How to Read

I don’t expect anyone to read this piece in one sitting; my best hope is that it will remain open on one of your tabs for several days or weeks where you can pop in and out and read about whatever may be crossing your mind. I will include a list of the contents inside this piece below where you can find easier whatever it is you may be curious about. My biggest hope for this piece however is that from reading it (or parts of it) you can at least become 90% aware of how Pochettino sets up his teams, how they play exactly and how he approaches squad management as well as game management. What you’re about to read is only my opinion however, my opinion on how Pochettino sets up his teams to play and I have guessed as to the reasoning for why he sets his teams out as they are but I may be wrong however this piece is here solely to provoke thought and attempt to raise the standard of which football is written about. I hope you enjoy!

Contents

General Theory

1.1 Splitting the pitch into 5 vertical channels

1.2 Building with a back three or “La Salida LaVolpiana”

1.3 Diagonality

Early season 1-4-2-3-1

2.1 Why no one (who’s sane) builds up in a 4-2-3-1 and my initial issues with VW

2.2 Pochettino adapts build-up structure and plays with two strikers

2.3 Unclean ball regains have a negative impact on structure

2.4 Wanyama’s role and why Pochettino loves him

2.5 Spurs struggle to cope with Liverpool’s press

2.6 Spurs switch to a 4-4-2 diamond vs Liverpool

2.7 How Pochettino’s 4-2-3-1 plays out in the oppositions half

2.8 Structural issues vs Sunderland

The 4-1-4-1

3.1 Eriksen moved into the centre and wing dynamics

3.2 Christmas tree pressing

3.3 Vs Manchester City (H)

3.4 This 4-1-4-1 is getting annoying (and flat midfield lines of 5)

Pochettino smells of Old Spice

4.1 Stale possession leads to stale results (and the specifics for providing width)

4.2 Why we struggle when pressed

4.3 The ‘3’ at the back is born (or born again) vs Arsenal

4.4 The diamond vs West Ham

4.5 Familiar faces with new scars (4-2-3-1 vs Chelsea)

The 3-4-2-1

5.1. A change in build-up structure (and why it’s Vertonghen – Alderweireld – Dier)

5.2. A horror show vs City

5.3. Please stop this 4-2-3-1 nonsense.

5.3 Liverpool nullify Tottenham’s most effective tactic

5.4 A return to 3-4-2-1 and how we press

5.5 Pochettino’s substitutions

5.6 Injuries prompt a return to the 4-2-3-1

6.0 Tactical Profile

6.1 Starting XI and player “profiles”

6.1 Defensive Strategy & Tactics

6.2 Pressing + Triggers

6.3 Offensive Strategy & Tactics

6.4 Set-pieces

7.0 Conclusion

Once again I hope you enjoy this piece and perhaps I’ll start it with the same words I used to end the last piece I wrote exploring Pochettino’s Tottenham Hotspur:

“I also hope this piece has given you, as readers, an idea of what types of players Pochettino needs and who he is after. Though I must say, the main aim of this piece is to provoke my readers to question further the tactical innovations taking place at all times in the modern game as this is how football will continue to grow and improve as a game and as a spectacle. The readers of this piece, as well as the authors of similar pieces, are the future of football and it is us who will change the way the game is thought of and how it is discussed.”

Once again… thank you and enjoy!

General Theory

1.1 Splitting the pitch into 5 vertical channels

The theory behind splitting the pitch into five vertical channels focuses around the positioning of players and how possession can affect a defensive block as it travels through the various channels. In terms of positioning, some teams use these channels as guidelines for their attacking players to occupy in order to pin the opposition midfield into deeper areas of the pitch. This means having five attackers high up within the final third of the pitch, overloading the back four, not only preventing the opposition midfield from venturing too high (meaning if they win the ball, it will be far away from our goal) and potentially forcing the opposition into a back six with the two wide midfielders being lured back by the high wide attackers. This consequently makes it harder for the opposition midfield to defend the width of the pitch (as they’ll now be defending in a 6-3-1 or 6-2-2 shape) and opens up space in the half-space channels.

In terms of possession, the general theory dictates that the differences between having possession in the centre and on the wing revolves around the space available to the player on the ball and the passing options available. The idea being that while there is more space on the wings, there are less passing options available as the players on the other wing are only accessible if the player attempts a long lofted pass which means the opposition defensive block can remain horizontally compact and temporarily forsake defending the opposite flank. If the ball is in the half-space, there is still the potential to access the entire width of the pitch as the ball carrier with lower and quicker passes. Having the ball in the centre however allows for both sides of the pitch to be accessible to the ball carrier however most teams tend to overload and protect the centre as this is where the goal is and thus most players struggle to find space within the central channel. This thus means that should a player have possession in the half-space, then the threat of a ball being played to either side of the pitch keeps the defensive block as horizontally stretched as possible thus opening up gaps along the defensive lines and should also mean there may be gaps the player can receive the ball in as close to without being inside the more crowded central channel.

1.2 Building with a back three or “La Salida LaVolpiana”

Building with three at the back can have two very distinct benefits to a team depending on how the opposition react to this. One benefit can be to easily play around a single opposition striker, usually even though he is up against three CBs a team or manager will still most likely moan if he doesn’t press the three CBs so if he does then he will become tired extremely quickly and thus become less of a threat offensively or he risks upsetting his teammates and thus this creates disharmony within the squad.

Secondly and more commonly seen, the opposition will send up a midfielder to help the striker press the three CBs thus conditioning the opponents into a 4-4-2 shape which most teams find easier to penetrate due to the gaps created between the strikers and the midfielders and the midfielders and the defence. Other benefits include covering the width of the pitch with one less defender who can now operate further forward and thus make life harder for the opposition’s defence as the CBs now have more progressive passing options as well as allowing WBs to push forward, creating dangerous width and allowing the team to overload the centre and half-spaces with creative types or “needle” players. The back three shape also can allow for easier access and occupation of the half-spaces due to the stretching of the first two opposition’s lines of pressure and can thus create beneficial passing angles (diagonal ones) which can help to ensure quick and clean circulation of the ball.

1.3 Diagonality

Generally it is more beneficial to pass and receive the ball upon diagonal angle so the ball receiver has a greater view of the play around and ahead of him when receiving the ball. A vertical pass will mean the receiver will likely receive the ball with his back to goal and therefore won’t be able to see the opposition behind him nor be in a position to act quickly and progressively as he has to turn to face goal. A horizontal pass is also not ideal as it doesn’t progress you’re team up the pitch and thus keeps you closer to your goal and further away from the oppositions. A diagonal pass therefore has benefits for both the team and the receiver as well as being more disruptive to the opposition team shape as they now have to shift diagonally as well as deal with the faster ball circulation.

Early season 1-4-2-3-1

For the purposes of this piece I am defining the build-up as possession that takes place outside the opponent’s defensive block (shape) as well as the initial passes and actions around and behind the opponent’s first line of defence/pressure.

2.1 Why no one (who’s sane) builds up in a 4-2-3-1 and my initial issues with VW

Opening the season away at Goodison Park, Pochettino “treated” us to Eric Dier and Victor Wanyama as the ‘2’ in a 1-4-2-3-1. Eric Dier made many similar movements to the ones he made during the majority of the 15/16 season which included dropping either in between or next to the CBs in order to form a back three. I wrote this in an earlier article on the matter of why back threes are so essential to clean build-up possession play:

“I do apologise for repeating much of what many of you may already know but this is for the benefit of any new readers and it’s also always nice to reinforce present knowledge. By splitting the CBs with only one holding midfield we can cover a wider area of the pitch with less players thus stretching the oppositions first line of pressure and creating more passing options further forward thus making progression of the ball out from the back much cleaner. Creating diagonal passing options allows the receiving player to receive the ball facing more of the play and thus makes it easier for him to detect and resist any pressure from the opposition.” – https://lukeballsburgess.wordpress.com/2016/12/22/will-tottenham-hotspur-challenge-in-201617-a-brief-analysis-on-tactical-theory-and-application-among-other-things/

Other vital advantages include conditioning the opponent to defend in a 1-4-4-2 shape as a team’s second striker isn’t likely to leave his striking partner to press a back three + a goalkeeper all by himself otherwise he’ll quickly tire and thus become less of a threat offensively. This allowed Walker and Rose to push on and provide width whilst Lamela and Eriksen played inside which is all sound theoretically except for the fact that this also leaves Victor Wanyama as a man in between the opponents 1st and 2nd lines of pressure. Whilst this allows Eriksen to find the ball easier by dropping deeper which would naturally increase the tempo of our play (thanks to Eriksen’s technical ability and Ajax education) it does as much slow down our play because Victor Wanyama is positioned in between the opponent’s 1st and 2nd lines of pressure.

This positional deployment of Wanyama as well as Everton’s aggressive 1st line of pressure (consisting of Deulofeu, Mirallas and Barkley) resulted in a rather chaotic tempo during our build-up play which resulted in a lack of clean and central progression. Wanyama often found it difficult to find the space in which he could properly receive a pass due to this pressing triangle of Everton forwards and his movement rarely occupied or disrupted this pressing trio in any purposeful way giving Everton an easy time of disrupting our build-up play. A common issue Wanyama would have would be he’d offer support to a player on the wings or in the 1st line of pressure along the same line as a teammate meaning the receiving teammate wouldn’t have any support himself thus making build-up tricky.

(Red highlights what happened, Green offers a friendly suggestion)

Above is an example from the game against Everton demonstrating Wanyama’s lack of understanding of structure and how his presence can often result in inefficient use of possession. Although in fairness, this criticism could’ve been aimed at a number of our players early in the season. Wanyama offers a horizontal pass to support Danny Rose on the ball by moving directly towards him and thus on the same vertical line as Jan Vertonghen, not only allowing Everton to press us easily due to the lack of distance between our players but also due to the fact that now, no matter who receives the pass off Danny Rose, this player has no immediate passing option which threatens to exploit or disrupt Everton’s defensive structure. This slows down our build-up play to a pace where Everton can press us and thus take the initiative out of the hands of our players.

