The Global Taiwan Brief Volume 3, Issue 21

Fortnightly Review

By: Russell Hsiao

Searching for a Basis for Taiwan in the United Nations

By: David An

China’s New Coercive Strategy and the Limits of TRA Security Guarantees

By: David J. Keegan

Archives, Truth and Transitional Justice: A New Narrative for Taiwan (Part 2)

By: Yi-Li Lee

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy: “One Country, Two Systems”

By: Jonathan Lim

Fortnightly Review

By: Russell Hsiao

Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute and the editor-in-chief of the Global Taiwan Brief.

As Elections Near in Taiwan, China’s Interference on the Rise

With the 2018 local elections less than a month away, clear evidence of China’s growing interference in Taiwan’s elections are on the rise. On November 24, voters in Taiwan will go to the polls to vote for their city mayors, councilors, magistrates, town chiefs, and other representatives. While not a national election that will directly impact the presidency or the balance of power in the island-democracy’s Legislative Yuan (i.e., Congress), the results of the local elections will provide an important signal of both the vitality of the major political parties and serve as a bellwether for the 2020 presidential and national legislature elections. With seemingly so much on the line and toss-up races in the mix, the two major political parties are going ‘pedal-to-the-metal’ in their efforts to mobilize and woo undecided supporters. Against this milieu there have been growing reports that China is directly interfering in Taiwan’s political process through the spreading of fake news (假新聞) and employing other direct measures.

In a recent interpellation before the Legislative Yuan, the director of Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB), which is the equivalent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), revealed that it has received 33 pieces of intelligence, which indicate that China is interfering in the island’s November 24 elections. Leu Wen-jong (呂文忠), the new head of MJIB, stated that they have evidence that China is interfering in Taiwan’s elections through vote-buying schemes, donating money to candidates’ campaigns, and inviting influential community leaders to tour China. Moreover, Leu claimed that the money from China was coming from the PRC State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office.

Taiwan is not the only democracy whose elections China is ostensibly interfering in. International concerns about China’s interference in the elections of democracies was thrown into sharp relief recently when President Donald Trump, at the UN Security Council meeting, accused China of interfering in the upcoming US midterm elections, which will be held on November 6. “Regrettably, we’ve found that China has been attempting to interfere in our upcoming 2018 election coming up in November against my administration,” President Trump said on September 26. “They do not want me—or us—to win because I am the first president ever to challenge China on trade,” he added. The president later substantiated his claims by pointing to the Chinese state-sponsored China Daily inserts in Iowa’s Des Moines Register that were railing against the Trump administration’s trade policy.

The heightened attention towards foreign election interference is occurring against the backdrop of the national security communities in multiple democracies growing concerns over China’s “sharp power.” Among the other tools in China’s “sharp power” toolkit are information operations, which include propaganda and disinformation. As the US National Security Strategy (NSS) explicitly stated: “Rival actors use propaganda and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western views and spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners.”

Highlighting the challenge, President Tsai underscored her administration’s determination to tackle this shared challenge of disinformation in her third National Day Speech on October 10:

For cases involving systematic dissemination of disinformation from specific countries, we will strengthen cross-border collaboration. That includes not only experience sharing, but also setting up monitoring and notification mechanisms, so that together, we can respond to any damage or negative impact that disinformation has on social stability in various countries.

Reports of China’s direct interference in Taiwan’s elections have been coupled with an increasing tide of fake news, misinformation, and even disinformation in Taiwan’s information landscape, which are disrupting public life. Some sources of such information have been attributable and traced back to “content farms” (內容農場), social media accounts, and IP addresses based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Other more traditional albeit indirect measures taken by the Chinese government include co-opting Taiwan’s traditional media outlets, for instance, a media report supposedly citing information from MJIB stated that two major media outlets from Taiwan and an online public opinion company have received “benefits” from China and published polls and news content with favorable positions towards China.

This long-standing malaise was thrust into Taiwan’s public square during the controversial pension reforms debate last year as Taiwanese netizens and users of a popular messaging began receiving a flood of messages and were pushed to websites carrying false claims about the central government’s plans. Taiwan’s national security authorities attributed the source of the fake news to a growing number of “content farms” based in the PRC. Additionally, a more recent example threw into sharp relief how the “poison” of disinformation could have deadly consequences. Fake news that was circulated about a Taiwanese envoy’s alleged failure to assist Taiwanese tourists stranded at a Japanese airport after a Typhoon struck in September led tragically to the diplomat committing suicide. The source of this fake news was reportedly traced to an IP address in Beijing and attributed to a Chinese government task force.

In the midst of the ongoing US-China trade war, the United States and Taiwan signed an agreement for the latter to import soybeans from the United States, then reports raising health concerns over GMO soybeans from the United States began circulating in Taiwan’s social media. While the claims about their adverse, if not catastrophic, health effects have been debunked by civil society and the government, it has not yet been determined whether the Chinese government was behind the disinformation campaign. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that CCP propaganda has also been directed against America’s soybean farmers with the focus of weakening domestic support for Trump’s trade policy.

Taiwan’s diplomacy is also being complicated by Chinese disinformation. According to Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, a widespread but false media report that one of Taiwan’s diplomatic ally was about to switch ties in May was traced back to a social media account based in the PRC’s Hebei province. The Foreign Minister added that a real-time news clarification webpage set up by the government, which had to respond to 820 suspected fake news reports in 2018 alone, represented only the “tip of the iceberg” of the problem. The Foreign Minister admitted that “with the advent of new technology, disinformation and falsehoods are spreading faster than ever—in many cases faster than we can clarify.”

