How The Nazis Used Gun Confiscation to Exacerbate the Holocaust

To what extent did the Nazis address the perceived threat of an armed Jewish population through the 1928 and 1938 German Weapons Acts?

Advertisements

By Ali Mecklai, Jan 4 2020

Introduction

In a modern context, one may be inclined to believe the relevance of Nazi firearm policy would not be a matter of significance, only to be conjured in the mind of a handful of historians attempting to make something out of what is simply not there. This however is not the case. By considering the 1928 and 1938 Weapons Acts, many parallels can be drawn to legislation being passed around the contemporary world today. By only evaluating these recent policies in isolation, a full grasp of what history may have said about it would be ignored, therefore, it is not only imperative to apply what has been learnt in the past today in a legislative and political sense, but in the larger context of the possible implications for a population in the future. It is for these reasons why the question To what extent did the Nazis address the perceived threat of an armed Jewish population through the 1928 and 1938 German Weapons Acts is of such importance to research.



Passed just one day after Kristallnacht, the Weapons act of 1938 defined Nazi weapons/firearms policy. However, the Weapons Acts of 1928 and 1938 were the product of two very different phenomenons. Both resulted in a new government arm with regards to firearms possession and distributions from previous laws, however the underlying difference between the acts of 1928 and 1938 would be that the 1938 German Weapons act would specifically target the firearms of Jews and “undesirables” as well as easing regulations on pro NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) individuals. Furthermore, the intentions of the laws were considerably different. While the 1928 revisions were set in the midst of the post Versailles turmoil in the hopes of preserving the sovereignty of the Weimar Republic , the 1938 revisions, signed by Hitler, sought to redefine German weapons policy to suit the endeavours of the NSDAP. Despite intention, the results expressed by the former 1928 German Weapons Act would prove to be useful to the Nazis, as it set the foundations and the tools needed to carry out the intentions of the 1938 Weapons Act which would pave way to the subsequent disarming of the Jewish population.



Much of the work Hitler needed to do in order to negate the threat of an armed Jewish population had already been done by the 1928 provisions. Refusing weapons to gypsies had already been passed by the law, but more importantly were the aspects of the gun registries and sweeping weapons restrictions. Under the 1928 law, the onerous process of obtaining a firearms affected the entirety of German society and in 1938, the previous restrictions allowed the Nazis to specifically target the Jews. Under the 1938 Law, “Persons who, according to the Nürnberg law, are regarded as Jews, are forbidden to possess any weapon.” Strictly enforcing this law and its legislative counterpart, the National Socialists considerably negated the threat of an armed Jewish population.

By virtue of the policies passed, the National Socialists had taken serious and undeniable action to deny Jews the ownership of firearms which serves to exacerbate the case that not having firearms in the hands of Jews was indeed a priority, thus, through the 1928 and 1938 German Weapons Acts the Nazis considerably negated the threats of an armed Jewish population.



Investigation



This investigation will be broken down into two main components which are based off of the premises set within the research question. The first premise being to the extent that the National Socialists perceived an armed Jewish population as a threat and the second being how effective they were at negating such a threat.



The “Threat”



By the time of the passing of the 1938 German Weapons Act, German Jews accounted for less than 1 per-cent of the German population. Being such a small portion of the greater population, the physical threat that an armed Jewish population could pose upon the full forces of Adolf Hitler could be considered to be at best inconsequential, and at worst unnoticeable. For the Nazi leadership, American Historian Alan Steinweis accepts that they too thought this way. Steinweis references the 1938 Weapons act to disarm the Jews as solely being a feature of National Socialist propaganda to inspire antisemitism. Thus maintaining that the 1938 Weapons Law was not of any consequence to any collective involved in the Holocaust. This is based upon his belief that the Weapons act of 1938 was merely a propaganda scheme and acted as a pretext to Kristallnacht, citing from his New York Times article; “The newly imposed ban on Jewish ownership of weapons must be understood as an element of the propaganda campaign launched by the Nazi regime in the wake of the pogrom. As a pretext for the Kristallnacht, the Nazis had seized upon the assassination of a low-ranking German diplomat by the Jewish teenager Herschel Grynszpan in Paris on Nov. 7. Then, in order to justify the orgy of anti-Jewish violence retroactively, the regime tried to depict German Jews as posing a physical danger to the German population as a whole.” Steinweis maintains that the 1938 Weapons Act was the product of the changing societal attitudes within Germany and had little to do with them being a physical threat, and that Nazi policy on Jewish ownership of firearms was orthogonal to any Nazi policy regarding Jews and had little to do with the threat of an armed Jewish population.



