PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2nd ANNUAL MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES COLLOQUIUM University of Calgary, 24 March 2000 Publications

"Under the Ice: Canada and Air Independent Propulsion"

By: Karen Winzoski

MA Student, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary

On the sixth of April, 1998, Canadian Defence Minister Art Eggleton announced that Canada had agreed to participate in a lease-to-buy program with the Royal Navy for the acquisition of Britain's four Upholder-class diesel-electric submarines (SSKs). To pay for the submarines, Canada will allow the British armed forces to continue using the training facilities at Canadian Forces Bases Suffield, Wainwright, and Goose Bay at no further cost to the United Kingdom. Canada will pay the balance, which will amount to approximately $610 million Cdn, over the next eight years. With no funds allocated to the project by parliament, this money, as well as a further $140 million Cdn for upgrades, will come from a reorganization of the Canadian defence budget. The four submarines are currently being reactivated at the Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd. shipyard at Barrow-in-Furness, where they have been berthed since their decommissioning in 1993-94. In mid-2000, the first submarine, the HMCS Victoria, formerly the HMS Unseen, is due to arrive at a port on the east cost of Canada where it will be refitted with larger torpedo tubes to accommodate Canada's supply of Mk 48 heavyweight torpedoes. While at the Canadian shipyard, the submarines will be fitted with the Lockheed Martin Librascope fire-control systems and SUBTASS towed sonar arrays from Canada's retired Oberon-class submarines.(1) At the same time that the details of this decision became known, Canada's Maritime Command announced that it plans to install some sort of Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, such as a fuel cell power plant of the sort developed by Ballard Power Systems of Vancouver, in the four Victorias.(2) Between 1994 and 1998, Maritime Command invested $4.8 million Cdn in Ballard for the production of a 50kW Exploratory Development Model (XDM) of a fuel cell power plant.(3) Pleased with the performance of the model, the Department of National Defence (DND) plans to invest a further $75 million Cdn in Ballard for the production of a 250 kW Advanced Development Model (ADM) fuel cell system. A submarine powered by this propulsion system would be able to patrol completely submerged for thirty days at 4kts.(4) If DND is satisfied with the capabilities of the ADM, it may decide to purchase several of the fuel cell systems from Ballard to install in the Victorias. Although it is not possible to accurately guess how much Ballard would eventually charge for these systems, it is reasonable to assume they would each cost several millions of dollars. Eighty million dollars plus is sizable investment for a defence department known for being chronically cash-strapped. The Department of National Defence must consider the Air Independent capabilities that Ballard fuel cells would provide to be vital for Canadian defence for such a large sum to have been allocated to the development of this technology. This paper will attempt to explain why indeed so much attention has been given to the development of Air Independent technology within DND and Maritime Command (MC). It will demonstrate how the decision to invest in Ballard was made, and how this decision making process could have been improved. It will describe how the various types of AIP technology that the Canadian Navy could have chosen operate and illuminate the drawbacks and benefits presented by each technology. It will describe some of the technical, operational, and even strategic hurdles that must be overcome for AIP technology to become a useful addendum to Canadian defence efforts. Finally, this paper will ask if, given these multiple hurdles to be surmounted and the flawed decision making process that led to the selection of fuel cell technology, AIP capable submarines are really worth the significant financial costs and the required major reorganization effort. Justification for AIP-capable submarines Canada has used Arctic sovereignty and security to justify the acquisition of under-ice capable subs since the 1970's. Since 1968, the United States has claimed that the Northwest Passage is an international strait, meaning that vessels with friendly intentions from all states have the right to pass through it without Canadian permission. Canada claims that the waters of the Arctic archipelago are internal waters, meaning that Canada has the right to deny passage of foreign vessels.(5) In defiance of Canada's claims to sovereignty over the region, an American oil tanker, the Manhattan, travelled through the Northwest Passage without Canadian permission in 1970. In response to this event, the Canadian government passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA).(6) This act bolstered Canada's claims to sovereignty because it gave Canada legal jurisdiction over some Arctic activities, if only those contributing to pollution. Despite Canada's assertions of jurisdiction over the Arctic, its claims to legal sovereignty over the region over the area have been hampered by the fact that Canada has historically been unable to assert functional sovereignty over the Arctic. To maintain functional sovereignty over a region, a state must be able to provide basic services to the region and its inhabitants. These basic services include health care, economic development, environmental preservation, and defence. With the creation of the AWPPA, Canada has attempted to provide environmental protection for the Arctic, but Canada has not been able to provide adequate defence for the Arctic.(7) Until the present day, Canada's military presence in the Arctic has been limited to Ranger patrols and the regular but brief and infrequent overhead surveillance flights of Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). Not to diminish the efforts of the Rangers, but their patrols cannot penetrate far north into the archipelago, nor are they armed well enough to respond to any major military threat. Although MPAs regularly patrol over the waters of the Arctic, their presence is fleeting, and they too are unable to respond to major military threats. Furthermore, thick ice, as is often present in the waters of the Arctic archipelago, prevents the MPAs from recognizing submerged threats. Because of the limited capabilities of both the Rangers and the Aurora aircraft, they would be incapable of deterring most military threats to the Arctic.(8) Since the late 1970's, military analysts have suggested that the only way to provide adequate defence for the Arctic, which would thus assist in our claims to sovereignty over the region, would be to acquire under-ice capable submarines.(9) At the time, Canada did have submarines, but these submarines were diesel-powered, and were therefore unable to function under ice. Canada's Oberon-class submarines, and all diesel-electric subs for that matter, cannot operate under ice because of their regular need to 'snorkel' or 'snort.' Diesel-powered submarines must spend between ten and twenty percent of their time at periscope depth with snorkelling masts raised to both draw in atmospheric oxygen for the combustion of diesel fuel, and to expel noxious exhaust. An SSK can spend up to 80 hours submerged running solely on battery power, but after that the sub must come to periscope depth and run the diesel engine to recharge the battery.(10) A submarine needs regular patches of open water to come to snorkelling depth. In the Arctic, especially in winter, there simply isn't enough open water for submarines to be able to snorkel as often as they must. Therefore, all diesel-electric submarines are incapable of safely operating in the waters of the Arctic. To operate under the Arctic ice, some sort of Air Independent Propulsion system is necessary. Most forms of AIP can reduce the need to snorkel by a factor of three to five.(11) It should be noted that when defence analysts of the 1970's suggested that Canada should acquire under-ice capable submarines to operate in the Arctic, most of the forms of AIP to be discussed were still quite undeveloped. When these analysts recommended that Canada should acquire under-ice capable submarines, they were suggesting that Canada should acquire the only kind of submarine then capable of operating air-independently, the nuclear-powered submarine (SSN).(12) During the 1980's, the call for under-ice capable submarines (read: nuclear-powered submarines) grew in intensity after the construction of the SOSUS listening net across the Greenland - Iceland - United Kingdom (GIUK) chokepoint. The SOSUS net is a series of listening devices located on the floor of the Atlantic ocean. These devices, which were placed in a more or less straight line between the east coast of Greenland and the west coast of Iceland, and between the east coast of Iceland and the west coast of Scotland, are capable of detecting the sound of ships and submarines passing through the GIUK chokepoint. The information these devices receive is transmitted to intelligence offices in the United States, where the sounds are interpreted. Using the SOSUS net, the United States hoped it would be able to monitor naval traffic entering the North Atlantic from the Arctic, thereby preventing Soviet submarines from entering the Atlantic through the GIUK chokepoint.(13) After the construction of this listening net was completed, both Canadian and American defence officials speculated that instead of completely preventing Soviet subs from entering the Atlantic, the SOSUS warning net would force the Red Fleet to find another route to enter the Atlantic. Analysts surmised that Soviet boats would enter the Atlantic by passing through the ice-infested Arctic and then through Baffin Bay.(14) At the same time, there was significant concern that Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), such as the Typhoons, might use the enclosed and ice-covered Arctic waters to conceal themselves while they waited for orders to surface and launch their missiles on the United States. After all, the Typhoon-class SSBNs had reinforced shoulders on their conning towers which, it was speculated, were intended to be used to break through the thick pack ice found in the Arctic ocean. When this new threat was revealed, analysts again declared that only under-ice capable submarines could preserve Canada's Arctic security,(15) to say nothing of sovereignty. With the reduction of the Soviet threat experienced since 1990, Arctic security has become less of a concern to the Canadian public. Without an immediate threat to the Arctic, it may be difficult to justify the acquisition of AIP systems to the Canadian public. However, with naval planning it is an incredibly bad idea to consider only immediate threats. Whereas states have historically been able to conscript, train, and deploy armies within a few short months, it usually takes over two decades to get a naval project from the design phase to the launching of a ship. For example, take the project to acquire submarines to replace the Oberons: naval planners recommended finding replacements for the boats during the mid 1970's.