Writings of Samuel P. Huntington - Selections by Peter Myers; my comments are shown {thus}. Date December 16, 2002; update June 6, 2008.

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(1) The Crisis Of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (2) Huntington's Clash of Civilizations article in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993 (3) The West: Unique not Universal, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 75 No. 6, November/December 1996 (4) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) (5) Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations (included here because Huntington draws heavily upon it) (6) Christian when it suits them; otherwise Jewish (7) Newsweek article about Neocons writes-out the JINSA connection (8) Bernard Lewis - a Jewish scholar - led Samuel Huntington to the "Clash of Civilizations" (9) Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage (10) PROFILE: BERNARD LEWIS: British Svengali Behind Clash Of Civilizations (11) Open Letter to the President - signed by Bernard Lewis

Included is a list of the members of the Trilateral Commission, as at August 15, 1975.

The list of members is a roll-call of the governing classes.

The war against the Arabs and Islam is run by two conspiracies, an Anglo-American one (the whale, because it controls the oceans), and a Zionist one (the elephant, the one you can't see in the china shop until you join up the dots).

Some people can't see the whale; some can't see the elephant. Chomsky and the Trotskyist Left see the whale but not the elephant.

The Balfour Declaration marked the joining-up of two conspiracies, the British one (now Anglo-American) and the Zionist one.

The British one had wanted to get the US back into the Empire, even if that meant transferring the capital to the US. In the end, they were only able to do that with the assistance of Jewish middlemen.

Before the Balfour Declaration, the two conspiracies were working against each other. It was in the Zionist interest to keep the protagionists in World War I as evenly balanced as possible, i.e. keep the US out of the war, until the fall of the Tsar, their hated enemy. Then they auctioned their support to the protagonists.

Suppose that the U.S. had entered the war earlier, and mobilized its troops and sent them to the front. Then Britain would not have made the Balfour Declaration, as "a contract with World Jewry", whereby Zionists got Palestine in return for getting the U.S. into the war - because the U.S. would already have titled the balance.

The catch was this: the Zionist one knew about the Anglo one, because Cecil Rhodes had invited Lord Rothschild to join it; but the Anglos did not know about the Zionist one.

Samuel Huntington is one of the leaders of the Anglo-American one. Huntington's importance as the oracle of George W. Bush's Clash of Civilizations justifies close study of his thinking.

Because these materials are so important to the workings of world power, they should be studied by the people of the world. After all, Huntington upholds Democracy as a core value. How can the people rule, if they be uninformed?

(1) The Crisis Of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission

Michel Crozier

Samuel P. Huntington

Joji Watanuki

Published by New York University Press 1975

{p. i} The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Western Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three regions on common problems. It seeks to improve public understanding of such problems, to support proposals for handling them jointly, and to nurture habits and practices of working together among these regions.

{p. iii} INTRODUCTORY NOTE {by all three authors}

Is democracy in crisis? This question is being posed with increasing urgency by some of the leading statesmen of the West, by columnists and scholars, and - if public opinion polls are to be trusted - even by the publics. In some respects, the mood of today is reminiscent of that of the early twenties, when the views of Oswald Spengler regarding "The Decline of the West" were highly popular. This pessimism is echoed, with obvious Schadenfreude, by various communist observers, who speak with growing confidence of "the general crisis of capitalism" and who see in it the confirmation of their own theories.

The report which follows is not a pessimistic document. Its authors believe that, in a fundamental sense, the democratic systems are viable. ... Their discussion of "The Crisis of Democracy" is designed to make democracy stronger as it grows and becomes more and more democratic. ...

{p. iv} This report has been prepared for the Trilateral Commission and is released under its auspices. The Commission is making the report available for wider distribution as a contribution to informed discussion and handling of the issues treated. The report was discussed at the Trilateral Commission meetings in Kyoto, Japan, on May 30-31, 1975. The authors, who are experts from North America, Western Europe and Japan, have been free to present their own views.

The report is the joint responsibility of the three rapporteurs of the Trilateral Commission's Task Force on the Governability of Democracies, which was set up in the spring of 1974 and which submitted its report in the spring of 1975. The chapter on Japan is the work of Joji Watanuki. The chapter on Western Europe is the work of Michel Crozier. The chapter on the United States is the work of Samuel P. Huntington.

Although only the three authors are responsible for the analysis and conclusions, they were aided in their task by consultations with experts from the trilateral regions.

{p. v} Zbigniew Brzezinski

Director

The Trilateral Commission

{p. 1} CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION {by all three authors}

At the present time, a significant challenge comes from the intellectuals and related groups who assert their disgust with the corruption, materialism, and inefficiency of democracy and with the subservience of democratic government to "monopoly capitalism." The development of an "adversary culture" among intellectuals has affected students, scholars and the media. Intellectuals are, as Schumpeter put it "people who wield the power of the spoken and the written word, and one of the touches that distinguish them from other people who do the same is the absence of direct responsibility for practical affairs." In some measure, the advanced industrial societies have spawned a stratum of

{p. 7} value-oriented intellectuals who often devote themselves to the derogation of leadership, the challenging of authority, and the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions, their behavior contrasting with that of the also increasing numbers of technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals. In an age of widespread secondary school and university education, the pervasiveness of the mass media, and the displacement of manual labor by clerical and professional employees, this development constitutes a challenge to democratic government which is, potentially at least, as serious as those posed in the past by the aristocratic cliques, fascist movements, and communist parties.

In addition to the emergence of the adversary intellectuals and their culture, a parallel and possibly related trend affecting the viability of democracy concerns broader changes in social values. In all three Trilateral regions, a shift in values is taking place away from the materialistic work-oriented, public-spirited values toward those which stress private satisfaction, leisure, and the need for "belonging and intellectual and esthetic self-fulfillment." These values are, of course, most notable in the younger generation. They often coexist with greater skepticism towards political leaders and institutions and with greater alienation from the political processes. They tend to be privatistic in their impact and import. The rise of this syndrome of values is presumably related to the relative affluence in which most groups in the Trilateral societies came to share during the economic expansion of the 1960s. The new values may not survive recession and resource shortages. But if they do, they pose an additional new problem for democratic government in terms of its ability to mobilize its citizens for the achievement of social and political goals and to impose discipline and sacrifice upon its citizens in order to achieve those goals.

{p. 8} The contextual challenges differ, as we have seen, for each society. Variations in the nature of the particular democratic institutions and processes in each society may also make some types of intrinsic challenges more prominent in one society than in another. But, overall, the intrinsic threats are general ones which are in some degree common to the operation of all democratic systems. The more democratic a system is, indeed, the more likely it is to be endangered by intrinsic threats. Intrinsic challenges are, in this sense, more serious than extrinsic ones. Democracies may be able to avoid, moderate, or learn to live with contextual challenges to their viability. There is deeper reason for pessimism if the threats to democracy arise ineluctably from the inherent workings of the democratic process itself. Yet, in recent years, the operations of the democratic process do indeed appear to have generated a breakdown of traditional means of social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms of authority, and an overload of demands on government, exceeding its capacity to respond.

{p. 11} CHAPTER III - THE UNITED STATES by Samuel P. Huntington

{p. 113} Al Smith once remarked that "the only cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy." Our analysis suggests that applying that cure at the present time could well be adding fuel to the flames. Instead, some of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy - an "excess of democracy" in much the same sense in which David Donald used the term to refer to the consequences of the Jacksonian revolution which helped to precipitate the Civil War. Needed, instead, is a greater degree Of moderation in democracy.

{p. 114} Second, the effective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups. In the past, every democratic society has had a marginal population, of greater or lesser size, which has not actively participated in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part of some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one of the factors which has enabled democracy to function effectively. Marginal social groups, as in the case of the blacks, are now becoming full participants in the political system. Yet the danger of overloading the political system with demands which extend its functions and undermine its authority still remains. Less marginality on the part of some groups thus needs to be replaced by more self-restraint on the part of all groups.

{p. 115} Political authority is never strong in the United States, and it is peculiarly weak during a creedal passion period of intense commitment to democratiC and egalitarian ideals. In the United States, the strength of democracy poses a problem for the governability of democracy in a way which is not the case elsewhere.

