On February 26th, while looking at an iOS application crash log, I noticed a distinctive value in register x18 :

This crash log from the New York Times app contains a kernel pointer in register x18 .

Register x18 contained a value prefixed by 0xfffffff0 (7 f s and a 0 ), which is the telltale signature of a kernel pointer. I almost dismissed this as a coincidence, but decided to check some other crash logs as well. To my surprise, all of them contained the same value in register x18 , even across different apps. This suggested a true kernel information leak, and a serious one. What was going on? The answer would lead back, of all places, to the Meltdown vulnerability.

The shape of a pointer

Kernel pointers are distinctive because they have low entropy (the kernel doesn’t take up that much memory). For example, on macOS, pointers to the kernel image typically begin with 0xffffff80[0-2] , pointers to the kernel heap begin with 0xffffff80[1-2] or 0xffffff9[0-2] , and pointers to kernel driver images begin with 0xffffff7f[8-9] .

On iOS, the layout of the kernel address space is different and varies by device. On the iPhone 7 and later, kernel heap addresses begin with 0xffffffe0 and kernel image addresses begin with 0xfffffff0[0-2] . On the iPhone 5s through iPhone 6s, kernel image and kernel heap addresses both begin with 0xfffffff0 .

These ranges may be large, but they are actually quite small when compared to the full space of 64-bit integers. Thus, when I saw that register x18 began with 0xfffffff0 , I knew there was a good chance it actually came from the kernel and wasn’t just a big negative number.

Identifying the source of the leak

The first step was to figure out how kernel pointers were getting into register x18 . For example, the leak might only be triggered while a process is crashing, or even worse, it might be a strange artifact of the crash reporting machinery itself. Such an information leak would still be interesting, but of limited value. Thus, the very first thing I tried was to create an empty iOS app, set a breakpoint, and read the value in register x18 :

The infoleak can be triggered by simply reading the value of register x18 using lldb.

And just like that, without writing any code at all, I had a working proof of concept! The fact that the leaked kernel pointer could be retrieved by a debugger on a still-running app strongly suggested that it would be possible to write a standalone exploit.

It looked to me like the x18 register was somehow not being cleared on return from the kernel. The AArch64 ABI specifies that register x18 is reserved for use by the platform, so it’s plausible that no userspace code had modified x18 since the last syscall return.

The next question was whether the kernel pointer could be retrieved directly by the running app. A straightforward way to read the value in a particular register is using inline assembly. Thus, I added inline assembly to read x18 into a variable and printed the result.

The kernel pointer does not appear when reading the value of register x18 using inline assembly.

Interestingly, even though the debugger claimed that x18 contained the kernel pointer, the inline assembly read the value 0 . This meant one of two things: either there was some sort of architectural magic going on, or the debugger was somehow not getting the true register values.

As it happens, the way a debugger reads registers from the thread being debugged is using the function thread_get_state . This function retrieves the state of a thread’s registers as they are saved when that thread enters the kernel. Thus, the leaked kernel pointer could be reaching userspace through that function, in which case register x18 might never actually contain a kernel pointer while in userspace.

To test this, I simply called thread_get_state on the current thread and printed the value that the kernel claimed was in register x18 :

The function thread_get_state , which is called by debuggers to get a thread’s registers, proves to be the source of the kernel pointer leak.

And voilà! We have found the source of the leak.

While the exploit in this case is completely trivial, you can find a POC on my GitHub.

Is it useful?

The next thing I wanted to know was what type of leak this was. The most interesting kernel pointer disclosures are those that can be used to defeat the kernel’s address space layout randomization (kASLR), which hides where the kernel resides in memory. Because kASLR simply slides the entire kernel image in memory to a new base address, revealing a single known pointer into the kernel image breaks the whole defense by allowing you to compute the kASLR slide directly.

