_______________________________________________________

Memorandum of Decision

of the

Honourable Mr. Justice E.J. Simpson

_______________________________________________________

I. Introduction

[1] On June 26, 2018 this Court issued a decision reported as McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 493 [McKechnie #1] which reviewed the litigation activities of Amos Edwin McKechnie [McKechnie], and concluded that McKechnie’s court activities may require management by a court access restriction order. McKechnie is currently detained in the Edmonton Remand Centre awaiting trials.

[2] What had triggered this step was the identification of a range of documents that McKechnie had filed (McKechnie #1, at paras 13-22) which, among other things:

1. seek a DNA order to establish the paternity of a child that McKechnie claims is his own, and to quash restrictions on McKechnie contacting the child and her mother; these documents describe purported sexual acts in pornographic detail, and McKechnie indicates he has a right under contract to kill the mother;

2. purports to sue a police service on behalf of himself and the province of Alberta for nearly $9 million in damages for alleged Charter breaches;

3. attempted to initiate numerous but obviously spurious Criminal Code private informations which allege criminal misconduct by a provincial court judge, Crown Prosecutors, defence counsel, government institutions, the Edmonton Police Service, and individual police officers;

4. apply to have the “ALBERTA-LAW-SOCIETY” declared a criminal organization, and states that McKechnie will “... pursue all of its members with Lethal force to ensure Justice ...”, and

5 include other threats “to coordinate the deaths” and “cause ... death of a target individual”.

[3] After review of McKechnie’s documents I concluded that his litigation exhibited indicia of abusive litigation conduct that potentially warrants court access restrictions:

1. litigation for an improper, abusive purpose (McKechnie #1, at paras 14-17);

2. litigation to further a criminal purpose, intimidating and making criminal threats (McKechnie #1, at paras 16-17);

3. “busybody” litigation purportedly on behalf of third parties (McKechnie #1, at para 18);

4. seeking impossible or excessive remedies (McKechnie #1, at para 19);

5. hopeless proceedings (McKechnie #1, at paras 20-22); and

6. using Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [OPCA] concepts (from Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, 543 AR 215) (McKechnie #1, at paras 23-24).

[4] On this basis the Court instructed that McKechnie had until July 23, 2018 to make written submissions as to whether he should be subject to court access restrictions, and, if so, what the scope of those restrictions would be: McKechnie #1, at paras 26-27. The Attorney General of Alberta was invited to file materials and submissions on these issues, with a deadline of July 9, 2018.

[5] The Court imposed unusually stringent interim court access restrictions, including a requirement that McKechnie may only submit or attempt to file documents in Alberta Courts, including private informations, via a member in good standing of the Law Society of Alberta, or another person authorized to represent him in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench pursuant to the Legal Profession Act, RSA 2000, c L-8: McKechnie #1, at para 30. I took this additional step in light of my conclusion that McKechnie’s litigation activities appeared to be for illegal purposes and to inflict harm on his targets.

[6] The Attorney General on July 6, 2018 in “Submissions of the Minister of Justice and Solicitor General of Alberta” submitted that the interim court access restrictions should be made permanent since “[t]he record of abusive litigation conduct set forth in [McKechnie #1] seems more than ample to justify a permanent Order.” No name is indicated to identify the person who endorsed this document on behalf of the Attorney General of Alberta.

[7] McKechnie did not make written submissions in response to the McKechnie #1 July 23, 2018 deadline. Instead, on July 24, 2018 he left a voice mail message with the Court indicating he would kill me.

II. Further Relevant Developments and Information

[8] Subsequent to McKechnie #1 there have been several additional relevant developments.

[9] First, on September 14, 2018, McKechnie attempted to file an “Originating Application - Notice of Appeal/Reference Under an Enactment” in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in Action FL09 01500, naming me personally as the Respondent. Its substantial component reads in whole:

Basis for the claim/reference/appeal/matter to be put before the Court:

1. Justice E.J. SIMPSON’s order pronounced the 26th day of June 2018 is an obstruction of justice contrary to s 139(2) of the C.C.

2. it is also contrary to section 153 of the criminal code pursuant to Section 23 of the criminal code

Remedy sought

3. Have Justice E.J. SIMPSON’s order from 26th day of June 2018 declared in no force or effect pursuant to section 52 of “CHARTER”.