{p. 157} CHAPTER V - CONCLUSION {by all three authors}

Internationally, confrontation has given way to detente, with a resultant relaxation of constraints within societies and of the impetus to collaborate among societies. There has been a substantial relative decline in American military and economic power, and a major absolute decline in American willingness to assume the burdens of leadership. And most recently, the temporary slowdown in economic growth has threatened the expectations created by previous growth, while still leaving existent the "postbourgeois" values which it engendered among the youth and intellectuals.

{p. 159} What is in short supply in democratic societies today is thus not consensus on the rules of the game but a sense of Purpose as to what one should achieve by playing the game. In the past, people have found their purposes in religion, in nationalism and in ideology. But neither church, nor state, nor class now commands people's loyalties. In some measure, democracy itself was inspired by and its institutions shaped by manifestations of each of these forces and commitments. Protestantism sanctified the individual conscience; nation-

{p. 160} alism postulated the equality of citizens; and liberalism provided the rationale for limited govemment based on consent. But now all three gods have failed. We have witnessed the dissipation of religion, the withering away of nationalism, the decline - if not the end - of class-based ideology.

In a nondemocratic political system, the top leadership can select a single purpose or closely related set of goals and, in some measure, induce or coerce political and social forces to shape their behavior in terms of the priorities dictated by these goals. Third World dictatorships can direct their societies towards the "overriding" goal of national development; communist states can mobilize their populace for the task of "building socialism." In a democracy, however, purpose cannot be imposed from on high by fiat; nor does it spring to life from the verbiage of party platforms, state of the union messages, or speeches from the throne. It must, instead, be the product of the collective perception by the significant groups in society of a major challenge to their well-being and the perception by them that this challenge threatens them all about equally. Hence, in wartime or periods of economic catastrophe, common purposes are easily defined. ...

In this situation, the machinery of democracy continues to operate, but the ability of the individuals operating that

{p. 161} machinery to make decisions tends to deteriorate. Without common purpose, there is no basis for common priorities, and without priorities, there are no grounds for distinguishing among competing private interests and claims. Conflicting goals and specialized interests crowd in one upon another, with executives, cabinets, parliaments, and bureaucrats lacking the criteria to discriminate among them. The system becomes one of anomic democracy, in which democratic politics becomes more an arena for the assertion of conflicting interests than a process for the building of common purposes.

THE DYSFUNCTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

{p. 162} 1. The Delegitimation of Authority

In most of the Trilateral countries in the past decade there has been a decline in the confidence and trust which the people have in government, in their leaders, and, less clearly but most importantly, in each other. Authority has been challenged not only in government, but in trade unions, business enterprises, schools and universities, professional associations, churches, and civic groups. In the past, those institutions which have played the major role in the indoctrination of the young in their rights and obligations as members of society have been the family, the church, the school, and the army. The effectiveness of all these institutions as a means of socialization has declined severely. The stress has been increasingly on individuals and their rights, interests, and needs, and not on the community and its rights, interests, and needs. These attitudes have been particularly prevalent in the young, but they have also appeared in other age groups, especially among those who have achieved professional, white-collar, and middle-class status. The success of the existing structures of authority in incorporating large elements of the population into the middle class, paradoxically, strengthens precisely those groups which are disposed to challenge the existing structures of authority.

{p. 163} Leadership is in disrepute in democratic societies. Without confidence in its leadership, no group functions effectively. When the fabric of leadership weakens among other groups in society, it is also weakened at the top political levels of government. The governability of a society at the national level depends upon the extent to which it is effectively governed at the subnational, regional, local, functional, and industrial levels. In the modern state, for instance, powerful trade union "bosses" are often viewed as a threat to the power of the state. In actuality, however, responsible union leaders with effective authority over their members are less of a challenge to the authority of the national political leaders than they are a prerequisite to the exercise of authority by those leaders. If the unions are disorganized, if the membership is rebellious, if extreme demands and wild-cat strikes are the order of the day, the formulation and implementation of a national wage policy become impossible. The weakening of authority throughout society thus contributes to the weakening of the authority of government.

{p. 167} In times of economic scarcity, inflation, and possible long-term economic downturn ... the leaders of democratic governments turn increasingly to foreign policy as the one arena where they can achieve what appear to be significant successes. Diplomatic triumph becomes essential to the maintenance of domestic power; success abroad produces votes at home.

{p. 201} Another Japanese Commissioner recalled a statement of Lenin's that a revolution cannot be initiated by demands from below, but only when the governing classes are divided and dissatisfied. One might argue that governing classes are now in this condition.

{But does Democracy have "governing classes"?}

{The Tsarist Government suffered revolutions in 1905 and 1917, after defeats in war. And this Conference of the Trilateral Commission was being held in the wake of the US defeat in Vietnam. The Soviet Union, in the late 1970s, entertained imperial ambitions, overstretched itself, and later collapsed in the wake of defeat in Afghanistan. Might the United States under GWB, and to some extent following Huntington's blueprint (below), be following the same imperial path?}

{p. 215} (As of August 15, 1975)

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION ...

North American Members

*W. Abel, President, United Steelworkers of America

David M. Abshire, Chairman, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies

Graham Allison, Professor of Politics, Harvard University

Doris Anderson, Editor, Chatelaine Magazine

John B. Anderson, House of Representatives

Ernest C. Arbuckle, Chairman, Wells Fargo Bank

J. Paul Austin, Chairman, The Coca-Cola Company

George W. Ball, Senior Partner, Lehman Brothers

Russell Bell, Research Director, Canadian Labour Congress

Lucy Wilson Benson, former President, League of Women Voters of the United States

W. Michael Blumenthal, Chairman, Bendix Corporation

*Robert W. Bonner, Q.C., Bonner & Fouks, Vancouver

Robert R. Bowie, Lawrence Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University

John Brademas, House of Representatives

*Harold Brown, President, California Institute of Technology

James E. Carter, Jr., Former Governor of Georgia

Lawton Chiles, United States Senate

Warren Christopher, Partner, O'Melveny & Myers

Alden W. Clausen, President, Bank of America

§William T. Coleman, Jr., Secretary, Department of Transportation

Barber B. Conable, Jr., House of Representatives

Richard N. Cooper, Frank Altschul Professor of International Economics, Yale University

John C. Culver, United States Senate

Gerald L. Curtis, Director, East Asian Institute, Columbia University

Lloyd N. Cutler, Partner, Wilmer, Culler & Pickering

Archibald K. Davis, Chairman, Wachovia Bank & Trust Company

Emmett Dedmon, Vice President and Editorial Director, Field Enterprises, Inc.

Louis A. Desrochers, Partner, McCuaig and Desrochers

{p. 216} Peter Dobell, Director, Parliamentary Center for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade

Hedley Donovan, Editor-in-Chief, Time, Inc.

Daniel J. Evans, Governor of Washington

Gordon Fairweather, Member of Parliament

Donald M. Fraser, House of Representatives

Richard N. Gardner, Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia University

*Patrick E. Haggerty, Chairman, Texas Instruments

William A. Hewitt, Chairman, Deere & Company

Alan Hockin, Executive Vice President, Toronto-Dominion Bank

Richard Holbrooke, Managing Editor, Foreign Policy Magazine

Thomas L. Hughes, President, Carnegie Endowment for Internatitional Peace

J. K. Jamieson, Chairman, Exxon Corporation

Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO

Sol M. Linowitz, Senior Partner, Coudert Brothers

Bruce K. MacLaury, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Claude Masson, Professor of Economics, Laval University

Paul W. McCracken, Edmund Ezra Day Professor of Business Administration, University of Michigan

Walter F. Mondale, United States Senate

Lee L. Morgan, President, Caterpillar Tractor Company

Kenneth D. Naden, President, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives

Henry D. Owen, Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Inshtution

David Packard, Chairman, Hewlett-Packard Company

*Jean-Luc Pepin, P.C., President, Interimco, Ltd.

John H. Perkins, President, Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company

Peter G. Peterson, Chairman, Lehman Brothers

*Edwin O. Reischauer, University Professor, Harvard University; former U.S. Ambassador to Japan

§EIliot L. Richardson, United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom

*David Rockefeller, Chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank

Robert V. Roosa, Partner, Brown Bros., Harriman & Company

*William M. Roth, Roth Properties

William V. Roth, Jr., United States Senate

Carl T. Rowan, Columnist

*William W. Scranton, Former Governor of Pennsylvania

*Gerard C. Smith, Counsel, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering

Anthony Solomon, Consultant

Robert Taft, Jr., United States Senate

Arthur R. Taylor, President, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

Cyrus R. Vance, Partner, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett

*Paul C. Warnke, Partner, Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney

Marina von N. Whitman, Distinguished Public Service Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

Carroll L. Wilson, Professor of Management, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, MIT

Arthur M. Wood, Chairman, Sears, Roebuck & Company

Leonard Woodcock, President, United Automobile Workers

*Executive Committee

§Currently in Government Service

{p. 217} European Members

*Giovanni Agnelli, President, FIAT, Ltd.

