Doctrine of Offensive-Defense

The Pakistan Army (PA) strategy against India calls for ‘offensive-defence’, also known as the Strategy of Riposte. This strategy calls for the armour heavy Strike Corps of Pakistan Army to seize initiative and attack across a narrow front. This is aimed at both unhinging Indian offensive plans in other sectors as well as seizing territory for later bargaining at the negotiating table. The holding Corps of the Pakistan Army are expected to absorb and delay the Indian offensive. And while the armour divisions are concentrated in the Strike Corps, holding corps have also evolved Corps Reserves centred around independent armour brigades and mechanized brigades for countering Indian offensive as well as for counter-penetration.

While it can be correctly argued that the Pakistan Army has broadly followed ‘offensive-defence’ strategy as witnessed in the 1965 war, General Mirza Aslam is credited with crystallizing this strategy. The strategy was demonstrated during the 1989 army exercise ‘Zarb-e-Momin’, which was the biggest exercise of the Pakistan Army at the time. And followed the massive Indian Army exercise of late 196-early 1987 ‘Brasstacks’.

The Pakistan Army is faced with a dilemma – creating strong armour/mechanized strike elements against a much larger adversary while also maintaining enough resources for absorbing/countering Indian offensive. And this needs to be done with less than 1/10th resources of its main adversary. This dilemma becomes still more acute when a comparison is done between the mechanized resources of the two armies.

As against Pakistan Army’s 2 x Strike Corps, Indian Army has 3 x Strike Corps. Further, while Holding/Pivot Corps in both armies have independent armoured brigades, not only are Indian armoured formations bigger in terms of armoured regiments and no of tanks, IA also has a unique formation known as RAPID – Re-organized Army Plains Infantry Division. Each RAPID has an armoured brigade apart from 2/3 infantry brigades. The armoured brigade has 2 x armoured regiments + 2 x mechanized regiments. This structure greatly increases the fire-power of a division in question. There is an offensive and defensive RAPID.

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Take IA’s 10 Corps for example – It has 1 x independent armored brigade (3 x armored regiments + 1 x mechanized infantry regiment) and 2 x RAPIDs ( 4 x armored regiments + 4 x mechanized infantry regiments). In all, this single ‘Pivot’ Corps has almost the same number of armoured regiments as a Strike Corps of Pakistan Army!

Though over past decade, PA has raised new armour regiments and armour brigades and mechanized more infantry battalions, armour and mechanized elements in IA have also seen expansion.

To offset IA’s superiority in the armour/mechanized assets, the Pakistan Army undertakes the following measures:

The smaller size of formations: The size of armour formations (brigades/division) in PA is relatively smaller as compared to India. For example, armour division of Pakistan and India consist of 5 and 6 armoured regiments, respectively. Indian independent armored brigades have 3+1 structure – 3 x armored regiments + 1 x mechanized infantry battalion. Pakistan Army has 2+1 structure. There is also likely slight variation (2-3 tanks) in a number of tanks held per armoured regiment with IA having a higher number.

Anti-Tank battalion: Pakistan Army has dedicated anti-tank battalions which are classified as Light Anti-Tank (LAT) battalion and Heavy Anti-Tank (HAT) battalions. These AT battalions are in addition to the anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) held at an individual infantry battalion level.

(A) Anti Tank Battalions Anti-tank battalions are a relatively cheap and cost-effective option to counter a superior mechanized force. It relieves the armour from undertaking defensive tasks and allows the higher formation to preserve its own armour for offensive and counter-penetration tasks. And wherever required, it helps to strengthen the existing anti-tank capabilities.

(A.1) Light Anti-Tank Battalions (LAT) During the 1965 war, some infantry battalions, at the scale of one battalion per division, were converted into Reconnaissance & Support Battalions (R&S). These battalions had about 60% manpower as compared to standard infantry battalion but were equipped with much higher firepower. Apart from their standard role of reconnaissance, these units were also used to hold the ground through fire-power and act as screening forces. Sometime in the early 90s, the R&S battalions with Infantry divisions were converted into anti-tank battalions. Pakistan Army today has dedicated LAT battalions. LAT battalions are held at Division HQ level and are most likely allocated to infantry brigades under the division at the scale of 1 x LAT Company/Brigade. The LAT battalions are equipped with Bakhtar-Shikan anti-tank guided missiles; these missiles are mounted on a 4 x 4 vehicle. However, during 2017 Pakistan Day Parade, an APC mounted contingent of Baktar-Shikan missiles from 27 Baloch Regiment was mentioned as LAT battalion. It is likely that some LAT battalions, especially which are part of partially Mechanized Divisions of PA are mounted on M-113 APCs or locally produced Pakistani versions of the same.

