Iraq’s parliamentary democracy has suffered from the absence of a parliamentary opposition since its inception in 2005. All political factions that won previous elections have formed coalition governments that are based on sectarian quotas because no one was willing to play the role of opposition. The immediate consequence was endemic corruption as each faction defends its executive nominees, even if they are corrupt or incompetent. But the differences among current political contestants in terms of programs, regional and international backing, and personalities indicate the possibility of having a parliamentary opposition in post-ISIS Iraq.

The literature shows several advantages to having a formal opposition, such as improving government performance, enhancing legitimacy, channeling disagreements and disputes through parliament, and preparing the opposition to govern. The Iraqi parliament witnessed several short-lived parliamentary oppositions that are formed by parties who are part of the government too, therefore, the norm was the absence of an effective parliamentary opposition. This could be attributed to several factors, such as the lack of trust among political factions, fear of losing resources necessary to operate and expand their patronage networks, fear of prosecution, and more importantly fear of demise or irrelevance. Even though some of these factors remain relevant today, the current political environment is shifting away from including all political contestants in the process of government formation following the upcoming parliamentary election in May 2018.

Current political contestants are polarized around several crucial issues, which could be classified into; First, the future of Popular Mobilization Forces, whether it should be completely disbanded, integrated into the Iraqi Army, or institutionalized. Second, the response to regional rivalries is another source of polarization. The power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran polarized the region into three camps; neutral, pro-Saudi, and pro-Iran. These trends have resonance among political contestants, as some push for aligning with one camp or another and others insist on maintaining a neutral position. Third, the economy is another source of polarization, as the political class has taken opposing sides on issues of privatization, taxation, and streamlining bureaucracy. While the incumbent government supports these measures, several parties voiced their opposition and mobilized their bases to protest such measures. The differences among political elites do not end here but extend to other issues, such as reconstruction (whether to be limited to liberated areas or extended to others), decentralization (and the extent to which it should be implemented), and even the nature of the electoral and political system. Thus, the political class has taken extremely opposing sides on issues of security, economy and regional rivalry.

Political polarization cannot be explained based on sectarian and ethnic identities alone since intra-communal differences between political factions also exist. This polarization is not limited to the political class, but even popular bases are polarized around these issues, for example, a survey found that 40% of Iraqis support PMU integration into the Army, while 23% support its institutionalization, in contrast to 16% who favor disbanding the PMU. Also, there is cross-sectarian polarization on the issue of PMUs entering politics, as appears in Chart I.