By Jonathan W. Hugg and Benjamin D. Wanger

We are Pennsylvania lawyers.

As advocates and counselors, we take seriously the professional and ethical obligation to pursue the best interests of our clients as well as the "higher calling" of the law.

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But the public perception of lawyers is persistently poor. Television, movies, and news media frequently portray us as unscrupulous, or even as scoundrels.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is now taking action to raise expectations for attorney conduct.

Following a national trend, the court is in the final stages of adopting a new mandatory rule that potentially subjects lawyers to discipline for engaging in "bias, prejudice, or harassment."

The new proposed Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) broadly prohibits attorneys from misconduct "based upon race, sex, gender identity or expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation."

This proposed new rule echoes the voluntary Code of Civility for lawyers adopted almost 20 years ago by the Supreme Court.

Both the new proposed rule and the older set of voluntary principles encourage lawyers to act with decorum and to "confirm the legal profession's status as an honorable and respected profession where courtesy and civility are observed as a matter of course."

The ultimate impact of the proposed rule may be finally to make civility mandatory, not just an aspirational.

The rule primarily targets the bullies among the bar, lawyers that cut down opponents with demeaning personal attacks, that belittle individual characteristics, and those who engage in threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts.

While this behavior wins public notoriety for some attorneys, the new rule underscores that it is never acceptable and may now be subject to official disciplinary action.

Lawyers are often in positions of influence and authority. Particularly with the recent coarsening of public discourse in our country, our profession should set the best example by acting with dignity and honor even when our work becomes combative or intense.

From this perspective, most attorneys have little to fear from the new rule. The intent of the rule is not to enforce political correctness.

Our law firms should already have non-discrimination policies and established practices against harassment. If the threat of discipline encourages more thoughtful discussion about bias and misconduct among and by lawyers, and thereby deters intentionally bad behavior, then no one can object.

On the other hand, attorneys tend to operate under highly visible and competitive circumstances and the proposed Rule contains enough vague language that it might invite complaints that are hard to balance. What may be offensive to one may be free speech to another. Some lawyers and litigants could also weaponize the Rule and wield it to seek a tactical advantage or settle scores against attorneys.

Furthermore, a glaring omission from the proposed rule is the lack of any explicit definition of what actually constitutes the "practice of law."

It is unclear if decisions and actions in the running of a law firm, bill collection by lawyers, law firm hiring and firing, or even authoring this article for publication, are part of the "practice of law," as opposed to the "business of law."

The rule could also cause confusion for licensed lawyers who may not think they are actually practicing law when they use their legal training and knowledge to pursue non-legal endeavors, like real estate development or board or charitable work.

Another potentially troublesome area is that the proposed Rule prohibits lawyers from "knowingly" engaging in bias, prejudice, or harassment. Although the requirement for actual intent should limit misuse of the Rule, it also creates a fact issue ripe for litigation.

The license to practice law is our livelihood, and it is easy to imagine how an opportunistic client or a disgruntled opponent could threaten it by attempting to trump-up an allegation of "knowing" misconduct. There is little cost to accusers and they have absolute immunity for filing a disciplinary complaint.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is currently wrestling with the same challenges confronting other institutions. A prohibition on knowing "bias, prejudice, or harassment" will foster civility and enhance relationships among lawyers and with clients. If this thereby elevates the quality and credibility of justice, then we should all welcome this change.

Jonathan W. Hugg is a partner and Benjamin D. Wanger is an associate at the law firm of Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP. They write from Philadelphia.