Could I have but a line a century hence crediting a contribution to the advance of peace , I would gladly yield every honor which has been accorded me in war

Douglas MacArthur (26 January 1880 – 5 April 1964) was an American five-star general and Field Marshal of the Philippine Army. He was Chief of Staff of the United States Army during the 1930s and played a prominent role in the Pacific theater during World War II, and in the Korean War. He received the Medal of Honor for his service in the Philippines Campaign, which made him and his father Arthur MacArthur, Jr., the first father and son to be awarded the medal. He was one of only five men ever to rise to the rank of General of the Army in the US Army, and the only man ever to become a field marshal in the Philippine Army.

Quotes [ edit ]

I have returned.

Duty, Honor, Country " — those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be.

They are your rallying point to build courage when courage seems to fail, to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith, to create hope when hope becomes forlorn.

America has evolved a model for this new free world … America has demonstrated that peoples of the East and peoples of the West may walk side by side in mutual respect and with mutual benefit

It was close; but that's the way it is in war. You win or lose, live or die — and the difference is just an eyelash. To Gen. Richard Sutherland after their flight over Japanese held territory to reach Australia (17 March 1942), as quoted in MacArthur and the War Against Japan (1944) by Frazier Hunt, p. 71



I came out of Bataan and I shall return! While transferring trains at Terowie, South Australia regarding the Battle of Philippines (20 March 1942) [ specific citation needed ]



I said, to the people of the Philippines whence I came, I shall return. Tonight, I repeat those words: I shall return! After his arrival in Australia from the Philippines (30 March 1942)



I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil. On landing in Leyte, Philippines (20 October 1944)

By the grace of Almighty God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil.

I see that the flagpole still stands. Have your troops hoist the colors to its peak, and let no enemy ever haul them down. To Colonel George M. Jones and the 503rd Regimental Combat Team, who recaptured Corregidor (2 March 1945), as quoted in Bureau of Navigation News Bulletin (1945), p. 40



It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe’s war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory. Letter to Representative Joseph W. Martin, Jr., (20 March 1951); read to the House by Martin on April 5.



I shall raise my voice as loud and as often as I believe it to be in the interest of the American people. I shall dedicate all of my energies to restoring to American life those immutable principles and ideals which your forebears and mine handed down to us in sacred trust. I shall assist in the regaining of that moral base for both public and private life which will restore the people's faith in the integrity of public institutions and the private faith of every man in the integrity of his neighbor.

I shall set my course to the end that no man need fear to speak the truth. I could not do less, for the opportunities for service my country has given me and the honors it has conferred upon me have imposed an obligation which is not discharged by the termination of public service.

Much that I have seen since my return to my native land after an absence of many years has filled me with immeasurable satisfaction and pride. Our material progress has been little short of phenomenal.

It has established an eminence in material strength so far in advance of any other nation or combination of nations that talk of imminent threat to our national security through the application of external force is pure nonsense.

It is not of any external threat that I concern myself but rather of insidious forces working from within which have already so drastically altered the character of our free institutions — those institutions which formerly we hailed as something beyond question or challenge — those institutions we proudly called the American way of life. Address to the Massachusetts legislature, Boston, Massachusetts (25 July 1951), as published in The General and the President (1951), by Richard Halworth Rovere; also in TIME magazine (6 August 1951), and General MacArthur Speeches and Reports 1908-1964 (2000) by Ed Imparato, p. 180 Variant: Talk of imminent threat to our national security through the application of external force is pure nonsense. Our threat is from the insidious forces working from within which have already so drastically altered the character of our free institutions — those institutions we proudly called the American way of life. Speech to the Michigan legislature, in Lansing, Michigan (15 May 1952), published in General MacArthur Speeches and Reports 1908-1964 (2000) by Edward T. Imparato, p. 206

I shall dedicate all of my energies to restoring to American life those immutable principles and ideals which your forebears and mine handed down to us in sacred trust. I shall assist in the regaining of that moral base for both public and private life which will restore the people's faith in the integrity of public institutions and the private faith of every man in the integrity of his neighbor. I could not do less, for the opportunities for service my country has given me and the honors it has conferred upon me have imposed an obligation which is not discharged by the termination of public service. Much that I have seen since my return to my native land after an absence of many years has filled me with immeasurable satisfaction and pride. Our material progress has been little short of phenomenal. It has established an eminence in material strength so far in advance of any other nation or combination of nations that

It is part of the general pattern of misguided policy that our country is now geared to an arms economy which was bred in an artificially induced psychosis of war hysteria and nurtured upon an incessant propaganda of fear. While such an economy may produce a sense of seeming prosperity for the moment, it rests on an illusionary foundation of complete unreliability and renders among our political leaders almost a greater fear of peace than is their fear of war. Speech to the Michigan legislature, in Lansing, Michigan (15 May 1952), published in General MacArthur Speeches and Reports 1908-1964 (2000) by Edward T. Imparato, p. 206, much of this was used in speeches of 1951, as quoted in The Twenty-year Revolution from Roosevelt to Eisenhower (1954) by Chesly Manly, p. 3, and Total Insecurity : The Myth Of American Omnipotence (2004) by Carol Brightman, p. 182

While such an economy may produce a sense of seeming prosperity for the moment, it rests on an illusionary foundation of complete unreliability and renders among our political leaders almost a greater fear of peace than is their fear of war.

Only those are fit to live who are not afraid of dying. Richards Topical Encyclopedia (1951)



"Duty, Honor, Country" — those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying point to build courage when courage seems to fail, to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith, to create hope when hope becomes forlorn ... In my dreams I hear again the crash of guns, the rattle of musketry, the strange, mournful mutter of the battlefield. But in the evening of my memory always I come back to West Point. Always there echoes and re-echoes: Duty, Honor, Country. Today marks my final roll call with you. But I want you to know that when I cross the river, my last conscious thoughts will be of the Corps, and the Corps, and the Corps. I bid you farewell. Sylvanus Thayer Award acceptance speech to the cadets of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York (12 May 1962)

... In my dreams I hear again the crash of guns, the rattle of musketry, the strange, mournful mutter of the battlefield. But in the evening of my memory always I come back to West Point. Always there echoes and re-echoes: Duty, Honor, Country. Today marks my final roll call with you. But I want you to know that when I cross the river, my last conscious thoughts will be of the Corps, and the Corps, and the Corps. I bid you farewell.

Rules are mostly made to be broken and are too often for the lazy to hide behind. Reported in William A. Ganoe, MacArthur Close-Up (1962), p. 137



Could I have but a line a century hence crediting a contribution to the advance of peace, I would gladly yield every honor which has been accorded me in war. Macarthur and the American Century: A Reader (2001) edited by William M Leary



The Puerto Ricans forming the ranks of the gallant 65th Infantry on the battlefields of Korea … are writing a brilliant record of achievement in battle and I am proud indeed to have them in this command. I wish that we might have many more like them. Quoted on 12 February 1951 in Tokyo



Our swollen budgets constantly have been misrepresented to the public. Our government has kept us in a perpetual state of fear — kept us in a continuous stampede of patriotic fervor — with the cry of grave national emergency. Always there has been some terrible evil at home or some monstrous foreign power that was going to gobble us up if we did not blindly rally behind it by furnishing the exorbitant funds demanded. Yet, in retrospect, these disasters seem never to have happened, seem never to have been quite real. Address to the Annual Stockholders Sperry Rand Corporation (30 July 1957), as published in General MacArthur Speeches and Reports 1908-1964 (2000) by Edward T. Imparato, p. 206



1920s [ edit ]

Americans never quit. Comment as president of the American Olympic committee when the manager of the American boxing team in the 1928 Olympic games wanted to withdraw the team because of what he thought was an unfair decision against an American boxer; reported in The New York Times (August 9, 1928), p. 13.



1940s [ edit ]

The history of failure in war can almost be summed up in two words: 'Too late.' Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance, too late in standing with one's friends. Victory in war results from no mysterious alchemy or wizardry but depends entirely upon the concentration of superior force at the critical points of combat. Statement MacArthur made in 1940, as quoted by James B. Reston in Prelude to Victory (1942), p. 64



The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and unarmed. It is the very essence and reason for his being. When he violates this sacred trust, he not only profanes his entire cult but threatens the very fabric of international society. The traditions of fighting men are long and honorable. They are based upon the noblest of human traits—sacrifice. From a 1946 statement by MacArthur confirming the death sentence imposed by a U. S. military commission on Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita, as quoted in MacArthur's Reminscences (McGraw-Hill, 1964) p. 295. Also used as the epigraph to Telford Taylor's Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (New York: Bantam, 1970).



Victory broadcast (1945) [ edit ]

Radio broadcast after the surrender of the Japan on the battleship USS Missouri officially ending World War II (2 September 1945)

We have known the bitterness of defeat and the exultation of triumph, and from both we have learned there can be no turning back. We must go forward to preserve in peace what we won in war.

