RUSSIA’S unacknowledged war in Ukraine did not start with the annexation of Crimea. The precedent was set six years earlier, during a five-day war between Russia and Georgia that resulted in Russia’s occupation of the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Unwilling to confront Russia directly, Western leaders instead blamed the recklessness of Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia’s president at the time. That was when Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, reportedly began talking about Crimea.

On the face of it, Georgia’s relationship with Russia has since much improved. Flights have been restored, and bans on Georgian wine, mineral water and fruit lifted. Yet Georgia may now be more vulnerable than ever. If Ukraine crumbles under Russia’s pressure and its own failings, Georgia could be the next target.

A small country that reinvented itself under Mr Saakashvili, Georgia is of strategic importance to Russia and its control over the Caucasus. Gas and oil pipelines from Azerbaijan to Turkey pass through the country. With Armenia choosing an alliance with Russia over Europe and Azerbaijan being courted by Moscow, Georgia is the last piece of the puzzle.

Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations remain a clear challenge to Mr Putin’s attempts to redraw international borders and keep NATO out of former Soviet territory. Last month Mr Putin signed a new treaty strengthening Russia’s grip on Abkhazia. For Georgia’s government, which had obliged Russia by refusing to join EU sanctions and arguing against arming Ukraine, this was a slap in the face.

Mr Putin sees Georgia not as an independent country, but as a card in a bigger game between Russia and the West. Although a military invasion can never be ruled out, the Kremlin is more likely to exploit Georgian political weakness, as it did in Ukraine (under the ousted Viktor Yanukovych) and more recently in Moldova (see next story). If Russia fails to lure Georgia into its sphere of influence, it will try to destabilise it so much as to make it unpalatable to the West. Developments in Georgia in the past two years make the task easier.

Two years after Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgia’s richest man, led the Georgian Dream coalition to victory over Mr Saakashvili’s United National Movement, the country’s politics are a noxious mix of ineptitude and vengeance. Georgia under Mr Saakashvili had many faults, but in the early years of his government the country was buzzing with ideas, projects and reforms. Today’s Georgia feels stagnant and confused, lacking any sense of direction. “This government has no clear ideas—only interests,” says Georgy Khukhashvili, a former adviser to Mr Ivanishvili who has since turned critic.

Having attacked Mr Saakashvili’s team for its lack of transparency, Mr Ivanishvili has created something far more opaque—a kind of shadow state. Although he has had no official post since stepping down as prime minister a year ago, Mr Ivanishvili remains the most important decision-maker in the country, periodically descending from his hilltop residence overlooking Tbilisi to work his political will. Tinatin Khidasheli, a member of parliament whose Republic Party is part of the Georgia Dream coalition, likens Mr Ivanishvili’s legitimacy to that of a Georgian patriarch. “Believe me, if Mr Ivanishvili was not involved, things would be much worse in Georgia today,” she says. That many of Mr Ivanishvili’s critics agree is a powerful indictment of his protégé, Irakly Garibashvili, the prime minister and a former manager in his business group.

The Georgian Dream coalition, brought together with the sole purpose of unseating Mr Saakashvili, is displaying growing cracks. Last month Irakly Alasania, the ardently pro-NATO defence minister and (according to one poll) most popular politician in Georgia, was fired by Mr Garibashvili. A row had erupted after four of Mr Alasania’s officials were targeted by prosecutors, in what Mr Alasania described as a politically motivated attack on Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic choice. The foreign minister, Maia Panjikidze (who is Mr Alasania’s sister-in-law), resigned in solidarity.

Mr Alasania’s public sacking pleased the Kremlin, which saw him as an American agent. Mr Ivanishvili went out of his way to show that he was behind the decision. Having made his fortune in Russia, only to pull out when Mr Putin came to power, Mr Ivanishvili is said to be afraid of the Russian leader. He seems to be playing for time, hoping that Russia will find some arrangement with America that determines Georgia’s future position.

What unites Mr Ivanishvili and Mr Putin is their joint hatred of the previous government. Mr Saakashvili cannot return to Georgia for fear of arrest. Vano Merabishvili, a former interior and prime minister, is in jail. Kakha Bendukidze, who served as a special minister for reforms and did more than anyone else to liberalise the Georgian economy, died recently in London, afraid to return. The list goes on. This does not mean that Georgia is turning into an authoritarian system. It has a free media and strong political opposition—something it lacked under Mr Saakashvili. As Mr Bendukidze often used to say: “Georgia made a step forward in terms of democracy, but sometimes when you make a step forward you step in shit.”

Yet instead of building on Georgia’s reforms, the new government seems to be moving in the opposite direction, repeating many of Mr Saakashvili’s mistakes. It has reimposed pointless restrictions on the length of visa-free stay for citizens from the European Union and banned the sale of farmland to foreigners.

Having (rightly) lambasted Mr Saakashvili’s government for his extra-judicial prosecutions and heavy-handedness, the new government seems just as keen on its own police and security forces. Mr Garibashvili said recently that strong security services are a “prerequisite of our country’s success, progress, [and] development”. Deputies have pushed through parliament a bill making it easy for the police to eavesdrop on citizens.

All of this has taken a toll on the government. The popularity of the Georgian Dream coalition has dropped from about 70% at its peak to about 40%. But that loss of popularity has not translated into growing support for the United National Movement or any other party. This creates a dangerous and easily exploitable vacuum of power and legitimacy. As Elene Khoshtaria, an analyst and former official for Georgia’s NATO integration, puts it, “we can’t afford to have a weak government. We have to be A+ students all the time just to stay afloat. Otherwise we sink.” This may be precisely what Mr Putin is hoping for.