The return of the strike partnership

For a decade or so, it seemed inconceivable that a top team could play with a pair of forwards and still prosper. Operate with two forwards, the logic ran, and you surrender control of the midfield. International football always lags behind club football when it comes to innovation, but even there, by Euro 2008, 4-2-3-1 had become the default. Yet this season, front pairings seem to have returned to fashion. When Manchester City pair Álvaro Negredo and Sergio Agüero, that is a strike duo: it's true that they may not play exactly alongside each other at all times, but neither can it be argued that one is operating in an attacking midfield role, as would be required legitimately to describe the formation as 4-2-3-1. Liverpool, similarly, have used Luis Suárez and Daniel Sturridge to great effect. At Atlético Madrid, Diego Costa and David Villa have thrived, while the Paris Saint-Germain pair Zlatan Ibrahimovic and Edinson Cavani. Fernando Llorente and Carlos Tevez are working well as a pairing for Juventus – although in a system that uses a back three rather than a back four.

Part of the reason for their success is that defences have, up to a point, forgotten how to deal with a partnership. When there are two centre-backs against one centre-forward, one marks and the other is cover: the mechanics of defending are easy. When it's two v two, there is no cover, or that cover has to come from a full-back, and modern full-backs are used to fighting individual battles with their wingers, looking to get forward at every opportunity. In addition, for many sides, one of the centre-backs has become at least in part a de facto playmaker. While one centre-back gets on with the business of defending, the other sweeps up behind him and looks to distribute form the back; with another player who needs marking, he becomes restricted in that role and so a front two can be an effective defensive strategy as well.

The down side of a front two is that it can leave a side short in midfield – and that has certainly been an issue at times for Manchester City this season. It seems a given that a team with three central midfielders ought to be able to dominate a team with two central midfielders. While the extra midfielder is an advantage, that can be mitigated by shape, and 4-4-2 remains the simplest and sturdiest of defensive structures. This is a point that Roy Hodgson made – admittedly obliquely – with his much-mocked assertion that there was no essential difference between the shape of his England and that of Borussia Dortmund. The German team are 4-2-3-1 in possession, but when out of possession, if not pressing, they rapidly fall back to having two compact banks of four. If those lines are compact, if there is no space between them, then they can be very difficult to penetrate.

When City played a 4-4-2 against Bayern Munich at home, it was seen as being crazily attacking and dismissed, yet when Hodgson played a 4-4-2 for England it was seen as blockish and unadventurous. It has the capacity to be both – formations, after all, are neural; it's their application that gives them offensive or defensive qualities; the issue, really, is one of transitions.

These are not quite the strike pairings of yesteryear, which typically fell into two categories: either big man and quick man – John Toshack and Kevin Keegan, Mark Hateley and Ally McCoist, Niall Quinn and Kevin Phillips – or creator and finisher – Kenny Dalglish and Ian Rush, Peter Beardsley and Gary Lineker,Teddy Sheringham and Alan Shearer – but tend to be more fluid, with more complete players capable of fulfilling either the goalscorer or creator role, of playing as the main striker or of pulling with or dropping deep. That in itself, of course, makes the supply less predictable and thus the pairing harder to combat.

Pressing and possession

Tiki-taka began to lose its lustre last year as people grew bored of Spain's sterile domination, but this was the year when a genuine alternative emerged. Or, perhaps, to be more accurate, a variant to the strangulation by possession that characterised Spain at the World Cup. The destruction of Barcelona and Real Madrid by Bayern Munich and Borussia Dortmund in the Champions League semi-finals offered the symbolic moment of change, but the revolution was less one of style than of degree. Both Bayern and Dortmund press, both look to win the ball back high up the pitch, both look for rapid transitions; the difference to the Spanish model is that they do it quicker, with greater muscularity and with a greater willingness to lose the ball with a risky vertical pass.

That pressing does not have to be allied to an obsession with safety-first passing is perhaps best exemplified by Southampton. According to stats at WhoScored.com they have made the third most tackles per game of any Premier League club this season – an indication of the ferocity of their pressing – and, even after their recent wobble, have had the second most possession in the division, and yet they have also played the joint most long passes and have only the 10th highest pass success rate. They win the ball back, look to get it forward quickly, and dominate possession not by looking to retain the ball but by reclaiming it efficiently.

Looking at Premier League possession statistics, there is an intriguing gulf: Arsenal have had the ninth-most possession this season with 54.7%, while Stoke have had the 10th-most with 47.9%. There will be anomalies and variants in individual games, but that suggests the Premier League is essentially split almost down the middle: nine clubs look to dominate the ball; 11 are prepared to sit back and absorb pressure.

Part two next week: false nines and back threes