Today the guns are silent. A great tragedy has ended. A great victory has been won. The skies no longer rain with death — the seas bear only commerce — men everywhere walk upright in the sunlight. The entire world lies quietly at peace. The holy mission has been completed. And in reporting this to you, the people, I speak for the thousands of silent lips, forever stilled among the jungles and the beaches and in the deep waters of the Pacific which marked the way.

We have known the bitterness of defeat and the exultation of triumph, and from both we have learned there can be no turning back. We must go forward to preserve in peace what we won in war.

A new era is upon us. Even the lesson of victory itself brings with it profound concern, both for our future security and the survival of civilization. The destructiveness of the war potential, through progressive advances in scientific discovery, has in fact now reached a point which revises the traditional concepts of war.

Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were found in so far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, Leagues of Nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blocks out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door.

We stand in Tokyo today reminiscent of our countryman, Commodore Perry, ninety-two years ago. His purpose was to bring to Japan an era of enlightenment and progress, by lifting the veil of isolation to the friendship, trade, and commerce of the world. But alas the knowledge thereby gained of western science was forged into an instrument of oppression and human enslavement. Freedom of expression, freedom of action, even freedom of thought were denied through appeal to superstition, and through the application of force. We are committed by the Potsdam Declaration of principles to see that the Japanese people are liberated from this condition of slavery. … To the Pacific basin has come the vista of a new emancipated world. Today, freedom is on the offensive, democracy is on the march. Today, in Asia as well as in Europe, unshackled peoples are tasting the full sweetness of liberty, the relief from fear.

1950s [ edit ]

Farewell address to Congress (1951) [ edit ]

know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition , as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes … But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.

War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there is no substitute for victory.

Farewell address to a Joint Session of Congress (19 April 1951) (with MPEG audio)

I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride — humility in the weight of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this home of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised.

Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race. I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.

I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country. The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the Gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.

In this situation, it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support — not imperious direction — the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation.

The Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader. It assumes, instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense.

China, up to 50 years ago, was completely non-homogenous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war-making tendency was almost non-existent, as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chang Tso Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant, aggressive tendencies.

The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity; and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice. Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust... I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battlefront without the slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race.

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized its full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.

Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said, in effect, that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. … But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.

War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there is no substitute for victory.

There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation. Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description.

They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific!"

I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade away."

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Audio clip (ogg format)



Speech to the Texas Legislature [ edit ]

I am concerned for the security of our great Nation; not so much because of any potential threat from without, but because of the insidious forces working from within which, opposed to all of our great traditions, have gravely weakened the structure and tone of our American way of life. Austin, Texas (13 June 1951); as published in General MacArthur Speeches and Reports 1908-1964 , ed. Edward T. Imparato, Turner Publishing Company (2000), p.175



1960s [ edit ]

High honors have come my way, but I shall always believe that my greatest honor was being a West Point graduate. The Military Academy has taught me many things, some of them not within the covers of books or written by any man. The first of these is tolerance: not to debase or deprive those from whom one may differ by character or custom, by race or color or distinction. The second is balance: a sense of proportion and ability to put first things first. A realization that there is a time and place for everything, but a recognition of the old maxim "nothing too much"- what the ancients meant by the "golden mean". The third is intelligence, rather than sentiment or emotion. Sentimentalism has muddled many problems, has settled none. Intellect is a man's only hope for improvement over his present state. And last, but by no means least, is courage: moral courage- the courage of one's convictions- the courage to see a thing through. This is not easy. The world is in constant conspiracy against the brave. It is the age-old struggle of the roar of the crowd on one side and the voice of your conscience on the other. Tolerance, balance, intelligence, courage. These should be the hallmarks of every graduate of the Military Academy at West Point. From MacArthur's remarks to a delegation of cadets from the United States Military Academy at West Point on the occasion of MacArthur's eighty-fourth birthday, on January 26, 1964. Since MacArthur's retirement from active duty in 1952, West Point had maintained a tradition of sending cadets to visit MacArthur on his birthday each year. Their visit in 1964 was the last. As quoted in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (1965), edited by Vorin E. Whan, Jr., p. 366-367

Reminiscences (1964) [ edit ]

These reminiscences are neither history, biography nor a diary, although they comprise something of each of these categories. What is presented is far from a complete account even of all of the incidents in which I had a part, but merely my recollections of events, refreshed by a reference to my own memoranda and a free use of staff studies and historical records made under my direction and supervision. It may assist the future historian when he seeks to account for the motives and reasons which influenced some of the actions in the great drama of war. It is also my hope that it will prove of some interest to the rising generations, who may learn thereform that a country and government such as ours is worth fighting for, and dying for, if need be. p. v



In preparing this record, penned by my own hand, of my life and my participation in our great struggles for national existence, human liberty and political equality, I make no pretence to literary merit. The motive that induces me is not authorship. The import of the subject matter of my narrative is my only claim to attention. The statements of facts are a matter of documentary evidence. The comments are my own and show how I saw the matters treated of, whether others saw them in the same light or not. Respectfully dedicating this work to the millions of armed men and devoted women who participated in the great wars of this country, I leave it as a heritage to my wife and son. p. vi



Late in the war, General Marshall, while returning from an Allied conference between Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill at Tehran, stopped over a day in the Southwest Pacific Area. We had a long and frank discussion. I called attention to the paucity of men and materiel that I was receiving as compared with all other theaters of war. He said he realized the imbalance and regretted it, but could do little to alter the low priority accorded the area. He said:

Admiral King claimed the Pacific as the rightful domain of the Navy; he seemed to regard the operations there as almost his own private war; he apparently felt that the only way to remove the blot on the Navy disaster at Pearl Harbor was to have the Navy command a great victory over Japan; he was adamant in his refusal to allow any major fleet to be under other command than that of naval officers although maintaining that naval officers were competent to command ground or air forces; he resented the prominent part I had in the Pacific War; he was vehement in his personal criticism of me and encouraged Navy propaganda to that end; he had the complete support of President Roosevelt and his Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, and in many cases of General Arnold, the head of the Air Force. p. 183

The days of the frontal attack are over. Modern infantry weapons are too deadly, and frontal assault is only for mediocre commanders. Good commanders do not turn in heavy losses. p. 198



In the last fifteen days of the war, my Fifth and Seventh Air Forces flew 6,732 sorties against Kyushu alone. Thus, with a deafening roar of blasting bombs, Kenney's Far East air forces culminated their blows against Japan. During the last seven and a half months of the war, their planes destroyed 2,846,932 tons of shipping and 1,375 enemy aircraft, dropped 100,000 tons of bombs, and flew over 150,00 sorties. p. 265



The President's party arrived in three planes with thirty-fie reporters and photographers. As I shook hands with Mr. Truman, he remarked, "I've been a long time meeting you, General." I replied, "I hope it won't be so long next time." But there was never to be a next time. p. 361



I had been warned about Mr. Truman's quick and violent temper and prejudices, but he radiated nothing but courtesy and good humor during our meeting. He has an engaging personality, a quick and witty tongue, and I liked him from the start. At the conference itself, he seemed to take great pride in his historical knowledge, but, it seemed to me that in spite of his having read much, it was of a superficial character, encompassing facts without the logic and reasoning dictating those facts. Of the Far East he knew little, presenting a strange combination of distorted history and vague hopes that somehow, some way, we could do something to help those struggling against Communism. p. 361



The object and practice of liberty lies in the limitation of governmental power. Through the ages the constantly expanding grasp of government has been liberty's greatest threat. p. 417



There are many who have lost faith in this early American ideal and believe in a form of socialistic, totalitarian rule, a sort of big brother deity to run our lives for us. They no longer believe that free men can successfully manage their own affairs. Their thesis is that a handful of men, centered in government, largely bureaucratic not elected, can utilize the proceeds of our toil and labor to greater advantage than those who create it. Nowhere in the history of the human race is there justification for this reckless faith in political power. It is the oldest, most reactionary of all forms of social organization. It was tried out in ancient Babylon, ancient Greece and ancient Rome; in Mussolini's Italy, in Hitler's Germany, and in all communist countries. Wherever and whenever it has been attempted, it has failed utterly to provide economic security, and has generally ended in national disaster. It embraces an essential idiocy, that individuals who, as private citizens, are not to manage the disposition of their own earnings, become in public office supermen who can manage the affairs of the world. p. 418



As I was leaving the hotel this morning, a doorman asked me, "Where are you headed, General?" and when I replied, "West Point," he remarked, "Beautiful place. Have you ever been there before?"

