When the Florida Panthers Head Coach Jacques Martin resigned his position in 2008 it was after a third straight year of knocking on the door of the playoffs with mid-eighties point totals. They had hired a coach with a long history of at least getting to the playoffs (Ottawa made the cut in 8 straight seasons under Martin), made blockbuster trades (including for all-star Tomas Vokoun, and defensemen Keith Ballard and Nick Boynton, while trading away Roberto Luongo). They were itching to take the next step, and Martin, who was Head Coach and General Manager at the time, couldn’t push them over the edge. So he stepped aside as Head Coach, and in his capacity as GM, he hired Pete DeBoer to take the Panthers to the next level.

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A WHALE OF A COACH

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DeBoer cut his coaching teeth extensively in the Ontario Hockey League, starting as an assistant, and being named Head Coach and General Manager of the OHL’s Detroit Whalers in 1995. During his first season in the role, he guided the Whalers to a first place finish in their division, and found some post-season success. After a setback in the 96-97 season that saw them eliminated in the first round after a rough year, DeBoer would take the team (renamed again, to the Plymouth Whalers) on a run of success, culminating in a 106 point Hamilton-Spector-Trophy-Winning 98-99 season that saw DeBoer win the Matt Leyden Trophy as the OHL’s Coach of the Year. He and his team would repeat both feats in the 99-2000 season en route to a J. Ross Robertson Cup Final loss. After returning to the Robertson Cup Finals (and losing) for the second straight year in 2001, DeBoer would take his awards (and his assistant) and move to the Kitchener Rangers.

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HOME ON THE RANGERS

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DeBoer would take over a sub-.500 Kitchener Rangers and find immediate success. After simply making the playoffs in his first season, the Rangers would take major strides in 02-03, earning the Hamilton Spector Trophy and guiding the team to its first Memorial Cup Championship since 1982. They would spend a few years rebuilding and in flux until the 07-08 season, when the Rangers would storm to one of the best records in OHL history at 53-11-4, winning decisive victories en route to the Memorial Cup Finals, but ultimately falling a game short of being crowned champions again. Still the run caught the attention of Jacques Martin, who named him Head Coach of the Florida Panthers for the 2008 season.

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THE CAT AND THE SPLAT

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Like many coaches who sign on in Florida, the temptation of being the guy who finally coaxed the Panthers to take the next step was alluring. The Luongo trade had already been cemented as one of the worst robberies in the league, but the team had a strong captain in Olli Jokinen, and the tandem of Vokoun and Craig Anderson had finally secured their situation in net.

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But Martin traded Jokinen to the Coyotes before he ever played a game for DeBoer, and the ultimate product on the ice was that which Florida hockey fans who didn’t dress in blue had come to expect: coming agonizing close, but missing the playoffs once all the math was done. Just to compound that frustration, they were actually tied for the final post-season slot with Montreal at 93 points, but the Canadiens held the tie-breaker.

DeBoer had issues transitioning to the NHL, made harder by the lack-luster Panthers roster. He managed to plug the hole left by Jokinen, maintaining a dangerous transition game, but the Florida defense floundered under his tutelage. Without Vokoun (who posted stats of .926/2.49, .925/2.55, and 9.22/2.55 during DeBoers’ tenure) the results likely would have been substantially worse, especially in the 09-10 season, when he posted his second best-ever season stat-line while facing the second most shots against in his career (2081).

Even with Vokoun masking serious defensive liabilities, DeBoer was unable to make his transition game work early on. His Panthers were outshot on a nightly basis, generating 7,235 (2,411/2,331/2,493) shots during his tenure while giving up 8,252 (2,843/2,800/2,609), for an average of 29.4 shots for and 33.5 shots against per game. Surprisingly, their worst season in terms of points (and DeBoer’s last with the team) would be their least porous, but their shooting percentage (9.6/8.7/7.7) would never even reach the league average after his first season.

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His system simply couldn’t generate offense with the Panthers. Now much of this can be attributed to an anemic Panthers roster ravaged by poor trades and a lack of desirability to free agents, but every stat not owned by Tomas Vokoun points to a team in distress.

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DeBoer was fired after his team authored their worst point total (72) since before the lockout, and his successor (Kevin Dineen) would end the Panthers playoff drought with a 94 point season the following year.

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SMELLS LIKE VICTORY

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DeBoer was not out of work for long. He was scooped up by the New Jersey Devils ahead of the 11-12 season, replacing his second Jacques (Lemaire). New Jersey had failed to make the playoffs the year before, after a disastrous year that saw Lemaire unretire in mid-season to replace John MacLean before retiring again once the season was complete.

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The turnaround was swift.

