The problem with referendums is that they can go horribly wrong. Ten years ago to the day, on 29 May 2005, France held a referendum over whether it should ratify the proposed European constitution. Opinion polls had predicted an overwhelming victory for the yes camp (some expecting the vote for yes to be as high as 65%). Yet the outcome was a resounding 55% in favour of no. The outcome effectively stymied plans for a single European constitution. Jacques Chirac, then president, had massively overplayed his hand.

As David Cameron embarks on a tour of European capitals during which he hopes to start renegotiating Britain’s relationship with the EU, it is worth pondering the French precedent.

Before I start, let me clarify: I don’t think Britain will leave the EU. I would bet money on the result being a clear yes, for the simple reason that people don’t tend to get too excited about jumps into the unknown. I believe Cameron made a strong case for membership in his January 2013 Bloomberg speech, in which he first put forward his rationale for a referendum: addressing those who want to see Britain follow the example of Norway – a country which is part of the single market but has stayed outside the EU – he stressed that Norway “has no say in setting the rules” in the EU, “it just has to implement its directives”. Norway pays for being part of a club, but cannot influence what it does. It’s an argument that could sway many hesitant voters.

I could be wrong, of course, just like French pundits were wrong in 2005.

What threw everyone then was that French voters ended up not answering the question that was put to them – a common phenomenon in referendums. People had other preoccupations and decided to voice them: the referendum became a channel for anger at France’s high unemployment rate, concerns about “ultra-liberalism” threatening the welfare state, and fears about the impact of globalisation. Britain today may have an unemployment rate under 6%, which is envied by many on the continent, but it is far from devoid of social tensions.

In 2005, France’s yes campaign only lost its lead in the final weeks before the vote. One of the topics that distorted the debate was Chirac’s professed support for Turkey’s EU membership: a cultural clash many in France, with its strong Catholic tradition, were not ready to accept. While large cities such as Paris, Lyon and Bordeaux mostly voted yes, the no camp gained strong majorities in small towns, rural areas and less economically developed parts of the country.

Recalling this, I can’t help wondering what kind of unforeseen events might creep up on Britain and Europe in the run-up to the UK referendum. Could a refugee crisis, a terrorist attack or more turmoil in the eurozone trigger a surge of europhobia? In a world where Europe is grappling with crises that weren’t on people’s maps only two years ago – think Ukraine or the Mediterranean – this doesn’t seem an unreasonable question.

Many analysts of the shock 2005 result also dwelt on the mismanagement of the yes campaign. While most of the mainstream parties had come out in favour of yes – as seems likely in Britain – they were painfully divided and struggled to rally behind a strong message. The far-left Gauche Radicale and far-right Front National, both strongly opposed to the constitution, were able to benefit from this. Within the French socialist party, the then general secretary François Hollande was struggling to contain endless quarrels and rebellions. Laurent Fabius, an old rival of Hollande and now France’s foreign minister, decided to support the no campaign, with at least one eye on the 2007 presidential elections.

Can Cameron be confident that internal disputes within the Conservative party will not get out of hand ? How will he deal with the Boris factor ? Ukip will continue to pose a threat to the Tories once the unrest in Farage’s party has settled.

There is one more concrete lesson Cameron can learn from France. In 2005, French citizens were not so much presented with a choice as with a puzzle. Instead of keeping things short and simple, voters were handed a huge bulk of literature: a 191-page booklet, containing no fewer than 448 articles, 36 protocols and 50 declarations.

The intention was that votes should be cast in a highly informed manner. The result was utter confusion. Some voters felt threatened: if these documents were so complex that they could only be understood by experts, they thought, the government surely had something to hide. So how Cameron manages to present the results of his renegotiation strategy with the EU will be crucial. Dwelling on the technicalities of opt-outs and protocols may carry more risk than benefit.

If the impressions Cameron has created on the continent are anything to go by, the omens aren’t too good. Britain’s prime minister has a history of mismanaging relations with his European colleagues, and it is felt that he only grasped the risks attached to last year’s Scottish referendum at the very last minute.

It’s no surprise Cameron planned to start his European roadshow with visits to Denmark (now postponed) and the Netherlands. These are countries that have traditionally held a vision of an EU centred on free trade – very much in tune with British sensitivities. In Germany and France, countries more historically focused on deeper European integration, Cameron’s choice of early destinations will have been seen as confirmation of Britain’s old allergy towards a more utopian vision of a Europe of shared sovereignty.

Cameron’s greatest weakness is that many in Europe have become convinced his renegotiation tactic is in fact a phoney war with the EU. He is now seen as waging a strictly domestic political battle. Few believe he is thinking strategically about the common European good. Whatever he obtains in terms of concessions – and no one anticipates that they will be particularly significant – his main struggle will be to sell the result to British public opinion. It may turn out to be much more of a battle over perceptions than over realities.

Much of the irritation on the continent comes from the fact that Cameron is seen as toying with nationalist sentiments. Many European leaders firmly believe European project was created to combat nationalism, and nationalism should therefore not be the reason to dismantle it.

Dwelling on the technicalities of opt-outs and protocols may carry more risk than benefit

Internal EU dynamics will play a role. In 2014 George Osborne told European officials in private that the UK referendum was inevitable and would result in a yes, because everyone knew Europe needed to reform. Osborne has a strong relationship with Germany’s finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble and shares a German view of fiscal European orthodoxy.

Cameron’s team has repeatedly taken to bashing France over its lack of reforms – once even pointing out that Yorkshire had created more jobs in 2014 than the whole of France. Of course this has irked many people in Paris; but the French government will also be careful not to position itself as an obvious bulwark against the kind of gestures that might help Cameron keep the UK in the EU.

There is not much doubt on the continent that a British withdrawal would spell the beginning of the end for the European project. But there is also no willingness to cave in to blackmail. Treaty change will remain out of the question.

The underlying hope is that British voters will come to see clearly that it makes no sense, in a globalised world, to embark on a go-it-alone strategy. In the 21st century the dividing lines on this planet are being redrawn in such a way that competition will exist between continents rather than between nations.

To Cameron’s credit, it could be argued that the referendum will shock Europe’s political establishment out of its complacency. For years, no one has convincingly managed to recast the European Union as a body that delivers something for its citizens: peace, stability and security. But then again, that was also what the 2005 French referendum was supposed to achieve.