5. God is the sole cause of every state of affairs, that is to say, for every substance x, and for every property f that x has at each moment of its existence t, God is the sole cause of x ’s having f at t1+y.

5. God is the sole cause of every state of affairs, that is to say, for every substance x, and for every property f that x has at each moment of its existence t, God is the sole cause of x ’s having f at t1+y.

3. If God conserves substance x , then for every property f that x has at each subsequent moment of existence t1+y and onwards , God is the sole cause of x’s having f at t1+y.

3. If God conserves substance x , then for every property f that x has at each subsequent moment of existence t1+y and onwards , God is the sole cause of x’s having f at t1+y.

, so in every subsequent moment, Malebranche contends, God is said to do the same thing, which is to fully specify all the individual attributes and modes of the world, and in the same manner as He did before. Thus divine conservation is continued creation, and God turns out to be the only true cause of anything that occurs:

Just as in the initial act of creation, God alone completely brings the world and everything in it into existence

Just as in the initial act of creation, God alone completely brings the world and everything in it into existence in toto , so in every subsequent moment, Malebranche contends, God is said to do the same thing, which is to fully specify all the individual attributes and modes of the world, and in the same manner as He did before. Thus divine conservation is continued creation, and God turns out to be the only true cause of anything that occurs:

After all, even Malebranche allowed that we can continue to speak of secondary “causes,” so long as we are clear about the fact that they do not really produce any effects – that is, so long as we are clear that they are not true causes at all. For Malebranche, what we refer to as causes are simply “occasional causes” – i.e. the occasions upon which God brings about the effects. This seems very similar to what would be continuous creation under eternalism, where causes are taking to be merely passive and do not really have an active tendency to produce any effects.

After all, even Malebranche allowed that we can continue to speak of secondary “causes,” so long as we are clear about the fact that they do not really produce any effects – that is, so long as we are clear that they are not true causes at all. For Malebranche, what we refer to as causes are simply “occasional causes” – i.e. the occasions upon which God brings about the effects. This seems very similar to what would be continuous creation under eternalism, where causes are taking to be merely passive and do not really have an active tendency to produce any effects.

The intuitive connection between continuous creation and being the total and exclusive cause of all their properties is easy to see. If God created a bent lamp at t3, God must create it with a determinate property – i.e. God must cause it to be either bent or non-bent. It is a simple matter of the law of excluded middle that for any property and any given moment, either an individual has that property at that moment or it does not. Moreover, in the case of creation in the narrow sense (i.e. of bringing about the existence of a new entity ex nihilo), it seems obvious that it must be God who causes the individual to possess the properties it has. After all, if t3 is the first moment of the bent lamp existence, then there was no opportunity prior to t3 for anything else to act upon the bent lamp and cause it to possess the properties it has at t3 of being bent.

The intuitive connection between continuous creation and being the total and exclusive cause of all their properties is easy to see. If God created a bent lamp at t3, God must create it with a determinate property – i.e. God must cause it to be either bent or non-bent. It is a simple matter of the law of excluded middle that for any property and any given moment, either an individual has that property at that moment or it does not. Moreover, in the case of creation in the narrow sense (i.e. of bringing about the existence of a new entity ex nihilo), it seems obvious that it must be God who causes the individual to possess the properties it has. After all, if t3 is the first moment of the bent lamp existence, then there was no opportunity prior to t3 for anything else to act upon the bent lamp and cause it to possess the properties it has at t3 of being bent.

What Malebranche claims is that God cannot be the total and exclusive cause of the existence of all things without also being the total and exclusive cause of all their properties substantial and accidental – accepting continuous creation commits us to accepting that God is the total and exclusive cause of all their properties as well. In order to defend this claim, Malebranche needs some additional assumptions. Continuous creation entails, for example, that God’s willing that I exist brings about my existence at this moment, but it certainly does not entail (not by itself, anyway) that my being seated at this moment is brought about by God’s willing that I be seated. This inference depends crucially upon the assumption that God cannot will that some contingent individual exist without willing that it exist with determinate properties.

What Malebranche claims is that God cannot be the total and exclusive cause of the existence of all things without also being the total and exclusive cause of all their properties substantial and accidental – accepting continuous creation commits us to accepting that God is the total and exclusive cause of all their properties as well. In order to defend this claim, Malebranche needs some additional assumptions. Continuous creation entails, for example, that God’s willing that I exist brings about my existence at this moment, but it certainly does not entail (not by itself, anyway) that my being seated at this moment is brought about by God’s willing that I be seated. This inference depends crucially upon the assumption that God cannot will that some contingent individual exist without willing that it exist with determinate properties.

On the face of it, the doctrine of continuous creation says nothing even close to occasionalism. It affirms that God is the total and exclusive cause of the existence of all contingent things at all times, and thus it clearly entails that secondary causes do not bring about the existence of anything. But occasionalism claims that secondary causes do not bring about anything at all – that is, in addition to denying that secondary causes bring about the existence of anything, occasionalism also denies that secondary causes make any contributions to properties or states of things. This is clearly a stronger claim, and it is far from obvious that (CC) is in any way committed to it.

On the face of it, the doctrine of continuous creation says nothing even close to occasionalism. It affirms that God is the total and exclusive cause of the existence of all contingent things at all times, and thus it clearly entails that secondary causes do not bring about the existence of anything. But occasionalism claims that secondary causes do not bring about anything at all – that is, in addition to denying that secondary causes bring about the existence of anything, occasionalism also denies that secondary causes make any contributions to properties or states of things. This is clearly a stronger claim, and it is far from obvious that (CC) is in any way committed to it.

The philosopher Malebranche is probably the most well known occasionalist. Although he offers at least four distinct arguments for occasionalism, interpreters generally regard his continuous creation argument or Divine Concursus Argument (DCA) as the most powerful. It is an argument based not upon the nature of created substances, but upon the nature of the creation of those substances.

The philosopher Malebranche is probably the most well known occasionalist. Although he offers at least four distinct arguments for occasionalism, interpreters generally regard his continuous creation argument or Divine Concursus Argument (DCA) as the most powerful. It is an argument based not upon the nature of created substances, but upon the nature of the creation of those substances.

God creates the world in the beginning and preserves it by continually recreating it ex nihilo, the upshot of which is that He is the sole efficient cause and created “agents” contribute nothing to the production of their effects.

Occasionalism: God creates the world in the beginning and preserves it by continually recreating it ex nihilo, the upshot of which is that He is the sole efficient cause and created “agents” contribute nothing to the production of their effects.

God creates the world in the beginning and continually preserves it in existence, but also retains His status as the continual efficient cause of the world by actively “concurring” with the activity of created agents therein, who thus actively contribute to the production of their effects. Yet, He is capable of both withholding his concurrence, thereby rendering natural agents impotent, as well as producing their effects alone without any natural agent at all.

Concurrentism: God creates the world in the beginning and continually preserves it in existence, but also retains His status as the continual efficient cause of the world by actively “concurring” with the activity of created agents therein, who thus actively contribute to the production of their effects. Yet, He is capable of both withholding his concurrence, thereby rendering natural agents impotent, as well as producing their effects alone without any natural agent at all.

