North Korea and not so crazy theories Part 3:

Is war coming along? Why North Korea did its test over Japan







North Korean tests are now a regular occurrence of our news feeds, despite an increased international pressure, including from China, and additional UN sanctions.

Those tests show an ever developing missile branch of the North Korean army. Not only is North Korean artillery way more present at every tactical and strategical levels than in other armies, but now it is starting to have a usable ballistic missile program.



The latest tests included short and middle range missiles, begging the question on whether a long range one would come next. Though information is as usual blurry, there being contradictory reports on the short range missile test and whether it's a SCUD or a 300mm artillery, the fact is that the tests were mostly successes.

This shows a step up by the North Korea army, presumably in an effort to show a heightened capability. As a matter of fact, artillery wouldn't be nearly enough in case of a war, and its quantity doesn't totally balance its obsolescence. On the other hand missiles, like the ones North Korea tested, could potentially be used to obliterate every US base in the region. The short ranged missiles have the obvious task of clearing the Korean peninsula, whilst the ones with a bit more reach would hit places like Guam and the US bases in Japan. This is crucial for North Korea. In case of a war, quick "decapitation strikes" on every military US base in the region will be the only way to avoid a cohesive and decisive US action. As a matter of fact, the North Korean navy is severely outgunned, out ranged and an antiquity, they couldn't forbid access to US aircraft carriers and transport of troops. Similarly the North Korean Air Force is non existent, giving the US utter air superiority since the start. Therefore, the only way to avoid having every valuable assets being blown up, and reinforcement for the South Korean army, would be to destroy every logistic centres, and boats and planes when they are on base. If successful, those strikes could kill up to 100000 US troops, and leave the nearest functional US base as Hawaii.

This is only until they master long range missiles, they could then wreak havoc up to San Diego, leaving US army response to mobile groups and group stationed on other missions in foreign countries as well as missile underground bases and East coast battalions. This would slow a real US response by months and shook its population, leaving it weaker, with a reduced army. The slow down of the US army would give North Korea time to invade the whole peninsula before the US can effectively respond. Only this scenario can see a complete North Korean victory in the Korean peninsula, as an amphibian landing on enemy territory is quite treacherous, even for the US army. It lacks the boats necessary for such an undertaking, and they are all based on 70 years old design, not suited for today's warfare.



That being said, the tests weren't merely muscle flexing and could have been avoided. The short range test was made to coincide with the US Korea drills. Those drills might seem harmless from an outside perspective, but the tens of thousands of troops could start invading the minute after such an order is given, and Pyongyang knows it. It also knows that the US president has been pretty bellicose towards them, even by its own standard, and given that he threatened "fire and fury", those drills could only be a pretext for the US army to send enough troops to invade North Korea. The response, that the small missiles were, was a way to warn the South Koreans, rather than the US. Most of the military assets that those missiles can affect are South Korean, and not American, and the fact that North Korea can send them quickly in batches, with cheap and mobile means (presumably multi rocket launchers) that are not easy to strike down, means that they will hit South Korean military bases multiple times, despite their air force and anti-missile countermeasures. It was an appropriate threat of retaliation, in case the South Korean opened the hostilities, which adds to its offensive potential of quick strikes against South Korean command chain and military infrastructure before a response is effectively taken by the US and South Korea.



The middle range test is another beast all by itself. It flew over Japan, which is almost unprecedented, happening only once before, in 1999. This is not only a threat, but also a message. The threat part is obvious, making another country do an emergency evacuation in its own soil, because of your test, is a real show of force. It remains a mystery, however, as to why the Japan defences didn't try to take the missile down. Some would say that it was harmless, and that the Japanese didn't to lower themselves to the level of the North Koreans by responding to their thinly veiled threats. This explanation doesn't withstand the fact that it violated Japanese airspace, making it dangerous to Japanese aircrafts, and, as a source of danger, and of sovereignty violation, it could have been downed without controversy, as long as the Japanese kept the rhetoric toned down on the military aspect, emphasising the safety concerns. This theory also doesn't make sense because there were emergency warnings and evacuation, this doesn't show that the Japanese knew it was harmless, and letting a missile that is potentially dangerous fly throughout your airspace is more damaging than accepting the North Koreans are a threat, this makes, except for maybe some culturally unique pride that we didn't understood, the whole hypothesis unlikely.

