Series: The Wall Street Money Machine As investors left the housing market in the run-up to the meltdown, Wall Street sliced up and repackaged troubled assets based on those shaky mortgages, often buying those new packages themselves. That created fake demand, hid the banks’ real exposure, increased their bonuses — and ultimately made the mortgage crisis worse.

Two years before the financial crisis hit, Merrill Lynch confronted a serious problem. No one, not even the bank's own traders, wanted to buy the supposedly safe portions of the mortgage-backed securities Merrill was creating.

Bank executives came up with a fix that had short-term benefits and long-term consequences. They formed a new group within Merrill, which took on the bank's money-losing securities. But how to get the group to accept deals that were otherwise unprofitable? They paid them. The division creating the securities passed portions of their bonuses to the new group, according to two former Merrill executives with detailed knowledge of the arrangement.

The executives said this group, which earned millions in bonuses, played a crucial role in keeping the money machine moving long after it should have ground to a halt.

"It was uneconomic for the traders" -- that is, buyers at Merrill -- "to take these things," says one former Merrill executive with knowledge of how it worked.

Within Merrill Lynch, some traders called it a "million for a billion" -- meaning a million dollars in bonus money for every billion taken on in Merrill mortgage securities. Others referred to it as "the subsidy." One former executive called it bribery. The group was being compensated for how much it took, not whether it made money.

The group, created in 2006, accepted tens of billions of dollars of Merrill's Triple A-rated mortgage-backed assets, with disastrous results. The value of the securities fell to pennies on the dollar and helped to sink the iconic firm. Merrill was sold to Bank of America, which was in turn bailed out by taxpayers.

What became of the bankers who created this arrangement and the traders who took the now-toxic assets? They walked away with millions. Some still hold senior positions at prominent financial firms.

Washington is now grappling with new rules about how to limit Wall Street bonuses in order to better align bankers' behavior with the long-term health of their bank. Merrill's arrangement, known only to a small number of executives at the firm, shows just how damaging the misaligned incentives could be.

ProPublica has published a series of articles throughout the year about how Wall Street kept the money machine spinning. Our examination has shown that as banks faced diminishing demand for every part of the complex securities known as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, Merrill and other firms found ways to circumvent the market's clear signals.

The mortgage securities business was supposed to have a firewall against this sort of conflict of interest.

Banks like Merrill bought pools of mortgages and bundled them into securities, eventually making them into CDOs. Merrill paid upfront for the mortgages, but this outlay was quickly repaid as the bank made the securities and sold them to investors. The bankers doing these deals had a saying: We're in the moving business, not the storage business.

Executives producing the securities were not allowed to buy much of their own product; their pay was calculated by the revenues they generated. For this reason, decisions to hold a Merrill-created security for the long term were made by independent traders who determined, in essence, that the Merrill product was as good or better than what was available in the market.

By creating more CDOs, banks prolonged the boom. Ultimately the global banking system was saddled with hundreds of billions of dollars worth of toxic assets, triggering the 2008 implosion and throwing millions of people out of work and sending the global economy into a tailspin from which it has not yet recovered.

Executives who oversaw Merrill's CDO buying group dispute aspects of this account. One executive involved acknowledges that fees were shared, but says it was not a "formalized arrangement" and was instead done on a "case-by-case basis." Calling the arrangement bribery "is ridiculous," he says.

The executives also say the new group didn't drive Merrill's CDO production. In fact, they say the group was part of a plan to reduce risk by consolidating the unwanted assets into one place. The traders simply provided a place to put them. "We were managing and booking risk that was already in the firm and couldn't be sold," says one person who worked in the group.

A month before the group was created, Merrill Lynch owned $7.2 billion of the seemingly safe investments, according to an internal risk management report. By the time the CDO losses started mounting in July 2007, that figure had skyrocketed to $32.2 billion, most of which was held by the new group.

The origins of Merrill's crisis came at the beginning of 2006, when the bank's biggest customer for the supposedly safe assets -- the giant insurer AIG -- decided to stop buying the assets, known as "super-senior," after becoming worried that perhaps they weren't so safe after all.

The super-senior was the top portion of CDOs, meaning investors who owned it were the first to be compensated as homeowners paid their mortgages, and last in line to take losses should people become delinquent. By the fall of 2006, the housing market was dipping, and big insurance companies, pension funds and other institutional investors were turning away from any investments tied to mortgages.

Until that point, Merrill's own traders had been making money on purchases of super-senior debt. The traders were careful about their purchases. They would buy at prices they regarded as attractive and then make side bets -- what are known as hedges -- that would pay off if the value of the securities fell. This approach allowed the traders to make money for Merrill while minimizing the bank's risk.

It also was personally profitable. Annual bonuses for traders -- which can make up more than 75 percent of total compensation -- are largely based on how much money each individual makes for the firm.

