The International 2013 Retrospective - Part 1 August 17th, 2013 19:42 GMT Text by TanGeng Graphics by riptide Table of Contents

Radiant vs Dire: Picking Sides At TI3



China Falls



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The International 3 Retrospective - Part 1





It has only been a few days since the conclusion of Dota 2's biggest event of the year, The International 2013, and now is the perfect time to look back and reflect upon the history made this year at Seattle's famous Benaroya Hall. There are many events throughout the year that lead up to TI3, but TI3 can be seen as the culmination of each of these events showing the growth each team has made since last year, and who can now be named the strongest team in all of Dota 2.



Only once each year will we gather for this amazing event, where we get to see the top 16 teams in all of Dota 2 pitted against each other, and with its amazing $2.8 million prize pool there is nothing quite like it. This year Western Dota prevailed as Na`Vi and Alliance met in the finals. They gave us one of the best series ever going right down to the wire in game 5, with Alliance taking home the win in the end. This International gave us a glimpse into the future of Dota 2 where Chinese/SEA teams are no longer the dominant forces they once were, but instead equals to those in the Western scene.



After writing some great daily recaps for TI3 this year we thought it would be best to focus on some feature retrospective pieces, but with the amazing amount of content coming in we will be splitting this up into 3 different retrospectives. This part one will start with an analysis of the fall in Chinese Dota by Tangeng, along with a great stats piece about the Picks and Bans at TI3 from Phantasmal.



We had been waiting for TI3 all year, and it has come and gone, meeting and even exceeding our expectations. We hope you enjoyed all of our coverage leading up to and during the event, and we also hope you enjoy our upcoming retrospectives as well.





This is why TI3 is the greatest event to ever happen



Radiant vs Dire:

Picking Sides At TI3 by phantasmal



With all the questions during The International asking why Alliance was always on Dire and Na`Vi was always on Radiant, I thought I’d take some time to clear up how team selection worked. From there we can look at the patterns in team selection to see what they reveal about each team’s preferences and also how those preferences might have influenced the Radiant/Dire and 1st/2nd pick win rates over the entire event.



Let’s get the easy stuff out of the way first. According to



For the playoffs the process is similar, but instead of a coin flip, the initial selection goes to the team with priority in the matchup. In the first round of the playoffs, priority is determined on seeding. For all other rounds, priority goes to Upper Bracket teams over Lower Bracket teams. If both teams are from the same bracket, priority goes to the team with the higher win rate.



With that out of the way, let’s look at how the prelims went down. We can’t determine who won the coin flips, but we know that every team in a group has an identical schedule to every other team in the group (minus themselves of course), and that every team got first selection in precisely half of their games. This makes it an environment that is ideal for a quick aggregate analysis.







To start things off, it is my belief that teams almost always preferred 1st pick to 2nd pick. The simplest evidence for this is Group B. There are only two teams in this group that had second pick more than 8 times: Rattlesnake and Alliance. These are also the two teams that showed the greatest overall preference for Dire in the entire tournament. Group B is also peculiar in that only 4 out of the 56 games featured a team that had both Radiant and 2nd Pick. The simplest explanation for these trends is that Group B was largely full of teams that preferred both 1st pick and Dire. In this environment, if you select Dire, I would select 1st pick. If you select 1st pick, I would select Dire. As a result over 90% of the games in this group featured 1st pick Radiant and 2nd pick Dire.



Group A is a more difficult case because the teams in this division seem to be split over their side preference. In this group 33 out of 56 games featured a team with both Radiant and 2nd pick. If we continue to assume that no one actively tries to get 2nd pick, we can conclude that Group A had a slight preference towards Radiant overall.



Another thing we can do with Group A is try to determine which teams preferred which side. If we assume that no teams actively sought 2nd pick, whichever side the teams play more often when they have 2nd pick reveals their side preference. Using this test, Na`Vi was unsurprisingly the most pro-Radiant, followed by mouz, Zenith, and Fnatic. On the other end of the spectrum, DK and LGD.cn were the most pro-Dire, with MUFC showing a slight Dire preference. Dignitas showed no consistent preference in either direction.



Another interesting fact when we look at the patterns in 2nd pick across both groups is that only 3 out of 16 teams played more than one game on both Radiant and Dire when they had 2nd pick: Fnatic, Dignitas, and TongFu. It is my suspicion that these three teams had the most malleable side preferences depending on who they were facing in their current match and what they wanted to run.



So with side preferences established, which teams prioritized 1st pick over side? This is actually difficult to answer from the aggregate data. Ideally we would look at specific game patterns, but trying to cover all of that here would be impossible. Based on what I’ve looked at, my belief is that Orange is the team that most favored 1st pick in the entire tournament. Close behind were iG, Liquid, DK, MUFC, and possibly LGD.cn. The teams that most favored side over 1st pick were Rattlesnake, Alliance, Na`Vi, Fnatic, and mouz.



