Does losing a referendum mean losing one’s grip on power? David Cameron insists that he will stay on as prime minister even if he loses the June 23 vote on continued British membership of the European Union, but others think a "No" result will spell the end of his premiership.

Here is a precedent from history, drawn from a different political tradition, but still relevant. In France 47 years ago today, on April 28, 1969, Charles de Gaulle stepped down as the president of the Fifth Republic, whose constitutional arrangements he had put in place a decade earlier. He resigned because of a "No" vote in a referendum on constitutional changes. The proposed changes — reform of the Senate and decentralization of power to regional governments — were rejected by 52.4 percent to 47.6 percent.

In a televised speech two days before the balloting, de Gaulle had made the vote effectively a referendum on his presidency — vowing to resign if he did not win. The divided country, wearied by the upheaval of 1968 — a year of revolution and protest — called time on the 78-year-old, who retreated to Colombey-les-Deux-Églises to write his memoirs.

De Gaulle’s resignation – and the referendum that triggered it – had a profound effect on the future of what is now the European Union. The French president had been the immovable object lying in the path of Britain’s attempts to join the founding six nations. He had effectively vetoed British membership in January 1963 and again in 1967 and thereby any possibility of the likes of Ireland, Denmark and Norway joining. Suddenly, to the surprise of the British foreign ministry, the immovable object removed himself, albeit with some assistance from the French electorate.

Even if the British do vote to remain the EU, there are many in France and in Brussels who think that after June 23 the eurozone countries should press on with greater integration.

The deadlock over enlarging the European Economic Community had been only one of various ways in which de Gaulle was putting the brakes on its development. Piers Ludlow’s excellent book “The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist challenge” (2006) explains how de Gaulle was at odds with his counterparts not just over which countries should participate but what the Community should do and how it should operate. Although Georges Pompidou, his successor as president, had been the general’s prime minister and acolyte, he nevertheless permitted a more cooperative and constructive spirit in inter-governmental negotiations after de Gaulle’s departure.

Eventually, that was to lead to the admission of Britain, Denmark and Ireland in January 1973 and so — by a long and tortuous route — to the referendum that faces the British electorate on 23 June.

The anniversary of de Gaulle’s departure seems an appropriate moment, therefore, to ask what might be at stake for the French in the Brexit referendum. Although they won’t get a vote, like the British back in 1969 they will live with the consequences.

Turn back the clock

The first thing to point out is that French history never tires of coming round again. Just as the French Revolution is never put to rest but continues to work on France (and indeed the rest of the world), so too the spectre of de Gaulle still stalks the Hexagon. There are those who aspire to his mantle, and those who use Gaullism as a dirty word, and all sides find themselves engaging with de Gaulle’s arguments.

If Britain does vote to leave the EU, there will be some in France who will take that as a cue to turn the clock back, if not quite to 1972, at least to before 2004, and perhaps to before 1995, when the admission of Austria, Sweden and Finland (but not Norway) raised the number of member countries from 12 to 15.

What seems attractive in these turbulent times is the notion that a smaller EU, stripped of troublemakers such as the U.K., Greece and Hungary, would work better and be more cohesive. Agreement round the Council table ought to be easier, say those who hark back to some golden age (though presumably not the Empty Chair Crisis that de Gaulle engineered in 1965). De Gaulle, it should be remembered, would take an even harder line than simply restricting the EU’s membership. Such was his opposition to supranationalism that he did not want to give power to what is today the European Commission. For him, shrinking the club would not be enough.

Even if the British do vote to remain in the EU, there are many in France and in Brussels who think that after June 23 the eurozone countries should press on with greater integration. The seductive idea here is that a purer core, committed to greater integration and with France playing a leading role, can pioneer a degree of political integration that is currently anathema to the likes of Britain and Poland. Jean-Claude Piris, long-time head of the legal service in the Council, wrote an eloquent manifesto for such an avant-garde back in 2012: "The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU?"

That Piris, a Frenchman, wrote his book in English is an acknowledgement of something that is not in doubt in the June 23 vote, but would have distressed de Gaulle and all succeeding French presidents: The chief language of the EU is now, de facto, English. Even if the British vote to pull out of the EU, the main working language of the EU will remain English. It is the second language of most of the officials and diplomats from central and eastern European countries, many of whom do not have adequate acquaintance with French to follow a discussion in the Council working groups in that language. So, whether by force majeure or faute de mieux, most of the business of the working groups is conducted in English. A requirement, introduced in 2004, that Commission officials would need to prove ability in three languages in order to attain promotion has not had the intended effect of shoring up the use of French.

Linguistic crimes

However, at the risk of distressing the ghost of de Gaulle, I would argue that a British exit from the EU would be calamitous for the future of the French language in the EU institutions. At present, the English language can be demonized as belonging to the overweening member state that is perfidious Albion. The French government can therefore argue that English must be counter-balanced by support for its main rival as a second language: French – one of the EU’s four founding languages, an official language of three member states and a close relation of other Romance languages such as Italian, Spanish and Portuguese (never forgetting that Romania is a member of the International Organization of La Francophonie).

A vote in favor of Brexit would not, however, be an unalloyed triumph for the English language.

But remove the U.K. from the EU scene and the English language will be seen and accepted for what it is — not so much an expression of British imperialism as the dominant lingua franca, knowledge of which is now a sine qua non for most aspiring bureaucrats and diplomats. For the moment, the EU’s language policy ensures that French is afforded special status, but the ground is shifting and pressure for change will increase should Britain leave the EU.

A vote in favor of Brexit would not, however, be an unalloyed triumph for the English language. What would win out would not be the language of Shakespeare that many cultural institutions in Britain were celebrating last weekend on the 400th anniversary of the playwright’s death. Instead, what would take root would be a cheapened, debased form of English as spoken and written by non-native speakers. Once the British were removed from the administration of the EU institutions, it would be left to Ireland to provide the EU’s native English-speakers. Ireland is, famously, a nation of poets, but it is a small country and probably not equal to the task of protecting the English language against the linguistic crimes committed by the Dutch, the Scandinavians and others who think they know better.

Such cultural niceties will not, however, swing the vote on June 23. The injury that would be done to both French and English as they are used in the EU’s institutions may be considered possible consequences, but they will not figure as plausible motives for a Brexit vote. Much more likely to motivate voters will be the temptation to deliver a verdict on Cameron’s government: Some voters wanting to see an end to his premiership would — for that reason alone — opt for Brexit.

That is precisely why the prime minister will not declare his political future dependent on the outcome of the referendum. Although it is hard to see how Cameron could stay in 10 Downing Street if he lost the Brexit referendum, for him to admit as much would be to repeat de Gaulle’s error.