God creates the world in the beginning but after this initial act His causal activity is effectively exhausted in his continual existential preservation of the world, which thus operates semi-autonomously and on the basis of the causal powers of the created agents therein, who thus produce their effects alone and unaided.

Mere-conservationism/weak concurrentism: God creates the world in the beginning but after this initial act His causal activity is effectively exhausted in his continual existential preservation of the world, which thus operates semi-autonomously and on the basis of the causal powers of the created agents therein, who thus produce their effects alone and unaided.

production of the creature. The idea that God’s creative activity is continuous in the universe is known as “continuous creation.” However, there are different versions of this doctrine. We can define it using Quinn's definition of Continuous Creation (CC):

sustained by the causal power of the First Cause. Therefore, the First Cause, or God, is the

So even with eternalism, we need an explanation for the block universe, as even without change. Actuality and Potentiality are still present because Scholastics construe existence along the lines of an activity – thus their favorite translation of the Latin verb esse is: “act of existing.” So the existence of a contingent being (anything whose essence and existence are distinct) is

Another alternative is demanding an explanation for the Block universe itself because its essence and existence are still distinct. Edward Feser proposed this in his essay

It does not seem to be the end of the argument though, we have an alternative possibility, which is that the First Cause may be external to the whole chain and in direct contact with each member, even if it turns out to be infinite in length. But we are gonna need a different way to get to God. Instead of concluding God exists using the impossibility of a infinite hierarchical causal series. Perhaps we can conclude the existence of something whose essence and existence are identical simply by the sheer fact that something which esse is distinct from its essence is merely a contingent being (it does not have to exist), thus it still needs an explanation for why it exists at all times that it exist.

It does not seem to be the end of the argument though, we have an alternative possibility, which is that the First Cause may be external to the whole chain and in direct contact with each member, even if it turns out to be infinite in length. But we are gonna need a different way to get to God. Instead of concluding God exists using the impossibility of a infinite hierarchical causal series. Perhaps we can conclude the existence of something whose essence and existence are identical simply by the sheer fact that something which esse is distinct from its essence is merely a contingent being (it does not have to exist), thus it still needs an explanation for why it exists at all times that it exist.

—the causing of sheer existence of a substance. It wouldn't be possible because as shown in earlier posts, an eternalist universe is incompatible with the powers ontology, which the arguments conception of God and his conservation of creation entails an entails an eternalist universe. So instruments are unable to be productive, thus cannot be used as instruments to produce the existence of substance. So the very notion of a chain of physical causes maintaining things in existence makes absolutely no sense. As hierarchical causal series don't exist within the universe. So this argument would not work as it concludes God via the impossibility of an infinite regress in a hierarchical causal series.

Even without wondering how God can use instruments to create ex nihilo —the causing of sheer existence of a substance. It wouldn't be possible because as shown in earlier posts, an eternalist universe is incompatible with the powers ontology, which the arguments conception of God and his conservation of creation entails an entails an eternalist universe. So instruments are unable to be productive, thus cannot be used as instruments to produce the existence of substance. So the very notion of a chain of physical causes maintaining things in existence makes absolutely no sense. As hierarchical causal series don't exist within the universe. So this argument would not work as it concludes God via the impossibility of an infinite regress in a hierarchical causal series.

As i am aware, the thomistic proof is one way of cashing divine conservation. Because there is a hierarchical causal series that sustains things in being at each moment that it exists, thus you get divine conservation. Since we have finite hierarchical causes in relation to giving and sustaining being (creation ex- nihilo—the act of causing something to exist as a whole substance from nothing), Feser seems to suggest the First Cause, God, could use creatures as active agents to conserve creation.

As i am aware, the thomistic proof is one way of cashing divine conservation. Because there is a hierarchical causal series that sustains things in being at each moment that it exists, thus you get divine conservation. Since we have finite hierarchical causes in relation to giving and sustaining being (creation ex- nihilo—the act of causing something to exist as a whole substance from nothing), Feser seems to suggest the First Cause, God, could use creatures as active agents to conserve creation.

Without a hierarchical causal series, we wouldn't even get a infinite regress, and thus cannot come to conclusion that a purely actual actualizer exists. The world consists of a succession of static events and then some of those events are ‘connected’ together by a contingent relation. That relation might be regular succession, counterfactual dependence, probability raising, or something else. There are no irreducible causal powers and change required by the proof in order to succeed.

Without a hierarchical causal series, we wouldn't even get a infinite regress, and thus cannot come to conclusion that a purely actual actualizer exists. The world consists of a succession of static events and then some of those events are ‘connected’ together by a contingent relation. That relation might be regular succession, counterfactual dependence, probability raising, or something else. There are no irreducible causal powers and change required by the proof in order to succeed.

To help visualize this. Think of the world as one giant Stop motion film where all the events are present simultaneously on one giant film reel. These events are merely different but they don't exhibit dynamic change,"things" in any of those events. They don't "Cause" other things. For example, if I try to use the paradigmatic illustration of a hierarchical causal series. My hand pushing a stick which is pushing a stone, there is no sense which it could be said that it's the "thing" which is "my "hand" which is pushing the "thing" which is "stone" it's just that all these objects which are persisting through time persist through discrete temporal parts/stages which are present in these "events" which are merely different from each other but which "Don't do anything" (they just keep sitting there ).

To help visualize this. Think of the world as one giant Stop motion film where all the events are present simultaneously on one giant film reel. These events are merely different but they don't exhibit dynamic change,"things" in any of those events. They don't "Cause" other things. For example, if I try to use the paradigmatic illustration of a hierarchical causal series. My hand pushing a stick which is pushing a stone, there is no sense which it could be said that it's the "thing" which is "my "hand" which is pushing the "thing" which is "stone" it's just that all these objects which are persisting through time persist through discrete temporal parts/stages which are present in these "events" which are merely different from each other but which "Don't do anything" (they just keep sitting there ).

, each at their own respective times characterized by B-relations (earlier,later,simultaneous with). With activity being reduced to mere sequences, nothing depends on another in order to act or exist as production is also reduced to mere sequences.

Secondly, there is something even more problematic, it would deny the existence of hierarchical causal series. As an hierarchical causal series is where the activity of A depends on B (`here and now`) and the activity of B depends on C(`here and now`). But activity in the block universe can only be reduced to sequences of facts which all exist equally

Secondly, there is something even more problematic, it would deny the existence of hierarchical causal series. As an hierarchical causal series is where the activity of A depends on B (`here and now`) and the activity of B depends on C(`here and now`). But activity in the block universe can only be reduced to sequences of facts which all exist equally simpliciter and also presently , each at their own respective times characterized by B-relations (earlier,later,simultaneous with). With activity being reduced to mere sequences, nothing depends on another in order to act or exist as production is also reduced to mere sequences.

(page 227-228), these theories would deny the reality of change, at least if change is defined as the actualization of a potential. Instead, change in exdurantism and perdurantism is analysed as a mere succession of discrete, self-contained objects, parts, or stages. It merely connects static parts in an attempt to manufacture change from changelessness.

