The role of the Soviet Union in the struggle against Japan has received considerable attention from politicians and publicists as well as scholars, and the subject continues to hold great interest for a wider audience than is ordinarily available to the academician. The reasons for this interest are not hard to find. They stern, in part, from the controversies aroused by the Yalta Agreement and the decision to use the atomic bomb in 1945. But more fundamentally they reflect a concern over the mounting tensions of the cold war and an effort to find in our wartime relations with the Soviet Union some explanation for the failure to achieve a just settlement and a lasting peace after the greatest war in history.

This emphasis on the controversial political aspects of Soviet involvement in the Far Eastern war has blurred somewhat the military and strategic necessities. At the time, whether rightly or not, these were the most important considerations in the minds of the Allied leaders, and perhaps in the long run they may prove to have been the most decisive. At any rate, it is these, the military factors that governed American relations with the Soviet Union, that I wish to examine here.

Russian interest in the Far East long antedated World War II, but in the period following the Revolution the Bolsheviks had been forced to adopt a passive policy in the region while the Japanese took over Manchuria and much of North China and probed Russian defenses along the Siberian border. After 1939, the Japanese shifted their interests to the south, where the crumbling empires of the British, French and Dutch offered tempting opportunities.

The Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 1941 proved a boon for both countries. It encouraged Japan in its plans for southern expansion by assuring Soviet neutrality in case of war with the United States, and it gave Russia similar assurances in the event of a German attack. As George Kennan remarked, the two countries "-one being confronted with great opportunities, the other with great dangers-agreed for the moment on a moratorium in the rivalry over East Asia."1 Two months after the Pact was signed, Hitler loosed the full fury of the Nazi war machine against his former ally. The Japanese, when the Germans struck, kept their side of the bargain. And when they in turn attacked the United States in December, the Russians kept theirs. Whatever the reasons, at least each made good on his pledge to the other.

Once the United States was in the war, many Americans assumed that the Soviet Union, in common with England and the Associated Powers, would now fight shoulder to shoulder with her Allies against the enemy in Asia as well as in Europe. Notice of this possibility was taken in the press, and on the day after the attack, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull raised the question with Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador. At the same time, General Marshall brought the matter up at a staff conference with Mr. Stimson. And from the Far East came messages from Chiang Kai-shek and General MacArthur, each for his own reasons urging Soviet participation in the war against Japan.2

To all these demands, Stalin turned a deaf ear. Politely but firmly he declined to take any step that might involve him with another enemy on another front. He had his hands full with Germany and was in no position to violate the neutrality pact with Japan. The Americans were sympathetic and readily accepted the Soviet refusal, especially since involvement might weaken the primary effort against Germany.

During 1942, the question of Soviet entry was related principally to the possibility that Japan might attack the Soviet maritime provinces and to the American interest in using air bases in that region to strike at Japan. It was essential to have information about Soviet facilities and forces so that plans could be concerted. The Russians finally consented to an American Military Mission and in July Major-General Follett Bradley left for Moscow. But they showed no disposition to be coöperative and Bradley learned little about Soviet resources or intentions in the Far East.

So long as Stalin persisted in his determination to maintain a scrupulous neutrality toward Japan and avoid a two-front war, all overtures for coöperation in the Far East came to naught. In December 1942, when Roosevelt offered him three heavy bombardment groups (105 planes) for use in the Far East if he would permit Bradley to survey installations in eastern Siberia, Stalin replied that he would be delighted to have the planes, but he needed them on the German front, not in Siberia. Nor would he allow Bradley to make his survey. "It would seem obvious," he told the President, "that Russian military objects can be inspected only by Russian inspectors, just as American military objects can be inspected only by American inspectors. On this matter," he said, "[there] must be no misunderstanding"-all of which has a familiar ring today.3

