Here's a question for you, and maybe you'd like to ask your Senators this one, too: What exactly does this FISA bill authorize in the way of domestic surveillance?

I've been wondering this myself -- literally to myself -- but Declan McCullagh has done us all the favor of writing it down:

Although most of the attention has focused on how the Senate bill might offer telecommunications service providers retroactive immunity (and derail the lawsuits against AT&T), the actual language appears to cover physical intrusions too: ASSISTANCE--The term 'assistance' means the provision of, or the provision of access to, information... facilities, or another form of assistance PERSON--The term 'person' means...a landlord, custodian, or other person who may be authorized and required to furnish assistance... IN GENERAL--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no civil action may lie or be maintained in a Federal or State court against any person for providing assistance to an element of the intelligence community, and shall be promptly dismissed, if the Attorney General certifies to the court that...any assistance by that person was provided pursuant to a directive under sections 102(a)(4), 105B(e)... ELEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--The term 'element of the intelligence community' means an element of the intelligence community as specified or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act... [Ed. Note: That includes the FBI, CIA, NSA, Homeland Security, the Defense Department, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the State Department, the Treasury Department, and any other agency the president chooses.] Let's translate that. A hotel manager who lets FBI agents into a guest's room to copy a laptop's hard drive in secret would not be liable. An apartment manager who gives Homeland Security the key to a tenant's unit to place a key logger in a PC would not be liable. A private security firm that divulges a customer's alarm code would not be liable. A university that agrees to forward a student's e-mail messages to the Defense Department would not be liable. An antivirus company that helps the NSA implant spyware in an unsuspecting customer's computer would not be liable. No court order is required. And if an eventual lawsuit accuses the hotel manager or antivirus firm of unlawful activities, it'll be thrown out of court as long as the attorney general or the director of national intelligence can provide a "certification." The "certification" is, of course, secret--all a judge may say publicly is that the rules were followed, and then dismiss the case.

McCullagh follows up by noting, quite correctly, that the bill borrows certain restrictions from the August FISA bill, meant to reduce the risk of "accidentally" snooping on Americans, or on domestic-to-domestic communications. But when was the last time you trusted this "administration" not to do whatever the hell it felt like doing because "the law" said it couldn't? We didn't fare all that well under their regime of "National Security Letters," as I recall. How much faith do you have in their willingness to play by this rule, even though they never played by that one?