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In my view, the gravest mistake NATO made in Afghanistan was to confuse allies for friends, to believe that those who fought with us against the Taliban would be trustworthy partners in reconstructing the country. Worse still were the efforts to appease those allies by allowing them free rein as they pillaged the state. Ultimately, the warlords of the Karzai regime were as much murderous fundamentalists as the Taliban, only greed was their God.

More broadly, NATO states confused having a common reason for war with having a common objective in war. The alliance was certainly united in its conviction that al-Qaida attack on the World Trade Center demanded a military response. However, this clarity of impetus obscured deep differences in goals.

Was the objective of the war to deny al-Qaida the use of Afghanistan as a base of operations for future attacks? Was it to destroy the Taliban? Was it to disrupt terrorist networks sprawling across borders? Was it to rescue the Afghan people from a humanitarian catastrophe? Was it to satisfy a craving for justice? Was it to meet the minimum requirements of treaties and public sentiment?

At different stages of the campaign, different NATO governments embraced different ends and it became increasingly difficult for the alliance’s citizens to recognize what “victory” would look like and when it would be time to call their troops home.

In my view, the gravest mistake NATO made in Afghanistan was to confuse allies for friends

After my address, my GOPAC colleague, French Senator Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam, asked me to meet with her fellow legislators in France’s parliament. It was important to continue the discussion, so that if, at some point in the unforeseeable future, NATO states had to reply to an attack on one of its members, the alliance would be ready to take sober, considered decisions.