PECULIARITES OF RUSSIAN WARFARE

by Erhard Raus

PECULIARITES OF RUSSIAN WARFARE

By Erhard Raus

Foreword

“PECULIARITES OF RUSSIAN WARFARE”was prepared by a committee of former German generals and general staff corps officers at the EUCOM Historical Division Interrogation Enclosure, Neustadt, Germany, in late 1947 and early 1948. The names of the committee members are not being announced at this time. All members, however, had extensive experience on the Eastern Front during the period 1941-45. The principal author, for example, commanded, in succession, a panzer division, a corps, a panzer army, and an army group.

The initial distribution of this report in early autumn 1948 was a severely limited one, including only those addressees to whom the report seemed to be of immediate, active concern. At that time, user agencies were cautioned that the report should not be used for purposes more precise than general background reading, because it contained certain errors of translation and of military terminology. During the intervening months, sufficient interest in the report has been evidenced to justify the preparation and distribution of a revised edition, on a much larger scale than was the case with the 1948 edition.

In the preparation of this revised edition, the German text has been retranslated, and ambiguities either resolved or called to the reader's attention when no other alternative was feasible. Certain changes in typography and in chapter and section titles have been made to improve clarity and facilitate use of the report by staff divisions and schools. All appendices have been redrawn and amplified, and a general reference map has been added to assist the reader in locating the various illustrative actions in the great expanse of the East.

The revised edition, therefore, is considered to be just as reliable and as sound as the text prepared by the German committee. The authors' prejudices and defects, whatever they may be, find the same expression in the following translation as they do in the original German.

HISTORICAL DIVISION

SPECIAL STAFF, U.S. ARMY

June 1949

LIST OF EXAMPLES

1941

1. Behavior of Russian Infantry near Bryansk and in the Citadel of Brest-Lltovsk

2. The Attempt to Starve Out an Encircled Russian Regiment on the Volkhov

3. The Timoshenko War Game of February 1941

4. General Petrov as Commander of Army Group Bryansk

5. A Commissar's Recommendations Concerning the Prohibition of Liquor

6. Liquidation of a Russian Company Commander by a Commissar

7. Russian Women in Combat (1941-42-43)

8. The Engagement at Maloryta (End of June 1941)

9. The Action Southeast of Plavskoye (November 194l)

12. Winter the Preferred Season for Russian Offensives (1941-45)

13. The Battle in the Dnepr—Bereslna Triangle (Mid-July to Mid-August 1941)

14. Fighting in the Poretsye Bridgehead on the Luga (Mid-July to August 1941)

15. The Meeting Engagement near Plavskoye (November 1941)

16. The Tank Battle at Raseiniai (June 1941)

17. Russian Armored Counterattack near Rawa Ruska, Galicia

18. The Thrust on Vyazma (Early October 1941)

22. The Russian Defensive Effort during the German Breakthrough of the Leningrad Line in the Fortified Krasnogvardeysk Region (September 1941)

28. Russian Defense in Woods during the Forward Thrust from the Poretsye Bridgehead on the Luga (August 1941)

31. A Siberian Rifle Division Breaks Through the Gorman Lines at Uzlovaya under cover of Darkness (November 1941)

32. Night Break-Out of Encircled Troops

36 Atrocities as a Medium of Propaganda (194l-43)

1942

7. Russian Women In Combat (1941-42-43)

12. Winter the Preferred Season for Russian Offensives (1941-45)

19. Russian Tank Thrust on Kamenka and Millerovo (Winter 1942-43)

24. The Russian Defense against the German Relief Thrust on Stalingrad (December 1942)

27. The Russian Ambush of a German Battalion near Sukhinlchi (February 1942)

33. Failures of Russian Defense in Night Operations (l942-43)

36. Atrocities as a Medium of Propaganda (1941-43)

38 Protection of Supply Lines near Klrovograd against Partisan Raids (1942-43)

1943

7. Russian Women In Combat (1941-42-43)

11 Russian Children as Intelligence Agents

12. Winter the Preferred Season for Russian Offensives (1941-45)

19. Russian Tank Thrust on Kamenka and Millerovo (Winter 1942-43)

20. The Tank Battle at Kharkov (August 1943)

21. The Break-Through in the Dnepr Bend south of Dnepropetrovsk (1943-44)

23. The Russian Defense System during the Pincers Attack on Kursk (July 1943)

26. Forest Fighting during the Russian Break-Through Attempt across the Upper Donets (August 1943)

30. Naked Russian Infantrymen Cross a Lake under cover of Darkness and Launch an Attack (September 1943)

33. Failures of Russian Defense in Night Operations (1942-43)

35. Deception by Individuals (1943-44)

36. Atrocities as a Medium of Propaganda (1941-43)

37. Desertion of an Uzbek Company (Byelgorod, 1943)

38. Protection of Supply Lines near Kirovograd against Partisan Raids (1942-43).

1943

10 Stationary Security Detachments as Protection for a Flanking Movement (Kandalaksha Front)

12. Winter the Preferred Season for Russian Offensives (1941-45)

21. The Break-Through in the Dnepr Bend south of Dnepropetrovsk (,1943-1944)

25. Break-Through of a Russian Tank Corps through Trackless Woodlands Fast of Lwow (June 1944)

29. Russian Thrust through the Pripyat Marshes toward Kowel (February 1944)

34. Successful Concealment of the First Russian Tank Army at Vinitsa (January 1944)

35. Deception by Individuals (1943-44)

1945

12, Winter the Preferred Season for Russian Offensives (1941-45)

1. The only written material available for the preparation of the following report consisted of a few memoranda in diary form, and similar notes of a personal nature. The report, therefore, is based to a preponderant degree on recollections of the author, and on material furnished by a small group of contributing commanders who had special experience in the East. For that very reason, it cannot lay claim to completeness. Moreover, the limited amount of time available to the author did not permit exhaustive treatment of the subject.

2. For the above-mentioned reasons, the report has had to be limited to a description of the characteristic traits of the Russian soldier, and their influence on the conduct of battle. The extent to which the political, economic, and social conditions of the country wore influential factors, could only be touched upon. Orientation concerning climate and terrain—indispensable to an understanding of the Russian methods of warfare—has been omitted intentionally, since pertinent points on those subjects are discussed elsewhere.

3. In order to make the peculiarities of Russian 'warfare more comprehensible, numerous examples, varying according to place, time, and nature, are incorporated in this study. From these examples, conclusions can he drawn concerning not only Russian behavior, but also German countermeasures and experiences.

INTRODUCTION

4. The topics of Russian fighting strength and methods of warfare have more and more become matters of vital concern because of the surprisingly rapid developments in world politics. They have become subjects of public interest, perhaps ever, the issues that might decide the fate of Europe. Propaganda, legend, and politics already have obscured facts and reality. The most nearly correct appraisal will be arrived at by knowing the peculiarities of the Russian territory and its inhabitants, and by analyzing and accurately evaluating the sources from which they derive their strength. There is no better method than a study of World War II, the struggle in which the characteristics of country and people were thrown into bold relief, and in which they developed to the fullest all their latent vigor. Although the passage of time may meanwhile have diminished the value of these experiences, they nevertheless remain the soundest basis for an evaluation. The war potential of the Soviet Union ray be subject to change; no doubt it has increased during the last few years and will increase further, at least until the end of the current Five Year Plan. The very latest implements of war surely have been further developed and produced in quantity, new offensive and defensive weapons perfected, and the main strategic emphasis shifted to the air force. Technological advances - will alter the external aspects of warfare. But the character and peculiarities of the Russian soldier, and his particular methods of fighting, remain unaffected by the innovations. Nor will the characteristics of Russian topography change during the next few years. In these decisively important aspects, therefore, the conclusions drawn from the late World War remain fully valid.

5. Nevertheless, it is not easy to draw the correct conclusions from the experiences gained, because the means available to the opposing forces were very unevenly matched. Except for the first few months of the Eastern Campaign, we were, so to speak, constantly waging a war of the poor against the rich. Several Russian surprise attacks would have been detected in the assembly stage, had we but had sufficient reconnaissance facilities at our disposal. The Russians would not have broken through many a German position, had it been more adequately manned, and had sufficient materiel for defense been available. The danger exists,. therefore, that Russian feats may be somewhat overrated.

6. On the other hand, that danger is lessened to a certain extent by the probability that also in tie future any power waging war against the Russians will, so far as numerical strength is concerned, be in a position similar to ours in World War II. For that reason, it should be no grave error to generalize from the observations made in the East between 1941 and 1945.

THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER AND RUSSIAN CONDUCT OF BATTLE

Chapter One. PECULIARITIES OF THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER

7. No one who belongs to the Western sphere of culture will ever be able to understand the Russian completely, or to analyze the character and soul of this Asiatic who has grown up on the far side of the border of Europe. The Russian is unfathomable. He swings from one extreme to the other without our being able to recognize the reasons for his behavior. It is possible to predict from experience how practically every other soldier in the world will behave in a given situation—but never the Russian. The characteristics of the Russian soldier, like his vast country, are strange and full of contradictions. There were units which one day repulsed a strong German attack with exemplary bravery, and on the next folded up completely. There were others which one day lost their nerve when the first shells exploded, and on the next allowed themselves, man by man, literally to be cut to pieces. The Russian is generally impervious to crises, but he can also be very sensitive to them. He has no fear of a threat to his flanks, but at the same time he can be most touchy about the flanks. He disregards all the old established rules of tactics, but he clings to the absolute letter of his own precepts.

