Countries across the Middle East and North Africa have collapsed into chaos, with fighting in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen seeing these states break apart in violent civil war and chaos. As these conflicts evolve into wars of attrition and the United States under President Barack Obama attempts to draw down its role as regional hegemon, new political alliances have emerged to vie for supremacy and regional influence. By supporting different sides in the ongoing civil wars and bringing to bear political and military influence across the region, these alliances challenge the traditional Middle East landscape, seeking to broaden their power at the expense of regional rivals.

The Shia Resistance

The Islamic Republic of Iran has, since its formation, sought to spread its theological political ideology across the Middle East. As the standard-bearer and religious center of the minority Shiite sect of Islam, Iran’s influence permeated throughout the region, particularly to those countries that have large Shia populations. From Lebanon to Iraq, Iran asserts itself as a major regional power by empowering allied Shiite groups and political organizations, using them as tools to strengthen its own political standings.

Iran has an extremely close relationship with the militant/political group Hezbollah in Lebanon, often using the group as a proxy to conduct operations against their common enemy in Israel or to conduct terrorist attacks against Iran’s enemies interests throughout the world. By controlling Hezbollah, one of the few groups in Lebanon that possesses both populist support and a strong military force, Iran wields considerable power over the country and the ability to project that power into surrounding countries.

Iran also maintains a strong relationship with Syria, its primary regional ally. During the Syrian Civil War, that relationship has evolved to such a degree that Iran has become the primary supporting actor of the Assad Regime, providing weapons, supplies, and even elite troops (including Hezbollah militants) to fight on the ground in Syria against rebels. Iran has propped up the Syrian state in order to maintain that strong relationship with the Syrian state, which has in essence been transformed into an Iranian proxy state due to the degree of support provided. The support for Syria fits into the narrative of Iran as defender of Shiite Islam, as the Syrian regime is comprised and supported largely by members of the Alawite Sect, often described as an offshoot of the Shia.

In Yemen, Iran provides material and political support to the Houthi Movement. The Houthis, a political movement comprised of the Zaidi sect of Shiite Islam, swept into the capital, Sanaa, and other major cities from their stronghold in the north of the country. According to Reuters, Iran has provided training for Houthi fighters via Hezbollah, and a small number of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard’s elite Quds Forces are on the ground along with the Houthis for additional on the ground training. With the Houthis taking advantage of the weakness of the central government to seize control over a large portion of the country and increase its power in the Yemeni government, Iran gains a significant foothold within Yemeni politics via ally.

With a heavily majority Shiite population, a long shared border with Iran, and significant economic resources, Iraq is easily the second most critical member of this alliance. Since their archnemesis Saddam Hussein was deposed by the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, Iran has sought to manipulate and control Iraq. Former dissidents against the Hussein regime that emerged as leading political figures after 2003 such as influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki spent time in exile in Iran and still maintain close ties with the Iranian establishment. In addition, Iran played an integral role in the rise of sectarian Shiite militias during the civil war in Iraq, providing weapons, money, and training to these groups as they carried out campaigns of terrorism against U.S. forces and the country’s Sunni minority. The rise of ISIS in Iraq has led to the Iraqi government’s increased reliance on these militias and military assistance from Iran, and the Shiite population in Iraq has welcomed the protection Iran and its proxies provide. Iraq sees Iran as a close ally in its war against Sunni insurgents, and Iran sees Iraq as an important asset in spreading its regional influence, as both countries deepen economic and security ties.

Friends of Political Islam

The so-called Arab Spring in 2011 brought about a series of revolutions across the Middle East and North Africa region. Citizens of many Arab countries sought to overthrow what they saw as oppressive autocratic governments. During these “revolutions,” many Islamist groups, particularly those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, sought to gain power through the ballot box. Appealing to the conservative Muslim nature of many citizens within the countries, these political entities emerged as major players in the new governments of the post-revolutionary states. While these groups arose from homegrown support, they found international backing from several other states that have sought to promote political Sunni Islam. As two major nations who threw their weight behind these political Islamists, Turkey and Qatar have sought to expand their political influence across the Middle East by supporting these groups.

