Introduction and summary

The United States needs a new progressive approach to revive and rebuild the trans-Atlantic alliance. Fully embracing the European Union and supporting European integration efforts that bolster the strength and resilience of Europe’s union should be core to a new American approach.

With the world witnessing an autocratic resurgence, the United States needs a strong and united European partner now more than at any time since the end of the Cold War. However, America’s approach to the European Union has oscillated from ambivalence to hostility and has failed to recognize that the European Union has the geopolitical potential of a rising power. When Europe is able to act as one, it has shown it can be a key force in global affairs and a powerful voice for liberal democratic values. A strong united Europe working in tandem with an America once again committed to its founding principles would create a robust liberal bulwark against the rising tide of authoritarianism.

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But while Europe can rise, it can also fall. The European Union faces acute internal and external challenges, which threaten its stability. European integration has stalled as the European Union’s current institutional structure leaves it vulnerable and stymies its ability to act internationally. Washington needs Europe not just to remain united, free, democratic, and prosperous but also to become a powerful actor on the world stage. It is time for America to use its influence to bolster and strengthen the European Union. The United States should view the European Union as a nascent rising power and should adopt a patient and concerted strategy to encourage its rise. As such, the United States should seek to strengthen Europe’s union and support its rise by building and developing a new special relationship with the European Union.

A plan for strengthening Europe as an ally

The trans-Atlantic alliance is in crisis. It is a crisis of America’s own making, and it is endangering one of America’s greatest foreign policy achievements—the transformation of a war-torn and divided Europe into a continent united, democratic, and at peace.

Three years into the Trump administration, it has become clear that President Trump will not change course … it is important to start thinking now about how to best repair, rebuild, and reinvigorate the alliance after a Trump presidency.

President Donald Trump’s administration has abandoned America’s traditional global leadership role, leaving U.S. allies shaken to the core. The Trump administration has taken a hostile approach toward Europe, treating America’s European allies—in particular the European Union—more like adversaries than allies. As such, President Trump has shown himself to be one of the gravest threats to the trans-Atlantic alliance since the Second World War. He has shown disdain for NATO, treating it like a protection racket. He has called the European Union a “foe,” actively seeking to undermine it. He has also supported the European Union’s disintegration, including by supporting Brexit; attempting to stoke anti-EU, right-wing populist sentiment; backing anti-democratic governments in Hungary and Poland; initiating a trade war with the European Union; personally attacking European leaders; and downgrading the diplomatic status of the European Union. This has caused dismay within Europe, cratered public opinion of the United States, and initiated a debate about the future of Europe’s relationship with the United States.

Three years into the Trump administration, it has become clear that President Trump will not change course and adopt a more positive and constructive approach toward the trans-Atlantic alliance. Yet, it is important to start thinking now about how to best repair, rebuild, and reinvigorate the alliance after a Trump presidency.

While the Washington foreign policy community has expressed shock and horror at Trump’s hostile approach to European allies, the United States will not simply be able to hit a reset button after Trump and revert back to previous American administrations’ approaches toward Europe. The recently departed French ambassador to the United States, Gérard Araud, explained insightfully a misconception: that “when Trump leaves power, everything will go back to business as usual. That’s the dream of Washington, D.C.”

Rebuilding the trans-Atlantic alliance after President Trump will require a new American approach toward Europe. This is necessary not only because of the damage caused by the Trump presidency, but also because the approaches of past administrations are outdated and ill-suited to a changing European continent facing a more hostile geopolitical environment. Europe has fundamentally transformed since the 1990s—the last time the United States thought deeply about Europe’s strategic direction.

The last 20 years have seen the process of European integration accelerate. The European Union is a new form of governance essentially unprecedented in a history: a federal supranational governing body fusing together its 28 members into a political and economic union. Since the formation of the European Union, the process of European integration has accelerated and welded together a continent rife with ethnic division and state conflict—and without considerable democratic tradition—into a liberal democratic continent that is a zone of peace and stability. It is a remarkable achievement that, after centuries of conflict and world wars that resulted in tens of millions of deaths and mass devastation, Europe was able to transcend its ethnic and national differences and build a new, innovative form of government that would serve to unite a continent.

Europe achieved this with the backing, and often through the insistence, of the United States, which pushed aggressively and consistently for European integration through the Marshall Plan and through intensive diplomatic engagement that supported the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community. Today, the European Union provides a model for the success of democracy, social market economies, and open societies. This is an achievement that the United States made possible.

However, Washington has spent the past two decades largely ignoring the process of European integration and therefore has missed Europe’s dramatic transformation. After 9/11, America’s attention shifted to counterterrorism and the Middle East. Europe was, for all intents and purposes, seen as solved. The United States wanted Europe to contribute more and complain less about American policy. Europe was seen from Washington through the prism of NATO, and, as such, the key focus was not European integration but rather how to make NATO useful in supporting America’s overstretched military forces. European integration was seen as a European project that did not involve the United States. Washington lost touch with the twists and turns of European integration and its resulting complex organizational structure. The lack of comprehension of European integration meant that the European Union effectively became a caricature for Europe, leading to the European Union being perpetually derided in Washington as feckless, ineffective, and irrelevant. The European Union was seen as a time-consuming bureaucracy that could cause diplomatic headaches. As such, the United States looked upon European integration ambivalently during the 21st century. Through both Democratic and Republican administrations, the United States has been a force perpetuating the status quo in Europe, acting more often as a brake on, rather than an accelerant for, European integration.

Furthermore, the European Union also became a proxy within a broader American foreign policy debate over multilateralism. This was one of the central foreign policy differences between Republicans and Democrats during the 2000s. The European Union was thus often seen through a domestic political lens in the United States, with American conservatives viewing it with instinctive derision and animosity and American liberals viewing it as a model for international cooperation. Additionally, American conservatives resent European opposition to certain foreign policy approaches of conservative administrations, such as the invasion of Iraq, the condemnation of detainee treatment, the withdrawal from the Iran agreement, attacks on international organizations, and the withdrawal from Paris climate agreement. In short, American conservatives fear that a stronger, more vocal European Union will hinder their ability to pursue shortsighted and ill-fated approaches that undermine American national security. But this is actually a feature of Europe’s rise, given the irresponsible course pursued by conservative American administrations. However, the conservative turn against the European Union in recent years also means that the bipartisan consensus toward European integration that was largely in place since World War II no longer exists.

Where bipartisan consensus does exist is in America’s continued support for NATO. Trump’s badgering of NATO countries and his seemingly weak commitment to the alliance has prompted an outpouring of support for NATO from both Democratic and Republican politicians. Indeed, despite a continued lack of defense spending from European countries, NATO’s force posture in Europe has been significantly bolstered in the last five years under both the Obama and Trump administrations. NATO therefore remains robust, despite Trump.

But NATO is not Europe. As important as NATO is—and the security that the alliance provides creates the foundation for European integration—a NATO-centric approach from Washington misses the shifting power dynamics within Europe. The European Union in Brussels—not the European capitals nor NATO headquarters—has become the political center of gravity for Europe. European states are no longer as powerful as they once were, as the United Kingdom, France, and other European countries lack the international clout they once had. As a result, they have individually become less impactful allies on the world stage. While Germany stands in contrast, as its geopolitical clout and influence within Europe and internationally has grown, its narrow conception of national interest and reticence to step out on the world stage has left both Germany and Europe punching well below their weight globally. Continuing to focus American diplomatic energy on individual European states will therefore leave Washington perpetually disappointed. The United States should also recognize that simply calling for Europe to “get its act together” and to plead with Germany, in particular, to do more is not going to work. Where Washington will find vision and drive for a stronger European role is not in the increasingly parochial individual European nations but rather in the capital of the European Union: Brussels. If Europe is going to assert itself and become a more critical ally, it will do that through the European Union and not through the nation-state.

Washington needs to stop imagining Europe as it was—a collection of nation-states. Instead, it needs to start viewing Europe how it is now—a single, if still weak and nascent, political and economic union—as well as how it wants Europe to be: united, cohesive, free and democratic, and a powerful ally on the world stage.

Yet the European Union is currently stuck in an institutional purgatory. While it has transformed and integrated Europe, resulting in the transfer of significant responsibilities to the European Union from the nation-state, there are also critical areas where responsibilities have not been transferred. This has left important gaps in the European Union’s capabilities that make Europe vulnerable. For instance, the European Union has a currency and monetary union with the euro, but it has no supranational fiscal union or fiscal policy. Another economic crisis could therefore severely test the European Union, particularly with the rise of populist and anti-EU parties. Additionally, the lack of integration of the European Union’s foreign and security policy has made it difficult for the European Union to forge unified positions. As a result, the European Union—with its enormous single market, with spending on defense second only in size to the United States, and with the highest spending on international development in the world—is unable to effectively leverage its power to assert itself on the international stage. Nor is Europe likely to be able to get its “act together” on a timeline needed by the United States without an external crisis or significant encouragement from the United States.

