2018 was a pivotal turning point in the foreign policy of North Korea. It marked a drastic shift from the previous year’s “fire and fury” rhetoric by both U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un. History was made on June 12, 2018 in Singapore as Trump became the first sitting U.S. President to engage in direct talks with the DPRK government. The international community cautiously observed this unexpected détente between the two normally hostile countries with great attention.

The 2018 US-DPRK Summit held in Singapore, CNN

This interest was especially true of Japan.

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe once said that “there can be no normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea unless the abduction issue is resolved.” This explicit declaration is representative of the current administration’s firm stance regarding the issue of over a dozen Japanese nationals who were systematically abducted by North Korea (DPRK) in the 1970s and 1980s and forcibly kept within the country for decades. Debated intensely over multiple generations, these kidnappings have played a key factor in the spread of conservative nationalism in Japan since the end of the Cold War to the present day.

The previous week before the Singapore summit, Abe personally visited the White House to discuss Japan’s concerns over the abductions. Trump assured that he would “absolutely” discuss the issue with Kim. For Japan, the abductions were a top agenda point to be raised, but America appeared to have placed it on the backburner in favor of more pressing issues such as denuclearization and security. While the two leaders signed an agreement regarding the repatriation of Korean War remains during the summit, concrete information on the Japanese abductees, if anything substantial was brought up, was not made public.

As evident by the lack of progress, Japan’s foreign policy priorities with North Korea show a clear conflict of interest compared to different concerns held by America and South Korea. While other stakeholders such as South Korea, China, and Russia engage in talks with the DPRK, Japan remains the most notable outsider or non-direct player in these negotiations. The Abe administration has kept a close eye on these developments, yet it is continuously reluctant to take an active part in establishing communication channels with North Korea. Currently, there are no plans to normalize relations, and the Japanese government have refused to provide sanctions relief until the abduction issue is resolved.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe (left) and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un (right), The Japan Times

The Abduction Issue

The Japanese government officially recognizes 17 nationals abducted by North Korea: eight men and nine women. They were mostly in their 20s at the time of their disappearances, although the youngest, Megumi Yokota, was 13 years old, and the oldest, Yutaka Kume, was 52 years old. A noticeable pattern is most victims being abducted in pairs from coastal towns. Why would the DPRK go to such lengths to abduct foreign citizens? A commonly cited reason is the desire to recruit Japanese language and culture teachers for North Korean spies.

The alleged sites of each abduction, Sankei Shimbun

It has also been suggested that abduction was a part of a greater ambition, which was spreading the DPRK’s state ideology across Asia in the form of ideological revolution. After an extended period of isolation, training, and conversation, the abductees-turned-spies would work for the DPRK. In cases where the abductees would be resilient to indoctrination, North Korean spies could instead easily assume foreign identities and re-enter their respective countries via forged passports.

The focus of the DPRK’s abductee program eventually shifted from the kidnapped themselves to their children. Most adults, due to vivid memories of their home countries, resisted even under extreme brainwashing tactics. In contrast, the offspring of North Korean women and foreigners could be easily indoctrinated into the state ideology from birth, and their mixed racial appearance would make them highly valuable as unsuspected spies. A variation of this program utilized children exclusively birthed among abductees.

Charles Robert Jenkins, an American soldier who lived in the DPRK for 40 years after crossing the DMZ in 1965, became the husband of abductee Hitomi Soga and had two daughters who looked half-Asian and half-Caucasian. Although the family was eventually repatriated to Japan, Jenkins maintained until his death in December 2017 that his children were being groomed to become spies for the regime.

American soldier Charles Jenkins and Japanese abductee Hitomi Soga who were married in the DPRK, from Jenkins’ memoir “Kokuhaku”

Additionally, Japanese were not the only target of the abduction program; Romanians, Lebanese, Thai, and other nationals have been sighted in the DPRK allegedly against their will. With abductees hailing from many countries even outside the Northeast Asian region, it becomes far more than simply a localized dispute between Japan and North Korea. Despite this, Japan is the only country that has brought up their own abductions and turned it into a major issue with public awareness.

The Poster Child of Abductions

On November 15, 1977, a 13-year-old Japanese girl walked home from school in Niigata Prefecture after her evening badminton practice. Under the cloak of the night’s darkness, multiple men jumped her, threw her onto a boat, and took her to North Korea. Due to her young age, it has been speculated that her abduction was likely a mistake. In any case, she was quickly made to learn Korean and ordered by her captors to teach Japanese to spies throughout the duration of her captivity. Her name was Megumi Yokota and to this day, if still alive, she remains in North Korea.

