Full text of "The Doctrine of Non-intervention with Slavery in the Territories"

Google This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online. It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover. Marks, notations and other maiginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you. Usage guidelines Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing tliis resource, we liave taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying. We also ask that you: + Make non-commercial use of the files We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes. + Refrain fivm automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help. + Maintain attributionTht GoogXt "watermark" you see on each file is essential for in forming people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it. + Keep it legal Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liabili^ can be quite severe. About Google Book Search Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at |http: //books .google .com/I I i FOUNDED BT JOHN D. BOCKSFBLLEB THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE (graduate school of ARTS AND LITERATURE) IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY) BY MILO MILTON QUAIFE, Ph..D. CHICAGO THE MAC C. CHAMBERLIN CO. 1910 \IS.S2(j7-^I ^n".-' '^-W-r^. \hr^r! n"T ir, 1911 From the University ■*«•.'■■*! ) ;•' CHAPTER I. The Mexican War and The Wilmot Proviso. From the time of the development of the Abolition movement until the beginning of the Civil War nearly three decades later, the American nation was agitated by the dis- cussion of the slavery question. During the latter half of this period, beginning with the annexation of Texas in 1845, slavery was the dominant political issue. Over it the nation became sectionalized and the issue was resolved into a strug- gle between the two sections for political and industrial su- premacy. The possession, first of the prospective Mexican acquisitions, later of the unorganized portion of the Louisiana Purchase, was the prize for which they strove, — the South to extend its system of slave labor to these regions, the North to restrain that system within existing limits and dedicate the future Territories and States to freedom. » The long contest was characterized by great intensity and ever increasing bitterness, with the single exception of the period of " finality " which followed the Compromise of 1850; then, indeed, it was temporarily lulled into an unquiet sleep, — a sleep rudely terminated by the introduction of Douglas's Nebraska Bill in 1854. Various efforts were made, at intervals throughout the course of the controversy, to settle it by postponement or compromise, and to some of these was due the origin and development of the constitutional doc- trines and political policy which may be designated by the 'The different names bv which the various forms of the Non-interycntion doctrine were designated will be given and defined in the course of the study. 4 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. common name of Non-intervention.* To examine the char- acter and trace the history of the political policy and the con- stitutional doctrines associated under this name, is the purpose of this study. Our first task will therefore be to set forth the conditions responsible for the orig^in of the Non-inter- vention policy, — the political environment which occasioned its birth. Our starting point must be the situation in Na- tional politics produced by the prospective acquisition of ter- ritory as a result of the Mexican War, and the consequent political struggle between the advocates and the opponents of slavery to extend that institution to, or to exclude it from, the new territory. In order to orient ourselves properly in the situation it will be necessary to review briefly the political aspects of the contest with Mexico. The war was begun and conducted by a Democratic administration, and accordingly was regarded as a Democratic war. The measures of the administration, therefore, w^ere nominally supported by the Democrats as a party. The Whigs were at heart opposed to the war. They felt that it had been begun in defiance both of justice and the Constitution. Before it began they denounced Polk's war policy as unjust and dishonorable.' But the clever tactics of the administration supporters in Congress, and the lack of moral backbone on the part of the Whig members, combined to force them, in spite of their opposition, to vote with their opponents for a declaration that the war had been caused by the aggression of Mexico. After Polk had pushed Taylor forward to the Rio. Grande, a position where a conflict was inevitable, he sent his famous war message to Congress. This asserted that ** war exists, and notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself."* The Democratic majority in Congress prefixed this assertion as a preamble to the bill appropriating supplies for the sup- port of Taylor and the American army.* The maneuver put *Schurz, Henry Clay, IT, 287. "Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV, 442. •Act of May 11, 1846: Globe, 29 Cong. 1 Sess., 795. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. D the Whigs in a dilemma; on the one hand they must play into the hands of their opponents by voting in favor of the declaration that the war had been begun by act of Mexico; on the other they must incur the charge of refusing to sup- port the American army in the face of the enemy. They bitterly resented the tactics that placed them in this predica- ment, but their desire for re-election proved stronger thpn their attachment to Whig principle. With the exception of two senators and fourteen representatives, all of them voted for the bill, with its preamble denounced by Clay, their great ^ leader, as a " palpable falsehood.'" After the war had been thus begun the V\ higs followed the policy of voting without opposition for whatever supplies the administration re- quested, in order to pose before the people as patriots and avoid the charge of attempting to cripple the government in the face of a foreign enemy. But at the same time they neglected no opportunity to belittle and discredit the war as an unrighteous, partisan enterprise.* From the beginning of the war there was a determina- tion on Polk's part that it should result in the acquisition of Mexican territory by the United States.* The opponents of the administration believed that the President had forced on the outbreak of hostilities with this express result in view.* We now know that t^e belief was justified and that this was one of four principal achievements, t^e accomplishment of which Polk had proposed to himself before his entrance upon the discharge of his executive duties.' But whatever miscon- *Spcech at Lexinjfton, Ky., Nov. 13, 1847: printed in National Era, Dec. 2. 1847. *Clay*s Lexfeigton speech of Nov. 13, 1847. whicb was regarded as his for'^al bid for the Presidential no-^iuation at the hands of the Whigs, furnishes one illus- tration of this attitude. After enlarging upon the evils attendant upon a state of war, he proceeds to inqnire as to t^e cause of the present on": in answer he demon- strates that the responsihilitv for it lios wit^-* the administration. He then proceeds to show that the action of the Whigs in opposing this war is not to be compared with the Federalist opposition to the War of 1812, silnce that war was a righteous one on the part of the United States, while the present war is one of iniquitous aggression. ("This is no war of defence, but one unnecessary and of offensive ag- gression. It is Mexico that is defending her firesides, castles and her altars, not wc , , ." — From Clay's speech, printed in the Nationaf Era. Dec. 2. 1847.) He then shows that the Whips are to be blamed, if at all, "for having Ifnt too ready a facility" to the prosecution of the war, and for having voted for the war bill "wifth a palpable falsehood stamped upon its face," the reference being to the pre- amble, which declared in effect that the war was due to the aggression of Mexico. •"The Treaty of Gaudalupe Hidalgo." Am. Hist., Rv., X. 310. Reeves, American Diplomacy Under Tyler and Polk. Chap. XI. •Schurz, Henry Clay, II, 290. •Schouler, Historical Briefs, 139 sq. 6 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. ception as to the real cause of the war there may have been at the time of its declaration, — whether it existed " by act of Mexico," as Polk and Congress united in asserting, or was " actuated by a spirit of rapacity and an inordinate de- sire for territorial aggrandizement," as Clay and the Whigs contended/ — Polk's message to Congress on the 8th of Au- gust, 1846, left no longer any doubt of the intention of the administration to acquire Mexican territory as its result. In this message the President asserted his desire for a peace just and honorable to both parties. The chief obstacle to this, he said, would be^ the adjustment of a satisfactory boundary; in the determination of this "we ought to pay a fair equivalent for any cessions that may be made by Mex- ico."' He therefore asked Congress for an appropriation of $2,000,000, to be used at his discretion in negotiating a treaty of peace. In these terms was broached the project of the " Two-million Bill," which was to precipitate a contest famous in our Congressional annals. This appropriation project was the result of no sudden resolve on the part of the administration. Its inception in Polk's mind antedates by two months the outbreak of the war, and by almost five months the sending of his message to Congress.* The scheme had been submitted to the consid- eration of the Cabinet on March 28. On that date Polk stated to his advisers that he apprehended the greatest ob- stacle to the conclusion of a treaty of boundary such as Slidell, his envoy then in Mexico, had been instructed to procure,* would he the want of authority to make a prompt payment of money at the time of signing it. The govern- ment of Paredes was a military one, dependent on the support of the army under his command. It was known that this army was badly fed and clothed ; that it was unpaid, and " might and probably would soon desert him." If, therefore, ^Schurz, Henry Clay. II, 290. For similar disapproval by Clay of the prea-^Me to this war bill, see his Lexington speech, No. 13, 1847, printed in the National Era, Dec. 2, 1847. ^Globe, 29 Cong. 1 Sess., 1211. •Polk's Diary, March 25, ^846. ♦This account of the proceedings in the Cabinet is taken from the Diary of March 2>^. The instructions to Slidell are indicated here; they are also stated in the article l)y Jesse S. Reeves on "The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo," in Am. Hist. Rev., X, 311. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 7 our minister could be authorized, upon the signing (the em- phasis is Polk's own), of a treaty to pay down a half mil- lion or a million dollars, Paredes would thus be enabled to support his army and so maintain himself in power until the treaty could be ratified and the subsequent installments that might be stipulated could be paid by the United States. Thus, Polk was persuaded, the prompt payment of such a sum would probably induce Paredes to make a treaty " which he would not otherwise venture to make." In these views the Cabinet seemed to concur.* The question at once arose how an appropriation could be obtained from Congress without the disclosure of its object to the public and to foreign governments.' Buchanan, the Secretary of State, deemed this impracticable, but it was finally agreed by the Cabinet that Polk should consult Ben^ ton, Cass, and such other leading senators as he saw fit, upon the practicability of getting the appropriation quietly through the Senate. In case this were done it was thought the House. would pass it also.* The result of' these inter- views was that those consulted approved of the scheme and of Polk's suggestion that it would be best for the Senate to consider it in executive session first and then pass it in open house without debate* But the project was fated to meet with disappointment. Benton, Cass, and Allen all thought that the President should take Calhoun into his confidence in the matter.