Critical Conversation: America’s place in the world, 2015

June 5, 2015

Over the past year, threats to U.S. security seem to have multiplied, even as the United States believed 14 years of war would come to an end with the drawdown of combat troops in Afghanistan. Rather than expanding spheres of peace, however, over the past year Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has unabashedly continued. ISIL has emerged from the chaos of Syria’s civil war as a destabilizing force in an already fragile part of the world. In Asia, maritime disputes continue to raise tensions, with recently-highlighted land reclamation efforts underscoring the level to which the status-quo is being up-ended. Against this backdrop, John Schaus, Fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS recently sat down with leading regional scholars at CSIS to discuss global perceptions of the United States and what role it might play over the coming year. With him were, Jon Alterman, Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program; Ernest Bower, senior adviser and Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies; Heather Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director, Europe Program; Jennifer Cooke, director, Africa Program; Andrew Kuchins, senior fellow and director, Russia and Eurasia Program; Carl Meacham, director, Americas Program; and Richard Rossow, senior fellow and Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies.

SCHAUS: The geopolitical landscape has shifted over the past 14 months. How have the changes—from Russia’s annexation of Crimea and involvement in the Ukraine, to China’s extensive island-building, to ISIL, Yemen, and the Iran nuclear framework changed how the United States is viewed in your region?

Jon Alterman (Middle East): Frustration with the United States has been growing, in part because the Middle East’s problems have been growing, and the United States government offers no easy solutions to them. There is a widespread view in the Middle East that the United States government simply doesn’t understand what is going on, and a view in the White House that the United States is taking a disciplined and strategic view. Because much broader historical processes are underway, the White House sees throwing the U.S. government into every conflict as a recipe for increasing demands on the U.S. government without solving any of the problems or satisfying anyone. At the core of much of the tension is a growing level of mutual disrespect and a diminishing level of trust among allies.

Rick Rossow (India and South Asia): India’s view of the United States has changed quite a bit over the past year. The Indian public correctly feel that following last year’s electoral victory by Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the U.S. administration is focused on India more deeply than we have seen in many years. And the language used to describe this engagement has a more appealing tone of “partnership” instead of “assistance,” or other language India has viewed as demeaning.

At the same time, there is a perceptible increase in concern in India over America’s continued military support to Pakistan. The U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan has forced us to intensify our engagement with Pakistan to help ensure Afghanistan’s stability. There is no doubt that Pakistan has a key role to play in Afghanistan’s uncertain future. Yet India’s top priority vis-à-vis Pakistan, is cutting down terrorist infiltrations into Indian territory and managing cross-border live fire incidents with Pakistan. This divergence of interests over Pakistan has strengthened as a point of contention between the United States and India.

Ernie Bower (Southeast Asia) : There continues to be a strong demand from Southeast Asia for more engagement by the United States in the region. Nearly four years into the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, the United States is getting some credit for developing a more nuanced understanding of Southeast Asia. The region is getting more attention from the White House and policy makers, and Southeast Asia sees this as an important and timely development. While traditional alliances are foundational, the U.S. government has been seen to be more proactive in reaching out to new partners like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.

Jennifer Cooke (Africa): Perception of the United States remains largely positive in Africa, and as in Southeast Asia, the appetite for U.S. engagement remains high. But the United States cannot afford to be complacent, as an expanded field of external actors offers African leaders alternatives, in economic partnerships and in models of growth and political development. The U.S. “values” agenda, with its emphasis on human rights and democratic governance, may resonate with many African citizens but is less popular with increasingly assertive African governments, who resent the tone in which it is delivered and point to inconsistencies in how these values are applied to non-African U.S. partners, depending on economic or security interests at play. Perceptions of U.S. respect for personal freedoms dropped in a number of countries, with several—Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania—rating China higher on that score. This is likely due to the lack of media coverage emanating from China, but it does underscore that many Africans follow U.S. domestic controversies over race and law-enforcement, civil liberties, torture and accountability.

