The DLF initially could only annoy the Sultan’s Armed Forces. British seconded and contracted officers provided the top leadership of the two thousand strong force, including the Commander Sultan’s Armed Forces (CSAF). The rank and file were composed of Arabs and Baluchis, the latter the legacy of Oman’s overseas colony of Gwadar in Pakistan. Having established relations with the Sultanate in 1646, the British were keen to maintain the rule of the Sultan. Oman’s continued importance lay both in its energy reserves and geostrategic location, controlling the southern littorals of the Strait of Hormuz. Hampered by economic constraints and political sensitivities, British involvement in Oman remained limited.[2]

Events in neighboring Yemen fundamentally changed the nature of the conflict. The new Arab communist government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen was keen to support the Dhofar rebels, providing them with arms, finance, manpower, and an overseas base. Additionally, the PDRY helped to arrange for support from other communist governments. The Chinese provided training and indoctrination for DLF guerrilla leaders in China, while Chinese advisors accompanied the DLF on military operations. North Korea trained the Dhofaris in assassination and sabotage. The Soviet Union and Cuba also provided arms and training.[3],[4]

The establishment of the PDRY fundamentally changed the ideological nature of the Dhofari guerilla movement. This change could be clearly seen in 1968 when the DFL rebranded itself as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). No longer simply content with liberating Dhofar, the PFLOAG was intent on spreading Marxism across the Arabian Gulf. Flush with modern weaponry, they now numbered around 6,000 strong. Skirmishes between government forces and the rebels increased from one or two a week in 1967 to two or three per day in 1969. By 1970, the PFLOAG controlled about 80% of Dhofar, and the British doubted that the Sultan could hold onto the province for another year.[5]

The British feared a communist victory in Dhofar would have a domino effect on the rest of the Gulf Arab states, emboldening other regional radical movements to rise up against their governments. What started off as a minor tribal revolt soon metamorphosed into a prominent guerilla outfit with significant foreign backing and serious geostrategic implications.

Irregular and Proxy Forces

When the Sultan refused to implement reforms, the British overthrew him in July 1970, replacing him with his Sandhurst educated and reform-minded son Qaboos bin Said. The new Sultan agreed to an expansion and modernization of the SAF, while implementing much needed civil development projects. These projects were executed by 22nd SAS teams sent by the British Government and referred to as Civil Action Teams (CAT), and whose taskings ranged from building schools, hospitals, and wells, to providing veterinarian services. The SAF hoped that this modernization policy would prove the new Sultan’s commitment to his previously neglected subjects, thus undermining a major narrative of the PFLOAG.

One major decision by the Sultan was to grant amnesty to surrendered guerrillas, who were then incorporated into a new irregular force called the firqat. This strategy was the brainchild of the SAS, recalling the employment of native tribesmen as scouts and trackers during the campaigns in Malaya and Borneo. The firqats were platoon to company sized elements led by SAS personnel. These native units proved invaluable in certain regards, possessing the intimate knowledge of the rebels, the terrain, and local cultural sensitivities that the SAF lacked. Prior to the firqats, virtually no Dhofaris served in the SAF, meaning they were often portrayed as a foreign army of occupation. The firqats helped bridge that cultural gap. Besides serving as scouts and guides, they were also useful in an auxiliary role, holding areas cleared by the SAF[6].