Minxin Pei fears that the Communist Party of China (CPC) – founded in 1921 – may not be in the mood to celebrate its centennial in 2021, and that “the one-party regime may not even survive until 2049,” when the People’s Republic of China will mark the centennial of its founding. It remains to be seen what message President Xi Jinping will be delivering on October 1 – the 70th anniversary of modern China under Communist rule.

The author says in 2012 Xi promised that the CPC “would deliver great successes in advance of the two upcoming centennials.” Back then Xi was teem with confidence and optimism, given six decades of Communist rule and three decades of unprecedented growth. Nevertheless, “the CPC’s rank and file are increasingly concerned about the regime’s future prospects – with good reason.”

In fact the “persistent” economic downturn and escalating tensions with the US are posing an enormous challenge to the leadership. Xi knows that “no amount of nationalist posturing can change the fact that the fall of the CPC appears closer than at any time since the end of the Mao era.” With a stalling economy, public discontent grows. Party leaders fear that ordinary citizens will no longer tolerate their iron grip on power.

Double-digit growth had lifted hundreds of millions Chinese out of extreme poverty. But the “Chinese miracle” was mainly “fueled by a large and youthful labor force, rapid urbanization, large-scale infrastructure investment, market liberalization, and globalization – all factors that have either diminished or disappeared.”

Xi hopes to implement his “Made in China 2025” plans and policies that aim to generate “innovation-driven development” to boost sustainable growth. If the Party “fails to deliver continued improvement in living standards,” people will question the legitimacy of its totalitarian rule. “And a regime that is dependent on coercion and violence will pay dearly in the form of depressed economic activity, rising popular resistance, escalating security costs, and international isolation.”

The author highlights the longevity of some one-party regimes: “Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party retained power for 71 years (1929-2000); the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ruled for 74 years (1917-1991); and Taiwan’s Kuomintang held on for 73 years (from 1927 to 1949 on the mainland and from 1949 to 2000 in Taiwan). The North Korean regime, a Stalinist family dynasty that has ruled for 71 years, is China’s only contemporary competition.”

Despite enjoying long, unbroken rule by any political party, the “greatest threat to the Party’s long-term survival lies in the unfolding cold war with the US.” Xi’s ambition to break the post-Mao tradition of keeping “a low profile on the international stage, painstakingly avoiding conflict while building strength at home,” may prove China’s undoing.

Since becoming the world’s second largest economy in August 2010, China has been “pursuing an increasingly muscular foreign policy. This drew the ire of the US, which began gradually to shift from a policy of engagement (the US helped China join the WTO in 2001, from which Beijing benefits) toward the confrontational approach evident today.”

The US still excels in “military capabilities, technology, economic efficiency, and alliance networks (which remain robust, despite President Donald Trump’s destructive leadership).”The author believes “the US is far more likely to prevail in the Sino-American cold war than China. Though an American victory could be Pyrrhic, it would more than likely seal the CPC’s fate.”

The Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Beijing, the elite training academy for the country’s autocratic leaders, has been able to debate the possible demise of the ruling CPC openly without fear of reprisal. Often, influential party members gather and discuss how long the party will be in charge and what they have planned for when it collapses.

China’s Communist rule has been a perennial issue since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and the fall of the Soviet Union. Deep reforms rather than stimuli are necessary to modernise its economy and political system. But Xi is reluctant to embrace fundamental changes, because he fears meeting the same fate as the last Soviet Union leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.