Match date: 8 November 2014

There is little introduction needed for this match. This was the exact fixture, Liverpool at home to Chelsea, that effectively ended Liverpool’s chances at winning their 19th title. Steven Gerrard’s slip was made famous and Manchester City went on to win the English Premier League. Just a few months on from that, Liverpool find themselves needing points, while Chelsea are comfortably at the top of the table.

Brendan Rodgers made significant changes to his starting XI against Real Madrid in preparation for this match, with the likes of Gerrard, Lovren, Henderson, Coutinho, Sterling, Johnson, and Balotelli left out. All seven were back in the starting XI against Chelsea, with Can, Skrtel, and Mignolet keeping their places in what started as a 4-3-3 for Liverpool.

Mourinho and Chelsea have yet to lose a match in any competition so far this season. Mourinho started with what is close to his best available starting XI and set them out in a 4-2-3-1.

Liverpool Control Midfield For Much of First Half

The opening ten minutes of the match were dominated by Liverpool and as a result, they scored early through a deflected effort by Emre Can. Chelsea’s respond to the goal was certainly a good one, as they were able to equalise in just a matter of minutes, but their best spells of play in the first half came from very direct play, bypassing the likes of Matic and Fabregas in midfield and looking to play into Diego Costa, who had a good game against Skrtel and Lovren, as quickly as possible. Aside from Chelsea’s more direct play when they were in possession of the ball, there were a few factors that led to Liverpool’s ability to win that particular area of the field.

When Liverpool were looking to build out of the back, Oscar, who was playing behind Diego Costa as a number 10 (a very industrious number 10), would support Costa in his pressure. Costa would usually push to Skrtel and so Oscar would push to Lovren as you can see below.

This left Chelsea open in midfield. You can see above that Gerrard is about to split Costa and Oscar and had no pressure on him because Henderson and Can were able to push Matic and Fabregas deep. This isn’t the first time there has been a disconnect in Chelsea’s midfield when playing against a 4-3-3. Against Manchester United, the same situation occurred with Daley Blind. Oscar and, in that case, Drogba would press to the Manchester United centre backs and goalkeeper, allowing space for Blind to receive and turn into as Fellaini and Mata were able to push Matic and Fabregas deep.

The screenshot above was taken from the build up play by Liverpool prior to Can’s goal. The ball eventually makes it way to Gerrard, who plays it Henderson, bypassing Oscar and Costa. Henderson shifted his body well to get by Fabregas and was able to play Sterling into a huge amount of space, with Moreno opening it up with a run on the left, and Matic left between Sterling and Can. This is where the problem was for Chelsea in the first half. Far too many times, the amount of space that Matic was left to cover on his own was far to big. Below you can see Sterling on the ball and Can inside the centre circle. Matic is caught between the two and Sterling dribbles at him, engaging the Serbian, and then passes to Can who takes his space and gives Liverpool a 1-0 lead.

Even when Chelsea were well organised; everyone behind the ball, in their 4-2-3-¼-4-2 shape, Liverpool were still able to control the midfield because they were able to get numbers up through the movement of Coutinho. The Brazilian started on the right side of the 4-1-4-¼-3-3, but consistently came inside, which caused Chelsea considerable problems because they were then three against four and Coutinho was able to engage and beat the Chelsea midfielders on the dribble, opening up space for himself and creating chances. Soon after Chelsea scored their equaliser, Coutinho found space twice and tried to play Sterling in, who was making runs from the left, played Balotelli in, who scored but was offside, and had a shot of his own parried into the path of Ivanovic by Courtois.

Can’s running was essential as well. With the direct dribbling of the German and Coutinho, as well as Henderson’s off the ball movement, Fabregas and Matic were consistently forced out of position.

Chelsea Begin To Dominate

At another the 30 minute mark, Chelsea began to get a hold on the game. This was down to two things: Liverpool began to drop a bit deeper and were caught too often on the ball and forced into making poor passes as a result of (the second) Chelsea’s more precise pressing and tackling. Up until 30 minutes in, Liverpool were easily able to bypass Chelsea’s lines of pressure. The Chelsea midfield three were disconnected from themselves, which caused a huge hole when Matic and Fabregas were deep and when Oscar was high. However, as the half hour mark came, they began to look more compact. Matic and Fabregas began to support the Costa and Oscar when Liverpool tried to build out of the back and they did well to stop the Merseyside club from doing so. When Liverpool did get out, they were forced to the left by Chelsea meaning Ramires could at least stay with Moreno, rather than test Hazard’s defensive qualities on the right with Coutinho.

