CITATION: R. v. J., 2016 ONSC 6035

COURT FILE NO.: CR14500005140000

DATE: 20160927

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN: )) HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – V.J. Defendant )) )) )) )) ) ) Maureen Bellmore, for the Crown Domenic Basile, for the Defendant HEARD: August 23, 2016

Subject to any further Order by a court of competent jurisdiction, an Order has been made in this proceeding directing that the identity of the complainant and any information that could disclose such identity shall not be published in any document or broadcast in any way pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

SPIES J. (orally)

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Overview

[1] On June 9, 2015, following a trial before me, I convicted V.J. of nine counts related to four assaults and one sexual assault on his wife, A.J., between September 5, 2010 and August 13, 2012. Counsel appeared before me for sentencing over a year after my decision. The sentencing hearing was delayed for reasons that are not relevant to this decision.

[2] The facts relevant to these convictions are set out in my Reasons for Judgment; R. v. J., 2015 ONSC 3672. In summary, this was a second marriage for both parties; an arranged marriage. They were married in India in February 2009 and began to live together in August 2009 when Ms. J. moved to Canada with her son. They lived in a two-bedroom basement apartment in the City of Toronto, in the home of Mr. J.’s aunt and uncle and their two children; one of whom is Ms. S., who testified at the trial. Mr. J.’s sons from his first marriage visited and stayed with the family on weekends. This is where the assaults and related offences took place.

[3] Counsel agreed that Count # 6 be conditionally stayed on the Kienapple principle since it involved the use of a slipper during the same assault when Mr. J. was found guilty of using a rolling pin as a weapon. As a result, Mr. J. is now before me to be sentenced on two assaults contrary to s. 266(a) of the Criminal Code, two assaults with a weapon contrary to s. 267(a) of the Code, two convictions for uttering death threats contrary to s. 264.1(2)(a) of the Code, one conviction for sexual assault contrary to s. 271(a) of the Code and one conviction for unlawful confinement contrary to s. 279(2)(a) of the Code; a total of eight offences.

The Facts

(a) Circumstances of the Offences

(i) First Incident - September 5, 2010 (Count # 1 - Assault)

[4] I found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that while Mr. J. was very angry he tried to grab a phone that was in Ms. J.’s hand and, at the same time, was threatening to kill her. In the course of doing this Mr. J. twisted Ms. J.’s arm resulting in a soft tissue injury to her wrist, which was treated in hospital with a tensor bandage and a painkiller.

(ii) Second Incident - December 2011 (Count # 2 – Assault and Count # 3 – Uttering a Threat to Cause Death)

[5] I found that the Crown had proven that on this occasion Mr. J. grabbed Ms. J. by her hair and hit her and threw her to the ground and that he threatened her by saying: “I will kill you and bury you in the basement”. Some of Ms. J.’s hair came out causing her pain in her head.

(iii) Third Incident – July 15, 2012 (Count # 4 – Assault with a Weapon (rolling pin), and Count # 5 – Uttering a Threat to Cause Death

[6] I found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that while Ms. J. was making food in the kitchen using a rolling pin, Mr. J. grabbed it and used it as a weapon to hit her on her right lower leg two or three times and that he then hit her on the leg with his plastic slipper, also using it as a weapon. While Mr. J. was assaulting Ms. J., he was threatening that he was going to kill her.

(iv) Fourth Incident – About July 20, 2012 (Count # 7 – Sexual Assault and Count # 8 – Unlawful Confinement)

[7] I accepted Ms. J.’s evidence about the sexual assault and was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it occurred as she alleged; namely, that Mr. J. picked her up and carried her to his room and locked the door while she was telling him she did not want to go. He forced her onto the bed and said he wanted to have sex with her. He put a lot of pressure on her while she was moving around trying to avoid this. He first put a pillow on her chest, which she removed and then he put her arms above her shoulders and put pressure on her arms. He removed her nightdress and forcibly had intercourse with her, which caused her pain, while she was telling him she did not want that. After the intercourse, Mr. J. kicked Ms. J. in the forehead and called her a “fucking woman” and told her to leave his room. He also threatened to kill her as he had before but there was no separate charge for this threat. Ms. J. had a headache and a small bruise and swelling on her forehead as a result of this assault.