(16) Only in 1998 was the decision to replace them with the 4 Upholders finalized, and as of mid-2000 the Upholders still have not arrived in Canada, nor have their refits been completed. By the time they make their first patrols, this one naval project will have taken well over a quarter of a century to come to fruition. Because naval projects take so long to get from the design phase to realization, it is important to plan for medium- and long-term threats, as well as immediate threats. Ascertaining future threats is an inexact science, which frequently runs the risk of identifying and then preparing for threats which may never materialize. This should be kept in mind as we make predictions about future threats and make recommendations to deal with these possible threats. In the medium and long-term, there will likely be a resurgence of threats to both Arctic security and sovereignty. In the medium term we can expect further interest in Arctic sovereignty due to the impending commercial development of the Arctic. During the Cold War, there was little commercial development of the Arctic region because of its location between two conflicting superpowers.(17) Now that the superpower threat has lessened due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, we can expect an increase of both foreign and domestic commercial interest in the region. Commercial development will lead to problems with smuggling, pollution, and the illegal exploitation of resources. Once again, Canadians will adjure their government to exercise sovereignty over the region in order to regulate commercial activity and prevent criminal operations in the area. Once again, under-ice capable submarines will be presented as the only way to provide defence for the Arctic, and thus bolster our claims to sovereignty. Although we will return to this topic later in the paper, it should be noted here that even though submarines will undoubtedly help in Canada's claims to sovereignty over the Arctic, they will be able to do precious little about most of the civilian-led illicit activities which will take place there. In the long-term, there will again be interest in Arctic security, arising from a conflict between the United States and Russia, resulting from the inauguration of the American National Missile Defence (NMD) program. This program will render Russian land-based ballistic missiles incapable of reaching American territory. Russia's nuclear arsenal will be unable to deter American missile attacks. Russia will be forced to rely on its SSBNs to provide missile defence for the Russian homeland. Even if the NMD interceptor missiles can stop ballistic missiles launched from a ground-based launcher in Russia, they might not have enough time to intercept cruise missiles launched from Arctic or the eastern seaboard of the United States.(18) So, once again Russian Typhoons and Delta IVs will use the Arctic archipelago for concealment and to enter the north Atlantic. Furthermore, the NMD program will require the construction of radar receivers and ground-based interceptor units in northern Alaska. To protect these structures from submarine launched cruise missile attack, or other sorts of military threats, it seems likely that more American submarines will be deployed to the waters north of Alaska. It is probable then, that there will be increased American and Russian submarine presence in the Canadian Arctic, and resulting from this, an increase in the possibility that these submarines will come into conflict with each other. Canadians will realize that in order to prevent both the American and Russian navies from using the Arctic, and thus prevent both sides from coming into conflict with each other, they must establish a submarine presence of their own in the Arctic. Again, the only way Canada can accomplish this is to have some sort of under-ice capable submarine.(19) So, although there is currently no significant threat to the North, very soon these factors will provide the Navy with further justification for the acquisition of AIP systems. Although Arctic sovereignty and security are invariably touted as the reasons Canada is interested in acquiring AIP, it is naive to think they are the only reasons the submarine service would like to acquire AIP. The desire to reduce the need to snorkel is not motivated solely by Arctic concerns. Besides preventing SSKs from operating under ice, the need to snorkel limits a submarine's ability to operate stealthily. While snorkelling, submarines are vulnerable to detection by radar, by sight, and by infrared (IR) satellite (due to the fact that when closer to the surface, a submarine's heat signature is more detectable). Furthermore, snorkelling is a noisy process, which makes SSKs more vulnerable to detection by passive sonar. Finally, while snorkelling, submarines are limited in speed.(20) This can hamper their attempts to evade attack after detection. Any reduction in the need to snorkel would help an SSK operate without being detected. Besides providing greater stealth capabilities by reducing the need to snorkel, some forms of AIP can enhance submarine performance in other ways, such as by reducing a submarine's submerged IR signature.(21) Canada's submarine service is likely to be interested in the other advantages that AIP can provide, as well as the under-ice capabilities it presents. Evidence to support this theory can be found in the fact that DND has chosen to invest in a more expensive form of AIP capable of enhancing stealth and providing other advantages,(22) over cheaper forms of AIP incapable of enhancing stealth.(23) Furthermore, if Canada was only interested in AIP's ability to protect Arctic security and sovereignty, our interest in Ballard should by all rights have waned when the Soviet threat to the Arctic ended. However, the exact opposite occurred. It was during the early 1990's, when the Soviet/Russian threat to the Arctic was at its lowest, that DND began investing millions of dollars in Ballard Power Systems.(24) Finally, we may find evidence for our theory that the Navy is interested in AIP for more than its under-ice advantages in the fact that many other navies, with no interest in under-ice operations at all, have also invested in AIP. Navies from such places as Pakistan, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and the Netherlands are all considering AIP modifications for their SSKs.(25) We can assume that these states have no interest whatsoever in operating under ice. They are spending millions of dollars on AIP simply to improve stealth and acquire other advantages that AIP can provide. If so many other navies are willing to invest millions of dollars in AIP technology just for enhanced stealth and a few other advantages, then the enhanced stealth and other advantages it provides must be quite valuable. AIP may be worth MC's attention even without the under-ice dimension. The decision to invest in AIP may be motivated not only by a desire to acquire under-ice capabilities, to operate more stealthily, and to profit from the other advantages presented by AIP; it may also be motivated by a desire to keep up with the other navies acquiring AIP. AIP is a rapidly developing industry. Investing in a technological leader such as Ballard would ensure that Canadian subs are not left in the dust by the stealthy and AIP-capable submarines of so many other mid-sized navies world-wide.(26) It is important to remember that the Canadian sub service is interested in other factors besides under-ice functioning when evaluating the many forms of AIP. It is equally important to remember that Arctic sovereignty and security are much more politically and publicly salient reasons to justify the expenditure of $80 million on a propulsion system than simply a desire to increase stealth capability, or the desire to keep up with other navies in this expanding technology. Although submariners may be interested in stealth and other factors, justification for investment in AIP will have to remain firmly ensconced in rhetoric about Arctic sovereignty and security if Canadian politicians and the Canadian public are to remain willing to spend tax dollars on it. Criteria for the evaluation of AIP technology There are many kinds of AIP systems that Canada could have chosen to give its submarines under-ice capabilities. Some of theses technologies have been installed in converted SSKs belonging to other mid-sized navies, others are still being developed by a number of naval engineering consortia. Each of these technologies has its strengths and weaknesses. Canada seems to have used a number of criteria to evaluate these technologies,(27) and made its selection based on these criteria. Some of the criteria used by Canada to evaluate AIP technologies would be used by other navies selecting an AIP system. That is, these criteria are universally desirable, no matter what role a state has given to its submarines.(28) Other criteria are more specifically Canadian. That is, these criteria would only be desirable to the Canadian Navy due to unique Canadian values or to a specific and unique role that Canada has outlined for its submarines, such as under-ice operations. Finally, there are a few criteria that Canada does not seem to have used when evaluating AIP technologies, but perhaps should have.(29) Had these criteria been used, Canada might have chosen a different form of AIP. This section will present these three kinds of criteria, which will then be used to evaluate the many kinds of AIP systems to be discussed in the next section. Universal criteria low signature It is universally desirable for a submarine to have a low signature. No matter what their role, submarines operate most effectively when they cannot be observed. Therefore, a propulsion system that can decrease a submarine's sonar, visual, radar, magnetic, infrared, and chemical signature would be appreciated by all navies considering AIP technology. As already mentioned, AIP can greatly reduce a submarine's sonar, visual, magnetic, radar, and infrared signatures by reducing the need to snorkel, but many kinds of AIP can reduce a submarine's signature even further. Admittedly, there is little a propulsion system can do to reduce a submarine's magnetic signature. That signature is largely a function of the size of the boat and the metals used in its hull.(30) However, some forms of AIP can operate virtually silently, which can reduce a submarine's sonar signature to noise produced by the screws and the crew.(31) Other forms of AIP operate at much lower temperatures than the approximately 400 degrees at which diesel-electric submarines operate.(32) This will greatly reduce a submarine's infrared signature, which is detectable by satellite. Unfortunately, some kinds of AIP actually increase a submarine's chemical signature. A few AIP technologies release pressurized exhaust into the water.(33) This exhaust, which consists mostly of carbon dioxide, is apparently detectable by chemical means. depth independence It is also universally desirable for a submarine propulsion system to be able to operate at any depth. Depth independence not only allows submarines greater mobility when evading torpedoes or other submarines, it also allows submarines to operate more stealthily at higher speeds. When a fast-moving submarine is submerged to only a few metres, the low pressure area created by its spinning propeller blades create tiny bubbles. When these bubbles leave the low pressure area they collapse with a small popping noise. This popping noise is called cavitation, and is easily detectable by passive sonar. To reduce cavitation, a submarine must operate at greater depths, where the pressure is so great the tiny bubbles never form.(34) If a submarine can dive deep enough, cavitation will not occur no matter how fast the submarine is moving. Arctic operations present a reason for Canada to be doubly interested in depth independence. Within the Arctic pack ice there are often ice keels, downward-pointing sharp-edged points of ice, extending up to 400m into the water below.