There were two basic camps within the Fed. On one side were the reserve bank presidents who wanted to throw anything and everything at the crisis. For the most part, these officials came from regions — like New York and Boston — that are home to big financial firms. They contended that the financial system was in such peril that big substantive action had to be taken, pronto.

On the other side were those who hoped to weigh the trillion-dollar programs — separately and together — to make sure their costs and risks didn’t exceed their benefits. Many holding this view were from regions with more diverse economies, like Kansas City and Dallas.

“This last discussion has been fascinating against the backdrop of our not having a clear sense of exactly why and how expanding our balance sheet affects the world,” said Jeffrey M. Lacker, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Va., at an April 2009 meeting. “I think we’re really groping in the dark here. I think we need to recognize that.”

Mr. Lacker and others who raised questions about the potential costs and benefits of the 2009 programs had good reason to. As the new transcripts indicate, their concerns were at least in part intended to protect the larger economy from the perils of rescuing reckless market participants.

Consider the discussions surrounding something with a mouthful of a name — the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, also known as TALF. Operated by the New York Fed, it was put in place in late November 2008 and allowed borrowers to receive loans for up to five years in exchange for asset-backed securities they held. For the securities to be eligible for exchange, they had to be newly issued and rated AAA. The program would have allowed up to $200 billion in loans.