The dramatic turn to Syria may represent the beginning of the end of the war in Ukraine.

Russia’s sudden intervention in Syria, which has led to steady gains by pro-Assad forces, has distracted the world from what is happening in Ukraine. Namely, nothing.

If the intervention in Syria is defined by its intensity, then the current state of the war in Ukraine can equally be defined by its relative quiet. After nearly 18 months of conflict between Ukrainian and Russian-backed separatist forces, eastern Ukraine has entered into a period of calm the likes of which haven’t been seen since President Victor Yanukovych was overthrown in February 2014.

Despite the death of a Ukrainian soldier on Wednesday, the first in a month, a truce signed on September 1st seems to be holding. Two previous agreements to end the conflict, the Minsk I and II agreements, which were signed by Ukraine, France, Russia, and Germany, failed to stop the fighting. Minsk I, signed in September 2014, didn’t halt the fighting for a minute, and the months after were dominated by the brutal battle for Donetsk airport. Minsk II, signed last February, was followed by the equally vicious struggle by Russian-Separatist forces to crush a pocket of Ukrainian forces at Debaltseve.

With the latest truce holding, though, thoughts have turned to finally implementing the Minsk agreements. An agreement between Ukraine and the separatists saw smaller sized weapons, such as mortars and rockets, withdrawn from the front lines to positions that would keep the line of contact out of their range. An agreement on the withdrawal of heavy weapons, although repeatedly violated in recent months, is still waiting for full implementation, but the apparent success of the movement of smaller indirect fire weapons is a clear sign of progress.

Separatist leaders also agreed to delay local elections they had planned on holding in October, which were threatening to derail the long-overdue implementation of Minsk II. Ukraine is holding local elections on October 25th, but the areas under the control of the separatists will not be included.

Even direct relations between Ukraine and Russia have improved enough that they were able to sign a deal that would supply Ukraine with gas for the winter. However, talks over an IMF rescue plan for Ukraine have stalled over Russian demands that a $3 billion debt incurred under President Yanukovych be paid off.

For another way to see how the situation has calmed, one can look at the demise of the once-plentiful live blogs on the conflict. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s live blog has little news coming from the front lines, and even The Interpreter, which has had its live blog going for 604 days, has little to put into the updates anymore. Reddit’s r/UkrainianConflict live updates were shut down after a long run that started during the height of the EuroMaidan protests.

A number of obstacles still remain, though. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has demanded that the border Russia shares with the separatist territories return to government control, as well as the withdrawal of Russian forces from the East (Russia, for its part, denies any presence). The separatists, for their part, are demanding an amnesty for those who took up arms, in addition to more authority being devolved to the local governments, among other demands.

Despite the obstacles, though, there has been an unmistakable change of tone. Reporting from Eastern Ukraine, VICE’s Simon Ostrovsky noted how, in the discussions there, “nobody’s talking about expanding the fight, expanding the front line, or driving their tanks to Kiev or anything like that. It seems like people are genuinely ready for some kind of a compromise.”

Ostrovsky, like many others, also noted what can and should be seen as a major change: the leadership of both Ukraine and Russia are talking about the separatist regions staying a part of Ukraine. No independence, no annexation by Russia. Back into the fold they go. The Novorossiya Project has been effectively abandoned. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in May that “we want [the separatist areas] to become part of Ukraine,” and it’s starting to seem like he means it.

It remains to be seen, of course, whether or not the war is actually coming to an end, if Russia really wants the separatist regions to stay a part of Ukraine, and if Putin really is going to essentially leave the country alone.

With Russia’s deepening involvement in Syria, its economic woes, and the continued sanctions that compound those economic problems, Putin may have lost his appetite for Ukraine. The cost of propping up the separatist republics is a further drain on the economy, and the corruption and incompetence of the separatist leadership in running their own affairs doesn’t seem to have inspired the confidence of the Kremlin. Meanwhile, despite its own severe economic problems (not to mention continuing endemic corruption), the Ukrainians are getting stronger. Under the tutelage of the United States and its allies, the National Guard and now regular military units have been receiving training that, combined with their own combat experience, will help boost the capabilities of the Ukrainian military.

The chance for Yanukovych to return passed long ago, Crimea was successfully seized and annexed, but the road seems to have come to a dead end. Putin’s best option for retaining influence in Ukraine may be to let the separatists rejoin the country and its political arena. If Putin wants to keep Ukraine from going headlong into the arms of Europe and the United States, what better way than to have former separatists in control of local governments or, even better, in the Ukrainian parliament?

Putin’s decision to intervene in Syria was influenced, at least in part, by the desire to be welcomed back into the international community as a good and productive member. Pulling back on the Ukrainian issue can help him with this, especially after the results of a Dutch investigation on the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight 17 proved to be rather unfriendly.

The war in Ukraine hasn’t rewarded optimism in the past, and there’s nothing to say that the conflict won’t just burst open again. Another possibility is that the situation will improve slightly, then freeze, bogged down in negotiations that go nowhere. After all, frozen conflicts aren’t exactly unheard of when it comes to Russia.