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Weak naturalism

Gary complains that my definition of weak naturalism is narrow, and then proceeds to conflate that definition with naturalism, claiming I equivocate. Allow me then to clarify so that any further discussion can be clear.

My claim that “As far as we know, the natural world is all there is,” is not, pace Gary’s claim, a knowledge claim about fundamental reality. It is agnostic about fundamental reality. This is a crucial distinction, as Gary is at pains to maintain the position of false equivalence between weak naturalism and supernaturalism. My position clearly states “as far as we know”, thereby delineating a point beyond our current level of “knowledge” (know). Weak naturalism does not enter this unknown country, rather it maintains that the natural world is all that exists, as far as we know.

This position deliberately allows its opponent to provide the evidence that the assertion is false. If the natural world is not all that exists, then the supernaturalist is free to provide the evidence of what exists beyond.

Gary claims that the qualifier “as far as we know” is illegitimate, as many other claims to knowledge are based on what we know at present including claims to a transcendent reality. This is false. The qualifier reduces the claim of naturalism to weak naturalism by it’s own definition. Further, we must distinguish knowledge claims or hypothesis or theories or conjecture from actual knowledge. To be clear, when I say “as far as we know”, I mean to say, that as far as is generally agreed by the human community as forming part of our knowledge. And that general agreement by the human community at large is based on verifiability and sufficient evidence – not, mind you by my own definition, but by fact. It is a far different matter, to base knowledge claims on knowledge and extrapolate from there, as is the case for supernaturalism, and theology in general. In this universally accepted understanding of knowledge, the Big Bang is evidence only for the Big Bang.

Gary is determined to stretch the position of weak naturalism so that is effectively equivalent to naturalism, as he can thereby assert equivalence between knowledge claims which are equally unverifiable. Weak naturalism is only a knowledge claim in asserting that the world exists, and that the universe represents a current limit to our knowledge. Examples of where I had previously used weak naturalism to posit a prima facie case for naturalism, provide no contradiction or suggestion that my definition of weak naturalism is anything less than clear. Ie. Naturalism makes a knowledge claim about fundamental reality whereas weak naturalism does not.

Gary appears to think I was arguing that naturalism can be proven from premises that “(1) nature exists; and (2) there is no evidence of a supernatural reality) that nature is all there is (which, of course, does not follow)”. Rather, my essay argued that there was a false equivalence between the two metaphysical views, not that I considered naturalism proven by the limits of our knowledge. In any case, making a straw man of my claims does nothing to substantiate claims of a supernatural realm.

To refute weak naturalism the supernaturalist needs to provide positive evidence of a supernatural world. It is not sufficient to present semantic disagreement on what the terms mean or to attempt to puncture weak naturalism by conflating and straw manning the concept. It is trivially true that the world exists, and undoubtedly true that we have no compelling evidence of a world beyond.

The question is: what sort of evidence would be adequate to refute weak naturalism? And by degree, this question becomes, what quantum of evidence would be sufficient to justify belief in a supernatural realm?

Scientism Red Herring

Following a strong recent tradition, Gary then seeks to discredit the argument for weak naturalism by accusing me of scientism. Although this tactic is quite familiar, it misunderstands my argument. I am not saying that science is all there is and that philosophy has no merit. What I am saying, is that you have to provide evidence to back up your claims.

It does no harm to my claims to suggest that all bachelors are unmarried. It does not matter if you consider this claim a scientific claim or not. One still needs to provide sufficient evidence for one’s claims of a supernatural dimension.

Gary claims that my statement that “The scientific method has become the accepted method of inquiry,” is false because there are other methods of inquiry. This simply introduces another point of semantics pertaining to where science starts and stops, and what other methods of inquiry might provide sufficient grounds for epistemic justification. This is fine and does not contradict my argument at all. Tell me what sort of evidence you have for a supernatural realm and we can consider it!

However, Gary does not attempt to refute my claim that hypothesis pertaining to fundamental reality are unlikely to be accepted without scientific consensus. It will not be the philosophers who determine to general satisfaction that God exists, or that there is a supernatural dimension. For any theory regarding fundamental reality to be confirmed, it will take the verification and testing of the scientific method. This is not scientism, it is an uncontroversial observation of reality. This is how the world operates. It is not based on my opinion.

But I agree with the convention.

To be absolutely clear, and as demonstrated in my first essay, I think that knowledge claims should be based upon evidence. I don’t care if you call that evidence science, history, philosophy or something else.

Evidence: the available body of facts or information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid.