Megumi Yokota, NPR

Back in Japan, Yokota’s family and other members from the local Niigata community were among the first to organize an active campaign to petition the Japanese government to investigate North Korean abductions. The movement did not get major national recognition until 1996 when a former North Korean spy directly testified to Yokota’s abduction. By the following year, Yokota’s family had collected thousands of dollars in donations and over 500,000 signatures from people who supported their cause. The movement was now too big for Japanese policymakers to ignore, and the media gradually increased their coverage.

Megumi Yokota became a household name in Japan and 40 years after her abduction, she remains a symbol for the families demanding that their kidnapped relatives be returned from North Korea. Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump have all met with Yokota’s relatives in solidarity. Manga comics, television movies, an anime short, books, songs, and an award-winning documentary all told her story in a tragic format that attempted to evoke the utmost emotional sympathy from the Japanese public.

Today the Japanese public still believe that Yokota is alive, despite previous reports that she committed suicide due to severe depression. It is known that she eventually had a daughter named Kim Eun-gyong with a South Korean abductee named Kim Young-nam. He later remarried and stated that his previous wife had indeed taken her own life, but Yokota’s parents dismissed the remarks as propaganda he was forced to repeat by the DPRK. In 2014, Kim Eun-gyong and her own infant daughter were allowed to meet with Yokota’s parents in Mongolia, but the true fate of Megumi herself remains unknown.

Representatives of the DPRK have repeatedly stated that the case is a resolved matter, but the Japanese government refuses to acknowledge the provided death certificate as legitimate. DNA results from her supposed cremated remains additionally proved to be inconclusive. Despite the lack of concrete information for either side’s argument, the Japanese media continue to push the narrative of Megumi Yokota being alive in North Korea as a beacon of hope for the eventual repatriation of her and other reportedly deceased abductees.

Conspiracy Theory Turned Diplomatic Crisis

At the time of Yokota’s and the other victims’ disappearances, the abduction issue was regarded as little more than an unverified conspiracy theory, especially by those on the Japanese Left and groups sympathetic to the DPRK. Discussion on abductions at both government and media levels would not occur until the 1987 bombing of Korean Air Flight 858. During its route from Baghdad, Iraq to Seoul, two North Korean agents detonated explosives which killed all 115 people on board. Although one of the terrorists committed suicide, the other named Kim Hyon-hui was arrested alive and admitted that she had been taught Japanese by abductee Yaeko Taguchi to assume her false identity utilized during the attack.

Yaeko Taguchi was abducted at age 22 and has long been cited as dead by North Korea, but Kim Hyon-hui asserts that she is still alive, CNN

This was the first official confirmation ever made about the abductions, and Japan felt compelled to raise the topic when engaging with North Korea. Accordingly, Tokyo began to demand a proper investigation, but the request was met with hostile response; whenever the word “abduction” was brought up during discussions, North Korean diplomats would walk out of the room.

The following decade brought another opportunity, however, when throughout the 1990s Japan began to change its approach. Prime Minister Yoshirō Mori and his successor Junichiro Koizumi both attempted to adopt a less hardline stance, preferring more direct negotiation channels and less reliance on the United States. This thawing mood culminated in Koizumi’s historic visit to Pyongyang in 2002.

Koizumi did not expect North Korea to be open to candidly discussing abductions. To his surprise, the issue did come up when Kim Jong-il publicly apologized for what he claimed to be the deeds of some independent actors’ “misguided heroism.” While not taking direct responsibility for the abductions, Kim admitted to 13 abductees; he stated that eight were dead of natural causes and that five were still alive.

Junichiro Koizumi meets Kim Jong-il at the 2002 Pyongyang summit, Sankei Shimbun

According to defector Jang Jin-sung, who was part of Kim’s entourage of advisors on the morning of the summit, the North Korean government anticipated a package equivalent to $11.4 billion from Japan, and they were willing to do anything to guarantee that they would not lose it. However, the admission was, as described in Jang’s memoirs, a “gross miscalculation” on Kim’s part. Enraged at the revelation, Koizumi’s team demanded the immediate repatriation of the surviving abductees. Desperate for a deal on economic aid, the North Korean side agreed to a temporary visit of the five Japanese nationals back to their hometowns with the stipulation that they would return to Pyongyang after a few weeks.