By the middle of 2006, the Merrill traders who bought mortgage securities were often clashing with the powerful division, run by Harin De Silva and Ken Margolis, which created and sold the CDOs. At least three traders began to refuse to buy CDO pieces created by De Silva and Margolis' division, according to several former Merrill employees. (De Silva and Margolis didn't respond to requests for comment.)

In late September, Merrill created a $1.5 billion CDO called Octans, named after a constellation in the southern sky. It had been built at the behest of a hedge fund, Magnetar, and filled will some of the riskier mortgage-backed securities and CDOs. (As we reported in April with Chicago Public Radio's This American Life and NPR's Planet Money, Magnetar had helped create more than $40 billion worth of CDOs with a variety of banks, and bet against many of those CDOs as part of a strategy to profit from the decline in the housing market.)

In an incident reported by the Wall Street Journal ($) in April 2008, a Merrill trader looked over the contents of Octans and refused to buy the super-senior, believing that he should not be buying what no one else wanted. The trader was sidelined and eventually fired. (The same Journal article also reported that the new group had taken the majority of Merrill's super-seniors.)

The difficulty in finding buyers should have been a warning signal: If the market won't buy a product, maybe the bank should stop making it.

Instead, a Merrill executive, Dale Lattanzio, called a meeting, attended by among others the heads of the CDO sales group -- Margolis and De Silva -- and a trader, Ranodeb Roy. According to a person who attended the meeting, they discussed creating a special group under Roy to accept super-senior slices. (Lattanzio didn't respond to requests for comment.)

The head of the new group, Roy, had arrived in the U.S. early in the year, having spent his whole career in Asia. He had little experience either with the American capital markets or mortgages. His new unit was staffed with three junior people drawn from various places in the bank. The three didn't have the stature within the firm to refuse a purchase, and, more troubling, had little expertise in evaluating CDOs, former Merrill employees say.

Roy had reservations about purchasing the super-senior pieces. In August 2006, he sent a memo to Lattanzio warning that Merrill's CDO business was flawed. He wrote that holding super-senior positions disregarded the "systemic risk" involved.

When younger traders complained to him, Roy agreed it was unwise to retain the position. But he also told these traders that it was good for one's career to try to get along with people at Merrill, according to a former employee.

But Roy and his team needed to be paid. As they were setting up the trading group, Roy raised the issue of compensation. "The CDO guys said this helps our business and said don't worry about it -- we will take care of it," recalls a person involved in the discussions.

The agreement, according to a former executive with direct knowledge of it, generally worked like this: Each time Merrill's CDO salesmen created a deal, they shared part of the fee they generated with the special group that had been created to "buy" some of the CDO. A billion-dollar CDO generated about $7 million in fees for Merrill's CDO sales group. The new group that bought the CDO would usually be credited with a profit between $2 million and $3 million -- despite the fact that the trade often lost money.

Sharing the bonus money for a deal or trade is common on Wall Street, arrangements known as "soft P&L," for "profit and loss." But it is not typical, or desirable, to pay a group to do something against their financial interests or those of the bank.

Roy made about $6 million for 2006, according to former Merrill executives. He was promoted out of the group in May 2007, but then fired in November of that year. He now is a high-level executive for Morgan Stanley in Asia. The co-heads of Merrill's CDO sales group, Ken Margolis and Harin De Silva, pulled down about $7 million each in 2006, according to those executives. De Silva is now at the investment firm PIMCO.

By early summer 2007, many former executives now realize, Merrill was a dead firm walking. As the mortgage securities market imploded, high-level executives embarked on an internal investigation to get to the bottom of what had happened. It did not take them long to discover the subsidy arrangement.

Executives made a sweep of the firm to see if there were other similar deals. We "made a lot of noise" about the Roy subsidy to root out any other similarly troublesome arrangements, said one of the executives involved in the internal investigation. "I'd never seen it before and have never seen it again," he says.

In early October 2007, Merrill began to purge executives and, slowly, to reveal its losses. The heads of Merrill's fixed income group, including Dale Lattanzio, were fired.

Days later, the bank announced it would write down $5.5 billion worth of CDO assets. Less than three weeks after that, Merrill raised the estimate to $8.4 billion. Days later, the board fired Merrill's CEO, Stan O'Neal.

Eventually, Merrill would write down about $26 billion worth of CDOs, including most of the assets that Ranodeb Roy and his team had taken from De Silva and Margolis.

After Merrill revised its estimate of losses in October 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission began an investigation to discover if the firm's executives had committed securities fraud or misrepresented the state of its business to investors.

But then the financial crisis began in earnest. By March 2008, Bear Stearns had collapsed. By the fall of 2008, Merrill was sold to Bank of America. In a controversial move, Merrill paid bonuses out to its top executives despite its precarious state. The SEC turned its focus on Merrill and BofA's bonuses and sued, alleging failures to properly disclose the payments.

As for the original SEC probe into Merrill Lynch's CDO business in 2007, nothing ever came of it.

ProPublica research director Lisa Schwartz and Karen Weise contributed reporting to this story.