“I know the history. I never want to identify as a Turkish person…” said Tayis, “[But] most of the time, I act like a Turkish person. There are not that many differences because we’re raised in the same place. Here, I don’t feel [any conflict between my Armenian and Turkish identities] but when I was in Armenia and I saw how the Diaspora was against Turkey… When someone is attacking [your culture], you want to preserve it. When I’m here [in Turkey] I feel a bit like a foreigner. I want to leave… but, when I’m abroad, I preserve [this culture]. I don’t want people to talk bad about where I live.”

“I can’t say I love living in Turkey. I would prefer to live in Europe or America. There are problems here… but it is my country. If I go to Armenia, I’m sure it would be nice but it’s not my home,” explained Natali.

Indeed, at the end of the day, this is what ties the Armenians of Istanbul, and the Armenians in Turkey more generally, to the country. Many Armenians living outside of Turkey do not understand that so much of what is Armenian is Turkish and so much of what is Turkish is Armenian.

“It would be quite difficult to develop substantial proposals on Turkish-Armenian relations without an analysis of the undeniable role of the ‘Turk’ in Armenian identity, and the ‘Armenian’ in Turkish identity,” wrote Hrant Dink. “There were so many aspects of positive and negative identity exchanged during the relationship that lasted for centuries that at times it is quite difficult to differentiate between the two in terms of their behavior. The experience of coexistence is so deep that one should not be surprised that both sides use as their own argument to describe the breakdown of this coexistence as betrayal. Against the Turkish view that describes the Armenian nation as a ‘loyal nation’ which, according to their claim, later went on to betray them, the Armenians do not only describe the events of 1915 as the total destruction of a people but also perceive it as a betrayal of a relationship that had lasted centuries.”[12]

Ariana continues this idea of homeland and roots: “If I could choose one [thing for my Turkish friends to understand], I wish they realized I'm the native. My roots are here. These are my lands,” she explains. “I wish they understood [the Armenian] roots in this country and land and how much influence we had [here]. We were merchants, architects… I wish they understood the diversity of this land.”

Although the relationship between Armenians and Turks throughout their centuries-long coexistence was far from the rosy and the peaceful picture many Turks like to paint, the intercultural exchange between the two cannot be denied.

Yet, while completing the Birthright Armenia program, Tayis met many Diasporans who would ask her “‘How can you live there?’ They said ‘All Turks can die.’ This hate was in an excessive amount and this hate is not the solution,” she said. Many Istanbul Armenians also recounted the hostility experienced by their friends who participated in the Pan-Armenian Games in Yerevan.

Etyen Mahçupyan, writer, journalist, former managing editor of Agos and Hrant Dink’s close friend, touched upon this contrast in attitude between the Armenians of Turkey and the Armenians of the Diaspora: “[Diasporans] asked why, after all they had gone through, were [Armenians] still in Turkey and why we were still living with the Turks. Whatever we said, they behaved as if they had not been persuaded.” Mahçupyan goes on to explain that he and Hrant believed that this line of questioning and resistance from Diasporans came from a “longing” for their ancestral homeland, for what Mahçupyan called “the lives that had been stolen from them” with the events of 1915. And as a result of this severance from their homeland, Mahçupyan explained, “[Diasporans] had convinced themselves that there was… no chance of ever enjoying a close association with Turks. We, on the other hand, declared that we wished to live in Turkey, not because of the land’s air or water, but because of its people; we told them that our closest friends and comrades were Turks. And they would look at us with doubtful eyes and suggest we spoke like this to console ourselves.”[13]

In his 2009 essay entitled “To Be an Armenian in Turkey,” Vahan Isaoğlu, after describing the countless discriminations Armenians in Turkey face, ends his piece by writing, “Being Armenian means that when they tell you, 'my dear, if you don't like it, you can stretch and go...', you should be able to answer them with ‘this is also my country.’"

Continuing Distinctions Between Armenians and Turks

Regardless of this close cultural relationship and despite the growing closeness and acceptance of Armenians into Turkish society, it is clear that many Armenians still feel more comfortable among fellow Armenians. This is not only a result of the fellowship and solidarity they feel and share with Armenians but the fellowship and solidarity they cannot feel and share with Turks. That is, to one who is openly Armenian, a clear distinction is still made between Armenians and Turks in society, oftentimes through the diminishment of Armenian identity and existence, if not outright discrimination of Armenians.

“Do you know what people say to me [when I tell them I’m Armenian?” Natali asked. “I’m sorry… Olsun.”

