09-02-2017 (Photo: File:Australian soldiers patrol in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan province, Afghanistan, July 26) http://JohnBatchelorShow.com/contact http://JohnBatchelorShow.com/schedules Twitter: @BatchelorShow

The generals war. Gregory Copley, Defense & Foreign Affairs.

The generals’ policy raises questions:

· 1. Was it not the US which created, or assisted the creation of the Taliban, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989), and pushed the Pakistan Government and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to sustaining the Taliban?

· 2. Was it not the US Government which demanded that the Pakistan Government use its military to break the historically-guaranteed boundaries of the Federally- Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) of Pakistan in order to find al-Qaida leaders allegedly being given safe-haven there? And, as predicted by Pakistani and British officials, did this demand by the US not lead to the flooding of angry Pashtuns into the mainstream of Pakistan, contributing to the destabilization of the country?

· 3. Why did the US gradually transform the Taliban in Afghanistan into the “main enemy”? Clearly, the Taliban resisted the US-led invasion of Afghanistan (and lost power there as a result), essentially transforming the Taliban into “the enemy”. But it remains significant that the Taliban itself has not, like al-Qaida and other jihadist groups, transformed itself into a global movement targeting the US.

· 4. Why is the US in Afghanistan? What is the end-state desired by US policies? Does the US seek to stop Afghanistan being a haven for anti-US terrorists? [And, if so, is it not clear that the past 16 years of operations — now being repeated into the future — have not achieved that goal?] Did the US wish to preserve its post-Cold War entry up into Central Asia where it hoped to capitalize on possible alliances with Central Asian former Soviet states? And if that is the case, has not the past 16 years seen the US position in Central Asia consistently decline?

· 5. How does the US expect to continue to sustain meaningful military operations in Afghanistan if it alienates Pakistan to the point that it will refuse to allow US transit access? The US suspension of $350-million in “military aid” and purchases to Pakistan in recent months, and the McMaster-Mattis speech by Trump, had resulted, by August 27, 2017, in Pakistan Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif canceling the visit to the country by US Acting Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Alice Wells. But the Russian and People’s Republic of China governments came to Pakistan’s defense as a result of the US speech.

· 6. Is it not clear that the PRC’s major overland link to the Indian Ocean and to its African and Middle Eastern resources and markets is via the Karakoram Highway and the port of Gwadar in Pakistan? And that by attacking Pakistan, the US not only loses its logistical access through the country to Afghanistan, it drives Pakistan into consolidating its strategic ties with the PRC? This not only damages the US strategic posture, it also damages India’s chances of ever being able to work with Pakistan to have overland access to the markets and resources of Central Asia.