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DeBoer had a much better roster, and another seasoned net-minder to lean on, and Ilya Kovalchuk had just entered the second year of his now infamous and CBA-defying 15 year $100 million contract. Kovalchuk would lead the Devils in goals (37) and points (83), and his teammates Patrik Elias and Zach Parise would combine for 147 points. Rookie Adam Henrique, a 2008 3rd round pick, would earn a roster spot for the first time, and end his rookie season with a stat line of 16-35-51 in 74 games played (the best point total of his career to date) and be a finalist for the Calder Trophy.

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Behind the aforementioned firepower, and with a little help from a more experienced and generally better defensive core, a DeBoer led team outshot their opponents for the first time (2,253 to 2,199) and beat the league average in shooting percentage by a healthy margin.

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In his first season with the team, DeBoer would inherit a gifted Devils roster and guide them to the Stanley Cup Finals, bouncing the Florida Panthers along the way. They would cede Lord Stanley to the Los Angeles Kings in 6 games, but the general feeling was that the Devils would be around for a while, and DeBoer had finally made good on his potential as a two-time OHL Coach of the Year.

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After tasting the Cup Finals the year before, New Jersey crashed to last place in their division during the shortened 12-13 season, with a brutal record of 19-19-10. They would miss the playoffs that year, and the year after, before DeBoer was fired 36 games into the 14-15 season, after compiling a 12-17-7 record. His record in New Jersey would stand at 114-93-25. Excluding his honeymoon season shows a more troubling record of 66-65-35, and it’s worth examining what happened in New Jersey more deeply than Florida, because while Florida added significant pieces to turn their franchise around the year after DeBoer was deposed, there were enough pieces in New Jersey to build a team that could do more than crash and burn, and a deeper dive into his coaching style shows trends that are going to be all too familiar to hockey fans in Northern California.

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THE DEVIL’S IN THE DETAILS

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In developmental leagues like the OHL, there’s a natural lean towards offense. Defensemen and goalies mature slower, and have more to learn in terms of positioning and poise. So it’s no surprise that coaches who transition directly from developmental leagues or college teams to the NHL tend to have less of a focus on defense. In this respect, DeBoer is not uncommon. David Quinn’s first year as Head Coach of the New York Rangers resulted in a -381 shot differential. Dave Hakstol got off to a better start with the Flyers, getting his defense to a +21 shot differential on the year, although he inherited a better defense than either Quinn or DeBoer, who’s first season generated a shot differential of -432. Offense just comes easier in the developmental and NCAA leagues, which is why there are precious few coaches hired with no AHL or NHL coaching experience.

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As such, DeBoer showed a fairly typical developmental mindset in New Jersey, characterized by a willingness to let young forwards experiment and play their game, while young defensemen were seldom trusted with significant ice-time or top pairings, while aging defensemen were clung to despite mistakes.

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David Clarkson had 18 points in 10-11, when he averaged 13:37 TOI per game. After DeBoer took over the next year, Clarkson’s ATOI jumped almost three minutes a night to 16:22, and he rewarded his coach with 30 goals and 46 points, both career highs.

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Adam Henrique was allowed to shine as a rookie and posted 16 goals and a career high 51 points.

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But during the DeBoer years in New Jersey, younger and more promising defenseman like Anton Volchenkov were allowed to languish, never averaging 18:00 TOI or higher under DeBoer. His point totals fell sharply. As he was languishing on the third pairing (when he was playing) an aging (33 years old and up) defensive core of Marek Zidlicky (+/- -15 under DeBoer) Henrik Tallinder (+/- -32 under DeBoer) and Bryce Salvador (+/- 4 under DeBoer) all averaged over 20 minutes a night. Throughout the years DeBoer only grew less interested in Volchenkov, with even the likes of Peter Harrold getting significant ice time.

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Now certainly, the collapse in New Jersey can’t be laid entirely at the feet of the Head Coach. Losing Zach Parise to a Kovalchuk-ian 13-year $98 Million offer from the Minnesota Wild took one of the most promising forwards off the team. Speaking of Kovalchuk, the veteran sniper opted to retire a year later to spend more time in Russia with his family. David Clarkson, who DeBoer had placed so much trust in, left for Toronto as a free agent at the same time. These three departures together meant that the Devils lost three of their top five point producers from the Stanley Cup run just two years later. How much of that had to do with the Devils financial woes (at one point, they borrowed $30 Million from an attorney to finance their payroll) and how much of a role DeBoer played in those players decisions is uncertain, but having those three point leaders quit on their teams isn’t a good look.