So to summarize everything, in Group A Na`Vi, mouz, and Fnatic all exhibited a strong preference for Radiant over everything, but mouz and Fnatic showed more inconsistencies than Na`Vi. DK, LGD.cn, and MUFC all showed a 1st pick then Dire preference. Zenith was probably 1st pick then Radiant. Dignitas was all over the place and may have been responding to specific match conditions.



In Group B, Alliance and Rattlesnake showed only side preferences, with both preferring Dire to everything else. TongFu behaved similarly to Dignitas and exhibited no clear overall preference. Every other team appeared to prefer 1st pick then Dire, with VP being the most inconsistent in this preference.



With all that out of the way, I want to turn my attention to the win rates for sides and pick orders. To be frank, my earnest advice is that when it comes to TI3 do not trust the pick/side win rates. It’s not merely that it’s a small sample; pro games as a whole are always going to be a small sample so you just try to make do. The bigger problem is that the sample is in no way random. To illustrate this, let’s look at the overall win rates:







What’s going on is most clearly displayed by 2nd pick Radiant. That pick/side combo has 54% win rate over 57 games, which looks pretty substantial. Unfortunately, 22 out of the 57 2nd pick Radiant games in the entire tournament were played by Na`Vi, who had a 72% win rate when on that side/pick combination. Given the degree team preferences warped the distribution these win rates cannot be considered reliable.



More importantly, consider that the top 3 teams all had different philosophies when it came to pick/side combo, and they all had pretty clear motives behind these preferences. For Orange, they were heavily dependent on grabbing Visage, who was the most drafted hero of the tournament. Securing first pick gave them the best shot at grabbing this highly coveted hero before their opponents. For Na`Vi, being on the Radiant side opened up their options in the hard lane by allowing them to farm ancients with either Mirana or Windrunner. For Alliance, being on the Dire side fit into their overall strategy to force early Roshan fights that they could win by utilizing buybacks.



The lesson to take from this is that you’re likely better off adopting a side/pick preference that fits what your team wants to accomplish. Sure, the statisticians might be able to tell you which side is marginally better on average, but surely you’re not striving to be just an average team. If you want to be a real contender, you need to go the extra step, look at the benefits of each choice in full detail, and then find a way to utilize those benefits in your overall team strategy.





China Falls by TanGeng



The Discontent of A Nation





Orange knocks out the final Chinese Team before top 3



At The International 2013, the five Chinese teams placed three teams in the 4-6 positions, one team in the 9th-12th, and one team in 13th-16th. These are solid results in the middle of the pack, but below this year's expectations and aspirations and well below last year's dominating performance. While Alliance and Na`Vi were known to be formidable opponents from their respective victories in China, the way Chinese teams were eliminated and the way they got shut out of the top 3 left Chinese commentators and fans both speechless and despondent. Even in Cologne where the Chinese were met with a crippled hero pool, EHOME had the decency to return with second place in consolation.



Especially discouraging was how weak of a fight Chinese teams put up against Alliance. While compared to the rest of the field, Chinese teams challenged Alliance in a few games. Tongfu and LGD each pushed Alliance to the limit once and DK handed Alliance its first loss in the competition. However, looking at the series overall, the Chinese teams didn't look to stand a chance against the efficient farming and more opportunistic yet low-mistake game of Alliance. The rest of the games were all solid Alliance victories and a testament to gap in skill. Meanwhile Tongfu's fountain-hook loss to Na`Vi, Liquid's Clockwerk Hook elimination of LGD, Orange's repeated early game crushing of DK, and the hopeless middle game of Tongfu in game 3 against Orange cemented the sense of inferiority of the Chinese teams against top competition.



The bitter taste of defeat in The International 3 is a sharp contrast to the sweet triumphant conquest of Chinese teams the previous year. In the days following the wipeout on Day 4, Chinese netizens published their opinions, flinging mud in all directions in disappointment and frustration, sometimes at ACE for lack of competition and sometimes at players for poor mentality and play. Under calm introspection, only part of the failure can be attributed to the closed beta, the lack of a public player base in China, or the lack of tournaments. Rather the recent fall of Chinese Dota has its roots in its historical dominance and success, and that dominance has guided the Chinese towards a play-style that is ill-suited to battling opponents that are similarly skilled, dedicated professionals.





