



Because of his two-world view, Plato’s initial approach to all political systems is to consider them as hopelessly corrupt. Any existing regime can only participate imperfectly in the perfect Form of justice. Plato is particularly disillusioned with democracy, however. In Gorgias he asserts that democracies are naturally morally corrupt due to their dependence on rhetoric, and the nature of rhetoric lies in pandering and flattery, not in wisdom, knowledge, and truth. What people really, truly want, according to Plato, is what is good for them, but they are distracted or blinded by appetites, and those appetites are what rhetoricians draw on. Democracy actually selects against the rule of the true philosopher in that the truth the philosopher teaches is unappetizing, particularly compared to the satisfaction offered by successful politicians through their rhetoric. The resulting statesman that caters to his people’s baser desires is far from Plato’s ideal wise statesman who guides his people to do what is good. The “favor of the mob” (Klosko 91) that democracy rests on stands directly in the way of the political regime’s goal of order and harmony for goodness’ sake.



In the Republic, Plato shifts his criticism to the argument that democracy gives citizens too much freedom. He means this in the sense that it leads to political instability—and thus to a dictator—but also morally, the citizens are too free. Klosko, quoting Plato: “democracy distributes “a kind of equality to the equal and the unequal alike,”” such that the young do not respect the old, students do not respect their teachers, etc. because of the belief that each is “as good as everyone else” (Klosko 92-93). Klosko describes our current conception of freedom, and the conception of freedom shared by Plato’s contemporaries, as negative freedom in that we consider ourselves free from coercive influences, safe in a sphere of privacy. But because Plato believes people are slaves to their appetites, he instead advocates “true” freedom—positive freedom. Positive freedom is aspirational, with what we call in psychology an “action tendency” towards developing one’s capacities and to be good. Plato compares all appetites to addiction, and posits that freedom can only be freedom without addiction. Furthermore, in treating the addict, his negative freedom may be, and should be, curtailed. In the polity, this takes the form of the administration of education, which counters the appetites. In this way, Plato would agree with Rousseau that it may be necessary for the good of the citizenry to “force them to be free” (Klosko 93). Fundamentally, Plato challenges democracy on the grounds that it does not make the effort to improve its subjects, because its subjects do not want improvement, and instead rule themselves according to the satisfaction of their appetites.



Laying Plato’s critiques alongside contemporary American constitutional democracy, many of his criticisms resonate. The critique of rhetoricians seems particularly valid. What leaps to mind immediately is the recent episode in which Senator Jon Kyl, during Senate debate on federal funding for the program Planned Parenthood stated that abortions were “well over 90% of what Planned Parenthood” does (Hall). The statement was grossly inaccurate, ad the real number is closer to 3%, but what was particularly revealing was his office’s response to the press: His remark was not intended to be a factual statement. The kind of dance with truth that the rhetorician enacts concerned and disgusted Plato. The postmodern “say anything” approach by American politicians, as demonstrated by Senator Kyl, to energize their constituents on the politician’s behalf would horrify Plato. It is not just this issue or this Senator. Harvard professor Gary King found that 27% of press releases put out by Senators from 2005-2007 consisted of legislators making partisan attacks (theWEEK). Ironically, some cynical media outlets like website “Gawker” cheered that it was “only 27%” (theWEEK). Still, this is just partisan attacks alone—Senator Kyl’s grossly inaccurate statement would not have even been counted in this study. Deliberation and rule by those whose primary concern is truth is clearly not at play, jeopardized by the entertainment of rhetoric, as Plato pointed out about democracy in ancient Athens.

Plato’s criticism of democracy as allowing its citizens too much freedom assumes an objective moral standpoint from which to evaluate citizens. The initial starting point of an objective moral standard is anathema to modern American citizens, as the overwhelming socialized tendency is towards moral relativity, but Plato’s criticisms still have a ring of truth to them, perhaps evidenced by the extreme cynicism most citizens feel towards our form of government. Democracy appears to operate on the utilitarian happiness principle of the greatest good for the greatest number, which Plato would reject, along with Kant. In Kant’s words, the utilitarian happiness principle “contributes nothing whatever toward establishing morality, since making a man happy is quite different from making him good” (Sandel 107). Thus negative freedom is clearly not the path to making people good, as people will instead pursue satisfaction of their appetites. However, positive freedom, in which the state actively enables its citizens to be free of their appetites, is counter to the principles of rights embodied in the American Constitution. Those rights cause all issues in America to be framed as negative freedom issues, rather than proclaiming a responsibility of the political regime to make the people good. The biggest exception is compulsory education, but that ends at legal adulthood, when your rights become your own and not held by your parent or guardian.





While Plato considers appetites an aspect of our selves, Kant envisions our desires as external to our true selves, so acting to satisfy them is not a free act. Because we did not choose the desire, satisfying it is not a free act, despite the conventional understanding of freedom as freedom to choose how and with what a desire will be satisfied. To Kant, if a behavior is acting to satisfy biological or social demands, it is not a free, autonomous act made according to a law one gives oneself. Instead it is acting heteronomously, according to external factors (Sandel 109). Plato would nearly agree with Kant, save that external social demands, in Plato’s ideal polis, would entail duties and obligations that keep a man’s desires in check, because only the philosopher-kings, and to some extent the auxiliaries, can control their appetites from within. The masses, the laborers, are incapable, and thus order and harmony, which democracy completely lacks in the way Plato conceives it, are what lead the polity to goodness and justice. Considering, then, Burke’s quote, we can see that once we believe man can and will restrain his appetites from within, we can place our faith and future in democracy. But until then, and modern American constitutional democracy demonstrates this, man is too subjugated to his animal nature, to his desires of the appetites, to rule and be ruled democratically.

Bibliography

Hall, Colby. (20100, April 13). Stephen Colbert Celebrates Sen. Jon Kyl’s Independence from ‘Factual Statements’. Retrieved April 19, 2011, from http://www.mediaite.com/online/stephen-colbert-celebrates-sen-jon-kyls-independence-from-factual-statements/

Klosko, George. (1993). History of Political Theory: An Introduction. Ancient and Medieval Political Theory. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.

Sandel, Michael J. (2009). Justice. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

TheWeek. (2011, April 8). How Senators Spend 27% of Their Time Taunting Each Other. Retrieved April 19, 2011, from http://news.yahoo.com/s/theweek/20110408/cm_theweek/214053_20110408130100