On July 4th, the Oakland Athletics owned a league-best 52-33 record and a run differential that was nearly twice as good as the next closest competitor. That didn’t stop them from pulling the trigger on the biggest trade of the season.

Oakland ended months of speculation over where Chicago Cubs pitchers Jeff Samardzija and Jason Hammel would end up by the trade deadline, acquiring both pitchers in exchange for their top two prospects, pitcher Dan Straily and a player to be named later.

The Athletics have never been known to be very active at the trade deadline. They’ve never been known to give out as much money as they did this offseason, when they gave Scott Kazmir two years and $22 million and Jim Johnson one year and $10 million, making them the second- and third-highest paid players on the team, and Johnson the third-highest paid closer in baseball. Most teams don’t think twice about contracts like that, but the Athletics have always been different.

But after two straight AL West titles that were both followed by Game 5 exits in the ALDS at the hands of Justin Verlander and the Detroit Tigers, general manager Billy Beane was running out of patience. He knew the window was closing on his chances to finally win that elusive championship. So he rolled the dice, and pulled off a trade that no one saw coming: he brought not one, but two of the top pitchers on the market to the best team in baseball.

What are the odds Beane’s gamble pay off? Here are the pros and cons of this trade from the Athletics’ perspective.

Pro: The Athletics already had a very good rotation.

Their starters amassed a 3.21 ERA, fourth-best in the league, and allowed the second-fewest runs. With a staff of Scott Kazmir, Sonny Gray, Jesse Chavez, Tommy Milone, and a fifth slot split by Drew Pomeranz and Dan Straily, the Athletics amassed a 7.0 WAR from their starters, 11th-best in the league. However, there was still room for improvement. Fielding Independent Pitching and xFIP values dropped the rotation back towards the middle of the pack, with marks of 3.80 in each. Walks per nine and strikeouts per nine were around league-average as well. In the past, Oakland has been done in by deep pitching rotations boasting Justin Verlander, Max Scherzer, Anibal Sanchez and Doug Fister. So what did the A’s do? They acquired two of the three top pitchers from the staff with the highest WAR, the Chicago Cubs. Jeff Samardzija and Jason Hammel make breakout pitcher Jesse Chavez (7-5, 3.06 ERA, 3.56 xFIP) the fifth starter, one who in theory would not even crack the postseason rotation now. Kazmir, Samardzija, Gray, Hammel, Chavez. The A’s have real starting pitching depth now, and should they run into those pesky Tigers again in the postseason, they should be comfortable knowing Doug Fister is now with the Washington Nationals. The Athletics have the edge on the mound over the Tigers and the rest of the American League.

Pro: O.Co Coliseum influence.

The A’s ballpark is a “con” for almost everyone, but not for pitchers. The deep fences and the unlimited foul territory make the O.Co Coliseum one of the most favorable locations for the men on the mound. Typically, people worry about National League pitchers making the jump to the DH-infested junior circuit. A lineup with an extra hitter and no “automatic outs” often inflate pitchers’ stats a bit. But Samardzija and Hammel seem to be prime candidates as any to survive the jump. They had been pitching in Wrigley Field, a difficult location to work in not only because it favors hitters, but because the wind is powerful and, more importantly, unpredictable. The two survived this year, posting ERA’s of 2.83 and 2.98 respectively. Their xFIP values, designed to simulate ERA in an average ballpark, also point to favorable production, with values of 3.19 and 3.23. Their American League road starts cannot necessarily be predicted with confidence, but at least in the caverns of Oakland’s stadium, Samardzija and Hammel should continue to excel.

Pro and Con: We’ve seen Hammel take on the AL before.

Jason Hammel spent two seasons in the American League with the Baltimore Orioles, and gave us a very mixed bag. He was great in 2012, going 8-6 with a 3.43 ERA, 3.29 FIP, 3.46 xFIP, and 113 strikeouts in 118 innings. But 2013 was a nightmare: he went 7-8 with a 4.97 ERA, 4.93 FIP, 4.56 xFIP, and 96 strikeouts in 136.1 innings. A shell of whatever Hammel we saw in 2012, his numbers ballooned to where they were early in his career in Colorado, where pitchers essentially wear “kick me” signs on their backs. Which Hammel shows up for Oakland? Well, maybe neither.

Hammel has drastically changed himself as a pitcher this year by altering his repertoire. His four-seam fastball usage is half of his career rate, and his two-seam fastball is more than double his career rate, up to 34.1 percent. His slider was always his go-to off-speed pitch, but he has never used at such a high rate as this year, up from 19.4 percent in his career to 32.6 percent in 2014. It has also never been so effective, as Hammel’s posting 11 runs above average with that pitch, when his previous career-high was 5.8. Hammel will be up against the AL for the third time, but with all of his changes this season, many American League hitters could feel like they’ve never faced Hammel before.

