PSYOP ORDER OF BATTLE

FOR VIETNAM

SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.)

Note: Images from this article were used with permission in a documentary film for the German Broadcaster ZDF entitled The Power of Music. Portions of this article appear in the journal Geopolitics in an article about Psywar in Vietnam

The story of psychological operations (PSYOP) in Vietnam is difficult to relate. There were a host of originators of propaganda and the lines of authority and control are difficult to unravel and chart. I have made an attempt in this article to outline the order of battle (OB) as it has been published in official and other documents. This is an ongoing project and one that I hope the readers will help me to finish. It is a labor of love. The data is from official records, published books, magazines, field manuals, interviews, and anecdotes. I believe it is fairly accurate, but I am sure that there are many omissions. I ask any reader who can add to this story to write to me at the address below. I will be happy to add any data that will make this story more complete. Background WWII Anti-Japanese Viet Minh Leaflet This very early Viet Minh guerrilla leaflet asks the Vietnamese people to resist the Japanese confiscation of their rice. The text is: Dear our fellowmen! The Japanese are collecting rice and grain again. They want to starve us all.

- Tell each other to keep the grain; do not give them to the enemy.

- Protest; ask to be allowed to sell rice as in the past.

- Go to the government offices and ask for rice.

- Attack the rice convoys and attack the Japanese grain depots.

- Forward! Beat back the Japanese for a better life. Viet-Minh French Propaganda Leaflet for the Viet Minh This leaflet depicts a peaceful Vietnam on the left and a war-torn Vietnam on the right. The Time Has Arrived and We Must Choose Vietnam : Independence . Freedom. Vietnam : Slavery. Communist China Vietnam : From 1940, the Viet Minh, communist guerillas headed by Ho Chi Minh, fought the Japanese occupiers, and in August 1945, the Viet Minh gained control over a Japanese-sponsored government. France , seeking to re-establish its colonial power in the area, fought nationalist and communist forces from 1946 to 1954, when, on 8 May 1954, France was defeated at Dien Bien Phu . Vietnam was divided at the 17th Parallel into North and South by a Geneva accord on 21 July 1954. Ho Chi Minh's communists took over the north and established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; in the south, Ngo Dinh Diem established the Republic of Vietnam . From 1954 on, the North attempted to conquer the South. The Communist and nationalist Ho Chi Minh is an interesting character. Ex-PSYOP Trooper Mervyn Edwin Roberts III, PhD, mentions Ho in depth in: Let the Dogs Bark: The Psychological War in Vietnam, 1960-1968, forthcoming from the University Press of Kansas, 2018: Born Nguyen Sinh Con in French Indochina (Vietnam), and later going by Nguyen Tat Thanh, he spent decades learning the skills of the propagandist under yet another alias, Nguyen Ai Quoc. By the time of the wars for Vietnamese independence, he had adopted his most famous name of all: Ho Chi Minh. He eventually became fluent in Chinese, French, English and Russian. He eventually settled in France and began a career writing propaganda for French and Vietnamese journals. He also lived for a period in Great Britain, teaching himself English. Ho helped establish the French Communist Party in 1920. Around 1923, Ho traveled to the Soviet Union and joined the Communist International (Comintern). By September 1924, the Comintern assigned Ho to Canton, China where he worked and taught at the Peasant Movement Training Institute in Canton. By 1930, Ho Chi Minh returned to Hong Kong. British police arrested him in July 1931 (under the name Sung Man Cho). As WWII approached, future general Vo Nguyen Giap, looked to China for inspiration on military matters, Ho carefully struck a balance between Soviet and Chinese support. In May 1941, Ho formed the League for the Independence of Vietnam, Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, normally abbreviated as Viet Minh. By the end of WWII Ho styled himself as the kindly khaki-clad Uncle Ho, winning admiration among the Vietnamese people as well as OSS officers. French Propaganda leaflet for the Viet Minh This leaflet depicts Stalin holding Ho Chi Minh on leash while kicking a Viet Minh soldier and forcing him forward to attack a French-Vietnamese fort. Hurry up stupid! There have been questions about why President Eisenhower never supported a free election in Vietnam and a CIA report indicates it was because of faith in Diem. Some comments found in Thomas Aherns declassified Center for the Study of Intelligence secret publication: The House of Ngo  Covert Action in South Vietnam 1954-1963 are: Ngo Dinh Diem's attractiveness to his first American patrons derived from three qualities: he was a certified anti-Communist nationalist, he was a Roman Catholic, and he understood English. After the partition of Vietnam with the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the Eisenhower administration began to directly support the government in the South headed by Ngo Dinh Diem. President Eisenhower, in a letter to Diem, promised to help Diem maintain a "strong, viable state capable of resisting outside aggression." Armed with this support, in July 1954, Diem rejected the reunification elections provided for in the Geneva Agreements and declared South Vietnam a republic with himself as president. The CIA, although pessimistic about establishing a stable, civilian regime in South Vietnam , nevertheless set about assisting Diem in creating a new state. Roberts mentions Diem in: Let the Dogs Bark: Ngo Dinh Diem was an intelligent, active, and independent nationalist leader, as well as a fierce anti-communist. Diem, the son of a Royal Court official in Hue, graduated first in his class in 1921 from the prestigious School of Administration, and became a junior official in Thua Thien province near Hue. Diem was Minister of the Interior in Emperor Bao Dais cabinet before World War II, but resigned in protest over French failure to grant the Emperor sufficient authority. Diem detested the Communists. He led counterinsurgency sweeps against them as province chief. His attitude likely intensified when the Viet Minh executed one of his brothers during the 1945 Revolution. The Viet Minh also imprisoned Diem during the chaos of 1945, until Ho ordered his release in an attempt to rally nationalists to the cause. The Vietnamese nationalists represented by Ngo Dinh Diem, constructed their own system, one based on Armed Propaganda Teams and agit-prop focusing on nationalist themes. The Diem forces had to create a national identity. This task was more difficult due to his connection with the French colonial power prior to 1954. Diem presented himself as a progressive reformer who believed that U.S. aid and expertise would figure prominently in Vietnams postcolonial future. However, Diem rigorously maintained his independence. Diem worried that an influx of Americans would develop a colonial mentality among the South Vietnamese, and that local officials would defer to the American on the scene. Diem wanted to limit the role of the United States. In 1956 the Viet Cong, aided by North Vietnam, pressed war in the south, and South Vietnam began receiving U.S. aid. Large-scale North Vietnamese troop infiltrations of the south began in 1964, with the support of China and the Soviet Union. Masses of troops were stationed in border areas of Laos and Cambodia. Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl discusses the inadequacies of the United States Army in Vietnam in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, Osprey Publishing , UK , 2008. He says: The United States entered the Vietnam War with a military trained and equipped to fight a conventional war in Europe, and totally unprepared for the counterinsurgency campaign it was about to wage. Ngo Dinh Diem Nguyen Cao Ky Nguyen Van Thieu Beginning in late 1963 with the assassination of longtime President Ngo Dinh Diem, the South experienced a series of military coups. The last of these was headed by Nguyen Cao Ky, who assumed control in June 1965, and who was replaced in 1967 by Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam's first presidential election. Operation Junction City was a great 1967 victory for the Americans. General Weyand had this to say in his Commander's Evaluation: During Junction City we dropped 9,768,000 leaflets and made 102 hours of aerial loudspeaker appeals. The major engagements of 20, 21 and 31 March 1967 were followed up with a wide variety of "quick-reaction" leaflets. They showed photographs of VC dead and contained surrender appeals to the survivors. A specially designed memorandum addressed to the Commanding General of the 9th Viet Cong Division was reproduced and distributed as a leaflet to further exploit our success of 20 March. A newsletter exploiting VC casualties and explaining the role of our forces was distributed throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone. Our military civic action projects supported the overall PSYOP effort. They added credibility to our central propaganda theme: The Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army destroy; the Government of Vietnam/United States Free World Military Armed Forces helps the people. Leaflet 88 Leaflet 88 depicts two of the leaders of the Republic of Vietnam after Diem, Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky. It is one of the very few that features Ky. The back of the leaflet is bordered in the yellow and three red stripes of the national flag. The text is quite long. Some of the more pertinent comments are: DEAR COMPATRIOTS OF NORTH VIETNAM On the occasion of the inauguration of the new President and Vice President of the Republic of Vietnam , the people and the government of the South send their brotherly greetings to the kith-and-kin compatriots of the North and their sincere wishes for an early return to peace in our beloved country. The people and government of the South have made great efforts in the past years, despite savage sabotage by the Communists, to build a democratic society in the South in which the citizens are free to make a living and to speak about their righteous aspirations. Nguyen Cao Ky was a dashing pilot who liked to walk around wearing his flight suit. He was quite the charmer and a close friend of mine who flew with him told me that he presented all the pilots with chrome-plated .357 pistols. The CIA did not think highly of Ky according to Thomas Aherns declassified secret publication entitled. CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam : As of June 1965, Station contacts depicted a first-class pilot and a poor administrator whose genuine charisma had given Air Force morale a dramatic boost when he became its commander in late 1963. He was also a thrill seeker and risk taker, according to intimates, renowned for his drinking, gambling, and an endless' succession of girlfriends; he also indulged a penchant for insubordination. In return, Ky did not think very kindly of his American allies. He said at various times: I am not bitter about America's involvement here, but I am bitter about the fact that her policy makers never listened to my advice. That is a glaring weakness with American foreign policy. Washington politicians and bureaucrats think they know more than the natives of a country like Vietnam. That is the arrogance of Washington and in my opinion it is an attitude that will always get America into trouble in countries they know very little about I have consistently told Washington you cannot win a defensive war in Vietnam when the other side is engaged in an offensive war. By fighting a limited, defensive war, the U.S. allowed the North Vietnamese to continuously re-supply their units in the field. The worst thing that happened to South Vietnam was when we allowed the United States to take control of our war with the North. Long before America decided to quit the war, I realized that this would be the inevitable result of Americas lack of commitment to victory. I offered to lead a South Vietnamese attack on North Vietnam, which was defended by a single division of regular troops. All I required from the US was air support. Nguyen Cao Ky, the flamboyant former air force general who ruled South Vietnam for two years during the Vietnam War died on 23 July 2011. He was 80. Ky died at a hospital in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where he was being treated for a respiratory complication. President Nixon was not exactly a solid supporter of Thieu. Carolyn Page mentions a comment by the American President in U.S. Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973, Leicester University Press, London, 1996: I was aware that many Americans considered Thieu a petty and corrupt dictator unworthy of our support. I was not personally attached to Thieu, but I looked at the situation in practical terms. As I saw it, an alternative to Thieu was not someone more enlightened or tolerant or democratic but someone weaker who would not be able to hold together the contentious factions in South Vietnam . The South Vietnamese needed a strong and stable government to carry on the fight against the efforts of the Viet Cong terrorists, who were supported by the North Vietnamese Army in their efforts to impose a Communist dictatorship on the 17 million people of South Vietnam . Handout 2653 - Independence Palace This July 1968 Joint United States Public Affairs Office handout depicts an 8 x 10-inch photograph of the Independence Palace . This building was the workplace of the Presidents of South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. On 27 February 1962, two anti-Diem government pilots flying Douglas A-1 Skyraiders bombed the building in a futile attempt at assassinating the president. On 8 April 1975, it was bombed again by a South Vietnamese pilot flying a Northrop F5E Tiger II aircraft. The palace was the site of the official handover of power during the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975 after a North Vietnamese tank knocked down the main gate. The North Vietnamese renamed it Reunification Palace . Lieutenant General Duong Van (Big) Minh There is no code on this leaflet so it is impossible to say if it was prepared by the Americans or the Vietnamese. However, the text would lead me to believe that this is a Vietnamese product. Minh led the South Vietnamese army under Prime Minister Diem. After the assassination he led Vietnam for three months before being replaced, and briefly led South Vietnam again in 1975 before surrendering the nation to the North Vietnamese Communists. He got the nickname, Big Minh, because he was six feet tall and weighed 198 pounds. It also distinguished him from General Tran Van (Little) Minh. The front depicts a photograph of Big Minh and the text: Lieutenant General Duong Van Minh Chairman of the Revolutionary Soldiers Committee. The back shows a scene of tanks and people in front of the Presidential palace and the text: Commemorate the Success of the 1-11-1963 Revolution. The Gia Long Palace , after a night of smoke and fighting was finally assaulted and