So ultimately, if the the consists of a succession of static events, as in perdurantism/exdurantism, we can conclude that the argument would fail. Because It relies on the premise that change is the actualization of potential. And as Edward Feser himself said in

So ultimately, if the the consists of a succession of static events, as in perdurantism/exdurantism, we can conclude that the argument would fail. Because It relies on the premise that change is the actualization of potential. And as Edward Feser himself said in Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (page 227-228), these theories would deny the reality of change, at least if change is defined as the actualization of a potential. Instead, change in exdurantism and perdurantism is analysed as a mere succession of discrete, self-contained objects, parts, or stages. It merely connects static parts in an attempt to manufacture change from changelessness.

So we can't consider that entity A at t1 is really the same A at t3 rather then a distinct but similar entity, so A at t1 does not survive other then an instant, instead of being located at several instantaneous regions, it is an instantaneous object. Thus A does not persist as it only exists for an instant.Then how we say that A persists? I see two possibilities: first, an perdurantist account where it is a whole composed of the different temporal parts), or second, an exdurantist account where it is a set of numerically distinct entities (the distinct temporal counterparts). Both of these accounts of persistence encompass what is called Four-dimensionalism.

So we can't consider that entity A at t1 is really the same A at t3 rather then a distinct but similar entity, so A at t1 does not survive other then an instant, instead of being located at several instantaneous regions, it is an instantaneous object. Thus A does not persist as it only exists for an instant.Then how we say that A persists? I see two possibilities: first, an perdurantist account where it is a whole composed of the different temporal parts), or second, an exdurantist account where it is a set of numerically distinct entities (the distinct temporal counterparts). Both of these accounts of persistence encompass what is called Four-dimensionalism.

If God concurs an entity's existence over multiple times from his beginningless and endless eternity, Then each cannot be considered the same object under eternalism. For example, if God actualized A at t1 and a similar but non-identical G also at t1. We would consider them separate objects, as God cannot give causal powers to two distinct wholly present objects at t1 from his eternity while being considered the same object. But this could also be applied if he was actualizing A at t1 and A at t3. God would be actualizing two

If God concurs an entity's existence over multiple times from his beginningless and endless eternity, Then each cannot be considered the same object under eternalism. For example, if God actualized A at t1 and a similar but non-identical G also at t1. We would consider them separate objects, as God cannot give causal powers to two distinct wholly present objects at t1 from his eternity while being considered the same object. But this could also be applied if he was actualizing A at t1 and A at t3. God would be actualizing two separate wholly present entities from eternity.

Assuming eternalism, let’s go with the possibility that the selfsame entity A is being concurrently actualized by the purely actual actulizer at three different times t1, t2 and t3 by “existing wholly” at each of these times (endurantism), without having temporal parts. As A is a three-dimensional, it occupies a four-dimensional region by being exactly located at several instantaneous regions making up that region.

Assuming eternalism, let’s go with the possibility that the selfsame entity A is being concurrently actualized by the purely actual actulizer at three different times t1, t2 and t3 by “existing wholly” at each of these times (endurantism), without having temporal parts. As A is a three-dimensional, it occupies a four-dimensional region by being exactly located at several instantaneous regions making up that region.

However, this option does not seem to be available: all the facts are eternally given in the MST, and the objective present progresses for the entire present time slice of the whole block. Think of it like this. Would it make a difference for whether the present progresses that I exercised my power to switch on the oven? If I did exercise my power to manipulate kitchen appliances, the progressed present will hopefully at one point contain a delicious cake. If I don’t express my power to switch on the oven, the dough will continue to exist unchanged (only at a later time). So the progression of the present in the MST cannot depend on the manifestation of powers. In the MST’s picture, if there exists a particle in some remote part of the universe such that no causal interaction with any other object is possible for it at the moment, and if this particle remains in a state of absolute rest such that it does not manifest any power, the present will still have progressed for it anyway, according to the MST. The progression of the present thus must be independent the expression of powers.

However, this option does not seem to be available: all the facts are eternally given in the MST, and the objective present progresses for the entire present time slice of the whole block. Think of it like this. Would it make a difference for whether the present progresses that I exercised my power to switch on the oven? If I did exercise my power to manipulate kitchen appliances, the progressed present will hopefully at one point contain a delicious cake. If I don’t express my power to switch on the oven, the dough will continue to exist unchanged (only at a later time). So the progression of the present in the MST cannot depend on the manifestation of powers. In the MST’s picture, if there exists a particle in some remote part of the universe such that no causal interaction with any other object is possible for it at the moment, and if this particle remains in a state of absolute rest such that it does not manifest any power, the present will still have progressed for it anyway, according to the MST. The progression of the present thus must be independent the expression of powers.

, but that powers, at the objective present, determine which facts become present, and maybe even that the expression of powers just is what the progression of the present consists of Wherever there is activity, where powers are manifested, there is the present. On such a view, it would be the manifestation of powers that are responsible for change and for temporal progression.

A proponent of the powers view might object this, and instead argue now that what powers do is not bring new substances or new facts into existence

A proponent of the powers view might object this, and instead argue now that what powers do is not bring new substances or new facts into existence simpliciter , but that powers, at the objective present, determine which facts become present, and maybe even that the expression of powers just is what the progression of the present consists of Wherever there is activity, where powers are manifested, there is the present. On such a view, it would be the manifestation of powers that are responsible for change and for temporal progression.

The same conclusion from eternalism can be concluded with the MST. Since it is essentially eternalism with extra baggage. In the MST, there is genuine change in which moment is present contra eternalism. But there is nothing more than that. There is no genuine change in whether I am sitting, or in whether there are dinosaurs, or whether a war is occurring just like under eternalism. The block is just as stasis as the Eternalist view.

The same conclusion from eternalism can be concluded with the MST. Since it is essentially eternalism with extra baggage. In the MST, there is genuine change in which moment is present contra eternalism. But there is nothing more than that. There is no genuine change in whether I am sitting, or in whether there are dinosaurs, or whether a war is occurring just like under eternalism. The block is just as stasis as the Eternalist view.

The Moving Spotlight Theory (MST) combines the eternalist notion of a block of all facts, events or things. the MST is an A-theoretic version of eternalism: while all facts past, present and future are equally real, there is an objective and progressing present in reference to which the past, present and future can be defined. This is the “spotlight”

The Moving Spotlight Theory (MST) combines the eternalist notion of a block of all facts, events or things. the MST is an A-theoretic version of eternalism: while all facts past, present and future are equally real, there is an objective and progressing present in reference to which the past, present and future can be defined. This is the “spotlight”

present. As we have seen above, both options are off the table.So while we maybe could try to give an account of what it would mean to be active in a static universe, this would be exactly what powers metaphysicians would want to avoid and instead support a non-reductive analysis of causality. For if what looks like activity reduces ultimately to stasis, then causation could not really be about doing. It would only appear to be about doing, just as the figures in animated flip-books only appear to be animated.

