Defining Veganism

The competing definitions for veganism are numerous, at times seemingly innumerable. If they all confined themselves to behavior instead of philosophy then there would be little worry. But the fierce resistance of animal justice advocates to descriptions of veganism as a “way of living” or “lifestyle” indicates the prevalence of the assumption that veganism transcends ‘mere’ conduct. This assumption is visible is in The Vegan Society’s (TVS) most comprehensive definition, given in its “Articles of Association,” which I focus on for the sake of this essay:

the word “veganism” denotes a philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude — as far as is possible and practicable — all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of humans, animals and the environment. In dietary terms it denotes the practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or partly from animals.

In other locations TVS surprisingly defines veganism solely in terms of a way of living, first as a “way of life” and then as a “lifestyle.” The latter word actually appears in a definition exclusively referring to consumer choice. However, in its most formal and comprehensive definition, TVS presents veganism as both a philosophy and a way of living. The introductory nod to a philosophical underpinning is, at the very minimum, logically necessary for the second clause of the definition; if veganism includes anything “by extension,” then some theory must explain that extension. Left unexplained is the identity of this “philosophy” that extends the vegan lifestyle into the realm of the active development of “animal-free alternatives” for the “benefit” of not only animals, but humans and “the environment” as well. So what is this philosophy of, or more specifically, that is veganism? Any generalized appeal to “nonviolence” or “anti-cruelty” or “anti-exploitation” fails to establish the particularity of a vegan philosophy and, grievously for animal justice, fails to isolate the oppression of nonhuman animals.

Alternatively, if “philosophy” functions non-technically as a loose reference to a basic attitude or disposition, then it may as well be discarded; “way of living” or “lifestyle” can carry the rest of the conduct-oriented definition. Such is also the case if the word implies the spectrum of motivations among vegans (e.g. animal rights, labor justice, sustainability, health), as motivation and philosophy are surely not one and the same. After all, a speciesist may have several reasons to adopt a vegan lifestyle even if not supportive of animal justice.

Good Intentions

With all this in mind, the conspicuous inclusion of “a philosophy” in TVS’ definition is curious. I claim that the phrase’s intentional insertion here, and in vegan discourse in general, works to position veganism alongside other social justice movements (e.g., feminism, anti-racism, anti-ableism) through a self-perception and representation as theory. Just as individual human justice movements encapsulate distinct forms of oppression and distinct oppressed groups, veganism hopes to accomplish the same for nonhuman animals. This slight but significant move prompts advocates to think and assert that veganism is an analogous social justice movement itself, rather than a tool for social justice.

But in its name veganism refers to neither the oppressed group nor the injustice that group suffers. Rather, it refers to a group of humans who live, and more specifically, consume in a particular exclusionary manner. Unfortunately this is not a mere superficial flaw. Its weakness is on full display every time the question, “Why don’t you eat animal products?” cannot satisfactorily be answered with, “Because veganism.” As a result, animal justice advocates typically tack on some version of, “Because animal oppression is wrong.” They recognize that their vegan way of living cannot explain itself, cannot explain why they do what they do.