8. The key to this odd behavior can be found in the character of the Russian soldier, who, as a fighter, possesses neither the perception, nor the ability to think independently. He is subject to moods which for us are incomprehensible; he acts instinctively. As a soldier, the Russian is primitive and unassuming, brave by virtue of natural inclination, but morosely vegetating in a group. These characteristics make the Russian in many respects an adversary superior to the self-confident and demanding soldiers of other armies. The later can, and must, by their physical and mental qualities, achieve not merely equality, but superiority, so that they may stand up successfully against the Russian soldier.

9. Disregard for human beings and contempt of death are other characteristics of the Russian soldier that are incomprehensible to us in such a degree. The Russian soldier climbs with complete indifference and cold-bloodedness over the bodies of hundreds of fallen comrades, in order to take up the attack on the same spot. With the same apathy he works all day long burying his dead comrades after the battle. He looks toward his own death with the same resignation. Even severe wounds impress him comparatively little. For instance, a Russian who was sitting upright at the side of the street, in spite of the fact that both his lower legs were shot away, asked with a friendly smile for a cigarette. The Russian soldier endures cold and heat, hunger and thirst, dampness and mud, sickness and vermin, with the same equanimity. With his simple and primitive nature, all sorts of hardships cause but few reflexes within his soul. His emotions run the gamut from animal ferocity to the utmost kindliness; odious and cruel in a group, is friendly and ready to help as an individual.

10. There can be no doubt that the sum of these most diverse characteristics makes the Russian a superior soldier, who, under the direction of an understanding leader, becomes a dangerous opponent. It would be a serious error to underestimate the Russian soldier, even though he does not quite fit into the picture of modern warfare and up- to-date fighters. The strength of the Western soldier is conscious action, controlled by his own mind, which accomplishes wonders. This acting on his own, the consciousness which accompanies the impulse, is not to be found in the Russian. But the fact must not be ignored that a change is taking place also in this respect. Even the difference between the Russian units in World War I and those in World War II was considerable. Whereas in the earlier war we faced a more or less amorphous mass, immovable and without countenance, the spiritual awakening through Communism made itself clearly felt in the last war. The number of illiterates was small, very much in contrast to the situation at the time of World War I. The Russian masses have acquired a countenance, or at least are well on the way to acquiring one. The Russian is beginning to become a conscious human being, and hence a soldier who is able to stand on his own feet. The number of good noncommissioned officers is still not large, and the Russian masses have yet to overcome their sluggishness, but their awakening is no longer far off. Whether this will work to the advantage or disadvantage of their soldierly qualities cannot yet be determined. Along with awareness flourish criticism and obstinacy. The arbitrary employment of masses resigned to their fate would become more difficult, and a prime factor in the typically Russian method of waging war would be lost. The force bringing about this change in the Russian soldier is Communism, or, more precisely, the spiritual awakening of the people, formerly so apathetic, by the rigid centralization of the entire State. The Russian is basically nonpolitical; at least that is true in the case of the rural population, which now as ever—but how much longer?—supplies the majority of soldiers. He is not an active Communist, not a political zealot. But he is—and here we already note a decisive change—a conscious Russian, who fights only in rare cases for any political ideals, but always for his fatherland.

11. In judging the basic qualities of the Russian it should be added that by nature he is brave, as he has well demonstrated in the course of his history. In 1807 it was the Russian soldier who for the first time, at Eylau, made a stand against Napoleon after the latter's victorious march through Europe; a stand which may be called almost epic.

12. In line with the awakening of the Russian soldier, another determining factor has been introduced into the Array by the political commissar—unqualified obedience. Carried out to the last word, it has made the raw mass of soldiers into a first-rate fighting machine. Systematic training, drill, disregard of one's own life, the natural inclination of the Russian soldier toward uncompromising subordination, and, not least of all, the unmistakable disciplinary powers available to the commissar, are the foundations of this ironclad obedience. In this connection, it must also be remembered that Russia is an autocratically ruled state with an absolute Fuehrerprinzip, demanding and, in case of necessity, compelling the complete subordination of the individual. That blind obedience of the masses is the triumph of Communism, the mainspring of the Army, and the basic explanation of its successes. Armies with a less strict concept of obedience and discipline might very easily come out second best in a contest with these troops.

13. Another characteristic of the Russian soldier, in addition to the simplicity which corresponds to his limited household needs and his primitive mode of living, is his close kinship with nature. It can be stated without exaggeration that the Russian soldier is unaffected by season and terrain. This immunity gives him a decisive advantage over other soldiers, especially in Russian territory, where season, temperature, and terrain play a decisive role.

Example 1

14. In the attack the Russian fought unto death. Despite our most thorough defensive measures he would continue to go forward, completely disregarding losses. He was generally not subject to panic. For example, in the break-through of the fortifications before Bryansk in October 1941, enemy bunkers, which had long since been bypassed and which for days lay far behind our front, continued to be held when every hope of relief had vanished. Directly after the crossing of the Bug in July 1941, the fortifications which had been cleared of the enemy by the 167th Infantry Division were occupied a few days later by groups of stragglers, and subsequently had to be painstakingly retaken by a division which followed in the rear. An underground room in the heart of the citadel of Brest-Litovsk held out for many days against the U5th Infantry Division in spite of the employment of Stukas and the heaviest types of special guns.

15. The supply problem in the Russian Army is of secondary importance, because the Russian soldier requires only very few provisions for his own use. The field kitchen, a sacred institution to other troops, is for the Russians a pleasant surprise when it is available, but can be dispensed with for days and weeks without undue hardship.

Example 2.

16. During the winter campaign of 1941, a Russian regiment was surrounded in the woods along the Volkhov, and, because of the weakness of our forces, had to be starved out. After one weak our reconnaissance patrols met with the same resistance as on the first day; after another week only a few prisoners were taken, the majority having fought their way through to their own troops in spite of close encirclement. According to the prisoners, the Russians subsisted during those weeks on a few pieces of frozen bread, leaves and pine needles — which in they chewed—and some cigarettes. It had never occurred to anyone to throw in the sponge because of hunger, and the cold (-310 F) had not affected them. From a purely physical point of view only the Russian is capable of such a feat.

17. The kinship with nature, which the Russians have retained to a greater degree than the other peoples of Europe, is also responsible for the ability of the Russian soldier to adapt himself to terrain features, and actually to merge with them. He is a master of camouflage, entrenchment, and defense construction. With unbelievable speed he disappears into the earth, digging himself in with unfailing instinct so as to utilize the terrain to make his fortifications very difficult to discover. When the Russian has dug himself into his native soil and has molded himself into the landscape, he is a doubly dangerous opponent.

18. The utmost caution is required when passing through unknown terrain. Even long and searching observation often dues not reveal the excellently camouflaged Russian. Frequently, German reconnaissance patrols passed through the immediate vicinity of Russian positions or individual riflemen without noticing them, and were then taken under fire from behind. Caution must be doubled in wooded terrain. In such areas the Russians often disappear without a trace, and must be driven out individually, Indian fashion. Here, sniping from trees was particularly favored by the Russians as a method of fighting.

19. The forced industrialization of the country, carried out in a very short period of time, has made available to the Russian Army a large number of industrial workers with full command of technical skills. The Russian has mastered all new weapons and fighting equipment, all the requirements of machine warfare, with amazing rapidity. In this respect, too, the awakening of the Russian people has paid off. Soldiers trained in technical subjects, carefully distributed through the ranks, taught the necessary rudiments to their duller comrades, and to those who came from rural areas. This mastery was especially outstanding in the field of signal communications. The longer the war lasted, the better the Russians became at handling this type of equipment. Their own communications improved steadily, and with noteworthy skill the Russians soon made themselves familiar also with our signal communications. Monitoring and tuning in, jamming and deception, all these were arts which they understood very well. Whereas in World War I the telephone was still uncanny magic to the average Russian, he regarded the complicated radio set of World War II as an amusing toy. He maintained his iron discipline also in the field of signal communications, thereby propounding many a riddle for our own signal intelligence.

20. In contrast to the good side of the Russian soldier there were bad aspects of equal significance. It was one of the imponderables about each Russian unit whether good or bad would predominate. The dawn has cast its first rays of light on the Russian masses, but it has not yet illuminated them. There still remains an appreciable residue of dullness, inflexibility, and apathy which it has not yet been possible to overcome, and which probably will not be overcome in the near future. Individual personalities rise above the masses.

21. The unpredictability of the mood of the Russian soldier, and his very pronounced herd instinct, make it possible for panics to arise suddenly in individual units. As often as one found it impossible to explain the fanatic resistance of individual units, as frequently did one encounter a mystery in their mass flights, or sudden, wholesale surrender. The reason may have been an imperceptible fluctuation in morale. Its effect could not be counteracted by any commissar.

22. His feelings drive the Russian into the group, which gives him strength and courage. The individual fighter created by modern warfare, of whom the German Army was composed, is rare among the Russians. In 80 out of 100 cases the Russian who has to stand on his own feet does not know what to do. This serious weakness of the Russian was compensated for by the large mass of men available. Put what will happen once the Russian is compelled to fight simultaneously on several fronts, and those masses are not available everywhere?

23. A work concerning the craftiness of the Russian. He seldom employed ruses on a large scale. The usual tricks, such as feigning the existence of troops by increased fire and other means, were just as common with the Russians as with all armies of the world. They seldom carried out feint attacks. All the more, however, must one be on guard against dishonesty and attempts at deception or the Dart of individual Russian soldiers and small units. One trick, a particular favorite, was feigning surrender, or coming over to the enemy with raised hands, white flags, and all the rest. Anyone approaching in good faith would very often be met with sudden surprise fire at close range. Feigning death is a trick often practiced by the Russian soldier, who can lie motionless for hours on end. An unguarded approach often costs one's life.

