To deter prospective nuclear adversaries, the United States must retain superiority across the range of nuclear strike capabilities. In turn, we should welcome the new deployment of low-yield nuclear warheads on U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).

As the Federation of American Scientists reported on Wednesday, the U.S. Navy has begun deploying SSBNs with W76-2 warheads. It says that the USS Tennessee, which is roughly halfway through an Atlantic Ocean deterrence patrol (Russia deterrence), is loaded with the W76-2. The federation estimates that "one or two of the 20 missiles on the USS Tennessee and subsequent subs will be armed with the W76-2, either singly or carrying multiple warheads. Each W76-2 is estimated to have an explosive yield of about five kilotons. The remaining 18 missiles on each submarine like the Tennessee carry either the 90-kiloton W76-1 or the 455-kiloton W88. Each missile can carry up to eight warheads under current loading configurations." The next Pacific Ocean SSBN deterrent patrol is also likely to carry the W76-2.

I know we're talking about nuclear weapons here, but this is good news.

This isn't some harebrained Trump administration idea to send the world closer to nuclear war. Instead, it represents an overdue step to recover from President Barack Obama's appeasement strategy and matches rising Russian nuclear threats. Authorized by President Trump under the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the W76-2 gives meaning to the review's assertion that "Russia must instead understand that nuclear first-use, however limited, will fail to achieve its objectives, fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, and trigger incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow."

As Russia has spent the past few years developing new nuclear strike capabilities such as its Avangard hypersonic system, it has also adopted a more aggressive first-use nuclear doctrine. That includes the consideration of using low-yield nuclear weapons in the vein of the W76-2 to attack NATO battlefield forces. Vladimir Putin might assume that limited nuclear strikes would force European NATO allies to call for a cease-fire (a topline objective in Russian war planning), but also fall short of giving a U.S. president cause for retaliation with high-yield nuclear weapons such as the W76-1 and W-88.

Contrary to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists's delusions, this is Russia's fault. Every single NATO ally has agreed that Russia is the primary driving force behind nuclear proliferation concerns. The W76-2 simply rebalances the equation by providing the U.S. with a proportionate means to counter a limited Russian nuclear strike. And now, Russia knows it.

True, none of this is pleasant. But effective nuclear strategy creates two certainties. First, it confers the certainty of moral readiness to do the unthinkable to defend the nation, and second, it gives adversaries certainty that our forces are able to defeat them across the range of conflict. The W76-2 bolsters both of those certainties and should be welcomed for it.