So what was presented on the surface side, before the Airbus took off and got involved, as an attack by Iranian gunboats on U.S. ships, is, in reality, demonstrably provable now that we attacked the gunboats .

And that then allowed — under this kind of specious rule of loosened hot pursuit — us to take military action.

That the United States forces enticed, in fact, entrapped the Iranian gunboats into a situation where we could then say that there’s been a hostile action by them, the firing on the helicopter.

Roger Charles (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marines, Retired), ABC News Consultant: What we know, beyond any doubt, is that there was a provocation .

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] Roger Charles is a former Marine lieutenant colonel who served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has been investigating the USS Vincennes incidents for several years, and was a consultant on this investigation.

What we’ve discovered is that the Vincennes helicopter, when it was fired upon by Iranian gunboats — if it was fired upon by Iranian gunboats — and there’s some dispute about that — that when that happened, in fact, the Vincennes helicopter was itself in Iranian airspace , over Iranian territorial waters.

John Barry ( Newsweek Correspondent): The fact is that the helicopter was nowhere near where it is positioned on that particular chart.

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(a) Whoever commits an offense...or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

(B) intentionally omitting information from a statement and thereby causing a portion of such statement to be misleading, or intentionally concealing a material fact, and thereby creating a false impression by such statement ...

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;

(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or

(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully —

Ronald Reagan : [T]he Vincennes sent a Mark III LAMPS Helicopter on investigative patrol in international airspace to assess the situation.

And, the helicopter , which seems — on Admiral Crowe’s chart — to be in international airspace, was not.

That call, it now appears, never happened.

The whole chain of events, remember, was set in motion when an armed reconnaissance helicopter from the Vincennes was sent to investigate a distress call from a merchant ship.

Ted Koppel: As our investigation scrutinized the Navy’s official report of the Vincennes , more and more inconsistencies became apparent.

And that was the operation which was going on that day, and into which the Vincennes charged its way.

And it was a decoy which had been organized by U.S. forces in the Gulf to lure out the Iranian gunboats from the islands in the Strait of Hormuz, so that these gunboats would come south to attack this helpless Liberian tanker and would instead find themselves confronted by U.S. warships and armed U.S. helicopters.

John Barry ( Newsweek Correspondent): The truth, we are told, is that this phantom vessel, Stoval , didn’t exist, because it was a decoy. It had no existence other than some radio transmissions.

Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. : Like Newsweek , I am unable to find the Stoval in the Liberian registry.

There is no evidence that any such ship exists.

As for the Liberian merchant ship, she is referred to on official Navy charts as the Stoval .

He tells us that he issued no distress call that day.

We checked with the captain of the Pakistani merchant ship.

Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. : We got no requests from the merchant ships.

That there were no distress calls that day.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] But Admiral Fogarty must have forgotten what he wrote in his own official report for the Navy.

Soon thereafter, explosions were heard in the vicinity of a Liberian merchant , where numerous Iranian gunboats were gathered.

William M. Fogarty (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director of Policy and Plans, U.S. Central Command, head of the investigative team): During the early morning of three July, a Pakistani merchant was also harassed.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] The official Navy investigation was conducted by Admiral William Fogarty.

George H.W. Bush (U.S. Vice President, Jan. 20 1981-1989 Jan. 20), formal prepared statement, to the U.N. Security Council, New York City, July 14 1988: [July 14, 1988] It occurred in the midst of a naval attack initiated by Iranian vessels against a neutral vessel and subsequently against the Vincennes when she came to the aid of the innocent ship in distress .

Remember Vice President Bush’s description of the incident at the U.N.?

There had to be more at stake, and there was.

[on camera] But, surely, the Reagan-Bush administration wouldn’t have engaged in a massive cover-up just to protect the reputation of one Navy captain.

Preliminary Objections by the United States of America, March 4 1991, pp. 24 n.1, 27, 27 n.1 { 737 kb pdf }, Iran v. United States (“Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988”) (U.N. I.C.J. , filed May 17 1989, discontinued on settlement Feb. 22 1996) ( case summary ). The important bearing northwest was concealed by U.S. Military Officers from their report. See below , for the significance of this prima facie criminal lie of omission. –CJHjr

At the time the USS Vincennes fired its surface-to-air missiles ( 6:54 UTC), it was located at 26 30 47 N , 056 00 57 E .

[D]uring the 17 minute engagement it became necessary for the USS Vincennes , in defending itself , to maneuver into waters claimed by Iran as territorial waters. ...

These positions are all outside of Iranian territorial waters.

All U.S. naval vessels prior to the engagement with Iranian small boats were in international waters. The ICAO investigation determined that at 6:10 a.m. the position of the three U.S. ships was as follows:

The Montgomery was even further inside.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] Qeshm Island is Iranian, so the Vincennes was almost three miles inside Iran’s 12-mile territorial limit.

And if you listen carefully to this videotape — shot on the bridge of Vincennes during the engagement — it is possible to hear the quartermaster giving the ship’s location to the same navigator.

Source: DoD Report (July 28 1988), ¶ b(2) , p.30 (Watch Organization, weapons release authority) (second sentence, silently redacted, by the DoD, from the copy released to the public on August 19 1988, 1988: p.20); p. 42 (1988: p.29a) ( Vincennes CIC Plan, top-left: CO, TAO; image widths: 640px , 800px , 1024px , 1280px ).

Victor Guillory (TAO) was seated directly next to Captain Rogers (CO). On his right hand. In the Vincennes Combat Information Center. –CJHjr

That’s Victor Guillory (Lieutenant Commander). The second in combat command. The only person on the warship authorized to release weapons, besides Captain Rogers (Commanding Officer).

