The Aviation Herald Last Update: Tuesday, Sep 29th 2020 20:26Z

26029 Articles available

Events from Jun 19th 1999 to Sep 29th 2020 www.avherald.com Incidents and News in Aviation List by: Filter: The Aviation Herald Android App

All Android devices

Version 1.01



Your easy and simple access to The Aviation Herald on Android Devices

The App permits full offline reading, tracking of already read articles, ad free. Crash: Sukhoi SU95 over Indonesia on May 9th 2012, aircraft impacted mountain

By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, May 9th 2012 10:31Z, last updated Wednesday, Aug 1st 2012 16:05Z A Sukhoi Sukhoi Superjet 100-95, registration RA-97004 performing a demonstration flight from Jakarta Halim Perdanakusuma Airport to Jakarta Halim Perdanakusuma Airport (Indonesia) with 37 passengers, 6 crew and 2 Sukhoi officials, was enroute near Mount Salak and Bogor about 36nm south of Jakarta about 30 minutes into the flight when the radio contact with the aircraft was lost between 14:21L and 14:33L (07:21Z to 07:33Z). The aircraft did not turn up at Jakarta or any other airport in the area. The aircraft wreckage was found by a helicopter the following morning (May 10th) at about 09:15L (02:15Z) on the slopes of Mount Salak at an elevation of about 5300 feet MSL. On May 11th around 14:00L (07:00Z) rescuers reached the crash site and subsequently recovered all 45 bodies.



Rescue and Recovery teams are currently on their way to the crash site. First attempts to reach the crash site, including attempts to set rescuers down by helicopters, have failed so far (May 10th 17:45L) due to the extremely steep terrain rising at up to 85 degrees. About 450 rescue personnel are currently moving towards the crash site on the ground but did not reach the site before darkness. At this time (May 10th 17:45L/10:45Z) no rescuer has yet reached the site, the status of the occupants on board of the aircraft is still unknown. The rescue operation has been suspended for the night May 10 to 11th.



The coordinator of the rescue operation said, that the aircraft appeared relatively intact from the air however has received substantial damage after leaving a trail away from the crater down the slope, there was no sign of survivors from the air. Rescue teams are currently on the ground about 1km from the crash site, the terrain being difficult to reach the wreckage.



The Air Force said the aircraft impacted the edge of a cliff (top of the cliff at 6250 feet MSL) about 1.7 nm from Cijeruk. Approximate final position of the aircraft is S6.7102 E106.7447 (initially reported as S6.7045 E106.7373 but updated on May 11th taking the crash site from the western to the eastern cliff).



Indonesian Authorities reported the aircraft was enroute at 10,000 feet near Mount Salak when at about 15:30L (08:30Z) the crew requested and was cleared to descend to 6,000 feet. This proved to be the last radio transmission. Radar contact was lost when the aircraft was in a right hand turn descending through 6,200 feet between Mount Salak and Mount Gede at approximate position S6.72 E106.72. The aircraft was flying clockwise around Mount Salak at that time. A search operation has been initiated and is mounting, first search flights on May 9th did not yet found any trace of the aircraft. Search on the ground is under way, a first team has departed for Mount Salak in the evening, a second ground team is expected to depart on May 10th early morning, more than 600 ground personnel have been deployed by sunrise May 10th.



In the evening of May 10th Police reported a total of 1353 rescue personnel are currently working to reach the aircraft and evacuate the occupants of the aircraft, which has to happen on the ground with the use of ladders. Access to the crash site from the air is not possible. Four rescue teams have been formed, each of which needs about 7 hours to climb to the wreckage. The first team of 10 people has already reached the site and was near the wreckage, but has not yet entered the wreckage. A second team of 75 people is due to arrive any time, a third team of 225 people departed during the night to May 11th and a fourth team of 250 people is going to depart at 05:00L May 11th.



In the morning of May 11th a first team reached the top of the cliff and is now descending on ropes towards the crash site.



On May 11th early afternoon Indonesia's President and rescuers announced in a press conference that 12 bodies have been discovered.



The discovered 12 bodies were recovered and flown out on May 11th, the recovery was subsequently suspended for the night at nightfall.



On May 12th Indonesia's Transport Minister said the black boxes have not yet been recovered, the search for them is under way.



On May 12th the chief of the disaster victim identification team reported identification of the bodys recovered so far began, 16 body bags have arrived at the hospital so far, the bodies are not intact. DNA testing will be needed to identify the victims. Russia pledged to send a DNA expert team to Indonesia to assist identification. DNA samples have been taken from the families.



By May 13th 21 body bags had been delivered to the hospital, where identification is going to be performed. 3 of the body bags however contained belongings of occupants of the aircraft, 18 of the bags contained human remains.



