FOLLOWING a brief hiatus in its testing programme, North Korea launched a missile in the small hours of November 29th that, unlike any previous missile, appeared to be able to strike any city in America. It was the third test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) since July, and the 20th missile test this year. After watching the launch, the country’s leader, Kim Jong Un, who had spent the previous day visiting a catfish farm, announced: “We have finally realised the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power.”

Mr Kim eschewed the extravagantly bellicose rhetoric he normally indulges in after a successful missile launch. His “solemn declaration” emphasised that North Korea would be a “responsible nuclear power” that “would not pose any threat to any country and region” as long as the interests of North Korea “are not infringed upon”. It sounded like a plea for North Korea to be respected as a nuclear state, not vilified as a pariah.

Like the two earlier launches, the missile was fired on a highly elevated trajectory, reaching a height of 4,475km during its 53-minute flight. On a normal trajectory, experts reckon, its range would be around 13,000km—enough to strike almost anywhere in the world (see map). The government news agency, KCNA, claimed that the missile carried a “super-large heavy warhead”, implying that it could deliver a hydrogen bomb of the kind the North detonated in an underground test on September 3rd.

There is no way of knowing whether the claim is true. If the payload was actually lighter than KCNA says, the missile’s range could drop to 8,000km when fitted with a real warhead, according to Michael Elleman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Most analysts believe that North Korea has managed to miniaturise a crude nuclear device. But it may not yet be able to make a more destructive H-bomb small enough to fit on a missile. There are also still doubts as to whether North Korea has mastered the technology needed to protect a warhead during an ICBM’s descent. In the previous ICBM test in July, the re-entry vehicle seemed to burn and disappear.

It would, however, be rash to assume that North Korea’s engineers will not soon be able to pack a miniaturised H-bomb into a robust re-entry vehicle. An indication of the speed with which they are learning is that the latest missile was launched with less warning than previous ones, suggesting that the lengthy process of fuelling it may have been carried out before it was transported to its launch pad, thus shortening the time of its vulnerability to pre-emptive attack.

Nonetheless, within six minutes of the launch South Korean forces fired missiles from a ground-based unit, an Aegis destroyer and a KF-16 fighter, in an apparent simulation of a pre-emptive strike on a missile launch. A military spokesperson said the drill “shows our resolve and ability to strike the origin of provocation”.

Donald Trump contented himself with telling reporters: “We’ll take care of it.” Rex Tillerson, America’s secretary of state, said that “diplomatic options remain viable and open, for now…The United States remains committed to finding a peaceful path to denuclearisation and to ending belligerent actions by North Korea.”

Nobody really believes that there is a diplomatic path that will lead Mr Kim to give up his nuclear weapons. But diplomacy may yet play a role in crisis management and thus reduce the risks of a disastrous miscalculation. That may be what Mr Kim is now angling for.