“They are the best team we have ever played” Sir Alex Ferguson told reporters shortly after his side had been beaten 3-1 in the 2011 Champions League final at Wembley Stadium. Barcelona had just put in one of the greatest performances in the club’s history to defeat Manchester United in their home country at the so-called “Home of Football”.

Lauded by many as the greatest team ever, I have examined the tactics that not only made them successful, but made them revolutionise modern football. I have only included their performances and strategy since the turn of the decade because 1) this is when they reached their peak 2) I did this research and analysis in preparation for an idea I had to write a book on the best teams of the 2010s.

The systems:

2010-2011: 4-3-3

In his first three seasons at the club, Guardiola used the 4-3-3 formation that Barcelona have been synonymous with for decades. With it’s natural triangles and diamonds, as well as it’s three-man midfield, it was perfect for the possession football Guardiola set out to create.

2011-2012: 3-4-3

In his last season at the club he became more experimental and moved towards the Cruyffian ideal of 3-4-3. Player’s positioning became more fluid and players such as Dani Alves were tasked with unorthodox roles in attack and defence. His use of three-at-the-back in his last season at the Camp Nou was perhaps a pretext to his extremely successful use of three-at-the-back throughout his last two seasons in Munich.

Juego de Posicion

‘Juego de Posicion’ or Positional Play refers to a philosophy of football based around creating a positional structure and set of guidelines for a team when they are in the attacking phase. Juego de Posicion is synonymous with teams that like to control the game through having large amounts of possession and using strategies such as numerical overloads, switches of play, and gegenpressing. The following pages will detail how Barcelona used said strategies as well as others to dominate world football during Pep Guardiola’s time as manager of the club.

First phase of possession

There are different theories as to how to break down the different stages of possession in football. The stages I will refer to in this book roughly align with the thirds on a pitch: ‘first/initial phase’ being distribution from the goalkeeper and possession in the first third, ‘second phase’ describing middle third circulation of the ball as well as the process of trying to find passes into the final third of the pitch, and finally ‘third/final phase’ which entails working the ball into the penalty area or finding a space to shoot from just outside it.

When the ball was with Victor Valdes, or whoever was playing in goal for Barcelona, they would rarely bypass the first phase of possession as many teams do. Barca would have excellent structural awareness and ability to keep possession under pressure (which was trained through rondos and other possession exercises) to draw out the opposition to exploit the space in behind their defensive line using dynamic forwards such as David Villa, Pedro Rodriguez and, of course, Lionel Messi.

The above structure is typical of Barcelona’s shape in the first phase. The centre-backs spread to each side of the penalty area with Busquets, the pivote, being the key player in this phase. The triangles and rhombuses created in this phase enable Barcelona to move the ball quickly, using one or two touches, around the opposition’s press as the player receiving the ball will always have a variety of options over a number of different lines.

The below video shows how Barca would use Valdes to create a 3v2 on the first line and play to Busquets in between the lines. The shape Barcelona create in this phase almost replicates the positions in a 4+4+3 possession exercise used by Pep Guardiola during his time at Barcelona.

An on-field manifestation of Guardiola's 4+4+3 possession drill. pic.twitter.com/UAhH6Erd53 — TT (@flyingwingback) December 23, 2016

The wide and advanced positioning of the Pedro and Villa mean Real Madrid’s fullbacks are pinned back and do not press Barca’s fullbacks, which would allow Real Madrid’s forwards to aggressively press Barca’s centre-backs and goalkeeper. In other words, the constant width of Barcelona on the opposition’s back-line gives the players immediately involved in possession both more space to play in, as well as a constant numerical superiority (overload).

In the event that the centre-backs are pressed with some intensity, or either centre back has the ball near to the touchline and the connection between the two centre-backs is compromised, Busquets would drop between the two centre-backs. This strategy of the centre-backs spreading for a midfielder to drop between them is called La Salida Lavolpiana, named after former Mexico coach Ricardo La Volpe who introduced it onto the world stage.

In Pep Confidential by Marti Perarnau, Guardiola explains to Perarnau the reasons behind his fondness of playing out with three-at-the-back:

“Playing out with three men at the back is very useful because it conditions the response of your rival. Even if they press you, it’ll be with their centre-forward and second striker, obliging them to move into a 4-4-2 shape and you can therefore over-run them by achieving superiority”

The strategy outlined in the above quote is evident in every match Guardiola has ever been a part of as a coach. The three-at-the-back in the first and sometimes second phase has been a permanent fixture of Guardiola’s tactical setup throughout his managerial career whether he uses three centre-backs, such as in his final season at Barcelona and (roughly) final eighteen months at Bayern, or La Salida Lavolpiana, such as in the first three seasons at Barca and first eighteen months in Munich.

