A core member of the Association who wished to remain anonymous said that in the past, the KMT would monopolize resources sent by Beijing. But over the past several years, more attention is being paid to smaller political parties and groups.

Wu Chieh-min (吳介民), an Associate Professor at the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica in Taiwan and editor of the book “The Anaconda in the Chandelier” once wrote:

“After the ground-breaking Sunflower Student Movement, collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party fell apart, which led to the KMT’s massive failure in the subsequent election. The every-day person can recognize the importance of the “China factor” in this electoral outcome. However, the methods through which Beijing is developing on-the-ground allies and when Beijing is exerting pressure on its supporters in Taiwan remain in the dark.”

How does Beijing develop on-the-ground allies? In an interview with The Reporter, Wu emphasizes that the “China factor has been operating in Taiwan for more than a decade.”

“Their most important model operate like this: the Chinese government takes advantage of cross-strait trade relations to build government-business relations,” says Wu. “And then uses its on-the-ground allies to promote Beijing’s political agenda regarding Taiwan with the end goal of merging Taiwan and absorbing its sovereignty.”

Wu adds that Association members are different from traditional Taiwanese business people who support China’s model of authoritarian development out of opportunistic commercial interests.

“Members of the Association reflect characteristics of a pre-modern, blood-based conception of national identity. They share a strong sense of identification with the Chinese nation, in contrast to a modern-day civic nationalism”, says Wu.

Among these people, many have a personal background or trajectory of migrating from China to Hong Kong or Macau, and then to Taiwan.

This trend also mirrors Beijing’s strategy in recent years to develop on-the-ground alliance networks in Hong Kong, the most visible example of which being groups whose names start with the first Chinese character “love”. These groups spare no effort in helping the CCP resist the democracy movement in Hong Kong.

Taiwan is not spared from such infiltration. China’s “united front activities” have indeed taken root in Taiwan, but the full reach of these activities is still unclear.

In October 2017, members of the public used a government-backed online participation platform to propose banning the use of the PRC’s five-star red flag on Taiwanese soil.

The proposal was rejected by Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice, noting that the ban “is not consistent with the ROC Constitution’s protections on freedom of expression.”

Freedom of speech ensures the right to wave the flag of an opposing political administration. However, the Association remain disapproving of Taiwan’s democracy.

“Taiwan is indeed democratic, but so what? Look at Taiwan’s economy. It has been stagnant for the past twenty years. When I first came to Taiwan, it was indeed better than Shanghai. But now, Taiwan is far behind Shanghai,” says Zhang.

Her comments represent the attitude of most of the Association. Compared to intangible democratic freedoms, they care more about a “strong motherland”. Witnessing the rapid development of the Chinese economy has further fuelled their longing for the “China model” and cross-strait unification.

“Look, products made in mainland China are also very high-quality,” says Chang Lu-tai (張魯台), a 63-year-old second-generation mainlander, and a member of the Association. He pulls out his Xiaomi cell phone and starts to fiddle with the Chinese-made device. In his opinion, “democracy is fake, but a nation’s power is real.”

Yuan Huanzhen (袁煥珍), a woman who migrated to Taiwan from Sichuan province for marriage, once spoke to Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) at a campaign event when he was running to be the party chairman of the KMT in 2017.

She told Wu during the event, “Mr. Wu, I hope that after you are elected party chairman, you will follow the path of Sun Yat-Sen’s (孫逸仙) one-China principle.” According to Yuan, Wu replied with “Yes, China will be unified under the banner of the Republic of China.”

But Yuan found Wu’s answer to be absurd. “China is the first or second most powerful country in the world. How could reunification ever be under the terms of Taiwan—The Republic of China?” she says. “At the end of the day, Wu is still a supporter of Taiwanese independence.”

Some members of the Alliance, however, are not so contemptuous of everything in Taiwan.

Xiao Qin is quick to praise the Taiwanese government’s public housing allocation process. “This place is good for precisely this reason - there is no distinction based on class differences, between nobleness and lowliness,” says Xiao. “You just line up, and when it’s time for your turn, you will receive the housing allocation.”

With regards to the survival of “red” pro-unification organizations in democratic Taiwan, Wu Jiemin looks at this phenomenon from the theoretical perspective of civil society.

“Theirs is a ‘fake civil society’ that fundamentally does not recognize Taiwan as a political community, but proceeds to take advantage of Taiwan’s democratic public wealth,” says Wu.

The China factor is deepening

“Your height is just about the same as Zhou”, says Xiao Qin to this reporter.

Xiao isn’t referring to Zhou Qingjun, the leader of the Association, but to Zhou Hongxu (周泓旭), a Chinese national recently arrested for spying for the CCP.

A graduate of National Chengchi University, Zhou Hongxu was taken into custody in March 2017, becoming the first case of a Chinese exchange student working as an undercover operative in Taiwan.

