Overview

Influenza pandemics are a natural phenomenon that have occurred from time to time for centuries – including 3 times during the 20th century. They present a real and daunting challenge to the economic and social wellbeing of any country, as well as a serious risk to the health of its population.

There are important differences between ‘ordinary’ seasonal flu and pandemic flu. These differences explain why we regard pandemic flu as such a serious threat.

Pandemic influenza is one of the most severe natural challenges likely to affect the UK, but sensible and proportionate preparation and collective action by the government, essential services, businesses, the media, other public, private and voluntary organisations and communities can help to mitigate its effects.

Inter-pandemic years provide a very important opportunity to develop and strengthen our preparations for the potentially devastating impact of an influenza pandemic, and the government will continue to take every practical step to prepare for and mitigate its health and wider socio-economic effects.

The Department of Health ( DH ) is the lead department for planning for a human influenza pandemic. However, given the wide impacts of a pandemic all government departments are involved in planning to mitigate its impacts.

This guide brings together available information on a possible influenza pandemic in order to support planning at all levels of society.

However well developed, plans are unlikely to be successful without the active support of individuals and communities. Therefore, a key part of the response will be to encourage the public to follow government advice and adopt basic hygiene measures to manage or reduce their own risk of catching or spreading the virus. Ensuring that all of us are fully aware of the necessary precautionary and response measures, are prepared to cooperate actively with them and accept responsibility for helping themselves and others must therefore be an integral part of our overall preparedness strategy.

Pandemic flu: description of the risk

Cause of pandemics

Pandemic influenza emerges as a result of a new flu virus which is markedly different from recently circulating strains. Few - if any - people will have any immunity to this new virus thus allowing it to spread easily and to cause more serious illness. The conditions that allow a new virus to develop and spread continue to exist, and some features of modern society, such as air travel, could accelerate the rate of spread. Experts therefore agree that there is a high probability of a pandemic occurring, although the timing and impact are impossible to predict. The H1N1(2009) pandemic does not lessen the probability of a further pandemic in the near future, and should not be seen as representative of future pandemics.

Impacts of a pandemic

Past pandemics have varied in scale, severity and consequence, although in general their impact has been much greater than that of even the most severe winter ‘epidemic’.

Each pandemic is different and, until the virus starts circulating, it is impossible to predict its full effects. As such, it is impossible to forecast the precise characteristics, spread and impact of a new influenza virus strain, however, based on historical information and scientific evidence we are able to predict the possible impacts:

Many millions of people around the world will become infected, up to around 50% become ill with symptoms and a variable proportion die from the disease itself or from complications such as pneumonia.

In the UK, up to one half of the population may become infected and between 20,000 and 750,000 additional deaths (that is deaths that would not have happened over the same period of time had a pandemic not taken place) may have occurred by the end of a pandemic in the UK.

In the absence of early or effective interventions, society is also likely to face social and economic disruption, significant threats to the continuity of essential services, lower production levels, shortages and distribution difficulties. Individual organisations may also suffer from the pandemic’s impact on business and services.

Large numbers of staff are likely to be absent from work at any one time.

More information on the challenges posed by an influenza pandemic, and the planning assumptions for pandemic preparedness can be found at: UK influenza pandemic preparedness strategy and analysis of the scientific evidence base.

The World Health Organization ( WHO ) Global Influenza Surveillance Network, comprising 105 countries, acts as a global alert mechanism, monitoring circulating influenza viruses in order to detect the emergence of those with pandemic potential.

Further information on WHO flu preparations, including an assessment of influenza at the human-animal interface.

UK influenza pandemic preparedness strategy 2011

The UK influenza pandemic preparedness strategy is aimed at guiding and supporting integrated contingency planning and preparations for pandemic influenza in health and social care organisations and more widely across government and public and private sector organisations. It provides information on the likely impact of an influenza pandemic and sets out some of the key assumptions for use in response planning.

Additionally, it describes the government’s strategic approach to responding to a pandemic and the arrangements within which organisations responsible for planning, delivering or supporting local responses should develop and maintain integrated operational arrangements.

The UK influenza pandemic preparedness strategy builds upon but supersedes the approach set out in the 2007 national framework for responding to an influenza pandemic (and the Scottish equivalent), taking account of the experience and lessons learned in the H1N1(2009) influenza pandemic and the latest scientific evidence.

