After the first 72 hours

From reaction to a direct struggle for power

The revolutionary movement in Lebanon has been undergoing a process of crystallization since Friday night when the first protesters took to the street. The last straw was a suggested tax on VOIP apps such as Whatsapp that most people use to circumvent the inflated costs of telecoms and to stay in touch with friends and family abroad. Before that though, the Lebanese government has been forcing a diet of austerity on the Lebanese population. These austerity measures are considered necessary by the government to secure foreign aid from the IMF and other allies of Lebanon’s ruling class.

Shortly after the budget was passed and the extent of the cuts revealed protests and strikes started taking place by retired military personnel whos pensions went under the knife and teachers at the Lebanese University launched strike due to increasing precarious work conditions and a hiring freeze which also touched all the public sector. Of course, although these freezes hit regular Lebanese, the government was still hiring whoever they thought deserved a job through special consultancy contracts; continuing the regular cycle of clientelism known in the state. In addition to austerity measures, a currency crisis ensued in Lebanon as Banks put a hold on injecting US dollars into the market due to loan repayments. The Lebanese Lira is pegged to the USD yet most institutions in Lebanon demand being paid in USD as it is seen as a stronger currency. The demand then far exceeded the supply and an illicit black market emerged putting significant strain on the day to day functioning of the country. Finally, massive fires broke out across Lebanon's mountain rage which was largely put out by an army of volunteers including Palestinian firefighters who usually have no jurisdiction outside of Palestinian refugee camps within Lebanon. The fires exposed tot he fullest extent the incompetence (previously known but now attached with the sheer destructiveness of it) of the Lebanese state that had no emergency plan to fight the fire and whos first act after their extermination was to launch new taxes. Then the uprising began.

Roots of Opposition

The movement today cannot just be understood in the current economic context, one also needs to look at the development and changes of political power within Lebanon. In 2005, the Lebanese Prime Minister was assassinated in a massive truck bomb. The assassination triggered a nationwide series of protests against the Syrian regime that had maintained a military presence in the country since 1976, a year after the start of the Lebanese Civil War. The Syrian’s presence in the country was a de facto occupation — even though legitimized through the Taif Agreement that ended the Lebanese Civil War — where they practised near-complete control of Lebanon's political life and brutally suppressed any opposition to their rule. The ‘Cedar Revolution’ of 2005 was successful in expelling them from the country and brought hopes of a Lebanese renaissance, political and economic. However, strong opposition was immediately faced from those who maintained loyalty (or thankfulness as they would put it) to the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Two political camps emerged out of that period, 8 and 14 March named after the respective dates they held mass rallies. Although initially hostile to each other, a synergy between the two groups was found as time progressed and they shared a nine-year honeymoon period as Lebanon's government was paralyzed after the resignation of the President in 2009 and MP’s from all parties voted for their own extensions time and time again against the constitution.

During that time, Lebanon also passed through a garbage crisis which sparked one of the first protest movement falling under the umbrella of the ‘Civil Movement’ — YouStink. The group had the immediate goal of the resignation of the environment minister and was able to stage several successful protests in the capital and some sit-ins at government buildings. The movement was successfully suppressed but it gave birth to a new line of political involvement in Lebanon. Soon enough campaigns around municipal and national elections under the banner of refusing any and all of the ‘old guard’ political parties were born. Although they both failed to achieve electoral success, the ideological shift in Lebanon away from the previous March 8 and 14 camps was now complete as the parties that made up both camps collaborated to crush the burgeoning ‘Civil Movement’. It was clear to all now that the deep corruption found in Lebanese politics was not a result of one or the other party, but that it was systemic and reinforced by all the current parties. This gave rise to the current slogan of “All of them means all of them”.

