



One problem: the version of 18 USC 1752 on which Mr. Howington based his analysis and that he "quotes" in his blog post is not the current version. Its a version that dates back to the mid-1990s. Here is a link to the current version.



Subsection (a)(2) of the current law uses the following words to describe one of the categories of restricted areas covered by the law: "any posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area of a building or grounds so restricted in conjunction with an event designated as a special event of national significance". That is exactly the same language as used in Subsection (c)(1)(C) of the law as amended by HR 347.



In other words the big change in the law that Howington cites is worked by HR 347 is only a change to someone who lacks the basic legal research skills to find the current law. In my experience, citing an old law and claiming its the current law is big fail both in law school and in court. Its downright embarrassing, actually.



As for the rest of Mr. Howington's analysis, it also doesn't hold up to scrutiny. He is right that the current law drops the word "willfully" from the "disorderly conduct" provision of 18 USC 1752. The current law (the one he doesn't cite or quote) reads as follows:



(3) willfully, knowingly, and with intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, to engage in disorderly or disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity to, any building or grounds described in paragraph (1) or (2) when, or so that, such conduct, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions;



And this is the language of HR 347:

(2) knowingly, and with intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, engages in disorderly or disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity to, any restricted building or grounds when, or so that, such conduct, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions;



In legal parlance "willfully" and "knowingly" have different meanings -- willfully requires that the actor have more than mere knowledge of the acts they are committing, but that they also have intent. Of course, that explains why the revised version drops "willfully" -- it already requires a showing of intent and the inclusion of "willfully" was unnecessarily redundant. (While Howington doesn't discuss the "enters and remains" provision of 18 USC 1752 as amended by HR 347, I will note that it contained a reference to "intent" but did require "willful" conduct. The willful is gone, but in its place is a new, express requirement that the accused have entered/remained in the restricted area "without lawful authority." Combined with "knowingly" that provision means that the government now has to prove that you knew you were entering/remaining in the place where you were AND that you knew you were there without lawful authority.)



Finally, Howington italicizes the words "or so that, such conduct, in fact" in the above quoted portion of HR 347 and argues that the inclusion of those words somehow negates the intent requirement. Of course, those words also are in the current version and if they negate the word "intent" they also negate "willfully". Except, of course, those words don't negate a damn thing. The law as written (both current and the revised version in HR 347) requires prosecutors to show not only that the accused had an intent to impede or disrupt in engaging in certain conduct but also that such conduct in fact did impede or disrupt. Requiring both intent and an actual result is hardly unusual in the law. Indeed, its pretty much standard as any half-decent lawyer would know.



Frankly, I wasn't particularly surprised at how pathetic Mr. Howington's analysis was. The giveaway was when he referenced Rep. Justin Amash. Amash is a notorious teabagger member of Congress from Michigan. Maybe some people respect the legal analytical skills of the tea baggers (which include some of those wonderful birthers whose legal gymnastics have kept us entertained for the past few years). But in my experience, the tea baggers legal interpretations rarely are correct -- rather they reach a conclusion that they want to reach and proceed to make up arguments and misstate the law to fit their conclusion. That's what Howington has done and I'm just sorry that some people are getting fooled by it.

For starters, Mr. Howington claims that a comparison of HR 347 to the "current law" reveals that HR 347 "expand(s) the meaning of the term restricted buildings or grounds to mean virtually any place in proximity to or place proper a government function or an event of national interest is taking place. "One problem: the version of 18 USC 1752 on which Mr. Howington based his analysis and that he "quotes" in his blog post is not the current version. Its a version that dates back to the mid-1990s. Here is a link to the current version. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1752 Subsection (a)(2) of the current law uses the following words to describe one of the categories of restricted areas covered by the law: "any posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area of a building or grounds so restricted in conjunction with an event designated as a special event of national significance". That is exactly the same language as used in Subsection (c)(1)(C) of the law as amended by HR 347.In other words the big change in the law that Howington cites is worked by HR 347 is only a change to someone who lacks the basic legal research skills to find the current law. In my experience, citing an old law and claiming its the current law is big fail both in law school and in court. Its downright embarrassing, actually.As for the rest of Mr. Howington's analysis, it also doesn't hold up to scrutiny. He is right that the current law drops the word "willfully" from the "disorderly conduct" provision of 18 USC 1752. The current law (the one he doesn't cite or quote) reads as follows:(3) willfully, knowingly, and with intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, to engage in disorderly or disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity to, any building or grounds described in paragraph (1) or (2) when, or so that, such conduct, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions;And this is the language of HR 347:(2) knowingly, and with intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, engages in disorderly or disruptive conduct in, or within such proximity to, any restricted building or grounds when, or so that, such conduct, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions;In legal parlance "willfully" and "knowingly" have different meanings -- willfully requires that the actor have more than mere knowledge of the acts they are committing, but that they also have intent. Of course, that explains why the revised version drops "willfully" -- it already requires a showing of intent and the inclusion of "willfully" was unnecessarily redundant. (While Howington doesn't discuss the "enters and remains" provision of 18 USC 1752 as amended by HR 347, I will note that it contained a reference to "intent" but did require "willful" conduct. The willful is gone, but in its place is a new, express requirement that the accused have entered/remained in the restricted area "without lawful authority." Combined with "knowingly" that provision means that the government now has to prove that you knew you were entering/remaining in the place where you were AND that you knew you were there without lawful authority.)Finally, Howington italicizes the words "or so that, such conduct, in fact" in the above quoted portion of HR 347 and argues that the inclusion of those words somehow negates the intent requirement. Of course, those words also are in the current version and if they negate the word "intent" they also negate "willfully". Except, of course, those words don't negate a damn thing. The law as written (both current and the revised version in HR 347) requires prosecutors to show not only that the accused had an intent to impede or disrupt in engaging in certain conduct but also that such conduct in fact did impede or disrupt. Requiring both intent and an actual result is hardly unusual in the law. Indeed, its pretty much standard as any half-decent lawyer would know.Frankly, I wasn't particularly surprised at how pathetic Mr. Howington's analysis was. The giveaway was when he referenced Rep. Justin Amash. Amash is a notorious teabagger member of Congress from Michigan. Maybe some people respect the legal analytical skills of the tea baggers (which include some of those wonderful birthers whose legal gymnastics have kept us entertained for the past few years). But in my experience, the tea baggers legal interpretations rarely are correct -- rather they reach a conclusion that they want to reach and proceed to make up arguments and misstate the law to fit their conclusion. That's what Howington has done and I'm just sorry that some people are getting fooled by it.