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Yet, that would appear to be the best explanation for the news, as reported last week, that the government intends to purchase an unknown number of Boeing Super Hornets via a sole-source contract, i.e. without competitive bids of any kind. Ostensibly this is being defended as an “interim measure,” to close a suddenly discovered “capability gap” between our promises to our NATO and NORAD allies and our actual force on hand. But this has been widely dismissed as a fig leaf — the previous government had budgeted $400 million to refurbish the CF-18s, enough to keep them in the air until 2025.

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The suspicion, rather, is that the purchase has been undertaken for (are you sitting down?) political reasons. By postponing the competition, neither buying the F-35 nor explicitly refusing to do so, they escape both the threatened lawsuit and the ignominy of choosing the F-35, without formally reneging on the promise to put the bulk of the purchase out to competitive tender at some later date. At the very least, they put off any difficult choices until after the next election. And if the “interim measure” should prove indefinite? Or the first in a series? Could the air force end up with a fleet of Super Hornets, acquired a few at a time?

After all, what option would remain, the initial commitment having been made? Bad enough the air force should have to maintain two fleets, CF-18s and Super Hornets, each with different training and equipment needs. But these are at least related, both using roughly similar technology, both made by Boeing (the Super Hornet is essentially an upgrade on its older cousin, originally known as the Hornet). But to add yet a third, entirely different category of plane? Possibly the military’s statement of requirements could be rewritten to justify it. Or possibly everyone would just forget there was ever supposed to be a competition.