

I found this book after reading Thomas Ligotti's "The Conspiracy Against the Human Race." This is a far more philosophical, dry text. Ligotti is focused on the "nightmare of being" and the human condition with a focus on the "curse" of consciousness and it's relation to horror fiction in particular. Benatar is more focused on the traditional anti-natalist viewpoint.



I thought this was a rigorously and deftly-argued book, and while Benatar realizes he isn't likely to change many minds, he feels he



I found this book after reading Thomas Ligotti's "The Conspiracy Against the Human Race." This is a far more philosophical, dry text. Ligotti is focused on the "nightmare of being" and the human condition with a focus on the "curse" of consciousness and it's relation to horror fiction in particular. Benatar is more focused on the traditional anti-natalist viewpoint.



I thought this was a rigorously and deftly-argued book, and while Benatar realizes he isn't likely to change many minds, he feels he needs to say it anyway.



His argument mostly hinges on his asymmetry argument that being born is always a harm and not being born is at least "not bad" and thus preferable. Furthermore, we think our lives are better than they really are because we adapt expectations to worse conditions, we compare ourselves to those who are worse off than ourselves, and we ignore the negatives of life everyone endures. He also discusses the right to procreative freedom, balanced with the harm of bringing new people into existence, including an in-depth chapter with a pro-death view of abortion. He rounds it out with a look at the most painless ways to have a phased-out of extinction.



Some points:

--For those who wonder why anti-natalists don't jump off a cliff, Benetar shows how deciding to bring a life into existence is completely different from decisions about _continued_ existence.

--Perhaps I romanticize, however I still feel glad to have lived, imperfect a life as it may be, and our adaptation to it which Benatar points out is a sort of mercy. We adapt, this is because happiness involved in being alive is relevant, and can depend to some extent on perspective.

--Toward the end of the text Benatar acknowledges that his arguments are using logic against what are psychological forces. He acknowledges that people don't even breed for completely rational reasons either.

--I wonder what Benatar might say if one threw out the following idea: Pain is merely chemical reactions in the brain and doesn't really exist to begin with. After reading Ligotti I could take his view that that all animate forms are merely part of a larger aberrant mutation called "life," and ultimately all pain and suffering amounts to nothing anyway. Matter is just getting passed around, recycled, animated at times and not at others. At this point in my life I am actually more sympathetic to this view.

--In the introduction he shows that if a person has just one child, if over ten generations each of his offspring has three children, that is over 88,000 people.



This is NOT light reading. The second chapter is full of deductive philosophical arguments that some will likely find challenging. Later chapters have the more conversational tone of the introduction at times.



I would suggest Ligotti's book over this one; it's more wide-ranging in what it discusses, has more impact and generally held my interest far better. Indeed, this book is quite dry; keep it away from open flames and sparks.



Here's some notes I took, unedited(!) -- at least what Goodreads will allow me to post within the character limit...



NOTES



Intro

Coming into existence is always a harm, not coming into existence does not deprive anyone. People rarely plan for children's existence. Sentience is a big harm to more evolved beings. Aside on sentient beings bred specifically for food, it is NOT better to have been born to be eaten than to be born not at all. It is not that nonexistence is good, but existence is a harm. It almost seems a joke to talk of nonexistent people. **"Life is a sexually transmitted terminal disease." People wish to spare children suffering, but to do this one must not have children to begin with. Having one child could lead to a mountain of suffering depending on how many children they produce. The likelihood of a person being born are extremely remote -- their parents had to be born, meet and have sex at the exact right time. Therefore being born being always a harm, and having come into existence at all is "really bad luck." Yet there are many people, and someone is always unlucky via procreation. We are evolutionarily biased to be pro-natalist. Procreating is seen as normal/adult/mature -- but going against one's primitive instincts is perhaps MORE mature than simply making babies. But people are pushed to do so, gvt even encourages it if the birthrate falls. Making babies vs. immigration, political concerns. Parents get preferential treatment. Some gvt like China have population control policies, and some people advocate being childfree -- but these aren't specifically anti-natalist views. ...Book Outline...



