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Other High-Quality Factsheets

Fact Sheet List by SoopaKhell: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OiSFG4P3QUBfPjXH6Tl-RC_Y-Lwnrrh3Qiea3yA4_ZU/edit

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Ultimate Research Document by Vaush: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ido70LgXsEhxcnyXE7RVS0wYJZc6aeVTpujCUPQgTrE/edit

Systemic Racism Factsheet by Rose Wrist and Left Ty: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OIVHtml45EcMSi3suI5Zn1ymef5Y-8hnHbeY6kxp-ec/edit

#1 Economic Fact Sheet by sock dem: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1stqf0RzJgB0X0boOWg8PoXAvm2edATdsJhttQ6AxIyM/edit

Research Document To End All Research Documents by Liberal Sanity Project: https://docs.google.com/document/d/13gzCsOG3Fr-HGkSlB1wreI1qdn3ccnrddyxmRKnm9eg/edit

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Collapsible Sections

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Economics

The Entrepreneurial State, Mazzacuto, 2013

The Entrepreneurial State, Mazzacuto, 2013: https://b-ok.cc/book/5218819/c937e7 Reviews the role of the state in spurring and spreading innovation from a non-socialist left perspective.

Capital in the 21st Century, Piketty, 2014

Capital in the 21st Century, Piketty, 2014: https://b-ok.cc/book/2329124/3da90d Reviews wealth accumulation, inequality, and growth (mostly) from 1800's to 2000's from a non-Marxist socialist perspective.

Farm to Factory, Allen, 2009

Farm to Factory, Allen, 2009: https://b-ok.cc/book/2606184/eda7a0 Reviews USSR economic growth and suggests it was a qualified success, particularly in 1920's-60's, beset by political failure.

Socialist Planning 3rd Edition, Ellman, 2014

Socialist Planning 3rd Edition, Ellman, 2014: https://b-ok.cc/book/2481030/a891e5 Reviews the commonalities and differences of socialist planning schemes from a Keynesian perspective.

The People's Republic of Walmart, Phillips and Rozworski, 2019

The People's Republic of Walmart, Phillips and Rozworski, 2019: https://b-ok.org/book/3705952/801cf6 Light reading about the fact that most companies are (internally) centrally planned economies.

History

The History of American Law, Friedman, 2005: Reviews the origins and development of laws in the postcolonial and industrializing USA. Understand why institutions developed as they did!

The History of American Law, Friedman, 2005: Reviews the origins and development of laws in the postcolonial and industrializing USA. Understand why institutions developed as they did!

Red Plenty, Spufford, 2012

Red Plenty, Spufford, 2012: https://b-ok.cc/book/993327/6085e0 Semi-fictionally reviews the the failure of the USSR to adopt computerized planning.

How Not to Network a Nation, Peters, 2016

How Not to Network a Nation, Peters, 2016: https://b-ok.cc/book/2729819/021dc8 Reviews the failure of the USSR to adopt internetted communication and production.

The Politics of Rage, Carter, 2000: Reviews the rise of populist conservatism via the career of arch-segregationist George Wallace.

The Politics of Rage, Carter, 2000: Reviews the rise of populist conservatism via the career of arch-segregationist George Wallace.

Institutions

Why Countries Fail, Acemoglu, 2012

Why Countries Fail, Acemoglu, 2012: https://b-ok.cc/book/1835660/482a34 Reviews the institutional causes of corruption and economic stagnation from a non-socialist left perspective.

How Democracies Die, Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018

How Democracies Die, Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018: https://b-ok.cc/book/2826730/2c8632 Reviews the institutional causes of democratic breakdown.

Praxis

Why Civil Resistance Works, Chenowith and Stephan, 2011

Why Civil Resistance Works, Chenowith and Stephan, 2011: https://b-ok.cc/book/3656840/d89e0d Reviews the relative success of resistance among violent and nonviolent movements.

Over Time

polity iv: democracy has greatly increased over time

polity iv: democracy has greatly increased over time: https://ourworldindata.org/democracy

Over Space

economist democracy index (flawed metric) by country

economist democracy index (flawed metric) by country: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index

Democracy Reduces Civilian Killings And Democide

strong democracies and strong civil rights result in many, many fewer killings by the government

strong democracies and strong civil rights result in many, many fewer killings by the government: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002795039001001

Democracy Increases Economic Growth

democracy increases economic growth: countries that transition to democracy see substantially higher growth afterward

democracy increases economic growth: countries that transition to democracy see substantially higher growth afterward: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20004.pdf ```Our index of democracy combines information from several datasets, including Freedom House and Polity IV, and only codes a country as democratic when several sources agree. The full construction of our measure is explained in detail in the Appendix, and we just provide an overview here. We code our dichotomous measure of democracy in country c at time t, Dct, as follows. First, we code a country as democratic during a given year if: Freedom House codes it as Free , or Partially Free and it receives a positive Polity IV score.```

Democracy Is Stable

consistent democracies and consistent autocracies are about equally stable; mixed systems are much less stable

consistent democracies and consistent autocracies are about equally stable; mixed systems are much less stable: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/PTfig03.htm

Leftists Support Democracy

leftists are more supportive of democracy than rightists or centrists: NYT

leftists are more supportive of democracy than rightists or centrists: NYT: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/23/opinion/international-world/centrists-democracy.html http://archive.is/UX2L5 Study: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fOGwtRUF-y-98IcDs-3YYrtREl8GbaoH/view

^ possible response

Direct Democracy

29% of Americans think direct democracy is "very good", 38% "somewhat good", 19% "somewhat bad", and 12% "very bad"

29% of Americans think direct democracy is "very good", 38% "somewhat good", 19% "somewhat bad", and 12% "very bad" http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/11/07/europe-north-america-publics-more-supportive-than-experts-of-direct-democracy/

Support For Democracy Over Time

Foa and Mounk 2016 claim that support for democracy has dramatically declined

Foa and Mounk 2016 claim that support for democracy has dramatically declined: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-danger-of-deconsolidation-the-democratic-disconnect/

this only occurs when looking at one response (10 out of 10): in reality, the mean score for "How important is living in a democracy?" is virtually unchanged from 2006 to 2017

this only occurs when looking at one response (10 out of 10): in reality, the mean score for "How important is living in a democracy?" is virtually unchanged from 2006 to 2017: https://jacobinmag.com/2018/02/public-opinion-democracy-authoritarianism-populism-trump

Agenda Setting

true democracy requires that the people be able to "set" the political agenda themselves

true democracy requires that the people be able to "set" the political agenda themselves: http://blog.felixbreuer.net/2011/11/21/mckelvey.html

Electronic Democracy

vTaiwan usefully converts citizen suggestions about a proposed law into "blocs" of agreeing and differing opinion, allowing legislators to better tailor laws

vTaiwan usefully converts citizen suggestions about a proposed law into "blocs" of agreeing and differing opinion, allowing legislators to better tailor laws: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/611816/the-simple-but-ingenious-system-taiwan-uses-to-crowdsource-its-laws/amp/ https://pol.is/3phdex2kjf

Economic Issues

basic math allows for direct votes on expenditure and taxation

basic math allows for direct votes on expenditure and taxation: https://paulcockshott.wordpress.com/2017/02/03/socialism-and-direct-democracy/

Trustworthiness Of Politicians

on average, studies find that US presidents keep about 67% of their promises

on average, studies find that US presidents keep about 67% of their promises: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trust-us-politicians-keep-most-of-their-promises/ [unformatted reread]

One-Party Rule And Regulatory Capture

Japanese one-party rule incorporated the nuclear industry, which resulted in less powerful and less transparent regulation

Japanese one-party rule incorporated the nuclear industry, which resulted in less powerful and less transparent regulation: https://www.cairn.info/revue-annales-historiques-de-l-electricite-2003-1-page-133.htm https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/727595692201214012/AHE_001_0133.pdf ```In Japan, there is considerable stress on voluntary compliance with nuclear regulations, which are less strict in the critical plant operating stage.``````And it is the reasons for this behind the scenes collaboration that must be analyzed here, based upon the gap between theory and practice in the case of Japanese nuclear regulation. First of all, while Japan s Diet [Parliament] was, in theory, based upon an open multi-party parliamentary system, in practice, it acquired a centralized Byzantine-like nature based upon a party-political machine , i.e. the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that was essentially unresponsive to changing or competing interests and changes in the composition of interest groups. The desire of LDP beneficiaries such as the Japanese nuclear-industrial complex were facilitated by governmental organizations with which they were closely linked. What occurred in Japan, therefore, was that the centralized government agencies regulating nuclear power, MITI and NSC (Nuclear Safety Commission), simply collaborated on safety issues to the benefit of the Japanese nuclear-industrial complex. Secondly, in Japan, not only were the parliamentary and regulatory structures centralized, but the nature of the domestic power interests industries and utilities was also monolithic and uncompetitive.```

Populism Reduces Democracy

populist rule correlates with a 15.3% decline in a country's Polity IV democracy score; each year of populist rule correlates with a 30.3% decline

populist rule correlates with a 15.3% decline in a country's Polity IV democracy score; each year of populist rule correlates with a 30.3% decline: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ https://institute.global/policy/populist-harm-democracy-empirical-assessment