Still, despite these rejections, American long-range plans continued to be based on the assumption that the Soviet Union would enter the war in the Far East, either on its own initiative or as a result of a Japanese attack. There was, in the opinion of both American and British strategists, a basic conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and Japan. Japan could not enjoy complete strategic security without control of eastern Siberia, and the Soviet Union could not feel secure so long as Japan was based on the Asiatic mainland and in Sakhalin. Though both found it in their interests for the moment to avoid war with the other, the Allied strategists felt that the Russians would probably attack Japan sooner or later, but not before the German threat had been removed. "After that," they declared, "she will make her decision in the light of her own interests and will intervene only when she reckons that Japan can be defeated at a small cost to her."4 Thus, the general strategy agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and Prime Minister stated that after the defeat of Germany, the Allied Powers in the Pacific, with the coöperation, if possible, of Russia, would direct their full resources against Japan to bring about her unconditional surrender.5 Plans for the final phases of the Far Eastern war, therefore, would have to remain tentative until the Russians made clear their intentions.

Signs of the Soviets' willingness to commit themselves appeared first in the fall of 1943 at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Moscow. Representing the United States was Secretary of State Hull, the newly appointed Ambassador, Averell Harriman, and Major-General John R. Deane, head of the Military Mission. Stalin on this occasion proved extremely coöperative. In an expansive mood, he told Mr. Hull "clearly and unequivocally" that once Germany was defeated, the Soviet Union would join the Allies against Japan. Molotov and Vishinsky, in private conversations, made similar statements, and at a party the Russians entertained their guests with a film depicting Japanese penetration of Siberia in 1921, a subtle way, perhaps, of telling the Americans that Japan was the common enemy.6

Though no formal commitment was made at the time, the Americans had every reason to feel confident that they could count on Soviet participation, a feeling that was confirmed by Molotov's assurances to Harriman the following month. Then, at the Tehran Conference at the end of November, Stalin expressed his regret to President Roosevelt that he had not been able to help in the Pacific, but said that after Germany's defeat there would be a "common front" against Japan. The next day, Roosevelt gave Stalin a list of questions which would have to be answered before firm plans for Soviet intervention could be made. And shortly thereafter, at Cairo, the Combined Chiefs approved in principle an over-all plan for the defeat of Japan that included Soviet participation. "We are agreed," they said, "that every effort should be exerted to bring the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date, and that plans should be prepared in that event."7

The mood of optimism over the Soviet attitude proved premature. General Deane was unable to secure any of the detailed information required for planning, and the prospect for closer military collaboration against Japan remained as remote as ever.8 But the American staff continued to work on a plan for the final defeat of Japan. As finally approved at Quebec in September 1944, this plan called, first, for sea and air blockades to reduce Japan's ability and will to resist; and second, for the invasion of the home islands by way of Kyushu and then Honshu and the Tokyo Plain.9 The invasion was expected to be extremely costly, but necessary to secure unconditional surrender.

Hope for coöperation with the Russians revived at the end of September when Stalin inquired of Mr. Harriman and the British Ambassador whether the United States still considered Soviet entry into the war essential. On being assured that it did, Stalin suggested that military conversations begin immediately. Then on October 16, with Churchill and Eden present, he discussed the question of Soviet entry again. On this occasion he spoke freely. The Russians, he said, had 30 divisions and 19 infantry brigades in the Far East, facing Japan's Kwantung Army estimated at 24 divisions and 42 brigades. He would have to move to the Far East, he estimated, about 30 more divisions before he could attack. This move would require 1,000 troop trains, and would take almost three months to complete. Thus, the Allies could expect a Russian declaration of war against Japan about three months after the defeat of Germany. But Stalin promised nothing definitely and noted that "the political aspects have not been fully considered."10 When an American team arrived in Moscow in December 1944, it found that the Russians had no intention of making firm military plans. They seemed interested only in supplies, and insisted on discussing priorities, not operations.

Although official policy continued to call for invasion and Soviet participation, there were some who doubted the wisdom of such a policy and wished, in any case, to delay invasion for a variety of reasons. One highly placed strategist suggested that the Pacific offensive be slowed down and that the United States seek positions on the China coast and a ring of air bases around Japan before trying to land troops on the home islands. The United States could thus force Russia to enter the war before the invasion of Japan, for if the Russians thought the United States would invade in any case, they might wait until the last moment and then move into Manchuria without opposition and at little cost.