Raymond Barre, Former Vice President of the Commission of the European Community

Piero Bassetti, President of the Regional Governent of Lombardy

*Georges Berthoin, Former Chief Representative of the Commission of the European Community to the UK.

*Kurt Birrenbach, Member of the Bundestag; President, Thyssen Vermogensverwaltung

Franco Bobba, Company Director, Turin

Frederick Boland, Chancellor, Dublin University; former President of the United Nations General Assembly

Rene Bonety, Representant de la CFDT

Jean-Claude Casanova, Director of Shudies, Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris

Umberto Colombo, Director of the Committee for Scientific Policy, OECD

Guido Colonna di Paliano, President, La Rinascente; former member of the Commission of the European Community

*Francesco Compagna, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of the Mezzogiorno

The Earl of Cromer, Former Britiish Ambassador to the United States; Partner, Baring Bros. and Co., Ltd

Michel Debatisse, President de la F.N.S.E.A.

*Paul Delouvrier, Chairman, French Electricity Board

Barry Desmond, Member of the Lower House of the Irish Republic

Fritz Dietz, President, German Association for Wholesale and Foreign Trade Werner Dollinger, Member of the Bundestag

*Herbert Ehrenberg, Member of the Bundestag

Pierre Esteva, Directeur General de I 'U.A.P.

*Marc Eyskens, Commissary General of the Catholic University of Louvain

M. H. Fisher, Editor, Financial Times

Francesco Forte, Professor of Financial Sciences, University of Tunn

Jacques de Fouchier, President, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas

Michel Gaudet, President de la Federation Francaise des Assurances

Sir Reay Geddes, Chairman, Dunlop Holdings, Ltd

Giuseppe Glisenti, Director of General Affairs, La Rinascente

Lord Harlech, Former Brihish Ambassador to the United States; Chairman, Harlech Television

Karl Hauenschild, President, German Chemical-Paper-Ceramics Workers' Union

Jozef P. Houthuys, President, Belgian Confederation of Christian Trade Unions

Daniel E. Janssen, Deputy Director General, Belgian Chemical Union, Ltd.

Pierre Jouven, President de Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann

Karl Kaiser, Director of the Research Instihute of the German Society for Foreign Policy

Michael Killeen, Managing Director, Industrial Development Authority, Irish Republic

Andre Kloos, Chairman of the Socialist radio and television network "VA.R.A. "; former chairman of the Dutch Trade Union Federation

*Max Kohnstamm, President, European Community Institute for University Studies Baron Leon Lambert, President, Banque Lambert, Brussels

Count Otto Lambsdorff, Member of the Bundestag

Arrigo Levi, Director, La Stampa, Turin

{p. 218} Eugen Loderer, President, German Metal Workers' Union

*John Loudon, Chairman, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company

Evan Luard, Member of Parliament

Robert Marjolin, Former Vice President of the Commission of the European Community

Roger Martin, President de la Cie Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson

Reginald Maudling, Member of Parliament; former Cabinet Minister

F. S. McFadzean, Managing Director, Royal Dutch Shell Group

Cesare Merlini, Director, Italian Institute for International Affairs

Alwin Munchmeyer, President, German Banking Federation

§Ivar Nrgaard, Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs and Nordic Affairs, Denmark

Michael O'Kennedy, Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs, Irish Republic; former Cabinet Minister

Bernard Pagezy, President Directeur General de la Paternelle Vie

Pierre Pescatore, Luxembourg; Member of the European Court of Justice

Sir John Pilcher, Former British Ambassador to Japan

Jean Rey, Former President of the Commission of the European Community

Julian Ridsdale, Member of Parliament; Chairman of the Anglo-Japanese Parliament Group

Sir Frank K. Roberts, Advisory Director of Unilever, Ltd; Advisor on Intemational Affairs to Lloyds of London

*Mary T. W. Robinson, Member of the Senate of the Irish Republic

Sir Eric Roll, Executive Director, S. G. Warburg and Company

Edmond de Rothschild, President de la Compagnie Financiere Holding

John Christian Sannes, Director, Norwegian Institute of Intemational Affairs

Gerhard Schroder, Member of the Bundestag; former Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany

Roger Seydoux, Ambassador of France

Andrew Shonfield, Director, The Royal Institute of International Affairs

Hans-Gunther Sohl, President, Federal Union of German Industry; President of the Board of Directors of August Thyssen Hutte A. G.

Theo Sommer, Editor-in-Chief, Die Zeit

Myles Staunton, Member of the Lower House of the Irish Republic

Thorvald Stoltenberg, International Affairs Secretary, Norwegian Trade Union Council

G. R. Storry, St. Antony 's College, Oxford (Far East Centre)

J. A. Swire, Chairman, John Swire and Sons, Ltd

*Otto Grieg Tidemand, Shipowner; former Norwegian Minister of Defense and Minister of Economic Affairs

A. F. Tuke, Chairman, Barclays Bank International

Heinz-Oskar Vetter, Chairman, German Federation of Trade Unions

Luc Wauters, President, Kredietbank, Brussels

Otto Wolff von Amerongen, President, Otto Wolff A. G.; President, German Chamber of Commerce

*Sir Kenneth Younger, Former Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

*Sir Philip de Zulueta, Chief Executive, Antony Gibbs Holdings, Ltd; former Chief Assistant to the British Prime Minister

*Executive Committee

§Currently in Government Service

{p. 219} Japanese Members

Isao Amagi, Director, Japan Scholarship Foundation; former Vice Minister of Education

Yoshiya Anyoshi, Chairman, Nippon Yusen Kaisha

Yoshishige Ashihara, Chairman, Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc.

Toshio Doko, President, Japan Federation of Economic Organizabons (Keidanren)

Jun Eto, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Shinkichi Eto, Professor of International Relations, Tokyo University

*Chujiro Fujino, Chairman, Mitsubishi Corporation

Shintaro Fukushima, President, Kyodo News Service

Noboru Gotoh, President, TOKYU Corporation

Toru Hagiwara, Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; former Ambassador to France

Sumio Hara, Chairman, Bank of Tokyo, Ltd

*Yukitaka Haraguchi, Chairman, All Japan Federation of Metal and Mining Industries Labor Unions

Norishige Hasegawa, President, Sumitomo Chemical Company, Ltd

*Yoshio Hayashi, Member of the Diet

Teru Hidaka, Chairman, Yamaichi Securities Company, Ltd

*Kazushige Hirasawa, Radio-TV news commentator, Japan Broadcasting Inc.

Hideo Hori, President, Employment Promotion Project Corporation

Shozo Hotia, Chairman, Sumitomo Bank, Ltd

Shinichi Ichimura, Professor of Economics, Kyoto University

Hiroki Imazato, President, Nippon Seiko K.K.

Yoshihiro Inayama, Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation

Kaoru Inoue, Chairman, Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd

Rokuro Ishikawa, Executive Vice President, Kajima Corporation

Tadao lshikawa, Professor, Department of Political Science, Keio University

Yoshizane Iwasa, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, Fuji Bank, Ltd.

Motoo Kaji, Professor of Economics, Tokyo University

Fuji Kamiya, Professor, Keio University

*Yusuke Kashiwagi, Deputy President, Bank of Tokyo, Ltd; former Special Advisor to the Minister of Finance

Ryoichi Kawai, President, Komatsu Seisakusho, Ltd

Katsuji Kawamata, Chairman, Nissan Motor Company, Ltd

Kazutaka Kikawada, Chairman, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Kiichiro Kitaura, President, Nomura Securities Company, Ltd

Koji Kobayashi, President, Nippon Electric Company, Ltd

Kenichiro Komai, Chairman, Hitachi, Ltd

Fumihiko Kono, Counselor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd

Masataka Kosaka, Professor, Faculty of Law, Kyoto University

Fumihiko Maki, Principal Partner, Maki and Associates, Design, Planning and Development

Shigeharu Matsumoto, Chairman, International House of Japan, Inc.

