

Six years ago today, a group of soccer team owners broke ranks from United Soccer Leagues (USL) with the intent of creating their own league. The drama that played out over the next several months gave birth to what we now know as the second division North American Soccer League (NASL), brought forth rigorous (some would say draconian) standards for USSF’s professional divisions and helped shape the lower-level soccer landscape as it exists today.

To mark the anniversary, I gathered three reporters who cover the lower divisions for a roundtable discussion of the impact of The Great Schism of ’09 and what the future holds given the events of the last six years.

The participants:

Brian Quarstad , whose former website Inside Minnesota Soccer was the resource for news and information on the business side of the lower divisions of the game for years, and who now blogs for Northern Pitch.

, whose former website Inside Minnesota Soccer was the resource for news and information on the business side of the lower divisions of the game for years, and who now blogs for Northern Pitch. Neil Morris , who has covered the NASL and the Carolina RailHawks since 2009 for Indy Week in Durham, NC, Top Drawer Soccer and, more recently, for WRALSportsFans.com.

, who has covered the NASL and the Carolina RailHawks since 2009 for Indy Week in Durham, NC, Top Drawer Soccer and, more recently, for WRALSportsFans.com. Brendan Doherty, who has covered the Rochester Rhinos and USL for his site, DohertySoccer.com and writes for The Bent Musket.

The discussion begins after the jump. (Responses have been edited for length and clarity.)

Q: “First question: Six years on, is the lower-division landscape better, worse or about the same compared to where it was in late 2009?”



Neil Morris: “Exponentially better. The split between the TOA and USL fostered a competitive paradigm that not only unsettled an overarching stasis that once enveloped lower division soccer , but it also forced the new rival leagues to achieve economic standards and growth initiatives that ultimately benefited both their particular leagues and American pro soccer as a whole. Each league is organized around distinct membership and corporate models that appeal to different types of investors. That provides a wider range of options for potential team owners, as well as generating leagues actively competing for those investors.”

Brian Quarstad: “Both the second and third division are far superior to what they were in 2009. It’s fascinating, since we are really still in our infancy in this country and haven’t grown the game as organically as most of the world. Although the USL has been growing lower level pro soccer since the early 90s, MLS was in some ways our base (inverted pyramid) with Division 2 and 3 growing about the same time as MLS. All three levels have had missteps along the way as the leagues have tried to figure out business models that work for them and their team owners.

“We are now finally to the point that both USL and NASL are firmly growing and (together) outnumber MLS teams – a true pyramid. The NASL now has 11 teams with two more announced to play in 2016 and the USL will have 29 teams next year.”

Brendan Doherty: “The landscape is undoubtedly better now. After the split there were stumbles like the Puerto Rico experiment and Antigua’s season on the road , but the USL is poised to fulfill its long-held vision. Back in the day, the league produced a terrible video presentation voiced by (Former USL President Tim) Holt that showed USL potentially spreading to 40 cities across the country in a few short years. Given that FCNY and the three Puerto Rico teams failed that same year, the goal was laughable. Now that is within reach. NASL has done well to separate themselves from the USL with match production, player budgets, media quality, etc.

“We don’t have a league of used car salesmen anymore but there are still owners using D2/D3 as a stepping stone for MLS. Even the mighty Cosmos declared multiple times that the NASL was a temporary stop on the path to MLS. The phenomenon of MLS harvesting lower-division teams really peaked around the same time as the split (Seattle November 2007, Portland and Vancouver March 2009, Montreal May 2010) so it’s hard to compare. Nonetheless, what does that say about the sustainability and viability of lower division soccer in light of the recent San Antonio happenings?”

NM: “The baseline measure growth is attendance. In 2009, the average per game attendance for the 11-team USL-1 was 4,709; this year, the average attendance for the 11-team NASL was 5,913, an increase of over 25 percent in six years. This despite the fact eight of the 2009 USL-1 clubs are no longer in D2 (not counting the Minnesota Thunder and Miami FC Blues, which essentially changed owners and brands). Meanwhile, attendance in today’s rapidly expanding USL D3 league dwarfs attendance figures in the nine-team 2009 USL-2.”

