Starting with Chrome 13, we'll have HTTPS pins for most Google properties. This means that certificate chains for, say, https://www.google.com , must include a whitelisted public key. It's a fatal error otherwise. Credit goes to my colleague, Chris Evans, for much of this.

The whitelisted public keys for Google currently include Verisign, Google Internet Authority, Equifax and GeoTrust. Thus Chrome will not accept certificates for Google properties from other CAs. As ever, you can look at the source if you wish (search that file for "Verisign"). DigiCert also issues some of our certificates, but we aren't yet enforcing pinning for those domains.

This works with HSTS preloading of Google properties to ensure that, when a user types gmail.com into the address bar, they only get the real Gmail, no matter how hostile the network.

What about MITM proxies, Fiddler etc?

There are a number of cases where HTTPS connections are intercepted by using local, ephemeral certificates. These certificates are signed by a root certificate that has to be manually installed on the client. Corporate MITM proxies may do this, several anti-virus/parental control products do this and debugging tools like Fiddler can also do this. Since we cannot break in these situations, user installed root CAs are given the authority to override pins. We don't believe that there will be any incompatibility issues.

Why public key hashes, not certificate hashes?

In general, hashing certificates is the obvious solution, but the wrong one. The problem is that CA certificates are often reissued: there are multiple certificates with the same public key, subject name etc but different extensions or expiry dates. Browsers build certificates chains from a pool of certificates, bottom up, and an alternative version of a certificate might be substituted for the one that you expect.

For example, StartSSL has two root certificates: one signed with SHA1 and the other with SHA256. If you wished to pin to StartSSL as your CA, which certificate hash would you use? You would have to use both, but how would you know about the other root if I hadn't just told you?

Conversely, public key hashes must be correct:

Browsers assume that the leaf certificate is fixed: it's always the starting point of the chain. The leaf certificate contains a signature which must be a valid signature, from its parent, for that certificate. That implies that the public key of the parent is fixed by the leaf certificate. So, inductively, the chain of public keys is fixed, modulo truncation.

The only sharp edge is that you mustn't pin to a cross-certifying root. For example, GoDaddy's root is signed by Valicert so that older clients, which don't recognise GoDaddy as a root, still trust those certificates. However, you wouldn't want to pin to Valicert because newer clients will stop their chain at GoDaddy.

Also, we're hashing the SubjectPublicKeyInfo not the public key bit string. The SPKI includes the type of the public key and some parameters along with the public key itself. This is important because just hashing the public key leaves one open to misinterpretation attacks. Consider a Diffie-Hellman public key: if one only hashes the public key, not the full SPKI, then an attacker can use the same public key but make the client interpret it in a different group. Likewise one could force an RSA key to be interpreted as a DSA key etc.

(It's possible that a certificate could be reissued with a different SPKI for the same public key. That would be a second sharp edge but, to my knowledge, that has never happened. SPKIs for any public key type should have a distinguished encoding.)

Can I get this for my site?