U. S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

WAR HISTORY

7 DECEMBER, 1941

TO

15 AUGUST, 1945

Preliminary Design Section

Bureau of Ships

Navy Department

30 April, 1947

WAR DAMAGE REPORT No. 59

Printed By U. S. Hydrographic Office

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

War History

7 December 1941

to

15 August 1945

Class YORKTOWN (CV5 Class) Length (O.A.) 827 Ft. 4 In. Launched 3 October 1936 Length (B.P.) 770 Ft. 0 In. Displacement (Standard) 19,900 tons (Before Blister Addition) Beam (Without Blisters) 83 Ft. 1 In. Beam (With Blisters) 95 Ft. 4-1/2 In.

References:

General:

(a) War Diaries of ENTERPRISE, complete from April 1942 through September 1945, plus January 1942.

Damage of 1 February 1942:

(b) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. to BuShips CV6/S81(50-wy), Serial 027 of 7 February 1942.

Damage of 24 August 1942:

(c) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. to BuShips CV6/Lll-l(50-wy), Serial 0200 of 5 September 1942.

(d) Comdt. Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, conf. ltr. to BuShips C-L11-1/CV/NY10, Serial Y-01967 of 25 October 1942.

(e) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. to BuShips CV6/L9-3(50-B1), Serial 052 of 16 March 1943.

Damage of 26 October 1942:

(f) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. to BuShips CV6/L11-1(50-B1), Serial 0273 of 8 November 1942.

(g) Comdt. Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, conf. ltr. to BuShips C-L11-1/CV/ NY10, Serial Y-01420 of 14 July 1943.

Damage of 18 and 20 March 1945:

(h) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. to BuShips CV6/Lll-l(50-cl), Serial 0200 of 4 April 1945.

Damage of 11 April 1945:

(i) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. to Cominch CV6/A16-3(11-Pe), Serial 0208 of 16 April 1945.

(j) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. to BuShips CV6/L9-3(70-Ec), Serial 0258 of 5 May 1945.

Damage of 14 May 1945:

(k) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. to Cominch CV6/A16-3(ll-Pe), Serial 0273 of 22 May 1945. (1) War Damage Report - U.S.S. ENTERPRISE - Actions of 11 April 1945 and 14 May 1945, prepared by Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, forwarded by ComNavShipYdPug conf. ltr. to BuShips CV6/L11(254), Serial 0649 of 1 February 1946.

CONTENTS

SECTION Page A FOREWORD 1 Photographs Nos. A-1 to A-4 B EARLY HISTORY 2 1. Design and Construction 2 2. Peacetime Operations 2 3. Start of the War 3 C BOMB DAMAGE, MARSHALL ISLANDS, 1 FEBRUARY 1942 4 1. Narrative 4 2. Material Damage 4 3. Fire and Firefighting 5 4. Conclusion 5 Photographs Nos. C-1 and C-2 Plate I D HISTORY, FIRST STRIKE AGAINST WAKE ISLAND, 24 FEBRUARY 1942, TO THE LANDINGS IN THE SOLOMONS, AUGUST 1942 6 1. Strikes Against Wake and Marcus Islands, 24 February and 4 March 6 2. Bombing of Tokyo, 18 April 6 3. The Battle of Midway, 4-6 June 6 4. Landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, 7-9 August 7 E BOMB DAMAGE, BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS, 24 AUGUST 1942 8 1. Narrative 8 2. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural 9 3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping, Machinery and Electrical 12 4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures 13 5. Fire and Firefighting 14 6. Japanese Bombs 15 7. Conclusion 16 Photographs Nos. E-1 to E-20 Plates II and III F BOMB DAMAGE, BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ, 26 OCTOBER 1942 17 1. Narrative 17 2. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural 18 3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping, Machinery and Electrical 21 4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures 22 5. Fire and Firefighting 23 6. Japanese Bombs 24 7. Conclusion 24 Photographs Nos. F-1 to F-24 Plates IV and V G HISTORY, 30 OCTOBER 1942 to 18 MARCH 1945 26 1. The Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November 1942 26 2. Winter and Spring 1943 26 3. Overhaul, Summer 1943 27 4. Amphibious Operations and Strikes, Winter 1943-44 28 5. Spring Activities, 1944 28 6. Advance to the Philippines, 1944-45 29 7. Landings on Iwo Jima, February 1945 31 H BOMB DAMAGE, STRIKES AGAINST SOUTHERN JAPAN, 18 and 20 MARCH 1945 33 1. Narrative 33 2. Dud Bomb of 18 March 34 3. Near-Misses, "Friendly" Shell Hits and Fire of 20 March 34 Photographs Nos. H-1 to H-6 Plate VI I SUICIDE PLANE CRASHES, OKINAWA, 11 APRIL 1945 37 1. Narrative 37 2. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural 38 3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping, 39 Machinery and Electrical 4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures 41 5. Fire and Firefighting 41 6. Japanese Planes and Bombs 41 7. Conclusion 42 Photographs Nos. I-1 to I-10 Plate VII J SUICIDE PLANE CRASH, KYUSHU, 14 MAY 1945 44 1. Narrative 44 2. Damage and Damage Control Measures -Structural 45 3. Damage and Damage Control Measures -Piping, Machinery and Electrical 46 4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures 49 5. Fire and Firefighting 49 6. Japanese Planes and Bombs 50 7. Conclusion 50 Photographs Nos. J-1 to J-18 Plate VII K EXIT ENTERPRISE 52 1. Repairs 52 2. The "Magic Carpet" 52 3. A National Memorial 52 L SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 53 1. Summary 53 2. Conclusion 55

SECTION A

FOREWORD

1. BOMB DAMAGE, MARSHALL ISLANDS, 1 FEBRUARY 1942

2. BOMB DAMAGE, BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS, 24 AUGUST 1942

3. BOMB DAMAGE, BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ, 26 OCTOBER 1942

4. BOMB DAMAGE, STRIKES AGAINST SOUTHERN JAPAN, 18 AND 20 MARCH 1945 5. SUICIDE PLANE CRASHES, OKINAWA, 11 APRIL 1945

6. SUICIDE PLANE CRASH, KYUSHU, 14 MAY 1945 *

A-1. The war history of ENTERPRISE is unique in length of active service, in extent of destruction brought to the enemy and in number of instances of damage survived. Therefore, this war damage report has been written with brief summaries of operational history and detailed discussions of each instance of damage to cover the whole war experience of the ship.

A-2. ENTERPRISE served with the Fleet throughout the war, steaming more than 275,000 miles and accumulating 18 out of a possible 22 combat stars for carriers in the Pacific area. She missed only the Battle of the Coral Sea and three operations in the Southwest Pacific: Eastern New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago and Treasury-Bougainville Island.

A-3. Her planes, the "big guns" of a carrier, are credited with sinking or an assist in the sinking of 71 enemy ships and with damaging 192 enemy ships. The sinkings and assists include three large carriers and a heavy cruiser of the Japanese Fleet in the Battle of Midway and a battleship, large cruiser and four carriers in the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

A-4. During the period of the war she was damaged by the enemy on six separate occasions by 13 hits or near-misses from bombs or suicide planes. In addition, she was damaged by a fire caused by the detonation of a "friendly" 5-inch anti-aircraft shell. In all cases but one,her excellent damage control organization prevented serious consequences and enabled ENTERPRISE to continue in action. Damage to her flight deck which resulted from the suicide plane crash of 14 May 1945 so impaired her operating efficiency that she was forced to retire the following day.

*Solid line indicates hits

Dashed lines indicate near-misses

†"Friendly" shell hits

--1--

Photo A-1: ENTERPRISE shortly after her commissioning 12 May 1938.

Photo A-2: ENTERPRISE from the port quarter, shortly after her commissioning.

Photo A-3: Planes taking off from ENTERPRISE for a strike in the Western Pacific.

Photo A-4: ENTERPRISE as she appeared during the latter part of the war after her 1943 overhaul.

SECTION B

EARLY HISTORY

1. Design and Construction

B1-1. At the close of World War I the potentialities of Naval air-power were recognized and in order to initiate development of a sound doctrine the collier JUPITER was converted into the experimental aircraft carrier LANGLEY (CV1). She was followed in 1927 by LEXINGTON (CV2) and SARATOGA (CV3), which were converted from battle-cruisers as a result of the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament.

B1-2. Through the years 1922 to 1929 preliminary design studies of 10,000, 13,800, 17,230 and 23,000 ton standard displacement aircraft carriers were made in order to determine the best way to utilize the 69,000 tons of carriers allowed under the Washington Treaty. Problems of suitable speed, armor, armament, torpedo protection, disposition of flue gases, arrangement of flight decks, elevators and hangars, location of bridge, criteria of stability, etc. were studied by the Bureau of Construction and Repair and discussed with the General Board, other Bureaus of the Navy Department and operating personnel. The studies finally crystallized into plans for RANGER (CV4), the first U.S. aircraft carrier to be designed as such from its inception. RANGER was ordered 1 November 1930 and commissioned 4 June 1934.

B1-3. With a valuable background of design lessons derived in the development of RANGER and a much greater knowledge of carrier operations gained from experience with LANGLEY, LEXINGTON and SARATOGA, preliminary design work on ENTERPRISE was started in 1931. Displacement was increased from 14,500 to 19,900 tons standard and speed from 29.5 to 32.5 knots. Many significant changes were made in the arrangements so that ENTERPRISE and her sistership, YORKTOWN (CV5), embodied many advances in carrier development. Construction of ENTERPRISE was ordered 3 August 1933 and her keel was laid 16 July 1934 at Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company. She was launched 3 October 1936 and commissioned 12 May 1938.

2. Peacetime Operations

B2-1. After a shakedown cruise to Brazil and winter maneuvers with the Fleet in the Caribbean early in 1939, ENTERPRISE was ordered to the Pacific in April 1939. With the proclamation of a state of limited national emergency in September 1939, she proceeded to Pearl Harbor where she trained for war operations as a part of the Hawaiian Fleet Detachment and shuttled planes and squadrons among the Pacific island bases. On 28 November 1941 she departed Pearl Harbor for Wake Island with twelve Marine Corps fighter planes to be delivered to the newly completed airfield there.

--2--

3. Start of the War

B3-1. ENTERPRISE was scheduled to return to Pearl Harbor on 6 December, but fortunately was delayed a day by heavy weather. Some of her planes flew to Pearl Harbor during the Japanese raid on 7 December and the remainder were launched in an unsuccessful attempt to locate the enemy carriers after word of the attack on Pearl Harbor had been received by radio. During the early weeks of the war she patrolled to the west of the Hawaiian Islands and acted as escort for transports reinforcing Samoa. Later in January she sailed north to participate in the first offensive U.S. carrier action of the war--the strike against the Marshall and Gilbert Islands on 1 February. There, ENTERPRISE with one task group of cruisers and destroyers and YORKTOWN with another participated in a joint air and sea bombardment.

B3-2. Planes from ENTERPRISE bombed and strafed shore installations on Moloelap, Wotje and Kwajalein in the Marshalls, and bombed and torpedoed several enemy ships including one cruiser and two submarines. The raid set back Japanese plans for strengthening bases in the West Central Pacific, and provided the first good news after the disaster at Pearl Harbor. The opposite result might have occurred if ENTERPRISE had not successfully evaded two determined bombing attacks from Japanese land-based planes, receiving only minor damage from a near-miss.