* They reasoned that his consent would go far toward securing unanimous action by the Senate. If he should disapprove no harm would have been done, since in that case his opposition would have to be encountered in any event. Calhoun agreed, when Polk explained the project to *PoIlc had a further argument of the same purport. It was that the Mexican people would oppose any cession of territory, and no government would dare to make such unless assured of the support of the army; backed by this, it might safely defy public sentiment. The sine qua non of the army's allegiance was regular financial support. Since, in the event, contemplated the Mexican people would not supply this, the advance payment by the United States would be necessary to enable the govern- ment to weather the storm. •This object was to procure a cession of New Mexico and California, if possible all north of latitude 32 degrees — from the Passo on the Del Norte — and west to the Pacific Ocean; or if this could not be obtained, then the next best boundary possible. — ■Polk's Diary, March 28, 1846. •Ibid, •Ibid., March 30, 1846. 8 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. him, that it was a meritorious one; but he objected that " with the greatest care to prevent it, the object of the appro- priation would become public and he apprehended would embarrass the settlement of the Oregon question." He " was much disposed to dwell on that subject," and in the end re- fused to acquiesce in the plan. It was, therefore, on the advice of Allen, laid aside for the present.* Polk had expected and desired only a little war.' His desire for peace became stronger, therefore, the longer the war continued, and in mid-summer the appropriation project was revived. Between July 25th and August 1st Polk had conferences with various senators concerning it.* We must pause to notice one of these, for in the light of the prolonged and bitter agitatioilover the Wilmot Proviso, it possesses a peculiar significance. On the advice of Cass, Polk conferred with Archer, a prominent Whig. To him the President stated that he wanted no party question out of it; he would rather drop the plan than have Congress make it such. Archer's reply was that he would confer with other Whig senators and then report to Polk.* The next day the President laid the plan before his Cabinet, stating again his desire for secrecy; if it approved he would send a message to the Senate in executive session, the object of this course being that if that body withheld its approval the matter need not be made public; but if it ap- proved with anything like unanimity, a bill could be put through it " wnth little or no debate." After full discussion the Cabinet advised the sending of such a message, and Buchanan was requested to draft it.* The message was accordingly sent to the Senate in exec- utive session the morning of August 4th.* On the 6th that body passed two resolutions approving of Polk's recommen- dations.^ The project seemed to be faring most prosperously. 'Folk's Diary, March 30, and April 3, 1846. *"The Treaty of Quadalupe Hidalpo." Am, Hist. Rev., X, 310; also Reeves, American Diplomacy Vnier Tyler and Polk. 'Polk's Diary, July 26 to August 1, 1846. ^Thid, July "31, 1846. ^Ihid, August 1. ^Ihid, August 4. Uhid, August 7. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 9 But the best laid plans often miscarry and disaster to this one was already looming up. The question of party respon- sibility for the project arose. Polk was informed by several senators, he records on August 7th, that the Senate expected he would now send in a confidential message to both Houses X requesting the appropriation. To state it briefly, the issue that had arisen was this; the Whigs objected to making the appropriation unless Polk would first take the responsibility of recommending it. Polk professes to have believed that by his first message to the Senate he had already assumed this. He rails at the stand taken by the Wbigs; to send a con- fidential message to the House of Representatives, — a thing that had not been done for twenty years, — would be a " per- fect farce " and in the end would result in greater publicity than would a message submitted in the ordinary way in open session. During the forenoon of the 8th, he learned that the Whigs were still standing their ground. It was now Satur- day, and the session was to expire at noon on Monday. There was no time to be lost if he would secure the appro- priation. After a conference with Buchanan a message was immediately prepared and sent in to both Houses about 12 o'clock.' That evening a bill was passed by the House in accordance with the President's wishes, but to it was tacked the famous Wilmot Proviso.* The bill came to the Senate on Monday about half an hour before the time set for ad- journment.* Here a motion was made to strike out the Proviso; whereupon John Davis, of Massachusetts, obtained the floor and talked until the Senate adjourned, and thus the Bill and Proviso both were lost. It has been necessary to relate at length the circum- stances connected with the origin of the message of August 8th, 1846, because thereby important light is thrown upon several points relating to our study. We see why it was that the message was not sent in until the last day but one of the session ; how Polk with blind fatuity thought to put through his project unopposed ; and how he pursued his plans with no ipolk's Diary, August 8, 1846. ^Ghbe, 29 Cong. 1 Sess., 1217. •Ibid, 1220-21. 10 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. apparent realization that they were leading straight to a political explosion over the slavery question that would en- danger the life of his party and his country. It was charged by the Whigs at the time that the message had been deliber- ately withheld by Polk in order that the gag might be applied under the plea of necessity, and the appropriation railroaded through without discussion. What we have seen proves that this accusation was unfounded. Polk did desire the appro- priation to go through quietly, and, in the House, without debate; but his original design provided for perfect freedom of discussion by the Senate in executive session; and his diary makes it clear that the reason the message of August 8th was not sent to Congress earlier was that not until the forenoon of that day did Polk have any intention of sending such a message at all. What is to be thought of his expectation that the project would go through in executive session, and of his complaints over the Whig demand that he publicly assume responsibility for it? If his diary did not breathe the tone oi sincerity it would be difficult to believe that the complaints confided to it were entirely free from guile. We can wonder at his short-sightedness, but our sympathy fn this matter must lie with the Whigs. Months after this they were still writhing under the incubus of the " lying preamble " of the War-bill of May 11th, into the approval of which they had been ruth- lessly dragooned. Yet Polk broached his " two-million " project with a child-like faith that it would be quietly acqui- esced in, and he sincerely felt aggrieved when the Whigs required him publicly to assume the responsibility for the appropriation he desired. But if we wonder at this lack of political sophistication, how much greater must be our surprise to learn that Polk proceeded calmly on the course that evoked the Wilmot Pro- viso, without even the shadow of a realization that the result he was working for had any bearing on the sectional issue of slavery — without any premonition that it might occur to some congressman, when called upon to provide for the acquisition of territory, to raise the question to which sec- V/ITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 11 tion of the country the gain was to accrue. The evidence that such was the case is largely negative in character, but it is conclusive nevertheless. In the diary there is no hint of such a contingency until after it had actually occtirred. Then Polk views the Proviso as a " mischievous and foolish amendment " and naively remarks, ** What connection slavery 'had to do with making peace with Mexico, it is difficult to conceive.'" He can only account for it on the theory that its movers are actuated by mere factiousness and that they take this method of avenging their disappointment over his disposal of the patronage. We have traced the origin and have seen the object of the administration project that evoked from Northern con- gressmen the Wilmot Proviso. This measure, falling on the administration like a bolt from the blue, tended for a time to fuse the people of North and South, irrespective of party lines, into compact groups, on the basis respectively of advo- cacy of or opposition to the Proviso. To the origin of this measure and the situation produced by it in national politics in the year following its introduction our attention must now be directed. The President's message of August 9th was regarded by Congress and the country as a clear avowal of the intention of the administration, in making peace, to acquire territory from Mexico. This avowal was received throughout the country with varying feelings of approbation or alarm.* In spite of Polk's indignant protests that the Two-million meas- ure had no possible connection with slavery,' the question of national expansion could not be considered on its own merits alone; it was inextricably involved with that of the future status of the prospective acquisition with respect to the pecu- liar institution. Upon this issue two great sectional groups were formed, the one determined to prevent the extension of slavery through any act of the national government, the other to protect its interests from national interference. 'Polk's Diary. August 8, 1846. 'Garrison, Westward Extension, 254. Wiary, Aug. 8, 1846; Jan. 4. 1847. 12 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. Thus the submission to Congress of Polk's request for . an appropriation looking to the acquisition of territory, fired the train already laid for a political explosion. When, on the day Polk's message was received, McKay of North Carolina introduced into the House a bill carrying the appropriation asked for. White of New York said he could not sanction it unless it were amended so as to exclude forever the possi- bility of extending the institution of slavery over the terri- tory.' Winthrop of Massachusetts followed, denouncing the administration for placing its opponents in a false position whichever way they voted. White and Winthrop were Northerners and Whigs and their opposition therefore occa- sioned no particular surprise. . But the action of David Wilmot, \\hich followed immediately upon that of White and Winthropr presented a different aspect. He was a Dem- ocrat from Pennsylvania and hitherto had stood well with the administration and the South.* But now he broke his political leading strings, and heedless of the desire of the administration, moved, as a proviso to the appropriation that was in process of being granted, that 'slavery should for- ever be excluded from the territory that was to be acquired by it.' . . Such was the famous Wilmot Proviso, and such the circumstances which evoked it. It is commonly stated by historians that Wilmot was not the real author of the meas- ure to which his name has been given, but that he merely acted as the mouthpiece of the author, who was Jacob Brin- kerhoff, of Ohio.*. This is a matter of minor importance, the role played by the Proviso after its introduction consti- tuting its claim to a place in history; yet the question of its authorship is interesting nevertheless; and since there is evi- dence, hitherto overlooked or ignored, which renders its ascription to Brinkerhoff improbable, it will be well to con- sider the question. 'The proceedings are in Globe, 29 Cong. 1 Sess., 1213-18. "Wilson, Slave Power, II, 16. *Globe, 29 Cong. 1 Sess., 1213-18. Divested of the portion which had only a temporary application, the Proviso was as follows: "Provided, that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said territory, except for crime, whereof the party shall first be duly convicted.** ♦Wilson, Slave Power, IT, 16, Von Hoist, Til. 287; Garrison, Westward Exten- sion, 255; Johnston-Woodhurn, II, 85. Schouler is an exception, ascribing the Pro- viso to Wilmot; he, however, gives no reasons for his decision. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 13 The customary explanation of the origin and authorship of the Proviso is in substance as follows: That it was con- ceived by Jacob BrinkerhoflF, who for reasons of expediency desired to keep its parentage concealed. He had opposed the annexation of Texas and had sought to exclude slavery from the western and northwestern portions of that region. Now he perceived an opportunity of renewing the proposal with reference to the prospective acquisition from Mexico; but being in bad odor with the Democratic majority because of his previous action in connection with Texas, he desired to have his present measure introduced by some Democrat who stood well with the administration. For this service Wilmoi was selected as the most suitable man, owing to the fact that by his recent course on the Tariff issue he had won the espe- cial regard of the leaders of his party. This account is taken from Henry Wilson's Slava Poiver;^ Wilson gives no author- ity for his story, having gotten it presumably through his contemporary acquaintance with the political life of thrt period. It is a plausible narrative, and in its support may be cited the fact that the belief was more or less prevalent in 1847 that Brinkerboff was the actual author of the Proviso.* He himself made no such claim at the time, while Wilmot assumed the responsibility of the authorship from the first. Later in life, however, Brinkerhoff claimed the honor, and on his death is said to have left to his family what purported to be the original Proviso, accompanied by an account of its origin.' This evidence would, if unopposed, ordinarily be deemed sufficient to establish Brinkerhoff's claim, and it is usually accepted without question. But unfortunately for ^The above account is taken substantially from Garrison, Westward Extension^ 255-56; he, in turn, drew upon Wilson for it (Vol. II, p. 16). See also Von Hoist, III, 287: and Smith, Political History of Slavery, I, 84. 2In a speech in Congress, Feb. 8, 1847, Strong, of New York, alluded to the ?tory that Brinkerhoff was the real author of the Proviso, and that he had published a card to his constituents to that effect during the autumn of 1846. Brinkerhoff two days later said in answer to this, that any effort to arouse envy in his heart over the fact that the P'-nviro bore the name of Wilmot would be despised by him. He was glad it was called the Wilmot Proviso, though in truth neither of them de- served the credit; it ought to be called the Jefferson Proviso. Globe, 29 Cong. 2 Sess., 377. •Smith, Political History of Slavery, I, 84. / 14 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. its acceptance, there exists another account, directly sub- versive of it. It was put forward by Wilmot himself in 1847, is straightforward, detailed, and explicit, and the cir- cumstances of its delivery are such as to make the probability of its correctness seem very certain. It is to the effect that on the day Polk's appropriation message was sent to Con- gress (Aug. 8, 1846), it was made the subject of conversa- tion at dinner between Wilmot, Owen of Indiana, Dunlap of Maine, and Yost of Pennsylvania. Wilmot remarked that it was clear the President's message looked to the acquisition of territory, arid that if McKay should bring in a bill in accordance with the message, he (Wilmot) intended to move an amendment to the effect that the exclusion of slavery from the territory to be acquired should be made a condition of granting the appropriation. Owen objected to this, saying that he would speak against it. Yost and Hamlin urged Wilmot to persevere in his intention. After dinner conver- sation was had with other Democrats, among them Brinker- hoff, Grover, and Hamlin. The result of this further con- sultation was an agreement to confer with Northern Demo- crats and if the measure met with their approval that it should be pressed. The upshot was that the desired approval was elicited, and therefore when the bill was called up in the House at the evening session, several men collected to agree upon the form and terms of the proposed amendment. Among them were Rathbun, King, and Grover of New York, Hamlin of Maine, Thompson and Wilmot of Pennsylvania, and Brinkerhoff of Ohio. Some engaged in drafting an amend- ment, Wilmot among the number ; several were submitted and all of them were subjected to more or less alteration at the hands of those standing around and taking part in the business. After various drafts had been drawn and altered, the language in which the amendment was offered was finally agreed upon.' Such is the evidence on both sides of the question. In coming to a decision upon it primary importance must be ^This account was given by Wilmot in a speech at Tioga, Pa., Sept. 21, 1847. It was printed in the National Era, October 21, 1847. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 15 attached to the testimony of the two principals, Wilmot and Brinkerhoff: that of others, the story of Henry Wilson in- cluded, being second-hand evidence, cannot overcome the testimony of the principals unless the reasons for its superi- ority are clearly apparent. To sum up then, we know that there was a belief abroad at the time that Brinkerhoff was the man really responsible for the Proviso. This we know from Strong's speech' and so much and no more is estab- lished by Henry Wilson. As between Wilmot and Brinker- hoff, the latter steadily refused to accept the mantle of authorship which it was attempted at various times to put upon him; late in life he did claim it and left to his family a statement of his claim together with what purported to be the original Proviso.* On "the other hand, Wilmot took the responsibility of the measure from the first, when the avowal required the exercise of great political courage and inde- pendence. He told his story of the origin of the Proviso within a year ; told it so minutely and explicitly that the only possible alternative to its acceptance is to conclude that it was a deliberate and' laborious falsification. If Wilmot's sturdy character were not enough to preclude this' conclusion, there are still objections to it that seem insuperable. Any one of the many men he names might have exposed the fraud ; some of them; in particular Thompson, had turned against the Proviso in the meantime, and Owen had opposed it from t^e first.' It is impossible to believe, had there been any falsification by Wilmot, that these men would not have exposed it. It remains to consider in how far the claims of Wilmot and Brinkerhoff are incompatible. In some of the details they do not necessarily conflict; Wilmot does not clainfi sole credit for the Proviso, and he admits that Brin- kerhoff had a share in it; thus we might easily believe that the latter left the original Proviso to his children, provided we overlook the fact that according to Wilmot several origi- nals were drawn up and all more or less altered. But on 'Speech of Feb. 8, 1847. -This docinnent was deposited in the Library of Congress whence it wa-s stolen fifteen or twenty years aprc (sta1;fment of Mr. Spoflford in letter of W. C. Ford to the writer). See Smith, Political History of Slavery, I, 84, for reference to it. Howe's History of Ohio, to which he there refers, is of no authority whatever on the subject. ^National Era, October 21, 1847. 16 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. the main issue, as to who was the original author of the idea, the conflict between the two accounts is irreconcilable; and on the basis of the evidence we have, there can be no hestitation in rejecting BrinkerhofFs claim to its authorship and accepting that of Wilmot.* To return to the fortunes of the Proviso. It appeared in the House without previous warning, and the entire debate upon it was limited to two hours;* There was little time for reflection, therefore, and the leaders had no opportunity to collect their forces or drum their followers into line on the measure. We must look then to an analysis of the votes, rather than to the discussion itself, for information as to how the measure was received by the House. Such an anal- ysis reveals several important facts. The House adopted the Proviso as an amendment to the appropriation bill, by a vote of 83 to 64. Thereupon a curious thing occurred. The original promoters of the bill, now that it was amended, turned against it, while those who had been its opponents hitherto, became its advocates.' This was revealed by the effort, which was promptly made, to lay the bill on the table and thus kill the whole matter. This was defeated, the vote standing 78 for to 94 against. Among the 78 were but four free-state representatives. That is, the vote was almost strictly sectional.* Another thing — the total representation to which the slave states were entitled at this time was ninety ; seventy-four slave-state votes are here recorded against the Proviso. Allowing for vacancies and absences and for the three who voted with the North, it is evident that the South mustered almost its whole voting strength against the Pro- viso on the occasion of its first appearance. This effectually refutes the statement that but little opposition was made to the Proviso at first, and that little by Southern Democrats.* Of the twenty-four Southern Whigs, members of this Con- gress, eighteen were present and voted on this question, and *Tt is not intended to convey the impression that there was any dispute between Wilmot and Brinkerhoflf on this point. I refer simply to the conflicting accounts of the event which each put forward, Wilmot in 1847, Brinkerhoff long afterward. ^Globe, 29 Cong. 1 Sess., 1211-18. •Polk's Din*'y, Aug. 10; Niles' Register, LXX, 374, and National Era, Jan. 21, 1847; and compare vote in Globe, 1217-18. *l)ouglas and three others voted in the affirmative, while Benton and two Ken- tucky Representatives voted in the negative. *e. g. sec Johnston-Woodburn.II, 85. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 17 , sixteen of these voted with their erstwhile opponents, the Democrats, in favor of tabling the Proviso. The Southern men were quiet perforce, because the gag rule had been ap- plied before the subject of the Proviso was introduced; but their votes are eloquent of their attitude toward the measure from the start. The final test of strength came with the vote on the engrossment; this was the crucial question and it car- ried by a vote of 85 to 79. The question now recurring on the passage of the bill, the opposition abated somewhat and it passed, 87 votes against 64. On all these votes McKay, who as a faithful mouth-piece of the administration had introduced the bill,, either opposed it or abstained from voting. The clear-cut division between the sections in these votes, the first, perhaps, in the history of the government,* was ominous of future strife and the dissolution of political parties. The Apple of Discord had been thrown. The vicissitudes of the appropriation bill after its passage by the House on the evening of August 8th are interesting and instructive. It was to go to the Senate on Monday. The intervening Sunday was spent by the admin- istration leaders in devising a plan whereby the appropria- tion could be secured without its obnoxious accompaniment. A scheme was hit upon by the conferees of the two Houses on disagreeing bills, whereby the House bill was to be stifled altogether and the appropriation secured by adding it as an amendment to the civil appropriation bill.* This plan was devised by a joint committee of six members of whom four were Democrats, and five came from slave states.' These facts did not tend to commend it to the Whigs and the Northern congressmen when the plan became noised about on Monday morning. Such a storm of opposition to the proposed action arose as to convince its advocates that per- sistence in it would cause the failure of the general appro- priation for the support of the government, and accordingly McKay announced that it had been abandoned.* The gen- ^Baltimore American, in Niles' Register, LXX, 374. 'The details of this project are drawn from the Baltimore American and the National Intelligencer, copied in Niles' LXXI, 373-374. The substance of it is fully confirmed by McKay himself Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1222. 