WASHINGTON — Though studies and lower court decisions have found that eyewitness testimony can be both unusually problematic and unusually persuasive, the Supreme Court on Wednesday did not seem inclined to rule that the Constitution requires judges to view such evidence with special skepticism. Ordinary trial procedures, several justices suggested, should be adequate to address the potential unreliability of eyewitness identifications.

“I understand you have very good empirical evidence which should lead us all to wonder about the reliability of eyewitness testimony,” Justice Elena Kagan told Richard Guerriero, a lawyer for Barion Perry, a New Hampshire man convicted of theft based in part on the testimony of a woman who said she saw him from a distance late at night.

But Justice Kagan and other members of the court appeared troubled by the solution Mr. Perry proposed. He said the Constitution’s due process clause should have allowed him to seek a hearing before a judge to decide whether eyewitness evidence against him should be kept from the jury.

The court’s precedents allow such hearings when the eyewitness identification at issue was the product of a suggestive police lineup or similar official conduct. Mr. Perry said there was similarly problematic suggestiveness in how he was identified, while he was held by the police in a parking lot near stolen goods. But he conceded that the suggestiveness was the product of happenstance and not official conduct.