By May 15th 27 bodies have been taken to the hospital for identification.



On May 16th the cockpit voice recorder was recovered and taken to Jakarta, where the recorder is being examined and opened. Russia and Indonesia agree that analysis of the data should take place in Indonesia, the necessary tools if necessary will be brought to Indonesia. The search for the flight data recorder is still underway.



On May 24th 2012 Indonesia's Ministry of Transport reported that the bodies of all 45 occupants of the aircraft have been identified, the remains are now being handed over to the relatives. Sukhoi is going to pay out compensation to the victims in accordance with Indonesia's regulations.



On May 24th Russia's Rosaviatsia (Civil Aviation Authority) released a report dated May 22nd stating that a descent from the mountaineous area's minimum safe altitude of 10,000 feet to 6,000 feet had been pre-arranged. The flight was continued at 6,000 feet until the aircraft impacted a slope rising up to 7254 feet MSL. The investigation is ongoing in all directions with a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) being a likely scenario. Rosaviatsia reported that CFIT accidents typically are the result of one or more of the following factors:



- Execution of flight below safe altitude as result of deliberate action of the crew or loss of situational awareness

- Lack of response by the crew to (GPWS/TAWS) alerts of terrain closure

- Clearance by ATC to descend in mountaineous terrain in absence of accurate position data

- Erroneous altitude indications due to incorrect pressure setting or system malfunction.



Sukhoi reported the aircraft registration RA-97004 (MSN 95004) was piloted by a very experienced crew that also flew the first prototype of the aircraft, the commander had more than 10,000 hours total. The crew did not report any anomaly and did not issue a distress call prior to the aircraft disappearing. The aircraft had already concluded another demonstration flight earlier the day. The accident aircraft had accumulated 800 flight hours in more than 500 cycles, there had been no serious technical problems since its first flight in 2009.



Sukhoi later added, that based on preliminary analysis of the cockpit voice recorder data a paper was signed by both Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee and Russia's Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) investigation the crash. The paper stated that no system malfunctions were detected prior to impact, the aircraft's Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) was operating and provided the crew with information about hazardeous ground proximity.



Indonesia's Ministry of Transport quoted the Director of Civil Aviation stating that the crew had requested to descend from 10,000 feet to 6,000 feet. Contact with the aircraft was lost between 14:21L and 14:33L (07:21Z to 07:33Z). The aircraft was later located on Mount Salak. The aircraft type has not been grounded, flights can continue with the Superjet 100. The area around Borok was chosen for the demonstration flight because of lack of other flights in the area. Weather data from Indonesia's "Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi dan Geofisika" (Institute for Meteorology, Climate and Geophysics) do not suggest the weather was below visual meteorologic conditions, however there is possibility of local cloud at Mount Salak that may have restricted the view of the crew. The occurrence is being investigated by Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC). The Transport Minister called for all sides to wait for the results of the investigation by the NTSC. The Minister also stated that the ministry will not block the purchase of a total of 42 Superjet 100s by two Indonesian Airlines.



On May 28th the Ministry of Transport stated that each of the demo flights was scheduled to take 30 minutes flying from Halim Perdanakusuma Airport to Pelabuhan Ratu and back at 10,000 feet. The Ministry also released a time line of the flight stating, that the aircraft took off Halim Perdanakusuma Airport's runway 06 at 14:21L and climbed to 10,000 feet. The aircraft subsequently established on radial 200 of the HLM VOR (located on Halim Perdanakusuma Airport) and was handed off to Soekarno Hatta Airport's air traffic control at 14:24L. At 14:26L the crew requested and was cleared to descend to 6000 feet, at 14:28L the crew requested a right orbit in the training area Atang Sanjaya (about 3nm north of Bogor). At 14:52L ATC contacted Soekarno Hatta Airport after the aircraft was no longer visible on the radar screen, at 14:55L ATC reported to the ATS coordinator because of the loss of the target. An uncertainty phase followed, at 16:05L ATC contacted Search and Rescue, at 16:55L the alert phase (ALERFA) was invoked and at 18:22L distress phase (DESTRESFA) was invoked after the aircraft's fuel would have run out.



On May 31st Indonesia's NTSC and Russia's MAK presented the just recovered flight data recorder in a press conference.



