From police leaving Michael Brown’s body on a street for four hours under an afternoon sun in August, to a county prosecutor waiting until the dark of a combustible night to announce that the officer who shot Brown would not be charged with a crime, the crisis in Ferguson, Missouri, has been punctuated by serious failures in public administration.



Police chiefs, regional leaders and the state’s governor have frequently struggled. At times they have seemed at odds with one another and out of their depth. This culminated on Monday night with the burning of sections of the city despite the presence of hundreds of national guard troops, and police having had three months to prepare for the evening.

This analysis is an attempt to retrace the missteps made since 9 August by five key players in the Ferguson crisis: St Louis County prosecuting attorney Bob McCulloch; Governor Jay Nixon of Missouri; Ferguson police chief Thomas Jackson; Ferguson mayor James Knowles and St Louis County police chief Jon Belmar.

Bob McCulloch, county prosecutor

Bob McCulloch. Photograph: Reuters

When the history of Ferguson’s 2014 unrest is written, McCulloch’s decision to time his announcement that Darren Wilson would not face criminal charges for 8.30pm, as hundreds of demonstrators swarmed outside the city’s police department, may be seen as the unforced error surpassing all others in this chaotic three-month saga.

Angry groups promptly embarked on hours of destruction, looting and arson under cover of darkness, in one of the worst nights of race-related rioting in the US for a generation. “It was the worst possible timing,” said Todd Swanstrom, a professor in public policy at the University of Missouri-St Louis. McCulloch’s spokesman said later that there had been “no good time” to make the announcement.

By choosing to use his extraordinary 20-minute speech not as a humble delivery of difficult news but rather a bitter exercise in score-settling against the press, social media users and some friends of Brown, McCulloch pointlessly enraged those watching his remarks around Ferguson on television or listening intently in the streets through car windows. Brown’s stepfather responded by screaming repeatedly at the surrounding crowds: “Burn this bitch down”. Swanstrom described McCulloch’s remarks as “tone deaf”.

The initial issue was greatly worsened by McCulloch’s failure to recuse himself ... The perception of bias was there. Todd Swanstrom

Already that day, McCulloch had failed to ensure that, as was agreed with their attorneys, Brown’s parents were the first to be informed that the grand jury had reached a decision regarding the shooting of their son. The news instead leaked almost immediately to CNN, and Brown’s parents learned of it from one of the station’s correspondents. Senior officials in St Louis city hall, trying to prepare for their own unrest, were also left guessing. “We were expecting it yesterday,” one told the Guardian when asked to confirm CNN’s report that day.

McCulloch also refused to step aside and appoint a special prosecutor, despite the inevitability that the conclusions of his process would not be trusted by the many in Ferguson who said he could not be impartial. His father was killed by a black man while serving as a St Louis police officer in the 1960s, and McCulloch has a decades-old relationship with police in the county, whose alliance and goodwill he would need after the decision on Wilson’s fate. “The initial issue was greatly worsened by McCulloch’s failure to recuse himself,” said Swanstrom. “It’s not a question of his integrity. The perception of bias was there.”

The prosecutor guarded even basic information about the case, meaning that the public only heard versions of the shooting given in media interviews by Brown’s neighbours – a fact that McCulloch would later lament in his speech, as if he could not have done something about it. Then, despite his previous insistence on secrecy, McCulloch dumped the entire case file online at 9pm after his speech, despite an ongoing federal inquiry into Wilson that is considering the same material.

McCulloch, an elected prosecutor, could have recommended charges against Wilson and advocated a position. Instead, he let 12 regular citizens plough their way through a vast amount of often complicated evidence, freeing himself from blame in the event of a non-indictment and recriminations from police allies if Wilson had been charged. “The argument can be made that this meant it was more likely that there would be no indictment,” said Swanstrom.

Asked by the Guardian at his announcement press conference why he declined to take a stand, McCulloch said he was “certainly not passing the buck,” adding: “You have an obligation to present the evidence. I don’t know how anyone can say that we’re passing the buck.” The alternative may actually be worse: that McCulloch conducted what amounted to a secret trial with no adversary to challenge what was presented to the jurors.

Jay Nixon, governor



Jay Nixon. Photograph: James Cooper/Corbis

Nixon’s flailing response to the emergency in Ferguson was summed up by his now-notorious answer to simple questions from a reporter in the days before the grand jury’s decision. Asked who was in charge, and whether the buck stopped with him in policing Ferguson, Nixon gave a pair of excruciating, rambling responses that lasted several minutes, and ultimately declined to accept personal responsibility. “At times he has appeared less decisive than he should be,” said Swanstrom.

The governor had by then shown faltering leadership for more than three months. He remained quiet after riot police mounted an unanticipated crackdown with teargas and rubber bullets on protesters on the night of Monday, 11 August. When he finally made public remarks on the situation the next evening, he said: “I’ve done a lot of praying the last few days”.

Only after a third night of clashes created vivid television footage of mass tear-gassing, stun grenades landing in the front yards of residential side-streets, and the arrests of reporters did Nixon decide to cancel an appearance at the Missouri state fair in order to visit the region.

