At the moment, the United States has nowhere to hold and interrogate newly captured terrorists. America just handed over control of its detention facility at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, a significant step toward transferring security operations to Afghans. And while Guantánamo Bay remains home to nearly 170 men that the United States believes are still a threat, no captured terrorist has been transferred there since August 2008. Yet in the past four years, drone strikes and airstrikes targeting Al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia have increased dramatically.

Since 2010, there have been about 2,000 such strikes in Pakistan alone, with hundreds more in Yemen and North Africa. Meanwhile, only one alleged terrorist outside of Afghanistan — a Somali named Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame — was captured, held and interrogated. He was later flown to New York to stand trial.

It’s true that drone strikes and other tactics that aim to kill, rather than capture, terrorists are an effective tool for combating serious threats. They increase America’s ability to quickly attack targets in remote regions where American troops cannot easily operate. Such strikes allow the United States to respond quickly to time-sensitive intelligence about a known terrorist’s location or plans. They avoid the political risks and the costs, in money and lives, of supporting a large-scale military operation on foreign soil. And they help the White House avoid controversial issues of long-term detention and interrogation, which remain a political liability at home and abroad.

But this one-sided approach — always opting to kill instead of capture — is a major weakness of America’s current approach to counterterrorism. It deprives us of significant amounts of intelligence about what Al Qaeda is thinking and planning, and information that could help find other senior terrorists. After all, it was intelligence from a detainee that helped American forces track down Bin Laden.

America’s heavy reliance on drones also creates more sympathy for Al Qaeda in some countries and, ultimately, may radicalize more people and encourage them to join forces with terrorists — creating more enemies for America, not fewer. One young Yemeni told me this summer that he and his friends “are like mobiles with two SIM cards,” his way of saying that American drone attacks make them shift allegiances, just as they easily switch their cellphone service providers and they become sympathetic with local Al Qaeda groups.