0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940

Memorandum for the Director



Subject: Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and

Recommendations for Action by the United States.



1. The United States today finds herself confronted

by a hostile Germany and Italy in Europe and by an equally

hostile Japan in the Orient. Russia, the great land link between

these two groups of hostile powers, is at present neutral, but

in all probability favorably inclined towards the Axis powers,

and her favorable attitude towards these powers may be expected

to increase in direct proportion to increasing success in their

prosecution of the war in Europe. Germany and Italy have been

successful in war on the continent of Europe and all of Europe

is either under their military control or has been forced into

subservience. Only the British Empire is actively opposing by

war the growing world dominance of Germany and Italy and their

satellites.



2. The United States at first remained coolly aloof

from the conflict in Europe and there is considerable evidence

to support the view that Germany and Italy attempted by every

method within their power to foster a continuation of American

indifference to the outcome of the struggle in Europe. Paradoxically,

every success of German and Italian arms has led to further

increases in United States sympathy for and material support of

the British Empire, until at the present time the United States

government stands committed to a policy of rendering every

support short of war the changes rapidly increasing that

the United States will become a full fledged ally of the British

Empire in the very near future. The final failure of German

and Italian diplomacy to keep the United States in the role of

a disinterested spectator has forced them to adopt the policy of

developing threats to U.S. security in other spheres of the world,

notably by the threat of revolutions in South and Central America

by Axis-dominated groups and by the stimulation of Japan to further

aggressions and threats in the Far East in the hope that by these

mean the Unites States would become so confused in thought

and fearful of her own immediate security as to cause her to

become so preoccupied in purely defensive preparations as to

virtually preclude U.S. aid to Great Britain in any form. As a

result of this policy, Germany and Italy have lately concluded

a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States

If the published terms of this treaty and the pointed

utterances of German, Italian and Japanese leaders can be believed,

and there seems no ground on which to doubt either, the three

totalitarian powers agree to make war on the United States,

should she come to the assistance of England, or should she

attempt to forcibly interfere with Japan's aims in the Orient and,

[2]

furthermore, Germany and Italy expressly reserve the right to

determine whether American aid to Britain, short of war, is a

cause for war or not after they have succeeded in defeating

England. In other words, after England has been disposed of

her enemies will decide whether or not to immediately proceed

with an attack on the United States. Due to geographic conditions,

neither Germany nor Italy are in a position to offer any

material aid to Japan. Japan, on the contrary, can be of much

help to both Germany and Italy by threatening and possibly even

attacking British dominions and supply routes from Australia,

India and the Dutch East Indies, thus materially weakening

Britain's position in opposition to the Axis powers in Europe.

In exchange for this service, Japan receives a free hand to seize

all of Asia that she can find it possible to grab, with the

added promise that Germany and Italy will do all in their power

to keep U.S. attention so attracted as to prevent the United

States from taking positive aggressive action against Japan.

Here again we have another example of the Axis-Japanese

diplomacy which is aimed at keeping American power immobilized,

and by threats and alarms to so confuse American thought as to

preclude prompt decisive action by the United States in either

sphere of action. It cannot be emphasized to strongly that

the last thing desired by either the Axis powers in Europe

or by Japan in the Far East is prompt, warlike action by the

United States in either theatre of operations.



3. An examination of the situation in Europe leads

to the conclusion that there is little that we can do now,

immediately to help Britain that is not already being done.

We have no trained army to send to the assistance of England,

nor will we have for at least a year. We are now trying to

increase the flow of materials to England and to bolster the

defense of England in every practicable way and this aid will

undoubtedly be increased. On the other hand, there is little

that Germany or Italy can do against us as long as England

continues in the war and her navy maintains control of the

Atlantic. The one danger to our position lies in the possible

early defeat of the British Empire with the British Fleet falling

intact into the hands of the Axis powers. The possibility of

such an event occurring would be materially lessened were we

actually allied in war with the British or at the very least

were taking active measures to relieve the pressure on Britain

in other spheres of action. To sum up: the threat to our security

in the Atlantic remains small so long as the British Fleet

remains dominant in that ocean and friendly to the United States.



4. In the Pacific, Japan by virtue of her alliance

with Germany and Italy is a definite threat to the security

of the British Empire and once the British Empire is gone the

power of Japan-Germany and Italy is to be directed against the

United States. A powerful land attack by Germany and Italy

through the Balkans and North Africa against the Suez Canal

with a Japanese threat or attack on Singapore would have very

serious results for the British Empire. Could Japan be diverted

or neutralized, the fruits of a successful attack on the Suez

Canal could not be as far reaching and beneficial to the Axis

powers as if such a success was also accompanied by the virtual

elimination of British sea power from the Indian Ocean, thus

[3]

opening up a European supply route for Japan and a sea route for

Eastern raw materials to reach Germany and Italy, Japan must be

diverted if the British and American ( ) blockade of Europe

and possibly Japan (?) is to remain even partially in effect.



