_______________________________________________________

Memorandum of Decision

of the

Honourable Mr. Justice D.R.G. Thomas

_______________________________________________________

Table of Contents

I. Introduction. 2

II. Knutson’s Litigation Activities. 3

A. Bank of Nova Scotia v James Knutson, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 1603 21486. 3

B. MCAP Service Corporation v James Knutson, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 1603 18699 7

C. Capital One Bank (Canada Branch) v James Knutson, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 1803 08102 10

III. Court Access Restrictions. 11

IV. Knutson’s Abuse of Court Processes. 15

A. OPCA Concepts and Strategies. 15

1. “Strawman” Theory. 15

2. The Three/Five Letters. 17

3. Fee Schedules, Copyright in a Personal Name, and Other Threats. 17

4. Fractional Reserve Banking Theories and Promissory Notes are as Good as Cash. 18

5. The :FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT Judgment 19

B. Other Indicia of Abusive Litigation. 21

V. Conclusion. 21

Appendix “A” - September 29, 2016 Correspondence. 23

Appendix “B” - “Notice of Dishonour”, dated October 7, 2016. 24

Appendix “C” - January 1, 2017 Document 25

Appendix “D” - First page of “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision of “FEDERAL-POSTAL-JUDGE : David-Wynn: Miller”. 27

Appendix “E” - Knutson Affidavit of August 1, 2017. 28

I. Introduction

[1] James Kenneth Knutson [Knutson] has since 2016 employed a broad spectrum of abusive pseudolegal strategies in his attempts to evade enforcement of his credit card and mortgage debts. His litigation arguments are “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments” or “OPCA”, a class of spurious “pseudolaw” concepts which are sold to abusive litigants by conman “gurus” who promise extraordinary but false benefits: Meads v Meads, 2012 ABQB 571, 543 AR 215. Gurus’ illusionary promises include free money, debt elimination, “get out of jail free cards”, immunity from income tax, and “travelling” - unlimited motor vehicle use. OPCA ideas sound like law and use legal terminology and references, but are universally rejected by Canadian courts.

[2] All OPCA constitute an abuse of court processes. The employing of OPCA strategies is a basis on which a court may impose court access restrictions through what is sometimes called a “vexatious litigant order”: Meads v Meads; R v Fearn, 2014 ABQB 233 at para 49, 586 AR 182; Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 at para 92, 590 AR 288, aff’d 2014 ABCA 444, 588 AR 303. Some OPCA ideas are so notoriously false that simply employing these concepts creates a presumption that a litigant appears in court for an abusive, ulterior motive: Fiander v Mills, 2015 NLCA 31, 368 Nfld & PEIR 80; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288.

[3] Knutson’s litigation history in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench amply demonstrates that he persistently employs these false concepts. He has continued with his abusive, futile schemes, despite failing on every occasion where he has attempted to impose pseudolaw on the Courts and opposing parties.

[4] In light of this history, this Court, on its own motion and under its inherent jurisdiction, will now investigate whether court access restrictions are appropriate for this abusive litigant to manage and minimize his future litigation misconduct in Alberta Courts, per the procedure followed in Re Boisjoli, 2015 ABQB 629, 29 Alta LR (6th) 334, Re Gauthier, 2017 ABQB 555, 87 CPC (7th) 348, aff’d 2018 ABCA 14; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652, court access restrictions imposed 2018 ABQB 834.

[5] I have been delegated the task of dealing with Knutson’s apparently abusive litigation by Chief Justice Moreau.

II. Knutson’s Litigation Activities

[6] Knutson’s abusive litigation activities occurred in three debt collection actions.

A. Bank of Nova Scotia v James Knutson, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 1603 21486

[7] On December 5, 2016, the Bank filed a Statement of Claim alleging Knutson had ceased making payments on two credit cards, and claimed $23,196.67, interest, and costs. Knutson did not defend this action. The Bank obtained a Default Judgment (“Default Judgment”) on January 9, 2017.

[8] Almost a year and a half later, on June 29, 2018, “James Knutson, a private individual” filed an Application and supporting affidavit:

1. to set aside the Default Judgment “due to Fraud”,

2. damages of $97,636.36, “4X what they allege I owe”, citing King James Bible verse Luke 19:8,

3. “$13,000 that was stolen out of my bank account”, and

4. “the perpetrators liable be investigated and criminally charged.”

[9] The Application then continues:

Grounds for making this application:

2. After several attempts at requesting validation and full accounting of the debt, (as per fair debt collection practices, as codified in Consumer Protection Act & Bills of Exchange Act), with no response I am led to believe the debt is non-existent. The Bank of Nova Scotia has committed FRAUD against James Knutson and the barrister representing The Bank of Nova Scotia is in contempt of court for representing a fictitious plaintiff. Blacks Law Dictionary 5th Ed. Page 562

Material or evidence to be relied on:

3. Affidavit entered on record and accompanying exhibits, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canadian Criminal Code, Bills of Exchange Act, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Canadian Human Rights Act, King James Bible, Supreme Court Case law, Legal Maxims

...

Applicable Acts and Regulations:

5. Consumer Protection Act, Canada Criminal Code Section 380 (1), 463 (c), 219 (1), 334, 794, Charter of Rights and Freedoms Section 1, 2, 7, 15, Canadian Human Rights Act Section 2, 3(1 ), Bills of Exchange Act Section 57.1, Legal Maxims - Fraus et celare fraudem (1 Ver 270) - It is Fraud to conceal Fraud, Fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent (3 Coke, 78.) - Fraud and deceit should benefit no one. Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant (Wing. 680.) Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fictio cedit veritati; fictio juris non est ubi veritas. (WHART. 386.) Fiction yields to truth; where there is truth fiction of law does not exist. Fictio Legis neminem laedit (381. Comm. 43.) A Fiction of Law injures no one.

Any irregularity complained of or objection relied on:

6. The Bank of Nova Scotia is attempting to collect a debt that they are unable, or unwilling to validate. According to the Consumer Protection Act, when validation is asked, the respondent has a duty to validate before they can attempt recovery. Their legal representative is denying James Knutson due process of law and obstructing/perverting the course of justice.

[Emphasis in original.]

[10] On July 13, 2018, the Bank filed an Affidavit of Vanita Patel documenting the credit card arrangements, debts, and a number of unusual communications received by the Bank in relation to these debts, which are identified by the deponent as an OPCA sham debt elimination arrangement. These include:

1. An email dated August 8, 2016, which states:

It is my belief that it is my lawful right to pay off my credit card balance using a consumer note. As long as everything is a consumable purchase and nothing has been purchased for resale. It is my belief that I can pay off this balance according to the Bill of Exchange Act of Canada. Please verify this for me by responding to this email address. ...

Sincerely, without ill will, vexation, or frivolity

James-Kenneth: Knutson

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

2. A document dated September 16, 2016 where Knutson demands Brian J. Porter, president of the Bank, do various things including validate the debt, provide a signed contract, and if these demands are not satisfied in seven days that means the debt never existed or has been paid, and that damages and fee schedule charges are due. This document is an exact duplicate of a “Conditional Acceptance” document sold by the UK “Get Out Of Debt Free” OPCA website (see Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, 2014 ABQB 771, 603 AR 261, paras 55-73, Appendix “A”), which is the first document in a Three/Five Letters pseudolaw process which is intended to eliminate debts by foisting obligations on lenders. This document is marked by ink fingerprints in the lower right corner of each page, with the annotation “Seal” and “Copy-claim”.

Also attached is a second document from the Get Out Of Debt Free website, titled “Common Law Copyright Notice” (reproduced in Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, Appendix “E”), which purports to claim intellectual property interests over Knutson’s name, biometric data, DNA, urine, feces, and other bodily fluids. Any breach of this claimed interest results in a $1 million penalty. This document also sports the ink fingerprint markings, and on its front page a Canadian postage stamp, signed across “by: James-Kenneth: Knutson”.