(35) Obviously, to be able to avoid these keels by manoeuvring underneath them would be greatly desirable. Most SSNs can operate to a depth of 500m. Any deeper than that will stress the submarine's pressure hull, and prematurely wear it out. Since we can only assume that the pressure hulls of SSKs would be able to withstand similar pressures to SSN hulls, the maximum depth we should hope for out of a propulsion system can be limited to 500m.(36) Any deeper than that is not really necessary, if the submarine's hull will not be able to withstand the pressure. Some AIP systems will operate safely at any depth. Others are severely limited in diving depth because they expel pressurized exhaust. For the exhaust to be expelled, the pressure in the propulsion system must be greater than the outside pressure. If the system is to expel exhaust at depth below 400m, the exhaust system must be so greatly pressurized that it becomes unsafe. power All navies considering AIP want their submarines to have enough power for the operation of a large number of hotel loads (such as sonar systems and life support), to allow them to travel for greater distances and for longer durations without refuelling, and to allow their submarines to travel faster. While increased speed is not so important in the Arctic, for safety reasons under-ice patrols will be limited to between 4 and 8kts, power for sonar operation is quite important.(37) To safely avoid ice keels, a submarine travelling under the Arctic ice must constantly use its active sonar to ascertain the contours of the seabed below and the pack ice above. Most SSKs have a maximum speed of about 20kts. Most SSNs can travel at up to 30kts, although the Soviet Alfas could reportedly travel at speeds up to 45kts. Currently, most AIP systems are not capable of travelling at speeds anywhere near even 20kts.(38) However, these technologies are constantly being refined, and many navies hope that within a decade AIP will offer speeds similar, if not superior, to what a normal diesel-electric engine offers. robustness & reliability A propulsion system will not be useful if it is not robust, and is therefore unreliable. Submarines cannot operate effectively if they are constantly in port for repairs to their engines. Furthermore, if their propulsion system breaks down during a conflict or while submerged under ice, the submarine and its crew may very well be destroyed.(39) Robustness and reliability are functions of two variables: how many small and delicate moving parts the propulsion system has, and how developed the technology it uses is. If a propulsion system has many delicate parts rapidly moving in concert with one another it is more likely to break, and at inopportune times such as when the submarine is moving faster or after it has been damaged. If a propulsion system uses relatively new technology, it is probable that the system hasn't got all of its 'bugs' worked out, and that it needs further refinement. When propulsion technologies are new and unrefined they will break down more often. This certainly happened with early nuclear-based propulsion systems, and the early diesel-electrics. Most AIP systems do not have many small delicate parts because they have been developed specifically for military usage, which demands great robustness from all of its technology. However some systems are less developed than others. Despite the potential of these less-developed systems, they are not likely to be used in a military setting until they are developed much further and they become more reliable.(40) Canadian criteria safety Safety is not a universal concern, but it is of great importance to Canada. As evidenced by their choice of propulsion system, many navies, such as Russia's,(41) do not consider the safety or comfort of their crew to be a primary concern. Canadians on the other hand would not allow their navy to use a propulsion system that might prove detrimental to the safety and health of a submarine crew. A submarine crew's safety may be compromised by many factors including dangerous materials used as fuel, pressurized components, radiation, and extreme heat. Admittedly, virtually all propulsion systems have some unsafe components, however, as we will see, some are much safer than others. cost Although this criteria is not a universal concern, it is a major concern to all the navies considering AIP. All the navies considering AIP want capabilities similar to SSNs, without the costs (financial and otherwise) associated with nuclear propulsion.(42) The cost to procure AIP systems varies greatly. Besides procurement costs, other costs must be considered as well. The price of fuel is a major consideration. Diesel fuel is quite cheap, but many AIP systems demand the use of more expensive fuel. Using a foreign-developed AIP system will mean higher repair and maintenance costs, if experts from Europe must be called in every time something breaks or every time submarine is refitted.(43) Some AIP systems will also require the construction of costly shore-based infrastructure. Canada has dismissed two otherwise promising AIP systems largely due to procurement costs.(44) It is a safe assumption that cost is a major concern to Canada's Maritime Command. environmental concerns Many navies do not even consider the environmental impact their submarines' propulsion system have. Canada does consider the environment to be a worthwhile concern. The Arctic is a fragile ecosystem, and minimizing the environmental impact submarines might have on it is an important goal.(45) Diesel-electric submarines release a large amount of noxious sulfur-based exhaust. Some AIP systems release exhaust composed solely of carbon dioxide, or even just pure water. Some AIP systems use non-renewable fossil fuels as a fuel source. Others use renewable fuels such as methanol, or even recyclable fuels such as refined aluminium.(46) Nuclear-powered submarines have fuel rods which must be disposed of in a specific kind of reactor. Most other kinds of AIP do not have problems associated with spent fuel. Many of the reviewed AIP systems will be better for the environment than either diesel-electric or nuclear propulsion. manoeuvrability Manoeuvrability is not a concern for navies whose submarines are limited to blue water operations. In the wide and deep open ocean, there is plenty of room to turn, and few obstacles to avoid. This is not true of the Arctic archipelago. As already mentioned, there are numerous sharp ice keels extending down into the water of the Arctic ocean, which submarines must manoeuvre under or around. Furthermore, the Arctic archipelago is littoral or coastal water. This means it is shallower than the deep ocean, with many obstructions such as large rocks and sandbars to avoid. Obviously, Canada will want a more manoeuvrable submarine to operate safely in the Arctic.(47) Manoeuvrability is largely a function of the size of a submarine. The larger the submarine, the more room it takes to turn, and the longer it takes to stop and turn. Most SSKs are quite small at about 2500 tonnes each.(48) However, nuclear-powered boats can weigh upwards of 18 700 tonnes each.(49) Any propulsion system that allows a submarine to remain as small as a regular SSK would be preferable to one that requires the submarine to be larger. Another factor, related to size, that can affect a submarine's manoeuvrability is whether the propulsion system requires a 'plug-in' section. Because most AIP systems are still not developed enough to travel at very high speeds and they use more expensive fuels, many navies will use a hybrid propulsion system, integrating a regular diesel-engine with the new AIP system. In this way, the submarine can travel most of the time under diesel power, but when it is necessary to operate with greater stealth, it can switch to AIP power. Because there is usually not enough room in a submarine to install a second propulsion system, it may be necessary to install a plug-in section. A 'plug-in' section contains the AIP propulsion system and its fuel. To install it, the submarine must be cut in half, the plug-in section fitted between the two halves, and the three parts welded together. As long as the plug-in section is not longer than the diameter of the submarine's hull, the submarine's operations should not be adversely affected.(50) However, if the if the plug-in section is any longer than that, the submarine's manoeuvrability will certainly be compromised. Most AIP systems require a plug-in section between 8 and 10m in length. An Upholder-class submarine hull has a diameter of between 6.5 and 7.6m.(51) You do the math. Besides adversely affecting manoeuvrability, installing plug-in sections is a costly procedure, and may prove to be quite useless if AIP technology advances enough that it can be used as a mono-propulsion system, without a diesel engine to back it up. extreme long-term underwater endurance While all navies considering AIP are interested in increased underwater endurance for the stealth it provides, few others are interested in providing their submarines with the capability to travel from one end of the Arctic to the other while completely submerged for the entire duration. So, while some navies might find a propulsion system that allows a submarine to function 3 times as long as it otherwise could to be entirely acceptable, Canada would prefer a system that would allow a submarine to remain submerged much longer. Admittedly, no AIP system currently in use would allow a submarine to stay submerged longer than a few days. However, some systems may be developed so that they eventually will be able to provide up to 30 days of submerged operations.(52) To give our submarines the ability to travel great distances through the Arctic while remaining completely submerged, Canada would do well to invest in these technologies over the ones that will never be able to provide more than 3 times submerged endurance. political acceptability More than many navies, the Canadian navy is constrained by the opinions of politicians and the Canadian public. In most countries, the decisions of the military are not held up to public scrutiny, but Canadian politicians and the Canadian public in general are more inclined to question military decisions. This is a consequence of both our right to free speech and the fact that we live in a relatively peaceful country. So, while the opinions of the public and many politicians do not affect which forms of AIP most navies choose, for better or for worse they do affect the choices made by our military. Therefore, a propulsion system must be acceptable to both the Canadian public and Canada's politicians, if the Navy expects the Canadian government to earmark funds for the procurement of this system. If either the public or a group of powerful politicians, such as the ruling party in government, does not approve of a propulsion system, no matter what advantages it presents no funds will be given towards its purchase. In the past, the public and powerful politicians have opposed under-ice propulsion systems due to cost, environmental matters, and doubts about the justification for the propulsion system.