John Andrews explains why Turkey under Erdogan chooses to interfere in Libya, seeking to prop up the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj. This move risks a direct confrontation with General Khalifa Haftar, the warlord in eastern Libya, who is said to be planning a decisive attack on the GNA in Tripoli. As his Libyan National Army (LNA) is backed by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Russia, and (at least covertly) France, it raises fears that oil-rich Libya could become the venue of a regional conflict, or even a "second Syria".

The author says, that Turkey and Qatar back the GNA, has much to do with ideology – “Islam is the solution” – a slogan adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). After the 2011 uprisings that ousted Muammar Qaddafi, the MB emerged as Libya’s largest Islamist party. Yet its popular support has plunged since 2012.

While Qatar and Turkey “view the Brotherhood with enthusiasm rather than alarm,” the powerholders in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain see the MB as a “terrorist” organisation, seeking to undermine their power – a reason enough to back Haftar. After the 2011 uprisings that ousted Qaddafi, the MB emerged as Libya’s largest Islamist party. The Saudi-backed regime in Egypt under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi launched a military coup in 2013 to overthrow the first democratically elected leader of the MB, Mohamed Morsi.

The author says, Erdogan has the ambition to revive the Ottoman Empire and Libya was once part of it. As Turkey is a country of over 80 million, with a “relatively developed” economy, and the second-largest army in NATO. So “it deserves to be treated with respect,” especially after being snubbed by the EU for rejecting its bid for membership. Last week Ankara authorised a troop deployment to help the Tripoli government, after already having sent drones, armoured vehicles and military advisers to bolster the GNA.

Another reason for deeper involvement in Libya is the controversial deal Ankara signed with Tripoli over oil and gas drilling rights in the Mediterranean. It “sets a maritime border between their two countries. The Turkish-Libyan deal ignores international law …. It also ignores geography, because the Greek island of Crete lies halfway between the two countries. And it threatens the 2019 agreement between Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority to exploit the gas reserves of the eastern Mediterranean.”

Ankara’s unilateral actions have infuriated the EU, and in particular Greece. Athens says the exclusive economic zone agreement in effect blocks Greece from drilling around Crete and is illegal. In fact it risks an anti-Turkish coalition forming that makes up of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Italy. These countries came together under the umbrella of the eastern Mediterranean gas forum – an outwardly energy-related but ultimately military partnership from which Turkey was excluded. The natural gas reserves in the region are estimated to be around 122 trillion cubic meters in total.

Erdogan has coerced the EU into being “financially generous, or else Turkey may let hundreds of thousands of Syrian and other refugees from war and poverty flood into Europe.” He has also established himself as an indispensable player in Syria, forcing Russia and Iran, which both support Bashar al-Assad’s regime, to take Turkey on board in this “three-party peace process.” He has been emboldened by Trump’s reluctance to impose sanctions against Turkey, despite his decision to buy the Russian S-400 air-defence missile systems, alienating the NATO allies.

The author says, “Erdoğan is the epitome of today’s strongman political leader. But by the time his Libyan gamble sours, as it inevitably will, he will have run out of both luck and friends.”

Erdogan and Putin may be wielding immense influence in Syria and Libya, brokering a truce between warring parties and - hopefully - a peace deal. But their relations may not last, as they purse national interests that clash with one another.

This year may decide Erdogan’s political future. Unlike last October’s incursion into Kurdish-held parts of Syria, intervention in Libya has little support among the Turkish public. Both former prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and former finance minister Ali Babacan have quit Erdogan’s Justice and Development party (AKP) in recent months to form their own breakaway opposition parties. As a result of Turkey’s economic woes, the AKP has lost 10% of its membership, creating a disillusioned new bloc of voters Davutoğlu and Babacan hope to woo.