Masaharu Matsushita, President, Matsushita Electric Company, Ltd

§Kiichi Miyazawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Akio Morita, President, SONY Corporation

Takashi Mukaibo, Professor, Faculty of Engineering, Tokyo University

*Kinhide Mushakoji, Director, Institute of International Relatiions, Sophia University

Yonosuke Nagai, Professor of Political Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Shigeo Nagano, President, Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry

{p. 220} Eiichi Nagasue, Member of the Diet

Toshio Nakamura, President, Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd.

Ichiro Nakayama, President, Janpa Institute of Labor

Sohei Nakayama, President, Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency

Yoshihisa Ohjimi, Advisor, Arabian Oil Company, Ltd; former Administrative Vice Minister of Intemational Trade and Industry

*Saburo Okita, President, Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund

Kiichi Saeki, Director, Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics

Kunihiko Sasaki, Chairman, Fuji Bank, Ltd.

*Ryuji Takeuchi, Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; former Ambassador to the United States

Eiji Toyoda, President, Toyota Motor Company, Ltd

Seiji Tsutsumi, President, Seibu Department Store, Inc.

Kogoro Uemura, Honorary President, Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren)

Tadao Umezao, Professor of Ethnology, Kyoto University

*Nobuhiko Ushiba, Former Ambassador of Japan to the United States

Jiro Ushio, President, Ushio Electric Inc.

Shogo Watanabe, President, Nikko Securities Company, Ltd

*Takeshi Watanabe, Chairman, Trident International Fmance, Ltd, Hong Kong, former President, the Asian Development Bank

Kizo Yasui, Chairman, Toray Industries, Inc.

*Executive Committee

§Currently in Government Service

{end}

In the light of this list of Who's Who, Huntington's stature is obvious: he is the leading analyst of the Anglo-American Establishment.

Given that major media owners were present at this Trilateral meeting, one might have expected that the public of the Trilateral countries would have read about it as a front page story, as would be appropriate if Democracy means "rule by the people". But instead, silence.

In the mid 1990s, I wrote a letter to Gough Whitlam, Prime Minister of Australia from 1972 to 1975, and in reply received a phone call from him, during which I asked him if he knew about the Trilateral commission. He said he had never heard of it. When I mentioned this to Professor E. L. Wheelwright he commented, "Whitlam had no idea what was going on".

(2) Huntington's Clash of Civilizations article in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993

http://www.alamut.com/subj/economics/misc/clash.html

THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

Samuel P. Huntington

Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993, v72, n3, p22(28) from the Academic Index (database on UTCAT system)

COPYRIGHT Council on Foreign Relations Inc. 1993

THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT

World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be -- the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes -- emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun." This nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War 1. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology.

These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its center- piece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.

THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS

During the cold war the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.

What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change. ...

Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study of History, Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.

WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH

Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Why will this be the case?

First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. ...

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. ...

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. ...

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.

In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. ...

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. ...

Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed,

"Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China). ... From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network -- often based on extensions of the traditional clans -- has been described as the backbone of the East Asian economy."(1)

Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization, founded originally in the 1960 by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission to the European Community. Similarly, Caricom, the Central American Common Market and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the Anglo-Latin divide, however, have to date failed.

As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. ...

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.

THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS

The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed ...

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East. ...

On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. The West's "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, "is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion:

We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations -- the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.(2)

Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian black peoples to the south. In the past, this antagonism was epitomized in the image of Arab slave dealers and black slaves. It has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa, and the political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity are likely to enhance the probability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the intensification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul II's speech in Khartoum in February I993 attacking the actions of the Sudan's Islamist government against the Christian minority there. ...

THE WEST VERSUS THE REST

The west in now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. Its superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. ...

THE CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC CONNECTION

The obstacles to non-Western countries joining the West vary considerably. They are least for Latin American and East European countries. They are greater for the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union. They are still greater for Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Japan has established a unique position for itself as an associate member of the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions. ...

(1) Murray Weidenbaum, Greater China: The Next Economic Superpower?, St. Louis: Washington University Center for the Study of American Business, Contemporary Issues, Series 57, February 1993, pp. 2-3.

(2) Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 266, September 1990, p. 6o; Time, June 15, 1992, pp. 24-28.

{end of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations article in Foreign Affairs of 1993}

(3) Samuel P. Huntington, The West: Unique not Universal, in Foreign Affairs, Volume 75 No. 6, November/December 1996

{p. 28} In recent years Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding, the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world. This conceit takes two forms. One is the Coca-colonization hypothesis. Its proponents claim that Western, and more specifically American, popular culture is enveloping the world: American food, clothing, pop music, movies, and consumer goods are more and more enthusiastically embraced by people on every continent. The other has to do with modernization. It claims not only that the West has led the world to modern society, but that as people in other civilizations modernize they also westernize, abandoning their traditional values, institutions, and customs and adopting those that prevail in the West. Both these project the image of an emerging, homogeneous, universally Western world - and both are to varying degrees misgruided, arrogant, false, and dangerous.

Advocates of the Coca-colonization thesis identify culture with the consumption ot material goods. The heart of a culture, however, involves language, religion, values, traditions, and customs. Drinking Coca-Cola does not make Russians think like Americans any more

{p. 29} than eating sushi makes Americans think like Japanese. Throughout human history, fads and material goods have spread from one society to another without significantly altering the basic culture of the recipient society. Enthusiasms for various items of Chinese, Hindu, and other cultures have periodically swept the Western world, with no discernible lasting spillover. The argument that the spread of pop culture and consumer goods around the world represents the triumph of Western civilization depreciates the strength of other cultures while trivializing Western culture by identifying it with fatty foods, faded pants, and fizzy drinks. The essence of Western culture is the Magna Carta, not the Magna Mac.

{Has Huntington campaigned to stop this trivializing and decadence, for example by tightening controls on Hollywood and the advertising industry? No, because, as he implies below when stressing the importance of Freedom, the Freedom to decadence is more important than the decadence itself}

The modernization argument is intellectually more serious than the Coca-colonization thesis, but equally flawed. The tremendous expansion of scientific and engineering knowledge that occurred in the nineteenth century allowed humans to control and shape their environment in unprecedented ways. Modernization involves industrialization; urbanization; increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization; and more complex and diverse occupational structures. It is a revolutionary process comparable to the shift from primitive to civilized societies that began in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, the Nile, and the Indus about 5000 B.C. The attitudes, values, knowledge, and culture of people in a modern society differ greatly from those in a traditional society. As the first civilization to modernize, the West is the first to have fully acquired the culture of modernity. As other societies take on similar patterns of education, work, wealth, and class structure, the modernization argument runs, this Western culture will become the universal culture of the world.

That there are significant differences between modern and traditional cultures is beyond dispute. A world in which some societies are highly modern and others still traditional will obviously be less homogeneous than a world in which all societies are comparably modern. It does not necessarily follow, however, that societies with modern cultures should be any more similar than are societies with traditional cultures. Only a few hundred years ago all societies were traditional. Was that world any less homogeneous than a future world of universal modernity is likely to be? Probably not.

{Huntington now defines Western Civilization}

{p. 35} ... the commitment to individual freedom that now distinguishes the West from other civilizations. Europe, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has said, is "the source - the unique source" of the "ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom ... These are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern Ideas, except by adoption. ... " These concepts and characteristics are also in large part the factors that enabled the West to take the lead in modernizing itself and the world. They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is precious not because it is universal but because it is unique.

{and yet George W. Bush, the implementer of Huntington's Clash, is trying to take away those very freedoms that, Huntington says, define Western Civilization. Has Huntington leapt to their defence?}

{In defining of Western Civilization in terms of Freedom, Huntington follows in the wake of Arnold Toynbee (quigley.html) and Lionel Curtis (curtis1.html)}

CAN THE REST COPY THE WEST?