3. A further document to Brian J. Porter, dated September 29, 2016, reproduced in Appendix “A”, which in brief says that two attached documents titled “Promissory Note” pay any outstanding debts. The September 29, 2016 letter states that if the “Promissory Notes” are not returned, or if they are returned “... without a legitimate written explanation ...” [emphasis in original], then that means “... my account balance is now zero for both accounts.” [emphasis of original]. The same fingerprint and postage stamp ornaments are present as the previous documents.

The two attached “Promissory Notes” are form documents which have had fields filled in by handwriting. Each states:

Terms and Conditions

The payment will be made in one (1) instalment of [$20,371.96 or $16,919.71] on 09/29/2016 until the obligation has been fulfilled. The payment can be obtained by the HOLDER at 6314 56 Ave. Beaumont, Alberta. I hereby give permission to the HOLDER IN DUE COURSE of this Promissory Note, to use this NOTE in any way necessary as a negotiable instrument to be financially traded on, whereas such trade shall terminate the obligation herein.

4. Next is an October 7, 2016 email to Brian Porter from Knutson. The body of that email is a document titled “NOTICE OF DISHONOUR”, reproduced in Appendix “B”. In brief, it says that the two promissory notes attached to the September 29, 2016 documents have fully discharged Knutson’s debts to the Bank, and that he will seek Charter and international treaty remedies for trespass against his “personal property.”

5. Last is a letter dated January 1, 2017, reproduced as Appendix “C”, where “Sovereign ©James of the family: Knutson, Authorized Agent and Representative for JAMES KNUTSON™” declares that he is “an endless creditor” thanks to “the birth certificate bond”, “money no longer exists”, and that he has been denied a “Common Law court de jure”. This trial can only proceed if he receives $10 million in gold or silver “paid up front”, he is recognized as an “Ambassador of God”, and “You must verity the [BAR CULT] fiction-code: NO LAW OR FACT SHALL BE TRIED IN COURT.”

This document attaches a 20 page “Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Right” [NOUICR], which is a document commonly used by persons in the Freeman-on-the-Land movement which purportedly eliminates state authority and fetters the operation of the Court. The document states:

... Free-men-on-the-land do not have earthly masters. I am a Free-man-on-the-land and I do not have a master on planet Earth other than GOD and only from GOD ...

This document also includes a “FEE SCHEDULE”, which allegedly sets fines to government actors, for example:

FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5000.00) PER HOUR or portion thereof if I am held, handcuffed, transported, incarcerated or subjected to any adjudication process without my express written and notarized consent ...

This particular NOUICR is largely identical to a NOUICR filed by Alfred Potvin in Royal Bank of Canada v Potvin, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket #1701 01667 and Potvin v Royal Bank of Canada, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket #1701 13997: Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652.

[11] Knutson filed a “Factum” and Affidavit on July 27, 2017 in support of his application to re-open the Default Judgment. Knutson denies he is an OPCA litigant. He argues he is applying “... Law Merchant principals accepted as valid for hundreds, if not thousands of years ...”. The credit card agreements are “invalid” under “contract law”, because “... all terms and devices were not fully disclosed and I made decisions based off of inaccurate information ... banks do not lend money ...”. The “Factum” does not present an argument but instead is composed of excerpts from a diverse range of authorities, including:

• Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 181 (“spreading false news”);

• Charter, ss 2, 7-8, 15, 32, 52, and some limited commentary on these provisions;

• passages apparently reproduced from websites;

• an inaccurately and incompletely reproduction of page 457 of Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd v Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan, 1979 CanLII 180 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 433, 107 DLR (3d) 1;

• sections from the Bills of Exchange Act, RSC 1985, c B-4;

• the passage from Fielding & Platt Ltd v Najjar, [1969] 2 All ER 150 at 152 (UK CA) which is often cited by OPCA litigants who purport to discharge debts with a promissory note: “We have repeatedly said in this court that a Bill of Exchange or a Promissory Note is to be treated as cash. It is to be honored unless there is some good reason to the contrary.”; and

• several “legal maxims” quoted from Bourvier’s and Black’s Law Dictionaries.

[12] On August 18, 2018 Knutson’s application to reopen the Default Judgment was heard by Master Birkett. At that hearing Knutson identified himself as “James, Family of Knutson”, and argued his late application to reopen the Default Judgment was valid because:

1. he was indigent and unable to hire a lawyer, after the Bank “stole $14,000.00” from him;

2. he required time to become familiar with the law;

3. the debt had not been validated, no collection can proceed because the credit card statements were not the actual accounting of the Bank, it “... should be showing the ledger, the assets and liabilities of the bank, to show they’ve actually loaned anything.”; and

4. he had no obligation to respond to correspondence from the Bank’s lawyers, they were “third party intervention”; “[d]o I have to contract with someone that I don’t even know who they are?”

[13] Master Birkett dismissed Knutson’s application, concluding he did not act in a timely manner and had no valid defence to the credit card debt. She ordered payment of $500.00 in costs.

B. MCAP Service Corporation v James Knutson, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 1603 18699

[14] On October 25, 2016 MCAP Service Corporation [MCAP], a mortgage lender, filed a Statement of Claim in response to Knutson’s default on a mortgage for a residential property located in Beaumont, Alberta. A $507.688.15 outstanding debt was owed as of October 18, 2016. MCAP sought judgment for the outstanding claimed debt, foreclosure, and solicitor and own client costs. A supporting appraisal affidavit indicated the outstanding debt was basically the value of the Beaumont residence.

[15] Master Wacowich ordered a Court-ordered sale on January 10, 2017. Knutson did not appear at that hearing. The Master subsequently on January 24, 2017 ordered any occupants of the mortgaged property had 14 days to exit the residence. A supporting affidavit attached a text message exchange between Knutson and the realtor conducting the January 10, 2017 court-ordered sale. Knutson’s texts reject that he is in a contract with the realtor, MCAP, or MCAP’s lawyer:

I am not in default as the document says, as I have given response to court of queen’s bench. I have proof of lading and signature from registered mail, so your contract with the courthouse is misleading and has not given full disclosure to you. I do not have a contract with you or with either corporation but if you wish to contract with me, I will send my terms and conditions and if you agree I will draft up a contract.

[16] Knutson filed an appeal of the January 10, 2017 Order on February 6, 2017, indicating he would rely on an affidavit, “3 requests for Validation of a debt document”, and “Document-contract-federal-postal-station-court-venue-performance”. MCAP applied for an order for vacant possession, to be heard on the same day.

[17] Both parties filed Affidavits. In the Affidavit filed by Knutson on March 7, 2017, Knutson indicates “I am a Common Law man , of inherent jurisdiction.”, and attaches as proof his NOUICR and Registration of Live Birth. Knutson continues to say he has sent this lender another set of Get Out Of Debt Free letters, which are attached as exhibits. Knutson claims that proves no debt exists. He also says Charter, s 32 means the law of Canada does not apply to him: “I have never, nor am I now acting as agent of the government.”

[18] Both the Knutson and MCAP Affidavits include a bizarre, practically indecipherable document, the first page of which is reproduced as Appendix “D”. The content and text of the first page of this document is representative of its entire nine pages. As best I can evaluate this item, I conclude this is a “judgment” of a purported US court, the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT”, issued on November 26, 2016 by “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-JUDGE: David-Wynn: Miller. The “judgment” is followed by a “:STUDY-GUIDE” which seems to indicate a strange kind of grammar. For example:

~4 = PRONOUNS = FOR THE SINGLE-ONE-WORD ; FOR AN ADJUCTIVE-PRONOUN-OPINION OF THE FACT CHANGES WITH THE FACT INTO THE PRONOUN; FOR AN ADVERB-CONNECTS TO THE PRONOUN BEFORE AND ADVERB .

[19] The remaining ten pages are the Knutson MCAP mortgage, but that document has been annotated. Each page is marked in thick felt marker “:EVIDENCE:” and stamped with a legend:

:Syntax-word-key-meaning:

1=Adverb 8=Past-time

2=Verb 9=Future-time

3=Adjective 0=Conjunction

4=Pronoun NC=No-Contract

and is sometimes annotated with other text, such as “:STYLES-Boxing=:OMIT-VOID-CONTENT-FRAUD-SYNTAX-GRAMMER”. All words are then individually annotated with a hand-written number, which appears to correspond to the stamped legend.

