ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Freer, 2017 ONCJ 623

DATE: 2017 09 14

COURT FILE No.: Guelph Provincial Offences No. 6870984B

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

— AND —

Gary Freer

Before Justice M.D. McArthur

Heard on July 13, 2017 at Guelph

Reasons for Decision released on September 14, 2017

P. Cassata.............................................................................................. Provincial Prosecutor

Gary Freer........................................................................... the Appellant on his own behalf

McArthur, M.D. J.:

[1] “A little learning is a dangerous thing; drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring: there shallow draughts intoxicate the brain, and drinking largely sobers us again.” These words of Alexander Pope might again serve us well to be recalled in this case and perhaps in these times when a reminder or restatement of the law appears to be required.

[2] Gary Freer appeals a conviction for the offence speeding made by the presiding Justice of the Peace on March 2, 2017 at Guelph. Mr. Freer was charged that on the 8th day of September, 2016 at 10:04 am on Highway 89 in the Town of Minto, Wellington County, he did commit the offence of speeding at 114 km/hour in a posted 80 km/hour zone contrary to Section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

[3] The trial commenced on December 14, 2016 and continued on March 2, 2017. At the conclusion of the trial, the Appellant was convicted of the offence and received a fine of $ 238 plus surcharge and costs and was given 90 days to pay.

The Issues

[4] Thankfully, oral argument on appeal provided some assistance in divining the appellant’s grounds for appeal that were a challenge to decipher from the documentation that had been filed. Whether by pure happenstance or otherwise, the gods thankfully bestowed their kindness and benevolence upon this court as similarly experienced and expressed by O’Donnell, J. in R. v. Duncan 2013 ONCJ 160 at paragraph 20. Ultimately, this court was able to boil down Mr. Freer’s grounds in this case to the following:

1. The appellant was just passing by or along the King’s Highway and that another Justice told him that a licence does not mean anything on the highway;

2. The Highway Traffic Act applies to only commercial vehicles and the appellant was only operating a “private conveyance”, in which his wife was a passenger, on the roadway. By doing so, the officer “put him and his wife in tort”;

3. The appellant was “put in servitude’ as a result of being stopped by the police. This amounted to a violation of United Nations principles and covenants and, particularly, that no one shall be held in servitude, that freedom is a natural right and that, pursuant to Section 7 of the Constitution Act, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and this can only be exercised by a human being, which he is and was. The 1976 universal covenant became International Law and the United Nations Law became the law of the land from which he derives and enjoys these fundamental freedoms;

4. The appellant signed his driver’s licence and ticket without prejudice and that he was not in any way “contracting” with the state and, as such, the driver’s licence and ticket were null and void.

The Facts

[5] The investigating police constable barely commenced his testimony at trial about the speeding event of September 8, 2016 when the appellant made a lengthy submission of his “status information” - a sililoquacious statement which occupies 5 pages of the trial proceeding transcript that ends perhaps with the rhetorical question by the appellant “Are you denying my rights?” The familiarity and intimacy of smaller jurisdictions has its own blessings and challenges depending on one’s perspective. In this case the presiding Justice of the Peace had, on some prior occasion, encountered the appellant in an earlier proceeding and fortunately was able to focus this case on its’ merits and avoid straying into irrelevant areas and black holes of irrational thought. He reminded the appellant about “the case out west” – no doubt referring to the well-known decision of Meads v. Meads 2012 ABQB 571 that the appellant appeared aware of. This case has been the subject of much judicial consideration and approval and is adopted also by this court.

[6] And so day 1 of the trial ended.

[7] Upon resuming proceedings for day 2 of the trial on March 2, 2017, the appellant sought to clarify who he was and stated “I am presenting myself today” and “I am a human being”. All of this was penetratingly obvious. With such a presence and jurisdiction before the court, the presiding Justice of the Peace put the case on the procedural rails and the evidence was heard. The appellant remained resolute and attentive in the proceeding throughout and so much so that the record reflects that the appellant preferred to stand for the entire evidence of the investigating office, the prosecutor’s chief and sole witness.

[8] One may have desired that the case cut-to-the-chase, so to speak. It was not to be. On the September 8, 2016 date, the investigating police officer was with the traffic management unit of the Mount Forest Ontario Provincial Police detachment and was operating a fully marked OPP cruiser on Highway 89 westbound in the Town of Minto. At 10:04 am he observed a 2005 Volkswagen Passat motor vehicle operated by the appellant travelling eastbound at 114 kilometers per hour according to two readings obtained on the radar that he was qualified and operating. This was an 80 kilometer per hour zone. The officer soon unremarkably stopped the appellant and eventually issued an Offence Notice to the appellant for the speeding infraction.

