Caltrans can't find proof rods were inspected

A shear key containing both broken anchor rods and still-tensioned rods are seen on the new Bay Bridge on Friday, May 3, 2013. A shear key containing both broken anchor rods and still-tensioned rods are seen on the new Bay Bridge on Friday, May 3, 2013. Photo: Lea Suzuki, The Chronicle Photo: Lea Suzuki, The Chronicle Image 1 of / 1 Caption Close Caltrans can't find proof rods were inspected 1 / 1 Back to Gallery

Caltrans has no evidence it verified the quality of the hundreds of irreplaceable rods needed to anchor the tower of the new Bay Bridge eastern span or made sure the manufacturer hadn't left them vulnerable to cracking, officials acknowledge.

Among thousands of documents about the safety of high-strength fasteners on the bridge, the agency cannot find any indication it inspected the manufacturer's plant - as required under Caltrans rules - or performed mandatory quality-assurance tests to prove that the rods met its standards before accepting them in 2007.

Long after the rods were installed, Caltrans discovered that the supplier, contrary to state instructions, had subjected the 24-foot-long fasteners to a process that could increase the chances they will fail.

It's the latest problem to beset bolts and rods on the $6.4 billion eastern span, which is scheduled to open to traffic Sept. 3. Caltrans has been conducting tests to determine whether 2,300 steel fasteners installed on the span are safe, and says it will decide by July 10 whether the opening will be delayed.

"The documentation problem is a concern," said Caltrans Chief Deputy Director Richard Land.

He stressed, however, that Caltrans officials see only a minimal danger that the rods will crack, because they are in a relatively dry environment and are not tightened to a degree that could shorten their life span.

Land also said that he's confident the documentation exists somewhere to prove the inspections were done, but that Caltrans simply can't find it.

"It's unfortunate we haven't been able to get our fingers on what we think exists," Land said. But he's sure inspectors would have done "a lot more than say, 'OK, oh well, go ahead and ship it.' "

Experts say Caltrans is normally a stickler for such paperwork.

"This is a high-profile project costing a huge amount of money," said Shakir Shatnawi, a former Caltrans engineer who is now a quality-assurance consultant for construction projects. "It should take a lot of attention. This doesn't seem right. Caltrans has its own independent lab and will only accept materials with a certificate of compliance."

Key job

The high-strength steel rods, each 3 or 4 inches in diameter, are installed at the base of the 525-foot tower on the self-anchored suspension span. Their function is to hold the giant structure to its foundation and resist the lateral forces that could otherwise destabilize it in an earthquake.

After 32 rods on the eastern span failed in March, Caltrans officials ordered a review of all similar parts. They removed a tower rod to be tested for possible problems after the quality-control paperwork couldn't be found.

Testing additional rods, however, is impractical, and replacing them is impossible. Space is tight because the tower was built atop the rods after they were installed. The steel fasteners have to be cut up to be removed and tested, and there is no room to install replacements.

Land said none of the tower rods has cracked so far, and that the quality-control mix-up "doesn't seem to have made a difference."

No visits to plant

The rods came from Vulcan Threaded Products. Caltrans inspectors never visited the Vulcan plant in Pelham, Ala., to ensure that the company was following the state's manufacturing instructions, Vulcan officials have said. Nor did they visit a Tennessee contractor, Tennessee Galvanizing Inc., that dipped the rods in molten zinc to protect them from rust - a process known as galvanization.

"Typical procedures for Caltrans would be to send an inspector to the source," said Thomas Young, a former Caltrans engineer who stressed that he does not have details of what happened on the Bay Bridge project.

The inspectors, he said, "validate that the materials are manufactured in accordance to Caltrans specifications, and the inspector will then certify the materials and issue a material certification tag."

Banned process

Caltrans inspectors did perform such checks in 2007 for the company that supplied 1,800 bolts and rods for the eastern span, Dyson Corp. of Ohio, and its subcontractors. One of the issues for Caltrans was whether the manufacturers were following its instructions not to subject the steel to a process that could leave it vulnerable to cracking.

That was a check Caltrans also was supposed to perform at Vulcan and its galvanization subcontractor for the tower rods, but didn't.

The banned process involved pickling the steel rods in hydrochloric acid to clean them before dipping them in molten zinc. Bathing high-strength steel in acid can make it brittle and susceptible to cracking.

Vulcan officials told The Chronicle that they never received any special instructions from Caltrans about how to galvanize the rods, and that absent any restrictions, its Tennessee subcontractor pickled the steel in acid.

Random check of reports

Once the rods were galvanized, they were sent to Kiewit Offshore Services in Ingleside, Texas, which was fabricating foundation elements for the eastern span.

A Caltrans quality-assurance inspector, Mary Madere, was in Ingleside and authorized the rods to be shipped for use on the eastern span on Feb. 3, 2007, according to her inspection report.

In that report, Madere described having conducted a "random review" of the rods' documentation. Those included notarized letters from Vulcan's Tennessee subcontractor stating that the steel rods had been galvanized to industry standards, without mentioning Caltrans' special no-acid instructions.

One letter included in the package given to Caltrans stood out. It was from Aztec Galvanizing Services of Houston, and stated that it had pickled steel parts it provided in hydrochloric acid - the process that Caltrans had banned for the rods.

Final review missing

It's unclear what parts Aztec supplied, but under Caltrans' rules, none of the steel for the tower foundation was supposed to be bathed in acid.

Madere concluded, after what she called a "random review of the contractor-supplied documents" and her own visual survey, that the rods "substantially" complied with Caltrans rules.

She noted that her finding was subject to a final review by the resident engineer in charge at the bridge.

Caltrans officials acknowledged in interviews that they have no proof that the resident engineer performed that final review. Land said that may be in documentation the agency can't find.

The lack of proof, Land said, "concerns me from a standpoint of what did we do, what didn't we do."