[20] Though my analysis of the meaning of this peculiar item is hampered by its perplexing nature, I conclude the function of the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision and attached annotated mortgage document is that the mortgage contract is being proofread using an abnormal grammar code. The failure of MCAP to format its documents according to this outlandish linguistic system allegedly means the contract is void and fraudulent.

[21] In support of that interpretation, I note the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench is not the first (legitimate) court to receive a document from the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT”. In Gilly v Ocwen, 2016 WL 868167 (Conn Dist Ct), US District Court Judge Meyer reports the local court had received dozens of purported “Certified Copy of Final Judgment, Translation of Final Default Judgements” from the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT”.

[22] Judge Meyer’s subsequent encounter with the “judge” behind this so-called Court is worth reproducing in full:

Because of doubts about the validity of the “Federal Postal Court,” I entered an order to show cause for a hearing to learn more about the judgment and the “Federal Postal Court.” Notice of the hearing was transmitted to plaintiff, but she did not communicate with the Court. Two individuals ended up participating in the hearing by telephone from an Arizona telephone number. They identified themselves as David Wynn Miller, who described himself as a judge of the “Federal Postal Court,” and Leighton Ward, who described himself as clerk of the “Federal Postal Court.” These two names appear on the registration documents filed with the Court.

Miller told me that Benjamin Franklin opened the “Federal Postal Court” on July 4, 1775. But the court was soon closed in 1776 with the onset of the Revolutionary War. It remained closed for more than two centuries. Then, according to Miller, he and a colleague reopened the court for operation on December 21, 2012 (a day that is otherwise well known as the predicted end of the world according to the Mayan Calendar).

Miller explained to me that the “Federal Postal Court” operates on the basis of a sophisticated mathematical understanding of language that proves that certain mortgage documents are fraudulent. According to Miller, the “Federal Postal Court” has been recognized by the United Nations. The “Federal Postal Court” does not have a courthouse or other fixed location; instead, it has transitory jurisdiction with a presence wherever the federal postal eagle symbol may be.

A YouTube search discloses numerous videos of Miller and others explaining the operation of the “Federal Postal Court.” A Westlaw search does not disclose any valid judgments or other proceedings involving the “Federal Postal Court.” A Westlaw search for the name of “David Wynn Miller” otherwise reflects a lengthy history of frivolous filings that use the same impenetrable language that appears in the filings in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Pflum, 2013 WL 4482706 (D. Kan. 2013) (collecting dozens of cases and noting that several district courts have imposed pre-filing screening orders to prevent Miller from filing suits in these courts without prior leave of the court).

[23] Judge Meyer refused to file the purported “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” default judgment, and instead concluded:

... there is no basis to conclude that the purported judgment of the “Federal Postal Court” arises from any valid legal authority at all. So far as I can tell, the “Federal Postal Court” is a sham and no more than a product of fertile imagination. ...

I totally agree with this statement.

[24] Commonwealth authorities have also previously rejected David Wynn Miller and his concepts as an authentic legal authority, for example: National Leasing v Top West Venture, 2001 BCSC 111; CIBC v Chesney, 2001 BCSC 625; Borkovic v Laurentian Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC 337; R v McMordie, 2001 BCCA 412, 155 BCAC 21; Wollongong City Council v Falamaki, [2010] NSWLEC 66; Wollongong City Council v Falamaki, [2009] FMCA 1204; APD Property Developments Ltd v Papakura District Council, [2009] NZHC 1677.

[25] The “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision I have reviewed and “Judge” Miller’s statements to Judge Meyer only hint at scope of Miller’s bizarre claims. For example, Wollongong City Council v Falamaki, [2010] NSWLEC 66 reports representation by “plenipotentiary judge David-Wynn Miller”, who shared “a little secret” with the Court: “Every word that starts in the English language with a vowel, a, e, i, o and u and followed by two consonants is a word that means no contract.” That insight is “astonishing”, or, in “Millerese”, “no contract”.

[26] Not surprisingly, the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision purchased by Knutson from Miller was of no legal effect. On March 6, 2017 Gill J dismissed Knutson’s appeal and ordered that Knutson must vacate the mortgaged property by March 20, 2017.

[27] The property’s list sale price was reduced to $515,000.00 on May 4, 2017 by order of Master Schulz. Mr. Knutson did not appear. On July 27, 2017 MCAP applied for sale of the mortgaged property to MCAP for $495,000.00. The outstanding debt at this point was $526,867.83.

[28] Knutson filed an Affidavit on the date of the court-ordered sale application, the body of which is reproduced in Appendix “E”. In brief, it states that “James, a minister of GOD” is making “a special limited appearance on behalf of the defendant [JAMES KNUTSON].” It cites Luke 19:8 for the authority that Knutson should have his mortgage discharged, and because of “... this fraud ...” receive “... the amount of four fold (4 x $555,000 purchase price of the house) ...”. Knutson says his religious beliefs are being threatened and intimidated. He will file private criminal code informations.

[29] Master Smart on August 1, 2017 ordered sale of the property. The remainder of this court file involves enforcement of the court-ordered sale judgment and the outstanding debt.

C. Capital One Bank (Canada Branch) v James Knutson, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Docket 1803 08102

[30] On April 23, 2018, the Bank filed a Statement of Claim suing Knutson for $5,921.87 in unpaid credit card debts, interest, and legal fees.

[31] Knutson on June 8, 2018 filed a Statement of Defence, which denied Knutson owes anything, that any contract exists between the parties, more fractional banking conspiracy theory OPCA arguments involving promissory notes, and four-fold damages on the basis of Biblical law:

Statement of fact relied on:

1. ... I am disputing I owe CAPITAL ONE BANK anything.

2. I wish to see proof of a contract with CAPITAL ONE BANK, as I have not received one yet, I would like to see a two people signed contract thus binding both parties with proof of offer, acceptance, full disclosure and equal consideration being given by both parties at the time of signing.

...

4. I am with knowledge that ALL DEBTS ARE COLLECTED ILLEGALLY WITHOUT THE ORIGINAL PROMISSORY NOTE.

5. CAPITAL ONE BANK is attempting to commit fraud against me.

Any matters that defeat the claim of the plaintiff(s):

6. Provide proof of a valid contract and proof of the actual accounting that I owe CAPITAL ONE BANK a debt, which I DISPUTE.

Remedy sought:

7. I motion to dismiss this claim with prejudice and wish to seek damages in accordance with the 1611 King James Bible. Luke 19:8 And Zacheus stood, and said unto the Lord, Behold, Lord, the halfe of my goods I giue to the poore, & if I haue taken any thing from any man by false accusation, I restore him foure fold. Unless any [wo]man can rebut the words of GOD. Therefore I ask the court to award me in the amount of $23,687.48. Which is four fold of the amount to which they were trying to commit fraud against me.

[32] Knutson also invokes the Consumer Protection Act, RSA 2000, c C-26.3 and Collection and Debt Repayment Practices Regulation, Alta Reg 194/1999, s 23.2. These have no application to this litigation: Consumer Protection Act, s 110(2).

[33] I conclude and confirm that these litigation activities of Knutson in these three debt collection actions are abusive.

III. Court Access Restrictions

[34] The authority to impose court access restrictions is an element of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to control its own processes: Ebert v Birch & Anor, [1999] EWCA Civ 3043 (UK CA); Bhamjee v Forsdick & Ors (No 2), [2003] EWCA Civ 1113 (UK CA); Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at paras 14-25, 273 ACWS (3d) 533, leave denied 2017 ABCA 63, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37624 (2 November 2017); Household Trust Co v Golden Horse Farms Inc (1992), 1992 CanLII 420 (BC CA), 13 BCAC 302, 65 BCLR (2d) 355 (BCCA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 23022 (19 November 1992); Tremblay v Charest, 2006 QCCA 204 at para 6, 147 ACWS (3d) 413, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 31410 (22 June 2006); British Columbia (Attorney General) v Lindsay, 2007 BCCA 165 at paras 24, 28-30, 238 BCAC 254, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 32026 (15 November 2007); Extra Gift Exchange Inc v Ernest & Twins Ventures (PP) Ltd, 2014 BCCA 228 at para 32, 357 BCAC 55; Tupper v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2015 NSCA 92 at para 27, 390 DLR (4th) 651, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36761 (10 March 2016); Ayangma v Canada Health Infoway, 2017 PECA 13 at paras 62-63, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 38030 (4 October 2018); Gichuru v Pallai, 2018 BCCA 78 at paras 74-81, leave to appeal to SCC filed, 38123 (4 May 2018); Peoples Trust Company v Atas, 2018 ONSC 58 at para 41.

