The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Delusional Thought Drawing on the latest work in cognitive neuroscience, a philosopher proposes that delusions are narrative models that accommodate anomalous experiences.



"An elegant meditation on delusion, dreaming, and default-mode thought. From dopamine dysregulation to delusional mood, from predictive coding to the phenomenology of agency, The Measure of Madness paints a compelling picture of thought gone wrong. This is philosophically informed cognitive neuropsychiatry at its best."

—Tim Bayne, Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester Ostension: Word Learning and the Embodied Mind An examination of the role of ostension—the bodily manifestation of intentio—-in word learning, and an investigation of the philosophical puzzles it poses.



“A beautiful and exciting book that engages a truly important topic. Engelland is a trustworthy guide; he introduces the reader to an ongoing conversation—carried out by philosophers and also cognitive scientists—that is, finally, about conversation itself and its power to make present a shared world. Anyone interested in understanding the human mind will benefit from and delight in this remarkable book.”

—Alva Noë, Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley The Conscious Mind An account of the emergence of the mind: how the brain acquired self-awareness, functional autonomy, the ability to think, and the power of speech.



Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity Psychopathy has been the subject of investigations in both philosophy and psychiatry and yet the conceptual issues remain largely unresolved. This volume approaches psychopathy by considering the question of what psychopaths lack. The contributors investigate specific moral dysfunctions or deficits, shedding light on the capacities people need to be moral by examining cases of real people who seem to lack those capacities.



Contributors:

Gwen Adshead, Piers Benn, John Deigh, Alan Felthous, Kerrin Jacobs, Heidi Maibom, Eric Matthews, Henning Sass, Thomas Schramme, Susie Scott, David Shoemaker, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Matthew Talbert Minds Without Meanings: An Essay on the Content of Concepts Two prominent thinkers argue for the possibility of a theory of concepts that takes reference to be concepts’ sole semantic property.



"A very small book that attempts to do the very ambitious job of solving the problem of content. Fodor and Pylyshyn argue that the only semantic notion worth scientific attention is reference. Then they give an empirically grounded theory of reference. The book is vintage Fodor and Pylyshyn—densely argued, funny, infuriating. Great fun and a must-read.”

—Anthony Chemero, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Cincinnati; author of Radical Embodied Cognitive Science Understanding Beliefs What beliefs are, what they do for us, how we come to hold them, and how to evaluate them.