A 1994 Chinese work. Scanned by Ismail, sent to him by an anonymous person.







Pages 418-419 and 466-467 were not included in the scan for some reason, so I'm posting them here:



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plished throughout the country. Nationwide more than 300 million landless and land-poor peasants (including those in old liberated areas) were given gratis about 700 million mu (15 mu=1 hectare) of land and large quantities of production means, free from the past heavy rent of about 35 billion kg of grain given to landlords annually. Ownership by the landlord class, the foundation of the feudal system that had continued for several thousand years in China, was by that time thoroughly eliminated. This meant a great, historic victory.

Opposition to feudalism was originally a democratic revolutionary task of the bourgeoisie. However, China's bourgeoisie was not strong enough to lead the peasants to fulfil this historical task. Only China's proletariat and its political party, the Communist Party of China, could clearly put forward this historical task and lead the peasants towards its accomplishment. The most fundamental task in opposition to feudalism was to eliminate its economic base; i.e., the feudal exploitative system of ownership by the landlord class. Without the struggle to abolish this, mere opposition to feudal ideology and culture could not be thorough, nor could shake the foundations of the feudal system. Of course, after abolition of this form of land ownership and elimination of the economic base of the feudal system, the Party had to transform the scattered individual economy (once also the foundation of the feudal society) into a socialized, large-scale production economy and continue to carry out arduous struggle in order to thoroughly eliminate the political and ideological influence of feudal and small-scale production. This was a long-term historical task.

With regard to agrarian reform in ethnic minority areas, in view of the economic and political situation and the many social and historical conditions different from those in the Han areas, the Party favoured adopting more prudent and gentle policies and steps, particularly in regard to the Tibetan region. The Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet signed between the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet stipulated, "In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central



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authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and demands for reform raised by the people shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet." The reactionaries in the local government of Tibet consistently obstructed the reform. Waiting for the awakening of Tibetan leaders and maturing of other conditions, up till 1956, the central government continued to tell the Tibetan local government that reform might not be carried out during the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62). However, reactionaries among serf-owners and nobles not only opposed agrarian reform in Tibet, but also collaborated with reactionary foreign forces to plot for "Tibetan independence." On March 10, 1959, they staged armed rebellion in Lhasa, which also spread to some other places in Tibet. The Chinese People's Liberation Army was ordered to swiftly put down the rebellion. On March 28, the State Council ordered that the original Tibetan local government be dissolved and that the Preparatory Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region exercise the function of the Tibetan local government. In June, the Preparatory Committee of the autonomous region held the 2nd plenary session, which adopted the Resolution on Conducting Democratic Reform. From that time on, democratic reform was carried out successively in a systematic and discriminating way throughout the region. The central task of the democratic reform was to change land ownership from that of feudal serf-owners to the peasants. The Party's class line in Tibet's rural areas was: reliance on poverty-stricken serfs and slaves, unity with middle-class serfs (including rich serfs) and with all forces that could be united, attacks on the rebellious and most reactionary serf-owners, thorough elimination of feudal serfdom and elimination of the serf-owning class. In the reform, it meant distinguishing those who participated in the rebellion and those who did not. Land and means of agricultural production of the Tibetan local government and of nobles and monasteries who participated in the rebellion were confiscated. A policy of redemption was adopted with regard to the land and means of agricultural production of the serf-owners, and monasteries who had not joined in the revolt. Within nearly two years, democratic reform



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launched in the Party to correct the styles of Party cadres. In the spring of 1951, the Party Central Committee held the First National Organizational Work Conference. It was decided to conduct a general rectification of the grass-root organizations of the Party and education on the eight requirements for Communist Party members, particularly with regard to the future of socialism and communism. On the basis of such education, conscientious examination and registration were carried out for Party members. Those who committed various errors and disqualified members were dealt with organizationally. Party consolidation, begun in the latter half of 1951, was carried out in stages and by groups. In work units, where the movement against the "three evils" was under way, Party consolidation took place in combination with the movement. By the spring of 1954, it had been basically concluded. Of the 6.5 million Party members, 410,000 were expelled from or asked to withdraw from the Party.

Just when the general line for the transitional period had been put forward, the serious event of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi carrying out anti-Party, splittist activities took place within the Party.

Gao Gang and Rao Shushi were transferred, successively, in late 1952 and early 1953 from their posts as top Party and government leaders of northeast and east China to work in central departments. Gao Gang was appointed chairman of the State Planning Commission and Rao Shushi head of the Organizational Department of the CPC Central Committee. At that time, the Party Central Committee was prepared to hold the 1st National People's congress and the 8th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Spying out the situation, Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, inflated with personal ambition, miscalculated that the time had come for them to usurp supreme Party and state leadership. At the National Financial and Economic Conference held in the summer of 1953, Gao Gang and a handful of his followers delivered various unprincipled statements and created internal Party disputes. Outside the meeting, they spread rumours, alleging that there were so-called "circles" among the central authorities, tarnishing the prestige of these entities and in



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particular attacking Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai of the leading core of the central government while lavishing praise on Gao Gang himself. At the National Organizational Work Conference in the autumn of the same year, Rao Shushi, taking co-ordinated action, also engaged in activities against Liu Shaoqi. After the National Financial and Economic Conference, Gao Gang went to south China, sowing discord in east and central-south China, attempting to incite resentment among high-ranking officials against the central government. He spread the so-called "army-Party theory," which divided the Chinese Communist Party into the "Party of the base area and the army" and the "Party of the white area." This ignored the fact that the army was established and led by the Party but rather asserted that the Party was created by the army. Gao Gang described himself as a representative of the "base area and army Party." He claimed that the leading organs of the Party Central Committee and the state weere now in the hands of the "white area Party" and because of this, the Party Central Committee should be "regrouped." In December, Mao Zedong made the usual proposal that Liu Shaoqi be entrusted to take charge of the Party Central Committee's work on his behalf during his leave. Gao Gang appeared personally to oppose this and engaged in clandestine activities, demanding that he be appointed the Party General Secretary or vice-chairman and that the candidate for the premier of the Government Administration Council be changed. In December 1953, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee exposed the anti-Party splittist activities of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi. The 4th Plenary Session of the 7th Party Central Committee held in February 1954 further exposed and criticized Gao Gang and Rao Shushi. It unanimously adopted the Resolution on Strengthening Party Unity. The resolution stressed that Party unity is the life of the Party and demanded that the whole Party, especially high-ranking Party cadres, raise their consciousness to safeguard Party unity and to wage resolute struggle against all words and deeds that undermined Party unity, tarnished the prestige of the Party Central Committee and interfered with the unified leadership of the Party Central Committee. After the conference, the Secretar-