--3--

SECTION C

BOMB DAMAGE

MARSHALL ISLANDS, 1 FEBRUARY 1942*

1. NEAR-MISS 62.5 KG. BOMB, FRAME 130 PORT

1. Narrative

C1-1. About. 1340 on 1 February 1942 while operating in the northeastern Marshalls, ENTERPRISE was approached on the starboard bow by five Japanese twin-engined land planes flying at 10,000 feet. While in a shallow power dive to about 3,500 feet, each plane released three bombs. ENTERPRISE was maneuvering at high speed and all bombs fell beyond the ship, the nearest about 50 feet off the port quarter at frame 130. The bombs were estimated by the ship to be general purpose with instantaneous fuzes, weighing between 100 and 200 pounds and were probably the 63 Kg Type 99 No. 6 Ordinary type (U.S. Navy Bomb Disposal School designation 63 Kg SAP). This bomb corresponds in size and charge weight approximately with the U.S. 100-pound GP type, but has somewhat superior penetrating ability.** Splashes were 100 to 125 feet high. Slight shock was felt throughout the ship, similar to that caused by firing the ship's guns. Fragments struck the port quarter.

C1-2, One plane returned, apparently to strafe the ship. Its right wing scraped the flight deck between frames 74 and 65, knocking off the ship's port side light and cutting off the tail of a scout bomber on deck. It plunged over the port side at frame 62 and carried away the forward stay of the antenna outrigger.

C1-3. A second attack began at 1600, when two Japanese twin-engined planes each dropped two bombs off the starboard bow. The nearest was 150 yards away and the splashes appeared to rise higher than those of the first bombs. Although several fragments were found on the forecastle, no damage was incurred.

2. Material Damage

C2-1. Fragments from the first attack opened four 1/2-inch holes in the 1/4-inch medium steel plating of the port hangar bulkhead between frames 130 and 133 and six holes in the hangar roller curtain (Plate I). There were numerous dents in the 5/8-inch STS shell plating below the main deck and fragments pierced and dented the splinter mats, gallery walkway, ladders and gallery deck in way of the .50 cal. machine gun at frame 134.

* BuShips War Damage Report No. 5

** Handbook of Japanese Explosive Ordnance, OPNAV 30-3M, 15 August 1945

--4--

C2-2. The externally-fitted 2 to 2-1/2-inch gasoline line was pierced by fragments in nine places between frames 119 and 135. A gasoline fire resulted.

C2-3. The M-1, M-2 and M-6 coils of the externally-fitted degaussing cable at frame 126, the hangar sprinkler electrical control box in the port pocket at frame 133 and fifteen minor electrical cables were pierced or severed by fragments or destroyed in the gasoline fire.

3. Fire and Firefighting

C3-1. Gasoline from the pierced gasoline line caught fire either from hot fragments or electrical short circuits and the fire spread over the port gallery walkway and the boat pocket between frames 130 and 144. The flames consumed canvas covers, splinter mats, airplane fueling hose, rubber deck matting, life jackets and paint on the deck and bulkheads (Photos C-1 and C-2).

C3-2. Although the fire seemed very threatening, it was soon extinguished with chemical foam from pressure-operated foam generators (phomene accumulators).

4. Conclusion

C4-1. By quick and effective use of the available firefighting apparatus, ENTERPRISE repair parties successfully passed their first real test.

C4-2. The penetration of splinter mats by fragments substantiated the prior decision to discontinue their use because of their limited value against even low velocity fragments.

C4-3. Although a gasoline fire developed as a result of penetration of the exposed portion of the gasoline piping by fragments, no change in its location was seriously considered. It would be impracticable to give adequate protection to this main and a fire on the gallery walkway is obviously preferable to one in the hangar.

C4-4. Although internal fitting of degaussing cables had become standard practice, ENTERPRISE could not be so fitted until her extensive 1943 overhaul.

--5--

Photo C-1: Fire damage in .50 cal. machine gun gallery, port side. Picture taken from about frame 144 looking forward.

Photo C-2: Charred paint on bulkhead, port gun gallery. Archway and ladder are between frames 140 and 141. Phomene accumulator at extreme left.

SECTION D

HISTORY

FIRST STRIKE AGAINST WAKE ISLAND, 24 FEBRUARY 1942 TO THE LANDINGS IN THE SOLOMONS, AUGUST 1942

1. Strikes Against Wake and Marcus Islands, 24 February and 4 March

D1-1. After the success of the raid on the Marshalls, other strikes were planned. While one task force assembled around LEXINGTON made a diversionary attack on Rabaul, ENTERPRISE accompanied another force against the newly established enemy garrison on Wake Island. Extensive damage to shore installations was inflicted by a combined air-sea bombardment.

D1-2. A brief surprise attack was next made on Marcus Island. Planes bombed shore installations before dawn and then returned to ENTERPRISE which was already proceeding toward Pearl Harbor.

D1-3. During March, alterations, including removal of ten boats and most of the .50 cal. machine guns and the installation of thirty 20mm guns and additional radar units, were accomplished by Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

2. Bombing of Tokyo, 18 April

D2-1. On 8 April, ENTERPRISE and her escort departed Pearl Harbor to rendezvous with HORNET (CV8) which had sailed from San Francisco with 16 Army B-25's spotted on her flight deck, destined for a bombing raid on Tokyo. ENTERPRISE provided search and combat air patrol for the attack on the Japanese capital. Although the force encountered heavy gales and was discovered some 800 miles off the coast of Japan, the bombers got away and were successful in carrying out their mission. The ships returned to Pearl Harbor on 25 April.

3. The Battle of Midway, 4-6 June

D3-1. ENTERPRISE next headed south to assist LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN in their efforts to slow the advance of the Japanese, but arrived too late to take part in the attack on the Japanese force at Tulagi, 4 May, and the air battles (Battle of the Coral Sea), 7 and 8 May, in which LEXINGTON* was sunk and YORKTOWN** was damaged. She returned to Pearl Harbor just in time to depart again to repel the expected Japanese landings on Midway.

D3-2. The Battle of Midway was a turning point in the Pacific War, for from this time the balance of power in the Pacific shifted steadily to the United States side. Three large forces of Japanese ships,

* BuShips War Damage Report No. 16

** BuShips War Damage Report No. 23

--6--

including many transports and cargo vessels, supported by seven carriers, eleven battleships, about fourteen cruisers and many destroyers were severely mauled and driven off by U.S. air groups from two task groups built around ENTERPRISE, HORNET and YORKTOWN and by land-based bombers. The Japanese were completely surprised. Four carriers and one heavy cruiser were sunk and one heavy cruiser, two destroyers and one transport were damaged. On 4 June dive bombers from ENTERPRISE and HORNET severely damaged the four carriers which later sank, and sank the heavy cruiser on 6 June. One of the damaged carriers was torpedoed by a submarine and sank, one sank as the result of a delayed fuel tank explosion and the other two were scuttled by their crews on 5 June. ENTERPRISE was not damaged, but YORKTOWN* and HAMMANN (DD412) were lost.

4. Landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, 7-9 August

D4-1. Following Midway, ENTERPRISE had a short availability at Pearl Harbor, during which the forward auxiliary elevator, the two catapults on the main deck and the remaining .50 cal. machine guns were removed. A 1.1-inch anti-aircraft mount was added at the extreme bow on the forecastle deck and forward fire control radar installed.

D4-2. ENTERPRISE departed 15 July for Tongatabu, the staging area for the landing in the Solomons. To cover the amphibious force and fire support groups of the first U.S. offensive thrust, three task groups were formed around SARATOGA, WASP (CV7) and ENTERPRISE. During the successful landings of 7 August on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, planes from the carriers provided air reconnaissance and tactical bombing. They were unable to participate, however, in the surprise night engagement of 8-9 August fought off Savo Island during which three U.S. cruisers were lost.

* BuShips War Damage Report No. 25

--7--

SECTION E

BOMB DAMAGE

BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS, 24 AUGUST 1942

1. 250 KG. BOMB HIT, FRAME 174

2. 250 KG. BOMB HIT, FRAME 179

3. 250KG. BOMB HIT, FRAME 127

4. NEAR-MISS 250KG. BOMB, FRAME 193 PORT

1. Narrative

E1-1. During the two weeks following the landings in the lower Solomons, the three carrier task groups operated to the southeast of Guadalcanal. On 23 August, WASP's task group was detached, leaving SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE in the area. The following day air contact was made with a large Japanese force of combatant ships. Planes from our carriers attacked this force at the same time our carriers were being attacked by Japanese planes. A Japanese carrier, a destroyer and a transport were sunk; 90 enemy planes were destroyed; a small carrier and a light cruiser were damaged. The Japanese retired without a surface engagement being joined. ENTERPRISE was the only U.S. vessel damaged.

E1-2. About 1712 on 24 August, ENTERPRISE underwent a heavy five-minute attack from more than 30 Japanese dive-bombers during which she received three direct bomb hits and four near-misses. The first bomb struck about two minutes after the start of the attack piercing No. 3 elevator at the flight deck and detonating 42 feet below, between the second and third decks, close to the starboard side. It caused extensive, though not serious structural damage, minor flooding, disablement of No. 3 elevator and several stubborn fires. Half a minute later a second bomb struck the flight deck at frame 179, close to the starboard edge of the same elevator, detonating 8 feet below. The flight deck was deflected upward and a severe fire broke out as 40 rounds of 5-inch 38 cal. propellant powder were ignited. A third bomb, dropped a minute later, detonated on impact with the flight deck near the after starboard corner of No. 2 elevator, putting the elevator out of commission and starting a small fire. At 1717 a bomb detonated in the water about 12 feet off the port quarter, causing general flexural vibration of the ship and permanent deformation of the hull and several decks, including the flight deck. Three other near-misses, which caused minor fragment damage, occurred during the attack.

E1-3. Despite the damage, ENTERPRISE commenced landing planes within an hour after the engagement. The following day, however, she proceeded to Pearl Harbor for repairs, escorted by PORTLAND (CA33) and four destroyers.

--8--

2. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural

E2-1. The first bomb, released from a 65° or 70° dive at an altitude of about 1500 feet, penetrated the forward starboard corner of No. 3 elevator at frame 174, 22 feet to starboard of the centerline. Leaving only a small hole, it continued down through the starboard bulkhead of the elevator well, the inboard forward corner of the GROUP III gun gallery, the hatchway on the flat below, the hangar deck at frame 172 and the second deck in D-203-1LM to its point of detonation between the second and third decks in D-303-1L at frame 171, 12 feet from the starboard side. Total thickness of steel plating penetrated was 2 inches including 1/4 inch of STS and distance from point of impact to point of detonation was 42 feet (Photos E-1, E-2 and E-3).

