(Allen Eyestone / The Palm Beach Post)

With the peak of the NBA’s free agency activity long gone, most NBA content is centered around team projections, predictions, forecasts, outlooks, or [insert word of your choice here]. Consequently, we now have a clearer picture of where teams stand going into the 2018–2019 season.

As it relates to the Miami Heat, the analysis seems to have a clear theme —that they’ll be incredibly average this season. In fact, FiveThirtyEight’s CARM-Elo early projections have the Heat finishing smack-dab in the middle of the league. At 41–41, they’d sit at sixth in the Eastern Conference (last season they finished 44–38 and as the sixth seed):

(Neil Paine/FiveThirtyEight)

Vegas seems to agree, with sportsbooks Westgate and Bovada placing the Heat’s over/under win total at 41.5.

To pile on, forecasts about the team’s future don’t seem too rosy either.

In his offseason rankings, TNT-NBA analyst David Aldridge was critical of the Heat’s moves (or lack thereof) this summer. Ranking their offseason as dead-last, he seemed to paint a bleak outlook of the team’s future:

“No, Heat people: I don’t hate your team. But when you have no Draft picks, and you have no cap space, and thus you literally could do nothing in the offseason, and basically did nothing in the offseason, and your biggest, most newsy event was whether your 36-year-old future Hall of Fame guard will come back for one more season or play over in China … well, what am I supposed to do with that information? Rank you first?”

Ranking a middle of the pack playoff team’s offseason as last, when the team likely did not jeopardize it’s standing, is perhaps an exaggeration. For the most part, however, Aldridge is fair in his assessment. The Heat did not have cap space this summer. The re-signing of Wayne Ellington actually placed the Heat over the luxury tax. Retaining Dwyane Wade at the $5.3 million taxpayer mid-level exception raises that tax number. Making matters worse, the Heat do not project to have meaningful cap space next summer either. At least 10 of their current players will be locked into deals (assuming a few player options are picked up — I imagine they all will be).

The Heat’s salary commitments

The quip about no draft picks isn’t entirely true. The Heat do owe 5 of their next 6 second round picks (ouch!), but own 5 of their next 6 first round picks (2021 is owed to Philadelphia via Phoenix). It’s worth bringing up that they did not have a first rounder this summer.

Apathy is probably the correct reaction to the Heat’s summer. Only re-signing a 30-year-old journeymen sharpshooter (however much a good value) doesn’t exactly warrant excitement.

It’s clear the Miami Heat are in a complicated situation. Their salary sheet is clogged with long term deals to good role players or above average starters. Their youth prospects are solid and present some intrigue, but lack elite upside. Without a bonafide star, they definitively sit behind Boston, Philadelphia, Toronto, Milwaukee, and Indiana in the Eastern conference pecking order.

Considering all of this, it’s worth clarifying what exactly got the Heat into their current predicament — and what can be done to escape it. It’s best to start two summers ago.

The summer of 2016

The summer of 2016 always evokes painful memories of Dwyane Wade’s departure and Chris Bosh’s medical issues. But it’s come to represent something more— the start of Miami’s habit of doling out big money to non-superstar players. As you may recall, the Heat opened free agency by re-signing Hassan Whiteside to a 4-year, $98 million dollar pact. Following the decisions of targets Kevin Durant and Dwyane Wade, the Heat matched the Nets’ $50 million dollar offer sheet to Tyler Johnson.

It’s important to remember that, at the time, re-signing Whiteside was most likely the correct decision. By no means a complete player, he was a 27-year-old in his athletic prime — capable of impacting team defense as a traditional drop-back big, while effectively rim-running on offense. Major skill development at that age is unlikely, but it wasn’t entirely crazy to believe he might elevate his game to an all-star level (especially in a watered down East). While it’s fair to wonder why the Heat committed to a center ill-fitted for small-ball, keep in mind the context at the time.

Whiteside’s signing was announced before the Kevin Durant meeting and Wade negotiations. In either scenario, Whiteside served as perhaps the best available option to maximize the roster. Further, fitting a roster to a certain playing style (i.e. small-ball) is less an on/off switch and more a slow evolutionary process. The personnel needed for an immediate pivot in style is not always available — and sometimes the potential production of the personnel that is, is too much to pass up. Many other teams that summer found themselves turning to centers like Andre Drummond, Dwight Howard, Timofey Mozgov, Ian Mahinmi, and Joakim Noah.

