In all my years serving in Jammu & Kashmir, an almost inevitable question posed to me by media was the potential impact any deterioration of the Afghan situation posed to security in J&K. My usual response was that ripples formed by turbulence in Afghanistan will inevitably flow to J&K.

I am subjected to the same query now, in the wake of the recently signed US-Taliban Accord: whether a repeat of the J&K situation of 1989-90 is inevitable once the US and allied forces withdraw from Afghanistan, just as it happened when the Soviets withdrew in 1989. However, 2020 is a far cry from 1989-90 and India is far better prepared to handle such adventurism this time.

The common perception is that if the withdrawal of foreign forces takes place as per agreement and Taliban returns to power, a large number of Taliban fighters will be available to Pakistan’s ISI to recruit and induct into J&K. In a repeat of 1989-90, this will lead to a surge in the strength of terrorists in J&K – currently reduced to as little as 250 or less from the high of 7,000 and more – in a repeat of 1989-90. This perception holds that a revival of terror on the lines of the 90s would then be almost inevitable.

There can be no doubt that Pakistan’s intent remains intact; the creation of turbulence and mayhem in J&K to bring another long cycle of violence to test India and keep the J&K proxy conflict alive. Pakistan probably believes that it yet has the advantage of the alienation of the people of Kashmir and a segment of the trans-Pir Panjal region against India, which it can exploit to advantage. A mix of Afghan, Pakistani and local Kashmiri terrorists inflicting higher Indian casualties through another long drawn campaign, will impact the Indian hinterland giving rise to greater antipathy towards the Kashmiris and Indian Muslims and thus weaken India’s social fabric.

Afghanistan is in the throes of instability at present. If for a moment we presume the unlikely possibility that peace prevails and the Afghan National Army and Taliban fighters merge to form a new force, ISI finding volunteers as mercenaries to re-initiate the J&K proxy campaign is possible.

However, one thing that even Pakistan’s deep state will acknowledge is that the situation in J&K is not even remotely akin to 1989-90. At that juncture the Indian army was stretched from Sri Lanka to Punjab and the Northeast could hardly be risked. Kashmir Valley had a single Indian division strength force, with a couple of independent brigades. India’s 15 Corps was stretched in its responsibility from Demchok in Eastern Ladakh to the Pir Panjal, all along the LAC and LoC; a deployment which only changed after Kargil 1999.

There were no counterinsurgency forces except the then not so reliable or confident J&K Police (JKP). 15 Corps and JKP now have 30 years of experience handling intense hybrid war. Two rather large infantry divisions with a couple of independent brigades still form the bedrock of the LoC defences.

In the rear in second and third tiers is deployed the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), India’s finest military experiment. Over two-thirds of the total force is in the Valley, operating by the principles for which these RR units and formations were raised; continuity of deployment, affinity with local people and total focus on the return of stability. In addition there is the CRPF which is far more confident and well integrated with the RR.

Pakistan could aim to employ four facets to make the situation simmer; mass infiltration, terror acts, people’s agitation and influence operations through various means including social media and mosque power.

Indian capability to limit infiltration received a boost since 2004 with the LoC fence and induction of modern surveillance technology. It has proved successful, yet mass infiltration attempts through the rough terrain remains feasible. The effectiveness of successfully infiltrated terror groups is contingent upon the support of overground workers and availability of finance networks. Indian security elements have a far tighter control on these today and their work in progress is being followed through with freshly conceived counter hybrid conflict strategy.

Surge in local recruitment is contingent upon success of the foreign terror (FT) groups and the penetration of influence operations by Pakistan’s ISPR. If Pakistan is dependent upon Afghan FTs to rekindle violent confrontation, our experience of the 90s shows this has severe limitations, particularly with better intelligence and limited propensity of the FTs to operate to plan.

The situation is likely to bring about limited violence but will tend to impact governance and outreach programmes as our previous experience reveals. The degree of success thus depends upon our capability to initiate a slew of development and outreach measures, which in such situations is the real challenge. Security will always be under control but it’s the non-military measures which have to receive impetus even in the face of fresh challenge.

An approach awaiting further stabilisation is unlikely to fetch dividend. Arguably engagement of the populace, preventing flow of finances, countering ISPR influence operations and developing own packages of such operations is the key to success in J&K. In the face of any increase in violence, the return of grassroots politics will see severe restrictions too.

The above assessment remains hypothetical. We are yet far from any successful implementation of a problematic and sketchy peace accord. But being prepared for a deterioration of the situation in J&K is only prudent.