The threat from extremists in Syria was the main factor behind the review of “Syrian policy.” US and European security services have been following the increasing threat and numbers of jihadists returning from Syria. Intelligence pointed to strong signals that Western countries may be struck by a terrorist attack coming from Syria. Some officials said that terrorism is a threat to the internal security of Western countries and that Syria “has become a domestic problem.”

President Barack Obama has faced criticism from Republicans, research centers and opinion-makers in Washington. A former national security adviser said the United States has spent about $6 trillion after the 9/11 attack to “fight terrorism,” and the result is Syria turning into a generator of terrorists rather than Afghanistan. In a closed session, another official said that if US policy doesn’t change, one should expect “hundreds of bombings, such as the one in September, coming from the fertile lands in Syria.”

The driving force of these meetings was the failure of two rounds of talks in Geneva between representatives from the regime and from the opposition’s Syrian National Coalition. The two sides realized the fragility of the US-Russia understanding, which entailed no more than keeping the two Syrian delegations in Switzerland at an international conference to search for a solution to the Syrian crisis. Also, the tension between Moscow and Washington over Ukraine and the return of the Cold War atmosphere has harmed any fragile understanding on Syria. The slow implementation of the removal of Syria’s chemical arsenal has raised questions in Western capitals, especially in Washington, about the success of the policy on Syria in the past three years.

According to available information, in recent weeks, political and security meetings between the opposition’s allies and the “Friends of the Syrian People” group have intensified. Arab-regional-European-American meetings have been held in Washington, and so have meetings among European countries, and meetings between European countries and the United States. Senior security officials participated in those meetings. There have also been closed-door meetings for planning officials and for political experts in the Middle East to review policy on Syria.

Officials from several Western capitals advised decision-makers in their own countries that the Syrian conflict is likely to continue for five to 10 years and that there must be medium- and long-term strategic policies, not just near-term policies.

The alarm has reached decision-makers, but they are split on how to respond. Some European countries are considering reopening security cooperation with the Syrian regime and unfreezing diplomatic representation, whether by accepting certain Syrian diplomats in European embassies or by sending diplomats to the Syrian capital, whether secretly or openly. Proponents of that option have unenthusiastically agreed to the “devil you know is better than the devil you don’t know” policy as a solution to the regime-jihadists equation.

Other European countries have discussed the possibility of engaging with the regime and concluded that the “regime has lost legitimacy and will not be dealt with now.” In this context, countries like France and Britain protested the official visit to Damascus by European Commission representative Christian Berger because his visit gave the wrong signal to Damascus and had no European consensus.

European policy is divided. The Europeans agree on the risk of jihadists returning from Damascus. They discussed the possibility of opening channels with Damascus but are split over the decision. US officials have declared that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a “magnet” for terrorists and is “attracting” jihadists to his country. They see the solution as a political settlement and a transitional phase that begins by forming a transitional government grouping the regime and the opposition, leading to the end of Assad’s rule. But the problem, according to their opinion, is that the regime is not serious about negotiating. The second problem is that the regime is receiving full military, political, security and economic support from Moscow and Tehran, including support for the presidential elections in the next two months with the participation of President Assad. Also, the Iranian regime is encouraging Assad to make local arrangements in the Damascus countryside, where there are tight blockades around these areas.

Western officials see the equation as follows: Russia and Iran are providing full support for the regime, and Moscow may raise its support after the events of Ukraine. There are no indicators that Tehran’s policy will change. The regime is regaining control over areas in the Damascus countryside and is linking them with the coast. It is also increasing its grip on Damascus and closing the supply corridors from Lebanon. The military opposition is divided in the north between moderates and Islamists and between Islamists and jihadists and between the northern and southern fronts. The political opposition is facing challenges. The terrorist threat in northern Syria is rising, while it is limited in the south, and there are indicators that it is expanding in the Golan Heights.

Accordingly, the policy in the coming period is expected to be about “harming, not ousting, the regime” and “changing the regime’s calculations, not the regime itself” and “stopping the deterioration of the power balance but without changing the power balance” and “supporting the opposition to prevent a victory for the regime, not to secure a victory for the opposition.” Some are predicting “a significant increase in the amount of weapons and a small increase in the quality of weapons,” including anti-armor and anti-aircraft weapons.

The West thinks that whenever the regime feels that it has won and has regained control of a certain area, a battle should start somewhere else. At the same time, the opposition will not be allowed to achieve a resounding victory. A good example of this is the “coastal battle,” which started days after the regime, supported by Hezbollah elements, recovered the strategic Qalamoun areas. In short, it is the policy of “holes in the barrel” — whenever a hole is closed, another hole is opened.

What does all this mean? It means that Syria is on the verge of a slow bleed and that the parties to the conflict — the Syrian regime and the opposition — are heading to a “war of attrition” amid a regional bleeding. A Western official said that Syria will be Iran’s Vietnam, as Vietnam has bled America.

There will be a war of attrition between Hezbollah and Jabhat al-Nusra. The regime will be not be allowed to fully collapse in all regions of Syria given the spread of the radical threat. Nor will the opposition and the moderates be allowed to be defeated. Thus, the regime’s quest to regain full control of Syrian territory and turn the clock back to 2010 — if any Damascus official thinks that’s possible — is nothing more than a mirage. A decisive “military resolution” is also a mirage. And if an oppositionist thinks that the time is ripe to reach the presidential palace in Damascus, that’s also a mirage.

The West thinks that once the Syrian and regional parties exhaust themselves, there comes the season of political settlement emanating from the Geneva process, whose sponsors want to extend to a Geneva III conference. The settlement will be according to the division of Syria in the coming period: The regime will have complete control from Damascus to the coast through Homs. There will be areas outside the regime’s control, but not under the absolute control of the opposition. There will be a large triangle of Kurdish influence in the north and northeast, with some areas a patchwork of influence of other opposition factions. Further, there will be warlords, a new economic and social class with political ambitions, militias and local leaders in the areas of the opposition and the regime.

At the same time, the central Syrian state will have ended, as it ended earlier in Iraq, Libya, Sudan and the Palestinian territories (because of the of occupation). The Syrian solution and the social-political contract will be characterized by an increase in the influence of emerging local administrations and leaders and the disintegration of the centralized state. Some even talked about a Tehran-supported proposal by representatives of the regime in the areas of Damascus, whereby locals will manage their areas while politics is left for Damascus, the center.

The project of reorganizing destroyed neighborhoods in the outskirts of the capital could be part of a decentralized Syria. But for now, the regime is holding on to all the totalitarian tools of propaganda, politics, security and military in the areas under its control as compensation for losing control in other places. But on the road to decentralization, Damascus will be a mirror of the political quotas and balances.

Regional countries and those with influence in Syria will support their allies on a sectarian, religious and ethnic basis. They also expect the Syrian border to no longer be sovereign regarding the flow of fighters and individuals or for cross-border operations and humanitarian assistance. The borders of Syria would be sacred only on paper, in political speeches and in ideological narratives.