(v) Fifth Incident – About August 12, 2012 (Count # 9 - Assault with a Weapon (slipper)

[8] On this occasion I found that Mr. J. assaulted Ms. J. with a slipper used as a weapon, as she alleged. Ms. J. suffered from headaches as a result of this assault as well.

(b) Impact on Ms. J.

[9] Ms. J. told the probation officer that she is still scared for her life. She said she is experiencing financial difficulty as she is living paycheque to paycheque to support herself and her child. Ms. J. also prepared a written victim impact statement. There she states that she remains very sad and depressed and does not like talking to anyone or meeting anyone. Her relatives have become very distant from her; she believes because she might ask them for help. She always feels scared and worried that Mr. J. or his family might harm her or her son. She has lost her appetite and is unable to sleep. She has lost her interest in work and as a result has lost customers, which has affected her income. She lost income coming to court and is concerned about fulfilling her needs and the needs of her son.

(c) Circumstances of Mr. J.

[10] A pre-sentence report (PSR) dated August 19, 2015 was filed as an exhibit. It was just over a year old but I received some additional information from three letters filed on Mr. J.’s behalf. Mr. J. is now 44 years old. He was born and raised in India. Mr. J. has a Bachelor of Arts degree from a university in India. He immigrated to Toronto as an adult in search of a better life with his first wife and his two children now aged 12 and 17. He has two older siblings still living in India with whom he has a close relationship. Mr. J. is also the primary caregiver of his elderly parents who live with him and who both suffer from several health complications.

[11] Mr. J. considers himself to be a hard working family man. He works six days per week. He filed two letters from his employer, F Inc., where he has worked since April 2006 as a freezer operator. According to these letters, Mr. J. is punctual with a good attendance record and is willing to do overtime and always ensures that his work is completed. Mr. J. also provided a letter from the vice president of his temple, which states he visits the temple on a regular basis and renders voluntary help in the shrine when needed. He is described as a polite person with a good nature.

[12] Mr. J. reported that he consumes alcohol only occasionally and denies having any problems with alcohol. Other persons contacted by the probation officer confirm this save for Ms. J. who claims that alcohol was a factor in the commission of the offences.

[13] Mr. J. became emotional during his meetings with the probation officer when discussing his current situation and his marital affairs. He stated that he is the first one from his family to ever become involved with the law and that he is bringing shame to his family name and creating undue stress on his elderly parents.

[14] Mr. J. told the probation officer that his main priority is supporting his parents and children. He pays weekly child support in the sum of $168 to his first wife. The probation officer found that Mr. J. appeared to be family-oriented as most of his concerns and discussion surrounded his children and parents. The probation officer concluded that Mr. J. has a “solid support system”.

[15] The PSR states that Mr. J. advised the probation officer that he hopes that he and Ms. J. will reconcile after this court matter is over. This comment was considered strange by Ms. Bellmore and its meaning was discussed during the sentencing hearing. By way of explanation Mr. Basile advised that Mr. J. told him the probation officer asked him whether he had any intention of getting back together with Ms. J. It was in response to that question that he stated that if she wanted to sit down and talk he would be open to getting back together with her. Even accepting the accuracy of this hearsay evidence, I find this statement, in the context it was made, is not relevant to my decision. I am advised that Mr. J. has no intention of initiating contact with Ms. J. and has complied, and will comply, with any no contact order. I have no reason to believe otherwise.

[16] Mr. J. maintains his innocence with respect to these convictions, which is, of course, his right. Mr. J. told the probation officer that Ms. J. made false allegations in retaliation against him after having her charged with assault. He is appealing my decision on the ground of ineffective counsel.

[17] Mr. J. does not have a criminal record. He has been on bail since December 19, 2012 and has not been charged with any breaches of his bail conditions. The conditions of release were not onerous and no request was made that they be considered for a credit against the sentence imposed.

[18] The probation officer interviewed two long time close friends of Mr. J. They described him as a “kind and loving husband and father”. Neither had ever witnessed any assaultive behaviour. A cousin of Mr. J.’s, N.S., was also interviewed. He considered Mr. J. to be “lenient and laid back”. He also stated that he lived upstairs and never witnessed or heard anything that would be a cause for concern. I have ignored this information, as this was not evidence called at trial.

