2. WORSENING SMUGGLERS’ TACTICS?

THE EFFECTS OF EUNAVFOR MED

While Frontex and other actors are blaming the NGO SAR assets’ presence close to the Libyan coast for leading to a shift in smugglers’ practices towards deteriorating conditions of crossing, shifting strategies were already recorded by EUNAVFOR MED over 2015, and described as a consequence of the anti-smuggling operation.

While we will argue in the next section that there were other factors influencing these shifts relating to developments on Libyan soil, in this section we focus on establishing the timing of the shifts in smuggling tactics and understanding the impact of the EUNAVFOR MED operation on them. We rely on the two EUNAVFOR MED reports that were made public by Wikileaks, the first covering the period from June to December 2015, the second from January to October 2016. We further corroborated their findings through interviews with military personnel, reports from Frontex and the Italian Coast Guard, and the analysis of investigative journalists having interviewed smugglers in Libya.

EUNAVFOR MED’s mission was planned as a progression through four operational phases: first, surveillance activities; second, interception and destruction of vessels used for smuggling, initially on the high seas and eventually, if a UN resolution and Libyan consent was secured, into territorial waters; a third phase involving action on Libyan land following similar approval; and finally a fourth phase of handing over control of migration from Libya to Libyan authorities.

As of the beginning of the operation on 22 June 2015 until the end of September 2015, the EUNAVFOR MED mission mainly focused on surveillance. The operation established “a patrol cycle predominantly located in the south west of the operating area in what was determined the area of highest migration concentration” – the so called ‘Lampedusa triangle’. […] Throughout the summer months,” the report continues, “the first priority of the force was to establish a presence and develop an understanding of the patterns of life within the area” - analysing the “flow of migration vessels” and determining patterns and modus operandi of smugglers. During this phase, only 3,078 migrants were rescued, and few boats appear to have been destroyed.

It is only on the 7th of October 2015 that EUNAVFOR MED moved into Phase 2A, which “saw a shift in the force’s focus from intelligence gathering to interdiction of Smugglers and Traffickers on the high seas, as the first active step in the disruption of [their] business model.” In comparison to Phase 1, the force deployed for Phase 2A was substantially augmented by Member States. “At the height of the surge, nine surface units, a submarine, three fixed wing maritime patrol aircraft, five helicopters and one tactical UAV were deployed”, before being slightly reduced again as of the end of November in line with the seasonal decrease in crossings. During this phase, “airborne surveillance was stepped up to provide a near persistent presence across the southern boundary of the Lampedusa Triangle”, which in turn allowed naval assets to be “deployed tactically to effect interdiction, boarding and subsequent detention of escort, lookout or jackal Smuggler and Trafficker craft”.

By the end of 2015, the report indicates that 8,336 migrants had been rescued, 67 migrant vessels (wooden and rubber) had been destroyed, and 46 individuals had been detained by Italian authorities and investigated for smuggling and trafficking crimes. The EUNAVFOR MED report notes that this surge in activities had important effects on smugglers’ mode of operation, which were described as “vigilant and highly adaptive, quickly implementing changes in the established Modus Operandi in accordance with perceived threats and opportunities.”

EUNAVFOR MED first had an impact on the spatial logic of smugglers. Due to the deployment of the EUNAVFOR MED assets off the Libyan coast, the 2015 report notes that:

“smugglers can no longer operate with impunity in international waters. They have to stay within Libyan Territorial Waters, as they otherwise would be apprehended by EUNAVFOR Med operation SOPHIA assets.” EUNAVFOR MED, Six Monthly Report 2015

Second, the interdiction on the high seas and the destruction of migrants’ boats had an important impact on the shift from the use of wooden to rubber boats by smugglers. The 2015 report notes that:

“Wooden boats are more valuable than rubber dinghies because they can carry more people, hence more profit for smugglers and are more resilient to bad weather and can be re-used if recovered by smugglers. However, following operation SOPHIA entering into Phase 2A (High Seas), smugglers can no longer recover smuggling vessels on the High seas, effectively rendering them a less economic option for the smuggling business and thereby hampering it. Inflatable boats are used in two thirds of the cases and wooden boats in one third of the cases.” EUNAVFOR MED, Six Monthly Report 2015

Third, also in their 2015 report, EUNAVFOR MED had already reported worsening conditions of crossings offered by smugglers coinciding with the beginning of the operation, without however noting any causal link. “Since the start of the operation, we have seen an evolution in smugglers Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, which has been corroborated by reporting from FRONTEX.” Specifically, the report noted that:

“over the past 6 months we have seen smugglers provide migrant vessels with less fuel, food and water and launch them in more difficult weather conditions.” EUNAVFOR MED, Six Monthly Report 2015

What is fundamental to note here is that several of the evolutions in the practices of smugglers that are today being blamed on the nongovernmental flotilla were recorded over 2015, a period in which civilian assets were still marginal (accounting for only 13% of rescued people), and while NGO SAR assets operated mostly outside of the 24nm limit marking the Libyan contiguous zone. Instead of the NGOs, the EUNAVFOR MED report attributes many of these shifts to the effects of its own operation.

It is probable that the effects of the EUNAVOR MED operation were incremental, and were heightened as the operation continued to implement Phase 2A over 2016, as described in its second six monthly report, covering the period from January to the end of October 2016. It is over this period that the destruction of vessels stepped up. While only 67 boats had been destroyed in the operation’s first 6 months in 2015, in the next 10 months in 2016, this figure was multiplied fourfold to reach 269 vessels (225 rubber boats, 40 wooden boats and 4 speed boats). This figure does not include the vessels destroyed by the other actors – such as the Italian Navy within its operation Mare Sicuro and other Italian assets, which are also reported to have increasingly destroyed vessels since 2015. Furthermore, while Médecins Sans Frontières for example usually does not destroy vessels following SAR events, some SAR NGOs such as Sea-Watch also puncture rubber boats so as not to confuse them on their radar Military sources reported to us that between 75-80% of all intercepted vessels were destroyed over 2016.

As EUNAVFOR MED had already indicated in its first report, the increasing destruction of vessels contributed to heighten the tactical shifts in smugglers’ practices towards the use of rubber boats. By the end of February 2016, Frontex also had reported internally this shift without attributing any cause to it, other than the shortage in wooden boats:

“Thus far in 2016, inflatable dinghies (67) have been the main type of boat used to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Italy from Libya, while wooden boats were used in 2 incidents. Thus far in 2016, only ~3% of migrant vessels intercepted in the Central Mediterranean have been wooden boats, whereas in 2015 this percentage was around 25%.” Frontex, JO EPN Triton, Biweekly Analytical Update, no 2, 15-28 Feb, 3 March 2016, p. 3.

Over 2016, the share of vessels continued to shift towards small rubber boats, which came to be used in 70% of the SAR events, as shown by the data collected by Frontex and the Italian CG.

Because rubber boats carry less people at a time, and even more people than before sought to make the crossing in 2016, the reliance on rubber boats multiplied the number of SAR events – with 1,424 SAR events recorded by the Italian Coast Guard in 2016 against 906 in 2015.

Furthermore, by the end of March 2016, Frontex had already noted the tactic of smugglers to send off several rubber boats at once:

“migrants continue to report simultaneous departures of rubber dinghies from the Libyan coast in what seems to be one solution to the lack of wooden boats. Using this approach smuggling networks are able to smuggle several hundred migrants at the same time aboard rubber dinghies” Frontex, JO EPN Triton, Biweekly Analytical Update, no 4, 14-27 March, 31 March 2016, p. 3

