Why would a country like Jordan feel so strongly about Iran? After all, Jordan doesn't share a border with Iran and has only minimal trade ties with the country. In late 2012, when Iran offered to send it oil, Jordan refused. It turned instead to its long-term Gulf donors in a tactical show of unity. What's more, Jordan enjoys close ties with the U.S. and relative stability with the Israelis, so it should not be fearful of a distant troublemaker. But Iran's unyielding support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is damaging to its standing in the Middle East and feeding into a growing regional trust deficit.

As it drags on, the Syrian civil war is edging closer to Jordan. The kingdom risks being drawn into a conflict it is desperate to avoid. Iran's role in Syria is significant and well-known -- they supply Assad's regime with weapons and advisors, and recently allowed Hezbollah fighters to cross into Syria and fight alongside government forces.

Iran is considered to be contributing towards the dire economic situation in Jordan by prolonging the Syrian conflict. Since the start of the uprising in March 2011, Jordan has received refugees fleeing Syria, despite its strained resources. The sharp increase in demand for housing has doubled prices in some areas, making it difficult for both ordinary Jordanians and Syrian newcomers. It's hard to ignore the growing number of Syrian number plates when driving in Amman ("Look, they're everywhere" said our taxi driver.) The risk of Islamist-extremist infiltration in refugee camps is a rising concern. The effects of the Syrian crisis are being felt by all; government, opposition (including Islamists), activists, and ordinary Jordanians and because of it, they are unequivocal about their dislike of Iran.

Growing sectarian divides between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the region are also blamed on Iran. One Jordanian opposition figure stated that Iran is "trying to make Shia communities more militant" and "inflaming" the Shia-Sunni conflict in order to extend its Islamic revolution. The perception is that Iran is stoking sectarian tensions not out of belief in the Shia cause, but instead, using Shia communities to insert itself into the social and political networks of all states in the region. This has a double effect: increasing resentment among regional political establishments and gradual growth in aversion to anything related to religion.

Jordanians abhorred Iran's suggestion of oil in exchange for the right to visit holy sites in southern Jordan last year. Even Islamists are beginning to question Iran's policies: One Islamic party member complained that Iran is selective in its support of Islamic movements in the region -- "it supports them when it is in the Iranian government's interest".

Jordan is no exception, just a barometer for the region. General Arab resentment and the magnitude of prejudices towards Iran have risen. Signs of wavering support on the Arab streets first emerged in 2009. The Iranian regime's crackdown on pro-democracy protestors during the presidential elections was viewed with surprise. Wasn't this the nation championing people's rights and standing up to the Satans of the world?