This pattern has been recurring since the state was founded and has again resurfaced in the three years since the latest Shiite-led Bahraini revolt, which mimicked uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other Arab nations. What started as a legitimate populist movement in Bahrain was soon co-opted by coalitions of young anarchists and so-called human rights activists that are completely beholden to the aging ayatollahs in Bahrain and Iran and are more interested in sectarian religious dominance than humanistic progress.

For nearly 50 years, significant strides toward development and reform have been consistently derailed. From the Shirazi and Sadr Shiite revolutionary movements of the 1960s and 70s to the formation of the Iranian-funded militant group, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, these movements have all professed deep sectarian ideologies. This mind-set helped propel the Shiite jihadi Sheikh Abdul-Amir al-Jamri to prominence in the 1990s by advocating an extreme, perverted Shiite political program based on the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s writings to wage a holy war on Bahrain’s monarchy.

In 2001, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa promulgated the National Action Charter, launching the process of institutionalizing democracy in Bahrain by promising a new era that would establish a progressive political system and more representative governance. It was hoped that these genuine strides toward reform would prompt radicals to moderate their views, return from exile and participate in reform efforts. But, in the absence of alternative moderate political parties, the radical, Iranian-financed theocratic agenda has become entrenched in domestic Bahraini politics.

The Wefaq Shiite party, the Shiite Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and other sectarian blocs have dominated the nation’s political arena, nearly monopolizing ballots and votes. Not only have these extremists failed to understand and represent their constituencies, their theocratic agenda remains incapable of addressing voters’ genuine economic and social grievances. This was particularly evident in 2004, when the Wefaq party succumbed to a fatwa by Ayatollah Isa Qassim, Bahrain’s most revered Shiite cleric and the party’s spiritual leader. The fatwa denied Shiite women the right to legal, civil and family protections.

Further evidence of the Shiite parties’ hostility to genuine political reform can be found in their lack of support for recently passed reforms geared toward more inclusive governance and empowerment of the legislature.