Such a reductive analysis is exactly what the proponents of the powers view wanted to get away from. Dynamism, if to be understood non-reductively, either involves production in the sense of bringing into existence (i.e by causing a change) or temporal progression: bringing a dynamic property into the

Such a reductive analysis is exactly what the proponents of the powers view wanted to get away from. Dynamism, if to be understood non-reductively, either involves production in the sense of bringing into existence (i.e by causing a change) or temporal progression: bringing a dynamic property into the objective present. As we have seen above, both options are off the table.So while we maybe could try to give an account of what it would mean to be active in a static universe, this would be exactly what powers metaphysicians would want to avoid and instead support a non-reductive analysis of causality. For if what looks like activity reduces ultimately to stasis, then causation could not really be about doing. It would only appear to be about doing, just as the figures in animated flip-books only appear to be animated.

So just like the Humean, for the eternalist, a physical token is produced can mean nothing over and above it being (regularly, lawfully) temporally located later than another token. I might add that this could include counterfactual dependence.

So just like the Humean, for the eternalist, a physical token is produced can mean nothing over and above it being (regularly, lawfully) temporally located later than another token. I might add that this could include counterfactual dependence.

into the present, if there is no objective present, and both tokens are eternally present at their respective times? On such a view, dynamism and activity can only be reduced to sequences of facts which all exist equally

. Every account of dynamism in eternalism, if dynamism is supposed to bring facts into the present, would have to be reductive in the sense that whatever is being made present would have to be reduced to some notion of dependence and of being located at earlier and later times, which are not ontologically privileged. Activity would be ultimately reduced to a sequence of events. In our case,

into the present is problematic as well. In static eternalism, it is not possible to give a non-reductive account of how one token could bring another one to exist

However, the first option to understand a producing b as a bringing b into the present is problematic as well. In static eternalism, it is not possible to give a non-reductive account of how one token could bring another one to exist presently . Every account of dynamism in eternalism, if dynamism is supposed to bring facts into the present, would have to be reductive in the sense that whatever is being made present would have to be reduced to some notion of dependence and of being located at earlier and later times, which are not ontologically privileged. Activity would be ultimately reduced to a sequence of events. In our case, a is existing presently at whatever time it exists at, and b is existing presently at whatever later time it exists at. How could we say that a brings b into the present, if there is no objective present, and both tokens are eternally present at their respective times? On such a view, dynamism and activity can only be reduced to sequences of facts which all exist equally simpliciter , but also presently , each at their own respective times.

. This external ground of the existence of concrete particulars is incompatible with the understanding of eternalism which requires, instead, that nothing substantial can be added to ‘being located at p ’.

. Nothing can be added. As If a given object, event, or property has been produced. It existentially depends on something external. Something other is the ground for the existence of the given token; it has had the power to produce the given particular. Thus, in a causal power ontology, something substantial has in fact to be added to ‘being located at p ’:

The second option is altogether impossible, since in static eternalism, all facts, past, present and future, timelessly exist simpliciter , so they cannot be brought into existence simpliciter . Nothing can be added. As If a given object, event, or property has been produced. It existentially depends on something external. Something other is the ground for the existence of the given token; it has had the power to produce the given particular. Thus, in a causal power ontology, something substantial has in fact to be added to ‘being located at p ’: b has been produced at p by a . This external ground of the existence of concrete particulars is incompatible with the understanding of eternalism which requires, instead, that nothing substantial can be added to ‘being located at p ’.

. Property tokens are the powers to produce further property tokens, so this could be classified as active potency. Since this generic existential dependence is an umbrella term to catch a lot of different dependence relations, including part–whole relations, we need to qualify it to get an ontologically substantial notion of production:

The powers view entails that in a powers ontology, production entails that the produced token b is existentially dependent on the producing token a . Property tokens are the powers to produce further property tokens, so this could be classified as active potency. Since this generic existential dependence is an umbrella term to catch a lot of different dependence relations, including part–whole relations, we need to qualify it to get an ontologically substantial notion of production: a produced b , if b generically existentially depends on a , and a existed before b existed. We have two possible ways of interpreting the notion that a existed before b did: a either existed presently before b , or simpliciter .

It is worthwhile to discuss whether the block universe which encompasses eternalism and moving spotlight theory are compatible with the powers view, which as discussed by Marius Backman in his paper No time for powers, unsurprisingly turns out not to be. The issue is that in eternalism, events or facts are timelessly given and merely ordered in an earlier/later relation. And that in the moving spotlight, any problems with eternalism and the powers view are also problems for the powers view and the Moving Spotlight theory

It is worthwhile to discuss whether the block universe which encompasses eternalism and moving spotlight theory are compatible with the powers view, which as discussed by Marius Backman in his paper No time for powers, unsurprisingly turns out not to be. The issue is that in eternalism, events or facts are timelessly given and merely ordered in an earlier/later relation. And that in the moving spotlight, any problems with eternalism and the powers view are also problems for the powers view and the Moving Spotlight theory

that it is simply impossible to reductively analyse dynamism in terms and with concepts that the passivist accepts like activity being a mere sequence of events. Hence, any characterisation of dynamism will involve dynamic language.

This is in contrast to passivist views of causation. They analyse activity or dynamic processes reductively as a mere sequence of events. It sees causes as “passive” rather than having any active tendency to bring about their effects. As activity itself would be reduced to mere sequence of events. Power metaphysicians like Ellis, Groff, and Mumford reject this. Groff argues in “Whose Powers? Which Agency?” In

This is in contrast to passivist views of causation. They analyse activity or dynamic processes reductively as a mere sequence of events. It sees causes as “passive” rather than having any active tendency to bring about their effects. As activity itself would be reduced to mere sequence of events. Power metaphysicians like Ellis, Groff, and Mumford reject this. Groff argues in “Whose Powers? Which Agency?” In Powers and Capacities in Philosophy, that it is simply impossible to reductively analyse dynamism in terms and with concepts that the passivist accepts like activity being a mere sequence of events. Hence, any characterisation of dynamism will involve dynamic language.

The powers view of causation is anti passivist and thinks causation is a kind of doing, a bringing about of change. Causes, from this perspective, really do produce effects -- literally. They do not simply precede them, or figure in theories about why they precede them. The idea that causation is productive assumes that activity, or dynamism, is an irreducible feature of the world. Where irreducible dynamism is understood as there being Change everywhere. It is continuous, in the sense that it does not break down into changeless parts. A process being the continuous development of change.

The powers view of causation is anti passivist and thinks causation is a kind of doing, a bringing about of change. Causes, from this perspective, really do produce effects -- literally. They do not simply precede them, or figure in theories about why they precede them. The idea that causation is productive assumes that activity, or dynamism, is an irreducible feature of the world. Where irreducible dynamism is understood as there being Change everywhere. It is continuous, in the sense that it does not break down into changeless parts. A process being the continuous development of change.

