Since the abrupt purge and execution of Jang Song-taek in December 2013, the proverbial “close as lips and teeth” relationship between China and North Korea has clearly taken a turn toward the chilly. Yet, in the past fourteen months, the relationship has not veered toward irrevocable rupture; indeed, China has been taking steps to keep the relationship stable while also trying to give itself room to maneuver. Despite perceptions of China’s allegedly influence over Pyongyang, China operates in a generally unstable climate in which North Korea’s response to overtures such as building roads to connect it to Chinese-financed cross-border activities, indicating intention to restart Six-Party Talks, or toning down relations with South Korea, is tentative and unconvincing. China, therefore, appears to be treading on relatively thin ice.

Thus, the appointment of a new Chinese Ambassador to Pyongyang, announced last week, will serve as a Rorschach test. If you think the relationship is bad, the change in ambassadors will highlight “instability,” if you think the relationship is stable, then it is clearly just a routine move. But, more concretely, the appointment can also function as a means of ascertaining where China, at least, thinks things might go.

Li Jinjun (李进军), former vice president of the International Liaison Department (ILD), was announced as the 17th ambassador to North Korea. Li replaces Liu Hongcai (刘洪才), who has returned to his former post of vice president of the ILD and now appears to be focusing on China-Africa relations, rather than moving into a plum ambassadorial post in Europe (as was the case with his predecessor Liu Xiaoming).

Historically, China’s ambassadors to North Korea began their careers as diplomats with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More recently, however, there seems to be a trend of appointees from the ILD, which focuses on international inter-party relations. While China has made certain moves in the past year and a half to “normalize” the relationship with North Korea (meaning to deal with North Korea under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry rather than ILD), the appointment of another ILD bureaucrat to staff the Embassy in Pyongyang could indicate that Beijing is not yet prepared to move things too quickly in that direction. Wang Jiarui, the head of ILD is one of the few members of the CCP who has met Kim Jong-un in person (Zhou Yongkang having been ignominiously purged), and continues to exert a certain magnetism over diplomacy with North Korea.

As People’s Daily describes, Li’s background is anchored in diplomacy, but he is far from a pure “Asia hand.” Experience dealing with divided Germany in the 1970s is also part of his makeup and outlook:

In 1972, Li entered the Shanghai Foreign Language Institute (上海外国语学院; now Shanghai International Studies University), and went on to study in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1974. From September 1975, he worked for the ILD, and has acted as deputy division director, division director; deputy director-general and then Director-General of the China Economic Cooperation Centre; Director-General of the General Office; and Director-General of the Bureau of West European Affairs. From September 1993 to October 1994, he undertook a secondment in Huantai County, Shandong province. In December 2000, Li was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Myanmar, and in November 2005 he became Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines. From March 2007 to March 2015, Li acted as vice president of the ILD, before taking up the position of Ambassador to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

In 1984, Li acted as Deng Xiaoping’s official German interpreter. He witnessed the establishment of party-to-party relations with the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany (now the German Social Democratic Party). In his words, this…

Not only opened the door for dialogue between the Chinese Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, but also for communication with other political parties around the world with different ideologies [不仅开启了中共和社民党的对话，继而也开启了中共和世界上其他奉行不同意识形态政党的交流].

On March 17, just one day before his appointment was made official, Li met with Dandong’s Party Secretary Dai Yulin in a hotel in the city. As the preeminent hub for Sino-North Korean trade, the border city of Dandong is the focus of cross-border economic initiatives, as well as black market trade. As it turned out, March 17 also happened to be the same day that two armed North Korean border guards escaped into Dandong, sparking a manhunt and the eventual arrest of one of the soldiers. If the Ambassador needed a crash course in North Korea’s ability to disrupt normal goings-on, he surely got it.

There is no doubt that Li already has a lot on his plate. However, with his impressive diplomatic and party credentials, it is hoped that his appointment will lead to improved relations with North Korea and facilitate an official visit by Kim Jong-un, who has yet to visit China since becoming Supreme Leader in December 2011.

Sources: “Li Jinjun is appointed China’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to North Korea” [李进军任中国驻朝鲜特命全权大使], Renmin Ribao, March 18, 2015.

“Former Vice President of ILD Li Jinjun is appointed China’s Ambassador to North Korea”［中联部原副部长李进军调任中国驻朝鲜大使], Guanchazhe, March 18, 2015.

Translations by Simone van Nieuwenhuizen.