There are a few reasons why the Japanese government would actually not try to shoot it down. This can be divided in two sections, the technical reasons, and the political reasons.

Anti missiles are notoriously poorly accurate, having been described as "trying to shoot a bullet with a bullet", obviously some system boast a reasonable success level, but even then you should take in account that the sources aren't necessarily reliable (see Saudi anti missile protections). This, combined with the fact that those anti measure will eventually fall down and might also be damaging, mean that it makes sense to, following a risk evaluation, reassess this option as not worth the cost. The poor accuracy could also theoretically mean that they tries to down it without success, or, even more conspiratorial, that they knew it wasn't a danger but tried to down it anyway despite the risks of fallout of the missiles, hence the emergency warnings. This is unlikely, but we like to show you here every potential scenario, so that if additional information confirms this (amateur footage, leaks), you will know how it fit with the rest.

Now the political aspect. Those might seem quite unlikely at first glance, but given Abe's government stance on war (they try to reform their constitution to get an "offensive" army), it's totally in line with their views. It's either to push Japan's public opinion and the International Community towards a pro-war stance on North Korea, or it's to make North Korea do an act of war, allowing Japan to then declare war. For the first possibility, it's rather obvious, the emergency evacuation and the violation of sovereign airspace shows the limit of Japan pacifism, and where a more militaristic stance could be useful. The other is less visible and would have been a gamble anyway on the part of the Japanese, not leaving any trace because it failed. Given North Korean infamous inaccuracy, even if they tried their best to calibrate their test to not hit Japan, it was entirely within the realm of possibility that they either landed on Japan, or shot a plane down. This would in turn allow Abe to declare war, with the North Koreans unprepared to confront the result of their mistakes.

As said before it was also a message. The message was pretty simple, the US media doubted that North Korea could straighten up their ballistic missiles' trajectory from a bell curve. This wasn't logical whatsoever that a missile would perform worse under its optimum trajectory, but made sense because it sheltered the US with an additional layer of difficulties for the North Koreans before they could hit US mainland. The test was a way for the North Korean to prove, albeit at great international relation cost, that they definitely have the capabilities, even with a middle range missile, to go beyond Japan, this also serves as a demonstration like would have been Guam, but without the same risk to accidentally go to war.

All this paints an interesting view of North Korean tests, why they acted this way, why the Japanese acted this way, and what the missiles could be used for, but we have yet to explore why they sent it north in both tests.



Guam lies south-east from North Korea, and the tests took an almost opposite direction. Again, as always with North Korea, there are no clear cut answers but different possibilities that raise above the others, with long-standing implications. The north is way less complex than the south in terms of land and sea mass, it also has less islands and territories in it. The first explanation could therefore be that the North Korean didn't resolve their inaccuracy issues, especially for longer flights. This would be good news because it would nullify most of their missile tactical and strategical use, it would explain why they didn't follow through the Guam threat, fear that they might actually hit the island, and no capability to follow through in case of war. The second explanation, about as likely, is that it was a "diplomatic effort". The North is not only less complicated, but tests there will anger less countries, basically only Japan. They won't have to fly over South Korea, or near other countries besides Japan, especially the US. This was surely not only intended to avoid war (which a strike near Guam might have provoked), but mainly to diminish the International Community anger, especially by the US and its North Korean neighbours, and to soften possible sanction. If this was the goal of the North Korean, it failed, with a new round of sanctions likely coming out of the UN reunion that will happen on tuesday, and China, and Russia losing patience. A final option, though not very likely, is that middle range and long range ballistic missiles can't be launched towards the South by North Korea because of the launch pad specificities and geography. Whilst not impossible, especially if the number of sites are limited and limitrophe, it is very unlikely that the North Koreans didn't manage to overcome the terrain constraints, given the time they had to figure this out and their heavy investment in artillery and ballistic missiles.



