Sources close to Ian Henderson, the veteran OPCW chemical weapons inspector - who is a qualified chemical engineer, has (very unusually) been rehired by the OPCW because of his experience, and is also a former artilleryman with considerable ballistics experience - have asked me to publish this rebuttal of attacks made by the organisation 'Bellingcat' on Mr Henderson.

What follows is a response, from sources close to veteran OPCW inspector Ian Henderson, to recent attacks on his testimony made by the organisation ‘Bellingcat’:

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2020/01/17/the-opcw-douma-leaks-part-2-we-need-to-talk-about-henderson/

It opens with a quotation from one of those attacks:

NB: The emphases and annotations are mine.PH

' "The mysterious Henderson has remained completely silent ever since his Engineering Summary was leaked in May 2019. It appears that Henderson will only provide further comment in an “official” sanctioned forum such as the at OPCW or the UN."

However, the Bellingcat blogger may have inadvertently provided Henderson, and supporters of his work, with the opportunity to publicly demonstrate the validity of the findings in the Engineering Summary. On 17 January 2020 the blogger Bellingcat posted an article entitled “The OPCW Douma Leaks Part 2: We Need To Talk About Henderson”, in which he contests the methodology and findings described in Henderson’s leaked report, the Engineering Summary. Bellingcat (I shall refer to them as a “him”) does so in a manner that is rather high-handed and apparently intended to be demeaning, a method of scientific debate that is unprofessional and thus does not help his (Bellingcat’s) cause. But let’s take his points, one at a time, and provide some more accurate commentary around the situation:

1. Bellingcat: "Henderson was an employee of the OPCW, but the organisation clearly did not consider him to be part of the FFM."

Thank you Bellingcat! This is exactly what the whistleblower “Alex” and others have been at pains to explain over the past few months. It has become clear that Henderson deployed to Syria as a part of the FFM; that he deployed to locations in Douma; and that he was the most qualified person in the team to conduct the engineering and ballistics analysis. However we had the subsequent panicked management lockdown, evidenced by the unusual (and confusing) designation of a “FFM Alpha Core Team” in July 2018 that consisted only of inspectors who had deployed to Country X (PH notes, this how the OPCW refer to Turkey, for diplomatic reasons) to talk with the White Helmets, and who would deliver the desired result to management to suit the influential delegations. This essentially dismissed the entire Douma FFM team. The findings of the Douma team were trashed and they were not allowed any further involvement in their mission. So yes, obviously the organisation was going to take the position that Henderson “was never a part of the FFM”.

2.Bellingcat: "Henderson delivered his report outside of protocol with less than a day before the final FFM report was published".

This is a rather silly assertion, Bellingcat. Had it been the case, was it a matter of the OPCW being aware that a significant piece of work that could result in the about-to-be-published FFM report being wrong, and then choosing to say “nope, sorry, you missed the deadline so bad luck”? No, it was a matter of pulling a fast one. Once the main FFM report was published, they knew that Henderson would be stymied. They knew he would be concerned and probably angry, but they knew he wouldn’t be able to do anything about it because the FFM report, having become public, was for an OPCW staff member sacrosanct. It seems they didn’t take into account that someone else, i.e. the leaker of the document, would take a different view of things.

But everyone in the FFM (“core team” and others), including management, knew that the work had been done and should have been expecting the report on the engineering work. Henderson made it abundantly clear to everyone involved, that he was going to complete the work that had been assigned to him, and submit it through the correct channels to the FFM Team Leader and/or the newly-appointed Head of FFM. Which he did.

3.Bellingcat:" Henderson’s report is fundamentally flawed by the assumption that these cylinders could not have fallen from an altitude of less than 500 metres".

This is a fair point, Bellingcat; thanks for raising it. It allows a very clear correction of where you have missed the point, and some useful clarifications we can see from Henderson’s side. Like any engineering study, a detailed computational analysis needs to start somewhere. We have all heard the “garbage in, garbage out” description of poorly defined and applied simulation models, so the specialists made every effort to make sure this situation reflected reality. That’s why it took six months. The groups involved in the work, do real-life engineering design and impact analysis for the automotive and aviation industries, so their results need to be counted upon. They aren’t in the business of gaming software.

