Ted Thompson made a big mistake by re-signing A.J. Hawk to a lucrative contract. Credit: Tom Lynn

Green Bay - The failure of the Green Bay Packers' defense this season lay at the feet of the players, Ted Thompson, Mike McCarthy and his staff of defensive coaches.

When the offense had one bad day, the defense not only wasn't there to pick it up last Sunday but exacerbated the problem by giving up 37 points in the crushing NFC divisional playoff loss to the New York Giants.

Lambeau Field stands ice cold and silent. The NFC Championship Game destined for Green Bay will be played late Sunday afternoon in San Francisco, and the Packers will be watching from home.

In his valedictory Wednesday, McCarthy spoke of weak fundamentals and sloppy tackling to explain the collapse of his defense. That was the sanitized coach-speak of a man obviously not interested in saying what was really on his mind.

It wouldn't have taken that much more to have catapulted the Packers into another Super Bowl. Credit the Giants for exposing the Packers, but at the same time blame the Packers for not taking care of business long before kickoff.

Green Bay had more than enough offense to become the ninth team of the Super Bowl era to repeat as champion and flame the fire of a second dynasty in the National Football League's smallest city. If a lesson could be learned, it's that every football decision made by an organization has meaning and that the margin for error, even for a team with a 15-1 record, isn't much.

In chronological order, let's look back at the people and events that shaped the worst defense in franchise history and the second-worst defense in NFL history. Clearly, this is a fall that could have been avoided.

On March 2, the Packers cut A.J. Hawk to escape his $10 million guaranteed salary for 2011. The next day, they signed him for $33.75 million over five years.

It made no sense at the time for Thompson to give Hawk that kind of money. The agent for Hawk told the Packers many teams called during those few hours when his client was on the street, no doubt insinuating that some of them wanted to sign Hawk quickly before the lockout was to begin.

Thompson appeared to have taken it hook, line and sinker. More than likely the Packers were just negotiating against themselves.

But Thompson always has had a soft spot for Hawk, his first-round draft choice in 2006. Inside linebackers in a 3-4 defense, unless they're dominant like a Patrick Willis, simply don't deserve that kind of money.

Hawk? You've got to be kidding. He's just a guy. His contract is by far the worst contract that Thompson has ever enacted.

The decision to re-sign Hawk was doubly damaging because it also meant the end of Nick Barnett's career in Green Bay. They played side-by-side from 2006 until Week 4 of 2010 when Barnett broke his wrist. Scouts routinely over the years called Barnett the better player of the two.

Yes, Barnett was 2½ years older than Hawk. He also had a balky right knee that had been reconstructed in 2008.

Barnett started all 16 games and played almost every down for the Buffalo Bills, leading them in tackles with 130 and notching four turnover plays. He never missed a day of practice due to injury. His three-year contract averaged $3.8 million.

Hawk started 15 games, playing almost every down. He finished third in tackles with 109 and didn't have a turnover play. His contract averaged $6.75 million.

If Barnett ruffled a few feathers by exposing McCarthy's plan to exclude injured-reserve players from the Super Bowl team photo, that's too bad. He was right. Barnett is no choir boy, but not everyone wearing a Green Bay uniform is.

Barnett is no Patrick Willis or NaVorro Bowman, his sidekick in San Francisco. But when compared to Hawk, Barnett is faster, tougher, more instinctive, slightly better in coverage, a stronger blitzer and a hell-raising, more emotional leader. A less than enthusiastic defense under Hawk's measured signal-calling could have used a kick in the butt.

It's beyond me how Thompson can come back with Hawk as the starter next season. There even have been whispers among Hawk's teammates. They know better than anyone else how little his game has to offer.

Some scouts have said rookie D.J. Smith played better in 3½ games than Hawk did. He's the future, not Hawk.

What's done is done. Hawk's $8 million signing bonus can't be brought back, but there is no more guaranteed money in his contract.

Despite stiff salary-cap ramifications, Thompson needs to get the Packers out from under Hawk's $4.4 million base salary in '12 either by trading him (good luck) or releasing him.

By draft day, Thompson already had made the decision that Cullen Jenkins was too much of an injury risk and wouldn't be re-signed. It was similar to March 2010, when Thompson let Aaron Kampman, another oft-injured pass rusher, walk as a free agent.

Thompson was dead right on Kampman because he kept getting hurt. But he was dead wrong on Jenkins.

The Packers were counting on Mike Neal to compensate for Jenkins' pass rush. If Neal failed, they knew the next-best rush option was to draft someone to start opposite Clay Matthews.