An overview of the science underpinning the proposals in the strategy has also been published.

International guidance

The UK strategy with regards to international preparedness is covered in the UK influenza pandemic preparedness strategy 2011. This supersedes the UK international preparedness strategy.

WHO global influenza preparedness plan

WHO has developed a global influenza preparedness plan (pdf), which defines the responsibilities of WHO and national authorities in case of an influenza pandemic. This plan incorporates new scientific data and experience obtained during recent outbreaks that had pandemic potential. WHO also offers guidance tools and training to assist in the development of national pandemic preparedness plans.

Further information on the work of WHO with regard to pandemic influenza, including detail of the pandemic influenza preparedness plan, is also available.

Fact sheet for British nationals overseas

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office ( FCO ) has produced a travel advice fact sheet for British nationals overseas. It describes sensible precautions for travellers and residents in affected areas, both in respect of avian influenza, and a possible future human flu pandemic. It also sets out the measures taken by FCO and its diplomatic posts abroad (embassies, consulates and high commissions) in response to these concerns.

Guidance for local planners

The Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat has produced a guidance document for local planners in England and Wales, as part of its role in providing leadership and guidance to the resilience community and in supporting the Department of Health, as lead department, in preparing and planning for a possible influenza pandemic. The guidance supersedes the earlier Cabinet Office documents ‘Preparing for Pandemic Influenza – Guidance to Local Planners’, and ‘Preparing for Pandemic Influenza – supplementary guidance for Local Resilience Forum Planners’ (and Welsh equivalent).

Pandemic Influenza LRF Guidance ( PDF , 688KB, 37 pages)

The primary aim of the updated document is to support the UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011 published by the Department for Health, to provide local planners with additional guidance and information to support the development of local level, multi-agency plans.

Local planners may also wish to refer to sector specific guidance in the development of their plans, including guidance aimed at the health and social care sectors, education, or guidance aimed at those responsible for the management of excess deaths. Further information on sector specific guidance can be found at in the sector-specific guidance section.

Generic guidance for businesses can also be found at the workplace/business guidance section. In addition, the following resources may be of assistance:

National planning assumptions assessments tool

To assist local planners in their planning and preparations for an influenza pandemic, central government has developed the National Planning Assumptions Assessments Tool to facilitate the application of national planning assumptions to the local setting.

Faith communities and pandemic flu

If an influenza pandemic happens in the UK, everyone will need to play a part in managing how it affects our society. This booklet explains how faith communities can play a part in protecting themselves and others, and how they can help face the challenge should an influenza pandemic occur in the UK.

Sector-specific guidance

Health and social care

UK health and social care services will be at the forefront of the response to an influenza pandemic coming under, at times, extraordinary strain. The Department of Health produces a number of guidance documents for the health and social care sectors. This includes Health and Social Care Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response. This guidance for health and social care workers is intended to support local preparedness and response planning in England.

Further guidance documents for the health and social care sector include:

Pandemic flu: managing demand and capacity in health care organisations

Pandemic influenza: guidance on preparing mental health services in England

Management of deaths

Scientific modelling estimates that the UK could experience up to 750,000 additional deaths over the course of a pandemic. These figures might be expected to be reduced by the impact of countermeasures, but the effectiveness of such mitigation is not certain. The combination of particularly high attack rates and severe disease, resulting in this deaths figure, is also relatively (but unquantifiably) improbable.

Taking account of this, and the practicality of different levels of response, when planning for excess deaths, local planners have been set the target of preparing to extend capacity on a precautionary but reasonably practicable basis, and aim to cope with a population mortality rate of up to 210,000 to 315,000 additional deaths, possibly over as little as a 15 week period and perhaps half of these over 3 weeks at the height of the outbreak.

These increases to the numbers of natural deaths in a potentially short period of time will place considerable pressure on local service providers. It is therefore essential that local authorities, Local Resilience Forums and other service providers (any private or public organisations involved in the management of deaths) develop plans for this eventuality. More extreme circumstances would require the local response being combined with facilitation or other support at a national level. The existing guidance consists of:

A framework for planners preparing to manage deaths

The guidance Planning for a possible influenza pandemic – a framework for planners preparing to manage deaths offers advice to local authorities and service providers who are responsible for producing and maintaining emergency and business continuity plans associated in the management of excess deaths.

