[CVE-2013-4484] DoS vulnerability in Varnish HTTP cache

Summary ======= Varnish Cache with certain configurations is vulnerable to a denial of service attack. Three lines of VCL code solves the problem. This issue was discovered by Ilia Sharov, Yandex. This has been assigned CVE-2013-4484. Details ======= If Varnish receives a certain illegal request, and the subroutine 'vcl_error{}' restarts the request, the varnishd worker process will crash with an assert. The varnishd management process will restart the worker process, but there will be a brief interruption of service and the cache will be emptied, causing more traffic to go to the backend. We are releasing this advisory because restarting from vcl_error{} is both fairly common and documented. This is purely a denial of service vulnerability, there is no risk of privilege escalation. Proof of concept ================ Given a VCL with the effect of: sub vcl_error { return(restart); } and a malformed HTTP request like: GET<SP><SP><SP><CR><NL> Host:<SP>foo<CR><NL> <CR><NL> Varnish will assert and restart the child process. (The precise number of spaces after GET is not magic.) Cause ===== A malformed request should never reach the VCL processing in Varnish in the first place, but for historical reasons we used vcl_error{} to deliver the error-response for some malformed requests. In future versions of Varnish, (4.x, 3.0.5) a standard summary 400 response will be returned for all requests which cannot be parsed correctly, without VCL involvement. Workaround ========== Insert this at the top of your VCL file: sub vcl_error { if (obj.status == 400 || obj.status == 413) { return(deliver); } } Or add this test at the top of your existing vcl_error{}. Versions affected ================= At least 2.0.x, 2.1.x, 3.0.x, possibly also older versions. -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 phk at FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.