Example of some of the LAT battalions are as under:

21 Punjab (LAT) battalion

23 Punjab (LAT) battalion

26 Punjab (LAT) battalion

19 Baloch (LAT) battalion – this is also the parent battalion of Special Service Group (SSG) (A.2) Heavy Anti-Tank Battalions (HAT) Pakistan Army also has the concept of Heavy Anti-tank (HAT) Battalions which are being held at Corps HQ level. This includes the two Strike Corps – Army Reserve North (ARN, I Corps, Mangla) and Army Reserve South (ARS, II Corps, Multan). Apart from HAT battalions, there exist Independent HAT Companies as well. While I don’t have the details of the exact number of such battalions (I do have names of some battalions), it highly likely that most Corps facing eastern border have a HAT battalion. And some divisions (mechanized ones in Strike Corps or those in sensitive sectors where large Indian armoured offensive is expected) also have HAT Companies. The HAT battalions and companies are equipped with TOW ATGM missiles and the same is mounted on M-113 APCs or Pakistan’s versions/derivatives of this venerable armoured personnel carrier. Considering the relatively limited number of TOW missiles imported by Pakistan, some HAT battalions are also equipped with Baktar-Shikan missiles. Example of some of the HAT battalions are as under: 39 Azad Kashmir (Heavy Anti Tank) battalion or 39 AK (HAT) battalion

40 AK (HAT) battalion

226 AK (HAT) Company

227 AK (HAT) Company

(A.2.1) M-901 Improved Tow Vehicle

In the early 80s, Pakistan Army also imported 24 M-901 Improved Tow Vehicles from the USA. These are dedicated TOW missile platforms based on M-113 APCs. Each vehicle has 2 x ‘ready to fire’ missiles along with 10 reloads. The reloading is done under the armour. All of them are concentrated under Multan based 2 Corps or Army Reserve South (ARS). ARS is Pakistan Army’s premier armour and mechanized heavy strike formation. Given the number of units, these are most likely held by a single HAT battalion.

(A.3) Organization Structure

While I do not have the details of the organizational structure of such anti-tank battalions (LAT or HAT), one can draw a fairly good approximation considering two main points as mentioned below:

(a) Most formations below a brigade have company, platoon and section structure. And the number of companies, platoons and sections varies as per the role & nature of the unit.

(b) A missile launcher along with ready-to-fire missiles and the first set of reloads will constitute a basic fire unit.

Keeping the above two points in mind, the following deductive reasoning can be applied:

In case of LAT battalion, it is a division level asset.

Each infantry division in PA generally has 3 x infantry brigades (some divisions are larger)

Therefore, an assumption can be made that each LAT battalion will most likely provide 1 x LAT Company per brigade with 1 x HQ Company.

Therefore, a LAT battalion most likely has five (05) companies – 1 x HQ Company, 3 x LAT Companies and 1 x Support Company (for technical support to LAT companies). If each LAT Company has organic technical support elements than the technical support company can be ruled out. Then each LAT battalion has four (04) companies

Each LAT company further likely has between 2 or 3 missile platoons

Missile platoons will be further broken down into missile sections. Each platoon likely has 2 or 3 missile sections.

Each missile section is equipped with 1 x missile launcher and with 1 ready-to-fire missiles and 3 reloads + 4 x reserves for a total of 08 missiles per section/launcher.

The above argument about the number of launchers and missiles can be summarized as such:

CASE 1 3 x Missile Companies with 3 x Missile Platoons/Company and 3 x Missile Sections/Platoon 3 x 3 x 3 – 27 launchers @ 8 missiles/launcher – 216 missiles

CASE 2 3 x Missile Companies with 3 x Missile Platoons/Company and 2 x Missile Sections/Platoon 3 x 3 x 2 – 18 launchers @ 8 missiles/launcher – 144 missiles



A similar structure likely exists in case of HAT battalions. The only difference being, the companies will be allotted to divisions under the Corps.

