A US Department of Defense review into the incident that led to live anthrax being sent to more than 80 laboratories in seven countries has found a “systemic … lack of specific standards” in the preparation and transport of weaponized pathogens.



“By any measure, this was a massive institutional failure with a potentially deadly biotoxin,” deputy secretary of defense Bob Work said in a press conference on Thursday.



The review pointed to “knowledge gaps” in the effectiveness of protocols used to render live spores inert for testing, and said that all the laboratories investigated “relied more on historical practices than validating the processes used”.



“This review taught us lessons we needed to learn,” Work said. “We were quite frankly surprised by them. We are shocked by these failures.”



The Department of Defense instigated the review after it emerged that live spores of the deadly pathogen were accidentally sent from Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, a US military facility that produces large quantities of Anthrax for testing, to 86 laboratories in 20 US states and the District of Columbia, as well as Japan, the UK, Canada, Australia, Italy and Germany.



All of the labs to which the samples were sent were free to send samples on to other places, and so the Department of Defense has been unable to account for all of the samples. Because of this, Work said he expected the total number of labs which had received live anthrax samples to rise.



Asked at the press conference if the department was confident it would be able to track down all live anthrax samples sent from Dugway, undersecretary of defense Frank Kendall, who headed the review, said that he “can’t absolutely guarantee that”.



The review, which was published on Thursday, said that the problem was “scientific-community wide” and called for a set of standards to be put in place. Currently there are no standardised set of operating procedures even across defense department laboratories for handling of weaponized pathogens such as anthrax.



However, while it referred to “inherent deficiencies in protocols”, the report also pointed to several factors unique to Dugway, including low sampling volume when testing the viability of samples, and a “very short time period” between irradiation and testing.



“It is clear that [anthrax] spores are particularly difficult to kill,” the report said, “and live spores injured by irradiation may be able to repair their injuries over time.”



The report also said that cross-contamination from live to inert spores could not be ruled out as a possible factor in the breach, saying that the only precaution to prevent this was the use of separate biological safety cabinets, and that these “do not offer full containment, if used improperly”, comparing the risk to “the open bench”.



US secretary of defense Ash Carter has instructed the department to develop a set of standards for the handling and inactivation of anthrax and other spore-based pathogens. Until that process was finished, Work said, there was a complete moratorium on the production and transport of anthrax.



Additionally, Work said, the army will carry out a full investigation into those responsible for the failures at Dugway.

• This article was amended on 24 July 2015 because an earlier version referred to “inert spoils” when “inert spores” was meant.