This argument adheres to a structural application of this history, as it primarily considers the influences of the everchanging structure within German society prevailing as a result of widespread anti semitism. Steinweis concurs that, if the opposite were true (being that the Nazis perceived an armed Jewish population as a threat as opposed to a mere scapegoat and/or political tool), “why did it (The Nazis) wait more than five years to issue such a law, and why did it limit licensure to handguns?” Here, Steinweis refers to the easing of restrictions within the 1938 law with regards to handguns. Admittedly, it is understood amongst historians on all sides of the spectrum that the 1938 law relaxed regulations in many aspects for supporters at least of the National Socialists. This claim made by Steinweis however neglects some of the evidence which may suggest otherwise. Foremost, it is misleading that the Nazis took five years to issue such a law. This is because Steinweis implies lack of regulation before the 1938 law whereas in reality, laws including the 1928 Weapons Acts and some revisions passed in 1933 (which was the year in which the gun registries switched hands from the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich) were continually being enforced in the build up towards 1938 – these laws being very restrictive in their nature. Furthermore, drafting of the 1938 law had begun in 1933, therefore the 1938 law was not representative of the origins of gun control for the Jews in Germany, rather it was the unique circumstance which modified gun control to aid in Nazi endeavours more effectively than before. Steinweis ignores the context for the limiting of licensure for handguns as well.



Nazi minister of the Interior, Wilhelm Frick, introduced the 1938 Weapons Act with specific intentions, one of these being to ease the regulations on pro NSDAP individuals. However in order to do this Frick saw it as necessary to first disarm all other groups – specifically Jews, thus the easing of regulations such as the the limiting of licensure for handguns only applied to the people who were pure according to the standards of the Third Reich. This had been made clear by Frick himself, as in mid-1933, Frick wrote to the other members of the cabinet, “If these provisions guarantee that no enemies of the National Socialist state possess any weapons, then it is justifiable and appropriate to relax the current limiting provisions of the Weapons Law for the population faithful to the state.” Considering that Jews were viewed by Frick as enemies of the state and unfaithful, in a similar category to communists and liberals politically speaking, the 1938 law seems to have been less so drafted to create anti Jewish fervour as Steinweis suggests, but to have been a prerequisite of the security of the Nazi state. These sentiments are expressed by University of Columbia historian Bernard E Harcourt who takes an individualist approach to the intent of the 1938 law. Harcourt believes that Frick played an extensive role in disarming the Jewish population because they posed a threat to the state. As stated by Harcourt, “What is clear from Frick’s memos to Hitler’s cabinet and from the section-by-section analysis of the proposed reforms, is that Frick intended some deregulation of firearms laws, but was concerned about implementing these and more deregulatory initiatives until Nazi ideology had more pervasively permeated the general population.” Thus, as Harcourt suggests, in order for the National Socialists to first relax some aspects of the gun laws (as Steinweis pointed out), they first had to refuse, register, and apprehend the arms of Jews and those like Jews.



