By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Sep 1st 2016 18:22Z, last updated Monday, Dec 18th 2017 17:25Z A Germania Airbus A321-200, registration D-ASTP performing flight ST-3700 from Dusseldorf (Germany) to Fuerteventura,CI (Spain) with 215 passengers and 7 crew, was on approach to Fuerteventura's runway 01 at 09:36L (08:36Z), went around but touched down hard causing a vertical acceleration of about +3.5G. Following a traffic circuit the aircraft landed without further incident and taxied to the apron.



The aircraft performed the return flight ST-3701 to Dusseldorf on schedule becoming airborne again 90 minutes after touchdown. Only after landing in Dusseldorf substantial damage to the landing gear as well as creases in the fuselage, indicative of substantial structural damage, were found.



The Aviation Herald learned of this occurrence on Aug 20th 2016 and immediately sent an inquiry to Germany's BFU, who replied on Aug 22nd 2016, that they are not aware of the occurrence, they are going to collect information and shall report back when further information becomes available. No further communication occurred.



On Sep 1st 2016 The Aviation Herald learned via other Accident Investigation Authorities, that the BFU had disseminated information about the accident to them. The BFU rated the occurrence an accident (indicative of substantial structural damage to the aircraft).



The airline subsequently stated to other media - there was no information sent to The Aviation Herald - that the aircraft suffered a hard landing at Fuerteventura indeed, during a go around the aircraft made brief contact with the runway. Following landing the crew performed a walk around and informed maintenance, neither examination revealed any damage. A G-load of 3.5G could not be found. Therefore the return flight was performed on schedule. Following return to Dusseldorf no structural damage was found, the airline however decided as a precaution in consultation with the gear manufacturer to replace the landing gear, which was scheduled for later the year anyway. The airline informed all relevant authorities about the occurrence without any delay.



The occurrence aircraft returned to service on Sep 2nd 2016, 48 days after the occurrence.



On Nov 23rd 2016 Germany's BFU released their July Bulletin stating that the aircraft touched down hard encountering a vertical acceleration of +3.3G on first approach, the crew initiated a go-around and performed another approach and landed without further incident. There were no injuries. The BFU, representing the country of operator and registration of aircraft, is assisting the investigating accident investigation body.



On Nov 23rd 2016 Spain's CIAIAC lists the occurrence in their active investigations, however, did not yet release any detail.



On Dec 20th 2016 the CIAIAC reported that the aircraft received substantial damage. The aircraft had been on an ILS approach to Fuerteventura's runway 01 when the crew reported they had gone around due to the approach becoming unstable on short final and abnormal contact with the runway. The aircraft then performed a visual circuit and landed on runway 01 without further incident 9 minutes later. The aircraft departed for the return flight 83 minutes after landing. Only in Dusseldorf the aircraft was taken out of service after substantial damage to the landing gear caused by the abnormal runway contact was found. The CIAIAC is investigating the occurrence.



On Aug 8th 2017 the CIAIAC released a provisional statement indicating the investigation is still on going. The CIAIAC reported that the crew had gone around after the aircraft became unstable on short final and an abnormal runway contact had occurred. The aircraft positioned for another approach and landed without further incident. A subsequent walk around by the crew did not reveal any damage, the commander contacted the airline's maintenance to assist with the assessment of the aircraft's automatic hard landing report. Due to lack of maintenance support at Fuerteventura as well as lack of any parameters suggesting gear damage the crew decided to perform the return flight. After landing in Dusseldorf the aircraft was taken out of service, a first notice of the occurrence to authorities was submitted on Aug 30th 2016, however, information about the severity of the occurrence and the damge did not arrive until the first two weeks in November 2016. The flight data recorder shows a hard landing at +3.32G resulting in substantial damage to the left main gear leg and its shock absorber. In addition the right hand gear leg's shock absorber needed to be replaced, too. The investigation is nearly completed, a final report is about to be published soon.



On Dec 18th 2017 Spain's CIAIAC released their final report concluding the probable causes were:



The serious incident was caused by the performance of an unstabilized final approach, resulting from a decrease in airspeed and falling below the glide slope, as well as from the late decision to execute a go-around.



Contributing to the incident is the fact that the maneuver was performed without automatic systems to control the airplanes attitude/flight path or thrust.



The decision made after the event to continue to operate the airplane with passengers was risky and unsafe, and resulted from an incorrect assessment of the seriousness of the hard landing.



