As the eyes of the world move from the NATO summit to the Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki, Canada’s key international vulnerability has come into sharp relief. What is this vulnerability? Answer: We Canadians don’t have our own theory of the world.

More precisely, we don’t have our own theory of the world independent of how our American friends have framed things for us. We don’t have a theory of defence independent of NATO and, despite most Canadians’ antipathy for the Trump administration, we don’t have serious countertheses to most of President Trump’s theses, absurd or less absurd, about the way the world works or ought to work.

The absence of a Canadian theory of the world has practical, potentially grave, consequences. If we might have safely presumed, a decade ago, that the Americans were cutting-edge in their analytics and understanding of global events and solutions, and that their “brief” was generally friendly to our own well-being, then what are we to do today when the Americans are, under a so-called America first framework, manifestly “out to lunch” in their assessments of many of the world’s problems – from North America to Northeast Asia, Europe, the Middle East and the multiple international institutions in between – and their prescriptions for what’s to be done?

Canadian interests this century must turn on our very own theory of the world. These interests, properly understood, and the underlying theory should be driven by five key considerations.

First, our geography. Canada has four countries or regions that are of core, existential concern to us: America (the southern border), China (immediately to our west), Russia (due north of us), and Europe (east of Newfoundland). These are the countries — or “fields”— friendly or hostile, at our borders. We must reckon with them at the guttural level. Everything else is commentary. In other words, every country or region outside of these four – whether it be India, Brazil, Israel, Iran, Ukraine, Australia or Tanzania – is secondary, tertiary or otherwise peripheral to the Canadian strategic condition this century.

Second, our mindset. Are we a serious country, mentally? In international affairs, not yet. Do we have a “hockey mindset” when it comes to understanding, filtering and defending our national interests? No. Apart from the American border and the bilateral relationship with the U.S., we have miles to go before we sleep. We will need to similarly “feel” our interests and the consequences of failure in all the other aforementioned key regions, and deploy serious talent and assets in support of these interests, if we are going to be taken seriously.

Third, diasporas. Full confession: I don’t do diaspora politics. Yes, I grew up, happily, on the soccer pitches of Toronto, swearing in about 20 different tongues. I live among and am myself of the diasporas. However, when it comes to determining the interests of Canada in the world, diasporic preferences in favour of or against this or that country or cause ought to have no materiality whatsoever. Indeed, it is the rank porousness of Canadian international policy and behaviour to diasporic briefs over the last two decades that has betrayed Canada’s inability to think for itself, and in a bloody-minded way, about what is happening in the world and what Canada should be doing.

Fourth, let’s not get caught up in the present absurd conceptual confusion about Canadian values and interests. Any value, from federalism to religious or equality rights, that we Canadians wish to export or pursue in the world is, by implication, a national interest. All conflicts at that level, then, are conflicts between interests, the holiness of which should not turn on tricks of vernacular or poor logic. Of course, where we do not wish to export a particular value, then that value is strictly domestic in character, and should not be presumed to interfere with the national interest.

Fifth, Canadians means should come before Canadian ends. This sounds counterintuitive: shouldn’t we determine our strategic goals in the world before making the supporting investments? Answer: No, because we don’t yet have our own theory of the world. Let’s first take the next decade to invest, nationally and globally, in the strategic assets, talent and relationships we will need to think properly for ourselves. Then watch us fly.