Date : 03/02/2016

Venue : Stadio Giuseppe Meazza

Competition : Serie A 2015/2016, Matchday 23

The starting line ups:

The absentee from the bench Roberto Mancini selected, as always, Samir Handanovic under the posts, behind a defensive line of four that consisted of Alex Telles, Jeison Murillo, Miranda and Nagatomo. Gary Medel was protecting the defense with Marcelo Brozovic and Geoffrey Kondogbia in front of him as CMs. Mauro Icardi, Rodrigo Palacio and Edere created the attacking trio.

Rolando Maran, on the other bench, chose to field his side on a 4-3-1-2. Seculin made his debut in Serie A under the goal posts. He had Frey, Spolli, Cesar and Gobbi in front of him. Radovanovic was the DM, with Pinzi and Rigoni the two CMs. Birsa was the trequartista with Inglese and Pellissier as the two Forwards up front.

Inter



Inter’s front three

What was interesting in terms of Inter’s front three, was that during the first half they did not play in the usual winger-striker-winger positioning, like in a 4-3-3, but all three were staying centrally instead. Their positioning was not resembling that of a 4-3-2-1 either, as in the game against Hellas Verona, when Ljajic and Perisic were moving in the spaces between the lines and behind Icardi. Rather than that, all three stayed centrally, with one of Palacio and Eder moving closer to the ball, to combine with the CMs of the FBs.

In transition, the same movements happened with the difference that the two forwards not moving closer to the ball, were occupying positions next to the Chievo FBs, in order to stretch the defense and also be in close proximity to the goal for when in need to make a run behind the defense.

The very narrow positioning of the front three of course, together with the narrow defensive shape that Chievo utilized meant that Nagatomo and Telles were the ones that gave offensive width to Inter’s attack and had always loads of space to run into and cross the ball.

Defense

On defense, during the very few times when Chievo attacked in an organized manner and not on transition, Inter were positioned in a very usual 4-3 plus the forward from the side of the ball, shape (like below).

With Chievo, also, almost never building from the back and kicking the ball long on goal kicks, Inter’s pressing was not utilized a lot (that was probably Maran’s plan, as his CBs and FBs are not of high quality with the ball on their feet).

When they did, though, Inter tried to force their opponents to pass the ball near the wing, where they could press easier in a very compact shape, that involved marking the closest passing options and forced Chievo long (like in the screenshot below).

Of course, Inter’s pressing was far from flawless once again.

In the below image, for example, Brozovic gets dribbled by a Chievo defender and a central passing lane appears to break the pressing. Icardi never runs there to close it, and the team from Verona can now break the pressing and start an organized attack.

Chievo’s Defense

Rolando Maran chose not to press high up the pitch but have his team force Inter to play the ball wide where they could press with the help of the side line.

The two forwards and the trequarista were forming a straight line, centrally, in order to force the Inter CBs or Medel to pass the ball to one of the FBs that was going to get pressed by the nearest side’s Chievo CM.

The lack of an executed correctly, due to lack of speed and intensity mostly, pressing, near the wings, however, meant an Inter FB can change the side of the game, through Medel, who was also rarely pressed, and find the other FB with lots of space to run into, as below.



But Maran’s problems didn’t stop there.

As his midfielders and forwards were not closing the passing lanes in the centre of the field successfully, Inter had the opportunity to appear in front of their opponent’s defensive line with a single pass.

As you can see above, two Chievo players in front of Brozovic are positioned incorrectly and leave a free passing lane to Eder.

With the Chievo FB at the side of the ball always being man oriented towards either Eder or Palacio, a space appears for Kondogbia to receive the ball, after Eder with a clever movement dragged the FB with him.

Maran changes Chievo’s shape and Inter respond

Seeing all the above mentioned problems, Maran, decided to move Birsa to the right, after the 30 minute mark, creating this way a 4-4-2 shape.

With four players now on the midfield line, Chievo could press Inter’s FBs without leaving huge spaces on the other side of the ball. Passing lanes were also covered much better, due to the presence of 4 instead of 3. The presence of two forwards up front to close the central spaces and force the ball wide (instead of them and Birsa, like before), was also enough.

Inter responded to this change of shape, as with the start of the second half Palacio and Eder stopped staying centrally when on defense and occupied wide positions.

Inter now defended on a 4-5-1/4-1-4-1 shape, depending on Medel’s movements.

The wide positions of Eder and Palacio on defense, meant that their positions on attack were much more wider too.

Second half

With the start of the second half, the new shape was not the only change for Chievo, as their mentality also changed.

They now pressed with more intensity and higher up the pitch, not allowing Inter to build-up their game from the back.

By doing that, they managed to keep the ball for much more time in comparison to the first half and become more dangerous.

Seeing Chievo becoming more dangerous and in order to escape another last minute disaster, Mancini, through Sylvinho, decided to change his team’s shape to a 5-3-2, in the 77th minute, by bringing in Juan Jesus to replace Palacio.

By changing to 5-3-2, Inter now had a 3v2 advantage over Chievo’s offensive line (three Inter CBs against two Chievo FWs), leaving the FBs to be occupied by the opponent wingers (Just as in the image below). The 3 man midfield also meant that there were possibilities for much better ball circulation and the breaking of the Chievo pressing, against two opponent CMs in the central area.

It was a shape that certainly helped, due to the numerical superiority at the back, during the final 5 or 7 minutes when Inter couldn’t keep hold of the ball or clear the ball correctly.

Conclusion



After a disastrous January, Inter took a very important from a psychological aspect win. Eder’s movements towards the ball, to help his teammates when pressured were one of the pluses in this game, as were Nagatomo’s improved deliveries. On the other side though, lack of patience, movement towards the ball and the lack of understanding that is required in order to see some movements and passing lanes from teammates, forced Inter to cross the ball far too much and base their attack on a very unsuccessful way of scoring.