Could the Brotherhood experiment be considered a failure when the Egyptian army resorted to a military intervention, that is, illegitimate means, to unseat a legitimate elected government?

This article was penned shortly before the Egyptian army’s ultimatum to President Mohammed Morsi was due to expire. No development on Egypt’s “fateful day” will change the judgment: The Brotherhood experiment in Egypt has — unfortunately — failed.

I thought at the time that they had passed premature judgment on the Brotherhood experiment in Egypt. I disagreed with that judgment. I thought they were wrong. Yet, I took note of the judgment. But now, in July 2013, they turned out to be right. The Brotherhood experiment in Egypt has failed.

They had all been ardent supporters of Egypt’s Jan. 25 Revolution in 2011 and greatly valued the Brotherhood’s ascent to power through democratic elections. So, for them, the “failure” of the “ Muslim Brotherhood experiment ” in Egypt meant a mournful situation.

It was January 2013. I was in Beirut in the company of several leading intellectuals of the Arab world, whose attention was focused exclusively on Egypt. Almost all were convinced that “the Muslim Brotherhood experiment had failed.”

That’s not the question to be asked. The question is: Why did Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi become the target of unprecedented mass protests demanding his resignation just a year after he had emerged as victor in the June 30, 2012 elections?

On June 30, 2013, Cairo was the scene of the world’s largest demonstration. The colossal human sea included the Tahrir crowds that brought down Hosni Mubarak in 2011, but their size had since doubled. The talk of a “military coup,” “old regime supporters” or “counter-revolutionists” is irrelevant.

The New York Times published an article on July 2 under the headline, “In Egypt, Democrats vs. Liberals.” The article concluded: “Removing Mr. Morsi through a military coup supported by the secular and liberal opposition could well be the worst.” That’s perfectly right. Those who come by the way of elections should go by the way of elections.

Yet, the great upheavals of history rarely go by the book. The fact that a record number of Egyptians rose up in their millions against Morsi and the Brotherhood just a year after their election is in itself a historic development. One may be categorically opposed to military coups, but still one cannot ignore the political lesson that Egypt of 2013 is offering for years to come: The Brotherhood experiment has failed in Egypt!

Undoubtedly, the reasons for this outcome will be analyzed in detail. The debate has already started. Egyptian historian Khaled Fahmy, for instance, argues that the Brotherhood is facing an “existential crisis” much more serious than in the Nasser and Mubarak eras, when the movement was severely persecuted and forced to go underground. “The Egyptian people are increasingly saying it is not about Islam versus secularism,” Fahmy says. “It is about Egypt versus a clique.”

The Brotherhood has been abandoned even by its closest allies and partners. The Salafists and their Al-Nour party, the second largest election winner, have refused to align with the Brotherhood in the latest crisis.

In spite of everything, Morsi declared he will stand firm. In a dramatic statement of defiance, he said, “If the price for safeguarding legitimacy is my blood, then I am prepared to pay it. That’s a small price to pay in defense of this country.”

Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, appointed army chief by Morsi himself, responded with equally dramatic words: “It is an honor for us to die rather than to turn a blind eye to anyone terrorizing or threatening the Egyptian people." Once people start speaking of “martyrdom,” “death” and “blood,” things are already out of hand.

The Brotherhood received 37% of the vote in the parliamentary elections. Morsi was elected president with 51%. The new constitution, shaped around Brotherhood ideas — despite all objections — was approved narrowly in a referendum with just 40% turnout, meaning that more than half of the electorate shunned the vote. All this demonstrates that the Brotherhood embraced “majoritarianism” over “pluralism.” And when the economy also deteriorated, the “hubristic” government of Morsi and the Brotherhood hit the wall in just one year.

The inner circle of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and members of his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have long acted as mentors to Morsi and the Brotherhood. It is only natural that the crash of the Brotherhood experiment in Egypt is sending troubling signals for the future of the “AKP experiment” in Turkey.

Certainly, there are huge differences between the AKP and the Brotherhood since the differences between Turkey and Egypt are also huge. Yet, there are some common features, some sort of a “kinship bond” between the two movements. It is therefore obvious that Morsi’s fate is of concern to the Erdogan government.

Compared to the Brotherhood, the AKP is much more experienced and successful in terms of public administration skills. The government’s performance from 2002 to 2011 is proof in itself. The party, however, has prompted comparisons to the Brotherhood since the Gezi Park protests, displaying traits such as being out of touch with Turkey’s new dynamics, deafness and intolerance.

The failure of the Brotherhood experiment in Egypt is certainly a distressing outcome for the AKP. Preventing the repetition of a similar development in Turkey depends largely on whether the AKP learns the right lessons from Egypt. Having obstinately refused to learn a lesson from the events in Turkey, the party better look to Egypt at least to learn a lesson for the well-being of Turkish democracy and its own government.