PREFACE

THIS BOOK, like any historical work, has a history, and it was crafted in a specific political and historiographic context. In 1987, I finished Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? and resumed work on the sequel to The Persistence of the Old Regime, which I had put aside to ponder and search into the Judeocide. But a turbulence in the surrounding political and intellectual atmosphere distracted me.

I spent much time in France in 1987–90, the years of the rites of the bicentennial of the French Revolution, in which historians were prominent officiants. There was nothing exceptional about French historians, particularly the public intellectuals among them, playing their self-assigned roles. They had been doing so practically ever since 1789, taking three distinct positions: abjure and excoriate the Revolution, root and branch; redeem the revolution without a revolution over against the radical revolution of the Terror; exalt and justify the Revolution, en bloc. There is something archetypal about these three positions: since 1917 they have defined the debates about the Russian Revolution, except that the third position eventually split in two over the question of the continuity or break between Lenin and Stalin.

The crescendo of violence (Jules Michelet) has been the single most important defining issue of the indomitable debate about the Great Revolution. For the bicentennial, French historians reenacted the tried and true battle between the prosecutors who blame one or more ideologically driven political leaders for the spiraling Furies, including the Terror, and the defenders who attribute them to the force of circumstance. Indeed, it seemed as if old polemical wine was being poured into new historiographic bottles.

Presently, however, the bicentennial debate became singularly polemical and impassioned. In part this was so because as may be expected, it served as a screen for heated arguments about France’s unmastered recent past. Had Vichy been the last stand of the counterrevolution dating from 1789, shielded by Nazi Germany? Had the French Communists, since the 1930s, been nothing but latter-day Jacobins, subservient to Soviet Russia? Not unrelated, the great historical ventilation was marked by the changing Zeitgeist which, in turn, it helped to shape. Because or in spite of the return of the tempered left to power in France in 1981, there was a vigorous resurgence of the far right and of traditional conservatism. This political and intellectual mutation coincided with the ascendancy of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, along with their neoconservative clerks, in the United States and Great Britain, as well as with the breakthrough of glasnost and perestroika in East Central Europe and Russia. Simultaneously, academic Marxism was going out with the tide.

This was the context in which ultraconservative historians resurfaced to revive and update their position: they argued that in addition to being an inexpiable sin, the French Revolution was the ultimate source of all the purgatorial fires of the twentieth century. No doubt these latter-day counterrevolutionaries would have remained inconsequential had they not found soul mates, not to say fellow travelers, among moderate conservatives and new-model liberal democrats. Among them in particular the ex-Communist renegades, who by European standards carried disproportionate weight in the Parisian intelligentsia, became vital intermediaries: even if unintentionally, they legitimated the resurgent die-hard position and its champions, and made them salonfähig in the 6th and 7th arrondissements. Georg Simmel, founder of formal sociology, incisively conceived renegades to be sworn to a distinctive loyalty because rather than naively grow … into a new political, religious, or other party, they join it after having broken with a previous one, which never ceases to repel and incense them.

The inverted true-believers took two successive steps to concretize the charge of the right-wing resurgence, in the process emerging as its chief and emblematic voice. First, they postulated the essential sameness of the ultimate causes and inner workings of the crescendo of violence of the French and Russian revolutions: Robespierre, Rousseau, and the Great Terror were said to be all but analogous with Lenin/Stalin, Marx, and the Gulag. They read the Jacobin Terror by the light of the Bolshevik Terror at the same time that they asserted that the rule of fear and blood of 1793–94 had been the dress rehearsal and portent for that of 1917–89.

Their second step was to stretch the analogic fabric to comprise the Third Reich. The Soviet and Nazi regimes were deemed to be fundamentally if not wholly identical: both were variants of the same totalitarianism, whose philosophic roots reached back to the Jacobin moment. Whatever the dissimilarities between the two regimes—there was no Soviet equivalent for Nazism’s genocidal racism—they were outweighed not only by the likenesses of their structures and methods of domination but also by the purpose of their murderous Furies. Compared to the line of descent from the Jacobin to the Bolshevik terror, that between the Bolshevik and Nazi terrors was not only immediate but material: by virtue of their chronological head start the Cheka/KGB and the Gulag presumably served as models for the SS state and concentration camps which Hitler set up to better fight Bolshevism at home and abroad. The ground was being seeded for the rehabilitation and justification of the anti-Communist warrant of Fascism and National Socialism, including of Vichy France’s national revolution.

There were important family resemblances between the querelle des historiens in France and the concurrent Historikerstreit in Germany, particularly the style of intellection and political purpose of the assailants. Oblivious to space and time, and making no effort to curb their virus of present-mindedness (Marc Bloch), they forced the similarities between the Soviet and Nazi systems, leaving little room for basic differences and contrasts, notably concerning the reason and role of terror and war. Profoundly troubled, I considered turning to a comparative and interactive study of the Soviet and Nazi Furies which would not be a portrait in black and white. But the prospect of plunging, once more, into the Judeocide gave me pause.

At this point, in late 1989, my good friend Maurice Agulhon extended an invitation for me to lecture at the Collège de France on Europe’s ancien régime between the two world wars. I refused, insisting that the bicentennial debate had thrown me off course. In conversation, over wine, I complained at some length about the transparent insufficiencies of the ongoing comparisons of the crescendos of violence in revolutionary France and Russia. Having vented my spleen, I facetiously suggested that I speak on this topic, about which I was in total ignorance. Instead of sending me packing, Maurice Agulhon reached for pen and paper and wrote down the title for a lecture series: Violence et Terreur aux Temps de la Révolution Française et de la Révolution Russe. These leçons, delivered in Spring 1991, became the foundation for this book.

An objective and value-free study of the most harrowing and controversial aspects of the revolutionary phenomenon is, of course, a logical impossibility. Paul Ricoeur rightly insists that there is no greater pretense than to allege that "ideology is the thinking of my adversary, that it is the thinking of the other. In dealing with the crescendo of violence it is difficult to strike a reasonable balance between explanation and condemnation, understanding and justification, detachment and proximity. No doubt by overreacting to historians who blithely assume the role of the prosecutor, judge, and moralizer, I lay myself open to the charge of assuming that of the cynic or apologist. Such is the risk—but also the intellectual challenge and responsibility—of brushing history against the grain" (Walter Benjamin) and of striving for empathetic understanding of the Furies.