To access the impact of an eternalist theory of time on the Aristotelian for God, we first must know what kind of causation is at work here. This would be Aristotle's powers theory of causation. Which is built up on the intuitive idea that when the cue ball knocks the eight ball into the pocket, the cue ball has an active power (active potency) to produce the sinking of the eight ball, and the eight ball has the passive power (passive potency) to be sunk. With the recent resurgence of scholastic metaphysics, there has also been the resurgence of Aristotle's powers view of Causation. (im aware this is a linear causal series of efficient causes and not hierarchical)

To access the impact of an eternalist theory of time on the Aristotelian for God, we first must know what kind of causation is at work here. This would be Aristotle's powers theory of causation. Which is built up on the intuitive idea that when the cue ball knocks the eight ball into the pocket, the cue ball has an active power (active potency) to produce the sinking of the eight ball, and the eight ball has the passive power (passive potency) to be sunk. With the recent resurgence of scholastic metaphysics, there has also been the resurgence of Aristotle's powers view of Causation. (im aware this is a linear causal series of efficient causes and not hierarchical)

From an ontological point of view, stage theory and worm theory are indistinguishable: both affirm the existence of instantaneous three-dimensional temporal parts, or “stages,” and of four-dimensional spacetime worms composed of these parts. However, while worm theorists identify persisting objects – cars, books, bodies, and so on – with worms, stage theorists identify them, as one might guess, with stages. If it exdures, it's a whole object waddling at t1 connected by an “I-relation” to a counterpart whole object flying at t2. The stage theorist says the proper name applies to each temporal counterpart or stage. Stage theory is usually included with perdurantism but as another separate version of it.

According to worm theory, unlike enduring objects, worms are not “wholly present” at any particular moment: rather, they are “partly present” at every moment where they have a temporal part. They persist through time in much the same way that bodies are spread out in space. At this moment, someone could accurately describe my body as resting on both a chair and an ottoman. What this means, of course, is not that my body is resting entirely on a chair and entirely on an ottoman, but rather that part of my body is resting on a chair and another part on an ottoman. The worm “Temporal Parts.” theorist holds that the proper name applies to the spacetime worm.

: According to endurantism, to say that an object persists is to say that it is “wholly present” at different times. Endurantism is sometimes referred to as three-dimensionalism because it conceives of persisting objects as three-dimensional continuants, entities that continue to exist in their entirety over a period of time. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the significance of these characterizations of endurantism is to contrast them with those of its principal competitor, worm theory or four-dimensionalism.

24. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

24. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

23. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite willing that x at t1 to t4 exists, brings about x’s existing at t1+y, then he is causally sufficient for the existence of x at t1 to t4

23. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite willing that x at t1 to t4 exists, brings about x’s existing at t1+y, then he is causally sufficient for the existence of x at t1 to t4

21. The absolutely simple or noncomposite willing that x exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4 brings about x’s existence at t1 to t4.

21. The absolutely simple or noncomposite willing that x exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4 brings about x’s existence at t1 to t4.

20. If the absolutely simple or noncompositeis the concurrent direct cause of x, then it wills x to exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4

20. If the absolutely simple or noncompositeis the concurrent direct cause of x, then it wills x to exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4

17. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite is the cause of composites either directly or indirectly. Then it will have to be the direct cause of the second member of any hierarchical causal series.

17. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite is the cause of composites either directly or indirectly. Then it will have to be the direct cause of the second member of any hierarchical causal series.

12. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause had a beginning or an end, it would have parts which could either be combined or broken apart.

12. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause had a beginning or an end, it would have parts which could either be combined or broken apart.

10. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause were changeable, then it would have parts which it gains or loses— which, being simple or non-composite, it does not have.

10. If the absolutely simple or noncomposite cause were changeable, then it would have parts which it gains or loses— which, being simple or non-composite, it does not have.

38. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

38. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

37. If SEI's willing that x at t1 to t4 exists, brings about x’s existing at t1+y, then he is causally sufficient for the existence of x at t1 to t4

37. If SEI's willing that x at t1 to t4 exists, brings about x’s existing at t1+y, then he is causally sufficient for the existence of x at t1 to t4

34. If SEI is the concurrent direct cause of x, then it wills x to exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4

34. If SEI is the concurrent direct cause of x, then it wills x to exist at each moment that it exists at t1 to t4

31. If SEI is the concurrent cause of things which have their esse distinct from there own intrinsic nature either directly or indirectly. Then it will have to be the direct concurrent cause of the second member of any hierarchical causal series.

31. If SEI is the concurrent cause of things which have their esse distinct from there own intrinsic nature either directly or indirectly. Then it will have to be the direct concurrent cause of the second member of any hierarchical causal series.

26. Whatever is purely actual does not exist in time and is eternal. Because if it existed in time, then it would have potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, which it is not.

26. Whatever is purely actual does not exist in time and is eternal. Because if it existed in time, then it would have potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, which it is not.

24. If that which is subsistent existence itself (SEI) had some potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, then existence would have to be imparted to it by some cause.

24. If that which is subsistent existence itself (SEI) had some potentiality for existence which needed to be actualized, then existence would have to be imparted to it by some cause.

25. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

25. if a cause is eternal and is sufficient for the existence of something, then the effect is also eternal

24. If the purely actual actualizer acts in one eternal act and is causally sufficent for A's existence at t1 to t4, then it is eternally causally sufficient for A's existence at t1 to t4.

24. If the purely actual actualizer acts in one eternal act and is causally sufficent for A's existence at t1 to t4, then it is eternally causally sufficient for A's existence at t1 to t4.

23. If the purely actual actualizer bring about A's existence at t1 to t4, then it is causally sufficient for the existence of A at t1 to t4

23. If the purely actual actualizer bring about A's existence at t1 to t4, then it is causally sufficient for the existence of A at t1 to t4

20.The existence of S depends on A (`here and now`) and the existence of A at any give moment requires the concurrent actualization of A’s potential for existence by the purely actual actualizer (`here and now`).

20.The existence of S depends on A (`here and now`) and the existence of A at any give moment requires the concurrent actualization of A’s potential for existence by the purely actual actualizer (`here and now`).

15. If this purely actual actualizer existed in time, then it would be capable of change, which it is not.

15. If this purely actual actualizer existed in time, then it would be capable of change, which it is not.

So, Fesers three proofs could be combined with additional to also serve as proofs for an eternalist theory of time. For example, after premise 14 of the Aristotelian proof, we could formulate a portion dedicated too deducing an eternalist theory of time where the past, present and future are real.

So, Fesers three proofs could be combined with additional to also serve as proofs for an eternalist theory of time. For example, after premise 14 of the Aristotelian proof, we could formulate a portion dedicated too deducing an eternalist theory of time where the past, present and future are real.

This is why some Theologians like Paul Helm subscribe to an Eternalist theory of time. If there is no beginning for the universe, then it would seem that God does not change in bringing the universe into existence and, given the statis theory of time/eternalism, God does not change by sustaining each temporal event. So God‘s willing the universe does not change and neither does God‘s eternal action. So, If God is not exercising his power to concurrently cause A (or any other currently nonexisting being) but at a later time we observe he does (or ceases to exercise his power to cause A in shrinking block theory and presentism), it's not so much a change in his act as his agency is simple and perfect, then it is us simply experiencing it. So eternalism prevents God's act and being be divided in successive state of affairs or parts.

