Special By By Paul Iddon Jun 25, 2014 in Politics Russia's close support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria over the last three years along with its recent annexation of Crimea has led to considerable worry over its intentions and foreign policy. But how much of it do we in fact understand? He writes a column entitled He recently answered some questions I had for him on these important subjects. i) First of all, could you tell us a little about yourself? I’m a graduate student in European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. My official academic interest is Russian foreign policy but in reality I’m torn between the former Soviet Union and the Middle East in terms of favored area of study. Examining Russian policy towards the Middle East is a nice way to bridge that gap. ii) It certainly isn't an uneventful point in time to specialize in Russian foreign affairs. Could you share with us some of the most notable and striking events that have transpired in the last year in regard to Russia's relationship with the wider world? The most striking has certainly been the intervention in Crimea. The entire process seemed somewhat surreal to me – it was a very emphatic instance of Vladimir Putin and Russia rejecting the accepted norm, at least in the Western world, that you can’t alter borders by force any more. With the exception of a brief period in the 1990s, Russian foreign policy has always been very realist and pragmatic in its worldview, and this was a poignant reminder of that. They saw their interests at stake with an allied government in a very important neighbor being toppled, and they acted accordingly to safeguard them. The other major incident with regards to Russia’s role on the world stage in the past year has been its handling of the chemical weapons crisis in Syria. Obama had been reluctant to act on the Syria issue before then, but when it looked as though his hand had been forced by the ‘red line’ comment and pressure from his European allies, Putin and Lavrov managed to offer him an out that still saved him some face. It was a masterful stroke of diplomacy that not only allowed the Kremlin to portray Russia dealing with the US as an equal, but also protected their allies in Damascus against quite high odds. Handshake. Assad and Putin Assad and Putin iii) Are there any widely held misconceptions regarding the nature of the Moscow-Damascus relationship in your view? I think one of the more misleading views that’s often stated in the media is that Russia is going all-in on Assad’s protection because of the Russian naval base at Tartus. It’s often made out to be this key strategic facility that enables Russian power projection throughout the region and is vital to Russia’s foreign policy strategy. This isn’t really the case. In terms of functional value, the port itself actually does not provide very much. It can provide some servicing, but it has no command and control facilities that would enable the Russians to direct operations from the port, nor is it deep enough to enable the larger Russian warships to dock. There have been planned and announced upgrades for the base for years, but nothing substantial has yet transpired – that should tell you something about its strategic importance. Where the base does offer significant value is its symbolism. It’s Russia’s last remaining military facility outside the former Soviet Union, so it’s one of the last vestiges of the once-global Soviet reach. Nostalgia for past greatness is a major factor in domestic popularity for Russian leaders, and as such being able to maintain bases in far-flung regions of the world is a very appealing notion to the Kremlin. Russian warship at Tartus naval facility some years ago. PressTV file photo iv) When writing your analysis of Russian policy analysis 'Towards Southern Shores' column what were the most notable things you learned about how Russia and the Russian media perceives developments and events in the Middle East? One thing I did pick up on was the terminology used by Russian media. Of course op-ed writers on RT [the Russia Today news network] are going to use very incendiary language, and as such it’s not surprising when you read borderline conspiracy theories on the Syrian conflict there. What surprised me a little more is the way in which the opposition is described in ITAR-TASS, Izvestia, RIA Novosti and other Russian outlets. In nearly every article on Syria I’ve read on those outlets, they almost go out of their way to use phrases like “Islamic extremists,” “terrorists,” “foreign-backed insurgents,” etc. It’s the same way the Syrian government describes the crisis and that’s very telling as to the degree to which the two are aligned. Another is the selective nature of reporting. The Russian press is keen to report on every opposition car bombing and mortar attack – the rebel attack on a pro-Assad rally in Daraa prior to the election was very heavily covered, for instance. By contrast, the [regime's] barrel-bombing campaign on Aleppo that ramped up in December 2013 and January 2014 was hardly mentioned. The apparent chlorine gas attacks in Hama province over the last month or two have received a similar treatment. Western media has