Ukraine signed a key agreement with the EU. Does that mean Europe has won?

Ukraine is a victim of a Western conspiracy, according to Russian media. A cabal of neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic Jews took over the country, backed by America, the Central Intelligence Agency, Germany and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Now, only the heroic Russian President Vladimir Putin will stand up to the Western juggernaut to defend the people of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, according to Western media, it’s more of a Disney story. The evil villain, Putin, ensured his incompetent sidekick, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, did not sign an association agreement with the European Union. The people rose up in protest. The EU rode to their aid, wielding sanctions, strongly-worded letters and “soft power.” They were victorious. In a vengeful frenzy, Putin seized Crimea, but in doing so, shot himself in the foot. He pushed Ukraine closer to Europe. Now Putin slinks away, while Ukraine lives happily ever after.

What both these (slightly exaggerated) narratives have in common is that they portray events in Ukraine as a victory for the West. On the surface, it does look that way. On November 29, Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement with the EU. The absence of a stroke of Yanukovych’s pen destroyed Europe’s eastern strategy—or so it seemed. Georgia and Moldova agreed in vague promises to sign at some point in the future. The EU’s push east produced nothing.

Seven months later, all of this has changed. On June 27, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia signed association agreements with the EU—approving the agreement that kicked off all the turmoil and protests last year. Europe 3; Russia 0.

But are the events in Ukraine a victory for Europe or America? Is a conflict even going on? Has Russia really been beaten?

An American Victory?

The idea of Ukraine being an American plot is easiest to debunk. Yes, there was involvement by the United States. It sent “dozens” of cia and fbi specialists to advise the government, and it spent $5 billion promoting democracy in Ukraine ever since it broke away from the Soviet Union in 1991.

This is easily twisted by the Russian media, as well as right-wing bloggers, who have inexplicably decided to take a leaf out of the radical left’s book and started parroting Russian government propaganda. They also ignore the much larger presence of Russian intelligence agencies. Hence the headlines along the lines of “The U.S. Admits to Sending huge Numbers of cia Agents and Billions of Dollars to Ukraine—Wake Up, Sheeple!”

It is obviously nonsense. If a few dozen secret agents and $5 billion, spread over 20 years, were enough to take over a country, and if the U.S. really is an evil empire bent on world domination, then it easily could have taken over every country in the world many times over by now.

Contrast that with America’s success in the rest of the world. It couldn’t take over Iraq or Afghanistan—and in neither of these cases did it face an enemy even remotely as capable as Russia. The U.S. refuses to stand up to China in the Pacific. It backed down to Russia in Syria, doing incalculable damage to its reputation as U.S. President Barack Obama ignored his own “red lines.”

American authorities may have wanted to cause trouble for Russia in Ukraine—it would be a way to punish Russia for Syria and keeping its focus away from the Middle East—but nowhere has America demonstrated the skill or resolve to pull off what Russian media claims it has done in Ukraine.

Europe, Then?

Europe, too, has been a shambles. It has given some support to democratic groups in Ukraine, but on nowhere near the scale necessary to overthrow a government.

Germany has been especially active in its support for Vitali Klitschko, now the mayor of Kiev and leader of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform. However, if Germany was determined to bring Ukraine into the EU’s sphere of influence, it missed several open goals. As Trumpet columnist Brad Macdonald noted when the crisis first kicked off in December, “Events in Ukraine expose Europe’s crisis of leadership.”

“It is shocking how ill prepared Brussels was for Yanukovych rejecting the EU trade agreement,” he continued. “Its response to the rejection and the subsequent crisis has been abysmal.” A few billion dollars and a bit of backbone, and Ukraine could have been Europe’s almost a year ago.

Throughout the crisis, Europe continued to be “abysmal.” Compelled by events, it finally came up with the package of loans Ukraine needed to keep its economy afloat. But it didn’t impose any serious sanctions on Russia or stand up to Putin.

In fact, every indication is that Germany is deliberately not confronting Russia—Europe’s response is a deliberate shambles. The biggest indication of this came just two days before Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine signed their association agreement with the EU. On June 25, nato Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that nato would not offer Georgia a Membership Action Plan (map) when it holds its summit in September.

A map would have put Georgia on a path to join nato and entitled it to substantial military aid from the alliance. Rasmussen promised that nato would offer a “substantive package” to Georgia instead.

