Drone warfare is an issue that is slowly uniting many Americans across multiple party and ideological lines against President Barack Obama. Indeed, as the photo to the right will attest, this controversy has ignited worldwide, given the direct effect drone warfare has had on Middle Eastern nations. This issue has become so divisive that FOX has opted to use the debate as a cornerstone for its plot development in the recent reboot of the network’s series 24: Live Another Day. Ultimately, this increasingly controversial issue touches on several points of debate and areas of political science. For the sake of scope, however, I present this issue, primarily, within the framework of international relations/foreign policy. And again, I present this objectively, insofar as is possible.

Drone warfare ultimately, from the perspective of a political scientist, is a new breed of political issue that straddles military action and foreign policy. Indeed, particularly since 9/11, but even further back than that, the United States has used instances of military action as a means of enforcing its foreign policy. But for its pros and its cons, drone warfare is unique among these instances. As a result, the dilemmas that ensue are anything but simple or black and white.

Briefly, the key arguments for and against drone warfare can be summarized as such. Those in favor of drone warfare stress the apparent success rate of the attacks, the protection it offers American troops by eliminating their presence in the field, and the overall perceived protection from terrorism both in the United States and around the world. Those opposed stress the collateral damage, that is, the loss of innocent human life as a result of drone strikes, their inherent conflict with international law, the inevitable diplomatic strain such action has on the relationships with target countries, and the insurrection that is often ignited as a result. It is within this framework and with respect to each concern that this issue is presented for examination.

To begin, I will start with an examination of the pro-drone strike side of the issue. In order to present and critique this argument accurately, a fundamental lesson of international relations and foreign policy must be learned. Putting it lightly, this lesson is a difficult pill to swallow, even for a political scientist. What must be realized about international relations is that there exists a fundamentally different standard of ethical conduct on this scale of politics. Whereas the loss of an innocent life may not be an acceptable cost of political response to an event domestically, within a state, town, etc., the difficult reality is that, on the scale of international relations, with goals far surpassing those of every day domestic politics, the loss of innocent life may be acceptable. Indeed, in some cases, the loss of many innocent lives may be acceptable. Furthermore, in some cases that are far more grim, the loss of innocent life may not only be acceptable, but encouraged.

Welcome to international relations. Welcome to war. For most, this fundamental principle is enough to make one’s stomach turn. However, each and every country that operates on an international scale accepts this ethical standard. It is the basic principle of sacrificing a number of innocent lives in order to save or protect an even greater number of innocent lives. This is more easily accepted when the benefits of doing so are immediately experienced. For instance, suppose one of the planes hijacked on 9/11 was shot down before it was able to reach its intended target. Though a number of innocent lives would be lost in the process, an even greater number of innocent lives would have been saved. What makes this lesson more difficult to process is the reality that, in the real world, most instances of benefit-for-cost with respect to human life are not immediately felt. Indeed, in some cases, one can only speculate that killing a terrorist with a drone strike that consequently kills 100 innocent civilians has protected a greater number of innocent lives because it is not known what this terrorist could have/would have done had the drone strike not taken place.

As difficult as it is to accept, it is the reality one faces when examining international relations. I must note that I am not saying that this is good or bad, only that it is the case. Indeed, one can center the differing theoretical bases for discussing international relations around this point, though that would be a post entirely its own. If you’re interested in learning more about international relations theory, there are links at the end to various resources.

With this fundamental basis out of the way, one can begin to dive into an examination of the pro-drone warfare side of the issue. Building upon the aforementioned ethical dilemma, one aspect of war and policy that drone warfare advocates cite is that any time a country deploys troops for an operation, the damage to infrastructure and the number of collateral casualties increases, virtually always (Clausewitz 1984). Moreover, this immediately puts U.S. lives in danger which, based on the aforementioned ethical standards, is immediately less than ideal because if people have to die, the United States sure as hell does not want lives lost to be American. Again, one sees the ethical dilemma of valuing particular lives over others. Ultimately, however, the logic is that, if deploying troops will place more lives (particularly American lives) at risk than a drone strike, then a drone strike is the obvious choice.

