Illustration by Kevin Kallaugher

IT WAS not difficult to distinguish between George Bush's farewell visit to Europe this week and a victory lap. True, things have sometimes been even worse: back in 2003 he was greeted by some of the biggest protests in European history. But this time he was being greeted by sullen indifference. Mr Bush is worse than a failure in European eyes. He is yesterday's failure.

Across the continent Bush hatred has been replaced by Obamamania. Barack Obama is playing the “good American” to Mr Bush's ugly one—articulate where Mr Bush was cloth-tongued and cosmopolitan where Mr Bush was Texas-insular. Europeans are perhaps even more entranced than Americans by Mr Obama's message of “change” and “hope”. They are also being forced to rethink some of their deepest prejudices about America. How can the land of “Stupid White Men” produce a Barack Obama? And how can Europe go on feeling quite so superior to America when it treats so many of its own minorities so badly? The French parliament has only one black person representing mainland France.

John McCain hardly enjoys Obama-like levels of enthusiasm. A new Pew poll shows that, in both France and Germany, only about 30% of people think that Mr McCain will do the “right thing” in foreign affairs compared with more than 80% for Mr Obama. But the Republican senator is still regarded as a huge improvement on Mr Bush. He has spent decades networking with European leaders, for example as a regular at the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy.

Just as significant for the future of the alliance is that both candidates agree on the importance of reversing the collapse of America's image in Europe. They are both determined to tackle three of its root causes—by banning torture, closing Guantánamo Bay and embracing a cap-and-trade policy on climate change. Here Mr McCain is proving himself, if anything, to be the bolder Atlanticist of the two, not only praising the relationship more loudly but also pitting himself against powerful groups within his own party, including the White House.

The two senators will also inherit plenty of materials for bridge-building. The Bush administration has pursued a much more conciliatory policy since 2004. Indeed, Condoleezza Rice, Mr Bush's secretary of state, argues that, in some ways, the relationship is deeper than ever before: for the first time ever NATO forces are fighting outside the European theatre, in Afghanistan.

Two pro-Americans, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, have replaced the troublesome Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac in Berlin and Paris. Mr Sarkozy has been particularly vocal in praising America and embracing a more pro-American position on Iraq and Iran (he argues that an Iranian nuclear bomb is “unacceptable”, for example). It is notable that when Mr Sarkozy visited Washington back in 2006 the only two people he found time to see on Capitol Hill were Messrs Obama and McCain.

The only worry is that things are looking a bit too good at the moment. The biggest danger for transatlantic relations now comes from out-of-control expectations—particularly where Mr Obama is concerned. Obamamania may be less of a problem than Bush derangement syndrome. But it contains the seeds of its own destruction. The world's dictators will be less inclined to melt before Mr Obama's charm than New England college professors. And, as the world's only superpower, America has no choice but to continue to worship Mars as well as Venus.

Mr Obama gave a hint of possible future tensions with Europe in a speech he delivered to AIPAC hours after winning the nomination. He declared that “Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel” and that “it must remain undivided”. He dismissed the Palestinian “right of return” (“Israel's identity as a Jewish state must be preserved”). He hedged on his promise to meet Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and declared that “I will do everything in my power to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon; everything in my power; everything.”

Plus ça change

The speedy collapse of a cap-and-trade climate bill on June 6th also hinted at problems to come. The bill was the most ambitious to reach the Senate floor thus far, and enjoyed bipartisan support. But it collapsed without a single vote. Optimists argue that the bill is just a dry run for a successful push under a different president and with a different constellation of power in Congress. But pessimists rightly point out that Americans face a harder job adjusting to higher energy prices than Europeans, given their dependence on cars and taste for suburban living. Paris, Texas, is not Paris, France; $4-a-gallon petrol is already creating widespread angst. Any politician who promises ever-rising energy prices, even in a good cause, faces obliteration.

Mr Obama's views on trade could also spell problems for the relationship. In a speech in Raleigh, North Carolina, on June 9th he declared himself a free-trader. But in the Ohio and Pennsylvania primaries he saturated the airwaves with ads denouncing NAFTA for devastating entire American cities. He also favours tougher standards on labour and the environment in trade deals. Mr Obama feels about free trade exactly what most Americans feel about tackling climate change—it's a great idea so long as it involves all gain and no pain.

The transatlantic relationship faces very different problems from the ones that plagued it in the Bush years. But it faces problems nonetheless. Avoiding disappointment will require a careful management of expectations from both sides. It will also require hard work. The American presidential candidates have already demonstrated that they are willing to invest in rebuilding the relationship. It is now up to the Europeans to produce some concrete suggestions of their own. They should not wait until January 2009 to get their act together.