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KOSOVO from fact check

Released on 2013-02-19 00:00 GMT

Email-ID 1810141 Date 1970-01-01 01:00:00 From marko.papic@stratfor.com To blackburn@stratfor.com

KOSOVO from fact check





Kosovo: A Souring View of the EU Mission



Summary



The European Union is delaying the deployment of its U.N.-mandated

institution-building force in Kosovo until Dec. 9. The mission, once seen

by Pristina as a desirable bulwark against Serbia and Russia, is now

viewed by Kosovars with suspicion and distrust as European priorities

begin to diverge from those of Kosovo (and of its underground economy

based on smuggling).



Analysis



EULEX, the European Union's 2,000-strong law-and-order mission in Kosovo,

will postpone its deployment until Dec. 9, EU officials said Dec. 1. The

delay comes alongside anti-EU (probably more clear than anti-EULEX, my

bad) protests in Pristina and amid reluctance by Kosovo's politicians to

support the EULEX mandate, which was finalized by the U.N. Security

Council (UNSC) on Nov. 26.



The struggle over EULEX is really a struggle for control over Kosovo's

nascent independence from Serbia, gained in February (LINK:

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/serbia_kosovo_declares_independence).

Belgrade had officially asserted its control over the former Ottoman

province in 1912 -- or re-asserted it, depending on how one views the

issue -- but never truly managed to exert its sovereignty fully, due to

the refusal of the ethnic-Albanian Kosovar population to assimilate or

submit to centralized rule. Belgrade eventually lost its de facto control

over the province due to the combination of a successful guerrilla

campaign by the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) in 1998-1999 and a NATO air

campaign -- waged under the aegis of a humanitarian intervention -- that

forced Serbian military and Interior Ministry troops out of Kosovo in

1999.







https://clearspace.stratfor.com/docs/DOC-3218



Ironically, however, the independence struggle (Kosovo is already

independent so the struggle between Brussels and Pristina is really about

turf and who controls law enforcement efforts) is now no longer primarily

between Pristina and Belgrade. Kosovo's government is facing off instead

with Brussels, which until recently

(http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/eu_meeting_kosovo) seemed as a firm

ally. However, now that independence is all but entrenched, Kosovo's

interests are diverging from those of the European Union (and incidentally

the United Nations LINK:

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/kosovo_rift_united_nations). Pristina

wants to claim sovereignty over its entire territory -- including the

restive Serbian-majority provinces -- while Brussels wants to begin

clamping down on the rampant narcotics- and human-smuggling operations in

the newly minted country.



INSERT GRAPHIC -- TO COME FROM SCOTT OF KOSOVO GEOGRAPHY



Kosovo sits on an elevated plain surrounded by imposing mountains, right

in the middle of one of the most lucrative drug and human-smuggling routes

in the world. The region is isolated enough to be practically

unconquerable, and certainly untamable, and yet is near enough to

historical trade routes (through the North-South Vardar River valley and

the nearby Adriatic coast) to be a perfect smuggler's haven.



Slaves, mainly young girls from Moldova and Ukraine, are transported

through the Balkans regularly and Kosovo is part of that route.

Transportation of heroin, however, is Kosovo's main resource and source of

income. Heroin from Afghanistan and Central Asia enters the Balkans

through Turkey and is distributed through Kosovo to various points in

Europe. One of the main smuggling routes goes to the Italian port of Bari

on the Adriatic Sea, where the Italian mafia distributes the product to

the rest of Europe. However, the most lucrative distribution method for

Kosovo is via its own diasporic networks in Turkey, Greece, Italy, Germany

and Switzerland. In particular, Switzerland -- where the diaspora numbers

more than 100,000 and where the Kosovar mafia handles up to 90 percent of

all incoming heroin -- is key for further distribution through Europe,

particularly now that the Swiss have joined the Schengen treaty of open

European borders.



European authorities, having dealt with the Kosovar mafia for decades, are

well aware of the strategic value of Kosovo to smuggling operations. The

Kosovar mafia is brutally efficient and is difficult to penetrate due to

Kosovo's clan- and family-based networks. (There is also an added language

barrier: Albanian, although of Indo-European origin, is unrelated to all

European languages and practically impossible to master by non native

speakers.) THIS IS A WEIRD ASSERTION SINCE ALL LANGUAGES ARE, BY

DEFINITION, UNINTELLIGIBLE TO NON-SPEAKERS ---- That is a very good point

Jeremya*| will rephrase.



At the heart of the problem, however, is the fact that Kosovo does not

have material or resource alternatives lucrative enough to support other

viable industries that might rival smuggling. Making matters more

difficult, many in Kosovo's current leadership are directly related to the

drug-trafficking operations. Much of Kosovo's current leadership,

including Prime Minsiter Hacim Thaci, has a history in the KLA, which was

mainly funded by the drug trade. Indeed, many Kosovars see the narcotics

trade as having been justified in light of what they consider illegitimate

domination by Serbia, the explanation being that it was the only way to

raise funds to combat alleged oppression.



EULEX was originally conceived as an institution-building and

law-enforcement mission, and was originally favored by Pristina because it

would lessen pressure from the United Nations (and thus the UNSC, in which

Serbia's ally Russia (LINK:

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/kosovar_independence_and_russian_reaction)

holds a veto). Kosovo has since soured on EULEX, however. Independence has

been achieved and Kosovo sees NATO as a sufficient security guarantee

against a return of Serbian aggression. Pristina therefore considers the

EU law-enforcement mission unnecessary to maintain its sovereignty -- and

EULEX most certainly is not welcome from the perspective of the drug trade

and its facilitators. The Europeans understand this, and member-states

have already upped their intelligence operations against smuggling

operations inside Kosovo (and their possible links to Kosovo's

government).



The Serbs, ironically, now do want EULEX because they are confident that

they can influence its mission through the United Nations. It is

Belgrade's one last-ditch effort to obstruct Kosovar independence through

official lines.



The stage is therefore set for a considerable confrontation between

Brussels and Pristina, only hinted at lately by protests against EULEX in

downtown Pristina and by a Nov. 14 grenade attack at EU headquarters in

the capital. A new Kosovar paramilitary group calling itself the "Army of

the Republic of Kosovo" took responsibility for the bombing and claimed

that it would continue attacks against EU facilities (and the Serb

minority inside Kosovo as well). While on the surface the angst is

directed against the EU's apparent acquiescence in what Kosovars consider

a "made in Serbia" EULEX mandate, the real issue at hand is the narcotics

operations that constitute Kosovo's only true lucrative resource.



RELATED:







http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/kosovo_serbia_partitioning_kosovo



http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/kosovo_serbias_involvement_mitrovicas_crisis



http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/georgia_and_kosovo_single_intertwined_crisis







--

Marko Papic



Stratfor Junior Analyst

C: + 1-512-905-3091

marko.papic@stratfor.com

AIM: mpapicstratfor