Chelsea’s play going forward caught Liverpool out of shape far too often. There were times when Liverpool would have four or five players around Matic and Fabregas attempting to win the ball back, leaving them extremely narrow and light at the back, which allowed Chelsea to see the influence of Hazard and Diego Costa begin to rise. The Belgian, in particular, was a huge threat as Johnson was sluggish defensively and there seemed to be hesitation about getting a tackle in on Hazard, perhaps with Liverpool’s defenders fearing conceding a set piece, which they can’t seem to defend. Hazard was able to get into the Liverpool penalty area frequently, with all five of his shots coming from inside the Liverpool penalty area.

At this point, it was Liverpool that looked incredibly stretched as they got numbers forward and when they lost the ball, tried to get too many numbers around the ball to win it back rather than having a more structured press where one or two press and passing lanes are cut off. Chelsea were able to play direct with Costa, Ramires, and Hazard as outlets. Hazard, and Azpilicueta in the build up to Chelsea’s second goal, were able to find a lot of space on the right side of Liverpool’s defense, as Coutinho would drift inside and a lot of Liverpool’s play went through Moreno, meaning Johnson would shift over to help cover for the full backs. When Chelsea got possession of the ball, it allowed them to quickly look for Hazard and Azpilicueta on the left in one versus one situations.

Rodgers’ Team, Changes, Plan B

There were question marks surrounding Rodgers’ starting XI selection as soon as the team news came out. Kolo Toure’s absence was a highlight considering how well the Ivorian had played against Real Madrid in the midweek game and how poorly Lovren’s form has been lately. Johnson’s inclusion was another that raised questions as his form has also been poor over the recent weeks and either did themselves or Rodgers much justice with their performance. Both Johnson and Lovren’s distribution out of the back was poor throughout the match and their decision making defensively was questionable. At one point Lovren tried to lift the ball over Costa’s head during a 1v1 near the touchline only for the Chelsea forward to win the ball and then turn Lovren far too easily. Johnson was consistently slow in closing out Hazard and on Chelsea’s second goal, should have gotten into a covering position for Coutinho before Azpilicueta was able to get around the Brazilian, but was instead laboured in his recovery.

Rodgers’ changes were interesting as well. The first two came after Costa put Chelsea up 2-1; with Joe Allen on for Can and Fabio Borini for Coutinho. The substitutes played well. Allen used his body to retain the ball really well when pressured by Willian and Oscar twice on the left side of Liverpool’s attack and moved the ball well going forward and Borini was lively in and around the Chelsea penalty area. However, during their time on the pitch, Coutinho and Can were arguably Liverpool’s two best players. Both showed that they could break the lines on the dribble and with their passing and were the only ones, with the inclusion of Sterling as well, that looked comfortable taking a risk going forward.

The final change for Liverpool was Lambert for Balotelli. At this stage of the game, Chelsea were winning 2-1 and had dropped deeper, allowing Liverpool to put them under a considerable amount of pressure. However, when intricate play around the area wasn’t working, Liverpool resorted to looking for crossing opportunities. In the final 30 minutes of the match, after Chelsea scored their second goal, Liverpool crossed the ball more than they had in the preceding hour of the match.

Conclusion

Chelsea were certainly on the back foot for the opening stages of the match as their back line and Matic weren’t comfortable moving up the pitch when Oscar and Costa pressed, allowing Liverpool to take control of the midfield space. As the match went on, Chelsea were able to begin dictating Liverpool’s play down the sides, the left in particular, and it allowed them to catch Liverpool out of their defensive shape.

Rodgers’ substitutions were questionable. He took off two of his best players and certainly the best creator in the starting XI in Coutinho while Liverpool were chasing the game and the ‘Plan B’ was to see if Rickie Lambert could win a header over Cahill and Terry to equalise for Liverpool. This has been a testing week for Liverpool and there will certainly be questions raised about the regular inclusion of players like Lovren, Johnson, and Gerrard in the starting XI.