Executive Summary

Internal and external forces are converging on the Korean Peninsula with potentially profound implications for Korean futures and regional stability. Between the unprecedented flurry of bilateral summits and agreements on North Korean denuclearization, the two Koreas have a broader goal—reunifying after nearly seventy-five years of division. The April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula proclaims, in part, that “South and North Korea will reconnect the blood relations of the people and bring forward the future of co-prosperity and unification led by Koreans by facilitating comprehensive and groundbreaking advancement in inter-Korean relations.”1 While the two Koreas have starkly different ideas of what form unification should take, it is an undeniable end-goal of ongoing engagement.

While it is a worthy goal, unification poses a high risk to political, economic, and social stability in Korea, even if it occurs peacefully and under the auspices of South Korea’s (Republic of Korea or ROK) democratic government. It requires careful forethought and planning. However, much of this planning is focused on predicting under which scenario—peaceful, collapse, or conflict—unification will occur. While scenario planning is useful, it downplays and neglects critical issues that will determine whether or not true political, economic, and social integration of the two Koreas can be achieved. This publication defines unification as a process of sustainable integration under a single, unified Korean state. While different scenarios may provide different starting points on this path, unification as a process will be drawn out and won’t be complete until the two Koreas are integrated socially, economically, and politically. Regardless of the scenario, such integration is contingent upon successful stabilization and stability actions, which refer to a framework for transforming fragile states into stable states. Although many international organizations will likely be involved in this process, given the importance of the United States’ alliance with South Korea and the positive role the United States can play in support of ROK-led unification, assessing unification through the lens of stabilization is essential.

The current emphasis on scenario-based planning places a premium on unpredictable elements of unification. Scenarios are also inherently limiting and often-times politicized. Progressives in Korea are reluctant to discuss collapse or conflict scenarios as they imply the absorption of North Korea. On all sides, the lack of Korean involvement in the original decision to divide the peninsula in 1945, among other experiences, makes South Korea wary of the potential for foreign actors to usurp control in any unification enterprise. Such views and other political obstacles severely limit and constrain the U.S. government and military from planning key support to the ROK throughout the process of unification with the exception of conflict contingency planning. However, South Korea also acknowledges that unification will not occur in a foreign policy vacuum. In order to ensure that foreign actors have a constructive, rather than a destabilizing role in unification, it is very important that South Korea work closely with its most important ally and, as necessary, other regional powers to overcome key obstacles to integration.

All three scenarios assume that unification will occur while North Korea is in a state of fragility, which will require a concerted effort on the part of South Korea and its international partners to stabilize the newly unified country. Many—if not most—of these stability actions will occur regardless of whether unification is peaceful or not. Even in peaceful scenarios, North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will need to be secured and dismantled. The 1.2-million-strong Korean People’s Army (KPA) will need to be demilitarized and demobilized and, to the extent possible, employed in other sectors. These tasks alone pose unprecedented challenges given their magnitude. Numerous essential services will need to be established or restored in the North, including access to food, clean water, medical services, temporary housing, as well as expanded educational and employment activities and other government services. Creating more inclusive political and economic institutions will be very difficult given the vast socio-economic-political differences including the enormous economic gap. North Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, for example, is estimated at about 6 percent of South Korea’s approximately $32,000.

These tasks are all critically important to fostering long-term stability regardless of how unification occurs. They can be divided into five major action clusters: establishing civil security, restoring essential services, establishing rule of law, supporting governance, and supporting development. While these five categories of stability actions will be relevant in any scenario, the type of scenarios will determine the magnitude of effort each will require. For example, in a conflict scenario, establishing civil security will be much more difficult, and restoring essential services will require more effort if infrastructure is destroyed or South Korea is temporarily and partially incapacitated as a result of war-related damage.

Under the stabilization framework, this study analyzes what factors present the greatest and most unique challenges to long-term stability in unification, and how the United States can play a supporting role that mitigates potentially destabilizing factors. Although international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Bank, and others are likely to be involved in the unification process, this study focuses on the role of the United States. This study also assumes that unification and stabilization will occur under a South Korean rather than North Korean–led scenario. Among the most important factors to consider for U.S. involvement in the unification process are the following:

Crucially, the United States should, at all times, be the supporting partner in unification contingencies, with South Korea always taking the lead. The United States’ role will primarily be in the initial and transformation phases of stabilization. In the fostering sustainability phase, the United States should provide assistance and should advise if called upon. Additionally, the U.S. response will be primarily security and humanitarian-assistance related, while limited in actions related to the rule of law, governance, and development.

In a 2018 survey conducted for the U.S. government’s Stabilization Assistance Review, 86 percent of U.S. government experts did not know which agencies have lead responsibility for which elements of stabilization. 2 The United States must carefully pinpoint areas of responsibility within the U.S. government and communicate them to South Korea. In addition to cooperation with the ROK, the U.S. response must be carefully coordinated with international organizations to the extent South Korea concurs. This will lend South Korea greater legitimacy to its leadership of unification efforts and make available the international community’s resources and capacity to enhance stabilization efforts. Within the United States, interagency cooperation between the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense will be critical to ensuring that stabilization efforts have unity of effort both within the U.S. government and in partnership with and support of its South Korean ally.

The United States must carefully pinpoint areas of responsibility within the U.S. government and communicate them to South Korea. In addition to cooperation with the ROK, the U.S. response must be carefully coordinated with international organizations to the extent South Korea concurs. This will lend South Korea greater legitimacy to its leadership of unification efforts and make available the international community’s resources and capacity to enhance stabilization efforts. Within the United States, interagency cooperation between the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense will be critical to ensuring that stabilization efforts have unity of effort both within the U.S. government and in partnership with and support of its South Korean ally. Dismantling North Korea’s WMD programs and demobilizing the KPA will require the greatest magnitude of effort early on. Civil security is a very man-power- and material-heavy task, and it is also critical to establishing an operating environment conducive to restoring essential services, establishing rule of law, and sustaining governance and development. Without successfully establishing civil security in the initial phase of stabilization, practitioners will be largely unable to carry out other stability actions.

Dismantling WMD will be critical to ensuring the operating environment is safe enough for other stability actions to proceed. Even in a peaceful unification scenario, dismantling WMD will probably be a prerequisite to a political agreement for unification or the initiation of economic integration between the two states. This is because the international sanctions regime is largely predicated on the existence of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibits non-nuclear-weapon states like South Korea from having access to information and materials related to nuclear weapons. This would include, for instance, limited involvement with dismantlement activities relating to nuclear warheads, warhead components, fissile material cores for warheads, weapon design information, and other weapons-related aspects of the program. In past cases, and most likely in a future North Korea case, the United States and other NPT nuclear weapon states would secure and dismantle these materials. South Korea would not be restricted by the NPT from undertaking activities related to dismantling other elements of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs that are not specifically related to nuclear weapons—certain delivery vehicles, material, research and development, and personnel related to the program. In this endeavor, the involvement of international organizations like the IAEA, United Nations, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) could strengthen international confidence and consensus in the destruction of North Korea’s WMD.

While the ROK’s role in dismantling weaponized nuclear material may be limited, ROK forces and officials must have a leading role in thoroughly vetting and possibly reassigning certain North Korean elites (including government officials, military officers, and anyone with knowledge of WMD programs) into nondefense sectors. Although integrating these elites into a new unified society will be a highly sensitive issue, it is essential that elites feel the process of unification will benefit them. If they feel at any point that the process does not serve their interests, elites will be more inclined to engage in destabilizing activities such as resisting integration, forming factions, or proliferating WMD-related knowledge or technology.

Given the highly politicized nature of the KPA including the critical role of political commissars, demilitarization and demobilization not only depend on military operations such as disbanding of military units including personnel, weapons systems, and supporting facilities, but also on whether party elements in the KPA will be ready to give up their responsibilities. Demobilizing the KPA also entails paramilitary units and semi-military forces such as units attached to various ministries and security agencies. Demobilizing the KPA, in more ways than one, is akin to demobilizing an entire nation given the highly militarized nature of North Korea.

Due to the North Korean state’s gross mismanagement of resources and neglect of critical infrastructure, restoring essential services will require a great deal of effort regardless of the scenario. However, it will require significantly more effort if infrastructure in North Korea is destroyed in conflict and if civilians suffer casualties, injuries, and displacement.

In restoring essential services, the United States and South Korea should plan to quickly establish transportation infrastructure to ensure even and expeditious distribution of resources. As North Korea’s state-imposed system of sociopolitical classification (songbun) often determines where citizens can live, some of the most vulnerable individuals will be located in rural and isolated locations. U.S., South Korean, and other foreign aid to North Korea should be carefully tailored to the local economy and distribution networks to ensure it does not displace local markets (jangmadang).

In establishing rule of law, supporting governance, and supporting development, South Korea will face major challenges in integrating North Koreans into new and unfamiliar political, economic, and legal institutions. South Korea will be the predominant driver in these endeavors, and should prioritize efforts that build the foundation for inclusive institutions.