Guidance on the management of death certification and cremation certification

The Department of Health has published proposed changes to the procedures for death and cremation certification that could be used in a severe influenza pandemic, in order to enable doctors to spend as much time as possible on the care of the living, and to ensure that processes for death and cremation certification can be managed as effectively as possible during a pandemic.

Education/childcare

The Department for Education has produced a range of guidance documents in consultation with other government departments and various external bodies as part of the government’s co-ordinated efforts to encourage prudent planning across all sectors, supporting the Department of Health, as lead department, in preparing and planning for a possible pandemic. This guidance is currently under review and a link to revised guidance will be provided in the near future.

Judicial processes

The Justice system plays a key role in the maintenance of law and order and public confidence in and respect for democratic institutions, rights and responsibilities, the safety of individuals and the protection of property. It depends on the effective participation of numerous agencies and other participants, so planning is vital to ensure services can be maintained during periods of disruption. The establishment of contingency plans for responding to a flu pandemic in the justice system is part of the government’s wider pandemic planning.

The aim of the guidelines is to bring together assumptions and response strategies of the various agencies involved in the justice system in England & Wales. This will enable planners at different levels within agencies to check consistency of their pandemic flu plans with their agency’s national position, and also check that their plans take account of the positions being taken by other agencies and the needs of other stakeholders.

Workplace/business guidance

The Cabinet Office has published a Pandemic flu checklist for businesses to assist in developing and reviewing plans. It identifies important and specific activities which organisations can do to prepare for a pandemic.

Other relevant guidance includes:

Pandemic flu workplace guidance, Health and Safety Executive ( HSE )

Advice on working with influenza viruses, HSE

Pandemic flu plans

An effective response to a pandemic will require the cooperation of a wide range of organisations and the active support of the public. As there may be very little time to develop or finalise preparations, effective pre-planning is essential. Many important features of a pandemic will not become apparent until after it has started (ie when person-to-person transmission has become sustained), so plans must be:

constructed to deal with a wide range of possibilities

based on an integrated, multi-sector approach

built on effective service and business continuity arrangements

responsive to local challenges (eg rural issues) and needs

supported by strong local and national leadership

With this in mind pandemic preparedness plans from across the resilience sector can be viewed under the headings below:

Local plans

Critical sectors

Aims and objectives

The overall objectives of the UK’s approach to planning and preparing for an influenza pandemic are to:

minimise the potential health impacts of a future influenza pandemic by: supporting international efforts to detect its emergence, and early assessment of the virus by sharing scientific information promoting individual responsibility and action to reduce the spread of infection through good hygiene practices and uptake of seasonal influenza vaccination in high-risk groups ensuring the health and social care systems are ready to provide treatment and support for the large numbers likely to suffer from influenza or its complications whilst maintaining other essential care

minimise the potential impact of a pandemic on society and the economy by: supporting the continuity of essential services, including the supply of medicines, and protect critical national infrastructure as far as possible supporting the continuation of everyday activities as far as practicable upholding the rule of law and the democratic process preparing to cope with the possibility of significant numbers of additional deaths promoting a return to normality and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity

instil and maintain trust and confidence by ensuring that health and other professionals, the public and the media are engaged and well informed in advance of and throughout the pandemic period and that health and other professionals receive information and guidance in a timely way so they can respond to the public appropriately

Given the uncertainty about the scale, severity and pattern of development of any future pandemic, 3 key principles should underpin all pandemic preparedness and response activity:

Precautionary: the response to any new virus should take into account the risk that it could be severe in nature. Plans must therefore be in place for an influenza pandemic with the potential to cause severe symptoms in individuals and widespread disruption to society. Proportionality: the response to a pandemic should be no more and no less than that necessary in relation to the known risks. Plans therefore need to be in place not only for high impact pandemics, but also for milder scenarios, with the ability to adapt them as new evidence emerges. Flexibility: there will need to be local flexibility and agility in the timing of transition from one phase of response to another to take account of local patterns of spread of infection, within a consistent UK-wide approach to the response to a new pandemic, and accounting for the different healthcare systems in the 4 countries.

