest and incontestable than we might have hoped. This means that we must secure our coastline with a substantial and well-equipped navy and air force. But even more important, it seems, are international alliances with the great powers who would underwrite – with force if necessary – the right of nations such as Australia to decide (in John Howard’s immortal phrase) “who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come”.

The first of those great forces would, of course, be the US, but unfortunately the words of President Barack Obama in a frank interview with the New York Times in August 2014 were already looking prophetic. “Our politics are dysfunctional,” he said. Gerrymandering, the Balkanisation (ie fragmentation) of the news media and uncontrolled money in politics – the guts of his country’s political system – were sapping America’s ability to take big decisions.

China, Indonesia and India: momentum for change

Facebook Twitter Pinterest ‘It would be foolish indeed to rely solely on the US to guarantee our national security at a time of unbridled global turbulence.’ Photograph: Xu Haijing/Xinhua Press/Corbis

Clearly, Australia must seek alternatives, and they must be as close to home as possible. The big three in the planners’ focus are China, Indonesia and India. But there are obvious impediments to Australia seeking the firm alliances required. Most are historical rather than practical. China is decidedly at the wrong end of the Five Eyes telescopes. But as the two economies become ever more complementary, the momentum for change might well become difficult to resist.

During his first journey there as prime minister, Tony Abbott promised a new urgency in negotiations for a free trade agreement. It is a complex document but among the most serious sticking points was China’s call for an investment regime comparable to that applied by Australia to the US. Americans could invest up to $1bn without referral to the Foreign Investment Review Board (Firb), whereas most Chinese investments were subject to Firb disapproval. While the effect is more symbolic than real – since the board waved through almost all investment proposals – it was an important issue of face to the Chinese.

Similar problems needed to be overcome in the developing relationship with Indonesia. Though good progress had been made behind the intelligence curtains, and a new “understanding” negotiated, SBY had departed. No doubt he warned his successor, Joko Widodo, a foreign policy tyro, that their southern neighbour was at best politically unreliable.

This was reflected in Jokowi’s refusal to bow to Australia’s plea for the commutation of the death sentences on reformed drug smugglers Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran carried out in April. And the subsequent revelation of Australian payments to people smugglers to return their human cargo to Indonesia only confirmed it. But at least the Americans would favour a closer relationship with a newly democratised country that to date had kept its Muslim extremists in check.

It involves a profound reordering of our self-perception, from a colonial regime to an enduring Asia-Pacific nationality

India was an unknown quantity; work had begun to remedy the situation but, in any major climate change disruption, the populous subcontinent might well provide a source of Australia’s unwanted immigrants rather than an official bulwark against their unregulated intrusions. The Aspi report highlighted the 250 million people living in the river deltas of Asia, a large proportion in the Ganges–Brahmaputra deltas where they were at “extreme risk” from rising sea levels.

Dr David Brewster, a visiting fellow at the ANU’s College of Asia and the Pacific, says, “Australia recognises India as an important new security partner in the Indo-Pacific, but India is only beginning to see Australia as a useful partner. For India, in some ways, Australia represents a difficult case. India has no direct security interests in our immediate area and Australia’s close relationship with the United States sometimes creates political unease in New Delhi”.

Both countries, he says, have “concerns” about China. But these “should not be elevated as the moving cause of the relationship ... in short, if Australia wishes to enhance its security and defence relationship with India it must be prepared to act outside its comfort zone”.

Should we face an existential crisis, the experience of the second world war has taught us that the old Anglophone ties are tenuous at best, and at worst a serious impediment to our territorial integrity. It would be foolish indeed to rely solely on the US to guarantee our national security at a time of unbridled global turbulence.

But that requires an intense reassessment of our national priorities. It involves a profound reordering of our self-perception, from an Anglophile colonial regime to a more realistic and enduring Asia-Pacific nationality blessed with a firm institutional foundation and an adventurous cosmopolitan population.

The future of Australia’s special forces

Facebook Twitter Pinterest ‘Within the ADF the movement towards a greater role for special forces is gaining traction.’ Photograph: Corporal Raymond Vance/Handout

At the same time, the convergence between the special forces pillars has continued. Duncan Lewis’s appointment as director general of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (Asio) marks the first time since the legendary Colonel Spry that a military careerist steeped in the special forces ethos has headed Australia’s top intelligence agency.

Within the ADF the movement towards a greater role for special forces is gaining traction. General Angus Campbell’s elevation to the command of Operation Sovereign Borders had opened the way for the special operations commander Gus Gilmore to be appointed deputy chief of army. He immediately took the opportunity to engage with Peter Jennings at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

The result was one of the more significant documents in the evolution of Australia’s armed forces. Published in April 2014, it recognised that the traditional “Big Army” was not well suited to a security environment where the great set battles of the 20th century had been replaced by smaller and more concentrated global operations in disparate terrain:

Over the past decade the Australian special operations capability has proven to be a major asset for the Australian government. Its specific skill set, developed over the years, is likely to become more, not less, important to the new strategic environment. Looking to the future, special operations capability could be further upgraded relative to the regular Army, which might be cut as part of a ‘peace dividend’.

