A change of pace

In September 2009, as if by clockwork, the Liberal Democratic Party lost in the general election and a new Democratic Party prime minister assumed office.

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama put much the previous party’s existing defense reform plans on ice. They not only didn’t fit with his party’s reinforcement of Japan’s “non-aggressive defense policy,” but the mandarins in the defense ministry were cool towards the Democratic Party, which had only seemed capable of saying “no” during its time in opposition.

Hatoyama put Toshimi Kitazawa in Ichigaya. He was to become Japan’s longest-appointed defense minister, heading the organization through Japan’s darkest moment since World War II—the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

Kitazawa had no cabinet experience to speak of, but he had served as chairman of the Upper House Foreign Policy and Defense Committee during the inquiry into Tamogami’s actions in 2008. Despite this, he was an unknown quantity to ministry bureaucrats—and that made them uneasy.

One of his first tasks only worsened that unease. The new Democratic Party leadership ended the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. At his inaugural press conference, Kitazawa told reporters that international appreciation for Japan’s Indian Ocean mission was “limited.”

The Liberal Democratic Party had given the Defense Agency stable long-term policy for 44 years. Kitazawa’s remarks underlined just how different the Democratic Party planned to be.

The Democratic Party’s decision to end the Indian Ocean mission and its squabbles over the relocation Futenma air base in Okinawa put the U.S.-Japan relationship on the rocks during Hatoyama’s time in office. But Kitazawa seemed to navigate the troubled relationship well.

The defense minister proved himself capable even while the new prime minister floundered. He encouraged better ties to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He worked on creating the framework by which Japan could, for the first time, sell military equipment to its neighbors.

He also helped forge the “dynamic defense” concept that publicly recognized China as Japan’s primary threat.

Popular hawks such as Toshio Tamogami and the mustachioed officer-turned-politician Masahisa Sato frequently criticized Kitazawa’s willingness to improve relations with its neighbors—a key theme of the Hatoyama government.

They also attacked him when news broke that the ministry was tracking the attendance of serving military personnel at nationalist lectures by former officers—such as Tamogami and Sato themselves. The tracking was a direct response to the leaks and politicization in the Self-Defense Forces that had ruined public trust in the ministry.

The criticism waned after the 2011 tsunami. The Ministry of Defense finally demonstrated its worth to the Japanese people as it coordinated the disaster-relief mission. For the first time in Japan’s pacifistic postwar history, the public seemed to appreciate the Self-Defense Forces and their administrators.

Kitazawa proved himself a capable statesman. He worked well with the civil servants in Ichigaya. He sought their advice but also knew when to stand firm on party promises and his personal judgement. He enjoyed trust in the cabinet and his tenure furthered ministry reforms.

Kitazawa is the only defense minister to remain in office after a change of prime ministers—Hatoyama was out in June 2010 and Naoto Kan was in office at the time of the earthquake. The mishandling of the meltdown in Fukushima destroyed public support for Kan and in September 2011 he stepped down.

Yoshihiko Noda was Japan’s sixth prime minister in four years. Noda’s father had been a soldier in the elite 1st Airborne Brigade. Noda himself was one of the key figures in the formation of the 2011 “dynamic defense force” concept. But despite knowing better, Noda chose to use the minister of defense position to reinforce divisions in the Democratic Party.

Noda’s man for Ichigaya—its eighth minister—was Yasuo Ichikawa, a key supporter of the now-disgraced party kingpin Ichiro Ozawa. The boss Ozawa’s toxic politics were increasingly unpopular with the public, but he still held considerable power within the Democratic Party.

This is what got Ichikawa his job. It clearly wasn’t because he actually wanted it.

“I am an amateur regarding security issues, but this is what you call the real ‘civilian control,’” Ichikawa told assembled reporters and staff in his inauguration address.

The opposition party had a field day with that speech. Ichikawa’s predecessor Shigeru Ishiba quickly rebuked Ichikawa’s naivety. “That remark itself warrants his dismissal as defense minister.”

From day one, Ichikawa was under fire. But it wasn’t his remarks that finally cost him the job. That dubious honor went to Ichikawa’s Okinawa Defense Bureau chief Satoshi Tanaka, who likened announcing the submission of an environmental report on the Futenma relocation site to rape. “Would you say, ‘I will rape you,’ before you rape someone?” the chief asked.

Not content to merely wallow in the fallout from that gaffe, Ichikawa dug an even deeper hole for himself. He told reporters that he didn’t know much about the 1995 rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen.

This came after the national press had highlighted the incident in order to show why Tanaka’s comments were so inappropriate. The defense minister came across as clueless and incompetent.

Ichikawa tried to weather the storm, and Noda’s desire to keep kingpin Ozawa on board meant supporting the beleaguered defense chief. “I hope he will shape up and fulfill his responsibilities,” Noda commented optimistically.

But the opposition-controlled upper house passed a censure motion against the defense minister. And at the start of 2012, Noda ditched Ichikawa.

Noda’s second choice for the defense position was a repeat of all his previous mistakes. Ichikawa’s replacement was Naoki Tanaka, husband of Makiko Tanaka, Koizumi’s outspoken foreign minister.

At first glance, he seemed like a better choice. He had served as parliamentary secretary in the foreign ministry and as head of the upper house’s foreign affairs and defense committee.

But it seemed like he had learned nothing during his time there.

On his appointment, a Yomiuri Shimbun article quoted an anonymous senior defense ministry official as responding with surprise. “He’s an amateur, isn’t he? Just like Mr. Ichikawa,” the official said.

In fact, Tanaka was actually much worse than Ichikawa.

His ignorance surprised former defense minister Yuriko Koike in the Diet, as she quizzed him on the defense topic of the day. “What is the strategic goal of ‘AirSea Battle?’” Koike asked.

“I don’t really understand it,” Tanaka responded.

This shocked Koike, who chastised Tanaka in front of the entire House of Representatives. “In the ABCs of defense, this is ‘A,’” she quipped.

Masahisa Sato also expressed his horror at the defense minister’s lack of knowledge. “Trying to debate policy with an unqualified individual like you just drives one out of one’s mind!” Sato declared.

The former colonel then stated what was on everyone’s minds. “Prime Minister Noda’s father was a soldier. In his heart, he must be thinking, ‘I would hate to have had my father working under this man.’”

Tanaka had no interest in the job, no talent for politics and didn’t know how to apply his experience as a civil servant. It’s shocking that Noda picked him—and more shocking that he kept him for five months.

But on his third attempt, the prime minister finally found someone who checked all the right boxes.