(53) In the future, we can expect similar kinds of concerns about whatever propulsion system the Navy chooses. Therefore, it behoves the Navy to either choose a propulsion system that does not present these concerns or present the desired AIP system in such a light that will minimize concerns about cost, environmental concerns, and the justification behind the system. To do this, DND must inform the public that the new system costs very little in comparison with many AIP systems; it will have minimal impact on the environment, and it is absolutely necessary for the defence of the Arctic. In what literature there has been on the matter, it is clear that the Navy has learned from its past mistakes, and is actively advertising these features of the new propulsion system.(54) potential for development Some AIP systems, no matter how much they are developed and their systems refined, will only give a certain quality of performance. This is often a function of the scientific principles behind the technology and the types of fuel used: no matter how efficient we can make a Slowpoke reactor, it will always give a minimal amount of power. No matter how efficient we make a diesel-engine its performance is always limited by the energy potential of its fuel. If Canada was to procure an inherently limited system, no matter how much the system is upgraded in the future, it will very soon become obsolete as other AIP technologies advance. This would prevent Canada from remaining on the forefront of AIP technology, where as already discussed, it would like to remain. Therefore, Canada should choose an AIP technology that, even if it is a bit undeveloped at present, has the potential to eventually become superior to other technologies. It is difficult to know which technologies have this potential, and thus there is a certain element of risk involved in choosing technologies based on this criteria. However, long-term potential can be (unreliably) gauged by comparing the specific energy of the fuel to be used(55) and evaluating the scientific principles behind the technology. Canada will also run the risk of trading robustness and reliability, which are often compromised in newer technologies, for long-term potential. domestic developer Not all navies are interested in having their AIP technology developed by domestic engineering firms. This is perhaps due to a dearth in domestic engineering firms capable of or interested in developing AIP technology, and the short-sighted assumption that it will cost less to buy a propulsion system from a competent foreign developer than it will to develop one's own technology. Canada on the other hand is greatly interested in procuring an AIP system developed by a Canadian firm. In fact, it may have disregarded a technology with even greater potential than fuel cells, just because that other technology is no longer being developed by a Canadian company.(56) The reasons for this interest in having a Canadian developer are many. Not only will investing in a Canadian firm provide employment for hundreds of skilled Canadian labourers, scientists, and engineers, it may also give Canada a new commodity for export, which may be used in bargaining with other countries who want AIP technology for their submarines. Furthermore, if Canada uses a domestic developer, we can be sure of the developer's loyalty. Whereas foreign developers may one day be prevented from interacting with Canada, due to fluctuations in the relationships between their host country and Canada, we can be sure that domestic developers will consider the needs of the Canadian government before any other government. Finally, if Canada uses a domestic developer, we can be sure that it will adhere to Canada's environmental and labour laws, which will be preferable to the Canadian public and politicians. The importance of having a domestic developer must not be understated. When Canada was considering procuring nuclear-powered submarines during the 1980's, it was willing to spend upwards of three times what it would cost to build the submarines in France or Britain, just to have the submarines built by Canadians in a Canadian shipyard.(57) Having a Canadian developer was definitely a deciding factor when Canada evaluated AIP systems. Had Ballard been an American firm, Canada's choice for AIP technology probably would have been different. Criteria not given enough attention Although the list of criteria used by the Canadian government to evaluate the different types of AIP includes many important considerations, the list is not complete. There are other criteria that the Navy should have considered when evaluating AIP systems, but have obviously not been given due attention. Had these factors been given greater consideration, Canada may have chosen a different type of AIP technology. support infrastructure Most of the AIP systems to be reviewed below require at least a shore-based cryogenics plant to be constructed at the submarine's home port. Some require much more costly infrastructure, including the modification of supply ships (AORs). All of them require specialized training for the submarine's crew and support staff. However, some need more costly changes to support infrastructure than others. This concern is not reflected in Canada's choice of AIP technology. This is odd inasmuch as when Canada was considering acquiring nuclear-powered submarines the need for a $3 billion shore-based facility to maintain and repair the SSNs was a major argument against the nuclear acquisition.(58) Why should the need for extensive shore-based infrastructure no longer be a major consideration? Other navies consider the need for extensive shore-based infrastructure to be an important concern. The Russian Navy has decided not to purchase fuel cell technology largely due to its requirements of shore-based maintenance facilities.(59) interoperability In many military policy discussions, Canada frequently advocates the need for the Canadian Forces to remain interoperable with the armed forces of the United States and our NATO allies.(60) However, our choice of AIP technology has not reflected this concern. Canada's choice of AIP technology requires a fuel, namely methanol, not used by any other navy in the world. This may limit our submarines' ability to participate in coalition efforts such as blockades and joint training exercises. It may also limit the distance afield that our submarines may travel, if they cannot refuel anywhere but Canada. Other navies consider interoperability to be an important concern. The concern for interoperability explains some otherwise confusing actions on the part of the German Navy. Germany is seriously considering converting its existing U 209 SSKs to hydride-based fuel cell power, and maybe making its forthcoming U 212 submarines AIP-powered as well. Germany is also spending a lot of money to advertise AIP fuel cell upgrades for the Type 209 submarines that it exported to 23 countries around the world between 1967 and 1995 .(61) Why would Germany care what sort of propulsion systems these other navies use? It cares about the type of propulsion system other countries use because it wants to be able to sail into 23 ports around the world and be able to refuel. The German Navy wants to remain interoperable with these other navies. If Canada is the only country using Ballard fuel cells, the only place Canadian subs will be able to refuel will be in Canada. An evaluation of the major forms of AIP Now that we have outlined some important criteria to consider when thinking about AIP systems, we may now evaluate the major forms of AIP using these criteria. This section will contain a very brief discussion about how each technology works, and an evaluation of that technology based on the criteria presented above. It will also describe which navies currently use this technology, and which are considering it. It will conclude by showing that although Ballard fuel cells do seem to be the best according to the criteria used by DND, they are certainly not the best when we consider the criteria ignored by DND. nuclear power While not usually considered a form of AIP, nuclear power allows submarines to operate without snorkelling, so it will be evaluated along with the other kinds of AIP. Simply put, nuclear power creates electricity by using Uranium 235 to sustain a fission reaction within a reactor core. The fission process is controlled by lowering control rods made of Boron, Hafnium, or Cadmium into the reactor core to absorb spare neutrons, and by surrounding the reactor's elements with pure water, which absorbs any heat produced.(62) Nuclear power presents submarines with a number of advantages. First and foremost, nuclear power produces excessive amounts of energy, which can be used for high speeds and hotel loads. This excess of power allows most nuclear submarines to travel fifty percent faster than the fastest SSK.(63) Due to the large amounts of power created by the reactor, the amount of time and the distance that a submarine can travel while submerged are limited only by the needs of the crew. Nuclear-powered submarines certainly have the extreme underwater endurance needed for under-ice operations. Nuclear-powered submarines can also operate at any depth, and their reactors are developed enough that there are few concerns with nuclear safety nowadays, at least in Western navies. Nuclear power is the preferred propulsion system for the world's largest navies. The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China all have nuclear-powered submarines, and India and Brazil are rumoured to be developing their own nuclear propulsion systems.(64) For a time between 1986 and 1988, the Maritime Command and Canada's defence ministers, Eric Nielsen and Perrin Beatty, seriously considered acquiring nuclear-powered submarines to replace Canada's Oberons. However, due to the cost of nuclear powered submarines, including the cost of shore-based infrastructure; environmental concerns; widespread public belief that Arctic sovereignty was fabricated as a way to justify the purchase of SSNs; and political resistance, these submarines were never acquired.(65) Ironically, the political inacceptibility did not come from strong public opinion about nuclear propulsion. In fact the Canadian public was rather indifferent to what sort of propulsion system was used as long as the boats were used for 'defense' and not 'attacking.'(66) Political resistance came from high-ranking Conservative politicians like external affairs minister Joe Clark and treasury minister Michael Wilson, who, respectively, objected to nuclear-powered subs for their potential to change the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact signatories, and their cost.(67) An excellent, and more detailed, discussion of the political machinations involved in the Canadian Navy's fruitless attempt to procure SSNs can be found in Through A Canadian Periscope (68) by Julie Ferguson. Now that Canada has agreed to buy the 4 Upholders, it is unlikely that Canada will seriously consider nuclear-powered submarines again for a very long time. Perhaps this is for the best. Besides being politically inacceptible, nuclear power has a number of other drawbacks. As already mentioned, nuclear-powered submarines require costly maintenance facilities, and are generally expensive to operate throughout their lives.(69) Disposal of the spent uranium fuel presents some environmental hazards. Lead-based radiation shielding needed to separate the reactor from crew compartments takes up a large portion of an SSN's volume, resulting in much larger and therefore less manoeuvrable boats. This makes SSNs unsuited to littoral or under-ice operations. Also, a nuclear reactor's coolant pumps are quite noisy. However, they must be run nearly constantly to avoid precipitating a meltdown in the reactor core.