[35] Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 sets the modern approach to court access restrictions issued under this Court’s inherent jurisdiction. The most common court access restriction prohibits a person from initiating or continuing litigation, except where that individual has obtained permission, or “leave”, from the court to do so. This is a prospective gatekeeper step where the court concludes that it is plausible that an individual will engage in further abuse of court processes: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at paras 36-37; 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 42-75, 283 ACWS (3d) 55. More stringent restrictions are also possible where they are proportionate to the anticipated future litigation abuse: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at para 34; Bhamjee v Forsdick & Ors (No 2).

[36] Court access restrictions may be ordered where a litigant has exhibited “indicia” of abusive litigation. Chutskoff v Bonora, 2014 ABQB 389 at para 92, 590 AR 288, aff’d 2014 ABCA 444, 588 AR 303, reviews 11 “indicia” categories:

1. collateral attacks,

2. hopeless proceedings,

3. escalating proceedings,

4. bringing proceedings for improper purposes,

5. initiating “busybody” lawsuits to enforce alleged rights of third parties,

6. failure to honour court-ordered obligations,

7. persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions,

8. persistently engaging in inappropriate courtroom behaviour,

9. unsubstantiated allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and misconduct,

10. scandalous or inflammatory language in pleadings or before the court, and

11. advancing OPCA strategies.

[37] Additional indicia categories have been identified in subsequent decisions of Canadian courts:

1. using court processes to further illegal activities (Re Boisjoli, at paras 98-103; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at para 35; McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 677 at paras 3, 30);

2. “judge shopping” (Onischuk (Re), 2017 ABQB 659 at para 18; McCargar v Canada, 2017 ABQB 729 at paras 8-9, 68 Alta LR (6th) 305; Re Botar, 2018 ABQB 193 at paras 23-28; Bourque v Tensfeldt, 2018 ABQB 419 at paras 17-18);

3. “forum shopping” (1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 91-97; MacLeod v Bank of Montreal, 2018 ONSC 5795 at para 7);

4. bad faith litigation strategies to pre-empt, divert, or sabotage proceedings that address court access restrictions (Alberta Lawyers Insurance Association v Bourque, 2018 ABQB 821 at paras 159-160, 175);

5. where a litigant indicates an intention to engage in future abuse of court processes (Lofstrom v Radke, 2017 ABCA 362 at para 8; Van Sluytman v Muskoka (District Municipality), 2018 ONCA 32 at paras 23-24, leave to appeal to SCC filed, 38057 (14 March 2018); Templanza v Ford, 2018 ABQB 168 at para 120, 69 Alta LR (6th) 110; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at paras 42-44; ET v Calgary Catholic School District No 1, 2017 ABCA 349 at para 11, leave to appeal to SCC filed, 38081 (1 May 2018); Lee v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 ABQB 464 at para 148);

6. where litigation has a political focus and is directed towards acknowledgement and correction of perceived government shortcomings, rather than asserting a right recognized in law (Van Sluytman v Muskoka (District Municipality), at paras 23-24; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at para 36);

7. where the litigant minimizes or dismisses litigation defects and abuse on the basis that the person is a self-represented litigant (Van Sluytman v Muskoka (District Municipality), at paras 23-24; Re Bruce, 2018 ABQB 283 at paras 8-9; Alberta Treasury Branches v Hawrysh, 2018 ABQB 618 at paras 36-46); and

8. employing proxy actors to circumvent court orders, court access restrictions, impede litigation, and improperly communicate with the court (Onischuk v Edmonton (City), at paras 24-25, 32; Onischuk (Re), at paras 11, 21; MacKinnon v Bowden Institution, 2018 ABQB 144 at paras 44-85).

[38] A decision to impose court access restrictions requires a broad-based inquiry into the litigation activities of the candidate for those restrictions. A court may refer to external evidence, including:

1. activities both inside and outside of the courtroom (Bishop v Bishop, 2011 ONCA 211 at para 9, 200 ACWS (3d) 1021, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34271 (20 November 2011); Henry v El, 2010 ABCA 312 at paras 2-3, 5, 193 ACWS (3d) 1099, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34172 (14 July 2011);

2. the litigant’s entire public dispute history (Thompson v International Union of Operating Engineers Local No 995, 2017 ABCA 193 at para 25, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 37974 (7 June 2018)), including:

a) litigation in other jurisdictions (McMeekin v Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 456 at paras 83-127, 543 AR 132; Curle v Curle, 2014 ONSC 1077 at para 24; Fearn v Canada Customs, 2014 ABQB 114 at paras 102-105, 586 AR 23; Hill v Bundon, 2018 ABQB 506 at paras 68-80, 91-96; Alberta Lawyers Insurance Association v Bourque, 2018 ABQB 821 at paras 41-51);

b) non-judicial proceedings (Bishop v Bishop, at para 9; Thompson v International Union of Operating Engineers Local No 995, 2017 ABCA 193 at paras 24-25); and

c) public records that are a basis for judicial notice (Wong v Giannacopoulos, 2011 ABCA 277 at para 6, 515 AR 58); and

3. whether the person has previously engaged in abusive litigation conduct, and/or was declared a “vexatious litigant” or made subject to court access restrictions: Canada v Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 at para 37, [2017] GSTC 17; Hill v Bundon, at paras 68-80; Alberta Lawyers Insurance Association v Bourque, 2018 ABQB 821 at paras 153-158; Fabrikant v Canada, 2018 FCA 171 at paras 14-15.

[39] Any indicium is a basis for the Court to evaluate whether or not intervention is warranted to control future abusive litigation. The presence of multiple indicia generally favours court intervention: e.g. Chutskoff v Bonora, at paras 131-132; Re Boisjoli, at para 104; Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ABQB 237 at para 158, 54 Alta LR (6th) 135, appeal abandoned, Edmonton 1603-0287AC (Alta CA).

[40] The preferred approach is prospective rather than punitive: 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 42-76; Templanza v Ford, at paras 102-104. When evaluating whether court access limitations are appropriate, a court asks what can be anticipated from a litigant:

... when a court considers limits to future court access by a person with a history of litigation misconduct the key questions for a court are:

1. Can the court determine the identity or type of persons who are likely to be the target of future abusive litigation?

2. What litigation subject or subjects are likely involved in that abuse of court processes?

3. In what forums will that abuse occur?

(Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at para 36)

... Court access restrictions are designed in a functional manner and not restricted to formulaic approaches, but instead respond in a creative, but proportionate, manner to anticipated potential abuse ...

(Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at para 45, referencing Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2)).

[41] Anticipated litigation abuse may be suggested by a person’s litigation history (issues, targets and forums where abuse may be anticipated), however the critical issue is what the court can anticipate. Therefore, statements of intent, motivation, political ideology, and behavioural pathology are also in some instances highly relevant: 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 42-79.

[42] As previously indicated, the usual access limitation placed on an abusive litigant is a requirement that he or she must seek permission - “leave”- prior to initiating a new action or application, or continuing an existing lawsuit. This is a very modest imposition on a problematic litigant: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651 at paras 32-33; Wong v Giannacopoulos, at para 8; Canada v Olumide, at paras 26-29; Bossé v Immeubles Robo Ltée, 2018 CanLII 71340 at para 38 (NBCA).