occupied by Revolutionary troops to end a dictatorial, corrupt and anarchist regime. It is interesting to note that few propaganda leaflets picture Diem. There are some Vietnamese who believe that he was the only leader who had the will and strength to defeat the Communists. It is also interesting to note that after Diems assassination, a number of Allied leaflets were prepared that attacked the former president and promised better times. The United States quickly turned on its old ally. For instance, leaflet SP-65 depicts General Duong-van-Minh (Chairman of the Revolutionary Council) and Prime Minister Nguyen Ngoc. It says in part: The new government of Vietnam , which overthrew the regime of the Ngo family, has been in existence only since November 1, 1963. Already much progress has been made. Many great plans are being prepared which will benefit the people of the rural areas Leaflet SP-71 adds: The despotic government of the Ngo Dinh Diem family was put to an end by the November 1 revolution. This transitory period of the national history is enthusiastically welcomed by all countrymen. Poster 1961

To encourage patriotism toward their nation, this 10 x 16-inch full-color poster Scroll was created by JUSPAO in August 1967 and depicts the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam. The text is:

Preamble Confident that the patriotism, indomitable will and unyielding traditions of the people will assure a radiant future for our country; Conscious that after many years of foreign domination, followed by the division of our territory, dictatorship and war, the people of Vietnam must take responsibility before history to perpetuate those hardy traditions and at the same time to welcome progressive ideas in order to establish a republican form of government of the people. by the people and for the people whose purpose is to unite the nation, unite the territory and assure independence, freedom, and democracy with justice and altruism for the present and future generations; We, 117 Deputies of the National Constituent Assembly representing the people of Vietnam, after debate, approve this constitution.

In 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the United States began air strikes against the North. Increased activity followed in 1965, including the use of U.S. ground troops. Failure of U.S. and South Vietnamese efforts and disputes in the U.S. over war aims led Richard Nixon in July 1969 to cease bombings of the North and to begin a series of U.S. troop withdrawals referred to as "Vietnamization." U.S. bombings of the North resumed in 1972-73. A cease-fire was negotiated in Paris in January 1973, but it was never implemented. U.S. aid was curbed by Congress in 1974. Increasing attacks from the North overwhelmed the remaining government outposts in the Central Highlands, and the Saigon government surrendered on 30 April 1975. A Socialist Republic of Vietnam, with capital in Hanoi , was established throughout Vietnam .

Laos : Laos regained independence from France on 19 July 1949 as a constitutional monarchy. The nation consisted of political ideologies from communist to conservative to neutralist. The Communist forces were made up of Prince Chao Souphanouvong (The Red Prince), Kaysone Phomvihane, the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies (supported by Red China and the USSR ). The pro-Western forces included King Savang Vatthana, Prince Boun Oum, General Phoumi Nosavan and the Hmong guerrillas and militia led by General Vang Pao (backed secretly by the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence Agency). The neutralists consisted of Prince Souvanna Phouma, General Kong Le, and the Royal Lao Government. Conflicts among neutralist, communist, and conservative factions led to increasingly chaotic and violent conflicts, particularly after 1960. The formal Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, signed on 23 July 1962, provided for a coalition government and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country by 7 October. The three factions then formed a coalition government with Prince Souvanna Phouma as premier. By 1964 the communist Pathet Lao had withdrawn from the coalition and renewed guerilla actions with support from North Vietnam . The United States got more deeply involved in Laos in an attempt to interdict the flow of traffic down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and also to pull some front-line units out of Vietnam and into Laos . In addition, the 4500-elevation Lima Site 85 (Pha Thi) was loaded with modern electronic equipment to help the USAF in operating its missions over North Vietnam . Trail Campaign Leaflet T-16 The leaflet above is written in both Vietnamese and Lao and is addressed to Vietnamese troops in Laos . PASSPORT To: North Vietnamese Soldiers Living in Laos. You have the opportunity to escape death and live in safety and peace. The Lao Royal Government and its people will welcome and treat you as brothers. Please show this passport to any LAO soldier or civilian. Tong Tu Lenh,

