Miracle. In the season of 2015/16, Hoffenheim were drowning in a pool of their own poor performances, and faced the distinct possibility of relegation. Fast forward to the summer of 2017, and the club are now about to play European football for the first time in their history. This whirlwinding revival can be owed to one person, in particular — Julian Nagelsmann.

Unlike most managers who have measurable experience with senior football, Nagelsmann had his playing career abruptly cut short at U19 level, due to persistent knee injuries at FC Augsburg. Being forced to retire from the sport he loved, Nagelsmann picked himself up to study Business Administration and Sports Science at university.

Following graduation, full-time management came calling and Nagelsmann worked his way from tutelage under Thomas Tuchel to success at underage level with 1860 München and Hoffenehim, before becoming assistant coach at the latter club alongside several managers.

Initially destined to take the reins before the 2016/17 campaign, the hierarchy’s decision to promote him to first-team coach were scuppered by freefall in the league and then-manager Huub Stevens being forced to step down for health reasons.

Since then, however, things have improved drastically…

Re-formation, Tactics and Philosophy

Nagelsmann heavily credits his success down to philosophy of mental traits, close man-management, chemistry, morale and a general togetherness amongst players. The belief is on a similar wavelength to that instilled at Athletic Club, where only players of Basque (an autonomous area in northern Spain and southern France) heritage are employed. At Athletic, there is a general feeling that it is better to lose with the club the players have supported all their lives than win with some of La Liga’s more successful sides. While Hoffenheim doesn’t boast the history or culture to bring players together as naturally, Nagelsmann has devoted most of his time to individually help players, build group spirit and inspire confidence in players both young and old.

In an interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, Nagelsmann backed-up his philosophy perfectly: “30% of coaching is tactics, 70% social competence.”

Unlike his elders, Nagelsmann is not heavily invested in tactics, but this by no means limits the vivid imagination that is at play. Heavily influenced by the pressing gospel Ralf Rangnick spread throughout Germany, Hoffenheim have become a dynamic team, as they concentrate on both closing down the opposition, but also wish to not gamble with possession.

Formation is considerably less important to the Landsberg-born coach, and was quoted to have said, “it’s just a question of five or ten meters whether it’s a 4-4-2 or a 4-3-2-1; you only see teams adhering to that at kick-off and, perhaps, eight times during the game.”

In light of his stance on tactics and formations incorporated into the modern game, Nagelsmann’s uniquely obscure fashion is difficult to pin down definitively. The youngest ever coach in Bundesliga history aggressively incorporates a trial-and-error method into his training: “I work like a baker — I mix things, put them in the oven and see if I like what comes out.”

Upon inheriting a faltering, dimensionless Hoffenheim side earlier than expected in February 2016, Nagelsmann experimented with a variation of methods, and succeeded in turning the ship around from the rocks of relegation.

Still attempting to find the best possible ‘formation’, Nagelsmann experimented with 4-4-2, 4-3-3 and 3-5-2 variations for half of the Hinrunde (first-half of season), before finally settling for something akin to a 3-1-4-2, for the remainder of the campaign.

Tactics: Build-up play

As previously mentioned, Hoffenheim do not wish to lose the ball purely for pressing sake and, instead, prefer to retain possession. A frequent means of attack came through building play from the back similar to the treble-winning Barcelona side of 2008/09, however, Nagelsmann preferred a more direct, central means, as opposed to Pep Guardiola’s more patient style. The figure nearby shows a typical 3-1-4-2 variant used during a scenario when playing from the back.

Hoffenheim rely on skilled passers of the ball, sharp instincts and a front man. Typically, Kevin Vogt, Niklas Süle (two of the three centre-backs) or Sebastian Rudy would perform line-breaking passes towards the two strikers, Andrej Kramarić and Sandro Wagner, where the ball would be laid-off to advanced midfielders Nadiem Amiri and Kerem Demirbay. Due to Rudy sitting deep, both players have licence to then venture away from the centre and into more attacking positions.

In this 3-1-4-2 formation, Hoffenheim had six attack-minded players, in front of three defensive. The forward duo of Kramarić and Wagner form a strong and free-scoring presence up top. While the Croatian acted more as a focal point, Wagner excelled at holding up the play, creating space for the four-man line behind him to push-up and create overloads, particularly in the centre.

Notably, Vogt has become a very interesting development in Hoffenheim’s reformed system. A midfielder in his days with FC Köln, the 25-year-old was converted into a makeshift centre-back, sitting in the heart of the defence. Aside from harnessing the passing ability used during his days at Effzeh, Vogt often initiates attacks from the back with profound effect, meaning the likes of Amiri, Demirbay and even the defensive-minded Rudy do not have to track back in support.

Demirbay, in particular, became a key cog since arriving from Hamburger SV. At a less than stellar Fortuna Düsseldorf side, Demirbay flourished, proving to be crucial in obtaining 10 goals and 5 assists in 25 games. Aside from roaming into free space in the buildup, the German international could also collect the ball short from Rudy and drive into vacated areas with his pace to feed players higher up the pitch.

Should Rudy find his passing lanes cut-off, wing-backs Pavel Kadeřábek and Steven Zuber can drop back to offer support and receive the ball. Moreover, they can also both push very high up the pitch to help lay siege to an opposition entrenched within their own half, whilst Amiri and Demirbay aid in that respect, as mentioned recently. Rudy is also proven in reinforcing the positional play strategy, which is made possible by his teammates open up the passing channels and, consequently, providing many options with their energetic movement.

