Gold Coast United owner Clive Palmer’s recent reassurances have done little to change public opinion. He can claim over and over again that his club has a future in the A-League, but unless there is a drastic reversal in support, then their future appears bleak.

Their plight, together with the collapse of North Queensland Fury, condemns Football Federation Australia’s expansion plans, not to mention calling into question the strategic planning of the competition from day one.

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Despite the self-inflicted wounds at the Gold Coast and North Queensland, the decision to expand with two extra teams in Queensland before second teams in Melbourne and Sydney has proved, ultimately, flawed. Or, to be more precise, the five-year moratorium on opposition to clubs given licences on the one team per city model was flawed.

How different would the A-League have looked – and how much healthier would it currently be – if the FFA had listened to the players’ union, the Professional Footballers’ Association, which in December 2002 published its suggestions for a new professional league, called the Australian Premier League.

The APL called for an eight- to 10-team competition with one club per city in Australia’s smaller centres – Perth, Brisbane and Adelaide along with two elsewhere for New Zealand and/or a regional centre – three teams in Sydney and two in Melbourne.

Melbourne could, according to the PFA, be split into two distinct sections – south-east and north-west; Sydney split into three with a club in the western sprawl, one south-west of the city, and the other encompassing the city itself and the northern suburbs (where Sydney FC pulls the majority of its support from).

Their justification was that the huge population bases in these catchment areas – each with a recommended and potential customer base of 250,000 – would be enough to support these franchises.

Five teams in two cities may seem excessive and could be considered a stretch, particularly three in the same city launching at the same time. But the justification in expanding and putting clubs where there was significant population bases and proven football fans made complete sense, particularly in markets as diverse as Melbourne and Sydney.



Melbourne has already proven it can host two A-League clubs, despite the difficulties of little to no differentiation. And while the PFA highlighted three potential clubs in Sydney, the geographical separation of Sydney and western Sydney provides the perfect point of difference for two clubs.

With the west of the city – an area rightly called the heartland of the game – left to the western Sydney club, Sydney FC would have been left to focus on and truly engage with its central, northern and southern areas, without being overstretched out west. Unlike in Melbourne, it was a much more obvious point of difference, making it a clear area for a second club with a sustainable base.

Ironically, the FFA expanded into the smaller of the two – Melbourne – before it did (if it ever does) in Sydney.

Crucially, the support for the respective clubs in each city would have evolved on an equal footing, preventing the situation Melbourne Heart were forced into; trying to carve-out support in a city Melbourne Victory had operated in exclusively (and with great success) for five seasons. It’s little wonder many are concerned about Heart as the Harry Kewell-Victory bandwagon rolls through Melbourne.

Instead, it (or, more specifically, the other Melbourne club) could have been just as if not more assured and settled than Victory.

Although in an easier predicament given they’ll have geographical differentiation, a potential western Sydney franchise faces a similar dilemma. Also, they’ll now face the AFL’s millions via the Greater Western Sydney Giants and the NRL’s subsequent response, when it could instead have had a seven-year head start.

Moreover, would Sydney FC have performed so poorly administratively if they had an opposing A-League club on their doorstep? Surely a club that has struggled to resonate since its bumper first season would have been able to better connect and work within an incredibly fickle city, if it had competition and specific regions it could better target.

By expanding into Australia’s two major and most important markets at different times, the competition was always going to create unevenness between the formation and expansion clubs. While Heart, for example, were criticised for poor home crowds by some, the challenge they faced was immense.



Their ability to pull the support they have, despite the limitations and head start Victory had, proves two teams in Melbourne would have worked from day one.

As the PFA highlighted in its report, the league had the potential to be the number two sporting code in each market – behind rugby league in NSW and Queensland, and behind the AFL in Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia.

But by under-delivering in its two most important and biggest markets, it had no chance of becoming the number two code in town.

What could have been? Consider where the Melbourne derby sits after just one season and three encounters; the rivalry well and truly laying its foundations with three enthralling contests – a win apiece and a draw – producing 11 goals, two red cards, 24 yellows, a combined crowd of 81,187, and a buzz not seen in an A-League home and away season match.

Now consider where that rivalry (alongside Sydney FC versus Western Sydney FC) would sit after six seasons, going into its seventh…

Derbies are an integral part of the football culture, be it round-ball football or the Australian codes. Why was this simple yet crucial fact ignored?

This is how the A-League should’ve looked from day one:

– Melbourne Victory

– Melbourne Heart (or equivalent)

– Sydney FC

– Western Sydney FC

– Queensland Roar

– Perth Glory

– Adelaide United

– Newcastle Jets

– Central Coast Mariners

– New Zealand Knights



Where to then? The derbies in Sydney and Melbourne would have provided a strong platform, with clubs in Adelaide, Brisbane, Perth, Central Coast, Newcastle and New Zealand (nee Wellington) proving they have the support to justify their place in those markets.

Having grown from its strongest and biggest markets outwardly, the FFA could have been more discerning when expanding the competition beyond the 10 teams. With this opportunity, had they followed the PFA suggestion, they would have looked at potential supporter levels based on population and football numbers, rather than bank account sizes of prospective owners.

Had they taken this approach, while also considering the market space available to a potential A-League club, Gold Coast and Canberra would’ve led the way – the latter least cluttered having been ignored by the AFL.

The point here is expansion would have been more of a luxury; which areas want it most – building from the most solid foundations out, with a greater selection of fringe markets to choice from. Also, clubs born into this expansion phase would have entered the league at a less delicate period – the FFA waiting for a more stable period, giving them the support they need given their smaller market sizes.

Instead, in the haste and flawed move into North Queensland and Gold Coast, the FFA have burnt bridges in what should have been two future destinations – after, not before, Melbourne and Sydney were maximised.

This is what the A-League could’ve looked like today, had the investment (money and time) burnt in Queensland been better utilised:

– Melbourne Victory

– Melbourne Heart

– Sydney FC

– Western Sydney

– Brisbane Roar (formerly Queensland Roar)

– Perth Glory

– Adelaide United

– Newcastle Jets

– Central Coast Mariners

– Wellington Phoenix (replacing New Zealand Knights)

– Canberra/Gold Coast United

– Wollongong/North Queensland/Tasmania/second team in New Zealand.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing. But as the FFA’s expansion moves unravel, you can’t help but look glumly on the A-League and wonder what could have been.



Download the APL for the Fans document from 2002