ameensol: ameensol: If the purpose of this is to allocate the EF’s budget, I believe that protecting against capture is paramount. In this setup, the EF would lose sovereignty over their funds as soon as they are sent to the DAO—they would not be able to withdraw their funds without the approval of the DAO. Further, because the rules of the DAO can be arbitrarily changed by ETH holders, you could end up in a scenario where the ETH holders attempt to hijack the funds (which would take 2 weeks) and the EF would have one attempt to try and withdraw their funds via a grant payment to themselves (which would take 1 week).

Allowing the EF to unilaterally deposit and withdraw funds from the org would simply require granting their multi-sig address the transfer funds permission. From a launch perspective this could be a simple way to dip feet without much risk relative to the status quo.

ameensol: ameensol: Second, I don’t think ETH holders should be able to have final say. Holding ETH does not strike me as having enough skin in the game to have the right to decide the ultimate fate of the DAO. Instead, I think ETH holders who want to participate should be forced to spend some of their own ETH towards the grants they decide to fund, and only earn voting rights proportional to their contributions. This is doable in the proposed paradigm but is weakened by the ability of ETH holders to make arbitrary changes at will.

I think this approach would make sense if the source of funds were coming from new donations only, though in that case it seems duplicative of the efforts on Moloch DAO. The underlying premise here is to make the use of EF funds more transparent and accountable to ETH holders. I think the justification for ETH holders having control of funding decisions is based on the fact that they are the source of funding for the protocol, both in the initial crowd-sale and through the ongoing funding of the block reward out of ETH inflation.

ameensol: ameensol: Yes, exactly this. Although it doesn’t have to be as extreme as a cartel deciding to give themselves the money, it could also just be that they no longer agree with how the rest of the token holders are voting to allocate the resources and want to exit. The ability to exit at any time is what preserves their sovereignty over the funds.

In the current version of the proposal the “exit” strategy is to have all fund transfers subject to a 3 week delay, so an illegitimate transfer would take a total of 1 week for voting and 3 weeks prior to being executed. If we allow the EF to withdraw funds from the vault at any time that is a 3 week period to exit prior to funds moving, if we don’t allow the EF to withdraw unilaterally then the assumption would be a HF and irregular state change could be used to block the transfer.

Normally I think relying on a HF + irregular state change in a DAO would be unreasonable, but given that this proposes the organization as an extension of the overall Ethereum governance process which largely revolves around social consensus it seems reasonable to set the expectation and norm that the organization is ultimately subservient to the existing social consensus layer.

ameensol: ameensol: I’m not sure you get it. From the Aragon Court description it seems that it’s just a way for ANT holders to arbitrate issues in Aragon DAOs, not for the individual members of those DAOs to retain sovereignty. It actually further abdicates sovereignty of the DAO to the ANT holders, creating an additional attack vector. The fact that you think this “completely solves 51% attacks” makes me seriously question your understanding of the game theory at play here.

I don’t want to fully respond to this here, as its not really relevant to the proposal, but for clarities sake. The court is intended as an opt-in dispute resolution layer which an organization can choose to use to help provide subjective constraints on what an organization can do, and assuming there is consensus among the organization stakeholder an organization can also opt-out and choose to no longer use the court. It is intended to protect minority and passive participants within an org from actions taken by the majority of stakeholders within the organization. I think that it is a good solution for “51 percent attacks” in many circumstances, but it’s still an untested mechanism and shouldn’t be seen as a solution to anything until it has been tested in incrementally more critical situations.