On October 2nd of last year, the Saudi Arabian journalist and dissident Jamal Khashoggi was murdered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The killing, according to the C.I.A., was carried out on the orders of the crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, or M.B.S., as he is often known. (David Ignatius, who has been reporting on the case for the Washington Post, recently wrote that it was possible that the intent of the Istanbul operation was only to kidnap Khashoggi.) Khashoggi’s murder has imperilled M.B.S.’s ability to operate internationally, with world leaders distancing themselves from him and companies with business interests in the kingdom expressing second thoughts about investing there. In the U.S., however, he has allies in the White House—most notably the President and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner—and connections well beyond it. Before Khashoggi’s death, M.B.S. was fêted by business leaders and celebrities from Rupert Murdoch and Robert Iger to the Rock. Commentators on the region, including the Times’ Thomas Friedman, hailed him as a visionary reformer. As Khashoggi’s life and death recede into history, one question hanging over Saudi Arabia is whether M.B.S.’s international reputation can be repaired.

Bernard Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton, is one of the most prominent commentators on modern Saudi Arabia. Haykel has met M.B.S., communicated with him via WhatsApp, and voiced support for the crown prince’s agenda, which includes economic reform and ending the ban on women driving. He also said, of his political talents, “I mean, he makes you feel like you’re the center of his universe when he’s speaking to you, which is a kind of a trait that I think you’re born with.” Haykel condemned Khashoggi’s death, but, in its aftermath, offered guidance for the kingdom, stating on CNN, “What I have been telling the Saudis is that they have to come up with a narrative, with a story that is plausible, that, you know, rebuffs the leaks that the Turks have been deliberately engaged in—that they lost the narrative thread because of the Turkish leaks, and they have to explain what happened to him.”

I recently had several phone conversations with Haykel, which have been edited for length and clarity. We discussed his communications with M.B.S., how much blame the Saudis deserve for the war in Yemen, his consulting work in the Middle East, and whether America should focus less—or more—on human rights abroad.

How secure is M.B.S.’s grip on power in Saudi Arabia? Is there any evidence he has lost the confidence of his father, the King, who still officially rules the country?

My sense is that he is very secure in his position, that he controls all the levers of power, and that he still enjoys the full support of his father, and that there is absolutely no daylight between him and his father. Had there been any difference or daylight, we would have seen it, because a number of people have tried to speak to the King about him, basically to complain about him. And, for a number of years now, he has enjoyed the support of his dad, who is an absolute monarch. So M.B.S. has the final say in all decisions in everything that happens in Saudi Arabia.

Do you have any sense of what the King may have made of the controversies in Saudi Arabia over the past six months, and whether he may hold his son responsible?

I don’t, and, frankly, I don’t think anyone does. I don’t think anyone has access to the conversations that happen between the King and his son. And my sense is that M.B.S. enjoys his father’s full support. His father also has maybe given him advice on how to behave and what to do. I don’t get the sense that he is deviating from his father’s broad policy guidelines, and those policy guidelines from his father are really two. The first is to diversify the economy away from oil and to generate jobs in the private sector, principally for graduating Saudi students who are coming onto the job market. The second is to basically build Saudi Arabia’s political and military capacity, so it becomes a major regional player that is less dependent on the United States, or anyone else, for that matter.

Do you think that M.B.S. has learned any lessons from Khashoggi or the war in Yemen?

On Khashoggi, I think it is too early to tell. I have been informed that there has been a reshuffle of the inner decision-making processes within the royal court and that a number of very seasoned and experienced Saudi officials and administrators have come to the fore. We will see if those changes have an effect. As far as the war in Yemen is concerned, my sense is that the Saudis really would like to get out of the war, would like to end it; they just don’t know how to do so without basically leaving a major beachhead for Iran in that country in the form of the Houthi rebels, who would take over the country.

You could starve everyone. Then there would be no beachhead. So what does that mean they are doing if there is no way to get out?

It’s a quagmire in the same way that the U.S. is in a quagmire in Afghanistan, or how the U.S. was in Vietnam. They can’t defeat the Houthis, and they feel that, if they just drop the war and withdraw, that country would become a threat to the national security of Saudi Arabia. I think that Yemen is a fairly complicated situation. Saudi Arabia certainly plays a very important role in exacerbating the humanitarian conditions, but you have to remember there is also a civil war that predates the Saudi involvement there. So it is more complicated than just attributing everything that happens there to Saudi Arabia.

Do you think that the humanitarian catastrophe has weighed on the rulers of Saudi Arabia at all?

A couple things: I think Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries know that they will have to eventually pay for the rebuilding of Yemen. And that the Yemenis are not just Arabs but Arabians. So I do think they feel some responsibility for what is happening there and what will happen after the war as well. They have offered humanitarian aid to the U.N. and directly to Yemen. And we are talking hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, so the idea that they are completely oblivious to Yemen is belied by what they offer by way of humanitarian aid in terms of food and other supplies.

But continuing the war?

Yes, continuing the war, because I think there is a serious conviction that the war in Yemen has to do with Iran. I personally think that they cannot win that war, that the Houthis are both too strong and too entrenched in that war, and that, in fact, Saudi Arabia would do better to go back to its old policy of dealing with Yemen through the tribes, through the different political notables in the country—in other words, to spread patronage, to try to build clients among the Yemenis, rather than engage in a full war. And then also to let the Houthis run the country if they think they can, which I don’t think they will be able to.