JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787.

Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising the federal System of Government. On that day a small number only had assembled. Seven States were not convened till,

Friday 25 of May, when the following members appeared to wit:

From Massachusetts, Rufus King. N. York, Robert Yates, Alexr. Hamilton. N. Jersey, David Brearly, William Churchill Houston, William Patterson. Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, Thomas Fitzsimons, James Edition: current; Page: [2] Wilson, Governeur Morris. Delaware, George Read, Richard Basset, Jacob Broome. Virginia, George Washington, Edmund Randolph, John Blair, James Madison, George Mason, George Wythe, James McClurg. N. Carolina, Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs Spaight, Hugh Williamson. S. Carolina, John Rutlidge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler. Georgia, William Few.

Mr. Robert Morris informed the members assembled Edition: current; Page: [a] Edition: current; Page: [3] that by the instruction & in behalf, of the deputation of Pena. he proposed George Washington, Esqr. late Commander in chief for president of the Convention. Mr. Jno. Rutlidge seconded the motion; expressing his confidence that the choice would be unanimous, and observing that the presence of Genl. Washington forbade any observations on the occasion which might otherwise be proper.

General Washington was accordingly unanimously elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by Mr. R. Morris and Mr. Rutlidge; from which in a very emphatic manner he thanked the Convention for the honor they had conferred on him, reminded them of the novelty of the scene of business in which he was to act, lamented his want of better qualifications, and claimed the indulgence of the House Edition: current; Page: [4] towards the involuntary errors which his inexperience might occasion.

(The nomination came with particular grace from Penntildea, as Docr. Franklin alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Docr. was himself to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of the weather and of his health confined him to his house.)

Mr. Wilson moved that a Secretary be appointed, and nominated Mr. Temple Franklin.

Col Hamilton nominated Major Jackson.

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On the ballot Majr Jackson had 5 votes & Mr. Franklin 2 votes.

On reading the Credentials of the deputies it was noticed that those from Delaware were prohibited from changing the Article in the Confederation establishing an equality of votes among the States.

The appointment of a Committee, consisting of Messrs. Wythe, Hamilton & C. Pinckney, on the motion of Mr. Pinckney, to prepare standing rules & orders was the only remaining step taken on this day.

Monday May 28.— From Massts. Nat: Gorham & Caleb Strong. From Connecticut Oliver Elseworth. From Delaware, Gunning Bedford. From Maryland James McHenry. From Penna. B. Franklin, George Clymer, Ths. Mifflin & Jared Ingersol, took their seats. Edition: current; Page: [ 6 ] Mr. Wythe from the Committee for preparing rules made a report which employed the deliberations of this day. Mr. King objected to one of the rules in the Report authorizing any member to call for the yeas & nays and have them entered on the minutes. He urged that as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the Constituents, it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes; and improper as changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of the business & would fill the minutes with contradictions. Edition: current; Page: [ 7 ] Col. Mason seconded the objection; adding that such a record of the opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change of them on conviction; and in case of its being hereafter promulged must furnish handles to the adversaries of the Result of the Meeting. The proposed rule was rejected nem. contrad certe. The standing rules agreed to were as follows: Viz. A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not less than seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the greater number of these Edition: current; Page: [8] which shall be fully represented; but a less number than seven may adjourn from day to day. Immediately after the President shall have taken the chair, and the members their seats, the minutes of the preceding day shall be read by the Secretary. Every member, rising to speak, shall address the President; and whilst he shall be speaking, none shall pass between them, or hold discourse with another, or read a book, pamphlet or paper, printed or manuscript—and of two members rising at the same time, the President shall name him who shall be first heard. A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without special leave, upon the same question; and not the second time, before every other, who had been silent, shall have been heard, if he choose to speak upon the subject. A motion made and seconded, shall be repeated, and if written, as it shall be when any member shall so require, read aloud by the Secretary, before it shall be debated; and may be withdrawn at any time, before the vote upon it shall have been declared. Orders of the day shall be read next after the minutes, and either discussed or postponed, before any other business shall be introduced. When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, other than to amend the question, to commit it, or to postpone the debate shall be received. A question which is complicated, shall, at the Edition: current; Page: [9] request of any member, be divided, and put separately on the propositions of which it is compounded. The determination of a question, altho’ fully debated, shall be postponed, if the deputies of any State desire it until the next day. A writing which contains any matter brought on to be considered, shall be read once throughout for information, then by paragraphs to be debated, and again, with the amendments, if any, made on the second reading; and afterwards the question shall be put on the whole, amended, or approved in its original form, as the case shall be. Committees shall be appointed by ballot; and the members who have the greatest number of ballots, altho’ not a majority of the votes present, shall be the Committee. When two or more members have an equal number of votes, the member standing first on the list in the order of taking down the ballots, shall be preferred. A member may be called to order by any other member, as well as by the President; and may be allowed to explain his conduct or expressions supposed to be reprehensible. And all questions of order shall be decided by the President without appeal or debate. Upon a question to adjourn for the day, which may be made at any time, if it be seconded, the question shall be put without a debate. When the House shall adjourn, every member shall stand in his place, until the President pass him. Edition: current; Page: [ 10 ] A letter from sundry persons of the State of Rho. Island addressed to the Honorable The Chairman of the General Convention was presented to the Chair by Mr. Govr. Morris, and being read, was Edition: current; Page: [11] ordered to lie on the table for further consideration. Edition: current; Page: [ 12 ] Mr. Butler moved that the House provide agst interruption of business by absence of members, and Edition: current; Page: [13] against licentious publications of their proceedings—to which was added by—Mr. Spaight —a motion to provide that on the one hand the House might not be precluded by a vote upon any question, from revising the subject matter of it, When they see cause, nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily to rescind a decision, which was the result of mature discussion.—Whereupon it was ordered that these motions be referred for the consideration of the Committee appointed to draw up the standing rules and that the Committee make report thereon. Adjj. till tomorrow 10. OClock.

