Egypt, obviously, finds itself in a very different place, coming out of decades of effective military rule. There is a significant faction of Egyptians who, for a variety of reasons, do not recognize the legitimacy of their current government, which was elected in June. (The very fact that a leading newspaper would call for a coup is itself evidence of this.) Such questions over legitimacy are, in part, the result of a woefully mismanaged transition as well as the inherent conflict between revolutionary legitimacy and democratic legitimacy. Because Egyptians launched what was essentially an extra-legal overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in February 25, 2011, there is a similar sense in certain quarters that the current president, Mohamed Morsi, can and should be removed from office outside the confines of normal politics. Of course, the major difference is that Mubarak was a dictator, and Mohamed Morsi, whatever his faults, certainly appears to have been freely elected by the Egyptian people.

The al-Dustour, no isolated incident, came in the context of worsening political polarization and growing rumors of an impending move to depose Morsi, possibly through a military coup. The most extreme example came when Tawfik Okasha, the sensationalist television commentator, called for violence against the Brotherhood and Mohamed Morsi, saying, "I make your blood permissible as well." Meanwhile, a million-man "second revolution" against the Brotherhood was announced to take place on August 24. Interestingly, the protest does not seem to have a specific political aim but instead calls for the dissolution of the Brotherhood and its affiliated Freedom and Justice Party. As Hesham Sallam wrote in Jadaliyya, "These trends, coupled with the developments that followed, signal that some military leaders may have been prodding their allies among opinion shapers and friendly media outlets to promote the image of popular support for a coup d'etat against the Brotherhood."

Fearing that the military might act against Morsi, the Brotherhood, in apparent coordination with a number of younger military officers, seem to have decided to take pre-emptive action and fire the presumed leader of any such coup: Hussein Tantawi, the head of the armed forces and Mubarak's longtime defense minister. The Dustour editorial, on August 11, had warned that Morsi was preparing to "overthrow" the "current leaders" of the armed forces. Tantawi was fired the next day. Maybe it was just a coincidence, but in this atmosphere of suspected coups, pre-emptive coups, and counter-coups, national security concerns might take greater precedence than might otherwise be appropriate.

This lack of security, along with persistent questions over legitimacy, could perhaps blur the line between protected and punishable speech. There are possible policy responses to this -- overhauling the obviously outdated penal code, for example -- but, more importantly, it may require Egyptians to establish the limits of public dissent. Maybe the Dustour editorial falls outside of those limits, or maybe not, but the point is setting norms. Some Egyptian clerics, for example, have sometimes come perilously close to takfir (the practice of making a Muslim's blood licit). Others have already crossed that line. Hashem Islam, a cleric from Daqahlia, declared that those who join the anti-Brotherhood protests on August 24 are guilty of committing "high treason" and suggested that their blood was licit.