Left Populism Also Reduces Democracy

rate of democratic backsliding by ideology was basically indifferent: of 13 right-wing populists, 5 (38.5%) backslid; of 15 left-wing, 5 (33.3%) backslid; of 17 unclassified (often centrist), 5 (29.4%) backslid

rate of democratic backsliding by ideology was basically indifferent: of 13 right-wing populists, 5 (38.5%) backslid; of 15 left-wing, 5 (33.3%) backslid; of 17 unclassified (often centrist), 5 (29.4%) backslid: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ https://institute.global/policy/populist-harm-democracy-empirical-assessment ```Between 1990 and 2014, 13 right-wing populist governments were elected; of these, five have significantly curtailed civil liberties and political rights, as measured by Freedom House. Over the same period, 15 left-wing populist governments were elected; of these, the same number reduced such freedoms. (Over the same period, there were also 17 populist governments that cannot easily be classified as either right- or left-wing; again, five of these governments diminished civil liberties and political rights.) Although this indicates a slightly higher rate of backsliding among right-wing populists than left-wing ones (38 per cent vs. 33 per cent), these data clearly contradict the belief that left-wing populism does not pose a threat to democracy.```

Populists Rule For Longer And Are More Likely To Be Ejected Than Voted Out (This Suggests They Centralize Power)

populists tend to rule for more years than non-populists

populists tend to rule for more years than non-populists: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ https://institute.global/policy/populist-harm-democracy-empirical-assessment

Increased Turnout: Direct Effects

13% of countries today have compulsory voting at any level (eg, Australia nationwide, Switzerland with one canton): on average, their turnout is 7.3% higher than those without compulsory voting

13% of countries today have compulsory voting at any level (eg, Australia nationwide, Switzerland with one canton): on average, their turnout is 7.3% higher than those without compulsory voting: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout/compulsory-voting

after adopting compulsory voting, Australian voter turnout increased by 24%; Labor vote share increased by 9%

after adopting compulsory voting, Australian voter turnout increased by 24%; Labor vote share increased by 9%: https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-12055 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1561/100.00012055

Increased Turnout: Reductions After Abolition

when compulsory voting has been abolished, turnout has fallen by 7-22%

when compulsory voting has been abolished, turnout has fallen by 7-22%: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 ```In the Netherlands (1971) turnout dropped from 92.1% in 1967 to 77.8% in 1971 (and to a historic low of 70.1% in 1998). In Switzerland (1974), where compulsory voting was only partially abolished, it fell from 53.2% in 1967 to 43.6% in 1975 (and to a historic low of 34.9% in 1999). In the only canton where voting remained compulsory, turnout is up to 20% higher than in the others (IDEA, 2004, 26 29). In the Philippines (from 1972 until 1987) turnout rose from 53.5% in 1967 to 78.6% in 1978 and fell from 78.2 per cent in 1987 to 65.3 in 1992 (and 64.8% in 2001). In Venezuela (from 1958 until 1993) turnout rose from 52.1% in 1947 to 79.7% in 1958 and fell from 72.7% in 1988 to 50.0% in 1993 (and 46.5% in 2000).``````While every Austrian citizen had to attend presidential elections until 1980, this was only the case for four provinces in 1986. As everything else remained the same, the evolution in turnout levels can be attributed exclusively to compulsory voting. Before 1986, turnout nowhere deviated much from the average of 95.2% of registered citizens. It rose from 91.6% in 1980 to almost 95% in 1986 in regions retaining compulsory voting and dropped to 85% in regions abolishing it.```

survey results from Belgium and Australia suggest that abolishing compulsory voting would reduce turnout by about 30%

survey results from Belgium and Australia suggest that abolishing compulsory voting would reduce turnout by about 30%: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 ```Another way of doing within-country comparisons is by means of surveys in which citizens that have to attend elections are asked whether they would vote if they no longer had to. Although this method tends to overestimate turnout in voluntary voting (would-be abstainers are more likely not to respond at all), results show that abolishing compulsory voting would probably lead to a decline of about 30% in countries like Australia (Jackman, 2001, 16316) and Belgium (Hooghe and Pelleriaux, 1998, 420 421).```

Increased Turnout: Law Passage Effects

even when not enforced, compulsory voting increases turnout: turnout in countries with non-enforced compulsory voting is still about 6% higher than countries voluntary voting

even when not enforced, compulsory voting increases turnout: turnout in countries with non-enforced compulsory voting is still about 6% higher than countries voluntary voting: https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/voter-turnout-1945-global-report https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/voter-turnout-since-1945.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/739264712692334652/pintor2002.pdf

the vast majority of nonvoters in Australia don't even pay a fine

the vast majority of nonvoters in Australia don't even pay a fine: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026137949800047X https://sci-hub.tw/10.1016/S0261-3794(98)00047-X ```In practice, the proportion of voters required to pay penalties or taken to court never exceeds 1 per cent of the electorate and is normally much less. For example, following the 1993 federal election, the AEC investigated 490 230 cases of persons who appeared not to have voted, there being a total of 11 384 638 enrolled voters at that election. Of the 490 230, fines of $A20 each were paid by 23 230 electors who had voted (or 4.7 per cent of all nonvoters). The remainder gave valid reasons for not voting, save for 4412 who went to court (or 0.9 per cent of all non-voters). The AEC has no information on what happened thereafter to them.```

Increased Representativeness: Income, Wealth, Class

Australia and Belgium (both of which have compulsory voting) have some of the lowest income bias (difference between high-income and low-income voter turnout) in the OECD

Australia and Belgium (both of which have compulsory voting) have some of the lowest income bias (difference between high-income and low-income voter turnout) in the OECD: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.577.2450 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/739234485144518736/finseraas2007.pdf

higher turnout correlates with lower income bias (difference between high-income and low-income voter turnout)

higher turnout correlates with lower income bias (difference between high-income and low-income voter turnout): http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.577.2450 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/739234485144518736/finseraas2007.pdf

in Bendigo in 1899, property owners were 10% more likely to turn out than non-owners; in Victoria in 1877, property-owners comprised 84% percent of voters despite comprising just 59% of eligible voters (unfortunately, no data exists for comparison immediately after implementation of compulsory voting)

in Bendigo in 1899, property owners were 10% more likely to turn out than non-owners; in Victoria in 1877, property-owners comprised 84% percent of voters despite comprising just 59% of eligible voters (unfortunately, no data exists for comparison immediately after implementation of compulsory voting): https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-12055 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1561/100.00012055 ```Put another way, property-owners comprised 84 percent of the electorate even though they only comprised 59 percent of the eligible voters.``````Consistent with expectation, owners were 10 percentage points more likely to vote than occupiers. Also, property values are highly correlated with turnout for both owners and occupiers. A single standard deviation increase in property value is associated witha7percentage point increase in an individual s probability of voting for owners and a 10 percentage point increase in an individual s probability of voting for occupiers.4```

Importance Of High Turnout

higher participation genuinely means more democracy

higher participation genuinely means more democracy: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 ```Indeed, where few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is (Verba and Nie, 1972, 1).``````This forms a problem because governments normally respond to the opinions expressed by citizens in elections: if you don t vote, you don t count (Burnham, 1987, 99). This assumption has been empirically confirmed. In their cross-country comparison, Mueller and Stratmann (2003, 2151) found that political participation has a positive impact on income equality. The more citizens abstain, the greater income inequality will become.```

Political Outcomes: Centrist Bias

moderates are the least likely to vote in general elections and in primary elections

moderates are the least likely to vote in general elections and in primary elections: https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-5-political-engagement-and-activism/

in the USA, nonvoters are disproportionately moderate Democrats

in the USA, nonvoters are disproportionately moderate Democrats: https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691159355/who-votes-now http://web.archive.org/web/20100921001908/http://www.nyu.edu:80/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/nagler/leighley_nagler_midwest2007.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/739244174599258155/leighley2007.pdf

Political Outcomes: Leftist Bias

higher turnout correlates with higher economic redistribution

higher turnout correlates with higher economic redistribution: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.577.2450 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/739234485144518736/finseraas2007.pdf

Libertarian Objections: Freedom To Stay At Home

compulsory voting is a very small imposition; if you would not allow the state to force citizens to cast a ballot (taking perhaps 15 minutes), one must also not allow the state to force citizens to pay taxes (literally taking a proportion of their work-hours)

compulsory voting is a very small imposition; if you would not allow the state to force citizens to cast a ballot (taking perhaps 15 minutes), one must also not allow the state to force citizens to pay taxes (literally taking a proportion of their work-hours): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500167 ```However, opponents of compulsory voting are not so easily fobbed off and claim that no government may oblige its citizens to attend elections. This argument functions as some kind of rock-bottom: I oppose compulsory voting because it infringes on my freedom by which I may well prefer to stay at home. One can doubt whether the resistance of opponents who prefer to stay at home is really based on libertarian conscientious objections. Against those who abstain because of pragmatic considerations, one can argue that attending the polling station every two or three years is not too much to ask, especially compared to governmental obligations such as compulsory education and tax duties, which are much more time-consuming (Keaney and Rogers, 2006, 7, 30, 35). Given the importance of democracy, I believe a government has every right and reason to demand this much from its citizens```

