When it comes to the Middle East, there is almost always a tendency to blame the victim of a crime or tragedy. When talking about Israel, there are attempts to rationalize the decades of oppression towards the occupied Palestinians, and there is also a similar rationalization from the opposition to try to justify Israeli civilians being attacked by Palestinian elements. Of course the largely innocent civilians are caught in the middle of it — not just the conflict itself, but the media war launched by the fringe hawks and vultures on either side.

With the Iraq conflict — and the lead up — there was an exaggeration of sectarianism by the fringe right. Sunnis in Iraq had historically held power for over a thousand years, and over the course of less than a decade we saw the historically repressed Shia enter both social and political circles with a large degree of power. Noting that Iraq’s government is democratic and set up in such a way that a certain group cannot hold absolute power, it was and still is referred to as a “Shia government,” or more conspicuously as “Shia-dominated” or “Shia-led.” All of these titles are of course false, and at best can only refer to the Prime Minister who happens to be Shia and holding the position with the highest level of authority in the country. With this in mind, calling Iraq “Shia-led” or characterizing it as a “Shia government” is somewhat parallel to calling the American government “African-led” or “African government” because President Obama happens to be of African descent. It is not only a spit in the face of Iraq’s democracy where the Prime Minister and his party were elected through a democratic election, but it’s also one of the key sources of sectarianism in Iraq.

It may be strange for me to suggest that phrases like “Shia-led” are a key source of sectarianism within Iraq, but this illusion of Shia in Iraq holding absolute power is a fantasy spread by domestic groups just as it is spread by regional and international groups. Not only is it used in an attempt to justify Iraqi tribes and political figures siding with the so-called “Islamic State” (aka ISIS or Da’ish), but it also sweeps the legitimate grievances of Shia in Iraq under the rug — most of these grievances are closely similar to (and in some cases completely parallel to) the grievances felt in other parts of the country by other groups — including Sunni Arabs.

Protest in Basra: the sign depicts a faucet with insects and reptiles coming out of it, captioned with “Basra’s water.”

Iraq faces serious corruption, nepotism, and unreasonably high levels of bureaucracy across the country. All three of these feed into each other, creating a seemingly endless cycle of abuse from the government towards civilians. This isn’t limited to just Sunni Arab parts of Iraq, but is actually widespread across Iraq’s entire cultural, ethnic and regional spectrum. Indeed, all Iraqis suffer from issues stemming from political corruption and incompetence in almost equal proportion. This involves services like electricity, clean water supply and security not being supplied in reasonable amounts, jobs not being available, and empty, unfilled promises made by the governments on local and federal levels. Kurdish Iraq isn’t exactly the exception to the rule, and Shia Iraq isn’t the sort of paradise that those who use phrases like “Shia-led” would have you believe.

Focusing exclusively on the Shia areas of Iraq, and using Anbar province as a benchmark, we can observe that five out of the nine largely-Shia provinces have a lower human development index than Anbar — the so-called heartland of the “Iraqi revolution” or “Iraqi spring” (or whatever it was that supporters of the Iraqi insurgency were calling it in 2014). The remaining largely-Shia provinces are only marginally above Anbar in the human development index, with Karbala — a province that is important both religiously and in terms of Shia identity — being only 0.003 points higher than Anbar. If there was truly a slant for Shia within the federal government of Iraq, it would be evident in the areas that are held most dear to Shia — such as Karbala — but the opposite seems true. Moving onto areas like Basra — the key source of Iraq’s oil and income, and also the province with the highest rate of human development across all of the Shia-majority provinces in Iraq — we see that it is marginally better than Anbar with a human development index that is only 0.004 points higher. At this point we’re merely splitting hairs — clearly the situation in Anbar is not far off to that experienced by other areas of Iraq, so there is no favoritism in play: the argument that Iraq’s Shia are favored above Sunnis falls flat on it’s face when closely examined. Not only is the holiest city in Shia Islam just a hair above Anbar, but so is the province that contributes 90% of Iraq’s GDP.

Human development index in Iraq organized by region: the highest level of human development is in the largely-Sunni Sulaymaniya province, and the lowest being in the largely-Shia Muthana province.

Indeed, when closely examining the Shia situation in Iraq, one quickly finds that it suffers at best in proportion, and at worst more, than non-Shia Iraq. The province with the least human development index in the country — a full 0.011 points less than Nineveh — is the Shia-majority province of Muthanna. How can one argue Iraq has a Shia government, or a Shia-led government, or a Shia-dominated government, if it is Shia that experience the least amount of development under it? Using the parallels to America, it is again similar to arguing that African-Americans have it better than everyone else, and using Obama being President as proof. It comes off as ridiculous when looked at from this perspective, and it is similarly ridiculous when viewed in the context of Iraq.

