The wanton terrorist attack on the All Saints Memorial Church in Peshawar has angered Pakistanis across the political spectrum. But the inefficacy of our collective outrage has been demonstrated in the past, such as after the attack on child activist Malala Yousafzai.

Terrorism is a complex activity and hence involves an equally complex solution. To truly eradicate terrorism, one needs to understand its genesis, which involves trying to decipher which “narrative”, if any, best fits the terrorism data. In this article, after briefly analysing the different narratives on terrorism, I will focus on what can be done to combat it.

According to the Global Terrorism Database, there were about 1,000 terror induced deaths in Pakistan in the 1980s, largely perpetrated by the sectarian outfits and the Al-Zulfiqar organization that was formed by the late premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s sons to avenge his murder. This included the notorious hijacking of a PIA plane in 1981. The next decade saw a 300% increase in terrorism largely perpetrated by the notorious Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), a sectarian Deobandi outfit that aims to “cleanse” Pakistan of the “infidel” Shia Muslims. In fact, around 30% of all deaths due to terrorism in Pakistan can be traced back to the SSP, including those in the current wave of suicide bombings. The decade following the 9/11 attacks witnessed a 1000% increase in terrorism, largely perpetrated by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

To explain this extraordinary rise in violence, three broad narratives have emerged. The first narrative asserts that the dramatic increase in terrorism is a direct result of Pakistan’s support for United States combined with drone strikes on the Pakistani soil that incurred the wrath of Afghan Taliban, local Pakistani Taliban, and other foreign militants. The second narrative asserts that this increase in terrorism is a result of creeping radicalization of Pakistan starting from 1970s, gaining unprecedented momentum in the General Ziaul Haq’s regime. The state instilled (and continues to instil) an extreme and intolerant ideology that manifested itself after the United States occupation of Afghanistan. This school argues that the current wave of terrorism is largely a part of a gradual increase in terrorism levels which is a direct result of bigotry, violence and hate in the domestic education system. A related third narrative also focuses on domestic origins of terrorism and blames Pakistan’s politically powerful military for providing militants with safe havens and using terrorist organizations to further its strategic interests against India.

All of these narratives are partly true, yet no single narrative alone can claim to fully explain terrorism in Pakistan because some of their implicit assumptions are contradicted by data. The first narrative fails to take into account terrorism, particularly sectarian terrorism by the SSP, prior to the events of September 11, 2001. Moreover, there is no evidence that increases in drone strikes coincides with increased terrorism. Nevertheless, to say that the US invasion of Afghanistan had no effect in terrorism levels in Pakistan belies even a cursory look at the data. The second and third narratives can neither explain the large jump in terror incidents after 2006, nor the persistently high levels of terrorism after 2006. The education system did not suddenly increase the instruction of bigotry in 2006, although terror related deaths increased from around 134 in 2005 (which is far less than the average in the 1990s) to around 1,300 terrorism deaths in 2007.

[quote]The Taliban, the criminal gangs in Karachi, and the “peace-loving” Pashtuns, all need to be disarmed[/quote]

In July 2005, a major ceasefire agreement between the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani government was violated, which resulted in a localized military operation by Pakistan Army. Every year since 2006, there have been more than 1,000 deaths due to terrorism, and the most recent and the highest levels of recorded terrorism show 1,011 terrorist incidents resulting in 1,658 deaths. This comes down to three terror incidents and almost four causalities per day on average.

This seems to suggest that severing dialogue with militants can significantly increase terrorism levels (as was the case in 2005) and an unthought-out military action can be counter-productive. Although the post 2006 spike (from around 100 to 1,000 deaths) contradicts the pure education narrative, as it would require a gradual increase in terrorism levels, one can argue that this increase was sustained by facilitation from institutional factors such as the type of education and the past behaviour of the military in coddling militants.

What does this all mean in our “fight” against terrorism? This means that for lasting peace we need a concerted approach on various fronts. We perhaps need the rhetoric of “disengagement” of United States’ war on terrorism, take out hate spewing literature from our textbooks, and disengage our military from all militant organizations. Yet, ironically, this is not the most important nor the most difficult step needed to curb terrorism over the long term. This brings me to my main point.

[quote]We can no longer let the possession of dangerous weapons pass as “culture”[/quote]

What is truly needed, over the long term, is an unrelenting campaign of complete disarmament in Pakistan. The Taliban, the criminal gangs in Karachi, or the “peace-loving” Pashtuns, all need to be disarmed. We know from research conducted around the world that reducing access to dangerous weapons reduces violence. In fact, Mark Duggan, the chair of public policy at the Wharton School, demonstrated that a 10% reduction in gun ownership reduces violence by 2.14%. Contrary to the popular perception, firearms are intrinsic to terrorism in Pakistan. It is what makes the execution of suicide attacks successful. In fact, according to the Global Terrorism Database, around 35.9% of terrorist attacks in the last decade were exclusively carried out through the use of guns. This of course is a gross underestimation, as successful suicide attacks also involve breaking an entry by using firearms. We can no longer let the possession of dangerous weapons pass as “culture”.

Sooner or later, as the current wave of terrorism recedes, a new motivation and a new movement will arise in this fertile land of the pure, with its 18 million (civilian) firearms of which over 60% are illicit (according to the Organization for Gun Policy). Hence, we must fight those who will not disarm and “jaw-jaw” with the rest.

The mere rhetoric of dialogue or military operation is bootless. Anger, pre-emption, apologies and condemnations are all inefficacious. The government should move in to disarm all of Pakistan to blunt the current wave of terrorism, and all the future waves lurching in the dark recesses of time.