E2-2. The bomb detonated high order. Its blast tore large holes in the second and third decks, a 12-foot by 4-foot hole in the fourth deck, and a 6-foot by 2-foot hole through the side plating (Photos E-4, E-5 and E-6). The second deck was bulged up 4 to 12 inches over its entire width between frames 157 and 173 and the third deck was dished down more or less irregularly over the same area (Photos E-8 and E-9). The main deck was bulged up symmetrically between frames 157 and 173 between the port and starboard boat pockets to a maximum height of 16 inches at frame 165. Stanchions between the main and second, and second and third decks were torn loose at their base but remained attached to the overhead (Photo E-9). The fourth deck was dished down in D-419-3A from the starboard shell to the inboard bulkhead. Transverse bulkheads 157 and 173 were only slightly distorted, except above the third deck immediately adjacent to the detonation where bulkhead 173 was badly distorted and torn. The starboard bulkhead around hydraulic oil tank and elevator machinery trunk, D-523-T, was severely deflected and holed above the third deck (Photo E-7) and deflected between the third and fourth decks. Watertight doors 2-173-1, 3-157-1, 3-173-1 and 3-186-2 were blown open and wrecked. Nearly all bunks and lockers in D-203-1LM, D-303-1L and D-305-L were demolished. The crew's washroom, D-203-2L, the carpenter shop and the brig were wrecked. Numerous longitudinals, frames and vertical stiffeners were severed, cracked or buckled.

E2-3. Fragment damage was extensive. Stiffeners, cables, ducts and piping under the main deck above the explosion were riddled, though only a few fragments perforated the deck itself (Photos E-4 and E-5). The second deck was peppered with holes and the third and fourth decks were also penetrated. A few fragments pierced the shell plating in D-305-L, D-303-1L, D-419-3A and D-521-A (Photo E-6). Other fragments passed through bulkhead 157 above the third deck, through bulkhead 165 into D-417-A, and through the starboard bulkhead of D-523-E. The maximum distance traveled by a fragment was 56 feet after which it pierced the 3/8-inch medium steel plate of bulkhead 157 above the third deck. The maximum thickness of plating penetrated was the 5/8-inch medium steel shell plating below the fourth deck, at a distance of 16 feet.

E2-4. The second bomb, released at about the same height and angle as the first, pierced the flight deck at frame 179 about 11 feet from the starboard edge of that deck and close to the starboard edge of No. 3 elevator. It traveled about 8 feet and detonated high order about 3 feet

--9--

above the deck of the GROUP III gun gallery, slightly forward and outboard of the point of impact (Photos E-11, E-12 and E-13).

E2-5. The blast tore a 12-foot by 6-foot hole in the adjacent starboard bulkhead of No.3 elevator trunk and another about 18 feet by 8 feet in the gallery deck (Photos E-15 and E-16). Instruments on 5-inch guns Nos. 5 and 7 were wrecked and the guns rendered unsafe for use. The ammunition hoist for No. 7 gun was torn loose and pushed inboard and the scuttle completely destroyed. The hoist for No. 5 gun was damaged and disabled. The splinter shield between the guns was torn loose at the bottom and bent aft (Photo E-14) and the sponson shield for No. 5 gun was blown out. The ready service powder locker for gun No. 5 was demolished and blown inboard and approximately 40 rounds of 5-inch propellant powder were destroyed by burning. Although the ready service locker for No. 7 gun also was distorted, the powder in it did not ignite. Hatch and scuttle 02-174-1 were blown in and wrecked and the upper half of door 1-174-1 was blown off and twisted. The flight deck above the gun gallery was deflected upward a maximum of 18 inches between frames 173 and 186 (Photo E-12). No. 2 arresting gear deck sheave was loosened and the yielding element control cable cut.

E2-6. Fragment attack was less severe than from the first hit. Fragments traveled downward through the deck of the gun gallery, the platform deck in the ready airplane issue room D-103-A, the main deck in D-103-A and upward through the flight deck. The splinter shields and guns Nos. 5 and 7 were peppered with small fragments and other fragments perforated the starboard bulkhead of No. 3 elevator trunk and the starboard bulkhead of D-102-E. The maximum distance traveled by a fragment was about 50 feet after which it penetrated 1/4-inch medium steel plate. The maximum thickness of plating pierced was that of the 3/4-inch STS main deck at a distance of about 19 feet.

E2-7. The third bomb, released from a 60° dive at an altitude of about 1500 feet, struck the flight deck at frame 127, 28 feet to starboard of the centerline, close to the starboard after corner of No. 2 elevator and detonated instantly (Photo E-18). Portions of the nose continued down through hatch cover 2-119 and trunk C-408-1A as far as the fourth deck.

E2-8. A hole approximately 10 feet in diameter was blown in the flight deck by the detonation (Photos E-17 and E-18). Blast knocked a high pressure torpedo charging flask from its bracket on the hangar deck bulkhead, but did not damage it. The yielding element of No. 9 arresting gear was blown overboard.

E2-9. Fragments cut or damaged the purchase cable sheave bracket, purchase cable, yielding element control cable and barrier cross-deck cable of No. 9 arresting gear and the purchase cables of Nos. 7 and 8 arresting gears. Fragments also pierced hatch cover 03-107, elements of No. 2 crane, the overhead of C-0211-A, the flight and hangar decks and one continued through the second deck. Although the bomb detonated almost against 3/4-inch STS plating protecting the ready torpedo and warhead stowage, no fragments penetrated. Yet the 3/4-inch STS after bulkhead of C-0301-M was pierced at a distance of 68 feet. The maximum distance traveled by a fragment was 113 feet after which it pierced 1/8-inch medium steel plating.

--10--

E2-10. While the ship was heeled to starboard in a left turn, a bomb detonated abreast frame 193 about 12 feet from the ship's port side. It had been released on the starboard quarter at a low angle of dive, about 50°, and at an altitude of about 1000 feet. The detonation caused general flexural vibration of the ship of low frequency but of relatively high amplitude. The Commanding Officer estimated that the stern was lifted bodily 2 or 3 feet.

E2-11. The column of water thrown up by the detonation deformed the flight deck upward about 8 inches between frames 194-1/2 and 198 for 17 feet inboard of the port waterway (Photo E-20). Four of the flight deck longitudinals were bent and two broken, planking in the area was split and shredded and a 60-man life raft secured at the gallery level on the port side was completely demolished. The force of the detonation dished in the hull between frames 188 and 196 from the first platform to the main deck (Photo E-19). The hangar deck was bulged upward slightly over a radius of 5 feet at frame 192 port, the second deck was buckled upward about 2 inches between frames 192 and 193-1/2 for about 3 feet inboard of the shell, third deck plating was wrinkled throughout the after CPO washroom and fourth deck plating was wrinkled 10 feet inboard of the shell. Bulkheads 190-1/2 and 192 were wrinkled 5 feet inboard. Below the fourth deck, in the void spaces, floors were buckled from the stern to as far forward as frame 188 and frames 189 through 195 were variously bent or broken.

E2-12. Two other confirmed near-miss bombs which detonated abreast frames 70 and 100 on the port side caused minor fragment damage on the port side between frames 78 and 93.

E2-13. The structural damage caused by the hits and near-misses did not seriously reduce the strength of the ship girder, but impeded operations. The large hole in the flight deck resulting from the detonation of the third bomb was rapidly covered with two 6-foot by 9-foot, 3/8-inch plates which were secured to the wood deck around the hole by 60 penny nails, previously cut short to a length of 2-1/2 inches. Nail holes had previously been drilled in the plate edges at 6-inch intervals. An identical plate was used to cover the hole in No. 3 elevator. Pieces of 1/8-inch plate 24 inches by 12 inches or 18 inches square were secured in a similar manner over small fragment holes. These repairs were evidently effective, for, within an hour, planes were landing on the deck.

E2-14. Wooden shores were fitted to support the main and second decks in way of ruptured stanchions, but vibrations at high speeds loosened the shores, so the stanchions were partially re-established by welding patches over the holes torn in the deck and four short lengths of 3-inch by 3-inch by 3/8-inch angle to each stanchion and to the patched deck (Photo E-9). Deck longitudinals broken at their connections to deck beams were temporarily strengthened by welding short sections of 2-1/2-inch by 2-1/2-inch angle to the beam, the longitudinal and the overhead. Where the deck had been pulled away around sounding tubes, split collars were fitted and welded to the deck and pipe.

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3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping, Machinery and Electrical

E3-1. The principal machinery damage caused by the first hit was disablement of machinery of No. 3 elevator which put the elevator out of commission. Both the low and the high pressure accumulator tanks were forced away from the starboard bulkhead in D-523-E, the oil storage tank was crushed and the bottom blown out, and motors were submerged in oil and salt water. This was a serious casualty, its repair beyond the capacity of the ship's force. However, since the elevator was at the flight deck level, flight operations were able to continue.

E3-2. Ammunition hoist motor No. 8 in D-203-1LM was knocked from its mounting and hoists in D-203-1L and D-303-1LM were bent and inoperable. Ventilation blowers 2-158-1, 2-158-2, 2-170, 2-176-1 and 4-173-4 were wrecked and ventilation ducts in the damaged spaces rendered useless. The aftermost riser of the firemain at frame 173 was ruptured in several places, but with the firemain split into four sections, each with its own pump, this casualty was easily isolated. The starboard riser for the hangar deck water curtain in bay No. 4, frame 173, was ruptured eight feet above the main deck and damage control mains in the damaged compartments were ruptured or carried away. Numerous lighting cables were cut in the damaged spaces.

E3-3. The second bomb completed the disablement of No. 3 elevator. Fragments gouged and burred the main plungers, destroyed the elevator platform lock, carried away all electrical leads and extensively damaged the flight deck safety rail and its starboard control shaft.

E3-4. All power wiring, fire control wiring, I.C. wiring and lighting in GROUP III gun gallery were completely destroyed. The motor and solenoid for controlling closure of the vent cover on the steering engine room exhaust duct were demolished. Machinery in the aviation sheet metal shop was damaged.

E3-5 An hour and a half after the second bomb hit and as a secondary result thereof, the casualty occurred which, from an operational standpoint, was the most serious of the whole engagement. ENTERPRISE was retiring south from the battle with the rest of the task force at 24 knots functioning again almost normally and landing aircraft when, suddenly, the rudder went hard left, then hard right and finally stopped at 20° right. Water and foamite used to fight the fire caused by the second bomb had collected in the exhaust vent trunk leading directly from the two steering motor casings in steering motor and control room (D-524-E) to the gun gallery. This trunk, holed by the first bomb at the level of the gun gallery, had been closed off immediately at its lower end and the exhaust fan secured when smoke and water passed down the duct. Supply blower 4-173-4 had been disabled by the first hit, cutting off the supply of air to the space; so, conditions became almost unbearable for personnel. When the ventilation system was reopened, water and foamite poured from the exhaust duct, flooded the starboard steering motor and its control panel and stopped the motor. Exhausted by heat

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and smoke, personnel on watch could not shift to the undamaged port motor before collapsing and the rudder stopped as noted above. A rescue party made its way to the space and put the port motor in operation restoring steering 38 minutes after it had been lost.

E3-6. The third bomb disabled No. 2 elevator leaving only No. 1 elevator able to handle aircraft. The platform lock control shaft, including the bevel gears, was carried away for about 15 feet along the starboard after side of the transverse hatch girder, the flight deck safety rail and two stanchions were badly damaged, hydraulic and air lines to the main elevator platform lock power unit were ruptured or crushed, and elevator control cables and electrical leads to the after safety rail control motor were carried away. Both elevator plungers were scored and burred by fragments, the largest score being 1-1/2 inches long by 3/32 inches deep in the forward plunger. The adjacent torpedo elevator was also rendered inoperable. Repair of this damage was beyond the capacity of the ship's force.

