I evaluate different kinds of expression of social intolerance and show that the rationale of intolerance of intolerance is either logically flawed and therefore not at all normative, or ethically self-defeating.

We are intolerant. We do not tolerate many things, ranging from lactose or gluten, boring movies, the company of obnoxious people, to torture and mass murder. The choices and actions motivated by our intolerance are discriminatory – this is what choosing means – but discrimination does not always entail intolerance: we can discriminate just because P is a more valuable choice than Q even if both choices are valuable. The political discourse about intolerance and discrimination is generally limited just to social attitudes and actions, and this is the context I will engage here.

I define social intolerance as exclusionary attitude, and social discrimination as action based on exclusionary attitude. Discrimination can be evasive or confrontational and the general social sentiment seems to be in favour of evasion over confrontation. For example, if I don’t tolerate lactose I may simply avoid drinking milk instead of trying to exterminate all cows. This does not mean that all forms of evasion are socially or legally acceptable.

Despite the fact that intolerance and discrimination are a normal and unavoidable aspect of practical existence, certain kinds of discrimination are deemed rationally unjustified and socially harmful, and therefore prohibited. For example, arbitrary confrontational discrimination on the basis of race is generally regarded as unlawful and is, in turn, lawfully discriminated against. Lawful discrimination against unlawful discriminators is generally grounded in complex ‘all things considered’ judgements obtained via public deliberation and implemented via established political processes with easily accessible avenues of recourse for those who are lawfully discriminated against. In this context the relevant logical structure is not just intolerance of intolerance but lawful intolerance, instituted via careful social deliberation and mitigated by the right of recourse, against socially harmful, careless actions motivated by subjective or arbitrary intolerance. In a democratic system, the formal political process of sanctioned intolerance and lawful discrimination is open to continuous public deliberation and revision, and as such is more or less consistent with the Habermassian criterion of ‘communicative action’ in Discourse Ethics:

“Whereas in strategic action one actor seeks to influence the behavior of another by means of the threat of sanctions or the prospect of gratification in order to cause the interaction to continue as the first actor desires, in communicative action one actor seeks rationally to motivate another by relying on the illocutionary binding/bonding effect of the offer contained in his speech act.” (Habermas, Jürgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, p85)

In other words, by communicating “we always already make use of substantive normative rules of argumentation” (Ibid. p86) and are logically committing to regard both ourselves and the other as interlocutors engaged in collaborative creation of meaning rather than as ideological adversaries. Habermassian discourse ethics, besides being the most comprehensively grounded ethical argument generated to date, is essentially anti-dogmatic, and as such allows for hypothetical resolution of social conflicts instead of their perpetuation.

The principle of intolerance of intolerance is interpreted more loosely in social activism and it is here that controversies about conflicting rights are the most pronounced. Is it acceptable to actively silence a speaker such as Milo who expresses intolerance of some person or group? There are several aspects to this ethical dilemma that are either not considered or prematurely dismissed. The most obvious aspect is the distinction between different kinds of intolerance practiced by the speaker and by the activists who try to silence him. The speaker is limited to subjective expression of intolerance of some object (X), or intolerance per se, while the activists are engaged in objective realisation of intolerance (Y): confrontational and often violent discrimination motivated by intolerance of the speaker’s intolerance. The object of intolerance X for the speaker is obviously different to the object of intolerance Y of the activists and each must be judged on its own merits. One does not of itself justify the other and the additional claim of right to reactive intolerance Y against intolerance X is objectively ungrounded and not rationally justified.

Both sides may be dogmatic about their value commitments and normative claims but only one side is engaged in Habermassian ‘strategic action’ and is therefore subject to a more stringent standard of rational justification, which nonetheless does not obtain. The resulting position Y, which imposes an explicit normative sanction, is also normatively void: it is a case of judging the proverbial apples by looking only at oranges.

The activists may believe they have the right or moral duty to prevent the speaker’s expression of intolerance, but a mere belief is no different to the belief of the speaker in having the right to express subjective intolerance. Violent action on the basis of my dogma justifies violence everywhere, on the basis of everyone’s dogma. If the norms of logic, meaning and communication are performatively affirmed by a meaningful response to the expressed meaning of another, then the rational or moral basis of such a reaction is also endorsed as objectively normative. This is the tragedy of any direct political action that bypasses the often slow and frustrating process of public deliberation: it logically justifies violence and obstruction done to itself as well as to all victims of violence and obstruction.

Short of defence of self or others to an immediate threat of political violence, what would already flag systematic rejection of deliberative democracy by those entrusted with power, strategic rationality of violent or obstructive political action is objectively unethical, fostering brutal repression by a minority instead of collective liberation.

Ideological dogmatism – ideology as a normative principle – is at the core of All political violence. It gives rise to conflicts that are irreconcilable through rational deliberation and therefore always potentially genocidal. It is the most dangerous kind of irrationality there is.

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