The New Orleans Pelicans shocked the NBA world last year when they acquired DeMarcus Cousins from the Sacramento Kings at the end of All-Star Weekend. In a league that is getting smaller by the day, the move went against conventional wisdom, pairing two of basketball’s apex big men, Cousins and incumbent Anthony Davis, together.

Since the Golden State Warriors’ dominant run began in the 2014-15 season, their personnel decisions have shaped the schools of thought among NBA executives. By using fewer big men and relying instead on quicker wings like Draymond Green and Kevin Durant, who can both protect the rim and switch on pick-and-rolls, they’ve established the new gold standard for rotations. Competitors have slimmed down in an effort to mirror this style of play, often running only a single big man with four rangy three-and-D players to try combating the Warriors’ “Death Lineup.”

But fielding a lineup with as much hardware as Curry, Thompson, Green, Iguodala and Durant is no small feat.

The trade for Cousins signified, and still represents, a divergent method of countering the pace-and-space attack championed by Golden State. Putting two bigs on the floor harkens back to the style of the ’80s and ’90s, when duos like Hakeem Olajuwon and Ralph Sampson or Tim Duncan and David Robinson were in vogue.

The Pelicans zigged while most of the league zagged. And it wasn’t easy.

“It was a very tough transition, especially for Alvin [Gentry] because of the pace of the game slowing down dramatically,” Pelicans assistant Jamelle McMillan told NBA Math. “We still try to emphasize it, however when both big men are on the floor it is tough to get out and run consistently. It definitely helps [that] those big guys are top 10 in the league talent-wise so we can be creative with how we use them.”

Slowly, surely, the Boogie-Brow connection is beginning to jell.

The Pelicans are 11-10 this year, with impressive wins over the should-be powerhouse San Antonio Spurs (no Kawhi Leonard) and Oklahoma City Thunder (a disappointment thus far). Seventh place in the Western Conference is nothing to brag about, but they’re trying to climb further up the ladder as injuries start to wear on other teams.

Davis and Cousins have logged 497 minutes together this season, through which New Orleans is a plus-4.3 points per 100 possessions. The initial difficulties involved with pairing two stars who need the ball seem to be subsiding. The experiment isn’t a de facto success, but the returns at this year’s quarter-pole are encouraging.

Davis and Cousins are averaging a combined 51.5 points and 23.9 rebounds per game—league-best marks for a pair of teammates in both categories. (Stephen Curry and Durant are averaging 51 points per game; DeAndre Jordan and Blake Griffin are amassing 21.6 rebounds). The Pelicans have one of the league’s most solid offenses, placing 11th in points scored per 100 possessions and sixth in effective field-goal percentage. They’re also seventh in pace, a pleasant surprise given their emphasis on slowing the game down to integrate both bigs. Davis and Cousins make for an incredibly effective duo on the glass, both cracking the top 25 in defensive rebounding percentage; the starting lineup is fourth in the same category among five-man units that have logged more than 100 minutes. This unorthodox gambit is working, but it runs counterintuitive to the the way most teams function.

So how does Alvin Gentry make this anachronistic Twin Towers pairing work? He has opened up the playbook and found an offense that allows him to get the ball to his two best players in their most effective areas. His pet approach is known as “Horns,” which starts with two high posters, wings in the deep corners and a ball-handler up top. And the Pelicans are making some magic with it this season.

This set is designed to take advantage of talented big men, something they have in spades. And they’re implementing a litany of twists to keep things fresh: using Davis and Cousins as screeners, rollers, spot-up shooters and even ball-handlers.

“Horns allows for a variety of different options, including letting the big guys isolate from the top without it being a primary action,” McMillan explained. “It creates movement early and allows those guys to be involved in the play at all times. When the ball is thrown back, we generally can get the bigs to move the ball to the other side of the floor within a flow, and it’s an easy set for guys to be creative out of without being robots in actions.”

Variety keeps defenses on their toes and forces them to be hyper-aware of switches and isolations that could leave them in exposed positions. On this play, both players act as screeners multiple times before eventually creating a one-on-one situation against Greg Monroe:

This single formation is the basis for a multitude of plays, ranging from simple ball screens to half-court sets that burn through the entire shot clock, making it difficult for opponents to read with immediacy. Creating indecision amongst defenders is lethal when a team has two players who can be effective in every offensive aspect. Misdirection and deception are pivotal to the success of Horns, and Gentry’s squad has mastered a myriad of different ways to keep opponents off-kilter.

Watch this play from Nov. 22 against the Spurs, as Davis uses a technique known as “screen the screener” to force Joffrey Lauvergne and LaMarcus Aldridge into a switch. Once the switch takes place, Cousins immediately attacks Aldridge off the dribble:

The screen for Jameer Nelson is a decoy for the pick on Lauvergne, and yet every Spur is trained on the ball. That subtle deception unfurls so quickly the defense misses the secondary action and plays into the mismatch. Cousins, a very capable driver, uses a quick shot fake to bait Aldridge, then catches him on his back foot when he puts the ball on the floor.

“Because [Cousins] can handle the ball the way he does,” McMillan said, “it is a tough cover for most bigs being out that high on the floor trying to move their feet.”

