29 April 1998

Thanks to Jeffrey T. Richelson and Ballinger

The U.S. Intelligence Community

Jeffrey T. Richelson

New York, Ballinger, 1989



This excerpt from Second Edition (soft), pp. 167-197

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Chapter 8

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is traditionally considered to be one of the most important and sensitive forms of intelligence. The interception of foreign signals can provide data on a nation's diplomatic, scientific, and economic plans or events as well as the characteristics of radars, spacecraft and weapons systems.

SIGINT can be broken down into five components:

communications intelligence (COMINT)

electronics intelligence (ELINT)

radar intelligence (RADINT)

laser intelligence (LASINT)

non-imaging infrared.

As its name indicates, COMINT is intelligence obtained by the interception, processing, and analysis of the communications of foreign governments or groups, excluding radio and television broadcasts. The communications may take a variety of forms--voice, Morse code, radio-teletype or facsimile. The communications may be encrypted, or transmitted in the clear.

The targets of COMINT operations are varied. The most traditional COMINT target is diplomatic communications--the communications from each nation's capital to its diplomatic establishments around the world. The United States has intercepted and deciphered the diplomatic communications of a variety of nations-- Britain during the 1956 Suez Crisis, Libya's communications to its East Berlin People's Bureau prior to the bombing of a nightclub in West Berlin in 1985, Iraq's communications to its embassy in Japan in the 1970s.

The United States also targets the communications between different components of a large number of governments. On some occasions both components are located

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within the country, on other occasions at least one is located outside national boundaries. Communications that may be targeted include those between government officials, different ministries, a ministry or agency and subordinate units throughout the country and abroad, arms factories, military units during exercises and operations, and police and security forces and their headquarters. More specifically, the United States intercepts communications between the Soviet Ministry of Defense and Military District headquarters, and between Military District headquarters and units in the field; between transmitter stations and Soviet submarines; between the President of Egypt and his subordinates (including the time when Egypt was holding the hijackers of the Achille Lauro); and between military units at all levels in the Philippines.

In 1980, U.S. intercepts of Soviet communications generated a fear that the Soviets were about to invade Iran. In 1983 intercepts allowed the United States to piece together the details concerning the sinking of a Soviet submarine in the North Pacific.1

At times, entire sets of targets may be dropped or have their coverage dramatically increased. In the early 1970s the United States dropped COMINT coverage of the Soviet civil defense network (coverage was later resumed). In 1983 it began an all-source intelligence program (that included COMINT) to improve intelligence on the Soviet prison camp system, with the specific intent of issuing a study that would embarrass the Soviets. The intelligence was intended to determine the location of the camps, existing conditions, and the number of political prisoners.

Governmental communications do not exhaust the set of COMINT targets. The communications of political parties or guerilla movements may also be targeted. The communications of the African National Congress in South Africa, the El Salvadoran rebels, and the Greek Socialist Party are all likely targets of COMINT activities. In addition, the communications of terrorist groups can also be COMINT targets--both to permit understanding of how the group functions and the personalities of its leaders, and to allow prediction of where and how the groups will strike next.

Another major set of COMINT targets are associated with economic activity (of both the legal and illegal variety)--for example, the communications of multinational corporations and narcotics traffickers. In 1970, the predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Administration informed the NSA that it had "a requirement for any and all COMINT information which reflects illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs." Specific areas of interest included organizations and individuals engaged in such activities, the distribution of narcotics, narcotic cultivation and production centers, efforts to control the traffic in narcotics, and all violations of U.S. Laws concerning narcotics and dangerous drugs.2

Electronic intercept operations are intended to produce electronic intelligence (ELINT) by intercepting the non-communication signals of military and civilian hardware, excluding those signals resulting from atomic detonations. Under NSA project KILTING, all ELINT signals are stored in computerized reference files containing the most up-to-date technical information about the signals.

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The earliest of ELINT targets were World War II air defense radar systems. The objective was to gather emanations that would allow the identification of the presence and operating characteristics of the radars--information that could be used to circumvent or neutralize the radars (through direct attack or electronic countermeasures) during bombing raids. Information desired included frequencies, signal strengths, pulse lengths and rates, and other specifications. Since that time, intelligence, space tracking, and ballistic missile early-warning radars have joined the list of ELINT targets.

In the early 1950s the primary targets were Soviet Bloc (including PRC) radars. Soviet radars remain a prime ELINT target. Monitoring Soviet radars also has an arms control verification aspect, since the 1972 ABM Treaty restricts the use of radars in an "ABM mode." During the Vietnam war, North Vietnamese radars were also major targets. Libyan and Iranian radars are clearly prime targets in the late 1980s.

A subcategory of ELINT is Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT). Foreign instrumentation signals are electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems that have military or civilian applications. Such signals include, but are not limited to, signals from telemetry, beaconing, electronic interrogators, tracking-fusing-aiming/command systems, and video data links.3

A subcategory of FISINT is Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT). Telemetry is the set of signals by which a missile, missile stage, or missile warhead sends, back to earth, data about its performance during a test flight. The data relate to structural stress, rocket motor thrust, fuel consumption, guidance system performance, and the physical conditions of the ambient environment. Intercepted telemetry can provide data to estimate the number of warheads carried by a given missile, its payload and throw-weight, the probable size of its warheads, and the accuracy with which the warheads are guided at the point of release from the missile's post-boost vehicles.4

Radar intelligence--the intelligence obtained from the use of non-imaging radar--is similar to ELINT in that no intercepted communications are involved. However, RADINT does not depend on the interception of another object's electronic emanations. It is the radar which emanates electronic signals--radio waves--and the deflection of those signals allows for intelligence to be derived. Information that can be obtained from RADINT includes flight paths, velocity, maneuvering, trajectory, and angle of descent.

Two further categories of SIGINT were listed in the proposed National Security Agency charter of 1980--information derived from the collection and processing of (I) non-imaging infrared, and (2) coherent light signals. The former involves sensors that can detect the absence/presence and movement of an object via temperature. The term "coherent light signal" refers to lasers, and hence this category includes the interception of laser communications, as well as the emissions from Soviet laser research and development activities.5

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The ease with which signals (whether communications or electronic signals) can be intercepted and understood depends on three factors: the method of transmission, the frequencies employed, and the encipherment system (or lack of) used to conceal the signals meaning form unauthorized personnel.

The most secure form of transmission is that sent by cables, either land lines or underwater cables. Communications or other signals transmitted through such cables cannot be snatched out of the air. Interception of cable traffic has involved physically tapping into the cables or using "induction" devices that are placed in the proximity of the cables and maintenance of equipment at the point of access. This might be unobtainable with respect to hardened and protected internal landlines, the type of landline that carries much high-priority, secret command and control communications. Undersea cables are most vulnerable since the messages transmitted by them are then transmitted by microwave relay once the cable reaches land.

A tremendous volume of communications is sent via satellite systems. Domestic and international telephone messages, and military and business communications are among those regularly transmitted via satellite using ultra, very, super, and extremely high frequencies (UHF, VHF, SHF and EHF). Thus, the United States has established major programs for the interception of Soviet and international commercial satellite messages. By locating satellite dishes at the proper locations, an enormous volume of traffic can be intercepted. Ground stations that send messages to satellites have antennas that direct the signals to the satellite with great accuracy; satellite antennas, on the other hand, are smaller and the signals they send back to earth are less narrowly focused--perhaps covering several thousand square miles.6

Often, communications that are transmitted through part of their path by satellite are sent via microwave towers through the rest of their path. In other cases, particularly telephone calls within a country, microwave towers serve as the entire means of transmission and reception. For example, in Canada, the majority of telephone calls are transmitted via microwave. As one observer has written with regard to microwave relay towers:

With modern communications, "target" messages travel not simply over individually tappable wires like those that connect the ordinary telephone, but as part of entire message streams, which can contain up to 970 individual message circuits, and have voice, telegram, telex and high speed data bunched together.7

Microwave signals can be intercepted by two means--(1) ground stations near the invisible line connecting the two microwave towers, or (2) by space collection systems, if the area of transmission is within the footprint of the system.

Radio is the most traditional means to transmit signals--including communications, missile telemetry, and foreign instrumentation signals. The accessibility of radio signals to interception will often depend on the frequencies upon which the signal is transmitted and the signal's geographic location. Messages transmitted at lower frequencies (ELF, VLF, LF, HF) travel for long distances since they bounce off the atmosphere and come down in locations far from the transmitting and

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intended receiving locations. On the other hand, data sent at higher frequencies will pass through the atmosphere and out into space. To intercept such higher frequency signals, intercept stations must be within line of sight of the radio communications. The curvature of the earth can therefore make monitoring from ground-based sites impossible. Former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Sayre Stevens has written of the Soviet ballistic missile defense test center at Sary Shagan that:

It lies deeply enough within the USSR to make it difficult to monitor from peripheral intelligence-gathering sites along the border Because flight test operations at Sary Shagan can be conducted well below the radio-horizon from such external monitoring locations, the Soviet Union has been able to conceal the details of its activities at Sary Shagan for many years.8

Under such conditions, geosynchronous space collection systems may be necessary to collect such signals.

Two additional methods of communication that are targets of interception operations are walkie-talkie and radio-telephone communications. Walkie-talkie communications are employed during military exercises as well as during emergency situations such as Chernobyl. Radio-telephone communications are used by government officials as they travel in their limousines. Since walkie-talkie traffic, particularly in the Soviet Union and China, may occur over areas not accessible to ground stations, satellite interception may be required. On the other hand, radio-telephone traffic is particularly large and significant in national capital areas, where embassy-based listening posts are often found.

