According to the chief of the General Staff of Russia, Valery Gerasimov, in the last five years Russia has profoundly increased its military presence in key regions of the world, in some areas “reaching the level of the Soviet Union” (Vpk.name, November 9). Speaking on November 7, Russia’s top-ranking military official devoted significant attention to Crimea, which Moscow had forcibly annexed from Ukraine in spring 2014. In particular, Gerasimov noted that Russia has installed there a self-sufficient military formation (“samodostatochnaya gruppirovka woysk”) consisting of a naval base, an army corps, as well as an aviation and air defense division. Also, the Black Sea Fleet (based out of Sevastopol) received six submarines, two frigates (the Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Essen, which took part in Russian military operations in Syria) equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles, and three divisions of costal missile complexes Bal and Bastion. Gerasimov claimed these deployments are part of a strategy aimed at upgrading the military capabilities of the Southern Military District, which subsumes occupied Crimea (Rosbalt, November 7).

Sergey Ermakov, an analyst with the Moscow-based Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), has argued that Russia’s primary strategic goal around the Black Sea is strengthening the military potential of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), “which is the key factor precluding NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the United States from more decisive actions in the region” (Rueconomics.ru, November 7). Comparative analysis of recent developments on Russia’s northwestern and southern flanks, however, undermines Ermakov’s argument that Russia is only trying to bolster the BSF. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that Moscow’s objective in Crimea is to complete the creation of an Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) “bubble” on the shores of the Black Sea.

Experts have pointed to Russian efforts to build up a military presence in Crimea (see EDM, September 22, 2014; March 27, 2015) and establish an A2/AD zone on the peninsula since the annexation (see EDM, June 24, 2016). All too often, however, Western analysis has tended to regard Russian A2/AD efforts as defensive in nature. Yet, much as in the case of the A2/AD bubbles being developed in Kaliningrad and Syria, Russia’s continuing aims in Crimea are in fact offensive (see EDM, March 4, 2016; November 1, 2017). Russia’s A2/AD strategy—including in Crimea—combines information/cyber security (including Electronic Warfare), strategic air operations, an integrated air-defense system as well as naval superiority, with submarines playing a key role (this last element is not universally recognized by the expert community). The analysis presented below will seek to highlight the above-mentioned points with respect to the Crimean A2/AD bubble.