Michael McFaul is the former U.S. ambassador to Russia.

Vladimir Putin is everywhere in the Western media these days – glaring at us from the cover of magazines, psychoanalyzed daily on television, lampooned as a bullying tyrant in cartoons. Most portrayals assign sinister intentions to the Russian ruler. Yet, a subtext in many accounts is that Putin is also succeeding. As Time magazine put it, “each new crisis makes him stronger.” Putin may be a bad guy, so this story goes, but he is also shrewd, tough, strategic and smart, outmaneuvering the hapless Western alliance seeking to counter this judo master in the Kremlin.

I disagree. Putin dreams of comparisons with Peter the Great or the Catherine the Great. But if we judge him by his ability to achieve even his own stated goals, his record is not so great. He has achieved some objectives aimed at restoring Russia to the position of global greatness he believes it deserves, but failed at achieving those most important to him. And the future looks even darker.


When I was still the U.S. ambassador to Russia earlier this year, there was much consensus among diplomats, Russian officials, and analysts about Putin’s priorities. Back then, the list was (1) strengthen the Eurasia Economic Union he was trying to forge with the post-Soviet states on Russia’s borders; (2) check American power around the world, including most importantly our alleged policies of regime change in the Middle East and Eurasia; (3) nurture the image of the United States as an enemy, as a way of strengthening Putin’s domestic supporters and weakening his domestic critics; (4) check the expansion of American missile defenses; (5) increase trade and investment; and (6) reclaim Russia’s role as a respected, pivotal power in the international system. One important objective from the past — stop NATO expansion—was not on this list because that objective, many believed, already had been achieved.

To be clear, this would not be my list for making Russia a great power. Like some in Russia (though, I fear, a dwindling minority ), I believe that a more democratic, more market-oriented Russia, which abides by the international rules of the game, is the path to greatness. But over the course of his nearly 15 years in power, Putin has demonstrated that he sees a different path to glory, one that does not involve democratic governance, that is suspicious of private property, and, increasingly, that ignores or circumvents international rules and norms Putin himself used to champion. But let’s not judge Putin by my standards. Let’s evaluate his success with reference to his own, clearly stated agenda.

How is Putin doing on his list? Not so great.

No doubt he has had some victories over the last few years. First, he has helped keep Bashar al-Assad, Russia’s closest ally in the Middle East, in power in Syria, blocking Security Council action and supplying arms and money amidst a brutal civil war. That’s a tragic fact. Second, he has succeeded in convincing most Russians that the United States is an enemy of Russia – and he did so well before this latest crisis over Ukraine and the correspondingly massive anti-Western propaganda on Russian media. In 2010, roughly two-thirds of Russians had a positive view of the United States. Today, the same percentage now has a negative view. Propaganda works. This effective campaign in turn has helped Putin crack down on Russia’s democratic opposition, since they are portrayed as puppets of the United States. Third, he had begun to restore Russia’s international stature, at least before the Ukrainian crisis. His positioning of Russia as a conservative counter to the liberal, decadent West resonated with many around the world, as did his stance in defense of sovereignty and against so-called American interventionism. He somehow was managing to appeal to social conservatives and anti-imperial leftists at the same time. And the Sochi Olympics generated a feel-good vibe about Russia that I have never witnessed before.

His list of recent failures, however, is even more impressive.

Most damagingly, he failed to secure Ukraine’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union—and in fact, his heavy-handed response to that failure is what has triggered the current crisis. With more than 40 million consumers, Ukraine was key to the economic success of the union in ways that tiny Belarus or oil-exporting Kazakhstan, the other members Putin has managed to sign up, were not. Initially, it had looked like Putin might succeed in bribing Ukraine to choose his Eurasian union over the European Union. Putin’s $15 billion “aid package” to Ukraine seemed to have helped convince Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich to postpone signing the accession agreement with the European Union (EU). I was U.S. ambassador in Moscow at the time and I remember how smug some of my Russian government counterparts were about this victory over the EU and by implication, over us. (Those in the Russian government responsible for paying the $15 billion price tag were not so excited.) But then, as we all know, Ukrainians responded. Their protests on Maidan Square stopped any further movement toward Putin’s union. Brilliant move by Putin? I am not so sure.

Having failed to achieve his most desired goal – Ukrainian membership in the Eurasian Union — Putin pursued what he saw as the next best outcome, a Russian-friendly government in Kyiv for as long as possible. In February of this year, European, American, and Russian officials worked together to try to forge a pact between the Yanukovich government and the Ukrainian opposition that would have prolonged Yanukovich’s tenure in office and postponed new elections. Again, however, Ukrainians on Maidan Square said no, and Moscow’s ally, Yanukovich, fled. Putin’s second-best option (and frankly the option also supported by U.S. government at the time) did not succeed.

