THE intended symbolism was strong. As Georgia celebrated the Orthodox New Year on January 13th, Bidzina Ivanishvili (pictured on the right), the prime minister, and Mikheil Saakashvili (pictured on the left), the president, sat side by side at the Patriarch’s house drinking wine. In the typical style of Georgian toasts, Mr Ivanisvhili said he hoped that 2013 would be “the year of love in Georgia”. The photogenic get-together followed Mr Saakashvili’s “five-point plan” to improve relations between the Georgian Dream coalition and the United National Movement (UNM), which he proposed on December 31st. The five points include: toning down the rhetoric, an end to the persecution and arrests of UNM members, and stopping the attacks on local self-government bodies. So will 2013 bring a turning point in their relationship? Nothing much has changed so far. Addressing the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe on January 21st, Mr Saakashvili criticised Mr Ivanishvili for “menacing” the UNM through its application of selective justice, blackmailing UNM lawmakers and harassing UNM local authorities. Mr Saakashvili used the opportunity to repeat his long-standing line on Russia’s imperial ambitions, thereby underlining his distance from the new government’s attempts to open up a dialogue with Russia. That process began with a meeting in Geneva on December 14th, in which Georgian and Russian delegates agreed to disagree on certain issues, and look for common ground elsewhere.

Mr Saakashvili also called Mr Ivanishvili’s recent comment that Armenia could serve as example to Georgia on how to maintain relations with both NATO and Russia “alarming”, claiming that Mr Ivanishvili wants to give up on Georgia’s NATO aspirations. More likely, and not for the first time, Mr Ivanishvili is guilty of carelessness when speaking to the media. Indeed, on January 22nd, Maja Panjikidze, the foreign minister, underlined that Georgia’s goals had not changed. But the earlier resignation of one of her deputies over the “course and style” of the new government’s foreign relations suggests a wider degree of unease.

The new government’s prisoner amnesty has provided another source of disagreement. When Mr Saakashvili vetoed the bill on December 27th, 91 MPs voted to overturn his veto the next day. Davit Usupashvili, the parliamentary speaker, then signed it into law on January 12th. 190 people, including those convicted of spying for Russia, left prison on January 13th, leaving Mr Saakashvili to vent his fury.

A recent article in the Journal of Democracy puts the current state of Georgian politics in a broader context. In the authors’ view, only the emergence of Mr Ivanishvili stopped the UNM’s slide towards autocracy. His considerable wealth bound together a disparate coalition, tapped into deep public disaffection with the UNM, and enabled his Georgian Dream movement to withstand the UNM’s hard-line response. Indeed, the authors argue, likely evidence of inflated voter lists suggests that the UNM was ready to falsify the vote. But high voter turnout and extensive international scrutiny helped persuade Mr Saakashvili to cede defeat, paving the way for Georgia’s first constitutional transfer of power.

That has given independent Georgia “a fourth chance of democracy after the opportunities under Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990-92), Eduard Shevardnadze (1992-2003) and Saakashvili all faded”. Whether the country takes it will depend, in part, upon the survival of the UNM and its ability to operate as a genuine parliamentary opposition. It also depends on Mr Ivanishvili. Will he really step down from power in 18 months, which he has said he wants to do “if everything goes perfectly”? Politics rarely runs perfectly in any country, let alone in Georgia. Besides, if he does go, his governing coalition is likely to fall apart.

The new government could still go the way of Georgia’s previous ones. Their high poll ratings can only decline over time, leading to what the authors identify as the temptation to “replace declining popularity with state power and Ivanishvili’s money”. To prevent this, Georgia needs more effective checks on state power than it has had in previous years, in the form of political opposition and civil society.

That requires a big change. As a recent paper from Chatham House, a think tank, argues, Georgia’s civil society is currently too weak to influence politics. Citizens do not participate in debates over public policy, and NGOs are the least understood of all public institutions. The result is an “NGO-cracy”, in which Tbilisi-based intellectuals and experts have more interaction “with embassies and Western foundations” than with ordinary citizens. Too often Georgian NGOs are “passive consumers of democracy development aid instead of the driving force behind democratic change”.

Part of the problem lies with foreign donors, the author suggests, who need to spend their money more wisely. Part of the problem lies with Georgians themselves. If they “want true democracy, transparency and personal freedom, they also need to engage in public debate and build social trust”. Yet few ordinary Georgians feel confident to talk about politics outside of the home, according to public opinion surveys. Changing that will take years. These days, Georgian public life inspires more fear and loathing than love.