In early January, as Ukrainian and Russian-backed Separatist forces were locked in battle over the ruins of what was once Donetsk Airport, it seemed to outside observers that the fighting couldn’t get any worse. Not only were both sides hurling increasing numbers of troops, tanks, and other armored vehicles into the fray, the civilian areas around the airport were being hammered by the indiscriminate use of artillery.

Heavier and heavier artillery was being brought to the front by both sides, including the 2S7 Pion 203-mm self-propelled gun, affectionately known as “the most powerful conventional artillery system in the world.” Neither the Ukrainians nor the Separatists have had any second thoughts about lobbing shells from the 2S7 into towns and cities and, indeed, numerous pieces of footage show the Separatists actually firing artillery and rockets from inside residential areas of Donetsk.

The fall of Donetsk Airport and the end of the resistance of the famed “Cyborgs,” Ukrainian soldiers given the title for their stout resistance in the face of months of assaults and bombardment, briefly gave hope that the worst was over. However, as has become the trend in the conflict, a new major front immediately succeeded the ending of another. In this case, it was the rail-hub and strategic transportation point of Debaltseve.

An apartment block in Vuhlehirsk in the Debaltseve pocket (Max Avdeev for BuzzFeed News)

Surrounded on three sides by Separatist forces, thousands of Ukrainian troops have desperately clung on to their positions as the Separatists seek to cut them off from reinforcement and resupply. Operating without any discernable plan, Ukrainian troops have been fed into the cauldron around Debaltseve in the hopes that numbers would help them keep the route into the town open, but that hasn’t stopped the Separatists from closing in.

Brutal fighting has characterized the battle around the Debaltseve pocket, and the civilian population is yet again caught in the middle. Brief humanitarian ceasefires have allowed for the evacuation of thousands, but many are still trapped, unable or unwilling to take to the roads. Many of the towns around Debaltseve have been effectively leveled by the fighting, and the key town itself has been heavily damaged.

The fighting for the road into Debaltseve has been confused and vicious, but Separatists do appear to have cut the road in a major attack that started on Feb. 9. Ukrainian officials say that the battle is ongoing, but Separatist attacks are getting increasingly close to Debaltseve itself. Chernukhino, just to the east of Debaltseve, is currently the scene of intense streetfighting.

A local counterattack to relieve the Ukrainian forces there has failed to materialize, but the situation far to the south around Mariupol is different. Recently the scene of a deadly Separatist rocket attack, Mariupol has been seen as the next target after Debaltseve. On February 10th, though, the volunteer Azov Battalion, supported by Ukranian military and Interior Ministry units, launched a surprise offensive to push the Separatists away from Mariupol and reclaim some of the towns lost in recent months along the coast of the Sea of Azov. The first day went well, with a number of towns being retaken, but the attack appears to have stalled out around the town of Sakhanka, with some reports saying that Azov’s units have run of out fuel.

Feb. 10 also saw the Separatists deliver a surprise bombardment of the town of Kramatorsk, where a Ukrainian military headquarters is located, killing at least seven civilians.

A member of the Azov Battalion (Anastasia Vlasova)

A Question of Lethality

With the exception of the minor offensive near Mariupol, events have not been playing out in Ukraine’s favor. The war is a serious drain on the resources of the country, and the pace of recruitment has fallen to the point where a new mobilization was called in order to bring in 50,000 desperately needed new soldiers. Ukrainians are more reluctant to fight than ever, wary of being sent East to fight in a poorly waged war led by inept commanders.

The level of fighting, and the string of Ukrainian defeats in recent weeks, has reignited the debate over whether or not to supply arms to Ukraine. Some, such as Senator John McCain, have always advocated arms, but it is only now that such sentiments are being serious considered. The United States, Canada, and many European countries have for months been sending non-lethal military equipment (UAVs, trucks, tents, blankets, medical gear, uniforms, etc.) and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, but refrained from sending arms and munitions. They have consistently resisted calls, including from Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko during his speech to Congress, to arm the Ukrainian military, but that position is now under attack.

There are two things that just about every policymaker, journalist, and analyst in the West agree upon: there are Russian troops in Ukraine, and Russia is arming, equipping, and training Separatist fighters. How many troops there are and what exactly Russia is sending across the border is debated, but there is plentiful evidence showing active Russian involvement.

This involvement is being used as both an argument for and against arming Ukraine. Ukraine “has been hard-put to resist this onslaught because it is denied access to the kinds of sophisticated weapons that the Russians routinely provide for the rebels,” as Max Boot notes, who also says that the Ukrainians are “urgent need of help right now.” Ashton Carter, President Obama’s newest Secretary of Defense (Carter was confirmed by the Senate this week), stated in his confirmation hearing that he was “strongly inclined” to support arming and equipping the Ukrainian military, and Secretary of State John Kerry reportedly told lawmakers that he was in favor of supplying lethal aid.