This made it difficult for Toby Alderweireld and Jan Vertonghen to properly dictate the tempo of the game and ensure the teams advancement up towards the halfway line from where they can control the game with less risk. Generally our build-up consists of utilising the GK as well as the employment of a back three in order to push our FBs on and create space for midfielders dropping into this space to receive the ball so we can utilise a mixture of horizontal, diagonal and vertical passing to circulate possession of the ball until our backline is in position near the halfway line. This means all 10 of our outfield players are inside the opposition half thus giving us the option of either using long switches of play, short passes or battling for the 2nd ball as offensive tactics with as little risk as possible as the opposition will be defending deeper and thus have greater distance to cover when transitioning into offence. This also means our offence have less distance to cover themselves and means we are more likely to end moves by creating chances on goal as once you’re in the opponent’s half, their goal is within sight.

The chaotic tempo created by Wanyama and Everton meant we found it harder to cleanly circulate the ball as the pressure created often meant our players were forced into kicking the ball longer and earlier or more of our players being forced into dribbling with the ball as a method to escape pressure thus meaning we were deeper in our own half, losing the ball more often and not creating appropriate structures to attack, defend or transition. This was perhaps reflected in the type of passes Harry Kane received during this match, receiving only two inside Everton’s penalty area and nine from passes originating in our own half.

2.2 Pochettino adapts build-up structure and plays with two strikers

These inefficiencies demanded a tweak and by our next game against Crystal Palace, our build-up play had taken on a different structure. This time Victor Wanyama was often allowed the opportunity to drop in between our CBs and thus keep Eric Dier in between the opposition lines. This gave Wanyama more time and space on the ball as well as the option for Toby and Jan to bypass him completely when circulating the ball as well as offering our CBs a more assured option further forward (in Dier) which allowed our build-up play to adopt a much more composed nature.

This however was only the case half the time as we rotated between a structure created by dropping Wanyama in between our CBs and one which had Dier dropping to the right side of our CBs which pushed Walker on. The line-up against Palace featured both Janssen and Kane starting with Lamela deployed on the left and Eriksen on the right so it was vital to allow Walker the license to advance forward on the right so Eriksen’s intelligence could be used more centrally and so we could create havoc with Janssen and Kane attacking the Palace box (thus why Dier’s role in this game).

2.3 Unclean ball regains have a negative impact on structure

This line-up against Wickham’s presence and Palace’s long ball tactic often meant our regains were unclean and players like Vertonghen, Wanyama and Alderweireld were often forced into clearances and thus keeping the ball in the air which often prevents any creation of any structure appropriate for a transition from defence to offence. This often meant we struggled to create from these transitional moments and exploit the periods in which Palace were unbalanced and not in their low 4-4-2/4-4-1-1 shape.

This wasn’t helped by the deployment of our most technically proficient players on the wings and with those responsible for dictating our play in the backline. Due to Palace’s long balls played towards the heads or in behind our CBs it meant Jan and Toby weren’t in a position to claim the 2nd ball and move the ball on into appropriate areas. This also left Wanyama and Dier and Kane fighting to control these bouncing and unpredictable 2nd balls adding to the scrappy nature of the game.

Not so much an issue however in this game as I suspect Tottenham’s selection had the idea of taking advantage of Palace’s poorly executed man marking system at set pieces. Spurs were able to create a number of scoring chances from corners by overloading the Palace box with Alderweireld, Dier, Wanyama, Kane and Janssen with these players managing to get on the end of a great deal of Eriksen’s deliveries.

Another problem we had during the build-up in this game was seeing both Wanyama and Dier drop into their respective positions in the backline alongside Jan and Toby at the same time, thus meaning we’d often build-up with 4 or 5 or even at times 6 players in our backline! With Janssen and Kane pinning the Palace backline, this often resulted with only Eriksen and Lamela providing a central link between our backline and our forward line, often meaning when (and if) they received the ball they were forced into ineffective passes backwards or early passes forward which again created a chaotic tempo and forced us into an unclean transition from which Palace could counter.

So you see without a clean build-up, we can’t attack with any clear structure or strategy as we’re either forced into playing too far away from the opposition goal or with too few numbers in attack and this goes some way as to explaining why our most dangerous moments against Palace came from set-pieces.

2.4 Wanyama’s role and why Pochettino loves him

It was (somewhat) fun to see Pochettino adapt his build-up structure so early on and tweak it to suit the game as well as the players he had at his disposal however whilst allowing Wanyama more time and space on the ball by dropping him deeper gave us more composure in our build-up, it meant he had more ground to cover if there was a sharp transition to defence if we lost the ball during this phase. This would severely limit Wanyama’s benefit to the team as his physical prowess and defensive instincts in transition could be severely restricted as he would be positioned deeper at the start of any potential transition between offences to defence. When you limit Victor’s impact on our defensive transition, then you make his inclusion in the team redundant.

Pochettino favours six foot plus monsters within his ‘2’ in midfield because he values their contributions within our defensive transition more than their contributions to our build-up. This is because Pochettino uses his ‘2’ to cover the entire width of the pitch during defensive transitions, so one monster can go chase down the ball carrier whilst the other can remain central and wait in ambush like a pride of lions after gazelle.

This takes the responsibility of defending the flanks away from our wide players (who up until this point had been a mixture of Eriksen, Lamela, Alli and Son) and therefore allows them to remain central or higher up the pitch in preparation for a potential offensive transition. This minimises the instances of attacking players, like Eriksen, Son or Lamela, from starting an offensive transition from the left and right back areas and allows them to remain more of a threat offensively.

This also allows your destroyers more freedom to do what they do best, it’s no different to allowing a playmaker to roam freely and make an impact when and where he feels best. This allows Dier and Wanyama to engage the opposition not only higher up the pitch but more frequently than their teammates thus allowing their teammates greater freedom and less likely to be exposed in a 1v1 engagement.

When your CBs are Ajax-educated and as technically proficient as Jan and Toby, then perhaps we can reap just as many benefits from incorporating monsters within our midfield, allowing guys like Eriksen, Lamela, Son, to find a place in the team away from the wide areas. While Wanyama can disrupt our build-up rather easily, Spurs always have the option through Toby to ping a long ball into an area of the pitch where we can exploit an under loaded area or play the game on our terms, within the transitional phases.

Wanyama’s role was then quickly corrected by the time of our 3rd game of the season against Liverpool with Dier returning to normal duties in dropping anywhere he so pleased to create a back three and with Wanyama in prime position to compete for 2nd balls and cancel out any potential Liverpool offensive transition.

2.5 Spurs struggle to cope with Liverpool’s press

The game against Everton however highlighted an issue that would continue to haunt Tottenham throughout the season and that is that Spurs struggled to maintain any sort of composure against high pressing teams. Liverpool are as aggressive as they come under Jurgen Klopp and they were ruthless in hunting down and pressuring any pass that was played a split second too slow and forcing Spurs into long and dangerous passes.

Dier and Wanyama made up the most physically dominant and defensively solid holding midfield pair in the Premier League however their lack of ball mastery created issues for Jan and Toby as they tried to circulate the ball against immense Liverpool pressure. Their lack of composure under pressure and control allowed Liverpool to commit many men to their press which made it hard for Jan and Toby to find many secure short passing options in order to circulate a composed build-up of possession. Vorm was often forced long in possession and Liverpool were able to create their best chance from open play as Liverpool’s press took advantage of a vertical pass played into Eriksen by Vertonghen as they pressed the Dane’s poor touch and poor receiving body shape in order to create “that” chance for Coutinho.

Spurs struggled to adapt to Liverpool’s press whilst Liverpool were undeterred by Spurs pushing four players forward early on in the build-up and continued to commit men forward to their press. This gave Liverpool the advantage during an offensive transition where they were easily able to overload our back four and create spaces where they could penetrate us with ease. Ironic isn’t it then that when the back four did receive some defensive support from our forwards, it resulted in a penalty for Liverpool.

2.6 Spurs switch to a 4-4-2 diamond vs Liverpool

Walker’s early injury in the game forced the introduction of Vincent Janssen into the fold, recreating a similar line-up to the one we played against Palace except with Alli in Dier’s place and Dier in Walker’s. Unable to build centrally with the personnel and the setup, Poch experimented with a 4-1-2-1-2 setup in the 2nd half with a midfield diamond of Wanyama – Dele, Eriksen – Lamela.

This allowed us to employ a more direct approach with our possession, minimising the amount of times we were being disposed just in front of our backline and giving us a greater chance of winning the 2nd ball off a long ball to our frontline. This also uncoordinated Liverpool’s press as their deeper midfielders were hesitant to step forward in anticipation of the long ball up to Kane, Janssen and Lamela. This direct approach had the potential to create a number of decent chances for Spurs with Danny Rose and Dier bombing down the flanks, Spurs would usually always hit the box with a minimum of four players, overloading Liverpool’s back line and creating a quality chance for Eriksen and Rose for our equaliser.

This formation also simplified the dynamic between our CBs and Victor Wanyama, with the Kenyan being the sole screen in front of our playmakers, offering an angled passing option to our CBs as well as allowing them to spread and cover the width of the pitch whilst in possession. This also created the space necessary for the two Belgians to drive forward with the ball, again creating new and challenging dynamics which Liverpool struggled to defend.

A positive mid-game change from Pochettino earned us the point against Liverpool however our severe failure to cope with Liverpool’s aggression offered a concerning foreshadowing of events later on in the season.

2.7 How Pochettino’s 4-2-3-1 plays out in the oppositions half

Our away game against Stoke saw a continuation of the Dier-Wanyama double pivot but also the introduction of Son Heung-Min and Ben Davies, two players who would become increasingly relied upon as the season progressed. Spurs had an easier time of it in this game with regards to our build-up due to Stoke’s rather uncoordinated approach to defending outside of their half often pseudo-pressing with a number of random combinations of three. However Stoke did press high which still made it difficult for Spurs to reach the halfway line in a consistently clean nature.

