Introduction

The long-time political leadership of Serzh Sargsyan ended after days of mass protests headed by the leader of the ‘Way Out’ parliamentary faction and the Civil Con­tract party, Nikol Pashinyan. The very fact that Prime Minister Sargsyan had to resign just days after the pro­tests began poses many questions regarding the depth of and reasons for such massive dissatisfaction, and the fragility of a system that did not survive increasing insta­bility and decreasing legitimacy. In part, the mobiliza­tion of protests succeeded by personalizing it and uniting various social groups—youth movements, rural popula­tions, socio-economically disadvantaged and dissatisfied groups—all frustrated by the monopolization of power and the oligarchization of the economy.

Pashinyan, who spent his entire political life in civil and eventually political opposition, articulated a rhetoric that was clear, straightforward and predict­able—to fight against a political system that was per­sonified by Serzh Sargsyan, against the power concen­tration and domination of the Republican Party, for the rule of law and equal opportunity, against corruption and monopolies, against the dispensation of privileges, against economic oligarchs, and for greater opportu­nities for small and medium enterprises. This rhetoric emphasized the domestic nature of the nonviolent resist­ance movement, a velvet revolution of love and toler­ance. The leaders of the movement claimed that domes­tic changes aimed at establishing rule of law, fighting oligarchy and monopolies, addressing corruption and creating equal opportunities for all economically active actors would be a decisive factor in Armenia’s future social-economic development, leading to a decrease of the shadow economy, attracting and increasing invest­ments into a better functioning economy and increase public wellbeing.

While domestic revolutionary changes were at the top of the political protest agenda, Pashinyan’s foreign policy faithfully emphasized his determination to con­tinue Armenia’s foreign policy priorities and commit­ments, as well as its international obligations. Despite the fact that in the fall of 2017, the ‘Way Out’ parliamen­tary faction initiated a temporary National Assembly commission on the possibility of withdrawing from the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (Avanesov 2017), Pashinyan always stated during the protests and later on in his meetings with various Russian officials that he does not intend to leave either the Common­wealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Secu­rity Treaty Organizations (CSTO) or the Eurasian Eco­nomic Union (EAEU) and is committed to Armenia’s existing international agreements and obligations. In a recent article, the Secretary of Armenia’s National Security Council, Armen Grigoryan, also confirmed that Pashinyan, being a pragmatist, would not change the course of foreign policy while the “political dialog with Moscow will reach a fundamentally new qualita­tive and pragmatic level” (Gazeta.ru 2018).

Keeping Foreign Policy Priorities Intact

For decades after independence, Armenian foreign pol­icy emphasized complementarity and prioritized national interests in its dealings with external actors. In general there has been a certain consensus among the majority of Armenian political parties. They agree that Armenia must implement a balanced and complementary policy toward regional players and Armenia must guarantee security for Karabakh. (For a more detailed account of the foreign policy approaches of on Armenia’s elite see Gasparyan 2016). While the majority of political actors would rather agree that Armenia benefits from multi­faceted cooperation with Russia, including in the mili­tary sphere, some had been advocating “more equal rela­tions” or making cooperation with Russia more efficient. Assumingly there would be some space for maneuver to keep strategic relations with Russia but emphasizing equal status of the parties in those relationships. That is a trend that Pashinyan’s foreign policy will try to follow. That also means that while Armenia will maintain strate­gic relations with Russia, it will also continue and expand its interactions with the EU, the US and regional players. This will take place under the constraints of the unre­solved Karabakh conflict and closed borders with Turkey. These are facets of Armenia’s security cooperation with Russia, rather than with the US or the EU, since neither currently offers Armenia any viable alternatives to its security challenges or the resolution of regional problems.