In response to this second failure, Putin struck back and annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. Before this year, I do not recall Putin ever devoting a major speech to defending the “oppressed” Russians in Crimea or criticizing Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 giveaway of Crimea to his comrades in Ukraine. But Putin’s newfound focus on these alleged injustices from the past helped him justify and complete quickly his occupation of Crimea.

This success, however, came at a very high price for his most important foreign policy objective: By annexing Crimea, Putin has made sure that Ukraine will never join the Eurasian Economic Union. In fact, more than any event in Ukraine’s two decades of independence, Putin’s intervention has accelerated the consolidation of Ukrainian nationhood. Even regions considered “pro-Russian” such as Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa or Kharkiv now embrace their Ukrainian identify more firmly than ever before. In addition, Ukraine’s leadership, including newly elected President Petro Poroshenko, finally seems serious about instituting comprehensive economic reforms, including, most importantly, anti-corruption measures, which if successful will make Ukraine more independent from Russia. In the wake of Putin’s recent blunders, it is hard to imagine how Ukraine could ever shift away from its pro-European orientation and back to a more pro-Russian stance. Russia has lost Ukraine forever. Great for Russia? Definitely not.

Putin also has made his current partners in the Eurasian Union project, Belarus and Kazakhstan, nervous. If Putin feels he has the right to defend ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, will he someday also feel the same obligation to defend ethnic Russians in those countries? Moreover, he has accelerated the signing of EU accession agreements by not only Ukraine but also nervous post-Soviet countries Georgia and Moldova. Realpolitik genius? I don’t see it.

After annexing Crimea, Putin hinted at running a similar play in eastern Ukraine. He reminded the world that the territory he has now started to call “Novorussia” (New Russia) was once part of the Russian empire, and criticized those Bolsheviks who gave this land away. His media took to calling this the “Russian Spring,” claiming in an aggressive campaign that this was practically an echo of the Arab Spring, with Russia as the liberator of the repressed ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine; on Twitter and the Russian social network VKontakte tens of thousands were mobilized to push for Novorussia independence. But that’s effectively all over now. The rebels in eastern Ukraine failed at rallying majorities in eastern Ukraine to embrace their separatist cause. And eventually the Ukrainian military pushed back, recapturing many cities and villages initially captured by the insurgents. Today, Putin never mentions Novorussia. He realizes that “liberating” this region is no longer attainable. Strategic mastermind? I am not so sure.

So now, Putin is holding out for a minimalist objective in eastern Ukraine – a situation best described as constant turmoil and contested sovereignty, which would make the region similar to other so-called “frozen conflicts” in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan left over from the breakup of the Soviet Union but never officially resolved. If the rebellion can fester for years or even decades, then the new regime in Kyiv is less likely to consolidate and the West is less likely to push for EU or NATO expansion to Ukraine, or so the Russian logic seems to go.

Just to be clear, I do not understand why a weak, poor and unstable neighbor would be in the national interest of any country—but Putin hasn’t asked for my definition of the Russian national interest. And besides, Putin is failing to achieve even this minimal goal. As his proxies started to lose ground a few weeks ago, he shipped them more dangerous weapons. We all know the tragic consequences of that decision — the shootdown of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. As the insurgents continue to lose, Putin has upped the ante even higher, shelling Ukrainian targets from Russian territory, and thereby threatening to transform a civil war into an interstate conflict. But Putin’s allies are still losing to the Ukrainian military and its patchwork of allied militias and volunteer forces. Putin the great? Not so much.

He has one option left—invasion. And yet, despite my low marks for Putin as a grand strategist, I still believe that he is too smart to send Russian troops into Ukraine. He must understand that Russian soldiers would sustain losses in the initial fight, and then endure constant guerrilla attacks as an occupying force. The bitter experience of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is still fresh for enough in the Russian military to urge caution. But if he does decide to go in, the long-term negative consequences to Russia’s military, economy and international standing would be enormous. He has no good options left in eastern Ukraine.

Putin’s failed proxy war in eastern Ukraine also has produced a lot of collateral damage to his other foreign policy objectives. If the debate about NATO expansion had drifted to a second-order concern before Putin’s move into Ukraine, it is front and center again now. Likewise, the strengthening of NATO’s capacity to defend its Eastern European members has returned as a priority for the first time in many years. Russian leaders always feared U.S. soldiers stationed in Poland or Estonia, yet that might just happen now. In addition, Putin’s actions in Ukraine have ensured that missile defense in Europe will not only proceed but could expand. And after a decade of discussion without action, Putin has now shocked Europe into developing a serious energy policy to reduce dependence on Russian gas and oil supplies. As a result of Putin’s actions in Ukraine, the United States is now likely to become an energy exporter, competing with Russia for market share. Some call Putin’s policies pragmatic and smart. I disagree.

