2014 has seen, ironically, not just the centenary of the start of the First World War, but also troubling parallels to the Balkans in the Western post-Soviet region which – as has become particularly apparent due to the recent crisis in Ukraine – is characterized by unrecognized borders, weak sovereignties, great-power rivalries. Meanwhile, on the eastern flank of Eurasia, the current developments may be less dramatic but potentially even more perilous.

More than a few scholars have found similarities between Europe in the period preceding World War I and what we are now witnessing in Asia. Even contemporary politicians cannot resist the temptation of drawing historical parallels, with Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declaring early this year that the increasing tensions between China and Japan were similar to the competition between Germany and Britain before World War I.

There is indeed an array of parallels between the pre-World War I Europe and contemporary Asia, including a lack of mutual trust, Mutual animosities and hatreds rooted in not-so-distant, alliance entrapment, the rising tide of nationalism, the dominance of the Westphalian nation-state, the concentration of great powers, power shifts and dissatisfaction with status quo, conflict triggers and a race for space. Then as now, economic interdependence is not nearly enough to secure peace.

Will Russia become China's Austria-Hungary? China's own power base, even when developed to its full capacity, will be insufficient to compete for geopolitical primacy with the combined might of the U.S. and its allies. The only realistic option for Beijing to substantially augment its power is through external balancing, that is by allying with another major player. The only great power potentially available for such an alliance is Russia.

If Sino-American rivalry goes from its currently more or less subdued mode to an open clash, Russia would find itself in a pivotal position. Thus, even short of an alliance, good relations with Russia give China huge strategic benefits. With Moscow as a close friend, China can be confident about the security of its northern borders and can count on unimpeded access to Russia's natural resources.

Should they form an entente, Moscow and Beijing could have Central Asia, as well as Mongolia, to themselves, effectively shutting out all external powers from the heart of Eurasia. An alliance with Moscow would also put Russia's military-industrial complex and vast military infrastructure in Eurasia to Beijing's service.

There is a greater possibility and potential in a Sino-Russia rapprochement than is commonly accepted in the West. Any Sino-Russian strategic partnership is often portrayed as an "axis of convenience" founded on a shaky basis. Moscow, the argument goes, will be wary of an alliance with Beijing because it distrusts and fears a rising China. The main problem with such thinking is that the U.S.-led West is seen by Moscow as a much bigger threat than China. The consensus in the Kremlin is that, for at least the next 20 years China will not pose a threat to Russia, Beijing's and Moscow's common main adversary being the U.S.

It is a cruel irony that the Ukraine crisis should have broken out at the year of the 100th anniversary of the Great War. Russia's current stance toward Ukraine is reminiscent of how, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Austria-Hungary felt about the Balkans, which it deemed its vital sphere of influence. The fear of losing control over the Balkans drove Austria-Hungary into the embrace of Imperial Germany, even though Vienna and Berlin had traditionally vied for control of Central Europe and fought a war in 1866. The alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary contributed to Europe's splitting into two camps and eventually general war.

Could this be the model for the Sino-Russian dyad? Just like Vienna and Berlin, Moscow and Beijing have had a historically complicated relationship, but this may not preclude them forming an entente. Challenging Russia in its "Balkans" – Ukraine and the post-Soviet space generally, which the Russians characteristically call "near abroad" – the West raises the likelihood of turning Russia into a modern-day Austria-Hungary, a besieged great power seeking support from an aspiring super power and thus becoming its junior ally.

The contemporary strategic picture in Asia has a number of striking, and alarming, similarities with the pre-World War I Europe. This does not mean that war is imminent but while we have not yet passed the point of no return beyond which strategic partnerships gel into political-military alliances, we may be fast approaching this point.

It is important to see Eurasia as a single geopolitical space, where Europe, the Middle East, Central, South and East Asia are increasingly linked together. Zbigniew Brzezinski's metaphor of Eurasia as a grand chess board is now more relevant than ever. What happens in Europe inevitably affects Asia, and vice versa. Instead of Europe and Asia as separate units, perhaps it makes more sense geopolitically to refer to the western and eastern wings of the single Eurasia.

Russia, China and the U.S. are the three most powerful strategic actors in Eurasia, and on the world stage, and are likely to remain so for at least the next 20 years. The accommodation among the U.S., China and Russia must form the initial basis for a multipolar and multilateral international architecture, in which other Eurasian players should also be invested and engaged. To be sure, this will be an immensely difficult task, but in trying to accomplish it we will at least have the benefit of historical lessons.

Artyom Lukin is associate professor and deputy director for research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia).

A longer version of this essay was published in the Asian Review of Books.