Daniel Gros maintains that it is "not just simplistic" but also "misleading" to believe that globalisation is "really fueling populism." While freer movement of goods, capital, services, labour, technology etc has "transformed economies," its victims, the so-called “losers of globalization” see it as a thorn in their side, driving them into the arms of "potentially dangerous political forces." Populists blame the establishment parties for an anaemic economy, saying globalisation has sent "low-skill jobs to the developing world," and taken a toll on domestic employment. They reject this "elite project" and demand for protectionist and inward-looking measures.

While Donald Trump is America's "standard bearer" of populism, France's Marine Le Pen is widely seen as his European equivalent. Trump doesn't seem to object to globalisation. He is a self-proclaimed "free-trader" himself. But he says he has a problem with free trade in the absence of talented negotiators. He said: "Free trade can be wonderful if you have smart people, but we have people that are stupid. We have people that aren't smart. And we have people that are controlled by special interests. And it's just not going to work." His policy would be "America first" and his "people" would be tough negotiators and play a zero-sum game.

Le Pen had once said that she faced two dangers - Islamic fundamentalism - a kind of totalitarianism in the 21st Century. The second is globalisation, seeing "trade liberalization" as another kind of totalitarianism, the ideology of free business with no boundaries. She does believe that "leaders in the US and Europe “hollowed out” the domestic manufacturing base, reducing the availability of high-paying jobs for low-skill workers, who now have to choose between protracted unemployment and menial service-sector jobs."

Although educated people are "on average, three times as likely to have a job," and can earn more than those who are "less-educated," young university graduates in Southern Europe complain about high unemployment and often share the same plight as "those without a secondary education." In the absence of job opportunities, Southern Europe sees a "brain drain" of its young and talented leaving for northern EU member states. Other young and jobless, who stay behind, miss out on gaining economic independence and confidence that come with steady employment. Some have to postpone their plans for families and pensions etc.

This economic malaise does "account for the rise of populism." Yet the author is reluctant to admit that the assupmption of "low-skill workers’ circumstances and prospects deteriorating faster vis-à-vis their high-skill counterparts" is also real in Europe, not just in America. They are the ones who support fringe parties on the far left or right. Even if it is true that "educational attainment correlates strongly with income and labor-market performance," and that "higher education has provided significant labor-market advantages for a long time," the sense of insecurity still prevails among those, who are qualified and employed, especially when economic times are tough.

The Euro crisis and the Greek bailout drama had enabled the rise of populism in Europe. In Southern Europe the "economic arguments" of populists are "simplistic" - globalisation and immigrants have become scapegoats for their grievances. Populist parties elsewhere in Europe jump on the bandwagon and hijack the refugee crisis to boost their political strength.

Indeed, it is important to know that globalisation is not a phenomenon of yesterday. For three decades it had helped boost the global economy, which has its cyclic ups and downs. However populism is an opportunistic movement, which is all about targting the perceived interests of ordinary people at the right moment, and winning their support.