So now that the base requirements are established, it makes sense to extend the function of the effort and improve the protocol. This proposal outlines the use of Transaction commitments in conjunction with an associated commitment pool. A Transaction commitment simply consists of a cryptographic attestation (signed message) that a payee commits not to spend a UTXO (or series of) to any other recieving address than the one attested to, before a required expiry time in the future. Miners hold the set of all commitments, and check incoming transactions against this set in order to decide to reject the transaction if it conflicts with any commitment. This creates a separation of concerns, which improves the performance of miners seeking double spends by eliminating many comparison operations which would otherwise take place against the transaction pool. This of course makes the bold assumption, that every transaction generated by the network must first be required to broadcast a transaction commitment. Without this all or nothing constraint, the regular method of seeking double spends would still be required. Merchants can interactively recieve an acknowledgement that the commitment has entered the commitment pool, and subsequently broadcast the primary transaction in a fire-and-forget manner. From the merchant perspective this is identical to the current method of confirmation by delay.