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S E C R E T BAKU 000625 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018 TAGS: ENRG, EPET, PTER, MARR, MASS, PBTS, IR, AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN FACES CHALLENGE OF PROTECTING CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d) 1. (S) Summary: On June 9-13 an interagency team representing the Global Critical Energy Infrastructure Program (GCEIP) and consisting of representatives from the Department of State, Department of Energy, the Coast Guard, and EUCOM met with a number of government and private industry officials responsible for Azerbaijan's critical energy infrastructure security. The team broached the subject with the GOAJ of the USG providing technical advice on the security of such infrastructure through an agreement by which the GOAJ pays for such assistance. A number of government agencies play a role in energy infrastructure security, including the Special State Protection Service (SSPS), the Defense Ministry, the State Border Service (SBS), the Ministry of National Security (MNS), and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR). The SSPS has primary responsibility for the physical protection of the onshore infrastructure, including the primary export pipelines and the critical node in energy production and transport in Azerbaijan: the Sangachal Terminal. SOCAR has responsibility for the secondary oil export pipelines, some domestic pipelines, two domestic refineries, and the Soviet-era derricks and platforms. Responsibility for protecting the offshore platforms and underwater pipelines lies with the Navy, part of the MOD, and the Coast Guard, which is a division of the SBS. The offshore platforms are the system's most vulnerable part. The Sangachal Terminal appears to be the most vulnerable onshore facility, with the point where the offshore pipelines make landfall en route to Sangachal also raising concerns. The pipelines and pump stations appear to be in good shape, both from the standpoint of technical and physical protection and having a well-designed response plan. End summary. DEFINING AZERBAIJAN'S CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE --------------------------------------------- ------- 2. (SBU) On June 9-13 an inter-agency team consisting of representatives from the Department of State, Department of Energy, the Coast Guard, and EUCOM met with a number of government and private industry officials from organizations responsible for critical energy infrastructure security in Azerbaijan to include British Petroleum (BP), the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of National Security (MNS), the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), and the State Special Protection Service (SSPS). The team, operating under the auspices of the Global Critical Energy Infrastructure Program (GCEIP) and led by Department of State's Office for the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, offered a coordinated technical assistance program to improve the security of such infrastructure, to be paid for by Azerbaijan, and sought information about what constitutes critical energy infrastructure in Azerbaijan, how that infrastructure is protected, and how the government coordinates its activities in this sphere. 3. (C) Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure system is composed of three equally important, integrated parts: energy extraction infrastructure, both land-based and sea-based; energy export infrastructure, i.e., pipelines, and to a lesser extent, rail; and Sangachal Terminal, the critical hub for receiving and exporting the vast majority of their energy production. 4. (C) Energy Extraction Infrastructure: While some legacy land-based onshore extraction continues, the offshore extraction operations represent the overwhelming bulk of Azerbaijan's production. BP currently operates six offshore platforms, pumping their production of oil and gas through a network of underwater pipelines to the coast and then on to Sangachal Terminal. These platforms provide the bulk of Azerbaijan's total current energy production. 5. (C) Energy export infrastructure - Pipelines: Azerbaijan has three oil export pipelines and one gas export pipeline. The largest and most significant of the oil export pipelines is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that carries approximately 850,000 barrels of oil per day between the Caspian Sea and the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The other oil pipelines are the Baku-Supsa (B-S) pipeline running from Baku to Georgia's Black Sea coast and the Baku-Novorossiysk (B-N) pipeline, which takes oil north to Russia. The South Caucasus pipeline carries gas from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia before linking up with Turkish pipeline infrastructure in Erzurum. 6. (C) Sangachal Terminal: All four of these export pipelines originate at the Sangachal Terminal, which is the single most important land-based infrastructure for the movement of oil and gas exports from the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian. The Sangachal Terminal is located approximately one and a half kilometers from the Caspian coast on a broad valley floor encompassing an estimated 800 hectares of land. The Combined Control Building, located on site at Sangachal, is the nerve center of BP's operations, where operators control the flow of oil and gas into the various pipelines and monitor the entire system for problems and disruptions. A redundant control room is located at one of the BP buildings in Baku, but the team did not visit te site. (The GOAJ is planning on building a secod terminal approximately 35-45 km south of Sangachal, but this is only in the initial planning stages). Until recently the terminal was fairly isolated, but development has begun in the area and that could create additional security concerns. 