Sending text-messages is of no effort for users today. This form of online communication and data transmission is one of the most important, integral parts of the internet. There are very few users who critically think about what happens with their personal data after clicking on fun, animated buttons for sending text messages on popular social networks. Where are these messages delivered to besides your peers? How are they stored? Who has access to them? In this article we will try to disassemble the key parts of encryption methods and message delivery systems in several popular services, using only facts and bypassing disputes over the technical aspects that use inaccurate terms and wordings to create confusion in the media.

Let’s start with WhatsApp — the most popular online application for instant-messaging with an active monthly user-base of 1.5 billion. As early as mid-2016, its representatives promised «end-to-end» encryption for each message sent. After a while, their promises came true — WhatsApp encryption systems have been updated and have acquired a new name in mass media, up to a certain point. As it turned out a few days later, in almost every official release there was a share of direct lies to users. Despite the claims of full, direct encryption of the new «end-to-end» method in all cases of correspondence, the necessary security settings were hidden deep making them very hard to discover. And in case you find them, the developers have prepared a huge backdoor, or a deliberate systemic vulnerability in the security of the entire structure. Data manipulation could be carried out by sending messages with a modified encryption key, duplicating data in the cloud, up to accessing the actions with all the information inside the application. Full materials with examples and confirmations, including code snippets, were published shortly on small resources not controlled by the US government or influenced by Facebook, Inc. It is worth noting that WhatsApp has a closed, legally protected source code, which means complete inability to verify the words and statements of its developers.

Now let’s look at the world’s second leading position — Facebook Messenger, with 1.3 billion active users. «End-to-end» chats were introduced roughly a year ago, characterized by a wave of positive media reviews and a lock icon on the person’s avatar. With closed source code, the level of trust in Facebook Messenger can be compared with the analogue above, taking a few new colors and shades of Facebook’s reputation in the field of security and respect for user data. As with most «classic» messengers, in the case of correspondence without specially configured settings, no information was provided on the security of your data.

Another interesting situation, emphasizing the credibility of confidentiality statements of the above two examples, has developed with the «nationwide» Chinese messenger WeChat. Recalling China’s policy of privacy and the requirements for IT products, below are quotes found on the official website of one of the most frequently used instant-messenger in China:

At WeChat, user privacy and data protection are our top priorities. WeChat considers user privacy and data protection not just our company’s responsibility, but also a key part of our users’ experience.

Source: https://help.wechat.com/cgi-bin/micromsgbin/oshelpcenter?opcode=2&plat=1&lang=en&id=1208117b2mai1410243yyQFZ&Channel=helpcenter

In the messenger’s privacy statements, complex technologies and methods of data-encryption are often described, without introducing the use of «end-to-end». The guarantees about safety of use are often given, insisting on privacy with a complete lack of evidence for such statements. And again, the source code is not publicly available.

The number of WeChat users today exceeds 1 billion.

Another popular Chinese service: QQ Mobile with nearly 800 million monthly active users. No trace of «end-to-end», including the already classic lack of open-source code.

Other well-known services share similar flaws. Viber, Skype, Snapchat, Line — all of them have closed source-code, covering this fact by advertising campaigns, loud statements, articles in trusted media, and completely ignoring the fact that it is impossible to confirm what has been said.

Telegram messenger that is popular in the Middle East in context of private communication, also doesn’t open the full source-code and doesn’t provide the verifiable information about what happens to users’ personal data. From the public information it is known only about the app’s general functionality, not about real user-messages management and storage. Nevertheless, a significant part of various countries’ media willingly separates Telegram from other «dark side» messengers, arguing in the same words that WhatsApp, WeChat, and other representatives use. Below we give the only known quotation from official Telegram website on the reasons for not revealing the full source code:

«All code will be released eventually. We started with the most useful parts — a well-documented API that allows developers to build new Telegram apps, and open source clients that can be verified by security specialists.»

The answer to the direct question is: «Why not open-source everything?»

Details: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9774402

If you read the text carefully, you will not be able to find the answer for yourself. Over the period of more than four years, nothing except an API was published. The «all code will be released eventually» has not happened yet. Today, a huge number of media outlets continue to popularize and feed the public with a sense of trust and security to Telegram Messenger, which has not shown any justified advantage over dozens of its counterparts, excluding the number of loud statements from its representatives.

The official Telegram statement on open-source code: https://telegram.org/faq#q-why-not-open-source-everything

Applications aiming for confidentiality or security of messaging seem to consistently introduce more functionality for the protection of user data, but always end up on the same path. The lack of anonymity due to the invariable authorization and identification systems they create, the constant disclosure of IP addresses, the storage of logs on devices, the free possibility of blocking users, and the centralized storage of data.

The result of such a critical situation in the field of data security was the reasoning behind the creation of the ADAMANT messenger, built on a radically new concept for messengers based on blockchain-technology. Attempting to maintain the comfort of communication, ADAMANT provides security and anonymity for everyone. The fully open-source code of the entire system allows you to verify this.

By using blockchain, this messenger does not have dependencies from central servers, developers, or internal identification systems. Support for its work is carried out by the users receiving internal currency, which will soon be listed on cryptocurrency exchanges.

The messenger is being actively developed — the support for ETH has been recently implemented.

Built by a small team of developers, the project gives a completely new perspective on messaging and multimedia exchange in the modern world.

If you are ready to learn more about the project, would like to contribute to its development through the purchase of tokens, or you have some technical knowledge — you can participate in the development on GitHub.