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By Date By Thread LPE and RCE in OpenSMTPD's default install (CVE-2020-8794) From: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa () qualys com>

Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 10:52:10 -0800

Qualys Security Advisory LPE and RCE in OpenSMTPD's default install (CVE-2020-8794) ============================================================================== Contents ============================================================================== Summary Analysis ... Acknowledgments ============================================================================== Summary ============================================================================== We discovered a vulnerability in OpenSMTPD, OpenBSD's mail server. This vulnerability, an out-of-bounds read introduced in December 2015 (commit 80c6a60c, "when peer outputs a multi-line response ..."), is exploitable remotely and leads to the execution of arbitrary shell commands: either as root, after May 2018 (commit a8e22235, "switch smtpd to new grammar"); or as any non-root user, before May 2018. Because this vulnerability resides in OpenSMTPD's client-side code (which delivers mail to remote SMTP servers), we must consider two different scenarios: - Client-side exploitation: This vulnerability is remotely exploitable in OpenSMTPD's (and hence OpenBSD's) default configuration. Although OpenSMTPD listens on localhost only, by default, it does accept mail from local users and delivers it to remote servers. If such a remote server is controlled by an attacker (either because it is malicious or compromised, or because of a man-in-the-middle, DNS, or BGP attack -- SMTP is not TLS-encrypted by default), then the attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands on the vulnerable OpenSMTPD installation. - Server-side exploitation: First, the attacker must connect to the OpenSMTPD server (which accepts external mail) and send a mail that creates a bounce. Next, when OpenSMTPD connects back to their mail server to deliver this bounce, the attacker can exploit OpenSMTPD's client-side vulnerability. Last, for their shell commands to be executed, the attacker must (to the best of our knowledge) crash OpenSMTPD and wait until it is restarted (either manually by an administrator, or automatically by a system update or reboot). We developed a simple exploit for this vulnerability and successfully tested it against OpenBSD 6.6 (the current release), OpenBSD 5.9 (the first vulnerable release), Debian 10 (stable), Debian 11 (testing), and Fedora 31. At OpenBSD's request, and to give OpenSMTPD's users a chance to patch their systems, we are withholding the exploitation details and code until Wednesday, February 26, 2020. Last-minute note: we tested our exploit against the recent changes in OpenSMTPD 6.6.3p1, and our results are: if the "mbox" method is used for local delivery (the default in OpenBSD -current), then arbitrary command execution as root is still possible; otherwise (if the "maildir" method is used, for example), arbitrary command execution as any non-root user is possible. ============================================================================== Analysis ============================================================================== SMTP clients connect to SMTP servers and send commands such as EHLO, MAIL FROM, and RCPT TO. SMTP servers respond with either single-line or multiple-line replies: - the first lines begin with a three-digit code and a hyphen ('-'), followed by an optional text (for example, "250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES"); - the last line begins with the same three-digit code, followed by an optional space (' ') and text (for example, "250 HELP"). In OpenSMTPD's client-side code, these multiline replies are parsed by the mta_io() function: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1098 static void 1099 mta_io(struct io *io, int evt, void *arg) 1100 { .... 1133 case IO_DATAIN: 1134 nextline: 1135 line = io_getline(s->io, &len); .... 1146 if ((error = parse_smtp_response(line, len, &msg, &cont))) { ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ - the first lines (when line[3] == '-') are concatenated into a 2KB replybuf: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1177 if (cont) { 1178 if (s->replybuf[0] == '\0') 1179 (void)strlcat(s->replybuf, line, sizeof s->replybuf); 1180 else { 1181 line = line + 4; .... 1187 (void)strlcat(s->replybuf, line, sizeof s->replybuf); 1188 } 1189 goto nextline; 1190 } ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ - the last line (when line[3] != '-') is also concatenated into replybuf: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1195 if (s->replybuf[0] != '\0') { 1196 p = line + 4; .... 1201 if (strlcat(s->replybuf, p, sizeof s->replybuf) >= sizeof s->replybuf) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Unfortunately, if the last line's three-digit code is not followed by the optional space and text, then p (at line 1196) points to the first character *after* the line's '\0' terminator (which replaced the line's '

' terminator in iobuf_getline()), and this out-of-bounds string is concatenated into replybuf (at line 1201). ... ============================================================================== Acknowledgments ============================================================================== We thank OpenBSD's developers for their quick response and patches. We also thank Gilles for his hard work and beautiful code. [https://d1dejaj6dcqv24.cloudfront.net/asset/image/email-banner-384-2x.png]<https://www.qualys.com/email-banner> This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please reply to advise the sender of the error and then immediately delete it. If you are not the intended recipient, do not read, copy, disclose or otherwise use this message. The sender disclaims any liability for such unauthorized use. NOTE that all incoming emails sent to Qualys email accounts will be archived and may be scanned by us and/or by external service providers to detect and prevent threats to our systems, investigate illegal or inappropriate behavior, and/or eliminate unsolicited promotional emails (“spam”). If you have any concerns about this process, please contact us. _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ By Date By Thread Current thread: LPE and RCE in OpenSMTPD's default install (CVE-2020-8794) Qualys Security Advisory (Feb 27)