Map 1. Reference Map. Peculiarities of Russian Warfare.

Chapter Two. THE RUSSIAN COMMAND ECHELONS

24. The higher echelons of command proved capable from the very beginning of the war and learned a great deal more during its course. They were flexible, full of initiative, and energetic. However, they were unable to inspire the great mass of Russian soldiers.

25. Most of the commanders had been advanced in peacetime to positions of authority at a very early age, although there were some older men among them. All social levels were represented, from the common laborer to the university professor of Mongolian languages and cultures. Of course, merit in the Revolution played a part, yet one had the impression that the choice was well made with respect to character, military understanding, and intelligence. Purely party generals apparently had been given positions carrying little more than prestige. The extraordinary industry with which these commanders went about their duties was characteristic. Every day, and far into the night, they sat together to discuss and to record in writing what they had seen and heard during the day.

26. During the various political purges an appreciable portion of this command strata disappeared. But it was a mistake to assume that a deterioration of the higher command had resulted. Military education in Russia, on the basis of precepts which were largely taken over from us, had made such great progress that even the higher commanders available at the beginning of the war were of a stature commensurate 'with their duties. It must in this connection be noted that a nation as young, energetic, and populous as Russia, was able to draw on an inexhaustible source of strength. In addition, this group of officers was held in high regard by the populace, was extolled in propaganda, and was very comfortably situated economically. Many things testified to the position which the higher military leaders of the Soviet Union enjoyed in the State and among the people pictures in prewar Russian illustrated newspapers; the display in Soviet Army office buildings of artistically valuable portraits of senior officers, and of paintings showing episodes in their military careers; and the exhibition on stairways and in government buildings of banners emblazoned with the pronouncements of high-ranking military officers. Our propaganda misunderstood and misrepresented much.

27. Many developments in the sphere of strategy, which now and then gave rise to doubts about the ability of these leaders, require an examination of their background before they can be properly judged. The alleged failure during the Finnish winter campaign of 1939-40 played a large part, but nevertheless, as much as the Finns disliked hearing it, the conjecture cannot be dismissed that there was a great deal of bluffing involved. The timing of the operation was correct and had to produce results as soon as the will of the immeasurably superior attacker desired them. That fact does not belittle the heroic display of courage by the Finnish people in the struggle.

25. Neither is the success of our surprise attack at the opening of the campaign against Russia in 1941 any proof to the contrary. A later generation will have to examine, and will perhaps be able to decide, to what extent the Soviets wanted to be surprised. Along the Central Front, and also in the North, one had the impression that the actual war did not begin until the Dnepr and the Luga had been reached. Timoshenko's strategic war game, as well as the course of events at the beginning of the Eastern Campaign, substantiate this assumption.

Example 3.

App. 1. Timoshenko Plan,

29. In mid-July 1941, the LI1I Infantry Corps joined in the defensive battle in the Dnepr—Beresina triangle against Timoshenko's thrust into the flank and rear of Panzer Group 2, which was advancing on Smolensk. Soon thereafter, Corps found out that in February 1941 , in a Komsomol home on the Bobruisk—Rogachev road, Timoshenko and higher commanders had held a conference which lasted several days. Upon exhaustive search, a map was found in that home, marked as follows: German armored units were assumed to be north of Rogachev, east of the Dnepr. A pincers operation was being launched against them from the regions of Zhlobin—Rogachev and Mogilev, with Bobruisk as the objective. A very strong group of forces was to advance to the northwest via Zhlobin— Rogachev, another of like strength to the southwest via Mogilev, and cut off the German armor. The two groups were to meet at Bobruisk. The intermediate daily objectives of the two groups were indicated by semicircles. A cavalry unit with three elements, committed on the west bank of the Beresina and striking northward from the Parichi area, was to cut the S1utsk—Bobruisk road and the Minsk—Bobruisk railroad, and complete the encirclement.

Since the armored units had already defeated the northern enemy group near Orsha, there remained only the southern arm of the pincers. With a total of twenty divisions, Timoshenko carried through this part of the operation that apparently had been planned in February. He thus came in contact with LIII Infantry Corns, which had in the meantime arrived in the Dnepr—Beresina triangle by way of Bobruisk. There developed a bitter 3-week defense action between the Corps—comprising three divisions—and those Russian forces which had advanced across the Dnepr near Zhlobin and Rogachev. During the course of this battle, the cavalry corns indicated on the map also appeared, and for a while actually reached its objectives. The LI IT Infantry Corps was cut off from the rear for about a week.

30. Customs and frontier guards on the Bug; very weak enemy forces after a few days; finally the big battle in the Dnepr— Beresina triangle: thus began the Eastern Campaign. Prisoner statements furnished a very clear picture pf the preliminaries, concentrations, and groupings for the battle on the Russian side. Again and again they gave the impression that large-scale enemy movements did not get under way until after the opening of the campaign, and that they took place beyond the Dnepr. From the viewpoint of Russian grand strategy it was undoubtedly an expedient solution. (Our own intelligence service, to be sure, identified continuous troop movements to the Russo-German frontier as early as spring of 1940, supposedly involving 130 divisions even at that time.)

31. The events which led up to the battle of Uman on the Southern Front offer no damaging proof against the Russian higher command, but show only the danger and the detrimental effect of injecting politics into current military operations.

32. Thus the Russian higher command was, by and large, fully competent. Whether Timoshenko's tenacity in carrying out his plan—as mentioned in Example 3 above—even though the northern part of the pincers operation was knocked out, should be regarded as inflexibility, or whether Timoshenko considered that there were possibilities for a great success just the same, is not up for discussion. During the subsequent course of the war, however, a flexibility in strategy was apparent in the Russian higher command that, in tactics, long remained unknown in the performance of the intermediate and lower command echelons. An awareness of responsibility accompanied the willingness to accept responsibility.

Example 4.

33. After the break-through of LIII Infantry Corps from the southwest to Bryansk at the beginning of October 1941, the opposing Fiftieth Russian Army, commanded by General Petrov, withdrew, badly shaken, to the wooded terrain northeast of Bryansk. The Bryansk pocket was the result. During the withdrawal the commander of the Fiftieth Army had been given command of Army Group Bryansk, under which, in addition to the Fiftieth Army, were placed the Thirtieth and Thirty-third Armies. The diary of Major Shabalin, a State Security (GPU) officer attached to Fiftieth Army Headquarters who was killed in the Bryansk pocket, contained approximately the following on the subject;

I (Shabalin) congratulated General Petrov at breakfast upon his appointment as commander of Army Group Bryansk. General Petrov answered only: "So now they are going to shoot me too." I replied: “How can you talk of shooting? Your appointment as commander of the Group is an indication of confidence in your ability to get things organized again. General Petrov: "How can I get the situation back under control when I don't know where the Thirtieth and Thirty-third Armies are and what condition they are in?"

A few days later General Petrov was killed in the Bryansk pocket at the side of Major Shabalin, State Security officer.

34. If, as seen in the previous example, the newly appointed commander of Army Group Bryansk, instead of rejoicing, sadly stated that he had no idea where the armies newly entrusted to him were, or what condition they were in, and that he, therefore, from a practical standpoint was unable to fulfill what was expected of him, then such a reaction represents a conscious sense of responsibility and a genuine soldierly demeanor. Marshal Kulik, with a serious leg injury, supported himself on a cane and led the 10,000 men, which he had reassembled after the Minsk pocket through the swamps near Bobruisk, and gave the German troops a lot of trouble. The higher Red Army commanders have never soared themselves.

35. The way operations were launched and carried out revealed the German influence on the Soviet higher command. Operations against flank and rear, large-scale envelopments, and encirclements all played a part. Other maneuvers employed were mobile defense and, finally, break-through and break-out.

36. Timoshenko's plan for a double envelopment and isolation of our large armored units which had advanced across the Dnepr undoubtedly was on the grand scale. The operatipn also was carried out energetically and efficiently. The strategic concentration, assembly, and commitment of units participating in the attack were irreproachable according to German concepts.

37. he great thrust via Yefremov at the beginning of November 194, in which the Russians aimed at the rear of our armored units standing in front of Tula, and which later led to the battle of annihilation southeast of Plavskoye, was likewise well planned. From a strategic and tactical point of view it had a chance of success. The weakest point of our armored thrust had been recognized and correctly exploited.

38. Altogether it cannot be denied that the Russian higher command had an eye for strategically and tactically weak points of the enemy. The battle of Moscow in 1991-42 and its consequences are just as good an example of this as, on a smaller scale, the operation on the Kandalaksha front in northern Finland against XXXVI Mountain Corps late in the winter of 1944. (Ed: See App. 3.) The Red Army higher command can, of course, claim more and even greater successes, such as the various major offensives from 1943 to 1945.

39. To be sure, the Soviet command had an easier time of it than we did, because the resources of their own country and a large number of troop units were available to them. Equipment, training, and physical and spiritual character of their armed forces all corresponded to the conditions in the East. For this reason, a great number of endless difficulties, which caused us all sorts of trouble, simply did not exist for the Russian higher command. In addition, a low valuation of human life gave the higher command a greater freedom from inhibitions. Whether, for example, several divisions were lost in an encirclement, or whether a reindeer division on the Murmansk front perished in a snowstorm, was of no particular importance. Not until later did the long duration of the war and the extensive losses force them to greater economy of manpower.