Once intercepted, signals have to be processed. If communications are sent without encipherment or scrambling, then the only processing needed may be translation. Communications may be sent in the clear either because they are considered too low level to justify the time and expense for protection, or because the method of transmission (e.g., cable) is believed immune to interception.

Electronic signals sent in the clear still need to be interpreted. Thus, telemetry signals on all channels may be transmitted as numbers. The variables being measured and the units of measurement must be inferred by correlating data on missile maneuvers with the intercepted telemetry. For example, measurement may be made concerning different types of events: one-time events (e.g., the firing of explosive bolts or separation of RVs from the post-boost bus), discontinuous events (e.g., adjustments to the guidance system during flight), and continuous events (e.g., fuel flow, motor burn, or acceleration of the missile during the boost phase). These events can be expressed in terms of absolute values, arbitrary values (a one to ten scale), relative values (percentages) or inferential values. It will not necessarily be evident what the particular characteristic to which an intercepted reading refers or the particular values used. A fuel tank reading may be given as "30," which could refer either to a tank that is 30 percent full or 30 percent empty. The temperature in the rocket motor combustion chamber can be measured from the temperature of another part known to have a specific temperature relative to that in the chamber.

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Communications or electronic signals may be either encrypted or scrambled, complicating the translation process. Diplomatic communications are traditionally enciphered. The sophistication of the encipherment and the quality of the operators determines whether such ciphers can be broken. Conversations via radio and radiotelephone can be scrambled and unscrambled. Non-communications signals may also be encrypted, as are a large portion of Soviet missile telemetry signals.

Interception of signals involves a massive effort, employing space and airborne collectors, ground stations, embassy listening posts, ships and submarines.



SPACE COLLECTION

The United States operates three basic types of satellite systems to collect foreign signals. Since 1962 the United States has been operating low-earth orbiting satellites whose mission has been to intercept the signals emitted by Soviet, Chinese, and other nations' air defense, ABM, and early-warning radars. The satellites, known as "ferrets" in the popular literature, are actually referred to as "balls" within the U.S. intelligence community.

The first ferret was launched by a Thor-Agena B on May 15, 1962, into an orbit with a 190-mile perigee and 392-mile apogee. Between the first launch and July 16, 1971, seventeen satellites of the initial type were launched, about one to three satellites being launched each year. The inclination of the earlier ferrets was approximately eighty-two degrees, while the inclination of the later satellites was seventy-five degrees. Likewise, the orbit changed after the first several launches to a more circular orbit, with about 300 miles separating the satellite from the earth. Switches to new boosters in June 1963 and October 1968 may have indicated new generations of ferrets coming into operation.9

A second class of ferret satellites was put into operation beginning in August 1963. Unlike the first class, which were launched as the only payload on the rocket, the new class served as the secondary payload to imaging satellites. As with the first class, elliptical orbits of 180 by 250 miles gave way to more circular orbits, in the vicinity of 300 miles above the earth.10 By 1972, launches no longer placed just ferret satellites in orbit. From 19.72 to the present only ferret subsatellites have been launched. In general, the satellites were launched as the secondary payload on launches of the KH-9 imaging satellite. The final KH-9 was orbited in 1984. If subsatellite launches are to continue once the presently operational ferrets expire, they will have to be piggybacked with a different primary payload. It is possible that the KH-11 satellite also has a ferret capability.

The exact number of ferrets within each class is not publicly known. What is known is that the code names for the satellites have had a common theme--they were all named after female sex symbols. Two of the satellites operating in the late 1970s were code-named RAQUEL and FARRAH, while earlier satellites had been code-named BRIDGET and MARILYN.11

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In addition to ferret satellites, the United States is presently using two or three types of geosynchronous satellites. In the early 1970s the United States began operating a set of geosynchronous satellites which were given the code name RHYOLITE. According to the most recent account, a total of five RHYOLITE spacecraft were placed into orbit, with one launch failure. RHYOLITEs were launched on June 19, 1970, December 20, 1972 (a failure), March 6, 1973, May 23, 1977, December 11, 1977, and April 7, 1978; all were launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida using an Atlas-Agena D booster.12

By the time the fourth satellite was in orbit, a two-station arrangement had emerged. Two of the satellites apparently were stationed near the Horn of Africa, at 45 degrees east, to receive telemetry signals transmitted from liquid-fueled ICBMs launched from Tyuratam in a northeasterly direction toward the Kamchatka Peninsula impact zone. Another two spacecraft were stationed farther east, over Borneo, at 115 degrees east, to monitor Soviet solid-propellant missiles such as the SS-16 and the SS-20 IRBM, launched from the Soviet Union's northern space launch facility at Plesetsk.13 The respective satellite footprints provided coverage of almost all the USSR and Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

In addition to the telemetry signals from Soviet and Chinese missile tests, RHYOLITE satellites reportedly also engaged in a variety of COMINT activities. The satellites apparently were used to intercept Soviet and Chinese telephone and radio communications across the VHF, UHF, and microwave frequency bands. Robert Lindsey has written that the satellites "could monitor Communist microwave radio and long-distance telephone traffic over much of the European landmass, eavesdropping on a Soviet commissar in Moscow talking to his mistress in Yalta or on a general talking to his lieutenants across the great continent."14

Walkie-talkie traffic generated by Soviet military exercises, which fall in the VHF-UHF range, also were regularly monitored by RHYOLITE satellites. Beyond the Soviet Union, RHYOLITE satellites intercepted communications from China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Lebanon.15

The RHYOLITE project was described by former CIA official Victor Marchetti as

a very interesting project, a very much advanced project in terms of technology, and a very desirable project because getting information of the type that we wanted and needed on Soviet ICBM testing, antiballistic missile programs, anti-satellite programs, and the like, much of this activity of course takes place in eastern Siberia and central Asia, getting information on the Chinese ICBM program.16

The RHYOLITE program suffered a serious setback in 1975 when a TRW employee, Christopher Boyce, and his boyhood friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, sold the KGB technical details about RHYOLITE. In accordance with standard security practice, the NRO changed RHYOLITE's code name to AQUACADE.17 At this time it is probable that none of the compromised satellites are operational.

The first satellite of a follow-on generation, code-named MAGNUM, was launched from the space shuttle Discovery on January 25, 1985. The satellite is

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reported to have two huge parabolic antennas, one of which is intended to intercept communications and telemetry signals. According to one account, MAGNUM is stationed over the western Soviet Union and its second antenna is to be used to relay the intercepted data to another satellite (possibly the SDS) for transmission to the Pine Gap, Australia ground control station.18 MAGNUM may, in fact, be stationed over Borneo, in which case its second antenna would transmit the data directly to Pine Gap.

Exactly how much MAGNUM is an improvement over RHYOLITE/AQUACADE is not known publicly. One possibility is that MAGNUM will be able to pick up lower powered signals than RHYOLITE, such as "turned-down" telemetry. MAGNUM's increased power might come from bigger antennas, and the satellite's potential is suggested by a project being undertaken for the NASA by Lockheed's Missile and Space Company. The project involves unfurling an antenna in space from the space shuttle's cargo bay. The antenna, resembling an umbrella, will be nearly twice the size of a football field, and so sensitive to low-powered signals from earth that it would pick up broadcasts from radios the size of a wristwatch.19

In addition, MAGNUM may have some stealth or spoofing capabilities that make it harder for the Soviet Union to find and jam its signals--as has been alleged they were doing to AQUACADE in recent years. In 1984, Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy charged in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the USSR had begun jamming telemetry-monitoring satellites to prevent collection of even the encrypted data. The jamming was alleged to be electronically precise, to have begun sometime after the Soviets shot down Korean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983, and to occur only during missile testing. The distinctive visual and radar image of MAGNUM will ordinarily allow the Soviets to know its location and mission.20 Hence, some sort of stealth technology would be required to hide the satellite from Soviet detection.

On June 10, 1978, the first of another class of geosynchronous SIGINT satellites was launched. Originally code-named CHALET, it was renamed VORTEX after its original code name was revealed in the press.21

VORTEX's original mission was strictly COMINT-related. However, after the loss of Iranian ground stations and the discovery of the sale of RHYOLITE documents to the KGB, VORTEX was modified to intercept Soviet telemetry. The first modified VORTEX was launched on October 1, 1979; subsequent launches occurred on October 31, 1981 and in 1984.22

The primary targets of VORTEX are in the Soviet Union. At the height of VORTEX operations at least three VORTEX satellites were operational. One covered Eastern Europe and the Western USSR, the other the central USSR, and the third the eastern portion of the Soviet Union, as well as non-Soviet targets in their footprints. During the Chernobyl incident the VORTEX responsible for monitoring the western USSR was employed to intercept all communications within several hundred miles of the accident site, including those of the military, party, government and security forces.

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Unlike AQUACADE, MAGNUM, or VORTEX, the other class of SIGINT satellites are neither in geosynchronous orbit nor are launched from Cape Canaveral. Rather, this class--known as JUMPSEAT--has been launched into sixty-three-degree inclined, highly elliptical orbits (200 by 24,000 miles) with Titan 3B-Agena D boosters from Vandenberg AFB, California. Approximately four JUMPSEATs have been launched since the first launch on March 5, 1975. In its highly elliptical orbit, JUMPSEAT "hovers" over the Soviet Union for eight to nine hours at a time. Its primary mission is to monitor Soviet ABM radars.23

There appears to be several new generations of SIGINT satellites in development, probably including JUMPSEAT and VORTEX follow-ons. One of those satellites will monitor Soviet laser activities.