[19] The probation officer obtained information from Ms. J. and Detective Halagian, which is reflected in the PSR. Ms. J. provided information concerning the conduct underlying the convictions, which is not relevant at this stage and must be ignored. As for Detective Halagian, he advised the probation officer that the evidence against Mr. J. at the trial was “irrefutable” and he described Mr. J. as a “manipulative man” who can present as a quiet, respectable member of society. Those opinions are not relevant to my sentencing determination and I have ignored them.

Legal Parameters

[20] The convictions for assault with a weapon, sexual assault and unlawful confinement carry a maximum sentence of ten years. The convictions for uttering threats carry a maximum sentence of five years. There are no minimum sentences for any of the convictions.

Positions of Crown and Defence

[21] Ms. Bellmore seeks a three-year penitentiary sentence as a global sentence. She suggested that I allocate that sentence to the most serious conviction of sexual assault and the sentences for the other convictions would run concurrently. She also requested a DNA order, a weapons prohibition order and an order that Mr. J.’s name be added to the Sex Offender Registry.

[22] It is Mr. Basile’s position that a reformatory sentence is the appropriate sentence in this case. He submitted that such a sentence would permit the court to impose a period of probation, which could include counselling. Although Mr. J. denies the conduct, Mr. Basile assured me he would comply with such an order. Mr. Basile took no issue with the ancillary relief requested by Ms. Bellmore.

Case Law

[23] Both counsel made considerable reference to R. v. Smith, [2011] O.J. No. 3832 (Ont. C.A.). Ms. Bellmore relies on this decision in support of her position and Mr. Basile argued that it is distinguishable as a much more serious case. Accordingly, the facts of that case and the reasons of the court must be carefully considered.

[24] In R. v. Smith, the trial judge found the offender guilty of ten offences in the context of three long-term domestic relationships. All of the convictions were quashed save for three in relation to two of the complainants; namely, uttering a death threat to the complainant DQ and assault and sexual assault of the complainant M. Leave to appeal sentence was granted.

[25] With respect to DQ, in count 9, the offender was found to have threatened her by telling her that he could kill her at any moment and that no one would be the wiser. She thought he was joking but she later saw a hole dug in the back of their property, which the offender said was a “test hole” related to construction taking place on the property.

[26] Count 10 related to M who had alleged that the offender had repeatedly assaulted her between 1978 and 1984 by pinching her legs, elbowing her in the stomach, throwing forks at her, whipping the back of her legs with a wire, grabbing her hair, hitting her on the back of her head and kicking her. I note there was no charge before the court of assault with a weapon. The sexual assault of M, count 12, occurred after the relationship ended. M had told the offender that she did not want to have sex with him but she eventually gave in believing she had no choice.

[27] One distinguishing feature of this case is that the offender had one previous assault conviction although he had only received a fine for this offence and was otherwise a law abiding member of the community. At the time of sentencing he was 66 years old and was being held to account for many actions that took place when he was in his 20’s.

[28] On appeal the court noted, at para. 85, that sentences for uttering a death threat in circumstances similar to those in that case tend to range from the imposition of a suspended sentence to six months’ imprisonment. The court went on to say at para. 86 that a sentence of one to two years will generally be appropriate for a conviction of common assault based on facts such as those comprising count 10, committed against a spouse or domestic partner in the context of a lengthy pattern of domestic abuse. Mr. Basile suggested this range was too high and I note that the sentence imposed for count 10 was ten months. Finally, at para. 87, the court stated that sexual assault involving forced intercourse with a spouse or former spouse generally attracts a sentence in the range of 21 months to four years.

[29] The court went on to consider the question of whether sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently. As the Crown had chosen not to cross-appeal sentence the court held (at para. 89) that the sentence imposed could not exceed three years in total, but contrary to what the trial judge did, the sentences should be consecutive. The court held that a fit sentence for count 9, uttering death threats to DQ, was two months and in relation to M; count 10 - ten months and count 12 - two years and that counts 10 and 12 be served consecutively with each other and consecutive to the sentence for count 9 for a total sentence of three years. In a footnote the court set out the two competing approaches for sentencing an offender for multiple offences, which I will come back to.

