As a variety of Egyptians and other observers have noted, this provision places the ulema in a position to determine the validity of legislation based on religious principles. Although al-Azhar's Senior Scholars are ostensibly independent from the government and do not have as broad a reach as Iran's Guidance Council for example, the two bodies are clearly analogues.

In addition, the new constitution includes Article 219, which to the uninitiated is extraordinarily difficult to decipher, but is intended to guard against the kind of expansive view of shari'a that Egypt's highest court had previously used in assessing legislation . The combination of all of these constitutional principles significantly advances the Islamization of Egyptian society and renders it unnecessary for leaders to promulgate a decree or law that specifically bans alcohol, for example. Of course, President Mohammed Morsi could take this dramatic step, but he would not need to unless there is political pressure -- say, from Salafis -- to do so. In a relatively short period of time, alcoholic beverages would become scarce because of the powerful disincentives associated with the religious tenets and norms that are now codified in Egypt's political institutions. The effect of this codification is similar, if slower, to an outright ban on liquor, as Egyptians will be compelled through both opprobrium and possible penalty to give up their beloved Stellas and Johnny Walker.

Yet, even if alcohol remains readily available in Egypt, that does not mean that the process of Islamizing its political and social institutions has failed. In Turkey, raki, Efes Pilsner, and a few passable varieties of red and white wines are plentiful. In fact, the wine bar has become a bit of a thing in Istanbul these days. Even so, one of the reasons--along with a strong record on the economy -- that the ruling AKP has been so successful for more than a decade has been its ability to foster an environment in which Turks can more freely express their Muslim identity. Part and parcel of this is the steady Islamization of institutions in the decade since the AKP came to power.

In March 2012, for example, the AKP paved the way for graduates of imam-hatip (preacher) schools to enter the bureaucracy by making it easier for them to matriculate at Turkey's universities -- a traditional feeder for public servants. In the context of Turkish politics and the Republic's history of aggressive laicisme, the change was controversial. Turkey's preacher schools are, as their name implies, intended to train prayer leaders for Turkey's 82,693 mosques and, as such, about half the curriculum is devoted to religious subjects while the remainder of the curriculum coincides with what the Ministry of National Education prescribes for non-religious high school students. Previously the vast majority of graduates of preacher schools went into the clergy -- Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan being a prominent exception -- and had difficulty entering Turkish universities. They either lacked the preparation as Turkey's predominantly Kemalist academic elites argued or they were subject to discrimination as pious Turks claimed. Either way, with larger numbers of imam-hatip graduates entering Turkish universities, larger numbers will enter careers in Turkey's sprawling bureaucracy. Although this development is far less dramatic than the innovations contained in Egypt's new constitution, the effects are similar: the slow, but steady, Islamization of society. Of course, not all imam-hatip graduates are Islamists, but together with their Islamist colleagues, they are well-positioned to funnel state resources to projects and causes that they favor regardless of who is in power.