generally portrayed them as being almost undoubtedly committed by the regime, while the Russian press generally glossed them over in favor of coverage of the Syrian government nearing completion of the chemical weapons deal, and when it did mention them, it was careful to state that the government blamed the rebels. The difference in tone is subtle in some places and stark in others. Residents inspect a huge hole in the ground at a site hit by what activists say was a Scud missile from forces loyal to Syria's President Bashar al-Assad in Raqqa, eastern Syria With permission by Reuters / Nour Fourat v) In your view are Russia's policies in the Middle East as of late seeing to its overall influence in the region increase, decline or fluctuate? Russian influence in the Middle East is most certainly on the rise. There are a number of factors we can point to here, but the most important has been its unwavering stance on the Syria crisis. The Kremlin has backed Assad one hundred percent from day one, and the message has been clear: we are not a country that abandons its allies. The Assad regime’s military resurgence has shored up Russia’s regional position and placed an exclamation point on that statement. By contrast, the United States has repeatedly wavered on the Syrian issue, as well as others in the region, especially Egypt. They’re now seen as responsible for not only the anarchic state Libya is in, but Iraq as well – the Russians issued a statement on the recent ISIS offensive and crisis there essentially saying, “we told you so.” The Russian/Syrian narrative on the Syrian opposition being composed of terrorists, Islamic extremists and foreign fighters has also become both increasingly accepted and increasingly true, which has been a major propaganda coup for Assad and the Kremlin. I think the September 2013 chemical weapons deal (and the fact that Assad has actually followed through with it, by most estimates) have also been crucial in boosting Russian standing in the region. The effects of this have been seen across the region. Russia is stepping into the gap in Egypt to forge a new military and economic relationship there. Of course, [former Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed] Morsi in Egypt was very anti-Assad, and Sisi has not yet really taken a stand on the issue, so it will be interesting to see if the Russians attempt to bring him around on the issue, perhaps by making the arms deal contingent on it. The Jordanians are getting their first nuclear plant courtesy of a Russian firm, so clearly there are incentives to working with Moscow. Russia is still somewhat at odds with the Saudis, but there are signs they’re coming around on the Syrian issue, or at least prioritizing domestic security and the prospect of returning fighters over military and rhetorical support for the opposition. Overall, the trend definitely favors a continued increase in Russian influence in the region, at least in the short term. Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in his former capacity as army chief in Putin's Novo-Ogaryovo state residence. 13 February 2014. Reuters/Mihail Metzel/RIA vi) To the surprise of many, and possibly even to the consternation of some, Israel sought not to condemn Russia's annexation of Crimea but instead decided to take a neutral stance in regard to that situation. What do you think motivated Israel to take a neutral stance on this issue? The clear motivation would be the Golan Heights issue and establishing a precedent for unilaterally redrawing borders by force. No other country recognizes Israel’s 1981 de facto annexation of the Golan, and it wants to leave the door open for a formal annexation sometime in the future if circumstance provides for it. Russian-Israeli relations are not the best, but there was nothing to be gained by needlessly antagonizing the Kremlin and condemning the move. The US likely pressured Israel to do so, but it’s well established that Washington has little leverage over Tel Aviv’s policy choices, and as such it’s not surprising that it would be rejected. vii) Russia has recently come out and made it clear that it fully supports the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Is there any significance to Russia speaking up for that government at this point in time given the fact that there are some in Washington who contend that Maliki needs to go? Putin’s announcement voicing full support for Maliki is a manifestation of one of the touchstones of Russian foreign policy: support for state stability and the unacceptability of overthrowing incumbent governments by force. It’s the same language we’ve seen Moscow using to describe the Syrian crisis for years: using terms such as “terrorists” and “extremists” and issuing full support for the government in “liberating” its territory. The statement referenced the link between the situation in Iraq and that in Syria, which is undoubtedly a fact that Putin will drive home at every opportunity in order to imply that Russia’s version of events – that supporting the opposition in Syria would lead to regional spillover and instability – was correct all along, and by extension Western notions of regime change have only led to chaos for the area. In this specific instance, backing Maliki himself is an uncomfortable option that Washington is unhappy about and that likely does not overly please the Kremlin either, as it was Maliki’s corrupt, sectarian and exclusionary policies that precipitated this crisis and the general Sunni uprising that has accompanied the ISIS offensive. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki casts his vote in the country's first parliamentary election since US troops withdrawal, at a polling station in Baghdad's fortified Green Zone, on April 30, 2014 Ali al-Saadi, AFP/File Nevertheless, it fits the Russian line, and given that the Russians can expect the Iranians to once again do the heavy lifting for them by organizing Iraqi militias and pro-government forces on the ground, I don’t foresee a change in policy on Iraq. viii) If the present negotiations over Iran's nuclear program with the western powers breaks down do you see a situation where Iran will pivot closer to Russia and its eastern allies? It’s certainly a possibility. Russian and Iran have had a very successful working relationship on Syria – Iran provides the weapons and training, Russia provides more weapons and diplomatic cover. Iran has more direct influence on the course of military events on the ground in Syria, but the Syrians seem to feel more indebted to the Russians; it was Russian that was just instituted as a mandatory subject in Syrian schools, not Farsi. The growth of Russia’s influence in the Middle East has buoyed its standing as an ally, as has its steadfast support of the Assad regime. However, Iran has its own agenda, and aspires to regional hegemony itself. It will not content itself to play second fiddle or to be a Russian client to the same degree as Syria, which is much smaller and does not have its own domestic arms industry as Iran does. Iran is engaged in a struggle with Saudi Arabia for regional dominance, and as such it is somewhat salient to look at the relationship between that country and the United States as a model for potential Russian-Iranian cooperation. While the US has significant influence over Saudi Arabia and concurrent interests with it, the latter maintains policies at odds with Washington’s desires and acts independently in a number of spheres. Similarly, while Moscow and Tehran have different objectives in some settings, there are a number of areas, such as nuclear cooperation, limiting US power in the region, and arming/funding the Syrian regime where they will continue to find common ground. Vladimir Putin meeting with Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in October 2007. ISNA News Agency ix) Have you any future projects in the works you would like to tell us about? I’m currently in the midst of beginning my graduate research project. It focuses, not surprisingly, on Russian-Syrian relations; specifically, the manner in which the Kremlin and Russian media have portrayed the conflict as it has developed. I’m aiming to identify whether the Russian line on the conflict hardens over time, especially as the Libyan civil war and intervention, which the Russians were very upset about, occurs during that time. This could reveal important shifts in Russian foreign policy as a whole and could explain why Putin has become more forceful in its conduct, such as in Ukraine. It’ll take some time but it should yield some interesting results. Neil Hauer is a specialist on Russia's relationship with the Middle Eastern region. His work aims to give us a clearer understanding of how Russia's perception of the Middle East region serves to shape its various policies towards that region.He writes a column entitled 'Toward Southern Shores' which is devoted to carefully analyzing news, events and developments pertaining primarily to Moscow-Damascus relations. His work, analysis and careful commentary on this very important strategic relationship is invaluable given his deep understanding of its background and history.He recently answered some questions I had for him on these important subjects.I’m a graduate student in European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. My official academic interest is Russian foreign policy but in reality I’m torn between the former Soviet Union and the Middle East in terms of favored area of study. Examining Russian policy towards the Middle East is a nice way to bridge that gap.The most striking has certainly been the intervention in Crimea. The entire process seemed somewhat surreal to me – it was a very emphatic instance of Vladimir Putin and Russia rejecting the accepted norm, at least in the Western world, that you can’t alter borders by force any more. With the exception of a brief period in the 1990s, Russian foreign policy has always been very realist and pragmatic in its worldview, and this was a poignant reminder of that. They saw their interests at stake with an allied government in a very important neighbor being toppled, and they acted accordingly to safeguard them.The other major incident with regards to Russia’s role on the world stage in the past year has been its handling of the chemical weapons crisis in Syria. Obama had been reluctant to act on the Syria issue before then, but when it looked as though his hand