Hitomi Soga (top left), Yukiki Okudo (middle left), Kaoru Hasuike (middle right), Fukie Hamamoto (lower middle), and Yasushi Chimura (lower right) upon their repatriation to Japan from North Korea, NY Post

Public fallout and intense media coverage soon followed, while the returned abductees eventually opted to stay in Japan permanently at the behest of their families. Kim, as a result, felt that the agreement had been broken and became more reluctant to offer more concessions. Subsequent talks eventually allowed for the abductees’ family members (including Hitomi Soga’s husband Charles Jenkins) to also return to Japan in 2004, but at heavy monetary cost and food aid paid for by the Koizumi administration. Approval ratings for the Prime Minister soon dropped and reeling from the negative response, Japan suspended all further talks of economic relief at later summits with North Korea. Since then, heavy sanctions placed onto the DPRK have not been lifted.

The 2002 Pyongyang summit was a key moment for both sides, but the specific question arose over the exact number of Japanese kidnapped by North Korea. Hitomi Soga was not even on Japan’s original list of missing people and the revelation of her existence cast doubt on the reliability of Tokyo’s claims of who was truly abducted. On the other hand, Soga and her mother were abducted simultaneously, but North Korea claims that the latter never entered their country. Pyongyang has given similar responses to the still-unresolved cases of other missing abductees, and Japan does not view their provided death certificates of the supposedly deceased as reliable evidence.

Historical Troubles

No discussion of present Japan-DPRK relations can be divorced from the problematic interactions both countries have had with each other since the beginning of the 20th century.

In 1910, Japan officially annexed the Korean Peninsula into its empire and would not relinquish its various Asian territorial acquisitions until its surrender to Allied forces in 1945. The Japanese colonial government made significant attempts to replace Korean as a language, names, artifacts, culture, and societal structures, which established generations of resentment from Koreans that persists to this very day.

Japanese officers in Korea during the decades-long colonial period, Getty Images

What is most notable is that both North and South Korea are united in their mutual contempt for their former occupier. Little needs to be said about the bitter political and ideological differences that divided both sides of the peninsula during and following the Korean War, but this shared dislike towards Japan has always been an easily recognizable point of agreement.

While Japan is firm in its stance that the abductions are the biggest roadblock towards normalizing relations with the DPRK, the latter believes itself to be owed compensation in the form of reparations and has little interest in progressing further otherwise. The Abe administration finds itself in the still-unresolved dilemma of being caught between one country that is ostensibly their ally (South Korea) and one that is their hostile neighbor (North Korea), while simultaneously being derided by both for the past.

Although the colonial era ended in 1945, Korean memory of it has not diminished, and these historical grievances continue to have a tangible effect on present relations. One such example can be seen in the lengthy legal case of four elderly South Korean nationals who filed a lawsuit against Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corp in 2005, asserting that they were owed compensation for forced labor during the colonial period. The South Korean Supreme Court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor in 2013 and upheld the ruling in October 2018.

President Moon subsequently drew further ire from the Japanese side after he urged Tokyo to “take a more humble stance” shortly after a 2019 New Year’s conference. In what appeared to be almost a sign of solidarity with Seoul, DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho cautioned his Japanese counterpart Tarō Konō that this case and similar wartime forced labor issues would inevitably be brought up if Tokyo continued to raise the abduction issue.

The Role of the Japanese Media

In the decades before the fateful summit, the abductions received very little news coverage due to the seemingly far-fetched idea that North Korea was responsible for what was still widely believed to be unconnected disappearances. Journalists like Kenji Ishidaka of the Asahi Shimbun attempted to investigate individual cases through interviews with South Korean intelligence agents and even the accomplices of alleged DPRK spies, but the Japanese public at the time appeared to be unwilling to believe the stories without official confirmation from their government or consistently reliable sources.

Widespread interest was thus not truly established until after the Kim-Koizumi meeting occurred. With an official admission from the Dear Leader of North Korea himself and the fact that five Japanese nationals would surprisingly be repatriated after over two decades spent in the DPRK, the public was in an uproar that the kidnappings had gone unnoticed for so long. The very same media that at one point was reluctant to cover the abductions due to the lack of concrete evidence was now operating on a constant news cycle.

