Loyal to the Polis, The Greek Hoplite

The Ancient Greek polis used citizen militias as the primary fighting force in the ancient world. The most important fact to know about these men is that they were not professionally trained soldiers; they were amateur fighters. These men were all from the same community – they grew up together, fought together and most certainly died together. They fought using a basic but elegant formation – the phalanx. The word phalanx literally means ‘the roller’, the objective of the phalanx was to group up men into a huge shielded unit and smash the enemy’s phalanx to pieces. The phalanx would usually be eight ranks deep in a rectangular formation .The men in the phalanx were called hoplites, named after their shield, the hoplon . The hoplon was a gigantic piece of wood in a circular shape that the hoplite used to defend himself and the man to his left. It had bronze around the rim, but by 425BC the Spartans were deploying shields entirely faced with a thin bronze sheet. The hoplon included two straps on the inner base to help the hoplite keep his grip . The central armband, the porpax, helped the hoplite by letting him hold the hoplon at an angle able to deflect blows off of it . The shield was the central piece of equipment for the hoplite – so important that Spartan mothers would tell their sons to return with it, or on it (as dropping the hoplon symbolises cowardice and renders the phalanx vulnerable). The hoplite also carried a spear to fight the enemy over his shield named a dory, effective as if the iron point or handle broke the other portion would still be functionable . It measured around 2-3 metres overall. In addition, they carried a short sword in case the dory broke beyond use. They fought foot against foot, shield against shield and crest upon crest with breastplates close to the other men to fight .

As each hoplite was carrying around seventy to eighty pounds of bronze, the initial engagement probably resembled two armoured vehicles smashing into each other . The objective was the ‘othismos’ or ‘push’ – to shove through and break up the opposing phalanx, which when broken could be attacked by light-armed troops and cavalry . Victory depended on every man standing his own ground – if there was a full-scale breakdown defeat was inevitable . Complicated manoeuvres were rarely attempted because these made it difficult for a phalanx to retain its formation . Few complicated manoeuvres were even devised (such as the Lakonian exeligmos) . This discipline of the phalanx trained citizens to understand their civil and social rights by making the polis their primary source of obligation . The phalanx was the main focus on the ancient battlefield but there were other combatants worth mentioning – the cavalry who rode down fleeing enemies, the light infantry who pelted the hoplites with javelins and the slingers and archers who rained missiles from afar. These other soldiers, though not as revered as the hoplite, were key to winning on the ancient battlefield. They aided the hoplites in harassing the enemy phalanx – as soon as the enemy phalanx broke it generally meant victory had been achieved. The cavalry, light infantry and missile launchers were all there to aid the hoplite along the way.

This kind of warfare is performed all across Greece before and during the Peloponnesian War. Citizen armies are the primary fighting force for city-states and thus are advantageous due to the fact they could perform in the war and then return home to their peacetime jobs with little obstruction. As wars were usually over in a single pitched battle with few causalities, a state could afford to send its citizens as soldiers instead of purchasing professional mercenaries for a one-time use.

But why would these men brave such a dangerous and hostile environment? Using the militia had one key advantage over using hired specialists – they had a stake in the outcome of the war and were defending their own land. It was kill or be killed. As most hoplites in the militia were farmers during times of peace they are literally defending their own farmlands. If the enemy breaks through and pillages the land surrounding the polis then the soldiers cannot feed themselves or their families. Fighting in the militia wasn’t just a job, it was a civil honour. The militia were not just defending their own land but the land of their friends too. Trundle sums it saying that warfare was a participatory and social obligation to the community . Everyone knew everybody else in the polis – they were small communities and you fought with the men you grew up with. Your brother in law, your brother and your father – victory meant defending them as well as yourself. And if you did not defend their land they would know. To flee from a phalanx or to not stand your ground meant running backwards into all the other men around you – they will see you running and stories of your cowardice will be told around the polis as soon as they return home. A man’s reputation was his life – being known as a war hero who held his ground and aided his friends means a man would enjoy a loving community. Everyone would know his name as a hero which gave him social perks – marriage options, money and friendship. Warfare primarily presented an opportunity for status enhancement and personal riches . However, being known as a coward who abandoned his friends in battle would mean a man is socially dead. He has no worth to anyone – he has no social perks and will most likely die lonely. He would lose his social worth irrespective of his wealth or birth and live with an everlasting sense of disgrace . Therefore performing well in combat (standing your ground) was essentially life or death in more than one way for the Greek hoplites. There was also a state funeral for those who died in war. In Athens, they were given a procession in which the whole population was invited to attend . There was no physical mandatory military service but every man knew the only way to prove himself a man was to fight, and fight well. This means using the militia was extremely effective for the Greek poleis.

These types of soldiers were advantageous before the Peloponnesian War due to several factors. They were cheap, extremely effective at defending their land and literally an army on demand. They were given three days of rations (mostly onions and cheese) .

