The Kurdish people have entered a new phase in the struggle to control their future. The current context is born of the Syrian revolution that emerged as part of the “Arab Spring” of early 2011. The outcome of the Kurdish struggle in Syria (and neighboring countries) is intimately tied to unfolding of the revolutionary civil war in Syria. Their heroic resistance in the northern Syrian town of Kobanê (‘Ayn al-Arab) against the fighters of the right-wing ISIS organization is just one part of it.

Importantly though the need to resist ISIS in the region of Rojava in northern Syria has brought together political groups which previously were facing-off against each other. The success of an allied force combining Kurdish YPG and forces aligned to the predominantly Arab Free Syrian Army (FSA) in defending Kobanê sets a powerful precedent for the rest of Syria.

The Syrian revolution has endured for over 3 years now in the face of monstrous regime repression and international apathy. Upwards of 200,000 have died – mostly civilian victims of the regime’s brutal war on the population. Syrian refugees number over 3 million[1] with a further 6.5 million internally displaced.[2]

Alongside the military campaign, the Syrian regime of Bashar Al-Assad has waged an ideological campaign against the revolution, seeking to paint it as the work of US-backed mercenaries seeking to impose a repressive Sunni-Islamist theocracy. It attempted to stir up sectarian divisions within the revolution to mirror the Alawi/Shi‘ah sectarianism of the regime. Until quite recently its success at this had been minimal.[3]

Then, as the regime’s counter-revolutionary war dragged on, and the brutal massacres by loyalist Alawi paramilitaries and Shi‘ah fighters imported from Lebanon, Iraq and Iran[4] mounted, Assad got the enemy he wanted. ISIS’ sectarianism emerged as a response to regime sectarianism – that of both the Syrian regime and of the sectarian Shi‘ah regime installed by the US-led occupation of Iraq. Fearing a revival of the revolutionary wave which emerged in 2011 and also seeing the opportunity extend their influence, regimes of all stripes across the region have tried to influence the war by sponsoring groups who will serve their interests and have a conservatizing effect on the revolutionary wave.

Despite these pressures and the near-absence of assistance from the outside world, the Syrian Revolution lives on. The mass movement which began in 2011 with the aim of ending dictatorship and creating a just, free and democratic Syria continues on as an armed struggle as it once did through peaceful protest.

Kurdish component

Although much commentary refers to “The Kurds” as a homogenous entity, they are affected by a multitude of political divisions. Spread across the national boundaries of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, each region has its own particular circumstances. For example, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq is dominated by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud Barzani, who actively backed the US-led invasion of Iraq to gain a semi-autonomous region.

The KRG has established close relations with Turkey and has become its second biggest trading partner after Germany. A planned oil pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan, through Turkey to the Mediterranean would be the jewel in the crown.[5] This puts the project of a broader Kurdish independence at odds with the interests of KRG and the ruling KDP who seek rapprochement with Turkey.

Within the Kurdish regions of Syria, known as West Kurdistan or Rojava, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Democrat or PYD) is dominant.

From July 2012 the Syrian regime, its forces stretched, started to give control of territory and state institutions to the PYD, while maintaining some presence.[6] From that point the facts are the subject of some controversy.

For its part, the PYD poses as having taken a position of neutrality. Spokesperson of the YPG, Redure Khalil, in Nov 2013 interview with AFP put his position:

“Our strategy is to defend out land and our people. As long as the Syrian regime and armed groups don’t attack us, we don’t attack them.”[7]

In any case, in the context of revolutionary civil war, neutrality is not an option. Defeat for the Syrian revolution would mean an end to the possibility of Kurdish liberation in the foreseeable future.

However, the allegations that regime-PYD agreement goes beyond one of mutual non-interference to outright collaboration are backed-up by a large body of evidence. The facts show that the Democratic Union Party (PYD) had struck a power-sharing deal with the Assad regime and repressed other Kurdish parties who wanted to fight Assad.[8] This alliance with the Syrian regime has been utterly detrimental to the revolution.[9]

Human Rights watch interviewed ‘Delal’ in Rojava:

“I think they arrested my father because of his political views. They arrested my father during his meeting with his friends in KDPS (Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria). In the first month they just tortured him without mentioning the charge. In the next month they accused him of a bombing in Afrin.” [10]

A Vice News report filmed during Sept 2013 – over a year after the Syrian regime started to withdraw from Rojava – shows the PYD-controlled Asayish militia moving freely through regime-held checkpoints in the northern city of Qamishlo to engage Free Syrian Army-aligned forces.[11] Together with a multitude of other reports[12], this constitutes a solid case that the PYD had established an agreement with the Syrian regime and was acting essentially as a counter-revolutionary police force.

