Blog Post

AEIdeas

In 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis said he came to the Shangri-La Dialogue to listen. In 2018, he sought to explain the Indo-Pacific strategy. To date, however, the strategy has yielded few tangible results. A Chinese military officer even asked at Shangri-La: “Where’s the beef?”

Critics of the Obama administration often faulted it for insufficient implementation of the rebalance to Asia. Observers argued that the rebalance had been well-conceived but poorly resourced and inconsistently implemented. The Trump administration now faces similar critiques.

Observers in Asia are rightly worried that the United States appears divided, distracted, and diminished. Without action, regional allies and partners will start to re-orient their relationships. Thus, the time has come for the Trump administration to shift from talk to action and implement its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Divided

All administrations face internal differences, but the Trump administration’s divisions have been deeper and more public than those of its recent predecessors. In several areas, President Trump’s own views appear to differ from those of some of his key advisers. This is particularly evident in the administration’s approach to allies and adversaries.

The National Security Strategy concluded that China and Russia “erode American security and prosperity.” The US National Defense Strategy stated that “long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities.” Yet, experts are questioning whether President Trump shares these views. Indeed, President Trump has lauded both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping while criticizing US allies, most recently at the G7 summit.

With the primary authors of the National Security Strategy (Nadia Schadlow) and National Defense Strategy (Bridge Colby) having left government, it is no longer clear that these documents still govern US strategy. And the same is true on the economic front, where the administration remains divided between prioritizing structural issues in the US-China economic relationship or trade deficits with US allies and partners.

If the administration is to pursue a consistent approach to Asia, it will need to demonstrate that it can overcome these divisions by implementing a coherent set of policies. The real test will not be the coherence of public speeches or statements, but the ability to implement concrete policy changes and alter resource allocations.

Distracted

US leaders must remain focused on long-term priorities rather than being distracted by lesser concerns. If China are Russia are truly the top concerns for the United States, as the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy assert, then US leaders must stay focused on these challenges. This is a major test for an administration that still is not fully staffed on Asia.

The greatest potential distraction is North Korea. A meaningful deal with North Korea would be a major accomplishment. Yet, the danger is growing that drawn-out negotiations with North Korea will divert US attention for months or years. The United States has already pulled ambassadors from the Philippines and Australia to manage this issue, to say nothing of the day-to-day focus of other senior policymakers.

Foreign governments were heartened by the administration’s commitment to address the challenges from China and Russia. But they want to see the administration shift from words to actions. The administration must keep its priorities straight to remain focused on the big picture.

Diminished

Finally, US leaders must counter the narrative that the United States is retreating and China is ascendant. There is no question that China has grown stronger in recent years, but its future path is by no means assured. China faces severe political, economic, technological, environmental, social, and cultural challenges. An increasingly authoritarian and repressive Chinese Communist Party may not be well-equipped to deal with all of these tests.

Moreover, although leaders in Beijing have been quick to claim the mantle of international leadership, China is poorly positioned to supplant the United States. Xi Jinping may promise to be the “keeper of international order,” but even in Asia, the security architecture remains rooted in US alliances. Discord among the United States and its allies plays directly into China’s narrative, yet few states want Beijing to supplant Washington.

Despite challenges to US leadership emanating from at home and abroad, US companies, investors, universities, and culture continue to be the most attractive in the world. And the US military remains far more capable than any competitors, particularly when one includes US allies in the mix. These are formidable advantages that the administration should seek to leverage and publicize as it implements its regional strategy.

From talk to action

Back in 2016, two of President Trump’s key advisers labeled the rebalance to Asia “appropriate and timely,” but warned that it had “turned out to be an imprudent case of talking loudly but carrying a small stick.” This was a fair critique then, and it is a fair observation now as well. There is no shortage of ideas about how the administration might implement its Indo-Pacific strategy. Indeed, most regional states want deeper US economic and security engagement. Trump administration officials must get to work implementing the Indo-Pacific strategy to avoid being victims of their own criticism.