The Senate Intelligence Committee on Tuesday released a bipartisan report into Russia's 2016 U.S. election interference. Failing to even once use the words "retaliation" or "retaliate," the report misses the most important point.

Yes, it is welcome that Republicans have joined with Democrats to admit that Russia's 2016 interference was systemic and designed to help President Trump. (I continue to believe that Trump would have won without this effort, for what it's worth.) Yes, the report's recommendations for greater cooperation among social media companies is useful. And yes, to the senators' credit, the report does not call for restricting free speech.

Still, the report doesn't tell us much that we didn't already know. Russia's operation in 2016 was vintage Russian information warfare. It created an American wilderness of mirrors that blurred the truth and attracted animosity. But the report doesn't help us to know more. Pages 64 to 68, for example, are almost entirely redacted. (Regrettably, Ben Rhodes' testimony is also redacted. I'm sure there are some real gems there). Nor are the report's recommendations terribly original. Page 81 basically says to "be less stupid" in immediately trusting what you read online. It's a fair point, as two of the most successful disinformation stories in 2016 involved the rather unlikely suggestions that Pope Francis had endorsed Trump and that Hillary Clinton was an ISIS arms dealer.

But the report's big problem is its failure to recommend retaliation. Instead, it focuses on public service announcements. This is silly.

Vladimir Putin attacked the 2016 election and sought to disrupt the 2018 election for the same two reasons that governments always conduct high-risk covert actions. Namely, because Putin believed it was in his interest to do so and that he could do so without suffering major blowback. Sadly, Putin was correct. The former KGB officer's attack continues to divide U.S. society, and President Barack Obama effectively let him get away with it. Putin and other hostile actors with a capable penchant for hostile cyberactivity (China, Iran, and North Korea) thus have reason to risk attacking America again.

The report could and should have addressed that very damaging adversary assessment.

It should have issued redacted recommendations to the White House to establish more warning tripwires for adversary governments. While the White House has authorized some actions here, more should be done. Why not recommend snap-effect sanctions against any actor found with high confidence to have engaged in a significant election attack? Why not pledge to simultaneously disrupt the telecommunications, energy, and military command system if a major attack occurs?

In the digital age, the threats will only grow in sophistication. The 2016 effort was one thing, but what if a future attacker manages to alter vote tallies or delete registers? What if they produce and release a deepfake photo or video showing a candidate committing an illegal act?

These threats require explicit deterrence. This report, unfortunately, missed the mark in providing any such thing.