This proposal received serious study but was finally rejected.11 One of the main counts against it was that it would delay the defeat of Japan and would involve the United States in unnecessary operations and loss of lives. And whether it would have the desired effect on Russia was by no means certain. Nevertheless, opposition to the invasion was clearly reflected in the preference of Admirals King and Leahy for a strategy of blockade and bombardment and in the support they gave for operations on the coast of China and elsewhere.12 Proponents of this strategy argued that it would remove the need for Soviet participation. If there were no invasion, it would no longer be essential to have the Russians pin down Japan's Kwantung Army.

At the end of 1944, the military planners reviewed Russia's position in the war and found no reason to change their view that Soviet participation would hasten the defeat of Japan and was therefore desirable. But, they went on to say, Russian aid was in no sense an essential condition for Allied victory. They recommended, therefore, that when and if Russia did come in-and they were sure it would-it be given no support that did not contribute directly to the war against Japan.

The timing of Russia's entry, the planners recognized, was all-important. That it could not come until after Germany's defeat was evident. But there was a danger also that the Russians might enter too soon or too late, from the American point of view. Too early an attack might involve the United States in a costly effort to support and supply an ally in danger of defeat; too late an attack might leave the Japanese free to move troops to the home islands at the moment of invasion. For the Americans, the best time for a Russian attack would be about three months before the invasion of Kyushu.

The planners also undertook to review what they thought would be the chief Russian contribution to Japan's defeat. Primarily, Russia's role would be to contain and defeat the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and to prevent reinforcement of the home islands before and during the American invasion. The possibility that the autonomous and supposedly powerful Kwantung Army would continue to fight on even after the defeat of Japanese forces in the home islands could not be ignored either, and Soviet participation would remove that danger. The planners concluded that the United States should seek: first, Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with an ability to engage in offensive operations; secondly, an all-out offensive by Soviet forces against Japanese forces in Manchuria; third, intensive air operations against Japan proper; and, finally, interdiction of the lines of communication between Japan and the mainland of Asia. This statement of principle received the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the President before the Yalta meetings, and provided the basis for plans discussed there.13

By this time, the price the Allies would have to pay for Soviet participation was already known. Meeting with Harriman in December 1944, Stalin explained just what he had meant by "political aspects" in his earlier conversations. The Russians, he said, should have the Kuriles and everything they had lost to Japan in 1905: the southern half of Sakhalin, leases to the port of Dairen, the naval base of Port Arthur, and the Chinese Eastern and the South Manchurian Railroads. In addition, Outer Mongolia was to remain independent and free from Chinese sovereignty.14

Thus, when President Roosevelt left for the meetings with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta in February 1945, he had the assurances of his military advisers, based on the most careful study, that invasion of the Japanese home islands would be necessary to secure the unconditional surrender of Japan, and that the heavy costs of such an operation would be considerably lightened if, several months before, the Russians would attack the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Soviet aid, therefore, was an important condition if not an essential element in the defeat of Japan.

This was a military judgment-one, incidentally, in which both Nimitz and MacArthur later concurred.15 And it was on the basis of this judgment that Roosevelt paid Stalin the price he asked when they met at Yalta. The terms were substantially those presented to Harriman in December 1944 and there was little discussion. The military members did not participate, though they knew about Stalin's price. On February 10, Harriman and Molotov drew up a statement of the agreement and next day the heads of state, including Churchill, signed.

On the military side, the Yalta Conference was less decisive and certainly less controversial. The Russians confirmed that they would declare war on Japan about three months after Germany's surrender and agreed to let the Americans base their B-29s on the lower Amur River. In response to a series of questions from the Americans, the Russian Chiefs of Staff provided full and satisfactory answers, and promised closer coöperation in the future.16

In April 1945, after the death of President Roosevelt, there was a marked shift in the attitude toward Soviet entry. What had appeared extremely desirable at the beginning of the year, by late spring was appearing less so. Victory in Europe was closer than ever and the prospect of bringing large forces to bear against Japan was bright. The B-29s from the Marianas, with fighter support from Iwo Jima, were proving so effective that the need for bases in Siberia seemed less pressing than before. Our ground forces had just landed on Okinawa, most of the Philippines was in American hands, the Imperial Navy had been virtually driven from the sea, and American carrier-based planes were bombing the coastal areas of Japan itself.