Son’s role in the team didn’t vary greatly from Lamela’s when Spurs were in possession inside Stoke’s half. Son was still expected to drift inside and open up space for Davies to advance so little changed in this aspect bar introducing a more direct, two-footed (though less creative) shooter into the team. Below is an illustration of generally how Spurs set-up their structure inside the opposition half whilst in possession with arrows offering a general indication of how players moved.

Putting this illustration together I imagined Toby had the ball at his feet however the structure differed very little if the ball was with Vertonghen, usually seeing players like Kane and Alli move over to the left side of the pitch. Dier and Wanyama’s movement would generally be key to opening up space for Eriksen to drop into so he could be used centrally whilst also providing security for the FBs to advance high up the pitch. With Dier dropping in between the CBs and Wanyama either staying very central or moving wide, Vertonghen and Alderweireld would have more success in terms of finding forward passing options to our attacking players as well as creating space in front of them where they could drive forward if necessary. FBs occupying the wide channels allow Eriksen to float within the half-spaces and allow Son, Alli and Kane to play within the width of the 18 yard area where their shooting ability can be best employed.

Perhaps due to Son’s skillset however (or due to Davies’ inclusion in the team) Son had a much wider starting position for every possession Spurs had. This way Son was the one providing a wide outlet for the team, meaning Davies had fewer opportunities to get forward. Deploying Son out wide can have many potential benefits for Spurs due to his directness and his ambidextrousness giving him the advantage in 1v1 duels. It was this wider starting position for Son which gave him the space on the counter-attack to score his 2nd goal of the game against Stoke. Two devastating offensive transitions within a close couple of minutes finished off an uninspired Stoke side and Spurs walked to three points and a second clean sheet of the season.

2.8 Structural issues vs Sunderland

A mixture of injury and perhaps insanity resulted in a more fascinating (though I probably described it as ‘sickening’ at the time) line-up as Spurs kept another clean sheet against a Moyes-led Sunderland (shocker!). Vertonghen’s deployment in his preferred position at LB made room for Dier to drop into CB alongside Toby, which in turn made space for Dembele’s return from suspension, partnering Wanyama in midfield. This is where the crazy part comes in…. Sissoko started over Eriksen! “Kill me now” may have been my favourite expression that day as an overwhelming sense of dread threatened to override my internal organs and end this extraordinary misery I called “life” on the day of 18th September 2016 when Moussa Sissoko started ahead of Eriksen for Tottenham Hotspur Football Club of the Premier League.

Perhaps I can see some theoretical, maybe even practical, reasoning for this absurdity with Sissoko offering a physical and direct option within an offensive transition against a side where this game would most likely be won considering our inability to break down any type of defensive block with sustained possession. Eriksen would also get a much needed and deserved rest against a side we would most likely walk over and Sissoko would get an easy ride in the side whilst he familiarised himself with his new surroundings. Maybe that was what Pochettino was thinking, maybe, but sometimes you have to realise the optimist inside you can be a blatant liar and that logic, evidence and common sense should always dictate decision-making over delusion-ist concepts.

The game against Sunderland painfully illustrated some flaws with Spurs’ possession structure in this game. With Sunderland defending in a 4-1-4-1/4-5-1 variant and with Defoe not making the effort to chase down any of Sunderland’s clearances, Spurs were able to regain the ball often and cleanly every time they pressed Sunderland into a clearance and were able to camp inside Sunderland’s half. The issue created here however was how Spurs deployed Son in this new winger role, with no one taking his place in the centre of the pitch.

Because Son was providing the width on the left hand side of the pitch, Vertonghen didn’t have the space to move forward so Son could drift inwards and instead Jan remained deep on the left flank. Spurs did an excellent job at isolating Sonny vs Denayer in this game and the South Korean was handed a number of chances to run at the FB creating great discomfort for Sunderland and creating a number of chances for Kane inside the box. With Jan playing deep, Januzaj felt little need to track back and this left Son 1v1 against Denayer and prevented a more space-limited 2v2 situation.

What was an issue however was that this was only where our threat was coming from because of who we had in the centre of the pitch. Spurs’ five man attack kept Sunderland’s back four pinned to the edge of their penalty area which in turn kept the Sunderland midfield wall from venturing too far away from their back four which left a lot of space for Spurs just outside of Sunderland’s defensive block. So, who was Spurs’ most creative player playing outside of this block? Depending on your own opinions, I imagine most of us would come to the conclusion of either Dembele or Alderweireld and while both are fantastic players we can realise that both would struggle to break down a 4-1-4/4-5 block considering the players they had around them.

Now I’m not saying, “Oh, if only Eriksen had played, we’d have won 5-0 and broken down Sunderland with every attack” but we certainly missed his speed circulating the ball and his lack of passiveness working in between the lines in comparison to Sissoko. With Ndong however being dragged into the back four due to Walker’s high positioning, Sunderland left a lot of space open high up within the right half-space where Eriksen prefers to operate and from where he could’ve offered some dangerous deliveries a la like his two assists vs Chelsea later on in the season. Sissoko failed to recognise this space opening up and instead preferred to hit the box, meaning Spurs rarely had the right personnel positioned in areas where we could’ve broken down Sunderland in this way. Sissoko’s lack of technical prowess also offered Spurs very little when trying to break down Sunderland centrally.

It was from a (very poorly defended) cross which led to Spurs’ winner in this game but again Spurs demonstrated an inability to create good goal-scoring chances outside of set-pieces and transitions as there possession play still lacked a creative spark. Apart from the game against Stoke, Spurs had scored four in four and conceded two, both from set-pieces and it was this approach that I’d begun to criticise as our attacking output was very low and this outstanding defensive form was unlikely to benefit us in bigger games. While I wasn’t expecting Pochettino to change up his system, it wasn’t a surprise to see him experiment with a new formation in response to our offensive struggles by the game against Middlesbrough.

The 4-1-4-1

3.1 Eriksen moved into the centre and wing dynamics

The single biggest benefit the 4-1-4-1 had on Tottenham was that the starting positions of the players allowed for a much easier access to the ball for Eriksen. Eriksen not only had a bigger space to receive the ball in outside of the opponent’s defensive block but he also had easier access to the central channel and both the half-spaces. Forgive me if this sounds like lazy analysis but guess what, giving your best players more freedom can paper over a lot of cracks i.e. Guardiola moving Messi into the centre and AVB doing the same with Bale in 12/13.

Other benefits the move to a 4-1-4-1 had for Spurs is it created the room deep in the left half-space (with Wanyama dropping towards the CBs) for Ben Davies to step into midfield and at times, create a pivot alongside Eriksen but mainly to create the room for Son out on the left. With Davies being encouraged to step inside into midfield, this was another way of leaving Son 1v1 vs his fullback but yet also gave us a useful passing option in the middle of the field unlike when Jan was simply remaining deep on the left flank.

On the right hand side of the pitch, the partnership between Walker and Sissoko was again employed in a similar vein to the way it was used against Sunderland. Sissoko would move inside in between the opposition midfield and defence and remain there so Walker could move high up the field and become the occupier of the opposition fullback. When the ball was with Walker, if he had lured the opposition fullback, Sissoko then had the space to attack, running into the chasm created between the opposition LCB and fullback. It offered Spurs a great way of moving the ball into the opposition penalty area yet Sissoko rarely had the end product to exploit it.

The game against Middlesbrough also saw Vincent Janssen receive his 2nd start in the Premier League in place of the injured Kane and he did a fantastic job in this game of pinning his marker and holding up the ball for onrushing attackers. With Janssen rarely dropping off the Middlesbrough backline and doing his best to receive the ball with his back to goal as high up as possible, this created some larger temporary pockets of space around Janssen where players like Dele, Son and Eriksen could combine with him near the opposition goal. What we lost with Kane in finishing and long shot ability, Janssen made up for with a simpler hold up game which created several 1-2/up-back-through opportunities.

Spurs did lose a lot of solidity moving Dier out of the midfield and defending with the 1-2 triangle in midfield as there were times during which Eriksen and Alli would make vertical pressing runs and the other wouldn’t provide the balance leaving Wanyama with large areas of open space to defend in the middle. This wasn’t highlighted as such due to Middlesbrough’s “safe” usage of possession and the lack of a strong central link between the base of midfield and the frontline.

This did offer some cause for concern however heading into our next game against (at the time) League frontrunners Manchester City, what needed to be corrected was, if Alli and Eriksen were going to break out of the midfield line in our low block 1-4-1-4-1 shape, they needed to press much more aggressively/quickly whilst the other tucked in closer towards Wanyama so he would have the freedom to plug any gap left by the pressing midfielder.

3.2 Christmas tree pressing

What was being attempted by Pochettino however was when the ball was with the Middlesbrough CBs, Spurs would press in an almost Christmas tree/arrow head shape, with Sissoko and Son remaining deep and wide and with Alli and Eriksen stepping forward, tucking in behind Janssen so as a way to deny Middlesbrough central penetration and so as to not discourage their uninspiring wide play. Wanyama was being given license to marshal a larger amount of space on his own but a space that was hard to break into for Middlesbrough due to previously mentioned variables.

This shape was the result of a slight tweak on our usual 4-3-1-2 pressing shape as this was more appropriate a pressing shape due to our change to a 4-1-4-1 shape as Pochettino wanted to keep our pressing three as Son, Alli and Eriksen who perhaps offer a more dynamic offensive transition than a combination of Son, Sissoko and Lamela.

3.3 Vs Manchester City (H)

This game saw a line-up selected by Pochettino dictated by our pressing scheme in this game. Tottenham again lined up in a 1-4-1-4-1 shape vs City with Rose coming in for Davies and Lamela in for Janssen with Son starting up-front. This game saw Spurs move away from their slow build-up play and their attacks through Alderweireld switches as they sought to make City’s life as uncomfortable as possible.

Spurs adopted a much more direct approach to their possession and pressing play, Spurs rarely waited to get to the halfway line with their possession before initiating an attack with the Spurs backline playing a lot of their passes and clearances into the channels for the likes of Son and Sissoko to chase down. Spurs tried desperately to exploit the spaces left open by City behind the fullbacks due to their possession structure and thus enjoy better quality chances on goal. Spurs sought to make this game as physical as possible, asking a lot of the City players being through asking them to use their strength and balance when battling for 2nd balls or through having to sprint backwards and forwards during the many transitions in this game.

