Updated on June 20, 2017, 12:10 AM PDT to add solution for Deep Security™.

On June 10, South Korean web hosting company NAYANA was hit by Erebus ransomware (detected by Trend Micro as RANSOM_ELFEREBUS.A), infecting 153 Linux servers and over 3,400 business websites the company hosts.

In a notice posted on NAYANA’s website last June 12, the company shared that the attackers demanded an unprecedented ransom of 550 Bitcoins (BTC), or US$1.62 million, in order to decrypt the affected files from all its servers. In an update on June 14, NAYANA negotiated a payment of 397.6 BTC (around $1.01 million as of June 19, 2017) to be paid in installments. In a statement posted on NAYANA’s website on June 17, the second of three payments was already made. On June 18, NAYANA started the process of recovering the servers in batches. Some of the servers in the second batch are currently experiencing database (DB) errors. A third payment installment is also expected to be paid after the first and second batches of servers have been successfully recovered.

While not comparable in terms of the ransom amount, this is reminiscent of what happened to Kansas Hospital, which didn’t get full access to the encrypted files after paying the ransom, but was instead extorted a second time.

Erebus was first seen on September 2016 via malvertisements and reemerged on February 2017 and used a method that bypasses Windows’ User Account Control. Here are some of the notable technical details we’ve uncovered so far about Erebus’ Linux version:

Figure 1: Erebus has a multilingual ransom note (English shown above)

Figure 2: Screenshot of a demo video from the attackers showing how to decrypt the encrypted files

Possible Arrival Vector

As for how this Linux ransomware arrives, we can only infer that Erebus may have possibly leveraged vulnerabilities or a local Linux exploit. For instance, based on open-source intelligence, NAYANA’s website runs on Linux kernel 2.6.24.2, which was compiled back in 2008. Security flaws like DIRTY COW that can provide attackers root access to vulnerable Linux systems are just some of the threats it may have been exposed to.

Additionally, NAYANA’s website uses Apache version 1.3.36 and PHP version 5.1.4, both of which were released back in 2006. Apache vulnerabilities and PHP exploits are well-known; in fact, there was even a tool sold in the Chinese underground expressly for exploiting Apache Struts. The version of Apache NAYANA used is run as a user of nobody(uid=99), which indicates that a local exploit may have also been used in the attack.

Figure 3: VirusTotal submissions of the Erebus Linux ransomware

It’s worth noting that this ransomware is limited in terms of coverage, and is, in fact, heavily concentrated in South Korea. While this may indicate that this ransomware attack is targeted, VirusTotal showed otherwise—several samples were also submitted from Ukraine and Romania. These submissions can also indicate they were from other security researchers.

Encryption Routine

Some ransomware families are known to scramble files in layers of encryption algorithms, such as UIWIX, later versions of Cerber, and DMA Locker. Erebus takes this up a notch; each file encrypted by Erebus will have this format:

Header (0x438 bytes) RSA-2048-encrypted original filename RSA-2048-encrypted AES key RSA-2048-encrypted RC4 key RC4-encrypted data

The file is first scrambled with RC4 encryption in 500kB blocks with randomly generated keys. The RC4 key is then encoded with AES encryption algorithm, which is stored in the file. The AES key is again encrypted using RSA-2048 algorithm that is also stored in the file.

While each encrypted file has its RC4 and AES keys, the RSA-2048 public key is shared. These RSA-2048 keys are generated locally, but the private key is encrypted using AES encryption and another randomly generated key. Ongoing analysis indicates that decryption is not possible without getting hold of the RSA keys.

Targeted File Types

Office documents, databases, archives, and multimedia files are the usual file types targeted by ransomware. It’s the same for this version of Erebus, which encrypts 433 file types. However, the ransomware appears to be coded mainly for targeting and encrypting web servers and data stored in them.

Here is a table that shows the directories and system tablespaces that Erebus searches. Note that var/www/ is where the files/data of websites are stored, while the ibdata files are used in MySQL:

Included directories: Excluded directories: var/www/ $/bin/ Included files: $/boot/ ibdata0 $/dev/ ibdata1 $/etc/ ibdata2 $/lib/ ibdata3 $/lib64/ ibdata4 $/proc/ ibdata5 $/run/ ibdata6 $/sbin/ ibdata7 $/srv/ ibdata8 $/sys/ ibdata9 $/tmp/ ib_logfile0 $/usr/ ib_logfile1 $/var/ ib_logfile2 /.gem/ ib_logfile3 /.bundle/ ib_logfile4 /.nvm/ ib_logfile5 /.npm/

Figure 4: System tablespaces Erebus searches

Adopt Best Practices

Despite their market share, Unix and Unix-like operating systems such as Linux are poised to be lucrative for bad guys as ransomware continues to diversify and mature in the threat landscape. Why? They are a ubiquitous part of the infrastructures that power many enterprises, used by workstations and servers, web and application development frameworks, databases, and mobile devices, among others.

And as we’ve seen in other families like WannaCry, SAMSAM, Petya, or HDDCryptor, the capability to affect servers and network shares amplifies the impact. A single, vulnerable machine on a network is sometimes all it takes to infect connected systems and servers.

Given the risks to business operations, reputation, and bottom line, enterprises need to be proactive in keeping threats like ransomware at bay. There is no silver bullet to ransomware like Erebus, which is why IT/system administrators should have a defense-in-depth approach to security. Best practices for mitigating ransomware include:

Backing up critical files

Disabling or minimizing third-party or unverified repositories

Applying the principle of least privilege

Ensuring servers and endpoints are updated (or deploying virtual patching

Regularly monitoring the network

Inspecting event logs to check for signs of intrusions or infection

Some of the security mechanisms that can be considered are:

IP filtering as well as intrusion prevention and detection systems

Security extensions in Linux that manage and limit access to files or system/network resources

Network segmentation and data categorization to curtail and mitigate infection and further damage to data

Enabling privilege separation in Linux

We will update this post as more information from our analysis of this Linux ransomware become available.

Trend Micro Solutions

Trend Micro™ Deep Security™ stops ransomware from compromising enterprise servers and workloads–regardless if they’re physical, virtual, in the cloud, or in containers. Deep Security™ defends against network threats with intrusion prevention (IPS) and host firewall, shielding vulnerable servers from attack with a virtual patch until a software patch can be applied. Deep Security™ keeps malware, including ransomware, off of servers with sophisticated anti-malware and behavioral analysis, ensuring that malicious actions are stopped immediately. Deep Security™ also has system security, including application control to lock down servers, and integrity monitoring that can detect potential indicators of compromise (IOCs), including ransomware.

Trend Micro Deep Discovery Inspector™ protects customers from this threat via this DDI rule:

DDI Rule ID 2434 – EREBUS - Ransomware - HTTP (Request)

TippingPoint customers are protected from this threat via this ThreatDV filter:

ThreatDV: 28725: HTTP: Erebus Ransomware Check-in

Trend Micro Deep Security™ protects customers from this threat via this DPI rule:

1008457 - Ransomware Erebus

Indicators of Compromise

SHA256 detected as RANSOM_ELFEREBUS.A: