WHEN experts try to ferret out the causes of America's lost decade, international trade is often cast as the villain. It may in fact be the victim. In the last decade America's commitment to openness has flagged, and with it, its trade prowess and its appeal as a destination for investment. As international trade and investment have historically been major drivers of productivity, employment, and innovation, this declining engagement with the world may be an important contributor to the malaise that afflicts the economy.

That, at least, is the upshot of an impressively detailed if troubling new report from the Council on Foreign Relations. America, it concludes, risks being left a bystander as the rest of the world integrates further.

The report was produced by a task force headed by Andy Card, the former chief of staff to George W. Bush, and Tom Daschle, former Democratic Senate leader. Its project leaders are Edward Alden of the Council and Matthew Slaughter of Dartmouth College. Task force members include academics, think tankers, and labour and corporate representatives with an interest in trade.

America's share of world exports has slipped more than that of most developed countries over the last decade while its share of direct investment has plummeted precipitously. Meanwhile, the number of export-related American jobs has stagnated and multinational companies are now expanding payroll overseas while cutting it in America, the reverse of their traditional pattern.

Conventional wisdom portrays footloose multinationals as the cause of these economic problems. The Council report instead fingers a growing ambivalence in America to openness. Trade has become increasingly politicised. Congress is increasingly reluctant to grant Trade Promotion Authority, or TPA (which enables a president to negotiate a trade pace that Congress can accept or reject but not amend).

After lapsing in 1994 it was renewed in 2002 by a single vote. Many of the deals George Bush pursued were deeply divisive, including the Central American Free Trade Agreement, and three—with Korea, Colombia and Panama—had not been voted on by the time Barack Obama came into office. Mr Obama has not made trade a priority and moved forward on the three leftover FTAs only after reopening negotiations to obtain further concessions, in effect violating the spirit of TPA.

Meanwhile, the rest of the world has raced ahead. Korea and the European Union now have a bilateral trade agreement. Brazil and Argentina will soon be joined by Canada in striking new deals with Colombia, to the detriment of American agricultural exports. Asian countries have concluded or are negotiating 300 trade deals among themselves that exclude America. All these negotiations matter for reasons beyond mere sales:

The United States cannot afford to be left behind, in part because such negotiations often establish the basis for product and other regulatory standards. By allowing the EU, in particular, to gain a first-move advantage, U.S. companies may find themselves forced to conform to European regulatory standards if they are to sell into the world's fastest growing markets.

The federal government is also lackadaisical in its practical support for trade. Less than 2% of its capital-goods exports received government export financing, compared to 3% to 8% in Germany, France and Canada. Meanwhile, America does seem to be on the losing end of the trade-dispute system. The World Trade Organisation is a marvel of international economic diplomacy but the report notes that America's frequent victories there are often “pyrrhic” because years may elapse before the WTO passes judgment, by which time other countries' unfair practices have already done their damage on American industry. What is the solution? The authors propose an ambitious “National Investment Initiative” alongside Obama's “National Export Initiative”. This would break down various domestic barriers to attracting foreign investment, the source of high-paying jobs, investment and innovation. Given their diagnosis of the problem this is a reasonable and ambitious prescription. But their vision involves promoting many individual policies that stand little chance in today's polarised political world, such as reducing the corporate income tax rate, ending the taxation of foreign-source income, encouraging more high-skilled immigration and spending more on infrastructure.

A warmer welcome will await their advice that America more aggressively punish other countries for unfair trade practices, either through the WTO or through its own authority to launch anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases, which has atrophied. This, they say, should be paired with efforts to open up foreign markets. This might have the benefit of persuading Americans, who have turned hostile to free trade, that they will not be played for chumps from further liberalisation. But while this might bring temporary breathing room to embattled industries, I doubt it will provide much lasting relief. Bringing more trade cases would push America onto shakier legal ground, increasing the odds it would lose, or provoke retaliation, or both. That would not leave the world better off.

More promising are the report's recommendations for approaching trade policy differently. The political capital invested in TPA has been wasted on too many small-bore trade deals that don't materially alter America's economic fortunes. Better, they say, to focus energy and capital on big ticket deals with major countries like India and Brazil. America should pursue more liberalisation in high-end services, where it is especially competitive, if not through the WTO then through a comprehensive services agreement with Japan, the EU and Canada. This is one policy on which Mr Obama and his Republican adversaries might actually find some common ground.