Kurdwatch, a Kurdish-run website dealing with Syrian Kurdish politics has even reported the recruitment of pro-Assad loyalists into the YPG. [13]

President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq Maussoud Barzani’s criticised the PYD: “PYD’s cooperation with the regime is a dangerous game for the future of our people in Rojava. PYD has not only taken control of the region, it has already started to arrest and kill members of other party members,” Barzani said.[14] Barzani’s criticism may be hypocritical, given his party’s collaboration with the Turkish state, but he has a point.

Kurdish groups seeking to support the revolt to topple the Assad regime, such as the Freedom Party, Salahudeen Ayubi Kurdish Brigade, Akrad Front and the Komala Brigade have also been repressed by the PYD.

Hardship and opportunity

The onslaught by ISIS on the city of Kobanê has highlighted the importance of correct revolutionary strategy for Kurdish liberation. With the various sections of Syrian society oppressed by the regime having thus far failed to unite effectively, this weakness has meant that the main enemies of the revolution, Assad and ISIS, have had the opportunity to either hold their ground or expand. The assault on Kobanê is both the outcome of the revolution’s weaknesses and an opportunity for a new course.

This September a series of brigades of the YPG and FSA announced the formation of the Burkan Al-Firat coalition to resist ISIS’ assault on Kobanê.[15] Fighting alongside the YPG are fighters from the Kurdish Al-Akrad Front, Islamic Front and other FSA-related groups. Also joining this coalition en masse are members of the local Arab Sherbian tribe.[16][17]

The more this example is followed across Syria, the better. For the Kurdish forces – specifically the PYD – this means renouncing any collaboration with the regime and a commitment to its overthrow. From the point of view of Arab revolutionary forces this means winning the support of the Kurdish masses by working to end to the ethnic and religious discrimination seen under the Ba‘ath regime and supporting a program of full national and democratic rights, including the right of succession. The unity of Syria should only be maintained through consent and not coercion.

To be able to mobilize as much of the population as possible in a revolutionary struggle, the masses must truly see they are fighting for something worth dying for. Wealth redistribution, women’s rights and full rights for national minorities are all important components. With the Kurdish minority alone making up around 10-20 percent[18][19] of the Syrian population, harnessing this power is crucial to the success of the revolution.

[1] http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

[2] http://syrianrefugees.eu/

[3] https://revolution101.wordpress.com/2012/08/20/sectarianism-sidelined-in-syria/

[4] Iran’s Secret Army, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZI_88ChjQtU

[5] http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/17/pkk-s-rise-in-iraqikurdistan.html

[6] http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=2593&z=en&cure=245

[7] Rojava: A Newborn Country, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwdHqGVCKiU

[8] http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/7/syriakurd530.htm

[9] http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/06/syrias-kurds-oppose-the-regime-y.html#

[10] Under Kurdish Rule in Syria, Human Rights Watch report, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WD-PtKopZok

[11] Vice News, Rojava: Syria’s Unknown War, http://youtu.be/p2zxlFQxkQ4?t=15m49s

[12] http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21628887-syrias-kurds-are-enjoying-more-autonomy-striking-out-their-own

[13] http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?cid=1009&z=en

[14] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pyd-has-authority-only-on-regions-given-by-the-al-assad-regime-iraqi-kurdish-leader-barzani-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=57956&NewsCatID=352

[15] YPG FSA Agreement: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qePezhg0DFg

[16] Ronahi TV English, YPG FSA Agree on Joint operations: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1kta7yAPMI

[17] Kurdish Militias’ Last Stand Against ISIS, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_uOKOU7j9f0

[18] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/syrian-kurd-leader-revolution-wont-succeed-without-minorities/251660/?single_page=true

[19] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html