This is the first article of a series about the sovereignty dispute over the islands in the South Atlantic called Falklands by the British, who control and inhabit them, and Malvinas by Argentina, the country that contests their ownership. I chose this topic because of my enthusiasm for history, the fact that I am Argentine, and because on this day, 30 years ago, an Argentine force took over the islands’ capital, starting the regrettable 1982 Malvinas/Falklands crisis. This commemoration motivated the stamp shown on the right, issued last Saturday.



This will hopefully be a four-post series. There are philatelic materials and stories that I will present but, this time, please allow me to use philately to contextualize history rather than doing it the other way round, as usual.





In her address to the U.N. Security Council during the conflict, U.S. Ambassador Kirk Fitzpatrick summarizes the long, legal dispute that preceded the 1982 war:





Yet know how deep is the Argentine commitment to recover islands they believe were taken from them by illegal force. This is not some sudden passion, but a long-sustained national concern that also stretches back 150 years, heightened by the sense of frustration at what Argentina feels were nearly 20 years of fruitless negotiation. We have all come to appreciate how deep the roots of the conflict are. Britain, in peaceful possession of the Falkland Islands for 150 years, has been passionately devoted to the proposition that the rights of the inhabitants should be respected in any future disposition of the Islands. No one can say that this attitude, coming from a country that has granted independence to more than 40 countries in a generation and a half, is a simple reflex to retain possession.Yet know how deep is the Argentine commitment to recover islands they believe were taken from them by illegal force. This is not some sudden passion, but a long-sustained national concern that also stretches back 150 years, heightened by the sense of frustration at what Argentina feels were nearly 20 years of fruitless negotiation.

The 150-year span, referred by Fitzpatrick, started with the events of January, 1833, when two British warships arrived at the islands, and removed the Argentine authorities that had been sent to repair the damage that a warship from the U.S. had done to the settlement founded by Louis Vernet.





Vernet was a Hamburg-born merchant of French Huguenot descent, married to a lady of the River Plate region. In the early 1820s, while he was operating a cattle business in the province of Buenos Aires, a relative-in-law, Jorge Pacheco, approached him with a proposal that probably caught his ambitious, entrepreneurial eye.





The government , owing Pacheco money in exchange of services rendered during the war for independence, had offered him a grant for the exploitation of wild cattle at Malvinas/Falklands, an activity that the Spanish undertook before abandoning the islands in 1811. Pacheco took the proposal to Vernet, who saw an economic potential, not just from cattle but also from fishery and support to sea traffic, the latter being numerous because the islands were on the main sea route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans (before the opening of the Panama Canal). Or at least he argued about this potential in 1832, in a report he wrote for the American Chargé d’Affairs where, among other things, he questions the reasons, of an economic nature, that the British were giving to justify their abandonment of the islands decades before.





As a well-read person, he also must have known that a proper occupation of the islands would strengthen the sovereignty that Buenos Aires claimed shortly before. Associated with Pacheco, they accepted the offer and enticed the government with the sovereignty argument to raise the ante, obtaining permission to re-found the old Spanish settlement. Equipped with those concessions and ships, hardware and men funded by Vernet, they tried to establish a settlement in 1823, but failed, as they did on another expedition in 1824, which was commanded by Pablo Areguati, who was designated commandant of the islands by Buenos Aires in 1823 . However, Vernet succeeded in 1826, after purchasing Pacheco’s part, therefore rising the first Argentine permanent settlement on the islands since they were claimed, in this country’s name, by Captain David Jewitt in 1820 , on the grounds of them being inside the sphere of the former Spanish colony and, as a consequence, now within the borders of the independent nation that had emerged from it.





uti possidetis juris, which was an important criterion to settle the borders of nascent states. This originates from a legal principle called, which was an important criterion to settle the borders of nascent states. European nations were not formally bound by it but they normally respected it, customary practice being an important source of international law uti possidetis juris, when applied to frontiers that were already international before the advent of the new state, was considered as a derivation of a preexisting general law of state succession by the International Court of Justice in its . During their wars for independence, the nations of the Americas disputed their territory with their former colonial powers, not with unprovoked third nations that felt that they had been given free rein to grab a piece. Moreover,, when applied to frontiers that were already international before the advent of the new state, was considered as a derivation of a preexisting general law of state succession by the International Court of Justice in its judgement for the frontier dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali

[T]he [uti possidetis juris] principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. [...] Its purpose, at the time of the achievement of independence by the former Spanish colonies of America, was to scotch any designs which non-American colonizing powers might have on regions which had been assigned by the former metropolitan State to one division or another, but which were still uninhabited or unexplored. However, there is more to the principle of uti possidetis than this particular aspect. The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. [...] The territorial boundaries which have to be respected may also derive from international frontiers which previously divided a colony of one State from a colony of another, or indeed a colonial territory from the territory of an independent State, or one which was under protectorate, but had retained its international personality. There is no doubt that the obligation to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of a State succession derives from a general rule of international law, whether or not the rule is expressed in the formula uti possidetis.





