Bangladesh had not finished wrestling with the aftermath of the appalling tragedy of the terrorist attack in Dhaka when terrorists struck again in Kishoreganj, a town 90 kilometres north of Dhaka. The Eid congregation at the town’s biggest mosque and the police were the targets. Bangladesh has been shaken to the core, and its collective national conscience thrown into turmoil. The fact that five of the Dhaka terrorists and at least two of them in Kishoreganj belonged to affluent families and had received modern education in English-medium schools as well as in private universities in Bangladesh and abroad shattered the country’s elite. The common refrain was — how could they do this?

Bangladesh’s Prime Miinister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, echoed this sentiment in a televised address to the nation. She said, “I want to ask those who are aiding terror, what do you get by taking innocent lives? Islam is a religion of peace, you are maligning its name … People must resist these terrorists. My government is determined to root out terrorism and militancy from Bangladesh.”An editorial in the Dhaka Tribune described the sentiment eloquently: “The terrorists behind this killing have exposed themselves as brutal, inhuman, and unfeeling. They have laid bare the hollowness of their souls and of their claims to act in the name of God.” A new struggle for the soul of the Bangladesh is now underway.

The ghastly attack on a popular restaurant in Gulshan, an upscale area of Dhaka, not only snuffed out innocent lives of citizens from Bangladesh, India, Italy, Japan and the United States of America, but also raised the question whether Bangladesh’s intelligence and security agencies were looking at the wrong people and wrong institutions while monitoring potential recruits for terrorism. There were no casualties from other SAARC countries as two Sri Lankan nationals were rescued. There were no Pakistanis in the restaurant when the terrorists struck, a fact that could be a coincidence or perhaps not.

There is little doubt that the educated, young Bangladeshi killers were radicalized completely and motivated by Islamist propaganda.They do not fit the stereotype of themadrasa-educated kind. Their Islamic fervour was evident as they barged into the restaurant screaming “Allahu Akbar”. They went around identifying Muslims by asking them to recite from the Quran. They did not kill Muslims, except for the extraordinarily brave young man and woman — both Muslims and Bangladeshis — who refused to abandon their Indian friend, Tarishi Jain, the sole Indian victim of the dastardly terrorist strike. The Islamic State claimed responsibility and splashed pre-attack and post-attack pictures on their new agency website, Amaq.

The depth of the attackers’ hate and ire against non-Muslims was evident from the brutal machete strikes; shooting the victims dead was not enough. It seems the machete assault was encouraged by the IS in pursuit of its shock and awe tactic. Gory pictures could be uploaded by the terrorists directly from the restaurant.The IS also released a video soon after the terrorist attacks, threatening to repeat such events till sharia is imposed in Bangladesh. Two Bengali-speaking youths in the video promise an unending war till one side is defeated. The two promise to embrace shahadat, or martyrdom, to achieve their goal.

Bangladesh is not new to Islamic radicalism. Islam in Bengal spread as a combination of complex historical factors that facilitated the process. Wandering dervishes or pirs(qalandars) preached throughout Bengal’s countryside, assimilating local beliefs, customs and traditions. There was a remarkable synthesis that succeeded in integrating popular local culture with Islam. Aiding the spread of Islam were other factors — the migration of Muslims into Bengal, the conversion of people to align with Muslim rulers for favours as well as patronage and escape from economic disabilities imposed on non-Muslims. The bulk increase in the population of Muslims in Bengal came from the voluntary conversion of a large number of Buddhists and Hindu lower castes as a result of oppressive Brahminical practices that characterised Hindu orthodoxy of that time.

Social differences between Hindus and Muslims were minimal since they spoke Bengali and followed similar cultural practices. Islamic practices in Bengal were fairly unique, but they did not displace the ethnic Bengali identity which continued to dominate. A British administrator at the time of the 1871 census noted that the people were Bengalis before they were Hindus or Muslims. This was facilitated by independent and enlightened Muslim rulers in a virtually semi-autonomous Bengal. This unique and highly localised form of Islam in Bengal did not go unnoticed by Islamic purists. In the 19th century, ‘reform movements’ arose to bring back Bengali Muslims into the mainstream. Islamic purists were shocked by the veneration of pirs by Bengali Muslims and by their social practice of adhering to local traditions, attending festivals and practising rituals that were indistinguishable from those of the Hindus. This was pervasive in Bengal’s agrarian countryside.

Ignorant mullahs, themselves unfamiliar with Arabic and Islamic jurisprudence, encouraged local ‘un-Islamic’ practices to earn their livelihood. The Faraizi and Tariqah-i-Muhammadiya movements launched by Islamic clerics, bent on reforming Bengali Muslims, made some impact. The Tariqah was inspired by Shah Waliullah Dehlawi. The Faraizi movement was founded by Haji Shariatullah of Faridpur who, having spent two decades in Saudi Arabia, was deeply influenced by the teaching of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, the progenitor of the Wahhabi doctrine. These reform movements had a marginal effect on the Bengali Muslims who were too deeply rooted in the Bengali language and culture and showed scant interest in a pan-Islamic identity based on alien Arab concepts. They continued with the syncretic religious practices that had developed over the centuries of Muslim rule in Bengal.

The work of Islamic clerics did lead to some Bengali Muslims joining the jihad against the British in the 19th century when organized bands of jihadis from the Bengal countryside went to the frontier to participate in a holy war against the British. The British came down harshly on these jihadis, and Bengali Muslims soon rejected Wahhabi tendencies. The Taiyuni movement rejected the concept of Bengal as Dar-al-Harb and its leader, one Keramat Ali, declared that jihad against the British was unlawful and denounced the Wahhabi-influenced reform movements.

Islamic radicalism dissipated in Bengal till the rise of Abul Ala Maududi, the Deobandis and Ahle Hadees movements several decades later. These movements did have a political impact in Bengal, though their original intent was to reform Bengali Muslims and bring them back to the path of ‘true Islam’. The most significant fall-out was the emergence of a political consciousness among Bengali Muslims which led to the formation of the Muslim League in Dhaka in 1906 with the full support of the British viceroy. Islamic radicals in the late 20th century drew inspiration from the earlier radical movements and harvested the political consequences of these movements in establishing the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan.

The emergence of Bangladesh, however, reversed this trend, once again, as Bengali Muslims, at least the majority of them, rose up against the racially arrogant, domineering and exploitative West Pakistanis on the basis of their language and culture. This was to have a toxic effect on Bangladesh’s post-independence politics and the subsequent tussle between secular aspirations based on language, culture and economic emancipation and the assertion of an Islamic identity.

The new wave of Islamic radicalism was fostered by the Afghan jihad in the 1980s. Many Bangladeshis joined the jihad against the godless Soviets and were trained in guerrilla tactics in training camps in Pakistan. More recently, in August 2005, around 500 bomb explosions ripped through Bangladesh at 300 locations in 63 out of its 64 districts. The Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, a group affiliated with al Qaida, claimed responsibility for the bombings. The Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (Bangladesh) cooperated with the JMB in carrying out the bomb blasts. Both the JMB and the HuJi-B were led by Afghan jihadveterans. Following the bombings, a deeply embarrassed Bangladesh government banned both groups.

The 2005 bomb blasts took place during the coalition government of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its alliance partner, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the premier Islamist party in Bangladesh, which was led by the then Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia. This was a golden period for the rise of radical Islamist influence in Bangladesh under the patronage of her son and heir apparent, Tarique Rahman, the de facto power broker. During the two stints that Khaleda Zia was Prime Minister, Bangladesh witnessed close cooperation with Pakistan, with the Inter-Services Intelligence supporting radical Islamist organizations and Indian insurgent groups. The inexperienced and immature Tarique wanted to manage the radical Islamists to strike fear in the Opposition Awami League led by Wajed. Pakistan was pursuing its usual agenda to destabilize India using Bangladesh’s soil and support from its intelligence agencies.

These groups have spawned new offshoots like the Ansarullah Bangla Team and the Shaheed Hamza Brigade that have sworn allegiance to the IS and al Qaida in South Asia. These new groups have gone on a killing spree of foreign nationals, secular bloggers and Hindu priests in the last three years. Over 37 people have been hacked to death by radical Islamists. The IS has claimed responsibility for these killings. The Sheikh Hasina Wajed government’s reaction to these killings has been myopic and ambivalent. Apart from denying any links to the IS, it has maintained that the killings were perpetrated by local Islamists and Opposition goons. Wajed also made the error of saying that bloggers should not insult or hurt religious feelings of Muslims, thereby obliquely giving vent to the view that they deserved to be killed. To be fair, she also said that those who harbour anti-religious beliefs should keep their views private.

