MaxDrei @3: “such headings are there simply to help bring the reader of the Statute more quickly to the words that matter, and are not themselves to be relied upon, at all, when construing the Section under the Heading.”

This is generally true in the US as well, as one must look to the actual text of the statute itself. “The title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947). This is particularly true when textual amendments to conform the body of the statute to the meaning behind the heading are expressly rejected in a congressional committee vote, as explained below.

Anon @1 is correct that the AIA bill managers truly intended to repeal the personal forfeiture bar for secret sales and public use – that they intended only publically-disclosed subject matter to be patent-defeating. That is why they changed the heading of Section 102 and why they inserted elaborate colloquies in the record to that effect. But the intent five members of Congress – even as the drafters and managers of the bill – does not make the law. Indeed, they tried putting that intent in the body of the statute where it counts, and failed. First, they correctly recognized that the plain language to achieve their goal is a simple exclusion of inventions that were “patented, described in a printed publication, or otherwise disclosed to the public” and that whether such disclosure was in a sale or public use is irrelevant as long as there was such disclosure to the public. Second, they proposed a Manager’s Amendment to H.R. 1249’s § 102(a)(1) as indicated by strikeout and underlined insertion as shown in the image above. Amendment to H.R. 1249 (Rep. Lamar Smith, April 14 2011). However, the House Committee rejected that part of the Managers Amendment, leaving the terms “on sale” and “public use” in the statute. Transcript HJU104000.

The reality is that repealing the secret commercialization personal forfeiture bars was never discussed in congressional hearings before enactment of the AIA. This is an important policy matter. The opportunity was there but the proponents did not dare raise the issue because they knew their proposals would be met with strong objections. Instead, they chose legislation by stealth and obfuscation, creating purposeful ambiguities, and inserting a Senate colloquy in the congressional record a day after the Senate passed the bill. They hoped that the courts would do what they failed to do by clear language. This tactic backfired on them. The legislative record of the AIA shows that “[e]ven the sponsor[’s] [remarks] are not controlling.” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979). “Congress reject[ed] … the very language that would have achieved the result [that proponents] urges here,” which “weighs heavily against [their] interpretation.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 579-80 (2006).

See my amicus brief in Teva v Helsinn at the CAFC for other arguments, including those based on canons of statutory interpretation, as to why the meaning of “on sale” and “public use” have not changed by the AIA. link to bit.ly