In related news, an article published by Mirror Media (鏡週刊) referenced a “Critical Report” (關鍵報告)—the veracity of which has been corroborated by another source—based on intelligence shared with the Taiwan government by like-minded countries. The Report pointed out that an external power is attempting to shape public opinion in Taiwan through information operations, with the aim to weaken the ruling party in the two years leading up to 2020 presidential election. The objective of the information operation is reportedly to undermine the trust between the Tsai government and the people as well as the military. The article also revealed that this external power will or has formed an “information warfare unit” (信息戰部隊) with the goal of supporting a pro-Beijing regime in Taiwan in 2020, and the local elections will be training ground for this disinformation war.

The United States and Taiwan are strengthening cooperation to combat fake news and disinformation. On October 18-19, US State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby attended an international workshop held in Taipei co-organized by the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office under the auspices of the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF). In his keynote address, Secretary Busby noted:

Taiwan also knows all too well how a determined external actor with hostile intentions can place enormous strain on democratic institutions through various influence tactics, including disinformation. As our Vice President noted recently: “The Chinese Communist Party shapes the information environment by rewarding or coercing American businesses, movie studios, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and federal officials.”

The main point: As elections near in Taiwan and the United States, China’s interference is on the rise. The United States and Taiwan are working together to combat fake news and disinformation.

Update: Since the publication of this article, the veracity of the “Critical Report” referenced by Mirror Media has been corroborated by another source.

Yushan Forum: A Platform to Showcase the “Taiwan Model”

On October 11-12, politicians, community leaders, academics, and social entrepreneurs from across the Indo-Pacific region and the world gathered in Taipei for the 2018 Yushan Forum (玉山論壇) organized by the newly established Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (臺灣亞洲交流基金會). The Forum included eight panels focused on a wide range of issues from talent cultivation, industrial innovation, regional agriculture, medical and public health cooperation, civil society, think tanks, youth leaders and cultural institutions.

The 2018 Yushan Forum, which was attended by more than 1,000 participants over the course of two days, featured 51 representatives from 17 countries, including international leaders such as Nobel Peace Prize laureates Frederik Willem de Klerk and Kailash Satyarthi. Modeled in form after the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, and the Raisina Dialogue, the Yushan Forum, according to the conference organizer, is intended to become an international platform focused on enhancing social connectivity and progress and to help bolster Taiwan’s “New Southbound Policy.”

Under the banner of “Working Together for Regional Prosperity,” President Tsai Ing-wen highlighted in her opening keynote at the Forum that, “coupled with the growing demand for inclusive growth and sustainable development in the world, we need more cooperation between Indo-Pacific societies, to take collective actions and shape our future together.”

Touting the success of her administration’s “New Southbound Policy,” which aims to increase economic and people-to-people engagement with 18 countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia, Tsai noted that over 41,000 students from New Southbound countries went to study in Taiwan in the first half of 2018 with the government aiming to attract 48,000 students in 2019. At the same time, the number of Taiwanese students studying in target countries increased by nearly 20 percent. Also, more than four million tourists from New Southbound countries went to Taiwan in the last two years. On the economic and trade front, the government and private firms signed a total of 69 MOUs and letters of intent for cooperation with the New Southbound countries. In 2017, bilateral trade between Taiwan and New Southbound countries grew by around 15 percent year-on-year. Taiwan investment in those countries also rose by 54 percent, while approved investment by partner countries into Taiwan also increased by around 15 percent.

While the Forum was mostly focused on economic and other practical areas of cooperation, speakers did not shy away from pointing out the importance of Taiwan’s democratic model. As former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, the Honorable Kasit Piromya, stated, Taiwan is “second to none” for its dual developments as a full-fledged democratic country and as an advanced, economically developed entity. He implored Taiwan to not be “shy” that it is an open and democratic society, while China is trying to convince its neighbors that it is better to have an authoritarian government for social and economic development. To be sure, the “China Model,” which attributes China’s economic growth to an exceptional model of social and economic development, is not simply an economic model but encompasses politics and the global balance of power—and at the center of it includes a powerful one-party state and a massive state sector.

The former Thai foreign minister was not the first to point out that China is promoting its system abroad. As journalist Richard Mcgregor also observed:

Increasingly, China is promoting its system as an alternative to Western democracy, something that was rare even five years ago. Mr. Xi now talks about the “China solution” for a world facing political and financial turmoil. In place of such uncertainties, which Beijing blames on the West, Mr. Xi lauds China’s “wisdom” of global governance. [… ]What Mr. Xi is really promoting is something else: the idea that authoritarian political systems are not only legitimate but can outperform Western democracies.

