Sergei Guriev says modern dictators do not heed Niccolò Machiavelli’s famous dictum – “it is better to be feared than loved.” They seem more concerned about keeping their citizens loyal, “not by giving them what they want,” but by controlling their thought process and manipulating them into believing whatever it serves the regime. As a former KGB spy, Putin has taken a page out of the Soviet playbook and “nobody executes this approach more masterfully” than he.

The author doubts if Putin’s “informational autocracy” will sustain, despite high approval rating at 61%. Since Western sanctions imposed against Russia following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, its economy is going through a period of long-term stagnation. Russia’s economic slowdown is not new. It became apparent in 2013 when energy prices were at an all-time high. Soon after, the double shock of tumbling oil prices and economic sanctions sent the country into a severe recession.

No doubt “anemic” GDP growth and declining real incomes have contributed to Putin’s dwindling popular support. Yet the author says Putin’s “enduring” popularity lies in the “ability to control the information people receive, which enables a leader to convince most of the population that, despite the regime’s imperfections, it is the country’s best option.” Hence it is in the collective best interest to support it, with him being the inevitable and indispensable leader.

Dictators are good at instilling fear and manuifacturing threat, placing themselves as the people’s only salvation. Putin has reinvented himself as a defender of conservative values, protecting Russia against a globalised world of Western decadence. Justifying his aggression in Eastern Ukraine, he portrayed the development there as a fascist seizure of power that threatened Ukraine’s ethnic Russian minority.

These ideological crusades are fought aggressively on television, but also enthusiastically promoted by millions of willing supporters in workplaces, schools and churches. Such strategies of persuasion and pressure are more effective than seeking to control what 140 million citizens think and do through force and threats alone.

But the author says “a growing number of educated citizens – or, as we call them, ‘informed elites’ – recognize the system’s deficiencies.” And Putin has realised how crucial it is “to prevent these elites from communicating the truth to the public.” The Kremlin has spent years consolidating its control of the media, controlling the flow of information and curbing dissent.

“Repression plays an important role here. But far from the widely publicized mass repression of the past – aimed at scaring off all potential opposition – today’s repression is targeted and, critically, deniable,” due to its subtlety. Ironically Russia’s constitution “explicitly” outlaws censorship, despite its “extensive use."

To circumvent the censorship, the Kremlin finds a loophole by concealing “information about their own activities from the public. And they are largely successful.” Meanwhile “the general public is significantly more optimistic about media freedom than educated elites.” The author mentions “co-optation” as a “key tool for silencing the informed elites.” The carrot and stick approach works, because the elites choose to support Putin’s regime, instead of fighting it, and are “rewarded handsomely” for their efforts.

The author says “the cohort of informed elites in Russia is growing.” He cites Russia’s top propagandist, Dmitry Kiselev, who recently lamented over “higher learning in the humanities (and social sciences) /that/ breeds social unrest.” He also complained that “too many” Russians are delving into these subjects.

“The majority of Russia’s population will not become well-informed overnight. But, as the regime is forced to dedicate more resources to silencing the informed, the majority will suffer economically. Eventually, the reality of their empty refrigerators will overwhelm the eternally optimistic messages coming from their televisions and computers, and the foundations of Putin’s informational autocracy will begin to crumble,”according to the author.

Three decades ago, when it became possible for Eastern European and then Soviet citizens to imagine a non-Communist future, the collapse came with startling speed, and no amount of propaganda could stop it. Putin’s "information autocracy" could be similarly tenuous. Even in Russia, reality resists the manipulation of information.