These new reports follow an earlier strike overnight on Dec. 1-2, 2017, when at least five missiles hurtled toward the city of Al Kiswah, another suburb of Damascus situated some 10 miles to the south, according to SANA. In that incident, Syrian officials said Israeli forces had employed surface-to-surface weapons, while other reports said that the Israeli Air Force jets had launched cruise missiles while inside Lebanese air space.

Syria said that the target was an ammunition depot belonging to the country’s 1st Division, while international media outlets said the attack leveled a base that experts believed to be Iranian-operated. It was unclear if there were any Iranians actually at the site at the time. As is commonly the case, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) declined to confirm or deny that any of these strikes even occurred. However, “let me reiterate Israel’s policy. We will not allow a regime [Iran] hell bent on the annihilation of the Jewish state to acquire nuclear weapons,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in part of a taped address that authorities released on Dec. 2, 2017. “We will not allow that regime to entrench itself militarily in Syria, as it seeks to do, for the express purpose of eradicating our state.”

The Israeli prime minister had taped the remarks on Nov. 30, 2017 and Israeli authorities said they would present the full speech as part of think tank Brookings’ annual Saban Forum in Washington, D.C., which occurred on Dec. 3, 2017. Earlier in November 2017, Netanyahu had insisted that Israel could not and would not allow Iran to establish a military presence near his country’s border, a sentiment other members of his cabinet have echoed recently. Though the release of the statement was not officially tied to the reported strike, it seems hard to believe the two events were unrelated. After the incident, experts and observers quickly obtained satellite imagery that appeared to show heavy damage to a suspected Iranian-run site in Al Kiswah.

In November 2017, the private U.K.-based McKenzie Intelligence Services first released analysis suggesting the facilities were part of an expanding Iranian presence near Damascus. Based on satellite imagery from October 2017, the analysts identified several barracks and other buildings, as well as additional structures under construction. We don’t know whether the site was complete and occupied at the time of the reported attack in December 2017. It is possible that Iranians, Iranian-backed fighters including Hezbollah personnel, or a mixture of both were situated at the facilities at the time. The Times of Israel, citing Lebanon’s Al Mustaqbal television and Saudi Arabia’s Al Arabiya, reported that 12 members of Iran’s powerful paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which operators in Syria overly to train and advise Syrian and other local forces, had died in the attack.

Syria claimed to have shot down two of the incoming missiles over Al Kiswah and an amateur video, widely available on social media, appeared to show one of them exploding in mid-air, but there has been no independent confirmation of the intercepts. Assad has threatened to retaliate against Israel over previous strikes and has attempted to intercept attacking aircraft during past attacks, though his forces have not been able to successfully shoot down any of them. It is possible that Israel could have decided to use ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles in this instance in light of Syria’s increasing attempts to knock down its aircraft. Israeli ground forces would be able to hit Al Kiswah from within the country by using the EXTRA GPS-guided artillery rockets, which have a range of more than 90 miles.

IMI A test launch of IMI's Predator Hawk.

Regardless of the weapons Israel used in the strike, and though it would be broadly in line with its earlier strikes in Syria, directly attacking Iranian forces would mark a significant escalation in the campaign. Since Syria descended into civil war in 2011, Israel has repeatedly launched punitive attacks into the country. The ostensible goal of this has largely been to prevent the transfer of significant amounts of advanced weaponry, including ballistic and anti-ship cruise missile technology, to the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah. Hezbollah has been fighting on behalf of Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad, establishing itself more fully inside the country. Iran has been supporting both parties, as well as a number of other militias, as well as deploying its own forces to help defeat the anti-regime insurgency. Israel has steadily expanded its aerial campaign in Syria to include both regime or Iranian targets, with the September 2017 strike on the Syrian Scientific Studies and Researchers Center site already marking an important escalation in the size and scope of the operations. The main reason for this shift appears to be the success that Iranian forces and their allies have had in establishing a land route that would link Tehran with its Shia Muslim partners in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, which has incensed Israel.

IAF An Israeli F-16 during a training exercise.

As the threat of ISIS terrorists has waned in both Iraq and Syria, Iran and their regional partners have been able to consolidate these gains. Underscoring this increased Iranian influence and cooperation in the region, in August 2017, ImageSat International (iSi), another private satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence firm, published analysis of a reported ballistic missile site in Syria. Based on the imagery, iSi suggested the Iran was either helping Syria expand its own ballistic missile facilities or was setting up its own sites in the country as a way to disperse its own program and protect it from international scrutiny and attack, or both. Either way, both the Syrian government and Hezbollah had to the potential to benefit from the new developments. In the meantime, Russia, another of Assad’s principle allies, has made various attempts to broker a deal to either stop or at least slow Israeli strikes. Though Syrian forces and their partners have in principle agreed to respect a buffer zone along the border with Israel, Netanyahu’s government has indicated repeatedly indicated that this is still unacceptable. There have also been numerous sporadic clashes in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights region throughout the course of the Syrian civil war, though it has been unclear in many cases what particular party to that conflict has been responsible. In October 2017, Israeli tanks fired into Syria after a mortar round exploded on open ground near their position.

Zachi Evenor via Wikimedia An Israeli Merkava Mk 4 tank.

“We do not accept spillovers,” Netanyahu’s said according to an official statement at the time. “If they hit us we return fire – and it doesn’t take much time.” At the same time, Israel has been steadily seeking to grow its ties with both traditional allies and even past opponents over shared a shared interest in containing Iran. Whether or it was an air- or ground-launched strike, the attack on Al Kiswah came just weeks after the IDF hosted dozens of fighter jets from, officially seven countries, including the United States, France, and Germany, for an exercise called Blue Flag 2017. It was the first time the latter two has taken part in the biennial drills, which began in 2013.

USAF A German Eurofighter Typhoon emerges from a hardened aircraft shelter at Uvda Air Force Base in Israel during Blue Flag 2017.

A pair of diplomatic incidents earlier in 2017 threatened to upend Israeli-Jordanian relations. The Israelis briefly restricted access to part Jerusalem's Old City that Jordan acts as the custodian of and an Israeli embassy guard in the Jordanian capital Amman killed two Jordanian citizens. The diplomatic wounds remain open, but both countries appear to be committed to maintaining their defense and security ties in the meantime. “There are some strategic problems that Iran is involved in in our area,” Jordan’s King Abdullah II told The Washington Post in an interview in April 2017. “But here, again, is an opportunity: bringing Israel and the Arabs closer together.” Israel seems to have recognized this itself and appears to be in the process of conducting significant outreach elsewhere in the Arab world, especially to Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. In November 2017, IDF Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot gave an unprecedented interview with Saudi online newspaper Elaph, in which he suggested Israel would be willing to share intelligence with the Kingdom regarding Iran. This was first time any senior Israeli military officer had given an interview to a Saudi media outlet of any kind, according to Israel’s Haaretz. Israel does not have diplomatic relations with the government in Riyadh, which itself does not official recognize the legitimacy of the Jewish state.

Sipa via AP IDF Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot

There are reports that this could change as Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman continues to oversee a historic purge of his political opponents and consolidate power in the country. Commonly known as MbS, experts see the royal heir as being the driving force behind new Saudi domestic and foreign policies, which heavily focus on containing Iran’s influence. He had previously been in charge of directing the country’s controversial intervention in Yemen, where, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels are seeking to establish control. U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration have also been broadly supportive of closer cooperation between Israel and various Arab states to form a cohesive front against Iran. In October 2017, Trump announced his own new hard line policy toward the Iranian regime, designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization, seeking to redefine the controversial deal over Tehran’s nuclear developments, and calling America's allies to join with the new push. Trump has also overseen increased sales of military equipment to Saudi Arabia and other American partners in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of an official permanent U.S. military base in Israel, and is reportedly in talks to recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. The latter decision could potentially up-end the Israel-Palestinian peace process, as both parties claim the city as their exclusive capital, but would underscore the administration’s support for the Jewish state. However Israel’s diplomatic ties develop throughout the Middle East, it seems that the country’s government feels it either has increasing political leeway to expand its punitive actions in Syria or that it simply must act to prevent Iran from becoming anymore entrenched, or some combination of both. These strikes, whether they are from air or ground platforms, will almost certainly continue in the near term at least, and they look to be steadily expanding in both size and scope. Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com