Erdogan’s ability to re-structure Turkish Islamic politics and avoid the failures that doomed his predecessors demonstrated not only his political acumen but also his grasp of history. More recently, the experiences of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt bolstered his belief and those of many others that Islamist politicians throughout the region will continue to face stiff resistance from entrenched secular actors, and a circumspect western audience. For these reasons, the failure of Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) to effectively manage their image abroad demonstrates a serious lack of foresight that may be costly. While Erdogan was remarkably successful in the domestic media market, he finds himself with few international allies and as a result, he is internationally perceived as a ‘thug’ and a ‘dictator’. And while these labels are largely grounded in reality, what is remarkable is the absence of any meaningful defense aimed at western media markets.

The prime minister’s attitude towards diplomacy is well known. Not only has he repeatedly stated his dislike for diplomats in general, his embarrassing behavior at Davos in 2009 illustrated his inability to parse between domestic and international politics. While cheap political strategies like anti-Semitism may win votes in central Anatolia, such outbursts wear on Turkey’s image abroad. His continued use of similar rhetoric in the months following the Gezi Park protests has only increased the misgivings of his global audience.

Meanwhile, the Turkish government deploys Mr. Davutoglu, its foreign minister, to do damage control in the wake of the Prime Minister’s forays abroad. When Erdogan visited the Balkans and delivered a speech that fanned the flames of sectarianism in a region still recovering from a horrific sectarian civil war, it was Davutoglu who was rushed in to put out the fires and clarify that the Prime Minister didn’t actually mean what he said. Months later Erdogan was at it again, this time accusing Israel if internal meddling. Later he directed his ire at the United States, threatening the expulsion of the ambassador, Francis Ricciardone and once again the Turkish Ministry of Foreign affairs went into overdrive.

As one debacle after another drew negative attention to Turkey and its leading politician, the absence of a strategic public relations effort grew more apparent. Erdogan’s foreign image crisis is neither unique nor unanticipated. Other semi-authoritarian states find their image suffering for a multiplicity of reasons, and many like Turkey, are tied to their style of governance. It is for this reason that governments like Russia and Qatar invest hundreds of millions of dollars in media companies that are beholden to their leadership that can be relied on to counter negative publicity abroad and promote a positive image. These media organizations are usually the premier foreign language source of information in the country as is the case with RT in Russia and Al-Jazeera in Qatar. How successful these efforts are is a matter of debate, but their presence shows a certain savvy that seems to be lacking in the Turkish case. Even countries that skew more democratic and liberal make use of media projects that target foreign audiences as a soft-power technique. Voice of America and the BBC are to examples of this.

The one accessible pro-AKP English language paper in Turkey, Sabah was taken over by businessmen close to Erdogan but its English language arm (targeting non-Turks) is anemic. Online, Sabah is drowned out by other news sources that experience significantly higher traffic. While the Turkish government does make an effort to network with Turkish émigrés and at times uses them to promote Turkish causes, these efforts are minimal and nowhere on the scale necessary to affect international opinion. The Foreign Ministry meanwhile, serves a diplomatic mission that also has little to do with broad international public perceptions. Therefore, western audiences are forced to look elsewhere for stories on Turkey and here is where the picture gets even grimmer for Erdogan and his allies.

The most widely read English language newspaper in Turkey is the Daily Zamaan followed by the Hurriyet Daily News, which comes in a distant second. Neither of these papers is sympathetic towards the Erdogan regime. In fact, the Zamaan is downright hostile and the Hurriyet is only slightly more tactful in its promotion of a western looking secularism that is opposed to Erdogan’s brand of political Islam. In other words, both extremes of the political spectrum present the same negative picture, in English.

In the current schism that is turning into a political civil war between what was once a united Islamic front, the Zamaan is the rebel faction that the prime minister has accused of treason. Under these circumstances the Zamaan represents a propaganda boon for the Gulen Movement which is pitted against the AKP in the ongoing corruption scandals. For Erdogan, having the country’s largest English language news source dedicated to removing him from power represents a serious threat. The Hurriyet Daily News, which is delivered to foreign embassies across the country and widely read amongst expatriates, carries a similar tone making the English language media landscape overwhelmingly hostile towards Erdogan. Anyone who conducts the classic, ‘Erdogan is…’ Google test will realize just how much his international reputation has suffered recently. It is no wonder that he has taken to repeatedly lambasting these same organizations in his speeches.

In the area of informal medias, the picture is the same. While the AKP assembled a social media branch to counter negative publicity on the internet, its focus was primarily domestic. During the Gezi Park protests, the volume of twitter traffic relating to the event was overwhelmingly in favor of the protestors. Given transnational nature of such media, it is far more likely that foreign inquiry would have come into contact with anti-government content than pro-government. Later, when the prime minister castigated Twitter and Facebook, it further eroded his image abroad.

Erdogan’s political adversaries are also better at managing their reputations as the recent opening of the CHP offices (the main opposition party) in Washington DC demonstrate. In addition, the CHP were able to capitalize on the international coverage of Gezi Park by presenting themselves as the liberal democratic alternative.

Ultimately, all this may not matter to Erdogan, especially if his party maintains its electoral gains in the elections this March and he is able to continue consolidating power. It may be his eschewal of diplomacy and image management in favor of conservative rhetoric and power politics that endears him to his constituency. But that is a tenuous assumption, especially as foreign direct investment moves elsewhere along with investors’ confidence. In the end, Turks, like everyone else, vote with their pocket books as do investors and the international economy.