BQ: “Neil mentioned attendance, and, of course, one needs to look at average numbers. That means a few weaker teams, which haven’t invested in marketing properly or have yet to figure out their fan base, drag down some pretty important numbers. In the NASL, Indy Eleven averaged 9,800 per game even though success on the field has been hard to come by in their first two years. Minnesota averaged 8,700 and sold out every home game of the spring season. Jacksonville averaged 7,900. The ‘average’ attendance numbers for those individual teams were unfathomable in 2009. In the USL, Sacramento Republic averaged a whopping 11,323 per game. Louisville averaged 6,700 and Rochester 5,500.”

BD: “Somewhat related to attendance, which gets too much weight without team-specific context, is stadiums. If an owner had a verbal agreement with a local school, he could get a pro team back in the Wild West days. In 2014 both Dayton and Charlotte played at high schools (elementary in Dayton’s case) but that’s it. The new venues for Pittsburgh and San Antonio are pretty and functional. Indy and Sacramento have done great things with what was available to them. The NASL’s push for legitimation and the USL’s announcement for (all its teams to be in) soccer-specific stadiums by 2020 have apparently lit a fire under teams to secure quality primary venues beyond baseball stadiums.”

NM: “Initial growing pains for the nascent NASL saw two charter members — AC St. Louis and Crystal Palace Baltimore — disband in rapid succession. But since the NASL was finally sanctioned as a Division Two soccer league prior to the 2011 season under the USSF’s new D2 league standards, the only NASL club to shutter is the Puerto Rico Islanders, a far cry from the pre-2009 revolving-door landscape. [It appears the Atlanta Silverbacks may eventually join the Islanders, although under soccer-related market circumstances that are hardly attributable to the club or league.] Meanwhile, durable expansion clubs have joined the league in San Antonio, Indianapolis, Ottawa, Jacksonville and New York. Deep-pocketed owners have purchased and in most instances revived existing clubs in Minnesota, Tampa Bay, Fort Lauderdale and Carolina.

“The USL made its own missteps after the 2009 split. Of the 15 members of USL Pro in 2011, seven no longer exist or compete in a pro soccer league. Five of the 13 members of USL Pro in 2013 have disbanded or moved to the PDL. This sort of turnover, once de rigueur, was not sustainable in the new lower division soccer. So USL and MLS forged a player development partnership—a venture that may not have occurred had the TOA/USL split never took place—that secured USL’s future and forged their current accelerated growth model.”

BQ: “Perhaps more importantly, is how different the business models of the NASL and USL are today from 2009. The failure rate of teams in the USL before that time was a whopping 75%. Much credit needs to go to Francisco Marcos who founded the USL when there was a barren landscape of pro soccer in the 80s. But the main reason for the TOA breakaway group was the lack of support by the USL for its teams. Beyond that the teams and owners had very little say in running of their leagues while Marcos and USL created income by taking in franchise fees for new teams.

“When USL was sold to NuRock holdings in 2010, new owners Alec Papadakis and Rob Hoskins charged themselves with righting their new – used – ship, but found themselves in the middle of a messy divorce from team owners who were frustrated with the former status quo of USL. NASL wanted team owners to control the league , not the league controlling team owners.

“Eventually, the TOA/NASL group got what they wanted: US Soccer sanctioned them to be the new Division 2 league in the country, but not before they mandated new, specific standards for the league. Things like ownership net worth and stadium size, even the size of the population of a city would now help dictate who could own a team and where it would play. The new standards have certainly slowed down the growth of second division soccer in the US, but, arguably, that’s been a good thing, as it’s provided more stable team owners, as Neil explained.

“Currently, the USL seems to be happy working with MLS and being a developmental league, which fits nicely with all the other facets of USL which are primarily developmental. These days, the NASL finds itself more in competition with MLS than USL because it sees itself as more of an entertainment league. So we now have two entirely different business models which have emerged from the split.”

NM: “Incidentally, the TOA/USL split has also served MLS well. The partnership with USL outsourced their atrophying reserve league and brought other financial and player development benefits. Further, a bevy of successful D2/D3 clubs in Orlando, Minnesota, Sacramento, San Antonio, Indianapolis and elsewhere germinated in this new competitive landscape, deepening the pool of existing, viable MLS expansion candidates.”

