The UN Status Bid

Months ago, Abbas described the pitch to upgrade the Palestinians' UN status to non-permanent observer as "the only way to address the assault of settlement activity and to save the two-state solution." But in stark contrast with the hullabaloo of last year's bid for full statehood recognition at the international body, sentiments were a mixture of ambivalence and skepticism. While a feat in its own accord, some Palestinians dubbed it a publicity stunt aimed at shoring up legitimacy for the PA -- the governing entity backed by Fatah -- after years of outliving its mandate. Others were angry that the UN move meant giving up on the right of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel. In the Gaza Strip, Palestinians questioned the benefits such a move would have on narrowing the chasm between the two groups.

Resorting to the ICC

In just one December week, the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pushed forward proposals to build more than 11,000 settlement units. Faced with this unprecedented flurry of plans to build mostly in and around Jerusalem, Abbas and numerous officials threatened to turn to the International Criminal Court (ICC). It was not long, however, before Abbas clarified his position to Ha'aretz: "I won't do anything as long as there are diplomatic negotiations." Even if the Palestinians did turn to the ICC, there's no guarantee that the court would take up their request to begin with. As David Luban notes in the Boston Review, the ICC prosecutor could cite the existence and capability of the Israeli legal system to handle such matters as a reason for it not to hear the case. And should it hear the case and indict Israeli officials, the court has no policing arm, and detaining them would be left to Israel or its allies--a move also highly unlikely to happen.

Threats to Dismantle the PA

On the heels of the ICC threats came threats from Abbas of dismantling the PA and forcing Israel to resume responsibility for the West Bank's Palestinians if peace talks don't recommence. The likelihood of Abbas turning over the keys of the Muqata' is inconceivable at a time when Fatah has yet to recover from the strategic loss of the Gaza Strip to Hamas. The Islamic movement quickly picked up on Abbas's threats: In a Facebook post, Hamas Deputy Politburo Chief Mousa Abu Marzouk wrote that his group would be a better option for managing the West Bank since "it has managed to survive the siege imposed on the Gaza Strip, and achieved victory in several wars waged against the movement."

The frequency of Abbas' threats, dating back to 2008, also leaves room for doubting their seriousness, instead showing them to be a form of saber-rattling. Should such a move actually be taken, it could spell the end of tens of thousands of Palestinians' dependency on the PA for their livelihoods, such as in 2006, when a Hamas/Fatah unity government was cut off by its international donors. Further, it is not at all likely that Israel would step in and assume responsibility for the 2.7 million Palestinians it occupies in the West Bank. The more feasible scenario regarding the PA's dissolution is that the authority may fall apart on its own without the resumption of international aid and the transfer of the monies Israel collects as taxes on its behalf. This too is unlikely, as Israel has no interest in returning to the pre-Oslo responsibility of administering the daily lives of Palestinians in the West Bank again.