40. The lower command echelons of the Russian Army, and for the most part also the intermediate echelons[1], remained for a long period inflexible and indecisive, avoiding ail personal responsibility. The rigid pattern of training, and an overly strict discipline, so narrowly confined the lower command within the framework of existing regulations that the result was lethargy. Spirited application to a task, born of the decision of an individual, was a rarity. Russian elements that had broken through our lines could remain for days behind our front without recognizing their favorable position and taking advantage of it. Their presence was an inconvenience, but one could be practically certain that they would do no harm. The Russian small unit commander's fear of doing something wrong and being called to account for it was greater than the urge to take advantage of a situation.

*[Ed: According to the German field service regulations (Heeresdierstvorschriften 300/]. Truppenfuehrung, 1943): "Command echelons are divided into higher and lower command. Higher command includes units down through infantry and cavalry divisions; lower command includes all smaller units." Generalmajor Hellmuth Reinhardt (CofS, General Army Office, German Army High Command, Mar 41-Oct 43) writes in MS # P-015 that the term "intermediate echelons" (mittlere Fuehrung) was a German military colloquialism for command at division level and, sometimes, at corps level; in rare cases, the term also included regimental level.]

41. The commanders of Russian combined-arms units were actually well trained along tactical lines, but to some extent they had not grasped the essence of tactical doctrines, and therefore often acted according to set patterns, not according to circumstances. Also, there was the pronounced spirit of blind obedience, which had perhaps carried over from civilian life into the military field. Thus, for example, toward the end of September 1941, in the area southwest of Bryansk, the same sector was attacked by various Russian battalions every day for seven days running without any apparent reason and without success, but with 3evere losses. Finally, a captured battalion commander supplied the explanation. In looking through some old files, their new regimental commander had found a top-level order to the effect that continuous attacks were to be made along the entire front in order to ease the pressure on Leningrad. Since he had received a negative answer to his inquiry as to whether these attacks had already been made, he had ordered this sector attacked every day. In the meantime, however, two months had passed, and the pressure on Leningrad had long since been relieved.

42. This lethargy and reluctance to assume responsibility was a serious drawback to the Red Army, completely neutralizing a great many good points of the Russian soldier. Later on, the Soviet commanders learned a great deal along this line and became more flexible. The tactical employment of the 6th Rifle Division in the battle of annihilation southeast of Plavskoye may be termed perfects advance, withdrawal in trucks in dangerous situations, another forward thrust, and then attack.

43. According to statements of prisoners and monitored telephone conversations, the Russian command faced the same problems we and probably other armies faced so far as care of the troops and internal administration were concerned. There was great interest in hygienic measures. But also other matters, such as decorations, promotions, results

Chapter Three. THE COMMISSAR

44. The commissar was probably the most controversial element in the Russian Army. Even in the Soviet Union itself opinions varied concerning his usefulness, his position, and his duties. The following picture has been pieced together from numerous captured files of the commissars, from the diary of Major Shabalin of the State Security Service, from the observed effect of their work, and from statements of prisoners.

45. The influence of the Party and of its representatives in the Army—the commissars or Politruks—was tremendous. They were the driving force of the Army. The commissars ruled with cunning, cold-bloodedness, and force. By means of a close-meshed network of especially chosen personalities, they held the entire army machine under their control and in a tight grip. The commissars were to a preponderant degree real political fanatics. They came mostly from the working class, were almost without exception city people, brave, intelligent, and unscrupulous. But they also took care of the troops. Even though, during the course of the war, their intervention in the military conduct of the war was reduced, thanks to Stalin's military instinct, their influence was not lessened thereby.

46. However, it is not true that the Russian soldier fought so well only because of fear of the commissars, under the pressure of the machine guns set up behind him and manned by Politruks. A soldier who is motivated solely by fear can never have the qualities that the Russian soldier of this war displayed. The motive of fear may often have been the final resort in difficult situations, but basically the Russian has no less national—as distinguished from political—ethos than the soldier of the Westem armies, and with it the same source of strength. Unceasing propaganda has burned nationalism into his soul. And however impervious he may be to foreign propaganda, he nevertheless has been unable to escape the engulfing waves of his own.

47. Among the troops themselves the relationship of the soldier to the commissar apparently was still endurable, in spite of his uncompromising strictness and severity. The higher headquarters, on the other hand, appear to have regarded him with mistrust. Testimony to that conclusion is found not only in the episode mentioned in Example 5 below, between a young officer of a division headquarters and the division commissar, but also in many remarks of the commander of the Fiftieth Army, General Petrov, to Shabalin, which the latter recorded verbatim in his diary. Thus, General Petrov once ironically asked Shabalin, who was sitting next to him in the tank: "Well, how many have you shot today?" Shabalin added the notes "Such sarcasm." The commissar was thus often considered an alien element by headquarters.

Example 5

48. On the battlefield of Bryansk the records of a division commissar were captured, among them the carbon copies of reports to a higher political office in Moscow. In one of these carbon copies was the following account. The prohibition of vodka in the Russian Army, which had been m effect until then, was rescinded in August 1941. The division commissar recommended the immediate restoration of the prohibition and based his recommendation on the following occurrence at his division headquarters: The first liquor to arrive was not distributed to the troops by division headquarters, but used by the headquarters staff itself. The result was general drunkenness among the staff members one evening. The officers allegedly went out into the village street and killed geese with their pistols. When there were no more geese, a officer of division headquarters pounded him—the commissar—on the shoulder and said, "Well, all the geese have been snot dead. Now it's your turn, Politruk." This was proof that a complete prohibition of liquor would have to be re-established in the army as quickly as possible.

Example 6

49. In the fighting east of Roslavl in August l941, a Russian tank company that had been sent into action suddenly stopped dead on the battlefield. From statements of prisoners it was learned that the leader of the tank company had received an order before going into action to refuel at a fuel depot somewhat to the rear of his bivouac area. He did not, however, want to bother going back and thought that it would be possible to refuel farther forward at the divisional command post nearer the front . But there was no opportunity to refuel at that point. The tank company just reached the battlefield and then ground to a halt. Thereupon the company commissar drew his pistol and shot the first lieutenant on the soot.

50. The attitude of the common man toward the commissar was conditioned not only by fear of his power, but also by his personal exemplification of the soldier and fighter. His concern for the welfare of the troops also determined to a large extent his relationship with the men. In all the captured reports dealing with the activity of the commissars there was considerable mention made of the condition of the troops.

Shabalin, for instance, reported to higher authority the insufferable conditions on the Moscow—Orel—Bryansk railroad. Thus, for example, he immediately sent a division commissar, whom, while reconnoitering for new division headquarters, he discovered in the rear, back to the front with the observations "You belong with your troops; go and take care of them." Innumerable recommendations for the improvement of conditions in the army hospitals were found among captured papers.

51. The example set by the commissars is largely responsible for the tenacious resistance of the Russian soldier, even in hopeless situations. It would be wrong to believe that the German Commissar Order (Ed: directing that, upon capture, commissars be turned over to the SS Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst) for "special treatment", i.e., execution) was solely responsible for inciting the commissars to bitter last-ditch resistance; the impetus much rather was fanaticism together with soldierly qualities, and probably also the feeling of responsibility for the victory of the Soviet Union. The previously mentioned occupation of the bunkers on the Bug and the continued resistance in the citadel of Brest-Litovsk can be traced to the influence of the commissars.

52. In innumerable other cases, too, dogged perseverance even under hopeless conditions was to be credited to the soldierly conduct of the commissars. For instance, in September 19Ul, long after the cattle of Posyolok Taytsy (south of Leningrad) had been taken, and strong troop units drawn up in the castle park, tanks passing near the park wall with open hatches drew single rounds of rifle fire from close range. The shots were aimed at the unprotected tank commanders who were looking out of the turrets. Not until three of them had been killed bv bullets through the head did the passing tank unit realize that the deadly shots were coming from a narrow trench close under the park wall ten meters away. The tanks now returned the fire, whereupon all thirteen occupants of the trench met death. They were the officers of the regimental headquarters grouped about their commissar, who fell with his rifle cocked and aimed.

53. After panzer divisions broke out of the Luga bridgeheads in August 1941, the commander of a task force (Kampfgruope) inspected several Russian tanks which had been knocked out two hours earlier near a church. A large number of men were looking on. Suddenly, the turret of one of the knocked-out tanks began to revolve and fire. The tank had to be blown up. It turned out that among the crew, which had been assumed dead, there was a commissar who had merely been unconscious. When he revived and saw the many German soldiers around him, he opened fire.

54. When in April 1942 a strong enemy position was taken along the Osuga (southwest of Rzhev), the attackers continued to receive rifle fire from one lone barricaded bunker. All demands for surrender were in vain. When an attempt was made to shoot through the embrasure with a rifle, the enemy grabbed it and fired the last three shots. Two of them wounded German soldiers, and the commissar, who was defending the bunker alone in the midst of his dead comrades, shot himself with the third.

55. One might well be of the opinion that much of the fighting spirit and concern for the welfare of the troops which the commissars displayed should have been the responsibility of the commanding officers and not of the commissars. However, as it appeared from captured records and from battle experiences, it was always a question of situations in which something had to be done. The commanding officers generally did nothing much, but the commissars acted. The passive character of the Russians was responsible for the fact that it was pot the commander but the commissar who discovered the road to action. Therefore, the commissar was really a necessary part in the structure of the Red Army. He was a sort of frontline conscience.

56. It is difficult for the Russians themselves to properly judge this matter, and much more so for anyone more distantly removed. Rejecting from the very outset an institution which also had its good points under prevailing conditions would be a mistake.

57. The commissars found special support among the women who served within the framework of the Soviet Army. The following example illustrates their political and military conduct.