had been forced by the ‘red line’ comment and pressure from his European allies, Putin and Lavrov managed to offer him an out that still saved him some face. It was a masterful stroke of diplomacy that not only allowed the Kremlin to portray Russia dealing with the US as an equal, but also protected their allies in Damascus against quite high odds.I think one of the more misleading views that’s often stated in the media is that Russia is going all-in on Assad’s protection because of the Russian naval base at Tartus. It’s often made out to be this key strategic facility that enables Russian power projection throughout the region and is vital to Russia’s foreign policy strategy. This isn’t really the case. In terms of functional value, the port itself actually does not provide very much. It can provide some servicing, but it has no command and control facilities that would enable the Russians to direct operations from the port, nor is it deep enough to enable the larger Russian warships to dock. There have been planned and announced upgrades for the base for years, but nothing substantial has yet transpired – that should tell you something about its strategic importance.Where the base does offer significant value is its symbolism. It’s Russia’s last remaining military facility outside the former Soviet Union, so it’s one of the last vestiges of the once-global Soviet reach. Nostalgia for past greatness is a major factor in domestic popularity for Russian leaders, and as such being able to maintain bases in far-flung regions of the world is a very appealing notion to the Kremlin.One thing I did pick up on was the terminology used by Russian media. Of course op-ed writers on RT [the Russia Today news network] are going to use very incendiary language, and as such it’s not surprising when you read borderline conspiracy theories on the Syrian conflict there. What surprised me a little more is the way in which the opposition is described in ITAR-TASS, Izvestia, RIA Novosti and other Russian outlets. In nearly every article on Syria I’ve read on those outlets, they almost go out of their way to use phrases like “Islamic extremists,” “terrorists,” “foreign-backed insurgents,” etc. It’s the same way the Syrian government describes the crisis and that’s very telling as to the degree to which the two are aligned.Another is the selective nature of reporting. The Russian press is keen to report on every opposition car bombing and mortar attack – the rebel attack on a pro-Assad rally in Daraa prior to the election was very heavily covered, for instance. By contrast, the [regime's] barrel-bombing campaign on Aleppo that ramped up in December 2013 and January 2014 was hardly mentioned. The apparent chlorine gas attacks in Hama province over the last month or two have received a similar treatment. Western media has generally portrayed them as being almost undoubtedly committed by the regime, while the Russian press generally glossed them over in favor of coverage of the Syrian government nearing completion of the chemical weapons deal, and when it did mention them, it was careful to state that the government blamed the rebels. The difference in tone is subtle in some places and stark in others.Russian influence in the Middle East is most certainly on the rise. There are a number of factors we can point to here, but the most important has been its unwavering stance on the Syria crisis. The Kremlin has backed Assad one hundred percent from day one, and the message has been clear: we are not a country that abandons its allies. The Assad regime’s military resurgence has shored up Russia’s regional position and placed an exclamation point on that statement.By contrast, the United States has repeatedly wavered on the Syrian issue, as well as others in the region, especially Egypt. They’re now seen as responsible for not only the anarchic state Libya is in, but Iraq as well – the Russians issued a statement on the recent ISIS offensive and crisis there essentially saying, “we told you so.” The Russian/Syrian narrative on the Syrian opposition being composed of terrorists, Islamic extremists and foreign fighters has also become both increasingly accepted and increasingly true, which has been a major propaganda coup for Assad and the Kremlin. I think the September 2013 chemical weapons deal (and the fact that Assad has actually followed through with it, by most estimates) have also been crucial in boosting Russian standing in the region.The effects of this have been seen across the region. Russia is stepping into the gap in Egypt to forge a new military and economic relationship there. Gazprom just signed a deal with Egypt and an arms contract is also in the works – Izvestia described it as “trying to raise cooperation to a level like the 1950s and 1960s.” [Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-] Sisi’s trip to Moscow has been just one of a number of high-profile Arab visits lately. The Bahraini crown prince and King Abdullah of Jordan have also visited. Abdullah’s visit in particular was interesting because Jordan has been one of the stronger backers of the Syrian opposition, but shortly after the visit the Jordanian air force carried out strikes on a rebel convoy and