Local plans

implemented in a phased, sustainable and proportionate way which can be adapted to the characteristics of a pandemic

are based on the best available scientific evidence

build on the existing services, systems and processes of local responders, augmenting, adapting and complementing them as necessary to meet the unique challenges of a pandemic

can be understood by and acceptable to service providers and the general public

can be implemented in advance of a pandemic if this action has significant potential to mitigate the effects of a pandemic and, where possible, other threats or hazards

designed to promote the earliest possible return to normality

You can also find more detailed information about civil protection arrangements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the Devolved administrations section.

A number of Local Resilience Forum flu plans are hosted on local websites, or alternatively, are available on the National Resilience Extranet in a number of cases.

Critical sector plans

Private sector organisations are increasingly responsible for the provision of many essential services, including the manufacture, supply and distribution of items critical to the response to an influenza pandemic and to minimising its social and economic effects. Planning to ensure the maintenance of supplies and services for as long and as far as that is possible is an essential part of developing effective response arrangements. Sector-specific emergency arrangements to build resilience and develop effective response frameworks are already required, and plans are in place in most key sectors. Those frameworks should recognise the unique nature of the disruptive challenges that an influenza pandemic is likely to present. A wider community of industrial and commercial organisations also plays a direct role in maintaining social normality and will want to minimise potential losses from disruption to business and promote a return to normality as soon as possible.

Communications

Telecommunications

Recognising the impact on the service provision that a pandemic would bring (perhaps from increased rates of absenteeism) the telecommunications industry would respond to a crisis by seeking to limit the impact on services by prioritising fault repairs at the expense of routine maintenance and the provisioning of new services. New services provided during such a crisis would generally be restricted to urgent requests from emergency responders recognised as Category 1 and Category 2 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

Organisations planning to increase home working in a pandemic must talk to their telecommunications providers well in advance and will also need to ensure that they have the necessary hardware and software in place and appropriate arrangements to ensure support, oversight and audit of home workers.

NISCC - Good Practice Guide To Telecommunications Resilience ( PDF , 237KB, 35 pages)

Telecommunication support in an emergency ( PDF , 44.4KB, 3 pages)

Telecommunications Networks – a vital part of the Critical National Infrastructure ( PDF , 257KB, 33 pages)

Postal services

Although there may at some point be some degradation of postal services due to a high level of staff absence at the peak of a pandemic, a wide range of postal operators will ensure that the sector maintains priority delivery services and essential postal communications.Any reduction to Royal Mail services would be managed in accordance with a list of corporate priorities reviewed by Postcomm, the industry regulator, which focus on maintaining those services involving high social responsibility (for example, access to cash/benefits). Normal deliveries and collections would be maintained as far as possible with any necessary managed degradation (for example, the number of collections during the course of the day may be reduced but final collections would be carried out to ensure optimum workflow). Continued access to the Post Office network (for example, for cash and benefits) will be maintained, with any local disruptions managed through contingency arrangements.

Energy

The provision of energy (gas and electricity) depends, at a high level, on a number of elements:

the primary ‘production’ of the energy, such as by the power station or the gas field/terminal

the transmission of that energy nationally

the distribution of that energy locally

the supply of that energy to consumers

It’s possible, for an individual customer, that different companies may be responsible for each of these 4 elements in order to provide energy to that customers’ site. Therefore it requires a cross industry effort to ensure that planning for an emergency (such as a possible flu pandemic) is effective in terms of providing energy to customers. The energy sector, along with government, the regulator and the devolved administrations, has been working for sometime to ensure this cross-industry preparation (for a possible flu pandemic) is undertaken and kept under review.

The energy sector is planning to maintain supplies of gas and electricity at near-normal service levels during a pandemic. Whilst routine maintenance is likely to be afforded lower priority if there are staffing shortfalls, essential repairs will continue to be carried out. Similarly, planning by fuel suppliers is aimed at maintaining near-normal levels. In both cases there may be some service disruption if peak staff absences coincide with technical or weather-related supply difficulties, leading to potentially longer periods of service loss than would normally be expected, and imports from main overseas suppliers may also be disrupted.

