Jurgen Klopp and Mauricio Pochettino face off for the 10th time in the Champions League final. What can we learn from their past matches?

The distance between the pitch and the stands at the old White Hart Lane was notably short. When Jurgen Klopp made his debut as Liverpool manager at the stadium, the gathering of photographers in front of the tunnel spilled out onto the pitch as the German emerged, desperate to capture a moment of football history.

The game itself didn’t match the fanfare. With so little training time under Klopp, Liverpool’s players seemed to be doing their best impression of his Borussia Dortmund side. The buzzword was “gegenpressing,” and so they ran and ran and ran, but did so with little organization or guile. The match was a hectic mess, aesthetically not dissimilar to those found in playgrounds up and down the country. It ended 0-0.

The two sides, and their two managers, have faced off eight times since then. On Saturday, in the Champions League final, Klopp will play Mauricio Pochettino for the 10th time. Head-to-head records between clubs, though often cited, are rarely worth much attention, but an exception can be made on this occasion.

Two managers highly committed to their respective philosophies with a history going back over four years, the catalogue of their matchups provides insight into both men and how they’re likely to approach a Champions League final that will vault one of them into legendary status.

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Klopp’s so-called Heavy Metal Football is, at its core, a tactical response to the rise in the popularity of possession football in the late 2000s. Liverpool sit in a 4-3-3 with a middlingly high defensive line, inviting their opponents to play the ball out from the back and setting a series of traps to win it in midfield, before counter-attacking quickly through their rapid forward line.

Pochettino prefers the sort of possession-heavy game plan to which Klopp’s tactics are a response. Despite this, the Tottenham manager stuck with this approach in matches against Liverpool in 2016-17, playing directly into his opponent’s hands. Pochettino was criticized by pundits and fans alike for this seemingly naive and stubborn approach.

The sense of frustration felt by Spurs fans was made worse by the success other, inferior teams were having against Liverpool at the time. The Reds’ 2-0 win over Tottenham in February 2017 was sandwiched between leagues defeats to Hull and Leicester, both of whom surrendered the ball, sat deep in their own half and played on the counter-attack.

For all their quality when offered space to break into, Liverpool lacked the creativity needed to pick the lock of a parked bus. Simultaneously, their proclivity for defensive errors meant teams could wait for their chance to pounce, confident the Reds would contrive to gift them an opportunity eventually.

The blueprint for beating Liverpool seemed obvious, but in press conferences Pochettino repeatedly insisted not only that Spurs could play through Liverpool’s intense pressure, but that they should.

“If we put the ball in the air, and we are going to fight for the ball we are going to lose,” he said. “The example is clear. Every time that the team played well, kept possession and play in the way that we want to play, we were close to winning.”

Yet in October 2017, Pochettino seemed to change his mind. Tottenham sat deep on the Wembley pitch, soaked up pressure and hit the Reds quickly on the break, targeting Dejan Lovren with a series of long balls over the top. They won the match 4-1, with only 36 percent possession.

Not only had a counter-attacking approach proved the clear method for beating Liverpool, Spurs had demonstrated they were capable of executing it effectively. Somewhat perplexingly, then, Pochettino has since returned to his possession game plan against Klopp’s side.

Odd though it may seem, there are reasons for this. Over the last 18 months, Liverpool have slowed their game down to elicit a greater control over matches. Heavy Metal Football has given way to something a little more Pop-Punk, which has allowed the Reds to develop their own possession game. A more patient approach means they now frequently score goals at the end of extended periods in control of the ball.

Outstanding, data-driven recruitment in attack has benefited Liverpool for several seasons, but more recent purchases at the back — Virgil van Dijk replacing Dejan Lovren and Allison Becker replacing Loris Karius — have seen defensive errors all but disappear from the Reds’ game. Add in the fruits of a focus on set-pieces and this slower, calmer version of Liverpool are no longer undone by the deep block, as demonstrated by their 97-point Premier League season.

This adjustment does, however, come at some cost. Toning down their more unique tactical characteristics has changed their approach in games against the rest of the Premier League’s top six. With Liverpool no longer seeking to create chaos to the same degree, and their opponents more aware of the danger they pose in a transition-heavy contest, these matches have become more traditional affairs in which the two sides trade longer periods of possession.