Here is an example of the output from a properly-conducted impact computational model, alongside the real thing. So, from the outset they needed to accurately define the components of the system; the cylinder, the concrete slab and the reinforcing bars, by establishing accurate dimensions, materials and mechanical properties. Where any doubts existed, conservative assumptions were made. In the end a very comprehensive integrated model was developed and validated, including all components. However, to build up to this, a starting set of input parameters was used to establish and test the model. This starting set of parameters included the first range of impact energies that would be modelled. You can’t do everything at once, so an initial range of 500m to 2000m was used. Now let’s get onto Bellingcat’s main point. For Location 2, why was 500m selected as the lower Page 3 of 7 range in the first set of parameters? The answer is; because it makes a lot of sense. Flying a helicopter at low altitude over enemy-occupied urban territory, is not something many pilots are keen to do, because of the increased dangers of ground fire. Low-altitude helicopter operations would mean that there would be a cessation of any artillery activity, therefore every rebel and his dog would be outside peppering the sky with e.g. AK-47, 14.5mm anti-aircraft, heavy machine guns fire and RPGs. And yes, you can argue the effective range of some of these, but generally, flying below 500m is asking for it.

But why would a helicopter be flying at lower than 500m, at night, over enemy-occupied territory? If it was to drop chlorine cylinders, were they specifically targeting a particular apartment block for a precision drop of the cylinder? Would that have required hovering in place, again increasing the risk of ground fire? Doesn’t that all sound somewhat unlikely? But anyway, Bellingcat, by incorrectly quoting Henderson as saying the cylinders “could not have fallen from an altitude of less than 500 metres” seems to have missed the mention in paragraph 20 of the Engineering Summary. Thanks for this, Bellingcat; we can now clarify. Henderson never says that. Paragraph 20 starts with “Finally an assessment was performed on the mechanism of formation of the crater, if assumed by the cylinder, independent of the need to assume a starting kinetic energy (i.e. the velocity of the cylinder at impact with the concrete slab).” It shouldn’t take a reader too much to realise that this “finally” bit of work assuming lower kinetic energy (velocity of cylinder) specifically takes into account the possibility of lower altitudes or a reduced cylinder velocity through the magical “intermediate impact with the corner of the roof”.

But this is useful. Bellingcat leads us to believe that if he is allowed to view the computational analysis results for scenarios with a lower assumed altitude than 500m, that continued to demonstrate the mismatch between the cylinder airdrop hypothesis and physical observations, he would then be satisfied?

The Intermediate Impact

Whether or not the cylinder struck a glancing blow on the corner of the upper roof (thus making the small dent, the “ripple” at the front side of the cylinder), it still needed to arrive with sufficient energy to make the crater in the terrace ceiling. This in turn would cause corresponding deformation at the front of the cylinder, which the computational analysis showed was absent. The mismatch between predictions and reality remained. No matter how you try and obfuscate, the simple facts of the matter are quite clear. Many an engineer has looked at the images and commented along the lines of “Are you joking? Are you saying this caused this?” Nonetheless, opinion doesn’t count in this game. Henderson had a responsibility do a piece of work that would stand up to the rigorous scrutiny from real experts, and therefore the detailed computational analysis.

The mangled frame and fins

Remember the cylinder allegedly hit the terrace ceiling and bounced back out again. It supposedly did not penetrate through any opening in a concrete slab. This makes it difficult to explain the means by which the metal framework and fins, which (as Bellingcat correctly notes) are secured by tightened nuts and bolts on the fastening straps, would be completely stripped off, leaving a cylinder body without any tell-tale scratches on the paintwork. The inspectors were there. They thought about these things, and closely inspected the cylinders more than once to try and come up with explanations for what was observed. They found there was no evident way the mangled framework could have been magically stripped off the cylinder.

