THE end is nigh. Olli Rehn, the European economic commissioner, says the euro zone has ten days to save itself (so what exactly will happen on December 12th?). Radek Sikorski, Poland's foreign minister, says he fears German paralysis more than German power (or Russian missiles). Barack Obama says the euro zone poses the greatest risk to America's well-being. Having once spurned the IMF, euro-zone leaders beg for its help. In European chancelleries the talk is of who should be the elect ones. Will it be the 27 members of the EU, or just the 17 that are in the euro zone? Or, if even that is impossible, could the six AAA-rated members of the euro zone bind themselves together?

It is time, in short, to repent. But what is the original sin? For Germany, it is over-indebtedness. Although troubled countries can be helped, real salvation must come through individual actions to reduce deficits, repay debts and boost competitiveness. Germany also wants a new covenant: EU treaties must be changed so that national budgets are scrutinised by Brussels, with powers to impose “automatic” sanctions on countries that stray. This would be backed up by the European Court of Justice. The Germans think only a treaty commitment and the power of the judges will ensure that vows of discipline are honoured.

Nobody denies that they have a point. But most also think that the sinning is more widespread than that. Germany itself was one of the first to breach the stability pact's ceilings in 2002-03. For every irresponsible borrower there is a reckless lender (often a German bank). Excessive deficits for some imply excessive surpluses in others. The euro's design was flawed, without fiscal integration or a central bank to act as a lender of last resort. If so, what is needed is greater mutual support: joint Eurobonds to mutualise at least some of the debt, as suggested by the European Commission, and perhaps a change to the statute of the European Central Bank (ECB).

Such positions will be hard to reconcile ahead of next week's summit. Germany and France usually try to present a common position but that looks less easy this time, with Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, making separate speeches this week. Germany will not hear of throwing cash at the problem: no more for the euro-zone rescue fund, no Eurobonds and no open pressure on the ECB to buy more bonds. In Brussels this week euro-zone finance ministers muddled along. They approved the next tranche of loans for Greece to avoid a sudden default; they finalised plans to enhance their rescue fund through financial engineering, even though it may fall short of the original promise of €1 trillion; they pledged a new effort to increase the IMF's funds. Where the money would come from was left vague; the IMF alone cannot save the euro. Perhaps, suggest some, it could borrow from the ECB.

It is being left to Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council, to find a compromise and avert a breakdown. He is known to be wary of opening up the treaties. But if amendments there must be, he is likely to try to balance Teutonic rigour with Latin solidarity. This might include a “road map” to Eurobonds. It might also involve toning down a previous deal that private creditors should be singled out if debtors cannot meet their obligations. But Mr Van Rompuy faces several conundrums.

First, Germany opposes any such grand bargain. Even though Mrs Merkel has crossed many earlier red lines, conversion to anything resembling Eurobonds or to unlimited ECB liquidity is unlikely in a few days, if ever. Second, Britain has an impossible list of demands if there is a new treaty. These include repatriation of social policy, special protection of the City of London and safeguards to stop the 17 “ins” ganging up against the ten “outs”. Third, France's overt campaign for a smaller, more exclusive inner core is stoking the fears of Britain and some others. “I think there is not enough economic integration in the euro zone, the 17, and too much integration in the EU at 27,” Mr Sarkozy declared in October. French EU diplomats recently stunned colleagues by arguing that, when the commission's proposals for new budget rules are debated in the European Parliament, only MEPs from euro-zone countries should be able to vote.

It has fallen to Poland, a non-euro country, to speak truth to the EU's bigger members. In a powerful speech in Berlin this week, Mr Sikorski said Germany was Europe's “indispensable nation” and had to provide leadership. With an eye on France, he declared: “To those who would like to divide Europe, I say: how about a natural division into growth-Europe and non-growth Europe?” And he told Britain: “We would prefer you in, but if you can't join, please allow us to forge ahead.”

Time to fix everything

Europe needs an all-encompassing deal to save itself. The crisis is now about the survival of the euro, so it requires a big response; nobody will be spared if the euro collapses. A sensible compromise would be to impose greater discipline now, in exchange for the eventual introduction of conditional Eurobonds. A paper by the Brussels-based think-tank Bruegel adds the need for a euro-zone finance ministry, with power to raise its own taxes and to oversee the banking system.

With time running short, an all-encompassing deal might take too long to negotiate. That said, a limited German-style treaty would also take time. A balanced deal is more likely to be accepted by voters, in both creditor and debtor states, and to assuage markets. It may need to be done in phases. In the short term, it must be enough to free the ECB to intervene without limit, by assuaging fears of moral hazard. In the long term it needs to signal to investors that the euro's problems are being fixed for good. Only then might the apocalypse be cheated.

Economist.com/blogs/charlemagne