Campaign Contributions May Bias Judges Business: 2010-2012 Data (Weak: Not Significant For Most Election Types)

justices received higher campaign funds and proportionately more funds from businesses in retention elections (3%), nonpartisan elections (17%), and partisan elections (25%)

justices received higher campaign funds and proportionately more funds from businesses in retention elections (3%), nonpartisan elections (17%), and partisan elections (25%): https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/old-uploads/originals/documents/JusticeAtRisk_Nov2013.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/727630557478912090/justice_at_risk.pdf

relative to appointed judges, a higher proportion of business contributions correlated with a higher likelihood with siding with a business; however, this correlation was only significant in nonpartisan elections (not retention elections or partisan elections)

relative to appointed judges, a higher proportion of business contributions correlated with a higher likelihood with siding with a business; however, this correlation was only significant in nonpartisan elections (not retention elections or partisan elections): https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/old-uploads/originals/documents/JusticeAtRisk_Nov2013.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/727630557478912090/justice_at_risk.pdf

Campaign Contributions May Bias Judges Business: 1995-1998 Data (Weak: Doesn'T Compare To Appointed Judges)

in partisan elections, campaign contributions from pro-business groups correlate with voting for businesses, labor groups with voting against employers, insurance companies with businesses and defendants in liability and tort cases; some, but not all, of these correlations are present in nonpartisan elections: (note: this study is weaker b/c it tests each type of contribution separately)

in partisan elections, campaign contributions from pro-business groups correlate with voting for businesses, labor groups with voting against employers, insurance companies with businesses and defendants in liability and tort cases; some, but not all, of these correlations are present in nonpartisan elections: (note: this study is weaker b/c it tests each type of contribution separately) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1910787 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/728329768772304956/shepherd2009a.pdf n1=>28,000 cases, n2=470 judges; Control variables: judge ideology score, tenure, industrial sector of litigant, type of issue under litigation, proportion of years since 1960 that Republicans have controlled state legislature, whether a lower apellate court exists, whether all supreme court justices vote on all cases (en banc), whether court has discretionary review

Money [Unformatted, Unread]

But decades of research suggest that money probably isn t the deciding factor in who wins a general election, and especially not for incumbents.

But decades of research suggest that money probably isn t the deciding factor in who wins a general election, and especially not for incumbents. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2605401

Most of the research on this was done in the last century, Bonica told me, and it generally found that spending didn t affect wins for incumbents and that the impact for challengers was unclear.

Most of the research on this was done in the last century, Bonica told me, and it generally found that spending didn t affect wins for incumbents and that the impact for challengers was unclear. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002764203260415

Most of the research on this was done in the last century, Bonica told me, and it generally found that spending didn t affect wins for incumbents and that the impact for challengers was unclear.

Most of the research on this was done in the last century, Bonica told me, and it generally found that spending didn t affect wins for incumbents and that the impact for challengers was unclear. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2138764

Most of the research on this was done in the last century, Bonica told me, and it generally found that spending didn t affect wins for incumbents and that the impact for challengers was unclear

Most of the research on this was done in the last century, Bonica told me, and it generally found that spending didn t affect wins for incumbents and that the impact for challengers was unclear http://www.sas.rochester.edu/psc/clarke/214/Gerber98.pdf

Advertising [Unformatted, Unread]

And, beginning around the mid-2000s, they began making serious progress on understanding how ads actually affect whether people vote and who they vote for. The picture that s emerged is well let s just say it s probably rather disappointing to the campaigns that spend a great deal of time and effort raising all that money to begin with.

And, beginning around the mid-2000s, they began making serious progress on understanding how ads actually affect whether people vote and who they vote for. The picture that s emerged is well let s just say it s probably rather disappointing to the campaigns that spend a great deal of time and effort raising all that money to begin with. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/money-and-elections-a-complicated-love-story/ https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104820

And, beginning around the mid-2000s, they began making serious progress on understanding how ads actually affect whether people vote and who they vote for. The picture that s emerged is well let s just say it s probably rather disappointing to the campaigns that spend a great deal of time and effort raising all that money to begin with.

And, beginning around the mid-2000s, they began making serious progress on understanding how ads actually affect whether people vote and who they vote for. The picture that s emerged is well let s just say it s probably rather disappointing to the campaigns that spend a great deal of time and effort raising all that money to begin with. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/money-and-elections-a-complicated-love-story/ http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/lau/articles/Lau-Rovner_NegativeCampaigning.pdf

And, beginning around the mid-2000s, they began making serious progress on understanding how ads actually affect whether people vote and who they vote for. The picture that s emerged is well let s just say it s probably rather disappointing to the campaigns that spend a great deal of time and effort raising all that money to begin with.

And, beginning around the mid-2000s, they began making serious progress on understanding how ads actually affect whether people vote and who they vote for. The picture that s emerged is well let s just say it s probably rather disappointing to the campaigns that spend a great deal of time and effort raising all that money to begin with. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/money-and-elections-a-complicated-love-story/ https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/minimal-persuasive-effects-of-campaign-contact-in-general-elections-evidence-from-49-field-experiments/753665A313C4AB433DBF7110299B7433

Take, for example, the study that is probably the nation s only truly real-world political advertising field experiment. During Rick Perry s 2006 re-election campaign for Texas governor, a team of researchers convinced Perry s campaign to run ads in randomly assigned markets and then tracked the effect of those ads over time using surveys. Advertising did produce a pro-Perry response in the markets that received the treatment. But that bump fizzled fast. Within a week after ads stopped running, it was like no one had ever seen them.

Take, for example, the study that is probably the nation s only truly real-world political advertising field experiment. During Rick Perry s 2006 re-election campaign for Texas governor, a team of researchers convinced Perry s campaign to run ads in randomly assigned markets and then tracked the effect of those ads over time using surveys. Advertising did produce a pro-Perry response in the markets that received the treatment. But that bump fizzled fast. Within a week after ads stopped running, it was like no one had ever seen them. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/money-and-elections-a-complicated-love-story/ https://www.jstor.org/stable/41480831

Primary Spending

in 2017, Bonica published a study that found, unlike in the general election, early fundraising strongly predicted who would win primary races.

in 2017, Bonica published a study that found, unlike in the general election, early fundraising strongly predicted who would win primary races. https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2016.0413

Participation [Unformatted, Unread]

Ongoing research from Alexander Fouirnaies, professor of public policy at the University of Chicago, suggests that, as it becomes normal for campaigns to spend higher and higher amounts, fewer people run and more of those who do are independently wealthy. In other words, the arms race of unnecessary campaign spending could help to enshrine power among the well-known and privileged.

Ongoing research from Alexander Fouirnaies, professor of public policy at the University of Chicago, suggests that, as it becomes normal for campaigns to spend higher and higher amounts, fewer people run and more of those who do are independently wealthy. In other words, the arms race of unnecessary campaign spending could help to enshrine power among the well-known and privileged. https://www.dropbox.com/s/t96hcfls5a1g3ss/SpendingLimits.pdf

Model Bills

about 10,000 "model" bills are passed per year in the united states

about 10,000 "model" bills are passed per year in the united states: https://mobile.twitter.com/robodellaz/status/1113868879338434560 https://www.azcentral.com/pages/interactives/asbestos-sharia-law-model-bills-lobbyists-special-interests-influence-state-laws/

Scope

types of selection systems by state

types of selection systems by state: https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/26/2/290/830985 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1093/jleo/ewn023

Quality: Elected Judges Are More Productive, Have Rates Of Citation, And Are Equally Independent

relative to appointed judges, elected judges are more productive (write more opinions per year: +61.6% for partisan, +29.1% nonpartisan), have similar quality (non-significantly-different citation rates by out-of-state judges), have substantially more dissents (+92.7% for partisan, +76.9% for nonpartisan), and have similar independence (measured by likelihood of disagreeing with same-party judges on the same case)

relative to appointed judges, elected judges are more productive (write more opinions per year: +61.6% for partisan, +29.1% nonpartisan), have similar quality (non-significantly-different citation rates by out-of-state judges), have substantially more dissents (+92.7% for partisan, +76.9% for nonpartisan), and have similar independence (measured by likelihood of disagreeing with same-party judges on the same case): https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/26/2/290/830985 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1093/jleo/ewn023 n1=27596 opinions, n2=408 state supreme court justices```Productivity is measured by total number of opinions written for any given year, including dissents and concurrences (Total Opinions).``````Our primary quality variable is the number of out-ofstate citations to a particular opinion by a particular judge (Outside State Citations).``````Our independence measure focuses on the tendency of judges to write opinions that disagree with co-partisans when the pool of judges provides opportunities to do so. We define an opposing opinion as either a majority opinion when a dissent exists or a dissent when a majority exists. We assume that a judge exhibits independence when she writes an opposing opinion against a co-partisan.```

^ control variables

^ control variables: https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article-abstract/26/2/290/830985 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1093/jleo/ewn023 whether justice is chief justice, experience in court, experience after law school, years before retirement, age, sex, whether they had served in private practice, justice ideology score, justice salary, whether any new justices joined the court, number of justices, whether retirement is mandatory, clerks per judge, number of trial cases, whether the decision went through an intermediate appellate court, whether publication is mandatory, state age, state population size, crime, median age of state population, median income of state population, proportion blacks in population, and ideology of state citizens

