#2

Post by Germanicus » 04 Jan 2015, 13:56

Dear SandeepI appreciate your question. I will be or try to be, as careful as possible in gauging the term performance. In historical terms it must be remembered that the creation of the 'Deutscher Volkssturm Wehrmacht', its official title, was an NSDAP creation. If defeat is anything to go by, as some will argue, it performed quite poorly. Yet stating the word poorly, would belittle and lay insult to the many who perished. This I will not do out of respect.One must further recall that the Volkssturm was created, approximately, within the final 6 months of the final defeat of Germany. Germany by this stage had been bombed into the stone age. How it was even able to remain in battle is incredible. More so the Volkssturm was being formed just before the Ardennes Offensive. The supply and transportation system was in chaos and bearing in mind all of that, the Volkssturm was born. With such little time left, it would be hard pressed to create an effective call up, with so many men, with such few weapons to fight with. Remember the weapon that is closely associated with the Volkssturm was the Panzerfaust!! So in essence the Volkssturm was at a disadvantage from the beginning. The First and Third Levy [mobilisation] of the Volkssturm and Hitlerjugend may have been most effective had ample weaponry been available and had been planned for well in advance. The First Levy was made up of men with military experience. The Third Levy made up of an organisation that was influenced and trained by the military.Mentioning the Hitlerjugend does and will instill bitter debate, on ethical and moral grounds. Yet a Nation must go through, what Germany was experiencing, so late in the war, to see what levels it will stoop to in order to have a chance of victory. Incredible I know, yet victory was still sort, yet Germany in 1944/45 had sowed the seed and was now reaping the whirlwind. Germany was fighting for survival and with a totalitarian Government in power, anything was possible, Total War had come home to roost.There are many occasions where the Volkssturm performed adequately and effectively, many occasions it performed not so well. However, to expect a victory, as stated above was beyond the realm of even the German Army, so late in the war. Dr David Yelton states : 'In areas where local conditions were favorable, where party officials worked with the army to provide adequate arms and training, and where they were integrated into the army command, militia units proved useful. When they believed they were being sacrificed to allow army units to withdraw, or witnessed the flight of party officials, Volkssturm men typically surrendered..'It was in the East that the Volkssturm was extensively involved in the defence of Germany. It is actually untrue to claim that the Volkssturm was totally ineffective, as Volkssturm troops fought extensively on the Eastern Front, particularly in East Prussia, Breslau, along the Oder River and in Berlin. The 19.Armee on the Upper Rhine became so dependent on Volksturm troops that it was nicknamed the 19.Volkssturm-Armee. Volkssturm troops also fought along the Western Front as well. While often ineffective in prolonged combat some Volksturm units fought well in local defense, in static positions, and in river positions.In the eastern frontiers the Volkssturm fought extensively in Danzig, Prussia, Brandenburg, Silesia, Pomeranien, Wartheland, Styrien and the Sudetes. In the west, the Volkssturm were used extensively in the region of Essen and the Westmark.When the Soviet offensive of January 1945 pushed back Armee Gruppe A and Center the VS units escorted and protected the three million German refugees. For instance, in Breslau 25,000 Volkssturm soldiers fought on until May 6. Fighting at Küstrin between 30 January to 29 March 1945, militia units made up mostly of the Volkssturm resisted for nearly two months. Losses were upwards of 60 percent for the Volkssturm at Kolberg, roughly 1900 of them died at Breslau, and during the Battle of Königsberg (Kaliningrad), another 2400 members of the Volkssturm were killed. Their most extensive use was during the Battle of Berlin, during which Volkssturm units fought in many parts of the city.The Volkssturm-Bataillon Libau which fought as part of a 607 Division, was dislodged three times, but in every case it launched fierce counter-attacks. In this bitter struggle the Bataillon Commander and most of his men remained on the field of battle. From The Wehrmacht Experience in Russia by Bob Carruthers. On Page 308 of Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945 By Erhard Raus also states the same. Yet he also states that on other occasions not so well.The following by Dr David Yelton may be of assistance.From David K. Yelton's well-researched Hitler's Volkssturm: the Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944-1945 (University of Kansas Press, 2002), pages 125-127:'Wehrmacht reliance on the Volkssturm as substitute infantry increased still further after the massive Soviet offensive against the Oder-Neisse position began on April 10. Volkssturm units here often fought bravely and inflicted heavy losses on the Soviet attackers, but they could not hold due to the Germans' lack of reserves. Intent on keeping the Soviets as far east as possible, Hitler authorized sending Berlin Volkssturm battalions and some 6,000 boys in HJ antitank teams as reinforcements to defend the Seelow Heights and other positions behind the Oder. Although fierce fighting here generated heavy casualties for both sides, these improvisations only delayed but could not halt the Soviets. Furthermore, much like their special purpose battalion comrades at Zielenzig, many hastily dispatched Volkssturm units were dispersed by air attacks (against which they had no protection) or quickly overrun before they reached their assigned positions.The decision to fight at the Oder also upset Berlin's defense preparations to some extent. The Berlin Volkssturm not only lost a substantial proportion of its better-equipped battalions, but Hitler also required it to turn over weapons to help arm thirty battalions of Luftwaffe and naval personnel. In spite of these reductions, Volkssturm units still constituted about half of Berlin's defense force; but what remained were generally poorly trained and ill equipped. In fact, one officer reported his zone's Volkssturm units had fifteen different rifle and ten different machine gun models.On the positive side, however, army-Volkssturm relations in Berlin had been largely cordial since defense preparations commenced in late January. Since then, Party-army efforts had improved fortification construction efforts, logistical arrangements, and Volkssturm unit and leader training -- particularly in antitank and street-fighting tactics. As in Breslau, the Party and army had reorganized units to create battle-worthy formations, scrutinized unit leader appointees for competence, replaced those found lacking with able former officers, and attempted to assign men to familiar geographic areas. Some units also received a stiffening of police to increase their combat potential. Wehrkreis officials even sought to ensure that rear-echelon soldiers treated Volkssturm men respectfully. These efforts led Berlin's military commanders to report on April 15 that the Volkssturm was willing and somewhat able to fight.Several Volkssturm battalions did indeed contribute to the city's bitter, if futile, defense by holding the Teltow Canal, protecting quiet sectors, ambushing Soviet reconnaissance patrols, and in street fighting. As always, however, Volkssturm units were brittle and poorly supplied, frequently reduced to procuring essential items by scavenging the battlefield, looting warehouses, or begging from sympathetic civilians. Many Volkssturm men recognized the futility of the struggle and either never reported for duty or threw away their armbands, paybooks, and equipment (if indeed they had any) and went home when they tired of fighting or ran out of ammunition or other necessary supplies.Hitler Youth military exploits in Berlin -- and indeed throughout Germany -- have been highly publicized, overshadowing the fact that they were only a fraction of the capital's substantial Volkssturm contingent. The fanatic HJ defense of the Pickelsdorfer bridges over the Havel did delay Soviet encirclement of the city for two days and was one of the most important Volkssturm successes in Berlin. HJ forces also fought, primarily as antitank teams, in other areas of Berlin and in the defenses west of the Oder ...'I will respond in more detail if you wish, however I am working on a major update of the Volkssturm-Bataillones listing.Most respectfullyMark