Tuesday May 29. John Dickenson and Elbridge Gerry, the former from Delaware, the latter from Massts. took their seats. The following rules were added, on the report of Mr. Wythe from the Committee— That no member be absent from the House, so as to interrupt the representation of the State, without leave. Edition: current; Page: [ 14 ] That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall be or ought to be, sitting. That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the sitting of the House without leave of the House. That members only be permitted to inspect the journal. That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published or communicated without leave. That a motion to reconsider a matter which has been determined by a majority, may be made, with leave unanimously given, on the same day on which the vote passed; but otherwise not without one day’s previous notice: in which last case, if the House agree to the reconsideration, some future day shall be assigned for that purpose. Mr. C. Pinkney moved that a Committee be appointed to superintend the Minutes. Mr. Govr. Morris objected to it. The entry of the proceedings of the Convention belonged to the Secretary as their impartial officer. A committee might have an interest & bias in moulding the entry according to their opinions and wishes. Edition: current; Page: [ 15 ] The motion was negatived, 5 noes, 4 ays. Mr. Randolph then opened the main business. He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather than those, who were of longer standing in life and political experience, to open the great subject of their mission. But, as the convention had originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed that some proposition was expected from them, they had imposed this task on him. He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American downfal. He observed that in revising the fœderal system we ought to inquire 1. into the properties, which such a government ought to possess, 2. the defects of the confederation, 3. the danger of our situation & 4. the remedy. 1. The Character of such a government ought to secure 1. against foreign invasion: 2. against dissensions between members of the Union, or seditions in particular States: 3. to procure to the several States various blessings, of which an isolated situation was incapable: 4. to be able to defend Edition: current; Page: [16] itself against encroachment: & 5. to be paramount to the state constitutions. 2. In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high respect for its authors, and considered them as having done all that patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions, & of confederacies,—when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown—no commercial discord had arisen among any States—no rebellion had appeared as in Massts—foreign debts had not become urgent—the havoc of paper money had not been foreseen—treaties had not been violated—and perhaps nothing better could be obtained from the jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty. He then proceeded to enumerate the defects. 1. that the confederation produced no security against foreign invasion; congress not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by their own authority—Of this he cited many examples; most of which tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations to be punished: that particular states might by their conduct provoke war without controul; and that neither militia nor draughts being fit for defence on such occasions, enlistments only could be successful, and these could not be executed without money. 2, that the fœderal government could not check the quarrels between states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor means to interpose accordingly to the exigency. Edition: current; Page: [ 17 ] 3, that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might acquire, which were not attainable under the confederation—such as a productive impost—counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations—pushing of commerce ad libitum,—&c &c. 4, that the fœderal government could not defend itself against encroachments from the states. 5, that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions, ratified as it was in many of the states. 3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation, appealed to the sense of the best friends of the U. S. the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of government every where; and to other considerations. 4. He then proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which he said must be the republican principle. He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following resolutions, which he explained one by one. 1. Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, “common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare.” 2. Resd. therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases. 3. Resd. that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches. 4. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the Edition: current; Page: [18] people of the several States every — for the term of —; to be of the age of — years at least, to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belong to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of — after its expiration; to be incapable of re-election for the space of — after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject to recall. 5. Resold. that the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of — years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of service; and for the space of — after the expiration thereof. 6. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to Edition: current; Page: [19] which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfil its duty under the articles thereof. 7. Resd. that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of — years, to receive punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the Magistracy, existing at the time of increase or diminution, and to be ineligible a second time; and that besides a general authority to execute the national laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation. 8. Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by — of the members of each branch. 9. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of Edition: current; Page: [20] inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminuation shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution. That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all Piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy: cases in which foreigners or Citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any national officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony. 10. Resolvd. that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government & Territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than the whole. 11. Resd. that a Republican Government & the territory of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government & territory, ought to be guarantied by the United States to each State. 12. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engagements. Edition: current; Page: [ 21 ] 13. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto. 14. Resd. that the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union. 15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or times, after the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people to consider & decide thereon. He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the present opportunity of establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the U. S. to pass away unimproved. It was then Resolved—That the House will tomorrow resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole House to consider of the state of the American Union — and that the propositions moved by Mr. Randolph be referred to the said Committee. Mr. Charles Pinkney laid before the House the draft of a federal Government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between the free and Edition: current; Page: [22] independent States of America. —Mr. P. plan ordered that the same be referred to the Committee of the Whole appointed to consider the state of the American Union. CHARLES PINCKNEY’S LETTER. (Reduced.) Edition: current; Page: [ b ] Edition: current; Page: [ c ] Edition: current; Page: [ 23 ] We the People of the States of New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode Island & Providence Plantations Edition: current; Page: [24] Connecticut New York New Jersey Pennsylvania Delaware Maryland Virginia North Carolina South Carolina & Georgia do ordain, declare & Edition: current; Page: [d] Edition: current; Page: [e] Edition: current; Page: [25] establish the following Constitution for the government of ourselves & Posterity. THE PINCKNEY DRAFT. (Reduced.) Edition: current; Page: [ 26 ] Article 1: The Style of this Government shall be The United States of America & the Government shall consist of supreme legislative Executive & judicial Powers. 2 The Legislative Power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of two separate Houses—one to be called the House of Delegates & the other the Senate who shall meet on the — — Day of — in every year. 3 The members of the House of Delegates shall be chosen every — year by the people of the several States & the qualification of the electors shall be the same as those of the electors in the several States for their legislatures—each member shall have been a citizen of the United States for — years; and shall be of — years of age & a resident in the State he is chosen for—Until a census of the people shall be taken in the manner herein after mentioned the House of Delegates shall consist of — to be chosen from the different States in the following proportions: for New Hampshire, —; for Massachusetts — for Rhode Island, — for Connecticut, — for New York — for New Jersey, — for Pennsylvania, — for Delaware, — for Maryld., — for Virginia, — for North Carolina, — Edition: current; Page: [27] for South Carolina, — for Georgia, — & the Legislature shall hereafter regulate the number of delegates by the number of inhabitants according to the Provisions herein after made, at the rate of one for every — thousand.—All money bills of every kind shall originate in the house of Delegates & shall not be altered by the Senate. The House of Delegates shall exclusively possess the power of impeachment & shall choose it’s own officers & vacancies therein shall be supplied by the executive authority of the State in the representation from which they shall happen. 