The rise of revisionist authoritarian states’ is leading to a competition of models in economic, social, and political developments in the world. China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative, which was launched in 2013 with the stated aim to connect major Eurasian economies through infrastructure, trade, and investments worth an estimated $1 trillion over 10-15 years, is, as Nadège Rolland assesses, “to build a Sinocentric Eurasian order in which Beijing’s influence and power have significantly expanded, authoritarian regimes have been consolidated, and liberal norms have receded.” The New Southbound Policy and the Yushan Forum present a stark contrast to the PRC’s OBOR initiative, and the United States sees Taiwan as a partner in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. As noted at the Yushan Forum by US Ambassador Atul Keshap:

Ample opportunity exists for Taiwan-South Asian cooperation in the areas of entrepreneurship, public health and women’s empowerment. For example, Taiwan can collaborate with Bangladesh to expand into electronics manufacturing, or partner with Sri Lanka develop its Information Technology sector, or collaborate with India to develop high value/high trust supply chains. The US can be a partner in these efforts through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework and there are no doubt many more avenues for mutually beneficial cooperation. Such efforts will forge additional Indo-Pacific linkages, boost prosperity and trade, enhance security, and help the aspirational people of South Asia taste even more of the prosperity of the modern world. For this vision to become a reality, it is absolutely vital and essential that all of us strive to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific for the next 70 years and beyond.

The competition in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world is between “models” of social, economic, and political developments. How emerging nations develop will help shape the narrative of the world’s future. As a forum for enhancing social connectivity within the region, the Yushan Forum has the potential to become the international platform to showcase the free and open model for social and economic development: a ‘Taiwan Model.’ The United States, Taiwan, and like-minded partners should use all tools to counter the authoritarian model and narrative for development. In the process, as President Tsai stated at the end of her speech: “Taiwan can help Asia, and Asia can help Taiwan.”

The main point: The Yushan Forum provides a good platform to showcase the ‘Taiwan Model’ that can complement the model given by other countries to provide an alternative to the China Model of development.

Searching for a Basis for Taiwan in the United Nations

By: David An

David An is a senior research fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute and was previously a political-military officer at the US Department of State.

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) general debate recently concluded on October 1 in New York City. Taiwan was again conspicuously excluded from sending a delegation to directly participate in the General Assembly as has been the case since 1971. In the lead up to the assembly meeting, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu said, “Taiwan deserves to have a role in the United Nations.” Indeed, Taiwan deserves a role on the international stage and there is arguably growing recognition of that need, but what has been holding Taiwan back from the UN? There are various minority views within Taiwan’s public opinion based on historical documents claiming that Taiwan is already tied to Japan or the United Nations, but such approaches can be misleading. A more promising approach starts with the recognition of geopolitical shifts throughout the past five decades and understanding their implications for the future.

Taiwan and UNGA 2018

While Taiwan’s civil society and supporters abroad typically advocate for Taiwan’s UN membership and protest outside the UN, Taiwan’s government took a different approach this year than previous years. This year, rather than to push for UN membership, Taiwan’s government sent its digital minister Audrey Tang and deputy environmental protection minister Thomas Chan to New York while the UN convened. Though these Taiwan officials could not officially participate in UN meetings, they worked on the sidelines to promote Taiwan’s adherence to UN goals.

There is much work to do even on the sidelines, since Taiwan’s international space and even the people of Taiwan’s access to the UN facility is shrinking. Though Taiwan’s passport is accepted for travel to most countries, it is not accepted to access the United Nations in New York, even for Taiwanese tourists who want to visit. Though visitors to the UN from Taiwan cannot use their Taiwan passports, they could in the past enter with a Taiwan Compatriots identification card issued by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, though Taiwan students are allowed to intern at the UN, they are not even allowed to say that they are from Taiwan.

On October 12, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it will lodge a protest to the UN in response to a media report that Taiwanese visitors were completely denied entry into the UN headquarters. A Taiwanese reporter tried to enter the UN for a pre-scheduled guided tour when she was refused entry after showing her Republic of China (Taiwan) passport, as is the case in the past. However, she then showed her travel permit issued by Chinese authorities for Taiwanese people—which until recently would work for entry into the UN—but was told those documents were no longer accepted either. She was not the only one, since another Taiwanese visitor with the same Chinese travel permit was also denied entry.

While this is Taiwan’s current predicament, there is a five-decade long history of Taiwan’s dwindling international space and access to the UN. While scholars typically blame Taiwan’s domestic politics, or obscure legal documents, the most important reasons for Taiwan’s situation are the geopolitical shifts.

Internal reasons in 1971

Chiang Kai-shek has been blamed for Taiwan’s current predicament. This is because Chiang was determined to retake China, and was unwilling to accept a “two-state solution” that would have allowed the PRC to take the Security Council seat, while the ROC would remain within the UN as Taiwan or Formosa. In wanting everything he risked losing everything, and in 1971, this led to UN Resolution 2758 transferring the UN seat from the ROC to PRC. In the face of this eventuality, the Taiwan delegation did indeed voluntarily “leave” the United Nations by literally walking out in 1971. However, even if Chiang acquiesced to the two-state solution in order to have Taiwan remain in the UN, this would have likely only been a short-term solution. Taiwan would probably have lost the UN seat to China in the long-term due to China’s growing international political clout and influence in the following years.

International and cross-Strait reasons

To the question of what is limiting Taiwan’s international space and holding Taiwan back from participating in the UN, the answer is simple: the cross-Strait situation. However, this does not answer why China was unsuccessful in doing so before 1971, and how successful China will continue to be in the future. Geopolitical shifts explain China’s success in the past, and whether it will continue to be successful in the future as it seeks to limit Taiwan’s international space.