It recommended that Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) be given control of much of its own budget, “In the same way that other specialist organisations, such as the Australian Signals Directorate, have a capability development budget that’s managed in house”.

It also recommended the creation of a joint capability manager within the ADF – preferably the vice-chief of the defence force – to ensure that major ADF projects, such as the future submarines and amphibious equipment purchases, be coordinated with the needs of special operations. The regular army should retain control of conventional combat operations, it said, but:

Special Forces offer the best value in unconventional operations and in so-called Phase Zero missions which focus on building and shaping defence relationships with key partners in a pre-crisis environment. SOCOMD has a lot to offer in Defence’s regional engagement strategy ... Augmentation of its capacity to contribute to regional and (limited) global defence engagement would be a valuable investment. It needs to have knowledge of allied and friendly country practices.

This would require a SOCOMD presence in selected headquarters in Australia’s near region. “That’s where our security interests are most closely engaged,” the report said, “and proximity would make it easier for other ADF elements to provide support for operations as required.”

It recommended establishing special forces liaison officers in selected Australian embassies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, “of which Indonesia is the most important”. In the South Pacific, fostering special forces cooperation with Papua New Guinea and Fiji should be a priority.

In the South Pacific, fostering special forces cooperation with Papua New Guinea and Fiji should be a priority.

Increased special forces engagement with South-East Asian nations could lead to the establishment of a special forces regional training centre in Australia. “The centre could also link to existing training centres beyond the Asia-Pacific region, such as Nato’s Special Operations Headquarters.”

And in a groundbreaking recommendation it advocated “an intensification” of cooperation with Chinese special forces. “Defence should promote cooperation between SOCOMD and its Chinese counterpart,” the report said.

“This would be a confidence-building measure in Australia–China military-to-military relations as well as a burden-sharing contribution to the US alliance. Exercises related to counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief would be well suited for this purpose.”

Nevertheless, it said, “maintaining and strengthening special forces cooperation with our US ally is vital ... while an agreement was recently signed for a SOCOMD liaison post at US Pacific command, similar arrangements could be considered with US central command and US Africa command to facilitate Australian special operations in the Middle East and Africa.”

It was a powerful contribution, generally well received within the establishment, except by the usual “Big Army” traditionalists with their obvious self-interest.

Africa and Islamism: the challenge ahead

Facebook Twitter Pinterest ‘Australia’s defenders will themselves have to become as nimble and adaptable as their enemy.’ Photograph: Australian Department Of Defence/Handout

However, mention of Africa raised the vexed issue of the “secret” SAS 4 Squadron with its longstanding African focus. The paper neatly avoided confirming their existence by implying that such missions “might be needed in the future”.

“Clandestine operations which involve military personnel in ways other than uniformed and declared military operations could become important for Australia’s special forces,” it said. “If the government decides to use SOCOMD in this way, we need an unambiguous legislative framework and robust oversight mechanisms.”

Ironically, it is America’s global rival, China, with no declared special forces operatives on the African continent, whose economic initiatives might well become a more effective weapon against the prophets of disorder.

However, growth among the various economies is uneven. Inequality is rising in many areas and violence continues to simmer in the Central African Republic, South Sudan and elsewhere. In Kenya, where Australian special forces have long enjoyed a close association, economic advances have been patchy and violence is increasing. The scourge of Aids has taken a terrible toll across the continent; outbreaks of Ebola and other killer diseases have ravaged communities and set back tentative economic advances. And nowhere is climate change more obvious, as the Sahara advances south at frightening speed.

Clearly, Africa will become a battlespace in the war against Islamist fundamentalism.

Clearly, Africa will become a battlespace in the war against a loosely allied grouping of terrorists fired by the zeal of Islamist fundamentalism and simmering resentment against Western colonial exploitation. While it will be hard fought – and Australia’s contribution will be strictly limited – it is by no means a lost cause.

It is only one of the fronts on which the battle will be joined. Already, the US has been drawn back into Iraq to confront the vicious Isis advances, with Australia once again in full-throated support from the government if not the people. In China, the Uighurs have begun armed attacks in their native Xinjiang Province, while terrorist teams have conducted knife-wielding outrages as far south as Yunnan. Yang Shu, the director of the Institute for Central Asian Studies at Lanzhou University, says more attacks can be expected.

“For Islamist extremists in China,” he says, “there’s also this issue of ethnic identity and that adds to extremist hatred.” In Indonesia, returning fighters from Syria and Iraq are already organising terrorist cells in West Java and Northern Sumatra.

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Australia’s defenders will themselves have to become as nimble and adaptable as their enemy. The stakes can hardly be overstated. It is a task that will demand nothing less than the best of us. And the most perceptive of the planners have already reached the view that the most effective response lies within the pillars of our special forces.

They draw their inspiration from the critical nature of the battle itself. But they are sustained by the knowledge of all those who went before, from the independent companies such as Sparrow Force who struggled against the Japanese tide when all contact with the home base was lost; to the jungle fighters of Borneo and Vietnam and East Timor; and to the troopers in the hellfire of ambush in the dusty mountain passes of Oruzgan. All served Australia well. They did what was asked of them and more. Now they, the warrior elite, stand on those broad shoulders as they face the longest, toughest fight of all.