The Kosovo Liberation Army has its roots in the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo, in effect its political arm, but the group first became publicly known late in 1996, after claiming responsibility for a series of attacks on refugee camps in Kosovo set up for Serbs fleeing the fighting in Bosnia and Croatia, Serbian policemen, civilians, Albanian civilians unsympathetic to their cause, and government buildings. At this time, the KLA was reported to have had around 600 fighters with no central command, but the numbers would soon grow into the thousands. Although exact numbers are hard to come by, their strength at the beginning of 1998 was said to have been around 2,000 fighters, with some estimates running as high as 12,000-20,000.

Funding to the KLA arrives from several different routes. Much of the money has arrived from Albanian nationals living abroad, and it has been said the largest amounts of money arrived from Western Europe and the United States. It has also been said that the intelligence services of Austria, Germany and the United States were heavily involved in providing funds and weapons to the KLA. Also cited were reports that the KLA is heavily involved with organized crime elements in smuggling narcotics, tobacco and immigrants throughout the Balkans to help pay for their cause. Jane's Intelligence Review has carried numerous articles on this KLA-crime connection, along with other major news agencies.

The core of the KLA is made up of Albanians who had served in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) prior to its dissolution, as well as former state security agents and veterans of the Croatian and Bosnian wars. Many had served time in prison for opposing the communist regime of former president, Josip Broz Tito. Hasim Thaci was the KLA's political director in 1999, and Sulejman "Sultan" Selimi was named the KLA's top military commander in 1999. He had previously led forces in the Drenica region, known for its resistance to the Serb forces, and the scene of alleged human rights violations committed by the Serb security forces. The KLA's leadership was reportedly operating from a training camp near Kukes, Albania, with other camps being located in Tropoje and Bajram Curri, both in Albania. It has been revealed by Albanian secret service agents, as well as Jane's Intelligence Review and various news organizations that at least some of these camps were being run by Osama bin Laden, and various other foreign mujahedeen. American intelligence had identified the presence of Egyptian, Afghanistani, Sudanese, Algerian, Saudi and Chechen nationals. It was reported that at least 120 Iranian fighters formed a special unit in the town of Donji Prekaz, and consisted of Bosnian and Albanian nationals, led by an Egyptian named Abu Ismail. (The Jerusalem Post September 14, 1998) There seems to have been some confusion about the origins of these fighters, and KLA commanders did not seem to be notified of their arrival. In addition to the mujahedeen, reports of around 300 members of the Croatian Army, mainly of Albanian nationality, members of Bosnia's Black Swans, as well as volunteers from the United States, the infamous 'Atlantic Brigade', surfaced in the world's newspapers.

Until 1997 the KLA employed hit-and-run tactics, avoiding direct confrontation with Serbian forces. In 1998, Serbian security forces launched a large-scale counter-insurgency operation, and the KLA was drawn into larger scale fighting, succeeding in holding large portions of Kosovo under their control. It was around this time that the KLA suddenly improved their tactics, weaponry and organization. There is a large amount of evidence that the CIA and British intelligence began training fighters in camps in Albania. The British Special Air Service (SAS) was apparently specifically tasked with training the guerrillas, while the CIA seems to have provided monetary support. The KLA began attacking Yugoslav Army border guard units, and these actions provoked a response from Serbian police forces in the region of Drenica, where a number of civilians died in clashes. As summer of 1998 approached, the fighting continued to escalate, as the Yugoslav Army began to get drawn deeper into the conflict. In October, a shaky cease fire was signed by the warring sides, but it failed to hold, and clashes were back in full swing by December of the same year. Peace negotiations at Rambouillet in early 1999 failed, and as the KLA and Serbian forces continued to battle, NATO threatened airstrikes against Serbian targets if they did not cease their counter-insurgency operation. On March 24, 1999 that threat became reality, as NATO launched Operation Allied Force with multiple waves of airstrikes against Serbian military, police and civilian targets. After the commencement of Allied Force, KLA's forces doubled in size, and American estimates put the size of the force around 17,000-20,000 men.

When the 74-day bombardment of Serbia ended on June 10, 1999, and Slobodan Milosevic had agreed to pull out Serbian security forces out of Kosovo, the KLA was suddenly left without a reason for existence. The agreement between NATO, Serbia and the Albanian representatives for Kosovo was that the KLA was to disband by September 19, 1999. Although the West was receiving assurances from KLA leaders that demilitarization was going according to schedule, events transpired otherwise. In the immediate aftermath of Allied Force, a large number of Serbs living in Kosovo fled the province as the Albanian population returned and launched a systematic "cleansing" process of non-Albanians. KLA members were implicated in assaults, murders, threats and destruction of Serbian Orthodox monasteries and churches throughout the province. Furthermore, the KLA was to hand over its anti-tank weapons, grenades, mines and some automatic weapons within 30 days of the signing of the agreement. However, NATO "peacekeeping" forces confiscated 500 weapons, including automatics and explosives on September 2. Various newspapers carried stories of NATO troops involved in limited clashes with KLA members. The ultimate goal was the restructuring of the KLA into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civilian emergency unit consisting of a helicopter unit, a honor guard, police and rapid reaction forces. Serbs vehemently opposed the creation of the unit, claiming that it would essentially remain the KLA with a new name.

Since its beginnings, the KLA has not had any specific uniform, the only consistent piece of identification being the red UCK patch. Various forms of camouflage uniforms could be seen, and many KLA fighters traveled and operated in civilian uniforms. Some units of the KLA, such as the Atlantic Brigade, had access to flak jackets, American woodland camouflage uniforms, assault vests and other modern equipment. In terms of weapons, the KLA was just as varied. In the initial stages of the conflict, it was armed mostly with vintage World War II weapons such as the PPsh-41 submachine guns and Moisin-Nagant rifles, as well as a limited number of Yugoslavian M-70 assault rifles. Following 1997, a large number of Chinese-built AK-47s poured into the hands of the KLA via Albania as the armories of that country were robbed on a large scale. Another large source of the KLA's weapons has been the black market, with weapons being smuggled in through Macedonia, Italy, Albania, Croatia, Hungary and even Serbia. By 1998, the KLA started receiving large caliber machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, recoilless cannons, mortars, assault and sniper rifles. Photographs show some KLA fighters with sophisticated American Barrett M82 .50 cal sniper rifles along with German models. Some KLA fighters have been seen sporting multiple grenade launchers and other advanced weaponry, although the mainstay of the KLA armory has been the Kalashnikov assault rifle. For communications, the KLA relied on satellite phones, cellular phones and other communications gear rumoured to have been supplied by the West.

Although the Kosovo Liberation Army has officially disbanded, a large number of its fighters streamed into Macedonia to form the backbone of the National Liberation Army (NLA), who is currently waging a counter-insurgency campaign in that country, and into the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB) that was involved in fighting against Serbian security forces in south Serbia in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo. It is very likely that the KLA and its former members will play a large part in the future of the Balkans for years to come, as they grow to be more involved in issues both as a political and military force.

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