IN THE sea of protesters on the streets of Hong Kong in the past three months, one can sometimes spot shirts plastered with the Oxford English Dictionary’s entry for Hongkonger: “a native or inhabitant of Hong Kong”. It is a telling slogan. What began in June as opposition to an unpopular extradition bill has grown into a broader movement against the Chinese government’s influence. At its core is a defence of Hong Kong’s distinct identity, with its comparative liberties, which many believe are under threat.

This identity has shifted considerably in recent years. In 1997, when Hong Kong was returned to China after 150 years of British colonial rule, the University of Hong Kong surveyed local residents about how they defined themselves. That year the share of respondents identifying as “Chinese”—as opposed to “Hongkonger” or “Mixed identity”—was about one in five; over the next decade this figure rose to more than one in three. Since 2006, however, it has fallen steadily. In June, fewer than one in ten said they were exclusively Chinese, a historic low. A plurality now call themselves Hongkongers (see chart).

This transformation has been most evident among young people. Fully three-quarters of 18- to 29-year-old residents of the territory identify as Hongkongers, twice the share that did so in 2006. The data show that the younger the respondents, the more negative their sentiments towards mainland China. Efforts to strengthen Chinese identity of the young in Hong Kong, such as an attempt in 2012 to introduce “national education” curriculum in primary schools, have been met with opposition. By seeking to tighten its grip on Hong Kong, and limit the freedoms enshrined in the promise of “One Country, Two Systems”, China is fast creating one country with two identities.