Satellite operations are supported by a worldwide network of ground control stations, stations that conduct housekeeping operations as well as receive information from the satellites. A key element in the network is the HQ Consolidated Space Test Center (HQ CSTC), formerly the Air Force Satellite Control Facility at Onizuka AFS (Sunnyvale). The HQ CSTC has ground stations across the globe--Vandenberg AFB; New Boston, New Hampshire; Kaena Point, Hawaii; Thule (AB), Greenland; Mahe, the Seychelles; Andersen AFB, Guam; Oakhanger, England. The stations perform basic housekeeping functions--communicating commands to the satellites, altering orbits, checking the equipment on board. The stations also receive ELINT data from the JUMPSEAT and ferret satellites.24

In addition to the HQ CSTC, several more specialized stations exist to control and receive signals from SIGINT satellites. Ft. Meade (NSA headquarters) is itself able to receive data from the satellites, but three overseas ground stations are backbone of the network: Pine Gap, Australia; Menwith Hill, United Kingdom; and Bad Aibling, Germany.25

RHYOLITE/AQUACADE and MAGNUM satellites have been controlled since the beginning of their respective programs from a facility in Alice Springs, Australia, commonly known as Pine Gap. Officially, the facility is the Joint Defence Space Research Facility and is code-named MERINO. The facility consists of seven large radomes, a huge computer room, and about twenty other support buildings. The radomes (which resemble golf balls with one end sliced off and then mounted on a pedestal) are made of Perspex and mounted on a concrete structure. The radomes are intended to protect the enclosed antennas against dust, wind, and rain and to hide some of the operational elements of the antennas from unfriendly observation, such as from Soviet imaging satellites.26

The first two radomes at Pine Gap were installed in 1968 and remain the facility's largest. The first appears to be about 100 feet in diameter and the second about 70 feet in diameter. They now form the western line of the antenna complex. The third and fourth radomes were fully installed by mid-1969. The third radome is about 55 feet in diameter and some 196 feet east of the largest radome, while the fourth is under 20 feet in diameter and just north of the second radome. In 1973 the antenna originally installed inside the third radome was dismantled and replaced by a thirty-three-foot communications terminal. The fifth radome is less than forty

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feet in diameter and was installed in 1971. The sixth dish is about the same size as the fifth and was installed in 1977. The seventh radome, which was built in 1980, houses a second communications terminal.27

On the northern edge of the complex is a high-frequency antenna that provides a direct communications link with Clark AB in the Philippines. It is the only non-satellite communications system linking Pine Gap with terminals outside Australia, and before installation of the 1973 antenna was the primary communications link between Pine Gap and the United States.28

Originally, the main computer room was about 210 feet square, but it was expanded twice in the 1970s to its present size, about 60,000 square feet. Its immense size requires that operators at each end of the room communicate with each other via headphones. The room is divided into three principal sections. The Station Keeping Section is responsible for maintaining the satellites in geosynchronous orbit and for correctly aligning them towards targets of interest. The Signals Processing Office receives the signals transmitted from the satellites and transforms them into a form that can be used by the analysts. The Signals Analysis Section is staffed solely by CIA personnel--no Australian citizens or contractor personnel are included. Many individuals in the section are linguists who monitor the voice intercepts.29

As of January 1986, there were 557 people employed at Pine Gap--273 Australians and 284 Americans. While in theory Pine Gap is a joint facility, the 50-50 relationship holds only with respect to the gross number of personnel. This relationship is achieved by counting Australian housemaids, cooks, and gardeners who work at the base as "equal" to the CIA personnel who conduct the actual operations.30

The two other major control stations for SIGINT satellites are located in Europe--Bad Aibling and Menwith Hill. Information received at either location can be transmitted directly via DSCS satellite to Ft. Meade.31



AIRBORNE COLLECTION

At present, the single most important airborne platform involved in the collection of signals intelligence is the RC-135, of which there have been twelve versions. The first RC-135, a RC-135B, entered the SAC reconnaissance inventory in December 1965. This began the replacement of thirty obsolescent RB-47Hs and ERB-47Hs that were then "performing the ELINT portion of the Global Peacetime Airborne Reconnaissance Program."32

At present there are eighteen RC-135s in the U.S. inventory. Fourteen are modernized RC-135V and RC-135M (RIVET CARD) models, code-named RIVET JOINT (Block III). These and the other models of the RC-135 have an overall length of 129 feet, a wingspan of 131 feet, and an overall height of 42 feet. At its operational altitude, 34,990 feet, it cruises at 460 miles per hour.33

RIVET JOINT planes fly their missions (known as BURNING WIND missions) from bases in Alaska (Eielson AFB), Nebraska (Offutt AFB), Panama (Howard AB), England (RAF Mildenhall), Greece (Hellenikon AB), and Japan (Kadena AB,

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Okinawa). RIVET JOINT/BURNING WIND missions average about seventy flights a month in Western Europe and the Far East and about twelve a month in Central America.34

The RC-135V carries a crew of seventeen and flies at 35,000 feet for up to ten hours before it requires refueling. Its COMINT capability can be expanded from a minimum of six positions to thirteen depending on the requirements of the mission. The RIVET JOINT-ELINT system is comprised of three collection positions-- an Automatic ELINT Emitter Location System position supplemented by two manual operator positions. From Alaska the aircraft can patrol along the Kamchatka and Chukotski peninsulas, intercepting short-range tactical signals from Soviet naval and ground forces. The Japanese-based RC-135s patrol along the coasts of Vietnam, China, North Vietnam, and the USSR, including the Sea of Okhotsk.35

British-based RIVET JOINT planes fly along the Baltic Sea, and over the Barents Sea just off the Kola Peninsula, possibly intercepting signals from the three naval bases in the Murmansk area or the Severodvinsk submarine construction yard. The pilots are under orders not to get within 40 nautical miles of the Soviet coastline, and generally loiter 100 miles or more out over the Barents Sea until they intercept signals of interest. The planes based at Hellenikon have Libya, Egypt, Israel, and Syria and to a lesser extent the USSR among their targets. Planes from Hellenikon periodically deploy to Saudi Arabia to operate against Iraq and Iran. In the past they have also deployed to Egypt and the Sudan.36

From Eielson AFB, RIVET JOINT/BURNING WIND missions target the Soviet Far East. The missions proceed around the southern tip of Kamchatka and into the Sea of Okhotsk, a projected deployment area for Soviet missile submarines. If not assigned to patrol the Sea of Okhotsk, they slide down the coast toward Sakhalin Island. The missions monitor the alert status of Soviet air squadrons on Sakhalin as well as Soviet Air Force exercises. In the latter case the planes track Soviet fighters in flight.37

RIVET JOINT/BURNING WIND missions flown from Nebraska and Panama are directed against Spanish and Russian-language targets in Cuba and Central America. Central American flights have been conducted in support of the El Salvador military and the contra rebels.38

The remaining four RC-135 aircraft are evenly divided between the RC-135U and RC-135S models. The RC-135Us (modified RC-135Cs) bear the nickname COMBAT SENT. COMBAT SENT missions are flown along the periphery of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, with specific routes, tactics, and even aircraft configurations varying with the tasking requirements.39

As with the RIVET JOINT planes, the COMBAT SENT aircraft fly at 35,000 feet and can fly for ten hours without refueling if necessary. Among their targets have been Soviet ODD PAIR, SIDE NET, and TOP STEER radar systems. The primary sensor for COMBAT SENT planes is the Precision Power Measurement System, which determines the absolute power, pattern, and polarization of selected target emitters. In addition there is a high-resolution camera and television and radar sensors in the tail that are used when the occasion permits. One of the

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COMBAT SENT planes is equipped with a system known as COMPASS ERA, a system containing infrared thermal imaging, interferometer-spectrometer, and spectral radiometer sensors.40

The RC-135S planes, based at Eielson AFB, Alaska and operating on occasion from Shemya, are nicknamed COBRA BALL and are the result of a late 1960s modification of two C-135Bs. The missions they conduct, known as BURNING STAR missions, involve the monitoring of the reentry phase of Soviet and Chinese ICBM, SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missile), and IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) research and development tests. The reentry phase of Soviet ICBM tests from Plesetsk and Tyuratam takes place either at Kamchatka Peninsula or into the expanses of the Pacific. For example. in 1974, three Soviet ICBM-test reentry phases occurred in the Pacific. In 1987 one test concluded in the vicinity of Hawaii.41

Because COBRA BALL missions are dictated by Soviet decisions to conduct missile tests, missions cannot be planned on any regular basis. Only some of these tests--specifically, multiple tests or those tests with reentry phases outside Soviet territory--need to be announced in advance. Thus, the COBRA BALL aircraft must be ready to fly on a moment's notice, in response to notification by the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC) that a Soviet test is about to occur. Immediate launches are "announced by the sounding of a Klaxon horn" at Eielson.42

The planes operate at 35,000 feet and up to ten hours unrefueled and eighteen hours refueled. Each COBRA BALL carries three sensor systems--one ELINT system and two photographic systems. The ELINT system is the Advanced Telemetry System (ATS), which automatically searches a portion of the frequency band and makes a digital record of all signals present. The operator of the ATS system allocates its collection resources to Soviet reentry vehicle links and records all telemetry detected.43

The Ballistic Framing Camera System images all the objects of interest in the reentry phase, while the Medium Resolution Camera (MRC) System photographs individual reentry vehicles.44 The images produced by the MRC System are used to determine the reentry vehicle size. In turn, size estimates are used to produce estimates of the explosive yield of the warheads.

