French government officials recently unveiled plans to launch a new counterterrorism initiative in the Sahel, code-named Opération Barkhane. The mission consists of over 3,000 troops spread across five countries who, according to The Economist, will be supported by 20 supply helicopters, ten transport aircraft, six fighter planes, three drones, and 200 armored vehicles.

Although the bulk of the forces and equipment required for Barkhane are already on the ground in Africa, it would be a mistake to characterize the operation as a mere reshuffling of French military assets in the region. In fact, Barkhane represents a stunning rejection of recent French policy toward Africa, which in turn was meant to be a departure from France’s previous post-colonial posture toward the continent.

“The objective is principally one of counterterrorism,” French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told reporters in Paris last month. “The aim is to prevent what I call the highway of all forms of traffic to become a place of permanent passage, where jihadist groups can rebuild themselves between Libya and the Atlantic Ocean.”

The operation is likely to deepen existing counterterrorism cooperation between France and Mauritania, as well as strengthen partnerships with Burkina Faso, from where France already carries out operations crucial to its counterterrorism efforts in the region.

Early indications are that approximately 1,200 troops will be based in N’Djamena, Chad, where France has maintained an uninterrupted presence since 1986 as part of Opération Épervier. Another 1,000 troops will remain in Gao, Mali, the launching pad for Opération Serval, France’s recently-concluded mission to drive Islamist rebels from northern Mali that began in January of last year.

Other troops will operate from of a constellation of forward operating bases and sites in Mali and Chad, as well as Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Niger.

A New Chapter

Although exact details have not been confirmed by the French government, Niger figures to feature prominently within Barkhane; France recently began flying Reaper drones purchased from the U.S. in the country, and French special forces maintain an active presence in the country’s north.

In the long view of French foreign policy, Barkhane represents a reversal from its more recent ambitions. The 2008 French White Paper on Defense and National Security for example, expressed an eagerness to end Françeafrique, the term commonly used to describe France’s web of post-colonial (some would say neocolonial) policies toward its former colonies in Africa. But when Islamist militants in northern Mali launched an ambitious push into the south of the country in January 2013, France intervened with alacrity, entangling itself in a major military operation.

According to Michael Shurkin, a former CIA analyst who is now a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, the 2013 White Paper, drafted during Opération Serval, represents a “pretty specific renunciation” of its 2008 counterpart. “Barkhane is a new chapter of French policy in the area,” he told me.