In her memoir about the two years she spent in Turkey researching and interacting with various members of Turkish and Turkish-Armenian society, Armenian-American Melanie Toumani explains the Turkish word “olsun,” a response she would also frequently receive when telling someone she was Armenian. “[Olsun] is the sort of thing you say if a waiter tells you he’s sorry, there’s no lentil soup today but he can offer you tomato soup. ‘Olsun,’ you reply. You had hoped for lentil soup but you’ll make do. Or if a friend calls to ask whether your meeting can be postponed by an hour: ‘Olsun,’ you tell her; you’re not in a big rush. Depending on the context, olsun can mean “no problem,” or it can mean, “fine, if you must.” Over and over, when I told people I was Armenian, they said, simply, ‘Olsun.’ Olsun, we’ll manage. Olsun, it’s not your fault. Olsun so you were born into a traitorous and unpleasant people, what can you do? Olsun, it’s not as if I’m some kind of racist and am going to treat you differently because of this unfortunate new information.”[14]

“[Because it is not a Turkish name, Turks] ask me ‘Why is your name Natali?’ ‘Oh, I see’ [they respond when I tell them]. ‘You are the first Armenian I know and you are not what I expected…’ they sometimes say. It makes me sad. What was this guy influenced to think? Here, they are growing with hate. [Armenians] have to use Turkish study books,” Natali explains. Armenian schools are mandated by law to follow a nearly identical curriculum to Turkish schools, the only exception being the addition of Armenian language classes, and the permission to teach some subjects in Armenian.[15,16] “They say ‘Turkish people have no friends other than Turks’”--- a popular Turkish proverb: Türk'ün Türk'ten başka dostu yoktur (The only friend of a Turk is a Turk.)[17]

Ariana, whose non-Turkish name also precipitates questioning about her ethnicity, iterated: “When I started to meet Turkish people, I had to explain why my name is different. [Turks] are not taught the right things. They say ‘Oh we were so nice to [Armenians] but they betrayed us. We just sent them away, we didn't do anything…’ I don't blame them [for saying this, as this is what they are taught in schools] but I do find it ignorant because you're responsible to research about your land and country.”

“People ask about my name,” Anita adds. “‘You’re not Turkish, what are you?’ But I’m from here.”

This dissonance between knowing one’s roots and history in the country, yet constantly being made to feel as if one does not belong and is not truly part of the greater society, is a feeling of dissonance and division that most of the interviewees expressed. Many cited examples of their Turkish peers asking harmlessly curious, yet nonetheless ignorant and hurtful, questions about where they came from, such as “Isn’t it hard to come from Armenia everyday?” “When did you come to Turkey?” “Where did your family come from?” “For a concert you came all the way from Armenia?”

“There are two responses [I receive] when say I am Armenian. It can be positive: ‘My father always used to talk about his Armenian neighbors,’ or negative: ‘[Armenians] were traitors, we should have killed them all…’ About two years ago, they did graffiti on my school’s wall. They wrote the name of Hrant Dink’s murderer. My [Turkish] friends don’t understand what it means to be a minority. They don’t understand a hate crime and the weight of the past, the past traumas that you get from your parents, grandparents, all the way down,” Ariana explained.

Which is why, despite the growing openness and closeness of Istanbul Armenian youth with Turkish society, there is still a wariness towards the average Turkish person (though not to the same extent as their parents).

“Of course some people will treat you worse if they find out you are Armenian. Armenian parents are really worried about the military, specifically. You can also have positive or neutral reactions. But you are always cautious because you don't know what you will get. The judge or lawyer or soldier or commander applying the laws can do something positive or negative… [Personally] I had some trouble at my after-school program from Turkish colleagues who were cold but not from teachers or police officers… [Sometimes] you can tell [how they will react to you] from their face or from their social background. Sometimes not to risk [being asked about my name], I might even say Aleyna as my name but it’s not that common [for Armenians] to have a nickname in their pocket like that,” Ariana continued. “Yes, it’s troublesome but being a minority is special. My culture is unique. Continuing a culture when you’re a minority in a country is harder so you appreciate and love [your culture] more.”