The Location 2 crater

Here it seems we are getting to a situation of “my experts say this, your experts say that”. But a couple of Bellingcat’s remarks shouldn’t be ignored. He points out “his” experts (the ones quoted in the FFM report) said there was an absence of fragmentation characteristics of an explosion. The experts quoted in the Engineering Summary, from both within and external to the Technical Secretariat, verified by examining the size, shape and characteristics of the crater, in particular the splayed-out rebar, that it was most likely the result of blast. This was consistent with the findings of the computational analysis, which showed a completely different crater would have been formed by a falling cylinder.

The ballistics experts also referred to the observed fragmentation pattern, of which there are many images that have been posted online, and that also appear (apparently) in photographs taken by the inspectors. Bellingcat also makes the comment about the very similar crater observed in a roof close to the balcony, saying “which he (Henderson) does not confirm was created by a blast”, which seems to be the sort of nit-picking that shows desperation. It was a war zone, and there was destruction all around, including many craters all over the place (seen by inspectors while travelling in and out of the area as well). It doesn’t take much to assume, seeing as it looked very much like a blast crater, that it was most likely one. And the one on the terrace looked exactly the same. But what does Bellingcat imply may have been the mechanism of formation of that other crater on the adjacent building? Another cylinder impact? Surely then, it would have received the same acclaim and postings on social media as the one in question?

Analysis of Location 4 Cylinder dimensions

Bellingcat’s assertions here are patently nonsense. The measurements of the scene, including the cylinders and the crater, were made by inspectors on the ground using tape measures, rulers, laser rangefinders, and other methods. Henderson went to pains in his summary to describe this, including the comment about taking many photographs with tape measure reference scales in the image. The crude estimate for crater dimensions 1.66m x 1.05m quoted in the FFM report, is in stark contrast to the complex shape of the crater that can be made out in the attachments to Henderson’ summary. That slipshod approach by the FFM, and the diagram in the FFM report of a “free” cylinder with no framework or fins, hovering above a crater, do not lend much authority to the supposed three expert studies quoted by OPCW management. But in questioning the measurements used in the Engineering Summary, is Bellingcat now widening the scope of his slagging-off of OPCW staff members? If the list of people discredited is growing to include all the inspectors that did the groundwork in Douma, where will it stop? Will he slag off the entire staff of the Technical Secretariat, save a handful of compliant inspectors who wrote the desired report, and their management overlords?

Location 4 Cylinder deformation

This is perhaps the area where Bellingcat most clearly shows his shortcomings. He has not understood the observations at the scene and what would have been the resulting mechanics. He suggests the deformation of the fins is consistent with the cylinder having passed through the crater. Let’s explain. The cylinder was clearly flattened along its length. By studying a range of impact configurations, using accurate scaled 3-D models of the pre-impact cylinder, the FFM engineering team established how the cylinder would have arrived at the alleged impact with the concrete slab of the roof. This was, according to the Engineering Summary, in a roughly horizontal configuration. If we now picture the cylinder with the flattened side resting on the roof, about to penetrate through its own (about to be formed) crater, we can imagine the fins being squeezed upward as the cylinder goes through. The problem is, that is the opposite of what was observed and measured by the inspectors. The fins and framework are deformed downwards, towards the side of the cylinder that was flattened, which would have occurred only if the cylinder impacted onto a solid surface that did not create a crater for it to pass through. The impact would have caused resulting inertia of the fins and frame to try and continue their downwards velocity after the cylinder came to a sudden halt. Thus, the most likely explanation that this was an old cylinder that had fallen onto a flat surface. That’s what the engineering analysis demonstrated. The inspectors are not reporting that there is no other possible explanation, just that it was not possible (by any combination of impact scenarios) to find any alternative explanation to the one that fitted all engineering calculations.

Cylinder corrosion

The inspectors reported that the cylinder at Location 4 did not discharge its contents. The valve at the front was intact. There were no reports of any casualties at this scene. There was apparently a chlorine-like smell in the room, which some inspectors attributed to the bed and walls having been doused with bleach. It was not possible to identify any clear “fresh” chloride corrosion in the room. The appearance of the cylinder was described as “already old” by the time it was seen in the room, but the more advanced corrosion was observed when the inspectors went, a month later, to re-inspect the cylinders and to apply tags and seals. The cylinders were lying on the ground in an outside location, so this was expected. There were no reported observations of chlorine-induced corrosion by the inspectors.

