Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), first President of the Republic of China. The Japanese issued their 21 Demands to his government in January 1915.

January 27, Tokyo—Of all the belligerents, Japan was by far having the most successful war so far. With essentially no resistance, they had seized all of Germany’s possessions in the Pacific north of the Equator. The only major fight was in the German concession around Tsingtao, which surrendered in November after a month’s siege. The Japanese continued to help protect Allied shipping in the Pacific and Indian Oceans against the two remaining armed German ships on that side of the world (the Prinz Eitel Friedrich and the Dresden, the last remnants of von Spee’s squadron), but largely Japan had already won her war, having refused to send troops to Europe.

Of course, her victories in 1914 could be meaningless if Germany won the war in Europe, so Foreign Minister Kato attempted to cement Japan’s gains in China by dealing with China directly. On January 18, Japan presented to China a list of 21 Demands, organized into five groups. Group 1 demanded that Germany’s lease and rights around Tsingtao be transferred to Japan directly. Group 2 was to cement southern Manchuria as a Japanese sphere of influence (as recognized by the European powers since the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905) and give Japan additional monopoly rights in eastern Inner Mongolia. Group 3 would give Japan joint ownership of certain iron and coal mines, as had been agreed with a previous Chinese government in 1912. Group 4 demanded China not give or lease any ports to any other foreign powers—basically, this was to prevent the United States from acquiring a base in Fujian province (across from Taiwan) where the Japanese had monopoly rights.

Group 5 would prove the most controversial; Kato knew this ahead of time, and phrased them as “wishes” as opposed to “demands.” Some were relatively tame; two articles requested that Japanese subjects could own property, establish schools and churches, and travel freely within China, rights largely already enjoyed by citizens of the other Great Powers. Other articles simply reiterated the status quo—the right to build railroads in the Yangtze valley and Japanese monopoly privileges in Fujian province. More objectionable were provisions that the Chinese government should hire Japanese advisers, that Japanese should jointly administer policing in “such localities…[where] police disputes…have hitherto arisen”, and that Japan should jointly manage a Chinese military arsenal. Even these were not as outrageous as they sound to the modern ear: the Chinese already employed other European advisers, Japanese police would (it was planned) only deal with Japanese subjects in their sphere of influence in South Manchuria, and Germany had enjoyed a similar defense relationship with China before the war. Although the Chinese obviously objected to a great many of the Japanese demands, few of them went far beyond the provisions the European powers (and the United States) had forced on an increasingly-exploited China over the years. In particular, the demands of Group 5 were not forced on Kato by a far-right fringe in Japan (though their inclusion certainly helped appease them).

The other European powers would probably have serious objections to the 21 Demands as a unilateral Japanese power grab in China, of course—as a result, Kato deliberately kept the 21 Demands a secret from the other powers, even his British allies. Of course, they could not remain hidden forever after they had been presented to the Chinese, but even nine days later, on January 27, the Japanese still officially denied ever issuing them to the Chinese government. It would take until February 10 for the British to even see the full list of demands, and US Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan even welcomed the demands as Japan joining the American “Open Door” policy in China. Both countries eventually objected to the demands, but so much time had passed that they (and the Chinese) lost a lot of negotiating power.

Sources: Frederick R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919; Hew Strachan, The First World War (Volume I).