Men calling for Syrian unity in a suburb of Damascus on Feb. 17, during a cease-fire between the group controlling the town and the regime. Louai Beshara/AFP/Getty Images

Little to offer

One critical effect of this development is that the already marginal influence of the SNC within Syria (by way of the SMC) has been dramatically reduced. This has important implications. First, it suggests that a military intervention in Syria would be disastrous, since it would be unlikely to favorably change President Bashar al-Assad’s “calculus” and there is absolutely no chance that the “good rebels” — the so-called moderate groups that are willing to play ball with the U.S. — would be able to seize, wield or maintain power legitimately in the aftermath. Instead, such a move would likely launch an even more grievous phase of the civil war. Second, if a deal is reached, the SNC will not be able to implement or enforce its side of the agreement, given that it has little credibility among the Syrian people and exerts no meaningful authority within the Syrian theater.

What really matters is how the Syrian people feel about the rebels. Increasingly, the only ones who seem to recognize their legitimacy are their foreign backers.

During the Geneva talks, and in defiance of calls from the Syrian government for a more inclusive approach, the credible, indigenous political opposition groups were marginalized in favor of the Western and Saudi-backed SNC. In turn, the head of the Islamic Front rejected altogether the notion of a negotiated settlement and endorsed putting a bounty on the heads of those who participate. That is, none of the players with clout are even participating in the talks — yet. But if these more substantial actors were to take part in subsequent dialogues, the SNC would be further rendered superfluous. Third, the SNC has little to offer at any negotiating table. They do not have the ability to enforce cease-fires — a chronic problem throughout the crisis that has only worsened over time. This means that subsequent negotiations with the coalition would entail the regime making concessions and receiving nothing in return. Accordingly, the regime has decided that a better way forward is to orchestrate truces and cease-fires at the local and regional levels, bypassing the SNC, which has been hitherto unable to either coalesce into a legitimate interlocutor for the state with a coherent vision or set of demands, or develop the know-how or means to realize its objectives.

Impact on peace process