Turkey is currently governed by the AKP, a party of moderate Islamic character that is the first successful religious-based party to emerge to lead the Turkish state, a traditionally secular country. Under the AKP, Turkey has expanded its economic growth and has taken advantage of the Arab Spring to assert itself as a regional player, lending support to several moderate Islamist groups and fostering positive relations with Muslim Brotherhood-affiliates. In Egypt, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood after the 2011 Revolution led to its political parties seizing a large number of seats in the Parliament and the Presidency. Turkey sought to use this to improve its relationship with Egypt through ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the overthrow of the Egyptian President and Brotherhood Member Mohammed Morsi by the Egyptian Military led to a sharp decline in the Turkish-Egyptian relationship. Turkey has not only cried foul on the “coup” that overthrew the former Egyptian president, but has openly embraced members of the Brotherhood in exile, hosting many who fled the military takeover.

Qatar also has been a strong supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. Similarly to Turkey, Qatar sought to use the Arab Spring to expand its regional influence, lending primarily financial support to Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, making connections it anticipated would allow the the Qatari government preferential status with the new revolutionary governments. Qatar has long been a haven for the Brotherhood, playing host to prominent cleric Youssef al-Qaradawi, as well as members of the deposed Egyptian government with ties to the Brotherhood.

Qatar’s choice of allies has also harmed its relationships with other regional states. Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood was so at odds with other Gulf States Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates withdrew their ambassadors for a period in 2014 in protest (more on these states below). After the Egyptian military seized power, it branded Qatar as an undue influence in Egypt due to its role in supporting the Brotherhood. Egypt expelled Qatar’s ambassador as a result, and relations between the two countries have been poor at best. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE heavily pressured Qatar’s government, reaching an agreement in late 2014 that many leading Brotherhood members would leave the small Gulf country, a major blow to Qatar’s political machinations.

In an internally fragmented Libya, Qatar and Turkey are the major international backers of the Tripoli-based government, a coalition of opposition and Islamist groups that lost the 2014 Libyan Parliamentary elections. In following the two countries’ sponsoring of Islamist groups, Qatar and Turkey supports this unofficial government of western Libya, which is not recognized by the international community writ large. Libya Dawn, a coalition of largely Islamist-leaning militias, has received since 2011 weapons paid for by the Qataris, shipped in the thousands to the city of Misrata, heartland of support for the Tripoli government.Turkey and Qatar both have contributed intelligence to these militias, and have been accused by Libyan Army-affiliated groups of “supporting terror” in Libya.

Qatar has been a leading supporter of hardline Islamists in Syria as well. The country provided weapons, equipment, and funding to Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islam (HASI), a Salafi group with ties to al-Qaeda, and even briefly to Jabhat Nusra (JN), al-Qaeda’s official Syria branch. While pressure from Western countries has stemmed the overt support for these radical groups, money still likely flows covertly from Qatar into the hands of less savory actors fighting the Assad regime, even as the Qatari government calls for the West to further train and equip moderate rebels in the country.

Since the beginning of the uprising against Assad, Turkey has been a leading voice calling for the removal of the Syrian President. Under Prime Minister (now President) Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish government has worked to arm Syrian rebel groups along its long border with Syria. There have been rumors that the Turkish government has worked with radical groups such as JN and ISIS, particularly since ISIS fighters control a long stretch of the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey’s support has given Syrian rebels a place to rest and regroup, as rebels frequently cross back and forth between Turkey and Syria. Turkey has also been a major conduit for foreign fighters to join the “jihad” in Syria; the majority of westerners who have joined ISIS and other jihadi groups in Syria have traveled through Turkey to get there. With Turkey set to assist the rebel training mission conducted by the United States, it will continue to exert considerable influence within the ranks of the Syrian opposition.

