In the months after the Deepwater Horizon disaster began, a number of other oil industry giants attested to the public that the accident was an aberrance, the fault of BP's irresponsibility alone. But a peek at the much-anticipated report of the commission assigned to investigate the accident concludes that the crisis in the Gulf is evidence of "systemic" failures – and that without "significant reform" in industry and government, it "might well recur."

At the heart of the commission's conclusion is the resounding finding that "the accident of 20 April was avoidable." That is, a number of steps could have been taken by the parties responsible for the Deepwater Horizon to prevent disaster but weren't. And unless a series of changes takes place in the industry and the government agencies responsible for oversight, we could well see more disasters like this.

The much-awaited final report from the National Oil Spill Commission isn't due until next Tuesday, but the commission released one chapter of it on Thursday, which elaborates on many of the findings they have aired in the months since the spill started. The commission points to "a failure of management" among those responsible for the Deepwater Horizon as the chief cause of the disaster. It also outlines a number of risks taken on the rig that were "both unreasonably large and avoidable". None of the parties involved – rig operator BP, owner Transocean or cement-provider Halliburton – are spared judgment. But more interesting is what it says about the broader context in which this disaster took place.

It was not just poor decision-making on the part of the companies involved; industry-wide failures also contributed to the disaster. As the commission concludes:

"The blowout was not the product of a series of aberrational decisions made by rogue industry or government officials that could not have been anticipated or expected to occur again."

In other words, this was a predictable disaster. As oil and gas drillers have moved into deeper waters and more challenging extractive environments, the attention to safety within the industry and oversight from government have not been kept up to date. It's also clear that corners were cut that saved time and money for the drillers. A chart accompanying the report lists nine crucial decisions – all of which had less risky alternatives available that the companies chose not to use. Of the nine, seven saved the drillers time, and therefore money.

The heads of other major oil companies have pointed the finger at BP in testimony to Congress, arguing that the company had taken risks that they would not. But as the report highlights, three giants in the oil industry were involved in this accident – and all three failed to take the steps necessary to avoid a disaster. Further, the report notes, the government agencies that are supposed oversee the industry and enforce regulations "lacked the authority, the necessary resources and the technical expertise to prevent" the incident.

"This disaster likely would not have happened had the companies involved been guided by an unrelenting commitment to safety first," said commission co-chair Bob Graham in a statement. "And it likely would not have happened if the responsible governmental regulators had the capacity and will to demand world-class safety standards."

The commission stopped short of assessing the motivations of the companies that led to corner-cutting and, regrettably, to disaster. But it makes clear that a level of complacency has developed in the industry that allowed expediency and profit to supersede safety. This is why regulations, and regulators, are essential.

Unfortunately, though, regulation has not kept pace with the speed that drilling has moved forward in US waters. To be sure, the Obama administration has made a number of moves in the months since the disaster to change that situation. Gone is the scandal-ridden Minerals Management Service, replaced by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, with separation between the regulatory and the revenue-collection roles of the agency reinforced. Interior Secretary Ken Salazar has also rolled out some stricter rules and more clear obligations for the agency. But there is much that Congress needs to do on this subject, too – though that doesn't seem likely any time soon.

Last year, the House passed a strong package of reforms that included barring repeat offenders from obtaining new leases in the Gulf, eliminating the liability cap so that those who spill are accountable for all the damage the cause, setting tougher standards for safety, and increasing fines for safety and environmental violations. But the Senate never passed a bill including these measures, meaning that, at least legislatively, the situation remains unchanged – despite the biggest oil disaster in US history. With the House now in the control of a Republican majority that has largely rejected any new regulations on the oil industry, the chances of passage in the next two years become very slim.

At this point, then, the administration will need to do as much as it can with the existing regulatory authorities and statutes to ensure that a disaster like this is not repeated. More advice on how to deal with Deepwater drilling is expected in the full report next week, but the extent to which that guidance is followed will show whether the country has truly learned anything from the Deepwater disaster. Let's hope we have.