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When you’re trying to understand a trend, it’s a good idea to look at the common factors in similar data points, but it’s an even better idea to look at the outliers. It’s already been pointed out that Canada is one of the few industrialized countries where anti-globalization has not (yet) become a major political force. Immigration and freer trade enjoy broad cross-party support, and economic nationalism is not the cause it once was. Why is Canada different?

The obvious answer is that the Canadian economy has been performing relatively well over the past 10 or 15 years, and the benefits have been broadly shared. Inflation-adjusted incomes in the top one per cent have been falling since their peak in 2006, even as real median incomes increased. Middle-class resentment is more difficult to sustain when elite incomes are falling and median incomes are rising.

Things are different elsewhere. In United States, household incomes have been falling since 2000, and especially men’s incomes: this is likely one of the factors contributing to Trump’s relatively strong support among men. In contrast, in Canada median real men’s incomes have been increasing during this time.

In this light, Canada isn’t really different so much as it is lucky. If declining incomes fuel anti-globalization — or if they just help create an environment in which anti-globalization sentiment can take root — then what sets Canada apart is its recent income gains. But indications for the next few years don’t look promising: the combination of population aging, low resource prices and a weak global economy could result in an extended period in which Canadian incomes grow slowly or not at all. Canada may end up joining the anti-globalization cause in a few years’ time.