The parents of Megumi Yokota, NPR

For the vast majority of Japanese, even in the modern-day Internet age, their major source of information on international affairs is television. Limited in terms of both format and time, this constricted media environment in Japan results in the loss of more careful and extended conversation on the abduction issue, as well as North Korea itself. Another complication arises from the corporate structure of the Japanese mass media. The country’s major networks include NHK, Nippon TV Network, TBS, Fuji TV, Asahi TV, and TV Tokyo. While there are notable ideological differences between them and even among individual journalists within newsrooms, these corporations rely heavily on advertisement sponsors. This has created a condition where news stories are produced largely on viewer response. As for viewership, reports on North Korea-related topics and abductions have consistently recorded high ratings. Remarkably, the 2002 Kim-Koizumi summit was given 30 hours of consistent news coverage in comparison to only 9 hours in total dedicated to the events of September 11, 2001 from Japanese television stations.

Consequently, the abduction narratives created by these news networks have been unvaried, and the journalistic competition has mainly arisen from who can produce the most up-to-date, emotionally stirring, and highest rated abduction issue stories. At the center of their coverage is a theme of victimhood; it has been established with the abductees and then extended to the Japanese people through an undertone of collective suffering. In these narratives, the despotic leaders of North Korea are convenient “villains,” while the kidnapped Japanese nationals are characterized as “innocent” victims taken from their grieving families.

“They’ve said things like ‘it will be resolved for sure this year’ so many times.” News coverage is almost always on the side of abductees and tends to paint Japanese politicians as ineffective in dealing with North Korea, News24

It has been questioned if the Japanese mass media are pushing an exploitative narrative with their reporting angle instead of unbiased stories out of genuine concern. Megumi Yokota’s relatives, like those of the other abductees, consider themselves to be ordinary citizens who only desire for their family members to be returned from North Korea. They have less interest in playing the roles of political props caught between the strained affairs of two governments. Families and repatriated abductees have doubted the motives of both reporters and the Abe administration, but feel trapped in a difficult situation that only grows more precarious with their increasing old age.

Does biased reporting playing into the emotions of audiences truly do anything to move progress on the issue forward? In the over 15 years since the 2002 summit, the answer appears to be in the negative. Most troubling is how alternative perspectives have been suppressed and not given proper airtime for public consideration, which leads to the silencing of abductee families themselves.

The Erasure of Dissent

The “kisha club” system of the Japanese press enables news coverage to maintain a homogeneous tone on key issues and events. In this environment, stories are only covered by a select group of journalists who collectively agree to interview subjects in a specific way, without becoming overly aggressive or confrontational against one another. Supporters of this system assert that this allows for victims of traumatizing crimes to be protected and to establish smooth communication between journalists and government organizations. Critics of this system, however, argue that kisha clubs create an avenue for self-censorship and potential conflict of interest, while obscuring inconvenient truths in the process.

For the abduction issue, too, a set of “rules” has been established on how journalists can interact with the repatriated abductees and their families. Groups and their spokesmen who represent the families declare boundaries for “acceptable” questions and will turn away journalists who stray from these guidelines.

Kaoru Hasuike, one of the five repatriated abductees. He now works as a Korean translator and academic, Asahi

While the typical media narrative has been that the kidnapped Japanese and their families hold nothing but contempt for North Korea, repatriated abductee Kaoru Hasuike continued to respect Korean culture and worked as a translator upon returning to Japan. In interviews, Hasuike firmly condemned his captors, but later explained that he understood the historical grievances North Koreans had for Japan over the colonial wartime past. This is in contrast to mainstream Japanese media outlets which rarely ever discuss these historical logjams during abduction issue coverage.

In 2019, the parents of Megumi Yokotas directly addressed Kim Jong-un in a public message and explicitly stated that they were not opposed to the normalization of Japan-DPRK relations; they only desired for their daughter to be returned. It can reasonably be gathered from this stance that the families of the abductees no longer view the Japanese government as reliable in solving this issue. If they believe that direct bilateral relations with North Korea may help the return of the abductees, the Abe administration needs to consider their perspectives seriously.

