…thinking about your answer to my question of why wait at all, you appear to grasp some recognition of the value of proceeding on a confidential basis, but then err with your “and blow away” comment — from multiple aspects.

As THIS thread points out, the “fastest” items bypass any such effect.

18 months is a rather arbitrary time selection, and nothing precludes an examination (and therefor by extension, any examination) from concluding prior to that 18 month window. It is merely by happenstance that the volume of backlog makes it so that prosecution does not conclude typically within the 18 month window.

So that is an aspect from outside of the patentee’s control.

Another aspect that I have alluded to is the original US Sovereign view of the Quid Pro Quo itself. I have spoken previously about the critical difference in viewing the exchange between the putative inventor and the government as the processor of turning an inchoate personal property into a full legal property. That exchange was NOT a publication of the submission for a mere chance at a patent right. That exchange was for a granted patent for the publication. This is a foundational point that must be understood, recognized, and incorporated into the discussion. Even these “quickest” items STILL remain in the control of the patentee as to accepting a realized grant for publication, as the patentee retains the power of express abandonment after notice of allowance — which, if exercised, would remove the presence of the application as if it never were (and preserve the option of Trade Secret, at the discretion of the holder of the inchoate right).

This is an aspect of the deal within the control of the patentee.

I have also spoken about the pragmatic effect of the US Sovereign in choosing to deal with Foreign Sovereigns that do not share the same foundational Quid Pro Quo. These are reflected in the conditions under which the opt-in (and in truth, this opt-in SHOULD be the default) for the Non-Publication route must be revisited and rescinded. The pragmatic effect is that by choice the holder of the inchoate right is engaging in other Sovereign’s and the deals of those other Sovereign’s and choosing to publish. Under those conditions, there is a sense that such an applicant’s choice should be reflected as well in this Sovereign, thereby curtailing the “confidential” protection here.

Many though (and perhaps reflecting your exuberance on ‘publishing’) mistakenly portray this surrender as some type of benefit to the applicant.

This of course is a ridiculous view, as this is a surrender of the Quo with NO obtaining of the Quid (reducing the more valuable foundational deal of the US system for the lower value deal of ROW).

Yet another aspect of this ‘evolution’ played out historically here in the states, as when the switch was made, we saw a patent office become lazy and entrenched in a Reject Reject Reject mode. After all, for all those not opting in to the Non-Publication route, the government realized their Quo with NO further effort. Why bother then with the difficult task (in anything other than a perfunctory manner), when one has already obtained their end of the bargain? Sure, this leaves a sour taste, but the evidence of Reject Reject Reject is undeniable (as is one of the outcomes: the bloat of backlog in any number of Office processing queues, such as first action in the merits, RCEs, and appeals). The Office lost its impetus to be timely because it had already obtained its Quo.