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DeBoer also struggled managing his goaltending. With the sun setting on Martin Broduer’s historic career, the Devils traded for Corey Schneider. Despite his significantly better numbers and play (Schneider’s GAA of 1.97 lead the Devils, as well as the entire NHL in 13-14), DeBoer did not allow Schneider to overtake Broduer as the starting goaltender, instead splitting starts between the two. The struggles and drama in net combined with offensive struggles (the Devils went without a 30-goal scorer for first time in 11 years, adjusted for the lockout season) left DeBoer with more questions than answers. When the 14-15 season started the same way (12-17-7) DeBoer was fired 36 games in.

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CALIFORNIA HERE WE COME

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The San Jose Sharks were in familiar territory. For the 10th straight season, they had made the playoffs, and for the 10th straight season they had fallen short of the Stanley Cup Final. Getting bounced by their rival LA Kings in round 1 was the final straw for Head Coach Todd McLellan. Under McLellan, the Sharks had made the playoffs 7 straight years, but in that time, they had only been to two conference finals, and they had one total win those two appearances. The message was clear; making the playoffs was no longer enough. Winning a playoff series was no longer enough. Parade-worthy achievements were expected. Captaincies were stripped. GM Doug Wilson referred to the Sharks playoff experience as being “like Charlie Brown trying to kick a football”. Todd McLellan announced that the players who wanted to be captain would have to earn the right. The team’s response to McLellan’s frustration was as emphatic as it was disastrous; they missed the playoffs with a record of 40-33-9. McLellan was summarily dismissed, and Pete DeBoer came to San Jose.

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Ownership made moves to make them successful. John Scott was sent to a farm upstate. Scott Hannan was allowed to leave. Veteran goaltender Antti Niemi was traded, and Martin Jones was brought to town. Pavelski was named team captain. The Sharks were ready to realize their goals.

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Like so many DeBoer lead teams, they knocked on the door of greatness in his first year with the team. Powered by a formidable defensive line-up, featuring Brent Burns and Marc Eduard Vlasic in their primes, DeBoer’s transitional offense thrived. Sure the young and promising Brendan Dillon was losing ice time to Roman Polak, but the Sharks surged to a 98 point season and a playoff berth (on the back of a career year for Martin Jones). They smelled blood in the water, and chewed through their rival LA Kings 4-1 in the opening round. The Predators fell in game 7, and St. Louis fans were left feeling blue as the Sharks took six games to send them home. Once again, Pete DeBoer had made an impossible turnaround. The Sharks looked dominant, and were in the Stanley Cup Final for the first time in franchise history.

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But the Penguins had other ideas, and they eventually sank the Sharks in six games.

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Despite that, the feeling was that the Sharks finally had all the pieces.

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They were finally ready to seriously compete in the postseason.

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The next year they stormed out for the 16-17 season with a purpose. With an almost identical record, they finished the year with 99 points, and earned a chance to face the Edmonton Oilers in round 1.

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THE JAWS OF DEFEAT

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Now the Oilers had finally looked to have turned the corner themselves. Under former Sharks Bench Boss Todd McLellan the Oilers had won 47 games and amassed 103 points. The superhuman superstar Connor McDavid ended the year with 100 points himself. Cam Talbot, who had been ridden for an unbelievable 73 starts, had exceptional stats with a .919 save percentage and a 2.39 GAA. All this to say, these were not the Oilers that my generation has become accustomed to seeing dwelling in the basement of the Eastern Conference with their Dunce Caps on. Even so, it was a shock to see how San Jose was ousted by them in the first round. They trailed 2-0, and battled back to force overtime and score the game winning goal. But then Cam Talbot went on a shutout streak that would last 1:20:15. For games two and three San Jose was held without a goal. The streak was ended 15 seconds into game 4, which would begin a 7-0 route by the Sharks, but the Oilers would battle back, winning game 5 in overtime, and the Sharks were unable to keep their season alive, falling 3-1 in game 6.

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The next year, they would reach round 2 after another 100 point season, only to be steamrolled by the Cinderella Story that was the Vegas Golden Knights.

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So what went wrong for DeBoer in San Jose?

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One could make the argument, that perennial playoff contention is a mark of success for the Jekyll-and-Hyde Head Coach. But the Sharks made it clear that with the roster they had assembled, simply making the playoffs was not the bar for success. It’s also clear that the Sharks were able to find success during the regular season, so why didn’t it translate?

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While there may not be a clear answer, there is one possibility that stands out among the rest: Pete DeBoer’s style has not changed much since he entered the league. He still coaches the same basic system, and while teams may not have the time to prepare for it and learn its intricacies during the regular season, when they have a week to prepare and only one opponent to play for multiple games in a row, it becomes easier to learn that opponents habits. Under DeBoer during the regular season the Sharks have an overall win percentage of .558. In the second game of back-to-backs against the same opponents, DeBoer’s Sharks have a win percentage of .400, even losing to the cellar dwelling Vancouver Canucks when they have time to prepare.