Promoting rule of law is the first step toward creating inclusive institutions, but legal reform must be incremental. Abruptly installing a non-endogenous legal code could encourage the development of de facto norms outside of the law. For example, if North Koreans are suddenly subject to South Korean standards for formal dispute adjudication, many are likely to resolve disputes over property, business, or personal harm informally through social networks rather than through the new and unfamiliar legal system. Over the long term, the entrenchment of these practices can prevent North Koreans from being integrated into the unified Korean legal system, systematically disadvantaging them by creating barriers to their participation and representation in legal institutions.

A unified Korean government should be cognizant of the political cleavages building a new democracy could create. Although inclusive and democratic institutions have demonstrated support of inclusive economic institutions that lead to sustained prosperity, they also redistribute power and wealth. In transitioning from a totalitarian autocracy, there will be many in North Korea who have benefited from the nation’s unequal power structure who will oppose a democratic redistribution of power. In the extreme, these individuals could form militant or violent groups that resist South Korean democratic norms. Moreover, they may eventually accept the new political system but organize parties based on the Korean Workers’ Party to contest nationwide parliamentary and municipal elections.

GDP per capita in North Korea is just around 6 percent of South Korea’s GDP per capita. If the two Koreas unified tomorrow, they would create one of the most unequal societies in the world. Bridging this gap will take time, and it will largely depend on how successful the unified nation is in transforming North Korea’s extractive economic institutions into inclusive ones similar to those in South Korea. Much of South Korea’s plans to develop the North hinge on investments from major conglomerates (chaebol). However, the chaebol’s massive market share already stymies competition from small and medium enterprises. Heavy chaebol investment in the North could therefore perpetuate extractive economic institutions that further concentrate wealth in South Korean conglomerates. Chaebol investment in North Korea should be carefully regulated so that capital flows do not exacerbate inequality.

The long-term development of the northern provinces of a unified Korea will be a primarily Korean task. That said, the U.S. and international community will have a crucial role in protecting North Korea from predatory and extractive investment by supporting and legitimizing domestic reform efforts. The North Korean labor force will be attractive to South Korean and foreign companies. While foreign investment should be welcome in North Korea, South Korea should remain vigilant and monitor the nature of investment, especially in regards to North Korea’s yet-untapped rare earth mineral reserves. Foreign resources and capital can be very positive for North Korea’s development, but they also have the potential to be environmentally and economically exploitative.

Introduction

At the Geneva Conference in 1954, South and North Korea stood for the first time on an international stage as separate, sovereign states. The 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement had called for a political conference to “settle the Korea question,” but few truly thought it would succeed. Indeed, the two Koreas entered the conference with what they knew to be irreconcilable conditions for unification. Between competing claims of legitimacy, conflicting provisions for election scope and supervision, and Cold War alliances, the conference failed to reunify the two Koreas and ultimately relegated the settlement of their division to a later date.

The Geneva Conference represented a gap between idea and reality that persists in unification discourses today. Inter-Korean discussions of unification live in the broad, sweeping language of high-level agreements and reflect distant ideals. Although each side has its own vision for unification, the differences that prevented the two Koreas from reunifying in 1954 are now compounded by nearly seventy-five years of separation and institutionalized political, economic, social, linguistic, and cultural divisions. While unification occupies a central place in policy and national identity, a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Korean question remains more as a long-term goal. Recently, South Koreans have increasingly been thinking about greater inter-Korean cooperation as they witness multiple inter-Korean summits and two U.S.-North Korea summits. While expectations are likely to grow throughout 2019 and beyond, it’s also important to bear in mind the huge structural challenges and impediments related to unification.

This study is concerned with how this gap between idea and reality impacts the role of international actors, and especially the United States, in unification. Since the first inter-Korean agreement in 1972 following Red Cross talks, the two Koreas have avowed that “unification shall be achieved independently, without depending on foreign powers and without foreign interference.”3 This mindset is justifiably informed by centuries of foreign interference on the Korean Peninsula, and has made the ROK wary of involving international partners in its detailed unification plans. U.S. policy is to support the ROK vision for unification, but ROK reluctance to include the United States (or other major powers) in unification planning has created barriers that prevent either nation from determining exactly what form U.S. support will take.

Chung Min Lee Chung Min Lee is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Asia Program. He is an expert on Korean and Northeast Asian security, defense, intelligence, and crisis management. More >

Currently, the United States has tacitly accepted that it will be called upon to support the ROK in as yet unknown ways in the stabilization phase of unification. Nevertheless, unification will not occur in a foreign policy vacuum, and the United States can better support and help prevent unfriendly actors from undermining the ROK’s vision with greater preparation and cooperation on key postconflict and peaceful unification issues. Focusing on the importance of stabilization as an essential element of unification could allow the ROK and its international partners, especially the United States, to form an enduring strategic consensus.

This introduction explains why Seoul should include international actors such as the United States on a case-by-case basis in its unification planning. To do so, it assesses the current state of U.S. involvement in unification planning, core issues presented by scenario-based planning, and how stabilization may provide a more productive approach to unification. Subsequent sections break down the challenges Korea will face with its international partners regarding major facets of stability actions such as dismantling North Korea’s WMD programs and demobilizing the KPA to establish civil security, restoring essential services, longer-term governance capacity-building, and supporting economic development. Given that this study focuses on the potential U.S. role, emphasis is placed on establishing security in the immediate to near term where the U.S. role is likely to be the most important and effective.

Planning for Stabilization of the Unified Korean Peninsula

By approaching unification through a stabilization framework rather than scenario-based planning, the ROK, the United States, and other potential international actors can open a productive and realistic conversation about unification. In the U.S. conception of stabilization, the goal is to create a stable operating environment in fragile states, whether they became fragile due to conflict, natural disaster, severe mismanagement of government resources, or another reason. The 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review defines stabilization across the U.S. government as “an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning U.S. Government efforts – diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense – toward supporting locally legitimate authorities and systems to peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence.”4



Stability Actions Limited ROK involvement Limited ROK involvement ROK-led, U.S. supporting ROK-led, U.S. supporting ROK only, international assistance as needed ROK only, international assistance as needed Table 1 Establish Civil Security Initial Response Transformation Fostering Sustainability Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements Implement a plan for disposition of KPA forces, intelligence services, and other national security institutions Establish military-to-military programs with unified Korean forces and services Secure weaponized nuclear material Identify future roles, missions, and structure of military and decommissioned military under the unified government; vet senior officers and other individuals for past abuses and criminal activity Sustain denuclearization and waste-management efforts Search for and secure unknown WMD sites Destroy and dismantle WMD and conventional weapons stockpiles Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement activities Begin destruction and dismantlement of weaponized nuclear material Protect key personnel and facilities; provide assurances for population Conduct security forces assistance Continue and support integration of former military into unified Korean society Conventional weapons collection and reduction of unauthorized weapons Public outreach and community rebuilding programs Establish Rule of Law Initial Response Transformation Fostering Sustainability Ensure humanitarian aid and security forces have access to endangered populations including refugee and internally displaced person camps and spontaneous sites Implement judicial reform Train legal professionals and police force, support judicial system capacity Investigate suspected war criminals; conduct war crimes courts and tribunals Control crowds, prevent looting, and manage civil disturbances Expand police force control in the North Perform civilian police functions, including investigating crimes and making arrests Implement property dispute resolution process and mechanisms Deploy interim justice personnel; enact interim legal codes; establish an atrocity reporting system Disseminate information about reconstruction, reconciliation, and integration efforts Document, preserve, and protect information on past atrocities Restore Essential Services Initial Response Transformation Fostering Sustainability Provide for immediate humanitarian needs Build capacity of unified Korea to operate and maintain essential services in the North Build capacity for educational opportunities, quality medical care, and access to essential resources. Ensure proper drinking water and provide interim sanitation services Investigate suspected war criminals; conduct war crimes courts and tribunals Control crowds, prevent looting, and manage civil disturbances Establish civil services Assist displaced persons and refugees; support security to displaced civilian camps Resettlement and repatriation Monitor food markets; assess adequacy of food distribution; provide emergency food aid as needed Provide security to food distribution networks Assess public health hazards and existing medical infrastructure; operate existing civilian medical facilities; provide vaccinations Rebuild damaged facilities, improve waste management, and promote medial infrastructure Repair and reopen schools Expand human rights protections Establish transitional curriculum for schools Expand educational opportunities Support Governance Initial Response Transformation Fostering Sustainability Vet officials for transitional administration; reconstitute leadership at multiple government levels Determine requirements for voter registration; establish or verify voter registry Promote North Korean engagement in local and national politics Establish interim legislative processes and local participation in democratic institutions Conduct local elections Restore and maintain essential public services Provide security to ensure free and fair elections Promote inclusivity of political institutions Ensure transparency of resources Provide education to North Koreans on democracy Implement reporting procedures for corruption Support Economic and Infrastructure Development Initial Response Transformation Fostering Sustainability Assess labor force; agricultural sector; natural resources; transportation, telecommunications, and energy infrastructure Implement employment initiatives and create employment opportunities; promote and support local private sector development Promote inclusive economy institutions in unified Korea Establish currency exchange rate between North and South Korean won Convert currency to South Korean won Reestablish payment mechanisms and capacity to process payments Initiate essential bank operations in the North Prioritize public investment needs and plan public sector resource allocation Build irrigation and establish agricultural work programs; build essential transportation infrastructure; energy facilities; and telecommunications infrastructure and connectivity Assess private sector and enterprise creation; identify obstacles to private sector development Secure vital natural resources and agricultural facilities Source: Joint Publication 3-07 Stability, Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 3, 2016; .ADRP3-07: Stability Operations, U.S. Department of the Army Headquarters, August 31, 2012

Stability actions are commonly divided into five categories (see table 1). Yet this is far from an exhaustive representation of all stability actions. Depending on which agency is involved, stability-action clusters may be represented by slightly different names and divisions. In this publication, the five task categories in figure 2 are used for the sake of simplicity. While nearly all of these actions will be critical in Korean unification, detailing each is beyond the scope of this publication. Instead, this study focuses on three areas where the ROK’s cooperation with international partners will be most critical: establishing civil security, restoring essential services, and supporting development. Governance and rule of law are discussed in the context of building inclusive institutions.