This work does not cover all aspects of the French and Russian revolutions. Instead, it is, specifically, a conceptually informed probe of their upward spirals of violence and terror. Based primarily on secondary sources, it intends to open new perspectives rather than present new facts. Because of the distinctly more thorough and sophisticated scholarship on the Jacobin than on the Bolshevik Furies, the former is of considerable heuristic importance for the study of the latter. At the same time, and paradoxically, there is a need to recover greater empathetic nearness to the French Revolution, which is over-studied and over-objectified, and to seek greater critical distance from the Russian Revolution, whose historiography is only beginning to be extricated from deafening and blinding polemics.

By choosing The Furies as the main title of this book, I mean to suggest that much of the revolutionary violence and terror, by virtue of being fear-inspired, vengeance-driven, and religiously sanctioned, was singularly fierce and merciless. Not unlike in the time of Aeschylus’ Greece, intense foreign and civil war, fear and disorder, were entwined with an endless cycle of spiraling violence in defense of the old order and in support of the new, characteristic of moments of rupture and (re)foundation. The transmutation of the raging female divinities Erinyes into the kindly Eumenides marked the termination of a difficult transition from a crescendo to a diminuendo of violence. This mutation was symbolized by the establishment of the Council of the Areopagus, which concluded the struggle between chaos and cosmos. Unlike the ancient Furies, which were one-sided, those of the French and Russian revolutions were manifold and dialectical.

I am indebted to Richard Wortman for his close critical reading, for Princeton University Press, of the penultimate version of my manuscript. Time and again I used Maurice Agulhon and Philip Nord as sounding boards on questions of French history, and Moshe Lewin and Stephen Kotkin on questions of Russian history. At different stages of my research and writing I had the thoughtful help of Kristin Gager, Guillaume Garreta, Gavin Lewis, and Moshe Sluhovsky. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Pamela Long, who typed and retyped successive drafts with altogether uncommon accuracy, speed, and, above all, infectious good cheer and understanding. Brigitta van Rheinberg, my editor at Princeton University Press, wielded the scepter with a firm hand and disarming wit, and so did Jodi Beder, my copy editor. At the insistence of Régine Azria, my sprightly and reflective neighbor, an early version of chapter 13 was published in the Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions, number 90 (April–June 1995).

Despite growing disagreements which eventually undermined a steadfast personal and intellectual complicité, François Furet accompanied me in my quest. Still and always Carl Schorske, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and Sheldon Wolin, besides spoiling me with their unconditional friendship, have been my essential scholarly and intellectual lifeline. This book is written with and for them.

Arno J. Mayer

Princeton and Chérence

Summer 1999

THE FURIES

INTRODUCTION

IN THIS early dawn of the twenty-first century, following one of humanity’s darkest seasons, revolution is seen as offering little promise and posing little threat. But only yesteryear, during the discontinuous yet not unrelated epochs of the French and Russian revolutions, promise and threat were vigorous and inextricably entwined. Indeed, revolution presents two contrasting faces: the one glorious and appealing; the other violent and terrifying.¹ Today utopia is completely eclipsed by dystopia. In much of the First and Second World there is a consensus, articulated by Hannah Arendt, that freedom has been better preserved in countries where no revolution ever broke out, no matter how outrageous the circumstances of the powers that be, and that more civil liberties exist even in countries where the revolution was defeated than in those where revolutions have been victorious. ² Revolution is seen as unnecessary, and its human and material costs morally and historically indefensible. The grand romance and the great fear of the French and Russian revolutions have given way to the celebration of essentially bloodless revolutions for human rights, private property, and market capitalism. This perspective, rooted in liberal and conservative values, precludes the revolutionary premise, and is as prejudicial to the critical study of revolution as the revolutionary premise itself.

It may be wise to bear in mind that in this season of globalism, this viewpoint is open to question in the still heavily peasant societies of the developing countries, with their run-away, overcrowded, and uneasy urban centers. Four of the 6 billion people dwell in these un-providential lands, and untold millions of them live at or below the level of poverty. The costs of this unjust and oppressive social order, over the long run, are at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a great deal more. ³ Indeed, historical inertia exacts a chronic price, intermittently heightened by famine and epidemic, war and civil war. Among the reasons for the absence of revolt in [this] context of exploitation and misery figure, above all, the deadly risks that governing and ruling classes can impose on would-be rebels with their enormous coercive and daunting force and violence, both physical and symbolic.⁴

Be that as it may, in this study of the Furies of the French and Russian revolutions I postulate that there is no revolution without violence and terror; without civil and foreign war; without iconoclasm and religious conflict; and without collision between city and country. The Furies of revolution are fueled primarily by the inevitable and unexceptional resistance of the forces and ideas opposed to it, at home and abroad. This polarization becomes singularly fierce once revolution, confronted with this resistance, promises as well as threatens a radical refoundation of both polity and society. Hannah Arendt quite rightly emphasized that revolution confront[s] us directly and inevitably with the problem of beginning, since it entails more than mere change. ⁵ Jules Michelet even suggested that it might be wiser to speak of Foundation than Revolution. ⁶

This problem of foundation or refoundation has engaged political and social theorists through the ages, and few if any of them entertained the theoretical or historical possibility of a radically fresh start without recourse to uncommon violence and reversion to barbarism. Prototypically, Machiavelli emphasized that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. ⁷ He argued that no thoroughgoing foundation or refoundation could survive in the face of intense disorder and resistance without an absolute ruler resorting to swift, extraordinary, and, if need be, cruel violence.

In rethinking the role of violence in revolution, I bear in mind not only the Furies inherent in the notion of a new foundation but also the reality and urgency of collective violence since time immemorial.⁸ This grim and stubborn fact challenges the widespread presumption that violence is as rare as revolution. Foreign war, perhaps the most common and essential form of deadly collective violence, is one of revolution’s chief radicalizing agents: war decisively revolutionized the French Revolution in 1792–94; and war and the imminence of war revolutionized the Russian Revolution in 1917–21 and in the 1930s. Civil war is the other common form of collective violence which fires the Furies of revolution, all the more so if it should interlock with quasi-religious foreign war. There is no better guide for the study of the lethal fusion of foreign and civil war in a time of general convulsion than Thucydides’ discussion of the furious and raw savagery on Corcyra (Corfu) during the Peloponnesian War.⁹ In any case, the violence accompanying revolution runs to extremes, or appears to do so, precisely because revolution entails both foreign and civil war.