[43] Courts have in certain instances gone further and ordered additional restrictions on problematic litigants, including:

1. representation by a lawyer as a pre-requisite of submitting a leave application,

2. representation by a lawyer for filing any document,

3. payment of outstanding court costs as a precondition to future litigation steps,

4. requiring payment into court of security for costs,

5. personal appearance of the abusive litigant in court proceedings, and

6. prohibitions on being inside or near court facilities.

[44] The requirement of legal representation has been ordered in instances where a litigant has engaged in a range of misconduct, including:

1. an established pattern of meritless and persistent filings, or improper communications with the courts (Boe v Boe, 2014 BCCA 208, 356 BCAC 217, leave to appeal to SCC denied, 36048 (26 February 2015); Re Boisjoli; Onischuk v Edmonton (City); Onischuk (Re); Re Gauthier; Templanza v Ford; Thompson v Alberta Labour Relations Board, 2018 ABQB 220; Hoessmann v Aldergrove Credit Union, 2018 BCCA 218; Lee v Canada (Attorney General); Hill v Bundon; McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 677; Alberta Lawyers Insurance Assocation v Bourque, 2018 ABQB 821; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 834);

2. attempts to enforce fictional OPCA claims on a target (Re Boisjoli; Re Gauthier; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 834;

3. attempts to use court processes to further criminal activities (Re Boisjoli; McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 677);

4. employing proxies in problematic litigation (Onischuk v Edmonton (City); Re Onischuk);

5. abuse of habeas corpus on more than one occasion (Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General); Re Gauthier; Lee v Canada (Attorney General)), or

6. where an abusive litigant is a “litigation terrorist” who engages in meritless litigation intended to intimidate and/or cause harm (Lee v Canada (Attorney General); McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 677).

[45] When a court contemplates the possibility of court access restrictions in addition to a requirement to obtain leave, that step must also be balanced against the predicted likelihood and the form of bad litigation conduct: Bhamjee v Forsdick & Ors (No 2), at para 35; Ewanchuk v Canada (Attorney General), at para 95; Ayangma v Canada Health Infoway, at para 62. The safety and operation of the Courts may also be relevant: McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 677 at paras 41-51.

IV. Knutson’s Abuse of Court Processes

[46] Knutson’s litigation to date exhibits a broad range of OPCA concepts, as well as other indicia of abusive litigation.

A. OPCA Concepts and Strategies

[47] I have reproduced and described Knutson’s OPCA materials in some detail to provide illustrations of the false concepts he has employed to this point. What follows is an incomplete review of his OPCA strategies, highlighting some of the most egregious misconduct.

1. “Strawman” Theory

[48] First, Knutson’s materials indicates he advocates “Strawman” Theory, which was recently summarized by Rooke ACJ in Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 83-85:

“Strawman” Theory claims an individual has two parts, a physical human being component, and an immaterial but legal double. Pseudolaw gurus use many names to identify the latter, but I will refer to this part by one of its more common names: the “Strawman”. The way one tells these two aspects apart is by the letter case of their name. “Alfred Gerald Potvin” is the human half, while “ALFRED GERALD POTVIN” is the “Strawman”.

“Strawman” Theory claims that human beings are born without a “Strawman”, but that nefarious government actors trick parents into obtaining a birth certificate, and that attaches the “Strawman” to the infant by a contract. In this scheme governments have no authority over humans, but instead must chain their authority through to the human via the “Strawman” and its secret contract.

“Strawman” Theory also often claims that “Strawman” and birth documentation is associated with a bank account or some other form of wealth, and with special techniques that money can be obtained by “A4V” ...

See also Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 110-120; Meads v Meads, at paras 417-446; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2017 ABQB 123 at paras 67-88, [2017] DTC 5024; d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298 at paras 57-70; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 134 at paras 10-17, confirmed 2018 ABQB 399 at paras 25-33.

[49] The “Strawman” scheme is so notoriously bad (“fanciful”, “no rational support”, and “no basis in the law”) that, in Fiander v Mills, at paras 20-21, 40, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal concluded that anyone who even uses the “Strawman” in court is presumed to act in bad faith, and for a “vexatious and abusive” ulterior purpose. A court that encounters the “Strawman” may act pre-emptively to terminate or restrict litigation abuse based on this notoriously false idea. This rule from Fiander v Mills has been subsequently adopted in many Alberta cases, including Re Boisjoli; Gauthier v Starr; Alberta v Greter, 2016 ABQB 293; Pomerleau v Canada (Revenue Agency); Re Gauthier, Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 134, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 288, decision confirmed 2018 ABQB 399; d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 438; Toronto-Dominion Bank v Leadbetter, 2018 ABQB 472, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 611; Alberta Treasury Branches v Hawrysh, 2018 ABQB 475, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 618; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652, litigant declared vexatious 2018 ABQB 834.

[50] Knutson obviously subscribes to “Strawman” Theories. He self identifies the two halves of himself by the usual language. For example, in the document reproduced in Appendix “C”, he is “James-Kenneth: Knutson”, rather than “JAMES KNUTSON™”, which “James” says is the real party to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench debt collection action.

[51] In Court he refused to identify himself as James Knutson, instead, he is “James of the Family Knutson”. His NOUICR also makes these distinctions.

[52] The Affidavit reproduced in Appendix “E” further illustrates Knutson’s spurious belief in the “Strawman”:

I James, a minister of GOD, am making a special limited appearance on behalf of the defendant [JAMES KNUTSON].

[53] He then indicates he believes the letter case of a name has legal significance:

I know the US Printing Style Manual, which explains how to identify a CORPORATION, dictates the use of capital letters.

Knutson continues to indicate he identifies JAMES KNUTSON as some kind of trust. He, the physical man, is its beneficiary.

[54] As was reviewed in Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652, OPCA theories put special significance on birth documentation, often associating it with great value. Knutson makes that claim in the August 1, 2017 Affidavit:

I know that man's laws are to make money for the Corporation of Canada and to pay back the Interest on the money you the 'de facto government' have borrowed in fraud on my behalf from the I.M.F. in the form of my birth bond #, on my Birth Certificate.

[55] This related claim that birth documentation has some extraordinary legal significance was also identified in Fiander v Mills, at paras 21, 37-40, as a separate basis for a court to presume that a litigant conducts themselves in bad faith and with abusive and ulterior objectives, see also d’Abadie v Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298 at paras 68-70; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 91-92.

2. The Three/Five Letters

[56] Knutson has employed template documents from the UK OPCA website Get Out Of Debt Free in the Bank of Nova Scotia and MCAP actions. These are a Three/Five Letters process: Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, at paras 55-73; Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at paras 6-21. Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at para 68 provides a useful overview of this concept:

... Briefly, a Three/Five Letter process uses a series of documents that are sent to a target one after another. Each says that if the target does not respond, or does not respond in an adequate manner, then certain results automatically occur. These “foisted unilateral agreements” ... are all based on a commonplace pseudolaw fallacy, that in contract silence means agreement or consent. [Citation omitted.]

In Knutson’s case, he purports to have eliminated his debts in this manner.

[57] What is particularly problematic is that the exact documents that Knutson used were reproduced in full and rejected in the Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky decision issued by this Court on December 16, 2014, long before Knutson began sending his creditors these documents in 2016. I draw a strong negative inference from Knutson’s using Get Out Of Debt Free materials after this Court issued an explicit finding that these materials were not merely worthless, but abusive.

[58] Further, Associate Chief Justice Rooke in Rothweiler v Payette, 2018 ABQB 288 at para 6-21 concluded that the Three/Five Letters scheme has been rejected in Canadian courts on so many occasions that, like “Strawman” Theory, as a principle of law, whenever a person uses a Three/Five Letters process that action creates the presumption that OPCA litigant is engaged in a vexatious and abusive argument, and does so for an improper and ulterior purpose.

[59] I conclude this rule applies to Knutson as well.

3. Fee Schedules, Copyright in a Personal Name, and Other Threats

[60] As previously indicated, Knutson’s NOUICR includes a “fee schedule”, which purports to unilaterally set penalties or fines for certain activities which are lawful acts, or duties, of government actors. This is yet another category of foisted unilateral agreement.