In Taiwan’s case, geopolitical shifts in the early 1970s that led to the ROC transitioning out of the UN are due to two key factors: 1) growing support for the PRC among the international community, which was 2) compounded by the growing number of countries in the world at the time. Quite simply, China was effective in making political inroads and gaining support in regions such as Africa and South Asia. The post WWII period was a time of decolonization and what scholar Samuel Huntington called the “second wave” of democratization. As the number of countries in the world expanded from less than 100 to 193 today, China strategically picked up increasing numbers of countries to its side for UN votes. Based on these geopolitical shifts, even if Taiwan did not “leave” the UN, it had little hope of staying in the UN in the long-term.

However, there have been minority views of political activists in Taiwan and abroad based on the Treaty of Shimonoseki, United Nations San Francisco Charter, and through referendum:

Searching for basis #1: Treaty of Shimonoseki

One minority view is that Taiwan is still part of Japan based on a treaty from over a century ago. The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed on April 17, 1985 was a peace treaty between China and Japan and suggests that Taiwan is part of Japan. Specifically, in Article 2, the wording states, “China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon: […] (b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.” Yet, this argument neglects that the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 nullified the Treaty of Shimonoseki and confirmed the transfer of Taiwan to the ROC government at that time.

Searching for basis #2: The United Nations Charter

The Republic of China (Taiwan) was the first to sign the UN Charter in San Francisco. There were two main parts of the UN Charter where the ROC was mentioned. In chapter V, article 23: “The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council.” Furthermore, in chapter XIX, article 110 on ratification and signature of the UN Charter: “The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states.”

One view is that since the UN Charter is still valid, and it still states the Republic of China and not the People’s Republic of China, therefore Taiwan should be part of the United Nations. However, this view neglects the fact that later in 1971, UN Resolution 2758 transferred the UN seat from the ROC to the PRC.

Searching for basis #3: Referendum

During the Chen Shui-bian Administration in 2003, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed a bill to allow national referendums on constitutional and sovereignty issues, which inspired hope that Taiwan can enlarge its political space through domestic votes. It was enough to prompt then-PRC President Hu to warn then-President Bush that President Chen was “brazenly” pushing a referendum to secure Taiwan’s admission to the UN. Even Chen’s predecessor former President Lee Teng-hui observed that, “UN membership is not a legal issue, it is a political issue,” and that Taiwan’s power pales in comparison to China’s. Lee continued that Taiwan must rely on friends like the United States and Japan, so Taiwan cannot afford to alienate them through controversial political moves such as through referendum. Furthermore, this neglects the China factor and broader underlying geopolitical shifts.

No easy solutions in the current geopolitical context

These unconventional and minority views—Treaty of Shimonoseki, UN Charter, referendum—do not take into account Taiwan’s current geopolitical environment in assessing what is possible. However, these ideas could someday be valuable as the historical and legal basis of a reconceptualization of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Just as the geopolitical environment shifted against Taiwan leading up to 1971, it could shift in Taiwan’s favor in the future. This is likely why some voices within Taiwan still hold on to the hope of UN membership.

It turns out that Taiwan did officially “leave” the United Nations when Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Taiwan ambassador to the UN to walk out. Yet, it is unlikely that Taiwan would have been able to stay much longer if it did not leave on its own, considering UN Resolution 2758 had passed in the PRC’s favor. Today, it is hard for Taiwan to push back against Beijing to gain more diplomatic allies, to reverse the current trend of Taiwan losing its allies. Beijing has more diplomatic and economic clout.

Yet, in the current geopolitical context, even in the absence of UN membership Taiwan can still maintain its presence on the international stage. Taiwan can and should continue to try to participate in international organizations as an observer or where statehood is not a requirement. It can continue to rely on informal though important diplomatic relations with the United States and the rest of the world. Taiwan should continue to emphasize its shared liberal values and freedoms with other democracies.

The main point: Any effective efforts at involving Taiwan in the United Nations should be based on a clear-eyed understanding of history—particularly international support for China in the 1970s as well as proliferation of the number of countries at that time—as well as the current and future geopolitical environment.

China’s New Coercive Strategy and the Limits of TRA Security Guarantees

By: David J. Keegan

Dr. David Keegan is an adjunct lecturer at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), teaching a graduate seminar on Taiwan-China-United States relations; he also teaches China and East Asian Area Studies at the State Department Foreign Service Institute (FSI). Dr. Keegan retired from the State Department Foreign Service in 2012 after numerous assignments covering Taiwan, China, and East Asia; he holds a Ph.D. in Chinese history from the University of California.

The Chinese leadership is creating a strategy of non-military coercion to shape Taiwan’s behavior toward acceptance of “reunification” without triggering a US response. This can be seen in the series of such coercive steps the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken since President Tsai Ing-wen was inaugurated. There are also indications that China is developing a number of additional coercive measures that could be applied against Taiwan in the coming years. None of these measures will likely result in military action against Taiwan, and therefore US military steps in support of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) may do little to deter them. Washington now needs to develop new cross-Strait policies to counter this new evolving threat of Chinese non-military coercion against Taiwan.