uti possidetis juris were not recognized for the Argentine actions starting in 1820, the principle of acquiring res nullius may be, given that Spain abandoned the islands in 1811. Gustafson makes the point that, ifwere not recognized for the Argentine actions starting in 1820, the principle of acquiringmay be, given that Spain abandoned the islands in 1811. [13] The Law of Nations considered that res nullius, or nobody's property, was available for whom properly claimed and occupied it. I find the application of res nullius to be arguable for this case, given that Spain’s absence was short and justified by the war with its former colonies, although the loss of the Vice-Royalty was reason to believe that the Iberians would not be interested in exercising sovereignty anymore. But Gustafson’s point is that, if uti possidetis juris is rejected on the grounds of Spain losing possession in 1811 when she abandoned the islands, then Argentina would earn rights by virtue of acquisition of res nullius. The other possibilities are to consider the islands in 1820 to be Spanish or to acknowledge competing claims if there were ones with merits at that time. More about this in the next post.





In 1828, Vernet extended his concessions by obtaining further land from Buenos Aires , and moved his family to the islands. To read more about his project, I recommend the aforementioned report, written by himself in 1832 to present his case to the American authorities, after the destruction of presumably much of his settlement by Captain Silas Duncan of the USS Lexington . It is a well-written, albeit long, piece where he details the story of the Argentine presence in the islands, and argues thoroughly in favor of her rights to them. Needless to say, it is the version he put forward in 1832 as a stakeholder, not an historian, yet I find it compatible with what I have read from authoritative sources.





Contemporary accounts about Vernet's settlement were also given by two Captains of the Royal Navy: Robert FitzRoy and L. B. Mackinnon. FitzRoy writes

To show how well the little colony, established by Mr Vernet at Port Louis, was succeeding, prior to its harsh and unnecessary ruin by Captain Duncan, we give an account of it by a visitor: “The settlement is situated half round a small cove, which has a narrow entrance from the sound. This entrance, in the time of the Spaniards, was commanded by two forts, both now lying in ruins; the only use made of one being to confine the wild cattle in its circular wall; when newly brought in from the interior. The governor, Louis Vernet, received me with cordiality. He possesses much information, and speaks several languages. His house is long and low, of one story, with very thick walls of stone. I found in it a good library of Spanish, German, and English works. A lively conversation passed at dinner; the party consisting of Mr Vernet and his wife, Mr Brisbane, and others. In the evening, we had music and dancing. In the room was a grand piano forte. Mrs Vernet, a Buenos Ayrean lady, gave us some excellent singing, which sounded not a little strange at the Falkland Isles, where we expected to find only sealers.



“Mr. Vernet’s establishment consisted of about fifteen slaves, bought by him from the Buenos Ayrean Government, on the condition of teaching them some useful employment, and having their services for a certain number of years, after which they were to be freed. They seemed generally to be from fifteen to twenty years of age, and appeared contented and happy.



“The total number of persons on the island consisted of about one hundred, including twenty-five gauchos and five Indians. There were two Dutch families (the women of which milked the cows and made butter) ; two or three Englishmen; a German family; and the remainder were Spaniards and Portuguese, pretending to follow some trade, but doing little or nothing. The gauchos were chiefly Buenos Ayreans; but their capataz or leader was a Frenchman.”



Such was the state of Vernet’s settlement a few months before the Lexington’s visit; and there was then every reason for the settlers to anticipate success, as they, poor deluded people, never dreamed of having no business there without having obtained the permission of the British Government.

Mackinnon's work corresponds to his 6-month residence at the islands in 1838, shortly following the expulsion of the Argentine authorities and before Britain had established its authority or there was any significant new immigration. In his depiction he narrates how Buenos Aires granted land to Vernet, 'who, after surmounting many difficulties, and under several privations, was advancing prosperously in his attempt at colonization', also describing the drying establishment where 'Don Louis Vernet, the governor, under the Argentine Republic, prepared this fish for the Brazilian market' and the numerous cattle that were tamed by Vernet's gauchos.





Robinson Crusoe’s own book , published in the US in 1848. All of these texts are available for online reading. Jewett's and FitzRoy's accounts are reproduced in Ellms' , published in the US in 1848. All of these texts are available for online reading.





Vernet was commemorated twice inpostal issues from Argentina. Firstly on a pair (Sc. 1365 and 1366), shown on the right, that was issued on June 12, 1982, during the last days of the war. A quite ugly pair, if you ask me. I prefer the second pair, issued in 2009, shown in pictures above, comprised of a stamp and a miniature sheet. These reproduce oil paintings by Luisa Vernet Lavalle Lloveras, who I believe was Vernet’s daughter although I couldn’t confirm this. The stamp shows a portrait of the Governor, while the sheet depicts the first houses built in stone in the settlement at the Island of Soledad, or East Falkland according to Britain.





