CAMBRIDGE, England — The Zapad military exercise, to be held jointly by Russia and Belarus this week, has spawned alarming predictions of covert Russian aggression against its Baltic neighbors, and even Belarus itself.

But Zapad is like Christmas: It comes around at a predictable time, yet the excitement and the long build-up obscure the original meaning of the event.

Zapad is a routine, scheduled exercise. It’s receiving even more attention than usual this year only because Russia is seen to pose a greater threat to European security. The seizure of Crimea and offensive actions against Ukraine are still fresh in our minds.

It is true that previous Russian exercises on this scale left troops in a position to undertake military operations immediately afterward, against Georgia in 2008 and against Ukraine in 2014.

Some in the Baltics have expressed concern the same could happen to them. But not every major Russian exercise ends with the invasion of a neighbor.

Both of those moves were precipitated by an immediate political crisis. From Russia’s point of view, what was happening in Georgia and Ukraine posed an immediate security threat.

While Western observers should welcome this openness by Belarus, the enhanced visibility in the country could also distract from Zapad’s most significant developments.

There is no such crisis currently along Russia’s northwestern periphery. If anything, the likelihood Russia will launch any kind of unfriendly action off the back of Zapad is lower than it was in 2013.

At the time, before the threat of Russian military adventurism against its Western neighbors was so generally recognized, there was no established NATO ground presence in the Baltic states.

Now, the small but significant Enhanced Forward Presence battalions provide a substantial insurance policy against Russian deviations from the exercise scenario.

As ever, the primary purpose of the exercise is to practice for war and to test Russia’s preparedness in terms of command and control, organization, logistics and specific capabilities.

On the flip side, that means it is also an opportunity for Western observers to watch what takes place and draw their own conclusions.

The Russian military has changed at a rapid pace. A number of aspects of the planned exercise will be of particular interest to analysts and the armed forces of other countries.

One of these will be the role, if any, of the VIO, the “information operations troops” that have been active in joint Russian-Belarusian exercises in previous years, but whose establishment in the Russian order of battle was only formally announced in February.

With Russia’s use of “information warfare” a hot topic, these troops should be watched closely for indications of how Russia plans to wage it at the tactical and operational levels.

Despite Russia’s reluctance to invite observers to the exercise, the opportunities for studying the proceedings are better than ever before — in particular, because of Belarus’ emphasis on making the exercise open and transparent. Major Western media have been invited to cover Zapad by the Belarusians, although emphatically not by the Russians.

Europe’s alarm at the prospect of Russian military adventurism puts Moscow in a comfortable position.

The fear fits with Russia’s rhetoric and its regular hints at direct military action against its neighbors and competitors further afield. Russia may not be providing information on the scope and scale of the exercise, but Western media — with its speculation and scare stories — are doing the Kremlin’s work for it.

Belarus, instead, has shown it wants to calm tensions and insure itself against both accidental and deliberate departures from the exercise scenario.

Minsk chose to hold the exercise across the middle of the country, as opposed to in close proximity with the Polish, Lithuanian or Ukrainian borders. This was deliberate, in order to reduce the chances of misinterpretation or incidents where Russian troops and aircraft come close to NATO borders — or to Ukraine, which is understandably concerned at the prospect of an increased Russian presence on its northern flank.

But while Western observers should welcome this openness by Belarus, the enhanced visibility in the country could also distract from Zapad’s most significant developments.

Foreign observers and journalists will see some of what is happening in Belarus during the exercise itself, but none of the much larger maneuvers over the border in Russia. And if they leave Belarus when the exercise is officially over, it will be too soon to tell if all Russia’s troops and equipment really leave as well.

Increased media coverage of what happens in Belarus between September 14-20 could divert attention from the real story, which could happen elsewhere or later. As ever, we will need to look beyond the headlines for the real meaning of Zapad.

Keir Giles is a senior consulting fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House. He is also a director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre, a group of subject matter experts in Eurasian security.