Now details of the life of Salman Abedi, the Manchester Arena bomber, are slowly emerging, many analysts will be struck by how many key aspects of his life are familiar from the profiles of previous terrorists. Officials and experts stress that there is no single path to extremist violence, but there are common factors in the background of others who have committed such appalling acts in recent years.



Youth

Abedi was 23, slightly younger than the average age of extremist attackers in Europe in recent years. Research has revealed a growing effort by Islamic State and other terror groups to recruit and train adolescents. Between September 2014 and December 2016, some 34 plots or alleged plots inspired by Isis were organised by teenagers, or those even younger.

Despite a significant recent increase in involvement of women – including those deployed by Isis in so-called “frontline” roles in attacks in France, northern Africa and elsewhere – extremists are still overwhelmingly male.

Immigration

Abedi’s family was from Libya and some analysts believe the current wave of extremism is largely the work of a second generation of young people born to parents who migrated to the west. Yet many attackers, particularly in the last few years, have been much more recent immigrants.

Experts cite a range of “risk factors” linked to the experience of immigration. These include a sense of geographic dislocation, cultural gaps between generations and complex identity issues resulting in a sense of alienation.

In some cases problems are exacerbated by frequent trips back to a family’s place of origin. Abedi appears to have split his time between the UK and Libya, where his parents have been living since 2011. Reports place him in Manchester two months ago, but in Tripoli more recently.

Facebook Twitter Pinterest A screengrab from an Isis recruitment video showing Islamist fighters, who claim to be British. Photograph: YouTube/PA

Family

Investigators will be looking for any indication that other members of Abedi’s family had been involved in extremism, or harboured radical views. A significant number of those involved in Islamic militancy – as with any extremist activity – have close relatives who share their commitment to the cause. Abedi’s brother, who has reportedly confessed to prior knowledge of the Manchester attack, and father are now being held by Libyan authorities.

Research has found that more than two thirds of Islamic “lone wolf” militants talked about forthcoming violent acts with family and friend.

There are many examples of British militants wanting to emulate fathers involved in an earlier generation of violent activism. There are unconfirmed reports that Abedi’s father, Ramadan, was linked to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which waged an Islamist insurgency against Muammar Gadaffi’s secular regime. It also appears that Ramadan Abedi returned to his homeland to take up arms during the Libyan revolution of 2011.

Travel

Even in an era where the internet, social media and encrypted messaging apps have transformed recruitment for Isis and its ilk, it is clear there is no substitute for personal contact. The most lethal attacks in Europe in recent years – the bombings and shootings in Paris in November 2015 – largely involved local men who had travelled to Syria to train and fight with Isis. There are believed to be 850 Britons who travelled to the Middle East to join Isis, and their potential return is a major worry for security services.



Abedi’s recent travel to Libya, where Isis and al-Qaida are present, is therefore of critical significance. It is possible he may have received training there. UK security officials have long feared “fast turnaround” radicalisation, whereby an individual is convinced by senior militants that his “duty” is to return to the UK to execute a terrorist act and despatched before the effect of the psychological conditioning he has received has worn off.

Gangs

There are some reports that Abedi was involved in gangs. Many western militants had some involvement with crime before developing an interest in radical Islam. The transition from a violent and marginal criminal brotherhood on the street to Isis is less of a step-change than it may seem. However, others doubt the gang connection in Abedi’s case, describing him as quiet and conservative, if prone to angry flare ups.

Abedi dropped out of a business management course at university. This too has been seen before. One of the two brothers who bombed the Boston marathon in 2012 was facing expulsion from his college. There are many other examples. One is Raphael Hostey, an Isis recruiter known as Abu Qaqa al-Britani, who dropped out of a degree at Liverpool John Moores University to go to Syria in 2013. There are several reports that Hostey, 24, was a friend of Abedi’s.

Extremist networks

The connection to Hostey may prove to be more important. The key element in any radicalisation is usually exposure to extremist activities and ideas through peers, not “brainwashing” by a distant operative. A family friend said Abedi also knew Abdalraouf Abdallah, 24, who was jailed for nine-and-a-half years last year after being convicted of funding terrorism and preparing acts of terrorism.

It is very likely Abedi was part of a broader network; not only are there are almost no true “lone wolves”, but there are few examples of individuals who have succeeded in making a lethal explosive device by themselves. It is therefore unsurprising that Amber Rudd, the UK home secretary, said police did not believe Abedi acted alone.

Isis has claimed Monday night’s attack, though there are indications the group had only limited prior knowledge, if any, of the operation. Al-Qaida has recently shown a renewed interest in strikes in the west. A search for a clear “chain of command” may be misplaced however. Research has shown that, for the new generation of violent extremists, allegiances tend to blur. For them, loyalty is to the overall ideology and the cause, not to an individual organisation.

Locality

For many years, Islamist violence, whether in the west or further afield, has involved attacks at locations within an hour’s travel of the perpetrators’ home. The ideology is global, but the practice is local.





