On January 29, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iran carried out a test launch of a medium-range ballistic missile. The test prompted harsh reactions by US President Donald Trump and his administration, including Michael Flynn, Trump’s national security adviser. Trump declared that he “officially has put Iran on notice” and threatened the Iranian government with reprisals.

Iran shrugged off the threats. President Hassan Rouhani responded by calling Trump a political novice. “It will take him a long time and will cost the United States a lot until he learns what is happening in the world,” he stated. On February 3, the US sanctioned 13 Iranian individuals and 12 entities. Those subject to the sanctions cannot access the US financial system or deal with American companies. Additionally, foreign companies and individuals are prohibited from dealing with them, or risk being blacklisted by the United States.

A tit-for-tat process between Iran and the US may be emerging, which could lead to the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the world’s six powers.

There are different theories explaining Iran’s impetus behind its missile test. Some observers maintain that the test was a retaliatory action to Trump’s wholesale ban on Iranians travelling to the US under the banner of keeping out “radical Islamic terrorists.”

However, it must be noted that the moderate faction within the Iranian establishment, led by Rouhani, does not favour provocative actions that could escalate the conflict with the US and thus jeopardise the nuclear deal. That is because the deal is considered as the moderate faction’s largest achievement in the previous four years. The moderates’ preferred approach was, as expected, measured and diplomatic. Following the announcement of the ban, Iran’s Foreign Ministry called the ban “insulting,” while also stating that any retaliation will be “proportionate” and made “while respecting the American people and differentiating between them and the hostile policies of the US government.”

Therefore, most likely, the missile test was planned and conducted by the radical faction of the government, the IRGC. That group is a powerful entity that, with the consent of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, has the capacity to influence such decisions.

Although it cannot be ruled out that the move was motivated in part by a display of bravado in response to Trump’s executive order, there is another — and most likely larger — motive behind the move: domestic politics.

On November 14, the IRGC, in its official political organ, Sobhe Sadeq (The True Dawn), offered several analyses regarding Trump’s election and its effect on Iran.

The weekly editorial was titled “The fate of the nuclear deal as a result of Trump’s election.” The editorial read, “At the grand level, America’s elections will not affect the Iran political system’s general [foreign] policies. However, one level lower — [the American election] — may affect the JCPOA and the [Iranian May 2017 presidential] election.”

After reviewing Trump and his team members’ stated positions, the editorial concluded that, “[u]nder these circumstances, with the presence of Trump, in practical terms, nothing [meaningful] will be left of the nuclear deal.” That is because “the nuclear deal, which has been the point of strength and the winning card of Rouhani’s administration for the next [Iranian] year’s [presidential] election, will be transformed into the Achilles Heel of the administration.”

Shaky position

It is based on this assessment that the IRGC seeks to escalate tension between Iran and the US. Doing so could trigger Trump or the US Congress to broaden the sanctions across Iran’s financial and energy sectors, which would hammer the final nail in the coffin of the nuclear accord. After all, as the JCPOA goes, so goes Rouhani’s chance of re-election.

Rouhani’s position is already shakier than 2015 and early 2016, when his popularity soared after the culmination of the nuclear deal. According to a poll released in January by the Centre for International and Security Studies in Maryland, although over 68 per cent of Iranians still regard Rouhani in broadly favourable terms, his “very favourable” rating has declined from 61 per cent in August 2015 to just over 28 per cent in December 2016. The Iranian people had high expectations that, once the sanctions were removed, the Iranian economy would miraculously make a turnaround. They are frustrated because almost nothing has changed. According to the poll, over 63 per cent of Iranians view Iran’s economic situation as “somewhat” or “very” bad. Meanwhile, nearly 73 per cent say that living conditions in Iran have not improved as a result of the nuclear agreement. Rouhani himself, miscalculating the outcome of the nuclear deal, has been responsible for raising people’s expectations by linking the solution to all economic and even non-economic problems to the removal of the sanctions.

To break the camel’s back, the last straw, as viewed by the radicals, would be the reintroduction of sanctions on Iran’s energy and financial sectors that would effectively shred the nuclear agreement. The ballistic missile tests would provide Trump with the pretext that he needs to expand sanctions and violate the nuclear agreement, thus forcing Iran to walk away from the deal. As such, more tests will likely be conducted before the May election.

However, there is one factor that the IRGC and the hardliners may not have included in their calculus: Trump may not only seek to deter Iran from expanding its missile programme. He may want more.

Michael Flynn, his national security adviser, has a fixated view on regime change in Iran. In his book, ‘The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies’, released only six months ago (!), Flynn argues that Iran’s nuclear programme is a secondary problem, the primary one being the Iranian regime itself. “To focus solely on the nuclear question is a serious failure of strategic vision; the issue is the regime in Tehran and their radical version of Islam, whatever its progress may be toward atomic bombs” (p. 88). He concludes that the US’ sole choice in dealing with Tehran is implementing plans aimed at regime change in Iran.

Trump’s tweets after Iran’s missile test indicate that he is inclined to use sanctions as a means to an end, the end being regime change. In a tweet on February 2, he said, “Iran has been formally PUT ON NOTICE for firing a ballistic missile. Should have been thankful for the terrible deal the US made with them!” A second tweet read, “Iran was on its last legs and ready to collapse until the US (Obama administration) came along and gave it a lifeline in the form of the Iran deal: $150bn.”

The hardliners in Iran would do well to understand that much more can be added to Obama’s crippling sanctions. Rouhani or no Rouhani, governing a population of 80 million under crushing sanctions is next to impossible. The resistance economy doctrine, centred on self-sufficiency, relentlessly promoted by the hardliners as a solution to confront sanctions of any scale and nature, is a proven failure as experienced in Latin America decades ago.

Shahir Shahidsaless is an Iranian-Canadian political analyst and freelance journalist writing about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the Middle East, and the US foreign policy in the region.