The simplest way to check whether a kernel infoleak is disclosing a kernel image pointer or something else is to get the leaked value, subtract the kASLR slide, and see if the difference is consistent across reboots. If it is, then the infoleak is disclosing a kernel image pointer and the difference is the static address of the leaked pointer in the kernelcache binary.

So, I disclosed the kernel pointer, panicked the phone, and subtracted the kernel slide recorded in the panic log. Repeating this experiment several times always yielded the same value. Thus, I had found a kernel image pointer leak capable of revealing the kernel slide.

Analyzing the cause of the leak

Once I’d demonstrated that this infoleak could be used to recover the kASLR slide, I reported it to Apple. A few days later, I had some time to try and figure out what was causing the leak.

Since the leak only manifested in register x18 , the natural place to begin was scanning XNU source code diffs for occurrences of x18 . It quickly became apparent that a large number of changes involving register x18 took place in the file osfmk/arm64/locore.s between XNU versions 4570.20.62 (iOS 11.1) and 4570.31.3 (iOS 11.2). These changes seemed to be related to a feature called __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ . Grepping through the source code for references to that string eventually revealed the following comment in the file osfmk/arm64/proc_reg.h :

__ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ is a feature intended to guard against potential architectural or microarchitectural vulnerabilities that could allow cores to read/access EL1-only mappings while in EL0 mode. This is achieved by removing as many mappings as possible when the core transitions to EL0 mode from EL1 mode, and restoring those mappings when the core transitions to EL1 mode from EL0 mode.

That is, when __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ is enabled, transitioning from EL1 (kernel mode) to EL0 (user mode) will remove as many kernel memory mappings as possible. The purpose of this feature is to limit the possible attack surface against kernel memory mappings when exploiting microarchitectural vulnerabilities like Spectre or Meltdown. In fact, a knowledge base article suggests that these changes in iOS 11.2 were specifically designed to protect against Meltdown.

The file osfmk/arm64/locore.s is responsible for, among other things, implementing the ARM exception vectors. Lel0_synchronous_vector_64 , the exception vector invoked on a system call (instruction svc #0 ), was significantly changed while adding support for __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ . In iOS 11.2, the implementation looks like this:

.text .align 7 Lel0_synchronous_vector_64: MAP_KERNEL BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR Lel0_synchronous_vector_64_long, 8

The macro MAP_KERNEL is responsible for setting up the EL1 memory mappings for the kernel. It is defined as:

/* * MAP_KERNEL * * Restores the kernel EL1 mappings, if necessary. * * This may mutate x18. */ .macro MAP_KERNEL #if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ /* Switch to the kernel ASID (low bit set) for the task. */ mrs x18, TTBR0_EL1 orr x18, x18, #(1 << TTBR_ASID_SHIFT) msr TTBR0_EL1, x18 /* * We eschew some barriers on Apple CPUs, as relative ordering of writes * to the TTBRs and writes to the TCR should be ensured by the * microarchitecture. */ #if !defined(APPLE_ARM64_ARCH_FAMILY) isb sy #endif /* * Update the TCR to map the kernel now that we are using the kernel * ASID. */ MOV64 x18, TCR_EL1_BOOT msr TCR_EL1, x18 isb sy #endif /* __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */ .endmacro

Meanwhile, the macro BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR is responsible for branching to the real implementation of the exception vector, which in this case is Lel0_synchronous_vector_64_long . It is defined as:

/* * BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR * * Branches to the requested long exception vector in the kernelcache. * arg0 - The label to branch to * arg1 - The index of the label in exc_vectors_tables * * This may mutate x18. */ .macro BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR #if __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ /* * Find the kernelcache table for the exception vectors by accessing * the per-CPU data. */ mrs x18, TPIDR_EL1 ldr x18, [x18, ACT_CPUDATAP] ldr x18, [x18, CPU_EXC_VECTORS] /* * Get the handler for this exception and jump to it. */ ldr x18, [x18, #($1 << 3)] br x18 #else b $0 #endif /* __ARM_KERNEL_PROTECT__ */ .endmacro

