Jen Helsby

Yeah. So generally, as I said earlier, we try to use widely used and established tools. So for example, if we add a dependency, we want to make sure that it's very commonly used. And we will, you know, when we make an update to that dependency, will review the changes, we do things like that, in terms of just general architect and for the project, we do threat modeling to analyze the functionality, the potential threats, and then when we're deciding what mitigation to apply, we go back to a threat model. So we have a document that's internal that contains every potential threat to the system. And then we try to rank all those threats to determine how to allocate engineering efforts so that we don't spend time mitigating threats that are either low impact or very hard to actually execute as an adversary. In terms of weak points and edge cases, probably the biggest challenge right now is just there are limits to what you know, any technical tool can do. So this cases where sources can be identified. And you know, unfortunately, we have seen this not necessarily people that use secured Rob, but people that try to share information with news organizations, operational security failures, you know, if you're using a tool, like scooter, and then you also email and use organization direct and those kind of situation, or if you're in a news organization, if you're in a organization as a leaker. And you're sharing a document that only a few people have access to, and access to the document is logged. That's another really challenging problem that we can't really engineer around. And so those are the biggest threats that face potential sources right now. And I think, you know, certain organizations realize that just having really good logging and other letting internally can potentially mean that as soon as somebody plugs into USB drive, you can flag it. So that is probably the biggest issue.