(B) Anti Tank Missiles

Pakistan Army employs three main types of ATGMs. These are as under:



(1) Baktar-Shikan:

This is the licensed produced copy of Chinese HJ-8/Red Arrow-8 ATGM. Employed by infantry and anti-tank battalions.

A version of the missile has also been adapted for use by AH-1 ‘Cobra’ helicopter gunships.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer database shows that a total of 23,350 HJ-8 missiles were contracted in 1989. And these were license manufactured between 1990 and 2016

However, other credible sources say that PA tested first home-produced Baktar-Shikan in 1997. It is quite likely that production began in 1997.

A 19 year period (1997-2016) to produce these number of missiles means a per annum production rate of ~1,229 missiles. This is unlikely to be the case.

Two things could’ve happened. One, an initial batch was procured off-the-shelf from China and Pakistan devoted its interest to produce the missile locally; and that initial production was at a low rate. Secondly, local production and subsequent induction picked steam after 2001 when the US funds started flowing. This is because until September 2001 event happened, Pakistan defence overall was in a bad shape due to lack of funds.

(2) BGM-71 Tow-2:

Used by Heavy Anti-Tank Battalions/Companies and AH-1 ‘Cobra’ helicopter gunships

The SIPRI database documents three instances of TOW missiles being ordered by Pakistan; these were in 1981, 2004 and 2007.

Considering the missiles ordered from the USA in 2004 and 2007, the number of TOW-2 missiles ordered (and supposedly held) by the PA is 5,205. I’ve not considered the 1,005 missiles ordered in 1981 and received between 1983-96 because these are beyond their shelf life; these were most probably exhausted in training.

TOW-2A missiles are a precious resource and this explains why HAT battalions are held at Corps HQ level or in Independent HAT Companies allotted to few important Divisions.

The use of Baktar-Shikan on AH-1 ‘Cobra’ gunships most likely stems from the lack of enough quantity of TOW missiles and their price. The topsy-turvy nature of US-Pakistan relationship would be another factor; post-1998 nuclear test, Pakistan did not have access to most US systems including TOW-2 missiles. Baktar-Shikan was a good alternative.

(B.1) Baktar-Shikan

Baktar-Shikan missile is Pakistan’s licensed copy of the Chinese HJ-8 or Red Arrow-8 anti-tank guided missile.

It is second generation, wire-guided, semi-automatic command-to-line-of-sight (SACLOS) anti-tank missile.

The missile consists of four components. These are (data in parenthesis is weight in Kg):

Missile inside missile case – 25 kg (missile only is 11.2 kg) Tripod – 23 Kg Guidance unit – 24 Kg IR Goniometer – 12.5 Kg.



IR Goniometer – As per army-guide.com, “the IR goniometer is mounted on the left side of the launcher and, as well as serving as a day sight, also receives and modulates IR signals from the missile and feeds resulting deviation signals to the guidance unit. A night device can also be fitted.”

Apart from use by the infantry on the man-pack basis, the missile is mounted on 4×4 vehicles and Armored Personnel Carriers (APC). APC consist of imported M113 APCs as well as locally manufactured modification of M113 APC by Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT). The base modification of M113A2 APCs is called ‘Talha’ while a Baktar-Shikan mounted version of ‘Talha’ APC is called ‘Maaz’.

Each Maaz APC has a single missile firing post with further 8 reloads. It is said that the missile firing post is retrieved inside the turret for reload. It has a crew of four people.

As is evident from the weight of each sub-component, Baktar-Shikan is not exactly a man-portable missile. The total weight of the system (missile + firing post) is close to 85 Kg. It can be carried on the man-pack basis and would be man-portable only for very short distances.

The data available about the missile weight and weight of encased tube (with the missile inside) is 11.2 Kg and 25 Kg, respectively. I’ve not come across the reason for such high weight of the empty missile tube (~14 Kg). Generally, the empty missile tube weighs about 1-2 Kg.

Only in case of AT-5B ‘Spandrel’ or ‘Konkur-M’ (used by Indian Army) does the missile tube weigh ~10 Kg because the tube has a gas generator. This gas generator ejects the missile from the tube before the main motor kicks-in.

But in case of HJ-8/Baktar-Shikan, the missile tube is ejected backwards and there is considerable back-blast. This rules out any device to eject the missile.

