This post is intended as a reply or rebuttal to a Washington Post article by Sudarsan Raghavan. Let me start off by saying I’m not too surprised by the content, it does not mark a departure from what has come before in regards to the Sinai and Egyptian Counter Terror efforts. This is not a personal attack on the author or any others who contributed. It’s simply a general response to this article and others like it.

The first issue I have is the use of successful Sinai Province attacks on Egyptian military positions and casualty statistics outside of the wider operational context. It [the article] makes no effort in distinguishing between the different areas of operations which although part of a greater whole [Northern Sinai] provide their own dynamics, challenges, and strategic importance.

For instance, the 11th of September attack on an Egyptian Interior convoy which was 48km West of Alaraich City was in an area which had seen very little to no Sinai Province activity for months. The attack on the Al-Bars checkpoint south of Egyptian Rafah was also out of the norm for an area that had been largely tamed. The latter being in the AlGorah – Rafah – Sheikh Zuwaid Triangle which was perhaps the most challenging area of operations in the entirety of Northern Sinai until Egyptian military offensives – Martyrs Right – in late 2015 and throughout 2016.

The point is that although Sinai Province are still capable of complex and multi-layered mass casualty attacks they are no longer as frequent or as elaborate as the ones that dominated news from 2013 to late 2015. In part this is thanks to Egyptian efforts in combating Sinai Province’s logistical rear in Central Sinai – including clearing infamous Gabal Alhalal – and Gaza with recent political efforts resulting in Hamas cooperating on border policing in addition to intelligence cooperation on Sinai Province’s Gaza affiliates. The tribal feud between the Tarabin – known for running smuggling through the Sinai – and Sinai Province has also had an effect on their ability to logistically support operations against Egyptian security forces.

To say the Egyptians are bogged down is to misunderstand to conflict itself. While Sinai Province’s successful mass casualty attacks are tactically embarrassing for Egyptian security forces they are also strategically unimportant to forces that can absorb large losses without losing ground. To this day the Sinai Province is not a Wilaya of the Islamic State in traditional sense. It has no territory to call its own or a population to govern despite five years worth of attempts.

It is true that Sinai Province has proven itself incredibly resilient and adaptable but it is in decline. In an attempt to reassert itself the organisation is willing to branch out towards acts of terror against civilians, targeted assassinations, or sporadic mass casualty attacks. To claim it no longer represents a danger or that North Sinai is fully stable is to be naive. However, at its core it remains a militancy. One that has increasingly resorted to using IEDs and sniper work – which in themselves are less frequent than the previous year – in response to Egyptian successes. While it is true that the Egyptians have suffered from and continue to suffer from a high casualty count that does not mean that there isn’t progress.

Claims by Egyptian politicians that terrorism will be eradicated within “X” months are unhelpful. They provide an arbitrary time line for the military and open themselves – and often the Armed Forces and by extension the country – to internal ridicule and foreign criticism. There are no set rules on how long it takes to win a war and if you set yourself a date you will increasingly push back what constitutes a win.

My second issue is with the framing of the insurgency as a response to the June 2013 Coup-volution when that has been repeatedly pointed out as being absurd. To prove otherwise is simple, the first mass casualty attack against Egyptian forces was in August of 2012, during the term of the deposed President Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egypt – Israel – Jordan gas pipeline had been sabotaged several times months before by militant attacks and in August of 2011 there was a cross border raid targeting Israeli forces and civilians.

It’s almost worrying that the Sinai insurgency is looked at as a local Egyptian issue while its roots are firmly entrenched in the Global War on Terror. The prison breaks of the 2011 Revolution and subsequent security collapse had allowed terrorists to successfully set up in a region which had a long history – just six years back a series of bombings shook Southern Sinai – of terrorist activity. The significant value the region has in current Jihadi thought and methos is also often overlooked.

Although the Coup-volution was a factor in further radicalising Islamist youth and providing an avenue for Sinai Province to recruit it does not mean that the Sinai insurgency would have been any less “successful” or brutal. Egypt presented just the right mixture of entrenched Islamist ideas and local grievances that allowed Alqaeda – alongside several other organisations – to recruit for decades. Contrary to popular wisdom the Muslim Brotherhood has never acted as a firewall against more extreme terrorist organisations. Contemporary examples of direct competition between the two in Syria always went AQs way and after the failures of the MB in power across the region more hardline groups – as well as parts of the MB itself – felt vindicated in their views.

The third point is rather topical. US Aid. Somewhat tired of this subject, like many Egyptians. One wishes that the US would cut it completely if only to stop pundits and politicians from whinging about it. Even though there was a clear demonstration of how ineffective it is a policy tool post 2013.

There are three rather important reasons as to why Sinai Province has not overrun the Egyptian Armed Forces in the Sinai. The Egyptian will to fight. The ability to organise and deploy signigicant amounts of man power. Air Power.

The latter being a crucial factor in why the Egyptian Armed Forces has not suffered strategic defeats thus far, with the Battle of Sheikh Zuweid perhaps the best example of where it turned the tide from near collapse. That ability, especially in the role of close air support and precision strike has been primarily served by US supplied F – 16 fighter jets and AH – 64 Apache helicopter gunships.

One also can’t ignore the capabilities at the periphery of the conflict, which are of vital importance as well. Egypt’s fleet of tactical lift in the C – 130 Hercules and CH – 46 Chinook provide logistical support for a very kinetic conflict. Ground radar stations help police Egypt’s porous borders which provide logistical and financial support for militants. Patrol ships and larger vessels cut off supply and infiltration by sea. Newly introduced MRAPs help with survivability on IED laden roads.

These platforms make a very real difference for the Egyptians and the US should rightly continue to support their Counter Terror efforts, but their dependency on these systems does not mean that they are without alternative. Attempting to leverage aid earmarked for Counter Terror due to political differences leaves a bad taste in everyone’s mouth regardless of why or who is doing it.

The lack of access to the Sinai is perhaps stifling any news of progress. The Administration for Morale Affairs and by extension the Military Spokesman’s silence on the situation is often deafening. It makes it increasingly hard to compile statistics or keep up with events and often damages the Armed Force’s credibility. But one suspects that even if this was the most heavily reported conflict in the world many pundits and those at the helm in DC would still be willfully ignorant on its reality, as they have been towards Egypt and the wider region since the Arab Spring.

My main gripe with this article is not what it gets wrong, it’s what it leaves out. Focusing on tactical failure – which we at Egypt Defence Review take very seriously if you checked out our previous posts and Twitter – while not providing a comprehensive account of what is going on can only result in an incomplete assessment of the situation.

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Wait out for @BTelawy and @moalla094 piece on the major operations and events in Sinai including details and statistics.

Wait out for our piece on Sinai and soldiering shortly afterwards. Thanks for reading.