reportedly forced rebels in the south to back down from a major planned offensive.Of course, [former Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed] Morsi in Egypt was very anti-Assad, and Sisi has not yet really taken a stand on the issue, so it will be interesting to see if the Russians attempt to bring him around on the issue, perhaps by making the arms deal contingent on it. The Jordanians are getting their first nuclear plant courtesy of a Russian firm, so clearly there are incentives to working with Moscow. Russia is still somewhat at odds with the Saudis, but there are signs they’re coming around on the Syrian issue, or at least prioritizing domestic security and the prospect of returning fighters over military and rhetorical support for the opposition. Overall, the trend definitely favors a continued increase in Russian influence in the region, at least in the short term.The clear motivation would be the Golan Heights issue and establishing a precedent for unilaterally redrawing borders by force. No other country recognizes Israel’s 1981 de facto annexation of the Golan, and it wants to leave the door open for a formal annexation sometime in the future if circumstance provides for it.Russian-Israeli relations are not the best, but there was nothing to be gained by needlessly antagonizing the Kremlin and condemning the move. The US likely pressured Israel to do so, but it’s well established that Washington has little leverage over Tel Aviv’s policy choices, and as such it’s not surprising that it would be rejected.Putin’s announcement voicing full support for Maliki is a manifestation of one of the touchstones of Russian foreign policy: support for state stability and the unacceptability of overthrowing incumbent governments by force. It’s the same language we’ve seen Moscow using to describe the Syrian crisis for years: using terms such as “terrorists” and “extremists” and issuing full support for the government in “liberating” its territory. The statement referenced the link between the situation in Iraq and that in Syria, which is undoubtedly a fact that Putin will drive home at every opportunity in order to imply that Russia’s version of events – that supporting the opposition in Syria would lead to regional spillover and instability – was correct all along, and by extension Western notions of regime change have only led to chaos for the area. In this specific instance, backing Maliki himself is an uncomfortable option that Washington is unhappy about and that likely does not overly please the Kremlin either, as it was Maliki’s corrupt, sectarian and exclusionary policies that precipitated this crisis and the general Sunni uprising that has accompanied the ISIS offensive.Nevertheless, it fits the Russian line, and given that the Russians can expect the Iranians to once again do the heavy lifting for them by organizing Iraqi militias and pro-government forces on the ground, I don’t foresee a change in policy on Iraq.It’s certainly a possibility. Russian and Iran have had a very successful working relationship on Syria – Iran provides the weapons and training, Russia provides more weapons and diplomatic cover. Iran has more direct influence on the course of military events on the ground in Syria, but the Syrians seem to feel more indebted to the Russians; it was Russian that was just instituted as a mandatory subject in Syrian schools, not Farsi. The growth of Russia’s influence in the Middle East has buoyed its standing as an ally, as has its steadfast support of the Assad regime.However, Iran has its own agenda, and aspires to regional hegemony itself. It will not content itself to play second fiddle or to be a Russian client to the same degree as Syria, which is much smaller and does not have its own domestic arms industry as Iran does. Iran is engaged in a struggle with Saudi Arabia for regional dominance, and as such it is somewhat salient to look at the relationship between that country and the United States as a model for potential Russian-Iranian cooperation. While the US has significant influence over Saudi Arabia and concurrent interests with it, the latter maintains policies at odds with Washington’s desires and acts independently in a number of spheres. Similarly, while Moscow and Tehran have different objectives in some settings, there are a number of areas, such as nuclear cooperation, limiting US power in the region, and arming/funding the Syrian regime where they will continue to find common ground.I’m currently in the midst of beginning my graduate research project. It focuses, not surprisingly, on Russian-Syrian relations; specifically, the manner in which the Kremlin and Russian media have portrayed the conflict as it has developed. I’m aiming to identify whether the Russian line on the conflict hardens over time, especially as the Libyan civil war and intervention, which the Russians were very upset about, occurs during that time. This could reveal important shifts in Russian foreign policy as a whole and could explain why Putin has become more forceful in its conduct, such as in Ukraine. It’ll take some time but it should yield some interesting results. More about Middle East, Russia, Syria More news from Middle East Russia Syria