This is why some Theologians like Paul Helm subscribe to an Eternalist theory of time. If there is no beginning for the universe, then it would seem that God does not change in bringing the universe into existence and, given the statis theory of time/eternalism, God does not change by sustaining each temporal event. So God‘s willing the universe does not change and neither does God‘s eternal action. So, If God is not exercising his power to concurrently cause A (or any other currently nonexisting being) but at a later time we observe he does (or ceases to exercise his power to cause A in shrinking block theory and presentism), it's not so much a change in his act as his agency is simple and perfect, then it is us simply experiencing it. So eternalism prevents God's act and being be divided in successive state of affairs or parts.

Feser's three proofs argue for a God who is the concurrent active agent in the created world. While at the same time being changeless, timeless, immutable, and simple. But this seems to be at odds with non-eternalist theories of times (where the past, present and future aren't all real). Because if a non-eternalist theory of time is true, where there is a succession of state of affairs, then it seems that because he is concurrent active agent at all moments in the created world, he would be exercising his power successively. Which means he wouldn't be changeless, timeless, immutable, and simple as he would have to move to extend his power. But being infinite, God does not even move to extend his power, which is already perfectly extended to all its effects (q. 9, a. 1). Likewise, God is universally operative in every moment, yet not successively, as that is another form of division incompatible with his simplicity (q. 10, aa. 1 & 4).

Feser's three proofs argue for a God who is the concurrent active agent in the created world. While at the same time being changeless, timeless, immutable, and simple. But this seems to be at odds with non-eternalist theories of times (where the past, present and future aren't all real). Because if a non-eternalist theory of time is true, where there is a succession of state of affairs, then it seems that because he is concurrent active agent at all moments in the created world, he would be exercising his power successively. Which means he wouldn't be changeless, timeless, immutable, and simple as he would have to move to extend his power. But being infinite, God does not even move to extend his power, which is already perfectly extended to all its effects (q. 9, a. 1). Likewise, God is universally operative in every moment, yet not successively, as that is another form of division incompatible with his simplicity (q. 10, aa. 1 & 4).

There is a fundamental division in the metaphysics of time between temporal ontology theories that are dynamic, while others are static. Dynamic theories are no doubt the “common sense” view of time, the fundamental nature of things is dynamic, and undergoes changes in ontological status. The world is made up of three-dimensional objects which constantly change, come into being and/or go out of being. There is no sense in which future episodes exist “tenselessly.” Alternatively, advocates of the stasic theory of time assert that objects do exist tenselessly, and the only temporal relations between them are the relations of “before,” “after,” and “simultaneous with.” Thus all objects and events are on an ontological par, whether we think of them as past, future, or present Objects do exist tenselessly, otherwise known as block universe or eternalism. Where the past, present and future are all equal in ontological status.

6. If the cause of a composite thing’s existence at any moment is itself composite, then it will in turn require a cause o f its own existence at that moment.

6. If the cause of a composite thing’s existence at any moment is itself composite, then it will in turn require a cause o f its own existence at that moment.

5. So, each of the things of our experience has a cause at any moment at which it exists.

5. So, each of the things of our experience has a cause at any moment at which it exists.

23. So, either directly or indirectly, each of the things we know from experience has its existence imparted to it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now, by some cause whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself. (2017, pp. 129-130)

23. So, either directly or indirectly, each of the things we know from experience has its existence imparted to it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now, by some cause whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself. (2017, pp. 129-130)

22. This first member could only be something whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.

22. This first member could only be something whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.

21. The causal series this would generate would be a hierarchical one, which cannot regress infinitely but must have a first member.

21. The causal series this would generate would be a hierarchical one, which cannot regress infinitely but must have a first member.

20. If this cause is something the essence o f which is distinct from its existence, then its own existence too must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.

20. If this cause is something the essence o f which is distinct from its existence, then its own existence too must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.

19. Either this cause is itself something the essence o f which is distinct from its existence, or it is something whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.

19. Either this cause is itself something the essence o f which is distinct from its existence, or it is something whose essence and existence are identical, something that just is subsistent existence itself.

18. So, for each o f the things we know from experience, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.

18. So, for each o f the things we know from experience, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.

17. Since its essence and existence remain really distinct at every moment at which it exists, including here and now, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.

17. Since its essence and existence remain really distinct at every moment at which it exists, including here and now, its existence must be imparted to it by some cause distinct from it at every moment at which it exists, including here and now.

13. So, the occurrence of C and thus the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of a purely actual actualizer.

13. So, the occurrence of C and thus the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of a purely actual actualizer.

12. So, either A itself is a purely actual actualizer or there is a purely actual actualizer which terminates the regress that begins with the actualization o f A.

12. So, either A itself is a purely actual actualizer or there is a purely actual actualizer which terminates the regress that begins with the actualization o f A.

10. If A ’s existence at the moment it actualizes S presupposes the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence, then there exists a regress of concurrent actualizes that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualizer.

10. If A ’s existence at the moment it actualizes S presupposes the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence, then there exists a regress of concurrent actualizes that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualizer.

9. A’s own existence at the moment it actualizes S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence or (b) A ’s being purely actual.

9. A’s own existence at the moment it actualizes S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence or (b) A ’s being purely actual.





Problem with the DCA

But as Louis Mancha has noted in his essay concurrentism: a philosophical explanation . The DCA relies on the traditional theistic premise that conservation is just continued re-creation . And it seems Malebranche is not entitled to interpret the doctrine this way, as in scholatic talk, continuous creation is the continual inpouring of esse to the creature, and not a series of successive acts of creation. So although there may be no real distinction between creation and conservation, we do not yet get the implication that the existence of the creature is being re-created. Instead, the distinction only means God creates and conserves via the same action and not different actions. This leaves no room to interpret conservation as continuous re-creation. If this is the case, premise 2 does not follow from premise 3, for the traditional interpretation leaves open the possibility that creatures can be causally responsible for the changes that occur in later states.



Properly interpreted, continuous creation does not entail that God continually re-creates each thing at each successive moment. An additional argument for that inference is required, and it is just not there in Malebranche. In general, the Scholastics all held that there was a difference between existence as permanent and as successive, with divine conservation establishing permanent existence in a creature. If a creature has permanent existence, then its existence is the same, numerical existence at each moment that it exists: it “remains to the end” (though it does not follow that it exists without fail). Successive existence, on the other hand, consists of a new, different esse conferred at each successive moment of “its” existence. I say, “its,” for it is unclear on a continuous re-creation view as to whether you would have the same substance from one moment to the next.



One could not help, but too notice that this distinction is identical to the distinction between endurance and perdurance/exdurance. On the one hand, something perdures if and only if it persists by having different temporal parts at different times. On the other hand, something endures if and only if it persists by being wholly present at different times. We can see the parallelism between a different esse conferred at each successive moment of its existence and the contemporary notion of a temporal part, as well as between the notion that a permanent entity existence is the same, numerical existence at each moment that it exists and the contemporary notion of being wholly present.





Saving the DCA with eternalism

Let's assume eternalism and go with the possibility that the selfsame entity x is conserved by God at two different times t1 and t2 by “existing wholly” at each of these times (endurantism), without having temporal parts. As x is a three-dimensional, it occupies a four-dimensional region by being exactly located at several instantaneous regions making up that region.