5.Bellingcat: "The methodology that Henderson employed for this report was not adequate for the task".

Bellingcat has put his foot in it again. He should have read the paragraph from the Engineering Summary and given the inspectors a bit more credit for saying they would expand the hypotheses if new facts or information arose: Paragraph 7 of the summary reads “Keeping the above in mind, an attempt was made to define a set of assumptions and at least two clear opposing hypotheses for each of the two locations, to use as inputs for the baseline cylinder studies. The baseline studies were aimed at examining the two situations in terms of what is alleged to have happened in each case, as best as is currently understood. This was then tested against an alternative explanation. This methodology will be expanded if any new facts or information need to be taken into account.” The inspectors spent many hours in brainstorming to develop hypotheses, including alternative means by which the cylinders could have arrived at their respective locations. These included travel by ground-launched projectors, and (in the case of Location 4) throwing off the roof of the higher adjacent apartment block; even though in the latter case it should still fall under the “manually placed” category. After much consideration, the two opposing hypotheses mentioned in the Engineering Summary were the ones that clearly made more sense. But what makes the manual placing a hypothesis worth considering? Surely in the circumstances in Douma, and the situation faced by the opposition group at the time, it had to be considered as an option that would be to their advantage, and therefore feasible to be considered by the FFM? This is for reasons that have been made abundantly clear by many observers, but the inspectors generally try to avoid any suggestion of political debate

6.The elephant in the room.

Bellingcat is quite justified in raising this point; “the fact that the FFM carried out three independent engineering analyses, by three independent teams, all of which contradict Henderson’s findings.” There is a large elephant in the room. Firstly, let’s be clear that some observers now see Henderson and the Douma inspectors as having been part of “the FFM”. Bellingcat’s quote above is referring to the compliant individuals later designated as “the FFM core team”. But that aside, what indications do we have that there were three independent engineering studies done by external experts, that arrived at conclusions in the main FFM report? The FFM report contains some rather flimsy text on the cylinders, supported by diagrams that don’t appear to relate to the text, in a way that is worryingly superficial. For example, there are phrases such as “the cylinder continued altered trajectory” without providing any credible explanation as to why the cylinder would alter trajectory. So, who exactly were these experts? The identity of one of the experts is known. It is also known that a verbal account of their consideration, was along the lines of “they say that one of the scenarios may be possible, but the other one very unlikely”. As for the other two experts, it is difficult not to be sceptical. In conclusion, by posting his “we need to talk about Henderson” article, Bellingcat has again sought to express himself as the self-appointed protector and spokesperson for the OPCW and for his backers.

He may have had some help from a couple of OPCW insiders. But is he now doing his backers more harm than good? He has now started an ever-broadening campaign of discrediting people. These include OPCW former experts such as Henderson, “Alex”, respected engineering consultants, ballistics experts (within and external to the OPCW), and now OPCW inspectors in the Douma FFM team. How far will he be prepared to go? Does he have the credibility and is he sufficiently respected for this to be in any way useful? This is not helping anyone, and should stop. He has aimed to tarnish Henderson’s professional reputation. This follows the similar approach from the management of the Technical Secretariat, who firstly stated that “Henderson was never a member of the FFM”, and then suspended him and had him escorted out of the OPCW building. So perhaps what Bellingcat has really done is triggered the justification for Henderson to finally respond to this sort of smear. Henderson has always said that he would only engage openly in the debate in an “official” forum such as at the OPCW or the UN, or in response to personal attacks on his professional reputation. This eventuality must be getting closer now.'

NB Ian Henderson in fact gave evidence to a special UN Security Council meeting on Monday 20th January. This can be viewed, or a transcript studied, in my previous blog posting here

https://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2020/01/what-governments-learned-from-the-iraq-war-to-prevent-independent-media-from-questioning-the-pretext.html