Bocheński’s philosophical activity can be briefly described as philosophical analysis (or its result as analytic philosophy). In his programmatic statement, presented in “Über die analytische Philosophie” (Bocheński 1986a), “Logic and Ontology” (Bocheński 1974c) and in numerous observations contained usually in the introductions to his analytic works, Bocheński insisted that he cultivated a kind of basic research, which seeks to understand what other disciplines presuppose. It is analytic philosophy, in which one conducts “a simple, sober, logical analysis of language. […] Therefore, analytic philosophy is primarily an analysis of language, words are indeed not taken into account here in the abstract sense, i.e. in isolation from the living language. On the contrary, different ways of using words are explored to determine their meaning better. That is to say, however, that these meanings are determined by continuous comparison with the reality reflected in language” (Bocheński 1974a, p. 12).

The program of practicing analytic philosophy can be summarized in the following schema: a philosopher, using the tools of logic (the consequence of the use of logic is simplicity and sobriety), performs linguistic analysis based on the examination of words in ordinary language in order to grasp their meaning; such an approach assumes, of course, the correspondence of language and reality (which is reflected in language).

Philosophical analysis is of a logical character. Therefore, philosophy adopts, according to Bocheński, the form of applied logic. “This may seem strange to a reader who regards logic as a reasoning technique. In fact, logic is a completely different thing; it is above all a theory of the most general, simplest connections between all things, and thus a great tool not as much for reasoning as for analysis” (Bocheński 1974a, 12). It is worth mentioning that Bocheński pointed to three important functions of logic in philosophy, namely: the educational function (paidagogos), the instrumental function (organon), and the informational function (meros), by means of which some logical statements lead to the solution of philosophical problems. However, the most important function of logic is its use as a tool for the analysis of concepts (Russell’s theory of descriptions, Tarski’s theory of truth or his own conceptual analyses serving as examples) (Bocheński 1988a, b).

Bocheński’s analytic papers are in line with the program of Polish analytic philosophy initiated by K. Twardowski and J. Łukasiewicz, whose followers include, among others, T. Kotarbiński, K. Ajdukiewicz, and T. Czeżowski. In the paper “Analiza i konstrukcja pojęcia przyczyny” (Łukasiewicz 1961, 9–65) Łukasiewicz distinguished two operations aimed at the determination of the concept: analysis and construction. “To provide a logical analysis of a concept, or an abstract object is to find all its features and explore the relationships that occur between them, with a particular emphasis on the necessary relationships, that is on the designation of both defining and consecutive characteristics” (Łukasiewicz 1961, 12). But, as he noted, it is not possible to provide all the features of a given concept, because besides absolute features, it has an unlimited number of relative features. An additional difficulty stems from the fact that in everyday language we use the word corresponding to the concept in various situations usually knowing which thing we have in mind. Therefore, to obtain the definition of a concept the analysis must be supplemented with a structural element. “To create, or construct, an abstract object means to find certain features, to consider which of them can be connected with each other, and which should be removed, and thereby to obtain a complete collection of features connected by relationships that would constitute precisely the object of research” (Łukasiewicz 1961, p. 13).Footnote 1 Thus, according to Łukasiewicz, the meaning of a word in ordinary language is to be reconstructed, and the determination of the meaning of a name should resemble efforts towards providing a regulatory definition.

Bocheński, as we will show by studying examples of his analysis of concepts, applied Łukasiewicz’s program. Philosophical analysis aims at defining clearly the concepts used in other disciplines. Modern development helps philosophers recognize that they can do a favor for other disciplines, that not only they alone but others can utilize their results. In the Middle Ages there was much discussion about the role of philosophy as ancilla theologiae. Many modern philosophers found that offensive—How could their dignified wisdom be a servant? Their indignation might not have been as radical had they heard the term ‘auxiliary’ instead of ‘servant’ discipline– since such is the meaning of the medieval ‘ancilla’. None of the mathematicians feels offended by the fact that an astronomer uses his science as an auxiliary discipline. Why would philosophers react differently? (Bocheński 1993, 46).

Philosophy is to be a propaedeutic to the domains of specific sciences (Aristotle attributed this role to the Organon) Bochenski listed four distinctive features of analytic philosophy—focusing on small tasks (rather than creating syntheses); clear expression; relying on logical tools; objectivity—allow philosophical propaedeutic to be seen as neutral in content. That neutrality is due to the fact that the analysis is carried out solely in order to determine the basic properties of the analyzed concept (Bocheński 1974a, p. 13), and philosophical analysis is based on the most general categories of ontology (and ontologically understood logic) (Bocheński 1974c, 285–288).

In the next section we will present the way to implement Bocheński’s method. The key stages of the analysis of a concept will be extracted on the basis of the analysis of the concept of authority. Since the object of this paper is concept analysis, we omit other papers by Bocheński on formalization, such as those on the formal analysis of the arguments for the existence of God.Footnote 2