Before Putin’s actions in Ukraine, nearly every senior Russian government official I spoke with was stressing Russia’s desperate need for increased investment as the only viable means to stimulate growth. Since Putin’s actions in Ukraine, roughly $75 billion has left the country, while tens of billions more of Russian taxpayer money has been spent to defend the ruble and finance more expensive debt. Serious economic sanctions, as well as the specter of new sanctions, imposed by the United States and Europe, are already triggering uncertainty among both Russian and foreign investors and caution among Russian consumers. And the task of integrating Crimea into Russia will costs tens of billions of dollars. Are these economic outcomes in Russia’s national interest? I don’t think so.

New American sanctions on the export of energy technology could be especially damaging to Putin’s agenda. More than once while I was in the U.S. government, I heard Putin explain to U.S. officials that the multibillion-dollar joint venture between Rosneft and ExxonMobil to develop energy deposits in the Arcticwas the most important achievement of U.S.-Russian relations in the last two decades. Many now wonder if this ambitious project can proceed along the timetables originally planned. Brilliant strategist for pursuing Russian national interests? I wonder what Igor Sechin, the head of Rosneft who is now on the U.S. sanctions list, thinks.

And of course the point is much broader than this one deal, no matter how significant. Putin has set in motion new autarkic, anti-modernization tendencies that if continued, will set back Russia’s economic development for decades to come. Putin has tried to justify these growing constraints on trade and investment and greater government ownership as blessings in disguise that will make Russian less dependent on the global economy. (He has even hinted that the Internet might be a dangerous CIA tool designed to undermine Russian sovereignty.) But that’s not exactly a recipe for prosperity: Historically, turning inward and increasing the role of the state in the economy have not often been strategies for economic growth. Remember the collapse of the Soviet Union? It’s hard to see Putin here as a master visionary, bucking decades if not centuries of experience. I would be nervous if I was an entrepreneur living in Russia right now. In fact, many are. That’s why they are leaving Russia.

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International polls show that Russia’s image around the world has suffered serious damage since the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Putin has lost forever his claim to be the world’s defender of state sovereignty. And the downing of Malaysia Airways #17 squandered in one day years of investment in changing Russia’s reputation abroad, including the $50 billion spent on the Sochi Olympics, which were intended to introduce the new, modern Russia to the world. Russia may be feared again, but Russia is not respected. Such a rogue image will deter foreign investment for decades to come, and will constrain Putin’s own ability to cut deals or forge alliances with other world leaders. Was arming the rebels in eastern Ukraine with ground-to-air missiles in Russia’s national interest? So far, it’s hard to see how.

The Putin Paradox Even as his international ratings fall, Putin's ratings within Russia have increased in recent months.

While Putin has tarnished Russia’s image abroad, it’s true he has strengthened his own image at home. That’s a fact. But for how long? Putin’s approval rating hovers well above 80 percent today, but remember that President George W. Bush had 90 percent support from the American people for launching the war against Afghanistan and still over 70 percent approval for invading Iraq, and he obtained these levels of support without controlling Congress or all major television stations as Putin does today. Already, in the wake of the Malaysia Air tragedy, an elite debate has sprouted inside Russia about the wisdom of Putin’s current course. Putin’s own former finance minister, Alexei Kudrin, has warned about the dangerous economic consequences of Russia’s new adventurous foreign policy, a sentiment that Russian businesspeople echo privately. This debate is bound to grow, especially with limited military successes inside Ukraine and continued stagnant economic growth in Russia.

The West, led by the United States, should continue to stimulate this debate – by continuing to confront Putin’s aggressive policies. This does not mean that we will invariably succeed. History is replete with examples over the last 70 years of the United States and our allies failing to deter Kremlin leaders in aggression against their neighbors, be it Ukraine today and Georgia in 2008 or Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956. But neither does that mean we should just stand back. Although we have failed often in stopping Kremlin aggression, we have succeeded at times in making Russian belligerent actions costly. Obama’s response today looks more like Ronald Reagan’s response to the Soviet supported crackdown against the Solidarity protest movement in Poland in December 1981 than weaker responses to other Kremlin interventions. He should continue that course. That was the last time that Washington imposed serious sanctions against Moscow. Reagan and his team did so not because anyone predicted that sanctions would change Russian (or Polish) behavior but because they believed that bad behavior had to be punished. Reagan didn’t immediately change Brezhnev’s mind, but he did help to frame the conflict as one about norms and not just calculating interests, an echo that resonates today in the outrage that should animate our response to Putin’s dismembering of a neighbor whose borders he has legally pledged to secure.

I will admit it. When I was leaving Russia as the U.S. ambassador earlier this year, I was impressed with Putin’s gains. He was leading the anti-American coalition in the world, a role he had joyfully played during the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg in September of last year. He had “succeeded” in Syria, was loving all the positive international publicity that his granting of asylum to American whistleblower Edward Snowden generated for him, and of course there was that spectacular show at the Sochi Olympics.

But he has squandered all these gains with his actions in Ukraine. It’s hard to see right now how he will end up in the history books next to Peter the Great or Catherine — unless, of course, he orders them to be written that way!