<<< NEWS FROM THE LAB - Thursday, November 3, 2011 >>> ARCHIVES | SEARCH Duqu: Questions and Answers Posted by Sean @ 16:47 GMT Due to its complexity, case Duqu is challenging to understand. Here are some questions and answers that we hope will help.



Q: What is Duqu?

A: Because of the news and ongoing developments surrounding Duqu, that's actually a very broad question. Here's a narrow answer: Duqu is a Windows bot (not worm) that has been used as part of highly targeted attacks against a limited number of organizations, in a limited number of countries.



Q: How does Duqu spread?

A: Duqu doesn't spread on its own. In one known case, Duqu was installed by a document attachment which was delivered via an e-mail message.



Q: Isn't that the same method by which RSA was hacked?

A: Yes. Numerous targeted attacks have used this method. In the RSA case, an Excel document attachment used an embedded Flash object that exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player to install a backdoor/remote access tool (RAT) called Poison Ivy.



Q: So what's so special about Duqu's exploit?

A: The zero-day used by Duqu's installer exploits a vulnerability in the Windows kernel.



Update: Microsoft has published their Security Advisory (2639658).



Q: How much more advanced is a Window kernel exploit than a Flash Player exploit?

A: What? Please.



Q: No, seriously, how much?

A: Significantly more. A Windows kernel vulnerability/exploit is worth a great deal more compared to one used against a third-party application, even one so widely installed as Flash Player.



Q: Can I patch my system against this vulnerability?

A: No. You can't.



Q: So what can I do if this Windows kernel vulnerability is unpatched?

A: Wait. Microsoft Security Response is currently investigating the vulnerability and is preparing a solution. Fortunately, the exploit document is in very limited circulation, and is under an NDA.



Q: Why is there an NDA on the document?

A: Because it was such a highly targeted attack, the document itself would most likely reveal the identity of the target. Sharing the document would be a breach of customer confidentially, and therefore, CrySyS Lab (discoverer of Duqu) cannot release the document unless done in a way that protects the privacy of their customer.



Q: So Duqu's installer is not "in-the-wild"?

A: Not generally, no. Though there could be some other undiscovered variants.



Q: So is Duqu a threat to me?

A: That depends on whom you are. But generally, no. However, Duqu will eventually create a big problem.



Q: What problem will Duqu create?

A: Once Microsoft patches the Windows kernel vulnerability, criminals at large will be able to reverse engineer the patch, and will discover the vulnerability. At that point, any Windows computer that isn't up to date will be vulnerable to what could prove be to be a very serious exploit.



Q: But not yet?

A: Correct.



Q: Is there anything else interesting about Duqu?

A: Yes, definitely. In one known case, a driver used by Duqu was signed using a stolen certificate issued to a Taiwanese hardware company called C-Media.



Q: Why did Duqu use a signed driver?

A: Signed drivers can circumvent security policies that prompt about or reject installation of unsigned drivers. Security policies can be configured to inherently distrust unsigned drivers. Having a driver signed by a known vendor provides a valuable level of trust.



Q: So then is that why Duqu is such a big deal? Because of the zero-day and the signed driver?

A: That… and because Duqu is "related" to Stuxnet.



Q: How is it related?

A: A component of "Duqu" is nearly identical to a component of "Stuxnet" and they appear to have been authored by somebody that has access to common source code.



Q: What else relates "Duqu" and "Stuxnet"?

A: One the drivers used by "Duqu" claims to be from a Taiwanese hardware company called JMicron. Stuxnet used drivers that were signed by a certificate stolen from JMicron.



Q: How were the certificates stolen?

A: Unknown.



Q: How many were stolen?

A: Known cases, three different hardware vendors from Taiwan: C-Media; JMicron; and Realtek.



Q: Why is "Duqu" connected to Taiwan?

A: Unknown.



Q: Why the quotes? What else is "Duqu"?

A: In a broad sense, Duqu is an "organized action" or a "mission" that has been deployed (or authorized) by a nation state.



Q: What do you mean by an "organized action"?

A: "Duqu" appears to be an espionage or reconnaissance mission of some sort. For example, in the real world, a reconnaissance mission of this sort could be considered what United States Marine Corp Force Reconnaissance (FORECON) teams call a "Green Operation".



Q: So "Duqu" isn't just malicious code?

A: The software component is only one part of what we call Duqu. Think about it like this: there's Duqu software and there's also Operation Duqu.



Q: And "Stuxnet"? What about the Stuxnet worm?

A: The installer used by Operation Stuxnet was an advanced USB worm. The worm used a zero-day Windows vulnerability to facilitate its spread.



Q: Are the missions of Operation Duqu and Operation Stuxnet the same?

A: No. Operation Stuxnet was more of a "Black Operation", a mission that involves direct action, which in Stuxnet's case, was to disrupt operations at an Iranian nuclear power facility.



