The recent rise of the populist right in Hungary and Poland has raised the alarm about the future of democracy in Europe, as constitutional safeguards, media pluralism and civil society come under sustained attack.

But there is another threat hiding in plain sight: the abuse of anti-corruption laws in Romania, a country often lauded as an example of successful reform in central and eastern Europe.

The country has been praised by EU leaders for its crackdown on graft, and its national anti-corruption body has been held up as a model for others to follow. But scratch beneath the surface and all is not as it appears.

In compiling a recent report for the Henry Jackson Society thinktank we found a body ofevidence to suggest that the Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) is abusing its power and reverting to communist-era methods to serve its own interests and pursue political vendettas.

Significantly, the critics include a number of former supporters, including Traian Băsescu, Romania’s president from 2004 to 2014, who initiated the country’s first major anti-corruption drive but has now accused the agency of violating human rights and acting outside the constitution.

Conviction rates in Romanian corruption cases are astonishingly high at 92%, and a close look at the methods used by the DNA reveals why. Almost all of the most high-profile cases involve one kind of procedural violation or another.

There are examples of guilty verdicts secured with the uncorroborated evidence of witnesses who testify in exchange for immunity. Suspects are sometimes told that if they do not cooperate then family members could also face prosecution.

Pre-trial detention is used as another form of leverage (despite the non-violent nature of the crimes in question) and edited transcripts of telephone intercepts are routinely leaked to the media to discredit defendants in advance of their trials.

We have also seen cases where judges who have ruled against the DNA subsequently found themselves under investigation, and cases where people in the highest echelons of government have accused their critics of corruption on national television.

In May 2014, the then socialist prime minister, Victor Ponta, suggested that Dan Adamescu, the owner of a critical newspaper, România Liberă, would shortly be arrested for corruption. Adamescu was detained a few days later and subsequently convicted of bribery after a legal process riddled with violations.

The case is in danger of turning the British courts into an extension of the dysfunctional legal system, after the Romanian authorities issued a European arrest warrant last year to secure the extradition of Adamescu’s son Alexander. The only evidence against the younger Adamescu appears to be that he has continued to campaign for his father.

Some of the most troubling allegations in Romania, however, concern the close relationship between the DNA and the Romanian intelligence service (SRI), the successor to the feared communist-era Securitate secret police.



The DNA relies on the SRI to intercept about 20,000 telephone calls each year and has acknowledged that the intelligence agency also plays a role in initiating investigations.

In 2015, one SRI general sparked outrage by describing the courts as a “tactical field” of operations and alluding to his agency’s role in influencing the outcome of cases. Judges and lawyers responded by demanding an inquiry into longstanding suspicions that the SRI has continued the old Securitate practice of placing undercover agents in the judiciary, but the government refused.

The case of Alina Bica, head of the agency responsible for countering organised crime and terrorism, illustrates the power of the DNA-SRI nexus.

Bica was arrested by the DNA on corruption charges in 2014 and her experience followed a familiar pattern. She spent months in pre-trial detention, her husband was arrested and efforts were made to destroy her reputation with media leaks.

Bica claimed she was detained after refusing to arrest individuals whose names were suggested by the SRI. When she cited lack of evidence, she was told: “You will not end well.”

None of these details are reflected in the European commission’s monitoring reports on Romania, which paint the country’s fight against corruption in an optimistic light.

But by turning a blind eye, the European Union risks encouraging other countries in the region to follow Romania’s example, using the “fight against corruption” as a smokescreen to weaken democratic standards.

It is an environment that provides the perfect breeding ground for the type of creeping authoritarianism we are seeing in Hungary and Poland.

David Clark was a special adviser at the Foreign Office from 1997 to 2001 and now works as a freelance foreign policy commentator and consultant