Quality: Appointed Judges Have Better Decisions (Weak Article Imo Due To Definition Of "Correct")

the rate of "incorrect" decisions (those that disagrees with the rest of the court) is substantially higher for elected judges (.3%) than appointed judges (.1%)

the rate of "incorrect" decisions (those that disagrees with the rest of the court) is substantially higher for elected judges (.3%) than appointed judges (.1%): https://www.princeton.edu/news/2013/02/22/researchers-find-appointed-justices-outperform-elected-counterparts https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272712000941 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.007 1 = probability voting correctly, 0 = incorrectly ```[J]udges that are shielded from voters' influence on average also have a lower probability of reaching an incorrect decision (0.1%) than justices that face retention elections (0.5%), and elected justices (0.3%). The effect is larger when we consider the probability of incorrectly overturning the decision of the lower courts. While judges that are shielded from voters' influence incorrectly overturn the lower court very infrequently (0.03%), the corresponding probabilities are 0.7% for justices facing retention elections and 0.6% for justices facing competitive reelections.```

justifications for above methodology

justifications for above methodology: https://www.princeton.edu/news/2013/02/22/researchers-find-appointed-justices-outperform-elected-counterparts https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272712000941 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.007 n1=5958 cases, n2=520 state Supreme Court justices: Control variables: `appeal or original or habeas corpus` `whether Petitioner is original defendant or the State` `evidence, sentencing and jury instruction` `years of prior judicial experience` `whether each justice had prior political experience or not` `number of years serving in the state Supreme Court` `whether the justice was elected or appointed` `whether she was appointed for life by elected officials, appointed for one term by elected officials with a possible reappointment by the same elected officials, or appointed for one term by elected officials with a possible reappointment depending on an up-or-down decision by voters in a retention election` `party-adjusted judicial ideology` `citizen (CIT) and government (GOV) ideology for the relevant state`Argument for why non-unanimous decisions are incorrect: ```Now, as it is, this identification scheme appears to penalize maverick justices who go against the grain by assigning them a low precision parameter. However, in the empirical work, we control for many case-specific covariates, and take into account inherent differences among justices due to political ideology, judicial experience, etc. Therefore, justices with low 's are those who have attributes that characterize justices who vote inconsistently, even after taking characteristics of the case into account: these are not maverick justices, but erratic ones.```

Independence: Elected Judges Tend To Vote In Favor Of State Voter Preferences (Not Independent)

Republican judges elected in partisan elections are substantially more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, employers over workers, doctors/hospitals over malpractice claimants, and defendants in tort cases -- however, these relations all disappear (except tort) if the judge is in their final term before mandatory retirement, suggesting re-election is the motivating factor

Republican judges elected in partisan elections are substantially more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, employers over workers, doctors/hospitals over malpractice claimants, and defendants in tort cases -- however, these relations all disappear (except tort) if the judge is in their final term before mandatory retirement, suggesting re-election is the motivating factor: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1910787 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/728329768772304956/shepherd2009a.pdf n1=>28,000 cases, n2=470 judges; Control variables: judge ideology score, tenure, industrial sector of litigant, type of issue under litigation, proportion of years since 1960 that Republicans have controlled state legislature, whether a lower apellate court exists, whether all supreme court justices vote on all cases (en banc), whether court has discretionary review

Independence: Appointed Judges And Partisan Judges Tend To Vote In Favor Of The State Government (Not Independent)

justices selected by the legislature or governor and justices elected in partisan races are more likely to vote in favor of the state, and this likelihood increases as they approach the end of their term (regression coefficient = percentage point difference in cases decided)

justices selected by the legislature or governor and justices elected in partisan races are more likely to vote in favor of the state, and this likelihood increases as they approach the end of their term (regression coefficient = percentage point difference in cases decided): https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1910897 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/728329767782318110/shepherd2009b.pdf ```The magnitudes of the marginal effects are statistically significant, but not huge. For example, the results suggest that a judge facing a gubernatorial reappointment, compared to the base category of judges facing unopposed retention elections, is approximately 7 percentage points more likely to vote in favor of the executive branch litigant.```

Diversity: Little Difference

both elective and appointive systems are producing similarly poor outcomes in terms of the diversity of judges

both elective and appointive systems are producing similarly poor outcomes in terms of the diversity of judges: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/improving-judicial-diversity https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Improving-Judicial-Diversity.pdf ```Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Diversity in State and Federal Appellate Courts: Change and Continuity Across 20 Years, 29 Just. Sys. J. 47, 52-53 (2008); see also id. at 52 (showing in 2005 nationally 12.97% of merit selected state appellate judges and 11.48% of elected state appellate judges are minorities and 23.35% of merit selected state appellate judges and 28.12% of elected state appellate judges are women); id at 66 (stating black women do fare somewhat better in electoral systems but Hispanic men seemed disadvantaged by elections); see also Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, An Examination of Judicial Diversity in the State Courts Over Time, 85 Judicature 84, 88.(2001) (finding by 1999 there was no tangible difference in the ability of NWMs [nonwhite males] to attain a position in the judiciary via either merit or non-merits systems. ).```

History Of Judicial Elections

judicial elections emerged as an anti-corruption reform

judicial elections emerged as an anti-corruption reform: https://today.law.harvard.edu/book-review/in-new-book-shugerman-explores-the-history-of-judicial-selection-in-the-u-s/ ```Shugerman discovered that at first the plan to create a more independent judiciary through popular elections worked. The first generation of elected judges in the early 19th century exercised the power of judicial review far more often than their predecessors did. Perhaps ironically, these democratically elected judges were also the first to criticize democratic excesses and to argue from a countermajoritarian perspective.`````` I began the book feeling horrified by American judicial elections, Shugerman says. When his research revealed that a significant impetus behind them was to correct for the corruption and partisanship of judicial appointments, he saw that judicial elections had a good-faith logic in their 19th-century context. From the republic s earliest days, Shugerman notes, the challenge of judicial selection has been to balance judicial accountability, which demands that judges bend to popular and political pressures, and judicial independence, which demands judicial allegiance to the rule of law. As he mined the historical record, he found that judicial election advocates vied for popular support for their cause by framing it primarily in terms of judicial independence.``````Of all the methods he looks at, Shugerman claims that merit selection, which involves vetting by a panel of professionals and executive appointment to a first term, followed by retention elections, has yielded the most judicial independence. It is currently employed in about 20 states. But he warns that it, too, may be adversely affected by the excessive campaign spending that preceded and may now be accelerated indirectly by Citizens United.``` [unformatted]

Rich Vs Poor Spending On Law

total federal, state, and local spending on legal aid was just $1.385 billion in 2013

total federal, state, and local spending on legal aid was just $1.385 billion in 2013: https://www.law.com/almID/1202730102717/The-Justice-Gap-How-Big-Law-Is-Failing-Legal-Aid/?/&slreturn=20191002113100 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/640215461199347732/BTB_23_PRECON_Poverty_Simulation_2.pdf

JPMorgan Chase alone spends $3-12 billion per year on legal cases

JPMorgan Chase alone spends $3-12 billion per year on legal cases: https://qz.com/809963/weirdly-jpmorgan-chase-jpm-is-now-making-money-from-litigation/

Legal Aid: Per Capita Spending: Pretty Sources

the USA spends far less per capita on legal aid than other countries

the USA spends far less per capita on legal aid than other countries: https://mobile.twitter.com/PeteDDavis/status/1118884965771632640 https://books.google.com/books?id=mtGltAEACAAJ

the USA spends far less per capita on legal aid than other countries

the USA spends far less per capita on legal aid than other countries: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46711885_International_Journal_for_Court_administration_2008_no_1

Legal Aid: Per Capita Spending: Ugly Sources

per capita spending

per capita spending

per capita spending

Arbitration Vs Courts (Ancap Talking Point)

mandatory arbitration reduces employee winrate by 15% in absolute terms and (41.2% in relative terms) and reduces employee damages received by 140000 (79.3%)

mandatory arbitration reduces employee winrate by 15% in absolute terms and (41.2% in relative terms) and reduces employee damages received by 140000 (79.3%): https://www.epi.org/publication/mandatory-arbitration-unfairly-tilts-the-legal-system/ https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/

56.2% of private-sector nonunion employees are subject to mandatory employment arbitration -- preventing them from using public courts

56.2% of private-sector nonunion employees are subject to mandatory employment arbitration -- preventing them from using public courts: https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers/

meta-study on reducing recidivism

wandering officers

wandering officers https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/4004/

possibly

Defund The Police: Terrible Meme About The Lapd

bad meme

bad meme:

Los Angeles budget: 10.53 billion overall, 1.86 billion (17.7%) for police

Los Angeles budget: 10.53 billion overall, 1.86 billion (17.7%) for police: http://cao.lacity.org/budget20-21/2020-21Budget_Summary.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751266814842896416/2020-21Budget_Summary.pdf

Public Polling

Underpolicing: Clearance Rate & Reporting Rate

phrase: "overpoliced but overprotected"

phrase: "overpoliced but overprotected"

baltimore

Studies

The criminologist Lawrence Sherman has observed that the United States is very unusual in spending much more money on the prison system than on our police departments.

The criminologist Lawrence Sherman has observed that the United States is very unusual in spending much more money on the prison system than on our police departments. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/nyregion/police-have-done-more-than-prisons-to-cut-crime-in-new-york.html?pagewanted=3&_r=0&smid=tw-share&pagewanted=all&login=email&auth=login-email

This suggests the possibility of switching to a formula Tabarrok has summarized as more police, fewer prisons, less crime : uniformed officers patrolling the streets stopping crime before it starts rather than working in prisons surveilling convicts.