Oriental Monastery



In the years leading up to 2012, Chinese Dota was a mystery to the outside world. Ensconced behind the Great Firewall of China, Dota developed in its own vigourous ecosystem independently from the Western, CIS, and Southeast Asian scene. Outside of the major international competitions, the rare peek into the Chinese tactics and strategy were the odd replays that leaked out of professional scrims and domestic Chinese tournaments. For the most part, the teams made little or no outside contact until they flew out and played Western and SEA teams in major international events like the SMM and ESWC, and they would take the world by storm starting in 2009.



The Chinese performances at these competitions were akin to Shaolin Monks descending out of their mountain meditation and training to show off their kung-fu at the biggest martial arts competition and dominating. Teams such as EHOME went through entire competitions undefeated, and the other Chinese teams manhandle the rest of the field in a tour de force that often resulted in a sweep of top honors. Then as suddenly as they appeared, the Chinese would retreat back to their reclusive scene only to re-emerge in strength at the next big competition.



The domination of Chinese teams over the international scene is heavily based on the early professionalization of Dota in the country. The well-funded teams paid out salaries and held regimented practices in team houses. On the other hand, their competition, both foreign and domestic, enjoyed far less support. Most competitors had to work part-time jobs to support their passion for Dota and their pursuit of competition. Against the amateur opposition, the professionals were able to enjoyed focused practice with coaching support to hone teamwork and laning techniques. But the area where the Chinese really out-classed their amateur counter-parts was in experience with all sorts of game situations and being able to execute a comprehensive game plan that covered the entire Dota game, from the laning phase to late end-game.





Will the Chinese scene dominate like this again?



Solid, Safe, Sure



In such an uneven competitive environment, the top Chinese teams molded a Dota doctrine centered around safe and solid play. Playing according to this doctrine was an absolute guarantee of getting past lesser teams early in tournaments and reaching the semi-finals or finals to play against other professional Chinese teams. By avoiding risky tactics or creative strategies, teams eliminated the possibility of handing the game to their opponent. Then by sitting back with safe play, the Chinese would capitalize on the inevitable mistakes that would come.



Against players of lesser laning skill, the Chinese would simply out-CS and kill their laning counterparts, build an experience and gold advantage, and methodically take high ground without ever risking their heroes. Against greedier farming teams, they might force the opponent into a team-fight with a strong push or track down out-of-position heroes for easy ganks. When aggressive teams find success early in the game, the Chinese would simply weather the storm and carry the game late, where they could capitalize on opponent's inexperience, weaker farming skills, and propensity for over-extension. In essence, the top Chinese teams merely had to wait for the opponent to defeat themselves and it worked time and time again.



Fast forward to present day, the safe and solid doctrine is so ingrained in the Chinese professional scene that it will not fail to come up in any strategy discussion. Players, casters, and commentary will regularly preach its virtues to the Chinese Dota audience. Some even go as far as to name adherence to safe and solid approach rather than pursuit of optimal play as the defining characteristic of top tier professionals, and when teams fail to to adhere to the doctrine, they are flamed by netizens for being immature and exuberant or are accused of throwing the game.





Conservative, Stodgy, Boring



While solid and safe is the correct approach against weaker and less experience opponents or in situations of significant advantage, it is no way to play against top teams and not a way to win any championship. Despite this fact, the Chinese teams are extending the approach to all opponents and applying it in all game situations. Instead of opening up and trying to play optimally against top-class opponents, Chinese teams come across as conservative and stodgy, rarely ever taking risks, and their safe play is exploited by greedy or optimal farming strategies that take advantage of the predictable Chinese ganking strategies.



Against Alliance, Chinese teams steadily give away ground waiting on the mistakes that never come or that come so late as to not matter. In near even games, they are selective, patient, and tentative to a fault with team-fight initiations. And when the situations are not perfect enough, they will often back away without a fight. Against fellow Chinese teams, the difficulty of finding suitable fights is further compounded by safe positioning of enemy players, leading to long periods of boring inaction where the two teams just farm the creeps between each aborted gank attempt. When behind, the Chinese teams shy away from seizing risky comeback opportunities, preferring to wait to capitalize on clear-cut mistakes.



Of the four major Chinese teams, the two teams most representative of the Chinese style are DK and LGD. In their period of dominance after TI2, iG played highly aggressively against their Chinese peers and their aggression and corresponding good team-fight form was a huge part of their success. Tongfu, the new power, is still learning to play mature Chinese Dota and will have moments of aggression that brings out cries of "throw!" from Chinese netizens.





Playing Not to Lose



For one hour, in the first game against Na`Vi during prelims, it looked like LGD might leap out of the team's predictable playbook and play exciting aggressive Dota. LGD needed one win against Na`Vi to force tiebreakers and two wins to secure upper bracket spot dived towers against Na`Vi like they'd never done before. It was so aggressive as to catch Na`Vi completely off guard and LGD would go on to win the game. However, that startlingly aggressive LGD would not make an appearance again in the tournament. After losing the second game to Na`Vi, LGD went on to pick Alchemist and Magnus combinations in all four of their remaining games.



