After a 2017/2018 season in which they finished 17th avoiding relegation by just one point and a 2018 summer transfer market that saw them spend only 8,90 Mill. € (according to https://www.transfermarkt.com) for players such as Jonathan Ikoné, Zeki Celik, Loïc Rémy, José Fonte, Rafael Leão and Jonathan Bamba, Lille OSC under the guidance of Christophe Galtier finished second in Ligue 1 in 2018/2019, with the third best offense (68 goals scored), best defense (33 goals conceded) and collecting 75 points (only one less than the title winning team of the 2010/2011 season).

In the article below I’ll try to explain how Galtier set up his team tactically and tried to get the most out of his players’ strengths, with the use of videos and diagrams.

All the videos are used based on Copyright Disclaimer under section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, allowance is made for “fair use” for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, education and research.

This analysis is based on 7 matches I watched.

Lille OSC 3–0 Olympique de Marseille (8th Round)

Lille OSC 1–0 Amiens SC (21st Round)

Lille OSC 4–0 OGC Nice (23rd Round)

Lille OSC 1–0 Dijon FCO (27th Round)

Lille OSC 0–1 AS Monaco (29th Round)

Lille OSC 5–2 PSG (32nd Round)

Olympique Lyonnais 2–2 Lille OSC (35th Round)

Defensive Organization

Lille get organized in a mid defensive block in a 4–4–2 formation with the two wingers tucked some metres inside in order to create a solid block in the centre of the pitch and force the opponent to pass to the wing, where the pressure gets more intense.

Pressing

Lille’s pressing strategy depends on the characteristics of the opponent but is mainly executed after a predetermined trigger is identified by one of the two forwards.

As you can see in the video’s below, in the matches against OL, OM, Nice and PSG the pressing trigger was the pass from the Fullback or Wingback to the CB. In terms of which player was pressing who, against 4-man defenses the two wingers were against the FBs while the FWs were pressing the CBs (and the GK if necessary).

But against PSG:

PSG’s LCB has just received the ball from the wingback and is getting pressed by two different directions from Ikoné (who cuts the diagonal passing options towards the centre) and Pépé who cuts his vertical passing lanes. PSG’s Wingback is getting marked by the FB Celik.

Against Amiens, a team that had neither very technical players at the back nor forwards or wingers that could create problems with consistency against Lille’s back four, but were trying to play from the back nonetheless without constantly kicking it long, Galtier decided to press very high up the pitch.

If the opponent manages to find a way to progress further with the ball, Lille moves back in a compact and flat 4–4–2 formation.

The above video also shows two characteristics of Lille’s defensive organization.

With the ball in their own half, the 2 FWs (Ikoné and Loïc Rémy or Rafael Leão ) stay behind the ball and try to close space centrally but if the ball passes between them and the midfield line, they do not help their teammates(probably in order to be in a better position to receive the ball during the offensive transition phase) .

It was something that made life more difficult for the two central midfielders who also had to cover more space as Pépé had the freedom to give up on his defensive duties in order to be ready for a counterattack.

The Ivorian would stay behind the ball and defend as the right winger in this 4–4–2 but once the ball was passed behind him or when the ball was in Lille’s defensive third and on the opposite side he would move a few meters further and wait to either run behind the opposition defense or receive the ball on counterattack.

Ikoné and Loïc Rémy or Rafael Leão would stay close to the midfield line, with the opponent in their defensive third, ready to receive the first pass on the counter attack, a pass that would be followed by either them turning around and running centrally with the ball, a pass to the wings or to the two central midfielders so they would pass the ball to the wings.

This low positioning of the two FWs created a problem for the opposition CBs. If they move up in order to mark them and not let them turn, the risk of having one of the fastest players in the league in Pépé running at their backs was huge. If they decide to stay back to avoid Pépé they leave Lille’s FWs with space to turn into and towards their goal.

This combination of Pépé’s freedom, the FWs’ positioning and the speed and pace of the two wingers and the two forwards of Galtier’s team made Lille one of the most dangerous teams on the counterattack in Europe and the thought of not covering your FBs adequately during the build-up phase when playing against them, suicidal.

Below you can see some examples of how quickly LOSC attacked on the counter.

Another great weapon for Galtier when it came to the fast execution of the offensive transition was his GK, Mike Maignan who was very fast in finding a teammate after a blocked shot or with a clearance.

Of course, LOSC wasn’t perfect in all of their counter attacks as there were situations in which too many players moved upwards too fast. The result was that if the ball was lost, too many players would be caught in front of the ball and unable to help on the defensive transition.

(Despite the loss of the ball in the second occasion LOSC still manage to steal the ball again and score a goal on the counter)

Build-Up Phase

A characteristic of LOSC’s build-up independently of the opponent or the shape used during that phase was the front 4 that were always ready to run behind the defense or in the channels at any time, with the CBs or FBs instructed to make the long ball if they had enough space and time and the defensive line of the opponent was high. Having 4 players always motivated and ready to make runs behind the defense and always making unmarking movements to signal to their teammates that they are ready for a pass, is a very underrated part of modern football and something not as common as it should be if we take into account the relative simplicity of its execution. It’s a part of the team’s game for which Galtier deserves huge merit.

If the opponent was organized in a mid or high defensive block one of the first options for Galtier’s LOSC was to move the ball to the left FB and with the help of Xeka and Mendes avoid the pressure on the wing, cut inside in the middle 3rd and make a diagonal ball for Pépé on the opposite wing for him to either take advantage of the space behind the defensive line or go on a 1vs1 against the opposing FB.

In terms of organization and positioning, the two Full backs move higher up the pitch while the Defensive Midfielders Mendes, Xeka or T.Maia position themselves depending on the opponent.

For example against Amiens, the DM close to the ball would drop next to the CB in order to cover the FB that was higher up the pitch and also be in a good position to make a vertical pass to either the winger or Ikone between the lines, while the other DM would stay in front of the CBs.

Against Dijon, Mendes joined Ikoné in moving between the lines (ready to drop down and help if needed) while Xeka was the only player in front of the CBs.

Other alternatives include both DMs in front of the CBs or Xeka making diagonal runs from the centre towards the wing to receive the ball between the lines from the FBs or the wingers.

In any case the idea remains the same. Move the ball to the wing were the FB, the Winger and Ikoné (whose role is to move from wing to wing to create those combinations) will create a triangle and combine.

Most frequently this combination will have as a result Pépé receiving the ball (even if the ball arrives to him from the other wing) who will tuck inside with the ball and either shot, cross at the back post or combine quickly with the striker or Ikoné.

LOSC due to their CBs, who cannot make vertical passes in very small spaces and sometimes succumb in mistakes, and their forwards and wingers who are much more dangerous with space to run into, are much more comfortable and dangerous at attacking when their opponent plays with a high defensive line or hasn’t fallen back in his defensive third yet. This is the reason why Galtier set up his team to either play fast on the counter, make diagonal balls to Pépé or search quickly the FWs with passes behind the defenders.

I hope I gave you a detailed but simple idea on how one of my favourite teams for the 2018/2019 season played. Many more articles on tactics to come!

You can contact me through Twitter @ThanosChelas