[30] In considering Mr. Basile’s submissions distinguishing this case, it was somewhat more serious in the sense that the offender had a related record and the abusive relationship with M was six years in length. However, I do not agree that the death threat against DQ was more serious. The offender did not tell the complainant that the test hole was connected to his threat; that was what DQ believed. I was satisfied in this case that Ms. J. believed the threats made by Mr. J. I also note that he has been convicted of two counts of this offence. Furthermore, uttering death threats occurred on other occasions as part of the assaults. As for M, the assaults were comparable to the case at bar although they occurred over a longer period of time. The sexual assault conviction in the case at bar in my view is more serious as in addition to the inherently violent nature of a sexual assault, it included further violence. Although each case must be decided on its own facts, I do find the Smith decision to be quite comparable to the facts in this case. This decision, therefore, is of assistance in determining a fit sentence in this case.

[31] Ms. Bellmore also relied on R. v. B.R., 2006 CanLII 29082 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 3404, an earlier decision from the Court of Appeal. In that case the offender was convicted after a trial of one count each of assault, assault with a weapon and sexual assault upon his wife. The assault conviction was as a result of the offender punching his wife several times on the left side of her head with a closed fist and slapping her face with an open hand. The complainant fell to the ground as a result and experienced a lot of pain. The assault with a weapon was committed by putting a shoelace around the complainant’s neck and tightening it and remarking “Let’s see if she dies or not”. There was no charge for uttering this threat. In the case of the sexual assault, the offender forced the complainant to have intercourse with him while she was in bed with their sleeping children. Justice Mossip sentenced the offender to 30 months’ imprisonment on the charge of sexual assault, with 12 months concurrent on the remaining charges.

[32] The convictions and sentence were upheld on appeal. The Court of Appeal found the sentences were appropriate for this offender and these offences. The offender had no prior criminal record and provided financially for his family. The offences were serious and occasioned considerable emotional trauma to the complainant. They occurred in the context of a domestic relationship while young children were present in the home in close proximity. The court noted as well that the offences were not isolated occurrences; “[t]hey took place against the backdrop of a lengthy abusive relationship. …The offences here require a denunciatory sentence that also meets the requirements of general and specific deterrence.” (at para. 84)

[33] Mr. Basile urged that I look at the B.R. decision closely, which he submitted was more serious than the case at bar. Although the sexual assault conviction was more serious in one respect, given the presence of the children during the course of the offence although it seems that they slept through it. The case does not suggest that additional force was used as it was in the case at bar. I agree that the use of a shoelace by B.R. to choke the complainant was more serious than Mr. J.’s use of a rolling pin or slipper, in the manner that he used these items as weapons in this case. Furthermore, the assault by punching the complainant in the head appears to have been more serious than any of the assaults in this case. However, although the relationship in B.R. lasted about seven years and was described as abusive in the sense that B.R. controlled and dominated the complainant; his arrest was based on these three specific incidents that occurred over a two week period. In the case at bar, Mr. J. is being sentenced for four assaults and one sexual assault. Overall then I disagree with Mr. Basile that the conduct by B.R. was far worse than the case at bar. Furthermore, the B.R. decision is now ten years old and I note that it was not referred to by the court in Smith.

[34] Mr. Basile referred to R. v. Gandhi, [2015] O.J. No. 5053, a more recent decision from the Court of Appeal, where the court upheld an eight-month sentence with a two-month credit for pre-sentence custody. I did not find that case to be of much assistance. As Ms. Bellmore submitted, there was no forced intercourse in that case.

[35] Mr. Basile also referred to R. v. B.D.N., [2016] O.J. No. 1369, a decision of Hackland J. In that case the offender was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement. The offender and his wife were living separate and apart in the matrimonial home. He lured the complainant upstairs to a computer room, pushed her onto the bed, bound her hands and feet with a rope, shaved her pubic hair, whipped her with a leather belt and then had forced sexual intercourse with her. He was a first offender and had a highly supportive family including the complainant.

[36] At the sentencing hearing the complainant made an emotional plea that her husband not be sent to jail. After referring to para. 87 of the Smith case, Justice Hackland determined that he would impose a sentence at the lower end of the range of 21 months to four years but he found that a penitentiary sentence was required. He imposed a sentence of two years on the sexual assault with a weapon and 12 months, to run concurrently, on the offence of unlawful confinement.

