The summit The two leaders accepted Carter’s invitation, and the summit began on September 5, 1978, and lasted for 13 days. It was extremely unusual for heads of state to engage in a summit meeting at which the outcome was so much in doubt. Not only had Egypt and Israel been at war for decades, but the personality differences of the leaders promised to complicate the dialogue. Begin, always formal in dress and manner, was extremely detail-oriented and careful about the possible ramifications of any agreements. He was pessimistic about what he believed could be achieved at Camp David and insisted that the objective be limited to developing an agenda for future meetings. By contrast, Sadat wore fashionable sports clothes, was relaxed and forthcoming, and was willing to join in comprehensive negotiations aimed at settling all controversial issues during the few days of the summit. All three men were accompanied by their leading foreign policy advisers, but Carter preferred that the three men work together in private sessions in a small office at Aspen, his cabin at Camp David. He also insisted that there be no direct press coverage of the meetings, fearing it would have a negative effect on negotiations. A humorous situation arose right before the first meeting, an awkward moment that nonetheless shed light on the personalities involved. After President Carter and the first lady entered the cabin, Begin and Sadat hesitated over who should follow through the doorway. Both men laughed, and Begin insisted that Sadat proceed first. As the first lady noted later, “Jimmy said to me that Begin would never go ahead of Sadat, being perfectly proper according to protocol—president above prime minister.” After three days of negotiations, the heated discussions reached an impasse, and direct discourse between Sadat and Begin became impossible. Carter then compiled a single document that encompassed a resolution of the major issues, presented the proposals to each leader in separate meetings, assessed their comments, and redrafted the manuscript some two dozen times, shuttling the manuscript back and forth for their review. (This single-document method became a mainstay of Carter’s post-presidency work at the Carter Center to resolve international disputes.) As the days passed, prospects for a settlement at Camp David appeared so bleak that Sadat threatened to leave, and Carter began planning to return to the White House and suffer the likely political consequences of failure. An agreement was reached on the final day, however, when, at the last minute, Begin agreed to allow the Knesset to decide the fate of the settlements Israelis had established on the Sinai Peninsula (which Sadat had required dismantled and Begin had sworn not to abandon). Anwar Sadat, Jimmy Carter, and Menachem Begin (From left) Egyptian Pres. Anwar Sadat, U.S. Pres. Jimmy Carter, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signing the Camp David Accords at the White House, Washington, D.C., September 17, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library/NARA

A framework for peace The eventual outcome of these talks, the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” had three parts: (1) a process for Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza, (2) a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and (3) a similar framework for peace treaties between Israel and its other neighbours. The prime minister and the Israeli Knesset agreed that a transitional self-governing Palestinian authority was to be elected to replace Israeli political and military forces in the occupied territories. Jimmy Carter; Camp David Accords Pres. Jimmy Carter announcing the results of the Camp David Accords before a joint session of the U.S. Congress, September 18, 1978. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (digital. id. ppmsca 09791) The peace treaty that Israel and Egypt signed in March 1979 closely reflected President Carter’s proposals at Camp David and formally ended the state of war that had existed between the two countries. Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai, and Egypt promised to establish normal diplomatic relations between the two countries and open the Suez Canal to Israeli ships (which until then had been banned from the waterway). These provisions were duly carried out. However, most Arab countries, rather than following Egypt’s lead, ostracized Egypt and expelled it from the Arab League. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), professing to speak for the Palestinian people, also rejected the accords. Nonetheless, the next major advance in Middle East peace negotiations, the Oslo Accords signed by Israel and the PLO in 1993, included provisions with regard to the West Bank and Gaza that were similar to those in the Camp David Accords. These included a transitional period, an elected self-governing Palestinian authority, withdrawal of the Israeli military government and redeployment of Israeli troops, the establishment of a local police force, and a plan to move ahead with negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories. Jimmy Carter