Strengthening the European Union is now essential. Europe is no longer geopolitically peripheral, as it was perceived by Washington after 9/11, nor is Europe immune from geopolitics, as many in Europe perceived after the formation of the European Union. In fact, Europe has become geopolitically central due to the rise of authoritarianism. Autocratic states such as Russia and China seek to divide and weaken the European Union in a deliberate effort to prevent it from asserting itself internationally. A united, free, and democratic Europe is also more difficult for autocrats to work with, and the European Union’s success provides a striking alternative model to their autocratic governments. As a result, autocrats seek to diplomatically exploit divisions within the European Union, amplify nationalist and populist voices, and gain leverage through targeted investments. Bizarrely, Russia, China, and the Trump administration are all currently working toward the same objective: weakening and potentially unraveling the European Union.

The collapse or unraveling of the European Union would be a geopolitical disaster for the United States. Not only could this cause a global economic shock, but it could also reintroduce the security dilemmas and balance of power politics to Europe that have been the norm throughout its history. The peaceful unification and integration of Europe, as facilitated by the United States, is perhaps one of America’s greatest foreign policy accomplishments. President Dwight Eisenhower remarked in 1957 that he hoped he would “live long enough to see a United States of Europe come into existence.” With the achievement of a united and integrated Europe now threatened by both internal and external challenges, the United States needs to do more than simply fret about the prospects of the European Union’s unraveling; it should develop an approach that seeks to bolster the European Union’s cohesion and unity.

To do so, Washington needs to stop imagining Europe as it was—a collection of nation-states. Instead, it needs to start viewing Europe how it is now—a single, if still weak and nascent, political and economic union—as well as how it wants Europe to be: united, cohesive, free and democratic, and a powerful ally on the world stage.

America needs a new approach toward Europe that embraces Europe’s transformation and that unequivocally supports the European Union. The rise of the European Union as a strategic actor and global player is firmly in Washington’s interests. As such, the United States should view the European Union as a possible rising power—a potential geopolitical force and essential strategic partner that could help counter challenges posed by rising authoritarianism. Europe has the potential to become a much stronger global ally, as a key voice for liberal democratic values, a model for successful multilateralism, and an important stalwart in upholding a rules-based international order. Europe’s rise, just like other rising powers, is far from assured. If it occurs, it will be gradual and take time. Yet the European Union in the short, medium, and long term should be America’s partner of first resort.

In a previous paper, the Center for American Progress argued that in order to rebuild U.S. alliances and restore American leadership—especially in the face of growing geopolitical challenge from the rise of authoritarian rivals—the United States needs a new approach that embraces a democratic, values-based foreign policy and that rebalances America’s diplomatic, military, and economic efforts toward democratic states. At the core of this strategy lies the need for America to strengthen its relationship with Europe.

The United States should strive to forge a new special relationship with the European Union akin to its relationship with the United Kingdom. In so doing, the United States should try to develop common U.S.-EU approaches toward major challenges such as Russia, China, democratic decline, migration, corruption and money laundering, as well as key economic challenges. Establishing this relationship will require immediately reversing course on the withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement and the Paris climate agreement.

On defense, the United States should fully support an expanded EU role. European states are unlikely to meet their defense spending commitments of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), because, for most European states, defense is not about national defense but rather about collective defense. Instead of Washington resisting collectivizing and integrating defense through the European Union, as it has since the 1990s for fear of the European Union complicating NATO efforts, it should fully back EU efforts to rationalize and integrate European defense capabilities. Such an approach will serve to strengthen NATO by strengthening European defense capabilities.

On foreign policy, the European Union has considerable influence when it acts as one on the world stage. When European states act separately, their influence is diminished. The United States should therefore back steps to expand the European Union’s role and presence in foreign policy.

On economic policy, the European Union is integrated economically, but significant gaps remain that pose severe potential vulnerabilities. The United States should support efforts to strengthen the European Union’s economic resilience and to encourage its members to address the deflationary trap caused by austerity imposed by the euro. The United States should also endeavor to create a new economic partnership with Europe that not only ends the current trade disputes but also prioritizes social and economic cohesion.

A key variable in this report is the loss of U.S. influence and credibility. Not only is the United States not nearly as influential as it was during the Cold War, but it is also not as influential as it was four years ago. The presidency of Donald Trump has caused a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment in Europe and led to calls to pivot away from allying with the United States. A new U.S. effort to partner with the European Union may find a dubious partner. Nevertheless, if America is to rebuild its geopolitical clout, it will need to revive the trans-Atlantic alliance. Furthermore, American influence in Europe remains substantial in spite of Trump. For example, U.S. opposition to EU defense efforts have effectively frozen them in place for more than two decades. A United States that engages Europe in strong support of European integration and uses its diplomatic leverage and clout to further those goals, just as the United States did after World War II, could have a significant impact on Europe’s direction. The U.S. should once again use its leverage and influence to support European integration. It is time for the United States to embrace the European Union.

From ambivalence to hostility: America’s 21st-century approach toward Europe

“Let me reaffirm clearly the support of this administration for European unity. We consider a strong and united Europe not a rival, but a partner.” – President Ronald Reagan, 1982

Since the founding of the United States, Europe had dominated America’s geopolitical thinking, from fear of European intervention in the United States and the Western hemisphere in the 19th century to world wars and conflicts in the 20th century. After the Cold War ended, Europe continued to consume Washington’s attention. The United States engaged in two conflicts in Europe—Bosnia and Kosovo—and sought to manage the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, unify Germany, and expand NATO.

But, in the 2000s, Europe went from being the focus of American foreign policy to an afterthought. From Washington’s vantage point following 9/11, Europe was seen as essentially solved—a zone of peace and democratic stability where history had seemingly ended. Washington’s attention became consumed by counterterrorism, wars in the Middle East, and eventually, China’s rise.

The Washington foreign policy community viewed Europe with annoyed ambivalence. The United States was annoyed by the feebleness of Europe’s contributions to the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the diplomatic deference Europeans expected despite their lack of contributions to NATO; and the occasional strong European opposition to American initiatives and actions, such as the invasion of Iraq. America was also increasingly ambivalent about the European Union and the project of European integration. After all, America was not in the European Union, struggled to understand the dynamics of integration, and was uncertain whether a united Europe untethered from American dependency was in U.S. interests. Washington’s ambivalence made it a force for the status quo in Europe, encouraging Europe to get its act together but fretting and opposing EU efforts that might reduce Washington’s influence.

Successive Democratic and Republican administrations saw little practical value in engaging with the European Union and viewed EU integration efforts as an internal effort that did not involve the United States. The European Union was seen by U.S. policymakers as little more than another regional organization. Engaging the European Union was often viewed as an impediment and a bureaucratic slog. During both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, the United States was largely ambivalent toward the project of European integration, which meant it was essentially silent and absent in critical debates over Europe’s future, including the future of the euro, the European Union’s institutional structure, and even hot-button issues such as migration. With the overriding focus on conflicts in the Middle East, especially prior to 2014, the U.S. State Department and the Pentagon directed their energies to corralling and coordinating individual European contributions. In the run-up to the Iraq war, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, frustrated by France and Germany’s opposition, divided Europe into two: old and new. New Europe included the new Eastern European members who were supporting the United States and joined the “coalition of the willing.”

But the annoyed ambivalence was bipartisan. Despite European enthusiasm for the new Obama administration, Europe soon felt neglected. There were a series of small but noticeable diplomatic slights early on in the administration. President Barack Obama skipped the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and was too busy to attend an EU-U.S. summit in Madrid. At the same time, the administration was highlighting the pivot to Asia. As Tom Wright explained in a 2017 Brookings Institution report, “Over the past 10 years, starting in the Obama administration and accelerating in the Trump administration, the United States has retrenched diplomatically and politically from Europe. … Obama felt that the United States should leave the European project to Europeans.” The Obama administration supported the idea of European integration but never offered a clear vision for what it wanted Europe to become—it was up to Europeans to decide. After World War II and throughout the Cold War, America was deeply engaged in internal European issues. But Wright observed in his report a stark contrast from today:

When one looks at the array of problems in Europe today—Catalonian separatism, faltering Brexit negotiations, difficult relations with Turkey, Russian political interference, the fallout from the refugee crisis, illiberal political trends in countries like Poland and Hungary, and differences over the future of the eurozone and the EU—the striking thing is the absence of the United States. Political problems appear to fester without meriting so much as a phone call from the president or secretary of state, let alone a concerted national effort to shape the outcome.

During the Obama administration, working with Europe was largely seen as an important functional, or multilateral, task, something that was done to avoid isolation and share the burden of global security.

The European Union also became an ideological proxy in a wider debate that dominated American foreign policy fights throughout the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. The European Union became viewed with seething hostility by the American right; it seemed to embody all that the right feared of multilateral organizations. As the European Union expanded, it subjugated the nation-state and created a new supranational bureaucracy in Brussels. The European Union was seen not as a governmental entity with which the United States had to engage, but rather as an entity to oppose.

