In arguing against moral desert as a factor in distribution of primary goods, Rawls enlists two forms of his Lottery Argument. I will object that neither form of the Lottery Argument provides an adequate justification for entirely eliminating moral desert from matters concerning distribution of primary goods.

Rawls formulates his lottery argument in the following manner:

We do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than we deserve our initial starting place in society. That we deserve the superior character that enables us to make the effort to cultivate our abilities is also problematic; for such character depends in good part upon fortunate family and social circumstances in early life for which we can claim no credit. The notion of desert does not apply here.[1]

His argument exhibits the following form: we do not deserve benefits from that which we do not deserve; we do not deserve our ability to cultivate our talents because it is largely dependent upon fortunate family and social circumstances that we do not control; thus, we do not deserve distribution in accordance with our natural endowments.

This line of argument by Rawls appears to take a position that denies any responsibility for one’s actions, if desert flows from responsibility. Rawls does indeed seem to tie desert to responsibility, since he seems to discount desert of the basis of not being able to claim credit, or not being responsible. To deny responsibility, Rawls argument must then rest on a denial of free will. To object to this, it is necessary to show a way in which an individual can be responsible for their actions by exercising sufficient control over them. This can be shown as follows: to be responsible for one’s actions, one must be responsible for the will from which their action stems; one is responsible for their will if, and only if, they will their will; one wills their will only in cases where they desire to have the exact will that they possess; thus, if one desires their exact will, they are responsible for it, and in addition, responsible for actions that stem from it.

To object to this argument, Rawls could plausibly convert the argument into a denial of free will. However, this does not appear to be Rawls goal, since he states, “I have urged, then, that moral theory is, in important respects, independent from certain philosophical subjects sometimes regarded as methodologically prior to it.”[2] Thus, it appears that Rawls’ goal is to construct a moral theory that isn’t reliant on any view pertaining to free will.

Rawls instead may object to the idea of moral desert by a further formulation of his Lottery Argument:

The precept which seems intuitively to come closest to rewarding moral desert is that of distribution according to…conscientious effort… however, it seems clear that the effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him… The idea of rewarding desert is impracticable.[3]

This line of argument, contrary to the former, does not deny any credit to the effort one exerts, but merely states that the tendency of one to exert effort is influenced by natural abilities and skills. So, it is possible that some portion of our effort is determined by these factors, while some is due to one’s being responsible. Since it cannot be determined how much one is responsible for, moral desert ought not to be rewarded.

Rawls’ conclusion does not appear to follow from his premises. If it is the case that we are responsible for some portion of the effort we exert, it is the case that we deserve rewards (or penalties) for that which we are responsible. While it may be impracticable to determine how much one is exactly responsible for, deciding to reward no aspect of effort, rather than all, or perhaps some portion of it, seems arbitrary.

If the amount of effort rewarded through claims of moral desert were largely arbitrary, it would appear appealing to Rawls’ publicity requirement (that is, “parties evaluate conceptions of justice as publicly acknowledged and fully effective moral constitutions of social life”[4]) would be the best way to decide on a point along the spectrum. If it were made public that one in no way deserves rewards for their effort and simply benefit because the system allows them to be entitled to their basket of primary goods, this would result in bad psychological effects on members of society. It would be de-motivating for all individuals if they did not feel responsible for their actions, and would cause all to be worsened, since there exists less motivation for self-betterment and due to this, the betterment of all. Similarly, it would appear psychologically damaging to tell members of society that they are entirely responsible. Such a view would seem to be damaging to those worst-off. Even though they may be disadvantaged merely, or at least in part, because of social circumstances, their self-respect will be damaged since they feel entirely at fault for their lot in life. Resultantly, it appears a position ought to be taken that allows for society to recognize some amount of moral desert, in addition to recognizing the significance of morally arbitrary factors.

The exact amount of desert to be rewarded may be decided after the veil, since it may be dictated according to what benefits the worst-off the most in terms of self-respect. While it may be bad for them to feel no responsibility due to the de-motivation of society, it would be equally bad to hold them fully responsible, claiming they are fully at fault for their lot. After the veil is lifted, a point in between the two extremes may be chosen that maximizes the benefits and minimizes the costs of both responsibility and recognition of social circumstances to self-respect.

Rawls objects to claims of moral desert first on grounds that claims cannot exist, and later on grounds that rewarding it is impracticable. However, it has been shown that it is possible for claims of moral desert to exist, which is undeniable by Rawls due to his desire for a moral theory independent from metaphysics. Furthermore, due to Rawls’ publicity requirement, it has been shown to be best to reward some amount of moral desert, to be decided after the veil is lifted, in addition to recognizing the significance of social circumstances. This minimizes the harm of the two extreme ends of the spectrum while maximizing the benefits for the worst-off, since they feel some amount of responsibility, in addition to recognizing that they aren’t necessarily entirely at fault for their societal position.

[1] Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999. 89.

[2] Rawls, John. “The Independence of Moral Theory.” American Philosophical Association 48 (1974-75): 5-22. Accessed March 2, 2018. JSTOR. 21.

[3] Rawls: A Theory of Justice, 274.

[4] Ibid., 115.