As a rule, the analysis and explanation of the revolutionary Furies is biased by the age-old assumption that a foreign war [is] a much milder evil than a civil war, and that there is nothing wrong with deflecting dangerously heated passions … among us … into some war with our neighbors. ¹⁰ It is difficult to understand why revolution should not be permissible because of its violence and bloodshed, while war is wholly permissible and morally justifiable. Although both are sinful and evidence of sin, to accept history is to accept the one and the other, and neither of them can be judged solely from the perspective of individual morality. ¹¹ The hecatombs of the foreign wars of the French and Russian revolutions exceed those of their civil wars, and yet the former are glorified and mythologized, the latter execrated. In the wake of the slaughter of the two world wars of the twentieth century, Maurice Merleau-Ponty had good reason to wonder whether after so much exhortation to ‘Make the Supreme Sacrifice’ for the Fatherland one ought perhaps to show more understanding for the rallying cry to ‘Make the Supreme Sacrifice’ for the Revolution. ¹²

It was Chateaubriand who first questioned the axiom that foreign war is morally superior to civil war. He noted that frequently a people has reinvigorated and regenerated itself by means of internecine discord. To be sure, it is horrible when close neighbors of a community lay waste each other’s property and stain each other’s home with blood. Chateaubriand wondered, however, whether it is "really that much more humane to massacre a German peasant whom you do not know and with whom you never exchanged a word, whom you rob and kill without remorse, and whose wives and daughters you dishonor with a clear conscience simply because c’est la guerre? In his alternative vision, civil wars are less unjust and revolting as well as more natural than foreign wars. They have the merit of turning on personal injuries and animosities, and at least or at worst the adversaries know why they draw their swords. By contrast, nations tend to go to war because a king is bored, an ambitious placeman means to advance himself, or a minister is out to supplant a rival."¹³

Revolution at once springs from and feeds on the collapse of the state’s undivided and centralizing sovereignty and its dissolution into several centers of competing power or impotence.¹⁴ During the French and Russian revolutions each of several centers eventually turned to violence in an effort to reclaim or secure a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion in its own favor at the national, regional, or local level. The attendant spiral of violence was amplified by the simultaneous breakdown of the judiciary and law enforcement generally, opening a breach for the return of repressed vengeance, particularly in zones of rampant civil war and terror, such as in the Vendée and Tambov, and in the cities of the Midi and Ukraine.

As Jacob Burckhardt suggested, whereas intrinsic resistance paralyzes spurious crises [or revolutions], it fiercely inflames genuine ones. ¹⁵ For certain, it takes two to make a revolution, and counterrevolution is revolution’s other half.¹⁶ Revolution and counterrevolution are bound to each other as reaction is bound to action, making for a historical motion, which … is at once dialectical and driven by necessity. ¹⁷ It is another central postulate of this study that revolution and counterrevolution ask to be conceived and examined in terms of each other. The inveterate governing and ruling classes of France and Russia could hardly have been expected to freely abandon their vested interests and prerogatives, especially since these were tied into a religious, cultural, and mental universe which was being sharply challenged. Before long the political field was polarized across what Carl Schmitt conceives as a friend-enemy divide or dissociation,¹⁸ with each side fighting savagely for its holy of holies. ¹⁹

In any case, counterrevolution was real and tangible. It was not, in the main, a phantasm: an aristocratic or capitalist plot invented by Jacobin and Bolshevik zealots or strongmen to enliven their Manichaean ideology and rhetoric with a view to justifying and legitimating revolutionary terror. Besides, conspiracy mongering was common on both sides of the friend-enemy divide. And much of it was nonideological and wild, conspiratorial reasoning being second nature above all in primitive peasant societies such as France and Russia in 1789 and 1917. Needless to say, counterrevolution is as complex, plastic, and factious as revolution. At the top of the resistance there is both the discord and synergy of conservatives, reactionaries, and counterrevolutionaries.²⁰ There is, in addition, a basic distinction and tension between this composite and organized counter-revolution from the top and the spontaneous and irregular anti-revolution from the ground up.²¹ This anti-revolution, primarily in the form of peasant resistance, was the epicenter of the civil wars in the French and Russian revolutions in which the incidence and ferocity of violence and terror, even by the standard of Corcyra, were beyond compare. The mindset and reason of the counterrevolution from above being elitist, it failed to connect with the popular anti-revolution from below, with the result that counterrevolutionary fortunes became heavily contingent on foreign aid and military intervention promoted by émigrés.

Counterrevolution is at least as deeply anchored and durable in the political tradition and culture of France and Russia as revolution. Its core ideas were first formulated as negations to the ideas of the philosophes in eighteenth-century France, and with accretions and variants have stayed the course ever since. Indeed, the controversion of the central ideas of the Enlightenment is as old as the [Enlightenment] itself, ²² and through its history the Enlightenment has been inseparable from a Counter-Enlightenment shadow. Moreover, to the extent that ideas make history, the putative dangers of … rationalistic, secular Enlightenment thought are more than matched by the dangers inherent in anything the Counter-Enlightenment would offer in its place. If the Enlightenment must assume some of the blame for the Great Terrors of the left-wing totalitarian regimes of the recent past, then the Counter-Enlightenment must assume an equally heavy responsibility for those of Nazi Germany.²³ In any case, in exploring and judging the violence and terror of the French and Russian revolutions, in their domestic as well as international aspects, it is important to remember that the counterrevolution was not innocent; that without it there would have been no Furies; and that at key junctures the forces of resistance came close to winning the day.

Another premise of this study is that religious conflict was a significant revolutionizing force. With France of 1789 and Russia of 1917 85 percent rural, peasant, and illiterate, church and religion were omnipresent. In both countries the organic unity of the political and the sacred was intact at the apex of political society.²⁴ Moreover, bolstered by their vast and awe-inspiring institutional endowments, the Gallican Catholic Church and Russian Orthodox Church wielded enormous influence in everyday life. For their part, the reformists and revolutionists were swayed by the progressive reason of the Enlightenment, which was primarily turned against the dogma and hegemony of the established churches. Confirmed cosmopolitans, and concentrated in a few cities, reformists and revolutionists disdained the world of the peasants which they were determined to liberate from the blight of ignorance and superstition nurtured by the priesthood. While the countryside was a distant backdrop for the platforms of the guillotine and the courtrooms of the show trials, its villages were the principal theater of the deadly peasant wars, which were intensified by antithetical cosmologies.

