The Canes are a team in a hurry. A defensive hurry, the kind of hurry they would like to whip into a defensive cyclone for the opposition.

It is not often that the Chiefs are held try-less for the full 80 plus minutes of a match, but that is exactly what the Hurricanes achieved in their semi-final win in Wellington.

The signs are that the contest between the Lions’ high-tempo attack and the Canes’ rush defence will be one the most critical aspects of the Super rugby final. Whoever wins this battle will be odds-on to become the 2016 champion team.

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Rush defence represents something of a sea-change for New Zealand teams defensively, who have tended to trust either drift or up-and-out patterns historically.

The Hurricanes used their defensive pattern as a major weapon against a Chiefs side who like to score a lot of tries, and it will be interesting to see whether the Canes have been ‘trialling’ this scheme surreptitiously for the All Blacks in the forthcoming Rugby Championship!

In the course of the match, they accrued:

• Two interceptions. One was converted immediately by Beauden Barrett for a try, the other resulted in a clear scoring opportunity for Jason Woodward.

• Three forced kicking errors. Two Chiefs kicks went directly into touch as a result of defensive pressure, the other resulted in an easy ‘mark’ inside the Canes’ 22.

• One five-metre turnover scrum. The Canes forced the Chiefs to concede a scrum on their own goal-line with pressure on the second receiver.

• Turnover opportunities from play forced back inside. The Canes pressure on second receiver frequently forced the Chiefs back on an inside track, and into the teeth of their strong work at the breakdown.

The following reel illustrates the basic structural themes of the Hurricanes’ defence.

Upfield rush – focus on second receiver

The main idea is for all players in the defensive line to rush directly upfield with a minimal turn-out toward the sideline. The opposition second receiver is targeted especially, as the second pass gives the defence more opportunity to develop its line-speed and generate a ferocious ‘rolling wave’.



The attack on the second pass has some concrete results in the reel. At 46:11, when the Chiefs attempt the ball-in-behind right on their own goal-line, the shoulders of Canes #13 Matt Proctor are turned towards the passer, and as soon as the pass is released he drives straight forward on to second receiver Damian McKenzie.

The theme is exactly the same on Beauden Barrett’s interception try at 34:10. Barrett doesn’t come up, stop and then look to drift out. His shoulders are turned in towards the ball-carrier, and the upfield rush comes on straight ahead without any break in momentum – keyed by Sam Cane’s delivery of the second pass.

The Canes like to bring this pressure well into phase play, as Ricky Riccitelli’s tackle on his opposite number Nathan Harris illustrates:









When Riccitelli makes the hit, both the Chiefs’ principal support players are ahead of the ball, and the Canes’ #6 and #3 are well-placed to drive forward on to the ball and counter-ruck for the turnover.

Defensive play on the edge

With the defensive pressure building on the second pass, the wing or end defender has to stay tight rather than attempt to cover the width of the field. So #11 Jason Woodward stays tight to the rusher Beauden Barrett at 16:28 and 30:12, leaving an attacker spare outside him.





When the ball goes to the edge at 15:19 with a floated pass, the Canes’ wing Cory Jane does not try to turn out and cover the attacker outside him (James Lowe), instead keeping his shoulders squared upfield and ‘eyes in’ on the passer. He is looking to infiltrate the gap between the passer and receiver – in this case Jane successfully makes the interception before offloading to Woodward to set up a good scoring chance for the left wing.



The inside force-back

If he cannot make an interception or take man-and-ball together, the defender opposite second receiver tries to force the play back inside and block out the wide option.

At 16:25, Barrett forces Anton Lienert-Brown step back inside and straight into the jackal of Willis Halaholo, who I believe should have been awarded a penalty for his efforts. At 30:12 it is Aaron Cruden who is forced back into a dominant hit by Ardie Savea with a fumble turning the ball over to the Canes. Two massive hits by Vaea Fifita repeat the dose at 56:33.