A Swiss Army Knife skill set makes Cousins one of the best in the game at the top of the key, and once opposing teams have seen decoy actions, they begin to anticipate them, which leads to plays like this:

Cousins sets the ball screen for E’Twaun Moore, but Davis holds off on the secondary action until Moore clears out. Cousins and Davis now have a two-man game against Tyson Chandler and Monroe. Few traditional bigs can attack the rim downhill like this duo does. New Orleans’ skyscrapers excel when luring rim-protectors away from the paint and attacking them off the dribble, as McMillan explained. Both Chandler and Monroe know this, so when Davis reverses course to create an open lane, they both hedge to prevent the drive and allow him to slip the screen for an alley-oop.

This series of high screens the dynamic twosome uses so precisely are the simplest presentation of the set and far from the only way the Pelicans get buckets. The above play alone showcases how the two bigs fill different roles in the same action. Cousins tends to operate on the high post, while Davis is more of a rim-runner.

“[Cousins] is a willing passer and can see a lot of plays that even many of our guards can’t,” McMillan told NBA Math when discussing these alignments. “Anthony is also a better offensive rebounder and more willing to dive, so sending him down in the hole allows him to be effective on the glass and active in the paint.”

The next iteration of this set plays up Boogie’s decision-making from the high post, with the ball-side wing coming to the post player for a dribble-handoff. This precursor to the pick-and-roll has buried itself deep within the greater offensive scheme to substantial effect.

Take this possession from the Nov. 20 win over Oklahoma City. Moore comes out of the play-side corner, takes the handoff and attacks the basket with a head start on his man:

Jerami Grant, defending Cousins, does not hedge to stop penetration, which allows Moore to convert. Poor effort isn’t the cause of this breakdown. The roll man is just a much more dangerous threat attacking outside the paint, away from the help defenders. Grant is stuck in no-man’s land to prevent Cousins from finishing the basket, and Moore makes Oklahoma City pay for that indecision.

Once the dribble-handoff has been established as a potent weapon, additional wrinkles take shape:

Cousins is a tremendous passing big man, averaging 5.4 assists per game, and he shows it here by creating a basket for Jrue Holiday. Troy Daniels anticipates the handoff and takes a single step the wrong way, inviting Holiday to cut backdoor into a perfect bounce pass for the bucket. These baskets are only possible if the dribble-handoff is set up as a cogent part of the offensive attack. Daniels has clearly watched some film and seen the efficacy of these DHOs, and this time, that due diligence burned him.

Great passing and screening are axial parts that contribute to the success of Horns, and the Pelicans have an array of screens to free up shooters and rollers.

Using both bigs as screeners to generate open looks is yet another component upon which New Orleans routinely leans. Setting two picks on the same player can throw other defenders into disarray; they must suddenly scramble to guard everyone and prevent an easy bucket. On the below play, for instance, the Thunder have to switch five different times:

Oklahoma City does an admirable job through all of the chaos, preventing a single switch from derailing the defense, but sets with double screeners can be hell to properly guard. If one thing goes awry—Rajon Rondo looks over the top to Davis while Carmelo Anthony has his back turned to the ball, or Paul George flips his head away from Cousins for even a half-second—New Orleans gets an easy two points.

Or, in this case, three points:

Despite only standing 6’4″, Moore has been extremely effective in the paint this year, shooting 65.1 percent within five feet of the hoop. The Toronto Raptors have to respect his ability to score, so they react when he’s heading downhill. DeMar DeRozan is trailing the play and, as a result, Jonas Valanciunas must hedge to prevent dribble penetration. This leaves Cousins with a wide-open look. And when the defense doesn’t hedge properly, well, this happens:

This action is a textbook example of forcing the defense to make hard choices: Chandler either has to prevent dribble penetration or stop a kick-out three-pointer. He elects to defend the arc, Devin Booker is a step late on his help defense, and the Pelicans are on the board again.

The deception, misdirection and uniformity of Horns foists bad decision-making onto defenses around the league—hence why New Orleans has so much success with it. While every team runs some variation of the set, few have the personnel to make it a prevalent part of a winning game plan.

All of which drives home how much the Pelicans are relying on their dual high-rises to carry them into the postseason. With injuries to Rudy Gobert, Blake Griffin and Paul Millsap, the road to the playoffs might be a little easier in the grueling Western Conference, but the Pelicans will still need the Herculean efforts they have received from Davis and Cousins to remain part of the late-spring picture.

The jury is still out on the overall fate of the Boogie-Brow Experience. Cousins is a free agent at the end of the season, and if things suddenly go south, he could end up leaving town at the trade deadline. Still, the effectiveness of such an unconventional experiment speaks for itself. Horns is founded upon simple actions, but in the right hands, it can be a scalpel regularly used to dissect opposing defenses.

“We only have four set calls from the Horns set,” McMillan said. “What happens after the initial actions are all based on reads. Possibilities are endless.”

As long as you have the two best big men in the game.

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Unless otherwise indicated, all stats are from NBA Math, Basketball Reference or NBA.com and are accurate heading into games on November 30. All quotes obtained firsthand.