This becomes more clear in the excellent video below of PA troops firing the missile from a 4×4 vehicle. Source of video (https://youtu.be/4GPShUqOZpk)

Further, as the picture below shows, given the dimensions of the firing post, the soldier has to be in kneeling position to fire the missile. This is because of the position of the aiming device. While the elevated missile firing post gives better line of sight, it is also a bigger target and exposes the missile pilot during the entire phase of missile flight.

The missile has also been adapted for use on AH-1 ‘Cobra’ helicopter gunships. The video below of Pakistan Army exercise dates from 2006. As the commentary says, it involves adaptation of Baktar-Shikan missile and demonstration of night-firing by AH-1 helicopter gunships.

The weight aspect of HJ-8 flows from the design philosophy where HJ-8 was meant to mirror heavy western ATGMs like BGM-71 ‘TOW’ and Euromissile HOT. The most visible impact is the heavy tripod of HJ-8 or Baktar-Shikan missile which copies from the American TOW missile. It has given the missile 360-degree swivel capability.

Another aspect of HJ-8 missile borrowed from French MILAN anti-tank missile is that fact that the missile tube (in which the missile is encased) is pushed back when the missile is fired. Though, the rearward travel of HJ-8/Baktar-Shikan missile tube seems to be much higher as compared to Milan missile.

(B.1.1) Missile Variants

The basic HJ-8 missile has evolved over the years. The picture below shows this evolution with various models of HJ-8 leading to HJ-9. PA at this stage does not operate HJ-9.

The basic HJ-8A missile was followed by an HJ-8C missile in the early 90s; HJ-8C missile featured a probe in-front with a precursor charge followed by main HEAT warhead.

This was meant to neutralize the Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) which had started proliferating on Soviet origin tanks.

The HJ-8E missile is a further improvement on HJ-8C with range increased from 3,500 meters to 4,000 meters. This missile was ready by late 90s and is supposed to have improved guidance system, thereby increasing the kill probability.

Considering that Baktar-Shikan is licensed copy of HJ-8 missile, it is but natural that Pakistan Army will also induct the progressive versions of the same missile.

Pakistan started displaying a tandem warhead version of Baktar-Shikan missile from 2002 onward. This tandem warhead version is most likely to be a licensed copy of HJ-8E missile with tandem warhead and enhanced range.

The new missile launcher also has the option of attaching a thermal imager to allow for acquisition and targeting of enemy mechanized assets at night. As per army-guide.com, “system can be fitted with a PTI- 32 thermal imagers which can detect tank-sized targets at a range of 4,000 m and identify tank size targets at a range of 2,000 m”

While it is likely the tandem warhead version will start replacing/supplanting the pure HEAT warhead versions in the PA service, the exact numbers and status of such a program are not known (at least to this author).

Malaysia had placed an order for Baktar-Shikan missiles in 2001 which as per SIPRI database was completed in the 2002-2003 period. As the picture of the missile below with a probe in front shows, Malaysia operates the tandem warhead version of the missile.

Interestingly, in the 2014 International Defense Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS) exhibition, Pakistan had also displayed the ‘Light’ version of the Baktar-Shikan missile. This is based on on the NORINCO HJ-8L version. HJ-8L version is an attempt to develop a genuine man-portable ATGM which consists of a much smaller & lighter firing post (smaller tripod and guidance cum aiming device). It retains the same missile. The total weight of this system is said to be under 25 Kg.

However, apart from redesigned and new guidance units and imaging tools, it is highly likely that Chinese have also developed a new missile case. This is because with the older missile+missile tube itself weighing 25 Kg, the overall weight of the missile+firing post cannot be under 25 Kg.

The above layout is quite similar to the Russian heavy KORNET-E anti-tank missile.

HJ-8 missile variants have seen considerable use in Syria by various forces. These missiles have been credited with taking out many modern MBTs in the civil war.

The video below, from 2013, is a compilation of use of HJ-8 missile in Syrian Civil War.

(B.2) BGM-71 TOW-2A

Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided or ‘TOW’ is the most famous of US anti-tank missiles and one which has been produced the most.

It is a heavy anti-tank missile with the heaviest warhead amongst land-based anti-tank missiles. The missile weighs about 22 kgs with the whole firing post including the missile weighing close to 90 kg.

