Submerged by the raucous and misdirected debate on Rafale and the intended purchase of 110 additional advanced fighter jets, the strategic and operational logic for the acquisitions have not been widely and correctly understood. Rafale and the 110 fighter jets are essential if India is serious about supplementing its posture of credible and proactive deterrence with matching capability and the ability to coerce and punish adversaries should the need arise.

India’s national security responses across the spectrum of conflict have generally remained in the zone of deterrence and seldom crossed the line and entered the realm of coercion and punishment. This has been rationalised as subscribing to a policy of restraint and responsibility. Some truth, however, lies in the proposition offered by Christine Fair recently that India lacks the firepower to punish adversaries and force them to change their behaviour. She argues that Pakistan has grasped this reality and continues to prosecute an effective proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir.

The Indian army has faced huge challenges in terms of indigenisation across the spectrum of equipment, specialist clothing and ordnance and much of the cutting edge equipment used by special forces, its primary punitive and coercive arm, is imported. Even if one looks at artillery, of the three guns that allow the army to engage an adversary at long distances and inflict serious punishment, two are outright imports (Bofors and M777), while the third is a collaborative gun (K9 Vajra).

The navy has creditably been at the forefront of indigenisation, however, there is a clear operational reason why it has had the luxury of adequate lead time for design, development and production of indigenous platforms. For some decades now, there has been a growing asymmetry in the maritime domain between the Indian navy (IN) and the Pakistan navy – almost 50+ combatant platforms versus 7-8 – and this has given IN adequate breathing space to concentrate on indigenisation. Notwithstanding the growing numerical asymmetry between the PLAN (Chinese Navy) and IN, the operational equation in the Indian Ocean Region heavily favours IN because of the Malaccan dilemma that confronts the Chinese if they want to project naval power into the Indian Ocean.

In a short, high-intensity and limited conflict, or even a short-of-war situation that demands punitive action or punishment, the principal warfighting tools that have the maximum potential to inflict punishment on an adversary and influence operational outcomes are cutting edge air power platforms. These can be used either independently, or in conjunction with special forces in counterforce, decapitation or ‘surgical strike’ missions. All leading powers have such capabilities and it is in this context that one must look at platforms like the Rafale and the 110 advanced fighter jets as this coercive and punitive element within a larger force.

The SU-30 MKI is a wonderful aerial warfighting platform with good precision capability; it will be the workhorse of the IAF for some decades but cannot be overburdened with specific punitive or punishment roles. The Tejas in large numbers could be nurtured as an effective platform for local air defence, effective battlefield air strikes and interdiction close to the land battle area. With alarm bells ringing that point at the decline in the number of fighter squadrons perilously to levels that PAF can match, and being outstripped a long way by the PLAAF (Chinese air force), India must take a strategic call about speedily building coercive capability and then exercise it with necessary political will.

Operation Parakram following the Parliament attack in December 2001 did see political will from Atal Bihari Vajpayee to engage in coercive action, but the lack of credible punitive capability prevented him from going the whole way despite having a set of aggressive field commanders led by General Padmanabhan. In more recent times the reluctance to follow through with more ‘surgical strikes’, or stall continued Chinese build-up in Doklam is as much a reflection of lack in coercive and punitive capability, as it is of lack of clarity in terms of where does India stand on the deterrence, coercive and punitive ladder. Acquisition of the Rafale, 110 fighters, sniper rifles, night vision devices and reinforced bullet proof jackets must be part of a larger strategic makeover if India wants to be a power of significant consequence and impact.