[37] I agree with Mr. Basile that the sexual assault in B.D.N. was more serious than the case at bar but clearly the wife’s plea at sentencing had an impact on the sentence Justice Hackland imposed.

[38] Mr. Basile also referred to R. v. H.V., [1998] O.J. No. 4694, a decision of MacDonnell J. when he was in the provincial court. Given that the Crown elected to proceed summarily and the accused pleaded guilty, and given this case is now almost 18 years old, I did not find this decision to be of any assistance.

Principles of Sentencing

[39] The fundamental purpose of sentencing, as set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code, is to ensure respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. The imposition of just sanctions requires me to consider the sentencing objectives referred to in that section, which the sentence I impose should attempt to achieve. These are denunciation, deterrence; both specific and general, separation of offenders from society when necessary, rehabilitation, reparation for harm done and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgment of the harm which criminal activity brings to our community. In addition, in imposing sentence I must take into account the principle of proportionality and the applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to the offences as set out in s. 718.2. The Court of Appeal has made it clear that the principles of denunciation and deterrence, both general and specific, are of particular importance in cases involving domestic violence.

Determination of a Fit Sentence

[40] I turn then to a determination of a fit sentence in this case.

[41] In my view the following facts are aggravating factors relevant to sentence in this case:

a) Pursuant to s. 718.2(a)(ii), the fact Mr. J. assaulted Ms. J., his wife, is an aggravating factor recognized by Parliament.

b) The offences took place in Ms. J.’s own home, a place that is meant to be one of comfort and security.

c) Ms. J. suffered some physical harm and has suffered emotional harm as a result of these offences although I accept, as submitted by Mr. Basile, that there is no evidence that she has gone to see a psychiatrist or is taking any medication.

d) As Ms. Bellmore submitted, the violence escalated from Mr. J. grabbing his wife’s arm, to grabbing her hair and throwing her on the floor and then to using weapons such as a rolling pin or slipper. It culminated with a sexual assault followed by one last assault before the relationship ended. Fortunately, as Mr. Basile submitted, the assaults never escalated to even more serious assaults involving the use of a knife or gun.

e) Ms. J. was in a vulnerable position in that she had come from India to marry Mr. J. and was living with her son in a basement apartment with Mr. J.’s family upstairs. She testified at trial that being a single woman with a child was not looked upon favourably in her culture and that it was important for her to maintain this second marriage. This was the reason she gave for the delay in reporting Mr. J.'s abuse. I agree with Ms. Bellmore that Mr. J. exploited Ms. J.'s vulnerability with his assaultive behaviour and threats.

[42] As I have already stated, Mr. J. maintains his innocence with respect to these convictions, which is, of course, his right. He cannot be penalized for insisting on his right to a trial and an appeal but he does not get the benefit of a reduced sentence because of a guilty plea and an expression of remorse. This is a neutral factor. It does mean, however, that there is no evidence that Mr. J. has any insight into the impact of his actions on Ms. J. However, I do accept that when he described the charges as ridiculous and fabricated in the PSR, that he was referring to his position that Ms. J. fabricated the charges.

[43] As for mitigating factors, Mr. J. has no criminal record, he is very hard working and has been a contributing member to society since he came to Canada. He has the support of his extended family and friends and is now the primary caregiver for his elderly parents.

[44] Mr. Basile agreed that a custodial disposition is warranted but submitted it ought not to be a penitentiary term. He argued that since Mr. J. does not have a criminal record and he has not breached his bail conditions for almost a two-year period, that the need for specific deterrence is less important. I disagree. Although Mr. J. does not have a criminal record, giving my findings, he committed repeated assaults on his wife over a two year period. The offences here require a denunciatory sentence that also meets the requirements of general and specific deterrence.

[45] Both counsel submitted that the sentence I impose should be determined on a global basis, looking at all of the convictions together, bearing in mind the principle of totality. Mr. Basile agreed with Ms. Bellmore’s suggestion that I sentence on the sexual assault first and that the other sentences run concurrently. At odds with this, however, Mr. Basile also made submissions on the charges individually suggesting, for example, that if Mr. J. had only been convicted with uttering a death threat, that he would likely have received a suspended sentence and probation. Similarly, he suggested that, individually, if the assault convictions were treated on their own they would attract sentences of up to 90 days intermittent. He submitted that with respect to all of the assaults, the appropriate sentence would be between three to six months and that the appropriate sentence for the sexual assault would be between 18 and 21 months.

