Because bribery in NK has become a de facto

necessity for citizens on every rung of the social ladder, any reform aimed at

stamping out public sector misconduct will need to have serious teeth. Only

systematic, widespread, and disruptive measures stand a chance to make a

difference. In China as well, President Xi Jinping has been undertaking an

unprecedented drive to “tackle both the tigers and the flies” in order to solve

his country’s corruption problem. But when the dust settles, will Xi’s takedown

of the country’s most egregious offenders prove to be just another political

purge, or will it scare the whole upper brass into propriety? For North Korea,

the stakes are even higher. As the economy continues to expand, they’ll need to

chip away at the bedrock of corruption before it further destabilizes the

delicate balance of power between the private and public sectors.

Structural Differences in the KPA/PLA’s

Relationships with the Economy

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is

now the largest standing army in the world, with over 3 million members

distributed across five branches. Over the past two decades, the Chinese

military has modernized and expanded on a large scale. The PLA’s budget has

increased over fivefold in the past 15 years – from $27 billion in 2000 to $141

billion in 2014. But this is mostly thanks to China’s overall economic

expansion. According to NATO, China spent just 2.1% of its GDP on its armed

forces in 2013, a figure which has remained steady since 1990. China’s rising

tide has raised a number of boats, and the PLA is simply one of them. North

Korea is a different story altogether.

The DPRK’s songun (military first)

policy ensures that the regime invests a huge chunk of the budget in the armed

forces. According to the US State Department, the DPRK spends approximately $10

billion annually, or 25% of its GNP. The KPA is proportionally larger than

China’s PLA, including approximately 1.19 million troops from a population of

less than 25 million. Although all Chinese citizens are legally required to

perform military service under the constitution of the PRC, there are so many

volunteers that compulsory conscription has become unnecessary. North Korea, on

the other hand, requires all men to serve a grueling 10 year term, and

announced earlier this year that eligible women will also be required to serve

terms of between 3-6 years starting in April.

The financial anatomy of the country’s

armed forces is significantly different. Unlike the PLA, the KPA is required to

take on private sector projects in order to fund itself. The December 7th

factory, for example, is operated by Unit 1501 and produces – among other

things – maxi pads and submarines. By having one hand in the civilian economy,

leveraging their monopolies in the manufacturing and construction sectors, and

taking advantage of a slave labor force, the KPA is able to stay afloat and

make its upper echelon officers rich. But because of massive inflation in 2002

and redenomination in 2009, most military personnel still only make about $1 to

$4 per month, with varying levels of rations available. Outside of Pyongyang,

ration distribution has largely dried up entirely. But the truth is that not

even state officials make their money through their official state salaries.

Instead, they use privileged access to construction projects, kickbacks for

appointments, and accept bribes from private partners bidding on contracts.

Thus, mid-level officers take home about $300-$500 a month. Some make much,

much more. In the last decade or so, the KPA has increasingly earned the ire of

recruits, their families, and the community. The 1990s famine, or “Arduous

March,” brought the North Korean people’s faith in their government down to an

all-time low. In light of this, the KPA’s corruption, favoritism, and brutality

has become even more difficult to swallow.

The PLA has also been in the headlines

recently for inciting antipathy among the general population. China’s growing

middle class has become fed up with seeing stories of how the super-rich

manipulate, bribe, and bully their way to the top, often to the detriment of

the public good. Furthermore, China’s executive branch is contending that the

PLA’s corrupt officers gum up the command chain with graft and misuse. After

witnessing America’s high tech army sustain minimal casualties while launching

devastating attacks in Iraq circa 1990, the Chinese brass realized just how

outdated their massive but ineffective cold war era army had become. The PLA

thereafter began a radical transition predicated on one main aspiration: become

a fighting force worthy of the world’s number two superpower.

They hope to do

this by ridding waste, eroding the culture of corruption, and updating

technologically. At the Academy of Military Science in Beijing, researchers

began dissecting the US’s “revolution in military affairs,” particularly

focusing on the way computers were used to increase efficiency by re-aligning

command structures. Through this, it must have become clear that the nepotism

and patronage networks of the PLA’s golden old days would need to be replaced

by squeaky clean cogs connecting together to form a seamless machine. Xi

Jinping’s aggressive witch hunting and desire to trim the fat from China’s

military have led to a different culture among commanding officers.

Corruption of the Chinese variety is a

white glove affair, consisting mostly of promotion kickbacks and graft in the

logistics department. Xinhua reported that 90% of corruption cases in China

involved rear area personal, not commanding officers. US Army Lt. Colonel

Dennis Blasko told Business Insider that very few operational commanders “have

been caught in the corruption dragnet.” Furthermore, many analysts predict that

though a crackdown on corruption in China may destabilize some functional

arrangements and put a hit on the luxury goods industry, it would substantially

improve cash flows within the economy and improve the PLA’s fighting capacity

in the long term. The major stakeholders in the KPA, on the other hand, have

become dependent on their illicit connections to the marketplace, without which

they would undoubtedly drown.

The KPA’s role in the larger economy is likewise

pivotal, and though the majority of the population loses out because the

military has a number of industries under its thumb, engages in systemic

corruption, and exploits its 1 million man plus labor source, the system’s

winners are far too well connected, invested, and afraid to see the house of

cards come crumbling down to invite change willingly.

It can’t be argued, however, that the KPA’s

relationship with the Workers’ Party in the DPRK doesn’t bear some resemblances

to the power sharing relationship between the executive and military branches

in China. And while many analysts are having trouble deciphering whether Xi

Jinping’s current initiatives are a political purge or a genuine clean up, it’s

hard to ignore the headlines that keep streaming out of Beijing. The latest

reports from the BBC’s Carrie Gracie indicate that “Wang Qishan, right hand man

to the president and head of the Communist Party’s corruption watchdog, is

planning to go ‘fox hunting’” abroad. This means traveling to the United States,

Australia, Canada, and France to track down wayward corrupt officials in order

to haul them back to Beijing for trial and sentencing. 10 years ago, who would

have predicted that anti-corruption measures of this scale would be possible in

China? Ten years from now, will they say the same about North Korea?

To be continued…

*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.