The European Commission seems to be in a media counter-offence over the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which sparked protests and rallies across the continent, and forced several governments to stop the ratification process.

In an attempt to answer criticisms over the alleged secrecy of negotiations, the Commission decided to disclose parts of the negotiation process (recognised to be the main problem of ACTA under the international law, as the first source of interpretation) on 13 February, and then spam social media with those texts under various pretexts.

The Commission stated that it had informed the European Parliament of the ACTA negotiations “in line with its obligations under the Lisbon Treaty”, and pointed to three plenary debates and series of other meetings Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht had in Parliament shortly before the negotiations were finished. In addition, the Commission said it shared draft texts of the agreement on seven occasions between January and October 2010, and made available internal working papers on 15 other occasions.

The Commission also said it reported its negotiating positions on three occasions, in January 2009, July 2009, and January 2010.

The Commission, as the chief negotiator for the EU, stated that they also informed different stakeholders, including NGOs, academia and party representatives, in particular emphasising the Pirate Party, of the negotiating progress made.

They published lists of documents and other information which were disclosed during the negotiations on ACTA.

This latest offence goes in two directions. Towards citizens and activists who campaigned against ACTA, but probably more so towards the European Parliament and its International Trade Committee (INTA).

It is unlikely that disclosure of participants of negotiations, listing dates and venues of consultations could appease anti-ACTA activists, who fear and reject any institutional barriers to freedom of internet. However, in intra-institutional power-struggle, this might come as another slap in the face of INTA.

Many have already raised the question of how qualified INTA is to supervise the commission in trade negotiations, as many of the MEPs sitting in the committee are junior members of their delegations and groups, with often limited knowledge of international trade and commerce laws, supported by only several advisers in the committee.

The former INTA rapporteur on ACTA, Kader Arif, who resigned the post amid the breakout of anti-ACTA protests, had very limited experience with the topic and he was in charge of stirring it through the parliament for two-and-a-half years.

This issue goes beyond just ACTA [which at this stage seems to be deprived of political support both in the member states and in the Parliament] and raises grave concerns about the general capacity of INTA to act as a legislative balance to the commission.

The new competence of the Parliament to sanction international trade agreements has been inaugurated by the Lisbon Treaty and after the far less controversial free trade agreement with South Korea, this is the second major piece of legislation submitted to INTA and the Parliament.

The question is if INTA is capable to oversee the Commission and bring democratic accountability to the negotiation process in an adequate and timely manner to ensure success of the EU foreign trade policy or will MEPs continue being complacent, or merely populist in their reaction to the revolt of citizens once negotiations were concluded and the agreement already signed.