The headline news is that the NSA has surreptitiously "burrowed its way into nearly all the security architecture" sold by the world's largest computer networking companies, including everyone from U.S. mainstays Cisco and Juniper to Chinese giant Huawei. But beneath this bombshell of a story from Der Spiegel, you'll find a rather healthy bit of irony.

After all, the United States government has spent years complaining that Chinese intelligence operations could find ways of poking holes in Huawei networking gear, urging both American businesses and foreign allies to sidestep the company's hardware. The complaints grew so loud that, at one point, Huawei indicated it may abandon the U.S. networking market all together. And, yet, Der Speigel now tells us that U.S. intelligence operations have been poking holes in Huawei networking gear – not to mention hardware sold by countless other vendors in both the States and abroad.

"We read the media reports, and we've noted the references to Huawei and our peers," says William Plummer, a Huawei vice president and the company's point person in Washington, D.C. "As we have said, over and over again – and as now seems to be validated – threats to networks and data integrity can come from any and many sources."

Plummer and Huawei have long complained that when the U.S. House Intelligence Committee released a report in October 2012 condemning the use of Huawei gear in telephone and data networks, it failed to provide any evidence that the Chinese government had compromised the company's hardware. Adam Segal, a senior fellow for China Studies at the Center for Foreign Relations, makes the same point. And now we have evidence – Der Spiegel cites leaked NSA documents – that the U.S. government has compromised gear on a massive scale.

"Do I see the irony? Certainly the Chinese will," Segal says, noting that the Chinese government and the Chinese press have complained of U.S hypocrisy ever since former government contractor Edward Snowden first started to reveal NSA surveillance practices last summer. "The Chinese government has been hammering home what they call the U.S.'s ulterior motives for criticizing China, and there's been a steady drumbeat of stories in the Chinese press about backdoors in the products of U.S. companies. They've been going after Cisco in particular."

To be sure, the exploits discussed by Der Spiegel are a little different from the sort of attacks Congress envisioned during its long campaign against Huawei and ZTE, another Chinese manufacturer. As Segal and others note, Congress mostly complained that the Chinese government could collaborate with people inside the two companies to plant backdoors in their gear, with lawmakers pointing out that Huawei's CEO was once an officer in China's People's Liberation Army, or PLA, the military arm of the country's Communist party. Der Spiegel, by contrast, says the NSA is exploiting hardware without help from anyone inside the Ciscos and the Huaweis, focusing instead on compromising network gear with clever hacks or intercepting the hardware as it's shipped to customers.

"For the most part, the article discusses typical malware exploits used by hackers everywhere," says JR Rivers, an engineer who has built networking hardware for Cisco as well as Google and now runs the networking startup Cumulus Networks. "It's just pointing out that the NSA is engaged in the practice and has resources that are not available to most people."

But in the end, the two types of attack have the same result: Networking gear controlled by government spies. And over the last six months, Snowden's revelations have indicated that the NSA is not only hacking into networks but also collaborating with large American companies in its hunt for data.

Jim Lewis, a director and senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, adds that the Chinese view state-sponsored espionage a little differently than the U.S. does. Both countries believe in espionage for national security purposes, but the Chinese argue that such spying might include the theft of commercial secrets.

"The Chinese will tell you that stealing technology and business secrets is a way of building their economy, and that this is important for national security," says Lewis, who has helped oversee meetings between the U.S. and the Chinese, including officers in the PLA. "I've been in the room when they've said that. The last time was when a PLA colonel said: 'In the U.S., military espionage is heroic and economic espionage is a crime. In China, the line is not that clear.'"

But here in the United States, we now know, the NSA may blur other lines in the name of national security. Segal says that although he, as an American, believes the U.S. government is on stronger ethical ground than the Chinese, other nations are beginning to question its motives.

"The U.S has to convince other countries that our type of intelligence gathering is different," he says. "I don't think that the Brazils and the Indias and the Indonesias and the South Africas are convinced. That's a big problem for us."

The thing to realize, as the revelations of NSA snooping continue to pour out, is that everyone deserves scrutiny – the U.S government and its allies, as well as the Chinese and others you may be more likely to view with skepticism. "All big countries," Lewis says, "are going to try and do this."