Example 7

58. Russian women served in all-female units with the so-called partisan bands, or individually as gunners in the artillery, as spies dropped by parachute, as medical corps aides with the fighting troops, or in the rear in the auxiliary services. They were political fanatics, filled with hate for every opponent, cruel, and incorruptible. The women were enthusiastic Communists, and dangerous.

58. It was also not unusual for women to fight in the front lines. Thus, uniformed women took part in the final break-out struggle at Sevastopol in 1942; medical corps women in 1941 defended the last positions in front of Leningrad with pistols and hand grenades, until they fell in the battle. (See Example 22.) In the fighting along the middle Donets in February 1943, a Russian tank was apparently rendered immobile by a direct hit. When our own tanks approached, it suddenly reopened fire and attempted to break out. A second direct hit again brought it to a standstill, but in spite of its hopeless position it defended itself while a tank-killer team advanced upon it, until it finally burst into flame from a demolition charge. Only then did the turret hatch open. A woman in tanker uniform climbed out. She was the wife and co- fighter of a tank company commander, who, killed by the first hit, lay beside her in the turret.

60. So far as the soldiers were concerned, women in uniform were superiors or comrades to whom respect was paid.

61. The four elements which determine the nature of Russian warfare—the higher command, the troops, the commissar, and the Russian territory—fitted together in such a way that their combination was responsible for good performance and great successes. The weakest elements were the intermediate and lower command echelons. Their shortcomings, however, were made up for in part by appropriate action on the part of the higher command, and by the good will, the discipline, the undemanding nature, and the self-sacrificing devotion to duty of the men under the influence of energetic commissars, who were filled with a belief in the essential necessity of victory. The Russian soldier thereby became an instrument which provided his leaders with the sort of fighter they needed for their operations.

Chapter Four. THE COMBAT ARMS

I. Infantry

62. The characterization of the Russian soldier presented up to this point applies primarily to the infantry. This branch of service supplied the bulk of fighting men in active combat, and most clearly exemplified the peculiar characteristics of the Russian.

63. The Red Army infantry was for a long period of time the mainstay of the Russian fighting machine, and in the Arctic it continued as such until the end of the war. As is apparent from the previously described characteristics of the Russian soldier, the Soviet infantry was willing, undemanding, suitable trained and equipped, and, above all, brave and endowed with a self-sacrificing devotion to duty. The Bolshevist philosophy appeared to have become firmly rooted among the great mass of younger people, and to have made them loyal soldiers, differing in their perseverance and performance from those of world War I. The Russian infantryman, subject to rapidly changing moods, was jovial one moment, cruel the next. However, the fighters in the Arctic, natives of the northern parts of Russia, were fair-playing opponents throughout.

64. The Russian infantryman was a member of the herd, preferring to fight in concert with others rather than to be left to his own devices. In the attack, this characteristic was evidenced in the massed lines, sometimes almost packs; in the defense we witnessed it in the stubbornly resisting bunker complements. Here, there was no individual action for one's personal advantage. The soldiers aided each other and, as was gathered from monitored telephone conversations, even displayed an interest in their comrades' family affairs.

65. It has already been pointed out that the Russian soldier was as good as immune to seasonal and terrain difficulties. Further, he was almost complete master of the terrain. There appeared to be no terrain obstacles for the infantryman. He was as much at home in dense forest as in swamp or trackless steppe. Difficult terrain features stopped him for only a limited time. Even the broad Russian streams were crossed quickly with the aid of the most primitive expedients. It could never be assumed that the Russian would be held back by terrain normally considered impassable. It was in just such places that his appearance, and frequently his attack, had to be expected. The infantryman could, if he chose, completely overcome terrain obstacles in a very short time. Kilometers of corduroy road were laid through marshy terrain in a few days; oaths were tramped through forests covered with deep snow. Ten men abreast, with arms interlocked, and in ranks 100 deep, prepared these lanes in 15-minute reliefs of 1,000 men each. Teams of innumerable infantrymen moved guns and heavy weapons wherever they were needed. During the winter, snow caves which could be heated were constructed to furnish night shelter for men and horses. The Russian materiel was useful in this respects motorization reduced to an absolute minimum; the lightest vehicles, tough horses that required little care; suitable uniforms; and, finally, again the human mass which moved all loads and performed all required tasks like a machine,

66. A singular kinship to nature made the Russian infantryman an ideal fighter in forests, barren country, and swamps. In the Arctic, small units of several men stayed for weeks in the desolate area in our rear. Female radio operators attached to those units were treated with particular respect.

67. Wounds were endured patiently and without complaint. Frostbite was a punishable offense because it was avoidable. Recovery, even from serious injuries, was rapid. Many an injury that would have been fatal to a Central European was endured and overcome.

68. The best weapon of the Russian infantryman was the machine pistol. It was an easily handled weapon equal to Russian winter conditions, and one which we also regarded highly. This weapon was slung around the neck and carried in front of the chest ready for immediate action. The mortar also proved highly valuables the ideal weapon for terrain conditions where artillery support was impossible.

At the beginning of the Eastern Campaign, Russian infantry far surpassed us in mortar equipment and in its use. The same was true for the Russian antitank gun, which at the beginning of the campaign considerably surpassed the antitank gun of our infantry divisions in efficiency, and therefore was readily put to use by us whenever we captured it.

69. The antitank gun was an auxiliary weapon from which the Russian soldier never separated. Wherever the Russian infantryman was, antitank defense could be expected. At times it appeared that each Russian infantryman had an antitank gun or antitank rifle, just as infantrymen of other armies had ordinary rifles. The Russian moved his antitank defense everywhere with great skill. It was to be found even where no enemy tank attacks might be expected. Emplacements were set up within a few minutes. If the small gun—always excellently camouflaged—was not needed for antitank defense, its flat trajectory and great accuracy were put to good use in infantry combat. For this reason, the following rule is again expressed: Engage Russian infantry immediately following their appearance, for shortly thereafter not only the soldier but also his antitank defense will have disappeared into the ground, and every countermeasure will be twice as costly.

70. The Russian infantryman had a noteworthy negative characteristics. He was not inquisitive. His reconnaissance often was extremely poor. Combat patrols were for him the means of gathering information about the enemy whenever he thought it necessary. Although the Russian proved himself an excellent scout, he made too little use of his abilities in this field. The higher Russian command was always well informed on the enemy situation by means of radio monitoring, interrogation of prisoners, captured documents, and other means. But the intermediate and lower commanders apparently were only slightly interested in their opponents. Here again the cause lay in the lack of self-reliance and in the individual Russian infantryman's inability to assemble into a useful report the observations made while on patrol.

71. Clothing and equipment of the Russian infantry suited summer as well as winter requirements of the East. We were amazed at how excellently the Siberian infantry was clothed in the winter of 1941-42. As might be expected, the fighters in the Arctic were likewise suitably clothed. The Russian infantryman was inferior to us and to the Finns only in his skiing. Of course, attempts were made to correct this deficiency through intensified training, but all efforts were doomed to failure since there was never more than one pair of skis available for several men.

72. Equipment that we always carried was discarded by the Russian infantryman, so long as it did not seem absolutely essential. Most Russian gas masks were stored in division depots. Steel helmets were seldom seen in the wilderness of the Far North.

II. Artillery

73. The efficiency of the Russian artillery varied greatly during the various stages of the war. In the beginning it was unable to achieve an effective concentration of fire, and, furthermore, was unenthusiastic about firing on targets in the depth of the battle position even when there was excellent observation. The Rogacnev water tower, for example, and the railroad control towers as well as the high railroad embankment at Zhlobin, all of which were in Russian hands during the battle in the Dnepr—Beresina triangle, commanded a view over the entire area for many kilometers; nevertheless, they were not used for directing fire on very important targets behind our lines. On the Kandalaksha front, continuous supply transport operations at the Karhu railroad station took place within sight of Russian observation posts. These operations were never taken under fire by enemy artillery. On the other hand, the Russian artillery liked to distribute its fire over the front lines, and occasionally shelled a road intersection located not too far from, the front.

74. During the course of the war the artillery, too, developed to a high degree the use of mass as a particularly characteristic procedure. Infantry attacks without artillery preparation were rare. Short preparatory concentrations lasting only a few minutes, frequently employed on the German side in order to preserve the element of surprise, seemed insufficient to the Russians. Thus, counting on the destructive effect of their massed fire, they consciously accepted the fact that we would recognize their intentions of attacking. Russian artillery fire often had no primary target, but covered the entire area with the same intensity. The Russian artillery was very vulnerable to counterbattery fire. It ceased firing, or changed position, after only a few rounds from our guns. The rigidity of the fire plan, and a certain immobility of the Soviet artillery—at least during the first years of the war—was pronounced. Only in rare cases was the artillery successful in promptly following the infantry, Most of the time the artillery was unable to follow up; it remained stuck in the old positions, leaving the infantry without fire support. This practice frequently took the momentum, out of the Russian attacks.

75. Attack tactics of the Russian artillery improved constantly during the war. Eventually, however, their tactics resolved into an ever-repeated, set scheme. Heavy preparatory fire, laid down broad and deep and lasting from one to two hours, was the initial chase; it rapidly mounted to murderous intensity. Once an attack was about to get under way, the Russians suddenly lifted their fire from very narrow lanes (about 80 to 100 meters wide), along which the infantry was to advance. At all other points the fire continued with undiminished fury. Only the most careful observation allowed recognition of those lanes. In most instances one had the impression that artillery preparation was still continuing in full force, though in reality the infantry attack had already begun. Here again, we found the same concept: human lives mean nothing at all. If our defensive fire forced the Russian infantry out of their narrow lanes, or if their own artillery was unable to maintain the lanes accurately—Nichevo!—those were operating expenses.

