3 | Building Doval

Ajit Doval’s appointment as NSA, in 2014, was hailed across party lines. It represented a step change in India’s seriousness with respect to her immediate neighbourhood. A much more muscular policy was in the offing. Doval lived in Pakistan for 7 years, helped vanquish a Sikh extremist movement and went undercover into the Mizo National Front — a front for Mizoram’s secession from India. I have consciously stayed away from the outlandish claims that Doval lived ‘undercover’ in Pakistan — he was posted to the Indian embassy. Even his exact role in Operation Black Thunder is disputed. As for ‘sole’ efforts in bringing MNF to the negotiating table; there were multiple factors, including loss of safe sanctuary in a newly independent Bangladesh, at play but Doval did provide an out-sized contribution. Lt. General JFR Jacob, Chief of Staff Eastern Command, has pointed out as much. What is undisputed, however, is that he is a recipient of the Kirti Chakra, India’s second highest peacetime gallantry award (at par with the Maha Vir Chakra). This is seldom awarded to non-Army personnel. This alone points to his involvement in countering domestic/international terrorism — putting his own life on the line.

Doval’s 1990s were spent in Kashmir at the height of the insurgency. He was an instrumental part of the initial strategy of containment. Praveen Dhonti’s account on Doval in the Caravan is a must read. A short excerpt reads,

Doval’s policies were dubbed Zero Doubt Policy way. The expert told me of Doval’s “Zero Doubt Policy” — “a name his colleagues came up with, as he dreamed up pragmatic ideas, often thinking the unthinkable, presenting them in briefing settings without a flicker of an eye.” The term referred, the expert continued, to how Doval “appeared to entertain no doubts, ever.”

It is far lesser known that Doval was one of the four negotiators to visit Kandahar, Afghanistan, on 27 December 1999, when IC 814 was hijacked. IC814 was an Indian Airlines flight flying from Kathmandu to Delhi that was hijacked on Christmas eve 1999.

The hijacked IC814, in Kandahar airport, being surrounded by Taliban gunmen. Later the sight of India’s Foreign Minister handing over three dreaded terrorists. (Image:Dawn Herald)

After being hijacked, the plane landed in Kandahar via Amritsar, Lahore and Dubai. Afghanistan, then under Taliban rule, provided safe sanctuary. India had three opportunities to either storm a grounded plane or force the hijackers to negotiate before they reached Afghanistan. India released three dreaded terrorists from Indian prisons to ensure safe passage of the Indian passengers on board. Although Doval reportedly talked down the terrorists from 36 prisoners and USD200mn to 3 prisoners, the move was roundly criticised in India and is an enduring symbol of national shame. Poor intelligence, abysmal crisis management, non-existent inter-ministerial coordination and ultimately, the lack of a coordinated response were laid bare for the world to see.

For Doval, a career spent on the front foot came to nought with this pitiful surrender. This episode firmed up, for good, Doval’s own views on national security.

Constant missteps by Prime Ministers Nehru, Gandhi, Gujral, Desai and Vajpayee trace back to the one key gap in the national security establishment’s understanding — that of military diplomacy or even a basic understanding of our own military’s capabilities. USA, China and even Pakistan understand this. The Indian politicians and bureaucracy find it easy to let the Army take the lead in an intractable situation like Kashmir but have regularly clipped the Army’s wings when it wanted to punitively punish an errant neighbour. The Indian Peace Keeping Force’s presence in Sri Lanka, one of the few attempts at military diplomacy, in the late 1980’s ended up being a massive strategic blunder. This uneasy alliance, one of deep mistrust and misunderstanding, has to be righted. All parties, including the three service chiefs, have to be brought to a common forum. Ajit Doval is the right person to do so.

The defence budget is the price you pay for your foreign policy

In the first few years of his tenure Doval was behind multiple punitive strikes — the surgical strikes across the Line of Control, surgical strikes on Myanmar’s territory and an offensive posture in the Kashmir valley. The surgical strikes, sanctioned by the Centre, deployed India’s Special Forces battalions across international borders for the first time. Although such strikes have long been undertaken at the Division or Command level — it was never necessary to read the PMO and the NSA into them. This paradigm changed with the first surgical strike in Myanmar. The question everyone asked then was, could India, would India, do something similar against Pakistan based terrorists. This was also emphatically answered later that year. It was the first time in a generation that the civilian leaders understood, and deployed, India’s military capability.

These strikes are keeping in line with Doval’s philosophy of an ‘offensively defensive posture’. Ajit Doval has openly discussed Balochistan’s secessionist movement against the Pakistani state, an area no politician or bureaucrat has previously ventured into. Modi worked the Balochistan reference into his Independence Day speech too. Doval’s parting words on the issue, still echo today.

Balochistan is the price Pakistan pays for another 26/11

Indo-China friction. Ajit Doval at the BRICS security summit in Beijing (Image: Indian Express)

Ajit Doval visited Bhutan on Modi’s first state visit in July 2014. India views Bhutan as strategic depth — any Chinese designs on Bhutanese territory or sovereignty bring it right to India’s doorstep at its most vulnerable point — the Chinken’s Neck. The Chicken’s Neck, or the Siliguri Corridor is just 22km wide and connects the North East with the rest of India. This was, perhaps, a harbinger of things to come.

The India-China-Bhutan Doklam plateau skirmish erupted on the tri-junction in 2017. India, on behalf of Bhutan, protested the Chinese claims on the plateau and the road they were hoping to build there. This led to a tense stand off between Indian and Chinese PLA soldiers. India, arguably, manoeuvred herself into a much weaker position with her blunt actions on the plateau where diplomacy was relegated to the backseat. India, subsequently, had to talk of a ‘reset’ of her China relationship and Prime Minister Modi visited Chairman Xi in 2018. This was the Doval-Modi-Military combine’s worst misstep.

This followed on the heels of another embarrassing gaffe in early 2016. India, constantly thwarted by China at the UN to label Masood Azhar a terrorist, impetuously issued a visa to the exiled Uyghur leader Dolkun Isa. China protested that Isa was labelled a fugitive by Interpol — not just China. India thereafter cancelled Isa’s visa and Isa’s proposed visit to Dharamshala — where the Dalai Lama resides.

These instances should definitely firm up one aspect of the office of the NSA.

However powerful, the NSA cannot be expected to take the lead on diplomacy. Especially Doval. He is a career intelligence operative and not well suited to head diplomatic missions.

Modi’s own faith in Doval and Doval’s own faith in himself, and his capabilities, reach its limits somewhere on the shores of diplomacy. After these gaffes the Foreign Secretary, Jaishankar, was designated to lead talks with China. However, policy making and forward thinking setups are born out of such missteps.

A nation doesn’t need to be embarrassed in a war or bow down to hijackers to reboot — skirmishes are the best place to judge your enemy’s strengths, weaknesses, preparedness and motivations and hopefully India has done that. For all talks of the lack of a coherent strategy there will continue to be moments where India is outmanoeuvred, out-thought and outfought — the key is to minimise the losses and maximise the learning. And move forward.