One fact repeatedly cited by Mr. Ghosn and others as a prominent feature of the Japanese criminal justice system is the country’s “99 percent conviction rate,” often through confessions. The objectives of prosecutors in Japan help explain this. The aim of achieving corrective behavior and reintegration into society, rather than simply determining guilt and punishment, is a high priority for Japanese prosecutors. This requires recognition of wrongdoing and remorse. Restitution and forgiveness of victims is an important element of this process (a highly unlikely outcome in this case, where Nissan’s interests are decidedly aligned with the prosecutors’). Once these objectives are achieved, prosecutors have considerable authority and discretion to grant leniency, and they often do. Only cases with a high likelihood of conviction tend to go to trial.

This leads to one of the most troubling issues to outside observers: the presumption of innocence. How can there be a determination of guilt and an admission of culpability before there has even been a trial on the merits?

Protections for the accused do exist under the Japanese Constitution; they were introduced by the United States during its occupation of the country after World War II. Under the Japanese civil law system, however, they generally apply only at the trial stage, where issues of guilt or innocence are formally determined. During the pretrial stage, local rules place emphasis on the investigatory powers of the prosecutors. So, the right to counsel during questioning depends on whether — in the prosecutors’ estimation — a lawyer’s presence is likely to “interfere” with the investigation. (Invariably, the determination is that it will, as in the case of Mr. Ghosn.)

Conditions for contact with others during detention and the granting of bail are based on assessments of the suspect’s good faith and willingness to cooperate and the perceived likelihood of evidence tampering. This explains why a defendant might be cut off from their spouse and held for prolonged periods without bail, as Mr. Ghosn was. Suspects are free to refuse to “confess,” as Mr. Ghosn has done, but that inevitably results in increased exercise of substantial prosecutorial powers to obtain a confession.

Mr. Ghosn has fled to Lebanon, which has no extradition treaty with Japan, so the prospect of a trial is unlikely. But if his case does go to trial, additional factors will come into play. In the context of Japanese prosecutorial objectives, going to trial would indicate that prosecutors’ efforts to obtain Mr. Ghosn’s remorse have failed, increasing the pressure on them to achieve a conviction. For Mr. Ghosn, everything would then rest on the discretion and probity of the judge, a career bureaucrat.