Stability actions occur in three phases of initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability (see figure 2). These phases are not necessarily discrete—actions in each phase may occur simultaneously with actions in another phase. Importantly, they also interface with a fragility spectrum. The initial response phase generally reflects actions to stabilize an operating environment in crisis, usually directly after a conflict or as violence is still ongoing. In this phase, the military role in stabilization, particularly in terms of civil security, is most pronounced. The transformation phase occurs in an environment relatively free of severe violence and is focused on host-nation capacity building. In the fostering sustainability phase, efforts are focused on building strong institutions, enabling sustainable development, and preventing regression to unstable conditions.5 As such, stabilization efforts do not only occur in postconflict environments. They may also occur in fragile states in the absence of violence and conflict, in which case stability actions may be focused in the transformation or fostering phase. Stabilization can prevent and mitigate issues that often plague fragile states—such as violent extremism and organized crime, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), humanitarian emergencies, pandemic diseases, mass atrocities, severe inequality, and many more—and prevent them from leading to violent conflict.6

Successful stabilization is a whole-of-government effort. As of December 2018, “the Department of State is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts; the U.S. Agency for International Development is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance.”7 The Department of Defense is a supporting element, providing proper access and resources in the operating environment to civilian agencies. Parts of the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Agriculture play key roles as well.8 However, the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review found that 86 percent of U.S. government experts were “not clear which U.S. government agencies have lead responsibility for different elements of stabilization.”9 In order to have an effective response, these roles must be clarified within the U.S. government as soon as possible and communicated to South Korea.

Even in the absence of conflict, North Koreans exist in a constant state of violence inflicted upon them by a regime that denies even the most rudimentary of civil and political freedoms and essential resources. According to the Fragile States Index, North Korea has been a chronically fragile state since the Fund for Peace began collecting data in 2006.10 Regardless of how unification occurs, the ROK and its international partners have to undertake stability actions that ensure the safety, security, well-being, and ultimately, prosperity and freedom of all North Koreans. This is critical not only for humanitarian reasons, but to prevent the vast political, economic, social, and cultural differences between North and South Korea from becoming destabilizing.

Connections Between Scenarios and Stability

At the simplest level, the three scenarios that receive primary attention are peaceful unification, collapse and absorption, and unification through conflict. Peaceful unification would occur via a mutually agreed upon political settlement of the Korean conflict between the ROK and North Korea, and subsequent facilitation of economic, political, and social integration of the two Koreas into a single state, federation, or confederation (discussed in the next section). Collapse and absorption scenarios take a path more similar to that of German unification. In this situation, the Kim regime is unable to maintain effective political, economic, social, and military control, which ultimately leads to regime collapse and absorption by South Korea. In a scenario whereby unification is achieved through conflict, North Korean use of force would trigger a conflict that ultimately results in the unification of the Korean Peninsula. In this circumstance, either of the two Koreas could unify the peninsula. All unification scenarios will require core stability actions to be undertaken. However, the sequence and level of effort required to complete each set of stability actions will differ between scenarios (see figures 3 through 5).

Conflict Scenario

Stabilization is most often referenced in postconflict scenarios (see figure 3). A conflict scenario would require that the highest magnitude of effort is put toward establishing civil security as the conflict de-escalates. In the traditional ROK-U.S. operation plan, this would begin to occur at the point when Kim Jong Un’s regime is incapacitated. In this scenario, political barriers to establishing civil security are minimal in certain aspects, such as securing WMD. Most stability actions, however, would require a high magnitude of effort relative to other scenarios given the destruction of infrastructure that is inevitable in the course of war. Additionally, incorporating those who benefited from the Kim regime’s patronage would likely take time and negotiation, as reflected in the graph. As U.S. and ROK personnel secure North Korean WMD, establish border security, and make plans for demobilizing the North Korean military, they would very shortly thereafter need to vet and identify those who served in all major political and military posts but especially those in security services and political prisons and begin the arduous process of restoring essential services to North Koreans. Amid displaced civilians, destroyed or dilapidated infrastructure, and poor or nonexistent services, returning essential services after conflict will require a greater magnitude of effort than other scenarios. As essential services are being restored and negotiations with any remaining North Korean factions or elites wind down, civil control and governance can begin to be revived under a postconflict political order. Here, the emphasis will also be placed on creating more durable governance and development structures.

Peaceful Scenario

There are two ways in which peaceful unification is typically discussed, the second of which is represented in figure 4. The first is outlined in detail in the next section, and continues to be represented in ROK unification policy. It involves three phases of unification. The first phase is akin to the steps being laid for South-North reconciliation now, which would ideally lead eventually to a Korean federation with two systems and two governments. This phase would eventually lead to the third and final phase of unification based on a common constitution, peninsula-wide elections, and a unified government and national assembly.

Another, and perhaps more probable, process of peaceful unification is predicated on economic integration rather than an overt political agreement to form a unified government. This scenario would likely involve a lengthy process of negotiation, as depicted in figure 4. Negotiations would center around North Korean activities that have led to sanctions restricting economic engagement between the two Koreas, particularly North Korea’s WMD programs and human rights abuses. In this scenario, negotiations for unification and civil security, particularly securing WMD, disarmament, and KPA demobilization, will likely occur simultaneously through a slower, step-by-step process. After an agreement to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program (and ideally its chemical and biological programs) is reached, South Korea and the international community could begin more robust efforts to restore essential services and improve access to basic necessities and rights in North Korea. Through sustained economic engagement, legal, institutional, and political norms in North Korea would hopefully change to accommodate international investment and trade.

Kathryn Botto Kathryn Botto is a research analyst in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focuses on Asian security issues, with particular emphasis on the Korean Peninsula and U.S. defense policy towards East Asia.

While the events that lead to a peaceful unification scenario will be vastly different from those leading to conflict, North Korea will likely remain a fragile state until its WMD programs are dismantled and sanctions are lifted. As a fragile state, North Korea can benefit from stability actions by ensuring aspects of its fragility do not lead to instability, and that any major economic changes do not become destabilizing. In that sense, integrating the two Koreas peacefully will still require many of the same elements as a conflict scenario, although the sequence and magnitude required for each stability action will differ.

Collapse Scenario

The sequence and magnitude of efforts would again be distributed differently in a collapse scenario. Figure 5 also takes into account the possibility of Chinese intervention, an important element that has so far not been discussed. China is just one international actor that could become involved in a unification scenario, and it should be noted that it may be in the interest of other states such as Russia to influence the situation as well. Based on China’s close historical ties with North Korea, its aversion to a North Korean collapse, and steadfast opposition to the stationing of any U.S. forces in a unified Korea, the chances are high.

In the event of a North Korean collapse, China will maximize its leverage to ensure its core interests in keeping a buffer between itself and the U.S. forces in Korea, enhancing its influence over the peninsula, and guaranteeing its access to North Korea’s natural resources. On one major issue—the full control and dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear and other WMD facilities and programs—the Chinese have similar interests with the United States since neither wants a unified Korea assuming control of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile arsenals. But beyond the nuclear and WMD issues, active U.S.-China cooperation on civilian displacement and economic development will be difficult. If more international actors are involved, many aspects of stabilization will need to be negotiated. Parties involved will likely permit early establishment of essential services to help those affected by the conflict, but the highly controversial element of establishing civil security (especially as related to WMD) will take far longer to negotiate than in other scenarios, as the three countries currently have no consensus on how to handle North Korea’s WMD.

One of the core assumptions in this study is that stability actions in a collapse scenario could begin after either state or regime collapse in North Korea. The boundary between state and regime collapse is hardly clear, especially in a state like North Korea where the Kim dynasty embodies the state. As a result, while it may make conceptual sense to differentiate between state or regime collapse, the underlying assumption is that a post–Kim Jong Un regime will be unable to exercise effective control over North Korea and attendant responsibilities.

The other major assumption underlying this study is that there is a possibility of Chinese military intervention in North Korea. As assessed in greater detail later, it is entirely possible that China could undertake limited military operations during and after collapse. These operations may seek to prevent the inflow of North Korean refugees across the Tumen (Yalu) River; to bolster an interim regime in North Korea; to prevent the entrance of South Korean and U.S. forces into North Korea in order to conduct disarmament and demobilization operations; to enhance UN-approved efforts in controlling and dismantling North Korea’s chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) facilities, weapons systems, and personnel; or to increase China’s strategic leverage from the onset of collapse in North Korea. Areas where potential Chinese intervention is likely is assessed in relevant sections but Chinese intervention is not assumed to be automatic. However, crafting contingency operations in North Korea following collapse without due consideration of Chinese intervention would be quite unrealistic.

The U.S. role in unification is not guaranteed, and will always be negotiated with South Korea. However, the stability approach, while not an end-all-be-all solution to the many barriers to more inclusive unification planning, can help avoid the unpredictable, politicized, and limiting restraints scenario-based planning has reinforced. Discrete unification scenarios­—peaceful unification through negotiation, unification through a North Korean collapse and absorption by South Korea, or unification through conflict—offer useful insight into what triggers may lead to conditions favorable to unification. However, they are inherently limited by the convergence of unpredictable variables that will determine the composition of scenarios. Moreover, once a trigger or sets of triggers prompt unification to begin, almost all of the multiple plans and step-by-step responses are likely to be overtaken by the speed and depth of changes. Rather, unification should be seen as a continuum and a process; at times volatile with high degrees of uncertainty and at times more predictable.

International Dimensions of Unification

From China’s centuries-long suzerainty over Korea, to the United States’ decision to cede control of the peninsula to Japan in 1905 through the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the Russo-Japanese War, to the unplanned U.S. decision to divide Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel in August 1945 in the wake of Japanese surrender, the territorial integrity of Korea has always been mired in geopolitics largely outside the control of the Korean people. As anxieties mounted in Seoul and Pyongyang following rapid rapprochement between the United States and China in 1972, Park Chung-hee and Kim Il Sung agreed to hold the first formal inter-Korean dialogue. The resulting July 4 South-North Joint Communique established the principles of independent, peaceful, and nationwide unification. This has remained as the bedrock of all subsequent inter-Korean agreements. The 1954 Geneva Conference was the first and last time foreign powers were included in inter-Korean negotiations over unification.

Although the two Koreas desire an independent unification process, South Korea also acknowledges the possibility of foreign powers’ participation. The integral involvement of the United States in guaranteeing South Korean security attests to its influence, especially in conflict-related scenarios. Until full operational control of the ROK military is transferred to South Korea, the United States will also lead the Korean military in any conflict. Even in a peaceful unification scenario, finding, securing, and dismantling North Korea’s wide array of nuclear weapons and WMD sites would require the United States and most likely, with other permanent members of the UN Security Council, to play a very critical role.

In addition to areas that require U.S. support, the United States has the capabilities and resources to help alleviate the strain on the ROK as it assumes primary responsibility for unification. While the United States has fought about eleven conventional wars since the American Revolution, the majority of its foreign military engagements abroad have been focused on various aspects of stabilization that will be necessary on the path toward a unified Korea.11 Moreover, U.S. experience in international development and its status as the largest foreign aid donor can be useful in a Korean context. Both successes and failures in U.S.-led stabilization, many of which will be discussed in this study, can inform emerging Korean needs.

This is particularly critical as the cost of unification will be massive for both the government and South Korean taxpayers. Unification cost estimates are numerous and wide-ranging, from $2 trillion, $3 trillion, or $471 billion over ten years; $2.5 trillion over thirty-four years; to even an optimistic $50 billion over forty years.12 In 2015, the ROK’s National Assembly Budget Office (NABO) estimated that unification would cost over $9 trillion if it occurred peacefully from 2016 to 2060. The office estimated the cost of unification would begin at over $60 billion in the first year and increase annually, peaking at $318 billion in 2056. After forty-five years, the two economies would be sufficiently integrated and the annual cost of unification-related government expenditure would begin to decrease.13 That is an annual average of $207 billion, a cost that will be a significant strain on taxpayers, especially as South Korea’s population continues to decline, shrinking tax revenues.

The cost of unification, both human and economic, will be even higher if it follows some form of military conflict. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the subsequent Operation New Dawn, which lasted from 2003 to 2011, cost the United States $815 billion, and those operations confronted a force much smaller than North Korea’s with less sophisticated weaponry.14 The costs would be astronomically higher if nuclear weapons are involved. If South Korea is decimated by war, its capacity to conduct stability actions to unite the peninsula would be limited. South Korea’s economy, the eleventh-largest in the world, is bigger than that of any country “that has experienced a military conflict on its own soil in the past seventy years.”15 As Anthony Fensom described in detail in the National Interest, a conflict on the peninsula would disrupt global supply chains, and even potentially shrink global GDP.16

After the two Koreas resolve to unify, the process of active integration begins in earnest. The differences in development between the two Koreas are not only potentially economically destabilizing, but politically destabilizing as well. For example, Rudiger Frank has noted “as long as the necessary infrastructure is missing, economic development will not take place, and economic problems will accumulate, turn into social problems, and have political consequences.”17 South Korea has copious plans to deal with unification on its own, but it will be able to overcome obstacles to integration more quickly with the cooperation of foreign countries.

International Support for Korean Unification

Although this publication focuses on U.S.-ROK cooperation in unification, it by no means advocates the United States be the ROK’s sole partner in this endeavor. Stabilizing North Korea will require a high magnitude of effort regardless of the scenario, and sharing this burden with the international community can enhance legitimacy and provide assurances to the process and also help alleviate financial, logistical, and man-power strains on South Korea. In other experiences with stabilization, supporting actors have commonly been involved. For instance, stabilization efforts in Afghanistan were supported by some 478 local and 350 international nonprofits, numerous for-profit companies, at least twenty-six UN agencies, five intergovernmental organizations, and a coalition of forty-two countries and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.18 This is not to say that the same panoply of international actors would or should descend upon a unified Korea—importantly, the involvement of any actor should require Korean consent. This publication focuses on the U.S. capacity to cooperate for the sake of simplicity, but it acknowledges that other actors could and are likely to support or exert influence over the unification process.

U.S. Support for Korean Unification.

Given the centrality of U.S. military operations over various conflict scenarios, U.S. involvement in potential conflict-related unification is unavoidable. If North Korea provokes a response that requires the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to incapacitate the Kim regime, it is understood in the alliance that unification will be the end result. Ultimately, once specific goals of CFC’s mission are concluded, the ROK will assume responsibility for unification. However, it is understood that the ROK limits U.S. or other foreign access to their postwar plan at the end of phase III of the operational plan, where the lion’s share of activities to stabilize the peninsula begin (see figure 6). In essence, this planning regards the end of the Kim regime as the point where unification occurs. Beyond this point, U.S. practitioners will likely be asked by the ROK for currently unknown forms of U.S. support that Washington will provide if possible. Currently, it does not appear that USAID plans for unification-related development and humanitarian assistance both for peaceful and nonpeaceful unification. This attention to the earlier phases of unification is echoed in policy and academic discourse, which focus on potential sequences of events that could lead to various unification scenarios.

To be sure, there are other unification scenarios that could be considered, but this study will focus on the more desirable ROK-led unification scenarios that would require stability actions. Moreover, unification is seen here as an arduous, complex, but ultimately unavoidable longer-term process of political, social, and economic integration of the two Koreas. As NABO acknowledges, it could take more than forty years or longer for the two Koreas to be fully economically integrated. Even at that point, potentially destabilizing inequalities between the North and South are likely to persist. NABO estimates that after forty-five years, the North’s GDP will still only be 66.5 percent of the South’s.19 Certain studies have found that “cross-jurisdictional per capita income differences on the order of 40 percent are consistent with social stability.”20

Unification Scenarios: Unpredictable, Politicized, and Incomplete

Korean unification can be positively or negatively influenced by international actors, but it will not occur in a vacuum. As such, South Korea needs to proactively plan with international partners for their role in unification. Nevertheless, the ROK government including the Blue House, the Ministry of Unification (MOU), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and other high-level policymaking bodies have largely excluded the United States and other major powers from any direct or explicit role in unification. The United States and other foreign powers cannot change the ROK’s historical memory that shapes its concerns about foreign involvement in the unification process. However, to adequately plan for unification, it’s important for the ROK to work closely with international actors to ensure that they support, rather than undermine, the process. Building trust is crucial in facilitating cooperation between the ROK and the United States and other major powers throughout the unification process.

