We have no long-term strategy to deal with Moscow. Kissinger’s original concept of détente can help.

On 28 April the lower house of the French parliament voted through a (thankfully, non-binding) resolution to lift sanctions on Russia. Not longer ago than March, John Kerry’s visit to Moscow occasioned talk of a possible new “thaw” between the Kremlin and Washington. Even the NATO-Russia council has been revived recent weeks. These are not freak political “accidents” but simply expressions of an obvious reality: the relationship with Moscow is complex and sometimes contradictory, particularly given the growing diversity of NATO’s membership. A varying level of openness for conciliation with Russia, whether driven by political preference or interest and necessity, will always exist within the alliance. While the approaching NATO summit, with its displays of cohesion and robust language on Russia, has now placed a lid over some of these tendencies, we can expect them to resurface sooner or later.

But we should not be fooled: any “thaw” with Russia can only be circumstantial, if not part of a wider, binding process that gives Russia a real stake in its overall success. It will be vulnerable to future crises. This is because the adversarial posture of Putin’s Russia is unlikely to be substantially transformed anytime soon, especially now that Moscow has restored its military power to a significant degree. This only leaves two options going forward: either aiming to “win” the competition; or to stabilize and manage it.

At the moment there is no coherent Western approach to Russia, and no long-term strategy. There have been only improvised reactions to Russian moves; transitioning to a more complex deterrence concept does not change the essentially reactive nature of NATO’s policy in Eastern Europe. Looking beyond the Warsaw summit, this drift could eventually lead us either into a trap (forsaking sanctions for a mere illusion of Russian cooperation in the short term) or, at worst, into a major crisis, even a war.

“Winning” this renewed competition with Russia – in the sense of breaking its will and capacity to continue on its present course and removing it as a threat, as happened in the dying years of the Soviet Union – is a fanciful proposition. Russia is proving very resilient to political and economic pressure from a much more divided West, and in a more complex, fluid and open international system. This is no re-run of the Reagan-Thatcher final push of the Soviet Union over the ideological and economic brink.

Stabilization, in its turn, can come about in three ways: either via appeasement; through a balance of threat (responding to the enemy’s build-up and effectively entering an arms race dynamic for deterrence purposes); or through a balance of security (a de-escalatory spiral). The first two options represent the dovish and hawkish extremes of policy, which is where the conversation usually revolves. But it is the third approach that should be the focus – and for this, history provides some lessons in the form of détente.

Détente

The détente policy concept was best articulated by its architect, Henry Kissinger, in his statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 19, 1974. Détente, unlike appeasement, is highly targeted, seeking incremental progress on specific issues rather than a wholesale, Yalta-type sudden “grand bargain,” and does not require (or expect) cessation of competition in other areas. There is no prospect of “peace for our time” notes fluttering in the wind on the tarmac. The general “atmosphere” of political relaxation is designed to signal a shared interest in the end goal of stable relations, rather than an immediate suspension of all hostile action. Cheerful Nixon-Brezhnev summits did not dent Communist subversion but they did create the conditions for arms control. Kissinger insisted that it was all about ensuring stable “coexistence” and the “regulation of competition” rather than its elimination. It seems difficult to fault that logic today.

There are two key advantages to détente, as prescribed by Kissinger. The first is that it is safe: by definition, it can only progress in an equitable fashion, leaving neither side worse off – overall – at any phase. The condition is to be able to actually deliver in the end on individual intermediary commitments that can be highly controversial at home. In practice, détente was undermined – and its potential therefore never fully realized – by Congressional legislation like the Stevenson amendment of 1974. This limited to $300 million the amount of U.S. financial loans the Soviet Union could access, with none of it allowed to be used for energy projects that were of key interest to Moscow.

The second advantage is that progress is verifiable and it does not depend on “trust” but on what Kissinger called, in his Senate statement, “a balance of mutual interests.” The “true intentions” of the Kremlin are immaterial, as détente deals in verifiable facts, whether it is meeting arms control targets or making progress on political issues on the negotiating agenda.

A similar context

Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon reached for détente at a time when strategic pressures of similar weight were at work. The United States was mired in Vietnam and its leadership of the free world was being questioned; its economic lead over other international competitors was reducing; domestic political and social tensions were rocketing; the Soviets were surging ahead with their military build-up; and important allies, like West Germany with its Ostpolitik, were already moving towards engaging more with the Soviets and reducing tensions. Eventually, the Soviet Union collapsed in the context of a diametrically-opposed U.S. approach pursued over the 1980s, but this should not obscure the role of détente in the 1970s as a strategically-useful policy at a challenging time.

A balance of interests

Beyond the shared incentive of avoiding a potentially uncontrollable crisis, détente happens when it is also serves both sides’ separate interests, being mutually beneficial.

