But changes were and still are slow. Agricultural policy changes hit roadblocks because there were economic losers. Without resources to head off opposition, changes were pursued half-heartedly. Special Economic Zones suffered from lack of infrastructure, the country’s reputation with foreign investors and a paranoid bureaucracy still trying to adjust to the changes needed to work with the outside world.

These changes are real. They were top-down, popular with the mid-level officials and buoyed by a grassroots community of entrepreneurs. But North Korea also mentioned it would never embark on “reform and opening”. While North Korea experimented, they resist the idea that ideologically they would be the same as other countries like China, Vietnam or South Korea. In implementation, this contradiction meant that North Korea would adapt ideas from abroad to its own circumstances – which include its geopolitical and security situation and its own experience of what works within the context of its history, political and social structures.

Essentially, they were “reforming” but in their own way and at their own pace. We wished North Korea would move faster. John Delury is right that North Korea needs a stable geopolitical environment before it could experiment more.

In 2011, Andray and I wrote an article in Harvard International Review arguing that the North Korea leadership was shifting its legitimacy towards economic development. They had prioritized something that was never a priority, and tying their hands publicly. In 2012, I visited Washington DC to share our thesis backed by analyses from training North Koreans and what we heard from governments in Southeast Asia that had hosted North Korean delegations. Speculating about intentions is a tricky business – I can only say I observe changes and actions, and speculated with some basis that this was a priority of Chairman Kim Jong Un. I have never met Kim Jong Un but talked to people who had done so. Many in DC laughed at us and dismissed us as “economic apologists” for North Korea. Some wise scholars and analysts probed our thesis and evidence. As the crisis intensified in 2016 and 2017, my property was physically attacked by people who hated our message that North Korea can integrate into international society, donors fled a challenging situation and if not for Blockchain technology and Bitcoin, a space I was forced to move into, I would have ended up living on the streets. Another story for another time.

That brings us to today. Secretary Pompeo is offering economic assistance and North Korea denies asking for it. Based on our experience in the country, this is my humble speculation on this exchange:

1. North Korea’s top priority is survival and security. The leadership does not see security as something to trade away.

2. North Korea places significant importance on economic development. This creates space for a creative deal but economic assistance is not a direct quid-pro-quo for degrading their security situation.

3. Understanding where US fits into the North Korea economic situation is key to a deal: US investments will be dwarfed by Chinese, South Korean and possibly Japanese investments. North Korea’s economic needs are better met by other parties but its security needs are best met by American AND South Korean assurances.

4. BUT US economic assistance matters because North Korea cares about legitimizing effect (e.g. sanctions), diversification (vis a vis China), international debt relief (e.g. World Bank/IMF), and US technology/entrepreneurship (e.g. Silicon Valley).

5. And US should care about economic cooperation not because it is a direct quid pro quo for denuclearization, but because it stabilizes what should be an ongoing relationship and can reinforce US security assurances to North Korea

Geoffrey See

Founder, Choson Exchange

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