With the militarised county police response drawing sharp criticism, Nixon revoked their control of the protests and placed the Missouri state highway patrol in charge – a snub that was humiliating to police chief Jon Belmar and which prompted McCulloch to call a St Louis Post-Dispatch reporter and describe the governor’s behaviour as “shameful”. (It would later emerge that Nixon and McCulloch, arguably the two most important figures in the presentation of the grand jury’s decision, had not spoken for the entire month before the decision was announced.)

The switch in police command allowed for a hands-off approach, led by Captain Ron Johnson, which was successful for one night. Yet when some looting broke out 24 hours later on Friday 15 August, Nixon performed a sharp about-turn. Under sustained heckling from residents, he declared at a press conference the following day that Ferguson would come under a midnight curfew. Appearing shell-shocked, he could not say how long it would last. After clashes resumed when he lifted the curfew the following Monday, Nixon finally called in the Missouri national guard. But he hedged on their role, saying they would only guard the police command centre at a strip mall and would remain largely out of sight.

Before the crisis, Nixon was being discussed as a potential Democratic presidential or vice-presidential candidate

When confronted on a Sunday talk show with claims that his response was slack, Nixon said of Ferguson: “I’ve been here almost every day”. Fact-checking website Politifact ruled that the statement was “mostly false”. Amid intensifying criticism, Nixon swung wildly in the direction of the protesters. On 20 August he said in a video statement that “a vigorous prosecution must now be pursued” against Wilson, thus causing fury among police representatives, who said that he had labelled the officer a guilty man.

Nixon also entertained claims that McCulloch should recuse himself from the grand jury case on Brown’s shooting due to an appearance of pro-police bias, saying that the prosecutor might do so. But he refused to actually make the call himself, leading a furious McCulloch to accuse him of dodging the decision and telling him to “man up”. Swanstrom said: “It would have been much better for the region if a special prosecutor had been appointed”.

But perhaps Nixon’s strangest move of all came last week. When he declared a state of emergency and sent national guard troops back into Ferguson almost a week before the grand jury decision was even reached, protesters concluded that the fix was in: Wilson would not be charged. Then the troops barely intervened as rioters ran wild after the jury decision was announced.

“It suggested to the population that there’s going to be chaos, yet when the decision was read, the national guard was nowhere to be found,” said a professor of public administration in Missouri who requested anonymity because he relies on Nixon’s administration for funding. “Administratively that’s a major screwup. You activated them yet we have police cars burning”.

Before the crisis, Nixon was being discussed as a potential Democratic presidential or vice-presidential candidate in 2016. He flirted with the speculation in July, saying Washington needed a “heartland voice.” After his response in Ferguson, he will more likely be working on sustaining a voice in his homeland.

Thomas Jackson, town police chief

Thomas Jackson. Photograph: Jeff Roberson/AP

On 9 August, minutes after one of his officers shot Brown dead, Jackson made the laudable decision to call Belmar, his St Louis County counterpart, and request that the county force take over investigating the death, so as to avoid an obvious conflict of interest. It was to be a rare glimpse of cool-headed wisdom from a police commander who subsequently seemed thoroughly overwhelmed as the crisis unfolded.

The problems for Jackson started long beforehand. He presided over a police force that was 94% white in a town with a population that is two-thirds black. African American residents reported feeling badly alienated from the officers who aggressively policed their driving and daily lives and issued costly fines for minor offenses. At the height of the clashes, Jackson complained that he had tried to recruit more black officers. “That’s ridiculous,” said Charles Menifield, a professor of public affairs at the University of Missouri. “Try a little harder. Where are you looking?”

On 9 August his officers allowed Brown’s body to lie on the road while dozens of residents, including Brown’s distraught mother, stood at the police tape surrounding the scene. “That was pretty much unforgivable,” a source close to Wilson’s defence team told the Guardian. More than six weeks later, Jackson would apologise to Brown’s family in an awkward video message. “It was just too long, and I am truly sorry,” he said. Protesters would never forgive him.

Jackson further enraged demonstrators b speculating that a non-indicted Wilson could return to work if he wished

Jackson’s worst day came on 15 August, when at a press conference convened ostensibly to release the long-awaited name of the officer who shot Brown, he simultaneously handed out an incident report and stills from surveillance footage saying that Brown had robbed a nearby grocery store minutes before he was shot dead. Brown’s parents were incensed, accusing Jackson of mounting a smear campaign. Nixon and other police chiefs could barely disguise their astonishment at Jackson’s decision to combine the two releases.

Having implied that the robbery had something to do with why Brown was shot, Jackson then backtracked a few hours later, stressing that Wilson had not known that Brown was a suspect when he encountered the 18-year-old. Later still, he gave an interview saying that Wilson realised halfway through their altercation – which turned out to be the account Wilson told the grand jury. Yet by then the needless confusion created by this flap meant that protesters only saw more dubiousness from the authorities.