[10] This document was rejected for filing by the Clerks since McKechnie had not obtained leave to file this item via the process set out in the interim court access restriction order. I also note this is a futile step even if this document had been filed. The correct forum for a review of McKechnie #1 is the Alberta Court of Appeal. It is difficult to see how Criminal Code, s 153 may have any potential application since that section prohibits sexual exploitation of young persons.

[11] Additional information has been obtained about McKechnie. McKechnie is the subject of 16 criminal informations, which include 51 charges, including uttering threats to cause death or bodily harm (Criminal Code, s 264.1(1)(a)), criminal harassment (Criminal Code, s 264), intimidation by threats (Criminal Code, s 423(1)(b)), sexual assault (Criminal Code, s 271), possession of a prohibited weapon (Criminal Code, s 117.01(3)(a)), and intimidation of justice system participants (Criminal Code, s 423.1(1)(b)).

[12] A psychiatric examination of McKechnie was ordered in Alberta Provincial Court action 161498936P1-01-001, which resulted in a report dated June 17, 2018. In parallel to McKechnie #1, at para 3, where I did not detail certain aspects of McKechnie’s documents out of respect for the persons who have been targeted by McKechnie for harassment and intimidation, I will not include certain information from the psychiatric assessment report of Dr. Santoch Rai.

[13] As previously indicated, McKechnie is facing numerous charges, including sexual assault and charges which relate to an incident where he is alleged to have confronted peace officers with a two foot sword. McKechnie has also been previously convicted of weapons-related charges. McKechnie stated to the psychiatrist he has the authority as a private person to arrest police. This report documents further death threats from McKechnie, such as he “... will now hunt down and kill all [Alberta Corrections Services] members to ensure justice in this province ...”. McKechnie also indicates he will kill his former defence counsel and police officers.

[14] McKechnie reports being the composer of songs performed by artists such as Beyonce and Eminem, “... but that he chose not to receive any financial proceeds from this work. ...”. He says he is a “genius” who cured himself of hepatitis C with homemade medication composed of acetaminophen, antihistamines, iodine, “and some other things.”

[15] The psychiatric report concludes McKechnie meets the criteria for delusional disorder, primarily persecutory and grandiose delusions, or very severe personality disorder with paranoid, antisocial, and narcissistic traits.

[16] In response to McKechnie’s threat against me personally the Court consulted with Alberta Justice Corporate Security and Emergency Services. This revealed that a formal threat assessment had been prepared in relation to McKechnie, which concluded that McKechnie represented a high risk for violence towards justice officials and others whom he comes into conflict with.

[17] McKechnie has also made additional explicit threats to justice system participants, including myself, while in court and on the record. Appendix “A” further documents these in-court statements. In light of legislative publication restrictions, Appendix “A” is redacted from the reported version of decision, but is present in the filed copy of this decision.

III. The Law

[18] The authority to impose court access restrictions is an element of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes: Ebert v Birch & Anor, [1999] EWCA Civ 3043 (UK CA); Bhamjee v Forsdick & Ors (No 2), [2003] EWCA Civ 1113 (UK CA); Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at paras 14-25, 273 ACWS (3d) 533, leave denied 2017 ABCA 63, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37624 (2 November 2017); Household Trust Co v Golden Horse Farms Inc (1992), 1992 CanLII 420 (BC CA), 13 BCAC 302, 65 BCLR (2d) 355 (BCCA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 23022 (19 November 1992); Tremblay v Charest, 2006 QCCA 204 at para 6, 147 ACWS (3d) 413, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 31410 (22 June 2006); British Columbia (Attorney General) v Lindsay, 2007 BCCA 165 at paras 24, 28-30, 238 BCAC 254, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 32026 (15 November 2007); Extra Gift Exchange Inc v Ernest & Twins Ventures (PP) Ltd, 2014 BCCA 228 at para 32, 357 BCAC 55; Tupper v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2015 NSCA 92 at para 27, 390 DLR (4th) 651, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36761 (10 March 2016); Ayangma v Canada Health Infoway, 2017 PECA 13 at paras 62-63, leave to appeal to SCC filed, 38030 (28 March 2018); Gichuru v Pallai, 2018 BCCA 78 at paras 74-81, leave to appeal to SCC filed, 38123 (4 May 2018); Peoples Trust Company v Atas, 2018 ONSC 58 at para 41.

