Klaus Larres is the Richard M Krasno Distinguished Professor of History and International Affairs at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. Peter Eltsov is senior research fellow and associate professor at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U. S. government.

Seventy years after Adolf Hitler’s suicide, Germany’s unconditional surrender in World War II and its isolation and breakup, the country is a colossus once again, and its chancellor was just named by Forbes as the world's most powerful woman. Angela Merkel, one of the globe’s most respected and influential statespersons, is playing a central role on at least two issues of global importance: Western relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the coherence and continuing survival of the EU and the common European currency, the Euro. On both matters Merkel has had a calming and stabilizing influence. She clearly is the European voice in world affairs.

And the United States needs Merkel, and Germany, beside it on the global stage. Following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and saddled with the continuing (drone-and-special-operations) war against fundamentalist terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere, the United States is less keen than ever on the role of the world’s policeman. British Prime Minister David Cameron appears to have largely excused himself from dealing with global affairs and the French president has decided to be happy with a supporting role while leaving the senior role to Merkel. In terms of economic and social outlook, Germany seems a natural partner. Germany is the EU’s largest nation, with a population of 80 million and by far Europe’s most productive, efficient and successful economy. Conveniently, the country’s political leadership apparently didn’t mind spying on their European partners on behalf of the U.S. National Security Agency.


And yet in important ways—in large part because Germany continues to be haunted by the terrible crimes of that earlier chancellor, Hitler—Merkel has failed to become a true “partner in leadership” for the United States, to deploy a term that George H.W. Bush once used to describe (hopefully but very prematurely) German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

The tensions between Germany’s not-so-distant past and its putatively powerful future are thus growing harder to reconcile. A significant number of Germans still regard their country as a kind of larger Switzerland: rich and prosperous but rather passive in global affairs. Yet the mood is changing–both within the population at large and among the country’s political elite. The tone was set in early 2014, when during a speech at the Munich Security conference, German President Joachim Gauck admonished his nation to become more active in international relations and more ready to use military force in UN- supported initiatives. Germany’s defense minister and the chancellor herself quickly supported Gauck’s advice.

But there are simply too many ghosts haunting the idea of a German-led Europe. The memory and legacy of German imperialism under the Kaiser that led to World War I, and the long-lingering evil legacy of Hitler and World War II, still are powerfully constraining factors. While Germany is widely recognized as the EU’s leading voice in economic and financial affairs, this is not the same as the acceptance of the country as the EU’s de facto political leader. In fact, the EU was founded to prevent the development of such a hegemonic position precisely because of the long history of German aggression. In particular, since the enlargement of the EU in 2004 that led to admission of the formerly communist states in Eastern Europe, a coalition of states has proved necessary to bring any legislation proposed by the EU Commission in Brussels to fruition.

Traditionally, at least Franco-German cooperation was vital. Now the inclusion of at least Poland and one or two other larger nations is necessary for obtaining the required votes. Thus building up Germany as the leader of the EU runs counter to everything the EU stands for, not least the careful balancing of nations within Europe. Turning Germany into Europe’s hegemonic power may well have disastrous consequences for the well-being of the EU and the carefully nourished stability and balance of power in Europe. The risks are too great.

Secondly, French and British sensitivities and Polish, Czech and Greek suspicions about German predominance within Europe persist. At present London and Paris are too occupied with their own economic and identity problems to make much of a fuss about Merkel’s new geopolitical role. Moreover, the chancellor is well-respected for being keen on mediation and cooperation, and no one suspects her of harboring global power political ambitions. But Britain and France, remembering their own hegemonic desires and the glories of their past imperial leadership roles, look with envy upon any notion that Germany is America’s—and the world’s—preferred European partner. Building up Germany’s leadership role further is bound to increase tension and competition and animosities within Europe. This would be an unwise development. Matters within the EU about national identities, economic problems and domestic social problems are bad enough as they are.