Conservative Washington think tanks have frequently critiqued the character of the European Union, mimicking generic U.K. conservative party criticisms of the European Union being bureaucratic, undemocratic, and socialist. The Heritage Foundation became a leading purveyor of hostility toward the European Union in Washington. Heritage Foundation senior fellow in Anglo-American relations, Ted Bromund, articulated the standard pro-Brexit attacks on the European Union in a piece titled “Ten Myths about the European Union,” asserting, “The essence of the EU … is that it is a supranational authority that has steadily imposed ever-tighter constraints on the free and democratic nations of Europe.” In 2009, Heritage’s Sally McNamara wrote a report titled “The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: How It Threatens Transatlantic Security.” She argued that the United States should oppose the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty, which strengthened the European Union’s role in foreign and security policy, stating that the then-new Obama administration “must make clear that building enduring bilateral alliances is a top U.S. foreign policy priority.”

This outright hostile approach toward the European Union has been adopted by the Trump administration. President Trump and his administration have been cheerleaders for Brexit. As a candidate in 2016, Trump called himself “MR. BREXIT” and urged the United Kingdom to “walk away” from talks with the European Union. Trump’s former national security adviser John Bolton said the United Kingdom would “jump to the ‘front of the queue’” in trade negotiations. And Secretary of State Mike Pompeo went to Brussels and attacked the European Union, asking, “Is the EU ensuring that the interests of countries and their citizens are placed before those of bureaucrats here in Brussels?” The speech left Europeans stunned for its “ignorance and arrogance,” as former Obama administration official Julie Smith surmised in Foreign Policy. In Washington, meanwhile, in a petty act it later reversed, the Trump administration downgraded the diplomatic status of the EU diplomatic mission to Washington.

As a result, there no longer is a bipartisan American approach toward Europe. The bipartisan support for integrating Europe after World War II, as seen through the Marshall Plan, the formation of NATO, and the backing of the European Economic Community, no longer exists. While there is general bipartisan consensus toward supporting NATO in Washington, there is now strong conservative opposition to European integration and the European Union.

However, concern over the future of Europe now once again permeates Washington. Russia’s illegal invasion and seizure of Ukrainian territory and its aggressive posture toward NATO and EU members have revived concerns over Europe’s territorial defense and security. The emergence of anti-EU populist far-right parties fueled by Europe’s languid recovery from the Great Recession and the 2015 wave of migration has led to concerns about the stability of the European Union. A united, democratic Europe can no longer be taken for granted. There is a growing sense of the need to reengage and revive the trans-Atlantic alliance. As Wright explains, “The United States must choose between … adopting a stance of benign disinterest, or returning to a strategy of deep engagement in Europe in pursuit of shared security and prosperity.”

Reengaging a changing Europe

Engaging Europe is hard, as there is no singular point of contact. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was purported to have quipped that when he wanted to call Europe, he didn’t know who to call. America’s approach has echoed this, focusing on Europe’s nation-state capitals and NATO, while largely neglecting the European Union. But Europe’s power dynamics are shifting away from its nation-states, and Brussels should become more of the focal point for Washington’s engagement with Europe.

As the United States turns to Europe after President Trump, its framework for approaching the continent is in need of an overhaul. Europe has transformed itself over the last 20 years—so much so that a diplomatic strategy of deep engagement focused on herding Europe’s 28 nation-states is bound to disappoint Washington. Europe’s states have seen their power erode or are unwilling to exercise their clout on the world stage. Thus, an engagement strategy focused on Europe’s states doing more will lead nowhere, and focusing on European capitals—and not on the European capital—no longer makes sense. However, engaging the European Union will not be easy or straightforward. The European Union remains stuck in an institutional purgatory. It has tremendous potential power but is unable to exercise it on the world’s stage. This section outlines the challenges of engaging a changed Europe.

The declining power of European states

The United States principally engages “Europe” in its various European capitals, most notably focusing on the big three powers: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Such an approach remains sensible. These European states continue to drive the continent’s broader approach to the world. Furthermore, the lack of a strong EU foreign policy apparatus has made shuttle diplomacy among London, Paris, and Berlin an essential part of American engagement with Europe. Yet, the geopolitical clout of European states has declined considerably since the end of the Cold War. While Germany is the exception, its lack of a strategic culture and narrow conception of national interest has made Germany a reluctant and unreliable player on the world stage. Berlin has the power to move Europe, yet thus far, Germany has been reluctant to do so. The United Kingdom’s impending departure from the European Union will also further erode its influence and dramatically alter America’s traditional pattern engagement with Europe. The special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, already having lost much of its former luster, will be a shadow of itself. France, meanwhile, strives for Europe to fulfill a role that America should support, yet France lacks the clout to dictate the direction of Europe. Furthermore, the influence of other European states has been reduced in part because of the emergence of the European Union, which consumes much of these states’ diplomatic energy. Therefore, focusing primarily on Europe’s nation-state capitals as the locus of U.S. engagement is bound to leave the United States disappointed and frustrated.

The United Kingdom: A wavering relationship

The long-heralded special relationship with the United Kingdom is waning. This is not just the result of Brexit. The toll of the Iraq war on the U.K. military and austerity from conservative Tory governments has led to the significant decline of not just the United Kingdom’s armed forces but also its global ambitions. The United Kingdom remains an important and valued contributor, as its military remains potent and its overseas territories provide bases for U.S. forces. But there has been a decline in both the United Kingdom’s military capacity and its willingness to partner with the United States.

Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU will significantly reduce its diplomatic relevance to the United States. The United Kingdom has served as America’s de facto translator in the European Union, explaining and flagging initiatives that could impact U.S. interests. The United Kingdom has also served as chief advocate and protector of the trans-Atlantic relationship within the European Union, often serving to block EU actions that the United States opposed. Professor and author Desmond Dinan explained that “the United States consistently supported European integration and British participation in it. To the extent the special relationship existed, it did so despite, not because of, Britain’s refusal to join the European communities. … Regardless of Britain’s opposition, the United States strongly supported deeper European integration.” The collapse of the United Kingdom’s influence within the European Union will require the United States to devote more attention to cultivating diplomatic partnerships with other European players.

Furthermore, the inevitable all-consuming focus on Brexit and its fallout will make the United Kingdom increasingly distracted from other world events. The United Kingdom has already shown itself to be enamored with the Chinese market, focused on rolling out the red carpet for Xi Jinping and breaking with the United States and joining the Chinese-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Additionally, the United Kingdom has been incredibly reticent to deal aggressively and comprehensively with Russian malign influence. The United Kingdom may act to address specific egregious incidents but lacks the will to uproot the systemic nature of Russian influence within its borders.

Furthermore, a United Kingdom coping with the economic fallout of its departure from the European Union will be intensely focused on building international economic ties with any willing partner it can find. Economics, not geopolitics, will likely drive U.K. thinking. This will lead to a narrower and insular approach to international affairs, reducing the United Kingdom’s dependability to the United States. The United Kingdom is, and will remain, an essential partner for the United States, a significant military power and financial center, but the heyday of the special relationship is almost certainly over.

France: The new special relationship?

France may have already surpassed the United Kingdom as America’s closest European military partner. Fifteen years ago, the U.S. Congress changed the name of French fries in the congressional cafeteria to “freedom fries.” Since then, France rejoined NATO in 2009 and has partnered with the United States in a number of military operations. France in particular has taken a lead role in the Sahel, deploying more than 3,000 forces, while the United States supports these efforts through aerial refueling and intelligence and surveillance. France has also been willing to engage militarily to address crises in the Middle East, such as in Libya and Syria. France has become the European power most likely and willing to partner with the United States in a military intervention. Under President Emmanuel Macron, France is also seeking to develop Europe’s capacity to act to address out-of-area contingencies by working to create a European intervention force made up of willing European countries that, if called upon, could take military action. France rightly sees itself as the military leader of Europe, a role that will likely grow in prominence with the departure of the British and German reticence.

However, France’s anemic recovery from the economic crisis and its sclerotic economy have limited its ability to resource its grand global ambitions. Yet France’s recognition of its limitations is in part why it is pushing to expand the capabilities of the European Union in a number of areas, including foreign and security policy. France seeks to build the European Union into a major global player. While Washington has long feared that the European Union would be a vehicle for French domination, especially following French President Charles de Gaulle’s decision to remove France from NATO in 1966. But the European Union—with its 28 members and increasingly powerful executive, the European Commission—is not easily controlled. Moreover, the expansion of the European Union’s authority would also involve France subjugating itself to the European Union in foreign and security policy. Therefore, past American concerns that the European Union would serve as a vehicle for French nationalist or Gaullist ambitions, which were often outwardly anti-American, are outdated and simplistic. France wants to empower the European Union, because it recognizes that the European Union can be a more powerful international player than France can be on its own. Therefore, a strong European Union serves France’s national interests, just as it serves American national interests.