On Jun 25th 2012 the NTSC released immediate safety recommendations reporting the crash site is located at a near vertical wall at the eastern side of Mount Salak at coordinates S6.7094 E106.7353 at 6100 feet MSL. Following intensive search for 22 days a number of items were recovered including APU ECU, HF transceiver, HF power amplifier, HF emergency radio, ELT406, ACRA Control, RCP for MPS-31C, CVR, DME Unit, harddisk, Aeroflot FOM, parachute, collection of aeronavigation information, metal parts from fuselage and the FDR. The aircraft was certified by Russia however was not suitable for commercial operation (i.e. transportation of passengers by fare) and was not the property of a commercial operation airline. No copy of a passenger manifest and aircraft documentation could be found, passenger manifest and aircraft documents were carried only on the aircraft. Recommendations to ensure minimum safe altitude during demonstration flights as well as ensure copies of documentation available on the ground were issued to both Indonesia's Directorate of Civil Aviation and Sukhoi.

Indonesia's Air Traffic Control, Jakarta Branch, reported, that communication between ATC and aircraft was done in English, there was no language problem hampering communication. The aircraft had been in the area of Bogor, approximate coordinates S6.55 E106.9, about 13nm north of the peak of Mount Salak and 7nm clear of mountaineous terrain in safe flat area, when the crew requested to descend from 10,000 to 6,000 feet and to perform a right orbit. As there was no reason to decline such a clearance the flight was cleared down and for the right orbit. This was the last transmissioon from the aircraft, the aircraft could not be reached afterwards. It is unclear how the aircraft got into the area of Mount Salak and crashed afterwards, ATC services hope the black boxes will explain how the aircraft got there. All data including flight plan, radar data and ATC recordings as well as transcripts of interviews with the air traffic controller have been handed to Indonesia's NTSC.



Mount Salak is 2,211 meters/7254 feet high, nearby Mount Gede is 2,958 meters/9,705 feet high.



At 14:30L and 15:30L the local weatherstation in Bogor reported visibility at 9000 meters (increasing to 10000 meters in the next reading at 16:30L), temperature at 31 degrees C, dew point at 25 degrees C, humidity 70% and winds arund 5 knots from northeast, no precipitation. In the morning the weatherstation had reported low visibility around about 2000 meters.



The chairman of Indonesia's NTSC (center) and Russian Investigator of MAK (left) present the burnt flight data recorder

(Photo: AP/Achmad Ibrahim):





The chairman of Indonesia's NTSC (left) receives the burnt cockpit voice recorder (Photo: AP/Jefri Tarigan):





A passenger's laptop shows the impact forces (Photo: Reuters/Duyeh Cidayu):





Looking down from the top of the cliff (Photo: AP):





Crash site from the bottom of the cliff (Photo: AFP/Adek Berry):





Crash site from the air (Photo: Lystseva Marina):





Lowest part of the crash site (Photo: APA/EPA/Subali Ahmad):





Video of the crash site off a search helicopter (Video: Sergey Doyla):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jP-Xfmdyzk



The aircraft in Jakarta on May 8th 2012:





Infrared MTSAT Satellite Image May 9th 09:00Z (Photo: MTSAT):





Infrared MTSAT Satellite Image May 9th 06:00Z (Photo: MTSAT):





Detail Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):





Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):









By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Dec 18th 2012 12:53Z, last updated Tuesday, Dec 18th 2012 12:53Z



- The flight crew was not aware of the mountainous area in the vicinity of the flight path due to various factors such as available charts, insufficient briefing and statements of the potential customer that resulted in inappropriate response to the TAWS warning. The impact could have been avoided by appropriate action of the pilot up to 24 seconds after the first TAWS warning.



- The Jakarta Radar service had not established the minimum vectoring altitudes and the Jakarta Radar system was not equipped with functioning MSAW for the particular area around Mount Salak.



- Distraction of the flight crew from prolonged conversation not related to the progress of the flight, resulted in the pilot flying not constantly changing the aircraft heading while in orbit. Consequently, the aircraft unintentionally exited the orbit.



The captain (57, Test Pilot License first class, 10,347 hours total, 1,348 hours on type) was pilot flying for the demonstration flight RA-36801, the first officer (44, Test Pilot License second class, 3,318 hours total, 625 hours on type) was pilot monitoring. In addition a navigator (51, Test Navigator License first class, 3,533 hours total, 485 hours on type) and a test flight engineer were on board plus 41 passengers. The representative of a potential customer occupied the observer's seat in the cockpit.



The aircraft departed Halim Perdanakusuma Airport's runway 06, turned right to intercept radial 200 of HLM VOR (Halim Perdanakusuma Airport's VOR) and climbed to 10,000 feet. About 5 minutes after departure the crew reported level at 10,000 feet. Another 2 minutes later the crew requested to descend to 6,000 feet, the controller asked to repeat the request, the first officer repeated the request to descend to 6000 feet, to which the controller replied "6,000 copied". The first officer replied "Descending to 6,000 feet".



Further 2 minutes later the crew requested a right hand orbit, the controller approved the right hand orbit at 6,000 feet. At that point the aircraft was 17nm southwest of HLM VOR over the Atang Sanjaya Training Area.



