Accepting Gen. Augusto Pinochet as senator for life and as commander in chief of the armed forces for eight years helped broker Chile’s transition. Naming members of the Communist Party as ministers of defense and the interior facilitated the Polish transition. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela’s appointment of F.W. de Klerk as deputy president was one of several pragmatic steps that made a historic change possible.

It is encouraging that in Venezuela each side sent relative moderates to begin the discussions in Norway. To find a way forward, opposition leaders must now sublimate their own differences and rivalries. This may require confronting those who are too skeptical of negotiations to undertake it in good faith, as well as rejecting the participation of those who encourage violence or external intervention. The incumbent regime must also constrain those who favor violent repression, as was done in Chile, Spain, South Africa, Brazil and elsewhere.

Those who seek to make a democratic transition must project an attractive, optimistic, inclusive and credible vision of the future that can help ordinary people overcome pervasive frustration and crippling fear and enable them to embrace positive change. Negotiations should concentrate on identifying and pursuing the interests all parties have in common before trying to resolve what divides them.

Processes of transitional justice must be carefully created to address or commemorate human rights violations without inviting revenge or risking a return to repression. Finding an approach that recognizes victims and restores justice without returning to mutual intolerance and exclusion must be a high priority.

A key challenge in democratic transitions is to bring the armed forces, the police and other security institutions under democratic civilian authority while recognizing their legitimate roles, their appropriate claim on some level of resources and their need to be protected from reprisals. Trying to replace security forces lock, stock and barrel is likely to be disastrous, as was the case in Iraq.

Claims that most of Venezuela’s military officials are deeply corrupt don’t take into account that some may still honor the codes and vocation of the professional armed forces. Subjecting all security and intelligence forces to firm civilian control will require constant vigilance and the gradual construction of trust. Vague references to eventual amnesties and reconciliation are not enough; detailed plans must be drafted in consultation with affected parties.

Democratic transitions are primarily achieved by domestic forces and processes, but they can be assisted by strategic international involvement. International players clearly have their own interests and priorities. They should not be expected or asked to resolve internal issues, nor should they try to displace domestic individuals, who should take and retain the lead. Military intervention would only bring more violence, destruction and hostility. It would also exacerbate the regional migration crisis. Threats of military force tend to silence moderates and lead hard-liners to dig in.