[46] The first issue to determine is whether or not to follow the approach in R. v. Jewell (1995), 1995 CanLII 1897 (ON CA), 83 O.A.C. 81 (C.A.) and fix an appropriate global sentence first and then assign sentences for each individual offence and designate them concurrent or consecutive to fit within the already determined global sentence. In Smith this approach was disapproved of (at para. 88) but that was because the court found there was no relevant nexus between the offences committed against DQ and M, including those in relation to M only. In the case at bar there is only one complainant but like the complainant M, the offences include both assault and sexual assault and unlike M, the assault convictions are with a weapon.

[47] I have, therefore, decided to follow the alternative approach describe in the footnote to Smith and assign fit sentences for each offence and designate those sentences as concurrent or consecutive and then as a final step consider the total sentence to ensure it does not offend the principle of totality.

[48] Turning then to the most serious offence, the sexual assault, in my view an appropriate sentence in all the circumstances is two years. For the related unlawful confinement conviction I find the appropriate sentence is two months, to run concurrently. For the two convictions of assault with a weapon, given the period of time that they occurred over and the nature of the harm suffered by the complainant, I find that an appropriate sentence is nine months each, to run concurrently to one another and consecutive to the sentence for the sexual assault. For the two convictions of assault, I find that an appropriate sentence is eight months, each to run concurrently to each other and the other sentences. As for the two convictions for uttering death threats, I find that an appropriate sentence is two months each, to run concurrently to one another and consecutive to the other sentences.

[49] In summary, Mr. J. is to serve a 35 month penitentiary sentence for these convictions.

[50] It will be apparent that I have fixed these sentences for periods of time that are the same as or similar to what the Court of Appeal did in Smith. I appreciate that the Smith decision is of guidance only and that I am not bound by the specific sentences imposed in that case and that even the range set out by the court for sexual assault sentences in the context of a domestic relationship is a guide only. However, in my view, considered on a global basis, a fit sentence is at or close to a three year penitentiary sentence as submitted by Ms. Bellmore. Applying the approach in Smith of determining the sentences on each of the charges has also brought me to a total sentence of 35 months. It is, therefore, not necessary to consider the totality principle.

[51] I have considered the fact that this sentence is higher than the sentence imposed by the trial judge in B.R. and upheld on appeal, and my finding that the facts in that case with respect to the convictions for assault and sexual assault were more serious. However, in that case the court was only dealing with three specific incidents. In this case there were five, resulting in eight convictions.

Final Disposition

[52] Mr. J. would you please stand.

[53] I will begin with count # 7, your conviction for sexual assault, I sentence you to two years’ imprisonment.

[54] With respect to your related conviction of unlawful confinement; count # 8, I sentence you to two months, to be served concurrently to your sentence on count # 7.

[55] With respect to your conviction of assault with a weapon; count # 4, I sentence you to nine months, to be served consecutively to your sentence on count # 7.

[56] With respect to your conviction of assault with a weapon; count # 9, I sentence you to nine months, to be served concurrently to your sentence on count # 4.

[57] With respect to your convictions of assault; counts # 1 and 2, I sentence you to eight months for each conviction, each to be served concurrently to your other sentences.

[58] With respect to your conviction for uttering a death threat in count # 3, I sentence you to two months, to be served consecutively to your other sentences.

[59] With respect to your conviction of uttering a death threat in count # 5, I sentence you to two months, to be served concurrently to your other sentences.

[60] As a result, your total sentence is 35 months. There is no credit for pre-sentence custody.

[61] In addition, there will be a mandatory weapons prohibition order pursuant to s. 109(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. As this is your first conviction, that order will be for ten years. I also make a DNA order in Form 5.03 authorizing the taking of a DNA sample pursuant to s. 487.051(1).

[62] In addition, pursuant to ss. 490.012(1) and 490.013(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, I make an order in Form 52 that your name be added to the Sex Offender Registry and that you comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for 20 years.

[63] In addition, pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code Mr. J. is to have no contact with Ms. J. either directly or indirectly while he is in custody.

___________________________

SPIES J.

Released: September 27, 2016