During its orbit the RC-135S records and cross-checks its position coordinates at least once every twenty minutes. It is also called on to provide a variety of information--including air speed, altitude, estimated time of arrival, orbit point, adjustments in timing or track, track length (in minutes), the status of the equipment, wind direction, and time remaining on the track.45

As a supplement to the COBRA BALL aircraft, the NSA and the SAC have employed another version of the C-135 to collect intelligence during Soviet missile tests. This variant is the EC-135N, a plane with a ten-foot radome built into its nose. This "droop snoot" radome carries an antenna seven feet in diameter that allows the eight-person crew to intercept voice communications, plus telemetered or radioed data on speed, temperature, and other characteristics of the object being

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tracked. The plane also has a probe antenna on each wingtip for high-frequency radio transmission and reception, and high-frequency trailing wire beneath the fuselage.46

The EC-135N has had, as its primary mission, tracking U.S. missiles during flight tests as well as keeping tabs on unmanned satellites. They perform these missions, according to the Air Force, "over land where tracking stations are limited by geographical constraints and over water where ships cannot move quickly enough to cover different portions during launch."47 However, as a secondary mission, the EC-135Ns--known as Advanced Range Instrumentation Aircraft or ARIAs-- have been used to monitor the end phase of Soviet missile tests, flying opposite Siberia or over the Pacific.

The EC-135Ns have been augmented by a new set of ARIA aircraft, which resulted in an increase in 1985 flying time of 300 percent. Three EC-135Ns have been equipped with new engines. They have been redesignated EC-135Es and will continue to be part of the ARIA program through the late 1990s. The replacement aircraft are EC-18B--American Airlines 707-313--modified into the ARIA configuration by the Air Force System Command's Aeronautical Systems Division. The first two EC-18Bs became operational in 1985, and by 1988 all four were in operation.48

Much of the equipment on the EC-18B airplanes will be recycled from the retired EC-135Ns. The recycled equipment includes radomes, antennas, and on-board mission equipment such as receivers, data processors, and recorders. Additions to the internal portion of the craft include a navigation station, a new flight director, a modified electrical system, and an improved environmental control system.49

Additions to the forward portion of the aircraft include a large, drooped radome housing the seven-foot steerable antenna, high-frequency (HF) probe antennas on each wingtip, and a trailing wire, HF antenna on the bottom of the fuselage. Antennas for post-mission data transmission and satellite transmission also have been added. As with the EC-135Ns, the EC-18Bs will have as their primary mission monitoring U.S. space and missile launches, including unmanned space launches, cruise and ballistic missiles tests, and space shuttle launches.50

Also employed for signals intelligence purposes are eight EC-130 aircraft, which are flown by the U.S. Air National Guard's 193rd Tactical Electronic Combat Group (headquartered at Harrisburg International Airport, Pennsylvania). The planes are deployed to Central America to fly missions against rebel targets in El Salvador and government targets in Nicaragua.51

Also employed for SIGINT collection are the SR-71, U-2, and TR-I. In its SIGINT role, the SR-71 is used to fly "peripheral intelligence missions. . .to pinpoint locations and characteristics of potentially hostile signal emitters."52 Thus, the SR-71s SIGINT role continues the peripheral electronic reconnaissance that has been part of U.S. intelligence activities since the late 1940s. The SR-71 apparently also continues the tradition of inducing the Soviet air defense system to "turn on" critical radar systems. The Commander of the Strategic Air Command in 1978,

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speaking of the SR-71 and RC-135, stated that "it is possible to operate these systems in a way that tells us things we want to know. This can't be done with satellites."53

There are three SIGINT collection systems designed for the U-2/TR-I: SENIOR RUBY, SENIOR STRETCH, and SENIOR SPEAR. SENIOR RUBY is a near real-time ELINT collection, processing, and reporting system that provides information (including type and location) on radar emitters within line of sight of the U2-R. The SENIOR RUBY system can handle a large number of emitters simultaneously and send its data to a Ground Control Processor that is colocated with the Transportable Ground Intercept Facility (TGIF), used in conjunction with realtime U-2 missions.54

SENIOR STRETCH is a near real-time COMINT collection, processing, and reporting system. The airborne receiver subsystem consists of a multi-channel microwave receiver, remotely controlled via satellite link from the Remote Operations Facility, Airborne (ROFA) at Ft. Meade. The data collected is transmitted via DSCS satellite back to the ROFA.55

SENIOR SPEAR is also a near real-time collection, processing, and reporting system that provides a line-of-sight collection capability--out to 300 nm--from the aircraft. Under development, as of 1983, was SENIOR SPAN. SENIOR SPAN to be installed in the U-2R, is a near real-time SIGINT collection, processing and reporting system--with the airborne receiver subsystem consisting of HF, VHF, UHF, and microwave receivers. The receiver is remotely controlled via a satellite from the ROFA or a TGIF, with the collected data transmitted via satellite back to the control site.56

U-2/TR-I missions are flown from several bases against a variety of targets. From Patrick AFB, Florida, Detachment 5 of the 99th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing flies SENIOR JUMP U-2Rs in collection missions against Cuba and Central America. The main Cuban targets are Cuban army, air force, and navy communications, with the intercepts being transmitted to Key West Naval Air Station, Florida. Data collected during Central American missions has been downlinked to installations in Honduras at Tiger Island or Cerro la Mole.57

SENIOR STRETCH U-2Rs fly from RAF Akrotiri (Operating Location OLIVE HARVEST) to intercept signals from several Middle Eastern states. The data are then uplinked to DSCS satellites for transmission to the ROFA. From Osan AB, South Korea, SENIOR SPEAR U-2Rs fly OLYMPIC GAME missions against the communications of Chinese and North Korean activities, with the intercepted communications being downlinked to an Electronic Security Command unit at Osan.58

TR-I/CREEK SPECTRE aircraft conduct COMINT/ELINT missions from RAF Alconbury, United Kingdom during missions along the border with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The data are downlinked to an ESC unit in West Germany.59

Two additional airborne SIGINT systems are Army systems: GUARDRAIL V and Improved GUARDRAIL V. GUARDRAIL is a remotely controlled airborne and ground-based intercept and radio-direction finding system, designed to exploit HF-VHF-UHF voice communications, mounted on RU-21H/GUARDRAIL V and RC-12D (Improved Guardrail V) aircraft. Both aircraft operate at between 10,000

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and 20,000 feet, and can spend up to four hours on station. The RC-12D aircraft allow a wider range of frequencies to be targeted for intercept or DF (direction finding) purposes. The targets of both sets of aircraft include mobile forces, missile units, aviation elements, air defense units, and artillery regiments. Each system consists of six aircraft--two RU-21Hs and four RC-12Ds.60



GROUND STATIONS

Beginning in the late 1940s, the United States began establishing ground stations to monitor the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This network changed composition over the years and has grown to include stations directed against China, Vietnam, North Korea, the Middle East, Central America, and other areas. Today, the network, largely run by the NSA, comprises approximately sixty stations in twenty countries. Included are heavily manned stations (employing about 30,000 personnel) and unmanned locations whose "take" is remoted to other locations and then to Ft. Meade. In addition, several radar stations, operated by the Air Force Space Command, are involved in detecting and tracking Soviet missile tests and space launches. The stations collectively conduct intercept operations across the VHF-UHF-HF bands. Approximately thirty stations collect HF, strategic COMINT while others focus on VHF-UHF tactical communications. Other stations target various forms of electronic emanations.

The biggest and most important set of stations remain those directed at the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Several facilities in Alaska are among those monitoring the Soviet Union. At Shemya Island, Alaska--which is approximately 400 miles across the Bering Sea from the Soviet eastern seaboard--is the Anders facility. Run by the Bendix Field Engineering Corporation for the NSA, the facility's Pusher HF antenna monitors Soviet communications in the Far East.61

Also located on Shemya is the COBRA DANE phased-array radar. The primary purpose of COBRA DANE is "to acquire precise radar metric and signature data on developing Soviet ballistic missile weapons systems for weapons system characterization determination. The Soviet developmental test to Kamchatka and the Pacific Ocean provided the United States with the primary source for collection of these data early in the Soviet developmental programs." Secondary missions are early warning and tracking of space objects.62

The COBRA DANE system consists of a AN/FPS-108 radar facility, measuring 87 by 107 feet at its base and approximately six stories or 100 feet in height, plus an attached one-story Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory (PMEL) measuring 87 square feet. Both structures are located on a 230-foot-high bluff in the northwestern section of Shemya, where it overlooks the Bering Sea.63

The most important characteristic of COBRA DANE is that it is a phased-array radar. To an observer depending only on eyes or using binoculars, a phased-array radar is simply a dormant structure, sort of an electronic pyramid. This is in sharp contrast to the older, more traditional radar dish "sweeping its beam of microwave

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radiation along the horizon in search of distant objects.'' Rather, COBRA DANE consists of 15,360 radiating elements occupying ninety-five feet in diameter on the radar's face. Each element emits a signal that travels in all directions. When the signals are emitted at the same time, only targets in the immediate vicinity of the array's perpendicular axis are detectable. However, by successively delaying by a fraction of a wavelength, one can "steer" the beam to detect objects away from the perpendicular axis.64

COBRA DANE, which achieved initial operating capability on July 13, 1977 can detect (with a 99 percent probability) and track a basketball-sized object at a range of 2,000 miles with a 120-degree field of view extending from the northern half of Sakhalin Island to just short of the easternmost tip of the Soviet Union nearing the Bering Strait. However, its ability to provide information on the size and shape is available only over a forty-four-degree range centered on the upper portion of Kamchatka, as indicated in Figure 8-1. COBRA DANE can simultaneously track up to 100 warheads when operating in an intelligence collection mode. It can also be employed for early warning and space surveillance; in those modes it can track up to 300 incoming warheads and up to 200 satellites.65

[Map showing Shemya Island base, western Alaska and eastern USSR omitted]

Figure 8-1. Range of COBRA DANE Coverage.