This situation was of the greatest importance in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the last few months of the war. Though the Joint Chiefs of Staff still wanted the Red Army to pin down the Kwantung Army, they now had a measure of strategic independence that they had not had before. No longer was there any need to make concessions to the Russians, who were more anxious than they had ever been to coöperate with the Americans. The role of the two Allies had been reversed. "If Russia should slow down or even stop its war effort in Europe and Asia," wrote Admiral Leahy, "no particular harm would be done to our war prospects."17

Concern over the agreements made at Yalta was also a factor in the changed relationship with the Soviet Union. This concern is strikingly revealed in an exchange between Joseph Grew, then acting Secretary of State, and Mr. Stimson. Seeking to define the postwar political goals of the United States in the Far East, Grew asked Stimson three questions:

1. Is the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war at the earliest possible moment of such vital interest to the United States as to preclude any attempt by the United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to certain desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to such entry?

2. Should the Yalta decision in regard to Soviet political demands in the Far East be reconsidered or carried into effect in whole or in part?

3. Should a Soviet demand, if made, for participation in the military occupation of the Japanese home islands be granted, or would such occupationadversely affect our long-term policy for the future treatment of Japan?18

Stimson's reply is most revealing. "The War Department," he said, "considers that Russian entry . . . will be decided by the Russians on their own military and political basis with little regard to any political action taken by the United States. . . . While the U.S.S.R. will seek and will accept any political inducement proffered by the United States as a condition to her entry into the war against Japan, such political inducements will not in fact affect the Russian decision as to when, if ever, she will enter the war." But, he said, "Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives."

Stimson's second point was that the concessions made at Yalta dealt with matters which were well within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of U.S. military action short of war. "Furthermore," he said, "the Russians can, if they choose, await the time when U.S. efforts will have practically completed the destruction of Japanese military power and can then seize the objectives they desire at a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by their entry into the war at an early date."

"It appears," Stimson concluded, "we can bring little, if any, military leverage to bear on the Russians . . . unless we choose to use force. From the military point of view it would be desirable to have a complete understanding and agreement with the Russians concerning the Far East. If it is believed that the reconsideration of the Yalta Agreement will assist such a complete understanding and agreement, then the War Department would favor it, but it is not believed that much good will come of a rediscussion at this time."19

Meanwhile, planning for the invasion of Japan had gone forward without interruption. In June, when preparations for the Potsdam Conference were being made, President Truman asked for a review of these plans. As a result of this review, which produced no new information and a reaffirmation of the importance of Soviet assistance, the President ordered preparations for the invasion to continue. Already Harry Hopkins, who had gone to Moscow in May, had learned from Stalin that the Red Army would be ready to attack Manchuria on August 8.20

The fact that the Japanese were virtually defeated was well understood by military and political leaders alike before the Potsdam Conference. But defeat did not mean "unconditional surrender," the announced war aim of the Allies. As the Army planners told Stimson, "The point at which the Japanese will accept defeat and agree to our terms is unpredictable. . . . Probably it will take Russian entry into the war coupled with a landing or imminent threat of landing, on Japan proper by us, to convince them of the hopelessness of their position."21 The Japanese Army was still considered strong and well disciplined, with a strength of about five million men. Two million of these, well supplied with ammunition, would be stationed in the home islands, and judging from past experience, they could be expected to resist fanatically to the very end.22 Neither blockade nor bombing alone would produce an unconditional surrender before the date already decided for invasion.