A second point that pro-drone warfare advocates cite is their effectiveness. Targets taken out by drones are ultimately done so much faster and more efficiently than with a traditional troop deployment or raids. By taking out the human element, drones are, at least in theory, much more accurate, can take out more targets in infinitely less time, and are ultimately much cheaper to use compared to other technological forms of warfare, troop deployment, and training, all while keeping American lives, at least directly, out of danger (Knoops 2012). Building upon this fact, drones are far better at waging the types of war fought in a modern world. In a world where interstate warfare, that is, war between two states, is virtually nonexistent, intrastate warfare (war within a state) and insurgency come to dominate. Ultimately, as advanced and properly trained as modern military infantry is, they are ill-equipped to respond on a large-scale to this new age of warfare.

Interstate and insurgency warfare cannot be properly responded to by sending large amounts of infantry “invasion style” into an area where these conflicts are being fought. This is ultimately the case because the nature of this type of warfare is irregular and autonomous. Small groups of insurgents are scattered throughout various regions throughout various countries all across the globe. The logistics of an infantry style military response, while having their proper role in responding to such conflict, do not do so as effectively as drones. It could be said that drones are ultimately far better at most key aspects of war–intelligence gathering and target elimination–both of which can be performed on larger scales, cheaper and more efficiently, with no direct threat to American lives.

To summarize the pro-drone warfare side of this debate, drones eliminate the need to place American lives in direct danger, drones eliminate human error and limitation, drones are far better suited at waging modern warfare, and they ultimately perform better than traditional means across key categories of intelligence gathering and target elimination.

However, the benefits of drone warfare (as those in favor would consider them) are not without consequences. Those opposed to drone warfare cite several reasons. The first of these stems from those that do not accept the nature of international relations. This is not to say they possess less intelligence or simply “don’t understand,” but rather, they tend to be more Wilsonian, that is, idealist or neoliberal in terms of their views of international relations theory. However, some may simply fail to see that there is no real alternative (at least yet) to this aforementioned ethical dilemma. Beyond that, the primary reasons for drone warfare opposition are rooted in collateral damage, international law, and “blow back,” that is, direct retaliation for such strikes. There are many other reasons people may oppose drone warfare, much like there are many other reasons many are in favor, however, for the sake of scope, the main points are addressed here.

Looking at collateral damage, one disturbing fact hides a considerable amount of the collateral damage associated with drone attacks. President Obama changed the definition of “enemy combatant” in order to make drone strikes appear more accurate. Now, regardless of intelligence reports pre-strike, any “military-aged males within the strike zone” are considered “enemy combatants” based on the logic that they are “probably up to no good” (Becker and Shane 2012). I note this here because it is unclear how much this skews the statistics listed later in this post. It is crucial that one keeps this in mind when considering the issue moving forward.

Clearly, collateral damage is an issue, so much so that the President of the United States went so far as to obscure the scale of such damage in drone strike reports. The following table demonstrates a key ratio to consider when determining just how “accurate” drone strikes are claimed to be. The table shows the ration between High Value Targets Killed, that is, known terrorists on kill lists or in intelligence reports, and total deaths, that is, enemy combatants and civilians alike.

As drone strikes increase, so has the number of total deaths, as one might expect. To put it in perspective, in phase 4, in 2009 and 2010, 161 drone strikes occurred. With total deaths at 1029, this is an average of about 7 deaths per strike. This information comes before Obama’s changing of the “enemy combatant” definition, which occurred around the beginning of 2011. In other words, there are more deaths occurring overall, but fewer high value targets are being eliminated along with them. This calls into question a fundamental issue that needs to be addressed.

In the past, before drone warfare became commonplace, when intelligence gathered revealed the location of enemy combatants, it was far more difficult to determine whether or not to eliminate the target because it would involve a complex military operation and putting American lives directly in danger. However, in an era where drones are the primary means of responding to such intelligence, the decision can be made with far more ease. That said, this may account for the increase in strikes and decrease in high value targets killed. It also raises the question, does the ease of drone usage create an impetus to respond to intelligence that may not be thoroughly accurate because the perceived risks are so drastically less significant than they once were? This ultimately proves to be a fundamental question and problem with drone warfare, because the likely answer is yes. Indeed, if the answer is yes, one could argue that, by extension, drone strikes therefore become less accurate and less efficient than small, tactical, infantry led operations.

At any rate, particularly with the aforementioned in mind, it is difficult to tell whether or not drone strikes under President Obama create less collateral damage than infantry operations. Throughout history, as Clausewitz demonstrates, this has always been the case. But in an era where drone strikes may be made with intelligence that is not subject to the same rigorous quality test, this may not be the case. Determining this, as it sits, is virtually impossible, in part because the average citizen does not have access to these intelligence reports. But the possibility is something that should be considered with a great weight.