I did that a couple of times later on, also to let him know that we were still within Iranian territorial waters.”

“I relayed down to the Tactical Action Officer at some point — I’m not sure if it was when we crossed the 12-nautical-mile limit or not — that we are now inside the 12-nautical-mile point.

Through the Freedom of Information Act, we obtained the testimony of the Vincennes ’ own navigator , that his ship had crossed into Iranian waters before she opened fire on the gunboats. Quote:

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] The Iranian gunboats on that particular day — during their gun battles with the Vincennes the Montgomery and the helicopter from the Vincennes — the Iranian gunboats, during the actual shooting, were in Iranian territorial waters .

But you’re invited to believe by the chart that it’s where the gunboats were.

If you then look a little higher up the chart, you can see that there’s a tiny brown mark, it’ll be a little bit like a launch, which says, I think, “encounter with gunboats.”

And if you look at that chart, what you see is that there was a large and imposing silhouette of the Vincennes , and that’s not where the Vincennes was.

And that cover-up starts with the very first chart that was ever produced of the event.

John Barry ( Newsweek Correspondent): The first and most basic thing that they covered up was where the Vincennes was when the whole thing happened.

Where was the Vincennes at the time that she shot down the Airbus?

Ted Koppel: Let me ask you again.

William J. Crowe Jr.: No, no, no. She was in Iran’s territorial waters.

Ted Koppel: [interviewing] But if I were to ask you today, was the Vincennes in international waters at the time that she shot down the Airbus—

Until a couple of weeks ago, locating the Vincennes in international waters was a position stoutly defended by Admiral William Crowe, who was then chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

And why would the entire executive branch of government, from the President on down, become involved in a cover-up concerning the location of that ship?

Where was the Vincennes at the time of the shootdown?

Ted Koppel: For several months now, ABC News Nightline and Newsweek magazine have been investigating just that question.

Frank C. Carlucci (Secretary of Defense, Nov. 23 1987-1989 Jan. 20): The exact location, as best we could tell, was in international waters , but if somebody has better evidence, they can certainly produce it.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] Former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci makes the same claim, to this day.

Captain Rogers: Through the maneuvering, the surface engagement, the missile launch, I thought we were outside of Iranian territorial waters .

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] And indeed, to this very day, the captain of the Vincennes , Will Rogers, insists that his ship was well outside Iran’s territorial waters.

They had to intentionally approve it .

And so if there are misstatements of fact , there—

The process is set up so that in all these cases, those relevant agencies sign off.

Richard S. Williamson : The sources of the information were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department and the National Security Council.

So where did Secretary Williamson get his information?

Doing so in their own territorial waters would be another matter altogether.

Iranian gunboats, for example, firing on U.S. warships in international waters would be the aggressors.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] Where the Vincennes was makes a lot of difference.

Richard S. Williamson (Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs, 1988-1989), formal prepared statement, to the U.N. ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, July 13 1988: [July 13, 1988] The ship was, at the time of the incident, in international waters , outside the zone of exclusion declared by Iran.

But if the President merely “misdirected” Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Williamson was left to carry the actual lie .

But not at the time of the shootdown itself.

[on camera] As indeed they were.

“On July 3, 1988, the USS Vincennes and the USS Elmer Montgomery were operating in international waters of the Persian Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz.”

[voice-over] President Reagan , in his letter to Congress regarding the incident: Quote,

The international community, the American public, the U.S. Congress were all led to believe that what happened that day occurred in and over international waters and was directly provoked by the Iranians.

But that was certainly the party line.

Ted Koppel: As we will show you, much, if not most, of what you just heard was untrue.

And it occurred in the midst of a naval attack initiated by Iranian vessels against a neutral vessel and subsequently against the Vincennes when she came to the aid of the innocent ship in distress .

This tragic accident occurred against a backdrop of repeated, unjustified, unprovoked and unlawful Iranian attacks against U.S. merchant shipping and armed forces.

George H.W. Bush (U.S. Vice President, Jan. 20 1981-1989 Jan. 20), formal prepared statement, to the U.N. Security Council, New York City, July 14 1988: [July 14, 1988] One thing is clear, and that is that the USS Vincennes acted in self-defense .

That message was carried to the United Nations 11 days after the incident by then-Vice President Bush.

It was the fault of the Iranians.

The captain of the Vincennes was not to blame.

Two points had to be made.

Whatever the public’s feelings toward Iran might have been, the shooting down of a civilian airliner, the deaths of 290 civilians, were both a tragedy and potentially a political embarrassment.

Ted Koppel: In July of 1988, the country was, as it is now, in the middle of a presidential campaign .

When we come back, the story you didn’t hear four years ago.

The official response to those two questions has been a tissue of lies, fabrications, half-truths and omissions .

And what was she doing there?

Where , precisely, was the Vincennes at the time of the shootdown?

But two critical issues were never addressed in public, not truthfully, at least.

And indeed, over the days and weeks to come, corrections would be made.

We know all these things now because the information was later retrieved through a detailed analysis of a tape made by the USS Vincennes ’ own Aegis radar tracking system.

“Questions and Answers with President Reagan Regarding USS Vincennes Shooting Down of Iranian Aircraft,” White House, South Lawn, 12:00 P.M. EDT, Monday, July 4 1988, on return from a weekend at Camp David (Federal News Service, transcript, id=19880704z0052 ), AP880704-0133.