However, while President Macron has laid out a bold vision for the European Union and proposed reform after reform, he has not been able to convince German Chancellor Angela Merkel to join him in bolstering the European Union. While some progress has been made, France is no longer able to set Europe’s course as it had in the past. Nevertheless, France will likely be a key—if not the key—partner for an American administration seeking to bolster and strengthen the European Union.

Germany: The reluctant superpower

Germany has emerged as the key power in Europe and has set the course for the European Union over the last decade. Chancellor Merkel is rightly admired for her professionalism and dignity in her conduct of international diplomacy, her advocacy for democracy and human rights, and the humanity she showed during the 2015 refugee crisis. Germany, however, is a force for the status quo in Europe—a status quo that largely benefits Germany but ultimately leaves the European Union in a very precarious position.

Germany has the economic and political might to drive EU policy, further EU integration, revive Europe’s moribund economic situation, and turn Europe into a potent global player. Yet Germany remains reticent to do so. Much of this is due to the legacy of World War II and Germany’s postwar rehabilitation. Germany sought to become a “normal” country, dismissing the notion that it was “exceptional” or that there was a German sonderweg, or “special path.” Thomas Bagger, the director of foreign policy in the Office of the Federal President of Germany, assessed recently in The Washington Quarterly, “The strong pacifist streak produced by two catastrophic wars that set Germany’s security and defense debates apart from neighbors such as France or Poland did not lose its relevance.” He assesses that Germany embraced the notion that history had ended after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, believing that the era of geopolitics ended in 1989. Germany’s entire strategic outlook and culture is therefore built on collaboration and cooperation, not on power politics and geopolitical competition. Bagger concludes that “Germany is more fundamentally challenged than others by the recent turn in international affairs” toward greater geopolitical competition.

Berlin is thus ill-prepared for this new era, leaving much of Europe and the liberal world disappointed and often aghast at the seemingly hypocritical conduct of its foreign policy. After Trump’s election, Angela Merkel was anointed by some as the new leader of the free world. While this was overstated, there was the potential for it to be true. With the United States walking away from its traditional leadership role, Merkel, as leader of the most powerful and influential country within the European Union, possessing the ability to drive the European Union, could have pushed for considerable action both within the European Union and globally. But Merkel dismissed the premise. Julie Smith, former Obama administration official and fellow of the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, expressed exasperation at Merkel’s lack of tangible action, noting that she highlights the problems internationally, “but she isn’t helping Europe to do anything about it.”

Germany, therefore, has likely missed its moment. With an increasingly partisan domestic political situation, Germany seems unlikely to reverse course and step up on the world stage. The country will therefore remain a rather insular power, with a narrow conception of national interests that will prevent it from revamping and bolstering the European Union. This is an unsettling dynamic. German stewardship of the European economic crisis left Europe and the euro currency teetering on the verge of collapse. Since the Great Recession, Germany has been a force for austerity and deflationary economics that are strangling the economies of southern EU members, helping to create an environment in which populists can thrive. Merkel’s approach to European economic issues prioritizing a narrow German outlook was fortunately mitigated by the tenure of Mario Draghi as head of the European Central Bank (ECB), who worked aggressively, often over German objections, to save the euro and stimulate eurozone economies. As Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf concluded, “The recovery of the eurozone from its crisis, perhaps even its survival, owes more to the ECB than any other institution.”

Militarily, despite a considerable budget surplus, Germany spends just 1.2 percent of its GDP on defense. Its neglected armed forces are now in a shockingly decrepit state: None of its submarines are operational; just four of its 128 Eurofighter Typhoon combat jets were combat ready in 2018; it lacks dozens of tanks and vehicles for NATO operations; and its troops lack body armor, cold weather gear, and night vision. Helicopter pilots lack helicopters to fly and are unable to train. Moreover, Germany’s penchant to seek better ties with Russia could lead to friction, especially over Germany’s willingness to move forward with Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.

While Germany could lead the European Union and push it in a direction that addresses many of its weaknesses, it has refused to do so. European integration has advanced when Germany and France move together—such as with the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community after World War II; French support for German unification after the Cold War, despite significant concerns; and Germany agreeing to the creation of an economic union and common currency. French President Macron has offered proposal after proposal to bolster the European Union, seeking a renewed Franco-German partnership. Yet every overture has been dismissed by Berlin. Germany is enamored with the idea of a Europe in union, but it balks at the price. Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Constanze Stelzenmüller explains that “no other country has been so deeply in denial about the tension between its high-minded normative convictions, and its own selective compliance with them. We sing the praises of normative universalism, but are absolutely ready to swerve away from our convictions in pursuit of our national interest. We see ourselves as the engine of European integration, but when it comes down to it, German governments regularly hit the brakes.”

Germany therefore remains a reluctant power that will undoubtedly frustrate a new energetic American administration seeking to revive the trans-Atlantic relationship. A new administration should not bank on Germany suddenly asserting itself internationally.

European states: When foreign policy is domestic policy

Europe’s other states have varying clout and influence on the world stage. For example, Spain maintains strong relationships with Latin America and provides important staging bases for the alliance in North and West Africa. Sweden is the world’s largest funder of international development per capita. Nordic and Baltic states maintain a laserlike focus on Russia and lead the way in responding to foreign interference. Italy and Greece are coping with a migration crisis in the Mediterranean and serving as the front line for dealing with instability from Syria and North Africa. But overall, the diplomacy of European states—small and large—has been increasingly consumed by Brussels. The foreign policy of EU states is often focused internally, while the energy and attention of foreign ministries is directed at Brussels rather than outside of the European Union. This is not unusual, as smaller European states have long focused on events within Europe. Seeking to develop new coalitions of smaller states is unlikely to significantly alter the dynamics within Europe.

In sum, the United Kingdom is no longer punching above its weight but is losing weight, France is trying to punch above its weight, and Germany doesn’t know how to punch. Other European states are focused on punching one other in Brussels. Overall, a continued American focus on engaging European states is unlikely to result in a significant shift.

America’s NATO-centric approach toward Europe

When Washington thinks about the future of Europe, it often does so through the lens of NATO. NATO remains the guarantor of European security, providing the foundation for European integration and therefore enabling the formation of the European Union. It provides an umbrella of security through the Article 5 commitment that deters adversaries and challengers. NATO also critically coordinates defense and security decisions and provides a strategic direction for the continent. But NATO is ultimately a military alliance and therefore fails to capture most issues and challenges that animate the continent and trans-Atlantic relations.

After decades adrift, searching for a new raison d’etre, the NATO alliance is now back to its core mission: defending Europe from Russian aggression—the very reason the organization was founded in the first place. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the Obama administration dramatically expanded U.S. military support to the European theater. And in various NATO summits following 2014, NATO took needed steps to reposture toward the renewed threat from Russia. Despite President Trump’s refusal to strongly commit to Article 5, the Jim Mattis-led U.S. Department of Defense, aided by ample funding from Congress, expanded on the approach laid out during the Obama administration by expanding the resources directed to Europe. The effort, initially called the European Reassurance Initiative, has been strengthened through substantial congressional funding and has become the European Deterrence Initiative.

Meanwhile, NATO has reorganized and taken important steps to meet the challenge posed by Russia. NATO has deployed multinational battlegroups to the Baltic states; brought back military commands focused on moving forces across the Atlantic to Europe and across Europe to the east to cope with a Russia contingency; and established air-policing missions in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. Charles Kupchan, who served on the National Security Council during the Obama administration, argued that, despite political concerns from the Trump administration and lack of European defense spending, NATO is on very firm footing and is in “extraordinarily robust shape.”

While European defense spending has not met American expectations, there have been substantial increases, particularly among the states most sensitive to the threat posed by Russia, such as Poland, the Baltic states, and even non-NATO countries such as Sweden. This increase in spending is not the result of American badgering, but rather due to the shock caused by Russian annexation of Ukrainian territory. The ease with which Russia conducted those operations led European states from Romania to Sweden to bolster their defenses. Furthermore, one positive aspect of President Trump’s hostility toward NATO is that it has led to renewed bipartisan support for the alliance in Congress, resulting in congressional resolutions and large delegations to European summits and conferences.

Nevertheless, NATO is not without its own challenges. The alliance is not well equipped to respond to Russian political, economic, cyber, and election-related interference, as well as other hybrid or so-called gray zone challenges that entail more political and regulatory responses. While NATO helps coordinate and set needed force requirements, there is incredible waste and duplication among its 29 member nations. NATO members such as Turkey and Hungary have rolled back democratic institutions, challenging NATO’s claim to be an alliance of democracies.