An Uprising Begins

It is on these ideological fault lines that the spontaneous uprising began last Friday. People took to the streets in a show of solidarity never before seen. protests and reclamations of public space took place not only in the capital Beirut but in all major coastal cities and smaller inland ones. The makeup of the attendees extended well beyond the intellectual and middle-class makeup of previous movements, it was all-encompassing and spread across confessional lines each city chanting in support of the other — a most unusual and inspiring occurrence considering the geographic division of Lebanon across sectarian lines. As such, a salute to another city was not just seen as comradery across geographic boundaries, but across sectarian ones as well. It’s also worth highlighting that although a few occurrences of violence and vandalism took place the protests were largely peaceful.

The following days saw an intensification of the protests with more and more people showing up to demonstrations with an estimate of a million and a half participants being suggested by Reuters. This time, the demonstrations were jubilant with music, dancing, and DJ’s and fireworks at night.

There was an attempt for current political parties to subvert the protest with each party leader calling for the participation of their supporters while at the same time accusing other parties of ineffectiveness and unwillingness to cooperate. The Prime Minister, in a much-awaited speech, proclaimed a 72-hour deadline for parties to come together to find a solution to the crisis — playing dumb to the known fact that they themselves are the crisis.

In an amazing display of popular democracy though, and in response to the attempts at subverting the demonstration, protestors immediately forbade the display of any party flags and even expelled several politicians and known media personalities with party affiliations from the spaces they have reclaimed. The message was simple, you had decades of uninterrupted rule, it’s our turn now.

After the 72 Hours

Today, the 72-hour deadline placed by the Prime Minister ended and he gave a televised announcement of a ministerial agreement on major concessions. What he thought was a winning strategy of appeasement immediately backfired against him.

The 72-hours proved to be indispensable to the organizational capacity of the uprising as, shortly after the Prime Ministers speech, and through a press conference, a group of people from a tent in the middle of the protests in the capital announced their ascendance into a leadership position of the uprising and unequivocally rejected the concessions and making it clear that they will accept nothing short than 1) the resignation of the government and 2) the formation of a smaller body of technocratic representative who will 3) draft a new electoral law that kills the confessional system that has plagued Lebanon since its independence.

The emergence of a revolutionary leadership made up of members of the ‘Civil Movement’ and others signifies a major and most promising transformation in this revolutionary process providing a shift from reactive uprising to a direct power confrontation between the government and the revolutionary movement. It is now the time of dual power.

There is no doubt that with the emergence of a revolutionary leadership and the announcement of concessions there will also be an intensification of counter-revolutionary activity from party members as their leaders mobilise them to suppress the uprising since a successful revolution would implode their raison d’etre. This makes this the most intense of existential battles.

The Burden of Leadership

The success and failure of this revolutionary movement rests on the shoulders of its self-proclaimed leaders. The army, assuming its historic role (in a Lebanese context), has made it clear that it will not tolerate any acts of violence against protestors, nor will it forcefully remove protestors or clear roadblocks. This alleviates fears of violent suppression from party members who are better organized and armed.

How successful the army will be in containing any and all violent actions against protestors is in doubt, especially in areas where the army historically has a weak presence. But their neutrality now confines this battle to one of legitimacy and the revolution coming out successful depends on its ability to keep the masses engaged and on its side.

So far, there is no sign of the mass movements subsiding and a general shut down of the country is expected for the sixth consecutive day. How things proceed from now will depend on the approach taken by the revolutionary leadership. They have already mentioned the organization of local organizational committees but it remains unclear if the role of these committees is just logistical as regards the demonstrations themselves or if it has any representative or executive functions which will directly challenge the authority of the government and claim itself as the legitimate voice of the people.

There is also an economic component to all of this. Time acts against revolutionaries as a prolongation of strikes starts having adverse impacts on the material lives of protestors as shortages of food and fuel emerge. Party leaders in bed with bank executives and major employers will also do all in their power to force workers to return to their offices or to make peoples lives difficult as a way to delegitimize the revolutionary movement. The success of this revolution then lays not just in the maintenance of the current state of civil disobedience but in its intensification.

Whether or not the leadership committee will seek a path of intensification, or what the new revolutionary structure may look like and its role are all items of conjecture at this stage. What is known though is that this revolutionary movement has already earned its place in history and if successful will be known as the revolution that finally ended the Lebanese Civil War.