There has never been a better time to be the NFL. And, oh yeah, the opposite.

On one hand, it's a marketing and money colossus, generating about $10 billion annually, with its eye on much more. Roger Goodell has set a goal of $25 billion in revenue by 2027. (Best not to think what a trip to the stadium with your friends—or a jersey for your son—will cost in a decade.) And why not be ambitious? The average value of a franchise grew 23% last year.

On the other, it's slow, ham-handed response to a variety of social and health issues (player violence and concussions, in particular) have called attention to significant risks that will remain even when the current crisis over abuse of women and children subsides.

The events of the past week-plus have called out those weaknesses and raise the question, "Is this NFL Maximus?"

Well sure, says Scott Rosner, a sports business professor at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School.

"The NFL sits perched on the mountaintop of sports today," he said. "It's the biggest sports league, by far.

"Like any other business, you wonder how long it can stay there? And there are examples of sports that were once No. 1. Baseball was No. 1, now it's a distant No. 2, and it's been that way for 40 years now."

Rosner points out that boxing and horse racing were once the biggest sports in the country. Now, except for maybe seven days a year, they are virtually irrelevant to the national sports conversation. That lesson, that nothing stays the same forever, is not lost on the NFL.

"Every day, the league is looking for ways to grow," he says, "to stave off competition."

So, if the NFL is No. 1, what should the NFL's owners do about it?

Here's one, perhaps surprising, answer: Purchase Major League Soccer. Lock, stock, and shin guards. Right now.

To explain why the NFL would do this, let's look at a very different business for some guidance.

Until the 1980s, selling cigarettes in the United States was a very lucrative thing, generating billions upon billions of dollars in profit. But the increasing awareness of the dangers of smoking starting in the 1970s led to an onslaught of lawsuits and ultimately to a settlement between Big Tobacco (including R.J. Reynolds, Phillip Morris, and Lorillard) and the U.S. government, in 1998.

Big Tobacco agreed to pay nearly a quarter of a trillion dollars over 25 years (and beyond) to aid states in caring for the victims of smoking, as well as to pay for efforts to squelch any influx of new users.

That would have been a catastrophe if the cigarette makers had remained the companies they were in the '60s and '70s. But they were smarter than that, and they hedged against the eventual settlement by diversifying their holdings. Mostly, they bought into the food business.

In 1985, RJR merged with Nabisco Brands and Phillip Morris bought General Foods; in 1988, Phillip Morris bought Kraft.

These acquisitions, financed with the billions in reserves that the companies had, kept them solvent—and profitable—even after the now highly regulated and closely watched cigarette business faltered and they started paying a collective $6 billion a year into the settlement.

And it put them in a business where their experience as marketers was valuable—though its effect on our collective waistlines might make you wish they'd merely stuck that cash in a CD for the next 50 years.

Let's not get carried away here. Cigarettes—and the companies that have traditionally sold them—are still around. In fact, you can buy them easily (though CVS recently stopped selling all tobacco products) and they will be for years. But their revenues have dropped greatly, and the industry has a $6 billion annual mortgage eating away its profits. The golden days, alas, are over (and, cough-cough, good riddance).

So you might ask, what in the heck is the NFL supposed to take away from that mini-history lesson? In a word, diversify.

Likewise, the NFL is not going anywhere; it will be the most prominent, lucrative sports league in the United States for years to come.

But it's possible that the NFL will never control a greater share of our discretionary dollars and fan goodwill than it does today. Because:

- it doesn't have a new TV contract negotiation until 2022. Media rights account for about half of that $10 billion annually, and that won't be changing markedly until then. Also, Rosner points out that oversaturation of media, TV especially, is a concern.

- it has already set aside $675 million to settle players claims regarding concussions, and relaxed the cap on that fund this summer, bowing to the realities of its exposure. How bad is their exposure? Last week, a report commissioned by the players union claimed that NFL players have a 30% chance of developing Alzheimer's or dementia in their lives, about twice the national average. There are 5.2 million Alzheimer victims today, and the direct costs of caring for them in 2014 will be an estimated $214 billion. That's more than $40,000 per person. (According to the 2011 MetLife Mature Market Institute's Survey of Long-Term Care Costs, the average cost of a semi-private room in a nursing home is $78,110 per year. Take that annual rate, multiply it by all the living players who have ever played in the NFL, multiply it by .3, and you have one big number.)