4 The Senate shall be elected & chosen by the House of Delegates which House immediately after their meeting shall choose by ballot — Senators from among the Citizens & residents of New Hampshire — from among those of Massachusetts — from among those of Rhode Island — from among those of Connecticut — from among those of New York — from among those of New Jersey — from among those of Pennsylvania — from among those of Delaware — from among those of Maryland — from among those of Virginia — from among those of North Carolina — from among those of South Carolina & — from among those of Georgia— The Senators chosen from New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode Island & Connecticut shall form one Edition: current; Page: [28] class—those from New York New Jersey Pennsylvania & Delaware one class—& those from Maryland Virginia North Carolina South Carolina & Georgia one class. The House of Delegates shall number these Classes one two & three & fix the times of their service by Lot—the first class shall serve for — years—the second for — years & the third for — years—as their times of service expire the House of Delegates shall fill them up by elections for — years & they shall fill all vacancies that arise from death or resignation for the time of service remaining of the members so dying or resigning. Each Senator shall be — years of age at least—shall have been a Citizen of the United States 4 years before his election & shall be a resident of the State he is chosen from. The Senate shall choose its own Officers. 5 Each State shall prescribe the time & manner of holding elections by the People for the house of Delegates & the House of Delegates shall be the judges of the elections returns & Qualifications of their members. In each house a Majority shall constitute a Quorum to do business — Freedom of Speech & Debate in the legislature shall not be impeached or Questioned in any place out of it & the Members of both Houses shall in all cases except for Treason Felony or Breach of the Peace be free from arrest Edition: current; Page: [29] during their attendance at Congress & in going to & returning from it—Both Houses shall keep journals of their Proceedings & publish them except on secret occasions & the yeas & nays may be entered thereon at the desire of one — of the members present. Neither house without the consent of the other shall adjourn for more than — days nor to any Place but where they are sitting. The members of each house shall not be eligible to or capable of holding any office under the Union during the time for which they have been respectively elected nor the members of the Senate for one year after. The members of each house shall be paid for their services by the States which they represent. Every bill which shall have passed the Legislature shall be presented to the President of the United States for his revision—if he approves it he shall sign it—but if he does not approve it he shall return it with his objections to the house it originated in, which house if two thirds of the members present, notwithstanding the President’s objections agree to pass it, shall send it to the other house with the President’s objections, where if two thirds of the members present also agree to pass it, the same shall become a law—& all bills sent to the President & not returned by him within — days shall be laws unless the Legislature by their adjournment prevent their return in which case they shall not be laws. Edition: current; Page: [ 30 ] 6 th The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay & collect Taxes Duties Imposts & excises To regulate Commerce with all nations & among the several States. To borrow money & emit bills of Credit To establish Post offices. To raise armies To build & equip Fleets To pass laws for arming organizing & disciplining the Militia of the United States To subdue a rebellion in any State on application of its legislature To coin money & regulate the Value of all coins & fix the Standard of Weights & measures To provide such Dock Yards & arsenals & erect such fortifications as may be necessary for the United States & to exercise exclusive Jurisdiction therein To appoint a Treasurer by ballot To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court To establish Post & military Roads To establish & provide for a national University at the Seat of the Government of the United States To establish uniform rules of Naturalization To provide for the establishment of a Seat of Government for the United States not exceeding — miles square in which they shall have exclusive jurisdiction Edition: current; Page: [ 31 ] To make rules concerning Captures from an Enemy To declare the law & Punishment of piracies & felonies at sea & of counterfeiting Coin & of all offences against the Laws of Nations To call forth the aid of the Militia to execute the laws of the Union enforce treaties suppress insurrections and repel invasions And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing powers into execution. The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power to declare the Punishment of Treason which shall consist only in levying War against the United States or any of them or in adhering to their Enemies. No person shall be convicted of Treason but by the testimony of two witnesses. The proportion of direct taxation shall be regulated by the whole number of inhabitants of every description which number shall within — years after the first meeting of the Legislature & within the term of every — year after be taken in the manner to be prescribed by the legislature No Tax shall be laid on articles exported from the States—nor capitation tax but in proportion to the Census before directed All Laws regulating Commerce shall require the assent of two thirds of the members present in each house—The United States shall not grant any title of Nobility—The Legislature of the United States shall pass no Law on the subject of Religion, nor touching or abridging the Liberty of the Press nor Edition: current; Page: [32] shall the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus ever be suspended except in case of Rebellion or Invasion. All acts made by the Legislature of the United States pursuant to this Constitution & all Treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the land & all Judges shall be bound to consider them as such in their decisions. 7 The Senate shall have the sole & exclusive power to declare War & to make treaties & to appoint Ambassadors & other Ministers to foreign nations & Judges of the Supreme Court. They shall have the exclusive power to regulate the manner of deciding all disputes & controversies now subsisting or which may arise between the States respecting Jurisdiction or Territory. 8 The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a President of the United States of America which shall be his style & his title shall be His Excellency. He shall be elected for — years & shall be reeligible. He shall from time to time give information to the Legislature of the state of the Union & recommend to their consideration the measures he may think necessary—he shall take care that the laws of the United States be duly executed: he shall commission all the officers of the United States & except as to Ambassadors other ministers and Judges of Edition: current; Page: [33] the Supreme Court he shall nominate & with the consent of the Senate appoint all other officers of the United States. He shall receive public Ministers from foreign nations & may correspond with the Executives of the different States. He shall have power to grant pardons & reprieves except in impeachments—He shall be Commander in chief of the army & navy of the United States & of the Militia of the several States & shall receive a compensation which shall not be increased or diminished during his continuance in office. At entering on the Duties of his office he shall take an oath faithfully to execute the duties of a President of the United States.—He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the house of Delegates & Conviction in the Supreme Court of Treason bribery or Corruption—In case of his removal death resignation or disability the President of the Senate shall exercise the duties of his office until another President be chosen—& in case of the death of the President of the Senate the Speaker of the House of Delegates shall do so. 9 The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power and it shall be their duty to establish such Courts of Law Equity & Admiralty as shall be necessary—The Judges of the Courts shall hold their offices during good behaviour & receive a compensation, which shall not be increased or diminished during their continuance in office—One of these Edition: current; Page: [34] Courts shall be termed the Supreme Court whose jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the laws of the United States or affecting ambassadors other public Ministers & Consuls—to the trial of impeachment of officers of the United States—to all cases of Admiralty & maritime jurisdiction—In cases of impeachment affecting ambassadors and other public Ministers this Jurisdiction shall be original & in all other cases appellate— All criminal offences (except in cases of impeachment) shall be tried in the State where they shall be committed—the trials shall be open & public & shall be by Jury. 10 Immediately after the first census of the people of the United States the House of Delegates shall apportion the Senate by electing for each State out of the citizens resident therein one Senator for every — members each State shall have in the House of Delegates—Each State shall be entitled to have at least one member in the Senate. 11 No State shall grant letters of marque & reprisal or enter into treaty or alliance or confederation nor grant any title of nobility nor without the Consent of the Legislature of the United States lay any impost on imports—nor keep troops or Ships of War in time of peace—nor enter into compacts with other States or foreign powers or emit bills of Credit or Edition: current; Page: [35] make any thing but Gold Silver or Copper a tender in payment of debts nor engage in War except for self defence when actually invaded or the danger of invasion be so great as not to admit of a delay until the Government of the United States can be informed thereof—& to render these prohibitions effectual the Legislature of the United States shall have the power to revise the laws of the several States that may be supposed to infringe the Powers exclusively delegated by this Constitution to Congress & to negative & annual such as do. 12 The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges & immunities of Citizens in the several States—Any person charged with Crimes in any State fleeing from justice to another shall on demand of the Executive of the State from which he fled be delivered up & removed to the State having jurisdiction of the offence. 13 Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislature & to the records & judicial Proceedings of the Courts & magistrates of every State. 14 The Legislature shall have power to admit new States into the Union on the same terms with the original States provided two thirds of the members present in both Houses agree. Edition: current; Page: [ 36 ] 15 On the application of the legislature of a State the United States shall protect it against domestic insurrection. 16 If two thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply for the same the Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for the purpose of amending the Constitution—or should Congress, with the Consent of two thirds of each house, propose to the States amendments to the same—the agreement of two thirds of the Legislatures of the States shall be sufficient to make the said amendments parts of the Constitution. The Ratification of the conventions of — States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution. Adjourned.

