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How can I safely erase the data from my SSD drive? I've seen a few pieces in recent days about how traditional "secure delete" programs fail to work properly on SSD drives, so what tools are available and useful?

As pointed out in a recent research article, there isn't a standard method for securely deleting data from a solid state drive. Hard disk drives have had this problem solved for ages, and can execute a secure delete by filling the space occupied by an incriminating file with zeroes or multiple writes of different characters. We'll go into why this approach and some other secure erase methods don't really work on an SSD, especially not for individual files, and then describe some approaches you might take to make sure all your old data is gone for good.

We did an Ask Ars not long ago concerning the way that SSDs handle deletion and cleanup of old files, and we'll assume you've read it or have equivalent knowledge. Basically, the issue with SSDs is this—let's say your SSD is a pirate, and your data is buried treasure. If you tell an SSD pirate to make his buried treasure disappear, all he really does is burn the treasure map. The buried treasure is still out there for someone to find if they know where to look. This isn't the case for all SSDs in the long term, but it is the case for all of them in the short term.

Some SSDs get around to destroying things like old versions of files with garbage collection, and some can take care of deleted files with TRIM, but because an SSD's only immediate reaction to a deleted file is to forget where that file is rather than erasing it, files can sit scattered around an SSD for a while. Deleting files immediately would cause extra wear on an SSD, which is why they don't do it.

Likewise, it is almost impossible to securely delete an individual file on an SSD, because the way that SSDs write and delete files is scattered, and a user has no control over what an SSD is doing where. If that's the kind of security you're looking for, your best bet is encryption, which we will cover in a little bit.

The overwriting procedure that works so well for HDDs doesn't work as well for SSDs for a couple of reasons. One is that many SSDs have extra storage space that's not accessible by users. This is called over-provisioning, and some deletion tools won't give you access to this area (if you can go through the BIOS and uninstall your drive, you can get full access). While the research paper noted above that overwriting did obscure all of the data in some of the SSDs they tested, some still had old readable data on them after twenty overwrites. This can happen because of firmware bugs, and unless you're able to physically confirm that this procedure works on your SSD of choice, it's not reliable enough for a real secure erase.

Many SSDs today also come preinstalled with secure wiping utilities that are meant to actually eradicate data from cells. But of the twelve drives tested by those researchers, only four of twelve erased their data reliably, and one that claimed to be securely erasing everything was just doing the old "forget where everything is and leave it there for now" trick, and all the data was still retrievable. Some drives are known to have better erase tools than others—for instance, drives with Indilinx controllers have a "Sanitary Erase" that deletes all data and restores drives to their out-of-the box condition.

Unless you can independently verify a drive is really deleting your data, this isn't a great option to rely on security-wise, either. However, if you are only trying to improve your SSD's performance by removing old data cruft, proprietary secure erase utilities can be sufficient.

The most popular option for protecting data, absent of robust secure erasing tools that scrub right down into the over-provisioned cracks, is to encrypt the SSD's contents. This way, if someone's coming after your data, the only thing you need to make sure is off the drive is the security key (128- or 256-bit AES is recommended) and your bits will be safe, unless whoever wants your data is up to cracking that code.

There's one more "however" here, though: an encrypted drive is still vulnerable to side-attacks and mis-handling of the deletion of the passkey. In another paper, researchers propose an even more involved procedure called SAFE (Scramble and Finally Erase) which proposes deleting the passkey, erasing the entire drive, zeroing it out, and then erasing it again. Drives on the market don't use this yet, but it gives you an idea of how deep SSD users need to go to feel like they've eradicated all traces of data.

SandForce-controlled SSDs do something similar—when an encrypted drive gets a Security Erase Unit command, it deletes all of the data on the drive, zeroes out the key so anything not erased is scrambled, and deletes all of the mapping data too. Without native encryption, other programs like the free TruCrypt can be a good option, and encryption isn't nearly as much of a speed downer on SSDs as it can be on HDDs.

While negotiating the process of securing deletion is currently kind of murky, serial ATA specifications and American National Standards Institute specifications that would require manufacturers to include a full and total data eradication process on their SSDs are in the works. SATA-IO is pushing for a Sanitize Device Set command, and ANSI for a "block erase" command that would delete data even from the parts of a drive inaccessible to users by default.

And finally, lest we forget, there are many more violent options if you don't intend to reuse the drive. Pulverization and pyrotechnics are both quite reliable.