As early as halfway through the Dignitas-LGD tiebreaker game, LD remarked that LGD was "playing not to lose" and based their entire strategy around it. Fielding lineups that have one hard carry and four supporting disables, LGD sat back and dared opponents to beat them, all the while waiting to pounce on mistakes and overextension. Under this strategy, LGD lost the lanes heavily to Dignitas in the tiebreaker but was able to seize on a poor Aegis steal at 33 minutes to turn around the game and win. In the upper bracket, LGD almost stole a won game 1 from Alliance but narrowly lost a base race since Alliance had already been so far ahead. They outright lost game 2 after being clearly outplayed by s4 and Loda in a series of team fights. In the elimination game against Liquid, LGD would once again be outplayed and only a few instances of overaggression by Liquid kept the game in doubt.







After watching LGD get eliminated, fellow staff and spectator Vykromond would remark, "Playing LGD is like playing against bots, sort of like the Shadow Fiend challenge." Indeed, LGD is predictable in their draft, in their laning, and in their conservative strategy to the point that their play is almost robotic. Likewise, if a team learns to attack their weaker laning heroes early, farm safely and efficiently during the middle game, and push towers and high ground with discipline, beating LGD becomes formulaic. Playing against them is excellent practice for learning good hero positioning and developing mistake-free Dota. But for LGD, the style may have been guaranteed victory and been sufficient for third place last year, but as the world catches up to China in professionalism, it is more becoming guaranteed mediocrity.





No-Risk Gaming







On the second day of the International, DK and iG played the longest and most boring game ever to grace competitive Dota 2. BurNing would set a record by farming over 60k gold, achieve the mythical 12 slotted Lone Druid and still lost dismally in 98 boring minutes. At 70 minutes in with a huge economic lead and one lane of barracks down, all DK had to do was break one more lane. In typical DK fashion, they chose to try in the lowest risk fashion possible, by sending the Spirit Bear high ground. But after being bursted down and destroyed, DK sought no alternative and retreated to farm. Rather than having BurNing move items to his main bear and risking a fight, DK sat back and farmed.... and farmed... and farmed... Until records fell, spectators did Roshan countdowns, and Korean casters screamed and whooped to fight back the boredom. iG naturally obliged as their tri-core used farm more efficiently. Finally, only 26 minutes later, DK pushed into iG in a desperate and hopeless high ground attempt. Thus, DK with their no-risk strategy turned a good but risky chance at victory into a sure thing, a sure loss.



DK ultimately won that series against iG, but it would foreshadow their loss against Alliance the following day. In game 1, once again, DK would find themselves with a decision to threaten high ground at 37 minutes. Three minutes prior, DK recovered a strong foothold in the game by winning a fight around Roshan and securing the aegis for Weaver. BurNing was full slotted and Alchemist was at the hero's peak as carry. With an Antimage on the enemy team sure to catch up in items within five minutes and the Nature's Prophet helping Alliance split push and farm far more efficiently, it looked like time for DK to take a stab at Alliance high ground even if Treants were threatening the bottom T3 tower. A play like a fake retreat into SB Alchemist initiation would have been extremely timely.



Instead, DK elected to do a full retreat to defend the bottom tower, and in the end the Weaver's Aegis would expire without a fight that DK needed so much. Predictably, when Antimage is full slotted at 45 minutes, Alliance proceeded to split-push and trounce DK in a series of team fights. Once again, DK by being so averse to risk, DK passed by their chance to win in a risky high ground attempt and instead took the inevitable and low-risk path to defeat.





The End Of An Era

Comparatively, professionalism of Western teams still lag behind those of Chinese organizations, but teams like Alliance and Na`Vi have already advanced past the point where their Dota succumbs to the typical safe Chinese play. Meanwhile, organizations in the rest of Europe and North America are quickly catching up. In a year, "playing to not lose" may not even come close to touching the top 8 of The International.



In the coming year, if Chinese teams want to recover some of their past dominance, teams will have to break away from the overly safe play that characterized their dominance. Instead, teams will have to follow iG and Tongfu and move towards more proactive play that pushes the envelope of safe play, especially against top competition. They can no longer treat opponents as weak amateur teams that will inevitably "throw" and hand them the game.



Yet, for Chinese players, it may be a difficult transition because players of the BurNing generation have only known the safe Chinese style. Moving away from such a style may be too painful of process. And with many veterans mulling retirement, a Chinese renaissance may just have to wait for a new generation of Dota players that arrive after Perfect World finally opens up its beta in China.



