THERE’S a joke that Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), likes to use as an ice-breaker. “Unlike that lot in Westminster who’ve never done a decent day’s work in their lives,” he tells the people who have crowded parish halls to hear him in recent weeks, “I worked damn hard in the City for 20 years.” A look of disdain crosses his impish features, as Mr Farage contemplates the soft-palmed professionals who preside over Britain’s better-established Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. Then his usual grin returns. “At least, I did until lunchtime!” he guffaws, playing to his reputation as a tippler. “Ah well,” sighs the leader of a party that broke through in county council elections on May 2nd, winning a quarter of the vote. “We all have our weaknesses.”

This is good stuff, appealing to the British love of full-hearted amateurs and ale-quaffing rogues. Yet Mr Farage, a former commodities trader, is no naive Little Englander and UKIP, despite its defensive-sounding name and trademark Euroscepticism and xenophobia, is not an especially British phenomenon. It is the latest of many populist parties that have surged to prominence across Europe in recent years. Though disparate in origin, most promise much the same package of wonders—looser ties with the EU, less immigration and a restoration of national pride and prosperity—as Mr Farage. He should try telling that joke, too: UKIP, which has the pound sign for its insignia, is now one of Britain’s most recognisably European institutions.

The rise of European populism has been fuelled by the financial and euro-zone crises. Yet it predates them and is thriving in places, such as the Nordic countries, which have suffered little economic damage. A prominent early exponent was Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party, which won power in Austria in the late 1990s on an anti-immigration platform; most, though by no means all, of the subsequent populists also hold right-wing views. They vary greatly in pitch, however, from Beppe Grillo, an eccentric Italian and former Marxist, to the fascism-lite of the Front National in France, led by Marine Le Pen (who tweeted congratulations to UKIP on its recent triumph). Dashes of dirigisme and a colourful array of local hobby-horses distinguish them further.

UKIP features a similar policy mess. Its success in the local elections, in which it won 147 council seats, marks its emergence from a single-issue Eurosceptic party to one with multiple views. It likes defence, dislikes wind farms and absolutely loathes high-speed rail. It is, though Mr Farage strongly denies it, the epitome of a populist party: analysis by the Times newspaper, which UKIP also disputes, points to a hole of some £120 billion ($185 billion) in its fiscal plans. It is also united, internally and with other European populists, by deep contempt for established parties, with their manufactured leaders, indistinct ideas and alleged complacency before Europe’s deep troubles. “They’re just three different coloured rosettes,” Mr Farage says of his bigger, more conventional rivals. “But they’re all the same party.”

This lack of originality explains an otherwise perplexing indifference towards UKIP’s insurgency this week in Brussels—where antennae tend to quiver with alarm at British Euroscepticism. “There’s a sense that people have seen this before,” says Jamie Bartlett, an expert on European populists at Demos, a think-tank. It might seem surprising, indeed, that it has taken UKIP so long to emerge, given Britain’s long history of unusually strong antipathy to immigration and the EU. There are a few reasons for that lag, including the party’s own failures, the right-wing views harboured in opposition by the Tory Party and the long-standing role of the Lib Dems as a repository for protest. But with those parties now in government together, the Tories dragged towards the political centre by their leader, David Cameron, Britain’s prime minister, and Mr Farage pleasing the crowds, his party has been freed to rise.

The parallels with other European populists are not lost on Mr Farage. A veteran member of the European Parliament, married to a German, he is an astute observer of continental politics. Asked which party he considers most like UKIP, he acknowledges having “some affinity” with the True Finns, a Eurosceptic outfit whose leader, Timo Soini, is a regular visitor to UKIP functions. He also describes Germany’s nascent Eurosceptic party, Alternative for Germany, as “a bit academic, but very interesting”. But he is wary of pushing the comparisons to his European counterparts: some of them, including Hungary’s anti-Semitic Jobbik Party, hold unsavoury views; and Mr Farage bows to no Eurosceptic. “The general view among Eurosceptics in Europe is that the Brits have to go first,” he says.

Given their early start, Mr Farage’s continental counterparts are in fact more likely to hold lessons for UKIP. One is that influencing the political agenda, even without holding power, is surprisingly easy. While in opposition, Geert Wilders’ Dutch Party for Freedom succeeded in lobbying for a ban on burkas; under pressure from the True Finns, Finland’s ruling parties have toughened the bail-out conditions for Greece and Spain. UKIP can claim some early progress on this front, too. Its success in the local polls has provoked a predictable flutter of renewed Euroscepticism in the Tory Party, including a call this week from Nigel Lawson, a highly respected former chancellor of the exchequer, for withdrawal from the EU.

Another lesson is more discouraging for Mr Farage. Support for the populists, which typically comes from the main victims of Europe’s stagnant wages and high unemployment, has so far been limited to around 25% of the vote. “That may be the ceiling for us,” concedes Mr Soini, a candid sort of a radical: “I would say 20-25% is probably the maximum.” Moreover, protest votes are by definition fickle; in the Netherlands support for Mr Wilders collapsed at the last general election.

In a British general election, UKIP is also unlikely to win anywhere near such a large share of the vote as it did on May 2nd. And Westminster’s first-past-the-post electoral system is brutal. It is hard to imagine the party winning more than one or two seats in the House of Commons. Britain now has a properly European populist party and an increasingly European electorate—but not, yet, a truly European politics.