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The Fed definitely seems to be gearing up for monetary tightening, even though inflation remains below target. And I’m with Ryan Avent: this will, if it happens, be a big mistake — just as Jean-Claude Trichet’s decision to raise rates in Europe in 2011 was a big mistake, just as the Swedish Riksbank’s early rate hike was a mistake, just as Japan’s rate hike in 2000 was a mistake.

And you would think that the Fed would understand that. In fact, I suspect it does, and is somehow letting itself be bullied into doing the wrong thing anyway. More on that in a minute.

First, on the policy substance: The point is not that we know that we’re still far from full employment. I think we are, but the truth is that I don’t know, you don’t know, and Stan Fischer doesn’t know. So the question is one of weighing the risks. And the fact is that the damage the Fed would do if it hikes rates too soon vastly outweighs the damage it would do if it waits too long.

Suppose the Fed waits too long. Well, inflation ticks up — probably not much, since the short-run Phillips curve looks very flat. And the Fed has the tools to rein the economy in. It would be annoying, unpleasant, and no doubt there would be Congressional hearings berating the Fed for debasing the dollar etc.. But not a really big problem.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the Fed raises rates, and it turns out that it should have waited. This could all too easily prove disastrous. The economy could slide into a low-inflation trap in which zero interest rates aren’t low enough to achieve escape — which has happened in Japan and is pretty clearly happening in the euro area. Also, there is now very strong reason to suspect that a protracted slump will inflict large losses on the economy’s future productive capacity.

And if someone tells you that these risks aren’t that big, consider this: we used to be told that 2 percent inflation was enough to make the risks of hitting the zero lower bound minimal — less than 5 percent in any given year. In fact, however, of the roughly 20 years since inflation dropped to circa 2 percent, 6 years — 30 percent! — have been spent in a liquidity trap. This says that we should be very afraid of missing our chance to escape from the trap out of an urge to normalize monetary policy too soon.

The thing is, I know that Janet Yellen, Stan Fischer, and the Fed staff know this — they’re very familiar with recent history and all the relevant economic analysis. So why do they seem to be rhetorically preparing the ground for early rate hikes?

My guess — and it’s only that — is that they have, maybe without knowing it, been bludgeoned into submission by the constant attacks on easy money. Every day the financial press, many of the blogs, cable financial news, etc, are full of people warning that the Fed’s low-rate policy is distorting markets, building up inflationary pressure, endangering financials stability. Hard-money arguments, no matter how ludicrous, get respectful attention; condemnations of the Fed are constant. If I were a Fed official, I suspect that I would often find myself wishing that the bludgeoning would just stop, at least for a while — and perhaps begin looking for an opportunity to prove that I’m not an inflationary money-printer, that I can take away punchbowls too.

So my guess is that the Fed, given an improving US job market, is strongly tempted to buy some peace by hiking rates a little, just to quiet the critics for a few months.

But the objective case for a rate hike just isn’t there. The risks of premature tightening are huge, and should not be taken until we have a truly solid recovery that includes strong wage gains and inflation clearly on track to rise above target. We don’t have any of that, and if the Fed acts nonetheless, it has the makings of tragedy.