(70) Finally, there are no Canadian developers of maritime nuclear reactors. Therefore, Canada would have to purchase reactor technology from one of the countries with SSN technology. There is a strong possibility that one of these countries will not want to give Canada marine reactor technology, as the United States did not during the 1980's.(71) So, perhaps it is for the best that the Canadian Navy was unsuccessful in its bid to acquire nuclear powered submarines. AMPS A variant on the nuclear them is the SSn. The concept of the SSn was developed by the Canadian ECS group of companies during the 1970's. An SSn was a regular diesel-electric submarine fitted with a plug-in section containing a nuclear-based Autonomous Marine Power Source (AMPS). The AMPS used a low-energy Slowpoke nuclear reactor to continuously recharge the SSn's batteries during submerged operations. This would allow the submarine to travel submerged under battery/nuclear power indefinitely. This propulsion system did present the advantages of allowing unlimited underwater endurance, and having a Canadian developer. However, it required the installation of a plug-in section, and at $40 million a system in 1983, it was quite expensive. Perhaps most damning was the fact that this propulsion system offered little useful potential. The Slowpoke reactor produced very little power, exactly as it was designed to do. No amount of 'tweaking' would allow a Slowpoke-powered submarine to travel at anything more than 6kts.(72) Canada briefly considered this technology during the early 1980's. However, the SSn idea was rejected, largely due to its lack of potential and price. Currently, no navies are considering SSn technology. improved batteries An Upholder-class submarine's lead-acid batteries weigh approximately 200 tonnes, and occupy approximately 10% of the submarine's volume. Despite their size, they offer a maximum of 80 hours of submerged operation. This is because lead-acid batteries have a very low specific energy of only 30Wh per kg. If the Navy was to use batteries containing different combinations of reactants with higher specific energies the submarines might be able to travel submerged for much longer.(73) For instance, silver-zinc batteries have gravimetric and volumetric energy densities five times higher than those of lead-acid batteries. (This just means than a silver-zinc battery with the same volume and weight would generate 5 times the power that a lead-acid battery could.) Sodium-sulphur batteries have a higher potential energy than lead-acid, and would cost about the same per kWh. Iron sulphide batteries offer approximately 3 times the specific energy of lead acid batteries, and require much less maintenance because the battery cells are sealed. Lithium thionyl chloride (TCL) batteries offer 10 times the energy capacity as lead-acid batteries. Even though improved batteries can offer up to 10 times the energy density of lead-acid batteries, most don't provide enough underwater endurance for safe Arctic operations. Improved batteries suffer from other drawbacks as well. For instance, many types of high energy batteries have safety issues stemming from the high reactivity of their components. Others, like TCL batteries are primary batteries, meaning that they cannot be recharged. Without exception, all of these improved batteries would cost more than lead-acid batteries. Lead-acid batteries are currently produced by several manufacturers. This competition has kept the price of lead-acid batteries quite low. There is no such competition for naval markets among the rare producers of improved batteries. Lead-acid batteries have been in use since the First World War, and consequently have been refined and improved so much that they are quite robust and reliable. New batteries are unlikely to be as reliable. Furthermore, support staff and submariners are well-acquainted with lead-acid battery operations, maintenance, and repairs. They would not be as well-versed with the operations and repairs of other kinds of batteries. Consequently, submariners and support staff would have to undergo additional training to learn how to properly use these new batteries. Largely due to the dramatically increased cost of new batteries, most navies, including Canada's, have not seriously considered switching to new batteries. Only one navy, the Russian Navy, has actually converted its submarines from lead-acid to a different variety of battery. Russia's submarines use nickel-cadmium batteries. Their reasons for this conversion are not clear, because nickel-cadmium batteries offer only slightly better performance than lead-acid batteries and cost considerably more.(74) It is extremely unlikely that Canada will switch to improved batteries for a very long time. closed-cycle diesel Perhaps the simplest of AIP conversions is the closed-cycle diesel (CCD). A CCD engine works like a regular diesel engine, except that it does not need to draw in atmospheric oxygen for the combustion of the diesel fuel. A CCD carries around its own oxygen, stored as liquid oxygen (LOX) in a cryogenic tank. Before entering the diesel generator the stored oxygen is mixed with an unreactive gas like argon in order to control the rate of combustion. The exhaust produced by the combustion of oxygen and diesel fuel... leaves the diesel engine outlet with a temperature of approximately 350 to 400 (degrees Celsius) and a pressure of up to 5 bar.... After being cooled down by a spray cooling system to approximately 80 (degrees Celsius) the gas is fed into the absorber. The absorber is a rotating scrubbing mechanism, consisting of a rotor which mixes the exhaust gas with seawater. The required amount of seawater is supplied by the water management system, in a way which enables the CCD to operate depth independently. The system is designed for a maximum operation depth of 500m and a maximum seawater flow of 50 litres per second.(75) CCD allows a submarine to increase its submerged endurance by a factor of five. CCD meets many of the desired criteria set forth in the previous section. The system can eject exhaust up to 500m, which just meets our requirement for depth independence. CCD will also allow the submarine to operate at the same speed as a regular diesel engine. Because the CCD system uses a regular diesel engine to provide propulsion, little in the way of new maintenance facilities or extensive training for crews and support staff will be necessary. (Although the construction of a shore-based cryogenics plant will be necessary for the storage of LOX.) Since the system uses regular diesel fuel, submarines powered by CCD can refuel at ports anywhere around the world, or use fuel supplies carried by any number of AORs. Although there are no large engineering firms currently producing CCD motors in Canada, research on CCD has taken place here, and it would probably be possible to find a Canadian engineering consortium to build a CCD propulsion system. Finally, because the CCD system uses a normal diesel-electric motor, which has been refined for well over half a century, it is an extremely robust and reliable system. The CCD system does have some drawbacks. Although its developers are currently working to overcome this necessity,(76) as it stands, CCD requires a 'plug-in' section to contain the argon and oxygen tanks and other components of the CCD system. As already discussed, this may adversely influence the boat's manoeuvrability. Furthermore, the CCD operates just as noisily and produces just as much heat as a regular diesel-electric motor. This makes it just as detectable by sonar and infrared means as an unmodified SSK. The CCD also ejects dissolved exhaust, which may be detectable by chemical means. Finally, the CCD can only offer performance similar to what a regular diesel-electric engine offers. While this seems quite beneficial right now, after all most AIP systems can't offer anywhere near the same kind of speed as a diesel engine, we must remember that engineers hope that other AIP technologies will one day offer performance many times better than standard diesel-electric propulsion systems. This lack of future potential has prevented the Closed-Cycle Diesel from receiving the attention it would otherwise deserve. Research on CCD has taken place in many countries, including Canada. However, the world leaders in CCD technology are definitely Germany's Thyssen Nordseewerke (TNSW) and RDM submarines of the Netherlands. They have been working on CCD since the late 1980's and have produced a 300kW power plant known as SPECTRE, which stands for Submarine Power for Extended Contact Trailing and Range Enhancement.(77) In 1988, TNSW installed the SPECTRE system in a decommissioned German Navy submarine, the ex- U1, for sea trials in the Baltic. Although TNSW and RDM have actively marketed the SPECTRE system to the Argentinian Navy, the Royal Netherlands Navy, the German Navy, and the South Korean Navy, so far they have had no success finding a buyer.(78) This is a shame. CCD offers speeds superior to what any other AIP system can currently offer or will likely be able to offer within the next decade, and it does so with minimal changes to interoperability or support infrastructure. Had Canada given either of these factors greater consideration, I am sure that some sort of CCD would be a front runner for our choice of AIP. MESMA The Module d'Energie Sous-Marin Autonome or MESMA system is so far the only AIP system to have been offered for export and purchased by a foreign navy. The MESMA system burns cryogenically stored oxygen and ethanol fuel at 700 degrees Celsius and 60 bar pressure in order to drive a "steam-driven Rankine cycle turbine that drives a high speed turbo alternator to supply direct current to the submarine."(79) Because the system is pressurized to 60 bar, the exhaust produced by the combustion of the ethanol and oxygen may be expelled from the submarine at any depth above 600m. The MESMA system is an improvement over diesel engines in many ways. First, it uses "rotating machinery rather than reciprocating machinery,"(80) which cuts down on noise produced. Furthermore, it can operate at depths up to 600m, which is quite desirable. Finally, the MESMA system offers submerged endurance 3 to 5 times greater than what a diesel-electric engine can offer. However, the MESMA system has many, many drawbacks. First of all, it requires the installation of a plug-in section to hold the Rankine cycle steam engine and the tanks for ethanol and oxygen storage. Second, it operates at a temperature of 700 degrees Celsius,(81) which increases the submarine's infrared signature. Third, the MESMA system expels warm carbon dioxide-based gases that can be detected using infrared or chemical means. Fourth, the MESMA system uses ethanol fuel which is not typically used for maritime propulsion systems. This means that any submarines using the MESMA system will only be able to refuel in their own ports, which limits the distances they can travel and their interoperability. (It should be noted, however, that DCN International, the French company producing the MESMA system, is currently working on a way to allow the MESMA system to use diesel fuel instead of ethanol.)(82) Fifth, The MESMA system is pressurized to 60 bar. This is very high, and may present some safety concerns. Sixth, the MESMA system will require the construction of facilities to maintain the Rankine cycle engine, if its owners do not want to send their subs to France every time maintenance or repairs are required. And seventh, the MESMA system can offer a maximum submerged speed of only 4 kts.