With the 32nd choice, Thompson was pleased to find tackle Derek Sherrod. It also was clear that the only pass rushers left with a chance to start as rookies were Jabaal Sheard, Brooks Reed and Da'Quan Bowers. Sheard went 37th to Cleveland, Reed went 42nd to Houston and Bowers went 51st to Tampa Bay.

Although the 255-pound Sheard played end in the Browns' 4-3, many teams thought he was athletic enough to stand up in a 3-4. A year-long starter, Sheard had 7½ sacks and five forced fumbles.

Reed, described by several scouts as a "poor man's Clay Matthews," started the last 13 games for injured Mario Williams at strong outside linebacker, had 9½ sacks and attacked the run hard.

After a slow start due in part to anticipated complications stemming from pre-combine knee surgery, Bowers (1½ sacks) was starting to harass quarterbacks late as a 4-3 end. The Packers had some doubts about Bowers' ability to play on his feet.

The Packers' last chance to reinforce their rush ended when they took Randall Cobb over outside linebacker Justin Houston at No. 64. A part-time starter as Kansas City's pick at No. 70, Houston posted 5½ sacks.

The sixth-round selection of Ricky Elmore, possibly Thompson's worst pick ever, showed just how desperate the Packers were to find another rusher.

Still, even when Jenkins didn't find his pot o' gold immediately in free agency, Thompson didn't reconsider and bring him back on the cheap. Jenkins' best option was a back-loaded five-year offer from the Eagles containing almost an insulting $3.5 million in guarantees.

Jenkins was the same player in Philadelphia that he had been in Green Bay except he didn't miss any games. Neal, of course, proved worthless. The entire D-line had 37½ pressures in 17 games this year whereas Jenkins had 35 by himself in 15 games last year.

Driven to wit's end by the non-pass rush, coordinator Dom Capers threw up his arms and decided he might as well just drop eight against the Giants. But given the dysfunction in the back seven, Eli Manning still shredded the defense and that was that.

Not even Capers' "Come to Jesus" meetings during the open week could rescue this bunch.

For whatever reason, everyone in the secondary with the exception of Charlie Peprah was caught up in a culture of risk-taking.

Tramon Williams, Sam Shields and Morgan Burnett learned it from Charles Woodson. They also had won a Super Bowl taking those same kinds of chances.

The difference was having three legitimate pass rushers in 2010. Matthews was almost as good, but B.J. Raji didn't play back to that level and the other two rush positions were null and void.

Capers responded by blitzing far more than ever before in Green Bay. That made it harder on those in coverage, as did quarterbacks having that crucial extra half-second in the pocket.

Even that is no excuse for what happened in coverage. What went on at the linebacker and secondary levels was shameful.

Not only wouldn't Williams and Shields hit anyone, they kept gambling as if they were trying to become the next Deion Sanders. Williams became a sitting duck for double-moves. Shields wouldn't stop peeking at the quarterback when he wasn't in contact with his receiver and too often ended up losing him.

Patrolling deep, Burnett got so itchy to join the interception parade that he kept vacating the middle and endangering the cornerbacks.

The cultural creator and ringleader, Woodson, came through with his normal haul of picks but also gave up two or three times as many costly plays.

Yet, Woodson always gets the benefit of the doubt from his coaches and almost always from the fans. Because his words and matter-of-fact body language almost never acknowledge fault, the ill-informed often consider him beyond reproach.

A year ago, the Packers played over many more injuries than just Nick Collins. This time they didn't because a raft of defenders fell off their performance level of 2010, including Woodson, Williams, Shields, Peprah, Hawk, Raji, Neal, Frank Zombo, Jarius Wynn, C.J. Wilson and Howard Green.

Some of those who coordinated and coached offenses against Green Bay this season pointed out that Capers' fire-zone scheme wasn't exactly hard to figure out, either.

Aaron Rodgers and the offense would have scored 50 points or more if given a shot at this inept defense. Even though the Packers were ahead at least 90% of the time, the defense still couldn't muster more than 29 sacks.

So it's over. An impressive 36-12 in the last three regular seasons, the Packers had a legitimate chance to win three Super Bowls and instead captured one.

If Thompson now lets center Scott Wells get away, as he did Jenkins, you'll know something is terribly amiss. But the guess is that the Packers will have learned from their mistake.

The Packers have a dominating offense led by a prolific quarterback. The next eight months will be about reshaping the defense into a competent group.

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