[61] OPCA fee schedules are a form of intimidation: Meads v Meads, at para 527; Fearn v Canada Customs, at para 199; Bank of Montreal v Rogozinsky, at para 78; Gidda v Hirsch, 2014 BCSC 1286 at para 84; R v Sands, 2013 SKQB 115 at para 18, 416 Sask R 279; R v Boxrud, 2014 SKQB 221 at para 46, 450 Sask R 147; Re Boisjoli, at paras 58-69; Allen Boisjoli Holdings v Papadoptu, 2016 FC 1260; Pomerleau v Canada Revenue Agency, at para 135; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, 2017 ABQB 124 at para 28, 276 ACWS (3d) 847; Gauthier v Starr, 2016 ABQB 213 at para 39, 86 CPC (7th) 348; Re Gauthier, at paras 65-66; Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at paras 79-80. In Potvin (Re), 2018 ABQB 652 at para 80, Rooke ACJ explains:

In law (and simple common sense) a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts ... Intimidation is the natural consequence of Mr. Potvin’s illegal and unreasonable fee schedule demands. I therefore presume Mr. Potvin intended exactly that by using these strategies and issuing bills and a counterclaim on that basis. [Citation omitted.]

[62] I adopt this reasoning, which applies equally to Knutson.

[63] The Get Out Of Debt Free claim by Knutson that anyone who infringes on his purported intellectual property rights is another attempt at illegal intimidation. There is no legal basis for his claim to have “common law copyright” in his name (Meads v Meads, at para 504), and, generally, this concept “... has an overwhelmingly juvenile character.” (Meads v Meads, at para 502). I conclude that threats of this kind are another example of illegitimate OPCA-based intimidation.

[64] Knutson also threatens in his August 1, 2017 Affidavit that unless MCAP accedes to his false OPCA-based demands for a free house and nearly a million dollars he will initiate criminal proceedings through the Criminal Code, ss 504, 507.1 private information process.

[65] All these OPCA intimidation activities are a potential basis for court access restrictions.

4. Fractional Reserve Banking Theories and Promissory Notes are as Good as Cash

[66] Knutson also advances two often intertwined but legally false claims that purport to eliminate debts and provide free money. First, he claims there is no such thing as real money (January 1, 2017 Affidavit, Appendix “C”):

l know that I am an endless creditor and NEVER a debtor from the birth certificate bond, which I claim fiduciary gent of. I know the corporation known as CANADA is in a 70 year bankruptcy cycle; money no longer exists, since the seizure of gold and there is only charge and discharge of credit. I know banknotes are debt instruments; having people pay debt with debt is enslavement! And I will not participate.

[67] This and other related claims concerning the operation of banks relate to a conspiracy theory that fractional reserve banking means that mortgages and other debts are a fraud. This concept has been thoroughly examined and rejected in many Canadian decisions, including Dempsey v Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 750 at paras 27, 39, 151 ACWS (3d) 204; Crossroads-DMD Mortgage Investment Corporation v Gauthier, 2015 ABQB 703 at paras 68-85, 28 Alta LR (6th) 104; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, at paras 51-53.

[68] Knutson in the Bank of Nova Scotia and Capital One Bank actions argues that his providing of a promissory note which promises that he will at some point pay the outstanding debt fully discharges his obligations. This “a promise to pay is payment” promissory note is cash argument is, in any case, ridiculous, since the end result would be nothing more than “a conga line of promissory notes, each purporting to satisfy the debt of the note one step up the cue”: Re Boisjoli, at para 35.

[69] Beyond advancing the fundamentally illogical argument that a promise is a payment, Knutson relies on a quotation of Lord Denning from Fielding & Platt Ltd v Najjar:

We have repeatedly said in this court that a bill of exchange or a Promissory Note is to be treated as cash. It is to be honoured unless there is some good reason to the contrary.

[70] Commonwealth Courts have consistently rejected Fielding & Platt Ltd v Najjar creates a principle that a debtor may discharge his or her obligations by a paper note that is not backed by actual funds: Re Boisjoli, at paras 32-34; Servus Credit Union Ltd v Parlee, 2015 ABQB 700 at paras 65-68, 7 Admin LR (6th) 700; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v McDougald, at paras 35-37; Dove v Legal Aid Ontario, 2018 ONSC 17 at paras 4, 8; Bank of New Zealand v Donaldson, [2016] NZHC 1225 at paras 47-52. The modern approach to payment of debt by a promissory note is set in Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission v Wilson, 2014 SLR 46, [2013] CSIH 95. The Denning rule only applies, and a bill of exchange or promissory note only extinguishes a debt, where the lender has agreed in advance to payment in that manner.

[71] Knutson’s attempts to ‘miracle away’ his debts by worthless promissory notes or claims he never received anything of value from his lenders is a further indication that Knutson is potentially an appropriate subject for court access restrictions.

5. The :FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT Judgment

[72] Knutson’s submitting to this Court and his reliance on the “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision of “Judge :David-Wynn: Miller” warrants special comment. This step is serious litigation misconduct. An attempt to impose a fictional court decision into an Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench process is prima facie contempt of court: Fearn v Canada Customs, at paras 201-210.

[73] That is not the only implication of asserting alleged authority of this kind. Pseudolaw is a kind of self-destructive extremist political ideology that is reinforced in highly introspective, introverted community ‘echo chambers’: Re Gauthier, at para 92. As I observed in 1985 Sawridge Trust v Alberta (Public Trustee), 2017 ABQB 548 at paras 72-73, people who use pseudolaw are motivated by extremist political beliefs and ideologies:

Judicial and legal academic authorities uniformly identify OPCA narratives and their associated pseudolegal concepts as resting on and building from a foundation of paranoid and conspiratorial anti-government and anti-institutional political and social belief. These individuals are sometimes called ‘litigation terrorists’ for this reason. They may act for personal benefit, but they also do so with the belief they are justified and act lawfully when they injure others and disrupt court processes. Persons who advance OPCA litigation to harm others have no place in Canada’s courts. ... Their next target can be anyone who crosses their path - government officials or organizations, peace officers, lawyers, judges, business employees - and who then offends the OPCA litigant’s skewed perspectives.

These individuals believe they have a right to attack others via the courts, they like the idea of doing that, and they view their litigation targets as bad actors who deserve punishment. ...

[74] That makes “summons”, “orders”, and “judgments” of vigilante fake courts purportedly operating under pseudolegal authority a highly problematic phenomenon. Worse, orders and decisions of vigilante courts are a precursor to illegal actions, including extrajurisdictional vigilante actions against government actors. As Tilleman J observed in Fearn v Canada Customs, at paras 201-204:

Another extremely disquieting aspect of certain OPCA movements is a belief that individuals are authorized to take extrajudicial vigilante actions against court actors, including judges. Naturally, these illegal actions are cloaked with some kind of purported though fictitious authority, most commonly as an expression of the “mutant” common law in a jury or court process. Typical language is formation of “common law”, “people’s” or “de jure” posses, juries, and trials. Other times OPCA litigants announce they are forming their own court, on the spot, using their “personal inherent jurisdiction”. A third related scenario is where an OPCA litigant claims that it is notaries who are the true judges or possess some supervisory, judicial authority ...

Othertimes OPCA litigants will threaten judges with sanctions from international courts and tribunals, real or imaginary.

... Freeman-on-the-Land guru Robert Arthur Menard operates a group of self-declared and appointed vigilante “peace officers”, the “Canadian Common Corps Of Peace Officers” (“C3PO”).

[75] The “C3PO” example is not an isolated one. In Alberta a vigilante court which called itself “The Tacit Supreme In Law Court” operated a police force of uniformed “Territorial Marshals”: Donald J Netolitzky, “The History of the Organized Pseudolegal Argument Phenomenon in Canada” (2016) 53(3) Alta L Rev 609 at 628-629. This fictional court claimed to terminate criminal prosecutions of its members.

[76] In Fearn v Canada Customs, at para 205, Justice Tilleman observed escalation to violence by OPCA litigants is a more common phenomenon in the US than in Canada. That is no longer the case.

