The draft of the executive order on cybersecurity calls for a review of cyber capabilities and vulnerabilities.

Executive Order??Strengthening U.S. Cyber Security and Capabilities

EXECUTIVE ORDER

STRENGTHENING U.S. CYBER SECURITY AND CAPABILITIES

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States

of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Policy.

It is the policy of the United States to defend and enhance the security of the Nation?s cyber

infrastructure and capabilities. Free and secure use of cyberspace is essential to advancing US.

national interests. The Internet is a vital national resource. Cyberspace must be an environment

that fosters ef?ciency, innovation, communication, and economic prOSperity without disruption,

fraud, theft, or invasion of privacy. The United States is committed to: ensuring the long-term

strength of the Nation in cyberspace; preserving the ability of the United States to decisively

shape cyberspace relative to other international, state, and non-state actors; employing the full

spectrum of our capabilities to defend US. interests in cyberspace; and identifying, disrupting,

and defeating malicious cyber actors.

Sec. 3. Findings.

America?s civilian government institutions and critical infrastructure are currently vulnerable

to attacks from both state and non-state actors. Criminals, terrorists, and state and non-state

actors are engaging in continuous operations that impose signi?cant costs on the US. economy

and signi?cantly harm vital national interests. These operations may disrupt or disable the

functioning of important economic institutions and critical infrastructure, and may potentially

cause physical effects that could result in signi?cant property damage and loss of life.

The cyber realm is undergoing constant, rapid change as a result of the pace of technological

innovation, the explosive global growth in Internet use, the increasing interdependencies

between the networks and the Operations of infrastructure and key economic institutions, and the

continuously evolving nature of cyberattacks and attackers.

As a result of these changes, cyberSpace has emerged as a new domain of engagement,

comparable in signi?cance to land, sea, air, and space, and its signi?cance will increase in the

years ahead.

The Federal Government has a reSponsibility to defend America from cyberattacks that could

threaten US. national interests or cause signi?cant damage to Americans? personal or economic

security. That responsibility extends to protecting both privately and publicly operated critical

networks and infrastructure. At the same time, the need for dynamism, ?exibility, and

innovation in cyber security demands that government exercise its responsibility in close

cooperation with private sector entities.

The executive departments and agencies (agencies) tasked with protecting civilian

government networks and critical infrastructure are not currently organized to act collectively/

collaboratively, tasked, or resourced, or provided with legal authority adequate to succeed in

their missions.

3. De?nitions. As used in this order:

The term ?critical infrastructure? means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so

vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems would have a

debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or

any combination of those matters.

The term ?national security system? means any telecommunications or information system

Operated by the Federal Government or any contractor on its behalf, the function, operation, or

use of which?

involves intelligence activities;

(ii) involves activities related to national security;

involves command and control of military forces;

(iv) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; or

is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions (but does not include a

system used for routine administrative and business applications, including payroll, finance,

logistics, and personnel management applications).

Policy Coordination.

Policy coordination, guidance, diSpute resolution, and periodic in-progress reviews for the

functions and programs described and assigned in this order shall be provided through the

interagency process established in National Security Presidential Directive of January 21,

2017 (Organization of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council), or any

successor.

Q. Review of Cyber Vulnerabilities.

Scope and Timing.

A review of the most critical U.S. cyber vulnerabilities (Vulnerabilities Review) shall

commence immediately.

(ii) Within 60 days of the date of this order, initial recommendations for the protection of

US. national security systems shall be submitted to the President through the Secretary

of Defense.

Within 60 days of the date of this order, initial recommendations for the enhanced

protection of the most critical civilian Federal Government, public, and private sector

infrastructure, other than US. national security systems, shall be submitted to the

President through the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(iv) The recommendations shall include steps to ensure that the responsible agencies are

appropriately organized, tasked, and resourced, and provided with adequate legal

authority necessary to ful?ll their missions.

Review Participants. The Secretary of Defense shall co?chair the Vulnerabilities Review with

the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security

and Counterterrorism.

(0) Operation ofthe Vulnerabilities Review. The Co-Chairs of the Vulnerabilities Review shall

assemble all information in the possession of the Federal Government that pertains to the most

urgent vulnerabilities to national security systems, the most urgent vulnerabilities to civilian

Federal Government networks, and the most critical private sector infrastructure. All agencies

shall comply with any request of the Co-Chairs to provide information in their

possession or control pertaining to US. cyber vulnerabilities. The Secretary of Defense, the

Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and

the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism may seek further

information relevant to the Vulnerabilities Review from any appropriate source.