22 minutes after the request for the right hand orbit the controller noticed the target had disappeared from his radar screen. Attempts to contact the aircraft over the next 3 minutes were without reply. The Air Traffic Services Operation Regional Coordinator subsequently attempted internal coordination to determine the position of the aircraft. 45 minutes after the aircraft target was detected missing INCERFA (Uncertainty Phase) was declared, after another 20 minutes ALERFA (Alert Phase) was declared and 3:32 hours after the target was detected missing DETRESFA (Distress Phase) was declared.



A helicopter pilot detected the location of the aircraft the following day about 17.5 hours after the aircraft target was detected missing. The aircraft had impacted a ridge of Mount Salak, facing to the east rising at an angle of 85 degrees, on radial 198 of HLM VOR 28nm from the VOR at 6000 feet at GPS coordinates S6.7125 E106.7347, the aircraft systems had recorded a last radio altitude of 370 feet.



The flight data and cockpit voice recorders ceased recording at 07:33:26Z, about 16.5 minutes prior to the air traffic controller noticing the target had been lost on his radar screen.



The recorders revealed that after departure from Jakarta the crew engaged LNAV mode which was active until during the descent to 6000 feet, too. At 07:27:24Z the commander commanded "heading", LNAV was disengaged and heading hold engaged. The aircraft was descending through 9200 feet at 211 KIAS at that time. At 07:28:21Z the right hand orbit was approved by air traffic control, the heading bug was moved to 333 degrees, then 033, 103 and 150 in sequence. The aircraft descended through 7700 feet at 210 KIAS.



The captain demonstrated the ability of the aircraft to fly holding patterns on the FMC, the first officer commented something could be seen through the clouds. At 07:29:27Z the captain announced the aircraft had levelled at 6000 feet, 47 seconds later the heading bug was set to 174 degrees.



The captain demonstrated the terrain awareness system to the observer by displaying the terrain on the navigation display and commented "but no problem with terrain, at this moment", the observer commented "ya, it's flat". Observer and crew engaged in a discussion about fuel consumption.



The captain instructed the first officer to request a right hand turn for the approach to Halim Airport, the first officer asked whether the commander intended another orbit or return to Halim, then repeated the question. In the meantime the autopilot began to roll out of the right hand turn and had wings level when the aircraft had reached the selected heading of 174 degrees at 07:31:53Z.



The first officer repeated his question again, the commander replied they'd make the approach. The first officer commented he would make the request after they had completed the orbit, the commander instructed to request the turn now, then hummingly tried to figure out the heading to Halim. The first officer suggested he could do that via the Legs Page on the FMC. The captain asked "Legs Page, which one?", the first officer was not able to find the heading information on the legs page and calculated the heading based on the outbound heading. The captain queried the calculation. At 07:32:24Z the captain stated the heading to Halim was 020 degrees and instructed at 07:32:29Z "on heading 020 for VOR/DME approach" and to request to descend to 1600 feet for the VOR/DME approach. The heading selector was moved to 325 degrees, the aircraft rolled into a right hand turn at 20 degrees of bank angle.



At 07:32:48Z the Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) alerted the crew "Terrain Ahead, Pull up!", 2 seconds later "Avoid Terrain!" and another second later "Avoid Terrain!" The first officer was puzzled "What is that?", the "Avoid Terrain!" alert sounded 4 more times, then the TAWS was selected inhibited. The captain commented "Maybe ... database".



At 07:33:19Z an aural alert "Gear not down" sounded, the side stick was moved resulting in the autopilot disconnecting simultaneously, the SYS and TERR buttons were pushed, the autopilot selected off, the chime indicating the autopilot off sounded. The first officer asked "What is that", the captain explained "Autopilot OFF" and the recordings ended.



Although the aircraft was equipped with an emergency location transmitter capable of transmitting on 406MHz, 121.5MHz and 243 MHz, no ELT signal was received from the crash site. The ELT was later recovered from the crash site with the antenna detached.



The NTSC conducted tests whether the TAWS alerts were in time to permit the aircraft climb to safety. The tests showed the TAWS did function as expected and provided correct information. Had the crew responded to the TAWS alerts timely, collision with terrain would have been averted, even if the crew had reacted only 24 seconds after the first TAWS alert only.



The NTSC analysed that on the outbound leg just prior to entering the orbit the first officer had commented on a dark cloud ahead, which indicated Mount Salak was in cloud. Further comment that the ground could be seen through the cloud further confirmed that the area at the training base was partially cloudy, too. While in the orbit, at approximately heading 070, the captain demonstrated the TAWS, at that time the terrain ahead of the aircraft was entirely flat. The NTSC analysed that the observer's comment "it's all flat" could have misled the crew to believe the entire terrain around their position was flat.



