Almost two years since the government selected the French company Naval Group to design Australia’s future submarine (FSM), it is timely to review that decision in the light of Australia’s evolving strategic challenges.

The acquisition of new military capability should be derived from the government’s defence strategy, which in turn depends on the level and nature of the threat confronting Australia. Herein lies the first problem; other than reliance on the United States under ANZUS, it is not clear that Australia has a well-defined defence strategy. Indeed, the ADF’s force structure is primarily designed for coalition warfare rather than for the independent defence of Australia.

A formation of Collins-class submarines moves through Gage Roads and Cockburn Sound. Petty Officer Photographer Damian Pawlenko

One key question, therefore, is whether the government should develop an independent strategy to address the contingency that Australia might be drawn into a high-level conflict with a major power without being able to rely on the military support of the United States. The second question then is how well the current $50 billion acquisition programme for the FSM would fit within the capability requirement derived from such a strategy, noting that the need for submarines would increase disproportionately if we were defending Australia independently.

In response to the first question, while Australia’s strategic environment may not have changed much over the last two years, perhaps our understanding of the nature of the future threat has developed significantly. After all, the 2009 Defence White Paper canvassed the possibility that in the future Australia could confront a great power adversary without US support. That scenario, regarded by some as rather fanciful at the time, is now almost commonplace among defence analysts.

It is becoming clear, for example, that in contesting regional leadership with the US, one of China’s strategic objectives is to be able to enforce a policy of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) against the US Navy, specifically its carrier battle groups, in the South China Sea. Emerging technologies in land-based ballistic and hypersonic missiles will make surface battle groups a threatened species in future conflicts. In the medium term, China’s A2/AD strategy could also extend into the Indo-Pacific region more broadly by the establishment of one or more forward bases.

In response to this challenge, particularly under ‘America First’, it is possible that the US would decide that its future national interest would be best served by retiring to Hawaii and, by default, ceding leadership in the Indo-Pacific to China. This would have profound implications for Australia’s foreign and defence policies.

Given the rapid increase in its defence budget, China might be able to present a credible threat in our region by the mid-2020s. This is not to say that China has any intention of attacking Australia and it is overwhelmingly in both countries’ interests to maintain a harmonious relationship. But wars can happen by default; were there to be a conflict over Taiwan, for example, who knows where that would end. Australia should develop, with some urgency, a strategy to defend itself in a conflict with a great power. This cannot be achieved overnight.

Australia is a big, remote country and, as Japan discovered in 1942, it is difficult to invade. Submarines are the classic means by which a weaker power can level the playing field and prosecute asymmetric warfare in its defence. Yet Australia has a very long coastline to defend and currently operates only six submarines of the Collins class, which are on the verge of obsolescence. This allows for a maximum of two ageing submarines to be in their areas of operations (AOs) at any time. Because their base is far distant from these AOs, they also face a major disadvantage with about 30 days of a 55-day patrol spent in transit.

In defending Australia, how would the submarine force operate? Current doctrine is for Australian submarines both to loiter outside naval bases in order to attack warships and submarines, and also to patrol the choke points in the Indonesian archipelago to prevent hostile forces from penetrating Australian waters.

To prosecute these missions effectively, a sizeable submarine force would be necessary. With 18 conventional submarines, for example, it is likely that a maximum of six could be on patrol at any one time. This would be the minimum force required, before allowing for the likelihood of attrition. Were the adversary to develop a forward base, more submarines, perhaps 24, would be needed. If some of the submarines were nuclear powered and therefore much faster and more powerful, perhaps fewer boats would be required. Indeed, it may be that the most efficient submarine force would include more than one class of submarine.

While the government has recognised the need to increase the size of Australia’s submarine force, not only is its ambition inadequate but it is also moving much too slowly. Were Naval Group’s design to be accepted, twelve extraordinarily expensive conventional submarines will enter service between 2034 and 2050. As with all ab initio submarine designs, they will inevitably be delivered late. In addition, and apparently against the advice of the French, they are being designed with an inefficient pump-jet propulsion system only found on nuclear submarines. They also will not incorporate air-independent propulsion, a critical new technology that allows a submerged endurance of up to three weeks rather than three days.

Apart from installing new sensors, the government has decided not to undertake a comprehensive life extension of Collins. This implies that these submarines will be unable responsibly to be sent into harm’s way beyond the late 2020s. This will leave Australia with an unacceptably dangerous capability gap as the new submarines come on stream. Eventually, in the mid-2030s, one submarine, at best, will be available for operations. This would not constitute a credible deterrent.

Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull speaks during a visit to Naval Group Submarine Ship yard in Cherbourg in 2017. AAP

What then should the government do? First of all, while continuing the contracted design process with Naval Group, as a matter of urgency order six new submarines based on a military off-the-shelf (MOTS) design. These would replace Collins and could be built in Australia subject to acceptable cost and delivery criteria. Secondly, address the issue of long transits by developing either a fixed or floating forward base with fly-in, fly-out facilities for crews.

Next, in the early 2020s, decide between ordering more MOTS boats, building the French design or perhaps taking a different approach. This could involve starting the lengthy process of acquiring nuclear submarines and also procuring underwater drones. An early discussion of these options could usefully occur during the forthcoming visit of President Macron.

Under the Constitution, a key role for the Commonwealth is to protect the nation against attack. In this time of strategic uncertainty, we cannot be confident that the government has a strategy and an acquisitions policy in place that will allow it to discharge this constitutional responsibility. At the least, it needs to focus urgently on accelerating and expanding its submarine procurement programme.

Dr Michael Keating is a former head of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Jon Stanford is a Director of Insight Economics and was a senior official in PM&C in the 1990s.