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Additionally, the formation of the Awakening Groups,

which helped downgrade al-Qaeda in Sunni areas and reduced sectarian violence in Baghdad, had further strengthened Maliki and reconstructed his image as a

strong and determined leader. Building on those successes, Maliki formed State of Law (SOL), a Da’wa-led coalition which emerged as the largest

and most popular Shia coalition in both the provincial

election of 2009 and the general election of 2010. He subsequently became more condent in making his own

decisions, pursuing a more aggressive approach, and acting in a more authoritarian way, in particular seeking

to consolidate his personal power over state institutions.

Although he could not acquire full control, he was heading in that direction, especially after his sweeping victory in

the general election of April 2014. This explains why the Muqtada al-Sadr movement and

ISCI decided to overcome their history of hostility and work together to counter the threat caused by Maliki’s

increasing popularity and his consolidation of power.

But it was only when Mosul, the second largest Iraqi city, fell to ISIS, and several units of the Iraqi army collapsed, that new conditions for challenging Maliki began to

materialize. The United States blamed Maliki and his

policies for intensifying the sectarian divide that had created a suitable environment for ISIS to recruit and

mobilize and to acquire territory. U.S. ofcials concluded

that it was necessary to have a less divisive prime minister

in order to advance the war against ISIS.

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The most powerful Shia cleric in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, also

favored removing Maliki. Additionally, several senior

Da’wa members, including Abadi, thought that Maliki’s

insistence on staying in ofce for a third term would jeopardize the party’s chances of maintaining the prime ministership. At the end, Maliki was left with only one major backer: Iran. Despite Iran’s backing, however, the party could not ignore Sistani’s will. In the end, Sistani’s position and the United States’ desire to see a new prime

minister put enough pressure on Iran so that it withdrew

its support for Maliki.

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Shia religious authorities and major groups, particularly the Sadr movement and ISCI, hoped that Abadi would be

less authoritarian and more willing to share power. Their long-term objective was to undermine Maliki’s inuence

within state institutions and the military, which, as prime minister and commander-in-chief, he had managed to

solidify by appointing his loyalists to key senior positions. In the end, Da’wa and other State of Law (SOL) leaders

were emboldened to propose a new candidate for the

position.

In August 2014, the Shia Alliance accepted the nomination of Abadi to be the new prime minister, and the Iraqi president, Fuad Masum, asked him to form a new

government, notwithstanding Maliki’s objections.

Abadi’s Prime Ministership: Undoing Maliki

Despite the broad support that existed for replacing

Maliki, Iraqi political parties have been less interested in installing an effective prime minister and enabling him to

succeed. Undoing Maliki was the main objective, even if

the price was to move back to the 2006 conditions, with

a weak prime minister amidst a chaotic political scene. Abadi had to choose between ghting the inuential

networks that Maliki had embedded within state institutions, or allying with the latter in order to secure

the support of SOL, which was still led by the previous prime minister. The conict between Abadi’s need to be

different from Maliki and his desire not to be at the mercy

of other political groups helps explain his hesitation and indecisiveness, as well as some of his political ventures. When Abadi came to ofce, the main challenge he faced was to prove that he was different from Maliki. He spent his rst months in ofce trying to distance himself from

the latter’s legacy by adopting a more institutionally based and inclusive style of leadership, building better

relations with Parliament and exhibiting a higher level of administrative professionalism. Specically, Abadi took three signicant steps toward reversing Maliki’s leadership style. The rst was to eliminate the position of

commander in chief, which Maliki had used to circumvent the Ministry of Defense and make military decisions in

isolation from the formal chain of command. This was

seen as a necessary step toward restructuring the Iraqi army according to professional standards, especially as it was followed by replacing most of the military commanders that had served under Maliki with new

ones.

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Secondly, Abadi’s government agreed on the “cabinet by-

law:” a set of rules governing the meetings of the Council of Ministers in such a way as to organize its decision- making process. Non-Da’wa parties had often argued that

the absence of this by-law had helped Maliki concentrate

the government’s powers in his ofce. This measure was

intended, at least theoretically, to make the operations of the government a collective responsibility, rather than

concentrating it in Abadi’s own person.