From a Western perspective, détente would be a way to manage the fundamental defense dilemma of our days, which is how to deliver more security in a context of continued budgetary pressures, increasingly diverse and sophisticated global threats, and domestic political turmoil. Open-ended confrontation with Russia erodes wider international stability, and undermines our own defensive architecture. Unchecked either by Western coercive measures or its own national interests (having little left to lose politically), a hostile Russia actively empowers our adversaries (like Assad, Iran), undermines our friends (like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) and Eastern frontline allies, and/or ties down increasingly large chunks of our spare military capabilities (especially in Eastern Europe), limiting our capacity for strategic response elsewhere. This is a challenge we can and are already meeting, but at a cost. Détente – especially its arms control component – is a means to reduce strategic commitments in a non-destabilizing way.

For Russia, the main attraction of détente would be the prospect of sanctions relief – by far the issue of most pressing concern for the Kremlin, despite Putin’s cavalier attitude to it. Détente, through a new form of arms control (as suggested below) is also the only realistic pathway available to the Kremlin for stopping or reversing a NATO military build-up on Russia’s borders, and restoring Moscow’s place at the top international table. Force will achieve neither.

Strategic equivalence

Finally, and crucially, Kissinger’s détente was designed to define and maintain a “strategic equivalence.” Reviving that Cold War notion today might seem misplaced, given that 2016’s Russia is not the Warsaw Pact military behemoth of the 1970s. But what military capacity Russia lost in the European theatre via Soviet collapse (comparatively modestly restored now), NATO has lost by voluntary scale-down coupled with the United States having to split its forces to face new challenges in Asia and the Middle East. In the meantime, new NATO allies have added vulnerabilities rather than strength to the alliance. Finally, hybrid, cyber and internet-powered informational warfare also act as force multipliers for the weaker side.

Arguably, where it actually matters – that is, in Europe – the question of strategic equivalence with Russia, in a broad sense, is becoming relevant again. Russian rearmament has transformed Moscow from the usual “spoiler” or “nuisance” into a real threat. This is now an irreversible situation: Russia will keep its new weapons for decades. Détente is the responsible way to deal with it in the long run.

Adapting détente

Although much of Kissinger’s sophisticated concept for détente remains valid today, this is not simply a question of “reviving” his 1970s policy or applying a blueprint – but of adapting it to the current context, particularly when it comes to arms control.

Cold War arms control developed as a very specific form of agreement which roughly traded “like-for-like” in conventional and/or nuclear capabilities to achieve a mutually satisfactory military balance. Today this negotiating model is difficult to replicate given the asymmetric advantages made possible by certain modern military technologies – particularly anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapons.

A potential solution is to develop custom NATO-Russia mutual security agreements tailored to the operational specificities of particular regions – such as the Baltic and the Black Sea. The principle of arms control – striking a military balance that satisfies both sides – would be retained, but the trade-offs would be ”non-traditional.”

Kaliningrad and Crimea seem ripe for this kind of approach. The basic political deal would involve Russia deflating these A2/AD “bubbles” in exchange for the West lifting some of its sanctions, with a clear prospect of halting and reversing NATO’s ongoing build-up once the Russian military pressure is reduced. Arguably, in some ways the Iran deal has been road-testing a similar logic.

An agreement along these lines would carry little risk for Russia in defense terms, since it would concern highly mobile A2/AD systems. Russia would retain the option of easily restoring its “bubbles” in the extreme case of a total political breakdown of détente. Likewise, NATO would continue to increase its readiness – from a non-provocative distance – so that plans for large-scale deployment in frontier countries could be resumed swiftly if needed.

A balance of security, not threat

Kaliningrad, particularly with its S-400 systems deployed there, is the principal obstacle to an effective NATO defense of the Baltics since it can prevent allied reinforcements arriving quickly by air and sea in the event of a crisis. This gives Russia the initiative and cancels out the benefits of (eventually) having a sizeable NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force if it cannot be deployed in time. NATO’s ostensible inability to continue to project adequate security over the Baltics without actually stationing troops there is the main military reason why local allies are pushing for permanent NATO bases in the region, which in turn impacts Russian security and fuels escalation.

To the south, Crimea plays a similar role. From there, Russia can hold at risk all NATO naval forces in the Black Sea, thereby achieving maritime dominance, and can in theory launch surprise attacks toward Odessa and Transnistria (the breakaway sliver of Moldova where Russian “peacekeepers” have been present since 1992), with a high risk of drawing neighboring Romania into a conflict. Various Crimean-based non-strategic missile systems – including nuclear-capable Iskanders, whose deployment has been considered by the Russian MoD for over a year and will likely ensue after the Warsaw summit – can also target directly the main Romanian port of Constanta and the nearby Kogalniceanu air base. As with Kaliningrad, Russian build-up in Crimea is prompting Romania to press for a “NATO fleet” in the Black Sea and more NATO troops on its territory which already hosts a U.S. missile defense facility (whose Mk-41 Vertical Launch System can also accommodate Tomahawk cruise missiles). Not linked to a wider strategy, this is only a recipe for increased tensions rather than mutual security.

