Getty Opinion The Media’s Trump Mirage The New York primary was a game changer — for the self-generated and self-reinforcing media narrative.

Rich Lowry is editor of National Review.

The New York primary was a game changer — for the self-generated and self-reinforcing media narrative.

We’ve gone from a certainty of a contested convention to Donald Trump closing in on presumptive-nominee status in the space of two weeks and on the strength of a primary that everyone knew he was going to win.


Of course, Trump blew the doors off the joint Tuesday, with 60 percent of the vote. When Trump wins a majority of the voters with postgraduate degrees, it’s been a big night for him. The size of his New York win was inarguably an achievement, given that his opponents had some hope of holding him beneath 50 percent statewide as of a few weeks ago. Yet his additional delegate haul over what had been realistic projections for him in New York was only five or 10 or so (Ted Cruz seemingly “rigs” that number of delegates every other Saturday afternoon).

New York is not a new dawn but the latest chapter in a story that has been clear for some time now. A wounded and divisive front-runner is still shambling toward the nomination in the weakest condition of any leading Republican in memory, sporting the most toxic general-election numbers of any candidate in memory. This story may be so well known that it demands dramatic, overhyped momentum swings to spice it up in the media, but the basic outline is unchanged.

If Trump gets to 1,237 or above, it will be on the last day of the primaries, and the likelier result — pending the outcome the next two months, particularly in Indiana and California — is that he falls short. Even if he can make up a deficit with unbound delegates and manage a win on a first ballot, the result will be uncertain for weeks after the final contests on June 7 and perhaps onto the convention floor in Cleveland. The period usually devoted to party consolidation and convention planning will be taken up with intrigue — and, if past is prologue — bitter denunciations.

Compared with Trump, John McCain and Mitt Romney were electoral juggernauts. They were both flawed nominees, but at least they knew how to put away opponents and unify their party, all without saying or doing things that made swaths of the rest of the country hate them with a passion.

The past couple of weeks have supposedly been the debut of the new, more disciplined Trump, brought to heel by Paul Manafort, who through his international lobbying work has highly relevant experience in dealing with unsavory authoritarian personalities. And it is true — Trump hasn’t made an insulting reference to menstrual cycles or the appearance of a rival candidate’s wife in weeks (and he’s only retweeted one apparent white supremacist). At this rate, Trump might eventually get his unfavorables with women below 70 percent.

Every day Trump can be kept from chewing on the furniture is of marginal benefit to his campaign. Yet the toned-down Trump is still talking loosely of violence at the convention in July and says the party he wants to lead is corrupt. He benefits from the bigotry of low expectations, and the wishfulness of his media cheerleaders.

It was first remarked that he was becoming more presidential when he held a post-Super Tuesday news conference at Mar-a-Lago during which he threatened the speaker of the House. MSNBC’s Joe Scarborough hailed an insanely sour-grapes Trump news release after Wisconsin as a sign of Trump’s new professionalism. (Scarborough says that he’s a John Kasich supporter — the Ohio governor should demand some tangible proof, and bring a couple of witnesses and a notary.)

Trump will surely romp again in the Acela states next Tuesday, and then it’s on to a true battleground, Indiana, that could decisively influence the nomination battle’s endgame.

For all of Trump’s weakness, his opposition is divided and uncertain. It is hobbled by several factors: 1) The establishment truly disdains Cruz, so won’t unite around him (if Marco Rubio were in Cruz’s position right now, he’d have 40 Senate endorsements and donors would be throwing money at him). 2) The chances are still reasonably good that Trump will be the nominee, meaning that the natural reflex of elected officials and other elements of the establishment is to hedge their bets. 3) Cruz doesn’t have enough strength with moderates to consistently and reliably deny Kasich support, so the governor’s zombie campaign lumbers on as a potential spoiler. 4) The Stop Trump groups, underfunded and built on the fly, have to make tough, resource-driven choices and decided, for instance, not even to try to build on their Wisconsin success in New York.

None of this is new, either. In the first phase of the race, Trump built an insurmountable delegate lead and simultaneously demonstrated his unsuitability as a nominee for much of the party. The battle for the nomination has, since then, been trench warfare. Which means progress one way or the other is so hard and slow it is difficult to distinguish from deadlock. Everyone bleeds, and the outcome promises to be unsatisfactory and costly for all sides; it’s just a matter of how unsatisfactory and costly and for whom.

Trump advanced his salient in New York, but that’s not a breakout.

