14 The Problematic Primacy of the Practical

13 The Standpoint of Life and the Standpoint of Philosophy

7 <i>Anstoß</i>, Abstract Realism, and the Finitude of the I

6 The Divided Self and the Tasks of Philosophy

5 The Spirit of the Early <i>Wissenschaftslehre</i>

3 “Real Synthetic Thinking” and the Principle of Determinability

This chapter aims to clarify the meaning of the term “intellectual intuition” by distinguishing four distinct senses of “intellectual” (or “inner”) intuition in Fichte’s Jena writings and contrasting all of them with “sensible intuition.” These four senses are: (1) the “actual intellectual intuition” of moral obligation and of one’s free power to determine oneself in accord with duty; (2) “intellectual intuition” as designating the pure structure of self-consciousness or “I-hood,” in which the subject and object are in immediate unity with one another as a fact/act of Tathandlung ; (3) “intellectual intuition” as a freely produced fact of (philosophical) consciousness; and (4) “intellectual intuition” as a central component of the transcendental philosopher’s “observational” or “descriptive” method of genetic construction. Of these four types, only the first occurs as such within ordinary consciousness and the others pertain exclusively to the “standpoint of philosophy.” The chapter also considers of some of the difficulties raised by Fichte’s method of intellectual intuition.

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