The Russian president has several routes of retreat in the face of growing pressure. He is unlikely to take any of them

Although visibly embarrassed and increasingly cornered by mounting evidence that rebels using missiles supplied by Moscow were responsible for shooting down flight MH17, Vladimir Putin still has plenty of ways to extricate himself and his country from the disaster.

Yet all such options ultimately entail an admission that his policies in Ukraine are counterproductive: something the Russian president is loth to do. So the chances are high that Russia will simply brazen out the crisis, regardless of any sanctions threatened by the west. The long-term interests of the Russian nation are being held hostage by the vanity of its leader.

A clever Russian de-escalation tactic would be for Moscow to assist in the immediate creation of an international committee of inquiry into the carnage, and even grant the committee access to Russian soil.

That carries the risk that the investigation would unearth unsavoury connections between the Russian military and ethnic Russian separatists. But the risks are manageable, partly because pro-Russian rebels have already destroyed much of the incriminating evidence at the airliner's crash site, and partly because the Buk missile system involved in the Malaysian jet's destruction is manufactured in a single Russian factory and operated by both the Ukrainian and Russian military.

The "smoking gun" linking the particular missile that hit the airliner to Russian arsenals is, therefore, never likely to be found, which will mean Moscow has plenty of wriggle room. That is precisely why Barack Obama and other western leaders have pointedly avoided any explicit accusations that the missile that destroyed the Malaysian plane was guided by Russian radar systems. Putin can appear to be co-operating with the inquiry without risking all that much.

An equally low-risk policy would be for Russia to accept the stationing of international observers on its border with Ukraine, to prevent the further smuggling of heavy weapons. Again, that would give little away, since ethnic Russian separatists already have all the weapons they are likely to need. And, again, western governments have offered Putin the easy way out: a team of observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe stands ready to be dispatched.

The snag for Putin is that all these options would entail him accepting that, at most, Russia would now only be able to obtain autonomy for Russian-speakers in eastern Ukraine. The possibility of carving up Ukraine in order to prevent the country from slipping into the western sphere of influence would be gone, and probably for good, since the Ukrainian authorities would then be able to re-establish control in the eastern parts of their country. And that Putin is not prepared to contemplate, because it would dent his carefully nurtured domestic image as Russia's invincible leader.

What Putin is banking on instead is the ability of his propaganda machinery to sow doubts about the circumstances of the disaster, in the hope that the wave of indignation will simply blow over with little damage to Russia.

Yet it is unlikely that the strategy of sitting out the crisis would work to Russia's advantage. International pressure to impose further sanctions on Moscow could become unstoppable. The Malaysian airliner's tragedy will embroil Russia in years of litigation. The families of the bereaved will seek compensation. Arrest warrants will be issued against individual Russian military commanders, and countries such as the Netherlands and Australia, which lost so many of their citizens, will demand satisfaction.

In his handling of the crisis, Putin has again revealed himself as a good tactician – a shrewd short-term operator. But he remains a poor strategist, and an obstacle to Russia's future wellbeing.

Jonathan Eyal is director of international security studies at London's Royal United Services Institute