2 REPORT



1. Volume I contains the Committees' Report, including the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations. Volume II contains the Memorandum from the Chairman of the Committees and associated annexes. Volume III contains oral and additional written evidence to the inquiry and ministerial correspondence. Volumes I, II and III are all published on the Committees' webpages.P2F[ 3] THE COMMITTEES' INQUIRY 2. The Committees have continued their intensive and detailed scrutiny of all aspects of the Government's arms exports and arms control policies. In addition, the Committees have given comprehensive scrutiny to the Government's policies on a wide range of international arms control agreements, and have also provided unprecedented detailed information about the UK's extant strategic export licences for military and dual-use goods going to the 27 countries named by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as being Countries of Human Rights concern. THE COMMITTEES' QUESTIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT'S QUARTERLY INFORMATION ON ARMS EXPORT LICENCES 3. On the Government's quarterly information on arms export licences, the Committees continue to recommend that the Government, in its quarterly arms export licence reports, and in its answers to the Committees' questions on those reports, should provide the maximum disclosure of information on a non-classified basis consistent with safeguarding the UK's security and trade interests. (See paragraph 36 of this Report.) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURES E XTRA - TERRITORIALITY 4. With regard to extra-territoriality, the Committees conclude that it is not justifiable to enable a UK person to escape UK criminal jurisdiction by engaging in arms export or arms brokering activities overseas which would be a criminal offence if carried out from the UK. The Committees, therefore, continue to recommend that extra-territoriality is extended to the remaining military goods in Category C. (See paragraph 37 of this Report.) "B RASS P LATE " COMPANIES 5. The Committees conclude that it is most regrettable that the Government have still to take any action against "brass-plate" arms exporting and arms brokering companies who have the benefit of UK company registration but carry out arms exporting and arms brokering activities overseas in contravention of UK Government policies. (See paragraph 38 of this Report.) A RMS BROKERS 6. The Committees conclude that the Government's regulation of arms brokers is patently inadequate. The Committees continue therefore to repeat their recommendation in previous Reports that the Government carries out a full review of the case for a pre-licence register of arms brokers. (See paragraph 39 of this Report.) T ORTURE END - USE CONTROL AND END - USE CONTROL OF GOODS USED FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 7. With regard to torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment the Committees recommend that the Government states what is the current position on the European Commission's review of the Torture Regulation and what steps it is taking to hasten that review. (See paragraph 43 of this Report.) ORGANISATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES E XPORT C ONTROL O RGANISATION (R EMIT AND RESPONSIBILITIES ) 8. On the remit and responsibilities of the Export Control Organisation, the Committees recommend that the Government states whether the present remit and responsibilities of ECO fully meet the Government's policy objectives, and, if not, what changes it will be making. (See paragraph 47 of this Report.) P OWERS TO CREATE NEW CATEGORIES OF EXPORT LICENCES 9. With regard to powers to create new categories of export licence, the Committees conclude that Article 26 of the Export Control Order 2008 enabling the Secretary of State to create new types of arms export licences without Parliamentary approval is unsatisfactory and could be used in a way that would significantly diminish the ability of Parliament to scrutinize the Government's arms export policies. The Committees recommend that the Government should amend the Export Control Order 2008 accordingly. (See paragraph 52 of this Report.) P RIORITY M ARKETS FOR UK ARMS EXPORTS 10. On the Priority Markets for UK arms exports, the Committees conclude that it is fundamentally anomalous, not least in terms of public perceptions, for countries listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as being of human rights concerns, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, then to be listed by the United Kingdom Trade and Investment Organisation within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills as Priority Markets for arms exports. (See paragraph 53 of this Report.) T RADE E XHIBITIONS 11. On trade exhibitions, the Committees recommend that the Government states whether it agrees that it is of the utmost importance that all defence and security equipment exhibitions licensed or facilitated by UK Government Departments, organisations and bodies do not display, promote or market Category A goods including goods that could be used for torture. (See paragraph 54 of this Report.) E NFORCEMENT 12. On enforcement, the Committees conclude that the Government's continued publication of individuals and companies convicted of arms export offences and their sentences is essential. (See paragraph 55 of this Report.) C OMBATING BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 13. On combating bribery and corruption, the Committees recommend that the Government states the names of the individuals and companies against whom it has taken action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010 in relation to their arms export dealings. (See paragraph 59 of this Report.) ARMS EXPORTS AGREEMENTS 14. With regard to the UK/US Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty, The UK/France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty and the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU the Committees have recommended that the Government states how satisfactorily , or not, each of these are working as far as British companies are concerned. (See paragraphs 61, 63 and 64 of this Report.) ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS A RMS T RADE T REATY 15. The Committees conclude that the adoption by the UN of the first ever international arms trade treaty applying to conventional arms as a whole in the Arms Trade Treaty of 2013 is most welcome and congratulates Ministers and their officials, under both the previous Labour Government and the present Coalition Government, on their contribution to this unprecedented international achievement. The Committees also welcome the fact that the UK was amongst the first of the countries to sign the Arms Trade Treaty when it became open for signature on 3 June 2013. The Committees recommend that the Government states by what date the UK will also ratify the Treaty. The Committees further recommend that the Government states what changes it will be making to its arms export controls legislation, administrative procedures and guidance, and policy to ensure the UK Government is fully compliant with all provisions in the Arms Trade Treaty, and what steps it will be taking to ensure that the ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty by the minimum of 50 countries necessary to bring it into force is achieved in the shortest possible time. (See paragraphs 65-66 of this Report.) C LUSTER M UNITIONS 16. The Committees recommend, with regard to cluster munitions, that the Government states whether it continues to consider a Government Code of Conduct or Government legislation against the indirect financing of the production of cluster munitions and their components as policy options. (See paragraph 67 of this Report.) L ANDMINES 17. On landmines, the Committees recommend that the Government states what steps it is taking to try to secure