Kenn Tomasch: “My take is that the schism – while certainly painful and chaotic – either helped birth (or at least midwife ) the USSF Professional Division standards, which I don’t believe get enough credit for the stability the lower levels now enjoy. Brian mentioned the failure rate of franchises; we can see now how few clubs have gone out of business in recent years (Puerto Rico in D2, VSI Tampa Bay and Phoenix FC in D3) compared to how many used to. That’s a positive. I was calling for either USL to self-impose or USSF to mandate some sort of standards as far back as 1998 when I was working in D3. It took a while, but I cannot imagine where we’d be without them. Probably in very similar straits to where we were in 2009.”

Q: “Next question: What happens with USL’s application for D2 status? How do you see that playing out for them AND for the dynamic of the USL/NASL cold war?”

NM: “Like many, I can’t imagine USL would publicly trumpet their D2 application (in contrast to the NASL’s apparent furtive D1 application earlier this year) unless it was reasonably confident it would prove successful. Obviously, USL’s relationship with MLS and, by extension, the USSF, bolsters that confidence level. That said, I’m unsure how many USL clubs (particularly the independent clubs) have principal owners worth $20 million. And approximately 11 teams (independents, plus MLS O&O) don’t currently meet the D2 stadium-size requirement. If concessions or changes to D2 standards are made to accommodate USL’s D2 sanctioning, that threatens to ignite legal reprisals from the NASL, particularly if changes are made to D1 league standards or commensurate accommodations aren’t given by the USSF that thwart the NASL’s D1 application (notwithstanding the propriety of that aspiration by NASL). There’s not a lot of intrinsic daylight between being labeled D3 versus D2. The chess match here is an investor recruitment squeeze game. NASL would be denied D1 status (rightly or wrongly), while no longer being able to claim themselves as the sole sanctioned D2 league.”

KT: “But if USL becomes D2 and nothing changes from a standards perspective, they will be competing for the same type of owner. (Unless USL retains some teams – like Harrisburg and maybe Austin and Arizona – in a third division.) If USL doesn’t retain some measure of a third division league, does someone create one?”

NM: “In many markets, NASL and USL are already competing for the same potential investors. The difference in the structure and composition of the leagues entice different types of investors. USL remains highly centralized, with owners still ceding (I believe) matters like brand ownership to the league. Their scheduling also remains difficult from a marketing point of view. However, USL has lower operational costs, particularly salary, travel expenses, yearly dues and expansion fee (if applicable). And of course there’s the MLS partnership: some potential investors like the tangible and intangible benefits of the partnership, while others don’t like the notion of investing in a perceived ‘reserve league.’ And some investors are actually drawn to NASL’s bullish attitude towards achieving D1 status. So, even if both leagues are D2, the structural and economic differences will undoubtedly remain.”

Q: “Given no NASL owners remain from the split (unless Boris Jerkunica still has a piece of Atlanta, of which I am not sure), is a potential merger/accommodation with USL more likely or still unlikely?”

BD: “Any rapprochement between the two leagues would depend on USL getting D2 status as the NASL definitely wouldn’t take that public relations hit. I think a lot would also depend on how the Cosmos position themselves, as much of the NASL posturing against MLS came after that team was rejected.”

NM: “Very unlikely. No owners remain from the split, but their spirit lives on in spades with the Cosmos’ ownership and, I suspect, some of the incoming investors. And the difference in corporate structures remains sharp.”

KT: “I agree. And I think the BIG player from 2009 who is still in place and still powerful is USL’s Papadakis. I have no doubt he will carry a grudge deep into stoppage time. That’s not to say he wouldn’t agree to some sort of accommodation; it just means he’d exact his pound of flesh along the way.”

Q. “What do you see as the number one priority for each league over the next 12-18 months?”

BD: “USL definitely needs to improve its low-end teams. Harrisburg, before or after they move to Lancaster, should be a top priority. The league has shaved its worst three teams in just about every aspect in recent years. Without the exception of the mathematically challenged Austin, the expansion class was fairly successful in 2015. The league has all but scrapped the terrible scheduling problems of the past and publicizes well its developmental role in the broader soccer landscape. If the bottom teams can’t get on board, it’s likely they’d be left in D3 when USL solidifies its application for D2.”