Regarding these marked tactical shifts in early 2016 - the increasing use of rubber boats and multiple simultaneous departures - it is crucial to note that they were reported by Frontex between January and March 2016. At this point in time, there was only one single NGO SAR vessel deployed (SOS Méditerranée’s Aquarius), while other SAR NGO assets had not been deployed over the winter. As such, the allegation that the presence of SAR NGOs has been the driver of these tactical shifts must be ruled out. The evidence provided by the evaluation of EUNAVFOR MED of its own mission between 2015 and 2016, confirmed by interviews in Libya and the trends documented by the data compiled by the Italian Coast Guard and Frontex, thus demonstrates that the shifts in smugglers’ tactics registered at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 cannot be attributed to NGO SAR activities since these activities were limited during these periods. Rather, EUNAVFOR MED attributes these shifts, which increased the danger of the crossing, to the effects of its own operation.

In addition to being corroborated by several sources, the effects of the operation are further consistent with the effects of past anti-smuggling operations, which systematically lead to an evolution of smuggling tactics, usually entailing more risk for migrants, while the demand for the service of smugglers remains unchanged. While we have identified several instances in which Frontex noted smugglers’ tactical shifts that were consistent with those recorded by EUNAVFOR MED, it is surprising that Frontex and others did not ever note that these may be even partly related to the EUNAVFOR MED operation, which seems to remain entirely outside of their field of attention. Keeping EUNAVFOR MED’s effects on smugglers’ tactics outside of the frame of analysis has allowed Frontex and others in turn to blame these shifts on SAR NGOs, fuelling the toxic narrative against them.

THE TURMOIL IN LIBYA

While we have focused on the evolution and effects of the EUNAVFOR MED operation in the preceding section, it would be simplistic to attribute to it the sole responsibility for the evolution in the practices of smugglers. EUNAVFOR MED’s reports are mostly focused on documenting the effects of its own mission so as to justify its existence, and thus do not fully account for other actors and factors, in particular dynamics taking place on Libyan soil. While the political context in Libya makes detailed fieldwork difficult, our ongoing collaboration with investigative journalist Nancy Porsia and a recent report by Mark Micallef offer uniquely informed glimpses into smugglers’ practices and the evolving context in which they operate. When possible their findings have been corroborated with analysis from other sources such as Frontex. Through this prism, we can tell the same story of evolving smuggling tactics between 2015-2016 reconstructed above, but seen from the perspective of Libyan soil. What these insights demonstrate is that the growing Libyan turmoil and the smuggling practices that were allowed to proliferate within it had a far greater impact on the deteriorating conditions of crossing than the presence of SAR NGOs.

As we argued in Death by Rescue, the downward spiral in the conditions offered by Libyan smugglers has been documented since 2013. The fall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011 led to deep changes in what had previously been a relatively stable smuggling business. The political fragmentation in Libya allowed new actors to enter the smuggling market, offering lower prices but not always possessing the willingness or know-how to organise safe crossings. With increasing competition, smugglers resorted to subpar navigation equipment, or to loading more migrants on board unsafe boats so as to guarantee their profit margins. The increasing number of crossings as of summer 2013 and the October 2013 shipwrecks, which led Italy to launch its Mare Nostrum operation, were the expression of these worsening crossing conditions. However, after this phase of “liberalisation” of the smuggling market which saw the rise of the “low cost” model of smuggling, Mark Micallef has identified a new phase which began to take shape at the end of 2014 and consolidated towards the end of 2015, which he calls “resource predation”. In this phase, militias have increasingly gained control over the migrant smuggling business, first taxing smuggling activities and then increasingly operating it themselves, considering migrants as “simply another commodity to be exploited in the broader resource predation carried out by armed groups that exercise effective control over the Libyan territory”. Frontex also recognises the increasing involvement of militias in smuggling networks, noting that on the Libya coast “the militia’s ‘commanding officer’ in the region is the head of the network.” Now, as Porsia notes, “migrants who voluntarily left their homes to seek a better future in Europe, are taken hostage by militias which sell them to smugglers from one leg to the other across the journey”. In this configuration, in addition to the ebbing and flowing of state and non-state actors and their operations at sea which we have discussed above, Micallef argues that “routes, hubs, actors and modalities” of smuggling also evolve as a function of “the ebb and flow of tribal and militia relations”. Several important evolutions took place over 2015-2016, which impacted the condition of crossing. We underline, in particular: the shift from Zuwara to Sabratha as main smuggling hub, which contributed to the fusion of the activities of smugglers and militias; secondly, the evolution of the main national groups of migrants crossing and the variegated smuggling networks they resort to; and finally, the increasing intervention of the Libyan Coast Guard.