With an average possession of 53% in Bundesliga matches and the fact Nagelsmann likes to collect data on when passing lanes are shut-off, it’s evident Hoffenheim cherish holding onto the ball, in lieu of sides gifting it away in different systems.

Tactics: Pressing pendulum vs. 4-4-2

Possession aside, Nagelsmann encourages organised pressing, in order to prevent the opposition from building from the back. While his methodology on the matter may not be as intense as that of Jürgen Klopp and Jupp Heynckes — two managers whom have greatly enhanced the art of pressing the most — closing down the rival team has been a crucial factor in propelling Hoffenheim to Europe’s elite.

In the figure on the left, the opposition are set-up in the popular, flat 4-4-2; Hoffenheim in a 3-1-4-2. The full-backs are left largely unmarked, before possession, while both central midfielders are occupied and the two wingers also face resistance. The forward duo are initially surrounded by four players.



Now look to the second picture: when the opposition right-back receives possession (starred), the wing-back, Zuber, presses high-up the pitch as he is nearest in proximity, and the closest central midfielder, Amiri, covers the gap vacated, by moving left. Simultaneously, Wagner drops back to close off the passing lane to one of the central midfielders and Kramarić cuts off the closest centre-back as an option. Grey spots indicate initial positions.

Soon after the aforementioned players are in position, there is a pendulum-like effect in the defence and a makeshift back-four is formed — play is shifted to the left to compress play, with Kadeřábek dropping back from wing-back to take up a position on the right. Hübner, in particular, moves over to the far left hand-side and pushes up to shut off the advancing winger.

With the wing-backs’s vertical, rapid movement, the same opponent is forced to cut-in towards the centre, but would instantly come under pressure from the midfielder covering the void and, if he gets forward enough, the makeshift full-back. Another frequent scenario is a pass being played in towards the centre, but, again, the receiver would be overwhelmed by those closing him down and swiftly intercepted.

Note also how the two strikers are heavily isolated from play, meaning Hoffenheim increase turnovers for the counterattack or force the opposition to pass back and, consequently, put more strain on the defence.

Tactics: Pressing pendulum vs. 4-2-3-1

This time, the opposition are deployed in a different, yet common formation — a standard 4-2-3-1 — but this time the team are more dimensioned and can offer better passing angles, unlike the flat 4-4-2. Since there is only the one positioned striker this time around, Hoffenheim can afford push slightly higher up the pitch than before.

Like before, Zuber, Wagner and Hübner press in synchronous, Amiri covers and the back-line shift over to the left. However, this time the opposition have an extra player in the midfield. To compensate, the holding midfielder, Rudy, closes in on the opposition attacking midfielder.

Against the more organised and stronger teams, Hoffenheim heavily pressed the midfield, with both strikers often dropping back to prevent build-up play. In the notable draw to Bayern at the Allianz Arena, proven playmaker Xabi Alonso was put under intense scrutiny, whilst ball-playing centre-backs Jérôme Boateng and Mats Hummels were each doubled marked when in in possession. As a result of Nagelsmann upping the intensity, Ancelotti’s side were caught off-guard and found themselves out of their comfort zone. The trip to Bavaria proved to be a season highlight.

For Nagelsmann, the movement from the wing-back and striker furthest away are the most key aspects for the actual pressing itself. The pendulum effect of the defence is also crucial to gaining numerical superiority on one side, while the sharp responsiveness and symmetry allows for pressing to be efficiently shifted across the pitch.

One more important thing to note: Apart from the striker, the runs in all pressing situations are relatively short and thus conserve energy, meaning the tactic can be kept up at a high rate longer than other similar systems.

Tactics: Defending

Like other famed aspects, Hoffenheim are well drilled in the art of defending, and conceding the second fewest league goals in 2016/17 is a testament to that.

Nagelsmann likes his Hoffenheim side to defend in numbers and normally in two banks of five and four or vice-versa, when appropriate. When up against a side blessed with attacking prowess, the wing-backs retreat to form a five-man defensive line that excel at plugging gaps and are responsive in preventing the opposition from getting in behind.

With an average height of 6ft4 amongst the three centre-backs, the defence are adept at dealing with crosses, and have only conceded 2 headed goals, demonstrating the aerial superiority.

The enigmatic Rudy has proven time and time again his ability to sweep in front of the back-line and help double-up on rival players. When defending against play down the centre, Vogt — the strategist of the defence — pushes up in an effort to prevent overloads and quash threatening possession play in the final third.

It will come as no surprise to realise Achtzehn99 went 17 Bundesliga games unbeaten, as sides struggled to break down what was / is a resolute and determined defence.

Future and conclusion

It’s beyond doubt Nagelsmann has what it takes to turn Hoffenheim into a consistent top-six side, and has frequently demonstrated his adaptability to overcome many obstacles encountered throughout the season. The successful amalgamation of possession-based play fixated on overloads and pressing is nothing short of admirable, especially for a manager so inexperienced on several fronts.

Nagelsmann and Hoffenheim are on the verge of venturing onto a new, unfamiliar battlefield in Europe, and with the loss of star duo Niklas Süle and Sebastian Rudy to Bayern, the club will have to adapt yet again to find suitable replacements. However, belief can be taken in the form of the club excelling following the departures of Kevin Volland and Tobias Strobl the summer before, whilst tactically intelligent players like Kevin Vogt and Kerem Demirbay are committed to taking the club forward.

The close management to get the best out of players has forged a rare feeling of togetherness amongst the players, allowing for a new sense of belief that was missing during the recent relegation dogfight. With a strong-willed manager, a club offering many positions and a surprisingly sizeable financial backing, players are likely to see Hoffenheim as an attractive destination.