'Benton, Lewis, and Johnson for the Senate; Severance, McKay, and Boyd for the Horse. Severance for Maine was the only free-state representative on the two committees. *Niles' Register, LXX, 374. 18 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. eral appropriation bill was then passed by the House without further debate. In the Senate the House bill of Saturday evening came up but a few minutes before twelve o'clock on Monday/ Here, Lewis of Alabama, one of the conferees concerned in the intrigue of Sunday, doubtless informed by now of the failure of that scheme in the House, moved to strike out the Proviso.* John Davis of Massachusetts now obtained recognition and proceded to execute his much berated feat of outtalking the session, by which means the taking of a vote was rendered impossible. Various opinions have been expressed as to the probable result if such a vote had been taken. Polk believed there was but little doubt the Proviso would have been stricken out had time permitted, and that the House would have concurred in this. He accordingly termed Davis's action " a disreputable expedient of speaking against time," and called down on his head the execrations of his country for the protraction of the war.' Curiously enough, he had no word of reproof for Wilmot, but this perhaps may be explained as due to his belief that but ^or Davis he would have procured the appropriation with the Proviso stricken off. Henry Wilson expresses the opinion that, contrary to Brinkerhoff's assertion, there was no chance for the Proviso to pass the Senate.*. Probably this is cor- rect; but it seems certain likewise, from the temper of the House on Monday and its determination to refuse to pass the general appropriation bill rather than let the Proviso be juggled out of existence, that Polk's belief that it would have concurred in the Senate's action of lopping the^Proviso off the bill was entirely unfounded. Months of bitter debate, and of the application of pressure by the administration, must ensue before the House could be brought to abandon the Proviso. Leaving the discussion of what might have been, we ^Niles* Register, LXX, 374, says twenty minutes; Polk, Diary, Aug. 10, says thirty to forty minutes. ^Glohe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1220. *Diary, August 10, 1846. *Wilson, Slave Power, II, 17. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 19 must continue to follow the fortunes of the Proviso. When Congress re-assembled in December (1846) the reasons still existing which had prompted the President's first request for an appropriation to assist him in his peace negotiations, he renewed the recommendation in his annual message.' Nothing was done in the matter by Congress until well into the winter.* Finally it was taken up and a bill introduced into the Senate carrying the sum of three million dollars in place of the two million of the preceding session.' February 8th, a similar bill was taken up in the House.* The discus- sion over the Wilmot Proviso was renewed in connection with these bills, which occupied the attention of Congress to such an extent that Von Hoist has termed this " The Session of the Three-Million Bill and the Wilmot Proviso." ' Out of the ferment of the long debate arose the idea of the policy of Non-intervention by Congress with the subject of slavery in the Territories, as a solution of the issue. The story of the evolution of this idea, of its development by slow degrees, will occupy our attention in a succeeding chapter. 'Richardson, Messages and Papers, IV, 495. 2 January 5 Polk complains in his Diary that five weeks of the session have gone by, and yet the Democrats have passed none of his measures for the prosecution of the war. a January 19, 1847; Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sesj., 204-05. *Jbid, 352. ^Constitutional History, Til. Chapter XI. v/ CHAPTER II. The Democratic Party in 1847: Southern Radicalism AND Northern Trimming. The account of the origin of the Wilmot Proviso con- tained in the preceding chapter has been designed as an in- troduction to the general poh'tical situation at the beginnin;^ of the year 1847. The few months immediately following are full of importance for the subject of Non-intervention; for out of the bitter travail of the struggle over the Three- Million bill and the alignment of forces for the coming Pres- idential campaign, were born the two doctrines associated respectively with the names of John C. Calhoun and Lewis Cass. The one was clear cut as crystal, the other ambiguous in expression and hazy as to its application, yet under the mask of a common name these doctrines concealed a rad- ical difference of thought and purpose and thus made it pos- sible for the Democratic party to conceal its internal differ- ences and prolong its life for yet a dozen years. The circum- stances governing their birth were influential in determining their character, and therefore will repay our careful study. The war was to result, it had become evident, in an ac- quisition of territory. The extreme Northern demand with respect to this, promptly put forward, was embodied in the Wilmot Proviso: the territory to be acquired should be devoted to freedom. Pro-slavery sympathizers were at first inclined to compromise and offered to divide the region on the line of 36^*30'. This proffer being rejected by the Anti- slavery party, which insisted on the Wilmot Proviso, they then put forward as a counter-blast to its demands the prop- osition that slavery had a constitutional right of way into all territory belonging to the United States, a right which no agency whatever was competent to nullify. These were the two extreme positions taken. Both were adopted in the first instance by Democrats, the former by Wilmot, Brinker- WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 21 lioflF, and their associates, the latter by Calhoun and his dis- ciples. Between these two extremes wTiich were threaten- ing the destruction of the party there was evolved during the months of 1847 the Cass doctrine of Non-intervention, adopted later by Douglas and re-named by him Popular Sov- ereignty. This soon became the **touch-stone of Demor racy.'" The Wilmot group was read out of the party, the integrity of which was preserved for the time being under the shibboleth of Non-intervention, a term which, as we shall see, included ideas almost antipodal in character. Thus much by way of a bird's-eye view of the period be- ginning with 1847, the events of which it will now be neces- sary to take up in considerable detail. The early winter saw a sad state of confusion and discord within the ranks of the Democratic party. Though it had a strong majority in the House and a safe one in the Senate, Polk frequently com- plained to the pages of his diary that his measures were neg- lected and that the administration was in a practical minor- ity in Congress because of the "factiousness in the party ranks."* Thus, on January 5 Polk records : " The dis- tracted state of the Democratic party was the subject of con- versation and regret [in the Cabinet meeting, that day]. The truth is there is no concert or harmony of action among the 1 democratic members. . . . The slavery question has been introduced into the House of Representatives by Mr. Preston King of New York, and is a fire-brand in that body." The query at once arises as to the reason for this state of discord. Polk could see in it nothing but a mass of factiousness and of selfish ambition. He thought that those Democrats who disagreed with him were actuated either by Presidential aspirations or by motives of revenge because of disappointment over his bestowal of the patronage.* But it can be said without hesitancy that Polk's diagnosis of the situation hit upon a symptom merely and not upon the under- * Johnston- Woodburn, II, 87. 'Polk's Diary, January 4, 5, 9, 12, et passim. On Jan. 4 he wrote: "The slavery question is opening a fearful and most important aspect. The movement of Mr. Kingr's today, if persevered in, will be attended with terrible consequences to the coun- try and cannot fail to destroy the Democratic party if it does not ultimately threaten the Union itself." ■On Jan. 4 he complains that the Democrats are '* scrabbling " over the next Presidential nomination prospects, while the "Federalists" are "united and delighted." In deep despondency he concludes: "I will do my duty and leave the rest to God and my country." 22 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. lying cause of the trouble. It seems clear that throughout all this period he failed to appreciate the real cause of the party discord, which lay in the fact that the prospective ac- quisition of territory must accrue, politically speaking, not to the nation as a whole but to one or other of the sections into which it was divided. Polk did not see that the fire- brand was thrown by himself rather than by Preston King, and that its date was not January 4, 1847, but the 8th of the preceding August, when he sent his Two-Million message to Congress/ On that day, as has been seen, the Democratic party was for the first time cleft in twain, the line of cleav- age being that which separated the slave states from the free. It is doubtless true that the factiousness and the Presidential ambitions of which Polk complains existed, but they were in- cidental circumstances in the situation, rather than its lead- ing cause. The rock of discord round which the factional currents surged was the question of the extension of slavery to the new territory, — or, in the concrete form in which it pre- sented itself, the question of the Wilmot Proviso. On Jan- uary 4 Preston King, a Democratic Representative from New York, asked the consent of the House to the introduction of a Two-Million bill. The substance of its second section was a re-statement of the slavery exclusion clause of the Wilmot Proviso. The desired permission was denied by the close vote of 89 to 88.* The next day, however, King, by way of ex- planation of his action, delivered a speech on the subject, deemed at the time of great political significance. It was supposed, and freely stated, that it had been prepared at Al- bany by the partisans of Silas Wright, and was, therefore, an expression of the Wright branch of the Northern Democracy as to its future attitude upon the issue of slavery-extension.* This belief was justified. It was given out authoritatively a few months later that though Wright did not "instigate'* King, yet the step the latter had taken met his entire approv- *Von Hoist, III, 301, gives a good exposition of the inevitableness of a domestic contest consequent on any addition of territory to the Union during this period. ^Glohe, 29 Cong. 2 Sess., 105, in Housg Journal, pagei 129, this vote is giv<n as 90 to 87. •Nilcs' Register, LXXI, 316; National Era, Jan. 7, 1847; Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess, 114. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 23 al. and he was in entire accord with King's cause/ The speech of King had been written out in advance, and, deliv- ered deliberately, was listened to with deep interest and was widely copied because of the authority it was believed to have.* Polk had already recorded in his diary the night be- fore his belief that, if persevered in, King's movement would be " attended with terrible consequences, and cannot fail to destroy the Democratic party." Further, he sent for his At- torney-General, who promised to expostulate with the refrac- tory New York Democrats on their course of procedure. The next day, as has been seen the '^distracted state of the Dem- ocratic party in Congress" was brought before the Cabinet, where it was " the subject of conversation and regret." What had King said to occasion such a tempest? He had asserted his belief in the necessity of the war and his approval of its vigorous prosecution. But since he deemed the acquisition of territory to be now inevitable, he demanded the recognition of the principle which would exclude slavery from it. He disclaimed any connection with Abolitionism; the Federal government had nothing to do with slavery in the states. But the enactment of the Wilmot Proviso was necessary because the character of the population of the ter- ritory determines the character of the institutions of the state. Let the territory be denied to slavery and a free state will be formed; but if the territory has a slave popula- tion of only one-fourth or one-fifth of the whole number it will be a slave state. Since free labor shuns the proximity of slave labor, the crucial question is tliat of the territorial status. He closed by announcing his intention to continue to urge the bill upon the House.