Dec 24, 2015

Though Washington and Moscow recently set aside their differences over Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s future role in governing Syria to pass a unanimous UN Security Council resolution establishing a timeline for a political process and a cease-fire to end Syria’s almost 5-year-long civil war, establishing a timeline and implementing it are two very different things. A shared understanding of Assad’s future will be a key factor in whether the latest effort to bring peace to Syria succeeds or fails. But it will not be the only factor: A clear understanding of leverage — and how and when to use it — might be no less important.

The United States and many of its allies are eager to see Russia use its leverage over Assad to persuade the Syrian president to agree to step down as part of a political transition. Though Washington and others earlier saw this as a precondition for talks, the United States appears to be softening this stance, if one is to take US Secretary of State John Kerry at his word in assessing his recent assertion that "the United States and our partners are not seeking so-called regime change" in Syria. If Assad’s eventual departure is no longer a precondition for talks, however, it likely remains among the Obama administration’s core requirements for a deal.

This raises an important question, however. If the parties eventually reach a settlement on this basis, how would Moscow persuade Assad to accept it? How much leverage does Russia have?

These questions are not easy to answer, since no one can objectively measure leverage against a universal standard. That said, Russia’s military intervention in Syria clearly provides Moscow with greater leverage over Damascus than it had as an arms supplier and an occasional friend in the UN Security Council. Russia’s airstrikes also increase its leverage relative to Iran, which is no longer the only state with a combat role in support of Syria’s government. Since the Kremlin looks less committed to Assad personally than Tehran, this could become important, too.

Still, Russia’s leverage over the Assad regime seems likely to subside over time. The reason is straightforward: Moscow’s influence over Damascus rests on not only what it is currently doing to support the Syrian government, but also what Syrian officials expect that Russia might do in the future. If Assad downgrades his expectations, then he would be less inclined to defer to Russian preferences and Moscow would have less leverage. As one of my colleagues likes to say, people are always more grateful for a favor they expect than for a favor already granted.