Beyond collateral damage, international law comes into play with drone warfare as well. International law is both complex and insufficient to address the presence of drone warfare. Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops writes a detailed article about the specific legal instances that ultimately amount to international law violations or gray areas by drone strikes, which is listed at the bottom of this page. However, this post is going to address the greater problem that this fact raises. Those opposed to drone warfare cite that the modern world is not legally prepared for the adoption of robotic warfare.

Indeed, the nature of insurgency and terrorism as enemies has only recently gained clarity in the international system, and robotic warfare is nowhere near having been addressed in a cohesive manner. Determining the status of civilian (CIA operatives) operated drones, determining the legality of strikes in particular countries, the legal ramifications for collateral damage, etc. have yet to be addressed in any meaningful way, and the opposition cites this, legitimately, as a source of great concern. The ethical acceptance of the inevitability of collateral damage in war has, in the past, always been made with respect to international law because, more often than not, states have been fighting against one another, subjecting all belligerents to a certain set of legal parameters. However, operating against insurgency is not subject to the same legal system because individual states are not waging war against one another. This problem ultimately raises the concern that since innocent lives are at stake, should such strikes be taking place in the absence of specific international regulation? Ultimately, it is a difficult question to answer.

Lastly, the third key point drone warfare opponents cite is the often inevitable retaliation of individuals in target countries. As the picture at the beginning of this post reveals, the direct effects of these drone strikes are felt by innocent civilians everywhere. People have lost children, family members, and friends to collateral damage as a result of drone strikes in every instance since they began being used. Coupled with the recent massive increase in the sheer number of strikes, opposition groups have formed in direct retaliation. Indeed, specific terrorist organizations have formed throughout much of the Middle East citing drone strikes by the United States as their sole issue for developing (Boyle 2013). One can see that, almost paradoxically, the effort to reduce the threat of terrorism through drone strikes has, in effect, fostered the development of terrorism. This is ultimately considered to be a fatal flaw by the opposition to drone warfare.

So here the debate sits.

Pros

Logistical benefit and effectiveness over traditional military action.

Better response to modern global enemies.

American lives are not directly placed in danger.

Human element largely removed in combat operations.

Traditionally, collateral damage is limited relative to traditional military action.

Cons

Accuracy and effectiveness likely bloated.

International law limitations.

May encourage action based on less accurate intelligence.

Creates blow back.

True level of collateral damage cannot clearly be assessed.

One can see that this issue is not a simple one. It is a complex issue that requires multiple theoretical, ethical, legal, and logistical considerations. Indeed, this examination raises a fundamental question that, if properly addressed, may direct the debate as to the way in which drone warfare in the future plays out, if at all. Is an assessment of the cost-benefit analysis used by President Obama and company necessary? Personally, I think the answer is yes. By addressing what scenarios would constitute issuing a drone strike, one can begin to paint a clearer picture of the realpolitik of drone warfare.

This issue could certainly be discussed in much more depth at great length, but for the sake of scope, this survey accurately portrays the key points of the debate. Feel free to post your own opinions and questions in the comments section.

Sources and Additional Reading

Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 1995.

On War, Carl Von Clausewitz, 1984.

The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare, Michael J. Boyle, 2013.

Legal, Political and Ethical Dimensions of Drone Warfare under International Law: A Preliminary Survey, Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, 2012.

The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan, Ian Graham Ronald Shaw and Majed Akhter, 2012.

Drones and Imagination: A Response to Paul Kahn, Samuel Moyn, 2013.

Drone Warfare: Blow Back from the New American Way of War, Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens, Matt Flannes, 2011.

New York Times Report on Obama’s Definition Change – http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?_r=3&pagewanted=1&

New York Times on Drone Warfare – http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/13/opinion/let-the-military-run-drone-warfare.html

Daily Kos Article on Obama’s Definition Change – http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/05/29/1095594/-WOW-to-avoid-counting-civilian-deaths-Obama-WH-reclassified-Militants-to-include-civilians#

Articles by Huff Post on Drone Warfare – http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tag/drone-warfare/

CNN Armed Drones Future of Warfare? – http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/13/opinion/bergen-armed-drones-key-future-warfare/

CSMonitor on Drone Warfare – http://www.csmonitor.com/content/search?SearchText=drone+warfare