Monday August 11 2008



The flare-up of major hostilities between Russia and Georgia has been dubbed by some "the pipeline war". The landlocked Caspian sea's huge oil reserves are a factor, especially since Georgia became a key transit country for oil to travel from Baku in Azerbaijan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean.



The pipeline, which was completed in May 2006, is the second longest in the world. Although its route was chosen in order to bypass Russia, denying Moscow leverage over a key resource and a potential source of pressure, the current crisis in the Caucasus is about issues far bigger than oil.



The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is only a minor element in a much larger strategic equation: an attempt, sponsored largely by the United States but eagerly subscribed to by several of its new ex-Soviet allies, to reduce every aspect of Russian influence throughout the region, whether it be economic, political, diplomatic or military.



Georgia's President Mikheil Saakashvili is the region's most enthusiastic proponent of this strategy. His "pipeline neighbours", Azerbaijan and Turkey, are less virulent. They have been trying to reap the economic benefits of Caspian oil while keeping good relations with Russia and avoiding provocations.



The question now is whether Saakashvili has over-reached himself. Has his escalation of the South Ossetian crisis done more than destroy any chance of normalising Georgian relations with Russia as long as he remains president? Has it reinforced his image among many western leaders as a hothead, and set back his hopes of getting a promise from Nato this autumn to start membership proceedings? France and Germany led Nato's cautious camp in April when they forced President Bush to delay a membership action plan for Georgia for months. Their argument that Georgia is not yet ready may well be strengthened now.



The sudden crisis has put the United States on the spot. While supporting Georgia's Nato ambitions, the White House was leery of military action, knowing it could do little in the face of a powerful Russian response. Visiting the former Soviet republic in 2005, President Bush urged Saakashvili to keep cool. "Georgia's leaders know that the peaceful resolution of conflict is essential to your integration into the transatlantic community," he told a huge rally in Tbilisi.



Saakashvili's supporters claim Nato's delay was what emboldened Russia to stir up tension in Abkhazia (the other rebel area of Georgia) and South Ossetia this spring and summer. "It was interpreted by the Russians as a window of opportunity," George Kandelaki, deputy chair of the Georgian parliament's foreign relations committee, said yesterday. Like other Georgians, he argued that it was not his country's forces that took the initiative last week for escalation in what had been in recent months a low level, tit-for-tat series of border incidents.



The fighting backfired, and the Russian counteroffensive now seems aimed at capturing the 40% of South Ossetia which was under Georgian control until last week. "They [the Russians] control pretty much all of South Ossetia now," Kandelaki said, adding: "They're trying to take over all of Abkhazia."



If the Russians succeed, they will have to decide whether to keep the newly acquired territory as a bargaining chip for negotiations with Saakashvili, or go to the extreme of encouraging South Ossetia, now unified, to do what most of its inhabitants want - proclaim independence from Georgia and a referendum on joining North Ossetia, its ethnic twin on the northern side of the Caucasus mountains. Russia's prime minister, Vladimir Putin, hinted at the tougher option, when he told Ossetian refugees this weekend that Georgia had lost the right to rule the territory.



When the fighting ends and the dust settles, Saakashvili may also face an onslaught from his political opposition in Georgia. In the heat of battle, parliamentary leaders have rallied round the national flag, but if a ceasefire comes with all Georgian troops and civilians driven out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Saaksahvili may be called to account for losing not just territory but the chance of early membership of Nato as well.