Since the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, the core of the US “One-China” policy has been our insistence that the future of relations between Taiwan and mainland China should be determined peacefully by the two sides free from coercion. Since 1979, when the United States established diplomatic relations with Beijing and the TRA became law, the United States has expressed concern over possible Chinese coercion, particularly military coercion by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwan. The United States has provided a variety of military equipment, training, and advice to Taiwan in furtherance of the TRA policy. The Trump Administration announced two tranches of sales, totaling over $1.7 billion to modernize the island’s defense capabilities. The United States has also strongly encouraged Taiwan to increase its defense budget and its defense capabilities to deter any consideration of the use of force by Beijing. Despite the growing strength of the PLA and its focus on Taiwan, US military deterrence and military assistance to Taiwan have helped keep the peace and can, I believe, continue to do so in the near term (the next five years).

Current tensions between the United States and China will leave the United States few ways to influence Beijing to restrain its new strategy of coercive efforts. More concrete moves will be required. I offer below a selective list of some of the steps Beijing has taken against Taiwan, steps it has taken elsewhere that could be applied against Taiwan, and a few thoughts about possible US responses.

Beijing’s Road to non-military cross-Strait Coercion

Beijing has acknowledged its policy to use non-military coercion to move Taiwan toward “peaceful reunification” for almost 30 years. In 1991, PRC President Yang Shangkun (楊尚昆) announced that China would use its growing commercial and investment relationship with Taiwan to advance unification. It never spelled out in detail what that policy meant, but it ranged from preferential terms for Taiwan investors to encouraging Taiwan business owners and managers living and working in the PRC to vote in Taiwan elections for candidates who would oppose Taiwan independence and expand cross-Strait economic ties. In 2010, Beijing signed a series of agreements with the Ma Ying-jeou Administration that were designed to further knit the two economies together. Fears that these agreements might enable the PRC to subvert Taiwan’s economic and social stability led to the Sunflower Protests of 2014 and helped lead to the elections of Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the majority in the Legislature in 2016.

None of this is news, and none of this overly worried US policymakers at the time. We thought Taiwan could reap the economic benefits of cross-Strait ties without any political costs. However, China has changed its approach to Taiwan over the last two years in ways that challenge US support for Taiwan and that we have not yet fully thought through or determined how to handle this new scenario.

China’s New non-military Coercion

Beijing has demanded that Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen accept the so-called “1992 Consensus” as the basis for any cross-Strait relationship. Beijing has done this fully conscious that no DPP leader could endorse this formulation, which had been popularized by a former Mainland Affairs Council chairman to criticize DPP president Chen Shui-bian in April 2000, over eight years after the 1992 meetings it claimed to characterize. Beijing has dismissed Tsai’s repeated efforts to acknowledge the fact and accept the outcomes of the 1992 and subsequent meetings. Beijing has taken this approach, knowing Tsai could not use the term “1992 Consensus” and survive politically, in order to signal to Taiwan voters and businesses that Taiwan will be denied any further progress in cross-Strait economic relations, and will indeed see cross-Strait trade and investment constrained, so long as the DPP remains in office. Regardless of what Tsai offers, Beijing is committed to use coercive pressure to undermine the political party that it sees as being committed to a Taiwan separate from the PRC in culture, history, and political identity.

In addition, Beijing has renewed its campaign to eliminate all of Taiwan’s formal diplomatic relationships by persuading third countries that China will use its economic and diplomatic muscle to support them if they recognize the PRC and to penalize them if they do not (examples include Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama).

Beijing has insisted that American hotel chains like Marriott and airlines like United and American use terms on their web sites that treat Taiwan as part of China. The Gap clothing chain was subjected to attacks for a map on t-shirts it sold that had omitted Taiwan and the South China Sea from a map of China. Noncompliance would risk the access of these companies to China’s enormous market.

Beijing pressured Spain, Cambodia, and the Philippines to extradite fraud suspects from Taiwan to China despite Taipei’s insistence that they should be sent back to Taiwan. Beijing has begun to issue resident identification cards to Taiwan students and business employees living in the PRC.

Beijing has used money and media access to exert political influence either in Taiwan or elsewhere directed at Taiwan.

Finally, China has conducted extensive cyber operations against Taiwan’s high-tech companies to steal their intellectual property, and we must assume it has conducted extensive operations against Taiwan government and infrastructure IT systems as well.

In addition, other measures could include: destructive hacking websites of Taiwan banks and companies, or Taiwan infrastructure; pressure on international insurance and financial institutions to choose between Taiwan or PRC business; and demanding ICAO to relocate the regional air control center currently in Taipei to another location.

These coercive efforts are intended to signal to Taiwan and to Taiwanese voters that:

Taiwan is effectively and increasingly isolated diplomatically.

This diplomatic isolation will have economic consequences when Beijing requires third countries to choose between preferential access to Chinese business and assistance (such as the Belt and Road Initiative) and welcoming Taiwan business and soft-power initiatives like Tsai’s New Southbound Policy.

Beijing may retaliate against any Taiwanese or foreign business that conduct business with the Taiwan government or with Taiwan companies that avoid demonstrating political loyalty to the “One China Principle.”

Taiwan passport holders traveling outside of Taiwan risk extradition to the PRC if they are arrested in third countries, whether for crimes we would consider real crimes or for politically constructed crimes.

Taiwan civil society can be disrupted by pro-unification activists, and Taiwan political campaigns can be reshaped by PRC money and media.

Taiwan’s government and government services could be disrupted at any time Beijing chooses to do so.