* Southern men in general were at this time willing to settle the territorial dispute on the basis of the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific* This was the settlement of the question favored by the administration as early as January 5, though Polk inclined to await the course events would take before committing himself; on January 16, after deliberate discussion, the Cabinet unanimously agreed *New York Evening Post, in National Era, May 27, 1847. ^National Era, Jan. 7, 1847. 'Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess, 114. ^Speech of Hilliard, Jan. 5, dbid 118; of Dargin, Jan. 7, ibid 135. Both assume to speak for the South. See also Grover's speech, ibid, 138. 24 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. that the line of 36**30' Ought to be extended to any territory that might be acquired from Mexico/ On this point Polk and Calhoun were for once in entire accord, and Southern men generally united in a stand on this issue. Calhoun held, however, that in politics as in war the safest plan of defence was to force the fighting on the fron- tier.' Accordingly the Southern congressmen did not wait to meet the issue of slavery extension in connection with the Three-MilHon bill and the Wilmot Proviso; instead they pre- cipitated a conflict over the bill for the territorial organiza- tion of Oregon. Bills for this purpose had been introduced in both houses on December 23 preceding.' The House bill came vp for consideration January 11*. Being interrogated as to its provisions with respect to slavery, Douglas, who had the bill in charge, answered that slavery was excluded by the 12th section of the bill which guaranteed to the inhab- itants all the rights and privileges, and subjected them to all the prohibitions, of the Ordinance of 1787. Southern men could have no hope of planting slavery in Oregon,* but Ore- gon could be made to serve as well as any other territory to .force the recognition of the extension of the Missouri Com- promise line.* Accordingly Calhoun influenced one of the Representatives from his state, Burt, to move an amendment to the 12th section of the Oregon bill recognizing, in these words, the extension of the Missouri Compromise line: "In- asmuch as the whole of said territory lies north of 36° 30' north latitude, known as the line of the Missouri Com- promise.'*' On January 15, this " Burt amendment,'* as it came to be known, was rejected by a vote of 113 to 82.' The negative votes were all given by free-state men; the 82 af- firmative votes comprised 76 from the slave, and 6 from the free states.* The principle of the Wilmot Proviso was now passed, so far as the House was concerned. The North with but 'Polk's Diary, Jan. 5, 16, 1847. •Calhoun's letter, printed in Benton, Thirty Yean' View, II, 698. ^Hoiise Journal, 29 Cong., 2 Sess.. 88; Senate Journal, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 66. * House Journal, ibid, 162. »See on this Burt's speech, Globe, 29 Cong., 2 S^ss., 196. •That this was the purpose of Southern men was fairly avowed at different times during the debate. TClobe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 170. 'Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 187; the House Journal, 173, gives the vote as 114-82. "Analyzed in National Era, Jan. 1, 1847. Eleven Whigs and seventeen Democrats in all were absent when the vote was taken. It is clear then that the vote was al- most purely sectional and that party lines were almost entirely disregarded. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES.' 25 six dissenting votes had rejected the Southern overture of a settlement of the issue between them on the basis of the extension of the Missouri Compromise line. The House bill was sent to the Senate January 18, where instead of being referred to the Committee on Territories in regular order, it was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary/ Benton is authority for the statement that this course was due to the influence of Calhoun, who desired it because of the com- position of the Judiciary Committee.* Certain it is that the bill was reported back with the anti-slavery clause stricken out. The members of the Judiciary Committee were all Southerners' and, according to Benton, acted merely at the dictation of Calhoun.* No action was taken on the bill till the last day of the session when, objection being made to the amendments, Westcott, who was responsible for them, moved to lay the bill on the table, which was done.' Thus the struggle over Oregon Territory was ended until another Con- gressional session should arrive. A few weeks after the passage by the House of the Oregon Territorial bill, as related above, the Wilmot Pro- viso was again, brought before Congress. In the House a measure which came to be known as the " Three-Million Bill,'' had been introduced; it was designed to provide the Plfesident . with the appropriation which he had requested of Congress the preceding session for the purpose of en- abling him to make peace with Mexico; but the sum it was now proposed to put at his disposal had been increased from two to three million dollars. To this bill, Hamlin, on Feb- ruary 15, proposed to add the slavery exclusion clause of the King bill to which the name of the Wilmot Proviso had now been extended.* Douglas tried to substitute for this the extension of the MiSwSouri Compromise line, but this was rejected by the House, 109 to 82." Hamlin's amendment 'Senate Journal, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 110. 'Letter in New Orleans Mercury, March, 1847; copied in Natioanl Era, May 13, 1847. 'Berrien, of Georsfia; Ashley, of Arkansas; Westtcott, of Florida— Albany Evening Ailas, in National Era, May-27, 1847. *Tn New Orleans Mercury, supra: "Upon the record the Judiciary Committee of the Senate is the author of that amendment, but not so the fact! The Committee is only mid-wife to it. Its author is the same mind that generated the fire-brand reso- lutions ... of which the amendment is the legislative derivation." "Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 571. ^Glnbe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 424. ^Ibid. 26 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. was then adopted by a vote of 115 to 106, and then the bill was passed, 115 to 105/ The affirmative vote on the adop- tion of the Proviso comprised 114 free and 1 slave state votes (the latter, Houston of Delaware). The negative vote was made up of 88 slave state and 18 free state votes'; this is significant for it shows that though the Northern Con- gressmen for the most part still voted for the Proviso, yet the desertion of it by them had begun. We will have occa- sion to refer to this movement again. We come now directly to the promulgation of what may be termed the Calhoun brand of Non-intervention/ The South had declared as with one voice that there must be no enactment of the Wilmot Proviso, come what might.' It had then proposed the extension of the Missouri Compro mise line as a settlement in which it would acquiesce, and by the votes on Burt's amendment to the Oregon bill and on Douglas's amendment to the Three-Million bill, the North had decisively rejected it. More than this, it had asserted its determination to be content with nothing short of the Wilmot Proviso. Unless the South intended to submit it must make a stand in a new position. But submission was far from the Southern mind, and such a position, with the radical Calhoun faction in the van, the South quickly assumed. The first appearance of the doctrine now put forward, like the origin of many another movement of public opin- ion, cannot be ascribed to any one individual, nor to any definite moment of time. It seems to have been instinctively framed in the minds of Southern men as their ultimate po- sition of safety against the Wilmot Proviso program of the North. The attitude of Southern Congressmen on the ques- tion of slavery-exclusion, in the early part of the session of 1847, was illogical and inconsistent. While advocating the extension of the Missouri Compromise line, and proclaiming ^Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess.. 425. The House Journal (29 Cong., 2 Scss., 349), gives the last vote as 115 to 106, the same as the first. •Analyzed in National Era, Feb. 25, 1847. *By this I do not mean to assert that Calhoun was its author necessarily; it was a general movement of Southern men, of which he was the acknowledged leader. ^In Congress the threats of a dissolution of the Union if the North persisted in passing the Proviso, were so frequent during this session that Northern men soon began to hold them up to ridicule. See Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., passim. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 27 it to the North as their ultimatum,' they were at the same time asserting this doctrine of no power in Congress over the subject of slavery in the territories. The inconsistency of this was ridiculed by Grover as early as January 7 (1847), and it appears from an explanation made by Chap- man of Alabama at this time that many Southern men had held the doctrine of the lack of power in Congress over slavery in the territories, at least as early as the preceding year.' But if this were so, Grover pertinently inquired, what became of the Missouri Compromise? If Congress had no power over the subject, what power had it to enact this? Following Grover the doctrine was proclaimed by Leake of Virginia, a week later, in a fire-eating speech/ The Burt amendment had just been rejected, and Leake, who was " a young man, very solemn and very threatening," * took oc- casion to express his disgust with all compromises in gen- eral, and with the action of the Northern representatives in particular; in the course of his philippic he enunciated the doctrine that slavery was a matter of municipal regulation with which the National government had no concern. The argument was repeated by Strong of New York a few days later,* and other instances of its enunciation at this time might doubtless be cited. The significance of these examples is that they are indicative of the attitude the South would assume upon the rejection of the Missouri Compromise ex- tension; they show the drift of thought at the head of which, on the final rejection of that measure, Calhoun put himself, and to which he looked for support for the platform which he proceeded to promulgate. Calhoun declared the era of compromises closed* and drew up a series of resolutions to embody his views of the rights of the South. His close follower and able lieutenant, >For example, see Leake's speech on the Burt amendment to the Oregon bill, Glohe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., App. 111. ^Globe. 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 138. *Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., App, 311. ^National Era, Jan. 21, 1847. fQn Feb. 8; Glohe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 321. ""I see my way in the Constitution. I cannot in a compromise. A compromise is but an act of Congress. It may be over-ruled at any time. It gives us no security. But the Constitution is stable. It is a rock. On it we can stand. It is a firm and stable ground on which we can better stand in opposition to fanaticism, than on the shifting sands of compromise. Let us be done with compromises. Let us go back and stand on the Constitution!" — Works, IV, 347. 