Like so many other things, our foreign aid programs are facing a slowdown of uncertain dimensions due to the pandemic. Many of us hope they will be able to restart soon, but as famously quoted “hope is not a strategy.” Taking this as a moment for introspection, we can ask not only ‘will programs resume as they were,’ but also ‘should they?’ Might possible future pandemics, aid versus trade, and the China model of foreign assistance combine to make this a sea change for development assistance itself?

Certainly the immediate focus of US foreign assistance is mobilizing emergency funds for addressing the pandemic. If the earliest we might see a vaccine is 18 months out, then for at least that long a major outbreak anywhere poses the danger of renewed outbreaks everywhere. Still, the bulk of that assistance may be funding and basic supplies with host country personnel performing the bulk of the work identifying, isolating and caring for the infected, with technical assistance coming from the CDC and WHO. As isolation periods end our allies will need to restart their economies, but that seems a job more fit for help from the IMF than bilateral aid agencies. Two years out, we may see a stronger emphasis on public health and pandemic preparedness than the recent past, but not so much as to obviate other needed, ongoing programming in Education, Governance, Natural Resource Management, Agriculture, etc.

Even before the pandemic, policymakers perennially asked whether development assistance was still needed in a world where private sector organic and investment driven growth was so much relatively greater than in the era when these programs originated. Yet the answer invariably came up yes: while the areas of assistance have evolved over the past fifty plus years, very real needs exist. For one, it has been development that helped supply the legal, institutional, and physical infrastructure needed for the private sector to take root, along with education for skilled human resources. Additionally, new threats have emerged, such as crises of national stability, and climate related risks to agriculture, natural disasters, and other threats to food systems. A new era of hybrid aid with trade (private sector) may emerge, but the end of need for aid is not in site. Additionally, the importance of development and diplomacy as complementary to defense in assuring national security has been a lesson broadly recognized from America’s security experience in the early 21st century (in a bipartisan fashion with one notable Executive Branch exception).

Various breathless articles have cited the increase in China’s foreign expenditures as its economy has grown (true) and asked whether this eclipses US foreign assistance and the way it is administered (overwrought speculation). Much of China’s foreign aid has been in the form of large turnkey infrastructure projects, tied to China’s pursuit of international transport routes for trade, and sources for raw materials. This form of aid is qualitatively different than most American aid, and has backfired on the recipient in at least one prominent case. China invested in modernizing a Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, with the funding having a grant component but a hefty loan as well; when Sri Lanka could not service the loan payments the contractual provisions came into play and the port facility came under Chinese control in a stunning loss of sovereign rights.

American technical assistance is deeply integrated into host country government and societies, reflecting levels of trust built up with decades of cooperation. Even during the ebb and flow of foreign affairs headline issues with America’s developing country allies, patient long-term development projects have continued in their respective sectors. Technical assistance is administered through Health, Agriculture, Forestry and various other ministries, and even through local civil society groups, under detailed cooperation agreements and reporting mechanisms.

America’s bilateral foreign assistance programs were in the best interest of both parties prior to the pandemic, and they will continue to be during and after it. While personal contact restrictions and a need for dealing with the pandemic will require flexibility now, it is very reasonable to expect a great deal of continuity in the long-term as a reflection of constant geopolitical realities supported by sustained cooperative relationships.