7. (S) Of these three critical components, security of the export pipelines - at least the Azerbaijan portions - appears to be sufficient. Damage control technology and the ability to identify and repair the pipelines relatively quickly make them the least problematic element of the infrastructure system. Additionally, the BTC and the SCP pipelines are well-protected by the SSPS. Since Sangachal Terminal is the central node for energy collection and transport, any successful large-scale attack at the facility would be "catastrophic," according to one BP security official. Offshore, the platforms are the most vulnerable energy infrastructure and are difficult to repair. A collision by a seaborne vessel could dislocate an off-shore platform by only a few inches and take that unit out of production for a period of months, according to BP officials. The platforms, the pipelines, and Sangachal Terminal must be viewed as a single system: if any one part of the system crashes, it can all go down. PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE --------------------------------------------- -------- 8. (C) The three government agencies directly responsible for the physical protection of critical energy infrastructure are the Special State Protection Service (SSPS), the State Border Service (SBS), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD). While SOCAR does have some responsibilities, the facilities under its care are primarily for domestic use and not export. Azerbaijan's coastline divides the spheres of responsibility. The SSPS protects all of the critical onshore energy infrastructure, and the Coast Guard, under the SBS, and the Navy, under the MOD, share responsibility for protecting the offshore platforms and underwater pipelines. ONSHORE FACILITIES ------------------- 9. (C) The primary responsibility of the SSPS is to provide security for the President and other high-ranking government officials, but approximately five years ago it was charged with ensuring the security of all onshore critical energy infrastructure. Under the mandate of its Oil and Gas Export Pipelines Security Department with its approximately 1000 employees, the SSPS guards the BTC and gas export pipelines and is responsible for the external security around the Sangachal Terminal, which it coordinates with BP. 10. (C) According to BP's Head of Regional Security in Azerbaijan, "pipeline security is in as good a shape as any pipeline in the world." The primary activity of the SSPS with regard to the pipelines is regular armed patrols, which it conducts on foot, in vehicles, and on horseback depending on the terrain. The head of the Export Pipeline Security Department estimated that about 25 vehicles and 35 horses patrol the four main export pipelines each day, using the SSPS' network of nine regional offices as bases. In addition to the patrols, the pumping stations located intermittently along the pipelines have stationary security. 11. (S) Beyond physical security, the SSPS and the Ministry of National Security (MNS), which is the primary counter-terrorist and intelligence organization in Azerbaijan, work in the regions along the pipeline corridors to gather intelligence about potential threats. According to the head of the SSPS's Export Pipeline Security Department, 80-85% of regional personnel are locals and are therefore in a better position to obtain information about possible security threats in their area. This type of informal information gathering is complemented by more professional work. Deputy Minister of National Security Ali Nagiyev claimed that his service has operatives and sources in the villages and settlements along the export pipelines that work to gather information on potential threats. 12. (C) The SSPS also works closely with BP to provide external security for the Sangachal Terminal. The SSPS maintains a unit near the Sangachal facility and performs approximately 30 patrols a day around the terminal. Additionally, the SSPS operates a lookout station on a hill overlooking the facility. The SSPS is planning on building a 17-km fence 500 m outside of Sangachal's current wall. Once this fence is built, the SSPS plans on using scanners to monitor all vehicles entering the facility. Currently, BP security has this responsibility, performing visual inspections on all deliveries at four vehicle entrance gates. The facility is surrounded by a thick concrete wall, built by the Ministry of Defense and designed to prevent a large vehicle from ramming its way into the terminal. 13. (C) BP is responsible for overall security inside the wall surrounding Sangachal Terminal, contracting some of the work to a private company named Titan. Currently, the SSPS can only enter Sangachal on BP's invitation. The security control room at the terminal contains a direct phone line so that BP can call the nearby SSPS detachment, and the SSPS patrols provide information to BP security within the facility if they encounter anything suspicious outside the walls. Both the head of BP security at Sangachal and the regional head of BP security said that there is a good relationship with the SSPS and that the organization acts professionally. 14. (C) Sangachal Terminal is a compartmented facility - oil processing, gas processing, and storage each take place at separate areas in the compound. Although the areas are close together, BP's head of regional security suggested that it would be possible to lose a section of the facility in an attack and still keep the rest of the facility going. The Combined Control Building, however, contains all the equipment necessary to operate the export pipelines from Azerbaijan. The head of Sangachal security cited this particular building as the most critical part of Sangachal Terminal. The BP security control room, also located in the Combined Control Building, will soon be linked to a network of closed-circuit television cameras that monitor the facility. Sangachal is located in a valley that can act as a wind tunnel, and these high winds led to the installation of camera that can withstand them. The head of security at Sangachal hopes that the closed-circuit television system will be fully operational by July. 15. (S) The major concern for the head of security at Sangachal is personnel, and particularly construction personnel with temporary access to the terminal. As more projects come on line in the Caspian, Sangachal has expanded, resulting in a large number of construction workers entering the facility each day. Currently, there are an estimated 2,000-3,000 construction personnel employed regularly at Sangachal, and some of these construction workers are not native Azerbaijanis, increasing the security risk. According to BP's head of security at the facility, the MNS vets all employees who gain access to the terminal, but Deputy Minister of National Security Nagiyev claimed that the MNS only looks into employees at Sangachal if they are linked in some way to one of their investigations or attract their attention due to their personal connections to foreigners or certain religious groups. Despite this discrepancy, both BP security and the MNS confirmed that MNS investigations have led to the removal of dozens of personnel from Sangachal and other critical energy facilities. BP also provides information on personnel to the SSPS. OFFSHORE FACILITIES --------------------- 16. (S) The State Border Service, in particular the Coast Guard, and the Navy share joint responsibility for protecting the offshore facilities, including the underwater pipelines that carry oil and gas to Sangachal Terminal from the platforms. According to BP security officials, the protection of the offshore infrastructure could be "much, much better." Neither the Coast Guard nor the Navy provide regular patrols around the platforms. They have also demonstrated poor response times, and BP officials said that it would take the Navy and the Coast Guard approximately four hours to reach the platforms in case of an attack or an emergency. 