[77] Recently, a Freeman-on-the-Land, Amos Edwin McKechnie went so far as to in court declare he has the right under his law to kill judges, lawyers, police, corrections and government personnel, and he will kill them, except if they act according to his OPCA-based pseudolegal demands: McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 493; McKechnie (Re), 2018 ABQB 677. McKechnie has been evaluated as a high threat of violence to any non-compliant justice system participant, and is currently detained facing multiple trials.

[78] OPCA Detaxer Ian Bush issued a “summons” from the “High Court of Humanitarian Justice” that demanded former Chief Judge Alban Garon appear at a vigilante court process: R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 2202 at para 110. Chief Judge Garon did not comply. Ian Bush subsequently conducted a home invasion of Chief Judge Garon’s residence, during which Bush hogtied, tortured, and killed by suffocation Chief Judge Garon, his wife, and an unfortunate neighbor who happened to be in the residence when Bush accessed the residence via subterfuge: R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 7426 at para 2; R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 7050 at para 3. This was only one attack in Bush’s broader plan to rob and murder a list of judges, government officials, lawyers, and human rights activists: R v Bush, 2017 ONSC 7627 at paras 9, 29-31.

[79] These are only examples of more violent and dangerous activities by Canadians with OPCA beliefs who exercise what they say is their own authority, or that of vigilante court and police organs: Donald J Netolitzky, “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments [OPCA] in Canada, an Attack on the Legal System” (2016) 10 JPPL 137; Barbara Perry, David C Hofmann & Ryan Scrivens, “Working Paper 17-02: Broadening our Understanding of Anti-Authority Movements in Canada” (Waterloo: TSAS, August 2017). Vigilante court proceedings, orders, and decisions are a dangerous precursor of elevated illegal activity by persons who have adopted pseudolaw: Netolitzky, “Attack on the Legal System” at 186; Stephen A Kent & Robin D Willey, “Sects, Cults, and the Attack on Jurisprudence” (2013) 14 Rutgers’ JL & Religion 306 at 319-329.

[80] In light of these facts I conclude that Knutson deploying a fictional decision of a fraudulent vigilante court is a very serious form of litigation misconduct. That, too, warrants investigation of whether Knutson should be made subject to court access restrictions.

B. Other Indicia of Abusive Litigation

[81] In addition to the many variations on abusive OPCA concepts that Knutson has employed in his litigation, he has also exhibited other litigation misconduct indicia identified in Chutskoff v Bonora and its successor decisions.

[82] I conclude that Knutson’s attempt to re-open the Bank of Nova Scotia Default Judgment is a form of collateral attack. His litigation attempts to frustrate the collection of his debts and foreclosure were hopeless. His appeal in the MCAP action had no prospect of success.

[83] Knutson has also sought impossible or disproportionate remedies, including:

1. $1 million “common law” intellectual property claims on his name, biometric data, and bodily excreta,

2. “four fold” damages “per Luke 19:8”,

3. Charter remedies vs a non-government entity, a bank, and

4. criminal investigation and prosecution in a civil proceeding.

[84] The multiple orders that Knutson vacate the mortgaged residence in the MCAP action indicate he does not follow court instructions. He refused to comply with instructions to cooperate with the realtor hired to conduct the court-ordered sale.

[85] As the passages and documents reproduced from Knutson’s materials indicate he has advanced unmeritorious claims of conspiracy, fraud and improper conduct by institutions and lawyers.

V. Conclusion

[86] My review of Knutson’s litigation has identified multiple OPCA schemes, all of which are an abuse of court processes and the opposing creditor parties. Three of those strategies result in a presumption that he litigates in bad faith. His activities include multiple additional indicia of abusive litigation.

[87] On this basis I conclude this Court, on its own motion and under its inherent jurisdiction, should investigate whether Mr. Knutson should be made subject to court access restrictions. Knutson has 15 days from filing of this decision in the Court’s registry to submit to me written argument and affidavit evidence:

1. as to whether he should be subject to court access restrictions in Alberta Courts, and

2. if so, what form those court access restrictions should take.

[88] This process will be conducted in writing only: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 335 at para 105; Stoney v 1985 Sawridge Trust, 2017 ABQB 436 at paras 60-62, appeal deemed abandoned (3 March 2018), Edmonton 1703-0195AC (Alta CA).

[89] Mr. Knutson is in the interim prohibited from filing any material on any Alberta Court file except for the submissions identified above, and Mr. Knutson may not continue or institute further court proceedings in Alberta without the leave of the Alberta Court in question: Hok v Alberta, 2016 ABQB 335 at para 105, enforced in Hok v Alberta (Justice & Solicitor General), 2016 ABCA 356 at para 7; Bourque v Alberta Lawyers Insurance Association, 2018 ABCA 257 at paras 5-7.

[90] The Court will prepare and file that Interim Court Access Restriction Order. Mr. Knutson’s approval of that Order is not required.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 16th day of October, 2018.

D.R.G. Thomas J.C.Q.B.A.

Appearances:

None





Appendix “A” - September 29, 2016 Correspondence

[Canadian flag graphic] [Annotate Canadian postage stamp]

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

James of the family: Knutson

c/o Non-Domestic

6314 56 Ave.

6314 56 Ave.

Beaumont

AB

T4X OH1

Brian J. Porter

44 King Street West

Toronto, Ontario

MSH 1H1

29th September 2016

Re: Account Numbers: [redacted] / [redacted]

NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL; NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT.

Dear Mr. Porter]

This is a LEGAL NOTICE and not a letter.

Please find the enclosed Promissory Notes (JKKPN0001 JKKPN0002) as payments for the outstanding amounts. Theses payments being an acceptable specie of payment under the The Bills of Exchange Act R.S.C.1985.

However, should you not accept this form of payment, then please return the Promissory

Notes, along with a full written explanation of why your organization is exempt from the legislation as outlined above, or why the Commercial Instrument is unacceptable.

Please note-

If you do not return the Promissory Note1 then we are in agreement that the bill has

been paid in full.

If you do return the Promissory Notes, but without a legitimate written explanation, as to why your organization is exempt from the legislation outlined above or why the Commercial Instrument is unacceptable; then we are in agreement that you have turned down my legal payment and therefore my account balance is now zero for both accounts.

I have always acted in good faith being in contact with Scotiabank and my insurance to pay my minimum payments as I have had no work for a year. It has always been my wish to pay what I lawfully owe. There was no need for you to put a hold on my account that is lawfully mine. You could have simply written me saying that the payment method I had given was not acceptable and I could have found another acceptable means.

It is my wish to have the hold taken off my bank account ([redacted]) effective immediately.

Please confirm my account balances is now zero.

If you do not understand this, please take legal advice.

I trust that this is to your satisfaction and that no further claims will be made against JAMES KNUTSON.

Yours, Without Dishonour, Ill Will or Frivolity. All Rights Reserved. Non Assumpsit.

Errors and Omissions Excepted





Appendix “B” - “Notice of Dishonour”, dated October 7, 2016.

NOTICE OF DISHONOUR October 7th, 2016

ATTENTION Brian Porter

I sent you 2 promissory notes (JKKPN0001 in amount of $16,919.71 for account [redacted], JKKPN0002 in amount of $20,371 .96 for account [redacted]) along with a legal notice on September 29th, 2016 by registered mail for these Scotia bank accounts. It arrived at: 44 King Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M5H 1H1, Scotiabank on October 4th, 2016 at 9:02 am and was signed for by H. Sharaz, which is a suitable method of delivery according to the Bills of Exchange Act 1985.

As outlined in my legal notice I stated if you do not return my promissory notes, then we are in agreement that the bill has been paid in full. If you do return my promissory notes (JKKPN0001, JKKPN0002), but without a legitimate written explanation, as to why your organization is exempt from the legislation outlined in the Bills of Exchange Act or why the Commercial Instruments are unacceptable; then we are in agreement that you have turned down my legal payment according to the Bills of Exchange Act and therefore my account balances are now zero.

You have not objected to this means of payment. This means that you accepted the promissory notes, it is settlement and was delivered according to the Bills of Exchange Act and means that this deal is concluded.