Much like how politicians and journalists attempted to exploit the September 11, 2001 Islamic terror attacks on American soil to instill a nationwide sense of solidarity and readiness for conflict, the abduction issue has had an arguably similar effect on Japanese society. While no Japanese administration ever implemented the equivalent of a Patriot Act or directly declared war on North Korea, the same sense of being “for or against” a cause quickly became the dominant narrative. America’s free press eventually allowed for cooler heads to prevail, but Japanese coverage has remained largely the same due to restrictive journalism.

Abductions Turned Agendas

In the weeks leading up to the 2002 Kim-Koizumi summit, the Japanese public appeared to be largely supportive towards the prospect of normalizing relations with North Korea. Yet following the revelation that only five abductees would be returned and that eight were claimed to be deceased, these feelings of hope quickly turned to condemnation of the Japanese government. It was perceived by the public that the Koizumi administration had not done enough to secure the safety of the abductees; some even went as far as to suggest that the eight (and possibly more) deceased abductees were partially his responsibility. Koizumi’s successor, Shinzō Abe, capitalized on this anger and made the abduction a major campaign issue in the lead-up to his eventual election victory in 2006. In a move of emotional strategy, Abe accused those against him as being on the side of North Korea.

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe has been known for hardline stance towards North Korea, Daily Express

Due to the proximal closeness of the DPRK and the strong chord the abduction issue has struck because of the human connection, the Abe administration have in the past attempted to utilize these elements as further justification for its proposal to expand the constitutional legal powers of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF). Abe once called the abduction issue “the most important problem our country faces” and continues to stress its importance with each passing year of his time in office. This continual hardline stance against North Korea has helped him win popular support from the Japanese public and essentially ensures that, for political reasons, there is less incentive that would make Abe change his official policy of “abduction issue first.”

Following Abe’s sudden resignation in September 2007 due to a surge of unpopularity and unexpected poor health, Yasuo Fukuda became the next Prime Minister. His one-year stint in office was marked with weak leadership and low approval ratings, but for the briefest of moments it appeared that North Korea was once again prepared to come back to the negotiating table. In exchange for a partial remission of sanctions, DPRK liaisons promised during 2008 talks in Beijing that they would re-open investigations of possibly living abductees. The Japanese side additionally stated that they would loosen travel restrictions on DPRK government officials and allow their ships to enter Japan’s ports.

Former President George W. Bush with former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, Zimbio

Due to the hostile public reaction to this announcement, the Fukuda cabinet eventually caved into pressure and stated that this would only happen after the abductions were properly investigated. Nevertheless, after a second round of talks, the DPRK appeared more willing to make concessions, but the resignation of Fukuda ended these plans. The following Prime Minsters only managed to serve short terms and offered little to no progress on North Korean issues. During his tenure, Naoto Kan of the more centrist Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) issued an explicit apology in 2010 for the historical colonization of the Korean peninsula, which appeared to be a step in the right direction. This apology, however, was aimed at South Korea with no mention of North Korea.

It was certainly an admirable declaration, although many remained doubtful of the concrete steps the Japanese government were willing to take to financially compensate victims of wartime labor. Regardless, Japan will once again have to engage in the strategy of apology if they ever decide to engage in further talks with the DPRK. Since Tokyo only recognizes South Korea as a legitimate state, North Korea has repeatedly petitioned for their own share of compensation and reparations.

Shinzō Abe, now in his third term after a grand return to politics, is the strongest Prime Minster Japan has seen after a string of weak leaders which wavered in what official policy to take towards North Korea. One positive aspect is that putting aside his hardline stance, his long-lasting cabinet introduces the possibility that a consistent and stable approach to the DPRK can be brokered if Abe is willing to make the first step. It is an inevitability that politicians will be held to public scrutiny on their actions, but if true initial progress in normalizing relations appears likely, the Japanese masses may too support these efforts at reconciliation.

American Involvement

The United States, undoubtedly one of Japan’s closest allies on the world stage, has consistently been the proxy for Japan in dealings with North Korea. Japan maintained its strong solidarity with George W. Bush’s administration, perhaps more than any other country in the world, particularly on its push for the abandonment of the DPRK’s nuclear program. However, upon the U.S. State Department’s removal of North Korea from the official list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in accordance to agreements made during the Beijing six-party talks in the mid-2000s, tensions soon grew from the Japanese side towards America.

To Japan, the abduction issue alone was already enough justification to consider North Korea a terrorist state, but the U.S., at the time, wished to broker a deal of normalized trade relations. Although not enough to drastically divide the normally cordial countries, this fundamental difference in position is a clear example of why Japan will have to find an alternative to detouring through the U.S. to talk to North Korea without hurting its relations with their American ally.