First of all, the geography of smuggling along the coast evolved in conjunction with the transformations of smuggling networks noted above. While since 2013 the area of Zuwara had become the main point of departure for migrants, following a tragic shipwreck in August 2015 which resulted in bodies washing ashore, smugglers were pushed out of the city by the local population. Several prominent smugglers long-established in Zuwara relocated their activities eastwards towards the area of Sabratha, which soon became the main departure hub. Sabratha however, is a highly militarised area fragmented along multiple fault-lines. It is here that the new model of militia control over the smuggling business achieved its fullest realisation – with a symbiosis between the experience of Zuwaran smugglers and the territorial control of Sabratha militias. As both Porsia and Micallef note, despite the struggle for power in the area, syndicates of smuggling militias soon emerged, leading to a concentration of the market into a handful of key players who were able to operate with a free hand. As a Zuwaran smuggler told Micallef in August 2016:

“Work in Sabratha is great, you can only imagine it. Imagine 30 or 40 different locations. From every location, five, six rubber boats leave (per day) and there is a location from which (large) boats leave with people from Eritrea or Syria. There is a specific location from which even 20 rubber boats leave (in a day). They all carry guns... and... nobody goes to them, it is only the people from Sabratha themselves who work from there, no foreigners are allowed to work from there. To work from there is fantastic.” Zuwaran smuggler interviewed by Mark Micallef, August 2016

Sabratha became a node of attraction within a web of increasingly strong transnational smuggling networks stretching to Sudan and Niger and enabling more and more intense movements of people to converge towards it. Now instead of a few dozen people locked in connection houses waiting for the next leg in their journey, several hundred people could be “stocked” at any given time, according to a security source from Sabratha interviewed by Porsia. This scale of human movement as a commodity illustrates the “industrial” dimension human smuggling has taken. The more the smuggling business came under the control of militias, the more migrants lost agency and control over their own fate. This evolution also contributed to worsening conditions, for in a market that increasingly depends on territorial and logistical control, as well as practices of extortion, rather then the choice and fidelity of customers, the level of service becomes less important in guaranteeing profitable transactions. In addition to the impact of EUNAVFOR MED, these changing smuggling dynamics in response to endogenous factors in Libya certainly contributed to the decreasing quality of boats offered to migrants and their ever-higher degree of overloading. It is probable that these factors also contributed to the increasing tendency towards continuing departures during the dangerous winter months, a trend that was noted as “exceptional” by Frontex in early 2016 without attributing any cause to it. While Sabratha is the paradigmatic example of the new fusion between smugglers and militias, it has emerged to different extents across the smuggling chain in other areas of the coast such as Garabulli, Zawiya, Surman and deeper inside Libya.