None of these efforts will lead to unification in the short-term, nor does Beijing expect that they will. Instead, they are designed, I believe, to reshape the political and social landscape in Taiwan so that increasing numbers of voters will decide that the cost to their wallets of electing a DPP president or mayor is too high. However, sympathetic they may be to a separate Taiwan identity, they may choose to vote for a KMT or another “Blue” candidate, hoping that it will improve Beijing’s treatment of Taiwan and their day-to-day lives. The net result would not be the kind of short sharp coercive steps that the US government has prepared for since 1979. Instead, it would be a slow-motion coercion.

The Need for a New US Response

The United States has been active in its military assistance to Taiwan in furtherance of the TRA, but far less clear in resisting “other forms of coercion.” The Trump Administration’s criticism of Beijing for its pressure on US airlines and hotel chains and the decision to recall our ambassadors to three Western Hemisphere countries that recently switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing constitute welcome acknowledgments that these changes do have real consequences for Taiwan’s viability. It is less clear whether they will have any real impact.

Now we must, I believe, consider a new approach of further steps in implementing the TRA policy to counter these new forms of coercion. We should:

Negotiate a free trade agreement or an investment agreement, acknowledging that the economic benefits alone do not justify the effort.

Take visible steps to integrate the Tsai Administration’s New Southbound Policy with the US and Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

Press US allies and security partners, beginning with Japan, to work actively with Taiwan on regional security, even if that cooperation is less visible than our own.

Look for creative ways to increase Taiwan’s visibility in the UN and international financial organizations. We could, for example, expand the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) programs and include Taiwan experts as advisors to US delegations. We could also make statements explicitly advocating Taiwan recommendations or expressing Taiwan’s concerns.

Some will counter that these exceed the limits of the United States’ carefully crafted “One China” policy that has fostered stability since 1971. However, if Beijing is incrementally eroding that stability, and we fail to act now, it may be too late to adjust by the time we and Taiwan find the ground collapsing below us.

The main point: The evidence is increasingly clear that China is implementing a strategy of non-military coercion to pressure Taiwan and Taiwan voters to accept incremental steps toward unification. The United States commitment to prevent Chinese coercion, based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, has focused on military steps to counter Chinese military coercion. The United States needs to develop a strategy of concrete non-military steps to counter China’s new form of coercion.

Archives, Truth and Transitional Justice: A New Narrative for Taiwan (Part 2)

By: Yi-Li Lee

Dr. Yi-Li Lee is an assistant professor at the Institute of Law for Science and Technology at National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan, and a former visiting scholar at Global Taiwan Institute.

Archives play an important role in the prosecution of justice and all transitional justice mechanisms. Archives provide evidence that can be vital to finding perpetrators of serious past human rights violations. Without access to archives, prosecution against wrongdoers will be very difficult. Access to archives is also a necessary tool to reveal the truth. For victims of human rights violations, information from the archives are the only source to know what really happened. Indeed, the families have a right to know the fate of their loved ones, whether violations occurred, and every member of society have a right to know their common history. This right obligates the state to search for those who are missing and preserve the archives to promote public knowledge to help forge a historically accurate narrative of Taiwan’s past.

Taiwan was ruled by the Nationalist government (Kuomintang, KMT) for almost four decades before its democratization in the 1980s. To consolidate its ruling power, the KMT regime not only used the “Martial Law Decree” (戒嚴令), which suspended the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC), but established a well-functioning security state to suppress political dissents and any anti-government activities. Under authoritarian rule, secrecy as a way of life was bolstered by many repressive laws that prevented the release and distribution of information about the activity of the security forces, as well as their human rights violations.

When Taiwan peacefully and successfully transitioned from a one-party authoritarian regime into a full-fledged constitutional democracy after the lifting of the “Martial Law Decree” in 1987, its democratization facilitated the opening of institutional space to address past human right violations through several large-scale constitutional and political reforms. Shaped by a negotiated-transition and authoritarian legacy, a compensation-oriented policy was made to address the issues of transitional justice. Monetary compensation legislation for the victims of the “February 28 Incident” and those wrongly charged during the decades of the “Martial Law Decree” were passed by the Legislative Yuan (the equivalent to Congress) in 1995 and 1998 respectively. Authorized by the above two laws, two foundations were established to provide financial compensation for the victims and families of the “February 28 Incident” and the “White Terror Period.”

In 1999, the Archives Act (檔案法) was passed by the Legislative Yuan to identify, manage, and preserve historical archives. Since August 2000, the Bureau of National Archive (國家發展委員會檔案管理局) began to centralize the archives of other government institutions. Hence, some historical documents about the “February 28 Incident” and the “White Terror Period” were made accessible to the public. A commission was created under the Executive Yuan as early as 1995 to investigate the “February 28 Incident.” Despite the notable progress, the truth remained elusive. While the commission’s investigation accounted for the political context of the “February 28 Incident” and explained the reasons behind the conflict between Taiwanese elites and the ruling administration, it did not assess who should be held responsible for the incident.

