At the Harvard Kennedy School’s commencement ceremony this May, former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry observed that “a lot of folks want to stop the world and get off...Yes, technology is transformative,” he explained, “but if it was your job that was disrupted and nothing replaced it, guess what? You would find zero comfort in the fact that some technology that stole your job also gave you a smartphone that lets you binge-watch a future that’s out of reach for you and everybody you grew up with.” Sustained U.S. engagement in the world depends on public support: even the most rousing case for preserving the postwar order is unlikely to gain enduring traction unless it demonstrates why flesh-and-blood Americans have a stake in its success. While “America First” may appear to prioritize U.S. national interests, departing radically from the foreign policy consensus of the past seven decades is likely to diminish the country’s influence—hence widespread disappointment with the Trump administration’s rejection of the TPP and abandonment of the Paris accord on climate change.

Whither Engagement?

In April 2014, responding to a journalist’s suggestion that some critics construed his foreign policy doctrine to be one of “weakness,” President Obama observed that “[y]ou hit singles, you hit doubles; every once in a while we may be able to hit a home run.” While his proposition was widely derided as defeatist, it is likely to grow more valid over time. Foreign policy successes are less likely be sweeping and total; instead, they are more likely be tentative and incremental. American University’s James Goldgeier and George Washington University’s Elizabeth Saunders note that “successful foreign policy is largely invisible. It often means paying up front for benefits that are hard to see until you lose them, or that will only be obvious when you really need them. Sometimes, successful foreign policy even means keeping real victories quiet.” That judgment should not dissuade Americans from engaging in world affairs; it should, however, temper their expectations about the scope of the dividends that such activities will accrue.

Foreign policy successes are less likely TO be sweeping and total; instead, they are more likely be tentative and incremental.

The opening to Cuba, for example, may not transform America’s relations with Latin and South America overnight, but it could gradually allow the country to rebuild trust and strengthen trade and investment ties in the Western Hemisphere.

The landmark P5+1 deal with Iran may not eliminate tensions between Washington and Tehran on a range of issues, but it could emerge as a case study in successful nonproliferation diplomacy, stimulate selective cooperation between the two countries, and reduce the influence Saudi Arabia has within the Middle East as well as on U.S. foreign policy.

The United States and China will not become allies; the evolution of their relationship is likely to be marked by piecemeal experimentation and continual readjustment, not front-page victories. But if they continue to strengthen their economic interdependence, deepen their shared efforts to counter climate change, and think imaginatively to identify other potential areas of cooperation—Zbigniew Brzezinski ventured that “a growing U.S.-PRC partnership in coping with the Middle Eastern crisis is an historically significant test of their ability to shape and enhance together wider global stability”—their relationship could mature over time and contribute significantly to a more stable world order. Deepening military, economic, and diplomatic engagement with Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia may not be glamorous, but it could contribute to strengthening what former U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter calls “a principled and inclusive security network” in the Asia-Pacific.

Building coalitions of governments, businesses, and civil society actors to tackle the pressing challenges of our time—climate change, nuclear proliferation, the swelling ranks of forcibly displaced persons, and the growing risk of famine in failing states, to name but a few—is slow, painful work, but it is indispensable, and the United States is uniquely disposed to undertake it. Unfortunately, though, the years ahead are likely to witness growing tension between the ethos of the American people and the demands of foreign policy. Georgetown government professor Daniel Byman contends that

Americans like to think that all problems can be solved and that, if they aren’t, incompetence or malfeasance is to blame. Often, however, the challenge is overwhelming and U.S. influence is limited. The problem is…that few foreign policy problems can truly be solved. Most can at best be managed, and just getting by is often the best we can do.

With Byman’s conclusion in mind, U.S. policymakers should recalibrate their standards for successful engagement in world affairs: lest they succumb to a defensive, even fatalistic, mindset, they must develop a greater tolerance for setbacks; focus more on managing problems than on solving them; pursue incremental gains rather than sweeping victories; appreciate more fully the limits to U.S. power, especially military; and accept that world order is neither a fixed state nor an attainable end, but a fluid condition and an ongoing process. To do so, however, they will have to give themselves the opportunity to pause and think—an opportunity that is becoming both more rare and more invaluable. New York Times columnist David Leonhardt recently recalled how George Shultz used to reserve an hour for himself each week when he was secretary of state, only taking calls from his wife and President Reagan:

Shultz…told me that his hour of solitude was the only way he could find time to think about the strategic aspects of his job. Otherwise, he would be constantly pulled into moment-to-moment tactical issues, never able to focus on larger questions of the national interest. And the only way to do great work, in any field, is to find time to consider the larger questions.

Those who hope to advance U.S. foreign policy interests through rousing slogans and transformational achievements are likely to be disappointed; those who instead take periodic “Shultz hours” and approach the undertaking of world ordering with patience are likely to prove more successful.