“It is easier to start a war than to end it,” Gabriel García Márquez once observed. This is true even when the skirmishes are fought over cotton hammocks, ornamental fish, motorboats and soya bean oil rather than territory. On Monday, Donald Trump ramped up his trade offensive by announcing that the US would impose new tariffs on $200bn worth of Chinese imports – and another $267bn if Beijing made any attempt to retaliate. The US commerce secretary, Wilbur Ross, crowed, prematurely, that China is “out of bullets”.

The metaphor was not an accident. Mr Trump is interested in the fight, not a deal. Billionaire Jack Ma’s forecast that the dispute could last 20 years was gloomy, but he was surely right that “if you want a short-term solution, there is no solution”. Even if they go ahead, bilateral talks mooted for this month are unlikely to make significant progress. Mr Trump would love to proclaim victory if the opportunity presented itself, but is counting on the chance to pose as the champion of the ordinary American, all the more so as political storms gather and the midterms approach. He can also count on increased antagonism to China across the political spectrum, prompted not only by its economic policies but also more generally by its growing might and the way it exercises that.

Minor concessions will neither satisfy him nor tackle the underlying strains. It is not simply a dispute about specific tariffs or narrow policies but more fundamentally about the way the Chinese state supports its businesses and intervenes in the economy, at the cost of foreign companies. Even if reformers in the country believe that changes are needed for their own sake, Beijing is hardly about to rush to what would, in reality, be a political as well as economic overhaul.

China’s approach has so far been measured. Its immediate reaction to Monday’s measures were counter-tariffs on $60bn of US imports, at a lower rate than previously listed, in what it described as a forced response. But its alarm at the potential repercussions are evident and its disagreements over how to handle the issue are becoming more apparent, as attempts to make progress with more sympathetic US interlocutors proved pointless thanks to the divisions within the Trump administration.

China exports around four times as much to the US as the US does to China, so is running out of goods to target. But both covert and overt options remain, from a higher tariff on products already listed to blocking exports of components needed by western companies – an idea floated by a former finance minister at the weekend. Chip maker Qualcomm believes its attempt to acquire a rival – scuppered by Chinese regulators’ foot-dragging – fell victim to the trade war. And Chinese seafood lovers are reportedly switching to Canadian crustaceans thanks to new inspections of US lobsters. That’s hardly a game-changer – but it is a reminder that US companies, ports and farmers are suffering, and that consumers will too; tellingly, the administration has staggered its new tariffs to avoid the holiday shopping season.

American and Chinese businesses and consumers will not be the only ones to pay for this conflict. Japan, which has plenty of its own disagreements with China, urged a swift resolution to the row for fear of its impact. Cecilia Malmström, the EU’s trade commissioner, said it agreed with some of the US complaints but not its tactics. Any serious attempt to address Chinese trade policies will require a multilateral approach and a great deal of patience. Neither is associated with Mr Trump.