Ukrainian Minister for Economy and Trade Aivaras Abromavicius has stepped down | Tobias Schwarz/AFP/Getty Opinion Ukraine’s political suicide The reformers are losing ground, and the results could be disastrous.

KIEV — Ukraine’s fledgling democracy edged closer to dismembering itself this week, as one of the most reform-minded members of the government stepped down.

In his resignation letter, Economy Minister Aivaras Abromavičius accused old political elites of systematically blocking much-needed reforms and paralyzing the fight against rampant corruption; and singled out a close confidant of President Petro Poroshenko as one of the main culprits.

With his announcement, it appears that the long-simmering conflict between the forces of change and those of preservation has come to a head. The outcome will determine whether Ukraine retains a chance of becoming a stable, democratic and European country, or sinks into political, economic and social chaos.

When the current government came to power in 2014, it faced a tall order. Ushered in by the popular Euromaidan protests, its mandate was nothing less than to end years of semi-autocracy and corruption under ousted president Viktor Yanukovych.

Ukrainians hoped their country, under new leadership, would adopt democracy, market economy and the rule of law, and associate more closely with the European Union. Added to this reform agenda, two immediate threats had to be addressed. First, economic collapse loomed: State reserves and assets had been looted by the previous government, debt was skyrocketing and the economy was in free fall. Second, Russia had attacked Ukraine, annexed Crimea, stoked separatism in Donbas, and terrorized the rest of the country.

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The Ukrainian government faced up to these challenges with some success. Reforms started in a number of areas, from public procurement to taxes, from the police to state companies. The government stabilized the economy and public finances; rebooted the military and contained Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine; curtailed energy and economic dependency on Russia; and signed a comprehensive association and trade pact with the EU. Under the circumstances, this is no mean feat.

But this partial progress has come at a price. It was made possible by a broadest-possible coalition of pro-European forces, which placed a minority of reformers, civic leaders and committed democrats alongside a majority of old political hands that clung to their influence and vested interests.

The latter grudgingly agreed to some changes, mostly those called for as a condition for financial aid or visa liberalization by Western partners. But the former mostly hit a wall when it came to pursuing structural reforms geared toward fixing Ukraine’s deeply corrupt political economy. As a result, the country’s rotten prosecution and judiciary systems have remained untouched, as has the pervasive influence of Ukrainian oligarchs.

Hopes for swift improvement have been shattered and confidence in the government, and its political elite, has reached all-time lows.

New anti-corruption bureaus are yet to become functional as are serious efforts to recover stolen assets. Privatizing Ukraine’s bloated and costly state companies has proven as elusive as decentralizing its public administration. This means any reform progress Ukraine has made thus far is not irreversible.

Ukraine’s uneasy political coalition is coming apart at the seams. Reformers are exhausted and feeling desperate in the face of the seeming futility of their efforts. Those stalling change have become emboldened and want to end their political hibernation.

Hopes for swift improvement have been shattered and confidence in the government, and its political elite, has reached all-time lows. The international pressure that once held the governing alliance together has receded: Bankruptcy is no longer imminent, Russian aggression has somewhat calmed, and Western interest in Ukraine is fading. As a consequence, political infighting has been on the rise for months.

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The situation eerily resembles the failure of the “Orange Revolution” a decade ago. But the collapse of the current government — and a likely succession by a less reform-oriented one — would be far more disastrous. It would mark the ultimate betrayal of Ukrainian citizens by their political class. The sacrifices Ukrainians made, in defending themselves against Russian aggression and pushing for reform, will have been in vain. Predictably, they will not remain apathetic and will mobilize in protest — deepening conflict in the country and dashing hopes for peace.

If the government fails in Kiev, it will have a direct effect on political and economic support from the West. Ukraine’s many skeptics will gain the upper hand, and its few friends will face a steep uphill struggle. Reduced assistance — whether political, financial, administrative or military — will eventually forfeit the modest gains Ukraine has made, and expose the country’s many vulnerabilities. Such a loss of faith in, and support for, Ukraine’s ability to change would almost certainly spill over to other countries and reinforce Western views of an incorrigible post-Soviet space that is best kept at arm’s length.

Reduced assistance will eventually forfeit the modest gains Ukraine has made, and expose the country’s many vulnerabilities.

Russia, by contrast, would triumph. No one fears a democratic and European Ukraine more than Vladimir Putin, and weakened commitment to change in Kiev, new rounds of infighting, and a stalled rapprochement with the West could help achieve Moscow’s objectives. Russia could return to manipulating Ukraine’s corrupt elite, wind down its operation in Donbas, consider Crimea a safe acquisition, expect Western sanctions to expire, and return to business as usual with Europe and the United States.

Ukraine can still escape this political suicide and its predictable consequences. To do so, decision-makers in Kiev have to, for once, place their country’s interest above their own petty concerns. Time is running out.

Joerg Forbrig is transatlantic fellow for Central and Eastern Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin.