In a class-based society the objects of exchange tend to assume the alienated form of a commodity and, as a consequence, reproduction in general assumes the particular form of commodity reproduction. In a clan-based society the objects of exchange tend to assume the nonalienated form of a gift; reproduction assumes the particular form of gift reproduction. This comes about because the objectification process predominates in a commodity economy, while the personification process predominates in a gift economy: that is, things and people assume the social form of objects in a commodity economy while they assume the social form of persons in a gift economy. Furthermore, different types of class (clan) organization are associated with different types of commodity (gift) reproduction.

This chapter attempts to demonstrate some of these propositions by focusing on exchange (circulation).1 It illustrates how commodity exchange establishes objective quantitative relationships between the objects transacted, while gift exchange establishes personal qualitative relationships between the subjects transacting. It also distinguishes a number of different types of commodity exchange and a number of [40] different types of gift exchange. Emphasis is given to the analysis of gift exchange because gift exchange of the PNG type is relatively unfamiliar.

THE DIRECT EXCHANGE OF THINGS

Exchange, in its simplest form, can be defined as a transaction involving two transactors, A and B, and two objects, x and y. The discussion here is limited to the case where A and B are individuals or groups, and where the objects are things.

The distinction between gifts and commodities manifests itself as a difference between the exchange relation established: gift exchange establishes a relation between the transactors, while commodity exchange establishes a relation between the objects transacted. This arises because of a difference in the social status of the transactors and a difference in the social status of the objects transacted.

The social status of transactors

The simple barter exchange of commodities presupposes, as Marx ([1867] 1965: 91) was first to point out, that transactors are in a state of reciprocal independence, that is, that the transactors are strangers, aliens. Such a state of reciprocal independence has no existence in a clan-based society based on communal property. In such societies people are related to one another and this brings with it rights and obligations of different kinds, that is, people in a clan-based economy are in a state of reciprocal dependence.

This distinction between dependence and independence should be seen as the extreme points on a continuum: as one moves from one extremity to another, the degree of dependence changes. In a clan-based society a measure of this dependence is “kinship distance” (Sahlins 1972: Chap. 5). This refers to “classificatory kinship distance” rather than the distance blood relations are apart. The meaning of this is best grasped by considering the position of an individual clansman in a tribal society of the ideal type. He is surrounded by a series of concentric circles each representing the ever-widening comembership spheres to which he belongs. The first circle contains his fellow clansmen, and the next his fellow [41] tribesmen. A measure of kinship distance, then, is the radius of one of these circles. At the periphery, for example, individuals are almost complete strangers, while at the center they are very closely related. It is only at the periphery that exchange assumes the pure commodity form. In a gift economy of East Africa, for example, “there is a kind of continuum in exchange relations. Between strangers there is a strict pecuniary relationship; this aspect is less marked between neighbors and tilia (trading partners), and is least so between clansmen and best friends” (Schneider 1957: 286). This phenomenon seems common to all clan-based societies, as suggested by Sahlins’ (1972: 231–46) survey of the evidence from Africa (Congo pygmies, !Kung Bushmen, Nuer, Tiv, Bemba), America (Washo, Eskimo, Shoshomi, Chuckchee), Oceania (Australian Aborigines, Maori), Asia (Semang, Andamans, Northern Tungas), and Melanesia (Busuma, Kuma, Siuai, Kapauku, Manus, Mafulu, Chimbu, Buka, Dobu, Trobriands, Tikopia).

This continuum of exchange relations defines a large number of different types of gift exchange. These can be classified as belonging to two broad types: interclan exchanges and intraclan exchanges. The principles governing these types of exchange are quite different. Broadly speaking, interclan gift-giving usually involves durable items such as shells and tends to be competitive, while intraclan giving usually involves food and tends to be noncompetitive.

The social status of objects

The material basis of a society not only determines the social status of the transactors, it also determines the social status of the object being transacted: commodities are alienable objects transacted by aliens; gifts are inalienable objects transacted by nonaliens.

