Let me first make it clear that I'm writing this under the presumed notion that consciousness (and thus self-awareness) is a byproduct of a complex, interconnected brain and its synaptic wiring, i.e. it's not a separate entity in and of itself that operates outside of the brain's wetware.

Having said that, the subject of mind uploading is a fascinating (and, at times, infuriating) topic that has sparked numerous research and debates over the last several decades. For those whose mindset infers that our sense of self is that of which in tandem with the notion of a "soul," mind uploading is a highly feasible prospect for potential post-human development.

However, for those whose mindset is that of a materialist objectification and observation (re: first paragraph) of consciousness and its relation to the human brain, mind uploading is usually deemed as a highly improbable potentiality.

It is thus my intention to try to persuade those of a materialist objectification and observation (like myself) that mind uploading is (at least theoretically) probable.

Let me start this off with a story. There was a young girl named Christina Santhouse from Levittown, PA. She was 8-years-old and full of life. She also had a rare inflammatory neurological disease known as Rasmussen's encephalitis, also known as chronic focal encephalitis (CFE). As a result, this young girl would have upwards to 150 seizures a day. Long-term wise, the disease would eventually paralyze and kill her.

Left with no other options, a prominent neurosurgeon known as Dr. Ben Carson (yes, the now-Republican politician) proposed a radical potential solution: remove the hemisphere of the brain of which the CFE was located. The parents agreed and so one of the two hemispheres was removed.

Remarkably, not only was the radical operation a resounding success, resulting in the removal of the CFE and all of its symptoms, but Santhouse was also able to live a relatively normal life from thereon in. Despite losing motor skills on one side of her body, she was able to pursue a speech-pathology major at Misericordia University and is now, 21 years later, happily married.

By now, you're asking: what does this have to do with mind uploading? Simply put, I hypothesize that a potential solution to achieving viable mind uploading is predicated on the reasoning behind why Santhouse was able to live a relatively normal life after having half of her brain surgically removed. And that reasoning is known as "brain lateralization," or the lateralization of brain function (LBF).

Essentially, what LBF entails is that the human brain is merely the sum result of two distinct cerebral hemispheres separated by the medial longitudinal fissure, whereby one of the hemispheres has a tendency to dominate the other in terms of either neural functions or cognitive processes.

In other words, when Dr. Carson surgically removed one of Santhouse's hemispheres, she was able to live a relatively normal life because the human brain was able to accommodate by having the remaining biological hemisphere become the dominant hemisphere.

Which then brings us back to the subject of mind uploading. For those of whom are unaware as to the reasoning why mind uploading is deemed highly improbable by those of an objective understanding of both consciousness and its relation to that of the human brain, let me first try to catch you up to speed.

In order for mind uploading to work, we would first need to figure out a way of ensuring that the uploaded mind is officially you, as opposed to a mere copy. After all, mind uploading is only an attractive solution if you were to actually survive and maintain your sense of self post-upload. If you believe that you'll achieve this by simply downloading the brain's wetware, upload it into an artificial brain, destroy the biological brain, and come out as yourself, you're highly mistaken.

This is known as the "continuity dilemma," whereby most proposed mind uploading scenarios would only result in the uploading of one's "functional continuity" - the encoded information being relayed via the brain's synapses - and not one's "physical continuity" - the human brain itself, i.e. you!

Which then raises an important question: how can we maintain physical continuity as we upload our functional continuity into an artificial brain?

This is where LBF comes into play. From hereon in, everything is purely theoretical.

Imagine that, for whatever reason, you're planning on surgically removing one of your cerebral hemispheres. Before the procedure commences, however, you download the entire human brain (both hemispheres) and upload it into either an artificial cerebral hemisphere or have it condensed into an implantable, micro-scaled chip for later use.

The procedure is then underway. Several hours later, the operation concludes and you finally wake up soon thereafter, with one less hemisphere encapsulated inside of your skull. Like Santhouse, you've lost motor skills on one side of your body, but the operation was a resounding success.

As LBF dictates, the remaining biological cerebral hemisphere becomes your dominant hemisphere. Months pass by as per your recovery time. You're now officially prepared for your second and final operation: attaching the artificial hemisphere to that of your remaining biological hemisphere (or implanting the micro-scaled chip into your remaining biological hemisphere).

One of two things should then occur over time (whether the allotted time is either short or long is purely speculative, at best):

Either...

(i) your body rejects the artificial hemisphere (or implant), ultimately concluding the second operation as a failure; or

(ii) your body doesn't reject the artificial hemisphere (or implant), ultimately concluding the second operation as a success (thus far).

If (i), any chance of being able to viably upload your mind while maintaining physical continuity drops down to 0%. If (ii), however, theoretically speaking, the artificial hemisphere (or implant) should become just as interconnected with that of your remaining biological hemisphere as if both hemispheres were biological in and of themselves, i.e. you become the sum result of both a biological and artificial cerebral hemisphere.

At the very least, unlike Santhouse who permanently lost her motor skills on one side of her body, the newly attached artificial hemisphere (or implant) should restore all motor skills throughout the body, and anything else which might've been lost after the first operation.

More importantly, however, if my hypothesis is accurate, you'll have become so interconnected with that of the artificial hemisphere (or implant) that, by the time your remaining biological hemisphere dies, the artificial hemisphere should've already become your dominant hemisphere and thus, officially, uploaded your mind (functional continuity) while maintaining your sense of self (physical continuity).

What do you think?