LATVIA and Iceland successfully issued sovereign bonds at yields approaching Spain's last week. There are rumours that Dubai may follow suit. That the countries which started the sovereign debt crisis are returning to the market while peripheral euro-zone sovereigns continue to struggle has led to crowing from those who see austerity as a misguided strategy for Greece, Ireland and Portugal.

The facts certainly suggest that the yoke of a single currency is a barrier to recovery. Iceland's krona has halved in value since the crisis began, providing a stimulus to exports unavailable to euro-zone governments. Iceland let its banks go bust, whereas Ireland's decision to stand behind hers led directly to the spike in Irish bond yields. Amid a temporary wobble in its currency peg to the euro, Latvia's government called on foreign banks, which had provided euro-denominated mortgages to Latvians, to accept writedowns. Even Dubai seems to provide a lesson for Ireland in how to deal with its banking debt; while Dubai kept up payments on its official sovereign bonds, it aggressively restructured the private debt of state-owned companies.

The lessons appear to be clear: devalue the currency and wallop foreign creditors to banks, state-owned enterprises and private citizens, honouring only the sovereign's own obligations. Your reward will be an inversion in credit-default swaps:

The Economist has regularly highlighted some of the nuances that belie this narrative. Iceland didn't willingly cut its banks adrift, they were simply too big save. Dubai has a much clearer backstop from Abu Dhabi than Ireland, Greece or Portugal have from Berlin or Frankfurt. Here are some new factors to ponder after discussions with some of the dealmakers involved in getting the Icelandic and Latvian bonds away:

First consider the timing. Latvia and Iceland both approached the IMF in 2008, Dubai halted coupon payments on Dubai World bonds in 2009. Greece was the earliest of the euro-zone peripherals to seek a bail-out, in May 2010. Icelandic and Latvian yields were higher at the start of the graph above, because their problems had already been recognised. That meant they had longer to come up with remedies. Latvia has won praise from the IMF for eliminating its current account deficit and exceeding targets for closing its fiscal budget. That took more than two years. Greece, Ireland and Portugal have only just started the process.

A second point is the surprisingly forgiving nature of the bond market. For all their progress, Iceland and Latvia continue to face significant problems. Iceland stabilised its currency only through severe capital controls, and it has yet to resolve demands from the Dutch and British governments to compensate savers, who lost money when Icelandic banks collapsed. Latvian unemployment remains high at 17%. Bond markets have welcomed these governments back even though they have not solved every problem.

This shouldn't surprise us. Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart's masterful history of sovereign debt shows that default is surprisingly common, while academic research suggests the interest rate penalty paid by all but the most serial of defaulters is small. It should, however, provide hope to euro-zone governments. Indeed one of the book runners involved in last week's offering said he would confidently underwrite an Irish bond issuance, once all banking sector losses are realised. Portugal, too, might return to the market soon, if the new government matches its reformist words with deeds. Only Greece, it seems, is consigned to beg from the official sector for the foreseeable future.

A third point is that these bonds weren't targeted at the same investors who hold peripheral euro-zone bonds. Both the Latvian and Icelandic bonds were issued in dollars and targeted American investors. The book runners say they are unlikely to target European investors anytime soon. They are simply too busy managing existing exposure for now to be interested in new issuing governments. Martin Harvey of Threadneedle's European Bond Fund confirms he wasn't tempted by the Icelandic or Latvian issuances, despite the current dearth of supply of new euro-zone bonds.

Mr Harvey, however, holds out hope for the peripheral sovereigns. His fund is still active in Italian and Spanish bonds, and he is not necessarily put off by the yields on Greek, Irish and Portuguese bonds. If these countries were to regain growth momentum and European politicians showed solidarity, then the yields available would surely be an attractive proposition for many investors, if only the bonds were liquid enough to trade in and out of. On that count, peripheral euro-zone governments should heed the record low trading volumes for their bonds, rather than cast jealous glances at neighbours, whose return to the markets should be welcomed.