From 2002 to 2017, Afghan opium poppy cultivation soared. In 2002, cultivation estimates ranged from 31,000 to 74,000 hectares, compared to 328,000 hectares in 2017. Opium production also rose to historic levels, from approximately 3,400 metric tons in 2002 to roughly 9,000 metric tons in 2017. No counterdrug program undertaken by the United States, its coalition partners, or the Afghan government resulted in lasting reductions in poppy cultivation or opium production.

U.S. Counternarcotics Funding Allocations by Agency, 2002–2017 ($ Millions) Skip Chart Note: Of the $452.5 million DEA allocated for counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan, $209 million was transferred to DEA from the State Department's Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. Source: SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation and strand of effort based on agency data calls, budget documentation, and correspondence. Chart Data Table Agency Funding ($ Millions) State $2,267.73 USAID $1,431.36 DEA $452.54 DOD $3,132.46

While counternarcotics efforts suffered from challenges that dogged the wider reconstruction effort—such as insecurity, corruption, lack of coordination, and poor metrics—there were also problems specific to the counternarcotics effort. A push for aggressive eradication was based on flawed assumptions and poor data. U.S. advocacy for aerial spraying damaged U.S.-Afghan relations, and geospatial imagery confirms that significant eradication efforts rarely led to any sustainable reductions in cultivation.

Some of the most intense eradication occurred in areas that did not benefit from alternative development. Some alternative development programs, intended to help farmers shift from poppy toward licit crops, focused narrowly on crop substitution. This contributed to the displacement of people and relocation of poppy cultivation to areas outside government control. Other programs had the inadvertent effect of enabling more poppy production.

“Everyone did their own thing, not thinking how it fit in with the larger effort. State was trying to eradicate, USAID was marginally trying to do livelihoods, and DEA was going after bad guys.” Senior DOD official

A key strategic U.S. interest in Afghanistan was to reduce the amount of funding insurgent groups received from the opium and heroin trade. However, the primary metric for U.S. counternarcotics efforts was levels of poppy cultivation, which did not effectively assess efforts to cut off insurgent financing. As of late 2017, these financing estimates underpinned assumptions about the potential benefits of a costly air interdiction campaign that carried risks of civilian casualties. Without a clear understanding of how insurgents benefit from and participate in the narcotics trade, it is difficult to measure the campaign’s effectiveness.

U.S. support helped establish well-trained, capable Afghan counterdrug institutions, such as the National Interdiction Unit and Sensitive Investigative Unit. These bodies are regarded as some of the most trustworthy and proficient in the country, but their effectiveness has been stymied by the lack of a competent, non-corrupt judicial system and sufficient Afghan political support. The fact that these entities have often been redirected to counterterrorism objectives is evidence of their value to both the Afghan and U.S. governments.

Given the difficult security and economic environment in Afghanistan today, particularly in many of the largest opium-producing regions, the Afghan drug trade will likely persist for decades. This makes it critical that U.S. policymakers focus limited resources on those counternarcotics programs that contribute to wider U.S. strategic goals.