To MODERNIZE, must non-Western societies abandon their own cultures and adopt the core elements of Western culture? From time to time leaders of such societies have thought it necessary. Peter the Great and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were determined to modernize their countries and convinced that doing so meant adopting Western culture, even to the point of replacing traditional headgear with its Western equivalent. In the process, they created "torn" countries, unsure of their cultural identity. Nor did Western cultural imports significantly help them in their pursuit of modernization. More often, leaders of non-Western societies have pursued modernization and rejected westernization. Their goal is summed up in the phrases ti-yong (Chinese learning for the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical use) and woken, yosei (Japanese spirit, Western technique), articulated by Chinese and Japanese reformers of a century ago, and in Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar bin Sultan's comment in 1994 that "'foreign imports' are nice as shiny or

{p. 36} high-tech 'things.' But intangible social and political institutions imported from elsewhere can be deadly - ask the Shah of Iran ... Islam is for us not just a religion but a way of life. We Saudis want to modernize but not necessarily westernize." Japan, Singapore, Taiwan Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser degree, Iran have become modern societies without becoming Western societies. China is clearly modernizing, but certamly not westernizing

Interaction and borrowing between civilizations have always taken place, and with modern means of transportation and communication they are much more extensive. Most of the world's great civilizations however, have existed for at least one millennium and in some case for several. These civilizations have a demonstrated record of borrowing from other civilizations in ways that enhance their own chances of survival. China's absorption of Buddhism from India, scholars agree, failed to produce the "Indianization" of China, it instead caused the Sinification of Buddhism. {wrong: it introduced a puritanism not found in Chinese philosophies such as Taoism} The Chinese adapted Buddhism to their purposes and needs. The Chinese have to date consistently defeated intense Western efforts to Christianize them. If at some point they do import Christianity, it is more than likely that it wlll be absorbed and adapted in such a manner as to strenghen the continuing core of Chinese culture.

Similarly, in past centuries Muslim Arabs received, valued, and used thelr "Hellenic inheritance for essentially utilitarian reasons. Being mostly interested in borrowing certain external forms or technical aspects, they knew how to disregard all elements in the Greek body of thought that would confiict with 'the truth' as established in their fundamental Koranic norms and precepts." Japan followed the same pattern. In the seventh century Japan imported Chinese culture and made the "transformation on its own initiative, free from economic and military pressures," to high civilization. During the centuries that followed, periods of relative isolation from continental influences during which previous borrowings wcre sorted out and the useful ones assimilated would alternate wlth periods of renewed contact and cultural borrowing." In similar fashion, Japan and other non-Western societies today are absorbing selected elements of Western culture and using them to strengthen their own cultural identity. It would, as Braudel argues.

{p. 37} almnost "be childish" to think that the "triumph of civilization in the singular" would lead to the end of the plurality of cultures embodled for centuries in the world's great civilizations.

{Fernand Braudel was a historian of civilizations, like Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler and Carroll Quigley. Huntington refers repeatedly to all four; see, for example, the index to his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. A sample of Braudel's writing is at braudel.html}

CULTURAL BACKLASH

MODERNIATION and economic development neither require nor produce cultural westernization. To the contrary, they promote a resurgence of, and renewed commitment to, indigenous cultures. At the individual level, the movement of people into unfamiliar cities, social settings, and occupations breaks their traditional local bonds, generates feelings of alienation and anomie, and creates crises of identity to which religion frequently provides an answer. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic wealth and military power of the country as a whole and encourages people to have confidence in their heritage and to become culturally assertive. As a result, many non-Western societies have seen a return to indigenous cultures. It often takes a religious form, and the global revival of region is a direct consequence of modernization. In non-Western societies this revival almost necessarily assumes an anti-Western cast, in some cases rejecting Western culture because it is Christian and subversive {i.e. missionary}, in others because it is secular and degenerate. The return to the indigenous is most marked in Muslim and Asian societies. The Islamic Resurgence has manlfested itself in every Muslim country; in almost all it has become a major social, cultural, and intellectual movement, and in most it has had a deep impact on politics. In 1996 virtually every Muslim country except Iran was more Islamic and more Islamist in its outlook, practices, and institutlons than it was 15 years earlier. In the countries where Islamist political forces do not shape the government, they invariably dominate and often monopolize the opposition to the government. Throughout the Muslim world people are reacting against the "Westoxification" of their societies.

{Wrong: Gay marriage ,the destruction of marriage and religion, and other such New Left and libertarian decadence, have only appeared in the wake of the Trotskyist victory in the universities following the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Why doesn't Huntington join the rest of the world in attacking these phenomena, instead of defending them as "Western Civilization"? The enemies are internal, not external, and they can be fought with laws, not guns}

East Asian societies have gone through a parallel rediscovery of indigenous values and have increasingly drawn unflattenng comparisons

{p. 38} between their culture and Western culture. For several centuries they along with other non-Western peoples, envied the economic prosperity, technologlcal sophistication, military power, and political cohesion of Western societies. They sought the secret of this success in Western practices and customs, and when they identified what they thought might be the key they attempted to apply it in their own societies. Now however, a fundamental change has occurred. Today East Asians attribute their dramatic economic development not to their import of Western culture but to their adherence to their own culture. They have succeeded, they argue, not because they became like the West, but because they have remained different from the West. {But this new West, the promoter of Gay Marriage, is, itself the enemy of the old West the rest of the world admired} In somewhat similar fashion, when non-Western societies felt weak in relation to the West, many of their leaders evoked Western values of self-determination, liberalism and democracy, and freedom to justify their opposition to Western global domination. Now that they are no longer weak but instead increasingly powerful, they denounce as "human rights imperialism" the same values they previously invoked to promote their interests. As Western power recedes, so too does the appeal of Western values and culture, and the West faces the need to accomodate itself to its declining ability to impose its values on non-Western societies. {Huntington seems to think it should so impose itself} In fundamental ways, much of the world is becoming more modern and less Western.

One manifestation of this trend is what Ronald Dore has termed the "second-generation indigenization phenomenon." Both in former Western colonies and in colltinuously independent, non-Western countrles, "the first 'modernizer' or 'post-independence' generation has often received its training in foreign (Western) universities in a Western cosmopolitan language. Partly because they first go abroad as imprressionable teenagers, their absorption of Western values and lifestyles may well be profound." Most members of the much larger second generation, in contrast, receive their education at home in universities the first generation established, where the local language, rather than its colonial replacement, is used for instruction. These universities "provide a much more diluted contact with metropolitan world culture" and knowledge is indigenized by means of translations - usually of limited

{p. 39} range and of poor quality." Graduates of these universities resent the dominance of the earlier Western-trained generation and thus often succumb to the appeals of nativist opposition movements. As Western influence recedes, young and aspiring leaders cannot look to the West to provide them with power and wealth. They have to find the means of success within their own society, and hence accommodate the values and culture of that society. Indigenization is furthered by the democracy paradox: when non-Western societies adopt Western-style elections, democracy encourages and often brings to power nativist and anti-Western political movements. In the 1960s and 1970s westernized and pro-Western governrnents in developing countries were threatened by coups and revolutions; in the 1980s and 1990s they have been increasingly in danger of being ousted in elections. Democracy tends to make a society more parochial, not more cosmopolitan. Politicians in non-Western societies do not win elections by demonstrating how Western they are. Electoral competition stimulates them to fashion what they believe wlll be the most popular appeals, and those are usually ethnic, nationalist, and religious in character. The result is popular mobilization against Western-oriented elites and the West in general. This process, which began in Sri Lanka in the 1950s, has spread from country to country in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and is manifest in the vlctories of reliously oriented parties in India, Turkey, Bosnia, and Israel in elections in 1995 and 1996. Democratization is thus at odds with westernization.

{But is not Huntington an advocate of Democracy? Or is that a smokescreen for Empire?}

The powerful currents of indigenization at work in the world make a mockery of Western expectations that Western culture will become the world's culture. The two central elements of any culture are language and religion. English, it has been asserted, is becoming the world's language. It clearly has become the lingua franca for communication in multinational business, diplomacy, international institutions, tourism, and aviation. This use of English for intercultural communication, however, presupposes the existence of different cultures; like translation and interpretation, it is a way of coping with those differences, not eliminating

{p. 40} them. In fact, the proportion of the world's population speaking English is small and declining. According to the most reliable data, compiled by Sidney S. Culbert, a professor at the University of Washington, in 1958 roughly 9.8 percent of human beings spoke English as a first or second languae; in 1992, 7.6 percent did. A language foreign to 92 percent of the world's populatlon is not the world's language. Similarly, in 1958, 24 percent of humans spoke one of the five major Western languages; in 1992, less than 21 percent did. The situation is similar for religion. Western Christians now make up perhaps 30 percent of the world's population, but the proportion is declining steadily, and at some point in the next decade or so the number of Muslims wlll exceed the numer of Christians. With respect to the two central elements of culture, language and religion, the West is in retreat. As Michael Howard has observed, the "common Western assumption that cultural diversity is a historical curiosity being rapidly eroded by the growth of a common, Western-oriented, Anglophone world culture, shaping our basic values ... is simply not true."