28 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. Robert B. Rhett, had already in the debate on the Burt amendment (January 15) announced the new position of the Calhoun faction, in a close constitutional argument. This speech and Calhoun's resolutions of February 19, taken to- gether, constitute the first formal enunciation of the doctrine of Non-intervention. Rhett drew his inspiration from the example of Cal- houn, his leader. His arguments were taken, according to a recent investigator, from that state-rights arsenal which had been so generously stocked by the Virginia opponents of John Marshall, during their struggle of a dozen years or more.' His argument on the Burt amendment was based on the assertion that slaves are property merely, coupled with the doctrine of State Sovereignty and the compact theory of government.' To prove the inability of Congress to ex- clude slavery from the territories, he reasoned thus: Sov- ereignty resides not in the Federal government, nor indeed in any government, but in the people of the states. This is proven by the fact that they possess the amending power, and further, by the definition of treason — it can be com- mitted only against the United States.' Any territory that may be acquired must belong to the sovereignty of the coun- try acquiring it. Accordingly the territories belong to the United States, and this is declared in the Constitution. The states are tenants in common or joint co-sovereigns over them. As such they have agreed in their common compact, the Constitution, that their agent, the general government, shall make " needful rules and regulations " for their com- mon property, the territories; but the states have retained unimpaired their sovereignty over this property; it exists within the territories as within the states themselves. No conflict can arise between the states, however, because they have conceded to the common agent the power 1o make rules and regulations for the territories that are to be binding on all. " The only effect of this reserved sovereignty is that it secures to each state the right to enter the territories, with her citizens, and settle and occupy them with their property 'Dodd, "Chief Justice Marshall and Virginia," Am. Hist. Rev., July, 1907, p. 78.^. 'The speech is given in Chhe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., App, 244. •That is, "the States of the Union united."— /Wrf. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 29 — with whatever is recognized as property by each state. The ingress of the citizen is the ingress of his sovereign, who is bound to protect him in his settlement. He is not responsible to any of the co-sovereigns for the nature of his property. That is an affair between him and his state.'*' Calhoun's resolutions, promulgated in the Senate after the defeat of Douglas's proposal of ' the extension of the Missouri Compromise line a month later, embody essentially the same argument as that contained in Rhett's speech, but in the form of a summary.* Their essential propositions were as follows: The territories of the United States belong to the several states and are held by them as their joint property. Congress is the joint agent of the states; as such it can pass no law " directly or indirectly impairing the equal rights of any of the states in any of the territories, acquired or to be acquired." Any law which would directly or by its effects. deprive citizens of any of the states from establiwShing themselves with their property in the territories, would have this effect; it would, therefore, be a violation of the Consti- tution and of the rights of the states from which such citi- zens emigrated. Finally, no conditions can rightfully be at- tached to the admission of a state into the Union other than that it rriust have a Republican form of government. Six decades have elapsed since Calhoun and Rhett laid down the interpretation of the Constitution contained in the foregoing arguments. Owing to the course of events during this period the interpretation of the nature of our govern- ment, accepted by statesmen and students alike, has become antipodal to the one for which they strove. The Civil War has rendered any refutation of the argument of the Calhoun school an academic occupation. It has settled forever the question of the location of sovereignty under our govern- mental system, which furnished the theme for so many heated debates in the period in which this study lies. Our present interest in the Calhoun doctrine therefore, is chiefly an historical one — to observe what it was and what part it played in the political arena of thie time, rather than to prove or disprove its constitutional validity. To this task then our further attention must be directed. ^IVorks, IV. 348. 30 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. What purpose did Calhoun have in view in the intro- duction of these resolutions? Benton, — though not an un- prejudiced critic of the great apostle of slavery, — has shown pretty conclusively that they were designed to serve as a plat- form around which to rally a Southern pro-slavery party/ At a large mass-meeting of the citizens of Charleston, held in honor of Calhoun's home-coming, March 9, 1847, he deliv- ered a speech which revealed his desire to break through the bonds of political parties and form a Southern party of his own.* He described the situation in the North, as he saw it, with respect to the slavery issue, and outlined the measures he deemed necessary to meet it. He showed the baneful influence of the elections, especially the Presidential election, on the fidelity of Southern politicians to the cause of slavery. He indicated accurately enough that the North- ern politicians, in their anxiety to capture the votes of both sections, would stifle the slavery issue, — would attempt to capture the " abolition " vote without losing that of the peo- ple of the slave-holding states.' The chief danger to the South, he thought, would lie in its entering into a national convention where its delegates could be coerced into support- ing a candidate acceptable to the " abolitionists.'* He there- fore warned his section against entering on such a course, and closed with a stirring appeal to Southerners to waive all partisan differences and make the safety of slavery their sole platform and party issue.* Thus did Calhoun promulgate publicly his policy of " forcing the issue '* on the North. Privately, as we shall see, he entertained and advocated even more radical opin- ions. Did this movement aim at the dissolution of the ^Thirty Years' View, II, 698 sq. This is confirmed by the Southern newspapers of the period and by Calhoun's own works. * Works, IV, 382-397. •T use "abolition" here in the sense in which it was more commonly used by Southern men at this time, to include the opponents of slavery in general. Thus Ixrake designated the opponents of the Burt amendment as "abolitionists." — Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., App. 111. ^"Henceforward let all party distinction among us cease . . . T-«ct us profit by the example of the abolition party ... As they make the destruction of our domestic institution the paramount question, so let us make, on our part, its safety the paramount question; let us regard every man as of our party who stands up in its defense; and everyone as against us who does not, until aggression ceases. It is thus and thus only that we can defend our rights, maintain our honor, en- sure our safety and command respect. The opposite course, which would merge them in the temporary and mercenary struggles of the day, would inevitably de- grade and ruin us.'*— Works, IV, 394. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 31 Union at this time? The leader himself professed to disclaim this much-threatened purpose/ Yet a man who deliberately sets a certain force in motion cannot, by shutting his eyes to its logical result, escape the responsibility therefor. And we must notice that even Calhoun's denials of an intention to dissolve the Union were all based on one condition — the maintenance of the political equality of the two sections.' That he preferred the continuance of the Union on the basis of the terms of his ultimatum, is probably true, as he claimed. That he desired its duration on other terms, the logical sequence of his words and actions tends to disprove. To be sure he believed the North would, if met with a united front by the South, accede to its terms. But in the event of its refusal he would lesd on his section in the path his relentless logic blazed, be the consequences what they might. If further evidence were needed it is not lacking. In the same speech with which he introduced his resolutions on slavery extension' he contemplated the policy to be pur- sued, in case the theories set forth in them were rejected by the Senate. Disclaiming to speak authoritatively as to the policy the slave states would adopt, he gave as his own opinion that there should be no submission.* In private he advocated a policy still more extreme and convulsive. He would regard any compromise, or even the defeat of the Proviso, as very unfortunate, unless " the danger " were met " in its full length and breadth.''' How was this to be done without resorting to the dis- solution of the Union? In answer Calhoun deliberately pro- posed his policy of *' retaliation," which was a deduction from his view of the Constitution as being a compact be- *"Far be it from us to desire to be forced on our own resources for protec- tion. Our object is to preserve the Union of these States if it can be done consist- ently with our rights, safely, and perfect equality with other members of thei Union," — Speech at Charleston, March 9, 1847; Works, IV, 395. ^Ibid; **Sir, the day that the balance between the two sections of the country . . . is destroyed, is a day that will not be far removed from poliitical revolu- tion, anarchy, civil war, and widespread disaster. . . . But if this scheme (the prevention of the extension of slavery) should be carried out; if "we arc to be re- duced to a handful — . . . woe, >iQe, I say, to this Union." — Speech on intro- duction of his resolutions, Feb. 19, 1847, Works, IV, 343. See also his Charles- ton speech, March 9, 1847. ibid, 395. •Feb. 19, 1SA7— Works, IV, 339 sq. **'! say for one I would rather meet any extremity upon earth than give up one inch of our equality — one inch of what belongs to us as members of this great Republic. , . . The surrender of life is nothing to sinking down into acknowl- edged inferiority." — Ibid, 348. "Letter printed in Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 698. 32 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. tween the slavery and anti-slavery sections of the country. He reasoned that since the non-slaveholding states had re- fused to carry out some of the stipulations iriade in favor of the South, the slave states were freed from their obligations to the North, and might select such of them as seemed most fit to make their non-observance a club with which^ to beat the North into submission/ This policy was to be inaug- urated with the closure of Southern ports to Northern ships. Into such illogical depths could the gfeat Southerner's devo- tion to logic lead him. The absurdity of calling this a constitutional remedy has been well shown by Benton, who points out that it violated the. Constitution in the very mat- ter that had immediately occasioned the creation of that instrument.* Calhoun thought the only obstacle to the suc- cessful, operation of his plan was that it would require the co-operation of all the South Atlantic states, to get which he advocated the calling of a Southern convention/ If the leader could, while disclaiming any desire to dissolve the Union, advocate such measures, what was likely to be the nature of the designs harbored in the minds of his enthusi^ astic followers? That they did .actually look forward to ultimate dis-union is certain, if the language habitually used signifies aught; and a vivid picture of the visions of a great Southern empire based on slavery, of which the ultra pro- slavery men were dreaming in the summer of 1847, has been drawn for us by General Brinkerhoff.