When the aircraft rolled out at heading of 174 degrees the crew inadvertently left the right hand orbit without completing the orbit that would have ended at 200 degrees. The NTSC analysed that the crew probably did not notice they had left the orbit and still believed they were turning evident by the first officer's remark he would request the return to Halim after the aircraft had completed the orbit.



During the following discussion about the return heading to Halim the aircraft travelled 4nm on heading 174 degrees, the captain was unaware of the mountaineous terrain around evident by his request to descent to 1600 feet for the approach to Halim.



Following the discussion the heaidng selector was rotated to 325 degrees and the aircraft began to turn right again. As soon as the aircraft rolled into the turn, the predictive function of TAWS, computing the turn performance as well, detected a conflict with terrain within 120 seconds and began to issue the related alerts. Following the TAWS inhibit not only the aural alerts, but visual alerts and terrain display were removed from the navigation display, too.



After the captain commented the alerts could be related to database, there was no communication between the pilots for 20 seconds until the gear not down warning and the simultaneous stick input occurred. The captain provided stick inputs to raise the nose to 5 degrees of pitch, the autopilot disconnected evident by the autopilot disconnected trickle sound.



The NTSC analysed that the captain's input to raise the nose to 5 degrees can not be seen as an escape maneouver. This would require to accelerate the engines to TOGA and flight control up input. The reason for the captain's input could not be determined by the investigation.



The NTSC concluded that simulator tests verified an escape maneouver could have avoided terrain contact until 24 seconds after the first TAWS alert, thereafter terrain contact could no longer be avoided.



The NTSC analysed that the briefing of the flight was incomplete and inadequate leaving the crew without information about the mountaineous area around Mount Salak.



The NTSC analysed that the controller had not understood the aircraft was a civil aircraft. When he looked up the type, he understood it was a Sukhoi military aircraft performing a test flight in the Bogor area and therefore was not concerned with the limits at the training area.



The NTSC analysed that the controller was under high work load with communication going on with the 13 aircraft in his area nearly continuously without pauses. The NTSC believes this is one of the factors why the aircraft was not detected missing from the radar screen. In a post occurrence interview the controller provided testimony that he felt over-loaded.



Following the mutliple TAWS alerts the captain disengaged the TAWS believing the alerts were the result of a database error.



Actual flight trajectory and time line (Graphics: NTSC):



Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) released their final report concluding the probable causes of the crash were:The captain (57, Test Pilot License first class, 10,347 hours total, 1,348 hours on type) was pilot flying for the demonstration flight RA-36801, the first officer (44, Test Pilot License second class, 3,318 hours total, 625 hours on type) was pilot monitoring. In addition a navigator (51, Test Navigator License first class, 3,533 hours total, 485 hours on type) and a test flight engineer were on board plus 41 passengers. The representative of a potential customer occupied the observer's seat in the cockpit.The aircraft departed Halim Perdanakusuma Airport's runway 06, turned right to intercept radial 200 of HLM VOR (Halim Perdanakusuma Airport's VOR) and climbed to 10,000 feet. About 5 minutes after departure the crew reported level at 10,000 feet. Another 2 minutes later the crew requested to descend to 6,000 feet, the controller asked to repeat the request, the first officer repeated the request to descend to 6000 feet, to which the controller replied "6,000 copied". The first officer replied "Descending to 6,000 feet".Further 2 minutes later the crew requested a right hand orbit, the controller approved the right hand orbit at 6,000 feet. At that point the aircraft was 17nm southwest of HLM VOR over the Atang Sanjaya Training Area.22 minutes after the request for the right hand orbit the controller noticed the target had disappeared from his radar screen. Attempts to contact the aircraft over the next 3 minutes were without reply. The Air Traffic Services Operation Regional Coordinator subsequently attempted internal coordination to determine the position of the aircraft. 45 minutes after the aircraft target was detected missing INCERFA (Uncertainty Phase) was declared, after another 20 minutes ALERFA (Alert Phase) was declared and 3:32 hours after the target was detected missing DETRESFA (Distress Phase) was declared.A helicopter pilot detected the location of the aircraft the following day about 17.5 hours after the aircraft target was detected missing. The aircraft had impacted a ridge of Mount Salak, facing to the east rising at an angle of 85 degrees, on radial 198 of HLM VOR 28nm from the VOR at 6000 feet at GPS coordinates S6.7125 E106.7347, the aircraft systems had recorded a last radio altitude of 370 feet.The flight data and cockpit voice recorders ceased recording at 07:33:26Z, about 16.5 minutes prior to the air traffic controller noticing the target had been lost on his radar screen.The recorders revealed that after departure from Jakarta the crew engaged LNAV mode which was active until during the descent to 6000 feet, too. At 07:27:24Z the commander commanded "heading", LNAV was disengaged and heading hold engaged. The aircraft was descending through 9200 feet at 211 KIAS at that time. At 07:28:21Z the right hand orbit was approved by air traffic control, the heading bug was moved to 333 degrees, then 033, 103 and 150 in sequence. The aircraft descended through 7700 feet at 210 KIAS.The captain demonstrated the ability of the aircraft to fly holding patterns on the FMC, the first officer commented something could be seen through the clouds. At 07:29:27Z the captain announced the aircraft had levelled at 6000 feet, 47 seconds later the heading bug was set to 174 degrees.The captain demonstrated the terrain awareness system to the observer by displaying the terrain on the navigation display and commented "but no problem with terrain, at this moment", the observer commented "ya, it's flat". Observer and crew engaged in a discussion about fuel consumption.The captain instructed the first officer to request a right hand turn for the approach to Halim Airport, the first officer asked whether the commander intended another orbit or return to Halim, then repeated the question. In the meantime the autopilot began to roll out of the right hand turn and had wings level when the aircraft had reached the selected heading of 174 degrees at 07:31:53Z.The first officer repeated his question again, the commander replied they'd make the approach. The first officer commented he would make the request after they had completed the orbit, the commander instructed to request the turn now, then hummingly tried to figure out the heading to Halim. The first officer suggested he could do that via the Legs Page on the FMC. The captain asked "Legs Page, which one?", the first officer was not able to find the heading information on the legs page and calculated the heading based on the outbound heading. The captain queried the calculation. At 07:32:24Z the captain stated the heading to Halim was 020 degrees and instructed at 07:32:29Z "on heading 020 for VOR/DME approach" and to request to descend to 1600 feet for the VOR/DME approach. The heading selector was moved to 325 degrees, the aircraft rolled into a right hand turn at 20 degrees of bank angle.At 07:32:48Z the Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) alerted the crew "Terrain Ahead, Pull up!", 2 seconds later "Avoid Terrain!" and another second later "Avoid Terrain!" The first officer was puzzled "What is that?", the "Avoid Terrain!" alert sounded 4 more times, then the TAWS was selected inhibited. The captain commented "Maybe ... database".At 07:33:19Z an aural alert "Gear not down" sounded, the side stick was moved resulting in the autopilot disconnecting simultaneously, the SYS and TERR buttons were pushed, the autopilot selected off, the chime indicating the autopilot off sounded. The first officer asked "What is that", the captain explained "Autopilot OFF" and the recordings ended.Although the aircraft was equipped with an emergency location transmitter capable of transmitting on 406MHz, 121.5MHz and 243 MHz, no ELT signal was received from the crash site. The ELT was later recovered from the crash site with the antenna detached.The NTSC conducted tests whether the TAWS alerts were in time to permit the aircraft climb to safety. The tests showed the TAWS did function as expected and provided correct information. Had the crew responded to the TAWS alerts timely, collision with terrain would have been averted, even if the crew had reacted only 24 seconds after the first TAWS alert only.The NTSC analysed that on the outbound leg just prior to entering the orbit the first officer had commented on a dark cloud ahead, which indicated Mount Salak was in cloud. Further comment that the ground could be seen through the cloud further confirmed that the area at the training base was partially cloudy, too. While in the orbit, at approximately heading 070, the captain demonstrated the TAWS, at that time the terrain ahead of the aircraft was entirely flat. The NTSC analysed that the observer's comment "it's all flat" could have misled the crew to believe the entire terrain around their position was flat.When the aircraft rolled out at heading of 174 degrees the crew inadvertently left the right hand orbit without completing the orbit that would have ended at 200 degrees. The NTSC analysed that the crew probably did not notice they had left the orbit and still believed they were turning evident by the first officer's remark he would request the return to Halim after the aircraft had completed the orbit.During the following discussion about the return heading to Halim the aircraft travelled 4nm on heading 174 degrees, the captain was unaware of the mountaineous terrain around evident by his request to descent to 1600 feet for the approach to Halim.Following the discussion the heaidng selector was rotated to 325 degrees and the aircraft began to turn right again. As soon as the aircraft rolled into the turn, the predictive function of TAWS, computing the turn performance as well, detected a conflict with terrain within 120 seconds and began to issue the related alerts. Following the TAWS inhibit not only the aural alerts, but visual alerts and terrain display were removed from the navigation display, too.After the captain commented the alerts could be related to database, there was no communication between the pilots for 20 seconds until the gear not down warning and the simultaneous stick input occurred. The captain provided stick inputs to raise the nose to 5 degrees of pitch, the autopilot disconnected evident by the autopilot disconnected trickle sound.The NTSC analysed that the captain's input to raise the nose to 5 degrees can not be seen as an escape maneouver. This would require to accelerate the engines to TOGA and flight control up input. The reason for the captain's input could not be determined by the investigation.The NTSC concluded that simulator tests verified an escape maneouver could have avoided terrain contact until 24 seconds after the first TAWS alert, thereafter terrain contact could no longer be avoided.The NTSC analysed that the briefing of the flight was incomplete and inadequate leaving the crew without information about the mountaineous area around Mount Salak.The NTSC analysed that the controller had not understood the aircraft was a civil aircraft. When he looked up the type, he understood it was a Sukhoi military aircraft performing a test flight in the Bogor area and therefore was not concerned with the limits at the training area.The NTSC analysed that the controller was under high work load with communication going on with the 13 aircraft in his area nearly continuously without pauses. The NTSC believes this is one of the factors why the aircraft was not detected missing from the radar screen. In a post occurrence interview the controller provided testimony that he felt over-loaded.Following the mutliple TAWS alerts the captain disengaged the TAWS believing the alerts were the result of a database error.Actual flight trajectory and time line (Graphics: NTSC): By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Aug 1st 2012 16:04Z, last updated Wednesday, Aug 1st 2012 16:14Z