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The regression of Martin Jones also cannot be ignored. While he was exceptional during the 16-17 season, and even in the playoff loss to the Oilers, his numbers in 17-18 began to look more pedestrian. His save percentage fell to .915, and his GAA jumped to 2.55. While his playoff stats were boosted by a clean sweep of the Anaheim Ducks in which he only allowed four goals, he struggled mightily against the Vegas Golden Knights, only earning a series save percentage of .895, and even that stat is bolstered dramatically by a game 4 shutout.

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Which brings us to the 2019 playoffs. The Vegas Golden Knights still have Martin Jones’ number. The Sharks won game 1 in spite of him. He lasted just 6:39 into game 2. He has allowed the Knights to score opening goals in the first two minutes in consecutive games. He allowed three goals on seven shots in game 2 before being pulled, and two of them were soft goals from bad angles, outside the hashmarks by off-handed players. He is playing his net like it’s ten feet wide, lunging in and out of position on saves that should be routine.

Yet DeBoer keeps going back to him.

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At the time of this writing, the Sharks are preparing for their first elimination game of 2019, and DeBoer has announced that despite failing to see the second period of half his games in the series, he will start Martin Jones again in game 5. Like Tallinder in New Jersey, and Bryan Allen in Florida, DeBoer just can’t bench a veteran player who’s letting him down. Aaron Dell has struggled this year as well, but he has looked better than Jones, despite playing in times when the Sharks were taking chances and penalties in equally inadvisable numbers, in full on panic mode implosions at the ends of dramatic losses.

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He has made saves that actually looked difficult, in contrast to Jones, who has managed to make every save he does make look difficult.

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But more importantly, it sends a message to the team.

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DeBoer, however, has no message to send. He looks positively bewildered behind the bench. He cannot control Evander Kane, or even avoid matching him up against Ryan Reaves.

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His press conference demeanor betrays the truth of the situation; the San Jose Sharks haven’t been eliminated from the playoffs yet, but they have been defeated. For the second year in a row, they don’t have an answer for their new rivals.

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WHAT NOW

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In 2015, when he was hired by San Jose, Susan Slutter of the San Francisco Chronicle interviewed DeBoer, and he had this to say about the end of his time in New Jersey:

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“If you ask any coach who gets fired, 90 percent of them would say they’ve run out of answers. You’d like to turn it around, but a lot of times, the team is at the end of the line because you push them to points that frustrate everybody.”

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The Sharks look like they are frustrated to a man. Martin Jones couldn’t even be found for the expected post-game press routine after game 4. All the guys seem frustrated to once again be offering dismal platitudes instead of celebratory praises. DeBoer himself looked shell-shocked by the swift dismantling of his defense that pushed too far towards an offensive transition and away from stay-at-home support of their beleaguered netminder.

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Now to be sure, the blame doesn’t lie squarely at DeBoer’s feet. If you were looking for the source of the Sharks most immediate problems, you wouldn’t need to look much farther than their goal crease. But like his newly acquired defensive superstar, DeBoer has shown an inability to pivot. Great coaches have done more with less before. Peter Laviolette took Carolina to Stanley Cup glory despite the fact that his top four defensemen barely earned 100 points between them, and despite his goalie tandem giving him 2019-Sharks-like numbers. Darryl Sutter took the 2012 Kings to Stanley Cup glory despite the fact that his top four defensemen didn’t reach 100 points, and despite the fact the his team didn’t even boast a 30 goal scorer. DeBoer’s advice to Jones seems emblematic of the mindset that has prevented his name from being etched in silver: “Just work through it.”

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That said, the Sharks are historically slow to react, especially after reasonably successful seasons that end in playoff berths. Pete DeBoer may have one or many more seasons left as the Head Coach of the Sharks, but the pressure is surely mounting. Players get older every year. The Sharks once vaunted defense is aging, and their core group of forwards aren’t getting any younger or more affordable either. The window is closing.

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In a press conference after practice yesterday, DeBoer had this answer to questions about Martin Jones:

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“You know, it’s a team… you win as a team and lose as a team. I think the challenge here, for everybody, is, are you part of the solution, or are you, you know, part of the problem.”

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Intentionally or not, DeBoer summarized the decision that GM Doug Wilson may be forced to entertain as soon as Thursday evening.

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And if his history is any indication, DeBoer’s token season as the solution may already be long behind him.