Spurs played this game with an unsustainable high intensity and created a chaotic tempo within which City struggled to cope and it was due to the chaos caused by these speedy transitions that City conceded their two goals. Spurs also wasted little time in waiting to take their chances vs City, with Spurs taking a number of early shots and limiting attacking moves to as little amount of passes as possible so as to reduce the number of times City could win the ball back cleanly and exploit Spurs’ high line.

Spurs continued to press City in a Christmas tree shape yet also modified it to press in a 4-1-3-2 shape at times with Alli stepping up alongside Son to either make vertical pressing movements towards City’s nearside CB or to cover Fernando so Son could make horizontal pressing movements towards the City CBs whilst also leaving the other always within his cover shadow. It was movements like these that often left City with little options to play out from the back and the only way out was through the use of Bravo in goal. Spurs were keen to force City long early where Aguero struggled to get on the ball or wide where Sissoko/Walker and Lamela/Rose used their physicality to bully the City wide players and win the ball back in this way.

This game also saw the continuation of Wanyama being left to marshal large areas of the centre of the field by himself but he did so masterfully and with relative ease due to our compact pressing shape (also helped by the aggressive advancement of Toby and Jan). Wanyama enjoyed the free roaming destroyer role as he was able to cover a vast amount of ground quickly due to his speed and due to Spurs’ man-orientated pressing, was able to read where the ball was going and was able to shut down plenty of City moves before they started.

Spurs’ efforts were rewarded in the first half with two goals however the physical exertion of the pressing took its toll on the players midway through the 1st half as Spurs rarely used their possession as a method to rest on the ball. This created a number of pockets of space for the city players, especially after Bravo became more involved in City’s build-up, who was able to find some simple passes into Fernando as the pace of the Spurs players slowed around this time. This led to a number of occasions where Silva was able to get on the ball and turn into space and where Spurs enjoyed some luck in the fact that City couldn’t field their strongest line up.

Had Gundogan started over Fernando and De Bruyne over Navas, City could’ve easily come back into this game between the 25th and 35th minute. Part of the reason why Spurs were unable to rest on the ball was because of their inability to cope with City’s aggressive pressing with Guardiola using Sterling and Aguero to press both our CBs, triggered by the two passing between each other. Saying this, Spurs rarely made the effort to play through the press or maintain any sustained period of possession perhaps fearing the quality City have in offensive transition and thus perhaps valuing any kind of possession high up the pitch with plenty of Spurs players behind the play in case it broke down. Spurs picked up the pace again at the start of the second half and their direct play resulted in a penalty which was unfortunately saved by Bravo. In and amongst the play of the second half, Guardiola turned to his bench which was again, severely lacking in quality. Gundogan came on as an 8 and Iheanacho went upfront alongside Aguero meaning City lost some central presence.

3.4 This 4-1-4-1 is getting annoying (and flat midfield lines of 5)

By the time of our game against West Brom, Pochettino maintained the 4-1-4-1 from the game against City with the only change resulting in Janssen coming in for Son as the 9.

Against West Brom’s deep 4-5-1 shape, Spurs lacked a strong central presence within Brom’s defensive block. By this, I mean with Lamela and Sissoko primarily occupying the wings, there were times where only Alli and Janssen occupied the space in between Brom’s midfield and defence meaning Spurs struggled for penetrating passing options as well as setting up actions in these areas (i.e. zone 14). This was because Eriksen would drop outside of Brom’s defensive block in order to receive the ball in front of Brom’s midfield where there were large amounts of space which Brom were sacrificing inside their half in order to protect their box.

With Lamela and Sissoko occupying the wings as well, there were more instances of Walker and Davies occupying the half-spaces so at times Spurs would build in a line of 4 outside Brom’s block (and at times, even 5 as Sissoko would randomly drop outside the block as well, although arguably, Walker should’ve advanced higher up the pitch in these instances) and with Brom’s discipline, rarely did they worry about the number of Spurs players receiving the ball in these areas. This flat line of 4/5 passing sideways outside of West Brom’s block just resulted in a lot of boredom and stale possession play which isn’t fun for anyone at any time of any day. It was a pseudo-battle of the line of fives with ours against West Brom’s defensive flat 5, and football wasn’t meant to be played in this way, not now, not then and not ever again.

Where Spurs enjoyed more success was when Alderweireld and Vertonghen had space to drive into midfield when Eriksen didn’t drop so deep and when Walker and Davies weren’t so central. Their advancement up the pitch allowed Eriksen to occupy spaces higher up the pitch (thus breaking up this stale line of 5) and this was also a much more luring prospect for the Brom midfield to press or at least engage with. However with the flat 5 midfield line and Janssen struggling to pin the more combative Brom CBs, Spurs primary form of penetration came via the wings and through 2nd balls.

With Brom’s man orientated defensive shape, competing for 2nd balls off crosses was the easiest way for Spurs to guarantee momentary freedom from their markers high up the pitch. With the ball being out on the wing, the Brom man markers would struggle to keep their eyes on both the ball and whoever they were meant to be marking creating greater potential for blind-side movements from the Spurs attackers and as I said increase the moments of temporary freedom as the chaos of the 2nd ball would again distract and lure Brom players out of a disciplined position.

Had Spurs been using their fullbacks to create the width, they may have enjoyed more success in terms of creating scoring chances off 2nd ball battles as this would allow Lamela and Sissoko to operate inside the pitch, inside the West Brom defensive shape and perhaps allow these guys to get on the ball (or allow Alli and Eriksen more freedom to do the same) and “make something happen”. Spurs’ structure wasn’t appropriate for creating scoring chances upon an offensive transition sparked by a 2nd ball as the Spurs wingers were too wide and the FBs remaining too deep and perhaps not as central as they should’ve been, leaving Spurs with minimal chances to take advantage of the chaos caused by a 2nd ball as only Alli, Janssen and Eriksen were in positions to fight for it inside the Brom block.

There was perhaps more of a call for a direct/wide-play orientated approach vs West Brom in order to create the same chaos as Spurs did vs Man City, Wanyama was always free to remain close to the midfield line as West Brom always left Rondon to press the Spurs CBs on his own meaning Wanyama had no reason to drop deep (West Brom were hardly likely either to allow themselves to be conditioned into a 4-4-2 shape so there was no point in Wanyama dropping to create a back three).

In reality, there wasn’t so much inherently wrong with Spurs’ play, they just lacked the quality inside the Brom block (the ‘needle’ players). Spurs played with the ball inside West Brom’s half for most of the match and there were many times when they were able to find a ball inside this shape, problem was, was that the ball was found by Janssen, Alli, Sissoko and Lamela and these players lack the quality to play through these shapes on the regular or in the right ways (case in point, Sissoko’s hashed chance in the 62nd minute or better yet, his performance the entire game).

In these tight defensive spaces, even the slightest misplay will be punished and the attack will break down and that can be caused by any innocuous bobble, minutely over-hit pass or just controlling the ball with the wrong surface etc. These spaces must therefore be widened and enlarged with quicker play and therefore you need to crowd your starting line-up with “quick” players, give me Leandro Paredes instead of Wanyama, give me Harry Winks for Sissoko and a less clumsy forward than Janssen and I might be happier. Create chaos Pochettino, not with Wanyama but with Messi, give me quick, direct vertical play, it can exist with little guys and it was from chaos that we scored our equaliser with little guys running around in that Brom box!

It was perhaps my emotional response to games like these which led to me to question Pochettino’s long term position at Tottenham in the piece I linked above and by the end of this piece I’ll know if I still stand by that point.

Pochettino smells of Old Spice

4.1 Stale possession leads to stale results (and the specifics for providing width)

Alderweireld’s injury sustained during the game against West Brom prompted Eric Dier’s return to the RCB role with Dembele regaining his starting spot in the team in the ‘2’ alongside Wanyama in the 4-2-3-1.

Again, watching these games I find myself dying a little inside with the personnel set up within the 4-2-3-1 and how the decision making of some players screws over the rest of the team. Without again touching on Wanyama, whose first touch is rarely ever progressive (or his second touch!), I find myself always crying out for the wide men to position themselves higher up the pitch and act differently when receiving the ball in these areas.

Son’s introduction into the team will always result in a little bit of chaos because that’s the player he is, a direct and hard-running, two-footed shooter whose first touch will usually always run a little away from him. When positioned as a wide man in a 4-2-3-1 he will usually disrupt the movements of our FBs and therefore the build-up down whatever flank he happens to be operating on. His preference to receive the ball close to the touchline will usually prevent the FB from moving forward and often means they’ll stay deep and (though they rarely do so) have to utilise their skillset within the half-space as part of the midfield line however as I said they rarely do so as they’re reluctant to give up their territory on the flanks.

What’s even more frustrating about this is that whether it is Sonny or the FBs on the flanks, they’re never high enough up the pitch to have the ideal effect upon the opposition and thus open up space in the centre for your creatives (…and Wanyama). In order to best do this, and to take advantage of this action, the wide player must be receiving the ball along the line of the defence and ideally, high up the pitch towards the by-line. This is so, (with the idea being to pin the opposition into a back six) you can threaten running in behind the opposition and thus luring their focus away from the central players only to then cut the ball back into the space opened up in the centre and half-spaces as the opponents move towards their own goal in panic. In the first phase of the build-up, the same principle applies; you pass wide in order to create time on the ball for yourself as a central player and the higher up the FB, the further back the opposition winger, thus stretching the opponent’s first line of pressure thus creating space.

Back to Spurs, there were simply too many times when one of Walker, Rose or Son were deeper than they needed to be and often meant they weren’t the highest positioned players entering the opposition final third meaning any pass into the central players was often made when the opponents defensive line had full sight of the ball and the receiver meaning the player receiving the ball was often in a position with his back to goal or his body wasn’t ideally positioned to turn on the ball or make a quick progressive action (also meaning he was forced into a shielding action and unable to turn).