Downstream Gas and Electricity National Emergency Plan (Incident Response Plan) ( PDF , 131KB, 21 pages)

DECC - Downstream oil resilience

Finance

Pandemic planning in this sector is being led and coordinated by the tripartite authorities (HM Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England), which share responsibility for maintaining financial stability in the UK. Planning – involving financial firms, infrastructure providers and overseas financial regulators – is advanced and has primarily focused on business continuity (ie maintaining core business activities whilst experiencing above-normal staff absence levels) and provision of basic services, such as cash circulation, banking and payment systems.

Overview of Financial Sector Pandemic Flu Planning ( PDF , 60.1KB, 8 pages)

Food

Companies across the food sector will work together through their representative organisations and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to maintain supplies as far as possible. However, at the peak of the pandemic, there may be a reduction in choice and accessibility if some local outlets close due to non-availability of staff.

British Retail Consortium's Guide for Retailers ( PDF , 15.7KB, 3 pages)

Retail Business Continuity Association's Pandemic Flu planning in the Retail Sector ( PDF , 329KB, 28 pages)

Transport

Public transport operators aim to run as near to normal services for as long and as far as that is possible during a pandemic and their plans provide for emergency timetables, redeploying staff and operating revised working (shift) patterns, if required. Although the government is not planning to impose closure of transport hubs/facilities in the UK, all sectors may experience operational difficulties when the pandemic virus is circulating and staff absence levels are significantly higher than normal. The aviation sector may also experience difficulties if non-UK airports or airlines have operational problems or stop operating.

ATOC/Network Rail Guidance Note - Contingency Planning Arrangements for a Flu Pandemic ( PDF , 207KB, 28 pages)

Confederation of Passenger Transport UK - Pandemic Flu Briefing ( PDF , 137KB, 18 pages)

Aviation Directorate Communicable Disease Contingency Plan ( PDF , 84.1KB, 18 pages)

Water

All water and sewerage companies have identified the minimum staffing levels required to maintain essential supply and sewerage operations, and have factored in potential staff absences in a pandemic scenario. As many key operations are automated, companies are confident that they will have sufficient staff to sustain these essential operations during a pandemic. Water companies have generic contingency plans for continuity of essential supplies. They have worked with suppliers and contractors to check preparedness arrangements, particularly in critical areas such as chemical supplies for water treatment.

Essential repairs to maintain water and sewage pipe work will continue, but staff shortages may reduce or halt non-essential work.

The Security and Emergency Measures Direction 1998 (SEMD) provides the legal framework within which water companies in England and Wales undertake planning for water and sewerage incidents and improve resilience of their infrastructure. In essence, it places a duty on such companies to have in place emergency plans, and in the eventuality of a incident, to make provisions for alternative water supplies, prioritising the vulnerable.

Water Industry Act 1991 - The Security and Emergency Measures (Water and Sewerage Undertakers) Direction 1998 ( PDF , 312KB, 4 pages)

Three Valleys Water - Pandemic Influenza Emergency Plan ( PDF , 456KB, 65 pages)

Sutton & East Surrey Water - Flu Pandemic Procedure ( PDF , 130KB, 8 pages)

Ethical framework

This section is to help people think about the ethical aspects of their decisions. It is for planners and strategic policy makers at national, regional and local level, both before and during a pandemic. It will also help clinicians and others (who will be guided by their own professional codes) in developing policies on clinical issues for use during a pandemic.

Although not designed to address individual clinical decision-making, clinicians and members of the public who want to think about the ethical implications of their actions during a pandemic might also refer to it.

Equal concern and respect is the fundamental principle that underpins the ethical framework. This means that:

everyone matters

everyone matters equally – but this does not mean that everyone is treated the same

the interests of each person are the concern of all of us, and of society

the harm that might be suffered by every person matters, and so minimising the harm that a pandemic might cause is a central concern

The ethical framework section was developed by the Committee on Ethical Aspects of Pandemic Influenza and first published in 2007. It was revised by the Department of Health and Social Care in 2017.

Using the framework

The principle of equal concern and respect draws together a number of different ethical principles.

When a particular decision has to be made, using the list of principles systematically as a checklist can help ensure that the full range of ethical issues is considered.

