That said, attempting to keep up, even proportionally, with states such as Britain or France is a waste of both money and opportunity. Instead, given the concept of a treaty-guaranteed NATO-wide response to any foreign aggression, the Baltic concept of territorial defense should to evolve to reflect this reality. Instead, emphasis should be put on small formations of volunteer professionals and/or well-trained conscripts evocative of the Israeli model, with a focus on further developing special operations forces (SOF).

Since the beginning of the NATO intervention in Afghanistan, the alliance’s small states have contributed niche resources, delivering quality over quantity. This has come in the form of SOF, as well as other specialized personnel such as medics, dog handlers, chemical and biological warfare experts, and, most ubiquitously, antiterrorism/force protection troops, i.e. facility security. These troops are low in number and economical to sustain in theater. Practically, the support functions and inter-SOF operations of NATO’s small states have fostered a considerable amount of battlefield integration and interoperability, in addition to freeing up some of the burden of the larger contributing members. It has also been a proving ground for NATO’s younger special operations units.

Excellent progress has already been made in the SOF forces of NATO’s minnows. The Norwegian Marinejegerkommandoen and Forsvarets Spesialkommando have been around for decades, and have performed well in Afghanistan. The Baltic SOF units, while younger, have made impressive gains in their capabilities, and have also distinguished themselves in multiple Afghan operations.

Excellent progress has already been made in the SOF forces of NATO’s minnows.

However, given the nature of the post-9/11 threat, these units have focused predominantly on counterterrorism, direct action, and hostage rescue, much in the vein of the U.S. Army’s Delta Force and the British Army’s Special Air Service. But the strategic skill set that would most benefit these small states is in fact what is termed in U.S. doctrine as UW – unconventional warfare. The remit of U.S. Army Special Forces, the “Green Berets”, in UW involves guerrilla warfare, sabotage, subversion, battlefield intelligence and reconnaissance, stay-behind operations, and the training and leading of partisans.

The reality is that small-state conventional forces will only slow down, not halt, a Russian invasion. With a Green Beret-style force focused on full-spectrum UW, NATO’s minnows can cause a great deal of damage to invading and occupying forces, not to mention prep the battlefield and gather vital intelligence for the conventional counter-offensive by NATO forces. Barring a conventional attack, UW forces can operate in conjunction with the intelligence services to counter Russian hybrid warfare, and engage in similar operations against Russia, putting Moscow on the defensive.

Lithuanians have already begun taking matters into their own hands, practicing counterinsurgency tactics, learning to identify Russian military weapons, as well as basic survival skills in the event of an invasion.[14] But more needs to be done: NATO’s small states should create a standing force dedicated to UW, modeled on U.S. Special Forces.

Feasibility

How can this be done? First, NATO should lower its 20% guideline for equipment expenditure and instead adopt a mix of armaments spending and the bolstering of intelligence communities. Furthermore, burden sharing could go beyond dollars and cents. This makes sense given that, despite most countries meeting that 20% goal and aiming for a 2% total GDP contribution rate, most NATO members cannot sustain out-of-area operations. In other words, smaller states should be focusing their attention on threats they can truly manage and let the stronger states handle conventional deterrence. This would be the greatest contribution Baltic and other small states could make to NATO’s collective defense.

...smaller states should be focusing their attention on threats they can truly manage and let the stronger states handle conventional deterrence.

Estonia has been one of the leaders in the alliance on this front, establishing a Cyber Defense League to combat threats to its networks, which contributes to both Estonian national defense and to NATO-wide systems defense. And as active Russian information operations, cyber warfare and covert action abound, so too should NATO’s collective response.[15] But what the U.S. administration fails to understand is exactly what Foreign Minister Gabriel argues, namely that not all contributions need to be monetary. Instead, the fostering of a robust intelligence community in states whose conventional power potential is limited would go a long way to reassert the contention that NATO is an indispensable alliance, and should be flexible in the face of modern security threats.