UN wants an ‘international tribunal of climate justice’ — power to tell democracies what to do

Thus do the claws of centralized big-government grow. I’s a committee, then a tribunal, then one day, a court?



An actual international court would end up being corruption-in-a-can — (think FIFA but with more money). The only way any legal system can work is with one law for all. As soon as countries can have individual targets, clauses and excuses, the wheeling and dealing begins. But a climate court won’t even pretend to start with an even playing field.

The danger of a system that doesn’t have “one rule for all” is already obvious in western democracies, where legal rights are being eroded by individual licensing systems. One farmer speaks out, and is slapped with 33 conditions that other farms don’t have to meet — their cash flow is cut and they slowly bleed dry, fighting all the while, and constantly being offered the possibility of better conditions “any month now”. Other farmers become afraid to speak, lest they get targeted. The Bureaucrats divide and conquer and become Kingmakers.

Daily Mail writes on the International Tribunal of Climate Justice — Sara Malm

The United Nations may launch an International Tribunal of Climate Justice which could see states who fail to uphold the international deal to tackle climate change brought before a court.

The International Tribunal of Climate Justice has been suggested as one of three options to ensure that all parties follow what is agreed during the Paris summit next month.

In essence, this means that any UN member state who agrees to the international deal to tackle climate change and fails to honour its commitment can be brought before the tribunal.

Toothless, Trojan, or Effective Tool?

This tribunal of climate justice could well be a toothless tiger, with no enforceable authority — “nothing to be afraid of”. But if that’s the case, it’s just a junket-job reward for the “right” people and why have it at all? On the other hand, if it has the power to change domestic energy policies, or direct billions in fines or reparations, that’s real power over voters. Once started, how hard would it be to “add teeth”? Perhaps legal minded readers can help?

But even without enforceable power — the toothless institution becomes a tool in the hands of the domestic thought police. Just the threat of being taken to “court” will be enough to beat weak politicians into line. The tribunal could produce embarrassing declarations of how backward a politician is, and the local big-government-loving media buffs will pick and choose which reports to amplify to suit themselves. It’s just another chance for the big-gov-blob to score PR against their favourite targets. It’s leverage. Because of the Love-media effect the tribunal is primarily a tool against Western Democracies. Third world tyrants would hardly care about a slap on the wrist from a UN committee: they don’t want votes, and they own their media.

Real democracies don’t need international tribunals. They need accurate information, and freedom of speech.

The good voters will act (as they have already done) to protect species, to set up nature reserves, pollution controls, and to fund research as they see fit. The idea of an international court presupposes that the voters can’t deal with “a potential catastrophe”.

The possibility of an International Tribunal of Climate Justice has been criticised in the U.S., where some commentators have argued that it will lead to developing nations dragging President Obama into court and bypassing Congress. ‘Whatever they call it, countries who sign onto this agreement will be voting to expand the reach of the UN climate bureaucracy, cede national sovereignty, and create a one-way street along which billions will be redistributed from developed to poor nations,’ claims CFACT co-founder Craig Rucker. ‘Developed nations would be expected to slash their emissions while the “poor” [developing] countries expand theirs,’ he adds.

The only document any government should sign must have an out-clause. If the voters don’t like what Obama-Turnbull-Trudeau-Cameron-Key-et al sign up for, they must be able to opt out.

The Draft treaty is almost unreadable. But the ambition is clear. The “best available science” according to who? Not the voters.

1. Collective long-term goal

Option 1:

[Parties aim [to achieve the global temperature goal], in accordance with the best available science [and the principles of the Convention], through [long-term global [low-[carbon][emission] transformation] [[climate][carbon] neutrality]], [and peaking their [net] emissions] [by 2030][20XX][as soon as possible], [with a [x]40-[y]70% net emission reduction below 2010 levels by 2050][according to the global carbon budget distribution based on climate justice], and [overall reductions][[net] zero emissions] [over the course of the century][by 2050][by 2100].2]

Option 2:

[Parties aim to reach long-term global low-emission transformation, in the context of sustainable development and equitable access to atmospheric space {placeholder for further elaboration of the context, including CBDR, comprehensiveness, distribution of global carbon budget based on climate justice and etc.}.]

Option 3:

[In pursuit of the objective of the Convention set out in its Article 2,][and][to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2 of this Agreement,] Parties aim to reach [by X date] [as soon as possible] [a peaking of global greenhouse gas emissions] [and rapid reductions of global greenhouse gas emissions thereafter to at least] [40-70] [70-95] per cent below 2010 levels by 2050] [and zero net greenhouse gas emissions in the period 2060 - 2080] [[bearing in mind that peaking will vary for different countries and will be longer for developing countries] [[and] bearing in mind social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing country Parties]][[in pursuing [decarbonisation of the global economy over the course of this century] [global low - carbon transformation] [global low-emission transformation]] [in the sharing of the remaining global emission budget]].

Article 11 (FACILITATING IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE)

Option 2: [An International Tribunal of Climate Justice as][A] [compliance mechanism] is hereby established to address cases of non-compliance of the commitments of developed country Parties on mitigation, adaptation, [provision of] finance, technology development and transfer [and][,] capacity-building[,] and transparency of action and support, including through the development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance.

A facilitative mechanism is hereby established to facilitate implementation by developing country Parties for enhanced action on mitigation, adaptation and transparency of action. The mechanism shall be facilitative, non-punitive, non-adversarial and non-judicial.]

It shall apply the following Consequences…

Who gets the right to change the clauses below? How hard would it be to ramp up these clauses?

The Compliance Branch shall examine, determine and address issues of non-compliance. Where it has determined that a Party is not in compliance, it shall apply the following consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of the non-compliance of that Party and pay attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties as appropriate:

(a) Declaration of non-compliance; and

(b) Request of the development of a compliance action plan.]

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