Similar to the opinion of historian Stephen Halbrook, Harcourt suggests that the drafters of the 1938 law believed that “the Weapons Law (1938) should be amended in its entirety only after the German people has been permeated with the National Socialist ideas to the degree that we no longer have to fear extensive armed Nazi Firearms Law and the Disarming of the German Jews”. This contradicts points also made by historian Michael Kater who stated in an email that “it was the least of Nazi worries that the Jews would be armed to offer resistance because they had firearms.” Kater references the accounts of historian and Holocaust survivor Saul Friedlander who examines the causes of the Nazi genocide, and suggests that weapons laws were not part of it. However, Nazi belief in gun confiscation to necessitate security, particularly against Jews, could be summarized with what the Fuhrer himself has said, “The most foolish mistake we could possibly make would be to allow the subject races to possess arms. History shows that all conquerors who have allowed their subject races to carry arms have prepared their own downfall by so doing.” Although being quoted from after the weapons acts, in 1941, Hitler reveals his belief that if the 1938 Weapons law was not passed and enforced, and that the “subject races” (Jews) were allowed to possess arms, the downfall of the Third Reich may have taken place prematurely. Bernard. E Harcourt acknowledges Hitler’s intention of the 1938 law saying that, “the Nazis were intent on killing Jewish persons and used the gun laws and regulations to further the genocide.”



The 1928 Law



1928 followed nearly a decade of economic turmoil within the rapidly declining Weimar Republic. Growing political divide between National Socialists, Communists, and the moderates in power shattered the pillars of German civil society including discourse, and to a wide extent, the rule of law. This unruliness was intensified by high unemployment as well as hyper inflation and deflation in the aftermath of the First World War. Responsive to the expanding political divide and fractiousness of the growing number of National Socialist and Communist radicals, the ruling moderate parliamentarians of the Reichstag under the Social Democratic Party sought to enact The Law on Firearms and Ammunitions or also known as the 1928 German Weapons Act. On July 13th 1928 the minister of interior Carl Severing imposed this law upon all German citizens which enforced new regulations on gun owners and manufacturers. In this arrangement Germans could possess firearms but would have to prove competency and a need for the weapon. As stated within the law, ownership would be permitted to “…persons whose trustworthiness is not in question and who can show a need for a (gun) permit.” Furthermore, a complicated scheme of licences and regulations placed upon dealers, owners, and manufacturers, made the process quite strenuous for ordinary civilians. However, the act did revoke the explicit ban on firearm ownership imposed on Germany in 1919. Despite this, a high number of privately owned firearms were held in Germany as a result of the First World War which served as more of a reason to regulate and licence them as opposed to leaving them in the hands of potentially dangerous individuals. The laws of 1928 sought to restrain a seemingly unregulated environment of chaos and upheaval as the Weimar Republic grew ever more unstable. Most notably, the dangerous rise of both Nazism and Communism were paramount in the decision of the Weimar Republic to regulate and register these firearms, as they feared them getting into the wrong hands. As stated by Dr. Hagemann in 1931, a member of the higher administrative court in Berlin, “Weapons and firearms often end up in the hands of radical political organizations, which can only acquire them through weapons smuggling or other illegal means.” Thus reaffirming his support for registries in the Berlin based law magazine, Jerusin Zeitung. Ironically, what would end up in the wrong hands was not the weapons, but the registries of such weapons as in 1933 the Nazis would acquire such documents, and subsequently use the information provided to seize unfortified weapons and raid the homes of Jewish gun owners.



Well known Olympian, Jew, and Holocaust victim Alfred Flatow registered 3 handguns before 1928. By virtue of the 1928 revisions, Flatow was forced to register all three firearms with the authorities before giving both his name and address to police. In that time the government ordered all of the registrations records to be kept securely. Many of these records were within a strictly enforced and government checked firearms dealers book so that “No extremist group could ever obtain them (weapons)”. However, in 1938 the same registry used to protect Flatow from extremists was used against him by those very same extremists – being the NSDAP. On October 4th 1938, the records were used to find Flatow and seize his weapons just as what was used for many other Jews who previously owned firearms. The tactic of using gun registries created under the 1928 law to search for “Jewish” names and / or addresses was not limited for Jews. Political opponents of the Nazis were also subject to search, seizure, and subsequent arrest for possessing firearms. Flatow, along with countless other individuals, were sentenced to 20 years into a concentration camp, however just 3 years later Flatow died in the camp.



Under the 1928 law, the onerous process of obtaining a firearms limited the amount of permits given. In the town of Northeim, for example, which at the time had a population of 10,000 people, only 9 permits were given.



