Minxin Pei maintains that 2019 has been an “annus horribilis” for Presiden Xi Jinping, and prospects for 2020 may well be “worse.” He says the Chinese leader has only himself to blame. Since Xi took office in 2013, his country has descended into authoritarianism. Last year, China’s constitution was amended to abolish the two-term limit on Xi’s tenure, allowing him to remain in office indefinitely. Apparently it was not enough. He also aspires, like Mao, to immerse citizens in his political philosophy, now officially known as “Xi Jinping thought”.

The author says tensions with the US are far from over despite reaching a partial trade deal last week. The – phase one – deal resets the terms of a nearly $700 billion trans-Pacific trade flow in Trump’s “America First” standoff with China. However, critics in the US complained that resolving the most damaging Chinese trade practices had been left to future talks. “The technology war – and the broader confrontation between the two powers – will continue.”

Xi has suffered major setbacks in 2019. Ominously he warned a gathering of senior Communist Party officials in January that China faced a raft of urgent economic and political risks, and told them to be on guard especially for “indolence, incompetence and becoming divorced from the public.” His warning seemed prescient. Critics blame him for mishandling the crisis in Hong Kong, while condemning his government’s repression of the Uighur Muslim minority in the far western region of Xinjiang.

Last month Beijing suffered an utter humiliation, when local council elections in Hong Kong saw record turnout – nearly three million voters delivered an unprecedented landslide victory for pro-democracy candidates. They won 388 of the 452 contested seats, ejecting pro-Beijing politicians, who had control over the city. The author says, “at this point, a crackdown reminiscent of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre would be likely to backfire, leaving Xi with few options.”

On November 16, The New York Times published 403 pages of sensitive Communist Party documents, which dealt a “serious blow” to Xi, linking him to China’s mass incarceration of ethnic minorities – particularly Uighur Muslims – in detention camps in Xinjiang. The exposure represents one of the largest ever data leaks from inside the Chinese government, where only “insiders had access to such sensitive materials,” that provide a rare window into the secretive policy decisions.

The author does not doubt that “Xi’s political enemies may have deliberately leaked them to the Western press in order to undermine his international standing.” According to the Times, the documents were leaked by a "member of the Chinese political establishment" who wanted to make sure that Xi and other senior officials do not escape culpability for their policy. Xi’s bold move in 2018 to amend the constitution, changing the longstanding rules of succession to rule for life, had no doubt angered many within the Communist Party, who also want to take the helm of the country.

Not only does Taiwan grant asylum to dozens of pro-democracy activists from Hong Kong, President Tsai Ing-wen, a thorn in Beijing's side, enjoys a more than 55% approval rating a month before her bid for re-election. Last year saw her popularity plunge to 24%. But since she openly voices her support for the protests in Hong Kong, and defends Taiwan from a pro-Beijing “stooge who would accept a ‘one country, two systems’ model,” Tsai now “seems set to secure a landslide victory” next month. Xi is “losing his grip” in Taiwan as well.

According to the author, “China’s collective leadership, however corrupt and indecisive, managed to limit the escalation of these crises, thanks largely to their aversion to risk. For example, when more than a half-million people in Hong Kong protested against a proposed national security law in 2003, the Chinese government immediately agreed to its withdrawal.”

But Xi, an authoritarian leader, rules with an iron fist. As he has “concentrated political power in his own hands, however, decision-making has been transformed. Those hoping to influence policy must gain access to Xi himself, and they have every incentive to cherry-pick information to support his preferences. Likewise, Xi’s colleagues on the Politburo Standing Committee, fearful of appearing disloyal, are loath to share information that may contradict his view. They know that proposing an alternate approach could be seen as a direct challenge to Xi’s authority.”

Due to his “intolerance of dissent and vulnerability to bad information" his government is "much more prone to policy blunders." What makes matters worse is that, "because a strongman must maintain an image of virtual infallibility, even demonstrably ineffective or counterproductive policies are unlikely to be reversed.”

There is fear that China would descend into chaos, should there be a political turmoil following Xi's removal as a result of power struggle. Fearing the demise of the communist regime, like the collapse of the Soviet Union, Xi is determined not to loosen his grip on power.