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Quote of the week:

“The earth — its cities and its forests in particular — is like a well-laid fire. If you light it with enough nuclear matches, it will burn, and as it burns it will fill the atmosphere with smoke and plunge much of the world into a frigid darkness for several months.” — Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (1984).

I salute Women’s Action for New Directions and Woman’s Legislators Lobby for convening women state legislators to lend impetus to the prevention of mushroom clouds on battlefields. They have assembled under the banner of No First Use. No First Use is crucial, because first use will be followed by second use, perhaps very quickly, given how spring-loaded nuclear postures are. Then all hell can break loose.

Whatever issue matters most to you, that issue is imperiled by mushroom clouds. I endorse No First Use, but wonder whether it is the right rallying cry. Please bear with me.

The prevention of battlefield use of nuclear weapons has been the most profound, unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War. No one expected success, not even the early conceptualizers of deterrence theory. Deterrence alone didn’t prevent battlefield use because deterrence is dangerous and is subject to breakdowns. Reassurance was as important as deterrence in preventing mushroom clouds, but there were still many close calls.

And yet we survived, so far, without nuclear war. There are many reasons for this success — hard diplomatic work, trust building, deterrence, plain dumb luck and perhaps divine intervention. The norm of non-battlefield use has now held for almost three-quarters of a century. The national leader that breaks this norm and uses nuclear weapons first will live in infamy for as long as there is recorded history.

Every useful step in reducing nuclear dangers as well as reducing the salience and numbers of nuclear weapons depends on the absence of mushroom clouds. Success in protecting this norm can compensate for failures on other fronts.

Crucial norms have succeeded even as treaties have fallen by the wayside. Nuclear arms control was conceived in the early 1960s. It was designed to be about stabilization, but it devolved into a numbers game, much to the disappointment of some of its conceptualizers, like Thomas Schelling. Because it was a numbers game and because harsh critics didn’t trust the process, the numbers became increasingly complex. Treaties became hundreds of pages long with dense paragraphs of fine print. The more complex the numbers got, the longer it took to negotiate them and the easier it was for critics that opposed lower numbers to take aim.

The era of numbers-based nuclear arms control is on life support. I’ve argued elsewhere that it is important to try to extend the numbers we’ve got (New START). Whether or not Donald Trump can be convinced of the wisdom of doing so, what do we do next?

In my book in progress, thankfully supported by the MacArthur Foundation, I argue that a new plan is needed, one that brings in other regional nuclear powers. Success is more likely by placing norms rather than numbers front and center. Demanding that China join the United States and Russia is a numbers-based treaty at this stage is a snare and a dodge. But we can bring Beijing into a norms-based approach. And if we can bring China in, India and Pakistan can follow.

What would a norms-based approach look like? The most important norm is no mushroom clouds. To reinforce this norm, the norm of no nuclear testing is also central. Every test — and there have been almost 2,000 during the Cold War — was an advertisement of potential use.

The norm of not demonstrating prowess through nuclear testing, like the norm of no battlefield use, is taking hold. The Soviet Union stopped testing in 1990. The United States stopped in 1992. China stopped in 1996. India and Pakistan started and stopped in 1998, over two decades ago. The passage of time without testing doesn’t foreclose resumption, but makes this decision harder for national leaders.

A new 21st Century plan can succeed if it’s built around these two norms. Subsidiary norms can lend reinforcement. Norm building can be reaffirmed by treaties. Their entry into force is to be sought and welcomed, but norms can still be strengthened absent entry into force. Numbers can also be utilized to back up norms, but without norms, the numbers might provide only cold comfort and would be hard to draw down. The longer key norms are observed, the more they facilitate the draw down of numbers — with or without treaties.

Amidst our cries of lamentation, it’s worth remembering that every day, month and year that passes without the use and testing of nuclear weapons constitutes a victory because the passage of time raises the bar for potential norm breakers.

I know that questions have lately been raised about whether Russia has tested nuclear devices below detectable yields. If the U.S. Intelligence Community has a credible case in this regard, it can defend this assertion against an intense inquiry by independent technical experts. Color me skeptical, given the U.S. Intelligence Community’s prior record of being wrong about declaring testing violations. This is one more mess — and a rather minor one, at that — to be cleaned up after the Trump administration moves on to the trash heap of history.

One reason why abolition campaigns run out of gas is that the focus of effort is, by design, on the end state. The sooner the proposed end state for abolition, the more politically unrealistic it seems; the more distant the end state, the easier it becomes to be dismissive. In contrast, with a norms-based approach, success happens every day, every month, and every year without battlefield use and testing. We succeeded yesterday. We can succeed today. And tomorrow. A norms-based approach lends itself to success far more than one based on complex numbers and an ideal end state.

What do we call this most important norm? What bumper sticker lends itself to growing public support and makes rebuttals harder?

In my view, “No First Use” isn’t the right frame. It’s too wonky. Rebuttals are easy, beginning with the obvious one: Russia doesn’t accept No First Use. Pakistan won’t accept No First Use, either. India is backing away from it. Why does embracing this make the United States safer? See what I mean?

No First Use is a doctrinal issue. Doctrinal debates don’t expand public support. And besides, nuclear orthodoxy usually wins doctrinal debates. Just ask Obama administration officials who sought doctrinal change.

What bumper sticker would be better than No First Use? My thinking is still evolving, and could use more feedback. For now, the slogan “No Use” works best for me. It’s readily understandable. It’s simple and hard to rebut. It’s not about doctrine; it’s about common sense and public safety. Opponents have to explain why a deterrent strategy based on threatening use is a sound idea, which places them on the defensive, particularly when seeking weapon systems that seem particularly oriented toward battlefield use.

“Weapons of last resort” is also better than No First Use, in my view, in part because the George H.W. Bush administration blessed these words. But this formulation is less succinct, and it doesn’t have the useful double entendre effect of “No Use.” Do we expand our congregation by arguing doctrine or common sense? If we wish to grow our ranks beyond those already committed, “No Use” seems a better way to go.

No state possessing nuclear weapons wants to use them on battlefields. Every state’s nuclear enclave would like to resume nuclear testing, but with every passing year, it will be harder to do this. A new, norms-based 21st Century plan to reduce nuclear dangers and weapons can be successfully built around these two norms.