Crowley, p. 69 (Here she cites Larson half-way through the paragraph, but uses full sentences of his report without using quotes)



Public support is a fluid dynamic: given information and analysis by leaders and elites, the public constantly weighs the benefits and prospects of success against the likely and actual costs and then reaches a determination as to whether the likely outcome is worth the sacrifice. As new events occur or objective conditions change, they are interpreted by political leaders and experts, and the ends and means are reevaluated. Traditionally, U.S. military operations have been explained and justified both in normative terms (stressing the importance of the principles and interests at stake) and pragmatic terms (stressing the good prospects and reasonable costs of the involvement.) [42] Further, a focus on the particular objectives of the operation and the perceptions of the principles and interests that are involved establishes a connection between the objectives of the operation and the larger purpose behind it. Eric Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations, p. 12



In short, support can be thought of as a constant rebalancing of the benefits and prospects for success against the likely and actual costs—and a determination of whether the outcome is judged worth the costs—all informed by leaders and experts. As new events occur or objective conditions change, they are interpreted by political leaders and experts, and the ends and means are reevaluated. Such a model, engendering both normative and pragmatic considerations, clearly has a great deal of intuitive appeal, but why should we believe that this is what is at work? First, as a practical matter, U.S. military operations are typically explained and justified both in normative terms—stressing the importance of the principles and interests that are at stake—and pragmatic terms—stressing the good prospects and reasonable costs of the intervention. Such a framework captures both the“operational code” of political leaders and the enduring concerns of the public. Second, a focus on the particular objectives of the operation and the perceptions of the principles and interests that are engaged establishes a connection between the objectives of a given operation and the larger purposes it is promoting.

Crowley, p. 359 (Here she cites Gaddis, but uses text from his book without offsetting in quotes)



Following the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union embarked on a long-term program of increasing its strength in strategic weapons. As Gaddis points out, the Johnson administration decided not to respond with a corresponding military buildup for three main reasons: first, because it underestimated the extent to which the Soviets were building; second, because Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was convinced that the American strategic programs had reached the point of diminishing returns; and third, because the escalating costs of the Vietnam war made the administration reluctant to go to Congress with requests for expensive new systems to counter Soviet increases. [155] John Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 265





Following its humiliation in the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union embarked on a steady, longterm program of bolstering its strength in strategic weapons. The Johnson administration decided not to respond with a corresponding American buildup, partly because it underestimated the extent of what the Russians were doing, partly because McNamara had become convinced that the point of diminishing returns in American strategic programs had been reached, but partly also because the mushrooming costs of the Vietnsam War made the administration reluctant to go to Congress with requests for expensive new systems to counter Soviet increases.

Crowley, p. 444-45 (She gave no citation in this paragraph)



Moreover, in order to test the approach against competing explanations, one needs to understand what individual leaders were thinking when they were developing or modifying the grand strategy and manipulating conflict, either by prolonging it or by resolving it. An area specialist would be at an advantage over the generalist in applying the model to particular cases, though both benefit from the parsimony inherent in the model. Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p. 248



Finally, to test the approach against competing explanations it is important to understand what leaders wereactually thinking when they were creating new grand strategies, launching mobilization drives, and manipulating or prolonging conflict with foreign powers. To complete this task, one needs to do archival research, sometimes in a foreign language. All of these demands privilege the area expert over the generalist in applying the mobilization model to particular cases.

Crowley, p. 4-5 (There is no footnote in this section of text. At the end of the paragraph this passage is in, she footnotes Christensen for a quote, but does not cite him for the ideas or text expressed above the quote)



Perceiving fundamental changes in the international balance of power, Truman in 1947 and Mao in 1958 decided to mobilize their nations around newly-designed long-term strategies to respond to those shifts and to preempt any resulting negative consequence. In both of Christensen’s cases, the security strategies were launched during peacetime, requiring creative and vigorous approaches to selling the strategies in order to persuade the public to support them. The apparently undesirable move of manipulating or prolonging a short-term conflict with another nation then became useful in rallying and maintaining public support for the basic grand strategy. Christensen, p. 163-4













Viewing basic changes in the international balance of power, Truman in 1947 and Mao in 1958 decided to mobilize their nations around long-term strategies, designed to respond to those shifts. In both cases the strategies adopted required significant public sacrifice in peacetime, so the leaders faced difficulties in selling those strategies to their respective publics. The manipulation or extension of short-term conflict with the other nation, while not desirable on straightforward international or domestic grounds, became useful in gaining and maintaining public support for the core grand strategy.

Crowley p. 22 (She does not cite Milner here at all, though she does on p. 23 for a different argument)



The generally accepted definition of cooperation is “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.” This dissertation shall argue that perceived preferences are just as important as actual or anticipated ones, and that cooperation occurs when each side simultaneously affects the other’s calculations and expectations until they reach some level of common interest. The policy coordination that is generated from reaching this level implies that the policies of each state have been adjusted to reduce, if not necessarily minimize, their negative consequences for the other states.

