Notes on Theological Implications of the Simulation Argument by Eric Steinhart

The Simulation Argument by Nick Bostrom posits that we are “almost certainly living in a computer simulation”. The above paper by Eric Steinhart examines the theological implications of this argument. It’s an interesting attempt to use the Simulation Argument to introduce positive evidence for existence of God, rather than requiring a negative proof. Eric Steinhart’s paper introduces interesting ties to Platonic religious philosophy (neoplatonism). Steinhart also introduces an approach for reasoning about why we would be simulated. He incorrectly draws out Bostrom’s argument to an infinite number of simulation layers to allow comparing the Simulation Argument with society’s preconceived notions of God. This convergence to infinity is used to develop new Cosmological (every event has a cause, first causer is God) and Intelligent Design arguments for the existence of God.

Neoplatonism, as described by Steinhart, describes reality as split into different levels of perfection, with a topmost perfect layer, the One. This parallels nicely with our universe being a simulation in a simulation in a simulation… and so on. Each higher level simulation will be a slightly more perfect level of reality, since any simulation can only be an imperfect model of the reality it is based in. Christian theism, in contrast, does not at all align with the Simulation Argument.

God is introduced in the Simulation Argument by applying the “Successor Rule”: for every universe, there is more likely than not a deeper universe, using the same arguments applied in the base universe. This is used to justify an infinite number of simulation universes. The wrong assumption is that even with a high probability of each universe being simulated, the total number of universes will still converge at a finite number. This seems more likely under Occam’s razor. Steinhart, in his conclusion, also expresses some skepticism about this convergence to infinity.

With this justification for God, Steinhart proposes that the God introduced under the Simulation Argument is “a pure mind, a pure unity.” This is justified by:

The physicality of every universe (and every computer in it) is derived from the fact that it is being simulated (that it is being produced by an algorithm), it seems reasonable to associate physicality with software. As a software process, every deeper universe (and every computer in it) is more richly physical.

In other words, since our universe is physical, we should assume that at higher levels universes will be less physical, and the final universe will be “pure mind.” This assumption is not evident. Upper level universes may have higher or lower levels of “physicality”, our universe gives no hints for either direction. The direction here is chosen to match society’s pre-drawn conclusions on the nature of God.

Steinhart also uses the Simulation Argument to propose this motivation for an afterlife: Designers in the n + 1 simulation will want to preserve records of those they deem interesting in their simulations. Any agent that moves up more than one layer moves closer to God.

Another interesting idea is that since each higher level moves more past the comprehension possible for agents in some lower level layer, there is justification for mysticism around the highest layer.

The paper ends with the question, “if we are being simulated, then why are we being simulated?” This may seem trivially answerable by saying no reason is needed, but Steinhart finds interesting approaches to it:

Is there any purpose for which our universe appears to have been designed? Say a universe U is finely tuned for F iff the basic features of U mean that F is common in U, while any slight variation of the basic features of U would mean that F is rare in U.

Steinhart first dismisses the idea that our universe is finely tuned for life, as there’s little evidence that life is common across the universe. He proposes instead that it is tuned for complexity. This leads to the interesting idea that the universe is only a pseudorandom number generator for the universe above ours. The idea works well; random-ness is both important for many areas in computer science and difficult to produce artificially.

Steinhart also looks at the reasons behind the simulations we have now: science and entertainment. These justifications can also be phrased as for knowledge or for dramatic beauty. The three justifications taken together: to create complexity, knowledge, and dramatic beauty overlap in the concept of interestingness.

Every creative agent at every level is interested in interestingness. And so our first commandment in this universe must be: “Lead an interesting life!”