Under 1928 law, permits would be refused to gypsies or “persons who are itinerant like Gypsies. The utilisation of firearms laws against Gypsies, would be used in the same way against Jews in 1938. Similar to the 1938 law, the 1928 law provided exemptions to “officials of the central government, the states, as well as the German Railways Company” or by “community officials to whom the highest government authority has permitted acquisition without an acquisition permit.”Practically however, those who were connected well but not part of the government also did not have to adhere as strictly to restrictions in both 1928 and 1938.

Perhaps most notable of all incidents of the exceptions of the 1928 law may come from Berlin socialite and closeted Jew, Bella Fromme. Fromme, who held a high status position as a result of her journalism was invited to a reception on the evening of March 29th, 1933 hosted by Vice Chancellor, Frau Von Papen. Not strictly regulated under previous laws, partly due to her status, partly due to the nature of the laws, Fromme possessed a revolver. Successfully avoiding all check ups which could have possibly revealed her Jewish origin, Fromme was able to live her life with relative accordance with any other Berlin socialite. At this reception, none other than Adolf Hitler would show up, making his first appearance at such an event as newly positioned Chancellor. As written in her memoirs, the Fuhrer spoke with her, and proceeded to kiss her hand which gave Fromme “Slight Nausea”. As what was going through the mind of Fromme as written in her diary, “Weird ideas flashed through my mind, why did I not have my revolver with me?” Distraught, Fromme ended the conversation with the Fuhrer with him again giving her a kiss on the hand once more, as to what Fromme would regret to not do – shoot Adolf Hitler. Being a polite lady and not having her revolver with her, Fromme, while wiping her Fuhrer touched hand on a friend’s sleeve, jokingly said “He’s supposed to smell a jew 10 miles away, Isn’t he? I guess his sense of smell isn’t working tonight.”



Under the Guise of the 1928 registrations the Nazis raided home after home searching for arms, particularly from Jewish households. Notably, the home of then absent Albert Einstein was raided only to find a bread knife, nevertheless a soon to be punishable offence. Such raids were described in Feuchtwanger’s, The Oppermanns, (a book ordered by Hitler to be burned) whereas an account of the raids is described. Although being based in a city with a fictional name, the events did in fact occur.



See Appendix A



Feuchtwanger further describes weapons raids to Jewish homes in other cities as well. “A number of population were searched for weapons” and subsequently mistreated he states in his book. One such circumstance of this was a police raid the home of an elderly lady who died in her bed when her house was raided. From the 1928 laws regarding registration, the Nazis could easily identify Jews by virtue of addresses, such as in high Jewish population areas, and through last names which indicate Jewish heritage. One such instance of this is in 1933 whereas by utilising the registries of 1928 the Nazis in the city of Breslau could find Jews easily, as stated in an April 22nd police report:



“All persons now or formerly of the Jewish faith who hold permits to carry arms or shooting licenses must surrender them forthwith to the police authorities.” Justified on the grounds that Jewish citizens have allegedly used their weapons for unlawful attacks on members of the Nazi organization and the police. Inasmuch as the Jewish population “cannot be regarded as trustworthy,” it is stated, permits to carry arms will not in the future be issued to any member thereof.” Subsequently through registries, many of the some 10,000 jews in the city were identified and raided.



The 1928 law extended its scope by being a more enforceable improvement in state control of firearm ownership. All aspects of firearms policy were covered from the assembly to the transfer. Even as noted in the law, “The reloading of cartridge cases is considered to be the same as the manufacture of ammunition.” If the 1928 Act would have been any less restrictive in its nature, perhaps the road to 1938 would seem less clear for Hitler. However, it is in spite of these exemptions in which the law allowed for the National Socialists to undermine the effectiveness of an armed Jewish population.

The 1938 Law



On November 9th, 1938 the New York Times reported from Berlin;



“The Berlin Police President, Count Wolf Heinrich von Helldorf, announced that as a result of a police activity in the last few weeks the entire Jewish population of Berlin had been “disarmed” with the confiscation of 2,569 hand weapons, 1,702 firearms and 20,000 rounds of ammunition. Any Jews still found in possession of weapons without valid licenses are threatened with the severest punishment.”