In a commodity economy there is a marked distinction between things and persons. This distinction, which is “the very condition of part of our system of property, alienation and exchange” (Mauss [1925] 1974: 46), is not the basis of a gift economy.2

[42] Leach’s ([1954] 1977: 141–54) discussion of the distinction between Shan (commodity) “trade” and Kachin (gift) “trade” in Burma is a particularly good illustration of this. Shan trade is “mainly trade as we understand it—that is, the bartering of goods of ordinary economic value to achieve a profit” (ibid.: 107). In Shan trade the objects transacted are alienated so that, after the exchange, the receiver of an object is the owner. But the receiver is not the owner after a Kachin gift exchange:

Kachins do not look upon movable property as capital for investment, they regard it rather as an adornment to the person… . Wealth objects other than ordinary perishable foodstuffs have value primarily as items of display. The best way to acquire notoriety as the owner (ruler) of an object is publicly to give possession of it to someone else. The recipient, it is true, then has the object, but you retain sovereignty over it since you make yourself the owner (madu) of a debt. In sum, the possessor of wealth objects gains merit and prestige mainly through the publicity he achieves in getting rid of them. (Leach [1954] 1977: 142–43)

This distinction between alienability and inalienability is just another way of talking about the presence or absence of private property. This point can be clarified by contrasting the concept of land as a gift with the concept of land as a commodity. Consider the following description of land tenure in the Siane of PNG, for example.

[T]he system of land tenure is of the kind common in segmentary societies. An individual has different rights by virtue of his membership in various groupings, hierarchically arranged in order of increasing size. The totality of rights is … called overlapping stewardship. (Salisbury 1962: 73)

Here, an individual may possess a given piece of land but it is owned collectively, in ascending order, by the subclan, clan, tribe, and so on. When land is a commodity, by way of contrast, there is no “overlapping stewardship.” In a commodity economy, an individual owns the lands he possesses, that is, there is private property of land. The concept of a thing-gift is an extension of the idea of overlapping stewardship to the products of land. Compare Siane land tenure with the Plateau Tonga (of East Africa) formulation of cattle ownership, for example.

[43] I own cattle. I belong to a kinship group. Therefore my kinsmen have the right to demand my assistance. My rights over my cattle are subject to the obligation which I have to assist my kinsmen. (Colson 1951: 12)

The Siane have a similar concept of property. They make a distinction between the merafo of an object and the amfonka of an object.

The rights of a merafo are those of a trustee momentarily exercising control over goods the absolute title to which is vested in a corporation which exists perpetually. The ancestors made these goods at the beginning of time when they emerged from holes in the ground, and their descendants (or reincarnations) must be handed these goods in unimpaired condition in the future. The trustee justifies his position in terms of his descent from the ancestors, and validates the privileges he obtains from his trusteeship by the performance of rituals in honor of the ancestors. (Salisbury 1962: 66)

Objects become amfonka property by virtue of the work done in creating them; the relationship between a thing and its producer is likened to the relationship between a person and his/her shadow (ibid.: 62). The producer regards his/her product as part of his/her person. For example, “Pigs cannot be eaten by their amfonka, and such an act is treated with the same distaste and horror as is expressed at the idea of cannibalism” (ibid.: 65).

One of the social consequences of the inalienable relation between a thing-gift and its producer is the phenomenon of personification: things are anthropomorphized in a gift economy. In the highlands of PNG, pigs, the principal instruments of gift exchange, are regarded as humans (Modjeska 1977: 92). In the coastal areas, yams, the principal means of subsistence, are regarded as human beings in metamorphosed form; legends exist explaining how yams originated by metamorphosis from humans (Fortune [1932] 1963: 95). Gawa Island specializes in the production and exchange of the ocean-going canoes which are used for the famous kula gift exchange system. These canoes are traded as gifts rather than commodities. Thus, although the clan which produces a canoe loses possession of it, it is never alienated from the clan. Like other gifts, canoes are personified.

[44] Canoes are adorned to make them beautiful. This adornment which Gawans compare to festive human adornment is concentrated primarily on the prowboards… . Verbal labels for human body parts are also playfully transferred to prowboard parts. Primarily through this adornment, the canoe acquires virtual properties of form that synthesize the non-human and human domains. (Munn 1977: 47)

Canoe origin myths also express this strong bond between things and persons. So too do the origin myths of people. Among the Umeda, for example, it is said that Umeda ancestors hunted and killed a cassowary in the forest. When it died on the present site of the Punda hamlet, its bones turned into men and its blood and flesh into women (Gell 1975: 226).

The personification of gifts provides a striking contrast to what Marx ([1867] 1965: 76–87) called the “fetishism” (i.e. objectification or reification) of commodities: the tendency for relations between people in a capitalist society to assume “the fantastic form of a relation between things.” In a commodity exchange, the reciprocal independence of the transactors, and the alienability of the objects transacted, means that the exchange relation established is between the objects rather than the subjects. Thus commodity exchanges objectify social relations between people and they appear as a quantitative relation between the objects exchanged.