Following departure from Halim Perdanakusuma Airport's runway 06 the aircraft climbed to 10,000 feet and joined radial 200 of HLM VOR. About 2 minutes later, at 07:26Z, the crew requested to descend to 6,000 feet. The ATC replied "6,000 copied", the crew acknowleged "Descend to 6000 feet". At 07:28Z the crew requested a right hand orbit, which was approved by the air traffic controller.



The NTSC reported that the radar display showed the aircraft overhead WI(R)-4 Atang Sanjaya Training Area, located about 17nm southwest of HLM VOR at that time 07:28Z.



At 07:50Z the air traffic controller noticed the aircraft had disappeared from the radar screen and attempted to contact the aircraft during the next 5 minutes. At 07:55Z the air traffic controller informed ATS coordination.



At 08:35Z uncertainty alert was raised, at 08:55Z distress alert was raised and at 11:22Z distress phase was declared.



A search for the aircraft began at 09:00Z, the location of the aircraft however was unclear. No ELT signal was ever received by Indonesian, Australian, Singaporean or Malaysian rescue coordination centers although the aircraft was equipped with an ELT capable to transmit on 406, 121.5 and 243 MHz.



The aircraft was located on May 10th at 01:35Z at S6.71 E106.7447 at an elevation of about 6000 feet at a 85 degrees slope ridge (editorial note: the position identifies the eastern cliff of the valley). All occupants perished in the crash, the aircraft was destroyed. The main parts of the wreckage like engines, landing gear, vertical stabilizers were found at the bottom of the valley about 500 meters below the point of impact. The ELT was found with its antenna detached.



The captain (57, test pilot license, 10,347 hours total, 1,348 hours on type) and the first officer (44, test pilot license, 3,318 hours total, 625 hours on type) were flying the aircraft.



The aircraft had been certified as civil passenger aircraft by experimental aircraft airworthiness certificate no. 95/13-415. According to Russian regulations this meant the aircraft was not designed for commercial operation (transportation of passengers by fare). The aircraft had been equipped with an additional flight test equipment (data acquisition).



The weather forecasts for the accident area predicted haze in the area with a visibility of 5000 meters, scattered to broken cloud at 1700 feet. The Bogor weather office observed haze and visbility of 4000 meters at the accident time with cloud base at 600 meters/2000 feet at 5-6 octas.



The flight data recorder, recovered on May 31st 2012, was found in good quality and its data have been successfully downloaded. The data and its interpretation are to be included in the final report only however.



The cockpit voice recorder recovered on May 15th 2012 was also found in good condition and was downloaded. The transcript/analysis will also be included in the final report.