In all these examples the Chiefs attack is turned back inside, and into a succession of vicious frontal tackles and improved shots at the jackal turnover as the breakdown sets.

Attacking the ‘T-Bone’ shape in midfield

One of the most common attacking shapes in New Zealand rugby, both at provincial and All Black level, is the ‘T-Bone’. Typically it features a ball-carrying second row in between two props, with a back sitting directly behind to transfer the ball wide to the far touch-line when the situation allows.

The Canes’ defensive pattern is very aggressive in this scenario, with a blitz by the first back on the far side shutting down the play out wide:







The ball never gets to the far side-line in any of these instances, which means that the Hurricanes have effectively denied a major attacking option for a side that specialises in using the full width of the field offensively.

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The second reel hints at some of the answers to the questions posed by the Canes defensive pattern:

You don’t get anything for nothing in the professional world of rugby, and there is a trade-off with the more aggressive defensive systems such as the one employed by the Hurricanes. The tackle completion rate tends to be substantially less than in safer, drift-based patterns (the Canes missed 23 tackles in the game for an 84% completion rate), and the number of clean breaks given up also tends to be higher (15 clean breaks by the Chiefs with 23 defenders beaten). So frequently the stats look ‘ragged’ and below par.

Two of the principal reasons for this are:

• Less margin for error. The individual tackler has less room for error when rushing up, chiefly because he cannot ‘set’ and has less time to get his angles right (see Proctor’s miss on Lienert-Brown at 74:00 and Vito’s on McKenzie at 42:22)

• Defenders caught on the wrong side. There are more defenders playing past the ball, and on the wrong side if the play breaks inside them (both centres on the wrong side of Aaron Cruden at 41:03, three Canes defenders on the wrong side of Cruden at 49:33). These defenders are essentially out of play.

Is the space on the outside real or apparent?

The space on the outside can often be more apparent than real in this pattern, although the scrambling defence has to work extremely hard to plug any leaks on the edge. At 41:08 and 66:20, the outside attackers find themselves in space on the right but the Hurricanes #9 and #15 work hard to shut them down; from the first phase scrum at 58:25 the last two backs (#11 Woodward and #15 Tom Marshall) are beaten, only for Ardie Savea to fold in behind them and take wing Tony Pulu down.

These represent risks the defence is happy to take in order to get positive pressure from the rush on other occasions. It’s an acceptable trade-off, although the increased amount of aerobic work can mean that the defence wears down more quickly in the final quarter.

Manipulating the inside defence. A more reliable approach is to develop methods to manipulate the inside defence as it works harder to fill the larger spacings created by a fast rush. At 20:45, the Canes’ #1 Lonnie Uhila picks the wrong attacker to rush on to, opening a gap for Damian McKenzie.



McKenzie is also the key runner on the out-to-in first phase ‘buttonhook’ move at 42:21, while the sequence at 49:30 shows Cruden making the half-break from first receiver and exploiting the Canes’ defenders who have over-run the play outside him.

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Summary

The Hurricanes have opted to sharpen up the aggression on defence this season and it paid definite dividends in the semi-final against the Chiefs. This is one scenario where the key stat (the number of tries conceded) has to be valued more highly than the rather average readout for the tackle completion rate and number of line-breaks conceded.

The Canes maintained a psychological stranglehold on the Chiefs offence throughout the game and realised the importance of forcing them to advance by threes rather than by fives or sevens on the scoreboard. The Chiefs did not answer effectively with their kicking game and dropped deeper and deeper with ball in hand as the game wore on.

Can they do the same to the Lions? I believe it will be more difficult as the Lions have more powerful forward ball-carriers (plus Rohan Janse van Rensburg) who can work effectively off their #9 Faf de Klerk without needing to risk the second pass. Elton Jantjies’ expertise on the cross-kick is another threat to the narrow Canes’ wing or end defender.

It promises to be a much closer, more intense contest.