Carl Meacham (Latin America): I would start with controversies—where Jennifer left off. We’ve seen a range of controversies impacting perceptions of the U.S. in Latin America this year. To start with the positive, Brazil is moving beyond the NSA revelations and the negative impressions they left throughout the hemisphere. But, the influx of unaccompanied minors across the U.S.-Mexico border and Congress’s inaction in response to the immigration crisis cut into perceptions of the United States among our regional neighbors. Overall, the year has been one of cautious recovery, which is largely reflected in a Pew poll from last September. The poll found that while 65 percent of the region views the U.S. favorably, individual country perceptions range from El Salvador (80 percent) to Argentina (32 percent) and everything in between.

Far and away, the most impactful change of this past year was when President Obama announced his overhaul of U.S. policy toward Cuba. At the latest Summit of the Americas, Raúl Castro and the region’s most prominent leaders celebrated the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba. And though there are still many challenges in its implementation—including the human rights situation in Cuba and the ongoing U.S. embargo—this policy change has enjoyed popular support around the region as well, in many ways taking fuel away from the fire of anti-U.S. vitriol and increasing the willingness of many Latin American countries to work with the United States.

Andy Kuchins (Russia): Clearly there has been a sea-change in how the United States is viewed by Russia officially as well as by the Russian people. The shift has been years in the making, but the conflict in Ukraine has moved the bar significantly. Perhaps more so than at any time since the early Cold War years, the United States and to a lesser extent its transatlantic allies are identified as the enemy.

In addition to Russia, I travelled extensively in 2014 to all Central Asian and South Caucasus states interviewing government officials and elites. Not surprisingly, all of them are very anxious about the implications of Russian aggression in Ukraine and the subsequent breakdown in relations between Russia and the West. It is fair to conclude that all eight states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus want stronger economic and commercial relations with Washington and most seek stronger security ties. But all these states also share greater skepticism about the credibility of U.S. commitments in the wake of what is perceived as a relatively weak response to the Ukrainian crisis.

Heather Conley (Europe): There has been a dramatic and extraordinarily negative change in Europe’s security environment due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its escalation of ambiguous warfare in eastern Ukraine. In his testimony to Congress this past winter, U.S. European Commander General Breedlove noted that the European security environment “requires a reformulation of the U.S. strategic calculus and corresponding resourcing” for U.S. forces in Europe.

There is an unfortunate lack of consensus among European allies about increasing European military readiness as well as the future of America’s security role in Europe. Government leaders and the public alike in Poland and the Baltic states generally support increasing domestic defense spending and welcome greater U.S. military presence in their countries. However, other European countries resist increasing defense spending as well as actively oppose increased NATO deterrence efforts in an attempt to prevent an escalation of tensions and avoid a future military confrontation with Russia.

SCHAUS: Heather and Andy, let’s spend a moment on Russia and the Ukraine. How are events there shaping the security environment more broadly?

Andy Kuchins (Russia): The war in Ukraine is part of a broad Russian assault on both the unity of the European Union and that of the transatlantic alliance. Vladimir Putin’s speech on March 18 of last year celebrating the annexation of Crimea cast Russian foreign policy and goals in chauvinistic Russian nationalist terms that have no precedent in the Soviet or post-Soviet periods. In essence, Putin’s foreign policy is his domestic policy. His popularity, steady at over 80 percent since the military occupation of Crimea one year ago, is no longer based on economic growth and prosperity which was the foundation of his popular authority during his first two terms as President of Russia. It is now based on a highly anti-Western version of Russian nationalism which is proving very effective with the Russian people who now view the United States negatively at all-time post-Cold War highs of about 80 percent.

Heather Conley (Europe): Russia’s continued demonstration of its readiness and willingness to use military means to achieve its political objectives in neighboring countries while probing the military readiness of NATO countries has reawakened, for some, the founding purpose of NATO. Russia’s active military posturing and snap regional exercises have shone a detrimental spotlight on Europe’s significantly atrophied militaries. Russia has increased its defense spending dramatically from 2.7 percent of GDP in 2010 to 3.4 percent in 2014, and this figure is slated to reach 4.2 percent in 2015; by contrast, NATO spending has steadily declined, falling from $275 billion to an estimated $250 billion between 2010 and 2014. Perhaps the most worrisome trend has been Russia’s tendency to casually invoke its nuclear arsenal. Whether it is simulating a nuclear strike against NATO members (as it did allegedly did its 2013 Zapad military exercises with Belarus); openly abrogating the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; or “showing off” its capabilities by flying Tu-95 Bear bombers close to the British coastline, the Kremlin appears to have shredded the Cold War playbook on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and is relying on behavior that is far faster, looser, and more ominous.

