Opinion

Gerrymandering, not voters, decide who goes to Congress Maps, not voters, determine who controls House

The U.S. Capitol, with the Senate at right and the House of Representatives at far left, is seen in Washington. Gridlock here, particularly in the House, is a direct result of redistricting that allows elected officials to choose their voters rather than voters choose their represenatives. less The U.S. Capitol, with the Senate at right and the House of Representatives at far left, is seen in Washington. Gridlock here, particularly in the House, is a direct result of redistricting that allows elected ... more Photo: J. Scott Applewhite /Associated Press Photo: J. Scott Applewhite /Associated Press Image 1 of / 1 Caption Close Gerrymandering, not voters, decide who goes to Congress 1 / 1 Back to Gallery

Democracy is not served when the popular will is not reflected in the outcome of elections.

This has happened in the past two U.S. House elections. In 2012, 1.4 million more Americans voted for Democrats, but Republicans came away with a 33-seat advantage.

In the 2014 elections, Democrats received 1.3 million more votes than Republicans. Yet Republicans increased their majority with 59 more seats than Democrats.

How did it happen in a legislative body that one of its designers, John Adams, hoped would become “a portrait of the people in miniature”?

Such a large distortion of the will of the people can only occur because of gerrymandering.

Racial gerrymandering — deciding the boundaries of electoral districts in a manner that unfairly limits the chances of racial and ethnic minorities to elect their preferred candidates — is unconstitutional and a violation of federal law. But the courts have tolerated partisan or political gerrymandering, which is defined as creating districts to benefit one political party over another.

As late as 1991, Democrats were still in control of redistricting in the South, much to the disadvantage of African-Americans and Republicans. Six of the 11 states of the Old Confederacy had no African-Americans serving in Congress. The other five states had only one black member each.

Lee Atwater, chairman of the Republican National Committee, and RNC counsel Ben Ginsberg devised a plan to help blacks get elected to Congress but at the same time deliver the South to Republicans. Atwater died in 1991 of a brain tumor at the age of 40. Ginsberg was left to implement the plan, which he referred to as “Project Rat(expletive).”

Political operatives first used the colorful phrase during the Watergate scandals to describe “dirty deeds done cheaply.”

The plan would use the Voting Rights Act to forge an “unholy alliance” with minority Democrats and pack African-American and Latino voters into districts they could not lose. This would bleach the surrounding districts, replacing minority voters with more conservative non-Hispanic whites likely to vote for Republican candidates.

The ‘unholy alliance’

Ginsberg knew that forming relationships and building trust was a necessary first step in working with minorities in redistricting. He brought a team of attorneys to San Antonio at the beginning of the 1990 redistricting cycle to learn how one of the Latino voting rights groups — the Southwest Voter Research Institute — was helping draw districts.

The RNC team’s visit to the institute — as well as other minority voting rights groups involved in redistricting — was preceded by a desktop computer loaded with map-making software, a gift from another nonprofit set up by Republicans.

This was the first redistricting cycle in which personal computers could be loaded with census and voter data to draft district maps.

Whether the RNC team had a significant influence on the process during the 1990 round of redistricting is unclear. Republicans had control of redistricting in only five states, so they were not in a position to lead gerrymandering efforts.

What is clear is that enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 spurred minority voter participation and representation in the South.

From 1982 to 1992, the number of black Democrats in Congress increased from two to 17. The number of non-Hispanic white Democrats shrank from 76 to 54, while the number of non-Hispanic white Republicans increased to 49 from 34.

The unintended consequence was party realignment in the South, culminating in a GOP majority in the House in 1994.

Two decades later, Republicans took political gerrymandering to a whole new level. The legal heist is described in great detail, state by state, in David Daley’s new book, “Ratf**ked: The True Story Behind the Secret Plan to Steal America’s Democracy.”

The project was redesigned in 2010 and named the Redistricting Majority Project, or REDMAP, by Republican strategist Chris Jankowski. The goal was to place state legislatures in charge of redistricting in Republican hands.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision in January 2010 helped the cause by allowing corporations to spend unlimited amounts of money on elections.

Jankowski was able to raise $30 million to bankroll key state legislative races and reverse control of redistricting from Democrats to Republicans in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, North Carolina, Alabama and Wisconsin.

The scheme worked. The 2010 election yielded 680 new state legislative seats for Republicans nationwide.

Now in control of redistricting in those states, Republicans could use the improved mapping programs and almost unlimited data available on voter behavior to gerrymander districts, block by block, with great precision and efficiency.

An analysis by Stephen Wolf of the online forum Daily Kos estimates that Republicans drew the lines for 55 percent of the districts in 2010, while Democrats drew only 10 percent. The remaining districts were drawn by commissions or in states with just one representative.

Collateral damage

The collateral damage to democracy caused by partisan gerrymandering has been enormous.

Voters no longer choose members of the House. Instead, House members effectively choose their voters by drawing their own district lines. Of the 435 House districts, 400 have been manipulated to practically guarantee re-election. That’s why, despite polls showing 84 percent of voters view incumbent Congress members negatively, those incumbents are re-elected at a rate of 90 percent.

General elections are no longer competitive.

Prior to the 2014 election, the Center for Responsive Politics projected the winners in 368 U.S. House races with 99.7 percent accuracy without having to consult the polling data.

Because the only real contests occur in party primaries, House members answer only to primary voters. These voters tend to be disproportionately from the ideological fringes of their parties. This explains the rise of the tea party in 2010, the loss of control within the party by Republican leaders, and Donald Trump’s emergence as their nominee this year.

Collaboration between the parties — the historical measure of effective government in action — no longer exists.

Largely because of partisan gerrymandering, Republicans have the biggest House majority since World War II, so they don’t have to compromise on legislation.

President Barack Obama has been frustrated in his attempts to get any legislation passed by in gridlocked legislative bodies.

While legal challenges to extreme partisan gerrymandering in several states are winding their way trough appellate courts, some experts say there is little hope of undoing the 5-to-1 Republican advantage in drawing congressional districts for at least a generation.

In the meantime, the two major political parties are caught up in what author Daley describes as a decennial arms race that escalates with each redistricting cycle.

Democrats launched Advantage 2020 and will spend nearly $70 million to chip away at the Republican majorities.

Republicans announced plans to raise $125 million for REDMAP 2020 to increase and consolidate their gains.

Regardless of which side wins, democracy loses.

Robert Brischetto of Lakehills is a sociologist and former executive director of the San Antonio-based Southwest Voter Research Institute, now called the William C. Velásquez Institute.