“Efficient Manager,” International Community and Popular Protest: What (or Who) Could Stop Serzh Sargsyan?

Obviously, whatever Sargsyan’s plans are, there is a chance that he will not be able to retain power after April 2018, There are three factors upon which Sargsyan’s plan will succeed or fail: his relationship with current Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan, the attitude of international players, and the possibility of protest.

Karen Karapetyan, appointed prime minister in September 2016, has a public image of “an efficient manager” and “an outsider,” someone who has not been involved with the local criminal-oligarchic networks. Instead, he is rumored to have strong connections in Russia, including figures such as Samvel Karapetyan (no family relation between the two), Russia’s wealthiest Armenian, who, with an estimated worth of 3.4 billion USD occupies the 32nd position in the Russian Forbes list. Among Armenia’s political and economic elite, such connections are seen as a valuable asset. It was Karapetyan, rather than Sargsyan, who became the public face of the Republican Party in the election campaign, so to a certain extent Republicans owe their victory to Karapetyan. The enthusiasm that Karapetyan’s appointment created among the Armenian public in the autumn of 2016 may have somewhat faded, as Karapetyan’s cabinet has not achieved any major breakthroughs. However, it has so far not had significant failures either, so at least for the moment Sargsyan has no credible reason to get rid of Karapetyan.

Obviously, whether or not Karapetyan may become a problem for Sargsyan depends on his own ambitions. So far Karapetyan has not shown signs of disloyalty to Sargsyan, at least publicly. However, in June 2017 he said he was ready to continue working as prime minister after April 2018, adding that his cabinet’s program covered the years 2017 to 2022. There is a legal hurdle that Karapetyan faces - from April 2018 the prime minister’s office will have a requirement of five years of continuously residing in Armenia, and Karapetyan has worked in the Russian natural gas giant GazProm from 2011 to 2016. However, Armenia’s post-Soviet experience shows that legal issues can be solved, in case there is a political will. So, it is not entirely impossible to imagine how this hurdle can be avoided (e.g. it might come to light that Karapetyan has been mostly working from his Yerevan home during his tenure in GazProm). So, Karapetyan remains a potential competitor for Sargsyan. If a part of Armenia’s political-economic elite decides it has had enough of Sargsyan, then Karapetyan could become an ideal candidate to replace Sargsyan.

Another issue is the international reaction. Probably, if Sargsyan prolongs his power after the end of his presidential term it would harm Armenia’s democratic credentials and put it on the same level with the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. However, both the EU and the U.S. have shown flexibility in dealing with authoritarian regimes in the region. Even in the immediate neighborhood of the EU, in Montenegro, (EU candidate since 2012 and NATO member since June 2017), the West has tolerated a leader as controversial as Milo Djukanovich. Djukanovich, a former Communist and former ally of Slobodan Milosevic, has in effect ruled Montenegro from 1991 to 2016, with two short breaks in 2006-2008 and 2010-2012. So, if Sargsyan manages to perform the transition without major complications or protests, he can hope for a relatively mild Western reaction. As for Russia and other EAEU countries, they will hardly be the ones to criticize Armenia for failing to uphold democratic values.

Time after time rumors emerge in Armenian political and analytical circles that Moscow is unhappy with Sargsyan and is looking to substitute him with a more loyal and reliable figure (Karapetyan may often be mentioned in this context). However, so far these speculations have not been substantiated by reliable evidence. So, unless Sargsyan’s plans are interrupted by a force majeure, the international reaction, whether from the West or from the East, is unlikely to hold him back.

Arguably, the most important factor that may influence Sargsyan’s plans is the factor of internal protests. Today the situation seems under control. Political opposition that could have challenged Sargsyan’s desire to prolong his rule is either very weak, or is being co-opted by the government. The “Sasna Tsrer” who are currently on trial, have failed to create a wide political movement and can hardly present a serious threat to Sargsyan at the moment. Moreover, the arrival of Karen Karapetyan and the rebranding of RPA helped to ease the tensions within society that led to the events of July 2016. However, this calm can be deceptive. Though the RPA as a party has claimed victory in the elections, the level of Sargsyan’s personal popularity (or unpopularity) remains unclear.

Many Armenians are equally disappointed with the government and the opposition, as well as with the legal means of political struggle, that is people no longer believe that government can be changed through elections. As opposition parties are weak and lack credibility, these protests are more likely to be dominated by radicals and result in violence. In the long-term this means that either street protests or armed incidents are possible in the medium and long-term perspective. And it is possible to imagine a situation, in which a perspective of indefinite prolongation of Sargsyan’s power can trigger protests. So, even though Sargsyan’s chess game so far seems to be progressing without major hurdles, the question of what will happen to Armenia’s political system in April 2018 remains open.