So Silvio Berlusconi says that Germany is "a hegemonial state that … dictated to the other European countries the rules of rigour and austerity". Big surprise. The guy is planning a comeback, and Germany-bashing always goes down well in Italy.

Remember when Berlusconi assumed the presidency of the EU in 2003? He used his first appearance before the European parliament to attack the German MEP Martin Schulz, saying he would recommend Schulz for the role of a Nazi concentration camp commander in an upcoming second world war film. A week later, Berlusconi's secretary of state for tourism criticised the "uniform supernationalistic blondes" – German tourists – who "loudly invade" Italy's beaches every summer.

The background to that round of anti-Teutonic fervour was also internal Italian politics, namely Berlusconi's legal woes.

The problem with Berlusconi's latest outburst is that – and I never thought I'd say this – he is in part right. Not about Germany's hegemony. We'll get to that. But when he says that it is an illusion to think "that austerity leads to debt reduction", Berlusconi has a point, as he does when saying that "public debt diminishes when GDP increases, which means development and growth". And he is also right to criticise his successor, Mario Monti, for caving in on labour market reform, which would be key to increasing Italy's competitiveness.

But what about this German "diktat"? Is Germany dictating austerity policies to other countries? Are national budgets now decided in Berlin? I might have been inclined to agree with Berlusconi before the French presidential election, the European summit of 28 June and Mario Draghi's announcement that the European Central Bank is ready to buy unlimited amounts of eurozone government bonds.

At the June summit, François Hollande, Mario Monti and Spain's Mariano Rajoy faced down Angela Merkel and got her to agree that next to structural budget cuts a big dollop of Keynesian stimulus is needed to get the eurozone moving again. Then came Draghi's "bazooka" and Germany's ratification of the European stability mechanism (ESM) with €700bn-worth of funds, €190bn courtesy of the German taxpayer.

As a result, the management of the debt crisis and the "economic governance" of the eurozone are now off the hands of national governments – including the one in Berlin. They are in the hands of three unelected officials: the bosses of the ECB, the ESM and the European commission. The European parliament has been sidelined. As has the council.

Draghi says that in order to qualify for the ECB's debt-buying programme, governments will have to apply for ESM aid and submit to the ESM's conditions. But since the June summit there is reason to suppose that the ESM will not impose very harsh conditions – why should they? The ECB, after all, is ready and waiting with its bazooka. The eurozone, in short, will try to inflate its way out of the crisis with Anglo-Saxon style "quantitative easing". So much for the German "diktat".

Merkel has got the opposite of what she wanted: the euro is now on the path to becoming a soft currency, as the French always hoped it would be. The Maastricht treaty is dead. Inflation is the new eurobonds. This is how Germany is paying for its vast current account surplus.

So, should Germany leave the euro, as some commentators in Britain and the US and German populists are suggesting? I can't help pointing out that Anglo-Saxon columnists just might be a weeny bit nationally biased, as a return to the deutschmark could price German exports out of the market. One of the nasty secrets about the euro is that the money German taxpayers fork out to keep the currency afloat is an export subsidy for German industry. Yet the idea that Germany leaving the eurozone would somehow benefit the southern Europeans is far-fetched, if not plain loony.

The rump euro would devaluate as the deutschmark rose, making not only German goods but almost all imports unaffordable to consumers. Fearing further devaluation, investors would pull out of government bonds, causing governments to default. Germany, on the other hand, would do what it has always done: concentrate on quality that people are willing to pay for, rationalise production, keep wages low and so on. In other words, pursue the mercantilist policy that is part of the current problem, concentrating on northern and eastern Europe, China, and the US rather than the Mediterranean basket cases. After a couple of hard years, Germany would be back, leaner and meaner than before.

Quite frankly, the new, soft euro – precisely because it makes German goods cheaper – is poison to that fabled German work ethic and innovative spirit. Vorsprung durch an undervalued currency? Not for very long.

Historical reasons mean that Germany can't exit the euro, period. The common currency was, after all, the price Helmut Kohl paid to get François Mitterrand's backing for German unification. Mitterrand thought this would give France some control over the economic giant next door. For a while, it looked as though he had blundered. But now it's Kohl who's got egg on his face. If there's one European instinct you can count on, it's clubbing together to keep the Germans down.