* , ; If such were the hopes and aims of the Calhoun ultras in 1847, it becomes important for our study of the situation which Non-intervention essayed to cope with to examine bow widely they were accepted in the South, and what was their power to influence the course of political events. The 'Rrnton, Thirty Years' View, IT, 698. *Ibid. ^"Ivet that be called, and let it adopt measures to bring about tbe co-operation, and I would underwrite for the rest." — Tbid, TI, 700. Benton was a zealous political hater of Cal'-oun, and his opinion of t>'e latter's motives is thefefore not to be blindly accepted. TVe foregoing, however, is not based upon Benton's opinion, but is the expression of conclusions drawn from an independent examination of Calhoun's own words. The fact that they harmonize with Benton's opinions, as intimated in the discussion, and that he was prejudiced against Calhoun, in no wise affects their validity. '"They had a magnificent dream of empire, which, in brief, contemplated the use of the government of the United States, so long as they could control it, for the acquisition of slave territory, and this included not only Texas and California, but all between them, and then in addition the island of Cuba. This scheme in- cluded also, somewhere in the future, the acquisition of Mexico and Central Ame-ica, with the Gulf of Mexico as an inland sea of the mighty oligarchy which was to come." — Brinkerhoff, Recollections of a Lifetime, 41-42. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 33 answer to this inquiry is important, for -the situation de- veloped within the Democratic party as a result of this movement, explains the course of politics in that party from this time till the election of 1848. Calhoun's Charles- Ion speech of March 9, outlined the immediate program — to shun political conventions and unite all the friends of slavery in one party, whose only basis of association was to be the safety of their " domestic institutions." * It also, as we have seen, traced with Calhoun's usual keenness and po- litical foresight, the influence of the disturbing factors of the Presidential election on the sectional issue, and the course that the Northern political leaders would take. It is not possible at this date to speak with statistical exactitude, but it is clear that the Calhoun moveme.nt gathered force with surprising swiftness. Probably this may be accounted for by the fact that the Southern mind had been prepared by the long debate in Congress during the session just closed on the subject of slavery extension.* At a mass-meeting at Columbia, South Carolina, March 15, 1847, in honor of Senator Butler's home-coming, Democracy was openly flouted, and Butler, who was himself a Democrat, stated that if the South relied on it as developed by the New York school of Democracy, she *' depended upon a broken reed that would wound the hand that rested upon it." * The Charleston Mercury followed up these movements for the organization of a Southern political party by a savage attack on the Washington Union, the official organ of the admin- istration, because of its supposed luke-warmness in the cause of slavery and its placing party success above the safety of the peculiar institution.* At the same time, a Northern Democratic journal, the New York Evening Post, was assail- ing the Union for its pro-slavery policy. Whereupon the editor of that much-maligned journal congratulated himself, as did Franklin in the Albany Convention, that he had at- tained the happy medium, the line of compromise on which the fathers stood.' ^ Works, IV, 394. "The session of the Three-million bill and the Wilmot Proviso. ^National Era, April 1, 1847. He denounced the Democratic party as "utterly devoid of political decency or political honesty, and thanked God he had severed himself from it forever." — Columbia Chronicle, in National Era, May 6, 1847. ^National Era, April 1, 1847. •Washington Union, printed in National Era, April 1, 1847. 34 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. The editor of the Union, however, must have forgotten the fate of Franklin's program. As it fell between two stools, so with the Washington Union; its position was spurned with contempt by the Democrats of both sections. In the South the Democratic advocates of the new all- Southern party began to make overtures to the Whigs to sink their long-standing differences over such questions as the tariff and internal improvements, and unite on some Presidential candidate, perhaps on Taylor, who would be " sound " on the slavery question.' The response of the Whigs to these overtures was immediate and gratifying.* At a pro-slavery meeting held at Lowndes, South Carolina, April 14, a series of resolutions was adopted; they embody the position taken by the South in general at this time or during the few succeeding months. They assert that Con- gress has no power to pass any law affecting, " mediately or immediately," the institution of slavery; that "as members of any party " they " will not vote for any man for Presi- dent or Vice-President who has not, previous to election, pledged himself to oppose the passage of any law by Con- g^ress on the subject of slavery and, if elected President, to exercise the veto power against any such law, however it may be expressed " : finally, " on the subject-matter of these resolutions, among ourselves we know no party dis- tinctions, and never will know any — that we will be either all Democrats or all Whigs or neither." * Further description could not exhibit the stand of the pro-slavery party under Calhoun's leadership better than is done in these resolutions. To quote all the evidences of approval of this policy, would mean the citation of most of the Southern newspapers, and of the names of most Southern public men. We therefore refer to but a few. It is upheld at length by the Governor of Mississippi, in an official letter to the Governor of Virginia.* It is advocated by the Alabama State Convention in a series of resolutions. These, and the common utterances of the newspapers are all to the same effect, — that poHtical fellowship with the North must be ^Charleston Mercury and Wytheville (Va.) Republican, in National Era, April 15, 1847. -Richmond Whig, in National Era, April 15, 1847. "Printed in National Era, May 20, 1847. * April 15, 1847. Printed in National Era, May 20. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 35 sundered unless the Southern ultimatum is complied with. Such was the program adopted by the Southern radicals during the first half of the year 1847. What answer would be made by the North to the ultimatum thus thrust upon it? Benton complained that this radical movement acted as the second blade of a pair of shears, whose first blade had already been forged by the Abolitionists; and that the agita- tion of the latter was innocuous until supplemented by the counter-agitation of the Southern radicals, set in motion by Calhoun. Accordingly Benton demonstrated, to his own satisfaction at least, that Calhoun, to whom he was bitterly opposed, was responsible for the agitation of the slavery question.^ The measure of truth contained in this asser- tion is undoubtedly exaggerated; yet Benton's metpahor was happily chosen. For while the Calhoun movement of 1847 was gaining headway, the great bulk of the population of the North, and especially of the Northern Democracy, with which party our subject is chiefly concerned, remained firmly attached to the principle of slavery-repression expressed in the Wilmot Proviso. It will be recalled that when the Proviso was first pro- posed in Congress, in August, 1846, it received the almost unanimous support of the Northern Representatives. This support was continued, for the most part, throughout the short session of 1846-47, but with defections ever increasing. When, on February 15, the Proviso was passed by the House, 114 Northern men voted for it and 18 against it' When, at the close of the session, the Senate Three-Million bill came to the House without the Wilmot Proviso, the latter chamber, in Committee of the Whole, added the Pro- viso to the bill by a vote of 90 to 80,' but in the open session enough of the previous supporters of the bill fell away to cause its defeat by a fairly close vote.* A motion by Wilmot to lay the bill on the table, made with the object of defeating it, since the Proviso was not to accompany it, was lost, 87 to 114, and the Three-Million appropriation was then finally passed by a vote of 115 to 82.' Thus was the Proviso lost, ^Thirty Years' View, II, 695. •Analyzed in National Era, February 25, 1847. •Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 573. *House Journal, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 501; the vote was 102 to 9/. ^Ihid, 502-505. 36 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. SO far as this session was concerned. The votes taken upon it have a twofold significance. They show that the great mass of the Northern Representatives steadfastly continued to support it until the session closed; but they also show an increasing defection from the Proviso on the part of the Northern men, a defection large enough toward the last to cause the defeat of the measure. But this movement can be accounted for largely on other grounds than that of changed convictions/ Whatever defections might occur in the ranks of their representatives at Washington, the great mass of the North- ern people stood firm in their support of the Proviso until the very eve of the national conventions in the following year. The keynote of the stand of the Northern Democrats against slavery had been sounded in that speech by Preston King on January 4, 1847, which had caused so much trouble and worry to Polk and his official advisers. The New York Tribune had hailed this speech as indicative of a new stand by the Northern Democrats against the domination of their Southern colleagues,' and other leading newspapers had viewed it in the same light. This significance, seen in King's speech, was due to the belief that it had been inspired by Silas Wright, the idol of the dominant faction of the New York Democracy and a promising Presidential possibility in 1848; in May it was announced authoritatively that this belief was justified — that Wright, though not responsible for King's speech, was in entire accord with it' Grover, a colleague of King, in a speech on January 5, elaborating the latter's position, professed to speak for "all north of Mason and Dixon's line," and his utterances were reiterated by many voices, " yes ; all the free states."* On the same day the Chicago Democrat, a leading party paper of the North- west, argued for the Proviso, concluding, it '' should not be the scarecrow of the South any longer."* Throughout the summer and autumn this feeling was dominant at the North, ^It was freely charged at the time that the manipulation of th« patronage at the disposal of the Executive was an important factor in the conversion of th«sc Northern men who abandoned the Proviso. «New York Tribune, Jan. 11, 1847. •New York Evening Post, in National Era, May 27, 184f . ^National Era, Jan. 14, 1847. •Chicago Daily Democrat, Jan. 7, 1847. V/ITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 37 • In far- western Iowa both of the Democratic candidates for Congress were strong advocates of the Proviso. The Chi- cago Democrat commented with approval on the stand taken by the Iowa candidates, and urged the people everywhere to exact pledges from the politicians in this matter.* If the scope of our study permitted, columns might be quoted from Democratic papers all over the Northern States, expressive of similar sentiments,* but the subject must be dismissed with the generalization that during 1847 and the early part of 1848 the almost universal attitude in the North was one of advo- cacy of the Proviso. It was the frequent lament of Northern men in this period that whenever a sectional issue arose, their repre- sentatives habitually yielded to Southern threats or South- ern persuasion: so in the present contest signs were not lacking to indicate which side would yield first when the political issue should become acute. For while the Southern people under Calhoun's leadership were making the protection of slavery their sole rule of political action, the cry of the Northern politicians and party organs was that the unity and success of the party should be the paramount goal toward which they should strive. Thus they announced publicly to their Southern opponents that they would forego their demands if only they were sufficiently opposed and threat- ened. The first result of such an attitude was, of course, to fortify the belief of Southern men, born of long experience, that when the test should be made the North would submit to their ultimatum. The student of the political life of this period will find it hard to believe that a lower plane of political ideals has ever in our history been occupied by leading parties, than that reached by the Whigs and Democrats in this Presidential campaign. They vied with each other in a rivalry to go before the country, each with a platform and nominee that would the more completely conceal the issue in which the ^''We are glad to see this great and paramount measure of the Democratic party over-riding all other questions Jn Iowa. It looks as though men were fight- ing for principles rather than offices, and we hope all the candidates will be pledged in this matter. ... If the people will only take hold of this matter in good earnest and exact pledges, politicians will soon be right." July 14, 1847. •See National Era, May 27, July 8, July 29, Sept. 16 and Sept. 23, for ex- tensive citations from reoresentative Northern Democratic newsoaoers. 