Reports of American-trained rebels handing over their weapons to the Nusra Front are the latest embarrassment for the White House in Syria.

Within hours of the announcement that American trained and equipped Syrian fighters from Division 30 had crossed from Turkey into Syria, reports came out saying that they had surrendered to the Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat an-Nusra (the Nusra Front, or Nusra) and turned over their weapons. Even worse, Syrian sources from within and outside the Nusra Front were saying that this was a deliberate betrayal on the part of Division 30 leader Anas Obaid.

Division 30 was the first benefactor of the American-run training program in Turkey that was supposed to turn out fighters who could take on the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS. They would be the boots-on-the-ground presence needed to take advantage of Coalition air strikes. Unable to support the Syrian Kurds as much as they would like due to Turkish opposition, the training program aimed to create a non-Kurdish Sunni force, which is officially known as the New Syrian Force. Vetted, trained, and equipped under American direction, thousands were meant to go through the program over the course of the next few years.

The first Division 30 operation was launched in late July, when 54 of its fighters were sent into Syria and promptly attacked by the Nusra Front. Their headquarters was overrun, their leadership kidnapped, and the force scattered as many questioned what exactly those fighters were doing there at that point. Last week, Central Command chief General Lloyd Austin admitted that only “four or five” of that original group were left in Syria.

With the failure of the first Division 30 mission in mind, the question needs to be asked: why not wait for the other 75 fighters to be ready? Why send in 54 at that point when, in just a few weeks, another 75 would apparently be ready for action? 129 fighters still isn’t exactly an imposing force, but it’s better than sending in just 54, only to watch them get effectively wiped out, and then send in another 75. What is the strategy here? Is it based on how many buses the United States can charter to take their men to the border?

Also, why send in the latest batch of 75 so soon after the debacle of the first Division 30 mission? Did the United States and whoever else was consulted feel that it was imperative to get another force into Syria in an attempt to make up for the failure of the first? Did they also think that the extra 21 fighters would make all the difference when they inevitably found themselves faced by Nusra? Were there also no questions being asked about the loyalty of Division 30’s leadership after they pledged never to fight the Nusra Front and described them as “brothers?”

Even if the reports of turning their weapons over to Nusra turn out to be false (update 9/26/2015- CENTCOM confirms Obaid surrendered some of his equipment to a “suspected Al-Qaeda intermediary”), the experiment with Division 30 has been an unmistakable disaster. Everything about the program to train, equip, and deploy them was done poorly, and the level of incompetence among American planners that has become evident through this is truly staggering.

After missing their chance to partner with Syrian groups who were actually politically moderate in the opening phases of the civil war, the White House has embarrassed itself while trying to make up for lost time. With the Syrian Civil War going on five years old, it is apparent that the White House is still not quite sure what it is doing and why in Syria.