Russian-backed Separatists firing mortars at Ukrainian positions (AP)

In Foreign Affairs, Alexander Motyl writes that supporting Ukraine in bolstering its ability to defend itself (as well as building its economy) is essential, as it can be made into a counterweight against Russia. “Ukraine’s importance to the West is thus a function of U.S. and European relations with Russia,” Motyl writes. “In this case, the West would regard Ukraine as an ally similar in strategic importance to West Germany during the Cold War.” Far from being an unimportant state on Europe’s periphery that the West is supporting essentially for the sake of opposing Putin, Ukraine has the potential of becoming a vital ally.

Foreign Policy’s James Jeffery takes a different angle, saying that possible escalation by Putin due to arming Ukraine would actually be a positive development, as it would “force Putin into a less covert means of pursuing his aggression — which has both moral and diplomatic value.” For Jeffery, Putin must be convinced that the West is not going to just quit on Ukraine, and that he will not win just by dragging the conflict on. Roger Cohen of the New York Times sounds a similar tune, saying that “there is a language Moscow understands: antitank missiles, battlefield radars, reconnaissance drones. Bolster the Ukrainian Army with them and other arms. Change Putin’s cost-benefit analysis.”

Perhaps the most widely discussed argument in favor of arming Ukraine was authored by a number of prominent former American diplomatic and defense officials, including former Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, former NATO Supreme Commander Admiral James Stavridis, and former Undersecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy. The United States and Europe must do more, they say, as sanctions alone were not enough to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to change his act. The only way to do was, to them, is by “giving the Ukrainian military sufficient means to make further aggression so costly that Putin and the Russian army are deterred from escalating the fight.”

The arguments against arming Ukraine have been centered around the possibility of it leading to dramatic escalation by Putin, leading to only more violence and bloodshed. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy wrote in the New York Times that Putin “enjoys “escalation dominance” in Ukraine, meaning that “whatever move we make, he can match it and go further.” Hill and Gaddy go on to argue that arming Ukraine would only strengthen Putin’s case at home that he is “defending the Russian nation in Ukraine.”

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have gotten the “Israel Lobby” band back together, writing in separate pieces of their opposition to arming Ukraine. “What advocates of arming Ukraine fail to understand,” Mearsheimer argues, “is that Russian leaders believe their country’s core strategic interests are at stake in Ukraine; they are unlikely to give ground, even if it means absorbing huge costs.” Walt, for his part, derides those (meaning Pifer and company) believing that arming Ukraine will act as a deterrent of further Russian aggression, and that sending arms “certainly will not enable Ukraine to defeat the far stronger Russian army; it will simply intensify the conflict and add to the suffering of the Ukrainian people.”

Emergency personnel in Kramatorsk inspect a rocket launched by Separatists (Christopher Nunn)

Partisans on both sides of the argument agree that arming Ukraine will most likely make Putin distinctly unhappy, and even most supporters of supplying lethal weaponry acknowledge that it will probably lead to some sort of escalation.

Is It Worth It, Then?

First, to answer a few important questions. Does the Ukrainian military need the weapons? Certainly. What modern equipment it possessed has been largely destroyed or damaged, and the losses are slow in being replaced. Ukrainian troops have often complained of a lack of effective anti-tank weaponry, mostly being equipped with older Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) that are unable to do much damage to tanks equipped with Kontakt and other advanced armor systems. Russia is certainly sending modern equipment, including advanced anti-tank systems, counter-artillery radar and anti-air systems, and the Ukrainians could certainly use some of the same.

Will arming lead to escalation by Putin? Almost certainly, especially in the short term. If anything, it’s going to lead to a dramatic short term escalation to hit the Ukrainians as hard as possibly before any of the equipment reaches their shores.

So, the question becomes a classic “just because we can, does it mean we should” conundrum.

The answer is “no.” Not a firm, absolute “no,” more of a “no” because the cons just plain outweigh the pros. Everyone agrees that the Ukrainians are not going to defeat the Separatists and retake the East any time soon. They came close during the summer, and then Putin doubled-down on his support — tripled-down if you count sticking with the Separatists after the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17 — and sent in regular Russian troops to launch a counter-attack.

If the only solution is a diplomatic one, then would an arms supply regime, which would take weeks at best, make that much of an impact? There is little to no short-term positive effect (i.e., within three months) to be had, unless making Putin apoplectic with rage counts as a positive. Supplying arms is, in fact, an inherently long-term policy that will give no benefits to the Ukrainians on the ground now in Debaltseve or Peski. Add in the time it takes to get trained to use what is sent and the Ukrainians are looking at a significant amount of time before anything reaches the front lines.

