I had another set of negotiations with Iranian diplomats when I was ambassador to Iraq in 2007. The goal was to persuade Iran to cease supporting groups like Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army, a Shiite militia that was targeting the Iraqi government and coalition forces. Unlike the Afghan negotiations, these talks took place in the full glare of the media, rendering the give-and-take of effective diplomacy impossible. While the negotiations accomplished nothing, they may have convinced Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki that his only option for dealing with the militias was military force. He launched a military operation against them in April 2008. In fighting that extended from Baghdad to Basra, the government eventually prevailed, with substantial coalition support.

The Afghan experience demonstrates that diplomatic progress between the United States and Iran is possible. It is certainly not guaranteed, but a solid diplomatic solution is always better than the alternatives.

The government of the Islamic Republic is clearly an adversary, but it is also a rational actor. And, like all governments, it is capable of being pragmatic and flexible when it is in its interest to do so. There is a chance that the Obama administration can replicate past successes if it applies four lessons from the 2001 talks.

First, American negotiators must understand that serious progress is likely to come only in direct talks between the United States and Iran. The involvement of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany should continue, but the heavy lifting will have to be done by the two central actors.

Second, the substance of the talks must be closely held. Revealing the details too soon will give ammunition to those who oppose the talks and limit the flexibility of the negotiators.

Third, America should be ready to introduce other issues beyond the nuclear file. Progress in one area can build confidence and facilitate progress in others. I mentioned this in a discussion with Iranian leaders in New York last month and they seemed receptive, mentioning Afghanistan and Syria as possibilities.

Finally, the United States must make clear that we do not seek to overthrow the Iranian regime. Iranian paranoia on this issue is virtually limitless and understandably so. In 1953, the American and British intelligence services ousted a democratically elected Iranian prime minister, an episode that very few Americans remember and no Iranian will ever forget.