That leaves the West. Despite all the moral outrage, Western governments have made clear the limits to which they are prepared to go to counter Moscow’s aggression and help defend Ukraine. At the very beginning, they ruled out the use of force in favor of political and economic sanctions. They then tailored sanctions to punish Russia, while risking as little damage to their own economies as possible. The United States has pressed for harsher sanctions, but it risks considerably less than its European partners—its trade with Russia is less than 10 percent of theirs.

To be sure, it is only prudent for the West to seek to limit the damage to itself, but the sanctions levied so far done little to deter Russia, and those that might—like bans on Russia energy exports—would carry grave risks for European economies, which have yet to recover from the global crisis of 2008-2009 and many of which are highly dependent on Russia for energy. No European government is prepared to run those risks.

Beyond sanctions, Ukraine needs Western support to deal with its mounting economic problems. Earlier this year, before the crisis began, Ukraine’s leaders estimated they needed $35 billion in 2014-15 just to bridge foreseeable financing gaps, not to speak of the tens of billions more that would be required to repair and modernize the economy. Even then, Ukraine would remain dependent on Russia for a large share of its energy

supply and as a market for its manufactured goods, which are not competitive in Europe. So far, the West has wavered, wary of providing large sums to a government in disarray, of still dubious legitimacy and run by a political class riven by massive corruption. Again, a prudent approach, perhaps, but also a sign of the limits of Western support for Ukraine.

Tellingly, throughout this crisis, no prominent Western leader has seen it fit to make a major address to explain what is at stake in Ukraine and to request significant sacrifices to advance Western goals. Indeed, it was the upsurge of public outrage over the downing of Flight MH17 and the desecration of the crash site that compelled reluctant European

governments to accede to the more stringent sectoral sanctions against Russia. But with that outrage subsiding, the preference remains to focus on what both governments and publics see as their more salient domestic political and economic challenges rather than divert resources to either punish Russia or help Ukraine.

Putin knows all this, even if many armchair generals in Washington do not. This balance of interests, resources, and sacrifice means that the West and Kyiv will have to accommodate Russia to some extent, especially on the question of Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation and Russian influence in Eastern Ukraine, to resolve the crisis. Many in the West will oppose any accommodation as a reward for Russia’s aggression. But it is the reality both the West and Kyiv face, given the Ukrainian government’s resources and the West’s low tolerance for sacrifice. Such an outcome might not be morally satisfying, and it is far from ideal, but it would provide Ukrainians with an opportunity to focus on the formidable challenges of economic reconstruction and political reform sheltered from bitter geopolitical competition and rebellion in the east. That is not a bad outcome.