As I was leaving the hotel this morning, a doorman asked me, "Where are you headed, General?" and when I replied, "West Point," he remarked, "Beautiful place. Have you ever been there before?" p. 423



Quotes about MacArthur [ edit ]

The best and the worst things you hear about him are both true . ~ Sir Thomas Blamey

Alphabetized by author

The man was clearly fallible, but the legend was not. In the dark days of early 1942, when rallying cries and heroes were in short supply, the legend had to be preserved at all costs. FDR knew it. Leahy appears to have blindly affirmed it. King Nimitz and Halsey would all come to grips with it in their own ways. But for now, America desperately needed a hero, and Douglas MacArthur was the man of the hour. ~ Walter R. Borneman

The general American public, still stunned by the shock of Pearl Harbor and uncertain what lay ahead in Europe, desperately needed a hero, they wholeheartedly embraced Douglas MacArthur … There simply were no other choices that came close to matching his mystique, not to mention his evocative lone-wolf stand—something that has always resonated with Americans. ~ Walter R. Borneman

Dugout Doug MacArthur lies ashaking on the Rock

Safe from all the bombers and from any sudden shock

Dugout Doug is eating of the best food on Bataan

And his troops go starving on. Anonymous, excerpt from "Dugout Dug", a derogatory poem about MacArthur that circulated during the siege of the Bataan peninsula in the Philippines in 1942. The words were at some point matched with the melody of "Battle Hymn of the Republic," but who originally wrote them is unknown.

Safe from all the bombers and from any sudden shock Dugout Doug is eating of the best food on Bataan And his troops go starving on.

Leahy had no part in the decision to relieve MacArthur, which came as a considerable shock to him, for he had known and liked the brilliant general for over fifty years, even though he had deplored his theatrical ways. He never questioned the president's authority and he felt he was not sufficiently informed to make a judgment on the question of MacArthur's relief. He wrote, somewhat mildly that the "detachment of MacArthur will stimulate aggressive political opposition by the Republican member of Congress." Henry H. Adams, Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (1985), p.



The best and the worst things you hear about him are both true. Sir Thomas Blamey, the only Australian Army officer ever to rise to the rank of field marshal, as quoted in Blamey, Controversial Soldier: a Biography of Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey (1973) by John Hetherington, p. 223



On a raw November day in 1863, the Twenty-Fourth Wisconsin formed beneath Missionary Ridge outside Chattanooga, Tennessee. Union troops were trying to lift the siege of the town, but Confederate defenders were proving stubborn. Quite suddenly, without orders, Union regiments in the center of the line began to move up the ridge. When their wild advance was over, among the battle flags atop the crest was the standard of the Twenty-Fourth Wisconsin, carried there by its eighteen-year-old "boy colonel," Arthur MacArthur, whose son, Douglas, would spend most of his own military career trying to emulate his father's charge. Walter R. Borneman, The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy and King — The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea (2012), p. 13



Popular perception has long suggested that FDR favored the Navy over the Army, but when it came to budgets, deployments, and promotions, he was evenhanded as a commander in chief. On an emotional level, however, Roosevelt's combination inspection-fishing-vacation trips — such as he enjoyed aboard the cruiser Houston — were among his favorite occasions. And his long-standing relationships with the Navy's admirals, particularly the duty-minded Leahy, made him more comfortable having them around. This contrast is underscored by remembering that the Army Chief of Staff from 1930 to 1935 was Douglas MacArthur. The general was still trying to emulate his father's advance up to Missionary Ridge during the Civil War, and his visits to the White House often took on the aura of a state visit. FDR was not intimidated by MacArthur — or anyone else — but neither was he terribly comfortable with him. When MacArthur left Washington for the Philippines and Malin Craig, whom Roosevelt did not know well, became Army Chief of Staff, it was only natural that Roosevelt gravitated toward the loyal and understated Leahy as his chief military adviser. Walter R. Borneman, The Admirals (2012), p. 167



Nine hours later, after other Japanese air attacks against northern Luzon were reported, several hundred Mitsubishi bombers and Zero fighters roared over Clark Field outside Manila and destroyed the bulk of American airpower in the Philippines — MacArthur's air force — as it sat on the ground. Even after years of increasingly hostile Japanese intentions and fair evidence that something was building to a head in the Far East, some might be tempted to forgive MacArthur for being the victim of a surprise attack. But how could he still have his airplanes lined up wingtip to wingtip nine hours after being notified of the attack on Pearl Harbor? Two days later, with the Philippine skies largely void of defending planes, another Japanese air attack destroyed the American naval base at Cavite. MacArthur "might have made a better showing at the beaches and passes, and certainly he should have saved his planes on December 8," a newly appointed brigadier general who had long served as the general's aide confided to his diary. "But," wrote Dwight D. Eisenhower, "he's still the hero." The man was clearly fallible, but the legend was not. In the dark days of early 1942, when rallying cries and heroes were in short supply, the legend had to be preserved at all costs. FDR knew it. Leahy appears to have blindly affirmed it. King, Nimitz and Halsey would all come to grips with it in their own ways. But for now, America desperately needed a hero, and Douglas MacArthur was the man of the hour. Walter R. Borneman, The Admirals (2012), p. 227

FDR knew it. Leahy appears to have blindly affirmed it. King, Nimitz and Halsey would all come to grips with it in their own ways. But for now,

Douglas MacArthur never acknowledged the basic tenet of American constitutional government: that the military is subordinate to civilian control. He moved quite easily between civil and military worlds because he saw himself at the apex of both. Indeed, Douglas MacArthur fought many military and political battles over the course of his career- winning some, losing others- but his greatest loss came in a campaign he waged his entire life: the one against himself. He was brilliant, charismatic, and decisive, but he was also manipulative, deceitful, and as egocentric as any military leader in American history- the "George trio" of George McClellan, George Armstrong Custer, and George S. Patton being his only close competition. Walter R. Borneman, MacArthur at War: World War II in the Pacific' (2016), p. 506-507



Ironically, during four years of war, MacArthur may have owed the most to the very people he was certain were out to discredit and disparage him. While never among his fans, Franklin Roosevelt and George Marshall nonetheless consistently supported MacArthur within the framework of their global priorities, from the first efforts to resupply the Philippines to MacArthur's appointment as Allied supreme commander. Even then, where would MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area have been had not Ernie King urged the Joint Chiefs to pour resources into the Pacific and wage a two-front war? Walter R. Borneman, MacArthur at War (2016), p. 507



On September 2, 1945, after four years of war, one thing was certain about Douglas MacArthur and his place in history. His rhetoric, however hyperbolic at times, and his characterization of events, however embellished his facts, had served to generate an enormous rallying cry for the American people in the dark days of 1942. Responsible though he was for much of the debacle in the Philippines, he had miraculously escaped on presidential orders, and the great majority in the Allied world was left with no doubt that he would return. He was their inspiration, their hope, and their synonym for victory over Japan. They saw only his stage-managed resolve, not the man behind the curtain. Walter R. Borneman, MacArthur at War (2016), p. 507



MacArthur carried with him an indominable will to win. It was ingrained in his genes. It was his most laudable quality. There is, as he would say, no substitute for victory, a concept that was much clearer in World War II than it would become even five short years later in Korea. He fit the times perfectly. Douglas MacArthur's most important contribution to history was to be the hero who rallied America and its allies when they were at a low ebb and to become the symbol of determined resolve so desperately needed in the grim months of 1942. It was the role of a lifetime and, publicly, he played it brilliantly. That he came to believe more strongly through this experience in his perception of himself, and through this adulation judged it to be unequivocal, is to his discredit. Walter R. Borneman, MacArthur at War (2016), p. 508



George Marshall may well have sighed at the results of the March 1945 poll- not at his own place but at MacArthur's. Marshall, more than most, knew the whole story of MacArthur's war. It is a mark of Marshall's own greatness that he so deftly managed MacArthur's fiery comet and unselfishly used its brilliance to accomplish the objectives of a global war. Walter R. Borneman, MacArthur at War (2016), p. 508



Douglas MacArthur has been dead for over fifty years yet he remains one of the most controversial military figures of the twentieth century. His well-polished reputation was far from unanimously accepted among his contemporaries, and a half-century has done nothing to smooth the contradictions of his personality and his career. There remains no middle ground with Douglas MacArthur. Walter R. Borneman, "Why Did MacArthur Become a Hero? In a Crisis We Are Desperate for Leaders.", History News Network of the Columbia College of Arts & Sciences at George Washington University (5 May 2016)



Most importantly, in a fragile period of the American psyche when the general American public, still stunned by the shock of Pearl Harbor and uncertain what lay ahead in Europe, desperately needed a hero, they wholeheartedly embraced Douglas MacArthur—good press copy that he was. There simply were no other choices that came close to matching his mystique, not to mention his evocative lone-wolf stand—something that has always resonated with Americans. Walter R. Borneman, "Why Did MacArthur Become a Hero? In a Crisis We Are Desperate for Leaders.", History News Network of the Columbia College of Arts & Sciences at George Washington University (5 May 2016)