the accession of the remaining countries to the Ottawa Landmines Convention. (See paragraph 69 of this Report.) T HE F ISSILE M ATERIAL C UT -O FF T REATY 18. Regarding the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), the Committees recommend that the Government states whether it will give further consideration to setting a deadline for the start of negotiations on the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament and to transferring the responsibility for starting the negotiations to the UN, or to another international forum, if that deadline is not met. (See paragraph 72 of this Report.) T HE A CADEMIC T ECHNOLOGY A PPROVAL S CHEME 19. On the Academic Technology Approval Scheme, the Committees recommend that the Government states whether it will consider introducing legislation to extend the Scheme to include those UK students who pose the greatest risk from studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education. (See paragraph 77 of this Report.) T HE C HEMICAL W EAPONS C ONVENTION 20. The Committees recommend, in relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention, that the Government states what specific steps it will take to try to secure accession to the Convention by those 8 states who have not done so thus far, namely Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria. (See paragraph 78 of this Report.) T HE B IOLOGICAL AND T OXIN W EAPONS C ONVENTION 21. On the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Committees conclude that the Government's statement that establishing a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention remains a long-term UK and EU aim is welcome, but that the absence of any such regime, because of US opposition in particular, is a matter of deep concern. (See paragraphs 79-80 of this Report.) T HE C OMPREHENSIVE N UCLEAR T EST B AN T REATY 22. On the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Committees recommend that the Government states what specific steps it is taking with each of the remaining 8 countries whose signature and ratification is necessary to enable the CTBT to enter into forcenamely China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USAto try to persuade them to ratify the CTBT. (See paragraph 82 of this Report.) T HE N ATIONAL C OUNTER -P ROLIFERATION S TRATEGY FOR 2012-15 23. With regard to the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15, the Committees recommend that the Government sets out what it considers to be the successes and failures of the Strategy to date. (See paragraph 85 of this Report.) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL POLICIES A RMS EXPORTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 24. On arms exports and human rights, the Committees continue to conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government continues to do, that these two policies "are mutually reinforcing". (See paragraph 86 of this Report.) U NMANNED A ERIAL V EHICLES (D RONES ) 25. On Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ("Drones"), the Committees recommend that the Government states whether it considers that any changes to UK export controls in relation to drones, components of drones and drone technology are necessary to achieve the Government's stated policy "we want to have a tough, strong export control regime at all times into the future", and, if so, what those changes are. The Committees further recommend that the Government states its policy on approving export licences for drones. (See paragraph 90 of this Report.) ARMS EXPORTS TO COUNTRIES OF CONCERN 26. The Committees asked the Government to state what approved strategic export licences are extant to each of the 27 Countries listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as Countries of Human Rights concern in the FCO's latest Human Rights Annual Report published in April 2013. From the information received from the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Committees compiled the following table:



Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs) Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs) Afghanistan 23,847,337 80 Pakistan 49,802,833 219 Belarus 128,042 11 Russia 86,329,387 271 Burma 3,332,192 8 Saudi Arabia 1,863,182,251 417 China 1,486,415,462 1163 Somalia 1,914,694 26 Colombia 20,089,524 53 South Sudan 0 0 Cuba 0 3 Sri Lanka 8,084,759 49 Democratic People's Republic of Korea 0 0 Sudan 7,642,480 14 Democratic Republic of Congo 2,127,980 20 Syria 143,867 3 Eritrea 960,031 6 Turkmenistan 1,022,016 17 Fiji 35,555 4 Uzbekistan 7,405,718 19 Iran 803,440,351 62 Vietnam 13,371,242 74 Iraq 15,915,430 69 Yemen 64,784 10 Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories 7,878,776,714 381 Zimbabwe 2,992,390 46 Libya 54,583,388 49 Total 12,331,621,526 3,074 27. The Committees conclude that there are some 3,074 extant licences for military and dual-use goods going to the FCO's 27 Countries of Human Rights concern with the value of the Standard Individual Export Licences alone being £ 12,331,621,526. (See paragraph 97 of this Report.) 28. With regard to the 27 Countries of Human Rights concern, together with Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Madagascar and Tunisia, the Committees recommend that the Government states in relation to each country that none of the extant export licences contravenes the Government's stated policy that "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" or is currently in contravention of any of the arms export Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position. (See paragraph 98 of this Report.) C OUNTRIES OF CONCERN S YRIA 29. With regard to Syria, the Committees have in addition recommended that the Government state: whether, since the BIS Secretary of State's letter of 10 May 2013, any UK strategic export control licences for goods to Syria have been approved stating the application type, Annual Report summary and goods value in the case of each licence; whether, since the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Foreign Secretary on 15 April and his Oral Statement on 20 May, any additional non-lethal equipment, or any goods subject to UK strategic export controls have been gifted to Syria, and, if so, to state the nature of the equipment and goods, and their value; and the Government's present policy on the supply, whether by sale or gift, and whether directly or indirectly, of goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists to Syria. (See paragraphs 108-110 of this Report.) C OUNTRIES OF CONCERN A RGENTINA 30. In relation to Argentina, the Committees conclude that it is reprehensible that the Government, given the relatively recent history of British ships being sunk in the Falklands War by missiles supplied by a fellow NATO member and the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, as reported on 5 February 2013, regarding Argentinian control of the Falkland Islands, when he said "I don't think it will take another 20 years", is unwilling to lobby other Governments to make the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012. The Committees recommend that the Government should do so. (See paragraphs 115-116 of this Report.) A RMS EXPORTS TO AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND TO C OUNTRIES OF CONCERN WORLDWIDE 31. Finally, with regard to arms exports to authoritarian regimes and to Countries of concern worldwide, given that the Government has now acknowledged that its new arms export suspension mechanism only applies to licence applications that are still being processed and not to military or dual-use goods that have already left the UK, the Committees repeat their previous recommendation that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes "which might be used to facilitate internal repression" in contravention of the Government's policy, as stated to the Committees by the Foreign Secretary on 7 February 2012. (See paragraphs 123-124 of this Report.)