SCHAUS: Beyond the challenges in Ukraine, events in the Middle East have dominated national security discussions the past eight months. Jon Alterman, what events in the Middle East are shaping views of the United States in the region?

Jon Alterman (Middle East): Two main issues dominate assessments of the United States. The first is a sense that the United States is simply naive about Iran and its regional ambitions. In the view of many in the region, the United States is devoting extraordinary resources to reaching a technical nuclear agreement that the Iranians won’t honor anyway, while the real issue is Iran’s regional behavior, which is going unchecked. The second is frustration over U.S. actions—or lack of actions—in Syria, where the death toll keeps rising and forces to which the United States and its allies are opposed keep gaining ground. U.S. support for the government of Iraq against the Islamic State doesn’t get much credit because of deep skepticism of Iraq’s neighbors (save Iran) toward the Abadi government in Baghdad.

SCHAUS: Over the last year, what actions, events, or trends have been most important in shaping views of the U.S. in your region? Are any of the trends worrying?

Ernie Bower (Southeast Asia) : The most important actions and events shaping views of the United States and driving demand for more engagement over the past year have emanated from Beijing. China’s continued and elevated assertiveness in the South China Sea, coupled with its aggressive economic diplomacy in promoting China-centered models for economic and financial integration of Asia (such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Silk Road Economic Belt, and the Maritime Silk Road) worry Southeast Asians as never before. That is because while they need China’s economic dynamism, they fear Beijing will use its increased economic leverage to force smaller neighbors to relent to its objectives on redefining sovereignty. This angst over what China wants and what role it wants to play in Asia has risen sharply as President Xi Jinping has made his intentions clearer over the past year.

Rick Rossow (India and South Asia): Clearly with India, the most important event was last year’s national election. Since Mr. Narendra Modi became prime minister last May, U.S.-India relations have expanded at a torrid pace. There have been two head of state summits in the last six months. Most importantly, the U.S. looks at Prime Minister Modi as both a strong and deal-focused leader with a new strategic outlook that is more similar to our own. Our government has renewed faith that summit-level commitments will see follow-through. The bigger challenge is making sure that American policy leaders and the bureaucracy are ready to think sufficiently big after being lulled to sleep in recent years.

Carl Meacham (Latin America): As noted, the United States had a mixed year in the Western Hemisphere. There have been a few developments that have served as the key markers of that year.

Ultimately, the biggest shaper of regional attitudes toward the United States this year was the White House’s new policy toward Cuba. The Latin American political left, whose narrative depends heavily on anti-U.S. sentiment, is disoriented, unsure of where renewed cooperation leaves a movement that traditionally vilifies the United States. And the rest of the region has long had diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba, despite protests from the United States. Washington's earlier posture toward Havana had been a sticking point for the region's leaders for decades. With a significant portion of that sticking point removed, much of the anti-U.S. rhetoric for now appears to have lessened. In short, the tone has fundamentally shifted.

The danger, of course, is that all the attention on Cuba risks drawing visibility and resources away from other pressing issues: corruption, transnational crime, immigration, environmental issues, and challenges to rule of law remain particularly important.

Jennifer Cooke (Africa): The U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit, hosted by the White House in August 2014, was generally well received, allaying some fears that the U.S. was “neglecting” Africa and ceding ground to China and others. The administration devoted a full day during the summit to building U.S.-Africa trade and investment partnerships, an area in which many Africans claim the U.S. has fallen behind, but also took on a broad range of issues—health, civil society, food security, wildlife trafficking, among others—showcasing the many facets of U.S. engagement. The U.S. response to West Africa’s Ebola crisis, a deployment of some 3,000 military personnel and support for 10,000 civilian responders, spearheaded a global mobilization against the virus. The U.S. effort was instrumental in changing the course of the epidemic and won praise from West African citizens and leaders alike.

Andy Kuchins (Russia): In addition to the war in Ukraine, the plunge in oil and gas prices is having a major impact in Russia and throughout much of Central Asia and the Caucuses. The risk of serious consequences to national economies remains high for many states in the region. Russian President Vladimir Putin remains outwardly confident that Russia’s national budget will weather the downturn of energy prices, but the impact of budget cuts will likely not manifest themselves immediately.