76. It must be admitted that, despite many shortcomings, the Russian artillery was a very good and extremely dangerous arm. Its fire was effective, rapid, and accurate, and it was always a mistake to regard it without due respect. Particularly during the Russian large-scale attacks in the summer of 1941 did it become apparent that the enemy had learned well how to mass and employ large artillery units. Establishment of a definite point of main effort and the use of superior masses of artillery crushed the thin lines of German opposition at many places at the Eastern Front before the actual attack had begun. This successful procedure of establishing definite points of main effort will be used by the Russians also in the future whenever they have the masses of artillery and ammunition required.

III. Armored Force

77. The heart of the Russian armored force was the well-known T-34 tank—an outstanding engineering feat—which might be termed an all-purpose tank. Because of its wide tracks, its powerful engine, and its low silhouette, the performance of the T-34 in Russian terrain was frequently superior to that of the German tanks, particularly with respect to cross-country mobility. To the surprise of all the experts, the T-34 easily- negotiated terrain theoretically secure against mechanized attack. The caliber of its guns was too small, however, and forced the Russians to produce several new types of tanks (KV-1, Stalin)., which, like the German models, became successively heavier. Despite all improvements, however, the new tanks remained on the whole inferior to the T-34. The Russians, too, recognized this fact, and continued to mass produce the T-34 until the end of the war.

78. Not until late did the Russians decide on launching concerted attacks by large tank forces. During the first years of the war, Russian tanks generally were used for local infantry support. Soviet tank attacks as such took place only after a sufficient number of the vehicles had become available. Here, too, the Russians adhered to their usual habit of employing great masses of men and machines.

79. Tank attacks generally were not conducted at a fast enough pace. Frequently they were not well enough adapted to the nature of the terrain. Those facts we noted time and again, up to the end of the war.

80. The training of the individual tank drivers was inadequate; the training period apparently was too short, and losses of experienced drivers were too high. The Russian avoided driving his tank through hollows or along reverse slopes, preferring to choose a route along the crests that would present fewer driving difficulties. This practice remained unchanged even in the face of unusually high tank losses. Thus the defense was in most cases able to bring the Russian tanks under fire at long range, and to inflict losses on them even before the battle had begun. Slow and uncertain driving, and numerous firing halts, made the Russian tanks good targets. Premature firing on the Russian tanks, though wrong in principle, was always the correct solution in those instances. If the defense was ready and adequate, the swarms of Russian tanks began to thin out very quickly in most cases. True, this fault in Russian tank tactics can be corrected by peacetime training, but it can hardly be totally eliminated.

81. On the whole, the Russian armored force does not merit commendation equal to that due the Russian artillery. Limited flexibility, and the inability of the subordinate commanders to exploit favorable situations rapidly and adroitly, were evident also here, and frequently prevented the Russians from achieving successes almost within their grasp. Toward the end of the war, however, the inadequate facilities of the poor contender no longer were able to stand up against the masses of equipment of the rich opponent, and the latter was able to roll along as he wished. Thus, for example, on 1 March 1945 a mere 70 German tanks faced 1,600 Russian tanks in the battle of Pomerania.

IV. Horse Cavalry

82. In the Russian theater of operations the cavalry, despite many changes in tactics and equipment, achieved a significance reminiscent of old times. In our army, all cavalry except, one lone division had been replaced by panzer units. That was a mistake so far as the Eastern Campaign was concerned. Tie Russian successfully followed another course. The LIII Infantry Corps quite often encountered Russian cavalry divisions, and once a cavalry corps comprising three cavalry elements—always in situations in which cavalry was a suitable arm for the enemy's purpose.

83. In the battle in the Dnepr—Beresina triangle, a cavalry corps comprising three elements appeared west of the Beresina near Bobruisk, out of the Prioyat Marshes, in the rear of the German corps which was engaged in hard fighting. This cavalry force cut the Slutsk— Bobruisk highway and the Minsk—Bobruisk railroad, and thereby isolated the corps for a week from its supply and contact with the rear. Bobruisk itself, together with the bridges there, was seriously threatened. Only by prompt emergency measures were we able to ease the pressure. During that period the corps ammunition supply dropped to twenty rounds per light field howitzer (Ed: 105 mm.), and that at a time when Timoshenko's major offensive had reached its peak. Forces other than cavalry would have been unable to conduct such a raid.

84. In the advance out of the Bryansk pocket northward past Plavskoye to the upper Don in October-November I941, the 112th Infantry Division of LIII Infantry Corps was met by a Russian cavalry division just as it reached the Orel—-Tula road. There ensued some very unpleasant delays. The cavalry division accomplished its mission by occupying every town along the route of advance, withdrawing from each one as soon as the Division advanced to attack. Thus the 112th Division was kept occupied by constant small-scale warfare.

85. During the battle of annihilation southeast of Plavskoye, cavalry divisions appeared on both wings of the Russian attack front. The cavalry division just mentioned was on the northern wing. The Russian higher command had diverted it to the battlefield as soon as the 112th Infantry Division turned in that direction. But the cavalry division, with its greater speed, reached the Plavskoye area ahead of the 112th Division and blocked its advance until a Russian rifle division arrived at the front. The cavalry division mentioned earlier was on the southern wing. That division was to reach the Orel-Tula express motor highway in a forced march so as to cut it near Chern - under prevailing circumstances a handsome and practicable task for a cavalry division.

86. The Corps' further advance to the upper Don was constantly accompanied and watched by a cavalry division ten to twenty kilometers off its right flank. The cavalry division would have been able to intervene at once, in any manner whatsoever, if the Russian higher command had had any occasion for ordering it to do so.

87. The above examples are drawn from situations in which the missions in question could have been executed only by cavalry. Our armored vehicles were laid up in October during the muddy period. Only cavalry could operate through the Pripyat Marshes.

88. Under Eastern conditions, as characterized in Central Russia by great forest and swamp areas, muddy periods, and deep snow, cavalry is an arm without peer. Where the motor failed, the horse's legs continued to move. The conduct of the cavalry forces was, however, not always suited to the situation and sometimes was even awkward. Leadership and training in the Russian cavalry were not up to the World War I standard.

Chapter Five. RUSSIAN COMBAT METHODS

89. Just as the Russian soldier had his own peculiarities in his internal make-up, so did he have them in his combat methods. The most common Russian form of combat was the use of mass. Human mass and mass of materiel were generally used unintelligently arid without variation, but they were always effective. Both had to be available before they could be used lavishly; they were therefore dependent upon limitless Russian supplies. The Russian disdain for life—always present, but now infinitely heightened by Communism—favored this practice. One must never believe that a Russian attack which has been twice repulsed with unheard-of losses will not be repeated a third and a fourth time at the same place and in the same fashion. Unimpressed by previous failures and losses, new waves always came on. An unusual inflexibility of mind and unimaginative obstinacy lay in this use of masses, and was dearly paid for. It will never be possible to estimate Russian war casualties with any degree of accuracy; there will always be a potential error of many hundred thousands. This inflexible method of warfare, with the objective of accomplishing everything through the use of human masses, is the most inhuman and costly possible.

90. Characteristic of the disdain for human life was the complete elimination of funeral rites. There was no such thing as a funeral ceremony for the ordinary citizen in Communist Russia. It ran counter to her antireligious philosophy and the mass sacrifice of human beings. The cemeteries dating from the era of Christian Russia had for the most pare disappeared, or were completely neglected. Weatherworn fragments of stont, or little irregularities in the ground under which were buried the rotted stumps of sawed-off wooden crosses, were the last witnesses in the East of a bygone belief in the life hereafter. On the other hand, hundreds of birch crosses bearing the names of German dead frequently lined the perimeters of towns, forests, and roads which earlier had been battlegrounds. Former town cemeteries, and grounds around hospitals and churches, were often dotted with thousands of such crosses, and were well tended. Here and there, on a high mound of earth, there rose a heavy wooden cross erected by German soldiers, bearing the inscription, "Here lie 275 Russian soldiers." Those were the only tokens that honored the heroism of Russian common soldiers. Of course, there were also the burial mounds in which a thick peg, painted red, had been driven into the ground at the head end, inscribed with the heroic deeds of some commissar killed in action. The bulk of the dead millions were unceremoniously plowed under. Thus, all outward indications of the number of dead were obliterated.

91. A typical example occurred before Leningrad in September 1941. Accustomed to this type of burial, prisoners of war and civilians—old men, women, and children—charged with the interment of three hundred Russian dead, loaded the bodies on Panje wagons (peasant carts), and tossed them into three trench graves. When they noticed that there was no room left for the last thirty or forty bodies, they tramped on the corpses with their boots until there was enough room. They finished this work with childish glee on their faces, happy that they had saved themselves the trouble of digging another hole.

92. Not until l941 did the Russians start using their men a bit more sparingly. Only after there were no new millions available to the Russians could one detect in their orders the first reference to consideration in the use of men, and admonitions to avoid losses. Nevertheless, a thinning of attack waves was virtually unknown to the Russians until almost the last days of the war. The herd instinct and lack of self-reliance on the part of the subordinate commanders time and again misled them into the concentrated employment of troops. It was not particularly difficult to crush the attack of the human mass so long as the opposition possessed a mass of materiel in trained hands.

93. n the winter of 1941, the Russians cleared a German mine field south of Leningrad by chasing over it tightly closed columns of unarmed Russian soldiers shoulder to shoulder. Within a few minutes, they became victims of the mines and the defensive fire.