(83) Although this speed is suitable for patrol, it is not suited to combat situations or high speed transit. The MESMA system was developed during the 1980's by a consortium of engineering firms led by DCN international, the French Navy's design and procurement bureau.(84) Although the French Navy has no plans to install MESMA systems in any of its submarines, DCN has offered to export the technology to several navies. So far, it has had one buyer. Pakistan has purchased MESMA systems for its 3 new French-built Agosta 90B-class submarines. The first two Agostas, the Hashmat and the Hurmat, will receive the MESMA system as a retrofit plug-in section; the last will have a MESMA system installed during construction in Karachi. In mid-2001, the Hashmat and Hurmat will be fitted with the MESMA system.(85) It is extremely unlikely that the Canadian Navy will ever procure MESMA technology from France. The system simply has too many problems, and offers very little in the way of useful capability. This leads us to wonder why Pakistan saw fit to procure this technology. Stirling engines "The Stirling engine is the first and as yet only AIP solution to enter service in the modern era." (86) A Stirling engine, such as the Mark 2 V4-275R model patented by Kockums Naval Systems of Sweden, burns LOX and a special low sulphur fuel called Ligroin(87) to produce heat which is then used to expand a working gas, presumably helium, to drive a series of pistons. The fuel exhaust created is then cooled from approximately 800 degrees Celsius to 25 degrees Celsius and then pressurized to 20 bar and ejected into the surrounding seawater. Because the Stirling engine's pistons are driven not by small explosions of fuel, as they are in a diesel engine, but by a constant heat source used to expand a working gas, the Stirling engine is apparently much quieter than diesel engines.(88) The Stirling engine, having been in development by Kockums since 1965, is certainly one of the more reliable and robust AIP systems. However, the Stirling engine is far from perfect. Each Mark 2 Stirling engine produced today can generate only 65 to 75 kW of power. Since a submarine needs least 200 kW of power to operate necessary hotel loads and move at a minimum of 4 kts, between 2 and 4 Stirling engines must be installed in each submarine.(89) This not only makes it necessary to install a 'plug-in' section in any submarine using Stirling engines, it also increases the price of the system, making Stirling power one of the more expensive varieties of AIP technology. Because of the large amount of oxygen needed by Stirling engines, no amount of development will take away the requirement for a plug-in section. Furthermore, although Kockums claims that the Stirling engine can use any kind of fossil fuel, they recommend the fuel Ligroin, which purportedly reduces corrosion. Ligroin is not widely available, nor will it be inexpensive. Because the Stirling engine's exhaust system is pressurized to just 20 bar, a submarine powered by a Stirling engine can only dive to 200m. Kockums claims that the system can be modified to operate at deeper depths with use of another compressor.(90) However, this compressor would take up a lot of power, and would likely be quite noisy. Finally, despite the fact that the Stirling engine has been in development for 35 years, it still offers only about two weeks submerged transit at 4 kts. It is unlikely that further development will be able to improve this much. Despite its limitations, many navies have considered procuring the Stirling engine for retrofitting into existing SSKs. In 1988, the Swedish Navy installed an 8m Stirling plug-in section into the Submarine Nacken. In 1995, Sweden installed Mk2 Stirling systems in its new Gotland-class submarines: the HMS Gotland, the HMS Uppland, and the HMS Halland. Other navies considering Stirling engines include the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and the Taiwanese Navy.(91) Canada also evaluated the Stirling engine in 1997, but rejected it due to the "large plant size and low overall system efficiencies."(92) semi-fuel cells Semi-fuel cells (SFCs) have a long term potential at least as promising as Ballard fuel cells. However, currently no one is working to develop them for maritime use. "The basic aluminium/oxygen semi-fuel cell can best be described as a hybrid between a fuel cell and a battery."(93) In a semi-fuel, cell a refined aluminium anode undergoes controlled corrosion producing electrons and positively charged aluminium ions. The electrons are used to provide direct current for submarine operations, while the positively charged aluminium ions (Al+) react with negatively charged hydroxyl ions (OH-) to produce an aluminate by-product, Al(OH)3. If there is enough electrolyte solution in the SFC, the aluminate will remain dissolved. However, if the electrolyte solution becomes saturated with Al(OH)3, the aluminate will precipitate out of solution and solidify on the anode, reducing the efficiency of the cell. To prevent aluminate from collecting on the anode, it may be necessary to install a pumped solids-free or solids-managed precipitate control system. These precipitate management systems will also reduce the efficiency of the semi-cells, and can be noisy. The self-managed precipitate management system would not require the use of a noisy pump.(94) By volume and by weight, aluminium semi-fuel cells have greater energy densities than any kind of battery. They offer speeds and performance similar to fuel cells. They also operate completely silently; that is, if they don't use a pumped precipitate management system. Semi-fuel cells operate at 25 degrees Celsius, which will present a minimal infrared signature.(95) Furthermore, the SFC system does not eject exhaust overboard, which makes it undetectable by chemical means, and it can safely operate at any depth. The aluminium fuel anodes are easily manufactured and the precipitate can be recycled and can used to make, among other things, toothpaste.(96) All products used in the semi-fuel cell can be handled safely, and refuelling is a simple process of restocking aluminium anodes, emptying precipitate reservoirs, and filling electrolyte chambers with potassium hydroxide solution (KOH). Even if these products are not widely available in ports abroad, they can be easily carried by Canadian supply ships. Semi-fuel cells would need shore-based maintenance facilities, but these facilities would not need cryogenics plants. Semi-fuel cells have a potential at least as promising as fuel cells. And in fact during the early 1990's, the world leader in semi-fuel cell technology, Alupower Canada Ltd. of Kingston, Ontario, did agree to build an XDM model of a semi-fuel cell power plant for the Department of National Defence. DND found that the semi-fuel cells offered capabilities similar to those offered by fuel cells, and concluded that neither technology was superior to the other. However, Alupower's sale to an American firm, Yardney, in 1994 ended the relationship between Canada and Alupower.(97) Despite the technology's potential, Canada will not continue investing in SFC technology without a Canadian developer. Canada's decision to end its development program with Alupower may have also been influenced by the fact that SFC technology is a least a generation behind all other AIP systems.(98) SFC technology is very new, and is no where near developed as closed cycle diesel technology, Stirling engines, and even fuel cells. To make SFC technology usable in a military situation, extensive and expensive development is still needed. While Alupower was still a Canadian company, the Canadian government was interested in developing SFC's potential, but it would seem that neither party is interested in marine applications for semi-fuel cells any more. This is indisputable evidence of the importance Canada has placed in having a Canadian developer. Let us just hope that the Navy will not be forced to adopt inferior technologies by being restricted to Canadian technologies. fuel cells There are as many kinds of fuel cells (FCs) as there are definitions of security. All work pretty much like a reverse battery. However, most varieties of fuel cells are unsuited to submarine operations because they produce a large amount of heat. For instance, the molten carbonate fuel cell (MCFC) operates at 645 degrees Celsius, while the monolithic solid oxide fuel cell (MSOFC) operates at 990 degrees Celsius. However, the advanced proton exchange membrane (APEM) fuel cell operates at a much more reasonable 80 to 85 degrees Celsius.(99) All APEM fuel cells work in basically the same way. Hydrogen, either extracted from methanol or metal hydride, is fed into the fuel cell where it breaks down into electrons and protons, with the help of a platinum-based catalyst. The electrons are used to provide power for the submarine, while the protons migrate across the proton exchange membrane. On the other side of the membrane, the electrons leave the electrical circuit and combine with the protons and oxygen to form pure, potable water, which is the only by-product of this reaction. Many engineering firms around the world are developing APEM fuel cell technology, and many navies are considering using this technology in submarines. The German firms Siemens and Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG (HDW) have developed a fuel cell power plant that they hope will be fitted as a 'plug-in' section in the new German Type 212 submarines. To hold fuel the German FC system uses one large tank containing liquid oxygen and several small, reinforced tanks containing metal hydride fuel kept outside the pressure hull. HDW's 300kW fuel system will allow a submarine like the U 212 to travel submerged for approximately 14 days. These fuel cells operate virtually silently, with no exhaust except for pure water, which may be consumed by the crew.(100) The Kristall-27E system developed by Russia's Rubin Central Marine Design Bureau works in a rather similar way. Rubin designed the Kristall system for use in Russia's new Amur-class SSKs, or for retrofitting Russian Kilo-class submarines. However, the Russian Navy is reluctant to procure Kristall fuel cell technology due to the "large overheads associated with shore-based infrastructure."(101) Russia is also reluctant to export the technology without further testing. The fuel cell system developed by Ballard works similarly to the German and Russian fuel cells except that it does not obtain the necessary hydrogen from metal hydride tanks, but from a single tank containing methanol (CH3OH). There are several reasons methanol fuel is preferable to hydrogen fuel. Besides being obviously safer, methanol fuel is an inexpensive renewable resource, and it can hold 40% more hydrogen atoms than can a similar volume of metal hydride. However, a piece of equipment called a 'reformer' is needed to extract the hydrogen from the methanol. The use of a reformer will reduce overall system efficiencies. Using methanol fuel also creates carbon dioxide exhaust, which must be disposed of.(102) Although the details of this part of the Ballard system are not clear, it would seem that Ballard intends to dispose of the carbon dioxide by dissolving it in seawater,(103) perhaps using some sort of absorber similar to the kinds used by the SPECTRE, MESMA, or Stirling systems. Until we know more about the absorber system Ballard intends to use we cannot know for sure, but there is a distinct possibility that the absorber will either reduce the fuel cell's system efficiency by requiring a noisy compressor, or it will limit the diving depth of the submarine, as the Stirling engine's exhaust system does. Furthermore, carbon dioxide exhaust, unlike the pure water produced by HDW's and Rubin's fuel cells, can be detected by chemical means. Nevertheless, Ballard's fuel cell technology has many benefits. It is widely regarded as having the greatest potential for development of any AIP technology. It has a low heat signature, and even with a reformer it is quieter than a diesel generator. It produces no sulfur-based exhaust, and is more efficient than most other systems (a notable exception being semi-fuel cells).