Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2080, as amended August 2, 1979, 93 Stat. 328, is set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. The Act establishes time limits for completing the various stages of a federal criminal prosecution. The information or indictment must be filed within 30 days from the date of arrest or service of the summons. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). Trial must commence within 70 days from the date the information or indictment was filed, or from the date the defendant appears before an officer of the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).

Moreover, in order to ensure that defendants are not rushed to trial without an adequate opportunity to prepare, Congress amended the Act in 1979 to provide a minimum time period during which trial may not commence. Speedy Trial Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-43, Section 3, 93 Stat. 327. Thus, the Act provides that trial may not begin less than 30 days from the date the defendant first appears in court, unless the defendant agrees in writing to an earlier date. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2). In United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231 (1985), the Supreme Court held that this 30-day trial preparation period is not restarted upon the filing of a substantially similar superseding indictment.

If the indictment is dismissed at the defendant's request, the Act's provisions apply anew upon reinstatement of the charge. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1). If the indictment is dismissed at the request of the government, the 70-day clock is tolled during the period when no indictment is outstanding, and begins to run again upon the filing of the second indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6). If trial ends in a mistrial, or the court grants a motion for a new trial, the second trial must begin within 70 days "from the date the action occasioning the retrial becomes final." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e).

Certain pretrial delays are automatically excluded from the Act's time limits, such as delays caused by pretrial motions. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). In Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330 (1986), the Supreme Court held that § 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes "all time between the filing of a motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in holding that hearing is 'reasonably necessary.'" The Act also excludes a reasonable period (up to 30 days) during which a motion is actually "under advisement" by the court. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(1)(J). Other delays excluded from the Act's time limits include delays caused by the unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)); delays attributable to a co-defendant (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)); and delays attributable to the defendant's involvement in other proceedings, including delay resulting from an interlocutory appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(E). (Note, however, that the 30-day defense preparation period provided for in § 3161(c)(2) is calculated without reference to the Section 3161(h) exclusions).

A defendant may not expressly waive his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. See, e.g., United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1090-1092 (10th Cir. 1993). However, if the trial judge determines that the "ends of justice" served by a continuance outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, the delay occasioned by such continuance is excluded from the Act's time limits. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The judge must set forth, orally or in writing, his reasons for granting the continuance. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The government should never rely on a defendant's unilateral waiver of his rights under the Act. The government should make sure that the judge enters an "ends of justice" continuance and that he sets forth his reasons for doing so.

The Act provides a sanction of dismissal for violation of its time limits that may be with or without prejudice to reprosecution. In assessing whether dismissal should be with prejudice, the court must consider the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances leading to dismissal, and the impact that reprosecution would have on the administration of the Act and on the administration of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a)(1)-(a)(2). In United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a trial court must examine each statutory factor in deciding to dismiss charges with prejudice. The Court in Taylor found that a minor violation of the time limitations of the act that did not prejudice the defendant's trial preparation did not justify the dismissal with prejudice of an indictment charging serious drug offenses.

While a defendant cannot unilaterally waive his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, he can forfeit his right to obtain a dismissal of the case for a claimed violation of the Act by failing to move for dismissal prior to trial. The statute provides that "[f]ailure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial * * * shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section." 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).