I have obtained, and am posting here, the first English-language copy of a massive new report by a Rwandan investigative commission into the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana, the country’s long-time dictator, whose plane was shot down by a pair of surface-to-air missiles and crashed in the backyard of his own palace on the night of April 6, 1994. As I have reported in my 1995 New Yorker article “After the Genocide” and in my book “We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda,” Hutu Power extremists used Habyarimana’s assassination as the pretext for going ahead with their plans for a genocide of the Tutsi minority—a program of massacres in which close to a million Tutsis were murdered in the next hundred days.

I have not yet had time to absorb the new report and its multiple annexes in their entirety, but I have read around in it enough to offer some initial thoughts about this extraordinary historical and political document. And the report makes for compelling reading, despite its dry and cumbersome title: “Report of the Investigation into the Causes and Circumstances of and Responsibility for the Attack of 06/04/1994 Against The Falcon 50 Rwandan Presidental Aeroplane Registration Number 9XR-NN.”

As I wrote in The New Yorker:

Habyarimana’s assassins have never been positively identified, but at the moment the bulk of circumstantial evidence collected by international investigators points to a job sponsored by members of the Hutu Power entourage. Immediately after the Presidential plane was shot down, the Rwandan Army sealed off the area around Kigali Airport, from which the surface-to-air missiles that hit the plane had been fired, thus preventing an investigation by the U.N. and adding to speculation that top Rwandan officers had something to hide…. [But] regardless of who killed Habyarimana, the fact remains that the organizers of the massacres were primed to exploit his death instantaneously.

In other words, the assassination was a coup d’etat. At the time of his death, Habyarimana was on the brink of implementing the Arusha Accords, a power-sharing peace agreement with the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a rebel army led by Paul Kagame (who is now Rwanda’s president). But the Hutu Power genocidaires wanted to consolidate their power through their campaign of extermination. Habyarimana, then, appeared to have been killed as a traitor to the Hutu Power cause; but his death was blamed on Kagame and the R.P.F. and turned into fuel for the Hutu Power cause.

The new Rwandan report—known, after its lead author, Jean Mutsinzi, as the Mutsinzi Report—lays out this story in remarkably convincing detail. It draws on a number of previous international investigations and on a remarkable collection of more than five hundred interviews that its own investigators conducted with former officers of the Hutu Power regime and other eyewitnesses, who describe the events before, during, and after the assassination with convincing consistency.

The broad findings are not surprising. What makes the Mutsinzi Report most remarkable is the thoroughness and seriousness of the underlying investigation, which covers not only the events leading up to the downing of the plane. It traces the history of earlier investigations into Habyarimana’s assassination and the genocide, and draws on these findings (which have never before been collected and cross-referenced) to build its own. The Mutsinzi commission brought in independent British ballistics experts to establish the trajectory and origins of the missiles that struck the plane; and, in passages of the report that read like pure farce, they traced the mystery of the black box from the cockpit, which kept disappearing and reappearing and ultimately vanished.

Obviously, the report serves President Kagame and his government’s interests. So why has it taken them so long to produce it? For more than a decade, critics held up the post-genocide government’s seeming reluctance to examine Habyarimana’s death as evidence that Kagame had something to hide. That impression was encouraged further when the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania, a satellite of the court at the Hague, opened an investigation into allegations of R.P.F. culpability in the shooting down of the plane, and Kagame’s government fought hard and successfully to shut down this investigation. Then, in 2007, Jean-Louis Bruguière, a French anti-terrorism judge who had made his name capturing Carlos the Jackal, indicted nine of Kagame’s closest associates for terrorism for bringing down Habyarimana’s plane. Rwanda promptly broke off all diplomatic relationships with France. Instead of merely denouncing Bruguière’s case as a pack of lies, Kagame established the investigative committee that produced the Mutsinzi report. (Among the report’s surprises are damning passages drawn from investigations of the same international tribunal that the Rwandans had stonewalled.)

France’s sponsorship of Rwanda’s genocidal regime is a steady subtext throughout the attached documents. Indeed, Habyarimana’s plane was a gift of the French, it had a French flight crew who died with him, and the French military was in joint control with the Hutu Power forces of the area where the missiles were fired and the plane crashed. An earlier Rwandan government investigative report that documented France’s role in the genocide was harsh and damaging, and its findings contributed to the work of the Mutsinzi commission. And yet this new report has brought about a rapprochement between Kigali and Paris. Over the past two years, Bruguière’s case fell apart as his “eyewitnesses” recanted, until even the French press treated it as a joke. Throughout that time Rwanda maintained a hostile public tone toward France; last fall Rwanda even joined the British Commonwealth. In private, however, Kagame maintained a constant dialogue with France, and established communications with President Nikolas Sarkozy—and two months ago, on the day after Rwanda’s admission to the Commonwealth, France and Rwanda reestablished normal diplomatic relations. Before that happened, of course, the Rwandans had shared the about-to-be-released Mutsinzi report with the French. The normalization of relations amounts to France’s acceptance of the report’s conclusions—and in the past few days the French press has been covering the substance of the report in uncharacteristic tones of admiration and respect.

The struggle of President Kagame’s regime to establish security, order, and a modicum of justice in Rwanda and to create conditions for economic and political development has always been in large part a struggle for legitimacy in the eyes of an international community that failed—or worse, betrayed—Rwanda during the genocide. In this context, the report on Habyarimana’s plane is the latest in a yearlong string of diplomatic and political moves that show the new Rwandan government achieving a level of sophistication, skill, and effectiveness in commanding international respect that has rarely, if ever, been seen before in Africa. A year ago, Rwanda was being blamed for all the woes of the war next door in the Democratic Republic of Congo—and now those woes have come to be seen overwhelmingly as the result of the continued presence of fugitive Hutu genocidaires in Congo. Leaders of these Hutu Power armies in exile, who had operated with impunity from European capitals, are being rounded up. And this week, on the day that the report first leaked in the French press, France’s foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, was in Kigali to announce the establishment of a special court in France to prosecute refugees suspected of genocide. Today’s issue of Rwanda’s official newspaper, New Times, announces that Sarkozy will visit next month.