A good point in case is the financial survival of Greece. Here Merkel and German Finance Minster Wolfgang Schauble have shown real leadership. Together with the equally hard-line European Central Bank, and in contrast to many wavering politicians in Paris and elsewhere, Germany has pursued a no-nonsense policy. Despite all attempts by the new left-wing Greek government to loosen the conditions imposed on the country for obtaining more bail-out money, Merkel stood in the way. She refused to being pushed about by Greece’s new finance minister, whom she personally regards as a joke, and shrugged off as rather silly all demands for Germany to pay Nazi war crimes compensation to Greece. She adamantly refused to allow the reversal of the firm austerity measures imposed on Greece by the country’s creditors–the EU, the European Central Bank, and the IMF. The most influential voice with the EU and the ECB is of course Germany’s (with Greece owning Germany more than 54 billion euros, a huge sum).

Yet Merkel’s strong stand has given much rise to tension within the EU. Countries such as Hungary and even Italy and France have shown a disposition to question her financial convictions regarding Greece. And some well-meaning but perhaps not very wise anti-austerity advice from across the Atlantic by Paul Krugman and others hasn’t helped either to strengthen Merkel’s credibility.

Thirdly, in the wake of David Cameron’s election victory in the UK, “Brexit” (Britain’s exit from the EU) has become more likely. Cameron will have to honor his promise to hold an “in/out” referendum about continued EU membership before late 2017. Increasing EU-skepticism and concerns about immigration from southern EU states among Britons make ‘Brexit’ a very real possibility. Any further emphasis on Germany as America’s new special partner would only hasten the UK’s animosity toward the EU and make Britain’s exit from the EU even more probable. Russia certainly would facilitate and applaud such a scenario. One of Moscow’s key goals, after all, is to break up the EU and NATO and invent a new European security architecture.

And suddenly suspicions of Germany are deeper than they have been in quite a while, thanks to the most recent revelations about espionage. Fewer than two years the disclosure that the NSA spied on German businesses, politicians and intelligence networks and even listened in on Angela Merkel’s cell phone created a deep crisis of confidence in American-German relations. It soon became known that Merkel had bought a cheap and entirely insecure cell phone in her local Aldi supermarket round the corner that made the NSA’s job rather easy. She was much ridiculed but solemnly proclaimed “friends don’t spy on each other.” The crisis became the most serious fallout between Berlin and Washington since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. But the recent revelations that the German intelligence services (with or without the knowledge of the government) did not hesitate to spy on Germany’s EU partners and helpfully passed on the rich information gleaned to the NSA was even more embarrassing to Merkel. They have created a deep domestic crisis and awakened more mistrust among Germany’s European partners about the reliability of Europe’s “leader in waiting.”

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The Obama administration seems to have realized, at long last, that Germany’s leadership potential is not as great as it once seemed. For instance, Berlin did its best to mediate in the crisis in Eastern Ukraine but failed. Merkel took a leading role in dealing with Putin right after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and she helped to establish the Normandy Quartet, a negotiating body comprising the leaders of four nations–Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine–aimed at solving the crisis. Most recently, Merkel visited Moscow on the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany. As a sign of disagreement with Russia’s neo-imperialist policies in Ukraine, she missed the military parade on the Red Square, yet held extensive talks and a joint press-conference with Russia’s president the next day. However, her anniversary visit, just a day after the grandiose military parade in Moscow (the biggest of a kind since World War II), vividly demonstrated that in spite of her regular contacts with Putin, Merkel achieved minimal if any results to reestablish peace and stability in Ukraine.

Now Washington is getting more involved. On April 21, U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Teft said on “Ekho Moskvy” that President Obama could join the Normandy Quartet if he is invited – a statement that was impossible to imagine just a few months ago. On May 12, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, their first meeting since the beginning of Ukrainian crisis. Most recently, on May 18, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland – a person who has been vilified in the Russian media for her alleged role in the Ukrainian crisis–visited Moscow to discuss further steps in the implementation of the Minsk Agreement.

In the final resort Washington needs a reliable and predictable Germany that enjoys the trust of its European allies, yet Germany is not ready for this role. Germany still has gained no taste for military engagements in support of the United States. German pacifism and left-wing political movements are alive, with anti-American sentiments on the rise, and under these domestic pressures Germany is cutting its defense budget rather than increasing it. Berlin is also much more focused on its domestic problems and on EU naval-gazing than politicians in Washington seem to be willing to concede. In the end Germany remains a provincial regional power without geopolitical ambitions and desires as well as expertise. And its past is still too much a part of its present.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U. S. government.