Franklin D. Roosevelt saw this problem clearly, and in his first inaugural address in 1933, addressing his plans to confront the economic crisis, he hinted darkly that “it is to be hoped that the normal balance of executive and legislative authority may be wholly equal, wholly adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us.”

“But it may be,” he continued, “that an unprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for temporary departure from that normal balance of public procedure.” In the event, Congress gave him the authorities he sought, and he did not follow through on this threat.

The basic problem today is that the president and the House Republicans are locked in a classic bargaining game. The worst outcome for both is default on the debt, but each side holds out for a favorable deal. They will certainly go to the wire, but economists who have studied bargaining games have shown that there is always a real possibility of breakdown rather than compromise, because only by refusing to deal can each side convey the seriousness of its position. That is why labor strikes occur even though workers and managers do jointly better if they make a deal. Failure to raise the debt ceiling, however, is not akin to any old plant shutdown: it would be catastrophic.

A proposal has been floated by Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Republican minority leader, under which Congress would delegate to the president the power to raise the debt ceiling, subject to some minor procedural constraints. Mr. McConnell’s ploy is suspect, because it assumes away the problem that it attempts to solve: the internal paralysis of Congress. Congress probably cannot act on its own — for example, by creating a veto-proof budget — because it is internally deadlocked. Not only do Democrats and Republicans disagree, but so do the Republican leaders, who want to avoid a debt default, and the Tea Party-inspired Republican back-benchers, who appear to believe that only a purifying Götterdämmerung can put public finances back in order. The latest proposed deal negotiated by House Speaker John A. Boehner and President Obama is vulnerable to the same problem.

Discussions of an earlier proposal to rely on the 14th Amendment for the President’s authority to raise the debt level centered on whether the debt issued after the president’s action would be under a cloud. Commentators pointed out that the language in the 14th Amendment, which commands that the validity of legally authorized public debt shall not be questioned, does not explicitly authorize the president to do anything. But debt under a cloud is better than default. It would be better if the parties made a deal, but if they don’t, default is the worst outcome.