(104) Perhaps most importantly, the world leader in fuel cell development is a Canadian company. Largely due to the technology's long-term potential and due to the fact that it has a Canadian developer, DND has decided to invest $75 million in Ballard for the creation of a 300kW power plant, which would allow a submarine to travel at 4kts for 30 days completely submerged. DND hopes that the new power plant would provide enough energy to allow the Upholders' diesel generators to be removed. "Using methanol fuel, the fuel generator would use LOX during submerged operations and air for surface and snorting operations."(105) Despite DND's decision to place all of its eggs in Ballard's basket, Ballard's fuel cells are not perfect. Aside from the operational problems arising from the use of methanol fuel mentioned above, fuel cell technology is well-known for being the most expensive AIP technology.(106) Furthermore, the technology is still quite new. It will be at least a decade before any Ballard-made products are installed in Canadian submarines. Even then it is doubtful they will be able to offer performance better than a CCD system. Methanol fuel is not currently used as a maritime fuel by any other navy, nor is it being considered as a potential fuel by other navies looking into AIP. This means that the only place our submarines will be able to refuel will be in Canadian ports with tanks specifically modified to store methanol and cryogenic facilities to store LOX. Facilities to store methanol and LOX will have to be constructed on both coasts, along with other types of shore-based maintenance facilities. Our submarines will not be able to participate in blockades or other joint operations far from Canadian ports without being accompanied by a Canadian AOR modified to carry LOX and methanol. This limits our interoperability. Even though methanol is inexpensive, it is doubtful we will be able to obtain large quantities of it for less than the price of diesel. So, to recap, Canada has chosen to invest in an AIP technology than requires extensive shore-based maintenance and fuel storage facilities, and is not interoperable with other navies. Our preferred AIP technology costs more than any other, will not be developed enough for use in military service for another decade, may not be able to dive to our desired depth of 500m, and may not run silently, whereas other technologies are able to do this. Already, we may begin to question whether or not choosing to invest in Ballard was a good idea. Our doubts may increase when we consider the great variety of technological, operational, and even strategic obstacles that must be surmounted for Canada to be able to effectively assert our Arctic sovereignty and deter unwanted submarine activity in the North. Challenges to be surmounted technical Arctic operations will present a number of technical challenges to Canada's submarines that must be overcome, and probably at great cost, if our submarines are to operate safely and effectively under the polar ice pack. First of all, the Victorias will have to be armoured to protect against ice damage. Russia's Typhoon-class submarines are well armoured against ice damage, as are some German submarines.(107) The Upholders were not built for under-ice operations. Thus, they will be easily damaged by brushing against ice keels, or attempting to surface under too thick ice. Their sails, bows, and sides should be reinforced with thick steel. Not only will it likely cost a fair amount to have steel plates welded onto the Victorias, the weight of the steel may slow the submarine down significantly. Any major modifications to submarine's hulls may also affect the submarine's manoeuvrability. Communications are also difficult in the polar region. Submarines must be able to surface a wire to transmit at both the Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) and the Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio bands. Surfacing a wire is difficult under thick pack ice. Polar Cap Disturbance (PCD), ionic interference resulting from sunspot activity occurring at the Earth's polar regions, can interfere with VLF radio reception for days at a time.(108) Canada should seek to develop ways to overcome these challenges to communication, or risk not being able to communicate with our submarines at critical moments during their Northern patrols. Finally, under-ice navigation presents a number of technical challenges. The polar ice cap moves an average of 5000m per day. The constantly moving currents twist the ice pack into a random pattern of ever-changing keels and polynyas. No maps can be drawn of the underside of this shifting mass of ice. Consequently, under-ice navigation is difficult. Since submarines first began their under-ice forays in 1952, the standard procedure for under-ice operations has been to use active sonar to get a picture of the topography of the ice pack above, beside, and ahead of the submarine.(109) However, the use of active sonar is readily detectable by other submarines. To avoid the loss of stealth engendered by the recourse to active sonar, alternative methods of under-ice navigation should be sought. Some submarines do use small television cameras mounted on the submarine's bow. Nevertheless, these cameras offer a limited picture of the ice's terrain, and are ineffective in the dark.(110) The submarines' satellite navigation system may also be adversely affected by under-ice operations. Satellite-based navigation systems, such as the kind used by the Oberons and therefore presumably the kind to be used in the Victorias, require a submarine to surface or extend a trailing antenna to the surface for the system to be able to ascertain the submarine's position.(111) Under thick ice, it is not possible for a submarine to surface, nor to surface a wire. To overcome this problem, Canada must either develop or purchase a new type of navigation system capable of charting a submarine's position without surfacing. operational changes Besides some technical challenges to be overcome, several operational changes must be made for our under-ice capable submarines to be effective deterrents of unwanted Arctic activity. Again, these changes are costly. However, if they are not made, our under-ice capable submarines will not be effective in their role of Arctic defense. If they will not be effective defenders of the Arctic, it will be very difficult to justify the acquisition of AIP technology. First of all, if the Ballard fuel cells limit our submarines to 30 days travel at 4kts, and we have no reason to think they won't, it will be necessary to have submarines on both coasts to protect both the western and eastern approaches to the Arctic. There is no way that fuel-cell powered boats based in Halifax would be able to protect the western approaches to the Arctic, because at 4kts it would take about 10 days to just reach the Arctic. A fuel-cell powered submarine wouldn't have the fuel to travel from Halifax and conduct patrols into the western end of the Arctic archipelago, and then return to Halifax. However, if there were submarines stationed on both coasts, they could each travel up to the Arctic in about 10 days, patrol their various approaches for 10 days, and return in 10 days. Fortunately, the Navy has indeed seen fit to station one submarine, the Victoria, on the west coast. However, ideally there would be two boats on the west coast. If all of our submarines are in port, other navies will have no reason to believe they will encounter one of our subs in the Arctic. If there is only one submarine at sea from either port, submarines from other navies will simply limit their operations to the opposite end of the Arctic archipelago. To be an effective deterrent of unwanted submarine activity in the North, at least one submarine from each cost must be at sea at all times. This will represent a dramatic change from submarine operations conducted using the Oberons, which spent most of their time close to port for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) training.(112) Constantly being out of port will put a terrific strain on the submarine and crew stationed on the west coast. The Navy has sought to rectify this situation by training two crews for the Victoria, allowing one crew to use the boat, while the other rests or works in Esquimalt.(113) This does not eliminate the strain put on the boat itself. By being in constant use, the Victoria will age twice as fast as submarines with one crew. Furthermore, the need to be constantly at sea will prevent the Victoria from undergoing large-scale repairs and maintenance. On the other hand, if the Victoria is taken out of service for maintenance and repairs, it will lose its deterrent value in the western approaches to the Arctic. The only real solution to this problem, is to station another boat on the west cost. This would eliminate the strain on the Victoria and its crew, and allow one boat to be constantly at sea. As already mentioned, if we procure Ballard technology, maintenance and repair facilities will have to be built on both coasts. These facilities will each have to have tanks for the storage of methanol and cryogenic facilities for the storage of oxygen. Furthermore, if we want our submarines to able to refuel while at sea we will have to modify our AORs to carry methanol fuel and cryogenically-stored liquid oxygen. Furthermore, since there will be no other ports where our submarines can refuel with methanol and oxygen, these supply ships will have to follow our submarines around on any missions more than 30 days travel at 4kts away. Our submarines will not be able to operate as part of a NATO or UN led blockade without bringing along a supply ship. Not only will it be a logistical challenge to always have to send a supply ship along when a submarine goes anywhere, it will also reduce a submarine's stealth, if foreign intelligence services realize that once a month our submarines will have to rendezvous with a Canadian supply ship. None of this would be a problem if Canada chose a propulsion system that used diesel. strategic changes Finally, to be effective deterrents of unwanted submarine activity in the Arctic, Canada's entire strategy towards the Arctic must change. While most of these changes to strategy won't cost much financially, they will require a lot of careful consideration, and may cause more grief than any decision to allocate funds to overcome some technical problem. Commanders from both coasts must include Arctic operations in their plans. At some time in the near future, it will be necessary to decide which fleet should cover which parts of the Arctic archipelago. The fleets on both coasts are already quite busy, so it is unlikely that either will be overjoyed at the prospect of thousands more square kilometres to patrol. To one or both fleets must also go the task of mapping the Arctic ocean floor. Both the Russian and American Navies have detailed maps of the floor of the Arctic ocean. Canada must either attempt to acquire these maps from either the Americans or the Russians, or map the