The Sunni Authoritarians

During the “Arab Spring,” several countries in the Middle East sought to stifle any dissent stirred up by the rise of populist movements. Led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, these authoritarian governments retrenched and sought to limit the threat of the region’s revolutionary zeal to their grips on power. Joined by the Egyptian government after the military overthrew the Brotherhood-led government in Cairo, these states have sought to extend their influence by supporting like-minded forces in the countries plunged into chaos. Opposing both Iran’s growing regional empire of influence and Qatar and Turkey’s revolutionary political Islamist agenda, these authoritarian governments have sought to project their own power through allies across the Middle East and North Africa under the banner of “fighting extremism.”

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia emerged as a strong opponent to the Arab Spring current, arresting and imprisoning thousands of citizens accused of “dissent.” On a regional level, these gulf countries has supported the Egyptian military’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which both see as stirring internal discontent within their own borders. The UAE and Saudi were the first countries to recognize the post-”coup” government in Egypt, delivering (along with Kuwait) a loan of $12 Billion to the new rulers of Egypt. Under Egyptian President (former General) Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the relationships between Egypt and its Gulf allies, particularly the UAE, have strengthened exponentially. The deal benefits both sides, as the UAE and Saudi gain a powerful military ally, and the Egyptian government is granted access to badly needed economic infusions from the resource rich Gulf.

The uniting factor of opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood has led these countries to act in unison with regards to Qatar, who is seen as a disruptive if not downright antagonistic actor. Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi all recalled their ambassadors for a time from Doha in a united front against Qatar’s support for revolutionary Islamists potentially destabilizing to these countries. Only after months of mediation and significant concessions extracted did these countries return their ambassadors, forcing Qatar to limit its contacts with Brotherhood members and the expulsion of a number of high ranking Islamists from the country.

The UAE and Egypt have also provided significant support to anti-Islamist reactionary forces in Libya, in particular the Operation Dignity coalition supporting the internationally recognized government based in Tobruk. General Haftar, leader of Operation Dignity, has worked closely with Egypt and the UAE, and fits the same mold of “anti-Islamist military leader” type as Egypt’s President Sisi. In August 2014, UAE jets, flying from airbases in Egypt, targeted Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Libya Dawn positions across the country in support of the fledgeling Libyan Armed Forces being overrun in Tripoli. After the execution-style murder of Egyptian Christians by Islamic State extremists in mid-February 2015, Egypt itself began a campaign of airstrikes in the country, ostensibly bombing IS targets in retaliation for the murders, but quickly expanded its target list to areas under Libya Dawn control, including Tripoli and the opposition stronghold of Misrata. Under the pretense of “fighting terrorism,” both the UAE and Egypt have provided military and logistical support to their allies within Libya, strengthening their regional influence through proxies.

The opposition to Islamists is not the only uniting factor amongst these states. Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular worry about their neighbor across the Persian Gulf, Iran. Checking the Iranian expansion of influence is a major driver behind these countries’ regional actions, particularly Saudi, who views Iran as its archrival for regional dominance. When the Shiite majority in Bahrain turned out in mass demonstrations against the Sunni monarchy during the 2011 Arab Spring, the UAE and Saudi Arabia were the most vocal in their opposition to the uprising. If Bahrain were to fall under control of a democratic government, the country’s Shiite majority would likely see it inch closer to Iran. In order to prevent this, military forces from the UAE and Saudi Arabia deployed into the small Gulf country to assist the beleaguered monarchy in crushing dissent. While the extent of Iran’s role in the initial uprising is unclear, this action was clearly aimed at preventing Bahrain from falling under Iranian influence.

The Middle East is slowly being drawn into a multipolar competition of influence, brought on by recent upheaval in the region. Even as the United States’ position in the region wanes, regional alliances have emerged to expand their own political strength to the many countries torn apart by civil war and sectarian strife. From Iran’s goal of a neo-Persian Empire erected on the ideology of defending the region’s Shiite Muslims to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirate’s desire to maintain stable Sunni authoritarianism, and to Qatar and Turkey’s desire to control and spread revolutionary Islam, each alliance has sought to utilize both ideological and political means to gain control of the region. Through proxies and allies, the Middle East and North Africa have seen new battle-lines drawn in the sand.