In addition to the ROK’s pronounced skepticism of foreign involvement, the scenario-based planning model is a major barrier to the U.S. ability to support the ROK’s unification plans. This study argues that in order to achieve stability throughout the process leading to unification, the ROK, the United States, and other friendly international actors should focus on stability-based planning rather than scenario-based planning since the former is a much more dynamic mechanism. This approach will ultimately open more avenues to international support for the ROK’s unification plans as it will mitigate unnecessary sources of friction stemming from limited knowledge of the ROK’s and other major powers’ concerns over unification and likely politicization of key issues, especially relating to sovereignty, legal claims, and jurisdictions.

Unpredictable Scenarios

The current emphasis on scenario-based planning places a premium on unpredictable elements of unification. Six events are commonly regarded as potential catalysts or triggers for unification scenarios (see figure 7). Each catalytic event (mindful that there are many more potential catalysts than those enumerated in figure 7) has an unwieldy number of potential paths, making predicting its exact trajectory and outcome virtually impossible. Once events reach a certain point, all of them involve the crucial aspects of establishing civil security, restoring essential services, establishing civil control, supporting governance, and supporting development. Hence, unification should be seen as a process whereby stabilization composes the lion’s share of activities and responses by the ROK and the United States.

Although stabilization is commonly associated with conflict, the goal of stability actions is explicitly to stabilize fragile states. According to U.S. joint doctrine for stabilization, a fragile state is “a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of its central government.”21 North Korea certainly qualifies based on this definition, and thus is considered a chronically fragile state on the Fragile States Index.22 Even in a peaceful unification, North Korea’s fragility will require major efforts in the five main areas of stability actions in order to prevent destabilizing disruption to economic and political institutions. It is important to keep in mind that all of the essential elements necessary to fostering greater stability remain unchanged regardless of specific scenarios. As a result, the stabilization framework is more useful for planning, and avoids unpredictable elements that are more prevalent in scenario-based planning frameworks.

Politicized Scenarios

On top of their artificial divisions and unpredictability, scenarios are heavily politicized and sanitized in South Korea. Although South Korea and the United States would only support unification under a democratic government, stating as much implies favoring absorption. South Korean progressives are reluctant to discuss unification in these terms for fear of upsetting North Korea, potentially closing doors to engagement and the building of a permanent peace regime. These discussions are also not palatable in the UN, where principles of respecting sovereignty and noninterference are enshrined in the UN Charter. Acknowledging unification-related aspects of conflict runs into similar predicaments.

The United States and China may be involved in peaceful unification scenarios especially if the current armistice is replaced by a permanent peace treaty ending the Korean War. But exactly how these two powers would be involved is a taboo subject in South Korea (as well as North Korea) given its deeply rooted reservations about any form of foreign power involvement on unification akin to the 2+4 process that resulted in German unification. Nevertheless, the overarching importance of stabilization cannot be overemphasized since it will impinge upon a unified Korea’s long-term prosperity, and international actors can help or hurt the speed of that process.

Incomplete Scenarios

Lastly, as enumerated earlier, scenarios focus on the short-term aspects of unification and are, therefore, incomplete. Given the permutations of various scenarios, it is better to conceptualize unification as a process that involves the full spectrum of developments ranging from negotiations to massive disruptions. Indeed, even if a negotiated settlement is reached, integrating vastly different organizations and institutions, personnel, and codes of conduct between the two Korea is going to be a long-term process, most likely for decades. Hence, rather than rejecting international support, it is in South Korea’s interest to integrate constructive international efforts from the onset of operations in order to minimize misperceptions and discord.

Unification Policies of the Two Koreas: Common Dream, Different Interpretations

Understanding why unification is such an emotionally charged, politically complicated, and structurally inconsistent concept lies in the very nature of bringing together two almost completely different political entities that also share common ethnic identities, histories, languages, and cultural norms. The South-North divide is a mutually dependent adversarial relationship. The two Koreas are “frenemies” who emphasize the penultimate importance of achieving peaceful unification through national reconciliation and maximizing the opportunities tendered by a common ethnic identity. This fundamental dichotomy has widened through seven decades of charting polar-opposite political trajectories: North Korea that has been ruled by the Kim family since 1948 under a ruthless communist dictatorship and South Korea that emerged from decades of authoritarian rule into a robust democracy one of the world’s largest economies.

The fundamental problem is whether the two Koreas will be willing to compromise core national interests in the name of creating a unified Korean state. Yet it would be extremely naïve to assume that South Korea, for example, could discard its democratic ideals and values to achieve reunification. At the same time, so long as the Kim dynasty remains in power, it is impossible to imagine Kim Jong Un being willing to shed the Juche ideology (the all-important ideology of self-reliance in North Korea) and Kim Il Sung Thought and Kim Jong Il Thought in order to foster a unified Korea. Although both sides emphasize the ultimate importance of a “common Korean home,” the very harsh reality is the juxtaposition of two widely divergent visions of a unified Korea.

South Korea’s Unification Formula

While North Korea’s state propaganda machinery constantly emphasizes unification as a central goal including the penultimate importance of forsaking all foreign influence, South Korea also sees unification as central to its national identity. The major problem, however, lies in diametrically different conceptions of unification. A fundamental disconnect exists between unification as a national goal and as a policy precept. In the preamble to the South Korean constitution, it is noted, in part, that the Korean people “have assumed the mission of democratic reform and peaceful unification of our homeland.” Moreover, the ROK is seen as having legal authority and jurisdiction over the Korean Peninsula.

Article 4 stipulates that “the Republic of Korea shall seek national unification and shall formulate and carry out peaceful unification policy based on the free and democratic basic order.” Hence, the notion of a free and democratic unified Korean state is enshrined in the constitution. However, notwithstanding the centrality of this point, left-of-center governments have eschewed the term “free and democratic” when it comes to stating the makeup of a unified Korea since they believe that such a characterization is a conduit for unification through absorption. As an example, the Kim Dae-jung administration (1998–2003) emphasized its so-called sunshine policy based on three key principles: the two Koreas won’t allow armed provocation, the South will not attempt unification through absorption, and the South will pursue a policy of reconciliation and cooperation.

For the Moon Jae-in administration, ensuring peaceful co-existence and common prosperity is the bedrock of inter-Korean cooperation through the “resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem,” sustainable inter-Korean relations, and a new economic commonwealth on the Korean Peninsula.23 Successive governments since democratization in 1987 have adopted their own approaches to inter-Korean ties, but a national unification formula has remained relatively unchanged since the adoption of the Korean National Commonwealth Unification Plan in September 1989 by the Roh Tae-woo administration (1988–1993) and subsequently reconfigured to include a three-phased strategy by the Kim Young-sam administration (1993–1998).

The Ministry of Unification’s official website notes that this unification plan is premised on the philosophy of freedom and democracy and three core principles: unification by the South and the North on the basis of national self-determination; unification through dialogue and negotiations and not through military means; and unification through democratic processes and methods.24 The three phases include the following: (1) reconciliation and cooperation through the basis of mutual recognition and multiple and diverse cooperative exchanges in order to foster change from antagonistic and adversarial ties to co-existence and common prosperity; (2) South-North Federation as an interim step based on the principle of two systems and two governments; and (3) creation of a unified state based on the adoption of a unification constitution through democratic processes, the holding of democratic elections, and the building of a unified government and national assembly.25

Yet while the political rationale for these principles is understandable, there is virtually no guideline on operationalizing them in any concrete fashion. At lower levels, such as fielding a common Olympic team, the two Koreas have reached agreements. But on major areas such as forging a common economic development plan, a unified defense force, and most importantly, the makeup of a unified Korean government, emphasizing the importance of “co-existence and common prosperity,” for example, won’t move the negotiation needle. The notion of a phased transition from “two systems and two governments” is politically palatable as a basic framework but remains virtually impossible to achieve at the operational level unless and until one side is willing to forego critical interests and core values. Since the restoration of democracy in 1987, successive left-wing and right-wing governments in South Korea have adhered to the Korean National Commonwealth Unification Plan with some modifications. Nevertheless, even this basic plan fails to concretely address how the two Koreas hope to achieve greater integration without massive political adjustments. Yet continuing to ignore this fundamental flaw in South Korea’s unification policy is only going to result in greater obfuscation and, ultimately, irresponsible and ineffective policy responses.

North Korea’s Unification Policy

North Korea’s views on unification have been premised on two critical principles since its founding in 1948: first, that national division was caused by imperialist powers, and second, that national unification must be based on total independence from foreign powers. In practice, this means that all foreign forces must be withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula and that a new Korean nation must be created through the basis of a Joseon Minjok Jaeiljuwi or “Joseon Nation First Policy.”

