× Expand Mary Altaffer/AP Images The East Side Access project in New York City

By now, it’s no longer startling to read that America’s infrastructure is near failing. In the highly respected Infrastructure Report Card issued every four years by the American Society of Civil Engineers, the grade assigned to 16 different categories of our infrastructure, including roads, transit systems, bridges, and public buildings, has toggled between a D and a C. Their assessment: “Our nation’s infrastructure is aging, underperforming, and in need of sustained care and action.” But this measures only the condition of our current infrastructure. When we consider that any infrastructure renewal strategy must address the need to carry us into the next century, the urgency of raising this grade to an A becomes even clearer.

Why is our public infrastructure such a consistent national disgrace? Why can we make no progress in creating the infrastructure we need for the next 100 years?

First, there is no national consensus on what should be fixed or built, or where, or how it will be paid for. Major physical infrastructure projects—roads, bridges, rail systems—take years and sometimes decades to build, which is itself a source of cost escalation. A few notorious ones:

East Side Access, a commuter rail project in New York City originally scheduled to open in 2009 and to cost $4.3 billion, is now to open in 2022 at a cost of $11.2 billion.

The Oakland Bay Bridge, following catastrophic earthquake damage, was to be rapidly rebuilt in 1989 at a cost of $1 billion and opened 17 years later at a cost of $6.4 billion.

The first phase of Manhattan’s Second Avenue Subway was started in 1972, halted in 1975 for fiscal reasons, and then restarted in 2007, finally opening ten years later at a cost of $4.45 billion instead of the original projection of $3.8 billion.

Thus, the two most common phrases that we hear or read about infrastructure projects of all kinds are “over budget” and “beyond schedule.” From project planning through ribbon cutting and beyond, into operations, the major causes include: uncertain, discontinuous, and inadequate funding; faulty estimates; funding agency mandates; local building codes; stakeholder disputes; unanticipated and unknowable physical conditions; poor project management and oversight; and unanticipated increases in material and equipment costs. The cost of the federal Davis-Bacon Act, mandating that federally funded construction projects pay prevailing wages, a favorite scapegoat of the right, has been a trivial factor. On many projects, labor and management agree on cost-saving “partnering” agreements.

Perhaps the biggest single source of delays and cost overruns is stop-and-go funding, which leads to stop-and-go implementation. In that respect, one of the most important contributions of a Green New Deal would be predictable, guaranteed, long-term federal funding. This would not just pay for more and better public infrastructure; it would allow it to be built much more efficiently, with more coherent public planning and with more public confidence.

Less well recognized but no less serious a problem is that deferred maintenance has pushed capital replacement costs ever higher. Mostly for funding reasons, much of our infrastructure is not kept in a State of Good Repair (SGR)—an industry term that means maintained in the operating condition for which it was designed. As deterioration of roads and transit systems accelerates, capital replacement costs escalate.

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The greatest single source of delays and cost overruns is stop-and-go funding; one of the most important contributions of a Green New Deal would be predictable, guaranteed, long-term federal funding.

A large part of this dysfunctional picture lies in the way the federal government and states now execute and operate established infrastructure programs—from planning to ribbon cutting—and in how they devolve financial responsibility for system operation to the system itself.

Do other economies do better at major project development? Let’s dispense with the Chinese model, because China is an autocracy that can literally command labor and spend unlimited money both for valid project costs and for the corruption that has been reported around all of its major public works. Rail can be built at what seems like breathtaking speed, unaccountable for safety, environmental impacts, labor exploitation, community disruption, and costs. Equally rapid highway building has been accomplished at a very high cost to air quality, public health, and personal productivity.Looking to more comparable societies, it’s a mixed picture:

The famous London Crossrail—a major infrastructure project in England—was to be completed in nine years and opened in 2018 at a cost of £15.4 billion. It has now cost £18.25 billion and will open in 2021. Official reasons given for the delay are writing and dynamic testing of the system’s software.