Armenians and Turkish Minority Politics: A Continuation of the Ethnic and Religious Homogenization Practices of the Kemalist Elite

And it’s especially hard to “continue a culture” when you’re a minority in Turkey. Present-day Turkish minority politics are based on dated policies of de-Christianization and ethnic homogenization that have their roots in the Republic of Turkey’s founding ideology of Kemalism, which in turn can trace its origin back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

In his master’s thesis on the September 6-7 pogroms conducted against the Turkish state’s Greek, Armenian, and Jewish minorities in 1955, Sureyya Arioba explains these Ottoman and pre-Republic roots: “Under the leadership of Abdulhamid II, the decline of the Ottoman Empire continued rapidly. The sultan attempted to keep his empire together by trying to instill Ottomanism and Islamism; he believed this would be a counterforce to nationalism that had swept the rest of the Empire. This policy, however, was not to stop the decline of the empire and the continued failures led the Young Turks to come to power in 1908. The Young Turk leaders moved the empire toward a purely Turkish brand of nationalism, known as Turkism… The aim was to disestablish and constrain non-Turkish communities whilst instilling patriotism among the Turks. The Young Turks also pursued nationalism through economic policies, favoring the newly rising Turkish middle class at the expense of the non-Muslims; and they promoted the ascendancy of the Turks as an ethnic group over other Muslims and non-Muslims… The Young Turks period under the CUP (1908-1918) is vital to an understanding of the minorities and Armenian question in the Ottoman Empire and its successor the Turkish Republic not only because of the disaster for the Armenian people of 1915… but also because the ideological foundations for the long term strategy on dealing with ‘non-Muslim minorities’ were laid under their guidance in this period”

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the modern Republic of Turkey, was inspired by the Ottoman Empire and the Young Turk regime. He maintained the idea of a homogenous Turkish state and identity as important pieces of the Republic’s long-term economic and political strategy. On the economic front was the wealth and property transfer from the non-Muslim minority to the Muslim majority and Turkish state, an economy-boosting strategy that was to continue after Atatürk’s death as well as through the multiple changes of power that would take place. On the political front, national non-Muslim minorities were to be decreased in number for “security” purposes, with the policy expanding to include ethnic minorities, such as Kurds, as time passed.

Hrant Dink examined this system of minority management and manipulation when he explained that “minorities have served as the main target of the state and of every succeeding government since the founding of the republic and, throughout that time, the government has been consistent in their efforts to reduce them in size. Sometimes this has meant reducing their numbers, while, at other times, it has meant reducing their assets… Thus exposed, they become easy targets for the state and also for the society, whose views it has manipulated…”[18]

Hrant Dink experienced the effects of many of these minority-reducing policies, a first-hand experience that would influence his involvement in, and his writings on the relationship between Armenians, Turkish society and the Turkish state. “It is a truth that Armenians, like other non-Muslim minorities, have constantly been percieved as a security threath throughout the history of the Republic…” he wrote. “The policy of the mindset that perceived the existence of minorities as a constant threat never changes throughout the history of the Republic, regardless of the political power in charge… Minorities were not to increase in number. All implementations were to aim at this target… In the end, the policy achieved its purpose.”[19] Minorities and foreigners constituted 56 percent of the population of Istanbul at the beginning of the 20th century. Today non-Muslim minority groups constitute less than 1 percent of the population of Turkey.

“And still a minority in Turkey is neither the minority described by the Treaty of Lausanne, nor the citizen defined by the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey,” Dink continued. He went on to identify examples of events, policies, and laws that exemplify major periods of Turkish state endeavors to limit its minority population, some of which include the 1942 Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) period, the events of September 6-7 1955, the 1964 Population Exchange, the periods before and after military coups, as well as times when the Karabakh and Kurdish issues escalated. “Because of the atmosphere of insecurity created in the Minority mindset, [these were] periods during which the slim stream of decrease thickened,” Dink explained.

Hrant Dink also gave examples of the way in which the Turkish government “seeks Armenian involvement in every threat it faces” and uses these claims of Armenian danger to state security to influence society and its attitude towards Armenians. “Official statements were made claiming Armenians were the force behind and within left wing organizations… At times, the Kurdish issue was said to be, in actual fact, nothing but the Armenian issue… Thus problems were either concealed, or deflected, by marking Armenians as the scapegoat… Transforming the word ‘Armenian’ into an invective in everyday speech did not prove difficult at all for the ‘Deep Media’. Defamatory expressions such as ‘Armenian bastard’ and ‘Armenian spawn’ entered colloquial language.”[20]

Hrant Dink wrote these words in 2005. Since then, not much has changed in regards to minority politics. As Minority Rights Group International noted in 2018 about the status of Armenians in Turkey, “Armenians continue to be targeted with hate speech and hate crimes…” In fact, commemorations of the Genocide, which had only begun in Turkey in 2005, were heavily restricted and repressed this past April. “I came here in 2013 and started being part of Apri 24 [commemorations] since 2013… This is the first time it was this awful,” Varduhi Balyan said.

