Part 1 of analysis

Anyone who watched the horrific Gilad Shalit display at the recent Hamas rally realized that the movement’s government in the Gaza Strip is no less than a monster. The infantile creativity that was broadcasted from there, which marked the dark continuation of the live “elimination” of the “Zionist” Mickey Mouse and Maya the Bee by Hamas’ holy warriors, reflects the worldview of this “government.”

In June of last year, Hamas “fighters” threw their Fatah rivals from the 10th floor of a building, while firing at their heads. If and when our troops are forced to enter Gaza, someone will have to remind Condoleezza Rice and George W. Bush that we simply object to the “Western-style democracy” that these fighters sought to establish in the Gaza Strip via free elections.

The lull may indeed be extended, yet even if that should happen, the all-out clash will come sooner or later, because the “Hamas government” in Gaza is has no hope of reforming. The 250 square kilometers of the Strip saw the emergence of a giant monster a long time ago; a sort of horrifying creature that combines religious fanaticism, terrorism, and crime.

This creature needs to be fought in every way possible and eliminated. However, the Egyptian mediators, who also fear this monster, are pressing Israel to accept its conditions for a lull: An end to targeted eliminations in the territories and the opening of Gaza crossings in exchange for an end to the Qassam rocket fire.

The violation of the agreement by the “Hamas government” via the firing of 300 rockets at Israeli communities is accepted as part of the rules of the game. Therefore, why wouldn’t Hamas find it convenient to continue such lull? Its hands are not tied, and its struggle against the “Zionist enemy” continues successfully; who needs more than that?

The truth is that Defense Minister Ehud Barak is also interested in seeing the lull continue, even at the price of its occasional violation by Hamas, because in face of the dilemma that has been created, a military operation is his last resort.

However, we must admit that Barak must also take into account the “obstacle course” which the IDF may encounter in case he decides to embark on a large-scale operation. We are not only talking about the expected casualty toll, the concern for Gilad Shalit’s wellbeing, and the financial burden on the economy. Security officials have realized a long time ago that the time of “luxury” operations has passed. Today, any operation would have to take into a count all sorts of constraints, including legal considerations, the power of the media, international pressure, and the objections of our soldiers’ families.

Part 2 of analysis, which will focus on constraints faced by Israel in respect to Gaza operation, to be published Tuesday evening