The war-of-words over the Strait of Hormuz is yet another case of how sane and rational Americans and Iranians can make for an insane -- and dangerous -- situation. Everybody wants the same thing: the free flow of goods (especially energy) and traffic through this waterway. Both sides fear the same thing: that the other will attempt to control the strait and to wield that control as a weapon. That fear leads to preventative action -- the U.S. sends war ships, Iran threatens to close the strait -- and that preventative action leads to even more threats and retaliations. Meanwhile, little actually happens, but the risk of an unwanted military confrontation gets a little higher. The Strait of Hormuz is not nearly as tense as the Yellow Sea, which has been heavily militarized for decades. But if global confrontations over the strait become normal in the way they have in the Yellow Sea, it's not hard to foresee a day when Yeonpyeong-style incidents become common as well.

Iran's interactions with the rest of the planet are trending closer and closer to the North Korean model, something that everybody wants to avoid but nobody knows how to stop. This doesn't mean that, internally, the Iranian state, though it is brutally repressive, will become anything remotely like the Orwellian, nation-sized gulag on the Korean peninsula. Externally, however, its relationship to the world -- and the world's relationship to it -- is increasingly defined by aggression, threats, and brinksmanship. As Iran becomes more isolated, it will increasingly rely on this behavior as the only tool in its diplomatic toolbox. But every time it uses that tool it will become more isolated, and the cycle will perpetuate.

The world has not yet figured out how to solve a problem like North Korea. Pressure, meant to deter bad behavior, also makes bad behavior more likely by guiding internal decision-making in that direction. Occasional openings for detente are usually missed because both sides mistrust the other too much to go through with it. Meanwhile, the pariah state ensures that forced regime change is as unattractive an option as possible. Outright collapse might just make things worse as bad states are often easier to manage than failed states. So could regime change from within, as new regimes behave aggressively to consolidate power.

Iran is not yet at the point of a North Korea, with which nearly every interaction is one of mistrust and aggression. Iran still has active trade ties and diplomatic relations with much of the world. But its position as a not-quite-total-pariah is shaky. The status quo of "managing" Iranian threats is effective at its immediate goals -- Tehran is weaker than ever and has still not moved decisively toward a nuclear weapon -- but it has done nothing to solve, and may in fact be worsening, the underlying problem of Iran's bitter North Korea-ification.