For some, the Diamondbacks’ decision to deal superstar Paul Goldschmidt to the St. Louis Cardinals on Wednesday was an unfortunate, but unavoidable, next step in the lifecycle of the modern-day player, particularly for a franchise that appears in need of a rebuild.

For many others, it was a blasphemous decision that promises to sour them on the organization for years.

The Diamondbacks, of course, were well aware of the lightning rod the decision represented but decided to push forward with it anyway. There are a multitude of factors as to why they did.

Three stand out: money, Goldschmidt’s age and the club’s competitive cycle.

Big-dollar decisions

With one year remaining on his contract, Goldschmidt, one of the best players in baseball over the past six years, has positioned himself for a significant payday. There aren’t many recent examples of star first basemen signing contract extensions or landing big deals in free agency, so predicting his value on the open market isn’t easy.

But it seems safe to say Goldschmidt would have been in line for a deal that pays at least $25 million a year over at least five years. And that seems like a conservative estimate.

Last offseason, Eric Hosmer, a far inferior player, received $21 million a year over the first five years of his deal with the San Diego Padres. The Braves’ Freddie Freeman will earn around the same in the five free-agent years he gave up with the eight-year extension he signed in February 2014.

Of course, both players were much younger than Goldschmidt when they signed. Plus, free-agent outcomes have been harder to predict in recent winters, with many players getting less than expected.

But all indications are that Goldschmidt is not looking to take another team-friendly deal like the one the Diamondbacks gave him early in his career. He is represented by agent Casey Close, who has a reputation for securing massive contracts, and sources indicated that preliminary conversations with Goldschmidt’s camp left the Diamondbacks less than confident they would be able to reach an agreement.

Whatever the length and size of the contract, it likely would have been a risky deal for a mid-market club like the Diamondbacks. Not just to fit him into their current payroll structure, but to be able to move forward successfully if Goldschmidt’s production were to dip even slightly in the coming years.

Getting up there

That leads to the next factor: age. A five-year extension would have covered Goldschmidt’s ages 32-36 seasons. For some players, this age bracket represents just a slight blip in their career production. But for most it is the beginning of what can be a steep decline. That was the case for many of the best first basemen of the past half-century.

Goldschmidt accumulated 39.8 WAR during his age 24-30 seasons, the fourth-most of any first baseman in the expansion era. Ahead of him are Albert Pujols (60.6), Jeff Bagwell (44.7) and Todd Helton (43.5), with Mark Teixeira (38.0) slightly behind in fifth.

Looking at the other four, they saw their production fall significantly over their ages 32-36 seasons compared to what they averaged over full seasons prior to that. Pujols’ WAR total fell 63 percent, Teixeira 69 percent, Helton 62 percent, and while Bagwell stayed the most productive of the bunch, he still saw his production drop off by more than a quarter at 29 percent.

Of course, it is entirely possible that Goldschmidt’s career unfolds differently. But based on historical comparisons, there is a decent chance it won’t.

Foundational cracks

Another factor that made a Goldschmidt extension less logical is the cast that would have surrounded him during the length of the deal.

The Diamondbacks are coming off a three-year stretch in which roughly the same core of players posted a combined record of just two games over .500. It reached the postseason in 2017, but finished just 82-80 this past season.

Not only was that core fairly mediocre, it was crumbling apart – with more pieces set to break off in the coming years.

Left-hander Patrick Corbin reportedly agreed on Tuesday to a whopping six-year, $140 million deal with the Washington Nationals. Center fielder A.J. Pollock, another free agent, seems likely to follow him out the door.

Outfielder David Peralta, lefty Robbie Ray, third baseman Jake Lamb, right-hander Taijuan Walker, shortstop Nick Ahmed and right fielder Steven Souza Jr. can become free agents in two years. In the meantime, they’ll continue to get more expensive in arbitration, making it difficult for the club to retain them all.

Moreover, the Diamondbacks’ farm system does not appear equipped to immediately replace them. The organization has few, if any, well-regarded, upper-level position player prospects and only a handful of advanced starting pitching prospects. Factoring in the attrition rate of prospects, the Diamondbacks would likely have a hard time sustaining the eventual veteran departures.

Given that, would it have made sense to spend big bucks on Goldschmidt to play for a rebuilding team? Or would it be wiser to deal him away to acquire players who might be a part of the next winning cycle?

That question comes down to philosophy. For nearly every other player, a trade is the obvious outcome. But should the situation have been handled differently for someone of Goldschmidt’s stature?

Keeping him would have appeased a large segment of the fan base. But keeping him might not have helped the club re-open its window to contend for a championship.

Should the organization have done everything it could to keep its franchise player in a Diamondbacks uniform throughout his career? Or should it be focused entirely on building a winner? Both perspectives seem reasonable, but it’s clear how the Diamondbacks felt about those two options.

Why now?

With Goldschmidt under contract for one more year, the Diamondbacks could have plowed ahead with him and tried once more to field a contending team. Failing that, they could have attempted to move him prior to the July 31 trade deadline.

That approach would have been risky. Goldschmidt could have gotten hurt. He could have underperformed. The club could have gotten to July and found that most contenders weren’t in need of first base help, thus driving down the potential return.

Trading him now also gives the acquiring team a chance to recoup a draft pick if Goldschmidt departs as a free agent. Were he traded in-season, he no longer would have been eligible for compensation. That enhanced the Diamondbacks’ potential return.

The move almost certainly ranks as the most controversial decision in franchise history. The trade of outfielder Justin Upton in 2013 drew mixed reviews but he wasn’t nearly as beloved as Goldschmidt. Declining outfielder Luis Gonzalez’s option and the decision to let left-hander Randy Johnson depart as a free agent were different given where that they were in the twilight of their careers.

Whether, in the final reckoning, it was the right move might not be clear for years. But the Diamondbacks had their reasons for thinking it was — and they went for it, armed with the knowledge it probably wouldn’t be well received.

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Reach Piecoro at (602) 444-8680 or nick.piecoro@arizonarepublic.com. Follow him on Twitter @nickpiecoro.