People are happiest when they experience better-than-expected progress. The U.S. deceleration of the 1970s brought on a national melancholia, culminating in 1979 with Jimmy Carter’s hand-wringing in what came to be known as his “malaise speech,” even though Carter never used that term. In today’s China, where the government hates nothing more than to express weakness, the signals may not be so obvious: Xi Jinping is not about to don a cardigan and ruminate about “a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will.” But China’s economic slowdown is nonetheless likely to take an insidious toll on the Chinese psyche. The country’s growth has slowed from an average annual rate of about 10 percent in the 2000s to an estimated 6.9 percent in 2015. And although the new rate remains impressive relative to that of most countries, the deceleration—and hence the shock to expectations—is sharper than that experienced in the United States four decades ago.

Indeed, China’s slowdown may be especially tumultuous because its society is under acute stress. Pollution, inequality, corruption, and precipitous urbanization have complicated the country’s growth miracle: A range of studies finds that economic progress has yielded surprisingly few gains in self-reported life satisfaction; in fact, among poor Chinese in urban areas, life satisfaction since 1990 has declined. Slower and more balanced growth, involving a shift away from dirty manufacturing, may eventually ease some of these stresses. But the slowdown’s immediate effect will be greater insecurity, as companies that had bet aggressively on limitless growth find themselves lumbered with unprofitable factories or empty apartment blocks. Many will lay off workers or go bust.

If China’s slowdown were temporary, this might not matter much. But the country’s deceleration is likely to become more severe. China’s growth has been founded upon exports, yet there is a limit to how much China’s trade surplus can expand without triggering a protectionist backlash. China’s growth has also been powered by favorable demography, but as today’s missing children become tomorrow’s missing adults, the ratio of workers to dependents will deteriorate and the demographic dividend will give way to a demographic tax. Most crucially of all, China’s growth has been built on an extraordinary level of investment, recently financed by an extraordinary level of debt. But, as we shall see presently, this road to riches leads over a cliff. China’s economic miracle is very likely at its end.

Downshifting is always painful, but politicians often make it more painful—and ultimately more destabilizing—than it needs to be. That was certainly the case in the U.S. in the 1970s, and Chinese leaders would do well to learn from America’s experience. The first and most important lesson is to accept the slowdown gracefully. Denial and resistance only make the problems worse.