The first argument of the author is "I like Keynesian policies"! The supporting argument that "since the monetary union’s launch in 1999, Germany has recorded some of the eurozone’s lowest rates of GDP and productivity growth," is nonsense! Who said that there has to be growth? The constant need for growth, embedded in the global monetary system, is what causes the perpetual dependence on new credit creation (to replace previous credit retraction on loan repayment), and thus the dependence on banks.



It is perfectly legitimate for an economy, as well functioning as the German, to slow down on growth and to support with its surpluses slowing wages not to lose much in purchasing power parity (PPP). Considering the 5.2% unemployment rate the article mentions, German economy ***is*** booming and is a gigantic success in its handling of the crisis and its population's cohesion, which cannot be said for those attempting to challenge Germany's attitude toward the economy.



The second argument of the author, which he calls "second German illusion", is that the real problem in eurozone (no banking union) is not helped by German attitude. This is correct. The choice of Keynesian or monetarist values in member fiscal policy cannot and will not be made by treaties. The argument of Germany for fiscal consolidation in eurozone governments, before going forward with the full banking union is legitimate. The idea that this can go forward with putting the rules on deficit in the constitutions of eurozone countries is misguided and leads to increasing disillusion of populations regarding the euro. It is an illusion to think that treaties and constitutions can force political choices in democratic countries. Maastricht treaty is deeply flawed, in that its public debt and deficit provisions are fiscal choices, which cannot be stringent conditionalities imposed to democratic member countries. There can be a democratically decided strategy about them, but even this strategy cannot be pre-decided against all future events to come!



The only way forward for eurozone is the formulation of a deeply democratic eurozone treasury, whose role would be to set fiscal strategy for eurozone, not necessarily in a uniform way across countries, and not serving only the interests of the strongest countries', but deciding the for the whole of eurozone, among equals. All parties of all countries must be represented in this democratic decision making body, according to each country's democratic institutions. The democratic formulation of this eurozone treasury-parliament *must not* preclude changes in the democratic institutions of member countries.



The third argument of the author is completely flawed, and is mistakenly attributed both to illusion and to Germans (even more provoking the author attributes illusion to Germany and not to some or many Germans!). Eurozone crisis is because of the euro and because of the undemocratic, treaty-based mandate of the ECB, which takes away sovereign power to print money (this could not be otherwise in a common currency), but does not replace it with an obligation to solidarity among eurozone countries. An internal market needs to be formed for sovereign debt. This market should be among countries (or among countries and the ECB), and should be backed by Eurobonds.



Furthermore, the hard-currency trajectory of the ECB, needs to become subject to the same deeply democratic eurozone treasury-parliament, I described above. Central banks and *non-elected* central bankers should be accountable and should have its mandate democratically defined, and not fixed and decided among bankers. Central banks should *only* have, so called, instrument independence, and European strong countries and elites should abandon their treaty-based attempts for undemocratic central bank goal independence. Central bank goals cannot be imposed on the basis of member country veto power. They need to be fully democratized, even if this requires putting in place institutional provisions for member state exit, if countries choose so.