Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that all expressions of contempt are equally bad. Contempt occurs in the context of social relationships that are themselves characterized by power differences. Those power differences have a profound effect on the shape of contempt and its effectiveness in diminishing the agency of its target. A contemptuous protest sign directed at the president is not on par with a contemptuous remark made by that president.

As every adolescent knows, certain people wield much greater social power than others. The source of that power in middle school may be mysterious, but the effects of it are obvious enough. A suitably socially positioned 12-year-old has the power to make a classmate persona non grata.

Adult relationships are less obviously, but equally, characterized by social power differentials, and we ignore these at our peril. Some people are well situated to dehumanize others; some people are more vulnerable to dehumanization than others. This means that not all contempt is the same. Contempt expressed by the socially powerful toward the socially vulnerable is a much greater moral danger than contempt that flows in the opposite direction. As president, Trump occupies a position of exceptional social power. Contempt bolstered by such power becomes far more effective and hence, far more threatening to our grounding democratic values.

Trump is broad-minded about the targets of his contempt; just about anyone who criticizes him seems to be fair game. Nevertheless, his tendency to treat members of much less powerful social groups with contempt is particularly troubling. Trump’s imitation of Kovaleski reinforced a specific social inequality that most people now recognize as morally abhorrent; namely, the marginalization of people with disabilities. In characterizing Mexicans as rapists and women as objects of sexual gratification, he has engaged in the same kind of marginalization.

Trump’s standard method of responding to critics includes denigrating their appearance, denying their intelligence and calling them total failures. He thus treats them as objects to be scorned and dismissed, rather than as fellow human beings worthy of basic respect. This is what makes it contempt and not merely colorfully expressed criticism.

It may seem as though the best response to Trump’s contempt is to return it in kind, treating him the same way he treats others. The trouble, though, is that contempt toward Trump does not function in the same way that his contempt toward others functions. Even if we grant that Trump deserves contempt for his attitudes and behaviors, his powerful social position insulates him from the worst of contempt’s effects. It is simply not possible to disregard or diminish the agency of the president of the United States. This means that contempt is not a particularly useful weapon in the battle against bigotry or misogyny. The socially vulnerable cannot wield it effectively precisely because of their social vulnerability.