The United Arab Emirates played a large role in the ousting of Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir. It helped establish a transitional government in the small nation and trained 14,000 Sudanese troops which later joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.[40] Both Qatar and the Emirates previously sent billions of dollars to Sudan as financial aid to gain favor with the government. When protests were on the verge of ousting Bashir, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi offered $3 billion to the military transitional council.[41] It appears, at least for the time being, United Arab Emirates’ influence has won the day with limited need for military action.

Recent announcements of large scale redeployments from Yemen indicate a range of possibilities with regards to the Emirates’ actual motivation.[42] Many observers believe the redeployments will help the Emirates position its forces better in the Gulf to counteract Iran’s aggression.[43] If true, this motive could indicate a cohesive strategy between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to balance activities between Iran and Yemen.[44] Abu Dhabi’s decision could also indicate a division between Saudi and Emirati policies, an impressive display of Emirati restraint, and leave Saudi Arabia isolated in Yemen.[45] After four years of fighting, military leaders may believe their strategic goals of port-security and the defeat of Al Qaeda in Yemen are accomplished. This view of limited-objective warfare would fit comfortably with the United Arab Emirates’ contemporary history of training local forces, acting through intermediaries, and coastal control of select locations.

Emirati officials argue they have trained 90,000 local soldiers to support the UN-backed cease-fire as they withdraw. Alternatively, the Emirati withdrawal may be “a belated recognition that a grinding war that has killed thousands of civilians and turned Yemen into a humanitarian disaster is no longer winnable.”[46] The move could also be intended to bolster the image of the United Arab Emirates in the U.S. and distance itself from Saudi Arabia amid the increasing scrutiny which lawmakers are placing on weapons deals with Riyadh.[47] Exact remain-behind numbers are unknown, but the Emirates will maintain at least its Mukalla facilities to continue conducting counterterrorism operations.[48]

Future Assessment

The previous decade demonstrates the willingness and ability of the United Arab Emirates to use military force to combat threats—actual or perceived—away from national shores. With willing partners and local militaries, the Emirates likely sees its operations as stabilizing for the Gulf region closer to home and a demonstration of national strength abroad. The national government views military expeditions and regional activities as positive measures at home. Conscription and military service aim to build national cohesion, while port expansion along the Red Sea and African coast can boost military and economic growth while counteracting rival construction at locations such as Duqm.[49]

The Emirates’ actions are not without criticism, and their involvement in wars such as Yemen face much of the same criticism as does Saudi Arabia and the United States.[50] However, the United Arab Emirates has aptly demonstrated its ability to use diplomacy, financial aid, and military force to further its interests in the region. More remarkably, it has demonstrated this ability as a relatively young state with a young military. Its domestic defense capabilities show promise for self-reliance and sustainability. Its proximity to and disputes with Iran, along with recent maritime incidents, only reinforces the need for capable military forces available and ready to operate. The disappearance of a Emirates-based oil tanker, multiple attacks on vessels near the Strait of Hormuz, and growing tensions with Iran recalls decades of territorial disputes between the state and Iran.[51] Little Sparta’s neighborhood is just as compressed and tense as was ancient Greece, and Abu Dhabi is positioning itself for more conflict and greater security responsibilities.