We thus come to the end of this piece, and in many ways, the end of a generation of Chinese Dota. If the East shook in early 2013, as teams like Alliance and Na`Vi took down the very best it had to offer, then now it lies shattered and sundered. Even the top Chinese teams are at best in disarray, and with rumours of roster changes and reshuffling everywhere, it is safe to say that we have come to the end of an age. Whatever BurNing decides to do, whatever happens to the powerhouse we once called LGD and wherever Chuan goes or doesn't do, Chinese Dota has been changed forever. What remains to be seen, then, is how the dynasties adapt to the new world order.



Will the dragon rise again? Only time will tell.





CREDITS

Writers: phantasmal, TanGeng

Gfx: riptide, Heyoka

Editors: Firebolt145, ScintilliaSD, TheEmulator

Photography and art via

Writers: phantasmal, TanGengGfx: riptide, HeyokaEditors: Firebolt145, ScintilliaSD, TheEmulatorPhotography and art via Valve and R1CH



It has only been a few days since the conclusion of Dota 2's biggest event of the year, The International 2013, and now is the perfect time to look back and reflect upon the history made this year at Seattle's famous Benaroya Hall. There are many events throughout the year that lead up to TI3, but TI3 can be seen as the culmination of each of these events showing the growth each team has made since last year, and who can now be named the strongest team in all of Dota 2.Only once each year will we gather for this amazing event, where we get to see the top 16 teams in all of Dota 2 pitted against each other, and with its amazing $2.8 million prize pool there is nothing quite like it. This year Western Dota prevailed as Na`Vi and Alliance met in the finals. They gave us one of the best series ever going right down to the wire in game 5, with Alliance taking home the win in the end. This International gave us a glimpse into the future of Dota 2 where Chinese/SEA teams are no longer the dominant forces they once were, but instead equals to those in the Western scene.After writing some great daily recaps for TI3 this year we thought it would be best to focus on some feature retrospective pieces, but with the amazing amount of content coming in we will be splitting this up into 3 different retrospectives. This part one will start with an analysis of the fall in Chinese Dota by Tangeng, along with a great stats piece about the Picks and Bans at TI3 from Phantasmal.We had been waiting for TI3 all year, and it has come and gone, meeting and even exceeding our expectations. We hope you enjoyed all of our coverage leading up to and during the event, and we also hope you enjoy our upcoming retrospectives as well.With all the questions during The International asking why Alliance was always on Dire and Na`Vi was always on Radiant, I thought I’d take some time to clear up how team selection worked. From there we can look at the patterns in team selection to see what they reveal about each team’s preferences and also how those preferences might have influenced the Radiant/Dire and 1st/2nd pick win rates over the entire event.Let’s get the easy stuff out of the way first. According to 2p.com , each prelim series begins with a coin flip. The winning team then gets to choose either a side or a draft order, and the losing team gets to choose the remaining option. In game two this order is flipped, with the loser of the initial coin flip getting the first selection.For the playoffs the process is similar, but instead of a coin flip, the initial selection goes to the team with priority in the matchup. In the first round of the playoffs, priority is determined on seeding. For all other rounds, priority goes to Upper Bracket teams over Lower Bracket teams. If both teams are from the same bracket, priority goes to the team with the higher win rate.With that out of the way, let’s look at how the prelims went down. We can’t determine who won the coin flips, but we know that every team in a group has an identical schedule to every other team in the group (minus themselves of course), and that every team got first selection in precisely half of their games. This makes it an environment that is ideal for a quick aggregate analysis.To start things off,The simplest evidence for this is Group B. There are only two teams in this group that had second pick more than 8 times: Rattlesnake and Alliance. These are also the two teams that showed the greatest overall preference for Dire in the entire tournament. Group B is also peculiar in that only 4 out of the 56 games featured a team that had both Radiant and 2nd Pick.In this environment, if you select Dire, I would select 1st pick. If you select 1st pick, I would select Dire. As a result over 90% of the games in this group featured 1st pick Radiant and 2nd pick Dire.Group A is a more difficult case because the teams in this division seem to be split over their side preference. In this group 33 out of 56 games featured a team with both Radiant and 2nd pick. If we continue to assume that no one actively tries to get 2nd pick,Another thing we can do with Group A is try to determine which teams preferred which side. If we assume that no teams actively sought 2nd pick, whichever side the teams play more often when they have 2nd pick reveals their side preference.On the other end of the spectrum,Dignitas showed no consistent preference in either direction.Another interesting fact when we look at the patterns in 2nd pick across both groups is that only 3 out of 16 teams played more than one game on both Radiant and Dire when they had 2nd pick: Fnatic, Dignitas, and TongFu. It is my suspicion that these three teams had the most malleable side preferences depending on who they