This suggests the possibility of switching to a formula Tabarrok has summarized as more police, fewer prisons, less crime : uniformed officers patrolling the streets stopping crime before it starts rather than working in prisons surveilling convicts. https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2013/01/more-police-fewer-prisons-less-crime.html

About a year ago, Stephen Mello of Princeton University assessed the Obama-era increase in federal police funding. Thanks to the stimulus bill, funding for Clinton s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) hiring grant program surged from about $20 million a year in the late-Bush era to $1 billion in 2009. The program design allowed Mello to assess some quasi-random variation in which cities got grants. The data shows that compared to cities that missed out, those that made the cut ended up with police staffing levels that were 3.2 percent higher and crime levels that were 3.5 percent lower.

About a year ago, Stephen Mello of Princeton University assessed the Obama-era increase in federal police funding. Thanks to the stimulus bill, funding for Clinton s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) hiring grant program surged from about $20 million a year in the late-Bush era to $1 billion in 2009. The program design allowed Mello to assess some quasi-random variation in which cities got grants. The data shows that compared to cities that missed out, those that made the cut ended up with police staffing levels that were 3.2 percent higher and crime levels that were 3.5 percent lower. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272718302305 http://sci-hub.tw/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.12.003 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751272248509333515/mello2019.pdf

A larger historical survey by Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary looked at a large set of police and crime data for midsize to large cities from 1960 to 2010 and concluded that every $1 spent on extra policing generates about $1.63 in social benefits, primarily through fewer murders.

A larger historical survey by Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary looked at a large set of police and crime data for midsize to large cities from 1960 to 2010 and concluded that every $1 spent on extra policing generates about $1.63 in social benefits, primarily through fewer murders. https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00694 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1162/REST_a_00694 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751272535701717123/chalfin2017.pdf

It s important in that context to note a recent study by John MacDonald, Jeffrey Fagan, and Amanda Geller that looked at localized policing surges in New York City (dubbed Operation Impact by the NYPD) over a period of years. They found that surges led to both less crime and more stop and frisk -type incidents where officers stopped citizens (typically young black or Latino men) without probable cause. That suggests a sharp trade-off between crime reduction and civil rights. But the same study, by looking at the covariance of stop and frisks and crime reduction, found that the additional stops were doing nothing to reduce crime. All of the anti-crime impact, in other words, came from putting more cops on the beat rather than from the use of aggressive tactics. New York City, not coincidentally, has continued to enjoy low and falling crime rates since stop and frisk tactics were curtailed. What s helpful is more officers, not more harassment.

It s important in that context to note a recent study by John MacDonald, Jeffrey Fagan, and Amanda Geller that looked at localized policing surges in New York City (dubbed Operation Impact by the NYPD) over a period of years. They found that surges led to both less crime and more stop and frisk -type incidents where officers stopped citizens (typically young black or Latino men) without probable cause. That suggests a sharp trade-off between crime reduction and civil rights. But the same study, by looking at the covariance of stop and frisks and crime reduction, found that the additional stops were doing nothing to reduce crime. All of the anti-crime impact, in other words, came from putting more cops on the beat rather than from the use of aggressive tactics. New York City, not coincidentally, has continued to enjoy low and falling crime rates since stop and frisk tactics were curtailed. What s helpful is more officers, not more harassment. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0157223 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1371/journal.pone.0157223 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/751274851616030800/macdonald2016.PDF

Fatigue

The key mechanism here is fatigue which while obviously not a substitute for curing systemic racism, is a lot easier to fix with concrete short-term steps. Tired officers, across a variety of studies, generate more complaints from the civilians they interact with.

The key mechanism here is fatigue which while obviously not a substitute for curing systemic racism, is a lot easier to fix with concrete short-term steps. Tired officers, across a variety of studies, generate more complaints from the civilians they interact with. https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-police-officers-overworked-cops.html

A 2017 audit of the Kings County Sheriff s Department in Washington found that working a single hour of overtime led to a 2.7 percent increase in the odds that the officer would be involved in a use-of-force incident the following week.

A 2017 audit of the Kings County Sheriff s Department in Washington found that working a single hour of overtime led to a 2.7 percent increase in the odds that the officer would be involved in a use-of-force incident the following week. https://www.kingcounty.gov/~/media/depts/auditor/new-web-docs/2017/kcao-overtime-2017/kcao-overtime-2017.ashx?la=en

A 2015 study of police officers in Phoenix found that being assigned to a 13-hour rather than 10-hour shift led to increases in fatigue and Professional Standards Bureau complaints.

A 2015 study of police officers in Phoenix found that being assigned to a 13-hour rather than 10-hour shift led to increases in fatigue and Professional Standards Bureau complaints. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1098611115584910?journalCode=pqxa

A 2018 study found that working back-to-back night shifts increased the odds of public complaints, and that the effect is particularly large when the officers had to make court appearances in the daytime between the night shifts.

A 2018 study found that working back-to-back night shifts increased the odds of public complaints, and that the effect is particularly large when the officers had to make court appearances in the daytime between the night shifts. https://academic.oup.com/sleep/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/sleep/zsy231/5195409?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Officer Time Usage

Recidivism: Effects

reducing recidivism would insanely reduce violent crime

reducing recidivism would insanely reduce violent crime: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3969807/ Among individuals convicted of one violent crime, 44 % (41,257 of 93,642) were reconvicted. After 2 violent convictions, 59 % (24,342 of 41,257) were reconvicted, and after 3 convictions, 68 % (16,435 of 24,342) were reconvicted. If violent careers could be stopped after 3 convictions, 53 % of all violent convictions would be prevented. The recurrence rate increased from about 70 % after 4 convictions to about 80 % after 7 and to about 90 % after 11 crimes per individual, after which the low number of perpetrators at each new step made further analyses difficult to interpret.

rates over time

rates over time: https://www.ebpsociety.org/blog/education/205-tough-crime-policies-have-struck-out It was found that in 1994, 51.8% of individuals released from prison in the United States were re-incarcerated within three years (Lagan & Levin, 2002). In more recent years, it was found that in 1999, 45.4% of individuals and in 2004, 43.3% of individuals were re-incarcerated within three years of their release (Pew Center on the States, 2011). https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/04/the-misleading-math-of-recidivism

Rehabilitation: Recidivism Decrease

rehabilitation reduces recidivism rates

rehabilitation reduces recidivism rates: www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Mastrobuoni_Terlizzese_bollate_oct14.pdf

rehabilitative programs reduce recidivism and increase employment

rehabilitative programs reduce recidivism and increase employment: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR564.html

Retribution: Recidivism Increase

longer prison sentences increase recidivism by 3% (0.18% per month after 12.7 months), but there was no difference

longer prison sentences increase recidivism by 3% (0.18% per month after 12.7 months), but there was no difference https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=2701549 http://madgic.library.carleton.ca/deposit/govt/ca_fed/publicsafety_prisonsentences_1999.pdf The essential conclusions reached from this study were: 1. Prisons should not be used with the expectation of reducing criminal behaviour. 2. On the basis of the present results, excessive use of incarceration has enormous cost implications. 3. In order to determine who is being adversely affected by prison, it is incumbent upon prison officials to implement repeated, comprehensive assessments of offenders attitudes, values, and behaviours while incarcerated. 4. The primary justification of prison should be to incapacitate offenders (particularly, those of a chronic, higher risk nature) for reasonable periods and to exact retribution.`

Retribution: Ineffective

three strike laws are positively (!) associated with homicide rates (however, this is probably not causal)

three strike laws are positively (!) associated with homicide rates (however, this is probably not causal): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07418820400095791 http://sci-hub.tw/10.1080/07418820400095791 Our study used a multiple time series design and UCR data from 188 cities with populations of 100,000 or more for the two decades from 1980 to 2000. We found, first, that three strikes laws are positively associated with homicide rates in cities in three strikes states and, second, that cities in three strikes states witnessed no significant reduction in crime rates.

three-strike laws are extremely expensive -- costing about $12,000 per crime prevented

three-strike laws are extremely expensive -- costing about $12,000 per crime prevented: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023/A:1011098100458.pdf https://www.jstor.org/stable/23366832

Effects On Crime

juvenile incarceration decreases schooling and increases re-incarceration later in life

juvenile incarceration decreases schooling and increases re-incarceration later in life: https://news.mit.edu/2015/juvenile-incarceration-less-schooling-more-crime-0610 https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/130/2/759/2330376

Effects On Economics

juvenile incarceration is very expensive

juvenile incarceration is very expensive: https://www.aecf.org/resources/no-place-for-kids-full-report/ https://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-NoPlaceForKidsFullReport-2011.pdf Multisystemic Therapy (MST) and Functional Family Therapy (FFT) are intensive family treatment models for delinquent youth. In MST, therapists lead a regimented three- to five-month family intervention process involving multiple contacts each week in the family s home and surrounding community. FFT employs office-based counseling (an average of 12 sessions) designed first to engage family members and then to support meaningful behavior changes that improve family interaction and address the underlying causes of delinquent behavior. Costs average $6,000 to $9,500 per youth for MST and $3,000 to $3,500 for FFT, whereas **a typical stay in a juvenile corrections facility (9 to 12 months at $241 per day) costs $66,000 to $88,000.**

Marijuana Legalization

legalizing marijuana has cut violent crime

legalizing marijuana has cut violent crime: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12521/full

legalizing marijuana reduces opioid deaths

legalizing marijuana reduces opioid deaths: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/1898878

legalizing marijuana reduces opioid abuse

legalizing marijuana reduces opioid abuse: https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2016.303426

Health

needle programs work

needle programs work: https://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/aids/providers/reports/docs/sep_report.pdf https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2014/12/report-documents-success-of-state-needle-exchange-program-017909 Intravenous drug users were among the most at-risk populations for contracting AIDS in the earliest years of the epidemic. In 1992, 52 percent of newly diagnosed AIDS cases in New York were among I.V. drug users. By 2012, intravenous drug users accounted for only 3 percent of new H.I.V. diagnoses.

