The past decade was the decade of the far right.

In January 2010, leftist and centrist politicians led three of the largest democracies in the world: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil), Manmohan Singh (India) and Barack Obama (US). In December 2019, all three countries have far-right leaders: Jair Bolsonaro, Narendra Modi and Donald Trump. In Europe, center-left parties have been decimated, while mainstream right parties mainly survive by adopting frames and policies from the radical right. Only Germany still has the same center-right leader, Angela Merkel, but that will probably change in the next year, too.

This political sea change is in large part the (delayed) consequence of demographic, economic and social shifts. After 9/11, the political debate in many countries shifted from socio-economic to socio-cultural issues. Even the Great Recession only changed this temporarily; once the dust over the bailouts had settled, immigration and security quickly replaced austerity and economic inequality as defining issues once again.

The decade started with a concerted attack on multiculturalism by mainstream-right leaders, including the former British prime minister, David Cameron, the former French president Nicolas Sarkozy and even Merkel. But while they pandered to far-right voters, they largely refused to adopt far-right frames and policies. In 2011, for example, Cameron blamed “state multiculturalism” for failed integration and Jihadi terrorism, but, he argued, “instead of encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity, open to everyone”.

This changed fundamentally with the so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015, which was a catalyst for the mainstreaming and normalization of the radical right. Immigration and security were now openly linked in the public mind. Mainstream and far right parties shot up in the polls, and radical right frames and policies were broadly shared by mainstream parties, from Austrian conservatives to Denmark’s Social Democrats.

Even politicians who defeated radical right politicians with inclusive electoral campaigns would soon start adopting part of the radical right’s program. Hillary Clinton, who gained 2.5 million more votes than Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election, shamelessly argued that Europe should curb immigration to stop the far right, while Emmanuel Macron, who comprehensively defeated Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French presidential election, has played on anti-Islam sentiments, particularly in his foreign policy.

And while the 2019 European elections were largely interpreted as a defeat of the far right, mostly based on exaggerated expectations – the far right actually scored its best result ever – the mainstreaming of far right frames had become so absolute that in September the president of the European Commission, the German Christian Democrat Ursula von der Leyen, proposed a controversial new title for the commissioner that includes immigration: “vice-president for protecting our European way of life.”

The far right has been punching politically well above its electoral weight in the past decade

Given the successes of rightwing populist parties and politicians in recent elections in Spain and the UK, one might think that the coming decade will see an even bigger electoral and political success for the far right, but I don’t think this will be the case. To be clear, the far right is here to stay, as is the mainstreaming and normalization of radical right ideas (and politicians) that characterizes what I have called the “fourth wave” of far-right politics. However, the far right has been punching politically well above its electoral weight in the past decade.

The main reason for their disproportionate impact is the ideological weakness of liberal democratic parties. While defining themselves as the silent majority, the far right is in fact a shouting minority, which has faced little pushback from ideologically bankrupt mainstream left and parties. Forced by crushing electoral defeats, some center-left parties have started to develop new ideological programs, prioritizing economic inequality over economic growth, sometimes pandering to nativism (like in Denmark), sometimes not (like in UK and US).

Mainstream rightwing parties have so far persisted, but their electoral success on the basis of radical right lite programs will not last forever. In the end, their only chance to sustain the electoral success is by transforming into full-fledged radical right parties, as we have seen in Hungary, Israel and the US. The only other way to survive is to re-establish conservative and Christian democratic programs that do not undermine the liberal democratic system and values.

While still a minority, a growing number of right-wing politicians, including within the powerful European People’s party, are starting to understand that, rather than having played the far right, the far right has played then. To survive, they will have to re-establish their own ideological programs and put the defense of liberal democracy at the center of their political struggle.