THEY seem such a promising pair, India and America. The two biggest and noisiest democracies are linked by language and blood: 125m Indians speak English, and over 3m Americans claim Indian descent. They share a belief in the rule of law and (most of the time) in free enterprise, as well as common regional concerns over such things as fighting Islamist extremism and accommodating the rise of China. But as much as a match of American wealth and know-how with Indian brawn and drive would make sense, and ought to bolster global security, Indian pride and American prejudice have repeatedly got in the way.

Yet with regional stars realigning, Indian pride has grown less prickly and American prejudice less smug. “Pivoting” to Asia during Barack Obama’s presidency, America has sought new friendships just as India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, finds it lacks the punch to back his bigger ambitions for India on the wider stage. There will be no flashy wedding between the two in the near future. But what is emerging is a quiet, cautious meeting of mutual interests. American officials call it a strategic handshake, Indian ones a strategic partnership. Neither would utter the word “alliance”, but if the relationship continues to thicken, that is what conceivably might take shape somewhere down the road.

The latest development is small but significant. During a visit to India between April 10th and 12th, his second in less than a year, the American defence secretary, Ashton Carter, joined his Indian counterpart, Manohar Parrikar, in promising quickly to sign a logistics agreement to enable smoother mutual support between the two armed forces. Two other pacts, covering communications and protocols for digital mapping, are also close to conclusion. Together they will make it easier for the two countries’ forces to co-operate, and allow India access to a bigger range of American equipment.

Indian logic rules

America has similar arrangements with dozens of countries. But in India’s case it has taken a decade of haggling to get this far. Before concluding the logistics deal, India insisted on a change of names to distinguish its own version. It is to be a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement rather than the usual Logistics Support Agreement. “We changed the initials so we don’t seem to follow the same logic as US allies,” says C. Uday Bhaskar, a military analyst and former Indian naval officer. He added that there remain “strong views in our services” about too close an embrace with America.

Those views have a long history. After independence, India prided itself on being “non-aligned”, while turning to the Soviet Union for military supplies. It has been wary of other countries’ causes, a wariness reinforced by watching America bungle in Vietnam and later in Iraq and Afghanistan. Trounced by China in a brief but bloody border war in 1962, India is also cautious about provoking its big neighbour, or being seen as part of an American-led gang-up. Most of all India resents the continued military support America gives to Pakistan, even in the face of evidence that Pakistan has sponsored anti-Indian terror attacks and worked to undermine American-led efforts to bring peace to Afghanistan.

Yet disdain for America is weakening. The latest agreements come on top of a growing pile of protocols that go beyond defence co-operation to include a “joint strategic vision” for Asia signed in January 2015. American armed forces now hold more joint exercises with India than with any other country. And two years ago India overtook Pakistan as a buyer of American weaponry. It helps that America has the kinds of goods that India’s armed forces want as they seek to project power more widely in the Indian Ocean, including long-range patrol aircraft and drones, maritime helicopters, aircraft-carrier technology and anti-submarine gear. America has also moved nimbly to accommodate India’s plans (see article) for strengthening its own defence industry. Aside from half-a-dozen existing partnerships involving such things as jet-engine design and avionics, the two sides have suggested jointly producing fighter aircraft, probably an Indian version of the F-18.

The trigger for all this is the growing boldness of China. With a GDP that is now five times India’s, the regional heavyweight has courted India’s smaller neighbours with aid. Chinese warships now regularly push into the Indian Ocean, and the Chinese government has sought to build a network of bases or, at the least, friendly ports extending from Myanmar to Pakistan to Djibouti. India has mostly stayed aloof from troubles outside its immediate waters. When American officials jumped the gun in February by claiming that India would join patrols in the South China Sea, where China is pressing maritime claims over the objections of everyone else, India issued a vigorous denial. But Chinese pressure closer to home raises alarms.

It is over China that Indian and American interests converge most. Mr Bhaskar says that Americans want India to become more capable and “carry a bigger load”. They may seek more than that. Speaking last month in Delhi, the Indian capital, Admiral Harry Harris, who heads America’s Pacific Command (responsible, he said, for American military operations “from Hollywood to Bollywood”), described expanded military co-operation with India as “arguably the defining partnership for America in the 21st century”.

But deepening mutual interests, kind American words and tempting American hardware are not enough, yet, to prod India into an open embrace. For one thing, the possibility has yet to be exposed to the rough and tumble of Indian politics, where opposition would be fierce. And for all its size and growing strength, India’s armed forces remain compartmentalised and tradition-bound. India still prefers its old bachelor ways to married life.