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Wednesday May 30. Roger Sherman (from Connecticut) took his seat. The House went into Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union. Mr. Gorham was elected to the Chair by Ballot. The propositions of Mr. Randolph which had been referred to the Com̃ittee being taken up. He moved on the suggestion of Mr. G. Morris, that the first of his propositions to wit “Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged, as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare,—should be postponed, in order to consider the 3 following: 1. that a union of the States merely federal will not accomplish the objects proposed by the articles of Confederation, namely common defence, security of liberty, & genl welfare. 2. that no treaty or treaties among the whole or Edition: current; Page: [38] part of the States, as individual Sovereignties, would be sufficient. 3. that a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The motion for postponing was seconded by Mr. Govr. Morris and unanimously agreed to. Some verbal criticisms were raised agst. the first proposition, and it was agreed on motion of Mr. Butler seconded by Mr. Randolph, to pass on to the third, which underwent a discussion, less however on its general merits than on the force and extent of the particular terms national & supreme. Mr. Charles Pinkney wished to know of Mr. Randolph, whether he meant to abolish the State Governts. altogether. Mr. R. replied that he meant by these general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones which explained the outlines of the system he had in view. Mr. Butler said he had not made up his mind on the subject, and was open to the light which discussion might throw on it. After some general observations he concluded with saying that he had opposed the grant of powers to Congs. heretofore, because the whole power was vested in one body. The proposed distribution of the powers into different bodies changed the case, and would induce him to go great lengths. Genl. Pinkney expressed a doubt whether the act Edition: current; Page: [39] of Congs recom̃ending the Convention, or the Commissions of the Deputies to it, could authorize a discussion of a system founded on different principles from the federal Constitution. Mr. Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt. Mr. Govr. Morris explained the distinction between a federal and national, supreme, Govt.; the former being a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a compleat and compulsive operation. He contended that in all Communities there must be one supreme power, and one only. Mr. Mason observed that the present confederation was not only deficient in not providing for coercion & punishment agst. delinquent States; but argued very cogently that punishment could not in the nature of things be executed on the States collectively, and therefore that such a Govt. was necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt required it. Edition: current; Page: [ 40 ] Mr Sherman who took his seat today, admitted that the Confederation had not given sufficient power to Congs. and that additional powers were necessary; particularly that of raising money which he said would involve many other powers. He admitted also that the General & particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed however not to be disposed to make too great inroads on the existing system; intimating as one reason, that it would be wrong to lose every amendment, by inserting such as would not be agreed to by the States. It was moved by Mr. Read, 2ded. by Mr. Chs. Edition: current; Page: [41] Cotesworth Pinkney, to postpone the 3d. proposition last offered by Mr. Randolph viz that a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive and Judiciary, in order to take up the following,—viz. “Resolved that in order to carry into execution the Design of the States in forming this Convention, and to accomplish the objects proposed by the Confederation a more effective Government consisting of a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, ought to be established.” The motion to postpone for this purpose was lost: Yeas Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, S. Carolina—4 Nays. N. Y. Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina—4. On the question as moved by Mr. Butler, on the third proposition it was resolved in Committee of whole that a national governt. ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive & Judiciary,—Massts. being ay—Connect.—no. N. York divided (Col. Hamilton ay Mr. Yates no) Pena ay. Delaware ay. Virga. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. The following Resolution, being the 2d. of those proposed by Mr. Randolph was taken up, viz.—“that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases.” Mr. Madison observing that the words, “or to the Edition: current; Page: [42] number of free inhabitants,” might occasion debates which would divert the Committee from the general question whether the principle of representation should be changed, moved that they might be struck out. Mr. King observed that the quotas of contribution which would alone remain as the measure of representation, would not answer, because waving every other view of the matter, the revenue might hereafter be so collected by the General Govt. that the sums respectively drawn from the States would not appear, and would besides be continually varying. Mr. Madison admitted the propriety of the observation, and that some better rule ought to be found. Col. Hamilton moved to alter the resolution so as to read “that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitants.” Mr. Spaight 2ded. the motion. Edition: current; Page: [ 43 ] It was then moved that the Resolution be postponed, which was agreed to. Mr. Randolph and Mr. Madison then moved the following resolution—“that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned.” It was moved and 2ded. to amend it by adding “and not according to the present system”—which was agreed to. It was then moved & 2ded. to alter the resolution so as to read “that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought not to be according to the present system.” It was then moved & 2ded. to postpone the Resolution moved by Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison, which being agreed to: Mr. Madison, moved, in order to get over the difficulties, the following resolution—“that the equality of suffrage established by the articles of Confederation ought not to prevail in the national Legislature, and that an equitable ratio of representation ought to be substituted.” This was 2ded. by Mr. Govr. Morris, and being generally relished, would have been agreed to; when, Mr. Reed moved that the whole clause relating to the point of Representation be postponed; reminding the Come. that the deputies from Delaware were restrained by their com̃ission from assenting to any change of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be fixed on, it might become their duty to retire from the Convention. Mr. Govr. Morris observed that the valuable assistance Edition: current; Page: [44] of those members could not be lost without real concern, and that so early a proof of discord in the Convention as the secession of a State, would add much to the regret; that the change proposed was however so fundamental an article in a national Govt., that it could not be dispensed with. Mr. Madison observed that whatever reason might have existed for the equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among sovereign States, it must cease when a National Governmt. should be put into the place. In the former case, the acts of Congs. depended so much for their efficacy on the cooperation of the States, that these had a weight both within & without Congress, nearly in proportion to their extent and importance. In the latter case, as the acts of the Genl Govt. would take effect without the intervention of the State legislatures, a vote from a small State wd. have the same efficacy & importance as a vote from a large one, and there was the same reason for different numbers of representatives from different States, as from Counties of different extents within particular States. He suggested as an expedient for at once taking the sense of the members on this point and saving the Delaware deputies from embarrassment, that the question should be taken in Committee, and the clause on report to the House, be postponed without a question there. This however did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read. By several it was observed that no just construction of the Act of Delaware, could require or justify a secession of her deputies, even if the resolution were Edition: current; Page: [45] to be carried thro’ the House as well as the Committee. It was finally agreed however that the clause should be postponed: it being understood that in the event the proposed change of representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty being started from any other quarter than from Delaware. The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed to, The Committee then rose. The Chairman reported progress, and the House having resolved to resume the subject in Committee to-morrow, Adjourned to 10 O Clock.

