Quite a while ago I wrote a reply to an ISO article attacking the Makhnovists entitled On The Bolshevik Myth. The ISO article by Jason Yanowitz used a PhD by Colin Darch, which I had a few words about (in passing, as the bulk of my reply focused on the ISO). I have discovered he has taken objection to my comments:

‘Subsequently, I sent a copy at his request to Jason Yanowitz, who cited it extensively in his article "The Makhno myth", published in the International Socialist Review no.53, May-June 2007 [click here]. This piece was subsequently attacked by the anarchist Iain McKay in the Anarcho-Syndicalist Review. Although his main target is Yanowitz, McKay accuses me in passing of having produced what he calls an "obviously biased account" that relies "on Soviet sources for many of [the] key attacks on the Makhnovists". With no sense of irony, given that he apparently regards what he insists on calling "Soviet sources" as uniformly tainted, McKay asserts that my "Marxism may [i.e. does] get in the way of [my] objectivity". In an earlier polemic in the Weekly Worker (no.507, 4 December 2003, p.3), McKay had also criticised "Darch's uncritical use of Soviet histories on the subject" of Makhno.’

Let me note the full context of my comments against the ISO (he does not link to my article):

‘The only real new development is that Yanowitz relies heavily on another Marxist’s PhD thesis on Makhno by Colin Darch. Yet this new source leaves much to be desired. To get a taste of Darch’s perspective, we can point to his first essay on the subject (“The myth of Nestor Makhno”, Economy and Society, 14(4)) where he considered “Makhno's role as a leader of peasant counterrevolution in the USSR” as “a significant one, and merits careful investigation.” That suggests his Marxism may get in the way of his objectivity. His PhD thesis relies on Soviet sources for many of his key attacks on the Makhnovists (it is on the basis of these that Yanowitz states the anarchist “timeline and version of events is well refuted by Darch”!)….

‘Yet even reading Darch’s obviously biased account shows that the main Bolshevik complaints about the Makhnovists were simply that they refused to stop spreading their own political ideas countering Bolshevik propaganda (“the political commissar of the Trans-Dnepr Division complained that anarchist and Left SR agitation was making his work very difficult”); they involved the general population in discussing social and military affairs by organising soviet conferences (“the reaction of the Bolshevik commanders to . . . the summoning of yet another anarchist [sic!] congress . . . at a time of military crisis -- was decisive and harsh”); and generally not allowing themselves to be treated like canon fodder for the Bolshevik dictatorship (“Despite the seriousness of the military situation for the Red Army and for the revolution in general, the Congress apparently felt no compunction about adopting and endorsing an anarchist platform that the Bolsheviks inevitably viewed as a provocation”).’

Darch does not object to being called a Marxist by Yanowitz or myself (although more correctly a Marxist-Leninist, a there are many libertarian Marxists who also view Makhno favourably). I came to this conclusion from the Economy and Society article from 1985 (Darch has made it available on-line as a pdf) as well as his PhD thesis (parts of which were on-line for a while and which is now fully on-line as a pdf). It appears to be being published by Pluto Press later this year – I cannot wait to read the reviews by Marxist-Leninists proclaiming that Lenin and Trotsky have been proven correct on the Makhnovists by this work written by a Marxist-Leninist…

The thesis is clearly written from a Leninist perspective, seeking to defend the Bolsheviks as well as refute attempts “by anarchists to occupy the moral high ground” (527) and attempts by non-Marxist historians “to rehabilitate the libertarian historiography of the revolution and civil war”. (528) That Yanowitz utiltises it makes sense but for those who are not seeking to destroy “the Makhno Myth,” it should be problematic. As such, I do not think I was saying anything untoward or controversial – I indicate below with a few more examples why this is the case.

Darch also notes:

‘Meanwhile, other commentators more interested in military history than polemic reached other conclusions: "Colin Darch is more reliable. For a start he read the White sources" and "a quite dispassionate account, and pretty good on military details. (Peregenovka is particularly well covered.)" [Click here or here]. Similarly, the recent book by Lucien van der Walt and Michael Schmidt, Black flame: the revolutionary class politics of anarchism and syndicalism (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2009) [click here for details] is written from an anarchist perspective and cites my work critically in several places. Despite fundamental differences in analysis, the authors nevertheless politely describe my work as "excellent, if fairly hostile" to the anarchist project (p.266, note 105), and avoid personal attacks altogether.’

Clicking on the first link shows that the first commentator is a miniature wargamer (both these links are to comments made by the same person). He seems to be suggesting that Darch is “more reliable” than anarchist sources “when it comes to military detail” but then, he also writes that “Makhno could never have set up a viable economic system, because he relied on plunder for manufactured goods and had no way of rewarding city workers.” What to say? First, “Makhno” would not have set on a “economic system” but rather was fighting for the freedom of the workers and peasants to do that. Second, the Makhnovists repeatedly argued for direct exchange between rural and urban workers. Third, the Bolshevik system was based on plundering the rural worker of their food and – least we forget – the urban worker of their product by means of State-appointed “one-man managers” armed with “dictatorial” powers within a centralised, bureaucratic economic regime. Fourth, apparently this gamer seems to think city workers do not need food...

All in all, I’m not inclined to take this commentator’s comments that seriously. However, a comment by another miniature wargamer is of note:

‘Colin Darch takes the pro-Bolshevik line that Shkuro's cossacks solely poured straight through the crumbling Makhnovists with virtually no resistance. He also accepts at face value that "Trotsky was convinced that Makhno's anarchism was only Kulak banditry in fancy dress" although the opposing view might be that Trotsky thought nothing of the sort and was using increasingly bitter slurs in a desperate bid to counter the perceived threat to the Bolshevik's Ukrainian ambitions represented by Makhno. Red Army commanders themselves report a steady haemorrhage from their Ukraine-front units deserting to the "Blacks".’

I should make a few comments on this, as Darch does indeed seek to blame Denikin’s advance purely on Makhno and so wishes to refute anarchist claims that this was caused by the Bolsheviks starving the Makhnovites of promised arms and ammunition.

The anarchist interpretation, he says, “remains unproven” (290) and claims other possibilities such as supply problems – yes, there were supply problems in general so lack of arms may have been accidental (so much for Bolshevik centralised “efficiency”). He also notes “repeated calls for reinforcements in Makhno’s sector” between Bolsheviks which, he claims, “belie any willingness to see the Insurgent Army annihilated”. (290) This is hardly the proof Darch thinks it is for he assumes every Bolshevik in the chain of command would have been informed of any “conspiracy” to destroy the Makhnovists. The nature of military plans is that they are on “a need to know” basis and the more people know of them, the more likely a leak would occur – particularly when troops are fraternising in a common struggle against counter-revolutionary forces. Common sense, surely, would conclude that this evidence is weak as those down the chain of command would easily be making calls in ignorance of decisions made further up the hierarchy.

Then he adds: “Quite simply, and with good reason, the Bolsheviks did not trust the Makhnovites.” (290) This, I would suggest, undermines his own speculations – quite simply, why would the Bolshevik high command arm those it did not trust? After all, Michael Malet (who is a libertarian and so sympathetic to the Makhnovists but reliable I would say) noted long ago:

“If the affair of the Italian rifles is any guide, Makhno was better off without Red Army supplies. Antonov admits that they were supplied so that if need be the flow of bullets could be stopped. In the tangled rivalries of the Red Army command in the Ukraine in this period it is difficult to say where this policy originated, but it is plain that Antonov bore the political and Skachko the military responsibility. This measure to control Makhno in both respects helped lead to the White breakthrough in the middle of May 1919.” (Michael Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 89)

Even if we discount a deliberate policy (and this is unproven, to coin a phrase) we should also note that the Bolsheviks were well aware that their regime was reliant on the army and political police force (the Cheka) to maintain itself in power. The authorities may, then, have let their position in the new social hierarchy along with their distrust of independent forces led them to prioritise their own troops in terms of military supplies.

Before moving on, I must note this interesting contrast. He notes that “Makhno’s forces had been weakened by the assignment of Dybenko’s division... to Voroshilov for his campaign against Grigor’ev” (286) yet rather than conclude this transfer of forces was decisive, the very next page he proclaims the “opening of the front to Denikin by the Makhnovite units...” (287) Hmmh… I cannot help thinking someone with a different ideology or goal would have drawn different conclusions.