Another important dimension of Armenia’s foreign policy are strategic relations with Georgia and Iran. They are also viewed through the prism of current regional geopolitical realities, and those countries are the main transportation routes that connect Armenia with the rest of the world. Both Georgia and Iran are impor­tant to Armenia as transportation hubs, and Iran addi­tionally plays a regional balance-of-power role as a player that is considered as a counterbalance to the expanding influence of Turkey. The roles of both Georgia and Iran are emphasized in the government program adopted by the Armenian parliament in June 2018. While a state visit to Iran might still be in the planning stage (assum­ing that it was difficult to organize this visit during Ramadan), during Pashinyan’s official meeting with the Georgian Prime Minister at the end of May 2018, he stressed that there are no issues in Armenian–Geor­gian relations that could not be solved and that the fur­ther development of the relationship with Georgia will continue to be one of the priorities of Armenia’s foreign policy. In general, Armenia is interested in expanding its cooperation with Georgia in various areas such as trade and the economy, energy, transportation, agri­culture, tourism and culture (Primeminister.am 2018).

The policy of complementarity presupposes that Armenia is building effective and cooperative relation­ships with all actors who are interested in mutually ben­eficial cooperation and can contribute not only to the country’s development but also to peace and stability in the region. So, based on those priorities, Armenian elites were participating in international processes considered to be consistent with Armenia’s national interests. The complementarity principle presumed the continuation of a strategic relationship with the Russian Federation but also presupposed maintaining positive, cooperative rela­tions with the West and a European development path. It also considers feasible its membership in and close coop­eration with the CSTO in parallel with NATO coopera­tion in the area of political dialog. This was reconfirmed during the NATO Partnerships and Cooperative Secu­rity Committee + Armenia meeting that took place in May in Brussels. Armenia indicated in this meeting that it is prepared to continue implementing the IPAP—Indi­vidual Partnership Action Plan (NATOinfo.am 2018).

The All-Important Karabakh Conflict

A complicated regional security architecture, the unsta­ble dynamics of a prolonged ethno-political conflict, and the economic and political blockade of Armenia by Tur­key and Azerbaijan form another layer of foreign policy priorities and determinants for the country. Resolution of the Karabakh conflict is one of the priorities of Arme­nia’s foreign and security policies. Armenia’s position is to exclusively support a peaceful settlement based on com­promise and that must incorporate the following prin­ciples: any final agreement on conflict resolution must be approved by the Artsakh1 authorities; Armenia will only accept “a resolution which would affirm the irrevers­ible reality of the existence of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh”, so the current de facto status of an unrecog­nized but independent state would then be de jure and supported by international guarantees; Artsakh should also be geographically connected to Armenia and its security must be internationally guaranteed (National Security Strategy 2007). In addition to those principles, the Armenian position emphasizes that the conflict set­tlement must be based on the recognition of the Art­sakh people’s right to self-determination, and that Art­sakh should have an uninterrupted land connection with Armenia, under Armenian jurisdiction (MFA 2018a).

Resolution of this conflict is being thwarted by var­ious factors, but the major disagreement seems to be completely mutually exclusive views on the final status of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia wants to obtain de jure status for a currently unrecognized but institutionalized state through a legally binding document that is interna­tionally recognized and recognition of the de jure existing state with internationally existing sovereignty guarantees. This approach appears to be unacceptable to Azerbaijan, who will only agree to autonomy but not independence for Artsakh. The official position of Baku is that Kar­abakh’s status should not affect Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and constantly refuses to negotiate with Kara­bakh officials. Azerbaijan further demands the return of lands surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh that the Arme­nian side has controlled since the end of the war in the 1990s. These territories are sometimes viewed as a pos­sible bargaining chip for Armenia to extract concessions from Azerbaijan. Although after the four-day war of April 2016 this position gets much less support in Armenia.

After Pashinyan was elected as Prime Minister, he presented his position on the issue subsequent to his meetings with Bako Sahakyan during a visit to Karabakh in May 2018. He was adamant that the conflict must be resolved peacefully and that negotiations must continue under the cochaired OSCE Minsk Group process. But he also called for the Artsakh Republic to be included as a full-fledged participant in the negotiation process. He also stressed that making progress in the negotiations is impossible with Azerbaijan’s persistently militant rheto­ric. Pashinyan stated that he was ready to negotiate with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev on behalf of Armenia, but Artsakh’s leadership must participate in negotiations to represent their own interests (Aslanyan 2018). While Armenia’s previous political leadership had the unex­pressed belief and desire that Karabakh must be repre­sented at the negotiating table, Armenia’s current politi­cal leadership explicitly wants to include Artsakh in the negotiation process. According to Masis Mailyan, this would allow Armenia to reject discussing with Azerbai­jan and the mediators the key issues that pertain exclu­sively to Artsakh authorities (NewsArmenia.am 2018).