There could be no transfiguring political and civil society without substantially modifying the relationship of state and church, and without considerably loosening organized religion’s grip on critical spheres of social and cultural life. Clearly, nothing could have been more divisive than the instant desacralization of high politics; disestablishment of the state church; dispossession of ecclesiastic property; and emancipation of religious minorities. Nearly all the bishops and most of the lower clergy eventually resisted institutional reform. Moreover, Pope Pius VI and Supreme Patriarch Tikhon anathematized and excommunicated Jacobins and Bolsheviks, thereby contributing to the escalation of a temporal conflict into a religious one. Probably more in France than in Russia, country priests played a considerable role in the peasant resistance to revolution.

Even as the two revolutions disestablished and reined in the official church, they launched alternative religions as part of their search for a sanctification of their new foundation. Half mimetic and half invented, these quasi-religions spawned their own dogma and catechism, as well as their own high priests, rituals, holy places, and martyrs. The all but simultaneous disestablishment of the dominant church and emergence of a parallel faith and cult were products of the friend-enemy dissociation, which they greatly exacerbated.

The force and indeterminacy of the revolutionary maelstrom is such that it gives rise to a headlong rush into an exigent but indeterminate future led by mostly inexperienced political leaders. These neophytes come face to face with what Edmund Burke decried as the enormous evils of … dreadful innovation and Hannah Arendt considered the strange pathos of novelty … inherent in all revolutions. ²⁵ This study will emphasize that, pressed by unsuspected and perplexing events, would-be leaders of the French and Russian revolutions had no choice but to make grave and perilous decisions without the benefit of a science of the future ²⁶—decisions for which there were no rational criteria. Following 1789 and 1917 the emerging disorders in the surrounding environment, both domestic and international, were too sweeping and intense for decision makers to be able to control and channel them according to preconceived and preordained ideological blueprints. To be sure, the Jacobin and Bolshevik ideologies played a crucial role. But they were fluid and flexible, not rigid, and they limited or facilitated rather than determined the actors’ choices.

The concept of ideology is at once too vague, charged, and mechanical to provide an explanatory frame. Revolutionary actors resort to ideology to legitimate and justify actions and policies as well as to criticize and invalidate those of their adversaries. In moments of vanishing sovereignty and failing hegemony, ideology also fosters social and political solidarity by spawning reassuring myths, slogans, and prophecies. It is not to deny the crucial importance of ideologies and public programs in revolutionary situations to insist that they are a poor guide to a revolution’s genesis, course, and outcome.²⁷

Besides, in 1788 France knew no ready-made revolutionary designs: at best a dozen … obscure writers professed to be true republicans and revolutionaries. ²⁸ The bulk of the deputies and of the new-model political class did not discover and embrace the Enlightenment until after the fall of the Bastille,²⁹ when they harnessed the writings of the philosophes to root their legitimacy as well as to justify their actions and give them a lineage. ³⁰ This is not to say that the regime of 1793 was the legitimate consequence or necessary and inescapable instrument of these founding texts.³¹ As late as December 1793 Robespierre held that the theory of revolutionary government was as new as the Revolution which had brought it about, insisting that it was pointless to look for this theory in the books of political writers, who in no way had foreseen this Revolution. ³²

In 1917, compared to 1789, the leading revolutionary actors were, of course, by far better armed with ideology and program which, to boot, were bolstered by political organizations and disseminated by periodicals. Even so, the case for ideological determinism is no stronger for the Russian than for the French Revolution. None of the three major revolutionary parties—Menshevik, Socialist Revolutionary, Bolshevik—were prepared for the chaos that confronted them in 1917, with the result that their guiding principles and party platforms were untimely. To be sure, the Bolsheviks acclimatized Marx and Marxism to Russian conditions, and canonized them. But the Soviet leaders were driven, above all, by the force of circumstance, not Marxist-inspired precepts, when, after calling for peace, bread, and land, they signed a peace at Brest-Litovsk and ratified the distribution of the land to the peasants. The adoption of War Communism in 1918 and the New Economic Policy in 1921 was a vast improvisation all but shorn of Marxist principle, and so was the Great Turn to forced-draft industrialization and collectivization. As for the iron organization and rule of the party, it was deeply conditioned by the authoritarian politics and culture of late imperial Russia. It was also favored, strengthened, and justified by the emergency rule of 1917–21 and, thereafter, by unrelenting external pressures, including war, both hot and cold.

Revolution and international politics are intimately interrelated, the outside world’s reaction being as consequential as the revolution’s impact on other countries and on the concert of powers. From the beginning the appeal of the French and Russian revolutions could not be confined to their countries of origin. Almost overnight both acquired a world-historical resonance and reach by virtue of the universal(izing) nature of their core messianic ideas and projects, which kept their luster untarnished and their enchantment seductive longer abroad than at home. Indeed, great revolutions are epidemic and cosmic, unlike revolts, which are endemic and territorial.³³ While the true-believers expected and prophesied that the revolution would triumph far and wide, the governors of other states were fearful of contagion. With the brazen revolutionary regime and the hostile great powers misreading each other’s capabilities and suspecting each other’s intentions, international politics grew more and more permeated with ideology, increasing the risk and incidence of war. Beginning in 1792 the Girondins, for essentially domestic political reasons, pressured the French Assembly and government to rush into war. In turn, unexpected military setbacks demanded the steeling of the regime, now run by the Committee of Public Safety. The Soviet government, for its part, was largely a product of war, in which it remained trapped until 1921. Unlike the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks assumed, or were forced to assume, an essentially defensive posture in the face of hostile foreign intervention, invited by Russia’s raging civil war and imperial breakup. But no matter how different their running starts on the world scene, the two revolutions were, as noted, revolutionized by foreign war: the Committee of Public Safety and the Council of People’s Commissars used terror to enforce conscription, price and wage controls, food requisitions, and the confiscation of church valuables. There was as close a connection between the decree on the levée en masse (mass mobilization), the proclamation of the Terror, and the adoption of the Law of Suspects in 1793 as there was between the decree on the Socialist Fatherland in Danger and the official declaration of the Red Terror in 1918. Likewise, the solemn regicide of Louis XVI and the secretive and unceremonious execution of Nicholas II were hastened by rising suspicions of these rulers’ encouragement of domestic resistance and foreign military intervention.

