After I got these credentials I went on to verify if they are working and are not just test credentials or with very limited access. So, I tried fetching the channel lists and users from the slack directory and it was a success. There were about 1000 channels and 200 employees. Then I pulled up the people in their slack group and also the conversation in a few channels ( like the one mentioned in the console log above, mstats_dev_alerts ) using slack APIs. After I got these I was pretty sure this was something important and should be reported.

Channel List

redacted.com didn’t have a public bug bounty page so I wasn’t sure as to how to reach the person responsible and also my prior experience with Indian companies hadn’t been very good ( once my CSRF report was redirected to the customer care which went on asking me “Sir, what problem are you facing with this ?”. That was from a reputable Indian travel booking portal ) . This is where Avinash Jain (@logicbomb_1) again helped me ( he has quite an experience with the Indian companies, kinda an expert on the Indian bug bounty scene ). I drafted a mail and sent it to the relevant contacts who can understand it.

Meanwhile I started gauging the depth of this exploit. As you can see from the partial screenshot, above there were quite a few ‘interesting’ channels, that could contain sensitive info. I pulled a few messages from some of these channels and it did contain aws credentials sent by a bot to the user on their slack channel and other sensitive info. People were sharing the ‘wifi password’ on the ‘#general’ channel ! That was really silly.

Using some of these credentials I could list their buckets and even read/write to these buckets, which contained their server as well as client application’s codebase.

Partial Output of : aws s3api list-buckets — query “Buckets[].Name”

Key Takeaways

Automate them all : Let machines take over ( The mundane tasks only ). While I had automated the screenshot part, I was also checking for RCE on Jenkins on these instances ( i.e. Jenkins instances with open Script Console and I did get quite a few ) Don’t presume anything : Now, usually Jenkins replaces secrets with asterisks but it can’t mask the tool output and as in this case the zookeeper was leaking the credentials. No secret sauce : Bugs are simple, persistence is the key.

Thank you everyone :)

You can follow me on Twitter : @aseemshrey