Paris is building the Grand Paris Express, a 200-kilometer suburban Métro expansion. The estimated cost was about €25 billion in 2012 prices, at that time average for a European subway. New cost estimates are now at €35 billion. Some of this increase occurred because small projects were added to the scope. But most of it was due to faulty understanding of physical conditions risk, and management risk. As in many European countries, the national government gives such projects priority and substantial funding.

The Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway (MTR), an extension to the then-new Hong Kong International Airport, was built with adequate and reliable funding, on time and within budget. The MTR was set up as a public corporation, with the (pre-1999) government the majority owner. To build the rail, the government sold the land needed for the new extension to the MTR at its then-current, undeveloped value. The MTR then sold the land to developers at an appreciated value and used this arbitraged difference to pay for the system. It was built quickly under the expertise of an international group of professionals who had constructed urban rail around the world.

What is the lesson here? You don’t have to look hard to find massively delayed European mega-projects. The reasons for those overruns and delays are almost identical to those we experience here in the U.S.: poor planning; underestimation of costs; poor project management and oversight; unanticipated physical conditions; unanticipated increases in material and equipment costs; and a big culprit, review delays, often by the federal government.

But there’s something really significant missing from that catalog of problems, a problem that American infrastructure development consistently and universally confronts but that our European counterparts do not: inadequate, inconsistent, and unreliable funding. And although it’s only one factor, it is the one that outweighs all the others in causing delays and cost increases.

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What underlies this difference? European projects are conceived of and executed as national in scope and purpose, supported by a national consensus that recognizes the nature of collective and mutual benefit and responsibility. Is it unanimous? Not by a long shot. There is opposition and debate, often intense and messy. But the basic principle has long been accepted, and with some exceptions (the U.K., currently) it doesn’t divide along lines of right and left. When there is resolution, based on a forged agreement of what is best for the country, funding support doesn’t waver. No stops and starts, no local interference or rogue locally generated redirection of funds. Funding is even there for cost overruns.

PARADOXICALLY, AND even perversely, the only modern example of our capacity to accept and act on the concept of national purpose in public infrastructure was the federal government’s long-term planning and financing of the 1950s National Interstate Highway system. With a different constellation of interest groups, a lot of that money might have gone for mass transit.

We do have infrastructure needs that cannot be viewed as anything but national but which have made no progress—inland waterways and high-speed rail (HSR) are just two examples. But federal agencies are limited to apportioning national funding to states and regions, in accordance with congressional intent. To reinforce the concept of infrastructure as a national imperative, history is on our side.

The federal government has provided funding to build and maintain roads since the beginning of the Republic, to encourage settlement of the country and the movement of goods. The Federal-Aid Highway Program began in 1912 with explicit deference to the motorcar and a requirement that states that received federal aid to build roads establish departments of transportation to act as stewards for the federal dollars.

Infrastructure not only creates public value but also enhances the value of privately owned land and real estate. The public role in creating this wealth also demands a public share in it.

In 1944, Congress passed the Federal-Aid Highway Act in response to an FDR proposal for a 40,000-mile national system of interstate highways, but not until 1952 did Congress allot funds specifically for interstate construction. That program evolved into President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Interstate Highway System, evoking the needed role of highways in national defense. The federal government covered 90 percent of the costs, paid from a Highway Trust Fund (HTF) financed with motor fuel and related taxes—a brilliant and innovative concept, on a par with the conceptualization of the system itself. With few mandates—OSHA, Buy America, environmental impact statements, and the Americans With Disabilities Act were yet to come—the country built 42,500 miles of high-design highways in relatively short times. The macroeconomic benefits of this achievement are well known, including the tens of thousands of construction jobs. Another salutary effect was the creation of a new generation of professionals trained to plan, design, and implement these projects.

