Fact Sheet Concerning Training Manuals Containing Materials Inconsistent With U.S. Policy From the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs Office

Contents:

Documents:

Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence,

"DoD Policy on Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-United States Persons",

27 August, 1992.

Page: (1)

In March, 1982, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight presented a Report of Investigation to the Secretary concerning these manuals. In this report, the Assistant to the Secretary concluded that six of the manuals contain about two dozen passages of objectionable and questionable material and that they were prepared without the required doctrinal approval. The text of this report has been declassified and is included in this package.

The report contains several recommendations which were approved by the Secretary of Defense in 1992. The Department of Defense sought to retrieve and destroy the manuals and took corrective action to prevent the recurrence of any similar problem. A copy of the memorandum signed in 1992 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence implementing this corrective action is attached. The Department also reported the results of this investigation to the Senate Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Seven Spanish-language manuals were compiled in the mid-1980's for use in intelligence courses.

The Manuals were not submitted to the appropriate command for review and approval of their contents.

The manuals were written in Spanish only; no English translation was prepared when they were compiled.

The manuals were used for training by Mobile Training Teams in Latin America from 1987 to 1989 and by the School of the Americas from 1989 to 1991.

The manuals were distributed to students in the courses and to intelligence schools in several Latin American countries.

Instructors incorrectly assumed that the information in the manuals was consistent with approved doctrine.

In 1991 and 1992, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight conducted an investigation concerning the preparation of these manuals

The investigation concluded that about two dozen short passages in six of the manuals, which total 1169 pages, contained material that either was not or could be interpreted not to be consistent with U.S. policy.

There was no evidence that there was a deliberate attempt to violate Army or Defense policies in the preparation of these manuals.

Objectionable and questionable passages identified in the investigations are listed on the attached summary pages.

The Secretary of Defense approved the report of the investigation and accepted its recommendations.

The Department of Defense discontinued the use of the manuals, directed their recovery to the extent practicable, and destroyed the copies in the field. U.S. Southern Command advised governments in Latin America that the manuals contained passages that did not represent U.S. government policy, and pursued recovery of the manuals from the governments and some individual students. All manuals under control of the Defense Department were destroyed, except for one record copy retained by the Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence reported the results of the investigation and the corrective action to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence issued a memorandum stating the Defense Department policy in clear and emphatic terms.

Spanish Title No. of Pages English Titles Manejo de Fuente 174 Handling of Sources Contrainteligencia 310 Counterintelligence Guerra Revolucionaria e Ideologia Comunista 128 Revolutionary War and Communist Ideology Terrorismo y Guerrilla Urbana 175 Terrorism and the Urban Guerrilla Interrogacion 150 Interrogation Inteligencia de Combate 172 Combat Intelligence *Analisis I 60 Analysis I Total Pages: 1169

* No questionable or objectionable statements found.

-p 1 (Translation p. 1) "information obtained involuntarily from insurgents who have been captured." -p. 31 (Translation p. 25) "In addition, if an individual has been recruited using fear as a weapon, the CI agent must in a position of [sic] maintain the threat." -p. 32 (Translation p. 26) "Specific individuals, organizations, and commercial companies must be the object of infiltration by government employees, in order to obtain information about the guerrillas." -p 35 (Translation p. 28) "The CI agent must offer presents and compensation for information leading to the arrest, capture, or death of guerrillas." -p. 79 (Translation p. 65) "The CI agent could cause the arrest of the employee's parents, imprison the employee or give him a beating as part of the placement plan of said employee in the guerrilla organization." -p. 80 (Translation p. 66) "The employee's value could be increased by means of arrests, executions, or pacification[,] taking care not to expose the employee as the information source." -p. 80 (Translation p. 66) "There are other methods of providing external assistance in order to assure the promotion of an employee. A method of achieving this promotion is by influencing an employee who has a much higher position in the guerrilla organization, another is to eliminate a potential rival among the guerrillas." -p. 147 (Translation p. 122-23) "The ancient Romans had a saying 'in vino veritras' [sic] there is much truth in wine-with that they wanted to say that a drunk man reveals his true thought and real reactions. If we could observe our employee drinking or in a drunken state, we could learn much about him." -p. 148 (Translation p. 122) "I am going to mention some of the mechanical methods to test, which could be used under certain extenuating circumstances. Sodiopentathol compound, which is an anesthetic drug, it could be used intravenously injected and would have the result of a 'truth serum'...Another method that can be used is hypnotism." -p. (Translation p. 155) "If the agent suspects that he could have difficulty in separating an employee, that the separation is to his advantage. That could convince the employee that he has been compromised by the guerrillas. That continuing working for the government could result in serious consequences for the employee and his family. If the employee does not believe this story, other measures could be taken to convince him placing anonymous telegrams or sending anonymous letters. Many other techniques could be used which are only limited by the agent's imagination." -p. 156 (Translation p. 129-30) "In the majority of cases, the purpose of the informal separation technique will be to have the employee 'placed on the black list' by all government agencies, or threatens [sic] to expose himself or admit his activities, or bring about his removal by means of imprisonment, threat of imprisonment, or voluntary or forced reestablishment....Threats should not be made unless they can be carried out. There are many disadvantages in the use of threats of physical violence or true physical abuse."









-p 49 "It is essential that internal intelligence agencies obtain information on the political party or parties that support the insurgent movement, on the influence the insurgent has on them, and on the substance of non-violent attacks the insurgents perpetrate against the government." -p. 61 Insurgents "can be considered criminal by the legitimate government" and are "afraid to be brutalized after capture."





-pp. 40 and 69 Mention of names of U.S. citizens -p. 112 "Another function of CI agents is recommending CI targets for neutralizing. The CI targets can include personalities, installations, organizations, documents and materials. A CI target is someone or something that could be included in the above categories and could be hostile or not." "The personality targets prove to be valuable sources of intelligence. Some examples of these targets are governmental officials, political leaders, and members of the infrastructure." -p.114 "To detect and neutralize the insurgents' activities and organizations."









-p. 77 "All the personal documents to include pocket litter should be carefully examined....The documents that have no military value, such as personal items, should be retained to be given to the prisoner at a later time."

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