After annexation, destabilisation Outside powers should support Ukraine, not dictate to it.

Many may heave a sigh of relief at the news that the United States is talking to Russia about Ukraine. I feel nervous.

Clearly American engagement in Europe is welcome. Without the US, the continent is in effect defenceless. American isolationism is a serious danger (a recent poll shows a record 52% saying that their country should “mind its own business” in international affairs).

But when big countries do deals, smaller countries need to look out. It would be a disastrous error for the US (or indeed Germany) to try to broker a deal with the Kremlin over the heads of the Ukrainians. I realise that the government in Kiev is a shambles. The country is grappling with a financial and geopolitical crisis at a time when its institutions have been eviscerated by an appallingly predatory and corrupt government. In a political spectrum that encompasses oligarchs and mob rule, the honest and sensible are squeezed.

Russia has cleverly masked the true significance of its intervention in Crimea. Too often in radio and TV studios I find I am debating with people who believe that the Russian regime is acting in a broadly rational and reasonable way. Crimea is lost, they argue. It is time to cut a deal. This will involve something along the lines of: 1) guaranteeing permanent neutrality for Ukraine; 2) turning the country into a federation in which ‘Russian-speaking’ regions will have great autonomy; 3) entrenching the status of the Russian language; and 4) ensuring that ‘nationalists’ do not take power.

No Western leader should entertain any of the above for a moment. It is the duty of all outside countries to help stabilise Ukraine, not to dictate to it. If Russia wants to help, there is plenty it can do (like removing its menacing troop concentrations from Ukraine’s borders, and turning off the spigot which sprays poisonous and incendiary propaganda).

Any decisions about future constitutional arrangements are for a future democratically elected government to ponder, in a calm and secure international climate. For now, a federation looks like a dreadful idea. Such arrangements work only when outside powers behave (how long would Switzerland or Belgium last if France took a Putinist attitude to ‘les compatriotes’?). Ukraine actually has an excellent record on bilingualism, so nothing particular is needed to support or protect the Russian language.

Nor is it up to Russia or anyone else to dictate the course of another country’s politics. It is true that revolutions bring radicalisation, and a troubling whiff of thuggishness hangs over some parts of Ukrainian politics. But that is a result partly of deliberate mischief-making (who pays for these far-right groups?) and partly because of the violence employed by Putin’s henchmen. It is also worth noting that Russia has a far more serious problem with far-right violence than Ukraine does. At any rate, the best way to diminish extremism and boost tolerance is to encourage Ukrainian politics to function normally, not to intervene from outside.

Nor is it for outside powers to decide what Ukraine’s future international orientation should be. Particularly given the shameful breach of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 (in which the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia solemnly promised to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders in exchange for it giving up nuclear weapons) it would be outrageous for these countries to be brokering a new deal now.

As Carl Bildt, Sweden’s foreign minister, tweeted acidly and correctly on 27 March: “Kremlin seeks a pact with the West to get acceptance for its scheme for Ukraine. A certain historical pattern here.” Is Barack Obama following him?

Edward Lucas writes for The Economist.