No responsible West German political parties or politicians

actively opposed unification: simply, the preamble to the country’s constitution

(Basic Law) stated that unification and freedom ought to come about through

self-determination. In public opinion polls conducted between 1973 and 1988,

69~77% of respondents agreed that this reunification provision must remain.

Nevertheless, right up to the fall

of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the will and desire of West Germans for

unification was very low. Citizens had resigned themselves to the idea that

unification in the near future was impossible. For some it had grown into a

taboo subject; in German society, such talk brought up nationalistic attitudes

and was seen as likely to impede unification itself. After the wall came down,

opinion polls may have shown that half of West German citizens felt a strong sense

of kinship with their brothers to the east, but there weren’t so many that truly

welcomed unification. Many feared that unification might jeopardize their secure

welfare system.

The attitudes of politicians during the divide

40 years after the governments

of East and West Germany were established, the Cold War system persisted and

many believed the chances of unification remained slim. There weren’t many

people who regarded unification as possible, much less a plausible policy goal.

The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of

West Germany both thought along these lines. The conservative CDU emphasized

the unification provision in the constitution, but did not regard unification

as a realistic end game. The progressive SPD did not deny unification as a

desirable goal, but saw it as impossible in the near future. Rather, the SPD

regarded “peaceful management of division” as the top priority. They emphasized

exchanges and cooperation with East Germany, and turned away from contact with

East German dissidents in favor of pouring their energies into exchanges through

the leadership of the communist regime.

Civilian attitudes during the division

Intellectuals also had little

interest. Well-known existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers created a stir

when he argued in 1960 that freedom in East Germany and integration with

Western Europe were more important than German reunification. Leftist

intellectuals claimed that the division of Germany was a natural result of Nazi

crimes and that reunification shouldn’t occur for the sake of world peace. Other

intellectuals, like Gunter Grass, who held onto the dream of a socialist utopia,

equated the cooperation of the U.S. with Western Europe with Soviet repressive

domination of Eastern Europe. These thinkers sided with East Germany, claiming

that at least East Germany remained a “humane society.”

Most citizens did not think very

differently. Opinion polls showed a stable 80% harboring hopes of unification,

but those who believed unification was a pressing issue was falling, from 45%

in 1965 to only 0.5% in 1988. Moreover, only 3% believed in the real possibility

of unification. In 1970, 68% of West Germans thought of East German citizens as

fellow countrymen, but by 1987 this number had dropped to 52%. Interestingly,

in 1987, 40% of people between the ages of 16 and 29 thought of East Germans as

akin to Austrians, while just 39% thought of them as fellow countrymen.

Attitudes on the brink of unification

When the Berlin Wall came

tumbling down, the people of West Germany celebrated. But just a few weeks

later, this passion had dissipated. Most West Germans had not thought of

unification as important or necessary; just half had agreed with the sentiment

that “We are one people” when it appeared at the Monday demonstration in

Leipzig.

Partly in reflection of Nazi

crimes, citizens had been educated to the effect that freedom and European

integration were more important than German unification. Some intellectuals had

been against unification because they were worried that a strong Germany could

commit crimes similar to those of Nazi Germany and that surrounding countries

would fear a unified state. Citizens feared that the flow of East Germans to

the west and the costs of unification would destabilize their welfare system.

And yet, as the communist regime

fell and unification became an observable phenomenon, citizens in West Germany

began to accept it­­ as inevitable. They came to believe the promise by politicians

that “no one will lose.” The words of Willy Brandt eventually spoke for the

majority of West Germans: “What was one should be one.”