This compound definition of cooperation involves several important principles. First, it assumes that each actor’s behavior is directed toward some goal or goals, which need not be the same for all of the actors involved, but that the behavior is rational and grounded in some degree of self-interest. Second, it implies that cooperation provides the actors with gains that they concluded could not be achieved through individualistic action. The distribution of gains need not be the same across the board, but the gains are mutual. Helen Milner, International Theories of Cooperation: Strengths and Weaknesses, p. 467



A notable feature of the recent literature on international cooperation is the acceptance of a common definition of the phenomenon. Following Robert Keohane, a number of scholars have defined cooperation as occurring “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.” Policy coordination, in turn, implies that the policies of each state have been adjusted to reduce their negative consequences for other states.

This conception of cooperation consists of two important elements. First, it assumes that each actor’s behavior is directed toward some goal(s) . It need not be the same goal for all the actors involved, but it does assume rational behavior on their part. Second, the definition implies that cooperation provides the actors with gains or rewards. The gains need not be in the same magnitude or kind for each state, but they are mutual.

Crowley, p. 24 (She footnotes Oye halfway through but does not put direct text from him in quotes)



The numbers issue in international relations consists of the debate over the relative stability of bipolar and multipolar systems (which is really a debate about the impact of the number of significant players on international conflict and cooperation) and of the debate over the impact of hegemonic stability and international regimes on cooperation. [15] Numbers affect the potential for and success of cooperation in several ways. First, cooperation requires the recognition of opportunities for the promotion of mutual interests, as well as policy coordination once they have been identified. Kenneth Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy, p.18





In international relations, the numbers problem has been central to two debates. The longstanding controversy over the stability of bipolar versus multipolar systems reduces to a debate over the impact of the number of significant actors on international conflict. A more recent controversy, between proponents of the theory of hegemonic stability and advocates of international regimes, reduces to a debate over the effects of large numbers on the robustness of cooperation. How do numbers affect the likelihood of cooperation? There are at least three important channels of influence. First, cooperation requires recognition of opportunities for the advancement of mutual interests, as well as policy coordination once these opportunities have been identified.

Crowley, p. 177 (Here she uses a quote from Gaddis at the end of a sentence that uses his direct words, without quoting him, in the first half)



This strategy was mapped out by Kissinger and his team in four foreign policy reports between 1970 and 1973 that set forth explicitly most of the fundamental elements of the Nixon strategy—the use of negotiations to integrate the Soviet Union into the existing order; the idea of linkage; the possibility of a new relationship with China; and the Nixon Doctrine—“often before events had taken place that made possible their realization.” [15] Gaddis, p. 306









There followed a detailed discussion, often at a philosophical level, that set forward with surprising explicitness most of the fundamental elements of the Nixon strategy— the use of negotiations to integrate the Soviet Union into the existing international order, the idea of "linkage," the possibility of a new relationship with China, the Nixon Doctrine—often before events had taken place that made possible their implementation.

Crowley p. 181 (Here she footnotes Gaddis for a quote at the end of the paragraph after heavily paraphrasing him and rearranging his sentences)



First, Nixon and Kissinger sought to address the changing nature of power. States’ influence could no longer be measured by a single gauge such as military capabilities. With the Soviet Union rapidly approaching parity with the United States, the practical utility of nuclear weapons had further decreased. Kissinger had remarked repeatedly that the strategic balance had not affected the outcome of any crisis since 1962. The constraints of public opinion and the problems of gradual escalation in Vietnam demonstrated the limits of conventional force. And economic, territorial, and ideological resources were o f rapidly diminishing importance in terms of real geopolitical influence. Underlying all of these trends, notes Gaddis, “the perception of power had become as important as power itself.” [4]

As Kissinger believed, it was no longer possible for the United States to think of the balance of power as a “zero-sum game,” in which gains for one side meant losses for the other.[5] Since policy had changed to recognize military, political, and economic strength as separate components of power, nations were freer to offset disproportionate strength in one category by emphasizing their strength in another. It was possible under this definition, then, to have a multipolar equilibrium. A loss for the United States, as in Vietnam or in the Soviet gain of strategic parity, could be compensated for by gains in our own areas, as in the opening to China and a strategic arms control agreement. The individual areas of competition were deemed far less important than the overall measure of power-—or the perception of it. Vietnam had skewed the American policy perspective; the objective of a reemphasis on global relationships was to restore it. Gaddis, p. 275









The first requirement for such a "deepening" was to recognize the multidimensional nature of power in the world: there was no single index by which the influence of states could be measured. Nuclear weapons, given the constraints on their use in an approaching era of parity, were of decreasing practical utility. Kissinger liked to point out that in no crisis since 1962 had the strategic balance determined the outcome. Vietnam had amply demonstrated the limits of conventional military force applied under constraints imposed by public opinion and the dangers of escalation. Ideology was proving to be a feeble force when arrayed against the compulsions of nationalism; territory bore little relationship to political influence; economic strength seemed at times to have little to do with any of these. And, underlying all of these complexities, there was the increasing importance of psychology: the perception of power had become as important as power itself.