So Weinberger reported to MacArthur's headquarters in Brisbane, where he was a very junior officer on the staff of the legendary general. Nonetheless, he saw enough to have a full appreciation of MacArthur's brilliance. "I saw the plans for the invasion of Japan,: Weinberger says. "the breadth and scope of MacArthur's brilliance. With very few troops, a couple of understrength divisions, and some Australian militia forces, he accomplished an enormous amount in the Pacific." The young intelligence officer also learned directly from MacArthur about judgment and decision making. Weinberger was on duty one night as American forces were moving on a small island, lightly occupied by the Japanese, to take it for a radio base. Suddenly, there were reports of a Japanese ship and Japanese aircraft in the vicinity. Weinberger thought he'd better take this information directly to MacArthur. "So I walked two blocks to his hotel," Weinberger remembers. "I got through the various security and gave him the message He came out in his bathrobe, looking just as erect and imposing as he did in full uniform, that magnificent posture, deep voice. He looked the message over carefully and said, 'Well, Lieutenant, what do you think?' I said, 'General, I think it's a coincidence that they're there. They don't seem to have hostile intent. I would go ahead with the landing.' General MacArthur said, 'That's what I think, too. Good night.'" Weinberger walked back through the night to his post "in fear and trembling — to see if I was wrong or not. Fortunately, it worked out." Tom Brokaw, describing experiences of Caspar Weinberger, 15th U.S. Secretary of Defense, while he was an Army intelligence officer and a member of MacArthur's staff during World War II, in The Greatest Generation (1998), p. 360



By the time of the surrender of Corregidor on May 6, MacArthur and his family had escaped to Australia under direct orders from President Roosevelt. (They left Corregidor in the PT boat of Lieutenant John Bulkely, who received the Medal of Honor for his many daring missions in the Philippines in the months from December 8, 1941 to April 10, 1942.) In ordering MacArthur to leave his command, President Roosevelt and General George C. Marshall, his Army Chief of Staff, made a political calculation. They reasoned that an inspirational figure planning a return to his command from Australia was a much more potent force than a dead hero in the Philippines. In Australia General MacArthur was presented with the Medal of Honor. MacArthur had been personally courageous in the face of the bombing attacks on Corregidor, but he did not get the medal for any single specified act of bravery. His award is one of the few of the war that could be described as "symbolic," in large part because MacArthur's Philippine army was an inspiration to the American people during those dark days. MacArthur himself acknowledged this when he accepted the medal, saying that he felt it was "intended not so much for me personally as it is a recognition of the indomitable courage of the gallant army which it has been my honor to command." (MacArthur's medal came seventy-eight years after his father, Arthur, earned a Medal of Honor for rallying Northern troops on November 25, 1863, at Missionary Ridge, Tennessee, during the Civil War. Together the MacArthurs are the only father and son both to receive the Medal of Honor.) Above and Beyond: A History of the Medal of Honor From the Civil War to Vietnam (1985), by the editors of the Boston Publishing Company, p. 200



Stepping off in Tokyo, I renewed an old acquaintance with General Douglas MacArthur, then Supreme Commander of the UN Forces. Ours really was an old acquaintanceship dating back to 1910, when my father, Charles C. Clark, then a major of infantry, was attending the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. MacArthur, then a first lieutenant of engineers, used to visit our house regularly, but at the time of the meeting in Tokyo I hadn't seen him for forty years. As we shook hands, MacArthur asked, "How's your mother? Give her my love; I'm a great admirer of hers." I knew that the general's courtly inquiry would please my mother, who has had her husband or son in every big shoot from the Spanish-American War to Korea. Mark W. Clark, From The Danube to the Yalu (1954), p. 25-26



MacArthur could not understand why we had permitted the enemy, the Chinese Communists, to have the advantage of a sanctuary as their base of supply and air operations. He expressed the strong conviction that had we carried the war to the Chinese with air attacks across the Yalu River, or even with the threat of such attacks, the war in Korea would have taken a course far more favorable to the United states and the United Nations. When the Chinese came into the war, masquerading their best armies as "volunteers," we should have hit them hard, MacArthur said. He said he couldn't conceive that our government would fail to retaliate when a nation came to war against us and crossed over the border into the country in which our troops were in battle. MacArthur was particularly bitter that his government had failed to do everything in its power to protect the American and Allied troops under his command when those men were menaced by the Chinese armies that were hurled into the Korean War. I fully agreed with MacArthur that we should not have allowed the enemy a sanctuary north of the Yalu. I have never changed my opinion. Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (1954), p. 26-27



It was only two months later that President Truman relieved MacArthur of his command. I was at a camp in the Southern states on a field-training inspection tour at the time. Someone told me the news as I came out of my billet early in the morning. My first thought was, "I wonder if I'm going to get the job." The answer was yes — but not until about a year later. MacArthur's dismissal was not exactly unexpected in view of his feud with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, like most other officers in the Army, I was shocked at the abrupt termination of such a distinguished career. Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (1954), p. 27



Arthur MacArthur's importance as a military leader grew as time went on. He became military governor of the Philippines in 1900. As a lieutenant general he served as Assistant Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in 1906. He retired in 1909. His famous son, Douglas MacArthur, was also a Medal of Honor winner. He became the symbol of American determination to return to the Philippines after their seizure by Japanese forces in World War II. Thus, both father and son were famous generals, both served in the Philippines, and both were awarded the coveted Medal of Honor. Donald E. Cooke, For Conspicuous Gallantry: Winners of the Medal of Honor (1966), p. 87



Arthur MacArthur was the most flamboyantly egotistical man I had ever seen, until I met his son. Enoch H. Crowder, aide to Arthur MacArthur, Jr. during the Philippines campaign in 1899, as quoted in American Caesar by William Manchester



During the war Westerners were told of the "child mind of the Jap conscript." After the war, the same newspapers and magazines spoke of "Seventy Million Problem Children"; and cartoonists had a field day depicting the Japanese as infants in the crib or, more often, children attending General MacArthur's School of Democracy. Such paternalism was unquestionably the essence of MacArthur's attitude toward the Japanese- and Oriental people in general. His guiding philosophy during the occupation, he stated widely in publicized Senate hearings in 1951, after President Truman had recalled him from Asia, had been to treat the Japanese as twelve-year-olds. This was not an incautious remark, for the former supreme commander went on to expound his position at some length, explaining in the process why he believed the Japanese might be more receptive to American-style democratic ideas than the "mature" Germans. "The German problem is a completely and entirely different one from the Japanese problem," MacArthur informed the senators. "The German people were a mature race. If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in his development, in the sciences, the arts, divinity, culture, the Germans were quite as mature. The Japanese, however, in spite of their their antiquity measured by time, were in a very tuitionary condition. Measured by the standards of modern civization, they would be like a boy of 12 as compared with our development of 45 years. Like any tuitionary period, they were susceptible to following new models, new ideas. You can implant basic concepts there. They were still close enough to origin to be elastic and acceptable to new concepts..." John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War (1986), p. 303-304



In his distinctive way, MacArthur meant this as a compliment of sorts, in that he was attempting to convey why he believed democracy might take firmer root in postwar Japan than in Germany. The bluntness of the metaphor embarrassed the general's Japanese admirers, however, and- in one of history's smaller losses- prompted some of them to abandon plans for a Statue of Liberty-sized statue of the general in Tokyo Bay. The comment was not only a fair reflection of the supreme commander's outlook, however, but also helps illuminate the kind but frequently condescending premises of U.S. occupation policy in general. Such parent-child or teacher-student paternalism was reminiscent of Japan's own now discredited Co-Prosperity Sphere rhetoric, and had obvious roots in the Western colonial tradition exemplified by such phrases as "white man's burden" and "little brown brother". It was certainly not an attitude reserved for the Japanese alone, although MacArthur's imposing paternal presence made it especially conspicuous in the Japanese case. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War (1986), p. 304



Another long message on "strategy" to MacArthur. He sent in one extolling the virtues of the flank offensive. Wonder what he thinks we've been studying for all these years. His lecture would be good for plebes. Dwight D. Eisenhower in a diary entry on February 8, 1942, as quoted in The Eisenhower Diaries (1981), edited by Robert H. Farrell, p. 47. "Plebes" refers to new cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point, the military college that Eisenhower and MacArthur both graduated from.



Spent the entire day preparing drafts of president's messages to MacArthur and Quezon. Long, difficult, and irritating. Both are babies. Dwight D. Eisenhower in a diary entry on February 9, 1942, as quoted in The Eisenhower Diaries (1981), edited by Robert H. Farrell, p. 47



Message to MacArthur was approved by President and dispatched. I'm dubious about the thing. I cannot help believing that we are disturbed by editorials and reacting to "public opinion" rather than to military logic. "Pa" Watson is certain we must get MacArthur out, as being worth "five army corps." He is doing a good job where he is, but I'm doubtful that he'd do so well in more complicated situations. Bataan is made to order for him. It's in the public eye; it as made him a public hero; it has all the essentials of drama; and he is acknowledged king on the spot. If brought out, public opinion will force him into a position where his love of the limelight may ruin him. Dwight D. Eisenhower, on February 23, 1942, The Eisenhower Diaries (1981), edited by Robert H. Farrell, p. 49



Corregidor surrendered last night. Poor Wainwright! He did the fighting... [MacArthur] got such glory as the public could find... MacArthur's tirades, to which TJ and I so often listened to in Manila, would now sound as silly to the public as they then did to us. But he's a hero! Yah. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Diaries (1981), edited by Robert H. Farrell, p. 54. "TJ" refers to T.J. Davis, one of MacArthur's aides at the time.



