“ISOLATION”, “consolidation” and “self-reliance” are different terms used among Moscow’s political and business elite to mean the same thing. In the face of international sanctions occasioned by its support of the rebels in eastern Ukraine and its earlier annexation of Crimea, Russia is preparing to pull inward. It is hunkering down for a long period of diplomatic antagonism and economic hardship.

That process appears to be accelerating. On August 6th the Kremlin responded to Western pressure by announcing that it will ban or reduce agricultural imports from countries imposing sanctions on Russia. The tensions in eastern Ukraine are rising. Ukrainian forces have, in effect, closed off the rebel stronghold of Donetsk through a campaign of often-indiscriminate shelling. If it falls to Kiev, then the pro-Moscow insurgency will lose its potency.

Mr Putin may be tempted to salvage his credibility by sending in Russian troops on the pretence of a “humanitarian” operation. According to NATO, 20,000 Russian soldiers have amassed at the border. They are engaged in live-fire drills involving fighter aircraft and bombers—the sort of manoeuvres that have presaged invasion before. Even if troops do not cross the border, the confrontation between Russia and the West looks set to continue through the rule of President Vladimir Putin and, perhaps, beyond.

By increasing his support of the rebels after the crash of flight MH17 last month, Mr Putin has shown that he values his own understanding of Russia’s historic destiny more than the economic well-being of his country and its global reputation. He is making a risky bet that challenging the architecture of the post-cold-war order will reap its own rewards and make up for a drop in living standards.

It is a mistake to think of Mr Putin as “mercantile”, says a Duma deputy from the pro-Kremlin United Russia party. Rather, he is an “historical figure” set on establishing Russia as a self-sufficient centre of power. Mr Putin told his security council last month that “Russia is fortunately not a member of any alliance”, which he presented as a “guarantee of our sovereignty”.

The new antagonism between Russia and the West will not be a battle between superpowers; for one thing, today’s Russia lacks an ideology with appeal beyond its borders. In an interview with The Economist last month, America’s president, Barack Obama, said that the challenges Russia presents are “effectively regional”.

The Kremlin proudly claims it will aim to replace Western goods and services with domestic ones, for instance in high-tech parts for the arms industry. Import substitution could work if manufacturers weren’t running at near-full capacity and in dire need of new investment, which will be in shorter supply as foreign financing shrinks. The country’s $173 billion in sovereign-wealth funds, built up over years of windfall profits from oil sales, will be drawn down to stabilise the rouble and pay off the debts of state banks and firms. “It won’t kill us, but it will create problems,” says the United Russia deputy.

Mr Putin will have to push the country’s financial resources to their limit if he wants to fulfil the promises on social spending he made when he returned to the presidency in May 2012. (At the time Russia forecast its GDP growth at 5% a year; the IMF now predicts GDP growth for this year at just 0.2%.) Mr Putin has already proposed the introduction of a 3% sales tax as a way of filling holes in regional budgets. The government has also announced it will siphon off private pension-fund contributions to the federal budget, prompting a deputy economic-development minister to declare he was “ashamed” of the move. He was fired the next day.

Such problems have not yet hurt Mr Putin. Indeed, he is more popular than ever and his propaganda apparatus is proving to be highly effective. A poll released this week by the Levada Centre, a think-tank in Moscow, shows that 74% of Russians have a negative view of America, the highest number in Russia’s post-Soviet history. The showdown with the West over Ukraine has allowed for a “powerful discharge of frustration” built up over years since the Soviet collapse, says Lev Gudkov, director of the Levada Centre. And now that Mr Putin knows relations with the West are spoiled no matter what, he may be prepared to up the ante again.