As for the second commentator Darch points to, as he notes the authors of Black Flag indicate that his work is “fairly hostile” (they were being polite, I assume – and I read that as regards the Makhnovists rather than to “the anarchist project,” although related are not identical but, then, his thesis is against “the anarchist project” using the Makhnovists as a means). Going through Black Flame, it does not rely on it for the same reasons the ISO did – indeed, I would say it usually uses Darch's book on general socio-economic points and then to refute orthodox Marxist-Leninist claims against Makhno (for example, on anti-Semitism). Ironically, it quotes him as someone who “uncritically accepted” the notion that “the Platform was Leninist or Blanquist”. (253)

Given that Black Flame points to the Makhnovists as an alternative to Bolshevism, it is doubtful the authors agree with Darch’s position. On this hunch, I decided to ask Lucien van der Walt about Darch's thesis and he kindly replied. He said that there were “issues in Colin Darch’s work, particularly his characterisation of the Makhnovists,” but also “some really strong material”:

‘I have drawn on some of Colin’s work in my writing. For one thing, he provides a good account of the massive agrarian restructuring that had taken place in much of Ukraine in the decades and years up to the Makhnovist revolution. An understanding of the social structure – and the changes in it – is almost completely absent from most studies on the Makhnovists, which focus on parties and personalities, or on the minutiae of developments in the revolutionary period, or on endless accounts of battles in which the Makhnovists were involved. I have consistently argued against the myth that anarchism is some sort of mysterious trans-historical force, or psychological impulse, or human nature that exists outside of social structures including classes and material conditions. Instead – and this is hardly an original or a new argument, you can find it in the early Kropotkin – anarchism emerged from capitalist modernity. It arose from the rebellions of its exploited classes, the modern working class, especially. The peasantry – meaning here small-scale family farmers exploited by the ruling classes, through rent and taxes, including tenant farmers – is transformed by capitalism, especially by growing dependence on commodity production i.e. cash-cropping, within a larger capitalist system. Large-scale anarchist peasant movements emerge in the context of agrarian upheavals, where older feudal ties break down, pressures on land become acute and capitalist penetration takes place extensively – and short-term shocks can play a role too. We can think of Manchuria/Korea, Mexico, Spain and Ukraine as examples. Ukraine was one of the most economically advanced parts of the old Russian Empire, responsible for a large part of its agricultural export – 20% of the world’s wheat, by no means a marginal rural region – and quite different to the semi-feudal system that remained in much of the Empire. This context – unpacked by Colin – is almost completely ignored in much of the literature.

‘For another, Colin provides very useful material on the early period of Nestor Makhno’s activities after his release from prison in 1917, and of the activities of his circle at the time – I mean here, especially, activities in the early revolutionary period in 1917 and 1918. This is before the Bolsheviks’ Treaty of Brest-Litovsk handed over the territory to the German-allied forces, who engaged in massive repressive and consciously counter-revolutionary activity. What we usually think of as the Makhnovist movement – the massive rebellion from 1918 that coalesced around the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of the Ukraine, or Black Army, and its associated soviets and communes – emerged, in part, through rebellion against these occupying forces and the White Armies. But before the occupation? Darch provides a detailed account; only Skirda’s anywhere close. Colin shows a Makhno articulating publicly positions very close indeed to what would later be articulated in the later, 1926, ‘Organisational Platform of the Libertarian Communists’ in this early period. Besides rubbishing ideas that the ‘Platform’ was simply a response to Bolshevik victory and anarchist defeat in the Russian Revolution, this shows an interesting continuity in his thought and that he never saw this as a break with anarchism – which of course is perfectly true, as Bakunin and others advocated something essentially the same decades earlier. In addition, Colin provides a valuable discussion of Makhno's and his circle’s relations with local, municipal bodies and urban labour unions in this period. This reveals a very pragmatic – yet radical – strategic approach: this is distinct from the way in which Makhno is presented as a hide-bound peasant traditionalist, who hated cities, as Voline and others suggest, or a narrow insurrectionist who always relied on the gun. It shows a Makhno who did not proceed from crude dogma and abstract slogans, but one who grabbed and made openings, especially in regard to land reforms prior to Best-Litovsk. Bear in mind, I’ve always argued for a concrete anarchism of the masses that addresses the actually-existing situation, rather than follows liberal or Marxist fads, or that conversely keeps itself safe and static with a retreat into wild hopes, slogans and memories, and this struck me as an interesting example.