Early reports indicate this package is not really “substantial.” Reuters reported that it would probably include things like closer political cooperation, military training and “strengthening nato’s liaison office in Georgia.” Georgia is disappointed. Its Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Aleksi Petriashvili said that the package “is not really what the Georgian authorities aspire to.”

The timing of the announcement is interesting. It may be coincidence, but just a few days before Georgia and Ukraine signed an economic agreement with the EU, nato essentially told Russia don’t worry, we have no desire to expand our military into these countries. It’s as if it was trying to reassure Russia ahead of the treaty signing on Friday.

About half nato’s members were ready to invite Georgia into the alliance, Reuters said, citing an anonymous source. The source named only two of nations against inviting Georgia: France and Germany.

We’ve been here before. In 2007, Germany was all for putting Georgia and Ukraine on the path to nato membership. The next year, it abruptly slammed on the brakes. Germany almost single-handedly prevented Ukraine and Georgia being given maps. Just a few months later, Russia invaded Georgia. After the invasion, Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry wrote:

I believe Germany may well have been complicit in Russia’s plan to attack Georgia! If Russia formed an agreement with Germany over the Georgia situation, then Russia would know the only possible other nation it would have to be concerned about is the U.S. And Russia knew that America was too weak to do anything about it! Russia has Germany—and all of Europe—over a barrel. Cutting off part of the flow of gas to a country would wreak havoc on the economy! [German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter] Steinmeier’s about-face on Ukraine and Georgia smells rotten!

This year, Germany had the opportunity for a “do-over”—a second chance to extend an invitation to Georgia. Its actions in 2008 paved the way for Georgia’s invasion. This time, it chose the same policy. With Georgia and Ukraine, Putin seemed to know he’d face no serious opposition from Germany.

It’s becoming obvious. Russia has a clear red line: No nato membership for any more former Soviet countries. And Germany has some kind of arrangement with Russia—either formal or informal, spoken or unspoken—not to cross that line.

The shape and scope of that red line is not clear. Would a significant nato presence in Poland or the Baltic countries violate it, for example? Throughout the crisis, Germany refused to sanction more than a token deployment to these nations, although German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen was more hawkish. What about bringing Ukraine into Europe’s economic reach without much of a military arrangement? It looks like Germany has been trying to get away with as much as it can, but there is a line somewhere it will not cross in its dealings with Russia.

‘Vast, Impersonal Forces’

If not Europe or America, whose victory is it in Ukraine? In an “A Law of History,” Mr. Flurry quotes an article columnist George Will wrote in 2001, which laments, “When history is taught at all nowadays, often it is taught as the unfolding of inevitabilities—of vast, impersonal forces. The role contingency in history is disparaged, so students are inoculated against the ‘undemocratic’ notion that history can be turned in its course by great individuals.”

The Trumpet often uses history to analyze world events. It is, in a way, a scientific approach to understanding the world. When trying to answer what happens next, we look back at what happened last time in similar circumstances.

But history is not destiny. As Mr. Flurry brings out in that article, people matter. This is, in fact, one of the most important lessons history teaches.

Whose is the victory in Ukraine? As far as we can tell at the moment, the answer seems to be the Ukrainian people, or at least the ones in the west. In analyzing the news, it’s easy to get caught up in this “unfolding of inevitabilities” view of history Will warned about. Russia needs Ukraine to be free of foreign powers, and Europe and the U.S. seemed unwilling to fight against it. When faced with these “vast, impersonal forces,” many, including this author, assumed that the Kiev protests would not last the harsh Ukrainian winter.

Instead, here’s what seems to have happened in Ukraine. The former Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, was broadly pro-Russia, but had no desire to become Putin’s puppet. So he tried to strike a balance by selling himself to the highest bidder—using the threat of closer ties to Europe to gain extra concessions from Russia, and vice versa.

When it came to signing the association agreement with the EU, however, he lost that balance. He promised to sign it. Putin both bought him off and twisted his arm, persuading him not to sign. Eastern Europe was annoyed. America grumbled. But Germany, with the real power in the EU, did little more than shrug. Ukraine was important to Putin and Europe hadn’t really expected him to let it go easily.

