Ecological and evolutionary dynamics of communities are inexorably intertwined. The ecological state determines the fate of newly arising mutants, and mutations that increase in frequency can reshape the ecological dynamics. Evolutionary game theory and its extensions within adaptive dynamics have been the mathematical frameworks for understanding this interplay, leading to notions such as evolutionarily stable states (ESS) in which no mutations are favoured, and evolutionary branching points near which the population diversifies. A central assumption behind these theoretical treatments has been that mutations are rare so that the ecological dynamics has time to equilibrate after every mutation. A fundamental question is whether qualitatively new phenomena can arise when mutations are frequent. Here, we describe an adaptive diversification process that robustly leads to complex ESS, despite the fact that such communities are unreachable through a step-by-step evolutionary process. Rather, the system as a whole tunnels between collective states over a short timescale. The tunnelling rate is a sharply increasing function of the rate at which mutations arise in the population. This makes the emergence of ESS communities virtually impossible in small populations, but generic in large ones. Moreover, communities emerging through this process can spatially spread as single replication units that outcompete other communities. Overall, this work provides a qualitatively new mechanism for adaptive diversification and shows that complex structures can generically evolve even when no step-by-step evolutionary path exists.