But there were consequences, beyond the stated goal of providing a streamlined new way to drive around the country, giving powerful dominance to motorized transport. Much of the social and physical organization of American society was rattled and reconfigured. Changes in the American landscape brought new patterns of land use that disrupted communities, helped devastate our urban centers, and hastened the decline of urban transit systems, as well as disastrous deterioration of air quality.

The Johnson administration restored, imperfectly, a concern for our urban centers and populations. In 1964, the federal government passed the Urban Mass Transportation Act, providing the means for capital development of urban transit systems, but no relief for the high costs of maintenance. Highway funding continued to dwarf funding for mass transit, and the social fallout continued.

Beginning in 1981, Ronald Reagan’s devolution policies caused an unanticipated shock to the decades-old arrangement by which the federal purse supported transportation infrastructure. Funding declined, but more radically, structures were changed. States were required to bear a much greater share of capital costs, and nearly all the operating and maintenance costs.

The terrible effect of the automobile on air quality could not be ignored. Clean Air Act (CAA) measurement and compliance requirements brought indisputable evidence of the damage, building environmental awareness and robust public debate. In fact, it was concern for air quality that drove the introduction and passage of the first environmentally constrained transportation planning and policy legislation in the post–Interstate Highway System era, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, sponsored by Senator Pat Moynihan of New York. It required that transportation projects in an urban area, taken singly or collectively, must meet clean air standards as set in the CAA and CAA amendments. This was a requirement for any federal funding, putting a brake on new highway building. The bill established a compliance mechanism through metropolitan planning organizations (mandated in 1975) to certify each year’s funding applications through appropriate transportation/air quality models. And it has worked, with measurable and meaningful improvement in air quality. It has also led to renewed planning for transit, transit-oriented land uses, and the use of non–fossil fuel vehicles. Unfortunately, today many of the CAA standards are being rolled back. Another job for the next administration.

The intense but inconsistent infrastructure development since the 1950s has led us to our current circumstances, some positive but mostly negative. These frame the context for the forward-facing infrastructure policies that will be a key component in responding to our global and national environmental, social, and economic challenges.

Highway-induced traffic, especially the growth of trucks (and the decline of rail), continues to cause road deterioration, requiring a shift from new capital construction to maintenance. Elevated understanding of the environmental, economic, and social issues around personal automobiles led to a recognition that public transit must be sustained and revitalized.

The federal government’s local match requirement is now as high as 50 percent for public transit. But in spite of its reduced funding role, the federal government adds substantial costs through complex regulations, lengthy project reviews, and special mandates. The Surface Transportation Program imposes specific planning and design criteria as conditions for funding. Additional federal mandates include Buy America, ADA, Clean Air and Clean Water standards, and certification of Clean Air standards. Some of these mandates are necessary and socially beneficial, but they add costs, which must be recognized in funding programs.

Each mile of highway, each mile of track is different from all others. Land costs, geological features, climate, and stakeholder values affect the cost of each mile. (Justified) political involvement or (not-so-justified) political interference can also throw a project off-balance, off-schedule, and off-budget.

But it is uncertainty of funding that most drives up project costs by causing delays and hiccups in project progress. Dollars available through federal programs are inadequate to meet the immense scope of infrastructure need, so these inadequate funds are now allocated through competition. Applicants must endure a complex and time-consuming competitive process and review of many steps in planning—from pre-engineering to final environmental impacts. These efforts alone add millions to every project, whether or not it receives funds.

The pressures to build infrastructure during periods of devolution have led to the federal government asking for “innovative solutions,” most notably so-called public-private partnerships. They might cost less, but mostly by reducing wages paid to workers. Overall they have not achieved promised success in performance, often returning to the public sector for some type of subsidy and even bailouts. Even in Europe, where “contracting out”—a loosely defined concept—was an EU requirement for transit systems two decades ago, a review after ten years found that while labor costs came down, service quality declined.

