The June 9 strike by the Indian Army on rebel camps inside Myanmar to avenge the June 4 ambush in Manipur that killed 18 soldiers was a spectacular and professionally executed 'strategic' operation. It would have remained just operational or tactical had the trans-border dimension not enhanced the label. It was also 'strategic' because the effect transcends the political, military and psychological domain. But within two hours of the initial information about the operation, I was advising on social media that the post-operation handling would need some expertise. The army handled the post-operation brief in a most sensitive and appropriate way, divulging the right amount of information. After any strategic-level operation, it is the "greyness" attached to the event that actually delivers the message. The "chest thumping" that followed may not have passed muster, yet I do not entirely fault it. There is a nuanced rationale for this belief.

Lt Gen (retd) Syed Ata Hasnain is a former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps Lt Gen (retd) Syed Ata Hasnain is a former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps

The North-east has been stable for some years, although a number of largely criminal militant groups with no ideology abound. The representatives of the separatist movement in Nagaland and some groups in Manipur were under ceasefire and seizure of operations. However, failed interlocution as well as extortion bids by militant groups prevented the next move towards any further understanding, creating the current impasse. The latest imbroglio emerged in the form of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) abrogating the ceasefire and taking under its umbrella other organisations such as the anti-talks faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) and National Democratic Front of Boroland (Songbijit) to form the United National Liberation Front of West South East Asia (UNLFWSEA). A series of strikes by UNLFWSEA rebels over the last few months has left around 30 Indian soldiers dead. The failure to establish peace in general and the emboldened stance of the NSCN(K) in particular would have emasculated the government's image and further eroded the stability of the counter-insurgency (CI) grid. It may even have emboldened the militants as far away as the Maoist corridor.

The chest-thumping after the successful operation and muted brief by the army presented two opposites. The army's quiet message was to convey symbolism of its capability-an opportunity which rarely presents itself. The operation may have been at a strategic level but the dissemination was projected right to the sub-tactical level. The less it is discussed, the higher is its value in terms of professional awe. In the national politico-strategic environment, however, the factors are different. Ever since the information revolution hit India with the proliferation of social media, different governments have been at the receiving end of criticism regarding their inability to adequately respond to an array of negative events perpetrated by anti-national elements (ANEs)-from Mumbai to Dantewada to Mendhar, Kathua and Uri. And on so many occasions, the chest-thumping was from the side of the ANEs. Any strategic success gives occasion to enhance national morale. However, the packaging has to be right.

The Indian media is yet to understand this and realise its role. Even if any particular country's name was mentioned by government functionaries in the course of chest-thumping, it could have been played down. I'm not endorsing a gung-ho attitude towards the western border, which has a completely different context, and no two military situations can ever be compared. I'm, however, justifying the chest-thumping since the political leadership has the right to claim credit for the quick decision-making, the risk management and the diplomatic handling, all of which would have been lost in the muted projection by the army which too had its justified dynamics. The chest-thumping has brought to the fore the overall picture which too was necessary.

The operation has energised the security grid in the North-east. While militant reprisals will be there, this should be the commencement of robust military engagement to send home the message of national intent translated into tactical effectiveness. The one important factor that the commanders on ground have to remember is that collateral effect on the population just cannot be accepted. It is a different era in which the reinvigoration of the CI grid is being executed. The government cannot afford to wait for the security environment to re-stabilise to start traditional initiatives expected of it. This time it has to be simultaneous. Also, the inefficiencies and corruption identified with official schemes need to be overcome if the efforts of the army and the Assam Rifles are to be exploited. Diplomatic efforts with Myanmar need to be energised including military diplomacy, which has its own place in such an environment.

Lastly, Pakistan and the western front may have entered the discourse more unconsciously than deliberately. It should not have got our national media so worked up to attract eyeballs. At least at some point, the media must down play inadvertent mistakes in support of national interest.

Lt Gen (retd) Syed Ata Hasnain is a former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps