Abstract

How does state repression affect civilians’ preferences for dissent? This essay examines administrative demolition orders issued against Palestinian structures in the West Bank. As administrative demolition is a penalty for illegal building and is not provoked by Palestinian violence and radicalization, the policy’s impact can be estimated while avoiding the challenge of reverse causality. Drawing on United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Demolition Order database and Palestinian opinion polls during 2001–12, the study finds that in the long run, the policy hardens preferences: as the number of demolition orders issued increases, Palestinians are more likely to oppose peace and support violence against Israelis. By demonstrating the provocative effect of collective threat, the study sheds light on a mechanism by which repression backfires. For the policy of administrative demolition, the findings suggest that while ostensibly exogenous to conflict dynamics, the practice has consequences for the peace process.