The virtual stopwatch, posted on the website of Turkish daily ‘Huriyyet Daily News,' came to a stop after 3 days, 22 hours, one minute and 45 seconds. This was the longest period in which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had maintained public silence during the recent election campaign. After appearing three times a day on TV screens, delivering public speeches that mocked the opposition, the election results left him shocked and silent, precisely at a time when Turkey did want to hear from him.

However, behind the walls of the showy and grotesque presidential palace, which cost Turkish taxpayers billions of dollars, activity did not cease for a minute. As soon as the results came in, Erdogan held a 20-hour long meeting with his advisers and senior members of his party. According to Turkish sources this was not a calm meeting. Accusations between senior officials were exchanged, and there were some who blamed Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu for the stinging rout. Erdogan supporters in the media cast blame on social network activists who didn’t do enough to mobilize the public to come out and vote for the Justice and Development Party, for not paying attention to the economy and other topics of public concern. Thus, said senior officials, these networks drew fire from the party’s opponents, mobilizing the public against it.

Shortly thereafter, there was a settling of scores with the media. This time it wasn’t the opposition media, which has been battered by the regime over the last few years, but the media which supports the government. Thus, for example, Erdogan’s billionaire friend Turgay Ciner, who owns, among other businesses, the ‘Ciner Media Group’ which controls several major media outlets in Turkey, rushed to fire Ece Uner, a popular anchor on Show TV, as well as 25 other journalists employed there. Some of these journalists had tweeted in support of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Party prior to Election Day. Others had expressed moderate criticism of Erdogan before the elections, and now was the time for settling scores.

But this process went both ways, since at the same time there were journalists who had supported Erdogan who were now curbing their support, in light of the new wind prevailing in Turkey after the elections. This is somewhat reminiscent of the soul searching done by Egyptian journalists after the 2011 revolution. Supporters of Hosni Mubarak quickly switched their allegiance to the revolution and joined, after the fact, the voices of the regime’s critics while trying to salvage some of their public legitimacy.

Settling accounts with political rivals can be dangerous at this time, at least until the formation of a governing coalition, since the next goal is attaining political stability. Turkish columnist Semih Idiz best defined the wishes of investors and business people in Turkey when he wrote: “The best thing that could have happened was a defeat for Erdogan and a victory for Prime Minister Davutoglu.” In other words, he meant that the number of parliament seats won by the Justice and Development Party would be low enough to prevent Erdogan from realizing his ambition of forming a presidential regime, but large enough to enable the prime minister to establish a government without partners. In numbers, Idiz preferred something between 276 and 329 seats in parliament for the ruling party. Business people, and they are not alone, oppose a presidential system, yet they also worry about a coalition government that could paralyze the government’s ability to function. The results didn’t fulfill these wishes. Erdogan can’t change the constitution with a party that won only 259 seats, but his prime minister can’t form a government without coalition partners.

“History shows that coalition governments don’t suit Turkey” said Davutoglu “but we are ready for any scenario based on recent developments.” Turkey indeed didn’t function well when ruled by coalition governments. The disputes and struggles caused not only immense economic damage, but led to violent outbursts which in two cases led to coup d'états. But “recent developments,” in the words of Davutoglu, or, more plainly, the ruling party’s rout, require the formation of a coalition, without which the government could fall at its outset. In a conversation with the senior member of parliament Deniz Baykal, who headed the opposition Republican People’s Party (before resigning in 2010 after the appearance of video clips purportedly showing him in bed with a female member of parliament), Erdogan said that “all options for forming a coalition are open." There is also an option for holding new elections, but it’s doubtful that the ruling party will want to submit itself to a public test in the near future.

Erdogan’s dilemma depends on the concessions he is willing to make to his partners. For example, bringing in the pro-Kurdish party which garnered 80 seats in parliament, will force him to mute the nationalist spirit that he has been invoking over the last year, to advance the reconciliation process with the Kurds, who will demand significant concessions in granting the cultural autonomy which they desire, and adopting the more liberal views espoused by that party, which gained the support of the LGBT community in Turkey. It will also require reexamining policies towards the Kurdish minority in Syria and the Kurdish region in Iraq. At the same time, Erdogan could continue advancing his religious agenda, since in these elections the pro-Kurdish party was also supported by conservative Kurdish elements, which voted in the past for Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party.

In contrast, an alliance with the nationalist party, headed by Devlet Bahceli, could damage Turkey’s ties with the European Union and could threaten the reconciliation process with the Kurds, forcing Erdogan to follow a more conciliatory policy towards Syria, since this party has accused Erdogan of dragging this war into Turkey. Adding the Republican party, headed by Kemal Kilicdaroglu, to a coalition has also not been ruled out yet, despite deep ideological divisions between it and the ruling party, and the ugly campaign waged by Erdogan against his rivals in that party. It appears that Erdogan will prefer a smaller party than [the Republican] one that holds 132 seats in parliament, and which could thus extract greater concessions.

Turkey, which only a few months ago allied itself with Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the fight against ISIS, is now raising questions in these countries with regard to its commitment to joint policies. The heads of the opposition parties in Turkey clarified during the election campaign that they would no longer lend support to radical groups in Syria such as the Muslim Brothers or the Nusra Front. The Saudis and Qatar see these groups as a vital anchor in their war against ISIS, in parallel to the struggle against Assad. If coalition partners of the ruling party in Turkey impede such policies, Turkey could lose its place in the new Arab coalition. In contrast, a new attitude towards these radical groups could bring Turkey closer to Egypt, which has broken off formal ties with Turkey in the last two years due to Erdogan’s support of the Muslim Brothers.

While Saudi Arabia is disappointed with the loss of power of its Sunni ally Erdogan, Iran is pleased with this development. “The implications of the Syrian curse will pursue Erdogan and the new Ottomans ... the Turkish people stood on guard against the Ottoman ambitions of Erdogan, burying them forever” wrote the Fars news agency (which is close to Iran’s revolutionary guards) on its website. Someone noted that suddenly there was an alliance between Iran and Israel, both of them happy at Erdogan’s defeat. It’s too early to assess whether Turkey’s foreign policies will change and how this will affect regional alliances. The immediate apprehension revolves around how the election results will impact Turkey’s economy, the scope of foreign investments and the future of the Justice and Development party, which plummeted from its perch as the all-powerful perennial ruling party to a position of a battered party.