Thursday May 31 William Pierce, from Georgia took his seat. In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph’s propositions. The 3d. Resolution “that the national Legislature Edition: current; Page: [46] ought to consist of two branches” was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Docr. Franklin who was understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation. Resol: 4. first clause, “that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States,” being taken up, Mr. Sherman opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately should have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want information and are constantly liable to be misled. Mr. Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In Massts. it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the administration of Governmt. It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular clamour in Massts. for the reduction of salaries and the attack made on that of the Govr. though secured by the spirit of the Constitution itself. He had he said been too republican heretofore: he was still however republican, Edition: current; Page: [47] but had been taught by experience the danger of the levelling spirit. Mr. Mason argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the Govt. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons—It ought to know & sympathize with every part of the community; and ought therefore to be taken not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it, which had in several instances particularly in Virga., different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits &c &c. He admitted that we had been too democratic but was afraid we sd. incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people. He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity & policy, considering that however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years, not only might but certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society. Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of Citizens. Mr. Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the federal Edition: current; Page: [48] pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the national Legislature. All interference between the general and local Governmts. should be obviated as much as possible. On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to federal measures had proceeded much more from the officers of the States, than from the people at large. Mr. Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the national Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first—the Executive by the second together with the first; and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be Edition: current; Page: [49] resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary branches of the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures. Mr. Gerry did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from the British Constitution were often fallacious when applied to our situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn that the State legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not always possess their confidence. He had no objection however to an election by the people if it were so qualified that men of honor & character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which the State legislatures should be bound to choose. Mr. Butler thought an election by the people an impracticable mode. On the question for an election of the first branch of the national Legislature, by the people, Massts. ay. Connect. divd. N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pena. ay. Delawr. divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georga. ay. The remaiñg Clauses of Resolution 4th. relating Edition: current; Page: [50] to the qualifications of members of the National Legislature, being pospd. nem. con., as entering too much into detail for general propositions; The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. “that the second, (or senatorial) branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures.” Mr. Spaight contended that the 2d. branch ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect. Mr. Butler apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve; and called on Mr. Randolph the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members he meant to assign to this second branch. Mr Randf. observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required; that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the passionate proceedings to which Edition: current; Page: [51] numerous assemblies are liable. He observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the U.S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their origin every man had found it in the turbulance and follies of democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for agst. this tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose. Mr. King reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as proposed (by Mr. Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures would be impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea of proportion among the States was to be disregarded. According to this idea, there must be 80 or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the choice of one of them.—Mr. Spaight withdrew his motion. Mr. Wilson opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several election districts for one branch, in chusing members for the other branch, as a good model. Mr. Madison observed that such a mode would Edition: current; Page: [52] destroy the influence of the smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the latter would chuse from within themselves, altho’ better men might be found in the former. The election of Senators in Virga. where large & small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had illustrated this consequence. Local partiality, would often prefer a resident within the County or State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known throughout his own State. Mr. Sherman favored an election of one member by each of the State Legislatures. Mr. Pinkney moved to strike out the “nomination by the State Legislatures;” on this question. Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pena. Edition: current; Page: [53] no. Del. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg no. On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. Jersey, no. Pena. no. Del. no. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C, ay, Ga. no. So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of the plan. The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the question whether each branch shd. originate laws, there was an unanimous affirmative without debate. On the question for transferring all the Legislative power of the existing Congs. to this Assembly, there was also a silent affirmative nem. con. On the proposition for giving “Legislative power in all cases to which the State Legislatures were individually incompetent,” Mr. Pinkney & Mr Rutledge objected to the vagueness of the term incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to vote until they should Edition: current; Page: [54] see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this definition. Mr Butler repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in taking away the powers of the States, and called on Mr. Randolph for the extent of his meaning. Mr. Randolph disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion was fixed on this point. Mr. Madison said that he had brought with him Edition: current; Page: [55] into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of Govt. as would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to. On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not competent—Massts. ay. Cont. divd. (Sherman no Elseworth ay) N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay. Georga. ay. The other clauses giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat. Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause, (the words “or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union,” being added after the words “contravening &c. the articles of the Union,” on motion of Dr. Franklin) were agreed to witht. debate or dissent. The last clause of Resolution 6, authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole agst. a delinquent State came next into consideration. Mr. Madison, observed that the more he reflected Edition: current; Page: [56] on the use of force, the more he doubted, the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and not individually.—A union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of force agst. a State, would look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render this resource unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to, nem. con. The Committee then rose & the House Adjourned.

