The South Yorkshire police officer who was in command outside Hillsborough at the 1989 FA Cup semi-final, when 96 people died in a crush, has agreed that crushing at the semi-final the previous year was “a precursor” to the disaster, but said it was not recognised by the police.

Roger Marshall, a superintendent in 1989 in charge of 270 police officers outside the turnstiles at the Leppings Lane end of the Hillsborough football ground, told the new inquest into the disaster that he had not known of the overcrowding on the terrace’s central pens in 1988. The inquest has heard that that year, at the semi-final between the same two clubs, Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, the central pens became overcrowded, some supporters endured crushing, and police closed the tunnel leading to those central pens to stop any more people entering that area.

Police did not close the tunnel in 1989, however, and the crush that year in the central pens became lethal, causing the 96 people in the two central pens to die. Pete Weatherby QC, representing 22 families whose relatives were killed in that crush, asked Marshall if 1988 had been a “near miss”.

Marshall replied: “I would question the words ‘near miss’.”

Weatherby then asked, of the congestion that developed outside the turnstiles in 1988 and the overcrowding in the pens that required the tunnel to be closed, whether that was “a precursor” to 1989.

“It may have been a precursor,” Marshall replied, “but I have to say I don’t think it was recognised as such.”

Marshall was in charge inside the ground in 1988, and swapped roles with another superintendent, Roger Greenwood, to take command outside in 1989. He has told the jury of seven women and four men that he did not discover that there had been crushing in 1988 and that the tunnel had been closed, and regarded the 1988 organisation as “a success”. The closing of the tunnel was not included in the debrief of 1988 and was not included in the operational order for the 1989 match.

Weatherby put to Marshall that three claims advanced by some police officers as causes of the disaster – that Liverpool supporters had drunk too much, had arrived late, and that many had no tickets – were in fact untrue or irrelevant. The former superintendent agreed under questioning that he would not have thought twice about the level of supporters’ drinking that day if the disaster had not happened. Shown video footage of supporters in the congestion outside Leppings Lane, which Weatherby argued showed “no obvious drink-fuelled behaviour”, Marshall agreed that there was “nothing wrong at all” with supporters going to an FA Cup semi-final having had two or three pints, but he said his perception was that “a substantial minority” of fans had had too much to drink.

Weatherby asked: “Had this terrible tragedy not occurred, you would have gone home that evening without thinking twice about the level of drinking, wouldn’t you?”

“Probably, yes,” Marshall replied.

Referring to the allegation that the congestion outside was partly caused because Liverpool fans arrived late in large numbers, Marshall said he preferred the word “later” than 1988, not “late”. He acknowledged, however, that by 2.15pm on the day of the semi-final, which was not late for a football match starting at 3pm, he and his officers had “completely lost control” of the crowd outside Leppings Lane. The inquest was shown video of the severe congestion which built from that time, an “escalating situation”, Marshall said, leading to his eventual request for a large exit gate to be opened to relieve the crush outside. The tunnel was not closed off as it had been in 1988 when the terrace pens were overcrowded, many fans went down the tunnel, and the lethal crush in 1989 developed in those pens.

Weatherby put to Marshall that as the congestion outside was substantial by 2.15pm, if the rest of the Liverpool supporters had turned up at 2.20pm or 2.30pm, they would not have been able to get into the ground before 2.47pm, when he first asked for the exit gate to be opened.

“They could not, no,” Marshall said.

Weatherby turned to the allegation that the disaster was partly caused by large numbers of Liverpool supporters going to the match without tickets, in the hope of buying one or getting into the match without one. He referred to evidence from John Cutlack, a structural engineer who gave expert evidence to the inquest, that no more people were in the Leppings Lane area than the number of tickets issued.

“I am going to suggest to you that fans without tickets played absolutely no part in the events of 1989,” Weatherby said.

“I can’t agree or disagree with that,” he replied.

Marshall then accepted a series of faults in the match operation and police planning for it put to him by Weatherby: that the Leppings Lane turnstiles were too few and inadequate for 24,000 Liverpool supporters, the plans on people’s tickets were “useless”, and there were problems with the police chain of command.

Asked if he had given “no instructions” to his officers outside Leppings Lane after 2.17pm when the congestion had developed, Marshall acknowledged: “Yes, I think that’s right.”

When he had called for the exit gates to be opened, Marshall agreed, he should have asked Ch Supt David Duckenfield, the officer in overall command, to have some measures in place to steer fans away from the overcrowded central pens. Duckenfield, Marshall said, was “in position to direct resources”.

Weatherby asked him: “Why didn’t you say [to Duckenfield]: ‘We need to open the exit gates, it is an emergency. But for goodness sake, make sure the fans are directed.’”

“I didn’t think to do so at the time,” Marshall replied.

Weatherby put to him: “South Yorkshire senior command that day, including yourself, failed to address the obvious problems with getting 24,000 fans into those 23 turnstiles and failed to learn the lessons from 1988, didn’t they?”

“No sir,” Marshall replied, “we did our professional best.”

The inquest continues.