‘I do think by the way that all of this material rather undermines Colin Darch’s own anti-Makhno stuff later in his thesis.’

Can a “hostile” account be “excellent”? Yes, particularly in parts even if not completely or even mostly. Does it mean it is not biased? No. Does it mean agreeing with everything written or suggested? No, as noted elements of a thesis can be strong while others betray the author’s prejudices and politics. I can say that Darch has done a lot of research and does utilise a lot of sources. However, if this research is conducted with a specific aim then the sources will be selected and utilised based on that. Thus utilisation of sources produced by those opposed to the Makhnovists to justify that very opposition is not convincing and, dare I say it, uncritical.

I suggested that Darch’s account is “obviously biased” – this can be seen from one of the quotes I provided: “summoning of yet another anarchist congress . . . at a time of military crisis”. I put “[sic!]” after anarchist because it was not an anarchist congress, it was a soviet congress made up of elected delegates from the villages and towns of the Makhnovist-protected region. Why was the congress called? Precisely because it was a time of crisis and the Makhnovists, rightly, thought that the toilers should have their say in developments and decisions. Sadly, Darch does not explain why this was a bad idea although he seems to be agreeing with “the Bolshevik commanders”….

The Makhnovists could do this, of course, because they had popular support – unlike the Bolsheviks who at this stage had placed the necessity of a party dictatorship into the heart of their ideology (replacing the need simply for party power). Now, I am sure that the Bolshevik commanders were horrified at the calling of any freely elected congress as this obviously went against the party dictatorship and the limited role they expected the masses to play in the revolution. I am also sure that, from a socialist perspective, the Makhnovists using opportunities during a war to involve the people the war was being waged for is a good thing – if you are fighting for a revolution rather than waging a war to secure your party’s regime, of course.

As another example, there is the section on anti-Semitism and the Makhnovists (the bulk of it not even about the Makhnovists). Even after recounting the lack of evidence of pogroms by the Makhnovists, he still concludes it “seems, then, that Makhno himself was probably free of anti-Jewish feeling… His troops may or may not have been guilty of some pogroms, but no conclusive evidence can be produced to prove them guilty of any major or systematic attacks on Jews. Whether such evidence exists must remain in doubt [in a footnote he adds: “It may lie in a Soviet archive…”].” (325) He cannot bring himself to suggest that claims of Makhnovist anti-Semitism is a slander (as Voline and Avrich, both Jews, concluded). So the evidence Darch presents shows that the Makhnovists cannot be labelled anti-Semitic (as Trotsky did) but his conclusion is, well, lacking… he seems to be hoping that there is some evidence, somewhere, which would confirm the Bolshevik slanders against the Makhnovists.

And, of course, Soviet sources – assuming they have not been rewritten – would have been based on the ideology of the writer and reflect the hierarchies and bureaucracies they were part of. Some may have been reporting events accurately, some may have reported certain facts and excluded others while placing an ideologically-correct spin to them, others would simply have reported what their superiors wanted to hear (due to fear or due to promotional aspirations). Yanowitz, for example, writes:

‘Darch points out that during the campaign against Wrangel, the Red Army leaders were sending a constant stream of cables to the rear about the failures and slowness of the Makhnovists (“Makhnovschina,” 115)’

I should note that page 115 on Darch’s thesis discusses “Household and commune in the Russian Empire” and makes no reference to Wrangel: the struggle against him is covered in pages 418-445. He seems to be summarising pages 430-2 and not very accurately at that. Darch does write that after the Red Army commander issued the order for a general advance on 26 October:

“It was two days after the order was issued, on 28 October, that Frunze’s army group lumbered into action…. Although Makhno scored some more successes, storming enemy entrenhments…. his advance was still too slow for the increasingly impatient Frunze, who was under pressure from Moscow and saw his chances of completing the encirclement of Wrangel slipping away. In the event, Makhno’s forces passed to the west of Tomkak only on the morning of the 29th” (431)