Failures in privatization are all around us, but the scope and scale of the U.K. Conservative privatization spree, beginning with the Thatcher government, has left much infrastructure and public service—rail, buses, water systems—in near failure, with the public sector having no choice but to step in and rescue the providers over and over again. Even on its own terms, “the market” has failed. Big firms overran the small firms, obliterating any advantages of competition.

Few recognize that private enterprise has always been involved in the public delivery of infrastructure. The government buys planning, engineering, and construction services, but applies labor and other standards to that work. There is usually a bidding process, designed to optimize quality and cost.

The backlog of needed repairs or improvements for our roads and transit systems is as much as $2 trillion. Cash-strapped state DOTs and transit authorities have to juggle funds available for keeping facilities in a good state of repair and for new capital investment. Today’s technology and its impact were literally unimaginable by most even a few years ago. And the pace of technological change itself adds to the challenge.

The federal government was once the single most impactful component of our infrastructure systems. Our history shows that it alone has the resources and the mandate to address the sweeping national challenge of building a system to carry us into the next century. Public accountability, access, and democratic values demand that this be a fully public initiative.

Many of the current policies, procedures, and programs have been layered onto what is essentially a mid-20th-century framework. A new government, pledged to address 21st-century environmental, economic, and social needs, can make a fast and fresh start with forward-facing resources and policies.

There is an opportunity to hit the ground running. As we work to put in place a long-term, green program for economic development and infrastructure, we can take existing, planned, approved, and ready-to-go projects off the shelf. They fit the criteria of any Green New Deal, and public consensus has already been built around these projects. All a new government has to do is create the systems and mechanisms for reliable, consistent, and continuing funding—and break ground. Ready to go are HSR in California, Texas, and the Midwest; bridges and tunnels on the Northeast Corridor; and NextGen air-traffic control.

This is a rare opportunity to deliver quickly on the real promise of public action and at the same time begin a more deliberative process for the long term:

Build on the national consensus for infrastructure need, using real mobility and economic criteria. Green New Deal proposals provide a framework for infrastructure and economic development that will meet climate-change challenges. Input and participation from stakeholders—community, labor, elected officials, NGOs—must be baked into the plan. Projects should respond to the rapidly changing cultural and environmental demands on new infrastructure development.

Legislate and appropriate a funding system that is continuous and reliable. This is the single action that will have the greatest impact on cost escalation and delay.

Review the role of metropolitan planning organizations; streamline current standards and methods of cost-benefit analysis, together with modern risk analysis, and the many layers of pre-funding. Redesign and speed up the review process, and encourage innovation.

Look to all feasible sources for revenue to support increased funding, especially at the local level. Infrastructure not only creates public value but also enhances the value of privately owned land and real estate. The public role in creating this wealth also demands a public share in it.

Support the development—and use—of new data-based methods of project planning, design, construction, and operation as developed and used with success in other places. Utilize new data-based methods of project management. Support improved and realistic methods of cost estimation and risk assessment.

Protect the environment, reverse environmental damage, and promote best land use practices. Attention to the environment and addressing climate change has been, since 1991, an integral objective of transportation and land use planning. These can no longer be treated separately. Reverse the changes made to the Clear Air Act and Clean Water Act by the present administration.

The economic role and impact of infrastructure is universally acknowledged. At a time when a strong economy has still left too many workers underemployed and underpaid, the job impacts alone would be reason enough for immediate action. For every $1 billion spent on highways, 42,000 direct and indirect jobs are created. Building infrastructure—smart infrastructure—is a mighty and rewarding jobs machine. But more profoundly, there is no real, sustained, equitable economic progress possible, in the long run, without it.

We face a real hope and possibility that a new government and a new president with a serious commitment to progress and equity will be in place in 2021. Substantial capital commitment for roads and transit, smarter cities, and better environment will be in their power to deliver. This is a generational opportunity to return to the value of public goods provided for the advancement of our entire country—all regions, urban and rural—and to build an economy that serves the 100 percent.