Putin and Xi. REUTERS/Paulo Whitaker We are seeing the emergence of a dual power structure in Central Asia, with China as the dominant economic power and Russia as the big security player.

Or, as Alexander Gabuev, senior associate and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, told Foreign Policy: "China would be the bank and Russia would be the big gun."

The confluence comes as Moscow shifts its attention toward Asia after being isolating by the West over the war in Ukraine. China, for its part, is seeking to find new countries it can export goods to as Western demands slows and Beijing transitions its economy.

China is taking the lead in economic-power ventures in the region, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the potential SCO development bank (which Russia is finally warming up to). Additionally, China has become the main moneylender in Central Asia: Its trade volume with the region surpassed that of Russia in 2009.

At the same time, Russia wants to keep its military bases and arms deals in Central Asia, along with the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a security bloc of former Soviet countries.

"It is Inner Asia — Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the five post-Soviet states of Central Asia — that is likely to see the most impact from the deepening of Sino-Russia integration," Dmitri Trenin, the director of Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote recently in a paper on the Sino-Russo entente.

China "sees economics as power," according to a report by Stratfor. "For Beijing, military might rests on a strong economic base, and global power stems as much from the ability to shape global markets as it does from military force."

The same reports suggest Russia is pursuing the regional muscle role because Moscow "believes military might is the basis for national strength, power, and influence."

That may be partially true, but it's difficult to make that call, as China is the economic leader in the region.

Alternatively, there's the sense Russia is pursuing security power in Eurasia because, simply put, that's the second-best option.