The end of the Premier League’s 25th campaign provides an opportune moment to marvel at the division’s tremendous tactical and technical development during its first quarter of a century. At its inaugural season in 1992-93 the Premier League was largely based around 4-4-2, long balls and getting it in the mixer; 25 years on it is about 3-4-2-1, intricate combination play and gegenpressing.

The most significant progress occurred during the mid-1990s. There were various contributing factors: the backpass law meant teams were obliged to become more comfortable in possession, the huge surge in broadcasting revenue meant English football could attract top players and the end of the three-foreigner rule inevitably changed teams’ approach significantly. On its first weekend, in August 1992, only 11 non-British or Irish players started for the Premier League’s 22 clubs combined. By the end of the decade foreign managers were dominant and Chelsea had fielded an all-foreign starting XI. English football, traditionally slow to embrace tactical innovations from abroad, opened its eyes. It was a period of remarkable change and tremendous excitement.

One of the Premier League’s most fascinating players during this period was Georgi Kinkladze, an absurdly talented Georgian No10 who provided some incredible moments of magic on joining Manchester City in 1995. Kinkladze was unlike anything City supporters had witnessed before, a marvellously evasive dribbler with an eye for a through-ball and the odd wonder goal. But Kinkladze was completely unsuited to the traditional English 4-4-2 system and, in order to incorporate him in his favoured position, City’s managers were forced into tactical experiments which often proved disastrous and eventually contributed to the club suffering consecutive relegations. The story of Kinkladze, as much as more successful foreign imports, summarised Premier League football during this period.

Manchester’s other Georgi, the City miracle-maker

After the transformative presence of Eric Cantona had established Manchester United as the Premier League’s dominant force by the mid-1990s, rival clubs desperately attempted to find their equivalent. This often proved successful – Arsenal had finished in the bottom half the season before Dennis Bergkamp’s arrival in 1995, as had Chelsea before Gianfranco Zola joined in 1996. Both rivalled Cantona’s impact, helping to introduce a more technical, continental style of play.

But basing a side around an inventive No10 did not always work, as Alan Ball’s Manchester City discovered with Kinkladze, the epitome of a frustrating genius. Kinkladze was recruited after a sensational performance in Georgia’s 5-0 thrashing of Wales in November 1994, a seismic result: only three years after Georgia had gained independence it was their first competitive victory.

Deployed behind Temuri Ketsbaia and Shota Arveladze in a 4–3–1–2 formation, Kinkladze ran the game and grabbed his first international goal. “They murdered us,” the Wales goalkeeper, Neville Southall, recalled. “Kinkladze was different class and the best player on the pitch by a mile.” In the return fixture the following summer Kinkladze again dominated. This time he scored the game’s only goal, an incredible 25-yard, left-foot chip over Southall.

The Georgian had been tracked by other clubs, having unsuccessful trials at Real and Atlético Madrid – and, intriguingly, a month-long loan at Boca Juniors, who revere the No10 role more than any club in world football, where Kinkladze met his idol, Diego Maradona. None of them signed Kinkladze permanently, however, and instead he joined Manchester City as Ball’s first signing.

The City experience started disastrously. They collected two points from their first 11 games, scoring only three goals, while Kinkladze struggled: homesick, unable to speak English and living alone in a Manchester hotel for three months. His improvement coincided with the arrival of two Georgian friends and his mother, Khatuna, who brought home comforts: Georgian cognac, walnuts and spices to make his favourite dishes. Kinkladze scored his first goal in November, a late winner in the 1-0 victory over Aston Villa at Maine Road. “He was bewildered to start with,” Ball said at the time. “He spoke very little English and it was foreign to him to tackle and scrap and fight like you do in England. But the boy’s got an immense talent.”

Kinkladze’s Premier League spell is best remembered for a couple of truly magnificent goals. The first opened the scoring against Middlesbrough in December 1995, when he collected the ball on the right and dribbled across into an inside-left position before suddenly cutting back inside Phil Stamp and sidefooting the ball firmly into the far corner. His other superb strike, later voted March’s goal of the month, came at Southampton. Having opened the scoring with a close-range tap-in and hit the crossbar from outside the box, Kinkladze collected the ball on the right, dribbled directly towards goal while evading four increasingly desperate challenges, dummied to put Dave Beasant on the ground, then lifted the ball over his head and into the net. “It was the closest thing I have seen to Maradona’s goal against England,” Ball raved, before somewhat unnecessarily clarifying: “Not the one with his hand, the one where he did everyone and put it away. People ask why we are bringing this type of player to this country. If that wasn’t the answer today, nothing is.”

City supporters were already tired of Manchester United’s dominance and Cantona’s cult-like status, and absolutely worshipped Kinkladze – the best Georgi in Manchester since Best. The feeling was reciprocated: after his initial alienation in Manchester Kinkladze grew to love the city and married a Mancunian. “If he’d been playing with a successful team,” said the striker Niall Quinn at the time, “then he would have won player’s player of the year because it’s quite breathtaking what he’s done in English football. He’s a lovely guy as well…I think, because he doesn’t speak a word of English…but he seems nice.”