As indigenization spreads and the appeal of Western culture fades, the central problem in relations between the West and the rest is the gap between the West's, particularly America's, efforts to promote Western culture as the universal culture and its declining ability to do so. The colapse of communism exacerbated this disparity by reinforcing the view in the West that its ideology of democratic liberalism had triumphed globally and was thus universally valid. The West - and especially the United States, which has always been a missionary nation - believes that the non-Western peoples should commit themselves to the Western values of democracy, free markets, limited government, separation of church and state, human rights, individualism, and the rule of law, and should embody these values in their institutions. Minorities in other civilizations embrace and promote these values, but the dominant attitudes toward them in non-Western cultures range from skepticism to intense opposition. What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest.

Non-Westerners do not hesitate to point to the gaps between Western principle and Western practice. Hypocrisy and double stan-

{p. 41} dards are the price of universalist pretensions. Democracy is promoted, but not if it brings Islamic fundamentallsts to power; non-proliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq but not for Israel; free trade is the elixir of economic growth, but not for agriculture; human rights are an issue with China but not with Saudi Arabia; aggression arainst oil-owning Kuwaitis is repulsed with massive force, but not so aggresion asrainst oil-less Bosnians.

The belief that non-Western peoples should adopt Western values, institutions, and culture is, if taken seriously, immoral in its implications. The almost universal reach of European power in the late nineteenth century and the global dominance of the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century spread many aspects of Western civilization across the world. But European globalism is no more, and Alnerican hegemony is receding, if only because it is no longer needed to protect the United States against a Cold War Soviet threat. Culture follows power. If non-Western societies are once again shaped by Western culture, it will happen only as a result of the expansion and deployment of Western power. Imperialism is the necessary, logical consequence of universalism, yet few proponents of universalism support the militarization and brutal coercion that would be necessary to achieve their goal {Does Huntington?}. Furthermore, as a maturing civilization, the West no longer has the economic or demographic dynamism required to impose its will on other societies. Any effort to do so also runs contrary to Western values of self-determination and democracy. This March, Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia told the assembled heads of European governments: "European values are European values; Asian values are universal values." As Asian and Muslim civilizations begin to assert the universal relevance of their cultures, Westerners will come to appreciate the connection between universalism and imperialism and to see the virtues of a pluralistic world.

{Aren't Asian values like the West's of only a few decades ago, before the Cultural Revolution Huntington despaired of in his Crisis of Democracy report to the Trilateral Commission?}

SHORING UP THE WEST

THE TIME has come for the West to abandon the illusion of universality and to promote the strength, coherence, and vitality of its civilization in a world of civilizations. The interests of the West are not served by promiscuous intervention into the disputes of other peoples. ...

{p. 43} In a multipolar, multicivilizational world, the West's responsibility is to secure its own interests, not to promote those of other peoples nor to attempt to settle conflicts between other peoples when those conflicts are of little or no consequence to the West.

{Huntington now calls for unity between Europe and North America}

The future of the West depends in large part on the unity of the West. Scholars of civiliations {read Arnold Toynbee} see them evolving through times of trouble and a period of warring states, eventually leading to a universal state for the civiliation that may be either a source ot or a prelude to decay and disintegration. Western Civilization has moved beyond its warring states phase and is heading toward its universal state phase {with World Government the aim? oneworld.html}. That phase is still incomplete, with the nation-states of the West cohering into two semi-universal states in Europe and North America. These two entities and their constituent units are, however, bound together by an extraordinarily complex network of formal and informal institutional ties. The universal states of previous civilizations were empires. Since democracy is the political form of Western civilization, the emerging universal state of Western civilization is not an empire but rather a compound of federations, confederations, and international regimes. {i.e. World Federalism}

The problem for the West, in this situation, is to maintain its dynamism and to promote its collerence. Western unity depends more on events in the United States than on those in Europe. At present the United States is pulled in three directions. It is pulled south by the continuing immigration of Latin Americans and the growing size and power of its Hispanic population; by the incorporation of Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agreement and the possibility of extending NAFA to other western hemisphere countries, and by the political, economic, and cultural changes in Latin America that make it more like the United States. At the same time, the United States is pulled westward by the increasmg wealth and influence of East Asian societies; by the ongoing efforts to develop a Pacific community, epitomized in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum; and by migration from Asian societies. If democracy, free markets, the rule of law, civil society, individualism, and Protestantism take firm root in Latin America,

{At this point, Huntington seems to define Western Civilization as Protestant, even though inhabiting the formerly Catholic domain}

{p. 44} that continent, whose culture has always been closely related to that of the West, will merge with the West and become the third pillar of Western civilization. No such conveence is possible with Asian societles. Asia is instead likely to pose continuing economic and political challenges to the United States specifically and the West more generally. The third pull, toward EULO, is the most important. Shared values, institutions, history, and culture dictate the continuing close association of the United States and Europe. Both necessary and desirable is the further development of institutional ties across the Atlantic, including negotiation of a European-Amerlcan free trade agreement and creation of a North Atlantic economic organization as a counterpart to NATO.

The major current differences between Europe and America arise not trom direct conflicts of interest with each other, but from their policies toward third parties. Among other questions, these include the provlsion of support to a Muslim-dominated Bosnia, the priority of Israeli securitv needs in Middle Eastern policy, U.S. efforts to penalize foreign companies that do business with Iran and Cuba, the maintenance of full economic sanctions against Iraq, and the part human rights and weapons proliferation concerns should play in dealing with China. Non-Western powers, especially China, have actively attempted to exploit these differences and play one Western country off against another. The differences themselves arise largey from difterent geopolitical perspectives and domestic political and economic interests. Maintaining the unity of the West is, however, is essential to slowing the decline of Western influence in world affairs. Western peoples have more in common with each other than they have with Asian, Middle Eastern, or African peoples. The leaders of Western countries have institutionalized patterns of trust and cooperation among themselves that, with rare exceptions, they do not have with the leaders of other societies. United, the West will remain a formidable presence on the international scene; divided, it will be prey to the efforts of non-Western states to exploit its internal differences by offering short-term gains to some Western countries at the price of long-term losses for all Western countries. The peoples o the West, in Benjamin Frinlklin's phrase, must hang together, or most assuredly they will hang separately.

{p. 45} Promoting the coherence of the West means both preserving Western culture within the West and defining the limits of the West. The former requires, among other things, controlling immigration from non-Western societies, as every major European country has done and the United States is beginning to do, and ensuring the assimilation into Western culture of the immigrants who are admitted. It also means recognizing that in the post-Cold War world, NATO is the security orgranization of Western civilization and that its primary purpose is to defend and preserve that civilization. Hence states that are Western in their history, religion, and culture should, if they desire, be able to join NATO. Practically speaking, NATO membership would be open to the Visegrad states, the Baltic states, Slovenia, and Croatia, but not countries that have historically been primarily Muslim or Orthodox. While recent debate has focused entirely on the expansion rather than the contraction of NATO, it is also necessary to recognize that as NATO's mission changes, Turkish and Greek ties to NATO will weaken and their membership could either come to an end or become meaningless. Withdrawal from NATO is the declared goal of the Welfare Party in Turkey, and Greece is becoming as much an ally of Russia as it is a member of NATO.

The West went through a European phase of development and expansion that lasted several centuries and an American phase that has dominated this century. If North America and Europe renew their moral life, build on their cultural commonality, and develop closer forms of economic and political integration to supplement their security collaboration in NATO, they could generate a third Euroamerican phase of Western affluence and political influence. Meaningful political integration would in some measure counter the relative decline in the West's share of the world's people, economic product, and military capabilities and revive the West's power in the eyes of the leaders of other civilizations. The principal responsibility of Western leaders is not to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West - which is increasingly

{p. 46} beyond their ability - but to preserve and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization. That responsibility falls overwhelmingly on the most powerful Western country, the United States of America. Neither globalism {the Trotskyist/Fabian variant of communism} nor isolationism {nationalism}, neither multilateralism nor unilateralism will best serve American interests. Its interests will be most effectively advanced if the United States eschews those extremes and instead adopts an Atlanticist policy of of close cooperation with its European partners, one that will protect and promote the interests, values, and culture of the precious and uniqlle civilization they share.

