When John Boehner was asked by reporters what he would do after stepping down as speaker of the House of Representatives and resigning his seat in Congress, he answered: “I have no idea.”

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When he is ready to decide, like most former members of Congress and high-ranking members of the executive branch, he will not be short of lucrative options. Offers to become an investment banker, lobbyist or corporate advisor are likely to roll in, as they have to retired politicians for ages – including to Boehner’s predecessor, Dennis Hastert, who went on to work for the Washington law firm and lobbying group Dickstein Shapiro, and his former deputy, Eric Cantor, who is now vice-chairman of the investment bank Moelis & Company.

But for any of these companies, Boehner would be a terrible investment.

We looked at the hiring of politically connected directors – both members of the House of Lords, called Lords, and the House of Commons, called MPs – by British banks during the three decades before the first world war. We found that the appointment of connected directors – even high-profile MPs – did not increase shareholder value.

In fact, the appointment of MPs to directorships had a negative effect on bank equity returns. To make matters worse, bank equity took a hit when its directors were elected to parliament – there were no rules against that sort of double dipping back then – but did not suffer when directors lost elections, or even when they died while in office.

Why, then, did banks continue to appoint connected directors in ever greater numbers as the 19th century wore on? It might have been a way for banks to buy “prestige”, similar to purchasing expensive art for the firm’s walls, or as a way of distinguishing itself from rivals. As they matured and prospered, acquiring an MP or a lord may have been the next item on the firm’s bucket list.

It’s not difficult to abstract our research to today to see why a corporation would be willing to pay large sums to House or Senate alumni or to a former member of the administration. They may bring some knowledge or experience that is relevant to the firm’s operation – either specific know-how about the business or more general expertise in organization, management or logistics. The presence of a high-level politician on the board might also reassure the firm’s customers and financiers, who are often swayed by name recognition and therefore more likely to buy the firm’s products, lend money or buy its stock.

Ex-politicians may also be appealing hires because they can influence politicians or regulators in ways that may allow the company to profit from loopholes or personal connections. The US firms that rely heavily on sales to governments for revenue tend to hire politically experienced directors.

And it’s also not difficult to see why such an offer would appeal to Boehner. It is not uncommon to see retired politicians serving on the multiple boards and earning over a million dollars a year, far above his low-six-figure congressional salary.

Nonetheless, historical precedent suggests that society would be better off if ex-politicians did not retire from Capitol Hill cloakrooms to corporate boardrooms.

It might be safer to just buy that Monet for the lobby than to invest in a former speaker of the House.