So the EU was ready to move on. This is where the protesters in Ukraine come in. Yanukovych’s change of course provoked mass demonstrations. The harder he cracked down, the more people protested. Yanukovych was pushed out in a maneuver of dubious constitutionality.

This overthrow put Europe on the spot. If it did nothing to support the protesters, it would be a laughing stock. So it put together an aid package and offered Ukraine another chance to sign the association agreement. America took advantage of the opportunity to push back on Russia close to Russia’s home turf and supported the European aid package. But America’s involvement is opportunistic, not an organized conspiracy. In fact, it emerged from the conflict looking even weaker, after it was unable to protect Ukraine from Russia’s revenge.

Germany had now been almost forced to confront Russia over Ukraine, so it quickly tried to make amends. It supported only token sanctions after Russia invaded Crimea, and it has consistently held Europe back from taking any real action.

If this analysis is correct, then Germany’s ties with Ukrainian opposition leaders was merely a strategic maneuver. It was keeping some skin in the game and gaining some influence in a strategically important country. But there’s very little evidence it had anywhere close to the level of influence needed to control how the crisis unfolded.

Now, this isn’t gospel truth—it is merely the version of events best supported by current evidence. It’s still possible for evidence of a different level of European involvement to emerge, for example.

Russia’s Victory

It’s important to note that in this version of events, Russia does not emerge as a total loser. In fact, it has a considerable consolation prize. The prevailing view among the Western media is that Putin’s invasion of Crimea backfired badly, pushing Ukraine away from Russia. But this is short-sighted.

Had Ukraine escaped Russia’s influence completely, it would have sent a powerful signal to the rest of Russia’s satellite nations that they could also escape any time they want. By taking Crimea, Putin made sure the most strategically vital piece of Ukrainian real estate remained in Russia’s hands no matter what happened, while at the same time demonstrating to any other nation that may consider leaving Russia’s orbit that Russia would, at the very least, take a pound of flesh in retaliation.

Since America stood by and did nothing, the invasion was the biggest blow yet to America’s prestige. Russia may have less control over Ukraine, but its reputation is stronger than ever. And now Germany has demonstrated that it still respects Russia’s red lines.

Of course, the war is not yet over. To say that individuals, not just “vast impersonal forces,” matter in history does not mean these forces are irrelevant. If Ukraine’s people want to remain independent from Russia, they have formidable obstacles to overcome. Russia still has great economic and political influence in Ukraine. Last time Ukraine fell to Western protesters, Russia was willing to bide its time and return a few years later. This time it also has a murky military presence in the east. Should Ukraine take a direction Russia does not like, it can sow chaos at a moment’s notice.

If events in Ukraine were merely a Disney movie, we should remember that good movies are usually followed by disappointing sequels.

So, a Western victory against Russia? Hardly. Instead, the West was surprised by the victory of Ukrainian protesters. Russia has made the most of a setback by making it clear to the world that no foreign forces will ever be based in Ukraine—the red line Russia has spent years establishing.

Europe, meanwhile, appears to be holding to some kind of bargain with Russia, despite great temptation to break it. There is weakness in this strategy—it is an acknowledgement that the Continent is too divided and lacks a strong leader to stand up to Russia.

“The presence of a deal between these two nations is not a sign of peace,” Mr. Flurry wrote in 2008. “Like the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and so many others before it, it is a sign of exactly the opposite. Both of these nations are looking to secure their shared border—so they can pursue their imperialistic aims elsewhere! It is a precursor to war! That is the way they operate! And the U.S. has no clue.”

Fear of Russia is driving Europe to become united, as we’ve pointed out several times during the crisis.

“Will the Georgia strike actually spark European unification?” Mr. Flurry continued. “Will a crisis occur over Ukraine? That area is the breadbasket of Russia, and surely it is willing to wage war over that as well …. Watch Europe to see how it responds to these dramatic developments in Asia …. As Russia gets stronger, as the world grows more dangerous, as economic problems escalate, the Germans will be crying out for strong leadership! They are looking for a king—with a fierce enough countenance to stand up to Vladimir Putin!”

Europe is respecting Russia’s red lines because it knows it lacks the power to confront Russia. It knows it not only did not defeat Russia over Ukraine, but also it cannot defeat Russia in the near future.

This crisis will stir Europe to correct its weakness.