By Simon Hradecky, created Monday, Dec 5th 2016 16:59Z, last updated Sunday, Mar 12th 2017 14:15Z A Go2Sky Boeing 737-800 on behalf of Norwegian Air Shuttle, registration LN-NII performing flight DY-277 from Kristiansand to Oslo (Norway), entered Kristiansand's runway 04, began to accelerate for takeoff, the crew rejected takeoff at low speed and stopped the aircraft after some distance. The aircraft remained in position for about 5 minutes, then accelerated for takeoff again and departed. The aircraft stopped the climb at FL150 and continued to Oslo for a landing without further incident about 40 minutes later.



Radar data confirm the aircraft rolled about 230 meters upon first acceleration, stopped for about 5 minutes, then departed but did not climb above FL150 (while usually the aircraft would climb to above FL300).



On Nov 14th 2016 a source told The Aviation Herald, that the crew received a takeoff configuration warning and rejected takeoff shutting down both engines, which caused all electrics to shut down as well including cabin lighting. While the flight crew was restarting the engines, cabin crew walked the aisles to calm passengers, the flight attendants expected another call by the crew to take their seats prior to takeoff, however, suddenly - with cabin crew still around the cabin in the aisles - the engines accelerated for takeoff and the aircraft departed with the cabin crew rushing to their seats. Climbing out of Kristiansand (usual cruise level FL300) the crew received a cabin altitude warning and levelled off at low altitude, it was later found the air conditioning systems had not been activated. The aircraft was operated by flight crew from Go2Sky and a cabin crew from Norwegian Air Shuttle.



LN-NII is in the process of being handed over from Norwegian Air Shuttle to Go2Sky, the actual transfer of ownership is expected by early January 2017. Editorial Note: The aircraft had already been transferred onto the Air Operator's Certificate of Go2Sky prior to the occurrence according to CAA Norway's statement received on Dec 6th 2016.



On Nov 14th 2016, immediately after receiving the above report, The Aviation Herald contacted Norway's AIBN to see, wether the occurrence was known and is being investigated. On Nov 23rd 2016 the AIBN responded stating: "The AIBN has not received any report matching your information (Operator, Registration, date, airport)."



In the following The Aviation Herald received information that the occurrence has now been reported to the AIBN and shot off another e-mail on Nov 30th 2016, in addition the occurrence made it onto a number of pilot fora being reported by different sources, another source contacted The Aviation Herald directly confirming the first source's narrative. On Nov 30th 2016 the AIBN informed The Aviation Herald, that all investigators were out of house for a seminar, it would take a couple of days until a response was possible.



The second source told The Aviation Herald, that the first officer, right after receiving the takeoff configuration warning, moved both engine start levers to shutoff which effectively shutdown both engines and generators leaving the aircraft dark on the runway. The captain subsequently started the APU, thereafter both engines were started again, then the crew accelerated for takeoff without informing anyone leaving a completely startled cabin crew in the cabin, who were trying to re-assure passengers. Following landing in Oslo the cabin crew decided to disembark and not continue schedule.



On Dec 5th 2016, while still waiting for reply by AIBN to the second inquiry, The Aviation Herald received further evidence confirming the occurrence enabling this coverage.



According to the evidence cabin crew reported that the aircraft departed Kristiansand with a delay of 2 hours following difficulties with the departure/arrival slots. Cabin crew provided a "cabin and galley secure" to the flight crew, the aircraft entered the runway and accelerated when suddenly all power was lost, the cabin went dark and the emergency lights activated. Cabin crew inquired with the flight deck but did not receive any reply that could be understood (there were language problems involved). Understanding that the flight crew was busy and expecting that the crew would call "be seated for takeoff" the flight attendant left the flight deck recommending to the flight crew to make an announcement to have the passengers re-assured, the announcement was made but confused the passengers, a number of passengers called for attention and wanted to get off the aircraft. While the flight attendant was in aisle at the passengers trying to re-assure those passengers the engines accelerated to takeoff power prompting the flight attendant to rush back to her seat and strap in. About 4-5 minutes after becoming airborne an alarm could be heard from the flight deck, the aircraft levelled off and the alarm became even easier to hear. The flight attendants decided to check the cockpit to make sure the pilots were awake, all flight attendants detected there was something wrong with the cabin pressure. Upon calling the flight deck there was no response, cabin crew attempted to enter the cockpit using the emergency code, while the code was entered the first officer responded and opened the door, however did not provide any information as to what was happening. Cabin crew decided to connect their oxygen masks to the portable oxygen bottles. The passengers noticed something was wrong. Finally it emerged they were about to land in Oslo in about 9 minutes, the cabin was cleared for landing, the flight crew called the cabin crew to take their seats for landing and the aircraft landed. After landing cabin crew insisted the flight crew would explain to the passengers what had happened, however, the announcement was unclear just mentioning a wrong switch. Cabin crew was alerted by the break down of crew communication. The occurrence was witnessed by a number of deadheading flight crew of Norwegian Air Shuttle.



On Dec 6th 2016 Norway's Civil Aviation Authority told The Aviation Herald: "this occurrence has been reported according to Regulation 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation, i.e. to the competent authority of the AOC-holder Go2Sky. However, CAA-Norway is well aware of the occurrence and we are assuring that Norwegian (being an Norwegian AOC-holder) is addressing relevant issues raised by the occurrence."



