In economic terms, this conundrum is called a “common-pool resource.” That’s when a good, like a fishery, has limited quantity but many users can access it. The more people try to use common-pool resources, the less available they are to others. More lobster fishermen means fewer lobsters for each fisherman, and fewer lobsters in the sea, too.

The proposals for managing access to prisons, the authors say, are similar to the way the government manages access to cod fishing grounds or cow pastures or lobster fisheries. “Each of these options seeks to change the current incentive structure, making prison more costly than non-incarcerative sanctions,” they write.

The first proposal involves charging counties for how many people they incarcerate. Currently, counties pay nothing to send someone to a state prison. And states pay for these prisoners with taxes levied on residents and businesses. But if that subsidy is taken away, counties would have to find the money for prison spots. Those that don’t send many people to prison could lower their taxes.

This proposal could be tweaked, the criminologists say, by lowering the subsidy the state pays so that counties aren’t responsible for the whole cost. Alternatively, counties who use prisons at a low rate in proportion to their population could get some sort of economic discount at the end of the year. A more radical solution would eliminate the subsidy entirely, and divide the state’s correctional budget among counties on a per capita basis. If counties finish the year with a surplus in their prison budgets, they can spend that money as they like, if they run out of money, they have to raise revenue through taxes.

A second proposal involves limiting the number of correctional-facility days counties can use each year. In this scenario, states would set a goal for the number of prison days allotted each year, at a rate lower than the current number. This cap would be divided by counties on a per capita basis, and counties could not exceed their limit. This would force judges to weigh the “relative seriousness of offenders and their crimes,” the criminologists say. Locking up people for minor crimes could use up spots that might be needed for more serious offenders. This may incentivize counties to explore alternatives to incarceration.

In such a scenario, counties could be rewarded with refunds if they effectively manage their incarceration rates. Allocating that refund to judges or prosecutors (or the budgets of their offices) could encourage them to look at other options for punishment.

The authors also propose the idea of using shame to influence change. By publishing public lists of counties that use the highest number of prison days per capita, the state could motivate them to conserve. This approach has been found to be effective in prodding people to conserve power and electricity.