Spin is the political language of Washington, but I have never encountered such conflicting currents of hype as those that have swirled around the globe since the gavel fell on the Copenhagen climate summit. Depending on whether you live in Beijing, Berlin or Boston the assessment ranges from catastrophe to success to somewhere in between. But what lies ahead?

First let us take stock. In important ways the Copenhagen accord signals significant and promising changes in the world's approach to global warming under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, not just in what it says, but also in how it was negotiated.

The dramatic story of a last-minute agreement fashioned in a meeting among the leaders of the "Copenhagen 5", Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and the United States reveals a profound change in global politics. One in which, for the first time, the rapidly developing giants of Asia, Africa, and Latin America emerged as key to the solution.

The ad hoc leadership by the so-called Copenhagen 5 (C-5), representing 45% of the world's population and 44% of global greenhouse gas emissions, constitutes a new and potentially historic alliance, a symbol, perhaps, of a new world order.

The Copenhagen accord signals other changes as well. It sets a goal of limiting global warming to 2C, and was accompanied by a requirement for explicit, quantitative pollution reduction commitments across the world.

The key obstacle that was overcome in the C-5 negotiations was the United States' insistence that all parties agree to verification of fulfillment of their carbon-cutting commitments. When the major developing economies agreed to a form of verification, they set in motion a process can be the basis for building the trust necessary ultimately to strengthen the accord.

Finally, the fact that the accord was negotiated by heads of state, and the way it became the Copenhagen accord, may be a significant step toward overcoming a dysfunctional negotiation process which requires that decisions be reached by consensus among all 190+ parties to the UNFCCC. Despite opposition from a small minority of countries, heads of state found a way to move the accord ahead without unanimity. By doing so they demonstrated their seriousness and exerted the capacity of the majority of nations to move forward when they agree.

However, unlike the Kyoto protocol, the accord is not legally binding, and provides neither rules to structure international carbon markets, nor means to enforce compliance. This creates daunting uncertainties about how nations and markets will interact over greenhouse gas reductions.

Europe, which was not part of the C-5 meeting from which the accord emerged, but endorsed it almost immediately, faces important decisions. First, what is the future role of the KP? Will Europe pursue two paths, both a second commitment period under the KP, and participation in the accord? Second, will Europe which has led the world toward collective action on climate, put aside disappointment about how the Copenhagen process played out, and seize the lead in creating a process to implement the accord?

The next few months will offer strong indicators of whether nations whose heads of state endorsed the accord will treat it as binding. Various signposts will suggest which way the road is heading. The first deadline to watch for is January 31. By then, developed countries must register national commitments — and developing countries national plans of action — to reduce greenhouse gases. Major defections at this point would doom the accord, but early indications are that countries that offered commitments coming into Copenhagen will register them.

A second key indicator that the accord has legs will be how fast and effectively key countries seek to implement its terms. It remains unclear who "owns" the Copenhagen accord, who staffs its implementation and even who has the authority to convene the next meeting to keep the process going. Will negotiations around the accord's implementation be included in the next UNFCCC meeting in late May, or does it require an entirely separate process? The accord includes promises of adaptation assistance, a green climate fund, and forest protection and technology "mechanisms". The question of who moves the process forward needs to be resolved in the next few months.

China has already invited the other emerging countries behind the accord, India, Brazil and South Africa, to meet this month to devise a united front on a way forward. Will Europe take the initiative to define a workable process?

There will be two more important signposts during 2010, from the two largest emitters. China will launch its 12th five-year plan, and much will ride on the strength of the measures they include to improve energy efficiency, and develop low-carbon sources of energy. Already since Copenhagen they have adopted new measures requiring electric utilities to purchase wind and solar energy.

Similarly, the US Congress will decide whether to complete action on legislation to reduce US emissions, as a bi-partisan trio of Senators — John Kerry, Lindsey Graham and Joe Lieberman — strive to find an acceptable compromise bill that addresses both climate and energy security.

One last hope. Because the accord may reflect a reordering of global political dynamics it may make possible a profoundly important shift in which action on climate change is no longer seen as a threat, but rather the key, to development and the future of poverty eradication is recognised as low carbon development. That would be an historic achievement.

• Jonathan Lash is president of the World Resources Institute (WRI)