This new wave of terrorist activity in the Middle East and its spread into new countries is equally alarming to Russia and the West. Here our interests fully coincide. After all, many from Europe, the United States, Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries who go to fight in Syria against government forces are interested not so much in the overthrow of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as in acquiring the skills and experience needed to carry out acts of terror in their home countries.

For Russia, the context of recent events has added to the sharp exacerbation in relations between followers of various denominations within Christianity and adherents of Orthodox churches of diverse jurisdictions within Ukraine . The dramatic intensification of attacks on the position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) by the Kiev-backed schismatic Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate) and the Uniate Church can be compared in part to the onslaught of Islamic extremists against traditionally tolerant Islam in Russia in terms of “anti-Russianness.” An even greater, off-the-scale “anti-Russianness” unites Ukrainian radicals of the right and other ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations with terrorists from radical Islamist groups in the Middle East.

Of course, clashes between different denominations and sects have always existed, but they have never been so acute. Russia believes that the United States has opened a Pandora's box, turning the Middle East into a site of feckless, violent “regime change” engineering. As Daniel Byman has rightly noted in global politics publication Survival , “The massive sectarian wave began to rise after the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, and grew in size and ferocity as Syria descended into strife.”

However, recently in the Middle East and beyond, there has been an increase of inter- and intra-religious strife , escalating into a sharply violent phase. For example, conflicts are escalating between Christians (including Orthodox) and Muslims in the Middle East and on a wider scope, Shiites and Sunnis (behind which stand governments often pursuing not religious but geopolitical interests) and followers of different Sunni groups, which pose a direct threat not only to regions close to Russian borders, but also to Russia's internal peace.

The existence of different denominations and sects within Islam is a manifestation of religious and cultural diversity that does not necessarily entail conflict and hostility, any more than do the existence of different religions or ethnicities. In multiethnic and multi-faith Russia, both Christians and Muslims know this well.

The growing influence of radical groups among the Muslim diaspora in Europe is used by far-right forces that manipulate the proverbial “Islamic threat” in order to promote their political positions and influence among the population. As is well known, the first round of municipal elections in France on March 23 has already given the far-right National Front (NF) 4.65% of the vote, and its representatives will have the chance to become mayors for the first time.

NF representatives have declared their plans to halt subsidies to local non-profit organizations that provide halal products for local Muslims. I recall how the father of the current leader of the NF, Jean-Marie Le Pen, had once called immigrants and Islamism the “fatal scourges” of France.

In the Arab world, the new wave of extremism is a cause for concern even among those governments traditionally considered to be their sponsors. In condemning some of the openly terrorist groups operating against the government in Syria, Riyadh proceeds not out of a desire to make a change in its Syria policies, but out of fear for its own future, which will be threatened by terrorists after their return from Syria with the training and experience they have gained.

Also appearing in the radical arena are new players with non-Islamist orientations. According to a number of local analysts, the Egyptian "Ultras," known for their coordinated and aggressive conduct at soccer matches, are turning into an organized political force. They may even be able to influence the upcoming presidential elections.

According to the European press, in the upcoming May elections of the European Parliament, far-right parties may receive approximately 10% of the vote. In other words, such groups may enjoy the support of 50 million voters. Not all of these people are neo-Nazis; some of them vote for extreme rightists in protest against poverty, unemployment and inequality. The combined resources of the extreme right in the European Parliament and within some European countries will both feed radical nationalists and neo-Nazis in Ukraine and provoke a counter-reaction in the Islamic world. Among the Muslim populations of Europe, this counter-reaction will come in the form of growing extremism. Both tendencies make Russia's task of opposing this two-headed threat all the more urgent.

A lot of guesswork has appeared in the global media concerning agreements that may have been reached between Saudi Arabia and the United States during the recent visit by President Barack Obama to Riyadh. In particular, speculation has spread about a possible deal in which Obama could make concessions to Saudi leaders, with Washington applying military pressure on the Assad regime in Syria and supporting the Egyptian government, which is presently the target of US criticism for its policy of brutal repression against the Muslim Brotherhood.

There were fears in Moscow that this visit might have been intended to convince Saudi leaders to increase oil supply in order to lower world oil prices as a part of the US pressures exerted on Moscow. Russian analysts believe that this animosity toward Russia is dictated by the interests of a group of neoconservatives within the current US administration, and that it can damage US-Russia cooperation in the Middle East as well as US relations with its key ally in the region. In this regard, I can mention that, according to the Pew Research Center, 82% of white evangelicals in the United States believe that Israel was given to the Jewish people by God (among American Jews, the percentage who believe in this is halved), and that the United States is not providing adequate support to Israel.

For some reason, observers are writing nothing about other topics that could not have been left undiscussed in the negotiations: the situation in Iraq and Saudi leaders' irritation over the actions of the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Did Riyadh not try, in exchange for its participation in the energy war against Moscow, to get Obama to use US leverage over Iraq, with the aim of changing the regime? Let us not forget that this pressure for regime change in Baghdad can be interpreted as a de facto recognition of US defeat in the Iraq war, and would evoke a sharp reaction from Tehran, for which Iraq has long lacked strategic depth. Paradoxically, up until now, Washington and Tehran have in practice oriented toward supporting the same partners in Iraq as a result of a coincidence of strategic interests (specifically, a purging of the remnants of the former regime and deterrence against radical Sunni groups).

The vast majority of Russian analysts believe that the course of isolating Russia, dictated by a view deeply rooted in the United States of its exclusive role in the world, has poor prospects and could damage the interests of the United States and its allies. The close relationship between the crisis over Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East is beyond doubt. But only joint actions by the United States and Russia are capable of countering the growing challenges and threats from radicals and extremists of all stripes, and reducing the intensity of inter-religious tensions in the Middle East and in the Islamic world.

For now, it is difficult to say whether Russia will act in response to strident pressure from the United States, or if it should take a more aggressive stance by way of significant changes to its Middle East strategy. One cannot help but agree with Paul Saunders when he wrote for Al-Monitor that Moscow has some leverage. Specifically, it is easy to imagine that Moscow could reverse its decision to suspend the supply of S-300 missiles to Iran, a deal Tehran has long insisted on.

Just now, a new game-changer for Russia has arisen in the situation in Crimea. As the vast majority of Crimean Tatars live in Turkey (even if they are, in fact, Turkified), the conflict shows a direct relationship to the Middle East. During a March 29 assembly of representatives, or Kurultay, of the Crimean Tatar population held in the city of Bakhchisaray, a resolution was adopted for the Crimean Tatar people to press for “national-territorial autonomy” in “their historical territory, Crimea.” With this demand, the Kurultay, according to local media reports, decided to address the UN, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The results of the last meeting between US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Paris evoke hope that Moscow and Washington will continue their dialogue on the Ukranian crisis and continue their constructive cooperation in the Middle East.