Friday June 1 st . 1787 William Houston from Georgia took his seat. The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution Edition: current; Page: [57] 7. “that a national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legislature for the term of — years &c to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the Executive powers of Congress &c.” Mr. Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace & war &c which would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one. Mr. Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a single person. Mr. C. Pinkney seconded the motion, so as to read “that a National Ex. to consist of a single person, be instituted. A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he should put the question, Docr. Franklin Edition: current; Page: [58] observed that it was a point of great importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the question was put. Mr. Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them, which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting the Executive power in a single person, tho’ he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer the public affairs best. Mr. Sherman said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depository of the supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the business which ought to be done by the Executive department, and consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he wished the number might not be fixed, but that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate. Mr. Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving Edition: current; Page: [59] most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he considered strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature. Mr. Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in order to give weight & inspire confidence. Mr. Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the fœtus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed by the British Govenmt as our prototype. He did not mean however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it he did not know that he should be opposed to it; Edition: current; Page: [60] but the fixt genius of the people of America required a different form of Government. He could not see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, dispatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in order to support its independence to consist of more than one. Mr. Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the manners so Edition: current; Page: [61] republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it. Mr. Wilson’s motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz—“that a National Executive be instituted.” Mr. Madison thought it would be proper, before a choice shd. be made between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and must be given to that departmt. whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive shd. be struck out & that after the words “that a national Executive ought to be instituted” there be inserted the words following viz. “with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers “not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature,” as may from time to time be delegated by the national Legislature.” The words “not legislative nor judiciary in their nature” were added to the proposed amendment, in consequence Edition: current; Page: [62] of a suggestion by Genl. Pinkney that improper powers might otherwise be delegated. Mr. Wilson seconded this motion. Mr. Pinkney moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member of it; viz: “and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated.” He said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the “power to carry into effect the national laws.” Mr. Randolph seconded the motion. Mr. Madison did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words, “to appoint to offices &c. the whole being perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not however see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions. In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinkney, the question on Mr. Madison’s motion was divided; and the words objected to by Mr. Pinkney struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y., N. J., Pena., Del., N. C., & Geo. agst. Mass., Virga. & S. Carolina the preceding part of the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided all the other States in the affirmative. The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive being under consideration, Mr. Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being Edition: current; Page: [63] apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Massts, shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety. Mr. Sherman was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which was to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing. Mr. Wilson moves that the blank for the term of duration should be filled with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred this short period, on the supposition that a re-eligibility would be provided for. Mr. Pinkney moves for seven years. Mr. Sherman was for three years, and agst. the doctrine of rotation as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties. Mr. Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment. Mr. Bedford was strongly opposed to so long a Edition: current; Page: [64] term as seven years. He begged the Committee to consider what the situation of the Country would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years. On the question for seven years, Massts. dividd. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no. There being 5 ays, 4 noes, & 1 divd., a question was asked whether a majority had voted in the Affirmative? The President decided that it was an affirmative vote. The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question. Mr. Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States; Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. Edition: current; Page: [65] He wishes however that Mr. Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form.—the clause, “to be chosen by the National Legislature”—was accordingly postponed.— Mr. Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch only of the national Legislature. The Committee then rose and the House Adjourned.