Con: Samardzija’s luck.

Jeff Samardzija does not have an extensive body of work as a starter to draw from; this is just his third year in that role. Last year was his first as the appointed “ace” of the Cubs. At many times as the season wore on it felt that Samardzija would not make it through the year with a sub-5.00 ERA. His month-by-month ERA marks tell a harrowing tale: March/April-3.35, May-2.31, June-4.20, July-5.28, August-5.54, September/October-5.58. Samardzija displayed a similar trend this year, with monthly ERA values of 1.98 in March/April, 1.32 in May, and then 5.45 in June. It would seem Samardzija has trouble staying sharp as the season progresses.

If the Athletics took these numbers at face value, they would not have made this trade; however, the A’s take no stat at face value, and they likely eased concerns with his xFIP values. Even with three months of grotesque 5.00+ ERAs in 2013, the month-by-month breakdown of xFIP still appears mostly good: 2.81, 3.31, 3.15, 4.77, 3.77, 3.09. There’s still one crooked number in there, but for the most part it appears the Cubs were just plain terrible at fielding and that Samardzija ran into a ton of bad luck along the way, inflating his ERA and making him 19-33 as a starter the last three years. Similarly, his xFIP in June 2014 was at 2.95, indicating that a year later the Cubs still stink at fielding (thanks, Starlin Castro). The Athletics are immensely better than the Cubs teams from the last two years, and as explained earlier, Samardzija should fine his new home a little more friendly to him than, well, the Friendly Confines.

Con: The trade package Oakland gave away.

The cons I listed above both had pros attached to them. This part of the trade is a real con. Oakland gave up a lot to make this deal. A lot a lot. Like the top two prospects in the system, including the #4 shortstop slash #11 overall prospect in baseball per MLB.com, a lot. Addison Russel was supposed to be the shortstop of the future for the A’s. Now they may have to resign 30-year-old Jed Lowrie, batting .231 through June 9th, to be a stopgap until another shortstop is ready to come up. The best in the system? Daniel Robertson, who profiles as good-not-great and is estimated to arrive in the majors in 2016. The A’s also lose Billy McKinney, a left-handed outfielder and a good hitter who was the A’s number two prospect and is number nine in a deep Cubs system. At 25, pitcher Dan Straily has only been average so far, and no one is sure if he’ll turn it around. He’s a bit of a throw-in; Cubs GM Theo Epstein may be attempting to see if he can manage to land another Jake Arrieta, or he could just be using him to temporarily plug a new hole in the rotation. A player to be named later is still on the table as well, and Epstein will likely choose wisely. This is a risk for the Athletics, but one I’m sure was very carefully evaluated by the front office.

Con: Contract situations of Samardzija and Hammel.

Remember, Oakland is a very small market and the team is famously cash-strapped. Jason Hammel is a free agent after this season, and if he continues to exceed, he may have priced himself off the team. The last contract he given was worth only $6 million over one year, but he’s definitely going to receive more than that this winter. If he’s valued anything more than $10 million, and he likely will be, it’s tough to see him back in an A’s uniform.

Samardzija has one season on his contract remaining after this one, but everyone already knows he has priced himself out of Oakland. Samardzija was involved in very public contract negotiations with the Cubs while trying to secure an extension, and reportedly rejected a five-year, $85 million deal. He was looking for money closer to what Homer Bailey received from the Reds, or six years, $105 million. The Athletics would not have given Shark $85 million, and nine-digit figures are sacrilege for the club. Unless Samardzija really enjoys his time in Oakland and takes a steep discount, he won’t be back for 2016, giving the Athletics a two-year window for this trade to succeed.

Conclusion: Pro: on-field aspects; Con: off-field aspects.

The Athletics invested heavily in this trade, shipping the very best part of the farm in order to give themselves the greatest chance to win the World Series within the next two years, before the team’s core deteriorates. The view a few years down the road isn’t as bright as it was, but in terms of the team Oakland will be sporting this season, there is arguably not a better squad out there. They have scored the most runs on offense and allowed the second-fewest while pitching, and their rotation just experienced a big upgrade. That type of run differential is tough for opponents to overcome.

But as Billy Beane, or at least Brad Pitt playing Beane, admitted, the playoffs are a bit of a crap shoot. The team that went 102-60 could go home in the first round, while the 90-win team that goes 11-8 in the nationally televised games is crowned champion. It’s unpredictable. It’s not always fair. But that’s the way it is, and the format isn’t changing soon. With deep pitching staffs so often being a defining characteristic of the teams that win the World Series, the Athletics just committed to a similar identity.

With this blockbuster, the time is now for Oakland. Two years to win it all. Clock’s ticking.