In thinking about the principles, decision-makers will need to use the best information that is available to them at the time (for example, about the likely effects of a particular decision). Whether or not a decision was ethically appropriate has to be judged in relation to the situation that existed at the time it was made, rather than by reference to facts that only became apparent at a later stage.

The individual principles

Sometimes, there will be tension both within and between these principles – in weighing different sorts of harm, and in trying both to minimise harm and to be fair.

There are often no absolute right answers. A judgement may have to be made on the priority to be given to each element of a principle (such as the potential impact of different types of harm) and to the principles themselves in the context of particular circumstances.

Sometimes, use of the first 7 principles may indicate that more than one possible decision would be ethically justifiable and would accord with the fundamental principle of equal concern and respect. In such a case, the principle of good decision-making should be used to decide which one to take.

Respect

This means:

keeping people as informed as possible

giving people the chance to express their views on matters that affect them

respecting people’s personal choices about their treatment and care

when people are not able to decide, those who have to decide for them take decisions based on the best interests of the person as a whole rather than just based on their health needs

There should be the widest possible involvement of people in planning for a pandemic. During a pandemic, the urgency of the situation may mean that it is not possible to consult widely (or indeed at all).

But treating people with respect means keeping them informed about what is happening and what is going to happen, as much as possible.

Communication will be needed on many different levels, from keeping the public informed as a whole, to a doctor discussing with one person how to treat that person’s health problem.

People’s choices about their treatment and care are very important. This does not mean that they are entitled to have treatment that those caring for them consider would not work or is not suitable for them. It may not be possible to provide all the treatment that people would like and that might benefit them.

Minimising the harm a pandemic could cause

During a pandemic, some harm is likely to be unavoidable. This principle means that there is a need to:

help other countries to fight a pandemic if it starts abroad, to stop it developing further and reaching this country

try to minimise the spread of a pandemic if it reaches this country

minimise the risk of complications if someone is ill, for example by the appropriate use of antiviral treatment

learn from experience both at home and abroad about the best way to fight the pandemic and to treat people who are ill

minimise the disruption to society caused by a pandemic

‘Harm’ is a broad concept and this principle is intended to cover the physical, psychological, social and economic harm that a pandemic might cause.

Examples of actions relevant to minimising harm include those that save lives, that support the health service in saving lives, and that are designed to ensure that society copes with and recovers from the pandemic.

Fairness

The principle of fairness means that:

everyone matters equally

people with an equal chance of benefiting from health or social care resources should have an equal chance of receiving them – however, it is not unfair to ask people to wait, if they could get the same benefit from an intervention at a later date

The implications of the principles of minimising harm, and fairness, arise in many planning and policy decisions.

So in considering a particular decision, a first question might be: How could harm be minimised? Then it is necessary to ask: Would it be fair to do this? Could the same outcome be achieved in a fairer way?

This involves thinking about the interests of everyone who may be affected by the decision. There need to be good reasons to treat some people differently from others, which the decision-maker should be prepared to explain.

Working together

This principle means:

working together to plan for, and respond to, a pandemic

helping one another

taking responsibility for our own behaviour, for example by not exposing others to risk

being prepared to share information (for example, on the effects of treatment) that will help others

Everyone will have a role in responding to the pandemic. This may include helping family and friends who become ill, helping in the local community if possible, and helping the UK to keep going by continuing to work and carry out day-to-day activities unless there is a reason not to (for example, when infectious).

Because a pandemic will affect the whole of society, it is important that the different public agencies, such as health and social care services and the voluntary sector, work together at both local and national level.

Similarly, there needs to be appropriate co-ordination between planning and response activities at national, regional and local level.

Health and social care staff will have particular roles to play in responding to the pandemic. This may mean using their skills where they are most needed, even though it may involve them acting outside their normal area of expertise.

Reciprocity

The principle of reciprocity is based on the concept of mutual exchange. Therefore, if people are asked to take increased risks, or face increased burdens, during a pandemic, they should be supported in doing so. The risks and burdens should be minimised as far as possible.

Some people, including health and social care staff, may face very heavy burdens in trying to help us through a pandemic. It is important to think about how to minimise those burdens.