were facing in their current match and what they wanted to run.So with side preferences established, which teams prioritized 1st pick over side? This is actually difficult to answer from the aggregate data. Ideally we would look at specific game patterns, but trying to cover all of that here would be impossible. Based on what I’ve looked at, my belief is thatis the team that most favored 1st pick in the entire tournament. Close behind were, and possibly. The teams that most favored side over 1st pick wereSo to summarize everything, in Group Aall exhibited a strong preference for Radiant over everything, but mouz and Fnatic showed more inconsistencies than Na`Vi.all showed a 1st pick then Dire preference.was probably 1st pick then Radiant.was all over the place and may have been responding to specific match conditions.In Group B,showed only side preferences, with both preferring Dire to everything else.behaved similarly to Dignitas and exhibited no clear overall preference.appeared to prefer 1st pick then Dire, with VP being the most inconsistent in this preference.With all that out of the way, I want to turn my attention to the win rates for sides and pick orders.It’s not merely that it’s a small sample; pro games as a whole are always going to be a small sample so you just try to make do. The bigger problem is that the sample is in no way random. To illustrate this, let’s look at the overall win rates:What’s going on is most clearly displayed by 2nd pick Radiant. That pick/side combo has 54% win rate over 57 games, which looks pretty substantial. Unfortunately,. Given the degree team preferences warped the distribution these win rates cannot be considered reliable.More importantly,. For, they were heavily dependent on grabbing Visage, who was the most drafted hero of the tournament. Securing first pick gave them the best shot at grabbing this highly coveted hero before their opponents. For, being on the Radiant side opened up their options in the hard lane by allowing them to farm ancients with either Mirana or Windrunner. For, being on the Dire side fit into their overall strategy to force early Roshan fights that they could win by utilizing buybacks.. Sure, the statisticians might be able to tell you which side is marginally better on average, but surely you’re not striving to be just an average team. If you want to be a real contender, you need to go the extra step, look at the benefits of each choice in full detail, and then find a way to utilize those benefits in your overall team strategy.At The International 2013, the five Chinese teams placed three teams in the 4-6 positions, one team in the 9th-12th, and one team in 13th-16th. These are solid results in the middle of the pack, but below this year's expectations and aspirations and well below last year's dominating performance. While Alliance and Na`Vi were known to be formidable opponents from their respective victories in China, the way Chinese teams were eliminated and the way they got shut out of the top 3 left Chinese commentators and fans both speechless and despondent. Even in Cologne where the Chinese were met with a crippled hero pool, EHOME had the decency to return with second place in consolation.Especially discouraging was how weak of a fight Chinese teams put up against Alliance. While compared to the rest of the field, Chinese teams challenged Alliance in a few games. Tongfu and LGD each pushed Alliance to the limit once and DK handed Alliance its first loss in the competition. However, looking at the series overall, the Chinese teams didn't look to stand a chance against the efficient farming and more opportunistic yet low-mistake game of Alliance. The rest of the games were all solid Alliance victories and a testament to gap in skill. Meanwhile Tongfu's fountain-hook loss to Na`Vi, Liquid's Clockwerk Hook elimination of LGD, Orange's repeated early game crushing of DK, and the hopeless middle game of Tongfu in game 3 against Orange cemented the sense of inferiority of the Chinese teams against top competition.The bitter taste of defeat in The International 3 is a sharp contrast to the sweet triumphant conquest of Chinese teams the previous year. In the days following the wipeout on Day 4, Chinese netizens published their opinions, flinging mud in all directions in disappointment and frustration, sometimes at ACE for lack of competition and sometimes at players for poor mentality and play. Under calm introspection, only part of the failure can be attributed to the closed beta, the lack of a public player base in China, or the lack of tournaments. Rather the recent fall of Chinese Dota has its roots in its historical dominance and success, and that dominance has guided the Chinese towards a play-style that is ill-suited to battling opponents that are similarly skilled, dedicated professionals.In the years leading up to 2012, Chinese Dota was a mystery to the outside world. Ensconced behind the Great Firewall of China, Dota developed in its own vigourous ecosystem independently from the Western, CIS, and Southeast Asian scene. Outside of the major international competitions, the rare peek into the Chinese tactics and strategy were the odd replays that leaked out of professional scrims and domestic Chinese tournaments. For the most part, the teams made little or no outside contact until they flew out and played Western and SEA teams in major international events like the SMM and ESWC, and they would take the world by storm starting in 2009.The Chinese performances at these competitions were akin to Shaolin Monks descending out of their mountain meditation and training to show off their kung-fu at the biggest martial arts competition and dominating. Teams such as EHOME went through entire