After a year of disaster for the left, isolation and weak strategic importance could turn out to be blessings for the region

A lurch towards the political right looks set to reshape the Americas in 2017 after a year that ended with the death of Cuba’s communist revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro, and the imminent presidency of Donald Trump.

That seismic shift has toppled the Workers’ party in Brazil, weakened Peronists in Argentina, threatened Mexico with a wall and seen growing problems for leftwing leaders in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile.

The questions now are how much further this trend can go, which countries might be affected and the extent to which the wilder tendencies of fledgling administrations can be tempered by strong Chinese influence, sturdy international institutions and pragmatic strategic considerations.

The past 12 to 14 months have been a disaster for the Latin American left. After dominating the region for the previous decade, the “pink tide” of socialist government has ebbed and with it has gone much of the progressive idealism that led to poverty reduction, improved access to healthcare and education, and greater rights for indigenous groups.



The reasons are manifold. Economically, many nations have been hit by weakening Chinese demand and the consequent ending of the commodity supercycle – a once-in-a-generation boom in primary agricultural and mining products.

Facebook Twitter Pinterest Dilma Rousseff during her impeachment trial in August. Photograph: Mario Tama/Getty Images

Politically, there was also an unscrupulous plot to impeach Dilma Rousseff and end 13 years of Workers’ party rule in Brazil. But the left here – as elsewhere – must bear a large part of the blame, having failed to deliver on many promises, been heavily implicated in corruption scandals, and withdrawn into a bunker mentality, with poor accountability.



Although the left in Brazil can partly blame treacherous allies and a hostile media, it also lost public support through its own incompetence and complacency. This was true in other nations where established leftwing leaders suffered election defeats.

Following the electoral defeat in Argentina of Daniel Scioli – Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s handpicked successor in November 2015 – there were also setbacks for Nicolas Maduro’s ruling United Socialist party of Venezuela, or PSUV, in Venezuelan parliamentary elections, and for Evo Morales’s efforts to change the constitution of Bolivia so he could stand for a fourth term.

Voters across the region – like those in Colombia who turned against a peace deal, those in the UK who opted for Brexit, and those in the US who cast ballots for Trump – were evidently jaded and ready for change, however uncertain.



Facebook Twitter Pinterest A supporter of the peace deal with the Farc, left, argues with an opponent in Bogotá. Photograph: Ivan Valencia/AP

Disturbingly, the main exception was a reversal for democracy – the Nicaragua vote in November, when Sandinista president Daniel Ortega was re-elected in a contest widely seen as one of the most rigged for decades.

But the biggest ripples will come from Trump’s victory. Although his administration has yet to start and his public statements have often been contradictory, initial appointments suggests it will be the most protectionist, nationalist and confrontational US government for decades.

Mexico is on the frontline of the changes that Trump has promised, particularly a southern border wall and massive repatriation of illegal migrants. President Enrique Peña Nieto got off to a bad start with an ill-judged meeting with Trump that appeared to erode public confidence in his rule.

His bureaucrats are now said to be working overtime to prepare for the shift in relations with the country’s superpower neighbour. If millions of undocumented migrants are deported at once, they could easily destabilise Mexico, which is already struggling with very high levels of violence and falling government popularity.

Facebook Twitter Pinterest Donald Trump and Enrique Peña Nieto before a joint press conference in Mexico City in August. Photograph: Yuri Cortez/AFP/Getty Images

If Trump fulfils his campaign promises, the consequences could be grim. Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, a professor at the Californian university UCLA, estimates the deportation of 3 million migrants would results in a US GDP loss of $2.6tn over the next decade. If remittances are seized, he forecasts a $25bn loss for Mexico, concentrated in poor areas. “We have been making these types of projections for five years now, never imagining that it might actually happen,” he said. “It would be a disaster, and all of this would result in a dramatic blowback on the US.”

Cuba is also in the line of fire. While Barack Obama built bridges with a first US presidential visit to the island since Castro’s 1959 seizure of power, Trump celebrated the elderly revolutionary’s death, saying it could be an opportunity for the island to liberate itself from one-party rule.

His aides have said they are ready to tear up the 2015 US-Cuba agreement unless Havana makes more concessions, which is code for multi-party democracy. Cuban officials bristle at the suggestion, saying it is an attempt to weaken the government of the island. For now, this is just rhetoric on both sides. But many fear ties will be put back in the deep freeze.

Elsewhere in Latin America, Trump has shown little political interest. Diplomats say this is good because it gives career ambassadors a free hand to shape policy. But there are also concerns the president-elect may see the region as a “US backyard” and push harder than his predecessor to influence elections and maximise financial returns for US investors.

Facebook Twitter Pinterest A bookseller exhibits posters depicting Fidel Castro in Havana, the day after his death in November. Photograph: Adalberto Roque/AFP/Getty Images

Among them is Trump’s own company, which is set to be run by his children. The potential conflicts of interest were highlighted in reports – later denied – that he and his daughter discussed their company’s business interests in a call with the Argentinian president, Mauricio Macri.

At first sight, it seems natural to assume that Macri would benefit from a Trump White House. Like Michel Temer in Brazil, he is from the pro-US, pro-business elite. But both are relatively centrist by their countries’ standards. And both – at least publicly – support the regional free trade deals that Trump has pledged to replace with bilateral agreements.

Over the past decade, their countries have also done increasing business with China, which has diluted US influence in the region. That won’t change - and might even grow, especially if Trump puts up walls while Beijing tries to open up trade. Certainly both Argentina and Brazil need an economic boost.

Looking ahead, the new centre-right governments in Brazil, Argentina and Peru (where Pedro Pablo Kuczynski won the presidency in 2016) appear far better placed to benefit from a Trump presidency than the Bolivarian left in Bolivia and Ecuador.

Venezuela, meanwhile, has come under more fire for its increasingly restrictive political policies and the spectacular failure of its economy, which has left it with the highest inflation in the world and worsening poverty levels.

Given these problems, it is hard to imagine Maduro will still be president this time next year, but he has proved his critics wrong in the past thanks to his control over the courts and the loyalty of the army. Nothing is a given.

Facebook Twitter Pinterest Raúl Castro, left, smiles as President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela speaks during a rally honouring Fidel Castro in Cuba in November. Photograph: Ricardo Mazalan/AP

The same might be said of the entire region. In an age of uncertainty, anti-globalisation movements, internet rumours, fake news and shifting political sands, it will be tough for Latin America to avoid being sucked into bigger conflicts. But its relative isolation, modest importance to the global economy and weak strategic importance could all prove a blessing if hostilities erupt over the share of the global spoils elsewhere.

Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, a professor at the University of São Paulo, said Latin America’s foreign trade had fallen to its lowest point in eight decades in 2016. As a result of declining prosperity, she said, there had been a fall in support for governments and political institutions.

More attention from Washington, however, was not the answer. “Since the end of the cold war, US policy toward South America has been what is commonly called benign neglect, meaning the region has little political importance to the United States. And that’s good. If it goes on like this, even better,” she said.

This is decreasingly the region of idealistic socialist pioneers, but the shift from the left to the centre may yet make it a sanctuary from an increasingly polarised world. Much, though, will depend on whether economies can stabilise after a turbulent few years or whether they too will be sucked into a downward global vortex.