For nearly a quarter century, almost unintentionally, successive French governments carried the internal struggles attending their nation’s new beginning to the four corners of Europe and beyond. By fixing the ideas of 1789 to the top of their bayonets, the Napoleonic armies may be said to have externalized the French Revolution’s founding violence in the form of a war of liberation. In the words of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the post-Thermidorean regimes "perfected the terror by substituting permanent war for permanent revolution."³⁴ Of course, this would-be crusade for human rights turned into a bid for the mastery of Europe which consumed several million lives, among them those of one million French soldiers. Ultimately, the armies of the victorious coalition of European powers, not internal resistance or counterrevolution, restored the Bourbons to their contested throne, but without reinstating an immaculate status quo ante. The triumphant but costly wars of 1795 to 1814 had facilitated the reestablishment of an undivided sovereignty, the appeasement of heated passions, and the consolidation of some of the chief revolutionary gains, extended to include the Code Napoléon.

In foreign policy, diplomacy, and war, the trajectory of the Russian Revolution was wholly different from the French. In 1918–21 the foreign intervention in support of the counterrevolution remained limited: the Allies were worn out from the Very Great War; (unlike in 1792) there was popular opposition to intervention; and the task seemed forbidding, given the geography and complexity of Russia. Following the glorious but brutal and exhausting early founding years, the Bolsheviks turned inward to pursue an increasingly autarkic course—economic, political, and cultural. With the cordon sanitaire, the first containment policy, firmly in place, this forced and improbable self-isolation favored the growth of a defiant siege mentality and justified the continuation of the ironbound political culture forged during the civil war.

Soviet Russia, unlike post-Thermidorean France, was quarantined and lacked the military capability and missionary zeal to send forth revolutionary armies far and wide. To be sure, eventually, during the Second World War, Moscow broke through the cordon sanitaire, reclaimed most of imperial Russia’s pre-1917 borders, and prepared the ground for its primacy in eastern Europe. But this expansion was the by-product of unintended and unforeseen diplomatic and military developments. Certainly the near-fatal but ultimately victorious Great Patriotic War was not a preconceived war of either Communist liberation or territorial conquest. And after 1945, with the Second Cold War, the Western powers resumed the quarantine, now termed containment. Except warily during the makeshift Grand Alliance of 1941–45, the Soviet Union was never accepted in the council of nations on a basis of equality, and kept being treated as an outsider.

By quarantining and isolating the revolutionary regime diplomatically, economically, and financially, the outside world helped create the preconditions for Stalin’s Socialism in One Country. This marginalization provided much of the rationale and justification for the furious pace of the industrialization and collectivization of the Second Revolution of the 1930s. In particular, the military imperative warped the breakneck drive for modernization and compounded the risks in braving the strange pathos of novelty. Meanwhile, Stalin exploited foreign perils to further his project and power. In the process he fiercely spurred on the construction of Socialism in One Country, brutally perverting it into Terror in One Country. Indeed, the quarantine and gathering war clouds provided the reason not only for the soaring priority of military-related heavy industry in successive Five-Year Plans but also the escalating domestic Furies culminating in the Great Purge Trials, the court-martial of General Tukhachevsky, and the Stalinshchina.

There was, of course, a world of difference between the first terror of 1917–22 and the second terror of the 1930s. The first terror was inseparable from the civil war with the Whites, the intervention of the European powers, and the struggles against the jacqueries, or peasant revolts. Its flux and reflux were closely though not perfectly correlated with military operations, making it difficult, if not impossible, to separate the casualties of military engagements from the victims of the enforcement terror. In the heat of foreign and civil war the Bolsheviks easily convinced themselves that the antirevolutionary peasant rebellions were part and parcel of the counterrevolutionary resistance with ties to the hostile outside world. In this respect they proceeded very much like the Jacobins in the Vendée.

In the 1930s, in contrast, the Bolshevik regime was involved in neither civil war nor foreign war, and the internal resistance was of less consequence than the international peril. Accordingly the second terror may be said to stand apart from what Chateaubriand conceived as civil war. And yet, it clearly belongs to internal, not external war. The Stalinshchina claimed few military casualties, and the bulk of the victims were Soviet citizens, whereas the casualties and victims of France’s externalized terror under Napoleon were not, in the main, French. Indeed, even considering the increasingly pressing foreign and military dangers, the Furies of the 1930s were essentially domestic and fratricidal, which largely accounts for their remaining singularly unfathomable.

This is a deliberately comparative study of violence and terror in the French and Russian revolutions. It points up a web of significant similarities which are explored and refined by analogic analysis. Of course, any comparative probe risks turning into a chase for resemblances instead of a recognition and appreciation of differences. ³⁵ To postulate resemblance is merely to posit that central aspects of the two revolutionary moments separated in time and space were neither totally unique nor totally alike, thereby forcing attention to telling dissimilarities and contrasts between them.

The comparative perspective helps to broach new questions, such as the role of vengeance; to bring to light and challenge unspoken scholarly assumptions, such as the anomaly and monstrosity of violence; and to identify singularities, such as the import of the precedent of the French for the Russian Revolution. Comparative analysis facilitates identifying the importance of historical legacies and memories, such as of the great religious massacres in France and the Siberian Exile System in Russia, for the contours and dynamics of the two terrors respectively. It also sparks a reassessment of the relative place of church and religion as well as of international politics and war in the hierarchy of radicalizing spheres and causes.

A comparative reading requires relating the similarities of the dynamics of the two revolutions to the dissimilarities in the environment in which they unfolded.³⁶ The long-run preconditions and immediate causes of the French and Russian revolutions were, of course, radically different. France, in 1789, with a population of 28 million, was the most populous and largest power of the European system, except for Russia. Its military was second to none, and so was its economy. France was also considered the most advanced country of the civilized world. Its cultural position and reach were beyond compare. French was the lingua franca of the finest of Europe’s ruling and governing classes, of the diplomatic world, and of the nascent transnational Enlightenment. Immediately following the radiant days of 1789 French became the language of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The strength and grandeur of France was carried by a population that was, like that of most of Europe, 85 percent peasant, rural, illiterate, and primitive Catholic.