[19] Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 sets the modern approach to court access restrictions issued under this Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The most common court access restriction is that a person is prohibited from initiating or continuing litigation, except where that individual has obtained permission, or “leave”, from the court to do so. This is a prospective gatekeeper step where the court concludes it is plausible that an individual will engage in further abuse of court processes: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at paras 36-37; 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 42-75, 283 ACWS (3d) 55. More stringent restrictions are also possible where those are proportionate to the anticipated future court-related abuse: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at para 34; Bhamjee v Forsdick & Ors (No 2).

[20] Court access restrictions may be ordered where a litigant has exhibited “indicia” of abusive litigation. Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 at para 92, 590 AR 288, affirmed 2014 ABCA 444, 588 AR 303, reviews 11 “indicia” categories:

1. collateral attacks,

2. hopeless proceedings,

3. escalating proceedings,

4. bringing proceedings for improper purposes,

5. initiating “busybody” lawsuits to enforce alleged rights of third parties,

6. failure to honour court-ordered obligations,

7. persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions,

8. persistently engaging in inappropriate courtroom behaviour,

9. unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and misconduct,

10. scandalous or inflammatory language in pleadings or before the court, and

11. advancing OPCA strategies.

[21] Additional indicia categories have been identified in other subsequent decisions of Canadian courts:

1. using court processes to further illegal activities (Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629 at paras 98-103, 29 Alta LR (6th) 334; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at para 35);

2. “judge shopping” (Onischuk (Re), 2017 ABQB 659 at para 18; McCargar v Canada, 2017 ABQB 729 at paras 8-9, 68 Alta LR (6th) 305; Re Botar, 2018 ABQB 193 at paras 23-28; Bourque v Tensfeldt, 2018 ABQB 419 at paras 17-18);

3. where a litigant indicates an intention to engage in future abuse of court processes (Lofstrom v Radke, 2017 ABCA 362 at para 8; Van Sluytman v Muskoka (District Municipality), 2018 ONCA 32 at paras 23-24, leave to appeal to SCC filed, 38057 (14 March 2018); Templanza v Ford, 2018 ABQB 168 at para 120, 69 Alta LR (6th) 110; Rothweiler v Payette, at paras 42-44; ET v Calgary Catholic School District No 1, 2017 ABCA 349 at para 11, leave to appeal to SCC filed, 38081 (1 May 2018); Lee v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 ABQB 464 at para 148);

4. where litigation has a political focus and is directed to acknowledgement and correction of perceived government shortcomings, rather than asserting a right recognized in law (Van Sluytman v Muskoka (District Municipality), at paras 23-24; Rothweiler v Payette, at para 36);

5. where the litigant minimizes or dismisses litigation defects and abuse on the basis the person is a self-represented litigant (Van Sluytman v Muskoka (District Municipality), at paras 23-24; Re Bruce, 2018 ABQB 283 at paras 8-9; Alberta Treasury Branches v Hawrysh, 2018 ABQB 618 at paras 36-46); and

6. employing proxy actors to circumvent court orders, court access restrictions, impede litigation, and improperly communicate with the court (Onischuk v Edmonton (City), at paras 24-25, 32; Re Onischuk, at paras 11, 21; MacKinnon v Bowden Institution, 2018 ABQB 144 at paras 44-85).