NM: “(For the NASL), the same priority as the last 12-18 months: logical, incremental expansion and nurturing those new expansion teams. It’s something the league has done well the past four to five years, and something I’m worried they’re straying from now.”

BQ: “When I heard rumors of USL stating they would apply for D2 sanctioning late in the summer of 2015, it did baffle me a bit. Then again there have been many moves in the “NASL/USL Cold War” that have left most of us shaking our heads. I think that begs the question of why is it so important for USL – beside spite, which I really don’t believe – to be D2 again? They seem to have found a comfortable niche.

“As much as soccer fans may want to believe that owners of successful soccer businesses, like Hoskins and Papadakis, have acted in vengeance or pettiness, that probably just isn’t the case. Competitiveness, perhaps? But they’ve achieved their business success with wise strategic business moves, not by being petty.

“In an interview I once conducted with Tim Holt, he said USL had “invested substantially more” into its league “than it has generated in revenue from this property.” He explained that USL felt a high professional league of soccer was important enough to lose money over because of the visibility of the organization for other levels of USL, like PDL, Super Y-League, etc. So the higher the level of the league you run, the more prestige and legitimacy it gives the rest of the company which is after all, about developing pro players. Which is obviously important.”

Q: “Last question: what will the landscape look like in six more years?”

BQ: “Well, there is one question we haven’t really touched on yet and that could be the determining factor of what the soccer landscape looks like six years from now. That question is: ‘How are these leagues and teams doing financially? Are they sustainable?’”

KT: “My theory on ‘How economically viable is your local club?’ is much the same as that old joke that goes, ‘How do you know if a Deadhead has been in your house? He’s still there.’

BQ: “LIKE!

“The cost of running an NASL team is a lot higher – so I’ve been told by a lot of team insiders – than a USL team. What tips the teams and their league to profitability? That question may lead back again to the same question I already asked. Why does USL really want D2? Are they just posturing (a strategic move) to get NASL to show their hand that they had wanted D1 status? There is just so much conjecture here. I do know most, if not all, NASL teams are losing money at a pretty good clip. For instance, Minnesota United FC brought their revenues up this year by better marketing, selling of advertising and raising attendance average up to nearly 9,000 a game. But they don’t own their stadium, which can be expensive. They are also paying out bigger player salaries to draw more people to games and, in doing so, they’ve had to hire more marketing and ticketing people. They may have the largest front office staff in the league, with about 40 employees. If you are going to be in an entertainment league as the NASL is, than you need to put on a pretty professional show to get people out in large numbers, and that costs money. A lot of money.

“It costs a lot less to be a developmental league. The bar is lower in so many ways. As has already been pointed out, even stadiums are smaller and therefore cheaper. Next year NASL teams will be traveling from Edmonton to Puerto Rico. That ain’t cheap, my friends.

“So I certainly don’t have an answer to what the landscape may look – other than to say I expect MLS to get to 30 teams in six years from now. But I think we still have a roller coaster ride in the lower divisions of US soccer for a while yet. Pull your caps on tight, boys and girls, because we still may be in for another wild six year ride.”

NM: “MLS will be at or near 28 teams. USL will be D2 and every MLS team will have their own O&O reserve team. League will comprise two conferences with two divisions each: Eastern independent clubs and Eastern MLS O&O teams; Western independent clubs and Western MLS O&O teams

“NASL will hover around 16 teams after gaining a few new outposts, yet losing more clubs to MLS and attrition. League leadership will attempt to craft a pro/rel system involving some NPSL teams, but NASL owners will reject it once they realize it means their teams may actually get relegated. Average per game attendance will be around 7,600. Online articles will still come out every month or so predicting the league’s demise is imminent.”

BD: “I have three words for you: promotion and relegation.”

KT: “I hate you.”

(Thanks to Neil, Brian and Brendan for taking the time to participate in this roundtable. Tell us your recollections of the split and how you feel about the current state of things in the comments.)