Another Decoration Day finds us still adding to the number of graves that will be decorated in future years. Men are stupid. MacArthur seems to have retired into the Waldorf Towers, from which stronghold he issues statements and occasionally emerges to see a baseball game. The first he does through Whitney — who, I think, is one of the Old Chief's mistakes. I cannot much blame MacA.— I get the impression that he is in a state of "watchful waiting." For what, I wouldn't know, but I do know that in his position I'd be after the bass of Wisconsin, the trout of Wyoming, or vacationing on the beach. Recently I wrote to him — had a nice reply. While I'm determined to stay aloof from all the current snarling and fighting in the United States, I'm most of all determined never to get into the "personality" kind of argument. In that respect the military men (especially including MacA.) have been exemplary. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Eisenhower Diaries (1981), edited by Robert H. Farrell, p. 193



While at the preparatory school for the Military Academy, I noticed a poster in the supply room that read "Stairway to the Stars." On the first riser was "West Point," on the next "Second Lieutenant," and so forth until, near the top, five stars blazed like a royal diadem. The year was 1953, and some wag had inked in "President" over the stars, obviously referring to Eisenhower. Not to be outdone, another wag added "God" above that, apparently referring to MacArthur. I still laugh at this because there is a grain of truth to most philosophical humor. MacArthur was not immortal, but he was one of those rare military figures that will be remembered and written about for millennia. George M. Hall, The Fifth Star: High Command in an Era of Global War (1994), p. xii



The one who came closest to Admiral King in his basic view that the Japanese should be kept under constant pressure was not a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, General MacArthur. Although his role was to recommend and then accept a decision from the JCS, and many of his views on strategy differed sharply from those endorsed by the JCS, his repeated efforts to get more support for his area of command and to push ahead as rapidly and with as much force as possible helped to insure that the war against Japan did not become a forgotten war and were largely responsible for the development of the advance on two axes.

Grace Person Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan (1982) by Grace Person Hayes, p. 725-726



During the Korean War, MacArthur was a law unto himself, in matters both big and small. He quarreled defiantly in public with President Truman, agitating for nuclear war. In their eventual confrontation on Wake Island, MacArthur went so far as to arrive first and then order the president's approaching plane into a holding pattern. MacArthur's commander in chief would thus arrive on the landing strip appearing to be MacArthur's supplicant. In explaining why he subsequently relieved MacArthur of his command, Truman said, "I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the president. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals." Truman was arguably pulling his punches. He could have easily called MacArthur an asshole. Aaron James, in his book Assholes: A Theory (2012), p. 1-2



General, I have a lot riding on you. I hope you don't pull a MacArthur on me. Lyndon Johnson, said to Westmoreland when the two men met in Honolulu in 1966. As quoted in The Truman-MacArthur Tug of War – A Lingering Aftermath (1993) by Stephen A. Danner, p. 14-15



MacArthur was a flamboyant character who made sure the people back home knew what he was doing to win the war. He was a great publicist but he made many enemies. Generals Marshall and Eisenhower disliked him and even President Roosevelt, resentfil of his popularity, did not wish him to have the limelight. After the war he ruled Japan as an all-powerful potentate but he overstepped the mark in Korea which led to his downfall. John Keegan (editor), Who's Who in World War II (1995), p. 101



The spectacle of the United States Army routing unarmed citizens with tanks and firebrands outraged many Americans. The Bonus Army episode came to symbolize Hoover's supposed insensitivity to the plight of the unemployed. In fact the worst violence, resulting in two deaths, had come at the hands of the district police, not the federal troops, and the blame for the torching of Anacostia Flats was MacArthur's, not Hoover's. But Hoover chose to ignore MacArthur's insubordination and assumed full responsibility for the army's actions. David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (1999), p. 92



It was disturbing to see that General Westmoreland kept asking for additional troops without any clear objective. During the Korean War, Douglas MacArthur requested permission to cross the Yalu River to invade Manchuria. He was fired. General Westmoreland kept asking for new troops and didn't know what to do with them. He was later promoted to Army Chief of Staff. This was the sign of the times. It was unfortunate that we did not have generals in Viet Nam of MacArthur's caliber who knew what the objectives were and how to achieve them. Lam Quang Thi, The Twenty-Five Year Century: A South Vietnamese General Remembers the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon (2001), p. 156



In the Pacific we gave our enemies a costly lesson in amphibious warfare, just as in Europe we, with our allies, demonstrated successful coalition warfare. The performance of all branches of the services in Europe under General Eisenhower, in the central and southern Pacific under Admiral Nimitz, and in the southwestern Pacific under General MacArthur brought glory to themselves and to their country. William D. Leahy, I Was There (1950), p. 439



[MacArthur's "Old Soldiers Never Die" speech was of] such a superlative quality of excellence... that there is no other individual... capable of preparing and delivering a comparable address... The public enthusiasm for General MacArthur in San Francisco and in Washington was a triumph beyond anything that I have ever seen anywhere for anybody, which seems strange in view of his recent summary detachment by President Truman. If the general's popularity persists for a considerable time, it should actively effect a change in the country's domestic political policy, and it might have a radical effect on the complexion of domestic political development. From a purely military point of view it appears that General MacArthur's attitude will be fully accepted by all qualified military authorities. William D. Leahy, as quoted by Henry H. Adams in Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (1985), p. 341



In the early 1920s his chauffeur was driving him along the west bank of the Hudson when a man with a flashlight stepped into the road and waved them to a stop. Producing a pistol, he demanded the brigadier's wallet. "You don't get it as easy as that," MacArthur said. "I've got around forty dollars, but you'll have to whip me to get it. I'm coming out of this car, and I'll fight you for it." The thug threatened to kill him. MacArthur said, "Sure, you can shoot me, but if you do they'll run you down and fry you in the big house. Put down that gun, and I'll come out and fight you fair and square for my money. My name is MacArthur, and I live —" The man lowered his gun. He said, "My God, why didn't you tell me that in the first place? Why, I was in the Rainbow. I was a sergeant in Wild Bill Donovan's outfit. My God, General, I'm sorry. I apologize." MacArthur told his driver to proceed, and when he reached West Point he made no attempt to notify the police. William Manchester, in his book American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (1978), p. 114-115



Back and forth the fantastic tableaux would spin, past his cruel plebe hazing, the self-discovery at the West Texas Military Academy, the patriarchal Judge MacArthur, all beard and cigar smoke, presiding over dynastic feats at Washington's 1201 N Street; the chimes of the drawing-room clock there telling off the quarters; the ceremonial changing of the guard at Leavenworth; his father's tales of Sherman's dauntless Boys in Blue; his mother's imperious commands to fight and fight and never lower his blade short of victory; the clean crack of Krag rifles and the warm prickling of desert sand as he played with his brother outside the fort stockade; the rumbling of the sunset gun and Pinky's face tilting downward, her lambent smile gilding the child's upturned features while he clutched at her cascading skirts; the yellow notes of the bugles as he stirred in his cradle; the chant of sergeants hawking cadence on the parade ground outside; and, snapping proudly in the overarching sky above him, the flag, and the flag, and the flag. William Manchester, in his book American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (1978), p. 709



History gives us ample precedence for making decisions at the speed of relevance. In 1941, General Douglas MacArthur was planning a landing in the Southwest Pacific. He wrote to Admiral William Halsey, in charge of the South Pacific, asking for a naval campaign to divert the Japanese forces. Only two days later, Halsey wrote back, pledging his support. There was no need for extended exchanges between staffs. The shared objective was to shatter the Japanese forces. All else was secondary. Two strong-willed commanders collaborated to unleash hell upon the enemy. James Mattis, Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead (2019), p. 57-58



In 1931 a new chief of staff, the charismatic Douglas MacArthur, began to shift War Department priorities toward modernizing and training only the most active portions of the Army of the United States. A controversial officer noted for his imperious treatment of existing Army plans and values, MacArthur directed the General Staff to focus on specific war plans or "probable conflicts" and to increase the president's ability to order a partial mobilization on a discretionary basis, meaning free of congressional interference. By 1934 the General Staff had consolidated the paper army active and reserve into a twenty-two division force, organized into four field armies, of regulars and National Guardsmen. Instead of emphasizing the organization of a mass army to protect the United States from invasion, MacArthur wanted the War Department's funds to go to an "Initial Protective Force" of 400,000 soldiers that could respond to a real crisis, especially a war with Japan. Continued by his successor, Malin Craig, MacArthur's approach- the Protective Mobilization Plan- included a series of six-year programs designed to modernize the regular Army and Guard. The latter force made steady progress in the interwar period, for in 1924 the federal government began to pay the Guardsmen for weekly drills. In 1933 additional legislation ensured that mobilized Guard units would not be broken up and required that Guard officers hold federal reserve commissions and meet regular Army standards in order to draw drill pay. Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States From 1607 to 2012 (2012), p. 356