- a 2013 ESPN report on youth football participation saw a 9.5% decline between 2010 and 2012. It was the biggest dropoff over two years since Pop Warner started tracking participation decades ago. Pop Warner's chief medical officer, Dr. Julian Bailes, said the perceived risk of head injuries was "the No. 1 cause" of the decline.

- it has a persistent off-field violence problem that could very well cut into the 45% of its fan base that are female—which is its clear differentiator from other pro sports leagues—as well as guys who can't stomach the off-field behavior and on-field risk that plays out before them on Sundays, and Mondays and Thursdays and Saturdays.

Each of the problems can be addressed. But taken together, it's not unthinkable that the league's popularity is at what the petroleum industry calls "peak oil"—the high point of production. If stadiums don't sell out, if the best young athletes stop playing football and move to basketball, soccer, or baseball because their parents won't let them, if the NFL's ability to attract a live TV audience diminishes even a little bit due to new viewing patterns … well then, the NFL could use a hedge to secure its ever-growing ambitions.

Luckily, there's one right under their noses: Major League Soccer.

Once a financial basket case, MLS has been on a 6-year tear. Per-game attendance now surpasses that of the NBA and NHL. The league has 19 teams, will add two more next season, and plans to have 24 by 2020. It has a new TV deal that tripled its annual revenue to $90 million annually ($7 million more than NBC is paying for the rights to the English Premier League). The average value of franchises is now well over $100 million. That's impressive, but, keep it in perspective; according to Forbes' annual rankings, the average NFL franchise is worth $1.43 billion.

What the MLS doesn't have is a large television audience, elite marketing muscle, and big-league facilities in every market.

I wonder who could help with all that?

Perhaps best of all, the MLS has a unique business structure. It's a single entity, and team owners are investors. Think of them as franchisees, with control of their team's operating rights. An acquisition could be relatively quick and painless. (OK, not quick and painless. The NFL is not a single entity; the league's power resides with the team owners and they would need to sign on—and pony up billions—to make it happen. And then it would have to survive all sorts of scrutiny. But let's play this out for a couple more minutes.)

Above all, it would be sensible—and potentially very profitable. It would provide the NFL with a new growth industry, in line with its expertise and without some of the constraints and issues of its main line of business (concussions could become an MLS issue, but it's unlikely to be as large an issue it is in football; youth participation in soccer isn't an issue). It also internationalizes the portfolio, which Rosner says is one of the NFL's biggest challenges.

"In the world today, we can follow any team that plays anywhere in the world. Just look at the success of the English Premier League," he says. "The NFL has played overseas, but it's an area where they have struggled.

"They're on it, though, and in 10 years it's likely you'll have an expansion team, at least, in London. Growing internationally is a long-term proposition, and part of a much larger strategy to grow the business."

So imagine the interest in a U.S.-based soccer league that used NFL money to chase after the biggest stars in the game. Think international audiences would tune in? Think there might be cross-sport promotions running during those telecasts to sell them on futbol Americano, too?

For the MLS, being acquired would provide capital and access to world-class facilities and a marketing organization that could provide a playbook on how to grow a multi-billion-dollar sports league. It would be a booster rocket propelling the league a decade forward instantaneously.

From a business standpoint, the two very different leagues could reduce overhead for administration and facilities and open the doors to a world of "bundled" opportunities—for sponsors, advertisers, perhaps even a combined football-and-soccer cable channel that had no extended offseason.

Standing atop the sports world, and a goodly chunk of American popular culture and business, maybe the NFL doesn't think it needs a hedge. And they might be right. But what if they're wrong? Do they want to be cornered into flagging or flat revenue growth by issues bigger than their stewardship of their game alone?

They could do worse than to buy the upstart outdoors sports league with an organic global footprint, a complimentary schedule, and a lot of momentum behind it.

Kevin Donahue Kevin is the Senior Managing Editor for Online at Men's Health.

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