SCHAUS: There seems to be no shortage of challenges—even where there are not full-blown crises. Across the range of issues the United States must manage, what is the biggest risk to U.S. success in your region, as you see it?

Ernie Bower (Southeast Asia): For countries in Southeast Asia, looking at risk, you’d have to start with the potential for loss of flexibility as they navigate between a rising China and a re-engaged United States. Southeast Asian governments, businesses, and civil society no longer have many illusions that China’s intentions won’t impact their sovereignty. After the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, many Southeast Asian countries rightly welcomed China’s enhanced economic engagement as a saving injection of dynamism. Now they wonder if that economic boom will be leveraged politically and diplomatically to pressure them into agreeing to organizing regional economies, security discussions and political thinking based on China-centered models. No Southeast Asian country is comfortable with this idea and they will continue efforts to ensure they can find geopolitical and economic balance to China’s aggressive push under President Xi. This explains the increasing demand for U.S. engagement led by President Obama, strong support for a more proactive and dynamic Japan under Prime Minister Abe, and an India that can not only “think East” but “act East” under Prime Minister Modi.

Rick Rossow (South Asia): With India, the United States has to beware the risk of unrealistic expectations. The focus on working with India to build regional connectivity should be tempered with an acknowledgement that the Modi government’s primary focus areas for connectivity are enhancing internal connectivity within India, and then on tightening economic ties with India’s immediate neighbors. Connecting to places further away is sometimes stated by Indian policymakers as a goal, but I would not consider it a major priority, as measured by actions.

Carl Meacham (Latin America): The ongoing violence and instability in the Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) and the resulting immigration crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border is a big risk—both in terms of regional perceptions of the U.S., but also that continued policy paralysis in Washington will prevent long-term solutions to these challenges. The United States saw the arrival of more than 60,000 unaccompanied children from the Northern Triangle in 2014, and the White House and Congress were unable to come to an agreement to mitigate that crisis—let alone pass comprehensive immigration reform legislation. Even with the White House’s request for US$1 billion to address these challenges still under consideration, the issue remains unresolved to date. This has inevitably weighed down the region’s perceptions of the United States.

Venezuela has also posed a real challenge in Latin America—both for the United States and for our regional neighbors. The country’s political and economic crisis is dire, and risks spilling over into neighboring Colombia and the Caribbean countries that rely on Venezuelan aid.

Jennifer Cooke (Africa): Across much of Africa, the United States faces the risk of deteriorating access and influence. The U.S. is confronting the limits of its influence with a number of its long-standing partners, particularly on issues of human rights and democracy. U.S. criticism of Uganda’s anti-sexuality bill provoked an angry response in Uganda, where, according to the Pew Forum, favorable views of the United States dropped by 11 percent last year. Leaders in South Sudan, where the U.S. has invested huge financial and diplomatic capital in the last decade, were impervious to U.S. exhortations as the country spiraled into war. The U.S.-Kenya relationship cooled somewhat as its response to the threat of al Shabaab raised questions about the professionalism of Kenya’s security forces and its commitment to civil freedoms. Nigeria, arguably the United States’ most important African partner, accused the United States of not being more forthcoming with intelligence sharing in the search for the kidnapped Chibok girls and was deeply frustrated by the U.S. refusal to allow the military to purchase Israeli Cobra attack helicopters for the fight against Boko Haram. With the daily slaughter of civilians in the country’s north east, many Nigerians were puzzled—and angered—that the United States was not willing to do more. The Nigerians turned elsewhere for helicopters, armored vehicles, and training support, and in fact are having some success in regaining territories from the militants. The election of General Muhammadu Buhari in March 2015 offers an opportunity to reset the relationship on a more positive footing.

Heather Conley (Europe): Certainly, in Europe the biggest security risk is Russia—and what Russian actions, including its non-military efforts to undermine governments in Central and Southern Europe, could do to the cohesion of NATO. At the same time, Southern Europe is also struggling to address a migration crisis which threatens to enflame anti-migration political sentiment throughout Europe. The Obama administration is struggling to resource an unanticipated, heightened, and most likely long-term security role along NATO’s eastern flank.