Even if enacted, none of these measures can provide an effective, sustainable solution for Eastern defense, or represent more than temporary reassurance for jittery, weak and exposed local allies who know that in their neighborhood Russia maintains escalation dominance. In all likelihood, decisions at the upcoming NATO summit in Warsaw will fall short of East European allies’ initial expectations, but will be robust enough to prompt further destabilizing responses from Moscow.

However, a successful negotiation over the A2/AD “bubbles” would make political room in Western capitals for stopping or reversing NATO land deployments and equipment pre-positioning in the region – a key Russian concern – if the Russian threat from Kaliningrad and Crimea is likewise verifiably scaled down. This would benefit NATO too: a deal that stabilizes the security situation on NATO’s Eastern flank, without much further American involvement and cost, will also add more pressure on local allies to seriously improve their own defenses as a matter of urgency rather than over-rely on Western resources which are needed elsewhere. The current imbalance of effort is straining the political fabric of the alliance to dangerous levels, potentially entailing a far greater ultimate risk than that of Russian aggression: American retreat.

Negotiating from a position of strength

Such an agreement cannot be achieved at a stroke. It can only be the culmination of a process – in a détente framework – that begins with confidence building measures. Ongoing, selective cooperation with Russia in Syria, for example, is something to build on – as is the Minsk II process in Ukraine. Other measures can include things like more information sharing between Russia and NATO on military exercises (especially Russian “snap” drills) or on air patrol routes. But once finalized, a Kaliningrad/Crimea accord can then open the way to a more comprehensive, CFE-type agreement for East European security, in a subsequent phase of détente further down the line.

Naturally, there is no expectation that Russia, on its own, would fully embrace détente – let alone the notion of drawing down in Kaliningrad and Crimea. But NATO could (and should) do much more to press the Kremlin on to this path, as Nixon and Kissinger did in their time by leveraging the opening to China.

For one, NATO can threaten the permanent deployment to Europe of F-22 stealth aircraft, which is likely the only aircraft able to evade the S-400. (F-22s have already been briefly deployed for two weeks in Germany in 2015 for training, as an early warning to Moscow; this April F-22s have been training in Britain.) Then, there are options to introduce new ballistic or land-based cruise missiles to Europe, and, as a final resort, even new nuclear weapons. Further and permanent land deployments closer to Russia (2-3 brigades above what has already been announced) can also credibly be put on the table in a real negotiation – this is well within NATO’s material capacity.

The point to retain from this approach – and one that Kissinger ultimately failed to adequately make in the face of fierce domestic political opposition – is that détente would not leave NATO exposed at any stage. Far from being “soft,” this strategy is grounded in the imperative of a strong defense all through.

Conclusion

With an implacable adversary which also cannot be overthrown, neither appeasement nor an open-ended arms race are satisfactory logical bases for policy, especially in the long term. A middle way that helps to both decrease tensions and increase mutual security is preferable. There are enough similarities today with Kissinger’s time to warrant a serious new look at détente, and there are pressures on both sides to move past the current situation.

The question is how to adapt Kissingerian détente to work in today’s context. This could mean taking a creative new look at arms control – with a focus on the two flashpoints in the Baltic area and the Black Sea – as well as keeping an open mind about developing linkages between various issues on the common agenda, including Ukraine and Syria.

Détente is based on the idea of mutual benefits. The risks in case of failure are low (indeed, the U.S. went on to win the Cold War despite détente unravelling), but the potential rewards are great: stability in bilateral relations, cooperation on mutual threats, a freer hand for the West to deal with other security challenges. Détente also holds a distant and faint promise of the greatest prize of all: a new, genuine “reset,” years from now, perhaps under a new Kremlin regime. But this can only be the outcome of a sustained process that generates real, interlocking interests – not of some diplomatic coup as was erroneously believed possible in 2009.

This makes détente worth attempting, especially as we would act from a position of strength. Indeed, Russia will likely have to be pressed on to this course – and now, with sanctions still in place, we have the leverage to do so. Paradoxically, détente might be the only way to maintain a solid stance on Russia after the Warsaw summit – let alone in case of major electoral surprises in key Western capitals – and prevent the return of an overly-conciliatory mood among some allies willing to give away our current strategic advantage for only short term gains. With Russia, we should know better than that – and we should be ready to play the long game.

(Written in April 2016)