In the west, we’re not inclined to assume that Vladimir Putin has good intentions, and understandably so. For complicated reasons, we’ve become accustomed to thinking of Russia as an enemy again during his presidency and, for the most part, the feeling is mutual.

So, the news this week that Putin was reforming the Russian Federation’s constitution was greeted with widespread cynicism. The consensus is that he’s come up with another ruse to keep power after his presidential term ends in 2024. There’s probably a lot of truth to that analysis, though it doesn’t necessarily mean that his reforms will damage Russia and it might not be the whole story.

On the surface, the constitutional changes announced in the Russian president’s state of the nation address were exactly the type of measures that western commentators have long been urging him to introduce. Putin is proposing to enhance the role of Russia’s parliament, the Duma, and restrict the powers of the presidency.

Most significantly, if his plans are endorsed by referendum, which they surely will be, it is the Duma rather than the president who will pick the prime minister and his executive. Putin’s successor will not be able to replicate his decision this week to pick a complete unknown, Mikhail Mishustin, as premier.

The State Council, a body of state governors that currently performs an advisory function, will gain a more influential role in the constitution. Putin, commentators suggest, may head up this organisation and use it to control Russian politics, after he is replaced as head of state.

These proposals have drawn some confused responses from critics in the west. Some of them have urged support for proposed rallies “in defence of the constitution”, planned by a fringe of activists in Russia.

Putin’s most high-profile opponent in Russia, Alexey Navalny, has already expressed his disapproval of these protests. “The constitution of the Russian Federation is disgusting,” he told his followers on Twitter, “there is no need to protect it.” He believes the notion of defending a “good constitution from bad Putin” is perverse.

There is every likelihood that the current president intends to maintain his influence over Russia after his tenure ends. But there are reasons to believe that his role will be different and less overbearing.

In the Spectator, the Russian expert Mark Galeotti, author of a book examining “how the west gets (Putin) wrong”, believes he wants “the continued opportunity to intervene in politics when he feels his interests or legacy is at risk . . . without the tedious necessities of actually running the country.” This analysis is probably closest to the mark.

There’s a common view that modern Russia is simply a dictatorship or an autocracy, which is a simplification that distorts our understanding of what’s happening in the world’s largest country.

Under Putin, the Moscow government is authoritarian certainly, but it has always carefully maintained the pretence of political freedom and competition, in a way that a state like China does not. This is the system that the president’s former guru, Vladislav Surkov, called “managed democracy”. The Kremlin is certainly not impervious to criticism, or to feelings of public frustration at worsening poverty in Russia.

Perhaps it’s in that context that we can understand Putin’s reforms best. Clearly, they’re not supposed to introduce parliamentary democracy as we would understand it. But they may be intended to give the impression of freedom, in a way that will not disadvantage the Russian people.