[22] This is a broad-based inquiry into the litigation activities of the candidate for court access restrictions. A court may refer to other external evidence, including:

1. activities both inside and outside of the courtroom (Bishop v Bishop, 2011 ONCA 211 at para 9, 200 ACWS (3d) 1021, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34271 (20 November 2011); Henry v El, 2010 ABCA 312 at paras 2-3, 5, 193 ACWS (3d) 1099, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34172 (14 July 2011);

2. the litigant’s entire public dispute history (Thompson v International Union of Operating Engineers Local No 995, 2017 ABCA 193 at para 25, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37974 (7 June 2018)), including:

a) litigation in other jurisdictions (McMeekin v Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 456 at paras 83-127, 543 AR 132; Curle v Curle, 2014 ONSC 1077 at para 24; Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114 at paras 102-105, 586 AR 23; Hill v Bundon, 2018 ABQB 506 at paras 68-80, 91-96);

b) non-judicial proceedings (Bishop v Bishop, at para 9; Thompson v International Union of Operating Engineers Local No 995, 2017 ABCA 193 at paras 24-25); and

c) public records that are a basis for judicial notice (Wong v Giannacopoulos, 2011 ABCA 277 at para 6, 515 AR); and

3. whether the person has previously engaged in abusive litigation conduct, and/or was declared a “vexatious litigant” or made subject to court access restrictions: Canada v Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 at para 37, [2017] GSTC 17; Hill v Bundon, at paras 68-80.

[23] Any indicium is a basis for the Court to evaluate whether or not intervention is warranted to control future abusive litigation. The presence of multiple indicia generally favours court intervention: e.g. Chutskoff v Bonora, at paras 131-132; Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629 at para 104; Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ABQB 237 at para 158, 54 Alta LR (6th) 135, appeal abandoned, Edmonton 1603-0287AC (Alta CA).

[24] The preferred approach is prospective rather than punitive: 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), at paras 42-76; Templanza v Ford, at paras 102-104. When evaluating whether court access limitations are appropriate, a court asks what can be anticipated from a litigant:

... when a court considers limits to future court access by a person with a history of litigation misconduct the key questions for a court are:

1. Can the court determine the identity or type of persons who are likely to be the target of future abusive litigation?

2. What litigation subject or subjects are likely involved in that abuse of court processes?

3. In what forums will that abuse occur?

(Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at para 36)

... Court access restrictions are designed in a functional manner and not restricted to formulaic approaches, but instead respond in a creative, but proportionate, manner to anticipated potential abuse ...

(Rothweiler v Payette, at para 45, referencing Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2)).

[25] Anticipated litigation abuse may be suggested by a person’s litigation history (issues, targets and forums where abuse may be anticipated), however the critical question is what the court can anticipate. Therefore, statements of intent, motivation, political ideology, and behavioural pathology are also in some instances highly relevant: 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), at paras 42-79.

[26] As previously indicated, the usual limitation placed on an abusive litigant’s access to the court is that the abusive litigant must first seek permission, “leave”, prior to initiating a new action or application, or continuing an existing lawsuit. This is a very modest imposition on a problematic litigant: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at paras 32-33; Wong v Giannacopoulos, at para 8; Canada v Olumide, at paras 26-29; Bossé v Immeubles Robo Ltée, 2018 CanLII 71340 at para 38 (NBCA).

[27] Courts have in certain instances gone further and ordered additional restrictions on problematic litigants, including:

1. representation by a lawyer as a pre-requisite of submitting a leave application,

2. representation by a lawyer for filing any document,

3. payment of outstanding court costs as a precondition to future litigation steps,

4. requiring payment into court of security for costs, and

5. personal appearance of the abusive litigant in court proceedings.

[28] The lawyer requirement has been ordered in instances where a litigant has engaged in a range of misconduct, including:

1. an established pattern of meritless and persistent filings, or improper communications with the courts (Boe v Boe, 2014 BCCA 208, 356 BCAC 217, leave to appeal to SCC denied, 36048 (26 February 2015); Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629; Onischuk v Edmonton (City); Re Onischuk; Re Gauthier; Templanza v Ford; Thompson v Alberta Labour Relations Board, 2018 ABQB 220; Hoessmann v Aldergrove Credit Union, 2018 BCCA 218);

2. attempts to enforce fictional OPCA claims on a target (Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629; Re Gauthier);

3. attempts to use court processes to further criminal activities (Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629);

4. employing proxies in problematic litigation (Onischuk v Edmonton (City); Re Onischuk);

5. abuse of habeas corpus on more than one occasion (Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General); Re Gauthier; Lee v Canada (Attorney General)), or

6. where an abusive litigant is a “litigation terrorist” who engages in meritless litigation intended to intimidate and/or cause harm (Lee v Canada (Attorney General), at paras 155-159).