E3-7. The near-miss on the port quarter caused considerable leakage through the stern tube glands of Nos. 2 and 3 shafts. Two blades of No. 2 propeller and all three blades of No. 3 propeller had edges curled aft by the detonation. Degaussing cable "Q," and "M" coils, fitted externally on the sheer strake, were torn loose from their supports for a length of 30 feet on the port quarter, but were not broken.

E3-8. Fragments from the other near-misses punctured the "M" and "F" degaussing coils in numerous places in way of frame 80 port and starboard, pierced sections of the gasoline line at hangar and flight deck levels between frames 80 and 106 port, and carried away the auxiliary radio antenna on the port side at frame 80.

4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures

E4-1. The shell was opened in way of the waterline by the detonation and fragments from the first bomb hit. As a result, D-521-A was completely flooded and D-419-3A partially flooded. A small hole in the forward bulkhead of D-419-3A permitted D-417-A to flood to a depth of about one foot on the starboard side. The addition of this water caused a list of approximately 3° to starboard. Trim aft was increased by 11 inches. The increase of mean draft was negligible.

Drafts: Forward Aft Before damage: 24 feet 0 inches 27 feet 8 inches After damage: 23 feet 7 inches 28 feet 2 inches

These drafts do not quite check with the ship's estimate of 245 tons of flooding water, but may have been incorrectly read.

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E4-2. Measures were taken immediately to remove the list by pumping out approximately 10,000 gallons (38 tons) of sea water from each of the following starboard tanks: B-15-F, B-21-F and B-27-F; and flooding the following port tanks with 10,000 gallons each: B-16-V, B-22-V and B-28-V. Spaces adjacent D-521-3A were found to be tight so the outboard bulkheads of D-520-A and D-523-E were shored. Flooding through the holes in D-521-A and D-419-A was stopped by constructing a cofferdam between frames 169 and 173, from the third deck down to the shell. The cofferdam was constructed of 2-inch by 6-inch planking set vertically into slots formed between 3-inch by 6-inch by 18-foot planks laid on the third and fourth decks (Plate III). Wire mesh was laid over the large hole and mattresses, blankets and pillows were packed down between the shell and the cofferdam, which was then wedged outboard, forcing the packing materials tight against the hull (Photo E-5). Flooding through a smaller hole, about 12 inches by 18 inches, just below the large hole, was stopped with an 18-inch wooden plug cut to shape. Smaller wooden plugs were forced into the little fragment holes. Although a speed of 25 knots and many course changes made construction very difficult, the cofferdam was completed in eighteen hours. Air-driven submersible pumps were used for initial pumping down of the flooded compartments and electric submersible pumps were added later. It took five pumps about six hours to dewater the two spaces because debris continually clogged the strainers. After the compartments were pumped down, only one submersible pump running ten minutes an hour was required to take care of the seepage through the cofferdam into D-521-A.

5. Fire and Firefighting

E5-1. The first bomb started a smoldering fire in protective clothing and gas masks in GROUP III 5-inch gun gallery as it passed through. This fire was absorbed in the general conflagration on the gallery deck which resulted from the second hit.

E5-2. Detonation and fragments from the first bomb started a serious Class A fire in bedding and personal effects in living compartments D-203-1LM, D-303-1L and D-305-L. Dense smoke completely filled these compartments. There was little paint on bulkheads and overheads to support the conflagration.

E5-3. Dense smoke, wreckage and damage to the firemain hindered firefighting personnel. The ventilation supply system was started in the undamaged area forward on the second and third decks, portable ventilation sets were set up and doors and hatches were opened to the hangar deck in an effort to clear the smoke and give access to the firefighters. Gas masks were found to give relief from the smoke for short periods. At first, firemain valves 5-160-5 and 5-125-3 were closed to segregate the damaged section, but when the damage was found to be in the riser aft of frame 160, valve 5-125-3 was opened. Before the damaged main was segregated, water pouring from the riser helped to extinguish the hottest fire in D-303-1L near the point of detonation. Damage control valve 7-129 was closed to prevent flooding from broken damage control mains and risers, but was reopened and valve 6-143-5 closed when damage was found to be confined to the starboard side. The fire was brought under control in an hour.

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E5-4. Detonation of the second bomb in the gun gallery caused, the immediate ignition of about 40 rounds of 5-inch 38 cal. ready service powder. Heavy weather and protective clothing, gas masks, rubber matting on the deck and paint on the guns contributed additional combustible material. Since all personnel in the gun gallery were killed, the fire was fought by repair parties from the flight deck (Photo E-11). Water, foam and CO 2 were used to bring this fire under control in about 40 minutes. As soon as conditions permitted, all remaining powder and projectiles from the gallery were jettisoned. The fire spread from the blasted gun gallery to airplane accessories, flight clothing, rubber lungs, etc. in airplane issue room D-103-A immediately below. This fire smoldered and broke out periodically for eight hours. In D-103-E minor fires occurred and were quickly extinguished among rubber hose, bedding, electric cables, in the paint on the overhead and in some small pieces of wood in the port forward corner of the elevator pit.

E5-5. A small fire, which was extinguished by water and CO 2 , was ignited in the port after corner of C-0211-A by fragments from the third bomb detonation.

6. Japanese Bombs

E6-1. The Commanding Officer estimated the hits to be from bombs as follows:

Weight in Pounds Diameter Kind Impact to Detonation Detonation Fragments Recovered Smoke 1st Hit 1000 12 In. AP 42 Ft. High Order 1 In. Yellowish 2nd Hit 500 12 In. GP 8 Ft. High Order 1 In. Not Noxious 3rd Hit 500 ? ? 0 Low Order 10 In. Nose White Near-Miss on Port Quarter 500- •1000 ? ? ? High Order None None

E6-2. The holes left by the first bomb as it passed through the elevator and main deck indicate that the diameter was approximately 12 inches (Photos E-1 and E-2). Therefore, this bomb was probably a 250 Kg Type 99, No. 25 Ordinary bomb (U.S. Navy Bomb Disposal School designation 250 Kg SAP) which corresponds approximately in size and charge weight with the U.S. 500-pound GP bomb. The extent of damage was consistent with the amount of explosive carried in a 250 Kg bomb and fragmentation was exceptionally good.

E6-3. From the small amount of evidence available, it is estimated that the second hit and the severe near-miss under the port quarter were also 250 Kg Ordinary bombs. The second bomb detonated in an unconfined space which would account for the lesser damage as compared with that of the first bomb.

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E6-4. The comparatively light damage and the recovery of large fragments, some 10 inches in diameter, and segments of the nose of the third bomb indicate that it detonated low order. It, too, was probably a 250 Kg Ordinary bomb.

7. Conclusion

E7-1. The campaign to scrape all paint from bulkheads, overheads and decks inside the ship, which was almost completed in the section affected by the first hit, reduced the extent of the fires. Dispersal of repair party personnel and equipment and detailing special firefighters to operate CO 2 systems in paint, alcohol and pyrotechnic lockers led to prompt action in combatting fires and repairing damage. The skill shown by personnel of ENTERPRISE in coping with serious damage and controlling fires and flooding attests to the serious attention given to careful preparation of equipment, to study of war damage to LEXINGTON* and YORKTOWN** and the recommendations of the special Damage Control Board of Inspection made in December 1941 and to regular damage control drills.

* BuShips War Damage Report No. 16

** BuShips War Damage Report No. 23

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Photo E-1: First hit. Bomb entry hole at forward starboard corner of after elevator, frame 174, looking forward and to starboard. Bomb exploded between second and third decks.

Photo E-2: First hit. Pathway of bomb from gallery deck through bulkhead 173 and main deck. Just to starboard of forward side of after elevator pit.

Photo E-3: First hit. Looking aft and upward from compartment D-203-1LM through bomb passage hole in main deck to bomb passage hole in bulkhead 173 between the main and gallery decks.

Photo E-4: First hit. Bomb hole in second deck, compartment D-203-1LM. Note fragment holes.

Photo E-5: First hit. Compartment D-419-A, starboard after corner looking outboard. Note bomb hole in third deck and shoring and mattresses used to stop leak in shell just below the fourth deck.

Photo E-6: First hit. Hole blown in shell just below fourth deck showing wire mesh and mattresses used to stop rapid influx of water.

Photo E-7: First hit. Compartment D-303-1L looking aft showing starboard bulkhead of No.3 elevator pump room (D-523-T) dished in to port, third deck dished down and second deck dished up.

Photo E-8: First hit. Compartment D-303-1L looking forward showing deflection of third deck.

Photo E-9: First hit. View of port after corner of D-303-1L. Note bulge in overhead and temporary angles welded between stanchion and third deck.

Photo E-10: First hit. View forward across No. 3 elevator pit showing bulge in main deck.

Photo E-11: Second hit. Fighting fire in the Group III gun gallery.

Photo E-12: Second hit. Group III gun gallery showing bulge in flight deck above guns caused by bomb explosion and ammunition blast.

Photo E-13: Second hit. Entrance hole in flight deck made by bomb.

Photo E-14: Second hit. Damage to STS shield between Nos. 5 and 7 guns.

Photo E-15: Second hit. View of 5-inch Group III gun gallery looking forward showing damage in gallery deck and inboard bulkhead by explosion of bomb and burning of 5-inch ready-service ammunition.

Photo E-16: Second hit. Looking outboard from No. 3 elevator trunk through hole blown in inboard bulkhead of Group III gun gallery by explosion of bomb and burning of 5-inch ready-service ammunition.

Photo E-17: Third hit. View of flight deck showing bomb hole near after starboard corner of No. 2 elevator.

Photo E-18: Third hit. Close-up of bomb hole in flight deck.

Photo E-19: Near-miss. View of counter showing near-miss damage. Note near rupture of shell in way of third deck and degaussing cable clips sheared from shell.

Photo E-20: Near-miss. Damage to extreme after port corner of flight deck caused by water column from the near-miss.

SECTION F

BOMB DAMAGE

BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ, 26 OCTOBER 1942

1. 250 KG. BOMB HIT, FRAME 4

2. 250 KG. BOMB HIT, FRAME 44 1/2

3. NEAR-MISS 250 KG. BOMB, FRAME 129 1/2 STBD.

4. NEAR-MISS 250 KG. BOMB, FRAME 30 STBD.

1. Narrative

F1-1. After leaving the Solomons on 25 August, ENTERPRISE proceeded via Tongatabu to Pearl Harbor, docking immediately upon her arrival on 10 September. She was undocked three days later and repairs were completed by 7 October. Besides battle damage repairs, some outstanding ShipAlts including installation of twelve additional 20mm guns, replacement of four 1.1-inch mounts with four 40mm quadruple mounts and installation of a search radar were accomplished.

F1-2. Damage to SARATOGA on 31 August and loss of WASP on 15 September, both from submarine torpedoes, had reduced the number of carriers available in the South Pacific to one--HORNET (CV8). After hastily replenishing her stores and training a new flight group, ENTERPRISE departed Pearl Harbor for the South Pacific with her escort plus the new battleship SOUTH DAKOTA on 16 October. On 24 October she joined HORNET's task force northwest of the New Hebrides Islands.

F1-3. In the meantime, despite the victory of the Battle of Cape Esperance on the night of 11-12 October, the support for U.S. troops on Guadalcanal was not proceeding well. The Japanese were preparing a large-scale land and sea offensive to drive the Americans out of the Solomons with a force which included four carriers, four battleships, nine cruisers and a large number of smaller ships. The U.S. task force ready to repel them was barely half as large, with only two carriers, one battleship, six cruisers and fourteen destroyers.