Ted Koppel: That, too, was wrong. The aircraft had been steadily climbing from liftoff and was still gaining altitude at the time of missile impact.

William J. Crowe Jr.: Decreasing in altitude as it neared the ship.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] The only electronic emission from the plane was its correct transponder signal, identifying it as a commercial aircraft.

William J. Crowe Jr.: There were electronic indications on Vincennes that led it to believe that the aircraft was an F-14 .

Ted Koppel: At the time it was shot down, the Iranian aircraft was actually turning slowly away from the Vincennes . Its top speed, a relatively minor point, was 385 knots.

William J. Crowe Jr.: More importantly, the aircraft headed directly for Vincennes , on a constant bearing, at high speed, approximately 450 knots.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] That was wrong. The aircraft was flying well within the commercial air corridor.

William J. Crowe Jr. (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral, U.S. Navy): [July 3, 1988] The suspect aircraft was outside the prescribed commercial air corridor .

First reports, as Admiral Crowe would later note, are almost always wrong.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] That same Sunday, July 3rd, Admiral William Crowe, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with reporters at the Pentagon to brief them on the incident.

But my overall and overriding responsibility at the time was to my ship and my crew, and I think I executed that as I had been sworn to do.

Unfortunately, innocent people’s lives were lost, and I think that is something that I will live with the rest of my life. It’s something that I regret.

Captain Rogers: The decision, I’m— I think probably was proper.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] Within a matter of hours, it became clear that the aircraft downed by the Vincennes was not a warplane, but a commercial airliner with what later turned out to be 290 civilians on board.

And that happened maybe 20 minutes later, by the time we collected the information and said, “Well, it might not have been an F-14.”

George Emerson (Gunnery Officer, USS Montgomery , Lieutenant, U.S. Navy): It seemed, to most people, that for the amount of wreckage that was seen falling, it probably wasn’t an F-14, although no one could be sure.

Otherwise, I would have certainly never released two standard missiles at it.

I thought it was a tactical aircraft engaged in support of the ongoing surface action.

Did I think it was absolutely an F-14, or an F-4, or a Fokker D-27?

2nd Seaman: Relax, relax, keep the noise down. Knock it off!

1st Seaman: Oh, dead. We hit it. We have got it. That was a dead on.

And the decision was made at that, and it intercepted and killed the aircraft.

When the aircraft reached a little over 10 miles, at that point in time I either make the decision then, or I don’t make it at all, because I reach minimum weapons range.

I had difficulty at 20 miles. I just did not want to shoot. I could not believe that this was really happening to us. So I held my fire.

At some point in time, you have to make the decision. I was having—

But when you don’t have time, you basically take what you have, and you’re—

Captain Rogers: The aircraft was warned, warned a number of times, continued to close. Time is a demon here. If I have a long time to sort things out, you’re going to take more time to look at this and more time to look at that.

Captain Rogers: Several minutes into this, we were notified that we have an aircraft departure from Bandar Abbas. Did not really become of tactical concern till it was around 47 miles away, primarily because aircraft flew in the Gulf. It was pointed out at this point that the aircraft was essentially inbound on what looked to be a closed constant bearing decreasing range, and we were monitoring it.

George Emerson (Gunnery Officer, USS Montgomery , Lieutenant, U.S. Navy): We fired at this contact, 10 rounds, got an explosion that covered or obscured the target with smoke, and the target seemed to disappear. It’s very difficult, when you’ve never been in a combat situation, to know what has actually transpired, until maybe just a few seconds after the event has transpired.

Captain Rogers: As they turned and began to maneuver and close us fairly high speed and on erratic courses, we asked permission to fire a warning shot. The bridge reported that they were firing at us, and indicated that we were taking this small craft under fire. We were maneuvering rapidly because, first place, my desire was to keep them at arm’s length, if you will. We were engaging, it essentially was barrage fire. We were shifting targets as rapidly as we could, and Montgomery at the same time was directed to engage the small craft, which they did.

William C. Rogers III (former Commanding Officer, USS Vincennes , Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired): The small craft turned in our direction.

We have reconstructed what happened next from audio and video tapes , recorded aboard those two U.S. Navy ships, and from the first TV interview granted by the captain of the USS Vincennes since the incident.

[on camera] On that hazy Sunday morning of July 3rd, in fact, the Aegis cruiser Vincennes and the frigate Montgomery were on patrol in the Gulf, when a helicopter from the Vincennes came under fire from Iranian gunboats while on a reconnaissance mission.

On the record, the United States was trying to remain neutral, although clear warnings had gone out that the U.S. would not stand idly by while Iranian gunboats harassed international shipping. Nor would the U.S. Navy permit mines to be planted in international waters.

[voice-over] And the videotape of bodies floating amid the wreckage was a horrifying reminder of how easily the United States could become involved in the bloody war that continued to rage between Iran and Iraq.

There were 290 men, women and children who died on that plane.

But the U.S. Navy does not deliberately target a civilian Airbus.

Granted, there was no love lost between the United States and Iran.

It was another July 4th weekend, four years ago, almost to the day, that an American warship, the USS Vincennes , shot down an unarmed civilian airliner over the Persian Gulf.

And when a U.S. ship accidentally shot down an Iranian passenger plane, the U.S. government covered up the truth, to prevent that alliance from becoming fully known.

But the United States did so much to ensure that Iraq would not lose its war against Iran that the Reagan and Bush administrations became allies to Saddam Hussein.

It was certainly never a declared war.

Before this program is over tonight, we will have told you what we’ve uncovered over the past few months, working with Newsweek magazine, about this country’s war against Iran.