The spatial aspect of exchange

The social status of the transactors, and the social relation between a transactor and the object transacted, has a number of profound consequences for understanding the difference between exchange in general and particular forms of exchange. The first consequence is that one act of exchange, while representing only one commodity transaction, becomes two transactions for the particular case of gifts. This is because gift giving is unidirectional, a point that is best illustrated by a simple example.

Suppose two transactors, A and B, exchanged two things, x and y. When x and y are commodities this exchange appears as one transaction, as shown in Figure 3.1. Here A gives B commodity x in exchange for commodity y, and a quantitative exchange relation is established between the objects: one unit of commodity x equals one unit of commodity y. [45]

Figure 3.1. Commodity exchange.

However, when x and y are gifts this exchange appears as two transactions, as shown in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2. Gift exchange.

Here A gives B gift x. B now has possession of x but A has ownership because it is A’s inalienable property. Thus a gift–debt relationship is established between A and B, with A the creditor, B the debtor. The relationship is complicated by the fact that B simultaneously gives A gift y. This creates a gift–debt relationship in the opposite direction, with B the creditor, A the debtor. The one exchange consists of two transactions and the transactors become mutually indebted to each other. Thus the exchange relation established is between the transactors rather than the objects, as is the case with commodity exchange.

Gift-debt of this type can only be cancelled by reversing the exchange, that is, by B returning x to A, and A returning y to B. Thus gift exchange is the exchange of like-for-like. Hill’s (1972: 211) description of the important biki gift exchange system among the Hausa of Northern Nigeria illustrates this point.

Contributions are not necessarily in cash, but may take such forms as clothes, threshed grain, bundles of grain, small livestock, food together with money, or enamelware; but like must always be “exchanged” for like, so that, e.g., a donor of threshed grain must be given such produce in return.

It is important to stress that it is not the natural attributes of the thing exchanged which determine whether or not an exchange is of the gift or [46] commodity form. Paper money can assume a gift form in certain social contexts, as Hill’s Hausa example illustrates.

Simple commodity exchange is different because it involves the exchange of unlike-for-unlike. Thus it is an exchange of heterogeneous rather than homogeneous things. When A gives B commodity x, a commodity-debt is established; but if B simultaneously gives A commodity y this debt is simultaneously cancelled because the alienability of the objects brings about a transfer of ownership.

The temporal dimension of exchange

The social data of an exchange also affect the temporal relationship established. Simple commodity exchange establishes a relation of equality between heterogeneous things at a given point in time while gift exchange establishes a relation of equality between homogeneous things at different points of time.

As an illustration, consider once again exchange in general where A and B exchange both x and y. This is simultaneous exchange but it can be split up into two parts that can be thought of as occurring at two different points in time. If this pair of temporally separated transactions is reproduced at a further two points in time, but in the reverse direction, the temporal outcomes of the debts thereby created will differ depending on whether the debt was of the commodity or the gift variety. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3.

Value and rank

The difference between a commodity exchange relation and a gift exchange relation can be summed up as the difference between “value” and “rank.” Commodity exchange—the exchange of unlike-for-unlike—establishes a relation of equality between the objects exchanged. When A and B exchange x and y as commodities of equal value, a relation of the form x = y is established. In a commodity economy, because of the operation of the law of value, two heterogeneous things are treated as equivalent and the problem is to find the common measure.

Gift exchange—the exchange of like-for-like—establishes an unequal relationship of domination between the transactors. This comes [47]

Figure 3.3.

about because the giver usually is regarded as superior to the receiver (A. J. Strathern 1971: 10). This is a feature that is common to gift exchange systems all over the world. But as Strathern (ibid.: 10) notes: “Whether this superiority implies political control over the recipient or whether it merely indicates a gain in prestige on the part of the giver are matters in which individual systems vary.” The precise meaning of “domination” is an empirical question; for the subsequent exposition it is sufficient that it implies that the giver has some kind of superiority.

