“We do not yet know what the government will set out as negotiating objectives for the UK’s relationship with the EU after exit.”

This extraordinary admission by the UK’s former ambassador to the EU after he resigned during the week underlines the continuing disarray over the UK’s Brexit strategy. They have not yet decided whether they want to stay in the EU’s single market (which would involve paying into its budget and rule out unilateral migration controls), in the customs union (ruling out unilateral trade deals) or whether they want a transitional agreement if a deal is not reached by 2019 (the outgoing ambassador said it could take 10 years).

Time really is pressing, as the prime minister is committed to invoke article 50 of the EU treaty by March and is due to make a keynote speech. To have the disarray dramatised like this bears out the belief of EU leaderships, including the Irish Government, that the internal politics of Brexit are not resolved. There is a remarkably naive belief among the most ardent Brexiteers that it will be easy to achieve a favourable and rapid outcome. That it is still so active, despite all the evidence to the contrary, diminishes British credibility.

As a result, the collective EU negotiating stance is firming up. Expectations are growing that a hard Brexit – leaving the UK without full access to both the EU single market and customs union – is more likely than a soft one, leaving relations as close as possible to the current ones.

The Irish and several other governments, including the Dutch, Danish, Swedish and Finns have indicated their clear preference for a softer outcome. But they resist being drawn politically or diplomatically into the British political game on this, since they cannot affect that outcome and are all too aware of traditional British approaches to European negotiations which rely on opening up divisions among opponents. They feel stronger negotiating as a united bloc.

Border

Tactically that is sensible at this juncture. But how does it match Ireland’s long-term strategic objective to secure a soft outcome that preserves an open Border on this island and freedom of movement (the common travel area) between Ireland and Britain? Ireland is uniquely and asymmetrically affected by Brexit compared to others.

That official objective, which has broad cross-party support, has been openly and clearly stated before and after the Brexit referendum last June. It has been widely and effectively canvassed among other EU member-states and with the EU institutions in Brussels. It is acknowledged as a priority by the European Commission chief negotiator Michel Barnier. As reported in this newspaper on Wednesday, the Government’s intensive lobbying for the common travel area and customs arrangements is recognised by the commission as being more advanced than Britain’s.

A similar point was made by the House of Lords report on UK-Irish relations and Brexit last month, based on extensive hearings and research in London, Belfast and Dublin. It underlines how vulnerable Ireland is to Brexit economically (especially in domestically-owned industry including food and agriculture), on free movement and in Northern Ireland. It calls for “the EU institutions and member-states to invite the UK and Irish governments to negotiate a draft bilateral agreement, involving and incorporating the views and interests of the Northern Ireland Executive and keeping the EU parties fully informed as this negotiation proceeds. Such an agreement would then need to be agreed by EU partners, as a strand of the final Brexit arrangements.”

Tactically

This proposal is more nuanced that was reported and discussed politically after its launch. It does not suggest “pre-negotiation” or simple bilateralism, but locks such a draft agreement into the overall Brexit deal. Tactically it made sense for Irish Ministers to dismiss such things, just as the Irish delegation reassured the commission on December 15th that it “is not ‘pre-negotiating’ nor is it enjoying any special relationship. Ireland is part of EU 27 and will negotiate as EU 27.”

Critics such as the recently retired Irish diplomat Ray Bassett and the columnist David McWilliams say the Government lacks allies in Brussels, must beware marginalisation by federalists such as Barnier and should press much more openly for an alliance with Britain to secure a soft outcome reflecting close Irish-British ties.

Their case underestimates British disarray, overstates Irish isolation, misinterprets Barnier’s Gaullism and ignores the diplomatic tactics involved. But it does register the dangers Ireland faces from a hard Brexit and the possibility of a shift in the public mood if it happens.

pegillespie@gmail.com