If God sustains the same object over multiple times, Then each cannot be considered the same object. As Gods conservation is creation ex nihilo and timeless , God would create x at t1 and x at t2 “simultaneously” in a single timeless act, so he would create two seperate objects as they are created via separate inputs of esse. So it would be Successive existence, which consists of a new, different esse conferred at each successive moment of “its” existence.



But the definition of endurantism is that a thing persists by being "wholly present" at any time that the thing exists. If the thing receives different esse conferred at each successive moment of “its” existence. Then you would have a different thing at each moment, as at each moment it is coming into being from non-existence. We can't consider that entity x at t1 is really the same x at t2 rather then a distinct but similar entity, so x at t1 does not survive other then an instant, instead of being located at several instantaneous regions, it is an instantaneous object.



Then how we say that x persists? I see two possibilities: first, an perdurantist account where it is a

whole composed of the different temporal parts), or second, an exdurantist account where it is a set

of numerically distinct entities (the distinct temporal counterparts).

Perdurantist approach

Lets go with perdurantism/worm theory, Worm theory seems to comport well with the doctrine of continuous creation. Indeed, it seems to offer a quite simple and straightforward way of understanding the doctrine – to say that God is continuously creating me is simply to say that at each moment God creates the temporal part of me that exists at that moment.



But worm theorists need to explain why a bunch of distinct instantaneous objects (stages) should be regarded as composing a further persisting individual or worm, and the most plausible accounts worm theorists have offered all require some kind of causal relation(s) between stages. So the earlier temporal parts will have to causally contribute to one (or both) of the following: (a) the existence of the later temporal parts, and/or (b) at least some of the properties possessed by the later parts.Call the former version existence-causal worm theory and the latter version property-causal worm theory.



But if God conserves (creates) x at t1 and x at t2, then it is paradoxical, to say the least, to insist that earlier temporal stages make causal contributions to the existence/properties of later stages when those later stages would not even exist unless they were immediately created by God. If God has to step in at later moments to create them, then it is hard to see how anything other than God can contribute to the existence or properties these later stages possess. So A’s earlier stages cannot cause the existence A’s of later stages.



For example, I would like to believe that the actions I am performing right now will cause certain words and sentences to be recorded on my laptop’s hard drive at later times. But if God must repeatedly cause my computer to exist at every subsequent moment, then it is hard to see how anything other than God can determine the state of its hard drive at those moments. Thus worm theory/perdurantism would be false.

Exdurantist approach

If perdurantism is false under continuous creation. Then the only way one can retain the notion that x persists is by accepting a exdurantist/stage theorist account of persistence. By saying that x persists (i.e. exist for longer than an instant) indirectly via having temporal counterparts that exist at other times. But in stage theory, exduring object do not survive, as the different stages are different objects. At best, an exduring object “continues” in some way, but the momentary stages are no more identical than are links in a chain.



So Malebranche would be entitled to view continuous creation as continuous re-creation. As in exdurantism, things at different stages are different objects, so God would have to pour a separate esse to conserve it. So he would continually re-create x at each moment that it existed. So God would be conserving "its" successive existence. I say, “its,” for it is unclear on a continuous re-creation view as to whether you would have the same substance from one moment to the next. It seems incoherent to affirm that God repeatedly causes multiple separate entities to exist at multiple instants in the same timeless act and affirm they all make up a single persistent entity





How exdurantism leads to occasionalism

According to (CC), God is the sole and total cause of the existence of every contingent being at every moment. Thus, the fact that I exist right now and am typing on my computer has no direct bearing upon whether I or my computer will exist a moment from now. What exists at any given moment is entirely up to God, so I will exist a moment from now if, and only if, God causes me to exist then – same goes for my computer and every other contingent thing. So where do secondary causes enter the picture? For example, I would like to believe that the actions I am performing right now will cause certain words and sentences to be recorded on my laptop’s hard drive at later times. But if God must repeatedly cause my computer to exist at every subsequent moment, then it is hard to see how anything other than God can determine the state of its hard drive at those moments.



We probably didn't even need to go this far, because as we seen, eternalism leads to causes being passive with no active tendency to bring about an effect. Both denying that secondary causes bring about the existence of anything and that secondary causes make any contributions to properties or states of things. If causes are merely passive, then they cannot make a contribution to anything at all. So it seems simply combining (CC) with eternalism leads to occasionalism even without Malebranche's DCA.





From Occasionalism to Pantheism via the Eleatic Principle

All that needs to be shown now is that occasionalism entails pantheism. This argument requires a crucial additional premise called the Eleatic Principle. Mark Colyvan summarises the principle as follows: “This principle justifies belief in only those entities to which causal power can be attributed, that is, to those entities which can bring about changes in the world.”



A rigorous argument for the Eleatic Principle lies outside the scope of this post. It seems, however, that to posit the existence of a substance that had no causal influence upon anything whatsoever would render the idea of substance rather meaningless. Edward Feser himself says in Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction , that to have substantial form rather than an accidental form and thus of its being a true substance, with an independent existence, rather than being a mere modification of something else, is having its own irreducible causal powers. For example, water has an intrinsic tendency to act as a solvent and to freeze at 32 degrees Fahrenheit.



For something to have irreducible causal powers is for it to be irreducibly directed toward the production of a certain outcome or range of outcomes as to an end; it is for it to exhibit irreducible teleology. And a substance is that reality to whose essence or nature it is proper to be by itself (esse per se , or to be in itself [esse in se]) and not in another subject . But as causes in eternalism are merely passive without active tendency to produce any effects, then things would not have irreducible causal powers. So, it would not be a substance, thus have no essence or nature.



Given the Eleatic Principle, pantheism (or panentheism) follows from occasionalism straightforwardly. Occasionalism states that only God’s will is causally efficacious; therefore, by the Eleatic Principle, God is the only substance, and only God exists. Without irreducible causal powers, everything else is a mere modification of him.



Although there are some contemporary analytic philosophers who have rejected the principle, one of the reasons for this fact is that these philosophers have invariably been motivated by their explicit commitment to atheistic naturalism, and the primary alternative they present is not tenable for theists: that an entity has to have a spatio-temporal location in order to be real.



Edward Feser himself seems to have come to the same conclusion while discussion Occasionalism in his Five Proofs Of The Existence Of God



Consider first why occasionalism cannot be correct. Since agere sequitur esse— what a thing does necessarily reflects what it is— if something could not truly do anything, if it had no causal efficacy at all, then it would not truly exist. Occasionalism would thus entail that God alone truly exists, since only he truly does anything. (p. 235)





What this means for the Thomistic proof

This would leave Feser's Thomistic proof as incoherent. For he arrived at the idea of God as First Cause only because he reasoned from the existence of things other than God which require him as a cause. He started with the idea that things have their essence distinct from their existence, inferred that they must be caused by something external, and deduced in turn that there must be a cause which sustains them in existence and which is subsequent existence itself. If Fesers Thomistic proof argument now says that God alone exists, he would be abandoning the very grounds that led him to affirm the existence of God as a being which is subsequent existence itself in the first place.