On Dec 6th 2016 Norwegian Air Shuttle confirmed the events as described. The spokesperson believed however that the engines were shut down because the crew was waiting for departure clearance. Following departure the aircraft maintained a lower altitude than planned due to problems with the cabin pressure. Norwegian is following up this event with Go2Sky, who have been operating the flight under "damp lease".



On Dec 6th 2016 the AIBN told Norwegian Media they are (now) aware of the occurrence (The Aviation Herald has not yet received direct information from the AIBN). A decision whether to investigate the occurrence has not yet been reached.



In the evening of Dec 6th 2016 Go2Sky told Austrianwings (however did not respond to an inquiry by The Aviation Herald nor did Go2Sky attempt to contact The Aviation Herald, though a number of staff posted in the reader comments) repeatedly stating the information as provided by The Aviation Herald above was incorrect, that the takeoff configuration warning resulted from the park brakes being set. In a slip, that the first officer was unable to explain, the first officer as pilot flying reacted very non-standard and shut down both engines, the aircraft stopped. Then the pilots did all actions necessary to start the engines again and power the aircraft up. A recalculation of the takeoff performance was not necessary however. "This situation did not have any impact on aircraft and passenger safety, it was just human error." the airline said. The situation was explained to the passengers and the aircraft proceeded to Oslo. "There were no injuries of passengers or damage of the aircraft, shut-off engines on the ground is not safety incident." the airline continued. The occurrence has been reported to the Ministry of Transport of the Slovak Republic. When asked about the reason for the audible alert during climb the airline simply answered "No". The airline stated that operating and deadheading crew members of Norwegian Air Shuttle were debriefed in Oslo.



On Dec 7th 2016 Norway's AIBN sent following mail: "We promised to get back to you on the matter and we can with reference to yesterday's correspondence confirm that we now are made aware of the occurrence from the Norwegian CAA. FYI we also checked and searched internally for misfiled or lost reports just in case."



On Mar 11th 2017 The Aviation Herald became aware of a letter in Norwegian dated Feb 20th 2017 that Norway's AIBN sent to Norway's Ministry of Transport stating that after review of the available information the occurrence was rated an incident and is not being investigated by the AIBN.



The AIBN reported that the occurrence had not been reported to the AIBN prior to media contacting the AIBN. The AIBN secured data of the flight including communication, flight data recorder and radar data.



The AIBN reported that the flight had a number of hours delay due to weather at Oslo's Gardermoen Airport. The flight then received a slot to depart from Kristiansand. The aircraft was ready for departure about 5 minutes prior to the slot time assigned to the flight. With no other traffic around the aircraft received clearance to line up and wait as needed. The aircraft taxied into position and held, the park brake was set as a natural choice. Upon slot time the aircraft was cleared for takeoff, the engine power was increased for takeoff, due to the park brake still being set the takeoff configuration warning activated.



The first officer (881 hours total, 445 hours on type) accidentally shut down both engines, which resulted in the loss of electrical power for most systems depending on electrical power, the aircraft was powered only by battery. According to the flight data recorder the aircraft rolled for 20 meters and stopped.



Tower observed that the aircraft blacked out, but the exterior emergency lighting came on.



To restart the aircraft the crew first needed to start the APU, also needed to start the air conditioning and cabin pressure system. After some time both engines were restarted and the navigation systems of the aircraft were put back into operation (editorial note: the aircraft transponder's position registers are being supplied by the navigation systems, the transponder then transmits those position data, which showed a movement of 230 meters - the AIBN report now offers an explanation for this suggesting - without actually writing it - that the navigation system and its position data were no longer reliable when the engines were shut down).



As the aircraft was still ahead of the runway threshold, no recomputation of takeoff performance was needed. The pilots did not announce that cabin crew should take their seats for departure, and the takeoff roll began before cabin crew were seated and strapped in.



Following departure the aircraft began to climb to planned cruise level FL330. However, when the aircraft climbed through FL140 the crew received a warning concerning the cabin pressure and stopped the climb at FL150. The crew discovered that the cabin pressurization had not been turned on and engaged the cabin pressurization, however in such a way that cabin pressure could not quickly be recovered. The cabin pressure alert continued to sound for 5 minutes. The crew advised ATC they had a technical problem and requested to continue the flight to Oslo at FL150, however no priority and no assistance was needed at Gardermoen.



The AIBN reported that cabin crew heard continous alert sounds from the cockpit and felt at the same time that the cabin pressure was not normal. The purser attempted to contact the cockpit via Intercom, however, was unable to reach the cockpit crew due to the aircraft system assigning priority to the aural alerts over the Intercom. As the cabin crew could not get into contact with the flight crew and was worried about what was going on on the cockpit, the purser used the emergency access code to the cockpit and entered the cockpit, however, due to language problems could not get reasonable explanation as to what had happened. Cabin crew therefore, on own initiative, decided to don their oxygen masks.



Radar and communication data suggest that the flight progressed without any further difficulty from there on. After landing cabin crew left the aircraft.





