History is written by the winners. That old maxim seems especially true about World War I.

Under the Treaty of Versailles, which ended the conflict, Germany was forced by the victors to accept responsibility for all of the damage and loss caused by the war. Subsequent histories of the Great War over the past one-hundred years have also tended to portray the Reich in a very negative light.

The recent book Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I, by Alexander Watson, offers a more balanced approach, however, by telling the story from the perspectives of the two major Central Powers. It’s an outstanding book, and I highly recommend you read the entire thing. Below I have identified five interesting things I learned about Germany after reading the book.

1. Despite Allied propaganda, German soldiers were not monsters during the invasion of Belgium in 1914.

Germany’s western strategy in 1914 required that its armies invade neutral Belgium. During the first few months of the invasion over 5,000 Belgian civilians were killed before a stalemate emerged on the Western Front. Watson notes that the atrocities against Belgian civilians “dealt a reputational blow from which Imperial Germany never recovered.”

Despite British and French propaganda at the time, Germany’s “culture” was not at fault, according to Watson. He points out that German soldiers had reasons to be fearful of civilian attacks in 1914. In an earlier war with France in 1870-1871, German soldiers had been subjected to fierce guerrilla warfare with “Francs tireurs” – French irregular soldiers who killed approximately 1,000 German soldiers. Rumors and anxiety during the initial invasion in August 1914 resulted in German troops becoming “scared, angry and deeply suspicious of the enemy’s civilians.”

Watson’s attempt to understand what happened in Belgium does not excuse those actions, of course. Rather, it provides context for events which severely damaged Germany’s reputation among neutrals for the remainder of the war. Ironically, the United States – the strongest neutral power at that time – had had its own problems with guerrilla fighters in the Mexican War of 1846-1848.

2. Russia’s invasion of East Prussia actually strengthened the German war effort.

While Germany was invading Belgium and France in August and September of 1914, it was simultaneously being attacked from the east by Russia. According to Watson, the Tsarist invasion of East Prussia briefly overran two-thirds of the province, and resulted in the deaths of almost 1,500 German civilians, along with tremendous damage and destruction of property. Russia also deported 13,000 German citizens – almost one-third of them did not survive.

Watson argues that the Russian invasion of East Prussia was a defining moment, and that “no other event did more to shape Germany’s understanding of what was at stake in the war.” The German public learned what would happen if they were defeated, and that knowledge helped unify the nation. Watson concludes,

For the rest of the conflict, East Prussia would stand as an awful warning of the consequences of allowing enemy troops onto German soil. The memory and myths of the invasions would retain their ability to mobilize and unify the German people long after all danger from the Russians had passed.

The invasion of Germany is often forgotten when we consider the First World War. That experience would have a long-lasting impact on German history.

3. Britain’s blockade of Germany was probably in violation of international law.

Just three weeks after entering the war, Britain announced its naval embargo on food imports into Germany. Prior to the war, Germany had been dependent on imports for 19% of its calories. Britain’s blockade would put enormous strains on the German people throughout the entire conflict.

Watson believes that the blockade was “legally dubious.” First, he points out that Britain’s “distant blockade” that attempted to close an entire sea was illegal according to the 1856 Declaration of Paris, which was still in force in 1914. Secondly, the 1909 London Declaration prohibited belligerents from interfering with neutrals’ exports of food to an enemy. While Britain’s Parliament never ratified the London Declaration, the embargo on food to Germany appeared to violate international norms at that time, according to Watson.

The legality of Britain’s blockade seems like an extremely important issue, in light of the Allies emphasis on international law during the peace discussions, after the conflict. Watson writes that the Germans can “be forgiven a certain amount of skepticism towards their enemy’s much-vaunted concern for international law.” The food embargo – referred to by the Germans as Britain’s “starvation policy” – caused extensive suffering in Germany during the war. I suspect this topic deserves a lot more attention than it has received in the past. Watson is wise to make the blockade a central part of his narrative.

4. Belgian civilians were deported and used as forced labor in Germany in 1916 and 1917.

Beginning in October 1916, tens of thousands of Belgian civilians were forcibly brought to Germany in order to man its factories. Watson reports that 60,847 Belgians were deported between October 1916 and February 1917. The treatment of these unfortunate Belgian civilians was appalling.

The decision to use Belgian forced labor was a huge fiasco, according to Watson. He writes, “The more violent the compulsion, the more miserable and recalcitrant workers became, and the less was achieved.” It was also a colossal public relations disaster for Germany. Americans, who were still neutral at that time, were particularly outraged. Watson believes that this policy hampered President Wilson’s attempt at peace negotiations.

5. Germany’s decision to launch an unrestricted U-boat campaign in 1917 was the worst decision of the war.

With no hope of victory anytime soon and conditions deteriorating on the home front, Germany decided on an unrestricted U-boat campaign in January 1917. The German leadership believed it could cut off wheat supplies to Britain, if it attacked, without warning, all merchant shipping heading to its ports. The big danger, of course, was that the United States might enter the war as a result of this policy. German leaders felt this was a risk worth taking.

Watson makes a very strong case that this was the worst decision of the war. On the eve of the decision, Britain was on the verge of bankruptcy. Meanwhile, France was on the ropes after the disastrous battle of Verdun, and the Tsar would actually be overthrown soon after the submarine campaign was announced. As expected, the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies in April 1917 in response to the sinking of its vessels.

If Germany had been able to avoid war with the United States, it’s possible to imagine a German victory in World War I. Once Russia was defeated, Germany could have then focused most of its efforts on the severely weakened British and French who, of course, wouldn’t have the tremendous support of American wealth and troops. In retrospect, Germany wagered far too much on that one, fateful decision.

For what?

In the epilogue to this fine book, Watson quotes a post-war diarist who asked, “For what have German mothers sacrificed their sons?” Germany’s defeat in the First World War was devastating. 2,036,897 German soldiers were killed, leaving behind 533,000 war widows and 1,192,000 orphans. And the nation lost a big chunk of its territory and population as a result of the Treaty of Versailles.

Understanding Germany’s role in World War I is extremely important for making sense of our world today. Watson has done an outstanding job in providing an accessible account of this topic for the ordinary reader. I highly recommend that you read this book.