Thus, when the American delegation left for Potsdam in July 1945, three things seemed clear: (1) Japan could not be brought to unconditional surrender by blockade and bombardment alone. (2) Invasion of the home islands-Kyushu in November 1945 and Honshu the following March-would be necessary. (3) The entry of Russia would facilitate the invasion and was therefore to be encouraged.

But at the same time, few of the military leaders were eager for Soviet intervention or as willing to make concessions as they had been at an earlier period. And there was a strong feeling that even if Soviet entry was not desired it would be impossible to prevent it. Ambassador Harriman believed "that Russia would come into the war regardless of what we might do, and that, in the end, Moscow would exercise control over whatever government might be established in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia."23

The conference at Potsdam, most recently chronicled by Herbert Feis, was the prelude to Allied victory and Japanese disaster. The atom bomb had been tested and the date of Russian entry into the war against Japan had been set. All conditions for Japan's defeat had been met except the terms of "unconditional surrender," and these were laid down in the Potsdam Declaration. The text of the Declaration was approved by the British at Potsdam and by the Chinese, but Russia was not informed, ostensibly because she was still neutral. In view of Soviet agreement to attack Japan and in view of the discussions already held, this was an obvious legalism. The true explanation lies perhaps in the fact that some thought the United States could end the war before the Russians entered. As Byrnes remarked on July 28, he was "anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in."24 Some may also have felt that Russia might construe the Potsdam Declaration as an unfriendly gesture by an ally who had previously pressed for intervention in Asia and now was seeking a Japanese surrender to avoid the commitments made to secure that intervention.

In Japan, the receipt of the Declaration led to frantic meetings to decide what should be done. The Japanese had approached the Russians earlier in an effort to secure Soviet mediation to end the war, and Ambassador Sato was then waiting in Moscow for an answer.25 The Americans knew of these overtures, having intercepted the messages between Sato and the Japanese Foreign Office.26 Stalin had mentioned the matter also to Truman and Churchill during the Conference. But the Declaration took no cognizance of these overtures and only repeated the demand for unconditional surrender, with the threat of military destruction if the demand was not met.27

The Japanese finally decided to ignore the Declaration until a reply was received from Moscow. But under pressure from the military, the Japanese Government issued a statement to the people that was taken by the Allies to mean a rejection. Meanwhile, in Moscow, Ambassador Sato was seeking vainly to get a response from the Soviet Government. He would have to wait, he was told, until Stalin and Molotov returned from Potsdam-and that would not be until August 6. Finally, at 5:00 p.m. on the 8th, two days after the bombing of Hiroshima, Sato had his interview with Molotov. At the appointed hour, the Japanese Ambassador arrived at the Kremlin only to be greeted with the Russian declaration of war, effective the following day.28 With this act, three months to the day after Germany's surrender, Russia lived up to its promise to the Allies-but violated the pledge it had made to Japan in April 1941 and which still had nine months to run. On the morning of the 9th, Soviet troops went into action on the Manchurian front, and an American B-29 dropped a second atomic bomb on Japan. The Japanese offer of surrender followed almost immediately, and five days later the war against Japan came to an end.

It is always risky to attempt to draw lessons from the past, especially, as in this case, when the past is so imperfectly known and so controversial. The historian is rightly skeptical of all such efforts. Still, with all the qualifications and reservations that must be made, it may be useful to try to draw some relevant conclusions from our wartime relations with the Soviet Union. First, it seems fair to say that on the basis of this historical record there is little reason to believe that the Soviet Union will accept inspection of a disarmament or test-ban agreement. The Russians would not permit inspection during the war when we were their Allies and when they needed our help desperately; there is even less likelihood that they will agree to it now.

A second point worth noting is that the Russians kept their pledge to the Allies about coming into the Far Eastern war. This in itself is not as significant as the timing of their entry. They could have delayed, though some will argue that the bombing of Hiroshima forced them to come in when they did. We do not know whether this was actually the case; nor are we completely certain whether the atomic bomb or the Soviet declaration of war weighed more heavily with the Japanese. But we do know that, whatever the reasons, Stalin kept the promise he had given at Yalta.