(AP Photo/Wilfredo Lee)

Tyler Johnson’s deal is harder to evaluate. Even at the time, the financial aspects were hard to swallow. The Heat matched a poison pill offer sheet (backloaded salary to discourage a team from matching). They would incur cap hits of approximately $5 million each of the first two seasons and $19 million each of the last two seasons. It’s been reported that the Heat asked Johnson for permission to smoothen the cap hits to $12.5 million annually across 4 years — he declined (It’s likely his agent instructed him to. Perhaps he wisely recognized that backloading increased Johnson’s odds of staying in Miami. The Heat did too, but were left with no choice).

Looking at it from an on-court perspective, Johnson was 24 years old with room to grow. A player well-suited for the modern NBA, he had flashed athleticism, shooting, and effort on defense. Add to this the fact that Wade’s exit had left a void not yet filled by Dion Waiters.

Ultimately, it was an okay move. It’s best to rationalize it by understanding he was underpaid in years 1 and 2 and will be overpaid in years 3 and 4.

The rest of the Heat’s signings that summer were good, low-risk moves unworthy of much analysis. James Johnson for $4 million. Derrick Williams for $4.6 million. Wayne Ellington at $6 million. Dion Waiters for $2.9 million.

From 11–30 to 30–11

Ah. The root of the notorious “tank” vs. “compete” debate that has raged on among Heat fans.

The Heat’s 2016–2017 season is, without question, one of the more memorable NBA storylines in recent years. Heading into the middle of January, the Heat sat with a putrid 11–30 record (second-worst in the league). They then rattled off 13 straight wins, before going 30–11 the rest of the way — falling just short of the playoffs. In the process, Erik Spoelstra was lauded for his ability to coach up career journeymen like James Johnson, Dion Waiters and Wayne Ellington.

There is a lot more to unpack here than just an incredible turnaround, though. Let me do it by answering a series of questions that build upon one another:

Are the Miami Heat against “tanking”?

It’s probably fair to say that at least Pat Riley is philosophically opposed to “tanking.” But it’s worth clarifying some things here. Tanking in the truest analytics sense, demonstrated most famously by Sam Hinkie, involves stripping down a roster to a degree in which it has little to no chance of winning on a nightly basis. Fielding such a team over the course of a few years increases the odds of landing superstar-caliber players (almost always found at the very top of the draft).

I think Pat Riley is against that form of tanking.

The thing is, tanking too often gets used interchangeably with teams losing because they are just bad — maybe due to management or coaching situations, a roster that does not mesh, or even a transition period. There aren’t really many teams who have “tanked” in the way the Sixers have — by attempting to mitigate some of the variability of the draft (aiming to consistently select at spots 1 and 2, rather than lower slots with even greater uncertainty). They have mostly just been bad, while still collecting young prospects in the process.

Riley is sometimes revered in a manner that implies he won’t even allow being bad — but in most of those situations you don’t have a choice (i.e. the 2008 season and the first half of 2016–2017).

Should the Heat have traded players like Johnson, Waiters, and Ellington for draft picks at the deadline?

I’m not sure the “trade expiring players for picks at the deadline” line of thinking was as straightforward in this situation as it is in others. The Heat had just completed a 14–2 run. Punishing coaches and players for hard work and perseverance seemingly promotes a workplace culture opposite the one the Heat want to maintain. Also, I imagine there were economic factors at play. The run certainly reengaged the fan-base after the loss of Wade and Bosh and it’s possible the Heat did not want to risk losing that for a few second round picks.

So was the Heat’s turnaround a costly endeavor?

Building NBA championship teams is comprised of low probability methods and it’s likely that drafting very high is the surest of those methods. There is a chance they missed out on player with great potential (also a chance they selected one with so-so potential).

But considering the turnaround was probably the reason they landed a meeting with Gordon Hayward, I’m not sure it was totally some waste (even despite not landing him). They gave themselves a chance.

I do think the Heat are a somewhat unique franchise, in that free agency can be a legitimate team-building strategy for them — in a way it’s not for small-market franchises.

The city of Miami remains an attractive destination for NBA players. There is still an aura to Pat Riley, while Erik Spoelstra remains one of the most respected coaches in the league. And there is significance to the likes of Alonzo Mourning, Shaquille O’Neal, LeBron James, Chris Bosh, and Dwyane Wade having passed through your franchise.