And, unlike most countries in the world — in which there’s no real expectation that the truth will out — Americans really do believe that sooner or later, however painful the truth may be, those who know it will ultimately tell it.

Still, unlike most countries in the world, when our government lies to us, there tend to be consequences:

But after Vietnam and Watergate, we know better.

There were times when we may have believed otherwise.

And, much as we’d like to believe otherwise, the U.S. government is no exception.

They do it all the time.

And why the U.S. government tried to cover it up .

Richard S. Williamson (Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs, 1988-1989): [July 13, 1988] The ship was, at the time of the incident, in international waters .

George H.W. Bush (U.S. Vice President, Jan. 20 1981-1989 Jan. 20): [July 14, 1988] One thing is clear, and that is that the USS Vincennes acted in self-defense .

How could this have happened?

The shooting down of an Iranian Airbus by the USS Vincennes .

{Chart, widths: 620px, 780px, 1000px, 1263px, 1580px}

0610 USS Vincennes in position 26 26 N, 056 02 E. USS Montgomery approximately 5 NM to the north-west {315°}. 26-29-31 N, 55-58-01 E

(26.492 N, 55.967 E). –CJHjr USS Sides approximately 18 NM to the north-east. 0615 USS Vincennes’ helicopter in a position 8 to 10 NM north {0°/360°} of USS Montgomery is fired upon by small boats. 8 n.miles: 26-37-31 N, 55-58-01 E

(26.625 N, 55.967 E).

4.2 n.miles offshore Iran (Qeshm Island).

3.2 n.miles offshore Iran (Hangam Island). 10 n.miles: 26-39-31 N, 55-58-01 E

(26.659 N, 55.967 E).

2.5 n.miles offshore Iran (Qeshm Island).

2.8 n.miles offshore Iran (Hangam Island). –CJHjr * * * 0654:22 USS Vincennes, first missile launch followed by the second missile. ... IR655 approximate position 26 40 06 N, 056 02 41 E. USS Vincennes is at position 26 30 47 N, 056 00 57 E, track 058 degrees, speed 22 kt. 8.9 n.miles offshore Iran (Hangam Island). –CJHjr USS Montgomery approximate position 26 31 N, 055 55 12 E, track 132 degrees, speed 17 kt. 6.5 n.miles offshore Iran (Hangam Island). At that same track and speed, ten minutes earlier, when the Montgomery opened fire on the small boats (0643Z): 3.6 n.miles offshore Iran. Though it likely changed course and speed during that 10 minutes. –CJHjr * * * 2.11.7 Positions of USS Vincennes and IR655. The position of USS Vincennes at the time of missile launch based on the AEGIS-system data was given as 26 30 47 N, 056 00 57 E and that of flight IR655 as 26 40 06 N, 056 02 41 E. ICAO Report, pp. A-1, A-11, 19 (Nov. 7 1988) _______________

The Montgomery’s bearing northwest from the Vincennes puts the U.S. military helicopter about 9 n.miles deep inside Iran’s territorial waters. Senior U.S. Military Officers concealed this bearing from their Report, both the public version and the classified version. (DoD Report, ¶ b.(2), p.35/23). They revealed it to the U.N. ICAO investigators (above). And U.S. Justice Department lawyers ratifed this bearing in their brief in the U.N. International Court of Justice. Yet, in public, senior U.S. Military Officers continued to pretend — even after this broadcast — that the Montgomery was south of the Vincennes.

Les Aspin, Chairman. Where was the Montgomery at this point? ... At the point that the helicopter was fired upon. Admiral William J. Crowe Jr.: It was near the Vincennes, about 8 or 10 miles south. House Hearing, p.19 (July 21 1992).

While continuing to conceal — all the while — the automatically recorded SINS logs (Ship’s Inertial Navigation System), and Link 11 messages, which document all the positions. Both in the tape recordings onboard each ship and, in real time, via satellite broadcasts. Tape recorded at the Pentagon. And the aircraft carrier. And the AWACS. And the E2C Hawkeye. And the NSA listening station on the Musandam Peninsula.

Ship’s movements are automatically recorded by computer programs for applications such as gun laying calculations and Link 11 position reporting. Electronics Technician, Volume 5–Navigation Systems, Chapter 1, Surface Navigation Systems, p.1-1 {1373 kb pdf} (Naval Education and Training Professional Development and Technology Center, Pensacola Florida, NETPDTC 1550/41 (Rev 4-00), April 1994). –CJHjr _______________

Senior U.S. Military Officers purposely concealed the positions of their warships, and their helicopter, from the public. And for good reason. The small boats — a military force — were lawfully entitled to fire warning shots, to enforce the integrity of their territorial boundaries, from an unlawful invasion by an armed military helicopter, of a hostile foreign power. Senior U.S. Military Officers may have disclosed the positions in secret classified exhibits to their report. Locked up in a distant, secured, guarded, high security room, which no member of any Congressional staff was allowed to see. And no Member of Congress was allowed to look at, except alone, or allowed to copy, or make notes of, or speak about, afterwards. See Dana Priest, “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized” (Washington Post, April 27 2004). And, some Members of Congress may have participated in the official conspiracy to lie to the public. And, in the official prima facie criminal conspiracy to lie to Congress. Knowingly, and willfully, with “specific intent.” Themselves lying to Congress, as principals. Knowingly and willfully permitting witnesses to conceal this material fact from their testimony. Concealing this material fact from the U.S. Government institution charged with the responsibility of acknowledging wrongdoing by the United States of America, and authorizing payment of money to the victims. Then, still more than two months before Pan Am 103 (December 19 1988, 270 victims). A foreseeable, promised, apparent, international countermeasure, against the stubborn refusal of the United States to admit its wrongdoing; punish those responsible; correct its prima facie criminal Rules of Engagement; correct its negligent operational protocols; correct its negligent equipping and negligent training of its crews; and pay damages to the victims, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, for its $30 million aircraft, owned by its state-owned corporation, Iran Air. –CJHjr