17. (S) BP has no security on its platforms and no firearms. There is, however, a direct line to Navy HQ from the platforms' control rooms so that BP can quickly relay information about what they see around the area of operations. BP officials claimed that there is a clear safety zone within a two mile radius around the platforms. Enforcement of the zone is currently limited to BP boats chasing off any ships that enter into the zone, although the Coast Guard claimed that it monitors vessel traffic and reserves the right to interdict and search any ship that crosses inside the two-mile radius. Notably, the Navy does not have the right to stop and search ships. According to BP security officials, in early June a small vessel came too close to one of the platforms, and BP sent a boat out to chase it away. The encroaching vessel was filled with men wearing ski masks over their faces, apparently illegally fishing for sturgeon, and it quickly sped away. BP reported this incident to the MNS, who in turn provided information about their investigation to BP. 18. (S) According to BP security personnel, the problems with offshore security stem from three main issues - lack of clarity between the Coast Guard and the Navy as to respective areas of responsibility, lack of coordination between the Coast Guard and theNavy, and inadequate equipment and training in both services. Both Admiral Sultanov, who leads Azerbaijan's Navy, and the Deputy Head of the SBS Farhad Tagizade stress that there are efforts underway to improve coordination. A Maritime Security Strategy, which Admiral Sultanov claimed would more clearly delineate responsibility for energy infrastructure, is currently in development, and the two services are working together with the United States to improve their coordination efforts through tabletop exercises. Two joint control and command centers currently exist, one controlled by the Coast Guard with Navy liaison officers and one controlled by the Navy with Coast Guard liaison officers. Despite these efforts, Deputy Head of the SBS Tagizade admits that it will take more time for the two services to develop what he called a "mature relationship." 19. (S) BP security officials also cited equipment problems that plague the Navy and Coast Guard. According to BP's head of regional security, the off-the-shelf, commercial anti-collision radar that BP installed on the platforms and provides the Navy is the best one that the Navy currently has. BP officials also claimed that there was a general shortage of boats in both services, making it difficult for them to patrol the areas around the platforms. The boats the services do have tend to be old Soviet-era vessels, built in the 1960s and 70s. EFFORTS TO COORDINATE ON ENERGY SECURITY ------------------------------------- 20. (C) The GOAJ claims to coordinate on energy infrastructure protection, both onshore and offshore, through the State Commission to Protect Pipelines, including representatives from the SSPS, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Emergency Situations, SBS, and MNS. Prime Minister Rasizade leads the commission, which meets twice yearly. The commission also has a monthly working group, co-chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister Abib Sharifov and General Akhundov of the SSPS. According to Akhundov, this working group has produced a document that clearly outlines what each agency is responsible for in the event of an emergency involving critical energy infrastructure, but this document is under review and awaiting approval. 21. (C) The various agencies also participate in exercises involving protection of critical energy infrastructure. In early June, the Navy, Coast Guard, and Ministry of Emergency Situations held a series of exercises testing their response to a variety of scenarios, including a fire on a platform, the discovery of a mine on an underwater section of the pipeline, the interdiction and search of a ship that had crossed into Azerbaijan's section of the Caspian, responding to a State Oil Company ship's seizure by terrorists, and the protection of a shipping convoy. 22. (C) BP officials have also formed a working group of the various government agencies involved in maritime critical energy infrastructure protection and produced an assessment of various threats and vulnerabilities. As of early July, BP officials were still waiting for the report to be cleared by the government agencies involved, but they shared a draft version with the Embassy. The report contains a number of recommendations for action to improve security. NEXT STEPS -------------- 23. (C) The GCEIP team proposes to form a Joint Working Group (JWG) with members from the relevant agencies/ministries in both countries. The Government of Azerbaijan needs to identify its working group members, and equally importantly, a single individual or office with overall responsibility and authority to serve as the lead. The GCEIP team believes that the Azerbaijan lead must be someone at a high level, perhaps in the Prime Minister's or President's office, as the various ministries appear to lack experience and interest in real coordination. 24. (C) Formal agreement must also be reached with respect to the terms of the framework of the collaboration, including the financial arrangements. The GCEIP team proposes to present Azerbaijan with a draft agreement, modeled upon the one pending signature with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for its consideration. This could be done within a few weeks. Embassy Baku concurs. 25. (C) At the request of the DCM, the GCEIP team will prepare a briefing for the Security Dialogue, tentatively scheduled for July. COMMENT ----------------- 26. (S) The success of this effort will rely heavily on the interest of the GOAJ and the willingness of the relevant ministries to work together. At this point, we do not have an indication as to how much financial support the government is willing to provide. While it is likely that substantial funding may be necessary in the maritime environment to provide much needed equipment and training, the GCEIP team's initial observations are that security could be greatly enhanced through less costly means, either through improved procedures and coordination or via other technological solutions. DERSE