5. While as pointed out in Paragraph (3) there is

little that the United States can do to immediately retrieve

the situation in Europe, the United States is able to effectively

nullify Japanese aggressive action, and do it without lessening

U.S. material assistance to Great Britain.



6. An examination of Japan's present position as

opposed to the United States reveals a situation as follows:



Advantages Disadvantages



1. Geographically strong position 1. A million and a half men

of Japanese Islands. engaged in an exhausting war

on the Asiatic Continent.

2. A highly centralized strong 2. Domestic economy and food

capable government. supply severely straightened.



3. Rigid control of economy on 3. A serious lack of sources of

a war basis. raw materials for war. Notably

oil, iron and cotton.

4. A people inured to hardship 4. Totally cut off from supplies

and war. from Europe.

5. A powerful army. 5. Dependent upon distant overseas

routes for essential supplies.

6. A skillful navy about 2/3 6. Incapable of increasing

the strength of the U.S. Navy. manufacture and supply of war

materials without free access

to U.S. or European markets.

7. Some stocks of raw materials. 7. Major cities and industrial

centers extremely vulnerable

to air attack.

8. Weather until April rendering

direct sea operations in the

vicinity of Japan difficult.



7. In the Pacific the United States possesses a very strong

defensive position and a navy and naval air force at present

in that ocean capable of long distance offensive operation. There

are certain other factors which at the present time are strongly

in our favor, viz:



A. Philippine Islands still held by the United States.

B. Friendly and possibly allied government in control

of the Dutch East Indies.

C. British still hold Hong Kong and Singapore and

are favorable to us.

D. Important Chinese armies are still in the field

in China against Japan.

E. A small U.S. Naval Force capable of seriously

threatening Japan's southern supply routes

[4]

already in the theatre of operations.

F. A considerable Dutch naval force is in the

Orient that would be of value if allied to U.S.



8. A consideration of the foregoing leads to the

conclusion that prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by

the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any

help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England and that

Japan itself would be faced with a situation in which her navy

could be forced to fight on most unfavorable terms or accept

fairly early collapse of the country through the force of blockade.

A prompt and early declaration of war after entering into suitable

arrangements with England and Holland, would be most effective

in bringing about the early collapse of Japan and thus eliminating

our enemy in the pacific before Germany and Italy could strike

at us effectively. Furthermore, elimination of Japan must surely

strengthen Britain's position against Germany and Italy and, in

addition, such action would increase the confidence and support

of all nations who tend to be friendly towards us.



9. It is not believed that in the present state of

political opinion the United States government is capable of

declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely

possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the

Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following

course of action is suggested:



A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of

British bases in the Pacific, particularly

Singapore.

B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of

base facilities and acquisition of supplies

in the Dutch East Indies.

C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government

of Chiang-Kai-Shek.

D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to

the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.

E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.

F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in

the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.

G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese

demands for undue economic concessions,

particularly oil.

H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan,

in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed

by the British Empire.



10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an

overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully

prepared to accept the threat of war.



A. H. McCollum

CC-0p-16

0p-16-F

File

[5]

0p-16-F-2 ON1 7 October 1940

Summary

1. The United States is faced by a hostile combination of

powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific.



2. British naval control of the Atlantic prevents hostile

action against the United States in this area.



3. Japan's growing hostility presents an attempt to open sea

communications between Japan and the Mediterranean by an

attack on the British lines of communication in the

Indian Ocean.



4. Japan must be diverted if British opposition in Europe is

to remain effective.



5. The United States naval forces now in the Pacific are

capable of so containing and harassing Japan as to nullify

her assistance to Germany and Italy.



6. It is to the interest of the United States to eliminate

Japan's threat in the Pacific at the earliest opportunity

by taking prompt and aggressive action against Japan.



7. In the absence of United States ability to take the

political offensive, additional naval force should be

sent to the orient and agreements entered into with Holland

and England that would serve as an effective check against

Japanese encroachments in South-eastern Asia.

[6]

Comment by Captain Knox



It is unquestionably to out general interest

that Britain be not licked - just now she has a stalemate

and probably cant do better. We ought to make it certain

that she at least gets a stalemate. For this she will probably

need from us substantial further destroyers and air reinforcements

to England. We should not precipitate anything in the

Orient that should hamper our ability to do this - so long as

probability continues.



If England remains stable, Japan will be cautious

in the Orient. Hence our assistance to England in the Atlantic

is also protection to her and us in the Orient.



However, I concur in your courses of action

we must be ready on both sides and probably strong enough

to care for both.

D.W.K.

Re your #6: - no reason for battleships not

visiting west coast in bunches.

