Tikhon Dzyadko warns that Putin’s plummeting approval ratings do not necessarily bode well for the international community. Russians may be “tired” but not Putin. He may have a geopolitical surprise in store for the whole world, when he feels that his power is weakening. It remains to be seen what he would do next. But his 18 years in office have showed that the will not hesitate to score a victory, even if it would come “at others’ expense.”

When Putin resumed the presidency in 2012, after serving two terms between 2000-2008, and a four-year stint as prime minister, his approval ratings “dropped to record lows – even lower than today’s level.” In December 2011 thousands of Russians attended the biggest anti-government rally in Moscow since the fall of the Soviet Union to condemn alleged ballot-rigging in parliamentary elections and demand a re-run. Russia had since then further tightened control over the media.

Putin’s popularity picked up again in 2014 following the impressive Winter Olympics in Sochi. A month later Russian annexed Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine. His high approval ratings had in part the state's control over television to thank for. He, according to state media, was fulfilling his promise of restoring Russia’s former greatness. However, his aggression triggered economic sanctions against the Kremlin, leading the country into the biggest East-West showdown since the Cold War.

In September 2015 Russia began its armed intervention in Syria to support Bashar al-Assad. Putin has brilliantly exploited America’s war fatique to be heavily involved in Syria or anywhere else in the Middle East. Assad has relied heavily on Russian carpet-bombing to recapture large parts of the country. He also wants a long-term Russian military presence in Syria, to help fight “terrorists” and secure his territorial gains.

At home many Russians do not support their country’s expenditure of treasure and blood in the faraway Syria. While Putin is seeking to undermine US influence in the region and interfere in its elections, Washington is especially eager to drain Russia’s resources and the public’s appetite for overseas adventure. Syria has turned out to be a longer, more expensive commitment than Putin may have bargained for. He is now stuck there. It explains why he is keen on ending the war and persuading European leaders to help reconstruct Syria. Russia has found Assad stubbornly unbiddable. At times, it seems Tehran has more influence in Damascus than Moscow.

As Russians are struggling to cope with high inflation and dwindling living standards, they are no longer impressed by the stridently nationalist course Putin has taken – appealing to memories of the vainglorious Soviet past to shore up domestic support, presenting himself as a strong leader who took Russia out of the economic, social and political crisis of the 1990s, and defending Russia's national interests, particularly against alleged Western hostility. But opponents and critics at home and abroad have accused him of undermining Russia's institutions, stymying democratic development, and entrenching an oligarchic rule. In this regard, the author fears that Putin might play another geopolitical card in order to distract Russians from their own economic woes.