DOJ Keeps Pointing To A '3 Factor Test' In Its Cases Against Apple; Except No Such 'Test' Exists

from the making-it-up-as-we-go-along dept

In New York Telephone Co., the Supreme Court considered three factors in concluding that the issuance of the All Writs Act order to the phone company was appropriate. First, it found that the phone company was not "so far removed from the underlying controversy that its assistance could not be permissibly compelled." ... Second, it concluded that the order did not place an undue burden on the phone company.... Third, it determined that the assistance of the company was necessary to achieve the purpose of the warrant.... Each of these factors supports issuance of the order directed to Apple in this case.

In addition, applicable case law requires me to consider three factors in deciding whether to issue an order under the AWA: the closeness of Apple's relationship to the underlying criminal conduct and government investigation; the burden the requested order would impose on Apple; and the necessity of imposing such a burden on Apple. As explained below, after reviewing the facts in the record and the parties' arguments, I conclude that none of those factors justifies imposing on Apple the obligation to assist the government's investigation against its will.

You could argue it’s three factors, or maybe four, or even five. The point is, NY Telephone isn’t as easy to apply as the government makes it out to be. Everyone in the Apple case is playing in uncharted waters.

The tricky part of New York Telephone is that the Court left the actual test for what the AWA allows frustratingly murky. The Court was comparatively clear about one essential limit on a Court’s power under the AWA: “We agree that the power of federal courts to impose duties upon third parties is not without limits; unreasonable burdens may not be imposed.” Okay. But the rest of what the Court says is really unclear.

Turning to the facts of this case, we do not think that the Company was a third party so far removed from the underlying controversy that its assistance could not be permissibly compelled. A United States District Court found that there was probable cause to believe that the Company’s facilities were being employed to facilitate a criminal enterprise on a continuing basis. For the Company, with this knowledge, to refuse to supply the meager assistance required by the FBI in its efforts to put an end to this venture threatened obstruction of an investigation which would determine whether the Company’s facilities were being lawfully used. Moreover, it can hardly be contended that the Company, a highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the public, had a substantial interest in not providing assistance. Certainly the use of pen registers is by no means offensive to it. The Company concedes that it regularly employs such devices without court order for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and preventing violations of law. It also agreed to supply the FBI with all the information required to install its own pen registers. Nor was the District Court’s order in any way burdensome. The order provided that the Company be fully reimbursed at prevailing rates, and compliance with it required minimal effort on the part of the Company and no disruption to its operations.



Finally, we note, as the Court of Appeals recognized, that without the Company's assistance there is no conceivable way in which the surveillance authorized by the District Court could have been successfully accomplished. The FBI, after an exhaustive search, was unable to find a location where it could install its own pen registers without tipping off the targets of the investigation. The provision of a leased line by the Company was essential to the fulfillment of the purpose— to learn the identities of those connected with the gambling operation—for which the pen register order had been issued.

The paragraph above is pretty confusing. It begins with the idea that the AWA doesn’t apply to someone “so far removed” from the controversy; then turns to the need for the phone company’s help; then talks about what is “offensive” to the company; and then covers the burden to the phone company, focusing on how much it cost the business and interfered with it. But the paragraph doesn’t link these ideas or say how they relate to one another. It doesn’t say what the standard is for each idea or how much weight to give it.

We’re mostly left with the uncertainty of the New York Telephone case itself. Beyond the “unreasonable burden” test, it’s not clear what to make of the other matters that the court mentions. Are they all just factors in a grand multi-factor test? Are they actually parts of the undue burden standard, just not explicitly labeled that way? Are they parts of what makes the order “appropriate”?



Once you figure that out — if you can — there’s the uncertainty about what each mentioned standard means.

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The deeper you dive into the various DOJ filings to try to use the All Writs Act to force Apple to hack into encrypted iPhones, the more and more dishonest they seem. We already covered some of the misleading claims in the DOJ's latest filing in NY, including pointing to a 2012 case as evidence that the All Writs Act can be used to force Apple to break into a phone, when thein that case said only that Apple had standingan All Writs Act order.However, buried in an excellent article by Sarah Jeong at Vice's Motherboard about that same filing , there's another interesting tidbit that seems worth exploring: in both the NY and California cases, the DOJ has repeatedly pointed to a so-called "three factor test" under United States v. New York Telephone Co. , which is the key case that established that it's acceptable, under the All Writs Act, for the FBI to force a telephone company to install and use a "pen register" device on telephone lines (to track who they call). In the original motion for the order in the San Bernardino case, here's the DOJ's argument on page 14 and 15 of that document:The DOJ repeated this paragraph verbatim in its motion to compel (on page 15) and again (verbatim) in the filing in NY (page 38).The magistrate judge in NY, James Orenstein, accepted this three factors test , and used it to argue that the DOJ's application actuallyto meet the requisite factors (starting right on page 1):There's just one problem in all of this -- as highlighted in Jeong's article linked above, and discussed in more detail by Orin Kerr last month:in the US v. NY Telephone case. As Jeong summarizes:Kerr notes that the paragraph in the Supreme Court's ruling , far from laying out a "three factor test" appears to be "frustratingly murky."Here are the key paragraphs from the Supreme Court ruling:So yeah, it mentions the three things the DOJ keeps insisting are the "three factor test" (if the third party is not "so far removed," if there is no "undue burden" and if the assistance was deemed "necessary"). But there's a hell of a lot of other stuff in there as well, including the fact that in that case, NY Telephone was "a highly regulated public utility." So that seems like a relevant "fourth" factor that weighs against the DOJ (and they conveniently skip over).And, as Kerr notes, unlike basically any judicial "test," this one fails to lay out any of the ground rules:In other words, this was just a way for the Court to get the case off the docket, not to set a "test" that would be applied 40 years later. Kerr later expands:Kerr then spends a lot of time noting that even with the actual establishment of the "unreasonable burden" test, there are no actual details or explanations to go with it and you can come up with a wide variety of possible interpretations that would lead to very different results. In short, there's no big "test" developed here, and despite nearly four decades, there's no evidence that anyone else has really made use of this "test" to determine the ground rules for it.Either way, it seems clear that the DOJ keeps making some pretty direct claims in its filings that are based on either direct misreadings of things, or deliberately misleading the courts about these things. That seems like a dangerous game to play.

Filed Under: all writs act, doj, encryption, fbi, pen register, supreme court, three factor test

Companies: apple