Bitterly disappointed by his defeat at the hands of the Chinese, MacArthur pressured the administration to accept his own war aims. Marshaling heroic rhetoric- "There is no substitute for victory"- the general conducted a political campaign to open Communist China to direct attack by his own forces and the Chinese Nationalists. He continued to hint darkly about the use of nuclear weapons, an option Truman never seriously considered. Incident mounted after incident: Indiscreet press conferences, unauthorized contacts with Chiang Kai-shek, inappropriate challenges to the Communists, provocative correspondence with veterans' groups and Republican congressional leaders, dark hints of treason by the UN allies, especially Britain. With the full approval of Acheson, the new Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, and the JCS, Truman finally relieved MacArthur and ordered him home in April 1951. Buoyed by his enthusiastic public reception and bathed in martyrdom, MacArthur took his case to Congress. Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States From 1607 to 2012 (2012), p. 460



In a memorable public address to both houses, he accused the administration of appeasement and defeatism before promising to fade away like an old soldier in a barracks ballad. Like most MacArthur predictions, the promise to disappear proved flawed, since the Senate held hearings on the war and defense policy. MacArthur produced harsh words and limited enlightenment but could not reverse the administration's policy of limiting the war. As JCS Chairman General of the Army Omar Bradley stated, MacArthur's wider war was "the wrong war, wat the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy." The concept that a theater commander could dictate global policy seemed to endanger the principle of civilian control as well as the professional stature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Acutely aware that MacArthur's proposals endangered his rearmament program and the development of NATO, Truman summed up the issue: "General MacArthur was ready to risk general war. I was not." MacArthur faded away after a weak showing in the early presidential primaries of 1952. The war went on without him. ** Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States From 1607 to 2012 (2012), p. 460



Japan fared no better [than Germany]. The United States took over the country, installed a military dictatorship under General Douglas MacArthur, and ruled the country with an iron fist. It is no accident that William Manchester titled his biography of MacArthur American Caesar . That MacArthur ruled wisely is a testimony to his observance of American heritage and democratic principles but should not obscure the fact that his rule was total. MacArthur ruled like a neocolonial military dictator possessing complete executive and legislative authority. "I could by fiat issue directives," he informed the U.S. Senate, and he did. Seymour Morris Jr., American History Revised: 200 Startling Facts That Never Made It into the Textbooks (2010), p. 291-292

. That MacArthur ruled wisely is a testimony to his observance of American heritage and democratic principles but should not obscure the fact that his rule was total. MacArthur ruled like a neocolonial military dictator possessing complete executive and legislative authority. "I could by fiat issue directives," he informed the U.S. Senate, and he did.

Many years before Harry Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur, there was another prima donna general, the renowned John C. Frémont. For issuing orders authorizing the emancipation of slaves in Missouri without presidential permission, Lincoln fired him on the spot. As for MacArthur, he should have known better: the same thing had also happened to his own father. Back in the early 1900s, General Arthur MacArthur, military governor of the Philippines, made the stupid mistake of not recognizing the superior authority of the civilian governor, William Howard Taft, who later became president. Years later, when MacArthur's turn came to be promoted to Army Chief of Staff, Taft blackballed him. Seymour Morris Jr., American History Revised: 200 Startling Facts That Never Made It into the Textbooks (2010), p. 314-315



Because Douglas MacArthur disliked, mistrusted, and resented George Marshall it should not be thought that his prejudices were reciprocated. They were not, and maybe that was the trouble. For almost the whole of these two men's lives and professional careers, they had shared the same vocation, served in the same Army, fought in the same wars. Wherever in the world GI boots had stamped to attention, they both had taken the salute, watched a regiment march-past, celebrated a soldierly anniversary. There was no battlefield where U.S. troops had fought on which they had not ducked the same shellfire, dodged the same bullets, faced the same setbacks, savored the same victories. It was true that fate had ordained that it was MacArthur who commanded the vast armies in the field and Marshall who stayed behind to manipulate the martial pieces on the global chessboard. But if any envy had been engendered as a result, surely it should have been on Marshall's part. Like the director who masterminds the movements of crew, cameras, and cast, it was Marshall, the "organizer of victory," as Churchill called him, who might have been expected to show resentment when the limelight was focused elsewhere. By no word of gesture had he ever done so. Leonard Mosely, Marshall: Hero for Our Times (1982), p. 484



In fact, however, the "antagonism" was entirely one-sided, and never once did Marshall harm MacArthur either as a man or as a soldier. On the other hand, MacArthur seemed to take pleasure in damaging Marshall's career. It was he, while Chief of Staff during the interwar years, who had deliberately blocked Marshall's advancement. It was he who had sneered at his appointment as Chief of Staff when WWII began. It was Marshall he blamed for starving him of supplies during the Pacific campaigns, sneered at him as a chairborne soldier, a Roosevelt stooge. Then he would add, "And no friend of mine." Marshall must have known all about these snide remarks on MacArthur's part. Not only did he ignore them, but he never once allowed them to influence the respect in which he held the Far East commander or to deflect him from giving him all the support and protection of which he had need. Twice during WWII he saved him from what, for MacArthur, would have been a fate worse than death- obscurity. Leonard Mosely, Marshall: Hero for Our Times (1982), p. 485



The U.S. Navy hated MacArthur, really hated him. Early in the Pacific War it began agitating for an overall command in the area, the idea being to get MacArthur and his troops under its control. Believing Marshall to share their antipathy, the Navy enlisted his support and was delighted when he appeared to give it. "But on one condition," he said. "If we're going to have an overall commander in the Pacific, there isn't any question about it, you will have to pick MacArthur- on the basis of pure competence alone." The Navy abruptly abandoned the idea. Later, when the Navy wished to bypass the liberation of the Philippines in favor of operations against Formosa, it was Marshall who again intervened to insist MacArthur be allowed to fulfill his pledge to the Philippine people, to whom he had vowed, "I shall return." He was given the go-ahead to do so, and, of course, was hailed as the greatest hero of the Pacific war. Leonard Mosely, Marshall: Hero for Our Times (1982), p. 485



Washington and Grant and Lee were all tried and true Eisenhower, Bradley, and MacArthur, too They will live forevermore, 'till the world is done with war Then they'll close that final door, fading away Vaughan Monroe, in his 1951 song Old Soldiers Never Die, which was named after MacArthur's speech.

King remained unconvinced that the Philippines should be the principal force of a Central Pacific campaign. He, in fact, agreed with MacArthur that the original War Plan Orange made little sense, since there was no beleaguered American force in Manila Bay to rescue. The only thing in need of rescue was MacArthur's beleaguered reputation, and King saw no point in doing that either, since liberating Luzon would simply kill thousands of Japanese and Filipinos, not to mention American soldiers, without any important impact on Japan's air and naval power or industrial activity. King expressed his doubts by challenging the selection of Palau as an objective and pointing instead to Formosa as a safer place than the Philippines to interdict Japanese overseas trade. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (2000), p. 339



If the disaster at Malaya discredited the British Empire, the doomed defense of the Philippines turned an American general, Douglas MacArthur, into an international hero and ensured that the future war with Japan would be fought under his influence. It was one of the most bizarre twists of World War II, for MacArthur made a defeat look like a victory of sorts, largely because of the dogged resistance of his common soldiers against what appeared to be overwhelming odds. A pioneer in army public relations even before World War I, MacArthur had already established his credentials as a hero of the Republican Party, an opponent of American subversives from the Right and Left (mostly left), a champion of the Chinese and Filipinos, and an outspoken critic of the British influence on American foreign policy. One of his contemporaries characterized him as the greatest actor ever to serve in the U.S. Army, and another observed that MacArthur did not have a staff but a court. His behavior under stress- including combat- confounded worshipers and detractors alike; he could be absolutely insensitive to danger, yet he also shrank from direct contact with combat troops, especially the sick and wounded. He had a habit of becoming ill at times of crisis, and his behavior even when he was young (and in 1941 he was sixty) suggested chemical depression and a tendency to hyperventilate and vomit. He always kept a physician in close attendance, and he observed his meal and rest schedule with the precision of a Swiss watchmaker. Without doubt, he understood American politics and the role of the media in shaping policy. FDR once characterized MacArthur as one of the two most dangerous demagogues in American politics, the other being Huey Long. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (2000), p. 181-182



MacArthur always knew he was at the center of the world stage, and he had no intention of allowing the Philippines to fall without a struggle of legendary proportions. The very real difficulties he faced were daunting enough, and it is doubtful that he or any other American general could have saved the islands, but his own and others' errors put his forces at grave risk from the very first day of war. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (2000), p. 182



