The possibility that Iran is seeking to develop a nuclear weapon and the reality that it is building a capability for enriching uranium continue to raise tensions in the Middle East and could push other countries in the region to move in the same direction. In my view the issue of nuclear weapons is not really of great importance for today's negotiations. After all, even if there were no such ambition now, Iran could change its mind next year and would then have come closer to a weapon by the progress made in the enrichment programme.

The conclusion is that it remains desirable to persuade Iran to abandon enrichment. But we do not know if this would be possible under any circumstances. Only direct talks will show this, and it is sad that such talks did not begin much earlier. Several years were wasted by making suspension of enrichment a precondition for talks. We should give President Obama the credit for the start of talks – without any guarantee, of course, that a deal will be reached.

In order to justify harsh punitive measures some may wish to show that Iran is lying and actually trying to develop a weapon. However, efforts to shame Iran will not improve the chances of persuading it to abandon its advanced enrichment programme – the most important objective.

What can be done? To persuade Iran to abandon enrichment, both incentives and disincentives have been offered. Economic sanctions and military measures could have dire consequences. They might also rally a majority of Iranians to support a government they otherwise oppose. Earlier European messages to Iran have pointed to possible rewards if the country were to abandon its enrichment programme. But the quid pro quo has evidently not been enough. This does not mean that "diplomacy is exhausted". Further incentives could be tried in the direct talks that are now on the agenda. Looking at the negotiations on a nuclear-free North Korea we find two interesting offers that appear not to have had parallels in the contacts with Iran. One is an assurance against attack and subversion; the other is US and Japanese readiness for diplomatic relations. After 30 years of no diplomatic relations with the US and more recent recurrent reminders by the US government that all military options are open to it to stop Iranian enrichment, perhaps offers of this kind could carry some weight in the negotiations with Iran.

A broadening of the agenda for discussions with Iran has sometimes been suggested as offering greater possibilities of balancing interests. It is interesting to note that while Iran said it was unwilling to discuss its enrichment programme in the recent direct Geneva talks, it was ready to take up the broader subjects of non-proliferation and disarmament. Discussions of these items could be used for delay, but they might also offer new openings. It could perhaps be of interest even to broach the deep-frozen subject of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and add to it the idea of making the area free of enrichment of uranium and production of plutonium.

Iran and Egypt were the first, many years ago, to take the initiative of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. All countries in the region – including Israel – have supported the concept, but for Israel, as the only nuclear-weapon country in the region, it has always been a remote scheme. Today, with Iran and perhaps other states in the Middle East moving into more advanced nuclear activities, the idea might appear in a new light to all concerned. For Iran, abandoning its enrichment programme within the framework of a zone could be a contribution to a broader global and regional disarmament and non-proliferation.

Israel may look at its nuclear weapons capability as a kind of life insurance against a possible future existential threat. However, this perception would change drastically if one or more states in the region were to develop nuclear weapons or move close to weapons capability by programmes for the production of enriched uranium or plutonium. To avoid having to face such a situation perhaps Israel would contemplate a zonal agreement under which all countries in the region – including Israel itself – renounced and eliminated nuclear weapons as well as nuclear fuel cycle installations.

This Israeli government may be far from this wavelength, but would it foresee continuing the line of action that began with the bombing of Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, and continued with the 2007 attack on Syrian installations claimed to be a North Korean designed research reactor, and the threatened bombing of Iranian nuclear installations?

I do not underestimate the problems of a zonal agreement – for instance those of verification, or outside assurances about security and the supply of uranium fuel. Yet the Obama administration, with the support of many governments, is seeking nuclear disarmament for all – including the original sinners – and both non-proliferation and disarmament are now on the agenda of the UN security council. The Middle East looks like a region in need of a bold broad approach.