competitions undefeated, and the other Chinese teams manhandle the rest of the field in a tour de force that often resulted in a sweep of top honors. Then as suddenly as they appeared, the Chinese would retreat back to their reclusive scene only to re-emerge in strength at the next big competition.The domination of Chinese teams over the international scene is heavily based on the early professionalization of Dota in the country. The well-funded teams paid out salaries and held regimented practices in team houses. On the other hand, their competition, both foreign and domestic, enjoyed far less support. Most competitors had to work part-time jobs to support their passion for Dota and their pursuit of competition. Against the amateur opposition, the professionals were able to enjoyed focused practice with coaching support to hone teamwork and laning techniques. But the area where the Chinese really out-classed their amateur counter-parts was in experience with all sorts of game situations and being able to execute a comprehensive game plan that covered the entire Dota game, from the laning phase to late end-game.In such an uneven competitive environment, the top Chinese teams molded a Dota doctrine centered around safe and solid play. Playing according to this doctrine was an absolute guarantee of getting past lesser teams early in tournaments and reaching the semi-finals or finals to play against other professional Chinese teams. By avoiding risky tactics or creative strategies, teams eliminated the possibility of handing the game to their opponent. Then by sitting back with safe play, the Chinese would capitalize on the inevitable mistakes that would come.Against players of lesser laning skill, the Chinese would simply out-CS and kill their laning counterparts, build an experience and gold advantage, and methodically take high ground without ever risking their heroes. Against greedier farming teams, they might force the opponent into a team-fight with a strong push or track down out-of-position heroes for easy ganks. When aggressive teams find success early in the game, the Chinese would simply weather the storm and carry the game late, where they could capitalize on opponent's inexperience, weaker farming skills, and propensity for over-extension. In essence, the top Chinese teams merely had to wait for the opponent to defeat themselves and it worked time and time again.Fast forward to present day, the safe and solid doctrine is so ingrained in the Chinese professional scene that it will not fail to come up in any strategy discussion. Players, casters, and commentary will regularly preach its virtues to the Chinese Dota audience. Some even go as far as to name adherence to safe and solid approach rather than pursuit of optimal play as the defining characteristic of top tier professionals, and when teams fail to to adhere to the doctrine, they are flamed by netizens for being immature and exuberant or are accused of throwing the game.While solid and safe is the correct approach against weaker and less experience opponents or in situations of significant advantage, it is no way to play against top teams and not a way to win any championship. Despite this fact, the Chinese teams are extending the approach to all opponents and applying it in all game situations. Instead of opening up and trying to play optimally against top-class opponents, Chinese teams come across as conservative and stodgy, rarely ever taking risks, and their safe play is exploited by greedy or optimal farming strategies that take advantage of the predictable Chinese ganking strategies.Against Alliance, Chinese teams steadily give away ground waiting on the mistakes that never come or that come so late as to not matter. In near even games, they are selective, patient, and tentative to a fault with team-fight initiations. And when the situations are not perfect enough, they will often back away without a fight. Against fellow Chinese teams, the difficulty of finding suitable fights is further compounded by safe positioning of enemy players, leading to long periods of boring inaction where the two teams just farm the creeps between each aborted gank attempt. When behind, the Chinese teams shy away from seizing risky comeback opportunities, preferring to wait to capitalize on clear-cut mistakes.Of the four major Chinese teams, the two teams most representative of the Chinese style are DK and LGD. In their period of dominance after TI2, iG played highly aggressively against their Chinese peers and their aggression and corresponding good team-fight form was a huge part of their success. Tongfu, the new power, is still learning to play mature Chinese Dota and will have moments of aggression that brings out cries of "throw!" from Chinese netizens.For one hour, in the first game against Na`Vi during prelims, it looked like LGD might leap out of the team's predictable playbook and play exciting aggressive Dota. LGD needed one win against Na`Vi to force tiebreakers and two wins to secure upper bracket spot dived towers against Na`Vi like they'd never done before. It was so aggressive as to catch Na`Vi completely off guard and LGD would go on to win the game. However, that startlingly aggressive LGD would not make an appearance again in the tournament. After losing the second game to Na`Vi, LGD went on to pick Alchemist and Magnus combinations in all four of their remaining games.As early as halfway through the Dignitas-LGD tiebreaker game, LD remarked that LGD was "playing not to lose" and based their entire strategy around it. Fielding lineups that have one hard carry and four supporting disables, LGD sat back and dared opponents to beat them, all the while waiting to pounce on mistakes and