Thus when A and B exchange x and y, A is superior to B because he gives him an x; but B is superior to A because he gives him a y. So who is superior to whom? This is the problem of rank and the answer to the question depends, in the first instance, on the rank of the objects, that is, their exchange-order. Objects as gifts have this exchange-order rather than exchange-value, because the relationship between them is ordinal rather than cardinal. This provides the key to understanding the shell-gift exchange systems (misleadingly called “shell-monetary” systems) of PNG, of which the so-called Rossel Island “monetary system” first described by Armstrong in the Economic Journal (1924) is the most famous example. This island then had, and still has, a highly developed [48] shell-gift exchange system. Over twenty different ranks of shell-gifts are distinguished. The top-ranking shell-gifts are small, highly polished, and extremely rare, while the bottom rank of shell-gifts are large, rough in appearance, and in abundant supply. The relation between the top shells and the lower ones was first analyzed (incorrectly) in value terms; but as Baric (1964: 47) was later to observe, “‘ranks’ rather than ‘values’ … represent the picture of the relationships.” Thus a shell-gift of high rank does not equal a number of shell-gifts of low rank. Leach ([1954] 1977: 154) provides a similar analysis of the instruments of exchange used in the Kachin gift economy. The central idea is that the objects are not interchangeable.3 For example, in Malekula, pigs are ranked according to the size and curvature of their tusks. High-status pigs have long finely curved tusks; one of these pigs does not equate with two pigs of low status (Deacon 1934: 197).

When A and B exchange x and y as gifts, then, the objects have exchange-order. Suppose x (given by A to B) has higher rank than y (given by B to A). It implies that A is superior to B because he has given the higher-ranking gift.

The ranking of things as gifts varies from society to society. It involves the classification of things into what has been called “spheres of exchange” by Bohannan and Bohannan (1968: 227–33) in their discussion of the Tiv gift economy of West Africa. This economy had three spheres of exchange. The supreme sphere contained a single item: rights in human beings, especially dependent women and children. The middle or “prestige” (shagba) sphere included cattle, horses, tugudu cloth, brass rods, and, in former times, slaves. The lowest sphere contained subsistence products: chickens, goats, household utensils, craft products (mortars, grindstones, calabashes, baskets, pots, beds, and chairs), some tools, and raw materials. The inclusion of women in the top sphere is a common practice and it is the empirical basis of Levi-Strauss’ ([1949] 1969: 65) theory that women are the “supreme gift.” The inclusion of subsistence products in the lowest sphere is also common practice. It is in this sphere that the distinction between gift exchange and commodity [49] exchange becomes blurred, because the products of this sphere are often marketed outside the community.

Contrast the traditional hierarchy of gifts4 among the Mae-Enga of highlands PNG given by Meggitt (1971: 200):

Pigs, cassowaries. Pearl-shell pendants, pork sides, stone axes, cassowary-plume headdresses, cowrie-shell headbands. Cowrie-shell necklets, bailer-shell pendants, gourds of tree oil, packages of ash salt, net-bags and aprons, birds of paradise plumes, bows, spears, hand drums, fowls, possums, etc. Conus-shell pendants, woven armlets and belts, bone head-scratchers, water gourds, rattan, bark fibre, tobacco, etc. Vegetable foods: Luxuries—pandanus nuts, taro, yams, ginger, sugarcane, bananas, sefaria. Staples—sweet potatoes, beans, relishes.

The top-ranking gifts were exchanged between clans and subclans at competitive gift exchange ceremonies, mortuary ceremonies, and marriage ceremonies. The lower-ranking gifts were distributed within clans. The shells found their way into the highlands via the traditional trade routes.

It is clear that each rank of gift contains a heterogeneous collection of things. While things of different rank are not interchangeable, things of the same rank are. Thus the principle of like-for-like must be interpreted as rank-for-rank. A pig-gift can be followed by a pig or cassowary counter-gift in the Mae-Enga case. This adds a further complication because it means that some gift exchanges appear as commodity exchanges. The famous kula gift exchange system, which still exists, is like this. In the kula, armshells exchange for necklaces in a large interisland system of exchange. The necklaces move in a clockwise direction and the armshells in an anticlockwise direction around the islands. However, these shells have their own spheres of exchange. Austin (1945) collected data on the existence of ten spheres in Kiriwina. The largest, oldest, most colorful [50] and attractive shells belong to the top rank; the smallest, newest, least colorful and attractive to the bottom rank. Only a top-ranking armshell can be exchanged for a top-ranking necklace, and a middle-ranking armshell for a middle-ranking necklace, and so on. Top-ranking shells do not equate to a number of a low-ranking shells.

