Leonard Peikoff wrote a book and David Harriman is taking credit for it. At the beginning Leonard is mentioned as the "silent author" but anyone who has read Peikoff will pick up on the style of his writing.



I like this book, just as I like most Objectivist literature. But it just doesn't seem quite complete.



First, this book has little to do with physics, math, or science. When it says, "Induction in physics", what it really means is induction through anecdotes about physics. I don't mean this n

Leonard Peikoff wrote a book and David Harriman is taking credit for it. At the beginning Leonard is mentioned as the "silent author" but anyone who has read Peikoff will pick up on the style of his writing.



I like this book, just as I like most Objectivist literature. But it just doesn't seem quite complete.



First, this book has little to do with physics, math, or science. When it says, "Induction in physics", what it really means is induction through anecdotes about physics. I don't mean this negatively, but if you are thinking there is some "discovery" or mathematical proof that is going to be laid out in this book then you are mistaken.



Second, this book is written polemically. If the world actually fit into the nice categories Peikoff gives us then his method of induction will seem so profound and extraordinary. But the reality is that there is a wide margin between rationalist and empiricist and for the most part I doubt others would agree this his definitions of these terms apply. In one case Kant is both the cause of the empiricists and a rationalist herald, as well. Again, this is not bad, but it does seem unnecessary.



Third, as a work of epistemology it is fairly removed from the common language of epistemology. There is no mention of JTB (justified true belief). No mention of the difference between knowledge and belief. No mention of self-knowledge, will, faith, courage, or meaning. These subjects all have epistemic merit and are typically added by philosophers into their system of epistemology, but none of this is discussed in this book. This is not bad, but is does seem incomplete.



Now about the work itself... it is good, really good, possibly great, but it doesn't seem too different than Ayn Rand's original work on this called, "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology". This book simply has more anecdotes and a better literary structure.



Peikoff does an amazing job on explaining what induction is, and how it works, and how we can rely on it. It really is top notch philosophy, but it seems very one sided to say the least. Peikoff defines induction as an integration of observable data. It all seems so scientific, in fact the whole book is committed to this thesis. I do not doubt his conclusion on this matter. I am comforted and inspired by his insights as to how concept formation and the scientific method are intrinsically identical. But not everything is "observable data". My inner thoughts, my experience of self, and my will for significance are all epistemic factors that are not observed in any sensational manner. And yet, I say that I possess knowledge according to these things.



Perhaps, "observable data" can be used to include certain internal states which are not observed in any way at all, but have epistemic value according to the objective nature of man? But this is never really discussed in the book.



I suspect the reason for this is because the book is committed to the thesis that thinking is quantitative in essence and the aforementioned articles exhibit a qualitative identification through knowledge. Of course, Peikoff writes on how we can know qualities through our thinking which is quantitative, and this is well and good, but it seems that there could be a flip side to knowledge which can be called qualitative thinking. Of course, it could not be called "inductive" by nature, and thus would also not be propositional.



There does seem hope for this in other areas of epistemological research. Warrant, for one, has potential to provide justification for non-propositional forms of knowledge. Hofstadter has also contributed a fascinating synthesis of epistemology and metaphysics which makes utilizes a mathematical self-referential formula discovered by Godel to illustrate how a self-referring system can develop higher level thinking. Using this method it could be argued that the quantitative thinking is just one level one which the qualitative reinterpretation takes place on another level. Thus, both systems could work together. But this book doesn't consider this option. Objectivists in general seem dogmatic to their own view of reason, which isn't bad, because its not a bad view of reason, but it just seems limiting.