Review of Cyber Adversaries.

Scope and Timing.

A review of the principal U.S. cyber adversaries (Adversaries Review) shall

commence immediately.

(ii) Within 60 days of the date of this order, a ?rst report on the identities, capabilities,

and vulnerabilities of the principal U.S. cyber adversaries shall be submitted to the

President through the Director of National Intelligence.

Review Pariiczpanis. The Director ofNational Intelligence shall co-chair the Adversaries

Review with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense. the Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs, and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security

and Counterterrorism.

(0) Operation ofthe Adversaries Review. The Co-Chairs of the Adversaries Review shall

assemble all information in the possession of the Federal Government that pertains to the

identities, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of US. cyber adversaries. All agencies shall

comply with any request of the Co-Chairs to provide information in their possession or control

pertaining to US. cyber adversaries. The Co~Chairs may seek further information relevant to the

Adversaries Review from any appropriate source.

2. US. Cyber Capabilities Review.

Scope and Timing.

Based on the results of sections 5 and 6 of this order, a review of the relevant cyber

capabilities of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the

National Security Agency (Capabilities Review) shall identify an initial set of capabilities

needing improvement to adequately protect U.S. critical infrastructure.

(ii) The Capabilities Review?s recommendations shall include steps to ensure that the

responsible agencies are appropriately organized, tasked, and resourced, and provided

with adequate legal authority necessary to ful?ll their missions.

Participants. The Secretary of Defense shall co?chair the Capabilities Review, with the

Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the National Security Agency.

(0) Operation ofCapobz?lz?ries Review. The Co-Chairs of the Capabilities Review shall assemble

all information in the possession of the Federal Government that pertains to relevant cyber

capabilities of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the

National Security Agency. All agencies shall comply with any request of the Co?

Chairs to provide information in their possession or control pertaining to US. cyber capabilities.

The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of the National

Security Agency may seek further information relevant to the Capabilities Review from any

appropriate source.

Workforce DeveZopmenr Review. In order to ensure that the United States has a long-term

cyber capability advantage, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security shall

also gather and review information from the Department of Education regarding computer

science, mathematics, and cyber security education from primary through higher education to

understand the ?ll] scope of US. efforts to educate and train the workforce of the future. The

Secretary of Defense shall make recommendations as he sees ?t in order to best position the US.

educational system to maintain its competitive advantage into the future.

Sec. Private Sector Infrastructure Incentives Report.

Scope and Timing.

Preparation of a Report on options to incentivize private sector adeption of effective

cyber security measures (Report) shall commence immediately.

(ii) Within 100 days of the date of this order, the Report recommending options shall be

submitted to the President through the Secretary of Commerce.

Participants. The Secretary of Commerce shall co-chair the group preparing the Report, with

the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Assistant to the

President for Economic Affairs. The Secretary of Commerce may also invite the Chair of the

Securities and Exchange Commission and the Chair of the Federal Trade Commission to

participate.

(0) Operation ofReport. The Co-Chairs of the group that prepared the Report shall review and

expand on existing reports on economic and other incentives to: induce private sector owners and

operators of the Nation?s critical infrastructure to maximize protective measures; invest in cyber

enterprise risk management tools and services; and adopt best practices with respect to processes

and technologies necessary for the increased sharing of and response to real-time cyber threat

information. All agencies shall comply with any request of the Co-Chairs to identify

those economic policies and incentives capable of accelerating investments in cyber security

tools, services, and software. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the

Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs may

seek further information relevant to the Report from any appropriate source.

Sec. 2. General Provisions.

This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability

of appropriations.

Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or any head

thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Of?ce of Management and Budget relating to

budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(0) All actions taken pursuant to this order shall be consistent with requirements and authorities

to protect intelligence and law enforcement sources and methods. Nothing in this order shall be

interpreted to supersede measures established under authority of law to protect the security and

integrity of speci?c activities and associations that are in direct support of intelligence and law

enforcement Operations.

This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or bene?t, substantive or

procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its

departments, agencies, or entities, its of?cers, employees, or agents, or any other person.