The redefinition of like-for-like as rank-for-rank also calls for a redefinition of inalienability. While it is conventional to interpret this in a literal sense at the level of pure theory, in practice this must be modified and interpreted in more of a metaphorical sense. Strictly speaking, like-for-like exchanges are impossible because, for example, a particular pig will be one day older tomorrow and hence a different pig. Thus “likeness” is a social concept that varies from one gift economy to another.

To recapitulate: the distinction between value and rank epitomizes the difference between commodity exchange relations and gift exchange relations. The former emphasizes quantity, objects, and equivalence; the latter emphasizes quality, subjects, and superiority.

The motivation of transactors

The motivation of the gift transactor, some people believe (Pospisil 1963; Epstein 1968), is that of the capitalist, that is, profit maximization. This is a profound misunderstanding. The gift transactor’s motivation is precisely the opposite of the capitalist’s: whereas the latter maximizes net incomings, the former maximizes net outgoings. The aim of the capitalist is to accumulate profit while the aim of the “big-man” gift transactor is to acquire a large following of people (gift-debtors) who are obligated to him.

Table 3.1, which shows the shell-gifts given and received by Enona clan (Irian Jaya) in 1955, illustrates this point. On interclan account, Enona gave 2638 shells of a certain rank and received 759 in return, giving a net credit of 1879. However, the bulk of the transactions were carried out by household number 6, who had a net credit of 1210. This household, which has the most prestige and status in the village, is the big-man’s household.

Table 3.1 also illustrates the way in which the motive “maximize net outgoings” must be qualified. This motive only refers to interclan gift transactions. Intraclan gift-giving is governed by altogether different principles. The principle that the giver is superior does not operate here. [51]

Table 3.1 Shell-gifts given and received by Enona clan, Irian Jaya, 1955

For example, an intraclan gift from a son to a father reinforces, rather than reverses, the father’s relationship of domination. Thus, the fact that household number 6 has a net debit on intraclan account in no way affects the status of this household within the clan.

Food is usually the primary instrument of intraclan gift-giving. Food acquired by a household unit from production or exchange is distributed according to clearly defined rules that vary from society to society. For example, the Thonga (Southern Africa) distribute an ox in the following way: a hind-leg to the elder brother, a fore-leg to the younger brother, the other two limbs to the eldest sons, the heart and kidneys to the wives, the tail and the rump to the relatives-in-law, and a piece of the loins to the maternal uncle (Levi-Strauss [1949] 1969: 35–36). The distribution of food within a clan, and its shared consumption, is not simply concerned with biological nourishment; it serves as an important symbol of clan solidarity and identity (A. J. Strathern 1973). Among the Kaluli of the PNG highlands, [52] for example, a sharp distinction is made between the sharing of a meal and the exchange of food. Sharing a meal implies a close brotherly relationship; giving food implies social distance. For example, hosts do not eat with guests. They present a large quantity of cooked food to their guests and, sitting apart, watch them eat (Schieffelin 1977: 51).

The aim of an interclan gift transactor is not simply to maximize the number of gifts of a given rank he gives away, but to give away a gift of the highest rank. However, as these usually circulate amongst a small group of big-men, a young ambitious man must begin by transacting gifts of low rank and work his way up the ladder of rank. Consider Berde’s (1973: 193) description of the contemporary Rossel Island system:

On the lower end of the social ladder there are younger men and less talented older men desiring to borrow ndap (shell-gifts). These people must demonstrate qualities that inspire trust in order for a lem (big-man) to give them a ndap piece. What inspires trust in both lem and ordinary people is a demonstrated willingness to give goods and services to one’s fellows when called upon. The underlying cultural foundation for this system is the understanding that no individual—lem or commoner—can avoid a need for the co-operation of and help from his fellows. Lending and helping, then, are really social investments redeemed at future occasions of personal need.

A young person is therefore faced with a dilemma: before he can give away a gift of high rank he must receive it. Thus subordination is necessary before he can acquire status. Because a gift of high rank does not equal a number of gifts of low rank, it is not sufficient for him to maximize his net outgoings of gifts of low rank. He must strive to maximize his net outgoings of gifts of high rank.