{end}

Huntington's imperial faction (Republican Party), and the Trotskyist/Fabian faction (Democratic Party), whilst opposing one another, unite against the isolationists (nationalists).

(4) Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York 1996.

{p. 42} The key cultural elements which define a civilization were set forth in classic form by the Athenians when they reassured the Spartans that they would not betray them to the Persians ...

Blood, language, religion, way of life, were what the Greeks had in common and what distinguished them from the Persians and other non-Greeks. Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion, as the Athenians emphasized. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions; and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other, as happened in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, and the Subcontinent {i.e. India-Pakistan}.

A significant correspondence exists between the division of people by cultural characteristics into civilizations and their division by physical characteristics into races. Yet civilization and race are not identical. People of the same race can be deeply divided by civilization; people of different races may be united by civilization. In particular, the great missionary religions, Christianity and Islam, encompass societies from a variety of races. The crucial distinctions among human groups concern their va!ues, beliefs, institutions, and social structures, not their physical size, head shapes, and skin colors.

{Note, below, how Huntington defines "civilization" in terms of Toynbee's ideas}

Third, civilizations are comprehensive, that is, none of their constituent units can be fully understood without reference to the encompassing civilization. Civilizations, Toynbee argued, "comprehend without being comprehended by others." A civilization is a "totality." Civilizations, Melko goes on to say,

{quote} have a certain degree of integration. Their parts are defined by their relationship to each other and to the whole. If the civilization is composed of states, these states will have more relation to one another than the do to states outside the civilization. They might fight more, and engage more frequently in diplomatic relations. They will be more interdependent economically. There will be perading aesthetic and philosophical currents. {endquote}

{p. 43} A civilization is the broadest cultural entity. ... It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he strongly identifies. Civilizations are the biggest "we" within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other "thems" out there {yet one may find detestable people within one's own religion, but admirable people of non-Western religions}. Civilizations may involve a large number of people, such as Chinese civilization, or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. Throughout history, many small groups of people have existed possessing a distinct culture and lacking any broader cultural identification. Distinctions have been made in terms of size and importance between major and peripheral civilizations (Bagby) or major and arrested or abortive civilizations (Toynbee). This book is concerned with what are generally considered the major civilizations in human history. ...

Fourth, civilizations are mortal but also very long-lived; they evolve, adapt, and are the most enduring of human associations, "realities of the extreme longue duree." Their "unique and particular essence" is "their long historical continuity. Civilization is in fact the longest story of all." Empires rise and fall, govemments come and go, civilizations remain and "survive political, social economic, een ideological uplleavals."

{p. 44} While civilizations endure, they also evolve. They are dynamic; they rise and fall; they merge and divide; and as any student of history knows, they also disappear and are buried in the sands of time. The phases of their evolution may be specified in various ways. Quigley sees civilizations moving through seven stages: mixture, gestation, expansion, age of conflict, universal empire, decay, and invasion. Melko generalizes a model of change from a crystallized feudal system to a feudal system in transition to a crystallized state system to a state system in transition to a crystallized imperial system. Toynbee sees a civilization arising as a response to challenges and then going through a period of growth involving increasing control over its environment produced by a creative minority, followed by a time of troubles, the rise of a universal state, and then disintegration. While significant differences exist, all these theories see civilizations evolving through a time of troubles or conflict to a universal state to decay and disintegration.

{Note the importance Huntington places on Quigley (p. 44, 48, 302, 303, 304) and Toynbee (p. 42, 43, 44, 48n, 55, 73, 301). The Quigley reference is Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations, Liberty Fund, 1979, Indianapolis. But Quigley, too, drew on Toynbee; thus Toynbee is the foundational thinker of the group: toynbee.html. Huntington's endorsement of Quigley adds credibility to Quigley's exposure, as an insider, of the workings of the Anglo-American Establishment: quigley.html}

Fifth, since civilizations are cultural not political entities, they do not, as such, maintain order, establish justice, collect taxes, fight wars, negotiate treaties, or do any of the other things which governments do. The political composition of civilizations varies between civilizations and varies over time within a civilization. A civilization may thus contain one or many political units. Those units may be city states, empires, federations, confederations, nation states, multinational states, all of which may have varying forms of government. As a civilization evolves, changes normally occur in the number and nature of its constituent political units. At one extreme, a civilization and a political entity may coincide. China, Lucian Pye has commented, is "a civilization pretending to be a state." Japan is a civilization that is a state. Most civilizations, however, contain more than one state or other political entity. In the modern world, most civilizations contain two or more states.

{p. 45} "Reasonable agreement," as Melko concludes after reviewing the literature, exists on at least twelve major civilizations, seven of which no longer exist (Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Cretan, Classical, Byzantine, Middle American, Andean) and five which do (Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Islamic, and Western). Several scholars also add Orthodox Russian civilization as a separate civilization distinct from its parent Byzantine civilization and from Western Christian civilization. To these six civilizations it is useful for our purposes in the contemporary world to add Latin American and, possibly, African civilization. The major contemporary civilizations are thus as follows:

Sinic. All scholars recognize the existence of either a single distinct Chinese civilization dating back at least to 1500 B.C. and perhaps to a thousand years earlier, or of two Chinese civilizations one succeeding the other in the early centuries of the Christian epoch. In my Foreign Affairs article, I labeled this civilization Confucian. It is more accurate, however, to use the term Sinic. While Confucianism is a major component of Chinese civilization, Chinese civilization is more than Confucianism and also transcends China as a political entity. The term "Sinic," which has been used by many scholars, appropriately describes the common culture of China and the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and elsewhere outside of China as well as the related cultures of Vietnam and Korea.

Japanese. Some scholars combine Japanese and Chinese culture under the heading of a single Far Eastern civilization. Most, however, do not and instead recognize Japan as a distinct civilization which was the offspring of Chinese civilization, emerging during the period between A.D. 1OO and 400.

Hindu. One or more successive civilizations, it is universally recognized, have existed on the Subcontinent since at least 1500 B.C. These are generally referred to as Indian, Indic, or Hindu, with the latter term being preferred for the most recent civilization. In one form or another, Hinduism has been central to the culture of the Subcontinent since the second millennium B.C. "[M]ore than a religion or a social system; it is the core of Indian civilization." It has continued in this role through modern times, even though India itself has a substantial Muslim community as well as several smaller cultural minorities. Like Sinic, the term Hindu also separates the name of the civilization from the name of its core state, which is desirable when, as in these cases, the culture of the civilization extends beyond that state.

Islamic. All major scholars recognize the existence of a distinct Islamic civilization. Originating in the Arabian peninsula in the seventh century A.D., Islam rapidly spread across North Africa and the Iberian peninsula and also eastward into central Asia, the Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. As a result, many distinct cultures or subcizilizations exist witl Islam, including Arab, Turkic, ersian, and Malay.

Western. Western civilization is usually dated as emerging about A.D. 700 or

{p. 46} 800. It is generally viewed by scholars as having three major components, in Europe, North America, and Latin America.

{Notice that this definition excludes the pre-Christian civilizations of Europe; for Huntington, "western" civilization is characterized by the fusion of the Greek and Jewish culture-streams}

Latin American. Latin America, however, has a distinct identity which differentiates it from the West. Although an offspring of European civilization, Latin America has evolved along every different path from Europe and North America. It has had a corporatist, authoritarian culture, which Europe had to a much lesser degree {what of monarchist France, France under Napoleon & Napoleon III, Germany under the Kaiser, Austria-Hungary? Were they not more like Russian corporatism, than English individualism? What Huntington is really saying, is that only English individualism counts as Western culture}, and North America not at all {what about the New Deal?}. Europe and North America both felt the effects of the Reformation and have combined Catholic and Protestant cultures. Historically, although this may be changing, Latin America has been only Catholic. Latin Arnerican civilization incorporates indigenous cultures, which did not exist in Europe, were effectively wiped out in North America, and which vary in importance from Mexico, Central America, Peru, and Bolivia, on the one hand, to Argentina and Chile, on the other. ...

The teml "the West" is now universally used to refer to what used to be called Western Christendom.