Spurs didn’t react nearly aggressive enough to these passes as when you make a forward diagonal pass from the wide areas into the centre you limit yourself into an up-back-through routine as a way to break the opposition shape and as I said Spurs didn’t seem to identify these scenarios and thus act appropriately. This is because, as I said, the opposition have an easier time of focusing on both the ball and the man and can pressure the ball receiver as he will most likely be receiving not entirely facing the goal. What is ideal, is for the wingers/wide players to be positioned as the highest attackers within the opposition final third, to threaten the backline with a dribble in order to create panic and attract the opposition midfield and defensive line towards their own goal and redirect their focus onto the ball out on the wings before cutting the ball back to a central player who should’ve positioned themselves as such within the half-spaces or central channel where they’ll have a moment to exploit the space afforded to him if he’s move correctly and potentially the spaces opened up as the opposition’s defence shifts again in panic.

As an example of how devastating this can be, just re-watch our two goals in our 2-0 home win over Chelsea, as Eriksen exploits the space created for him in the right half-space after Walker receives the ball and threatens to attack the by-line before playing the ball back into Eriksen to cross for Alli.

4.2 Why we struggle when pressed

Again, Bournemouth’s pressing within a narrow 4-2-2-2 structure also created difficulties for Spurs as their wide midfielders would prioritise defending the half-spaces and preventing Dembele and Eriksen from receiving the ball at the “risk” of allowing Wanyama and the FBs easier access to the ball. Their energetic pressing within the wide areas where they forced us made for a scrappy game which again created issues with tempo and structure.

A general trend again resurfaces when teams actively press Tottenham high up the pitch as we’ll often see Eriksen drop deep in an attempt to ease ball circulation and escape pressure however what this frequently results in is Spurs occupying the space high up the pitch with less players. This thus makes it harder to battle for any 2nd balls should our defenders be forced into a clearance as there’s less players around to win the 1st or retain the 2nd ball, this also makes it easier for the opponents to press us as they can now commit one more player to the high press as Eriksen is now operating deeper and this also means we can’t utilise the skillsets of Alli, Kane or Son as they’re also further away from the opposition goal.

A possible solution to such an issue is to perhaps in these games where we are pressed, simply leave Wanyama higher up the pitch and drop Eriksen deeper and then use Wanyama as a wall pass or hold up player. Alternatively you drop Wanyama altogether and you sign Leandro Paredes (too bloody late now) however if you’re Pochettino and you have little faith in the pressing-resistance of your players, then I suppose you need these “scrappers” to make your life easier during the constant transitions and turnovers. By including these “scrappers” however, you guarantee a scrappy game much like the one against Bournemouth where nothing but nonsense turnovers in wide areas occur every 30 seconds.

4.3 The ‘3’ at the back is born (or born again) vs Arsenal

3 consecutive Premier League draws after the win against City and after not scoring from open play in 5 matches across all competitions, Spurs’ form prompted a change of system for the game against Arsenal. Pochettino seemingly threw together a 3-4-1-2 with Eriksen, Son and Kane forming the inverted triangle up top.

The introduction of an orthodox back three changed very little in terms of Spurs’ structure during the build-up bar the FBs having greater license to get forward as well as Eriksen enjoying more space and time in the centre of the pitch. What did massively change for Spurs was how their structure conditioned the opposition to defend in a 4-4-2 shape as the starting positions of the players lent itself to the 3-4-3 build-up structure so instead of having Wanyama umming and ahrring about when and where to drop off, Spurs were already lined up with a back three.

This forced Arsenal into a 4-4-2 shape as they were never going to let Sanchez press on his own and what’s more, they had to adopt this shape for the entirety of Spurs’ build-up and with Kane and Son occupying the back four, Arsenal’s FBs couldn’t push high up the pitch and squeeze the midfield line. Also with Son always threatening to run in behind the Arsenal back line, the back four were hesitant to push too far up the pitch thus in turn meaning Arsenal’s midfield line did the same creating large gaps in between Arsenal’s lines and on a pitch the size of the Emirates, Dembele and Eriksen enjoyed frequent touches on the ball in large areas of space, conducting our possession upon an extremely vertical orientation.

With three at the back and two striker formations, there is sometimes the worry of being outplayed and outnumbered down the flanks however if the two strikers position themselves correctly then this isn’t an issue. To pin a back four with two strikers, the two strikers must occupy the spaces in between the opposing CBs and FBs thus creating a difficult situation/scenario if the opposition FB attempts to move forward as this will either leave a lot of space down the flank for the striker to attack or threaten to open up space in the middle if the opposition CB chooses to move over to cover the advanced FB.

In this game, this meant Rose and Walker were free to occupy Walcott and Iwobi thus stretching the midfield line of four for Arsenal leaving Dembele to dominate a number of 1v1 battles vs Coquelin and Xhaka again ensuring a quick and vertical tempo to Spurs’ possession.

Spurs didn’t always position themselves like this however and so did not maximise the potential this structure could create for them and perversely they instead (at times) positioned themselves with narrow strikers (no greater than the distance of the opposition CBs) and high and wide FBs, conditioning a wider defensive line and narrower midfield line for Arsenal. This created an extremely difficult 4-4-2 defensive block to break down for Spurs as Arsenal could easily overload the central and half-space channels making penetration near impossible, in other words, we at times, through simple positional deficiencies conditioned Arsenal to defend like Atletico Madrid and doesn’t that make you feel a little sick!

This is of course an exaggeration and an unforgivable comparison for Atletico Madrid however this scenario was the consequence of a drastic change in attacking structure after less than three days of training time and the change in pace associated with a North London Derby.

Another issue with this formation was how we defended in a low block, in a 5-3-0-2 formation, with Eriksen dropping into the same line as Dembele and Wanyama. The three man midfield was easily overloaded on a number of occasions and Arsenal enjoyed a lot of good possession on the edge of our box and against a more prepared opponent Spurs would’ve been punished more severely. This defensive flaw meant this formation was unlikely to be a long term solution for Spurs’ issues with getting a positive result from games and was merely a one-off experiment. Spurs duly switched system again in time for the next game against West Ham switching to a 4-1-2-1-2 diamond formation as well as handing Harry Winks his full debut in the Premier League as the LCM.

4.4 The diamond vs West Ham

The diamond in midfield created issues for West Ham in the way of stopping them from defending high up the pitch. West Ham defended in a 5-1-3-1 formation with Pedro Obiang man marking whichever Spurs midfielder operated within the ‘10’ space. This meant that West Ham’s midfield line of three had to defend deep and narrow as there were still three central Spurs players to consider and with Rose and Walker staying high and occupying the West Ham WBs (Antonio and Cresswell), Dier and Vertonghen could easily between them (+ Wanyama and Lloris) pass rings around the lonely Sakho.

This gave Spurs easy access to the halfway line where they could ensure appropriate structure for a defensive transition or at the very least make any potential West Ham offensive transition even harder thus guaranteeing a lot of possession during the game. It was from being able to apply good pressure on the ball carrier upon a West Ham offensive transition due to appropriate structure upon losing the ball that Spurs were able to regain the ball to start the move that resulted in their initial equaliser.

Spurs’ issues then quickly became apparent against the West Ham low block as with Obiang making life difficult for Eriksen, Spurs struggled for passing options centrally and many attacks broke down once the ball was played into the physical battle Kane and Janssen were engrossed in with the West Ham back three. Rose and Walker as well, did very little to threaten in behind (by staying deeper) though at times this could’ve been a ploy to open up space to attack behind the Ham WBs as our two strikers and midfielders attacked this space on a number of occasions without any real success.

Although Spurs went into the second half 1-0 down, only minor tweaks were needed to ensure Spurs could break down the opposition shape on a more regular basis including: 1) Speed up the tempo of our play and 2) Push Harry Winks into the space between Ham’s midfield and defence. These two changes would overload the opposition defensive line thus opening up spaces on the wings as well as giving Spurs a fair chance on converting scoring chances from crosses.

These tweaks allowed Spurs to overload the space Obiang was marshalling which brought the opposition midfield deeper however they were kept narrow by Dembele and Wanyama giving Walker and Rose greater license to get forward with Kane, Winks, Eriksen and Janssen occupying the Ham back five. It was the result of this which gave Rose the space to attack down West Ham’s right and put in the ball for Janssen to shoot and for Winks to convert the rebound.

With Spurs looking good after the half-time changes, Pochettino inexplicably switched Spurs back to a 4-2-3-1 with the introduction of Alli for Janssen. With the wider attacking midfielders and with the double pivot in play, Walker and Rose seemingly became more hesitant to move forward and Sonny’s introduction didn’t help matters and Spurs lost a lot of their dynamism and momentum they’d built up.

Pochettino’s saving grace in this game came in the last five minutes of regular time when Pochettino dropped Wanyama into a permanent back three, changing Spurs into a 3-3-3-1 variant. The back three restored Walker and Roses’ license to get forward and gave Winks freedom of the centre whilst also creating space for Dier and Vertonghen to drive forward with the ball thus speeding up our build-up play. Walker and Rose maintaining a higher position up the pitch (as well as it being so late on in the game with y’know attacking mentalities n’all that) Son was restrained to the width of the penalty area and Eriksen, Alli and Kane were able to again pin the opposition back five and midfield. Spurs then enjoyed a lot of space in dangerous channels in West Ham’s half and the new dynamics late on the game duly delivered Spurs with two chances to enter West Ham’s box and punish West Ham accordingly so a good result for Spurs after a mixed performance.

4.5 Familiar faces with new scars (4-2-3-1 vs Chelsea)

The big news emerging from Tottenham’s starting XI pre-Chelsea depicted a starting line-up with Kevin Wimmer returning to the team in the LB position with the rest of the team picking itself, with Son on the left and Eriksen floating right.

The immediate thing to notice in this game was just how wide Son was playing out on the left, almost never coming into the centre like how Pochettino usually prefers his attacking midfielders to play. With no Danny Rose and with Victor Moses still adjusting to his new RWB position for Chelsea, it made sense to stretch the pitch in this area and if possible isolate Moses 1v1 and after Sonny’s performance as a winger against Sunderland, it was worth a try to see if he could recreate a similar performance against the League leaders.