floor ourselves. Canada must develop a policy to address how unfriendly encounters in the Arctic must be dealt with. Do we torpedo a Russian or American SSN using our internal waters? Or, do we simply follow them until they leave our waters, keeping in mind that they can wait submerged much longer than we can. We must also develop a policy to deal with criminal activity encountered in the Arctic. Keeping in mind that aside from torpedoing suspected criminals, there is little we can do to stop their illegal activity. We must also consider making a major strategic change by sharing information about our Arctic submarine operations with the United States, and vice versa. Until now, both the United States and Canada have kept information about submarine operations a closely-guarded secret. That may have to change. Within the enclosed and narrow straits of the Arctic archipelago, where communications are difficult for reasons discussed above, there is a considerable chance that submarines from either state will encounter a submarine from the other country and mistake it for a threat. These sort of 'blue on blue encounters'(114) may be avoided if both sides give the other information about where their submarines are likely to be found in the Arctic and when. Increased integration will be a great change, a sea change if you will, in the submarine strategies of both countries. Despite the obvious desirability of this kind of information sharing for both sides, it may not come about. If Canada - U.S. relations sour due to conflicting ideas about NMD, the Americans may be unwilling to share information with Canadians, and vice versa. These costly technical challenges to be overcome, and these necessary changes to Canadian submarine operations and strategy show us that simply acquiring AIP technology will not solve all of our problems in the Arctic. As with all technologies, changes must be made to strategy and operations to exploit the new technology to its fullest potential. We must ask ourselves if, given the flawed decision making process used to select Ballard fuel cells and the many strategic, operational and technical changes which will be necessary, if the ability to patrol the Arctic and the stealth capabilities presented by AIP are really worth all the costs. After all, submarines, AIP powered or not, are not the most versatile of platforms. While they are suited to deterring unfriendly navies from using Canada's Arctic, participating in some joint exercises, bolstering our claims to sovereignty over the region, and to assisting surface ships in maintaining sea control over our territorial waters, they are not well-suited to many of the tasks given to the Navy of late. Due to their lack of extra space, submarines are not suited to transporting soldiers or supplies for peacekeeping or humanitarian missions. Because of their size and stealthy nature, they are not well-suited to hosting diplomatic dinners, 'showing the flag,' and other activities of a diplomatic nature.(115) Because their weaponry is limited to the uniformly destructive Mark 48 torpedo, they are not suited to dealing with low-level conflicts or responding to criminal activity.(116) While it was possible for a surface ship to put a shot across the bow of a Spanish fishing vessel, it is not possible for a submarine to put a shot across the bow of a ship simply to make a point. For one thing, torpedoes are not designed to go across bows; they go straight into bows and sink their targets. Furthermore, Mark 48 torpedoes cost between $1.25 million and $4 million apiece.(117) It is unlikely that the Canadian government would be willing to spend over a million dollars to show some interloping vessel we mean business. It is equally ridiculous to think that torpedoes would be used to halt criminal activity. However, if we are unwilling to use our submarines' weapons in low level conflicts, and we are known to be unwilling to use our weapons in these situations, our submarines cease to be an effective deterrent of any of the unwanted activities that lead to low level conflict situations. It is naive to think that just acquiring Ballard fuel cells will allay all of our concerns in the Arctic. Many technical, operational, and strategic changes must be made for that to happen. Seventy-five million dollars may not seem that much to preserve Arctic sovereignty and security, but effectively defending the Arctic will cost much, much more than that. We must now ask ourselves if, given the flawed rationale for choosing Ballard fuel cells and the limited uses for submarines, AIP propulsion is really worth millions of dollars and dramatic changes to strategy and operations. Are increased stealth and defending the Arctic from threats which may never materialize really worth hundreds of millions of dollars? Or, can we get away with having obsolete submarines and virtually no military presence in the Arctic, as has been the case for 25 years? We must consider these questions now, before any more money is invested in Ballard. Citations (1) Sharon Hobson, "Canada Plans to Customise Upholder Submarines," Jane's Defense Weekly , (24 June 1998): 28-29. (2) Ibid., 29. (3) Sharon Hobson, "Canada Studies Ballard Fuel Cell Solutions," Jane's International Defense Review , (November 1999): 49. (4) Ibid., 49. (5) Harriet Critchley, "Canadian Naval Responsibilities in the Arctic," in RCN in Transition: 1910-1985 , ed. W.A.B. Douglas, (Vancouver, The University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 281. (6) Ibid., 283. (7) Ibid., 283. (8) Canada, Maritime Command, Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada (Ottawa, 1997), 12. (9) Critchley, "Canadian Naval Responsibilities in the Arctic," 289. (10) Richard Scott, "Power Surge: Air-Independent Propulsion Systems are Now in Service," Jane's Defense Weekly , (1 July 1998): 24. (11) "MESMA Air Independent Propulsion system," http://www.dcintl.com/mesma.htm (21 October 1998). (12) Critchley, "Canadian Naval Responsibilities in the Arctic," 289. (13) Julie H. Ferguson, Through A Canadian Periscope: The Story of the Canadian Submarine Service (Toronto: Oxford Press, 1995), 312. (14) Ibid., 312-313. (15) Ibid., 313. (16) Ibid., 297. (17) Richard Compton-Hall, Submarine Versus Submarine: The Tactics and Technology of Underwater Confrontation ( Toronto: Collins, 1988), 79. (18) Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope , 312. (19) Compton-Hall, Submarine Versus Submarine , 80. (20) Ibid., 23. (21) Ian J. Potter, Underwater Power Systems: Assessment of an Air-Independent Diesel Engine (Calgary: University of Calgary, Department of Mechanical Engineering, 1992), 52-57. (22) Scott, "Power Surge," 26. (23) "The Little 'n' That Could," Canada's Naval Annual , 4 (1989/90): 28-29. (24) M.J. Adams, "Fuel Cells and the Navy," Maritime Engineering Journal , (October 1994): 4. (25) Antony Preston, Submarine Warfare: An Illustrated History (London: Brown Packaging Books Ltd., 1998), 100-103. (26) Hobson, "Canada Plans to Customise Upholder Submarines," 29. (27) Scott, "Power Surge," 27. (28) Ibid., 27. (29) Potter, Underwater Power Systems, 43. (30) Preston, Submarine Warfare , 79. (31) Compton-Hall, Submarine Versus Submarine , 35-36. (32) "TNSW Closed Cycle," International Defence Technolo gy, (September 1997): 36. (33) Richard Scott, "Boosting the Staying Power of the Non-nuclear Submarine," Jane's International Defence Review , (November 1999): 44. (34) Compton-Hall, Submarine Versus Submarine , 35. (35) Ibid., 184. (36) Ibid., 22. (37) Ibid., 81. (38) Scott, "Boosting the Staying Power of the Non-nuclear Submarine," 47-50. (39) Potter, Underwater Power Systems, 43-46. (40) Ibid.,52-57. (41) Compton-Hall, Submarine Versus Submarine , 109-112. (42) Joris Janssen Lok, "Submarines Make a Return to Convention," Jane's Defence Weekly , (19 February 1997): 21. (43) "Rescue Operation, " http://www.submarines.com/history.html (21 October 1998). (44) Hobson, "Canada Studies Ballard Fuel Cell Solutions," 49; Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope , 328. (45) Janssen Lok, "Submarines Make a Return to Convention," 21. (46) Adams, "Fuel Cells and the Navy," 2. (47) David Foxwell, "Sub Proliferation Sends Navies Diving for Cover: The Multiple Menace of Diesel-Electric Submarines," Jane's International Defence Review , (1 August 1997): 31. (48) Compton-Hall, Submarine Versus Submarine , 34-35. (49) Ibid., 70. (50) "TNSW Closed Cycle Diesel," 37. (51) "UPHOLDER Class," http://www.uss-salem.org/navhist/Canada/current/upholder.htm (8 February 2000). (52) Hobson, "Canada Studies Ballard Fuel Cell Solutions," 49. (53) Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope , 312, 323, 327. (54) "ballard | products | other applications | marine power," http://www.ballard.com/03pr/pr0402.html (19 October 1998). (55) Adams, "Fuel Cells and the Navy," 5. (56) Ibid., 5. (57) Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope , 322. (58) Ibid., 309. (59) Scott, "Boosting the Staying Power of the Non-nuclear Submarine," 43. (60) Canada, Maritime Command, Adjusting Course , 24. (61) Udo Ude, "Class 209 Submarines: A Success on the Export Market," International Defence Technology , (September 1997): 33-35. (62) Compton-Hall, Submarine Versus Submarine , 27. (63) Ibid., 30. (64) Preston, Submarine Warfare , 83. (65) Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope , 323-324. (66) Ibid., 310. (67) Ibid., 310. (68) Ibid. (69) Scott, "Boosting the Staying Power of the Non-nuclear Submarine," 41. (70) Compton-Hall, Submarine Versus Submarine , 27. (71) Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope , 314. (72) 'The Little 'n' That Could," 28. (73) Potter, Underwater Power Systems, 46-49. (74) Ibid., 46-49. (75) "TNSW Closed Cycle Diesel," 36. (76) Ibid., 36. (77) Scott, "Power Surge," 27. (78) Ibid., 27. (79) Ibid., 26. (80) Ibid., 26. (81) Scott, "Boosting the Staying Power of the Non-nuclear Submarine," 50. (82) Ibid., 50. (83) Ibid., 50. (84) Scott, "Power Surge," 26. (85) Preston, Submarine Warfare , 90. (86) Scott, "Power Surge," 25. (87) Potter, Underwater Power Systems, 57-60. (88) "Kockums AIP System," http://www.kockums.se/aip.htm (21 October 1998). (89) Scott, "Power Surge," 24-25. (90) Ibid., 25. (91)Scott, "Boosting the Staying Power of the Non-nuclear Submarine," 44. (92) Hobson, "Canada Studies Ballard Fuel Cell Solutions," 49. (93) Adams, "Fuel Cells and the Navy," 1. (94) Ibid., 2. (95) Potter, Underwater Power Systems, 52-57. (96) Adams, "Fuel Cells and the Navy," 2. (97) Ibid., 5. (98) Potter, Underwater Power Systems, 52-57. (99) Ibid., 52. (100) Adams, "Fuel Cells and the Navy," 1. (101) Scott, "Boosting the Staying Power of the Non-nuclear Submarine," 43. (102) Adams, "Fuel Cells and the Navy," 1. (103) Scott, "Power Surge," 26. (104) Adams, "Fuel Cells and the Navy," 1. (105) Scott, "Power Surge," 26. (106) Ibid., 25. (107) Dieter Stockfisch, "Modern Submarines (SSKs) in Naval Warfare," International Defence Technology , (September 1997): 17. (108) Compton-Hall, Submarine Versus Submarine , 83. (109) Waldo Lyon, "The Submarine and the Arctic Ocean," The Polar Record , Vol. 11, No. 75 (1963), 700. (110) Compton-Hall, Submarine Versus Submarine , 81. (111) Ibid., 45. (112) Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope , 296. (113) Sharon Hobson, "Canada's Cabinet Upholds Decision to Buy RN Boats," Jane's Defence Weekly , (8 April 1998): 3. (114) Tom Clancy, SSN: Strategies of Submarine Warfare (New York: Berkley Books, 1996), 326. (115) Canada, Maritime Command, Adjusting Course , 31-32. (116) Ibid., 34. (117) Ferguson, Through a Canadian Periscope , 299.