[29] When a court contemplates the possibility of court access restrictions in addition to a requirement to obtain leave, that step must also be balanced against the predicted likelihood and form of bad litigation conduct: Bhamjee v Forsdick & Ors (No 2), at para 35; Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), at para 95; Ayangma v Canada Health Infoway, at para 62.

IV. Court Access Restrictions in Response to McKechnie’s Activities

[30] The multiple and serious forms of litigation abuse by McKechnie clearly warrants that he is required to obtain leave prior to initiating or continuing litigation in Alberta Courts. His misconduct is not constrained to a particular subject or level of court.

[31] This case is an instance of where the abusive litigant should be required to retain a lawyer to interact with the Courts. Mr. McKechnie has:

1. an established pattern of meritless and persistent filings, and improper communications with the Courts;

2. attempted to use court processes to further criminal activities; and

3. is a “litigation terrorist” who engages in meritless litigation intended to intimidate and/or cause harm.

[32] In certain instances an order that a litigant use a lawyer for court-related matters has been restricted to filing applications for leave (for example Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629; Re Onischuk, Re Gauthier) or even to filing a certain class of applications for leave (for example Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General)). In other instances a person’s misconduct is of a kind that any interaction with a court must be via counsel: Boe v Boe, 2014 BCCA 208, 356 BCAC 217, leave to appeal to SCC denied, 36048 (26 February 2015); Hoessmann v Aldergrove Credit Union, 2018 BCCA 218; Bhamjee v Forsdick & Ors (No 2), [2003] EWCA Civ 1113 at para 35 (UK CA). This lawyer representation requirement may also extend to filing private Criminal Code informations: Lee v Canada (Attorney General); Hill v Bundon.

[33] Any court access restriction in addition to a leave requirement is only appropriate where that is proportionate to an abusive litigant’s plausible future misconduct. In evaluating that question I note certain factors have special relevance. First, McKechnie is an OPCA litigant and subscribes to Freeman-on-the-Land ideology. In 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), Thomas J explained how Freeman beliefs are motivated by extremist political objectives and ideology that justifies targeting government actors as ‘outlaws’ (paras 72-73):

Judicial and legal academic authorities uniformly identify OPCA narratives and their associated pseudolegal concepts as resting on and building from a foundation of paranoid and conspiratorial anti-government and anti-institutional political and social belief. These individuals are sometimes called ‘litigation terrorists’ for this reason. They may act for personal benefit, but they also do so with the belief they are justified and act lawfully when they injure others and disrupt court processes. Persons who advance OPCA litigation to harm others have no place in Canada’s courts. ... Their next target can be anyone who crosses their path - government officials or organizations, peace officers, lawyers, judges, business employees - and who then offends the OPCA litigant’s skewed perspectives.

These individuals believe they have a right to attack others via the courts, they like the idea of doing that, and they view their litigation targets as bad actors who deserve punishment. ...

[34] McKechnie has been forthright about this. He says he has the legal right to arrest and kill police, lawyers, and court judges who in his opinion have disobeyed his law. McKechnie’s psychiatric and threat assessments are not favourable.

[35] Further evidence of whether a person should be subject to court access restrictions is how they respond to unfavourable court results: 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), at paras 60-62. McKechnie responds to unfavourable outcomes with death threats. This result does not suggest he will cooperate with court processes in the future.

[36] McKechnie is clearly aware he is subject to court access restrictions, but he has not obeyed them.

[37] I therefore conclude that McKechnie should be required to be represented in Alberta Courts via a member in good standing of the Law Society of Alberta, or another person authorized to represent him in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench pursuant to the Legal Profession Act, RSA 2000, c L-8, in the following circumstances:

1. where McKechnie seeks leave to apply to initiate or continue an action, application, appeal, or other civil proceeding;

2. to submit any documents or otherwise interact with an Alberta court in any civil proceeding; and

3. laying of private Criminal Code, ss 504, 507 informations in the Provincial Court of Alberta.

[38] For clarity, this order does not require that McKechnie retain counsel to conduct a defence, judicial review, appeal, or litigation step where he is a person accused of a criminal offense, or a person convicted of a criminal offence, in an Alberta court.

