This week your humble columnist attended the Middle East Research Institute’s (MERI) conference in Erbil, “The Future of the Middle East: Challenges and Opportunities.” When Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) politburo member Mala Bakhtiar and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) politburo member Fazil Mirani spoke, they both agreed that every Kurdish party in Iraq supports independence. They just disagree about when to seek independence.





From Mr. Bakhtiar and other PUK leaders’ comments, they believe it is better to wait and hold the push for independence for some time in the future. Mr. Bakhtiar stated that “We might stay in Iraq another ten years; we need time.” Barham Salih, another high ranking PUK leader and former Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister, likewise highlighted the importance of working as a part of Iraq for the time being.





This perspective jibes well with the stated views of the Americans and Europeans, of course, who argue that everyone should focus on combatting the Islamic State and re-stabilizing the region. Despite what some conspiracy theorists might tell us, the United States and European countries want stability in the Middle East. A stable international order allows them to do business and thrive. They created this order, after all, and they remain best positioned to extract the most benefits from it.





The opposite seems true for the Kurds, however. Stability means the status quo of the past century, which saw the Kurdish populations of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria suppressed and oppressed by central governments in Ankara, Baghdad, Teheran and Damascus. The Cambridge dictionary of English defines instability as “uncertainty caused by the possibility of a sudden change in the present situation.” It makes perfect sense that the creators of the post-World War Two order fear such change, but the Kurds welcome it.





One should thus understand that “a sudden change in the present situation” is precisely what most Kurds yearn for. Instability is the best friend of Kurds deeply unhappy with the Sykes-Picot status quo. That is why the Islamic State’s routing of the Iraqi Army in June 2014 turned out to be a good thing for Kurds in Iraq, as the sudden change severely weakened an increasingly authoritarian Baghdad. It also, practically overnight, left Erbil in control of almost all the disputed territories.





Instability likewise gave the Syrian Kurds their first measure of freedom in decades. Despite all the difficulties and dangers of the civil war in Syria, Rojava managed to emerge from the dark thanks to the “sudden change” there. Given increasing levels of oppression of Kurds in Turkey and Iran, one might imagine that many Kurds there would appreciate some instability – in spite of the dangers such change entails. If the challenge of governments in Ankara and Teheran is to convince their Kurdish populations that they have a hopeful future within the current stable political system, then they really seem intent on botching the job.





Returning to the Iraqi case, one might wonder when that time in the future that PUK leaders talk about will come? Will it be when Iraq is stable? When Baghdad has little to occupy its attention, except for dealing with bothersome Kurdish secessionists in the north, perhaps? Or maybe when the Islamic State risk is gone and nothing is happening in the area for the Kurds to attract the sympathy of the United States, Europe and much of the world?





Or perhaps a time of instability in the Middle East is precisely the right time for independence, before a new status quo wraps its tentacles around the region. A Kurdish push for more self-determination need not involve a fight with Baghdad either (especially if Baghdad is a bit too weak to fight at the moment). Such a push does seem to require more unity amongst the political parties of the KRG, however, so that they might go to Baghdad together and peacefully arrange the terms of their divorce.





Yet Kurdistan’s political parties seem divided as ever, and perhaps your humble columnist wastes ink and readers’ time speculating on a degree of consensus in Erbil that seems ever elusive.

David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.



The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.