Viktor Zolotov, commander in chief of the National Guard, recently released a video message challenging opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who has accused Zolotov of corruption, to a duel. Zolotov, one of the most formidable and secretive representatives of the security services and a former bodyguard of President Vladimir Putin, is viewed as close to the president. The very idea of such a video message, as well as its substance and style, runs counter to standard protocol in a political system where conflicts are usually resolved in a very different way. The most striking thing about Zolotov’s video message is how inappropriate it is for an influential national security official to directly address, especially in an unpolished and stylistically clumsy manner, an opposition leader whom the government stubbornly refuses to acknowledge as an important political player and views as a U.S. government-funded criminal determined to rise to power. The authorities avoid mentioning him by name, and Putin is no exception, having never uttered Navalny’s name in public.

Indeed, Zolotov came under fire for being politically irrational, in no small part for resorting to the threat of violence. Observers wondered why Zolotov drew attention to Navalny’s investigations and addressed him as an equal, elevating the opposition leader’s status and veering from the Kremlin line. The video message also appeared to be highly personal and not that of an institution, which would have had enough resources to prepare an adequate response. The video message put Zolotov’s private emotions on display and revealed his personal vulnerability to someone like Navalny. It is surprising that Zolotov—a former head of the Federal Protective Service, which serves as a major counterweight to the Federal Security Service, or FSB, and a silovik striving to turn the National Guard into an institution of political significance—would want to enter into a public conflict of this sort. Yet no matter how illogical and spontaneous Zolotov’s video message may appear to be, it has a rational component and offers many insights into the current state of Russia’s political system. It is clear that the authorities’ policy on Navalny in particular, and the non-systemic opposition more generally, is growing increasingly incoherent. Should Navalny be allowed to participate in elections? Should he go to prison? Should he be permitted to organize unsanctioned rallies? Should these rallies be harshly suppressed? The president’s various allies offer contradictory answers to these questions. As Navalny becomes an instrument of elite infighting and in turn a part of Russia’s political system, the authorities will become further divided and their efforts to contain him less effective. Zolotov has essentially reproached the political system and criticized its inability to curb Navalny’s activities and counter the threat he poses to regime security. Crucially, he observed in his video message that “no one has ever hit you back, Mr. Navalny,” a veiled attack on those responsible for managing the challenge from the non-systemic opposition, from the FSB to those Kremlin officials who oversee domestic politics. Zolotov, however, would not have recorded his video message just because he felt that the government was too lenient toward Navalny. His appeal reveals not only Zolotov’s political solitude but also his lack of access to Putin. To be sure, it is not that Putin’s attitude toward his former bodyguard has soured. Rather, no matter how tight their personal and professional relations may be, the president is preoccupied with foreign affairs and has little time to spare for domestic politics.