Our proposed statute would provide that the president must consult with Congress before ordering a “significant armed conflict”  defined as combat operations that last or are expected to last more than a week. To provide more clarity than the 1973 War Powers Resolution, our statute also defines what types of hostilities would not be considered significant armed conflicts  for example, training exercises, covert operations or missions to protect and rescue Americans abroad. If secrecy or other circumstances precluded prior consultation, then consultation  not just notification  would need to be undertaken within three days.

To guarantee that the president consults with a cross section of Congress, the act would create a joint Congressional committee made up of the leaders of the House and the Senate as well as the chairmen and ranking members of key committees. These are the members of Congress with whom the president would need to personally consult. Almost as important, the act would establish a permanent, bipartisan staff with access to all relevant intelligence and national-security information.

Congress would have obligations, too. Unless it declared war or otherwise expressly authorized a conflict, it would have to vote within 30 days on a resolution of approval. If the resolution of approval was defeated in either House, any member of Congress could propose a resolution of disapproval. Such a resolution would have the force of law, however, only if it were passed by both houses and signed by the president or the president’s veto were overridden. If the resolution of disapproval did not survive the president’s veto, Congress could express its opposition by, for example, using its internal rules to block future spending on the conflict.

We believe our proposal is good for the presidency because it would eliminate a law that every president since Richard Nixon has treated as unconstitutional, while giving the president the political benefit of forcing Congress to take a position on going to war. And it would do so without insisting that the president get the consent of Congress.

The statute is good for Congress because the legislative branch would get a more significant role when the nation decides whether to go to war. Some may argue that Congress should have the dominant role in war powers debates. But it hasn’t played that role under the 1973 resolution. Rather than endorse any absolutist position, our statute would give Congress access to intelligence, a full-time staff for studying national security issues and a well-defined mechanism for consulting and voting on significant armed conflicts.

Finally, the statute is good for the country because it would enhance the prospects for cooperation between Congress and the president. It would ensure that the president received independent advice from Congress, and it would allow the people to hold Congress accountable for its role in the process.

When it comes to war, Americans deserve better than a law that is ineffective and ignored. They deserve a law that will encourage future presidents and Congresses to work together to protect our nation.