Commander in Chief of Lao Military Forces An Air Commando who was stationed at LS-20A (Long Tieng) and LS-153 (Mouang Kassy) told me: Those of us who fought the war from Laos have always considered it to have been more important than the coverage indicated. But since the whole mess was classified as never happening and those who fought there didn't exist it is no wonder that most people who are knowledgeable about the war in Viet Nam will dismiss Laos as a sideshow. Laos was divided into five Military Regions (MR). MR I was in the northwest, including Luang Prabang and the borders with Burma and China ; MR II was in the northeast, including Long Tieng, Sam Neua and Sam Thong; MR III consisted of the central panhandle region, including Savannakhet and much of the Ho Chi Minh trail. MR IV was in the south, including Pakse and the Bolovens Plateau; finally MR V consisted of the neutral zone around Vientiane . Early in the war there were plans to use local Lao tribes as part of an American-led resistance movement. This plan was forwarded to American Ambassador Sullivan who was concerned that it might be impossible to limit and control such an operation. Furthermore, if the resistance got into trouble there would be no way to militarily support them, which might result in their very embarrassing slaughter. Amidst the Vietnam War in 1970, the U.S. increased its military activities, but after Pathet Lao military gains, in May 1975 the government forces ceased fighting and the Pathet Lao took control. A Lao People's Democratic Republic, strongly influenced by Vietnam , was proclaimed 3 December 1975. The Republic of Vietnam and the United States Government directed several PSYOP campaigns targeting enemy troops in both Laos and Cambodia . A PSYOP officer who served in 1967-1968 discussed some of the campaigns used in Laos against the Viet Cong moving southward on the Ho Chi Minh Trail: There was the B-52 Follow-up Program. Within four hours of a B-52 strike leaflets were dropped informing the enemy that he has been bombed by B-52s and showed him a picture of the bomber which flew so high that he would otherwise never see it. It reminded him that the bombers would come again and urged the Viet Cong to use the printed safe conduct pass on the leaflet. Another operation, the Trail Campaign was directed against military and civilian personnel who used and maintained the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Most of the Trail leaflets bore a numerical code from 1-125 and the letter T. Readers who wish to know more about the Laos campaign are encouraged to check http://www.laoveterans.com/about.html . Trail Campaign Leaflet T-07. It seems obvious that the officer is discussing Leaflet T-07. The front of the leaflet depicts a B-52 dropping bombs. The back is all text: You will never see one of these You probably won't hear it. It flies too high. It is a B-52 bomber, used by the South Vietnamese people's powerful American allies to blast aggressors out of their hiding places. One B-52 carries 29,700 kilos of bombs and can drop them with pin-point accuracy, dealing certain death to everyone within the target area. The B-52 can strike you at any time during all seasons and weather conditions. Your chance to avoid this fate will come. Look for your safe conduct pass. We should mention the fear factor produced by the B-52 bomber. Truong Nhu Tang talks about the bombers in Viet Cong Memoir. He called the strikes undiluted psychological terror. Despite having been hunted by South Vietnamese and American ground forces and having endured all of the privations and hardships associated with the life of a guerrilla, Truong Tang noted that nothing the guerrillas had to endure compared with the stark terrorization of the B-52 bombardments. Cambodia: During late 1966 and 1967, the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) conducted an intensive PSYWAR campaign against North Vietnamese army troops located along the Cambodian border with South Vietnam. In an effort to minimize violation of Cambodian air space, MACV used the wind drift method of leaflet dissemination, whereby aircraft flew along the border and used favorable wind currents to carry leaflets into Cambodia. U.S. leaflet drops from Cambodian air space were never officially acknowledged. However, information from a recently declassified top secret report US PSYOP structure in Vietnam published in the MACVSOG Command History, Index B, 1971-1972 reported that: Under no circumstances will anyone having knowledge about these operations acknowledge that leaflets are being dropped over Cambodia. Public comments on this subject whether on background, off the record, or any other basis are prohibited. Following line, not to be volunteered, should be used in Saigon (and will be followed in Washington) in answering any press queries on a background basis: "We have for sometime been dropping leaflets in South Vietnamese border areas, Given wind drift, we assume some of these leaflets have been falling inside Cambodia." It goes on to say: "In the event of incidents involving loss of US personnel or aircraft...spokesman may acknowledge possibility of inadvertent entry into Cambodia air space by elements operating in SVN as a result of navigational error. Cambodian Leaflet 4-36-70 Since we mention the campaigns in Cambodia I want to add a Cambodian-language leaflet here. This all-text leaflet says: Attention Cambodian Friends The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army are bringing supplies and personnel into your country and using Cambodian sanctuaries to launch attacks against the Cambodian and Vietnamese people. They have invaded the neutral nation of Cambodia . To oppose this aggression and destroy our common enemy it is necessary to bomb enemy base camps, supply routes, convoys and depots. Follow the instructions on the reverse side and you will be safe. Instructions for safety: 1. Stay in your homes. 2. Stay of roads, bridges, trails and waterways. 3. Stay away from enemy troops. US PSYOP Structure in Vietnam Leaflets Prior to the Entrance of U.S. PSYOP Units in 1965 American PSYOP leaflets appeared before the arrival of the companies, battalions and group starting about 1965. The below leaflet was used in 1964 and bears an unknown code 19. This all changed with the arrival of U.S. Army PSYOP units with their codes that identified the printer. Leaflet 19 Leaflet 19 depicts a grinning Viet Cong walking with the villages stolen rice and kidnapped children. The text is: Stop the Viet Cong from stealing rice and crop and kidnaping youngsters. Inform the army of the whereabouts of the Viet Cong. Leaflet 21 This leaflet depicts a VC in the bush while behind him a giant soldier stands with glistening bayonet. The text implies it is a South Vietnamese soldier but the size and the spit-shined boots says American to me. The text is: Soldiers of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front: All of your hiding places have been discovered by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. You can be destroyed at any time. Other leaflets printed by Special Forces or unknown organizations bore no code numbers at all. Propaganda and safe-conduct passes and leaflets were produced under the jurisdiction of the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). JUSPAO was formed in July 1965, following 11 years of increasingly uncoordinated and inefficient psychological operations that began in summer of 1954 during Vietnam's transition from French rule. JUSPAO was given authority for all propaganda activities in an effort to end disputes and lack of coordination between Americans and Vietnamese and between American military and civilian agencies. Major Marcus S. Welch says in Irregular Pen and Limited Sword: Psywar, Psyop, and Miso in Counterinsurgency, Pennyhill Press: JUSPAO was a complex organization, consisting of five major departments: Office of the Director, Information, Cultural Affairs, North Vietnamese Affairs, Technical Services, and Field Development. JUSPAO was sizable; at its peak it possessed a staff of over six hundred American and Vietnamese employees, rivaling its military counterparts. Apart from JUSPAOs executive responsibilities, the organization conducted PSYOP in direct and advisory roles, primarily using mass media outlets such as the Republic of Vietnams Voice of Freedom and the overt US Voice of America radio stations. JUSPAO delved into television, supporting Truyen Hinh Viet Nam, a Government of Vietnam television station, in 1965. Similarly, JUSPAO created a number of printed products such as the Ngon Song newspaper, and the Huong Que, Gioi Tu-Do, Long Ne, and Van Tac Vu magazines. Synchronization and coordination were also the responsibilities of JUSPAO. With a civilian director (initially, Barry Zorthian) reporting to the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), JUSPAO integrated the psychological operations of the U.S. Information Service (USIS, USIA's overseas arm), The State Department's U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint Chief's Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and the U .S. Embassy. At its apex it employed 695 people, 245 Americans and 116 from the military and had an annual budget of 10 million dollars. Zorthian seemed a good choice for the position of director since he had been a combat Marine and a reporter for Time Magazine before working for the United States Information Agency. An understanding was reached in 1966 that whereas JUSPAO would retain responsibility for overall PSYOP policy and would conduct strategic operations such as the Chieu Hoi surrender program, MACV would be responsible for PSYOP tactical field operations. Don North wrote about Barry Zorthian in January 2011 upon his death at age 90. He said in part: At Yale, Zorthian practiced journalism He was editor of The Yale Daily News and became a member of the secret campus society, Skull and Bones, a controversial fraternity whose members included both Presidents Bush and other American powerbrokers. Upon graduation in 1941, Zorthian served in a U.S. Marine artillery unit in the South Pacific and came out a captain. After the war ended, he took a job at CBS radio in New York. He received a law degree from New York University but instead of practicing law preferred journalism and spent 13 years with the Voice of America as a reporter, editor and program manager. In 1961, Zorthian joined the State Department and became a deputy public affairs officer in the U.S. Embassy, New Delhi, India. Three years later, in February 1964, U.S. Information Agency Director Edward R. Murrow appointed him as head of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Vietnam. Although untrained in the art of psychological operations, Zorthian was responsible for coordinating these tactics designed to erode the morale of the enemy and win the allegiance of the Vietnamese people through hearts and minds programs. Zorthian invested in excess of $10 million a year in dropping tons of leaflets; staging plays in which the Viet Cong were always the villains; and rounding up peasants at gunpoint for propaganda lectures. Some of the more bizarre techniques that didnt prove to be very successful were having local fortune tellers deliver false predictions at the expense of the Viet Cong and broadcasting funeral music from helicopters to enemy positions, followed by a childs voice crying in Vietnamese, Daddy, Daddy, please come home! The most successful PSYOP initiative was the Chieu Hoi or Open Arms program which Zorthian supported and greatly expanded in 1967. Several times, I saw Viet Cong emerging from the swamps in the Delta with fistfuls of safe conduct  passes dropped from aircraft. The Chieu Hoi program promised economic aid, jobs, and relocation of families to safe areas. It is estimated to have caused 250,000 defections from 1963 to the last months of the war in 1975. Daniel A. Castro adds in his 2007 Naval Postgraduate School thesis: Do Psychological Operations Benefit from the use of Host Nation Media: The Vietnam War saw one of the most intensive PSYOP campaigns ever executed, far surpassing any PSYOP effort in World I, II, and Korea. In World War II there were 1,000 personnel conducting PSYOP, in Korea there war 600 personnel with 130 host nation Koreans and Chinese. In Vietnam, the numbers ballooned to over 1,200 personnel and over 750 indigenous Vietnamese conducting PSYOP with an annual budget over 12 million dollars. Additionally, because PSYOP was a priority with the Kennedy and Johnson administration, it became a priority with various inter- agencies involved in PSYOP such as: the State Department, USAID (United States Agency for International Development), CIA, MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam, and the USIA (United States Information Agency). MACV Headquarters  Saigon Navy E4 David White worked in Saigon in the J3 (Operations Section) of MACV in 1970. He communicated with various units relaying information either by phone or encrypted messages. He adds: I was stationed at MACV in Saigon from April 1970 through May 1971 and lived in the Dodge City barracks. I worked in PSYOP in the main Headquarters (1 floor up and about 10 offices down from General Creighton Abrams). I did many presentations for the general and his staff. Dave White