2

There are cases where being born CAN be a harm -- genetic deficiencies of parents, unprepared mother, etc. Some will argue the non-existent person however does not exist, so is NOT better off than the impaired person. But a person can be WORSE off than he would have been. Another way to look at it is that one need not have a better condition to compare it to, to say this person is worse off. Analogy of a person deciding they're better off dead, he doesn't expect to be in a better condition dead, but not existing is preferable. Life worth starting vs live worth continuing. We judge a life worth starting on standards of one worth continuing. If someone loses a limb they can continue on with life, but if someone is born without a limb, we would rather not start that life. Coming to exist in any morally relevant sense is a gradual process, thus we would rather kill an impaired fetus, than a man who will be impaired. The man has more interest in continuing to exist. Another objection is that disabilities bad enough to make people wish they'd never existed are very rare, and most with disabilities prefer to exist. Adopting currently existing people's perspectives on this are inadequate -- life worth starting does not equal a life worth continuing. Life is a harm in all cases, everyone experiences pain and death. Absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone -- absence of pleasure isn't a bad unless there's someone being deprived. We know bringing suffering people into existence is bad, and believe the absence of suffering is good, even if there's no one to enjoy this absence. We would rather avoid bringing a suffering person into existence than feel a duty to bring happy people into existence. It is strange to claim to have a child for it's sake, but not to avoid having a child because of bad circumstances. Bringing people into existence or not can both be regretted, but only when someone IS brought into existence do we have someone to regret it FOR. When not, we only regret it for ourselves. Finally, we do not feel bad for nonexistent people on an unpopulated island for example, but do feel bad for those who are harmed when a populated one is destroyed by a volcanic eruption. These reasons assert the asymmetry argument. For a non-existent being the absence of pleasure is "not good, but not bad either" instead of being "bad." For an existent person, being deprived of pleasure is a neutral state, worse than experiencing pleasure, but for a non-existent person there is no neutral state. Pleasures of existence not greater than absent pleasures of nonexistence. Ex. It is better to be Healthy who cannot recover quickly from illness, but never gets sick, rather than Sick who recovers quickly, but gets ill often. He is not so far arguing for how great a harm coming into existence is, only that it always is one, categorically. Nonexistence is still better than a life full of pleasure, with only one brief pain. Arguments of Shiffrin who does not see benefit and harm as on a scale, but absolute conditions. One could cause a minor harm to a non-consenting person to avoid a greater one, but wouldn't cause a harm to cause a benefit to them. Since bringing someone into existence can be a benefit, we cannot inflict the potential harm first without their consent. Fehige's argument argues that having a fulfilled desire is better than an unfulfilled one, but no better than having no desire at all. Having UNsatisfied desires is what matters, avoiding frustration is most important. Most would argue they are glad to have lived, with it's sorrows than not at all. But having enjoyed pleasures is a good and evil is something one can experience, but a nonexistent person isn't deprived of the good. And one may enjoy life now, but the future can change their view. But it can't be true that they were better off both existing and never having existed -- it must be one or the other.



3

One's life is usually worse than one thinks. Being born is always a harm, but there's a quantitative difference. It's not just the amount of good and bad, but how they're distributed through one's life. It's better to have increasing pleasure as one ages, less intense and more mild pleasures. Length of life -- if there's little good it becomes boring. One could argue once a threshold of badness is reached, no amount of goodness makes it worth living. One could have more good in life X than Y, but if X suffers more bad too then Y may have a better life. People think their lives are better than they are -- they recall the positive rather than the negative, and expect a better future. Depressed people, those with low self-esteem have more realistic views. People's perception of their health correlates with their happiness. The rich and poor are both fairly happy groups. Also humans adapt to worse conditions, unhappy at first, but they adjust expectations -- once again this is subjective and unreliable. A third factor is we compare ourselves to others to decide how good our life is, negative features of life EVERYONE endures are ignored. Adaptation and comparison however come from this general optimism -- they reinforce optimism. Quality of life based on hedonism -- experiencing pleasure/pain, desire-fulfilment -- extent desires are fulfilled, "objective lists" -- objective goods irrespective of whether they bring pleasure or pain. As for the hedonistic view -- we are almost always experiencing some sort of pain, desire, but we ignore it largely because everyone else does, and because we adapt to them. And these are merely the states for a HEALTHY life, it's much worse for chronic conditions and aging. The pleasures of life are few and experienced with these pains. Getting relief from pain, neutral states is not being happy, one is only experiencing pain and it makes life absurd to live. As to the desire-fulfilment view -- this does not always include a pleasurable mental state, so we can be wrong about whether a desire has been satisfied, and thus misjudge how good our life is again. Desires are goals one must wait in frustration to achieve, and they're rarely permanent states. Marriages end, vacations end, etc. Desires fulfilled lead to a need of new desires. Maslow said we constantly seek new happiness, Schopenhauer said happiness isn't real, it is only a temporal satisfaction of desires, a state of default dissatisfaction. Some gain satisfaction from the striving to fulfill a desire, but not all, probably not most. And not all striving is to be desired, like striving to beat cancer. Delayed pleasure can make it sweeter, but not striving would make many things better. It would be better not to have to strive for freedom, even if it makes freedom more pleasurable. Deprivation is NOT better than quicker desire fulfillment, and if it makes fulfillment sweeter it is an unfortunate fact, not a good. In reality we adapt desires to that which WILL be fulfilled, not that which is whatever one desires. Buddhists believe in tamping down one's desires to one's situation; this is reasonable to do, however it does not mean that we are better off objectively. Objective lists include desires and pleasurable states, and are general ideas groups have, but depend on a person's situation. But we don't consider a life a failure that doesn't life to 240 years old, yet consider a death at 40 a tragedy. Maybe a good life is unattainable? What of a meaning to life? From the perspective of the universe we are meaningless whatever we do. Declaring that it doesn't matter we're meaningless from the perspective of the universe still takes away a large good when all that is left is subjective, human meaning. Some cannot imagine a better existence -- having human cognitive ability could be a blessing or curse, but certainly it could be more advanced than it is. Some may object we compare people as we might judge students -- but that is a setting in which we have a standard, but in comparing lives there are many ways to do so. Concluding on three views -- we rarely realize how bad life is, and the test on whether to bring a life into the world is whether all the suffering in a life could be decently inflicted on an already existing person for no good reason. The suffering of the world is great, optimism is a mockery of the human condition. Recounting of the millions killed by war, disease, murder, etc. Even a GOOD human life, rare as it is will be full of suffering. The optimists bear the burden of justifying their position, playing "Russian roulette with a fully loaded gun...aimed at their future offspring."