The ‘superiority’ Guardiola is referring to, is the 3v2 in the centre of midfield that occurs as the opponents are left with two central midfielders. Achieving a numerical superiority in the centre of the pitch is possibly Guardiola’s main aim when creating a tactical plan for his team for a match. The video below shows how Barcelona used said 3v2 overload in their 2011 Champions League final clash vs Manchester United.

Creating small overloads all over the pitch is vital to be able to keep possession and progress up the field in a manner which ‘Pep’ desires.

When playing a back four of Alves, Mascherano/Puyol, Pique and Abidal, Alves would usually be more advanced in the first phase while the remaining three centre-backs played on the first line. In the situation above, Pique is being pressed by Hernandez so Abidal and Mascherano shuffle back slightly to create a back three (pressed by Valencia and Hernandez). Abidal can find a pass through to Busquets who was Rooney was never far from all game. With Busquets under pressure, Xavi drops to create a 2v1 on the second line. Busquets, one of the most press-resistant players of all time, can move the ball to Xavi, who is then pressed by Park Ji-Sung. Mascherano then must move up onto this line to again give Barcelona numerical superiority.

Breaking Lines in the Middle Third

“There’s numerical, positional, and qualitative superiority. Not all 1 vs. 1’s are a situation of equality”

– Paco Seirul-Lo (Barcelona head of training methodology/fitness)

Of the three said superiorities, positional superiority is the most vague and probably the most difficult to achieve. One such way of creating positional superiority is positioning in between the lines of the opposition. To be effective in playing in between the lines of the opponent, a team must create as much space as possible between these lines and stretch the opposition. The theory behind this is the same to that of playing out from the back. One way to create such space in the middle third is to use backwards passes. Guardiola is often criticised of having a boring, non-direct style of play. However for the Catalan genius the famous phrase “one step backwards in order to take two steps forwards” rings true.

The above video shows how Barca used backwards passes effectively to destroy the disorganised pressing shape of Santos. Alves and Thiago were positioned on either touchline on Santos’ last line for almost the whole duration of the game (when Barca were in the attacking phase). This stretched Santos laterally, allowing the passing lanes to open up as we saw in the video, as well as vertically as Santos’ back four were often reluctant to push up and leave Alves and Thiago offside. With Alves and Thiago pinning back the opposition full-backs, this often gave space for Barcelona’s creative midfielders in the half space, as we can see below with Alves’ positioning giving Fabregas freedom in the right half-space.

Staggering

Guardiola’s Juego de Posicion not only requires players to be placed on different lines horizontally across the field, but also to be staggered along the five vertical columns to create a sound structure to keep possession and manipulate the defensive shape of the opposition. The below image shows an example of Barcelona’s attacking structure in the middle third of the field. We can see the triangles and rhombuses their staggered positioning creates. Messi and Iniesta’s positioning in the half spaces mean Busquets can move forward to create a 3v2 on this line.

Switching Play

““The secret is to overload one side of the pitch so the opponent must tilt its own defence to cope. When you’ve done that, we attack and score from the other side.”

-Pep Guardiola

As well as looking to find space between the opposition’s horizontal lines, Barcelona also looked to create and exploit space on either side of the opponents defensive block. As Guardiola explains above, they would overload one side of the field and draw the opponent in using a series of combinations, then switch to the other side of the field. Having a sound Juego de Posicion structure is key here as Barca would need players deeper in the half-space and centre to provide said switch of play, as well have a player in the opposite flank to switch to, with preferably a player advanced in the half-space providing support.

This video shows two examples of this. Moving the ball quickly is key to using switches of play to penetrate the opposition.

Messi as a False 9

“If it wasn’t for Messi I’d be coaching in the 3rd division”

-Pep Guardiola

After playing Messi as a right-winger for most of his first two seasons in charge at the Camp Nou, Guardiola decided to experiment during the early stages of an El Clasico game in May 2009. Pep had called Messi to his office at 10pm the night before the game to explain to the Argentine his plans. After around 10 minutes at the Santiago Bernabeu, the nod was given for Samuel Eto’o to move out to the right, while Messi moved inside and adopted what would become known as the ‘false 9’ position. This can be seen as a pivotal moment in the history of 21st century football as it did not only result in one of the most memorable games of the century (it finished 2-6 to Barcelona), however it also gave Messi the position in which he would flourish into the greatest player of all time.

