Building a healthy democracy in EOS: Why democratic voting isn’t enough to protect us from the corrosive effects of centralization.

by Ryan Bethem

While we believe in the checks and balances offered through the medium of democratic elections, we also see the vulnerability of concentrated wealth in the EOS ecosystem. EOS voting power is based on an individual’s stake, which results in larger stakeholders having louder voices. We understand the sentiment that heavily invested individuals have more to lose and therefore deserve to have voting power. While we want to honor more voting power for those with more at risk, we also have serious doubts about leaving it to voters to provide the primary checks and balances which protect EOS from centralization.

Recently, we’ve seen BP’s like EOSstore make a critical mistake and then receive millions more votes as opposed to being voted out (we are not intending focus on EOSstore. We’re drawing attention to what’s revealed in this example. We understand mistakes will be made and BP’s should have the opportunity to correct those mistakes). We do not think this is reflective of a healthy democracy. If a democracy has an informed voter base with the right checks and balances, we would expect critical mistakes that are detrimental to the majority interest to be reflected in receiving less votes. After all, you’d expect a healthy democratic system to represent as many interests as possible. The example above highlights how special interests can assert power on the EOS blockchain.

Additionally, we see issues with the potential for large stakeholders or exchanges to own one or more BP’s, allowing them to produce more rewards and use those votes for themselves. We believe it would only be a matter of time before these stakeholders would gain an advantage that wouldn’t allow any competition. It’s also possible that BP’s that heavily invest in Dapps would be motivated to show favoritism towards their Dapp instead of the the broader EOS commnity.

We believe in giving a voice to the majority 24/7. Therefore, we propose additional built in checks and balances to protect EOS from big money interests and monopolizing the top BP spots. We propose the community considering the following:

1) Requiring more rigorous criteria to register as a BP.

2) At least 33% of the top 21 BPs must meet the “criteria” for an independent BP at all times.

3) Going back to the 121 model would also allow for more backups to run viable operations, resulting in more BP diversity.

Developing metrics to determine what qualifies as an independent BP would be necessary. We are developing reliable metrics to determine what it means to be independent and will share our proposal in the near future. Until then we will lead by example.

We envision an EOS ecosystem in which the tension between BP’s which are independent and BP’s whom are privately funded/incentivized, creates an optimal balance of perspectives and incentives that will ultimately lead to healthy debate and a robust blockchain. We hope that the community will join us in debating and endorsing these ideas in order to find an optimal balance of power. Together, we can build a robust democracy that secures life, liberty and property.

EOS Blocksmith

We are fully independent and 100% self-funded. Internally Incentivized to Advocate the Interests of the Majority