France stood tall and strong when, after the fall of the Bastille, the National Assembly abolished feudalism and adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Notwithstanding the unsettling fiscal pinch on the eve of the Revolution, successive provisional governments were economically and financially relatively secure as they adopted increasingly radical policies. Following the frontier defeats of 1792, France’s new governors managed to rally the nation-in-arms for nearly a quarter century of expansionist warfare without straining the economy and exchequer until after the retreat from Moscow in 1812.

Russia in 1917 bore no resemblance to France in 1789. To be sure, it, too, had a population that was 85 percent peasant, rural, illiterate, and primitive Orthodox. But more than a century after 1789 this social and cultural profile was out of season in the concert of great powers. Forty times the size of France, the Romanov empire had a population estimated at between 140 and 160 million, only less than one-half great Russian. In nearly every major respect the overwhelmingly agrarian economy was of another time, and so was the world of artisans and craftsmen. The industrial sector was small and, like the railways, concentrated in the western regions, dependent on foreign loans, and distorted by military imperatives. Russian never was, nor became, a world language.

Although the Renaissance and Reformation barely touched Russia, in their time the ideas of the Enlightenment exercised a full and powerful influence. For sectors of Russia’s ruling and governing elites, however, these ideas were less a promise to liberate man from superstition and oppression and unite him with Reason and Nature than a recipe for modernizing and strengthening the state for the purpose of catching up with the West.³⁷ Eventually, between 1848 and 1917 Marxism entered Russia as a form of Second Enlightenment, with an updated prescription for rapid Western-style development to prepare the ground for the socialist transformation of society. Unlike the public intellectuals and sympathizers of the first Enlightenment, who had access to the court and the salons, the champions of the second Enlightenment in Russia were political dissidents, rebels, and revolutionaries, most of whom went underground or into exile, or were jailed and sent to Siberia.

Whereas in 1789 France was strong, prosperous, at peace, and a hub of Europe’s high culture, in 1917 Russia was not only backward and on the margins of European civilization but also caught up in a draining and all-devouring war. Indeed, when first the reformists and then the Bolsheviks assumed power, the country faced military defeat, economic collapse, and famine along with the breakdown of political authority, jeopardizing the very survival of the state. These were the extreme circumstances which brought the Bolsheviks to power and, at the same time, weighed on their rule from the creation. The fact that the revolution in backward Russia at once failed to spread to central Europe and was locked in by the advanced Western powers and Japan substantially complicated the Bolsheviks’ gargantuan task.

Just as there is no historical explanation without comparison, explicit or implicit, there is none without theory. History may well be the least scientific of all the sciences, and by virtue of its flux and indetermination historical analysis balks conceptual rigor. ³⁸ Even so, historians formulate their questions and explanations with the help of theoretics and concepts, whether they do so out loud or sotto voce.³⁹ In this study of the revolutionary or founding Furies I willfully and explicitly look to political and social theorists for help in framing questions, analytic constructs, and arguments: Machiavelli and Hobbes; Montaigne and Montesquieu; Burke and Maistre; Tocqueville and Marx; Weber and Schmitt; Arendt and Ricoeur.

Of course, this theoretical borrowing is not innocent. It is informed by the same subjective valuations which inform every other aspect of the historical quest. There is, above all, the risk of perverting the inner logic of a unified theoretical construct by appropriating one of its sub-theorems to bolster a historical exploration or argument. It is of small comfort that as users of history … fabricated … and valorized … by others, theorists are equally predatory and risk perverting historical constructions when marshaling discrete historical facts and events to support their reasoning.⁴⁰ Above all, theorists tend to slight chronology, while historians never lose from sight that historical time is the plasma in which events are immersed, and the environment from which they derive their meaning. ⁴¹

It is as difficult to reasonably and effectively blend fact and theory as it is to blend narrative and thematics. In his magisterial critical history of the French Revolution, Edgar Quinet consciously combined thematics and theoretics, but without ignoring diachronics.⁴² Breaking new ground, Quinet devoted a separate and long chapter, entitled Theory of the Terror, to a probing conceptual and comparative discussion of what he considered the most problematic and contested aspect of the French Revolution.⁴³ But he also emphasized, strongly, that any attempt to explain the Terror called for a careful reconstruction of dates. According to Quinet, not to pay close attention to the chronology of the clashes between the old and the new France is to isolate the French Revolution in time … and suspend it in a vacuum. And to tell its story without taking account of the forces of opposition, which as often as not were on the offensive, is like telling the story of a military battle without taking account of the enemy army. ⁴⁴ Indeed, to interpret the French and Russian revolutions, particularly their Furies, undialectically is to risk rendering them either as infamous chapters in the history of human madness and crime or as dreadful and fatal calamities—as inevitable real-life tragedies. Usually the past masters of such constructions ascribe the crescendo of violence to a convergence of the irresistible force of a messianic and Manichaean belief system with the iron will of an all-powerful and demonic leader. Ultimately such over-ideologized and over-personalized explanations are obsessively monocausal. In historical discourse, all too often the fixation on a single cause is merely the insidious form of a search for a responsible person premised on a value judgment. Unlike the lawyer, who pleads a case, and the judge, who holds the scales, the critical historian asks ‘why,’ and realizes that the answer will not be simple. ⁴⁵

NOTES

1. Alain Rey, Révolution: Histoire d’un mot (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), pp. 17–18; and John Dunn, Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 12.

2. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1965), p. 41.

3. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon, 1966), pp. 103–4, 485–86, 491, and 505. See also E. H. Carr, What Is History? (New York: Vintage, 1961), p. 102.

4. James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 193–94 and pp. 226–27.

5. Arendt, On Revolution, p. 13. See also Dana R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 156 and p. 171.

6. See his opening lecture of 1845 in Jules Michelet, Cours au Collège de France, 1838–1851, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), vol. 2, p. 17.

7. Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Modern Library, 1940), p. 21 (The Prince, ch. VI).

8. Wolfgang Sofsky, Traktat über die Gewalt (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1996).

9. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Thomas Hobbes, vol. 1 (London, 1812), bk. 3, pp. 183–87; trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1954), bk. 3, pp. 207–12; trans. Steven Lattimore (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1998), bk. 3, chs. 80–84.

10. Michel de Montaigne, Essais, bk. 2, ch. 23.

11. Nicolas Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1948), pp. 131–32.

12. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem (Boston: Beacon, 1947/1969), p. xxxiv.

13. Chateaubriand, Mémoires d’Outre-tombe, vol. III, 12:4.

14. Rod Aya, Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Methods of Collective Violence, in Theory and Society 8:1 (July 1979): pp. 40–45.