Second, the changing composition of migrants discussed above has probably contributed to increasing the danger of crossing. We noted earlier the increasing prevalence of Central and Western African nationalities in 2016, while the number of Eritreans crossing the sea dropped by nearly half. However, migrants of different nationalities resort to using distinct smuggling networks, which have their respective operational modes, implying more or less danger for migrants. As Porsia notes, Nigerian, Eritrean and Ethiopian brokers have set up their headquarters inside Libya and are able to control the entire passage from Sudan and Niger up to Europe, relying on Libyan smugglers for particular sections of the crossing through and from Libya. Migrants from the Horn of Africa – mainly Eritreans, Ethiopians and Somalis – seal their deals with smugglers in Sudan with local brokers and their business partners from Eritrea and Ethiopia for the whole journey to Europe. They also pay higher prices then their West African counterparts, and in certain cases the smugglers only receive actual payment once the passengers have arrived safely on European soil thanks to a payment system known as “hawala”. This means that migrants from the Horn of Africa have more margin of manoeuvre in exercising their limited bargaining power. For examples, they usually refuse to leave outside of the Spring and Summer months when the risk of encountering bad meteorological conditions is higher. Central and Western African migrants have instead usually been recruited by smugglers in Niger, in the city of Agadez, and pay their smugglers cash for each leg of their journey up to the embarkation point, often opting for lower budget crossings. As a result, they are offered less high security standards, which translates in boats of lesser quality, travelling in the hold of vessels and being regularly sent off during the winter. While Porsia notes that over 2015 “the low cost business model for migrants’ sea crossing spread over all the embarkation points, including those in which the major smuggling players operate,” a hierarchy has continued to exist between the networks smuggling migrants from the Horn of Africa versus those smuggling migrants from Central and West Africa. The changing composition of nationalities marking the crossing over 2016 has meant that a greater proportion of migrants went through the more dangerous networks. This certainly affected the risk of crossing even though this is difficult to verify empirically.

Third and finally, over 2016, under pressure from European authorities the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) increased their interception of migrants upon departure, thereby leading to a rise of the volatility and danger of the crossing. Ever since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, with whom Italy had collaborated to push-back migrants intercepted at sea, the EU and its member states have been pressuring whichever authority they could speak to in Libya to clamp down on migrants. The EU’s mission EUBAM Libya has been conducting training with the LCG since 2014, and the LGC further cooperates with the EU Commission, Frontex and the EU’s Seahorse project. The European Council decided on 20 June 2016 to launch a new training program for the LGC to be implemented by EUNAVFOR MED, which considers “a capable and well-resourced Libyan Coastguard who can […] prevent irregular migration taking place from their shores” critical to its exit strategy. The training began on 26 October with 78 trainees on board EUNAVFOR MED assets and with teams from UNHCR as well as Frontex in charge of specific modules. Finally, on 2 February 2017, the cooperation with Libya that Italy had sought to re-establish over the last years was formalised in a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU) signed between Italy and the National Reconciliation Government of Libya. While the MoU, which has at its core the fight against illegalised migration at sea and on Libya’s southern border, has been officially suspended following a decision of the Tripoli Appeals Court, its implementation remains underway and several patrol boats have been recently delivered by the Italian government to the LCG.

As Nancy Porsia’s analysis however shows, the Libyan LCG is itself as fragmented and volatile as the Libyan political landscape. While the Libyan Coast Guard is technically made up of six sectors which should be coordinated by the national command located in the capital of Tripoli, in practice the LCG command in Tripoli has no control over the units in the Eastern area, as they report to the Parliament based in Tobruq. Even in the Western area however the LCG command in Tripoli has little control overall and militias have come to operate Coast Guard-like functions, making it extremely difficult to differentiate actors on the ground. Despite this fragmentation of the LCG, as well as the limited vessels at its disposal, the increased pressure from the EU has resulted in a greater number of interceptions of migrants at sea in 2016. While over 2015 the LCG intervened infrequently in response to situations of distress, over 2016 the LCG units “rescued” 18,904 people off the Libyan coast according to IOM data, bringing them back to Libya where migrants are subsequently detained in extremely dire conditions. The delivery by the Italian government on 15 May 2017 of the first four out of ten patrol vessels will further boost the LCG capacity to intervene at sea.

