After much deliberation, hand-wringing and years of misguided and contradictory policy initiatives, it appears that the European Union is finally considering appointing an envoy to the Western Balkans. No definitive decision has been made and no names were formally proposed at Wednesday's (rather brief) EU Western Balkans Summit in Sarajevo. It is, after all, only one of a number of options being considered by Lady Ashton, the EU's foreign and security policy chief. But it is an option that should be given very serious consideration.

In principle, the idea is sound and would represent a step in the right direction for both the EU and the applicant states of the western Balkans. The right individual, one with a regional perspective, who could convey the region's interests and needs within the union and act as an effective conduit between the applicant and existing EU member states, would be mutually beneficial. Emphasis, however, should be placed on the "right individual". Speculation over possible candidates has been rife, but the very mention of one in particular has been enough to ruffle the feathers of some regional political elites.

Paddy Ashdown, no stranger to the complex and often brusque character of the politics of the region, is one of the names in the frame. Ashdown, who has consistently advocated the creation of an EU special envoy to the Western Balkans, has a past there. He was Bosnia's high representative between 2002 and 2006 – a golden age for the HR, and a time when he still enjoyed rather unlimited power. Lord Ashdown revelled in his role. His robust methods frequently brought him into conflict with the leadership of the Republika Srpska, but won him plaudits among those Bosnian citizens who shared his vision of a functioning Bosnian state. Admirers view his tenure as progressive and constructive, detractors as a disaster. But his autocratic style was, however unpalatable to some, effective and, to his great credit, it produced results.

Towards the end of his tenure, however, attitudes toward the role of the HR changed. Many, including the influential thinktank the European Stability Initiative (ESI), believed that Ashdown's rule turned Bosnia into a European "Raj", and that the time had come to allow Bosnians to assert control over their own affairs, with the HR playing a less proactive role. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, Ashdown's successor, made it clear from the outset that his approach would be light by comparison with his predecessor. It was to prove immensely damaging for Bosnia, and since then, progress has stalled and the country has lurched from one crisis to the next.

With the benefit of hindsight, Ashdown's tenure as HR may well appear something of a zenith by subsequent standards. But does this mean that Ashdown is the right man to be the EU's envoy? There are few who would inject the enthusiasm and vitality or that possess the authority that would be required to make a success of the post. The problem may be that he carries too much baggage to be an effective EU envoy. Domestically, there will be little opposition; he enjoys the support of the British foreign minister, William Hague, who has himself demonstrated an interest in Balkan affairs. In 2009 Hague visited Bosnia and was evidently disturbed by the negative trends in Bosnian politics. Upon his return he made it clear that a future Conservative government would make Bosnia a foreign policy priority. Clearly, Hague would firmly support Ashdown's appointment as a man who would not be afraid to tackle with the region's problems. Other EU member states may not share Hague's enthusiasm. Major European powers such as Germany and France are likely to resist Ashdown's appointment, lest the EU's diplomatic service be dominated by the British.

But regardless of their motives for opposition, there are good reasons to suspect that an Ashdown appointment could prove counterproductive. At this point, he has not put himself forward, and may not do so. He himself may be acutely aware that his "previous" in the region would render the post somewhat compromised from the outset. He would undoubtedly be a divisive figure, impeded from the start by preconceived ideas about his agenda. Changing these pre-existing perceptions – justified or otherwise – would be a significant, possibly insurmountable, challenge.

Chris Patten, another name in the frame, may be a stronger candidate in the sense that he is less burdened with the baggage of being a former HR. He has significant experience as a former EU external relations commissioner, but, again, his potential candidacy would likely be just as vigorously opposed by Germany. An "acceptable" alternative may be the Slovak foreign minister, Miroslav Lajčák, another former HR, but one perceived as less contentious and divisive than Ashdown.

Critics may argue that his history in Bosnia would render it almost impossible for him to make a positive impact on an already fraught political context. They may also argue that while Ashdown knows the territory in Bosnia, he is less well versed in the nuances of, for example, Serbian, Montenegrin, Macedonian or Albanian politics – and there are significant differences even between Bosnia and, say, Montenegro. Moreover, the Western Balkan region is changing; a more youthful and pro-EU political elite now lead their respective countries.

There are some obvious exceptions to this. Bosnia and Montenegro are still, to a significant extent, governed by those who were in power during the collapse of the Yugoslav state in the early 1990s (although they too are pro-EU), but this is not representative of the region holistically. The appointment of an EU envoy should reflect this new reality.

There are numerous variables and as many possible outcomes, but the idea of creating an EU envoy is a good one. It is simply that finding the right, politically acceptable, candidate should be given both time and serious thought.