Another Uraza Bayram.

Countless photos showing zillions of Muslims filling up Moskvabad’s streets. More gleeful shitposts from /pol/ to svidomy forums about imminent Russabia.

But you don’t have to be a particularly big fan of open borders with Central Asia to be able to look at statistics.

In a series of recent posts, Russian blogger Ivan Vladimirov tallied the percentage of newborn ethnic Russians relative to the percentage of Russians as a whole per region.

This is a solid approach, because while counting immigrants is hard – estimates of illegal migrants in Russia vary all over the place – doing so for newborns is far easier. Ultimately the vast majority of births happen in hospitals, and it is difficult to imagine a vast Uzbek/Tajik underground baby boom taking place, not least because of the banal fact that the vast majority of Gastarbeiters are males.

Anyhow, bearing in mind that newborns today reflect society in 30-50 years’ time, the figures are actually quite encouraging (from an assimilationist perspective).

The percentage of ethnic Russians is increasing across almost the entirety of core Russia.

Here is another set of maps from blogger n_avdeev.

The first one shows the percentage of ethnic Russians by region:

The second shows the percentage of ethnic Russians younger than 5 years by region (note that green numbers represent an increase, and red numbers a decrease, relative to the total percentage of ethnic Russians):

You can actually see the majority Russian areas getting even more Russian. This even includes Moscow and Saint-Petersburg, despite them being Gastarbeiter magnets.

The Chuvash, Udmurts, Karels, Komi, Mari, and Mordva are steadily becoming Russians. The Republic of Karelia, once a separate Soviet Socialist republic from 1940-1956, has gone from being 57% Russian in 1926 to 82% by 2010 (and 94% amongst infants), while the comically named Jewish autonomous oblast has seen its Jews decline from 16% of the population in 1939 to 1% by 2010, and becoming 93% Russian overall (98% amongst infants).

Unsurprisingly, the Ukrainians and Belorussians are becoming Russians at an even faster pace, as are as the few remaining Jews and Germans.

Only the Tatars and Bashkirs are holding their own in their ethnic republics, though outside them, they too are dissolving into Russiandom.

However, in regions already mostly populated by highly fertile, underdeveloped, and lower IQ ethnic minorities, such as the North Caucasus (esp. “DICh”, i.e. Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya) and some Siberian regions such as Tyva and the Sakha Republic, the share of ethnic Russians is falling, often at a precipitous rate.

If Russia has an equivalent to US states like Arizona and Texas, where the original White American stock is steadily being outpaced by demographic expansionism from more virile southern ethnicities, it is Stavropol krai (81% total vs. 77% infants), Astrakhan oblast (67% vs. 64%), and the Altai republic (57% vs. 51%).

However, these are literally the only major exceptions to a pattern where ethnic Russians are stable or increasing in the parts of the country where they already constitute a solid majority. In this sense, Russia is far better off not just relative to the US, where non-Hispanic Whites now total 62% of the population and account for less than 50% of new births since 2011, but also many West European countries that have gone from being ~99% to 85%-90% White in the space of just a couple of generations (see Mark Yuray’s map to the right).

Since ethnic Russians don’t have particularly high fertility rates (though they are not significantly lower than those of non-DICh and Mongoloid Siberian minorities), the primary vehicle through which Russianizationization occurs must happen on account of differential rates of intermarriage with Russians (in such marriages, children typically adopt the dominant Russian culture).

Another blogger, Oleg Lisovsky, has compiled figures on intermarriage for both men and women.

Around 70% of Ukrainians and Belorussians marry Russians, so assimilation there is particularly fast, considering also the barely indistinguishable nature of those cultures.

These figures are considerably lower amongst the Christian Caucasian (Armenians, Georgians) and Finno-Ugric (20%-50%) nationalities, and extremely low amongst the Tyvans and DICh peoples (<5%).

On the basis of this data, Vladimirov also compiled a map of the intermarriage coefficient for Russia’s regions. Unfortunately, the scale is not specified, but one can make out the general pattern:

High levels of intermarriage in the regions where there are substantial ethnic minorities amongst large Russian majorities;

Moderate levels of intermarriage in regions with near homogenous Russian populations and predominant ethnic minorities;

Extremely low levels of intermarriage in DICh (who barely even intermarry amongst themselves).

One notes that this applies even to small population groups within DICh, such as the Laks, of whom there are 161,000 in Dagestan and 179,000 in Russia according to the 2010 census. Male Laks marry female Laks 85% of the time and ethnic Russians 5% of the time (my grandfather is a very rare case); female Laks marry male Laks 88% of the time and ethnic Russians a mere 1.2% of the time.

Three are three main lessons to take away from this:

(1) Russia is simply not undergoing population replacement/displacement on the American or West European model. There is, to be sure, considerable… métissage, but it is primarily happening between genetically and psychometrically similar peoples – and in many cases, this is something that has been happening for centuries anyway (e.g. north Russians are basically admixed Slavs and Finno-Ugrics anyway).

(2) The DICh regions are a lost cause in terms of assimilation, but in all fairness, they probably always were. They are very distinct from the rest of Russia, and understandably so, since like Central Asia, they were only annexed in the middle of the 19th century. They are also absurdly ethnocentric in terms of marriage and reproduction.

During the course of the next century, it seems inevitable that Russians will fade away from the other ethnic minority Caucasian republics, such as Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia, as well as Kalmykia and Tyva.

The only places in the North Caucasus where a demographic “struggle” of sorts is occuring with respect to traditional Russian majority regions are Stavropol krai and Astrakhan oblast, but even there, the scale of the problem is decidedly smaller than in America’s borderlands with Mexico’s or Western Europe’s inner cities.

(3) The system of ethno-republics, apart from feeding corrupt regional oligarchies, also seems to act as a break on assimilation. The prime historical example is of course the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which foistered a Ukrainian identity upon Malorussians within its territories – including Novorossiya, where they were essentially just settlers – whereas the Malorussians of the Russian Kuban have almost all became Russians since the 1920s by dint of being in the RSFSR. However, as the demographic statistics above make it clear, the same trends are playing out, to some extent, even within the Russian Federation proper.

This is why most Russian nationalists have tended to dislike federalism and ethnic minority republics, and urge a return to the imperial system of guberniyas.