Last week your humble columnist discussed how south Kurdistani political parties need to get their house in order. The parties need to unify behind a Kurdistani national interest, establishing more red lines that must not be crossed in light of the shared and enduring aspirations of their people – security, welfare and independence. At present, the only red line the parties appear intent on respecting involves a refusal to fight each other by force of arms (especially at the bidding of outside powers). The civil war of 1994-1998 remains a bitter memory in the region.





When it comes to Kurdistani political parties from other parts of Kurdistan, however, even this red line now seems tenuous. In a recent interview with journalist Amberin Zaman, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani discussed the Shingal region:





During the calamity that befell the Yazidi people in Sinjar, obviously the Rojava forces — meaning the PYD [Democratic Unity Party] — played a valuable role in helping to protect them and shepherd them to safety, and we recognize and appreciate that. But under the present circumstances, the presence of PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] forces in Sinjar will only add to instability in the area and nothing more.…we strongly believe that the PKK must leave Sinjar.

Mr. Barzani said that while the KRG is willing to accept somewhat independent militias in Sinjar that follow orders from and coordinate with the Ministry of Peshmerga, the presence of PKK fighters in the area threatens to suck Baghdad, Turkey and other actors into conflict there. In such a scenario, Mr. Barzani said, “… we too, as the KRG, are players and hold certain cards in our hands. Having said that, I don’t think it would be in anybody’s interest to reach that point.” Ms. Zaman then asked directly, “Are you suggesting that you might resort to military force in order to push the PKK out of Sinjar?” To which Prime Minister Barzani replied “Yes, I am.”





This is an alarming and unfortunate development for Kurds all across Kurdistan. The PKK’s ongoing presence and activities in Sinjar unfortunately puts the KRG in an impossible situation. If south Kurdistan is to have a chance at independence, it needs to cultivate and sustain options other than Baghdad. Erbil must reassure its neighbors and the international community that south Kurdistan’s independence will not lead to even more region-wide irredentism and instability. These days Iran seems almost synonymous with Baghdad, however, and Syria for the foreseeable future does not offer the KRG any routes to the outside world either.





This leaves only Turkey, which has invested heavily in south Kurdistan and recently allowed Erbil independent oil and gas export routes. The Turkish rapprochement with Iraqi Kurdistan since 2010 has been nothing short of remarkable, but this too comes with strings attached. For the last 15 years, the KRG doggedly resisted Turkish pressure to act militarily against PKK forces based in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdish leaders instead did their best to try and mediate peace talks between Ankara and the Kurdish movement in Turkey. The PKK repaid them for this in two ways: by keeping Islamist radicals out of Qandil and other mountainous areas, and by helping defend the region against the Islamic State when it attacked in August 2014.





The PKK’s insistence on remaining in Sinjar goes too far, however. With no elected deputies in south Kurdistan’s parliament, the PKK is not a military force of the region. No state, or would-be state for that matter, can allow a foreign force to so directly challenge its rule and recruit and govern large swathes of its territory. Max Weber’s very definition of a state comes to mind here: “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”





Rather than push the KRG on this red line, the PKK might better consider withdrawing its armed forces from Sinjar in return for whatever concessions it can wring from Erbil. These concessions could include the right to conduct more extensive (but unarmed) political activities within south Kurdistan, an end to the embargo on Rojava (an embargo that probably resulted from heavy Turkish pressure and that nonetheless remains fairly loose in deference to Rojava’s needs), or similar things. If the PKK truly cares about all parts of Kurdistan as it claims to, it will understand that there are real limits (for the time being) to what the KRG can allow on its territory.





Given how much the PKK and its affiliates have bitten off in both Syria and Turkey, they could also well use more forces in theaters other than Sinjar. This would help maintain the red line of intra-Kurdish war that no one in Kurdistan wants to see crossed.





David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.



The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.