A Sikh LI Battalion (Source: Daily News)

Egged on by the same, boisterous, overconfident General who planned the ill-fated Operation Bluestar, General Sundarji, Rajiv Gandhi put boots on the ground in Sri Lanka with outdated maps and World War II era weapons — pitted against a competent, if somewhat undisciplined, force. The key strength of the LTTE however, lay in its’ local support. As Sepoy Govindan of the Madras Regiment put it, “everyone above the age of 10, was a combatant”. Girls as young as 6 were used as shields and grandmothers as old as 70 shot officers in the back.

In the beginning of October, it became evident that the LTTE was sabotaging negotiations and was preparing to fight the IPKF. General Sundarji, who had recently visited Sri Lanka, ordered Major General Harkirat Singh to come good on Sundarji’s promise of a “72 hour to 7 days” demolition of LTTE. The Major General was not up to the task; and honestly, there was no General officer who could be.

General Harkirat Singh had at his disposal, battalions which had almost no experience of Counter Insurgency (CI) operations, and he compounded his force’s weaknesses by making fatal errors at the beginning of the hostilities. He ordered a, clearly inadequate, two pronged attack on the Jaffna University on 12 October 1987 which was pegged back by a supremely well entrenched defensive force in the city of Jaffna (it would later require a five pronged attack, carried out by five full strength battalions). Undeterred by the high casualty rates, two days later he ordered an air-drop of special forces soldiers from 10 Para (SF) and the 13 Sikh LI (Light Infantry).

9 Para Commando, as 9 Para SF was known then, in Sri Lanka (Don’t own image rights)

Only a fifth of the intended forces were able to land in the first wave — 120 Special Forces men and 30 men from 13 Sikh LI, in the face of intense fire from the LTTE. The LTTE, having intercepted Indian communication, were lying in wait. All five M-8’s used in this mission were hit. Far from being an offensive mission, this now turned into a fight for survival. Soldiers of 13 Sikh LI were separated from 10 Para (SF) “in the fog of battle”. Of the 30 Sikh LI men, 29 were killed. The men of 10 Para (SF) fared better, as they were able to secure an old house as a defensive fortress, and reported 6 casualties. The bodies of a number of slain soldiers were never recovered. Eventually, soldiers of both these battalions had to be rescued by an armoured column reinforced with soldiers from 10 Para (SF).

“That was the foolishness of Major General Harkirat Singh. You don’t do a helicopter attack in full moonlight, after giving advance notice to the enemy” — JN Dixit, the Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka

The IPKF eventually had to abandon the idea of Chetaks or M-8’s running sorties as they couldn’t fly below 2000 feet without being shot at. LTTE snipers were wreaking havoc, on not only the land forces, but they managed to damage five choppers as well. The IPKF was forced to induct armor plated M-24’s.