See Appendix B and C

Policies such as these could be described as a method for the Nazis to secure themselves domestically and to repel any threat that the Jews may pose if armed. As stated by Stephen Halbrook, Nazi policies prohibiting possession of firearms helped to consolidate Hitler’s power at home, exacerbated persecution of Jews, aiding their arrest and deportation, and foreshadowed some of the most sever policies undertaken during the war.”

In response to Nazi leadership in Germany, the 1938 revisions echoed a far more specific sentiment more to the tune of Adolf Hitler than to Paul Von Hindenburg and the Social Democratic Party when the 1928 revisions were passed. Under these new revisions, Jews were the first to be put on the receiving end of this law. Superseding previous law stating that permits were only to be given to people of “trustworthiness”, the case for disarmament of the Jewish population was that “the Jewish population “cannot be regarded as trustworthy”. Thus, by utilizing the same justifications as the 1928 revisions, with a change of rhetoric the Nazis could make some of their first advances against the Jewish population. Much of the contents of the changes directed towards Jews were carried out immediately including but not limited to searches, seizures, and arrest warrants. Through the 1938 law the identities could easily be found from registries previously made, specifically in 1928. “It was those same laws that authorized confiscation of firearms from persons not deemed trustworthy.” Naturally, this would single out the people who could use weapons to enforce the Nazi agenda, not to oppose it.



See Appendix D and E

The 1938 law allowed for even further and extensive raids of Jewish arms and to expand government control of firearm registries. It also allowed local police authorities to persecute Jews based off of the laws such as the one below:

Nazi government order of the immediate seizure of weapons from Jews as ordered by the SS



Translation of text:



The SS Reichsführer and German Police Chief has issued the following Order:

Persons who, according to the Nürnberg law, are regarded as Jews, are forbidden to possess any weapon. Violators will be condemned to a concentration camp and imprisoned for a period of up to 20 years.



See Appendix F



The law of 1938, as characterized by Bernard E Harcourt stated that, “Hitler imposed regulations prohibiting Jewish persons from possessing any dangerous weapons, including firearms. The Nazi regime implemented this prohibition by confiscating weapons, from Jewish persons, and subsequently engaged in genocide of the Jewish population.”



Conclusion



Through the 1928 and 1938 Weapons Acts, a binge of anti Jewish fervour and police action had taken hold of Germany. These being from the home raids searching and seizing weapons to Kristchnallt and the justification of the destruction of Jewish property, the Nazis effectively (re)introduced a strong government arm within the area of firearm ownership – particularly for Jews. What is clear from the internal memos of minister of the interior, Wilhelm Frick, and quotes from other prominent Nazi figures, including Hitler, is that the Nazis deemed it necessary to the security of the Nazi state, that Jews not have weapons. Through the 1938 Weapons Act, with the aid of the registries and established legislation of the 1928 Weapons Act, the Nazis successfully addressed this problem. Not only did the laws allow for Jews to be disarmed, but also allowed for a more efficient manner of identifying and persecuting Jews. Thus it can be stated that the Nazis took serious and undeniable action to address the perceived threat of an armed Jewish population both effectually and definitively.

Appendix

Specificalities of the Law (1928):

The regulations of the 1928 German Weapons act includes but is not limited to;



All weapons and ammunitions were to be licenced

Licences were required to transfer any firearms, which were defined as “weapons from which a bullet or a load of pellets may be driven through a barrel, by means of the development of an explosive gas or air pressure”.

Permits required to be renewed every year

Serial numbers were required to be attached to all firearms by manufacturers

20 years of age were required for owning firearms

Permits only were to be extended to one handgun per person. Longuns, shotguns, and other firearms in any quantity other than one would need additional licensing.

Manufacturers were required to keep Firearms Dealer’s Book which would provide the following information: Serial Numbers Quantity and type of firearm Stamped signature by police to ensure validity Manufacturer signature to ensure authenticity Name and address of person who would acquire the firearm



The Firearms Dealer’s Book was strictly regulated and enforced as well as it acted as a registry for gun owners and manufacturers. This book was regularly kept up to date and often verified by police, as stated within the law, “before it can be put into use, the police authority is to certify the page numbers by stamping.” Furthermore, at then end of each respective year, the book was to be “closed out” and “delivered to the police authority for verification of the closure.” If at any time before this close out the book was needed by authorities, the book would need to be “produced with the required documents on demand by the police authority or their agents.”