The LCG’s intervention, however, simultaneously conflicts with, and is embedded within, the smuggling business. While the LGC has sought to demonstrate its effectiveness in intercepting migrants to tap into the opportunity for EU financial and political support, units also receive payment by smugglers and militias to let boats pass, and officials may receive payment for the release from detention centres of intercepted migrants. The ambivalent role played by Libyan officials in relation to smuggling is no secret. While not referencing explicitly the LCG, Frontex has noted several times in its internal reports information it gathered of the participation of Libyan authorities in the smuggling business. For example, in its Biweekly report internally released on the 31st of March 2016, it noted that:

“Gathered information suggests that high ranking officers from different military branches are involved in the smuggling of irregular migrants from the west coast of Libya towards Italy. The information collected suggests that military officers between the ranks of Lieutenant and General are involved at different stages of smuggling people from Libya to Italy. Moreover, information regarding the identification of law enforcement officers involved in the smuggling of migrants from Libya to Italy was also obtained during the interviews.” Frontex, JO EPN Triton, Biweekly Analytical Update, no 4, 14-27 Mar, 31 March 2016, p. 3

In this sense, the LCG appear as one more actor intervening in migrant smuggling which has increased the volatility and danger of the smuggling business and SAR alike. Smugglers have adapted to the increasing activity of the LCG by carrying heavy weapons. The risk of having vessels intercepted by the LCG may have also contributed to the shift from wooden to cheaper rubber boats as well as the tactic of towing one boat by another, which we have discussed above. The LCG itself has been involved in repeated acts of violence at sea. The LCG of Zawiya, which still has several functioning patrol vessels and rigid hulled inflatable boats, has been the most active West of Tripoli, patrolling the coastline stretching from Mutrud to Sabratha. It is reported to have removed the engine of boats seeking to pass without payment, leaving the boats adrift. The Times further published a video (initially part of Ross Kemp’s documentary Libya’s Migrant Hell) showing the Zawiya CG beating migrants with a rope, while they were packed into a rubber boat during an interception. Deplorable in it self, such a practice can also lead to the boat capsizing.

Several maritime units located near Zawiya – some belonging to the LCG, others not formally LCG but patrolling near an offshore oil refinery, were implicated in incidents with SAR NGOs. On 17 August 2016, MSF’s vessel Bourbon Argos was attacked while it was located 24 nautical miles north of the Libyan coast. As MSF’s press release at the time described, “armed men on board the speedboat fired shots toward the Bourbon Argos from a distance of 400 to 500 metres and then boarded the vessel”. The armed men then left without harming the crew. On 9 September 2016, the crew of a speedboat belonging to the NGO Sea-Eye was also arrested by the LCG after it entered territorial waters near Zawiya. Finally, on 21 October 2016, the LCG of Zawiya violently interrupted a rescue operation Sea-Watch was conducting 14.5nm from the coast, boarding the overcrowded rubber boat and beating people, causing panic and a rupture in the boat. Over 150 people ended up in the water; of which Sea-Watch rescued 124 people and recovered four corpses. This last incident exemplifies the additional risk the LCG’s increasing intervention has entailed for migrants.

As we finalise this report, a new incident between the LCG and Sea-Watch occurred, which has been well documented by Sea-Watch as well as a report by Amnesty International. On 10 May 2017, the Italian coastguard Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Rome (MRCC Rome) received a distress call from migrants navigating within the Libyan territorial waters. MRCC Rome contacted the Libyan authorities who responded that they would take over the coordination of the rescue. MRCC Rome also contacted Sea-Watch, since its vessel was in the area, and requested it to direct itself towards the boat in distress. Sea-Watch’s vessel reached the passengers in distress first, with their boat now located outside Libyan territorial waters. As Sea-Watch deployed its RHIB to approach the migrants’ boat, the LCG’s vessel almost rammed into the Sea-Watch vessel to intimidate them. The Sea-Watch vessel retreated immediately, but could witness the LCG stopping the migrants’ boat under the threat of a gun and failing to act in accordance to established safety standards. While no casualties were reported, the migrants were pulled-back back to Libya, a country where their lives are at risk and where they were brought to detention centres. This incident indicates that the destabilising intervention of the LCG is bound to increase in 2017, as the pressure and resourcing from the EU continues.