Guidance is Semi-Automatic Command to Line of Sight (SACLOS) meaning the missile pilot has to keep tracking the target till impact. The guidance signals are transmitted through wires (wire-guided) or one-way secured radio-frequency link (RF). The RF-based guidance does not make the missile ‘fire & forget’. It simply replaces the wire as a medium of delivery guidance.

From its first version in the early 1970s, the missile and attached paraphernalia have undergone the continuous upgrade. At present, there are two main avatars of the missile, along with variants of these two dominant types. The details of the same are as follows:

Different versions of TOW missiles (TOW-2B ‘Aero’ is not shown):

TOW-2B ‘Aero’ – compare the front section with standard TOW-2B shown above.

Internal diagrams of TOW-2A and TOW-2B. TOW-2B ‘Aero’ differs from TOW-2B only in terms of the shape of front section. In case RF versions, the rear section of the missile has RF receiver instead of wire-dispenser

(picture source TOW-2A & 2B: army-technology.com. TOW-2B Aero-internet)

(B.2.1) Nos & Type in Pakistan Army

As discussed earlier, Pakistan Army acquired various versions of BGM-71/TOW missiles in three tranches. These details of the order are as follows (Year of Order/Quantity/Usage):

1981 – 1,005 – To be used on AH-1 ‘Cobra’ helicopters and M-901 ITV 2004 – 2,007 – TOW-2A variant; to be used on AH-1 ‘Cobra’ helicopters 2007 – 3,198 – TOW-2A-RF variants



The Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notification about the 2007 sale of TOW-2A missiles gives the following break-up of the order:

The Government of Pakistan has requested a possible sale of 2,769 Radio Frequency (RF) TOW 2A Missiles, 7 RF TOW 2A Fly-to-buy Missiles, 415 RF Bunker Buster Missiles, 7 RF Fly-to-buy Bunker Buster Missiles, upgrade of 121 TOW Basic/TOW-I launchers to fire TOW II configuration for wire-guided and wireless missiles, TOW Data Acquisition Systems, gunner aiming sight, testers, cameras, spare and repair parts, technical support, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, technical data and publications, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $185 million.

Given the quantity of missiles ordered and likely to be held (5,205), TOW-2A is a precious resource for Pakistan Army.

The stock is most probably divided between the Pakistan Army’s Army Aviation Corps (AAC) which operates the AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships and the Heavy Anti-Tank (HAT) battalions.

(3.0) Lessons for India

The Arab-Israel war of October 1973, known as the Yom-Kippur war (or the Ramadan War as per the Arabs) offers insight into the tank versus anti-tank missile scenario. It has lessons for India because the adversary (Pakistan) intends to use ATGMs to blunt India’s superior armour capabilities.

The 1973 war is a landmark event because it became the proving ground of two new weapon systems in modern warfare – anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) and anti-aircraft missile. The success of these two systems forced a major rethink in tank warfare and air combat in terms of tactics, the design of weapon system and development of measures & counter-measures.

Egyptian Army employed thousands of Soviet Union supplied 9M14 ‘Malyutka’ (NATO reporting name: AT-3 ‘Swagger’) ATGM. While the Israeli intelligence and its general staff were aware of this weapon system with Egyptians, they did not consider it as an effective counter-measure to their armour. This faulty assessment caused the Israeli heavily – Israel Defence Forces (IDF) lost about 800 tanks in this war with Egyptian ATGM teams accounting for 20%-25% of the total losses. But the real impact of ATGM was felt in the initial days of the war when the Israelis were completely taken by surprise by the ATGM and the efficacy of Egyptian anti-tank defences. During first two days of the war, Israelis lost about 260 tanks – the bulk of these losses were on account of ATGMs.

But the anti-tank teams were highly effective because the Egyptians employed innovative anti-tank tactics. In the words of one Israeli tank commander[1] who led the initial counter-attack against the Egyptian Army:

“We were advancing and in the distance, I saw specks dotted on the sand dunes. I couldn’t make out what they were. As we got closer, I thought they looked like tree stumps. They were motionless and scattered across the terrain ahead of us. I got on the intercom and asked the tanks ahead what they made of it. One of my tank commanders radioed back: ‘My God, they’re not tree stumps. They’re men!’ For a moment I couldn’t understand. What were men doing standing out there—quite still-when we were advancing in our tanks towards them? Suddenly all hell broke loose. A barrage of missiles was being fired at us. Many of our tanks were hit. We had never come up against anything like this before….”