F1-4. Air reconnaissance made initial contact with elements of the Japanese force about noon, 25 October. The Battle of Santa Cruz took place the following day without contact being made at any time between surface ships of the opposing forces. During the course of the battle, planes from the Japanese carriers made at least eight separate attacks on the U.S. ships, damaging both carriers, the battleship, one light cruiser and two destroyers, at a cost of about 100 planes. HORNET and PORTER (DD356) were so extensively damaged that they were abandoned and sunk by our own force. ENTERPRISE was damaged by two bomb hits and two near-misses. Three waves of aircraft from HORNET and ENTERPRISE succeeded in damaging two of the Japanese carriers, a heavy cruiser and two destroyers, with the loss

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of 74 planes, 20 of them in combat. Although the costly Battle of Santa Cruz appeared of dubious value to our cause, aircraft losses and damage inflicted on the enemy's carriers prevented him from providing effective air cover in the decisive Battle of Guadalcanal, 11-15 November 1942.

F1-5. Between 1115 and 1120 on 26 October, ENTERPRISE was attacked by 24 dive bombers which succeeded in making two direct hits and two damaging near-misses. The first bomb struck the flight deck at frame 4, port side, passed down and out through the ship's side and detonated in the air off the port bow. It produced heavy fragment damage and started two small fires. The second bomb struck at frame 44-1/2 on the port side of the flight deck and broke up below, part detonating on the hangar deck and part on the third deck in the forward repair party station. It caused blast damage in second and third deck living spaces, disablement of the forward elevator and two small fires. A near-miss bomb detonated about 8 feet below the waterline, 10 feet from the starboard side at frame 129-1/2, deflecting the shell plating below the armor, flooding three fuel tanks and causing shock damage to No. 2 H. P. turbine casing. Twenty minutes later, 25 torpedo bombers were driven off. At 1221, some 20 dive bombers attacked scoring a second near-miss with a bomb which detonated approximately 17 feet below the waterline and 8 feet outboard of the starboard shell opposite frame 30-1/2. The shell plating was distorted, several tanks were flooded and the pump and motor for No. 1 elevator were disabled by shock. At 1232, a fourth group of 15 dive bombers was repulsed without damage to ENTERPRISE.

F1-6. Despite the crippling damage to No. 1 elevator, ENTERPRISE continued in action and landed a large number of planes from the abandoned HORNET as well as her own. With the hangar deck full and planes parked on the flight deck as far aft as No. 1 elevator, aircraft continued to land successfully. The following day, ENTERPRISE proceeded south toward Noumea for repairs, arriving 30 October.

2. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural

F2-1. The first bomb, released by a dive bomber at an angle of 45° and a height of about 1500 feet, pierced the flight deck at frame 4, 9 feet to port of the centerline (Photo F-1), passed through the transverse bent at frame 3, tumbled down through the forecastle deck just inboard of the port bitts about 2 feet forward of the forward perpendicular (Photo F-2) and exited 2 feet farther forward through the port shell above the main deck, tearing two of the externally-fitted degaussing cables (Photo F-3).

F2-2. This bomb detonated high order about 20 feet below the forecastle deck, close to the port bow. Blast effect on the ship was negligible, but the fragment attack was heavy. About 160 fragment holes were made, varying in diameter from 1/4 inch to 12 inches, the majority being small. Fragments perforated the ship's side in A-1-W, A-101-A and A-201-A, some continuing out through the starboard side (Photo F-4). Other fragments traveled upward through the port edge of the forecastle deck, the splinter shield of the 1.1-inch director and the flight deck. The maximum distance traveled by a

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fragment was about 50 feet after which it pierced the 1/4-inch flight deck plating; the maximum thickness of plating penetrated was the 3/4-inch medium steel stem plate in way of the second deck at a distance of 10 feet.

F2-3. The second bomb, released from approximately 1500 feet in a 45° dive, pierced the flight deck at frame 44-1/2, 6 feet to port of the centerline, leaving a 14-inch diameter hole, struck the lower flange of the transverse bent at frame 43 and broke in two (Photo F-5). The conical tail section sheared away from the cylindrical body and hit the hangar deck 3 feet to starboard of the centerline at frame 39, tearing a 14-inch by 16-inch hole, and detonated (Photo F-6). The nose and body section pierced the hangar deck on the centerline at frame 40-1/2, making a hole about 14 inches by 37-1/2 inches and passed through hatch 2-39 in A-208-1L (Photo F-7) down to hatch 3-39 at the Repair II Station in compartment A-306-L where it detonated (Photo F-8).

F2-4. The detonation of the main portion of the bomb caused extensive blast damage on the third deck in A-306-L, A-307-1L, A-307-2L and A-308-1LM (Photo F-9) and on the second deck in A-208-1L, A-208-2M, A-208-3M and A-208-7L. Above the third deck, bulkhead 38 was deflected forward and bulkhead 43 aft. Watertight doors 3-43-2 and 3-54-2, open during the attack, were damaged and watertight door 3-43-1, which was closed, was blown off and wrecked. The third deck in A-306-L was wrinkled. The second deck was deflected upward unevenly a distance of 2 to 5 inches above A-306-L and A-307-1L, pulling up stanchions and tearing holes in the third deck. Bulkhead 38 above the second deck was distorted and both doors in it were wrecked. The hangar deck was deflected upward symmetrically between frames 37 and 54 to a maximum of 14 inches at frame 42 on the centerline (Photo F-10) except in way of the top of gasoline trunk A-513-T where it remained undeformed. Trunk A-513-T was not damaged. Hatch 3-39 to magazine trunk A-409-T was demolished and watertight hatch 3-42 was distorted. The staterooms and Repair II locker in A-306-L were demolished. Officers' washroom A-307-2L and all staterooms in A-307-1L were wrecked. Blast effect in A-308-1LM was confined to the port side, partially wrecking the warrant officers' messroom and slightly damaging the staterooms. Blast damage on the second deck between frames 38 and 54 may have resulted from both detonations. All staterooms in A-208-1L and baths A-208-4L and A-208-5L were demolished. The lightly constructed bulkheads of ammunition handling rooms A-208-2M and A-208-3M and their doors 2-41-3 and 2-41-2 were demolished. Officers' washroom A-208-7L was partially wrecked. On the main deck, the sliding door to the bomb elevator at frame 72 was blown off and hatch 1-39 was wrecked.

F2-5. Fragments traveled downward from the point of detonation of the nose and body of the bomb through the deck of A-306-L and hatch 3-39. Hatch 4-39 was pierced at the edge by a fragment, destroying the watertight integrity. Fragments flew sideward in all directions, but none penetrated upward through the second deck. Fragments from the tail section penetrated downward through the second deck, sideward through the starboard bulkhead of No. 1 elevator trunk slightly gouging and burring the elevator plungers, and through doors 1-39-1 and 2. Other fragments traveled upward and through the flight deck and No. 1 elevator. The greatest thickness pierced by fragments from the main portion of the bomb was 1/2-inch STS, 9 feet distant. Fragments from the tail passed through 1/4-inch medium steel plate at a distance of 40 feet.

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F2-6. The first damaging near-miss occurred when a bomb detonated about 8 feet below the waterline, 10 feet outboard of the starboard shell opposite frame 129-1/2. Shock to the ship was moderate and a general flexural vibration of low frequency occurred of an amplitude estimated by the Commanding Officer as 1-1/2 feet.

F2-7. The shell was opened by rivet failure along the seam between "G" and "H" strakes between frames 124 and 129 and also at the upper seam of "H" strake between frames 131 and 134 (Photo F-11). Tanks D-3-F, D-13-F and C-35-F were opened to the sea. Plating was deflected inward generally over an area about 48 feet by 17 feet between frames 123 and 135, from the upper edge of the armor belt at the fourth deck almost to the bilge keel. Maximum deformation was about 18 inches at the lower edge of "H" strake. Evidently the lap seam between "G" and "H" strakes provided local discontinuity of structure, as the plating was bent very sharply inward just above the seam (Photo F-11). All structural members behind the deflected plating were buckled between frames 124 and 135 (Photos F-12 and F-15). The armor was sprung in a maximum of 10 inches and held by the bent plating behind. No. 2 torpedo bulkhead immediately inboard and the fourth deck were not damaged. Bulkhead 123 was not distorted, but bulkhead 130 was badly buckled (Photos F-13 and F-14) and torn at the face plate of the longitudinal stringer behind the lower edge of the armor belt. Bulkhead 134 also was slightly buckled but not torn (Photo F-16). There was no penetration of structure by fragments.

F2-8. During the third attack of the day, ENTERPRISE was heeled to port in a hard right turn when the second damaging near-miss, a bomb released from a Japanese plane in a 45° dive, glanced off the starboard side at the waterline, frame 30. It detonated about 17 feet below the waterline and 8 feet outboard of the starboard shell opposite frame 30-1/2. Shock was moderate, causing a general flexural vibration of low frequency with an estimated amplitude of one foot.

F2-9. The shell plating was deflected inward over a roughly elliptical area about 48 feet by 25 feet, between frames 23 and 35, from the first platform level to the keel. The maximum indentation was about 2-1/2 feet, at frame 30-1/2, above and below the lower longitudinal behind "F" strake (Photos F-17 and F-18). Four small cracks (circled in Photo F-18) were torn in the shell by the buckling of frames and longitudinals which pulled away from the plating. One crack occurred at the juncture of bulkhead 29 and watertight longitudinal 2-1/2, opening up adjoining compartments, A-6-W, A-7-V, A-11-V and A-901-V. The largest crack was 9 inches by 1 inch at the juncture of tanks A-901-V and A-11-V. All frames, floors and bulkheads in way of deflected plating were bent or buckled (Photos F-19 and F-23) and frames 30, 31 and 34 were broken. The 4-inch STS bulkhead at frame 35 held rigid and no distortion occurred aft of it. Bulkhead 29 was carried away above longitudinal 2-1/2 interconnecting tanks A-7-V and A-11-V and a weld cracked below longitudinal 2-1/2 interconnecting tanks A-6-W and A-901-W. Bulkhead 26 between A-5-W and A-6-W was buckled and forced away from the shell, making a 3-inch by 1/32-inch opening. Bulkhead 18 was bulged forward opening two small leaks near the keel between A-3-A and A-4-W. Inner bottom plating, extending to the fourth deck was bulged inboard in spaces A-9-E and A-6-W from frame 34 to bulkhead 26 (Photo F-24) with a maximum deflection of 15 inches at a point just below longitudinal 2-1/2 at frame 31.

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F2-10. The weakened structure showed signs of panting with the ship underway; so temporary shoring was installed in A-505-A to strengthen the first platform over A-9-E and A-6-W and the inboard bulkheads of A-7-V and A-11-V. There was no penetration of structure by fragments.

F2-11. Several other bombs detonated close enough to the ship to throw geysers of water on the side. The only damage noted, however, was a pattern of small fragment holes in the hangar curtain at frame 102 on the port side, probably resulting from a near-miss off frame 95.

3. Damage and Damage Control Measures -Piping, Machinery and Electrical

F3-1. The "M" and "F" loops of the degaussing cables externally fitted on the port bow were cut by the first hit as it passed out through the shell and by fragments. About 20 lighting cables located on the forecastle forward of frame 9 were also cut by fragments. No. 2 radio direction finder loop on the port catwalk forward was knocked over the side and the receiver and power pack were wrenched loose from the bulkhead of the direction finder room.