Admiral William J. Crowe Jr.: Several exhibits included navigational data — that is, logs, et cetera — which were used to reconstruct the incident. When the report was redacted for public release, that information was withheld for two reasons: • It could help define our rules of engagement in ways we did not want to disclose at that time, and especially the fact that our rules under certain circumstances permitted entry into territorial waters. • We were also concerned about the possibility of Iranian retaliation and didn’t want to throw gasoline on the flames which we believed might follow the Vincennes incident. ... Nevertheless, the classified report and the redacted unclassified version were transmitted to both the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees. ... Again, I believe the congressional members and staff must have believed it more beneficial not to disclose the classified material at that time. Very shortly after the shootdown, the International Civil Aviation Organization, colloquially known as ICAO, inaugurated an investigation of the incident, conducted by five people from neutral countries. ... All of the navigational data from the classified report was to be revealed during the deliberations. ... The report cited the correct latitude and longitude of the Vincennes at the time of firing and included an easily understood chart portraying the Vincennes position. This information was furnished by the United States, as the chart made clear. ... Perhaps at the time of the ICAO release — the international environment had then calmed and the terrorist activity in the Gulf had ceased — we should have declassified the ship’s position and issued a press release pointing out Vincennes’ location within Iranian waters at the time of firing. With the prescience of 20-20 hindsight, I wish we had done that. House Hearing, pp.10-11 (July 21 1992).

Ted Koppel: But that still leaves the Airbus itself.

Wasn’t there any way to correctly identify it for what it was?

Admiral Fogarty’s report notes that the preferred method of identifying an incoming aircraft is to send another plane up to meet it.

But — the admiral told Congress — there were no available aircraft close enough to do that.

William M. Fogarty (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director of Policy and Plans, U.S. Central Command, head of the investigative team): No, sir, there were no aircraft that were in the area of the Vincennes. Robert J. Kelly (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Vice Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff): They were about, as I recall, some 250 miles from the scene.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] The commanding officer of the U.S. aircraft carrier Forrestal contradicts that statement.

The Forrestal was stationed just outside the Gulf.

Her skipper claims — and his logs confirm — that he launched his fighter aircraft before the time stated in the Fogarty report, that they were in a position to assist the Vincennes within a couple of minutes.

Investigator: And where are your aircraft at that point, in relation to the Vincennes? John A. Pieno Jr. (former Commanding Officer, USS Forrestal, July 1987-1989 Feb., Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired): As I recall, the point Alpha, which is the holding point, was about roughly 50 miles from the center of the Straits of Hormuz, and that’s roughly where the Vincennes was operating, so— Possibly a little bit less.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] And, indeed, if you look closely at one of the Aegis photographs used by Admiral Fogarty in his briefing, it appears these are the aircraft down here in the corner.

Captain Pieno says he was never interviewed by Admiral Fogarty’s investigators.

Admiral William J. Crowe Jr.: At that time the F-14s were 58 miles away, orbiting at 390 knots. House Hearing, July 21 1992, p.13.

David R. Carlson (former Commanding Officer, USS Sides, Captain, U.S. Navy): At the time of the incident itself, we were about 36,000 yards away from the Vincennes, roughly 18 nautical miles to the northeast of Vincennes, and we were under their direct tactical control.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] Captain David Carlson was commander of the USS Sides.

David R. Carlson: My problem with the entire affair has never been what Captain Rogers’ decision was. Any Naval officer, almost any Naval officer, placed in that situation for the minute or so before the shootdown, given the information that he had available, would probably have made that decision. The problem that I’ve always had with it is, why was he there? How come the information was the way it was?

Ted Koppel: Captain Carlson puts his finger on the key questions.

Why would the Navy, the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House all participate in such an elaborate cover-up to protect the reputation of one Navy captain?

Roger Charles (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marines, Retired), ABC News Consultant: The full disclosure of what happened with the Vincennes would have brought about the disclosure of a secret war, the United States as an active military participant on the side of the Iraqis, fighting the Iranians.

Ted Koppel: We’ll have that part of the story when we come back.

[Commercial break]

Ted Koppel: Remember the Stark?

The USS Stark, the Navy frigate that was hit by Iraqi missiles the year before the Vincennes incident?

Remember?

Thirty-seven American sailors were killed.

[voice-over] At a memorial service in their honor, President Reagan reminded us how important the Persian Gulf and its oil are to America’s national interest.

Ronald Reagan (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1981-1989 Jan. 20): [May 22, 1987] Peace is at stake here. And so, too, is our own nation’s security and our freedom. Were a hostile power ever to dominate this strategic region and its resources, it would become a choke point for freedom, that of our allies and our own.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] Peace, security, freedom at stake.

A gloves-off warning to that “hostile power” that it won’t be allowed to dominate the Persian Gulf.

Well, you’d expect the President to be outraged, after Iraqi missiles killed 37 American sailors.

Except that the President’s warning wasn’t directed at Iraq.

