By Phuong Nguyen

Views in Washington on the outcomes of Vietnam’s 12th Communist Party Congress, held January 21-28, center on what the new leadership lineup means for Vietnam’s economic reforms and participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), its future strategy toward Washington and Beijing, and Vietnam’s overall trajectory. The United States and Vietnam have made great strides in their partnership in recent years, and there are good reasons to expect the new leadership to support deeper cooperation in trade and investment as the driving force of bilateral relations in years to come.

Delegates to the congress reelected current party general-secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, and elected a new 19-member Politburo and 200-member Central Committee to lead Vietnam over the next five years. The congress voted to let current Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung withdraw from serving in the next government, a motion required after a number of delegates nominated him as a candidate to the new Central Committee — from which Politburo members are chosen. The voting results spelled an end to Dung’s political ambition; the prime minister was reportedly vying for the party chief post, the highest position in Vietnam’s political system.

There were concerns that without Dung, who has been outspoken on issues ranging from economic reforms and democracy to relations with China, the incoming government might be less enthusiastic about pursuing more difficult reforms, as required by the TPP, or choose to be more cautious in its foreign policy approach.

However, a look at the makeup of the new Politburo reveals efforts by the party to achieve a balance in its leadership choices. Five of its members—Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, chair of the Central Committee’s economic commission Vuong Dinh Hue, central bank governor Nguyen Van Binh, Minister of Transportation Dinh La Thang, and Deputy Prime Minister Hoang Trung Hai—are, or were, experienced cabinet members who have managed economic and infrastructure portfolios. Phuc is the party’s pick to serve as the next prime minister, while Binh is expected to be a future deputy prime minister. Two of the Politburo members, former education minister Nguyen Thien Nhan and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, are young technocrats educated in the United States. Others hail from security, military, party, and legislative backgrounds.

The three highest-ranking Politburo members in the new group — party chief Trong, Minister of Public Security Tran Dai Quang, and Vice-Chair of the National Assembly Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan—have all visited the United States within the past year. Quang met last March with a wide array of U.S. government agencies in Washington to expand bilateral judicial and law enforcement cooperation, and help pave the way for Trong’s historic visit to the United States in July 2015. He also met with senior U.S. lawmakers and called for their support for Vietnam’s participation in the TPP. Ngan, widely seen as a rising star, is no stranger to Washington: she visited the United States twice between 2012 and 2015, and took part in discussions ranging from legislative exchanges, trade and investment cooperation to the finer points of the TPP and the Lower Mekong Initiative.

These developments should be seen as constructive for future U.S.-Vietnam relations. What is clear is while Vietnam’s leaders may disagree on internal party politics, the majority concur on the importance of advancing cooperation with the United States in areas of mutual interest between the two sides. Many in Hanoi believe that Trong’s attitude toward Washington has evolved positively since his visit last year.

The congress agreed on a new, integrated approach to Vietnam’s external relations, seeking to combine the strengths and priorities of the national defense, public security, and foreign affairs portfolios to advance Vietnam’s national interests and international integration drive. This approach will likely see more resources allocated to the Vietnamese armed forces and public security apparatus in the coming years, and a more visible role for the military in foreign policy-making, especially on maritime issues related to the South China Sea.

Military leaders now occupy the largest component in the new central committee. Vietnam’s military leadership has begun to engage with a more diverse set of foreign partners, in particular the United States and Japan, over the past decade; yet the majority still prefer a slow pace in security cooperation with Washington.

Vietnam’s labor and legal reforms in accordance with the TPP can be expected to proceed as planned. Under the deal, Vietnam has five years to allow independent local, factory-level unions to affiliate with each other and/or form sector-specific unions, and an additional two years during which the United States can assess whether Vietnam has complied with the labor requirements of the pact. The TPP stipulates that should the United States not be satisfied after this transition period, it can enter talks with Vietnam and, in a worst-case scenario, unilaterally suspend tariff phase-outs (for garments or footwear) that have not yet taken place. Vietnam has also agreed to modify its laws to improve worker rights as part of joining the TPP.

It remains to be seen how actively the incoming government will carry out the difficult task of privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The congress unanimously agreed to guarantee private enterprises “equal access” to resources such as land and credit, long prioritized for the state-owned sector. This is a new point in the party’s guiding documents, which have always credited SOEs with playing a dominant role in the economy.

Since Hanoi and Washington did not agree on a specific plan for SOE reform at the conclusion of the TPP negotiations last October, it falls on Vietnam to categorize its SOEs that are or are not subject to TPP requirements and implement its own roadmap for SOE reforms. The government in January announced plans this year to divest stakes in a number of large SOEs in the textile/garment, telecommunications, and dairy industries.

Regardless of who is in charge, Hanoi’s economic reform agenda remains the same: achieving an average 6.5-7 percent gross domestic product growth and reaching a per capita income of $3,200-3,500 (from the current $2,170) by the year 2020. The economy is forecast to expand by 6.7-6.8 percent this year, making Vietnam the world’s second-fastest growing economy, after India. It will be up to the incoming leadership to make the most of this momentum.

Ms. Phuong Nguyen is an associate fellow with the Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at CSIS. Follow her on twitter @PNguyen_DC.