The problem, however, of low European defense spending has consumed not just NATO but also the trans-Atlantic relationship. European states are well below the agreed-upon contribution threshold of 2 percent of GDP, and the military capabilities and readiness of European forces remain in a shocking state. The marginal increases in defense spending have not been enough to mask the general disinterest among European states on spending more on defense. While President Trump’s badgering of European countries has largely proven counterproductive, the more kindly prodding from President Obama was not any more effective. This has left America in a state of bipartisan exasperation.

It is worth assessing why European states still refuse to meet their commitments. The answer is varied, but it is not simply that European states enjoy being free riders off America’s military might. European states understand the importance of solidarity and the responsibility of membership in an organization; they often understand this more so than the United States, which is why European states have often made excuses for this lack of spending, pointing to development contributions or playing accounting tricks to show that defense spending is higher than it actually is—something the United Kingdom has done. The major problem is that many European states no longer see national security as primarily the responsibility of their state and are increasingly willing for the European Union to take on that responsibility. Defense is increasingly seen as a collective European responsibility.

When it comes to defense, European states increasingly think less like nation-states and more like states in the American conception. Asking an American state to voluntarily devote 2 percent of its budgets to national defense would result in similar shortfalls. Would Vermont use 2 percent of its tax revenue it uses for schools and roads to pay to defend the Texas border? While the analogy is an exaggeration, it does touch on the root of the problem. Slovenians and Belgians see themselves as European; they value Europe and want Europe to be defended. But their politicians are also hesitant to take money from their states’ schools or pension funds to spend more to defend Estonia. By asking for significant increases in defense spending, the alliance is asking member states to think geopolitically, not locally. However, short of a massive external shock, which Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused for some, it remains highly unlikely that European states will do so. In a 2013 Foreign Policy piece, Mark Leonard and Hans Kundnani explained that “the EU has revolutionized the way its members think about security, replacing the old traditions of balance-of-power politics and noninterference in internal affairs with a new model under which security for all is guaranteed by working together.”

A state-centric approach to European defense is bound to leave Washington disappointed. Over the last decade, the United States has both played good cop, with Obama, and bad cop in the form of Trump. Europe has seen a neighbor invaded and the election of an American president with little commitment to European security, yet even these developments failed to result in a broad increase in European defense spending. Washington has seemingly tried everything. But the one approach it has not tried is embracing the expansion of the European Union’s role into European defense.

The driver of any renewed effort to bolster European defense is most likely to come from the European Union. Yet Washington has consistently stymied and opposed EU defense efforts. Worried that the European Union will potentially impinge on NATO competencies and reduce the importance of NATO and undermine U.S. influence in Europe, the United States has made its voice heard whenever the European Union has sought to involve itself in defense. When the European community was negotiating the Maastricht Treaty to form the European Union in 1991, the United States was largely aloof. But as Professor Desmond Dinan of George Mason University noted, “The United States made its disapproval of a European defense identity or capability known early in the conference, thereby nixing discussion of the issue.”

During the Clinton administration, the United States pushed vigorously for NATO expansion and was frustrated by the slower pace of EU expansion. The United States could not drive EU expansion, but it could control NATO’s, which became the focus of U.S. policy toward Europe. As NATO was expanding, the United States sought to put the European Union in its place. In December 1998, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in a speech at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, outlined the famous “three Ds”: no duplication, no discrimination, and no delinking. She explained that “Any [EU] initiative must avoid preempting Alliance decision-making by de-linking ESDI [a European Security Defense Identity] from NATO, avoid duplicating existing efforts, and avoid discriminating against non-EU members.” For the last two decades, this has been the mantra from the United States, often cut and pasted again and again by State Department officers and placed into official statements and into the talking points of U.S. officials expressing concern about EU initiatives duplicating NATO. This approach was on full display in May 2019 when Andrea Thompson, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, and Ellen Lord, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, sent a joint letter to EU High Representative Federica Mogherini objecting to what amounts to extremely limited EU defense initiatives. Additionally, America’s closest allies within NATO, such as the United Kingdom, Poland, and other Eastern European states, adopted the American perspective and used their position as EU members to block or slow EU integration efforts.

The United States has therefore been a force for the status quo on European defense as well as on the European Union becoming a larger, more geopolitically minded player. Instead of trying to encourage EU expansion into foreign and defense areas, the United States has often worked diplomatically to put the brake on European integration efforts.

As a result of these efforts, American opposition to EU defense initiatives is contradictory. Even though America complains about the shambolic state of European defense, the United States intervenes whenever there are ambitious EU initiatives to address the defense sector. Former head of the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy, Javier Solana, writes, “Paradoxically, while his [Trump’s] administration demands that we Europeans take charge of our security, it consistently strives to undermine every joint defense project that we pursue. Such prejudice and shortsightedness with respect to European security cooperation is not new.”

Furthermore, while NATO is the world’s greatest military alliance and provides an essential trans-Atlantic forum, it still has an operational military purpose: to ensure its members can fight together. It is a multinational combatant command focused on the military missions the alliance deems most necessary, such as the defense of Europe. There is a tendency on the American side to have NATO continuously expand into other nondefense or quasi-defense areas that distract from its core mission and that are better handled by the European Union. Yet the United States often crams more into NATO, because the alliance is America’s forum to engage Europe. But NATO is not Europe; it is a trans-Atlantic military alliance. NATO is essential and must be preserved and strengthened, as it focuses on its core task of deterring conflict. But by focusing so much attention on NATO, the United States has overmilitarized the trans-Atlantic relationship to the detriment of critical diplomatic, political, economic, and other challenges.

Missing Europe’s integration transformation

The European Union has massively transformed Europe. Over the last 70 years, the process of European integration has welded together a continent rife with ethnic division, state conflict, and without considerable democratic tradition into a liberal democratic political and economic union. It has turned a continent constantly at war into a zone of peace and stability. It is a remarkable human achievement, one that America helped forge.

European integration did not happen by accident. The United States pushed, cajoled, and encouraged European integration, often over the strong initial objections of European states. In 1948, as relations with the Soviet Union began to collapse and as communism spread, the United States created the Marshall Plan, which added fuel to European integration by requiring European states to work together. Paul Hoffman, who led the Truman administration’s Economic Cooperation Agency, which implemented the Marshall Plan, gave a speech in Paris in October 1949, saying that the “steady improvement in the conditions of life [requires] nothing less than an integration of the West European economy.” In his book The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War, Benn Steil notes that the push for integration, lowering internal economic barriers, and not seeking massive reparations from a defeated Germany brought significant protestations from French and British officials. Dutch politician Ernst van der Beugel defended American cajoling, stating that “it was again American and not European initiative which pushed Western Europe further on the road to greater cooperation and integration.” In 1953, Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European integration project, noted that America’s support for Europe’s integration was “the first time in history that a great power, instead of basing its policy on ruling by dividing, has consistently and resolutely backed the creation of a large Community uniting peoples previously apart.” Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany—that is, West Germany—privately told President Harry S. Truman’s secretary of state, Dean Acheson, that “Americans were the best Europeans.”

American support for European integration prompted France in 1950, through the work of Jean Monnet and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, to develop the Schuman Plan, which proposed joint control of coal and steel production and removed the materials critical to war-making from national control. The European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951, forming the basis for the European Economic Community in 1958, which eventually became the European Union. European integration has tackled different policy challenges: the reconstruction of Europe; the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Germany; expanding continental trade and lowering internal market tariffs; addressing currency speculation; and enabling freedom of movement of people and goods and services. This process of integration—of economies, societies, and politics—has happened at different speeds and continues to this day.

EU expansion has served to unite most of the continent under one political and economic system. Through the process of integration, a unified Europe has begun to emerge. Europe has a capital (Brussels), increasingly a common language (English), a developing legal system (the European Court of Justice), a common currency (the euro), popularly elected representatives (the European Parliament), a government (the European Commission), a foreign minister or secretary of state, (the European high representative), and a foreign diplomatic service with missions abroad (the European External Action Service). Europe has most of the trappings of a nascent state and as such is beginning to act like one.

Economically, the European Union has created a single economic space, which has broken down barriers not just to trade but also to the movement of people. The Berlin Wall came down 30 years ago, and since then, a new generation has grown up in a Europe united and largely without borders. They have been able to live, work, and study anywhere in Europe. European cities are now often multinational. Transportation sectors have become integrated, creating a plethora of inexpensive flights throughout the continent. By turning the continent into a single economic space, the European Union has begun to forge a common identity. European youth tend to be the most pro-EU population segment in polls and tend to identify as European. The formation of “Europe” and a “European identity” can certainly be overstated. But too often, the degree of change and transformation has been understated.

Too big to fail

The integration process has also, in effect, made the European Union “too big to fail.” The level of economic, social, cultural, and political integration is so substantial that the disintegration of the European Union would have devastating consequences for Europe and the globe. Nevertheless, despite the catastrophe that could unfold, the European Union can still certainly fail. The economic shock of the Great Recession, as well as the dramatic change brought about by integration, has led to a populist blowback against Brussels and the European Union, which now serves as a convenient scapegoat for nationalist politicians. While the European Union’s impact is significant and influential enough to foster a populist backlash, it still lacks the strength and the tools that a normal state possesses to address the social and economic issues that give rise to populist leaders and movements.

The European Union is stuck in an institutional purgatory. It is not yet a state, but it is more than an international organization. Internal friction over roles and responsibilities between the European Union’s federal institutions—the European Commission and the European Parliament—and its intergovernmental institutions made up of member states—the European Council and Council of European Union—is not that dissimilar to the constitutional debates within the United States over the role of the federal government vis-a-vis America’s states. The process of integrating European states into a collective union has therefore been uneven and often the result of hard-forged compromises that form awkwardly structured institutions and procedures. Europe’s nation-states have ceded power and authority to a supranational body in a number of areas, such as trade, market regulations, monetary policy, and freedom of movement. Yet Europe’s nation-states retain control over critical areas such as fiscal policy as well as foreign and defense policy. Integrating in some areas but not in others has exposed vulnerabilities within the European Union and inhibited the ability of it to play a more prominent global role. This has put the European Union at a crossroads.

Politically, European integration has also created an opening for right-wing nationalists or populists to decry the loss of national control and to use the European Union as a scapegoat…

Economically, the European Union has a monetary policy with the euro currency and the ECB but not a fiscal policy, as the European Commission lacks a significant budget or control over taxation; that remains the purview of member states. The common currency has helped accelerate integration but also represents Europe’s greatest structural weakness. The euro was not accompanied by an integration of fiscal policy or fiscal transfers to address the divergence among EU member states’ economies. While Americans tend to see Europe through a domestic lens as being a bastion of progressive economic policy, the European Union has in fact been a force for economic liberalization, breaking down market barriers, removing economic impediments to trade, and forging a common market. Through its common currency, the European Union has been a force for austerity and deflationary economics, locking its economies in a budgetary pact that prevents states from fiscally stimulating their economies during economic downturns.

The governance of the euro has largely reflected the interests of the largest European economic power, Germany, which adheres to a highly conservative economic approach. The euro has in effect served to depreciate Germany’s currency and boost its exports. If Germany was still using the deutsche mark, its currency would be valued much higher than with the euro, making German exports much more expensive. Germany’s export-led growth is possible because of the euro. In other words, northern Europe has benefited from gaining a large market—Europe—for its goods, all the while enjoying a currency that is lower in value than it would be if these countries maintained national currencies, making their exports much cheaper and more competitive.

Meanwhile, Southern European countries are struggling with having an inflated currency relative to their economic situation, hurting their ability to export. Additionally, the 19 EU member states that use the euro have lost the ability to stimulate their economies through expansionary fiscal policy. The European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact obligates states to limit deficit spending and not run a deficit more than 3 percent of GDP. While the same is true for states in the United States, the U.S. government usually steps in to provide fiscal stimulus in times of recession. Yet the European Union is not empowered nor able to do that. As a result, member states undergoing an economic recession are unable to depreciate their currencies and unable to boost growth through fiscal policy. The euro and the European Union have therefore created a deflationary trap for many of its members. As Hans Kundnani explains in his book The Paradox of German Power, “Germany’s rhetoric focuses on stability … [but] when Germany talks about stability it means price stability and nothing else. In fact, in attempting to export its ‘stability culture,’ Germany has in a broader sense created instability.” There have therefore been stark divergences in economic performance between Europe’s north and south. This has plunged many Southern European economies into a deep recession, while depriving them the means, namely economic stimulus or currency depreciation, to escape.

This has prompted many economists to describe the euro as a huge mistake that has hurt Europe’s economic growth, helped give rise to populist leaders, and continues to pose a real threat to its economic future. While this view misses the significant political and cultural benefits in having a common currency, there is a real need for the European Union and members in the eurozone to address the structural weaknesses and encourage growth.

The European Union is therefore quite vulnerable should another economic crisis hit. The economic situation in Italy, the third-largest economy in the eurozone, remains sclerotic, with Italian debt levels now exceeding 130 percent of GDP—the highest since the 1940s. Meanwhile, Italy’s political instability raises fears of another Greek-style debt crisis, but this time with an economy 10 times the size. Another economic downturn could therefore pose a significant threat to the stability of the euro and the European Union—and, by extension, the global economy. Currently, the spread in bond rates on government debt vary considerably across the eurozone, with negative interest rates on German debt—meaning the creditor actually has to pay Germany to buy its debt—while in Italy, bond rates are rising. This divergence could lead to contagion and potentially a bank run in a crisis, with money fleeing risky Italian banks for safer European banks, as took place in Greece. Yet the European Union possesses essentially the same limited tools to combat a crisis as it did after the last crisis. As Kundnani explains, Germany’s “ongoing reticence about the extent to which it will accept mutualization of European debt … has created a climate of uncertainty. Thus one might almost speak of a German ‘instability culture’.”

Politically, European integration has also created an opening for right-wing nationalists or populists to decry the loss of national control and to use the European Union as a scapegoat for failing to restrict migration, undermining national culture, and creating a massive bureaucracy in Brussels. In Europe, politicians lambasting Brussels is now as ubiquitous as American politicians castigating Washington.

Nevertheless, the May 2019 European Parliament elections have shown that Europe’s political center of gravity is shifting from national capitals to Brussels and the European Union. The EU parliamentary elections, the lone EU institution with direct voter participation, saw turnout rise for the first time ever, surpassing 50 percent. The boost was driven by a highly charged debate about the European Union’s future, pitting far-right nationalists looking to devolve power against unionists looking to strengthen it. In the end, a robust showing from pro-EU parties, particularly the Greens, staved off a feared far-right surge. As The Washington Post columnist Anne Applebaum observed following the elections, “the continent is becoming a single political space.”

Ironically, Brexit seems to have strengthened support for the European Union. Through the chaotic Brexit process, it has become readily apparent how interconnected the United Kingdom is to Europe and how disentangling from it has the potential for massive economic, political, and social disruption. In other words, the costs of disintegration of the European Union are now too high to contemplate for other European states. The aftermath of Brexit has also showed the political strength of the European Union. The Brexit vote brought fears of a great unraveling and a sense that the European Union was facing imminent demise, as more countries could seek to emulate the United Kingdom and leave the European Union. Yet the doom and gloom was wrong. Emmanuel Macron’s campaign for the French presidency in 2017 ran on a pro-EU message and populist leaders, such as Matteo Salvini in Italy, have downplayed the notion that they would move to leave the European Union once elected. Additionally, the unity that the European Union showed in the Brexit negotiations with the United Kingdom, with the European Union acting as a cohesive bloc, meant that the United Kingdom capitulated throughout the negotiating process. EU leaders were committed to driving a hard bargain in part to make clear that leaving the European Union has costs. Whereas in 2016, there were at least 15 political parties across Europe campaigning for a referendum to leave the European Union, today, as Susi Dennison of the European Council on Foreign Relations points out, “that message is practically nonexistent.” Instead, she says, “in an ironic twist, nationalist parties are joining hands across the EU … demanding a ‘Common-Sense Europe’: not the end of the European Union but a changed European Union.”

The European Union has thus shown its resilience. Despite a massive economic recession, threats to the common currency, a migrant crisis, democratic backsliding, and the impending departure of an important member, the European Union has forged on. It has shown its strength and its importance, and those predicting the European Union’s imminent collapse have been proven wrong. Yet the past decade has taken a toll on the European Union. Political forces seeking to weaken it have grown, and the European Union’s structural weaknesses have not been adequately addressed in the decades since the economic crisis. Additionally, far-right populists, now more of a political force, maybe able to block or stymie actions to address the crisis, hoping to exploit the crisis to attack the European Union and improve their political position. There are therefore still clear reasons for the United States to fret about the European Union’s stability.

Missing foreign and defense policy

The simple survival of the European Union is not America’s only goal. The question for the United States is whether the European Union can continue to forge on with integration and become a more prominent global actor.

Europe is tremendously powerful when it operates as one bloc, as demonstrated during the Brexit negotiations. Yet foreign and defense policy remains largely the domain of the member states, hindering the development of a common foreign and security policy. This area remains among the least-integrated aspects of the European Union and represents a final frontier for European integration.

The European Union has taken important steps to become a more cohesive actor on the global stage. In 2007, it ratified the Lisbon Treaty, which created the position of European high representative—equivalent to the role of secretary of state or foreign minister—as well as a diplomatic foreign service, the European External Action Service, designed to represent EU interests abroad. These actions have made the European Union a more cohesive actor, enabling it to play a bigger role on the world’s stage. EU High Representative Mogherini played an important role in the Iran negotiations and negotiations over the Paris climate talks, and EU sanctions against Russia had a significant impact.