Saturday June 2 d . In Committee of whole William Saml. Johnson from Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, from Maryd., & John Lansing Jr. from N. York, took their seats. It was movd. & 2ded. to postpone ye Resol: of Mr. Randolph respecting the Executive, in order to take up the 2d branch of the Legislature; which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: agst. N. Y. Pena. Maryd. The mode of appointing the Executive was resumed. Mr. Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode proposed by Mr. Randolph’s resolution, “that the Executive Magistracy shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided into — districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect — members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive Magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at — Edition: current; Page: [66] and they or any — of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body — person— in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested.” Mr. Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election by the national Legislature. Mr. Gerry, opposed the election by the National legislature. There would be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature & the candidates wd. bargain & play into one another’s hands, votes would be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to their friends. He liked the principle of Mr. Wilson’s motion, but fears it would alarm & give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such as might not be requisite for local purposes. He was for waiting till the people should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States, instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions. Edition: current; Page: [ 67 ] Mr Williamson could see no advantage in the introduction of Electors chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to them as the State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended with great trouble and expence. On the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson’s substitute, it was negatived: Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Mard. ay. Virga. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geoa no. On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legislature for the term of seven years, it was agreed to, Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. Pena. no. Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. Docr. Franklin moved that what related to the compensation for the services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute—“whose necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary, stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services.” He said that being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the permission of the Committee read instead of speaking them. Mr. Wilson made an offer to read the paper, which was Edition: current; Page: [68] accepted. The following is a literal copy of the paper: Sir, It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive branch I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The Committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change mine.—I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary, great advantages. Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men, a post of honour that shall be at the same time a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it is that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions which are perpetually Edition: current; Page: [69] dividing the Nation, distracting its Councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of peace. And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your Government and be your rulers.—And these too will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation: For their vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the people. Besides these evils, Sir, tho’ we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them. Hence as all history informs us, there has been in every State & Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the Governing & Governed; the one striving to obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone occasioned Edition: current; Page: [70] great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people. Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in an hundred who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharoah, get first all the people’s money, then all their lands, and then make them and their children servants for ever. It will be said, that we don’t propose to establish Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government of these States, may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I think may be long delayed, if in our proposed System we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by making our posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho’ we do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the fœtus of a King, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly Edition: current; Page: [71] expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over us. It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive department, without paying them well for their services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and usually by some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In France, the office of Counsellor, or Member of their Judiciary Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a high price: There are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more than three Per Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as legal interest is there at five PerCt. they in fact pay two PerCt for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not however mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary department. I only bring the instance to shew that the pleasure of doing good & serving their Country and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time to the Public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction. Edition: current; Page: [ 72 ] Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made the experiment, and practised it with success more than one hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences. In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it is never made profitable by salaries, fees or perquisites. And indeed in all cases of Public service the less the profit the greater the honor. To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and most important of our offices, that of General of our armies executed for eight years together without the smallest salary, by a Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and this through fatigues and distresses in common with the other brave men his military friends & companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the U. States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our Country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and faithfully the office in question. Edition: current; Page: [ 73 ] Sir. The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted I must be contented with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty. The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with the view he said merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or practicability. Mr. Dickinson moved, “that the Executive be made removable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual States.” It was necessary he said to place the power of removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great officers of State. He did Edition: current; Page: [74] not know how provision could be made for removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States. Mr. Bedford seconded the motion. Mr. Sherman contended that the national Legislature should have power to remove the Executive at pleasure. Mr. Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the fundamental principle of good Government. Mr. Madison & Mr Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent ye. removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for intrigues agst. him in States where his administration tho’ just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency could be otherwise supplied. Edition: current; Page: [ 75 ] Mr. Dickinson considered the business as so important that no man ought to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary departments ought to be made as independt. as possible; but that such an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited monarchy. In the British Govt. itself the weight of the Executive arises from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must look out for something else. One source of stability is the double branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct States formed the other principal source of stability. This division ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the States into one great Republic, we might read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A limited Monarchy he considered as one of the best Governments in the world. It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet been derived from any of the republican form. A limited Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times—the state of our affairs forbade the experiment, if it were Edition: current; Page: [76] desireable. Was it possible moreover in the nature of things to introduce it even if these obstacles were less insuperable. A House of Nobles was essential to such a Govt. could these be created by a breath, or by a stroke of the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a complication of circumstances none of which existed in this Country. But though a form the most perfect perhaps in itself be unattainable, we must not despair. If antient republics have been found to flourish for a moment only & then vanish for ever, it only proves that they were badly constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky division of this Country into distinct States; a division which some seemed desirous to abolish altogether. As to the point of representation in the national Legislature as it might affect States of different sizes, he said it must probably end in mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice at least in one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within each State would form a better ratio for the other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of property. A motion being made to strike out, “on request Edition: current; Page: [77] by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual States,” and rejected, Connecticut, S. Carol: & Geo. being ay, the rest no: the question on Mr. Dickinson’s motion for making Executive removable by Natl. Legislature at request of majority of State Legislatures was also rejected all the States being in the negative Except Delaware which gave an affirmative vote. The Question for making ye. Executive ineligible after seven years, was next taken and agreed to: Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. Pa divd. Del. ay. Maryd. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. Mr. Williamson 2ded. by Mr. Davie moved to add to the last clause, the words—“and to be removable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty”—which was agreed to. Mr. Rutlidge & Mr. C. Pinkney moved that the blank for the no. of persons in the Executive be filled with the words “one person.” He supposed the reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor of one that no member would oppose the motion. Mr. Randolph opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to suffer the establishmt. of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt an opposition to it which he believed he Edition: current; Page: [78] should continue to feel as long as he lived. He urged 1. that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. 2. that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of the department. 3. that the necessary confidence would never be reposed in a single Magistrate. 4. that the appointments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near the center of the Community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal footing. He was in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the country. Mr. Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate as most likely to answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its interests. If three or more should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In Military matters this would be particularly mischievous. He said his opinion on this point had been formed under the opportunity he had had of seeing the manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland when threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of the Country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest. The motion was then postpd., the Committee rose & the House Adjd.