F3-2. As a result of the second hit, firemain risers were carried away at frame 40, port and starboard, in A-208-1L and on the port side in A-306-L. The main had been segregated at frame 111 port and starboard prior to the action, creating 4 separate sections. Ventilation blower 2-43 was damaged, its control panel destroyed and motor shaft bent and all ventilation ducts in the blasted areas were demolished.

F3-3. There were about 30 gouges and burrs on the main elevator plungers, the largest being about 1 inch long, 1/2 inch wide and 1/16 inch deep in the starboard- plunger. The starboard pitch and roll guide and gear rack were also slightly gouged.

F3-4. Remote control and telephone cables for GROUP I 5-inch battery, all power, lighting, fire control and I.C. cables in A-208-1L and A-306-L and many cables in A-307-1L and 308-L were cut. Controllers for two sprinkling valves were damaged, several power panels destroyed and two ammunition hoist motors were torn loose from their foundations in A-208-1L. The flooding and sprinkling remote control station in A-306-L and auxiliary Battle Dressing Station II were destroyed. Vacuum tubes were shattered and leads broken by shock in all transmitters in Radio II (A-0201-C).

F3-5. The most serious damage from the shock of the first near-miss bomb detonation was a crack which occurred in the after bearing pedestal of No. 2 H.P. turbine. The pedestal was cast iron and formed an integral part of the after lower section of the turbine casing. The crack extended fore and aft on the inboard side, just above the fillet to the lower flange of the pedestal.

F3-6. The cracked pedestal was repaired temporarily by securing an angle support, built up of a 1-inch plate vertical leg, 1-1/4-inch plate

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horizontal leg and 1-1/4-inch plate gussets to the foot and vertical webb of the pedestal which were ground to make a neat fit. The horizontal leg of the angle support was secured by extra long bolts passing through the foot of the pedestal, and the vertical leg of the angle was secured to the webb of the pedestal by eight body-bound bolts and one cap screw.

F3-7. In addition to the cracked pedestal and also as a result of the shock of the first near-miss, the forward and after gyros spilled a small quantity of mercury, the foremast was rotated in its socket throwing the SG radar wave guide out of alignment, the YE homing antenna drive shaft was disabled, an overboard flushing line was cracked at frame 130 in C-409-L and fourteen fuel oil tank level gauges were broken.

F3-8. Shock of the second near-miss threw No. 1 elevator pump and motor off their foundation in A-9-E and bent the drive shaft. This, together with damage from the second hit, effectively disabled the elevator. In addition, some lengths of high pressure hydraulic piping were distorted and ruptured, the secondary drain pump in A-9-E was thrown off its foundation and broken and overboard piping and valves from the pump were ruptured. Two fresh water pumps were damaged.

4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures

F4-1. Peak tank A-1-W was flooded by seas coming in through fragment holes from the first bomb hit in way of and above the waterline. No attempt was made to control this flooding until ENTERPRISE returned to port. The tank was then pumped out with submersible pumps and the holes were patched.

F4-2. Flooding after the second hit came from the broken firemains in A-208-1L and A-306-L. Firemain valves 5-56-2 and 5-57-5 were closed to stop flooding from ruptured risers at frame 40 after it was found that remote controls for root valves in the risers were inoperable and the valves were inaccessible because of 6 feet of flood water in A-406-A. A-410-A and A-412-A were flooded to a depth of two feet from A-307-1L through holes in the third deck opened by the pulling up of stanchions. A small amount of water ran down ventilation duct outlets, located just above the second deck, into magazines A-509-M, A-510-M, A-514-M, A-520-M, A-521-M, A-524-M, A-601-M, A-602-M, A-704-M and A-705-M. Some water also leaked through the fragment hole in hatch 4-39 into magazine trunk A-508-T.

F4-3. The four rows of wing tanks in way of the first near-miss were generally empty except for tanks in the second row between torpedo bulkheads 2 and 3, which were about three-quarters full of fuel oil. Three outboard tanks, C-35-F, D-3-F, and D-13-F, were holed by the detonation and flooded to the waterline. C-35-F and D-3-F flooded immediately. D-13-F flooded more slowly, at about 3000 gallons per hour, and was controlled with pumps. A list of 2-1/2° to starboard resulted from the flooding.

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F4-4. Tank relief valves in compartments C-409-L and D-401-L above the flooded tanks were gagged to prevent progressive flooding. The list was removed by partially counterflooding six diagonally opposite forward tanks, A-48-F, A-54-F, B-14-F, B-16-F, B-22-F and B-28-F. Although no explanation was given for not completely flooding two or three of these tanks, it is possible they were already partially full.

F4-5. Compartment A-7-V flooded completely and compartments A-11-V and A-901-V flooded to a depth of 19 feet in about 1-1/2 hours through small cracks in the hull opened by the second near-miss. A-9-E flooded to the fourth deck through ruptured drainage piping and through the overflow pipes from fresh water tanks, A-4-W, A-5-W and A-6-W. Very slow flooding occurred in these three tanks through cracked plating and bulkheads. A-3-A also flooded to a depth of almost six feet.

F4-6. The slow flooding resulting from the second near-miss could not be controlled by the ship's pumps because the drainage pump in A-9-E was disabled and subsequently submerged and severed power leads in the vicinity of frame 35, cut by the second bomb hit, prevented the use of electric submersible pumps until casualty power leads could be rigged.

F4-7. Drafts resulting from the flooding and counterflooding were approximately 30 feet forward and 29 feet aft. Drafts prior to the action were approximately 26 feet forward and 28 feet aft.

5. Fire and Firefighting

F5-1. Heat generated as the first bomb pierced the flight deck set fire to planking in way of the hole. A plane parked nearby caught fire and leaked gasoline which burned on the deck. Passage of the bomb also set fire to some rags, bunting and small cordage in A-101-A. The burning plane was pushed over the bow and the small fires quickly extinguished.

F5-2. Several fires resulted from the twofold detonation of the second bomb. Three planes triced up in the overhead and one plane on the hangar deck near frame 40 were ignited by hot fragments or flash from the detonation of the tail section. These fires were quickly extinguished by the sprinkling system which was turned on immediately in the forward end of the hangar. Fires in bedding, office files, etc. in A-105-L, started by hot fragments, also were extinguished without difficulty.

F5-3. A small fire started in protective clothing and personal effects in A-306-L from detonation of the main portion of the second bomb. This fire was extinguished by water from the ruptured firemain riser at frame 40 on the port side of the compartment. The only serious fire, a combination electrical and Class A fire, occurred in A-208-L. Dense smoke filled the compartment and hampered firefighters, but was partially cleared by turning on the supply ventilation in A-309-LM and A-310-11 M. The fire was brought under control within an hour by water and CO 2 .

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6. Japanese Bombs

F6-1. Recognizable fragments of the second bomb were recovered, including several pieces of the tail fuze, small pieces of the nose fuze, pieces of the nose, body and conical tail and one tail strut. With these, the bomb was identified as a 250 Kg No. 25 "Land" bomb which corresponds approximately with the U.S. 500-pound GP type. The conical tail section was secured by a row of screws to a collar, which in turn was riveted to the cylindrical body. This weak connection, later corrected by the Japanese, probably caused the rupture of the bomb. The tail cone, containing about one quarter of the explosive, fell to the hangar deck and detonated, set off by the tail fuze as described in paragraph F2-3. From the large size of the fragments, the fact that unburned powder still clung to these fragments and the extent of damage, it is estimated that the tail portion detonated low order. It is believed that the main portion also detonated low order.

F6-2. Although no conclusive evidence exists for identifying the other three bombs, it is believed that they were of the same type and size. The first bomb detonated high order, judging by the excellence of the fragment attack, which was, however, of a different character than that of the first bomb hit on 24 August. The size of the holes left in the ship's structure by the passage of the bomb indicates a diameter of about 14 inches. The two near-miss bombs which struck close to the starboard side also evidently detonated high order. As experience has often indicated, the water prevented underwater fragment attack. The shock of the detonation was in both cases sufficient, however, to open up the shell by structural failures.

7. Conclusion

F7-1. Again, as during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the excellent damage control organization of ENTERPRISE prevented fires from getting out of hand and enabled the ship to continue in the battle as an almost normal fighting unit. Measures taken to train the crew and to strip the ship of all inflammable material had been continued at an accelerated pace. Linoleum and paint were being removed, wooden articles, overstuffed furniture and transoms had been put ashore, office files, libraries and publications had been reduced to a minimum, and a policy of keeping only one week's supply of inflammable materials stowed above the waterline had been established.

F7-2. As in the action of 24 August, flooding of watertight compartments through piping, ventilation ducts, etc., occurred. Firefighting water found its way down ventilation ducts into some of the magazines, and elevator pump room A-9-E flooded partly through relief valves in overflow pipes from the three fresh water tanks forward. In way of the near-miss aft, however, tank relief valves were accessible and were gagged by the ship's force to prevent progressive flooding in spaces above those opened to direct flooding.

F7-3. Flooding resulting from the two near-misses probably could have been avoided had the outboard spaces been full of water instead of empty.

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F7-4. The crack sustained by the after bearing pedestal of No. 2 H.P. turbine casing from the shock of the first near-miss again demonstrated the poor shock resisting qualities of cast iron. During the ship's availability in the summer of 1943, this pedestal casting was replaced with one made of cast steel. It was decided, however, not to replace the undamaged cast iron pedestals of the other turbines. It is, therefore, of particular interest to note that the casualty occurred again on 11 April 1945 on No. 3 H.P. turbine as a result of an underwater detonation.

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Photo F-1: First hit. View of bomb entry hole in flight deck.

Photo F-2: First hit. Bomb passage hole in port side of forecastle deck.

Photo F-3: First hit. Bomb exit hole in way of degaussing cables and fragment holes on port bow.

Photo F-4: First hit. Fragment holes on port bow. Fragment exit holes circled on starboard bow.

Photo F-5: Second hit. View from hangar deck showing bomb entry hole in flight deck and point of impact on transverse bent at frame 43.

Photo F-6: Second hit. Hangar deck at hatch 1-39, looking aft. Main portion of bomb passed through deck aft of hatch on centerline. Tail portion struck and detonated on starboard side of hatch.

Photo F-7: Second hit. Hatch 2-39 on second deck looking forward. Main portion of bomb passed through hatch to A-306-L. Fragment holes are from detonation of tail portion at main deck above.

Photo F-8: Second hit. Third deck near point of detonation of main portion of bomb in A-306-L.

Photo F-9: Second hit. Blast effect in A-306-L, starboard side looking aft. Stanchion in center is at frame 50.

Photo F-10: Second hit. Blast effect in A-208-L, showing lifting of main deck and tearing of bulkhead 42.

Photo F-11: First near-miss. Starboard side frames 123-135 in way of detonation. Note wooden plugs driven into rivet holes by divers.

Photo F-12: First near-miss. Looking aft and outboard to frame 127 and shell in tank C-35-F. Note sharp bends in shell at seam between G and H strakes.

Photo F-13: First near-miss. Looking aft to bulkhead, frame 130 in tank C-35-F. Note deep wrinkles in bulkhead plating.

Photo F-14: First near-miss. Looking forward and outboard in tank D-3-F showing distorted stiffeners on bulkhead 130.

