Moscow believes the so-called color revolutions—a series of popular uprisings in former Soviet satellites—were concerted attempts by the United States and its allies to erode Russian influence in the region. "Russian foreign policy appears to be based on a combination of fears of popular protest and opposition to U.S. world hegemony, both of which are seen as threatening the Putin regime," writes Dmitry Gorenburg , an expert on the Russian military at CNA, a Virginia-based research institution.

But many western and Russian analysts say Moscow's concerns with NATO are often overstated and divert attention from more practical threats like those looming on Russia's southern periphery, including ethnic insurgencies in the North Caucasus region , weapons proliferation, and a potential resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan .

What are Russia's strategic objectives in the region?

Military modernization will enable the world's largest country by far (and one of the most sparsely populated) to better defend its vast territory and national interests. But the conflicts in Ukraine and Georgia have aroused concerns about Russian aggression, namely Putin's willingness to use military force unilaterally to preserve Russia's traditional sphere of influence.

Shortly before annexing Crimea in March 2014, Putin said he would defend the rights of Russians abroad, and in April he referred to a large swath of Ukrainian territory as Novorossiya (New Russia) , a term used during imperial Russia. According to NATO and Ukrainian officials, Moscow has provided ethnic Russian insurgencies in Eastern Ukraine with training, personnel, and heavy weapons, including battle tanks and antiaircraft missiles. In November, Russia acknowledged rebel elections in the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, a move that echoed Russia's unilateral recognition of separatist governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia after its conflict with Georgia in 2008.

But Russia's assertiveness has come with a cost. The Group of Eight (now G7) cut Moscow out of its elite club in March, and top Russian officials, banks, and businesses face an array of Western sanctions that may push the economy into recession. The Russian military will also suffer: France has delayed delivery of the first of two Mistral-class amphibious warships, and Russia's extensive defense-industrial cooperation with Ukraine is in jeopardy.

Experts say that there may also be domestic political consequences down the road. "[Putin]'s brand of ethnic geopolitics , redolent of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, is a double-edged sword," wrote Strobe Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution, in August 2014. "It could shrink Russian territory, since vast parts of that country are populated by non-Russian ethnic groups who are unlikely to welcome or, over the long run, tolerate a Russian chauvinist in the Kremlin."

What is U.S. and NATO strategy toward Russia?

Alliance leaders are reassessing defenses in Europe, particularly in the East. Since the annexation of Crimea, NATO has quadrupled (to sixteen) the number of warplanes policing the Baltics, which have witnessed a major surge in provocations involving Russian planes. NATO also announced plans for a new rapid reaction force— the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)—of about five thousand troops. Officials say the VJTF should be fully operational in early 2016 and will serve as an elite subset of the NATO Response Force composed of thirteen thousand troops.

Some analysts recommend the alliance adopt a strategy of containment not unlike that of the Cold War. "Give up any hope of a return to business as usual; Boost the defense of Baltic states and Poland; Expose Russian corruption in the West; Impose sweeping visa sanctions on the Russian elite; Help Ukraine; and Reboot the Atlantic Alliance ," writes British journalist and Russia expert Edward Lucas .

CFR's Janine Davidson , an expert on military and defense strategy, says that NATO members need to prepare for the type of guerilla tactics Russia has used in eastern Ukraine. "NATO must consider what happens if and when these well-armed, unmarked, [Special Operations Forces]-like, suspiciously disciplined masked men turn up in a NATO nation, such as Estonia or Latvia (respectively 24 and 27 percent ethnic Russian) and commence another creeping invasion," she writes.

At the same time, CNA's Gorenburg says Baltic governments should be wary of Russian subversion. "There is a danger that in focusing too much on strengthening military defenses, the Baltic states and NATO will neglect the non-military tools in Russia's toolkit, including promoting and funding Euroskeptic political movements, encouraging radical groups to commit violent acts to create an environment of disorder, and using information warfare techniques to strengthen anti-government and anti-EU attitudes among minority populations," he told CFR.

This post appears courtesy of CFR.org .