Abstract: The principle of charity is a presumption often applied whereby preconceptions about an argument, a topic, or a belief are set aside in the attempt to gain an accordant understanding prior to the evaluation of an idea or argument. Divergent cognate versions of the principle are described and illustrative examples are provided in accordance with various purposes used in the evaluation of arguments or ideas. In practice, the principle of charity is an indeterminate and inexact guide for translation and interpretation.

“The Principle of Charity: If a participant's argument is reformulated by an opponent, it should be carefully expressed in its strongest possible version that is consistent with what is believed to be the original intention of the arguer. If there is any question about that intention or about any implicit part of the argument, the arguer should be given the benefit of any doubt in the reformulation and/or, when possible, given the opportunity to amend it.”



T. Edward Damer, Attacking Faulty Reasoning: A Practical Guide to Fallacy-Free Arguments 6th ed. (2005 Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 7.

Notes

“When I began reading ‘The 9 Words Parents Should Never Say to Their Kid’ … I was skeptical that essayist Patrick Coleman's point of view would line up with my own, and I wasn't disappointed.” [John Rosemond, “It's OK to Tell Your Kinds the Truth,” Index-Journal 100 no. 6 (March 24, 2018), 7A.]

“According to the gentles, children behave badly only because their adult caregivers have failed to ‘connect’ with them in some essential way (e.g., they have failed to treat said children as equals). It is essential to maintain the charade that children are divine beings sent from heaven to grace us with their immaculate presence.” [“It's OK”]

The Principle of Charity Bibliography

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