Libyan soldiers rape British soldier and civilians and then break the rapists out of jail by threatening british military police...Next Article → MALI: Plagues From Libya And GuineaNovember 14, 2014: In early November Britain sent 300 Libyanofficer trainees home before their 24 week training was completed. Fiveof the Libyans did not leave as they are being held on rape charges.Three of these Libyans are charged with raping women and two of raping aman. The Libyans had arrived in June and within a month locals werecomplaining of Libyans coming into the nearby village and behavingbadly. This was not supposed to happen as the Libyans were selected toreceive combat and leadership training so they could better train andcommand troops back in Libya. British authorities were surprised by thebad behavior and responded by ordering the Libyans were restricted tothe 80 hectare (200 acre) base where they lived and trained. In Augustthis led to a mutiny among the Libyans.The August mutiny occurred when British officers in charge ofthe training put three of the trainees under guard after police pickedthem up for being off base without permission. Then twenty othertrainees went and threatened the British soldier guarding the threeLibyan trainees. The British guard let the three go free rather thanrisk violence. Senior officers were uncertain about how to handle thisinsubordination given the nature of Arab military trainees. Thesituation went downhill from there. The Libyans were not onlyundisciplined but also unreliable. They would agree to certainconditions (as in how they behaved towards civilians on and off thebase, especially women) and then ignore those agreements. Whenconfronted they would plead ignorance of British customs and refuse toaccept responsibility. The Libyans also constantly fought amongthemselves. Although depicting themselves as devout Moslems many of themwould go to the village, get drunk and behave badly. Some blamed theBritish for making alcohol too easy to obtain. The British tried to copewith all this by stationing hundreds of armed soldiers in the village(population 3,500) and on the base to prevent the Libyans from gettingout of hand. This did not work either. Some of the Libyans tried toapply for political asylum. This was denied after the rape incidents inlate October and the decision was made to send all the Libyans home.What happened with these Libyans was not uncommon whenWesterners are assigned to train Arabs to be military leaders. Whatthese trainers run into is a collection of problems that have long madeit difficult for Arab, and many other poor (and often Moslem) nations toestablish democratic governments or prosperous economies. A lot of theproblem has to do with culture, especially culture influenced by Islam.There are a number of reasons for this and the most important problemsare;Most Arab countries are a patchwork of different tribes andethnic or religious groups, and Arab leaders survive by playing onegroup off against another. Loyalty is to one's group, not the nation.Most countries are dominated by a single group that is usually aminority (Bedouins in Jordan, Alawites in Syria, Sunnis in Iraq, Nejdisin Saudi Arabia). All of which means that officers are selected not bymerit but by loyalty and tribal affiliation.Islamic schools favor rote memorization, especially ofscripture. Most Islamic scholars are hostile to the concept ofinterpreting the Koran (considered the word of God as given to Hisprophet Mohammed). This has resulted in looking down on Western troopsthat will look something up that they don't know. Arabs prefer to fakeit, and pretend it's all in their head. Despite that improvisation andinnovation is generally discouraged. Arab armies go by the book, Westernarmies rewrite the book as needed and thus usually win.There is no real use of NCOs (sergeants or petty officers).Officers and enlisted troops are treated like two different socialcastes and there is no effort to bridge the gap using career NCOs.Enlisted personnel are treated harshly. Training accidents that wouldend the careers of US officers are commonplace in Arab armies, andnobody cares. The troops do not appreciate this and that dislike oftenmanifests itself in unpleasant ways.Officers tend to be despised by their troops, and this doesnot bother the officers much it all. Many Arab officers simply cannotunderstand how treating the troops decently will make them bettersoldiers. Westerners have a hard time convincing Arab leaders on thispoint and those that do understand and implement these ideas riskridicule for not being authentic (as an Arab).Paranoia prevents adequate training. Arab tyrants insist thattheir military units have little contact with each other, thus insuringthat no general can became powerful enough to overthrow the government.Units are purposely kept from working together or training on a largescale. Arab generals don't have as broad a knowledge of their armedforces as do their Western counterparts. Even at the most senior levelspromotions are based more on political reliability than combatproficiency. Arab leaders prefer to be feared, rather than respected, bytheir soldiers. This approach leads to poorly trained armies and lowmorale. A few rousing speeches about "Moslem brotherhood" before a warstarts does little to repair the damage.Arab officers often do not trust each other. While an Americaninfantry officer can be reasonably confident that the artilleryofficers will conduct their bombardment on time and on target, Arabinfantry officers seriously doubt that their artillery will do its jobon time or on target. This is a fatal attitude in combat.Arab military leaders consider it acceptable to lie tosubordinates and allies in order to further their personal agenda. Thishad catastrophic consequences during all of the Arab-Israeli wars andcontinues to make peace difficult between Israelis and Palestinians.When called out on this behavior, Arabs will assert that they were"misunderstood."While Western officers and NCOs are only too happy to imparttheir wisdom and skill to others (teaching is the ultimate expression ofprestige), Arab officers try to keep any technical information andmanuals secret. To Arabs, the value and prestige of an individual isbased not on what he can teach, but on what he knows that no one elseknows.While Western officers thrive on competition among themselves,Arab officers avoid this as the loser would be humiliated. Better foreveryone to fail together than for competition to be allowed, even if iteventually benefits everyone.Westerners are taught leadership and technology; Arab officersare taught only technology. Leadership is given little attention asofficers are assumed to know this by virtue of their social status asofficers.Initiative is considered a dangerous trait. So subordinatesprefer to fail rather than make an independent decision. Battles aremicromanaged by senior generals, who prefer to suffer defeat rather thanlose control of their subordinates. Even worse, an Arab officer willnot tell a U.S. ally why he cannot make the decision (or even that hecannot make it), leaving Western officers angry and frustrated becausethe Arabs won't make a decision. The Arab officers simply will not admitthat they do not have that authority.Lack of initiative makes it difficult for Arab armies tomaintain modern weapons. Complex modern weapons require on the spotmaintenance, and that means delegating authority, information, andtools. Arab armies avoid doing this and prefer to use easier to controlcentral repair shops. This makes the timely maintenance of weaponsdifficult.Security is maniacal. Everything even vaguely military is topsecret. While Western promotion lists are routinely published, thisrarely happens in Arab armies. Officers are suddenly transferred withoutwarning to keep them from forging alliances or networks. Any teamspirit among officers is discouraged.All these traits were reinforced, from the 1950s to the 1990s,by Soviet advisors. To the Russians, anything military was secret,enlisted personnel were scum, they had no use for NCOs and everyone wasparanoid about everyone else. These were not "communist" traits, butRussian customs that had existed for centuries and were adopted by thecommunists to make their dictatorship more secure from rebellion. Arabdictators avidly accepted this kind of advice, but are still concernedabout how rapidly the communist dictatorships all came tumbling downbetween 1989 and 1991.Arab states can produce fearsome looking armies, at least onpaper. But these troops cannot survive an encounter with well trainedand led soldiers. Even fanatical Islamic terrorists are often too muchto handle. This is still happening throughout the Arab world as can beseen recently in Libya and Iraq.