Ronald Reagan (U.S. President, Jan. 20 1981-1989 Jan. 20): [May 29, 1987] Mark this point well. The use of the vital sea lanes of the Persian Gulf will not be dictated by the Iranians.

Ted Koppel: You heard correctly. Iran. Not Iraq.

In fact, privately, behind the scenes, the Stark incident brought the United States and Iraq closer together, would make them, ultimately, covert allies in the war against Iran.

James H. Webb Jr. (U.S. Secretary of the Navy, 1987-1988): Ironically, it probably brought us closer to Iraq, because after that Iraq allowed American teams to come in and talk about deconfliction and to share intelligence information and this sort of thing.

Ted Koppel: U.S. military officers were stationed in Baghdad.

Initially to help keep Iraqi planes from hitting any more U.S. ships.

But the end result was that the United States helped Iraq conduct long-range strikes against key Iranian targets, using U.S. ships as navigational aids.

“We became,” as one senior U.S. officer told us, “forward air controllers for the Iraqi air force.”

The intelligence-sharing relationship between Washington and Baghdad expanded.

In fact, as we reported a few weeks ago, critical targeting information was carried to the Iraqi capital on a weekly basis by U.S. military personnel.

Richard L. Armitage (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, June 1983-1989 May): At the time, as I say, Iran was on a roll, and our very active use of force in the Gulf certainly put us, temporarily, on the side of the lesser wolf, Iraq.

Ted Koppel: At some point in late 1986 or early ’87, an alarming piece of intelligence fell into U.S. hands.

Michael A. Palmer (Naval Historian, Professor and Chair, History Department, East Carolina University, Greenville North Carolina): There were invasion plans that apparently had made their way into American hands through some fashion, I don’t know how, that indicated that there was at least—

The Iranians were at least planning to invade Kuwait.

Robert B. Oakley (National Security Council, Assistant to the President for Middle East and South Asia, Jan. 1 1987-1988 Aug.): They apparently had a plan to use small boats and things to attack Bubiyan Island, and we were trying to help the Kuwaitis, once we’d made the decision that they were worth helping.

Michael A. Palmer: And I think Kuwait is the key to the occasion.

I mean, if you look ahead to 1990 and ’91, with the Gulf war, you can see the lengths to which we were willing to go to save Kuwait.

We were never willing to risk war with Iran to save Baghdad.

We were willing to risk war — and did risk war — with Iran, and fight an undeclared naval war with Iran, to save Kuwait.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] Much of what the United States did to save Kuwait is a matter of public record. There was, first of all, the reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers in the summer of 1987. Those tankers would henceforth sail the Gulf under the American flag, and under U.S. Navy protection. That was called Operation Earnest Will {1069 kb pdf}.

The USS Stark incident was fresh in everyone’s mind.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral William Crowe, had flown out to the Gulf to brief his naval commanders on a new set of rules of engagement.

William J. Crowe Jr.: It was necessary for us to have rules of engagement that permitted us to— Perhaps not take the first shot, but fire the first shot.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] A year later, the commander of the Vincennes would implement those new rules with tragic consequences.

But in July of 1987, Operation Earnest Will had just begun. The U.S. Navy was sailing its first convoy through the Persian Gulf.

On that very first mission, the U.S. ship Bridgeton hit a mine that had been laid in its path by Iranian gunboats.

William J. Crowe Jr.: The most worrisome or troublesome moment of the entire evolution was the Bridgeton mining, and I thought if the— If this is an indication of what the Iranians are going to do, that yes, we may be involved in a real sea war here.

John Barry (Newsweek Correspondent): They thought the Congress was going to shut down the whole reflagging operation. And so what happened was, that the administration decided to initiate what amounted to a secret war.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] The Pentagon dispatched Special Operations helicopters to the Gulf, eventually including this new, heavily armed model developed especially for the mission.

They can operate at night. Until they fired, they were exceptionally quiet, nearly invisible.

These Army helicopters, flown by Army pilots, operated off Navy ships, probing the night for Iranian gunboats called “boghammers.”

William J. Crowe Jr.: When we were sailing a convoy, we preceded all the convoys with wide helicopter coverage. And if we found a bug in armor at night in the path, off to the bow, something that looked threatening, we usually took him out. Dan Curry (Helicopter Pilot, Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army): They didn’t know exactly where we were or where we were coming from. Richard L. Armitage (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, June 1983-1989 May): Well, there was very much a war at night, and we controlled the night. The Iranians used darkness to try to lay their mines safely, secretly, and we were intent on denying that, and we used special operations capabilities and, I think, successfully.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] Sometimes publicly, sometimes not.

In September of ’87, when Army helicopters nicknamed “Little Birds” caught the Iranian minelayer Iran AJR in the act, it suited the White House to go public.

Robert B. Oakley (National Security Council, Assistant to the President for Middle East and South Asia, Jan. 1 1987-1988 Aug.): Little Birds were primarily to detect and to stop the minelaying, and the great success was when they found an Iranian minelayer heading out from one of the Iranian ports, tracked it out to the middle of the Gulf, photographed it in the middle of the night. And the minelaying ship didn’t know the Little Bird was sitting there.

Michael A. Palmer (Naval Historian, Professor and Chair, History Department, East Carolina University, Greenville North Carolina): At about the same time, an Iranian diplomat at the U.N. was denying that they were responsible for the mining, so it was really meant to embarrass them and make them look as bad as possible, and they caught them red-handed, laying the mines.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] In that instance, the White House wanted and sought maximum publicity for what the U.S. military was doing in the Gulf.

But listen to what the powerful chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee had to say, following a classified briefing on the Iran AJR incident.