Crime

the illegal drug market causes violent crime and cannot be solved by increased law enforcement

the illegal drug market causes violent crime and cannot be solved by increased law enforcement: http://www.ijdp.org/article/S0955-3959(11)00022-3/fulltext The present systematic review demonstrates that drug law enforcement interventions are unlikely to reduce drug market violence. Instead, and contrary to the conventional wisdom that increasing drug law enforcement will reduce violence, the existing scientific evidence base suggests that drug prohibition likely contributes to drug market violence and increased homicide rates and that increasingly sophisticated methods of disrupting illicit drug distribution networks may in turn increase levels of violence.

Colorado Legalization In 2014 (Jan 1)

after colorado legalized marijuana in 2014, marijuana use increased among 18+ (from ~30% to ~32%) and decreased among 12-17 (from ~10% to ~8%)

after colorado legalized marijuana in 2014, marijuana use increased among 18+ (from ~30% to ~32%) and decreased among 12-17 (from ~10% to ~8%): https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2019/mar/25/john-hickenlooper/did-spike-marijuana-use-colorado-after-legal/ https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHsaePercents2016/NSDUHsaePercents2016.pdf https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHsaeMethodology2016/NSDUHsaeMethodology2016.pdf sample size 5207 for 2015-16, in-person interviews based on Census-weighted population data

Portugal Decriminalization In 2001

monthly drug use has declined among adults and teens

monthly drug use has declined among adults and teens: https://transformdrugs.org/the-success-of-portugals-decriminalisation-policy-in-seven-charts/ http://archive.ph/xEg3m

drug deaths have declined

HIV and AIDS transmission among drug users has declined almost 100 times

HIV and AIDS transmission among drug users has declined almost 100 times: https://transformdrugs.org/the-success-of-portugals-decriminalisation-policy-in-seven-charts/ http://archive.ph/xEg3m

decriminalization is not expensive; drug policy costs just 0.05% of Portugal's GDP

decriminalization is not expensive; drug policy costs just 0.05% of Portugal's GDP: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/4508/TD0116918ENN.pdf while in Europe, on average, just incarceration for drug offenses cost 0.05 % of GDP or EUR 5.9 billion http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_228272_EN_TDAT14001ENN.pdf

decriminalization reduced the number of people charged with drug possession and therefore reduced the pressure of drugs on the criminal justice system

decriminalization reduced the number of people charged with drug possession and therefore reduced the pressure of drugs on the criminal justice system: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/13325/1/BFDPP_BP_14_EffectsOfDecriminalisation_EN.pdf.pdf

Https://News.Vice.Com/Article/Ungass-Portugal-What-Happened-After-Decriminalization-Drugs-Weed-To-Heroin

Public Opinion

in 2019, 66% of Americans said "marijuana should be made legal"

in 2019, 66% of Americans said "marijuana should be made legal": https://news.gallup.com/poll/243908/two-three-americans-support-legalizing-marijuana.aspx

"Kill Drug Dealers": Northern Ireland

study about Ireland

study about Ireland: https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/6868/1/McElrath_4051_Drug_use_and_drug_markets.pdf

data about Ireland

data about Ireland: https://www.health-ni.gov.uk/publications/statistics-northern-ireland-drug-misuse-database-200102-201516

"Kill Drug Dealers": Philippines

not clear that drug prices are rising

not clear that drug prices are rising: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-drugs/more-blood-but-no-victory-as-philippine-drug-war-marks-its-first-year-idUSKBN19G05D In July 2016, a gram of shabu cost 1,200-11,000 pesos ($24-$220), according to agency s figures. Last month, a gram cost 1,000-15,000 pesos ($20-$300), it said.

in Philippines, 2% of population uses meth

in Philippines, 2% of population uses meth: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal_drug_trade_in_the_Philippines

118,000 "drug personalities" have been arrested

118,000 "drug personalities" have been arrested: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/senator-rodrigo-duterte-drug-war-killed-20000-180221134139202.html

wikipedia article

Financial Harms

the death penalty in Washington state costs 1.43x more than comparable life without parole

the death penalty in Washington state costs 1.43x more than comparable life without parole: https://ballotpedia.org/Fact_check/Is_the_death_penalty_more_expensive_than_life_in_prison https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/documents/WashingtonCosts.pdf

Effect On Crime: Consensus

the vast majority of criminologists hold that the death penalty does not reduce crime

the vast majority of criminologists hold that the death penalty does not reduce crime: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20685045 https://sci-hub.tw/10.2307/20685045 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/750920918104145960/radelet2009.pdf ```To shed light on this dispute, we drew up a list in mid-2008 of every living person who (1) was a Fellow in the American Society of Criminology (ASC),69 (2) had won the ASC's Sutherland Award, the highest award given by that organization for contributions to criminological theory,70 or (3) was a president of the ASC between 1997 and the present. The American Society of Criminology was founded in 1941 and is the world's largest organization of academic criminologists, boasting a membership in 2008 of 3,500 criminologists from fifty countries.71```

Effect On Crime: Recidivism

among 1088 released homicide offenders after a followup period of mean 10.3 years, 60% were re-arrested for any crime, 21% for a serious offence (robbery, assault, sxual assault, abduction, extortion, burglary, arson, child pornography), and 0.28% were re-arrested for murder

among 1088 released homicide offenders after a followup period of mean 10.3 years, 60% were re-arrested for any crime, 21% for a serious offence (robbery, assault, sxual assault, abduction, extortion, burglary, arson, child pornography), and 0.28% were re-arrested for murder: http://regnet.anu.edu.au/news-events/news/6874/how-likely-it-murderers-will-re-offend https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0004865817722393 http://sci-hub.tw/10.1177/0004865817722393 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/750924330137026620/broadhurst2017.pdf

Innocence Rate

1.6% of death row inmates have been exonerated and at least 4.1% are expected to be exonerated

1.6% of death row inmates have been exonerated and at least 4.1% are expected to be exonerated: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/many-prisoners-on-death-row-are-wrongfully-convicted/ https://www.pnas.org/content/111/20/7230 http://sci-hub.tw/10.1073/pnas.1306417111 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/750929003572887645/gross2014.pdf

Psychological Harms

life sentencing provides closure while death penalty does not: among 46 close family members of a homicide victim, those in Texas (where the homicidal agent was sentenced to death) and Minnesota (to life imprisonment), Minnesotans had higher satisfaction, were less likely to still be involved in prosecution, and more likely to have post-prosecution growth

life sentencing provides closure while death penalty does not: among 46 close family members of a homicide victim, those in Texas (where the homicidal agent was sentenced to death) and Minnesota (to life imprisonment), Minnesotans had higher satisfaction, were less likely to still be involved in prosecution, and more likely to have post-prosecution growth: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/death-penalty-bring-closure-victims-family https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=5144&context=mulr

mass incarceration cannot explain the decline in crime

mass incarceration cannot explain the decline in crime: https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-caused-crime-decline xxx reread

only 1 in 5 rapes are committed by strangers

only 1 in 5 rapes are committed by strangers: https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/sexual-assault-victims/

only 1 in 4 sexual assaults are committed by strangers

only 1 in 4 sexual assaults are committed by strangers: https://www.rainn.org/statistics/perpetrators-sexual-violence

police steal more than burglars do

police steal more than burglars do: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/23/cops-took-more-stuff-from-people-than-burglars-did-last-year/

Police Are More Likely To Abuse Their Spouses

police officers are about 3-4x more likely to violently abuse their spouses

police officers are about 3-4x more likely to violently abuse their spouses: http://womenandpolicing.com/violenceFS.asp https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED338997.pdf In a 1988 Arizona study of 553 police officers and their spouses, 41% of male officers and 34% of female officers reported violent assaults in their marital relationships compared with 16% of civilians. Over one-third of wives of police officers (37%) reported violence in their marriage. (Neidig, Russell, and Seng, unpublished). A 1981 survey of Toronto police officers found a divorce and separation rate of 63%, almost double the national average among Canadians at the time. Recent studies indicate that as many as 75% of police marriages in large metropolitan areas are likely to end in divorce. (Came, et al., 1989). [....] A 1986 review suggested that as many as 30% of all police officers abuse alcohol, compared with less than 10% of the population at large. (Hepp, 1987)

police officers and military are about 3x more likely to abuse their spouses

police officers and military are about 3x more likely to abuse their spouses: http://womenandpolicing.com/violenceFS.asp https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/polic15&div=12&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals

All: Usa

literally every kind of inequality is getting worse (wealth, income, consumption)

literally every kind of inequality is getting worse (wealth, income, consumption): https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2018001pap.pdf https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/727611018758455357/fisher18.pdf

Wealth Inequality: Usa

the US has the greatest wealth inequality

the US has the greatest wealth inequality: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=SDD/DOC(2018)1&docLanguage=En

the US has much more wealth inequality than income inequality

the US has much more wealth inequality than income inequality: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=SDD/DOC(2018)1&docLanguage=En

Wealth Inequality: Global

in 2018, the top 0.8% held 44.8% of all wealth

in 2018, the top 0.8% held 44.8% of all wealth: https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2018/12/04/the-top-1-own-48-of-all-global-personal-wealth-10-own-85/