While it hasn’t bore fruit in recent years, Miami has pretty consistently secured meetings with top free agents. The years of 2015–2017 alone saw them meeting with LaMarcus Aldridge, Kevin Durant, and Gordon Hayward. Simply getting those meetings is huge, because in some convoluted way it might represent odds akin to those of drafting a star.

The summer of 2017

Mistakes were made.

While ultimately missing out on Hayward to the Boston Celtics, the Heat seemed to have stumbled into a viable post Big-3 team building strategy — one that emphasized the strengths of both Pat Riley and Erik Spoelstra. The front office would cycle in gritty journeymen on short, low-risk deals, to go alongside a handful of solid youth prospects and starters. Erik Spoelstra would overachieve by selling a set of hard-nosed, defensive-minded ideals. Players would have incentive to buy in, getting a chance to secure richer contracts in the future. The organization would maintain a reputation around the league as a place of stability and strong coaching. And most importantly, the Heat would remain flexible summer after summer, pitching any star player who would listen, all against the backdrop of beautiful Miami.

It’s safe to say they veered from that strategy. Following Hayward’s decision, the Heat quickly pivoted back to their own free agents. James Johnson was awarded a 4-year, $60 million dollar contract. Dion Waiters signed for 4 years and $52 million. And in a surprise twist, Kelly Olynyk was inked to a 4-year, $50 million dollar deal.

(Pedro Portal/El Nuevo Herald/TNS)

Somewhat ironically, after months of a marketing campaign that implied such player revivals could only happen in Miami, the Heat bet against themselves. Specifically, they went against their front office’s ability to identify diamonds in the rough, and their coaching staff’s ability to maximize them.

Look, the issue here isn’t even necessarily that they chose to re-sign Johnson or Waiters. And arguing that doing so completely disregarded youth development reeks of some revisionist history. Justise Winslow was coming off an incredibly short (and shaky), injury-plagued season. Josh Richardson, despite signing an extension, had not yet displayed the potential he would the following year. Bam Adebayo was drafted as a rotational big.

The issue very clearly is the years to those deals. There remains no reason to have signed Johnson and Waiters to 4-year deals (I maintain the Olynyk deal was solid business). Neither seemed to have an incredibly robust market for their services. In fact, Waiters’ other suitors were rumored to be offering deals in the 1–2 year range.

What’s more, Riley’s insistence that those deals be viewed as assets has never added up. Johnson was 30 years old and in great basketball shape for the first time in his career. Waiters, whose reputation as an unpredictable player is well-documented, was facing severe injury concerns over his ankle.

What now?

The Heat find themselves in a catch-22 of sorts. Limiting the playing time of pricier veterans, in favor of developing youth, may further drive down trade value and keep Miami in cap hell. Showcasing those veterans for an extended period may introduce trade options, but it could limit the sort of internal development that might attract stars.

So what should the Heat do? Realistically, they may have no choice but to divvy up playing time (not great!) and remain competitive (that’s fine!). But they must continue looking for opportunities to reduce long-term salary — preferably swapping deals with 2–3 years remaining for deals with 1–2 years remaining — and collect any draft compensation offered in the process.

Doing so will address one of the roster’s biggest flaws — redundancy. For each young player exists an older, more expensive counterpart. Justise Winslow has James Johnson. Josh Richardson has Dion Waiters (and Tyler Johnson). Bam Adebayo has Hassan Whiteside. This is not an ideal way to allocate salary across a roster.

And it’s not a stretch to think the young core could soon outproduce Johnson, Waiters, and Whiteside (at-least within the Heat’s system). The Heat managed 44 wins last season with limited contributions from 2 of them (Whiteside and Waiters played a combined 84 games and weren’t exactly glowing metric-wise).

(Nathaniel S. Butler/NBAE via Getty Images)

If the Heat can prudently offload long-term money, you might see a rough foundation from which Riley could begin building his next title contender.

There is a window here that Miami absolutely needs to maximize. Winslow, Richardson, and Adebayo have a chance at becoming smart, versatile, and competent starters. While they may never develop into stars, it’s very likely they end up outperforming their deals— Winslow and Richardson each at nearly 10 million annually (Winslow’s deal is a prediction) and Adebayo on a rookie-scale contract. If, within the next 2 years, Miami can get back into the free agency game, these 3 could serve as strong complements to stars — both financially and skillset-wise.