Defence Notes Opinion: Fallon down – the challenges facing the UK’s new defence secretary

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Gavin Who? That’s the likely first reaction from many seasoned Whitehall warriors on the news that Gavin Williamson, the 41-year-old MP for South Staffordshire and Chief Whip, had been appointed the new Secretary of State for Defence following the unexpected resignation of Michael Fallon. The new Secretary of State becomes the fourth incumbent of the post since 2010, inheriting a department in the throes of yet another financial crisis that will require difficult, politically unpalatable choices to fix. Williamson arrives without prior ministerial experience and a reputation as a ‘May loyalist’ who was involved in the agreement between the Conservatives and the DUP following the 2017 election. Unlike Fallon, a man who stood by Teresa May but was not dependent on her largesse, Williamson is perceived as the Prime Minister's man through-and-through, who most Westminster observers suspect will one day seek to succeed her. His rapid promotion to one of the most senior departments of state is either a sign that he is tipped for even greater roles in future, or that the Prime Minister has run out of allies to put in the post. Within the MoD there will be natural suspicion of his background, amid fears that he could have been appointed to oversee a hatchet job in delivering significant defence cuts. A politically weak Prime Minister leading a minority government will need a strong hand to push these through without a backbench rebellion and possible leadership challenge. Appointing a former Chief Whip to deliver this could reduce the risk, as he will know the way to make truculent MPs fall into line and behave in the short term. There are likely to be many Tory MPs angry about defence cuts who will also have one eye on their own future parliamentary career and be forced to choose between principles and politics. Williamson is already being touted in some media channels as a future hopeful candidate for No 10. For the MoD this could be an advantage – he is unlikely to want to make too drastic cuts that threaten any chance of backbench support in the near term.

The key risk he faces politically is in pushing through cuts that threaten interests of high profile Tory MPs such as the highly regarded Johnny Mercer and Penny Mourdant, both who have a strong interest in defence, particularly the Royal Navy, and both who may harbour their own leadership aspirations. Keeping the back benches on side and willing to support him will be critical in his calculations. As a May loyalist, he is also likely to have the ability to influence her thinking on whether defence should take further cuts, and may be more easily able to make the case for reducing them to her than his predecessor. The question is what instructions were given when he took the post – does the Prime Minister see him as a hatchet man, sent to do a politically difficult job, or does she sense an opportunity to promote an ally to succeed her, and thus be more inclined to support him? The appointment of an individual with no ministerial experience or prior exposure to the MoD will send alarm bells ringing across the 5th floor of Main Building. Particularly so given the paucity of defence ministerial experience across the department. Between them, the four ministers from the Commons have barely four years of collective experience in the MoD. The longest serving minister in the MoD today (Earl Howe, who shares the role with wider Lords duties) took up his post in 2015. It takes months, if not years, to fully understand the subtleties and nuances of defence, and recognise the difference between genuine ‘service need’ and ‘special pleading’. It is inevitably easy for a new minister to want to protect the size of the front line at any cost, and any minister with aspirations for No 10 will want to keep as much headline military capability as possible and keep defence out of the headlines for the same reason. As their experience with the department grows, ministers learn how sometimes it is better to protect the less glamorous ‘enablers’ such as logistics, infrastructure and ISTAR assets. They realise that the reason the UK can exert influence and global reach is as much through investment in capabilities that are not front-line assets, as it is about ships or aircraft. This requires harder choices to be made, but to fully learn and understand the implications of how it all works takes time.

As their experience with the department grows, ministers learn how sometimes it is better to protect the less glamorous ‘enablers’ such as logistics, infrastructure and ISTAR assets. — Author