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Once Phoenix got rolling, everything was going to work smoothly again.

On the surface, there was every reason to believe in Phoenix in those innocent days.

Eight years of planning and preparation went into the pay system that would launch in February 2016 — four months after the Liberals won a general election.

And it had some good advance reviews from outside consultants — sort of.

Treasury Board and Public Services and Procurement Canada commissioned at least two reviews that were delivered days before the launch.

The two reached opposite conclusions. One review, by Gartner Inc., offered a number of important warnings, but the second report, by S.i. Systems, was optimistic about the new pay system.

“The (Phoenix) initiative is very likely to achieve its goals and desired outcomes within the first year or two of full operations,” S.i. Systems wrote in its draft final report in January, 2016 — a month before launch.

“All in-scope work has been completed, a (software) code freeze has been imposed on Phoenix and the Miramichi pay centre is fully operational.”

S.i. Systems didn’t say it would be easy, but the firm did feel the project would work: It “will be challenging,” its report noted, “but it is likely that the problems and difficulties will be manageable.”

They weren’t. Not even close, and not even today, nearly four years after the launch.

Photo by Tony Caldwell / Postmedia

The pay system that flew under the radar during the decade’s first half became, in the final four years, the biggest problem in the public service. Its breakdowns have affected more than half of the nearly 300,000 employees paid by Phoenix.