Eriksen and Alli offered Spurs a strong presence in between the Chelsea lines and their movement was fantastic as they constantly interchanged and roamed and linked with the flanks to create overloads in order to help Spurs maintain possession in Chelsea’s half. Wimmer staying deep and wide in this game created an interesting dynamic for Spurs down the left hand side as his occupation of Pedro, alongside Hazard’s passivity over on the right hand side, stretched the Chelsea midfield line creating a crude 2v2 in the middle. Dembele again enjoyed his 1v1 battles and with the Chelsea midfield line stretched it didn’t so much highlight Kante’s or Matic’s defensive skills and instead left them rather troubled.

Spurs still weren’t controlling the game however and their lead was hardly justifiable (and it seemed to make Eriksen go mad as he wasted a few decent possessions with stupid long range shots after his opener). Spurs’ press was slightly more intense than it had been in previous games (perhaps understandable due to the proximity of the two clubs as well as their previous encounter) however it stretched the midfield line terribly and Chelsea were able to play through it/around it several times which made it harder for Spurs to offensively transition effectively outside of an out ball to Son who was doing an impression of 15/16 Sonny. Alongside a number of well-timed fouls, Spurs limited the amount of times this happened however and this maintained an impression of control at least as Spurs could then setup in their mid/low block shape. Spurs also struggled to penetrate Chelsea’s penalty area and a lot of shots came from outside of the area as Kane didn’t do enough to unsettle the Chelsea back three by dropping off, instead merely trying to pin one of them or occupy just the two.

Ultimately a mad moment from Dembele led to a chain of events which ended with Pedro’s equaliser. Frustrated by Kante’s tactical foul, Dembele tried to restart play quickly with Eriksen and Walker not appropriately set up to support him on the right hand side leaving Dembele to run into a cul-de-sac where upon losing the ball Spurs didn’t appropriately invest in their own press. Tired towards the end of the half and with the midfield line disorganised with Dembele out right and Eriksen central, Matic easily found an incisive pass into Pedro who produced a moment of magic on the edge of our box to level with Chelsea’s second attempt of the game.

I can’t necessarily slate Son for not tracking back for the Moses winner as his instructions seemed to tell him to stay high in an attempt to pin Moses or exploit his offensive tendencies and thus the winner came as a result of a poorly dealt with cross and a gamble that paid off for the Chelsea WB.

Through tiredness or tweaks, Spurs played less intensively in the second half of the game and Chelsea took the initiative away from Spurs and threatened to run away with the game early on after the restart. All of Spurs’ issues became exaggerated in the second half as they produced a rather pathetic display akin to a bottom six side merely making up the numbers in clashes against the top four. It was perhaps the cherry on top to be placed upon the cake of poor form that Spurs wallowed in towards the back end of 2016 which prompted the publication of a number of doom-and-gloom tactics articles from myself, Nathan Clark (@TTTactics) and Jake Meador (@jake_meador) just in time for Christmas. As aforementioned, I even called into question Pochettino’s long term position at Tottenham Hotspur as his emphasis on defensive concentration and rigidity seemed at odds with our youthful side’s inexperience and flair.

The 3-4-2-1

5.1. A change in build-up structure (and why it’s Vertonghen – Alderweireld – Dier)

As addressed when first reviewing our switch to a three at the back formation for our 1-1 draw against Arsenal, the starting positions of the players streamlined a lot of Spurs’ positioning and thus their circulation. We now had capable ball players like Dier and Vertonghen stretching the opposition’s 1st line of pressure and operating (and at times) driving into the half-spaces with Wanyama providing the tip of a diamond which gave our CBs the option of a quick 1-2 or wall pass in order to find space. Both Dier and Vertonghen have experience playing as FBs and aren’t shy to take on their man or drive with the ball and coupled with Dier’s crossing ability, this gave Spurs a new dynamic in possession and the potential for a new threat which is hard for the opposition to defend as if you press a CB, you are most likely leaving open a midfielder or forward. I’ve previously explained some benefits to operating deep in the half-space in my first tactical profile of Pochettino:

“This tactic allows our midfielders easier access to the ball from our CBs and allows (the ball receiver) the chance to drive/pass diagonally infield. From this angle, (the ball receiver) has a greater view of the field and the play ahead of him and is therefore also able to make a better decision and hurt the oppositions shape. By driving diagonally in towards the centre of the pitch, this forces the opposition to drastically change their shape, having to drop both horizontally and vertically, therefore creating more disruption (as opposed to reacting to a vertical long ball, the opposition would only have to drop vertically, taking a few steps back). This also allows (the ball receiver) to pick up the ball in more space as the opposition are unlikely to press him in this area and risk losing their shape.”

It is also important to analyse why Toby Alderweireld is positioned as the central CB in this shape and the answer is relatively simple. Toby is, without question, the CB who possesses the greatest range of passing in our squad and who can be relied upon to not only see a defence splitting pass but also pull it off with laser-like precision. So, if Alderweireld possesses the ball in the central channel of the pitch, then the opposition’s shape will likely be at its most stretched as Toby has access to players both on the right and left side of the pitch. With the opposition’s shape at its most stretched, ideally you’d want your most dangerous passer on the ball in order to exploit the existing gaps as well as giving him the freedom to dictate the direction of our play where he can ping a ball to the left or right as he so pleases.

With Wanyama also restricted within the central channel due to the advanced nature of our wide CBs his lack of appreciation for structure is minimised and again he is limited to operating merely as a wall pass for our more purposeful passers. This also gives him quicker access to all channels on the pitch upon a defensive transition where he can work his (for the sake of it) “magic”. With the WBs still operating as the sole width-providers in this formation, this leaves open space higher up within the half-spaces for Dembele and Eriksen to work within. With the five channels already now occupied during our build-up structure, Alli and Kane are free to move about the ‘10’ space and drop-off or pin the opposition’s defence and create as much havoc as they see fit. Our new build-up shape is illustrated below.

The above illustration is a little deceiving however as it indicates that we keep this 3-1-4-2 shape once we enter the opposition’s half or final third which isn’t usually the case. Upon entering the opposition’s half, generally our shape will change to a more traditional 3-4-3 or 3-2-5 with Wanyama stepping up alongside Dembele and Eriksen joining the forward line so as to occupy the five vertical channels high up the pitch as well as providing us with a steely counter-pressing double pivot which will help us circulate possession, prevent counter attacks and ultimately, control the game.

The danger defending this build-up shape for the opposition comes mainly from how to defend against the CBs who are bold enough to drive into midfield. After conditioning the opponents into a 4-4-2 with our three CBs and with Alli and Kane occupying the back four, we outnumber the opposition midfield 5v4, which not only keeps them pinned but opens up areas in the half-space for our CBs to drive into where they can either be left alone to put a ball into the box or be pressed at the risk of opening up receiving space for the WBs or forwards.

The greatest example of how difficult it became for teams to defend against us came in our 4-0 thrashing of West Brom at the Lane. With Walker, Rose, Kane and Alli pinning West Brom into a back six, West Brom were defending the edge of their area with a very narrow three man midfield who simply couldn’t defend the space they needed due to the speed at which Tottenham Hotspur were playing. This was helped by Vertonghen and Dier joining the midfield line, confident Alderweireld could defend any (if any) hopeful ball cleared to Rondon, therefore easily allowing Spurs to outplay and overload the West Brom midfield three with the help of Wanyama, Dembele and Eriksen.

The rate at which West Brom’s midfield three were getting overloaded prompted panic from the West Brom low block and this led to a number of occasions where a defender from the last line was forced into a late reaction, leaving his line to press the ball carrier opening up gaps to exploit. At times one of the wide men was forced into a hurried press, opening up an angle for our WBs to receive in time and space and even for our opener where McAuley was hurried into pressing Eriksen leaving Kane open to receive and hammer home his first of the day. Our shape and positioning was leaving the West Brom defence in tatters and it was as beautiful to watch as it was horrifying knowing there were teams in the English Premier League being thrown about like a ragdoll.

This shape also lent itself to our high-pressing game as with the three CBs offering protection, our WBs could really push up the pitch and press without fear and squeeze the opposition’s shape. Dembele would also often step up and join in with the squeezing of the opposition, especially in games like our 2-0 win over Chelsea where he would man-mark Kante during the press. Likewise Spurs’ wide CBs would usually break out from their line to press one of the Chelsea attackers who would be receiving with their back towards goal, knowing the four other defenders or Wanyama would close up and cover for them.

5.2. A horror show vs City

Spurs’ man orientations during their press however still had the potential to cause them issues such as in the 2-2 draw away to Manchester City in January. Spurs attempted to press City’s back line man for man with Alli and Kane on the two City CBs and one of Eriksen or Dembele would be responsible for Toure however Claudio Bravo was the ace up City’s sleeve and his composed nature on the ball helped lure the likes of Dembele, Kane and Alli away from their man opening up space.

Even if Bravo was forced long, his passing ability usually meant he was able to find a City player which caught Spurs out a number of times due to the nature of their pressing/marking. With Toure’s movement separating Eriksen/Dembele from the midfield line, De Bruyne and Silva often easily found the space to receive the ball as they would venture into the half-spaces where Wanyama and Dembele were rarely willing to follow due to the risk of creating too large a gap in the middle.

City would also throw their FBs forward early as well, putting Sterling, Sane and Aguero right up against our CBs which gave City’s attackers the advantage when attacking long balls in behind due to the speed advantage they had over our CBs. City’s front five meant Wanyama was often being dragged deeper and deeper which forced us to defend in that dreaded 6-2-2 shape as Alli and Kane maintained a high position whilst we were defending, perhaps anticipating a clearance but meant we were overloaded with ease in midfield.

With City maintaining a similar man for man structure during their press with their front three on our back three Spurs struggled to maintain any possession or create a meaningful attack as our CBs weren’t free to dictate the play and with Silva and De Bruyne covering our double pivot, Spurs struggled to find Eriksen or any of our forwards with a clean pass leading to structural issues upon any transition.