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The major limitation of COBRA DANE is that the final, near earth trajectory of Soviet reentry vehicles is not visible due to the line-of-sight constraints imposed by the curvature of the earth.66

Elmendorf AFB, located in Anchorage, is home of Naval Security Group Command and Electronic Security Command contingents, and an AN/FLR-9 "Elephant Cage" antenna. The AN/FLR-9 consists of three circular arrays, each made up of antenna elements around a circular reflecting screen. In the middle of the triple array is a central building, which contains the electronic equipment that forms the directional beams for monitoring and direction finding. The entire system is about 900 feet in diameter. The ESC contingent monitors USSR-Far Eastern military activity through voice, Morse Code, and printer intercepts.67

Also targeted on the Soviet Far East is a major base at Misawa AB in Japan. Four miles northwest of Misawa is the "Hill." On the hill is a 100-foot AN/FLR-9 antenna system. The base and its antenna lie at the northern tip of Honshu Island, about 500 miles west of Vladivostok and 400 miles south of Sakhalin Island. Misawa's importance is testified to by the presence of representatives of all four services' cryptological authorities. There is a 900-person detachment from the Electronic Security Command, a 700-person detachment from the Naval Security Group Command, 200 representatives of the Army's Intelligence and Security Command, and 80 representatives of Company E, Marine Support Batallion.68

According to one account, Misawa's AN/FLR-9 "can pick up a Russian television broadcast in Sakhalin or an exchange of insults between Chinese and Soviet soldiers on the Sino-Soviet border."69 The INSCOM contingent focuses its attention on Soviet army and General Staff activity, as well as on Afghanistan. The NSGC contingent monitored the Soviet Navy's search and rescue activity after the Soviets shot down Korean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983.70

Misawa is also the site of Project LADYLOVE, which involves the interception of the communications transmitted via several Soviet satellite systems--Molniya, Raduga, and Gorizont.71

Also involved in the satellite communications interception project are three additional stations, all run by the NSA. Rosman Research Station was transferred from the NASA to the Department of Defense on February 1, 1981 for use as a "Communications Research Station" and became operational on July 1, 1985 with 250 employees. At present it has four satellite dishes pointed straight up and four in radomes. Also involved is the NSA's Menwith Hill station, located eight miles west of Harrogate in Yorkshire, England. The 562-acre station consists of a large array of satellite tracking aerials. Under Project MOONPENNY, a variety of Soviet satellite communications are intercepted by Menwith Hill's antennas. In addition, Menwith Hill is also the home of Project SILKWORTH, a high-frequency, wideband communications interception program. Finally, the Bad Aibling station in Germany represents the fourth component of the satellite communications (SATCOM) intercept project.72

Another station located in the United Kingdom that is heavily involved in the interception of Soviet communications is RAF Chicksands, near Bedford, home

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of an 800-person ESC contingent. Among the Soviet communications targeted are those of the air defense network.73

Over the years, the Chicksands mission has expanded to also focus on the military and diplomatic signals of Western European nations, particularly France. Inside the Chicksands facility are rooms and compartments with interception and direction finding allocated to different mission targets. Signs used to hang above the heads of coordinating "mission supervisors" which included, in the early 1970s, "France," "Czechoslovakia," and "Civil Navigation." On each of 3 daily shifts, over 100 operators staff interception positions. With over 1,750 military staff alone, Chicksands is the USAF's largest non-flying base in Britain.74

Outside of Britain, important European ground stations involved in the monitoring of Soviet Bloc activities are located in Italy, Germany, and Turkey. At San Vito dei Normanni, Italy is a 700-person contingent of the Electronic Security Command. Employing the AN/FLR-9, the unit intercepts selected Soviet, East European, and Middle East communications.75

In Turkey there are two important facilities, one run by the NSA and its SCAs the other by the Air Force Space Command. Sinop, nicknamed "Diogenes Station," began operating in the mid-19SOs and is now home to the 290-person Army Field Station Sinop and the 97-person Naval Security Group Activity Sinop. Sinop is a fishing port and farm center with a population of just over 18,000 persons. The station is 2 miles west of the town and is a 300-acre facility on a bleak 700-foot hill at the end of a peninsula. The INSCOM contingent and Turkish civilians at the base are involved in monitoring Soviet activity in the Black Sea area as well as Soviet missile testing activities. A major aspect of monitoring Soviet missile telemetry from Sinop is the interception of electronic emanations and telemetry connected with Soviet missile and space rocket launches from Kapustin Yar and other locations in the southern USSR. The monitoring of Soviet air activity can be a rather "boring job. . .a morse operator, for instance, just sits there in front of a radio receiver with headphones, and a typewriter copying morse signals."76

The single most important U.S. intelligence facility in Turkey is the one at Pirinclik Air Base, a satellite operation of Diyarbakir Air Station. Located on a rocky plateau in southeastern Turkey, Pirinclik had its operations suspended from 1974 to 1978. During that time U.S. housekeeping personnel rotated one radar dish to prevent roller-bearing damage while the Turks locked up a key piece of radar equipment to make sure the radar was inoperative.77

The base resumed operations on November 3, 1979, with its 2 radar antenna fixed permanently toward the northeast, where the Soviet border lies 180 miles away. The electronic beams of the radar operate through a natural "duct" in the mountains around the plateau, picking up Soviet missiles and space launches as they rise above the horizon. An AN/FPS-17 detection radar is used which can detect an object 1 meter in diameter up to 5,000 miles away. After the AN/FPS-17 indicates that a missile launch or space shot has taken place, the AN/FPS-79 "swings its white, round face in a noiseless arc in the same direction, ready to track missiles along their course."78

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The radars are operated largely by civilian technicians from the contractor, General Electric. In addition to the 70 contractor personnel there are about 145 Air Force personnel, mostly enlisted personnel. Few of them are permitted in the top-secret radar control rooms. Rather, they are more likely to operate the communications facilities that transmit the data via DSCS satellite to Washington.79

As might be expected, Germany is home for several strategic and tactical SIGINT stations targeted on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The two most important are located at Augsburg and Bad Aibling. Augsburg hosts units from INSCOM (Field Station Augsburg), the Electronic Security Command, and the Naval Security Group Command. With 1,814 personnel, Augsburg covers selected communications in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the western USSR, employing an AN/FLR-9 antenna.80

As already noted, the Bad Aibling station serves as a downlink for satellite SIGINT data and as part of a four-station network involved in intercepting Soviet satellite communications. In addition, Bad Aibling has two other functions. Employing Rhombic and Pusher antennas, the Bad Aibling station conducts HFDF (high-frequency, direction finding) and communications intercept coverage of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, in support of Augsburg. It also serves as the initial reception site for data from two unmanned locations on Cyprus and Oman. The Cyprus stations consists of a Pusher HF antenna set up by the NSA at the Episkopi Sovereign Base Area to cover targets in the Middle East and southern USSR. The Abut Sovereign Base Area, home for a British SIGINT operation, is also home for NSA equipment that monitors military activity in the Near East and the southern USSR.81

A second set of stations are directed primarily against the activities of Asian Communist nations. The major targets are the PRC, Vietnam, and Korea, with Cambodia and Laos being secondary targets.

The two stations farthest from their targets are at Clark AB in the Philippines and Kunia, Hawaii. Clark AB is host to an AN/FLR-9 antenna and a 180-person contingent of the Electronic Security Command which intercepts a variety of Vietnamese and Chinese communications, both air and ground based, as well as diplomatic communications.82

Kunia is host to the NSA-run "Defense Research Facility," INSCOM (Field Station Kunia), NSGC, and ESC contingents. Kunia serves as the NSA's B-Group Remote Operations Facility, receiving data from two remote facilities at Taegu, South Korea and Khon Kean, Thailand.