94. The inflexibility of Russian methods of warfare was evidenced repeatedly, and could be illustrated by countless examples. Only the top Russian command during the last years of the war was an exception. This inflexibility manifested itself as high as army level; in divisions, regiments, and companies it was unquestionably the retarding factor in the way they fought. A division boundary was a sacred wall, and a neighbor's interest halted at his side of that wall. The senseless repetition of attacks, the rigidity of artillery fire, the plotting of lanes of attack and movement without regard to terrain, all these were additional symptoms of this inflexibility. The oft-intercepted, frantic query, "The enemy has broken through, what shall we do?", was characteristic. Only a few subordinate commanders knew how to help themselves when the situation presented them with surprises of that nature. The leaders displayed a certain flexibility in their frequent shifting of units in the front lines. These units disappeared unnoticed overnight and reappeared several days later in another sector of the front. It was, however, no trick to relieve and exchange troops so long as one had the number of reserves that the Russians had; on the other hand, it was all the more difficult if one had none, as was the case with the Germans. The Russians have this method to thank for the fact that only a few of their units became thoroughly depleted during the course of prolonged battles; on the German side such a depletion became inevitable over the years of continuous service of units. None of the Soviet units that were thus shifted from sector to sector ever disappeared. It could be safely assumed that the unit withdrawn would be recommitted within the same army sector. The organization of an army, and the assignment of individual divisions to it also remained fixed. It seldom happened that divisions were interchanged between the armies.

95. Though he was generally no master of improvisation, the Russian nevertheless knew how to bring battered infantry units up to strength, or how to constitute new units as replacements for destroyed ones. This procedure frequently was accomplished with startling speed, but it soon turned out to be an unscrupulous game played with human lives. For example, the inhabitants of a threatened city, or perhaps the entire male population of areas from which we had recently withdrawn, were gathered up like lightning by means of excellent organization. Regardless of age, nationality, deferred status, or fitness, they were used to fill out these units. With no training at all, or, at most, only a few days of it, and often without weapons and uniforms, these soldiers were thrown into battle. They were supposed to learn in combat all that was necessary, and to acquire their weapons from their dead comrades. The Russians themselves were aware of the fact that these men were no soldiers, but they filled gaps and supplemented the sinking numbers of the "human mass." During the fighting in a bridgehead southeast of Kremenchug in September 19U3, the Russians at nighttime used to drive ahead of their armed soldiers large numbers of civilians whom they had gathered up, so that the German infantry might, expend its scant supply of ammunition.

96. The same old story again and again: employment of masses, and narrow division sectors held by large complements replenished time after time after time. Therefore also the mass attacks. In the twinkling of an eye the terrain in front of our line teemed with Russian soldiers. They seemed to grow out of the earth, and nothing would stop their advance for a while. Gaps closed automatically, and the mass surged on until the supply of men is used up and the wave, substantially thinned, receded again. How often we witnessed this typical picture of a Russian attack! It is impressive and astounding, on the other hand, how frequently the mass failed to recede, but rolled on and on, nothing able to stop it, even a few hours, we were in most cases too late, and on the next day success was more remote than ever. Even if there were but one platoon of infantry arid one tank available, they had to be committed at once; the Russian was not yet dug in, he was still visible and within reach, he still had no organized defensive fire and no heavy weapons in the new position—a little later he had all of these. Every delay brought disaster; only an immediate counterattack led to success.

97. Another specifically Russian battle technique was filtration. It was a practice which especially suited the Russian, and of which he was a master. Despite closest observation of the avenues of approach, the Russian was suddenly there; no one knew where he had come from, nor how long he had already been there. Wherever the terrain was considered impassable, but was still kept under close observation to be doubly safe—just at those very points did the Russian infiltrate. He was suddenly there in substantial numbers and had already vanished into the earth. Nobody had seen a thing. What with the drawn-out German defense fronts, it was no particular art to steal between the widely separated strong points. Just the same, it was always a surprise 'when, despite all watchfulness during the night, we found the next morning that strong Russian units fully equipped with weapons and ammunition had assembled and dug in far behind our own front. These operations were executed with unbelievable skill, completely noiseless and almost always without a struggle. It was a very profitable technique which succeeded in hundreds of cases and gained the Russians great advantages. There was only one method of countering it: extreme watchfulness, and heavily occupied, deep positions, secured throughout at all times.

98. Of the same nature was the Russian's constant effort to establish bridgeheads (or advance covering positions, which are here included in the same category). These bridgeheads were to serve often to harass the German enemy and to sap his strength, and often as a base for Russian attacks. They were established by means of infiltration or by attack, and were a dangerous Russian tactic. It always proved wrong and absolutely hopeless to do nothing about those bridgeheads for the time being for this or that reason, and to postpone their elimination. It was dead certain that Russian bridgeheads which had existed only 24 hours would during that time have grown into a serious menace. Though only one Russian company might have occupied the newly formed bridgehead in the evening, by the next morning it was sure to have turned into an almost invincible fortress held by at least a regiment and bristling with heavy weapons. No mater how heavy and accurate our fire, the flow of men into the bridgehead continued. Regardless of all counter-measures the bridgehead continued to swell until it ran over. Only by using very strong forces and planned attack could it still be contained or eliminated, provided one was lucky and not afraid of heavy losses. Therefore, the warning against these bridgeheads can never be stressed sufficiently. There was only one way of fighting them, and that had to be made a rule: Every Russian bridgehead in the process of being formed, and every advanced position, no matter how small, must be attacked immediately, while it is still undeveloped, and eliminated. If we waited unexpected turns of events. Russian reactions to the tactical rules of warfare, and to tricks of the trade such as envelopment, flanking threat, feint, surprise, etc., could never be determined beforehand. One time the Russian would react according to the rules and give up sooner than anticipated; on another occasion, all efforts were to no avail, and neither encirclement nor flank attack fazed him. The struggle with the Russians was thereby placed on an entirely new basis; predictive calculation was out of the picture, and every action was full of suspense and surprise. At times, positions which were tactically decisive according to normal concepts would be evacuated by the Russians without delay. At other times, individual terrain features, of no evident importance would be held even in the face of serious losses. In those instances the Russian often relied only on his intuition, which he substituted for his practical schooling. It must be conceded that this tactical instinct often stood the Russians in better stead than the theories of many academies could have done. The soundness of many an action which at first seemed surprising to us, often had to be recognized at a later time.

99. The Russian's kinship with nature expressed itself also in his preference for night operations. Shifts from one position to another, and concentrations, executed rapidly and silently in darkness, were more frequent than night attacks, which themselves were no rarity. However, the Russian generally avoided large-scale night attacks, since it appeared to him that the individual soldiers and subordinate commanders lacked the necessary self-reliance. A major offensive operation was conducted at night only when a victory definitely expected by the highest command had not been achieved in the course of daylight attacks. Such large-scale night attacks were mostly acts of desperation that failed to produce success (See Example 20). On the other hand, night attacks with a limited objective were a method which the Russians liked to employ in order to gain advantages for the next day, or to recapture lost ground. These night attacks were mostly infantry battles only, without use of artillery. It was always proper to be prepared for a Russian attempt to regain in the night a position that had been lost during the day.

100. The Russian's excellent utilization of railroads should be noted here, even though it does not actually fall into the category of combat. The Russians accomplished strategic concentrations or shifts of large units, one or more armies, in an unbelievably short time with the help of the railroads. The imperfect rail net of European Russia did not often present opportunity for such measures, but wherever a chance offered itself, it was thoroughly utilized. Every expedient was used even though it bore the unmistakable mark of improvisation: a continuous succession of trains without any technical railroad safety measures; trains traveling one within sight of the next, or on two tracks in the same direction; reckless overcrowding and overloading of trains. The number of trains necessary per unit was less here than for any other army. The Russian neither had nor needed baggage or accessories, bulky clerk's lockers, surplus vehicles, or large food supplies. He could be packed into railroad cars like a sardine in a can. The wider gauge and the corresponding greater width of the Russian railroad car was significant in this respect. In any event, by using this type of railroad transport the Russians succeeded in surprising the German command, since such rapidity in large-scale troop movements by railroad contradicted all experience.

101. Fighting the Russian on his own ground necessitated orientation in a new type of combat. Fighting had to be primitive and unscrupulous, but rapid and flexible. One could never afford to be nonplussed, not even in the face of the most surprising occurrences and repulsing such an attack was certainly dependent on the strength of our own forces and means for defense; primarily, however, it was a question of nerves. Only seasoned soldiers mastered the fear which instinctively gripped everyone upon the onslaught of such masses. Only the true soldier, the experienced individual fighter, could in the long run stand up under the strain; only a multitude of them could stop those masses.

102. There was just one tactical misconception which the Russians could not relinquish despite all losses i the belief that an elevation was in every case the only terrain feature of value. They tried for every elevation, fought for it with perseverance and strong forces, no matter whether or not it actually dominated the terrain and the situation demanded its possession. If the elevation was really important, it was well to occupy it before the Russians; otherwise, it was to be expected that the elevation could be taken only with heavy losses. In more cases than had earlier been assumed, however, the possession of level ground was sufficient; the value of the elevation was frequently overestimated.

103. Thus the Russian soldier voided a number of tactical principles. Still others were altered because of the nature of the country itself, a factor discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter Six. RUSSIA AS A THEATER OF OPERATIONS

104. The characteristics of Russian terrain brought about an inordinate number of new experiences, and created new doctrines of combat. Land and climate constituted weapons with which one had to be thoroughly familiar in order to deal with them, or, at least, to neutralize their restrictive effect. Their qualities altered tactical procedures formerly in common use, and forced the adoption of measures necessary for military operations in that particular area and climate.

