FLINT, MI -- A judge has ordered a new trial for city Councilman Eric Mays on charges related to an early morning drunken driving stop in which police and prosecutors claim he was found outside a disabled car facing the wrong way on I-475.

Genesee Circuit Judge Joseph J. Farah reversed Mays' impaired driving conviction in an opinion issued Thursday, June 4, saying the trial court did not do enough to confirm that Mays wanted to represent himself in the 2014 trial, or adequately advise Mays of the risks in doing so.

Farah also ruled that "inappropriate considerations" were a contributing factor in Flint District Court Judge Nathaniel Perry's sentencing of Mays. Farah reversed the imposition of $10,800 in fines and costs, saying it was "statutorily invalid."

"Hallelujah and the greatest praise to God," Mays said when informed by a Flint Journal reporter of the reversal today, June 5. "I have not seen (the opinion). I have not talked to attorney Neil Szabo (but) I believe those issues were there.

"I give praise and honor to God as well as the legal work that was done."

The Flint Journal-MLive could not immediately reach Szabo, who represented Mays in his appeal, or Flint City Attorney Peter Bade for comment on Farah's eight-page decision.

Mays, a first-term councilman who represented himself in a jury trial in Perry's courtroom last year, claimed in his appeal that he was entitled to a new trial because his right to self-representation was violated, that he was denied his right to a fair trial because he was limited in his closing argument, that the sentence against him was invalid, and the court costs assessed against him should be dismissed.

On all but one of those claims, Farah agreed with Mays, who has been free on bond since August but under house arrest and orders not to drink or drive.

A candidate for mayor, Mays said he hopes the city will drop the case against him so that he and other officials can move on with business in City Hall.

If the city goes ahead with a new trial, Farah's opinion says, it is limited to charging him with impaired driving, a lesser offense than operating a vehicle while intoxicated, which he had originally been charged with.

In the same case, the jury acquitted Mays of possession of marijuana and refusal to be fingerprinted, and could not reach a verdict on a charge of leaving the scene of an accident.

Farah's reversal of Mays conviction follows what was an unusual trial and sentencing that included Mays taking out his dentures to emphasize a point to the jury and a surprise witness who claimed his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when asked whether he -- not Mays -- was driving Mays' vehicle on the night the councilman was arrested.

No witness testified to having seen Mays drive the vehicle on the night in question, but police witnesses said he confessed to driving drunk the night he was arrested and had a blood-alcohol level above the legal limit.

Mays' actions in court appeared to frustrate Perry at various times during his trial, and the judge threatened Mays with contempt of court, telling him to "have a seat and be quiet," and saying, "You don't know what you're doing," at different points in the trial.

In his reversal opinion, Farah says he "empathizes with the trial judge -- who exercised exemplary, even transcendent patience with Mays," but says Perry did not substantially determine whether Mays made a "knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision" to represent himself.

Farah's decision says Mays made things harder -- not easier -- for the court by repeatedly wavering when he was asked if he wanted an attorney.

"While the reversal of Mays' conviction might leave a bad taste in the court's mouth, especially where Mays got what he seemed to want -- to represent himself -- allowing this conviction to stand ... would produce a far more acrid result," the opinion says.

Farah's ruling says Perry was operating within his discretion in limiting Mays' closing argument but said "inappropriate considerations were, at least in part, a contributing factor" in a 72-day jail sentence.

The imposition of $10,800 in court costs was "statutorily invalid," according to the opinion, because costs should have been limited to costs of convictions obtained -- not the charges of which Mays was acquitted.