THE symbolism of a photograph in July of Brexit negotiators in Brussels was unmissable. Britain’s team, led by David Davis, the Brexit secretary, had no papers before it, whereas the European Union’s negotiators, led by Michel Barnier of the European Commission, had thick dossiers. The message of Mr Davis’s grin was palpable: don’t worry about the detail, it will be all right on the night.

Yet despite Mr Davis’s breezy cheeriness, the government is sensitive to claims that it is unprepared. Even worse has been the open bickering within the cabinet since Theresa May lost her parliamentary majority in June’s general election. The government has now sought to respond to these problems, in three ways.

First was the release of two in a promised series of “partnership papers”, outlining Britain’s position on future customs arrangements and the Northern Ireland border. Second was a joint article by Philip Hammond, the chancellor and advocate of a softer Brexit, and Liam Fox, the international-trade secretary and arch-Brexiteer, which proposed a time-limited transition period to avoid a cliff-edge exit in March 2019, during which Britain would be out of both the EU’s single market and its customs union. And third was talk of a big prime-ministerial speech on Britain’s Brexit objectives to be given next month, before the Tory party conference.

The papers were widely welcomed, even though they are aspirational and lack substance. The customs paper suggests the long-term adoption of a highly streamlined customs arrangement or a new and untested “customs partnership”, which proposes that Britain would itself collect EU customs duties on products in transit. Both would rely on new IT systems, which British governments have proved bad at delivering (a new customs IT system is already late and over budget). Moreover, as the paper concedes, “there will remain an increase in administration compared with being inside the EU customs union.”

More telling is the paper’s proposal to form a temporary customs union with the EU after March 2019. This seems directly to contradict the Hammond/Fox promise, making it impossible for Dr Fox to conclude free-trade deals with third countries. One official tries to reconcile the two by noting the difference between “the” (existing) and “a” (new) customs union. Yet if leaving the customs union in 2019 is a serious proposal, where are the people and infrastructure needed to impose controls at the borders? Why is the port of Dover not a huge construction site? Furthermore, the idea of a temporary tariff-free deal is unconvincing: once Britain leaves the EU, non-discrimination rules mean that the two can avoid bilateral tariffs only by scrapping them for all members of the World Trade Organisation.

There are equally big holes in the second paper, on Northern Ireland. The goal of maintaining a frictionless border, with no physical infrastructure, is not disputed, whether in London, Dublin, Belfast or Brussels. Again, technology is promised as part of the solution. Yet if the United Kingdom is not in the customs union, and even more if it strikes separate free-trade deals with third countries like America that include farm produce, it will be impossible to avoid border controls in some form—as the Irish prime minister, Leo Varadkar, has pointed out. One idea in the paper, to maintain regulatory equivalence on agri-food measures, would surely inflame Brexiteers, as it seems to imply continuing observance of EU laws.

Exit by name, remain by nature

Yet here is a clue as to what really lies behind the papers and the Fox/Hammond article. As Mujtaba Rahman of the Eurasia Group, a consultancy, notes, there is a difference between leaving the EU in law and escaping its rules in practice. Brexiteers may be satisfied by Britain’s formal exit in March 2019, and so able to live with single-market and customs rules for some time. The row will be over how long. Already Dr Fox and Boris Johnson, the foreign secretary, are reported to want an interim period of only a year, whereas Mr Davis and Mr Hammond talk of two or three.

A partial answer may be to shift the focus to the long-term relationship instead. This is the aim of the promised speech by Mrs May. Britain has accepted the negotiating sequence in Brussels, which demands “sufficient progress” in talks on the rights of EU citizens, the Irish border and the settling of accounts before discussing trade relations. But Mrs May will argue that, because all issues are interlinked, talks on the long term must anyway start soon. Given the limited time left before Britain’s departure date, that should lead quickly to discussion of a transition.

The trouble is that the EU 27, which often seem forgotten amid the squabbling in London, are likely to resist. To them unity remains vital, and nobody wishes to undermine Mr Barnier. The expectation in Brussels is that the October European Council will deem that there has not been sufficient progress on the exit negotiations, including over money. That means it will be December or even later before any long-term talks can begin.

Brussels is also keenly aware of the shifting political ground in Britain. The EU knows that getting Parliament to agree to a hard Brexit, outside the single market and customs union, has become more difficult since the election. One pro-European Tory, Anna Soubry, has already talked of putting country above party.

Among the public there is little sign of a shift against Brexit, but most voters back a softer version than Mrs May’s, not least because of worries about the economy. A large study of Remainers and Leavers by the London School of Economics and Oxford University was misreported as finding that even most Remainers now backed a hard Brexit. In fact the researchers found that Leavers and Remainers were still divided on several key Brexit issues.

Launching his new papers this week, Mr Davis stressed the negotiating advantages of “constructive ambiguity”. He also said the Brexit process was going “incredibly well”. Incredibly may be correct; well is surely less so. The crunch could come at the October European Council.