NEW DELHI: The Army has rejected reports that there were specific intelligence inputs about the impending terror attack on the artillery regiment compound in Nagrota , which left two officers and five soldiers dead on Tuesday. However, it did not deny lapses in ensuring proper perimeter security of the camp.“There were no specific intelligence,” asserted the outgoing Northern Army Command chief Lt-General D S Hooda on Wednesday. Another top officer, who did not want to be identified, added: “Generalised intelligence alerts, which hold high-value targets are going to be attacked, are a routine practice in J&K. They are neither specific, nor actionable. In fact, I would call it a major intelligence failure, both on part of the intelligence agencies as well as the J&K Police.”But the Army does agree that it will have to further refine its standard operating procedures as well as strengthen the perimeter security of its camps in J&K. “But the government also has to allocate funds for strengthening the security infrastructure around military bases,” he said.In its edition on Wednesday, TOI had reported that both the defence ministry as well as the armed forces have largely failed to act on the comprehensive recommendations of the tri-Service committee, headed by former Army vice-chief Lt-General Philip Campose, which had submitted its report six months ago. The Campose committee, which was constituted after the terror attack on the Pathankot airbase in January, has held there are several gaping holes in the existing security arrangements around the majority of military bases and installations around the country.“But for every one successful strike by terrorists, there are around 30 that we manage to thwart in J&K. I wish we could succeed all the time but this is the nature of the battle. We have to accept some setbacks,” said Lt-Gen Hooda, who retired on Wednesday, while talking exclusively to TOI.“Can we do better? Yes, we can. We take our casualties seriously. We, more than anyone, mourn over them. The Army will learn lessons and apply them. Army camps, of course, are high-visibility targets for terrorists that grab a lot of media attention, while civilian targets generate the opposite sentiment,” he added.But after the Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota terror attacks, several questions are being asked about the heavy casualties the Army is taking in such encounters without learning the requisite lessons. In contrast, the terrorists, with active help and reconnaissance by local sympathisers, seem to have fine-tuned their strategy.Such attacks, of course, are not a recent phenomenon. The deadliest such attack was the massacre at the Kaluchak camp in May 2002, which left 31 people dead and many more wounded, at the height of the Army’s forward deployment during Operation Parakram after the terror strike on Parliament in December 2001.After the initial assault plan against Pakistan in January 2002 was deferred, India came close to war for the second time that year after the Kaluchak incident.