First week in-country at MACV  April 1970 There were Army and Air Force sections that dealt with the PSYOP units in the field. Later, the offices were combined into one section with eight officers. I worked 10-12 hour days in Headquarters of MACV typing messages, making presentations, and delivering correspondence. I saw samples of leaflets from various campaigns, but was never involved in the production of them. I guess you could say I was a Psyclerk, and not a Psywarrior. Major Michael G. Barger mentions MACV in his U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 2007 Masters thesis Psychological Operations Supporting the Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam: The commander and staff of MACV placed great emphasis on PSYOP from the planning stages of the troop buildup in 1965. One reason for this, in addition to the perceived failure of PSYOP advisory efforts, was the agreed division of responsibilities between MACV and JUSPAO. This agreement specified that MACV would execute PSYOP in the field and provide print capability to JUSPAO, so MACV planners requested the addition of units with these capabilities to the troop buildup. Because General Westmoreland and his staff appreciated and encouraged the use of PSYOP , U.S. Army PSYOP units would deploy and operate in Vietnam in unprecedented numbers compared to previous conflicts. One instrument used to communicate and encourage this marked interest in PSYOP was USMACV Directive 525-3, dated 7 September 1965, which emphasized discrimination in the application of firepower and the use of all available PSYOP resources in combat operations The 2010 Report: RAND in Southeast Asia - A History of the Vietnam War Era, goes into a bit more depth: Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara began to address the issue of how to fight insurgencies under the rubric of “flexible response.” Kennedy believed that, besides military means, counterinsurgency would also require economic, diplomatic, and psychological-warfare activities combined into a multi-pronged approach. He assigned the State Department the responsibility of dealing with diplomatic and political issues, and coordinating the efforts of other key agencies. USAID was given the task of nation-building, turning economic aid into a tool of counterinsurgency by strengthening recipient countries against subversion. The United States Information Agency (USIA) was assigned psychological warfare. The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office Returning to JUSPAO, the 1968 MACV PSYOP Guide says: JUSPAO is an altered and expanded form of the United States Information Service in Vietnam . By decision of the National Security Council in May 1965, the responsibility for all PSYOP in Vietnam was delegated to the Director of USIA. Although JUSPAO is primarily a civilian organization many of its personnel are military, assigned through MACV. Selected foreign officers are also assigned. The North Vietnamese Affairs Division directs PSYOP against North Vietnamese and North Vietnamese Army infiltrators. Because it was a joint operation, everybody was involved in policy. For instance, among those on the policy board were the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam, General Westmorland, the station head of The United States Agency for International Development, the station head of the CIA, the head of the United States Information Agency post, and General Edward Lansdale (Special Advisor). The annual budget of JUSPAO was 12 million dollars; 6.5 million from the USIA, 2.5 million from USAID, and 3 million from the Department of Defense. At its peak, PSYOP personnel numbered about 1200, with about 750 Vietnamese nationals. [The Political Warfare Division advised, assisted and supported the Vietnamese General Political Warfare Department and its subordinate elements.] JUSPAO at first consisted of about 150 officers, later 250, more than half from USIA, and about 600 Vietnamese. Harry D. Latimer discusses the organization chart for the organization in U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam, Brown University, 1973: The office of Plans, Policy and Research handled policy directives, quality control, and research associated with the attitudes in friendly areas and with the enemy. The Field Development Division was an operations shop wholly committed to the propaganda effort. In addition to responsibility for leaflets and posters, and for coordination of various campaigns, it supervised field operations. Monta L. Osborne was the Chief of Field Development Division in the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Saigon . He told me about the propaganda output of his organization. NEWSPAPERS Vietnam Ngay Nay ( Vietnam Today), a weekly, printed in 600,000 copies, distributed to pacified areas. Mien Nam Tu-Do (Free South), a bi-weekly, printed in 1,300,000 copies, air-dropped to denied areas. Special Issue - Mien Nam Tu-Do - No.52  JUSPAO 3022 - December 1968 Stories include President Nguyen Van Thieu taking part in Paris talks, a photograph of Vice-President Ky and President Nixon strengthening US-Vietnam ties. The newspaper Mien Nam Tu-Do was written by the Field Development Division, then printed in the United States Information Agency plant in Manila, with the cost paid for by the U.S. Army (7th PSYOP Group). Each issue was given a regular JUSPAO code number. For instance, mini-newspaper issue 49 of November, 1968 was coded 2984. The newspaper targeted rural areas of Vietnam that were not served by the civilian press. Its purpose was to keep those rural areas informed of national programs in their behalf; publicize Government victories and Communist defeats; developments in the Chieu Hoi program; Free World assistance to the Government of Vietnam; and the anti-Government actions by Hanoi, the NLF and the Viet Cong. The newspaper came in both a regular and a mini-size issue. In 1968, 520,000 copies of the mini-issue were distributed to the 44 provinces mostly by hand instead of air drop. The size of the mini-edition is 9.5-inches by 10.5-inches. The full-size newspaper was 10.5-inches by 16-inches. Full-sized number 10 was dated November, 1968 and coded 2987. In 1968, 2,000,000 copies were printed every other week. Occasionally, special issues were produced. The newspaper was printed in Manila and flown to Vietnam for distribution by the four PSYOP Battalions. 1,300,000 copies were issued to the battalion to be airdropped over Viet Cong areas. The other 700,000 issues were shipped to the 44 provinces. Full-sized issue 10 depicted a photograph of President Nixon and news of his election as President of the United States. Ngon Song Newspaper We should mention that the U.S. printed many newspapers for the Vietnamese. JUSPAO 2955, printed in November, 1968, was entitled Ngon Song. (Notice that the Vietnamese spell it Nguon Song). The Vietnam spelling translates to Life Source or Source of Life. 30,000 copies of this newspaper were prepared and handed out by the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) Cadre to urban citizens that lived around the capitol of Saigon. The general theme of the newspaper was The Government of Vietnams image. Stories on the front page include: The President severely denounces indiscriminate shell in cities by the North Vietnamese Army and the Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia. The population of Saigon denounces the shelling of the Communists. According to the 1969 declassified report: Employment of US Army Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam, other newspapers include: Ban Tin (News Clips), issued twice weekly, two pages, 72,000 copies per edition. The 7th PSYOP Battalion printed Ban Tin for Vietnamese target audiences in Corps Tactical Zone I. Tin Tong Hop (News Roundup), issued daily, two pages, 40,000 copies per edition. The 6th PSYOP Battalion printed Tin Tong Hop for VC and general population audiences in support of CORDS Corps Tactical Zone III. A January 1969 report states that the 6th PSYOP Battalion printed 845,000 copies of the daily newspaper Tin Tong-Hop (News Roundup) for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). These newspapers were disseminated by Vietnamese Newspaper Service (VIS) personnel in villages and hamlets throughout the III Corps area. Tin Chien Truong (News from the Front), one page, 50,000 copies per edition. The 6th PSYOP Battalion printed Tin Chien Truong for VC and NVA troop target audiences in support of CORDS Corps Tactical Zone III. A January 1969 report states that the 6th PSYOP Battalion printed 800,000 copies of the daily newspaper Tin Chien-Truong (News from the Battlefield) for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). These newspapers were disseminated by aircraft over enemy areas of operation and are designed to give enemy troops a true picture of current events and the battlefield situation. Khanh Hoa, issued twice monthly, one page, 15,000 copies per edition. The 8th PSYOP Battalion printed Khanh Hoa for distribution by hand during face-to-face PSYOP missions in Corps Tactical Zone III. I was surprised that the Army gave no translation for Khanh Hoa and then realized that it was the name of a province in which Nha Trang City is located. That is Corps Tactical Zone II so it is possible that the report information is incorrect in this entry. I believe this newspaper was for CTZ II. FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures mentions the proper use of propaganda newspapers: Newspapers and magazines are an excellent means of transmitting a PSYOP message, as they are durable and lasting. Therefore, PSYOP Soldiers should use them as a means to disseminate messages of enduring importance, such as the long-term stability of your country hinges upon a representative governmentvote in the upcoming elections. Newspapers produced by PSYOP should provide timely, truthful news and entertainment in a format familiar to the Target Audience. Articles should include current events, meaningful stories, and leisure articles. The persuasive messages contained within should convey enduring themes that directly or indirectly incorporate U.S. national objectives in an effort to achieve long-term behavior changes in the Target Audience. Stories, such as those that exemplify positive accomplishments of the Allied forces, should be balanced with human interest and some entertainment features. PSYOP messages should be clear with an identifiable source. News stories must be as unbiased as possible. Credibility is critical. MAGAZINES Huong Que Huong Que (Rural Spirit), a monthly, printed in 565,000 copies, for distribution throughout the rural areas of South Vietnam, intended to help improve farming methods.The publication was written by the Field Development Division staff of JUSPAO, and printed at the Regional Support Center in Manila. The magazines were distributed by the Vietnamese Information Service throughout the 44 provinces of Vietnam. The magazine above is Number 72, with the code 3386 although it is not found anywhere on the publication. Some of the stories in this issue are: Effective Protection for Pigs and Chickens; Hatching and raising pond fish; Growing sugar cane and the globe artichoke. PFC Alan Wondra of the 199th Infantry Brigade passes out copies of Free World to children at Cat Lai on 30 August 1967.

Photo by SP4 Jerrold Fishman The Gioi Tu-Do (Free World), JUSPAO printed monthly in 155,000 copies. This was a general interest magazine, edited for educated adults and students. Free World offered adults a digest of U.S. magazines. Long Me (Mothers Heart), targets the civil bureaucracy of Vietnam, the Armed Forces, the population of contested areas and the general public. It is published bi-monthly in 100,000 copies each, to gain support for the Chieu Hoi Program and act as a house organ for Chieu Hoi cadre. . Tien Phong (Vanguard), JUSPAO's News for the Officers Corps. It contains items of interest to those in command positions. 20,000 copies per month Chien Si Cong Hoa (Republican Fighter), Non-commissioner Officers magazine. 247,000 copies a month. Chien Si Tim Hieu (Fighters Information Booklet), the soldiers booklet, which serves to keep him informed and helps build morale and a fighting spirit. 300,000 copies every two weeks. Tien Tuyen (Front lines), 25,000 copies a day for soldiers and civilians. It reports both military and civilian news from the Republic of Vietnam and around the world. JUSPAO printed 100,000 copies per month of Quest, targeting students with popular science articles. Van Tac Vu Van Tac Vu (Cultural Drama), published bi-monthly in 12,000 copies: It provided materials (songs, skits, poems, etc.) and guidance to the Cultural Drama Teams. Thong Cam Thong Cam (Mutual Understanding) Magazine. The 4th PSYOP Group produced a monthly 16-page magazine targeted to Vietnamese employees of US military forces and civilian firms. This multi-color magazine was printed by the 7th PSYOP Group in 80,000 copies. Initially, distribution of the magazine was limited to III CorpsTactical Zone. However, plans were made to expand the magazine to 32 pages in 135,000 copies per month beginning in July 1969 to allow country-wide circulation. The magazine was aimed at promoting good will and understanding between the US and Vietnamese people. FM 3-05.301 also discusses magazines: Production concerns and considerations for magazines are similar to newspapers. A magazine done well, on glossy paper with quality-color illustrations, is expensive. However, a magazine of less-than-high quality is usually a waste of resources and talent. Magazines allow for longer, more scholarly articles supporting PSYOP arguments. A magazine should have interesting and entertaining articles and features as well. A magazine may have broad appeal to multiple Target Audience, but it is unreasonable to expect one magazine to be all things to all Target Audience. PROPAGANDA BOOKLETS American PSYOP units prepared leaflets, posters, newspapers, calendars, magazines, and of course booklets. I thought I would show the reader a few that were prepared by the 7th PSYOP Group on Okinawa for Vietnam. Land Tenure Booklet The first booklet was developed in May 1968, coded 2593, and titled Land Tenure Booklet. The cover has a farmer working his field with water buffalo and the back has a colorful painting of a farm scene. The 18-page booklet was printed for the general population to provide information to land owners of rights and privileges and government regulations that affect them. There are 60 numbered paragraphs answering every question that a land owner might ask regarding rights and obligations, land rights and contracts, renting, crops, seeds, fertilizer, security, disputes and penalties. Rights and Duties of the Citizens The second booklet was developed in August 1968, coded 2613, and titled Rights and Duties of the Citizens. The cover has the flag of the Republic of Vietnam at top and a Vietnamese woman voting on the back. 500,000 copies were printed in the Regional Service Center in Manila. The 10-page booklet is designed for children to teach them their civic duties. The book is meant to instill patriotism and pride in their nation and national heritage. It explains their Constitution and lists 29 rights and duties the children will have as adults. PROPAGANDA NEWSLETTERS Because there were numerous organizations in Vietnam supported and sponsored by the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam; civilian, military, social and governmental, the 7th PSYOP Group provided newsletters to keep them up to date on current news and policies. I have selected two as an example of this type of a propaganda publication. Phuoc Ninh District Newsletter This July 1968 publication is the Phuoc Ninh District Newsletter, designed to provide an attractive and attention-getting cover to facilitate dissemination to the district, both urban and rural. 2,000 copies wuold be printed weekly with the JUSPAO code number 2659. Kiem Tan Newsletter This June 1968 publication is the Kiem Tan Newsletter with the JUSPAO code 2663. In English it is Peoples Progress, by the Tien Yan Information Services. INFORMATIVE WALLET CARDS Ready Reference Facts on Vietnam The military constantly prepares informative wallet cards to be carried by their personnel giving information and protocol for different occurrences. In Vietnam some of the cards prepared were titled: The Enemy in Your Hands (On POW care); Nine Rules (On how to act correctly in Vietnam) and Guidance for Commanders in Vietnam (Care of the men and tactics). When the command desired such cards they were usually printed by the PSYOP units because they had the writers, artists and printing presses. The card above prepared by the 7th PSYOP Group is titled Ready Reference Facts on Vietnam and covers the stakes in Vietnam, the military effort, building a nation, the country, and the enemy. POSTERS Posters were produced in varying sizes, multi-color. Normally, 50,000 copies were printed of each poster. Poster 2878 Because I mostly study leaflets which are usually about 6 x 3-inches and can fit into a small book or into plastic holders, I have few full-sized posters. They tend to be large and clumsy and are difficult to store. However, I do want to show our readers at least one full-sized JUSPAO poster. This one measures 30 inches in height by 11 inches in width. It would normally be tacked to a large board where Vietnamese civilians congregate. There are two images of Vietnamese self-defense forces on parade. The text is: THE PEOPLES UNITE TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY The goal of the peoples self-defense program is to mobilize the entire population to actively participate in the fighting. The people will defend the rear area, will carry out production activities, and will support the front lines. OUR ENTIRE POPULATION MUST UNITE TO DEFEND OUR JUST CAUSE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY. My translator commented: The wording is something that could have been copied right out of North Vietnamese propaganda posters or leaflets. I wonder if they had an ex-Viet Cong who went Chieu Hoi write this. Poster 2746 This JUSPAO poster was printed in September 1968 and features U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson. The text is: WE WILL NOT FAIL WE WILL NOT TIRE WE WILL NOT RETREAT On 7 April 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson solemnly promised to help the people of the Republic of Vietnam to the end. The Government of the Unite States will always respect this promise to the people of South Vietnam. I absolutely believe...that the first requirement for the other side to change its attitude is to do something to show that our position is strong and firm and that we are determined that we will not abandon our promises regarding the independence and the national right to self-determination of the South Vietnamese people. 24 October 1964 - U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson

Statement at the Manila Summit If the negotiating effort is unable to restore peace, peace will come when Hanoi understands that our resolve will not be altered and that our power is unmatched. President Johnson's statement

To the American people - 31 March 1968 Poster 2768 This JUSPAO poster was printed in September 1968 in color and features President Johnson and President Thieu. The text is: THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM RESOLUTELY OPPOSE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION At the request of President Nguyen Van Thieu, a meeting between the Presidents of the United States and Vietnam was held in Honolulu, Hawaii, on 19 and 20 July 1968. During this meeting the leaders of the two nations discussed important military and political developments in South Vietnam related to the Paris Conference. The two President's took this opportunity to call on the North Vietnamese authorities to cease all aggressive actions and to demonstrate a good faith desire for peace in the Paris talks in order begin direct talks between the Republic of Vietnam and North Vietnam. The two Presidents also affirmed their resolute opposition to any aggression against South Vietnam. In joint policy statements the President of the Republic of Vietnam emphasized the determination of the Government and people of South Vietnam to defend his nation and the American President promised that the U.S. would continue to help the Republic of Vietnam defend its territory. Poster 2854 This JUSPAO poster was printed in September 1968 in full color, the size 21 x 33-inches. There are six photographs of civilian and paramilitary forces. The text is: PEOPLE DEFEND THE NATION People take charge of defending the rear. This is a self-defense unit at Tan Tru District, Long An Province. Mr. Huynh Van Dao, of the Prime Ministers Office, congratulates a self-defense unit at Tan Tru that fought to protect the lives and property of the people. Women participate in medical aid work. The purpose of the People's Self-Defense force is to mobilize all the people to destroy the Communist enemy. Poster 2855 This JUSPAO poster was printed in September 1968 in full color. This poster has three larger photographs. The theme is The Government of Vietnam Image. 50,000 copies were prepared for dissemination all over the country to the civilian population. The text is: THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM HELPS THE PEOPLE IN RECONSTRUCTION During the Tet attack in Hoc Mon the Viet Cong destroyed this bridge. Government soldiers repaired the bridge. Besides destroying the enemy on the battlefield, Government soldiers maintain roads for the people. Reconstruction of Viet Cong damage helps people to resume their normal lives so that they can enjoy peace and prosperity. HELP THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO DEFEAT THE VIET CONG JOIN YOUR LOCAL SELF-DEFENSE FORCE REPORT VIET CONG MOVEMENT TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS Poster 2514 Many of the posters prepared by JUSPAO for the South Vietnamese people encouraged patriotism and love of country. This very colorful poster is a map of the Republic of Vietnam showing all the provinces, the province capital, and the products found in that province. The poster was printed in May of 1988 in the size of 10 x 14 inches as 2514A, and also as 17 x 22 inches code numbered 2514. The United States Archives mentions Vietnam War propaganda posters and says in part: We list 438 posters produced by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) for use in psychological warfare activities supporting the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) during the Vietnam War. The poster themes and designs reflect the fierce competition between the two Vietnams, North and South, to win the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese public. Posters are grouped under ten main themes reflecting JUSPAO propaganda priorities. The theme with the largest poster concentration is "Support Social and Economic Accomplishments," comprising one third of the total item count. This category highlights the activities of the government's Revolutionary Development program to work alongside rural Vietnamese in building houses, medical centers, roads, wells, bridges, schools, markets, and in making other infrastructure improvements. Many of the rural communities featured were the New Life Hamlets. Another well-represented theme is Encourage the Goals of the Chieu Hoi Program, referring to the South Vietnamese government program designed to encourage and facilitate the defection of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers back to the Southern cause. The Explain American Presence in Vietnam grouping illustrates the activities of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam, with the purpose of assuring the rural people of the South of the friendly intentions of the United States. Several posters in this category feature South Korean forces engaged in similar activities. A small number also feature the activities in Vietnam of other allied forces from Thailand, New Zealand, the Philippines and Australia. Another large category, Exploit All Military Victories, publicizes military victories won by Popular Forces, Regional Forces and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces against the Viet Cong. The Exploit Viet Cong Vulnerabilities highlights the depredations and atrocities committed by the Viet Cong in the South. Pictures show dead and wounded atrocity victims, funerals of victims, captured Viet Cong perpetrators, buildings damaged and destroyed in Viet Cong attacks, the hardships imposed on the people by Viet Cong actions, and anti-Viet Cong protest rallies. A few posters also relate the story of the Viet Cong defector, Nguyen Van Be, shown holding North Vietnamese newspapers that erroneously announce his sacrifice of his life for the sake of the Northern cause. The smaller-volume categories feature messages on public health issues, Vietnamese armed forces recruitment, and a broad miscellany of subjects that include the U.S. Apollo 11 lunar mission, Vietnamese public security, and the inauguration ceremony for South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.

OTHER ITEMS

Air-drop leaflets: These were usually 3 X 6, normally printed on both sides; an average of 15 prototypes were developed each month. We had the capability of printing and air-dropping 1 billion per month. Pamphlets: These were program-oriented; for example, they supported the IR-8 rice program, land reform, etc. They were printed in any quantity needed, ranging from 25,000 to 1,000,000 copies.

Airborne loudspeaker tapes: These were 30 to 40 second messages, normally produced in three dialects of Vietnamese.

JUSPAO had a printing plant in Saigon . We were supported by a large USIA printing plant located in Manila . The U.S. military PSYOP Group had a printing plant in Vietnam, but depended also on the printing plant of the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa .

The Information Division was also an operations shop, with the more traditional roles of explaining American policy and projecting the U.S. image beginning in 1964 there was a more psychological operations slant to the efforts of the Information Division. This division was also into radio, television, motion pictures, photography and publications. The Cultural Affairs Division was not involved in the propaganda business, being concerned with such programs as libraries, cultural centers and bi-national centers, book translations, and English teaching. The Technical Division was largely USAIDs area of material assistance. The North Vietnamese Affairs Division handled propaganda to the North, along the trails in Laos, and later in Cambodia.