The CIAIAC reported Airbus as well as Safran Landing Systems, after assessment of the data off the flight data recorder, recommended:



a) Left main gear: the main fitting experienced excessive loads and is not serviceable. Replace the shock absorber subassembly, including the sliding tube, which is not serviceable due to excessive loads. All other components can be returned to service after the hard landing inspection. No other findings.



b) Right main gear: replace the shock absorber subassembly, including the sliding tube, which is not serviceable due to excessive loads. All other components can be returned to service after the hard landing inspection. No other findings.



c) Wheels, axle sleeves, brakes and tires: can be returned to service after the hard landing inspection. No other findings. The brake fans should also be checked in a functional test before being returned to service.



The CIAIAC analysed:



The copilot, along with the captain, who had an instructor rating, decided to make the approach with thrust and control in manual. This resulted in a go-around after making contact with the runway. Until that moment, the flight had been uneventful. During the final approach phase, the approach unstabilized, primarily due to a drop in speed and to the airplane falling too low, and the captain executed a go-around.



The aircraft touched the runway surface at a slight nose-up angle and zero bank angle, but at a high descent rate, resulting in a hard landing. The airplane went to the air and the crew flew a visual circuit to make a new ILS approach to runway 01 again, this time with the automatic systems engaged.



The captain spoke with the Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) in Berlin to assess the damage to the aircraft and determine its operability. The aircraft automatically generated and sent, via ACARS, an A15 hard-landing report to the companys control center and to the manufacturer.



The joint decision was made to go ahead with the return flight with passengers, with that flight departing half an hour behind schedule. Once at the destination, the airplane was grounded (AOG).



The event was not reported for over a month, and the inquiry to ascertain its seriousness and significance took an additional two months, after which the event was deemed to have been a serious incident and an investigation was opened.



The flight crew, consisting of a highly experienced captain with an instructor rating, and a copilot who was still undergoing line training, decided to attempt the approach and landing in Fuerteventura with the airplanes automation systems disengaged, with the controls and thrust being operated manually. The weather conditions at the destination did not pose any difficulties, and the crew had even visually evaluated the runway and the displaced threshold.



The final approach, with the copilot at the controls and the captain as the pilot monitoring, unstabilized gradually but continuously, with the airplanes flight path falling below the glide slope as its vertical descent rate increased. The captains instructions did not manage to correct these conditions, and he ended up taking control and initiating a go-around. The captains action to take control was somewhat delayed. It should be noted that the operator has already proposed and implemented some corrective actions (Point 1.17  Organizational and management information) to better define and regulate flying without automatic systems.



Thanks to the level attitude of the airplane upon contacting/impacting the ground, with a small nose-up angle on the order of 2º and a zero bank angle, the damage to the airplane was limited to the structural components of the landing gear, as the overload was spread out evenly to both legs of the landing gear. There was no visible damage to the landing gear components.



Due to its physical effects, the crew realized that they had had a hard landing, and the captain apologized to the passengers and explained to them what had happened as they waited to be disembarked. But the crew did not have any conclusive data on the seriousness and significance of the overload sustained by the aircraft, so the incorrect decision was made to make the return flight with passengers.



On the one hand the crew did not know how to find the A15 hard landing report in the airplane, and on the other the detailed exterior inspection of the airplane on the ground yielded no findings. The operator did not have maintenance support in Fuerteventura, and the most important means of support for the safe operation of the airplane, which should have been consulting with the Maintenance Operations Center at the operators main base, did not provide any assistance to the crew.



Without going into details on why the crew support structure did not work at a remote aerodrome, and why no local maintenance support was available, what is certain is that the interpretation of the data in the A15 report was delayed. As a result, the suitability of the airplane to remain in service could not be evaluated in time, and the less safe, though most economic, decision was made to make the return flight with passengers. Because of this, a safety recommendation is issued to the operator, Germania, to have it improve the aptitude of its MOC personnel to ensure they provide correct support so that safe decisions are made in every aerodrome at all hours of operation.



Metars:

GCFV 161000Z 05011KT CAVOK 27/16 Q1015=

GCFV 160930Z 04009KT CAVOK 27/18 Q1015=

GCFV 160900Z 05006KT 020V090 CAVOK 26/18 Q1015=

GCFV 160830Z 04007KT CAVOK 26/16 Q1015=

GCFV 160800Z 02008KT CAVOK 26/15 Q1014=

GCFV 160730Z 01005KT 340V040 CAVOK 25/13 Q1014=

GCFV 160700Z VRB01KT CAVOK 23/17 Q1014=

GCFV 160630Z 03004KT CAVOK 22/16 Q1014=

GCFV 160600Z 03005KT CAVOK 23/16 Q1014=

GCFV 160530Z 02004KT 340V040 CAVOK 23/14 Q1013=

GCFV 160500Z 03003KT 010V070 CAVOK 23/14 Q1013=