Andy Kuchins (Russia): The greatest risk for U.S. policy toward Russia is that our policies are having the desired effect, but will not lead to the desired outcome. We need to disabuse ourselves of the illusion that our economic sanctions and economic hardship at large are likely any time soon to cause an oligarchic revolt against Putin, let alone a broad-based social opposition movement. For now sanctions and economic decline are hurting those most integrated with the global economy and those that are likely to be most opposed to the course Mr. Putin is taking Russia, and he is using this environment to further consolidate assets in the hands of state/Kremlin control.

Jon Alterman (Middle East): So much has been in turmoil in the Middle East for so long, I’m not sure you can talk about “risks to success.” In fact, it seems to me that no one is much focused on defining success, let alone achieving it. After two greatly misplaced enthusiasms—for the Iraq war and the Arab Spring—which systematically underestimated the challenges of peaceful change in the Middle East, it feels to me like most parties in the region and in the U.S. government would settle for “muddling through.” Given the instability right now in Libya, Sinai, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and the prospect of instability in an even longer list of places, a broad sense of “aspiration fatigue” has set in.

SCHAUS: The National Security Strategy was released on February 6. How well does it address U.S. security interests in your region? How is it viewed by those in your region?

Carl Meacham (Latin America ): The President’s National Security Strategy largely focuses on regional competitiveness and trade standards—and in the region making up the lion’s share of U.S. trade, that’s a huge priority. As we continue to move forward with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the strategy prioritizes countries like Chile, Peru, and Mexico in an effort to build traction on free-trade issues and set out common goals with our partners in the region.

Still, the strategy leaves much to be desired in the Western Hemisphere—particularly regarding security. Central America—especially the Northern Triangle countries—are grappling with crippling violence and insecurity, but the strategy mentions them only in passing. Venezuela is mired in political and economic crisis and could have serious implications for the region, but the strategy just touches on governability and rule of law. And our traditional partners in regional security—Mexico and Colombia—are notably absent, despite our years of security cooperation with both. Rule of law, transnational crime, narco-trafficking, and governability must factor heavily into U.S. policy in the region.

Ernie Bower (Southeast Asia): Southeast Asia continues to have questions about long-term U.S. commitment to the region. There is a suspicion that heightened U.S. engagement in Asia is driven by a desire to counter China—a concern not fully alleviated by the National Security Strategy. Southeast Asia would prefer to see a U.S. rebalance built on the foundation of American self-interest. Specifically they hope to see a U.S. president who would consistently talk to Americans about why Asia is core to U.S. economic growth and prosperity, and to the safety and security of the United States. ASEAN wants to know that the United States has a broad and comprehensive economic strategy for Asia that includes ASEAN at its center. They see an economic base as a necessary foundation for an enduring, Asia-based security strategy. The National Security Strategy does not delve deeply enough into this vision and it does not address needed reforms to update domestic U.S. political discourse and bureaucracy to suggest that Americans will make the changes at home to convince partners in Asia that they are in the game for the long term.

Jennifer Cooke (Africa) : The National Security Strategy emphasizes the “softer” underpinnings of security—democracy, development, economic growth, but says little about the growing hard security threats—terrorism, narcotics trafficking, proxy conflict—that will require more immediate responses. The document calls for building capacity of African national and regional forces and strengthening civilian and military institutions through the Security Governance Initiative, announced at the August summit. This language will be uncontroversial in Africa, but it fails to address the more immediate and vexing challenge of responding to current threats that are beyond the existing capacity of African forces. In what circumstances should the United States intervene, and how directly? How should a government’s human rights record factor in U.S. security partnerships? How best to share the burden of intervention, and with what partners? France has been more directly engaged in responding to crises in Mali, Central African Republic, and against Boko Haram in Nigeria, and President Hollande has impatiently called on other great powers to step up: to “act” rather than simply to “give lectures.” The NSS does not provide much of a blueprint.

Rick Rossow (India and South Asia): The National Security Strategy had solid references to India’s rising prominence as a strategic and economic partner to the United States. The President himself was in India just ahead of the NSS 2015’s release, concluding important new agreements on defense, civilian nuclear cooperation, and more.