Here, North Korea is referring to an “ethnically pure Korean race” that is untainted by foreign imperialism and colonialism. For North Korea, the purest Korean race are the Koreans who have thrived under the Kim dynasty. It excludes those who are deemed anti-Juche, anti-unification, and anti-socialist.26 As South Korean expert Park Young Ho puts it, “‘independence’ does not refer to the concept in which an individual is granted human dignity. Rather, it refers to a component in group [that] receives recognition as a ‘socio-political life’ once it is subject to the ‘Supreme Leader’, under the Juche ideology.”27 In South Korea, particularly in the political left, independence from imperialism is often discussed in the context of unification with special reference to deconstructing the so-called Cold War mechanism (naengjeoncheje). This refers to the institutional norms that have been in place in South Korea since 1948, which many progressives argue were imposed on South Korea by the United States. These include the stationing of U.S. forces, a capitalist economy, and a pro-U.S. political class. As a result, in order for peace and unification to prevail on the peninsula, some progressives have argued that the Cold War mechanism should be deconstructed, to include diminishing or abolishing the U.S. military presence in South Korea (although this is not the stated policy of the current progressive government).

In his New Year’s Address in January 2019, Kim Jong Un stressed that he was committed to ending military hostilities between the two Koreas and that since “north and south committed themselves to advancing along the road of peace and prosperity, we maintain that the joint military exercises with foreign forces, which constitute the source of aggravating the situation on the Korean Peninsula, should no longer be permitted and the introduction of war equipment including strategic assets from outside should completely be suspended.”28 Pyongyang also maintains that its nuclear weapons program has nothing to do with building a peace regime since nuclear weapons are meant solely for deterring existing nuclear threats from the United States. Only after the United States ceases its hostile policy toward North Korea, such as stopping all nuclear-war-related military exercises and ending the transfer of strategic assets (such as bombers and nuclear submarines) into South Korea, can North Korea begin to talk about genuine denuclearization. Hence, the key phrase in North Korea’s unification policy is “building the conditions of peace,” meaning the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the end of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Contrasting Views Within South Korea

Although there is nominal support for unification in South Korea as an important national goal, views on how rapidly unification should be pursued, how necessary it is, and the extent to which South Koreans should bear financial responsibilities such as willingness to accept a unification tax differ substantially. As a national goal or aspiration, a majority of South Koreans support unification as evinced by numerous surveys such as the April 2017 poll conducted by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). However, only 13.8 percent of South Koreans responded that unification was very necessary, followed by 44 percent (somewhat necessary), 36.5 percent (not very necessary), and 5.7 percent (not necessary at all).29 (See figure 8.)

The support for the status quo is also reflected in the belief that if the two Koreas can live in peaceful co-existence, then there is less urgency for unification. For example, 46 percent answered that a permanent state of separation was acceptable and 50.4 percent in their twenties said they’re willing to live with a divided Korea so long as there is peaceful coexistence.30 This poll was conducted in April 2017, and public sentiments have changed since the rush of inter-Korean summits in 2018 and the first-ever U.S.–North Korea summit in June 2018. Nevertheless, 65 percent of South Koreans prefer gradual unification over a decade according to a September 2018 Gallup Korea poll (see figure 9).31 Interestingly, 16 percent of those under thirty felt that unification should be accelerated, while those in their thirties (13 percent) and forties (14 percent) preferred rapid unification least (see figure 10).32 Even of those in their sixties and above, who have the highest emotional attachment to unification given their relative lack of distance from the Korean War, only 26 percent felt that unification should be pursued rapidly.

At a conceptual level, South Koreans believe that there are “national” benefits to unification. In the April 2017 poll conducted by KINU, 54.1 percent said there were some benefits and 14.7 percent responded that there were significant benefits to unification at the national level (see figure 11). Here, South Koreans are referring to a peace dividend flowing from unification rather than living in fear of North Korea’s nuclear weapons or the possibility of another protracted conflict.

The story is very different when South Koreans think about individual benefits from unification. In 2017, for example, 67.1 percent replied that there wasn’t much of a personal benefit stemming from unification, 20.5 percent said that there was some benefit, and 3.7 percent responded that there was a lot of benefit from unification (see figure 12).33 At the same time, when asked whether South Koreans should “sacrifice everything in exchange for achieving a grand goal of unification,” 3.5 percent answered “very much agree” and 37.5 percent said they “somewhat agree” versus 25.4 percent who said “not very much agree” and 2.8 percent that “not at all agree.”34

Unification costs are likely to be extremely high for a protracted period of time and an issue that amplifies potential direct costs for South Koreans. The same survey asked South Koreans whether they supported a tax increase for unification and only 1.3 percent said they “very much agree” while 15.2 percent said they “somewhat agree.” Sixty-two percent said they didn’t agree much or not at all (15 percent), which illustrates the divide between normative support for unification versus assuming direct personal costs.35 Last but not least, continuing ambivalence continues to shape South Korean attitudes toward unification and North Korea. In a poll conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in April 2018, 31.9 percent of South Koreans said that North Korea was a “stranger/enemy” while 55.8 percent said that North Korea was “one of us/neighbor” so that positive views of North Korea prevailed.36

What is very surprising, however, is that 49.3 percent of those in their twenties felt that North Korea was a “stranger/enemy.”37 This is because from the period when democracy was restored in 1987 until the 2000s, ideological affinity with North Korea remained strongest among those who were in their twenties and thirties. The ability to speak much more freely on South-North issues and the propensity to see North Korea as more independent and nationalistic than South Korea contributed to greater sympathy for the North. But millennials in South Korea are much more concerned about job security and new opportunities than focusing on pro–North Korean activities. Clearly, there are millennials who are more supportive of North Korea, but in the mainstream, most of this generation also understands North Korea has committed gross violations of human rights and feels more detached from Pyongyang’s ideology.

These perceptions of unification suggest that there is a significant divergence in how the public will perceive specific aspects of unification, the government’s response to contingencies, and the degree to which it is willing to coordinate policies with the United States. Many South Koreans believe there will be some national benefit from unification. But if they have to assume direct tax burdens, suffer cuts or delays in their own social welfare benefits, or agree to provide preferential treatment to North Korean refugees, political support for whichever government remains in power is going to dissipate. In terms of stabilization, this suggests that most South Koreans are likely to support humanitarian responses, such as economic and food aid to the North, but will be less enthusiastic about the long-term financial burden associated with integrating North Koreans into South Korea’s economic institutions.

South Koreans are more likely to support stabilizing activities such as securing WMD or implementing viable policing in North Korea given that rapidly deteriorating civil security conditions in North Korea could be destabilizing in South Korea as well. However, longer-term commitments required to demobilize the KPA and manage nuclear waste would be called into question. This is why most South Koreans—some 65 percent—believe that unification should be stretched out over a longer period of time, such as ten years.

One of the most important dimensions of unification is that no one really knows the speed or magnitude of changes that are likely to be triggered in the event of regime collapse in North Korea. Moreover, even under the most peaceful unification scenario through a political settlement—a very large leap of faith—major obstacles will remain. If a “two systems, two nations” situation is maintained for the time being, will South Koreans be willing to give up their civil liberties in exchange for the creation of a unified state? Those in their thirties and below have always lived under a democracy in South Korea, it is nearly impossible for them to fathom the possibility of living in an authoritarian system. As this group matures politically, job security, personal incomes, level of social welfare benefits, and educational opportunities are likely to dominate rather than any ethnic bond with North Koreans.

There will be huge political debates within South Korea as the ROK, together with the United States and other international partners, begins to focus on establishing civil control after order and security are achieved in North Korea. Such control could be realized by putting into place a viable criminal justice system, impartially allocating private property, and addressing the problem of gross human rights violations as well as de facto genocide in North Korea. Finding a political consensus within South Korea on how best to cope with reconciliation but also achieve justice for all of the suffering of the North Korean people will be divided sharply along ideological lines.

Ultimately, factors that compel South Koreans to think positively about unification such as overcoming more than seven decades of partition are always balanced by much more cautious views on the nature of the North Korean regime. In a Gallup Korea poll conducted in December 2018 to assess how South Koreans viewed the flurry of inter-Korean summits in 2018 and unprecedented engagement between the two Koreas, 45 percent responded that North Korea was unlikely to keep its promises while 38 percent said that North Korea was likely to keep its word on the various agreements.38 Entrenched political divisions and deep contradictions within the South, such as support for unification but unwillingness to make major political concessions as well as perceiving North Korea as a partner but also an adversary, likely means that public support for extensive engagement with North Korea will be tempered over time. Expectations for the results of engagement are already moderating—in a poll conducted by the Korea Society Opinion Institute, 54 percent of South Koreans were optimistic that the second summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump would produce a deal leading to the eventual denuclearization of North Korea, compared to 75 percent at the time of the first Trump-Kim summit.39

U.S. Role and Capacity

The United States’ role in Korean unification will be shaped largely by three factors. First, as South Korea’s most important ally and one that shares common universal values, the United States has reaffirmed its support for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas as well as the creation of a free and democratic Korea. This is crucial because regardless of the deep sensitivities involved in laying down the characteristics of a unified Korea, it behooves the United States as the world’s most powerful democracy to throw its weight behind the creation of a unified Korea that is free and democratic.