Sam Nunn (U.S. Senator, Democrat, Georgia): Now that we’ve had hostile acts, then we’re in a different situation, and we would have to hear from the administration as to whether they have any good argument why the War Powers Act should not be invoked.

Ted Koppel: So when the Navy captured another Iranian minelaying ship only a few weeks later, nothing was said.

Indeed, we know about it now only because the command history of the USS LaSalle, the Mid-East flagship, tells us, quote:

“The vessel Rakish was disabled by U.S. forces and a prize crew was sent aboard the vessel and escorted Iranian crew members aboard LaSalle for further transfer.”

It was a very successful mission. A U.S. military aircraft flew the Iranian crew to Oman, where it was picked up, under cover of night, by an Iranian aircraft. It would have made a great story, but it might also have triggered a massive fight with Congress, so nothing was revealed about that mission, or a great many others.

More unreported stories from the Gulf when we come back.

[Commercial break]

Ted Koppel: For all the American public and the U.S. Congress knew in late ’87, early ’88, the U.S. military was playing a rather passive role in the Gulf.

[voice-over] Operations were restricted to escorting and protecting commercial traffic through international waters. Certainly, the United States wasn’t doing anything that could be seen as provoking Iran.

So when, on April 14th of 1988, the USS Samuel Roberts nearly broke in two after hitting a newly laid Iranian mine, the United States had every reason, so it seemed, to retaliate in a major way.

The operation, code-named “Praying Mantis,” was the biggest U.S. Naval engagement since World War II.

On April 18th, U.S. Special Forces seized and destroyed Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf, and then U.S. forces proceeded to sink not just an Iranian destroyer, but half of Iran’s navy.

Frank C. Carlucci (Secretary of Defense, Nov. 23 1987-1989 Jan. 20): When the minelaying became intolerable, we tried to respond proportionately, and the President authorized an attack on the oil platforms. And that’s what led to the firefight, which resulted in the destruction of about half the Iranian navy in 24 hours.

68. The Court notes that the attacks on the Salman and Nasr platforms were not an isolated operation, aimed simply at the oil installations, as had been the case with the attacks of 19 October 1987; they formed part of a much more extensive military action, designated “Operation Praying Mantis”, conducted by the United States against what it regarded as “legitimate military targets”; armed force was used, and damage done to a number of targets, including the destruction of two Iranian frigates and other Iranian naval vessels and aircraft. The Court, (1) By fourteen votes to two, Finds that the actions of the United States of America against Iranian oil platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States of America under ... the 1955 Treaty ... as interpreted in the light of international law on the use of force Iran v. United States (“Oil Platforms”) (summary) (U.N. I.C.J., Judgment on the Merits, Nov. 6 2003) {190 kb pdf}

Ted Koppel: Pretty quick reaction, right?

The Samuel Roberts is mined on April 14th, half the Iranian navy is taken out on the 18th.

What was not known at the time is that Special Forces, including U.S. Navy SEALS, had been operational in the Gulf for months.

Richard L. Armitage (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, June 1983-1989 May): One of their roles was to assist the explosive ordnance disposal and the identification and elimination of mines, but beyond that, I don’t think I’d want to speak about what the SEALS were doing.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] Another secret unit was Task Force 118, a night-attack helicopter unit.

Investigator: Three of your people got air medals. Edmund Hughes (Commander, Task Force 118, Lieutenant Colonel): Yes, sir. Investigator: Why? What was that for? Edmund Hughes: That’s what— Something I can’t tell you about. I can tell you they earned them, but I can’t tell you what they did to earn them.

Ted Koppel: What had been in progress for months was a low-intensity covert war.

On which Congress had not been fully informed.

Listen to how, even now, former Defense Secretary Carlucci bobs and weaves around that one.

Investigator: So, in many ways, we were at war. Frank C. Carlucci (Secretary of Defense, Nov. 23 1987-1989 Jan. 20): Oh, yes, I don’t think there’s any question that— Well, war— And you get into semantic issues here. The military would call it more an engagement, or a firefight— Investigator: Limited war? Frank C. Carlucci: We were having problems with the War Powers Act. So I hesitate to use the term war. But there’s no question it was a conflict.

Ted Koppel: Even Washington’s allies in the Gulf, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, didn’t want to be too closely associated with what the United States was doing.

So they refused U.S. combat forces’ permission to use Kuwaiti or Saudi military bases.

The U.S. Navy adapted.

Richard L. Armitage (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, June 1983-1989 May): You will recall that we had a rather controversial base, called a barge, in the middle of the Persian Gulf. It would give us a platform from which to launch those Special Operations aircraft that you referred to, and we’d be able to surveil absolutely silently, all-weather, at night, and to prosecute their targets, should it become necessary. And they did this. Robert B. Oakley (National Security Council, Assistant to the President for Middle East and South Asia, Jan. 1 1987-1988 Aug.): Occasionally, one would take actions to preempt. If we felt they were coming out with small boats, then one would try to destroy the concentration of small boats before they could get too far out. Richard L. Armitage: It certainly was very much to our liking if we were able to trick them out into— And trick them into identifying themselves, exposing themselves, and make themselves vulnerable to our fire.

Michael A. Palmer (Naval Historian, Professor and Chair, History Department, East Carolina University, Greenville North Carolina): One of the ways that they would try to attract the Iranians out were to take a pair of Mark III patrol boats and put them end to end in a column, close enough together that they would look like one blip on an Iranian radar.

So at a distance it would look like the— somewhat like the profile of a tanker, a small tanker.

