Starting in 1858, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder issued a series of tactical problems in the form of map exercises, often one-page military problems designed to train Prussian staff officers and commander. Moltke needed a vehicle to help officers visualize the changing character of war. European countries fielded increasing large formations, moved by rail, capable of increased firepower. By analyzing the map exercises or conducting staff rides, the “Great General Staff” could develop options for mobilizing corps, conducting separate lines of march, and concentrating at the decisive point for the final battle. Wargames were how the military profession adapting to changing material conditions and socio-economic dynamics that altered how and why political actors fought wars. They offered a unique means to teach the essence of tactical victory, campaigning, and strategy, which Moltke saw as a “free, practical, artistic activity” that set the conditions for battlefield success.

Over the next year, as a part of an ongoing series on #wargaming, we will return to Moltke’s vision of a series of map exercises that illuminate the changing character of war and, in the process, help the military professional develop new theories of victory. Every month #wargaming will feature a vision of the next war by publishing a campaign-level decision game. These short, seminar-style games are designed to help national security professionals think about multinational campaigns and major operations possible, but not necessarily probable, in the near future. These modern map exercises can be played individually similar to a tactical decision game, or used by a group to discuss military strategy and practice.

As defined by Philip Sabin, wargaming refers to “any type of warfare modeling, including simulation, campaign and systems analysis, and military exercises.” For Peter Perla, “wargaming is part of a larger toolkit of techniques for learning about warfare” that often explore “future military situations” through the “interplay of human decisions and game events.” Similarly, according to Frank McHugh, wargames provide the national security professional “decision-making experience and decision-making information” based on a simulation of a particular conflict situation.

The games in this series will be take the form of short, seminar games that can be conducted by collaborative networks of individuals sharing their ideas or in small groups. The games will establish a scenario and available forces. Based on this initial data, readers can discuss military options, possible adversary countermoves, and the resulting cascading effects. These discussions provide a vehicle for the national security professional to visualize and describe the changing character of war.

For example, recently the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group used future decision games to investigate major contingencies possible in the next twenty-years. Similarly, a group of Marine, Army, and Air Force officers in the Marine Corps University, Advanced Studies Program are constructing a series of campaign-level decision games to hypothesize new manned-unmanned teaming concepts. In each case, small teams visualize future war and describe the military problems likely to confront Coalition and Joint forces engaged in multi-domain battle. These teams develop a mission, a concept of operations and articulate a theory of victory and the required capabilities, joint functions, and considerations to achieve it (such as doctrine, organizations, training, etc.). They learn and adapt short of the feedback of actual battle.