This pair was issued on the occasion of the 180th anniversary of a decree dated June 10, 1829, that appointed Vernet, then Director of the settlement, as Civil and Military Commandant of the Islands and their adjacencies , therefore empowering him with a public title to complement his commercial concessions. In his own words, this was done to ‘[impose] on him the duty of carrying into effect the regulations relative to the Seal-fishery’ because ‘The depredations of Foreigners on the Coasts still went on, and there was no force in the Colony capable of restraining them, nor was there any public Officer to protest against them. This state of disorder obliged me to require the Government to adopt some measures.’





At his return to the islands, the new commandant began his efforts to enforce sealing regulations approved by the Argentine government. In one attempt, he seized two American vessels that, as he argued, had breached those norms in spite of previous warnings. Vernet sailed to Buenos Aires with one of the captains, to try them at court. Unfortunately, the U.S. Consul at the Argentine capital, George Slacum, who was inexperienced and, according to Peterson , ‘a tactless diplomatic novice’ , regarded the seizure as an act of piracy, encouraging Silas Duncan, the captain of the USS Lexington, to sail to the islands. The Lexington was a warship just passing by the city. Duncan sailed supposedly to rescue a few American citizens who were stranded as a result of the seizures, but instead he took his time to perform other matters. Among these, to cause havoc on Vernet’s settlement and evict many settlers, with a share of violations to human dignity.





Buenos Aires made Slacum responsible for the destruction and rejected his offices. U.S. President Jackson sent Francis Baylies to discuss the case, appointing him as Chargé d’Affairs. Baylies defended Duncan’s actions and demanded reparations from the seizure, only to be presented with the Argentine case for the islands, explained by Vernet in the aforementioned report of 1832. The Chargé d’Affairs returned the report, arguing that he was not entitled to discuss those kinds of matters, and promptly returned home, disregarding Argentine requests to continue talking. John Quincy Adams, who was former U.S. president at the time and a political opponent to Jackson, not being fond of Baylies whom he regarded as ‘one of the most talented and worthless men in New England’, summarizes the exchange in his memoirs: ‘Jackson, to appease him, gave [Baylies] as a second sop the office of Chargé d’Affaires at Buenos Ayres. He went there; stayed there not three months —just long enough to embroil his country in a senseless and wicked quarrel with the Government; and, without waiting for orders from his Government, demanded his passports and came home. Nothing but the imbecility of that South American abortion of a state saved him from indelible disgrace and this country from humiliation in that concern.’





These American reactions, including John Quincy Adams' words, are better understood if we consider Jackson's inclination towards 'gunboat diplomacy' as well as his 'spoils system', which meant that government jobs were assigned in reward for electorate services, no matter how unfit for the job the candidate was. These characteristics were heavily criticized by Jackson's opponents, which included previous president Adams.





Before departing, Baylies’ renamed Slacum as the American head diplomat in Argentina, but Buenos Aires once again did not accept his offices, arguing that he was a transgressor of justice taking refuge at the American residence. Thus, Slacum departed with Baylies. The U.S. did not officially appoint a replacement, and relations between these two countries remained severed for more than a decade.





In the meantime, Buenos Aires had appointed a new governor for the islands, who was sent there with some personnel on board clipper Sarandí, depicted in this 1977 stamp (Sc. 1146). They were commissioned to restore order and rebuild the garrison. The settlement had suffered, not just from destruction and eviction of some settlers, but from the uncertainty caused by the incident.





Despite those reconstruction efforts, the scene was set for a forceful action by Britain. We can speculate on several reasons for this. On the one hand, an invasion had turned to be more tolerable to the eyes of the world, due to the state of disarray in the settlement, particularly after the new governor was killed by some rebels in his crew. But another element was probably more important. However desirable the islands were, one of the deterrents to a high-handed act from the U.K. was the Monroe doctrine, which indicated that the US would respond to European attempts of conquest in the Americas. But the Lexington incident was a risk for American diplomacy, which presumably inclined her to accept British arguments based on a history of discovery, first landing and occupation that I will elaborate in the next post. Moreover, some commercial interests in the US had not liked Vernet’s determination to enforce the rule of law. The Commandant had justified them on the grounds of regulating fishing to preserve the population of seals, but some claimed they constituted an attempt to retain privileges unjustifiably. Among them, Greenhow, who writes, in a defense of the American position that was contemporary with the events



Had the Buenos Ayreans been content to settle on the islands, without seeking to deprive others of advantages which they had no means of appropriating to themselves, and which, by reason, justice, and the consent of all civilized nations, were common to all, it is more than probable that their rights thus exercised would have been tacitly recognized, and that their establishment might have become profitable to themselves, and beneficial to all other nations But their imprudent and rapacious conduct, in attempting to revive the unjust and obsolete prohibitions which Spain had been unable to enforce, drew down upon them the indignation of more powerful states, and subjected them to humiliations for which they have no claims to redress.

The next post discusses the 1833 takeover and its interpretation from a legal point of view . Hopefully, the series will have a third post with a chronicle of the dispute from 1833 to 1982, and a fourth about the 1982 war. I may get hold of and publish, anytime soon, high-resolutions scans of some of the stamps showcased here. As always, comments are welcome.