This was at the height of Britpop and Kinkladze was rewarded for his fine form with a chant to the tune of Oasis’ Wonderwall. “All the runs that Kinky makes are blinding,” it ran, before ending with a brilliant: “And after all … we’ve got Alan Ball.” The composer of that song, City fan Noel Gallagher, also offered a wonderful Kinkladze summary. Describing him as “either the most frightening thing I’ve ever seen or the best thing I’ve ever seen”, Gallagher predicted Kinkladze would either lead City to the European Cup, or take them down to the fourth division. He was nearly right: when Kinkladze left City in 1998 they were in the third tier.

City were relegated precisely because Ball built the entire team around Kinkladze. “For me, Georgi had been the catalyst for City’s problems,” said the forward Paul Walsh. “Don’t get me wrong, Georgi had amazing individual ability and, if you put his top five goals on YouTube, they’d rival any great player on the planet. But Ball indulged him. He wanted to build the team around Georgi and change the whole dynamic of the side, but it was never going to work…for a player who the whole team operated around he didn’t score enough goals, didn’t make enough goals, didn’t tackle, didn’t head it and his overall contribution wasn’t enough.”

Facebook Twitter Pinterest Georgi Kinkladze leaves the field at Stoke City after Manchester City are relegated to the third tier for the first time in their history in May 1998. Photograph: Ross Kinnaird/Allsport

The winger Nicky Summerbee agreed. “Bally loved him. Georgi could do no wrong – I got on very well with him and we weren’t jealous because we could all see how talented he was, but some hated Alan Ball for doing that – except Georgi because he loved all the praise…the problem with Georgi was that you couldn’t play 4-4-2 because to get the best out of him you wouldn’t want him playing a conventional running midfield game and, if there are two men wide, that leaves only one in midfield. Ball changed formation all the time, a sure sign he didn’t know what he was doing.”

Keith Curle, then City’s captain, later recalled the extent of the free role Ball afforded Kinkladze. “I remember losing away to Arsenal that season and one of the goals we conceded came because Georgi hadn’t tracked a runner. The lads were not happy and some said as much to the manager after the game. In reply he told them that, if they were as talented as Georgi, they wouldn’t have to track back either.”

After City’s relegation Ball lasted only three games before he was replaced by Frank Clark, who tried a similar approach. “I wanted to build the team around Kinkladze because that’s the ideal way to get the best out of him. He’s an incredible talent… [but] he certainly didn’t like running if he didn’t have the ball at his feet and I thought there was a certain amount of resentment towards him from some of the squad.” Like Ball, Clark ended up changing formation to change Kinkladze’s role. He initially played a 4-4-2 with the Georgian as a deep-lying forward, then switched to 4-3-1-2, fielding him behind a strike duo. “We tied ourselves up in knots trying to accommodate him,” Clark said. “The 4-3-1-2 system suited Kinkladze perfectly because it gave him great freedom, but it didn’t suit the other players and it didn’t work.”

Clark was replaced by Joe Royle, less of a footballing romantic, whose first words to the board about footballing matters were simple: “We have to sell Kinkladze.” He would no longer be indulged. “Kinkladze was not a team player and had a disturbing habit of disappearing for long periods during games,” Royle explained. “To the supporters he was the only positive in all that time. To me he was a big negative.” The Georgian was sold to Ajax, a club who deeply value technical players but also generally play a 4-3-3 system – meaning the manager, Jan Wouters, had no space for a No10. “I could have been Maradona and he wouldn’t have changed the system to accommodate me,” Kinkladze complained. He returned to the Premier League and showed flashes of brilliance during a spell with Derby County, but by this stage managers had tired of basing their side around him.

Facebook Twitter Pinterest The Mixer by Michael Cox: The Story of Premier League Tactics, from Route One to False Nines Photograph: PR Company Handout

English football had learned to appreciate the quality provided by mysterious, continental No10s, but the Premier League was still largely fixated on varieties of 4-4-2.

Therefore, while the entire definition of a No10 is that he is neither a forward nor a midfielder and instead somewhere in between, realistically almost every No10 can be considered one or the other. And while withdrawn forwards like Cantona, Bergkamp and Zola thrived by dropping deep and turning their side into a 4-4-1-1, brilliant attacking midfielders like Kinkladze and Middlesbrough’s Juninho – who also suffered relegation despite his immense talent – caused managers problems because they generally needed more unusual formations which their English team-mates were not accustomed to. The Premier League had evolved radically in terms of incorporating more technical footballers but in a tactical sense there was still plenty of improvement required.

This is an edited extract from The Mixer: The Story of Premier League Tactics, from Route One to False Nines, by Michael Cox (HarperCollins) £16.99, which is out on 1 June