Within 20 minutes Spurs had switched to a 4-3-3 variant with Dier moving into midfield which whilst it made it easier for us to defend in a low block, it hampered our offensive transitions as the FBs now had less protection and license to go forward. This meant we struggled to create any width offensively and thus made it easier for City to press us as we didn’t stretch the pitch or attack with appropriate numbers again meaning we struggled to keep possession of the ball.

Upon surviving the first half, Pochettino committed to changing back to the 4-2-3-1 with Son coming on for Wimmer, which again, whilst making it easier for Spurs to defend in midfield as we now could defend with better horizontal coverage in a 4-2-3-1/4-1-4-1 mid/low block, we struggled to threaten City with any central presence and again most of our possession occurred in wide areas where we were easily pressed and lost the ball.

Later on in the game, when Wanyama had to fill in for Toby at CB and Winks was introduced, Pochettino changed our defensive shape to a 4-3-1-2 shape in an attempt to split the pitch and perhaps prevent City from circulating the ball across the width of the pitch considering Sonny’s lack of defensive work ethic when placed on the wing. This switch provided some temporary offensive relief for Spurs however as the inverted triangle at the top of our defensive shape could quickly pin the opposition back four into a narrow shape and Sonny’s introduction further enforced this, thus opening up space on the wings from where Spurs created some decent chances, one from which they converted for Dele’s goal.

5.3. Please stop this 4-2-3-1 nonsense.

Within minutes of watching our game against Sunderland I’m vomiting again. 4-2-3-1, Wanyama not splitting the CBs, FBs wide but deep and wingers inaccessible with a lack of strong central presence, do I have to say anymore. To watch me watch these games where we played the 4-2-3-1 in this manner would most likely resemble Gordon Ramsey throwing up some trash served to him as all red faced he screams, “BLAND! RAW! DISGUSTING”

I tell you what as well, it’s these games I remember more than anything else because the solution is not so simple except it is. There’s more to a game than a one team playing 3-4-3 in possession and thus the other 4-4-2 out of it however you dismantled West Brom by overloading their back line and opening up the half-spaces and in this game, you barely attempted to and we had boring old stale Tottenham that couldn’t break down a team bound for relegation. Against Middlesbrough in the next game as well, it was the same! These are games which kill our title challenge and where I question a man who’s broken records and giving us two of our best seasons in recent memory.

5.3 Liverpool nullify Tottenham’s most effective tactic

Against Liverpool, Pochettino switched Alderweireld and Dier around at CB, placing Alderwiereld on the right and Dier left perhaps knowing he could use Toby’s diagonal pass to the left of the pitch as an escape from Liverpool’s press. Dier does try but can’t pull off the pass with the same accuracy or trajectory often making the usage of this redundant. Perhaps it was also a ploy to cover Ben Davies against Mane’s pace however that didn’t bloody work.

Like City, Liverpool didn’t so much care for creating space for their attackers away from our defenders as they knew the speed of their attackers would find them that space if they could find the right ball in behind. Liverpool applied little subtlety to their attacks and often hit the channels early upon winning the ball back seeking to exploit any gaps in our shape upon transition, avoiding Wanyama and Dembele (a crucial tactic for Liverpool and one that had several consequences for Spurs) and looking to best exploit the space left behind our back four.

These passes created plenty of issues for Spurs as their attackers were forced into sprinting retreats and with Dembele and Wanyama unable to counter-press successfully Spurs struggled again upon offensive transitions. Not only this but when Davies failed to hold the defensive line, he let Mane run inside and behind him to score the opener. It was also threw the positioning of Liverpool’s attackers (narrow and central) that space was opened up for Liverpool on the flanks where Clyne in particular found the space to attack to allow Liverpool to play more of these direct attacks which forced Spurs into disrupting any potential structure appropriate for an offensive transition.

Spurs’ 4-2-3-1 rarely threatened Liverpool’s defensive shape and why would it due to its acknowledged flaws. With Wanyama and Dembele unable to create through the counter-press, Spurs could never disrupt Liverpool’s defensive shape and struggled to create good quality chances. Pochettino changed next to nothing in the second half and the game turned into a bore fest in the second half and Spurs whimpered to a 2-0 defeat.

Spurs didn’t help themselves in this game as they failed to match Liverpool’s intensity, too many times they handed Liverpool the initiative by failing to advance up the pitch quick enough after a clearance forward. With Son out on the left and Davies hesitant to get forward this often meant Son stayed wide on the left, again meaning Spurs struggled to provide a strong enough central presence offering a route of penetration through Liverpool’s centre. This left Wanyama and Dembele struggling for passing options which made it easy for Liverpool to press our midfield and regain the ball in order to launch a counter.

Liverpool’s style of press upon our build-up again created a chaotic tempo and this disruption led to inappropriate structure for Spurs upon transition and no sustained period of possession from which to progress up the pitch. With Firmino deep and the near side ‘Pool wingers pressing our CBs from the line of our FBs Spurs were often forced long and left barren for options during the build-up. The over and underlapping runs from Liverpool’s 8s also created a number of marking issues for Spurs as Wanyama and Dembele were often forced to track back into the defensive line for fear of letting Wijnaldum and Lallana run behind our backline freely again meaning Spurs were often inappropriately structured to form an effective offensive transition.

Spurs again switched to a 4-1-2-1-2 diamond around the 25th minute and it helped to create Spurs a couple of chances for a few minutes through Ben Davies who now had room to move into ahead of him with Son now partnering Kane up front. This also prompted Spurs to defend again in a 4-3-1-2 shape perhaps to again split the pitch and stop Liverpool from exploiting under loaded flanks with a direct switch. This change didn’t improve Spurs’ defensive performance however as Liverpool still found ways to isolate Mane against Davies and still release Clyne down the right hand flank which now featured an overload in Liverpool’s favour. Son was having a really poor game up top as well and our attacks regularly broke down once they found his feet which didn’t allow the rest of his teammates to setup in time to defend the incoming counter attack, all in all a bad day for Spurs.

5.4 A return to 3-4-2-1 and how we press

The next home game against Stoke, Pochettino, buoyed by the return of Jan Vertonghen from injury, returned Spurs back to the 3-4-2-1 which prompted another 4-0 thrashing of one of the League’s most forgetfuls. With Dier and Vertonghen boosting the midfield line, Spurs enjoyed a strong central presence with Eriksen, Alli and Kane floating in between the Stoke lines whilst Davies and Walker had the freedom to pin the opposition wide men. One interesting thing to note from this game was how we attacked Stoke with our set-pieces as we positioned Vertonghen and Kane on the edge of the box for many of them. Stoke were unwilling to place anyone there on the edge and left both Jan and Kane free every time and Spurs punished them rightfully with Eriksen finding Kane to score the second of the game from this position and on another occasion Vertonghen hit the crossbar.

I previously mentioned how our new 3-4-2-1 lent itself to our pressing shape without going into much detail however I shall now correct that. Like in the home game against Everton, teams found it very hard to produce any clean build-up whilst being pressed by Spurs. The main reason for this is how the front three press as a unit in such a way that makes it difficult for the opposition to create and exploit overloads in these areas.

Even though Everton would tend to use one of Schneiderlin or Barry to drop in between the CBs whilst leaving the other six slightly higher so as in order to create a diamond shape to attempt to escape the Spurs press, Spurs would position their players much like how Liverpool pressed us in order to disrupt this build-up. One of the front three of Kane/Eriksen/Alli would sit more or less on the higher 6 whilst another would do the same on the CB furthest from the ball however not so close so as not to open up gaps in the middle. This would leave the first presser to then press the ball receiver (either the deeper six or other CB) from the line of the free man, leaving the free man in their cover shadow thus meaning we could press four Evertonians with three attackers. This means we still had a numerical advantage behind the ball (7v6) and our WBs could press high up the pitch so as to restrict the usage of any wide outlets Everton might plan on using.

With the three CBs as well as Dembele and Wanyama, Spurs also enjoyed great access and presence within the half-spaces and central channels of the pitch thus making it really difficult for teams to pass through us. Our pressing shape is illustrated below.

With this pressing shape, Spurs can easily split the pitch (by which I mean cut off half the pitch from the player on the ball) and from this make the opposition play predictable and force them to clear it long where we’ll have the advantage. As you can see as well, Spurs are heavily man-orientated during their press as it is the easiest method for cutting off passing options and forcing the opposition into clearing it long, also with our physically superior players Spurs have the advantage in pressing players receiving the ball facing their own goal as well as retaining the ball upon a recovery such as a tackle.

If the opposition do try to pass through us and play into these players being forced to receive with their back to our goal (due to our man-orientations) we tend to see Wanyama/Dembele/Walker set upon them with a mixture of arms and chest and upon winning the ball simply hold off whoever they’ve just tackled. With the numbers advantage behind the ball, Spurs’ midfield line also had the potential to press up the pitch as high as necessary and even on occasion see one of the midfielder or wide CBs break from their line to press the ball in a dangerous area if they thought the risk was worth it much like in our home game again Chelsea. That game saw, on plenty of occasions, our wide CBs breaking from the defensive line in order to press Pedro and Hazard further up the pitch in order to stop them turning on the ball and running at our mid/low block.

The 3-4-2-1 again as I mentioned streamlined our circulation and whilst it had the potential to give access to Eriksen and Dembele, it also meant Wanyama was able to receive the ball at a beneficiary angle on more occasions thus meaning his first touch didn’t kill moves early on in the build-up. Saying that, Wanyama definitely improved over the season with how he used his first touch in order to receive the ball facing play so that he at least could see where he needed to pass early on and he thus wouldn’t slow our possession play down as much as he used to. In most cases he learned how to scan before receiving the ball so that upon being passed the ball he wouldn’t even have to take a directional first touch and could instead let the ball roll past him so he could keep his head up and receive the ball facing the play.

