The following is the full content of the WikiLeaks document written by James C Kenny, then US ambassador to Ireland, on the United States’ attitude about the use of Shannon airport.

TheJournal.ie’s article on the matter can be read here.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 001020

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015

TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL EAIR PTER EI

SUBJECT: EMERGING CONSTRAINTS ON U.S. MILITARY TRANSITS AT

SHANNON

REF: A. DUBLIN 891

¶B. DUBLIN 709

¶C. USDAO DUBLIN EI U-0011-06

Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

¶1. (C) This is an action request. Please see para 10.

¶2. (C) Summary: Although supportive of continued U.S.

military transits at Shannon Airport, the Irish Government

has informally begun to place constraints on U.S. operations

at the facility, mainly in response to public sensitivities

over U.S. actions in the Middle East. Shannon remains a key

transit point for U.S. troops and materiel bound for theaters

in the global war on terror, while yielding diplomatic

benefits for the Irish Government and significant revenues

for the airport and regional economy. Segments of the Irish

public, however, see the airport as a symbol of Irish

complicity in perceived U.S. wrongdoing in the Gulf/Middle

East and in regard to extraordinary renditions, a view that

underpinned a recent jury decision to acquit the “Shannon

Five” protesters who damaged a U.S. naval aircraft. The

Irish Government has repeatedly defended U.S. interests in

the face of public criticism, but has recently introduced

more cumbersome notification requirements for

equipment-related transits in the wake of the Lebanon

conflict. These requirements, which entail a more expansive

interpretation of munitions of war, are designed to give the

Irish Government mor latitude to decide on allowable

transits, accoring to a senior Department of Foreign Affairs

oficial. We suspect that the Government aims with tese new

constraints to dampen public criticism ahead of the 2007

general elections, and we would apreciate Department

gudance on a USG response, including on any next steps

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regarding the Shannon Five. End summary.

Shannon: Significant Benefits and Sensitivities

——————————————— –

¶3. (SBU) U.S. military access to Shannon Airport in western

Ireland is among the most tangible benefits of traditionally

strong U.S.-Irish relations. For the United States,

geography makes Shannon a key transit point for military

flights and military contract flights carrying personnel and

materiel to Iraq and the Middle East/Gulf theater in the

global war on terror, as well as to Europe and Africa. In

2005, roughly 340,000 U.S. troops passed through Shannon on

nearly 2,500 contract carrier flights; about 450

equipment-related/distinguished-visitor transit milair

flights and thousands of airspace overflights also took

place. Approximately 220,000 troops have transited to date

this year. For Ireland, U.S. military transits not only

demonstrate bilateral cooperation in support of U.S.

objectives in the Gulf/Middle East, but also generate

significant revenue for Shannon Airport and the regional

economy. In 2005, the airport turned a euro 2.9 million

profit after earning roughly euro 10.3 million from services

for transit flights, including landing, parking, catering,

and fuel. The economic gains for the Shannon area are less

easily calculated, but would include, at a minimum, payments

for hotels, food/beverages, transportation, and cultural

activities that come with 8-10 overnight stops per year for

roughly 200 soldiers each time. (Revenues may fall in 2006,

as World Airways, a DOD-contract carrier, has begun to

transfer operations from Shannon to its Leipzig hub for

internal logistical reasons.)

¶4. (SBU) For segments of the Irish public, however, the

visibility of U.S. troops at Shannon has made the airport a

symbol of Irish complicity in perceived U.S. wrongdoing in

the Gulf/Middle East. This popular sentiment was manifest in

the July 25 jury decision to acquit the “Shannon Five,” a

group of anti-war protesters who damaged a U.S. naval

aircraft at the airport in 2003 in the belief that they would

prevent loss of life in Iraq (ref A). Members of the Shannon

Five have subsequently called for a mass demonstration in

Dublin on September 23 (capitalizing on publicity for the

September 21-24 Ryder Cup tournament and the return of

university students) as part of a campaign to “demilitarize”

the airport. Although it is by no means clear that any

protest will reach “mass” proportions, participation in the

planned protest will likely draw from a vocal anti-war lobby

that has demonstrated against U.S. use of Shannon from the

start of the Iraq War up through the recent Lebanon conflict.

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In late 2005/early 2006, EU-wide debate on extraordinary

renditions similarly galvanized this lobby, and the Irish

public generally, to question U.S. military access to the

airport.

The Irish Government and Shannon

——————————–

¶5. (C) The Irish Government consistently has acted to ensure

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continued U.S. military transits at Shannon in the face of

public criticism. Since the Shannon Five decision, for

example, Irish authorities have upgraded airport security,

doubling the number of police and military personnel

patrolling the facility and introducing rigorous checks at

the parking lot and perimeter fence. (The upgrade is also

partly a response to possible Islamic extremist threats.)

Moreover, despite a general Government reluctance to

challenge independent court decisions, Defense Minister

Willie O’Dea and governing Fianna Fail party politicians have

publicly questioned the legal merits of the Shannon Five jury

decision. These public statements track with representations

to the Irish Parliament by Government ministers over recent

years and months in defense of U.S. practices at Shannon,

including by Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern, who cited U.S.

assurances on renditions this past year to rebuff calls for

random aircraft checks. In parliamentary debate this spring,

Minister of State for Europe, Noel Treacy, dismissed renewed

calls for random inspections following the transit of a U.S.

military prisoner that occurred without prior notification to

the Irish Government (ref B).