Their lone loss in the Premier League came against Manchester City, and draws against Chelsea, Arsenal and Manchester United, kept them from the title. This was a trade worth making, especially in the league, but it has taken away some of their edge, some of what makes them unique in the biggest matches.

On paper, Liverpool’s record against Tottenham remains impressive, but a combination of Klopp’s change of tempo and Pochettino’s own trial and error adjustments in these games has given us two closer contests between the teams in the past 18 months.

The February 2018 match between Spurs and Liverpool started in the usual fashion — with a long kick, a loose ball and a misplaced back pass playing in Mohamed Salah, who calmly beat Hugo Lloris. In the second half, Pochettino switched around his personnel to push Dele Alli to the tip of a diamond. From that position, he provided Spurs with a route through midfield with his ability to receive the ball on the turn and his smart movement into the pockets of space either side of the deepest midfielder in Liverpool’s 4-3-3 — on this occasion Jordan Henderson.

Lot a talk about Dele recently. He also played some football.pic.twitter.com/371IzjvzFd — NathanAClark (@NathanAClark) February 7, 2018

Controversial penalty decisions, an incredible solo dribble by Salah and Victor Wanyama’s stunning long-range goal dominated discussion following the match, which ended 2-2. Yet the key to Tottenham securing an away draw was a small tactical shift that enabled them to push Liverpool back into their half, where they were vulnerable to Tottenham’s own pressing game.

Despite missing Dele for the next game between the sides, in September of 2018, Pochettino opted to stick with the diamond. Klopp was prepared, however, and responded by having his central midfielders stay a little deeper, inviting his full-backs to operate a little more adventurously. The 2-1 victory underplayed Liverpool’s dominance in the match.

Finally, and most recently, at Anfield in March, Pochettino countered Liverpool’s 4-3-3 with a 3-5-2. On this occasion, the opening minutes were more evenly-matched than usual, but the home side soon started to take control, with their full-backs finding more and more space high up the pitch. In the 16th minute, left-back Andy Robertson provided the cross for Roberto Firmino’s opener.

At halftime Pochettino, watching from the stands as he served a touchline ban, made his boldest tactical tweak yet, moving to an eye-catchingly asymmetrical 4-3-3, with Dany Rose operating as a kind of “false wing-back.” By doubling and tripling up in wide areas, Tottenham made their buildup play very difficult to read, and Liverpool struggled to lay their usual traps.

Spurs also made use of frequent diagonal switches to progress the ball into the final third. This wasn’t a hugely productive means of attacking in itself, but it managed to push Liverpool back into their own half, allowing Spurs to establish control.

The match ended 2-1 in Liverpool’s favor, but was decided by a freak Toby Alderweireld own goal. It was a mostly even contest, with the Reds edging the xG by the narrowest of margins, 1.09-1.05 (per Understat).

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With the full history between Pochettino’s Tottenham and Klopp’s Liverpool in mind, it seems the Argentine’s decision to persist, against criticism, with a possession game in those early matchups may be beginning to pay off.

Just as Spurs are about to face the Merseyside club in the biggest game in club football, Pochettino’s own head-to-head history with Klopp, and all the opportunities it has afforded him to tweak and tailor his game plan to facing Liverpool, gives Tottenham a potential advantage afforded to few other sides.

Liverpool tend to stick with their 4-3-3 and the same general tactical approach, but Klopp has been known to twist, and used a 4-2-3-1 early in the season, to go along with his slightly more defensive-minded setup. Such a big occasion would certainly warrant that level of preparation and he did end that recent 2-1 victory in a 4-4-2, though admittedly the Reds were throwing bodies forward knowing they needed to win to keep up with City in the title race.

For Pochettino, the focus appears to be equal parts finding, perhaps asymmetrical, shapes and patterns to flummox the Liverpool press and equal parts fitting whichever players are available into the starting XI, with talisman Harry Kane’s potential return likely to push one of Heung-min Son or semifinal star Lucas Moura to the bench.

Regardless of how the teams line up, history suggests we’ll see a match in which Liverpool create a flurry of chances early before Tottenham adapt tactically and rally late. What will be decisive is the extent to which each team can make their time on top count — something that has dragged each of them to the Champions League final.