^ scrollbar-based representation of global wealth inequality

^ scrollbar-based representation of global wealth inequality: https://mkorostoff.github.io/1-pixel-wealth/

^ graphical representation of global wealth inequality

^ graphical representation of global wealth inequality: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/visualizing-the-extreme-concentration-of-global-wealth/

Wealth Inequality: Stocks

the top 1% owns 56% of all equities (stock and ownership stakes), while the bottom 90% own just 12%

the top 1% owns 56% of all equities (stock and ownership stakes), while the bottom 90% own just 12%: https://www.ft.com/content/2501e154-4789-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441 ```Three decades ago, ownership was also lopsided, but the top percentage point of Americans by wealth only controlled 46 per cent of all US equities held by households. By the end of September 2019, that proportion had hit a record 56 per cent, amounting to $21.4tn, according to the investment bank s calculations. That includes both public stock and ownership stakes in private companies.```

Income Inequality

america is less mobile than the UK or any Scandinavian country

america is less mobile than the UK or any Scandinavian country: http://ftp.iza.org/dp1938.pdf

Income Mobility

relative movement of income across generations

relative movement of income across generations: https://www.bostonfed.org/inequality2014/papers/reeves-sawhill.pdf

absolute movement of income across generations

absolute movement of income across generations: https://www.bostonfed.org/inequality2014/papers/reeves-sawhill.pdf

on average, it would take 5 generations to move from the bottom 10% to the median 50% of incomes in the USA

on average, it would take 5 generations to move from the bottom 10% to the median 50% of incomes in the USA: http://www.oecd.org/social/broken-elevator-how-to-promote-social-mobility-9789264301085-en.htm

income mobility is dead: you've got a 50/50 chance of earning more at 30 than your parents did at 30

income mobility is dead: you've got a 50/50 chance of earning more at 30 than your parents did at 30: http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/assets/documents/abs_mobility_summary.pdf

Income Inequality Over Time

those with higher incomes have seen faster income growth than those with lower incomes

those with higher incomes have seen faster income growth than those with lower incomes: http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/PSZ2017.pdf https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/8/16112368/piketty-saez-zucman-income-growth-inequality-stagnation-chart

Class Structure

~2% of the US population are 'capitalists' (could subside on capital gains alone); the portion of capitalists and the portion of income going to capitalists both decreased until the 1970's and increased afterwards

~2% of the US population are 'capitalists' (could subside on capital gains alone); the portion of capitalists and the portion of income going to capitalists both decreased until the 1970's and increased afterwards: https://thenextrecession.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/classstructure1918to2011wmf.pdf ```Suppose the capitalist-managerial class were defined as that group that has sufficient assets to generate a nonlabour income on which a typical member could survive without having to enter the labour market. [....] Call this capitalist-managerial class "quasi-capitalist managers" or "Qc managers" for short. Managers who are in a structurally different position, being forced to sell their labour-power, are noncapitalist-managers. Still managers, with supervisory responsibilities in production, they are not free to choose whether or not to take employment, because they do not have sufficient assets to generate a nonlabour income enabling them not to enter the labour market. Hence call them "labour-power dependent managers" or "Lpd managers" for short.```

```Suppose the capitalist-managerial class were de ned as that group that has su cient assets to generate a nonlabour income on which a typical member could survive without having to enter the labour market. This is independent of whether they choose to enter it (although the PS data show that on average they do so enter it); because of their level of nonlabour income, they are genuinely free to choose whether or not to take employment. Call this capitalist-managerial class quasi-capitalist managers or Qc managers for short.```

```Suppose the capitalist-managerial class were de ned as that group that has su cient assets to generate a nonlabour income on which a typical member could survive without having to enter the labour market. This is independent of whether they choose to enter it (although the PS data show that on average they do so enter it); because of their level of nonlabour income, they are genuinely free to choose whether or not to take employment. Call this capitalist-managerial class quasi-capitalist managers or Qc managers for short.```

^ 2012 study, 4 classes, unformatted

^ 2012 study, 4 classes, unformatted https://sci-hub.tw/10.1111/meca.12107

Education Inequality

higher parental income increases a student's college graduation rate by 1.8-5.3 times

higher parental income increases a student's college graduation rate by 1.8-5.3 times: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/upshot/for-the-poor-the-graduation-gap-is-even-wider-than-the-enrollment-gap.html http://archive.is/38kns

income and education between generations have a strong relationship

income and education between generations have a strong relationship: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/rich-kids-stay-rich-poor-kids-stay-poor/

^ the causal pathways for this are not yet fully understood

^ the causal pathways for this are not yet fully understood: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnins.2014.00276/full

academic performance differences between the rich and the poor have increased, not decreased

academic performance differences between the rich and the poor have increased, not decreased: https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/reardon%20whither%20opportunity%20-%20chapter%205.pdf

Childhood Poverty

those disadvantaged at birth or in early stages of life are much more likely to be disdvantaged at later stages of life

those disadvantaged at birth or in early stages of life are much more likely to be disdvantaged at later stages of life: https://www.bostonfed.org/inequality2014/papers/reeves-sawhill.pdf

poverty literally stunts brain growth -- there are significant impacts for family income below 50,000 or so

poverty literally stunts brain growth -- there are significant impacts for family income below 50,000 or so: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-inequality-does-to-the-brain/ https://issuu.com/1magazine18/docs/9sdcsdc https://www.nature.com/articles/nn.3983

poverty during childhood harms the growth of the brain, reduces academic performance, and reduces intellectual performance

poverty during childhood harms the growth of the brain, reduces academic performance, and reduces intellectual performance: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapediatrics/fullarticle/2381542

Income Inequality

higher income inequality is associated with reduced mobility

higher income inequality is associated with reduced mobility: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.27.3.79

Unmeritocratic Pay At The Top

CEO compensation vs worker compensation has increased from 20x higher to 200x higher -- are CEOs 10x more productive today than they were in 1960?

CEO compensation vs worker compensation has increased from 20x higher to 200x higher -- are CEOs 10x more productive today than they were in 1960? https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/130354.pdf

Luck

luck very probably has a significant role in financial and scientific success

luck very probably has a significant role in financial and scientific success: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.07068.pdf

Wasteful Consumption / Frivolous Consumption

the poor don't spend more on entertainment; instead, they spend more on food and healthcare

the poor don't spend more on entertainment; instead, they spend more on food and healthcare: https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/being-rich-means-having-money-to-spend-on-being-richer/389871/

the poor do not spend frivolously

the poor do not spend frivolously: https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/03/household-expenditures-and-income

the poor spend very little on luxury spending (here defined as "goods whose consumption increases as income increases")

the poor spend very little on luxury spending (here defined as "goods whose consumption increases as income increases") https://www.db.com/newsroom_news/Inequality_Jan2018.pdf

General

inequality can be solved: multiple interventions in early life result in large cumulative benefits

inequality can be solved: multiple interventions in early life result in large cumulative benefits: https://www.bostonfed.org/inequality2014/papers/reeves-sawhill.pdf

more-equal societies have higher intergererational income mobility

more-equal societies have higher intergererational income mobility: https://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/medios/44582910.pdf

Economics

income inequality can be solved by progressive economic policies

income inequality can be solved by progressive economic policies: https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-summary-english.pdf https://www.vox.com/2018/7/29/17627134/income-inequality-chart

higher unemployment benefits and higher tax progressivity decrease intergenerational income inequality

higher unemployment benefits and higher tax progressivity decrease intergenerational income inequality: https://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/medios/44582910.pdf

Education

intergenerational immobility of education can be decreased by larger teacher payscales, higher unemployment replacement rate, higher tax progressivity, higher enrollment in preschoool, less tracking (ie, less nonuniform education), and lower enrollment in vocational school

intergenerational immobility of education can be decreased by larger teacher payscales, higher unemployment replacement rate, higher tax progressivity, higher enrollment in preschoool, less tracking (ie, less nonuniform education), and lower enrollment in vocational school: https://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/medios/44582910.pdf

education reduces inequality

education reduces inequality: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/joes.12056 The conditional MRA predictions reported in Table 3 suggest that education has had no effect on average levels of inequality when measured by the Gini coefficient. However, the MRA also indicates that education has led to a compression in incomes: it has resulted in reduced income inequality at both ends of the income distribution. The results also suggest that compared to primary schooling, secondary schooling and educational attainment are more effective at reducing inequality.

increased public education spending is associated with increased educational mobility (difference between years of schooling of child and parent)

increased public education spending is associated with increased educational mobility (difference between years of schooling of child and parent): http://www.oecd.org/social/broken-elevator-how-to-promote-social-mobility-9789264301085-en.htm

Health Mobility

increased health employment is associated with increased health mobility (difference between self-reported health of child and parent)

increased health employment is associated with increased health mobility (difference between self-reported health of child and parent): http://www.oecd.org/social/broken-elevator-how-to-promote-social-mobility-9789264301085-en.htm

Labor Policy

decreased middle class residents falling into poverty is associated with increased active labor market policy (programs to help residents find work) spending

decreased middle class residents falling into poverty is associated with increased active labor market policy (programs to help residents find work) spending: http://www.oecd.org/social/broken-elevator-how-to-promote-social-mobility-9789264301085-en.htm