5.5 Pochettino’s substitutions

It was also around this time, with Spurs out of other competitions that Pochettino now wasn’t restricted to using his substitutions for merely fitness purposes and his subs could now take on a more tactical nature. Frequently in games around this time we’d see Winks come on between the 60th-70th minute for Dembele, now this one was primarily driven by fitness issues as Dembele would often fade around this time. After this, generally when winning games, Pochettino would bring on Sissoko and Janssen for the likes of Kane and Alli in order to see out the game and use their physicality to hold-up/battle for the ball and suck in fouls or even make them in order to run down the clock. Janssen in particular became known as a time vacuum and his energy alone became an absolute nuisance for tired teams towards the end of games as he would be relentless in his pressing and his physical nature would rub defenders up the wrong way and win a number of fouls which allowed Spurs to maintain control of possession within the opposition’s half.

Pochettino was rarely forced to tinker with this formation from game to game as a number of teams failed to find an adequate way to defend against the positioning of players. Southampton in particular, or their FBs to be specific, struggled to contain Spurs’ 10s (Alli and Eriksen) and never stepped inside to keep the back four narrow and with Southampton’s wide players not covering the spaces opened up in the half-spaces, Spurs FBs were able to occupy two respective Saints defenders whilst Eriksen and Alli enjoyed great deals of space on the ball. Eriksen benefitted in particular being allowed so much space upon receiving the ball and he punished Saints by chipping in with his 10th goal of the season.

5.6 Injuries prompt a return to the 4-2-3-1

Pochettino would rather switch to a system he doesn’t trust rather than pick a player he doesn’t trust which is why when Dembele or Wanyama was injured, Pochettino would thrust Dier into midfield and switch back to a 4-2-3-1 then restore Kevin Wimmer to the starting XI. This was also reflected in Pochettino’s continuous selection of Trippier over Walker towards the end of the season even though Trippier was perhaps the weaker performer within the 4-2-3-1 formation.

Thankfully the Spurs players were firing on all cylinders around this time perhaps thanks to Pochettino’s adapted fitness regime throughout the season (or perhaps due to the fact he couldn’t get his hands on half of them over pre-season due to the Euros) and all players were playing with a new found drive and desire. The final set of games at White Hart Lane also set an emotional tone upon many of Spurs’ last few games which potentially had a number of benefits on the player’s arousal levels. In the game against Arsenal for example, the Spurs players were applying themselves with a great sense of urgency (I know that’s a pathetic thing to say in a tactics piece) which meant the Spurs players were making greater effort to get into positions which would disrupt the Arsenal shape.

Players like Trippier and Davies were running into positions higher up the pitch earlier than usual, players like Son, Alli and Kane were making more runs in behind the Gunner’s defence and our players pressed the opposition with a higher intensity and counter-pressed for longer periods of time. That’s why Spurs’ 4-2-3-1 didn’t show itself with the same flaws it had done throughout the course of the season. Wanyama and Dier were circulating the ball at a quicker rate partly because of the occasion but mostly due to the speed of movement from their teammates around them. The only tweaks made to the 4-2-3-1 towards the late end of the season was with Dier now back in midfield, he was responsible for dropping back into the deeper areas of the right flank and right half-space to create our back three as well as provide some protection for Trippier who’s a weaker performer defensively than Walker. This position also meant Spurs could still utilise Dier’s crossing ability and even though the positions he crosses from are less than ideal (too deep) it can have the potential to create for Spurs due to the accuracy of his delivery as well as competing for second balls high up the pitch near the opposition goal.

Spurs’ issues in possession within the 4-2-3-1 were still apparent however as Spurs’ struggled to break down Arsenal’s newfound three at the back shape outside of the transitional phases of the game. These struggles again plagued Spurs in their away trip to West Ham where Spurs struggled to overload the West Ham defensive line of five with their possession play. The best chance of the game for Spurs came as a result of a long ball from Toby Alderweireld where Son was able to knock the ball down to Kane who’s long shot produced a number of rebound chances immediately after.

Again the 4-2-3-1 struggled to break down the opposition’s shape in possession with neither Son or Alli operating within the half-spaces, with neither of the FBs having the room to advance up the pitch as high as they needed to be and thus meant pot shots and set-pieces were the only way Spurs looked like they could get something from this game. Having to rely on unreliable sources of goals is a bad idea and it showed for Spurs in this flat performance as they succumbed to a 1-0 defeat which was the final nail in the coffin for Spurs’ title challenge.

With Sonny’s continuous selection in the team combined with Rose’s injury and Pochettino preferring the 4-2-3-1, Pochettino did utilise Ben Davies as an inverted FB in games to allow Sonny to operate wide left whilst maintaining some presence within the half-spaces. When Davies did take up residence in the half-spaces it did help to clean up our circulation in the initial phases of our build-up as it helped us to keep the ball in dangerous areas as well as overload the opposition’s initial lines of pressure with a 2-3/4-/5/4 shape. When forced to combine with Son higher up the pitch however, Davies’ dribbling ability (or lack thereof) as well as his crippling right foot did lead to some attacks breaking down and it would’ve been interesting to see Rose used in this role at points during the season.

In the final match staged at White Hart Lane, Spurs again enjoyed success against a top six opponent using the 4-2-3-1 but with the FBs pushing on constantly into high positions. Such was the extent to which Davies and Trippier were pushing on that even when Spurs had the ball on the halfway line, Manchester United (because of their rigid man-marking system) were already conditioned into a 6-3-1 shape. This allowed plenty of room for Alli, Son and Eriksen to combine with the FBs as well as Dier and Wanyama in order to ensure plenty of progressive possession within the Man Utd half.

This limited Man Utd offensively however their deep and horizontally compact defensive line did mean Spurs failed to create some good quality chances and it showed as our only two goals of the game came from set-pieces. Man Utd’s man-marking system did have some benefits for Spurs as players like Son reacted quicker to transition situations and were able to free themselves of their marker. Spurs’ interchanging attacking midfielders created the same effect as the Man Utd players struggled at times to register when to stop following their man and communicate that to their teammates. Man Utd’s team selection made life easier for Spurs with players like Bailly, Blind and Lingard providing the width for Man Utd, with Martial isolated from the rest of his team up front Man Utd rarely produced a quality attack. Their goal coming from an individual moment of quality when Martial was isolated 1v1 vs Trippier and then able to get to the byline near our goal and lay on the goal for Rooney.

The last two games of the season turned out to be a matter of smooth sailing for Spurs with away trips against already-consigned-to-midtable Leicester and already-relegated Hull. With Dembele returning from injury, Spurs again deployed the 3-4-2-1 formation with minor rotational tweaks (Son for Eriksen and Sissoko for Trippier) as well as a small tactical one with Alderweireld playing as the RCB with Dier in the centre. This tactical change was perhaps in anticipation of the fact that we would again easily overload Leicester’s 4-4-2 and have our wide CBs (as well as our defensive line in general) positioned high up the pitch, Poch probably preferred the choice to push Alderweireld on and leave Dier back so as to match the pace of Vardy potentially running in behind. Pochettino continued this rearrangement of his back three in our next game against Hull however so perhaps he saw Alderweireld as offering more to our possession play from the right half space than Dier. It’ll be interesting to see if Pochettino continues with this arrangement going into the new season as both players have the quality to benefit our attacking play from this area.

6.0 Tactical Profile

This part of the piece will provide an overview of Pochettino’s tactics and strategies and will perhaps be the only part of this piece most will read and will thus cover his player “profiles”, his defensive and offensive strategies as well as how he prefers his teams to press. This will be presented without the game-by-game diary-esque manner as presented above but will however include further analysis from me on the pros and cons of his various tactics.

6.1 Starting XI and player “profiles”

This part of the piece will provide an outline of what I deem to believe Pochettino looks for in his “profiles” and will perhaps give us a sense or what we will look for in the transfer market ahead of the 2017/18 season. Universal attributes for new signings will include being under the age of 25/26 so we can have at least two years of these players at their prime before possibly declining and so they may retain some potential resale value. These players will also have to be known to work extremely hard on and off the pitch so as to maintain Pochettino’s fitness requirements and so as to avoid Pochettino “freezing” him out of the 1st team picture after a couple of months.

Goalkeeper: Of course, every goalkeeper in the Premier League has to be a fantastic shot stopper however for Pochettino and his systems, the goalkeeper has to be comfortable coming off his line and adept at using his feet in order to assist our build-up play. Though these skills aren’t as necessary considering Pochettino generally prefers a midfielder dropping in between the CBs to help in this way and with the likely signing of Pau Lopez, I don’t believe we’ll be looking for a GK in this window anyway.

Centre-back: A Pochettino CB has to be a physically superior specimen, height doesn’t necessarily matter however these CBs have to be physically strong as well as have enough pace about them to cover a large distance of ground quickly due to our high-line. Ideally this CB will also have enough experience or nous to be able to play in one of the FB positions due to the offensive contributions they’ll be expected to perform in a wide CB role in Poch’s 3-4-2-1. Good technical ability, referring to passing and dribbling ability is also necessary considering our CBs are the ones who dictate play due to the roles of our DMs in both the 4-2-3-1 and 3-4-2-1. With Pochettino switching to a back three for the second half of the season, Spurs are perhaps one CB light in this area, especially if Kevin Wimmer forces a move out however with Cameron Carter-Vickers and Ben Davies we have two potential squad options already available to us.

FBs/WBs: Again these players have to be physically superior specimens in terms of their stamina, acceleration, pace and strength due to the man orientated nature of our pressing/marking. Pochettino certainly adores the modern FB/WB so this player will be expected to be adept at both defensive situations as well as offensive ones as they will be almost solely responsible for what occurs down the flanks. Good crossing technique is therefore desirable though not so important due to Spurs’ tendency to try and overload the box and fight for 2nd balls. If Walker does end up leaving (he did) then we’ll certainly be in need of another RB whether or not that comes in the form or Walker-Peters being promoted or otherwise. Personally I don’t feel as if our FBs/WBs are as important to the way we play and I feel like what’s more important is their understanding of the role and application so I wouldn’t be too unsettled if we went into the new season with Rose/Davies/Trippier/KWP though I would prefer a RB with a more guaranteed offensive output.

DMs/CMs: Perhaps where I dis