Looking towards Iraq’s government under Maliki, Sunni politicians held just under 50% of the ministries, had significant power in all areas of the democratic process, and direct management of almost half of the different areas of the federal government. This is only focusing on the federal government, because if we look towards Sunni-majority provinces and focus on their local governments we almost always find a Sunni representative elected. Where do Shia come into play in this case? With this in mind, phrases like “Shia-dominated” or “Shia government” not only sounds absurd, but those who use such phrases are almost intentionally being misleading about the realities of the Iraqi government.

Other arguments try to suggest that the “Shia-led Maliki government” purged people out of Iraq’s military based on sect or ethnicity. Numbers don’t lie, however, with the figures produced by Ismael al-Sodani — the former Iraq Military Attaché to the United States — indicate that of the 26 highest ranking positions within the Iraqi military, fifteen of them belonged to Sunnis and only eleven were being held by Shia. The Sunni figures include four positions held by Sunni Kurds. Some of the highest positions, including Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff, were and continue to be held by Sunnis. For context on Iraq’s ethnic make-up, at least 70% of Iraqis are Shia. With that in mind, it can be observed that almost 30% of Iraq have almost 50% representation within the Iraqi federal government, as well as 60% representation within Iraq’s security forces. Indeed, to argue that Sunnis as a demographic are underrepresented or kept away from either political or military circles is a myth with no basis in reality.

Protest in Dhi Qar governorate against corruption and a lack of services.

Does this mean that the Iraqi government is perfect? Not even remotely. Sect-based quotas are literally the absolute application of sectarianism that serve to encourage further sectarianism and continue the cycle of corruption, nepotism and poor government services. Rather than living in the ideal neo-liberal world of everyone having representation in everything, Baghdad should have the right to discriminate based on skill, ability, reliability, trustworthiness and not have to meet any form of quota that is ultimately detrimental to Iraq’s development. No democracy in the world is required to fill their cabinet with members of opposing parties, or required to fill ministerial posts based on ethnic or religious quotas. It’s an institution that is designed to fail, easily infiltrated and easily exploitable.

So where is the Sunni repression that was so extreme it forced (and according to some, continues to force) Sunni Iraqis into siding with the “Islamic State”? The services provided were not any better or worse than what is provided in other parts of Iraq, and they were not kept out of the government or strong-armed out of the military. They had the same access to education facilities, same job and lifestyle prospects, and similar grievances to those felt by every other Iraqi. Where does the slavery, genocide, militant “Islamist” extremism and burqa-clad women fit into this? The argument which the average person is spoon-fed is along the lines of “Sunnis in Anbar were upset at Shia in Baghdad, so they enslaved Yezidis in Nineveh and evicted Christians from their homes.” It makes no sense, yet it’s shamelessly promoted as legitimate analysis of post-American Iraq. Even worse is how the slaughter of Sunnis by the “Islamic State” in Salahuddin and Anbar is completely ignored by sectarian analysts, and instead the focus is placed exclusively on the Shia-Sunni relationship as the be-all and end-all of jihadist extremism in Iraq.

During the protests in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, a protester puts an Iraqi flag scarf around an officer’s head and tells him “[The security forces] are what lifts our spirits.”

But with the numbers out of the way, this fantasy of mistreatment of Sunnis is often used to try to rationalize Sunni tribes siding with terrorists, or even the existence of the “Islamic State” in Iraq itself. It tries to mischaracterize former Prime Minister Maliki as some sort of paranoid Shia-supremacist who had his foot on the head of Sunni Iraq while propping up Shia Iraq, and the current Iraq insurgency being a Sunni response to repression from Shia. It attempts to blame the victim of acts that match the United Nations’ description of genocide with arguments that try to justify attacks on Iraq’s Shia majority and ethnic minorities. It tries to somehow go through the mental gymnastics of validating the existence of the “Islamic State” — including their murders, tortures, enslavement, child abuse and genocide — as being some sort of legitimate grassroots representative of Sunni grievances in Iraq, and those who go through those mental leaps attempt to — at the same time — treat the so-called “Islamic State” as a fringe insurgency. It is inappropriate as much as it is ignorant, but the worst part of it is that it has pushed large swathes of Sunni Iraq towards the jihadists, fueled by the media, political camps and propagandists into the idea that Iraq’s political and social climate can somehow be polarized into Sunni vs. Shia, with the Shia populous having some sort of upper hand in any area of Iraq’s society.