Feser's Neo-platonic proof and Eternalist theory of time

Feser's Neo-platonic proof could be considered a more broad version of his thomistic proof. As his thomistic proof is based off the essence/existence distinction (so essence-existence composites). His neo-platonic proof can make use of numerous ways things are composites like having material parts and metaphysical parts like form and matter.



With the extreme similarities to the thomistic proof, we can suspect it would suffer from the same problems. Which it does. Firstly, the very notion of a hierarchical chain of physical causes productively causing composites in existence makes absolutely no sense as again we are dealing with an eternalist universe. So this argument would not work as it concludes a non-composite via the impossibility of an infinite regress in a hierarchical causal series. But it is also salvageable. Because composites still require a cause and God can still directly cause composites ex nihilo ( out of nothing) or cause the block universe itself ex nihilo. God does not cause things ex materia (out of material). My refutation of the Neo-Platonic proof will essentially be a shortened version of my refuation of the Thomistic proof.





Exdurantist account of persistence again

But Assuming eternalism, let’s go with the possibility that the selfsame entity A is being concurrently actualized by the purely actual actualizer at three different times t1, t2 and t3 by “existing wholly” at each of these times (endurantism), without having temporal parts. As A is a three-dimensional, it occupies a four-dimensional region by being exactly located at several instantaneous regions making up that region.



If God concurs an entity's existence over multiple times from his beginning-less and endless eternity, Then each cannot be considered the same object under eternalism. For example, if God caused composite A at t1 and a similar but non-identical composite G also at t1. We would consider them separate objects, as God cannot cause two distinct wholly present objects at t1 from his eternity while being considered the same object. But this could also be applied if he caused composite A at t1 and composite A at t3. God would be causing two composite wholly present entities from eternity.

So we can't consider that entity A at t1 is really the same A at t3 rather then a distinct but similar entity, so A at t1 does not survive other then an instant, instead of being located at several instantaneous regions, it is an instantaneous object. Thus A does not persist as it only exists for an instant. Then how we say that A persists?

Again, we have two possibilities: first, an perdurantist account where it is a whole composed of the different temporal parts), or second, an exdurantist account where it is a set of numerically distinct entities (the distinct temporal counterparts). But as discussed earlier, if God causes composite A at t1 and A at t3, then it is paradoxical, to say the least, to insist that earlier temporal stages make causal contributions to the existence/properties of later stages when those later stages would not even exist unless they were immediately caused by God. So can only have a exdurantist account of persistence.

Occasionalism and Pantheis m all over again

With an exdurantist account of persistence and God being the direct cause of all composites at any moment they exist. Then again we can apply Malebranches Divine Concursus Argument (DCA) for occasionalism. Because the premise that continuous creation is just continuous re-creation would be correct. As in exdurantism, things at different stages are different objects, so God would cause a different composite at that moment. So he would continually re-cause composite A at each moment that it existed. So God would be causing its successive existence.





And as its paradoxical to think a counterpart composite can have causal contributions to the existence/properties of later counterpart composites when those counterpart composites would not even exist unless they were immediately caused by God ex nihilo . If God has to step in at later moments to create them, So only God can contribute to the existence or properties these later counterpart composites possess. The fact that I exist right now and am typing on my computer has no direct bearing upon whether I or my computer will exist a moment from now. What exists at any given moment is entirely up to God, so I will exist a moment from now if, and only if, God causes me to exist then – same goes for my computer and every other contingent thing. So where do secondary causes enter the picture?



For example, I would like to believe that the actions I am performing right now will cause certain words and sentences to be recorded on my laptop’s hard drive at later times. But if God must repeatedly cause my computer to exist at every subsequent moment, then it is hard to see how anything other than God can determine the state of its hard drive at those moments. Thus occasionalism follows, and given the Eleatic Principle, pantheism (or panentheism) follows from occasionalism straightforwardly. Occasionalism states that only God’s will is causally efficacious; therefore, by the Eleatic Principle, God is the only substance, and only God exists. Without irreducible causal powers, everything else is a mere modification of him.

What this means for the Neo-Platonic proof

The Neo-Platonic proof attempts to establish a noncomposite or utterly simple ultimate cause of composites. But if his argument conclusion leads to pantheism (or panentheism), it would be incoherent. He started with the idea that things have parts and thus are composites, inferred that they must be caused by something external, and deduced in turn that there must be a cause which is a noncomposite. If Fesers Neo-Platonic proof argument now says that God alone exists. Either the noncomposite or utterly simple God is a composite, as this argument deduces a noncomposite from the existence of composites. And because these composites are part of God himself, then he would be a composite. Or these composites are really noncomposites as they are "part" of a noncomposite God. Either option means Feser would be abandoning the very grounds that led him to affirm the existence of God as a being which is noncomposite or utterly simple in the first place.









Conclusion

After all of this, we can say that all of Feser’s three proofs fail, as the arguments conclusions would contradict the premises, which were supposed to help deduce these conclusions.

For the Aristotelian proof, it would presuppose a theory of time, which denies the existence of irreducible causal powers and entails at the very least, a temporal parts account of persistence and at most a exdurantist account of persistence, which would deny the reality of change (as scholastic would define it). Contradicting numerous premises, mainly premise 1 and 2.

For the Thomistic proof, it would suffer the same problems but is easily salvageable unlike the other. But even then, if it is true, it entails eternalism. Given eternalism and continuous creation, it entails occasionalism. Given occasionalism, it entails pantheism. Given pantheism, God is the only substance, so there would be no essence/existence distinction nor anything essence that needs to be actualized.

For the Neo-Platonic proof, it would suffer the same problem as the Thomistic proof, it entails pantheism. Given pantheism, God is the only substance and everything else is just a part of him. So, either God is a composite or everything else is a noncomposite or utterly simple.





What should Feser do?





The best approach i think for Feser or anyone else in order to avoid this, is to attack my premises that try to use Feser's arguments to support eternalism. I personally think this will be a very tough task, as A-theorists like William Lane Craig, Alan Padgett, RT Mullins all argue that a timeless, immutable, and simple God with his causal activity in the universe, would lead to an eternalist theory of time. Perhaps one way is to invoke Aquinas No Real Relations doctrine. Which is that since God is simple and lacks all accidents, He cannot possess any relations to creatures or any real relation to the world. So one could say that while A does have the real relation of being actualized by God, God does not have a real relation of actualizing A. So he could avoid eternalism and avoid my refutation entirely. It should strike one as implausible that a relation obtains between one relatum and not the other relatum in the relation.





Typically we think that a relation is a two way street. When x stands in a relation to y, it is also the case that y stands in a relation to x. This move, however, says that x stands in a relation to y, but that y does not stand in any relation to x. This appears to be self-contradictory. This seems to be saying that a relation obtains when in fact no relation obtains. If one is forced to deny the commonsense notion of relations in order to maintain divine timelessness, simplicity, and immutability, one should reconsider one’s position.





This claim would also undermine his three proofs, as they all argue for an the uncaused ultimate cause of everything other than itself. So, things depend on God’s causal activity. If God has no real relation to creatures then he is not really the ultimate cause of everything other than itself but only in our minds. It would also seemingly deny God's power (active potency) actually causes anything as he has no real relation of causing anything.