[39] This Court has also imposed additional communication restrictions on persons who have abused court processes. For example, in Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 690 a Freeman-on-the-Land who defied court access restriction orders with scandalous and offensive materials was required to communicate with the Court via a specific email address.

[40] In light of McKechnie’s conduct, threat assessment, and psychological evaluation, I order that where McKechnie is not required to retain and interact with the Court via a lawyer, then McKechnie may only personally communicate with the Alberta Courts and submit documents to the Alberta Courts by fax.

[41] This communication format requirement meshes with a final and very unusual step. McKechnie is prohibited from accessing Alberta court buildings except if he is personally appearing in Court. This prohibition is warranted because:

1. McKechnie uses court processes to threaten and intimidate justice system participants,

2. McKechnie has been evaluated as a high threat of violence to justice system participants,

3. McKechnie has been evaluated as having serious mental health issues, and

4. McKechnie has indicated he will kill justice system participants, including lawyers and judges, and doing that is within his legal rights.

[42] A superior court of inherent jurisdiction, such as the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, is defined by its authority and capacity to discharge its social function:

... the essential character of a superior court of law necessarily involves that it should be invested with a power to maintain its authority and to prevent its process being obstructed and abused. Such a power is intrinsic in a superior court; it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such a power, the court would have form but would lack substance

(I H Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court?” (1970) 23 CLP 23 at 27.)

[43] This inherent jurisdiction is not restricted to a defined list of mechanisms and principles. Instead, it is a results-oriented tool to ensure the court system is able to function. As Lamer CJ noted in R v Morales, 1992 CanLII 53 (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 711 at 755, 144 NR 176:

The nature of the application of these rules reflects the requirement that they be reasonably flexible and applicable even in unforeseen and unusual circumstances.

[44] The inherent jurisdiction authority exists to protect the functionality of the court apparatus as a whole. Many modern rules of court is simply a codification of that authority: Hunt v Carey Canada Inc, 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 959, 74 DLR (4th) 321. While the majority of court access restriction regimes imposed as an expression of court inherent jurisdiction attempt to structure litigation to assist in the best use of Court resources and to restrain abusive litigation practices, the inherent jurisdiction of the Court does not simply end there.

[45] Courthouse security is a facet of the courts’ inherent authority: R v Gillespie, 2000 CanLII 26952 (MB CA), 2000 MBCA 1, 185 DLR (4th) 214. Dickson CJ concluded in BCGEU v British Columbia (Attorney General), 1988 CanLII 3 (SCC), [1988] 2 SCR 214, 53 DLR (4th) 1 that this jurisdiction extended outside the Courthouse itself, to restrain any threat or impediment to the public’s access to court processes, and the work of staff in Court facilities.

[46] In other words, the inherent jurisdiction of the Court captures the institution as a functional whole. I have jurisdiction to take steps to protect all persons who are found in Alberta courts - the public, witnesses, lawyers, litigants, court clerks and other staff, and judges: R v Levogiannis, 1993 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1993] 4 SCR 475 at paras 27-28, 160 NR 371, citing R v DJX (1989), 91 Cr App R 36 at 39-41 (UK CA).

[47] In BCGEU v British Columbia (Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that a provincial superior court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to respond to and prohibit picketing around courthouses. In my opinion, the same principle would certainly apply where a person says he will kill court system participants, and claims that is his right.

[48] To be explicit, this prohibition is not intended to prohibit McKechnie from appearing in court to represent himself, nor would an order to that effect be valid in Canadian law. This restriction responds to a person who indicates he has no respect for Canadian law, courts, and police, and espouses an ideology that he is allowed to sue, physically harm, and murder those he considered to act outside his definition of the law. In these highly unusual circumstances, I conclude the Court has the authority to minimize the degree to which McKechnie may be present at and interact with the Court.

[49] McKechnie is therefore prohibited from being inside or within 300 meters of any Courthouse in Alberta, except if he is authorized to do so by court order, or is personally appearing in Court. He may communicate with Alberta Courts only via a lawyer or other authorized legal representative, or via fax.