38 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. nation was chiefly interested, and the more completely be- fuddle the people as to where the party really stood on that issue. Of the two, the Whig party reached the lowest depth of abnegation of principle, by putting forward its nominee as its sole declaration of principle and policy — and he a man who had never voted in his life and of whose attitude about all that could be learned was that he would follow the policy of the earlier Presidents/ The party met, four years later, perhaps the most crushing defeat ever encoun- tered by a great political party in our history; and within six years it met the death which, by its action in this cam- paign of 1848, it had so richly merited. But for the present we mention these things only because of the light they throw on the attitude taken by the Northern Democratic leaders, that the success of the party was the summum bonum to which all else should be subordinated. Many of the partisan papers most emphatic in their support of the Proviso were at the same time fervently ap- pealing to Democrats of both sections to waive their dif- ferences and unite their votes in order to save the party. The course of the Chicago Democrat may be cited as an illustration of the attitude of which we are speaking. It was an early advocate of the Proviso, but almost as soon as that measure began to threaten a party schism the Democrat began its appeals for unity. Let Democrats, North and South, it urged, overlook their differences on the Proviso and unite their votes to save the Party. What virtue there may be in a party that avowedly stands for no principle, or rather avows its willingness to admit everything to its ranks for the sole purpose of attaining success at the polls, it is not easy to see. Yet this organ, with no higher aim in view, made fervent appeals to the party loyalty of the Democrats, in whose hands alone, it considered, the country's continued existence could be assured. It mattered not what opinions one might hold or what policies he might advocate; if only he would consent to label himself a Democrat and vote for the nominees who bore that party label, this organ of public *Th€ naive lucidity of this pronouncement will best be appreciated if one tries for a moment to plot the probable course of a President who should seek to follow out at the ¥ime time the policies of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson! WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 39 opinion would be content. As a typical example of this unblushing worship of the spoils of office, we may note the editorial appeal of January 4, 1847. It holds before its party followers the example of the Whigs, who always get together on an election whatever differences of belief may exist among them, as worthy of all emulation. Therefore, let Southern Democrats tolerate the opinions of their North- ern brethren on the Wilmot Proviso. " No one wishes to drive the South, and events are proving every day that the North cannot be driven. Toleration, a little more toleration of honest Northern opinions, is all that the North asks of the South, to ensure perfect union and a complete victory in 1848." It is entirely plain that the '* complete victory in 1848 " is the one great desideratum before which all else must give way. " The North cannot be driven " — these were brave words; yet this same organ was pursuing, and for months to come continued to pursue, a two-faced, hypocritical policy with respect to the slavery question and the Wilmot Proviso. On the one hand, it continued for many months its advocacy of resistance by the Northern Demorats to the demands of the Southern section of the party concerning the Proviso. Six months after it had hurled at the South the defiance we have quoted, it commended the Iowa Democrats for their support of the ** great and paramount issue of the Demo- cratic Party:" this description of the Wilmot Proviso was painted, it should be noted, not by the Iowa Democrats, but by the Chicago Democrat itself. At the same time* it urged Northern people generally to exact from their nominees a pledge to support the Proviso. Only thus did it feel that the wishes of the Northern voters could be safeguarded against betrayal at the hands of their representatives. Yet all the while the Democrat was flying at its editorial masthead the banner, " For President, the nominee of the Baltimore Convention;" and it did valiant service during these months in preparing its readers for the Doughface surrender that was to take place. The cry was taken up that the Proviso should not be made a party test; that though »July 14, 1847. 40 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. the Democrat believed in its wisdom, many able members of the party did not; therefore let all Democrats, for the sake of party harmony, agree to waive the question. But the Southern Democrats had already made the Proviso a party test, and for the Northern members of the party to say, under these circumstances, that they would not insist upon it was simply to give notice in advance to their Southern brethren of their willingness to submit, at the proper time, to the con- ditions prescribed in the latter's ultimatum. Such was the specious argument dinned into the ears of Northern voters to prepare them for the desertion of the Proviso. Yet the laudation of that " great and paramount issue of the Democratic Party " was still continued. As late as March, 1848, under the caption '* 52-2, the Great Change," the Democrat recited exultingly that though Cass in his Nicholson letter had said a great change had taken place in the public mind as to the power of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories, yet since the reception of that letter in Michigan, Cass's own State, the Democratic House of Representatives had registered by a vote of 52 to 2, its approval of the Wilmot Proviso; and that the convention that nominated Cass for the Presidency did not endorse his Nicholson letter. The editorial concluded, however, with the argument already indicated, that the Proviso should not be made a party question, "as many of the ablest Democrats op- pose it," and it would support Cass for the Presidency if he should get the party nomination.' A month later it described with approval an enthusiastic Democratic mass-meeting at Chicago which had "but one object and was animated by but one feeling — opposition to slavery-extension." Whenever "dough-face" was mentioned a "spontaneous outburst of in- dignation" greeted it; but when the "abiding determination of the Northern Democracy was insisted on" the "cheering was enthusiastic and overpowering."' A few weeks after this the Baltimore convention was held; there the Wilmot Proviso was ignored, more or less calmly, and the Doughface program was overwhelmingly tri- » Chicago Daily Democrat, March 4, 1848. *Ibid, April 3, 1848. WITH SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES. 41 umphant. The Democrat then, true to its promise, silently dropped its former opinions favorable to the Proviso and gave its unqualified. support to Cass and the Baltimore platform. WTien taken to task by a rival journal for its inconsistency in deserting the Proviso it gravely rebuked its accuser with simulated indignation; his charges were utterly absurd and insincere, for did he not well know that it had for months been floating the banner "for President the nominee of the Baltimore Convention?'' Whatever may be our views as to the merits of the sectional contest we are following, we must turn with a sense of nausea from such political deprav- ity and abnegation of principle; while we leave our study of Calhoun, however much we may disagree with him, with the feeling of respect which sincerity always commands. We have followed thus fully the course of the Chicago Democrat not because of any pre-eminence possessed by it over other Northern Democratic organs, but because it fur- nishes as convenient an example as any of that attitude in the North, among the politicians especially, that gave oppor- tunity and encouragement for the evolution of the next and most important type of the Non-intervention dogma, fos- tered by Northern men like Cass and Dickinson. The Dem- ocrat is a typical example of the newspaper Dough-face of the period; just as men like D. S. Dickinson are examples of the politician Dough-face. For, though the Northern people seem not to have perceived it, the Dough- face was not a "Northern man with Southern principles;" he was rather a party man with one paramount principle, and that — suc- cess at the polls! It was not the Dough- faces themselves who were primarily responsible for this desertion of "North- ern principles." It was rather the Northern people who man- ifested their willingness to submit to betrayal. When an Illi- nois State Democratic Convention would deprecate the agi- tation of "abstract questions," the Wilmot Proviso being ob- viously the agitation referred to, and at the same time pledge in advance its authoritative support of the platform and nominee of the Baltimore Convention, whatever might be their character, as was done in the springy of 1848;' when the » Reported in Chicago Daily Democrat, May 4, 1848. 42 THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. official representatives of the party in Michigan would con- demn Cass, by a vote of 52 to 2, on the chief issue for which he stood, and at the same time propose him for the Presi- dency; when all this time the Southern Democrats were re- peating as their ultimatum no support to any man, whatever his party label, who was not a sworn opponent of the Wilmot Proviso: under such circumstances, the Dough- faces were not solely to blame if they forgot "the abiding determination of the Northern Democracy" for the sake of party unity and the hope of party success. We have here the key to the course of the Democratic party in 1847 and 1848. As in other electoral campaigns be- fore and since, the various aspirants for the Presidential mantle began to groom themselves for the race two years or more in advance. As early as March, 1846, Polk and Ban- croft had noticed a change in Buchanan's position on the Oregon question, and they had agreed in attributing it to his aspirations to the Presidency. It was the fashion then for the candidate for the party nomination to make his bid for the honor in a letter which, ostensibly addressed to some friend or constituent, was in reality a statement, for the use of his party, of the writer's position on such political issues as he saw fit to discuss. Of such epistles during this cam- paign Cass's Nicholson letter has acquired a fame far ex- ceeding any of the others, but in 1848 it is fairly debatable whether Buchanan's "Harvest Home" letter was not more ])rominent; the Cass letter, it is clear, was only one of a ser- ies and possessed no claim to uniqueness or to distinction over the others of similar purpose. When the Wilmot Proviso question was re-opened by Preston King in January, 1847, the Cabinet immediately took counsel upon the party situation thus developed and Buchan- an was eager to commit the administration to the program of advocacy of the extension of the Missouri Compromise.* Polk, however, preferred to await developments before com- mitting himself to the policy of the administration. But on January 16, after full discussion, the members of the Cab- inet expressed themselves unanimously in favor of the ex- tension of the Missouri Compromise line. This decision »Polk's Diary, March 23, 1846. 'Polk's Diary, January 5, 1847. WITH SLAVER