The reason that the motivation of a gift transactor is often confused with that of a capitalist is that incremental gift-giving appears to be identical with the lending and borrowing of money at interest. If A gives B 100 pigs today and B gives A 110 pigs one year later it seems reasonable to argue that the increment of 10 pigs represents interest. However, this argument overlooks an important difference between gift-debt and commodity-debt: whereas commodity-debt increases [53] over time, gift-debt does not. When A gives B 100 pigs as a commodity at 10% interest per annum, a return of 110 pigs is necessary in order to cancel the debt. However, 100 pigs given as a gift requires a return of only 100 pigs to cancel the debt. If more are given, new gift-debt is created. Consider A. J. Strathern’s (1971: 216) definition of moka gift exchange:

One of the most striking features of the moka is the basic rule that to make moka one must give more than one has received. It is the increment that entitles a man to say he has made moka; if he returns the equivalent of what he was given initially, he is said to be simply returning his debts.

Moka is defined as the increment in excess of debt; it is this which brings prestige to the giver. The motivation to outgive sets in motion a theoretically never-ending series of exchanges: A gives B 100 pigs, B counter-gives 110 pigs (moka = 10 pigs), A counters with 30 pigs (moka = 20 pigs), B counters with 60 pigs (moka = 40 pigs), and so on. This sets up what Strathern (ibid.: 11) has called an “alternating disequilibrium” to capture the fact that the partners are superior to each other in turn.

In some areas of PNG, where the clan structure assumes a particular form, such that leadership is in the hands of elders rather than bigmen, balanced rather than incremental giving is practiced. Among the Eastern Abelam of the Sepik District, for example, “men give their ceremonial exchange partners (equals) great quantities of displayed and decorated yams and receive exactly the same in return” (Forge 1971: 137). The balancing can be done simultaneously or over time and the principle of like-for-like is always adhered to. For example, the Wamira engage in a practice which involves the delayed exchange (i.e. intertemporal exchange) of female piglets: if A gives B a female piglet, then B is obligated to return the female offspring of that piglet to A. This practice binds a wide circle of people together in a web of gift-debt. Furthermore, because the one piglet may be exchanged three or four times, the accumulated debt often far exceeds the actual stock of pigs that are usually exchanged between close kin. Between more distant relatives, pork is exchanged in a more public and ceremonial way. However, the principle of balance and like-for-like is still preserved. If A gives B a hind-leg, B must repay a hind-leg two or three years later. The precise [54] status of the transaction is clarified at the time of giving by shouting the words: “this pays off a debt” or “this creates a new debt” (see Kahn 1980: 171–74).

The difference between balanced and incremental gift-giving is one of form rather than substance, as the underlying motivation—to acquire relationships—is the same in both cases. The formal difference between them comes about because the gift in an incremental gift-giving sequence combines two gifts: one part of the return-gift cancels the original debt, the other part creates a new debt.

Table 3.2 Yam transactions (Urigubu),a Trobriand Islands, PNG, 1950

A third form of gift exchange that needs to be distinguished is “tributary” gift-giving. This occurs in tribes where leadership is in the hands of hereditary chiefs. Consider Table 3.2, which shows figures for the giving and receiving of yams on the Trobriand Islands, PNG, in 1950. It can be seen that while outgoings and incomings roughly balance for the commoners, the chief appropriates a sizeable surplus. However, this surplus is not invested by the chief in the production of more yams. Instead, it is ceremonially displayed in elaborately constructed yam houses as a symbol of his power and authority and ultimately redistributed to the people at various ceremonial distributions during the year (Powell 1969b: 588). The motivation of a chief in respect of gift-giving is the [55] same as the big-man in that power, authority, and status are achieved by giving rather than receiving.

Consider Leach’s ([1954] 1977: 163) account of tributary gift-giving among the Kachin:

In theory … people of superior class receive gifts from their inferiors. But no permanent economic advantage accrues from this. Anyone who receives a gift is thereby placed in debt (hka) to the giver. The receiver for a while enjoys the debt (he has it, he drinks it: lu) but it is the giver who owns the debt (rules it: madu). Paradoxically therefore although an individual of high-class status is defined as one who receives gifts (e.g. “thigh-eating chief ”) he is all the time under a social compulsion to give away more than he receives. Otherwise he would be reckoned mean and a mean man runs the danger of losing status. For though Kachins hold that a man is born to high rank and do not acknowledge that social climbing is possible, they readily admit that it is possible “to go downhill” (gumyu yu)—i.e. lose class status.

The motivation of a transactor, then, is determined by the social context of the exchange. It varies in the first instance according to whether the society is class-based or clan-based, in the second instance according to the particular type of clan structure, and in the third instance according to whether the exchange is interclan or intraclan.