The Mission Press Center was part of JUSPAO until 1968 when it was separated. Chieu Hoi Propaganda Team Member JUSPAO carried out extensive campaigns to induce North Vietnamese troops to surrender. The bulk of money and attention was focused on the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program to encourage Viet Cong to "rally" to the cause of the Republic of Vietnam. Begun in 1963 and administered by JUSPAO after its formation in 1965, the Chieu Hoi campaign resulted in billions of leaflets, millions of posters, magazines, and leaflets, and thousands of hours of loudspeaker exhortations encouraging Viet Cong defection; this is said to have been the largest propaganda campaign in history, with over 10 billion leaflets dropped in 1969 alone. In addition to offering amnesty and good treatment, monetary rewards were offered and paid to defectors who turned in weapons. Rewards were offered to third parties who induced Viet Cong to defect, with special bonuses for mass defections. These schemes were highly successful and were extended through 1969, but were terminated on 31 December 1969, probably because of abuses in awarding the money. We should also mention the Dai Doan Ket Program. This was a Chieu Hoi program aimed at middle and higher cadre in the Viet Cong. Most officers had come from the peasantry and it was believed that they would not rally to the Government just to be returned to the peasant class. This program promised to accept high-ranking returnees and place them in responsible positions. The 6 August 1967 PSYOP Guide prepared by the Office of the Psychological Operations Directorate of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, mentions the Dai Doan Ket Program: Potential defectors need to be reassured concerning the treatment they will receive after rallying and the opportunities offered them for reintegration into society. Former middle-level and higher cadre have stated their desire to prove themselves by working for the Government of Vietnam in jobs that make use of their qualifications. Leaflets making specific reference to the Dai Doan Ket (National Reconciliation Program) which is aimed at helping qualified returnees find employment commensurate with their previous training and experience should be particularly useful in appealing to this group. There were numerous command and control problems at JUSPAO just as there were in the field PSYOP groups and battalions. Colonel William E. Linn was the Chief of Policy, Plans and Research and later the Assistant Director for Field Operations from March 1968 to April 1969. He wrote a PSYOP After-Action Report on 6 June 1969 that details the problems and recommendations for solving them. I will just mention a few of the more important ones. COL Linn is particularly disturbed that JUSPAO was never warned in advance about major policy shifts, and if given advance notice, was not allowed to utilize the information for PSYOP. He gives as example the bombing halts of March 1968 and October 1968. On both occasions JUSPAO was ready to tell the Vietnamese people why the bombing was halted. Because they had no guidance or permission they were unable to do so. As a result: Hanoi propagandists had a field day pounding all Vietnamese target audiences that they had won a total victory; to fight on until the U.S. aggressors are forced out of Vietnam; that the North Vietnamese regime had not conceded anything to the United States at Paris; and that the United States was required to admit defeat due to U.S. and world public opinion; and that the bombing halt was proof that the communists fight in the Republic of Vietnam was just and right. Linn complains about the lack of a single person in charge of all PSYOP in Vietnam . This complaint is seen again and again in after-actions. There was far too much division of authority. An interesting complaint is that although JUSPAO in theory is in general charge of PSYOP, they are not cleared to know what black operations are being performed by MACV-SOG. He worries that the two agencies might be sending different messages to the enemy: It is recognized that this is a sensitive area, but we must also recognize that the effectiveness of PSYOP is predicated, to a large degree, on a coordinated effort. In the case of these two activities, the product they are attempting to sell should complement one another; thereby adding to the credibility of each others product. Finally, a complaint that I have seen in almost every PSYOP after-action since the Korean War is the training of personnel. Linn says: As an example, in the Army the bulk of resources for PSYOP come from the Armor and Artillery branches, while in the Air Force the majority are ex-bombardiers of other SAC personnel. A further deficiency in the selection criteria is that officers selected for the JUSPAO staff seldom if ever are old hands with background and experience. Curiously. Linn supports his own argument. His signature block shows that he was a Colonel, Field Artillery. Another complaint was made by William Lloyd Stearman who headed the North Vietnamese Affairs Division of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office from December 1965 to September 1967. He states that when he arrived he was the only officer in the Saigon mission that had actual experience with Communist affairs. Stearman says that the early leafleting campaign was not as effective as it could have been in his book: An American Adventure, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2012. He says that in 1965: I scurried around the State Department in search of expertise on North Vietnam. To my astonishment, we had no one working fulltime on a country with which we had been de facto at war for nearly a year JUSPAO was largely staffed by officers the United States Information Service and Army and Air Force officers. The result was an organization that was predictably weak in substance and long on techniques. I rarely heard any discussion on why we were doing anything. It was almost always about how we were doing it [JUSPAO] got most of its information about the North from Vietnamese who came South in 1954 to escape Communist rule in the North. More than ten years had elapsed since they left and much had changed in the interim. In other words, their knowledge about the North was hopelessly outdated. I went through all the leaflets in our inventory and had a number of questions about them. I decided to show them to captured North Vietnamese Army soldiers to see their reaction. I was not surprised to see that they didnt seem to understand the messages. For one thing, there was a constant harping on the Chinese menace. Chinese forces, especially artillery, were in a large measure responsible for the decisive Communist defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. China provided considerable military assistance to the North In other words; I believed the people in the North had begun to look on the Chinese more as friends than as foes . Thomas C. Sorensen tells us more about special JUSPAO teams in The Word War, Harper & Row, N.Y., 1968: JUSPAO helped train six-man Van Tac Vu (Cultural Drama Service) troupes and assisted in the production of their material. The entertainers - among them, attractive actresses unaccustomed to hardship - traveled in black pajamas commonly worn by peasants, and lived with the villagers as they moved around the countryside, performing twenty or more shows a month. The troupes sang patriotic songs ("Vietnam, Vietnam" and "Our House"), amused and indoctrinated the peasantry with primitive dramas about villainous Viet Cong and heroic South Vietnamese soldiers and officials, and off stage distributed medicines, seed, food, and pamphlets, and helped at chores ranging from repairing damaged buildings to bathing infants. The PSYOP Guide also mentions Culture Drama teams: This group, made up of all types of entertainers, provides culture drama shows for Vietnamese military primarily in the Capital Military District. Organic to each POLWAR Battalion in the four Corps is a culture Platoon which provides entertainment throughout the Corps area in the form of songs, dramas, dances and similar activities. In the remote areas, these platoons may provide the only source of entertainment for the people. Under the heading Current Activities the PSYOP Guide mentions other programs of interest: Armed Propaganda Teams are made up of ralliers under the Chieu Hoi Program. The teams provide their own protection and have proven most effective in obtaining ralliers, quite frequently by interacting with the families of known Viet Cong. Mobile Training Teams provide on-site indoctrination training for the Popular Forces in each of the four Corps. The purpose of the teams is to promote solidarity and morale of the Popular Forces. Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). The basic intent of MEDCAP is to establish and maintain a continuing spirit of mutual respect and cooperation between the Vietnamese and U.S. military medical personal and the civilian population by providing basic medical care to the people living in rural and often Viet Cong infested villages and hamlets. Under PSYOP Programs the 1968 Guide says: The Chieu Hoi Program consists of all activities designed to cause members of the Viet Cong and their supporters to return to the rightful and legitimate government of the Republic of Vietnam . The Dai Doan Ket Program extends the Chieu Hoi program to middle and high level Viet Cong cadre. The B-52 Follow-up Program . Within four hours of a B-52 strike leaflets are dropped informing the enemy that he has been bombed by B-52s and showing him a picture of the bomber which flies so high that he would otherwise never see it. It reminds him that the bombers will come again and urges the Viet Cong to use the safe conduct pass. The North Vietnamese personnel in South Vietnam Program is designed to create doubts and fears in the minds of enemy troops about their chance of survival; the dangers of injury and disease; burial in unmarked graves; the hopelessness of their situation; the fate of their friends and relatives in the north, and the competence of their commanders. The Weapons Reward Program offers money and gifts for retrieval of weapons and ordnance. The Defoliation Program provides security for lines of communication by removing dense vegetation that could be used to conceal ambush sites, remove jungle cover from enemy base areas and infiltration routes, and provide increased visibility around friendly installations. PSYOP programs can minimize any adverse psychological impact of defoliation and reduce the effect of enemy propaganda by providing the population with timely information. The defoliant used in Vietnam is particularly effective against broadleaf vegetation and is harmless to men and animals. The Frantic Goat Campaign formally known as Fact Sheet  disseminates news and related facts to North Vietnam . The Trail Campaign is directed against military and civilian personnel who use and maintain the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Tallyho Campaign is conducted in the panhandle area of North Vietnam against the civilians who maintain the lines of communications and warns them that the lines will continue to be interdicted and bombed. The later December 1973 Survey of Psychological Operations in Vietnam adds more data about operations at the end of the war: After the Paris Agreements were signed earlier this year, most leaflet operations were halted. Operation Trail, a leaflet program against North Vietnamese troops on the Ho Chi Minh Trail; the Royal Lao air Force Operation Fountain Pen, directed against North Vietnamese troops in Laos, and Operation Rice River, directed against North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, continued for a period. There is one Khmer language leaflet campaign. Operation Big Show, a gray leaflet (without attribution) by the Khmer government Operation Freedom Care, a white leaflet (U.S. attribution) to Vietnamese communists in the Khmer Republic the Khmer Republic has a small leaflet program. The government of Vietnam leaflet program is sharply limited and rated ineffective Most of the leaflet printing capability is in the hands of the Americans Giant presses are operated by the Seventh PSYOP Group in Okinawa and at the United States Information Agencys Regional Service Center in Manila. Bob Fulton was the Executive Officer for Regional Service Center (RSC) in Manila, (part of the United States Information Agency (USIA). He told me about the printing plant: In mid-1967 JUSPAO and MACV outsourced to our organization a significant portion of the design, procurement, production and logistics of printed PSYOP products, especially those that required four-colors. This was a Department of Defense-State Department level joint decision based in part on capacity and capability, strategic location, and a few convoluted international and domestic political considerations. Until I left in the second half of 1970, almost the entire high-altitude leaflet drops were printed on our presses, packed in our plant in triple-wall cardboard air-drop containers together with release shrouds, and either shipped to Clark AFB or by U.S. ship to a Republic of Vietnam or Thailand port for subsequent transport to one of five bases. If memory serves me correctly, October or November 1968 was the high mark for leaflet drops, almost 1 billion, and we produced 75% to 80% of that total. There was no U.S. Army PSYOP commander, although JUSPAO was represented at command level through a coordinating committee. The President of the United States directed in 1970 that an Ad Hoc PSYOP Committee on Vietnam be formed to provide direction for and coordination of psychological warfare against the Vietnamese Communists. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group proposed the following objectives for more effective coordination of psychological operations against the Vietnamese Communists. 1. Develop a National Psychological Warfare strategy directed against the Vietnamese Communists, including psychological objectives to be accomplished. 2. Coordinate the overall psychological warfare effort against the Vietnamese Communists. 3. Provide thematic guidance. 4. Prepare periodic reports to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on our psychological warfare operations against the Vietnamese Communists. 5. Assess the anticipated psychological impact of Vietnam related policy options as appropriate. Other decisions relating to a psychological warfare strategy, as well as other decisions covering major issues in the conduct of our psychological warfare against the Vietnamese Communists, were to be referred to the President for approval. Additional recommendations were to persuade the Communist Party leadership to change its policies; increase internal tensions, doubts, and policies; and motivate the Vietnamese people to question the wisdom of the North Vietnamese Government. The proposed targets were the top Party leadership, the Party apparatus, the North Vietnamese people, and Communist forces in the north and south. The themes developed for each target were designed to convince them that the war could not be won and policies must be changed, to increase war weariness and discouragement among troops and the population, and to cause resentment and tension between northerners and southerners. The United States Prepares to pull out of Vietnam Under President Nixons plan of Vietnamization; giving the war to the South Vietnamese, PSYOP units began to disband. The 4th PSYOP Group disbanded in 12 October 1971. Meanwhile, in an attempt to get the North Vietnamese to the peace table the United States began the bombing of the North. This campaign was called Operation FIELD GOAL, a psychological operation against North Vietnam from July 1972 to the cease-fire in January 1973. The original plan for directing PSYOP against NVN existed in 1965 under the code name FACT SHEET. Originally conceived by JUSPAO as a threat campaign, its main message threatened increased bombing if the North Vietnamese continued to support their government's policies. Later, the program was renamed FRANTIC GOAT and was redirected to inform the people of North Vietnam of the actual progress of the war and of the intentions of the government of the Republic of Vietnam and its Allies. The total number of leaflets dropped by all aircraft types during FIELD GOAL operations from 1 July 1972 to 28 January 1973 was 660,649,000. This was an average of slightly over 94 million per month compared to the desired 240 million. On 1 July 1972 , the management and control of PSYOP in Southeast Asia (SEA) shifted from the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). The general concept developed for post-Vietnamization PSYOP aerial activity continued to be the high-altitude, wind-drift delivery of leaflets to targeted areas. The 5th, 7th, and 13th Air Forces, provided delivery and logistics support. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was tasked to provide B-52s or drone aircraft when authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Army's 7th Psychological Operations Group in Okinawa, provided the packaged leaflets, handling and loading, and information on tile wind-borne characteristics of the leaflets. PSYOP CHRONOLOGY The Location of U.S. PSYOP Units U. S. Army Major Michael G. Barger wrote a thesis entitled Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam. In it, he gave a chronology of PSYOP in Vietnam. We mention some of the more important dates here: 27 APR 1960 - CINCPAC directs deployment of PSYWAR personnel to Vietnam. FEB 1962 - First PSYWAR Mobile Training Team (MTT) arrives in Vietnam 14 MAY 1965 - Formation of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). 22 JUL 1965 - 1st Provisional PSYOP Detachment ordered to Vietnam by U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity Pacific (USABVAPAC) 02 SEP 1965 - 24th PSYOP Detachment arrives in Qui Nhon. 07 FEB 1966 - 6th PSYOP Battalion activated at Tan Son Nhut. 10 FEB 1966 - 244th, 245th, and 246th Tactical Propaganda Companies activated at Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Bien Hoa. 19 NOV 1966 - 19th PSYOP Company (Advice and Support) activated at Can Tho. 01 DEC 1967 - 6th PSYOP Battalion redesignated 4th PSYOP Group; 244th PSYOP Company redesignated 7th PSYOP Battalion; 245th PSYOP Company redesignated 8th PSYOP Battalion; 19th PSYOP Company redesignated 10th PSYOP Battalion. 05 DEC 1967 - 246th PSYOP Company redesignated 6th PSYOP Battalion. 16 APR 1971 - 10th PSYOP Battalion inactivated. 26 JUN 1971 - 8th PSYOP Battalion inactivated. 30 JUN 1971 - 6th PSYOP Battalion inactivated. 02 OCT 1971 - 4th PSYOP Group inactivated. 21 DEC 1971 - 7th PSYOP Battalion inactivated. Leaflet Codes and Colors The vast majority of Vietnam leaflets bore codes or designations. For the most part they are simple to read. In general, the originating unit placed its number first, then the number of the leaflet (for that year), and finally the year itself. So, we would expect to find leaflets starting with 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 244, 245, 246, etc. A leaflet will generally have a code like 6-250-68 which indicates that it was the 250th leaflet produced (or distributed) in 1968 by the 6th PSYOP Battalion. An American leaflet with no code is probably one produced by Special Forces prior to 1967. Early JUSPAO leaflets had the code "SP" (Special Project) before the leaflet number. For example, SP-2250. JUSPAO removed the "SP" when it became clear that it identified the leaflet as American in origin. The later leaflets would have only a numerical code like "4450." This was explained in an issue of the 4th PSYOP Group monthly magazine Credibilis of 10 January 1968 which explained the change thusly: Letters of the alphabet will no longer be used in 4th PSYOP Group leaflet designations to eliminate any markings which would tend to identify the leaflet as being of American Origin. The earliest numbered leaflets (before they were marked with a unit number) simply showed a numerical and a year. For instance, leaflets in the I Corps Tactical Zone Leaflet Catalog  Joint Psywar Civil Affairs Center, have codes like 79-66 or 183-66. The catalog calls them the 66 series but it seems clear these were produced by the 244th PSYOP Company. Later on, unit designations were added. Number coded leaflets starting with "4-" are Fourth PSYOP Group. Number coded leaflets starting with "6-" are Sixth PSYOP Battalion, "7-" are Seventh PSYOP Battalion, "8-" are Eighth PSYOP Battalion, and "10-" are Tenth PSYOP Battalion. I also discovered that the 10th Battalion printed leaflets coded CC though I do not know what the letters stood for. Higher numbered leaflets are usually the earlier PSYOP Companies; "19-" are the 19th PSYOP Company and curiously we sometimes see that 19 as the middle number of a leaflet like 6-19-67, 244- are the 244th PSYOP Company, "245-" are the 245th PSYOP Company and "246-" represents the 246th PSYOP Company. I have not seen leaflets starting "24-", but there may be some printed by the 24th PSYOP Company. In addition, there were a number of special codes. Leaflets dropped along the Ho Chi Minh Trail as part of the "Trail Campaign" had the letter T at the front. An example is T80. If the Ts was at the end of the code like 95T it indicated that the leaflet was designed for another campaign but modified for use on the trail. Leaflets dropped on North Vietnam during the Operation Fact Sheet or Operation Frantic Goat of 1965-68 have very low numbers, from 1-151. There are leaflets in the Lao language designed by the Lao Government with American help and printed by U.S. PSYOP units during the Vietnam War that have very low code numbers preceded by a period. Examples are .1, .110, and .530. There are other codes such as "A" (the basic form of a leaflet when there is more than one variation following variations would be B, C. D, etc); "H" (handbill), "P" (poster) and "R" (reprint or revision) and letters like a, b, and c, at the end of the numbers which indicate versions, revisions or one of a series. The code NP was the newspaper Nhan Van (Human Knowledge). CP represents Camel Path, the secret operation in Cambodia. The CP is sometimes hidden inside the code such as T-1-CP-C which could show the leaflet was dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail as part of Camel Path for Cambodia. The CP leaflets were quite secret and cancelled early. I think some might have been disguised. I recently saw the leaflet CP-08 that was identical to another coded just P-08. This might have been done to hide the Cambodian connection. ATF leaflets were printed by the Australians. In addition, there are other codes such as F we cannot identify. HQ was the headquarters of the 6th Battalion, later the 4th Group for leaflet use in South Vietnam. L at the end of a leaflet indicates it was printed on a light paper to make use of light prevailing winds (16-pound paper instead of the normal 20-pound paper), M (leaflets seem to be all in the Cambodian language), we don't know much about the NT series (NT3, NT4 etc.), P, was original for PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam), now NVA, and targeted NVA inside South Vietnam Q, R followed by a single digit like R-4 indicates a scrap leaflet designed for various campaigns. "R" within the body or at the end of the leaflet indicates a revision, and example is 146-66-R. S (in Vietnamese or Lao) for slam such as "S-3 or S12, which later became the trail campaign "T-01 or T-013", S at the end of a leaflet like 116S indicates a summer leaflet on 16-pound paper (116S). SPC (Vietnamese in Laos or on the Trail to Laos?) V, X, another scrap leaflet used without regard to dissemination characteristics so they are leaflets just printed in blank spaces on sheets to utilize the paper more efficiently. The letters N and P after the numbers such as following the 245 of the 245th PSYOP Battalion indicate Nha Trang or Pleiku locations. In the same way, some units have more than one printing facility so a number will be added at the end of the unit number, such as 8(1) which indicates the Pleiku Detachment of the 8th PSYOP Battalion. We should point out that apparently nobody bothered to record the meaning of the codes or who printed the leaflets during the war. Some we have been able to decipher by unit, language or message, but many are still unknown today. There may be a reason for the mystery. We were told that some of the codes were in regard to classified missions. Leaflets printed by the Vietnamese Armed Forces or ARVN usually start with a BV such as BV15AH2268 or the letter A followed by numbers or letters such as A5V4. About 1970 I first saw a Military Assistance Command Vietnam and 4th PSYOP Group chart of the colors that were good and bad to use on leaflets for Vietnam. The PhDs and cultural experts had done 760 surveys and printed out a chart showing what colors were safe and trusted and which ones were to be avoided if possible. I don't know if this chart was helpful at all but here are the colors and the alleged emotions they arouse in the Vietnamese people. I doubt if this chart was used extensively. Black - Death, mourning, bad luck, danger, fear, the Viet Cong, war and sadness.

