After the facility in Dimona was exposed by U.S. surveillance capabilities, the United States sought proof that a single reactor existed and that no other machinery for uranium re-processing in the facility was present. As Hersh indicates, however, there was such a machine in the facility, hidden underground in a casual-looking administrative building.[9] Israel eventually agreed on inspections of the Dimona facility, though these inspections could be described as neither thorough nor transparent.[10] Despite these inspections, Israel was able to construct its first nuclear weapon in 1966, though testing of the nuclear device was postponed.[11] In September, 1979 U.S. satellite Vela 6911 observed an unusual double flash above the southern Atlantic Ocean, noticeably resembling the explosion of a nuclear weapon. All evidence pointed towards South Africa and Israel, but Israel denied any involvement in this event.[12]

In 1963, Israeli Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres and U.S. President John F. Kennedy met to discuss the Israeli nuclear programme, among other issues. This meeting signified an important milestone in the history of Israel’s nuclear ambitions. President Kennedy, a supporter of nuclear non-proliferation, expressed concerns about Israel’s actions, and Peres assured the President that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East.[13] This statement was both unclear and misleading, however. Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin later explained that the Israeli government understood the expression "introduction of nuclear weapons" as their public acknowledgement and recognition of their ownership; their existence and physical presence was not taken into account.[14] With this discourse Israel meant to defend its nuclear efforts under the pretense that until the existence of a nuclear arsenal is acknowledged and tested, it technically does not exist.

This is often regarded as the origins of the Israeli nuclear strategy amimut, and it represents one of Israel’s great strategic and diplomatic successes. By not acknowledging its arsenal Israel puts forth both a deterrent against exogenous threats and avoids the political consequences associated with an an acknowledged arsenal as well.[15] This policy has two major features, secrecy and signaling. Secrecy helps to keep the Israeli nuclear activities hidden both from the public and other countries. Israel does not openly conduct tests of nuclear weapons, nor does it confirm or deny their existence. Furthermore, it prohibits and obstructs the inspections of its facilities. With careful signaling, though, Israel aims to spread a certain image of its nuclear arsenal through information leaks, spreading of rumors or misinformation, and other political actions.[16] The whistleblowing activities of Mordechai Vanunu thus paradoxically became beneficial for Israel, as information leaked by Vanunu created an image of an Israeli deterrent in the minds of its potential adversaries. This signaling may thus have deterred Saddam Hussein from employing chemical weapons against Israel during the 1991 Gulf War.[17]

An Iran with nuclear ambitions has forced Israel to consider a new threat in its nuclear policies. Iran has pressured Israeli planners to shift their attention from the threat of conventional war to the danger of attacks with weapons of mass destruction.[18] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed concerns about lifting sanctions against Iran after several nations conducted successful negotiations to restrict Iran’s nuclear programme.[19] Furthermore, Israel is a major stakeholder in the negotiations with Iran, but its representatives have never taken part in these deliberations. A nuclear-armed Iran could lead a coalition against Israel, dissolve the aversion towards Iran among other Middles Eastern or Islamic states, states or even launch further nuclear proliferation in the region.[20]

The concerns of Israeli strategists and representatives about the Iranian threat are understandable. A theocratic regime that values the Shia tradition of martyrdom might be difficult to deter with a nuclear balance of terror.[21] The existential threat of Iranian nuclear ambitions is also strengthened by assumptions of irrationality and ideological zealotry in Iran’s leadership.[22] Israelis are also concerned a nuclear-armed Iran would create an unstable multipolar Middle East full of actors incapable of securing proper control over their nuclear arsenals. As a result, the risk of mistaken or accidental launch caused by human or institutional error would thus increase.[23]

The future of the amimut policy depends to a large extent on Iran and the potential nuclear policy it would adopt. Iran’s open declaration of its nuclear arsenal would cause Israel to face enormous pressure to shift from its ambiguity and secrecy; an open nuclear posture might be necessary to reinforce its deterrent credibility.[24] In the event Iran decided to use the veil of secrecy, Israel would not face such pressure to change its current strategy, but this could create incentives for the two actors to start discussions on nuclear confidence-building measures.[25] This option would mean the preservation of current status quo, which according to some Israeli analysts is outdated, offers little deterrence value, and requires more transparency and accountability in terms of present security environment. This view is in minority, however, and held mostly by academics; the defense community generally supports continued opacity and ambiguity.[26]

Israeli ambiguity raises questions about its deterrence strategy. Deterrence is achieved when a state credibly communicates its capabilities and the intent to retaliate to its adversaries.[27] In the case of Israel, its nuclear arsenal has never been disclosed. This might lead one to ask: Why put enormous resources into maintenance of secret nuclear arsenal, when it does not fulfill its main task, to deter adversaries? Signaling may be therefore considered to be more important for Israeli nuclear policy than its secrecy. According to Ofer Israeli, the amimut policy even encourages regional and international security and stability.[28]