overextension. Under this strategy, LGD lost the lanes heavily to Dignitas in the tiebreaker but was able to seize on a poor Aegis steal at 33 minutes to turn around the game and win. In the upper bracket, LGD almost stole a won game 1 from Alliance but narrowly lost a base race since Alliance had already been so far ahead. They outright lost game 2 after being clearly outplayed by s4 and Loda in a series of team fights. In the elimination game against Liquid, LGD would once again be outplayed and only a few instances of overaggression by Liquid kept the game in doubt.After watching LGD get eliminated, fellow staff and spectator Vykromond would remark, "Playing LGD is like playing against bots, sort of like the Shadow Fiend challenge." Indeed, LGD is predictable in their draft, in their laning, and in their conservative strategy to the point that their play is almost robotic. Likewise, if a team learns to attack their weaker laning heroes early, farm safely and efficiently during the middle game, and push towers and high ground with discipline, beating LGD becomes formulaic. Playing against them is excellent practice for learning good hero positioning and developing mistake-free Dota. But for LGD, the style may have been guaranteed victory and been sufficient for third place last year, but as the world catches up to China in professionalism, it is more becoming guaranteed mediocrity.On the second day of the International, DK and iG played the longest and most boring game ever to grace competitive Dota 2. BurNing would set a record by farming over 60k gold, achieve the mythical 12 slotted Lone Druid and still lost dismally in 98 boring minutes. At 70 minutes in with a huge economic lead and one lane of barracks down, all DK had to do was break one more lane. In typical DK fashion, they chose to try in the lowest risk fashion possible, by sending the Spirit Bear high ground. But after being bursted down and destroyed, DK sought no alternative and retreated to farm. Rather than having BurNing move items to his main bear and risking a fight, DK sat back and farmed.... and farmed... and farmed... Until records fell, spectators did Roshan countdowns, and Korean casters screamed and whooped to fight back the boredom. iG naturally obliged as their tri-core used farm more efficiently. Finally, only 26 minutes later, DK pushed into iG in a desperate and hopeless high ground attempt. Thus, DK with their no-risk strategy turned a good but risky chance at victory into a sure thing, a sure loss.DK ultimately won that series against iG, but it would foreshadow their loss against Alliance the following day. In game 1, once again, DK would find themselves with a decision to threaten high ground at 37 minutes. Three minutes prior, DK recovered a strong foothold in the game by winning a fight around Roshan and securing the aegis for Weaver. BurNing was full slotted and Alchemist was at the hero's peak as carry. With an Antimage on the enemy team sure to catch up in items within five minutes and the Nature's Prophet helping Alliance split push and farm far more efficiently, it looked like time for DK to take a stab at Alliance high ground even if Treants were threatening the bottom T3 tower. A play like a fake retreat into SB Alchemist initiation would have been extremely timely.Instead, DK elected to do a full retreat to defend the bottom tower, and in the end the Weaver's Aegis would expire without a fight that DK needed so much. Predictably, when Antimage is full slotted at 45 minutes, Alliance proceeded to split-push and trounce DK in a series of team fights. Once again, DK by being so averse to risk, DK passed by their chance to win in a risky high ground attempt and instead took the inevitable and low-risk path to defeat.Comparatively, professionalism of Western teams still lag behind those of Chinese organizations, but teams like Alliance and Na`Vi have already advanced past the point where their Dota succumbs to the typical safe Chinese play. Meanwhile, organizations in the rest of Europe and North America are quickly catching up. In a year, "playing to not lose" may not even come close to touching the top 8 of The International.In the coming year, if Chinese teams want to recover some of their past dominance, teams will have to break away from the overly safe play that characterized their dominance. Instead, teams will have to follow iG and Tongfu and move towards more proactive play that pushes the envelope of safe play, especially against top competition. They can no longer treat opponents as weak amateur teams that will inevitably "throw" and hand them the game.Yet, for Chinese players, it may be a difficult transition because players of the BurNing generation have only known the safe Chinese style. Moving away from such a style may be too painful of process. And with many veterans mulling retirement, a Chinese renaissance may just have to wait for a new generation of Dota players that arrive after Perfect World finally opens up its beta in China.We thus come to the end of this piece, and in many ways, the end of a generation of Chinese Dota. If the East shook in early 2013, as teams like Alliance and Na`Vi took down the very best it had to offer, then now it lies shattered and sundered. Even the top Chinese teams are at best in disarray, and with rumours of roster changes and reshuffling everywhere, it is safe to say that we have come to the end of an age. Whatever BurNing decides to do, whatever happens to the powerhouse we once called LGD and wherever Chuan goes or doesn't do, Chinese Dota has been changed forever. What remains to be seen, then, is how the dynasties adapt to the new world order.Will the dragon rise again? Only time will tell. Moderator 我们是个踏实的赞助商模式俱乐部