Then, with other participants, I found this scenario to be completely unrealistic. But of course, making predictions is a thankless task. I recall that in a book written in 1964, which was then repeatedly republished — the last time in 1978, approximately a decade before the collapse of the Soviet political system — two extremely brilliant political scientists wrote how both the US and the Soviet systems, when compared, were “highly successful” and “not likely to change drastically.” They were Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington ("Political Power: USA/USSR," Penguin Books: 1978, page 436).

You can argue all you want, but one thing is clear, and that is that the reality surpasses even the most daring predictions of analysts who had forecast the possibility of future changes in the map of the Middle East. I remember how, at an expert discussion on future development scenarios in the Middle East organized in the United Kingdom by the American authors of the forthcoming report “Global Trends 2030,” one of the options was an Islamic caliphate.

These days, debates are raging everywhere, including in Russia, about who is responsible for the crumbling of Iraq, one of the main pillars of the Arab world. Some ascribe the blame to the United States for toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein under false pretenses in the name of democracy. Others say that the culprits are the radical Islamists, who have destroyed state borders that had been historically established, or arbitrarily drawn by European colonizers, all in the name of the caliphate. Still others blame Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria for supporting Islamists to weaken the secular opposition, as the leaders of the National Coalition maintain.

The region, however, continues to stun those closely following its turbulent transformation. In the near future, yet another state — namely, an independent Kurdistan , which may be formed in northern Iraq — threatens to be added to the already self-proclaimed, cross-border Islamic State (formerly known as ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) or caliphate — irrespective of how long the latter will last.

The idea that the Middle East is experiencing a period of unprecedented, dynamic transformation is so trivial that it does not bear repeating, either in Russia or anywhere else. Yet, far less trivial is a contemplation of the crisis of the system of nation-states in the region and the “ end of Sykes-Picot ,” about which many analysts have written, including this writer.

Either the Arab Spring (“Arab headaches,” in the words of the Saudi Emir Turki al-Faisal) is reshaping the region, or outside intervention has brought it to ruin, or the worldwide “fashion for referenda” has simply caught up with it, becoming a tool of re-identification with ethno-religious groups. First Europe, then Eurasia and now the Middle East. Only recently, in an article in Al-Monitor, I considered the possibility of creating an independent Kurdish state in Iraq (though I have long been talking about the viability of the Kurds gaining statehood in the foreseeable future), and now this prospect has edged closer to becoming reality.

A high-ranking Turkish official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told me that Turkey sees no threat in the possible establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, since such a state would depend heavily on Turkey, preserve friendly relations with it and would not support Kurdish separatists across the border in consideration of its national interest. Furthermore, the Turkish authorities are confident in the stability of the internal situation in their country. At the same time, the source added, he did not rule out that the referendum about the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan might be delayed. I know that the Iranian authorities are just as confident in the stability of the internal situation in their country, so they would also have no reason for concern over the implementation of Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani’s declaration.

For Russia, the geographically close Middle East is a source of great opportunities and considerable risks, as well as — undoubtedly — new surprises. Who until recently would have thought that in Iraq a Sunni Islamist group would take hostage 80 Turkish citizens? And what is even more surprising is that a staff member of the Turkish Foreign Ministry tells Al-Monitor at the same time that Turkey does not consider “either ISIS or the other radical groups as a direct threat to our [Turkey's] national security.”

Who could have imagined only a few days ago that Russian military aircraft with military-technical personnel would so quickly reappear in Baghdad? It is certainly not “boots on the ground,” as our American friends like to put it, but it is nonetheless some form of presence. This is a serious show of support for Baghdad, though experience shows that the air force alone cannot defeat terrorism. And who would have foreseen that despite all the acute controversies between them, the United States, Iran and Russia would effectively be in the same trench fighting against the obscurantist caliphate supporters?

Who could have predicted that after a long period of offensive anti-Russian rhetoric, a reboot in relations with Moscow would suddenly appear in the local press in Saudi Arabia? And that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would be accorded such a warm welcome by the most senior officials in the kingdom (in contrast with the cold reception to US Secretary of State John Kerry)? And that Saudi Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud would even receive Lavrov symbolically on a Friday (June 20)? Truly, as they say in Russia, the Lord works in mysterious ways!

Incidentally, Russian media reported that, during the discussions in the kingdom, there was talk of cooperation “in the field of oil, gas and peaceful nuclear energy as well as peaceful space exploration, agriculture and infrastructure projects.” As the sources to Russian newspaper Izvestia recounted, “Many joint projects were frozen a few years ago under the influence of the Americans.” It is noteworthy that the development of cooperation in the humanitarian sphere has also been planned, which is quite unusual for Moscow’s ties with Riyadh. Regarding this, Lavrov remarked: "We thanked the Saudi authorities for their consistently attentive and impeccable attitude toward our pilgrims during the hajj season, and we expressed the hope that Saudi subjects will also come to Russia more often as tourists. We have sights to be visited. This proposal was also met with support.” No sign here of the controversy on Syria.

What will happen to Syria, however, if a united Iraq disintegrates? The successful advance of the ISIS terrorists and their allies, on the one hand, may worsen Assad’s position, as the Islamists intensify military pressure on the government forces. But, on the other hand, radical Islamist forces will be even more overstretched, having to fight in both Iraq and Syria. Thus, along with government forces, many others will be leading a war of extermination against them.

I do not accept allegations that the Syrian regime supports Islamist terrorists to weaken the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Islamist terrorists are the regime's uncompromising sworn enemies. And I cannot quite imagine how FSA units and subdivisions under the new circumstances, having received the promised generous support from the United States, will conduct combat operations simultaneously against both significantly strengthened ISIS Islamists, and government forces that have achieved considerable local progress. As for the unity of Syria, the prevailing view in Moscow is that it can be maintained, despite Iraq’s negative effect. But to achieve this, an inclusive peace process is needed.

Finally, I fear that the virus of ethno-religious atomization will come to Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops. Yet, as they put it in a popular Russian documentary series, that's another story altogether.