Photo F-15: First near-miss. Tank D-3-F looking aft and up to armor deck.

Photo F-16: First near-miss. Tank D-13-F, looking forward and outboard to shell and upper portion of bulkhead 134.

Photo F-17: Second near-miss. View of damage to shell frames 23-35 starboard.

Photo F-18: Second near-miss. View of damage to shell with small cracks in plating circled.

Photo F-19: Second near-miss. Tank A-5-W looking forward and outboard to shell and swash bulkhead 24.

Photo F-20: Second near-miss. Tank A-6-W looking down and aft on forward side of bulkhead 29.

Photo F-21: Second near-miss. Tank A-11-V looking forward and down to swash bulkhead 32.

Photo F-22: Second near-miss. Tank A-11-V looking down and forward between frames 33 and 34. Note break in frame 34.

Photo F-23: Second near-miss. Looking down into tank A-7-V.

Photo F-24: Second near-miss. Deflected inner bottom plating in A-9-E, looking forward on starboard side.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION G

HISTORY

30 OCTOBER 1942 TO 18 MARCH 1945

1. The Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November 1942

G1-1. In Noumea, shipfitters and machinists from VESTAL (AR4), a construction battalion and the ship's force worked continuously to repair damage incurred in the Battle of Santa Cruz. Work was not completed on 11 November, however, when ENTERPRISE was ordered to proceed to Guadalcanal.

G1-2. The Japanese had assembled a large force with which to make a last supreme effort to drive the U.S. forces from Guadalcanal. It was essential to reinforce our troops and destroy the Japanese force. ENTERPRISE'S planes, operating from Henderson Field, gave air support to U.S. ground forces on Guadalcanal and made strikes against the Japanese Fleet in the battle which culminated in the defeat of a superior Japanese force by two U.S. battleships and escorting destroyers in the night surface engagement of 14-15 November, and the full retreat of the remnants of the Japanese Fleet on 15 November.

G1-3. Unremitting repair work on ENTERPRISE succeeded in readying the forward elevator for testing at the height of the battle. However, because of the possibility that it might not come up again after being lowered, the tests were postponed and ENTERPRISE completed her part in the engagement with only two elevators operating. After her return to Noumea on 16 November, work was continued, although no effort was made to repair the damage caused by the two near-misses received on 26 October beyond restoring watertight integrity and stiffening weakened frames forward as extended drydocking would have been required. Canvas partitions sufficed to replace demolished joiner bulkheads in the officers' country forward until permanent repairs could be made the following summer.

2. Winter and Spring 1943

G2-1. From December 1942 until May 1943, ENTERPRISE operated out of Espiritu Santo spending a relatively quiet time in port with occasional sorties for patrol, submarine hunting or training duties. The only action occurred at the end of January when her planes provided air cover for CHICAGO which had been damaged by Japanese bombers and torpedo planes in the evening of 29 January. Unfortunately, a force of 11 or 12 Japanese torpedo planes, intercepted in a projected attack on ENTERPRISE, succeeded in hitting CHICAGO with four additional torpedoes which sank her. The enemy planes were all shot down subsequently by AA fire and fighter planes. *

* BuShips War Damage Report No. 37

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G2-2. ENTERPRISE sailed for Pearl Harbor on 1 May where she was drydocked from 18 to 29 May for the repair of the underwater damage suffered in the Battle of Santa Cruz. On 27 May, Admiral Nimitz presented the award of the Presidential Unit Citation to ENTERPRISE, the first carrier to receive this distinction.

3. Overhaul, Summer 1943

G3-1. After leaving drydock on 29 May, ENTERPRISE remained in Pearl Harbor during June and part of July. A few alterations, including fitting of identification radar, removal of paint and inflammable stores to fume-tight compartments below the waterline fitted with mechanical ventilation and CO 2 fire extinguishing systems, and fitting of watertight quick-acting scuttles in hatches leading to elevator machinery and pump room A-9-E, were accomplished during this period.

G3-2. On 14 July, ENTERPRISE departed Pearl Harbor for Puget Sound where she was placed in No. 5 graving dock on 23 July. During the period from 23 July to 26 September blisters were fitted between frames 36 and 150 to effect improvement in stability necessitated by the/increase in topside weights resulting from wartime alterations. Her original gasoline tanks were replaced with saddle tanks which had been devised to give increased protection against underwater attack, shells, bombs, splinters, etc. (A discussion of this type of tank is included in BuShips War Damage Report No. 39 "WASP").

G3-3. In addition to the two major structural alterations mentioned above, compartments A-18 and A-25, made available by the change in gasoline stowage, were altered to provide additional 40mm, plane ammunition and incendiary bomb stowage; gasoline mains were extended aft; a manually-controlled inert gas system was installed to replace the CO 2 system for protection and purging of gasoline lines; and air-driven defueling pumps were fitted at each fueling station on the flight and hangar decks to expedite the draining of fuel tanks in returned planes.

G3-4. Firefighting facilities were improved by the installation of manually-controlled fixed fog nozzle systems in many spaces and steam smothering lines in the machinery spaces and by replacing chemical foam generators with new design mechanical foam pressure proportioners. Additional cutout valves were fitted in the damage control and firemain systems and two 1000 GPM Diesel-driven centrifugal pumps were installed, one in A-9-E and one in D-523-E, and connected to the fire-mains.

G3-5. The entire ventilation system was revised to improve watertight integrity and living conditions. The system was altered in the steering motor room to prevent a recurrence of the casualty of 29 August 1942 and terminals of all natural exhaust ducts from forward magazines were raised 5 feet above the second deck.

G3-6. Other alterations included fitting 60-pound STS plating around trunk D-304-T between the second and third decks leading to the after

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magazines; installation of internal degaussing cables; addition of several radars; replacement of the two forward flight deck catapults with units of a later design; and an increase of armament by the addition of 8 - 40mm twin mounts and several 20mm guns. All alterations, trials, etc. were complete and ENTERPRISE was ready for sea 31 October.

4. Amphibious Operations and Strikes, Winter 1943-44

G4-1. On 1 November, ENTERPRISE departed Puget Sound for Pearl Harbor where on 10 November she joined the task force which was to support the landings on Tarawa, Makin and Apamama in the Gilbert Islands. On board were newly organized teams of night fighters, "Bat Teams," each consisting of a radar-equipped Avenger torpedo plane and two Hellcat fighters. ENTERPRISE planes struck at Makin during the three-day period 19-21 November and during the nights of 24, 25 and 26 November her night fighters successfully repulsed attacks by Japanese torpedo bombers against the task force. ENTERPRISE withdrew on the afternoon of 28 November, her part in the operation against the three islands completed. On the way back to Pearl Harbor she circled north of the Marshalls in order to launch a strike against shipping and shore installations on Kwajalein. She arrived in Pearl Harbor 9 December.

G4-2. ENTERPRISE departed Pearl Harbor 16 December to participate in the landings on Kwajalein in the Marshalls. Operating to the south and west of the islands, she provided planes for the bombardment of enemy aircraft and ground installations, for combat air patrol, anti-submarine patrol, photographic reconnaissance and for direct support of landing troops. The Japanese offered comparatively little resistance. No special night fighters were required and the occupation was completed by 4 February.

G4-3. On 16 February, planes from ENTERPRISE participated in strikes against shipping and oil storage installations at Truk. Although the major units of the Japanese Fleet had already left that base, six enemy combatant ships and many enemy auxiliaries were sunk or damaged. The strikes continued through the seventeenth. Then the U.S. carriers and their escorts retired rapidly to the northeast, pausing to launch two strikes against shore installations on Jaluit, 20 February.

5. Spring Activities, 1944

G5-1. On 7 March, ENTERPRISE headed once more for the Southwest Pacific where her planes provided air support, combat air patrol and anti-submarine patrol for the landings on Emirau. She then joined Task Force 58 and participated in strikes against Peleliu and Koror in the Palau Islands, Yap and Ulithi in the western Carolines and, as the group retired eastward, against Woleai.

G5-2. ENTERPRISE planes flew their first strikes against airfields and installations in Hollandia on 21 April in support of amphibious operations in Tanahmerah Bay. She remained in the area

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until 26 April, when, after a final strike against Wakde Island, she retired to the newly won harbor at Manus to repair a hydraulic leak in the steering engine and to pick up replacements.

G5-3. On 29 and 30 April, six strikes were flown by ENTERPRISE planes each day against ground installations and aircraft on Truk. Her task group then continued eastward to Majuro, where they anchored 4 May.

G5-4. After a month of relative inactivity, ENTERPRISE departed Majuro on 6 June with Task Group 58.3 to support landings on Saipan. Her first fighter sweeps were sent against the Island on 11 June and continued for the next three days. On 15 June the landings took place, supported by carrier planes and bombardment by surface ships. While repulsing an air attack, superficial damage to superstructure was sustained when a 40mm shell from a U.S. vessel struck ENTERPRISE.

G5-5. It was suspected that the Japanese Fleet was in the vicinity, and during 17 and 18 June the U.S. ships worked around to the west of Saipan, searching for the enemy fleet. On 19 June the U.S. task group was attacked by more than 400 Japanese dive bombers and torpedo planes, the majority of them carrier type aircraft. So effective were the combat air patrol and anti-aircraft defense, that approximately 366 enemy planes were destroyed, ENTERPRISE fliers accounting for 19. Unfortunately search planes could not discover the Japanese naval force until the afternoon of the twentieth, some 670 miles west of Saipan. Moderate damage was inflicted on the enemy and one carrier was sunk. The Japanese retired rapidly westward so that, although contact was maintained by search planes through the following day, the distance was too great to launch a strike. ENTERPRISE and the other U.S. vessels then returned closer to Saipan from where she launched daily strikes against Guam between 28 June and 5 July. She returned to Eniwetok on 9 July and from Eniwetok proceeded to Pearl Harbor where she had availability at the Navy Yard from 16 July to 3 August.

6. Advance to the Philippines, 1944-45

G6-1. At the cost of hard fighting and many casualties, Saipan was established as a base from which the strategic bombing of Japan could take place. In addition, it afforded protection to the northern flank of the line of advance from the Central Pacific to the Philippines, toward which the amphibious forces of the Southwest Pacific were also headed. A base in the western Carolines was needed, however, and the Palau Islands were chosen.

G6-2. To divert attention from the projected landings on Peleliu in the Palau Islands, Task Group 38.4, which included ENTERPRISE, made a raid on the Volcano and Bonin Islands. While the other carriers of the task group struck at Iwo Jima, she launched fighter sweeps against Chichi Jima and provided combat air patrol and photographic reconnaissance.

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G6-3. After a brief stop at Saipan, ENTERPRISE sent fighter sweeps and photographic missions against Yap and Ulithi on 6, 7 and 8 September, followed by strikes against Malakai Harbor in the Palau Islands on 10 and 11 September.

G6-4. On 15 September, troops landed on Peleliu with planes from ENTERPRISE furnishing a part of the direct air support. She continued to provide air support until 18 September when she retired to Manus.

G6-5. The task group returned to patrol duties west of the Palaus on 27 September remaining for the next eight days ready to intercept any attempt by the Japanese Fleet to repeat the tactics used at Saipan.

G6-6. During the operations against the Palau Islands, another task group was making the first large raids on Formosa and the northern Philippines. These were designed to divert the Japanese away from the amphibious operation and to whittle down the enemy's strength in the Philippines. Opposition was so light that the decision was made to accelerate the speed of advance by landing directly in the Philippines.

