Martin Kettle refers to the particular damage that no deal would inflict on Ireland and the influence that this factor might carry (Deal or no deal: it’s not really up to Dominic Cummings, 8 August). But is there perhaps an argument that the EU’s insistence on the backstop is ultimately self-defeating, when up against someone as perverse as Boris Johnson, and is he therefore calculating that the EU will eventually be forced to “blink”?

The EU is insisting, quite correctly, on the “insurance policy” of the backstop as the means of ensuring the integrity of the Good Friday agreement (GFA) in case a solution to the Irish border issue can’t be found before the future transition period expiry date. But if the UK left the EU this October without a deal, there would be an immediate and certain reinstatement of a land border across the island of Ireland, this autumn. From an EU perspective such an outcome is arguably worse than the one that the backstop seeks to avert, where at worst there would at least be a transition phase in which to mitigate the impact of border reinstatement.

So given that the Johnson government, unlike the EU, is clearly not much concerned about the GFA, they have less incentive than the EU to avert no deal. In this sense, do they possess a significant negotiating advantage because no deal affects the EU’s cause more adversely than it does their own?

Dr Alan Fowler

Newcastle upon Tyne

• Living in Northern Ireland, I understand only too well why a backstop is considered necessary. But why does it have to be finalised now?

By definition it could not come into operation before the end of the transition period. During that time we will have negotiations on the future trading relationship. The outcome of those deliberations will show more clearly whether a backstop is needed, and just what shape it needs to take.

Deferring the backstop discussions until that second phase would pose no risk to Ireland or the EU. They could still insist on a backstop as a precondition for a trading deal. At worst that might precipitate a hard Brexit in a few years’ time, but that is better than having one now.

And perhaps by that time the parliamentary arithmetic may be more favourable to a compromise solution, such as the Northern Ireland-only backstop, which may well be the best way to avoid a hard border after leaving the EU.

For Ireland and the EU to accept deferral would be a helpful gesture; refusal to do so would encourage the perception (which I do not share) that, for Ireland and the EU, form is more important than substance, and that it is they rather than Boris Johnson who are intransigent.

Pat Carvill

Bangor, Northern Ireland

• As amusing as Seamas O’Reilly’s article is, he is mistaken (Hard Brexiters’ stance on the Irish border is nonsense – I can tell you, I grew up there, 7 August).

There has never been an impervious hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. There was military infrastructure on the border during the Troubles, but it was never impervious. The IRA were able to practise “shoot and scoot” operations across the border, with the majority of killings having been in the border areas.

The Good Friday agreement did not call for the removal of all border infrastructure. It required the removal of military apparatus. That has been done.

After a no-deal Brexit, Northern Ireland and the Republic would indeed be operating as part of different customs areas, but there would be no need for border infrastructure. The WTO requires the imposition and collection of tariffs. It does not require that this be done in conjunction with border controls. Customs could sensibly be collected on the basis of self-declarations – just as VAT is collected. Checks could then be done in the exception, as audits, away from the border. It is also important to note that trade between Northern Ireland and the Republic amounts to 0.5% of total trade between the UK and EU – tiddly.

Finally, while in theory an unpatrolled border may give rise to persons without requisite rights entering both Northern Ireland and the Republic, across their border, they would be illegal immigrants and subject to deportation. In practice, particularly given that Ireland is not part of the Schengen zone, the number of illegal immigrants is likely to be minimal.

So, after a Brexit on WTO terms, there would be no need for any border infrastructure. This issue has been blown out of proportion and used by the EU and Ireland as a negotiating tool. The backstop is an insidious construction and the UK must never sign it.

Ben Habib MEP

London, Brexit party

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