THERE are good reasons to cheer the missile attack ordered by Donald Trump on a Syrian air base on April 6th. It sent a message to Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s despot, that America would not tolerate his use of chemical weapons. It also showed that Mr Trump, despite many indications to the contrary, was prepared to act to uphold an international norm and to do so for humanitarian reasons: he was outraged by a nerve-gas attack that killed more than 80 people in the rebel enclave of Idlib. But one barrage doesn’t make a strategy.

Before Mr Trump saw television pictures of poisoned children, he had said that getting rid of Mr Assad was no longer a goal of American policy, as it had been, at least notionally, under Barack Obama. In the week before the chemical attack, both the secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, and America’s UN ambassador, Nikki Haley, had confirmed that shift, thus possibly increasing Mr Assad’s sense of impunity. The priority for Mr Trump was the defeat of Islamic State (IS). Wider questions about Syria’s future would come later.

Inevitably, those questions are now back to the fore. When military force is used, it is reasonable to ask: what next? Various members of the administration have tried to explain the thinking behind the missile strike (see article). Mr Tillerson, on his way to a G7 foreign ministers’ meeting in Italy, castigated the Russians for “incompetence” in failing to restrain their repulsive ally, but said that nothing else had changed. Ms Haley contradicted him, arguing that there could be no peace with Mr Assad still in power. H.R. McMaster, Mr Trump’s national security adviser, tried splitting the difference. Mr Trump himself was uncharacteristically reticent. Confusion reigns.

What might Mr Trump now do about the Syrian regime’s continued use of other indiscriminate weapons against civilians, such as barrel bombs packed with scrap metal? Maybe nothing. But in Italy Mr Tillerson suddenly suggested a new policy of unlimited interventionism, saying: “We rededicate ourselves to holding to account any and all who commit crimes against the innocents anywhere in the world.” A few hours later Sean Spicer, the president’s press secretary, said: “If you gas a baby, if you put a barrel bomb into innocent people, I think you will see a response from this president.” Does that mean that Mr Trump now favours overthrowing Mr Assad? Surely not, for that would mean direct confrontation in the air with Russia and on the ground with Mr Assad’s other ally, Iran.

Instead of confusing rhetoric, the administration should be preparing for the day, fast approaching, when IS in Syria has been thrown out of its “capital” in Raqqa by American-backed Kurdish and Arab forces. When the jihadists no longer hold significant territory, America should be prepared to lead international forces protecting mainly Sunni Arab and Kurdish areas in the east and north of the country from the Assad regime’s attempts to widen its area of control. The temporary de facto partition of Syria offers the best hope of a political settlement that ultimately leads to Mr Assad’s departure. Yet if Mr Trump is thinking about such a plan, there is no sign of it.

Of Putin and predictability

After the missile strike, any lingering notion that Mr Trump might strike a grand bargain with Russia over Syria is dead. The end of his bromance with Vladimir Putin is welcome—America’s interests and Russia’s are so at odds that it was always doomed to fail. However, it would be nice to think that Mr Trump was pursuing a coherent strategy abroad, rather than reacting to what he had just seen on Fox News. Unpredictability has its uses in foreign policy, but it is worrying that even Mr Trump’s closest aides have no idea what he will do next.