Training was not an issue. Being amateur soldiers meant they did not need extensive training. This meant the state saved more money as they did not need to train their hoplites much. The men fighting also provided their own equipment . Skill was a bonus for a militia hoplite. Fighting in the phalanx required little skill – follow the man in front and if he should fall take his place. Trundle argues that hoplite armies relied as much on morale as on skill . Morale was key to combat – if the phalanx broke the battle was surely over.

Warfare was communal as well as civic – the defending militia fought furiously to protect their families and state. The citizens accepted it as their duty to fight in person for their city in times of war: this duty was seemly unquestioned, at least until after the Peloponnesian War when wars became longer and citizens could not afford to be away from their farms for the extended periods being demanded .

Loyal to a Fault

However, after the Peloponnesian War, the citizen militia saw a sharp decline in use. The men fighting were barely trained, if at all. To be a hoplite in the phalanx you had to be physically strong to wear the kit but the only real tactic they knew (disregarding Spartans) was to follow the man in front and take his place fighting at the front line if he should fall. It was an elegant system which required no immense training and simple enough for any man to do. As long as the soldier held his ground against the enemy he was doing his job. But if the phalanx formation should collapse then chaos would occur. Generals could not regroup their men in the mayhem – because hoplite helmets had small eye slots and no piercings for the ears it was practically impossible for generals to give precise orders in the midst of battle . Instead, they would shout words of encouragement to their men, attempting to aid the morale . As specialist troops drastically increased in use in the fourth century, citizen militias could no longer be used as a safe method. These specialists were highly professional and could perform complicated manoeuvres whilst having the ability to reform into the phalanx. The safest way to combat these growing numbers of specialists was to add to them for your own personal use.

Militia were also limited in their use during long campaigns, a type of warfare that became more prevalent during and after the Peloponnesian War. It was practically impossible for them to fight for extended periods. They would take three days rations and the campaigns would be brief. Wars tended to be settled after one swift engagement; afterwards the militia would return home for the harvest and other civil duties . This limited the city states ability to wage wars. They could only realistically war with the militia against others who were in a certain proximity. Weather was also an issue. It was customary practice for Greeks to only campaign in the summer months . This changed after the Peloponnesian War as battles, rather than swiftly deciding the conclusion of a war, became more ‘sections’ of a war, with different battles in different theatres. Citizens could not fight all these theatres, as they needed to return home to perform their peacetime duties. Year round wars became the norm after the Peloponnesian War and the city-states could not afford to send their citizens to every war.

Causalities were also a large risk. The states could not risk losing large portions of their citizens in wars. Losing massive citizen numbers damaged a state’s economy and ability to defend itself against attacks. This mostly effected siege warfare – we can see this from the development, or lack, of sieging methods. Generally, large scale attacks on cities were avoided by the Greeks due to the lack of proper equipment and the cost in citizen lives that the assault would entail . We can see this from the siege of Troy, fantasy or not, it fits with our current knowledge of Greek siege craft – the siege took 10 years and the Greeks were only victorious through tricking the Trojans with a wooden horse . Sieges lasting months, or even years, were the rule in the Greek world, not the exception . The best way of achieving victory during a siege was starvation – as we see from the Peloponnesian War Sparta causes Athens to submit after cutting off her links to the sea and her food supply . An assault on the city of Athens itself by the Spartans would have been too costly for them – the Spartans were expertly trained in land combat and losing a great deal of hoplites assaulting a city as large as Athens was not worth it. Though siege craft becomes more sophisticated in the fourth century with the development of catapults and mobile towers, they were countered by the increased width and height of walls and towers .

In conclusion, we can see that the citizen soldiers were highly advantageous to use in wars before the Peloponnesian War. They fought in close combat with their families, friends and neighbours using a highly effective and cheap method. This meant that morale was higher than if the men were to be fighting with complete strangers. The type of warfare meant that the citizens fighting were protecting themselves along with their companions. If a citizen were to flee, it would render the phalanx vulnerable – therefore destroying his reputation back home. Men were motivated by the obligation of social and participatory factors. Prior to the Peloponnesian War, a single pitched battle decided the outcome of the entire war – meaning wars would be rapid and decisive. This gave citizens the chance to campaign in the summer and return to their crops without much time spent away from home – but after the Peloponnesian War, wars ceased being a single decisive encounter between heavy infantry phalanxes, they became prolonged wars of attrition Citizen militia were not well suited to this type of warfare – most were agricultural workers. Their productive and other skills were needed at home . It became cheaper to hire professionals where training in certain arms was tradition, rather than going through the expense of training those men . The state could not afford to keep its citizens in the field for long stretches of time – with the exception of Sparta, whose citizens fully enrolled in the military from the age of 20 to 60 thanks to their use of slaves (or helots) . This new type of warfare also effected the causalities – the more battles it took to decisively end a war, the more causalities a city-state would suffer. Instead of piling up citizen bodies, the city-states of Ancient Greece would have to start investing in new methods of war. They would need professionals and specialists, namely the epikouros or misthoporos: the mercenary.