The government program presented in June by Pashi­nyan and adopted by the National Assembly also focuses exclusively on a peaceful resolution negotiated through the co-chaired OSCE Minsk Group process and based on the principles of international law, including the nation’s self-determination principle as a base for con­flict resolution. For Armenia, the security and status of Artsakh are seen as the top priority. The program also emphasized that Artsakh, as the main component of the conflict, must have a voice and involvement in the resolu­tion process. In his speech, Pashinyan again addressed the need for Karabakh representation in the negotiations, saying that without their participation, negotiations could not be effective (ArmeniaSputnik 2018a). Such an approach has not been acceptable so far for Azerbai­jan, while the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ser­gey Lavrov, stated that Moscow would respect any deci­sion on Karabakh’s participation in negotiations agreed to by Yerevan and Baku (ArmeniaSputnik 2018b). It should be noted that Karabakh was represented in var­ious negotiation formats until 1997.

With the increased tension at the border and grow­ing disagreements in the negotiations there is a danger that all that may result in the resumption of hostilities at different levels, which would certainly have very neg­ative effect on the security of the entire region. Currently, Armenia continues to seek progress in the negotiation process led by the OSCE Minsk Group, whose media­tion is seen as fundamental and instrumental for intro­ducing and implementing effective conflict resolution mechanisms. Negotiations with Azerbaijan under the new Armenian premiership have not taken place, even though during Pashnyan’s June 2018 visit to Moscow, President Putin introduced him to Azerbaijani President Aliev. So far, no talks have taken place and the visit by the Minsk Group co-chairs to Yerevan in June was more of a fact-finding, introductory meeting aimed at learn­ing the new Armenian leadership’s positions. During these meetings, Armenia once again expressed its sup­port for the work of the OSCE Minsk Group and its willingness to continue under its auspices.

Regional Relations: Keeping Russia and the EU Close

In addition to the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, two other major foreign policy priorities for Armenia include cooperation with Russia and the EU. This coop­eration is not seen as mutually exclusive but rather as synergetic for Armenia’s development. According to the governmental program cooperation with Russia is prior­itized being considered as strategic. The military and security aspects of this alliance, as well as Russia’s role in the Artsakh negotiations, will most certainly continue to be an important determinant of bilateral relations. In addition, the large Armenian community in Russia is also an important factor, especially considering that the current government emphasizes the role of the diaspora and its potential for channeling investment to the Arme­nian economy. No less important is Russia’s role as one of Armenia’s principal trading partners and as a major investor in the Armenian economy. Those investments extend to a wide variety of sectors including energy and energy infrastructure, where Armenia is deeply depend­ent on Russian supplies. Armenia is dependent on Rus­sia’s gas as well as nuclear fuel deliveries for the Met­samor plant. Russia has provided USD 250 million in credit and USD 30 million in a grant for the modern­ization of this nuclear power plant. Natural gas imports and distribution are also monopolized by Gazprom- Armenia, owned by Russia since 2014. Energy depend­ence on Russia also poses security issues for transporta­tion routes through Georgia’s north–south gas pipeline. Disruptions of this pipeline, as those which occurred in August 2008, might raise serious concerns.

In addition to the economic aspects of Armenian–Rus­sian relations, there is a robust military collaboration based on both bilateral and multilateral agreements, namely the CSTO. In 2010, Armenia extended for another 49 years the presence of a Russian military base as well as the geo­graphical scope and defensive functions of the base located in the country since 1995. As a CSTO member, Armenia also cooperates in the arms industry and is able to purchase weapons from Russia at low prices. This military coop­eration with Russia is considered to be one of the impor­tant elements of Armenia’s national security as confirmed by the governmental program (Government of Armenia 2018). In 2015–2016, Armenia received 200 million USD in a soft loan and another 100 million USD soft loan was provided the next year for military/technical cooperation.