The Khon Kean facility was apparently set up in the fall of 1979. The absence of such a facility apparently resulted in a shortfall of intelligence during the Chinese-Vietnam War earlier that year.83

The Taegu facility, run for the NSA by the Bendix Field Engineering Group, is equipped with a Pusher HF antenna and targeted against communications in China, North Korea, and Vietnam.84

Located at Pyong' Taek, Korea is U.S. Army Field Station, Korea (also known as Zoeckler Station), with a 304-person contingent and three operating locations:

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Detachment J (at Koryo-Son Mountain on the island of Kangwna), Detachment K (at Kanak-San Mountain, six miles from the demilitarized zone), and Detachment L (on Yawol-San Mountain, within 1,500 meters of the DMZ). Collectively, the installations focus on a variety of North Korean COMINT and ELINT targets.85

A third set of ground stations are those targeted on the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, and international satellite traffic. Among the stations with Middle East intercept functions is the previously mentioned San Vito facility, which in addition to its Soviet Bloc intercept mission is responsible for the interception of diplomatic messages in the Mediterranean, South European, and North African regions. In addition, the remote facility at Episkopi Sovereign Base Area, Cyprus covers targets in the Middle East in addition to the southern USSR. Finally, a 400-person contingent of the ESC is stationed at Iraklion, Greece and engages in the interception of Arabic language communications originating from countries in North Africa and the Middle East.86

The Iraklion station employs a rhombic/dipole antenna field to conduct its intercept operations. A rhombic array is a highly directional antenna system. Each element or antenna of that array consists of a wire several feet off the ground and attached to four posts spaced in the shape of a diamond, each side being approximately ten feet long. At one end the wire is connected to a coaxial cable that runs underground to a centrally located operations building. The entire array consists of between thirty and forty structures over several hundred acres.87

Latin America, and particularly Central America, has obviously become a target of increased importance. At Lackland AFB, Medina Annex, San Antonio is a 272person contingent from INSCOM (U.S. Army Field Station, San Antonio) and one from the ESC which receive intercepted, Spanish language communications remoted from Tiger Island and Cerro la Mole in Honduras. Homestead AFB, Florida is the headquarters of Naval Security Group Activity Homestead, with its main operations center at Card Sound (known as Site Alpha or Seminole Station), which engages in the monitoring of Cuban military communications as well as Soviet activity in Cuba. It also monitors all communications involving Cuban and Soviet air activity originating in or destined for Cuba. Intercept operations are conducted using an AN/FRD-10 antenna system. Also targeted on Cuba are the antennas of the U.S. Army Field Station, Key West.88

Outside of the continental United States, two stations on U.S. territory contribute to SIGINT operations directed against Latin America. At Guantanamo Bay, Cuba are more than 100 members of the Guantanamo Naval Security Group Activity. Employing an AN/FRD-10 antenna system, the unit intercepts Cuban and Soviet military communications in and around Cuba and the Caribbean Basin. The 430person Naval Security Group Activity at Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico employs an AN/FRD-10 to target internationally leased carrier and diplomatic communications for all of Central and South America.89

Two stations target INTELSAT/COMSAT satellite communications. An NSA facility at Sugar Grove, West Virginia with 30, 60, 105, and 150 foot satellite antennas intercepts the signals being sent by the INTELSAT/COMSAT satellite over the

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Atlantic and intended for the INTELSAT/COMSAT ground station at Etam, West Virginia. A second installation at the Yakima Research Station un Yakima, Washington targets the Pacific INTELSAT/COMSAT satellite.90



COVERT LISTENING POSTS

In addition to the ground-based listening posts such as those described above, there is a second set of such posts. However. rather than using large areas of land they are surreptitiously hidden in U.S. embassies and consulates. Such listening posts allow the United States to target the internal military, political, police, and economic communications of the nation in which the embassy is located.

Such listening posts are joint CIA-NSA operations, formally known as Special Collection Elements, and exist in approximately forty-five U.S. embassies and consulates.

The best known of the listening posts is the one in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Embassy listening post was used to intercept the radio-telephone conversations of Soviet Politburo members, including General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, President Nikolai Podgorny, and Premier Alexsei Kosygin as they drove around Moscow.91

Traffic from the interception operation was transmitted back to a special CIA facility a few miles from the agency's Langley, Virginia headquarters. Originally, the conversations simply needed to be translated, since no attempt had been made to scramble or encipher the conversations.92

After a 1971 disclosure in the press concerning the operation, code-named GAMMA GUPY, the Soviets began enciphering their limousine telephone calls to plug leaks. Despite that effort, the United States was able to intercept and decode a conversation between General Secretary Brezhnev and Field Marshal Grechko that took place shortly before the signing of the SALT I treaty. Grechko assured Brezhnev that the heavy Soviet SS-l9 missiles under construction would fit inside the launch tubes of lighter SS-11 missiles, making the missiles permissible under the SALT I treaty.93

In general, however, the intelligence obtained was less than earthshaking. According to a former intelligence official involved in GAMMA GUPY, the CIA "didn't find out about, say, the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was very gossipy--Brezhnev's health and maybe Podgorny's sex life." At the same time the official said that the operation "gave us extremely valuable information on the personalities and health of top Soviet leaders."94

Other covert listening posts are located in the U.S. embassies in Tel Aviv and Buenos Aires. The Tel Aviv outpost is targeted on Israeli military and national police communications. The latter gives the United States the capability to follow very closely the activities of the police in suppressing Palestinian demonstrators. The presence of a U.S. Listening post has not gone unnoticed by Israeli officials due to the large number of antennas on the roof of the Tel Aviv embassy.95

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The Buenos Aires post was used to target the communications of the Argentine General Staff during the Falklands crisis--information that would be quickly passed to the British.96



SURFACE SHIPS

At one time, the United States placed great reliance on signals intelligence gathered by ship-based sensors. The United States began using combat ships in this role. Destroyers and destroyer escorts often carried mobile vans packed with antennas as well as special detachments to operate the equipment. Use of destroyers and destroyer escorts, however, degraded fighting capabilities as combat ships were assigned to intelligence missions. Further, some Navy officials felt the stationing of a destroyer off a foreign shore, especially that of a hostile nation, to be provocative.97

Two alternatives were deployed--Auxiliary General Technical Research (AGTR) and Auxiliary General Environmental Research (AGER) ships in 1961 and 1965 respectively. The AGTRs were converted World War II Liberty ships--each 458 feet long and 10,860 tons. The AGERs were old World War II vintage, converted diesel-driven light-cargo ships approximately 170 feet in length, with a maximum speed of thirteen knots and a cruising speed of ten knots. Each had an estimated range of 4,000 nautical miles. AGER collection capability was more restricted than AGTR capability, being concerned with SIGINT and hydrographic information. Elimination of the AGER and AGTR collection ships resulted from events in 1967 and 1969. The AGTR U.S.S. Liberty was bombed by Israeli aircraft in the midst of the 1967 Six Day War, resulting in severe damage and the death of thirty-four crew members. It was alleged by the Israeli government that the ship was mistaken for an Egyptian vessel; others have alleged the attack was deliberate and intended to prevent the United States from learning of Israeli military gains that would lead the United States to pressure Israel into a "premature" cease-fire.98

In 1969, the AGER U.S.S. Pueblo was captured by the North Koreans and its crew held hostage. Shortly after the Pueblo was seized, the U.S.S. Sergeant Joseph P. Muller almost drifted into Cuban waters. After several attempts she was finally towed to safety by the escorting destroyer. Subsequently, the AGERs and AGTRs were decommissioned.99

More recently, the United States has employed Spruance-class destroyers and frigates to collect intelligence concerning Nicaragua and El Salvador. The 7,800-ton destroyer Deyo, as well as her sister ship Caron, were stationed in the Gulf of Fonzeca. The ships could monitor suspected shipping, intercept communications and encrypted messages, and probe the shore surveillance and defense capabilities of the other nations. With regard to the latter use, they can induce nations to switch on shore-to-sea, ship-to-ship, and air-to-air radar.100

In addition to being in the Gulf of Fonzeca, the Caron has been present in the Baltic, the Northern Sea, and off the Libyan coast. During the birth of Solidarity in Poland in August 1980, the Caron cruised fourteen miles off the coast of Gdansk,

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and in the summer of 1981 she was among the ships that constituted the task force that was on an exercise off the Libyan coast in the Gulf of Sidra. During a North Atlantic cruise, she came as close to the Soviet naval base at Murmansk as the Chesapeake Bay Bridge is to the U.S. Naval Base at Norfolk, Virginia.101

The Caron was again employed in an intelligence collection mission against a Soviet target in 1986. Along with another warship, the U.S.S. Yorktown, the Caron entered Soviet-claimed territorial waters in the Black Sea on March 10 and remained there a week, coming as close as six miles to the Soviet coast. While a Pentagon official claimed that intelligence collection was not the primary rationale of the exercise--which had been ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the name of Secretary of Defense Weinberger--it was at the very least an important secondary mission.102

In addition to helicopters to gather information, the Yorktown is also outfitted with electronic equipment that can monitor voice communications and radar signals. It has been normal procedure to use such systems to determine if new radars have been deployed onshore and to check the readiness of Soviet forces. Additionally, with the headquarters of the Soviet Union's Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol, communications monitoring would be certain. In a previous expedition, the Yorktown's equipment was used in part to monitor aircraft movements within the Soviet Union.103

The Soviets responded to the Yorktown/Caron mission both militarily and diplomatically. A destroyer was used to trail both ships, while military aircraft overflew them. In addition, a Soviet protest note said the episode "was of a demonstrative, defiant nature and pursued clearly provocative aims."104

In February 1988, the Yorktown and Caron again entered the Black Sea with the same objectives as in 1986--to assert the right to free passage in waters outside the U.S.-recognized three-mile limit and to collect intelligence. When the ships came closer than the twelve-mile limit claimed by the Soviets, destroyers were sent to nudge the ships as a means of indicating Soviet displeasure.105

Two Navy frigates stationed in the Pacific have also been used against targets in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. One ship--the 3,990-ton Blakely--is a Knox-class frigate commissioned in 1970; the other--the 3,400-ton Julius A. Furei--is a Brooke-class guided-missile frigate. The missions involved homing and recording voice and signals communications, locating transmitting stations, logging ships' movements, and studying their waterlines to help determine if they were riding low in the water when entering port and high when exiting--indicating the unloading of cargo.106

