What does Vladimir Putin want? It is hard to read much into his flat, high-cheekboned face. The Russian despot smiles rarely, says little, and guards his privacy so ferociously that almost nothing is known about his daughters beyond their names. Still, we can perhaps make one or two inferences from what we know of his place in the world.

To start with the obvious, Putin rules the biggest country on the planet. True, it may not have a commensurately large economy — Russia’s GDP is similar in size to that of Mexico or Spain — but it nonetheless manages to be treated as a great power in the counsels of the world. Putin is an unchallenged autocrat, wielding the arbitrary powers of an 18th-century tsar. He is also reported to be the richest man alive.

Put these facts together and it seems reasonable to conclude that he is mainly interested in keeping that (for him) happy state of affairs going. Putin does not have the option of stepping down, building a presidential library, and going on to the global speaker circuit. If he were ever forced from office, the best he could hope for would be to spend the rest of his life fighting off criminal indictments. There is a reason dictators generally don’t stand down. As that flinty English politician and saint, Sir Thomas More, observed 500 years ago, "Sola mors tyrannicida est": Death is the only way to get rid of a tyrant.

It is in this context that we should consider the latest peace moves in Ukraine. The two sides have met for talks for the first time since 2016. I say “the two sides” because, although Moscow still vaguely pretends that this is a dispute between two lots of Ukrainians, one lot of whom happen to receive support from Russian volunteers, the Russians do not actually expect anyone to believe that. Putin is negotiating with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, as the leader of one of two belligerent parties. The two presidents are accompanied by the French and German leaders, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, and the moves they have agreed to so far — a cease-fire and a pulling back of Ukrainian troops — amount to a deescalation, albeit as a result of one-sided concessions.

Zelensky, who became president after playing the role of president in a popular sitcom, has been excoriated by Ukrainian rightists, some of whom argue that he was a Russian stooge all along. But will he yield enough to convince the Russians to pull out?

That depends on Putin’s motives. My guess is that the old KGB man has no interest in peace, even on the most favorable terms. What he wants is to stay in power at home. And while victories help to shore him up, ongoing conflicts are even better.

Autocrats depend on public opinion. They may not have to worry about elections, but they need a critical mass of public support to sustain their regimes. Putin knows how to use foreign quarrels to shore up his position, keeping Russian voters in a state of high-octane, patriotic anxiety. Putin’s domestic record is, by most measures, pretty shoddy. Opposition parties have been closed down, critical media silenced, and dissidents murdered. Economic growth is lackluster, and unpopular decisions — such as his attempt last year to raise the state pension age — can lead to a sudden drop in support for the regime. But as long as Russians feel besieged, they will swing behind a tough leader.

Russian foreign policy is driven by domestic political imperatives. Even the most apparently self-defeating moves, such as the clumsy murder of a former Russian spy on British soil in March 2018 or the industrialized doping of athletes that has led to Russia being banned from sporting events, make sense when seen in this light. Anything that boosts the paranoia of (frankly speaking) an already conspiracy-minded nation serves the man who presents himself as its father and champion.

We all see the world through our own lenses. The American view of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is inflected by the Hunter Biden affair, the Manafort scandal, and, obviously, the impeachment process. The suspicion of the Kremlin that used to go without saying in Republican circles has become more nuanced as a result of President Trump’s obvious closeness to the Russian leader.

Still, it is hard to see any realistic way to draw Putin into the comity of nations. We can flatter him, lift sanctions, invite him to rejoin the G-8, and force concessions on Ukraine. But in the end, none of it will make him behave differently. Our enmity is more valuable to him than our friendship could ever be.