15. Jacob Burckhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1978), p. 174.

16. Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford: Hoover Institution of War, Revolution, and Peace, 1964), pp. 6–7.

17. Arendt, On Revolution, p. 8 and pp. 47–48.

18. See Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

19. Burckhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen, p. 177.

20. Arno J. Mayer, Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe, 1870–1956: An Analytic Framework (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), chs. 2–3.

21. See Claude Mazauric, "Autopsie d’un échec: La résistance à l’anti-révolution et la défaite de la contre-révolution," in François Lebrun and Roger Dupuy, eds., Les résistances à la Révolution: Actes du Colloque de Rennes, 17–21 Septembre 1985 (Paris: Imago, 1987), pp. 237–44.

22. Isaiah Berlin, cited in Raymond Tallis, Enemies of Hope: A Critique of Contemporary Pessimism (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 1.

23. Tallis, Enemies, p. 2, p. 61, and p. 55.

24. Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New York: Doubleday, 1967); and Roger Caillois, L’homme et le sacré, 3rd ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1950).

25. Paul Langford, ed., The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, vol. 9 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), p. 156; and Arendt, On Revolution, p. 19, p. 27, and p. 39.

26. Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror, p. xxxiii.

27. Aya, Theories, pp. 46–48.

28. Daniel Mornet, Les origines intellectuelles de la Révolution française, 1715–1878, 6th ed. (Paris: Colin, 1967), p. 217.

29. See Timothy Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture, 1789–1790 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

30. Roger Chartier, Les origines culturelles de la Révolution française (Paris: Seuil, 1990), pp. 14–15.

31. Edgar Quinet, La Révolution (Paris: Belin, 1987), p. 45.

32. Robespierre, Discours et rapports à la convention (Paris: 10/18, 1965), p. 190.

33. Eugen Rosenstock, Die europäischen Revolutionen: Volkscharaktere und Staatenbildung (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1931), ch. 1; and Jacques Ellul, Autopsie de la révolution (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1969), ch. 1.

34. The Holy Family, in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 4 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), p. 23 (italics in text).

35. Marc Bloch, Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes, in Bloch, Mélanges historiques, vol. 1 (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1963), pp. 16–40, esp. p. 17 and p. 38.

36. Bloch, Pour une histoire comparée, p. 17.

37. Ernest Gellner, Times Literary Supplement, December 9, 1994. See also Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879–1921 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 187–89.

38. Burckhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen, p. 83.

39. See Paul Veyne, Comment on écrit l’histoire (Paris: Seuil, 1971), esp. pp. 174–82.

40. Michel Foucault in Quinzaine littéraire, March 1 and 15, 1986, and Foucault, Dits et écrits, 1954–1988, vol. 4 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), pp. 73–75. For the problematic relationship between history and sociology, see Rudolf Hamann, Revolution und Evolution: Zur Bedeutung einer historischen akzentuierten Soziologie (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1981), pp. 11–17.

41. Marc Bloch, Apologie pour l’histoire ou métier d’historien (Paris: Colin, 1974), p. 36.

42. Quinet, La Révolution, p. 61.

43. Ibid., ch. 17.

44. Ibid., p. 55 and pp. 70–71.

45. Bloch, Apologie, p. 156; A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1962), p. 13; Carr, What Is History?, pp. 99–100 and p. 113. See also Carlo Ginzburg, Le juge et l’histoire (Paris: Verdier, 1997), passim.

PART ONE

Conceptual Signposts

Francisco Goya: The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters (preparatory drawing for the Caprichos), 1797

CHAPTER 1

Revolution

REVOLUTION is a word-concept of multiple meanings. It evokes dialectically linked oppositions: light and darkness; rupture and continuity; disorder and order; liberation and oppression; salvation and damnation; hope and disillusion.¹ Precisely because it is Janus-faced, revolution is intrinsically tempestuous and savage. The Furies of revolution are fueled above all by the resistance of the forces and ideas opposed to it. This confrontation turns singularly fierce once it becomes clear that revolution entails and promises—or threatens—a thoroughly new beginning or foundation of polity and society. Hannah Arendt rightly insists that revolutions are the only political events which confront us directly and inevitably with the problem of beginning. ² Comprehensive and forced, as well as rapid, such an uncommon fresh start involves not only the radical mutation of the established governing and ruling elites but also the simultaneous desacralization of the old order and the consecration of the new in the urgent quest for legitimacy.

Revolution provokes enormous resistance in part because it entails far-reaching changes not only in politics but also in society and culture, including church and religion. In 1789 in France and in 1917 in Russia state and church were firmly joined, and there was no reforming the one without reforming the other, and without redefining their relationship, precipitating a struggle occasioning an escalation from liberal to illiberal secularism. Indeed, society being largely built and cemented on a foundation of religion … it is impossible to loosen the cement and shake the foundation without endangering the superstructure. ³ Since the ideologically fired presumption to recast political and civil society, including its sacred core, transcends national borders, it also arouses strong resistance abroad. By reason of its ideology, which disturbs the international system, revolution is an intrinsically world-historical phenomenon. It becomes a potent siren for sympathizers and converts far and wide; at the same time, it looms as a ubiquitous specter for foreign powers, which then provide the lifeblood for resistance in the world arena and in the epicenter of the revolutionary eruption as well.

Shortly after the first anniversary of the French Revolution, before the Great Terror, Count de Mirabeau, without losing faith, avowed that he never believed in a great revolution without bloodshed and that he considered civil war a necessary evil. ⁴ Over a century later, before 1914, Jean Jaurès, while reflecting critically on the French Revolution and forewarning of an Armageddon pregnant with another revolution, still considered revolution a necessary and fruitful, even if barbarous means of progress. ⁵ But after 1945, following Europe’s harrowing Second Thirty Years War, marked by extreme revolution and counterrevolution, Hannah Arendt concluded, as noted, that no matter how outrageous the circumstances of the powers that be … freedom had been better served in countries where no revolution had ever broken out. ⁶

Except in some precincts of the Third World, where political freedoms cannot take first or absolute priority, the principle of revolution is either utterly disvalued or so redefined as to fit revolutions that are found acceptable, even extolled, this side of paradise: the revolutions without revolution of 1789 to 1792 in France and of February–March 1917 in Russia, or the recent velvet revolutions in eastern and east-central Europe. In this day and age the only genuine and virtuous revolution is said to be one in which at best limited violence, well short of terror, is used to force the establishment of a Rechtsstaat to guarantee individual rights, political freedoms, private property, and free-market capitalism. At the same time, by reason of its promiscuous use, the word revolution is being trivialized. Every single aspect of contemporary society, economy, and culture is said to be in perpetual revolution: business, finance, telecommunications, life sciences, medicine, health services, work, and leisure. What were once conceived as gradual mutations have been reconceived as revolutions, most of them represented in essentially positive terms, and this despite the reigning disbelief in the idea of progress. Of course, the political fate of the word revolution has been extraordinary. In France, Marc Bloch noted, "whereas the ultras of 1815 shuddered at the very word revolution, those of 1940 used it to dissemble their coup d’etat."⁷ Since then, as if in extension of Vichy’s practice, it has become increasingly fashionable to characterize the National Socialist takeover and regime in Germany a revolution rather than a counterrevolution.