Indonesia's NTSC released their preliminary report reporting the demonstration flight was filed as an IFR flight maintaining 10,000 feet enroute and joining HLM VOR's (located at Jakarta Halim Perdanakusuma Airport) radial 200 for a flight to Pelabuhan Ratu and back. The estimated flight time was 30 minutes, the endurance of the aircraft was 4 hours.Following departure from Halim Perdanakusuma Airport's runway 06 the aircraft climbed to 10,000 feet and joined radial 200 of HLM VOR. About 2 minutes later, at 07:26Z, the crew requested to descend to 6,000 feet. The ATC replied "6,000 copied", the crew acknowleged "Descend to 6000 feet". At 07:28Z the crew requested a right hand orbit, which was approved by the air traffic controller.The NTSC reported that the radar display showed the aircraft overhead WI(R)-4 Atang Sanjaya Training Area, located about 17nm southwest of HLM VOR at that time 07:28Z.At 07:50Z the air traffic controller noticed the aircraft had disappeared from the radar screen and attempted to contact the aircraft during the next 5 minutes. At 07:55Z the air traffic controller informed ATS coordination.At 08:35Z uncertainty alert was raised, at 08:55Z distress alert was raised and at 11:22Z distress phase was declared.A search for the aircraft began at 09:00Z, the location of the aircraft however was unclear. No ELT signal was ever received by Indonesian, Australian, Singaporean or Malaysian rescue coordination centers although the aircraft was equipped with an ELT capable to transmit on 406, 121.5 and 243 MHz.The aircraft was located on May 10th at 01:35Z at S6.71 E106.7447 at an elevation of about 6000 feet at a 85 degrees slope ridge (editorial note: the position identifies the eastern cliff of the valley). All occupants perished in the crash, the aircraft was destroyed. The main parts of the wreckage like engines, landing gear, vertical stabilizers were found at the bottom of the valley about 500 meters below the point of impact. The ELT was found with its antenna detached.The captain (57, test pilot license, 10,347 hours total, 1,348 hours on type) and the first officer (44, test pilot license, 3,318 hours total, 625 hours on type) were flying the aircraft.The aircraft had been certified as civil passenger aircraft by experimental aircraft airworthiness certificate no. 95/13-415. According to Russian regulations this meant the aircraft was not designed for commercial operation (transportation of passengers by fare). The aircraft had been equipped with an additional flight test equipment (data acquisition).The weather forecasts for the accident area predicted haze in the area with a visibility of 5000 meters, scattered to broken cloud at 1700 feet. The Bogor weather office observed haze and visbility of 4000 meters at the accident time with cloud base at 600 meters/2000 feet at 5-6 octas.The flight data recorder, recovered on May 31st 2012, was found in good quality and its data have been successfully downloaded. The data and its interpretation are to be included in the final report only however.The cockpit voice recorder recovered on May 15th 2012 was also found in good condition and was downloaded. The transcript/analysis will also be included in the final report.

By DR on Monday, Dec 24th 2012 17:19Z





By noske on Monday, Dec 24th 2012 13:24Z





By noske on Monday, Dec 24th 2012 13:23Z





By (anonymous) on Sunday, Dec 23rd 2012 13:24Z





By (anonymous) on Sunday, Dec 23rd 2012 13:23Z





By Platon on Sunday, Dec 23rd 2012 08:22Z





By (anonymous) on Saturday, Dec 22nd 2012 15:25Z





By bob on Thursday, Dec 20th 2012 21:38Z





By Stefano on Wednesday, Dec 19th 2012 13:46Z





By noske on Wednesday, Dec 19th 2012 13:29Z





By (anonymous) on Wednesday, Dec 19th 2012 11:18Z





By noske on Wednesday, Dec 19th 2012 10:01Z





By Platon on Wednesday, Dec 19th 2012 10:01Z





By How Mike on Wednesday, Dec 19th 2012 08:09Z





By DR on Wednesday, Dec 19th 2012 05:27Z





By Gerry on Wednesday, Dec 19th 2012 01:04Z





By The Old Bloke on Wednesday, Dec 19th 2012 00:02Z





By Ground Gripper on Tuesday, Dec 18th 2012 20:31Z





By Richard Holster on Tuesday, Dec 18th 2012 16:07Z





By werner on Tuesday, Dec 18th 2012 15:47Z





By Stefano on Tuesday, Dec 18th 2012 15:28Z





By (anonymous) on Tuesday, Dec 18th 2012 12:52Z





By Thomas S. on Sunday, Aug 5th 2012 06:36Z





By Stefano on Friday, Aug 3rd 2012 08:32Z





By Stefano on Friday, Aug 3rd 2012 08:09Z





By Bravo on Thursday, Aug 2nd 2012 20:57Z





By Dave on Thursday, Aug 2nd 2012 13:20Z





By Michael Anthony on Thursday, Aug 2nd 2012 08:56Z





By Thomas S. on Thursday, Aug 2nd 2012 08:08Z





By Bravo on Thursday, Aug 2nd 2012 08:00Z





Add your comment: (max 1024 characters) Your Name: Your Email: Subject: Your comment: The Aviation Herald Apps

Android and iOS

Support The Aviation Herald

one time

Monthly support 1 €/month

Interview: The human factor named "Simon Hradecky" and the team of man and machine Get the news right onto your desktop when they happen © 2008-2020 by The Aviation Herald, all rights reserved, reprint and republishing prohibited. We use cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our site, learn more