¶6. (C) Notwithstanding its general support for U.S.

interests, the Irish Government has more recently begun to

place limits on certain forms of U.S. transits at Shannon.

On August 15, the Irish Department of Transport informally

advised Post by e-mail that all military equipment, including

HMMWVs and trucks, were to be considered “munitions of war,”

requiring prior notification to the Transport Department and

exemption waivers for transshipment. In addition to

diplomatic clearance requests for state aircraft, we have

heretofore provided notification for troop transits (with

accompanying weapons), hazmat, and actual weapons/munitions,

but not non-lethal military articles. The Transport

Department notice followed upon the Department of Foreign

Affairs (DFA) oral but definitive decision during the Lebanon

conflict to forbid U.S. military transits carrying munitions

to Israel, a policy that DFA did not convey to Post before

informing the media. Indications of this trend to constrain

U.S. operations at Shannon first arose in the context of the

extraordinary renditions issue. In late 2005, for instance,

the DFA informally denied a DHS deportation transit through

Shannon of convicted foreign nationals from the United States

out of apparent concern that the public would misread the

transit as a rendition.

¶7. (C) In an August 30 meeting with the DCM and emboff, DFA

Political Director Rory Montgomery said that the Department

of Transport’s more encompassing approach to munitions of war

and notification requirements reflected the Irish

Government’s interest in knowing the full scope of military

materiel transiting Ireland. He recalled that the February

shipment through Shannon of U.S. Apache helicopters to/from

Israel, which the U.S. contract carrier had not listed as

munitions of war, elicited parliamentary criticism and

highlighted the need for clarity about the nature of materiel

in transit (ref C). More expansive notification requirements

that would apply to all countries would “make it easier” for

the Irish Government to decide on allowable shipments, while

remaining predisposed to respond quickly and positively to

U.S. transit requests, said Montgomery. He added that the

DFA would recommend that the Department of Transport consult

with Post in the process of clarifying and publishing

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guidance on munitions of war. The DCM noted Post’s intention

to confer with the Transport Department, and he emphasized

that broader notification requirements would make it more

cumbersome to process materiel shipments, with the

possibility that U.S. military planners would consider

alternatives to Shannon as a transit hub.

Comment and Action Request

————————–

¶8. (C) Comment: Irish sensitivities generally about foreign

military usage of the airport often make any inadvertent

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breaches of Ireland’s restrictive rules on foreign military

transits more visible and problematic. A neutral country,

Ireland has no military attache system, no SOFA for U.S.

activities, and strict rules regarding weapons transits and

the wearing of foreign military uniforms. Occasional and

inadvertent breaches of weapons and uniform policies, like

“failure” to notify transiting prisoners (ref B) and military

equipment, are met with public and press scrutiny, but also

with Government understanding. Any incident, however, that

becomes the cause for a public debate about the U.S. use of

Shannon will likely add pressure on the Government. Embassy

has sought to manage the policy issues, notification

requirements, and the coordination of transiting flights,

overflights, refuelings, crew rest overnights, and equipment

failure overnights with existing DAO and civilian Embassy

resources on the ground. With the help of extra TDY support

to the DAO office and a TDY EUCOM presence at Shannon airport

(which is three-and-a-half hours from Dublin), we have

managed the occasional problems adequately and well.

¶9. (C) More comment: We intend to engage other ranking DFA,

Transport, and Irish Defense Department officials, upon their

return from the August holiday period, on the reasons for new

constraints at Shannon, particularly the novel interpretation

of munitions of war and its application to other countries

(Russian transits to Venezuela, for instance). The Irish

public’s overwhelming opposition to Israeli military actions

in Lebanon has exacerbated the governing Fianna Fail party’s

sensitivity to public criticism ahead of Ireland’s May 2007

general elections. The major opposition party, Fine Gael,

supports continued U.S. military use of Shannon, but the

Labour Party and the Green Party, Fine Gael’s opposition

partners, favor a review, if not reversal, of Irish policy on

U.S. transits. Against this political backdrop, U.S.

missteps at Shannon could easily become campaign grist, a

Fianna Fail concern that mid-level DFA officials have cited

in informal discussions with Post. Compliance with the new

rules (entailing notification for almost any U.S. military

equipment transiting), if feasible from the U.S. logistical

perspective, will require a higher order of coordination

among TRANSCOM, Air Mobility Command, TACC, and the contract

carriers.

¶10. (C) Action request: We would appreciate input from the

Department and other USG agencies for our planned follow-on

discussions with Irish officials on Shannon. Embassy will

diplomatically pursue the most workable arrangements possible

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with Irish officials, but we would appreciate Washington’s

judgment as to whether the process of notification of almost

everything of a military nature (including by contract

carriers) through Shannon is becoming too difficult to make

the airport a preferred transit stop. Guidance is also

requested regarding the Shannon Five decision, an outcome

that DFA Political Director Montgomery described as “bizarre”

and presumably not precedential. Our understanding is that

the case, as a criminal matter, has run its course, as there

is no possibility to appeal a jury decision under Irish law.

There may be an option to pursue the case as a civil matter,

and Post would need authorization and funding to contact

local attorneys about this possibility. Another option would

be to present an itemized bill for aircraft damages to the

Irish Government, either to seek compensation outright or, at

least, to convey USG dissatisfaction with the Shannon Five

verdict.

KENNY

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