Although Messi mainstreamised the use of the term, the first exponent of the False 9 is thought to be Matthias Sindelar in Austria’s ‘Wünderteam’ of the 1930’s. Hungary’s Nandor Hidegkuti also adopted the role in the 1950s as part of the ‘Mighty Magyars’.

The thinking behind giving Messi this role is to create an overload in the centre of the field to help Barcelona keep possession, and more importantly penetrate the opposition’s midfield line with vertical passes in central areas. Having Sergio Busquets, one of the best players of all time at executing these line-breaking passes was important to the success of Messi in this role.

Giving Messi a deeper starting position allows him to use his talent of beating players and being able to wriggle free of 1v1 and 1v2 situations to break the lines of the opposition.

It also poses a dilemma for the opposition centre-backs. When Messi is positioned in between the opposition lines, do they move up to press him, or stay deep? If they move up, they then leave a gap in the back four, this is dangerous and Pedro and Villa would always be positioned on the last line, often in the blind-side of the opposition full-backs. However if they allow Messi to turn, they have the best dribbler of all time running at them.

Against Manchester United in the Champions League, David Villa would move into central areas in the final third as Alves pushed up to maintain width on the right-hand side. This would allow Messi to combine with Villa, as well as allow Messi to be 1v1 with Vidic or Ferdinand as he moved forward with the ball. Even Messi would struggle to beat both of the best centre-back pairing in World football at the time. The below video shows how Messi uses his false 9 role in this game to create superiority on United’s second line and then score from the space in between the lines. The ‘Messi Zone’.

Final Phase Combinations

It was in this final attacking phase where Barcelona were at their most spectacular. Much of their success in this phase was down to the natural talent and instinct of some of the most creative players the world has ever seen. Despite this, they did use a number of different coachable methods to penetrate the defensive line of the opposition.

The below video shows the key strategies Barcelona use to penetrate a retreated defence, with explanation of these beneath.

Dribble + Release: Most commonly used by Messi and Iniesta who would dribble in front of the opposition penalty area, attracting opposition defenders, and then release a pass to a player in the space which is created.

Small combination triangles: This is where the instinctive first touches and flicks that are woven into the fabric of a Barcelona player through the famous 7v2 Rondos they take part in every day come to fruition on the field of play. Having these structures in the final phase allow players to make one-touch passes and play at speed to penetrate the opposition.

Third man runs: Barcelona use third-man runs to breach the opposition’s defensive line. The benefit of this run starting deep is that the runner is already moving at pace by the time the ball is played so can stay onside and still receive the ball in space behind even the deepest of defensive lines.

Final ball from the half space: Barcelona try to create room for Xavi and Iniesta in the halfspaces to play that final ball over the top of the defence. Playing the ball from the half space gives the optimal angle of pass for the runner (Fabregas in the second clip) to receive. A ball from the flank (a cross) travels further distance and is at a flatter angle so is easier for the defence to cut out. While a pass from the centre would have to come over Fabregas’ shoulder so would be harder for him to control. Plus, when in the central column of the field, the opposition defence are standing with a 180-degree view of the whole field whereas when a ball is played half space to half space (see second clip), Fabregas has a blindside advantage.

Wall passes: The most classic combination in football, most effective when one of the players is moving at speed as the constant change of position of the ball and the players is difficult to defend against.

Counterpressing

“Do you know how Barcelona win the ball back so quickly? It’s because they don’t have to run back more than 10 metres as they never pass the ball more than 10 metres.”

– Johan Cruyff

Counterpressing or Gegenpressing is something that has existed in different forms in the game for decades but was brought to the mainstream in football coaching through Pep Guardiola’s use of counter pressing at Barcelona. The “six second rule” became a term used universally in the coaching world to describe how Guardiola wanted his players to win back the ball within six seconds of losing it. However, Guardiola’s counter pressing is a lot more complex than simply as many players as possible running after the ball to win it back.

To increase the chance of ball retention in defensive transition, or to merely prevent a counter-attack, the attacking structure of a team is key. This is what Cruyff is referring to above. Having players correctly staggered on vertical and horizontal lines allows them to quickly compact around a loose ball and have access to the ‘first man’ of the opposition to receive the ball in transition.

The video demonstrates how Barcelona’s attacking structure allows them to counter press so effectively. It’s extremely rare that both Xavi and Iniesta will be on the last line. They tend to use a 2-1-4-3 shape in this phase of play.

