Now again, if naturalism were an excuse to treat each other like objects, as in the Frankfurt School’s criticism of consumer society, for example, then indeed Sartre may have a point about the pragmatist’s self-deception. In reducing philosophies to “models,” the naturalist may be privileging “facticity” or the world of the “in-itself,” in which case pragmatism might be a rationalization of our failure to take personal responsibility for our choices. And indeed, the naturalist is liable to objectify everyone in the search of transhuman godhood, since divinity would be equated with dominance and our power would derive from technological enhancements of our bodies, not so much from any need for wisdom in using that power. This indicates that something like Sartre’s version of authenticity likewise needs to be reformulated to provide us with a sobering reminder that people (things that are for themselves) aren’t just objects, contrary to overly reductionistic versions of naturalism. Indeed, there’s a ready place for such authenticity, since the pragmatist is likely condemned to going back and forth between models, in which case she has to suffer their imperfect coherence, that is, the incompleteness of even our best worldview . Instead of needing to reconcile our concrete limitations with our spontaneity, we’re left with having to reconcile naturalism with Sartre’s existentialism, and in either case we’re unlikely to fully succeed. So the existential struggle and absurdity remain.