There are those that say America must act tough in order to reassure allies that they can trust the United States. That if America doesn’t support Ukraine by sending weapons, countries and pro-U.S. movements may doubt their resolve. If friendship was measure in military aid received from the United States, then places like Egypt and Israel would be worshipping at the altar of America. Except they aren’t. Delivering lethal weaponry isn’t going to make Ukrainians rabidly pro-American. The honor and reputation of the United States of America are not at stake in this; no allies are going to jump ship because President Obama decides against sending lethal military aid to Ukraine.

That’s not to say that there isn’t more the United States and Europe can be doing. More so than small arms, tanks, artillery, and anti-tank missiles, Ukraine needs a new military. It needs a new army, air force, and navy. Not in the sense of new weaponry and equipment, but in total reformation of the Ukrainian military, in structure, personnel, and culture. Ukraine needs an entirely new defense establishment, from top to bottom and from bottom to top. It needs new political leadership in the Ministry of Defense, it needs a new General Staff, new senior officers, staff officers, small-unit level officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank and file soldiers. The Ukrainian military, as it exists today, is a decrepit and barely-functioning heap of scrap left over from the Soviet era. The handbooks need to rewritten, classes at military academies changed, new training methods created. This is where the United States and Europe come in. They need to provide the knowledge and support Ukraine needs to begin getting to work on reforming their military into something at least moderately capable of defending the country and asserting the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Ukrainian troops on guard at Debaltseve (AP)

The story of the Ukrainian throughout the conflict is one of repeated errors, inept leadership, and corruption within the bureaucracy. Sending weapons is not going to change that. There is no point in sending weapons that no one knows how to effectively use or the Ukrainian military leadership knows how to effectively deploy. 50,000 were called up as part of the last mobilization, but those who turn up will be put through an extremely basic month-and-change long training program. Much more is needed, and it’s not just as the lower levels of the ranks. They’re going to be sent to the front and commanded by leaders who seem to possess no meaningful strategy. The disaster at Illovaisk, the fall of Donetsk Airport, and the current debacle at Debaltseve are indicative of a culture of command that consistently fails to learn from its mistakes and adapt. The Ukrainian military just is not capable of prosecuting the conflict in the East, and needs significant amounts of help from the United States and Europe to get things together.

In the end, what Ukraine needs from the United States and Europe more than anything is help with its economy. Russia’s faltering economy has been getting all of the attention lately with its currency woes, but it’s distracted many from the fact that Ukraine’s economy is doing even worse. Petro Poroshenko’s government needs money, it needs a lot of it, and it needs it right about now. Short of outright war with Russia, nothing would show that the United States and Europe are firmly behind Ukraine like helping prop up their economy while they go through very painful reforms. The $40 billion IMF funding package that received preliminary approval on February 12th is going to do more for Ukraine than any weapons shipment would.

These two major issues are obviously also going to require long-term solutions. They are, however, more effective solutions that will do far more to get Ukraine standing on its on feet than simply sending weapons, having American and other NATO-member troops train Ukrainian soldiers, and perpetuating the culture of failure in the Ukrainian military.

The Minsk Reunion

(Left to Right) Putin, Hollande, Merkel, and Poroshenko (AP)

Against the backdrop of these battles, incidents, and debates, a new Minsk conference began meeting on the night of February 11th to try to create an agreement for a new ceasefire. The last Minsk Agreement, signed in early September, was dead on arrival, as the fighting never stopped. Even after months of intense battles up and down the line of contact, Western diplomats and politicians still spoke of a “return” to the Minsk Agreements, despite the fact that there was no possibility of this happening. Finally realizing the futility of this line of thinking, it was decided to reconvene and hash out another peace plan. President Poroshenko, French President Francois Hollande, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and President Putin are being hosted by Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko in what amounts to a last ditch-effort to put a lasting armistice in place.

It appears that they were successful. After more than 12 hours of talks throughout the night, President Putin addressed the media and announced that the parties had agreed (verbally, not signed) on to a ceasefire plan that is essentially a revamped version of September’s Minsk Agreement. A ceasefire is set to go into effect at midnight on Saturday, February 15th, but lingering doubts over what exactly to do about Ukrainian troops trapped in Debaltseve, and Separatist leaders announcing their intentions to march on Mariupol, have already put the ceasefires chances of success in doubt. However, all this ceasefire has to do is last a day and it will have been more successful than the previous Minsk Agreement.

Update: This post has been updated to reflect that Ashton Carter was confirmed by the Senate on Feb. 12, 2015, as Secretary of Defense.