Specificalities of the Law (1938):

*Below are the revised stances of the 1938 Weapons act with regards to non Jewish Germans who were deemed Trustworthy.

The regulations and licensing scheme of 1928 no longer applied to long guns and ammunitions. Licences and permits would only be required for handguns. 8

The legal age at which guns could be purchased was lowered from 20 to 18.

The length of a firearm permit’s validity was extended to 3 years as opposed to just 1 under the 1928 act.

Manufacturing ammunition and firearms permits would no longer be issued to companies fully or even partially owned by Jews.

Dealing arms and ammunitions were prohibited for Jews.

Owning firearms, stabbing weapons/truncheons, and ammunitions were prohibited for Jews.

Special groups who were exempt from the law were expanded. Including holders of annual hunting permits, government workers, and members of the NSDAP

Appendix A



Appendix B

Appendix C



Appendix D



Appendix E

Appendix F

Works Cited



Cameron Norman, and R.H Stevens. HITLER’S SECRET CONVERSATIONS. 1961.



Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, July 15 1931.



Erinnerungskultur im Sport. 2. Auflage: Vom kritischen Umgang mit Carl Diem.



Feuchtwanger, The Oppermanns.



Flatow Alfred, Report Concerning Political Incident, Oct. 4, 1938. House Searches of Jews 1938–39, Berlin State Archives.



Fromm, Bella, Blood & Banquets: A Berlin Social Diary (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990).



“Gateway to Tyranny – Nazi Weapons Law of November 11, 1938.” Jews for the Preservation of Firearm Ownership, Jews for the Preservation of Firearm Ownership, jpfo.org/filegen-n-z/NaziLawEnglish.htm.



“German Jewish Life.” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/jewish-communities-of-prewar-germany.



Gesetz gegen den Waffenmissbrauch, Mar. 28, 1931, RGBl. I, at 77; Vierte Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten, Dec. 8, 1931, RGBl.



“Gun Regulation in the Third Reich.” Gun Legislation in Germany, ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/Gun_legislation_in_Germany.html#cite_note-NRA-8.



Halbrook, Stephen P. “Registration – The Nazi Paradigm.” Registration: The Nazi Paradigm – by Stephen P. Halbrook, www.stephenhalbrook.com/registration_article/registration.html.



Halbrook, Stephen P. “NAZI FIREARMS LAW AND THE DISARMING OF THE GERMAN JEWS.” 17 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 3, no. 3, 2000, http://www.stephenhalbrook.com/article-nazilaw.pdf.



Harcourt, Bernard E. “On Gun Registration, the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and Nazi Gun Laws: Exploding the Gun Culture Wars (A Call to Historians).” Fordham Law Review, vol. 73, no. 2, 2004, ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4029&context=flr.



Kline, Audrey D. “Gun Control in Nazi Germany | Audrey D. Kline.” Mises Institute, 8 May 2014, mises.org/library/gun-control-nazi-germany.



New York Times, Nazis Hunt Arms In Einstein Home, Berlin, March 21 1933.



New York Times, Berlin Police Head Announces Disarming of Jews, Berlin, Nov 11 1938.



Palmer, and Edith. “Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy: Germany.” Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy: Germany | Law Library of Congress, Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/law/help/firearms-control/germany.php#f3.



Peck, John. “Gun Control & Genocide · Fr. John Peck.” Fr. John Peck, 2 Oct. 2013, frjohnpeck.com/gun-control-genocide/.



Steinweis, Alan E. “Opinion | Ben Carson Is Wrong on Guns and the Holocaust.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 19 Jan. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/opinion/ben-carson-is-wrong-on-guns-and-the-holocaust.html.



Ulrich Herbert, “A biographical study of radicalism, worldview, and reason 1903 – 1989”