Second, U.S. diplomatic acumen, strategy, and support is going to be critical in forging a broad international coalition that reaffirms the principles of peaceful unification and the building of a democratic, unified Korea. This will be especially relevant given the growing political influence of China across Asia and, indeed, the world. In a development that no one could have foreseen two to three decades ago, all of the United States’ allies in Asia today trade more with China than the United States. In short, China enjoys significant leverage over every single U.S. ally and partner in the Asia Pacific region but especially on the Korean Peninsula. The only power that will be able to match and counter Chinese influence in and around the Korean Peninsula is the United States.

Third, as described in greater detail below, the U.S. role in undertaking stability actions in North Korea as the unification process begins, if managed properly, will be constructive and significant. Dismantling North Korea’s CBRN, demobilizing the KPA, and controlling the country’s security apparatuses cannot be done solely by South Korea. On top of that, the U.S. capacity to assist in restoring essential services, establishing civil control, and supporting governance and economic development can be a stabilizing force behind South Korea’s efforts.

Regardless of the second U.S.–North Korea summit, the likelihood of a peace agreement formally ending the Korean War, and the normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea, the United States will continue to play an important role in supporting Korean security and taking the lead in multilateral diplomacy. German unification relied on a 2+4 mechanism (the two Germanies plus France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and something similar could work in the Korean context. However, it seems highly unlikely that China, Russia, or the two Koreas (in case of a negotiated settlement) would agree to any formal role for Japan. In the end, as South Korea’s most important ally, the United States’ steadfast commitment to a unified Korea that is led by the ROK is the best conduit for ensuring the highest levels of cooperation throughout the process of unification.

Establishing Civil Security (I): Weapons of Mass Destruction

In the stabilization context, civil security refers to “the provision of security for state entities and the population, including protection from internal and external threats.”40 Creating a secure and stable environment helps not only ensure the protection of civilians but also create conditions for other stability actions to succeed. Without civil security, practitioners will find extreme difficulty in restoring essential services, establishing rule of law, or sustaining governance and development. The exact scale of North Korea’s WMD programs is unknown, but they will certainly require an extensive and complex dismantlement effort. Additionally, although its soldiers are malnourished and possess outdated equipment, North Korea still has the fourth-largest military in the world with 1.2 million personnel, or 5 percent of its population.41 By contrast, Saddam Hussein’s army in 2003 had just 360,000 to 420,000 men with far inferior conventional capabilities.42 At this scale, even if unification occurs without conflict, demobilizing all of these elements and simultaneously dealing with the challenge of maintaining civil security will require massive amounts of man power and money, as well as careful strategic planning.

Securing and dismantling WMD programs, and particularly the nuclear program, will be one of the most critical stability actions in North Korea. Building a nuclear program is an expensive and time-consuming process, but so is its dismantlement. In Iraq, 1,625 U.S. and UN inspectors took two years to search nearly 1,700 sites for WMD at a cost of $1 billion. After Russia bought Soviet-era strategic warheads back from the Ukraine, the United States provided $500 million through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) fund to dismantle Ukraine’s remaining intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ICBM silos, heavy bombers, and cruise missiles over a period of six years.43 IAEA safeguards in Iran to implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) cost $18.42 million in 2017 to perform inspection activities at eighteen facilities and nine other locations.44 Libya dismantled its nuclear and chemical weapons programs with assistance from the UK. South Africa decided of its own volition to dismantle its six air-deliverable nuclear weapons in just a few months.45

Needless to say, the size, scope, and character of past WMD dismantlement efforts have varied greatly. Dismantlement of North Korean WMD will be different still. U.S. intelligence estimates that North Korea has the fissile material to build between thirty and sixty nuclear bombs, and has assembled ten to twenty.46 Its copious missile tests have confirmed its ability to manufacture delivery vehicles, including ICBMs. A 2017 U.S. intelligence assessment concluded that North Korea had successfully miniaturized a nuclear warhead to fit ICBMs.47 Experts estimate that North Korea has upwards of 1,000 missiles of varying ranges.48 On top of weapons and delivery vehicles, securing all of North Korea’s highly enriched uranium, plutonium, weapons R&D materials, and personnel will be major tasks. In addition to nuclear weapons, North Korea is believed to possess an arsenal of 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, as well the potential to produce biological pathogens such as anthrax and smallpox.49

Fully eliminating North Korea’s WMD programs would require securing at the very least 141 known (and certainly many more unknown) CBRN-related sites, dismantling nuclear arms, halting uranium enrichment, disabling reactors, closing nuclear test sites, ending hydrogen bomb fuel production, destroying germ arms, destroying chemical arms, and curbing its missile program.50 North Korea’s WMD will require far more extensive counter-WMD (CWMD) operations than recent efforts in Libya, Syria, Iraq, or Iran.

Not only is the scale of North Korea’s WMD programs immense, but in the event of conflict or a messy regime collapse, securing North Korea’s WMD will have to occur in severely unstable conditions. Many of North Korea’s WMD are in heavily fortified, concealed, or unknown locations that will take time to locate without the cooperation of North Koreans with knowledge of the programs. Moreover, securing WMD requires a major ground-force presence, and the United States and South Korea have never fought a ground war with loose CBRN material in the operating environment. Once secured, dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program will also be a decidedly slow endeavor. While National Security Adviser John Bolton has said that fully verified dismantlement can occur within a year, experts estimate the full process could take anywhere from a few years to fifteen years.51 And after that, a critical remaining issue will be how to dispose of nuclear material.

Major Challenges to Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Korean Context

In the short term, the most immediate priorities for WMD elimination (WMD-E) related civil security actions will be verifiably locating all WMD, securing CBRN materials, and securing elites and others with WMD-related knowledge. These tasks will be sufficient to ensure enough security that other stability actions can proceed. However, because many of the locations of North Korea’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are unknown, this phase will be a major undertaking requiring a considerable amount of time, delaying other vital missions.

Each phase of stabilization—initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability—poses its own challenges, but the initial phase will be the most critical as it possesses the most potential for instability if done poorly. In the fog of war, a power vacuum, or pronounced political uncertainty, the threat of uncontained WMD is amplified, and the potential for enemy combatants to seize, use, or proliferate WMD poses a serious threat. For this reason, quickly finding and securing WMD in an unstable scenario is absolutely critical to protecting local populations and enabling subsequent stability actions. As such, the military should first focus on securing population centers and known sites so that essential services can be delivered to these areas as quickly as possible.

Simultaneously, the military will have to scour the country to locate any as yet unknown WMD sites, of which there may be many. In situations where the North Korean government is incapacitated or conflict occurs, securing WMD will be far more integral to ensuring civil security and laying the foundation for other stability actions to begin. Although an incapacitated North Korean government will allow for less restricted access to WMD sites, if North Korean officials do not cooperate, the United States and South Korea will enter into an operational environment with hazardous WMD in unknown locations. Fighting a war in this context poses extremely high risks, including the potential for accidental detonation of a nuclear weapon. In a scenario with various military factions and insurgents, enemy elements could also gain control of WMD. It goes without saying that ascertaining and securing the location of WMD as quickly and thoroughly as possible will be critical to reducing potential harm in these contexts.

In Iraq, no WMD were found but the experience offers insights into the challenges in securing WMD in North Korea. North Korea is a little less than one-third the size of Iraq, and physically searching for hidden WMD could conceivably take less time. However, North Korea’s terrain also presents different challenges. Iraqi terrain consists mostly of broad plains, with some mountains and marshes on the border. North Korea, meanwhile, is predominately mountainous, which makes finding, securing, and dismantling WMD far more difficult, and the KPA has heavily prioritized concealment of everything including “command posts, foxholes, runways, fighter jet and naval bases, and cave strongholds.”52

Based on defector accounts and evidence from tunnels discovered leading into the North, IHS Janes estimates that North Korea has a network of 11,000 fortified underground facilities, some of which could potentially conceal WMD.53 Searching for and locating all the WMD in North Korea could take months or even years. Wargames conducted by RAND that accounted for factors specific to the Korean context found that securing a single site could take weeks or months, depending on the level of interference from North Korean forces. Once located, securing a single large site is estimated to take four days, and then another three days to ascertain whether the site is critical to the WMD program. The process of “systematically searching for and collecting information, material, and persons from a designated location and analyzing them to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, or support criminal prosecution” (exploitation) would take an average of eighteen days, although very large sites like Yongbyon could take months to secure and exploit.54 As the RAND study noted:

Reaching these sites is extremely difficult, as is finding the weapons. The mountainous, channelized terrain along the DMZ is defended by dug-in North Korean forces. If these units actively defend their positions, analysis found that U.S. forces would not arrive at the first nuclear site for almost two weeks, and then only after suffering substantial combat losses. Even when wargames posited weak-to-nonexistent North Korean resistance—allowing U.S. forces to quickly reach the closest sites—locating nuclear weapons and material took a considerable amount of time, tying up both large maneuver units and the highly specialized units that locate and safely eliminate nuclear weapons. Moreover, in the wargames, analysts playing the role of North Korean factions impeded the U.S. search efforts by sabotaging the facilities, blowing up tunnels, and contaminating the sites with radiological waste.55

In a peaceful scenario, negotiating away North Korea’s nuclear program will likely be a precursor to economic integration and a condition for the unification process to begin. It will therefore not be an initial stability action, as the lack of volatility and negotiated access to nuclear sites will make WMD less of a threat to the general population. However, regardless of whether denuclearization results through diplomatic negotiations or seizure in an unstable context, providing security assurances to North Korean officials will be critical to ensuring nonproliferation and long-term stability of the process. In any scenario, there will be elites and officials in North Korea that have had a stake in, and knowledge of, its WMD program. Successful unification requires that they believe the process will not be harmful to them. If they are uncertain or unconvinced of the positive outcomes of unification, they will have an incentive—and resources—to undermine CWMD and nonproliferation efforts.