4

People have no duty to procreate, certainly not for potential, currently non-existent people. Even if one thinks a few potential lives are worth starting must consider the risk and not start them. The harm of coming into existence outweighs the considerations of a theoretical duty. Is there a duty NOT to procreate? These are strong human drives one cannot reject easily. Most people procreate simply because they were satisfying sexual interests, not trying to make babies, and avoiding this is easily done with contraception. Procreation interest aside, if people have a parenting interest, they can adopt. Many have children to satisfy the interests of others, which coincide with their own interests, and to gain a feeling of immortality. Serving one's own interests isn't a bad thing, however in this case it inflicts a harm on another. Some will argue that they are glad to have existed, so they cannot help feeling the same for potential children. But bringing an unhappy person into existence, even if they do not regret their existence, is wrong even if it satisfies the parent's procreational interests -- the cost must be as low as possible. If more people regretted their existence, we would not consider this argument anyway, but because people are adapted to their lives, we engage in a mass self-delusion about how good life really is. We are prepared to tell some not to procreate because their child will be bad off -- but their burden is no less than anyone else's. Given that we cannot know when a child will be bad off, this demand for non-procreation is not too demanding. Is it merely preferable NOT to have babies, or is there a duty to not breed? It can be immoral to breed, but should it be illegal? We allow people to say immoral things, but do not allow them to murder, steal, etc. The harm by a government attempting to control pregnancy would entail great harms and intrusiveness, nor would it accomplish the goal. But what if we could painlessly sterilize everyone? Some will say that most people disagree that existing is a harm, therefore it is up for debate and left open to do. The Harm Principle -- states prohibit harm to the unconsenting, except when there is disagreement. People disagree on harm through abortion, yet it is legal. In a slave-owning society they might say abolitionist views are highly debated and thus exempt from the harm principle. How do we distinguish reasonable disagreement? This is what will decide the issue -- gvts will only ban reproduction after much consideration. We can respect a legal right to procreate, while rejecting it on moral grounds. Even in cases where the baby will have a terrible disease, we still respect the right. Would we impose on a currently existing person a genetic disability or disease? J.S. Mill advocated that the poor should not breed without limit for example. Some disabilities are bad, but not horrific, people with these usually prefer having come into existence, and people who would rather die than have these things happen to them would actually adjust to the disability. Some say disability is part of a social construct -- if most people could fly, those without wings would be disabled in certain ways. It's that society doesn't accommodate itself to these inabilities that makes people DISabled. Another response is that saying disabled people shouldn't be born is hurtful and creates more prejudice. The social construct argument points out human inabilities which most people never consider. People with disabilities find life harder because they must adapt to society as it is, and they cannot compare themselves with people who are worse off typically. We all have inabilities, even if disabilities are socially constructed. Also, those with disabilities believe their lives are better than they actually are, just as do people with NORMAL lives. As to this being hurtful to say, the author is saying that NO lives are worth starting, disabled or normal. Saying it's not worth starting a life exactly like one's own is NOT the same as saying that that life is not worth continuing. "Wrongful life suits" suing parents who brought them into existence -- others with disabilities who are happy with their lives will be considered in the determination. Disability rights activism pushes that the lives of the disabled are only somewhat worse than everyone elses' -- other factors like poverty could be a bigger factor. Some say procreation should only come in certain conditions, a loving marriage, and that all sex should be to make children. For Benatar, for sex to be morally acceptable it must NOT produce children. Furthermore, fertility assistance would be wrong as well. Some people have a second child, hoping it will be a suitable donor for their first child who may have leukemia, this might not be the case and in other cases they will only embryos are implanted which WILL be suitable donors. Cloned people are seen as means to an end too. But then ALL people are made, not for their benefit, they didn't exist in some void, waiting to be pulled into existence. "Children are brought into existence not in acts of great altruism, designed to bring the benefit of life to some pitiful non-being suspended in the metaphysical void..."** In reality, having a child to help a currently-existing person is more ethical than making a child for its own sake.



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