Update (24 Jan 2018): The discussion below still applies but the model has been updated (and will be updated through the OI search) and the latest results will always be kept here.

With the boring hypothetical internal report to OI management text and methodology out of the way, we can get to the only thing we care about – what are the chances of success? Note that we don’t apply Bayesian Search Theory just yet per se (stay tuned), we’re just catching up to the current residual probability condition to establish a baseline. With that, we can view the hypothetical OI internal report results, but with the standard caveat:

NOTE: Please realize that I am still playing “catch-up” and am well behind the state-of-the-art of knowledge on MH370. I have not dug into every report, read every blog, read every news item since about March, 2015. There are big gaps in my knowledge that could change the analysis herein significantly. The biggest known gaps (that I intend to dig into) are :1) What is the status of the area north of 26S latitude? CSIRO’s drift analysis was cut off there even though it would seemingly predict the same results at 25S as 26S. 2) What is the probability of being within +/- 25 nm of the 7th arc? I just have to guess at this, but it potentially makes a big difference. 3) Other things I am not thinking / aware of. OI surely knows much more about these two items than I do.

Also, I may not be accounting for the previous subsurface scan gaps in coverage – if so, probabilities in unscanned areas go down a bit and residual probabilities in previously scanned areas go up a bit.

———Begin Hypothetical OI Report Results Excerpt———–

Modelling Results and Summary

Model Results are summarized in the following figure. Results apply to +/25 nm from 7th arc only:

Update: Columns D, E and F combine to form G. Column H is formed from the debris field model combined with Column L. Column G and H combine to form I. Finally, Column I is combined with Column O to form Column J, the current MH370 resting place probability.

Columns D, E and F combine to form G. Column H is formed from the debris field model combined with Column L. Column G and H combine to form I. Finally, Column I is combined with Column O to form Column J, the current MH370 resting place probability. The assumption of 1.5-sigma end-of-flight confidence and 3-sigma confidence conspiracy theories are wrong results in an overall 86% probability that MH370 lies within +/- 25 nm of the 7th arc between latitudes between 18S and 40S. This result is highly dependent on end-of-flight confidence.

Much of the arc has received good to excellent aerial and/or subsurface scanning (Columns P and Q).

The current OI target search area between 33S and 36S has a cumulative probability of MH370 location of 31% (Column J) with a specific probability of 18% at 35S.

The 30S target identified by Radiant Physics has an MH370 location probability of 34% due to the debris sightings there. It is unclear whether CSIRO retroactive analyses for aerial search apply outside the +/- 25 nm boundary, but it has been assumed they do not. If they do, probabilities at 30S could be reduced slightly.

Both of the above areas combined represent a 65% MH370 location probability. All of these depend highly on the expected number of debris fields as outlined in the previous report, and this is the largest uncertainty in the analyses. However, a sensitivity analysis (not shown) indicates that if the expected number of debris fields doubled to 12 from 6, the total probability would reduce to 53%. If doubled again to 24, probability reduces to 44%.

We have a ____% detection probability which results in a ___% chance of success if both areas are scanned and the expected number of debris fields is 6.

The previously discussed issues with the debris drift model would affect these results very little and our simplified assumptions are adequate.

Recommendations

Search at 30S and 35S should include scans outside the 1.5 sigma 25 nm end-of-flight boundary. Any “pinpoint” high probability areas such as these along the 7th arc should scan a wider area across the arc to take advantage of the assumed ~14% probability MH370 lies outside these locations before moving to other locations which have lesser probabilities. We recommend thinking in terms of searching across the arc rather than along the arc in such locations with scans extending to 2 to 3-sigma perpendicular to the arc. Latitude 28S, which has no pinpoint evidence, by contrast could be searched with the lesser 1.5-sigma strategy along the arc.

Should neither 30S or 35S result in finding MH370, the CSIRO-style retroactive analysis of aerial search data combined with drift analyses should be repeated for satellite data to both identify potential debris field and also blank out areas along the 7th arc that have effectively been scanned by satellite.

We don’t recommend searching the Intangibles Area 18S to 25S until more is known and the CSIRO drift analyses are extended to include the area.

Beyond the above areas, only 28S and 40S remain as weakly probable. The lower quality aerial search coverage in the CSIRO retroactive analysis, combined with high probability drift model results make 28S a candidate. The 40S location has received minimal search but is contraindicated by the drift analysis and is at the extreme edge of the B777 performance limit. Performance limits should be reevaluated prior to moving to this target.

———End Hypothetical OI Report Results Excerpt———–

Clearly the chances of finding MH370 are good, depending on OI’s detection probability, which I assume may be 95% or better based on the previous subsurface. They are looking in the next best areas. The puzzling thing is the existence of the debris fields (which dominate this analysis) and the capability to do drift analysis has been known and possible since 2014. It’s easy to see in hindsight, but these should have been given much more attention than they were. CSIRO’s retroactive analysis is quite ingenious and valuable if it is accurate. In true Bayesian Search Theory fashion, this technique could be extended to satellite data, but let’s just hope they find MH370 quickly and make such an analysis unnecessary.

Update (1/22/18): The big caveat with everything I said above is the above analysis only takes into account data-based analysis and does not include human factors, which could shift probabilities around. Nevertheless, search must proceed to areas where man-made debris was spotted in the early aerial search, because statistics say those areas are simply high probability areas.

Implications for the Waypoint Hypothesis

It’s hanging in at 2.7% probability at 40S. It’s simply there by virtue of elimination of other high probability areas by search. This number is based on data alone, which do not take into account human factors at all. The Waypoint Hypothesis has been since 2014, a potential “pinpoint” location like the 30S and and 35S locations due to human factors. In a future post, we will examine the potential to take human factors (which are typically pinpoint along the arc in nature) into account in the above analyses.

With the Waypoint Hypothesis being pinpoint in nature, scans should be across the arc there, if they ever make it that far south. The performance limit is next up in my “catch-up” series of posts.