Well, there is a lot of important questions in that, Mr. Chairman. And let me begin by saying that I was aware of certain incidents at our facility and the attack on the British diplomat. I was briefed on steps taken to repair the breach in the perimeter wall after the June bombing, steps taken to reduce off-compound movements.

Our team, led by security professionals, but also including intelligence professionals and others, did not recommend, based on those incidents, abandoning Benghazi. In part, because over the last years we have become accustomed to operating in dangerous places, in Pakistan, in Iraq -- excuse me -- in Afghanistan and Yemen and elsewhere. And we do, as by necessity, rely on security professionals to implement the protocols and procedures necessary to keep our people safe. And as I said in my opening statements, because you know, most of the time they get it right.

But I was also engaged -- and I think this is what Deputy Secretary Burns was referring to -- in the issues related to the deteriorating threat environment, particularly in Libya. There were other places across the region. We were also watching to try to see what we could do to support the Libyan government to improve the overall stability of their country to deal with the many militias. We have many programs and actions that we were working on. I had a number of conversations with leading Libyan officials. I went to Libya in October of 2011. In fact, shortly before the attack on Benghazi we approved Libya for substantial funding from a joint State/DOD account for border security, CT capabilities and WMD efforts.