Blue - Hope, family, good luck, happiness, love and peace.

Green - Hope, family, good luck, happiness, prosperity and peace.

Purple - Love and sadness,

Red - Blood, anger, danger, death, fear, the Viet Cong and war.

White - Purity, peace and chastity.

Yellow - Skin color, the GVN, prosperity and nobility.

Pink - Love. There was a series of interviews in Kontum province in May 1971 that indicated the significance of color differs from one place to another and from one Montagnard tribe to another. Leaflet P-08 I have seen at least ten of the P leaflets. Examples are: P-01 (Where are your comrades?); P-02 (Life in South Vietnam); P-04 (Aspects of peoples life in South Vietnam); and P-010 (Where is the liberated territory?). The image on P-08 above depicts an American helping a Vietnamese with construction. Some of the text is: IS THIS IMPERIALISM? The United States is the richest and most powerful country in the world. What does it need from Vietnam? NOTHING. In fact, it is now giving free Vietnam 40,000,000,000 piasters in food and economic assistance a year. Is this the new form of imperialism as propagandized and distorted by the North Vietnamese Communists? We mention Catalog several times in this article. I have a number of such catalogs and their use is explained the 1969 document Employment of U.S. Army Psychological Operation Units in Vietnam: Each PSYOP battalion published a catalog listing 600 to 800 available leaflets. The catalog was numerically indexed and gave data on leaflet number, theme, target, size and color of the leaflet, together with the leaflet and English translation. Catalogs were inventoried and screened periodically to maintain current leaflets. Catalogs were distributed to tactical units and PSYOP customers to facilitate ordering specific leaflets for the target audience. Action was taken by the 4th PSYOP Group to cross-index leaflet catalogs according to PSYOP themes. It was noted that several units initiated or completed indexing of catalogs by target audiences as well. Leaflet X-6 The X leaflets are very strange. They seem to fit no pattern and usually come with a comment such as To be disseminated without regard to dissemination characteristics with normal leaflet requirements. In other words, even though mathematical formulas were used for most leaflets according to their size and paper weight to assure that they would drop on their targets, these X leaflets were just added to the pile and were allowed to fall wherever they landed. It would appear the cost of leaflet paper sheets was expensive and there was no desire to waste any space. So, when eight or ten leaflets were printed on a sheet and there was a small space in some corner where the paper was blank, they would print a leaflet on some general subject, just to utilize the paper more efficiently. Many of the X leaflets that I have seen are in regard to the Paris Peace talks. The text on leaflet X-6 is: PEACE The Party and the Government of the North will be found guilty by history if they dont end this senseless war. Leaflet R-2 The R leaflets are very odd. Most leaflets are used for a specific purpose. Leaflets coded "R" were scrap leaflets, printed to use up all the paper on a printing sheet and save Uncle Sam money. The PSYOP specialists hated dead space that could be utilized on a big sheet of paper. The R leaflets had a general message so that they could be added to any leaflet bomb regardless of the theme of the leaflet-mix in that bomb. This one has a nice patriotic image on the front depicting an American soldier, a South Vietnamese soldier and a Vietnamese civilian all working to protect the nation. The text on the front is: WE FIGHT THE COMMUNISTS TOGETHER THE PEOPLE AND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THEIR AMERICAN FRIENDS ALL ARE FIGHTING FOR A FREE VIETNAM The back is all text: Why are American troops in Vietnam? The international communists want the whole world to become communist.