{p. 47} African (possibly). Most major scholars of civilization except Braudel do not recognize a distinct African civilization. The north of the African continent and its east coast belong to Islamic civilization. Historically, Ethiopia constituted a civilization of its own. Elsewhere European imperialism and settlements brought elements of Western civilization. In South Africa Dutch, French, and then English settlers created a multifragmented European culture. Most significantly, European imperialism brought Christianity to most of the continent south of the Sahara. Throughout Africa tribal identities are pervasive and intense, but Africans are also increasingly developing a sense of African identity, and conceivably sub-Saharan Africa could cohere into a distinct civilization, with South Africa possibly being its core state.

Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations, and, as Christopher Dawson said, "the great religions are the foundations on which the great civilizations rest." Of Weber's five "world religions," four-Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism - are associated with major civilizations. The fifth, Buddhism, is not. Why is this the case? Like Islam and Christianity, Buddhism early separated into two main subdivisions, and, like Christianity, it did not survive in the land of its birth. Beginning in the first century A.D., Mahayana Buddhism was exported to China and subsequently to Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. In these societies, Buddhism was variously adapted, assimilated to the indigenous culture (in China, for example, to Confucianism and Taoism), and suppressed. Hence, while Buddhism remains an important component of their cultures, these societies do not constitute and would not identify themselves as part of a Buddhist civilization. What can legitimately be de-

{p. 48} scribed as a Therevada Buddhist civilization, however, does exist in Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. In addition, the populations of Tibet, Mongolia, and Bhutan have historically subscribed to the Lamaist variant of Mahayana Buddhism, and these societies constitute a second area of Buddhist civilization. Overall, however, the virtual extinction of Buddhism in India and its adaptation and incorporation into existing cultures in China and Japan mean that Buddhism, although a major religion, has not been the basis of a major civilization. *

{footnote} * What about Jewish civilization? Most scholars of civilization hardly mention it In temls of numbers of people Judaism clearly is not a major civilization. Toynbee describes it as an arrested civilization which evolved out of the earlier Sriac civilization {Toynbee was no favourite among Zionists}. It is historically affiliated with both Christianity and Islam, and for several centuries Jews mailltained their cultural identity within Western, Orthodox, and Islamic ciilizations. With the creation of Israel, Jews have all the objective accoutrements of a civilization: religion, language, customs, literature, institutions, and a territorial and political home. But what about subjective identification? Jews living in other cultures have distributed themseles along a continuum stretching from total identification witll Judaism and Israel to nominal Judaism and full identification with the civilization withi which they reside, the latter, however, ocurring principally among Jews living within the West (See Mordccdi M Kaplan, Judaism as a Civilization (Philadelphia Reconstructionist Press, 1981; originally published 1934, esp pp. 173-208.

{Yet Ben-Ami Shillony writes in his book The Jews and the Japanese: the Successful Outsiders (Charles E. Tuttle Company, Rutland, Vermont, 1991):

"It is significant that Americans of Japanese ancestry call themselves Japanese-Americans, whereas the Jews living in America refer to themselves as American Jews. ... Unlike the Japanese-Americans who gave up allegiance to Japan, American Jews later became vigorous supporters of Israel. ... American Jews lobby for Israel." (p. 87) japan.html

Professor Shillony bills himself as "a Jew, an Israeli" (p. 10).}

{p. 49} The early civilizations in the valleys of the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, Indus, and Yellow rivers also did not interact {this is wrong; The Indus, Nile & Mespomotamia formed a trading triangle, in whose path Thor Heyerdahl followed in his travels by reed boat. Joseph Needham and David Anthony showed the early overland contacts between China and the West: needham-anthony.html}. Eventually, contacts between civilizations did multiplv in the eastern Mediterranean, southwestern Asia, and northern India. Communications and commercial relations were restricted, however, by the distances separating civilizations and the limited means of transport available to overcome distance. While there was some commerce by sea in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, "Steppe-traversing horses, not ocean-traversing sailing ships, were the sovereign means of locomotion by which the separate civilizations of the world as it was before A.D. 15OO were linked together - to the slight extent to which they did maintain contact with each other." {Huntington's sources for this statement are out of date}

Ideas and technology moved from civilization to civilization, but it often took centuries. Perhaps the most important cultural diffusion not the result of conquest was the spread of Buddhism to China, which occurred about six hundred years after its origin in northern India. Printing was invented in China in the eighth century A.D. and movable type in the eleventh century, but this technology only reached Europe in the fifteenth century. Paper was introduced into China in the second century A.D., came to Japan in the seventh century, and was diffused westward to Central Asia in the eighth century, North Africa in the tenth, Spain in the twelfth, and northern Europe in the thirteenth. Another Chinese invention, gunpowder, made in the ninth century, disseminated to the Arabs a few hundred years later, and reached Europe in the fourteenth century.

{On p. 49, Huntington reproduces a chart showing historical influences from one civilization to another, from Carroll Quigley's book The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 2nd ed., 1979 - first published in 1961), p. 83. This is the same Carroll Quigley who wrote The Anglo-American Establishment: quigley.html}.

{p. 50} Impact: The Rise of the West. ...

Intermittent or limited multidirectional encounters among civilizations gave way to the sustained, overpowering, unidirectional impact of the West on all other civilizations. The end of the fifteenth century witllessed the final reconquest of the Iberian peninsula from the Moors and the beginnings of Portuguese penetration of Asia and Spanish penetration of the Americas. During the subsequent two hundred fifty years all of the Western Hemisphere and significant portions of Asia were brought under European rule or domination.

{p. 51} In the course of European expansion, the Andean and Mesoamerican civilizations were effectively eliminated, Indian ani Islamic civilizations along with Africa were subjugated, and China was penetrated and subordinated to Western influence. Only Russian, Japanese, and Ethiopian civilizations, all three governed by highly centralized imperial authorities, were able to resist the onslaught of the West and maintain meaningful independent existence. For four hundred years intercivilizational relations consisted of the subordination of other societies to Western civilization. ...

The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.

{Is this what George W. Bush is trying to emulate?}

{p. 54} Every civilization sees itself as the center of the world and writes its history

{p. 55} as the central drama of human history. ... A few decades later Toynbee castigated the "parochialism and impertinence" of the West manifested in the "egocentric illusions" that the world revolved around it, that there was an "unchanging East," and that "progress" was inevitable. Like Spengler he had no use for the assumption of the unity of history, the assumption that there is "only one river of civilization, our own, and that all others are either tributary to it or lost in the desert sands." Fifty years after Toynbee, Braudel similarly urged the need to strive for a broader perspective and to understand "the great cultural conflicts in the world, and the multiplicity of its civilizations." The illusions and prejudices of which these scholars warned, however, live on and in the late twelltieth century have blossomed forth in the widespread and parochial conceit that the European civilization of the West is now the universal civilization of the world.

{p. 66} UNIVERSAL CIVILIZATION: SOURCES

The concept of a universal civilization is a distinctive product of Westem civilization.

{p. 67} Second, there is the assumption that increased interaction among peoples - trade, investment, tourism, media, electronic communication generally - is generating a common world culture. ... In 1913, however, international trade was at record highs and in the next few years nations slaughtered each other in unprecedented numbers. ...

In social psychology, distinctiveness theory holds that people define themselves by what makes them different from others in a particu}ar context: ... People define their identity by what they are not.

{p. 69} Whatever the overall merits of Wittfogel's hydraulic civilization thesis, agriculture dependent on the construction and operation of massive irrigation systems does foster the emergence of centralized and bureaucratic political authorities. ...

What were these distinguishing characteristics of Western society durillg the hundreds of years before it modernized? ...

The Classical legacy. ... The legacies of the West fronl Classical ciilization are many, including Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, Latin, and Chlistianity. Islamic and

{p. 70} Orthodox civilizations also inherited from Classical civilization but nowhere near to the same degree the West did ...

{Yet the West inherited much of the Greek tradition via the Byzantine and Islamic worlds; it had been destroyed in Rome}

Rule of law. The concept of the centrality of law to civilized existence was inherited from the Romans. Medieval thinkers elaborated the idea of natural law according to which monarchs were supposed to exercise their power, and a common law tradition developed in England. During the phase of absolutism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the rule of law was obsered more in the breach than in reality, but the idea persisted of the subordination of human power to some external restraint. "Non sub homine sed sub Deo et lege." The tradition of the rule of law laid the basis for constitutionalism and the protection of human rights, including property rights, against the exercise of arbitrary powe