I was still in Europe at the time. Truman said he had the authority to relieve him and he did it. I have never made up my mind whether he was right or not, but I happened to be with a British unit the night we learned of MacArthur's dismissal. The British had a brigade in Korea at the time and the British officers in the Mess were very anti-MacArthur and celebrating his demise. I think MacArthur was a magnificent general, but he became more and more insulated from the world by his staff, many of whom had been with him since the Bataan days. I think that was part of the problem. He was not a young man at the time of Korea. I think, perhaps, he got too dependent on his staff officers and certain things happened which were not in MacArthur's best interest... Even after MacArthur was relieved by the President of the United States he had a tickertape parade in New York City and he made two great speeches, one to Congress and one about Duty, Honor, Country. The Duty, Honor, Country speech is one of the greatest ever made by a military man, and he made it without a note at the age of seventy-five. I believe Douglas MacArthur in 1945 could have come home and run for president and won going away. He was worshipped at the end of the war. George S. Patton, IV, as quoted in The Fighting Pattons (1997) by Brian M. Sobel, p. 66-67



He carried a different level of prestige. I don't think anybody would fool with him. MacArthur was MacArthur and everybody was subordinate to MacArthur. For his part and with regard to leadership, MacArthur commanded a theater, and of course his responsibilities far transcended those of my dads. He was a superb leader and was probably the greatest general this country has ever produced. George S. Patton, IV, as quoted in The Fighting Pattons (1997) by Brian M. Sobel, p. 222



He was a superb leader and was probably the greatest general this country has ever produced. ~ George S. Patton, IV

No man of our time is more authentically the voice of real America than Douglas MacArthur. To the millions who lined the streets of our great cities to cheer and weep as he passed by, he is the personification of the American tradition and history. As he rode up great avenues 'midst vast throngs, the people through misty eyes saw in him the noble leaders of the past- Washington, Lee, Grant. And when he addressed the Congress of the United States, once again Americans heard the great truths which many, starved for them, never expected to hear again, and those who never heard them before wept unashamedly. In this stalwart, romantic figure, the great hopes, dreams and ideals of our country come to life again. He stimulates renewed faith that the land of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln still lives in the hearts of the people. I shall never forget the light on General MacArthur's face and the deep feeling in his voice when he said to me — "They are a wonderful people — the American people — quick, impulsive, generous, whole-hearted! You can always trust in them and believe in them, for in their hearts they are good and true; in a crisis, they will do the right thing." Norman Vincent Peale, D.D., in the introduction to Revitalizing A Nation: A Statement of Beliefs, Opinions, and Policies Embodied in the Public Announcements of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (1952) by The Heritage Foundation, Inc., p. 5



MacArthur's most obvious trait was his vanity, which is often seized on as if it were the key to the man. It seems to me, however, that while MacArthur was infuriatingly vain, was egotistical, was fascinated by himself, he was not in the deepest sense ego-driven. The motor that powered his ascent was his amazing willpower, the same willpower that made him control his body under fire, that made him study his way to the top at West Point, that made him impose his strategy on a reluctant government in World War II. MacArthur's parents had planted a vision of himself in the deepest, richest soil of his character. That vision never changed from childhood to old age. He had a destiny to fulfill. The thirst for medals, trophies, publicity, flattery and an adoring staff was vanity, but more than vanity. These were his compass bearings, the way he confirmed that he was on the right track to his destination. But it was implacable, inexhaustible will that was the engine taking him toward his goal. it was that will that made him a difficult subordinate and distanced him from other men — at times even distanced him from himself — yet it finally got him where he intended to go. Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur (1996), p. 588-589

infuriatingly vain, egotistical, fascinated by himself, he was not in the deepest sense ego-driven. The motor that powered his ascent was his amazing willpower, the same willpower that made him control his body under fire, that made him study his way to the top at West Point, that made him impose his strategy on a reluctant government in World War II. MacArthur's parents had planted a vision of himself in the deepest, richest soil of his character. That vision never changed from childhood to old age. He had a destiny to fulfill. The thirst for medals, trophies, publicity, flattery and an adoring staff was vanity, but more than vanity. These were his compass bearings, the way he confirmed that he was on the right track to his destination. But it was implacable, inexhaustible will that was the engine taking him toward his goal. it was that will that made him a difficult subordinate and distanced him from other men — at times even distanced him from himself — yet it finally got him where he intended to go.

Even allowing for the failures, the disappointments, the scorn and rebuffs, wasn't MacArthur, as William Manchester claims, the greatest soldier in American history? Not in my view. MacArthur was too difficult a subordinate to be an entirely successful commander. He created far more problems for Marshall, Stimson, Roosevelt and Truman than any general has the right to make, especially in time of war. He also spent time and energy toying with political ambitions when everything that was in him should have gone into fighting the enemy. At best he was probably the second-greatest soldier in American history, second only, that is, to Ulysses S. Grant. And along the way he did lead the most adventurous and dramatic life in American history, which makes him a gift to biographers and a subject of enduring interest to Americans. Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur (1996), p. 589



During the year just past there came to this country from across the sea a man — a leader of men. He was a tall man, clear of eye, imposing in stature and lofty in mien who had met and wrestled with this "greatest scourge of mankind" and who understands fully the determining concepts and the motivating forces of international Communism. He shapes his every utterance, act and deed in consonance with this understanding. He is a man of such broad vision and knowledge that the Atlantic Ocean becomes merely a peaceful lake, although enclosed by the shores of continents, and the broad Pacific, a benign moat but on which can be carried the thriving commerce of billions of men. This man has such a knowledge of the historical past and such an insight into a divinely ordained future that he fashions the deeds of today to mesh with a tomorrow of one thousand years from now. This man is known to the world as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. John M. Pratt, in the foreword chapter "Revitalizing a Nation", in the book Revitalizing A Nation: A Statement of Beliefs, Opinions, and Policies Embodied in the Public Announcements of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (1952) by The Heritage Foundation, Inc., p. 7-8



On April 12, 1951, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Pacific, was relieved of his command, stripped of all authority and ordered to leave Japan. He was dismissed with as little consideration as though he had been a new office boy found pilfering pennies from the cash register. Apparently it was intended that he be humiliated and that he return disgraced. General MacArthur had to his credit 52 years of loyal and unquestioned service. He was a soldier. He obeyed orders. He returned to his native land, but not as a broken, beaten soldier. He was a "Daniel come to judgement" — with a vibrant message that thrilled, inspired and re-created hope in the hearts of his countrymen. He began the task of revitalizing the nation. John M. Pratt, in the foreword chapter "Revitalizing a Nation", in the book Revitalizing A Nation: A Statement of Beliefs, Opinions, and Policies Embodied in the Public Announcements of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (1952) by The Heritage Foundation, Inc., p. 9



Not since the beginning of the war has a story been so overplayed and commercialized as General MacArthur's defense of Bataan. It is natural and desirable that we should play up the activities of our own generals and especially a general of the caliber of MacArthur. But in the interests of a well-informed public opinion it is essential that we maintain some semblance of proportion. What was gained by giving the impression that the arrival of General MacArthur in Australia foreshadowed the beginning of a great offensive against Japan? What is the point of carrying dispatches about Australia's being "built into a great Allied fortress"? How does one build into a "great Allied fortress" a continent almost exactly the size of continental United States? This kind of editing merely plays into the hands of our enemies... The defense of Bataan was doomed from the start, as every responsible newspaperman new, yet many papers raised up the hopes by failing to put the story in its proper perspective. The defense of Bataan and the siege of Corregidor were comparable in this war to the siege of Tobruk, and they did not compare in importance to the defense of Malta. Yet who can tell the name of the commander who held Tobruk or the leader of the men at Malta? James B. Reston, Prelude to Victory (1942), p. 127-128



With his flamboyant headgear, his sunglasses and corn cob pipe, he looked like an actor playing the role of a great general. He also had the sort of press an actor likes; he arranged that, in part, by keeping his subordinates as anonymous as possible. But the truth was that Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific, was a great general. He had one of the most distinguished military careers on record (top of his class at West Point, a hero in the first war, Army Chief of Staff), and it is doubtful that anyone in any of the services knew more about the Pacific theater. Nonetheless, the war that would be waged to return him to the Philippines, as he had promised, would be a Navy war, and [three admirals] — Nimitz, King, and Halsey — would have every bit as much to do with the strategy and tactics of winning that war as he had. C.L. Sulzberger, in his book The American Heritage Picture History of World War II (1966), p. 335



McVay and the Indianapolis were about to sail from he Marianas Sea Frontier into the Philippine Sea Frontier, and it was like passing between two different worlds. A ship moved from one frontier to the other by crossing the Chop, a boundary marked by the 130-degree line of longitude. Clear as this delineation was, there was a complicating factor: communications in this area were often confused by a political battle between Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, who were locked in a struggle to control the Navy. MacArthur, in charge of the Seventh Fleet, wanted to unite it with the Army. Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, wanted to remain autonomous. In the end, Nimitz had been given control of the entire Pacific naval operation, but friction between the two military titans still existed. Information about a ship's whereabouts, or other crucial facts, sometimes got lost in the fallout. This could mean trouble for the Indianapolis , which sometimes relied on the presence of carefully-timed escorts to protect her from enemy submarines and spirit her out of danger. Doug Stanton, In Harm's Way (2001), p. 74

were about to sail from he Marianas Sea Frontier into the Philippine Sea Frontier, and it was like passing between two different worlds. A ship moved from one frontier to the other by crossing the Chop, a boundary marked by the 130-degree line of longitude. Clear as this delineation was, there was a complicating factor: communications in this area were often confused by a political battle between Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, who were locked in a struggle to control the Navy. MacArthur, in charge of the Seventh Fleet, wanted to unite it with the Army. Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, wanted to remain autonomous. In the end, Nimitz had been given control of the entire Pacific naval operation, but friction between the two military titans still existed. Information about a ship's whereabouts, or other crucial facts, sometimes got lost in the fallout. This could mean trouble for the , which sometimes relied on the presence of carefully-timed escorts to protect her from enemy submarines and spirit her out of danger.