Keeping things in proportion

This principle means that:

those responsible for providing information will neither exaggerate nor minimise the situation and will give people the most accurate information that they can

decisions on actions that may affect people’s daily lives, which are taken to protect the public from harm, will be proportionate to the risk and to the benefits that can be gained

At the start of a pandemic, much will remain unknown about how it is going to affect people and the country as a whole. However, things need to be kept in proportion.

The media and other people responsible for communications will have a role to play in ensuring that people know what the real situation is and what they need to do, without exaggerating or minimising the situation.

Flexibility

This principle means that:

plans will be adapted to take into account new information and changing circumstances

people will have as much chance as possible to express concerns about or disagreement with decisions that affect them

Good decision-making

Respect for this principle involves openness and transparency. This means those making the decisions will:

consult those concerned as much as possible in the time available

be open about what decisions need to be made and who is responsible for making them

be as open as possible about what decisions have been made and why they were made

Good decision-making is inclusive – this means that those making decisions will:

involve people as much as possible in aspects of planning that affect them

take into account all relevant views expressed

take into account any disproportionate impact of the decision on particular groups of people

try to ensure that no group is excluded from becoming involved

Some people find it harder to access communications or services than others, and decision-makers need to think about how these people can express their views and have a fair opportunity to get their needs for treatment or care met.

Good decisions are about being accountable. This means that those who make them are answerable for the decisions they do or do not take.

Good decisions involve reasonableness. This means they should be:

rational

based on evidence

the result of a process, taking into account how quickly a decision has to be made and the circumstances in which it is made

practical – what is decided should have a reasonable chance of working

Records should be kept of decisions taken and the justification for them.This matters for accountability, but such records can also help people learn from experience in order to respond to further pandemic waves, or to a different pandemic in the future.

Devolved administrations

The devolved administrations are responsible for the major areas of pandemic influenza planning and response in their respective countries.

This section provides information on pandemic flu preparedness arrangements in the devolved administrations.

Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland has an integrated system for the delivery of health and social services. The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety ( DHSSPS ) sets the strategic direction and allocates the annual budget for health and social care services. Responsibility for commissioning services, resource management, performance management and service improvement lies with the Health and Social Care Board. Responsibility for delivery of services lies with 5 Health and Social Care Trusts, which currently provide hospital-based services and community services, and a single ambulance trust for the region.

The Public Health Agency has responsibility for health protection, screening, health improvement and development to improve overall public health and address existing health inequalities. DHSSPS takes the lead in regional contingency planning for pandemic influenza and is represented in national UK pandemic planning structures by its senior medical officer. Pandemic planning work is progressed through a Regional Pandemic Flu Steering Group. Each Health and Social Care Trust has identified ‘flu leads’, who oversee planning for their respective organisation.

The Northern Ireland Contingency Plan for Health Response for an Influenza Pandemic outlines the strategic approach to and preparations for an influenza pandemic. It provides general information on the likely impact and sets out some of the key assumptions for use in response planning. This plan is currently being updated to reflect the UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011. Information on pandemic influenza planning including the Northern Ireland Contingency Plan for Health Response for an Influenza Pandemic can be found on the NI Direct website.

The Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), through its Civil Contingencies Policy Branch (CCPB), is responsible for co-ordinating the non-health preparedness of the NI departments and their associated sectors for an Influenza Pandemic. The focus of these preparations is to ensure that all public service organisations and utilities have business continuity arrangements in place to help enable them to maintain essential services during an Influenza Pandemic and to provide for the effective management of supply lines and the operations of government. This work is overseen by the Civil Contingencies Group (NI), which is chaired by OFMDFM.

Scotland

Managing the impact of a pandemic presents us with unique and difficult challenges if we are to save lives and keep our society running. The Scottish government has been working very hard to meet these challenges both across Scotland and as part of the wider UK planning.

The majority of emergency preparedness work in Scotland is conducted at a local level, and carried forward by strategic co-ordinating groups which comprise key local responders in each of Scotland’s 8 police force areas. This is backed by a range of work underway at a national level to support these local planning arrangements.

The UK Influenza Preparedness Strategy 2011 sets out the strategic approach for responding to an influenza pandemic in Scotland.