[50] While this step is unusual, I note intervention of this type has been authorized in Québec, where in the recent Grenier c Procureure générale du Québec, 2018 QCCA 266 decision, Savard JA concluded at para 27 that certain Code de procédure civile, RLRQ c C-25.01 and Règlement de procédure civile, RLRQ c C-25.01, r 4 provisions codify Québec Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control abusive litigation. One such provision restricts physical access to court buildings:

... The order of prohibition is general or is limited to one or more judicial districts, or with respect to one or more persons. In an extreme case, the order of prohibition may include an order preventing the person from having access to the courthouse .

(Règlement de procédure civile, s 85)

[51] The Court in Grenier c Procureure générale du Québec concluded section 85 is constitutional, despite its prohibition on access to courthouses. I adopt the reasoning of Savard JA in that regard, and conclude this Court has a parallel authority to impose a restriction to physically access courthouses in “an extreme case”. In light of the unusual, threatening, and disruptive conduct by McKechnie that I have reviewed, I conclude McKechnie satisfies the “extreme case” criterion.

[52] I therefore order, under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, and on its own motion, and effective immediately, that:

1. Amos Edwin McKechnie is a vexatious litigant, and is prohibited from commencing, or attempting to commence, or continuing, any appeal, action, application, or proceeding:

(i) in the Alberta Court of Appeal, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, or the Provincial Court of Alberta, and

(ii) on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person or estate,

without an order of the Court in which the proceeding is conducted.

2. Amos Edwin McKechnie must describe himself in any application for leave or document to which this Order applies as “Amos Edwin McKechnie”, and not by using initials, an alternative name structure, or a pseudonym.

3. Amos Edwin McKechnie must be represented by a member in good standing of the Law Society of Alberta, or another person authorized to represent Amos Edwin McKechnie in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, pursuant to the Legal Professions Act, RSA 2000, c L-8:

(i) to submit a request for leave to apply to commence or continue any civil appeal, action, application or proceeding,

(ii) to submit any documents or otherwise communicate with an Alberta court in any civil proceeding; and

(iii) to submit an information to a justice from Amos Edwin McKechnie per Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 504.

4. For greater clarity, Amos Edwin McKechnie is not required to seek leave or retain counsel to conduct a defence, judicial review, appeal, or other litigation step where he is a person accused of a criminal offense, or a person convicted of a criminal offence in an Alberta court.

5. To commence or continue an appeal, application, or other proceeding in the Alberta Court of Appeal, Amos Edwin McKechnie must apply to a single appeal judge for leave to commence or continue the proceeding, and

(i) The application for leave must be made in writing by sending a Letter addressed to the Case Management Officer explaining why the new proceedings or the continuance of an existing proceedings is justified.

(ii) The Letter shall not exceed five double-spaced pages.

(iii) The Letter is to contain no attachments other than, for a new proceeding, the proposed notice of appeal, application or other proceeding.

(iv) If the single appeal judge requires further information, he or she can request it.

(v) The single appeal judge can respond to and dispose of the leave application in writing, or hold the application in open Court where it shall be recorded.

(vi) If the single appeal judge grants Amos Edwin McKechnie leave to commence an appeal, Amos Edwin McKechnie may be required to apply for permission to appeal under Rule 14.5(1)(j). An application for permission to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Alberta Rules of Court and must be accompanied by an affidavit:

a) attaching a copy of this Order restricting Amos Edwin McKechnie’s access to the Alberta Court of Appeal;

b) attaching a copy of the appeal, application, or proceeding that Amos Edwin McKechnie proposes to file;

c) deposing fully and completely to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed appeal, application, or proceeding, so as to demonstrate that it is not an abuse of process, and that there are reasonable grounds for it; and

d) indicating whether Amos Edwin McKechnie has ever sued some or all of the respondents previously in any jurisdiction or Court, and if so providing full particulars.

6. To commence or continue an appeal, application, or other proceeding in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench or the Provincial Court of Alberta, Amos Edwin McKechnie shall submit an application to the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate:

(i) The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate, may, at any time, direct that notice of an application to commence or continue an appeal, action, application, or proceeding be given to any other person.

(ii) Any application shall be made in writing.