Barack Obama with the parents of Megumi Yokota, The Japan Times

The next stage of America’s involvement with Japan-DPRK relations came with the ascension of Barack Obama into the Presidency. During both of his terms in office from 2008 to 2016, North Korean issues were given less priority and more attention was turned to agreements with China and continual warm interactions with Japan. Like Bush before him, Obama met with the family members of Megumi Yokota and pledged his solidarity with Japan’s push for reaching a solution to the abduction issue. With a relatively weak East Asian policy and lack of focus on North Korea, however, this gesture amounted to little more than a formality. While not as hardline as Abe, Obama similarly did not attempt to pursue direct engagement with Kim Jong-un and instead continued the strategy of noninteraction like his predecessors.

Donald Trump’s unexpected election victory in 2016 led to widespread speculations from pundits and analysts on what direction America would take with North Korea. At the start of Trump’s presidency, Abe was quick to establish close relations, and the two leaders continue to demonstrate a sense of nationalistic sentiments that resonate with their respective voter bases. During a 2017 address to the UN, Trump, presumably at the urging of Abe, directly mentioned Megumi Yokota. These remarks were also repeated during a subsequent meeting with Yokota’s family at the time of a Presidential visit to Tokyo.

Trump, Abe, and the abductee family members, The Japan Times

As of 2019, both work closely with each another on a variety of issues related to North Korea. Abe visited Trump before both U.S. summits with Kim Jong-un and pressed him to raise the abduction issue. While mentioned in passing during the Singapore summit, it was overshadowed by larger points such as denuclearization and only received a brief answer of acknowledgement during a press conference. The February 2019 Hanoi summit ended with no deal it is doubtful that anything substantial was achieved in line with Japan’s interests. As a result of this failure and uncertainty towards America’s future with the DPRK, the Abe administration will likely have to seek a new course of action and not be solely reliant on their ally’s whims.

New Developments

In February 2019, reports arose that abductee Minoru Tanaka was alive and well in Pyongyang decades after his alleged kidnapping while abroad in Europe in 1978. The DPRK government previously denied that Tanaka ever entered their country, but this time they claimed that he was married with two children and had no desire to return to Japan. In addition, coworker Tatsumitsu Kaneda was also revealed to be alive in North Korea under the same circumstances. Like Hitomi Soga before him, Kaneda had not been on the official list of abductees published by the Japanese government. More surprisingly, while this was new information to the Japanese public, the press reported that Pyongyang had repeatedly conveyed this information to Tokyo through covert channels since 2014.

Abductee Minoru Tanaka, allegedly still alive and well in North Korea, Abema Times

The alleged confirmation of Tanaka’s existence proves that other abductees may be alive and that previous denials from North Korea should not be viewed as the final word on the debate. In the best-case scenario, this could possibly even mean that Megumi Yokota did not commit suicide as repeatedly claimed by the DPRK government. If true, however, this introduces a difficult pretense for Japan to accept future promises as factual. At the same time, the Japanese government, as shown in Kaneda’s case, has also been selective in delivering the information about abductees to the public. If both sides really hope to solve the abduction issue, they must operate in good faith and be transparent in sharing the correct facts.

A week after the failed Hanoi summit, Abe stated in an address to the abductees’ families, “I have to meet face-to-face with Chairman Kim Jong-un to resolve this issue.” This remark appears at odds with his previous statements of less direct engagement, and it remains to be seen whether this will be enacted as official government policy. Nevertheless, this change in tone, however precarious it may seem, can be read as an indicator that Japan realizes the need to be more actively engage in communication with North Korea.

Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump at the February 2019 DPRK-US summit in Hanoi, Vietnam which resulted in no deal on either side, CSIS

Another sign arose in March 2019 when, unlike the previous 11 years, the Japanese government decided not to condemn the DPRK for human rights violations in its report to the UN. A clear divergence from the typical strategy of “maximum pressure,” this was cited as an attempt to pave the way towards discussion of the abduction issue with the North Korean side. Of even greater note was the historic, but largely symbolic three-way meeting between Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un, and Moon Jae-in at the DMZ between the two Koreas in June 2019. Does this mark a sign of further progress? As most North Korea watchers are fully aware, new developments related to the Korean Peninsula break quickly and nothing is ever for certain.

Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un, and Moon Jae-in at the DMZ in June 2019, the first ever three-way meeting of its kind in history, Military Times

The Future

At present, Japan is reluctant to believe that the DPRK will hold to any agreed framework while the Kim government is resentful of Japan’s failure to acknowledge and compensate for historical issues. The abduction issue is undoubtedly a pressing crisis for Japan, and the declining health of the abductees’ families places considerable pressure on Abe to find some solution within a time frame that becomes shorter with each passing year. In the greater context of relations with the DPRK, however, it is apparent that the abductions are a small part of a larger picture fraught with historical grievances and controversy.

It is indisputable that the actions of the Imperial Japanese Army under the auspices of Japan’s wartime leadership resulted in immeasurable suffering for those on the Korean peninsula. On the other hand, the DPRK itself is a perpetrator of human rights abuses and engages in activities which violate international law. An objective observer can see the nuances of both points and realize that neither should be regarded as a moral justification for the other. With this in mind, it is understandable that both sides hold legitimate reservations, but they must be overcome at some point. Their future relations cannot be permanently defined by the troubled history they experienced in the past.

Shinzō Abe in talks with Moon Jae-in during a September 2018 New York conference, The Japan Times

The sincerity of Japan’s various apologies directed towards South Korea is open for debate, but at the very least they have offered some form of compensation and expression of regret. North Korea, however, has not been given any direct reparations and there is reluctance from Japan to even use this terminology. If Tokyo wishes to normalize relations, this is an inevitable hurdle that must be overcome. It is frequently a difficult logjam for one country to apologize to another, but Japan should set the tone properly and explicitly. In promising a possible warming of relations, as the Fukuda administration once briefly did, the North Korean side would become more open to discussing the abductions.

On the domestic front, it would benefit Japan to improve the tone of its media coverage surrounding the abduction issue. More perspectives that move past the rigid black-and-white binary of North Korea-related reporting would change public perception for the better. In the lead-up to the summits between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump, Pyongyang took active measures to noticeably reduce the anti-American propaganda within their country as a sign of good will. If the DPRK can achieve this, Japan is more than capable of doing so as well. This would be an easy step in establishing a more friendly tone and reducing animosity.

Photo exhibit dedicated to Megumi Yokota at Tokyo’s Shinjuku Station, Yahoo News Japan

Restrictive mass media additionally prevents the voices of those directly affected from being properly heard. A narrative of ideological homogeneity has been pushed by the Japanese corporate press for years, yet multiple perspectives from repatriated abductees and their relatives exist. While constant media coverage may have at one point been beneficial for families such as the Yokotas in raising awareness of their plight, a lack of concrete progress has reduced it to something akin to emotional exploitation. Others, like Kaoru Hasuike, have made a conscious effort to promote cultural exchange between Japan and both Koreas. With the Japanese media’s surface-level coverage of the abduction issue later translated into other languages and exported abroad for foreign consumption, there is less of a chance of these perspectives receiving wider attention if they are not even promoted within the abductees’ own country.

Moving forward, Japan needs to seek its own independent approach with its DPRK foreign policy. Kim Jong-un has shown a greater willingness to engage with the outside world, which offers the potential for opportunities that previously did not exist. Learning from the failure of the Hanoi summit, however, Japan can look to the U.S. for what to avoid when dealing directly with North Korea. Namely, this entails having tangible near-future goals, reasonable demands, and something of value to bring to the negotiating table. Abe, thus, can set the example of successful negotiation for future administrations to follow.

The situation, of course, is still under very delicate circumstances and a well-prepared plan is necessary for results to be gained. By avoiding an over-reliance on America and improving the tone of its domestic discourse, Japan can achieve results beneficial to not only itself, but to its surrounding Asian neighbors. If Tokyo wishes for a thorough and explicit resolution to the abduction issue, the onus is on them to make the first steps towards peacemaking talks.

“Bring back all the abductees.”

This article was adapted and condensed from an undergraduate thesis I completed upon graduation from the University of Pittsburgh in April 2019. I am incredibly grateful to my advising professor Dr. Seung-hwan Shin for his tireless guidance throughout the academic year. My research came to fruition thanks him and his significant input proved to be crucial with the editing process. The full unabridged paper with an abstract, bibliography of sources, and footnotes can be downloaded as a PDF here.