While Europe has failed to fully fill the global leadership void left by the Trump administration, it has worked to bolster the international order in America’s absence. The European Union has sought to keep the Iran deal alive over Washington’s objections. It has pushed forward on climate change, advancing implementation of the Paris climate agreement. It has picked up the remnants of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was rejected by the Republican-controlled Congress at the end of the Obama administration, by striking trade deals with Canada, Mexico, and Japan. It has led the way in addressing the harm caused by social media companies, making Brussels the epicenter for tech regulation.

However, the European Union’s role in foreign policy remains quite limited and complicated by member states. Unlike in trade policy where the European Union makes decisions through qualified majority vote, foreign and security policy require consensus.

The expansion of the European Union to incorporate former Warsaw Pact members has brought EU membership up to 28 members. Expansion has given the European Union a continental scale—more than 500 million inhabitants, the third-largest population in the world after China and India. The European Union has the second-largest economy in the world in nominal terms. Yet this expansion to 28 member nations and 24 official languages, although English has effectively become Europe’s common language, has created difficulties for the European Union in moving forward with a unified agenda and approach. It is much more difficult to herd 28 members compared with the 12 members of the European Economic Community of the 1980s. This creates a structural impediment to the European Union acting forcefully in foreign affairs, as a single member can block action. In response, the European Commission has recently proposed an expansion of qualified majority voting to foreign policy, which would enable a vote to pass with 55 percent of the member states and 65 percent of the population. Nevertheless, the current need for unanimity among member states creates a real impediment to the European Union acting as one in global affairs.

Meanwhile, the European Union has also made very little progress integrating defense capabilities. Even with Europe’s current low military spending, it has the potential to be a military power. Collectively, European forces can, on paper, bring to bear conventional combat power comparable to Russia’s. However, the disposition and disorganization of its forces—spread across 28 countries with duplicating or mismatched capabilities—mean Europe’s collective military strength is less than the sum of its parts. Europe’s defense industrial base remains largely segmented along national lines and has not witnessed the level of integration seen in other economic sectors. The integration of European defense capabilities through the European Union has been a major redline for the United States, as noted earlier, as it fears the European Union duplicating and supplanting NATO. The European Union’s efforts throughout the 2000s to create a European Rapid Operational Force never got off the ground, and efforts to rationalize and coordinate defense research and development, as well as procurement, have remained extremely limited. Nevertheless, the European Union has emerged as a defense actor, all be it in a limited manner. It has deployed peacekeeping forces to the Balkans and to the Central African Republic and Mali and contributed naval assets through Operation Atalanta to the counterpiracy campaign off the coast of Somalia.

Those who express fears that integrating defense would make it impossible for the European Union to deploy forces abroad rightly note that unanimity of decision-making is a real obstacle. But they also overlook that deployments on the European Union level spread the risk and reduce the potential ownership and the political cost for national politicians making deployment decisions. Voting to approve an EU deployment likely has a lower threshold for national governments than approving the deployment of member states’ own forces. Broadening the costs and risks could in fact reduce Europe’s reticence to act.

The EU paradox

The European Union remains a paradox. It is stronger and more legitimate than its critics give it credit for, yet it remains a young and convoluted political system, with its integration uneven. Therefore, it remains at risk of unraveling, like any nascent governing system. Its future direction is thus highly uncertain. Does the European Union move toward operating more as a state? Does it remain stuck in a state of institutional purgatory? Or does the European Union regress, ceding authority back to the nation-states or unravel completely?

The rise of populist politicians and parties portends an increasingly divisive and partisan political environment within Europe, more akin to the hyperpartisanship in the United States. The European Union was largely a nonpartisan topic in most European states with the center-left and center-right largely committed to European integration. Going forward, future integration efforts will be contested and challenged by empowered populists. Additionally, there is now a conservative view, embodied by Angela Merkel’s Germany, that is content with Europe’s status quo. As The Guardian columnist Timothy Garton Ash identified, “There is now a realistic, even conservative (with a small c) argument for maintaining what has already been built – which, of course, necessarily also means reforming it. If we merely preserved for the next 30 years today’s EU, at its current levels of freedom, prosperity, security and cooperation, that would already be an astonishing achievement.”

Nevertheless, the logic of integration, and European federalism, remains. Brussels will continue to push to address the European Union’s weaknesses, gain greater responsibility, and integrate further. The European Union, as the history of European integration has shown, will likely slowly but surely make advances and integrate further. However, time is of the essence; Europe is once again a major geopolitical theater for great power competition, and America’s rivals are seeking to divide it.

Europe’s renewed geopolitical centrality in an era of great power competition

In turning away from Europe in the 2000s, America assumed Europe was fading into geopolitical irrelevance. The president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haass, wrote in The Washington Post in 2011, “Europe, the principal arena of much 20th-century geopolitical competition, will be spared such a role in the new century. … In the coming decades, Europe’s influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply limited, and it is in other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined.” Professor Walter Russell Mead concluded recently that “the most consequential historical shift of the last 100 years continues: the decline of Europe as a force in world affairs.” And foreign affairs commentator Fareed Zakaria observed, “We are watching the shriveling of a group of nations that have defined and dominated the international stage since the 17th century. Brexit will only accelerate this sad slide.” Europe’s departure from the geopolitical stage is indeed a historical aberration. But the view, articulated by Haass, that the 21st century would be “defined” elsewhere may be mistaken. Europe, once again, is geopolitically pivotal. Whether or not the continent steps back out onto the world’s stage could define the current geopolitical era.

Europe is a potential power. As the director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, Mark Leonard, and former Swedish prime minister, Carl Bildt, assess, “Collectively, the EU’s member states have: the biggest single market in the world; higher defence spending than any power but the US; the world’s largest diplomatic corps; and the highest levels of development spending.” Europe is also technologically advanced; has a wealthy and well-educated population; and lacks the socio-economic inequality infecting the United States and many autocratic countries. It has well-developed and extensive relationships with countries all over the globe—in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. It has the ability to drive global policy and set international norms, such as it has on climate and technology. But, as Leonard and Bildt conclude, “unless Europeans can leverage their collective potential – through the EU or other mechanisms – these impressive facts will mean little.”

It is precisely because Europe has such tremendous latent economic, political, and even military power potential that its future course and direction will be crucial to determining whether the 21st century is a democratic century. The European Union represents a model for the success of democracy, social market economies, and open societies. This is akin to how the power of America’s image—as a beacon of freedom and democracy—has served at points throughout history as motivation to those seeking freedom. The European Union also has been an inspirational model. The allure of closer relations with the European Union was enough to inspire people in Kyiv to take to Maidan Square. European Union membership remains a tremendous carrot for states on its periphery and perspective members to stay on the democratic path. Additionally, the example of the European Union shows how war-torn societies of different nationalities can overcome their differences to live, work, and govern in peace and prosperity. The European Union also demonstrates what can be accomplished when states work together, enabling it to be a powerful force for regional and international cooperation. Furthermore, the European Union does not just support multilateral approaches to address global problems, but it also serves as a real-world example of a multilateral approach to address a global problem—what to do with a war-ravaged continent whose nation-states can’t stop fighting one another. Therefore, the European Union is extremely deft in engaging in international processes, possessing the tact and patience that America sometimes lacks. Zakaria further explains that in an era of geopolitical competition, Europe “could play a crucial role in helping to preserve the rules, norms and values that have been built up since 1945. But Europe would need to harness its power and act with purpose.”

A Europe that acts as one could be a strong voice in international affairs, not just as a key ally of the United States but as a crucial bulwark against China and Russia. As a result, China and Russia are working to keep Europe down—divided and weakened—and to build ties with select European states to block and stymie Europe from acting as one. Europe is once again geopolitically contested and is now a key theater in this new geopolitical era.

The rise of China and the resurgence of Russia, as well as the emboldening of strongman autocrats around the world, have created not just a renewed geopolitical challenge to the United States but also an ideological challenge to liberal democracy. Should the United States decide to mobilize to respond to this geopolitical and ideological challenge after the Trump administration, it will need to turn to its democratic allies in both Europe and Asia and seek to rebuild and solidify its relationships and alliances. In a 2018 Center for American Progress report, the authors identified the need for the United States to pursue a “democracy rebalance” to focus on building and cementing ties with America’s democratic allies. The logic is that the stronger America’s democratic alliances are, the stronger the United States will be. To ensure that the 21st century continues to be a democratic age, America will not simply need to pursue a foreign policy that aligns with its democratic values; it will also need partners. And Europe will be the most critical partner. A strong, united, democratic Europe assertively engaging the world would be a huge boon to the United States and huge blow to its autocratic adversaries. Put simply, America needs Europe to rise and its adversaries to become weaker.

China and Russia understand that and are engaging to deliberately weaken and divide Europe. Both Russia and China prefer to deal with European countries on a national level, where they have more leeway to cut political and economic deals. Russia and China also recognize that an increasingly integrated and united European Union would represent a strong pillar in the liberal global order. As Leonard and Bildt, explain, “Great power competition is … increasingly splitting the EU itself. Russia, China, and the US routinely exploit splits between EU member states and have become adept at watering down or blocking EU decisions.”