It was too simplistic, therefore, to continue thinking of the balance of power as a "zero sum game," in which "gains" for one side invariably meant "losses" for the other. 6 What might appear as a loss in one area—the stalemate in Vietnam, for example, or the Soviet attainment of strategic parity—could be compensated for by gains in others—an opening to China, or a negotiated settlement on arms control. It was the overall calculus of power that was important, not the defeats or victories that might take place in isolated theaters of competition. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations had erred by making Vietnam a symbol of American power and commitment throughout the world. The Nixon administration, taking advantage of its more ecumenical definition of power, would seek to reduce Vietnam to its proper perspective—"a small peninsula on a major continent," as Kissinger put it 7 —and to concentrate on global relationships.

Crowley, p. 453 (There are no footnotes included in this section of text. In the previous paragraph, she footnotes a direct quote from Christensen)



For example, even the few Chinese threats to enter the Korean war may have been more effective had Washington not been consumed with launching the new grand strategy. Similarly, the need to preserve whatever remained of that mobilization made Nixon more likely to curtail American involvement in Vietnam than he otherwise would have been. This may help to illuminate for leaders why other leaders take the actions they do given a mobilization situation. If foreign leaders recognize that initial mobilization is often accompanied by a short-term but intense anti-foreign campaign, then they may avoid drawing incorrect and possibly dangerous assumptions from those actions. Further, if foreign leaders understand that a long-term mobilization is losing its momentum at home, they may be able to foresee a realignment of that nation’s foreign policy that may include more cooperative policies. In either case, it may not be necessary for foreign leaders to assume that such posturing will lead to long-term hostile or conciliatory policies. If Mao had understood American politics during the initial cold war mobilization, he might not have felt as threatened by American actions in Korea and Taiwan and may have resisted sending Chinese troops into Korea. Christensen, p. 253









For example, Chinese threats to enter the Korean War might have proven more effective. Not only did the needs of mobilization make Truman less likely to compromise in Korea, but they precluded sturdy lines of communication and thereby muted Chinese deterrent warnings. On a more practical level, if foreign leaders understand that early-stage mobilization is often accompanied by short-lived but fiery antiforeign posturing, then they might avoid drawing inappropriate and dangerous conclusions from the behavior of mobilizing states. There may be no reason for the challenged nation to infer irredentism or the inevitability of long-term aggression from a mobilizer’s hostile postures. If Mao had understood the politics of Cold War mobilization in the United States, he might not have concluded from American actions in Korea and Taiwan that the United States was planning to invade Manchuria. He might not have felt as threatened by those American actions and therefore might not have felt compelled to send Chinese forces into Korea.

Crowley p. 182-3 (She cites a Kissinger statement—footnote 7—but is pulling direct phrases and otherwise paraphrasing Gaddis with no footnote or in-text citation)



A traditional realist, Kissinger believed that a more precise and effective conceptualization of interests required “no illusions” and the recognition that conflict and competition were immutable facts of international life. The United States would always have to function within the international system, contrary to the idealists’ hope that someday the U.S. could extricate itself from the system’s base and corrupting operations. For Kissinger, these unrealistic dreams distorted reality and policy, generating the wild extremes of isolationism and overextension. Accept the unpleasantries of the world, thought Kissinger, and then design policy to manage them. [7] Gaddis p. 276











Despite the acceptance of diversity as an inevitable condition in world affairs, despite the recognition that it was not inconsistent with American security requirements, there lingered in the United States, Kissinger believed, a reluctance to accept the fact that conflict and disharmony were and would continue to be inescapable characteristics of international life. There was still the belief that somehow the United States might transcend the international order, instead of simply having to operate within it. These unrealistic hopes, and the corrosive effects of reality upon them, had produced oscillations between isolationism and overextension in the American approach to the world.

Crowley p. 355-356 (She includes a citation to Gaddis at the end of the passage after quoting "selective genocide," which Gaddis also has in quotes in his text)



In addition to Vietnamization, another practical manifestation of the counterweight strategy was the war between India and Pakistan in 1971. The crisis stemmed from West Pakistan’s refusal to grant autonomy to the people of East Pakistan, separated by a vast expanse of Indian territory. As the crisis escalated, the administration, using Pakistan as its secret channel to the Chinese, cautiously refrained from criticizing the Pakistani government and delayed cutting off arms shipments to it, despite reports of “selective genocide.” [147] Gaddis p. 328











A similar myopia seemed to shape official attitudes toward Pakistan during that country's bloody civil conflict and subsequent war with India in 1971. The crisis had arisen over West Pakistan's refusal to grant autonomy to the citizens of East Pakistan, separated by some 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Officially sanctioned repression of the ensuing revolt there had grown to the stage, by March of that year, that State Department reports were speaking of "selective genocide"; later estimates would suggest that well over a million Bengalis had been killed. But the Nixon administration, intent on using Pakistan as an intermediary in its "opening" to Beijing, carefully refrained from criticizing the government in Islamabad and delayed cutting off arms shipments to it as long as possible.