G6-7. ENTERPRISE'S part preliminary to this landing was to strike north of the Philippines as a unit of one of three task groups. On 10 October her planes flew against Okinawa Shima in the Ryukyus. The next day she provided combat air patrol while planes from other carriers attacked northern Luzon. On 12 and 13 October, strikes were made against strong Japanese installations on Formosa, On 15 October, from a position east of Luzon, ENTERPRISE sent a fighter strike and sweep against Manila and on 18 and 19 October her planes made bombing and strafing strikes against aircraft and installations at Legaspi and Manila.

G6-8. The landings on Leyte took place 20 October, with ENTERPRISE planes among the air support groups. She left the next day, however, and headed toward Ulithi as the task group had been out since 24 September and other ships were available to cover the operations. But on the twenty-third, intelligence advised that the Japanese Fleet was at last coming out of hiding to throw all of its weight against the U.S. foothold in Leyte Gulf and all available American vessels were readied for action.

G6-9. The Japanese attack was three-pronged. One force came up from the south, through the Sulu Sea toward Surigao Strait, south of Leyte; a central force passed north of Palawan into the Sibuyan Sea, heading for San Bernardino Strait, north of Samar; and a northern force sailed south from Japan directly toward Samar and Leyte. The resulting Battle for Leyte Gulf accordingly developed in three parts, known respectively as the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle off Samar and the Battle off Cape Engano.

G6-10. ENTERPRISE planes participated in action against all three of these Japanese Forces. On the morning of 24 October, they damaged two battleships and a cruiser in the Sulu Sea and in the afternoon they scored torpedo and bomb hits on a third battleship in the Sibuyan Sea. During the night and next day, the Seventh Fleet bore the brunt of the attacks from the Japanese southern and central forces. The southern force was routed in the night Battle of Surigao Strait and the next morning the powerful central force was engaged by a task unit of CVE's. During

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this time, ENTERPRISE had steamed north with the Third Fleet to engage the Japanese northern force off Cape Engano. Five strikes launched by ENTERPRISE on 25 October assisted in sinking four Japanese carriers and damaging battleships and other units.

G6-11. This ended ENTERPRISE'S part in the largest Naval engagement of the war. For the remainder of the month, she remained on patrol east of Samar and Leyte, providing combat air patrol, survivor searches and search-attack groups. On 30 October, a strong enemy air attack developed which included suicide plane crashes on FRANKLIN* (CV13) and BELLEAU WOOD (CVL24). One ZEKE, although on fire from repeated hits, dived on ENTERPRISE from the starboard beam, crossed the after flight deck, narrowly missed parked planes and fell into the sea on the port quarter. The next day the task group departed for Ulithi.

G6-12. ENTERPRISE spent only three days at Ulithi, leaving on 5 November with Task Group 38.4. On 11 November, a successful strike was made on a Japanese convoy landing troops in Ormoc Bay on the west side of Leyte and on 13-14 November a heavy attack was made against shipping in Subic and Manila Bays. Many ships were sunk or damaged. After routine patrols and fueling near Palau, the task group returned on 19 November to attack Clark Field and Subic Bay.

G6-13. After the strike of 19 November, ENTERPRISE retired eastward sending planes against the airfields at Yap before anchoring in Ulithi on 22 November. Five days later, she departed for Pearl Harbor arriving 6 December for two weeks' availability at the Navy Yard where new four-bladed propellers were fitted in an effort to reduce vibration during high speed turns. The new propellers were successful and on 24 December she departed for the Philippines.

G6-14. After the successful landings at Leyte and Mindoro, it was decided to land on Luzon and Lingayen Gulf was chosen to achieve surprise in the rear of the main Japanese forces on the island. In order to protect the amphibious operations, a strong force of carriers and other ships operated between Luzon and the mainland of Asia.

G6-15. ENTERPRISE joined Task Group 38.5, a night carrier group forming part of this strategic support force, on 5 January. During the following twenty days, her planes performed routine patrols, participated in strikes against airfields on Luzon, shipping off the coast of Indo-China and installations on the coast of China and made sweeps along the coastal area of the China Sea from Formosa to Hong Kong.

7. Landings on Iwo Jima, February 1945

G7-1. In February, as a diversion for the planned amphibious operations against Iwo Jima, carriers of the Fifth Fleet sailed north from Ulithi to within 120 miles of Honshu. While planes from the other carriers struck at airfields, ground installations and shipping in the Tokyo area, ENTERPRISE provided planes for combat air patrol.

*BuShips War Damage Report No. 56

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G7-2. The carriers then retired southward, arriving near Iwo Jima on the evening of the landings, 19 February. For almost three weeks thereafter, until 10 March, ENTERPRISE planes had a busy routine of day and night combat air patrol and strikes against airfields on Chichi Jima. With the bitter struggle for Iwo Jima almost completed, ENTERPRISE returned to Ulithi on 12 March.

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Photo H-1: Dud hit. Forward elevator showing point of initial impact.

Photo H-2: Dud hit. Port side of island and navigating bridge showing brackets broken by passage of bomb.

Photo H-3: Dud hit. Flight deck amidships showing main portion of bomb and scattered lumps of picric acid.

Photo H-4: "Friendly" shell hit. Parked planes on fire. Note use of low velocity fog applicator to protect man with foam hose.

Photo H-5: "Friendly" shell hit. View of flight deck near island after fires extinguished.

Photo H-6: "Friendly" shell hit. Gutted 40mm mounts Nos. 5 and 7.

SECTION H

BOMB DAMAGE

STRIKES AGAINST SOUTHERN JAPAN - 18 AND 20 MARCH 1945

1. 250 KG. DUD BOMB HIT, FRAME 32

2. 5 INCH, 38 CAL. "FRIENDLY SHELL", FRAME 60-70 STARBOARD

3. 5 INCH, 38 CAL. "FRIENDLY SHELL", FRAME 34 PORT

1. Narrative

H1-1. Shortly before operations started against Okinawa Gunto, the fast carrier force which had supported the landings on Iwo Jima was sent north to continue strikes against the Japanese home islands. Its mission was to provide a powerful shield between Japan and Okinawa which could prevent large-scale Japanese Fleet action against the U.S. amphibious operations,, to bombard and bomb strategic shore installations and to seek out and destroy the remnants of the Japanese Fleet.

H1-2. ENTERPRISE departed Ulithi on 14 March as a unit of a night carrier task group. Her primary mission was to furnish night combat air patrol for the task force which struck airfields, factories and ships in the Kyushu, Shikoku and southern Honshu area during the three-day period 18-20 March.

H1-3. On 18 March, the task group operating to the southeast of Kyushu was subjected to sporadic attacks by single Japanese planes. At 0735 a JUDY was sighted on the port bow at a distance of 10,000 yards and an altitude of about 150 feet. Although taken under fire, the plane flew head on toward ENTERPRISE and dropped a 250 Kg bomb which ricocheted off the forward elevator, struck under the navigating bridge and fell to the deck, a dud. Five more attacks were made on the ship during the day without causing damage. The following day, ENTERPRISE was spared attack, but FRANKLIN was badly damaged by two bombs and subsequent fires.

H1-4. On 20 March, the ships were subjected to additional sporadic attacks from Japanese planes. At 1613 a JUDY dropped a bomb about 50 feet to port of frame 60 and at 1626 another plane dropped a bomb off the starboard quarter. Other ships in the vicinity had opened fire and two 5-inch 38 cal. projectiles detonated over ENTERPRISE, starting a moderately serious fire on the flight deck in way of the island and a small fire in shield ammunition at No. 6, 40mm mount. At 1652 another Japanese bomb was dropped but missed the port quarter.

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H1-5. The task group retired to the southeast on the twentieth, and on 22 March, ENTERPRISE, in company with other damaged ships, returned to Ulithi for repair.

2. Dud Bomb of 18 March

H2-1. On 18 March as described in paragraph H1-3, a bomb was released almost horizontally from masthead height, struck the forward elevator at frame 32 about 7 feet to starboard of the centerline, ricocheted aft and struck the island structure just below the port side of the navigating bridge at frame 72 (Photos H-1 and H-2). It passed through seven brackets supporting the navigating bridge and primary fly control, tumbling as it went, and broke into two parts. The small tail cone fell to the flight deck, immediately below the navigating bridge and the main portion came to rest farther aft on the flight deck without detonating. Some picric acid was strewn over severed electric cables under the navigating bridge and ignited by short circuits, causing a small fire. Picric acid was also scattered over the flight deck from frame 74 to frame 125, but did not ignite (Photo H-3). The bomb was pushed overboard soon after it hit.

H2-2. Planking on No. 1 elevator was crushed and broken in way of the initial impact over an area roughly 10 feet by 6 feet, the aluminum deck beneath was ruptured and one longitudinal was sheared at frame 34 so that the elevator sagged about 12 inches. Electric cables running along the port side of the island structure to primary fly control and to the alidade on the port wing of the navigating bridge were severed.

H2-3. The small fire under primary fly control was quickly extinguished and temporary repairs were made to No. 1 elevator within half an hour, permitting it to operate. Direction of air activities was shifted to secondary fly control.

H2-4. The bomb was identified as a 250 Kg, streamlined, No. 25, Mod. 2 Ordinary bomb. It corresponds approximately with the U.S. 500-pound GP bomb, but has somewhat greater penetrating ability. Although normally fitted with nose and tail fuzes, it had a plug in its nose fuze seat which partially accounts for its not detonating. The tail cone was fuzed with a B-3(a) fuze which fell out on deck without functioning.

H2-5. Throughout the war ENTERPRISE was favored by good fortune which accounts in no small measure for her survival. This was particularly true in this case, for had the bomb detonated either on impact with the forward elevator or on striking the island, severe damage would have resulted.

3. Near-Misses, "Friendly" Shell Hits and Fire of 20 March

H3-1. On 20 March, as stated in paragraph H1-4, three bombs detonated in the water not far from the ship; one about 150 feet to port of frame 60 and two off the port and starboard quarters, 50 to 100 feet away. These were visually identified as the 250 Kg streamlined Ordinary type. Shock

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cracked 2-inch tubing in the relief and replenishing line to the expansion tank of the starboard steering unit and a brazed joint between the flange and shell of a 12-inch copper auxiliary exhaust pipe in the after engine-room. No other damage was reported. Steering was shifted to the port unit until repairs could be effected during the night.

H3-2. During the bombing attack, a 5-inch, 38 cal. projectile, fired by another U.S. ship in the task group, detonated over 40mm mounts Nos. 5 and 7 between frames 60 and 70 on the starboard side of the flight deck. Almost simultaneously a second 5-inch, 38 cal. projectile detonated off the port bow starting a small fire in the ammunition on the shield of 40mm mount No. 6. This fire was quickly extinguished.

H3-3. Shell fragments from the first detonation pierced the belly gasoline tanks of two F6F planes spotted in the vicinity of the hit, igniting gasoline which spread over the flight deck between frames 60 and 75. The burning gasoline ignited two additional planes and initiated the explosive burning of 40mm ready-service ammunition stowed on the shields of Nos. 5 and 7 40mm mounts and .50 cal. plane ammunition piled on the flight deck just forward of the island.

H3-4. Primary fly control, the main communication office, radio central and CIC were made untenable by heat and smoke and abandoned via 