Russia

For the Kremlin, the European Union poses a distinct challenge. The success and appeal of the European Union is a potential threat to the Kremlin and the survival of the Vladimir Putin regime. The decision over whether to enter an economic association agreement with the European Union instigated the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, as then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to align with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union led to thousands taking to the streets and, ultimately, the collapse of the Yanukovych government. For the Kremlin, if the appeal of the European Union can spawn revolution in Kyiv, then why not in Moscow?

Prior to 2014, Europe did not have a unified approach toward Russia. Generally, Eastern European nations had a highly antagonistic relationship with the Kremlin and wanted policies to contain and confront Russia, while most Western European nations were either ambivalent or sought to engage with the Kremlin. Russia took advantage of this internal division by developing its economic ties with countries such as Italy and Germany. Russia exploited Europe’s openness to cooperation and the its tendency to see foreign relations through an economic lens. Far from reforming and liberalizing Russia, as the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Kremlin Playbook documents, economic engagement enabled the Kremlin to utilize its businessmen and commercial enterprises as tools of the state to gain access and influence. For instance, Russia pursued gas pipeline deals such as the Nord Stream 2 with Germany, which would allow Russia to transport natural gas direct to Western Europe. This would enable Russia to bypass its immediate EU neighbors, giving it leverage to cut off gas supplies to these dependent countries. Russia also cut energy deals with Italy and sought to build close commercial ties. Russian oligarchs bought up real estate in London and set up lobby groups to push for warm relations with Moscow. However, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, Europe awoke to the threat and united in enacting sanctions. Despite fears in Washington that the European Union would not renew sanctions, which have to be approved every six months, the sanctions remain in place.

Russia, in response, has ramped up its efforts to sow discord in European politics. The Kremlin provided financing to support far-right parties, such as Marie Le Pen’s National Front, now the National Rally. It also hacked the Macron campaign and released emails and documents just before the election. In addition, the Kremlin hacked the German parliament, the Bundestag, and aggressively spreads disinformation, conspiracy theories, and propaganda that undermine the European Union and the trans-Atlantic alliance.

China

While Russian influence and interference efforts have at times been quite blunt, China’s attempts have been more subtle yet are just as transparent. Beijing, like Moscow, has sought to divide the European Union.

Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China is seeking to heavily invest and buy up critical European infrastructure, giving it potentially significant leverage over certain EU member states. The Chinese have created a dialogue with smaller central and Eastern European nations, including 11 EU members, such as Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as non-EU Balkan states, such as Serbia. China deliberately left out major European nations, such as Germany and France. The purpose is straightforward: build political and economic ties with some of the smaller EU members with the goal of using these countries as Trojan horses within the European Union to block efforts that China opposes. In particular, China has sought to take advantage of EU members that are struggling economically and are desperate for investment. These efforts already started paying off in 2016, when Hungary and Greece —both eager recipients of Chinese investment—watered down EU efforts to condemn Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Moreover, as the Center for a New American Security’s Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Rachel Rizzo noted, Beijing has been looking to Europe for support during the Hong Kong protests: “There’s a reason China thinks Europe might be persuaded. … European leaders remain convinced they can uphold the values and norms they share with Washington while benefitting economically from greater engagement with China. This stance is short-sighted and dangerous—putting liberal democracy in peril.”

A report from the Global Public Policy Institute and Mercator Institute for China Studies found that “Beijing realized early on that dividing the US and the EU would be crucial to isolating the US, countering Western influence more broadly, and expanding its own global reach. China senses that a window of opportunity to pursue its goals has opened, with the Trump administration seen as withdrawing from the role as guardian of the liberal international order that the US has long played.” In addition to investing in infrastructure in Europe’s fragile and investment-desperate economies on its periphery, such as Greece, China is also focused on Brussels. “In Europe,” the report concludes, Chinese influence “efforts particularly target Brussels as Beijing aims to implant its official views where EU decision-making takes place.”

China and Russia are both focused on Brussels, but the United States is not. Chinese and Russian efforts to divide the European Union should send a signal to Washington that it should reverse course and pursue a strong, cohesive, and empowered European Union. Furthermore, by focusing predominantly on the military aspect of the alliance, NATO, the United States has lost sight that the key arena for geopolitical competition may not be a battlefield but rather the political or economic areas.

Why the European Union’s unraveling is a geopolitical disaster for the United States The Guardian’s Timothy Garton Ash observed, “Each time, the new post-war European order lasts a while – sometimes shorter, sometimes longer – but gradually frays at the edges, with tectonic tensions building up under the surface, until it finally breaks apart in a new time of troubles. No European settlement, order, empire, commonwealth, res publica, Reich, concert, entente, axis, alliance, coalition or union lasts forever.” Historically, a divided Europe has often quickly led to a Europe in conflict. More immediately, however, the collapse or unraveling of the European Union would have devastating economic consequences for the United States and the world. The European Union is the second-largest economy and America’s largest trading partner. The collapse of the euro currency would create a systemic economic shock, roiling the global economy and financial markets. The unraveling of the European Union would also mean the collapse of the common market, which would cause an economic calamity as European governments seek to reerect borders, tariffs, and other barriers to trade and commerce within the European Union. A Europe without a union would also make it open season for external actors to cut economic and political agreements with individual European states. This could potentially deprive the United States of reliable allies, undercut NATO, and create a dizzying array of alliances similar to Europe prior to World War I. The European Union’s collapse would return Europe back to its normal historic state: a continent divided along national, ethnic, and religious lines, where escalating tensions and divisions create an unsettled balance of power, creating stark security dilemmas for each nation-state. The European Union’s unraveling would therefore make Europe a poorer, less secure, more tense region that would once again consume American foreign policy.

Reviving the trans-Atlantic alliance requires a new American approach

America faces a conundrum: It needs to revive the trans-Atlantic alliance and ensure European unity in order to address the rising geopolitical challenge from China and Russia. But the question of how to revive the alliance is less certain. America needs Europe to step up. But this is no longer about Europe “pulling its weight” or “reducing the burden” on America globally. The need is more urgent. America now needs Europe—not just to share America’s global burden, but also to help it counter autocratic efforts to set the rules of the international road. America, as former Deputy Secretary of State William Burns explains in his memoir, is no longer as powerful as it once was. The power and influence of other states have grown, and therefore, America’s international clout and influence have been in a state of relative decline. America therefore needs allies now more than at any time since World War II.

But getting Europe to finally realize its potential power is a conundrum. An American strategy aimed at convincing European states to act, as noted previously, is destined to disappoint. Furthermore, a new American administration after President Trump will likely find a Europe eager to partner and repair relations but conversely feeling little incentive to do anything. After all, if America is back, why does Europe need to assert itself? If European states, following Trump’s election were not going to step into the leadership void or spend more on defense or assert their strategic autonomy from the United States, they certainly are not going to do so after Trump leaves the stage. The incentives for European states to act will be gone.

Considering the fact that U.S. foreign policy efforts to undermine the international order are also harmful to American security, Europe’s ability to blunt harmful approaches pursued by the American right is, in fact, beneficial for the United States and the world.

Yet the European Union will continue to seek a greater international role. As noted, the European Union remains stuck in institutional purgatory—often unable to act despite a willingness to do so. Unlike Berlin, Brussels wants to assert itself internationally. There is now a vibrant discussion within the European Union on the need for “strategic autonomy” but, thus far, such a debate has remained largely rhetorical with little tangible progress. This is due in no small measure to the United States’ continued opposition to the European Union adopting a more prominent role in foreign and security policy. As Benjamin Haddad and Alina Polyakova explain in a Foreign Affairs article, the United States should “support and encourage European autonomy in the right direction.”

Many on the American right view the European Union as serving as a potential impediment to American global objectives, and some even see it as a potential adversary—including those in the current administration. There is no doubt that a united and more assertive European voice in global affairs could clash with American objectives and efforts. The United States and the European Union will not always see eye to eye. But these cases often occur when the American right pursues an extremely ill-advised foreign policy course, such as pulling out of the Iran nuclear agreement, invading Iraq, or withdrawing or blocking international treaties and agreements, including on climate change or arms control. In short, when America pursues counterproductive policies that serve to undermine the liberal international order, erode international norms, destabilize regions, and endanger the planet, Europe will likely strongly oppose those efforts. Considering the fact that U.S. foreign policy efforts to undermine the international order are also harmful to American security, Europe’s ability to blunt harmful approaches pursued by the American right is, in fact, beneficial for the United States and the world.

America’s best bet for reviving Europe as a pivotal geopolitical ally is embracing the European Union. It is time for America to pivot away from a state-centric approach and toward engaging the European Union. America should seek to use its influence and clout to free the European Union from its institutional purgatory, especially on foreign and security policy. America should once again become the major champion for European integration and should push for the European Union to assert itself globally. The course and direction sought by the European Union is the v