Forty years ago, China began its era of reform. After the disaster and devastation of Maoism, Deng Xiaoping announced that China was opening up, especially to the West. His reforms were wildly successful, made possible by a new acceptance of free market principles and growing diplomatic ties that have helped China, with its thriving economy, become a burgeoning world power.

On Tuesday, the anniversary of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party where Deng announced the reforms in 1978, Chinese President Xi Jinping laid out his vision for China, one that is less modeled on western liberalization than on China charting its own course.

In some respects, Xi echoed Deng’s plan championing reform and honoring the success of his predecessors vision. But the China of 2018 is not the China of 1978. Where Deng had proposed working through territorial disputes and pushing for greater liberalization even at the expense of Communist Party control, Xi emphasized that neither the United States nor anyone else would call the shots for China. As Xi explained, per SupChina editor Jeremy Goldkorn’s translation, “Nobody can be the teacher master of the Chinese People.”

Xi also made clear that despite hopes for a more conciliatory approach to the ongoing trade spat with Washington, China would not be looking for more free market reforms. Instead, he seemed to reverse course of much of the policy Deng had championed, calling for more CCP control of society and the economy telling viewers, “On the road ahead, we must unswervingly consolidate and develop the publicly owned economy.”

On international relations, Xi reaffirmed Beijing’s current outward looking stance making clear that signature projects like the Belt and Road Initiative would remain at the forefront of policy.

Perhaps the most evident legacy pioneered by Deng Xiaoping on display, however, was the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to continually evolve. When Deng broke with Mao’s commitment to communism, he staked the legitimacy of the party not on its ideological commitments but on the success of its policies. Calling it “socialism with Chinese characteristics” he demonstrated that with a little rhetorical slight of hand, the CCP could easily adapt, so long as the result was prosperity.

That is an inescapable legacy for the modern CCP, despite Xi Jinping’s own resurgent emphasis on Marxist-Leninist principles. Thanks to Deng, an adherence to principles above prosperity will no longer be enough for the party to remain legitimate in the eyes of the people.

Xi knows this and has repeatedly legitimized his own position and the power of the CCP on the grounds of its success, telling the story of China’s development of one made possible because of the guidance of its leaders – guidance that can only come from him and the CCP. Or, as Xi explained, “the party’s leadership over all tasks must be adhered to and the party’s leadership must be incessantly straightened and improved.”

This may ultimately prove problematic as Xi's policies of increasing state control are fundamentally at odds with the reforms that brought the rapid development of his country. And his ideas are likely to fail by the metrics of economic success established forty years ago.

But Washington shouldn't bet on China's failure.

For now, Xi remains in control, and for all of the potential long term problems, China’s economy remains strong, with an expanding international reach. That’s not going to change anytime soon and China has made clear that it's certainly not to easily bend to Washington's demands.