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Monday June 4. In Committee of the Whole The Question was resumed on motion of Mr. Pinkney, 2ded. by Mr. Wilson, “shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled with a single person?” Mr Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had been opposed by the gentleman from Virga. (Mr. Randolph) but the arguments used had not convinced him. He observed that the objections of Mr. R. were levelled not so much agst the measure itself, as agst. its unpopularity. If he could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of the plan of which it should form a part, though the part were an important one, yet he would give it up rather than lose the whole. On examination he could see no evidence of the alledged antipathy of the people. On the contrary he was persuaded that it does not exist. All know that a single magistrate is not a King. One fact has great weight with him. All the 13 States tho agreeing in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of the Governt. The idea of three heads has taken place in none. The degree of power is indeed different; but there are no co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former reasons for preferring a Unity, he would mention another. The tranquility not less than the vigor of the Govt. he thought would be favored by it. Among three equal members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrouled, continued, & violent animosities; which would not only interrupt Edition: current; Page: [80] the public administration; but diffuse their poison thro’ the other branches of Govt., thro’ the States, and at length thro’ the people at large. If the members were to be unequal in power the principle of opposition to the Unity was given up. If equal, the making them an odd number would not be a remedy. In Courts of Justice there are two sides only to a question. In the Legislative & Executive departmts. questions have commonly many sides. Each member therefore might espouse a separate one & no two agree. Mr. Sherman. This matter is of great importance and ought to be well considered before it is determined. Mr. Wilson he said had observed that in each State a single magistrate was placed at the head of the Govt. It was so he admitted, and properly so, and he wished the same policy to prevail in the federal Govt. But then it should be also remarked that in all the States there was a Council of advice, without which the first magistrate could not act. A council he thought necessary to make the establishment acceptable to the people. Even in G. B. the King has a Council; and though he appoints it himself, its advice has its weight with him, and attracts the Confidence of the people. Mr. Williamson asks Mr. Wilson whether he means to annex a Council. Edition: current; Page: [ 81 ] Mr. Wilson means to have no Council, which oftener serves to cover, than prevent malpractices. Mr. Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of three members for the Executive. It wd. be extremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly in military matters, whether relating to the militia, an army, or a navy. It would be a general with three heads. On the question for a single Executive it was agreed to Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. Pena. ay. Del. no. Maryd. no. Virga. ay. (Mr. R. & Mr. Blair no—Docr McCg. Mr M. & Gen. W. ay. Col. Mason being no, but not in the house, Mr. Wythe ay but gone home). N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Georga. ay. First Clause of Proposition 8th. relating to a Council of Revision taken into consideration. Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as they will have a sufficient check agst encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the Judges had actually set aside laws as being agst. the Constitution. This was done too with general approbation. It was quite foreign from the nature of ye. office to make them judges of the policy of public measures. He moves to postpone the clause in order to propose “that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by — parts of each branch of the national Legislature.” Mr. King seconds the motion, observing that the Edition: current; Page: [82] Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation. Mr Wilson thinks neither the original proposition nor the amendment goes far enough. If the Legislative Exetvtilde & Judiciary ought to be distinct & independent, The Executive ought to have an absolute negative. Without such a self-defence the Legislature can at any moment sink it into non-existence. He was for varying the proposition in such a manner as to give the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute negative. On the question to postpone in order to take Mr. Gerry’s proposition into consideration it was agreed to, Masss. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Maryd. no. Virga. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Ga. ay. Mr. Gerry’s proposition being now before Committee, Mr. Wilson & Mr. Hamilton move that the last part of it (viz. “wch. sl. not be afterwds. passed “unless by — parts of each branch of the National legislature”) be struck out, so as to give the Executive an absolute negative on the laws. There was no danger they thought of such a power being too much exercised. It was mentioned by Col: Hamilton that the King of G. B. had not exerted his negative since the Revolution. Mr. Gerry sees no necessity for so great a controul over the legislature as the best men in the Community would be comprised in the two branches of it. Docr. Franklin, said he was sorry to differ from his colleague for whom he had a very great respect, Edition: current; Page: [83] on any occasion, but he could not help it on this. He had had some experience of this check in the Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary Government of Pena. The negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. An increase of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition; till at last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive the former before he should sign the latter. When the Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-defence could not be got, till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from taxation: so that the people were to fight for the security of his property, whilst he was to bear no share of the burden. This was a mischevous sort of check. If the Executive was to have a Council, such a power would be less objectionable. It was true, the King of G. B. had not, as was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution; but that matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now given to the members of parliament rendered it unnecessary, every thing being done according to the will of the Ministers. He was afraid, if a negative should be given as proposed, that more power and money would be demanded, till at last eno’ would be gotten to influence & bribe the Legislature into a compleat subjection to the will of the Executive. Edition: current; Page: [ 84 ] Mr. Sherman was agst. enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws, but not permit him to overrule the decided and cool opinions of the Legislature. Mr. Madison supposed that if a proper proportion of each branch should be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely if ever happen that the Executive constituted as ours is proposed to be, would have firmness eno’ to resist the legislature, unless backed by a certain part of the body itself. The King of G. B. with all his splendid attributes would not be able to withstand ye. unanimous and eager wishes of both houses of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this Country; its present temper at least. Mr. Wilson believed as others did that this power would seldom be used. The Legislature would know that such a power existed, and would refrain from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation would therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief. The case of Pena. formerly was very different from its present case. The Executive was not then as now to be appointed by the people. It will not in this case as in the one cited be supported by the head of a Great Empire, actuated by a different & sometimes opposite interest. The salary too is now proposed to be fixed by the Edition: current; Page: [85] Constitution, or if Dr. F.’s idea should be adopted all salary whatever interdicted. The requiring a large proportion of each House to overrule the Executive check might do in peaceable times; but there might be tempestuous moments in which animosities may run high between the Executive and Legislative branches, and in which the former ought to be able to defend itself. Mr Butler had been in favor of a single Executive Magistrate; but could he have entertained an idea that a compleat negative on the laws was to be given him he certainly should have acted very differently. It had been observed that in all countries the Executive power is in a constant course of increase. This was certainly the case in G. B. Gentlemen seemed to think that we had nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the Executive power. But why might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in this Country as well as in others. Mr. Bedford was opposed to every check on the Legislature, even the Council of Revision first proposed. He thought it would be sufficient to mark out in the Constitution the boundaries to the Legislative Authority, which would give all the requisite security to the rights of the other departments. The Representatives of the people were the best Judges of what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external controul whatever. The two branches would produce a sufficient controul within the Legislature itself. Col. Mason observed that a vote had already passed he found [he was out at the time] for vesting Edition: current; Page: [86] the executive powers in a single person. Among these powers was that of appointing to offices in certain cases. The probable abuses of a negative had been well explained by Dr. F. as proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will not the same door be opened here. The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures till new appointments shall be referred to him; and having by degrees engrossed these into all his own hands, the American Executive, like the British, will by bribery & influence, save himself the trouble & odium of exerting his negative afterwards. We are Mr. Chairman going very far in this business. We are not indeed constituting a British Government, but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. We are introducing a new principle into our system, and not necessary as in the British Govt. where the Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen mean to pave the way to hereditary Monarchy? Do they flatter themselves that the people will ever consent to such an innovation? If they do I venture to tell them, they are mistaken. The people never will consent. And do gentlemen consider the danger of delay, and the still greater danger of a rejection, not for a moment but forever, of the plan which shall be proposed to them. Notwithstanding the oppression & injustice experienced among us from democracy; the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted. He could not but consider the federal system as in effect dissolved by the appointment of this Convention to Edition: current; Page: [87] devise a better one. And do gentlemen look forward to the dangerous interval between extinction of an old, and the establishment of a new Governmt. and to the scenes of confusion which may ensue. He hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever be attempted in this Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the late Revolution. Will it not be eno’ to enable the Executive to suspend offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections to them overruled by a greater majority than was required in the first instance. He never could agree to give up all the rights of the people to a single magistrate: If more than one had been fixed on, greater powers might have been entrusted to the Executive. He hoped this attempt to give such powers would have its weight hereafter as an argument for increasing the number of the Executive. Docr Franklin. A Gentleman from S. C., (Mr. Butler) a day or two ago called our attention to the case of the U. Netherlands. He wished the gentleman had been a little fuller, and had gone back to the original of that Govt. The people being under great obligations to the Prince of Orange whose wisdom and bravery had saved them, chose him for the Stadtholder. He did very well. Inconveniences however were felt from his powers; which growing more & more oppressive, they were at length set aside. Still however there was a party for the P. of Orange, which descended to his son who excited insurrections, spilt a great deal of blood, murdered the Edition: current; Page: [88] de Witts, and got the po