The government program adopted by the Armenian parliament states that the development of strategic rela­tions with Russia in various spheres is among the coun­try’s main priorities and constitutes an important part of the Armenian security system (Government of Arme­nia 2018). In his interview with RT, Pashinyan stated that there will be no reversals in bilateral relations with Russia and he expects a new phase that could be charac­terized as “more positive, more constructive, more pro­ductive, and more direct” (Petrenko 2018).

Considering Russia to be an important ally, Armenia will continue to closely cooperate with other members of the Eurasian Union and the CSTO on both bilateral and multilateral tracks, and remains ready to address and dis­cuss problems in those relationships. They include var­ious issues such as arms sales to Azerbaijan by Russia and Belarus, and vague or unvoiced positions by CSTO member states on the escalation of tensions at the Arme­nia–Azerbaijani border. Armenia’s complex and strate­gic dependence on Russia sometimes conflicts with its complementarity approach, and maintaining equilib­rium with other actors seems to be a difficult foreign pol­icy task for the Armenian authorities. However, Yerevan still seeks out more meaningful partnerships beyond its strategic alliance with Russia, and Armenia continues to develop relationships with the collective West—the US and the EU. The government program presented by Prime Minister Pashinyan and approved by Armenia’s National Assembly in June 2018 adheres to the foreign policy priorities of previous administrations. Armenia considers Russia to be a strategic partner and as the Prime Minister stated, the relationship of the two coun­tries must be based on friendship, equality and readi­ness to solve problems through dialog.

Nevertheless, Armenia also intends to pursue closer relations with the EU, following the EU-Armenia Com­prehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed in November 2017, which was ratified unanimously by the Armenian Parliament and is now being provi­sionally applied. Cooperation with the EU is sought in at least three major areas. The first area is cooperation with the EU to promote democracy, civil society, rule of law, good governance, human rights and fundamental free­doms. The second area is close economic cooperation and expanding trade with EU countries. It should be noted that in terms of investment, the EU is among the larg­est investors in the Armenian economy. Finally Armenia supports EU regional initiatives aimed at establishing an environment of lasting stability and cooperation in the South Caucasus region (National Security Strategy 2007).

A recent statement issued after the June 21 Partner­ship Council meeting between the European Union and Armenia under the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), reaffirmed the willingness of both parties to expand and strengthen cooperation within the new legal framework of the East­ern Partnership and the revised European Neighborhood Policy. It also clearly reconfirmed the EU’s promised support for democratic reforms, its readiness to assist in the organization and monitoring of new elections along with important amendments to the electoral code, for enhancing “the rule of law and respect of human rights, as well as to increase prosperity and socioeconomic resil­ience in Armenia” (MFA (2018b). Thus, Armenia con­tinues to consider its cooperation with the EU and par­ticipation in the Eastern Partnership as an important platform for dialog and collaboration, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, mentioned in an interview while reiterating that this should not be achieved at somebody else’s expense (Kommersant 2018).

Conclusion

Armenia’s foreign policy is heavily influenced by the regional geopolitical environment and its apparent per­manent security threats arising in part from the unre­solved Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the broad and complex historical-political relationship with Turkey. Those security threats will persist for the current Arme­nian government. The country’s extensive and multifa­ceted relationship with Russia in various strategic areas in some ways limits Armenia’s ability to maneuver. How­ever, Armenia tries to balance the interests of various regional players in areas where they have a common interests. For now, no major changes are seen in the foreign policy priorities of Armenia’s new government, but regional complexities and challenges remain and addressing them will still be a challenging task.

Note

1 Armenians refer to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as Artsakh. The two terms are used interchangeably in this paper.

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About the Author

Alexander Markarov is a Professor of Politics, Deputy Vice Rector and Head of the International Coopera­tion Office at Yerevan State University. He is also Director of the CIS Institute branch in Armenia.

Armenia’s Velvet Revolution in the Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite

By Farid Guliyev