Frigates have also been used to monitor Soviet missile telemetry. It was reported in 1979 that "American ships equipped with sensitive listening gear . . . patrol the North Atlantic, where they collect telemetry broadcast by the new Soviet submarine-launched missiles tested in the White Sea, northeast of Finland." Likewise, on the night of August 31, 1983, when the United States was expecting the Soviet Union to test a SS-X-24 missile, the frigate Badger was stationed in the Sea of Okhotsk.107

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The Badger and the rest of the forty-six Knox-class frigates have dimensions of 438 by 46.8 by 24.8 feet, can travel at 27 knots and carry 275 personnel. In addition to ASROC (antisubmarine rocket) weapons, search radar, and sonar, they are fitted with satellite communications antennas for both transmission and reception.108

In August 1985, the Navy commissioned its first ship dedicated solely to intelligence collection since the decommissioning of the AGTR and AGER ships in 1969 The ship, the ARL-24 Sphinx, is a former repair ship converted to its present role. The 328 by 50 foot ship can travel at 11.6 knots. With a home port at Little Creek, Virginia, it spends most of its time off the coast of Nicaragua intercepting Sandinista military communications.109

The most important ship-based system for monitoring Soviet missile tests is a phased-array radar designated COBRA JUDY, which resides on the U.S.N.S Observation Island. Emplaced on the 563-foot ship is a 4-story turret on the aft deck that houses the major components of COBRA JUDY. The turret is essentially a thirty-foot cube with one face tilted slightly inward. An antenna array 22.5 feet In diameter occupies an octagonal, raised area on the cube's slanting face. In addition, on top of the superstructure there are two, thirty-two-foot diameter geodesic radomes containing a complex of passive receiving antennas funded by the NSA.110

The deployment of COBRA JUDY was designed to allow the monitoring of the final near-earth trajectories of Soviet reentry vehicles during the portion of their flight not "visible" to COBRA DANE because of the earth's line-of-sight constraints. In particular, the sensors provide information on the radar signatures of reentry vehicles and warheads. To enhance that capability, an X-band radar with parabolic dish antennas was added in 1985 to further improve COBRA JUDY's capability. Because of the higher degree of resolution and target separation, the radar may be able to distinguish between multiple warheads and penetration aids such as decoys and chaff.111



SUBMARINES

A program that had its genesis in the later years of the Eisenhower Administration but is still operational today involves not surface ships but submarines. Known by a variety of code names, the best known of which is HOLYSTONE, the program is one of the most sensitive intelligence operations of the United States.

HOLYSTONE, which also has been known as PINNACLE, BOLLARD, and most recently as BARNACLE, began in 1959 and has involved the use of special electronically equipped submarines to collect electronic communications and photographic intelligence. The primary target has always been the Soviet Union but at times countries such as Vietnam and China have been targets of the operations which sometimes involved penetration of the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese three-mile territorial limits.112

The missions lasted about ninety days. Crews were given cover stories such as being on an undersea geodetic survey project that was using sonar to study ocean

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water temperatures in support of data collected by satellites. The crews were forbidden to use any active electronic or sonar gear while on a HOLYSTONE mission so as to avoid detection by Soviet antisubmarine warfare devices. In addition, hatches were tied down to prevent rattling.113

By 1975, the program apparently had provided vital information on the Soviet submarine fleet--its configuration, capabilities, noise patterns, missiles, and missile firing capabilities. One mission involved obtaining the "voice autographs" of Soviet submarines. Using detailed tape recordings of noise made by submarine engines and other equipment, analysts of the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center (now the Naval Intelligence Support Center) were able to develop a methodology to identify individual Soviet submarines, even those tracked at long range under the ocean. The analysts could then follow the submarine from its initial operations to its decommissioning.114

HOLYSTONE operations also provided information about theater and strategic sea-based missiles. Some Soviet sea-based missiles were tested against inland targets to reduce U.S. observation. On occasion, HOLYSTONE submarines would penetrate close enough to Soviet territory to observe the missile launchings, providing information on the early stages of the flight. According to one government official, the most significant information provided by the missions was a readout of the computer calculations and signals put into effect by Soviet technicians before launching the missiles. Beyond that the U.S. submarines also provided intelligence by tracking the flight and eventual landing of the missiles, providing continuous information on guidance and electronic systems.115

In addition to providing acoustic and telemetry intelligence, the HOLYSTONE submarines also tapped into Soviet communications cables on the ocean floor. The tapping operation allowed the United States to intercept higher level military messages and other communications considered too sensitive to be entrusted to insecure means of communication such as radio and microwave.116

Beyond signals intelligence, the submarines also were able to bring back valuable photographs, many of which were taken through the submarine's periscope. In the mid-1960s, photographs were taken of the underside of an E Class submarine that appeared to be taken inside Vladivostok harbor.117

As was the case when the program was code-named HOLYSTONE, today's BARNACLE operations employ thirty-eight nuclear-powered Sturgeon-class submarines such as the SSN-6Y. The submarines have dimensions of 292 by 31.7 by 26 feet and carry SUBROC (submarine rocket) and antisubmarine torpedoes as well as Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles. With their 107-person complement (twelve officers and ninety-five enlisted personnel), the ships can travel at speeds at over twenty knots when surfaced and at over thirty knots underwater and can reach a depth of 1,320 feet. Their standard electronic equipment includes a search radar and both active and passive sonar systems.118

The special equipment placed on submarines for HOLYSTONE/BARNACLE missions has included the WLR-6 Waterboy Signals Intelligence System. The WLR-6 is in the process of being replaced by a more advanced system known as SEA

192

NYMPH, described in one document as "an advanced, automatic, modular signals exploitation system designed for continuous acquisition, identification, recording, analysis and exploitation of electromagnetic signals." All the Sturgeon submarines will carry a basic skeletal system that can be upgraded to full capacity when authorized.119

Another reconnaissance project involving submarines that began later than the HOLYSTONE program was code-named IVY BELLS. This project involved implanting a device to intercept the signals transmitted along a Soviet underwater cable in the Sea of Okhotsk, between the Kamchatka Peninsula and the eastern Soviet coastline. A combined Navy-NSA team, operating from a submarine, installed a miniaturized waterproof eavesdropping device--a large tape pod that fit over the Soviet cable, through which key Soviet military and other communications flowed. The pod had a wraparound attachment that intercepted the cable traffic by "induction" it could intercept the signals being transmitted along the cable without physically tapping into the cable. In addition, if the cable were raised by the Soviets for maintenance, the pod would break away and remain on the ocean floor. Tapes in the pod recorded messages and signals on various channels or communications links for four to six weeks, with the pod being installed for only two recording sessions a year.120

The Sea of Okhotsk operation continued until 1981, when former NSA employee Ronald Pelton sold the Soviets information about the operation.





NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. George C. Wilson, Soviet Nuclear Sub Reported Sunk," Washington Post, August 11, 1983, p. A9.

2. John E. Ingersoll, "Request for COMINT of Interest to Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs," in U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 152-55.

3. U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 38.

4. John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982), p. 203; Farooq Hussain, The Future of Arms Control Part IV, The Impact of Weapons Test Restrictions (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 44; Robert Kaiser, "Verification of SALT II: Art and Science," Washington Post, June 15, 1979, p. 1.

5. U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, HR 6588, The National Intelligence Act of 1980 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 521.

6. Deborah Shapley, "Who's Listening?: How NSA Tunes In On America's Overseas Phone Calls and Messages," Washington Post, October 7, 1977, pp. C1, C4.

7. Ibid.

8. Sayre Stevens, "The Soviet BMD Program," in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 182-221 at p. 192.

9. Anthony Kenden, "U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programs," Spaceflight, 20, pp. 7 (1978): 243ff.

10. Philip Klass, Secret Sentries in Space (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 194.

11. Seymour M. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 38; Private information.

12. Des Ball, Pine Gap: Australia and the US Geostationary Signals Intelligence Satellite Program (Sydney: Allen & Unwin Australia, 1988), pp. 14-15.

13. Philip Klass, "U.S. Monitoring Capability Impaired," Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 14, 1979, p. 18.

14. Robert Lindsey, The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionage (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 111.

15. Ball, Pine Gap, p. 54.

16. Victor Marchetti, Allies (A Grand Bay film directed by Marian Wilkinson and produced by Sylvia Le Clezio, Sydney, 1983).

17. See Lindsey, Falcon and the Snowman, for a full-length account; on the renaming of RHYOLITE, see William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 192; Glenn Zorpette, "Monitoring the Tests," IEEE Spectrum (July 1986), 57-66 at 60.

18. James Gerstenzang, "Shuttle Lifts Off with Spy Cargo," Los Angeles Times, January 25, 1985, pp. 1, 11.

19. William J. Broad, "Experts Say Satellite Can Detect Soviet War Steps," New York Times, January 25, 1985, p. A12.

20. Walter Andrews, "Defense Aide Confirms U.S. Satellites Jammed," Washington Times, June 21, 1984, p. 1.

21. Richard Burt, "U.S. Plans New Way to Check Soviet Missile Tests, New York Times, June 29, 1979, p. A3; Burrows, Deep Black, p. 192.

22. Hussain, The Future of Arms Control Part IV, p. 42; Ball, Pine Gap, pp. 14-15.

23. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' p. 4; Burrows, Deep Black, p. 223.

24. James B. Schultz, "Inside the Blue Cube," Defense Electronics (April 1983) 52-59; Organization and Functions Chartbook (Onizuka AFS, Calif.: Air Force Satellite Control Facility, December 1, 1986), p. 61; Space Division Regulation 23-3, "Air Force Satellite Control Facility," December 16, 1983.

