Farley believes that the United States would be better off without the intercontinental ballistic missile and bomber legs of the nuclear triad. This has been a frequent argument since the end of the Cold War. Some believe that when the Soviet Union dissolved, the threat of nuclear weapons ceased. This assertion neglects the fact that China and Russia are both modernizing their arsenals. In fact, Russia intends to rely heavily on its nuclear arsenal for future self-defense.

Debates over cutting one or more legs of the triad have recurred since the end of the Cold War for two reasons. First, the threat of nuclear war has diminished dramatically.

Second, the expense of developing the next generation of each of the three legs of the triad has grown onerous. One need not believe that “the threat of nuclear weapons ceased,” to think that the U.S. nuclear force structure requires significant reform, especially as our ICBMs, bombers and ballistic-missile submarines age.

In approaching these reforms, it’s undoubtedly best to take a fresh look, especially given that the Triad was as much a result of service in-fighting as a rational strategic choice.

Such a review is particularly necessary given that it has become apparent, over the last decade, that the Air Force itself has lost interest in its nuclear arsenal; a long series of incidents, from a nuclear weapon-laden B-52 taking off from Minot to the recent set of revelations about unpreparedness and unprofessionalism amongst missile crews.

A cynic, or a recently retired Secretary of Defense, might suggest that the USAF no longer sees its nuclear assets as a serious bureaucratic bargaining chip.

And so, given that the Air Force itself no longer seems to take its nuclear responsibilities very seriously, it might behoove us all to rethink how the United States ought to approach nuclear deterrence, especially in context of a threat environment radically different than the one that existed in 1963.

Neglecting cost, the bombers provide the only visible demonstration of U.S. will. This fact necessitated the use of B-2s to show resolve when North Korea was threatening nuclear attacks on the United States earlier this year.

Having had the opportunity to visit an aircraft carrier during my research, I discovered that such vessels are not, in fact, invisible. The United States military has multiple means for intimidating or deterring a potential adversary. For example, the decision to steam the USS Nimitz and the USS Independence into the South China Sea during the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1996 is widely credited with defusing tensions.

Perhaps more to the point, military assets do not require the words “USAF” on the body in order to intimidate. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union used Tu-95s (operated by the Soviet Air Forces) and Tu-142 (operated by the Soviet Navy) interchangeably in order to visibly demonstrate Soviet presence and will.