So, Frunze’s troops “lumbered into action” (interesting choice of words!) on the 28 October, the Makhnovists seem to have reached their goal the following morning even in the face of military engagements – this being considered “too slow”! And note the “under pressure from Moscow” – it does not seem unreasonable to assume Makhno was a convenient scapegoat in official responses. Darch, in fact, notes “the Soviet commander was still unable to get his troops moving fast enough” and “Bolshevik sluggishness”. (433) Incidentally, his comments that “Frunze started disparaging the Makhnovites’ contributions to the campaign from the start” and quotes a direct wire message complaining that, well, the Makhnovists did not seem to want to be cannon-fodder (439) seem to be the closest to Yanowitz’s summary.

Given that Red Army commanders were in constant danger of being shot by their superiors it makes sense for them to blame their problems on the Makhnovists in their official communications. As such, I would reject Darch’s comments:

‘McKay, I suggest, falls into the trap of believing that the voices from the past that we hear in the sources are speaking directly to us. But in fact, as historians, we are eavesdropping on forgotten conversations from which large chunks have been excised by the accidents of the intervening decades. There is no universal reason to trust or mistrust particular kinds of source - rather they must all, without exception, be subjected to critical evaluation for reliability and coherence. I have no objection to being proven wrong, and my account of the Махновщина is doubtless defective in many ways. But to accuse me of partiality in the use of sources is to mistake the discourse of political polemic for the discourse of the professional writing of history.’

Darch seems to forget that these are not “conversations” between comrades, they are official communications between inferior and superior within a hierarchical, bureaucratic machine. A machine in which the inferiors know – often had seen – that their superiors shoot those whom they deem as being a danger to “the revolution.” They know that dissident voices – even within the party – are subject to bureaucratic penalties, if they were lucky (Emma Goldman later recounted how during the Kronstadt events Victor Serge remained silent because said speaking up “would mark him for the Cheka and even silent disappearance”). So even official communications would be seeking to avoid punishment and confirming superior’s biases would help with that.

Now, indeed, there is no “universal” reason but there are particular reasons to mistrust certain sources. However, the willingness of Leninists to lie is well known and well established – and it existed before and after Stalin. Indeed, Darch himself notes (294) how the “Bolshevik press unscrupulously used [a] letter... to suggest that negotiations” between the Makhnovites and the Whites were taking place when the Makhnovists had published the letter to mock the suggestion. Yes, there may well be elements of fact within these communications and archives but basing your account of the Makhnovists on Soviet sources is problematic – particularly if the aim of the work seems to be to destroy the “myth” of Makhno, for obvious reasons.

Then there is the unstated ideological context. This period – 1919 onwards – was one marked by the de facto Bolshevik party dictatorship becoming securely placed within Bolshevik ideology, being considered as an essential aspect of this and every revolution. This meant that the kind of genuine soviet democracy that the Makhnovists were actively encouraging (much to the chagrin of Bolshevik commanders, including Trotsky) could not be tolerated. That is echoed uncritically in Darch’s account suggests that this “Leninist principle, inviolable for every Bolshevik, that the dictatorship of the proletariat is and can be realized only through the dictatorship of the party” (to quote Trotsky from 1927) still infuses Leninism. It can also be seen from this:

“the Makhnovists were to have the right to participate in elections to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, to be held in December. This last may possibly have been an alarming prospect for the Bolsheviks, who in Ukraine at least were falling back more and more on authoritarianism as a cover for their political weakness.” (426)

Interesting qualifiers – “may possibly” and “in Ukraine at least”! The lack of popular support for the Bolsheviks was hardly confined to Ukraine – hence the “dictatorship of the party” dogma which was, inherently, marked by “authoritarianism,” indeed “more and more” across Russia. As for the prospect for soviet democracy, well, the Kronstadt revolt would soon show that it was a definite “alarming prospect” which had been haunting the Bolsheviks since the spring of 1918, one to be exorcised by military force…

Darch notes that Trotsky accused “the insurgents of undermining Soviet power” (294) but neither explains how organising freely elected soviet congresses can do this. Unless, of course, by “Soviet power” it is meant the party dictatorship… At least Darch does admit – and so refutes Trotsky – that the Makhnovists “had a broader peasant base in 1919 and 1920 than just the kulaks” before adding that “the Bolsheviks consciously and deliberately made a choice in favour of the interests of the urban working class over those of the peasantry which destroyed commodity relations and ultimately led to famine.” (521) Except, of course, those “interests” were defined by the Bolsheviks, not the urban working class themselves – I doubt any worker thinks producing a famine is in anyone’s interests (except the bureaucrats controlling the distribution of resources, perhaps).

