“Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth,” Mike Tyson has famously said. Khamenei’s reaction—or lack thereof—to being punched by Trump repeatedly could have important consequences for the global economy, the stability of Iran and the Middle East, and even America’s 2020 presidential election.

Rarely have an American president and his national security adviser held more divergent views than Donald Trump and John Bolton. Trump has repeatedly expressed an aversion to greater U.S. involvement (including conflict) in the Middle East, and his affinity for autocrats makes clear that he has no interest in democracy promotion or regime change in Iran. He has made numerous unreciprocated efforts to meet Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and has told aides and foreign leaders that his “maximum pressure” campaign is designed to be a prelude to diplomacy, not conflict.

Bolton, by contrast, has a long history of advocating both military strikes and regime change against Iran. Pompeo has sought to reconcile these contradictory impulses by focusing on the means—that is, by raising the pressure—rather than the endgame. “The worst fear of Bolton and Pompeo,” a senior State Department official told me, “is that the Ayatollah [Khamenei] writes Trump a letter, suggesting a get-together. They know the president would jump at such an opportunity.”

Can Khamenei overcome his pride and cynicism to try to exploit the Trump administration’s internal divides, or will he choose to escalate? An insufficient response to American bullying could cause him to lose face; an excessive response could cause him to lose his head. Khamenei essentially has three options, and all of them are fraught with risk:

Strike a Deal With Trump

The quickest way for Khamenei to halt Iran’s economic hemorrhaging would be to allow Rouhani to pursue a deal with the Trump administration. Given Trump’s weakness for flattery and disinterest in details, it’s conceivable Tehran could get an even better deal with Trump than it did with Obama.

While this outcome is plausible, it’s highly unlikely. Khamenei’s longtime distrust of the “deceitful, untrustworthy, and back-stabbing” U.S. government was vindicated after Trump pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the Iran nuclear deal—and he understandably fears that giving in to pressure may encourage Bolton and Pompeo to turn the heat up, not off. For Khamenei, subjecting 80 million Iranians to another 20 months (at least) of economic hardship may be preferable to holding his nose, swallowing his pride, and doing a deal with Trump.

Wait Trump Out

While Khamenei had vowed to “burn” the JCPOA were the United States ever to renege on its commitments, Tehran’s response to Trump’s provocations has so far been restrained. Iran has complied with the nuclear deal and has yet to react to the Trump administration’s designation of the IRGC as a terrorist group. Although one of the strategic goals of this restraint was to show the world it is the United States, not Iran, that deserves to be isolated, America’s economic might has rendered this strategy moot. “One of the strongest industrialized countries in the world has made a political decision.” Ralf Thomas, the CFO of Siemens, said last year. “As an industrial company, we have to recognize that.”