If this DISHONOURING is not rectified within the next 7 days, and my account balances are not confirmed that they are in fact zero. I will take appropriate action according to the Bills of Exchange Act.

Please confirm that my account balances are now zero. I trust that this is to your satisfaction and that no further claims will be made against JAMES KNUTSON.

I received 2 letters from Scotialife Financial for these accounts dated September 28th, 2016, Under Oath of your office by what authority did you cancel the insurance on these accounts to make my minimum payments? By refusing these insurance payments we are in agreement that you have turned down another means of payment for these Scotiabank accounts meaning the balances are now zero.

As previously stated, I recognize that you are limiting and abridging my and my families fundamental rights and freedoms as outlined in the Constitution Act of 1982, also the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognized by the United Nations. If you continue with this course of action then I will require appropriate compensation for the use and enjoyment of my property as outlined in the Constitution Act:

24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.

You have trespass against my personal property.

I require the immediate restoration of my property (account#108190204587).

Yours, Without Dishonour, Ill Will or Frivolity,

by: James of the family: Knutson

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ERRORS AND OMMISSIONS EXCEPTED. NON-

RECOURSE. NON ASSUMPSIT





Appendix “C” - January 1, 2017 Document

[Canadian Flag graphic]:BONDED: [Canadian postage stamp and annotations]

January 1, 2017

I am a man, a soul, a creature of God; equal to every wo/man above ALL corporations, I will not take cognition as a Nom De Guerre and/or any legal fiction with loss of my rights, and submission into slavery. I will not be surety for a corporate fiction that the government has made up with a full loss of rights (legal name or capitis diminutio maxima).

It is my understanding that walking into a courtroom, other than a Common Law court de jure1 is like walking into a foreign vessel in dry dock, which will result in me committing the crime of Trespass and Perjury as soon as I speak. I have the right not to self incriminate and am exercising that right.

The Bank of Nova Scotia cannot show me positive proof that a debt even exists when I asked multiple times for a confirmation of a debt I would have been happy to pay any debt that I lawfully owe.

l know that I am an endless creditor and NEVER a debtor from the birth certificate bond, which I claim fiduciary gent of. I know the corporation known as CANADA is in a 70 year bankruptcy cycle; money no longer exists, since the seizure of gold and there is only charge and discharge of credit. I know banknotes are debt instruments; having people pay debt with debt is enslavement! And I will not participate.

In sponse to The Bank of Nova Scotia statement of claim, court file/docketnumber 1603-214861 Court of Queens Bench of Alberta, Judicial Centre Edmonton.

It is my wish to have this court file DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

For this matter to go further1 it will have to be taken to Common Law Court where a wo /man can bring their claim against me. Which I have every right according to the Constitution Act of 1982, Article 24 (1). I was denied the proper paperwork to turn the court of Queens Bench into a Common Law court de jure, where the magistrate is independent of the tribunal at the John E Brownlee Building in Edmonton, Alberta; further limiting and abridging my fundamental rights and freedoms as a human being.

If either corporation (Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta or Oshry & Company) would like to contract with me, here are my terms and conditions:

1. Payment of Ten (10) Million dollars worth of gold or silver paid up

front, and,

2. You cognize me as an Ambassador of God and,

3. I may decide to change the terms and conditions of the contract without notice and,

4. You must verify the [BAR CULT] fiction-code: NO LAW OR NO FACT SHALL BE TRIED IN COURT.

If you agree with rny terms and conditions, I give you permission to send me a letter and I shall draft this document up.

If the Court of Queens Bench of Alberta continues to go forward with this Quo-Warranto-Complaint of the fraudulent claims against the entity JAMES KNUTSON™, I wi1l seek sanctions.

Enclosure, my Notice of Understanding and Intent AND Claim of Right, which was present into public record back in April of 2016.

Yours, Without Dishonour, Ill Will or Frivolity,

By:

[James-Kenneth: Knutson]

Sovereign ©James of the family: Knutson

Authorized Agent and Representative for JAMES KNUTSON™

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ERRORS AND OMMISSlONS EXCEPTED. NON-RECOURSE, NON-ASSUMPSIT





Appendix “D” - First page of “:FEDERAL-POSTAL-COURT” decision of “FEDERAL-POSTAL-JUDGE : David-Wynn: Miller”.





Appendix “E” - Knutson Affidavit of August 1, 2017

I, James Knutson, of Alberta, SWEAR/AFFIRM AND SAY THAT:

1. I James, a minister of GOD, am making a special limited appearance on behalf of the defendant [JAMES KNUTSON].

2. I know the US Printing Style Manual, which explains how to identify a CORPORATION, dictates the use of capital letters.

3. I am with the knowledge that the Clerk, who is the administrator of the CESTUI QUE TRUST, then appointed you Judge/master as the TRUSTEE for the TRUST and since neither of you can be the BENEFICIARY, that leaves me and therefore you are MY TRUSTEE. So as MY TRUSTEE, I instruct you to discharge this entire matter, with prejudice and award the penalties to be paid to me for this fraud in the amount of four fold (4 x $955,000 purchase price of the house) as per Luke 19:8 which states: (1611 KJV) And Zacheus stood, and said unto the Lord, Behold, Lord, the half of my goods I give to the poor, & if I have taken any thing from any man by false accusations, I restore him foure fold. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of Cestui Que Trust and Cestui Que use definitions from Black's Law Dictionary 2nd Edition.

4. Whereas Canada is founded upon the principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law: Deuteronomy 4:1-2; 12:32; Numbers 15:15. (Ezekiel 33:6-10). I am in good faith, re lying on Her Majesty's duty to be in defence of the faith of the King James Bible in royal style, as such, so all of her agents by an Oath of Allegiance are faithful and bear true allegiance with her in that declared defence of the faith. I hope you will not be prejudice or discriminate against my faith and beliefs because I assure you I will not be the only one offended if you so choose to try and threaten or intimidate me to bow before a de facto Government. Yahuwah tells us to separate ourselves from commerce Matthew states that "No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other'' (Matthew 6:24). Ye cannot serve God and mammon (de facto Government). I assure you that I will not be threatened or intimidated into submission to your false gods because Yahuwah commands me: Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a copy of Oath of Allegiance.

5. I demand my property be returned to me immediately. If denied, I intend to seek charges under private information in your private capacity utilizing some of these sections of the Criminal Code of Canada for my remedy 39(1), 122, 332, 336, 337, 346, 366, 386, 387, 388, 423, 794. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a copy of Criminal Code sections noted above.

6. I cannot emphasize enough that Yahuwah does not want me to bow to a false god, Deuteronomy 4: 1-2. Therefore, I must take a stand in His name as prescribed in His good book the authorized King James Bible, 1611 edition that is to give sanction to her majesty's courts. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a copy of scripture of Gods words of truth and law to be followed by man from the 1611 King James Bible.

7. I believe The law society of this country uses language like the Pharisees of Jesus' time, "Then went the Pharisees, and took counsel how they might entangle him (Jesus) in his talk" (Matthew 22: 15), very similar to the legalese which the Government, Lawyers, and Judges us to confuse and entangle us in our talk.

8. I know that man's laws are to make money for the Corporation of Canada and to pay back the Interest on the money you the 'de facto government' have borrowed in fraud on my behalf from the I.M.F. in the form of my birth bond #, on my Birth Certificate.

9. I served the Court of Queen's Bench, Bishop & McKenzie LLP and RMG in response to a statement of claim with my Notice of Understanding and Intent AND Claim of Right. RMG did not reply and the Court of Queen's Bench and Bishop & McKenzie LLP returned the documents but did not rebut the claims therein, making it a tacit agreement in my opinion. Each was mailed via registered mail. This document is filed as exhibit "A" from my March 7th, 2017 affidavit.

10. I have still not received any evidence that a debt exists for JAMES KNUTSON after repeated attempts to obtain a validation that a debt in deed does exist I am with the knowledge that my signature was an asset for RMG and the actual means to obtain the funds by my wet ink signature on a promissory note.