Q: Stuxnet disrupted operations at a nuclear power plant?

A: Yes. Operation Stuxnet was very complex, and also, subtle. The Stuxnet worm and its additional components needed to travel a sizeable distance geographically. It also needed to infiltrate a closed target which was not connected to the Internet, on autopilot, and without calling home.



Q: So that's why Stuxnet used a USB worm as the installer/infection vector?

A: Yes. Because of the difficult mitigating factors, Stuxnet needed to spread itself without any external resources. And so it was equipped with numerous zero-day exploits. Out of context, Stuxnet's infection capabilities seem to be overkill, but then, its mission appears to have been a success, so those behind Stuxnet probably don't think so.



Q: How does Duqu differ?

A: Duqu is advanced but is not configured to act autonomously. Once the installer infects its target, Duqu calls home to a command and control (C&C) server. There are two servers that are currently known. One was located in India and the other was located in Belgium. The IP addresses are now inactive.



Q: What actions were carried out by the C&C?

A: In one known case, Duqu downloaded an "infostealer" to collect data from the target. That infostealer is actually the component from which Duqu gets its name, because it prepends log files related to stolen data with "DQ".



Q: What else can the C&C do?

A: For example, Duqu could be instructed to spread itself on the target network via shared network resources.



Q: How did Duqu send the collected data to the C&C?

A: It encrypted the data and appended it to JPG images.



Q: What? JPG images? Why?

A: So that somebody monitoring network traffic would only see innocent looking image files instead of confidential materials. See here for more information.



Q: Wow. Does Duqu do anything else sneaky?

A: Yes. After 30 days, unless told otherwise by the C&C, Duqu will delete itself to limit evidence of the breach.



Q: Who is behind Duqu?

A: Unknown.



Q: Speculate: who is behind Duqu? — Question added on November 4th.

A: Based on all the various factors, a nation state.



Q: What were they looking for, and why?

A: Unknown.



Q: What can you definitively tell us about Duqu?

A: The software components of "Operation Duqu" were made by a very skilled team of developers and exploit analysts.



Q: Can you speculate on Duqu's objectives?

A: Whatever it was, it must be very important to the interests of the nation state actor pulling the strings. It this actor's mind, the cost of disclosing a Windows kernel vulnerability is outweighed by the benefits. Only those with privileged information can accurately determine Duqu's true goals, unless and until an identifiable direct action results.



Q: So you think a government agency is behind Duqu?

A: Yes.



Q: Should a government actor use malware such as Duqu?

A: It doesn't appear to be up for a vote.



Q: What about Germany's R2D2 trojan?

A: R2D2 is a trojan written for police surveillance. It did not use zero-day exploits and drivers signed with stolen certificates from legitimate hardware vendors. R2D2 was commissioned by German authorities for normal police work.



Q: But police trojans are not good, right?

A: Right, malware often finds a way of escaping control. It never seems like a good idea to us.



Q: How bad is R2D2?

A: R2D2 appears to have far overreached what is allowed by German law. It has created a legal and political mess in Germany, but not so much of a technical mess. Our system automation determined R2D2 should not be trusted on its own long before human analysts ever took notice of it. The thing that made R2D2 valuable to the police was its limited install base. It was not really innovative in a way that could be co-opted by criminals.



Q: Are Stuxnet/Duqu innovative?

A: Yes, very much so. Once the vulnerability is disclosed, we (and others) will need to devote numerous man-hours creating strong generic detections for this new exploit. Other members of our Labs will need to datamine our file collections for software signed by C-Media in order to rescan them and process the results. Duqu creates technical headaches and the lessons learned will be adopted by criminals at some point.



Q: What about those that say that Duqu isn't related to Stuxnet?

A: Let's compare the similarities between the two operations.



• The installer exploits zero-day Windows kernel vulnerability(ies).

• Have components signed with a stolen certificates.

• Highly targeted in a way that suggests advanced intelligence.



The technical development team that coded and built the infrastructure for Duqu may differ in part from the team that developed Stuxnet. The highly targeted nature of the attacks suggests a considerable amount of human intelligence work was involved. This intelligence work could have been done by the same or different analysts — but that hardly matters — whatever the composition of the teams involved, the similarities between the operations would suggest a common nation state actor pulling the strings.



Q: Will we ever learn the identity of this nation state?

A: Doesn't seem likely… at least not anytime soon. The consequences of Duqu's wake discourages any sort of disclosure.



Q: Does this nation state actor have other operations in progress?

A: Unknown. But it wouldn't seem very surprising if so.



Q: Final question (for now): Operation Duqu used an e-mail attachment. Isn't that something that everybody should know to be on guard against? Why use such a basic attack methodology?

A: Because it works.







See yesterday's post for links to additional resources.