T HE C OMMITTEES ' C ONCLUSIONS AND R ECOMMENDATIONS 33. The Committees conclude that the giving of Oral evidence to the Committees by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Foreign Secretary at the last two annual Oral evidence sessions of the Committees reflects the importance that the Government rightly attaches to arms export and arms control policies. The Committees continue to recommend that given the far-reaching significance of arms export and arms control decisions for the Government's foreign, trade, defence and international development polices, Oral evidence should continue to be given to the Committees on Arms Export Controls by both Secretaries of State. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 1-6.) T HE G OVERNMENT ' S "U NITED K INGDOM S TRATEGIC E XPORT C ONTROLS A NNUAL R EPORT 2011" (HC 337) 34. The Committees conclude that neither the quarterly updates on the Countries of Concern in the Government's annual Human Rights report nor the quarterly updating of statistical data about export licensing on the BIS and FCO websites in themselves meet the entirety of the Committees' scrutiny requirements, particularly given the substantial time lapse between the year covered by the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report and the Report's publicationusually 6-18 months. The Committees recommend that the Government informs the Committees directly and promptly of all material developments and changes to the Government's arms export and arms control policies. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 7-11.) T HE C OMMITTEES ' R EPORT OF 2011-12 (HC419) 35. The Committees conclude that as their 2012 Report (HC 419) was published on 13 July 2012 and as the Government's Response (Cm8441) was published in October 2012 and did not defer the responses to any of the Committees' recommendations, the Government has achieved a welcome improvement in the timeliness of its Responses to the Committees' Report. The Committees recommend that this improvement is maintained. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 12-14.) T HE C OMMITTEES ' QUESTIONS ON THE G OVERNMENT ' S QUARTERLY INFORMATION ON ARMS EXPORT LICENCES 36. The Committees continue to recommend that the Government, in its Quarterly arms export licence reports, and in its answers to the Committees' questions on those reports, should provide the maximum disclosure of information on a non-classified basis consistent with safeguarding the UK's security and trade interests. The Committees conclude that it is disappointing that the Government only noted, rather than accepted, this same recommendation made in the Committees' 2012 Report. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 15-18.) Arms export control legislation and procedures E XTRA - TERRITORIALITY 37. The Committees conclude that it is not justifiable to enable a UK person to escape UK criminal jurisdiction by engaging in arms export or arms brokering activities overseas which would be a criminal offence if carried out from the UK. The Committees, therefore, continue to recommend that extra-territoriality is extended to the remaining military goods in Category C. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 19-27.) "B RASS P LATE " COMPANIES 38. The Committees conclude that it is most regrettable that the Government have still to take any action against "Brass Plate" arms exporting and arms brokering companies who have the benefit of UK company registration but carry out arms exporting and arms brokering activities overseas in contravention of UK Government policies. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report what steps it will take to discontinue the UK registration of such companies. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 28-33.) A RMS BROKERS 39. The Committees conclude that as 4 of the 19 individuals and companies who are listed as having received criminal convictions for arms export offences in the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports for 2010 and 2011 had previously received Government SPIRE registration, as had Mr Gary Hyde and Mr Michael Ranger both of whom have since received criminal convictions, the Government's reliance on its SPIRE registration system to regulate arms brokers falls far short of what is required. The Committees further conclude that as the BIS Secretary of State has now acknowledged to the Committee that: a) SPIRE registration does not constitute Government approval of an arms broker; b) the only check that the Government makes for SPIRE registration "is to ensure that any person registering on behalf of an entity is properly authorised by that entity to act on its behalf"; and c) it is possible to apply for a licence on SPIRE without "registering" to use the system the Government's regulation of arms brokers is patently inadequate. The Committees continue therefore to repeat their recommendation that the Government carries out a full review of the case for a pre-licence register of arms brokers. 40. The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether, when the Arms Trade Treaty comes into force, the UK Government will be compliant, or non-compliant, with the provisions of the Treaty relating to the regulation of arms brokers and, if non-compliant, what action it will take. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 34-44.) U DUAL - USE CONTROLS 41. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) sets out what information it currently has as to the extent the European Commission has, or has not, accepted the Government's concerns about certain proposals in the EU Commission's Green Paper The dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competiveness in a changing world; b) states whether the Commission's forthcoming dual-use legislation will be decided upon by Qualified Majority Voting and, if so, what steps the Government is taking to try to ensure that EU dual-use legislation is not enacted which will be detrimental to the British Government's arms export control policies and procedures; and c) explains whether the Government agrees with the European Commission's view that: " it has been commonly accepted that dual-use export controls constitute an exclusive competence of the European Union and form an integral part of the EU's Common Commercial Policy." (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 45-50.) EU END - USE CONTROL OF EXPORTED MILITARY GOODS 42. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out what information it currently has as to the extent the European Commission has, or has not, accepted the Government's concerns about the adequacy of the Commission's military end-use proposals in the Commission's Green Paper The dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competiveness in a changing world with particular reference to ensuring that military end-use control: a) can be applied to the export of complete items which are to be used as complete items; and b) will permit preventing the export of unlisted items that are to be modified for military purposes, either in the destination country or in an intermediate destination. The Committees further recommend that the Government states whether it has provided to the Commission the draft text it has offered to the Commission on a) and b) above. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 51-55.) T ORTURE END - USE CONTROL AND END - USE CONTROL OF GOODS USED FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 43. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response: a) what is the current position on the European Commission's review of the Torture Regulation and what steps it is taking to hasten that review; b) whether the Government has yet made any submission to the Commission relating to this Review; c) whether, in the context of the EU Torture Regulation, the Government still considers that list-based controls are more likely to be effective than end-use controls, and whether it has considered pressing for both; and d) whether the Government intends to introduce new end-use controls on torture and death-penalty goods and, if so, by what date. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response: a) whether it is the case that wholly owned or majority owned subsidiaries of UK companies that are domiciled in other countries are not subject to UK export controls and, if so, whether the Government has any plans to bring forward amending legislation; and b) whether UK parent companies are subject to UK strategic export controls legislation in respect of transfers made by their subsidiaries domiciled in other countries and, if not, whether the Government has any plans to bring forward amending legislation. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 56-65.) R E -EXPOR t CONTROL s AN d UNDERTAKING s 44. The Committees recommend that the Government states whether it has any information about controlled goods with export licence approval from the Government having subsequently been re-exported for undesirable uses or to undesirable destinations contrary to the Government's re-export controls and undertakings which became compulsory from July 2010 and, if so, provides the Committees with details. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 66-71.) L ICENSED PRODUCTION OVERSEAS 45. The Committees recommend that the Government states whether it has any information that, during the lifetime of the present Government, breaches of UK arms control policies may have occurred as a result of the export of UK-designed goods, including components, from licensed production facilities overseas, and, if so, provides the Committees with details. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 72-76.) T HE C ONSOLIDATED C RITERIA AND EU C OMMON P OSITION 46. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it will be consulting publicly on its updating of the UK Government's Consolidated Criteria on arms exports and when it will be carrying out this updating. The Committees further recommend that the Government confirms in its Response that it will adhere to the policy unequivocally endorsed by the Foreign Secretary to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that "The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licenses where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 77-86.) Organisational and operational Issues E XPORT C ONTROL O RGANISATION R EMIT AND RESPONSIBILITIES 47. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether the present remit and responsibilities of the Export Control Organisation fully meet the Government's policy objectives, and, if not, what changes it will be making. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 87-90.) E XPORT C ONTROL O RGANISATION C HARGING FOR PROCESSING ARMS EXPORT LICENCES 48. The Committees conclude that it would be undesirable to make the Export Control Organisation financially dependent on fee income from arms exporters and that the Government's decision not to introduce a charging regime for arms export licences is therefore welcome. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 91-99.) E XPORT C ONTROL O RGANISATION P ERFORMANCE 49. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report: a) sets out its reply to the criticisms made of the Export Control Organisation (ECO) by the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) in the course of the Committees' inquiry; b) states whether it considers ECO to be under-funded and under-staffed and, if so, what specific action it will take to rectify this; c) states what further improvements to its efficiency the Export Control Organisation it intends to make under its Service Improvement Project over and above those set out in paragraph 96 of the Chairman's Memorandum, and the date by which the Government intends to implement each of these improvements; and d) further confirms that in determining arms export licence applications the Government will adhere strictly to its arms export control policies as set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria, the EU Council's Common Position and the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that it remains the Government's policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 100-112.) E XPORT C ONTROL O RGANISATION R EVIEW OF ECO 50. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report what further progress it has made in its review of the Export Control Organisation over and above that stated to the Committees in paragraph 112 of the Chairman's Memorandum. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 113-115.) E XPORT C ONTROL O RGANISATION T RANSPARENCY OF ARMS EXPORT LICENSING 51. The Committees recommend that the Government, in fulfilment of its transparency policy on arms exports, sets out in its Response to this Report: a) whether a facility is now in operation on SPIRE to obtain additional information on arms exports and, if not, when it will be; b) whether the Government has decided on the mechanism for making this additional information public, and, if not, by what date it intends to do so; and c) whether it is still the Government's policy to appoint an independent reviewer to scrutinise the operation of the Export Control Organisation's licensing process and, if not, the reasons why this policy has been abandoned. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 116-123.) P OWERS TO CREATE NEW CATEGORIES OF EXPORT LICENCE 52. The Committees conclude that Article 26 of the Export Control Order 2008 enabling the Secretary of State to create new types of arms export licences without Parliamentary approval is unsatisfactory and could be used in a way that would significantly diminish the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the Government's arms export policies. The Committees recommend that the Government should amend the Export Control Order 2008 accordingly. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 124-128.) P RIORITY M ARKETS FOR UK ARMS EXPORTS 53. The Committees conclude that it is fundamentally anomalous, not least in terms of public perceptions, for countries listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as being of human rights concerns, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, then to be listed by the United Kingdom Trade and Investment Organisation within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills as Priority Markets for arms exports. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 129-131.) T RADE E XHIBITIONS 54. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response: a) whether it agrees that it is of the utmost importance that all defence and security equipment exhibitions licensed or facilitated by UK Government Departments, organisations and bodies do not display, promote or market Category A goods including goods that could be used for torture; and b) whether it is satisfied with the adequacy of its legal powers to enforce the legislation relating to defence and security equipment exhibitions licensed or facilitated by UK Government Departments and also with the sufficiency of the BIS Guidance on the Impact of UK Trade Controls on Exhibitions and Trade Fairs. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 132-138.) E NFORCEMENT 55. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it considers that enforcement by the UK Border Force with HMRC of compliance with the terms of all arms export licences is fully satisfactory and, if not, what further enforcement action it will take. The Committees conclude that the Government's continued publication of individuals and companies convicted of arms export offences and their sentences is essential. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 139-145.) C OMPOUND PENALTIES 56. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response: a) states what improvements to the compound penalties system it has identified and when it will implement them; and b) clarifies whether the Government is using compound penalties as an alternative to civil penalties only, or as an alternative to both criminal and civil proceedings. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 146-148.) C ROWN D EPENDENCIES 57. The Committees conclude that the Government's statement that "UK Strategic Export Control legislation has already been applied in the Crown Dependencies by the Crown Dependencies themselves" is welcome. 58. The Committees recommend that the Government monitors enforcement by the Crown Dependencies of the UK Government's arms export controls and policies and notifies the Committees of any breaches (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 149-154.) C OMBATING BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 59. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response: a) states the names of the individuals and companies against whom it has taken action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010 in relation to their arms export dealings; and b) provides its assessment as to whether the provisions of the now concluded Arms Trade Treaty will be of any practical help in combating bribery and corruption in the international arms trade. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 155-159.) I NTERNATIONAL D EVELOPMENT 60. Now that a global Arms Trade Treaty has been adopted, the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the outcome of the Department for International Development's consideration of its role in the UK arms export control system. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 160-164.) Arms Exports Agreements UK/US D EFENCE T RADE C OOPERATION T REATY 61. The Committees recommend in relation to the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT) that the Government in its Response: a) states how many UK members of the DTCT Approved Community have been registered to use the Treaty-specific UK Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for exports under the Treaty; b) lists the complete membership of the Treaty Approved Community; c) states whether, in accordance with the Government's Transparency Initiative, the detailed implementation of public reporting of transactions undertaken under this Treaty's OGEL licences on the Government's Strategic Export Controls website was completed by April 2013 as planned and, if not, when it will be; d) states the reasons, notwithstanding its Transparency Initiative, the Government is not requiring exporters to declare that a particular export was made under the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty; e) states what specific steps it will take to make the Treaty more user-friendly; and f) states how satisfactorily or not the Treaty is working as far as British companies are concerned. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 165-172.) BUS I NTERNATIONAL T RAFFIC IN A RMS R EGULATIONS (ITAR) 62. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response sets out fully its response to the criticisms of the US International Traffic in Arms regulations (ITAR) made by the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) in EGAD's written and oral evidence to this inquiry, and says what specific action the Government is taking to address each of those criticisms. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 173-179.) UK-F RANCE D EFENCE AND S ECURITY C O -OPERATIO n TREAT y 63. The Committees recommend in relation to the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty that the Government in its Response states: a) how many UK companies have been registered to use the Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for exports under the Treaty; b) the reasons, notwithstanding its Transparency Initiative, the Government is not requiring exporters to declare that a particular export was made under the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty; and c) how satisfactorily or not the Treaty is working as far as British companies are concerned. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 180-185.) T HE I NTRA -C OMMUNITY T RANSFER (ICT) D IRECTIVE ON ARMS TRANSFERS WITHIN THE EU 64. The Committees recommend in relation to the EU Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU that the Government in its Response states: a) how many times it has raised concerns about possible breaches of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports in relation to ICTs in the EU Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports, and in relation to which EU Member States and what defence-related products; b) how many UK companies have been approved to use Open General Export Licences under the EU ICT Directive; c) how many companies in the EU have been approved to use Open General Export Licences under the EU ICT Directive and how many of these are British companies; and d) how satisfactorily or not the EU ICT Directive is working as far as British companies are concerned. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 186-191.) Arms Control Agreements A RMS T RADE T REATY (ATT) 65. The Committees conclude that the adoption by the UN of the first ever international arms trade treaty applying to conventional arms as a whole in the Arms Trade Treaty of 2013 is most welcome and congratulates Ministers and their officials, under both the previous Labour Government and the present Coalition Government, on their contribution to this unprecedented international achievement. The Committees also welcome the fact that the UK was amongst the first of the countries to sign the Arms Trade Treaty when it became open for signature on 3 June 2013. The Committees recommend in its Response that the Government states by what date the UK will also ratify the Treaty. 66. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response: a) what changes it will be making to its arms export controls: i. primary legislation; ii. secondary legislation; iii. Government administrative procedures and guidance; and iv. Government policy to ensure the UK Government is fully compliant with all provisions in the Arms Trade Treaty stating, in each case, the date the change will come into effect; and b) what steps it will be taking to ensure that the ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty by the minimum of 50 countries necessary to bring it into force is achieved in the shortest possible time. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 192-212.) C LUSTER M UNITIONS 67. The Committees recommend that in its Response the Government states: a) how many countries have now signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions and which countries it is currently urging to become signatories; b) how many countries have now ratified the Convention and which of the countries that are now only signatories it is currently urging to ratify the Convention; c) what steps it is taking to encourage the United States, Russia, China and Israel to become signatories and/or to ratify the Convention; d) whether the Government is satisfied or not with the progress by the financial institutions in producing voluntary codes of conduct against the indirect financing of the production of cluster munitions and their components; and e) whether the Government continues to consider a Government Code of Conduct or Government legislation against the indirect financing of the production of cluster munitions and their components as policy options. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 213-225.) S MALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS 68. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response: a) what steps it is taking to achieve full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects; b) what steps it is taking to achieve full implementation of the EU's Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy; and c) how far the UN Programme and the EU Strategy will, or will not, be superseded by the small arms and light weapons elements of the Arms Trade Treaty when it comes into force. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 226-230.) L ANDMINES 69. The Committees recommend in its Response that the Government states: a) which countries have yet to accede to the Ottawa Landmines Convention; and b) what steps it is taking to try to secure the accession of the remaining countries to the Convention. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 231-234.) T HE W ASSENAAR A GREEMENT 70. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states: a) how far its objectives for the Wassenaar Arrangement were fulfilled at the Plenary meeting in December 2012; b) what steps it is taking to encourage China to make an application for membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and c) which other significant arms exporting countries, in addition to China, should desirably become members of the Wassenaar Arrangement; d) what the Government wishes to see achieved at the Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting in December 2013; and e) what outcome the Government wishes to see from the review of the Wassenaar Arrangement export control lists and what input it will be making to this review. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 235-240.) T HE UN R EGISTER OF C ONVENTIONAL A RMS 71. The Committees conclude that the Government is right to include in its annual report for the UN Register of Conventional Arms Government military equipment it gifts, as well as sells, to other States, and recommends that it encourages other Governments to do likewise. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what progress it is making in widening the categories of military equipment that are to be reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 241-244.) T HE F ISSILE M ATERIAL C UT -O FF T REATY 72. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response: a) what specific routes to starting negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva the British Government and the other P5 countries are actively investigating; and b) whether it will give further consideration to setting a deadline for the start of negotiations on the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament and to transferring the responsibility for starting the negotiations to the UN, or to another international forum, if that deadline is not met. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 245-252.) T HE M ISSILE T ECHNOLOGY C ONTROL R EGIME 73. The Government has stated that the main missile technology exporters who remain outside the Missile Technology Control Regime include China, Israel, India and Pakistan. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response with which of those countries it has had, or will be having, discussions about membership of the MTCR. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 253-258.) T HE G8 G LOBAL P ARTNERSHIP A GAINST THE S PREAD OF W EAPONS AND M ATERIALS OF M ASS D ESTRUCTION 74. The Committees conclude that the UK's expenditure of £322 million by the previous and present Governments from 2002 to 2012 in the Global Threat Reduction Programmethis being the UK's contribution to the G8-based Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destructionhas been fully merited and very necessary. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what its Global Threat Reduction Programme planned expenditure will be in 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 259-264.) T HE N UCLEAR S UPPLIERS G ROUP 75. The Government has stated that the major technology holders who remain outside of the Nuclear Suppliers Group include India, Pakistan and Israel, and that suppliers of dual-use technology who are not members include the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response with which of those countries it has had, or will be having, discussions about membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 265-270.) T HE A USTRALIA G ROUP 76. The Committees recommend that, as the Government has said that the Australia Group focus is on those countries that have large or developing chemical industries, for example China, India and Pakistan, or those which act as transhipment hubs, such as Singapore and Vietnam, it states in its Response what steps it is taking to ensure UK participation in Australia Group outreach visits to those countries. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is satisfied with the interface between the Australia Group and those organisations responsible for implementing and monitoring the Chemical Weapons Convention. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 271-274.) T HE A CADEMIC T ECHNOLOGY A PPROVAL S CHEME 77. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report: a) whether it remains satisfied that the UK's Academic Technology Approval Scheme remains effective in preventing those foreign students who pose the greatest risk from studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education; and b) whether it will consider introducing legislation to extend the Scheme to include those UK students who pose the greatest risk. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 275-277.) T HE C HEMICAL W EAPONS C ONVENTION (CWC) 78. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response: a) how far it considers that its objectives for the Chemical Weapons Review Conference as set out in the Written Answer of FCO Minister Alistair Burt on 26 March 2013 were, or were not, fulfilled; and b) what specific steps it will take to try to secure accession to the Convention by those 8 states who have not done so thus far, namely Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 278-282.) T HE B IOLOGICAL AND T OXIN W EAPONS C ONVENTION 79. The Committees conclude that the Government's statement that establishing a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention remains a long-term UK and EU aim is welcome, but that the absence of any such regime, because of US opposition in particular, is a matter of deep concern. 80. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response a) lists which States have signed but not ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and which States have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC; b) sets out what specific steps it will take to try to secure accession to the BTWC by those States who have not done so thus far; c) whether it is aware of States with holdings of biological or toxin weapons and, if so, which those States are; and d) whether it considers the civil population to be at risk from State or non-State holdings of biological or toxin weapons and, if so, what steps it is taking both nationally and internationally to mitigate that risk. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 283-288.) T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY 81. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response in specific terms: a) the extent to which it considers that the commitments made at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, and in the 2010 NPT Action Plans have, or have not, been fulfilled; and b) what are the Government's objectives for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 289-295.) T HE C OMPREHENSIVE N UCLEAR T EST B AN T REATY 82. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each of the remaining 8 countries whose signature and ratification is necessary to enable the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to enter into forcenamely China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USAto try to persuade them to ratify the CTBT. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 296-297.) S UB - STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS 83. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response: a) what specific action it is taking to reduce the requirement for short-range nuclear weapons assigned to NATO in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area, and developments in the broader security environment; b) whether it supports the implementation of the US B-61 Life Extension Programme in Europe; and c) whether it favours US and Russian holdings of short-range nuclear weapons being reduced to zero on both sides, as achieved for intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the 1987 INF Treaty, in future negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons between the US and Russia. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 298-301.) BA M IDDLE E AST W EAPONS OF M ASS D ESTRUCTION F REE Z ONE 84. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response: a) when it expects the planned regional conference to discuss a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone to take place; b) what are the current positions of Iran and Israel on attending this conference; and c) what steps it is taking to try to ensure this Conference takes place. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 302-312.) T HE N ATIONAL C OUNTER -P ROLIFERATION S TRATEGY FOR 2012-15 85. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response: a) any amendments or updating it wishes to make to the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15 since its publication in 2012; and b) what it considers to be the successes and failures of the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15 to date. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 313-316.) Arms export control policies A RMS EXPORTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 86. The Committees continue to conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government continues to do, that these two policies "are mutually reinforcing". (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 317-319.) O VERSEAS S ECURITY AND J USTICE A SSISTANCE (OSJA) H UMAN R IGHTS G UIDANCE 87. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response by what date its review of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance will be completed, and whether it has accepted the Committees' previous recommendation that the requirement on officials in the current OSJA Guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria if military and security equipment is being exported in an OSJA Programme should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 320-324.) S URVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT 88. The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states what progress has been made both within the EU and within the Wassenaar Arrangement to prevent exports of surveillance technology and equipment to repressive regimes who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 325-328.) E XPORT OF T ASERS 89. The Committees continue to recommend that the Government specifically reports breaches of export controls in relation to Tasers, and on the enforcement action taken, in the next UK Strategic Export Controls Annual report following any breach, stating in each case to where the Tasers were exported or were due to be exported. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 329-332.) U NMANNED A ERIAL V EHICLES (D RONES ) 90. The Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees with regard to the export from the UK of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones that "we want to have a tough, strong export control regime at all times into the future" is welcome. In the light of that policy, the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response: a) what specific action it is taking within the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to ensure that the MTCR is not weakened in relation to drones, components of drones and drone technology; and b) whether it considers that any changes to UK export controls in relation to drones, components of drones and drone technology are necessary to achieve the Government's stated policy, and, if so, what those changes are and the date by which they will be implemented. The Committees further recommend that the Government states its policy on approving export licences for drones. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 333-336.) A RMS EXPORTS TO COUNTER PIRACY 91. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether there have been any breaches to date in the conditions the Government has attached to licences of exported arms to be used by private security companies for counter-piracy purposes, and, if so, what are the breaches that have occurred and by which private security companies. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 337-340.) T HE LICENSING OF SECURITY SERVICES 92. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response: a) whether the governance mechanism to monitor compliance with the International Code of Conduct for private security service providers has now been established, and, if so, what the details of the mechanism are; and b) whether it remains the Government's position that it has no plans to extend legislation, other than the requirement for export or trade control licences, to UK-based Private Military and Security Companies. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 341-343.) A RMS EXPORTS AND INTERNAL REPRESSION 93. The Committees conclude it is welcome that the Government has confirmed that it has no plans to change its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression, that policy being: "The long-standing British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." The Committees further conclude that the Government's acceptance of the Committees' recommendation that it adheres strictly to its stated policy on arms exports and internal repression for all export licence applications is also welcome. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 344-350.) T HE G OVERNMENT ' S A RAB S PRING ARMS EXPORT POLICY REVIEW 94. The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states: a) how many arms export licence applications to date have been suspended using the Government's new suspension mechanism; and b) the nature of the goods and country of export destination in each case. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 351-367.) A RMS EXPORT LICENCE REVOCATIONS 95. The Committees recommend that the Government informs them of all strategic export licence revocations as soon as each revocation is made stating in each case as in Annex 1 of the Government's Response to the Committees' 2011 Report (Cm8079): a) the End-user Country; b) the Annual Report Summary; c) the rating; and d) the reason for revocation. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 368-377.) E XPORTS OF GIFTED EQUIPMENT 96. The Committees recommend that they are informed of all gifts of military goods requiring Parliamentary approval at the same time as the relevant Main or Supplementary estimate, or departmental Minute is laid. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether all gifted military goods are subject to the same arms export policy as commercial military goods, namely compliance with: a) the Government's stated policy that "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."; and b) the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position and whether it is satisfied that this is still the case with all approved gifts of military goods that have not yet left the UK Government's control. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 378-382.) Arms exports to Countries of concern 97. The Committees conclude that in his letter of 10 May 2013, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, states that there are over 3,000 Standard Individual and Open Individual Export Licences (SIELs and OIELs) that remain extant to the FCO's 27 Countries of human rights concern. According to the Business Secretary's letter the total value of the UK's SIELs to these 27 Countries is some £12,331,621,526 as set out below. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature. FCO Countries of Human Rights concernextant licences Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs) Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs) Afghanistan 23,847,337 80 Pakistan 49,802,833 219 Belarus 128,042 11 Russia 86,329,387 271 Burma 3,332,192 8 Saudi Arabia 1,863,182,251 417 China 1,486,415,462 1163 Somalia 1,914,694 26 Colombia 20,089,524 53 South Sudan 0 0 Cuba 0 3 Sri Lanka 8,084,759 49 Democratic People's Republic of Korea 0 0 Sudan 7,642,480 14 Democratic Republic of Congo 2,127,980 20 Syria 143,867 3 Eritrea 960,031 6 Turkmenistan 1,022,016 17 Fiji 35,555 4 Uzbekistan 7,405,718 19 Iran 803,440,351 62 Vietnam 13,371,242 74 Iraq 15,915,430 69 Yemen 64,784 10 Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories 7,878,776,714 381 Zimbabwe 2,992,390 46 Libya 54,583,388 49 Total 12,331,621,526 3,074 It should be stressed that a considerable number of the above extant licences will be for dual-use goods or military goods not readily usable for internal repression. 98. The Committees conclude that in his letter of 20 May 2013, the Business Secretary, states that there are around 400 Standard Individual and Open Individual Export Licences (SIELs and OIELs) that remain extant to the 5 additional Countries of concern highlighted by the Committees (Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Madagascar and Tunisia). According to the Business Secretary's letter the total value of the UK's SIELs to these 5 countries is some £111,657,154 as set out below. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature. Other Countries of concernextant licences Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences Country Value of SIELs (£) Number of extant licences (SIELS and OIELs) Argentina 7,543,100 57 Madagascar 24,348,066 40 Bahrain 13,630,375 105 Tunisia 7,062,299 51 Egypt 59,073,314 134 Total 111,657,154 387 It should be stressed that a considerable number of the above extant licences will be for dual-use goods or military goods not readily usable for internal repression. 99. The Committees have made individual Recommendations in respect of 16 out of the 32 Countries of concern. These 16 Countries of concern are: Afghanistan, China, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Madagascar and Tunisia. These individual Recommendations are set out in paragraphs 385 to 501 in the Memorandum from the Chairman of the Committees. 100. With regard to the other 16 Countries of concern which are: Belarus, Burma, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Vietnam and Zimbabwe, the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 772 extant UK export licences to these countries: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms export Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 383-386.) C OUNTRIES OF CONCERN M IDDLE E AST AND N ORTH A FRICA B AHRAIN 101. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 105 extant UK export licences to Bahrain: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Bahrain for cryptographic software, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition, command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, components for pistols, pistols, weapon sights, components for machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns, gun silencers and weapon sight mounts. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 387-396.) E GYPT 102. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 134 extant UK export licences to Egypt: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Egypt for cryptographic software, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment, body armour, military helmets, components for military combat vehicles, components for pistols, pistols, acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for sniper rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon sights, components for machine guns, combat shotguns, components for rifles, rifles, general military vehicle components, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment and military communications equipment. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 397-402.) I RAN 103. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 62 extant UK export licences to Iran: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Iran for: cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 403-405.) I RAQ 104. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 69 extant UK export licences to Iraq: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Iraq for: assault rifles, small arms ammunition, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, cryptographic software equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment and, weapon night sights. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 406-408.) I SRAEL AND THE O CCUPIED P ALESTINIAN T ERRITORIES 105. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 381 extant UK export licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories for: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection; body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for pistols, components for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, military support vehicles, small arms ammunition, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, weapon sights, military communications equipment and components for small arms ammunition. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 409-415.) L IBYA 106. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 49 extant UK export licences to Libya: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Libya for: gun mountings, military helmets, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, pistols, small arms ammunition, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, hand grenades, combat shotguns, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, command communications control and intelligence software, military communications equipment, military software, software for military communications equipment. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 416-421.) S AUDI A RABIA 107. The Committees have noted the Government's answer that it applies the same stated policy on arms exports and internal repression to Saudi Arabia as it does to the other states in the region and to states worldwide. However, the Committees conclude that that does not appear to have been so in the case of the deployment of Saudi forces in British armoured vehicles to Bahrain to protect installations, thereby enabling Bahraini security forces to end, sometimes violently, predominantly peaceful demonstrations. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 417 extant UK export licences to Saudi Arabia: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Saudi Arabia for: body armour, anti riot/ballistic shields, components for body armour, military helmets, components for all-wheel vehicles with ballistic protection, general military vehicle components, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military support vehicles, components for military communications equipment, crowd control ammunition, hand grenades, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training crowd control ammunition, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, gun silencers, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, components for machine guns, machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military combat vehicles and military support vehicles. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 422-429.) S YRIA 108. The Committees recommend that when the Government in its quarterly reports on the BIS website publishes export licence approvals of dual-use items that are frequently associated with military use, such as hydrophone arrays, hydrophones and towed-hydrophone arrays, it should make clear whether or not these are for civil use only, in order to avoid misleading the public. 109. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that neither of the 3 extant UK export licences to Syria or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to those in Syria: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including the extant licences to Syria for components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection. 110. The Committee further recommend that in its Response the Government states: a) whether, since the BIS Secretary of State's letter of 10 May 2013, any UK Strategic Export Control licences for goods to Syria have been approved stating the application type, Annual Report summary and goods value in the case of each licence; b) whether, since the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Foreign Secretary on 15 April and his Oral Statement on 20 May, any additional non-lethal equipment, or any goods subject to UK Strategic Export Controls have been gifted to Syria, and, if so, to state the nature of the equipment and goods, and their value; and c) the Government's present policy on the supply, whether by sale or gift, and whether directly or indirectly, of goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists to Syria. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 430-447.) T UNISIA 111. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 51 extant UK export licences to Tunisia: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Tunisia for: cryptographic software, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, small arms ammunition, command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment, weapon night sights, military support vehicles, components for military support vehicles, anti-armour ammunition and small arms ammunition. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 448-453.) Y EMEN 112. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that neither of the 10 extant UK export licences to Yemen: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including the extant licence to Yemen for body armour. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 454-459.) O THER C OUNTRIES OF CONCERN A FGHANISTAN 113. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report lists the items of military equipment and their values that it has gifted or it intends to gift to the Government of Afghanistan and its agencies as British military forces withdraw. 114. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of its items of gifted military equipment and none of the 80 extant UK export licences to Afghanistan or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to Afghanistan: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Afghanistan for: body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for all-wheel vehicles with ballistic protection, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for machine guns, machine guns, small arms ammunition, components for pistols, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, military support vehicles and technology for military support vehicles. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 460-467.) A RGENTINA 115. The Committees conclude that it is reprehensible that the Government, given the relatively recent history of British ships being sunk in the Falklands War by missiles supplied by a fellow NATO member and the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, as reported on 5 February 2013, regarding Argentinian control of the Falkland Islands, when he said "I don't think it will take another 20 years", is unwilling to lobby other Governments to make the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012. The Committees recommend that the Government should do so. 116. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 57 extant UK export licences to Argentina: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Argentina for: cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 468-477.) C HINA 117. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 1163 extant UK export licences to China: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to China for: body armour, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for ground vehicle communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of equipment employing software, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for the production of military communications equipment, weapon sights. 118. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will seek to widen the EU arms embargo on China to include: a) all military goods; and b) all listed goods which "might be used to facilitate internal repression" contrary to the UK Government's stated policy. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 478-486.) M ADAGASCAR 119. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 40 extant UK export licences to Madagascar: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Madagascar for: cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, combat shotguns, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols, sniper rifles and weapon night sights. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 487-491.) S RI L ANKA 120. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response how the statement made by the FCO Minister Alistair Burt on 20 February 2013 that during the period 1 July-30 September 2012 only 2 arms export licences were approved to the Sri Lankan military can be reconciled with the information put on the BIS website for licences approved to Sri Lanka in this period as reproduced in paragraph 496 of the Memorandum from the Chairman of the Committees in Volume II. 121. The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 49 extant UK export licences to Sri Lanka: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position including those extant licences to Sri Lanka for: acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, military helmets, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military support vehicles, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights, combat shotguns and equipment employing cryptography. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 492-499.) U ZBEKISTAN 122. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 19 extant UK export licences to Uzbekistan or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to Uzbekistan: a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 500-503.) A RMS EXPORTS TO AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND TO C OUNTRIES OF CONCERN WORLDWIDE 123. The Committees conclude that the Government's answer, in response to the Committees' question, that it is satisfied that none of its extant arms export licences to authoritarian regimes and Countries of human rights concern worldwide contravenes the Government's stated policy to the Committees on arms exports and internal repression, or the UK's Consolidated Criteria on arms exports, or the EU's Common Position on arms exports is welcome. However, the Committees further conclude that the Government would have done better to have accepted the Committees' Recommendation in successive Reports that it should extend its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and Countries of human rights concern worldwide rather than to have disagreed with the Committees' Recommendation and then to have been obliged to extend its review worldwide in order to be able to answer the Committees' subsequent questions. 124. Given that the Government has now acknowledged that its new arms export suspension mechanism only applies to licence applications that are still being processed and not to military or dual-use goods that have already left the UK, the Committees repeat their previous recommendation that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes "which might be used to facilitate internal repression" in contravention of the Government's policy, as stated to the Committees by the Foreign Secretary on 7 February 2012. (Refer to Volume II, paragraphs 504-510.)



3 Volumes I, II and III of this Report are published on the Committees' webpages at www.parliament.uk/caeccomm Back