Beyond India, the NSS did not indicate any dramatic changes in direction for how the United States looks at the broader South Asian region. We can expect that the existing contours of our broad strategy for the rest of the region—treating Pakistan as more of an ally in the war on terror than a source of terrorism, and finding the least harmful path to reduce our role in Afghanistan—will remain in place.

Jon Alterman (Middle East): Senior people in Middle Eastern governments complain that the United States government lacks strategic focus and resolve, and the NSS did not allay those concerns.

Heather Conley (Europe): The National Security Strategy notes Russia’s aggression in Eastern Ukraine but it does not spell out a specific, long-term strategy to address this aggression. The NSS states that the U.S. is “strengthening our enduring commitment to a free and peaceful Europe by countering aggression and modernizing the NATO alliance to meet emerging threats.” Yet strategies are only aspirational unless they are properly resourced. Russian President Putin’s actions have completely upended that strategy. Temporary deterrence and assurances measures, such as the $1 billion European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), have provided funds to support the 600 additional troops that the United States has stationed in the Baltic States and Poland, increase U.S. participation in more frequent exercises and training programs in the East, and provide training to the Ukrainian military. U.S. participation in NATO’s Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) appears to be fairly minimal, however, with Washington offering support to enable the VJTF’s “framework nations” and bolster the Multi-National Corps-Northeast (MNC-NE) headquarters in Szczecin, Poland.

Andy Kuchins (Russia): The National Security Strategy, even with the usual caveats that such documents are hardly “strategic” in that there is no clear prioritization of threats and no linking of means with ends, is inadequate in its characterization of the magnitude and comprehensive nature of the threat Russia presents today under Vladimir Putin. Russia is mobilizing a complex combination of political, economic, military, cyber, public relations, and other tools to contest U.S. power and influence. The first step in developing an adequate strategy is to conduct a net assessment of the nature and capacity of these tools and how they are mobilized toward Russia’s neighbors as well as our European allies, and ourselves. The second step is to assess the capacity of the U.S., as well as our allies and partners, to resist these tools, and then from that we can have a chance to develop a genuine strategy that links in realistic and operational ways with clear prioritizations.

Aside from Russia, the NSS only mentions Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova as countries of concern. But our concerns and policies should have a broader focus to address interests of all those countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia as well as Belarus. Because they are geographically further from, and have fewer linkages with, Europe they feel their sovereignty and independence are at greater risk.

SCHAUS: As we wrap up our conversation, I wanted to ask each of you what initiatives, operations, and/or policy changes the United States could pursue to better advance its interests in your region?

Andy Kuchins (Russia): Regarding Russia, I would add that we need to have a clear, comprehensive, and fine-grained understanding of the impact economic sanctions are having on Russia’s political economy. Even many U.S. government officials in private have admitted that we are kind of “winging it” in this regard as there is no precedent for trying to sanction and isolate an economy the size of Russia. Second we need to be able to more clearly differentiate between the impact of oil price collapse and sanctions on what is happening in the Russian economy.

I would strongly recommend we increase our attention to promoting more trade and commercial delegations to Central Asia and the South Caucasus countries, as well as expand our military-military and security ties to the extent that the market will bear.

Heather Conley (Europe): Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its ambiguous warfare in Eastern Ukraine were neither foreseen nor anticipated 14 months ago, and require a completely new strategic approach to Europe. Although Washington would prefer that this unwelcomed strategic surprise was primarily addressed by its European partners with American support, it is clear the threat Russia poses to NATO cannot be addressed without strong and sustained U.S. leadership and engagement. This crisis will simply not permit the U.S. to rely on a “leading from behind” model and demands long-term U.S. military engagement in Central Europe that moves away from a rotational and temporary presence toward one that is forward-operating and permanent, with fixed infrastructure in the East. This presence will require some “muscle memory” from the Cold War era, but it must also entail an agile and flexible joint land, air, and maritime component that emphasizes ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and C2 [command and control] capabilities and is geographically concentrated in the Black and Baltic Sea regions, alongside forward deployments in Poland. An increased U.S. presence will likely require additional forces beyond the two U.S. Combat Brigades already stationed in Europe and pre-positioned military equipment. Tragically for the Ukrainian people, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine gives NATO an opportunity to prepare for the greater regional instability emanating from the East that is yet to come. It is hoped that NATO and specifically the U.S. will use this time wisely.