25. Paul Stares, Space and National Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 188; Private information.

26. Desmond BalI, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1980), p. 59.

27. Ball, Pine Gap, p. 61.

28. Ibid., p. 70.

29. Ibid., pp. 67, 80.

30. Ibid., p. 77.

31. Ibid., pp. 27-28; Private information; Defense Communications Agency, Facilities Handbook (Areas 1, 2, and 9) (Scott AFB, Ill,: DCAOC, January 1985), p. %A.

32. Untitled memo, Declassified Documents Reference System 1982-001583.

194

33. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1984, Part 8 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 384; Martin Streetly, "U.S. Airborne ELINT Systems, Part 3: The Boeing RC-135 Family," Jane's Defence Weekly, March 16, 1985, pp. 460-65.

34. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' p. 9.

35. Burrows, Deep Black, p. 171; Private information.

36. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed," pp. 9-10; Burrows, Deep Black, p. 171; Private information.

37. George C. Wilson, "U.S. RC-135 Was Assessing Soviet Air Defenses," Washington Post, September 7, 1983, p. A-12; Philip Taubman, "U.S. Says Intelligence Plane Was On A Routine Mission," New York Times, September 5, 1983, p. 4; Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' p. 220.

38. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' p. 9

39. Private information.

40. Private information; References to the COMBAT SENT missions against the mentioned radars were found in the documents catalog of the Office of Air Force History.

41. Streetly, "U.S. Airborne ELINT Systems, Part 3"; Bill Gertz, "Soviets Test-Fire ICBM Just North of Hawaii," Washington Times, October 1, 1987, pp. Al, A10.

42. 6th Strategic Wing Regulation 55-2, "Operations, Aircrew and Staff Procedures," September 30, 1983, pp. 4-11.

43. Private information; Burrows, Deep Black, p. 172.

44. Private information; Burrows, Deep Black, p. 172.

45. 6th Strategic Wing Regulation, "Operations, Aircrew and Staff Procedures," pp. 3-5.

46. Charles W. Corddry and Albert Sehlstedt, Jr., "Plane's Covert Role is to Monitor Soviet Space Flights, Missile Tests," Baltimore Sun, May 1, 1981, p. 1.

47. Ibid.

48. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Military Construction Appropriations for 1985, Part 3 (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 105-6; Brendan M. Greeley, Jr., "USAF Readies Range Instrumentation Aircraft for First Flight," Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 25, 1985, pp. 23-4; "Aerospace World," Air Force Magazine, December 1987, p. 33.

49. Greeley, "USAF Readies Range Instrumentation Aircraft for First Flight."

50. Ibid.

51. Martin Streetly, "Hercules C-130 Electronic Missions," Jane'.s Defence Weekly, November 16, 1985, pp. 1092-96; Private information.

52. "Electronic Environment Sampled Regularly," Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 10, 1976, pp. 90-92.

53. Duncan Campbell, "Spy in the Sky," New Statesman, September 9, 1983, pp. 8-9.

54. Private information.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.





195

62. Dr. Michael E. del Papa, Meeting the Challenge: ESD and the Cobra Dane Construction Effort on Shemya Island (Bedford, Mass.: Electronic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, 1979), pp. 1-2.

63. Ibid., p. 2-3.

64. Eli Brookner, "Phased-Array Radars," Scientific American (April 1985) 94-102.

65. Philip J. Klass, "USAF Tracking Radar Details Disclosed," Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 25, 1976, pp. 41-46; del Papa, Meeting the Challenge. p. 38.

66. Klass, "USAF Tracking Radar Details Disclosed."

67. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain (London: Michael Joseph, 1984), p. 155; "British MP Accuses U.S. of Electronic Spying," New Scientist, August 5, 1976, p. 268; Private information.

68. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' p. 47.

69 . Keyes Beech, "Secret U. S. Base Keeps Eye on Far East," Los Angeles Times, January 20, 1980, p. 17.

70. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' pp. 47-48.

71. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Military Construction Appropriations for 1981, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 875; Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' p. 49; David Morison, "Sites Unseen," National Journal, June 4, 1988, pp. 1468-72.

72. Duncan Campbell and Linda Melvern, "America's Big Ear on Europe," New Statesman, July 18, 1980, pp. 10-14; Stella Trapp, "Rosman Research Center is a 'Vital Part of the Security'," Transylvania Times, August 21, 1986, pp. 1A, 16A; Morison, "Sites Unseen"; Private information.

73. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' p. 4.

74. Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, p. 155.

75. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' p.47n.; Private information.

76. Marvine Howe, "U.S. and Turks Monitor Soviet at Isolated Post," New York Times, January 4, 1981, p. 7; Michael Getler. "U.S. Intelligence Facilities in Turkey Get New Attention After Iran Turmoil," Washington Post, February 9, 1979, p. A15; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Fiscal Year 1980 International Security Assistance Authorization (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print ing Office, 1979), p. 365; U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 43-44; Michael K. Burns, "U.S. Reactivating Bases in Turkey," Baltimore Sun, October 21, 1978, pp. 1, 23; TUSLOG Detachment 28, Command History, 1January-30 September 1977; "U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir," Ramparts (August 1972) pp. 35-50 at 40.

77. Burns, "U.S. Reactivating Bases in Turkey."

78. Getler, U.S. Intelligence Facilities in Turkey Get New Attention After Iran Turmoil."

79. Ibid.

80. Private information.

81. Ibid.

82. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' p. 47; Private information.

83. Brian Toohey and Marian Wilkinson, The Book of Leaks: Exposes in Defence of the Public's Right to Know (North Ryde, Australia: Angus & Robertson, 1987), p. 135; Private information.

196

84. Private information.

85. United States Army Field Station Korea, Fiscal Year 1986 Annual Historical Report, 1987, p. 2; Private information.

86. Private information.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Military Construction Appropriations for 1987, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 682; Private information.

90. James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America 's Most Secret Agency (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 172-72; Private information.

91. Laurence Stern, "U.S. Tapped Top Russian's Car Phones," Washington Post, December 5, 1973, pp. A1, A16; Ernest Volkman, "U.S. Spies Lend an Ear to Soviets," Newsday, July 12, 1977, p. 7.

92. Stern, "U.S. Tapped Top Russians Car Phones."

93. Ibid.; Bill Gertz, "CIA Upset Because Perle Detailed Eavesdropping," Washington Times, April 15, 1987. p. 2A.

94. Jack Anderson, "CIA Eavesdrops on Kremlin Chiefs," Washington Post, September 16, 1971, p. F7.

95. Howard Kurtz, "Pollard: Top Israelis Backed Spy Ring," Washington Post, February 28, 1987, p. A8.

96. Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice, The Sinking of the Belgrano (London: Secker & Warburg, 1984), p. 205 n.5.

97. Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability (New York: Coward McCann, 1970), p. 87.

98. Ibid.; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Incidents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 1632, 1634; James Ennes, Assault on the Liberty (New York: Random House, 1980).

99. Paul Backus, "ESM and SIGINT Problems at the Interface," Journal of Electronic Defense (July-August 1981) 23ff.

100. Richard Halloran, "U.S. Navy Surveillance Ship is Stationed Off Central America," New York Times, February 25, 1982, pp. 1, 6; Private information.

101. Private information.

102. Richard Halloran, "2 U.S. Ships Enter Soviet Waters Off Crimea to Gather Intelligence," New York Times, March 19,1986, pp. A1, A11; George C. Wilson, "Soviet Ships Shadowed U.S. Vessels' Transit," Washington Post, March 20, 1986, p. A33.

103. Halloran, "2 U.S. Ships Enter Soviet Waters Off Crimea to Gather Intelligence"; Private information.

104. Halloran, "2 U.S. Ships Enter Soviet Waters Off Crimea to Gather Intelligence"; Private information.

105. Philip Taubman, "Moscow Blames U.S. for Incident Between Warships," New York Times, February 14, 1988, pp. 1, 19; John H. Cushman, Jr.. "2 Soviet Warships Reportedly Nudged U.S. Navy Vessel," New York Times, February 13, 1988, pp. 1, 6.

106 . George C. Wilson, "U. S. Detects Slowdown in Shipments of Weapons to El Salvador,'' Washington Post, April 29, 1983, p. A13.

197

107. Richard Burt, "Technology is Essential to Arms Verification," New York Times August 14, 1979, pp. Cl, C2; Murray Sayle, "KE 007: A Conspiracy of Circumstance," The New York Review of Books, April 25, 1985, pp. 44-54.

108. Jane's Fighting Ships 1983-1984 (London: Jane's Publishing, 1983), p. 681.

109. Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the US. Fleet, 14th ed., (Annapolis Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 317.

110. Kenneth J. Stein, "Cobra Judy Phased Array Radar Tested," Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 10, 1981, pp. 70-73.

111. Ibid.; "X-Band Expands Cobra Judy's Repertoire," Defense Electronics (January 1985) 43-44.

112. Seymour Hersh, "Submarines of U.S. Stage Spy Missions Inside Soviet Waters," New York Times, May 25, 1975, pp. 1, 42.

113. Seymour Hersh, "A False Navy Report Alleged in Sub Crash," New York Times, July 6, 1975, pp. 1, 26.

114. Hersh, "Submarines of U.S. Stage Spy Missions Inside Soviet Waters."

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Jane's Fighting Ships 1983-1984, p. 639.

119. Private information.

120. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CM 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 448-449.