105. In many instances, climate and soil conditions in the U. S. S. R. would for extended periods void all rules governing military movement. The German Army was not modern enough to overcome these difficulties, and therefore was fore to fight in winter and during muddy periods as best it could without the assistance of operative motor vehicles. This retrogression of about a century was a problem which could be dealt with only by means of improvisation.

106. The great forest and swamp areas of Arctic, Northern, and Central Russia often forced all movement into the narrow lanes of a few sand and swamp roads, and made it extremely difficult and time-consuming. Development of the columns was generally out of the question. The execution of any and all measures required a multiple of the usual amount of time, and the advantage of motorization was almost negligible.

107. Sand, mud, and snow impeded the advance of all types of troops, and put great strain on motors. Lined up and jammed along one road, the troops slowly and painfully inched forward; a long snake crawling slowly over the difficult ground. The halt of one cart of this snake stopped all parts behind it, pressing them still closer together. Weak bridges barely supported the infantry vehicles. Time- consuming bridge and road repairs were necessary, and many defiles had to be traversed. Previous experiences and doctrines were useless under these conditions. Time calculations, the most important factor in operations, had to be based on entirely new concepts. Frequently the time required for a movement could not be estimated even approximately. It continued to run far in excess of the expected maximum. Remedies were difficult and could be achieved only by flexibility and practice.

108. In by far the largest part of Southern Russia, and in most of the swampless areas of Northern and Central Russia, travel in dry weather was considerably better, and the terrain, too, was passable for vehicles of all types almost everywhere. During that time, operations on even the largest scale were possible everywhere with the exception of swamp areas.

109. The principle of establishing lanes of movement rather than routes of advance proved satisfactory on the German as well as on the Russian side; the same was true of the separation of lanes of movement for motorized and non-motorized unit?. Here, the motorized troops had to be allotted the lanes with the best roads. Engineers were always placed far up in the column so that they might quickly reinforce bridges and eliminate terrain obstacles. Only strict regulation of traffic, and relentlessly severe discipline, guaranteed the best possible progress. Every halt for rest had to be closely timed, passing procedure strictly regulated, and priority definitely determined. Each driver pressed forward, and in unguarded moments became a traffic violator. For that reason, trained troops were needed for traffic control, and had to be used, just as every tactical unit, according to the point of main effort. Likewise, all staffs and higher headquarters had to abide by traffic discipline, since exceptions only caused confusion. In particularly difficult large-scale movements, special purpose staffs under the command of senior officers were employed.

110. The rate of progress of motorized troops could be roughly estimated in advance only if they were traveling on hard-surfaced roads. A rule of thumb is that, on average dry roadways, motorized troops can make from eight to ten kilometers per hour, and foot troops from two to four kilometers per hour. Terrain and road conditions in the East required, according to our experience, three to four times the amount of motor fuel needed under normal European conditions.

111. The assumption that long columns can easily be stopped by the enemy appears justified. However, it developed that the Russian overestimated the constraining effect of the channeled movements. In almost every case he blocked only the roads and bridges with task forces deployed without breadth or depth. It was, therefore, not too difficult to knock out such enemy blocking attempts by attacks against the flanks and rear of the enemy groups. This maneuver required two conditions for success: reconnaissance far to the front, and incorporation of combat forces capable of cross-country movement at the head of the march groups. No matter how easy it was for vehicles with cross-country mobility to cross great, open stretches in any direction during dry seasons, they nevertheless were confined mostly to the existing roads on long marches, since the Russian terrain always confronted them with terrain obstacles which they were unable to overcome (swamps, watercourses, ravines, steep rises, etc.). Furthermore, it required considerably more time and fuel to move cross-country.

112. In drawing conclusions from the battles of the German armies in the East it is to be noted that the German Armed Forces went unprepared into the Russian winter and into the muddy periods, and for that reason they faced numerous difficulties and emergencies which could have been avoided by conscientious preparation.

PECULIARITIES OF RUSSIAN TACTICS

Chapter One. GENERAL

113. Comprehension of Russian tactics demands a clear conception of the premises on which they are based. Russian tactics have their roots in the Russian himself and in his social order, in the Russian land mass with its climate and soil conditions, its expanse, and its varied topography. The most important points on those subjects have been summed up elsewhere in this report. These points will be supplemented in detail in the following pages, and illustrated by numerous examples. The examples should permit insight into the practical effect of these characteristics under various conditions, and illustrate how the German command coped with them.

114. While the bulk of the Red Array consisted of infantry divisions, which were combined into corps and armies, and supplemented by numerous GHQ troops (artillery, antitank, and engineer brigades, as well as tank and self-propelled artillery elements), there were also the large, highly mobile tank and mechanized corps—the strategic force —which in most instances were combined into tank armies. Tank corps and mechanized corps were seldom placed under infantry armies. This method of organization reveals the effort of the Russian high command to assure strategic mobility. That mobility was demonstrated in the sweeping employment of these large, fast forces. As soon as the battle fronts became static (position warfare), the Russian command withdrew its tank and mechanized forces from the front, and did not commit them again until the infantry had breached the enemy defensive system. That mode of employment coincided with the concepts expressed in the Russian field service regulations. In fighting for a system of defensive positions, HQ tank and self-propelled artillery regiments (that is, not the organic forces of the mobile corps) supported the infantry divisions in great numbers.

115. Because of the long duration of the war it was possible to observe the combat methods of the Russian enemy in all phases. As early as the first winter in Russia, it was evident that the German lower command would have to find new methods of fighting if it wanted to be successful. The extensive area, the mass employment of men, the peculiar characteristics of Russian fighting methods, and the different climatic conditions forced them to develop a new line of tactical thought. Only a better-led soldier, and one superior in fighting qualities, had any prospect of success. In logical sequence, those thoughts had to concern close observation of all Russian habits, Russian reaction to German fighting methods, and thorough exploitation of Russian weaknesses. In order to make information about the characteristics of the Russian available to all concerned, it was exceedingly important to compile all experiences and to disseminate them, particularly to the replacement training units and to the schools. There had to be a constant flow of instructors with combat experience to these units in order to train replacements and new recruits according to the latest experiences.

116. These measures proved invaluable. Divisions that had been newly formed, or transferred from other theaters, and sent to the East without a sufficient number of officers and noncommissioned officers with prior experience In the East, failed in the beginning almost without exception and suffered heavy losses. On the other hand, even remnants of divisions which had long been going through the hard school of the East, made outstanding accomplishments. At the same time, divisions which had fought in the East performed excellently also on all other fronts.

Chapter Two. RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

117. Russian march reconnaissance and security generally corresponded to German concepts. There way no really intense activity, but one very skillfully adapted to the objective and to local conditions (terrain, climate, transportation routes, and weather).

118. In his march reconnaissance the Russian was very hesitant, groping, and cautious. Ho allowed himself much time. If he found no enemy resistance, he frequently plunged ahead into the unknown without further reconnaissance.

Example 8

App 2. The Engagement at Maloryta (End of June 1941)

The engagement at Maloryta grew out of the thrust of a Russian division east of the Bug near Wlodawa, into the flank of our armored units which were rolling from Brest-Litovsk through Kobryn in the direction of Slutsk. The Russian division had sent ahead armored reconnaissance cars. These made their appearance about half a day before the division itself, and encountered our 255th Infantry Division, which was advancing from Wlodawa on Maloryta. The terrain (Pripyat Marshes) was extremely unfavorable for armored reconnaissance cars. Nevertheless, they came on. After two cars had been knocked out, the others disappeared for good. Instead, there appeared after a few hours infantry security detachments, already deployed as a thin screen of skirmishers. Several kilometers behind followed the rifle division split into battle teams (Kampfgruppen), which were deployed over a front of about 10 kilometers, with large gaps between the teams.

The Russian division had undoubtedly anticipated an encounter with the Germans in the vicinity of Maloryta, and so had sent out motorized reconnaissance to obtain promptly the information needed for deployment for action of the division. The infantry screens following later served as local security for the battle teams.

Example 9. The Action Southeast of Plavskoye (November 1941)

120. The Russians intended to thrust from Yefremov along the main road to the northwest in the direction of Tula, into the rear of our armored units which were before Tula. When the leading elements of our l6?th Infantry Division met them near Teploye, the Russians were Just as surprised as we were. Certainly they had not yet counted on meeting the enemy. On this basis, their advance can be taken as typical of a Russian march against the enemy with only one usable road available, when direct contact with the enemy is not yet expected. Again, several armored reconnaissance cars appeared at first, but they seemed to have only local reconnaissance missions. They moved ahead by bounds. Behind them, following German procedure, came infantry security detachments. Only then followed the foremost division (6th Rifle Division). This division possessed numerous trucks, which, however, were not used until later during local shifts on the battlefield. They were not intended for the strategic forward displacement of the division at this time. On the road there followed behind the 6th Rifle Division further infantry divisions without such a great number of trucks. Several days later, when the battle was already in progress, there appeared a cavalry division which had come up on a bad side road running to the west. There also appeared a tank brigade, which had been standing ready behind the long column of rifle divisions. It was thrown forward in a single movement only when the battle had reached its climax.

121. It seemed as if in an advance against the enemy the chain of rifle divisions following one another was not to be disturbed. Accordingly, though it would have been possible to move a single division forward, this was not done. Perhaps this maneuver was also to serve the purpose of preventing the enemy from recognizing the movement prematurely. Had the cavalry division advanced simultaneously with the rifle divisions, the Russians would not have been able to surprise us.

122. For combat reconnaissance, the Russian used either assault teams in platoon strength, or tanks alone or in combination with riflemen.

Example 10

App. 3. Kandalaksha Front

123. The following example from the Kandalaksha front sho