[9] Mr. Freer’s cross-examination of the officer included statements that the investigating officer was violating his human rights when he was stopped on the side of the road. The appellant also testified in relation to the Offence Notice that he received and, also apparently reading from a prepared script, that “Various devious people have been entering information not collected from myself and these people are using it as though I entered it. I don’t consent, and if I had in any way or form, I made a mistake, I am withdrawing my consent. I am here only here to collect what you give or issue to forward that onto the title/security holder of the registered legal name, Gary Cecil Freer as the avail(sic). I will accept what you give as true and correct for and on behalf of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II as her authorized representative. I am not in receipt of any documentation or disclosure from the insurer that I hold liability, not that I have given consent to the information collected under or through it to be used against myself.”

[10] The appellant also testified that his driver’s licence was relevant by the way it is signed and that he had another witness but he was not calling that witness but saving the witness for the appeal. Such an indication may have had a cliff-hanger effect that one would hope find its way onto the appeal stage as indicated by the appellant. This was also not to be.

[11] The appellant was found guilty by the Justice of the Peace and convicted of the speeding offence but not before appellant took exception to an earlier offered resolution by the prosecutor for presumably a small fine and no demerit points. Ultimately, the Justice of the Peace imposed a fine of $238.

Analysis

[12] As mentioned earlier, the law in this area has been well-considered and largely, fortunately and somewhat remarkably, seems rather limited to many cases alleging travelling in a rapid manner, and for whatever reason, upon the public roads. In addition to the Meads vs. Meads case referred to earlier, many of these issues have also been dealt with by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Bydeley [2011] O.J. 6282 on appeal from the trial decision in Kitchener reported at 2010 ONCJ 740. That case dealt with the same offence as the present case and similar arguments. In addition, there is the more recent decision of R. v. Duncan 2013 ONCJ 160, in which O’Donnell, J. does a review of the law and analysis of which I adopt here and will commend to the appellant since I suspect this may likely escaped his earlier attention.

[13] With reference to the grounds of appeal as delineated earlier, this court can address each ground of appeal as follows:

1. Section 1 of The Highway Traffic Act defines the following: ““highway” includes a common and public highway, street, avenue, parkway, driveway, square, place, bridge, viaduct or trestle, any part of which is intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles and includes the area between the lateral property lines thereof; and “King’s Highway” includes the secondary highways and tertiary roads designated under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act. Section 128 provides (1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle at a rate of speed greater than (b) 80 kilometres per hour on a highway, not within a built-up area, that is within a local municipality that had the status of a township on December 31, 2002 and, but for the enactment of the Municipal Act, 2001, would have had the status of a township on January 1, 2003, if the municipality is prescribed by regulation; or (c) 80 kilometres per hour on a highway designated by the Lieutenant Governor in Council as a controlled-access highway under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act, whether or not the highway is within a local municipality or built-up area.” Accordingly, in any case the appellant was driving a motor vehicle on the highway as defined in the circumstances while speeding as mentioned. In addition, there was no evidence of any judicially-induced error in this case. Accordingly, this ground of appeal fails;

2. Under the Highway Traffic Act a “motor vehicle” is defined as follows: “motor vehicle” includes an automobile, a motorcycle, a motor assisted bicycle unless otherwise indicated in this Act, and any other vehicle propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power, but does not include a street car or other motor vehicle running only upon rails, a power-assisted bicycle, a motorized snow vehicle, a traction engine, a farm tractor, a self-propelled implement of husbandry or a road-building machine”. There exists no statutory or common law exception for a commercial vehicle as submitted by the appellant. This ground of appeal fails;

3. There is no doubt that the appellant is a human being, however, this ground of appeal and issue was specifically dealt with in the trial decision of R. v. Bydeley 2010 ONCJ 740 at paragraph 24 and in the appeal decision [2011] O.J. 6282 at paragraph 7. This ground of appeal fails; and

4. The notion of “contract” and other acts of will, freedom and rights is, as O’Donnell, J. has observed, based on an unhealthy degree of freedom from societal obligations and norms. It is also an erroneous understanding that perhaps suffers from poor legal information, advice or interpretation, whatever the source, and descends into gibberish and foolishness that does not serve the appellant nor any other person well. Simply put, such a concept of contract is taken entirely out of context and has no applicability in this case. This ground of appeal also fails.

[14] One may have wished for something new and interesting in this case. What was new was not that interesting and what was interesting was not necessarily new. The public at large, however, might be better served in the long run by a further patient and considered restatement of the law in this manner.

CONCLUSION

[15] In conclusion, the appeal is dismissed in the circumstances.

Released: September 14, 2017

Signed: Justice M.D. McArthur