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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 001409 SIPDIS EUR/CE FOR MORRIS, PIERANGELO E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, BO, GG, UP, RS, PL SUBJECT: POLAND: A NATURAL U.S. ALLY ON EASTERN POLICY REF: A. STATE 111058 B. WARSAW 1010 C. STOCKHOLM 792 Classified By: DCM Quanrud for reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D) 1. (S) SUMMARY: Like us, Poland seeks to draw key countries on the eastern boundary of Europe, like Ukraine and Georgia, towards Western institutions. An increasingly active regional player, Poland has evolved since 1989 from aid-recipient to donor, helping us to spur reforms in the region. Warsaw has lead EU engagement with its eastern neighbors through the joint Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership proposal, which was accelerated in the shadow of the Georgia crisis and is now embedded in European Commission strategy. Yet growing self-confidence and an historical distrust of Russia can sometimes lead Poland to get too far out in front -- like when the Poles transferred sensitive armaments to Georgia and took a gamble by pushing through the sudden removal of most EU sanctions against Belarus. Despite the occasional overstepping, Poland's Eastern Policy is an excellent complement to our own, and projects like the Eastern Partnership merit our support. END SUMMARY. STRATEGY BEHIND EASTERN PARTNERSHIP ----------------------------------- 2. (C) The Eastern Partnership -- a proposal championed by Poland and Sweden to deepen EU relations with Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan -- embraces the central goals of Poland's increasingly active regional policy: -- Counter Russia's influence in Eastern Europe (although Russia is officially welcome to take part in the Partnership); -- Energize EU engagement with eastern neighbors in the face of enlargement fatigue; and -- Entice former Soviet states to embrace Western democratic and free-market principles by offering tangible benefits -- particularly a free trade area and eventual visa-free travel. 3. (C) The Eastern Partnership and other Polish policies in the region aim to counter a resurgent Russia. Foreign Minister Sikorski told U.S. officials the GoP used to think Russia would be a danger in 10-15 years, but after the Georgia crisis, it could be as little as 10-15 months. Polish analysts tell us having a pro-Western buffer zone in Ukraine and Belarus would keep Poland off the front line with an increasingly assertive Russia. By offering former Soviet republics the prospect of free trade and visa-free travel to the EU, the Eastern Partnership can spur the reforms needed for eventual EU membership and stem growing Russian influence. MFA officials note that the holder of a Russian passport in Georgia currently faces fewer travel restrictions in Europe than a holder of a Georgian passport. On the economic front, Polish officials believe a larger western business presence in countries like Belarus and Ukraine will provide an alternative to Russian state-controlled companies, and EU good governance programs can fight the corruption that facilitates Russian political and economic influence. 4. (C) Convinced that the EU has greater leverage with Moscow than do individual Member States, the Tusk Government has shed the confrontational rhetoric of its predecessor and sought to build coalitions among EU members. Foreign Minister Sikorski developed the Eastern Partnership with Swedish FM Bildt, and Polish and Swedish embassies in EU capitals jointly lobbied other Member States to support the package. EU colleagues in Warsaw praise the undertaking as a real coming of age for Poland in the EU. Tusk has also striven to improve relations with Germany, which the Polish MFA hopes will bring more financial backing for the Eastern Partnership. The Prime Minister struck a deal with Paris in March 2008 to support French proposals on the EU's southern dimension initiative in exchange for France's support for the Partnership. 5. (C) Poland itself has evolved from aid recipient to assistance provider, bilaterally allocating PLN 26 million (USD 8.7 million) to Belarus and PLN 16 million (USD 5.3 million) to Ukraine in 2008. The aid will enhance independent broadcasting media, border cooperation, public administration, and people-to-people contacts. Poland has also committed 6 million euro (USD 7.8 million) to Georgia for the period 2008-2010. Robert Tyszkiewicz, the Deputy Chair of the Sejm's Foreign Relations Committee, described Poland's assistance as "modest, but useful and credible, because we struggled with many of the same post-Communist challenges." MFA officials have called for a high-level strategic dialogue between Washington and Brussels -- with WARSAW 00001409 002 OF 003 Polish participation -- on targeting assistance to eastern neighbors. STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL SECURITY UMBRELLA -------------------------------------------- 6. (S) To complement increased EU engagement, Warsaw seeks to bolster the U.S. and NATO security stance in Eastern Europe. Polish officials perceive Russia's invasion of Georgia in August as a vindication of their warnings about Moscow,s aggressive behavior. According to the "Sikorski Doctrine," any further attempt by Russia to redraw borders by force or subversion should be regarded by Europe as a threat to its security, entailing a proportional response by the entire Euro-Atlantic community. Poland has pushed hard for Ukraine and Georgia's NATO accession, and called on NATO to make sure it can make good on Article V guarantees. Sikorski has complained that NATO has evolved into a political club with no teeth and warned that Poland would not be able to ignore a repetition of the Georgia scenario in Ukraine. He has also told U.S. officials that, in light of Russian excesses in Georgia, Poland's risky policy of arming the Georgians with MANPADS proved the right thing to do despite USG objections (Ref B). 