Another example of how much thought Egyptians had given to anti-tank warfare based on ATGM is given below[2]:

“According to one report, the Egyptians, with an abundance of SAGGERs, established a defence that lured the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) into a Kill Zone which optimized the potential of both SAGGERs and RPG-7s. The IDF tankers saw Egyptian tanks in the far distance and closed to do battle; however, they were unaware of great numbers of camouflaged RPG-7s and SAGGERs forward of the Egyptian tanks”

This is shown in the image below (taken from the same document):

The Israeli Armoured Corps did evolve tactics to counter the Egyptian anti-tank teams; these tactics meant the armour advancing under the cover of artillery and with supporting infantry (mounted on APC/IFV and dismounted). ATGM placed a restriction on the free reign which the armour had against the infantry.

But the widespread use of anti-tank missiles did not make the Main Battle Tank (MBT) obsolete. In words of a CIA Report[3] on analysis of 1973 Arab-Israel War done in 1975:

“Antitank weapons like the Sagger and RPG-7 took a heavy toll of Israeli armour. But they did not render the tank obsolete. The initial impression created by the Egyptian use of antitank missiles was artificially reinforced by the inappropriate tactics used by the Israelis in the first few days of the war

“Antitank weapons like the Sagger and RPG-7 took a heavy toll of Israeli armour. But they did not render the tank obsolete. The initial impression created by the Egyptian use of antitank missiles was artificially reinforced by the inappropriate tactics used by the Israelis in the first few days of the war. It is probably safe to say that no large, modern army will again make the mistake of using unsupported tanks against massed infantry.

The Israelis rediscovered some ancient principles in seeking a response to the antitank weapon threat posed at the beginning of the October war. Foremost, the Israelis found that no single weapon can long dominate the battlefield. Victory requires the use of a balanced force with much complementary offensive and defensive elements. The battlefield, in short, is a complicated environment and no one weapon or arm of service can function effectively on it without the active aid and cooperation of others. This is reassuring for the Israelis since the effective and flexible use of mobile forces under difficult circumstances is precisely the area in which they hold the greatest comparative advantage over the Arabs”.

The same report also adds the following about Israeli adaptation to this new threat in course of the war:

“Despite all the problems, however, the Israelis once again proved the importance of flexibility in maintaining their superiority. The most striking example of this is provided by the Israeli response to the Arab–particularly Egyptian–antitank weapons. By 8 October the Israelis had recognized the flaws in their armour tactics and adopted a defensive procedure under which they waited for the Arab armour to attack and then took the Arabs under fire from extreme range. This made it difficult for the Arabs to bring their antitank weapons forward. This change of tactics by the Israelis took maximum advantage of the longer range of most of their tank guns and the superiority of their long-range tank gunnery.

The Israeli attack on 8 October appears to have been the last attempt to use tanks in the unsupported 1967 style and even then the Israelis may have been drawn in by their initial success. Within four or five days after the beginning of the war, the Israelis were adopting tactics which reduced the threat from Arab antitank weapons to manageable proportions. This adjustment in the midst of combat provides a fair measure of the flexibility of Israeli leadership and the thoroughness of low-level training.”

(4.0) Conclusion

Pakistan Army possesses strong anti-tank capability which will be a challenge to Indian mechanized formations in any future conflict.

The main objective of these anti-tank formations is to prevent a break-out by Indian armoured formations. Using speed, mobility, terrain familiarity and stand-off range of their missiles, they intend to blunt Indian mechanized offensive.

With the ability to engage targets at night, they can spring a surprise on any advancing armour column. Working in conjunction with some armour and/or AH-1 ‘Cobra’ gunship helicopters will make for a formidable force.

They will play an important role in next Indo-Pak war. And like the Israelis in 1973 war, Indian Army will have to evolve tactics to counter them. And while Israelis were taken by surprise, Indian Army knows the existence of this capability.

Apart from counter-tactics, Indian Army also needs to invest in a technological solution like Active Protection Systems (APS) for its main battle tanks.

(This article was written by Rohit Vats who tweets at @KesariDhwaj, the original article can be read on his blog)