(iii) Any application to commence or continue any appeal, action, application, or proceeding must be accompanied by an affidavit:

a) attaching a copy of the Order restricting Amos Edwin McKechnie access to the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, and Provincial Court of Alberta;

b) attaching a copy of the appeal, pleading, application, or process that Amos Edwin McKechnie proposes to issue or file or continue;

c) deposing fully and completely to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed claim or proceeding, so as to demonstrate that the proceeding is not an abuse of process, and that there are reasonable grounds for it;

d) indicating whether Amos Edwin McKechnie has ever sued some or all of the defendants or respondents previously in any jurisdiction or Court, and if so providing full particulars;

e) undertaking that, if leave is granted, the authorized appeal, pleading, application or process, the Order granting leave to proceed, and the affidavit in support of the Order will promptly be served on the defendants or respondents; and

f) undertaking to diligently prosecute the proceeding.

(iv) The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or Chief Judge, or his or her designate, may:

a) give notice of the proposed claim or proceeding and the opportunity to make submissions on the proposed claim or proceeding, if they so choose, to:

(1) the involved potential parties;

(2) other relevant persons identified by the Court; and

(3) the Attorney Generals of Alberta and Canada;

b) respond to and dispose of the leave application in writing; and

c) hold the application in open Court where it shall be recorded.

7. Leave to commence or continue proceedings may be given on conditions, including the posting of security for costs, and proof of payment of all prior cost awards.

8. An application that is dismissed may not be made again, directly or indirectly.

9. An application to vary or set aside this Order must be made on notice to any person as directed by the Court.

10. Any communication by Amos Edwin McKechnie with the Provincial Court of Alberta, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, and the Alberta Court of Appeal must be:

(i) by a member in good standing of the Law Society of Alberta, or another person authorized to represent Amos Edwin McKechnie in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, pursuant to the Legal Professions Act, RSA 2000, c L-8; or

(ii) by fax.

11. Amos Edwin McKechnie is prohibited from being inside or within 300 meters of any Courthouse in Alberta, except if he is authorized to do so by court order, or is personally appearing in Court.

12. For greater clarity, paragraphs 10-11 apply to all communications or appearances by Amos Edwin McKechnie, including criminal proceedings.

13. Amos Edwin McKechnie is prohibited from:

(i) providing legal advice, preparing documents intended to be filed in court for any person other than himself, and filing or otherwise communicating with any court, except on his own behalf; and

(ii) acting as an agent, next friend, McKenzie Friend (from McKenzie v McKenzie, [1970] 3 All ER 1034 (UK CA) and Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010, s 2.22-2.23), or any other form of representative in court proceedings before the Provincial Court of Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, and Alberta Court of Appeal.

14. The Clerks of the Provincial Court of Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, and Alberta Court of Appeal shall refuse to accept or file any documents or other materials from Amos Edwin McKechnie, unless:

(i) Amos Edwin McKechnie is a named party in the action in question, and

(ii) if the documents and other materials are intended to commence or continue a civil appeal, action, application, or proceeding, Amos Edwin McKechnie has been granted leave to take that step by the Court.

15. All fee waivers granted to Amos Edwin McKechnie by the Clerks of the Provincial Court of Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, and Alberta Court of Appeal are revoked.

16. The Clerks of the Provincial Court of Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, and Alberta Court of Appeal shall refuse any fee waiver application by Amos Edwin McKechnie unless Amos Edwin McKechnie has a court order which authorizes that step.

17. The Chief Justice of the Alberta Court of Appeal and the Chief Judge of the Provincial Court of Alberta, or his or her designate, may, on his or her own authority, vary the terms of this Order in relation to the requirement, procedure or any preconditions to obtain leave to initiate or continue litigation in their respective Courts.

18. The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket #FL09 01500 Order titled “Interim Court Filing Restrictions for Amos Edwin McKechnie”, dated June 26, 2018, is vacated immediately.

19. The approval of Amos Edwin McKechnie as to the form and content of this Order is not required per Rule 9.4(2)(c).

Dated at the Town of Peace River, Alberta this 20th day of September, 2018.

E.J. Simpson J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances:

None





Appendix “A”

Note: the contents of Appendix “A” have been redacted from the published version of this decision in compliance with the Criminal Code, RSC 1986, c- C-46, s 517 prohibition against publication of proceedings under Criminal Code, s 515 in relation to judicial interim release.