§8. Knowing and Saying That One Knows

§5. Seeing That <i>P</i> and Knowing That <i>P</i>

This chapter sets out the core thesis of epistemological disjunctivism: In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge an agent, S , has perceptual knowledge that φ in virtue of being in possession of rational support, R , for her belief that φ which is both factive (i.e., R 's obtaining entails φ ) and reflectively accessible to S .

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