So the FBI has backed off – at least for the time being – in its bid to force Apple to write a crippled version of the iPhone operating system in order to enable the bureau to unlock the phone used by a terrorist. Last Tuesday government lawyers asked a judge to postpone the scheduled hearing because FBI investigators believe they may have found a way to hack the iPhone’s security without forcing Apple to help. The judge readily agreed, thereby putting on the back burner an epic confrontation between an irresistible force and an immovable object. If you wanted a case study that illustrates the challenges posed by digital technology for the modern state, then this battle between the FBI and Apple is it.

The story began on 2 December with an attack by two terrorists that left 14 people dead and 22 seriously injured at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. Four hours after the shooting, the two killers (a married couple) were shot dead by the police. The man – Syed Rizwan Farook – had an iPhone provided by his employers, which survived the raid.

Like most iPhones, Farook’s regularly backed up its data to an iCloud account but there was a period between the most recent backup and the day of the massacre when it hadn’t synced with the Apple server. In a cock-up of Olympic proportions, the iCloud password was reset by Farook’s employers (the owners of the phone) with the explicit consent of the FBI. If this hadn’t been done, the phone could have been left plugged in and would have eventually uploaded the fresh data to the cloud. But once the reset had happened, the phone would only do it after its user’s passcode had been entered. And the Feds didn’t know the passcode.

There is an alarmingly widespread failure to appreciate what is at stake here

In normal circumstances, the FBI could have hooked up the phone to a computer, which would then have spent a day or two trying every passcode combination until it hit on the right one. But the security provisions built into iPhones since version 8 of its operating system precludes that. After 10 unsuccessful guesses the phone automatically destroys its data.

No problem, thought the Feds: we’ll just get a court order forcing Apple to write a special version of the operating system that will bypass this security provision and then download it to Farook’s phone. They got the order, but Apple refused point-blank to comply – on several grounds: since computer code is speech, the order violated the first amendment because it would be “compelled speech”; because being obliged to write the code amounted to “forced labour”, it would also violate the fifth amendment; and it was too dangerous because it would create a backdoor that could be exploited by hackers and nation states and potentially put a billion users of Apple devices at risk.

The resulting public furore offers a vivid illustration of how attempting a reasoned public debate about encryption is like trying to discuss philosophy using smoke signals. Leaving aside the purely clueless contributions from clowns like Piers Morgan and Donald Trump, and the sanctimonious platitudes from Obama downwards about “no company being above the law”, there is an alarmingly widespread failure to appreciate what is at stake here. We are building a world that is becoming totally dependent on network technology. Since there is no possibility of total security in such a world, then we have to use any tool that offers at least some measure of protection, for both individual citizens and institutions. In that context, strong encryption along the lines of the stuff that Apple and some other companies are building into their products and services is the only game in town.

Facebook Twitter Pinterest FBI director James Comey testifies at a house judiciary committee hearing on encryption in Washington on 1 March. Photograph: Drew Angerer/Getty Images

Of course this will provide difficulties for law enforcement and surveillance at times, and we therefore need some to devise rational and legal ways of dealing with genuine life-or-death cases. But the San Bernardino iPhone case isn’t one of those. From the very beginning the tech community has been saying that there were various options available to the FBI other than leaning on Apple. The reason for postponement offered to the court on Tuesday by government lawyers – which was that they believed a way had been found to hack the iPhone’s security without forcing Apple to help – confirms that technical consensus.

Which leaves us with two questions. Why did the Feds take this approach in the first place? Answer: they saw a way of harnessing (understandable) public outrage at the San Bernardino massacre to pressure a technology company into providing an encryption backdoor for government. Secondly: why have they suddenly backed off? Could it be that the agency couldn’t face the prospect of having its technical incompetence dissected in open court? As Francis Urquhart in House of Cards would put it: you might think that; I couldn’t possibly comment. But it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that the FBI has been playing politics with our security.