For critics outside and within Turkey, the government’s harsh response to genocide commemoration this year was simply a small part of a larger ploy to quash any dissenting views and ideas in the country. Garo Paylan explained that the restrictions placed on commemorators and protestors “are the result of the current political climate and rising nationalism. It appears the government has lost its will to resolve the Armenian issue, that it has reverted to its former position… The refusal to grant Kurds’ demands, the erosion of the rule of law, detentions of peace activists, the inability to reconcile with the Armenian genocide and our other democratic problems are all connected.”

To commemorate the Armenian Genocide this year, Sevan Nişanyan, Turkish Armenian linguist and writer currently living in exile in Greece, translated his 2015 article, “Genocide is a Corollary of the Turkish National Doctrine,” into English. At the end of the piece, Nişanyan added an endnote in which he explained the political changes that have taken place since the mid-2010s, when the Republic of Turkey, whose path to a more liberal and accepting society had already been faltering, took a complete turn towards autocracy. He went on to explain how this has affected Armenians, as well as Turkish society at large:

“What was risky enough to write in 2015, one can no longer talk about without risking rabid invective, ostracism and possible prosecution. This is a shame because it could have been different. For a brief moment, it did seem it would be otherwise. From about the turn of the millennium, the formerly untouchable taboo of the Armenian ‘disappearance’ gradually became a part of the Turkish public debate. Books were published and seminars held; there were television debates and photographic exhibitions; foreign speakers were invited to speak on Armenian matters where it would have been unimaginable before and timid demonstrations of Armenian remembrance were held without drawing the usual police violence. Opinion leaders from the right and left of the spectrum felt compelled to learn about the sins of their ancestors and face the darkest secrets of their Republic… That is all past now. An insane brand of jingoism has taken over the land, fanned furiously by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had once appeared to many as a friend of liberty. The gâvur – the infidel – is the cosmic enemy. Any aspersion on Turkish honor is a self-evident imperialist lie to be drowned in abuse and hatred. The talkers and questioners of yesteryear have mostly dropped from public view. The most articulate – like Ahmet Altan, a journalist; Osman Kavala, a civil rights activist; and Selahattin Demirtaş, a political leader – are behind the bars. Many have left the country, hoping to return one day when the storm has passed.”

And it is not just journalists or civil rights activists who feel silenced and stifled by the growing instability and increasing totalitarianism in the country. “Many of my [Turkish] friends don’t even feel themselves ‘Turkish’ because… we live in a conservative society… My Turkish friends [and I] always talk about [how] we don’t belong here, we need to go to the West,” explained Tayis. Erdoğan’s government has been narrowing the definition of what it means to be a proper Turk through its suppression of those whose beliefs and ideologies do not fall in line with its own.

In 2017, the new Constitution, which expanded Erdoğan’s power, was approved. In 2018, it was implemented. That year saw the emigration of 113,000 Turks, a sharp increase compared to 2016, when 69,000 left the country, as well as the increase of asylum applications to Europe by Turks. In Istanbul, young people said that they had many friends who wanted to leave: “Many say they’re thinking about it themselves… Recent emigres and would-be emigres… [said] their decision was about safety from persecution, having a voice in society and, even more crucially, an uncertain future in the so-called ‘new’ Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. They say that Turkey went from being a haven of stability and economic growth in the region to a country with increasing societal divisions, rising violence and a government that continues to become increasingly authoritarian. Many people — particularly young, secular and educated Turks — say they have had enough.” As have Turkish Armenians, who are applying for Armenian passports. “It’s the easiest way of getting out if anything happens,” explained Varduhi Balyan.

But the environment in which a new generation of Istanbul Armenians were raised cannot be ignored. It was a period that influenced the mindset and thought processes of both Armenians and Turks alike, and allowed for a growing sense of rapprochement between Armenian and Turkish youth. While Armenians, as ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey, are still regarded through a lens of suspicion, the current political climate means that they are not the only targets of state scrutiny. Autocracy and attacks on freedom of speech and expression are on the rise in the country, dissidence and any opposition to the state regulated norms of conventional society are susceptible to backlash -- from both the state and Turkish populace at large. The early years of the 21st century saw Turkey take steps toward a more open and accepting society. Perhaps it can happen again and succeed.