If the management of national crises was to be dependant on forging a national consensus involving the government and the opposition, India would inevitably fall back on inaction. This is particularly true in any run-up to a general election where both sides believe they are in with a chance. Since the prerogative of doing something rests with the government, the opposition will do its utmost to see that the ruling party falters, preferably by doing nothing or getting it all wrong.

This cussedness hasn’t come about because Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a polarising figure and previous prime ministers weren’t. Those with memories that go back a few years will recall that the opposition wasn’t really interested in backing the government during the Kargil conflict in the summer of 1999. With a caretaker regime under Atal Bihari Vajpayee in place, the unstated but real hope of the opposition rested on the belief that the difficult military action to clear the hill tops of Pakistani intruders wouldn’t succeed.

Such a military failure would, in effect, have taken the election away from the BJP. Vajpayee would have been held guilty of extreme naïveté in taking a bus to Lahore, embracing the enemy and letting the country’s guard down. The BJP’s nationalist credentials would have been punctured. That is why throughout the military campaign 20 years ago, Congress spokespersons cried themselves hoarse over intelligence failures and military unpreparedness. Sonia Gandhi even went to the extent of calling Vajpayee a liar, a charge her son has repeated against Modi. In 1999, the country was united behind the government and the armed forces, but a political consensus proved elusive.

So what is different after Pulwama and Balakot? The answer: very little. After the Pulwama attack that killed 40 CRPF jawans, there was a momentary show of unity with the opposition giving the government a free hand to do what was necessary. But this unity barely lasted 48 hours, with Mamata Banerjee wondering how the authorities had instantly concluded that Pakistan was responsible for the killings. On its part, the Congress chipped in with familiar allegations of intelligence failure, a charge that rests on the silly assumption that terror groups are duty bound to leak like a sieve. Both attacks were premised on the belief that the government would huff and puff and fall back on angry platitudes. In the 12 days between the Pulwama bombing and the air strikes in Balakot, Modi was mocked relentlessly, not least for flaunting his legendary 56-inch chest.

There is little doubt that in terms of sheer audacity, the air strikes on the Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot were spectacular. At the same time it was a risky operation since Pakistan was anticipating some Indian retaliation. The Indian Air Force deserves unstinted praise for completing the operation with surprise, speed and precision. And yet, the Balakot operation has been dragged into murky controversy.

There is a case for debating the larger implications of India amending its strategic doctrine to include both pre-emptive strikes across the Line of Control and international border, and hot pursuit of terrorists. On this count, the different fractions of the opposition have taken positions that fluctuate between demanding outright war to exclusive dependence on diplomacy. There is no coherent alternative doctrine to Modi’s new assertiveness. If there is indeed a mahagathbandhan alternative to Modi, its thinking on counter-terrorism is very confusing and centred exclusively on the conviction that whatever the Prime Minister does must necessarily be wrong.

The question of how many terrorists were killed and the buildings destroyed in Balakot are operational details that the government is not obliged to disclose. As a rule, special operations — and the US raid on Abbotabad to take out Osama bin Laden is a recent example — are clouded in secrecy because details risk compromising intelligence gathering and human assets on the ground.

Pakistan is understandably anxious to suggest that the Balakot raid was all hype and no substance. Any admission on its part is certain to prompt further questions of its role as a launch pad of jihad. It has no alternative but to combine brazenness and denial with Imran Khan’s charm offensive.

It is tragic that a section of the opposition and Indian opinion-makers have provided ammunition to Pakistan’s propaganda machinery. They are not being wilfully anti-national. In their minds they are patriots. However, they are also blinded by their blind hatred of Modi. To them nothing matters more than his removal from power. In pursuit of this end, the means have ceased to matter.