Ernie Bower (Southeast Asia) : Unlike what it’s facing in Europe, the most important action the United States can take in Asia in the near term is to finish negotiations and pass a strong Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement. The Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee took important steps on this front on April 22 and 23 by passing similar versions of a Trade Promotion Authority bill, and the Senate is poised to vote on its version of the bill. That legislation, which is seen as critical for completion of the TPP, is expected to face full votes in the House and Senate in May. At the same time, the president and his cabinet should articulate a vision for a rules based, ASEAN-centric integration of the economies of the Indo-Pacific. In so doing, the White House should enlist members of Congress and the cabinet, and make a concerted effort to educate Americans about the importance of Asia to the economic future of the country, and tell them how this will impact their own lives including access to jobs, opportunity, and ensuring their safety and security.

Rick Rossow (India and South Asia): The United States must look for more opportunities to publicly explain our positions on issues where we have differences with India. While we may not ultimately convince India that our strategy of engaging Pakistan to help confront terrorism is the best course, many in India believe we do not have a Pakistan strategy at all and blindly support Pakistan because of a historical allegiance. In addition, the United States should actively seek more opportunities to work collaboratively when appropriate in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. The U.S. and India have shared interests in strengthening the democratic institutions and economic development of each of these nations.

Jon Alterman (Middle East): Politics in the Middle East is personal, and the lack of warm presidential relationships with any leader in the region has an impact. A stronger U.S. position will not come about because of any speech or policy adjustment. If it comes, it will be because the United States at the most senior levels becomes committed to something important and sees it through to success.

Carl Meacham (Latin America): First and foremost, I think it’s important to remember that Latin America is a large and diverse region—and, as a result, U.S. foreign policy in the region doesn’t have to equally prioritize all 34 countries we share the Americas with. That would be unrealistic.

We also have to keep in mind that the Latin America we’re seeing now isn’t the Latin America of the 1980s and 1990s. The challenges and opportunities in the region have fundamentally changed. We’re facing transnational crime in Central America, Colombia, and Venezuela, the emergence of the Pacific Alliance and a growing Atlantic-Pacific economic divide, an increasingly powerful and dynamic North American energy sector, a Brazil full of potential still seeking its footing as a regional and global player despite its current economic and political challenges, and of course the new and developing relationship between the United States and Cuba.

With all that in mind, the U.S. will be best served in the region by playing to its strengths and to its interests, both in the immediate results and in the longer-term impact that course will have on perceptions of the United States. Working with our hemispheric partners that are important to our regional and geostrategic interests—working with those countries willing to work with the White House and in a position to deliver results—this must be our priority. Mexico, Colombia, Brazil—these are necessarily our primary interlocutors, our indispensable regional partners. That isn’t to say that other countries aren’t important, too. Peru, Chile, Panama, Costa Rica, the Northern Triangle countries—these and others are reliable and productive partners.

Ultimately, the U.S. image and interests in the region will be best bolstered by prioritizing comprehensive immigration reform, developing a robust security cooperation framework with Central America, staying the course on our new policy with Cuba, and deepening our commercial and political ties with Brazil.

Jennifer Cooke (Africa): Africa is, as Carl just described Latin America, a large and diverse region. Among the major challenges of U.S. engagement in Africa will be formulating policies that are relevant on a continent that is increasingly diverse, and where big opportunities in economic growth and development are opening up alongside worrying trends in conflict and violent extremism. Budgetary constraints are likely to endure, and the United States will need to get more strategic in prioritizing how it spends limited development funds. That will mean greater flexibility, agility, and responsiveness to partner country priorities—something that the United States, despite rhetoric to the contrary, has not been very good at. Tapping into the power of the U.S. private sector will be critical, and the proof of initiatives like Power Africa, Trade Africa, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act will be in whether the U.S. private sector more fully capitalizes on what Africa has to offer. The United States will also need to recalibrate the tone of its messaging with African leadership on issues of governance and human rights, avoiding lectures and instead supporting domestic African constituencies for reform, which will ultimately be the more effective catalysts for change. The decrease in democracy and human rights funding for Africa in 2014 is not a good sign in this regard.

SCHAUS: Thanks to each of you for your time today. The United States is confronting challenges and opportunities across the globe and we will continue to rely on your expert analysis and practical advice to find solutions to these issues.