Meanwhile the inherently polarizing duality of the blinding promise and panic fear of revolution continues to perplex historians and social theorists as much as it confounded contemporaries of the French and Russian revolutions. Precisely because of the built-in tension between its light and dark sides, revolution continues to be one of the most vexed historical and political questions. Indeed, it is a topic about which it is neither possible nor proper to be neutral … [and] value-free. ⁸ There are good reasons to distrust scholars and public intellectuals who allege that ideology is the thinking of my adversary ⁹ while claiming the high ground of objectivity for themselves even as they brace it with pluralistic liberalism or conservatism which excludes the revolutionary hypothesis. ¹⁰ Ultimately the study of revolution bears out Benedetto Croce’s aphorism that all genuine history is contemporary history. ¹¹

The word-concept of revolution has a history, its changing meanings being defined in arguments advanced in specific contexts and expressed in contemporaneous language and rhetoric.¹² Intellectuals and scholars contribute to this periodic redefinition, probing current understandings which, by virtue of the apparent contradictions, they consider to be inadequately conceived and theorized.¹³ In any case, the components, structures, dynamics, and contours of the word-concept of revolution are periodically revised in the light of changing circumstances, and so are its correlations with other concepts, which are equally subject to revision. But at all times revolution has many meanings in that whatever the context, the word seems to overflow the precise and definite meaning assigned to it. ¹⁴ Whoever uses the word-concept of revolution freights it with his or her particular idea of its nature and dynamics. This is as true of splitters and nominalists as it is of lumpers and holists. Whereas the former presumably foreswear totalizing and dialectical reason, the latter implicitly embrace it. But whatever their methodological premises, students of revolution tend to seek unifying explanations in part to master their own unease in face of a perplexing and disquieting problem which tests the limits of understanding and justification.

Prior to the seventeenth century, with kings and princes ruling by divine right, willful rebellions were unthinkable for being profane and sinful. It was a time when revolution went by the name of civil war, which was considered a subspecies of war fueled by feudal, seignorial, or confessional conflicts.¹⁵ Montesquieu noted that there were plenty of civil wars without revolutions ; and not unlike Voltaire after him, he envisaged the overturn of despotic government without civil war.¹⁶ Impressed by the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which marked the establishment of a constitutional monarchy without bloodshed and terror, Voltaire and his fellow dissidents began to conceive of revolution as a counter-concept opposite civil war, which they considered a legacy of the fanatical religious parties which would be left behind by the advance of civilization. ¹⁷ Ultimately the intention and outcome of the revolution in England was a restoration of monarchic power. This was in keeping with the cyclical connotations of the term revolution which politics appropriated from astronomy. Besides, in England the final moment of 1688 was called revolution, not the Puritan rebellion and the civil wars of mid-century. This was in contrast to France a century later, where it was precisely the first moment that went by that name.¹⁸

The revolution in America, like that in England, was actually a restoration. The secessionists of the Thirteen Colonies fought a war of liberation against the British government for having violated England’s own political principles which the rebels claimed for themselves. No wonder the colonists represented this founding act as their War of Independence, and it was not until a decade after 1776, and especially after 1789, that it began to go by the name of American Revolution. Like the Glorious Revolution, it was driven by tradition. The rebels never intended to bring about major changes in the colonies’ moral, social, or economic values or institutions. The political and civil freedoms which were reclaimed were not extended to Blacks and Native Americans, who easily accounted for one-fifth of a total population of 2.5 million. To be sure, numerous Loyalists fought on the side of the British against the insurgents, but there was nothing counterrevolutionary about this resistance, whose core values were not at war with those of their adversaries. Nor was there a civil war following the establishment of the new and independent American government, at any rate not until 1861. Although within a generation or two there were considerable changes in the political practices, social relationships, and cultural tastes of the ex-colonial society, none of them had been imagined or projected by the secessionists and they evolved gradually, without brutal ruptures with the past.¹⁹

By contrast, the French and Russian revolutions were anything but cyclical and restorative. Both were made by self-conscious revolutionaries open or sworn to new ideas. Admittedly, in 1788 ready-made ideological canons or blueprints were nonexistent in France: at best a dozen writers professed to be true republicans and revolutionaries, and they were very obscure. ²⁰ The advocates of disestablishment of the Gallican Church were equally scarce. The ideas, agents, and agencies of the lumières (Enlightenment) had, however, fostered an atmosphere favorable to questioning, but not defying, the reign of privilege, feudalism, and absolutism. When the Estates-General met in the spring of 1789, enlightened and progressive factions of the ruling and governing classes looked for constitutional, fiscal, and legal reforms respectful of the person and office of Louis XVI, as well as of the spirit of the monarchist regime. In the summer and fall of that same year, however, when the National Assembly abolished seignorial rights and feudal privileges and adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, this not only represented a drastic acceleration of the revolutionary process, but was also associated with a decisive change in the very meaning of the word-concept revolution. These spectacular measures were voted under the pressure of events, and carried the imprint of the critical ideas and principles of the unstructured dissidence of the eighteenth century. But this was also the moment of the sudden emergence of political actors who represented themselves to be revolutionaries as they plunged into the emergent debates and struggles over the direction and defense of what they here and now proclaimed to be the Great Revolution. It was these self-proclaimed and self-conscious revolutionaries who may be said to have invented the Enlightenment, in that they harnessed the writings of the philosophes to ground their legitimacy and philosophic genealogy as well as to justify their actions.²¹