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(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this column are that of the writer. The facts and opinions expressed here do not reflect the views of www.economictimes.com .)

Recently, when Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa stated that politics over defence acquisitions harmed the preparedness of India’s forces, he was perhaps expressing an anguish shared by the three services. As expected, his stout defence of the Rafale deal was not relished in certain political circles. The concern of the Chief of the Air Staff can be easily understood by anyone who has had a glimpse into the defence acquisitions of the last two decades.The last set of fighter aircraft of any class that India acquired in recent memory was the SU-30, mostly manufactured by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) under licence from the Russian government. However, the delivery of these aircraft, which began at the turn of the century, is way behind schedule. Apart from the SU-30, the air force is heavily dependent on the aging fleet of MiG-21s, Jaguars and Mirage 2000s which have to be decommissioned in the coming years, leading to significant depletion of our fighter squadrons.The first decision to buy the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) was made nearly 17 years ago, but the first Rafale aircraft is scheduled to fly into India only in October 2019. Despite these facts on record, the critics of the Rafale deal have conveniently glossed over the urgency to acquire aircraft to counter the build-up of air power by China. The timely decision of the NDA government to order two squadrons of Rafale fighters through an intergovernmental process to bolster India’s defence preparedness has been questioned. The procedure followed in the procurement process has withstood the scrutiny of the apex court, which also ruled that the plea of the petitioners to initiate an investigation did not have merit. The critics of the deal are clamouring for a JPC (joint parliamentary committee) bypassing the PAC (public accounts committee), the appropriate forum for scrutinising the CAG (Comptroller and Auditor General) report which would definitely deal with the pricing of the fighter jets.The unabashed efforts at politicising defence acquisitions like Rafale by questioning the integrity of the process without adequate evidence is rather unprecedented. This is bound to have serious repercussions on defence acquisitions in the future. We had seen the Bofors scam in the eighties which was raked up following the detection of a money trail linked to middlemen, but in the Rafale controversy there is no such link whatsoever and is based entirely on perceptions. Thanks to the paralysis in decisionmaking which followed the Bofors scandal, it was nearly 30 years before the acquisition of another set of guns of similar capability as the M777 Ultra Light Howitzers could be finalised.Defence acquisitions by their very nature are highly technical and procedure-bound. As a rule, speed is sacrificed at the altar of procedural puritanism. Our experience so far is that any major acquisition which should theoretically take a couple of years as per the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) takes anything from seven to eight years on average to materialise. The main factors contributing to the delay are the elaborate, but often contested, field trials, the evaluation of bids and the protracted negotiation processes. Add to this the unscheduled delays caused when rival bidders question some stage of decision-making with a view to discrediting their competitors in the fray.In short, a heavy price is paid in terms of time and money to preserve the integrity of the process. Even a mild deviation to facilitate quick decision-making is resisted by the acquisition bureaucracy, which might prefer to retract the entire process at the end of seven or eight years rather than take the risk of carrying the process through. A classic example was the go slow of the proposed indigenous development and manufacture of futuristic infantry combat vehicles nearly ten years after initiating the process.Needless to say, retraction of acquisitions at the fag end of the process is a terribly frustrating experience for the military leadership whose longterm acquisition plans for capability building get derailed. The armed forces rightfully feel badly let down. This is often one of the reasons that affect cordial civil-military relationship. This state of affairs exists because the acquisition bureaucracy is deeply (and rightly) apprehensive of the prospect of ex-post scrutiny by the “three Cs”, namely the CAG, the CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation) and the CVC ( Central Vigilance Commission ) some day in the future and possible departmental action or criminal prosecution. The stringent provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 had contributed a great deal to this state of affairs, but after its recent amendment things are expected to improve. Yet, this could still remain wishful thinking.In the aforesaid context, the political bickering over the Rafale acquisition based on mere perceptions is bound to worsen matters seriously by slowing further defence acquisitions. Officials will dither and procrastinate more than ever. They will record in notes that serve to save their skin but will be difficult for superiors to overrule. Senior decision-makers may riddle files with queries galore – both relevant and irrelevant – so that they can avoid making decisions during their tenure. The instinct of selfpreservation will blind officers to the exigencies of national security on an unprecedented scale. Another undesirable consequence could be extrareadiness to source equipment from public sector agencies, in complete disregard of their ability to deliver, by excluding the private sector. This will be an unwelcome prospect considering the headway India has to make in building private sector capabilities in defence production and R&D (research and development).Whether politicians of the socialist hue like it or not, it needs to be recognised that without the active involvement of the private sector through the creation of a defence industrial ecosystem in the SME (small and medium enterprises) sector, India is bound to lag behind in high-end technology development and innovation. Overplaying ‘crony capitalism’ will have deleterious consequences. Despite some bad examples in the corporate world, stigmatising capitalists and corporates will only lead to extreme hesitation in entrusting key defence acquisitions to the private sector. The unseemly debate on the Rafale offsets conveniently disregards the fact that offsets are the means of creating a vibrant defence industrial ecosystem in the private sector which is a sine qua non for a vibrant world-class defence industry. This is vital for the country to achieve its military goals of the future.The Ministry of Defence has also framed the strategic partnership policy for involving the private sector directly in the manufacture of major platforms such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, submarines and armoured vehicles or tanks. This is calculated to unleash the entrepreneurial and innovative energy of the private sector to develop a strong defence industrial base, which is undoubtedly the hallmark of a world military power. If in the aftermath of Rafale politics, the private sector becomes untouchable, the strategic partnership policy could be in serious jeopardy and this will help only the foreign vendors who are against India attaining self-reliance in defence manufacturing. The preamble of the DPP-2016 recognises that defence acquisitions are not a standard open market commercial form of procurement and has certain unique features such as supplier constraints and technological complexity and recognises that decisionmaking is unique and complex. The needs of the armed forces being nonnegotiable, flexibility in procurement process is required.The letter and spirit of the preamble have not yet led to the evolution of a new pathway for bolder and faster decision-making. Both probity and trust are essential. Bona fide decisions made transparently in the larger interests of national security have to be supported and a high margin of safety and protection afforded to the acquisition teams. A system of pre-audit by a team comprising representatives of the CAG and CVC and independent experts of proven integrity before signing any major contract could be a way out and this needs consideration of the government.It is therefore imperative that we isolate defence and national security issues from the rough and tumble of political games. They are not matters which are to be discussed openly in the streets or subjected to the glare and searing heat of media debates. It hurts the nation and demoralises the armed forces. The costs may be too high for the nation to bear. It should be the government’s endeavour to evolve a judicious system of discreetly examining defence and national security matters should there arise strong reasons to reopen any issue on solid evidence and not based on superficial perceptions. In a maturing democracy like ours it is high time the nation evolved a consensus on a code of conduct on responsible politics.(The author was the defence secretary of India from May 2015 to May 2017 when the deal for 36 Rafale jets was signed with France)