7. (C) Poland's perennial concerns about the adequacy of its Allies' security guarantees played a key role in the decision to sign the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA) with the U.S. The GoP wants US/NATO boots (and infrastructure) on the ground so that the U.S. will feel obliged to defend Poland's territorial sovereignty in the event of a conflict. Immediately after Russia's invasion of Georgia, Tusk emphasized Poland's sense of vulnerability when he asked high-level U.S. officials, "Now do you see why we wanted the Patriot missiles and further security guarantees (as requested during the Missile Defense talks)?" RUSH TO REDUCE MINSK SANCTIONS ------------------------------ 8. (C) The Polish government -- lead by Sikorski -- pushed through the temporary repeal of almost all EU visa sanctions against Belarusian President Lukashenka's regime, despite USG calls for a more gradual easing of sanctions. Sikorski publicly suggested the U.S. was engaging in double standards because of our close relations with a "dictatorship in Saudi Arabia, but not in Belarus." Both Sikorski and Tusk acknowledge that the GoP risks being perceived as embracing a dictator; but they argue that engaging Belarus is particularly important after the Russian invasion of Georgia. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister told U.S. officials in August that Poland is responding to Belarus' signals of interest in dialogue, and, like the U.S., to the release of political prisoners in Belarus. 9. (C) Tusk and Sikorski see engagement with Belarusian authorities as the lesser of two evils. In the Poles' view, an isolated Belarus could become completely ensnared by Russia, with or without Lukashenka in power. Russian domination would jeopardize democratic transformation and -- more importantly, in Warsaw's view -- would dash hopes that Belarus could become a buffer state between Poland and Russia. The GoP is betting that Lukashenka enjoys enough power to resist the elimination of independent Belarusian institutions and maintain his freedom of maneuver. MFA officials tell us that in response to the lifting of EU visa sanctions, Belarus has signaled Brussels that Minsk would ease some media restrictions. CHALLENGES AHEAD ---------------- 10. (C) MFA officials understand Poland's eastern policies could elicit a sharp Russian reaction, but they see a greater danger in doing nothing since they believe a resurgent, aggressive Russia is here to stay. Poland has sought to mitigate the risk of a backlash by maintaining a cordial dialogue with Moscow and pursuing a united US-EU front vis-a-vis Russia on sensitive energy and security issues. President Lech Kaczynski, the Prime Minister's top political rival, takes a more confrontational approach to Russia; he often visits Georgia and makes pronouncements there without coordinating with the government. To a certain extent, Kaczynski's lurching east takes pressure off the Tusk Government to be tough in public with Russia, but the two leaders' divergent approaches could also hamper their ability to achieve the shared goal of extending European and trans-Atlantic institutions eastward. 11. (C) The Eastern Partnership competes for EU financing with other projects, particularly the Union's Southern WARSAW 00001409 003 OF 003 Initiative with Mediterranean countries. The European Commission's Eastern Partnership proposal included a request for 350 million euro in fresh funds for 2010-13, which was much less than the 600 million euro sum originally proposed by Poland and Sweden. In contrast to the Southern Initiative, the Partnership lacks a high-level special coordinator who can advocate on the program's behalf within the EU bureaucracy. Polish MFA officials also point out that the success of the program depends on identifying and implementing credible projects. HELPING THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP SUCCEED --------------------------------------- 12. (C) Poland can be a reliable ally as we looks for ways to enhance western influence beyond NATO's eastern borders. Russian President Medvedev's threat to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in response to the Missile Defense program has redoubled Polish determination to work with the U.S. and the EU to shore up its eastern neighbors as a bulwark against Russian encroachment. It is also very much in our interest to work closely with Warsaw, Brussels, and the incoming Czech and Swedish EU presidencies to ensure the Partnership's success in enhancing EU ties with its eastern neighborhood. ASHE