Rather than stay quiet in the anxious days before the grand jury decision, Jackson surprised many observers and further enraged demonstrators by needlessly speculating to a local television station that a non-indicted Wilson could return to work if he wished. “This was a gross misstep,” said Menifield. “Residents hear ‘he’s going back on the street’ and think this guy just endorses what the officer did.”

After being slapped down the following morning by Knowles, who said no such decision had been reached, Jackson agreed and said – to nobody’s surprise – that his comments had been misinterpreted by media.

James Knowles, mayor

James W Knowles III. Photograph: Aaron P Bernstein/Getty Images

Knowles’ biggest mistake began earlier, in presiding over city administration that depended on fines levied on residents

Ferguson’s 35-year-old, part-time mayor was almost invisible as his city was engulfed by chaotic protests. Sometimes he popped up in TV interviews to defend the actions of the police. Since then he has proved unable to insert himself into the crisis in any meaningful way, choosing instead to make a series of unfortunate comments.



While other officials were conceding that they had a problem, Knowles told MSNBC in late August: “There’s not a racial divide in the city of Ferguson. That is the perspective of all residents in our city. Absolutely.” He would later say in November that he “absolutely” regretted the remarks, which were roundly dismissed by residents and protesters.



Despite being the city’s highest-ranking elected official, Knowles appeared bewildered by the notion of responsibility for what was happening. “Somebody needs to own it,” he said to the New York Times of the crisis at one point. “That’s the problem. Even on the government side, nobody’s owned it.” He added later, “Somebody needed to say, ‘I’m in charge.’” As the mayor struggled with the spotlight, Knowles spent public funds on hiring a private PR man who, after doing little to improve matters, turned out to have once been convicted of reckless homicide.

But Knowles’ biggest mistake began earlier, in presiding over a city administration that depended on fines levied on residents in the municipal court system for an ever-more significant proportion of its revenues. The clashes following Brown’s death exposed anger among poorer African American residents who say they feel milked for money to fund the largely white bureaucracy. Last year, Ferguson’s municipal court issued 24,532 warrants, mostly for minor traffic offenses, an average of about three per household in a city of just 21,000 residents, according to a study by Arch City Defenders, a legal non-profit.

Ferguson expects to collect about $2m in court fines this year, to fund more than 11% of its budget. Court takings have risen by 44% since 2010 under a newly aggressive system of traffic policing, according to the city. Knowles took over in 2011. A supposed reform implemented by the city council amid sharp criticism of the system following the protests, would actually allow the city to collect almost 50% more money next year. “The police are viewed like an occupying army generating revenue out of them,” said Swanstrom.

“Before the demonstrations I was not aware of how oppressive the system was to minority populations,” said the professor, adding that the process had eroded the legitimacy of local government in their eyes.

“If you have money, you can hire a lawyer and bargain these tickets down to a non-moving violation, which is what I do,” he said. “You get no stress and no points on your license. It’s high stress when you can’t, and losing your license or jail time can be crippling.”

Jon Belmar, county police chief

Jon Belmar. Photograph: Reuters

Having taken control of the inquiry into the shooting, Belmar made a significant error during his first press conference the following day that was never corrected by police. He told reporters that Brown died 35ft from Wilson’s SUV. This was repeated ad nauseum in the media for months and seemed compatible with the notion of the 18-year-old being killed in an encounter at fairly close quarters. McCulloch this week gave the true distance: 153ft.

Belmar made a significant error during his first press conference the following day that was never corrected by police

Belmar’s force then responded to the 10 August looting and burning of the QuikTrip gas station near where Brown was killed with an unexpectedly harsh crackdown the following night on dozens of demonstrators gathered on West Florissant Avenue. Teargas and smoke was fired in large quantities, also enveloping residents trying to get home and the journalists who were at the protest site before it became an international spectacle. Protesters were shot with wooden and rubber bullets and threw stones at police as officers swept them out.

The militarised police action seemed only to provoke protesters, helping to swell the numbers of a relatively small group of demonstrators with like-minded young people who flocked from the surrounding region and beyond to confront the police. “One of my students was there peacefully protesting and obeying the law and she felt like she was going to be shot,” said Menifield. One after another, protesters told the Guardian in August that the police seemed like an invading military force and that they were engaged in warfare.

After simply standing their ground and shutting down West Florissant the following night without much incident, the force swung back the following night, allowing hundreds of demonstrators to congregate in the warm afternoon before launching a barrage of teargas and stun grenades to clear them from the streets after a single bottle was thrown.

Belmar and his fellow commanders spent the week before the grand jury decision assuring residents that 1,000 officers had been training for months to prepare for that day. His force told the Guardian that it had spent more than $170,000 on new riot control equipment and funds for damaged vehicles. The county force had direct responsibility for policing Ferguson. Yet when the decision came, dozens of officers were stationed on the nicer side of town while West Florissant Avenue, the home of Ferguson unrest, was left relatively unprotected. A series of locally owned firms there were burned and looted into the early hours of Tuesday without interruption from police or fire officials. “I don’t see how you have a phalanx of officers in front of the police department and not in front of the small businesses,” said Swanstrom. “They were not prepared. They were ill prepared for what ensued,” said Menifield.