To say that this policy was somewhat counter-productive would be an understatement – and it is not “to occupy the moral high ground” to suggest there were better ways (such as the Makhnovist one). Indeed, it could be argued that much pro-Bolshevik historical writing is to deny that alternatives existed to any Bolshevik policy, regardless of how authoritarian, bureaucratic or counter-productive it was. In short, that regardless of Bolshevik assertions to the contrary, its rule was not “in the interests of the urban working class” at all – for to claim this would suggest that that one-man management, the militarisation of labour, the repression of strikes, packing, gerrymandering and disbanding of soviets, abolition of military democracy, party dictatorship raised to an ideological principle and ruthlessly applied, etc., etc., etc. were all in “the interests of the urban working class”.

It was precisely because the Makhnovists were creating a free area within which the both the urban and rural toilers could express and act upon their own interests themselves that the Bolsheviks could not tolerate them. So Maurice Brinton’s words about Kronstadt are worth recalling:

‘It is a question of one’s basic attitude as to what socialism is all about. What are epitomized in the Kronstadt events are some of the most difficult problems of revolutionary strategy and revolutionary ethics: the problems of ends and means, of the relations between Party and masses, in fact of whether a Party is necessary at all. Can the working class by itself only develop a trade union consciousness. Should it even be allowed, at all times, to go that far?

‘Or can the working class develop a deeper consciousness and understanding of its interests than can any organization allegedly acting on its behalf? When the Stalinists or Trotskyists speak of Kronstadt as “an essential action against the class enemy”, when more “sophisticated” revolutionaries refer to it as a “tragic necessity”, one is entitled to pause for a moment. One is entitled to ask how seriously they accept Marx’s dictum that “the emancipation of the working class is the task of the working class itself. Do they take this seriously or do they pay mere lip-service to the words? Do they identify socialism with the autonomy (organizational and ideological) of the working class? Or do they see themselves, with their wisdom as to the “historical interests” of others, and with their judgments as to what should be “permitted”, as the leadership around which the future elite will crystallize and develop? One is entitled not only to ask ... but also to suggest the answer!’

Is Drach simply presenting an example of “the professional writing of history”? As noted by a miniature war-gamer:

‘As for Darch, hmm, I'm not sure he's a soldier or has much interest in military affairs as his essay "The Myth of Nestor Makhno" is largely a political polemic from a Marxist-Leninist POV. In fact at the end of the essay he states "..it is Skirda's (book) which captures the imagination : it is written with passion and scholarship, although it is principally a narrative political and military history, avoiding idealogical, social and economic questions…A truly problematised Marxist history of the Makhnovshchina has yet to be written." Presumably he wants to be the one that does it!’

I have to say, I never thought I would be quoting miniature war-gamers in a political discussion (“polemic”!) but this conclusion seems more than justified.

So there we have it: a Marxist-Leninist produces a thesis whose aim, utilising Bolshevik sources, is to prove that the Bolsheviks were right with regards to Makhno and this thesis is latter used by another Marxist-Leninist to prove that Bolsheviks were right with regards to Makhno.

That a lot of work went into the thesis is clear but that does not deflect from its ideological purpose. Still, it being clearly and obviously ideologically driven is good as it arms the reader not to take it at face value – nor those who rely on it to show the Bolsheviks were right. I am sure that Darch’s thesis will be happily utilised by those seeking to bolster the Bolshevik Myth but it does not destroy the “Makhno Myth”— for it is no myth. The ironic thing is, Darch’s thesis – as Lucien van der Walt notes – can be used by those seeking to learn from, rather than repeat, history to help refute such pro-Bolshevik attempts.