Wales

The arrangements for responding to an influenza pandemic in Wales are currently under review in the light of the lessons learnt from the response to Swine Flu in 2009 and the publication of the UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011. A multi-agency Pandemic Influenza Task and Finish Group has been established to develop arrangements which take account of the structures and processes established under the UK Strategy and the consolidation of the response arrangements contained in the Wales Pandemic Influenza Response Arrangements, the Wales Framework for Managing Major Infectious Disease Emergencies and the structures used under the Pan-Wales Response Plan.

The work being taken forward focuses on 5 key areas:

developing a Wales storage and distribution solution to deal with the deployment and use of the range of health countermeasures

ensuring Wales has access to levels of health countermeasures needed for a pandemic with a higher attack rate and produce more severe symptoms than swine flu

ensuring there is a robust plan for dealing with excess deaths that would result from a higher attack rate more severe virus than swine flu

revising Wales pandemic plans at all levels to ensure they are precautionary, proportionate and flexible

strengthening planning for communication of pandemic information to local responders, professional bodies and the public in Wales

The Welsh government website contains information explaining pandemic flu, why we are planning for it, and what we are doing now to minimise any future impact.

The Local Resilience Forums (LRFs), based on the police force areas of South Wales, North Wales, Dyfed-Powys and Gwent, provide the statutory basis for multi-agency planning for an influenza pandemic in Wales. Guidance has been issued to support this work through the Wales Framework for Managing Major Infectious Disease Emergencies. This document focuses on the need for organisations to have robust business continuity arrangements in place and to engage in co-ordinated multi-agency planning to implement any social measures that may be recommended, provide for integrated working with health services on areas such as the use of medical countermeasures, plan for handling excess deaths and prepare for any wider impacts. Through the LRF structure there is also a mechanism for establishing the progress being made with local planning and for testing plans. The Wales Resilience Forum, chaired by the First Minister for Wales, provides the mechanism for a national multi-agency overview of pandemic preparedness in Wales.

Pandemic flu: underpinning evidence and studies/research

Scientific evidence papers

We understand that public confidence in the government’s pandemic strategy depends on it being based on a credible and wide-ranging evidence base, which has been objectively analysed. This enables informed decisions and ensures that all options are explored to their full potential. With this in mind, the Department of Health has produced an evidence base paper which informed and underpinned the policy content of the UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011.

Scientific Pandemic Influenza Advisory Committee ( SPI )

We are fortunate in having some of the best scientific and medical experts in the world leading our work on pandemic preparations, and the World Health organization ( WHO ) has identified the UK as one of the best prepared countries in the world.

In 2005, as part of the UK’s pandemic influenza preparation, the Department of Health established a Scientific Advisory Group ( SAG ) on Pandemic Influenza, to advise on the scientific evidence base for health-related pandemic influenza policies. The Scientific Pandemic Influenza Advisory Committee ( SPI ) is an enhanced group which replaces the SAG . Besides providing advice on specific questions, the group will act as an information network for the government to ensure that it is informed of important developments in pandemic influenza related sciences, which could affect government policy.

Pandemic flu: communication and public engagement

Background

Preparing for, responding to and recovering from an influenza pandemic will depend significantly on cooperation between the government, public authorities, business, non-governmental organisations, the voluntary sector and individuals. An effective 2-way communication strategy that positively engages each of these key groups prior to and during a pandemic is therefore a major strand of the government’s preparations. Any emergency on this scale also needs strong national direction of public information from the outset. Timely advice and information will help prepare the population for the potential impact of a pandemic and will be critical to its subsequent management.

Please see Section 5 of the UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011 for detailed information on the UK’s communications and public engagements strategy, and the separate UK Pandemic Influenza Communications Strategy 2012.

Public health campaign

During the inter-pandemic period, the main objectives are to provide accurate advice and information, encourage the adoption of high standards of personal hygiene and prepare the population for the emergence of an influenza pandemic and its potential impacts.

During any period of increased alert and throughout the response phase, the objectives are to promote and reinforce individual and collective actions that reduce the spread of influenza and minimise its health and wider impact on the UK.

For more information on the Department of Health’s hygiene information please follow the links below.

Communications

Wet, Soap, Wash, Rinse, Dry - handwashing poster

Coughs and sneezes spread diseases - poster