Until recently, few of us were familiar with the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the international organisation that governs many aspects of nuclear energy activity in member states. Brexit, and the rapidly retracted “leak” that Britain may seek “associate membership” of Euratom has suddenly brought Euratom to the fore. The precise legal situation regarding the UK’s continued membership of Euratom is contested, but there is much to learn from the history of this relationship: over the past six decades the UK has attempted to become an associate member or full member of Euratom five times.

Q&A What is at risk if the UK quits Euratom? Show Hide Scientists have warned that British power stations may not be able to source nuclear fuel if it cannot be legally transported across borders. The shipment of medical isotopes used in scans and cancer treatment is also said to be jeopardised. European workers on shared research projects, such as experimental fusion reactors, face an equally uncertain future without Euratom’s separate guarantees of freedom of movement. Arranging new rules to ensure safety and govern shipments should not be that hard; but the cost of any short-term chaos is hard to justify given that nobody ever complained about the minor compromises imposed by Euratom on British sovereignty in the first place.

First of all, we might ask whether associate membership of Euratom is politically feasible? Whilst there are a number of Conservative MPs poised to vote against leaving Euratom, Theresa May’s Article 50 letter specifically noted that the UK would trigger Article 106a of the Euratom treaty and withdraw from Euratom. There may not be a way to withdraw Article 106a notification for Euratom without withdrawing Article 50 notification as well. It is hard to see the UK withdrawing Article 50 in order to achieve associate membership of Euratom. But that aside, the idea that the UK can quickly and easily become an associate member is not supported by history.



Every time that British politicians have negotiated to join Euratom they have expected the debate to be over quickly. Indeed, in 1970, the foreign secretary thought negotiations would be completed so quickly that he would be able to formally announce success before Christmas that year. But things were not that simple. By May 1971, the best that could be announced was that there were “no major difficulties” left (which was a very diplomatic way of saying that they had finished arguing about difficult bits of the treaty and were ready to start arguing about the rest).

From 1957 right up to the UK finally joined in 1973, the fundamental miscalculation was to assume that “they needed us more than we needed them”. Governments of both colours expected that, as the first nation to commercialise nuclear power, the UK would be welcomed with open arms. However, this assumption made for an inflexible negotiating position. Although officials and ministers stressed to the cabinet that they “accepted the terms of the Euratom treaty”, British negotiating briefs contained over 150 pages of red lines, clarifications and modifications. Some officials were concerned that such an inflexible position gave the impression that they were assessing Euratom’s case to join the UK and not the other way around.

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Such rhetoric is not quite being repeated now. The UK does not have the same active nuclear research base that it once had. Although the UK has more extensive experience of decommissioning than its European partners, this is not uniquely specialised knowledge, and most of the private companies involved are multinational. In spite of this the debate on potential associate membership still hinges on the assumption that Euratom will be grateful to keep the UK a member. The belief that the UK was (and would be) doing Euratom a favour by joining (or staying) neglects the fact that British membership would involve difficulties for Euratom as well.

In fact, the fact that many aspects of Euratom are now governed through EU institutions means that associate membership will be difficult for Euratom and for the UK. For instance, Euratom research is increasingly linked with research funded through grants administered by the EU. If the UK remains in Euratom, but not the EU, will it be able to receive research funding?

If the UK remains in Euratom but not the EU, will it still contribute to the ITER fusion reactor project in the south of France, and if so will it have any rights to the design if it works? Britain has long been one of the most consistent supporters of fusion research, and the work of the Joint European Torus project near Oxford has been vital in developing ITER. If the ITER reactor and its successor work successfully they could herald a new era of electricity generation.

If Britain remains in Euratom but not the EU, will it retain access to the European Electricity Single Market? This doesn’t entirely exist yet, but will be the mechanism through which Britain can trade for European electricity through its “interconnectors” to France, the Netherlands, and Ireland. If Britain is not in the single market, its ability to trade in the Electricity Single Market will need to be specially agreed. The interconnectors are vital for “keeping the lights on”. On an average week the UK gets between 5% and 10% of its electricity through these imports.



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One thing that associate membership would make easier is the most important and most overlooked difficulty of withdrawal from Euratom. Since joining in 1973, any nuclear treaties with other nations (including any signed before that date) were placed under the aegis of Euratom. This means that if Britain leaves Euratom, all its complex nuclear treaties with the United States, the rest of Europe and many other nations across the world will need to be re-ratified in national legislatures before Britain is no longer a member. This is a large international legislative task, and requires quick action before the Article 50 process ends in just over a year. If the treaties are not re-ratified by national parliaments, then, depending on the treaty, the UK could be in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and a worst-case scenario could have a variety of very serious consequences including: stopping work on Hinkley C, halting the movement of nuclear fuel, and even ending the import of medical isotopes for cancer treatments.

This is not to argue that re-ratification of these treaties, or that associate membership is impossible. However, our relations with Euratom have always proven more difficult to negotiate than expected. Whatever our position on Brexit, Euratom does not need Britain more than Britain needs Euratom, and this is what the government must remember as it negotiates a vital new relationship.

Stuart Butler is a Research Fellow at the Science Museum in London working on the History of Nuclear Energy and Society (HoNESt) project. This project has received funding from the Euratom research and training programme 2014-2018 under grant agreement No 662268.