Is Empiricism Self-Defeating?

Proceeding from the red herring of scientism, Gary then quotes several statements which aim to show that science and empiricism rely on philosophical presuppositions. Gary then goes on to state that he thinks theories are distinct from science (they are not), and cites scientists such as Smolin as if he were a philosopher. Theories are an essential part of science, and that’s why Gary was able to quote extensively from Albert Einstein to Stephen Hawking, both of whom explicitly reject a theistic worldview.

Quoting Catholic theologian Edward Feser at length, one is perplexed to find that for science to have legitimacy it must prove itself! The ample evidence of the success of the scientific method in improving our lives is evidently not enough.

This is a spurious and foolish brand of sophistry, which, even if it succeeded, would do nothing to provide evidence for a supernatural realm. The extensive writings of someone like Feser are aimed rather narrowly at discrediting the assertions of atheists such as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens. What they don’t do, is provide any evidence that the theistic worldview has merit.

In a similar way, Gary consoles himself by arguing that my worldview is conceptually flawed. But how does this provide any solace for the supernaturalist? Answer, it doesn’t.

In aiming to justify philosophy in such a belaboured manner, it appears as though Gary has convinced himself that this is really just a disagreement about buildings in a University. If he can pump up the tyres of philosophy enough, then he will feel less of an onus to provide actual evidence. And, as is evidenced in his need to quote scientists, this feels very much like a case of trying to convince oneself rather than others.

Invoking hypotheses and intuition as if they were proof

Gary then goes on to inform me that the missing means of evidence, “typically involve either deductive philosophical arguments based on solid empirical and/or metaphysical premises, or abductive inferences drawn from observational data”.

And here we see clearly the difference. Gary thinks that sufficient evidence can be pieced together by adding philosophical arguments and inferences based on empirical evidence. And in this manner, Gary posits the Big Bang as evidence of a supernatural realm. He then quotes Stephen Hawking saying the Big Bang “smacks of divine intervention “, despite the fact that he knows Stephen Hawking does not believe in God or think that the Big Bang proves a supernatural realm.

And this is where we can answer our earlier question. What is sufficient evidence? Is it sufficient to speculate that the Big Bang suggests a beginning to the universe, and then extrapolate that this must mean a supernatural realm exists outside of it? Is it sufficient to insert some quotes of others who think the Big Bang infers a creator?

No. No. No.

We can intuit or infer any number of causes or explanations of the universe, based on the Big Bang. I’ve outlined some examples, in A Fallacy of Cosmic Proportions – the Kalam Cosmological Argument ,and so needn’t repeat them here.

But, it does highlight the difference between our views. It is apparent that Gary thinks an intuition or theory based upon a set of facts is a sufficient warrant for belief. Gary explains:

“Of course, the empirical data doesn’t prove the transcendent cause is God; it merely suggests that an inference to supernatural causation is plausible on evidentiary grounds.”

A telling admission. It’s such a small claim as to be trivial: a plausible inference. Are you really basing your world view, and your observance of your religion, on a belief claim based on a plausible inference?

What we are discussing is the relative likelihood of a supernatural realm. Given there are an infinite number of possibilities as to the source (if there is one) or explanation of ultimate reality, the plausibility of a supernatural realm (with a Creator God, presumably Catholic) provides no indication of likelihood whatsoever. Of course, it is plausible.

But there is insufficient evidence to consider it likely.

Sufficient Evidence

In order to demonstrate some likelihood of a supernatural realm, one would need to demonstrate some actual evidence pertaining to that realm. (As opposed to a set of inferences based on the natural world).

What might this evidence consist of?

First, we might expect the supernaturalist to be able to define what this realm entailed. What does the realm consist of? How does it relate to the natural world? What information leads us to believe that the supernatural realm has these characteristics?

For example, does the supernatural realm consist of heaven and hell? Either eternal torment or eternal bliss?

In summary, if there was sufficient evidence of a supernatural realm, then we would have a generally agreed description of what was contained in that realm. Alas, we have virtually no agreed ideas. Further, we have no universally agreed upon evidence of the existence of a supernatural realm.

As such, proponents of such a realm need to content themselves with finding holes in the naturalist argument. Implicit in the argument that supernaturalism is equally likely to naturalism, is that the lack of evidence of a supernatural realm means that neither can be proved empirically. This is why weak naturalism is powerful. To discredit weak naturalism , it’s opponents proponent must provide positive evidence of a supernatural realm. Alas, there is none.