The Bangladesh terrorist attacks were followed by devastating bomb blasts in Baghdad, Jeddah, Medina and Qatif. The Medina bombing was at the famous mosque where Prophet Mohammad is buried. In Jeddah, a suicide bomber blew himself up in front of the American consulate. While casualties in the Saudi Arabian cities have been few, in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, over 220 Ramazan shoppers were killed. The IS has claimed responsibility for these attacks. Earlier, the IS had struck at the airport in Turkey. A lone wolf attack in Orlando was also claimed by the IS. Saudi authorities have identified a Pakistani resident as the suicide bomber in Jeddah. The attack in Qatif targeted a Shia mosque. Pakistan’s signature has appeared repeatedly and may even emerge in the Dhaka terrorist attack, as investigators dig deeper into the incident.

Conservative Islam and Wahhabi beliefs are virulently against praying at anyone’s grave, including that of the prophet.There has been a raging debate in Saudi clerical circles demanding that the prophet’s body be exhumed and buried in an unmarked grave as per Wahhabi tradition. This has not happened so far, primarily because the Saudi regime is worried about the reaction of the majority of Muslims who do not follow Wahhabi traditions. The targeting of a Shia mosque in Qatif and the Medina bombings seem to indicate that these are inspired by the IS.

For the vast majority of Muslims, the month of Ramazan is when they fast and pray for spiritual renewal and far from what the IS’s propaganda exhorts them to do. But jihadists have a perverted sense of religious responsibility. According to the IS, Ramazan is the best time to go about killing infidels by jihadists. It is clear that the IS has manipulated its propaganda cleverly and added the killing of infidels as a goal of Ramazan. Takfir, or the right to brand others — including Muslims — as infidels, claims that they not only deserve death but their wives and daughters must also be violated. Such is the concept of Takfir propagated by the Wahhabis and now adopted by the IS.

It is noteworthy that many of these terrorist attacks across the world have been carried out during the holy month of Ramazan. The jihadists were advising their followers that it was a good month to kill infidels. During end-May, the IS put out a statement that jihadists everywhere should “make it, with God’s permission, a month of pain for infidels everywhere.” Some jihadists have, indeed, tried to implement this propaganda. Urdu newspapers have also carried commentaries about ‘Jang-e-Badr’, the first battle led by the prophet with his Muslim followers against the infidels of Medina during Ramazan. The IS has extrapolated this historical event to call for killing infidels during this month.

The terror attacks in Bangladesh have also revealed the role of radical Islamic preachers, including that of the Indian televangelist, Zakir Naik, who is a medical practitioner by profession. Naik has come under heavy and renewed criticism after it was found that two of the Bangladeshi terrorists had acknowledged on Facebook posts that they were inspired by him. The Indian government has launched an investigation into Naik’s sermons and a raging debate in the Indian media is still continuing. Naik is a Salafist preacher, and he is followed by millions. He has even received an award from the Saudi king for his sermons. Indian politicians have also gravitated towards him for the obvious political aim of exploiting his followers for electoral gain. Naik’s sermons have been controversial because of their apparent support for terrorism, Osama bin Laden, as well as for their derogatory references to other religions, particularly Hinduism. Salafists abhor idolatry. Anger has been brewing against Naik for quite some time and has now boiled over after the terrorist strikes in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is facing an enormous challenge that the Sheikh Hasina Wajed government has to meet with determination. Bangladesh’s Prime Minister is known for her steely nerves and is unlikely to flinch from taking strong action. Her vulnerability lies in the nature of domestic politics wherein the likes of Khaleda Zia are likely to label Wajed as anti-Islamic when she orders a crackdown on Islamists. Her comments on the killing of bloggers was made with an eye on appeasing Muslim sentiments. The deeply polarised nature of Bangladesh’s politics is a formidable impediment to building any national consensus. The Opposition leader, Khaleda Zia, has made some noises about national unity but she continues to harp on the demand that Wajed and her government must resign and hand over power to a neutral government.

Both India and the US have offered help, and Bangladesh has agreed to receive assistance and advice. India has a special interest because of its geographical proximity and the danger of a spill-over effect that can cause similar attacks in India. The roles of Pakistan and its intelligence agency, the ISI, have to be investigated because of their long-standing association with Islamist groups in Bangladesh and for their abiding interest in destabilising the Wajed government and promoting terrorism in India. While Pakistan is a confirmed sponsor of terrorism, Bangladesh, under the stewardship of Wajed, has taken strong action against radical Islamists and insurgents. Indian intelligence agencies had shared information of the heightened risk of impending terrorist attacks, even though the information may have been of general nature.The time has come to mount a sophisticated campaign against all radical Islamists and those who inspire them from afar. A meticulous investigation must uncover the sources of funding, weapons and training camps. Bangladesh and India must cooperate closely and seek cooperation from friendly countries. Swift action is required and punishment for those involved must follow. There is no time to lose.

This commentary originally appeared in The Telegraph.