AS THE world’s richest family, the House of Saud has a geopolitical wish-list that has—of late—been strikingly short. Its main aim is to thwart the ambitions of Iran, a Shia Muslim republic that has for three decades been the Sunni Muslim kingdom’s stubborn rival for regional influence. And the Saudis want their fellow Arabs to settle down quietly and stop all this talk of democracy and revolution.

The infectious mood of the Arab spring, along with Iran’s extension of influence into troubled Iraq and Syria, has challenged both those policies in recent years. Revolutionary turmoil in the region not only revealed that many Arabs view autocracy in general, let alone Saudi-style absolute monarchy, with disfavour. It pushed close friends of the kingdom, such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, out of power, while boosting the fortunes of the Muslim Brotherhood, a group whose pretensions to Sunni leadership, tentacular reach and secrecy have long stirred deep Saudi suspicions. Iran’s massive commitment of money, men and materiel to bolster Bashar Assad in Syria has meanwhile outweighed Saudi Arabia’s hesitant backing for bickering rebel groups. Worse yet, the Sauds’ oldest and strongest ally, America, looked ever more keen to abdicate its regional role.

Yet things may be tilting nicely back in the Saudis’ favour. Post-uprising messes in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen have all served to dampen the general enthusiasm for revolution. The toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi as Egypt’s president in July was especially gratifying. Egypt’s generals, many with close ties to the Saudis, are back at the helm. Qatar, the small but punchy Gulf emirate that had annoyingly backed the Brothers, has been put back in its box. And for now at least, Mr Mubarak is out of prison. Small wonder the kingdom is showering Egypt with aid, and loudly voices diplomatic support in the face of criticism for the new regime’s ruthless suppression of its opponents.

Events in Syria may have also begun, in Saudi eyes, to unfold their way. Saudi-supplied arms, which began to flow in earnest only earlier this year, are grinding down Mr Assad’s war machine, encouraging rebels on the southern front to push closer to Damascus. The chemical attack on rebel-held suburbs of Damascus on August 21st may have helped the Saudi cause still more. After months of quiet Saudi lobbying in Washington for a tougher American line, Mr Obama is being prodded—albeit hobbled by his foes in Congress and the UN Security Council—into taking drastic action. The Saudis still hope that Mr Assad’s forces will be clobbered by American cruise missiles before too long.

The turnaround has been particularly satisfying for Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who served for two decades as ambassador to America but now runs Saudi intelligence. Back in the old days, he played a quiet but crucial role in America’s covert cold-war forays, providing funds, when the CIA could not, to Afghan mujahideen, Nicaraguan Contras and the Iraqi army then fighting Iran. Especially if Mr Obama gets his way and gives Mr Assad’s regime a drubbing, the Saudis will be hoping that the good times will roll again.