There are multiple constraints that would explain why the truth investigation and documentation about the “February 28 Incident” and the “White Terror Period” encountered so many hurdles. The first reason is the legal restrictions on public access to the archives. Due to privacy concerns, the Bureau of National Archive imposes several restrictions to archive usage, which infringes on the right of victims and their families to seek truth. For example, Article 22 of the Archives Act provides that the national archives shall be open no later than after 30 years of creation. However, the Bureau of National Archives often uses Article 18 of the Archives Act on the protection of the public interest and the privacy and rights of the third parties to reject archives disclosure applications. In addition, the Classified National Security Information Protection Act（國家機密保護法）also imposes several legal restrictions on public access of the confidential archives. Also, the Personal Information Protection Act (個人資料保護法) places further limits on the disclosure of personal information as a reason to refuse access to archival documents. Another reason is that two foundations charged with victim compensation have no investigative power, which makes it difficult for them to locate and obtain documents related to the human rights violations about the “February 28 Incident” and the “White Terror Period.”

Since January 2016, there have been several legislative proposals to reform archive usage after the Democratic Progressive Party won the presidency and became the majority in the Legislative Yuan. The first significant progress was made in December 2017 with the passage of the “Act on Promoting Transitional Justice” (促進轉型正義條例). This new act confers the Commission on Promoting Transitional Justice (促進轉型正義委員會) a wide range of power to collect all available documents relating to human rights violations occurred during the “February 28 Incident” and the “White Terror Period.” In addition, the Commission also has power to fine individuals, political parties, and government officials when they obstruct truth investigations or remove, destruct, conceal, and falsify related documents.

Since the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, the Taiwan government has not formally issued a finding on the truth of the “White Terror Period.” Therefore, it is still unclear who perpetrated state violence and how many victims were tortured, imprisoned, or even executed during the authoritarian period. The current scope of the truth investigation also lacks a gender perspective as there are no comprehensive documents about historical accounts of women’s victimization under authoritarian rule. This lack of a comprehensive truth investigation of past wrongdoings makes the current discourse on transitional justice an easy target of political manipulation that could impede social reconciliation. Immediate legal reforms on access to the national archives could offer opportunities to usher in a new era for transitional justice by building a foundation for a historically accurate and comprehensive collective memory, hence a new narrative for Taiwan’s future.

The main point: Despite significant progress in transitional justice, limitations on access to the national archives, which can facilitate a comprehensive truth investigation of past wrongdoings, make the current discourse on transitional justice an easy target of political manipulation.

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy: “One Country, Two Systems”

By: Jonathan Lim

Jonathan Lim is a graduate law student with the Australian National University, a Young Leader with Pacific Forum CSIS, and Editor of the Young Diplomats Society. He was published with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, China Matters, and and the Yonsei Journal of International Studies.

On June 24, Chairman Xi Jinping hosted the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing. Therein, Xi upheld the significance of equating domestic and international policies of the CCP in achieving China’s “great rejuvenation,” promoting world peace, and advancing common development. Accordingly, participating figures and State organs seized the opportunity to laud Xi’s views on diplomacy as an essential overarching guideline in safeguarding national sovereignty, in advancing peaceful development, in implementing major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, and in realising the “Chinese Dream” (中國夢). The consolidation of “Xi Jinping Thought” (XJT, 習近平思想) within China’s diplomacy illustrates a growing degree of assertiveness in China’s foreign policy and represents an intensified threat to the endurance and stability of the “One Country, Two System” (OCTS) model as a framework for cross-Strait peace and security.

The conference marked a watershed moment in enshrining XJT within China’s foreign policy, and the total consolidation of Xi’s authority over all aspects of the government and CCP. Its origins and effect upon China’s policies can be traced to the ostensible selection of the Politburo Standing Committee during the 19th CCP Congress in October 2017, stretching to the formal removal of presidential term limits from the PRC Constitution on March 11.

A deconstruction of the 14-points of XJT evidences an increasingly assertive containment strategy within cross-Strait relations, one which redefines the fundamental precepts of OCTS and establishes a coherent strategy predicated towards achieving the unification of Taiwan by 2049 in accordance with XJT Point 12. OCTS was first applied as the framework for achieving the harmonious integration of Hong Kong post-1997 and remains the Chinese leadership’s only avenue for unification with Taiwan. Core elements of the OCTS are ostensibly defined by the preservation of a high degree of autonomy within a unified territory, and encompass the maintenance of distinguishing systems of law, the division of sovereign responsibilities, and preservation of cultural identity.

Where the OCTS existed as one of Deng’s key policies it was colored by his grand strategy for China’s foreign policy over the following decades, premised upon his 24-Character Strategy of 1990 to “hide our capabilities and bide our time.” However, Xi’s transformation as China’s new Paramount leader has upended the precedent strategy established under Deng, coloring all facets of China’s policy with Xi’s grand strategy of “striving for achievement;” commensurate with China’s emergence as a global superpower.

One Country, Two Systems Redux

Where XJT now exists as a guiding principle for China’s diplomacy, the scope of XJT Point 12 represents a redefining moment for OCTS, and its assertive application within cross-Strait relations.

The evolving nature of OCTS, as it applied to Hong Kong over the past two-decades, has evoked concerns over its continued viability within cross-Strait relations as a solution for unification. Under OCTS, Hong Kong has experienced a notable erosion of fundamental rights and freedoms, coupled with an increasing degree of interference by the central government beyond the scope of the Basic Law; developments which have been keenly observed in Taiwan.

Indeed, President Tsai Ing-wen’s deliberate omission of references to the “1992 Consensus” within her inaugural speech in May 2016 revealed both an independent conception of “One China,” and her doubts concerning the OCTS as advanced by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This view was reinforced by Tsai’s Mainland Affairs Council, which interpreted China’s attempts to promote OCTS and “One China Principle” (OCP) as forceful and a barrier to common ground, the foundations of which require mutual respect and understanding.