The Vietnamese communists want South Vietnam to become communist.

The Vietnamese and the American people are determined to fight against this communist plot in order to: Live in true freedom, happiness, and peace> As friends, we are fighting alongside you because communism is a threat to all free peoples. The Vietnamese coded their leaflets with the letters "DV" and a long series of numbers afterwards. The "DV" indicated Quan-Doi Viet Nam Cong Hoa (Army of the Republic of Vietnam). Leaflet CP-09 The leaflets coded CP are extremely rare and were highly classified. They were used in Cambodia by American troops that were not supposed to be there. The CP stood for the classified operation name Camel Path. These leaflets were not to be mixed with other leaflets and were only to be dropped over Cambodia. And of course, the words Camel Path were not to be spoken. The leaflet is text at the top with an arrow pointing to the official 7-flag safe conduct pass used in Vietnam. The text on the front is: You can avoid this hopeless fate. Use the pass to cross the front line and come back to live under the protection of the Government of Vietnam. The pass bears this symbol. The back of the leaflet depicts a dead North Vietnamese soldier and the text: Why did this young man from North Vietnam come to die here, outside the mud wall of a lonely outpost in Ba Long? His place should have been at his home, in his farm, where his labor is needed to help feed his compatriots in the north. Instead, he has been sent to the South and assigned the hopeless job of storming into an outpost defended by the people of the South. What did he hope to achieve by his suicidal attempt? To "liberate" the people of the South as he had been told by his Communist masters? But why do the people that he is supposed to liberate build mud walls and plant bamboo spikes to keep the liberators out? Perhaps, at the last minute he saw the truth. But, it was too late. The Labor Party has already spent him like an expendable item in its bid to take over South Vietnam. Leaflet 1389A This leaflet was part of a mix that we mention just below this entry. It depicts the back of the 7-flag safe conduct pass usually signed by Thieu or Ky on the front. The back is all text. Although it does not bear the CP code, we know it was dropped on North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. The text on the front is: To friends on the other side of the front line You will be treated deservedly once you leave the Communist ranks to return to the Country and the Nation. You will live in peace under the protection and help of the government of the Republic of Vietnam. You will be greeted as loved ones by your compatriots. You will be provided all articles for everyday use until you will have had a new life. Should you bring in a weapon, you will be rewarded a monetary amount adequate to the value of the weapon. Leaflet DV15AH2268 Vietnamese PSYOP leaflet DV15AH2268 depicts President Nguyen Van Thieu and clarifies his attitude towards the National Liberation Front. The text is: THE PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS DECLARED: There will be never a Joint Government in South Vietnam . The back is all text: THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS AGAINST A JOINT GOVERNMENT President Nguyen Van Thieu has declared his willingness to talk to anyone in the South Vietnamese Liberation Front, but the government of the Republic of Vietnam will never recognize that Front as an independent organization. Lately, with continuous failures in the battlefield, the Communists have spread rumors that there will be a Joint Government in the South. Their sole purpose is to create confusion among the public. However, the people of the South understand that the rumors of a Joint Government are just a propaganda tactic of the Communists. Its sole purpose is to cover their military and political failures. There will be no Joint Government in the South. The extent of the Allied propaganda effort in Vietnam is told by James William Gibson in The Perfect War- Technowar in Vietnam, The Atlantic Monthly Press, NY, 1986: From 1965 through 1972 over fifty billion leaflets were distributed in South and North Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia; this vast sum was the equivalent of more than 1,500 leaflets per person in both the north and the south. In 1969 the military and civilian propaganda apparatuses produced over 10.5 billion leaflets, 4 million pamphlets, 60,000 newspaper articles, over 24.5 million posters, and nearly 12 million magazines. <>Press sheet The uncut sheet depicted above consists of a mixture of propaganda leaflets in the Vietnamese language and represents a sample press sheet from the small format, high speed Hancho web presses. Two of them were used to print leaflets during the 1966-1967 periods. Another press was added in 1968. Declassified SOG documents show the extent of the leaflet operation in Vietnam . 31 million leaflets were dropped in 1964, 67 million in 1965, 142 million in 1966 and 271 million in 1968. MACV could produce 200,000 3x6-inch leaflets per eight-hour shift on its Harris high-speed press. The PSYWAR Directorate had a Webendorf Press that that SOG was authorized to use from 1600-2400. It could produce 500,000 leaflets per shift. In addition, the deception mail operation produced 200 fake letters per month of various types to be mailed into North Vietnam . The black letter program was constantly being fine-tuned. A MACVSOG comment on the subject states: We plan to use notional leftist organizations abroad as originators of the letters, but are beginning with a true leftist Japanese fishing organization. In line with this, we are soon going to use a Paris-based Vietnamese, pro-Hanoi student organizations magazine to infiltrate subtle anti-Communist propaganda into North Vietnam by making slight changes in some of the articles We will experiment in the printed media field, for example; calendars, fishing hints, and tide tables are presently being obtained. Varying paper stocks are now being used. As the war progressed the black letter output went from 3,993 in 1965 to 6,000 in 1966 and 7,550 in 1967. The letters were mailed from Singapore , Paris , Hong Kong, Bangkok and Tokyo , allegedly from North Vietnamese living outside the country. There were nine general themes for the letters: Weakness in Communist ideology; Revision in North Vietnam; Chinese imperialism; North Vietnamese mismanagement; Peace; Free Enterprise; Free society; Resistance movements and the Chieu Hoi program. The letters were coded according to type: Special: High level hard sell propaganda (400 letters per month).

Vulcan: High and medium level with a revisionist point of view. (50-60 letters per week).

Thor: A personal letter with soft sell and human interest. (15 letters a week)

Mars: To next-of-kin of battlefield casualties. (10 letters per week)

Luna: Exploitation of captured Viet Cong letters. (as available) I should mention here that we discuss black SOG operations in greater depth in our article on the Sacred Sword of the Patriots League. Readers interested in black operations are encouraged to read that article for more information on the dirty tricks of the Vietnam War. In Volume I of the Department of Defense contracted the Final Report Psychological Operations Studies  Vietnam, Human Sciences Research Inc, 1971, Drs. Ernest F. and Edith M. Bairdain mention the value of leaflets: In regard to the best means for disseminating the Allied message among the Viet Cong, members who rallied to the government stated that 99% saw propaganda leaflets, 100% heard airborne loudspeakers, 98% saw radio sets, 34% saw newspapers, 13% saw magazines, 9% heard ground loudspeakers, 7% read posters, 4% saw television sets and just 1% saw PSYOP novelty items. Of the enemy who saw the leaflets, 81% of the VC and 97% of the NVA actually read them. Of the enemy who heard the airborne loudspeakers, 89% of the VC and 98% of the NVA actually listened to the message. The authors point out that this demonstrates that leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, and radio are the best methods to reach Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army personnel. Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces PSYOP Although Americans like to believe that they invented PSYOP and are the masters of the art, the Vietnamese were practicing PSYOP early in their war against the Communists. On 1 July 1953 the Vietnamese Army had two PSYOP companies to conduct propaganda in the 1st and 2nd Military Regions (Later Corps Tactical Zones). On 1 January 1958 the unit was renamed the Mobile Cultural Battalion. On 1 November 1959 it was renamed a PSYWAR Battalion. On 1 March 1963 a decision was made to form 3 PSYWAR Battalions and the original unit became the 1st PSYWAR Battalion headquartered in Saigon . The 2nd and 3rd PSYWAR battalions would be assigned to the 2nd and 3rd CTZs headquartered in Pleiku and Da Nang with a 4th battalion planned to be activated in the 1964-1965 time frame for the 4th CTZ. A Vietnamese Army Loudspeaker Truck

Not exactly up to U.S. Standards, but apparently it did the job As an ARVN tactical unit the mission of the battalion was local civic action to promote confidence in the government, to win the people from the influence of the enemy and to encourage the people to stand up against the communists; troop morale operations among ARVN forces to promote a fighting spirit and a strong determination to win, to promote discipline and a willingness to sacrifice ones life for the nation and the people; and PSYOP campaigns against the enemy to break their fighting will and to cause them to surrender. The original single battalion consisted of 602 men, but under the new organization, each battalion was authorized 367 men. The battalions have the ability to produce white, grey and black propaganda using leaflets, loudspeakers, printed material, photographs and documents. Each battalion supports a corps, the companies support divisions, the groups support regiments and the PSYWAR teams support battalions. After the 1963 reorganization the ARVN PSYWAR battalion consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, a Technical Company, and three PSYWAR Companies. The Technical Company was comprised of a Special Operations Platoon, a Cultural Platoon, a Radio Augmentation Platoon and a Press Platoon. Each of the PSYWAR Companies was made up of six PSYWAR Teams. Vietnamese PSYOP structure The Vietnamese PSYOP structure was designed after that of the Republic of China on Taiwan . Curiously, the structure was