What did Gulf states stand to gain from toppling Assad in Syria?

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE seemed aligned in their opposition to Iranian influence, but as the war in Syria has waged on, their interests appear to be diverging

From Gulf States’ Policies on Syria by Will Todman, Visiting Research Associate, Middle East Program at CSIS

Amidst the confusion, euphoria, fear, and uncertainty that surrounded the Syrian uprisings of 2011, one thing was clear: virtually all of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states supported the Syrian opposition.[1] Their decision was a calculated one, resting on the belief that Bashar al-Assad’s fall would be a blow to Iranian influence in the Middle East. In recent years, however, this unity has diminished and states’ priorities have changed. Those countries that have invested the most in the Syrian conflict, namely Saudi Arabia and Qatar, now increasingly agree on which Syrian opposition groups to support, and they have adopted progressively more assertive policies in Syria. Other countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have toned down their rhetoric and reduced their support for the Syrian opposition, focusing instead on playing a greater diplomatic and humanitarian role.

The current splits seem durable. Saudi Arabia and Qatar appear intent on using their Syria policy to spur the United States into playing a more active role in the conflict. The other GCC members are much more cautious about regime change, and they are especially wary of any steps that would allow salafi-jihadi groups to establish a permanent foothold in Syria. A new U.S. administration could change the calculus of the first group. More likely, though, the splits will endure until the balance of power changes on the ground in Syria.

The two GCC countries that invested most in toppling Assad — Saudi Arabia and Qatar — are now looking more isolated than ever within the international community. Their initial policies on Syria seemed irreconcilable, but by late 2014 the perception of being abandoned by the United States pushed them toward greater cooperation. Both countries had hoped that the United States would intervene decisively against Assad, but even after Assad crossed Obama’s red line, this did not occur. Saudi Arabia therefore began coordinating its support to opposition factions — including groups with salafi-jihadi ideologies — with both Qatar and Turkey. This support contributed to the gradual radicalization of the opposition, which in turn further increased the United States’ reticence to act against Assad. The United States and Russia agreed to the establishment of a “Joint Implementation Center” as part of their ceasefire deal in September 2016 which intended to coordinate the two countries’ intelligence and airstrikes against agreed radical jihadi targets in Syria. As such, the ceasefire contributed to the trend of reducing the focus on Assad.[2]

Meanwhile, some of Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s key regional allies have also increased coordination with Russia, adding to the Gulf countries’ sense of isolation. Saudi Arabia had long worked with Jordan to coordinate support to the Syrian opposition, but in early 2016, Jordan established an operations center in Amman with Russia to direct operations in Syria.[3] Meanwhile, Qatar’s main ally in the Syrian conflict, Turkey, has also signaled a possible shift in its Syria policy. In June 2016, Turkey normalized relations with both Israel and Russia, and then released ambiguous statements about the desire to return ties with Syria “to normal.”[4] A sudden U-turn in Turkish policy is unlikely given the significant resources it has expended on supporting the Syrian opposition, but the current recalibration of Ankara’s foreign policy is likely to cause unease in Riyadh and Doha. Even fellow GCC countries such as Bahrain and the UAE have indicated that ensuring regional stability is a greater priority than regime change in Syria. Broadly, opposition to Assad’s regime among key regional players appears to be softening.

The prospect of a jihadi victory in Syria appears to have made Bashar al-Assad more secure. In part, turning the conflict into a battle between Assad and the jihadists seems to have been Assad’s strategy all along. But it also represents a setback for the strategy Saudi Arabia and Qatar embraced — that is, support for “effective” opposition fighters now and plans for sidelining the jihadists later. For the GCC as a whole, which was unified on the need to limit Iranian influence in the Levant, the current situation is far from favorable. Leaders certainly hope for a decisive change in U.S. policy with the coming of a new U.S. president in January 2017. Absent that, however, it seems unlikely that either Gulf approach will yield the desired results.

Read the full report online: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161019_Gulf_States_Policies_on_Syria.pdf

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