However, the evolving nature of OCTS has only accelerated further following Xi’s consolidation of power. In March, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) of the State Council derided Tsai’s, stating that Taiwan’s problems “will become more complex”, and that only acceptance of the “One China Principle” will allow Taiwan to widen its “maneuvering space” on the international stage. Presently, the iteration of OCTS and OCP advanced by China under XJT evidences the unequivocal aim of hostile integration through economic, diplomatic, and cultural assimilation.

Mindful of the 2049 timeline and promises of a “Chinese Dream,” and frustrated by the political power wielded by the incumbent Tsai and the pan-Green coalition, Xi is enacting the forceful imposition of OCTS upon Taiwan; moving beyond the notion of unification by consensus and posing an exponential threat to the self-determination of the Taiwanese people.

The basis of this forceful and assertive imposition is derived from Xi’s comments during a meeting with the head of the TAO on July 13, during which Xi cited “Four Reasons” for his confidence in cross-Strait ties moving forward: describing how the promotion of cross-Strait ties is a trend of the times and a collective interest, how the changing political climate will not erode the sentiment of shared nationality, and that the establishment of closer relations is a unanimous and unstoppable trend. Within such language emerges Xi’s determined and insatiable intent to impose OCTS and OCP without consent, disregarding the perspectives of any sitting Taiwanese government and its citizens.

In enforcing his conception of OCTS, Xi has adopted a mix of military hard-power and diplomatic posture. This has been established through a mixture of sharp power initiatives aimed at intensifying efforts to undermine Taiwan’s democratic institutions, corrode national identity, foster social instability, further isolate Taiwan internationally, and decimate its economy by encouraging a brain drain.

Eroding National Identity through Legal Incorporation

Under the application of XJT within China’s diplomacy, Beijing is attempting to erode Taiwan’s national identity through the incorporating of Taiwan into the PRC’s domestic legal frameworks.

This has involved the uniform provision of legal privileges and enforcement frameworks upon Taiwanese nationals, equal to those afforded to and imposed upon mainland citizens. Such was evident within the decision of the State Council to ease work visa requirements for Taiwanese citizens residing on the mainland, simplifying the changing of jobs and movement across mainland cities, by abolishing the work permit requirement for Taiwanese citizens.

The Ministry of Public Security’s announced several weeks after that Taiwanese citizens residing in the PRC would be eligible for social and public services through registration for permanent residency under the “state” ID card system; identical to those provided to PRC citizens. This measure was interpreted by the Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council as part of a “united front through equal treatment” strategy, to lure Taiwanese citizens to subjecting themselves to comprehensive surveillance and monitoring under the mainland’s automated facial recognition technology and social credit system.

Consequently, treatment equating Taiwanese citizens on an equal footing with PRC citizens also comes with equal duties and obligations. This has resulted in the gradual implementation of compulsory mandatory training for Hong Kong and Macau students at mainland tertiary institutions. The training seeks to enhance students’ sense of national defence and national security awareness, imparted through three-weeks of military activities and political indoctrination. While at present military training remains an option for Taiwanese students, its eventual forced institution upon Taiwanese citizens attending mainland tertiary education institutions does not exist beyond reasonable doubt.

The attempted repeated imposition of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law [1] upon Taiwan has also been elevated to a new level. This was revealed through its proposed use against Taiwanese Premier William Lai by mainland state-run media Global Times, which called for his prosecution under both China’s criminal code and the Anti-Secession Law. This raised the possibility of the law being used in a targeted manner against Taiwanese citizens, being used to target Taiwanese politicians, and revealed plans to further cultivate an opinio juris under international law by establishing a precedent for the application of PRC law upon Taiwan.

Already, in November 2017 the PRC government convicted the first Taiwanese national – human rights activist Lee Ming-che – under the 2015 National Security Law [2] for attempting to “subvert national authority and overthrow the socialist system,” in a move calculated to project the extraterritorial reach of its domestic laws upon all Chinese people wherever they reside.

Over time Beijing perhaps anticipates that the assimilation of Taiwanese citizens under PRC’s legal and social frameworks will contribute to the erosion of a Taiwanese identity and pave the route towards forceful unilateral reunification without consent under OCTS.

Conclusion

The application of XJT within China’s foreign policy indicates a determined and elevated campaign by the PRC to enforce both the OCP and OCTS upon Taiwan through non-military force. Where Taiwanese citizens and business stand to benefit from the privileges and benefits provided by Beijing, Taiwan must continue to stand firm and act to ensure that such “gifts” do not contribute toward the gradual and calculated sacrifice of Taiwan’s self-determination as a sovereign nation.

The main point: The consolidation of “Xi Jinping Thought” in China’s diplomacy signals a growing degree of assertiveness in China’s foreign policy and represents an intensified threat to the endurance and stability of the “One Country, Two System” model as a framework for cross-Strait peace and security.

[1] (中華人民共和國反分裂國家法) “China: Law No. 34 of 2005, Anti-Secession Law” People’s Republic of China, President of the People’s Republic of China, Order No.34, 14 March 2005.

[2] (中華人民共和國國家安全法) “National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China” People’s Republic of China, President of the People’s Republic of China, Order No 29, 1 July 2015.