The idea is to get them to attack us, rather than to attack a Liberian tanker, or a Greek tanker, or someone else’s.

Ted Koppel: Does any of that sound at all familiar?

Remember that hazy Sunday morning, July 3rd of 1988?

That, too, was a day when a ship said to be a Liberian tanker, the Stoval, was reported under attack by Iranian gunboats.

That was the U.S. Navy’s account.

But the Stoval has never been found, exists in no registry.

That was a day when the USS Montgomery and the USS Vincennes were said to be responding to distress calls from a Pakistani merchant ship being harassed by Iranian gunboats.

Only the captain tells us there was no harassment that day, nor did he issue any distress signal.

The official logs of the USS Montgomery are classified.

Not in general, mind you. Just for that day.

We do not know if she was engaged in luring Iranian gunboats into the kind of ambush that was very much a part of Special Operations in those days.

We do know that both ships, the Montgomery and the Vincennes, were in Iranian waters when the fight began on the water, and when the Iranian Airbus flew overhead.

[Commercial break]

Ted Koppel: In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration, desperate to get American hostages back from Lebanon, authorized the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran, and then took the profits and used them to support the Contras in Nicaragua.

That came to be known as the Iran/Contra scandal.

It was, in more ways than one, one of the great diversions of the 1980s.

In reality, throughout the ’80s and into the ’90s, U.S. assistance to Saddam Hussein and the government of Iraq dwarfed anything this country did for Iran.

As we’ve been reporting for more than a year now, the Reagan/Bush administrations permitted — and frequently encouraged — the flow of money, agricultural credits, dual-use technology, chemicals, and weapons to Iraq.

What we didn’t fully understand was how those programs fit into the larger Washington/Baghdad alliance against Iran.

We didn’t know, for example, that there were actually U.S. contingency plans for an attack against the Iranian mainland.

Admiral Ace Lyons was commander of the Pacific fleet.

James A. “Ace” Lyons Jr. (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral, U.S. Navy): We were prepared, as I would say at the time, to drill them back to the fourth century. And I felt we stood a good chance of sufficiently weakening the Khomeini regime that it would have collapsed. Richard L. Armitage (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, June 1983-1989 May): The decision was made not to completely obliterate Iran. We didn’t want a naked Iran. We wanted a calm, quiet, peaceful Iran. However, had things not gone well in the Gulf, I’ve no doubt that we would have put those plans into effect.

Ted Koppel: [voice-over] One reason why that U.S. attack against Iran never became necessary is because the Iraqis were able to do the job.

But they did it with a great deal of American help.

U.S. intelligence enabled the Iraqi general staff to successfully plan and execute the retaking of the crucial Faw peninsula.

Nightline got that information from a now-retired senior U.S. intelligence officer.

What’s so fascinating is the timing of that Iraqi campaign.

It began on April 17th, 1988, the day before Operation Praying Mantis began.

One of the most important Iraqi offensives of the war began the day before U.S. armed forces wiped out half of the Iranian Navy.

Richard L. Armitage (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, June 1983-1989 May): I’m very comfortable initially with what we did. Particularly when I recall that we did this in the face of almost overwhelming opposition of the Congress. And, in retrospect, I think we have kept the Iranian wolf from exercising hegemony. Unfortunately, the Iraqi wolf got well and itself exercised hegemony. But our crystal ball was very muddy in 1987, just as our crystal ball today is very muddy concerning the future.

Ted Koppel: It may just be, in the current climate, that declaring Congress irrelevant to the conduct of foreign policy would gain a lot of support.

Maybe that’s the way U.S. foreign policy should be conducted.

By the executive branch.

With a minimum of consultation and a large dose of secrecy.

If Congress seems likely to disapprove, don’t tell ’em what you’re doing.

Of course, if and when things go wrong — as they ultimately did when Saddam’s forces invaded Kuwait — there’s no one to blame but the executive branch.

[Commercial break]

Ted Koppel: Tomorrow night on Nightline, a conversation with Vice President Dan Quayle.

That’s our report for tonight.

I’m Ted Koppel in Washington.

For all of us here at ABC News, good night.

Announcer: This has been a Nightline special investigation, produced in cooperation with Newsweek magazine.

Copyright © 1992 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., All rights reserved.

_______________

Executive producer: Tom Bettag.

Senior producer: John Fielding.

Editorial producer: Tara Sonenshine.

Producers: Jay LaMonica, Leroy Sievers.

Editorial manager/correspondent: Ted Koppel.

This transcript was the topic of a U.S. Congressonal hearing, 3 weeks later, The July 3, 1988 Attack by the Vincennes on an Iranian Aircraft {250 kb} (U.S. Congress 102-2, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Investigations and Defense Policy Panel, July 21 1992, Committee Serial H.A.S.C. No. 102-77, 3+37 pages), SuDoc Y 4.Ar5/2a:991-92/77, ISBN: 0160408423, LCCN: 93231140, LC Call No: KF27.A753 1992r. Witness: William J. Crowe Jr.

Copyright © 1992 American Broadcasting Companies Inc., and copied here as fair use in the report of a legislative proceeding, so that I can add information and comment to this broadcast, and so that readers can evaluate the truth of this broadcast, and evaluate and dispel uncertainty, whether quotations from this broadcast during that Congressional hearing, and comments about it, and responses to it, are accurate, responsive, and not misleading.

CJHjr

Charles Judson Harwood Jr.

Posted July 26 2004. Updated August 16 2004.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-nightline-19920701.html