North Korea has learned from the experiences of Ukraine, Iraq, Libya, and Iran. Specifically, that nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent against foreign intervention. Ukraine gave up its large nuclear stockpile in exchange for security assurances from Russia and the United States, yet Russia annexed Ukrainian Crimea in 2014. Iraq did not have nuclear weapons, and thus could not stave off U.S. forces in 1991 or 2003. Muammar Gaddafi renounced Libya’s WMD on December 19, 2003, only to be deposed and killed in the Libyan Civil War in 2011. Iran entered into the JCPOA to reduce its nuclear program, and watched as it was jeopardized by U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the agreement. As a result, regardless of an agreement, if North Korean elites believe at any point that protections afforded by an external security guarantee will expire, they will be more likely to sell knowledge, expertise, or even smuggle nuclear technology outside of the country. Given the scale of North Korea’s nuclear program and the number of people involved, this has the potential to create a proliferation threat similar and likely larger than that posed by A. Q. Khan, the one-time head of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program who sold uranium enrichment technology to many international buyers including North Korea, Libya, and Iran.56

As such, it is highly important that elites, scientists, and anyone with knowledge of North Korea’s WMD programs, especially nuclear, be quickly located and secured. While unification will require transitional justice to address human rights abuses committed by elites, vetted elites and professionals with WMD knowledge should have opportunities to contribute meaningfully in a unified Korea. The U.S. learned this lesson the hard way in Iraq, when after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 it systematically eliminated Saddam’s ruling Baath Party, confiscated some of its wealth, and removed party members from their government jobs without offering viable alternative occupations or ensuring their safety. The Baath Party was so integral to the governance of Iraq that its elimination left the government short-staffed and hardly able to function. De-Baathification fueled resentment in many communities and led to widespread political and social instability in Iraq that undermined stabilization and contributed to the insurgency, the legacy of which still undermines governance in Iraq today.57

The same potential exists in North Korea with the added threat of elite and professionals’ access to information on North Korea’s WMD programs. The ROK government’s plans for North Korean scientists and elites are opaque, but allowing North Korean scientists and officials to maintain their status will likely be unpalatable to many Koreans. A transitional justice process that judges the future of these people based on their individual conduct, not their affiliations, will be critical to demonstrating to the public rigorous vetting and formally legitimizing security guarantees for WMD-related personnel. Even once transitional justice is complete, elites will need to be constantly reassured of their security. Although technology and WMD research and development materials can be physically secured, individual knowledge cannot. Those with WMD knowledge will continue to pose a proliferation risk throughout their lifetime.

U.S. Role and Capacity

Securing and dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons is perhaps the only aspect of unification in which ROK involvement is restricted by international treaty. The NPT explicitly prohibits South Korea and other non-nuclear-weapon states from handling nuclear weapons and related materials or information.58 Although South Korea can secure non-weapons-related nuclear materials or delivery vehicles, only the five NPT nuclear weapon states are permitted to handle weapons-related materials, technologies, and information. Even IAEA involvement in this endeavor is restricted, except where participating member states are restricted to the five nuclear weapon states. In the fog of war, it may be difficult to distinguish which sites have a combination of weaponized and other material. Even in a peaceful context, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program may be inextricable from peaceful elements of the nuclear program, which could restrict the ROK’s involvement further.

Biological and chemical weapon disposal, however, can include much more robust South Korean participation. It remains unclear how the Biological Weapons Convention would be implemented in North Korea, as the UN Security Council’s power to investigate violations of the convention has never been invoked.59 This in and of itself poses a stability risk—the United States and South Korea should delineate tasks, responsibilities, and lead agencies to counter biological weapons in conflict or collapse. There is more precedent for chemical weapons, and the OPCW will likely have a leading role in coordinating the destruction as both South Korea and the United States are members. Discovery of chemical weapons can be reported to the OPCW under Article IV of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and generally states are permitted to “select and implement the appropriate destruction technologies” for chemical weapons “by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons and which—in an irreversible manner—renders munitions and other devices unusable as such.”60 These activities will occur under the supervision of the OPCW, which will verify the completion and legitimacy of destruction.61

The United States and ROK have plans for how they will handle CWMD in conflict, although the details of the operational plan are classified. The U.S. Joint Publication 3-40 on Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, however, lays out U.S. doctrine for neutralizing WMD.62 The doctrine is geared toward conducting CWMD operations in a failing or collapsing state where intervention to secure WMD is required, although the principles outlined would largely apply in a conflict scenario as well. While the task designations will be the same in Korea, understanding the operational environment, threats, and vulnerabilities will require far greater effort than depicted in this publication. As it stands, the United States and ROK know of many WMD storage sites, research centers, factories, and other facilities, but many remain unknown. If access is permitted, units can be immediately dispatched to secure known sites and the ROK and U.S. may be given information on the location of as yet unknown sites that can be subsequently secured. However, if conflict occurs and especially if a North Korean insurgency is involved, completely and verifiably securing North Korea’s WMD could take much longer.

In many aspects of stability actions in the North, particularly restoring essential services and establishing rule of law, the United States will be most heavily involved in the initial phase of restoration. However, in the case of civil security, the United States needs to remain engaged in the transformation and fostering sustainability phases as well due to the NPT’s restrictions on South Korea’s access to nuclear weapons as well as the logistics denuclearization will require.

While chemical weapons can be destroyed relatively easily and safely through incineration or neutralization,63 and biological weapons can be eliminated through heat or chemical compounds, dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program will create enormous amounts of nuclear waste that poses a security risk. Decommissioning Yongbyon alone will be a hugely challenging endeavor, Whang Jooho and George T. Baldwin have explained:

[It will] result in anywhere from 50 to 100 metric tons of uranium spent fuel, as much as 500,000 liters of liquid high-level waste, as well as miscellaneous high-level waste sources from the Radiochemical Laboratory. A substantial quantity of intermediate-level waste will result from disposing 600 metric tons of graphite from the reactor, an undetermined quantity of chemical decladding liquid waste from reprocessing, and hundreds of tons of contaminated concrete and metal from facility dismantlement.64

Dealing with this waste will be a long-term challenge with international implications. One option for disposing of fissile material and delivery vehicles is to remove them from the country—a very expensive process and one that could be opposed by residents of their destination country. A second option is to transport the spent fuel to a location abroad where it can be vitrified, and then return it to North Korea for storage. Countries with the infrastructure required to vitrify North Korea’s nuclear waste include the United States, Japan, France, and the UK.

Because of South Korea’s NPT status and North Korea’s radioactive waste, dismantling its nuclear program will at some point become an international endeavor. The ROK’s closest ally, the United States, may not immediately be able to access, locate, or secure North Korea’s WMD sites, but China might. A number of North Korea’s known nuclear facilities are much closer to the border with China than South Korea, including the Pyunggye-ri nuclear test site, suspected uranium enrichment facilities Yeongjeo-ri and Cheonmasan, and suspected underground nuclear facilities Bakcheon, Taechon, and Hagap. In short, almost all of North Korea’s major nuclear facilities other than Yongbyon are closer to China than South Korea. China has the ability to deploy those forces on the ground to WMD sites much more quickly than the United States, and that access has the potential to be destabilizing if not properly coordinated with the United States and South Korea.

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If South Korea does not involve China in planning, China’s reactions could be discordant from joint U.S.-ROK responses although it has a vested interest in ensuring stability on the peninsula. Including China in planning for WMD-E operations could decrease the time required to secure the area, allowing for other organizations to come in more quickly and restore essential services to populations in need. Still, this would likely be a difficult sell in both South Korea and the United States, not to mention key obstacles that information sharing with China presents. To open a conversation, the United States and the ROK could approach China first on the basis of dealing with North Korea’s nuclear waste. The issue of nuclear waste is less sensitive than securing and dismantling nuclear material, but still will be a significant challenge in dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program in the long term. This phase of denuclearization also requires less intelligence sharing, and therefore is easier to approach with China. In fact, the United States and China have cooperated before to remove highly enriched uranium from Ghana.65

Assuming trust can be built through discussing this topic, the United States and the ROK can potentially work backward to China’s cooperation on other WMD-E tasks. To mitigate the potential political risks of involving China, such as giving it too much influence, in addition to the IAEA the United States and South Korea coul