Most important, none of the factors that led to success in history’s classic counterinsurgency campaigns are present in the fight against the Taliban. In British Malaya in the 1950s, for example, success depended on direct imperial control of the government, a powerful and cooperative local administration, large numbers of troops, active support from much of the population, a detailed understanding of local culture and politics, control of the borders and strong political support at home.

Image Credit... Harry Campbell

In Afghanistan, by contrast, the American-led coalition is not the government and has to operate in tandem with an Afghan civil service, military and police force that are at best ineffective and at worst actively undermine coalition operations.

The dominant Pashtun tribes in the south and east are suspicious of foreign troops and are reluctant to side with them against the Taliban, who are from their own ethnic group. Coalition-backed governments have been unable to prevent the insurgents from taking sanctuary and receiving armaments and money from across the porous borders with Pakistan and Iran. American and European voters will not send the hundreds of thousands of troops the counterinsurgency textbooks recommend, and have no wish to support decades of fighting.

Worst of all, an increased foreign troop presence will help the Taliban, who are unable to deliver government services and often live parasitically off the people, and whose best selling point is that they are fighting for Afghanistan and Islam against a foreign occupation. If we commit more troops we will find it very difficult to withdraw them later without losing credibility.

Our best hope in Afghanistan is to continue to manage the country through a light civil and military presence. Southern Afghanistan will remain unstable for some time to come. Although we cannot change this, we can contain the situation. We can prevent Qaeda units from using the area as a base from which to attack the United States, and we can prevent the Taliban from again mobilizing conventional forces or capturing major northern cities like Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif.

This will not require large numbers of troops. If the Taliban tried to raise another conventional army, it would be an easy target for coalition forces and air power. The most efficient and sustainable way to protect American soil from a terrorist attack is not to deploy tens of thousands of troops to occupy rural areas of Afghanistan, but to invest in intelligence to identify the few radicals who want to attack Western targets, and use special forces operations to eliminate them.

We can do much more to show people the benefit of cooperating with the coalition. Projects in hostile areas, where the local population is not working with us and where a minority wants to attack us, are not a constructive use of our limited resources. Our best hope is rather to focus on the many secure and welcoming parts of Afghanistan’s center and north. Efforts to jumpstart local economies led by members of those communities are more effective, more relevant and more sustainable than those dictated by outsiders. We have a great opportunity in the north, center and west of Afghanistan to lead development projects for which Afghans will still be grateful 50 years from now.