The decision to seek Soviet participation provides one of the clearest examples in recent history of the subordination of the political to the military considerations of policy. No one can study these negotiations and not be struck by the almost complete absence of political representation. Here was a matter involving political considerations of the highest importance, yet it was not until near the very end of the war, after the political questions had been settled, that the State Department was brought in at all. As a matter of fact, when Stettinius offered his services at the time of the Yalta meetings, Roosevelt declined the offer politely.29 Throughout, he treated Soviet entry primarily as a military matter, and it was apparently on the advice of the Joint Chiefs, who viewed the problem in purely military terms, as they should, that he made his decision to pay the price of Soviet intervention. Perhaps he had no other choice, since Stalin could have taken what he asked for anyhow. Or perhaps Roosevelt wanted to get Stalin's coöperation for the postwar settlement. But these in themselves might not have justified the price Stalin asked. That justification Roosevelt found in the strategy of his military advisers, for it was their plans rather than postwar political aims that established with inexorable logic the requirement for Soviet intervention.

Finally, if Soviet entry was based on military necessity, that necessity sprang from an inflexible and unrealistic political goal-the unconditional surrender of Japan. This was the announced war aim of the Allies, made, so far as is known, without any reference to the military. Yet it had enormous implication for the planners. What it did was impose on them a strategy of invasion and total destruction. In the case of Japan, such a strategy was unnecessary, for Japan was already defeated and seeking a way out of the war. But the unconditional-surrender formula could not be changed at this late date, and so the military went ahead with their plans for the invasion. It was this which made Soviet intervention desirable and played so large a role in the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.30 Perhaps, then, the greatest lesson we can draw from this experience with the Soviet Union is, first, the importance of maintaining a proper balance between the political and military elements of policy, one of the most difficult tasks of a democracy; and, secondly, the danger of complex and inflexible war plans that may themselves commit the nation to a course from which there is no return. In an age of intercontinental missiles and thermonuclear warheads, no nation can afford to overlook these lessons. 1 "Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin." Boston: Little Brown, 1961, p. 371. 2 These conversations and messages, and subsequent actions, are described in several works: Cordell Hull, "The Memoirs of Cordell Hull," 2 volumes (New York: Macmillan, 1948); Maurice Matloff and E. M. Snell, "Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942" (Washington: G.P.O., 1953); Louis Morton, "The Fall of the Philippines" (Washington: G.P.O., 1953) and "Strategy and Command" (in press); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, "Stilwell's Mission to China" (Washington: G.P.O., 1953). The author has examined the sources cited in each case. 3 Radio message, Stalin to Roosevelt, January 13, 1943. See also radio messages, Roosevelt to Stalin, January 8, and Stalin to Roosevelt, January 5. 4 The relevant paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated August 6, 1943, is contained in the Department of Defense pamphlet, "The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945," September 1955. Many of the J.C.S. and Combined Chiefs of Staff documents cited in this article can be found in that source. 5 Memo by C.C.S., May 25, 1943: "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (Trident Conference)," C.C.S. 242/6. 6 Hull, "Memoirs," v. 2, p. 1113 and 1309-10. The original messages by Harriman and Deane are quoted in "Entry of the Soviet Union," op. cit., p. 21-22. 7 Memo by J.C.S., December 3, 1943: "Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944," C.C.S. 397. 8 For an account of the difficulties experienced by General Deane on this occasion and subsequently, see his "Strange Alliance" (New York: Viking Press, 1947) and Harriman's reports and messages in "Entry of the Soviet Union" and in "Military Situation in. the Far East" (MacArthur Hearings) Part 5, (Washington: G.P.O., 1951). 9 Report to the President and Prime Minister, September 15, 1944, C.C.S. 680/1. 10 In addition to the sources cited above, see messages and papers contained in "Foreign Relations of the United States" (Yalta Papers) (Washington: G.P.O., 1955), p. 361-400; and Matloff, op. cit. 11 Louis Morton, "National Policy and Military Strategy," The Virginia Quarterly Review, Winter 1960, p. 11. 12 For Leahy's and King's views, see Leahy, "I Was There" (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 312 et seq.; King and Whitehill, "Fleet Admiral King" (New York: W. W. Norton, 1952), p. 591-2. 13 J.C.S. 1176/6, January 18, 1945, approved January 24, 1945. 14 Harriman to Roosevelt, December 15, 1944, p. 378; Harriman Statement, MacArthur Hearings, op. cit., Part 5, p. 3330. 15 MacArthur's and Nimitz's views are given in detail in messages sent to Marshall and King, and in "The Forrestal Diaries," edited by Walter Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 31. The messages are quoted in "Entry of the Soviet Union," op. cit., p. 50-52. 16 Memo, Roosevelt to Stalin, February 5, 1945; Leahy to Roosevelt, February 6, 1945; and Draft of Final Report to President and Prime Minister, February 8, 1945. 17 Leahy, "I Was There," op. cit., p. 351. 18 Memo, Grew to Stimson, May 12, 1945, in "Entry of the Soviet Union," op. cit., p. 69-70. See also notes on Conference with Grew, Harriman, Bohlen, Forrestal, et al, on Relations with Russia, May 12, 1945. 19 Stimson to Grew, May 21, 1945 (prepared by General G. A. Lincoln, edited by General Marshall, and reviewed by John J. McCloy), quoted in "Entry of the Soviet Union," op. cit., p. 69-70. 20 Robert E. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins" (New York: Harper, 1948, p. 887-912) contains extracts from Hopkins' record of his meeting with Stalin. "Foreign Relations of the United States" (Potsdam Papers, 2 volumes. Washington: G.P.O., 1960) contains a full record of the preparations and planning for the meeting at Potsdam as well as of the meeting itself. The memoirs cited above as well as those of Henry L. Stimson, "On Active Service in Peace and War" (New York: Harper, 1948) and Byrnes, "Speaking Frankly" (New York: Harper, 1947) are of value here. 21 Operations Division, War Department General Staff, Draft Memo, Chiefs of Staff for Secretary of War, no date: Study by General Lincoln, June 4, 1945, quoted in Ray S. Cline, "Washington Command Post" (Washington: G.P.O., 1951), p. 344. 22 C.C.S. 643/3, Report by Combined Intelligence Committee, July 8, 1945: Estimate of the Enemy Situation. 23 Leahy, "I Was There," op. cit., p. 369. 24 Byrnes, op. cit., p. 205-6, 207; "The Forrestal Diaries," op. cit., p. 55, 78. 25 For a fun account of these negotiations, see "Potsdam Papers," v. 1, p. 873-902; v. 2, p. 1250-64; Robert J. C. Butow, "Japan's Decision to Surrender" (Stanford University Press, 1954); U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "Japan's Struggle to End the War" (Washington: G.P.O., 1946); Takushiro Hattori, "Complete History of the Greater East Asia War" (Japan: Masu Shobo, 1953), v. 4; Herbert Feis, "Japan Subdued" (Princeton University Press, 1961). 26 "The Forrestal Diaries," op. cit., p. 74-77. 27 "Potsdam Papers," op. cit., v. 1, p. 884-902; v. 2, p. 1265-90. The Declaration is on p. 1474-6. See also John Ehrman, "Grand Strategy," v. 6, October 1944-August 1945 (H.M.S.O., 1956), p. 461-4; and Winston Churchill, "Triumph and Tragedy" (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 641-2. 28 Butow, op. cit., p. 142-9, 153-4; Ehrman, op. cit., p. 469; Hattori, op. cit., v. 4, p. 153; "Potsdam Papers," op cit., v. 2, p. 1474, note 1. The Japanese response to the Declaration can be traced in Kazuo Kawaii, "Mokusatsu," Pacific Historical Review, November 1950, p. 409-14; William J. Coughlin, "The Great Mokusatsu Mistake," Harper's, March 1953, p. 31-40. 29 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., "Roosevelt and the Russians." Garden City: Doubleday, 1949, p. 95. 30 Louis Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Foreign Affairs, January 1957, p. 334-353.