All this might on the one hand makes you think that if North Korea achieves its ballistic missile program, it would be too late to stop them, and that on the other they currently are very possibly not good enough to present a serious danger to US bases in the region and that the US therefore should intervene now. In addition the essay over Japan shows that we might not know how far they are willing to go, if it their "restrained" and "diplomatic" way of testing. But this would be overlooking another factor, very important in any war, that was talked about in the start of the article: artillery. In case of war, you shouldn't only worry about Seoul, basically every military infrastructure in the South will be targeted, and because it's not guided bombs, you will have to calculate the civilian death toll accordingly. The sheer number of artillery in the North Korean army not only makes it impossible to be quickly eliminated, especially since it is hidden in fortified mountains and camouflaged, but also mean a quick flattening of the DMZ and an on par speed of invasion by the North Koreans, who will easily penetrate the South, at least initially. Those are perfect exhibit as to why a total attrition war would be disastrous, and long. Alternatively, the most commonly suggested strategy is a "decapitation strike". But the North Korean army is, believe or not, exceptionally decentralised , to be able to withstand loss of communications. Local commanders can make decisions, and given the sheer artillery power under their authority, it won't stop the invasion nor the damage. Moreover, the troops in North Korea are fanatical, way more so than the civilian elite or even Kim Jong Un himself, they prepared themselves decades for such an encounter. We shouldn't count on, even overwhelming, headquarter losses, for them to stop, panic and retreat. This mentality really showed during the accident of 1996, where a few stranded North Korean elite troops, showed no mercy towards their own (killing the crew of the submarine that they were in), before rampaging for several weeks in South Korean countryside with the South struggling to catch them. It is not the sole incident like that either. Deep penetration without outside help is part of North Korean military strategy, especially with the tunnels that reportedly go deep inside South Korea, and war will already be waged on several fronts without reversal possible before any decapitation strike has effects. Such a strike might even prove counterproductive, because without any order to surrender from higher ups, several more sections of the North Korean army will be active and so for longer, than otherwise. It leaves us no war option to stop North Korea, and I don't need to go into the nuclear option: nuking effectively North Korea also nukes effectively most of South Korea and a bit of China and Russia, and the North Korean are so heavily fortified that they would still have artillery capabilities left.

Now, there are other ways, though sanctions are at their maximum currently, because it is the maximum that China thinks will pressure North Korea without putting at the risk of collapse, and forget any dream of cutting them off their oil supply, because it is what leave the country standing, and even if China changes its views on North Korea, which it has already shown with a willingness to impose strong sanctions, it doesn't want a migration crisis and instability at its border, especially if it could bring US bases nearer to its territory.

What is left is basically diplomacy, and trying to reintegrate North Korea, as further isolation won't impact them significantly while lowering our leverage. Cooperation could for example include a new cold war "friendly" competition, like challenging them to go to Mars. If we show more interest in a peaceful civilian technology race, and don't seem threatening, they will likely transfer most of their ballistic program into a space project.



To conclude, the last tests highlighted North Korean capabilities, and the possible weakness they have, and showcased their international relations strategy, which could only end poorly given the rejection by most countries of their test. It also gave us an insight on how Japan might be using those tests to remilitarise, and how those tests are ticking through the lists of technological capabilities the west said North Korea doesn't have. Finally we explored why a military response would be a costly failure, and what are the alternatives, but unfortunately it must be noted that the International Community goes into the opposite way, acting aggressively militarily and trying to expand sanctions, which won't work, and might just precipitate a war the North Koreans still mostly don't want, except for their army.



If you want to see the rest of the series, it's under the heading North Korea here: https://thenewrealityinforeignpolicy.blogspot.co.uk/



You can also access them through our facebook updates: https://www.facebook.com/The-new-reality-in-foreign-policy-492287754467588/?ref=bookmarks