The most significant tactical feature of the above video is the positioning of the ‘full-back’ on the opposite side to where the play begins. We can see how Abidal in the first clip and Alves in the second are tucked into the half space/centre. Although they would sometimes be used in this area of the field to help switch play from the centre, via the half space to either Pedro or Villa on the wing, this is more defensively-minded positioning. Having Abidal and Alves in this area in the final attacking phase shows the early stages of the ‘halfback’ role that Guardiola used successfully in his second and third year at Bayern Munich and at the beginning of his time at Manchester City.

Also notice in both clips the important role Sergio Busquets has in the second phase of the counterpress, closing down the free option.

Barcelona use an option/passing lane-based style of counterpressing, using cover-shadows to apply medium pressure to the ball carrier and cover/block the opposition’s passing lanes. The aim of this is to stifle the opposition’s build-up and not allow them to transition into an attacking shape. This style, which differs from Jürgen Klopp’s method of ball-orientated counterpressing (everyone towards the ball), allows Barcelona to remain in a sound attacking shape while attempting to recover possession. This means once they regain possession, they can counter-attack more effectively.

Xavi and Pedro are the key players in the above video. Xavi initially forces the Real’s ‘first man’ to play the backwards pass, cover shadowing the square option until Pedro can cover this man.Xavi then applies pressure to Xabi Alonso, meaning he doesn’t have the time to set himself to play the long switch pass. Meanwhile, Pedro is cover-shadowing Alonso’s forward passing options until Puyol can get tight to the man Pedro leaves at the beginning of the sequence. Pedro’s positioning in the second freeze frame stops Alonso from being able to play the ball into the space, forcing a rushed pass to feet which is intercepted by Messi. It’s likely that Messi is deliberately positioning himself a few feet away from the man to tempt Alonso to play this risky pass.

This aggressive counterpressing style is what allowed Barcelona to dominate possession in every game during the Guardiola era.

Pressing

Guardiola’s Barcelona would always press the opposition’s build-up play in all areas of the field. They would use similar techniques to that of their counterpress such as the use of cover-shadows and positioning to cover multiple passing lanes. Whereas their counterpress is more aimed at regaining possession as soon as possible by surrounding the area the ball is in, the aim of their pressing is to force the opposition to either make a rushed clearance or play to the wing. Once the ball is to an isolated player in wide area, Barcelona can use the touchline as an extra defender to force the opposition player to clear the ball or make a mistake.

They would often press their opposition’s first phase with their front three, with a second pressing wave of Barcelona’s midfield players marking the opposition’s midfield outlets. Barcelona’s front three would often find themselves pressing a four or five man build-up so would have to be intelligent in their positioning and movement to prevent the opposition progressing up the field.

Above, Messi and Villa are intelligent in their positioning, covering multiple players. Barcelona allow the ball to go wide before surrounding the ball and forcing the rushed clearance.

Barcelona would encourage their opponents to play from the back, confident of their ability to regain possession higher up the field and counter attack vs an untransitioned defence.

Messi’s positioning encourages United to play short, and giving the impression Barcelona are applying minimal pressure. However, when Ferdinand receives the ball, Pedro forces United to up their tempo and play forward into an area Barcelona have isolated. Iniesta’s body-shape and curved run is key to this.

Barca would also use this high-intensty approach when defending the opposition’s mid-third possession. With Barcelona always playing a high defensive line, it was vital that they maintained pressing intensity in this phase to prevent the opposition playing the easy ball over-the-top. Any dropping forwards, such as Rooney in the clip below, would be followed touch-tight by one of Barca’s centre-backs.

On the rare occasion that Barcelona had to defend in their own third of the field, they would use the 4-4-1-1 shape shown below. Again, they would look to force the opponents to the flank and overload the near halfspace/wing to try to box their opponents in to the flank and regain possession. The two 1s in the 4-4-1-1 are key in preventing the opponents recycling the ball into circulation. Also notice Villa at the very bottom of the picture, ready to make a darting run forward should Barcelona win the ball. In the situation below, this is exactly what happens, Messi uses his press resistance to hold the ball until Villa is advanced before playing a through-ball to the Spaniard who made it 4-0.

Conclusion

Guardiola’s Barcelona will be looked back on as not only one of the greatest team in history, but also a side whose methods shaped the future of player development, coaching and tactics. Winning 14 trophies from a possible 19, they were the epitome of effective yet entertaining football, something which only the greatest coaches of all time have been able to master. Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona were the absolute pinnacle of football.

“Quality without results is pointless. Results without quality is boring.”

Johan Cruyff