PRISTINA, the capital of Kosovo, is one of very few places that can boast a statue of Bill Clinton. The gold-painted monument depicts the former American president raising his arm in a gesture meant to evoke leadership, but which more closely resembles hailing a taxi. Ethnic-Albanian Kosovars venerate Mr Clinton for his role in the war that freed their country from Serbian rule and established a UN-administered protectorate in 1999, and led to independence in 2008. But the statue’s gleam has faded and its veneer is beginning to chip—much like the legacy of the Clinton era in the Balkans.

Just as Mr Clinton shaped the western Balkans during the wars of the 1990s, those wars shaped his foreign-policy views—and those of his wife. The liberal interventionism espoused by Hillary Clinton was forged in the American efforts to bring peace to Bosnia and Kosovo. When backing military action in Libya in 2011, Mrs Clinton invoked the memory of the massacre at Srebrenica in 1995. Balkan countries expected Mrs Clinton to continue her muscular efforts to build an international liberal order if she were elected president.

Mrs Clinton’s defeat and the victory of Donald Trump herald difficult times for Kosovo and uncertainty in the Balkans at large. Mr Trump’s win has emboldened Russia’s authoritarian president, Vladimir Putin, a friend to Serbia and Serb nationalists in neighbouring Bosnia, and an implacable enemy of Kosovo’s very existence. That in turn may encourage Turkey to wield its influence among Muslims in Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. Balkan countries’ dreams of becoming fully fledged members of a prosperous and united European Union are beginning to fade.

In Belgrade a candidate in Serbia’s presidential election celebrated Mr Trump’s victory in America by playing a song in parliament urging the president-elect to expel Muslims and join forces with Mr Putin. In Moldova, Igor Dodon won the presidency on November 13th by boasting of his closeness to Mr Putin and to the Orthodox church, defeating a pro-European, anti-corruption rival. A candidate campaigning on a Russia-friendly ticket won Bulgaria’s presidency on the same day.

Montenegro’s government has accused Russian and Serbian nationalists of plotting to murder its outgoing prime minister, Milo Djukanovic, on October 16th, the day of its elections. The aim, says the government, was to stop Montenegro’s accession to NATO, which is nearly complete. (Some think Mr Djukanovic’s allies made up the story to win votes for his party.) Alarmed by Russian muscle-flexing, the region’s Muslims are looking to Turkey’s authoritarian leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. On November 14th the new Turkish ambassador to Bosnia delivered a speech emphasising the “common history of our peoples”, an appeal sure to conjure up historical memories of the Ottoman “yoke” among Serbs and Croats. Yet those hoping that America’s change of regime will allow them to upset the balance of power bloodily established in the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s may be disappointed. Nationalist Serbs had hopes that George W. Bush, Mr Clinton’s successor, would help them reverse some of their losses in the Balkan wars. Instead, Kosovo declared independence with full American backing during his term. One diplomat in the region speculates that the effect of a Trump-Putin friendship will be the reverse of the one that Serbs hope for, causing Russia to lose interest in the region. Mr Putin’s main reason for meddling in the Balkans has been to strike back at Western countries for supporting sanctions against Russia and helping Ukraine. With Mr Trump in the White House, he may have much less cause to retaliate.

Dimitar Bechev, a Bulgarian academic and author of a recent a book on Russian influence in the Balkans, warns against exaggerating the role of outsiders. Bulgarian and other Balkan politicians exploit networks extending into Russia as sources of influence and cash, especially in the energy business. But for the most part they make decisions based on their own interests, not those of outsiders.

The problem is that playing pro-Russian cards—or pro-Turkish ones—is generally intended as a distraction from the failure to deal with the urgent tasks of boosting employment and improving schools and health care. It leads countries away from the efforts to build democracy that have been a priority of the EU and, until now, America.

“From a governance point of view we are falling apart,” says Alida Vracic, a Bosnian analyst at SWP, a German think-tank. Balkan countries’ slow progress towards joining the EU has made matters worse. In their annual reports on western Balkan countries that have yet to join, published on November 9th, the European Commission said none had made much progress towards adhering to the EU’s membership standards. Macedonia is going backwards.

Unsurprisingly, the populations of the Balkan countries are shrinking. Young people are migrating when they can to more prosperous European countries with brighter prospects. Those who remain are in danger of adopting Mr Putin, Mr Trump or Mr Erdogan as their role models. As Mr Clinton’s statue flakes, so does the allure of the EU and the Western example.