I graduated on June 13, number 4 in a class of 102. General MacArthur gave me my diploma and his "Congratulations, Mr. Taylor" was the last time I heard his voice until, as the new Chief of Staff of the Army, I called on him in the Waldorf Towers in 1956. Although he had done much for the Corps of Cadets during his superintendency, oddly enough he had never made an effort to impress his personality on the cadets through direct communication with them. I do not ever recall his having made a speech to us and only a few cadets were ever asked to his house. Certainly no graduate has left greater evidence of deep affection for West Point and the Corps than MacArthur, but the cadets saw little of this during his superintendency. Maxwell D. Taylor, United States Military Academy Class of 1922, in his book Swords and Plowshares (1972), p. 28



I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the president. That's the answer to that. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail. Harry S. Truman, quoted in Plain Speaking : An Oral Biography of Harry S Truman (1974) by Merle Mille



Nothing but a damn bunch of bullshit! Harry S. Truman on MacArthur's "Old Soldiers Never Die" speech, as quoted in The Fifties (1993) by David Halberstam



This has been a hectic month. General Mac, as usual has been shooting off his mouth. He made a preelection statement that cost us votes and he made a postelection statement that has him in hot water in Europe and at home. I must defend him and save his face even if he has tried on various and numerous occasions to cut mine off. But I must stand by my subordinates... Harry S. Truman, in a November 30, 1950 entry on his calendar, as quoted by Margaret Truman in her book Harry S. Truman (1972), p. 493



On November 6, the day before the 1950 elections, General MacArthur issued a demand to bomb the Yalu River bridges. Men and material were pouring across them and he said, "This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command." With great reluctance, Dad gave him permission to destroy the Korean end of the bridges. But General Bradley pointed out to my father that within fifteen to twenty days the Yalu would be frozen, and the bombardment, so frantically insisted upon by General MacArthur, was hardly worth the risk of bombs dropping in Chinese or Soviet territory. The following day General MacArthur reported that enemy planes were engaging in hit-and-run raids across the Yalu and demanded the right to pursue them into their "sanctuary." Panic reigned in the UN until my father categorically rejected this request, which could only have widened the war. General MacArthur did not seem to realize that our planes were flying from privileged sanctuaries in Japan which could have been attacked by Russian or Chinese aircraft if we gave them the pretext by bombing targets in Manchuria. Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (1972), p. 490



After sounding the alarm about Chinese intervention in the gravest possible terms, General MacArthur now did a complete flip-flop. He decided that he could resume his advance to the Yalu. The Joint Chiefs nervously asked him to remember that he was under orders to use only Republic of Korea troops in these northern provinces. General MacArthur replied that he was using Americans for the advance but would withdraw them as soon as he had cleared the area. This was a definite act of insubordination. But the Joint Chiefs were far more worried about MacArthur's appalling strategy. He had divided his army into two parts, sending one up the eastern side of Korea, the other up the west, separated by a massive mountain barrier that made liaison impossible. He called it a "general offensive" to "win the war" and predicted that the troops will "eat Christmas dinner at home." In one communiqué he described his advance as "a massive compression envelopment." In another report he called it "the giant U.N. pincer." Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (1972), p. 491



Everyone feared that MacArthur was plunging toward disaster, but no one had the courage to speak out. Finally, General Ridgway, who was not a member of the Joint Chiefs and therefore without a vote, asked for permission to speak. He declared that they owed it "to the men in the field and the God to whom we must answer for these men's lives to stop talking and to act." The only answer he received was silence. Later, General Ridgway buttonholed General Hoyt Vandenberg, commander of the Air Force. "Why don't the Joint Chiefs send orders to MacArthur and tell him what to do?" Vandenberg shook his head. "What good would that do? He wouldn't obey the orders. What can we do?" "You can relieve any commander who won't obey orders, can't you?" General Ridgway exclaimed. General Vandenberg gave General Ridgway a look that was, Ridgway says "both puzzled and amazed." Then he walked away without saying a word. Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (1972), p. 491-492

him what to do?" Vandenberg shook his head. "What good would that do? He wouldn't obey the orders. What can we do?" "You can relieve any commander who won't obey orders, can't you?" General Ridgway exclaimed. General Vandenberg gave General Ridgway a look that was, Ridgway says "both puzzled and amazed." Then he walked away without saying a word.

General MacArthur was fond of saying that he had a policy, and President Truman had no policy. But when he testified before Senator Russell's committee, it became quite clear that the shoe was on the other foot. One senator asked him, "Assume we embrace your program, and assume the Chinese were chased back across the Yalu River, and suppose they then refused to sign a treaty, and to enter into an agreement on what their future course will be, what course would you recommend at that stage? General MacArthur had nothing to recommend. "I don't think they could remain in a state of belligerency," he replied grandly. He had no solution to the problem of maintaining an army across 420 miles of northern Korea, compared to the 110 miles of front we were required to defend along the 38th parallel. He admitted it would be madness to invade Manchuria and begin an all-out war with China's 400 million people. Where id this leave General MacArthur's much-quoted phrase, There is no substitute for victory?" It was Harry S. Truman who had a policy. General MacArthur was nothing more than a collection of disorganized ideas. Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (1972), p. 518-519



Not a simple man! Unnamed Japanese statesman to John Gunther in 1950, as quoted in the preface of American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (1978)



It was a mistake ever to visualize a landing in force against the Japanese main islands. Such an attack would have cost us a tremendous number of lives and was not necessary. The Japanese lived by the sea, and once their Navy, shipping, and Air Force were destroyed it was certain that they could be starved into surrender. MacArthur and Nimitz could have maintained a tight blockade around the islands ad infinitum . Fortunately the war ended before OLYMPIC, the actual invasion of Japan, was ever mounted. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (1958), p. 428

. Fortunately the war ended before OLYMPIC, the actual invasion of Japan, was ever mounted.

Award Citations [ edit ]

On a field where courage was the rule, his courage was the dominant feature.

loving He has so inspired his command by his vision, his judgment , his indomitable will and his unshakeable faith , that is has set a shining example of gallantry and tenacity in defense and of audacity in attack matched by but few operations in military history . His conduct has been in accord with the highest traditions of the military service of the United States , and is deserving of the enduring gratitude of the freedom peoples of the world

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 1918, takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Service Cross to Brigadier General (Corps of Engineers) Douglas MacArthur (ASN: 0-57), United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in action while serving as Chief of Staff, 42d Division, A.E.F., in the Salient-du-Feys, France, 9 March 1918. When Company D, 168th Infantry, was under severe attack in the salient du Feys, France, General MacArthur voluntarily joined it, upon finding that he could do so without interfering with his normal duties, and by his coolness and conspicuous courage aided materially in its success. Citation for MacArthur's first Distinguished Service Cross. War Department, General Orders No. 27 (1919)



The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 1918, takes pleasure in presenting a Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster in lieu of a Second Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Brigadier General (Corps of Engineers) Douglas MacArthur (ASN: 0-57), United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in action while serving as Chief of Staff, 42d Division, A.E.F., near Cote-de-Chatillon, France, October 14 - 16, 1918: As brigade commander General MacArthur personally led his men and by the skillful maneuvering of his brigade made possible the capture of Hills 288, 242, and the Cote-de-Chatillon, France, 14 - 16 October 1918. He displayed indomitable resolution and great courage in rallying broken lines and in reforming attacks, thereby making victory possible. On a field where courage was the rule, his courage was the dominant feature. Citation for MacArthur's second Distinguished Service Cross. War Department, General Orders No. 27 (1919)



The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 1918, takes pleasure in presenting the Army Distinguished Service Medal to Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur (ASN: 0-57), United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious and distinguished services to the