Finally, Lel0_synchronous_vector_64_long contains the original definition of the exception vector Lel0_synchronous_vector_64 from iOS 11.1:

Lel0_synchronous_vector_64_long: EL0_64_VECTOR mrs x1, TPIDR_EL1 // Load the thread register ldr x1, [x1, TH_KSTACKPTR] // Load the top of the kernel stack to x1 mov sp, x1 // Set the stack pointer to the kernel stack adrp x1, fleh_synchronous@page // Load address for fleh add x1, x1, fleh_synchronous@pageoff b fleh_dispatch64

Thus, Apple has effectively prefixed the original exception vector with some code to restore the kernel mappings and perform an indirect jump (via x18 ) to the original implementation.

The problem is that this prefix code clobbers the value of x18 from userspace before the userspace registers are saved. While both macros clobber x18 , the information leak that we observe is due to BRANCH_TO_KVA_VECTOR . This macro performs an indirect branch to Lel0_synchronous_vector_64_long through register x18 . However, this means x18 is set to Lel0_synchronous_vector_64_long before Lel0_synchronous_vector_64_long has a chance to save the userspace registers. And since the original exception vector implementation does not clear x18 before saving the userspace registers, this makes the clobbered value of x18 available to clients of thread_get_state . The result is that when we call thread_get_state , we end up with a pointer to Lel0_synchronous_vector_64_long in x18 .

Timeline

After I discovered and reported the bug on February 26 and provided a more complete analysis on March 2, Apple managed to have the hole fixed in time for their iOS 11.3 release on March 29. The speed at which this bug was fixed was quite a pleasant surprise, especially given that I initially found the bug on a beta release of iOS 11.3.

However, Apple’s initial security announcement for iOS 11.3 did not mention this bug at all. This was a disappointment, but I contacted Apple and they promptly recognized the issue and agreed to assign a CVE and update the advisory.

While waiting for the updated advisory, a friend sent me a link to the following tweet:

How to defeat KASLR on 11.2.6: 1. Create a new xcode project 2. Close it and delete it, choose 'Delete Immediately' from trash 3. Open extra_recipe instead 4. Add a 2 on line 547 so that "i < 28". 5. Remove line 527 6. Who would win, an American multi billion company or one 2boi — John Åkerblom (@jaakerblom) April 5, 2018

Intrigued, I looked at the GitHub project by John Åkerblom (@jaakerblom and @potmdehex), extra_recipe_extra_bug, that the author mentioned in a reply to the original tweet. It quickly became clear from looking at the source that the leak was coming from Mach exception messages containing register state for a thread. As it turns out, Mach exception messages use the same state that is returned by thread_get_state , which means this is another way of triggering the same bug.

Shortly after that, Viktor Oreshkin (@stek29) published a brief analysis:

So, speaking of info leak (found by @potmdehex I guess): It leaks kernel address of Lel0_synchronous_vector_64_long exception handler.



Here's how you find unslid address (in kernel cache for example): https://t.co/egJA3FI4As — Viktor Oreshkin (@stek29) April 6, 2018

At that point, I decided to publish my work, even though Apple hadn’t updated the advisory yet.

Conclusion

Given how easy it was to detect, I’m quite surprised that this information leak lasted for nearly 3 months before it was discovered. I wouldn’t be surprised to learn that other parties had found the leak earlier than me but didn’t disclose it.

This bug was an all-around pleasure to find, exploit, and analyze. Stumbling onto a security issue by accident is by far my favorite way to find a bug. Not only that, I quite enjoyed the experience of developing a complete proof-of-concept exploit for a serious security vulnerability without writing a single line of code. And to top it all off, I learned that the bug was actually introduced by the mitigation against Meltdown! (Who’d have thought that the fix for a really big information leak would introduce a small information leak?) Quite good fun, and I hope we never see its like again.

Apple assigned this issue CVE-2018-4185 and updated their advisory for iOS 11.3 on July 19, 2018.