Weaker Economic Growth (Simple Studies)

income inequality hurts economic growth

income inequality hurts economic growth: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/trends-in-income-inequality-and-its-impact-on-economic-growth_5jxrjncwxv6j-en http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/trends-in-income-inequality-and-its-impact-on-economic-growth-SEM-WP163.pdf

income increases for the bottom 60% are associated with increased GDP, while increases for the top 20% are associated with decreased GDP

income increases for the bottom 60% are associated with increased GDP, while increases for the top 20% are associated with decreased GDP: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2016/12/31/Causes-and-Consequences-of-Income-Inequality-A-Global-Perspective-42986 https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/418850379518705675/729362995523616768/dablanorris15.pdf ```More importantly, we find an inverse relationship between the income share accruing to the rich (top 20 percent) and economic growth. If the income share of the top 20 percent increases by 1 percentage point, GDP growth is actually 0.08 percentage point lower in the following five years, suggesting that the benefits do not trickle down. Instead, a similar increase in the income share of the bottom 20 percent (the poor) is associated with 0.38 percentage point higher growth. This positive relationship between disposable income shares and higher growth continues to hold for the second and third quintiles (the middle class). This result survives a variety of robustness checks, and is in line with recent findings for a smaller sample of advanced economies (OECD 2014).```

Weaker Economic Growth (Meta-Studies)

meta-analysis finds that inequality has a weak negative effect on growth

meta-analysis finds that inequality has a weak negative effect on growth: https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/growth-and-inequality-a-meta-analysis https://sci-hub.tw/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2008.00470.x ```The use of fixed-effects estimators or the inclusion of regional-specific dummies in the regressions has a similar effect of reducing the negative impact of inequality on growth in the cross-section estimates, and of accentuating the positive effect in studies based on pooled data. In accordance with Barro (2000), we found that the correlation between growth and income inequality is different in rich as compared to poor countries. The negative impact of an uneven distribution of income is higher in less developed countries.``````The longer the length of the growth period (ie, from 5 to 10 to 20 years), the lower the coefficient estimates of the correlation between income and economic growth [become]. This result supports the assertion that the mechanism at the basis of the relationship between inequality and growth works differently in the short run as compared to the long run. We also found that the quality of data on income inequality and economic growth is weaker, regardless whether the correlation is estimated to be positive or negative.```

meta-analysis finds that inequality has a weak negative effect on growth, and that wealth inequality has a stronger effect -- a 10% increase in inequality correlates with a 3% decrease in growth

meta-analysis finds that inequality has a weak negative effect on growth, and that wealth inequality has a stronger effect -- a 10% increase in inequality correlates with a 3% decrease in growth: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X15002600 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.038 ```After correcting for these two forms of publication bias, we investigated the sources of heterogeneity by means of a metaregression. As in Dominicis et al. s (2008) our results suggest that for a 5% level of significance: the effect of inequality on growth is negative and more pronounced in less developed countries than in rich countries; the inclusion of regional dummies in the growth regression of the primary studies considerably weakens such effect; expenditure and gross income inequality tend to lead to different estimates of the effect size. However, contrary to it Dominicis et al. (2008), we find that: the impact of inequality on growth is not significantly influenced by the quality of the data on income distribution or by the use of different panel estimation techniques; crosssection studies systematically report a stronger negative impact than panel data studies. Furthermore, our results suggest that wealth inequality is more pernicious to subsequent growth than income inequality is. With the exception of the impact of using expenditure versus gross income, all these results are robust.```

Increased Crime

income inequality explains most of the homicide differences between Canadian provinces, between US states, and between Canada and the US

income inequality explains most of the homicide differences between Canadian provinces, between US states, and between Canada and the US: https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2003-99209-003 Comparison across the Canadian provinces provides a test case in which average income and the Gini are, instead, positively correlated, and we find that the positive relationship between the Gini and the homicide rate is undiminished. Temporal change in the Gini is also shown to be a significant predictor of temporal change in provincial homicide rates. When Canadian provinces and U.S. states are considered together, local levels of income inequality appear to be sufficient to account for the two countries' radically different national homicide rates.

income inequality between neighborhoods strongly predicts property crime

income inequality between neighborhoods strongly predicts property crime: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0042098016643914 https://sci-hub.tw/10.1177/0042098016643914 The average total impact of a 1% increase in the percentage of households under the poverty line is estimated to have a 0.48% increase in the block group property crime rate. The average total impact of a 1% increase in the percentage of high income households is estimated to have a 0.81% decrease in the block group property crime rate. The average total impact of a 1% increase in the income difference from the poorest neighbouring block group is estimated to have a 0.25% increase in the block group property crime rate. These marginal effects are of similar magnitude as in the previous OLS model.

higher income inequality significantly predicts higher homicide and lower trust

higher income inequality significantly predicts higher homicide and lower trust: https://academic.oup.com/eurpub/article/21/2/241/498070 The association between income inequality and homicide (Path c) was statistically significant; each SD increase in income inequality corresponded to 0.82 SD increase in homicide. Associations between income inequality and trust, and between trust and homicide, were also significant. Each SD increase in income inequality corresponded to a 0.65 SD decrease in trust, and each SD increase in trust corresponded to a 0.58 SD decrease in homicide.

Decreased Home Ownership

higher wealth inequality correlates with lower home ownership

higher wealth inequality correlates with lower home ownership: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=SDD/DOC(2018)1&docLanguage=En

Psychological Outcomes

money literally buys happiness

money literally buys happiness: http://www.pnas.org/content/107/38/16489

higher social class is associated with greed

higher social class is associated with greed: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuqGrz-Y_Lc https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/why-those-who-feel-they-have-less-give-more http://www.pnas.org/content/109/11/4086.full

Increased Death

in 1965, if wealth had been equally distributed between countries, 14,060,000 deaths (22.7% of 62,000,000 deaths total) could have been avoided

in 1965, if wealth had been equally distributed between countries, 14,060,000 deaths (22.7% of 62,000,000 deaths total) could have been avoided: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002234337601300405 http://sci-hub.tw/10.1177/002234337601300405

Scope

~60% of private wealth in the USA and ~55% of private wealth in Europe is inherited

~60% of private wealth in the USA and ~55% of private wealth in Europe is inherited: http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/AlvaredoGarbintiPiketty2015.pdf

Scope At Death

very few old people in the USA have over 1 million dollars

very few old people in the USA have over 1 million dollars: https://www.nber.org/chapters/c12429 https://www.nber.org/papers/w17824.pdf

poor people don't survive to become seniors

poor people don't survive to become seniors: http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/05/poor-people-often-dont-survive-to-become-seniors-who-vote.html unformatted

between 1980 and 2008, less than 2.5% of deaths were subject to the estate tax

between 1980 and 2008, less than 2.5% of deaths were subject to the estate tax: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Estate_Tax_Returns_as_a_Percentage_of_Adult_Deaths,_1982_-_2010.gif

Scope By Income

in the USA, higher-income and higher-wealth people are more likely to inherit wealth, and more likely to inherit more wealth, than lower-income people

in the USA, higher-income and higher-wealth people are more likely to inherit wealth, and more likely to inherit more wealth, than lower-income people: https://www.nber.org/papers/w16840 https://www.nber.org/papers/w16840.pdf ```We also found, somewhat surprisingly, that inheritances and other wealth transfers tend to be equalizing in terms of the distribution of household wealth. Indeed, the addition of wealth transfers to other sources of household wealth has had a sizeable effect on reducing the inequality of wealth.```

in the UK, higher-income people are more likely to inherit wealth, and more likely to inherit more wealth, than lower-income people

in the UK, higher-income people are more likely to inherit wealth, and more likely to inherit more wealth, than lower-income people: https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/bns/bn192.pdf

Wealth Inequality From Inheritance

inheritance accounts for 50-60% of the effect of parental wealth on child wealth

inheritance accounts for 50-60% of the effect of parental wealth on child wealth: http://ftp.iza.org/dp10126.pdf The results suggest that bequests are an important source of an individual s wealth status. Regressing child wealth rank on inheritance rank (columns 1 and 4) show high and statistically significant correlations between 0.32 and 0.38. Turning to the baseline generational equation (columns 2 and 5), parental wealth correlations are around the same levels as seen before, between 0.26 and 0.31. When adding ranked inheritance to the baseline model (columns 3 and 6), parental wealth correlations drop to 0.12 and 0.14, which represents a drop of between 50 and 60 per cent. This is a remarkably large reduction, suggesting that inherited wealth accounts for the majority of the measured intergenerational wealth correlation.

direct transfers probably account for most of the environmental correlation between parent and child wealth

direct transfers probably account for most of the environmental correlation between parent and child wealth: https://www.nber.org/papers/w21409.pdf Column 6 of Table 5 presents the estimates when we control for all these possible mechanisms together. All together, we can explain almost 50% of the effect of the biological parent s wealth effect on children s wealth, while we are able to explain only a bit more than 20% of the adoptive parent s wealth effect. 47 Given that most of the environmental effect remains unexplained by earnings, savings rates, and investment returns, direct financial transfers from parents to children are a likely explanation for much of the environmental effect. 48 However, we do not have data on financial transfers that would allow us to study this directly.

Wasted

inheritances are squandered

inheritances are squandered: https://www.nber.org/papers/w12569.pdf The estimated coefficient on the latter is 0.79 with a standard error of 0.03. This suggests that wealth increases by only $0.79 for every dollar in inheritance received. Alternatively stated, individuals consume 21 percent of the inheritance received. Wi