Xiao says Zhou Hongxu attended Concentric Patriotism Association events frequently. “Wang Ping-chung (王炳忠) has also attended our events,” says Xiao.

Wang Ping-chung is the New Party’s 31 year-old spokesman, and leader of the New Party’s Youth Corps. The New Party is the product of a 1993 split within the then-ruling KMT, and has gone on to become the most vocal mainstream political party to advocate for unification. This June, Wang and three other New Party Youth Corps members were arrested on charges of espionage. Prosecutors found evidence that Wang had worked with Zhou Hongxu to infiltrate Taiwan’s military, and attempted to create a network of young, pro-Beijing collaborators within political circles.

“Perhaps their contact was too frequent, which attracted these wrongful lawsuits against Zhou,” says Xiao.

The Association believe that Zhou’s court verdict was unjust.

But from a Taiwan’s perspective, as cross-strait relations continue to deteriorate, the impact of the “China factor” continues to deepen, leading the Taiwanese government to pay closer attention to possible infiltration by the CCP.

The majority DPP caucus in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan recently proposed changing the definition of organized crime in Taiwan’s Regulations on the Prevention of Organized Crime from “continuous and profit-seeking” to “continuous or profit-seeking.” Based on the context of the proposed changes, it’s likely the DPP’s bill seeks to target pro-unification political parties like the Association and the Chinese Unification Promotion Party (CUPP).

The CUPP and the Association believe that Taiwan’s Ministry of Interior—the ministry responsible for managing the country’s political parties—is deliberately making things difficult for their respective parties by sending auditors to monitor their finances. When Xiao Qin encounters said auditors, he doesn’t miss a chance to scold them.

“Today, you have the power to clear our accounts, but when I have the power one day, it will be me who’s clearing yours!” says Xiao.

However, auditing the Association’s finances has little to do with creating obstacles for the group. For instance, the annual report submitted by the Association to the Ministry in 2017 lists $560,000 New Taiwan dollars ($18,000 USD) of “political party funding”.

Taiwan’s regulations on political party funding states that political organizations must report and seek approval from the Control Yuan—the political body tasked with monitoring the government—before accepting funds.

The Association has never reported special accounts for political party funding, leading the Department of Civil Affairs to send a letter on September 6, 2017 requesting an explanation.

But the Association claims that this lump sum of “political party funding” is actually personal donations from Association President Zhou Qingjun. They claim that they changed the budgetized item in the annual report to “special funding”, and wrote the following to the Department of Civil Affairs:

“The Concentric Patriotism Association and its members support the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, support the reunification of the country, oppose separatism of national territory, and firmly denounce Taiwan’s independence. This position will not waver regardless of which political party is in power. If anyone wishes to indict us for our opposition to Taiwanese independence, they will bear the effects of karma within one or two years. We sincerely call upon public servants to strictly observe a neutral position as the political scene in Taiwan is about to change.”

According to the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, unless granted permission, organizations in Taiwan may not engage in any form of cooperation with Chinese political parties, the government, or military institutions.

Members of the Association do not shy away from discussing their contact with various levels of the Chinese government, including the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), the main political body tasked with setting China’s guidelines and policies related to Taiwan. Xiao Qin mentions that he’s dined with Gong Qinggai (龚清概), the TAO’s former Deputy Director.

In the past, Xiao has written recommendations about how to promote unification and submitted them to officers at the TAO. One of the TAO officers responded passionately with: “Rest assured, you can count on the organization.”

However, Xiao admits that after these suggestions were submitted, he has yet to receive a response. According to him, many Chinese officers are “too high to be reached, and impossible to have a conversation with.”

Over the past few years, the TAO system has started to pay increasing attention to local organizations in Taiwan. The Association is deeply aware of this shift. One of their core members said to The Reporter in a serious tone: “To be honest, what we want the most is for the other side [the TAO] to send core executive members here and deliver lessons, just like they used to do in the ‘underground political party’ days.”

Members of the Association often describe their life in a grandiose and dramatic fashion, full of intrigue and intelligence activity. For instance, they assume their telephone calls are monitored and compromised, and believe they are on the Taiwan government’s “black list”.

“Xiao Qin never uses WeChat or other chat apps, and he only contacts me by calling me over the phone,” says Lu Hsin-shang. “It seems like he has received professional training. I think he is here with a special mission.”

The truth is far less glamorous. During Xiao’s time in the PLA, he directed the department of health and did some work for the Communist Youth League of China. After arriving in Taiwan, he worked as a baker, not a spy.

Nevertheless, Lu still believes he’s being watched. “For people who do work like us, it is probably better to stick to small alleys and restaurants.”

Conflicts between “red” pro-unification organizations

At 201 Xining South Road, near the busy Ximending shopping area, the Association occupies floors two to five in an old walk-up apartment building.

The Main office on the second floor is covered with framed portraits of Sun Yat-sen and XI Jinping, with printed Chinese characters reading: “Complete the founding father’s mission of national reunification.