This isn’t a phenomenon limited to “Islamic State” supporters, but it is a common idea in the greater Sunni world that Iraq’s “sectarian government” is the reason behind the current insurgency. Those who are sectarian themselves jump at the opportunity to demonize Shia in general, prompting people to join the “resistance movement” in Iraq. The Governor of Anbar at the time, Ahmed al-Dulaimi, recently commented on how his support of the fight against the “Islamic State” last year was considered by Sunni politicians as supporting “the agenda of a sectarian government.” He also remarked on how, one year on, those same politicians have renegged on the aforementioned idea — it took a whole year of suffering for Anbar’s people, tribes and political representation to finally accept that the jihadists do not represent them.

Anti-government protest in Fallujah, April 2013. The protesters fly the Ba’ath flag of Saddam Hussein alongside flags of the “Islamic State”.

This unjust notion wasn’t just limited to media, but it was picked up and accepted by the American government as fact and greatly influenced American foreign policy towards Iraq. When the “Islamic State” first began their major assault on Iraq — in mid 2013 — the Iraqi government requested airstrikes (even in the form of unmanned drones) on the Iraqi-Syrian border to try to stop the assault as the Iraqi military lacked the capabilities to do so themselves. These calls fell on deaf ears, and continued to fall on deaf ears all the way through to the fall of Mosul in 2014 and beyond. City after city fell, with the American government asking for “reforms” and an “inclusive” government to replace the already reformed and already inclusive government (which has more reform and more inclusiveness than any government in the Middle East, and maybe even most of the world). This fantasy of Sunni repression led to Sunni area after Sunni area to be captured by rampaging terrorists, with the locals supporting their ‘liberators’ and Iraq’s friends turning a blind eye. The only losers in this have been Iraq’s ethnoreligious minorities who lived with Sunnis — such as the Yezidis, Shabaks and Assyrians — and Sunnis themselves. Some of these foreign policy hawks have gone so far as to suggest that the United States finally conducting airstrikes in August 2014 — after the jihadists had seized some 30% of the country — without waiting for “reforms” was actually subservience to the Iraqi government. It sounds silly at first, but this is the depressing reality of how deep this sickness has found its way into American political circles. But I digress.

In the last few weeks we’ve seen dozens of protests over government corruption in southern Iraq. These protests were a purely grassroots movement that came — among other things — as a result of low electricity rations during a heatwave that has temperatures rising as high as 115ºF (55ºC), with a “feels like” temperature of over 160ºF (70ºC). Contrary to statements made by the “Islamic State”, Iraq’s Shia don’t actually worship fire and many would prefer to spend their time under an air-conditioner during such temperatures. Thousands poured into the streets to protest something that Sunni Iraq had protested just two years earlier: corruption, lack of services, security issues, and looking for change in the government.

This isn’t the first time these protests happened — they happened simultaneously with the protests in Anbar in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Unlike those protests in Anbar, however, they were not carrying jihadist banners, and they were not carrying rifles. On the contrary: they were carrying pickets, they were carrying the modern Iraqi flag, and they were protesting in the street against the same grievances felt by everyone else in the Iraqi nation. They did not attack police, they did not accuse the government of being “Sunni-dominated,” and they did not try to justify their position by arguing that others have it better. When opportunists — including politicians and controversial figures — tried to join the protests, they were quickly evicted. No politician was spared, and all were equally blamed as a single unit that forms the government. Naturally, their grievances cannot be hijacked — this was a grassroots movement by the people, and not an opportunity for political figures to try to prop up their image.

Women leading a chant through Baghdad.

These protests are still ongoing. But what they symbolize is more than just the lack of services faced in central and southern Iraq. Indeed, what these protests symbolize is that all Iraqis have a similar lack of services; that the corruption and dissatisfaction with the government extends beyond those who belong to a specific religious denomination; that one side does not have it better than the other; that the deep-rooted issues in Iraq are only sectarian to those who intentionally try to interpret them as such.

So let’s stop with the victim blaming. There was no justification for siding with the “Islamic State”, and there were no “legitimate grievances” that convinced people to join the militants. But the scapegoat of “Shia” appears to be a little to enticing for the neoconservatives, Wahhabis, Sunni supremacists and the armchair analysts and journalists who said the word “Shia” enough times with negative connotation to entice other neoconservatives, Wahhabis and Sunni supremacists to give them jobs as serious analysts and journalists.

God help Iraq, where our friends are friends with our enemies, and where the terrorists are allowed to lead the narrative both domestically and internationally.